,,hegel',s ,,lectures ,,on ,,the ,,history ,,of ,,philosophy ,,volume ,,one ,hegel's ,lectures on ,,the ,,history ,,of ,,philosophy ,translated from the ,german by ,e4 ,s4 ,,haldane ,in three volumes ,,volume ,,one ,illustration ,,routledge ,,kegan ,,paul ,,ltd ,broadway ,house1 #fh-gd ,carter ,lane ,london1 ,e4,c4#d ,first published in ,england #ahib by ,kegan ,paul1 ,trench1 ,trbner ,co4 ,ltd ,reprinted #aiee by ,routledge ,kegan ,paul ,ltd ,broadway ,house1 #fh-gd ,carter ,lane ,london1 ,e4,c4#d ,reprinted by lithography in ,great ,britain by ,jarrold and ,sons ,limited1 ,norwich ,,translator',s ,,note ,,it is perhaps unnecessary to say anything respecting the difficulty of making any adequate translation of ,hegel's writings4 ,in the case of the ,history of ,philosophy1 that difficulty is possibly enhanced by the fact that the greater part of the book is put together from the notes of different courses of lectures delivered on the subject at various times4 ,hegel1 as we learn from ,michelet1 in his preface to the first edition of this work1 lectured in all nine times on the ,history of ,philosophy3 first in ,jena in #ahje-ahjf1 then in ,heidelberg in #ahaf-ahag and #ahag-ahah1 and the other six times in ,berlin between the years #ahai and #ahcj4 ,he had begun the tenth course on the subject in #ahca when death cut his labours short4 ,it was only for the first course of lectures--that delivered in ,jena--that ,hegel fully wrote out his lectures2 this was evidently done with the intention of future publication in book form4 ,at ,heidelberg he composed a short abstract of his subject1 giving in a few terse words the main points dealt with in each system of ,philosophy4 ,in the later courses of lectures ,hegel trusted to extempore speaking1 but at the same time made considerable use of the above writings1 the margins of which he annotated with subsequent additions4 ,besides these annotations he left behind him a large number of miscellaneous notes1 which have proved of the greatest value4 ,the present translation is taken from the second and amended edition of the 8,geschichte der ,philosophie10 published in #ahdj4 ,this edition is derived from no one set of lectures in particular1 but carefully prepared by ,michelet--himself one of ,hegel's pupils--from all available sources1 including the notes of students4 ,the ,jena volume is1 however1 made the basis1 as representing the main elements of the subject afterwards to be more fully amplified2 or1 in ,michelet's words1 as the skeleton which was afterwards to be clothed with flesh4 ,i have endeavoured to make this translation as literal as possible consistently with intelligibility1 and have attempted1 so far as might be1 to give the recognized symbols for the words for which we have in ,english no satisfactory equivalents4 8,begriff10 when used in its technical sense1 is translated by 8,notion10 8,idee0 by 8,idea10 as distinguished from the colloquial 8idea02 8,vorstellung0 is usually rendered by 8popular0 or 8ordinary conception40 ,miss ,frances ,h4 ,simson has rendered very valuable assistance in going carefully over most of the proofs of the first volume1 and she is now engaged with me in the translation of the volumes following4 ,e4 ,s4 ,h4 ,,contents ,,page ,,introduction #a ,a4 ,notion of the ,history of ,philosophy #g #a4 ,common ,ideas regarding the ,history of ,philosophy #aj #b4 ,explanatory remarks upon the ,definition of the ,history of ,philosophy #ai #c4 ,results obtained with respect to the ,notion of the ,history of ,philosophy #bi ,b4 ,the ,relation of ,philosophy to other ,departments of ,knowledge #di #a4 ,the ,historical side of this ,connection #ej #b4 ,separation of ,philosophy from other allied departments of ,knowledge #ee #c4 ,commencement of ,philosophy and its ,history #id ,c4 ,division1 ,sources1 and ,method adopted in treating of the ,history of ,philosophy #aja #a4 ,division of the ,history of ,philosophy #aja #b4 ,sources of the ,history of ,philosophy #aaj #c4 ,method of ,treatment adopted #aad ,,oriental ,,philosophy #aag ,a4 ,chinese ,philosophy #aai #a4 ,confucius #abj #b4 ,the ,philosophy of the ,y-king #aba #c4 ,the ,sect of the ,tao-,see #abd ,b4 ,indian ,philosophy #abe #a4 ,the ,sanc'hya ,philosophy of ,capila #abh #b4 ,the ,philosophy of ,gotama and ,canade #ada ,,part ,,one ,,greek ,,philosophy ,introduction #adi ,the ,seven ,sages #aef ,division of the ,subject #afc ,,section ,,one ,,chapter ,i4--,,first ,,period1 ,,first ,,division #aff ,a4 ,the ,ionic ,philosophy #aga #a4 ,thales #aga #b4 ,anaximander #ahe #c4 ,anaximenes #ahi ,b4 ,pythagoras and the ,pythagoreans #aid #a4 ,the ,system of ,numbers #bjh #b4 ,application of the ,system to the ,universe #bbd #c4 ,practical ,philosophy #bce ,c4 ,the ,eleatic ,school #bci #a4 ,xenophanes #bda #b4 ,parmenides #bdi #c4 ,melissus #beg #d4 ,zeno #bfa ,d4 ,heraclitus #bgh #a4 ,the ,logical ,principle #bhb #b4 ,natural ,philosophy #bhe #c4 ,relation of the ,principle to ,consciousness #bic ,e4 ,empedocles1 ,leucippus and ,democritus #bih #a4 ,leucippus and ,democritus #bii a4 ,the ,logical ,principle #cjb b4 ,the ,constitution of the ,world #cjd c4 ,the ,soul #caj #b4 ,empedocles #caj ,f4 ,philosophy of ,anaxagoras #cai #a4 ,the ,universal ,principle #cbi #b4 ,the ,homomeri #ccc #c4 ,the ,relation of the ,two #cci ,,chapter ,,ii4--,,first ,,period1 ,,second ,,division #cej ,a4 ,the ,sophists #ceb #a4 ,protagoras #cgb #b4 ,gorgias #cgh ,b4 ,socrates #chd #a4 ,the ,socratic ,method #cig #b4 ,the ,principle of the ,good #djf #c4 ,the ,fate of ,socrates #dbe ,c4 ,the ,philosophy of the ,socratics #ddh #a4 ,the ,megarics #ded a4 ,euclides #dee b4 ,eubulides #def c4 ,stilpo #dfd #b4 ,the ,cyrenaic ,school #dfi a4 ,aristippus #dgj b4 ,theodoras #dge c4 ,hegesias #dgg d4 ,anniceris #dgh #c4 ,the ,cynic ,school #dgi a4 ,antisthenes #dha b4 ,diogenes #dhd c4 ,later ,cynics #dhf ,,inaugural ,,address ,,delivered ,,at ,,heidelberg ,,on ,,the #bh,,th ,,october1 #ahaf ,,gentlemen1--,since the ,history of ,philosophy is to be the subject of these lectures1 and to-day ,i am making my first appearance in this ,university1 ,i hope you will allow me to say what satisfaction it gives me to take my place once more in an ,academy of ,learning at this particular time4 ,for the period seems to have been arrived at when ,philosophy may again hope to receive some attention and love--this almost dead science may again raise its voice1 and hope that the world which had become deaf to its teaching1 may once more lend it an ear4 ,the necessities of the time have accorded to the petty interests of every-day life such overwhelming attention3 the deep interests of actuality and the strife respecting these have engrossed all the powers and the forces of the mind--as also the necessary means--to so great an extent1 that no place has been left to the higher inward life1 the intellectual operations of a purer sort2 and the better natures have thus been stunted in their growth1 and in great measure sacrificed4 ,because the spirit of the world was thus occupied1 it could not look within and withdraw into itself4 ,but since this stream of actuality is checked1 since the ,german nation has cut its way out of its most material conditions1 since its nationality1 the basis of all higher life1 has been saved1 we may hope that1 in addition to the ,state1 which has swallowed up all other interests in its own1 the ,church may now resume her high position--that in addition to the kingdom of the world to which all thoughts and efforts have hitherto been directed2 the ,kingdom of ,god may also be considered4 ,in other words1 along with the business of politics and the other interests of every-day life1 we may trust that ,science1 the free rational world of mind1 may again flourish4 ,we shall see in the ,history of ,philosophy that in other ,european countries in which the sciences and the cultivation of the understanding have been prosecuted with zeal and with respect1 ,philosophy1 excepting in name1 has sunk even from memory1 and that it is in the ,german nation that it has been retained as a peculiar possession4 ,we have received the higher call of ,nature to be the conservers of this holy flame1 just as the ,eumolpid in ,athens had the conservation of the ,eleusinian mysteries1 the inhabitants of the island of ,samothrace the preservation and maintenance of a higher divine service2 and as1 earlier still1 the ,world-spirit reserved to the ,jewish nation the highest consciousness that it should once more rise from thence as a new spiritual force4 ,we have already got so far1 and have attained to a seriousness so much greater and a consciousness so much deeper1 that for us ideas and that which our reason justifies1 can alone have weight2 to speak more plainly1 the ,prussian ,state is a ,state constituted on principles of intelligence4 ,but the needs of the time and the interests of the events in the world already mentioned1 have repressed a real and earnest effort after ,philosophy and driven hence any general attention to it4 ,it has thus happened that because vigorous natures turned to the practical1 insipidity and dulness appropriated to themselves the preeminence in ,philosophy and flourished there4 ,it may indeed be said that since ,philosophy began to take a place in ,germany1 it has never looked so badly as at the present time--never have emptiness and shallowness overlaid it so completely1 and never have they spoken and acted with such arrogance1 as though all power were in their hands6 ,to combat the shallowness1 to strive with ,german earnestness and honesty1 to draw ,philosophy out of the solitude into which it has wandered--to do such work as this we may hope that we are called by the higher spirit of our time4 ,let us together greet the dawn of a better time in which the spirit1 hitherto a prey to externalities1 may return within itself1 come to itself again1 and win space and room for a kingdom of its own1 where true minds will rise above the interests of the moment1 and obtain the power to receive the true1 eternal and divine1 the power to consider and to grasp the highest4 ,we elders1 who in the storms of the age have ripened into men1 may think you happy whose youth falls in the day in which you may devote the same undisturbed to ,science and to ,truth4 ,i have dedicated my life to ,science1 and it is a true joy to me to find myself again in this place where ,i may1 in a higher measure and more extensive circle1 work with others in the interests of the higher sciences1 and help to direct your way therein4 ,i hope that ,i may succeed in deserving and obtaining your confidence4 ,but in the first place1 ,i can ask nothing of you but to bring with you1 above all1 a trust in science and a trust in yourselves4 ,the love of truth1 faith in the power of mind1 is the first condition in ,philosophy4 ,man1 because he is ,mind1 should and must deem himself worthy of the highest2 he cannot think too highly of the greatness and the power of his mind1 and1 with this belief1 nothing will be so difficult and hard that it will not reveal itself to him4 ,the ,being of the universe1 at first hidden and concealed1 has no power which can offer resistance to the search for knowledge2 it has to lay itself open before the seeker--to set before his eyes and give for his enjoyment1 its riches and its depths4 ,,prefatory ,,note ,,in the ,history of ,philosophy the observation is immediately forced upon us that it certainly presents great interest if its subject is regarded from a favourable point of view1 but that it would still possess interest even if its end were regarded as opposite to what it is4 ,indeed1 this interest may seem to increase in the degree in which the ordinary conception of ,philosophy1 and of the end which its history serves1 is reversed2 for from the ,history of ,philosophy a proof of the futility of the science is mainly derived4 ,the demand that a history1 whatever the subject may be1 should state the facts without prejudice and without any particular object or end to be gained by its means1 must be regarded as a fair one4 ,but with a commonplace demand like this1 we do not get far2 for the history of a subject is necessarily intimately connected with the conception which is formed of it4 ,in accordance with this what is important in it is determined1 and the relation of the events to the end regulates the selection of facts to be recorded1 the mode of comprehending them1 and the point of view under which they are regarded4 ,it may happen from the ideas formed of what a ,state really is1 that a reader of the political history of a country may find therein nothing of what he looks for4 ,still more may this be the case in the history of ,philosophy1 and representations of this history may be instanced in which everything1 excepting what was supposed to be ,philosophy1 appears to be found4 ,in other histories we have a clear conception of their subjects1 at least so far as their principal points are concerned2 we know whether they concern a particular land1 people or race1 or whether their subject is the science of mathematics1 physics1 c41 or an art1 such as painting4 ,the science of ,philosophy has1 however1 this distinguishing feature1 and1 if you will1 this disadvantage as compared with other sciences1 that we find the most varied points of view as regards its ,notion1 and regarding that which it ought to and can accomplish4 ,if this first assumption1 the conception of the subject of the history1 is not established1 the history itself is necessarily made vacillating1 and it only obtains consistency when it sets forth a definite conception3 but then in view of the various ways of regarding its subject1 it easily draws upon itself the reproach of one-sidedness4 ,that drawback relates1 however1 only to an external consideration of this narrative2 there is another and greater disadvantage allied to it4 ,if there are different ,notions of the science of ,philosophy1 it is the true ,notion alone that puts us in a position to understand the writings of philosophers who have worked in the knowledge of it4 ,for in thought1 and particularly in speculative thought1 comprehension means something quite different from understanding the grammatical sense of the words alone1 and also from understanding them in the region of ordinary conception only4 ,hence we may possess a knowledge of the assertions1 propositions1 or of the opinions of philosophers2 we may have occupied ourselves largely with the grounds of and deductions from these opinions1 and the main point in all that we have done may be wanting--the comprehension of the propositions4 ,there is hence no lack of voluminous and even learned histories of ,philosophy in which the knowledge of the matter itself about which so much ado has been made1 is absent4 ,the authors of such histories may be compared to animals which have listened to all the tones in some music1 but to whose senses the unison1 the harmony of their tones1 has not penetrated4 ,the circumstance mentioned makes it in no science so necessary as in the history of ,philosophy to commence with an ,introduction1 and in it correctly to define1 in the first place1 the subject of the history about to be related4 ,for it may be said1 ,how should we begin to treat a subject1 the name of which is certainly mentioned often enough1 but of whose nature we as yet know nothing8 ,in treating the history of ,philosophy thus1 we could have no other guidance than that of seeking out and taking up whatever has received the name of ,philosophy1 anywhere or any time4 ,but in fact1 when the ,notion of ,philosophy is established1 not arbitrarily but in a scientific way1 such treatment becomes the science of ,philosophy itself4 ,for in this science the peculiar characteristic is that its ,notion forms the beginning in appearance merely1 and it is only the whole treatment of the science that is the proof1 and indeed we may say the finding of its ,notion2 and this is really a result of that treatment4 ,in this ,introduction the ,notion of the science of ,philosophy1 of the subject of its history1 has thus likewise to be set forth4 ,at the same time1 though this ,introduction professes to relate to the history of ,philosophy only1 what has just been said of ,philosophy on the whole1 also holds good4 ,what can be said in this ,introduction is not so much something which may be stated beforehand1 as what can be justified or proved in the treatment of the history4 ,these preparatory explanations are for this reason only1 not to be placed in the category of arbitrary assumptions4 ,but to begin with stating what in their justification are really results1 can only have the interest which may be possessed by a summary1 given in advance1 of the most general contents of a science4 ,it must serve to set aside many questions and demands which might1 from our ordinary prejudices1 arise in such a history4 ,,introduction ,,there are various aspects under which the ,history of ,philosophy may possess interest4 ,we shall find the central point of this interest in the essential connection existing between what is apparently past and the present stage reached by ,philosophy4 ,that this connection is not one of the external considerations which may be taken into account in the history of ,philosophy1 but really expresses its inner character3 that the events of this history1 while they perpetuate themselves in their effects like all other events1 yet produce their results in a special way--this it is which is here to be more clearly expounded4 ,what the history of ,philosophy shows us is a succession of noble minds1 a gallery of heroes of thought1 who1 by the power of ,reason1 have penetrated into the being of things1 of nature and of spirit1 into the ,being of ,god1 and have won for us by their labours the highest treasure1 the treasure of reasoned knowledge4 ,the events and actions of this history are therefore such that personality and individual character do not enter to any large degree into its content and matter4 ,in this respect the history of ,philosophy contrasts with political history1 in which the individual1 according to the peculiarity of his disposition1 talents1 affections1 the strength or weakness of his character1 and in general1 according to that through which he is this individual1 is the subject of actions and events4 ,in ,philosophy1 the less deserts and merits are accorded to the particular individual1 the better is the history2 and the more it deals with thought as free1 with the universal character of man as man1 the more this thought1 which is devoid of special characteristic1 is itself shown to be the producing subject4 ,the acts of thought appear at first to be a matter of history1 and1 therefore1 things of the past1 and outside our real existence4 ,but in reality we are what we are through history3 or1 more accurately1 as in the history of ,thought1 what has passed away is only one side1 so in the present1 what we have as a permanent possession is essentially bound up with our place in history4 ,the possession of self-conscious reason1 which belongs to us of the present world1 did not arise suddenly1 nor did it grow only from the soil of the present4 ,this possession must be regarded as previously present1 as an inheritance1 and as the result of labour--the labour of all past generations of men4 ,just as the arts of outward life1 the accumulated skill and invention1 the customs and arrangements of social and political life1 are the result of the thought1 care1 and needs1 of the want and the misery1 of the ingenuity1 the plans and achievements of those who preceded us in history1 so1 likewise1 in science1 and specially in ,philosophy1 do we owe what we are to the tradition which1 as ,herder has put it1#a like a holy chain1 runs through all that was transient1 and has therefore passed away4 ,thus has been preserved and transmitted to us what antiquity produced4 ,but this tradition is not only a stewardess who simply guards faithfully that which she has received1 and thus delivers it unchanged to posterity1 just as the course of nature in the infinite change and activity of its forms ever remains constant to its original laws and makes no step in advance4 ,such tradition is no motionless statue1 but is alive1 and swells like a mighty river1 which increases in size the further it advances from its source4 ,the content of this tradition is that which the intellectual world has brought forth1 and the universal ,mind does not remain stationary4 ,but it is just the universal ,mind with which we have to do4 ,it may certainly be the case with a single nation that its culture1 art1 science--its intellectual activities as a whole--are at a standstill4 ,this appears1 perhaps1 to be the case with the ,chinese1 for example1 who may have been as far advanced in every respect two thousand years ago as now4 ,but the world-spirit does not sink into this rest of indifference2 this follows from its very nature1 for its activity is its life4 ,this activity presupposes a material already present1 on which it acts1 and which it does not merely augment by the addition1 of new matter1 but completely fashions and transforms4 ,thus that which each generation has produced in science and in intellectual activity1 is an heirloom to which all the past generations have added their savings1 a temple in which all races of men thankfully and cheerfully deposit that which rendered aid to them through life1 and which they had won from the depths of ,nature and of ,mind4 ,to receive this inheritance is also to enter upon its use4 ,it constitutes the soul of each successive generation1 the intellectual substance of the time2 its principles1 prejudices1 and possessions2 and this legacy is degraded to a material which becomes metamorphosed by ,mind4 ,in this manner that which is received is changed1 and the material worked upon is both enriched and preserved at the same time4 ,this is the function of our own and of every age3 to grasp the knowledge which is already existing1 to make it our own1 and in so doing to develop it still further and to raise it to a higher level4 ,in thus appropriating it to ourselves we make it into something different from what it was before4 ,on the presupposition of an already existing intellectual world which is transformed in our appropriation of it1 depends the fact that ,philosophy can only arise in connection with previous ,philosophy1 from which of necessity it has arisen4 ,the course of history does not show us the ,becoming of things foreign to us1 but the ,becoming of ourselves and of our own knowledge4 ,the ideas and questions which may be present to our mind regarding the character and ends of the history of ,philosophy1 depend on the nature of the relationship here given4 ,in this lies the explanation of the fact that the study of the history of ,philosophy is an introduction to ,philosophy itself4 ,the guiding principles for the formation of this history are given in this fact1 the further discussion of which must thus be the main object of this introduction4 ,we must also1 however1 keep in mind1 as being of fundamental importance1 the conception of the aim of ,philosophy4 ,and since1 as already mentioned1 the systematic exposition of this conception cannot here find a place1 such discussion as we can now undertake1 can only propose to deal with the subject provisionally and not to give a thorough and conclusive account of the nature of the ,becoming of ,philosophy4 ,this ,becoming is not merely a passive movement1 as we suppose movements such as those of the sun and moon to be4 ,it is no mere movement in the unresisting medium of space and time4 ,what we must represent to ourselves is the activity of free thought2 we have to present the history of the world of thought as it has arisen and produced itself4 ,there is an old tradition that it is the faculty of thought which separates men from beasts2 and to this tradition we shall adhere4 ,in accordance with this1 what man has1 as being nobler than a beast1 he has through thinking4 ,everything which is human1 however it may appear1 is so only because the thought contained in it works and has worked4 ,but thought1 although it is thus the essential1 substantial1 and effectual1 has many other elements4 ,we must1 however1 consider it best when ,thought does not pursue anything else1 but is occupied only with itself--with what is noblest--when it has sought and found itself4 ,the history which we have before us is the history of ,thought finding itself1 and it is the case with ,thought that it only finds itself in producing itself2 indeed1 that it only exists and is actual in finding itself4 ,these productions are the philosophic systems2 and the series of discoveries on which ,thought sets out in order to discover itself1 forms a work which has lasted twenty-five hundred years4 ,if the ,thought which is essentially ,thought1 is in and for itself and eternal1 and that which is true is contained in ,thought alone1 how1 then1 does this intellectual world come to have a history8 ,in history what appears is transient1 has disappeared in the night of the past and is no more4 ,but true1 necessary thought--and it is only with such that we have to do--is capable of no change4 ,the question here raised constitutes one of those matters first to be brought under our consideration4 ,but in the second place1 there are also many most important things outside of ,philosophy1 which are yet the work of ,thought1 and which are left unconsidered4 ,such are ,religion1 ,political ,history1 forms of ,government1 and the ,arts and ,sciences4 ,the question arises as to how these operations differ from the subject of consideration1 and how they are related in history8 ,as regards these two points of view1 it is desirable to show in what sense the history of ,philosophy is here taken1 in order to see clearly what we are about4 ,moreover1 in the third place1 we must first take a general survey before we descend to particulars1 else the whole is not seen for the mere details--the wood is not seen for the trees1 nor ,philosophy for mere philosophies4 ,we require to have a general idea of the nature and aim of the whole in order to know what to look for4 ,just as we first desire to obtain a general idea of a country1 which we should no longer see in going into detail1 so we desire to see the relation which single philosophies bear to the whole2 for in reality1 the high value of the detail lies in its relation to the whole4 ,this is nowhere more the case than with ,philosophy1 and also with its history4 ,in the case of a history1 indeed1 the establishment of the ,universal seems to be less needful than in that of one of the sciences proper4 ,for history seems at first to be a succession of chance events1 in which each fact stands isolated by itself1 which has ,time alone as a connecting-link4 ,but even in political history we are not satisfied with this4 ,we see1 or at least divine in it1 that essential connection in which the individual events have their place and relation to an end or aim1 and in this way obtain significance4 ,for the significant in history is such only through its relation to and connection with a ,universal4 ,to perceive this ,universal is thus to apprehend the significance4 ,there are1 therefore1 the following points with which ,i wish to deal in this introduction4 ,the first of these will be to investigate the character of the history of ,philosophy1 its significance1 its nature1 and its aim1 from which will follow inferences as to its treatment4 ,in particular1 we shall get an insight into the relation of the history of ,philosophy to the science of ,philosophy1 and this will be the most interesting point of all4 ,that is to say1 this history represents1 not merely the external1 accidental1 events contained within it1 but it shows how the content1 or that which appears to belong to mere history1 really belongs to the science of ,philosophy4 ,the history of ,philosophy is itself scientific1 and thus essentially becomes the science of ,philosophy4 ,in the second place1 the ,notion of ,philosophy must be more adequately determined1 and from it must be deduced what should be excluded from the history of ,philosophy out of the infinite material and the manifold aspects of the intellectual culture of the nations4 ,religion1 certainly1 and the thoughts contained in and regarding it1 particularly when these are in the form of mythology1 are1 on account of their matter1 and the sciences with their ideas on the state1 duties and laws1 on account of their form1 so near ,philosophy that the history of the science of ,philosophy threatens to become quite indefinite in extent4 ,it might be supposed that the history of ,philosophy should take account of all these ideas4 ,has not everything been called ,philosophy and philosophizing8 ,on the one hand1 the close connection has to be further considered in which ,philosophy stands with its allied subjects1 religion1 art1 the other sciences1 and likewise with political history4 ,on the other hand1 when the province of ,philosophy has been correctly defined1 we reach1 with the determination of what ,philosophy is and what pertains to it1 the starting-point of its history1 which must be distinguished from the commencements of religious ideas and mere thoughtful conjectures4 ,from the idea of the subject which is contained in these first two points of view1 it is necessary to pass on to the consideration of the third point1 to the general review of this history and to the division of its progress into natural periods--such an arrangement to exhibit it as an organic1 progressive whole1 as a rational connection through which this history attains the dignity of a science4 ,and ,i will not occupy further space with reflections on the use of the history of ,philosophy1 and other methods of treating it4 ,the use is evident4 ,but1 in conclusion1 ,i wish to consider the sources of the history of ,philosophy1 for this is customary4 ,a ,,the ,,notion ,,of ,,the ,,history ,,of ,,philosophy4 ,,the thought which may first occur to us in the history of ,philosophy1 is that the subject itself contains an inner contradiction4 ,for ,philosophy aims at understanding what is unchangeable1 eternal1 in and for itself3 its end is ,truth4 ,but history tells us of that which has at one time existed1 at another time has vanished1 having been expelled by something else4 ,truth is eternal2 it does not fall within the sphere of the transient1 and has no history4 ,but if it has a history1 and as this history is only the representation of a succession of past forms of knowledge1 the truth is not to be found in it1 for the truth cannot be what has passed away4 ,it might be said that all this argument would affect not only the other sciences1 but in like degree the ,christian religion1 and it might be found inconsistent that a history of this religion and of the other sciences should exist2 but it would be superfluous further to examine this argument1 for it is immediately contradicted by the very fact that there are such histories4 ,but in order to get a better understanding of this apparent contradiction1 we must distinguish between the outward history of a religion or a science and the history of the subject itself4 ,and then we must take into account that the history of ,philosophy because of the special nature of its subject-matter1 is different from other histories4 ,it is at once evident that the contradiction in question could not refer to the outward history1 but merely to the inward1 or that of the content itself4 ,there is a history of the spread of ,christianity and of the lives of those who have avowed it1 and its existence has formed itself into that of a ,church4 ,this in itself constitutes an external existence such that being brought into contact with temporal affairs of the most diverse kind1 its lot is a varied one and it essentially possesses a history4 ,and of the ,christian doctrine it is true that it1 too1 has its history1 but it necessarily soon reached its full development and attained to its appointed powers4 ,and this old creed has been an acknowledged influence to every age1 and will still be acknowledged unchanged as the ,truth1 even though this acknowledgment were become no more than a pretence1 and the words an empty form4 ,but the history of this doctrine in its wider sense includes two elements3 first the various additions to and deviations from the truth formerly established1 and secondly the combating of these errors1 the purification of the principles that remain from such additions1 and a consequent return to their first simplicity4 ,the other sciences1 including ,philosophy1 have also an external history like ,religion4 ,philosophy has a history of its origin1 diffusion1 maturity1 decay1 revival2 a history of its teachers1 promoters1 and of its opponents--often1 too1 of an outward relation to religion and occasionally to the ,state4 ,this side of its history likewise gives occasion to interesting questions4 ,amongst other such1 it is asked why ,philosophy1 the doctrine of absolute ,truth1 seems to have revealed itself on the whole to a small number of individuals1 to special nations1 and how it has limited itself to particular periods of time4 ,similarly with respect to ,christianity1 to the ,truth in a much more universal form than the philosophical1 a difficulty has been encountered in respect to the question whether there is a contradiction in the fact that this religion should have appeared so late in time1 and that it should have remained so long and should still remain limited to special races of men4 ,but these and other similar questions are too much a matter of detail to depend merely on the general conflict referred to1 and when we have further touched upon the peculiar character of philosophic knowledge1 we may go more specially into the aspects which relate to the external existence and external history of ,philosophy4 ,but as regards the comparison between the history of ,religion and that of ,philosophy as to inner content1 there is not in the latter as there is in ,religion a fixed and fundamental truth which1 as unchangeable1 is apart from history4 ,the content of ,christianity1 which is ,truth1 has1 however1 remained unaltered as such1 and has therefore little history or as good as none4#b ,hence in ,religion1 on account of its very nature as ,christianity1 the conflict referred to disappears4 ,the errors and additions constitute no difficulty4 ,they are transitory and altogether historical in character4 ,the other sciences1 indeed1 have also according to their content a ,history1 a part of which relates to alterations1 and the renunciation of tenets which were formerly current4 ,but a great1 perhaps the greater1 part of the history relates to what has proved permanent1 so that what was new1 was not an alteration on earlier acquisitions1 but an addition to them4 ,these sciences progress through a process of juxtaposition4 ,it is true that in ,botany1 ,mineralogy1 and so on1 much is dependent on what was previously known1 but by far the greatest part remains stationary and by means of fresh matter is merely added to without itself being affected by the addition4 ,with a science like ,mathematics1 history has1 in the main1 only the pleasing task of recording further additions4 ,thus to take an example1 elementary geometry in so far as it was created by ,euclid1 may from his time on be regarded as having no further history4 ,the history of ,philosophy1 on the other hand1 shows neither the motionlessness of a complete1 simple content1 nor altogether the onward movement of a peaceful addition of new treasures to those already acquired4 ,it seems merely to afford the spectacle of ever-recurring changes in the whole1 such as finally are no longer even connected by a common aim4 #a4 ,,common ,,ideas ,,regarding ,,the ,,history ,,of ,,philosophy4 ,at this point appear these ordinary superficial ideas regarding the history of ,philosophy which have to be referred to and corrected4 ,as regards these very current views1 which are doubtless known to you1 gentlemen1 for indeed they are the reflections most likely to occur in one's first crude thoughts on a history of ,philosophy1 ,i will shortly explain what requires explanation1 and the explanation of the differences in philosophies will lead us further into the matter itself4 a4 ,the ,history of ,philosophy as an accumulation of ,opinions4 ,history1 at the first glance1 includes in its aim the narration of the accidental circumstances of times1 of races1 and of individuals1 treated impartially partly as regards their relation in time1 and partly as to their content4 ,the appearance of contingency in time-succession is to be dealt with later on4 ,it is contingency of content which is the idea with which we have first to deal--the idea of contingent actions4 ,but thoughts and not external actions1 or griefs1 or joys1 form the content of ,philosophy4 ,contingent thoughts1 however1 are nothing but opinions1 and philosophical opinions are opinions relating to the more special content of ,philosophy1 regarding ,god1 ,nature and ,spirit4 ,thus we now meet the view very usually taken of the history of ,philosophy which ascribes to it the narration of a number of philosophical opinions as they have arisen and manifested themselves in time4 ,this kind of matter is in courtesy called opinions2 those who think themselves more capable of judging rightly1 call such a history a display of senseless follies1 or at least of errors made by men engrossed in thought and in mere ideas4 ,this view is not only held by those who recognize their ignorance of ,philosophy4 ,those who do this1 acknowledge it1 because that ignorance is1 in common estimation1 held to be no obstacle to giving judgment upon what has to do with the subject2 for it is thought that anybody can form a judgment on its character and value without any comprehension1 of it whatever4 ,but the same view is even held by those who write or have written on the history of ,philosophy4 ,this history1 considered only as the enumeration of various opinions1 thus becomes an idle tale1 or1 if you will1 an erudite investigation4 ,for erudition is1 in the main1 acquaintance with a number of useless things1 that is to say1 with that which has no intrinsic interest or value further than being known4 ,yet it is thought that profit is to be derived from learning the various opinions and reflections of other men4 ,it stimulates the powers of thought and also leads to many excellent reflections2 this signifies that now and then it occasions an idea1 and its art thus consists in the spinning one opinion out of the other4 ,if the history of ,philosophy merely represented various opinions in array1 whether they be of ,god or of natural and spiritual things existent1 it would be a most superfluous and tiresome science1 no matter what advantage might be brought forward as derived from such thought-activity and learning4 ,what can be more useless than to learn a string of bald opinions1 and what more unimportant8 ,literary works1 being histories of ,philosophy in the sense that they produce and treat the ideas of ,philosophy as if they were opinions1 need be only superficially glanced at to find how dry and destitute of interest everything about them is4 ,an opinion is a subjective conception1 an uncontrolled thought1 an idea which may occur to me in one direction or in another3 an opinion is mine1#c it is in itself a universal thought which is existent in and for itself4 ,but ,philosophy possesses no opinions1 for there is no such thing as philosophical opinions4 ,when we hear a man speaking of philosophical opinions1 even though he be an historian of philosophy itself1 we detect at once this want of fundamental education4 ,philosophy is the objective science of truth1 it is science of necessity1 conceiving knowledge1 and neither opinion nor the spinning out of opinions4 ,the more precise significance of this idea is that we get to know opinions only1 thus laying emphasis upon the word ,opinion4 ,now the direct opposite of opinion is the ,truth2 it is ,truth before which mere opinion pales4 ,those who in the history of ,philosophy seek mere theories1 or who suppose that on the whole only such are to be found within it1 also turn aside when that word ,truth confronts them4 ,philosophy here encounters opposition from two different sides4 ,on the one hand piety openly declares ,reason or ,thought to be incapable of apprehending what is true1 and to lead only to the abyss of doubt2 it declares that independent thought must be renounced1 and reason held in bounds by faith in blind authority1 if ,truth is to be reached4 ,of the relation existing between ,religion and ,philosophy and of its history1 we shall deal later on4 ,on the other hand1 it is known just as well1 that so-called reason has maintained its rights1 abandoning faith in mere authority1 and has endeavoured to make ,christianity rational1 so that throughout it is only my personal insight and conviction which obliges me to make any admissions4 ,but this affirmation of the right of reason is turned round in an astonishing manner1 so that it results in making knowledge of the truth through reason an impossibility4 ,this so-called reason on the one hand has combated religious faith in the name and power of thinking reason1 and at the same time it has itself turned against reason and is true reason's adversary4 ,instinct and feeling are maintained by it against the true reason1 thus making the measure of true value the merely subjective--that is a particular conviction such as each can form in and for himself in his subjective capacity4 ,a personal conviction such as this is no more than the particular opinion that has become final for men4 ,if we begin with what meets us in our very first conceptions1 we cannot neglect to make mention of this aspect in the history of ,philosophy4 ,in its results it permeates culture generally1 being at once the misconception and true sign of our times4 ,it is the principle through which men mutually understand and know each other2 an hypothesis whose value is established and which is the ground of all the other sciences4 ,in theology it is not so much the creed of the church that passes for ,christianity1 as that every one to a greater or less degree makes a ,christianity of his own to tally with his conviction4 ,and in history we often see theology driven into acquiring the knowledge of various opinions in order that an interest may thus be furnished to the science1 and one of the first results of the attention paid them is the honour awarded to all convictions1 and the esteem vouchsafed to what has been constituted merely by the individual4 ,the endeavour to know the ,truth is then of course relinquished4 ,it is true that personal conviction is the ultimate and absolute essential which reason and its philosophy1 from a subjective point of view1 demand in knowledge4 ,but there is a distinction between conviction when it rests on subjective grounds such as feelings1 speculations and perceptions1 or1 speaking generally1 on the particular nature of the subject1 and when it rests on thought proceeding from acquaintance with the ,notion and the nature of the thing4 ,in the former case conviction is opinion4 ,this opposition between mere opinion and truth now sharply defined1 we already recognize in the culture of the period of ,socrates and ,plato--a period of corruption in ,greek life--as the ,platonic opposition between opinion and ,science 4 ,it is the same opposition as that which existed in the decadence of ,roman public and political life under ,augustus1 and subsequently when ,epicureanism and indifference set themselves up against ,philosophy4 ,under this influence1 when ,christ said1 8,i came into the world that ,i should bear witness unto the ,truth10 ,pilate answered1 8,what is ,truth80 ,that was said in a superior way1 and signifies that this idea of truth is an expedient which is obsolete3 we have got further1 we know that there is no longer any question about knowing the ,truth1 seeing that we have gone beyond it4 ,who makes this statement has gone beyond it indeed4 ,if this is made our starting point in the history of ,philosophy1 its whole significance will consist in finding out the particular ideas of others1 each one of which is different from the other3 these individual points of view are thus foreign to me3 my thinking reason is not free1 nor is it present in them3 for me they are but extraneous1 dead historic matter1 or so much empty content1 and to satisfy oneself with empty vanity is mere subjective vanity itself4 ,to the impartial man1 the ,truth has always been a heart-stirring word and one of great import4 ,as to the assertion that the ,truth cannot be known1 we shall consider it more closely in the history of ,philosophy itself where it appears4 ,the only thing to be here remarked is that if this assumption be allowed1 as was the case with ,tennemann1 it is beyond conception why anyone should still trouble about ,philosophy1 since each opinion asserts falsely in its turn that it has found the truth4 ,this immediately recalls to me the old belief that ,truth consists in knowledge1 but that an individual only knows the ,truth in so far as he reflects and not as he walks and stands3 and that the ,truth cannot be known in immediate apprehension and perception1 whether it be external and sensuous1 or whether it be intellectual perception 7for every perception as a perception is sensuous7 but only through the labour of thought4 b4 ,proof of the futility of ,philosophical ,knowledge obtained through the ,history of ,philosophy itself4 ,from another point of view another consequence ensues from the above conception of the history of ,philosophy which may at will be looked at as an evil or a benefit4 ,in view of such manifold opinions and philosophical systems so numerous1 one is perplexed to know which one ought to be accepted4 ,in regard to the great matters to which man is attracted and a knowledge of which ,philosophy would bestow1 it is evident that the greatest minds have erred1 because they have been contradicted by others4 8,since this has been so with minds so great1 how then can ego homuncio attempt to form a judgment80 ,this consequence1 which ensues from the diversity in philosophical systems1 is1 as may be supposed1 the evil in the matter1 while at the same time it is a subjective good4 ,for this diversity is the usual plea urged by those who1 with an air of knowledge1 wish to make a show of interest in ,philosophy1 to explain the fact that they1 with this pretence of good-will1 and1 indeed1 with added motive for working at the science1 do in fact utterly neglect it4 ,but this diversity in philosophical systems is far from being merely an evasive plea4 ,it has far more weight as a genuine serious ground of argument against the zeal which ,philosophy requires4 ,it justifies its neglect and demonstrates conclusively the powerlessness of the endeavour to attain to philosophic knowledge of the truth4 ,when it is admitted that ,philosophy ought to be a real science1 and one ,philosophy must certainly be the true1 the question arises as to which ,philosophy it is1 and when it can be known4 ,each one asserts its genuineness1 each even gives different signs and tokens by which the ,truth can be discovered2 sober reflective thought must therefore hesitate to give its judgment4 ,this1 then1 is the wider interest which the history of ,philosophy is said to afford4 ,cicero 7,de natura ,deorum ,i4 #h sq47 gives us from this point of view1 a most slovenly history of philosophic thought on ,god4 ,he puts it in the mouth of an ,epicurean1 but he himself knew of nothing more favourable to say1 and it is thus his own view4 ,the ,epicurean says that no certain knowledge has been arrived at4 ,the proof that the efforts of philosophy are futile is derived directly from the usual superficial view taken of its history2 the results attendant on that history make it appear to be a process in which the most various thoughts arise in numerous philosophies1 each of which opposes1 contradicts and refutes the other4 ,this fact1 which cannot be denied1 seems to contain the justification1 indeed the necessity for applying to ,philosophy the words of ,christ1 8,let the dead bury their dead2 arise1 and follow ,me40 ,the whole of the history of ,philosophy becomes a battlefield covered with the bones of the dead2 it is a kingdom not merely formed of dead and lifeless individuals1 but of refuted and spiritually dead systems1 since each has killed and buried the other4 ,instead of 8,follow thou ,me10 here then it must indeed be said1 8,follow thine own self0--that is1 hold by thine own convictions1 remain steadfast to thine own opinion1 why adopt another8 ,it certainly happens that a new philosophy makes its appearance1 which maintains the others to be valueless2 and indeed each one in turn comes forth at first with the pretext that by its means all previous philosophies not only are refuted1 but what in them is wanting is supplied1 and now at length the right one is discovered4 ,but following upon what has gone before1 it would rather seem that other words of ,scripture are just as applicable to such a philosophy--the words which the ,apostle ,peter spoke to ,ananias1 8,behold the feet of them that shall carry thee out are at the door40 ,behold the philosophy by which thine own will be refuted and displaced shall not tarry long as it has not tarried before4 c4 ,explanatory remarks on the diversity in ,philosophies4 ,certainly the fact is sufficiently well established that there are and have been different philosophies4 ,the ,truth is1 however1 one2 and the instinct of reason maintains this irradicable intuition or belief4 ,it is said that only one philosophy can be true1 and1 because philosophies are different1 it is concluded that all others must be erroneous4 ,but1 in fact1 each one in turn gives every assurance1 evidence and proof of being the one and true ,philosophy4 ,this is a common mode of reasoning and is what seems in truth to be the view of sober thought4 ,as regards the sober nature of the word at issue--thought--we can tell from every-day experience that if we fast we feel hunger either at once or very soon4 ,but sober thought always has the fortunate power of not resulting in hunger and desire1 but of being and remaining as it is1 content4 ,hence the thought expressed in such an utterance reveals the fact that it is dead understanding2 for it is only death which fasts and yet rests satisfied4 ,but neither physical life nor intellectual remains content with mere abstention2 as desire it presses on through hunger and through thirst towards ,truth1 towards knowledge itself4 ,it presses on to satisfy this desire and does not allow itself to feast and find sufficiency in a reflection such as this4 ,as to this reflection1 the next thing to be said of it is that however different the philosophies have been1 they had a common bond in that they were ,philosophy4 ,thus whoever may have studied or become acquainted with a philosophy1 of whatever kind1 provided only that it is such1 has thereby become acquainted with ,philosophy4 ,that delusive mode of reasoning which regards diversity alone1 and from doubt of or aversion to the particular form in which a ,universal finds its actuality1 will not grasp or even allow this universal nature1 ,i have elsewhere#d likened to an invalid recommended by the doctor to eat fruit1 and who has cherries1 plums or grapes1 before him1 but who pedantically refuses to take anything because no part of what is offered him is fruit1 some of it being cherries1 and the rest plums or grapes4 ,but it is really important to have a deeper insight into the bearings of this diversity in the systems of ,philosophy4 ,truth and ,philosophy known philosophically1 make such diversity appear in another light from that of abstract opposition between ,truth and ,error4 ,the explanation of how this comes about will reveal to us the significance of the whole history of ,philosophy4 ,we must make the fact conceivable1 that the diversity and number of philosophies not only does not prejudice ,philosophy itself1 that is to say the possibility of a philosophy1 but that such diversity is1 and has been1 absolutely necessary to the existence of a science of ,philosophy and that it is essential to it4 ,this makes it easy to us to comprehend the aim of ,philosophy1 which is in thought and in conception to grasp the ,truth1 and not merely to discover that nothing can be known1 or that at least temporal1 finite truth1 which also is an untruth1 can alone be known and not the ,truth indeed4 ,further we find that in the history of ,philosophy we have to deal with ,philosophy itself4 ,the facts within that history are not adventures and contain no more romance than does the history of the world4 ,they are not a mere collection of chance events1 of expeditions of wandering knights1 each going about fighting1 struggling purposelessly1 leaving no results to show for all his efforts4 ,nor is it so that one thing has been thought out here1 another there1 at will2 in the activity of thinking mind there is real connection1 and what there takes place is rational4 ,it is with this belief in the spirit of the world that we must proceed to history1 and in particular to the history of ,philosophy4 #b4 ,,explanatory ,,remarks ,,upon ,,the ,,definition ,,of ,,the ,,history ,,of ,,philosophy4 ,the above statement1 that the ,truth is only one1 is still abstract and formal4 ,in the deeper sense it is our starting point4 ,but the aim of ,philosophy is to know this one ,truth as the immediate source from which all else proceeds1 both all the laws of nature and all the manifestations of life and consciousness of which they are mere reflections1 or to lead these laws and manifestations in ways apparently contrary1 back to that single source1 and from that source to comprehend them1 which is to understand their derivation4 ,thus what is most essential is to know that the single truth is not merely a solitary1 empty thought1 but one determined within itself4 ,to obtain this knowledge we must enter into some abstract ,notions which1 as such1 are quite general and dry1 and which are the two principles of ,development and of the ,concrete4 ,we could1 indeed1 embrace the whole in the single principle of development2 if this were clear1 all else would result and follow of its own accord4 ,the product of thinking is the thought2 thought is1 however1 still formal2 somewhat more defined it becomes ,notion1 and finally ,idea is ,thought in its totality1 implicitly and explicitly determined4 ,thus the ,idea1 and it alone is ,truth4 ,now it is essentially in the nature of the ,idea to develop1 and only through development to arrive at comprehension of itself1 or to become what it is4 ,that the ,idea should have to make itself what it is1 seems like a contradiction2 it may be said that it is what it is4 a4 ,the ,notion of ,development4 ,the idea of development is well known1 but it is the special characteristic of ,philosophy to investigate such matters as were formerly held as known4 ,what is dealt with or made use of without consideration as an aid to daily life1 is certainly the unknown to man unless he be informed in ,philosophy4 ,the further discussion of this idea belongs to the science of ,logic4 ,in order to comprehend what development is1 what may be called two different states must be distinguished4 ,the first is what is known as capacity1 power1 what ,i call being-in-itself 7potentia1 72 the second principle is that of being-for-itself1 actuality 7actus1 74 ,if we say1 for example1 that man is by nature rational1 we would mean that he has reason only inherently or in embryo3 in this sense1 reason1 understanding1 imagination1 will1 are possessed from birth or even from the mother's womb4 ,but while the child only has capacities or the actual possibility of reason1 it is just the same as if he had no reason2 reason does not yet exist in him since he cannot yet do anything rational1 and has no rational consciousness4 ,thus what man is at first implicitly becomes explicit1 and it is the same with reason4 ,if1 then1 man has actuality on whatever side1 he is actually rational2 and now we come to reason4 ,what is the real meaning of this word8 ,that which is in itself must become an object to mankind1 must arrive at consciousness1 thus becoming for man4 ,what has become an object to him is the same as what he is in himself2 through the becoming objective of this implicit being1 man first becomes for himself2 he is made double1 is retained and not changed into another4 ,for example1 man is thinking1 and thus he thinks out thoughts4 ,in this way it is in thought alone that thought is object2 reason produces what is rational3 reason is its own object4 ,the fact that thought may also descend to what is destitute of reason is a consideration involving wider issues1 which do not concern us here4 ,but even though man1 who in himself is rational1 does not at first seem to have got further on since he became rational for himself--what is implicit having merely retained itself--the difference is quite enormous3 no new content has been produced1 and yet this form of being for self makes all the difference4 ,the whole variation in the development of the world in history is founded on this difference4 ,this alone explains how since all mankind is naturally rational1 and freedom is the hypothesis on which this reason rests1 slavery yet has been1 and in part still is1 maintained by many peoples1 and men have remained contented under it4 ,the only distinction between the ,africans and the ,asiatics on the one hand1 and the ,greeks1 ,romans1 and moderns on the other1 is that the latter know and it is explicit for them1 that they are free1 but the others are so without knowing that they are1 and thus without existing as being free4 ,this constitutes the enormous difference in their condition4 ,all knowledge1 and learning1 science1 and even commerce have no other object than to draw out what is inward or implicit and thus to become objective4 ,because that which is implicit comes into existence1 it certainly passes into change1 yet it remains one and the same1 for the whole process is dominated by it4 ,the plant1 for example1 does not lose itself in mere indefinite change4 ,from the germ much is produced when at first nothing was to be seen2 but the whole of what is brought forth1 if not developed1 is yet hidden and ideally contained within itself4 ,the principle of this projection into existence is that the germ cannot remain merely implicit1 but is impelled towards development1 since it presents the contradiction of being only implicit and yet not desiring so to be4 ,but this coming without itself has an end in view2 its completion fully reached1 and its previously determined end is the fruit or produce of the germ1 which causes a return to the first condition4 ,the germ will produce itself alone and manifest what is contained in it1 so that it then may return to itself once more thus to renew the unity from which it started4 ,with nature it certainly is true that the subject which commenced and the matter which forms the end are two separate units1 as in the case of seed and fruit4 ,the doubling process has apparently the effect of separating into two things that which in content is the same4 ,thus in animal life the parent and the young are different individuals although their nature is the same4 ,in ,mind it is otherwise3 it is consciousness and therefore it is free1 uniting in itself the beginning and the end4 ,as with the germ in nature1 ,mind indeed resolves itself back into unity after constituting itself another4 ,but what is in itself becomes for ,mind and thus arrives at being for itself4 ,the fruit and seed newly contained within it on the other hand1 do not become for the original germ1 but for us alone2 in the case of ,mind both factors not only are implicitly the same in character1 but there is a being for the other and at the same time a being for self4 ,that for which the 8other0 is1 is the same as that 8other20 and thus alone ,mind is at home with itself in its 8other40 ,the development of ,mind lies in the fact that its going forth and separation constitutes its coming to itself4 ,this being-at-home-with-self1 or coming-to-self of ,mind may be described as its complete and highest end3 it is this alone that it desires and nothing else4 ,everything that from eternity has happened in heaven and earth1 the life of ,god and all the deeds of time simply are the struggles for ,mind to know itself1 to make itself objective to itself1 to find itself1 be for itself1 and finally unite itself to itself2 it is alienated and divided1 but only so as to be able thus to find itself and return to itself4 ,only in this manner does ,mind attain its freedom1 for that is free which is not connected with or dependent on another4 ,true self-possession and satisfaction are only to be found in this1 and in nothing else but ,thought does ,mind attain this freedom4 ,in sense-perception1 for instance1 and in feeling1 ,i find myself confined and am not free2 but ,i am free when ,i have a consciousness of this my feeling4 ,man has particular ends and interests even in will2 ,i am free indeed when this is mine4 ,such ends1 however1 always contain 8another10 or something which constitutes for me 8another10 such as desire and impulse4 ,it is in ,thought alone that all foreign matter disappears from view1 and that ,mind is absolutely free4 ,all interest which is contained in the ,idea and in ,philosophy is expressed in it4 b4 ,the ,notion of the ,concrete4 ,as to development1 it may be asked1 what does develop and what forms the absolute content8 ,development is considered in the light of a formal process in action and as destitute of content4 ,but the act has no other end but activity1 and through this activity the general character of the content is already fixed4 ,for being-in-self and being-for-self are the moments present in action2 but the act is the retention of these diverse elements within itself4 ,the act thus is really one1 and it is just this unity of differences which is the concrete4 ,not only is the act concrete1 but also the implicit1 which stands to action in the relation of subject which begins1 and finally the product is just as concrete as the action or as the subject which begins4 ,development in process likewise forms the content1 the ,idea itself2 for this we must have the one element and then the other3 both combined will form a unity as third1 because the one in the other is at home with1 and not without1 itself4 ,thus the ,idea is in its content concrete within itself1 and this in two ways3 first it is concrete potentially1 and then it is its interest that what is in itself should be there for it4 ,it is a common prejudice that the science of ,philosophy deals only with abstractions and empty generalities1 and that sense-perception1 our empirical self-consciousness1 natural instinct1 and the feelings of every-day life1 lie1 on the contrary1 in the region of the concrete and the self-determined4 ,as a matter of fact1 ,philosophy is in the region of thought1 and has therefore to deal with universals2 its content is abstract1 but only as to form and element4 ,in itself the ,idea is really concrete1 for it is the union of the different determinations4 ,it is here that reasoned knowledge differs from mere knowledge of the understanding1 and it is the business of ,philosophy1 as opposed to understanding1 to show that the ,truth or the ,idea does not consist in empty generalities1 but in a universal2 and that is within itself the particular and the determined4 ,if the ,truth is abstract it must be untrue4 ,healthy human reason goes out towards what is concrete2 the reflection of the understanding comes first as abstract and untrue1 correct in theory only1 and amongst other things unpractical4 ,philosophy is what is most antagonistic to abstraction1 and it leads back to the concrete4 ,if we unite the ,notion of the concrete with that of development we have the motion of the concrete4 ,since the implicit is already concrete within itself1 and we only set forth what is implicitly there1 the new form which now looks different and which was formerly shut up in the original unity1 is merely distinguished4 ,the concrete must become for itself or explicit2 as implicit or potential it is only differentiated within itself1 not as yet explicitly set forth1 but still in a state of unity4 ,the concrete is thus simple1 and yet at the same time differentiated4 ,this1 its inward contradiction1 which is indeed the impelling force in development1 brings distinction into being4 ,but thus1 too1 its right to be taken back and reinstated extends beyond the difference2 for its truth is only to be found in unity4 ,life1 both that which is in ,nature and that which is of the ,idea1 of ,mind within itself1 is thus manifested4 ,were the ,idea abstract1 it would simply be the highest conceivable existence1 and that would be all that could be said of it2 but such a ,god is the product of the understanding of modern times4 ,what is true is rather found in motion1 in a process1 however1 in which there is rest2 difference1 while it lasts1 is but a temporary condition1 through which comes unity1 full and concrete4 ,we may now proceed to give examples of sensuous things1 which will help us further to explain this ,notion of the concrete4 ,although the flower has many qualities1 such as smell1 taste1 form1 colour1 c41 yet it is one4 ,none of these qualities could be absent in the particular leaf or flower3 each individual part of the leaf shares alike all the qualities of the leaf entire4 ,gold1 similarly contains in every particle all its qualities unseparated and entire4 ,it is frequently allowed with sensuous things that such varied elements may be joined together1 but1 in the spiritual1 differentiation is supposed to involve opposition4 ,we do not controvert the fact1 or think it contradictory1 that the smell and taste of the flower1 although otherwise opposed1 are yet clearly in one subject2 nor do we place the one against the other4 ,but the understanding and understanding thought find everything of a different kind1 placed in conjunction1 to be incompatible4 ,matter1 for example1 is complex and coherent1 or space is continuous and uninterrupted4 ,likewise we may take separate points in space and break up matter dividing it ever further into infinity4 ,it then is said that matter consists of atoms and points1 and hence is not continuous4 ,therefore we have here the two determinations of continuity and of definite points1 which understanding regards as mutually exclusive1 combined in one4 ,it is said that matter must be clearly either continuous or divisible into points1 but in reality it has both these qualities4 ,or when we say of the mind of man that it has freedom1 the understanding at once brings up the other quality1 which in this case is necessity1 saying1 that if ,mind is free it is not in subjection to necessity1 and1 inversely1 if its will and thought are determined through necessity1 it is not free--the one1 they say1 excludes the other4 ,the distinctions here are regarded as exclusive1 and not as forming something concrete4 ,but that which is true1 the ,mind1 is concrete1 and its attributes are freedom and necessity4 ,similarly the higher point of view is that ,mind is free in its necessity1 and finds its freedom in it alone1 since its necessity rests on its freedom4 ,but it is more difficult for us to show the unity here than in the case of natural objects4 ,freedom can1 however1 be also abstract freedom without necessity1 which false freedom is self-will1 and for that reason it is self-opposed1 unconsciously limited1 an imaginary freedom which is free in form alone4 ,the fruit of development1 which comes third1 is a result of motion1 but inasmuch as it is merely the result of one stage in development1 as being last in this stage1 it is both the starting point and the first in order in another such stage4 ,goethe somewhere truly says1 8,that which is formed ever resolves itself back into its elements40 ,matter--which as developed has form--constitutes once more the material for a new form4 ,mind again takes as its object and applies its activity to the ,notion in which in going within itself1 it has comprehended itself1 which it is in form and being1 and which has just been separated from it anew4 ,the application of thought to this1 supplies it with the form and determination of thought4 ,this action thus further forms the previously formed1 gives it additional determinations1 makes it more determinate in itself1 further developed and more profound4 ,as concrete1 this activity is a succession of processes in development which must be represented not as a straight line drawn out into vague infinity1 but as a circle returning within itself1 which1 as periphery1 has very many circles1 and whose whole is a large number of processes in development turning back within themselves4 c4 ,philosophy as the apprehension of the development of the ,concrete4 ,having thus generally explained the nature of the ,concrete1 ,i now add as regards its import1 that the ,truth thus determined within itself is impelled towards development4 ,it is only the living and spiritual which internally bestirs and develops itself4 ,thus the ,idea as concrete in itself1 and self-developing1 is an organic system and a totality which contains a multitude of stages and of moments in development4 ,philosophy has now become for itself the apprehension of this development1 and as conceiving ,thought1 is itself this development in ,thought4 ,the more progress made in this development1 the more perfect is the ,philosophy4 ,this development goes no further out than into externality1 but the going without itself of development also is a going inwards4 ,that is to say1 the universal ,idea continues to remain at the foundation and still is the all-embracing and unchangeable4 ,while in ,philosophy the going out of the ,idea in course of its development is not a change1 a becoming 8another10 but really is a going within itself1 a self-immersion1 the progress forward makes the ,idea which was previously general and undetermined1 determined within itself4 ,further development of the ,idea or its further determination is the same thing exactly4 ,depth seems to signify intensiveness1 but in this case the most extensive is also the most intensive4 ,the more intensive is the ,mind1 the more extensive is it1 hence the larger is its embrace4 ,extension as development1 is not dispersion or falling asunder1 but a uniting bond which is the more powerful and intense as the expanse of that embraced is greater in extent and richer4 ,in such a case what is greater is the strength of opposition and of separation2 and the greater power overcomes the greater separation4 ,these are the abstract propositions regarding the nature of the ,idea and of its development1 and thus within it ,philosophy in its developed state is constituted3 it is one ,idea in its totality and in all its individual parts1 like one life in a living being1 one pulse throbs throughout all its members4 ,all the parts represented in it1 and their systematization1 emanate from the one ,idea2 all these particulars are but the mirrors and copies of this one life1 and have their actuality only in this unity4 ,their differences and their various qualities are only the expression of the ,idea and the form contained within it4 ,thus the ,idea is the central point1 which is also the periphery1 the source of light1 which in all its expansion does not come without itself1 but remains present and immanent within itself4 ,thus it is both the system of necessity and its own necessity1 which also constitutes its freedom4 #c4 ,,results ,,obtained ,,with ,,respect ,,to ,,the ,,notion ,,of ,,the ,,history ,,of ,,philosophy4 ,thus we see that ,philosophy is system in development2 the history of ,philosophy is the same2 and this is the main point to be noted and the first principle to be dealt with in this treatise on that history4 ,in order to make this evident1 the difference in respect to the possible modes of manifestation must first be pointed out4 ,that is to say1 the progression of the various stages in the advance of ,thought may occur with the consciousness of necessity1 in which case each in succession deduces itself1 and this form and this determination can alone emerge4 ,or else it may come about without this consciousness as does a natural and apparently accidental process1 so that while inwardly1 indeed1 the ,notion brings about its result consistently1 this consistency is not made manifest4 ,this is so in nature2 in the various stages of the development of twigs1 leaves1 blossom and fruit1 each proceeds for itself1 but the inward ,idea is the directing and determining force which governs the progression4 ,this is also so with the child whose bodily powers1 and above all whose intellectual activities1 make their appearance one after the other1 simply and naturally1 so that those parents who form such an experience for the first time1 marvel whence all that is now showing itself from within1 comes from2 for the whole of these manifestations merely have the form of a succession in time4 ,the one kind of progression which represents the deduction of the forms1 the necessity thought out and recognized1 of the determinations1 is the business of ,philosophy2 and because it is the pure ,idea which is in question and not yet its mere particularized form as ,nature and as ,mind1 that representation is1 in the main1 the business of logical ,philosophy4 ,but the other method1 which represents the part played by the history of ,philosophy1 shows the different stages and moments in development in time1 in manner of occurrence1 in particular places1 in particular people or political circumstances1 the complications arising thus1 and1 in short1 it shows us the empirical form4 ,this point of view is the only one worthy of this science4 ,from the very nature of the subject it is inherently the true one1 and through the study of this history it will be made manifest that it actually shows and proves itself so4 ,now in reference to this ,idea1 ,i maintain that the sequence in the systems of ,philosophy in ,history is similar to the sequence in the logical deduction of the ,notion-determinations in the ,idea4 ,i maintain that if the fundamental conceptions of the systems appearing in the history of ,philosophy be entirely divested of what regards their outward form1 their relation to the particular and the like1 the various stages in the determination of the ,idea are found in their logical ,notion4 ,conversely in the logical progression taken for itself1 there is1 so far as its principal elements are concerned1 the progression of historical manifestations2 but it is necessary to have these pure ,notions in order to know what the historical form contains4 ,it may be thought that ,philosophy must have another order as to the stages in the ,idea than that in which these ,notions have gone forth in time2 but in the main the order is the same4 ,this succession undoubtedly separates itself1 on the one hand1 into the sequence in time of ,history1 and on the other into succession in the order of ideas4 ,but to treat more fully of this last would divert us too far from our aim4 ,i would only remark this1 that what has been said reveals that the study of the history of ,philosophy is the study of ,philosophy itself1 for1 indeed1 it can be nothing else4 ,whoever studies the history of sciences such as ,physics and ,mathematics1 makes himself acquainted with ,physics and ,mathematics themselves4 ,but in order to obtain a knowledge of its progress as the development of the ,idea in the empirical1 external form in which ,philosophy appears in ,history1 a corresponding knowledge of the ,idea is absolutely essential1 just as in judging of human affairs one must have a conception of that which is right and fitting4 ,else1 indeed1 as in so many histories of ,philosophy1 there is presented to the vision devoid of idea1 only a disarranged collection of opinions4 ,to make you acquainted with this ,idea1 and consequently to explain the manifestations1 is the business of the history of ,philosophy1 and to do this is my object in undertaking to lecture on the subject4 ,since the observer must bring with him the ,notion of the subject in order to see it in its phenomenal aspect and in order to expose the object faithfully to view1 we need not wonder at there being so many dull histories of ,philosophy in which the succession of its systems are represented simply as a number of opinions1 errors and freaks of thought4 ,they are freaks of thought which1 indeed1 have been devised with a great pretension of acuteness and of mental exertion1 and with everything else which can be said in admiration of what is merely formal4 ,but1 considering the absence of philosophic mind in such historians as these1 how should they be able to comprehend and represent the content1 which is reasoned thought8 ,it is shown from what has been said regarding the formal nature of the ,idea1 that only a history of ,philosophy thus regarded as a system of development in ,idea1 is entitled to the name of ,science3 a collection of facts constitutes no science4 ,only thus as a succession of phenomena established through reason1 and having as content just what is reason and revealing it1 does this history show that it is rational3 it shows that the events recorded are in reason4 ,how should the whole of what has taken place in reason not itself be rational8 ,that faith must surely be the more reasonable in which chance is not made ruler over human affairs1 and it is the business of ,philosophy to recognize that however much its own manifestations may be history likewise1 it is yet determined through the ,idea alone4 ,through these general preliminary conceptions the categories are now determined1 the more immediate application of which to the history of ,philosophy we have now to consider4 ,this application will bring before us the most significant aspects in this history4 a4 ,the development in ,time of the various ,philosophies4 ,the first question which may be asked in reference to this history1 concerns that distinction in regard to the manifestation of the ,idea1 which has just been noticed4 ,it is the question as to how it happens that ,philosophy appears to be a development in time and has a history4 ,the answer to this question encroaches on the metaphysics of ,time1 and it would be a digression from our object to give here more than the elements on which the answer rests4 ,it has been shown above in reference to the existence of ,mind1 that its ,being is its activity4 ,nature1 on the contrary1 is1 as it is2 its changes are thus only repetitions1 and its movements take the form of a circle merely4 ,to express this better1 the activity of ,mind is to know itself4 ,i am1 immediately1 but this ,i am only as a living organism2 as ,mind ,i am only in so far as ,i know myself4 1 ,know thyself1 the inscription over the temple of the oracle at ,delphi1 is the absolute command which is expressed by ,mind in its essential character4 ,but consciousness really implies that for myself1 ,i am object to myself4 ,in forming this absolute division between what is mine and myself1 ,mind constitutes its existence and establishes itself as external to itself4 ,it postulates itself in the externality which is just the universal and the distinctive form of existence in ,nature4 ,but one of the forms of externality is ,time1 and this form requires to be further examined both in the ,philosophy of ,nature and the finite ,mind4 ,this ,being in existence and therefore ,being in time is a moment not only of the individual consciousness1 which as such is essentially finite1 but also of the development of the philosophical ,idea in the element of ,thought4 ,for the ,idea1 thought of as being at rest1 is1 indeed1 not in ,time4 ,to think of it as at rest1 and to preserve it in the form of immediacy is equivalent to its inward perception4 ,but the ,idea as concrete1 is1 as has been shown1 the unity of differences2 it is not really rest1 and its existence is not really sense-perception1 but as differentiation within itself and therefore as development1 it comes into existent ,being and into externality in the element of ,thought1 and thus pure ,philosophy appears in thought as a progressive existence in time4 ,but this element of ,thought is itself abstract and is the activity of a single consciousness4 ,mind is1 however1 not only to be considered as individual1 finite consciousness1 but as that ,mind which is universal and concrete within itself2 this concrete universality1 however1 comprehends all the various sides and modes evolved in which it is and becomes object to the ,idea4 ,thus ,mind's thinking comprehension of self is at the same time the progression of the total actuality evolved4 ,this progression is not one which takes its course through the thought of an individual and exhibits itself in a single consciousness1 for it shows itself to be universal ,mind presenting itself in the history of the world in all the richness of its form4 ,the result of this development is that one form1 one stage in the ,idea comes to consciousness in one particular race1 so that this race and this time expresses only this particular form1 within which it constructs its universe and works out its conditions4 ,the higher stage1 on the other hand1 centuries later reveals itself in another race of people4 ,now if we thus grasp the principles of the ,concrete and of ,development1 the nature of the manifold obtains quite another signification1 and what is said of the diversity in philosophies as if the manifold were fixed and stationary and composed of what is mutually exclusive1 is at once refuted and relegated to its proper place4 ,such talk is that in which those who despise ,philosophy think they possess an invincible weapon against it1 and in their truly beggarly pride in their pitiful representations of it1 they are in perfect ignorance even of what they have and what they have to know in any meagre ideas attained1 such as in that of the manifold and diverse4 ,yet this category is one which anybody can understand2 no difficulty is made in regard to it1 for it is thoroughly known1 and those who use it think they can do so as being entirely comprehensible--as a matter of course they understand what it is4 ,but those who believe the principle of diversity to be one absolutely fixed1 do not know its nature1 or its dialectic2 the manifold or diverse is in a state of flux2 it must really be conceived of as in the process of development1 and as but a passing moment4 ,philosophy in its concrete ,idea is the activity of development in revealing the differences which it contains within itself2 these differences are thoughts1 for we are now speaking of development in ,thought4 ,in the first place1 the differences which rest in the ,idea are manifested as thoughts4 ,secondly1 these distinctions must come into existence1 one here and the other there2 and in order that they may do this1 they must be complete1 that is1 they must contain within themselves the ,idea in its totality4 ,the concrete alone as including and supporting the distinctions1 is the actual2 it is thus1 and thus alone1 that the differences are in their form entire4 ,a complete form of thought such as is here presented1 is a ,philosophy4 ,but the ,idea contains the distinctions in a peculiar form4 ,it may be said that the form is indifferent1 and that the content1 the ,idea1 is the main consideration2 and people think themselves quite moderate and reasonable when they state that the different philosophies all contain the ,idea1 though in different forms1 understanding by this that these forms are contingent4 ,but everything hangs on this3 these forms are nothing else than the original distinctions in the ,idea itself1 which is what it is only in them4 ,they are in this way essential to1 and constitute the content of the ,idea1 which in thus sundering itself1 attains to form4 ,the manifold character of the principles which appear1 is1 however1 not accidental1 but necessary3 the different forms constitute an integral part of the whole form4 ,they are the determinations of the original ,idea1 which together constitute the whole2 but as being outside of one another1 their union does not take place in them1 but in us1 the observers4 ,each system is determined as one1 but it is not a permanent condition that the differences are thus mutually exclusive4 ,the inevitable fate of these determinations must follow1 and that is that they shall be drawn together and reduced to elements or moments4 ,the independent attitude taken up by each moment is again laid aside4 ,after expansion1 contraction follows--the unity out of which they first emerged4 ,this third may itself be but the beginning of a further development4 ,it may seem as if this progression were to go on into infinitude1 but it has an absolute end in view1 which we shall know better later on2 many turnings are necessary1 however1 before ,mind frees itself in coming to consciousness4 ,the temple of self-conscious reason is to be considered from this the point of view alone worthy of the history of ,philosophy4 ,it is hence rationally built by an inward master worker1 and not in ,solomon's method1 as freemasons build4 ,the great assumption that what has taken place on this side1 in the world1 has also done so in conformity with reason--which is what first gives the history of ,philosophy its true interest--is nothing else than trust in ,providence1 only in another form4 ,as the best of what is in the world is that which ,thought produces1 it is unreasonable to believe that reason only is in ,nature1 and not in ,mind4 ,that man who believes that what1 like the philosophies1 belongs to the region of mind must be merely contingent1 is insincere in his belief in divine rule1 and what he says of it is but empty talk4 ,a long time is undoubtedly required by ,mind in working out ,philosophy1 and when one first reflects on it1 the length of the time may seem astonishing1 like the immensity of the space spoken of in astronomy4 ,but it must be considered in regard to the slow progress of the world-spirit1 that there is no need for it to hasten3--8,a thousand years are in ,thy sight as one day40 ,it has time enough just because it is itself outside of time1 because it is eternal4 ,the fleeting events of the day pass so quickly that there is not time enough for all that has to be done4 ,who is there who does not die before he has achieved his aims8 ,the world-spirit has time enough1 but that is not all4 ,it is not time alone which has to be made use of in the acquisition of a conception2 much else is required4 ,the fact that so many races and generations are devoted to these operations of its consciousness by ,mind1 and that the appearance is so perpetually presented of rising up and passing away1 concern it not at all2 it is rich enough for such displays1 it pursues its work on the largest possible scale1 and has nations and individuals enough and to spare4 ,the saying that ,nature arrives at its end in the shortest possible way1 and that this is right1 is a trivial one4 ,the way shown by mind is indirect1 and accommodates itself to circumstances4 ,considerations of finite life1 such as time1 trouble1 and cost1 have no place here4 ,we ought1 too1 to feel no disappointment that particular kinds of knowledge cannot yet be attained1 or that this or that is still absent4 ,in the history of the world progression is slow4 b4 ,the application of the foregoing to the treatment of ,philosophy4 ,the first result which follows from what has been said1 is that the whole of the history of ,philosophy is a progression impelled by an inherent necessity1 and one which is implicitly rational and priori determined through its ,idea2 and this the history of ,philosophy has to exemplify4 ,contingency must vanish on the appearance of ,philosophy4 ,its history is just as absolutely determined as the development of ,notions1 and the impelling force is the inner dialectic of the forms4 ,the finite is not true1 nor is it what it is to be--its determinate nature is bound up with its existence4 ,but the inward ,idea abolishes these finite forms3 a philosophy which has not the absolute form identical with the content1 must pass away because its form is not that of truth4 ,what follows1 secondly from what we have said1 is that every philosophy has been and still is necessary4 ,thus none have passed away1 but all are affirmatively contained as elements in a whole4 ,but we must distinguish between the particular principle of these philosophies as particular1 and the realization of this principle throughout the whole compass of the world4 ,the principles are retained1 the most recent philosophy being the result of all preceding1 and hence no philosophy has ever been refuted4 ,what has been refuted is not the principle of this philosophy1 but merely the fact that this principle should be considered final and absolute in character4 ,the atomic philosophy1 for example1 has arrived at the affirmation that the atom is the absolute existence1 that it is the indivisible unit which is also the individual or subject2 seeing1 then1 that the bare unit also is the abstract being-for-self1 the ,absolute would be grasped as infinitely many units4 ,the atomic theory has been refuted1 and we are atomists no longer4 ,mind is certainly explicitly existent as a unit or atom1 but that is to attribute to it a barren character and qualities incapable of expressing anything of its depth4 ,the principle is indeed retained1 although it is not the absolute in its entirety4 ,this same contradiction appears in all development4 ,the development of the tree is the negation of the germ1 and the blossom that of the leaves1 in so far as that they show that these do not form the highest and truest existence of the tree4 ,last of all1 the blossom finds its negation in the fruit4 ,yet none of them can come into actual existence excepting as preceded by all the earlier stages4 ,our attitude to a philosophy must thus contain an affirmative side and a negative2 when we take both of these into consideration1 we do justice to a philosophy for the first time4 ,we get to know the affirmative side later on both in life and in science2 thus we find it easier to refute than to justify4 ,in the third place1 we shall limit ourselves to the particular consideration of the principle itself4 ,each principle has reigned for a certain time1 and when the whole system of the world has been explained from this special form1 it is called a philosophical system4 ,its whole theory has certainly to be learned1 but as long as the principle is abstract it is not sufficient to embrace the forms belonging to our conception of the world4 ,the ,cartesian principles1 for instance1 are very suitable for application to mechanism1 but for nothing further2 their representation of other manifestations in the world1 such as those of vegetable and animal nature1 are insufficient1 and hence uninteresting4 ,therefore we take into consideration the principles of these philosophies only1 but in dealing with concrete philosophies we must also regard the chief forms of their development and their applications4 ,the subordinate philosophies are inconsistent2 they have had bright glimpses of the truth1 which are1 however1 independent of their principles4 ,this is exemplified in the ,timus of ,plato1 a philosophy of nature1 the working out of which is empirically very barren because its principle does not as yet extend far enough1 and it is not to its principle that we owe the deep gleams of thought there contained4 ,in the fourth place it follows that we must not regard the history of ,philosophy as dealing with the past1 even though it is history4 ,the scientific products of reason form the content of this history1 and these are not past4 ,what is obtained in this field of labour is the ,true1 and1 as such1 the ,eternal2 it is not what exists now1 and not then2 it is true not only to-day or to-morrow1 but beyond all time1 and in as far as it is in time1 it is true always and for every time4 ,the bodily forms of those great minds who are the heroes of this history1 the temporal existence and outward lives of the philosophers1 are1 indeed1 no more1 but their works and thoughts have not followed suit1 for they neither conceived nor dreamt of the rational import of their works4 ,philosophy is not somnambulism1 but is developed consciousness2 and what these heroes have done is to bring that which is implicitly rational out of the depths of ,mind1 where it is found at first as substance only1 or as inwardly existent1 into the light of day1 and to advance it into consciousness and knowledge4 ,this forms a continuous awakening4 ,such work is not only deposited in the temple of ,memory as forms of times gone by1 but is just as present and as living now as at the time of its production4 ,the effects produced and work performed are not again destroyed or interrupted by what succeeds1 for they are such that we must ourselves be present in them4 ,they have as medium neither canvas1 paper1 marble1 nor representation or memorial to preserve them4 ,these mediums are themselves transient1 or else form a basis for what is such4 ,but they do have ,thought1 ,notion1 and the eternal ,being of ,mind1 which moths cannot corrupt1 nor thieves break through and steal4 ,the conquests made by ,thought when constituted into ,thought form the very ,being of ,mind4 ,such knowledge is thus not learning merely1 or a knowledge of what is dead1 buried and corrupt3 the history of ,philosophy has not to do with what is gone1 but with the living present4 c4 ,further comparison between the ,history of ,philosophy and ,philosophy itself4 ,we may appropriate to ourselves the whole of the riches apportioned out in time3 it must be shown from the succession in philosophies how that succession is the systematization of the science of ,philosophy itself4 ,but a distinction is to be noted here3 that which first commences is implicit1 immediate1 abstract1 general--it is what has not yet advanced2 the more concrete and richer comes later1 and the first is poorer in determinations4 ,this may appear contrary to one's first impressions1 but philosophic ideas are often enough directly opposed to ordinary ideas1 and what is generally supposed1 is not found to be the case4 ,it may be thought that what comes first must be the concrete4 ,the child1 for instance1 as still in the original totality of his nature1 is thought to be more concrete than the man1 hence we imagine the latter to be more limited1 no longer forming a totality1 but living an abstract life4 ,certainly the man acts in accordance with definite ends1 not bringing his whole soul and mind into a subject1 but splitting his life into a number of abstract unities4 ,the child and the youth1 on the contrary1 act straight from the fulness of the heart4 ,feeling and sense-perception come first1 thought last1 and thus feeling appears to us to be more concrete than thought1 or the activity of abstraction and of the universal4 ,in reality1 it is just the other way4 ,the sensuous consciousness is certainly the more concrete1 and if poorer in thought1 at least richer in content4 ,we must thus distinguish the naturally concrete from the concrete of thought1 which on its side1 again1 is wanting in sensuous matter4 ,the child is also the most abstract and the poorest in thought3 as to what pertains to nature1 the man is abstract1 but in thought he is more concrete than the child4 ,man's ends and objects are undoubtedly abstract in general affairs1 such as in maintaining his family or performing his business duties1 but he contributes to a great objective organic whole1 whose progress he advances and directs4 ,in the acts of a child1 on the other hand1 only a childish and1 indeed1 momentary 8,i10 and in those of the youth the subjective constitution or the random aim1 form the principle of action4 ,it is in this way that science is more concrete than sense-perception4 ,in applying this to the different forms of ,philosophy1 it follows in the first place1 that the earliest philosophies are the poorest and the most abstract4 ,in them the ,idea is least determined2 they keep merely to generalities not yet realized4 ,this must be known in order that we may not seek behind the old philosophies for more than we are entitled to find2 thus we need not require from them determinations proceeding from a deeper consciousness4 ,for instance1 it has been asked whether the philosophy of ,thales is1 properly speaking1 ,theism or ,atheism1#e whether he asserted a personal ,god or merely an impersonal1 universal existence4 ,the question here regards the attribution of subjectivity to the highest ,idea1 the conception of the ,personality of ,god4 ,such subjectivity as we comprehend it1 is a much richer1 more concentrated1 and therefore much later conception1 which need not be sought for in distant ages4 ,the ,greek gods had1 indeed1 personality in imagination and idea like the one ,god of the ,jewish religion1 but to know what is the mere picture of fancy1 and what the insight of pure ,thought and ,notion1 is quite another thing4 ,if we take as basis our own ideas judged by these deeper conceptions1 an ancient ,philosophy may undoubtedly be spoken of as ,atheism4 ,but this expression would at the same time be false1 for the thoughts as thoughts in beginning1 could not have arrived at the development which we have reached4 ,from this it follows--since the progress of development is equivalent to further determination1 and this means further immersion in and a fuller grasp of the ,idea itself--that the latest1 most modern and newest philosophy is the most developed1 richest and deepest4 ,in that philosophy everything which at first seems to be past and gone must be preserved and retained1 and it must itself be a mirror of the whole history4 ,the original philosophy is the most abstract1 because it is the original and has not as yet made any movement forward2 the last1 which proceeds from this forward and impelling influence1 is the most concrete4 ,this1 as may at once be remarked1 is no mere pride in the philosophy of our time1 because it is in the nature of the whole process that the more developed philosophy of a later time is really the result of the previous operations of the thinking mind2 and that it1 pressed forwards and onwards from the earlier standpoints1 has not grown up on its own account or in a state of isolation4 ,it must also be recollected that we must not hesitate to say1 what is naturally implied1 that the ,idea1 as comprehended and shown forth in the latest and newest philosophy1 is the most developed1 the richest and deepest4 ,i call this to remembrance because the designation1 new or newest of all in reference to ,philosophy1 has become a very common by-word4 ,those who think they express anything by using such terms might quite easily render thanks respecting any number of philosophies just as fast as their inclination directs1 regarding either every shooting-star and even every candle-gleam in the light of a sun1 or else calling every popular cry a philosophy1 and adducing as proof that at any rate there are so many philosophies that every day one displaces another4 ,thus they have the category in which they can place any apparently significant philosophy1 and through which they may at the same time set it aside2 this they call a fashion-philosophy4 8,scoffer1 thou call'st this but a fleeting phase ,when the ,spirit of ,man once again and anew1 ,strives earnestly on1 towards forms that are higher40 ,a second consequence has regard to the treatment of the older philosophies4 ,such insight also prevents us from ascribing any blame to the philosophies when we miss determinations in them which were not yet present to their culture1 and similarly it prevents our burdening them with deductions and assertions which were neither made nor thought of by them1 though they might correctly enough allow themselves to be derived from the thought of such a philosophy4 ,it is necessary to set to work on an historical basis1 and to ascribe to ,philosophy what is immediately given to us1 and that alone4 ,errors crop up here in most histories of ,philosophy1 since we may see in them a number of metaphysical propositions ascribed to a philosopher and given out as an historical statement of the views which he has propounded1 of which he neither thought nor knew a word1 and of which there is not the slightest trace found in history4 ,thus in ,brucker's great ,history of ,philosophy 7,pt4 ,i4 pp4 #dfe-dgh seq47 a list of thirty1 forty1 or a hundred theorems are quoted from ,thales and others1 no idea of which can be traced in history as having been present to these philosophers4 ,there are also propositions in support of them and citations taken from discussions of a similar kind with which we may occupy ourselves long enough4 ,brucker's method is to endow the single theorem of an ancient philosopher with all the consequences and premises which must1 according to the idea of the ,wolffian ,metaphysics1 be the premises and conclusions of that theorem1 and thus easily to produce a simple1 naked fiction as if it were an actual historical fact4 ,thus1 according to ,brucker1 ,thales said1 ,ex nihilo fit nihil1 since he said that water was eternal4 ,thus1 too1 he was to be counted amongst the philosophers who deny creation out of nothing2 and of this1 historically at least1 ,thales was ignorant4 ,professor ,ritter1 too1 whose history of ,ionic ,philosophy is carefully written1 and who on the whole is cautious not to introduce foreign matter1 has very possibly ascribed to ,thales more than is found in history4 ,he says 7pp4 #ab1 #ac71 8,hence we must regard the view of nature which we find in ,thales as dynamic in principle4 ,he regarded the world as the all-embracing1 living animal which has developed from a germ like every other animal1 and this germ1 like that of all other animals1 is either damp or water4 ,thus the fundamental idea of ,thales is that the world is a living whole which has developed from a germ and carries on its life as does an animal1 by means of nourishment suitable to its nature0 7cf4 p4 #af74 ,this is quite a different account from that of ,aristotle1 and none of it is communicated by the ancients regarding ,thales4 ,the sequence of thought is evident1 but historically it is not justified4 ,we ought not by such deductions to make an ancient philosophy into something quite different from what it originally was4 ,we are too apt to mould the ancient philosophers into our own forms of thought1 but this is just to constitute the progress of development2 the difference in times1 in culture and in philosophies1 depends on whether certain reflections1 certain thought determinations1 and certain stages in the ,notion have come to consciousness1 whether a consciousness has been developed to a particular point or not4 ,the history of ,philosophy has simply to deal with this development and bringing forth of thought4 ,the determinations involved certainly follow from a proposition1 but whether they are put forth as yet or not is quite another thing1 and the bringing forth of the inner content is the only matter of importance4 ,we must therefore only make use of the words which are actually literal1 for to use further thought determinations which do not yet belong to the consciousness of the philosopher in question1 is to carry on development4 ,thus ,aristotle states that ,thales has defined the principle 77 of every thing to be water4 ,but ,anaximander first made use of 1 and ,thales thus did not possess this determination of thought at all2 he recognized as commencement in time1 but not as the fundamental principle4 ,thales did not once introduce the determination of cause into his philosophy1 and first cause is a further determination still4 ,there are whole nations which have not this conception at all2 indeed it involves a great step forward in development4 ,and seeing that difference in culture on the whole depends on difference in the thought determinations which are manifested1 this must be so still more with respect to philosophies4 ,now1 as in the logical system of thought each of its forms has its own place in which alone it suffices1 and this form becomes1 by means of ever-progressing development1 reduced to a subordinate element1 each philosophy is1 in the third place1 a particular stage in the development of the whole process and has its definite place where it finds its true value and significance4 ,its special character is really to be conceived of in accordance with this determination1 and it is to be considered with respect to this position in order that full justice may be done to it4 ,on this account nothing more must be demanded or expected from it than what it actually gives1 and the satisfaction is not to be sought for in it1 which can only be found in a fuller development of knowledge4 ,we must not expect to find the questions of our consciousness and the interest of the present world responded to by the ancients2 such questions presuppose a certain development in thought4 ,therefore every philosophy belongs to its own time and is restricted by its own limitations1 just because it is the manifestation of a particular stage in development4 ,the individual is the offspring of his people1 of his world1 whose constitution and attributes are alone manifested in his form2 he may spread himself out as he will1 he cannot escape out of his time any more than out of his skin1 for he belongs to the one universal ,mind which is his substance and his own existence4 ,how should he escape from this8 ,it is the same universal ,mind that is embraced by thinking ,philosophy2 that ,philosophy is ,mind's thought of itself and therefore its determinate and substantial content4 ,every philosophy is the philosophy of its own day1 a link in the whole chain of spiritual development1 and thus it can only find satisfaction for the interests belonging to its own particular time4 ,on this account an earlier philosophy does not give satisfaction to the mind in which a deeper conception reigns4 ,what ,mind seeks for in ,philosophy is this conception which already constitutes its inward determination and the root of its existence conceived of as object to thought2 ,mind demands a knowledge of itself4 ,but in the earlier philosophy the ,idea is not yet present in this determinate character4 ,hence the philosophy of ,plato and ,aristotle1 and indeed all philosophies1 ever live and are present in their principles1 but ,philosophy no longer has the particular form and aspect possessed by that of ,plato and of ,aristotle4 ,we cannot rest content with them1 and they cannot be revived2 hence there can be no ,platonists1 ,aristotelians1 ,stoics1 or ,epicureans to-day4 ,to re-awaken them would be to try to bring back to an earlier stage the ,mind of a deeper culture and self-penetration4 ,but this cannot be the case2 it would be an impossibility and as great a folly as were a man to wish to expend his energies in attaining the standpoint of the youth1 the youth in endeavouring to be the boy or child again2 whereas the man1 the youth1 and the child1 are all one and the same individual4 ,the period of revival in the sciences1 the new epoch in learning which took place in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries1 began not only with the revived study of1 but also with the re-animation of the old philosophies4 ,marsilius ,ficinus was a ,platonist2 an ,academy of ,platonic philosophy was established and installed with professors by ,cosmos de ,medici1 and ,ficinus was placed at the head of it4 ,there were pure ,aristotelians like ,pomponius3 ,gassendi later on maintained the ,epicurean philosophy1 for his philosophy dealt with ,physics after the manner of the ,epicureans2 ,lipsius wished to be a ,stoic1 and so on4 ,the sense of opposition was so great1 ancient philosophy and ,christianity--from or in which no special philosophy had developed--were so diverse1 that no philosophy peculiar to itself could develop in ,christianity4 ,what was or could be had as philosophy1 either in conformity with or in opposition to ,christianity1 was a certain ancient philosophy which was thus taken up anew4 ,but mummies when brought amongst living beings cannot there remain4 ,mind had for long possessed a more substantial life1 a more profound ,notion of itself1 and hence its thought had higher needs than such as could be satisfied by these philosophies4 ,a revival such as this is then to be regarded only as the transitory period in which we learn to know the forms which are implied and which have gone before1 and as the renewal of former struggles through the steps necessary in development4 ,such reconstructions and repetitions in a distant time of principles which have become foreign to ,mind1 are in history transitory only1 and formed in a language which is dead4 ,such things are translations only and not originals1 and ,mind does not find satisfaction excepting in knowledge of its own origination4 ,when modern times are in the same way called upon to revert to the standpoint of an ancient philosophy 7as is recommended specially in regard to the philosophy of ,plato7 in order to make this a means of escaping from the complications and difficulties of succeeding times1 this reversion does not come naturally as in the first case4 ,this discreet counsel has the same origin as the request to cultivated members of society to turn back to the customs and ideas of the savages of the ,north ,american forests1 or as the recommendation to adopt the religion of ,melchisedec which ,fichte#f has maintained to be the purest and simplest possible1 and therefore the one at which we must eventually arrive4 ,on the one hand1 in this retrogression the desire for an origin and for a fixed point of departure is unmistakable1 but such must be sought for in thought and ,idea alone and not in an authoritatively given form4 ,on the other hand1 the return of the developed1 enriched ,mind to a simplicity such as this--which means to an abstraction1 an abstract condition or thought--is to be regarded only as the escape of an incapacity which cannot enjoy the rich material of development which it sees before it1 and which demands to be controlled and comprehended in its very depths by thought1 but seeks a refuge in fleeing from the difficulty and in mere sterility4 ,from what has been said it is quite comprehensible how so many of those who1 whether induced by some special attraction such as this1 or simply by the fame of a ,plato or ancient philosophy in general1 direct their way thereto in order to draw their own philosophy from these sources1 do not find themselves satisfied by the study1 and unjustifiably quit such altogether4 ,satisfaction is found in them to a certain extent only4 ,we must know in ancient philosophy or in the philosophy of any given period1 what we are going to look for4 ,or at least we must know that in such a philosophy there is before us a definite stage in the development of thought1 and in it those forms and necessities of ,mind which lie within the limits of that stage alone are brought into existence4 ,there slumber in the ,mind of modern times ideas more profound which require for their awakening other surroundings and another present than the abstract1 dim1 grey thought of olden times4 ,in ,plato1 for instance1 questions regarding the nature of freedom1 the origin of evil and of sin1 providence1 c41 do not find their philosophic answer4 ,on such subjects we certainly may in part take the ordinary serious views of the present time1 and in part philosophically set their consideration altogether aside1 or else consider sin and freedom as something negative only4 ,but neither the one plan nor the other gives freedom to ,mind if such subjects have once been explicitly for it1 and if the opposition in self-consciousness has given it the power of sinking its interests therein4 ,the case is similar with regard to questions regarding the limits of knowledge1 the opposition between subjectivity and objectivity which had not yet come up in ,plato's age4 ,the independence of the 8,i0 within itself and its explicit existence was foreign to him2 man had not yet gone back within himself1 had not yet set himself forth as explicit4 ,the subject was indeed the individual as free1 but as yet he knew himself only as in unity with his ,being4 ,the ,athenian knew himself to be free1 as such1 just as the ,roman citizen would1 as ingenuus4 ,but the fact that man is in and for himself free1 in his essence and as man1 free born1 was known neither by ,plato1 ,aristotle1 ,cicero1 nor the ,roman legislators1 even though it is this conception alone which forms the source of law4 ,in ,christianity the individual1 personal mind for the first time becomes of real1 infinite and absolute value2 ,god wills that all men shall be saved4 ,it was in the ,christian religion that the doctrine was advanced that all men are equal before ,god1 because ,christ has set them free with the freedom of ,christianity4 ,these principles make freedom independent of any such things as birth1 standing or culture4 ,the progress made through them is enormous1 but they still come short of this1 that to be free constitutes the very idea of man4 ,the sense of this existent principle has been an active force for centuries and centuries1 and an impelling power which has brought about the most tremendous revolutions2 but the conception and the knowledge of the natural freedom of man is a knowledge of himself which is not old4 ,b ,,the ,,relation ,,of ,,philosophy ,,to ,,other ,,departments ,,of ,,knowledge4 ,the ,history of ,philosophy has to represent this science in that form of time and individualities from which its outward form has resulted4 ,such a representation has1 however1 to shut out from itself the external history of the time1 and to take into account only the general character of the people and time1 and likewise their circumstances as a whole4 ,but as a matter of fact1 the history of ,philosophy does present this character1 and that indeed in the highest possible degree2 its connection with it is of the closest kind1 and the particular appearance presented by a philosophy belonging to one special period1 is only a particular aspect or element in the character4 ,because of this inward correspondence we have partly to consider more closely the particular relation borne by a philosophy to its historical surroundings1 and partly1 but pre-eminently1 what is proper to itself1 from which alone1 after separating everything related however closely1 we can fix our standpoint4 ,this connection1 which is not merely external but essential1 has thus two sides1 which we must consider4 ,the first is the distinctly historical side1 the second is the connection with other matters--the connection of ,philosophy with ,religion1 for instance1 by which we at once obtain a deeper conception of ,philosophy itself4 #a4 ,,the ,,historical ,,side ,,of ,,this ,,connection4 ,it is usually said that political affairs and such matters as ,religion are to be taken into consideration because they have exercised a great influence on the ,philosophy of the time1 and similarly it exerts an influence upon them4 ,but when people are content with such a category as 8great influence0 they place the two in an external relationship1 and start from the point of view that both sides are for themselves independent4 ,here1 however1 we must think of this relationship in another category1 and not according to the influence or effect of one upon the other4 ,the true category is the unity of all these different forms1 so that it is one ,mind which manifests itself in1 and impresses itself upon these different elements4 a4 ,outward and historical conditions imposed upon ,philosophy4 ,it must be remarked in the first place1 that a certain stage is requisite in the intellectual culture of a people in order that it may have a ,philosophy at all4 ,aristotle says1 8,man first begins to philosophize when the necessities of life are supplied0 7,metaphysics1 ,i4 #b72 because since ,philosophy is a free and not self-seeking activity1 cravings of want must have disappeared1 a strength1 elevation and inward fortitude of mind must have appeared1 passions must be subdued and consciousness so far advanced1 before what is universal can be thought of4 ,philosophy may thus be called a kind of luxury1 in so far as luxury signifies those enjoyments and pursuits which do not belong to external necessity as such4 ,philosophy in this respect seems more capable of being dispensed with than anything else2 but that depends on what is called indispensable4 ,from the point of view of mind1 ,philosophy may even be said to be that which is most essential4 b4 ,the commencement in ,history of an intellectual necessity for ,philosophy4 ,however much ,philosophy1 as the thought and conception of the ,mind of a particular time1 is priori1 it is at the same time just as really a result1 since the thought produced and1 indeed1 the life and action are produced to produce themselves4 ,this activity contains the essential element of a negation1 because to produce is also to destroy2 ,philosophy in producing itself1 has the natural as its starting point in order to abrogate it again4 ,philosophy thus makes its appearance at a time when the ,mind of a people has worked its way out of the indifference and stolidity of the first life of nature1 as it has also done from the standpoint of the emotional1 so that the individual aim has blotted itself out4 ,but as ,mind passes on from its natural form1 it also proceeds from its exact code of morals and the robustness of life to reflection and conception4 ,the result of this is that it lays hold of and troubles this real1 substantial kind of existence1 this morality and faith1 and thus the period of destruction commences4 ,further progress is then made through the gathering up of thought within itself4 ,it may be said that ,philosophy first commences when a race for the most part has left its concrete life1 when separation and change of class have begun1 and the people approach toward their fall2 when a gulf has arisen between inward strivings and external reality1 and the old forms of ,religion1 c41 are no longer satisfying2 when ,mind manifests indifference to its living existence or rests unsatisfied therein1 and moral life becomes dissolved4 ,then it is that ,mind takes refuge in the clear space of thought to create for itself a kingdom of thought in opposition to the world of actuality1 and ,philosophy is the reconciliation following upon the destruction of that real world which thought has begun4 ,when ,philosophy with its abstractions paints grey in grey1 the freshness and life of youth has gone1 the reconciliation is not a reconciliation in the actual1 but in the ideal world4 ,thus the ,greek philosophers held themselves far removed from the business of the ,state and were called by the people idlers1 because they withdrew themselves within the world of thought4 ,this holds good throughout all the history of ,philosophy4 ,it was so with ,ionic ,philosophy in the decline of the ,ionic ,states in ,asia ,minor4 ,socrates and ,plato had no more pleasure in the life of the ,state in ,athens1 which was in the course of its decline2 ,plato tried to bring about something better with ,dionysius4 ,thus in ,athens1 with the ruin of the ,athenian people1 the period was reached when ,philosophy appeared4 ,in ,rome1 ,philosophy first expanded in the decline of the ,republic and of ,roman life proper1 under the despotism of the ,roman ,emperors3 a time of misfortune for the world and of decay in political life1 when earlier religious systems tottered and everything was in the process of struggle and disintegration4 ,with the decline of the ,roman ,empire1 which was so great1 rich and glorious1 and yet inwardly dead1 the height and indeed the zenith of ancient ,philosophy is associated through the ,neo-,platonists at ,alexandria4 ,it was also in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries1 when the ,teutonic life of the ,middle ,ages acquired another form1 that ,philosophy first became taught1 though it was later on that it attained to independence4 ,before that1 political life still existed in unity with ,religion1 or if the ,state fought against the ,church1 the ,church still kept the foremost place1 but now the gulf between ,church and ,state came into existence4 ,philosophy thus comes in at a certain epoch only in the development of the whole4 c4 ,philosophy as the thought of its time4 ,but men do not at certain epochs1 merely philosophize in general1 for there is a definite ,philosophy which arises among a people1 and the definite character of the standpoint of thought is the same character which permeates all the other historical sides of the spirit of the people1 which is most intimately related to them1 and which constitutes their foundation4 ,the particular form of a ,philosophy is thus contemporaneous with a particular constitution of the people amongst whom it makes its appearance1 with their institutions and forms of government1 their morality1 their social life and the capabilities1 customs and enjoyments of the same2 it is so with their attempts and achievements in art and science1 with their religious1 warfares and external relationships1 likewise with the decadence of the ,states in which this particular principle and form had maintained its supremacy1 and with the origination and progress of new ,states in which a higher principle finds its manifestation and development4 ,mind in each case has elaborated and expanded in the whole domain of its manifold nature the principle of the particular stage of self-consciousness to which it has attained4 ,thus the ,mind of a people in its richness is an organization1 and1 like a ,cathedral1 is divided into numerous vaults1 passages1 pillars and vestibules1 all of which have proceeded out of one whole and are directed to one end4 ,philosophy is one form of these many aspects4 ,and which is it8 ,it is the fullest blossom1 the ,notion of ,mind in its entire form1 the consciousness and spiritual essence of all things1 the spirit of the time as spirit present in itself4 ,the multifarious whole is reflected in it as in the single focus1 in the ,notion which knows itself4 ,the ,philosophy which is essential within ,christianity could not be found in ,rome1 for all the various forms of the whole are only the expression of one and the same determinate character4 ,hence political history1 forms of government1 art and religion are not related to ,philosophy as its causes1 nor1 on the other hand1 is ,philosophy the ground of their existence--one and all have the same common root1 the spirit of the time4 ,it is one determinate existence1 one determinate character which permeates all sides and manifests itself in politics and in all else as in different elements2 it is a condition which hangs together in all its parts1 and the various parts of which contain nothing which is really inconsistent1 however diverse and accidental they may appear to be1 and however much they may seem to contradict one another4 ,this particular stage is the product of the one preceding4 ,but to show how the spirit of a particular time moulds its whole actuality and destiny in accordance with its principle1 to show this whole edifice in its conception1 is far from us--for that would be the object of the whole philosophic world-history4 ,those forms alone concern us which express the principle of the ,mind in a spiritual element related to ,philosophy4 ,this is the position of ,philosophy amongst its varying forms1 from which it follows that it is entirely identical with its time4 ,but if ,philosophy does not stand above its time in content1 it does so in form1 because1 as the thought and knowledge of that which is the substantial spirit of its time1 it makes that spirit its object4 ,in as far as ,philosophy is in the spirit of its time1 the latter is its determined content in the world1 although as knowledge1 ,philosophy is above it1 since it places it in the relation of object4 ,but this is in form alone1 for ,philosophy really has no other content4 ,this knowledge itself undoubtedly is the actuality of ,mind1 the self-knowledge of ,mind which previously was not present3 thus the formal difference is also a real and actual difference4 ,through knowledge1 ,mind makes manifest a distinction between knowledge and that which is2 this knowledge is thus what produces a new form of development4 ,the new forms at first are only special modes of knowledge1 and it is thus that a new ,philosophy is produced3 yet since it already is a wider kind of spirit1 it is the inward birthplace of the spirit which will later arrive at actual form4 ,we shall deal further with this in the concrete below1 and we shall then see that what the ,greek ,philosophy was1 entered1 in the ,christian world1 into actuality4 #b4 ,,separation ,,of ,,philosophy ,,from ,,other ,,allied ,,departments ,,of ,,knowledge4 ,the history of the other ,sciences1 of culture and above all the history of art and of religion are1 partly in regard to the elements contained in them1 and partly to their particular objects1 related to the history of ,philosophy4 ,it is through this relationship that the treatment of the history of ,philosophy has been so confused4 ,if it is to concern itself with the possession of culture generally and then with scientific culture1 and then again with popular myths and the dogmas contained only in them1 and yet farther with the religious reflections which are already thoughts of a speculative kind1 and which make their appearance in them1 no bounds are left to ,philosophy at all4 ,this is so1 partly on account of the amount of material itself and the labour required in working it up and preparing it1 and partly because it is in immediate connection with so much else4 ,but the separation must not be made arbitrarily or as by chance1 but must be derived from fundamental determinations4 ,if we merely look at the name of ,philosophy1 all this matter will pertain to its history4 ,i shall speak of this material from three points of view1 for three related aspects are to be eliminated and separated from ,philosophy4 ,the first of these is that which is generally considered to be the domain of science1 and in which are found the beginnings of understanding thought4 ,the second region is that of mythology and religion2 the relation of ,philosophy to them seems often to be inimical both in the time of the ,greeks and of the ,christians4 ,the third is that of philosophizing and the metaphysics of the understanding4 ,while we distinguish what is related to ,philosophy1 we must also take note of the elements in this related matter which belong to the ,notion of ,philosophy1 but which appear to us to be partially separated from it3 and thus we may become acquainted with the ,notion of ,philosophy4 a4 ,relation of ,philosophy to ,scientific ,knowledge4 ,knowledge and thought certainly form the element of whatever has to do with particular sciences as they form the element of ,philosophy2 but their subjects are mainly finite subjects and appearance4 ,a collection of facts known about this content is by its nature excluded from ,philosophy3 neither this content nor such a form has anything to do with it4 ,but even if the sciences are systematic and contain universal principles and laws from which they proceed1 they are still related to a limited circle of objects4 ,the ultimate principles are assumed as are the objects themselves2 that is1 the outward experience or the feelings of the heart1 natural or educated sense of right and duty1 constitute the source from which they are created4 ,logic and the determinations and principles of thought in general are in their methods assumed4 ,the forms of thought or the points of view and principles which hold good in the sciences and constitute the ultimate support of all their matter1 are not peculiar to them1 but are common to the condition and culture of the time and of the people4 ,this culture consists mainly in the general ideas and aims1 in the whole extent of the particular intellectual powers dominating consciousness and life4 ,our consciousness has these ideas and allows them to be considered ultimate determinations2 it makes use of them as guiding and connecting links1 but does not know them and does not even make them the objects of its consideration4 ,to give an abstract example1 each act of consciousness has and requires the whole abstract thought-determination of ,being4 8,the sun is in the heavens1 the bunch of grapes is ripe10 and so on into infinitude4 ,again1 in a higher culture1 such relations as those of cause and effect are involved1 as also those of force and its manifestation4 ,all its knowledge and ideas are permeated and governed by a metaphysic such as this2 it is the net in which all the concrete matter which occupies mankind in action and in impulses1 is grasped4 ,but this web and its knots in our ordinary consciousness are sunk into a manifold material1 for it contains the objects and interests which we know and which we have before us4 ,these common threads are not drawn up and made explicitly the objects of our reflection4 ,we ,germans seldom now count general scientific knowledge as ,philosophy4 ,and yet traces of this are found1 as for instance1 in the fact that the philosophic ,faculty contains all the ,sciences which have not as their immediate aim the ,church and ,state4 ,in connection with this1 the significance of the name of ,philosophy1 which is even now an important matter of discussion in ,england1 comes in question4 ,natural ,sciences are in ,england called ,philosophy4 ,a 8,philosophic ,journal0 in ,england1 edited by ,thompson1 treats of ,chemistry1 ,agriculture1 ,manuring1 ,husbandry1 ,technology1 like ,hermbstdt's ,journal1 and gives inventions connected therewith4 ,the ,english call physical instruments1 such as the barometer and thermometer1 philosophical instruments4 ,theories too1 and especially morality and the moral sciences1 which are derived from the feelings of the human heart or from experience1 are called ,philosophy1 and finally this is also so with the theories and principles of ,political ,economy4 ,and thus at least in ,england1 is the name of ,philosophy respected4 ,some time ago a banquet took place under the presidency of ,lord ,liverpool1 at which the minister ,canning was also present4 ,the latter in returning thanks congratulated ,england in having philosophic principles of government there brought into operation4 ,there1 at least1 ,philosophy is no by-word4 ,in the first beginnings of culture1 however1 we are more often met by this admixture of ,philosophy and general knowledge4 ,there comes a time to a nation when mind applies itself to universal objects1 when1 for example1 in seeking to bring natural things under general modes of understanding1 it tries to learn their causes4 ,then it is said that a people begins to philosophize1 for this content has thought in common with ,philosophy4 ,at such a time we find deliverances about all the common events of ,nature1 as we also find intellectual maxims1 moral sentences1 general principles respecting morality1 the will1 duty1 and the like1 and those who expressed them have been called wise men or philosophers4 ,thus in the beginnings of ,greek ,philosophy we find the seven sages and the ,ionic ,philosophers4 ,from them a number of ideas and discoveries are conveyed to us which seem like philosophic propositions4 ,thus ,thales1 amongst others1 has explained that the eclipse of sun and moon is due to the intervention of the moon or earth4 ,this is called a theorem4 ,pythagoras found out the principle of the harmony of sounds4 ,others have had ideas about the stars3 the heavens were supposed to be composed of perforated metal1 by which we see throughout the empyrean region1 the eternal fire which surrounds the world4 ,such propositions as products of the understanding1 do not belong to the history of ,philosophy1 although they imply that the merely sensuous gaze has been left behind1 as also the representation of those objects by the imagination only4 ,earth and heaven thus become unpeopled with gods1 because the understanding distinguishes things in their outward and natural qualities from ,mind4 ,in a later time the epoch of the revival in the sciences is as noteworthy in this respect4 ,general principles regarding the state1 c41 were given expression to1 and in them a philosophic side cannot be mistaken4 ,to this place the philosophic systems of ,hobbes and ,descartes belong3 the writings of the latter contain philosophic principles1 but his ,philosophy of ,nature is quite empirical4 ,hugo ,grotius composed an international law in which what was historically held by the people as law1 the consensus gentium1 was a main element4 ,though1 earlier1 medicine was a collection of isolated facts and a theosophic combination mixed up with astrology1 c4 7it is not so long ago since cures were effected by sacred relics71 a mode of regarding nature came into vogue according to which men went forth to discover the laws and forces of ,nature4 ,the priori reasoning regarding natural things1 according to the metaphysics of the ,scholastic ,philosophy or to ,religion1 has now been given up4 ,the ,philosophy of ,newton contains nothing but ,natural ,science1 that is1 the knowledge of the laws1 forces1 and general constitution of ,nature1 derived from observation and from experience4 ,however much this may seem to be contrary to the principle of ,philosophy1 it has in common with it the fact that the bases of both are universal1 and still further that ,i have made this experience1 that it rests on my consciousness and obtains its significance through me4 ,this form is in its general aspect antagonistic to the positive1 and has come forward as particularly opposed to ,religion and to that which is positive in it4 ,if1 in the ,middle ,ages1 the ,church had its dogmas as universal truths1 man1 on the contrary1 has now obtained from the testimony of his 8own thought10 feeling and ideas1 a mistrust of these4 ,it is merely to be remarked of this that 8my own thought0 is in itself a pleonasm1 because each individual must think for himself1 and no one can do so for another4 ,similarly this principle has turned against the recognized constitutions and has sought different principles instead1 by them to correct the former4 ,universal principles of the ,state have now been laid down1 while earlier1 because religion was positive1 the ground of obedience of subjects to princes and of all authority were also so4 ,kings1 as the anointed of the ,lord1 in the sense that ,jewish kings were so1 derived their power from ,god1 and had to give account to ,him alone1 because all authority is given by ,god4 ,so far theology and jurisprudence were on the whole fixed and positive sciences1 wherever this positive character might have been derived4 ,against this external authority reflection has been brought to bear1 and thus1 especially in ,england1 the source of public and civil law became no longer mere authority derived from ,god like the ,mosaic ,law4 ,for the authority of kings other justification was sought1 such as the end implied in the ,state1 the good of the people4 ,this forms quite another source of truth1 and it is opposed to that which is revealed1 given and positive4 ,this substitution of another ground than that of authority has been called philosophizing4 ,the knowledge was then a knowledge of what is finite--the world of the content of knowledge4 ,because this content proceeded through the personal insight of human reason1 man has become independent in his actions4 ,this independence of the ,mind is the true moment of ,philosophy1 although the ,notion of ,philosophy through this formal determination1 which limits it to finite objects1 has not yet been exhausted4 ,this independent thought is respected1 has been called human wisdom or worldly wisdom1 for it has had what is earthly as its object1 and it took its origin in the world4 ,this was the meaning of ,philosophy1 and men did rightly to call it worldly wisdom4 ,frederick von ,schlegel revived this by-name for ,philosophy1 and desired to indicate by it that what concerns higher spheres1 such as religion1 must be kept apart2 and he had many followers4 ,philosophy1 indeed1 occupies itself with finite things1 but1 according to ,spinoza1 as resting in the divine ,idea3 it has thus the same end as religion4 ,to the finite sciences which are now separated also from ,philosophy1 the ,churches objected that they led men away from ,god1 since they have as objects only what is finite4 ,this defect in them1 conceived of from the point of view of content1 leads us to the second department allied to ,philosophy1--that is1 to ,religion4 b4 ,relation of ,philosophy to ,religion4 ,as the first department of knowledge was related to ,philosophy principally by means of formal and independent knowledge1 ,religion1 though in its content quite different from this first kind or sphere of knowledge1 is through it related to ,philosophy4 ,its object is not the earthly and worldly1 but the infinite4 ,in the case of art and still more in that of ,religion1 ,philosophy has in common a content composed entirely of universal objects2 they constitute the mode in which the highest ,idea is existent for the unphilosophical feeling1 the perceiving and imagining consciousness4 ,inasmuch as in the progress of culture in time the manifestation of ,religion precedes the appearance of ,philosophy1 this circumstance must really be taken account of1 and the conditions requisite for beginning the ,history of ,philosophy have to depend on this1 because it has to be shown in how far what pertains to ,religion is to be excluded from it1 and that a commencement must not be made with ,religion4 ,in ,religion1 races of men have undoubtedly expressed their idea of the nature of the world1 the substance of nature and of intellect and the relation of man thereto4 ,absolute ,being is here the object of their consciousness2 and as such1 is for them pre-eminently the 8other10 a 8beyond10 nearer or further off1 more or less friendly or frightful and alarming4 ,in the act and forms of worship this opposition is removed by man1 and he raises himself to the consciousness of unity with his ,being1 to the feeling of1 or dependence on1 the ,grace of ,god1 in that ,god has reconciled mankind to ,himself4 ,in conception1 with the ,greeks1 for instance1 this existence is to man one which is already in and for itself and friendly1 and thus worship is but the enjoyment of this unity4 ,this existence is now reason which is existent in and for itself1 the universal and concrete substance1 the ,mind whose first cause is objective to itself in consciousness2 it thus is a representation of this last in which not only reason in general1 but the universal infinite reason is4 ,we must1 therefore1 comprehend ,religion1 as ,philosophy1 before everything else1 which means to know and apprehend it in reason2 for it is the work of self-revealing reason and is the highest form of reason4 ,such ideas as that priests have framed a people's ,religion in fraud and self-interest are consequently absurd2 to regard ,religion as an arbitrary matter or a deception is as foolish as it is perverted4 ,priests have often profaned ,religion--the possibility of which is a consequence of the external relations and temporal existence of ,religion4 ,it can thus1 in this external connection1 be laid hold of here and there1 but because it is ,religion1 it is really that which stands firm against finite ends and their complications and constitutes a region exalted high above them4 ,this region of ,mind is really the ,holy place of ,truth itself1 the ,holy place in which are dissolved the remaining illusions of the sensuous world1 of finite ideas and ends1 and of the sphere of opinion and caprice4 ,inasmuch as it really is the content of religions1 this rational matter might now seem to be capable of being abstracted and expressed as a number of historical theorems4 ,philosophy stands on the same basis as ,religion and has the same object--the universal reason existing in and for itself2 ,mind desires to make this object its own1 as is done with ,religion in the act and form of worship4 ,but the form1 as it is present in ,religion1 is different from what is found to be contained in ,philosophy1 and on this account a history of ,philosophy is different from a history of ,religion4 ,worship is only the operation of reflection2 ,philosophy attempts to bring about the reconciliation by means of thinking knowledge1 because ,mind desires to take up its ,being into itself4 ,philosophy is related in the form of thinking consciousness to its object2 with ,religion it is different4 ,but the distinction between the two should not be conceived of so abstractly as to make it seem that thought is only in ,philosophy and not in ,religion4 ,the latter has likewise ideas and universal thoughts4 ,because both are so nearly related1 it is an old tradition in the history of ,philosophy to deduce ,philosophy from ,persian1 ,indian1 or similar philosophy1 a custom which is still partly retained in all histories of ,philosophy4 ,for this reason1 too1 it is a legend universally believed1 that ,pythagoras1 for instance1 received his ,philosophy from ,india and ,egypt2 the fame of the wisdom of these people1 which wisdom is understood also to contain ,philosophy1 is an old one4 ,the ,oriental ideas and religious worship which prevailed throughout the ,west up to the time of the ,roman ,empire1 likewise bear the name of ,oriental ,philosophy4 ,the ,christian ,religion and ,philosophy are thought of in the ,christian world1 as more definitely divided2 in these ,eastern days1 on the other hand1 ,religion and ,philosophy are still conceived of as one in so far as that the content has remained in the form in which it is ,philosophy4 ,considering the prevalence of these ideas and in order to have a definite limit to the relations between a history of ,philosophy and religious ideas1 it is desirable to note some further considerations as to the form which separates religious ideas from philosophical theorems4 ,religion has not only universal thought as inward content implicite contained in its myths1 ideas1 imaginations and in its exact and positive histories1 so that we require first of all to dig this content out of such myths in the form of theorems1 but it often has its content explicite in the form of thought4 ,in the ,persian and ,indian ,religions very deep1 sublime and speculative thoughts are even expressed4 ,indeed1 in ,religion we even meet philosophies directly expressed1 as in the ,philosophy of the ,fathers4 ,the scholastic ,philosophy really was ,theology2 there is found in it a union or1 if you will1 a mixture of ,theology and ,philosophy which may very well puzzle us4 ,the question which confronts us on the one side is1 how ,philosophy differs from ,theology1 as the science of ,religion1 or from ,religion as consciousness8 ,and then1 in how far have we in the history of ,philosophy to take account of what pertains to ,religion8 ,for the reply to this last question three aspects have again to be dealt with2 first of all the mythical and historical aspect of ,religion and its relation to ,philosophy2 in the second place the theorems and speculative thoughts directly expressed in ,religion2 and in the third place we must speak of ,philosophy within ,theology4 4 ,difference between ,philosophy and ,religion4 ,the consideration of the mythical aspect of ,religion or the historical and positive side generally1 is interesting1 because from it the difference in respect of form will show in what this content is antagonistic to ,philosophy4 ,indeed1 taken in its connections1 its difference passes into apparent inconsistency4 ,this diversity is not only found in our contemplation but forms a very definite element in history4 ,it is required by ,philosophy that it should justify its beginning and its manner of knowledge1 and ,philosophy has thus placed itself in opposition to ,religion4 ,on the other hand ,philosophy is combated and condemned by ,religion and by the ,churches4 ,the ,greek popular religion indeed1 proscribed several philosophers2 but the opposition is even more apparent in the ,christian ,church4 ,the question is thus not only whether regard is to be paid to ,religion in the history of ,philosophy1 for it has been the case that ,philosophy has paid attention to ,religion1 and the latter to the former4 ,since neither of the two has allowed the other to rest undisturbed1 we are not permitted to do so either4 ,of their relations1 therefore1 we must speak definitely1 openly and honestly--aborder la question1 as the ,french say4 ,we must not hesitate1 as if such a discussion were too delicate1 nor try to help ourselves out by beating about the bush2 nor must we seek to find evasions or shifts1 so that in the end no one can tell what we mean4 ,we must not seem to wish to leave ,religion alone4 ,this is nothing else than to appear to wish to conceal the fact that ,philosophy has directed its efforts against ,religion4 ,religion1 that is1 the theologians1 are indeed the cause of this2 they ignore ,philosophy1 but only in order that they may not be contradicted in their arbitrary reasoning4 ,it may appear as if ,religion demanded that man should abstain from thinking of universal matters and ,philosophy because they are merely worldly wisdom and represent human operations4 ,human reason is here opposed to the divine4 ,men are1 indeed1 well accustomed to a distinction between divine teaching and laws and human power and inventions1 such that under the latter everything is comprehended which in its manifestation proceeds from the consciousness1 the intelligence or the will of mankind2 which makes all this opposed to the knowledge of ,god and to things rendered divine by divine revelation4 ,but the depreciation of what is human expressed by this opposition is then driven further still1 inasmuch as while it implies the further view that man is certainly called upon to admire the wisdom of ,god in ,nature1 and that the grain1 the mountains1 the cedars of ,lebanon in all their glory1 the song of the birds in the bough1 the superior skill and the domestic instincts of animals are all magnified as being the work of ,god1 it also implies that the wisdom1 goodness and justice of ,god is1 indeed1 pointed out in human affairs1 but not so much in the disposition or laws of man or in actions performed voluntarily and in the ordinary progress of the world1 as in human destiny1 that is1 in that which is external and even arbitrary in relation to knowledge and free-will4 ,thus what is external and accidental is regarded as emphatically the work of ,god1 and what has its root in will and conscience1 as the work of man4 ,the harmony between outward relations1 circumstances and events and the general aims of man is certainly something of a higher kind1 but this is the case only for the reason that this harmony is considered with respect to ends which are human and not natural--such as those present in the life of a sparrow which finds its food4 ,but if the summit of everything is found in this1 that ,god rules over ,nature1 what then is free-will8 ,does ,he not rule over what is spiritual1 or rather since ,he himself is spiritual1 in what is spiritual8 and is not the ruler over or in the spiritual region higher than a ruler over or in ,nature8 ,but is that admiration of ,god as revealed in natural things as such1 in trees and animals as opposed to what is human1 far removed from the religion of the ancient ,egyptians1 which derived its knowledge of what is divine from the ibis1 or from cats and dogs8 or does it differ from the deplorable condition of the ancient and the modern ,indians1 who held and still hold cows and apes in reverence1 and are scrupulously concerned for the maintenance and nourishment of these animals1 while they allow men to suffer hunger2 who would commit a crime by removing the pangs of starvation through their slaughter or even by partaking of their food8 ,it seems to be expressed by such a view that human action as regards ,nature is ungodly2 that the operations of ,nature are divine operations1 but what man produces is ungodly4 ,but the productions of human reason might1 at least1 be esteemed as much as ,nature4 ,in so doing1 however1 we cede less to reason than is permitted to us4 ,if the life and the action of animals be divine1 human action must stand much higher1 and must be worthy to be called divine in an infinitely higher sense4 ,the preeminence of human thought must forthwith be avowed4 ,christ says on this subject 7,matt4 vi4 #bf-hj71 8,behold the fowls of the air10 7in which we may also include the ,ibis and the ,kokilas17 8are ye not much better than they8 ,wherefore1 if ,god so clothe the grass of the field1 which to-day is1 and to-morrow is cast into the oven1 shall ,he not much more clothe you80 ,the superiority of man1 of the image of ,god1 to animals and plants is indeed implicitly and explicitly established1 but in asking wherein the divine element is to be sought and seen--in making use of such expressions--none of the superior1 but only the inferior nature1 is indicated4 ,similarly1 in regard to the knowledge of ,god1 it is remarkable that ,christ places the knowledge of and faith in ,him not in any admiration of the creatures of nature nor in marvelling at any so-called dominion1 over them1 nor in signs and wonders1 but in the witness of the ,spirit4 ,spirit is infinitely high above ,nature1 in it the ,divine ,nature manifests itself more than in ,nature4 ,but the form in which the universal content which is in and for itself1 first belongs to ,philosophy is the form of ,thought1 the form of the universal itself4 ,in ,religion1 however1 this content is for immediate and outward perception1 and further for idea and sensation through art4 ,the import is for the sensuous nature2 it is the evidence of the ,mind which comprehends that content4 ,to make this clearer1 the difference must be recollected between that which we are and have1 and how we know the same--that is1 in what manner we know it and have it as our object4 ,this distinction is an infinitely important matter1 and it alone is concerned in the culture of races and of individuals4 ,we are men and have reason2 what is human1 or above all1 what is rational vibrates within us1 both in our feelings1 mind and heart and in our subjective nature generally4 ,it is in this corresponding vibration and in the corresponding motion effected that a particular content becomes our own and is like our own4 ,the manifold nature of the determinations which it contains is concentrated and wrapt up within this inward nature--an obscure motion of ,mind in itself and in universal substantiality4 ,the content is thus directly identical with the simple abstract certainty of ourselves and with self-consciousness4 ,but ,mind1 because it is ,mind1 is as truly consciousness4 ,what is confined within itself in its simplicity must be objective to itself and must come to be known4 ,the whole difference lies in the manner and method of this objectivity1 and hence in the manner and method of consciousness4 ,this method and manner extends from the simple expression of the dulness of mere feeling to the most objective form1 to that which is in and for itself objective1 to ,thought4 ,the most simple1 most formal objectivity is the expression of a name for that feeling and for the state of mind according with it1 as seen in these words1 worship1 prayer1 etc4 ,such expressions as 8,let us pray0 and 8,let us worship0 are simply the recalling of that feeling4 ,but 8,let us think about ,god0 brings with it something more2 it expresses the absolutely embracing content of that substantial feeling1 and the object1 which differs from mere sensation as subjective self-conscious activity2 or which is content distinguished from this activity as form4 ,this object1 however1 comprehending in itself the whole substantial content1 is itself still undeveloped and entirely undetermined4 ,to develop that content1 to comprehend1 express and bring to consciousness its relations1 is the commencement1 creation and manifestation of ,religion4 ,the form in which this developed content first possesses objectivity is that of immediate perception1 of sensuous idea or of a more defined idea deduced from natural1 physical or mental manifestations and conditions4 ,art brings about this consciousness1 in that it gives permanence and cohesion to the fleeting visible appearance through which objectivity passes in sensation4 ,the shapeless1 sacred stone1 the mere place1 or whatever it is to which the desire for objectivity first attaches itself1 receives from art1 form1 feature1 determinate character and content which can be known and which is now present for consciousness4 ,art has thus become the instructress of the people4 ,this was the case with ,homer and ,hesiod for instance1 who1 according to ,herodotus 7,,ii4 #ec71 8,made the ,greeks their ,theogony10 because they elevated and consolidated ideas and traditions in unison with the spirit of the people1 wherever and in whatever confusion they might be found1 into definite images and ideas4 ,this is not the art which merely gives expression in its own way to the content1 already perfectly expressed1 of a ,religion which in thought1 idea and words has already attained complete development2 that is to say1 which puts its matter into stone1 canvas1 or words as is done by modern art1 which1 in dealing either with religious or with historical objects1 takes as its groundwork ideas and thoughts which are already there4 ,the consciousness of this ,religion is rather the product of thinking imagination1 or of thought which comprehends through the organ of imagination alone and finds expression in its forms4 ,if the infinite ,thought1 the absolute ,mind1 has revealed and does reveal itself in true ,religion1 that in which it reveals itself is the heart1 the representing consciousness and the understanding of what is finite4 ,religion is not merely directed to every sort of culture4 8,to the poor is the ,gospel preached10 but it must as being ,religion expressly directed towards heart and mind1 enter into the sphere of subjectivity and consequently into the region of finite methods of representation4 ,in the perceiving and1 with reference to perceptions1 reflecting consciousness1 man possesses for the speculative relations belonging to the absolute1 only finite relations1 whether taken in an exact or in a symbolical sense1 to serve him to comprehend and express those qualities and relationships of the infinite4 ,in ,religion as the earliest and the immediate revelations of ,god1 the form of representation and of reflecting finite thought cannot be the only form in which ,he gives existence to ,himself in consciousness1 but it must also appear in this form1 for such alone is comprehensible to religious consciousness4 ,to make this clearer1 something must be said as to what is the meaning of comprehension4 ,on the one hand1 as has been remarked above1 there is in it the substantial basis of content1 which1 coming to ,mind as its absolute ,being1 affects it in its innermost1 finds an answering chord1 and thereby obtains from it confirmation4 ,this is the first absolute condition necessary to comprehension2 what is not implicitly there cannot come within it or be for it--that is1 a content which is infinite and eternal4 ,for the substantial as infinite1 is just that which has no limitations in that to which it is related1 for else it would be limited and not the true substantial4 ,and ,mind is that alone which is not implicit1 which is finite and external2 for what is finite and external is no longer what is implicit but what is for another1 what has entered into a relation4 ,but1 on the other hand1 because the true and eternal must be for ,mind become known1 that is1 enter into finite consciousness1 the ,mind for which it is1 is finite and the manner of its consciousness consists in the ideas and forms of finite things and relations4 ,these forms are familiar and well known to consciousness1 the ordinary mode of finality1 which mode it has appropriated to itself1 having constituted it the universal medium of its representation1 into which everything that comes to consciousness must be resolved in order that it may have and know itself therein4 ,the assertion of ,religion is that the manifestation of ,truth which is revealed to us through it1 is one which is given to man from outside1 and on this account it is also asserted that man has humbly to assent to it1 because human reason cannot attain to it by itself4 ,the assertion of positive ,religion is that its truths exist without having their source known1 so that the content as given1 is one which is above and beyond reason4 ,by means of some prophet or other divine instrument1 the truth is made known3 just as ,ceres and ,triptolemus who introduced agriculture and matrimony1 for so doing were honoured by the ,greeks1 men have rendered thanks to ,moses and to ,mahomed4 ,through whatever individual the ,truth may have been given1 the external matter is historical1 and this is indifferent to the absolute content and to itself1 since the person is not the import of the doctrine4 ,but the ,christian ,religion has this characteristic that the ,person of ,christ in ,his character of the ,son of ,god1 ,himself partakes of the nature of ,god4 ,if ,christ be for ,christians only a teacher like ,pythagoras1 ,socrates or ,columbus1 there would be here no universal divine content1 no revelation or knowledge imparted about the ,nature of ,god1 and it is regarding this alone that we desire to obtain knowledge4 ,whatever stage it may itself have reached1 the ,truth must undoubtedly in the first place come to men from without as a present object1 sensuously represented1 just as ,moses saw ,god in the fiery bush1 and as the ,greek brought the god into conscious being by means of sculpture or other representations4 ,but there is the further fact1 that neither in ,religion nor in ,philosophy does this external form remain1 nor can it so remain4 ,a form of the imagination or an historical form1 such as ,christ1 must for the spirit be spiritual2 and thus it ceases to be an external matter1 seeing that the form of externality is dead4 ,we must know ,god 8in ,spirit and in ,truth40 ,he is the absolute and actual ,spirit4 ,the relation borne by the human spirit to this ,spirit involves the following considerations4 ,when man determines to adopt a ,religion he asks himself1 8,what is the ground of my faith80 ,the ,christian ,religion replies--8,the ,spirit's witness to its content40 ,christ reproved the ,pharisees for wishing to see miracles2 the ,spirit alone comprehends ,spirit1 the miracle is only a presentiment of that ,spirit2 and if the miracle be the suspension of natural laws1 ,spirit itself is the real miracle in the operations of nature4 ,spirit in itself is merely this comprehension of itself4 ,there is only one ,spirit1 the universal divine ,spirit4 ,not that it is merely everywhere2 it is not to be comprehended as what is common to everything1 as an external totality1 to be found in many or in all individuals1 which are essentially individuals2 but it must be understood as that which permeates through everything1 as the unity of itself and of a semblance of its 8other10 as of the subjective and particular4 ,as universal1 it is object to itself1 and thus determined as a particular1 it is this individual3 but as universal it reaches over this its 8other10 so that its 8other0 and itself are comprised in one4 ,the true universality seems1 popularly expressed1 to be two--what is common to the universal itself and to the particular4 ,a division is formed in the understanding of itself1 and the ,spirit is the unity of what is understood and the understanding person4 ,the divine ,spirit which is comprehended1 is objective2 the subjective ,spirit comprehends4 ,but ,spirit is not passive1 or else the passivity can be momentary only2 there is one spiritual substantial unity4 ,the subjective ,spirit is the active1 but the objective ,spirit is itself this activity2 the active subjective ,spirit is that which comprehends the divine1 and in its comprehension of it it is itself the divine ,spirit4 ,the relation of ,spirit to self alone is the absolute determination2 the divine ,spirit lives in its own communion and presence4 ,this comprehension has been called ,faith1 but it is not an historical faith2 we ,lutherans--,i am a ,lutheran and will remain the same--have only this original faith4 ,this unity is not the ,substance of ,spinoza1 but the apprehending ,substance in self-consciousness which makes itself eternal and relates to universality4 ,the talk about the limitations of human thought is futile2 to know ,god is the only end of ,religion4 ,the testimony of the ,spirit to the content of ,religion is itself ,religion2 it is a testimony that both bears witness and at the same time is that witness4 ,the ,spirit proves itself1 and does so first in the proof2 it is only proved because it proves itself and shows or manifests itself4 ,it has further to be said1 that this testimony1 this inward stirring and self-consciousness1 reveals itself1 while in the enshrouded consciousness of devotion it does not arrive at the proper consciousness of an object1 but only at the consciousness of immersion in absolute ,being4 ,this permeating and permeated ,spirit now enters into conception2 ,god goes forth into the 8other0 and makes ,himself objective4 ,all that pertains to revelation and its reception1 and which comes before us in mythology1 here appears2 everything which is historical and which belongs to what is positive has here its proper place4 ,to speak more definitely1 we now have the ,christ who came into the world nearly two thousand years ago4 ,but ,he says1 8,i am with you even unto the ends of the earth2 where two or three are gathered together in ,my ,name1 there will ,i be in the midst40 ,i shall not be seen of you in the flesh1 but 8,the ,spirit of ,truth will guide you into all ,truth40 ,the external is not the true relation2 it will disappear4 ,the two stages have here been given1 the first of which is the stage of devotion1 of worship1 such as that reached in partaking of the ,communion4 ,that is the perception of the divine ,spirit in the community in which the present1 indwelling1 living ,christ as self-consciousness has attained to actuality4 ,the second stage is that of developed consciousness1 when the content becomes the object2 here this present1 indwelling ,christ retreats two thousand years to a small corner of ,palestine1 and is an individual historically manifested far away at ,nazareth or ,jerusalem4 ,it is the same thing in the ,greek ,religion where the god present in devotion changes into prosaic statues and marble2 or in painting1 where this externality is likewise arrived at1 when the god becomes mere canvas or wood4 ,the ,supper is1 according to the ,lutheran conception1 of ,faith alone2 it is a divine satisfaction1 and is not adored as if it were the ,host4 ,thus a sacred image is no more to us than is a stone or thing4 ,the second point of view must indeed be that with which consciousness begins2 it must start from the external comprehension of this form3 it must passively accept report and take it up into memory4 ,but if it remain where it is1 that is the unspiritual point of view2 to remain fixed in this second standpoint in this dead far-away historic distance1 is to reject the ,spirit4 ,the sins of him who lies against the ,holy ,ghost cannot be forgiven4 ,that lie is the refusal to be a universal1 to be holy1 that is to make ,christ become divided1 separated1 to make ,him only another person as this particular person in ,judea2 or else to say that ,he now exists1 but only far away in ,heaven1 or in some other place1 and not in present actual form amongst ,his people4 ,the man who speaks of the merely finite1 of merely human reason1 and of the limits to mere reason1 lies against the ,spirit1 for the ,spirit as infinite and universal1 as self-comprehension1 comprehends itself not in a 8merely0 nor in limits1 nor in the finite as such4 ,it has nothing to do with this1 for it comprehends itself within itself alone1 in its infinitude4 ,if it be said of ,philosophy that it makes reality the subject of its knowledge1 the principal point is that the reality should not be one outside of that of which it is the reality4 ,for example1 if from the real content of a book1 ,i abstract the binding1 paper1 ink1 language1 the many thousand letters that are contained in it1 the simple universal content as reality1 is not outside of the book4 ,similarly law is not outside of the individual1 but it constitutes the true ,being of the individual4 ,the reality of my ,mind is thus in my ,mind itself and not outside of it2 it is my real ,being1 my own substance1 without which ,i am without existence4 ,this reality is1 so to speak1 the combustible material which may be kindled and lit up by the universal reality as such as objective2 and only so far as this phosphorus is in men1 is comprehension1 the kindling and lighting up1 possible4 ,feeling1 anticipation1 knowledge of ,god1 are only thus in men2 without such1 the divine ,mind would not be the in and for itself ,universal4 ,reality is itself a real content and not the destitute of content and undetermined2 yet1 as the book has other content besides1 there is in the individual mind also a great amount of other matter which belongs only to the manifestation of this reality1 and the individual surrounded with what is external1 must be separated from this existence4 ,since reality is itself ,spirit and not an abstraction1 8,god is not a ,god for the dead but for the living10 and indeed for living spirits4 ,the great ,creator was alone ,and experienced desire1 ,therefore ,he created ,spirits1 ,holy mirrors of ,his holiness4 ,the noblest ,being ,he found no equal2 ,from out the bowl of all the spiritual world1 ,there sparkled up to ,him infinitude4 ,religion is also the point of view from which this existence is known4 ,but as regards the different forms of knowledge existing in ,religion and ,philosophy1 ,philosophy appears to be opposed to the conception in ,religion that the universal mind first shows itself as external1 in the objective mode of consciousness4 ,worship1 commencing with the external1 then turns against and abrogates it as has just been said1 and thus ,philosophy is justified through the acts and forms of worship1 and only does what they do4 ,philosophy has to deal with two different objects2 first as in the ,religion present in worship1 with the substantial content1 the spiritual soul1 and secondly with bringing this before consciousness as object1 but in the form of thought4 ,philosophy thinks and conceives of that which ,religion represents as the object of consciousness1 whether it is as the work of the imagination or as existent facts in history4 ,the form of the knowledge of the object is1 in religious consciousness1 such as pertains to the ordinary idea1 and is thus more or less sensuous in nature4 ,in ,philosophy we do not say that ,god begot a ,son1 which is a relation derived from natural life4 ,thought1 or the substance of such a relation1 is therefore still recognized in ,philosophy4 ,since ,philosophy thinks its object1 it has the advantage of uniting the two stages of religious consciousness--which in ,religion are different moments--into one unity in philosophic thought4 ,it is these two forms which are different from one another and which1 as opposed1 may therefore seem to be mutually conflicting2 and it is natural and it necessarily seems to be the case1 that on first definitely coming to view they are so to speak conscious of their diversity1 and hence at first appear as inimical to one another4 ,the first stage in the order of manifestation is definite existence1 or a determinate ,being-for-self as opposed to the other4 ,the later form is that ,thought embraces itself in the concrete1 immerses itself in itself1 and ,mind1 as such1 comes in it to consciousness4 ,in the earlier stage1 ,mind is abstract1 and in this constraint it knows itself to be different1 and in opposition to the other4 ,when it embraces itself in the concrete1 it is no more simply confined in determinate existence1 only knowing or possessing itself in that diversity1 but it is the ,universal which1 inasmuch as it determines itself1 contains its 8other0 within itself4 ,as concrete intelligence1 ,mind thus comprehends the substantial in the form which seemed to differ from it1 of which it had only grasped the outward manifestation and had turned away from it2 it recognizes itself in its inward content1 and so it for the first time grasps its object1 and deals justice to its opposite4 ,generally speaking1 the course of this antithesis in history is that ,thought first of all comes forth within ,religion1 as not free and in separate manifestations4 ,secondly1 it strengthens itself1 feels itself to be resting upon itself1 holds and conducts itself inimically towards the other form1 and does not recognize itself therein4 ,in the third place1 it concludes by acknowledging itself as in this other4 ,or else ,philosophy has to begin with carrying on its work entirely on its own account1 isolating ,thought from all popular beliefs1 and taking for itself quite a different field of operation1 a field for which the world of ordinary ideas lies quite apart1 so that the two exist peacefully side by side1 or1 to put it better1 so that no reflection on their opposition is arrived at4 ,just as little did the thought of reconciling them occur1 since in the popular beliefs the same content appeared as in any external form other than the notion--the thought that is1 of explaining and justifying popular belief1 in order thus to be able again to express the conceptions of free thought in the form of popular religion4 ,thus we see ,philosophy first restrained and confined within the range of the ,greek heathen world2 then resting upon itself1 it goes forth against popular religion and takes up an unfriendly attitude to it1 until it grasps that religion in its innermost and recognizes itself therein4 ,thus the ancient ,greek philosophers generally respected the popular religion1 or at least they did not oppose it1 or reflect upon it4 ,those coming later1 including even ,xenophanes1 handled popular ideas most severely1 and thus many so-called atheists made their appearance4 ,but as the spheres of popular conception1 and abstract thought stood peacefully side by side1 we also find ,greek philosophers of even a later period in development1 in whose case speculative thought and the act of worship1 as also the pious invocation upon and sacrifice to the gods1 coexist in good faith1 and not in mere hypocrisy4 ,socrates was accused of teaching other gods than those belonging to the popular religion2 his was indeed opposed to the principles of ,greek morals and religion1 but at the same time he followed quite honestly the usages of his religion1 and we know besides that his last request was to ask his friends to offer a cock to sculapius--a desire quite inconsistent with his conclusions regarding the existence of ,god and above all regarding morality4 ,plato declaimed against the poets and their gods4 ,it was in a much later time that the ,neo-platonists first recognized in the popular mythology rejected earlier by the philosophers1 the universal content2 they transposed and translated it into what is significant for thought1 and thus used mythology itself as a symbolical imagery for giving expression to their formulas4 ,similarly do we see in the ,christian ,religion1 thought which is not independent first placing itself in conjunction with the form belonging to this ,religion and acting within it--that is to say1 taking the ,religion as its groundwork1 and proceeding from the absolute assumption of the ,christian doctrine4 ,we see later on the opposition between so-called faith and so-called reason2 when the wings of thought have become strengthened1 the young eaglet flies away for himself to the sun of ,truth2 but like a bird of prey he turns upon ,religion and combats it4 ,latest of all ,philosophy permits full justice to be done to the content of ,religion through the speculative ,notion1 which is through ,thought itself4 ,for this end the ,notion must have grasped itself in the concrete and penetrated to concrete spirituality4 ,this must be the standpoint of the ,philosophy of the present time2 it has begun within ,christianity and can have no other content than the world-spirit4 ,when that spirit comprehends itself in ,philosophy1 it also comprehends itself in that form which formerly was inimical to ,philosophy4 ,thus ,religion has a content in common with ,philosophy the forms alone being different2 and the only essential point is that the form of the ,notion should be so far perfected as to be able to grasp the content of ,religion4 ,the ,truth is just that which has been called the mysteries of ,religion4 ,these constitute the speculative element in ,religion such as were called by the ,neo-platonists 1 7being initiated71 or being occupied with speculative ,notions4 ,by mysteries is meant1 superficially speaking1 the secret1 what remains such and does not arrive at being known4 ,but in the ,eleusinian mysteries there was nothing unknown2 all ,athenians were initiated into them1 ,socrates alone shut himself out4 ,openly to make them known to strangers was the one thing forbidden1 as indeed it was made a crime in the case of certain people4 ,such matters however1 as being holy1 were not to be spoken of4 ,herodotus often expressly says 7e4g4 ii4 #de-dg7 that he would speak of the ,egyptian ,divinities and mysteries in as far as it was pious so to do3 he knew more1 but it would be impious to speak of them4 ,in the ,christian ,religion dogmas are called mysteries4 ,they are that which man knows about the ,nature of ,god4 ,neither is there anything mysterious in this2 it is known by all those who are partakers in that ,religion1 and these are thus distinguished from the followers of other ,religions4 ,hence mystery here signifies nothing unknown1 since all ,christians are in the secret4 ,mysteries are in their nature speculative1 mysterious certainly to the understanding1 but not to reason2 they are rational1 just in the sense of being speculative4 ,the understanding does not comprehend the speculative which simply is the concrete because it holds to the differences in their separation2 their contradiction is indeed contained in the mystery1 which1 however1 is likewise the resolution of the same4 ,philosophy1 on the contrary1 is opposed to the so-called ,rationalism of the new ,theology which for ever keeps reason on its lips1 but which is dry understanding only2 no reason is recognizable in it as the moment of independent thought which really is abstract thought and that alone4 ,when the understanding which does not comprehend the truths of ,religion1 calls itself the illuminating reason and plays the lord and master1 it goes astray4 ,rationalism is opposed to ,philosophy in content and form1 for it has made the content empty as it has made the heavens1 and has reduced all that is1 to finite relations--in its form it is a reasoning process which is not free and which has no conceiving power4 ,the supernatural in ,religion is opposed to rationalism1 and if indeed the latter is related in respect of the real content to ,philosophy1 yet it differs from it in form1 for it has become unspiritual and wooden1 looking for its justification to mere external authority4 ,the scholastics were not supernaturalists in this sense2 they knew the dogmas of the ,church in thought and in conception4 ,if ,religion in the inflexibility of its abstract authority as opposed to thought1 declares of it that 8the gates of ,hell shall not triumph over it10 the gates of reason are stronger than the gates of ,hell1 not to overcome the ,church but to reconcile itself to the ,church4 ,philosophy1 as the conceiving thought of this content1 has as regards the idea of ,religion1 the advantage of comprehending both sides--it comprehends ,religion and also comprehends both rationalism and supernaturalism and itself likewise4 ,but this is not the case on the other side4 ,religion from the standpoint of idea1 comprehends only what stands on the same platform as itself1 and not ,philosophy1 the ,notion1 the universal thought determinations4 ,often no injustice is done to a ,philosophy when its opposition to ,religion has been made matter of reproach2 but often1 too1 a wrong has been inflicted where this is done from the religious point of view4 ,the form of ,religion is necessary to ,mind as it is in and for itself2 it is the form of truth as it is for all men1 and for every mode of consciousness4 ,this universal mode is first of all for men in the form of sensuous consciousness1 and then1 secondly1 in the intermingling of the form of the universal with sensuous manifestation or reflection--the representing consciousness1 the mythical1 positive and historical form1 is that pertaining to the understanding4 ,what is received in evidence of ,mind only becomes object to consciousness when it appears in the form of the understanding1 that is to say1 consciousness must first be already acquainted with these forms from life and from experience4 ,now1 because thinking consciousness is not the outward universal form for all mankind1 the consciousness of the true1 the spiritual and the rational1 must have the form of ,religion1 and this is the universal justification of this form4 ,we have here laid down the distinction between ,philosophy and ,religion1 but taking into account what it is we wish to deal with in the history of ,philosophy1 there is something still which must be remarked upon1 and which partly follows from what has been already said4 ,there is the question still confronting us as to what attitude we must take in reference to this matter in the history of ,philosophy4 4 ,the religious element to be excluded from the content of the ,history of ,philosophy4 4 ,mythology first meets us1 and it seems as if it might be drawn within the history of ,philosophy4 ,it is indeed a product of the imagination1 but not of caprice1 although that also has its place here4 ,but the main part of mythology is the work of the imaginative reason1 which makes reality its object1 but yet has no other means of so doing1 than that of sensuous representation1 so that the gods make their appearance in human guise4 ,mythology can now be studied for art1 c4 ,but the thinking mind must seek out the substantial content1 the thought and the theory implicitly contained therein1 as reason is sought in ,nature4 ,this mode of treating mythology was that of the ,neo-platonists2 in recent times it has for the most part become the work of my friend ,creuzer in symbolism4 ,this method of treatment is combated and condemned by others4 ,man1 it is said1 must set to work historically alone1 and it is not historic when a theory unthought of by the ancients1 is read into a myth1 or brought out of it4 ,in one light1 this is quite correct1 for it points to a method adopted by ,creuzer1 and also by the ,alexandrians who acted in a similar way4 ,in conscious thought the ancients had not such theories before them1 nor did anyone maintain them1 yet to say that such content was not implicitly present1 is an absurd contention4 ,as the products of reason1 though not of thinking reason1 the religions of the people1 as also the mythologies1 however simple and even foolish they may appear1 indubitably contain as genuine works of art1 thoughts1 universal determinations and truth1 for the instinct of reason is at their basis4 ,bound up with this is the fact that since mythology in its expression takes sensuous forms1 much that is contingent and external becomes intermingled1 for the representation of the ,notion in sensuous forms always possesses a certain incongruity1 seeing that what is founded on imagination cannot express the ,idea in its real aspect4 ,this sensuous form produced as it is by an historic or natural method1 must be determined on many sides1 and this external determination must1 more or less1 be of such a nature as not to express the ,idea4 ,it may also be that many errors are contained in that explanation1 particularly when a single one is brought within our notice2 all the customs1 actions1 furnishings1 vestments1 and offerings taken together1 may undoubtedly contain something of the ,idea in analogy1 but the connection is far removed1 and many contingent circumstances must find their entrance4 ,but that there is a ,reason there1 must certainly be recognized1 and it is essential so to comprehend and grasp mythology4 ,but ,mythology must remain excluded from our history of ,philosophy4 ,the reason of this is found in the fact that in ,philosophy we have to do not with theorems generally1 or with thoughts which only are implicite contained in some particular form or other1 but with thoughts which are explicit1 and only in so far as they are explicit and in so far as a content such as that belonging to ,religion1 has come to consciousness in the form of ,thought4 ,and this is just what forms the immense distinction which we saw above1 between capacity and actuality4 ,the theorems which are implicite contained within ,religion do not concern us2 they must be in the form of thoughts1 since ,thought alone is the absolute form of the ,idea4 ,in many mythologies1 images are certainly used along with their significance1 or else the images are closely attended by their interpretation4 ,the ancient ,persians worshipped the sun1 or fire1 as being the highest existence2 the first cause in the ,persian ,religion is ,zervane ,akerene--unlimited time1 eternity4 ,this simple eternal existence possesses according to ,diogenes ,lrtius 7,i4 #h71 8the two principles ,ormuzd 77 and ,ahriman 771 the rulers over good and evil40 ,plutarch in writing on ,isis and ,osiris 7,t4 ,,ii4 p4 #cfi1 ed4 ,xyl47 says1 8,it is not one existence which holds and rules the whole1 but good is mingled with evil2 nature as a rule brings forth nothing pure and simple2 it is not one dispenser1 who1 like a host1 gives out and mixes up the drink from two different barrels4 ,but through two opposed and inimical principles of which the one impels towards what is right1 and the other in the opposite direction1 if not the whole world1 at least this earth is influenced in different ways4 ,zoroaster has thus emphatically set up the one principle 7,ormuzd7 as being the ,light1 and the other 7,ahriman7 as the ,darkness4 ,between the two 7 7 is ,mithra1 hence called by the ,persians the ,mediator 7740 ,mithra is then likewise substance1 the universal existence1 the sun raised to a totality4 ,it is not the mediator between ,ormuzd and ,ahriman by establishing peace and leaving each to remain as it was2 it does not partake of good and evil both1 like an unblest middle thing1 but it stands on the side of ,ormuzd and strives with him against the evil4 ,ahriman is sometimes called the first-born son of the ,light1 but ,ormuzd only remained within the ,light4 ,at the creation of the visible world1 ,ormuzd places on the earth in his incomprehensible kingdom of ,light1 the firm arches of the heavens which are above yet surrounded on every side with the first original ,light4 ,midway to the earth is the high hill ,albordi1 which reaches into the source of ,light4 ,ormuzd's empire of ,light extended uninterruptedly over the firm vault of the heavens and the hill ,albordi1 and over the earth too1 until the third age was reached4 ,then ,ahriman1 whose kingdom of night was formerly bound beneath the earth1 broke in upon ,ormuzd's corporeal world and ruled in common with him4 ,now the space between heaven and earth was divided into light and night4 ,as ,ormuzd had formerly only a spiritual kingdom of light1 ,ahriman had only one of night1 but now that they were intermingled he placed the terrestrial light thus created in opposition to the terrestrial night4 ,from this time on1 two corporeal worlds stand opposed1 one pure and good1 and one impure and evil1 and this opposition permeates all nature4 ,on ,albordi1 ,ormuzd created ,mithra as mediator for the earth4 ,the end of the creation of the bodily world is none other than to reinstate existence1 fallen from its creator1 to make it good again1 and thus to make the evil disappear for ever4 ,the bodily world is the battle-ground between good and evil2 but the battle between light and darkness is not in itself an absolute and irreconcilable opposition1 but one which can be conquered1 and in it ,ormuzd1 the principle of ,light1 will be the conqueror4 ,i would remark of this1 that when we consider the elements in these ideas which bear some further connection with ,philosophy1 the universal of that duality with which the ,notion is necessarily set forth can alone be interesting and noteworthy to us2 for in it the ,notion is just the immediate opposite of itself1 the unity of itself with itself in the 8other30 a simple existence in which absolute opposition appears as the opposition of existence1 and the sublation of that opposition4 ,because properly the ,light principle is the only existence of both1 and the principle of ,darkness is the null and void1--the principle of ,light identifies itself with ,mithra1 which was before called the highest existence4 ,the opposition has laid aside the appearance of contingency1 but the spiritual principle is not separate from the physical1 because the good and evil are both determined as ,light and ,darkness4 ,we thus here see thought breaking forth from actuality1 and yet not such a separation as only takes place in ,religion1 when the supersensuous is itself again represented in a manner sensuous1 notionless and dispersed1 for the whole of what is dispersed in sensuous form is gathered together in the one single opposition1 and activity is thus simply represented4 ,these determinations lie much nearer to ,thought2 they are not mere images or symbols1 but yet these myths do not concern ,philosophy4 ,in them ,thought does not take the first place1 for the myth-form remains predominant4 ,in all religions this oscillation between form and thought is found1 and such a combination still lies outside ,philosophy4 ,this is also so in the ,sanchuniathonic ,cosmogony of the ,phnicians4 ,these fragments1 which are found in ,eusebius 7,prpar4 ,evang4 ,i4 #aj71 are taken from the translation of the ,sanchuniathon from ,phnician into ,greek made by a ,grammarian named ,philo from ,biblus4 ,philo lived in the time of ,vespasian and ascribes great antiquity to the ,sanchuniathon4 ,it is there said1 8,the principles of things are found in ,chaos1 in which the elements exist undeveloped and confused1 and in a ,spirit of ,air4 ,the latter permeated the chaos1 and with it engendered a slimy matter or mud 77 which contained within it the living forces and the germs of animals4 ,by mingling this mud with the component matter of chaos and the resulting fermentation1 the elements separated themselves4 ,the fire elements ascended into the heights and formed the stars4 ,through their influence in the air1 clouds were formed and the earth was made fruitful4 ,from the mingling of water and earth1 through the mud converted into putrefying matter1 animals took their origin as imperfect and senseless4 ,these again begot other animals perfect and endowed with senses4 ,it was the crash of thunder in a thunder-storm that caused the first animals still sleeping in their husks to waken up to life40#g ,the fragments of ,berosus of the ,chaldeans were collected from ,josephus1 ,syncellus and ,eusebius under the title ,berosi ,chaldaica1 by ,scaliger1 as an appendix to his work ,de emendatione temporum1 and they are found complete in the ,greek ,library of ,fabricius 7,t4 xiv4 pp4 #age-baa74 ,berosus lived in the time of ,alexander1 is said to have been a ,priest of ,bel and to have drawn upon the archives of the temple at ,babylon4 ,he says1 8,the original god is ,bel and the goddess ,omoroka 7the sea71 but beside them there were yet other gods4 ,bel divided ,omoroka in two1 in order to create from her parts heaven and earth4 ,hereupon he cut off his own head and the human race originated from the drops of his divine blood4 ,after the creation of man1 ,bel banished the darkness1 divided heaven and earth1 and formed the world into its natural shape4 ,since certain parts of the earth seemed to him to be insufficiently populated1 he compelled another god to lay hands upon himself1 and from his blood more men and more kinds of animals were created4 ,at first the men lived a wild and uncultivated life1 until a monster0 7called by ,berosus1 ,oannes7 8joined them into a state1 taught them arts and sciences1 and in a word brought ,humanity into existence4 ,the monster set about this end with the rising of the sun out of the sea1 and with its setting he again hid himself under the waves40 4 ,what belongs to ,mythology may in the second place make a pretence of being a kind of ,philosophy4 ,it has produced philosophers who availed themselves of the mythical form in order to bring their theories and systems more prominently before the imagination1 for they made the thoughts the content of the myth4 ,but the myth is not a mere cloak in the ancient myths2 it is not merely that the thoughts were there and were concealed4 ,this may happen in our reflecting times2 but the first poetry does not start from a separation of prose and poetry4 ,if philosophers used myths1 it was usually the case that they had the thoughts and then sought for images appropriate to them2 ,plato has many beautiful myths of this kind4 ,others likewise have spoken in myths1 as for example1 ,jacobi1 whose ,philosophy took the form of the ,christian ,religion1 through which he gave utterance to matter of a highly speculative nature4 ,but this form is not suitable to ,philosophy4 ,thought which has itself as object1 must have raised itself to its own form1 to the form of thought4 ,plato is often esteemed on account of his myths2 he is supposed to have evinced by their means greater genius than other philosophers were capable of4 ,it is contended here that the myths of ,plato are superior to the abstract form of expression1 and ,plato's method of representation is certainly a wonderful one4 ,on closer examination we find that it is partly the impossibility of expressing himself after the manner of pure thought that makes ,plato put his meaning so1 and also such methods of expression are only used by him in introducing a subject4 ,when he comes to the matter in point1 ,plato expresses himself otherwise1 as we see in the ,parmenides1 where simple thought determinations are used without imagery4 ,externally these myths may certainly serve when the heights of speculative thought are left behind1 in order to present the matter in an easier form1 but the real value of ,plato does not rest in his myths4 ,if thought once attains power sufficient to give existence to itself within itself and in its element1 the myth becomes a superfluous adornment1 by which ,philosophy is not advanced4 ,men often lay hold of nothing but these myths4 ,hence ,aristotle has been misunderstood just because he intersperses similes here and there2 the simile can never be entirely in accord with thought1 for it always carries with it something more4 ,the difficulty of representing thoughts as thoughts always attaches to the expedient of expression in sensuous form4 ,thought1 too1 ought not to be concealed by means of the myth1 for the object of the mythical is just to give expression to and to reveal thought4 ,the symbol is undoubtedly insufficient for this expression2 thought concealed in symbols is not yet possessed1 for thought is self-revealing1 and hence the myth does not form a medium adequate for its conveyance4 ,aristotle 7,metaph4 ,,iii4 #d7 says1 8,it is not worth while to treat seriously of those whose philosophy takes a mythical form40 ,such is not the form in which thought allows itself to be stated1 but only is a subordinate mode4 ,connected with this1 there is a similar method of representing the universal content by means of numbers1 lines and geometric figures4 ,these are figurative1 but not concretely so1 as in the case of myths4 ,thus it may be said that eternity is a circle1 the snake that bites its own tail4 ,this is only an image1 but ,mind does not require such a symbol4 ,there are people who value such methods of representation1 but these forms do not go far4 ,the most abstract determinations can indeed be thus expressed1 but any further progress brings about confusion4 ,just as the freemasons have symbols which are esteemed for their depth of wisdom--depth as a brook is deep when one cannot see the bottom--that which is hidden very easily seems to men deep1 or as if depth were concealed beneath4 ,but when it is hidden1 it may possibly prove to be the case that there is nothing behind4 ,this is so in freemasonry1 in which everything is concealed to those outside and also to many people within1 and where nothing remarkable is possessed in learning or in science1 and least of all in ,philosophy4 ,thought is1 on the contrary1 simply its manifestation2 clearness is its nature and itself4 ,the act of manifestation is not a condition which may be or may not be equally1 so that thought may remain as thought when it is not manifested1 but its manifestation is itself1 its ,being4 ,numbers1 as will be remarked in respect of the ,pythagoreans1 are unsuitable mediums for expressing thoughts2 thus 1 1 are1 with ,pythagoras1 unity1 difference1 and unity of the unity and of the difference4 ,the two first of the three are certainly united by addition2 this kind of union is1 however1 the worst form of unity4 ,in ,religion the three make their appearance in a deeper sense as the ,trinity1 and in ,philosophy as the ,notion1 but enumeration forms a bad method of expression4 ,there is the same objection to it as would exist to making the mensuration of space the medium for expressing the absolute4 ,people also quote the ,philosophy of the ,chinese1 of the ,fo1 in which it is said that thoughts are represented by numbers4 ,yet the ,chinese have explained their symbols and hence have made their meaning evident4 ,universal simple abstractions have been present to all people who have arrived at any decree of culture4 4 ,we have still to remark in the third place1 that ,religion1 as such1 does not merely form its representations after the manner of art2 and also that ,poetry likewise contains actual thoughts4 ,in the case of the poets whose art has speech as medium1 we find all through deep universal thought regarding reality2 these are more explicitly expressed in the ,indian ,religion1 but with the ,indians everything is mixed up4 ,hence it is said that such races have also had a ,philosophy proper to themselves2 but the universal thoughts of interest in ,indian books limit themselves to what is most abstract1 to the idea of rising up and passing away1 and thus of making a perpetual round4 ,the story of the ,phnix is well known as an example of this2 it is one which took its origin in the ,east4 ,we are able similarly to find thoughts about life and death and of the transition of ,being into passing away2 from life comes death and from death comes life2 even in ,being1 in what is positive1 the negation is already present4 ,the negative side must indeed contain within it the positive1 for all change1 all the process of life is founded on this4 ,but such reflections only occasionally come forth2 they are not to be taken as being proper philosophic utterances4 ,for ,philosophy is only present when thought1 as such1 is made the absolute ground and root of everything else1 and in these modes of representation this is not so4 ,philosophy does not reflect on any particular thing or object already existing as a first substratum2 its content is just ,thought1 universal thought which must plainly come first of all2 to put it otherwise1 the ,absolute must in ,philosophy be in the form of thought4 ,in the ,greek ,religion we find the thought-determination 8eternal necessity20 which means an absolute and clearly universal relation4 ,but such thought has other subjects besides2 it only expresses a relation1 the necessity to be the true and all-embracing ,being4 ,thus neither must we take this form into our consideration4 ,we might speak in that way of a philosophy of ,euripides1 ,schiller or ,goethe4 ,but all such reflection respecting1 or general modes of representing what is true1 the ends of men1 morality and so on1 are in part only incidentally set forth1 and in part they have not reached the proper form of thought1 which implies that what is so expressed must be ultimate1 thus constituting the ,absolute4 4 ,particular theories found in ,religion4 ,in conclusion1 the philosophy which we find within ,religion does not concern us4 ,we find deep1 speculative thoughts regarding the nature of ,god not only in the ,indian ,religions1 but also in the ,fathers and the ,schoolmen4 ,in the history of dogmatism there is a real interest in becoming acquainted with these thoughts1 but they do not belong to the history of ,philosophy4 ,nevertheless more notice must be taken of the ,schoolmen than of the ,fathers1 for they were certainly great philosophers to whom the culture of ,christendom owes much4 ,but their speculations belong in part to other philosophies such as to that of ,plato1 which must in so far be considered for themselves2 partly1 too1 they emanate from the speculative content of ,religion itself which already exists as independent truth in the doctrine of the ,church1 and belongs primarily to faith4 ,thus such modes of thought rest on an hypothesis and not on ,thought itself2 they are not properly speaking themselves ,philosophy or thought which rests on itself1 but as ideas already firmly rooted1 they act on its behalf either in refuting other ideas and conclusions or in philosophically vindicating against them their own religious teaching4 ,thought in this manner does not represent and know itself as the ultimate and absolute culmination of the content1 or as the inwardly self-determining ,thought4 ,hence1 too1 when the ,fathers1 seeing that the content of the ,christian ,religion can only be grasped after the speculative form1 did1 within the teaching of the ,church1 produce thoughts of a highly speculative nature1 the ultimate justification of these was not found in ,thought as such1 but in the teaching of the ,church4 ,philosophic teaching here finds itself within a strongly bound system and not as thought which emanates freely from itself4 ,thus with the scholastics1 too1 ,thought does not construct itself out of itself1 but depends upon hypotheses2 and although it ever rests more and more upon itself1 it never does so in opposition to the doctrine of the ,church4 ,both must and do agree1 since ,thought has to prove from itself what the ,church has already verified4 c4 ,philosophy proper distinguished from ,popular ,philosophy4 ,of the two departments of knowledge allied to ,philosophy we found that the one1 that of the special sciences1 could not be called a philosophy in that it1 as independent seeing and thinking immersed in finite matter1 and as the active principle in becoming acquainted with the finite1 was not the content1 but simply the formal and subjective moment4 ,the second sphere1 ,religion1 is deficient in that it only had the content or the objective moment in common with ,philosophy4 ,in it independent thought was an essential moment1 since the subject had an imaginary or historical form4 ,philosophy demands the unity and intermingling of these two points of view2 it unites the ,sunday of life when man in humility renounces himself1 and the working-day when he stands up independently1 is master of himself and considers his own interests4 ,a third point of view seems to unite both elements1 and that is popular ,philosophy4 ,it deals with universal objects and philosophizes as to ,god and the world2 and thought is likewise occupied in learning about these matters4 ,yet this ,philosophy must also be cast aside4 ,the writings of ,cicero may be put under this category2 they contain a kind of philosophy that has its own place and in which excellent things are said4 ,cicero formed many experiences both in the affairs of life and mind1 and from them and after observing what takes place in the world1 he deduced the truth4 ,he expresses himself with culture on the concerns most important to man1 and hence his great popularity4 ,fanatics and mystics may from another point of view be reckoned as in this category4 ,they give expression to a deep sense of devotion1 and have had experiences in the higher regions4 ,they are able to express the highest content1 and the result is attractive4 ,we thus find the brightest gleams of thought in the writings of a ,pascal--as we do in his ,penses4 ,but the drawback that attaches to this ,philosophy is that the ultimate appeal--even in modern times--is made to the fact that men are constituted such as they are by nature1 and with this ,cicero is very free4 ,here the moral instinct comes into question1 only under the name of feeling2 ,religion now rests not on what is objective but on religious feeling1 because the immediate consciousness of ,god by men is its ultimate ground4 ,cicero makes copious use of the consensus gentium2 in more modern times this appeal has been more or less left alone1 since the individual subject has to rest upon himself4 ,feeling is first of all laid hold of1 then comes reasoning from what is given1 but in these we can appeal to what is immediate only4 ,independent thought is certainly here advanced2 the content too1 is taken from the self2 but we must just as necessarily exclude this mode of thinking from ,philosophy4 ,for the source from which the content is derived is of the same description as in the other cases4 ,nature is the source in finite sciences1 and in ,religion it is ,spirit2 but here the source is in authority2 the content is given and the act of worship removes but momentarily this externality4 ,the source of popular ,philosophy is in the heart1 impulses and capacities1 our natural ,being1 my impression of what is right and of ,god2 the content is in a form which is of nature only4 ,i certainly have everything in feeling1 but the whole content is also in ,mythology1 and yet in neither is it so in veritable form4 ,the laws and doctrines of ,religion are that in which this content always comes to consciousness in a more definite way1 while in feeling there still is intermingled the arbitrary will of that which is subjective4 #c4 ,,commencement ,,of ,,philosophy ,,and ,,of ,,its ,,history4 ,now that we have thus defined the ,notion of ,philosophy to be the ,thought which1 as the universal content1 is complete ,being1 it will be shown in the history of ,philosophy how the determinations in this content make their appearance little by little4 ,at first we only ask where ,philosophy and its ,history begin4 a4 ,freedom of ,thought as a first condition4 ,the general answer is in accordance with what has been said4 ,philosophy begins where the universal is comprehended as the all-embracing existence1 or where the existent is laid hold of in a universal form1 and where thinking about thought first commences4 ,where1 then1 has this occurred8 ,where did it begin8 ,that is a question of history4 ,thought must be for itself1 must come into existence in its freedom1 liberate itself from nature and come out of its immersion in mere sense-perception2 it must as free1 enter within itself and thus arrive at the consciousness of freedom4 ,philosophy is properly to be commenced where the ,absolute is no more in the form of ordinary conception1 and free thought not merely thinks the ,absolute but grasps its ,idea4 ,that is to say where ,thought grasps as ,thought1 the ,being 7which may be ,thought itself71 which it recognizes as the essence of things1 the absolute totality and the immanent essence of everything1 and does so as an external ,being4 ,the simple existence which is not sensuous and which the ,jews thought of as ,god 7for all ,religion is thinking71 is thus not a subject to be treated of by ,philosophy1 but just such a proposition as that 8,the existence or principle of things is water1 fire or thought40 ,thought1 this universal determination which sets forth itself1 is an abstract determinateness2 it is the beginning of ,philosophy1 but this beginning is at the same time in history1 the concrete form taken by a people1 the principle of which constitutes what we have stated above4 ,if we say that the consciousness of freedom is connected with the appearance of ,philosophy1 this principle must be a fundamental one with those with whom ,philosophy begins2 a people having this consciousness of freedom founds its existence on that principle seeing that the laws and the whole circumstances of the people are based only on the ,notion that ,mind forms of itself1 and in the categories which it has4 ,connected with this on the practical side1 is the fact that actual freedom develops political freedom1 and this only begins where the individual knows himself as an independent individual to be universal and real1 where his significance is infinite1 or where the subject has attained the consciousness of personality and thus desires to be esteemed for himself alone4 ,free1 philosophic thought has this direct connection with practical freedom1 that as the former supplies thought about the absolute1 universal and real object1 the latter1 because it thinks itself1 gives itself the character of universality4 ,thinking means the bringing of something into the form of universality2 hence ,thought first treats of the universal1 or determines what is objective and individual in the natural things which are present in sensuous consciousness1 as the universal1 as an objective ,thought4 ,its second attribute is that in recognizing and knowing this objective and infinite universal1 ,i1 at the same time1 remain confronting it from the standpoint of objectivity4 ,on account of this general connection between political freedom and the freedom of ,thought1 ,philosophy only appears in ,history where and in as far as free institutions are formed4 ,since ,mind requires to separate itself from its natural will and engrossment in matter if it wishes to enter upon ,philosophy1 it cannot do so in the form with which the world-spirit commences and which takes precedence of that separation4 ,this stage of the unity of ,mind with ,nature which as immediate is not the true and perfect state1 is mainly found in the ,oriental conception of existence1 therefore ,philosophy first begins in the ,grecian world4 b4 ,separation of the ,east and its ,philosophy4 ,some explanations have to be given regarding this first form4 ,since ,mind in it1 as consciousness and will1 is but desire1 self-consciousness still stands upon its first stage in which the sphere of its idea and will is finite4 ,as intelligence is thus finite too1 its ends are not yet a universal for themselves2 but if a people makes for what is moral1 if laws and justice are possessed1 the character of universality underlies its will4 ,this presupposes a new power in ,mind with which it commences to be free1 for the universal will as the relation of thought to thought or as the universal1 contains a thought which is at home with itself4 ,if a people desire to be free1 they will subordinate their desires to universal laws1 while formerly that which was desired was only a particular4 ,now finitude of the will characterizes the orientals1 because with them the will has not yet grasped itself as universal1 for thought is not yet free for itself4 ,hence there can but be the relation of lord and slave1 and in this despotic sphere fear constitutes the ruling category4 ,because the will is not yet free from what is finite1 it can therein be comprehended and the finite can be shown forth as negative4 ,this sensation of negation1 that something cannot last1 is just fear as distinguished from freedom which does not consist in being finite but in being for itself1 and this cannot be laid hold of4 ,religion necessarily has this character1 since the fear of the ,lord is the essential element beyond which we cannot get4 8,the fear of the ,lord is the beginning of wisdom0 is indeed a true saying2 man must begin with this in order to know the finite ends in their negative character4 ,but man must also have overcome fear through the relinquishment of finite ends1 and the satisfaction which that ,religion affords is confined to what is finite1 seeing that the chief means of reconciliation are natural forms which are impersonated and held in reverence4 ,the oriental consciousness raises itself1 indeed1 above the natural content to what is infinite2 but it only knows itself as accidental in reference to the power which makes the individual fear4 ,this subordination may take two forms and must indeed from one extreme pass to the other4 ,the finite1 which is for consciousness1 may have the form of finitude as finite1 or it may become the infinite1 which is however an abstraction4 ,the man who lives in fear1 and he who rules over men through fear1 both stand upon the same platform2 the difference between them is only in the greater power of will which can go forth to sacrifice all that is finite for some particular end4 ,the despot brings about what his caprice directs1 including certainly what is good1 not as law1 but as arbitrary will3 the passive will1 like that of slavery1 is converted into the active energy of will1 which will1 however1 is arbitrary still4 ,in ,religion we even find self-immersion in the deepest sensuality represented as the service of ,god1 and then there follows in the ,east a flight to the emptiest abstraction as to what is infinite1 as also the exaltation attained through the renunciation of everything1 and this is specially so amongst the ,indians1 who torture themselves and enter into the most profound abstraction4 ,the ,indians look straight before them for ten years at a time1 are fed by those around1 and are destitute of other spiritual content than that of knowing what is abstract1 which content therefore is entirely finite4 ,this1 then1 is not the soil of freedom4 ,in the ,east1 ,mind indeed begins to dawn1 but it is still true of it that the subject is not presented as a person1 but appears in the objectively substantial1 which is represented as partly supersensuous and partly1 and even more1 material1 as negative and perishing4 ,the highest point attainable by the individual1 the everlasting bliss1 is made an immersion into substance1 a vanishing away of consciousness1 and thus of all distinction between substance and individuality--hence an annihilation4 ,a spiritually dead relation thus comes into existence1 since the highest point there to be reached is insensibility4 ,so far1 however1 man has not attained that bliss1 but finds himself to be a single existent individual1 distinguished from the universal substance4 ,he is thus outside the unity1 has no significance1 and as being what is accidental and without rights1 is finite only2 he finds himself limited through ,nature--in caste for instance4 ,the will is not here the substantial will2 it is the arbitrary will given up to what is outwardly and inwardly contingent1 for substance alone is the affirmative4 ,with it greatness1 nobility1 or exaltitude of character1 are certainly not excluded1 but they are only present as the naturally determined or the arbitrary will1 and not in the objective forms of morality and law to which all owe respect1 which hold good for all1 and in which for that same reason all are recognized4 ,the oriental subject thus has the advantage of independence1 since there is nothing fixed2 however undetermined is the substance of the ,easterns1 as undetermined1 free and independent may their character be4 ,what for us is justice and morality is also in their state1 but in a substantial1 natural1 patriarchal way1 and not in subjective freedom4 ,conscience does not exist nor does morality4 ,everything is simply in a state of nature1 which allows the noblest to exist as it does the worst4 ,the conclusion to be derived from this is that no philosophic knowledge can be found here4 ,to ,philosophy belongs the knowledge of ,substance1 the absolute ,universal1 that whether ,i think it and develop it or not1 confronts me still as for itself objective2 and whether this is to me substantial or not1 still just in that ,i think it1 it is mine1 that in which ,i possess my distinctive character or am affirmative3 thus my thoughts are not mere subjective determinations or opinions1 but1 as being my thoughts1 are also thoughts of what is objective1 or they are substantial thoughts4 ,the ,eastern form must therefore be excluded from the ,history of ,philosophy1 but still1 upon the whole1 ,i will take some notice of it4 ,i have touched on this elsewhere1#h for some time ago we for the first time reached a position to judge of it4 ,earlier a great parade was made about the ,indian wisdom without any real knowledge of what it was2 now this is for the first time known1 and naturally it is found to be in conformity with the rest4 c4 ,beginnings of ,philosophy in ,greece4 ,philosophy proper commences in the ,west4 ,it is in the ,west that this freedom of self-consciousness first comes forth2 the natural consciousness1 and likewise ,mind disappear into themselves4 ,in the brightness of the ,east the individual disappears2 the light first becomes in the ,west the flash of thought which strikes within itself1 and from thence creates its world out of itself4 ,the blessedness of the ,west is thus so determined that in it the subject as such endures and continues in the substantial2 the individual mind grasps its ,being as universal1 but universality is just this relation to itself4 ,this being at home with self1 this personality and infinitude of the 8,i0 constitutes the ,being of ,mind2 it is thus and can be none else4 ,for a people to know themselves as free1 and to be only as universal1 is for them to be2 it is the principle of their whole life as regards morality and all else4 ,to take an example1 we only know our real ,being in so far as personal freedom is its first condition1 and hence we never can be slaves4 ,were the mere arbitrary will of the prince a law1 and should he wish slavery to be introduced1 we would have the knowledge that this could not be4 ,to sleep1 to live1 to have a certain office1 is not our real ,being1 and certainly to be no slave is such1 for that has come to mean the being in nature4 ,thus in the ,west we are upon the soil of a veritable ,philosophy4 ,because in desire ,i am subject to another1 and my ,being is in a particularity1 ,i am1 as ,i exist1 unlike myself2 for ,i am 8,i10 the universal complete1 but hemmed in by passion4 ,this last is self-will or formal freedom1 which has desire as content4 ,amongst the ,greeks we first find the freedom which is the end of true will1 the equitable and right1 in which ,i am free and universal1 and others1 too1 are free1 are also 8,i0 and like me2 where a relationship between free and free is thus established with its actual laws1 determinations of the universal will1 and justly constituted states4 ,hence it is here that ,philosophy began4 ,in ,greece we first see real freedom flourish1 but still in a restricted form1 and with a limitation1 since slavery was still existent1 and the states were by its means conditioned4 ,in the following abstractions we may first of all superficially describe the freedom of the ,east1 of ,greece1 and of the ,teutonic world4 ,in the ,east only one individual is free1 the despot2 in ,greece the few are free2 in the ,teutonic world the saying is true that all are free1 that is1 man is free as man4 ,but since the one in ,eastern countries cannot be free because that would necessitate the others also being free to him1 impulse1 self-will1 and formal freedom1 can there alone be found4 ,since in ,greece we have to deal with the particular1 the ,athenians1 and the ,spartans1 are free indeed1 but not the ,messenians or the ,helots4 ,the principle of the 8few0 has yet to be discovered1 and this implies some modifications of the ,greek point of view which we must consider in connection with the ,history of ,philosophy4 ,to take these into consideration means simply to proceed to the dividing up of ,philosophy4 ,c ,,division1 ,,sources1 ,,and ,,method ,,adopted ,,in ,,treating ,,of ,,the ,,history ,,of ,,philosophy4 #a4 ,,division ,,of ,,the ,,history ,,of ,,philosophy4 ,since we set to work systematically this division must present itself as necessary4 ,speaking generally1 we have properly only two epochs to distinguish in the history of ,philosophy1 as in ancient and modern art--these are the ,greek and the ,teutonic4 ,the ,teutonic ,philosophy is the ,philosophy within ,christendom in so far as it belongs to the ,teutonic nations2 the ,christian-,european people1 inasmuch as they belong to the world of science1 possess collectively ,teutonic culture2 for ,italy1 ,spain1 ,france1 ,england1 and the rest1 have through the ,teutonic nations1 received a new form4 ,the influence of ,greece also reaches into the ,roman world1 and hence we have to speak of ,philosophy in the territory of the ,roman world2 but the ,romans produced no proper ,philosophy any more than any proper poets4 ,they have only received from and imitated others1 although they have often done this with intelligence2 even their religion is derived from the ,greek1 and the special character that it has1 makes no approach to ,philosophy and ,art1 but is unphilosophical and inartistic4 ,a further description of these two outstanding opposites must be given4 ,the ,greek world developed thought as far as to the ,idea2 the ,christian ,teutonic world1 on the contrary1 has comprehended ,thought as ,spirit2 ,idea and ,spirit are thus the distinguishing features4 ,more particularly the facts are as follows4 ,because ,god1 the still undetermined and immediate ,universal1 ,being1 or objective ,thought1 jealously allowing nothing to exist beside ,him1 is the substantial groundwork of all ,philosophy1 which never alters1 but ever sinks more deeply within itself1 and through the development of determinations manifests itself and brings to consciousness1 we may designate the particular character of the development in the first period of ,philosophy by saying that this development is a simple process of determinations1 figurations1 abstract qualities1 issuing from the one ground that potentially already contains the whole4 ,the second stage in this universal principle is the gathering up of the determinations manifested thus1 into ideal1 concrete unity1 in the mode of subjectivity4 ,the first determinations as immediate1 were still abstractions1 but now the ,absolute1 as the endlessly self-determining ,universal1 must furthermore be comprehended as active ,thought1 and not as the ,universal in this determinate character4 ,hence it is manifested as the totality of determinations and as concrete individuality4 ,thus1 with the of ,anaxagoras1 and still more with ,socrates1 there commences a subjective totality in which ,thought grasps itself1 and thinking activity is the fundamental principle4 ,the third stage1 then1 is that this totality1 which is at first abstract1 in that it becomes realized through the active1 determining1 distinguishing thought1 sets itself forth even in the separated determinations1 which1 as ideal1 belong to it4 ,since these determinations are contained unseparated in the unity1 and thus each in it is also the other1 these opposed moments are raised into totalities4 ,the quite general forms of opposition are the universal and the particular1 or1 in another form1 ,thought as such1 external reality1 feeling or perception4 ,the ,notion is the identity of universal and particular2 because each of these is thus set forth as concrete in itself1 the universal is in itself at once the unity of universality and particularity1 and the same holds good of particularity4 ,unity is thus posited in both forms1 and the abstract moments can be made complete through this unity alone2 thus it has come to pass that the differences themselves are each raised up to a system of totality1 which respectively confront one another as the ,philosophy of ,stoicism and of ,epicureanism4 ,the whole concrete universal is now ,mind2 and the whole concrete individual1 ,nature4 ,in ,stoicism pure ,thought develops into a totality2 if we make the other side from ,mind--natural being or feeling--into a totality1 ,epicureanism is the result4 ,each determination is formed into a totality of thought1 and1 in accordance with the simple mode which characterizes this sphere1 these principles seem to be for themselves and independent1 like two antagonistic systems of ,philosophy4 ,implicitly both are identical1 but they themselves take up their position as conflicting1 and the ,idea is also1 as it is apprehended1 in a one-sided determinateness4 ,the higher stage is the union of these differences4 ,this may occur in annihilation1 in scepticism2 but the higher point of view is the affirmative1 the ,idea in relation to the ,notion4 ,if the ,notion is1 then1 the universal--that which determines itself further within itself1 but yet remains there in its unity and in the ideality and transparency of its determinations which do not become independent--the further step is1 on the other hand1 the reality of the ,notion in which the differences are themselves brought to totalities4 ,thus the fourth stage is the union of the ,idea1 in which all these differences1 as totalities1 are yet at the same time blended into one concrete unity of ,notion4 ,this comprehension first takes place without constraint1 since the ideal is itself only apprehended in the element of universality4 ,the ,greek world got as far as this ,idea1 since they formed an ideal intellectual world2 and this was done by the ,alexandrian ,philosophy1 in which the ,greek ,philosophy perfected itself and reached its end4 ,if we wish to represent this process figuratively1 ,a4 ,thought1 is 77 speaking generally abstract1 as in universal or absolute space1 by which empty space is often understood2 77 then the most simple space determinations appear1 in which we commence with the point in order that we may arrive at the line and angle2 77 what comes third is their union into the triangle1 that which is indeed concrete1 but which is still retained in this abstract element of surface1 and thus is only the first and still formal totality and limitation which corresponds to the 4 ,b4 ,the next point is1 that since we allow each of the enclosing lines of the triangle to be again surface1 each forms itself into the totality of the triangle and into the whole figure to which it belongs2 that is the realization of the whole in the sides as we see it in ,scepticism or ,stoicism4 ,c4 ,the last stage of all is1 that these surfaces or sides of the triangle join themselves into a body or a totality2 the body is for the first time the perfect spacial determination1 and that is a reduplication of the triangle4 ,but in as far as the triangle which forms the basis is outside of the pyramid1 this simile does not hold good4 ,grecian ,philosophy in the ,neo-platonists finds its end in a perfect kingdom of ,thought and of bliss1 and in a potentially existent world of the ideal1 which is yet unreal because the whole only exists in the element of universality4 ,this world still lacks individuality as such1 which is an essential moment in the ,notion2 actuality demands that in the identity of both sides of the ,idea1 the independent totality shall be also posited as negative4 ,through this self-existent negation1 which is absolute subjectivity1 the ,idea is first raised into ,mind4 ,mind is the subjectivity of self-knowledge2 but it is only ,mind inasmuch as it knows what is object to itself1 and that is itself1 as a totality1 and is for itself a totality4 ,that is to say1 the two triangles which are above and below in the prism must not be two in the sense of being doubled1 but they must be one intermingled unity4 ,or1 in the case of body1 the difference arises between the centre and the peripheral parts4 ,this opposition of real corporeality and centre as the simple existence1 now makes its appearance1 and the totality is the union of the centre and the substantial--not1 however1 the simple union1 but a union such that the subjective knows itself as subjective in relation to the objective and substantial4 ,hence the ,idea is this totality1 and the ,idea which knows itself is essentially different from the substantial2 the former manifests itself independently1 but in such a manner that as such it is considered to be for itself substantial4 ,the subjective ,idea is at first only formal1 but it is the real possibility of the substantial and of the potentially universal2 its end is to realize itself and to identify itself with substance4 ,through this subjectivity and negative unity1 and through this absolute negativity1 the ideal becomes no longer our object merely1 but object to itself1 and this principle has taken effect in the world of ,christianity4 ,thus in the modern point of view the subject is for itself free1 man is free as man1 and from this comes the idea that because he is ,mind he has from his very nature the eternal quality of being substantial4 ,god becomes known as ,mind which appears to itself as double1 yet removes the difference that it may in it be for and at home with itself4 ,the business of the world1 taking it as a whole1 is to become reconciled with ,mind1 recognizing itself therein1 and this business is assigned to the ,teutonic world4 ,the first beginning of this undertaking is found in the ,religion which is the contemplation of and faith in this principle as in an actual existence before a knowledge of the principle has been arrived at4 ,in the ,christian ,religion this principle is found more as feeling and idea2 in it man as man is destined to everlasting bliss1 and is an object of divine grace1 pity and interest1 which is as much as saying that man has an absolute and infinite value4 ,we find it further in that dogma revealed through ,christ to men1 of the unity of the divine and human nature1 according to which the subjective and the objective ,idea--man and ,god--are one4 ,this1 in another form1 is found in the old story of the ,fall1 in which the serpent did not delude man1 for ,god said1 8,behold1 ,adam has become as one of us1 to know good and evil40 ,we have to deal with this unity of subjective principle and of substance2 it constitutes the process of ,mind that this individual one or independent existence of subject should put aside its immediate character and bring itself forth as identical with the substantial4 ,such an aim is pronounced to be the highest end attainable by man4 ,we see from this that religious ideas and speculation are not so far asunder as was at first believed1 and ,i maintain these ideas in order that we may not be ashamed of them1 seeing that we still belong to them1 and so that if we do get beyond them1 we may not be ashamed of our progenitors of the early ,christian times1 who held these ideas in such high esteem4 ,the first principle of that ,philosophy which has taken its place in ,christendom is thus found in the existence of two totalities4 ,this is a reduplication of substance which now1 however1 is characterized by the fact that the two totalities are no longer external to one another1 but are clearly both required through their relation to one another4 ,if formerly ,stoicism and ,epicureanism1 whose negativity was ,scepticism1 came forth as independent1 and if finally the implicitly existent universality of both was established1 these moments are now known as separate totalities1 and yet in their opposition they have to be thought of as one4 ,we have here the true speculative ,idea1 the ,notion in its determinations1 each of which is brought into a totality and clearly relates to the other4 ,we thus have really two ,ideas1 the subjective ,idea as knowledge1 and then the substantial and concrete ,idea2 and the development and perfection of this principle and its coming to the consciousness of ,thought1 is the subject treated by modern ,philosophy4 ,thus the determinations are in it more concrete than with the ancients4 ,this opposition in which the two sides culminate1 grasped in its widest significance1 is the opposition between ,thought and ,being1 individuality and substance1 so that in the subject himself his freedom stands once more within the bounds of necessity2 it is the opposition between subject and object1 and between ,nature and ,mind1 in so far as this last as finite stands in opposition to ,nature4 ,the ,greek ,philosophy is free from restraint because it does not yet have regard to the opposition between ,being and ,thought1 but proceeds from the unconscious presupposition that ,thought is also ,being4 ,certainly certain stages in the ,greek ,philosophy are laid hold of which seem to stand on the same platform as the ,christian philosophies4 ,thus when we see1 for instance1 in the ,philosophy of the ,sophists1 the new ,academics1 and the ,sceptics1 that they maintain the doctrine that the truth is not capable of being known1 they might appear to accord with the later subjective philosophies in asserting that all thought-determinations were only subjective in character1 and that hence from these no conclusions could be arrived at as regards what is objective4 ,but there is really a difference4 ,in the case of ancient philosophies1 which said that we know only the phenomenal1 everything is confined to that2 it is as regards practical life that the new ,academy and the ,sceptics also admitted the possibility of conducting oneself rightly1 morally and rationally1 when one adopts the phenomenal as one's rule and guide in life4 ,but though it is the phenomenal that lies at the foundation of things1 it is not asserted that there is likewise a knowledge of the true and existent1 as in the case of the merely subjective idealists of a more modern day4 ,these last still keep in the background a potentiality1 a beyond which cannot be known through thought or through conception4 ,this other knowledge is an immediate knowledge--a faith in1 a view of1 and a yearning after1 the beyond such as was evinced by ,jacobi4 ,the ancients have no such yearning2 on the contrary1 they have perfect satisfaction and rest in the certitude that only that which appears is for ,knowledge4 ,thus it is necessary in this respect to keep strictly to the point of view from which we start1 else through the similarity of the results1 we come to see in that old ,philosophy all the determinate character of modern subjectivity4 ,since in the simplicity of ancient philosophy the phenomenal was itself the only sphere1 doubts as to objective thought were not present to it4 ,the opposition defined1 the two sides of which are in modern times really related to one another as totalities1 also has the form of an opposition between reason and faith1 between individual perception and the objective truth which must be taken without reason of one's own1 and even with a complete disregard for such reason4 ,this is faith as understood by the church1 or faith in the modern sense1 i4e4 a rejection of reason in favour of an inward revelation1 called a direct certainty or perception1 or an implicit and intuitive feeling4 ,the opposition between this knowledge1 which has first of all to develop itself1 and that knowledge which has already developed itself inwardly1 arouses a peculiar interest4 ,in both cases the unity of thought or subjectivity and of ,truth or objectivity is manifested1 only in the first form it is said that the natural man knows the ,truth since he intuitively believes it1 while in the second form the unity of knowledge and ,truth is shown1 but in such a way that the subject raises itself above the immediate form of sensuous consciousness and reaches the ,truth first of all through ,thought4 ,the final end is to think the ,absolute as ,mind1 as the ,universal1 that which1 when the infinite bounty of the ,notion in its reality freely emits its determinations from itself1 wholly impresses itself upon and imparts itself to them1 so that they may be indifferently outside of or in conflict with one another1 but so that these totalities are one only1 not alone implicitly1 7which would simply be our reflection7 but explicitly identical1 the determinations of their difference being thus explicitly merely ideal4 ,hence if the starting-point of the history of ,philosophy can be expressed by saying that ,god is comprehended as the immediate and not yet developed universality1 and that its end--the grasping of the ,absolute as ,mind through the two and a half thousand years' work of the thus far inert world-spirit--is the end of our time1 it makes it easy for us from one determination to go on through the manifestation of its needs1 to others4 ,yet in the course of history this is difficult4 ,we thus have altogether two philosophies--the ,greek and the ,teutonic4 ,as regards the latter we must distinguish the time when ,philosophy made its formal appearance as ,philosophy and the period of formation and of preparation for modern times4 ,we may first begin ,teutonic philosophy where it appears in proper form as ,philosophy4 ,between the first period and those more recent1 comes1 as an intermediate period1 that fermentation of a new ,philosophy which on the one side keeps within the substantial and real existence and does not arrive at form1 while on the other side1 it perfects ,thought1 as the bare form of a presupposed truth1 until it again knows itself as the free ground and source of ,truth4 ,hence the history of ,philosophy falls into three periods--that of the ,greek ,philosophy1 the ,philosophy of the ,middle ,ages and the modern ,philosophy4 ,of these the first is speaking generally1 regulated by ,thought1 the second falls into the opposition between existence and formal reflection1 but the third has the ,notion as its ground4 ,this must not be taken to mean that the first contains ,thought alone2 it also has conceptions and ideas1 just as the latter begins from abstract thoughts which yet constitute a duality4 ,first ,period4--,this commences at the time of ,thales1 about #fjj ,b4,c41 and goes on to the coming to maturity of the ,neo-platonic philosophy with ,plotinus in the third century2 from thence to its further progress and development with ,proclus in the fifth century until the time when all philosophy was extinguished4 ,the ,neo-platonic philosophy then made its entrance into ,christianity later on1 and many philosophies within ,christianity have this philosophy as their only groundwork4 ,this is a space of time extending to about #ajjj years1 the end of which coincides with the migration of the nations and the decline of the ,roman ,empire4 ,second ,period4--,the second period is that of the ,middle ,ages4 ,the ,scholastics are included in it1 and ,arabians and ,jews are also historically to be noticed1 but this philosophy mainly falls within the ,christian ,church4 ,this period is of something over #ajjj years' duration4 ,third ,period4--,the ,philosophy of modern times made its first independent appearance after the ,thirty ,years' ,war1 with ,bacon1 ,jacob ,bhm and ,descartes2 it begins with the distinction contained in3 cogito ergo sum4 ,this period is one of a couple of centuries and the philosophy is consequently still somewhat modern4 #b4 ,,sources ,,of ,,the ,,history ,,of ,,philosophy4 ,we have to seek for sources of another kind in this than in political history4 ,there historians are the fountainheads1 which again have as sources the deeds and sayings of individuals2 and the historians who are not original have over and above performed their work at secondhand4 ,but historians always have the deeds already present in history1 that is to say1 here brought into the form of ordinary conception2 for the name of history has two meanings3 it signifies on the one hand the deeds and events themselves1 and on the other1 it denotes them in so far as they are formed through conception for conception4 ,in the history of ,philosophy there are1 on the contrary1 not any sources which can be derived from historians1 but the deeds themselves lie before us1 and these--the philosophic operations themselves--are the true sources4 ,if we wish to study the history of ,philosophy in earnest1 we must go to such springs as these4 ,yet these operations form too wide a field to permit of our keeping to it alone in this history4 ,in the case of many philosophers it is absolutely necessary to confine oneself to the original authors1 but in many periods1 in which we cannot obtain original sources1 seeing that they have not been preserved to us1 7as1 for instance1 in that of the older ,greek philosophy7 we must certainly confine our attention simply to historians and other writers4 ,there are other periods1 too1 where it is desirable that others should have read the works of the philosophers and that we should receive abstracts therefrom4 ,several schoolmen have left behind them works of sixteen1 twenty-four and twenty-six folios1 and hence we must in their case confine ourselves to the researches of others4 ,many philosophic works are also rare and hence difficult to obtain4 ,many philosophers are for the most part important from an historic or literary point of view only1 and hence we may limit ourselves to the compilations in which they are dealt with4 ,the most noteworthy works on the history of ,philosophy are1 however1 the following1 regarding which ,i refer for particulars to the summary of ,tennemann's ,history of ,philosophy1 by ,a4 ,wendt1 since ,i do not wish to give any complete list4 #a4 ,one of the first ,histories of ,philosophy1 which is only interesting as an attempt1 is the 8,history of ,philosophy10 by ,thomas ,stanley 7,london1 #afee1 folio ed4 ,,iii41 #agja1 #d4 translated into ,latin by ,godofr4 ,olearius1 ,lipsi1 #agaa1 #d74 ,this history is no longer much used1 and only contains the old philosophic schools in the form of sects and as if no new ones had existed4 ,that is to say1 it keeps to the old belief commonly held at that time1 that there only were ancient philosophies and that the period of philosophy came to an end with ,christianity1 as if ,philosophy were something belonging to heathendom and the truth only could be found in ,christianity4 ,in it a distinction was drawn between ,truth as it is created from the natural reason in the ancient philosophies1 and the revealed truth of the ,christian religion1 in which there was consequently no longer any ,philosophy4 ,in the time of the ,revival of ,learning there certainly were no proper philosophies1 and above all in ,stanley's time systems of ,philosophy proper were too young for the older generations to have the amount of respect for them necessary to allow of their being esteemed as realities4 #b4 ,jo4 ,jac4 ,bruckeri ,historia critica philosophi1 ,lipsi1 #agdb-agdd1 four parts1 or five volumes in four1 for the fourth part has two volumes4 ,the second edition1 unaltered1 but with the addition of a supplement1 #agff-agfg1 four parts in six quartos1 the last of which forms the supplement4 ,this is an immense compilation which is not formed straight from the original sources1 but is mixed with reflections after the manner of the times4 ,as we have seen from an example above 7p4 #dc7 the accounts given are in the highest degree inaccurate4 ,brucker's manner of procedure is entirely unhistoric1 and yet nowhere ought we to proceed in a more historic manner than in the history of ,philosophy4 ,this work is thus simply so much useless ballast4 ,an epitome of the same is ,jo4 ,jac4 ,bruckeri ,institutiones histori philosophic1 usui academic juventutis adornat1 ,lipsi1 #agdg1 #h2 second edition1 ,leipzig1 #agef2 third edition prepared by ,born1 ,leipzig1 #agij1 #h4 #c4 ,dietrich ,tiedmann's ,geist der ,speculativen ,philosophie1 ,marburg1 #agia-agig1 #f vols41 #h4 ,he treats of political history diffusely1 but without any life1 and the language is stiff and affected4 ,the whole work is a melancholy example of how a learned professor can occupy his whole life with the study of speculative philosophy1 and yet have no idea at all of speculation4 ,his argumenta to the ,plato of ,brucker are of the same description4 ,in every history he makes abstracts from the philosophers so long as they keep to mere ratiocination1 but when the speculative is arrived at1 he becomes irate1 declaring it all to be composed of empty subtleties1 and stops short with the words 8we know better40 ,his merit is that he has supplied valuable abstracts from rare books belonging to the ,middle ,ages and from cabalistic and mystical works of that time4 #d4 ,joh4 ,gottlieb ,buhle3 ,lehrbuch der ,geschichte der ,philosophie und einer kritischen ,literatur derselben1 ,gttingen1 #agif to #ahjd1 eight parts1 #h4 ,ancient philosophy is treated with disproportionate brevity2 the further ,buhle went on1 the more particular he became4 ,he has many good summaries of rare works1 as for instance those of ,giordano ,bruno1 which were in the ,gttingen ,library4 #e4 ,wilh4 ,gottl4 ,tennemann's ,geschichte der ,philosophie1 ,leipzig1 #agih--ahai1 eleven parts1 #h4 ,the eighth part1 the ,scholastic ,philosophy1 occupies two volumes4 ,the philosophies are fully described1 and the more modern times are better done than the ancient4 ,the philosophies of recent times are easier to describe1 since it is only necessary to make an abstract or to interpret straight on1 for the thoughts contained in them lie nearer to ours4 ,it is otherwise with the ancient philosophers1 because they stand in another stage of the ,notion1 and on this account they are likewise more difficult to grasp4 ,that is to say1 what is old is easily overthrown by something else more familiar to us1 and where ,tennemann comes across such he is almost useless4 ,in ,aristotle1 for instance1 the misinterpretation is so great1 that ,tennemann foists upon him what is directly opposite to his beliefs1 and thus from the adoption of the opposite to what ,tennemann asserts to be ,aristotle's opinion1 a correct idea of ,aristotelian philosophy is arrived at4 ,tennemann is then candid enough to place the reference to ,aristotle underneath the text1 so that the original and the interpretation often contradict one another4 ,tennemann thinks that it is really the case that the historian should have no philosophy1 and he glories in that2 yet he really has a system and he is a critical philosopher4 ,he praises philosophers1 their work and their genius1 and yet the end of the lay is that all of them will be pronounced to be wanting in that they have one defect1 which is not to be ,kantian philosophers and not yet to have sought the source of knowledge4 ,from this the result is that the ,truth could not be known4 ,of compendiums1 three have to be noticed4 #a4 ,frederick ,aft's ,grundriss einer ,geschichte der ,philosophie4 7,landshut1 #ahjg1 #h2 second edition1 #ahbe7 is written from a better point of view2 the ,philosophy is that of ,schelling for the most part1 but it is somewhat confused4 ,aft by some formal method has distinguished ideal philosophy from real4 #b4 ,professor ,wendt's ,gttingen edition of ,tennemann 7fifth edition1 ,leipzig1 #ahbh1 #h74 ,it is astonishing to see what is represented as being ,philosophy1 without any consideration as to whether it has any meaning or not4 ,such so-called new philosophies grow like mushrooms out of the ground4 ,there is nothing easier than to comprehend in harmony with a principle2 but it must not be thought that hence something new and profound has been accomplished4 #c4 ,rirner's ,handbuch der ,geschichte der ,philosophie1 #c vols41 ,sulzbach1 #ahbb-ahbc1 #h 7second amended edition1 #ahbi7 is most to be commended1 and yet ,i will not assert that it answers all the requirements of a ,history of ,philosophy4 ,there are many points which leave much to desire1 but the appendices to each volume in which the principal original authorities are quoted1 are particularly excellent for their purpose4 ,selected extracts1 more specially from the ancient philosophers1 are needed1 and these would not be lengthy1 since there are not very many passages to be given from the philosophers before ,plato4 #c4 ,,method ,,of ,,treatment ,,adopted ,,in ,,this ,,history ,,of ,,philosophy4 ,as regards external history ,i shall only touch upon that which is the concern of universal history1 the spirit or the principle of the times1 and hence ,i will treat of conditions of life in reference to the outstanding philosophers4 ,of philosophies1 however1 only those are to be made mention of the principles of which have caused some sensation1 and through which science has made an advance2 hence ,i shall put aside many names which would be taken up in a learned treatise1 but which are of little value in respect to ,philosophy4 ,the history of the dissemination of a doctrine1 its fate1 those who have merely taught a particular doctrine1 ,i pass over1 as the deduction of the whole world from one particular principle4 ,the demand that in ,philosophy an historian should have no system1 should put into the philosophy nothing of his own1 nor assail it with his ideas1 seems a plausible one4 ,the history of ,philosophy should show just this impartiality1 and it seems in so far that to give only summaries of the philosophers proves a success4 ,he who understands nothing of the matter1 and has no system1 but merely historic knowledge1 will certainly be impartial4 ,but political history has to be carefully distinguished from the history of ,philosophy4 ,that is to say1 though in the former1 one is not indeed at liberty to limit oneself to representing the events chronologically only1 one can yet keep to what is entirely objective1 as is done in the ,homeric epic4 ,thus ,herodotus and ,thucydides1 as free men1 let the objective world do freely and independently as it would2 they have added nothing of their own1 neither have they taken and judged before their tribunal the actions which they represented4 ,yet even in political history there is also a particular end kept in view4 ,in ,livy the main points are the ,roman rule1 its enlargement1 and the perfecting of the constitution2 we see ,rome arise1 defend itself1 and exercise its mastery4 ,it is thus that the self-developing reason in the history of ,philosophy makes of itself an end1 and this end is not foreign or imported1 but is the matter itself1 which lies at the basis as universal1 and with which the individual forms of themselves correspond4 ,thus when the history of ,philosophy has to tell of deeds in history1 we first ask1 what a deed in ,philosophy is2 and whether any particular thing is philosophic or not4 ,in external history everything is in action--certainly there is in it what is important and that which is unimportant--but action is the idea immediately placed before us4 ,this is not the case in ,philosophy1 and on this account the history of ,philosophy cannot be treated throughout without the introduction of the historian's views4 ,,oriental ,,philosophy ,,the first ,philosophy in order is the so-called ,oriental1 which1 however1 does not enter into the substance or range of our subject as represented here4 ,its position is preliminary1 and we only deal with it at all in order to account for not treating of it at greater length1 and to show in what relation it stands to ,thought and to true ,philosophy4 ,the expression ,eastern philosophy is specially employed in reference to the period in which this great universal ,oriental conception aroused the ,east--the land of circumscription and of limitation1 where the spirit of subjectivity reigns4 ,more particularly in the first centuries of ,christendom--that significant period--did these great ,oriental ideas penetrate into ,italy2 and in the ,gnostic philosophy they began to force the idea of the illimitable into the ,western mind1 until in the ,church the latter again succeeded in obtaining the ascendency and hence in firmly establishing the ,divine4 ,that which we call ,eastern ,philosophy is more properly the religious mode of thought and the conception of the world belonging generally to the ,orientals and approximates very closely to ,philosophy2 and to consider the ,oriental idea of religion just as if it were religious philosophy1 is to give the main reason why it is so like4 ,we do not similarly maintain that the ,roman1 ,greek and ,christian ,religions constitute ,philosophy4 ,these bear all the less similarity thereto in that the ,greek and ,roman gods as also ,christ and the ,god of the ,jews1 on account of the principle of individual freedom which penetrates the ,greek and still more the ,christian element1 make their appearance immediately as the explicit1 personal forms1 which1 being mythological or ,christian1 must first be themselves interpreted and changed into a philosophic form4 ,in the case of ,eastern ,religion1 on the contrary1 we are much more directly reminded of the philosophic conception1 for since in the ,east the element of subjectivity has not come forth1 religious ideas are not individualized1 and we have predominating a kind of universal ideas1 which hence present the appearance of being philosophic ideas and thoughts4 ,the ,orientals certainly have also individual forms1 such as ,brahma1 ,vishnu and ,civa1 but because freedom is wanting the individuality is not real1 but merely superficial4 ,and so much is this the case1 that when we suppose that we have to deal with a human form1 the same loses itself again and expands into the illimitable4 ,just as we hear amongst the ,greeks of a ,uranus and ,chronos--of ,time individualized--we find with the ,persians1 ,zeroane ,akerene1 but it is ,time unlimited4 ,we find ,ormuzd and ,ahriman to be altogether general forms and ideas2 they appear to be universal principles which thus seem to bear a relationship to ,philosophy or even seem to be themselves philosophic4 ,just as the content of the ,eastern religions1 ,god1 the essentially existent1 the eternal1 is comprehended somewhat in the light of universal1 we find the relative positions of individuals to ,him to be the same4 ,in the ,eastern religions the first condition is that only the one substance shall1 as such1 be the true1 and that the individual neither can have within himself1 nor can he attain to any value in as far as he maintains himself as against the being in and for itself4 ,he can have true value only through an identification with this substance in which he ceases to exist as subject and disappears into unconsciousness4 ,in the ,greek and ,christian ,religion1 on the other hand1 the subject knows himself to be free and must be maintained as such2 and because the individual in this way makes himself independent1 it is undoubtedly much more difficult for ,thought to free itself from this individuality and to constitute itself in independence4 ,the higher point of view implicitly contained in the ,greek individual freedom1 this happier1 larger life1 makes more difficult the work of ,thought1 which is to give due value to the universal4 ,in the ,east1 on the contrary1 the substantial in ,religion is certainly on its own view the principal matter1 the essential--and with it lawlessness1 the absence of individual consciousness is immediately connected--and this substance is undoubtedly a philosophic idea4 ,the negation of the finite is also present1 but in such a manner that the individual only reaches to its freedom in this unity with the substantial4 ,in as far as in the ,eastern mind1 reflection1 consciousness come through thought to distinction and to the determination of principles1 there exist such categories and such definite ideas not in unity with the substantial4 ,the destruction of all that is particular either is an illimitable1 the exaltitude of the ,east1 or1 in so far as that which is posited and determined for itself is known1 it is a dry1 dead understanding1 which cannot take up the speculative ,notion into itself4 ,to that which is true1 this finite can exist only as immersed in substance2 if kept apart from this it remains dead and arid4 ,we thus find only dry understanding amongst the ,easterns1 a mere enumeration of determinations1 a logic like the ,wolffian of old4 ,it is the same as in their worship1 which is complete immersion in devotion and then an endless number of ceremonials and of religious actions2 and this on the other side is the exaltitude of that illimitable in which everything disappears4 ,there are two ,eastern nations with which ,i wish just now to deal--the ,chinese and the ,indian4 ,a4 ,,chinese ,,philosophy4 ,it is true of the ,chinese as well as of the ,indians that they have a great reputation for culture2 but this1 as well as the amount of ,indian literature which exists1 has largely diminished through a further knowledge of it4 ,the great knowledge of these people bears upon such subjects as ,religion1 ,science1 the constitution and administration of the state1 poetry1 handicrafts and commerce4 ,but when we compare the laws and constitution of ,china with the ,european1 we find that we can only do so in respect of what is formal1 for the content is very different4 ,it is also felt1 however consistently they may be constituted as to form1 that they cannot find their place with us1 that we could not allow of their giving us satisfaction1 and that they take the place of law1 or rather that they put an end to it4 ,it is the same thing when we compare ,indian poetry with ,european2 considered as a mere play of the imagination it is as brilliant1 rich and cultured as that of any other people4 ,but in poetry we have to do with content1 and that is the important part of it4 ,even the ,homeric poetry is not serious for us1 and hence such poetry cannot last4 ,it is not the lack of genius in the ,oriental poetry2 the amount of genius is the same and the form may be very much developed1 but the content remains confined within certain bounds and cannot satisfy us1 nor can it be our content4 ,this is at outset a fact applying universally to such comparisons1 inasmuch as men let themselves be dazzled by form1 making it equal with1 or even preferring it to ours4 #a4 ,confucius4 ,the first subject of remark with regard to the ,chinese respects the teaching of ,confucius 7#ejj years before ,christ7 which made a great sensation in ,liebnitz' time2 this teaching is a moral philosophy4 ,confucius has1 besides1 commented upon the old traditional principles of the ,chinese2 his high moral teaching1 however1 gave him his great fame1 and that teaching is the authority most esteemed in ,china4 ,confucius' ,biography has been translated by ,french missionaries from the original ,chinese2 from this he appears to have been almost contemporaneous with ,thales1 to have been for a considerable time ,minister1 to have then fallen into disfavour1 lost his place and lived and philosophized amongst his own friends1 while still being often asked to give advice4 ,we have conversations between ,confucius and his followers in which there is nothing definite further than a commonplace moral put in the form of good1 sound doctrine1 which may be found as well expressed and better1 in every place and amongst every people4 ,cicero gives us ,de ,officiis1 a book of moral teaching more comprehensive and better than all the books of ,confucius4 ,he is hence only a man who has a certain amount of practical and worldly wisdom--one with whom there is no speculative philosophy4 ,we may conclude from his original works that for their reputation it would have been better had they never been translated4 ,the treatise which the ,jesuits produced#i is1 however1 more a paraphrase than a translation4 #b4 ,the ,philosophy of the ,y-king4 ,a second matter of remark is that the ,chinese have also taken up their attention with abstract thoughts and with pure categories4 ,the old book ,y-king1 or the ,book of ,principles1 serves as the foundation for such2 it contains the wisdom of the ,chinese1 and its origin is attributed to ,fohi4 ,that which is there by him related passes into what is quite mythological1 fabulous and even senseless4 ,the main point in it is the ascription to him of the discovery of a table with certain signs or figures 7,ho-tu7 which he saw on the back of a horse-dragon as it rose out of the river4#aj ,this table contains parallel lines above one another1 which have a symbolical signification2 and the ,chinese say that these lines are the foundation of their characters as also of their philosophy4 ,these symbols are quite abstract categories1 and consequently the most superficial determinations of the understanding4 ,it must certainly be considered that pure thoughts are brought to consciousness1 but in this case we make no advance1 merely remaining stationary so far as they are concerned4 ,the concrete is not conceived of speculatively1 but is simply taken from ordinary ideas1 inasmuch as it is expressed in accordance with their forms of representation and of perception4 ,hence in this collection of concrete principles there is not to be found in one single instance a sensuous conception of universal natural or spiritual powers4 ,to satisfy the curious1 ,i will give these principles in greater detail4 ,the two fundamental1 figures are a horizontal line 71 ,yang7 and the one which is broken into two equal parts 71 ,yin74 ,the first which is the perfect1 the father1 the manlike1 the unity1 such as is represented by the ,pythagoreans1 represents the affirmative2 the second is the imperfect1 the mother1 the womanly1 the duality and the negation4 ,these signs are held in high esteem1 for they are considered to be the ,principles of things4 ,first of all they are placed in combination of two from which four figures result3 1 1 1 1 or the great ,yang1 the little ,yang1 the little ,yin1 and the great ,yin4 ,the signification of these four representations is matter as perfect and imperfect4 ,the two ,yangs are perfect matter3 the first is in the category of youth and power2 the second is the same matter1 but as old and powerless4 ,the third and fourth images1 where ,yin constitutes the basis1 are imperfect matter1 which has again the two determinations of youth and age1 strength and weakness4 ,these lines are further united in sets of three1 and thus eight figures result1 which are called ,kua1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 ,i will give the interpretation of these ,kua just to show how superficial it is4 ,the first sign1 containing the great ,yang and the ,yang is the ,heavens 7,tien7 or the all-pervading ether4 ,the ,heavens to the ,chinese means what is highest1 and it has been a great source of division amongst the missionaries whether they ought to call the ,christian ,god1 ,tien1 or not4 ,the second sign is pure water 7,tui71 the third pure fire 7,li71 the fourth thunder 7,tschin71 the fifth wind 7,siun71 the sixth common water 7,kan71 the seventh mountains 7,ken71 the eighth the earth 7,kuen74 ,we should not place heaven1 thunder1 wind and mountains on the same footing4 ,we may thus obtain a philosophic origin for everything out of these abstract thoughts of absolute unity and duality4 ,all symbols have the advantage of indicating thoughts and of calling up significations1 and in this way such are likewise present there4 ,thought thus forms the first beginning1 but afterwards it goes into the clouds1 and ,philosophy does likewise4 ,therefore if ,windischmann#aa in his commentary recognizes in this system of ,confucius1 a 8thorough interconnection between all ,kua in the whole series10 it should be remembered that not a particle of the ,notion is to be found in it4 ,united further in sets of four1 the lines produce sixty-four figures1 which the ,chinese consider to be the origin of their characters1 since there have been added to these straight lines those which are perpendicular and inclined in different directions4 ,in ,schuking there is also a chapter on ,chinese wisdom1 where the five elements from which everything is made make their appearance4 ,these are fire1 water1 wood1 metal and earth1 which exist all in confusion1 and which we should no more than we did before1 allow to be principles4 ,the first canon in the law is found in the ,schuking1 as the naming of the five elements2 the second1 considerations upon the last1 and so it goes on4#ab ,universal abstraction with the ,chinese thus goes on to what is concrete1 although in accordance with an external kind of order only1 and without containing anything that is sensuous4 ,this is the principle of all ,chinese wisdom and of all the objects of study in ,china4 #c4 ,the ,sect of the ,tao-,see4 ,there is yet another separate sect1 that of the ,tao-,see1 the followers of which are not mandarins and attached to the state religion1 nor are they ,buddhists or ,lamaics4 ,the originator of this philosophy and the one who was closely connected with it in his life1 is ,lao-,ts1 who was born in the end of the seventh century before ,christ and who was older than ,confucius1 for this representative of the more political school went to him in order to ask his advice4 ,the book of the ,lao-,ts1 ,tao-king1 is certainly not included in the proper ,kings and has not their authority1 but it is an important work amongst the ,taosts or the followers of reason1 who call their rule in life ,tao-,tao1 which means the observation of the dictates or the laws of reason4 ,they dedicate their lives to the study of reason1 and maintain that he who knows reason in its source will possess universal science1 remedies for every ill and all virtue2 he will also have obtained a supernatural power of being able to fly to heaven and of not dying4#ac ,his followers say of ,lao-,ts himself that he is ,buddha who as man became the ever-existent ,god4 ,we still have his principal writings2 they have been taken to ,vienna1 and ,i have seen them there myself4 ,one special passage is frequently taken from them3 8,without a name ,tao#ad is the beginning of ,heaven and ,earth1 and with a name she is the ,mother of the ,universe4 ,it is only in her imperfect state that she is considered with affection2 who desires to know her must be devoid of passions40 ,abel ,rmusat says that taken at its best this might be expressed by the ,greek in 4 ,the celebrated passage which is often quoted by the ancients is this1#ae 8,reason has brought forth the one2 the one has brought forth the two2 the two have brought forth the three2 and the three have produced the whole world40 ,in this men have tried to find a reference to the ,trinity4 8,the ,universe rests upon the principle of ,darkness1 the universe embraces the principle of ,light10 or 8it is embraced by ether20 it can be thus reversed1 because the ,chinese language has no case inflection1 the words merely standing in proximity4 ,another passage in the same place has this sense1 8,he whom ye look at and do not see1 is named ,i2 thou hearkenest to him and hearest him not1 and he is called ,hi2 thou seekest for him with thy hand and touchest him not1 and his name is ,we4 ,thou meetest him and seest not his head2 thou goest behind him and seest not his back40 ,these contradictory expressions are called the 8chain of reason40 ,one naturally thinks in quoting these passages of and of the ,african kingly name of ,juba and also of ,jovis4 ,this ,i-hi-we or ,i-,h-,w#af is further made to signify an absolute vacuity and that which is ,nothing2 to the ,chinese what is highest and the origin of things is nothing1 emptiness1 the altogether undetermined1 the abstract universal1 and this is also called ,tao or reason4 ,when the ,greeks say that the absolute is one1 or when men in modern times say that it is the highest existence1 all determinations are abolished1 and by the merely abstract ,being nothing has been expressed excepting this same negation1 only in an affirmative form4 ,but if ,philosophy has got no further than to such expression1 it still stands on its most elementary stage4 ,what is there to be found in all this learning8 ,b4 ,,indian ,,philosophy4 ,if we had formerly the satisfaction of believing in the antiquity of the ,indian wisdom and of holding it in respect1 we now have ascertained through being acquainted with the great astronomical works of the ,indians1 the inaccuracy of all figures quoted4 ,nothing can be more confused1 nothing more imperfect than the chronology of the ,indians2 no people which has attained to culture in astronomy1 mathematics1 c41 is as incapable for history2 in it they have neither stability nor coherence4 ,it was believed that such was to be had in the time of ,wikramaditya1 who was supposed to have lived about #ej ,b4,c41 and under whose reign the poet ,kalidasa1 author of ,sakontala1 lived4 ,but further research discovered half a dozen ,wikramadityas and careful investigation has placed this epoch in our eleventh century4 ,the ,indians have lines of kings and an enormous quantity of names1 but everything is vague4 ,we know how the ancient glory of this land was held in the highest estimation even by the ,greeks1 just as they knew about the ,gymnosophists1 who were excellent men1 though people ventured to call them otherwise--men who having dedicated themselves to a contemplative life1 lived in abstraction from external life1 and hence1 wandering about in hordes1 like the ,cynics renounced all ordinary desires4 ,these latter in their capacity as philosophers1 were also more especially known to the ,greeks1 inasmuch as ,philosophy is also supposed to exist in this abstraction1 in which all the relationships of ordinary life are set aside2 and this abstraction is a feature which we wish to bring into prominence and consider4 ,indian culture is developed to a high degree1 and it is imposing1 but its ,philosophy is identical with its ,religion1 and the objects to which attention is devoted in ,philosophy are the same as those which we find brought forward in ,religion4 ,hence the holy books or ,vedas also form the general groundwork for ,philosophy4 ,we know the ,vedas tolerably well2 they contain principally prayers addressed to the many representations of ,god1 direction as to ceremonials1 offerings1 c4 ,they are also of the most various periods2 many parts are very ancient1 and others have taken their origin later1 as1 for instance1 that which treats of the service of ,vishnu4 ,the ,vedas even constitute the basis for the atheistical ,indian philosophies2 these1 too1 are not wanting in gods1 and they pay genuine attention to the ,vedas4 ,indian ,philosophy thus stands within ,religion just as scholastic ,philosophy stands within ,christian dogmatism1 having at its basis and presupposing the doctrines of the church4 ,mythology takes the form of incarnation or individualization1 from which it might be thought that it would be opposed to ,philosophy in its universality and ideality2 incarnation is not1 however1 here taken in so definite a sense1 for almost everything is supposed to partake of it1 and the very thing that seems to define itself as individuality falls back directly within the mist of the universal4 ,the idea of the ,indians more appropriately expressed1 is that there is one universal substance which may be laid hold of in the abstract or in the concrete1 and out of which everything takes its origin4 ,the summit of man's attainment is that he as consciousness should make himself identical with the substance1 in ,religion by means of worship1 offerings1 and rigid acts of expiation1 and in ,philosophy through the instrumentality of pure thought4 ,it is quite recently that we first obtained a definite knowledge of ,indian ,philosophy2 in the main we understand by it religious ideas1 but in modern times men have learned to recognize real philosophic writings4 ,colebrooke1#ag in particular1 communicated abstracts to us from two ,indian philosophic works1 and this forms the first contribution we have had in reference to ,indian ,philosophy4 ,what ,frederick von ,schlegel says about the wisdom of the ,indians is taken from their religious ideas only4 ,he is one of the first ,germans who took up his attention with ,indian philosophy1 yet his work bore little fruit because he himself read no more than the index to the ,ramayana4 ,according to the abstract before mentioned1 the ,indians possess ancient philosophic systems2 one part of these they consider to be orthodox1 and those which tally with the ,vedas are particularly included2 the others are held to be heterodox and as not corresponding with the teaching of the holy books4 ,the one part1 which really is orthodox1 has no other purpose than to make the deliverances of the ,vedas clearer1 or to derive from the text of these original treatises an ingeniously thought-out ,psychology4 ,this system is called ,mimansa1 and two schools proceed from it4 ,distinguished from these there are other systems1 amongst which the two chief are those of the ,sanc'hya and ,nyaya4 ,the former again divides into two parts which are1 however1 different in form only4 ,the ,nyaya is the most developed2 it more particularly gives the rules for reasoning1 and may be compared to the ,logic of ,aristotle4 ,colebrooke has made abstracts from both of these systems1 and he says that there are many ancient treatises upon them1 and that the versus memoriales from them are very extensive4 #a4 ,the ,sanc'hya ,philosophy of ,capila4 ,the originator of the ,sanc'hya is called ,capila1 and he was an ancient sage of whom it was said that he was a son of ,brahma1 and one of the seven great ,holy men2 others say that he was an incarnation of ,vishnu1 like his disciple ,asuri1 and that he was identified with fire4 ,as to the age of the ,aphorisms 7,sutras7 of ,capila1 ,colebrooke can say nothing2 he merely mentions that they were already mentioned in other very ancient books1 but he does not feel able to say anything definite in the matter4 ,the ,sanc'hya is divided into different schools1 of which there are two or three1 which1 however1 differ from one another only in a few particulars4 ,it is held to be partly heterodox and partly orthodox4 ,the real aim of all ,indian schools and systems of ,philosophy1 whether atheistic or theistic1 is to teach the means whereby eternal happiness can be attained before1 as well as after1 death4 ,the ,vedas say1 8,what has to be known is the ,soul2 it must be distinguished from nature1 and hence it will never come again40 ,that means that it is exempt from metempsychosis and likewise from bodily form1 so that it does not after death make its appearance in another body4 ,this blessed condition therefore is1 according to the ,sanc'hya1 a perfect and eternal release from every kind of ill4 ,it reads3--8,through ,thought1 the true ,science1 this freedom can be accomplished2 the temporal and worldly means of procuring enjoyment and keeping off spiritual or bodily evil are insufficient2 even the methods advocated by the ,vedas are not effectual for the purpose1 and these are found in the revealed form of worship1 or in the performance of religious ceremonies as directed in the ,vedas40 ,the offering up of animals is specially valuable as such a means2 and in this regard the ,sanc'hya rejects the ,vedas2 such an offering is not pure1 because it is connected with the death of animals1 and the main tenet in the former is not to injure any animal4 ,other methods of deliverance from evil are in the excessive acts of penance performed by the ,indians1 to which a retreat within themselves is added4 ,now when the ,indian thus internally collects himself1 and retreats within his own thoughts1 the moment of such pure concentration is called ,brahma1 the one and the clearly supersensuous state1 which the understanding calls the highest possible existence4 ,when this is so with me1 then am ,i ,brahma4 ,such a retreat into ,thought takes place in the ,religion as well as in the ,philosophy of the ,indians1 and they assert with reference to this state of bliss that it is what is highest of all1 and that even the gods do not attain to it4 ,indra1 for example1 the god of the visible heavens1 is much lower than the soul in this life of internal contemplation2 many thousand ,indras have passed away1 but the soul is exempt from every change4 ,the ,sanc'hya only differs from ,religion in that it has a complete system of thought or logic1 and that the abstraction is not made a reduction to what is empty1 but is raised up into the significance of a determinate thought4 ,this science is stated to subsist in the correct knowledge of the principles--which may be outwardly perceptible or not--of the material and of the immaterial world4 ,the ,sanc'hya system separates itself into three parts3 the method of knowledge1 the object of knowledge1 and the determinate form of the knowledge of principles4 a4 ,as regards the methods of obtaining knowledge1 the ,sanc'hya says that there are three kinds of evidence possible3 first of all1 that of perception2 secondly1 that of inference2 thirdly1 that of affirmation1 which is the origin of all others1 such as reverence for authority1 a teachable disposition1 and tradition4 ,perception is said to require no explanation4 ,inference is a conclusion arrived at from the operation of cause and effect1 by which one determination merely passes over into a second4 ,there are three forms1 because inferences are made either from cause to effect1 from effect to cause1 or in accordance with different relations of cause and effect4 ,rain1 we may say1 is foretold when a cloud is seen to be gathering2 fire1 when a hill is seen to be smoking2 or the movement of the moon is inferred when1 at different times1 it is observed to be in different places4 ,these are simple1 dry relations1 originating from the understanding4 ,under affirmation1 tradition or revelation is understood1 such as that of the orthodox ,vedas2 in a wider sense1 immediate certainty or the affirmation in my consciousness1 and in a less wide sense1 an assurance through verbal communication or through tradition is so denominated4 b4 ,of objects of knowledge or of principles1 the ,sanc'hya gives five-and-twenty2 and these ,i will mention to show the want of order that is in them4 #a4 ,nature1 as the origin of everything1 is said to be the universal1 the material cause1 eternal matter1 undistinguished and undistinguishable1 without parts1 productive but without production1 absolute substance4 #b4 ,intelligence1 the first production of ,nature and itself producing other principles1 distinguishable as three gods through the efficacy of three qualities1 which are ,goodness1 ,foulness and ,darkness4 ,these form one person and three gods1 namely1 ,brahma1 ,vishnu1 and ,maheswara4 #c4 ,consciousness1 personality1 the belief that in all perceptions and meditations ,i am present1 that the objects of sense1 as well as of intelligence1 concern me1 in short that ,i am ,i4 ,it issues from the power of intelligence1 and itself brings forth the following principles4 #d-h4 ,five very subtle particles1 rudiments or atoms1 which are only perceptible to an existence of a higher order1 and not through the senses of men2 these proceed from the principle of consciousness1 and bring forth on their own account the five elements--space and the first origination of earth1 water1 fire and air4 #i-ai4 ,the eleven succeeding principles are the organs of feeling1 which are produced by the personality4 ,there are ten external organs1 comprising the five senses and five active organs--the organs of the voice1 hands and feet1 the excretory and genital organs4 ,the eleventh organ is that of the inward sense4 #bj to #bd4 ,these principles are the five elements brought forth from the earlier-named rudiments--the ether which takes possession of space1 air1 fire1 water and earth4 #be4 ,the soul4 ,in this very unsystematic form we see only the first beginnings of reflection1 which seem to be put together as a universal4 ,but this arrangement is1 to say nothing of being unsystematic1 not even intelligent4 ,formerly the principles were outside of and successive to one another2 their unity is found in the ,soul4 ,it is said of the latter that it is not produced1 and is not productive2 it is individual1 and hence there are many souls2 it is sentient1 eternal1 immaterial and unchangeable4 ,colebrooke here distinguishes between the theistic and atheistic systems of the ,sanc'hya1 since the former not only admits of individual souls1 but also upholds ,god 7,iswara7 as the ruler of the world4 ,the knowledge of the soul still remains the principal point4 ,it is through the consideration of nature and through abstraction from nature that the unity of the soul with nature is brought about1 just as the lame man and the blind are brought together for the purposes of transport and of guidance--the one being the bearer and being directed 7nature871 the other being borne and guiding 7soul874 ,through the union of ,soul and ,nature1 the creation is effected1 and this consists in the development of intelligence and of other principles4 ,this unity is the actual support for that which is1 and the means by which it is so maintained4 ,it is at the same time an important consideration that the negation of the object which is contained in thought1 is necessary in order to comprehend2 this reflection has far more depth than the ordinary talk about immediate consciousness4 ,the view is superficial and perverted which maintains the ,easterns to have lived in unity with nature2 the soul in its activity1 mind1 is indeed undoubtedly in relation with nature and in unity with the truth of nature4 ,but this true unity essentially contains the moment of the negation of nature as it is in its immediacy2 such an immediate unity is merely the life of animals1 the life and perception of the senses4 ,the idea which is present to the ,indians is thus indeed the unity of nature and of soul1 but the spiritual is only one with nature in so far as it is within itself1 and at the same time manifests the natural as negative4 ,as regards the creation1 this is further signified4 ,the soul's desire and end is for satisfaction and freedom1 and with this view it is endowed with a subtle environment1 in which all the above-mentioned principles are contained1 but only in their elementary development4 ,something of our ideal1 or of the implicit is present in this idea2 it is like the blossom which is ideally in the bud1 and yet is not actual and real4 ,the expression for this is ,lingam1 the generative power of nature1 which holds a high place in the estimation of all ,indians4 ,this subtle form1 says the ,sanc'hya1 also assumes a coarse bodily shape1 and clothes itself in several garbs2 and as a means of preventing the descent into a coarse materiality1 philosophic contemplation is recommended4 ,hitherto we have observed the abstract principles2 the following is to be noticed regarding the creation of the concrete actuality of the universe4 ,the bodily creation consists of the soul habited in a material body2 it comprehends eight orders of higher beings and five orders of lower beings1 which constitute--with men1 who form a single class--fourteen orders1 and these are divided into three worlds or classes4 ,the first eight orders have appellations which appear in ,indian mythology1 viz4 ,brahma1 ,prajapatis1 ,indra1 c42 there are both gods and demi-gods1 and ,brahma himself is represented here as if he were created4 ,the five lower orders are composed of animals3 the four-footed animals are in two classes1 birds come third1 reptiles1 fishes1 and insects fourth1 and1 finally1 vegetable and inorganic nature comes fifth4 ,the abode of the eight higher classes is in heaven2 they are1 it is said1 in the enjoyment of that which is good and virtuous1 and consequently are happy1 though still they are but imperfect and transient2 underneath is the seat of darkness or delusion1 where beings of the lower orders live2 and between is the world of men1 where untruth or passion reigns4 ,against these three worlds1 which have their place in the material creation1 the system places yet another creation1 and that is the ,intellectual1 consisting of the powers of understanding and the senses4 ,these last are again divided into four classes1 viz4 those determinations which impede1 those which incapacitate1 those which satisfy1 and those which perfect the intelligence4 #a4 ,sixty-two of the impeding determinations are adduced2 eight kinds of error1 as many of opinion or of illusion1 ten of passion as being illusion carried to extremity1 eighteen of hate or sullenness1 and the same of grief4 ,here there is shown somewhat of an empirical1 psychological1 and observing mode of treatment4 #b4 ,the incapacity of intelligence has again eight-and-twenty variations3 injury1 want of organs1 c4 #c4 ,satisfaction is either inward or outward4 ,the inward satisfaction is fourfold2 the first concerns nature1 the whole universal or substantial1 and is set forth in the opinion that philosophic knowledge is a modification of the principle of nature itself1 with which there is immediately united the anticipation of a liberty given through the act of nature2 yet the true liberty is not to be expected as an act of nature1 for it is the soul which has to bring forth that liberty through itself and through its thinking activity4 ,the second satisfaction is in the belief of securing liberty through ascetic exercises1 pains1 torments1 and penances4 ,the third has to do with time--the idea that liberty will come in the course of time and without study4 ,the fourth satisfaction is obtained in a belief in luck--in believing that liberty depends on fate4 ,the external mode of obtaining satisfaction relates to continence from enjoyment1 but continence from sensuous motives1 such as dislike to the unrest of acquisition1 and fear of the evil consequences of enjoyment4 #d4 ,there are1 again1 several means of perfecting the intelligence adduced1 and1 amongst others1 there is the direct psychological mode of perfecting mind1 as is seen in the act of reasoning1 in friendly converse1 and so on4 ,this we may find1 indeed1 in our applied logic4 ,there is still somewhat to be remarked as to the main points of the system4 ,the ,sanc'hya1 and likewise the other ,indian systems of ,philosophy1 occupy themselves particularly with the three qualities 7,guna7 of the absolute ,idea1 which are represented as substances and as modifications of nature4 ,it is noteworthy that in the observing consciousness of the ,indians it struck them that what is true and in and for itself contains three determinations1 and the ,notion of the ,idea is perfected in three moments4 ,this sublime consciousness of the trinity1 which we find again in ,plato and others1 then went astray in the region of thinking contemplation1 and retains its place only in ,religion1 and there but as a ,beyond4 ,then the understanding penetrated through it1 declaring it to be senseless2 and it was ,kant who broke open the road once more to its comprehension4 ,the reality and totality of the ,notion of everything1 considered in its substance1 is absorbed by the triad of determinations2 and it has become the business of our times to bring this to consciousness4 ,with the ,indians1 this consciousness proceeded from sensuous observation merely1 and they now further define these qualities as follows3 ,the first and highest is with them the ,good 7,sattva72 it is exalted and illuminating--allied to joy and felicity--and piety predominates within it4 ,it prevails in fire1 and therefore flames rise up and sparks fly upwards2 if it has ascendency in men1 as it does have in the eight higher orders1 it is the origin of virtue4 ,this also is the universal--throughout and in every aspect the affirmative--in abstract form4 ,the second and mediate quality is deceit or passion 7,najas1 ,tejas7 which for itself is blind2 it is that which is impure1 harmful1 hateful2 it is active1 vehement1 and restless1 allied to evil and misfortune1 being prevalent in the air1 on which account the wind moves transversely2 amongst living beings it is the cause of vice4 ,the third and last quality is darkness 7,tamas72 it is inert and obstructive1 allied to care1 dullness1 and disappointment1 predominating in earth and water1 and hence these fall down and tend ever downwards4 ,with living beings stupidity takes its origin in this4 ,the first quality is thus the unity with itself2 the second the manifestation or the principle of difference1 desire1 disunion1 as wickedness2 the third1 however1 is mere negation1 as in mythology it is concretely represented in the form of ,siva1 ,mahadeva1 or ,maheswara1 the god of change or destruction4 ,as far as we are concerned1 the important distinction is that the third principle is not the return to the first which ,mind and ,idea demand1 and which is effected by the removal of the negation in order to effect a reconciliation with itself and to go back within itself4 ,with the ,indians the third is still change and negation4 ,these three qualities are represented as the essential being of nature4 ,the ,sanc'hya says1 8,we speak of them as we do of the trees in a wood40 ,yet this is a bad simile1 for the wood is but an abstract universal1 in which the individuals are independent4 ,in the religious ideas of the ,vedas1 where these qualities also appear as ,trimurti1 they are spoken of as if they were successive modifications1 so that 8,everything was darkness first1 then received the command to transform itself1 and in this manner the form0--which1 however1 is a worse one--8of movement and activity 7foulness7 was assumed1 until finally1 by yet another command from ,brahma1 the form of goodness was adopted40 ,further determinations of the intelligence in respect of these qualities follow4 ,it is said that eight kinds of intelligence are counted1 of which four pertain to what is good3--virtue first1 science and knowledge second1 thirdly1 freedom from passion1 which1 may have either an external and sensuous motive--the repugnance to disturbance--or be of an intellectual nature1 and emanate from the conviction that nature is a dream1 a mere jugglery and sham2 the fourth is power4 ,this last is eight-fold1 and hence eight special qualities are given as being present2 viz4 the power to contract oneself into a quite small form1 for which everything shall be penetrable2 the power to expand into a gigantic body2 the power to become light enough to be able to mount to the sun on a sunbeam2 the possession of unlimited power of action in the organs1 so that with the finger-tips the moon may be touched2 irresistible will1 so that1 for instance1 one may dive into the earth as easily as in the water2 mastery over all living and lifeless existence2 the power to change the course of nature2 and the power to perform everything that is wished4 8,the feeling that such transcendent power10 ,colebrooke goes on1 8is within the reach of man in his life is not peculiar to the ,sanc'hya sect1 but is common to all systems and religious ideas1 and such a power is in good faith ascribed to many holy men and ,brahmins in dramas and popular narratives40 ,sensuous evidence is of no account as opposed to this1 for with the ,indian1 perception of the senses is1 generally speaking1 absent3 everything adopts the form of imaginary images1 every dream is esteemed just as much as truth and actuality4 ,the ,sanc'hya ascribes this power to man1 in so far as he elevates himself through the working of his thought into inward subjectivity4 ,colebrooke says1 8,the ,yoga-sastra names in one of its four chapters a number of acts by which such power may be attained2 these are exemplified by a profound meditation1 accompanied by holding back the breath and inactivity of the senses1 while a fixed position is constantly preserved4 ,by means of such acts the adept reaches the knowledge of all that is past as well as future2 he has learned to divine the thoughts of others1 to have the strength of elephants1 the courage of lions1 the swiftness of the wind1 the power to fly in the air1 to swim in the water1 to dive into the earth1 to behold every possible world in one moment1 and to accomplish other wonderful deeds4 ,but the quickest mode of reaching happiness through deep contemplation is that worship of ,god which consists in ever murmuring the mystic name of ,god1 #8,om4'0 ,this idea is a very general one4 ,colebrooke deals more particularly with the theistic and atheistic divisions of the ,sanc'hya as distinguished4 ,while in the theistic system1 ,iswara1 the chief ruler of the world1 is a soul or spirit distinguished from the other souls1 ,capila1 in the atheistic ,sanc'hya1 disowns ,iswara1 the originator of the world by volition1 alleging that there is no proof of the existence of ,god1 since it is not shown by perception1 nor is it possible that it should be deduced from argument4 ,he recognizes1 indeed1 an existence proceeding from nature which is ,absolute ,intelligence1 the source of all individual intelligences and the origin of all other existences1 which gradually develop out of it3 about the ,creator of the world1 understanding this to be creation1 he emphatically remarks that 8the truth of such an ,iswara is proved40 ,but1 he says1 8the existence of effects depends on the soul1 on consciousness1 and not on ,iswara4 ,everything proceeds from the great ,principle1 which is ,intelligence20 to this the individual soul belongs1 and through this it is brought about4 c4 ,as to the third division of the ,sanc'hya1 the more particular consideration of the forms of knowledge as regards the principle1 ,i shall make a few more remarks1 which may perhaps have some interest4 ,of the various kinds of knowledge already given1 that of reasoning1 of the connection existing with the conclusion through the relation of cause and effect1 remains the chief1 and ,i will show how the ,indians comprehend this relation4 ,the understanding and all other principles derived from it are to them effects1 and from these they reason to their causes2 in one respect this is analogous to our inference1 but in another different4 ,they perceive that 8effects exist even before the operation of the causes2 for what does not exist cannot be made explicit in existence through causality40 ,colebrooke says1 8,this means that effects are educts rather than products40 ,but the question is just what products are4 ,as an example of how the effect is already contained in the cause1 the following is given3--,oil is already existent in the seeds of sesamum before it is pressed out2 rice is in the husk before it is thrashed2 milk is in the udder of the cow before it is milked4 ,cause and effect are in reality the same2 a piece of a dress is not really different from the yarn from which it is woven1 for the material is the same4 ,this is how this relation is understood4 ,a consequence derived from it was the eternity of the world1 for the saying 8,out of nothing there comes nothing10 which ,colebrooke also mentions1 is opposed to the belief in a creation of the world from nothing in our religious sense4 ,as a matter of fact1 it must also be said1 8,god creates the world not out of nothing1 but out of ,himself2 it is ,his own determination1 by ,him brought into existence40 ,the distinction between cause and effect is only a formal distinction2 it is the understanding that keeps them separate1 and not reason4 ,moisture is the same as rain2 or again we speak in mechanics of different movements1 whereas motion has the same velocity before as after impact4 ,the ordinary consciousness cannot comprehend the fact that there is no real distinction between cause and effect4 ,the ,indians infer the existence of 8a universal cause which is undistinguishable1 while determinate things are finite10 and on this account there must be a cause permeating through them4 ,even intelligence is an effect of this cause1 which is the soul in so far as it is creative in this identity with nature after its abstraction from it4 ,effect proceeds from cause1 yet1 on the other hand1 this last is not independent1 but goes back into universal cause4 ,general destruction is postulated along with what is called the creation of the three worlds4 ,just as the tortoise stretches out its limbs and then draws them back again within its shell1 the five elements1 earth1 c41 which constitute the three worlds1 are in the general ruin and dissolution of things which takes place within a certain time1 again drawn back in the reverse order to that in which they emerged from the original principle1 because they return1 step by step1 to their first cause--that is1 to what is highest and inseparable1 which is ,nature4 ,to this the three qualities1 goodness1 passion1 and darkness1 are attributed2 the further attributes of these determinations may be very interesting1 but they are understood in a very superficial way4 ,for it is said that nature operates through the admixture of these three qualities2 each thing has all three within itself1 like three streams which flow together2 it also works by means of modifications1 just as water which is soaked in through the roots of plants and led up into the fruit1 obtains a special flavour4 ,there are hence only the categories of admixture and of modification present4 ,the ,indians say3--8,nature has these three qualities in her own right as her forms and characteristics2 other things have them only because they are present in them as effects of the former40 ,we still have to consider the relation of nature to spirit4 8,nature1 although it is quite inanimate1 performs the office of preparing the soul for its freedom1 just as it is the function of milk--of a substance having no sensation--to nourish the calf40 ,the ,sanc'hya makes the following simile4 ,nature is like a bajadere showing herself to the soul as to an audience2 she is abused for her impudence in exposing herself too often to the rude gaze of the spectators4 8,but she retires when she has shown herself sufficiently2 she does so because she has been seen1 and the audience retires because it has seen4 ,nature has no further use as regards the soul1 and yet the union remains a lasting one40 ,with the attainment of intellectual knowledge through the study of principles1 the final1 incontrovertible1 single truth is learnt1 that 8,i neither am1 nor is anything mine1 nor do ,i exist40 ,that is1 the personality is still distinguished from the soul1 and finally personality and self-consciousness disappear for the ,indian4 8,everything that comes forth in consciousness is reflected by the soul1 but like an image which does not dull the crystal of the soul1 and does not belong to it4 ,in possession of this self-knowledge0 7without personality7 8the soul contemplates nature at its ease1 thus exempt from all terrible variation1 and freed from every other form and operation of the understanding1 with the exception of this spiritual knowledge40 ,this is a mediate spiritual knowledge of the likewise spiritualized content--a knowledge without personality and consciousness4 8,the soul still indeed remains for some time in bodily garb1 but this is only so after the same manner as the potter's wheel1 when the jar is perfected1 still turns round from the effect of the previously given impulse40 ,the soul thus has1 according to the ,indians1 nothing further to do with the body1 and its connection therewith is therefore a superfluous one4 8,but when the separation of the already prepared soul from its body at length comes to pass1 and nature is done with soul1 the absolute and final liberation is accomplished40 ,here we find the crowning moments in the ,sanc'hya philosophy4 #b4 ,the ,philosophy of ,gotama and ,canade4 ,the philosophy of ,gotama and that of ,canade belong to one another4#ah ,the philosophy of ,gotama is called ,nyaya 7reasoning71 and that of ,canade1 ,vaiseshica 7particular74 ,the first is a specially perfect dialectic1 and the second1 on the other hand1 occupies itself with physics1 that is1 with particular or sensuous objects4 ,colebrooke says3--8,no department of science or of literature has taken up the attention of the ,indians more than the ,nyaya2 and the fruit of this study is an infinite number of writings1 included in which there may be found the works of very celebrated men of learning4 ,the system which ,gotama and ,canade observe is that indicated in one part of the ,vedas as being the path which must be trodden in the pursuit of learning and study2 viz41 enunciation1 definition1 and investigation4 ,enunciation is the specification of a thing by its name1 that is1 by the expression denoting it1 as revelation directs2 for language is considered as revealed to man4 ,definition sets forth the particular quality which constitutes the real character of a thing4 ,investigation consists in an inquiry into the adequacy and sufficiency of the definition4 ,in conformity with this1 the teachers of philosophy presuppose scientific terms1 proceed to definitions and then come to the investigation of the thus premised subjects40 ,by the name1 the ordinary conception is indicated1 and with it what is given in definition is compared in investigation4 ,what comes next is the object to be contemplated4 8,gotama here adduces sixteen points1 amongst which proof1 evidence0 7which is formal71 8and what has to be proved1 are the principal2 the others are merely subsidiary and accessory1 as contributing to the knowledge and confirmation of the truth4 ,the ,nyaya concurs with the other psychological schools in this1 that it promises happiness1 final excellence1 and freedom from evil as the reward of a perfect knowledge of the principles which it teaches1 that is to say1 of the ,truth1 meaning the conviction of the eternal existence of the soul as separable from body10 which makes spirit independent4 ,soul then is itself the object which is to be known and proved4 ,this has still to be shown more particularly4 a4 ,the first point of importance1 the evidence brought forth as proof1 is said to be divided into four kinds3--first of all1 perception2 secondly1 inference1 of which there are three kinds1 viz4 inference from result to cause1 that from cause to effect1 and that derived from analogy4 ,the third kind of evidence is comparison1 the fourth1 trustworthy authority1 including both tradition and the revelation implied in it4 ,these kinds of proof are much brought forward1 both in the ancient ,treatise ascribed to ,gotama and in innumerable commentaries4 b4 ,the second point of importance is found in the subjects which have to be proved1 and which have to be made evident2 and of these twelve are here given4 ,the first and most important is1 however1 the soul1 as the seat1 distinguished from the body and from the senses1 of feeling and of knowledge1 the existence of which is proved through inclination1 disinclination1 will1 c4 ,it has fourteen qualities3 number1 size1 individuality1 connection1 separation1 intelligence1 pleasure1 pain1 desire1 dislike1 will1 merit1 fault1 and imagination4 ,we see in this first commencement of reflection1 which is quite without order1 neither connection nor any totality of determinations4 ,the second object of knowledge is body2 the third1 the organs of sensation1 as the five outward senses are called4 ,these are not modifications of consciousness1 as the ,sanc'hya asserts1 but matter constructed out of the elements1 which respectively consist of earth1 water1 light1 air1 and ether4 ,the pupil of the eye is not1 they say1 the organ of sight1 nor the ear of hearing1 but the organ of seeing is a ray of light that proceeds from the eye to the object2 the organ of hearing is the ether that in the cavity of the ear communicates with the object heard1 through the ether that is found between4 ,the ray of light is usually invisible1 just as a light is not seen at mid-day1 but in certain circumstances it is visible4 ,in taste1 a watery substance like saliva is the organ1 and so on4 ,we find something similar to what is here said about sight in ,plato's ,timus 7pp4 #de1 #df1 ,steph42 pp4 #ej-ec1 ,bekk472 there are interesting remarks upon the phosphorus of the eyes in a paper by ,schultz1 contained in ,goethe's ,morphology4 ,examples of men seeing at night1 so that their eyes lighted up the object1 are brought forward in numbers1 but the demonstration certainly demands particular conditions4 ,the objects of sense form the fourth subject4 ,here ,cesava1 a commentator1 inserts the categories of ,canade1 of which there are six4 ,the first of these is substance1 and of this there are nine kinds3 earth1 water1 light1 air1 ether1 time1 space1 soul1 understanding4 ,the fundamental elements of material substances are by ,canade regarded as if they were original atoms1 and afterwards aggregates of the same2 he maintains the everlasting nature of atoms1 and thus much is adduced about the union of atoms1 by which means motes are also produced4 ,the second category is that of ,quality1 and of it there are twenty-four kinds1 viz4 #a1 colour2 #b1 taste2 #c1 smell2 #d1 tangibility2 #e1 numbers2 #f1 size2 #g1 individuality2 #h1 conjunction2 #i1 separation2 #aj1 priority2 #aa1 posteriority2 #ab1 weight2 #ac1 fluidity2 #ad1 viscidity2 #ae1 sound2 #af1 intelligence2 #ag1 pleasure2 #ah1 pain2 #ai1 desire2 #bj1 dislike2 #ba1 will2 #bb1 virtue2 #bc1 vice2 #bd1 a capacity which includes three different qualities1 viz4 celerity1 elasticity1 and power of imagination4 ,the third category is action2 the fourth1 association of qualities2 the fifth1 distinction2 the sixth1 is aggregation1 and1 according to ,canade1 this is the last2 other writers add negation as the seventh4 ,this is the manner in which philosophy is regarded by the ,indians4 c4 ,the philosophy of ,gotama makes doubt the third topic1 succeeding those of the evidence of knowledge1 and the subjects of interest to knowledge4 ,another topic is regular proof1 formal reasoning1 or the perfect syllogism 7,nyaya71 which consists of five propositions3--#a1 the proposition2 #b1 the reason2 #c1 the instance2 #d1 the application2 #e1 the conclusion4 ,to take examples3--#a4 ,this hill is burning2 #b1 because it smokes2 #c1 what smokes is burning1 like a kitchen fire2 #d1 accordingly the hill smokes2 #e1 therefore it is on fire4 ,this is propounded as syllogisms are with us1 but in the manner adopted1 the matter which is in point is propounded first4 ,we should1 on the contrary1 begin with the general4 ,this is the ordinary form1 and these examples may satisfy us1 yet we shall recapitulate the matter once more4 ,we have seen that in ,india the point of main importance is the soul's drawing itself within itself1 raising itself up into liberty1 or thought1 which constitutes itself for itself4 ,this becoming explicit of soul in the most abstract mode may be called intellectual substantiality1 but here it is not the unity of mind and nature that is present1 but directly the opposite4 ,to mind1 the consideration of nature is only the vehicle of thought or its exercise1 which has as its aim the liberation of mind4 ,intellectual substantiality is in ,india the end1 while in ,philosophy it is in general the true commencement2 to philosophize is the idealism of making thought1 in its own right1 the principle of truth4 ,intellectual substantiality is the opposite of the reflection1 understanding1 and the subjective individuality of the ,european4 ,with us it is of importance that ,i will1 know1 believe1 think this particular thing according to the grounds that ,i have for so doing1 and in accordance with my own free will2 and upon this an infinite value is set4 ,intellectual substantiality is the other extreme from this2 it is that in which all the subjectivity of the 8,i0 is lost2 for it everything objective has become vanity1 there is for it no objective truth1 duty or right1 and thus subjective vanity is the only thing left4 ,the point of interest is to reach intellectual substantiality in order to drown in it that subjective vanity with all its cleverness and reflection4 ,this is the advantage of arriving at this point of view4 ,the defect in such a view is that because intellectual substantiality1 while represented as end and aim for the subject1 as a condition that has to be produced in the interest of the subject1 even though it be most objective1 is yet only quite abstractly objective2 and hence the essential form of objectivity is wanting to it4 ,that intellectual substantiality that thus remaining in abstraction1 has as its existence the subjective soul alone4 ,just as in empty vanity1 where the subjective power of negation alone remains1 everything disappears1 this abstraction of intellectual substantiality only signifies an escape into what is empty and without determination1 wherein everything vanishes4 ,therefore what remains to be done is to force forward the real ground of the inwardly self-forming and determining objectivity--the eternal form within itself1 which is what men call ,thought4 ,just as this ,thought in the first place1 as subjective1 is mine1 because ,i think1 but in the second place is universality which comprehends intellectual substantiality1 it is likewise in the third place forming activity1 the principle of determination4 ,this higher kind of objectivity that unfolds itself1 alone gives a place to the particular content1 allows it to have free scope and receives it into itself4 ,if in the ,oriental view1 the particular shakes and is destined to fall1 it still has its place grounded on thought4 ,it is able to root itself in itself1 it is able to stand firm1 and this is the hard ,european understanding4 ,such ,eastern ideas tend to destroy it1 but it is preserved active in the soil of thought2 it cannot exist when regarded as independent1 but must exist only as a moment in the whole system4 ,in the ,eastern ,philosophy we have also discovered a definite content1 which is brought under our consideration2 but the consideration is destitute of thought or system because it comes from above and is outside of the unity4 ,on that side there stands intellectual substantiality1 on this side it appears dry and barren2 the particular thus only has the dead form of simple reason and conclusion1 such as we find in the ,scholastics4 ,based on the ground of thought1 on the other hand1 the particular may receive its dues2 it may be regarded and grasped as a moment in the whole organization4 ,the ,idea has not become objective in the ,indian ,philosophy2 hence the external and objective has not been comprehended in accordance with the ,idea4 ,this is the deficiency in ,orientalism4 ,the true1 objective ground of thought finds its basis in the real freedom of the subject2 the universal or substantial must itself have objectivity4 ,because thought is this universal1 the ground of the substantial and likewise 8,i0--thought is the implicit and exists as the free subject--the universal has immediate existence and actual presence2 it is not only an end or condition to be arrived at1 but the absolute character is objective4 ,it is this principle that we find in the ,greek world1 and the object of our further consideration is its development4 ,the universal first appears as quite abstract1 and as such it confronts the concrete world2 but its value is both for the ground of the concrete world and for that which is implicit4 ,it is not a beyond1 for the value of the present lies in the fact that it exists in the implicit2 or that which is implicit1 the universal1 is the truth of present objects4 ,,part ,,one ,,greek ,,philosophy ,,introduction ,,the name of ,greece strikes home to the hearts of men of education in ,europe1 and more particularly is this so with us ,germans4 ,europeans have taken their religion1 the life to come1 the far-off land1 from a point somewhat further off than ,greece--they took it from the ,east1 and more especially from ,syria4 ,but the here1 the present1 art and science1 that which in giving liberty to our spiritual life1 gives it dignity as it likewise bestows upon it ornament1 we know to have proceeded from ,greece either directly or indirectly--through the circuitous road of ,rome4 ,the latter of these two ways was the earlier form in which this culture came to us2 it also came from the formerly universal church which derived its origin as such from ,rome1 and has retained its speech even until now4 ,the sources of authority in addition to the ,latin ,gospels have been the ,fathers4 ,our law1 too1 boasts of deriving its most perfect forms from ,rome4 ,teutonic strength of mind has required to pass through the hard discipline of the church and law which came to us from ,rome1 and to be kept in check2 it is in this way that the ,european character first obtained its pliability and capacity for freedom4 ,thus it was after ,european manhood came to be at home with itself and to look upon the present1 that the historical and that which is of foreign derivation was given4 ,when man began to be at home with himself1 he turned to the ,greeks to find enjoyment in it4 ,let us leave the ,latin and the ,roman to the church and to jurisprudence4 ,higher1 freer philosophic science1 as also the beauty of our untrammelled art1 the taste for1 and love of the same1 we know to have taken their root in ,greek life and to have created therefrom their spirit4 ,if we were to have an aspiration1 it would be for such a land and such conditions4 ,but what makes us specially at home with the ,greeks is that they made their world their home2 the common spirit of homeliness unites us both4 ,in ordinary life we like best the men and families that are homely and contented in themselves1 not desiring what is outside and above them1 and so it is with the ,greeks4 ,they certainly received the substantial beginnings of their religion1 culture1 their common bonds of fellowship1 more or less from ,asia1 ,syria and ,egypt2 but they have so greatly obliterated the foreign nature of this origin1 and it is so much changed1 worked upon1 turned round1 and altogether made so different1 that what they1 as we1 prize1 know1 and love in it1 is essentially their own4 ,for this reason1 in the history of ,greek life1 when we go further back and seem constrained so to go back1 we find we may do without this retrogression and follow within the world and manners of the ,greeks1 the beginnings1 the germination and the progress of art and science up to their maturity1 even seeing the origin of their decay--and this completely comprehended within their own range4 ,for their spiritual development requires that which is received or foreign1 as matter or stimulus only2 in such they have known and borne themselves as men that were free4 ,the form which they have given to the foreign principle is this characteristic breath of spirituality1 the spirit of freedom and of beauty which can in the one aspect be regarded as form1 but which in another and higher sense is simply substance4 ,they have thus not only themselves created the substantial in their culture and made their existence their own1 but they have also held in reverence this their spiritual rebirth1 which is their real birth4 ,the foreign origin they have so to speak thanklessly forgotten1 putting it in the background--perhaps burying it in the darkness of the mysteries which they have kept secret from themselves4 ,they have not only done this1 that is they have not only used and enjoyed all that they have brought forth and formed1 but they have become aware of and thankfully and joyfully placed before themselves this at-homeness ,heimathlichkeit in their whole existence1 the ground and origin of themselves1 not merely existing in it1 possessing and making use of it4 ,for their mind1 when transformed in this spiritual new birth1 is just the living in their life1 and also the becoming conscious of that life as it has become actual4 ,they represent their existence as an object apart from themselves1 which manifests itself independently and which in its independence is of value to them2 hence they have made for themselves a history of everything which they have possessed and have been4 ,not only have they represented the beginning of the world--that is1 of gods and men1 the earth1 the heavens1 the wind1 mountains and rivers--but also of all aspects of their existence1 such as the introduction of fire and the offerings connected with it1 the crops1 agriculture1 the olive1 the horse1 marriage1 property1 laws1 arts1 worship1 the sciences1 towns1 princely races1 c4 ,of all these it is pleasingly represented through tales how they have arisen in history as their own work4 ,it is in this veritable homeliness1 or1 more accurately1 in the spirit of homeliness1 in this spirit of ideally being-at-home-with-themselves in their physical1 corporate1 legal1 moral and political existence2 it is in the beauty and the freedom of their character in history1 making what they are to be also a sort of ,mnemosyne with them1 that the kernel of thinking liberty rests2 and hence it was requisite that ,philosophy should arise amongst them4 ,philosophy is being at home with self1 just like the homeliness of the ,greek2 it is man's being at home in his mind1 at home with himself4 ,if we are at home with the ,greeks1 we must be at home more particularly in their ,philosophy2 not1 however1 simply as it is with them1 for ,philosophy is at home with itself1 and we have to do with ,thought1 with what is most specially ours1 and with what is free from all particularity4 ,the development and unfolding of thought has taken place with them from its earliest beginning1 and in order to comprehend their ,philosophy we may remain with them without requiring to seek for further and external influences4 ,but we must specify more particularly their character and point of view4 ,the ,greeks have a starting-point in history as truly as they have arisen from out of themselves3 this starting-point1 comprehended in thought1 is the oriental substantiality of the natural unity between the spiritual and the natural4 ,to start from the self1 to live in the self1 is the other extreme of abstract subjectivity1 when it is still empty1 or rather has made itself to be empty2 such is pure formalism1 the abstract principle of the modern world4 ,the ,greeks stand between both these extremes in the happy medium2 this therefore is the medium of beauty1 seeing that it is both natural and spiritual1 but yet that the spiritual still remains the governing1 determining subject4 ,mind immersed in nature is in substantial unity with it1 and in so far as it is consciousness1 it is essentially sensuous perception3 as subjective consciousness it is certainly form-giving though it is devoid of measure4 ,for the ,greeks1 the substantial unity of nature and spirit was a fundamental principle1 and thus being in the possession and knowledge of this1 yet not being overwhelmed in it1 but having retired into themselves1 they have avoided the extreme of formal subjectivity1 and are still in unity with themselves4 ,thus it is a free subject which still possesses that original unity in content1 essence and substratum1 and fashions its object into beauty4 ,the stage reached by ,greek consciousness is the stage of beauty4 ,for beauty is the ideal2 it is the thought which is derived from ,mind1 but in such a way that the spiritual individuality is not yet explicit as abstract subjectivity that has then in itself to perfect its existence into a world of thought4 ,what is natural and sensuous still pertains to this subjectivity1 but yet the natural form has not equal dignity and rank with the other1 nor is it predominant as is the case in the ,east4 ,the principle of the spiritual now stands first in rank1 and natural existence has no further value for itself1 in its existent forms1 being the mere expression of the ,mind shining through1 and having been reduced to be the vehicle and form of its existence4 ,mind1 however1 has not yet got itself as a medium whereby it can represent itself in itself1 and from which it can form its world4 ,thus free morality could and necessarily did find a place in ,greece1 for the spiritual substance of freedom was here the principle of morals1 laws and constitutions4 ,because the natural element is1 however1 still contained in it1 the form taken by the morality of the state is still affected by what is natural2 the states are small individuals in their natural condition1 which could not unite themselves into one whole4 ,since the universal does not exist in independent freedom1 that which is spiritual still is limited4 ,in the ,greek world what is potentially and actually eternal is realized and brought to consciousness through ,thought2 but in such a way that subjectivity confronts it in a determination which is still accidental1 because it is still essentially related to what is natural2 and in this we find the reason as promised above1 for the fact that in ,greece the few alone are free4 ,the measureless quality of substance in the ,east is brought1 by means of the ,greek mind1 into what is measurable and limited2 it is clearness1 aim1 limitation of forms1 the reduction of what is measureless1 and of infinite splendour and riches1 to determinateness and individuality4 ,the riches of the ,greek world consist only of an infinite quantity of beautiful1 lovely and pleasing individualities in the serenity which pervades all existence2 those who are greatest amongst the ,greeks are the individualities1 the connoisseurs in art1 poetry1 song1 science1 integrity and virtue4 ,if the serenity of the ,greeks1 their beautiful gods1 statues1 and temples1 as well as their serious work1 their institutions and acts1 may seem--compared to the splendour and sublimity1 the colossal forms of oriental imagination1 the ,egyptian buildings of ,eastern kingdoms--to be like child's play1 this is the case yet more with the thought that comes into existence here4 ,such thought puts a limit on this wealth of individualities as on the oriental greatness1 and reduces it into its one simple soul1 which1 however1 is in itself the first source of the opulence of a higher ideal world1 of the world of ,thought4 8,from out of thy passions1 oh1 man10 exclaimed an ancient1 8thou hast derived the materials for thy gods10 just as the ,easterns1 and especially the ,indians1 did from the elements1 powers and forms of ,nature4 ,one may add1 8out of ,thought thou takest the element and material for ,god40 ,thus ,thought is the ground from which ,god comes forth1 but it is not ,thought in its commencement that constitutes the first principle from which all culture must be grasped4 ,it is quite the other way4 ,in the beginning1 thought comes forth as altogether poor1 abstract1 and of a content which is meagre in comparison to that given to his subject by the oriental2 for as immediate1 the beginning is just in the form of nature1 and this it shares with what is oriental4 ,because it thus reduces the content of the ,east to determinations which are altogether poor1 these thoughts are scarcely worth observation on our part1 since they are not yet proper thoughts1 neither being in the form of1 or determined as thought1 but belonging really to ,nature4 ,thus ,thought is the ,absolute1 though not as ,thought4 ,that is1 we have always two things to distinguish1 the universal or the ,notion1 and the reality of this universal1 for the question here arises as to whether the reality is itself ,thought or ,nature4 ,we find in the fact that reality at first has still the immediate form and is only ,thought potentially1 the reason for commencing with the ,greeks and from the natural philosophy of the ,ionic school4 ,as regards the external and historical condition of ,greece at this time1 ,greek philosophy commences in the sixth century before ,christ in the time of ,cyrus1 and in the period of decline in the ,ionic republics in ,asia ,minor4 ,just because this world of beauty which raised itself into a higher kind of culture went to pieces1 ,philosophy arose4 ,crsus and the ,lydians first brought ,ionic freedom into jeopardy2 later on the ,persians were those who destroyed it altogether1 so that the greater part of the inhabitants sought other spots and created colonies1 more particularly in the ,west4 ,at the time of the decline in ,ionic towns1 the other ,greece ceased to be under its ancient lines of kings2 the ,pelopideans and the other1 and for the most part foreign1 princely races had passed away4 ,greece had in many ways come into touch with the outside world and the ,greek inhabitants likewise sought within themselves for a bond of fellowship4 ,the patriarchal life was past1 and in many states it came to be a necessity that they should constitute themselves as free1 organized and regulated by law4 ,many individuals come into prominence who were no more rulers of their fellow-citizens by descent1 but who were by means of talent1 power of imagination and scientific knowledge1 marked out and reverenced1 and such individuals came into many different relations with their fellows4 ,part of them became advisers1 but their advice was frequently not followed2 part of them were hated and despised by their fellow-citizens1 and they drew back from public affairs2 others became violent1 if not fierce governors of the other citizens1 and others again finally became the administrators of liberty4 ,the ,seven ,sages4 ,amongst these men just characterized1 the seven sages--in modern times excluded from the history of ,philosophy--take their place4 ,in as far as they may be reckoned as milestones in the history of ,philosophy1 something about their character should1 in the commencement of ,philosophy1 be shortly said4 ,they came into prominence1 partly as taking part in the battles of the ,ionic towns1 partly as expatriated1 and partly as individuals of distinction in ,greece4 ,the names of the seven are given differently3 usually1 however1 as ,thales1 ,solon1 ,periander1 ,cleobulus1 ,chilon1 ,bias1 ,pittacus4 ,hermippus in ,diogenes ,laertius 7#a1 #db7 specifies seventeen1 and1 amongst these1 various people pick out seven in various ways4 ,according to ,diogenes ,laertius 7#a1 #da7 ,dicarchus1 who came still earlier in history1 only names four1 and these are placed amongst the seven by all2 they are ,thales1 ,bias1 ,pittacus and ,solon4 ,besides these1 ,myson1 ,anacharsis1 ,acusilaus1 ,epimenides1 ,pherecydes1 c41 are mentioned4 ,dicarchus in ,diogenes 7#a1 #dj71 says of them that they are neither wise men 77 nor philosophers1 but men of understanding 77 and law-givers2 this judgment has become the universal one and is held to be just4 ,they come in a period of transition amongst the ,greeks--a transition from a patriarchal system of kings into one of law or force4 ,the fame of the wisdom of these men depends1 on the one hand1 on the fact that they grasped the practical essence of consciousness1 or the consciousness of universal morality as it is in and for itself1 giving expression to it in the form of moral maxims and in part in civil laws1 making these actual in the state2 on the other hand it depends on their having1 in theoretic form1 expressed the same in witty sayings4 ,some of these sayings could not merely be regarded as thoughtful or good reflections1 but in so far1 as philosophic and speculative2 they have a comprehensive1 universal significance ascribed to them1 which1 however1 does not explain them4 ,these men have not really made science and ,philosophy their aim2 it is expressly said of ,thales that it was in the latter part of his life that he first took to ,philosophy4 ,what had relation to politics appeared most frequently2 they were practical men1 men of affairs1 but not in our sense of the word2 with us practical activity devotes itself to a special line of administration or to a particular business1 or to economics1 c4 ,they lived in democratic states and thus shared the responsibilities of the general administration and rule4 ,they were not statesmen like the great ,greek personalities1 like ,miltiades1 ,themistocles1 ,pericles and ,demosthenes1 but they were statesmen in a time when safety1 preservation and1 indeed1 the whole well-being1 disposition and well nigh the very foundation of civic life were in question2 and certainly when this was so with the foundations of legally established institutions4 ,thales and ,bias thus appear as the representatives of the ,ionic towns4 ,herodotus 7,i4 #afi-aga7 speaks of both1 and says of ,thales that he advised even before the overthrow of the ,ionians 7apparently through ,crsus71 that they should constitute a supreme council 7 7 in ,teos1 in the centre of the ,ionian people1 and thus make a federal state with a capital and principal federal town1 so that they might still remain separate nations 77 as before4 ,however1 they did not follow this advice1 and this isolated and weakened them1 and the result was their conquest2 it has always been a difficult thing for the ,greeks to give up their individuality4 ,later on1 when ,harpagus1 the general of ,cyrus who accomplished their overthrow1 pressed in upon them1 the ,ionians took no better the most excellent advice of ,bias of ,priene1 given them at the decisive moment when they were assembled at ,panionium1 8to go in a common fleet to ,sardinia1 there to found an ,ionic state4 ,by so doing they would escape servitude1 be happy1 and1 inhabiting the largest island1 subdue the others4 ,but if they remained in ,ionia there was no hope of liberty to be seen for them40 ,herodotus gives his corroboration to this advice--8,if they had followed him they would have been the happiest of ,greeks40 ,such things take place1 but through force and not voluntarily4 ,we find the other sages under similar conditions4 ,solon was an administrator in ,athens1 and thereby became famous2 few men have attained the honourable position of being a law-giver4 ,solon shares it with ,moses1 ,lycurgus1 ,zaleucus1 ,numa1 c41 alone4 ,no individuals can be found amongst ,teutonic peoples who possess the distinction of being the law-givers of their people4 ,nowadays there can be law-givers no longer2 legal institutions and regulations are in modern times always ready to hand1 and the little that can still be done by means of the law-giver and by law-making assemblies is simply the further modification of details or making very insignificant additions4 ,what is dealt with is the compilation1 wording and perfecting of the particular only2 and yet neither ,solon and ,lycurgus did more than respectively bring the ,ionic mind and the ,doric character--being that which had been given them and which was implicitly present--into the form of consciousness1 and obviate the temporary inconvenience of disorder through effective laws4 ,solon was thus not a perfect statesman2 this is manifest from the sequel of his history4 ,a constitution which allowed ,pisistratus in ,solon's own time to raise himself into the ,tyranny1 showing itself to be so destitute of strength and organization that it could not prevent its own overthrow1 7and by what a power67 manifests some inward want4 ,this may seem strange1 for a constitution must be able to afford resistance to such an attack4 ,but let us see what ,pisistratus did4 ,what the so-called tyrants really were1 is most clearly shown by the relation borne by ,solon to ,pisistratus4 ,when orderly institutions and laws were necessary to the ,greeks1 we find law-givers and regents of states appearing1 who laid down laws1 and ruled accordingly4 ,the law1 as universal1 seemed and still seems now to the individual to be force1 inasmuch as he does not have regard to or comprehend the law3 it applies first to all the people1 and then only1 to the individual2 it is essential first of all to use constraint until the individual attains discernment1 and law to him becomes his law1 and ceases to be something foreign4 ,most of the law-givers and administrators of states undertook themselves to constrain the people and to be their tyrants4 ,in states where they did not undertake it1 it had to be done by other individuals1 for it was essential4 ,according to ,diogenes ,laertius' account 7,i4 #dh-ej71 we find ,solon--whom his friends advised to secure the mastery for himself since the people held to him 771 and would have liked to see him become tyrant--repulse them1 and try to prevent any such occurrence1 when he became suspicious of ,pisistratus' intentions4 ,what he did when he remarked upon the attitude of ,pisistratus1 was to come into the assembly of the people1 and tell them the design of ,pisistratus1 accoutred in armour and shield2 this was then unusual1 for ,thucydides 7#a1 #f7 makes it a distinguishing feature between ,greeks and ,barbarians1 that the former1 and pre-eminently the ,athenians1 put aside their arms in time of peace4 ,he said1 8,men of ,athens1 ,i am wiser than some and braver than others3 ,i am wiser than those who do not see the deceit of ,pisistratus1 braver than those who certainly see it1 but say nothing from fear40 ,as he could not do anything1 he left ,athens4 ,pisistratus is said to have then written a most honourable letter to ,solon in his absence1 which ,diogenes 7,i4 #ec1 #ed7 has preserved for us1 inviting him to return to ,athens1 and live with him as a free citizen4 8,not only am ,i not the only one of the ,greeks to have seized the tyranny1 but ,i have not taken anything which was not my due1 for ,i am of the race of ,codrus4 ,i have only taken back to myself what the ,athenians swore they would preserve to ,codrus and his race1 and yet took from them4 ,moreover ,i am doing no evil toward gods and men1 but as thou hast given laws to the ,athenians1 ,i take care 77 that in civil life they shall carry them out 747 ,his son ,hippias did the same4 ,and these relations are carried out better than they would be in a democracy1 for ,i allow nobody to do evil 771 and as ,tyrant1 ,i lay claim to no more 7 7 than such consideration and respect and specified gifts 7 7 as would have been offered to the kings in earlier times4 ,every ,athenian gives the tenth part of his revenue1 not to me1 but towards the cost of the public offering1 and besides for the commonwealth1 and for use in case of war4 ,i am not angry that thou hast disclosed my project4 ,for thou didst it more out of love to the people than hate against me1 and because thou didst not know how ,i would conduct my rule4 ,for if thou hadst known this1 thou wouldst have submitted to it willingly1 and wouldst not have taken flight20 and so he goes on4 ,solon1 in the answer given by ,diogenes1 7,i4 #ff1 #fg7 says1 that he 8has not a personal grudge against ,pisistratus1 and he must call him the best of tyrants2 but to turn back does not befit him4 ,for he made equality of rights essential in the ,athenian constitution1 and himself refused the tyranny4 ,by his return he would condone what was done by ,pisistratus40 ,the rule of ,pisistratus accustomed the ,athenians to the laws of ,solon1 and brought them into usage1 so that after this usage came to be general1 supremacy was superfluous2 his sons were hence driven out of ,athens1 and for the first time the constitution of ,solon upheld itself4 ,solon undoubtedly gave the laws1 but it is another thing to make such regulations effectual in the manners1 habits and life of a people4 ,what was separate in ,solon and ,pisistratus1 we find united in ,periander in ,corinth1 and ,pittacus in ,mitilene4 ,this may be enough about the outward life of the seven sages4 ,they are also famed for the wisdom of the sayings which have been preserved to us2 these sayings seem in great measure1 however1 to be superficial and hackneyed4 ,the reason for this is found in the fact that1 to our reflection1 general propositions are quite usual2 much in the ,proverbs of ,solomon seems to us to be superficial and commonplace for the same reason4 ,but it is quite another thing to bring to the ordinary conception for the first time this same universal in the form of universality4 ,many distichs are ascribed to ,solon which we still retain2 their object is to express in maxims general obligations towards the gods1 the family and the country4 ,diogenes 7,i4 #eh7 tells us that ,solon said3 8,laws are like a spider's web2 the small are caught1 the great tear it up3 speech is the image of action10 c4 ,such sayings are not philosophy1 but general reflections1 the expression of moral duties1 maxims1 necessary determinations4 ,the wisdom of the sages is of this kind2 many sayings are insignificant1 but many seem to be more insignificant than they are4 ,for instance1 ,chilon says3 8,stand surety1 and evil awaits thee0 71 74 ,on the one hand this is quite a common rule of life and prudence1 but the sceptics gave to this proposition a much higher universal significance1 which is also accredited to ,chilon4 ,this sense is1 8,ally thyself closely to any particular thing1 and unhappiness will fall upon thee40 ,the sceptics adduced this proposition independently1 as demonstrating the principle of scepticism1 which is that nothing is finite and definite in and for itself1 being only a fleeting1 vacillating phase which does not last4 ,cleobulus says1 1 another 1 and this has likewise a universal significance which is that limitation1 the of ,plato as opposed to the ---the self-determined as opposed to undetermined--is what is best2 and thus it is that in ,being limit or measure is the highest determination4 ,one of the most celebrated sayings is that of ,solon in his conversation with ,crsus1 which ,herodotus 7,i4 #cj-cc7 has in his own way given us very fully4 ,the result arrived at is this3--8,nobody is to be esteemed happy before his death40 ,but the noteworthy point in this narrative is that from it we can get a better idea of the standpoint of ,greek reflection in the time of ,solon4 ,we see that happiness is put forward as the highest aim1 that which is most to be desired and which is the end of man2 before ,kant1 morality1 as eudmonism1 was based on the determination of happiness4 ,in ,solon's sayings there is an advance over the sensuous enjoyment which is merely pleasant to the feelings4 ,let us ask what happiness is and what there is within it for reflection1 and we find that it certainly carries with it a certain satisfaction to the individual1 of whatever sort it be--whether obtained through physical enjoyment or spiritual--the means of obtaining which lie in men's own hands4 ,but the fact is further to be observed that not every sensuous1 immediate pleasure can be laid hold of1 for happiness contains a reflection on the circumstances as a whole1 in which we have the principle to which the principle of isolated enjoyment must give way4 ,eudmonism signifies happiness as a condition for the whole of life2 it sets up a totality of enjoyment which is a universal and a rule for individual enjoyment1 in that it does not allow it to give way to what is momentary1 but restrains desires and sets a universal standard before one's eyes4 ,if we contrast it with ,indian philosophy1 we find eudmonism to be antagonistic to it4 ,there the liberation of the soul from what is corporeal1 the perfect abstraction1 the necessity that the soul shall1 in its simplicity1 be at home with itself1 is the final end of man4 ,with the ,greeks the opposite is the case2 the satisfaction there is also satisfaction of the soul1 but it is not attained through flight1 abstraction1 withdrawal within self1 but through satisfaction in the present1 concrete satisfaction in relation to the surroundings4 ,the stage of reflection that we reach in happiness1 stands midway between mere desire and the other extreme1 which is right as right and duty as duty4 ,in happiness1 the individual enjoyment has disappeared2 the form of universality is there1 but the universal does not yet come forth on its own account1 and this is the issue of the conversation between ,crsus and ,solon4 ,man as thinking1 is not solely engrossed with present enjoyment1 but also with the means for obtaining that to come4 ,crsus points out to him these means1 but ,solon still objects to the statement of the question of ,crsus4 ,for in order that any one should be conceived of as happy1 we must await his death1 for happiness depends upon his condition to the end1 and upon the fact that his death should be a pious one and be consistent with his higher destiny4 ,because the life of ,crsus had not yet expired1 ,solon could not deem him happy4 ,and the history of ,crsus bears evidence that no momentary state deserves the name of happiness4 ,this edifying history holds in its embrace the whole standpoint of the reflection of that time4 ,division of the ,subject4 ,in the consideration of ,greek philosophy we have now to distinguish further three important periods3--in the first place the period from ,thales to ,aristotle2 secondly1 ,greek philosophy in the ,roman world2 thirdly1 the ,neo-platonic philosophy4 #a4 ,we begin with thought1 as it is in a quite abstract1 natural or sensuous form1 and we proceed from this to the ,idea as determined4 ,this first period shows the beginning of philosophic thought1 and goes on to its development and perfection as a totality of knowledge in itself2 this takes place in ,aristotle as representing the unity of what has come before4 ,in ,plato there is just such a union of what came earlier1 but it is not worked out1 for he only represents the ,idea generally4 ,the ,neo-platonists have been called eclectics1 and ,plato was said to have brought about the unity2 they were not1 however1 eclectics1 but they had a conscious insight into the necessity for uniting these philosophies4 #b4 ,after the concrete ,idea was reached1 it came forth as if in opposites1 perfecting and developing itself4 ,the second period is that in which science breaks itself up into different systems4 ,a one-sided principle is carried through the whole conception of the world2 each side is in itself formed into a totality1 and stands in the relation of one extreme to another4 ,the philosophical systems of ,stoicism and ,epicureanism are such2 scepticism forms the negative to their dogmatism1 while the other philosophies disappear4 #c4 ,the third period is the affirmative1 the withdrawal of the opposition into an ideal world or a world of thought1 a divine world4 ,this is the ,idea developed into totality1 which yet lacks subjectivity as the infinite being-for-self4 ,,section ,,one ,,first ,,period1 ,,from ,,thales ,,to ,,aristotle ,,in this first period we shall again make three divisions3-- #a4 ,the first extends from ,thales to ,anaxagoras1 from abstract thought which is in immediate determinateness to the thought of the self-determining ,thought4 ,here a beginning is made with the absolutely simple1 in which the earliest methods of determination manifest themselves as attempts1 until the time of ,anaxagoras2 he determines the true as the 1 and as active thought which no longer is in a determinate character1 but which is self-determining4 #b4 ,the second division comprises the ,sophists1 ,socrates1 and the followers of ,socrates4 ,here the self-determining thought is conceived of as present and concrete in me2 that constitutes the principle of subjectivity if not also of infinite subjectivity1 for thought first shows itself here only partly as abstract principle and partly as contingent subjectivity4 #c4 ,the third division1 which deals with ,plato and ,aristotle1 is found in ,greek science where objective thought1 the ,idea1 forms itself into a whole4 ,the concrete1 in itself determining ,thought1 is1 with ,plato1 the still abstract ,idea1 but in the form of universality2 while with ,aristotle that ,idea was conceived of as the self-determining1 or in the determination of its efficacy or activity4 ,,chapter ,i ,,period ,i4--,,division ,i4--,,thales ,,to ,,anaxagoras ,,since we possess only traditions and fragments of this epoch1 we may speak here of the sources of these4 #a4 ,the first source is found in ,plato1 who makes copious reference to the older philosophers4 ,for the reason that he makes the earlier and apparently independent philosophies1 which are not so far apart when once their ,notion is definitely grasped1 into concrete moments of one ,idea1 ,plato's philosophy often seems to be merely a clearer statement of the doctrines of the older philosophers1 and hence it draws upon itself the reproach of plagiarism4 ,plato was willing to spend much money in procuring the writings of the older philosophers1 and1 from his profound study of these1 his conclusions have much weight4 ,but because in his writings he never himself appeared as teacher1 but always represented other people in his dialogues as the philosophers1 a distinction never has been made between what really belonged to them in history and what was added by him through the further development which he effected in their thoughts4 ,in the ,parmenides1 for instance1 we have the ,eleatic philosophy1 and yet the working out of this doctrine belongs peculiarly to ,plato4 #b4 ,aristotle is our most abundant authority2 he studied the older philosophers expressly and most thoroughly1 and he has1 in the beginning of his ,metaphysics especially1 and also to a large extent elsewhere1 dealt with them1 in historical order3 he is as philosophic as erudite1 and we may rely upon him4 ,we can do no better in ,greek philosophy than study the first book of his ,metaphysics4 ,when the would-be-wise man depreciates ,aristotle1 and asserts that he has not correctly apprehended ,plato1 it may be retorted that as he associated with ,plato himself1 with his deep and comprehensive mind1 perhaps no one knew him better4 #c4 ,cicero's name may also occur to us here--although he certainly is but a troubled spring--since he undoubtedly gives us much information2 yet because he was lacking in philosophic spirit1 he understood ,philosophy rather as if it were a matter of history merely4 ,he does not seem to have himself studied its first sources1 and even avows that1 for instance1 he never understood ,heraclitus2 and because this old and deep philosophy did not interest him1 he did not give himself the trouble to study it4 ,his information bears principally on later philosophers--the ,stoics1 ,epicureans1 the new ,academy1 and the ,peripatetics4 ,he saw what was ancient through their medium1 and1 generally speaking1 through a medium of reasoning and not of speculation4 #d4 ,sextus ,empiricus1 a later sceptic1 has importance through his writings1 ,hypotyposes ,pyrrhonic and adversus ,mathematicos4 ,because1 as a sceptic1 he both combated the dogmatic philosophy and also adduced other philosophers as testifying to scepticism 7so that the greater part of his writings is filled with the tenets of other philosophers71 he is the most abundant source we have for the history of ancient philosophy1 and he has retained for our use many valuable fragments4 #e4 ,the book of ,diogenes ,laertius 7,de vitis1 c41 ,philoss4 lib4 x41 ed4 ,meibom4 c4 notis ,menagii1 ,amstel4 #afib7 is an important compilation1 and yet it brings forward copious evidence without much discrimination4 ,a philosophic spirit cannot be ascribed to it2 it rambles about amongst bad anecdotes extraneous to the matter in hand4 ,for the lives of philosophers1 and here and there for their tenets1 it is useful4 #f4 ,finally1 we must speak of ,simplicius1 a later ,greek1 from ,cilicia1 living under ,justinian1 in the middle of the sixth century4 ,he is the most learned and acute of the ,greek commentators of ,aristotle1 and of his writings there is much still unpublished3 to him we certainly owe our thanks4 ,i need give no more references1 for they may be found without trouble in any compendium4 ,in the progress of ,greek philosophy men were formerly accustomed to follow the order that showed1 according to ordinary ideas1 an external connection1 and which is found in one philosopher having had another as his teacher--this connection is one which might show him to be partly derived from ,thales and partly from ,pythagoras4 ,but such a connection is in part defective in itself1 and in part it is merely external4 ,the one set of philosophic sects1 or of philosophers classed together1 which is considered as belonging to a system--that which proceeds from ,thales--pursues its course in time and mind far separate from the other4 ,but1 in truth1 no such series ever does exist in this isolation1 nor would it do so even though the individuals were consecutive and had been externally connected as teacher and taught1 which never is the case2 mind follows quite another order4 ,these successive series are interwoven in spirit just as much as in their particular content4 ,we come across ,thales first amongst the ,ionic people1 to whom the ,athenians belonged1 or from whom the ,ionians of ,asia ,minor1 as a whole1 derived their origin4 ,the ,ionic race appears earlier in ,peloponnesus1 but seems to have been removed from thence4 ,it is1 however1 not known what nations belonged to it1 for1 according to ,herodotus 7,i4 #adc71 the other ,ionians1 and even the ,athenians1 laid aside the name4 ,according to ,thucydides 7,i4 #b and #ab71 the ,ionic colonies in ,asia ,minor and the islands proceeded principally from ,athens1 because the ,athenians1 on account of the over-population of ,attica1 migrated there4 ,we find the greatest activity in ,greek life on the coasts of ,asia ,minor1 in the ,greek islands1 and then towards the west of ,magna ,grcia2 we see amongst these people1 through their internal political activity and their intercourse with foreigners1 the existence of a diversity and variety in their relations1 whereby narrowness of vision is done away with1 and the universal rises in its place4 ,these two places1 ,ionia and ,greater ,greece1 are thus the two localities where this first period in the history of ,philosophy plays its part until the time when1 that period being ended1 ,philosophy plants itself in ,greece proper1 and there makes its home4 ,those spots were also the seat of early commerce and of an early culture1 while ,greece itself1 so far as these are concerned1 followed later4 ,we must thus remark that the character of the two sides into which these philosophies divide1 the philosophy of ,asia ,minor in the east and that of ,grecian ,italy in the west1 partakes of the character of the geographical distinction4 ,on the ,asia ,minor side1 and also in the islands1 we find ,thales1 ,anaximander1 ,anaximenes1 ,heraclitus1 ,leucippus1 ,democritus1 ,anaxagoras1 and ,diogenes from ,crete4 ,on the other side are the inhabitants of ,italy3 ,pythagoras from ,samos1 who lived in ,italy1 however2 ,xenophanes1 ,parmenides1 ,zeno1 ,empedocles2 and several of the ,sophists also lived in ,italy4 ,anaxagoras was the first to come to ,athens1 and thus his science takes a middle place between both extremes1 and ,athens was made its centre4 ,the geographical distinction makes its appearance in the manifestation of ,thought1 in the fact that1 with the ,orientals a sensuous1 material side is dominant1 and in the west1 ,thought1 on the contrary1 prevails1 because it is constituted into the principle in the form of thought4 ,those philosophers who turned to the east knew the absolute in a real determination of nature1 while towards ,italy there is the ideal determination of the absolute4 ,these explanations will be sufficient for us here2 but ,empedocles1 whom we find in ,sicily1 is somewhat of a natural philosopher1 while ,gorgias1 the ,sicilian sophist1 remains faithful to the ideal side4 ,we now have to consider further3--#a1 ,the ,ionians1 viz4 ,thales1 ,anaximander1 ,anaximenes2 #b1 ,pythagoras and his followers2 #c1 the ,eleatics1 viz4 ,xenophanes1 ,parmenides1 c42 #d1 ,heraclitus2 #e1 ,empedocles1 ,leucippus and ,democritus2 #f1 ,anaxagoras4 ,we have to trace and point out the progression of this philosophy also4 ,the first and altogether abstract determinations are found with ,thales and the other ,ionians2 they grasped the universal in the form of a natural determination1 as water and air4 ,progression must thus take place by leaving behind the merely natural determination2 and we find that this is so with the ,pythagoreans4 ,they say that number is the substance or the essence of things2 number is not sensuous1 nor is it pure thought1 but it is a non-sensuous object of sense4 ,it was with the ,eleatics that pure thought appeared1 and that its forcible liberation from the sensuous form and the form of number came to pass2 and thus from them proceeds the dialectic movement of thought1 which negates the definite particular in order to show that it is not the many but only the one that is true4 ,heraclitus declares the ,absolute to be this very process1 which1 according to the ,eleatics1 was still subjective2 he arrived at objective consciousness1 since in it the ,absolute is that which moves or changes4 ,empedocles1 ,leucippus1 and ,democritus1 on the contrary1 rather go to the opposite extreme1 to the simple1 material1 stationary principle1 to the substratum which underlies the process2 and thus this last1 as being movement1 is distinguished from it4 ,with ,anaxagoras it is the moving1 self-determining thought itself that is then known as existence1 and this is a great step forward4 ,a4 ,,the ,,ionic ,,philosophy4 ,here we have the earlier ,ionic philosophy1 which we desire to treat as shortly as possible2 and this is so much the easier1 that the thought contained in it is very abstract and barren4 ,other philosophers than ,thales1 ,anaximander1 and ,anaximenes1 only come under our consideration as names4 ,we have no more than half a dozen passages in the whole of the early ,ionic philosophy1 and that makes it an easy study4 ,yet learning prides itself most upon the ancients1 for we may be most learned about that of which we know the least4 #a4 ,thales4 ,with ,thales we1 properly speaking1 first begin the history of ,philosophy4 ,the life of ,thales occurred at the time when the ,ionic towns were under the dominion of ,crsus4 ,through his overthrow 7,ol4 #eh1 #a2 #edh ,b4,c471 an appearance of freedom was produced1 yet the most of these towns were conquered by the ,persians1 and ,thales survived the catastrophe only a few years4 ,he was born at ,miletus2 his family is1 by ,diogenes 7,i4 #bb1 #cg71 stated to be the ,phnician one of ,thelides1 and the date of his birth1 according to the best calculation1 is placed in the first year of the #ceth ,olympiad 7#fdj ,b4,c471 but according to ,meiners it was a couple of ,olympiads later 7#chth ,olympiad1 #fbi ,b4,c474 ,thales lived as a statesman partly with ,crsus and partly in ,miletus4 ,herodotus quotes him several times1 and tells 7,i4 #ge7 that1 according to the narratives of the ,greeks1 when ,crsus went to battle against ,cyrus and had difficulty in passing over the river ,halys1 ,thales1 who accompanied the army1 diverted the river by a trench1 which he made in the form of a crescent behind the camp1 so that it could then be forded4 ,diogenes 7,i4 #be7 says further of him as regards his relations to his country1 that he restrained the men of ,miletus from allying themselves with ,crsus when he went against ,cyrus1 and that hence1 after the conquest of ,crsus1 when the other ,ionic ,states were subdued by the ,persians1 the inhabitants of ,miletus alone remained undisturbed4 ,diogenes records1 moreover 7,i4 #bc71 that he soon withdrew his attention from the affairs of the ,state and devoted himself entirely to science4 ,voyages to ,phnicia are recorded of him1 which1 however1 rest on vague tradition2 but that he was in ,egypt in his old age seems undoubted4#ai ,there he was said to have learned geometry1 but this would appear not to have been much1 judging from the anecdote1 which ,diogenes 7,i4 #bd1 #bg7 retails from a certain ,hieronymus4 ,it was to the effect that ,thales taught the ,egyptians to measure the height of their pyramids by shadow--by taking the relation borne by the height of a man to his shadow4 ,the terms of the proportion are3 as the shadow of a man is to the height of a man1 so is the shadow of a pyramid to its height4 ,if this were something new to the ,egyptians1 they must have been very far back in the theory of geometry4 ,herodotus tells 7,i4 #gd71 moreover1 that ,thales foretold an eclipse of the sun that happened exactly on the day of the battle between the ,medians and ,lydians1 and that he ascribed the rising of the ,nile to the contrary ,etesian winds1 which drove back the waters4#bj ,we have some further isolated instances of1 and anecdotes about his astronomical knowledge and works4#ba 8,in gazing at and making observations on the stars1 he fell into a ditch1 and the people mocked him as one who had knowledge of heavenly objects and yet could not see what lay at his own feet40 ,the people laugh at such things1 and boast that philosophers cannot tell them about such matters2 but they do not understand that philosophers laugh at them1 for they do not fall into a ditch just because they lie in one for all time1 and because they cannot see what exists above them4 ,he also showed1 according to ,diogenes 7,i4 #bf71 that a wise man1 if he wishes1 can easily acquire riches4 ,it is more important that he fixed that the year1 as solar year1 should have #cfe days4 ,the anecdote of the golden tripod to be given to the wisest man1 is recorded by ,diogenes 7,i4 #bg-cc72 and it carries with it considerable weight1 because he combines all the different versions of the story4 ,the tripod was given to ,thales or to ,bias2 ,thales gave it to some one else1 and thus it went through a circle until it again came to ,thales2 the latter1 or else ,solon1 decided that ,apollo was wisest1 and sent it to ,didyma or to ,delphi4 ,thales died1 according to ,diogenes 7,i4 #ch71 aged seventy-eight or ninety1 in the #ehth ,olympiad2 according to ,tennemann 7vol4 i4 p4 #dad71 it was in ,olympiad #ei1 #b 7#edc ,b4,c471 when ,pythagoras came to ,crotona4 ,diogenes relates that he died at one of the games1 overcome by heat and thirst4 ,we have no writings by ,thales1 and we do not know whether he was in the habit of writing4 ,diogenes ,laertius 7,i4 #bc1 #cd1 #ce7 speaks of two hundred verses on astronomy1 and some maxims1 such as 8,it is not the many words that have most meaning40 ,as to his philosophy1 he is universally recognized as the first natural philosopher1 but all one knows of him is little1 and yet we seem to know the most of what there is4 ,for since we find that the further philosophic progress of which his speculative idea was capable1 and the understanding of his propositions1 which they alone could have1 make their first appearance and form particular epochs with the philosophers succeeding him1 who may be recognized thereby1 this development ascribed to ,thales never took place with him at all4 ,thus if it is the case that a number of his other reflections have been lost1 they cannot have had any particular speculative value2 and his philosophy does not show itself to be an imperfect system from want of information about it1 but because the first philosophy cannot be a system4 ,we must listen to ,aristotle as regards these ancient philosophers1 for he speaks most sympathetically of them4 ,in the passage of most importance 7,metaph4 ,i4 #c71 he says3 8,since it is clear that we must acquire the science of first causes 7 71 seeing that we say that a person knows a thing when he becomes acquainted with its cause1 there are1 we must recollect1 four causes--,being and ,form first 7for the #8why' is finally led back to the ,notion1 but yet the first #8why' is a cause and principle72 matter and substratum1 second2 the cause whence comes the beginning of movement1 third2 and fourth the cause which is opposed to this1 the aim in view and the good 7for that is the end of every origination74 ,hence we would make mention of those who have undertaken the investigation of ,being before us1 and have speculated regarding the ,truth1 for they openly advance certain principles and first causes4 ,if we take them under our consideration1 it will be of this advantage1 so far as our present investigation goes1 that we shall either find other kinds of causes or be enabled to have so much the more confidence in those just named4 ,most of the earliest philosophers have placed the principles of everything in something in the form of matter 7 71 for1 that from which everything existent comes1 and out of which it takes its origin as its first source1 and into which it finally sinks1 as substance 771 ever remains the same and only changes in its particular qualities 772 and this is called the element 77 and this the principle of all that exists0 7the absolute prius74 8,on this account they maintain that nothing arises or passes away1 because the same nature always remains4 ,for instance1 we say that1 absolutely speaking1 ,socrates neither originates if he becomes beautiful or musical1 nor does he pass away if he loses these qualities1 because the subject 7 71 ,socrates1 remains the same4 ,and so it is with all else4 ,for there must be one nature1 or more than one1 from which all else arises1 because it maintains its existence0 7 71 that means that in its change there is no reality or truth4 8,all do not coincide as to the number of this principle or as to its description 772 ,thales1 the founder of this philosophy10 7which recognizes something material as the principle and substance of all that is71 8says that it is water4 ,hence he likewise asserts the earth to be founded on water40 ,water is thus the 1 the first ground1 and1 according to ,seneca's statement 7,qust4 ,nat4 vi4 #f71 it seems to him to be not so much the inside of the earth1 as what encloses it which is the universal existence2 for 8,thales considered that the whole earth has water as its support 7subjecto humore71 and that it swims thereon40 ,we might first of all expect some explanation of the application of these principles1 as1 for example1 how it is to be proved that water is the universal substance1 and in what way particular forms are deduced from it4 ,but as to this we must say that of ,thales in particular1 we know nothing more than his principle1 which is that water is the god over all4 ,no more do we know anything further of ,anaximander1 ,anaximenes and ,diogenes than their principles4 ,aristotle brings forward a conjecture as to how ,thales derived everything directly out of water1 8,perhaps 77 the conclusions of ,thales have been brought about from the reflection that it was evident that all nourishment is moist1 and warmth itself comes out of moisture and thereby life continues4 ,but that from which anything generates is the principle of all things4 ,this was one reason for holding this theory1 and another reason is contained in the fact that all germs are moist in character1 and water is the principle of what is moist40 ,it is necessary to remark that the circumstances introduced by ,aristotle with a 8perhaps0 which are supposed to have brought about the conclusions of ,thales1 making water the absolute essence of everything1 are not adduced as the grounds acknowledged by ,thales4 ,and furthermore1 they can hardly be called grounds1 for what ,aristotle does is rather to establish1 as we would say from actuality1 that the latter corresponds to the universal idea of water4 ,his successors1 as for instance ,pseudo-,plutarch 7,de plac4 phil4 ,i4 #c71 have taken ,thales' assertion as positive and not hypothetical2 ,tiedmann 7,geist der spec4 ,phil4 vol4 ,i4 p4 #cf7 remarks with great reason that ,plutarch omits the 8perhaps40 ,for ,plutarch says1 8,thales suggests 77 that everything takes its origin from water and resolves itself into the same1 because as the germs of all that live have moisture as the principle of life1 all else might likewise 77 take its principle from moisture2 for all plants draw their nourishment1 and thus bear fruit1 from water1 and if they are without it1 fade away2 and even the fires of sun1 and stars and world are fed through the evaporation of water40 ,aristotle is contented with simply showing in regard to moisture that1 at least1 it is everywhere to be found4 ,since ,plutarch gives more definite grounds for holding that water is the simple essence of things1 we must see whether things1 in so far as they are simple essence1 are water1 77 ,the germ of the animal1 of moist nature1 is undoubtedly the animal as the simple actual1 or as the essence of its actuality1 or undeveloped actuality4 77 ,if1 with plants1 water may be regarded as for their nourishment1 nourishment is still only the being of a thing as formless substance that first becomes individualized by individuality1 and thus succeeds in obtaining form4 77 ,to make sun1 moon and the whole world arise through evaporation1 like the food of plants1 certainly approximates to the idea of the ancients1 who did not allow the sun and moon to have obtained independence as we do4 8,there are also some10 continues ,aristotle1 8who hold that all the ancients who1 at the first and long before the present generation1 made theology their study1 understood ,nature thus4 ,they made ,oceanus and ,tethys the producers of all origination 7 71 and water1 which by the poets is called ,styx1 the oath of the gods4 ,for what is most ancient is most revered1 and the oath is that most held in reverence40 ,this old tradition has within it speculative significance4 ,if anything cannot be proved or is devoid of objective form1 such as we have in respect of payment in a discharge1 or in witnesses who have seen the transaction1 the oath1 the confirmation of myself as object1 expresses the fact that my assurance is absolute truth4 ,now since1 by way of confirmation1 men swear by what is best1 by what is absolutely certain1 and the gods swore by the subterranean water1 it follows that the essence of pure thought1 the inmost being1 the reality in which consciousness finds its truth1 is water2 ,i1 so to speak1 express this clear certainty of myself as object1 as ,god4 #a4 ,the closer consideration of this principle in its bearings would have no interest4 ,for since the whole philosophy of ,thales lies in the fact that water is this principle1 the only point of interest can be to ask how far that principle is important and speculative4 ,thales comprehends essence as devoid of form4 ,while the sensuous certitude of each thing in its individuality is not questioned1 this objective actuality is now to be raised into the ,notion that reflects itself into itself and is itself to be set forth as ,notion2 in commencement this is seen in the world's being manifested as water1 or as a simple universal4 ,fluid is1 in its ,notion1 life1 and hence it is water itself1 spiritually expressed2 in the so-called grounds or reasons1 on the contrary1 water has the form of existent universal4 ,we certainly grant this universal activity of water1 and for that reason call it an element1 a physical universal power2 but while we find it thus to be the universal of activity1 we also find it to be this actual1 not everywhere1 but in proximity to other elements--earth1 air and fire4 ,water thus has not got a sensuous universality1 but a speculative one merely2 to be speculative universality1 however1 would necessitate its being ,notion and having what is sensuous removed4 ,here we have the strife between sensuous universality and universality of the ,notion4 ,the real essence of nature has to be defined1 that is1 nature has to be expressed as the simple essence of thought4 ,now simple essence1 the ,notion of the universal1 is that which is devoid of form1 but this water as it is1 comes into the determination of form1 and is thus1 in relation to others1 a particular existence just like everything that is natural4 ,yet as regards the other elements1 water is determined as formless and simple1 while the earth is that which has points1 air is the element of all change1 and fire evidently changes into itself4 ,now if the need of unity impels us to recognize for separate things a universal1 water1 although it has the drawback of being a particular thing1 can easily be utilized as the ,one1 both on account of its neutrality1 and because it is more material than air4 ,the proposition of ,thales1 that water is the ,absolute1 or as the ancients say1 the principle1 is the beginning of ,philosophy1 because with it the consciousness is arrived at that essence1 truth1 that which is alone in and for itself1 are one4 ,a departure from what is in our sensuous perception here takes place2 man recedes from this immediate existence4 ,we must be able to forget that we are accustomed to a rich concrete world of thought2 with us the very child learns1 8,there is one ,god in ,heaven1 invisible40 ,such determinations are not yet present here2 the world of ,thought must first be formed and there is as yet no pure unity4 ,man has nature before him as water1 air1 stars1 the arch of the heavens2 and the horizon of his ideas is limited to this4 ,the imagination has1 indeed1 its gods1 but its content still is natural2 the ,greeks had considered sun1 mountains1 earth1 sea1 rivers1 c41 as independent powers1 revered them as gods1 and elevated them by the imagination to activity1 movement1 consciousness and will4 ,what there is besides1 like the conceptions of ,homer1 for instance1 is something in which thought could not find satisfaction2 it produces mere images of the imagination1 endlessly endowed with animation and form1 but destitute of simple unity4 ,it must undoubtedly be said that in this unconsciousness of an intellectual world1 one must acknowledge that there is a great robustness of mind evinced in not granting this plenitude of existence to the natural world1 but in reducing it to a simple substance1 which1 as the ever enduring principle1 neither originates nor disappears1 while the gods have a ,theogony and are manifold and changing4 ,this wild1 endlessly varied imagination of ,homer is set at rest by the proposition that existence is water2 this conflict of an endless quantity of principles1 all these ideas that a particular object is an independent truth1 a self-sufficient power over others existing in its own right1 are taken away1 and it is shown likewise that there is only one universal1 the universal self-existent1 the simple unimaginative perception1 the thought that is one and one alone4 ,this universal stands in direct relationship to the particular and to the existence of the world as manifested4 ,the first thing implied in what has been said1 is that the particular existence has no independence1 is not true in and for itself1 but is only an accidental modification4 ,but the affirmative point of view is that all other things proceed from the one1 that the one remains thereby the substance from which all other things proceed1 and it is only through a determination which is accidental and external that the particular existence has its being4 ,it is similarly the case that all particular existence is transient1 that is1 it loses the form of particular and again becomes the universal1 water4 ,the simple proposition of ,thales therefore1 is ,philosophy1 because in it water1 though sensuous1 is not looked at in its particularity as opposed to other natural things1 but as ,thought in which everything is resolved and comprehended4 ,thus we approach the divorce of the absolute from the finite2 but it is not to be thought that the unity stands above1 and that down here we have the finite world4 ,this idea is often found in the common conception of ,god--where permanence is attributed to the world and where men often represent two kinds of actuality to themselves1 a sensuous and a supersensuous world of equal standing4 ,the philosophic point of view is that the one is alone the truly actual1 and here we must take actual in its higher significance1 because we call everything actual in common life4 ,the second circumstance to be remembered is that with the ancient philosophers1 the principle has a definite and1 at first1 a physical form4 ,to us this does not appear to be philosophic but only physical2 in this case1 however1 matter has philosophic significance4 ,thales' theory is thus a natural philosophy1 because this universal essence is determined as real2 consequently the ,absolute is determined as the unity of thought and ,being4 #b4 ,now if we have this undifferentiated principle predominating1 the question arises as to the determination of this first principle4 ,the transition from universal to particular at once becomes essential1 and it begins with the determination of activity2 the necessity for such arises here4 ,that which is to be a veritable principle must not have a one-sided1 particular form1 but in it the difference must itself be absolute1 while other principles are only special kinds of forms4 ,the fact that the ,absolute is what determines itself is already more concrete2 we have the activity and the higher self-consciousness of the spiritual principle1 by which the form has worked itself into being absolute form1 the totality of form4 ,since it is most profound1 this comes latest2 what has first to be done is merely to look at things as determined4 ,form is lacking to water as conceived by ,thales4 ,how is this accorded to it8 ,the method is stated 7and stated by ,aristotle1 but not directly of ,thales71 in which particular forms have arisen out of water2 it is said to be through a process of condensation and rarefaction 7 71 or1 as it may be better put1 through greater or less intensity4 ,tennemann 7vol4 ,i4 p4 #ei7 in reference to this1 cites from ,aristotle1 ,de gen4 et corrupt4 ,i4 #a1 where there is no mention of condensation and rarefaction as regards ,thales1 and further1 ,de clo1 ,,iii4 #e1 where it is only said that those who uphold water or air1 or something finer than water or coarser than air1 define difference as density and rarity1 but nothing is said of its being ,thales who gave expression to this distinction4 ,tiedmann 7vol4 ,i4 p4 #ch7 quotes yet other authorities2 it was1 however1 later on1 that this distinction was first ascribed to ,thales4#bb ,thus much is made out1 that for the first time in this natural philosophy as in the modern1 that which is essential in form is really the quantitative difference in its existence4 ,this merely quantitative difference1 however1 which1 as the increasing and decreasing density of water1 constitutes its only form-determination1 is an external expression of the absolute difference2 it is an unessential distinction set up through another and is not the inner difference of the ,notion in itself2 it is therefore not worth while to spend more time over it4 ,difference as regards the ,notion has no physical significance1 but differences or the simple duality of form in the sides of its opposition1 must be comprehended as universally in the ,notion4 ,on this account a sensuous interpretation must not be given to the material1 that is to particular determinations1 as when it is definitely said that rare water is air1 rare air1 fiery ether1 thick water1 mud1 which then becomes earth2 according to this1 air would be the rarefaction of the first water1 ether the rarefaction of air1 and earth and mud the sediment of water4 ,as sensuous difference or change1 the division here appears as something manifested for consciousness2 the moderns have experimented in making thicker and thinner what to the senses is the same4 ,change has consequently a double sense2 one with reference to existence and another with reference to the ,notion4 ,when change is considered by the ancients1 it is usually supposed to have to do with a change in what exists1 and thus1 for instance1 inquiry would be made as to whether water can be changed through chemical action1 such as heat1 distillation1 c41 into earth2 finite chemistry is confined to this4 ,but what is meant in all ancient philosophies is change as regards the ,notion4 ,that is to say1 water does not become converted into air or space and time in retorts1 c4 ,but in every philosophic idea1 this transition of one quality into another takes place1 i4e4 this inward connection is shown in the ,notion1 according to which no one thing can subsist independently and without the other1 for the life of nature has its subsistence in the fact that one thing is necessarily related to the other4 ,we certainly are accustomed to believe that if water were taken away1 it would indeed fare badly with plants and animals1 but that stones would still remain2 or that of colours1 blue could be abstracted without harming in the least yellow or red4 ,as regards merely empirical existence1 it may easily be shown that each quality exists on its own account1 but in the ,notion they only are1 through one another1 and by virtue of an inward necessity4 ,we certainly see this also in living matter1 where things happen in another way1 for here the ,notion comes into existence2 thus if1 for example1 we abstract the heart1 the lungs and all else collapse4 ,and in the same way all nature exists only in the unity of all its parts1 just as the brain can exist only in unity with the other organs4 #c4 ,if the form is1 however1 only expressed in both its sides as condensation and rarefaction1 it is not in and for itself1 for to be this it must be grasped as the absolute ,notion1 and as an endlessly forming unity4 ,what is said on this point by ,aristotle 7,de ,anima1 ,i4 #b1 also #e7 is this3 8,thales seems1 according to what is said of him1 to consider the soul as something having movement1 for he says of the loadstone that it has a soul1 since it moves the iron40 ,diogenes ,laertius 7,i4 #bd7 adds amber to this1 from which we see that even ,thales knew about electricity1 although another explanation of it is that was besides a metal4 ,aldobrandini says of this passage in ,diogenes1 that it is a stone which is so hostile to poison that when touched by such it immediately hisses4 ,the above remark by ,aristotle is perverted by ,diogenes to such an extent that he says3 8,thales has likewise ascribed a soul to what is lifeless40 ,however1 this is not the question1 for the point is how he thought of absolute form1 and whether he expressed the ,idea generally as soul so that absolute essence should be the unity of simple essence and form4 ,diogenes certainly says further of ,thales 7,i4 #bg71 8,the world is animated and full of demons10 and ,plutarch 7,de plac4 phil4 ,i4 #g7 says1 8,he called ,god the ,intelligence 77 of the world40 ,but all the ancients1 and particularly ,aristotle1 ascribe this expression unanimously to ,anaxagoras as the one who first said that the is the principle of things4 ,thus it does not conduce to the further determination of form according to ,thales1 to find in ,cicero 7,de ,nat4 ,deor4 ,i4 #aj7 this passage3 8,thales says that water is the beginning of everything1 but ,god is the ,mind which forms all that is1 out of water40 ,thales may certainly have spoken of ,god1 but ,cicero has added the statement that he comprehended him as the which formed everything out of water4 ,tiedmann 7vol4 ,i4 p4 #db7 declares the passage to be possibly corrupt1 since ,cicero later on 7c4 #aa7 says of ,anaxagoras that 8he first maintained the order of things to have been brought about through the infinite power of ,mind40 ,however1 the ,epicurean1 in whose mouth these words are put1 speaks 8with confidence only fearing that he should appear to have any doubts0 7c4 #h7 both previously and subsequently of other philosophers rather foolishly1 so that this description is given merely as a jest4 ,aristotle understands historic accuracy better1 and therefore we must follow him4 ,but to those who make it their business to find everywhere the conception of the creation of the world by ,god1 that passage in ,cicero is a great source of delight1 and it is a much disputed point whether ,thales is to be counted amongst those who accepted the existence of a ,god4 ,the ,theism of ,thales is maintained by ,plouquet1 whilst others would have him to be an atheist or polytheist1 because he says that everything is full of demons4 ,however1 this question as to whether ,thales believed in ,god does not concern us here1 for acceptation1 faith1 popular religion are not in question2 we only have to do with the philosophic determination of absolute existence4 ,and if ,thales did speak of ,god as constituting everything out of this same water1 that would not give us any further information about this existence2 we should have spoken unphilosophically of ,thales because we should have used an empty word without inquiring about its speculative significance4 ,similarly the word world-soul is useless1 because its being is not thereby expressed4 ,thus all these further1 as also later1 assertions do not justify us in maintaining that ,thales comprehended form in the absolute in a definite manner2 on the contrary1 the rest of the history of philosophical development refutes this view4 ,we see that form certainly seems to be shown forth in existence1 but as yet this unity is no further developed4 ,the idea that the magnet has a soul is indeed always better than saying that it has the power of attraction2 for power is a quality which is considered as a predicate separable from matter1 while soul is movement in unison with matter in its essence4 ,an idea such as this of ,thales stands isolated1 however1 and has no further relation to his absolute thought4 ,thus1 in fact1 the philosophy of ,thales is comprised in the following simple elements3 7a7 ,it has constituted an abstraction in order to comprehend nature in a simple sensuous essence4 7b7 ,it has brought forth the ,notion of ground or principle2 that is1 it has defined water to be the infinite ,notion1 the simple essence of thought1 without determining it further as the difference of quantity4 ,that is the limited significance of this principle of ,thales4 #b4 ,anaximander4 ,anaximander was also of ,miletus1 and he was a friend of ,thales4 8,the latter10 says ,cicero 7,acad4 ,quaest4 ,,iv4 #cg71 8could not convince him that everything consisted of water40 ,anaximander's father was called ,praxiades2 the date of his birth is not quite certain2 according to ,tennemann 7vol4 ,i4 p4 #dac71 it is put in ,olympiad #db1 #c 7#faj ,b4,c471 while ,diogenes ,laertius 7,,ii4 ,i1 #b7 says1 taking his information from ,apollodorus1 an ,athenian1 that in ,ol4 #eh1 #b 7#edg ,b4,c471 he was sixty-four years old1 and that he died soon after1 that is to say about the date of ,thales' death4 ,and taking for granted that he died in his ninetieth year1 ,thales must have been nearly twenty-eight years older than ,anaximander4 ,it is related of ,anaximander that he lived in ,samos with the tyrant ,polycrates1 where were ,pythagoras and ,anacreon also4 ,themistius1 according to ,brucker 7,pt4 ,i4 p4 #dgh71 says of him that he first put his philosophic thoughts into writing1 but this is also recorded of others1 as for example1 of ,pherecydes1 who was older than he4 ,anaximander is said to have written about nature1 the fixed stars1 the sphere1 besides other matters2 he further produced something like a map1 showing the boundary 77 of land and sea2 he also made other mathematical inventions1 such as a sun-dial that he put up in ,lacedmon1 and instruments by which the course of the sun was shown1 and the equinox determined2 a chart of the heavens was likewise made by him4 ,his philosophical reflections are not comprehensive1 and do not extend as far as to determination4 ,diogenes says in the passage quoted before3 8,he adduced the ,infinite0 7 1 the undetermined71 8as principle and element2 he neither determined it as air or water or any such thing40 ,there are1 however1 few attributes of this ,infinite given4 747 8,it is the principle of all becoming and passing away2 at long intervals infinite worlds or gods rise out of it1 and again they pass away into the same40 ,this has quite an oriental tone4 8,he gives as a reason that the principle is to be determined as the ,infinite1 the fact that it does not need material for continuous origination4 ,it contains everything in itself and rules over all3 it is divine1 immortal1 and never passes away40#bc 747 ,out of the one1 ,anaximander separates the opposites which are contained in it1 as do ,empedocles and ,anaxagoras2 thus everything in this medley is certainly there1 but undetermined4#bd ,that is1 everything is really contained therein in possibility 771 8so that10 says ,aristotle 7,metaphys4 ,,xi4 #b71 8it is not only that everything arises accidentally out of what is not1 but everything also arises from what is1 although it is from incipient being which is not yet in actuality40 ,diogenes ,laertius adds 7,,ii4 #a73 8,the parts of the ,infinite change1 but it itself is unchangeable40 747 ,lastly1 it is said that the infinitude is in size and not in number1 and ,anaximander differs thus from ,anaxagoras1 ,empedocles and the other atomists1 who maintain the absolute discretion of the infinite1 while ,anaximander upholds its absolute continuity4#be ,aristotle 7,metaphys4 ,i4 #h7 speaks also of a principle which is neither water nor air1 but is 8thicker than air and thinner than water40 ,many have connected this idea with ,anaximander1 and it is possible that it belongs to him4 ,the advance made by the determination of the principle as infinite in comprehensiveness rests in the fact that absolute essence no longer is a simple universal1 but one which negates the finite4 ,at the same time1 viewed from the material side1 ,anaximander removes the individuality of the element of water2 his objective principle does not appear to be material1 and it may be understood as ,thought4 ,but it is clear that he did not mean anything else than matter generally1 universal matter4#bf ,plutarch reproaches ,anaximander 8for not saying what 77 his infinite is1 whether air1 water or earth40 ,but a definite quality such as one of these is transient2 matter determined as infinitude means the motion of positing definite forms1 and again abolishing the separation4 ,true and infinite ,being is to be shown in this and not in negative absence of limit4 ,this universality and negation of the finite is1 however1 our operation only3 in describing matter as infinite1 ,anaximander does not seem to have said that this is its infinitude4 ,he has said further 7and in this1 according to ,theophrastus1 he agrees with ,anaxagoras71 8,in the infinite the like separates itself from the unlike and allies itself to the like2 thus what in the whole was gold becomes gold1 what was earth1 earth1 c41 so that properly nothing originates1 seeing that it was already there40#bg ,these1 however1 are poor determinations1 which only show the necessity of the transition from the undetermined to the determined2 for this still takes place here in an unsatisfying way4 ,as to the further question of how the infinite determines the opposite in its separation1 it seems that the theory of the quantitative distinction of condensation and rarefaction was held by ,anaximander as well as by ,thales4 ,those who come later designate the process of separation from the ,infinite as development4 ,anaximander supposes man to develop from a fish1 which abandoned water for the land4#bh ,development comes also into prominence in recent times1 but as a mere succession in time--a formula in the use of which men often imagine that they are saying something brilliant2 but there is no real necessity1 no thought1 and above all1 no ,notion contained in it4 ,but in later records the idea of warmth1 as being the disintegration of form1 and that of cold1 is ascribed to ,anaximander by ,stobus 7,eclog4 ,phys4 c4 #bd1 p4 #ejj72 this ,aristotle 7,metaphys4 ,i4 #e7 first ascribed to ,parmenides4 ,eusebius 7,de prp4 ,evang4 ,i4 #h71 out of a lost work of ,plutarch1 gives us something from ,anaximander's ,cosmogony which is dark1 and which1 indeed1 ,eusebius himself did not rightly understand4 ,its sense is approximately this3 8,out of the ,infinite1 infinite heavenly spheres and infinite worlds have been set apart2 but they carry within them their own destruction1 because they only are through constant dividing off40 ,that is1 since the ,infinite is the principle1 separation is the positing of a difference1 i4e4 of a determination or something finite4 8,the earth has the form of a cylinder1 the height of which is the third part of the breadth4 ,both of the eternally productive principles of warmth and cold separate themselves in the creation of this earth1 and a fiery sphere is formed round the air encircling the earth1 like the bark around a tree4 ,as this broke up1 and the pieces were compressed into circles1 sun1 moon1 and stars were formed40 ,hence ,anaximander1 according to ,stobus 7,ecl4 ,phys4 #be1 p4 #eaj71 likewise called the stars 8wheel-shaped with fire-filled wrappings of air40 ,this ,cosmogony is as good as the geological hypothesis of the earth-crust which burst open1 or as ,buffon's explosion of the sun1 which beginning1 on the other hand1 with the sun1 makes the planets to be stones projected from it4 ,while the ancients confined the stars to our atmosphere1 and made the sun first proceed from the earth1 we make the sun to be the substance and birthplace of the earth1 and separate the stars entirely from any further connection with us1 because for us1 like the gods worshipped by the ,epicureans1 they are at rest4 ,in the process of origination1 the sun1 indeed1 descends as the universal1 but in nature it is that which comes later2 thus in truth the earth is the totality1 and the sun but an abstract moment4 #c4 ,anaximenes4 ,anaximenes still remains as having made his appearance between the #eeth and #ehth ,olympiads 7#efj-edh ,b4,c474 ,he was likewise of ,miletus1 a contemporary and friend of ,anaximander2 he has little to distinguish him1 and very little is known about him4 ,diogenes ,laertius says neither with consideration nor consistency 7,,ii4 #c73 8,he was born1 according to ,apollodorus in the #fcrd ,olympiad1 and died in the year ,sardis was conquered0 7by ,cyrus1 ,olympiad #ehth74 ,in place of the undetermined matter of ,anaximander1 he brings forward a definite natural element2 hence the absolute is in a real form1 but instead of the water of ,thales1 that form is air4 ,he found that for matter a sensuous being was indeed essential1 and air has the additional advantage of being more devoid of form2 it is less corporeal than water1 for we do not see it1 but feel it first in movement4 ,plutarch 7,de plac4 phil4 ,i4 #c7 says3 8,out of it everything comes forth1 and into it everything is again resolved40 ,according to ,cicero 7,de ,nat4 ,deor4 ,i4 #aj71 8he defined it as immeasurable1 infinite1 and in constant motion40 ,diogenes ,laertius expresses this in the passage already quoted3 8,the principle is air and the infinite0 7 7 as if there were two principles2 however1 may be taken together as subject1 and regarded as the predicate in the statement4 ,for ,simplicius1 in dealing with the ,physics of ,aristotle1 expressly says 7p4 #f1 a7 8that the first principle was to him one and infinite in nature as it was to ,anaximander1 but it was not indefinite as with the latter1 but determined1 that is1 it was air10 which1 however1 he seems to have understood as endowed with soul4 ,plutarch characterizes ,anaximenes' mode of representation which makes everything proceed from air--later on it was called ether--and resolve itself therein1 better thus3 8,as our soul1 which is air1 holds us together 771 one spirit 77 and air together likewise hold 77 the whole world together2 spirit and air are synonymous40 ,anaximenes shows very clearly the nature of his essence in the soul1 and he thus points out what may be called the transition of natural philosophy into the philosophy of consciousness1 or the surrender of the objective form of principle4 ,the nature of this principle has hitherto been determined in a manner which is foreign and negative to consciousness2 both its reality1 water or air1 and the infinite are a 8beyond0 to consciousness4 ,but soul is the universal medium2 it is a collection of conceptions which pass away and come forth1 while the unity and continuity never cease4 ,it is active as well as passive1 from its unity severing asunder the conceptions and sublating them1 and it is present to itself in its infinitude1 so that negative signification and positive come into unison4 ,speaking more precisely1 this idea of the nature of the origin of things is that of ,anaxagoras1 the pupil of ,anaximenes4 ,pherecydes has also to be mentioned as the teacher of ,pythagoras2 he is of ,syros1 one of the ,cyclades islands4 ,he is said to have drawn water from a spring1 and to have learned therefrom that an earthquake would take place in three days2 he is also said to have predicted of a ship in full sail that it would go down1 and it sank in a moment4 ,theopompus in ,diogenes ,laertius 7,i4 #aaf71 relates of this ,pherecydes that 8he first wrote to the ,greeks about ,nature and the gods0 7which was before said of ,anaximander74 ,his writings are said to have been in prose1 and from what is related of them it is clear that it must have been a theogony of which he wrote4 ,the first words1 still preserved to us1 are3 8,jupiter and ,time and what is terrestrial 77 were from eternity 7 72 the name of earthly 77 was given to the terrestrial sphere when ,zeus granted to it gifts40#bi ,how it goes on is not known1 but this cannot be deemed a great loss4 ,hermias tells us only this besides3#cj 8,he maintained ,zeus or ,fire 771 ,earth and ,chronos or ,time as principles--fire as active1 earth as passive1 and time as that in which everything originates40 ,diogenes of ,apollonia1 ,hippasus1 and ,archelaus are also called ,ionic philosophers1 but we know nothing more of them than their names1 and that they gave their adherence to one principle or the other4 ,we shall leave these now and go on to ,pythagoras1 who was a contemporary of ,anaximander2 but the continuity of the development of the principle of physical philosophy necessitated our taking ,anaximenes with him4 ,we see that1 as ,aristotle said1 they placed the first principle in a form of matter--in air and water first1 and then1 if we may so define ,anaximander's matter1 in an essence finer than water and coarser than air4 ,heraclitus1 of whom we have soon to speak1 first called it fire4 8,but no one10 as ,aristotle 7,metaph4 ,i4 #h7 remarks1 8called earth the principle1 because it appears to be the most complex element0 7 72 for it seems to be an aggregate of many units4 ,water1 on the contrary1 is the one1 and it is transparent2 it manifests in sensuous guise the form of unity with itself1 and this is also so with air1 fire1 matter1 c4 ,the principle has to be one1 and hence must have inherent unity with itself2 if it shows a manifold nature as does the earth1 it is not one with itself1 but manifold4 ,this is what we have to say about the early ,ionic ,philosophy4 ,the importance of these poor abstract thoughts lies 7a7 in the comprehension of a universal substance in everything1 and 7b7 in the fact that it is formless1 and not encumbered by sensuous ideas4 ,no one recognized better the deficiencies in this philosophy than did ,aristotle in the work already quoted4 ,two points appear in his criticism of these three modes of determining the absolute3 8,those who maintain the original principle to be matter fall short in many ways4 ,in the first place1 they merely give the corporeal element and not the incorporeal1 for there also is such40 ,in treating of nature in order to show its essence1 it is necessary to deal with it in its entirety1 and everything found in it must be considered4 ,that is certainly but an empirical instance4 ,aristotle maintains the incorporeal to be a form of things opposed to the material1 and indicates that the absolute must not be determined in a one-sided manner2 because the principle of these philosophers is material only1 they do not manifest the incorporeal side1 nor is the object shown to be ,notion4 ,matter is indeed itself immaterial as this reflection into consciousness2 but such philosophers do not know that what they express is an existence of consciousness4 ,thus the first great defect here rests in the fact that the universal is expressed in a particular form4 ,secondly1 ,aristotle says 7,metaph4 ,i4 #c73 8,from this it may be seen that first cause has only been by all these expressed in the form of matter4 ,but because they proceeded thus1 the thing itself opened out their way for them1 and forced them into further investigation4 ,for whether origin and decay are derived from one or more1 the question alike arises1 #8,how does it happen and what is the cause of it8' ,for the fundamental substance 7 7 does not make itself to change1 just as neither wood nor metal are themselves the cause of change2 wood neither forms a bed nor does brass a statue1 but something else is the cause of the change4 ,to investigate this1 however1 is to investigate the other principle1 which1 as we would say1 is the ,principle of ,motion40 ,this criticism holds good even now1 where the ,absolute is represented as the one fixed substance4 ,aristotle says that change is not conceivable out of matter as such1 or out of water not itself having motion2 he reproaches the older philosophers for the fact that they have not investigated the principle of motion for which men care most4 ,further1 object is altogether absent2 there is no determination of activity4 ,hence ,aristotle says in the former passage3 8,in that they undertake to give the cause of origin and decay1 they in fact remove the cause of movement4 ,because they make the principle to be a simple body 7earth being excepted71 they do not comprehend the mutual origination and decay whereby the one arises out of the other3 ,i am here referring to water1 air1 fire1 and earth4 ,this origination is to be shown as separation or as union1 and hence the contradiction comes about that one in time comes earlier than the other4 ,that is1 because this kind of origination is the method which they have adopted1 the way taken is from the simple universal1 through the particular1 to the individual as what comes latest4 ,water1 air1 and fire are1 however1 universal4 ,fire seems to be most suitable for this element1 seeing that it is the most subtle4 ,thus those who made it to be the principle1 most adequately gave expression to this method 77 of origination2 and others thought very similarly4 ,for else why should no one have made the earth an element1 in conformity with the popular idea8 ,hesiod says that it was the original body--so ancient and so common was this idea4 ,but what in ,becoming comes later1 is the first in nature40 ,however1 these philosophers did not understand this so1 because they were ruled by the process of ,becoming only1 without again sublating it1 or knowing that first formal universal as such1 and manifesting the third1 the totality or unity of matter and form1 as essence4 ,here1 we see1 the ,absolute is not yet the self-determining1 the ,notion turned back into itself1 but only a dead abstraction2 the moderns were the first1 says ,aristotle1 7,metaph4 ,i4 #f2 ,,iii4 #c7 to understand the fundamental principle more in the form of genus4 ,we are able to follow the three moments in the ,ionic philosophy3 77 ,the original essence is water2 77 ,anaximander's infinite is descriptive of movement1 simple going out of and coming back into the simple1 universal aspects of form--condensation and rarefaction2 77 the air is compared to the soul4 ,it is now requisite that what is viewed as reality should be brought into the ,notion2 in so doing we see that the moments of division1 condensation1 and rarefaction are not in any way antagonistic to the ,notion4 ,this transition to ,pythagoras1 or the manifestation of the real side as the ideal1 is ,thought breaking free from what is sensuous1 and1 therefore1 it is a separation between the intelligible and the real4 ,b4 ,,pythagoras ,,and ,,the ,,pythagoreans4 ,the later ,neo-,pythagoreans have written many extensive biographies of ,pythagoras1 and are especially diffuse as regards the ,pythagorean brotherhood4 ,but it must be taken into consideration that these often distorted statements must not be regarded as historical4 ,the life of ,pythagoras thus first comes to us in history through the medium of the ideas belonging to the first centuries after ,christ1 and more or less in the style in which the life of ,christ is written1 on the ground of ordinary actuality1 and not in a poetic atmosphere2 it appears to be the intermingling of many marvellous and extravagant tales1 and to take its origin in part from eastern ideas and in part from western4 ,in acknowledging the remarkable nature of his life and genius and of the life which he inculcated on his followers1 it was added that his dealings were not with right things1 and that he was a magician and one who had intercourse with higher beings4 ,all the ideas of magic1 that medley of unnatural and natural1 the mysteries which pervade a clouded1 miserable imagination1 and the wild ideas of distorted brains1 have attached themselves to him4 ,however corrupt the history of his life1 his philosophy is as much so4 ,everything engendered by ,christian melancholy and love of allegory has been identified with it4 ,the treatment of ,plato in ,christian times has quite a different character4 ,numbers have been much used as the expression of ideas1 and this on the one hand has a semblance of profundity4 ,for the fact that another significance than that immediately presented is implied in them1 is evident at once2 but how much there is within them is neither known by him who speaks nor by him1 who seeks to understand2 it is like the witches' rhyme 7one time one7 in ,goethe's 8,faust40 ,the less clear the thoughts1 the deeper they appear2 what is most essential1 but most difficult1 the expression of oneself in definite conceptions1 is omitted4 ,thus ,pythagoras' philosophy1 since much has been added to it by those who wrote of it1 may similarly appear as the mysterious product of minds as shallow and empty as they are dark4 ,fortunately1 however1 we have a special knowledge of the theoretic1 speculative side of it1 and that1 indeed1 from ,aristotle and ,sextus ,empiricus1 who have taken considerable trouble with it4 ,although later ,pythagoreans disparage ,aristotle on account of his exposition1 he has a place above any such disparagement1 and therefore to them no attention must be given4 ,in later times a quantity of writings were disseminated and foisted upon ,pythagoras4 ,diogenes ,laertius 7,,viii4 #f1 #g7 mentions many which were by him1 and others which were set down to him in order to obtain authority for them4 ,but in the first place we have no writings by ,pythagoras1 and secondly it is doubtful whether any ever did exist4 ,we have quotations from these in unsatisfactory fragments1 not from ,pythagoras1 but from ,pythagoreans4 ,it cannot be decisively determined which developments and interpretations belonged to the ancients and which to the moderns2 yet with ,pythagoras and the ancient ,pythagoreans the determinations were not worked out in so concrete a way as later4 ,as to the life of ,pythagoras1 we hear from ,diogenes ,laertius 7,,viii4 #a-c1 #de7 that he flourished about the #fjth ,olympiad 7#edj ,b4,c474 ,his birth is usually placed in the #dith or #ejth ,olympiad 7#ehd ,b4,c472 by ,larcher in ,tennemann 7,vol4 ,i41 pp4 #dac1 #dad71 much earlier--in the #dcrd ,olympiad 7#dc1 #a1 i4e4 #fjh ,b4,c474 ,he was thus contemporaneous with ,thales and ,anaximander4 ,if ,thales' birth were in the #chth ,olympiad and that of ,pythagoras in the #dcrd1 ,pythagoras was only twenty-one years younger than he2 he either only differed by a couple of years from ,anaximander 7,ol4 #db1 #c7 in age1 or the latter was twenty-six years older4 ,anaximenes was from twenty to twenty-five years younger than ,pythagoras4 ,his birthplace was the ,island of ,samos1 and hence he belonged to the ,greeks of ,asia ,minor1 which place we have hitherto found to be the seat of philosophy4 ,pythagoras is said by ,herodotus 7,,iv41 #ic to #if7 to have been the son of ,mnesarchus1 with whom ,zalmoxis served as slave in ,samos2 ,zalmoxis obtained freedom and riches1 became ruler of the ,get1 and asserted that he and his people would not die4 ,he built a subterranean habitation and there withdrew himself from his subjects2 after four years he re-appeared2#ca hence the ,getans believed in immortality4 ,herodotus thinks1 however1 that ,zalmoxis was undoubtedly much older than ,pythagoras4 ,his youth was spent at the court of ,polycrates1 under whose rule ,samos was brought1 not only to wealth1 but also to the possession of culture and art4 ,in this prosperous period1 according to ,herodotus 7,,iii41 #ci71 it possessed a fleet of a hundred ships4 ,his father was an artist or engraver1 but reports vary as to this1 as also as to his country1 some saying that his family was of ,tyrrhenian origin and did not go to ,samos till after ,pythagoras' birth4 ,that may be as it will1 for his youth was spent in ,samos and he must hence have been naturalized there1 and to it he belongs4 ,he soon journeyed to the main land of ,asia ,minor and is said there to have become acquainted with ,thales4 ,from thence he travelled to ,phnicia and ,egypt1 as ,iamblichus 7,,iii41 #ac1 #ad7 says in his biography of ,pythagoras4 ,with both countries ,asia ,minor had many links1 commercial and political1 and it is related that he was recommended by ,polycrates to ,king ,amasis1 who1 according to ,herodotus 7,,ii4 #aed71 attracted many ,greeks to the country1 and had ,greek troops and colonies4 ,the narratives of further journeys into the interior of ,asia1 to the ,persian magicians and ,indians1 seem to be altogether fabulous1 although travelling1 then as now1 was considered to be a means of culture4 ,as ,pythagoras travelled with a scientific purpose1 it is said that he had himself initiated into nearly all the mysteries of ,greeks and of ,barbarians1 and thus he obtained admission into the order or caste of the ,egyptian priesthood4 ,these mysteries that we meet with amongst the ,greeks1 and which are held to be the sources of much wisdom1 appear in their religion to have stood in the relationship of doctrine to worship4 ,this last existed in offerings and solemn festivals only1 but to ordinary conceptions1 to a consciousness of these conceptions1 there is no transition visible unless they were preserved in poems as traditions4 ,the doctrines themselves1 or the act of bringing the actual home to the conception1 seems to have been confined to the mysteries2 we find it to be the case1 however1 that it is not only the ideas as in our teaching1 but also the body that is laid claim to--that there was brought home to man by sending him to wander amongst his fellow-men1 both the abandonment of his sensuous consciousness and the purification and sanctification of the body4 ,of philosophic matter1 however1 there is as little openly declared as possible1 and just as we know the system of freemasonry1 there is no secret in those mysteries4 ,his alliance with the ,egyptian priesthood had a most important influence upon ,pythagoras1 not through the derivation of profound speculative wisdom therefrom1 but by the idea obtained through it of the realization of the moral consciousness of man2 the individual1 he learned1 must attend to himself1 if inwardly and to the outer world he is to be meritorious and to bring himself1 morally formed and fashioned1 into actuality4 ,this is a conception which he subsequently carried out1 and it is as interesting a matter as his speculative philosophy4 ,just as the priests constituted a particular rank and were educated for it1 they also had a special rule1 which was binding throughout the whole moral life4 ,from ,egypt ,pythagoras thus without doubt brought the idea of his ,order1 which was a regular community brought together for purposes of scientific and moral culture1 which endured during the whole of life4 ,egypt at that time was regarded as a highly cultured country1 and it was so when compared with ,greece2 this is shown even in the differences of caste which assumes a division amongst the great branches of life and work1 such as the industrial1 scientific and religious4 ,but beyond this1 we need not seek great scientific knowledge amongst the ,egyptians1 nor think that ,pythagoras got his science there4 ,aristotle 7,metaph4 ,i47 only says that 8in ,egypt mathematical sciences first commenced1 for there the nation of priests had leisure40#cb ,pythagoras stayed a long time in ,egypt1 and returned from thence to ,samos2 but he found the internal affairs of his own country in confusion1 and left it soon after4 ,according to ,herodotus' account 7,,iii4 #de-dg71 ,polycrates had--not as tyrant--banished many citizens from ,samos1 who sought and found support amongst the ,lacedmonians1 and a civil war had broken out4 ,the ,spartans had1 at an earlier period1 given assistance to the others1 for1 as ,thucydides says 7,i4 #ah71 to them thanks were generally ascribed for having abolished the rule of the few1 and caused a reversion to the system of giving public power to the people2 later on they did the opposite1 abolishing democracy and introducing aristocracy4 ,pythagoras' family was necessarily involved in these unpleasant relations1 and a condition of internal strife was not congenial to ,pythagoras1 seeing that he no longer took an interest in political life1 and that he saw in it an unsuitable soil for carrying out his plans4 ,he traversed ,greece1 and betook himself from thence to ,italy1 in the lower parts of which ,greek colonies from various states and for various motives had settled1 and there flourished as important trading towns1 rich in people and possessions4 ,in ,crotona he settled down1 and lived in independence1 neither as a statesman1 warrior1 nor political law-giver to the people1 so far as external life was concerned1 but as a public teacher1 with the provision that his teaching should not be taken up with mere conviction1 but should also regulate the whole moral life of the individual4 ,diogenes ,laertius says that he first gave himself the name 1 instead of 2 and men called this modesty1 as if he thereby expressed1 not the possession of wisdom1 but only the struggle towards it1 as towards an end which cannot be attained4#cc ,but at the same time means a wise man1 who is also practical1 and that not in his own interest only1 for that requires no wisdom1 seeing that every sincere and moral man does what is best from his own point of view4 ,thus signifies more particularly the opposite to participation in practical matters1 that is in public affairs4 ,philosophy is thus not the love of wisdom1 as of something which one sets oneself to acquire2 it is no unfulfilled desire4 means a man whose relation to wisdom is that of making it his object2 this relationship is contemplation1 and not mere ,being2 but it must be consciously that men apply themselves to this4 ,the man who likes wine 77 is certainly to be distinguished from the man who is full of wine1 or a drunkard4 ,then does signify only a futile aspiration for wine8 ,what ,pythagoras contrived and effected in ,italy is told us by later eulogists1 rather than by historians4 ,in the history of ,pythagoras by ,malchus 7this was the ,syrian name of ,porphyry7 many strange things are related1 and with the ,neo-,platonists the contrast between their deep insight and their belief in the miraculous is surprising4 ,for instance1 seeing that the later biographers of ,pythagoras had already related a quantity of marvels1 they now proceeded to add yet more to these with reference to his appearance in ,italy4 ,it appears that they were exerting themselves to place him1 as they afterwards did with ,apollonius of ,tyana1 in opposition to ,christ4 ,for the wonders which they tell of him seem partly to be an amplification of those in the ,new ,testament1 and in part they are altogether absurd4 ,for instance1 they make ,pythagoras begin his career in ,italy with a miracle4 ,when he landed in the ,bay of ,tarentum1 at ,crotona1 he encountered fishermen on the way to the town who had caught nothing4 ,he called upon them to draw their nets once more1 and foretold the number of fishes that would be found in them4 ,the fishermen1 marvelling at this prophecy1 promised him that if it came true they would do whatever he desired4 ,it came to pass as he said1 and ,pythagoras then desired them to throw the fishes alive back into the sea1 for the ,pythagoreans ate no flesh4 ,and it is further related as a miracle which then took place1 that none of the fishes whilst they were out of the water died during the counting4 ,this is the kind of miracle that is recorded1 and the stories with which his biographers fill his life are of the same silly nature4 ,they then make him effect such a general impression upon the mind of ,italy1 that all the towns reformed upon their luxurious and depraved customs1 and the tyrants partly gave up their powers voluntarily1 and partly they were driven out4 ,they thereby1 however1 commit such historical errors as to make ,charondas and ,zaleucus1 who lived long before ,pythagoras1 his disciples2 and similarly to ascribe the expulsion and death of the tyrant ,phalaris to him1 and to his action4#cd ,apart from these fables1 there remains as an historic fact1 the great work which he accomplished1 and this he did chiefly by establishing a school1 and by the great influence of his order upon the principal part of the ,greco-,italian states1 or rather by means of the rule which was exercised in these states through this order1 which lasted for a very long period of time4 ,it is related of him that he was a very handsome man1 and of a majestic appearance1 which captivated as much as it commanded respect4 ,with this natural dignity1 nobility of manners1 and the calm propriety of his demeanour1 he united external peculiarities1 through which he seemed a remarkable and mysterious being4 ,he wore a white linen garment1 and refrained from partaking of certain foods4#ce ,particular personality1 as also the externalities of dress and the like1 are no longer of importance2 men let themselves be guided by general custom and fashion1 since it is a matter outside of and indifferent to them not to have their own will here2 for we hand over the contingent to the contingent1 and only follow the external rationality that consists in identity and universality4 ,to this outward personality there was added great eloquence and profound perception2 not only did he undertake to impart this to his individual friends1 but he proceeded to bring a general influence to bear on public culture1 both in regard to understanding and to the whole manner of life and morals4 ,he not merely instructed his friends1 but associated them in a particular life in order to constitute them into persons and make them skilful in business and eminent in morals4 ,the ,institute of ,pythagoras grew into a league1 which included all men and all life in its embrace2 for it was an elaborately fashioned piece of work1 and excellently plastic in design4 ,of the regulations of ,pythagoras' league1 we have descriptions from his successors1 more especially from the ,neo-,platonists1 who are particularly diffuse as regards its laws4 ,the league had1 on the whole1 the character of a voluntary priesthood1 or a monastic order of modern times4 ,whoever wished to be received was proved in respect of his education and obedience1 and information was collected about his conduct1 inclinations1 and occupations4 ,the members were subject to a special training1 in which a difference was made amongst those received1 in that some were exoteric and some esoteric4 ,these last were initiated into the highest branches of science1 and since political operations were not excluded from the order1 they were also engaged in active politics2 the former had to go through a novitiate of five years4 ,each member must have surrendered his means to the order1 but he received them again on retiring1 and in the probationary period silence was enjoined 774#cf ,this obligation to cease from idle talk may be called an essential condition for all culture and learning2 with it men must begin if they wish to comprehend the thoughts of others and relinquish their own ideas4 ,we are in the habit of saying that the understanding is cultivated through questioning1 objecting and replying1 c41 but1 in fact1 it is not thus formed1 but made from without4 ,what is inward in man is by culture got at and developed2 hence though he remains silent1 he is none the poorer in thought or denser of mind4 ,he rather acquires thereby the power of apprehension1 and comes to know that his ideas and objections are valueless2 and as he learns that such ideas are valueless1 he ceases to have them4 ,now the fact that in ,pythagoras there is a separation between those in the course of preparation and those initiated1 as also that silence is particularly enjoined1 seems most certainly to indicate that in his brotherhood both were formal elements and not merely as present in the nature of things1 as might occur spontaneously in the individual without any special law or the application of any particular consideration4 ,but here it is important to remark that ,pythagoras may be regarded as the first instructor in ,greece who introduced the teachings of science2 neither ,thales1 who was earlier than he1 nor his contemporary ,anaximander taught scientifically1 but only imparted their ideas to their friends4 ,there were1 generally speaking1 no sciences at that time2 there was neither a science of philosophy1 mathematics1 jurisprudence or anything else1 but merely isolated propositions and facts respecting these subjects4 ,what was taught was the use of arms1 theorems1 music1 the singing of ,homer's or ,hesiod's songs1 tripod chants1 c41 or other arts4 ,this teaching is accomplished in quite another way4 ,now if we said that ,pythagoras had introduced the teaching of science amongst a people who1 though like the ,greeks1 untaught therein1 were not stupid but most lively1 cultured and loquacious1 the external conditions of such teaching might in so far be given as follows3--77 ,he would distinguish amongst those who as yet had no idea of the process of learning a science1 so that those who first began should be excluded from that which was to be imparted to those further on2 and 77 he would make them leave the unscientific mode of speaking of such matters1 or their idle prattle1 alone1 and for the first time study science4 ,but the fact that this action both appeared to be formal and likewise required to be made such1 was1 on account of its unwonted character1 a necessary one1 just because the followers of ,pythagoras were not only numerous1 necessitating a definite form and order1 but also1 generally speaking1 they lived continually together4 ,thus a particular form was natural to ,pythagoras1 because it was the very first time that a teacher in ,greece arrived at a totality1 or a new principle1 through the cultivation of the intelligence1 mind and will4 ,this common life had not only the educational side and that founded on the exercise of physical ingenuity or skill1 but included also that of the moral culture of practical men4 ,but even now everything relating to morality appears and is or becomes altogether formal1 or rather this is so in as far as it is consciously thought of as in this relation1 for to be formal is to be universal1 that which is opposed to the individual4 ,it appears so particularly to him who compares the universal and the individual and consciously reflects over both1 but this difference disappears for those living therein1 to whom it is ordinary habit4 ,finally1 we have sufficient and full accounts of the outward forms observed by the ,pythagoreans in their common life and also of their discipline4 ,for much of this1 however1 we are indebted to the impressions of later writers4 ,in the league1 a life regulated in all respects was advocated4 ,first of all1 it is told us1 that the members made themselves known by a similar dress--the white linen of ,pythagoras4 ,they had a very strict order for each day1 of which each hour had its work4 ,the morning1 directly after rising1 was set aside for recalling to memory the history of the previous day1 because what is to be done in the day depends chiefly on the previous day2 similarly the most constant self-examination was made the duty of the evening in order to find whether the deeds done in the day were right or wrong4 ,true culture is not the vanity of directing so much attention to oneself and occupying oneself with oneself as an individual1 but the self-oblivion that absorbs oneself in the matter in hand and in the universal2 it is this consideration of the thing in hand that is alone essential1 while that dangerous1 useless1 anxious state does away with freedom4 ,they had also to learn by heart from ,homer and from ,hesiod2 and all through the day they occupied themselves much with music--one of the principal parts of ,greek education and culture4#cg ,gymnastic exercises in wrestling1 racing1 throwing1 and so on1 were with them also enforced by rule4 ,they dined together1 and here1 too1 they had peculiar customs1 but of these the accounts are different4 ,honey and bread were made their principal food1 and water the principal1 and indeed only1 drink2 they must thus have entirely refrained from eating meat as being associated with metempsychosis4 ,a distinction was also made regarding vegetables--beans1 for example1 being forbidden4 ,on account of this respect for beans1 they were much derided1 yet in the subsequent destruction of the political league1 several ,pythagoreans1 being pursued1 preferred to die than to damage a field of beans4#ch ,the order1 the moral discipline which characterized them1 the common intercourse of men1 did not1 however1 endure long2 for even in ,pythagoras' life-time the affairs of his league must have become involved1 since he found enemies who forcibly overthrew him4 ,he drew down upon him1 it is said1 the envy of others1 and was accused of thinking differently from what he seemed to indicate1 and thus of having an arrire pense4 ,the real fact of the case was that the individual belonged1 not entirely to his town1 but also to another4 ,in this catastrophe1 ,pythagoras himself1 according to ,tennemann 7,vol4 ,i4 p4 #dad71 met his death in the #fith ,olympiad 7#ejd1 ,b4,c47 in a rising of the people against these aristocrats2 but it is uncertain whether it happened in ,crotona or in ,metapontum1 or in a war between the ,syracusans and the ,agrigentines4 ,there is also much difference of opinion about the age of ,pythagoras1 for it is given sometimes as #hj1 and sometimes as #ajd4ci ,for the rest1 the unity of the ,pythagorean school1 the friendship of the members1 and the connecting bond of culture have even in later times remained1 but not in the formal character of a league1 because what is external must pass away4 ,the history of ,magna ,grcia is in general little known1 but even in ,plato's#dj time we find ,pythagoreans appearing at the head of states or as a political power4 ,the ,pythagorean brotherhood had no relation with ,greek public and religious life1 and therefore could not endure for long3 in ,egypt and in ,asia exclusiveness and priestly influence have their home1 but ,greece1 in its freedom1 could not let the ,eastern separation of caste exist4 ,freedom here is the principle of civic life1 but still it is not yet determined as principle in the relations of public and private law4 ,with us the individual is free since all are alike before the law2 diversity in customs1 in political relations and opinions may thus exist1 and must indeed so do in organic states4 ,in democratic ,greece1 on the contrary1 manners1 the external mode of life1 necessarily preserved a certain similarity1 and the stamp of similarity remained impressed on these wider spheres2 for the exceptional condition of the ,pythagoreans1 who could not take their part as free citizens1 but were dependent on the plans and ends of a combination and led an exclusive religious life1 there was no place in ,greece4 ,the preservation of the mysteries certainly belonged to the ,eumolpid1 and other special forms of worship to other particular families1 but they were not regarded in a political sense as of fixed and definite castes1 but as priests usually are1 politicians1 citizens1 men like their fellows2 nor1 as with the ,christians1 was the separation of religious persons driven to the extreme of monastic rule4 ,in ordinary civic life in ,greece1 no one could prosper or maintain his position who held peculiar principles1 or even secrets1 and differed in outward modes of life and clothing2 for what evidently united and distinguished them was their community of principles and life--whether anything was good for the commonwealth or not1 was by them publicly and openly discussed4 ,the ,greeks are above having particular clothing1 maintaining special customs of washing1 rising1 practising music1 and distinguishing between pure and impure foods4 ,this1 they say1 is partly the affair of the particular individual and of his personal freedom1 and has no common end in view1 and partly it is a general custom and usage for everybody alike4 ,what is most important to us is the ,pythagorean philosophy--not the philosophy of ,pythagoras so much as that of the ,pythagoreans1 as ,aristotle and ,sextus express it4 ,the two must certainly be distinguished1 and from comparing what is given out as ,pythagorean doctrine1 many anomalies and discrepancies become evident1 as we shall see4 ,plato bears the blame of having destroyed ,pythagorean philosophy through absorbing what is ,pythagorean in it into his own4 ,but the ,pythagorean philosophy itself developed to a point which left it quite other than what at first it was4 ,we hear of many followers of ,pythagoras in history who have arrived at this or that conclusion1 such as ,alcmon and ,philolaus2 and we see in many cases the simple undeveloped form contrasted with the further stages of development in which thought comes forth in definiteness and power4 ,we need1 however1 go no further into the historical side of the distinction1 for we can only consider the ,pythagorean philosophy generally2 similarly we must separate what is known to belong to the ,neo-,platonists and ,neo-,pythagoreans1 and for this end we have sources to draw from which are earlier than this period1 namely the express statements found in ,aristotle and ,sextus4 ,the ,pythagorean philosophy forms the transition from realistic to intellectual philosophy4 ,the ,ionic school said that essence or principle is a definite material4 ,the next conclusion is 77 that the absolute is not grasped in natural form1 but as a thought determination4 77 ,then it follows that determinations must be posited while the beginning was altogether undetermined4 ,the ,pythagorean philosophy has done both4 #a4 ,the ,system of ,numbers4 ,thus the original and simple proposition of the ,pythagorean philosophy is1 according to ,aristotle 7,metaph4 ,i4 #e71 8that number is the reality of things1 and the constitution of the whole universe in its determinations is an harmonious system of numbers and of their relations40 ,in what sense is this statement to be taken8 ,the fundamental determination of number is its being a measure2 if we say that everything is quantitatively or qualitatively determined1 the size and measure is only one aspect or characteristic which is present in everything1 but the meaning here is that number itself is the essence and the substance of things1 and not alone their form4 ,what first strikes us as surprising is the boldness of such language1 which at once sets aside everything which to the ordinary idea is real and true1 doing away with sensuous existence and making it to be the creation of thought4 ,existence is expressed as something which is not sensuous1 and thus what to the senses and to old ideas is altogether foreign1 is raised into and expressed as substance and as true ,being4 ,but at the same time the necessity is shown for making number to be likewise ,notion1 to manifest it as the activity of its unity with ,being1 for to us number does not seem to be in immediate unity with the ,notion4 ,now although this principle appears to us to be fanciful and wild1 we find in it that number is not merely something sensuous1 therefore it brings determination with it1 universal distinctions and antitheses4 ,the ancients had a very good knowledge of these4 ,aristotle 7,metaph4 ,i4 #f7 says of ,plato3 8,he maintained that the mathematical elements in things are found outside of what is merely sensuous1 and of ideas1 being between both2 it differs from what is sensuous in that it is eternal and unchangeable1 and from ideas1 in that it possesses multiplicity1 and hence each can resemble and be similar to another1 while each idea is for itself one alone40 ,that is1 number can be repeated2 thus it is not sensuous1 and still not yet thought4 ,in the life of ,pythagoras1 this is further said by ,malchus 7#df1 #dg73 8,pythagoras propounded philosophy in this wise in order to loose thought from its fetters4 ,without thought nothing true can be discerned or known2 thought hears and sees everything in itself1 the rest is lame and blind4 ,to obtain his end1 ,pythagoras makes use of mathematics1 since this stands midway between what is sensuous and thought1 as a kind of preliminary to what is in and for itself40 ,malchus quotes further 7#dh1 #ec7 a passage from an early writer1 ,moderatus3 8,because the ,pythagoreans could not clearly express the absolute and the first principles through thought1 they made use of numbers1 of mathematics1 because in this form determinations could be easily expressed40 ,for instance1 similarity could be expressed as one1 dissimilarity as two4 8,this mode of teaching through the use of numbers1 whilst it was the first philosophy1 is superseded on account of its mysterious nature4 ,plato1 ,speusippus1 ,aristotle1 c41 have stolen the fruits of their work from the ,pythagoreans by making a simple use of their principle40 ,in this passage a perfect knowledge of numbers is evident4 ,the enigmatic character of the determination through number is what most engages our attention4 ,the numbers of arithmetic answers to thought-determinations1 for number has the 8one0 as element and principle2 the one1 however1 is a category of being-for-self1 and thus of identity with self1 in that it excludes all else and is indifferent to what is 8other40 ,the further determinations of number are only further combinations and repetitions of the one1 which all through remains fixed and external2 number1 thus1 is the most utterly dead1 notionless continuity possible2 it is an entirely external and mechanical process1 which is without necessity4 ,hence number is not immediate ,notion1 but only a beginning of thought1 and a beginning in the worst possible way2 it is the ,notion in its extremest externality1 in quantitative form1 and in that of indifferent distinction4 ,in so far1 the one has within itself both the principle of thought and that of materiality1 or the determination of the sensuous4 ,in order that anything should have the form of ,notion1 it must immediately in itself1 as determined1 relate itself to its opposite1 just as positive is related to negative2 and in this simple movement of the ,notion we find the ideality of differences and negation of independence to be the chief determination4 ,on the other hand1 in the number three1 for instance1 there are always three units1 of which each is independent2 and this is what constitutes both their defect and their enigmatic character4 ,for since the essence of the ,notion is innate1 numbers are the most worthless instruments for expressing ,notion-determinations4 ,now the ,pythagoreans did not accept numbers in this indifferent way1 but as ,notion4 8,at least they say that phenomena must be composed of simple elements1 and it would be contrary to the nature of things if the principle of the universe pertained to sensuous phenomena4 ,the elements and principles are thus not only intangible and invisible1 but altogether incorporeal40#da ,but how they have come to make numbers the original principle or the absolute ,notion1 is better shown from what ,aristotle says in his ,metaphysics 7,i4 #e71 although he is shorter than he would have been1 because he alleges that elsewhere 7infra41 p4 #bad7 he has spoken of it4 8,in numbers they thought that they perceived much greater similitude to what is and what takes place than in fire1 water1 or earth2 since a certain property of numbers 7 7 is justice1 so is it with 77 the soul and understanding2 another property is opportunity1 and so on4 ,since they further saw the conditions and relations of what is harmonious present in numbers1 and since numbers are at the basis of all natural things1 they considered numbers to be the elements of everything1 and the whole heavens to be a harmony and number40 ,in the ,pythagoreans we see the necessity for one enduring universal idea as a thought-determination4 ,aristotle 7,met4 ,,xii4 #d71 speaking of ideas1 says3 8,according to ,heraclitus1 everything sensuous flows on1 and thus there cannot be a science of the sensuous2 from this conviction the doctrine of ideas sprang4 ,socrates is the first to define the universal through inductive methods2 the ,pythagoreans formerly concerned themselves merely with a few matters of which they derived the notions from numbers--as1 for example1 with what opportuneness1 or right1 or marriage are40 ,it is impossible to discern what interest this in itself can have2 the only thing which is necessary for us as regards the ,pythagoreans1 is to recognize any indications of the ,idea1 in which there may be a progressive principle4 ,this is the whole of the ,pythagorean philosophy taken generally4 ,we now have to come to closer quarters1 and to consider the determinations1 or universal significance4 ,in the ,pythagorean system numbers seem partly to be themselves allied to categories--that is1 to be at once the thought-determinations of unity1 of opposition and of the unity of these two moments4 ,in part1 the ,pythagoreans from the very first gave forth universal ideal determinations of numbers as principles1 and recognized1 as ,aristotle remarks 7,metaph4 ,i4 #e71 as the absolute principles of things1 not so much immediate numbers in their arithmetic differences1 as the principles of number1 i4e4 their rational differences4 ,the first determination is unity generally1 the next duality or opposition4 ,it is most important to trace back the infinitely manifold nature of the forms and determinations of finality to their universal thoughts as the most simple principles of all determination4 ,these are not differences of one thing from another1 but universal and essential differences within themselves4 ,empirical objects distinguish themselves by outward form2 this piece of paper can be distinguished from another1 shades are different in colour1 men are separated by differences of temperament and individuality4 ,but these determinations are not essential differences2 they are certainly essential for the definite particularity of the things1 but the whole particularity defined is not an existence which is in and for itself essential1 for it is the universal alone which is the self-contained and the substantial4 ,pythagoras began to seek these first determinations of unity1 multiplicity1 opposition1 c4 ,with him they are for the most part numbers2 but the ,pythagoreans did not remain content with this1 for they gave them the more concrete determinations1 which really belong to their successors4 ,necessary progression and proof are not to be sought for here2 comprehension1 the development of duality out of unity are wanting4 ,universal determinations are only found and established in a quite dogmatic form1 and hence the determinations are dry1 destitute of process or dialectic1 and stationary4 a4 ,the ,pythagoreans say that the first simple ,notion is unity 772 not the discrete1 multifarious1 arithmetic one1 but identity as continuity and positivity1 the entirely universal essence4 ,they further say1 according to ,sextus 7adv4 ,math4 ,x4 #bfj1 #bfa73 8,all numbers come under the ,notion of the one2 for duality is one duality and triplicity is equally a #8one1' but the number ten is the one chief number4 ,this moved ,pythagoras to assert unity to be the principle of things1 because1 through partaking of it1 each is called one40 ,that is to say1 the pure contemplation of the implicit being of a thing is the one1 the being like self2 to all else it is not implicit1 but a relationship to what is other4 ,things1 however1 are much more determined than being merely this dry 8one40 ,the ,pythagoreans have expressed this remarkable relationship of the entirely abstract one to the concrete existence of things through 8simulation0 774 ,the same difficulty which they here encounter is also found in ,plato's ,ideas2 since they stand over against the concrete as species1 the relation of concrete to universal is naturally an important point4 ,aristotle 7,metaph4 ,i4 #f7 ascribes the expression 8participation0 77 to ,plato1 who took it in place of the ,pythagorean expression 8simulation40 ,simulation is a figurative1 childish way of putting the relationship2 participation is undoubtedly more definite4 ,but ,aristotle says1 with justice1 that both are insufficient2 that ,plato has not here arrived at any further development1 but has only substituted another name4 8,to say that ideas are prototypes and that other things participate in them is empty talk and a poetic metaphor2 for what is the active principle that looks upon the ideas80 7,metaph4 ,i4 #i74 ,simulation and participation are nothing more than other names for relation2 to give names is easy1 but it is another thing to comprehend4 b4 ,what comes next is the opposition1 the duality 771 the distinction1 the particular2 such determinations have value even now in ,philosophy2 ,pythagoras merely brought them first to consciousness4 ,now1 as this unity relates to multiplicity1 or this being-like-self to being another1 different applications are possible1 and the ,pythagoreans have expressed themselves variously as to the forms which this first opposition takes4 77 ,they said1 according to ,aristotle 7,metaph4 ,i4 #e73 8,the elements of number are the even and the odd2 the latter is the finite0 7or principle of limitation7 8and the former is the infinite2 thus the unity proceeds from both and out of this again comes number40 ,the elements of immediate number are not yet themselves numbers3 the opposition of these elements first appears in arithmetical form rather than as thought4 ,but the one is as yet no number1 because as yet it is not quantity2 unity and quantity belong to number4 ,theon of ,smyrna#db says3 8,aristotle gives1 in his writings on the ,pythagoreans1 the reason why1 in their view1 the one partakes of the nature of even and odd2 that is1 one1 posited as even1 makes odd2 as odd1 it makes even4 ,this is what it could not do unless it partook of both natures1 for which reason they also called the one1 even-odd0 774 77 ,if we follow the absolute ,idea in this first mode1 the opposition will also be called the undetermined duality 7 74 ,sextus speaks more definitely 7adv4 ,math4 ,x4 #bfa1 #bfb7 as follows3 8,unity1 thought of in its identity with itself 7 71 is unity2 if this adds itself to itself as something different 7 71 undetermined duality results1 because no one of the determined or otherwise limited numbers is this duality1 but all are known through their participation in it1 as has been said of unity4 ,there are1 according to this1 two principles in things2 the first unity1 through participation in which all number-units are units1 and also undetermined duality through participation in which all determined dualities are dualities40 ,duality is just as essential a moment in the ,notion as is unity4 ,comparing them with one another1 we may either consider the unity to be form and duality matter1 or the other way2 and both appear in different modes4 77 ,unity1 as the being-like-self1 is the formless2 but in duality1 as the unlike1 there comes division or form4 77 ,if1 on the other hand1 we take form as the simple activity of absolute form1 the one is what determines2 and duality as the potentiality of multiplicity1 or as multiplicity not posited1 is matter4 ,aristotle 7,met4 ,i4 #f7 says that it is characteristic of ,plato that 8he makes out of matter many1 but with him the form originates only once2 whereas out of one matter only one table proceeds1 whoever brings form to matter1 in spite of its unity1 makes many tables40 ,he also ascribes this to ,plato1 that 8instead of showing the undetermined to be simple 7 71 he made of it a duality--the great and small40 77 ,further consideration of this opposition1 in which ,pythagoreans differ from one another1 shows us the imperfect beginning of a table of categories which were then brought forward by them1 as later on by ,aristotle4 ,hence the latter was reproached for having borrowed these thought-determinations from them2 and it certainly was the case that the ,pythagoreans first made the opposite to be an essential moment in the absolute4 ,they further determined the abstract and simple ,notions1 although it was in an inadequate way1 since their table presents a mixture of antitheses in the ordinary idea and the ,notion1 without following these up more fully4 ,aristotle 7,met4 ,i4 #e7 ascribes these determinations either to ,pythagoras himself1 or else to ,alcmon 8who flourished in the time of ,pythagoras' old age10 so that 8either ,alcmon took them from the ,pythagoreans or the latter took them from him40 ,of these antitheses or co-ordinates to which all things are traced1 ten are given1 for1 according to the ,pythagoreans1 ten is a number of great significance3-- #a4 ,the finite and the infinite4 #b4 ,the odd and the even4 #c4 ,the one and the many4 #d4 ,the right and the left4 #e4 ,the male and the female4 #f4 ,the quiescent and the moving4 #g4 ,the straight and the crooked4 #h4 ,light and darkness4 #i4 ,good and evil4 #aj4 ,the square and the parallelogram4 ,this is certainly an attempt towards a development of the ,idea of speculative philosophy in itself1 i4e4 in ,notions2 but the attempt does not seem to have gone further than this simple enumeration4 ,it is very important that at first only a collection of general thought-determinations should be made1 as was done by ,aristotle2 but what we here see with the ,pythagoreans is only a rude beginning of the further determination of antitheses1 without order and sense1 and very similar to the ,indian enumeration of principles and substances4 77 ,we find the further progress of these determinations in ,sextus 7adv4 ,math4 ,x4 #bfb-bgg71 when he speaks about an exposition of the later ,pythagoreans4 ,it is a very good and well considered account of the ,pythagorean theories1 which has some thought in it4 ,the exposition follows these lines3 8,the fact that these two principles are the principles of the whole1 is shown by the ,pythagoreans in manifold ways40 4 8,there are three methods of thinking things2 firstly1 in accordance with diversity1 secondly1 with opposition1 and thirdly1 according to relation4 77 ,what is considered in its mere diversity1 is considered for itself2 this is the case with those subjects in which each relates only to itself1 such as horse1 plant1 earth1 air1 water and fire4 ,such matters are thought of as detached and not in relation to others40 ,this is the determination of identity with self or of independence4 77 8,in reference to opposition1 the one is determined as evidently contrasting with the other2 we have examples of this in good and evil1 right and wrong1 sacred and profane1 rest and movement1 c4 77 ,according to relation 7 71 we have the object which is determined in accordance with its relationship to others1 such as right and left1 over and under1 double and half4 ,one is only comprehensible from the other2 for ,i cannot tell which is my left excepting by my right40 ,each of these relations in its opposition1 is likewise set up for itself in a position of independence4 8,the difference between relationship and opposition is that in opposition the coming into existence of the #8one' is at the expense of the #8other1' and conversely4 ,if motion is taken away1 rest commences2 if motion begins1 rest ceases2 if health is taken away1 sickness begins1 and conversely4 ,in a condition of relationship1 on the contrary1 both take their rise1 and both similarly cease together2 if the right is removed1 so also is the left2 the double goes and the half is destroyed40 ,what is here taken away is taken not only as regards its opposition1 but also in its existence4 8,a second difference is that what is in opposition has no middle2 for example1 between sickness and health1 life and death1 rest and motion1 there is no third4 ,relativity1 on the contrary1 has a middle1 for between larger and smaller there is the like2 and between too large and too small the right size is the medium40 ,pure opposition passes through nullity to opposition2 immediate extremes1 on the other hand1 subsist in a third or middle state1 but in such a case no longer as opposed4 ,this exposition shows a certain regard for universal1 logical determinations1 which now and always have the greatest possible importance1 and are moments in all conceptions and in everything that is4 ,the nature of these opposites is1 indeed1 not considered here1 but it is of importance that they should be brought to consciousness4 4 8,now since these three represent three different genera1 the subjects and the two-fold opposite1 there must be a higher genus over each of them which takes the first place1 since the genus comes before its subordinate kinds4 ,if the universal is taken away1 so is the kind2 on the other hand1 if the kind1 not the genus1 for the former depends on the latter1 but not the contrary way40 77 8,the ,pythagoreans have declared the one to be the highest genus of what is considered as in and for itself0 7of subjects in their diversity72 this is1 properly speaking1 nothing more than translating the determinations of the ,notion into numbers4 77 8,what is in opposition has1 they say1 as its genus the like and the unlike2 rest is the like1 for it is capable of nothing more and nothing less2 but movement is the unlike4 ,thus what is according to nature is like itself2 it is a point which is not capable of being intensified 772 what is opposed to it is unlike4 ,health is like1 sickness is unlike4 77 ,the genus of that which is in an indifferent relationship is excess and want1 the more and the less20 in this we have the quantitative relation just as we formerly had the qualitative4 4 ,we now come for the first time to the two opposites3 8,these three genera of what is for itself1 in opposition and in relationship1 must now come under0--yet simpler1 higher--8genera10 i4e4 thought-determinations4 8,similarity reduces itself to the determination of unity40 ,the genus of the subjects is the very being on its own account4 8,dissimilarity1 however1 consists of excess and want1 but both of these come under undetermined duality20 they are the undetermined opposition1 opposition generally4 8,thus from all these relationships the first unity and the undetermined duality proceed20 the ,pythagoreans said that such are found to be the universal modes of things4 8,from these1 there first comes the #8one' of numbers and the #8two' of numbers2 from the first unity1 the one2 from the unity and the undetermined duality the two2 for twice the one is two4 ,the other numbers take their origin in a similar way1 for the unity over moves forward1 and the undetermined duality generates the two40 ,this transition of qualitative into quantitative opposition is not clear4 8,hence underlying these principles1 unity is the active principle0 or form1 8but the two is the passive matter2 and just as they make numbers arise from them1 so do they make the system of the world and that which is contained in it40 ,the nature of these determinations is to be found in transition and in movement4 ,the deeper significance of this reflection rests in the connection of universal thought-determinations with arithmetic numbers--in subordinating these and making the universal genus first4 ,before ,i say anything of the further sequence of these numbers1 it must be remarked that they1 as we see them represented here1 are pure ,notions4 77 ,the absolute1 simple essence divides itself into unity and multiplicity1 of which the one sublates the other1 and at the same time it has its existence in the opposition4 77 ,the opposition has at the same time subsistence1 and in this is found the manifold nature of equivalent things4 77 ,the return of absolute essence into itself is the negative unity of the individual subject and of the universal or positive4 ,this is1 in fact1 the pure speculative ,idea of absolute existence2 it is this movement3 with ,plato the ,idea is nothing else4 ,the speculative makes its appearance here as speculative2 whoever does not know the speculative1 does not believe that in indicating simple ,notions such as these1 absolute essence is expressed4 ,one1 many1 like1 unlike1 more or less1 are trivial1 empty1 dry moments2 that there should be contained in them absolute essence1 the riches and the organization of the natural1 as of the spiritual world1 does not seem possible to him who1 accustomed to ordinary ideas1 has not gone back from sensuous existence into thought4 ,it does not seem to such a one that ,god is1 in a speculative sense1 expressed thereby--that what is most sublime can be put in those common words1 what is deepest1 in what is so well known1 self-evident and open1 and what is richest1 in the poverty of these abstractions4 ,it is at first in opposition to common reality that this idea of reality as the manifold of simple essence1 has in itself its opposition and the subsistence of the same2 this essential1 simple ,notion of reality is elevation into thought1 but it is not flight from what is real1 but the expression of the real itself in its essence4 ,we here find the ,reason which expresses its essence2 and absolute reality is unity immediately in itself4 ,thus it is pre-eminently in relation to this reality that the difficulties of those who do not think speculatively have become so intense4 ,what is its relation to common reality8 ,what has taken place is just what happens with the ,platonic ,ideas1 which approximate very closely to these numbers1 or rather to pure ,notions4 ,that is to say1 the first question is1 8,numbers1 where are they8 ,dispersed through space1 dwelling in independence in the heaven of ideas8 ,they are not things immediately in themselves1 for a thing1 a substance1 is something quite other than a number3 a body bears no similarity to it40 ,to this we may answer that the ,pythagoreans did not signify anything like that which we understand by prototypes--as if ideas1 as the laws and relations of things1 were present in a creative consciousness as thoughts in the divine understanding1 separated from things as are the thoughts of an artist from his work4 ,still less did they mean only subjective thoughts in our consciousness1 for we use the absolute antithesis as the explanation of the existence of qualities in things1 but what determines is the real substance of what exists1 so that each thing is essentially just its having in it unity1 duality1 as also their antithesis and connection4 ,aristotle 7,met4 ,i4 #e1 #f7 puts it clearly thus3 8,it is characteristic of the ,pythagoreans that they did not maintain the finite and the infinite and the ,one1 to be1 like fire1 earth1 c41 different natures or to have another reality than things2 for the ,infinite and the abstract ,one are to them1 the substance of the things of which they are predicated4 ,hence too1 they said1 ,number is the essence of all things4 ,thus they do not separate numbers from things1 but consider them to be things themselves4 ,number to them is the principle and matter of things1 as also their qualities and forces20 hence it is thought as substance1 or the thing as it is in the reality of thought4 ,these abstract determinations then became more concretely determined1 especially by the later philosophers1 in their speculations regarding ,god4 ,we may instance ,iamblichus1 for example1 in the work 1 ascribed to him by ,porphyry and ,nicomachus4 ,those philosophers sought to raise the character of popular religion1 for they inserted such thought-determinations as these into religious conceptions4 ,by ,monas they understood nothing other than ,god2 they also call it ,mind1 the ,hermaphrodite 7which contains both determinations1 odd as well as even71 and likewise substance1 reason1 chaos 7because it is undetermined71 ,tartarus1 ,jupiter1 and ,form4 ,they called the duad by similar names1 such as matter1 and then the principle of the unlike1 strife1 that which begets1 ,isis1 c4 c4 ,the triad 77 has now become a most important number1 seeing that in it the monad has reached reality and perfection4 ,the monad proceeds through the duad1 and again brought into unity with this undetermined manifold1 it is the triad4 ,unity and multiplicity are present in the triad in the worst possible way--as an external combination2 but however abstractly this is understood1 the triad is still a profound form4 ,the triad then is held to be the first perfect form in the universal4 ,aristotle 7,de ,clo ,i4 #a7 puts this very clearly3 8,the corporeal has no dimension outside of the ,three2 hence the ,pythagoreans also say that the all and everything is determined through triplicity10 that is1 it has absolute form4 8,for the number of the whole has end1 middle1 and beginning2 and this is the triad40 ,nevertheless there is something superficial in the wish to bring everything under it1 as is done in the systematization of the more modern natural philosophy4 8,therefore we1 too1 taking this determination from nature1 make use of it in the worship of the gods1 so that we believe them to have been properly apostrophized only when we have called upon them three times in prayer4 ,two we call both1 but not all2 we speak first of three as all4 ,what is determined through three is the first totality 772 what is in triple form is perfectly divided4 ,some is merely in one1 other is only in two1 but this is ,all40 ,what is perfect1 or has reality1 is its identity1 opposition and unity1 like number generally2 but in triplicity this is actual1 because it has beginning1 middle1 and end4 ,each thing is simple as beginning2 it is other or manifold as middle1 and its end is the return of its other nature into unity or mind2 if we take this triplicity from a thing1 we negate it and make of it an abstract construction of thought4 ,it is now comprehensible that ,christians sought and found the ,trinity in this threefold nature4 ,it has often been made a superficial reason for objecting to them2 sometimes the idea of the ,trinity as it was present to the ancients1 was considered as above reason1 as a secret1 and hence1 too high2 sometimes it was deemed too absurd4 ,but from the one cause or from the other1 they did not wish to bring it into closer relation to reason4 ,if there is a meaning in this ,trinity1 we must try to understand it4 ,it would be an anomalous thing if there were nothing in what has for two thousand years been the holiest ,christian idea2 if it were too holy to be brought down to the level of reason1 or were something now quite obsolete1 so that it would be contrary to good taste and sense to try to find a meaning in it4 ,it is the ,notion of the ,trinity alone of which we can speak1 and not of the idea of ,father and ,son1 for we am not dealing with these natural relationships4 d4 ,the ,four 77 is the triad but more developed1 and hence with the ,pythagoreans it held a high position4 ,that the tetrad should be considered to be thus complete1 reminds one of the four elements1 the physical and the chemical1 the four continents1 c4 ,in nature four is found to be present everywhere1 and hence this number is even now equally esteemed in natural philosophy4 ,as the square of two1 the fourfold is the perfection of the two-fold in as far as it--only having itself as determination1 i4e4 being multiplied with itself--returns into identity with itself4 ,but in the triad the tetrad is in so far contained1 as that the former is the unity1 the other-being1 and the union of both these moments1 and thus1 since the difference1 as posited1 is a double1 if we count it1 four moments result4 ,to make this clearer1 the tetrad is comprehended as the 1 the efficient1 active four 7from and 72 and afterwards this is by the ,pythagoreans made the most notable number4 ,in the fragments of a poem of ,empedocles1 who originally was a ,pythagorean1 it is shown in what high regard this tetraktus1 as represented by ,pythagoras1 was held3 8,if thou dost this1 ,it will lead thee in the path of holy piety4 ,i swear it ,by the one who to our spirit has given the ,tetraktus1 ,which has in it eternal nature's source and root40#dc e4 ,from this the ,pythagoreans proceed to the ten1 another form of this tetrad4 ,as the four is the perfect form of three1 this fourfold1 thus perfected and developed so that all its moments shall be accepted as real differences1 is the number ten 771 the real tetrad4 ,sextus 7adv4 ,math4 ,,iv4 #c2 ,,vii4 #id1 #ie7 says3 8,tetraktus means the number which1 comprising within itself the four first numbers1 forms the most perfect number1 that is the number ten2 for one and two and three and four make ten4 ,when we come to ten1 we again consider it as a unity and begin once more from the beginning4 ,the tetraktus1 it is said1 has the source and root of eternal nature within itself1 because it is the ,logos of the universe1 of the spiritual and of the corporeal40 ,it is an important work of thought to show the moments not merely to be four units1 but complete numbers2 but the reality in which the determinations are laid hold of1 is here1 however1 only the external and superficial one of number2 there is no ,notion present although the tetraktus does not mean number so much as idea4 ,one of the later philosophers1 ,proclus1 7in ,timum1 p4 #bfi7 says1 in a ,pythagorean hymn3-- 8,the divine number goes on10444 8,till from the still unprofaned sanctuary of the ,monad ,it reaches to the holy ,tetrad1 which creates the mother of all that is2 ,which received all within itself1 or formed the ancient bounds of all1 ,incapable of turning or of wearying2 men call it the holy ,dekad40 ,what we find about the progression of the other numbers is more indefinite and unsatisfying1 and the ,notion loses itself in them4 ,up to five there may certainly be a kind of thought in numbers1 but from six onwards they are merely arbitrary determinations4 #b4 ,application of the ,system to the ,universe4 ,this simple idea and the simple reality contained therein1 must now1 however1 be further developed in order to come to reality as it is when put together and expanded4 ,the question now meets us as to how1 in this relation1 the ,pythagoreans passed from abstract logical determinations to forms which indicate the concrete use of numbers4 ,in what pertains to space or music1 determinations of objects formed by the ,pythagoreans through numbers1 still bear a somewhat closer relation to the thing1 but when they enter the region of the concrete in nature and in mind1 numbers become purely formal and empty4 a4 ,to show how the ,pythagoreans constructed out of numbers the system of the world1 ,sextus instances 7adv4 ,math4 ,x4 #bgg-bhc71 space relations1 and undoubtedly we have in them to do with such ideal principles1 for numbers are1 in fact1 perfect determinations of abstract space4 ,that is to say1 if we begin with the point1 the first negation of vacuity1 8the point corresponds to unity2 it is indivisible and the principle of lines1 as the unity is that of numbers4 ,while the point exists as the monad or ,one1 the line expresses the duad or ,two1 for both become comprehensible through transition2 the line is the pure relationship of two points and is without breadth4 ,surface results from the threefold2 but the solid figure or body belongs to the fourfold1 and in it there are three dimensions present4 ,others say that body consists of one point0 7i4e4 its essence is one point71 8for the flowing point makes the line1 the flowing line1 however1 makes surface1 and this surface makes body4 ,they distinguish themselves from the first mentioned1 in that the former make numbers primarily proceed from the monad and the undetermined duad1 and then points and lines1 plane surfaces and solid figures1 from numbers1 while they construct all from one point40 ,to the first1 distinction is opposition or form set forth as duality2 the others have form as activity4 8,thus what is corporeal is formed under the directing influence of numbers1 but from them also proceed the definite bodies1 water1 air1 fire1 and the whole universe generally1 which they declare to be harmonious4 ,this harmony is one which again consists of numeral relations only1 which constitute the various concords of the absolute harmony40 ,we must here remark that the progression from the point to actual space also has the signification of occupation of space1 for 8according to their fundamental tenets and teaching10 says ,aristotle 7,metaph4 ,i4 #h71 8they speak of sensuously perceptible bodies in nowise differently from those which are mathematical40 ,since lines and surfaces are only abstract moments in space1 external construction likewise proceeds from here very well4 ,on the other hand1 the transition from the occupation of space generally to what is determined1 to water1 earth1 c41 is quite another thing and is more difficult2 or rather the ,pythagoreans have not taken this step1 for the universe itself has1 with them1 the speculative1 simple form1 which is found in the fact of being represented as a system of number-relations4 ,but with all this1 the physical is not yet determined4 b4 ,another application or exhibition of the essential nature of the determination of numbers is to be found in the relations of music1 and it is more especially in their case that number constitutes the determining factor4 ,the differences here show themselves as various relations of numbers1 and this mode of determining what is musical is the only one4 ,the relation borne by tones to one another is founded on quantitative differences whereby harmonies may be formed1 in distinction to others by which discords are constituted4 ,the ,pythagoreans1 according to ,porphyry 7,de vita ,pyth4 #cj71 treated music as something soul-instructing and scholastic ,psychagogisches und ,pdagogisches4 ,pythagoras was the first to discern that musical relations1 these audible differences1 are mathematically determinable1 that what we hear as consonance and dissonance is a mathematical arrangement4 ,the subjective1 and1 in the case of hearing1 simple feeling which1 however1 exists inherently in relation1 ,pythagoras has justified to the understanding1 and he attained his object by means of fixed determinations4 ,for to him the discovery of the fundamental tones of harmony are ascribed1 and these rest on the most simple number-relations4 ,iamblichus 7,de vita ,pyth4 ,,xxvi4 #aae7 says that ,pythagoras1 in passing by the workshop of a smith1 observed the strokes that gave forth a particular chord2 he then took into consideration the weight of the hammer giving forth a certain harmony1 and from that determined mathematically the tone as related thereto4#dd ,and finally he applied the same1 and experimented in strings1 by which means there were three different relations presented to him--,diapason1 ,diapente1 and ,diatessaron4 ,it is known that the tone of a string1 or1 in the wind instrument1 of its equivalent1 the column of air in a reed1 depends on three conditions2 on its length1 on its thickness1 and on the amount of tension4 ,now if we have two strings of equal thickness and length1 a difference in tension brings about a difference in sound4 ,if we want to know what tone any string has1 we have only to consider its tension1 and this may be measured by the weight depending from the string1 by means of which it is extended4 ,pythagoras here found that if one string were weighted with twelve pounds1 and another with six 7 1 #a 3 #b7 it would produce the musical chord of the octave 7 72 the proportion of #h 3 #ab1 or of #b 3 #c 7 7 would give the chord of the fifth 7 72 the proportion of #i 3 #ab1 or #c 3 #d 7 71 the fourth 7 74#de ,a different number of vibrations in like times determines the height and depth of the tone1 and this number is likewise proportionate to the weight1 if thickness and length are equal4 ,in the first case1 the more distended string makes as many vibrations again as the other2 in the second case1 it makes three vibrations for the other's two1 and so it goes on4 ,here number is the real factor which determines the difference1 for tone1 as the vibration of a body1 is only a quantitatively determined quiver or movement1 that is1 a determination made through space and time4 ,for there can be no determination for the difference excepting that of number or the amount of vibrations in one time2 and hence a determination made through numbers is nowhere more in place than here4 ,there certainly are also qualitative differences1 such as those existing between the tones of metals and catgut strings1 and between the human voice and wind instruments2 but the peculiar musical relation borne by the tone of one instrument to another1 in which harmony is to be found1 is a relationship of numbers4 ,from this point the ,pythagoreans enter into further applications of the theory of music1 in which we cannot follow them4 ,the priori law of progression1 and the necessity of movement in number-relations1 is a matter which is entirely dark2 minds confused may wander about at will1 for everywhere ideas are hinted at1 and superficial harmonies present themselves and disappear again4 ,but in all that treats of the further construction of the universe as a numerical system1 we have the whole extent of the confusion and turbidity of thought belonging to the later ,pythagoreans4 ,we cannot say how much pains they took to express philosophic thought in a system of numbers1 and also to understand the expressions given utterance to by others1 and to put in them all the meaning possible4 ,when they determined the physical and the moral universe by means of numbers1 everything came into indefinite and insipid relationships in which the ,notion disappeared4 ,in this matter1 however1 so far as the older ,pythagoreans are concerned1 we are acquainted with the main principles only4 ,plato exemplifies to us the conception of the universe as a system of numbers1 but ,cicero and the ancients always call these numbers the ,platonic1 and it does not appear that they were ascribed to the ,pythagoreans4 ,it was thus later on that this came to be said2 even in ,cicero's time they had become proverbially dark1 and there is but little after all that is really old4 c4 ,the ,pythagoreans further constructed the heavenly bodies of the visible universe by means of numbers1 and here we see at once the barrenness and abstraction present in the determination of numbers4 ,aristotle says 7,met4 ,i4 #e71 8,because they defined numbers to be the principles of all nature1 they brought under numbers and their relationships all determinations and all sections1 both of the heavens and of all nature2 and where anything did not altogether conform1 they sought to supply the deficiency in order to bring about a harmony4 ,for instance1 as the ,ten or dekad appeared to them to be the perfect number1 or that which embraces the whole essence of numbers1 they said that the spheres moving in the heavens must be ten2 but as only nine of these are visible1 they made out a tenth1 the ,antichthone 7740 ,these nine are1 first the milky way1 or the fixed stars1 and after that the seven stars which were then all held to be planets3 ,saturn1 ,jupiter1 ,mars1 ,venus1 ,mercury1 the ,sun1 ,moon1 and in the last and ninth place1 the ,earth4 ,the tenth is thus the ,antichthone1 and in regard to this it must remain uncertain whether the ,pythagoreans considered it to be the side of the ,earth which is turned away1 or as quite another body4 ,aristotle says1 in reference to the specially physical character of these spheres 7,de clo ,,ii4 #ac and #i71 8,fire was by the ,pythagoreans placed in the middle1 but the ,earth was made a star that moved around this central body in a circle40 ,this circle is1 then1 a sphere1 which1 as the most perfect of figures1 corresponds to the dekad4 ,we here find a certain similarity to our ideas of the solar system1 but the ,pythagoreans did not believe the fire to be the sun4 8,they thus10 says ,aristotle1 8rely1 not on sensuous appearance1 but on reasons10 just as we form conclusions in accordance with reasons as opposed to sensuous appearances2 and indeed this comes to us still as the first example of things being in themselves different from what they appear4 8,this fire1 that which is in the centre1 they called ,jupiter's place of watch4 ,now these ten spheres make1 like all that is in motion1 a tone2 but each makes a different one1 according to the difference in its size and velocity4 ,this is determined by means of the different distances1 which bear an harmonious relationship to one another1 in accordance with musical intervals2 by this means an harmonious sound arises in the moving spheres0--a universal chorus4 ,we must acknowledge the grandeur of this idea of determining everything in the system of the heavenly spheres through number-relations which have a necessary connection amongst themselves1 and have to be conceived of as thus necessarily related2 it is a system of relations which must also form the basis and essence of what can be heard1 or music4 ,we have1 comprehended here in thought1 a system of the universe2 the solar system is alone rational to us1 for the other stars are devoid of interest4 ,to say that there is music in the spheres1 and that these movements are tones1 may seem just as comprehensible to us as to say that the sun is still and the earth moves1 although both are opposed to the dictates of sense4 ,for1 seeing that we do not see the movement1 it may be that we do not hear the notes4 ,and there is little difficulty in imagining a universal silence in these vast spheres1 since we do not hear the chorus1 but it is more difficult to give a reason for not hearing this music4 ,the ,pythagoreans say1 according to the last quoted passage of ,aristotle1 that we do not hear it because we live in it1 like the smith who gets accustomed to the blows of his hammer4 ,since it belongs to our substance and is identical with ourselves1 nothing else1 such as silence1 by which we might know the other1 comes into relationship with us1 for we are conceived of as entirely within the movement4 ,but the movement does not become a tone1 in the first place1 because pure space and time1 the elements in movement1 can only raise themselves into a proper voice1 unstimulated from without1 in an animate body1 and movement first reaches this definite1 characteristic individuality in the animal proper2 and1 in the next place1 because the heavenly bodies are not related to one another as bodies whose sound requires for its production1 contact1 friction1 or shock1 in response to which1 and as the negation of its particularity its own momentary individuality resounds in elasticity2 for heavenly bodies are independent of one another1 and have only a general1 non-individual1 free motion4 ,we may thus set aside sound2 the music of the spheres is indeed a wonderful conception1 but it is devoid of any real interest for us4 ,if we retain the conception that motion1 as measure1 is a necessarily connected system of numbers1 as the only rational part of the theory1 we must maintain that nothing further has transpired to the present day4 ,in a certain way1 indeed1 we have made an advance upon ,pythagoras4 ,we have learned from ,kepler about laws1 about eccentricity1 and the relation of distances to the times of revolution1 but no amount of mathematics has as yet been able to give us the laws of progression in the harmony through which the distances are determined4 ,we know empirical numbers well enough1 but everything has the semblance of accident and not of necessity4 ,we are acquainted with an approximate rule of distances1 and thus have correctly foretold the existence of planets where ,ceres1 ,vesta1 ,pallas1 c41 were afterwards discovered--that is1 between ,mars and ,jupiter4 ,but astronomy has not as yet found in it a consistent sequence in which there is rationality2 on the other hand1 it even looks with disdain on the appearance of regularity presented by this sequence1 which is1 however1 on its own account1 a most important matter1 and one which should not be forgotten4 d4 ,the ,pythagoreans also applied their principle to the ,soul1 and thus determined what is spiritual as number4 ,aristotle 7,de anim4 ,i4 #b7 goes on to tell that they thought that solar corpuscles are soul1 others1 that it is what moves them2 they adopted this idea because the corpuscles are ever moving1 even in perfect stillness1 and hence they must have motion of their own4 ,this does not signify much1 but it is evident from it that the determination of self-movement was sought for in the soul4 ,the ,pythagoreans made a further application of number-conceptions to the soul after another form1 which ,aristotle describes in the same place as follows3--8,thought is the one1 knowledge or science is the two1 for it comes alone out of the one4 ,the number of the plane is popular idea1 opinion2 the number of the corporeal is sensuous feeling4 ,everything is judged of either by thought1 or science1 or opinion1 or feeling40 ,in these ideas1 which we must1 however1 ascribe to later ,pythagoreans1 we may undoubtedly find some adequacy1 for while thought is pure universality1 knowledge deals with something 8other10 since it gives itself a determination and a content2 but feeling is the most developed in its determinateness4 8,now because the soul moves itself1 it is the self-moving number10 yet we never find it said that it is connected with the monad4 ,this is a simple relationship to number-determinations4 ,aristotle instances 7,de anim4 ,i4 #c7 one more intricate from ,timus3 8,the soul moves itself1 and hence also the body because it is bound up with body2 it consists of elements and is divided according to harmonic numbers1 and hence it has feeling and an immediately indwelling 77 harmony4 ,in order that the whole may have an harmonious movement1 ,timus has bent the straight line of harmony 77 into a circle1 and again divided off from the whole circle two circles1 which are doubly connected2 and the one of these circles is again divided into seven circles1 so that the movements of the soul may resemble those of the heavens40 ,the more definite significance of these ideas ,aristotle unfortunately has not given2 they contain a profound knowledge of the harmony of the whole1 but yet they are forms which themselves remain dark1 because they are clumsy and unsuitable4 ,there is always a forcible turning and twisting1 a struggle with the material part of the representation1 as there is in mythical and distorted forms3 nothing has the pliability of thought but thought itself4 ,it is remarkable that the ,pythagoreans have grasped the soul as a system which is a counterpart of the system of the heavens4 ,in ,plato's ,timus this same idea is more definitely brought forward4 ,plato also gives further number-relations1 but not their significance as well2 even to the present day no one has been able to make any particular sense out of them4 ,an arrangement of numbers such as this is easy1 but to give to it a real significance is difficult1 and1 when done1 it always must be arbitrary4 ,there is still something worthy of attention in what is said by the ,pythagoreans in reference to the soul1 and this is their doctrine of the transmigration of souls4 ,cicero 7,tusc4 ,qust4 ,i4 #af7 says3 8,pherecydes1 the teacher of ,pythagoras1 first said that the souls of men were immortal40 ,the doctrine of the transmigration of souls extends even to ,india1 and1 without doubt1 ,pythagoras took it from the ,egyptians2 indeed ,herodotus 7,,ii4 #abc7 expressly says so4 ,after he speaks of the mythical ideas of the ,egyptians as to the lower world1 he continues3 8,the ,egyptians were the first to say that the soul of man is immortal1 and that1 when the body disappears1 it goes into another living being2 and when it has gone through all the animals of land and sea1 and likewise birds1 it again takes the body of a man1 the period being completed in #cjjj years40 ,diogenes ,laertius says in this connection 7,,viii4 #ad7 that the soul1 according to ,pythagoras1 goes through a circle4 8,these ideas10 proceeds ,herodotus1 8are also found amongst the ,greeks2 there are some who1 earlier or later1 have made use of this particular doctrine1 and have spoken of it as if it were their own2 ,i know their names very well1 but ,i will not mention them40 ,he undoubtedly meant ,pythagoras and his followers4 ,in the sequel1 much that is given utterance to is fictitious3 8,pythagoras himself is said to have stated that his former personality was known to him4 ,hermes granted him a knowledge of his circumstances before his birth4 ,he lived as the son of ,hermes1 thalides1 and then in the ,trojan war as ,euphorbus1 the son of ,panthous1 who killed ,patroclus1 and was killed by ,menelaus2 in the third place he was ,hermotimus2 fourthly1 ,pyrrhus1 a fisherman of ,delos2 in all he lived #bjg years4 ,euphorbus' shield was offered up to ,apollo by ,menelaus1 and ,pythagoras went to the temple and1 from the mouldering shield1 showed the existence of signs1 hitherto not known of1 by which it was recognized40#df ,we shall not treat further of these very various and foolish stories4 ,as in the case of the brotherhood copied from the ,egyptian priesthood1 so must we here set aside this oriental and un-,greek idea of the transmigration of souls4 ,both were too far removed from the ,greek spirit to have had a place and a development there4 ,with the ,greeks1 the consciousness of a higher1 freer individuality has become too strong to allow any permanence to the idea of metempsychosis1 according to which1 man1 this independent and self-sufficing ,being1 takes the form of a beast4 ,they have1 indeed1 the conception of men as becoming springs of water1 trees1 animals1 c41 but the idea of degradation which comes as a consequence of sin1 lies at its root4 ,aristotle 7,de anim4 ,i4 #c7 shortly and in his own manner deals with and annihilates this idea of the ,pythagoreans4 8,they do not say for what reason soul dwells in body1 nor how the latter is related to it4 ,for owing to their unity of nature when one acts the other suffers3 one moves and the other is moved1 but none of this happens in what is mutually contingent4 ,according to the ,pythagorean myths any soul takes to any body1 which is much like making architects take to flutes4 ,for crafts must necessarily have tools and soul body2 but each tool must have its proper form and kind40 ,it is implied in the transmigration of souls that the organization of the body is something accidental to the human soul2 this refutation by ,aristotle is complete4 ,the eternal idea of metempsychosis had philosophic interest only as the inner ,notion permeating all these forms1 the oriental unity which appears in everything2 we have not got this signification here1 or at best we have but a glimmering of it4 ,if we say that the particular soul is1 as a definite thing1 to wander about throughout all1 we find firstly1 that the soul is not a thing such as ,leibnitz' ,monad1 which1 like a bubble in the cup of coffee1 is possibly a sentient1 thinking soul2 in the second place an empty identity of the soul-thing such as this has no interest in relation to immortality4 #c4 ,practical ,philosophy4 ,as regards the practical philosophy of ,pythagoras1 which is closely connected with what has gone before1 there is but little that is philosophic known to us4 ,aristotle 7,magn4 ,moral4 ,i4 #a7 says of him that 8he first sought to speak of virtue1 but not in the right way1 for1 because he deduced the virtues from numbers1 he could not form of them any proper theory40 ,the ,pythagoreans adopted ten virtues as well as ten heavenly spheres4 ,justice1 amongst others1 is described as the number which is like itself in like manner 7 72 it is an even number1 which remains even when multiplied with itself4 ,justice is pre-eminently what remains like itself2 but this is an altogether abstract determination1 which applies to much that is1 and which does not exhaust the concrete1 thus remaining quite indeterminate4 ,under the name of the 8,golden words10 we have a collection of hexameters which are a succession of moral reflections1 but which are rightly ascribed to later ,pythagoreans4 ,they are old1 well-known1 moral maxims1 which are expressed in a simple and dignified way1 but which do not contain anything remarkable4 ,they begin with the direction 8to honour the immortal gods as they are by law established10 and further1 8,honour the oath and then the illustrious heroes20 elsewhere they go on to direct 8honour to be paid to parents and to relatives10 c4#dg ,such matter does not deserve to be regarded as philosophy1 although it is of importance in the process of development4 ,the transition from the form of outward morals to morality as existent1 is more important4 ,as in ,thales' time1 law-givers and administrators of states were preeminent in possessing a physical philosophy1 so we see that with ,pythagoras practical philosophy is advocated as the means of constituting a moral life4 ,there we have the speculative ,idea1 the absolute essence1 in its reality1 and in a definite1 sensuous existence2 and similarly the moral life is submerged in actuality as the universal spirit of a people1 and as their laws and rule4 ,in ,pythagoras1 on the contrary1 we have the reality of absolute essence raised1 in speculation1 out of sensuous reality1 and expressed1 though still imperfectly1 as the essence of thought4 ,morality is likewise partly raised out of actuality as ordinarily known2 it is certainly a moral disposition of all actuality1 but as a brotherhood1 and not as the life of a people4 ,the ,pythagorean ,league is an arbitrary existence and not a part of the constitution recognized by public sanction2 and in his person ,pythagoras isolated himself as teacher1 as he also did his followers4 ,the universal consciousness1 the spirit of a people1 is the substance of which the accident is the individual consciousness2 the speculative is thus the fact that pure1 universal law is absolute1 individual consciousness1 so that this last1 because it draws therefrom its growth and nourishment1 becomes universal self-consciousness4 ,these two sides do not1 however1 come to us in the form of the opposition2 it is first of all in morality that there is properly this ,notion of the absolute individuality of consciousness which does everything on its own account4 ,but we see that it was really present to the mind of ,pythagoras that the substance of morality is the universal1 from an example in ,diogenes ,laertius 7,,viii4 #af74 8,a ,pythagorean answered to the question of a father who inquired as to the best education he could give his son1 that it should be that which would make him the citizen of a well-regulated ,state40 ,this answer is great and true2 to the great principle of living in the spirit of one's people1 all other circumstances are subordinate4 ,nowadays men try to keep education free from the spirit of the times1 but they cannot withdraw themselves from this supreme power1 the ,state1 for even if they try to separate themselves1 they unconsciously remain beneath this universal4 ,the speculative meaning of the practical philosophy of ,pythagoras thus is1 that in this signification1 the individual consciousness shall obtain a moral reality in the brotherhood4 ,but as number is a middle thing between the sensuous and ,notion1 the ,pythagorean brotherhood is a middle between universal1 actual morality and maintaining that in true morality the individual1 as an individual1 is responsible for his own behaviour2 this morality ceases to be universal spirit4 ,if we wish to see practical philosophy reappear1 we shall find it2 but1 on the whole1 we shall not see it become really speculative until very recent times4 ,we may satisfy ourselves with this as giving us an idea of the ,pythagorean system4 ,i will1 however1 shortly give the principal points of the criticism which ,aristotle 7,met4 ,i4 #h7 makes upon the ,pythagorean number-form4 ,he says justly1 in the first place3 8,if only the limited and the unlimited1 the even and odd are made fundamental ideas1 the ,pythagoreans do not explain how movement arises1 and how1 without movement and change there can be coming into being and passing away1 or the conditions and activities of heavenly objects40 ,this defect is significant2 arithmetical numbers are dry forms and barren principles in which life and movement are deficient4 ,aristotle says secondly1 8,from number no other corporeal determinations1 such as weight and lightness1 are conceivable20 or number thus cannot pass into what is concrete4 8,they say that there is no number outside of those in the heavenly spheres40 ,for instance1 a heavenly sphere and a virtue1 or a natural manifestation in the earth1 are determined as one and the same number4 ,each of the first numbers may be exhibited in each thing or quality2 but in so far as number is made to express a further determination1 this quite abstract1 quantitative difference becomes altogether formal2 it is as if the plant were five because it has five stamens4 ,this is just as superficial as are determination through elements or through particular portions of the globe2 it is a method as formal as that by which men now try to apply the categories of electricity1 magnetism1 galvanism1 compression and expansion1 of manly and of womanly1 to everything4 ,it is a purely empty system of determination where reality should be dealt with4 ,to ,pythagoras and his disciples there are1 moreover1 many scientific conclusions and discoveries ascribed1 which1 however1 do not concern us at all4 ,thus1 according to ,diogenes ,laertius 7,,viii4 #ad1 #bg71 he is said to have known that the morning and evening star is the same1 and that the moon derives her light from the sun4 ,we have already mentioned what he says of music4 ,but what is best known is the ,pythagorean ,theorem2 it really is the main proposition in geometry1 and cannot be regarded like any other theorem4 ,according to ,diogenes1 7,,viii4 #ab71 ,pythagoras1 on discovering the theorem1 sacrificed a hecatomb1 so important did he think it2 and it may indeed seem remarkable that his joy should have gone so far as to ordain a great feast to which rich men and all the people were invited4 ,it was worth the trouble2 it was a rejoicing1 a feast of spiritual cognition--at the cost of the oxen4 ,other ideas which are brought forward by the ,pythagoreans casually and without any connection1 have no philosophic interest1 and need only be mentioned4 ,aristotle1 for instance1 says 7,phys4 ,,iv4 #f7 that 8the ,pythagoreans believed in an empty space which the heavens inspire1 and an empty space which separates natural things and brings about the distinction between continuous and discrete2 it first exists in numbers and makes them to be different40 ,diogenes ,laertius 7,,viii4 #bf-bh7 says much more1 all of which is dull2 this is like the later writers1 who1 generally speaking1 take up what is external and devoid of any intellectual meaning4 8,the air which encircles the earth is immovable0 71 at least through itself7 8and diseased1 and all that is in it is mortal2 but what is highest is in continual movement1 pure and healthy1 and in it everything is immortal--divine4 ,sun1 moon and the other stars are gods1 for in them warmth has predominance and is the cause of life4 ,man is related to the gods because he participates in warmth1 and hence ,god cares for us4 ,a ray penetrates from the sun through the thick and cold ether and gives life to everything2 they call air1 cold ether1 the sea and moisture1 thick ether4 ,the soul is a detached portion of ether40 ,c4 ,,the ,,eleatic ,,school4 ,the ,pythagorean philosophy has not yet got the speculative form of expression for the ,notion4 ,numbers are not pure ,notion1 but ,notion in the form of ordinary idea or sensuous perception1 and hence a mixture of both4 ,this expression of absolute essence in what is a pure ,notion or something thought1 and the movement of the ,notion or of ,thought1 is that which we find must come next1 and this we discover in the ,eleatic school4 ,in it we see thought becoming free for itself2 and in that which the ,eleatics express as absolute essence1 we see ,thought grasp itself in purity1 and the movement of ,thought in ,notions4 ,in the physical philosophy we saw movement represented as an objective movement1 as an origination and passing away4 ,the ,pythagoreans similarly did not reflect upon these ,notions1 and also treated their essence1 ,number1 as fleeting4 ,but since alteration is now grasped in its highest abstraction as ,nothing1 this objective movement changes into a subjective one1 comes over to the side of consciousness1 and existence becomes the unmoved4 ,we here find the beginning of dialectic1 i4e4 simply the pure movement of thought in ,notions2 likewise we see the opposition of thought to outward appearance or sensuous ,being1 or of that which is implicit to the being-for-another of this implicitness1 and in the objective existence we see the contradiction which it has in itself1 or dialectic proper4 ,when we reflect in anticipation on how the course of pure thought must be formed1 we find 77 that pure thought 7pure ,being1 the ,one7 manifests itself immediately in its rigid isolation and self-identity1 and everything else as null2 77 that the hitherto timid thought--which after it is strengthened1 ascribes value to the 8other0 and constitutes itself therefrom--shows that it then grasps the other in its simplicity and even in so doing shows its nullity2 77 finally1 ,thought manifests the other in the manifold nature of its determinations4 ,we shall see this in the development and culture of the ,eleatics in history4 ,these ,eleatic propositions still have interest for ,philosophy1 and are moments which must necessarily there appear4 ,xenophanes1 ,parmenides1 ,melissus and ,zeno are to be reckoned as belonging to this school4 ,xenophanes may be regarded as the founder of it2 ,parmenides is supposed to have been his pupil1 and ,melissus1 and especially ,zeno1 are called the pupils of ,parmenides4 ,in fact1 they are to be taken together as forming the ,eleatic school2 later on it lost the name1 being then called ,sophistic1 and its locality was transferred to ,greece proper4 ,what ,xenophanes began1 ,parmenides and ,melissus developed further1 and similarly ,zeno perfected what these two taught4 ,aristotle 7,metaph4 ,i4 #e7 characterizes the first three thus3 8,parmenides seems to comprehend the one as ,notion 7 71 ,melissus as matter 7 72 hence the former says that it is limited 77 and the latter that it is unlimited 774 ,but ,xenophanes1 who was the first of them to express the theory of the ,one1 made the matter no plainer 771 nor did he deal with either of these aspects 771 but looking into the heavens0--as we say1 into the blue--8said1 ,god is the ,one4 ,xenophanes and ,melissus are on the whole less civilized 7 72 ,parmenides1 however1 is more acute 7 740 ,there is less to say of ,xenophanes and ,melissus1 and what has come to us from the latter in particular--in fragments and derived from the sayings of others--is still in a state of ferment1 and in his case there is least knowledge obtainable4 ,on the whole1 philosophic utterances and ,notions are still poor1 and it was in ,zeno that ,philosophy first attained to a purer expression of itself4 #a4 ,,xenophanes4 ,the period at which he lived is clear enough1 and as this suffices1 it is a matter of indifference that the year of his birth and of his death is unknown4 ,according to ,diogenes ,laertius 7,,ix4 #ah71 he was contemporary with ,anaximander and ,pythagoras4 ,of his circumstances further than this1 it is only known that he1 for reasons which are unknown1 escaped from his native town1 ,colophon1 in ,asia ,minor1 to ,magna ,grcia1 and resided for the most part at ,zancle1 7now ,messina7 and ,catana 7still called ,catania7 in ,sicily4 ,i find it nowhere said by the ancients that he lived at ,elea1 although all recent writers on the history of ,philosophy repeat it1 one after the other4 ,tennemann1 in particular1 says 7,vol4 ,i4 pp4 #aea and #dad71 that about the #fast ,olympiad 7#ecf ,b4,c471 he repaired from ,colophon to ,elea4 ,diogenes ,laertius 7,,ix4 #bj71 however1 only says that he flourished about the #fjth ,olympiad and that he made two thousand verses on the colonization of ,elea1 from which it might be easily concluded that he was also born at ,elea4 ,strabo says this in the beginning of his sixth book--when describing ,elea--of ,parmenides and ,zeno only1 and these he called ,pythagoreans2 hence1 according to ,cicero 7,acad4 ,qust4 ,,iv4 #db7 the ,eleatic school took its name from these two4 ,xenophanes was nearly a hundred years old1 and lived to see the ,median wars3 it is said that he became so poor that he had not the means of having his children buried1 and was obliged to do so with his own hands4 ,some say that he had no teacher2 others name ,archelaus1 which is a chronological error4 ,he wrote a book 8,on ,nature10 the general subject and title of ,philosophy at that time2 some verses have been preserved to us which so far show no powers of reasoning4 ,professor ,brandis of ,bonn collected them together1 with the fragments of ,parmenides and ,melissus1 under the title 8,commentationum ,eleaticarum1 ,p4 #a10 ,alton1 #ahac4 ,the older philosophers wrote in verse1 for prose comes much later on2 on account of the awkward and confused mode of expression in ,xenophanes' poems1 ,cicero calls them 7,acad4 ,qust4 ,,iv4 #bc73 minus boni versus4 ,as to his philosophy1 ,xenophanes in the first place maintained absolute existence to be the one1 and likewise called this ,god4 8,the all is ,one and ,god is implanted in all things2 ,he is unchangeable1 without beginning1 middle or end40#dh ,in some verses by ,xenophanes found in ,clemens of ,alexandria 7,strom4 ,v4 #ad1 p4 #gad1 ed4 ,potter71 it is said3 8,one ,god is greatest amongst gods and men4 ,neither like unto mortals in spirit or in form20 and in ,sextus ,empiricus 7adv4 ,math4 ,,ix4 #add73 8,he sees everywhere1 thinks everywhere1 and hears everywhere10 to which words ,diogenes ,laertius 7,,ix1 #ai7 adds3 8,thought and reason are everything and eternal40 ,by this ,xenophanes denied the truth of the conceptions of origination and of passing away1 of change1 movement1 c41 seeing that they merely belong to sensuous perception4 8,he found10 says ,tennemann 7,vol4 ,i4 p4 #aef7 8all origination to be inconceivable30 the ,one as the immediate product of pure thought1 is1 in its immediacy1 ,being4 ,for us the determination of ,being is already known and trivial1 but if we know about ,being1 the ,one1 we place this1 as a particular determination1 in a line with all the rest4 ,here1 on the contrary1 it signifies that all else has no reality and is only a semblance4 ,we must forget our own ideas2 we know of ,god as ,spirit4 ,but1 because the ,greeks only had before them the sensuous world1 these gods of their imagination1 and found in them no satisfaction1 they rejected all as being untrue1 and thus came to pure thought4 ,this is a wonderful advance1 and thought thus becomes for the first time free for itself in the ,eleatic school4 ,being1 the ,one of the ,eleatic school1 is just this immersion in the abyss of the abstract identity of the understanding4 ,just as this comes first1 so it also comes last1 as that to which the understanding comes back1 and this is proved in recent times when ,god is grasped only as the highest ,being4 ,if we say of ,god that this the highest ,being is outside of and over us1 we can know nothing more of it but that it is1 and thus it is the undetermined2 for if we knew of determinations1 this would be to possess knowledge4 ,the truth then simply is that ,god is the ,one1 not in the sense that there is one ,god 7this is another determination71 but only that ,he is identical with ,himself2 in this there is no other determination1 any more than in the utterance of the ,eleatic school4 ,modern thought has1 indeed1 passed through a longer path1 not only through what is sensuous1 but also through philosophic ideas and predicates of ,god1 to this all negating abstraction2 but the content1 the result arrived at is the same4 ,with this the dialectic reasoning of the ,eleatics is closely connected in respect that they have also proved that nothing can originate or pass away4 ,this deduction is to be found in ,aristotle's work1 ,de ,xenophane1 ,zenone et ,gorgia1 c4 #c4 8,it is impossible1 he says1#di that if anything is1 it arises 7and he even applies this to the ,godhead72 for it must arise either from the like or from the unlike4 ,but both are equally impossible3 for it is no more probable that the like should be engendered from the like1 than that it should engender it1 for the like must have determinations identical with one another40 ,in acknowledging similarity1 the distinction between begetting and begotten falls away4 8,just as little can unlike arise from unlike1 for if from the weaker the stronger takes its rise2 or from the smaller1 the greater2 or from the worse1 the better3 or if1 conversely1 the worse proceeds from the better1 non-being would result from ,being3 this is impossible1 and thus ,god is eternal40 ,the same thing has been expressed as ,pantheism or ,spinozaism1 which rests on the proposition ex nihilo fit nihil4 ,the unity of ,god is further proved by ,xenophanes3 8,if ,god is the mightiest1 ,he must be ,one2 for were ,he two or more1 ,he would not have dominion over the others1 but1 not having dominion over the others1 ,he could not be ,god4 ,thus were there several1 they would be relatively more powerful or weaker1 and thus they would not be gods1 for ,god's nature is to have nothing mightier than ,he4 ,were they equal1 ,god would no longer possess the quality of being the mightiest1 for the like is neither worse nor better than the like0--or it does not differ therefrom4 8,hence if ,god is1 and is such as this1 ,he is only one2 ,he could not1 were there several1 do what ,he willed4 ,since ,he is one1 ,he is everywhere alike4 ,he hears1 sees and has also the other senses everywhere1 for were this not the case1 the parts of ,god would be one more powerful than the other1 which is impossible4 ,since ,god is everywhere alike1 ,he has a spherical form1 for ,he is not here thus and elsewhere different1 but is everywhere the same4 ,since ,he is eternal and one and spherical in form1 ,he is neither unlimited nor limited4 ,to be unlimited is non-being2 for that has neither middle1 beginning1 end1 nor part2 and what is unlimited corresponds to this description4 ,but whatever non-being is1 ,being is not4 ,mutual limitation would take place if there were several1 but since there is only ,one1 it is not limited4 ,the one does not move itself1 nor is it unmoved2 to be unmoved is non-being1 for to it none other comes1 nor does it go into another2 but to be moved must mean to be several1 for one must move into another4 ,thus the ,one neither rests nor is it moved1 for it is neither non-being nor is it many4 ,in all this ,god is thus indicated2 ,he is eternal and ,one1 like ,himself and spherical1 neither unlimited nor limited1 neither at rest nor moved40 ,from this result1 that nothing can arise from the like or from the unlike1 ,aristotle 7,de ,xenophane1 ,zenone et ,gorgia c4 #d7 draws this conclusion3 8that either there is nothing excepting ,god1 or all else is eternal40 ,we here see a dialectic which may be called metaphysical reasoning1 in which the principle of identity is fundamental4 8,the nothing is like nothing and does not pass into ,being or conversely2 thus nothing can originate from like40 ,this1 the oldest mode of argument1 holds its place even to the present day1 as1 for example1 in the so-called proof of the unity of ,god4 ,this proceeding consists of making presuppositions such as the power of ,god1 and from them drawing conclusions and denying the existence of predicates2 that is the usual course in our mode of reasoning4 ,in respect of determinations1 it must be remarked that they1 as being negative1 are all kept apart from the positive and merely real being4 ,we reach this abstraction by a more ordinary way1 and do not require a dialectic such as that of the ,eleatic school3 we say ,god is unchangeable1 change concerns finite things alone 7which we represent as an empirical proposition72 on the one hand we thus have finite things and change1 and on the other1 unchangeableness in this abstract absolute unity with itself4 ,it is the same separation1 only that we also allow the finite to be ,being1 which the ,eleatics deny4 ,or else we too proceed from finite things to kinds and genera1 leaving the negative out bit by bit2 and the highest order of all is ,god1 who1 as the highest ,being1 is affirmative only1 but devoid of any determination4 ,or we pass from what is finite to the infinite1 for we say that the finite as limited must have its basis in the infinite4 ,in all these different forms which are quite familiar to us1 there is the same difficult question which exists in reference to the ,eleatic thought4 ,whence comes determination and how is it to be grasped--how is it in the one1 leaving the finite aside1 and also how does the infinite pass out into the finite8 ,the ,eleatics in their reflections were distinguished from this our ordinary reflecting thought1 in that they went speculatively to work 7the speculative element being that change does not exist at all7 and that they thus showed that1 as ,being was presupposed1 change in itself is contradictory and inconceivable4 ,for from the one1 from ,being1 the determination of the negative1 of the manifold1 is withdrawn4 ,thus while we1 in our conception1 allow the actuality of the finite world1 the ,eleatics are more consistent1 in that they proceeded to say that only the ,one exists and that the negative does not exist at all2--a consequence which1 if it necessarily arouses in us surprise1 still none the less remains a great abstraction4 ,sceptics saw in this the point of view of the uncertainty of all things1 and ,sextus several times#ej quotes verses such as these3-- 8,no man at any time knew clearly and truly2 nor will he ever know ,what of the gods ,i say1 as also of the universe4 ,for what he thinks to speak most perfectly ,he knows that not at all2 his own opinions cleave to all40 ,sextus1 generalizing1 explains this in the first passage thus3 8,let us imagine that in a house in which are many valuables1 there were those who sought for gold by night2 in such a case everyone would think that he had found the gold1 but would not know certainly whether he actually had found it4 ,thus philosophers come into this world as into a great house to seek the truth1 but were they to reach it1 they could not tell whether they really had attained to it40 ,the indefinite expressions of ,xenophanes might also merely mean that none knows that which he 7,xenophanes7 here makes known4 ,in the second passage ,sextus puts it thus3 8,xenophanes does not make all knowledge void1 but only the scientific and infallible2 opinionative knowledge is1 however1 left4 ,he expresses this in saying that opinion cleaves to all4 ,so that with him the criterion is made to be opinion1 i4e4 the apparent1 and not that which is firm and sure2 ,parmenides1 on the contrary1 condemns opinion40 ,but from his doctrine of the ,one1 there follows the annihilation of ordinary ideas1 which is what he did in the foregoing dialectic2 it is evident1 however1 that nobody could know the truth which he hereby utters4 ,if a thought such as this passed through one's head1 one could not tell that it was true1 and in such a case it would only be an opinion4 ,we here find in ,xenophanes a double consciousness2 a pure consciousness and consciousness of ,being1 and a consciousness of opinion4 ,the former was to him the consciousness of the divine1 and it is the pure dialectic1 which is negatively related to all that is determined and which annuls it4 ,the manner in which he expresses himself towards the sensuous world and finite thought-determinations is seen most clearly in his allusions to the ,greek mythological conceptions of the gods4 ,he says1 amongst other things1 according to ,brandis 7,comment4 ,eleat4 ,p4 ,i4 p4 #fh73-- 8,did beasts and lions only have hands1 ,works of art thereby to bring forth1 as do men1 ,they would1 in creating divine forms1 give to them ,what in image and size belongs to themselves40 ,he also animadverts on the ideas of the gods held by ,homer and ,hesiod in verses which ,sextus 7adv4 ,math4 ,,ix4 #aic7 has preserved to us3-- 8,hesiod and ,homer have attached to the gods ,all that which brings shame and censure to men2 ,stealing1 adultery1 and mutual deceit40 ,as1 on the one hand1 he defined absolute ,being to be simple1 making that which is1 however1 break through and be immediately present in it1 on the other hand he philosophizes on appearances2 in reference to this certain fragments only are transmitted to us1 and such physical opinions as these can have no great interest4 ,they are meant to have no speculative significance any more than are those of our own physicists4 ,when he says in this connection 8,out of the earth comes all1 and returns to it again1 ,we all have come from earth and water alike1 ,thus all that grows and takes its rise is only earth and water10#ea this does not signify existence1 physical principles1 as did the water of ,thales4 ,for ,aristotle expressly says1 that no one regarded the earth as the absolute principle4 #b4 ,,parminides4 ,parmenides is a striking figure in the ,eleatic school1 and he arrives at more definite conceptions than does ,xenophanes4 ,he was1 according to ,diogenes 7,,ix4 #ba71 born at ,elea of a rich and honourable race4 ,of his life1 however1 little is known2 ,aristotle only says 7,met4 ,i4 #e7 from tradition that he was a scholar of ,xenophanes4 ,sextus ,empiricus 7adv4 ,math4 ,,vii4 #aaa7 calls him a friend 77 of ,xenophanes4 ,diogenes ,laertius further states3 8,he heard ,anaximander and ,xenophanes also1 but did not follow the latter0 7which seems only to refer to his place of abode71 8but he lived with ,aminias and ,diochartes the ,pythagorean1 attached himself to the latter1 and by the former1 and not by ,xenophanes1 was prevailed upon to lead a quiet life40 ,that the period in which his life falls comes between ,xenophanes and ,zeno--so that he is contemporaneous with them1 though younger than the former and older than the latter--is ascertained4 ,according to ,diogenes 7,,ix4 #bc7 he flourished about the #fith ,olympiad 7#ejd-eja ,b4,c474 ,what is most important is his journey to ,athens with ,zeno1 where ,plato makes them talk with ,socrates4 ,this may be accepted generally1 but what is strictly historical in it cannot be ascertained4 ,in the ,thtetus ,plato makes ,socrates reply to the invitation to examine the ,eleatic system3 8,for ,melissus and the others who assert the ,all to be ,one at rest1 ,i have a certain respect2 ,i have even more for ,parmenides4 ,for1 to speak in ,homeric language1 he seems to me both venerable and strong4 ,i knew him when he was an old man and ,i was still quite young1 and ,i heard wonderful things from him40#eb ,and in the ,platonic ,dialogue ,parmenides 7p4 #abg4 ,steph4 p4 #d4 ,bekk47 where1 as is well known1 the conversation is carried on by ,parmenides and ,socrates1 the historic circumstances of this interview are related in detail4 8,parmenides was very old1 had hair which was quite grey1 was beautiful in countenance1 about sixty-five years old1 and ,zeno almost forty40 ,tennemann 7,vol4 ,i4 p4 #dae7 places the journey in the #hjth ,olympiad 7#dfj-deg ,b4,c474 ,thus ,socrates1 since he was born in ,olympiad #gg1 #d 7#dfi ,b4,c471 would seem to have been still too young to have carried on a dialogue such as ,plato describes1 and the principal matter of this dialogue1 which is written in the spirit of the ,eleatic school1 belongs to ,plato himself4 ,besides1 we know from ,parmenides' life1 that he stood in high respect with his fellow-citizens at ,elea1 whose prosperity must be chiefly ascribed to the laws which ,parmenides gave them4#ec ,we also find in the of ,cebes 7towards the beginning7 8a ,parmenidian life0 used synonymously with a moral life4 ,it must be remarked that here1 where the ,eleatic school is definitely treated of1 ,plato does not speak of ,xenophanes at all1 but only of ,melissus and ,parmenides4 ,the fact that ,plato1 in one of his dialogues1 likewise accords the chief part to ,parmenides1 and puts in his mouth the most lofty dialectic that ever was given1 does not concern us here4 ,if with ,xenophanes1 by the proposition that out of nothing nothing comes1 origination and what depends upon or can be traced back to it is denied1 the opposition between ,being and non-being makes its appearance still more clearly with ,parmenides1 though still unconsciously4 ,sextus ,empiricus and ,simplicius have preserved to us the most important fragments from the poems of ,parmenides2 for ,parmenides also propounded his philosophy as a poem4 ,the first long fragment in ,sextus 7adv4 ,math4 ,,vii4 #aaa7 is an allegorical preface to his poem on ,nature4 ,this preface is majestic2 it is written after the manner of the times1 and in it all there is an energetic1 impetuous soul which strives with ,being to grasp and to express it4 ,we can show ,parmenides' philosophy best in his own words4 ,the introduction runs thus3-- 8,horses that bore me1 impelled by their courage1 ,brought me to the much-famed streets of the goddess ,who leads the wise man to every kind of knowledge4 ,maidens point out the way4 ,the axle sings hot as the daughters of ,helios quickly approach1 ,leaving the dwelling of night1 pressing on to the light1 ,with mighty hands raising the sheltering veil40 ,the maidens are1 according to ,sextus 7adv4 ,math4 ,,vii4 #aab1 #aac71 the senses1 and ,helios' daughters are more especially the eyes3-- 8,these are the gates of the pathways of night and of day4 ,now the heavenly maidens approach the great doors1 ,whose lock double-turned the punishing ,dice protects4 ,to this one soft words were by the maidens addressed ,subtly persuading her the barriers of oak from the gates1 ,now to withdraw4 ,yet these1 ,directly the yawning breadth of the doors was revealed1 ,drove the horses and waggon1 on through the gate4 ,the goddess received me in friendship1 seized with her one hand my right1 ,and turning towards me1 she said3 #8,oh1 thou1 who with guides all immortal and horses1 ,camest here in my palace1--be welcome1 young man4 ,for no evil fate has led thee into this path1 7,indeed it lies far from the ways of a man7 ,but ,themis and ,dice4 ,now shalt thou all things explore1 ,the heart never-flinching of the truth that persuades1 ,the transient opinions which are not to be trusted4 ,but from such paths keep the inquiring soul far away4 ,on this way let not the much followed custom ,cause thee to take the rash eye as thy guide1 ,or the confused sounding ear and the tongue4 ,ponder considerately ,with thy reason alone1 the doctrine much and often examined1 ,which ,i will proclaim4 ,for there lacks but desire on your way4'0 ,the goddess develops everything from the double knowledge 77 of thought1 of the truth1 and 77 of opinion2 these make up the two parts of the poem4 ,in another fragment taken from ,simplicius' ,commentary on ,aristotle's ,physics 7p4 #be2 #ai a7 and from ,proclus on the ,timus 7p4 #bi b71 we have the principal part of what is here related preserved to us4 8,understand10 says the goddess1 8which are the two roads of knowledge4 ,the one which is only ,being1 and which is not non-being1 is the path of conviction1 the truth is in it4 ,the other that is not ,being1 and which is necessarily non-being1 is1 ,i must tell you1 a path quite devoid of reason1 for thou canst neither know1 or attain to1 or express1 non-being40 ,the nothing1 in fact1 turns into something1 since it is thought or is said3 we say something1 think something1 if we wish to think and say the nothing4 8,it is necessary that saying and thinking should be ,being2 for ,being is1 but nothing is not at all40 ,there the matter is stated in brief2 and in this nothing1 falls negation generally1 or in more concrete form1 limitation1 the finite1 restriction3 determinatio est negatio is ,spinoza's great saying4 ,parmenides says1 whatever form the negation may take1 it does not exist at all4 ,to consider the nothing as the true is 8the way of error in which the ignorant and double-minded mortals wander4 ,perplexity of mind sways the erring sense4 ,those who believe ,being and non-being to be the same1 and then again not the same1 are like deaf and blind men surprised1 like hordes confusedly driven40 ,the error is to confuse them and to ascribe the same value to each1 or to distinguish them as if non-being were the limited generally4 8,whichever way is taken1 it leads back to the point from which it started40 ,it is a constantly self-contradictory and disintegrating movement4 ,to human ideas1 now this is held to be reality and now its opposite1 and then again a mixture of both4 ,simplicius quotes further1 in writing on ,aristotle's ,physics 7p4 #ag a2 #ca1 #ai73 8,but the truth is only the #8is'2 this is neither begotten of anything else1 nor transient1 entire1 alone in its class 771 unmoved and without end2 it neither was1 nor will be1 but is at once the all4 ,for what birth wouldst thou seek for it8 ,how and whence should it be augmented8 ,that it should be from that which is not1 ,i shall allow thee neither to say nor to think1 for neither can it be said or thought that the #8is' is not4 ,what necessity had either later or earlier made it begin from the nothing8 ,thus must it throughout only be or not be2 nor will any force of conviction ever make something else arise out of that which is not4 ,thus origination has disappeared1 and decease is incredible4 ,being is not separable1 for it is entirely like itself2 it is nowhere more1 else would it not hold together1 nor is it less1 for everything is full of ,being4 ,the all is one coherent whole1 for ,being flows into unison with ,being3 it is unchangeable and rests securely in itself2 the force of necessity holds it within the bounds of limitation4 ,it cannot hence be said that it is imperfect2 for it is without defect1 while non-existence is wanting in all40 ,this ,being is not the undetermined 77 for it is kept within the limits of necessity2 we similarly find in ,aristotle that limitation is ascribed to ,parmenides4 ,the sense in which the expression 8limit0 is to be taken is uncertain4 ,according to ,parmenides1 however1 this absolute limitation is as 1 absolute necessity clearly determined in itself2 and it is an important fact that he went beyond the uncultured conception of the infinite4 8,thought1 and that on account of which thought is1 are the same4 ,for not without that which is1 in which it expresses itself 7 71 wilt thou find ,thought1 seeing that it is nothing and will be nothing outside of that which is40 ,that is the main point4 ,thought produces itself1 and what is produced is a ,thought4 ,thought is thus identical with ,being1 for there is nothing beside ,being1 this great affirmation4 ,plotinus1 in quoting 7,v4 ,ennead4 ,i4 #h7 this last fragment says3 8,parmenides adopted this point of view1 inasmuch as he did not place ,being in sensuous things2 identifying ,being with ,thought1 he maintained it to be unchangeable40 ,the ,sophists concluded from this3 8,all is truth2 there is no error1 for error is the non-existent1 that which is not to be thought40 ,since in this an advance into the region of the ideal is observable1 ,parmenides began ,philosophy proper4 ,a man now constitutes himself free from all ideas and opinions1 denies their truth1 and says necessity alone1 ,being1 is the truth4 ,this beginning is certainly still dim and indefinite1 and we cannot say much of what it involves2 but to take up this position certainly is to develop ,philosophy proper1 which has not hitherto existed4 ,the dialectic that the transient has no truth1 is implied in it1 for if these determinations are taken as they are usually understood1 contradictions ensue4 ,in ,simplicius 7in ,arist4 ,phys4 p4 #bg b42 #ca b47 we have further metaphorical images from ,parmenides4 8,since the utmost limit of ,being is perfect1 it resembles on every side the form of a well rounded sphere1 which from its centre extends in all directions equally1 for it can be neither larger or smaller in one part or another4 ,there is no non-being which prevents it from attaining to the like0--from coming into unity with itself--8and there is no ,being where it was devoid of ,being1 here more and there less4 ,because the all is without defect1 it is in all places in the same way like itself in its determinations40 ,plotinus in the passage quoted says3 8,he compares ,being with the spherical form1 because it comprehends all in itself1 and ,thought is not outside of this1 but is contained in it40 ,and ,simplicius says3 8,we must not wonder at him1 for on account of the poetic form1 he adopts a mythological fiction 7740 ,it immediately strikes us that the sphere is limited1 and furthermore in space1 and hence another must be above it2 but then the ,notion of the sphere is the similarity of withholding the different1 notwithstanding that even the undifferentiated must be expressed2 hence this image is inconsistent4 ,parmenides adds to this doctrine of the truth1 the doctrine of human opinions1 the illusive system of the world4 ,simplicius1 writing on ,aristotle's ,physics 7p4 #g b2 #ci a71 tells us that he says3 8,men have two forms of opinion1 one of which should not be1 and in it they are mistaken2 they set them in opposition to one another in form and symbol4 ,the one1 the ethereal fire of the flame1 is quite fine1 identical with itself throughout1 but not identical with the other1 for that is also for itself2 on the other hand there is what belongs to night1 or thick and ponderous existence40 ,by the former1 warmth1 softness1 lightness is expressed1 and by the latter1 cold4 8,but since everything is called light and night1 and their qualities are suited both to the one kind of things and the other1 everything alike is filled with light and dark night2 both are alike since nothing exists without both40 ,aristotle 7,met4 ,i4 #c and #e71 and the other historians1 likewise unanimously attribute to ,parmenides the fact that he sets forth two principles for the system of manifest things1 warmth and cold1 through the union of which everything is4 ,light1 fire1 is the active and animate2 night1 cold1 is called the passive4 ,parmenides also speaks like a ,pythagorean--he was called by ,strabo--in the following1 and likewise mythological conception3 8,there are circlets wound round one another1 one of which is of the rare element and the other of the dense1 between which others are to be found1 composed of light and darkness mingled4 ,those which are less are of impure fire1 but those over them of night1 through which proceed the forces of the flames4 ,that which holds this all together1 however1 is something fixed1 like a wall1 under which there is a fiery wreath1 and the most central of the rare spheres again is fiery4 ,the most central of those mixed is the goddess that reigns over all1 the ,divider 771 ,dice and ,necessity4 ,for she is the principle of all earthly produce and intermingling1 which impels the male to mix with the female1 and conversely2 she took ,love to help her1 creating him first amongst the gods4 ,the air is an exhalation 77 of the earth2 the sun and the milky way1 the breath of fire2 and the moon is air and fire mingled1 c40#ed ,it still remains to us to explain the manner in which ,parmenides regarded sensation and thought1 which may undoubtedly at first sight seem to be materialistic4 ,theophrastus1#ee for example1 remarks in this regard3 8,parmenides said nothing more than that there are two elements4 ,knowledge is determined according to the preponderance of the one or of the other2 for1 according as warmth or cold predominate1 thought varies2 it becomes better and purer through warmth1 and yet it requires also a certain balance40 8,for as in each man there still is in his dispersive limbs an intermingling1 ,so is the understanding of man2 for that ,which is thought by men1 is the nature of the limbs1 ,both in one and all2 for thought is indeed the most40#ef ,he thus takes sensation and thought to be the same1 and makes remembrance and oblivion to arise from these through mingling them1 but whether in the intermingling they take an equal place1 whether this is thought or not1 and what condition this is1 he leaves quite undetermined4 ,but that he ascribes sensation to the opposites in and for themselves is clear1 because he says3 8,the dead do not feel light or warmth or hear voices1 because the fire is out of them2 they feel cold1 stillness and the opposite1 however1 and1 speaking generally1 each existence has a certain knowledge40 ,in fact1 this view of ,parmenides is really the opposite of materialism1 for materialism consists in putting together the soul from parts1 or independent forces 7the wooden horse of the senses74 #c4 ,,melissus4 ,there is little to tell about the life of ,melissus4 ,diogenes ,laertius 7,,ix4 #bd7 calls him a disciple of ,parmenides1 but the discipleship is uncertain2 it is also said of him that he associated with ,heraclitus4 ,he was born in ,samos1 like ,pythagoras1 and was besides a distinguished statesman amongst his people4 ,it is said by ,plutarch 7in ,pericle1 #bf7 that1 as admiral of the ,samians1 he gained in battle a victory over the ,athenians4 ,he flourished about the #hdth ,olympiad 7#ddd ,b4,c474 ,in regard to his philosophy1 too1 there is little to say4 ,aristotle1 where he mentions him1 places him always with ,parmenides1 as resembling him in mode of thought4 ,simplicius1 writing on ,aristotle's ,physics 7p4 #g sqq471 has preserved several fragments of his prose writings on ,nature1 which show the same kind of thoughts and arguments as we find in ,parmenides1 but1 in part1 somewhat more developed4 ,it was a question whether the reasoning in which it is shown that change does not exist1 or contradicts itself1 which1 by ,aristotle in his incomplete1 and1 in some parts1 most corrupt work on ,xenophanes1 ,zeno1 and ,gorgias 7c4 #b471 was ascribed to ,xenophanes1 did not really belong to ,melissus4#eg ,since the beginning1 in which we are told whose reasoning it is1 is wanting1 conjecture only applies it to ,xenophanes4 ,the writing begins with the words 8,he says10 without any name being given4 ,it thus depends on the superscription alone whether ,aristotle speaks of the philosophy of ,xenophanes or not1 and it must be noticed that different hands have put different superscriptions4 ,indeed1 there is in this work 7c4 #b7 an opinion of ,xenophanes mentioned in such a way that it appears as though had what was previously quoted by ,aristotle been by him ascribed to ,xenophanes1 the expression would have been different4 ,it is possible that ,zeno is meant1 as the internal evidence abundantly shows4 ,there is in it a dialectic more developed in form1 more real reflexion1 than from the verses could be expected1 not from ,xenophanes alone1 but even from ,parmenides4 ,for ,aristotle expressly says that ,xenophanes does not yet determine with precision2 thus the cultured reasoning contained in ,aristotle must certainly be denied to ,xenophanes2 at least1 it is so far certain that ,xenophanes himself did not know how to express his thoughts in a manner so orderly and precise as that found here4 ,we find it said3-- 8,if anything is1 it is eternal 7740 ,eternity is an awkward word1 for it immediately makes us think of time and mingle past and future as an infinite length of time2 but what is meant is that is the self-identical1 supersensuous1 unchangeable1 pure present1 which is without any time-conception4 ,it is1 origination and change are shut out2 if it commences1 it does so out of nothing or out of ,being4 8,it is impossible that anything should arise from the nothing4 ,if everything could have arisen1 or could it merely not have been everything eternally1 it would equally have arisen out of nothing4 ,for1 if everything had arisen1 nothing would once have existed4 ,if some were alone the existent out of which the rest sprang1 the one would be more and greater4 ,but the more and greater would thus have arisen out of the nothing of itself1 for in the less there is not its more1 nor in the smaller its greater40 ,simplicius makes this note to the ,physics of ,aristotle 7p4 #bb b73 8,no more can anything arise out of the existent1 for the existent already is1 and thus does not first arise from the existent40 8,as eternal1 the existent also is unlimited1 since it has no beginning from which it came1 nor end in which it ceases4 ,the infinite all is one1 for1 if there were two or more1 they would limit one another10 and thus have a beginning and end4 ,the one would be the nothing of the other and come forth from this nothing4 8,this one is like itself2 for if it were unlike it would no longer be the one that was posited1 but many4 ,this one is likewise immovable1 inasmuch as it does not move itself1 since it does not pass out into anything4 ,in passing out1 it would require to do so into what is full or what is empty2 it could not be into the full1 for that is an impossibility1 and just as little could it be into what is empty1 for that is the nothing4 ,the one1 therefore1 is in this way devoid of pain or suffering1 not changing in position or form1 or mingling with what is different4 ,for all these determinations involve the origination of non-being and passing away of ,being1 which is impossible40 ,thus here again the contradiction which takes place when origination and passing away are spoken of1 is revealed4 ,now ,melissus places opinion in opposition to this truth4 ,the change and multiplicity extinguished in ,being appears on the other side1 in consciousness1 as in what is opinionative2 it is necessary to say this if only the negative side1 the removal of these moments1 the ,absolute as destitute of predicate1 is laid hold of4 8,in sensuous perception the opposite is present for us2 that is to say1 a number of things1 their change1 their origination and passing away1 and their intermingling4 ,thus that first knowledge must take its place beside this second1 which has as much certainty for ordinary consciousness as the first40 ,melissus does not seem to have decided for the one or the other1 but1 oscillating between both1 to have limited the knowledge of the truth to the statement that1 speaking generally1 between two opposite modes of presentation1 the more probable opinion is to be preferred1 but that what is so preferred is only to be regarded as the stronger opinion1 and not as truth4 ,this is what ,aristotle says of him4 ,since ,aristotle1 in distinguishing his philosophy from the philosophy of ,parmenides1 maintains that in the first place ,parmenides seems to understand the ,one as the principle of thought1 and ,melissus as matter1 we must remark that this distinction falls away in pure existence1 ,being1 or the ,one4 ,pure matter1 as also pure thought 7if ,i am to speak of such a distinction71 are not present to ,parmenides and ,melissus1 since they are abrogated2 and it must only be in the manner of his expression that one of them--according to ,aristotle 7,phys4 ,i4 #b71 on account of his clumsier mode of treatment 7 7--could seem to have conceived of the other sense4 ,if the difference consisted secondly in the fact that ,parmenides regarded the one as limited and ,melissus as unlimited1 this limitation of the one would1 in effect1 immediately contradict the philosophy of ,parmenides2 for since limit is the non-being of ,being1 non-being would thus be posited4 ,but when ,parmenides speaks of limit1 we see that his poetic language is not altogether exact2 limit1 however1 as pure limit1 is just simple ,being and absolute negativity1 in which all else said and set forth is sublated4 ,necessity1 as this pure negativity and movement within itself1 although impassive thought1 is absolutely bound to its opposite4 ,in the third place it may be said that ,parmenides set forth a concomitant philosophy of opinion or reality1 to which ,being as existence for thought was thus more opposed than was the case with ,melissus4 #d4 ,,zeno4 ,what specially characterizes ,zeno is the dialectic which1 properly speaking1 begins with him2 he is the master of the ,eleatic school in whom its pure thought arrives at the movement of the ,notion in itself and becomes the pure soul of science4 ,that is to say1 in the ,eleatics hitherto considered1 we only have the proposition3 8,the nothing has no reality and is not at all1 and thus what is called origin and decease disappears40 ,with ,zeno1 on the contrary1 we certainly see just such an assertion of the one and removal of what contradicts it1 but we also see that this assertion is not made the starting point2 for reason begins by calmly demonstrating in that which is established as existent1 its negation4 ,parmenides asserts that 8,the all is immutable1 for1 in change1 the non-being of that which is would be asserted1 but ,being only is2 in saying that non-being is1 the subject and the predicate contradict themselves40 ,zeno1 on the other hand1 says3 8,assert your change2 in it as change there is the negation to it1 or it is nothing40 ,to the former change existed as motion1 definite and complete4 ,zeno protested against motion as such1 or pure motion4 8,pure ,being is not motion2 it is rather the negation of motion40 ,we find it specially interesting that there is in ,zeno the higher consciousness1 the consciousness that when one determination is denied1 this negation is itself again a determination1 and then in the absolute negation not one determination1 but both the opposites must be negated4 ,zeno anticipated this1 and because he foresaw that ,being is the opposite of nothing1 he denied of the ,one what must be said of the nothing4 ,but the same thing must occur with all the rest4 ,we find this higher dialectic in ,plato's ,parmenides2 here it only breaks forth in respect to some determinations1 and not to the determination of the ,one and of ,being4 ,the higher consciousness is the consciousness of the nullity of ,being as of what is determined as against the nothing1 partly found in ,heraclitus and then in the ,sophists2 with them it never has any truth1 it has no existence in itself1 but is only the for-another1 or the assurance of the individual consciousness1 and assurance as refutation1 i4e4 the negative side of dialectic4 ,according to ,diogenes ,laertius1 7,,ix4 #be7 ,zeno was likewise an ,eleat2 he is the youngest1 and lived most in company with ,parmenides4 ,the latter became very fond of him and adopted him as a son2 his own father was called ,telentagoras4 ,not in his ,state alone was his conduct held in high respect1 for his fame was universal1 and he was esteemed particularly as a teacher4 ,plato mentions that men came to him from ,athens and other places1 in order to profit from his learning4#eh ,proud self-sufficiency is ascribed to him by ,diogenes 7,,ix4 #bh7 because he--with the exception of a journey made to ,athens--continued to reside in ,elea1 and did not stay a longer time in the great1 mighty ,athens1 and there attain to fame4 ,in very various narratives his death was made for ever celebrated for the strength of his mind evinced in it2 it was said that he freed a ,state 7whether his own home at ,elea or in ,sicily1 is not known7 from its ,tyrant 7the name is given differently1 but an exact historical account has not been recorded7 in the following way1 and by the sacrifice of his life4 ,he entered into a plot to overthrow the ,tyrant1 but this was betrayed4 ,when the ,tyrant now1 in face of the people1 caused him to be tortured in every possible way to get from him an avowal of his confederates1 and when he questioned him about the enemies of the ,state1 ,zeno first named to the ,tyrant all his friends as participators in the plot1 and then spoke of the ,tyrant himself as the pest of the ,state4 ,the powerful remonstrances or the horrible tortures and death of ,zeno aroused the citizens1 inspired them with courage to fall upon the ,tyrant1 kill him1 and liberate themselves4 ,the manner of the end1 and his violent and furious state of mind1 is very variously depicted4 ,he is said to have pretended to wish to say something into the ,tyrant's ear1 and then to have bitten his ear1 and thus held him fast until he was slain by the others4 ,others say that he seized him by the nose between his teeth2 others that as on his reply great tortures were applied1 he bit off his tongue and spat it into the ,tyrant's face1 to show him that he could get nothing from him1 and that he then was pounded in a mortar4#ei ,it has just been noticed that ,zeno had the very important character of being the originator of the true objective dialectic4 ,xenophanes1 ,parmenides1 and ,melissus1 start with the proposition3 8,nothing is nothing2 the nothing does not exist at all1 or the like is real existence10 that is1 they make one of the opposed predicates to be existence4 ,now when they encounter the opposite in a determination1 they demolish this determination1 but it is only demolished through another1 through my assertion1 through the distinction that ,i form1 by which one side is made to be the true1 and the other the null4 ,we have proceeded from a definite proposition2 the nullity of the opposite does not appear in itself2 it is not that it abrogates itself1 i4e4 that it contains a contradiction in itself4 ,for instance1 ,i assert of something that it is the null2 then ,i show this by hypothesis in motion1 and it follows that it is the null4 ,but another consciousness does not assert this2 ,i declare one thing to be directly true2 another has the right of asserting something else as directly true1 that is to say1 motion4 ,similarly what seems to be the case when one philosophic system contradicts another1 is that the first is pre-established1 and that men starting from this point of view1 combat the other4 ,the matter is thus easily settled by saying3 8,the other has no truth1 because it does not agree with me10 and the other has the right to say the same4 ,it does not help if ,i prove my system or my proposition and then conclude that thus the opposite is false2 to this other proposition the first always seems to be foreign and external4 ,falsity must not be demonstrated through another1 and as untrue because the opposite is true1 but in itself2 we find this rational perception in ,zeno4 ,in ,plato's ,parmenides 7pp4 #abg1 #abh1 ,steph41 pp4 #f1 #g1 ,bekk47 this dialectic is very well described1 for ,plato makes ,socrates say of it3 8,zeno in his writings asserts fundamentally the same as does ,parmenides1 that ,all is ,one1 but he would feign delude us into believing that he was telling something new4 ,parmenides thus shows in his poems that ,all is ,one2 ,zeno1 on the contrary1 shows that the ,many cannot be40 ,zeno replies1 that 8,he wrote thus really against those who try to make ,parmenides' position ridiculous1 for they try to show what absurdities and self-contradictions can be derived from his statements2 he thus combats those who deduce ,being from the many1 in order to show that far more absurdities arise from this than from the statements of ,parmenides40 ,that is the special aim of objective dialectic1 in which we no longer maintain simple thought for itself1 but see the battle fought with new vigour within the enemy's camp4 ,dialectic has in ,zeno this negative side1 but it has also to be considered from its positive side4 ,according to the ordinary ideas of science1 where propositions result from proof1 proof is the movement of intelligence1 a connection brought about by mediation4 ,dialectic is either 77 external dialectic1 in which this movement is different from the comprehension of the movement1 or 77 not a movement of our intelligence only1 but what proceeds from the nature of the thing itself1 i4e4 from the pure ,notion of the content4 ,the former is a manner of regarding objects in such a way that reasons are revealed and new light thrown1 by means of which all that was supposed to be firmly fixed1 is made to totter2 there may be reasons which are altogether external too1 and we shall speak further of this dialectic when dealing with the ,sophists4 ,the other dialectic1 however1 is the immanent contemplation of the object2 it is taken for itself1 without previous hypothesis1 idea or obligation1 not under any outward conditions1 laws or causes2 we have to put ourselves right into the thing1 to consider the object in itself1 and to take it in the determinations which it has4 ,in regarding it thus1 it shows from itself that it contains opposed determinations1 and thus breaks up2 this dialectic we more especially find in the ancients4 ,the subjective dialectic1 which reasons from external grounds1 is moderate1 for it grants that3 8,in the right there is what is not right1 and in the false the true40 ,true dialectic leaves nothing whatever to its object1 as if the latter were deficient on one side only2 for it disintegrates itself in the entirety of its nature4 ,the result of this dialectic is null1 the negative2 the affirmative in it does not yet appear4 ,this true dialectic may be associated with the work of the ,eleatics4 ,but in their case the real meaning and quality of philosophic understanding was not great1 for they got no further than the fact that through contradiction the object is a nothing4 ,zeno's dialectic of matter has not been refuted to the present day2 even now we have not got beyond it1 and the matter is left in uncertainty4 ,simplicius1 writing on the ,physics of ,aristotle 7p4 #cj71 says3 8,zeno proves that if the many is1 it must be great and small2 if great1 the many must be infinite in number0 7it must have gone beyond the manifold1 as indifferent limit1 into the infinite2 but what is infinite is no longer large and no longer many1 for it is the negation of the many74 8,if small1 it must be so small as to have no size10 like atoms4 8,here he shows that what has neither size1 thickness nor mass1 cannot be4 ,for if it were added to another1 it would not cause its increase2 were it1 that is to say1 to have no size and be added thereto1 it could not supplement the size of the other and consequently that which is added is nothing4 ,similarly were it taken away1 the other would not be made less1 and thus it is nothing4 ,if what has being is1 each existence necessarily has size and thickness1 is outside of one another1 and one is separate from the other2 the same applies to all else 7 71 for it1 too1 has size1 and in it there is what mutually differs 7 74 ,but it is the same thing to say something once and to say it over and over again2 in it nothing can be a last1 nor will there not be another to the other4 ,thus if many are1 they are small and great2 small1 so that they have no size2 great1 so that they are infinite40 ,aristotle 7,phys4 ,,vi4 #i7 explains this dialectic further2 ,zeno's treatment of motion was above all objectively dialectical4 ,but the particulars which we find in the ,parmenides of ,plato are not his4 ,for ,zeno's consciousness we see simple unmoved thought disappear1 but become thinking movement2 in that he combats sensuous movement1 he concedes it4 ,the reason that dialectic first fell on movement is that the dialectic is itself this movement1 or movement itself the dialectic of all that is4 ,the thing1 as self-moving1 has its dialectic in itself1 and movement is the becoming another1 self-abrogation4 ,if ,aristotle says that ,zeno denied movement because it contains an inner contradiction1 it is not to be understood to mean that movement did not exist at all4 ,the point is not that there is movement and that this phenomenon exists2 the fact that there is movement is as sensuously certain as that there are elephants2 it is not in this sense that ,zeno meant to deny movement4 ,the point in question concerns its truth4 ,movement1 however1 is held to be untrue1 because the conception of it involves a contradiction2 by that he meant to say that no true ,being can be predicated of it4 ,zeno's utterances are to be looked at from this point of view1 not as being directed against the reality of motion1 as would at first appear1 but as pointing out how movement must necessarily be determined1 and showing the course which must be taken4 ,zeno now brings forward four different arguments against motion2 the proofs rest on the infinite divisibility of space and time4 7a7 ,this is his first form of argument3--8,movement has no truth1 because what is in motion must first reach the middle of the space before arriving at the end40 ,aristotle expresses this thus shortly1 because he had earlier treated of and worked out the subject at length4 ,this is to be taken as indicating generally that the continuity of space is presupposed4 ,what moves itself must reach a certain end1 this way is a whole4 ,in order to traverse the whole1 what is in motion must first pass over the half1 and now the end of this half is considered as being the end2 but this half of space is again a whole1 that which also has a half1 and the half of this half must first have been reached1 and so on into infinity4 ,zeno here arrives at the infinite divisibility of space2 because space and time are absolutely continuous1 there is no point at which the division can stop4 ,every dimension 7and every time and space always have a dimension7 is again divisible into two halves1 which must be measured off2 and however small a space we have1 the same conditions reappear4 ,movement would be the act of passing through these infinite moments1 and would therefore never end2 thus what is in motion cannot reach its end4 ,it is known how ,diogenes of ,sinope1 the ,cynic1 quite simply refuted these arguments against movement2 without speaking he rose and walked about1 contradicting them by action4#fj ,but when reasons are disputed1 the only valid refutation is one derived from reasons2 men have not merely to satisfy themselves by sensuous assurance1 but also to understand4 ,to refute objections is to prove their non-existence1 as when they are made to fall away and can hence be adduced no longer2 but it is necessary to think of motion as ,zeno thought of it1 and yet to carry this theory of motion further still4 ,we have here the spurious infinite or pure appearance1 whose simple principle ,philosophy demonstrates as universal ,notion1 for the first time making its appearance as developed in its contradiction2 in the history of ,philosophy a consciousness of this contradiction is also attained4 ,movement1 this pure phenomenon1 appears as something thought and shown forth in its real being--that is1 in its distinction of pure self-identity and pure negativity1 the point as distinguished from continuity4 ,to us there is no contradiction in the idea that the here of space and the now of time are considered as a continuity and length2 but their ,notion is self-contradictory4 ,self-identity or continuity is absolute cohesion1 the destruction of all difference1 of all negation1 of being for self2 the point1 on the contrary1 is pure being-for-self1 absolute self-distinction and the destruction of all identity and all connection with what is different4 ,both of these1 however1 are1 in space and time1 placed in one2 space and time are thus the contradiction2 it is necessary1 first of all1 to show the contradiction in movement1 for in movement that which is opposed is1 to ordinary conceptions1 inevitably manifested4 ,movement is just the reality of time and space1 and because this appears and is made manifest1 the apparent contradiction is demonstrated1 and it is this contradiction that ,zeno notices4 ,the limitation of bisection which is involved in the continuity of space1 is not absolute limitation1 for that which is limited is again continuity2 however1 this continuity is again not absolute1 for the opposite has to be exhibited in it1 the limitation of bisection2 but the limitation of continuity is still not thereby established1 the half is still continuous1 and so on into infinity4 ,in that we say 8into infinity10 we place before ourselves a beyond1 outside of the ordinary conception1 which cannot reach so far4 ,it is certainly an endless going forth1 but in the ,notion it is present1 it is a progression from one opposed determination to others1 from continuity to negativity1 from negativity to continuity2 but both of these are before us4 ,of these moments one in the process may be called the true one2 ,zeno first asserts continuous progression in such a way that no limited space can be arrived at as ultimate1 or ,zeno upholds progression in this limitation4 ,the general explanation which ,aristotle gives to this contradiction1 is that space and time are not infinitely divided1 but are only divisible4 ,but it now appears that1 because they are divisible--that is1 in potentiality--they must actually be infinitely divided1 for else they could not be divided into infinity4 ,that is the general answer of the ordinary man in endeavouring to refute the explanation of ,aristotle4 ,bayle 7,tom4 ,,iv4 art4 ,znon1 not4 ,e47 hence says of ,aristotle's answer that it is 8pitoyable3 ,c'est se moquer du monde que de se servir de cette doctrine2 car si la matire est divisible l'infini1 elle contient un nombre infini de parties4 ,ce n'est donc point un infini en puissance1 c'est un infini1 qui existe rellement1 actuellement4 ,mais quand-mme on accorderait cet infini en puissance1 qui deviendrait un infini par la division actuelle de ses parties1 on ne perdrait pas ses avantages2 car le mouvement est une chose1 qui a la mme vertu1 que la division4 ,il touche une partie de l'espace sans toucher l'autre1 et il les touche toutes les unes aprs les autres4 ,n'est-ce pas les distinguer actuellement8 ,n'est-ce pas faire ce que ferait un gomtre sur une table en tirant des lignes1 qui dsignassent tous les demi-pouces8 ,il ne brise pas la table en demi-pouces1 mais il y fait nanmoins une division1 qui marque la distinction actuelle des parties2 et je ne crois pas qu',aristote eut voulu nier1 que si l'on tirait une infinit de lignes sur un pouce de matire1 on n'y introduist une division1 qui rduirait en infini actuel ce qui n'tait selon lui qu'un infini virtual40 ,this si is good6 ,divisibility is1 as potentiality1 the universal2 there is continuity as well as negativity or the point posited in it--but posited as moment1 and not as existent in and for itself4 ,i can divide matter into infinitude1 but ,i only can do so2 ,i do not really divide it into infinitude4 ,this is the infinite1 that no one of its moments has reality4 ,it never does happen that1 in itself1 one or other--that absolute limitation or absolute continuity--actually comes into existence in such a way that the other moment disappears4 ,there are two absolute opposites1 but they are moments1 i4e4 in the simple ,notion or in the universal1 in thought1 if you will2 for in thought1 in ordinary conception1 what is set forth both is and is not at the same time4 ,what is represented either as such1 or as an image of the conception1 is not a thing2 it has no ,being1 and yet it is not nothing4 ,space and time furthermore1 as quantum1 form a limited extension1 and thus can be measured off2 just as ,i do not actually divide space1 neither does the body which is in motion4 ,the partition of space as divided1 is not absolute discontinuity ,punktualitt1 nor is pure continuity the undivided and indivisible2 likewise time is not pure negativity or discontinuity1 but also continuity4 ,both are manifested in motion1 in which the ,notions have their reality for ordinary conception--pure negativity as time1 continuity as space4 ,motion itself is just this actual unity in the opposition1 and the sequence of both moments in this unity4 ,to comprehend motion is to express its essence in the form of ,notion1 i4e41 as unity of negativity and continuity2 but in them neither continuity nor discreteness can be exhibited as the true existence4 ,if we represent space or time to ourselves as infinitely divided1 we have an infinitude of points1 but continuity is present therein as a space which comprehends them3 as ,notion1 however1 continuity is the fact that all these are alike1 and thus in reality they do not appear one out of the other like points4 ,but both these moments make their appearance as existent2 if they are manifested indifferently1 their ,notion is no longer posited1 but their existence4 ,in them as existent1 negativity is a limited size1 and they exist as limited space and time2 actual motion is progression through a limited space and a limited time and not through infinite space and infinite time4 ,that what is in motion must reach the half is the assertion of continuity1 i4e4 the possibility of division as mere possibility2 it is thus always possible in every space1 however small4 ,it is said that it is plain that the half must be reached1 but in so saying1 everything is allowed1 including the fact that it never will be reached2 for to say so in one case1 is the same as saying it an infinite number of times4 ,we mean1 on the contrary1 that in a larger space the half can be allowed1 but we conceive that we must somewhere attain to a space so small that no halving is possible1 or an indivisible1 non-continuous space which is no space4 ,this1 however1 is false1 for continuity is a necessary determination2 there is undoubtedly a smallest in space1 i4e4 a negation of continuity1 but the negation is something quite abstract4 ,abstract adherence to the subdivision indicated1 that is1 to continuous bisection into infinitude1 is likewise false1 for in the conception of a half1 the interruption of continuity is involved4 ,we must say that there is no half of space1 for space is continuous2 a piece of wood may be broken into two halves1 but not space1 and space only exists in movement4 ,it might equally be said that space consists of an endless number of points1 i4e4 of infinitely many limits and thus cannot be traversed4 ,men think themselves able to go from one indivisible point to another1 but they do not thereby get any further1 for of these there is an unlimited number4 ,continuity is split up into its opposite1 a number which is indefinite2 that is to say1 if continuity is not admitted1 there is no motion4 ,it is false to assert that it is possible when one is reached1 or that which is not continuous2 for motion is connection4 ,thus when it was said that continuity is the presupposed possibility of infinite division1 continuity is only the hypothesis2 but what is exhibited in this continuity is the being of infinitely many1 abstractly absolute limits4 7b7 ,the second proof1 which is also the presupposition of continuity and the manifestation of division1 is called 8,achilles1 the ,swift40 ,the ancients loved to clothe difficulties in sensuous representations4 ,of two bodies moving in one direction1 one of which is in front and the other following at a fixed distance and moving quicker than the first1 we know that the second will overtake the first4 ,but ,zeno says1 8,the slower can never be overtaken by the quicker40 ,and he proves it thus3 8,the second one requires a certain space of time to reach the place from which the one pursued started at the beginning of the given period40 ,thus during the time in which the second reached the point where the first was1 the latter went over a new space which the second has again to pass through in a part of this period2 and in this way it goes into infinity4 c d e f g ,b ,a ,b1 for instance1 traverses two miles 7c d7 in an hour1 ,a in the same time1 one mile 7d e72 if they are two miles 7c d7 removed from one another1 ,b has in one hour come to where ,a was at the beginning of the hour4 ,while ,b1 in the next half hour1 goes over the distance crossed by ,a of one mile 7d e71 ,a has got half a mile 7e f7 further1 and so on into infinity4 ,quicker motion does not help the second body at all in passing over the interval of space by which he is behind3 the time which he requires1 the slower body always has at its avail in order to accomplish some1 although an ever shorter advance2 and this1 because of the continual division1 never quite disappears4 ,aristotle1 in speaking of this1 puts it shortly thus4 8,this proof asserts the same endless divisibility1 but it is untrue1 for the quick will overtake the slow body if the limits to be traversed be granted to it40 ,this answer is correct and contains all that can be said2 that is1 there are in this representation two periods of time and two distances1 which are separated from one another1 i4e4 they are limited in relation to one another2 when1 on the contrary1 we admit that time and space are continuous1 so that two periods of time or points of space are related to one another as continuous1 they are1 while being two1 not two1 but identical4 ,in ordinary language we solve the matter in the easiest way1 for we say3 8,because the second is quicker1 it covers a greater distance in the same time as the slow2 it can therefore come to the place from which the first started and get further still40 ,after ,b1 at the end of the first hour1 arrives at d and ,a at e1 ,a in one and the same period1 that is1 in the second hour1 goes over the distance e g1 and ,b the distance d g4 ,but this period of time which should be one1 is divisible into that in which ,b accomplishes d e and that in which ,b passes through e g4 ,a has a start of the first1 by which it gets over the distance e f1 so that ,a is at f at the same period as ,b is at e4 ,the limitation which1 according to ,aristotle1 is to be overcome1 which must be penetrated1 is thus that of time2 since it is continuous1 it must1 for the solution of the difficulty1 be said that what is divisible into two spaces of time is to be conceived of as one1 in which ,b gets from d to e and from e to g1 while ,a passes over the distance e g4 ,in motion two periods1 as well as two points in space1 are indeed one4 ,if we wish to make motion clear to ourselves1 we say that the body is in one place and then it goes to another2 because it moves1 it is no longer in the first1 but yet not in the second2 were it in either it would be at rest4 ,where then is it8 ,if we say that it is between both1 this is to convey nothing at all1 for were it between both1 it would be in a place1 and this presents the same difficulty4 ,but movement means to be in this place and not to be in it1 and thus to be in both alike2 this is the continuity of space and time which first makes motion possible4 ,zeno1 in the deduction made by him1 brought both these points into forcible opposition4 ,the discretion of space and time we also uphold1 but there must also be granted to them the overstepping of limits1 i4e4 the exhibition of limits as not being1 or as being divided periods of time1 which are also not divided4 ,in our ordinary ideas we find the same determinations as those on which the dialectic of ,zeno rests2 we arrive at saying1 though unwillingly1 that in one period two distances of space are traversed1 but we do not say that the quicker comprehends two moments of time in one2 for that we fix a definite space4 ,but in order that the slower may lose its precedence1 it must be said that it loses its advantage of a moment of time1 and indirectly the moment of space4 ,zeno makes limit1 division1 the moment of discretion in space and time1 the only element which is enforced in the whole of his conclusions1 and hence results the contradiction4 ,the difficulty is to overcome thought1 for what makes the difficulty is always thought alone1 since it keeps apart the moments of an object which in their separation are really united4 ,it brought about the ,fall1 for man ate of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil2 but it also remedies these evils4 7c7 ,the third form1 according to ,aristotle1 is as follows3--,zeno says3 8,the flying arrow rests1 and for the reason that what is in motion is always in the self-same ,now and the self-same ,here1 in the indistinguishable20 it is here and here and here4 ,it can be said of the arrow that it is always the same1 for it is always in the same space and the same time2 it does not get beyond its space1 does not take in another1 that is1 a greater or smaller space4 ,that1 however1 is what we call rest and not motion4 ,in the ,here and ,now1 the becoming 8other0 is abrogated1 limitation indeed being established1 but only as moment2 since in the ,here and ,now as such1 there is no difference1 continuity is here made to prevail against the mere belief in diversity4 ,each place is a different place1 and thus the same2 true1 objective difference does not come forth in these sensuous relations1 but in the spiritual4 ,this is also apparent in mechanics2 of two bodies the question as to which moves presents itself before us4 ,it requires more than two places--three at least--to determine which of them moves4 ,but it is correct to say this1 that motion is plainly relative2 whether in absolute space the eye1 for instance1 rests1 or whether it moves1 is all the same4 ,or1 according to a proposition brought forward by ,newton1 if two bodies move round one another in a circle1 it may be asked whether the one rests or both move4 ,newton tries to decide this by means of an external circumstance1 the strain on the string4 ,when ,i walk on a ship in a direction opposed to the motion of the ship1 this is in relation to the ship1 motion1 and in relation to all else1 rest4 ,in both the first proofs1 continuity in progression has the predominance2 there is no absolute limit1 but an overstepping of all limits4 ,here the opposite is established2 absolute limitation1 the interruption of continuity1 without however passing into something else2 while discretion is presupposed1 continuity is maintained4 ,aristotle says of this proof3 8,it arises from the fact that it is taken for granted that time consists of the ,now2 for if this is not conceded1 the conclusions will not follow40 7d7 8,the fourth proof10 ,aristotle continues1 8is derived from similar bodies which move in opposite directions in the space beside a similar body1 and with equal velocity1 one from one end of the space1 the other from the middle4 ,it necessarily results from this that half the time is equal to the double of it4 ,the fallacy rests in this1 that ,zeno supposes that what is beside the moving body1 and what is beside the body at rest1 move through an equal distance in equal time with equal velocity1 which1 however1 is untrue40 #a ,e----------------,f k i m ,c----------------,d g n h ,a----------------,b ,in a definite space such as a table 7,a ,b7 let us suppose two bodies of equal length with it and with one another1 one of which 7,c ,d7 lies with one end 7,c7 on the middle 7g7 of the table1 and the other 7,e ,f71 being in the same direction1 has the point 7,e7 only touching the end of the table 7h72 and supposing they move in opposite directions1 and the former 7,c ,d7 reaches in an hour the end 7h7 of the table2 we have the result ensuing that the one 7,e ,f7 passes in the half of the time through the same space 7i k7 which the other does in the double 7g h72 hence the half is equal to the double4 ,that is to say1 this second passes 7let us say1 in the point l7 by the whole of the first ,c ,d4 ,in the first half-hour l goes from m to i1 while k only goes from g to n4 #a ,e----------------,f k o i m ,c----------------,d g n h ,a----------------,b ,in the second half-hour l goes past o to k1 and altogether passes from m to k1 or the double of the distance4 #a ,e----------------,f k o i m ,c----------------,d g n h ,a----------------,b ,this fourth form deals with the contradiction presented in opposite motion2 that which is common is given entirely to one body1 while it only does part for itself4 ,here the distance travelled by one body is the sum of the distance travelled by both1 just as when ,i go two feet east1 and from the same point another goes two feet west1 we are four feet removed from one another2 in the distance moved both are positive1 and hence have to be added together4 ,or if ,i have gone two feet forwards and two feet backwards1 although ,i have walked four feet1 ,i have not moved from the spot2 the motion is then nil1 for by going forwards and backwards an opposition ensues which annuls itself4 ,this is the dialectic of ,zeno2 he had a knowledge of the determinations which our ideas of space and time contain1 and showed in them their contradiction2 ,kant's antinomies do no more than ,zeno did here4 ,the general result of the ,eleatic dialectic has thus become1 8the truth is the one1 all else is untrue10 just as the ,kantian philosophy resulted in 8we know appearances only40 ,on the whole the principle is the same2 8the content of knowledge is only an appearance and not truth10 but there is also a great difference present4 ,that is to say1 ,zeno and the ,eleatics in their proposition signified 8that the sensuous world1 with its multitudinous forms1 is in itself appearance only1 and has no truth40 ,but ,kant does not mean this1 for he asserts3 8,because we apply the activity of our thought to the outer world1 we constitute it appearance2 what is without1 first becomes an untruth by the fact that we put therein a mass of determinations4 ,only our knowledge1 the spiritual1 is thus appearance2 the world is in itself absolute truth2 it is our action alone that ruins it1 our work is good for nothing40 ,it shows excessive humility of mind to believe that knowledge has no value2 but ,christ says1 8,are ye not better than the sparrows80 and we are so inasmuch as we are thinking2 as sensuous we are as good or as bad as sparrows4 ,zeno's dialectic has greater objectivity than this modern dialectic4 ,zeno's dialectic is limited to ,metaphysics2 later1 with the ,sophists1 it became general4 ,we here leave the ,eleatic school1 which perpetuates itself in ,leucippus and1 on the other side1 in the ,sophists1 in such a way that these last extended the ,eleatic conceptions to all reality1 and gave to it the relation of consciousness2 the former1 however1 as one who later on worked out the ,notion in its abstraction1 makes a physical application of it1 and one which is opposed to consciousness4 ,there are several other ,eleatics mentioned1 to ,tennemann's surprise1 who1 however1 cannot interest us4 8,it is so unexpected10 he says 7,vol4 ,i41 p4 #aij71 8that the ,eleatic system should find disciples2 and yet ,sextus mentions a certain ,xeniades40 ,d4 ,,heraclitus4 ,if we put aside the ,ionics1 who did not understand the ,absolute as ,thought1 and the ,pythagoreans likewise1 we have the pure ,being of the ,eleatics1 and the dialectic which denies all finite relationships4 ,thought to the latter is the process of such manifestations2 the world in itself is the apparent1 and pure ,being alone the true4 ,the dialectic of ,zeno thus lays hold of the determinations which rest in the content itself1 but it may1 in so far1 also be called subjective dialectic1 inasmuch as it rests in the contemplative subject1 and the one1 without this movement of the dialectic1 is abstract identity4 ,the next step from the existence of the dialectic as movement in the subject1 is that it must necessarily itself become objective4 ,if ,aristotle blames ,thales for doing away with motion1 because change cannot be understood from ,being1 and likewise misses the actual in the ,pythagorean numbers and ,platonic ,ideas1 taken as the substances of the things which participate in them1 ,heraclitus at least understands the absolute as just this process of the dialectic4 ,the dialectic is thus thre-fold3 77 the external dialectic1 a reasoning which goes over and over again without ever reaching the soul of the thing2 77 immanent dialectic of the object1 but falling within the contemplation of the subject2 77 the objectivity of ,heraclitus which takes the dialectic itself as principle4 ,the advance requisite and made by ,heraclitus is the progression from ,being as the first immediate thought1 to the category of ,becoming as the second4 ,this is the first concrete1 the ,absolute1 as in it the unity of opposites4 ,thus with ,heraclitus the philosophic ,idea is to be met with in its speculative form2 the reasoning of ,parmenides and ,zeno is abstract understanding4 ,heraclitus was thus universally esteemed a deep philosopher and even was decried as such4 ,here we see land2 there is no proposition of ,heraclitus which ,i have not adopted in my ,logic4 ,diogenes ,laertius says 7,,ix4 #a7 that ,heraclitus flourished about the #fith ,olympiad 7#ejj ,b4,c471 and that he was of ,ephesus and in part contemporaneous with ,parmenides3 he began the separation and withdrawal of philosophers from public affairs and the interests of the country1 and devoted himself in his isolation entirely to ,philosophy4 ,we have thus three stages3 77 the seven sages as statesmen1 regents and law-givers2 77 the ,pythagorean aristocratic league2 77 an interest in science for its own sake4 ,little more is known of ,heraclitus' life than his relations to his countrymen the ,ephesians1 and according to ,diogenes ,laertius 7,,ix4 #ae1 #c71 these were for the most part found in the fact that they despised him and were yet more profoundly despised by him--a relationship such as we have now-a-days1 when each man exists for himself1 and despises everyone else4 ,in the case of this noble character1 the disdain and sense of separation from the crowd emanates from the deep sense of the perversity of the ordinary ideas and life of his people3 in reference to this1 isolated expressions used on various occasions are still preserved4 ,cicero 7,tusc4 ,qust4 ,v4 #cf7 and ,diogenes ,laertius 7,,ix4 #b7 relate that ,heraclitus said3 8,the ,ephesians all deserve to have their necks broken as they grow up1 so that the town should be left to minors0 7people now say that only youth knows how to govern71 8because they drove away his friend ,hermodorus1 the best of them all1 and gave as their reason for so doing that amongst them none should be more excellent than the rest2 and if any one were so1 it should be elsewhere and amongst others40 ,it was for the same reason that in the ,athenian ,democracy great men were banished4 ,diogenes adds3 8,his fellow-citizens asked him to take part in the administration of public affairs1 but he declined1 because he did not like their constitution1 laws and administration40 ,proclus 7,t4 ,,iii4 pp4 #aae1 #aaf1 ed4 ,cousin7 says3 8,the noble ,heraclitus blamed the people for being devoid of understanding or thought4 #8,what is1' he says1 #8their understanding or their prudence8 ,most of them are bad1 and few are good4'0 ,diogenes ,laertius 7,,ix4 #f7 furthermore says3 8,antisthenes cites1 as a proof of ,heraclitus' greatness1 that he left his kingdom to his brother40 ,he expresses in the strongest manner his contempt for what is esteemed to be truth and right1 in the letter preserved to us by ,diogenes 7,,ix4 #ac1 #ad71 in which1 to the invitation of ,darius ,hystaspes1 8to make him acquainted with ,greek wisdom--for his work on ,nature contains a very forcible theory of the world1 but it is in many passages obscure--to come to him and explain to him what required explanation0 7this is certainly not very probable if ,heraclitus' turn of mind was also ,oriental71 he is said to have replied3 8,all mortal men depart from truth and justice and are given over to excess and vain opinions according to their evil understandings4 ,but ,i1 since ,i have attained to an oblivion of all evil1 and shun the overpowering envy that follows me1 and the vanity of high position1 shall not come to ,persia4 ,i am content with little and live in my own way40 ,the only work that he wrote1 and the title of which1 ,diogenes tells us1 was by some stated to be 8,the ,muses0 and by others 8,on ,nature10 he deposited in the temple of ,diana at ,ephesus4 ,it seems to have been preserved until modern times2 the fragments which have come down to us are collected together in ,stephanus' ,posis philosophica 7p4 #abi1 seq474 ,schleiermacher also collected them and arranged them in a characteristic way4 ,the title is 8,heraclitus1 the ,dark1 of ,ephesus1 as represented in fragments of his work and by the testimony of the ancients10 and it is to be found in ,wolf and ,buttmann's 8,museum of ancient ,learning10 vol4 ,i4 7,berlin1 #ahjg7 pp4 #cae-ecc4 ,seventy-three passages are given4 ,kreuzer made one hope that he would work at ,heraclitus more critically and with a knowledge of the language4 ,he made a more complete collection1 particularly from grammarians2 however1 as1 for lack of time1 he left it to be worked up by a younger scholar1 and as the latter died1 it never came before the public4 ,compilations of the kind are as a rule too copious3 they contain a mass of learning and are more easily written than read4 ,heraclitus has been considered obscure1 and is indeed celebrated for this2 it also drew upon him the name of 4 ,cicero 7,de ,nat4 ,deor4 ,i4 #bf2 ,,iii4 #ad2 ,de ,finib4 ,,ii4 #e7 takes up a wrong idea1 as often happens to him2 he thinks that ,heraclitus purposely wrote obscurely4 ,any such design would1 however1 be a very shallow one1 and it is really nothing but the shallowness of ,cicero himself ascribed by him to ,heraclitus4 ,heraclitus' obscurity is rather a result of neglecting proper composition and of imperfect language2 this is what was thought by ,aristotle 7,rhet4 ,,iii4 #e71 who1 from a grammatical point of view1 ascribed it to a want of punctuation3 8,we do not know whether a word belongs to what precedes or what succeeds40 ,demetrius is of the same opinion 7,de ,elocutione1 #aib1 p4 #gh1 ed4 ,schneider74 ,socrates1 as ,diogenes ,laertius relates 7,,ii4 #bb2 ,,ix4 #aa-ab71 said of this book3 8,what he understood of it was excellent1 and what he did not understand he believed to be as good1 but it requires a vigorous 77 swimmer to make his way through it40 ,the obscurity of this philosophy1 however1 chiefly consists in there being profound speculative thought contained in it2 the ,notion1 the ,idea1 is foreign to the understanding and cannot be grasped by it1 though it may find mathematics quite simple4 ,plato studied the philosophy of ,heraclitus with special diligence2 we find much of it quoted in his works1 and he got his earlier philosophic education most indubitably from this source1 so that ,heraclitus may be called ,plato's teacher4 ,hippocrates1 likewise1 is a philosopher of ,heraclitus' school4 ,what is preserved to us of ,heraclitus' philosophy at first seems very contradictory1 but we find the ,notion making its appearance1 and a man of profound reflection revealed4 ,zeno began to abrogate the opposed predicates1 and he shows the opposition in movement1 an assertion of limitation and an abrogation of the same2 ,zeno expressed the infinite1 but on its negative side only1 in reference to its contradiction as being the untrue4 ,in ,heraclitus we see the perfection of knowledge so far as it has gone1 a perfecting of the ,idea into a totality1 which is the beginning of ,philosophy1 since it expresses the essence of the ,idea1 the ,notion of the infinite1 the potentially and actively existent1 as that which it is1 i4e4 as the unity of opposites4 ,from ,heraclitus dates the ever-remaining ,idea which is the same in all philosophers to the present day1 as it was the ,idea of ,plato and of ,aristotle4 #a4 ,the ,logical ,principle4 ,concerning the universal principle1 this bold mind1 ,aristotle tells us 7,metaph4 ,,iv4 #c and #g71 first uttered the great saying3 8,being and non-being are the same2 everything is and yet is not40 ,the truth only is as the unity of distinct opposites and1 indeed1 of the pure opposition of being and non-being2 but with the ,eleatics we have the abstract understanding that ,being is alone the truth4 ,we say1 in place of using the expression of ,heraclitus1 that the ,absolute is the unity of being and non-being4 ,when we understand that proposition as that 8,being is and yet is not10 this does not seem to make much sense1 but only to imply complete negation and want of thought4 ,but we have another sentence that gives the meaning of the principle better4 ,for ,heraclitus says3 8,everything is in a state of flux2 nothing subsists nor does it ever remain the same40 ,and ,plato further says of ,heraclitus3 8,he compares things to the current of a river3 no one can go twice into the same stream10#fa for it flows on and other water is disturbed4 ,aristotle tells us 7,met4 ,,iv4 #e7 that his successors even said 8it could not once be entered10 for it changed directly2 what is1 is not again4 ,aristotle 7,de ,clo1 ,,iii4 #a7 goes on to say that ,heraclitus declares that 8there is only one that remains1 and from out of this all else is formed2 all except this one is not enduring 7740 ,this universal principle is better characterized as ,becoming1 the truth of ,being2 since everything is and is not1 ,heraclitus hereby expressed that everything is ,becoming4 ,not merely does origination belong to it1 but passing away as well2 both are not independent1 but identical4 ,it is a great advance in thought to pass from ,being to ,becoming1 even if1 as the first unity of opposite determinations1 it is still abstract4 ,because in this relationship both must be unrestful and therefore contain within themselves the principle of life1 the lack of motion which ,aristotle has demonstrated in the earlier philosophies is supplied1 and this last is even made to be the principle4 ,this philosophy is thus not one past and gone2 its principle is essential1 and is to be found in the beginning of my ,logic1 immediately after ,being and ,nothing4 ,the recognition of the fact that ,being and non-being are abstractions devoid of truth1 that the first truth is to be found in ,becoming1 forms a great advance4 ,the understanding comprehends both as having truth and value in isolation2 reason1 on the other hand1 recognizes the one in the other1 and sees that in the one its 8other0 is contained4 ,if we do not take the conception of existence as complete1 the pure ,being of simple thought in which everything definite is denied1 is the absolute negative2 but nothing is the same1 or just this self-identity4 ,we here have an absolute transition into the opposite which ,zeno did not reach1 for he remained at the proposition1 8,from nothing1 comes nothing40 ,with ,heraclitus1 however1 the moment of negativity is immanent1 and the ,notion of ,philosophy as complete is therefore dealt with4 ,in the first place we have here the abstract idea of ,being and non-being in a form altogether immediate and general2 but when we look closer1 we find that ,heraclitus also conceived of the opposites and their unification in a more definite manner4 ,he says3 8,the opposites are combined in the self-same one1 just as honey is both sweet and bitter40 ,sextus remarks of this 7,pyrrh4 ,hyp4 ,i4 #bi1 #baj1 #baa2 ,,ii4 #f1 #fc73 8,heraclitus1 like the ,sceptics1 proceeds from ordinary ideas2 no one will deny that healthy men call honey sweet1 while those who are sick will say it is bitter40 ,if it is only sweet1 it cannot alter its nature in another individual2 it would in all places and even to the jaundiced patient be sweet4 ,aristotle 7,de mundo1 #e7 quotes this from ,heraclitus3 8,join together the complete whole and the incomplete0 7the whole makes itself the part1 and the meaning of the part is to become the whole71 8what coincides and what conflicts1 what is harmonious and what discordant1 and from out of them all comes one1 and from one1 all40 ,this one is not an abstraction1 but the activity of dividing itself into opposites2 the dead infinite is a poor abstraction as compared with the depths of ,heraclitus4 ,all that is concrete1 as that ,god created the world1 divided ,himself1 begot a ,son1 is contained in this determination4 ,sextus ,empiricus mentions 7adv4 ,math4 ,,ix4 #ccg7 that ,heraclitus said3 8,the part is something different from the whole and is yet the same as the whole2 substance is the whole and the part1 the whole in the universe and the part in this living being40 ,plato says in his ,symposium 7p4 #ahg1 ,steph42 p4 #cig1 ,bekk47 of ,heraclitus' principle3 8,the one1 separated from itself1 makes itself one with itself like the harmony of the bow and the lyre40 ,he then makes ,eryximachus1 who speaks in the ,symposium1 criticize this thus3 8,in harmony there is discord1 or it arises from opposites2 for harmony does not arise from height and depth in that they are different1 but from their union through the art of music40 ,but this does not contradict ,heraclitus1 who means the same thing4 ,that which is simple1 the repetition of a tone1 is no harmony2 difference is clearly necessary to harmony1 or a definite antithesis2 for it is the absolute becoming and not mere change4 ,the real fact is that each particular tone is different from another--not abstractly so from any other1 but from its other--and thus it also can be one4 ,each particular only is1 in so far as its opposite is implicitly contained in its ,notion4 ,subjectivity is thus the 8other0 of objectivity and not of a piece of paper1 which would be meaningless2 since each is the 8other0 of the 8other0 as its 8other10 we here have their identity4 ,this is ,heraclitus' great principle2 it may seem obscure1 but it is speculative4 ,and this to the understanding which maintains the independence of ,being and non-being1 the subjective and objective1 the real and the ideal1 is always difficult and dim4 #b4 ,natural ,philosophy4 ,in his system ,heraclitus did not rest content with thus expressing himself in ,notions1 or with what is purely logical4 ,but in addition to this universal form in which he advanced his principle1 he gave his idea a real and more natural form1 and hence he is still reckoned as belonging to the ,ionic school of natural philosophers4 ,however1 as regards this form of reality1 historians are at variance2 most of them1 and amongst others1 ,aristotle 7,met4 ,i4 #c1 #h71 say that he maintained fire to be the existent principle2 others1 according to ,sextus 7adv4 ,math4 ,,ix4 #cfj2 ,x4 #bcc71 say it was air1 and others again assert that he made vapour to be the principle rather than air2#fb even time is1 in ,sextus 7adv4 ,math4 ,x4 #baf71 given as the primary existence4 ,the question arises as to how this diversity is to be comprehended4 ,it must not be believed that all these accounts are to be ascribed to the inaccuracy of historians1 for the witnesses are of the best1 like ,aristotle and ,sextus ,empiricus1 who do not speak casually of these forms1 but definitely1 without1 however1 remarking upon any such differences and contradictions4 ,we seem to have a better reason in the obscurity of the writing of ,heraclitus1 which might1 by the confusion of its expression1 give occasion to misunderstanding4 ,but when regarded closer1 this difficulty1 which is evident when merely looked at superficially1 disappears2 it is in the profoundly significant conceptions of ,heraclitus that the true way out of this difficulty manifests itself4 ,heraclitus could no longer1 like ,thales1 express water1 air or anything similar as an absolute principle--he could no longer do so in the form of a primeval element from which the rest proceeds--because he thought of ,being as identical with non-being1 or the infinite ,notion2 thus the existent1 absolute principle cannot with him come forth as a definite and actual thing such as water1 but must be water in alteration1 or as process only4 a4 ,understanding the abstract process as time1 ,heraclitus said3 8,time is the first corporeal existence10 as ,sextus 7adv4 ,math4 ,x4 #bca1 #bcb7 puts it4 ,corporeal is an unfortunate expression2 the ,sceptics frequently pick out the crudest expressions or make thoughts crude in the first place so that they may afterwards dispense with them4 ,corporeal here means abstract sensuousness2 time1 as the first sensuous existence1 is the abstract representation of process4 ,it is because ,heraclitus did not rest at the logical expression of ,becoming1 but gave to his principle the form of the existent1 that it was necessary that time should first present itself to him as such2 for in the sensuously perceptible it is the first form of ,becoming4 ,time is pure ,becoming as perceived1 the pure ,notion1 that which is simple1 and the harmony issuing from absolute opposites2 its essential nature is to be and not to be in one unity1 and besides this1 it has no other character4 ,it is not that time is or is not1 for time is non-being immediately in ,being and ,being immediately in non-being3 it is the transition out of ,being into non-being1 the abstract ,notion1 but in an objective form1 i4e4 in so far as it is for us4 ,in time there is no past and future1 but only the now1 and this is1 but is not as regards the past2 and this non-being1 as future1 turns round into ,being4 ,if we were to say how that which ,heraclitus recognized as principle1 might1 in the pure form in which he recognized it1 exist for consciousness1 we could mention nothing else but time2 and it quite accords with the principle of thought in ,heraclitus to define time as the first form of ,becoming4 b4 ,but this pure1 objective ,notion must realize itself more fully1 and thus we find in fact1 that ,heraclitus determined the process in a more markedly physical manner4 ,in time we have the moments of ,being and non-being manifested as negative only1 or as vanishing immediately2 if we wish to express both these moments as one independent totality1 the question is asked1 which physical existence corresponds to this determination4 ,to ,heraclitus the truth is to have grasped the essential being of nature1 i4e4 to have represented it as implicitly infinite1 as process in itself2 and consequently it is evident to us that ,heraclitus could not say that the primary principle is air1 water1 or any such thing4 ,they are not themselves process1 but fire is process2 and thus he maintains fire to be the elementary principle1 and this is the real form of the ,heraclitean principle1 the soul and substance of the nature-process4 ,fire is physical time1 absolute unrest1 absolute disintegration of existence1 the passing away of the 8other10 but also of itself2 and hence we can understand how ,heraclitus1 proceeding from his fundamental determination1 could quite logically call fire the ,notion of the process4 c4 ,he further made this fire to be a real process2 because its reality is for itself the whole process1 the moments have become concretely determined4 ,fire1 as the metamorphosis of bodily things1 is the transformation and exhalation of the determinate2 for this process ,heraclitus used a particular word--evaporation 77--but it is rather transition4 ,aristotle 7,de anim4 ,i4 #b7 says of ,heraclitus in this regard1 that1 according to his view1 8the soul is the principle because it is evaporation1 the origination of everything2 it is what is most incorporeal and always in a state of flux40 ,this is quite applicable to the primary principle of ,heraclitus4 ,furthermore he determined the real process in its abstract moments by separating two sides in it--8the way upwards 7 7 and the way downwards 7 70--the one being division1 in that it is the existence of opposites1 and the other the unification of these existent opposites4 ,corresponding to these1 he had1 according to ,diogenes 7,,ix4 #h71 the further determinations 8of enmity and strife 71 71 and friendship and harmony 71 72 of these two1 enmity and strife is that which is the principle of the origination of differences2 but what leads to combustion is harmony and peace40 ,in enmity amongst men1 the one sets himself up independently of the other1 or is for himself and realizes himself2 but unity and peace is sinking out of independence into indivisibility or non-reality4 ,everything is thre-fold and thereby real unity2 nature is the never-resting1 and the all is the transition out of the one into the other1 from division into unity1 and from unity into division4 ,the more detailed accounts of this real process are1 in great measure1 deficient and contradictory4 ,in this connection1 it is in some accounts#fc said of ,heraclitus that he defined it thus3 8,of the forms taken by fire there is first of all the sea1 and then of it half is the earth and the other half the lightning flash 7710 the fire which springs up4 ,this is general and very obscure4 ,diogenes ,laertius 7,,ix4 #i7 says3 8,fire is condensed into moisture1 and when concrete it becomes water2 water hardens into earth and this is the way downwards4 ,the earth then again becomes fluid1 and from it moisture supervenes1 and from this the evaporation of the sea1 from which all else arises2 this is the way upwards4 ,water divides into a dark evaporation1 becoming earth1 and into what is pure1 sparkling1 becoming fire and burning in the solar sphere2 what is fiery becomes meteors1 planets and stars40 ,these are thus not still1 dead stars1 but are regarded as in ,becoming1 as being eternally productive4 ,we thus have1 on the whole1 a metamorphosis of fire4 ,these oriental1 metaphorical expressions are1 however1 in ,heraclitus not to be taken in their strictly sensuous signification1 and as if these changes were present to the outward observation2 but they depict the nature of these elements by which the earth eternally creates its suns and comets4 ,nature is thus a circle4 ,with this in view1 we find ,heraclitus1 according to ,clement of ,alexandria 7,strom4 ,v4 #ad1 p4 #gaa71 saying3 8,the universe was made neither by ,god nor man1 but it ever was and is1 and will be1 a living fire1 that which1 in accordance with its laws1 77 kindles and goes out40 ,we now understand what ,aristotle says of the principle being the soul1 since the latter is evaporation2 that is to say1 fire1 as this self-moving process of the world1 is the soul4 ,another statement follows1 which is also found in ,clement of ,alexandria 7,strom4 ,,vi4 #b1 p4 #gdf73 8,to souls 7to the living7 death is the becoming water2 to water death is the becoming earth2 on the other hand from earth1 water arises1 and from water1 the soul40 ,thus1 on the whole1 this process is one of extinction1 of going back from opposition into unity1 of the re-awakening of the former1 and of issuing forth from one4 ,the extinction of the soul1 of the fire in water1 the conflagration that finally results1 some1 and amongst others1 ,diogenes ,laertius 7,,ix4 #h71 ,eusebius 7,prp4 ,evang4 ,,xiv4 #c7 and ,tennemann 7,vol4 ,i4 p4 #bah71 falsely assert to be a conflagration of the world4 ,what ,heraclitus is said to have spoken of as a conflagration of this world1 was thought to be an imaginary idea that after a certain time--as1 according to our ideas1 at the end of the world--the world would disappear in flames4 ,but we see at once from passages which are most clear1#fd that this conflagration is not meant1 but that it is the perpetual burning up as the ,becoming of friendship1 the universal life and the universal process of the universe4 ,in respect of the fact that1 according to ,heraclitus1 fire is the animating1 or the soul1 we find in ,plutarch 7,de esu4 carn4 ,i4 p4 #iie1 ed4 ,xyl47 an expression which may seem odd1 namely1 that 8the driest soul is the best40 ,we certainly do not esteem the most moist the best1 but1 on the other hand1 the one which is most alive2 however dry here signifies fiery and thus the driest soul is pure fire1 and this is not lifeless but life itself4 ,these are the principal moments of the real life-process2 ,i will stop here a moment because we here find expressed the whole ,notion of speculative reflection regarding ,nature4 ,in this ,notion1 one moment and one element goes over into the other2 fire becomes water1 water earth and fire4 ,the contention about the transmutation and immutability of the elements is an old one2 in this conception the ordinary1 sensuous science of nature separates itself from natural philosophy4 ,in the speculative point of view1 which is that of ,heraclitus1 the simple substance in fire and the other elements in itself becomes metamorphosed2 in the other1 all transition is abolished and only an external separation of what is already there is maintained4 ,water is just water1 fire is fire1 c4 ,if the former point of view upholds transmutation1 the latter believes in the possibility of demonstrating the opposite2 it no longer1 indeed1 maintains water1 fire1 c41 to be simple realities1 for it resolves them into hydrogen1 oxygen1 c41 but it asserts their immutability4 ,it justly asserts that what is asserted and implied in the speculative point of view1 must also have the truth of actuality2 for if to be the speculative means to be the very nature and principle of its elements1 this must likewise be present4 ,we are wrong in representing the speculative to be something existent only in thought or inwardly1 which is no one knows where4 ,it is really present1 but men of learning shut their eyes to it because of their limited point of view4 ,if we listen to their account1 they only observe and say what they see2 but their observation is not true1 for unconsciously they transform what is seen through their limited and stereotyped conception2 the strife is not due to the opposition between observation and the absolute ,notion1 but between the one ,notion and the other4 ,they show that changes--such as that of water into earth--are non-existent4 ,even in modern times this transformation was indeed maintained1 for when water was distilled1 a residuum of earth was found4 ,on this subject1 however1 ,lavoisier carried on a number of very conclusive researches2 he weighed all the receptacles1 and it was shown that the residuum proceeded from the vessels4 ,there is a superficial process that does not carry us beyond the determinate nature of substance4 ,they say in reference to it1 8water does not change into air but only into moisture1 and moisture always condenses back into water again40 ,but in this they merely fix on a one-sided1 insufficient process1 and give it out to be the absolute process4 ,in the real process of nature they1 however1 found by experience that the crystal dissolved gives water1 and in the crystal1 water is lost and solidifies1 or becomes the so-called water of crystallization2 they found that the evaporation of the earth is not to be found as moisture1 in outward form in the air1 for air remains quite pure1 or hydrogen entirely disappears in pure air2 they have sought in vain to find hydrogen in the atmospheric air4 ,similarly they discovered that quite dry air in which they can show neither moisture nor hydrogen1 passes into mist1 rain1 c4 ,these are their observations1 but they spoilt all their perceptions of changes by the fixed conception which they brought with them of whole and part1 and of consistence out of parts1 and of the previous presence as such1 of what manifests itself in coming into existence4 ,when the crystal dissolved reveals water1 they say1 8it is not that water has arisen1 for it was already present there40 ,when water in its decomposition reveals hydrogen and oxygen1 that means1 according to them1 8these last have not arisen for they were already there as such1 as the parts of which the water subsists40 ,but they can neither demonstrate water in crystal nor oxygen and hydrogen in water1 and the same is true of 8latent heat40 ,as we find in all expression of perception and experience1 as soon as men speak1 there is a ,notion present2 it cannot be withheld1 for in consciousness there always is a touch of universality and truth4 ,for the ,notion is the real principle1 but it is only to cultured reason that it is absolute ,notion1 and not if it remains1 as here1 confined in a determinate form4 ,hence these men necessarily attain to their limits1 and they are troubled because they do not find hydrogen in air2 hygrometers1 flasks full of air brought down from heights by an air-balloon1 do not show it to exist4 ,and similarly the water of crystallization is no longer water1 but is changed into earth4 ,to come back to ,heraclitus1 there is only one thing wanting to the process1 which is that its simple principle should be recognized as universal ,notion4 ,the permanence and rest which ,aristotle gives1 may be missed4 ,heraclitus1 indeed1 says that everything flows on1 that nothing is existent and only the one remains2 but that is the ,notion of the unity which only exists in opposition and not of that reflected within itself4 ,this one1 in its unity with the movement of the individuals1 is the genus1 or in its infinitude the simple ,notion as thought2 as such1 the ,idea has still to be determined1 and we shall thus find it again as the of ,anaxagoras4 ,the universal is the immediate simple unity in opposition which goes back into itself as a process of differences2 but this is also found in ,heraclitus2 he called this unity in opposition ,fate 77 or ,necessity4#fe ,and the ,notion of necessity is none other than this1 that determinateness constitutes the principle of the existent as individual1 but in that very way1 relates it to its opposite3 this is the absolute 8connection 77 that permeates the ,being of the whole40 ,he calls this 8the ethereal body1 the seed of the ,becoming of everything02#ff that to him is the ,idea1 the universal as reality1 as process at rest4 #c4 ,relation of the ,principle to ,consciousness4 ,there is still something else to consider1 and that is what position in this principle ,heraclitus gives to consciousness2 his philosophy has1 on the whole1 a bent towards a philosophy of nature1 for the principle1 although logical1 is apprehended as the universal nature-process4 ,how does this come to consciousness8 ,how is it related to the individual soul8 ,i shall explain this here in greater detail3 it is a beautiful1 natural1 childlike manner of speaking truth of the truth4 ,the universal and the unity of the principle of consciousness and of the object1 and the necessity of objectivity1 make their first appearance here4 ,several passages from ,heraclitus are preserved respecting his views of knowledge4 ,from his principle that everything that is1 at the same time is not1 it immediately follows that he holds that sensuous certainty has no truth2 for it is the certainty for which something exists as actual1 which is not so in fact4 ,not this immediate ,being1 but absolute mediation1 ,being as thought of1 ,thought itself1 is the true ,being4 ,heraclitus in this relation says of sensuous perception--according to ,clement of ,alexandria--7,strom4 ,,iii4 #c1 p4 #ebj73 8,what we see waking is dead1 but what we see sleeping1 a dream10 and in ,sextus 7adv4 ,math4 ,,vii4 #abf1 #abg71 8,men's eyes and ears are bad witnesses1 for they have barbarous souls4 ,reason 77 is the judge of truth1 not the arbitrary1 but the only divine and universal judge0--this is the measure1 the rhythm1 that runs through the ,being of everything4 ,absolute necessity is just the having the truth in consciousness2 but every thought1 or what proceeds from the individual1 every relation in which there is only form and which has the content of the ordinary idea1 is not such2 what is so is the universal understanding1 the developed consciousness of necessity1 the identity of subjective and objective4 ,heraclitus says in this connection1 according to ,diogenes 7,,ix4 #a73 8,much learning 77 does not instruct the mind1 else it had instructed ,hesiod1 ,pythagoras1 ,xenophanes and ,hecatus4 ,the only wisdom is to know the reason that reigns over all40 ,sextus 7adv4 ,math4 ,,vii4 #abg-acc71 further describes the attitude of the subjective consciousness1 of particular reason1 to the universal1 to this nature-process4 ,that attitude has still a very physical appearance1 resembling the state of mind we suppose in men who are mad or asleep4 ,the waking man is related to things in a universal way1 which is in conformity with the relation of the things and is the way in which others also regard them1 and yet he still retains his independence4 ,if1 and in so far as ,i stand in the objectively intelligent connection of this state of mind1 ,i am1 just because of this externality1 in finitude2 but waking1 ,i have the knowledge of the necessity of a connection in the form of objectivity1 the knowledge of the universal existence1 and thus the ,idea in finite form4 ,sextus puts this in definite form3 8,everything that surrounds us is logical and intelligent0--yet not therefore accompanied by consciousness4 8,if we draw this universal reality through our breath1 we shall be intelligent1 but we are so waking only1 sleeping we are in oblivion40 ,the waking consciousness of the outer world1 what belongs to the sphere of the understanding1 is rather what may be called a condition2 but here it is taken as the whole of rational consciousness4 8,for in sleep the channels of feeling are closed and the understanding that is in us is prevented from uniting 77 with the surroundings2 the breath is the only connection 77 maintained1 and it may be compared to a root40 ,this breath is thus distinguished from the universal breath1 i4e4 from the being of another for us4 ,reason is this process with the objective3 when we are not in connection with the whole1 we only dream4 8,separated1 the understanding loses the power of consciousness 7 7 that it formerly had40 ,the mind as individual unity only1 loses objectivity1 is not in individuality universal1 is not the ,thought which has itself as object4 8,in a waking condition1 however1 the understanding--gazing through the channels of sense as though it were through a window1 and forming a relationship with the surroundings--maintains the logical power40 ,we here have the ideal in its native simplicity4 8,in the same way as coals which come near fire1 themselves take fire1 but apart from it1 go out1 the part which is cut off from the surroundings in our bodies becomes1 through the separation1 almost irrational40 ,this confutes those who think that ,god gives wisdom in sleep or in somnambulism4 ,but in connection with the many channels it becomes similar to the whole4 ,this whole1 the universal and divine understanding1 in unity with which we are logical1 is1 according to ,heraclitus1 the essence of truth4 ,hence that which appears as the universal to all1 carries with it conviction1 for it has part in the universal and divine ,logos1 while what is subscribed to by an individual carries with it no conviction from the opposite cause4 ,he says in the beginning of his book on ,nature3 8,since the surroundings are reason1 men are irrational both before they hear and when they first hear4 ,for since what happens1 happens according to this reason1 they are still inexperienced when they search the sayings and the works which ,i expound1 distinguishing the nature of everything and explaining its relations4 ,but other men do not know what they do awake1 just as they forget what they do in sleep40 ,heraclitus says further3 8,we do and think everything in that we participate in the divine understanding 774 ,hence we must follow the universal understanding4 ,but many live as if they had an understanding 77 of their own2 the understanding is1 however1 nothing but interpretation0 7being conscious7 8of the manner in which all is ordered4 ,hence in so far as we participate in the knowledge 77 of it1 we are in the truth2 but in so far as we are singular 77 we are in error40 ,great and important words6 ,we cannot speak of truth in a truer or less prejudiced way4 ,consciousness as consciousness of the universal1 is alone consciousness of truth2 but consciousness of individuality and action as individual1 an originality which becomes a singularity of content or of form1 is the untrue and bad4 ,wickedness and error thus are constituted by isolating thought and thereby bringing about a separation from the universal4 ,men usually consider1 when they speak of thinking something1 that it must be something particular1 but this is quite a delusion4 ,however much ,heraclitus may maintain that there is no truth in sensuous knowledge because all that exists is in a state of flux1 and that the existence of sensuous certainty is not while it is1 he maintains the objective method in knowledge to be none the less necessary4 ,the rational1 the true1 that which ,i know1 is indeed a withdrawal from the objective as from what is sensuous1 individual1 definite and existent2 but what reason knows within itself is necessity or the universal of being2 it is the principle of thought1 as it is the principle of the world4 ,it is this contemplation of truth that ,spinoza in his ,ethics 7,p4 ,,ii4 propos4 ,,xliv41 coroll4 ,,ii4 p4 #aah1 ed4 ,paul71 calls 8a contemplation of things in the guise of eternity40 ,the being-for-self of reason is not an objectless consciousness1 or a dream1 but a knowledge1 that which is for itself2 but this being-for-self is awake1 or is objective and universal1 i4e4 is the same for all4 ,the dream is a knowledge of something of which ,i alone know2 fancy may be instanced as just such a dream4 ,similarly it is by feeling that something is for me alone1 and that ,i have something in me as in this subject2 the feeling may profess to be ever so elevated1 yet it really is the case that for me as this subject1 it is what ,i feel1 and not an object independent of me4 ,but in truth1 the object is for me something essentially free1 and ,i am for myself devoid of subjectivity2 similarly this object is no imaginary one made an object by me alone1 but is in itself a universal4 ,there are1 besides1 many other fragments of ,heraclitus1 solitary expressions1 such as his saying1 8men are mortal gods1 and gods immortal men2 living is death to the former and dying is their life40#fg ,life is the death of the gods1 death is the life of the gods2 the divine is the rising through thought above mere nature which belongs to death4 ,hence ,heraclitus also says1 according to ,sextus 7adv4 ,math4 ,,vii41 #cdi73 8the power of thinking is outside the body10 which1 in a remarkable way1 ,tennemann makes into3 8outside of men40 ,in ,sextus 7,pyrrh4 ,hyp4 ,,iii4 #bd1 #bcj7 we further read3 8,heraclitus says that both life and death are united in our life as in our death2 for if we live1 our souls are dead and buried in us1 but if we die1 our souls arise and live40 ,we may1 in fact1 say of ,heraclitus what ,socrates said3 8,what remains to us of ,heraclitus is excellent1 and we must conjecture of what is lost1 that it was as excellent40 ,or if we wish to consider fate so just as always to preserve to posterity what is best1 we must at least say of what we have of ,heraclitus1 that it is worthy of this preservation4 ,e4 ,,empedocles1 ,,leucippus ,,and ,,democritus4 ,we shall take ,leucippus and ,democritus with ,empedocles2 in them there is manifested the ideality of the sensuous and also universal determinateness or a transition to the universal4 ,empedocles was a ,pythagorean ,italian1 whose tendencies were ,ionic2 ,leucippus and ,democritus1 who incline to the ,italians1 in that they carried on the ,eleatic school1 are more interesting4 ,both these philosophers belong to the same philosophic system2 they must be taken together as regards their philosophic thought and considered thus4#fh ,leucippus is the older1 and ,democritus perfected what the former began1 but it is difficult to say what properly speaking belongs to him historically4 ,it is certainly recorded that he developed ,leucippus' thought1 and there is1 too1 some of his work preserved1 but it is not worthy of quotation4 ,in ,empedocles we see the commencement of the determination and separation of principles4 ,the becoming conscious of difference is an essential moment1 but the principles here have in part the character of physical ,being1 and though partaking also of ideal ,being1 this form is not yet thought-form4 ,on the other hand we find in ,leucippus and ,democritus the more ideal principles1 the atom and the ,nothing1 and we also find thought-determination more immersed in the objective--that is1 the beginning of a metaphysics of body2 or pure ,notions possess the significance of the material1 and thus pass over thought into objective form4 ,but the teaching is1 on the whole1 immature1 and is incapable of giving satisfaction4 #a4 ,,leucippus ,,and ,,democritus4 ,nothing is accurately known of the circumstances of ,leucippus' life1 not even where he was born4 ,some1 like ,diogenes ,laertius 7,,ix4 #cj71 make him out to be an ,eleatic2 others to have belonged to ,abdera 7because he was with ,democritus71 or to ,melos--,melos is an island not far from the ,peloponnesian coast--or else1 as is asserted by ,simplicius in writing on ,aristotle's ,physics 7p4 #g71 to ,miletus4 ,it is definitely stated that he was a disciple and a friend of ,zeno2 yet he seems to have been almost contemporaneous with him as well as with ,heraclitus4 ,it is less doubtful that ,democritus belonged to ,abdera in ,thrace1 on the ,aegean ,sea1 a town that in later times became so notorious on account of foolish actions4 ,he was born1 it would appear1 about the #hjth ,olympiad 7#dfj ,b4,c471 or ,olympiad #gg1 #c 7#dgj ,b4,c472 the first date is given by ,apollodorus 7,diog4 ,laert4 ,,ix4 #da71 the other by ,thrasyllus2 ,tennemann 7,vol4 ,i4 p4 #dae7 makes his birth to fall about the #gast ,olympiad 7#did ,b4,c474 ,according to ,diogenes ,laertius 7,,ix4 #cd71 he was forty years younger than ,anaxagoras1 lived to the time of ,socrates1 and was even younger than he--that is supposing him to have been born1 not in ,olympiad #ga1 but in ,olympiad #hj4 ,his connection with the ,abderites has been much discussed1 and many bad anecdotes are told regarding it by ,diogenes ,laertius4 ,that he was very rich1 ,valerius ,maximus 7,,viii4 #g1 ext4 #d7 judges from the fact that his father entertained the whole of ,xerxes' army on its passage to ,greece4 ,diogenes tells 7,,ix4 #ce1 #cf7 that he expended his means1 which were considerable1 on journeys to ,egypt and in penetrating into the ,east1 but this last is not authentic4 ,his possessions are stated to have amounted to a hundred talents1 and if an ,attic talent was worth about from #ajjj to #abjj thalers1 he must undoubtedly have been able to get far enough with that4 ,it is always said that he was a friend and disciple of ,leucippus1 as ,aristotle relates 7,met4 ,i4 #d71 but where they met is not told4 ,diogenes 7,,ix4 #ci7 goes on3 8,after he returned from his journeys into his own country1 he lived very quietly1 for he had consumed all his substance1 but he was supported by his brother and attained to high honour amongst his countrymen0--not through his philosophy1 but--8by some prophetic utterances4 ,according to the law1 however1 he who ran through his father's means could not have a place in the paternal burial-place4 ,to give no place to the calumniator or evil speaker0--as though he had spent his means through extravagance--8he read his work to the ,abderites1 and the latter gave him a present of #ejj talents1 had his statue publicly erected1 and buried him with great pomp when1 at #ajj years old1 he died40 ,that this was also an ,abderite jest1 those who left us this narrative1 at least1 did not see4 ,leucippus is the originator of the famous atomic system which1 as recently revived1 is held to be the principle of rational science4 ,if we take this system on its own account1 it is certainly very barren1 and there is not much to be looked for in it2 but it must be allowed that we are greatly indebted to ,leucippus1 because1 as it is expressed in our ordinary physics1 he separated the universal and the sensuous1 or the primary and the secondary1 or the essential and the nonessential qualities of body4 ,the universal quality means1 in speculative language1 the fact that the corporeal is really universally determined through the ,notion or the principle of body3 ,leucippus understood the determinate nature of ,being1 not in a superficial manner1 but in a speculative4 ,when it is said that body has those universal qualities1 such as form1 impenetrability and weight1 we think that the indeterminate conception of body is the essence1 and that its essence is something other than these qualities4 ,but speculatively1 essential existence is just universal determinations2 they are existent in themselves1 or the abstract content and the reality of existence4 ,to body as such1 there is nothing left for the determination of reality but pure singularity2 but it is the unity of opposites1 and the unity of these predicates constitutes its reality4 ,let us recollect that in the ,eleatic philosophy ,being and non-being were looked at as in opposition2 that only ,being is1 and non-being1 in which category we find motion1 change1 c41 is not4 ,being is not as yet the unity turning back1 and turned back into itself1 like ,heraclitus' motion and the universal4 ,it may be said of the point of view that difference1 change1 motion1 c41 fall within sensuous1 immediate perception1 that the assertion that only ,being is1 is as contradictory to appearances as to thought2 for the nothing1 that which the ,eleatics abolished1 is4 ,or within the ,heraclitean ,idea1 ,being and non-being are the same2 ,being is1 but non-being1 since it is one with ,being1 is as well1 or ,being is both the predicate of ,being and of non-being4 ,but ,being and non-being are both expressed as having the qualities of objectivity1 or as they are for sensuous perception1 and hence they are the opposition of full and empty4 ,leucippus says this2 he expresses as existent what was really present to the ,eleatics4 ,aristotle says 7,met4 ,i4 #d73 8,leucippus and his friend ,democritus maintain that the full and the empty are the elements1 and they call the one the existent1 and the other the non-existent2 that is1 the full and solid are the existent1 the empty and rare1 the non-existent4 ,hence they also say that ,being is no more than non-being because the empty is as well as the bodily2 and these form the material sources of everything40 ,the full has the atom as its principle4 ,the ,absolute1 what exists in and for itself1 is thus the atom and the empty 7 73 this is an important1 if at the same time1 an insufficient explanation4 ,it is not atoms as we should speak of them1 such1 for example1 as we represent to ourselves as floating in the air1 that are alone the principle1 for the intervening nothing is just as essential4 ,thus here we have the first appearance of the atomic system4 ,we must now give the further signification and determination of this principle4 a4 ,the ,logical ,principle ,the principal point of consideration is the ,one1 existent for itself3 this determination is a great principle and one which we have not hitherto had4 ,parmenides establishes ,being or the abstract universal2 ,heraclitus1 process2 the determination of being-for-self belongs to ,leucippus4 ,parmenides says that the nothing does not exist at all2 with ,heraclitus ,becoming existed only as the transition of ,being into nothing where each is negated2 but the view that each is simply at home with itself1 the positive as the self-existent one and the negative as empty1 is what came to consciousness in ,leucippus1 and became the absolute determination4 ,the atomic principle in this manner has not passed away1 for it must from this point of view always exist2 the being-for-self must in every logical philosophy#fi be an essential moment and yet it must not be put forward as ultimate4 ,in the logical progression from ,being and ,becoming to this thought-determination1 ,being as existent here and now#gj certainly first appears1 but this last belongs to the sphere of finality and hence cannot be the principle of ,philosophy4 ,thus1 though the development of ,philosophy in history must correspond to the development of logical philosophy1 there will still be passages in it which are absent in historical development4 ,for instance1 if we wished to make ,being as existent here the principle1 it would be what we have in consciousness--there are things1 these things are finite and bear a relation to one another--but this is the category of our unthinking knowledge1 of appearance4 ,being-for-self1 on the other hand1 is1 as ,being1 simple relation to itself1 but through negation of the other-,being4 ,if ,i say ,i am for myself1 ,i not only am1 but ,i negate in me all else1 exclude it from me1 in so far as it seems to me to be external4 ,as negation of other being1 which is just negation in relation to me1 being-for-self is the negation of negation and thus affirmation2 and this is1 as ,i call it1 absolute negativity in which mediation indeed is present1 but a mediation which is just as really taken away4 ,the principle of the ,one is altogether ideal and belongs entirely to thought1 even though we wish to say that atoms exist4 ,the atom may be taken materially1 but it is supersensuous1 purely intellectual4 ,in our times1 too1 more especially through the instrumentality of ,gassendi1 this conception of atoms has been renewed4 ,the atoms of ,leucippus are1 however1 not molecules1 the small particles of ,physics4 ,in ,leucippus1 according to ,aristotle1 7,de gen4 et corr4 ,i4 #h7 there is to be found the idea that 8atoms are invisible because of the smallness of their body10 which is much like the way in which molecules are now-a-days spoken of3 but this is merely a way of speaking of them4 ,the ,one can neither be seen nor shown with magnifying glasses or measures1 because it is an abstraction of thought2 what is shown is always matter that is put together4 ,it is just as futile when1 as in modern times1 men try by the microscope to investigate the inmost part of the organism1 the soul1 and think they can discover it by means of sight and feeling4 ,thus the principle of the ,one is altogether ideal1 but not in the sense of being in thought or in the head alone1 but in such a way that thought is made the true essence of things4 ,leucippus understood it so1 and his philosophy is consequently not at all empirical4 ,tennemann 7,vol4 #a1 p4 #bfa71 on the other hand1 says1 quite wrongly1 8,the system of ,leucippus is opposed to that of the ,eleatics2 he recognizes the empirical world as the only objective reality1 and body as the only kind of existence40 ,but the atom and the vacuum are not things of experience2 ,leucippus says that it is not the senses through which we become conscious of the truth1 and thereby he has established an idealism in the higher sense and not one which is merely subjective4 b4 ,the ,constitution of the ,world ,however abstract this principle might be to ,leucippus1 he was anxious to make it concrete4 ,the meaning of atom is the individual1 the indivisible2 in another form the ,one is thus individuality1 the determination of subjectivity4 ,the universal and1 on the other side1 the individual1 are great determinations which are involved in everything1 and men first know what they have in these abstract determinations1 when they recognize in the concrete that even there they are predominant4 ,to ,leucippus and ,democritus this principle1 which afterwards came to light with ,epicurus1 remained physical2 but it also appears in what is intellectual4 ,mind indeed1 is also an atom and one2 but as one within itself1 it is at the same time infinitely full4 ,in freedom1 right and law1 in exercising will1 our only concern is with this opposition of universality and individuality4 ,in the sphere of the state the point of view that the single will is1 as an atom1 the absolute1 may be maintained2 the more modern theories of the state which also made themselves of practical effect1 are of this kind4 ,the state must rest on the universal1 that is1 on the will that exists in and for itself2 if it rests on that of the individual1 it becomes atomic and is comprehended in accordance with the thought-determination of the one1 as is the case in ,rousseau's ,contrat ,social4 ,from what ,aristotle tells us in the passage last quoted1 ,leucippus' idea of all that is concrete and actual is further this3 8,the full is nothing simple1 for it is an infinitely manifold4 ,these infinitely many1 move in the vacuum1 for the vacuum exists2 their conglomeration brings about origination0 7that is1 of an existing thing1 or what is for the senses71 8disintegration and separation result in passing away40 ,all other categories are included here4 8,activity and passivity subsist in the fact1 that they are contiguous2 but their contiguity is not their becoming one1 for from that which is truly0 7abstractly7 8one there does not come a number1 nor from that which is truly many1 one40 ,or1 it may be said1 they are in fact neither passive nor active1 8for they merely abide through the vacuum0 without having as their principle1 process4 ,atoms thus are1 even in their apparent union in that which we call things1 separated from one another through the vacuum which is purely negative and foreign to them1 i4e4 their relation is not inherent in themselves1 but is with something other than them1 in which they remain what they are4 ,this vacuum1 the negative in relation to the affirmative1 is also the principle of the movement of atoms2 they are so to speak solicited by the vacuum to fill up and to negate it4 ,these are the doctrines of the atomists4 ,we see that we have reached the extreme limits of these thoughts1 for when relation comes into question1 we step beyond them4 ,being and non-being1 as something thought1 which1 when represented for consciousness as differing in regard to one another1 are the plenum and the vacuum1 have no diversity in themselves2 for the plenum has likewise negativity in itself2 as independent1 it excludes what is different2 it is one and infinitely many ones1 while the vacuum is not exclusive1 but pure continuity4 ,both these opposites1 the one and continuity1 being now settled1 nothing is easier to imagine than that atoms should float in existent continuity1 now being separated and now united2 and thus that their union should be only a superficial relation1 or a synthesis that is not determined through the inherent nature of what is united1 but in which these self-existent beings really remain separated still4 ,but this is an altogether external relationship2 the purely independent is united to the independent1 and thus a mechanical combination alone results4 ,all that is living1 spiritual1 c41 is then merely thrown together2 and change1 origination1 creation1 are simple union4 ,however highly these principles are to be esteemed as a forward step1 they at once reveal to us their total inadequacy1 as is also the case when we enter with them on further concrete determinations4 ,nevertheless1 we need not add what is in great measure added by the conception of a later date1 that once upon a time1 there was a chaos1 a void filled with atoms1 which afterwards became united and orderly1 and that the world thereby arose2 it is now and ever that what implicitly exists is the plenum and the vacuum4 ,the satisfying point of view which natural science found in such thoughts1 is just the simple fact that in these the existent is in its antithesis as what is thought and what is opposed to thought1 and is hereby what exists in and for itself4 ,the ,atomists are therefore1 generally speaking1 opposed to the idea of the creation and maintenance of this world by means of a foreign principle4 ,it is in the theory of atoms that science first feels released from the sense of having no foundation for the world4 ,for if nature is represented as created and held together by another1 it is conceived of as not existent in itself1 and thus as having its ,notion outside itself1 i4e4 its principle or origin is foreign to it and it has no principle as such1 only being conceivable from the will of another2 as it is1 it is contingent1 devoid of necessity and ,notion in itself4 ,in the conception of the atomist1 however1 we have the conception of the inherency of nature1 that is to say1 thought finds itself in it1 or its principle is in itself something thought1 and the ,notion finds its satisfaction in conceiving and establishing it as ,notion4 ,in abstract existence1 nature has its ground in itself and is simply for itself2 the atom and the vacuum are just such simple ,notions4 ,but we cannot here see or find more than the formal fact that quite general and simple principles1 the antithesis between the one and continuity1 are represented4 ,if we proceed from a wider1 richer point of view in nature1 and demand that from the atomic theory1 it1 too1 must be made comprehensible1 the satisfaction at once disappears and we see the impossibility of getting any further4 ,hence we must get beyond these pure thoughts of continuity and discontinuity4 ,for these negations1 the units1 are not in and for themselves2 the atoms are indivisible and like themselves1 or their principle is made pure continuity1 so that they may be said to come directly into one clump4 ,the conception certainly keeps them separate and gives them a sensuously represented ,being2 but if they are alike1 they are1 as pure continuity1 the same as what is empty4 ,but that which is1 is concrete and determined4 ,how then can diversity be conceived of from these principles8 ,whence comes the determinate character of plants1 colour1 form8 ,the point is1 that though these atoms as small particles may be allowed to subsist as independent1 their union becomes merely a combination which is altogether external and accidental4 ,the determinate difference is missed2 the one1 as that which is for itself1 loses all its determinateness4 ,if various matters1 electrical1 magnetic and luminous1 are assumed1 and1 at the same time1 a mechanical shifting about of molecules1 on the one hand unity is quite disregarded1 and1 on the other1 no rational word is uttered in regard to the transition of phenomena1 but only what is tautological4 ,since ,leucippus and ,democritus wished to go further1 the necessity of a more definite distinction than this superficial one of union and separation was introduced1 and they sought to bring this about by ascribing diversity to atoms1 and1 indeed1 by making their diversity infinite4 ,aristotle 7,met4 ,i4 #d7 says3 8,this diversity they sought to determine in three ways4 ,they say that atoms differ in figure1 as ,a does from ,n2 in order0 7place7 8as ,,an from ,,na2 in position0--as to whether they stand upright or lie--8as ,z from ,n4 ,from these all other differences must come40 ,we see that figure1 order and posture are again external relationships1 indifferent determinations1 i4e4 unessential relations which do not affect the nature of the thing in itself nor its immanent determinateness1 for their unity is only in another4 ,taken on its own account1 this difference is indeed inconsistent1 for as the entirely simple one1 the atoms are perfectly alike1 and thus any such diversity cannot come into question4 ,we here have an endeavour to lead the sensuous back into few determinations4 ,aristotle 7,de gen4 et corr4 ,i4 #h7 says in this connection of ,leucippus3 8,he wished to bring the conception of the phenomenal and sensuous perception nearer1 and thereby represented movement1 origination and decease1 as existent in themselves40 ,in this we see no more than that actuality from him receives its rights1 while others speak only of deception4 ,but when ,leucippus in the end represents the atom as also fashioned in itself1 he brings existence certainly so much nearer to sensuous perception1 but not to the ,notion2 we must1 indeed1 go on to fashioning1 but so far we are still a long way off from the determination of continuity and discretion4 ,aristotle 7,de sensu1 #d7 therefore says3 8,democritus1 and most of the other ancient philosophers are1 when they speak of what is sensuous1 very awkward1 because they wish to make all that is felt into something tangible2 they reduce everything to what is evident to the sense of touch1 black being rough1 and white smooth40 ,all sensuous qualities are thus only led back to form1 to the various ways of uniting molecules which make any particular thing capable of being tasted or smelt2 and this endeavour is one which is also made by the atomists of modern times4 ,the ,french particularly1 from ,descartes onward1 stand in this category4 ,it is the instinct of reason to understand the phenomenal and the perceptible1 only the way is false2 it is a quite unmeaning1 undetermined universality4 ,since figure1 order1 posture and form1 constitute the only determination of what is in itself1 nothing is said as to how these moments are experienced as colour1 and indeed variety of colour1 c42 the transition to other than mechanical determinations is not made1 or it shows itself to be shallow and barren4 ,how it was that ,leucippus1 from these poor principles of atoms and of the vacuum1 which he never got beyond1 because he took them to be the absolute1 hazarded a construction of the whole world 7which may appear to us as strange as it is empty71 ,diogenes ,laertius tells us 7,,ix4 #ca-cc7 in an account which seems meaningless enough4 ,but the nature of the subject allows of little better1 and we can do no more than observe from it the barrenness of this conception4 ,it runs thus3 8,atoms1 divergent in form1 propel themselves through their separation from the infinite1 into the great vacuum40 7,democritus adds to this1 8by means of their mutual resistance 77 and a tremulous1 swinging motion 77407#ga 8,here gathered1 they form one vortex 77 where1 by dashing together and revolving round in all sorts of ways1 the like are separated off with the like4 ,but since they are of equal weight1 when they cannot1 on account of their number1 move in any way1 the finer go into outer vacuum1 being so to speak forced out2 and the others remain together and1 being entangled1 run one against another1 and form the first round system4 ,but this stands apart like a husk that holds within it all sorts of bodies2 since these1 in pressing towards the middle1 make a vortex movement1 this encircling skin becomes thin1 because from the action of the vortex1 they are continually running together4 ,the earth arises in this way1 because these bodies1 collected in the middle1 remain together4 ,that which encircles and which is like a husk1 again becomes increased by means of the adherence of external bodies1 and since it also moves within the vortex1 it draws everything with which it comes in contact to itself4 ,the union of some of these bodies again forms a system1 first the moist and slimy1 and then the dry1 and that which circles in the vortex of the whole2 after that1 being ignited1 they constitute the substance of the stars4 ,the outer circle is the sun1 the inner the moon10 c4 ,this is an empty representation2 there is no interest in these dry1 confused ideas of circle-motion1 and of what is later on called attraction and repulsion1 beyond the fact that the different kinds of motion are looked at as the principle of matter4 c4 ,the ,soul ,finally ,aristotle relates 7,de anim4 ,i4 #b7 that in regard to the soul1 ,leucippus and ,democritus said that 8it is spherical atoms40 ,we find further from ,plutarch 7,de plac4 phil4 ,,iv4 #h7 that ,democritus applied himself to the relation borne by consciousness to the explanation1 amongst other things1 of the origin of feelings1 because with him1 the conceptions that from things fine surfaces1 so to speak1 free themselves1 and fly into the eyes1 ears1 c41 first began4 ,we see that1 thus far1 ,democritus expressed the difference between the moments of implicit ,being and ,being-for-another more distinctly4 ,for he said1 as ,sextus tells us 7adv4 ,math4 ,,vii4 #ace73 8,warmth exists according to opinion 771 and so do cold and colour1 sweet and bitter3 only the indivisible and void are truthful 7740 ,that is to say1 only the void and indivisible and their determinations are implicit2 unessential1 different ,being1 such as warmth1 c41 is for another4 ,but by this the way is at once opened up to the false idealism that means to be done with what is objective by bringing it into relation with consciousness1 merely saying of it that it is my feeling4 ,thereby sensuous individuality is1 indeed1 annulled in the form of ,being1 but it still remains the same sensuous manifold2 a sensuously notionless manifold of feeling is established1 in which there is no reason1 and with which this idealism has no further concern4 #b4 ,,empedocles4 ,the fragments of ,empedocles left1 have several times been collected4 ,sturz of ,leipzig collected above #djj verses4#gb ,peyron arranged a collection of fragments of ,empedocles and ,parmenides1#gc which was put into print in ,leipzig in #ahaj4 ,in ,wolff's ,analects1 a treatise is to be found on ,empedocles by ,ritter4 ,empedocles' birthplace was ,agrigentum in ,sicily1 while ,heraclitus belonged to ,asia ,minor4 ,we thus come back to ,italy1 for our history changes about between these two sides2 from ,greece proper1 as the middle point1 we have as yet had no philosophies at all4 ,empedocles1 according to ,tennemann 7,vol4 ,i4 p4 #dae71 flourished about the #hjth ,olympiad 7#dfj ,b4,c474 ,sturz 7pp4 #i1 #aj7 quotes ,dodwell's words3 7,de tate ,pythag4 p4 #bbj71 which indicate that ,empedocles was born in ,olympiad #gg1 #a 7#dgb ,b4,c474 ,they are as follows3 8,in the second year of the #heth ,olympiad ,parmenides had reached his #feth year1 so that ,zeno was born in the second year of the #geth ,olympiad2#gd thus he was six years older than his fellow-student ,empedocles1 for the latter was only one year old when ,pythagoras died in the first or second year of the #ggth ,olympiad40 ,aristotle says 7,met4 ,i4 #c73 8,in age ,empedocles is subsequent to ,anaxagoras1 but his works are earlier40 ,but not only did he philosophize earlier as regards time1 that is1 at a younger age1 but in reference to the stage reached by the ,notion1 his philosophy is earlier and less mature than that of ,anaxagoras4 ,from ,diogenes' accounts of his life 7,,viii4 #ei1 #fj-gc71 he also seems to have been a kind of magician and sorcerer1 like ,pythagoras4 ,during his life he was much respected by his fellow-citizens1 and1 after his death1 a statue was erected to him in his native town2 his fame extended very far4 ,he did not live apart1 like ,heraclitus1 but in the exercise of great influence on the affairs of the town of ,agrigentum1 like ,parmenides in ,elea4 ,he acquired the credit1 after the death of ,meton1 the ruler of ,agrigentum1 of bringing about a free constitution and equal rights to all citizens4 ,he likewise frustrated several attempts which were made by people of ,agrigentum to seize upon the rulership of their city2 and when the esteem of his fellow-citizens rose so high that they offered him the crown1 he rejected their offers1 and lived ever after amongst them as a respected private individual4 ,both of his life and death much which was fabulous was told4 ,seeing that he was famous in life1 we are told that he wished not to appear to die an ordinary death1 as a proof that he was not a mortal man1 but had merely passed out of sight4 ,after a feast he is said either to have suddenly disappeared1 or else to have been on ,etna with his friends1 and suddenly to have been seen of them no more4 ,but what became of him was revealed by the fact that one of his shoes was thrown up by ,etna1 and found by one of his friends2 this made it clear that he threw himself into ,etna1 thereby to withdraw himself from the notice of mankind1 and to give rise to the idea that he did not really die1 but that he was taken up amongst the gods4 ,the origin and occasion for this fable seems to lie in a poem in which there are several verses that1 taken alone1 make great professions4 ,he says1 according to ,sturz1 7p4 #ecj3 ,reliqui 1 v4 #cfd-cgf73-- 8,friends who dwell within the fort on yellow ,acragas ,and who in the best of works are busy1 ,i greet you6 ,to you ,i am an immortal god1 no more a mortal man1 ,do ye not see how that where'er ,i go1 all honour me1 ,my head being #8circled round with diadems and crowns of green8 ,when so decked out1 ,i show myself in towns of wealth1 ,men and women pray to me4 ,and thousands follow ,my steps1 to seek from me the way to bliss1 ,others ask for prophecies2 others again1 ,healing words for ailments manifold beseech4 ,but what is this to me--as though #8twere anything ,by art to conquer much corrupted man40 ,but1 taken in the context1 this laudation means that ,i am highly honoured1 but what is the value of that to me2 it expresses weariness of the honour given him by men4 ,empedocles had ,pythagoreans as pupils1 and went about with them2 he is sometimes considered to have been a ,pythagorean like ,parmenides and ,zeno1 but this is the only ground for such a statement4 ,it is a question whether he belonged to the ,league2 his philosophy has no resemblance to the ,pythagorean4 ,according to ,diogenes ,laertius 7,,viii4 #ef71 he was also called ,zeno's fellow-pupil4 ,there have1 indeed1 been many isolated reflections of a physical kind preserved to us1 as also some words of exhortation1 and in him thought as penetrating within reality1 and the knowledge of nature seem to have attained to greater breadth and compass2 we find in him1 however1 less speculative depth than in ,heraclitus1 but a ,notion more imbued with the point of view of reality1 and a culture derived from natural philosophy or the contemplation of nature4 ,empedocles is more poetic than definitely philosophical2 he is not very interesting1 and much cannot be made of his philosophy4 ,as to the particular ,notion which governs it1 and which really begins in it to appear1 we may call it ,combination or ,synthesis4 ,it is as combination that the unity of opposites first presents itself2 this ,notion1 first opening up with ,heraclitus1 is1 while in a condition of rest1 conceived of as combination1 before thought grasps the universal in ,anaxagoras4 ,empedocles' synthesis1 as a completion of the relationship1 thus belongs to ,heraclitus1 whose speculative ,idea1 though in reality1 is process1 but this is so without the individual moments in reality being mutually related as ,notions4 ,empedocles' conception of synthesis holds good to the present day4 ,he also is the originator of the common idea that has even come down to us1 of regarding the four known physical elements of fire1 air1 water1 and earth1 as fundamental2 by chemists they are certainly no longer held to be elements1 because they understand by elements a simple chemical substance4 ,i will now give ,empedocles' ideas shortly1 and draw the many units mentioned into the connection of a whole4 ,his general ideas ,aristotle#ge shortly sums up thus3 8,to the three elements1 fire1 air1 and water1 each of which was in turn considered as the principle from which everything proceeded1 ,empedocles added the ,earth as the fourth corporeal element1 saying that it is these which always remain the same1 never becoming1 but being united and separated as the more or the less1 combining into one and coming out of one40 ,carbon1 metal1 c41 are not something existing in and for itself which remains constant and never becomes2 thus nothing metaphysical is signified by them4 ,but with ,empedocles this undoubtedly is the case3 every particular thing arises through some kind of union of the four4 ,these four elements1 to our ordinary idea1 are not so many sensuous things if we consider them as universal elements2 for1 looked at sensuously1 there are various other sensuous things4 ,all that is organic1 for example1 is of another kind2 and1 further1 earth as one1 as simple1 pure earth1 does not exist1 for it is in manifold determinateness4 ,in the idea of four elements we have the elevation of sensuous ideas into thought4 ,aristotle further says in reference to the abstract ,notion of their relation to one another 7,met4 ,i4 #d71 that ,empedocles did not only require the four elements as principles1 but also ,friendship and ,strife1 which we have already met with in ,heraclitus2 it is at once evident that these are of another kind1 because they are1 properly speaking1 universal4 ,he has the four natural elements as the real1 and friendship and strife as the ideal principles1 so that six elements1 of which ,sextus#gf often speaks1 make their appearance in lines that ,aristotle 7,met4 ,,ii4 #d7 and ,sextus 7adv4 ,math4 ,,vii4 #ib7 have preserved3-- 8,with the earth1 we see the earth1 with water1 water1 ,with air1 heavenly air1 with fire1 eternal fire1 ,with love1 love is seen1 and strife with sorrowful strife40 ,through our participation in them they become for us4 ,there we have the idea that spirit1 the soul1 is itself the unity1 the very totality of elements1 in which the principle of earth relates to earth1 water to water1 love to love1 c4#gg ,in seeing fire1 the fire is in us for whom objective fire is1 and so on4 ,empedocles also speaks of the process of these elements1 but he did not comprehend it further2 the point to be remarked is that he represented their unity as a combination4 ,in this synthetic union1 which is a superficial relation devoid of ,notion1 being partly related and partly unrelated1 the contradiction necessarily results that at one time the unity of elements is established and at another1 their separation3 the unity is not the universal unity in which they are moments1 being even in their diversity one1 and in their unity different1 for these two moments1 unity and diversity1 fall asunder1 and union and separation are quite indeterminate relationships4 ,empedocles says in the first book of his poem on ,nature1 as given by ,sturz 7p4 #eag1 v4 #ajf-aji73 8,there is no such thing as a ,nature1 only a combination and separation of what is combined2 it is merely called ,nature by men40 ,that is to say1 that which constitutes anything1 as being its elements or parts1 is not as yet called its nature1 but only its determinate unity4 ,for example1 the nature of an animal is its constant and real determinateness1 its kind1 its universality1 which is simple4 ,but ,empedocles does away with nature in this sense1 for every thing1 according to him1 is the combination of simple elements1 and thus not in itself the universal1 simple and true3 this is not what is signified by us when we speak of nature4 ,now this nature in which a thing moves in accordance with its own end1 ,aristotle 7,de gen4 et corr4 ,,ii4 #f7 misses in ,empedocles2 in later times this conception was still further lost4 ,because the elements were thus existent simply in themselves1 there was1 properly speaking1 no process established in them1 for in process they are only vanishing moments1 and not existent in themselves4 ,being thus implicit1 they must have been unchangeable1 or they could not constitute themselves into a unity2 for in the one their subsistence1 or their implicit existence would be destroyed4 ,but because ,empedocles says that things subsist from these elements1 he immediately establishes their unity4 ,these are the principal points in ,empedocles' philosophy4 ,i will quote the remarks that ,aristotle 7,met4 ,i4 #d7 makes in this regard4 77 8,if we wish to follow this up1 and do so in accordance with the understanding1 not merely stumbling over it like ,empedocles1 we should say that friendship is the principle of good and strife the principle of evil1 so that in a measure we may assert that ,empedocles maintained--and was the first to do so--that the evil and the good are the absolute principles1 because the good is the principle of all good1 and the bad the principle of all evil40 ,aristotle shows the trace of universality present here2 for to him it may be termed essential in dealing with the ,notion of the principle1 that which is in and for itself4 ,but this is only the ,notion1 or the thought which is present in and for itself2 we have not yet seen such a principle1 for we find it first in ,anaxagoras4 ,if ,aristotle found the principle of motion missed in ancient philosophers1 in the ,becoming of ,heraclitus1 he again missed in ,heraclitus the still deeper principle of the ,good1 and hence wished to discover it in ,empedocles4 ,by the good the 8why0 is to be understood1 that which is an end in and for itself1 which is clearly established in itself1 which is on its own account1 and through which all else is2 the end has the determination of activity1 the bringing forth of itself1 so that it1 as end to itself1 is the ,idea1 the ,notion that makes itself objective and1 in its objectivity1 is identical with itself4 ,aristotle thus entirely controverts ,heraclitus1 because his principle is change alone1 without remaining like self1 maintaining self1 and going back within self4 77 ,aristotle also says in criticizing further the relationship and determination of these two universal principles of ,friendship and ,strife1 as of union and separation1 that 8,empedocles neither adequately made use of them nor discovered in them what they involved 7 72 for with him friendship frequently divides and strife unites4 ,that is1 when the ,all falls asunder through strife amongst the elements1 fire is thereby united into one1 and so is each of the other elements40 ,the separation of the elements which are comprised within the ,all1 is just as necessarily the union amongst themselves of the parts of each element2 that which1 on the one hand1 is the coming into separation1 as independent1 is at the same time something united within itself4 8,but when everything through friendship goes back into one1 it is necessary that the parts of each element undergo separation again40 ,the being in one is itself a manifold1 a diverse relation of the four diversities1 and thus the going together is likewise a separation4 ,this is the case generally with all determinateness1 that it must in itself be the opposite1 and must manifest itself as such4 ,the remark that1 speaking generally1 there is no union without separation1 no separation without union1 is a profound one2 identity and non-identity are thought-determinations of this kind which cannot be separated4 ,the reproach made by ,aristotle is one that lies in the nature of the thing4 ,and when ,aristotle says that ,empedocles1 although younger than ,heraclitus1 8was the first to maintain such principles1 because he did not assert that the principle of motion is one1 but that it is different and opposed10 this certainly relates to the fact that he thought it was in ,empedocles that he first found design1 although his utterances on the subject were dubious4 77 ,as to the real moments in which this ideal realizes itself1 ,aristotle further says1 8,he does not speak of them as four0--equivalents in juxtaposition--8but on the contrary as two2 fire he puts by itself on the one side1 and the three others1 earth1 air1 and water1 on the other40 ,what would be most interesting is the determination of their relationship4 77 ,in what deals with the relationship of the two ideal moments1 friendship and strife1 and of the four real elements1 there is thus nothing rational1 for ,empedocles1 according to ,aristotle 7,met4 ,,xii4 #aj71 did not properly separate1 but co-ordinated them1 so that we often see them in proximity and counted as having equal value2 but it is self-evident that ,empedocles also separated these two sides1 the real and the ideal1 and expressed thought as their relation4 77 ,aristotle says with justice 7,de gen4 et corr4 ,i4 #a7 that 8,empedocles contradicts both himself and appearances4 ,for at one time he maintains that none of the elements springs out of the other1 but all else comes from them2 and1 at another time1 he makes them into a whole through friendship1 and again destroys this unity through strife4 ,thus through particular differences and qualities1 one becomes water1 the other fire1 c4 ,now if the particular differences are taken away 7and they can be taken away since they have arisen71 it is evident that water arises from earth1 and the reverse4 ,the ,all was not yet fire1 earth1 water1 and air1 when these were still one1 so that it is not clear whether he made the one or the many to be1 properly speaking1 real existence40 ,because the elements become one1 their special character1 that through which water is water1 is nothing in itself1 that is1 they are passing into something different2 but this contradicts the statement that they are the absolute elements1 or that they are implicit4 ,he considers actual things as an intermingling of elements1 but in regard to their first origin1 he thinks that everything springs from one through friendship and strife4 ,this customary absence of thought is in the nature of synthetic conceptions2 it now upholds unity1 then multiplicity1 and does not bring both thoughts together2 as sublated1 one is also not one4#gh ,f4 ,,anaxagoras4 ,with ,anaxagoras#gi a light1 if still a weak one1 begins to dawn1 because the understanding is now recognized as the principle4 ,aristotle says of ,anaxagoras 7,met4 ,i4 #c73 8,but he who said that reason 771 in what lives as also in nature1 is the origin of the world and of all order1 is like a sober man as compared with those who came before and spoke at random 7740 ,as ,aristotle says1 hitherto philosophers may 8be compared to the fencers who fence in an unscientific way4 ,just as the latter often make good thrusts in their struggle1 though not by any skill1 these philosophers seem to speak without any knowledge of what they say40 ,now if ,anaxagoras1 as a sober man amongst drunkards1 was the first to reach this consciousness--for he says that pure thought is the actually existent universal and true--he yet1 to a considerable extent1 still thrusts into space4 ,the connection of his philosophy with what precedes is as follows3 ,in ,heraclitus' ,idea as motion1 all moments are absolutely vanishing4 ,empedocles represents the gathering together of this motion into a unity1 but into a synthetic unity2 and with ,leucippus and ,democritus it is the same4 ,with ,empedocles1 however1 the moments of this unity are the existent elements of fire1 water1 c41 and with the others1 pure abstractions1 implicit being1 thoughts4 ,but in this way universality is directly asserted1 for the opposing elements have no longer any sensuous support4 ,we have had ,being1 ,becoming1 the ,one1 as principles2 they are universal thoughts and not sensuous1 nor are they figures of the imagination2 the content and its parts are1 however1 taken from what is sensuous1 and they are thoughts in some sort of a determination4 ,anaxagoras now says that it is not gods1 sensuous principles1 elements1 or thoughts--which really are determinations of reflection--but that it is the ,universal1 ,thought itself1 in and for itself1 without opposition1 all embracing1 which is the substance or the principle4 ,the unity as universal1 returns from the opposition into itself1 while in the synthesis of ,empedocles1 what is opposed is still apart from it and independent1 and ,thought is not ,being4 ,here1 however1 ,thought as pure1 free process in itself1 is the self-determining universal1 and is not distinguished from conscious thought4 ,in ,anaxagoras quite new ground is thus opened up4 ,anaxagoras concludes this period1 and after him a fresh one begins4 ,in accordance with the favourite idea of there being a genealogical descent of principles from the teacher to the taught1 because he was an ,ionian1 he is often represented as perpetuating the ,ionic school1 and as an ,ionic philosopher3 ,hermotimus of ,clazomen1 too1 was his teacher4 ,to support this theory ,diogenes ,laertius 7,,ii4 #f7 makes him a disciple of ,anaximenes1 whose birth is1 however1 placed in ,ol4 #ee-eh1 or about sixty years earlier than that of ,anaxagoras4 ,aristotle says 7,met4 ,i4 #c7 that ,anaxagoras first began by these determinations to express absolute reality as understanding4 ,aristotle and others after him1 such as ,sextus 7adv4 ,math4 ,,ix4 #g71 mention the bare fact that ,hermotimus gave rise to this conception1 but it was clearly due to ,anaxagoras4 ,little is gained if such a fact were true1 since we learn no more about the philosophy of ,hermotimus2 it cannot have been much4 ,others have made numerous historical researches respecting this ,hermotimus4 ,the name we have already mentioned amongst those of whom it is said that ,pythagoras existed in them before he lived as ,pythagoras4 ,we also have a story of ,hermotimus to the effect that he possessed the peculiar gift of being able to make his soul quit his body4 ,but this did him bad service in the end1 since his wife1 with whom he had a dispute1 and who besides knew very well how matters stood1 showed to their acquaintances this soul-deserted body as dead1 and it was burnt before the soul reinstated itself--which soul must have been astonished4#hj ,it is not worth while to investigate what lies at the ground of these ancient stories1 i4e4 into how we should regard the matter3 we may think of it as implying a state of ecstasy4 ,we must consider the life of ,anaxagoras before his philosophy4 ,anaxagoras1 according to ,diogenes 7,,ii4 #g71 born in ,ol4 #gj 7#ejj ,b4,c471 comes earlier than ,democritus1 and in age also precedes ,empedocles1 yet1 on the whole1 he was contemporaneous with these1 as also with ,parmenides2 he was as old as ,zeno1 and lived somewhat earlier than ,socrates1 but still they were acquainted with one another4 ,his native town was ,clazomen1 in ,lydia1 not very far from ,colophon and ,ephesus1 and situated on an isthmus by which a great peninsula is connected with the mainland4 ,his life is shortly summed up in the statement that he devoted himself to the study of the sciences1 withdrew from public affairs2 according to ,valerius ,maximus 7,,viii4 #g1 extr4 #f7 he made numerous journeys1 and finally1 according to ,tennemann 7,vol4 ,i4 pp4 #cjj1 #dae71 in the forty-fifth year of his age1 in the #hast ,olympiad 7#def ,b4,c471 and at a propitious time1 he came to ,athens4 ,with him we thus find ,philosophy in ,greece proper1 where so far there had been none1 and coming1 indeed1 as far as ,athens2 hitherto either ,asia ,minor or ,italy had been the seat of ,philosophy1 though1 when the inhabitants of ,asia ,minor fell under ,persian rule1 with their loss of freedom1 it expired amongst them4 ,anaxagoras1 himself a native of ,asia ,minor1 lived in the important period between the war of the ,medes and the age of ,pericles1 principally in ,athens1 which had now reached the zenith of its greatness1 for it was both the head of ,grecian power1 and the seat and centre of the arts and sciences4 ,athens1 after the ,persian wars1 brought the greater part of the ,greek islands into subjection1 as also a number of maritime towns in ,thrace1 and even further into the ,black ,sea4 ,as the greatest artists collected in ,athens1 so also did the most noted philosophers and sophists live there--a circle of luminaries in the arts and sciences such as we have in schylus1 ,sophocles1 ,aristophanes1 ,thucydides1 ,diogenes of ,apollonia1 ,protagoras1 ,anaxagoras1 and others from ,asia ,minor4 ,pericles then ruled the ,state1 and raised it to that height of splendour which may be called the golden age in ,athenian life2 ,anaxagoras1 although living in the most flourishing time of ,athenian life1 touches on its decay1 or rather reaches the first threatening of that decay1 which ended in a total extermination of this beautiful life4 ,what is of special interest at this time is the opposition between ,athens and ,lacedmon1 the two ,greek nations which contended with one another for the foremost place in ,greece2 here we must therefore allude to the principles of these celebrated ,states4 ,while the ,lacedmonians had no arts or sciences1 ,athens had to thank the character of its constitution1 and of its whole spirit1 for the fact that it was the seat of the sciences and fine arts4 ,but the constitution of ,lacedmon is also worthy of high esteem1 for it regulated and restrained the high ,doric spirit1 and its principal feature was that all personal peculiarity was subordinated1 or rather sacrificed1 to the general aim of the life of the ,state1 and the individual had the consciousness of his honour and sufficiency only in the consciousness of working for the ,state4 ,a people of such genuine unity1 in whom the will of the individual had1 properly speaking1 quite disappeared1 were united by an indestructible bond1 and ,lacedmon was hence placed at the head of ,greece1 and obtained the leadership1 which1 we find1 it held among the ,argives in the days of ,troy4 ,this is a great principle which must exist in every true ,state1 but which with the ,lacedmonians retained its one-sided character2 this one-sidedness was avoided by the ,athenians1 and by that means they became the greater4 ,in ,lacedmon personality proper was so much disregarded that the individual could not have free development or expression2 individuality was not recognized1 and hence not brought into harmony with the common end of the ,state4 ,this abrogation of the rights of subjectivity1 which1 expressed in his own way1 is also found in ,plato's ,republic1 was carried very far with the ,lacedmonians4 ,but the universal is living spirit only in so far as the individual consciousness finds itself as such within it2 the universal is not constituted of the immediate life and being of the individual1 the mere substance1 but formed of conscious life4 ,as individuality which separates itself from the universal is powerless and falls to the ground1 the one-sided universal1 the morality of individuality cannot stand firm4 ,the ,lacedmonian spirit1 which had not taken into account the freedom of consciousness1 and whose universal had isolated itself therefrom1 had hence to see it break forth in opposition to the universal2 and though the first to come forward as the liberators of ,greece from its tyranny were the ,spartans1 whom even ,athens thanks for the expulsion of the descendants of ,pisistratus1 their relationship to their confederates soon passes into that of common1 mean1 tyranny4 ,within the ,state it likewise ends in a harsh aristocracy1 just as the fixed equilibrium of property 7each family retaining its inheritance1 and through forbidding the possession of money1 or trade and commerce1 preventing the possibility of inequality in riches7 passes into an avarice which1 as opposed to this universal1 is brutal and mean4 ,this essential moment of particularity1 not being taken into the ,state1 and hence not made legal and moral 7moral first of all71 comes forth as vice4 ,in a rational organization all the elements of the ,idea are present2 if the liver were isolated as bile it would become not more1 and not less active1 but becoming antagonistic1 it would isolate itself from the corporate economy of the body4 ,solon1 on the contrary1 gave to the ,athenians not only equality of laws and unity of spirit in their constitution 7which was a purer democracy than in ,sparta71 but although each citizen had his substantial consciousness in unity with the laws of the ,state1 he also gave free play to the individual mind1 so that each might do as he would1 and might find expression for himself4 ,solon entrusted the executive to the people1 not to the ,ephors1 and this became self-government after the displacement of the tyrants1 and thus in truth a free people arose2 the individual had the whole within himself1 as he had his consciousness and action in the whole4 ,thus we see in this principle the formation of free consciousness and the freedom of individuality in its greatness4 ,the principle of subjective freedom appears at first1 however1 still in unison with the universal principle of ,greek morality as established by law1 and even with mythology2 and thus in its promulgation1 because the genius of its conceptions could develop freely1 it brought about these masterpieces in the beautiful plastic arts1 and the immortal works of poetry and history4 ,the principle of subjectivity had1 thus far1 not taken the form that particularity1 as such1 should be set free1 and that its content should be a subjectively particular1 at least distinguished from the universal principle1 universal morality1 universal religion1 universal laws4 ,thus we do not see the carrying out of isolated ideas1 but the great1 moral1 solid1 divine content made in these works object for consciousness1 and generally brought before consciousness4 ,later we shall find the form of subjectivity becoming free for itself1 and appearing in opposition to the substantial1 to morality1 religion1 and law4 ,the basis of this principle of subjectivity1 though it is still a merely general one1 we now see in ,anaxagoras4 ,but amongst this noble1 free1 and cultured people of ,athens1 he who had the happiness to be first1 was ,pericles1 and this circumstance raised him in the estimation of the individual to a place so high that few could reach it4 ,of all that is great amongst men1 the power of ruling over the will of men who have but one will1 is the greatest1 for this controlling individuality must be both the most universal and the most living--a lot for a mortal being than which hardly any better can be found4 ,his individuality was1 according to ,plutarch1 7in ,pericle #e7 as deep as it was perfect2 as serious 7he never laughed71 as full of energy and restfulness3 ,athens had him the whole day long4 ,thucydides has preserved some of ,pericles' speeches to the people which allow of few works being compared to them4 ,under ,pericles the highest culture of the moral commonwealth is to be found1 the juncture where individuality is still under and also in the universal4 ,presently individuality prevails1 because its activity falls into extremes1 since the state as state1 is not yet independently organized within itself4 ,because the essence of the ,athenian ,state was the common spirit1 and the religious faith of individuals in this constituted their essence1 there disappears with the disappearance of this faith1 the inner ,being of the people1 since the spirit is not in the form of the ,notion as it is in our states4 ,the speedy transition to this last is the 1 subjectivity1 as ,being1 self-reflection4 ,when ,anaxagoras at this time1 the principle of which has just been given1 came to ,athens1 he was sought out by ,pericles1 and1 as his friend1 lived in very intimate relations with him1 before the latter occupied himself with public affairs4 ,but ,plutarch 7in ,pericle #d1 #af7 also relates that ,anaxagoras came to want because ,pericles neglected him--did not supply the illuminating lamp with oil4 ,a more important matter is that ,anaxagoras 7as happened later with ,socrates and many other philosophers7 was accused of despising those whom the people accepted as gods4 ,the prose of the understanding came into contact with the poetic1 religious point of view4 ,it is distinctly said by ,diogenes ,laertius 7,,ii4 #ab7 that ,anaxagoras believed the sun and stars to be burning stones2 and he is1 according to ,plutarch1 7in ,pericle1 #f7 blamed for having explained something that the prophets stated to be a marvellous omen1 in a natural way2 it quite tallies with this that he is said to have foretold that on the day of gos-,potamos1 where the ,athenians lost their last fleet against ,lysander1 a stone should fall from heaven4#ha ,the general remark might be made of ,thales1 ,anaximander1 c41 that the sun1 moon1 earth and stars were counted as mere things1 i4e4 as objects external to mind1 and that they no longer held them to be living gods1 but represented them in different ways--which ideas1 for the rest1 deserve no further consideration1 since these matters belong properly to ordinary learning4 ,things may be derived from thought2 thought really brings about the result that certain objects which may be called divine1 and certain conceptions of these which may be called poetic1 together with the whole range of superstitious beliefs1 are demolished--they are brought down to being what are called natural things4 ,for in thought1 as the identity of itself and of ,being1 mind knows itself as the truly actual1 so that for mind in thought1 the unspiritual and material is brought down to being mere things1 to the negative of mind4 ,all the ideas of those philosophers have this in common1 that nature is through them undeified2 they brought the poetic view of nature down to the prosaic1 and destroyed the poetic point of view which ascribes to all that is now considered to be lifeless1 a life proper to itself1 perhaps also sensation1 and1 it may be1 a being after the usual order of consciousness4 ,the loss of this point of view is not to be lamented as if unity with nature1 pure faith1 innocent purity and childlike spirit went with it4 ,innocent and childlike it may certainly have been1 but reason is just the going forth from such innocence and unity with nature4 ,so soon as mind grasps itself1 is for itself1 it must for that very reason confront the #8other' of itself as a negation of consciousness1 i4e4 look on it as something devoid of mind1 an unconscious and lifeless thing1 and it must first come to itself through this opposition4 ,there is in this a fixing of self-moving things such as are met with in the myths of the ancients1 who relate such tales as that the ,argonauts secured the rocks on the ,straits of the ,hellespont which formerly moved like scissors4 ,similarly progressive culture consolidated that which formerly was thought to have its own motion and life in itself1 and made it into unmoving matter4 ,this transition of the mythical point of view into the prosaic1 here comes to be recognized by the ,athenians4 ,a prosaic point of view such as this1 assumes that man has requirements quite different from those he formerly had2 in this we find traces of the powerful1 necessary conversion brought about in the ideas of man through the strengthening of thought1 through knowledge of himself1 and through ,philosophy4 ,the institution of charges of atheism1 which we shall touch upon more fully in dealing with ,socrates1 is1 in ,anaxagoras' case1 quite comprehensible1 from the specific reason that the ,athenians1 who were envious of ,pericles1 who contended with him for the first place1 and who did not venture to proceed against him openly1 took his favourites to law1 and sought through charges against his friend1 to injure him4 ,thus his friend ,aspasia was brought under accusation1 and the noble ,pericles had1 according to ,plutarch 7in ,pericle1 #cb71 in order to save her from condemnation1 to beg the individual citizens of ,athens with tears for her acquittal4 ,the ,athenian people in their freedom1 demanded such acts of the potentates to whom they allowed supremacy1 for thereby an acknowledgment was given of their subordination to the people2 they thus made themselves the ,nemesis in respect to the high place accorded to the great1 for they placed themselves in a position of equality with these1 while these again made evident their dependence1 subjection and powerlessness before the others4 ,what is told about the result of this charge against ,anaxagoras is quite contradictory and uncertain3 ,pericles certainly saved him from condemnation to death4 ,he was either1 as some say1 condemned only to banishment after ,pericles had led him before the people1 speaking and entreating for him1 after1 by reason of his age1 attenuation and weakness the sympathy of the people had been aroused2 or else1 as others say1 with the help of ,pericles1 he escaped from ,athens and was in absence condemned to death1 the judgment never being executed upon him4 ,others again say that he was liberated1 but from the vexation that he felt respecting these charges1 and from apprehension as to their repetition1 he voluntarily left ,athens4 ,and at about sixty or seventy years of age1 he died in ,lampsacus in the #hhth ,olympiad 7#dbh ,b4,c474#hb #a4 ,the ,universal ,principle4 ,the logical principle of ,anaxagoras was that he recognized the as the simple1 absolute essence of the world4 ,the simplicity of the is not a ,being but a universality which is distinguished from itself1 though in such a way that the distinction is immediately sublated and the identity is set forth for itself4 ,this universal for itself1 sundered1 exists in purity only as thought2 it exists also in nature as objective existence1 but in that case no longer purely for itself1 but as having particularity as an immediate in it4 ,space and time are1 for example1 the most ideal1 universal facts in nature as such1 but there is no pure space1 no pure time and motion any more than any pure matter--for this universal is immediately defined space1 air1 earth1 c4 ,in thought1 when ,i say1 ,i am ,i1 or ,i ,i1 ,i certainly distinguish something from me1 but the pure unity remains2 there is no movement but a distinction which is not distinguished1 or the being-for-me4 ,and in all that ,i think1 if the thought has a definite content1 it is my thought3 ,i am thus known to myself in this object4 ,this universal which thus exists for itself and the individual1 or thought and being1 thus1 however1 come into definite opposition4 ,here the speculative unity of this universal with the individual should be considered as it is posited as absolute unity1 but the comprehension of the ,notion itself is certainly not found with the ancients4 ,we need not expect a pure ,notion such as one of an understanding realizing itself into a system1 organized as a universe4 ,how ,anaxagoras enunciated the ,notion of the 1 ,aristotle 7,de anim4 ,i4 #b7 goes on to tell3 8,anaxagoras maintains that the soul is the principle of movement4 ,yet he does not always express himself fully about the soul and 3 he seems to separate and soul from one another1 and still he makes use of them as though they were the same existence1 only that by preference he makes the the principle of everything4 ,he certainly speaks frequently of the as of the cause of the beautiful and right1 but another time he calls it the soul4 ,for it is in all animals1 in large as well as small1 the higher kind and the lower2 it alone of all existence is the simple1 unadulterated and pure2 it is devoid of pain and is not in community with any other40#hc ,what we therefore have to do is to show from the principle of motion1 that it is the self-moving2 and this thought is1 as existent for itself4 ,as soul1 the self-moving is only immediately individual2 the 1 however1 as simple1 is the universal4 ,thought moves on account of something3 the end is the first simple which makes itself result2 this principle with the ancients is grasped as good and evil1 i4e4 end as positive and negative4 ,this determination is a very important one1 but with ,anaxagoras it was not fully worked out4 ,while in the first place the principles are material1 from these ,aristotle then distinguishes determination and form1 and thirdly he finds in the process of ,heraclitus1 the principle of motion4 ,then in the fourth place there comes the reason why1 the determination of end1 with the 2 this is the concrete in itself4 ,aristotle adds in the above-mentioned passage 7p4 #aib71 8according to these men0 7the ,ionians and others7 8and in reference to such causes0 7water1 fire1 c471 8since they are not sufficient to beget the nature of things1 the philosophers are1 as already said1 compelled by the truth to go on to the principle following 774 ,for neither the earth nor any other principle is capable of explaining the fact that while on the one hand all is good and beautiful1 on the other1 something else is produced1 and those men do not seem to have thought that this was so2 nor is it seemly to abandon such matters to hazard 77 and to chance40 ,goodness and beauty express the simple restful ,notion1 and change the ,notion in its movement4 ,with this principle comes the determination of an understanding as of self-determining activity2 this has hitherto been wanting1 for the ,becoming of ,heraclitus1 which is only process1 is not yet as fate1 the independently self-determining4 ,by this we must not represent to ourselves subjective thought2 in thinking we think immediately of our thought as it is in consciousness4 ,here1 on the contrary1 quite objective thought is meant1 active understanding--as we say1 there is reason in the world1 or we speak of genera in nature which are the universal4 ,the genus animal is the substantial of the dog2 the dog itself is this2 the laws of nature are themselves nature's immanent essence4 ,the nature is not formed from without as men make a table2 this is also made with understanding1 but through an understanding outside of this wood4 ,this external form1 which is called the understanding1 immediately occurs to us in speaking of the understanding2 but here the universal is meant1 that which is the immanent nature of the object itself4 ,the is thus not a thinking existence from without which regulates the world2 by such the meaning present to ,anaxagoras would be quite destroyed and all its philosophic interest taken away4 ,for to speak of an individual1 a unit from without1 is to fall into the ordinary conception and its dualism2 a so-called thinking principle is no longer a thought1 but is a subject4 ,but still the true universal is for all that not abstract1 but the universal is just the determining in and out of itself of the particular in and for itself4 ,in this activity1 which is independently self-determining1 the fact is at once implied that the activity1 because it constitutes process1 retains itself as the universal self-identical4 ,fire1 which1 according to ,heraclitus1 was process1 dies away and merely passes over1 without independent existence1 into the opposite2 it is certainly also a circle and a return to fire1 but the principle does not retain itself in its determinateness as the universal1 seeing that a simple passing into the opposite takes place4 ,this relation to itself in determination which we see appearing in ,anaxagoras1 now1 however1 contains the determination of the universal though it is not formally expressed1 and therein we have the end or the ,good4 ,i have just recently 7p4 #caf7 spoken of the ,notion of the end1 yet by that we must not merely think of the form of the end as it is in us1 in conscious beings4 ,at first1 end1 in as far as ,i have it1 is my conception1 which is for itself1 and the realization of which depends on my wish2 if ,i carry it out1 and if ,i am not unskilful1 the object produced must be conformable to the end1 containing nothing but it4 ,there is a transition from subjectivity to objectivity through which this opposition is always again sublated4 ,because ,i am discontented with my end in that it is only subjective1 my activity consists in removing this defect and making it objective4 ,in objectivity the end has retained itself2 for instance1 if ,i have the end in view of building a house and am active for that end1 the house results in which my end is realized4 ,but we must not1 as we usually do1 abide at the conception of this subjective end2 in this case both ,i and the end exist independently and externally in relation to each other4 ,in the conception that ,god1 as wisdom1 rules the world in accordance with an end1 for instance1 the end is posited for itself in a wise1 figuratively conceiving ,being4 ,but the universal of end is the fact that since it is a determination independently fixed1 that rules present existence1 the end is the truth1 the soul of a thing4 ,the ,good in the end gives content to itself1 so that while it is active with this content1 and after it has entered into externality1 no other content comes forth than what was already present4 ,the best example of this is presented in life2 it has desires1 and these desires are its ends2 as merely living1 however1 it knows nothing of these ends1 but yet they are first1 immediate determinations which are established4 ,the animal works at satisfying these desires1 i4e4 at reaching the end2 it relates itself to external things1 partly mechanically1 partly chemically4 ,but the character of its activity does not remain mechanical or chemical2 the product is rather the animal itself1 which1 as its own end1 brings forth in its activity only itself1 since it negates and overturns those mechanical or chemical relationships4 ,in mechanical and chemical process1 on the other hand1 the result is something different1 in which the subject does not retain itself2 but in the end1 beginning and end are alike1 for we posit the subjective objectively in order to receive it again4 ,self-preservation is a continual production by which nothing new1 but always the old1 arises2 it is a taking back of activity for the production of itself4 ,thus this self-determining activity1 which is then active on something else1 enters into opposition1 but it again negates the opposition1 governs it1 in it reflects upon itself2 it is the end1 the thought1 that which conserves itself in its self-determination4 ,the development of these moments is the business of ,philosophy from henceforth4 ,but if we look more closely as to how far ,anaxagoras has got in the development of this thought1 we find nothing further than the activity determining from out of itself1 which sets up a limit or measure2 further than the determination of measure1 development does not go4 ,anaxagoras gives us no more concrete definition of the 1 and this we are still left to consider2 we thus have nothing more than the abstract determination of the concrete in itself4 ,the above-mentioned predicates which ,anaxagoras gives the 1 may thus indeed be affirmed1 but they are1 on their own account1 one-sided only4 #b4 ,the ,homomeri4 ,this is the one side in the principle of ,anaxagoras2 we now have to consider the going forth of the into further determinations4 ,this remaining part of the philosophy of ,anaxagoras at first1 however1 makes us think that the hopes in which such a principle justified us must be very much diminished4 ,on the other side1 this universal is confronted by ,being1 matter1 the manifold generally1 potentiality as distinguished from the former as actuality4 ,for if the ,good or the end is also determined as potentiality1 the universal1 as the self-moving1 may rather be called the actual in itself1 the being-for-self1 as opposed to implicit being1 potentiality1 passivity4 ,aristotle says in an important passage 7,met4 ,i4 #h73 8,if any one should say of ,anaxagoras that he adopted two principles1 he would rest his statement on a point respecting which the latter never really clearly defined himself1 but which he had necessarily to acknowledge to those who adduced it4444 ,that is1 ,anaxagoras says that originally everything is mingled4444 ,but where nothing is yet separated1 no distinguishing feature is present2 such substance is neither a white1 black1 gray1 nor any other colour1 but colourless2 it has no quality nor quantity nor determination 774 ,all is mingled except the 2 this is unmingled and pure4 ,with this in view1 it thus occurs to him to denominate as principles the one1 for it alone is single and unmingled1 and the other-being 771 what we call the indeterminate1 before it has become determined or partakes of any kind of form40 ,this other principle is celebrated under the name of homomeries 771 of like parts or homogeneous1 in ,aristotle's rendering 7,met4 ,i4 #c1 #g72 ,riemer translates 8the similarity of individual parts to the whole10 and 8the elementary matter10 yet this latter word seems to be of a later origin4#hd ,aristotle says1 8,anaxagoras sets forth0 7in respect of the material7 8infinitely many principles1 for he maintained that1 like water and fire in ,empedocles' system1 nearly all that is formed of like parts only arises from union and passes away through separation2 other arising and passing away there is none1 for equal parts remain eternal40 ,that is1 the existent1 the individual matter1 such as bones1 metal1 flesh1 c41 in itself consists of parts like itself--flesh of small particles of flesh1 gold of small gold particles1 c4 ,thus he said at the beginning of his work1 8,all has been alike0 7i4e4 unseparated as in a chaos71 8and has rested for an infinitude of time2 then came the 1 and it brought in movement1 separated and brought order into the separated creation 771 in that it united the like40#he ,the homomeri become clearer if we compare them with the conceptions of ,leucippus and ,democritus and others4 ,in ,leucippus and ,democritus1 as well as ,empedocles1 we saw this matter1 or the absolute as objective existence1 determined so that simple atoms--with the latter the four elements and with the former infinitely many--were set forth as separate only in form2 their syntheses and combinations were existing things4 ,aristotle 7,de clo1 ,,iii4 #c7 says further on this point1 8,anaxagoras asserts of the elements the opposite to ,empedocles4 ,for the latter takes as original principles1 fire1 air1 earth1 and water1 through whose union all things arise4 ,on the other hand1 ,anaxagoras maintains what are of like parts such as flesh1 bones1 or the like to be simple materials2 such things as water and fire1 on the contrary1 are a mixture of the original elements4 ,for any one of these four consists of the infinite admixture of all invisible1 existing things of like parts1 which hence come forth from these40 ,the principle held good for him as for the ,eleatics1 that 8the like only comes out of the like2 there is no transition into the opposite1 no union of opposites possible40 ,all change is hence to him only a separation and union of the like2 change as true change1 would be a ,becoming out of the negative of itself4 8,that is1 because ,anaxagoras10 says ,aristotle 7,phys4 ,i1 #d71 8partook of the view of all physicists that it is impossible that anything can come out of nothing1 there was nothing left but to admit that what becomes was already present as an existent1 but that1 on account of its small size1 it was imperceptible to us40 ,this point of view is also quite different from the conception of ,thales and ,heraclitus1 in which1 not only the possibility1 but the actuality of the transformation of these like qualitative differences is essentially maintained4 ,but to ,anaxagoras with whom the elements are a mingled chaos formed therefrom1 having only an apparent uniformity1 concrete things arise through the severance of these infinitely many principles from such a chaos1 since like finds like4 ,respecting the difference between ,empedocles and ,anaxagoras1 there is further what ,aristotle adds in the same place3 8,the former allows a change 77 in these conditions1 the latter only their one appearance40 ,the conception of ,democritus is similar to that of ,anaxagoras in so far as that an infinite manifold is the original source4 ,but with ,anaxagoras the determination of the fundamental principles appears to contain that which we consider as organized1 and to be by no means an independently existent simple2 thus perfectly individualized atoms such as particles of flesh and of gold1 form1 through their coming together1 that which appears to be organized4 ,that comes near our ordinary ideas4 ,means of nourishment1 it is thought1 contain such parts as are homogeneous to blood1 flesh1 c4 ,anaxagoras hence says1 according to ,aristotle 7,de gen4 anim4 ,i4 #ah71 8,flesh comes to flesh through food40 ,digestion is thus nothing more than the taking up of the homogeneous and separation of the heterogeneous2 all nourishment and growth is thus not true assimilation but only increase1 because each internal organ of the animal only draws its parts to itself out of the various plants1 bodies1 c4 ,death is1 on the other hand1 the separation of the like and the mingling with the heterogeneous4 ,the activity of the 1 as the sundering of the like out of the chaos and the putting together of the like1 as also the setting at liberty again of this like1 is certainly simple and relative to itself1 but purely formal and thus for itself contentless4 ,this is the general standpoint of the philosophy of ,anaxagoras1 and quite the same standpoint which in more recent times reigns in chemistry for instance2 flesh is certainly no longer regarded as simple1 but as being hydrogen1 c4 ,the chemical elements are oxygen1 hydrogen1 carbon and metals1 c4 ,chemistry says1 if you want to know what flesh1 wood1 stone1 c41 really are1 you must set forth their simple elements1 and these are ultimate4 ,it also says that much is only relatively simple1 e4g4 platinum consists of three or four metals4 ,water and air were similarly long held to be simple1 but chemistry at length analyzed them4 ,from this chemical point of view1 the simple principles of natural things are determined as infinitely qualitative and thus accepted as unchangeable and invariable1 so that all else consists only of the combination of these simples4 ,man1 according to this1 is a collection of carbon and hydrogen1 some earth1 oxides1 phosphorus1 c4 ,it is a favourite idea of the physicists to place in the water or in the air1 oxygen and carbon1 which exist and only require to be separated4 ,this idea of ,anaxagoras certainly also differs from modern chemistry2 that which we consider as concrete1 is for him qualitatively determined or elementary4 ,yet he allows1 with regard to flesh1 that the parts are not all alike4 8,for this reason1 they say10 remarks ,aristotle 7,phys4 ,i4 #d2 ,met4 ,,iv4 #e71--;but not particularly of ,anaxagoras--8everything is contained in everything1 for they saw everything arise out of everything3 it only appears to be different and is called different in accordance with the predominating number of the particular kind of parts which have mingled themselves with others4 ,in truth the whole is not white1 or black1 or sweet1 or flesh1 or bones2 but the homomeri which have most accumulated in any place1 bring about the result that the whole appears to us as this determinate40 ,as thus each thing contains all other things1 water1 air1 bones1 fruits1 c41 on the other hand1 the water contains flesh as flesh1 bones1 c4 ,into this infinitely manifold nature of the principles1 ,anaxagoras thus goes back2 the sensuous has first arisen through the accumulation of all those parts1 and in it the one kind of parts then has a predominance4 ,while he defines absolute existence as universal1 we see here that in objective existence1 or in matter1 universality and thought abandon ,anaxagoras4 ,the implicit is to him1 indeed1 no absolutely sensuous ,being2 the homomeri are the non-sensuous1 i4e4 the invisible and inaudible1 c4 ,this is the highest point reached by common physicists in passing from sensuous ,being to the non-sensuous1 as to the mere negation of the being-for-us2 but the positive side is that existent ,being is itself universal4 ,the objective is to ,anaxagoras certainly the 1 but for him the other-,being is a mixture of simple elements1 which are neither flesh nor fish1 red nor blue2 again this simple is not simple in itself1 but in its essence consists of homomeri1 which are1 however1 so small that they are imperceptible4 ,the smallness thus does not take away their existence1 for they are still there2 but existence is just the being perceptible to sight1 smell1 c4 ,these infinitely small homomeri undoubtedly disappear in a more complete conception2 flesh1 for instance1 is such itself1 but it is also a mixture of everything1 i4e4 it is not simple4 ,further analysis equally shows how such a conception must1 to a greater or lesser degree1 become confused2 on the one side each form is thus in its main elements1 original1 and these parts together constitute a corporeal whole2 this whole has1 however1 on the other side1 to contain everything in itself4 ,the 1 then1 is only what binds and separates1 what divides and arranges das diakosmirende4 ,this may suffice us2 however easily we may get confused with the homomeri of ,anaxagoras1 we must hold fast to the main determination4 ,the homomeri still form a striking conception1 and it may be asked how it conforms with the rest of ,anaxagoras' principle4 #c4 ,the ,relation of the ,two4 ,now as to the relation of the to that matter1 both are not speculatively posited as one1 for the relation itself is not set forth as one1 nor has the ,notion penetrated it4 ,here the ideas become in some measure superficial1 and in some measure the conceptions are more consistent as regards the particular1 than they at first appear4 ,because the understanding is the self-determining1 the content is end1 it retains itself in relation to what is different2 it does not arise and pass away although it is in activity4 ,the conception of ,anaxagoras that concrete principles subsist and retain themselves1 is thus consistent2 he abolishes arising and passing away and accepts only an external change1 a uniting together1 and a severance of what is so united4 ,the principles are concrete and have content1 i4e4 so many ends2 in the change that takes place the principles really retain themselves4 ,like only goes with like even if the chaotic mixture is a combination of the unlike2 but this is only a combination and not an individual1 living form which maintains itself1 binding like to like4 ,thus1 however rude these ideas are1 they are still really in harmony with the 4 ,but if the is with ,anaxagoras the moving soul in all1 it yet remains to the real1 as the soul of the world and the organic system of the whole1 a mere word4 ,for the living as living1 since the soul was conceived of as principle1 the ancients demanded no further principle 7for it is the self-moving71 but for determinateness1 which the animal is as element in the system of the whole1 they again required only the universal of these determinations4 ,anaxagoras calls the understanding such a principle1 and in fact the absolute ,notion1 as simple existence1 the self-identical in its differences1 the dividing1 the reality-establishing1 must be known as such4 ,but that ,anaxagoras showed forth the understanding in the universe1 or had grasped it as a rational system--of this not only do we not find a trace1 but the ancients expressly say that he simply let the matter pass1 just as when we say that the world or nature is a great system1 the world is wisely ordered or is generally speaking rational4 ,by this we are shown no more of the realization of this reason or the comprehensibility of the world4 ,the of ,anaxagoras is thus still formal1 although the identity of the principle with the realization was recognized4 ,aristotle 7,met4 ,i4 #d7 recognizes the insufficiency of the ,anaxagorean principle3 8,anaxagoras1 indeed1 requires the for his formation of the world-system2 that is1 when he has a difficulty in showing the reason for which it is in accordance with necessity1 he brings it in2 otherwise he employs anything for the sake of explanation1 rather than thought40 ,it is nowhere more clearly set forth that the of ,anaxagoras is still formal1 than in the well-known passage out of ,plato's ,phdo 7p4 #ig-ii1 ,steph42 p4 #he-hi1 ,bekk471 which is noteworthy for its exposition of the philosophy of ,anaxagoras4 ,socrates1 according to ,plato1 states most definitely both what the absolute to them was1 and why ,anaxagoras did not satisfy them4 ,i quote this because it will best of all lead us on to the main conception which we recognize in the philosophic consciousness of the ancients2 at the same time it is an example of the loquacity of ,socrates4 ,socrates' understanding of the as end is better because its determinations are congenial to him1 so that we also see in it the principal forms that appear in ,socrates4 ,plato makes ,socrates1 in prison1 an hour before his death1 relate at considerable length his experiences with regard to ,anaxagoras3 8,when ,i heard it read from a book of ,anaxagoras1 that he said that the understanding is the disposer of the world and the first cause1 ,i rejoiced in such a cause1 and ,i held that if ,mind apportioned out all reality1 it would apportion it for the best0 7the end would be shown forth74 8,now if anyone wished to find the cause of the individual thing1 how it becomes1 and how it passes away1 or how it is1 he must discover this from what is best for that thing1 whether it is being or in some way suffering or doing40 ,that the understanding is cause1 or that everything is made for the best1 means the same thing2 this will become clearer from the opposite4 ,it is further said1 8,for this reason a man has only to consider for himself1 as for all others1 what is best and most perfect1 and then he would of necessity know the worse1 for the same science comprises both4 ,thus reflecting1 ,i rejoiced that ,i could believe that ,i had found in ,anaxagoras a teacher of the cause of existence0 7of the good7 8such as ,i approved of2 he would1 ,i believed1 tell me whether the earth was flat or round1 and if he told me this1 he would show me the cause and necessity of the fact1 because he would show me the one or the other as being the better2 and if he said that the earth is in the centre1 he would show me that it was better that it should be in the centre0 7i4e4 its implicitly and explicitly determined end1 and not utility as an externally determined end74 8,and when he had shown me this1 ,i should be satisfied though he brought forward no other kind of causes1 for the same would hold good for the sun1 the moon1 and the other stars1 their respective velocities1 returnings1 and other conditions4 ,because he assigned its cause to each and to all in common1 ,i thought that he would explain what was best for each and what was best for all0 7the free1 implicitly and explicitly existent ,idea1 the absolute end74 8,i would not have given up this hope for a great deal1 but seized these writings zealously and read them as soon as possible in order to learn as soon as possible the good and the evil4 ,these bright hopes faded when ,i saw that he did not require thought at all nor any reason for the formation of things1 but had recourse to air1 fire1 water and many other eccentricities40 ,we here see how to what is best1 according to the understanding 7the relation of final end71 that which we call natural causes is opposed1 just as in ,leibnitz the operating and the final causes are different4 ,socrates explains this in the following way3 8,it appears to me to be as if some one were to say that ,socrates performs all his actions with understanding1 and then in going on to give the reasons for each of my actions1 were to say that ,i sit here because my body consists of bones and muscles2 the bones are fixed and have joints that divide them 771 but the muscles have the power of extending and bending1 and they cover the bones with flesh and skin2 it is as though he were further to bring forward as the cause of my talking with you1 other similar causes1 sounds1 and air1 hearing1 and a thousand other things1 but omitted to give the true cause0 7free independent determination71 8which is that the ,athenians judged it fit to condemn me1 and therefore ,i judged it better and more just to sit here and to suffer the punishment which they accorded0 7we must recollect that one of his friends had arranged everything for the flight of ,socrates1 but that he refused to go7 8for else1 by the dog of ,egypt1 how long ago would these bones and muscles have gone to ,megara or to ,boeotia1 had they been moved only by their opinion of what was best1 and had ,i not considered it juster and better to bear the punishment which the ,state laid upon me1 instead of escaping and fleeing from it40 ,plato here correctly places the two kinds of reason and cause in opposition to one another--the cause proceeding from ends1 and the inferior1 subject1 and merely external causes of chemistry1 mechanism1 c4--in order to show the discrepancy between them1 as here exemplified in the case of a man with consciousness4 ,anaxagoras seems to define an end and to wish to proceed from it2 but he immediately lets this go again and proceeds to quite external causes4 8,but to call these0 7these bones and muscles7 8causes is quite improper4 ,if1 however1 anyone were to say that without having bones and muscles and whatever else ,i have1 ,i could not do that which ,i consider best1 he would be quite right4 ,but to say that from such causes1 ,i do that which ,i do1 and do with understanding2 to say that ,i do not do it from the choice of what is best--to make such an assertion shows a great want of consideration2 it signifies an incapacity to distinguish that the one is the true cause and the other is only that without which the cause could not operate10 i4e4 the conditions4 ,this is a good example for showing that we miss the end in such modes of explanation4 ,on the other hand1 it is not a good example1 because it is taken from the kingdom of the self-conscious will1 where deliberate and not unconscious end reigns4 ,in this criticism of the ,anaxagorean we can certainly see it generally expressed that ,anaxagoras made no application of his to reality4 ,but the positive element in the conclusion of ,socrates seems1 on the other hand1 to be unsatisfying1 because it goes to the other extreme1 namely1 to desire causes for nature which do not appear to be in it1 but which fall outside of it in consciousness4 ,for what is good and beautiful is partly due to the thought of consciousness as such2 end or purposive action is mainly an act of consciousness and not of nature4 ,but in so far as ends become posited in nature1 the end1 as end1 on the other hand1 falls outside of it in our judgment only2 as such it is not in nature itself1 for in it there are only what we call natural causes1 and for its comprehension we have only to seek and show causes that are immanent4 ,according to this1 we distinguish1 for instance1 in ,socrates the end and ground of his action as consciousness1 and the causes of his actual action3 and the latter we would undoubtedly seek in his bones1 muscles1 nerves1 c4 ,since we banish the consideration of nature in relation to ends--as present in our thought and not existent in nature--we also banish from our consideration teleological explanations in nature formerly admired1 e4g4 that grass grows that animals may eat it1 and that these last exist and eat grass1 so that we may eat them4 ,the end of trees is said to be that their fruit may be consumed and that they should give us wood for heat2 many animals have skins for warm clothing2 the sea in northern climates floats timber to the shores because on these shores themselves no wood grows1 and the inhabitants can hence obtain it1 and so on4 ,thus presented1 the end1 the ,good1 lies outside of the thing itself3 the nature of a thing then becomes considered1 not in and for itself1 but only in relation to another which is nothing to it4 ,thus1 because things are only useful for an end1 this determination is not their own but one foreign to them4 ,the tree1 the grass1 is as natural existence1 independent1 and this adaptation of it to an end1 such as making grass that which is to be eaten1 does not concern the grass as grass1 just as it does not concern the animal that man should clothe himself in his skin2 ,socrates may hence seem to miss in ,anaxagoras this mode of looking at nature4 ,but this to us familiar way of regarding the good and expedient is on the one hand not the only one1 and does not represent ,plato's meaning1 while1 on the other1 it is likewise necessary4 ,we have not to represent the good or the end in so one-sided a manner that we think of it existing as such in the perceiving mind1 and in opposition to what is2 but set free from this form1 we must take it in its essence as the ,idea of all existence4 ,the nature of things must be recognized in accordance with the ,notion1 which is the independent1 unfettered consideration of things2 and because it is that which things are in and for themselves1 it controls the relationship of natural causes4 ,this ,notion is the end1 the true cause1 but that which recedes into itself2 it is the implicitly existent first from which movement proceeds and which becomes result2 it is not only an end present in the imagination before its actuality exists1 but is also present in reality4 ,becoming is the movement through which a reality or totality becomes2 in the animal or plant its essence as universal genus1 is that which begins its movement and brings it forth4 ,but this whole is not the product of something foreign1 but its own product1 what is already present as germ or seed2 thus it is called end1 the self-producing1 that which in its ,becoming is already implicitly existent4 ,the ,idea is not a particular thing1 which might have another content than reality or appear quite different4 ,the opposition is the merely formal opposition of possibility and actuality2 the active impelling substance and the product are the same4 ,this realization goes right through the opposition2 the negative in the universal is just this process4 ,the genus sets itself in a state of opposition as individual and universal1 and thus1 in what lives1 the genus realizes itself in the opposition of races which are opposed1 but whose principle is the universal genus4 ,they1 as individuals1 aim at their own self-preservation as individuals in eating1 drinking1 c41 but what they thereby bring to pass is genus4 ,individuals sublate themselves1 but genus is that which is ever brought forth2 plants bring forth only the same plants whose ground is the universal4 ,in accordance with this1 the distinction between what have been badly named natural causes and the final causes has to be determined4 ,now if ,i isolate individuality and merely regard it as movement and the moments of the same1 ,i show what are natural causes4 ,for example1 where has this life taken its origin8 ,through the generation of this its father and mother4 ,what is the cause of these fruits8 ,the tree whose juices so distil themselves that the fruit forthwith arises4 ,answers of this kind give the causes1 i4e4 the individuality opposed to an individuality2 but their principle is the genus4 ,now nature cannot represent essence as such4 ,the end of generation is the sublation of the individuality of ,being2 but nature which in existence certainly brings about this sublation of individuality1 does not set the universal in its place1 but another individual4 ,bones1 muscles1 c41 bring forth a movement2 they are causes1 but they themselves are so through other causes1 and so on into infinitude4 ,the universal1 however1 takes them up into itself as moments which undoubtedly appear in movement as causes1 though the fundamental ground of these parts actually is the whole4 ,it is not they which come first1 but the result into which the juices of the plants1 c41 pass1 is the first1 just as in origination it appears only as product1 as seed1 that which constitutes the beginning and the end1 even though they be in different individuals4 ,their real nature is the same4 ,but such a genus is itself a particular genus and is essentially related to another1 e4g4 the ,idea of the plant to that of the animal2 the universal moves on4 ,this looks like external teleology--that plants are eaten by animals1 c41 in which their limitation as genus lies4 ,the genus of the plant has the absolute totality of its realization in the animal1 the animal in the conscious existence1 just as the earth has it in the plant4 ,this is the system of the whole in which each moment is transitory4 ,the double method of considering the matter thus is that each ,idea is a circle within itself1 the plant or the animal the ,good of its kind2 and1 on the other hand1 each is a moment in the universal ,good4 ,if ,i consider the animal merely as externally adapted to an end1 as created for something else1 ,i consider it in a one-sided way2 it is real existence1 in and for itself universal4 ,but it is just as one-sided to say that the plant1 for instance1 is only in and for itself1 only end to itself1 only shut up within itself and going back into itself4 ,for each idea is a circle which is complete in itself1 but whose completion is likewise a passing into another circle2 it is a vortex whose middle point1 that into which it returns1 is found directly in the periphery of a higher circle which swallows it up4 ,thus1 for the first time1 we reach the determination of an end in the world which is immanent within it4 ,these explanations are necessary here1 since hereafter we see the speculative ,idea coming more into the universal2 it was formerly expressed as ,being and the moments and movements were called existent4 ,what has to be avoided in this transition is that we should thereby think that ,being is given up and that we pass into consciousness as opposed to ,being 7in so doing the universal would lose all its speculative significance72 the universal is immanent in nature4 ,this is the meaning which is present when we represent to ourselves that thought constitutes1 orders1 c41 the world4 ,it is not1 so to speak1 the activity of the individual consciousness1 in which ,i stand here on one side and1 opposite to me1 an actuality1 matter1 which ,i form1 dispose and order as ,i will2 for the universal1 ,thought1 must abide in ,philosophy without this opposition4 ,being1 pure ,being1 is universal when we thereby keep in mind that ,being is absolute abstraction1 pure thought2 but ,being as it is thus set forth as ,being1 has the significance of the opposite to this ,being-reflected-into-itself1 to thought and recollection2 the universal1 on the contrary1 has reflection immediately in itself4 ,so far1 the ancients really got3 it does not seem far4 8,universal0 is a dry determination2 everyone knows about the universal1 but not of it as real existence4 ,thought1 indeed1 reaches to the invisibility of the sensuous2 not to the positive determinateness of thinking it as universal1 but only to the predicateless absolute as to the merely negative2 and that is as far as the common ideas of the present day have come4 ,with this discovery of thought we conclude the first ,section and enter upon the second period4 ,the profit to be derived from the first period is not very great4 ,some1 indeed1 think that there is still some special wisdom in it1 but thought is still young1 the determinations are thus still poor1 abstract and arid4 ,thought here has but few determinations--water1 ,being1 number1 c4--and these cannot endure2 the universal must go forth on its own account as the self-determining activity1 and this we find it doing in ,anaxagoras alone4 ,we have still to consider the relationship of the universal as opposed to ,being1 or consciousness as such in its relation to what is4 ,by ,anaxagoras' determination of real existence1 this relationship of consciousness is also determined4 ,in this regard nothing satisfactory can be found2 for he recognized1 on the one hand1 thought as real existence1 without1 however1 bringing this thought to bear on ordinary reality4 ,thus1 on the other hand1 this is destitute of thought and independent1 an infinite number of homomeri1 i4e4 an infinite amount of a sensuous implicit existence1 which now1 however1 is sensuous ,being2 for existent ,being is an accumulation of homomeri4 ,the relationship borne by consciousness to real existence may likewise be various4 ,anaxagoras could thus either say that the truth is only in thought and in rational knowledge1 or that it is sensuous perception2 for in this we have the homomeri which are themselves implicit4 ,thus1 in the first place1 we find from him--as ,sextus tells us1 7adv4 ,math4 ,,vii41 #hi-ia7 8that the understanding 77 is the criterion of the truth2 the senses cannot judge of the truth on account of their weakness0--weakness for the homomeri are the infinitely small2 the senses could not grasp them1 do not know that they have to be something ideal and thought4 ,a celebrated example of this is given by him according to ,sextus 7,pyrrh4 ,hyp4 ,i4 #ac1 4 #cc71 in the assertion that 8the snow is black1 for it is water1 and water is black40 ,he here asserts the truth in a reason4 ,in the second place1 according to ,aristotle 7,met4 ,,iii4 #g71 ,anaxagoras is said to have asserted that1 8there is a medium between contradiction 772 so that everything is untrue4 ,for because the two sides of the opposition are mingled1 what is mingled is neither good nor not good1 and thus not true40 ,aristotle also quotes another time from him 7,met4 ,,iii4 #e73 8,that one of his apothegms to his disciples was that to them things were as they supposed them40 ,this may relate to the fact that because existent ,being is an accumulation of homomeri which are what really exists1 sensuous perception takes things as they are in truth4 ,there is little more to be made of this4 ,but here we have the beginning of a more distinct development of the relationship of consciousness to ,being1 the development of the nature of knowledge as a knowledge of the true4 ,the mind has gone forth to express real existence as ,thought2 and thus real existence as existent1 is in consciousness as such2 it is implicit but likewise in consciousness4 ,this ,being is such only in so far as consciousness recognizes it1 and real existence is only the knowledge of it4 ,the mind has no longer to seek existence in something foreign1 since it is in itself2 for what formerly appeared foreign is ,thought1 i4e4 consciousness has this real existence in itself4 ,but this consciousness in opposition is an individual consciousness2 thereby in fact1 implicit ,being is sublated1 for the implicit is what is not opposed1 not singled out1 but universal4 ,it is1 indeed1 known1 but what is1 only is in knowledge1 or it is no other ,being than that of the knowledge of consciousness4 ,we see this development of the universal in which real existence goes right over to the side of consciousness1 in the so much decried worldly wisdom of the ,sophists2 we may view this as indicating that the negative nature of the universal is now developing4 ,,chapter ,,ii ,,first ,,period1 ,,second ,,division3 ,,from ,,the ,,sophists ,,to ,,the ,,socratics4 ,,in this second division we have first to consider more particularly the ,sophists1 secondly ,socrates1 and thirdly the ,socratics1 while we distinguish from these ,plato1 and take him along with ,aristotle in the third division4 ,the 1 which is at first only grasped in a very subjective manner as end1 that is to say as that which is end to men1 i4e4 the ,good1 in ,plato and ,aristotle became understood in what is on the whole an objective way1 as genus or ,idea4 ,because thought has now become set forth as principle1 and this at first presents a subjective appearance as being the subjective activity of thought1 there now sets in 7since the absolute is posited as subject7 an age of subjective reflection2 i4e4 there begins in this period--which coincides with the disintegration of ,greece in the ,peloponnesian war--the principle of modern times4 ,since in the of ,anaxagoras1 as the still formal self-determining activity1 determination is as yet quite undetermined1 general and abstract1 and along with that contentless throughout1 the universal standpoint is the immediate necessity of going on to a content which begins actual determination4 ,but what is this absolute1 universal content which abstract thought as self-determining activity gives itself8 ,that is the real question here4 ,consciousness now confronts the untrammeled thought of those ancient philosophers1 whose general ideas we have considered4 ,while hitherto the subject1 when it reflected on the absolute1 only produced thoughts1 and had this content before it1 it is now seen that what is here present is not the whole1 but that the thinking subject likewise really belongs to the totality of the objective4 ,furthermore1 this subjectivity of thought has again the double character of at once being the infinite1 self-relating form1 which as this pure activity of the universal1 receives content-determinations2 and1 on the other hand1 as consciousness reflects that it is the thinking subject which is thus positing1 of also being a return of spirit from objectivity into itself4 ,thus if thought1 because it immersed itself in the object1 had as such1 and like the of ,anaxagoras1 at first no content1 because this stood on the other side1 so now1 with the return of thought as to the consciousness that the subject is what thinks1 we have the other side--that what has to be dealt with is the attainment of a truly absolute content4 ,this content1 taken abstractly1 may itself be again a double one4 ,either the 8,i0 is in respect of determination the real when it makes itself and its interests the content1 or the content becomes determined as the altogether universal4 ,according to this1 we have two questions to deal with1 which are--how the determination of what is in and for itself is to be comprehended1 and how this is likewise in immediate relation to the 8,i0 as thinking4 ,it comes to pass in ,philosophy that although the 8,i0 is the positing1 yet the posited content of that which is thought is the object existent in and for itself4 ,if one were to remain at saying that the 8,i0 is that which posits1 this would be the false idealism of modern times3 in earlier times men did not remain at saying that what is thought is bad because ,i posit it4 ,to the ,sophists the content is mine1 and subjective3 ,socrates grasped the content which is in and for itself1 and the followers of ,socrates have1 in direct connection with him1 merely further defined this content4 ,a4--,,the ,,sophists4 ,the ,notion1 which reason has found in ,anaxagoras to be real existence1 is the simple negative into which all determination1 all that is existent and individual sinks4 ,before the ,notion nothing can exist1 for it is simply the predicateless absolute to which everything is clearly a moment only2 for it there is thus nothing so to speak permanently fixed and sealed4 ,the ,notion is just the constant change of ,heraclitus1 the movement1 the causticity1 which nothing can resist4 ,thus the ,notion which finds itself1 finds itself as the absolute power before which everything vanishes2 and thereby all things1 all existence1 everything held to be secure1 is now made fleeting4 ,this security--whether it be a security of natural ,being or the security of definite conceptions1 principles1 customs and laws--becomes vacillation and loses its stability4 ,as universal1 such principles1 c41 certainly themselves pertain to the ,notion1 yet their universality is only their form1 for the content which they have1 as determinate1 falls into movement4 ,we see this movement arising in the so-called ,sophists whom we here encounter for the first time4 ,they gave themselves the name 1 as teachers of wisdom1 i4e4 as those who could make wise 774 ,the learning of the ,sophists is thus directly the opposite to ours1 which only aspires to acquire information and investigate what is and has been--it is a mass of empirical matter1 in which the discovery of a new form1 a new worm1 or other vermin is held to be a point of great importance4 ,our learned professors are in so far much less responsible than the ,sophists2 however1 ,philosophy has nothing to do with this lack of responsibility4 ,but as regards the relation of the ,sophists to what is ordinarily believed1 they are1 by the healthy human understanding1 as much decried as by morality4 ,by the former this is on account of their theoretic teaching1 since it is senseless to say that nothing is2 and in respect of practice because they subvert all principles and laws4 ,for the first mentioned1 things certainly cannot be left in this confusion of movement and in their negative aspect merely2 yet the rest into which they pass is not the restoration of what is moved into its former condition of security1 as if in the end the result were the same and the action were a superfluous one4 ,now the sophistry of common opinion1 which is without the culture of thought and without scientific knowledge1 is found in the fact that to it its determinations are1 as such1 held to be existent in and for themselves1 and a number of rules of life1 maxims1 principles1 c41 are considered as absolutely fixed truths4 ,mind itself is1 however1 the unity of these in many ways limited truths1 which in it are all recognized as being present as sublated only1 as merely relative truths1 i4e4 with their restrictions1 in their limitation1 and not as existent in themselves4 ,hence these truths to the ordinary understanding1 are1 in fact1 no more1 for on another occasion it allows and even asserts the opposite to have a value also for consciousness2 or it does not know that it says directly the opposite to what it means1 its expression being thus only an expression of contradiction4 ,in its actions generally1 and not in its bad actions1 ordinary understanding breaks these its maxims and its principles itself1 and if it leads a rational life1 it is properly speaking only a standing inconsistency1 the making good of one narrow maxim of conduct through breaking off from others4 ,for example1 a statesman of experience and culture is one who knows how to steer a middle course1 and has practical understanding1 i4e4 deals with the whole extent of the case before him and not with one side of it1 which expresses itself in one maxim only4 ,on the other hand1 he1 whoever he is1 who acts on one maxim1 is a pedant and spoils things for himself and others4 ,most commonly it is thus4 ,for example1 we hear it said1 8it is certain that the things that ,i see are2 ,i believe in their reality40 ,anyone can say this quite easily4 ,but in fact it is not true that he believes in their reality2 really he assumes the contrary4 ,for he eats and drinks them1 i4e4 he is convinced that these things are not in themselves1 and their being has no security1 no subsistence4 ,thus common understanding is in its actions better than it thinks1 for in action it is ,mind as a whole4 ,but it is not here known to itself as ,mind1 for what comes within its consciousness are definite laws1 rules1 general propositions1 such as by its understanding are esteemed to be the absolute truth1 whose limitation it1 however1 sets aside in action4 ,now1 when the ,notion turns to the riches which consciousness thinks to possess1 and when the latter is sensible of the danger to its truth without which it would not be1 when its fixed realities are destroyed1 it is enraged2 and the ,notion which in this its realization applies itself to the common verities1 draws hatred and disdain upon itself4 ,this is the ground of the universal denunciation of the ,sophists2 a denunciation of healthy human understanding which does not know how else to help itself4 ,sophistry is certainly a word of ill-repute1 and indeed it is particularly through the opposition to ,socrates and ,plato that the ,sophists have come into such disrepute that the word usually now signifies that1 by false reasoning1 some truth is either refuted and made dubious1 or something false is proved and made plausible4 ,we have to put this evil significance on one side and to forget it4 ,on the other hand1 we now wish to consider further from the positive and properly speaking scientific side1 what was the position of the ,sophists in ,greece4 ,it was the ,sophists who now applied the simple ,notion as thought 7which with ,zeno in the ,eleatic school had commenced to turn towards its pure counterpart1 motion7 to worldly objects generally1 and with it penetrated all human relations4 ,for it is conscious of itself as the absolute and single reality1 and1 jealous of all else1 exercises its power and rule in this reality as regards all else1 since this desires to be considered as the determinate which is not ,thought4 ,the thought identical with itself1 thus directs its negative powers towards the manifold determination of the theoretical and the practical1 the truths of natural consciousness and the immediately recognized laws and principles2 and what to the ordinary conception is established1 dissolves itself in it1 and in so doing leaves it to particular subjectivity to make itself first and fixed1 to relate everything to itself4 ,now that this ,notion has appeared1 it has become a more universal ,philosophy1 and not so much simple ,philosophy as the universal culture of which every man who did not belong to those devoid of thought1 partook1 and necessarily partook4 ,for we call culture just the ,notion as applied in actuality1 in so far as it makes its appearance not purely in its abstraction1 but in unity with the manifold content of all ordinary conceptions4 ,but in culture1 the ,notion is the predominant as also the actuating1 because in both the determinate is recognized in its limits1 in its transition into something else4 ,this culture became the general aim of education1 and there were hence a number of teachers of ,sophistry4 ,indeed1 the ,sophists are the teachers of ,greece through whom culture first came into existence in ,greece1 and thus they took the place of poets and of rhapsodists1 who before this were the ordinary instructors4 ,for religion was no instructress1 since no teaching was in it imparted2 and though priests certainly offered sacrifices1 prophesied and interpreted the sayings of the oracle1 instruction is something quite different from this4 ,but the ,sophists educated men in wisdom1 in the sciences1 music1 mathematics1 c41 and this was their foremost aim4 ,before ,pericles appeared in ,greece1 the desire for culture through thought and through reflection was awakened2 men wished to be cultured in their ideas1 and in their various relations to guide themselves by thought1 and no longer merely through oracles1 or through custom1 passion1 the feelings of the moment4 ,for the end of the ,state is the universal1 under which the particular is comprehended4 ,because the ,sophists kept in view and enlarged upon this culture1 they prosecuted teaching as a special calling1 business1 or profession1 as an office taking the place of schools2 they travelled round the towns of ,greece1 the youth of which was by them instructed4 ,now culture is certainly an indefinite expression4 ,it has1 however1 this meaning1 that what free thought is to attain must come out of itself and be personal conviction2 it is then no longer believed but investigated--in short1 it is the so-called enlightenment of modern times4 ,thought seeks general principles by which it criticizes everything which is by us esteemed1 and nothing has value to us which is not in conformity with these principles4 ,thus1 thought undertakes to compare the positive content with itself1 to dissolve the former concrete of belief2 on one side to split the content up1 and1 on the other1 to isolate these individualities1 these particular points of view and aspects1 and to secure them on their own account4 ,these aspects1 which are properly not independent1 but only moments of a whole1 when detached from it1 relate themselves to themselves1 and in this way assume the form of universality4 ,any one of them can thus be elevated to a reason1 i4e4 to a universal determination1 which is again applied to particular aspects4 ,thus1 in culture1 it is requisite that men should be acquainted with the universal points of view which belong to a transaction1 event1 c41 that this point of view and thereby the thing1 should be grasped in a universal way1 in order to afford a present knowledge of what is in question4 ,a judge knows the various laws1 i4e4 the various legal points of view under which a thing is to be considered2 these are already for him universal aspects through which he has a universal consciousness1 and considers the matter in a universal way4 ,a man of culture thus knows how to say something of everything1 to find points of view in all4 ,greece has to thank the ,sophists for this culture1 because they taught men to exercise thought as to what should have authority for them1 and thus their culture was culture in philosophy as much as in eloquence4 ,in order to reach this double end1 the ,sophists were one in their desire to be wise4 ,to know what constitutes power amongst men and in the ,state1 and what ,i have to recognize as such1 is counted as wisdom2 and because ,i know the power1 ,i also know how to direct others in conformity with my end4 ,hence the admiration that ,pericles and other statesmen excited1 just because they knew their own standpoint1 and had the power of putting others in their proper place4 ,that man is powerful who can deduce the actions of men from the absolute ends which move them4 ,the object of the ,sophists has thus been to teach what is the mainspring of the world1 and since ,philosophy alone knows that this is the universal thought which resolves all that is particular1 the ,sophists were also speculative philosophers4 ,learned in the proper sense they hence were not1 because there were as yet no positive sciences without ,philosophy1 such as in their aridity did not concern all mankind and man's essential aspects4 ,they further had the most ordinary practical end1 to give a consciousness of that which is involved in the moral world and which satisfies man4 ,religion taught that the gods are the powers which rule over men4 ,immediate morality recognized the rule of laws2 man was to find satisfaction in conforming to laws1 and was to assume that others also find satisfaction because they follow these laws4 ,but from the reflection which here breaks in1 it no longer satisfies man to obey law as an authority and external necessity1 for he desires to satisfy himself in himself1 to convince himself1 through his reflection1 of what is binding upon him1 what is his end and what he has to do for this end4 ,thus the impulses and desires that man has1 become his power2 and only inasmuch as he affords them satisfaction does he become satisfied4 ,now the ,sophists taught how these powers could be moved in empirical man1 for the good as ordinarily recognized1 no longer determined them4 ,rhetoric1 however1 teaches how circumstances may be made subject to such forces2 it even makes use of the wrath and passions of the hearer in order to bring about a conclusion4 ,thus the ,sophists were more especially the teachers of oratory1 and that is the aspect in which the individual could make himself esteemed amongst the people as well as carry out what was best for the people2 this certainly characterizes a democratic constitution1 in which the citizens have the ultimate decision4 ,because1 in this way1 oratory was one of the first requirements for the rule of a people1 or for making something clear to them through their ordinary ideas1 the ,sophists trained men for common ,greek life1 for citizenship and for statesmen1 without appearing to prepare ,state officials for an examination in specific subjects4 ,for the particular characteristic of eloquence is to show the manifold points of view existing in a thing1 and to give force to those which harmonize with what appears to me to be most useful2 it thus is the art of putting forward various points of view in the concrete case1 and placing others rather in the shade4 ,aristotle's ,topica comes to mind in the connection1 inasmuch as it gives the categories or thought-determinations 771 according to which we have to regard things in order to learn to speak2 but the ,sophists were the first to apply themselves to a knowledge of these4 ,this is the position taken up by the ,sophists4 ,but we find a perfectly definite picture of their further progress and procedure in ,plato's ,protagoras4 ,plato here makes ,protagoras express himself more precisely respecting the art of the ,sophists4 ,that is to say1 ,plato in this dialogue represents that ,socrates accompanies a young man named ,hippocrates1 who desires to place himself under ,protagoras1 then newly arrived in ,athens1 for instruction in the science of the ,sophists4 ,on the way1 ,socrates now asks ,hippocrates what is this wisdom of the ,sophists which he wishes to learn4 ,hippocrates at first replies ,rhetoric1 for the ,sophist is one who knows how to make men clever 77 in speech4 ,in fact1 what is most striking in a man or people of culture is the art of speaking well1 or of turning subjects round and considering them in many aspects4 ,the uncultivated man finds it unpleasant to associate with people who know how to grasp and express every point of view with ease4 ,the ,french are good speakers in this sense1 and the ,germans call their talking prattle2 but it is not mere talk that brings about this result1 for culture is also wanted4 ,we may have mastered a speech quite completely1 but if we have not culture1 it is not good speaking4 ,men thus learn ,french1 not only to be able to speak ,french well1 but to acquire ,french culture4 ,what is to be obtained from the ,sophists is thus the power of keeping the manifold points of view present to the mind1 so that the wealth of categories by which an object may be considered1 immediately occurs to it4 ,socrates1 indeed1 remarks that the principle of the ,sophists is not hereby determined in a sufficiently comprehensive way1 and thus it is not sufficiently known what a ,sophist is1 8yet10 he says1 8we have a desire to go on40#hf ,for likewise1 if anyone wishes to study ,philosophy1 he does not as yet know what ,philosophy is1 else he would not need to study it4 ,having reached ,protagoras with ,hippocrates1 ,socrates finds him in an assemblage of the foremost ,sophists and surrounded by listeners1 8walking about and like an ,orpheus entrancing all men by his words1 ,hippias sitting meanwhile on a chair with not so many round him1 and ,prodicus lying amongst a great number of admirers40 ,after ,socrates brought before ,protagoras the request to have ,hippocrates placed under his instruction1 in order that he might by him be taught how to become eminent in the ,state1 he also asks whether they might speak with him in public or alone4 ,protagoras praises his discretion1 and replies that they act wisely to make use of this precaution4 ,for because the ,sophists wandered about the towns1 and thus youths1 deserting fathers and friends1 followed them in view of improving themselves through their intercourse with them1 they drew upon themselves much envy and ill-will--for everything new is hated4 ,on this point ,protagoras speaks at length3 8,i assert that the art of the ,sophists is old2 but that those of the ancients who practised it in fear of giving offence0 7for the uncultured world is antagonistic to the cultured7 8veiled and concealed it4 ,one section1 like ,homer and ,hesiod1 taught it in their poetry2 others1 like ,orpheus and ,musus1 through mysteries and oracles4 ,some1 ,i believe1 like ,iccus of ,tarentum1 and the ,sophist now living and unsurpassed--,herodicus1 of ,selymbria--in gymnastics1 but many more through music40 ,we see that ,protagoras usually describes the end of mental culture as being to bring about morality1 presence of mind1 sense of order and general capacity4 ,he adds3 8all those who feared envy arising against the sciences1 required such veils and screens4 ,but ,i think that they do not attain their end1 for men of penetration in the ,state see the end appearing through1 while the people notice nothing1 and only quote the others4 ,if people behave so1 they make themselves more hated1 and appear to be impostors4 ,i have therefore taken the opposite way1 and openly acknowledge 771 and do not deny that ,i am a ,sophist0 7,protagoras first used the name of ,sophist71 8and that my business is to give men culture 7740#hg ,further on1 where the arts which ,hippocrates was to acquire under ,protagoras' instruction were discussed1 ,protagoras answered ,socrates3 8,what you ask is sensible1 and ,i like to answer a sensible question4 ,hippocrates will not have the same experience that he would have with other teachers 774 ,these latter are at variance with 77 their pupils1 for they take them against their wills straight back to the arts and sciences which they just wished to escape1 inasmuch as they teach them arithmetic1 geometry and music4 ,but he who comes to me will be instructed in nothing else than that in which he comes to be instructed40 ,thus the youths came freely1 with the wish to be made men of culture through his instruction1 and in the hope that he1 as teacher1 knew the way to succeed in so doing4 ,as to his general aim1 ,protagoras says1 8,the instruction consists in bringing about a right perception and understanding 77 of the best way of regulating one's own family affairs1 and similarly as regards citizenship1 in qualifying men both to speak on the affairs of the ,state1 and to do the best for the ,state40 ,thus two interests are here apparent1 that of the individual and that of the ,state4 ,now ,socrates expresses dissent and surprise at ,protagoras' assertion as to imparting instruction in political aptitude4 8,i thought that the political virtues could not be learned10 for it is ,socrates' main tenet that virtue cannot be taught4 ,and ,socrates now brings forward the following argument1 after the manner of the ,sophists appealing to experience4 8,those who are masters of the art of politics cannot impart that art to others4 ,pericles1 the father of these youths1 gave them instruction in all that instructors could teach2 but not in the science for which he is celebrated2 here he left them free to wander in the chance of their lighting upon wisdom4 ,similarly other great statesmen did not teach it to others1 whether friends or strangers40#hh ,protagoras now replied that it could be taught1 and shows the reason why great statesmen did not give this instruction1 while he asks whether he is to speak as an elder to younger men in a myth1 or whether he should give his reasons4 ,the company left the matter to him and he began with the following myth of everlasting interest3 8,the gods commanded ,prometheus and ,epimetheus to adorn the world and confer on it its qualities and powers4 ,epimetheus imparted strength1 power of flight1 arms1 clothing1 herbs and fruits1 but in some incomprehensible way he gave all to the beasts1 so that nothing remained to men4 ,prometheus saw them unclothed1 unarmed1 helpless1 when the moment came in which the form of man had to go forth into the light4 ,then he stole fire from heaven1 the arts of ,vulcan and ,minerva1 to equip man for his needs4 ,but political wisdom was wanting1 and1 living without any common bond1 they were in a constant state of strife and misery4 ,then ,zeus gave the command to ,hermes to grant reverence0 7natural obedience1 honour1 docility1 respect of children for parents1 and of men for higher and better natures71 8and justice4 ,hermes asks1 #8,how shall ,i impart them8 ,to individuals1 as particular arts are distributed1 just as some have a knowledge of medicine sufficient for assisting others8' ,but ,zeus answers that it must be to all1 for no body of men 77 can exist if only a few partake of those qualities4 ,and it shall be the law that whoever cannot acknowledge authority and justice must be exterminated as a plague to the ,state4 ,hence the ,athenians when they wish to build1 call builders into counsel1 and when they contemplate any other business1 those who have experience in it1 but when they wish to come to a decision or make a regulation in ,state affairs1 they admit all4 ,for all must partake of this virtue or no ,state could exist4 ,thus if anyone is inexperienced in the art of flute-playing and yet professes to be a master in it1 he is justly thought to be mad4 ,but in justice it is otherwise2 if anyone is not just and confesses it1 he is thought to be mad4 ,he must profess to be so1 for everybody must either share in it or be shut out from social life40#hi ,for the fact that this political science is also so constituted 8that everyone by education and diligence 7 7 may acquire it10 ,protagoras gives additional reasons in the following argument3 8,no one blames or punishes on account of a defect or evil that has come to anyone by nature or by chance4 ,but defects and faults which can be removed through diligence1 exercise and teaching are considered to be blameworthy and punishable4 ,impiety and injustice are of this description and1 generally speaking1 all that opposes public virtue4 ,men guilty of these sins are thus reproached2 they are punished in the idea that they had the power to remove the wrong and still more to acquire political virtue through diligence and teaching4 ,thus men do not punish on account of what is past--excepting as we strike a vicious beast on the head--but on account of what is to come1 so that neither the one who committed the crime nor any other misled by his example1 should do the same again4 ,thus it is in this implied that virtue can be acquired through education and exercise40#ij ,this is a good argument for the teachability of virtue4 ,as to the statement of ,socrates that men such as ,pericles1 who were famed for their political virtues1 did not impart these to their children and friends1 ,protagoras in the first place says that it may on the other hand be replied1 that in these virtues all men are instructed by all men4 ,political virtue is so constituted that it is the common province of all2 this one essential for all men is justice1 temperance1 and holiness--in one word1 whatever comprises manly virtue4 ,in it no particular education from men of eminence is thus required4 ,the children are from their earliest infancy exhorted and admonished to do what is good1 and are accustomed to that which is right4 ,instruction in music and gymnastics contributes to temper the indulgence of self-will and pleasure1 and to accustom men to conform to a law or rule2 and the reading of the poets who enforce this does the same4 ,when man steps outside this circle of education1 he enters into that of the constitution of a ,state which likewise contributes to keep everyone within the bounds of law and order1 so that political virtue is a result of the education of youth4 ,but the objection that distinguished men did not impart their distinction to their children and friends1 ,protagoras answered secondly and very well as follows3 8,let us say that in a ,state all the citizens had to become flute-players1 all would be instructed in the art2 some would be distinguished1 many good1 some mediocre1 a few perhaps bad1 and yet all would have a certain amount of skill4 ,but it might very well be the case that the son of an artist should be a bad player1 for the distinction depends on particular talents1 and a particularly good natural capacity4 ,from very skilful players very unskilful might descend1 and conversely1 but all would have a certain knowledge of the flute1 and all would certainly be infinitely better than those who were quite ignorant of the art4 ,similarly all1 even the worst citizens of a rational ,state are better and juster than citizens of a ,state where there is no culture nor justice nor law1 in a word1 where there is no necessity to bring them up to be just4 ,for this superiority they have to thank the education given in their ,state40#ia ,all these are quite good examples and striking arguments which are not at all worse than ,cicero's reasoning--a natura insitum4 ,the arguments of ,socrates and the development of these arguments are1 on the contrary1 examples based upon experience1 and are often not better than what is here placed in the mouth of a ,sophist4 ,what now confronts us is the question of how far this may be inadequate1 and particularly how far ,socrates and ,plato came into collision with the ,sophists and constituted the antagonism to them4 ,for the claim made by the ,sophists in ,greece was that they had given a higher culture to their people2 for this1 indeed1 great credit was ascribed to them in ,greece1 but they were met by the reproach that was encountered by all culture4 ,that is to say1 because the ,sophists were masters of argument and reasoning1 and were within the stage of reflective thought1 they wished1 passing from the particular to the universal1 to awaken attention through examples and illustrations to what in his experience and to his mind appears to man to be right4 ,this1 the necessary course of free1 thinking reflection1 which with us has also been adopted by culture1 must1 however1 necessarily lead beyond implicit trust and unrestricted faith in the current morality and religion4 ,the statement that the ,sophists thereby fell into one-sided principles rests upon the fact that in ,greek culture the time had not yet come when1 out of thinking consciousness itself1 the ultimate principles had become manifested1 and thus there was something firm to rest upon1 as is the case with us in modern times4 ,because1 on the one hand1 the need of subjective freedom existed merely to give effect to that which man himself perceives and finds present in his reason 7thus laws1 religious ideas1 only in so far as ,i recognize them through my thought71 on the other hand1 no fixed principle had so far been found in thought2 thought was rather reasoning1 and what remained indeterminate could thus only be fulfilled through self-will4 ,it is otherwise in our ,european world where culture is1 so to speak1 introduced under the protection and in presupposition of a spiritual religion1 i4e4 not of a religion of the imagination1 but by presupposing a knowledge of the eternal nature of ,spirit and of the absolute end1 of the end of man1 to be in a spiritual way actual and to posit himself in unity with the absolute spirit4 ,thus here there is a groundwork of a fixed spiritual principle which thus satisfies the needs of the subjective mind2 and from this absolute principle all further relationships1 duties1 laws1 c41 are established4 ,consequently culture cannot receive the variety of direction--and hence the aimlessness--of the ,greeks and of those who extended culture over ,greece1 the ,sophists4 ,as regards the religion of the imagination1 as regards the undeveloped principle of the ,greek ,state1 culture was able to divide itself into many points of view1 or it was easy to it to represent particular subordinate points of view as highest principles4 ,where1 on the contrary1 as is the case with us1 a universal aim so high1 indeed the highest possible1 floats before the imagination1 a particular principle cannot so easily reach this rank1 even if the reflection of reason attains to the position of determining and recognizing from itself what is highest2 for the subordination of special principles is already determined1 although in form our enlightenment may have the same standpoint as that of the ,sophists4 ,as regards content1 the standpoint of the ,sophists differed from that of ,socrates and ,plato1 in that the mission of ,socrates was to express the beautiful1 good1 true1 and right1 as the end and aim of the individual1 while with the ,sophists the content was not present as an ultimate end1 so that all this was left to the individual will4 ,hence came the evil reputation obtained by the ,sophists through the antagonism of ,plato1 and this is certainly their defect4 ,as to their outward lives1 we know that the ,sophists accumulated great riches2#ib they became very proud1 and some of them lived very luxuriously4 ,but in respect of the inward life1 reasoning thought has1 in distinction to ,plato1 this prevailing characteristic1 that it makes duty1 that which has to be done1 not come from the ,notion of the thing as determined in and for itself2 for it brings forward external reasons through which right and wrong1 utility and harmfulness1 are distinguished4 ,to ,plato and ,socrates1 on the other hand1 the main point is that the nature of the conditions should be considered1 and that the ,notion of the thing in and for itself should become evolved4 ,socrates and ,plato wished to bring forward this ,notion as opposed to the consideration of things from points of view and reasonings which are always merely particular and individual1 and thus opposed to the ,notion itself4 ,the distinction in the two points of view is thus that cultured reasoning only belongs1 in a general way1 to the ,sophists1 while ,socrates and ,plato determined thought through a universal determination 7the ,platonic ,idea71 or something fixed1 which mind finds eternally in itself4 ,if sophistry is bad in the sense that it signifies a quality of which only bad men are guilty1 it is at the same time much more common than this would imply2 for all argumentative reasoning1 adducing of arguments and counterarguments1 bringing into prominence particular points of view1 is sophistry4 ,and just as utterances of the ,sophists are adduced against which nothing can be said 7as they are by ,plato71 men of our day are urged to all that is good for the very reasons that are reasons to the ,sophists4 ,thus it is said1 8do not cheat1 else you lose your credit1 hence your wealth10 or1 8be temperate1 or you will spoil your appetite and have to suffer40 ,or for punishment men give the external reasons of improvement1 c42 or else an action is defended on external grounds taken from the result4 ,if1 on the other hand1 firmly rooted principles lie at the foundation--as in the ,christian ,religion1 although men now remember this no longer--it is said1 8the grace of ,god in respect of holiness1 c41 thus directs the life of men20 and these external grounds fall away4 ,sophistry thus does not lie so far from us as we think4 ,when educated men discuss matters now-a-days1 it may seem all very good1 but it is in no way different from what ,socrates and ,plato called sophistry--although they themselves have adopted this standpoint as truly as did the ,sophists4 ,educated men fall into it when they judge of concrete cases in which a particular point of view determines the result1 and we must in ordinary life do the same if we wish to make up our minds in action4 ,if duties and virtues are advocated as in sermons 7this is so in most sermons71 we must hear such reasons given4 ,other speakers1 such as those in parliament1 likewise make use of arguments and counterarguments similar to these1 through which they try to persuade and convince4 ,on the one hand something definite is in question1 such as the constitution1 or a war1 and from the fixed direction thus given1 certain provisions have to be deduced consistently2 but this consistency1 on the other1 soon disappears1 just because the matter can be arranged either this way or that1 and thus particular points of view always are decisive4 ,men likewise make use of good arguments1 after the manner of the ,sophists1 against ,philosophy4 ,there are1 they say1 various philosophies1 various opinions1 and this is contrary to the one ,truth2 the weakness of human reason allows of no knowledge4 ,what is ,philosophy to the feelings1 mind1 and heart8 ,abstract thinking about such matters produces abstruse results which are of no use in the practical life of man4 ,we no longer apply the word sophistry thus1 but it is the way of the ,sophists not to take things as they are1 but to bring about their proofs by arguments derived from feelings as ultimate ends4 ,we shall see this characteristic of the ,sophists more clearly still in ,socrates and ,plato4 ,with such reasoning men can easily get so far as to know 7where they do not1 it is owing to the want of education--but the ,sophists were very well educated7 that if arguments are relied upon1 everything can be proved by argument1 and arguments for and against can be found for everything2 as particular1 however1 they throw no light upon the universal1 the ,notion4 ,thus what has been considered the sin of the ,sophists is that they taught men to deduce any conclusion required by others or by themselves2 but that is not due to any special quality in the ,sophists1 but to reflective reasoning4 ,in the worst action there exists a point of view which is essentially real2 if this is brought to the front1 men excuse and vindicate the action4 ,in the crime of desertion in time of war1 there is1 for example1 the duty of self-preservation4 ,similarly in more modern times the greatest crimes1 assassination1 treachery1 c41 have been justified1 because in the purpose there lay a determination which was actually essential1 such as that men must resist the evil and promote the good4 ,the educated man knows how to regard everything from the point of view of the good1 to maintain in everything a real point of view4 ,a man does not require to make great progress in his education to have good reasons ready for the worst action2 all that has happened in the world since the time of ,adam has been justified by some good reason4 ,it appears that the ,sophists were conscious of this reasoning1 and knew1 as educated men1 that everything could be proved4 ,hence in ,plato's ,gorgias it is said that the art of the ,sophists is a greater gift than any other2 they could convince the people1 the senate1 the judges1 of what they liked4#ic ,the advocate has similarly to inquire what arguments there are in favour of the party which claims his help1 even if it be the opposite one to that which he wished to support4 ,that knowledge is no defect1 but is part of the higher culture of the ,sophists2 and if uneducated men naturally form conclusions from external grounds which are those alone coming to their knowledge1 they may perhaps be mainly determined by something besides what they know 7by their integrity1 for instance74 ,the ,sophists thus knew that on this basis nothing was secure1 because the power of thought treated everything dialectically4 ,that is the formal culture which they had and imparted1 for their acquaintanceship with so many points of view shook what was morality in ,greece 7the religion1 duties1 and laws1 unconsciously exercised71 since through its limited content1 that came into collision with what was different4 ,once it was highest and ultimate1 then it was deposed4 ,ordinary knowledge thus becomes confused1 as we shall see very clearly in ,socrates1 for something is held to be certain to consciousness1 and then other points of view which are also present and recognized1 have similarly to be allowed2 hence the first has no further value1 or at least loses its supremacy4 ,we saw in the same way1 how bravery1 which lies in the hazarding of one's life1 is made dubious by the duty of preserving life1 if put forward unconditionally4 ,plato quotes several examples of this unsettling tendency1 as when he makes ,dionysodorus maintain3 8,whoever gives culture to one who does not possess knowledge1 desires that he should no longer remain what he is4 ,he desires to direct him to reason1 and this is to make him not the same as he is40 ,and ,euthydemus1 when the others say that he lies1 answers1 8,who lies1 says what is not2 men cannot say what is not1 and thus no one can lie40#id ,and again ,dionysodorus says1 8,you have a dog1 this dog has young1 and is a father2 thus a dog is your father1 and you are brother to its young40#ie ,sequences put together thus are constantly found in critical treatises4 ,with this comes the question which the nature of thought brings along with it4 ,if the field of argument1 that which consciousness holds to be firmly established1 is shaken by reflection1 what is man now to take as his ultimate basis8 ,for something fixed there must be4 ,this is either the good1 the universal1 or the individuality1 the arbitrary will of the subject2 and both may be united1 as is shown later on in ,socrates4 ,to the ,sophists the satisfaction of the individual himself was now made ultimate1 and since they made everything uncertain1 the fixed point was in the assertion1 8it is my desire1 my pride1 glory1 and honour1 particular subjectivity1 which ,i make my end40 ,thus the ,sophists are reproached for countenancing personal affections1 private interests1 c4 ,this proceeds directly from the nature of their culture1 which1 because it places ready various points of view1 makes it depend on the pleasure of the subject alone which shall prevail1 that is1 if fixed principles do not determine4 ,here the danger lies4 ,this takes place also in the present day where the right and the true in our actions is made to depend on good intention and on my own conviction4 ,the real end of the ,state1 the best administration and constitution1 is likewise to demagogues very vague4 ,on account of their formal culture1 the ,sophists have a place in ,philosophy2 on account of their reflection they have not4 ,they are associated with ,philosophy in that they do not remain at concrete reasoning1 but go on1 at least in part1 to ultimate determinations4 ,a chief part of their culture was the generalization of the ,eleatic mode of thought and its extension to the whole content of knowledge and of action2 the positive thus comes in as1 and has become1 utility4 ,to go into particulars respecting the ,sophists would lead us too far2 individual ,sophists have their place in the general history of culture4 ,the celebrated ,sophists are very numerous2 the most celebrated amongst them are ,protagoras1 ,gorgias1 and also ,prodicus1 the teacher of ,socrates1 to whom ,socrates ascribes the well-known myth of 8,the choice of ,hercules0#if--;an allegory1 beautiful in its own way1 which has been repeated hundreds and thousands of times4 ,i will deal only with ,protagoras and ,gorgias1 not from the point of view of culture1 but in respect of proving further how the general knowledge which they extended to everything1 has1 with one of them1 the universal form which makes it pure science4 ,plato is the chief source of our acquaintanceship with the ,sophists1 for he occupied himself largely with them2 then we have ,aristotle's own little treatise on ,gorgias2 and ,sextus ,empiricus1 who preserved for us much of the philosophy of ,protagoras4 #a4 ,,protagoras4 ,protagoras1 born at ,abdera1#ig was somewhat older than ,socrates2 little more is known of him1 nor1 indeed1 could there be much known4 ,for he led a uniform life1 since he spent it in the study of the sciences2 he appeared in ,greece proper as the first public teacher4 ,he read his writings#ih like the rhapsodists and poets1 the former of whom sang the verses of others1 and the latter their own4 ,there were then no places of learning1 no books from which men could be taught1 for to the ancients1 as ,plato says1#ii 8the chief part of culture0 77 8consisted in being skilled0 77 8in poetry10 just as with us fifty years ago the principal instruction of the people consisted of ,bible ,history and ,biblical precepts4 ,the ,sophists now gave1 in place of a knowledge of the poets1 an acquaintanceship with thought4 ,protagoras also came to ,athens and there lived for long1 principally with the great ,pericles1 who also entered into this culture4 ,indeed1 the two once argued for a whole day as to whether the dart or the thrower or he who arranged the contest was guilty of the death of a man who thus met his death4#ajj ,the dispute is over the great and important question of the possibility of imputation2 guilt is a general expression1 the analysis of which may undoubtedly become a difficult and extensive undertaking4 ,in his intercourse with such men1 ,pericles developed his genius for eloquence2 for whatever kind of mental occupation may be in question1 a cultivated mind can alone excel in it2 and true culture is only possible through pure science4 ,pericles was a powerful orator1 and we see from ,thucydides how deep a knowledge he had of the ,state and of his people4 ,protagoras had the same fate as ,anaxagoras1 in being afterwards banished from ,athens4 ,the cause of this sentence was a work written by him beginning1 8,as to the gods1 ,i am not able to say whether they are or are not2 for there is much which prevents this knowledge1 both in the obscurity of the matter1 and in the life of man which is so short40 ,this book was also publicly burned in ,athens by command of the ,state1 and1 so far as we know1 it was the first to be treated so4 ,at the age of seventy or ninety years ,protagoras was drowned while on a voyage to ,sicily4#aja ,protagoras was not1 like other ,sophists1 merely a teacher of culture1 but likewise a deep and solid thinker1 a philosopher who reflected on fundamental determinations of an altogether universal kind4 ,the main point in his system of knowledge he expressed thus3 8,man is the measure of all things2 of that which is1 that it is2 of that which is not1 that it is not40#ajb ,on the one hand1 therefore1 what had to be done was to grasp thought as determined and as having content2 but1 on the other1 to find the determining and content-giving2 this universal determination then becomes the standard by which everything is judged4 ,now ,protagoras' assertion is in its real meaning a great truth1 but at the same time it has a certain ambiguity1 in that as man is the undetermined and many-sided1 either he may in his individual particularity1 as this contingent man1 be the measure1 or else self-conscious reason in man1 man in his rational nature and his universal substantiality1 is the absolute measure4 ,if the statement is taken in the former sense1 all is self-seeking1 all self-interest1 the subject with his interests forms the central point2 and if man has a rational side1 reason is still something subjective1 it is 8he40 ,but this is just the wrong and perverted way of looking at things which necessarily forms the main reproach made against the ,sophists--that they put forward man in his contingent aims as determining2 thus with them the interest of the subject in its particularity1 and the interest of the same in its substantial reason are not distinguished4 ,the same statement is brought forward in ,socrates and ,plato1 but with the further modification that here man1 in that he is thinking and gives himself a universal content1 is the measure4 ,thus here the great proposition is enunciated on which1 from this time forward1 everything turns1 since the further progress of ,philosophy only explains it further3 it signifies that reason is the end of all things4 ,this proposition further expresses a very remarkable change of position in asserting that all content1 everything objective1 is only in relation to consciousness2 thought is thus in all truth expressed as the essential moment1 and thereby the ,absolute takes the form of the thinking subjectivity which comes before us principally in ,socrates4 ,since man1 as subject1 is the measure of everything1 the existent is not alone1 but is for my knowledge4 ,consciousness is really the producer of the content in what is objective1 and subjective thinking is thus really active4 ,and this view extends even to the most modern philosophy1 as when1 for instance1 ,kant says that we only know phenomena1 i4e4 that what seems to us to be objective reality1 is only to be considered in its relation to consciousness1 and does not exist without this relation4 ,the fact that the subject as active and determining brings forth the content1 is the important matter1 but now the question comes as to how the content is further determined--whether it is limited to the particularity of consciousness or is determined as the universal1 the existent in and for itself4 ,god1 the ,platonic ,good1 is certainly at first a product of thought1 but in the second place ,he is just as really in and for ,himself4 ,since ,i1 as existent1 fixed and eternal1 only recognize what is in its content universal1 this1 posited as it is by me1 is likewise the implicitly objective1 not posited by me4 ,protagoras himself shows us much more of what is implied in his theory1 for he says1 8,truth is a manifestation for consciousness4 ,nothing is in and for itself one1 but everything has a relative truth only10 i4e4 it is what it is but for another1 which is man4 ,this relativity is by ,protagoras expressed in a way which seems to us in some measure trivial1 and belongs to the first beginnings of reflective thought4 ,the insignificant examples which he adduces 7like ,plato and ,socrates when they follow out in them the point of view of reflection71 by way of explanation1 show that in ,protagoras' understanding what is determined is not grasped as the universal and identical with self4 ,hence the exemplifications are taken mostly from sensuous manifestation4 8,in a wind it may be that one person is cold and another is not2 hence of this wind we cannot tell whether in itself it is cold or hot40#ajc ,frost and heat are thus not anything which exist1 but only are in their relation to a subject2 were the wind cold in itself1 it would always be so to the subject4 ,or again1 8if we have here six dice1 and place by them four others1 we should say of the former that there are more of them4 ,but1 again1 if we put twelve by them we say that these first six are the fewer40#ajd ,because we say of the same number that it is more and fewer1 the more and the less is merely a relative determination2 thus what is the object1 is so in the idea present to consciousness only4 ,plato1 on the contrary1 considered one and many1 not like the ,sophists in their distinction1 but as being one and the same4 ,plato says further on this point1 that the white1 warm1 c41 or everything that we say of things1 does not exist for itself1 but that the eye1 sensation1 is necessary to make it for us4 ,this reciprocal movement is what first creates the white1 and in it the white is not a thing in itself1 but what we have present is a seeing eye1 or1 to speak generally1 sight1 and particularly the seeing of white1 the feeling of warmth1 c4 ,undoubtedly warmth1 colour1 c41 really are only in relation to another1 but the conceiving mind divides itself into itself and into a world in which each also has its relation4 ,this objective relativity is expressed better in the following way4 ,if the white were in itself1 it would be that which brought forth the sensation of it2 it would be the action or the cause1 and we1 on the contrary1 the passive and receptive4 ,but the object which thus requires to be active1 is not active until it enters into 77 relation with the passive2 similarly the passive is only in relation to the active4 ,thus what is said in defining anything never concerns the thing as in itself1 but clearly only as being related to something else4 ,nothing is thus constituted in and for itself as it appears1 but the truth is just this phenomenon to which our activity contributes4 ,as things appear to the healthy man they are thus not in themselves1 but for him2 as they appear to the sick or deranged man1 they are to him1 without our being able to say that as they appear to him1 they are not true4#aje ,we feel the awkwardness of calling any such thing true1 for after all the existent1 if related to consciousness1 is yet not related to it as fixed1 but to sensuous knowledge2 and then this consciousness itself is a condition1 i4e4 something which passes away4 ,protagoras rightly recognized this double relativity when he says1 8,matter is a pure flux1 it is not anything fixed and determined in itself1 for it can be everything1 and it is different to different ages and to the various conditions of waking and sleep1 c40#ajf ,kant separates himself from this standpoint only in that he places the relativity in the 8,i10 and not in objective existence4 ,the phenomenon is1 according to him1 nothing but the fact of there being outside an impulse1 an unknown x1 which first receives these determinations through our feeling4 ,even if there were an objective ground for our calling one thing cold and another warm1 we could indeed say that they must have diversity in themselves1 but warmth and cold first become what they are in our feeling4 ,similarly it can only be in our conception that things are outside of us1 etc4 ,but if the experience is quite correctly called a 8phenomenon10 i4e4 something relative1 because it does not come to pass without the determinations of the activity of our senses1 nor without categories of thought1 yet that one1 all-pervading1 universal1 which permeates all experience1 which to ,heraclitus was necessity1 has to be brought into consciousness4 ,we see that ,protagoras possesses great powers of reflective thought1 and indeed reflection on consciousness came to consciousness with ,protagoras4 ,but this is the form of manifestation which was again taken by the later sceptics4 ,the phenomenal is not sensuous ,being1 for because ,i posit this as phenomenal1 ,i assert its nullity4 ,but the statements 8,what is1 is only for consciousness10 or 8,the truth of all things is the manifestation of them in and for consciousness10 seem quite to contradict themselves4 ,for it appears as though a contradiction were asserted--first that nothing is in itself as it appears1 and then that it is true as it appears4 ,but objective significance must not be given to the positive1 to what is true1 as if1 for example1 this were white in itself because it appears so2 for it is only this manifestation of the white that is true1 the manifestation being just this movement of the self-abrogating sensuous ,being1 which1 taken in the universal1 stands above consciousness as truly as above ,being4 ,the world is consequently not only phenomenal in that it is for consciousness1 and thus that its ,being is only one relative to consciousness1 for it is likewise in itself phenomenal4 ,the element of consciousness which ,protagoras has demonstrated1 and owing to which the developed universal has in it the moment of the negative ,being-for-another1 has thus indeed to be asserted as a necessary moment2 but taken for itself1 alone and isolated1 it is one-sided1 since the moment of implicit ,being is likewise essential4 #b4 ,,gorgias4 ,this scepticism reached a much deeper point in ,gorgias of ,leontium in ,sicily1 a man of great culture1 and also distinguished as a statesman4 ,during the ,peloponnesian war he was1 in ,ol4 #hh1 #b 7#dbg ,b4,c471 a few years after ,pericles' death in ,ol4 #hg1 #d1 sent from his native town to ,athens4#ajg ,and when he attained his object1 he went through many other ,greek towns1 such as ,larissa in ,thessaly1 and taught in them4 ,thus he obtained great wealth1 along with much admiration1 and this lasted till his death at over a hundred years of age4 ,he is said to have been a disciple of ,empedocles1 but he also knew the ,eleatics1 and his dialectic partakes of the manner and method of the latter2 indeed ,aristotle1 who preserves this dialectic1 in the work ,de ,xenophane1 ,zenone et ,gorgia1 which has indeed only come to us in fragments1 deals with them together4 ,sextus ,empiricus also gives us in full the dialectic of ,gorgias4 ,he was strong in the dialectic requisite for eloquence1 but his preeminence lies in his pure dialectic respecting the quite universal categories of ,being and non-being1 which indeed is not like that of the ,sophists4 ,tiedemann 7,geist4 der ,spec4 ,phil4 vol4 ,i4 p4 #cfb7 says very falsely3 8,gorgias went much further than any man of healthy mind could go40 ,tiedemann could say of every philosopher that he went further than healthy human understanding1 for what men call healthy understanding is not ,philosophy1 and is often far from healthy4 ,healthy human understanding possesses the modes of thought1 maxims1 and judgments of its time1 the thought-determinations of which dominate it without its being conscious thereof4 ,in this way ,gorgias undoubtedly went further than healthy understanding4 ,before ,copernicus it would have been contrary to all healthy human understanding if anyone had said that the earth went round the sun1 or before the discovery of ,america1 if it were said that there was a continent there4 ,in ,india or in ,china a republic would even now be contrary to all healthy understanding4 ,the dialectic of ,gorgias moves more purely in ,notion than that found in ,protagoras4 ,since ,protagoras asserted the relativity1 or the non-implicit nature of all that is1 this only exists in relation to another which really is essential to it2 and this last1 indeed1 is consciousness4 ,gorgias' demonstration of the non-implicitness of ,being is purer1 because he takes in itself what passes for real existence without presupposing that other1 and thus shows its own essential nullity and separates therefrom the subjective side and ,being as it is for the latter4 ,gorgias' treatise 8,on ,nature10 in which he composes his dialectic1 falls1 according to ,sextus ,empiricus 7adv4 ,math4 ,,vii4 #fe71 into three parts4 8,in the first he proves that0 7objectively7 8nothing exists1 in the second0 7subjectively71 8that assuming that ,being is1 it cannot be known2 and in the third place0 7both subjectively and objectively71 8that were it to exist and be knowable1 no communication of what is known would be possible40 ,gorgias was a congenial subject to ,sextus1 but the former still proved1 and this is what the ,sceptics ceased to do4 ,here very abstract thought-determinations regarding the most speculative moments of ,being and non-being1 of knowledge1 and of bringing into existence1 of communicating knowledge1 are involved2 and this is no idle talk1 as was formerly supposed1 for ,gorgias' dialectic is of a quite objective kind1 and is most interesting in content4 a4 8,if anything is10 7this 8anything0 is1 however1 a makeshift that we are in the habit of using in our conversation1 and which is1 properly speaking1 inappropriate1 for it implies an opposition of subject and predicate1 while at present the 8is0 alone is in question7--then 8if it is0 7and now it becomes for the first time defined as subject7 8it is either the existent or the non-existent1 or else existence and non-existence4 ,it is now evident of these three that they are not40#ajh 4 8,that which is not1 is not2 for if ,being belonged to it1 there would at the same time be existence and non-existence4 ,that is1 in so far as it is thought of as non-existent1 it is not2 but in so far as it is the non-existent1 it must exist4 ,but it cannot at the same time be and not be4 ,again1 if the non-existent is1 the existent is not1 for the two are opposed4 ,thus1 if ,being pertained to non-being1 non-being would belong to ,being4 ,but if ,being does not exist1 no more does non-being40#aji ,this is with ,gorgias a characteristic mode of reasoning4#aaj 4 8,but in proving10 ,aristotle adds to the passages just quoted1 8that the existent is not1 he follows ,melissus and ,zeno40 ,this is the dialectic already brought forward by them4 8,if ,being is1 it is contradictory to predicate a quality to it1 and if we do this1 we express something merely negative about it40 4 ,for ,gorgias says3 8,what is1 either is in itself 77 being without beginning1 or it has originated10 and he now shows that it could neither be the one nor the other1 for each leads to contradiction4 8,it cannot be the former1 for what is in itself has no beginning1 and is the infinite10 and hence likewise undetermined and indeterminable4 8,the infinite is nowhere1 for if it is anywhere1 that in which it is1 is different from it40 ,where it is1 it is in another1 8but that is not infinite which is different from another1 and contained in another4 ,just as little is it contained in itself1 for then that in which it is1 and that which is therein1 would be the same4 ,what it is in1 is the place2 that which is in this1 is the body2 but that both should be the same is absurd4 ,the infinite does not thus exist40#aaa ,this dialectic of ,gorgias regarding the infinite is on the one hand limited1 because immediate existence has certainly no beginning and no limit1 but asserts a progression into infinitude2 the self-existent ,thought1 the universal ,notion1 as absolute negativity1 has1 however1 limits in itself4 ,on the other hand1 ,gorgias is quite right1 for the bad1 sensuous infinite is nowhere present1 and thus does not exist1 but is a ,beyond of ,being2 only we may take what ,gorgias takes as a diversity of place1 as being diversity generally4 ,thus1 instead of placing the infinite1 like ,gorgias1 sometimes in another1 sometimes within itself1 i4e4 sometimes maintaining it to be different1 sometimes abrogating the diversity1 we may say better and more universally1 that this sensuous infinite is a diversity which is always posited as different from the existent1 for it is just the being different from itself4 8,in the same way ,being has not originated1 because it must then have come either from the existent or from the non-existent4 ,from the existent it did not arise1 for then it would be already2 just as little from the non-existent1 because this cannot beget anything40#aab ,the sceptics followed this up further4 ,the object to be contemplated hence ever becomes posited under determinations with #8either' #8or1' which then contradict one another4 ,but that is not the true dialectic1 because the object resolves itself into those determinations only2 when nothing follows respecting the nature of the object itself1 then1 as is already proved1 the object must be necessarily in one determination1 and not in and for itself4 4 ,in a similar way ,gorgias shows 8of what exists1 that it must either be one or many2 but neither is possible4 ,for as one1 it would have a certain magnitude1 or continuity1 or number1 or body1 but all this is not one1 but different1 divisible4 ,every sensuous one is1 in fact1 necessarily another1 a manifold4 ,if it is not one1 it cannot be many1 for the many is many ones40#aac 4 8,similarly both1 ,being and non-being1 cannot exist at the same time4 ,if one exists as much as the other1 they are the same1 and therefore neither of them is1 for the non-being does not exist1 and hence neither does the ,being1 since it is identical with it4 ,nor can they1 on the other hand1 both exist1 for if they are identical1 ,i cannot express them both10#aad and thus both do not exist1 for if ,i express both1 ,i differentiate4 ,this dialectic1 which ,aristotle 7,de ,xenoph4 c41 c4 #e7 likewise designates as peculiar to ,gorgias1 has its truth4 ,in speaking of ,being and non-being1 we always say the opposite to what we wish4 ,being and non-being are the same1 just as they are not the same2 if they are the same1 ,i speak of the two as different3 if different1 ,i express the same predicate of them1 diversity4 ,this dialectic is not to be despised by us1 as if it dealt with empty abstractions1 for these categories are1 on the one hand1 in their purity the most universal1 and if1 on the other hand1 they are not the ultimate1 yet it is always ,being or non-being that are in question2 they are not1 however1 definitely fixed and divided off1 but are self-abrogating4 ,gorgias is conscious that they are vanishing moments1 while the ordinary unconscious conception also has present to it this truth1 but knows nothing about it4 b4 ,the relation of the conceiver to conception1 the difference between conception and ,being1 is a subject which is in our mouths to-day4 8,but if there is an #8is1' it is unknowable and unthinkable1 for what is presented is not the existent0 but only a presentation4 8,if what is presented is white1 it is the case that white is presented2 if what is presented is not the really existent1 it is the case that what is1 is not presented4 ,for if what is presented is the real existent1 everything that is presented also exists1 but no one says that if a flying man1 or waggon riding on the sea were presented to us1 it would exist4 ,further1 if what is presented is the existent1 the non-existent is not presented1 for opposites are in opposition4 ,but this non-existent is everywhere presented as it is in ,scylla and the ,chimra4#aae ,gorgias on the one hand pronounces a just polemic against absolute realism1 which1 because it represents1 thinks to possess the very thing itself1 when it only has a relative1 but he falls1 on the other hand1 into the false idealism of modern times1 according to which thought is always subjective only1 and thus not the existent1 since through thought an existent is transformed into what is thought40 c4 ,we finally have the basis of the dialectic of ,gorgias in respect of the third point1 that knowledge cannot be imparted1 in this3 8,if the existent were presented1 it could still not be expressed and imparted4 ,things are visible1 audible1 c41 or are experienced4 ,the visible is grasped through sight1 the audible through hearing1 and not the contrary way2 thus1 the one cannot be indicated by the other4 ,speech1 by which the existent has to be expressed1 is not the existent2 what is imparted is thus not the existent1 but only words4#aaf ,in this manner ,gorgias' dialectic is the laying hold of this difference exactly as again occurred in ,kant2 if ,i maintain this difference1 certainly that which is1 cannot be known40 ,this dialectic is undoubtedly impregnable to those who maintain sensuous ,being to be real4 ,but its truth is only this movement to posit itself negatively as existent1 and the unity is the reflection that the existent1 comprehended also as non-existent1 becomes1 in this comprehension of it1 universal4 ,that this existent cannot be imparted1 must likewise be held most strongly1 for this individual cannot be expressed4 ,philosophic truth is thus not only expressed as if there were another truth in sensuous consciousness2 but ,being is present in that philosophic truth expresses it4 ,the ,sophists thus also made dialectic1 universal ,philosophy1 their object1 and they were profound thinkers4 ,b4--,,socrates4 ,consciousness had reached this point in ,greece1 when in ,athens the great form of ,socrates1 in whom the subjectivity of thought was brought to consciousness in a more definite and more thorough manner1 now appeared4 ,but ,socrates did not grow like a mushroom out of the earth1 for he stands in continuity with his time1 and thus is not only a most important figure in the history of ,philosophy--perhaps the most interesting in the philosophy of antiquity--but is also a world-famed personage4 ,for a mental turning-point exhibited itself in him in the form of philosophic thought4 ,if we shortly recall the periods already passed over1 we find that the ancient ,ionic philosophers certainly thought1 but without reflecting on the thought or defining its product as thought4 ,the ,atomists made objective existence into thoughts1 but these were to them only abstractions1 pure entities4 ,anaxagoras1 on the other hand1 raised thought as such1 into a principle which thereby presented itself as the all-powerful ,notion1 as the negative power over all that is definite and existent4 ,protagoras finally expresses thought as real existence1 but it is in this its movement1 which is the all-resolving consciousness1 the unrest of the ,notion4 ,this unrest is in itself at the same time something restful or secure4 ,but the fixed point of motion as such1 is the #8,i1' for it has the moments of movement outside of it2 as the self-retaining1 which only abrogates what is different1 the #8,i' is negative unity1 but just in that very way individual1 and not yet the universal reflected within itself4 ,now we here find the ambiguity of dialectic and sophistry1 which rests in the fact that if the objective disappears1 the signification of the fixed subjective is either that of the individual opposed to the objective1 and thereby the contingent and lawless will1 or that of the objective and universal in itself4 ,socrates expresses real existence as the universal #8,i1' as the consciousness which rests in itself2 but that is the good as such1 which is free from existent reality1 free from individual sensuous consciousness of feeling and desire1 free finally from the theoretically speculative thought about nature1 which1 if indeed thought1 has still the form of ,being and in which ,i am not certain of my existence4 ,socrates herein adopted firstly the doctrine of ,anaxagoras that thought1 the understanding1 is the ruling and self-determining universal1 though this principle did not1 as with the ,sophists1 attain the form of formal culture or of abstract philosophizing4 ,thus1 if with ,socrates1 as with ,protagoras1 the self-conscious thought that abrogates all that is determined1 was real existence1 with ,socrates this was the case in such a way that he at the same time grasped in thought rest and security4 ,this substance existing in and for itself1 the self-retaining1 has become determined as end1 and further as the true and the good4 ,to this determination of the universal1 we have1 in the second place1 to add that this good1 which has by me to be esteemed as substantial end1 must be known by me2 with this the infinite subjectivity1 the freedom of self-consciousness in ,socrates breaks out4 ,this freedom which is contained therein1 the fact that consciousness is clearly present in all that it thinks1 and must necessarily be at home with itself1 is in our time constantly and plainly demanded2 the substantial1 although eternal and in and for itself1 must as truly be produced through me2 but this my part in it is only the formal activity4 ,thus ,socrates' principle is that man has to find from himself both the end of his actions and the end of the world1 and must attain to truth through himself4 ,true thought thinks in such a way that its import is as truly objective as subjective4 ,but objectivity has been the significance of substantial universality1 and not of external objectivity2 thus truth is now posited as a product mediated through thought1 while untrained morality1 as ,sophocles makes ,antigone say 7vers4 #ded-deg71 is 8the eternal law of the ,gods03 8,and no one knew from whence it came40 ,but though in modern times we hear much said of immediate knowledge and belief1 it is a misconception to maintain that their content1 ,god1 the ,good1 ,just1 c41 although the content of feeling and conception1 is not1 as spiritual content1 also posited through thought4 ,the animal has no religion1 because it only feels2 but what is spiritual rests on the mediation of thought1 and pertains to man4 ,since ,socrates thus introduces the infinitely important element of leading back the truth of the objective to the thought of the subject1 just as ,protagoras says that the objective first is through relation to us1 the battle of ,socrates and ,plato with the ,sophists cannot rest on the ground that these1 as belonging to the old faith1 maintained against the others the religion and customs of ,greece1 for the violation of which ,anaxagoras was condemned4 ,quite the contrary4 ,reflection1 and the reference of any judgment to consciousness1 is held by ,socrates in common with the ,sophists4 ,but the opposition into which ,socrates and ,plato were in their philosophy necessarily brought in regard to the ,sophists1 as the universal philosophic culture of the times1 was as follows3--,the objective produced through thought1 is at the same time in and for itself1 thus being raised above all particularity of interests and desires1 and being the power over them4 ,hence because1 on the one hand1 to ,socrates and ,plato the moment of subjective freedom is the directing of consciousness into itself1 on the other1 this return is also determined as a coming out from particular subjectivity4 ,it is hereby implied that contingency of events is abolished1 and man has this outside within him1 as the spiritual universal4 ,this is the true1 the unity of subjective and objective in modern terminology1 while the ,kantian ideal is only phenomenal and not objective in itself4 ,in the third place ,socrates accepted the ,good at first only in the particular significance of the practical1 which nevertheless is only one mode of the substantial ,idea2 the universal is not only for me1 but also1 as end existent in and for itself1 the principle of the philosophy of nature1 and in this higher sense it was taken by ,plato and ,aristotle4 ,of ,socrates it is hence said1 in the older histories of ,philosophy1 that his main distinction was having added ethics as a new conception to ,philosophy1 which formerly only took nature into consideration4 ,diogenes ,laertius1 in like manner says 7,,iii41 #ef71 that the ,ionics founded natural philosophy1 ,socrates ethics1 and ,plato added to them dialectic4 ,now ethics is partly objective1 and partly subjective and reflected morality ,sittlichkeit und ,moralitt1#aag and the teaching of ,socrates is properly subjectively moral1 because in it the subjective side1 my perception and meaning1 is the prevailing moment1 although this determination of self-positing is likewise sublated1 and the good and eternal is what is in and for itself4 ,objective morality is1 on the contrary1 natural1 since it signifies the knowledge and doing of what is in and for itself good4 ,the ,athenians before ,socrates were objectively1 and not subjectively1 moral1 for they acted rationally in their relations without knowing that they were particularly excellent4 ,reflective morality adds to natural morality the reflection that this is the good and not that2 the ,kantian philosophy1 which is reflectively moral1 again showed the difference4 ,because ,socrates in this way gave rise to moral philosophy1 all succeeding babblers about morality and popular philosophy constituted him their patron and object of adoration1 and made him into a cloak which should cover all false philosophy4 ,as he treated it1 it was undoubtedly popular2 and what contributed to make it such was that his death gave him the never-failing interest derived from innocent suffering4 ,cicero 7,tusc4 ,qust4 ,v4 #d71 whose manner of thought was1 on the one hand1 of the present1 and who1 on the other hand1 had the belief that ,philosophy should yield itself up1 and hence succeeded in attaining to no content in it1 boasted of ,socrates 7what has often enough been said since7 that his most eminent characteristic was to have brought ,philosophy from heaven to earth1 to the homes and every-day life of men1 or1 as ,diogenes ,laertius expresses it 7,,ii4 #ba71 8into the market place40 ,there we have what has just been said4 ,this would seem as if the best and truest ,philosophy were only a domestic or fireside philosophy1 which conforms to all the ordinary ideas of men1 and in which we see friends and faithful ones talk together of righteousness1 and of what can be known on the earth1 without having penetrated the depths of the heavens1 or rather the depths of consciousness4 ,but this last is exactly what ,socrates1 as these men themselves indicate1 first ventured to do4 ,and it was not incumbent on him to reflect upon all the speculations of past ,philosophy1 in order to be able to come down in practical philosophy to inward thought4 ,this gives a general idea of his principle4 ,we must examine more closely this noteworthy phenomenon1 and begin with the history of ,socrates' life4 ,this is1 however1 closely intertwined with his interest in ,philosophy1 and the events of his life are bound up with his principles4 ,we have first of all to consider the beginning of his life only4 ,socrates1 whose birth occurs in the fourth year of the #ggth ,olympiad 7#dfi ,b4,c471 was the son of ,sophroniscus1 a sculptor1 and of ,phnarete1 a midwife4 ,his father brought him up to sculpture1 and it is said that ,socrates acquired skill in the art1 and long after1 statues of draped ,graces1 found in the ,acropolis1 were ascribed to him4 ,but his art did not satisfy him2 a great desire for ,philosophy1 and love of scientific research1 got possession of him4 ,he pursued his art merely to get money for a necessary subsistence1 and to be able to apply himself to the study of the sciences2 and it is told of ,crito1 an ,athenian1 that he defrayed the cost of ,socrates' instruction by masters in all the arts4 ,during the exercise of his art1 and specially after he gave it up altogether1 he read the works of ancient philosophers in so far as he could get possession of them4 ,at the same time he attended ,anaxagoras' instructions1 and1 after his expulsion from ,athens1 at which time ,socrates was thirty-seven years old1 those of ,archelaus1 who was regarded as ,anaxagoras' successor1 besides those of ,sophists celebrated in other sciences4 ,amongst these he heard ,prodicus1 a celebrated teacher of oratory1 whom1 according to ,xenophon 7,memorab4 ,,ii4 c4 #a1 #ba1 #cd71 he mentions with affection1 and other teachers of music1 poetry1 etc4 ,he was esteemed as on all sides a man of culture1 who was instructed in everything then requisite thereto4#aah ,another feature in his life was that he fulfilled the duty of protecting his country1 which rested on him as an ,athenian citizen4 ,hence he made three campaigns in the ,peloponnesian war1 which occurred during his life4 ,the ,peloponnesian war led to the dissolution of ,greek life1 inasmuch as it was preparatory to it2 and what took place politically was by ,socrates carried out in thinking consciousness4 ,in these campaigns he not only acquired the fame of a brave warrior1 but1 what was best of all1 the merit of having saved the lives of other citizens4 ,in the first1 he was present at the tedious siege of ,potida in ,thrace4 ,here ,alcibiades had already attached himself to him1 and1 according to ,plato1 he recited in the ,banquet 7p4 #bai-bbb1 ,steph42 p4 #dfa-dff1 ,bekk471 a eulogy on ,socrates for being able to endure all toil1 hunger and thirst1 heat and cold1 with mind at rest and health of body4 ,in an engagement in this campaign he saw ,alcibiades wounded in the midst of the enemy1 lifted him up1 forced his way through1 and saved both him and his arms4 ,the generals rewarded him with a wreath1 which was the prize of the bravest2 ,socrates did not1 however1 take it1 maintaining that it was given to ,alcibiades4 ,in this campaign it is said that once1 sunk in deep meditation1 he stood immovable on one spot the whole day and night1 until the morning sun awoke him from his trance--a condition in which he is said often to have been4 ,this was a cataleptic state1 which may bear some relation to magnetic somnambulism1 in which ,socrates became quite dead to sensuous consciousness4 ,from this physical setting free of the inward abstract self from the concrete bodily existence of the individual1 we have1 in the outward manifestation1 a proof of how the depths of his mind worked within him4 ,in him we see pre-eminently the inwardness of consciousness that in an anthropological way existed in the first instance in him1 and became later on a usual thing4 ,he made his other campaign in ,botia at ,delium1 a small fortification which the ,athenians possessed not far from the sea1 and where they had an unfortunate1 though not an important engagement4 ,here ,socrates saved another of his favourites1 ,xenophon2 he saw him in the flight1 for ,xenophon1 having lost his horse1 lay wounded on the ground4 ,socrates took him over his shoulders1 carried him off1 defending himself at the same time with the greatest tranquillity and presence of mind from the pursuing enemy4 ,finally he made his last campaign at ,amphipolis in ,edonis1 on the ,strymonian ,bay4#aai ,besides this1 he occupied various civil offices4 ,at the time when the democratic constitution of ,athens hitherto existing1 was taken away by the ,lacedemonians1 who now introduced everywhere an aristocratic and indeed tyrannical rule1 whereby they in great measure put themselves at the head of affairs1 he was chosen for the council1 which1 as a representative body1 took the place of the people4 ,here he distinguished himself by his immovable firmness in what he held to be right as against the wills of the thirty tyrants1 as formerly against the will of the people4 ,for he sat in the tribunal which condemned the ten generals to death1 because1 as admirals at the battle of ,arginus1 though they certainly had conquered1 yet1 being kept back through storm1 they had not dragged out the bodies nor buried them on the shore1 and because they neglected to erect trophies2 i4e4 really because they did not stand their ground1 and thus appeared to have been beaten4 ,socrates alone did not agree with this decision1 declaring himself more emphatically against the people than against the rulers4#abj ,to-day he fares badly who says anything against the people4 8,the people have excellent intelligence1 understand everything1 and have only the most excellent intentions40 ,as to rulers1 governments1 ministers1 it is self-evident that 8they understand nothing1 and only desire and bring forth what is bad40 ,along with these to him more accidental relationships to the ,state1 in which he acted only from the ordinary sense of citizenship1 without spontaneously making the affairs of the ,state his real business1 or pressing on to the head of public affairs1 the real business of his life was to discuss moral philosophy with any who came in his way4 ,his philosophy1 which asserts that real existence is in consciousness as a universal1 is still not a properly speculative philosophy1 but remained individual2 yet the aim of his philosophy was that it should have a universal significance4 ,hence we have to speak of his own individual being1 of his thoroughly noble character1 which usually is depicted as a complete catalogue of the virtues adorning the life of a private citizen2 and these virtues of ,socrates are certainly to be looked at as his own1 and as made habitual to him by his own will4 ,it has to be noted that with the ancients these qualities have generally more of the character of virtue1 because with the ancients1 in ordinary morality1 individuality1 as the form of the universal1 was given free scope1 so that virtues were regarded more as the actions of the individual will1 and thus as personal qualities2 while with us they seem to be less what is meritorious to the individual1 or what comes from himself as this unit4 ,we are accustomed to think of them much more as what exists1 as duty1 because we have a fuller consciousness of the universal1 and consider the pure individual1 the personal inward consciousness1 as real existence and duty4 ,with us virtues are hence actually either elements in our dispositions and nature1 or they have the form of the universal and of what is necessary2 but with ,socrates they have the form1 not of ordinary morality or of a natural or necessary thing1 but of an independent determination4 ,it is well known that his appearance indicated naturally low and hateful qualities1 which1 as indeed he says1 he himself subdued4 ,he lived amongst his fellow-citizens1 and stands before us as one of those great plastic natures consistent through and through1 such as we often see in those times--resembling a perfect classical work of art which has brought itself to this height of perfection4 ,such individuals are not made1 but have formed themselves into what they are2 they have become that which they wished to be1 and are true to this4 ,in a real work of art the distinguishing point is that some idea is brought forth1 a character is presented in which every trait is determined by the idea1 and1 because this is so1 the work of art is1 on the one hand1 living1 and1 on the other1 beautiful1 for the highest beauty is just the most perfect carrying out of all sides of the individuality in accordance with the one inward principle4 ,such works of art are also seen in the great men of every time4 ,the most plastic individual as a statesman is ,pericles1 and round him1 like stars1 ,sophocles1 ,thucydides1 ,socrates1 c41 worked out their individuality into an existence of its own--into a character which regulated their whole being1 and which was one principle running throughout the whole of their existence4 ,pericles alone lived with the sole end of being a statesman4 ,plutarch 7in ,pericle1 c4 #e1 #g7 says of him that1 from the time that he devoted himself to the business of the ,state1 he laughed no more1 and never again went to a feast4 ,thus1 too1 ,socrates formed himself1 through his art and through the power of self-conscious will1 into this particular character1 and acquired this capacity for the business of his life4 ,through his principle he attained that far-reaching influence which has lasted to the present day in relation to religion1 science1 and justice1 for since his time the genius of inward conviction has been the basis which must be fundamental4 ,and since this principle proceeded from the plasticity of his character1 it is very inappropriate when ,tennemann regrets 7,vol4 ,,ii4 p4 #bf7 8that though we know what he was1 we do not know how he became such40 ,socrates was a peaceful1 pious example of the moral virtues--of wisdom1 discretion1 temperance1 moderation1 justice1 courage1 inflexibility1 firm sense of rectitude in relation to tyrants and people2 he was equally removed from cupidity and despotism4 ,his indifference to money was due to his own determination1 for1 according to the custom of the times1 he could acquire it through the education of youth1 like other teachers4 ,on the other side1 this acquisition was purely matter of choice1 and not1 as with us1 something which is accepted1 so that to take nothing would be to break through a custom1 thus to present the appearance of wishing to become conspicuous1 and to be more blamed than praised4 ,for this was not yet a ,state affair2 it was under the ,roman emperors that there first were schools with payment4 ,this moderation of his life was likewise a power proceeding from conscious knowledge1 but this is not a principle found to hand1 but the regulation of self in accordance with circumstances2 in company he was1 however1 a good fellow4 ,his sobriety in respect to wine is best depicted in ,plato's 8,symposium10 in a very characteristic scene in which we see what ,socrates called virtue4 ,alcibiades there appears1 no longer sober1 at a feast given by ,agathon1 on the occasion of a success which his tragedy had obtained on the previous day at the games4 ,since the company had drunk much on the first day of the feast1 the assembled guests1 amongst whom was ,socrates1 this evening took a resolution1 in opposition to the ,greek custom at meals1 to drink little4 ,alcibiades1 finding that he was coming in amongst abstemious men1 and that there was no one else in his own frame of mind1 made himself king of the feast1 and offered the goblet to the others1 in order to bring them into the condition reached by himself2 but with ,socrates he said that he could do nothing1 because he remained as he was1 however much he drank4 ,plato then makes the individual who tells what happened at the ,banquet1 also tell that he1 with the others1 at last fell asleep on the couch1 and as he awoke in the morning1 ,socrates1 cup in hand1 still talked with ,aristophanes and ,agathon about comedy and tragedy1 and whether one man could write both comedies and tragedies1 and then went at the usual time into the public places1 to the ,lyceum1 as if nothing had happened1 and walked about the whole day as usual4#aba ,this is not a moderation which exists in the least possible enjoyment1 no aimless abstemiousness and self-mortification1 but a power belonging to consciousness1 which keeps its self-possession in bodily excess4 ,we see from this that we have not to think of ,socrates throughout after the fashion of the litany of moral virtues4 ,his behaviour to others was not only just1 true1 open1 without rudeness1 and honourable1 but we also see in him an example of the most perfect ,attic urbanity2 i4e4 he moves in the freest possible relations1 has a readiness for conversation which is always judicious1 and1 because it has an inward universality1 at the same time always has the right living relationship to the individual1 and bears upon the case on which it operates4 ,the intercourse is that of a most highly cultured man who1 in his relation to others1 never places anything personal in all his wit1 and sets aside all that is unpleasant4 ,thus ,xenophon's1 but particularly ,plato's ,socratic ,dialogues belong to the highest type of this fine social culture4 ,because the philosophy of ,socrates is no withdrawal from existence now and here into the free1 pure regions of thought1 but is in a piece with his life1 it does not proceed to a system2 and the manner of his philosophizing1 which appears to imply a withdrawal from actual affairs as it did to ,plato1 yet in that very way gives itself this inward connection with ordinary life4 ,for his more special business was his philosophic teaching1 or rather his philosophic social intercourse 7for it was not1 properly speaking1 teaching7 with all2 and this outwardly resembled ordinary ,athenian life in which the greater part of the day was passed without any particular business1 in loitering about the market-place1 or frequenting the public ,lyceum1 and there partly partaking of bodily exercises1 and partly and principally1 talking with one another4 ,this kind of intercourse was only possible in the ,athenian mode of life1 where most of the work which is now done by a free citizen--by a free republican and free imperial citizen alike--was performed by slaves1 seeing that it was deemed unworthy of free men4 ,a free citizen could in ,athens certainly be a handicraftsman1 but he had slaves who did the work1 just as a master now has workmen4 ,at the present day such a life of movement would not be suitable to our customs4 ,now ,socrates also lounged about after this manner1 and lived in this constant discussion of ethical questions4#abb ,thus what he did was what came naturally to him1 and what can in general be called moralizing2 but its nature and method was not that of preaching1 exhortation or teaching2 it was not a dry morality4 ,for amongst the ,athenians and in ,attic urbanity1 this had no place1 since it is not a reciprocal1 free1 and rational relationship4 ,but with all men1 however different their characters1 he entered on one kind of dialogue1 with all that ,attic urbanity which1 without presumption on his part1 without instructing others1 or wishing to command them1 while maintaining their perfect right to freedom1 and honouring it1 yet causes all that is rude to be suppressed4 #a4 ,the ,socratic ,method4 ,in this conversation ,socrates' philosophy is found1 as also what is known as the ,socratic method1 which must in its nature be dialectic1 and of which we must speak before dealing with the content4 ,socrates' manner is not artificial2 the dialogues of the moderns1 on the contrary1 just because no internal reason justifies their form1 are necessarily tedious and heavy4 ,but the principle of his philosophy falls in with the method itself1 which thus far cannot be called method1 since it is a mode which quite coincides with the moralizing peculiar to ,socrates4 ,for the chief content is to know the good as the absolute1 and that particularly in relation to actions4 ,socrates gives this point of view so high a place1 that he both puts aside the sciences which involve the contemplation of the universal in nature1 mind1 c41 himself1 and calls upon others to do the same4#abc ,thus it can be said that in content his philosophy had an altogether practical aspect1 and similarly the ,socratic method1 which is essential to it1 was distinguished by the system of first bringing a person to reflection upon his duty by any occasion that might either happen to be offered spontaneously1 or that was brought about by ,socrates4 ,by going to the work-places of tailors and shoemakers1 and entering into discourse with them1 as also with youths and old men1 ,sophists1 statesmen1 and citizens of all kinds1 he in the first place took their interests as his topic--whether these were household interests1 the education of children1 or the interests of knowledge or of truth4 ,then he led them on from a definite case to think of the universal1 and of truths and beauties which had absolute value1 since in every case1 from the individual's own thoughts1 he derived the conviction and consciousness of that which is the definite right4 ,this method has two prominent aspects1 the one the development of the universal from the concrete case1 and the exhibition of the notion which implicitly exists in every consciousness1#abd and the other is the resolution of the firmly established1 and1 when taken immediately in consciousness1 universal determinations of the sensuous conception or of thought1 and the causing of confusion between these and what is concrete4 a4 ,if we proceed from the general account of ,socrates' method to a nearer view1 in the first place its effect is to inspire men with distrust towards their presuppositions1 after faith had become wavering and they were driven to seek that which is1 in themselves4 ,now whether it was that he wished to bring the manner of the ,sophists into disrepute1 or that he was desirous to awaken the desire for knowledge and independent thought in the youths whom he attracted to himself1 he certainly began by adopting the ordinary conceptions which they considered to be true4 ,but in order to bring others to express these1 he represents himself as in ignorance of them1 and1 with a seeming ingenuousness1 puts questions to his audience as if they were to instruct him1 while he really wished to draw them out4 ,this is the celebrated ,socratic irony1 which in his case is a particular mode of carrying on intercourse between one person and another1 and is thus only a subjective form of dialectic1 for real dialectic deals with the reasons for things4 ,what he wished to effect was1 that when other people brought forward their principles1 he1 from each definite proposition1 should deduce as its consequence the direct opposite of what the proposition stated1 or else allow the opposite to be deduced from their own inner consciousness without maintaining it directly against their statements4 ,sometimes he also derived the opposite from a concrete case4 ,but as this opposite was a principle held by men as firmly as the other1 he then went on to show that they contradicted themselves4 ,thus ,socrates taught those with whom he associated to know that they knew nothing2 indeed1 what is more1 he himself said that he knew nothing1 and therefore taught nothing4 ,it may actually be said that ,socrates knew nothing1 for he did not reach the systematic construction of a philosophy4 ,he was conscious of this1 and it was also not at all his aim to establish a science4 ,on the one view1 this irony seems to be something untrue4 ,but when we deal with objects which have a universal interest1 and speak about them to one and to another1 it is always the case that one does not understand another's conception of the object4 ,for every individual has certain ultimate words as to which he presupposes a common knowledge4 ,but if we really are to come to an understanding1 we find it is these presuppositions which have to be investigated4 ,for instance1 if in more recent times belief and reason are discussed as the subjects of present intellectual interest1 everyone pretends that he knows quite well what reason1 c41 is1 and it is considered ill-bred to ask for an explanation of this1 seeing that all are supposed to know about it4 ,a very celebrated divine1 ten years ago1#abe published ninety theses on reason1 which contained very interesting questions1 but resulted in nothing1 although they were much discussed1 because one person's assertions issued from the point of view of faith1 and the other's from that of reason1 and each remained in this state of opposition1 without the one's knowing what the other meant4 ,thus what would make an understanding possible is just the explanation of what we think is understood1 without really being so4 ,if faith and knowledge certainly differ from one another at the first1 yet through this declaration of their notional determinations the common element will at once appear2 in that way questions like these and the trouble taken with them may1 for the first time1 become fruitful2 otherwise men may chatter this way and that for years1 without making any advance4 ,for if ,i say ,i know what reason1 what belief is1 these are only quite abstract ideas2 it is necessary1 in order to become concrete1 that they should be explained1 and that it should be understood that what they really are1 is unknown4 ,the irony of ,socrates has this great quality of showing how to make abstract ideas concrete and effect their development1 for on that alone depends the bringing of the ,notion into consciousness4 ,in recent times much has been said about the ,socratic irony which1 like all dialectic1 gives force to what is taken immediately1 but only in order to allow the dissolution inherent in it to come to pass2 and we may call this the universal irony of the world4 ,yet men have tried to make this irony of ,socrates into something quite different1 for they extended it into a universal principle2 it is said to be the highest attitude of the mind1 and has been represented as the most divine4 ,it was ,friedrich von ,schlegel who first brought forward this idea1 and ,ast repeated it1 saying1 8,the most ardent love of all beauty in the ,idea1 as in life1 inspires ,socrates' words with inward1 unfathomable life40 ,this life is now said to be irony6 ,but this irony issues from the ,fichtian philosophy1 and is an essential point in the comprehension of the conceptions of most recent times4 ,it is when subjective consciousness maintains its independence of everything1 that it says1 8,it is ,i who through my educated thoughts can annul all determinations of right1 morality1 good1 c41 because ,i am clearly master of them1 and ,i know that if anything seems good to me ,i can easily subvert it1 because things are only true to me in so far as they please me now40 ,this irony is thus only a trifling with everything1 and it can transform all things into show3 to this subjectivity nothing is any longer serious1 for any seriousness which it has1 immediately becomes dissipated again in jokes1 and all noble or divine truth vanishes away or becomes mere triviality4 ,but the ,greek gaiety1 as it breathes in ,homer's poems1 is ironical1 for ,eros mocks the power of ,zeus and of ,mars2 ,vulcan1 limping along1 serves the gods with wine1 and brings upon himself the uncontrollable laughter of the immortal gods4 ,juno boxes ,diana's ears4 ,thus1 too1 there is irony in the sacrifices of the ancients1 who themselves consumed the best2 in the pain that laughs1 in the keenest joy which is moved to tears1 in the scornful laughter of ,mephistopheles1 and in every transition from one extreme to another--from what is best to what is worst4 ,sunday morning may be passed in deep humility1 profoundest contrition and self-abasement1 in striking the breast in penitence1 and the evening in eating and drinking to the full1 going the round of pleasures1 thus allowing self to re-assert its independence of any such subjection4 ,hypocrisy1 which is of the same nature1 is the truest irony4 ,socrates and ,plato were falsely stated to be the originators of this irony1 of which it is said that it is the 8inmost and deepest life10 although they possessed the element of subjectivity2 in our time it was not permitted to us to give effect to this irony4 ,ast's 8inmost1 deepest life0 is just the subjective and arbitrary will1 the inward divinity which knows itself to be exalted above all4 ,the divine is said to be the purely negative attitude1 the perception of the vanity of everything1 in which my vanity alone remains4 ,making the consciousness of the nullity of everything ultimate1 might indeed indicate depth of life1 but it only is the depth of emptiness1 as may be seen from the ancient comedies of ,aristophanes4 ,from this irony of our times1 the irony of ,socrates is far removed2 as is also the case with ,plato1 it has a significance which is limited4 ,socrates' premeditated irony may be called a manner of speech1 a pleasant rallying2 there is in it no satirical laughter or pretence1 as though the idea were nothing but a joke4 ,but his tragic irony is his opposition of subjective reflection to morality as it exists1 not a consciousness of the fact that he stands above it1 but the natural aim of leading men1 through thought1 to the true good and to the universal ,idea4 b4 ,now the second element is what ,socrates has called the art of midwifery--an art which came to him from his mother4#abf ,it is the assisting into the world of the thought which is already contained in the consciousness of the individual--the showing from the concrete1 unreflected consciousness1 the universality of the concrete1 or from the universally posited1 the opposite which already is within it4 ,socrates hence adopts a questioning attitude1 and this kind of questioning and answering has thus been called the ,socratic method2 but in this method there is more than can be given in questions and replies4 ,for the answer seems occasionally to be quite different from what was intended by the question1 while in printed dialogue1 answers are altogether under the author's control2 but to say that in actual life people are found to answer as they are here made to do1 is quite another thing4 ,to ,socrates those who reply may be called pliable youths1 because they reply directly to the questions1 which are so formed that they make the answer very easy1 and exclude any originality in reply4 ,to this plastic manner1 which we see in the method of ,socrates1 as represented by ,plato and ,xenophon1 it is objected that we do not answer in the same relation in which the questioner asks2 while1 with ,socrates1 the relation which the questioner adopts is respected in the reply4 ,the other way1 which is to bring forward another point of view1 is undoubtedly the spirit of an animated conversation1 but such emulation is excluded from this ,socratic method1 in which the principal matter is to keep to the point4 ,the spirit of dogmatism1 self-assertion1 stopping short when we seem to get into difficulties1 and escaping from them by a jest1 or by setting them aside--all these attitudes and methods are here excluded2 they do not constitute good manners1 nor do they have a place in ,socrates' dialogues4 ,in these dialogues1 it is hence not to be wondered at that those questioned answered so precisely to the point1 while in the best modern dialogues there is always an arbitrary element4 ,this difference concerns only what is external and formal4 ,but the principal point1 and the reason why ,socrates set to work with questions in bringing the good and right into consciousness in universal form1 was that he did not proceed from what is present in our consciousness in a simple form through setting forth the conception allied to it in pure necessity1 which would be a deduction1 a proof or1 speaking generally1 a consequence following from the conception4 ,but this concrete1 as it is in natural consciousness without thinking of it1 or universality immersed in matter1 he analyzed1 so that through the separation of the concrete1 he brought the universal contained therein to consciousness as universal4 ,we see this method also carried on to a large extent in ,plato's dialogues1 where there is1 in this regard1 particular skill displayed4 ,it is the same method which forms in every man his knowledge of the universal2 an education in self-consciousness1 which is the development of reason4 ,the child1 the uncultured man1 lives in concrete individual ideas1 but to the man who grows and educates himself1 because he thereby goes back into himself as thinking1 reflection becomes reflection on the universal and the permanent establishment of the same2 and a freedom--formerly that of moving in concrete ideas--is now that of so doing in abstractions and in thoughts4 ,we see such a development of universal from particular1 where a number of examples are given1 treated in a very tedious way4 ,for us who are trained in presenting to ourselves what is abstract1 who are taught from youth up in universal principles1 the ,socratic method of so-called deference1 with its eloquence1 has often something tiresome and tedious about it4 ,the universal of the concrete case is already present to us as universal1 because our reflection is already accustomed to the universal1 and we do not require1 first of all1 to take the trouble of making a separation2 and thus1 if ,socrates were now to bring what is abstract before consciousness1 we should not require1 in order to establish it as universal1 that all these examples should be adduced1 so that through repetition the subjective certainty of abstraction might arise4 c4 ,the next result of this method of procedure may be that consciousness is surprised that what it never looked for should be found in consciousness4 ,if we reflect1 for example1 on the universally known idea of ,becoming1 we find that what becomes is not and yet it is2 it is the identity of ,being and non-being1 and it may surprise us that in this simple conception so great a distinction should exist4 ,the result attained was partly the altogether formal and negative one of bringing home to those who conversed with ,socrates1 the conviction that1 however well acquainted with the subject they had thought themselves1 they now came to the conclusion1 8that what we knew has refuted itself40 ,socrates thus put questions in the intent that the speaker should be drawn on to make admissions1 implying a point of view opposed to that from which he started4 ,that these contradictions arise because they bring their ideas together1 is the drift of the greater part of ,socrates' dialogues2 their main tendency consequently was to show the bewilderment and confusion which exist in knowledge4 ,by this means1 he tries to awaken shame1 and the perception that what we consider as true is not the truth1 from which the necessity for earnest effort after knowledge must result4 ,plato1 amongst others1 gives these examples in his ,meno 7p4 #ga-hj1 ,steph42 p4 #cbg-cdf1 ,bekk474 ,socrates is made to say1 8,by the gods1 tell me what is virtue40 ,meno proceeds to make various distinctions3 8,man's virtue is to be skilful in managing state affairs1 and thereby to help friends and harm foes2 woman's to rule her household2 other virtues are those of boys1 of young men1 of old men10 c4 ,socrates interrupts him by saying1 that it is not that about which he inquires1 but virtue in general1 which comprehends every thing in itself4 ,meno says 8,it is to govern and rule over others40 ,socrates brings forward the fact that the virtue of boys and slaves does not consist in governing4 ,meno says that he cannot tell what is common in all virtue4 ,socrates replies that it is the same as figure1 which is what is common in roundness1 squareness1 c4 ,there a digression occurs4 ,meno says1 8,virtue is the power of securing the good desired40 ,socrates interposes that it is superfluous to say the good1 for from the time that men know that something is an evil1 they do not desire it2 and also the good must be acquired in a right way4 ,socrates thus confounds ,meno1 and he sees that these ideas are false4 ,the latter says1 8,i used to hear of you1 before ,i knew you1 that you were yourself in doubt 771 and also brought others into doubt1 and now you cast a spell on me too1 so that ,i am at my wits' end 774 ,you seem1 if ,i may venture to jest1 to be like the torpedo fish1 for it is said of it that it makes torpid 77 those who come near it and touch it4 ,you have done this to me1 for ,i am become torpid in body and soul1 and ,i do not know how to answer you1 although ,i have talked thousands of times about virtue with many persons1 and1 as it seemed to me1 talked very well4 ,but now ,i do not know at all what to say4 ,hence you do well not to travel amongst strangers1 for you might be put to death as a magician40 ,socrates again wishes to 8inquire40 ,now ,meno says1 8,how can you inquire about what you say you do not know8 ,can you have a desire for what you do not know8 ,and if you find it out by chance1 how can you know that it is what you looked for1 since you acknowledge that1 you do not know it80 ,a number of dialogues end in the same manner1 both in ,xenophon and ,plato1 leaving us quite unsatisfied as to the result4 ,it is so in the ,lysis1 where ,plato asks the question of what love and friendship secures to men2 and similarly the ,republic commences by inquiring what justice is4 ,philosophy must1 generally speaking1 begin with a puzzle in order to bring about reflection2 everything must be doubted1 all presuppositions given up1 to reach the truth as created through the ,notion4 #b4 ,the ,principle of the ,good4 ,this1 in short1 is ,socrates' method4 ,the affirmative1 what ,socrates develops in the consciousness1 is nothing but the good in as far as it is brought forth from consciousness through knowledge--it is the eternal1 in and for itself universal1 what is called the ,idea1 the true1 which just in so far as it is end1 is the ,good4 ,in this regard ,socrates is opposed to the ,sophists1 for the proposition that man is the measure of all things1 to them still comprehends particular ends1 while to ,socrates the universal brought forth through free thought is thereby expressed in objective fashion4 ,nevertheless1 we must not blame the ,sophists because1 in the aimlessness of their time1 they did not discover the principle of the ,good2 for every discovery has its time1 and that of the ,good1 which as end in itself is now always made the starting point1 had not yet been made by ,socrates4 ,it now seems as if we had not yet shown forth much of the ,socratic philosophy1 for we have merely kept to the principle2 but the main point with ,socrates is that his knowledge for the first time reached this abstraction4 ,the ,good is nevertheless no longer as abstract as the of ,anaxagoras1 but is the universal which determines itself in itself1 realizes itself1 and has to be realized as the end of the world and of the individual4 ,it is a principle1 concrete within itself1 which1 however1 is not yet manifested in its development1 and in this abstract attitude we find what is wanting in the ,socratic standpoint1 of which nothing that is affirmative can1 beyond this1 be adduced4 a4 ,as regards the ,socratic principle1 the first determination is the great determination which is1 however1 still merely formal1 that consciousness creates and has to create out of itself what is the true4 ,this principle of subjective freedom was present to the consciousness of ,socrates himself so vividly that he despised the other sciences as being empty learning and useless to mankind2 he has to concern himself with his moral nature only in order to do what is best--a one-sidedness which is very characteristic of ,socrates4 ,this religion of the ,good is to ,socrates1 not only the essential point to which men have to direct their thoughts1 but it is that exclusively4 ,we see him showing how from every individual this universal1 this absolute in consciousness may be found as his reality4 ,here we see law1 the true and good1 what was formerly present as an existent1 return into consciousness4 ,but it is not a single chance manifestation in this individual ,socrates1 for we have to comprehend ,socrates and his manifestation4 ,in the universal consciousness1 in the spirit of the people to which he belongs1 we see natural turn into reflective morality1 and he stands above as the consciousness of this change4 ,the spirit of the world here begins to change1 a change which was later on carried to its completion4 ,from this higher standpoint1 ,socrates1 as well as the ,athenian people and ,socrates in them1 have to be considered4 ,the reflection of consciousness into itself begins here1 the knowledge of the consciousness of self as such1 that it is real existence--or that ,god is a ,spirit1 or again1 in a cruder and more sensuous form1 that ,god takes human form4 ,this epoch begins where essence is given up as ,being--even though it be1 as hitherto1 abstract ,being1 ,being as thought4 ,but this epoch in a naturally moral people in the highest state of development1 makes its appearance as the destruction threatening them or breaking in upon them unprevented4 ,for its morality1 as was usually so with the ancients1 consisted in the fact that the ,good was present as a universal1 without its having had the form of the conviction of the individual in his individual consciousness1 but simply that of the immediate absolute4 ,it is the authoritative1 present law1 without testing investigation1 but yet an ultimate ground on which this moral consciousness rests4 ,it is the law of the ,state2 it has authority as the law of the gods1 and thus it is universal destiny which has the form of an existent1 and is recognized as such by all4 ,but moral consciousness asks if this is actually law in itself8 ,this consciousness turned back within itself from everything that has the form of the existent1 requires to understand1 to know1 that the above law is posited in truth1 i4e4 it demands that it should find itself therein as consciousness4 ,in thus returning into themselves the ,athenian people are revealed to us3 uncertainty as to existent laws as existent has arisen1 and a doubt about what was held to be right1 the greatest freedom respecting all that is and was respected4 ,this return into itself represents the highest point reached by the mind of ,greece1 in so far as it becomes no longer the mere existence of these moralities1 but the living consciousness of the same1 which has a content which is similar1 but which1 as spirit1 moves freely in it4 ,this is a culture which we never find the ,lacedmonians reach4 ,this deepest life of morality is so to speak a free personal consciousness of morality or of ,god1 and a happy enjoyment of them4 ,consciousness and ,being have here exactly the same value and rank2 what is1 is consciousness2 neither is powerful above another4 ,the authority of law is no oppressive bond to consciousness1 and all reality is likewise no obstacle to it1 for it is secure in itself4 ,but this return is just on the point of abandoning the content1 and indeed of positing itself as abstract consciousness1 without the content1 and1 as existent1 opposed to it4 ,from this equilibrium of consciousness and ,being1 consciousness takes up its position as independent4 ,this aspect of separation is an independent conception1 because consciousness1 in the perception of its independence1 no longer immediately acknowledges what is put before it1 but requires that this should first justify itself to it1 i4e4 it must comprehend itself therein4 ,thus this return is the isolation of the individual from the universal1 care for self at the cost of the ,state2 to us1 for instance1 it is the question as to whether ,i shall be in eternal bliss or condemnation1 whereas philosophic eternity is present now in time1 and is nothing other than the substantial man himself4 ,the ,state has lost its power1 which consisted in the unbroken continuity of the universal spirit1 as formed of single individuals1 so that the individual consciousness knew no other content and reality than law4 ,morals have become shaken1 because we have the idea present that man creates his maxims for himself4 ,the fact that the individual comes to care for his own morality1 means that he becomes reflectively moral2 when public morality disappears1 reflective morality is seen to have arisen4 ,we now see ,socrates bringing forward the opinion1 that in these times every one has to look after his own morality1 and thus he looked after his through consciousness and reflection regarding himself2 for he sought the universal spirit which had disappeared from reality1 in his own consciousness4 ,he also helped others to care for their morality1 for he awakened in them this consciousness of having in their thoughts the good and true1 i4e4 having the potentiality of action and of knowledge4 ,this is no longer there immediately1 but must be provided1 just as a ship must make provision of water when it goes to places where none is to be found4 ,the immediate has no further authority but must justify itself to thought4 ,thus we comprehend the special qualities of ,socrates1 and his method in ,philosophy1 from the whole2 and we also understand his fate from the same4 ,this direction of consciousness back into itself takes the form--very markedly in ,plato--of asserting that man can learn nothing1 virtue included1 and that not because the latter has no relation to science4 ,for the good does not come from without1 ,socrates shows2 it cannot be taught1 but is implied in the nature of mind4 ,that is to say1 man cannot passively receive anything that is given from without like the wax that is moulded to a form1 for everything is latent in the mind of man1 and he only seems to learn it4 ,certainly everything begins from without1 but this is only the beginning2 the truth is that this is only an impulse towards the development of spirit4 ,all that has value to men1 the eternal1 the self-existent1 is contained in man himself1 and has to develop from himself4 ,to learn here only means to receive knowledge of what is externally determined4 ,this external comes indeed through experience1 but the universal therein belongs to thought1 not to the subjective and bad1 but to the objective and true4 ,the universal in the opposition of subjective and objective1 is that which is as subjective as it is objective2 the subjective is only a particular1 the objective is similarly only a particular as regards the subjective1 but the universal is the unity of both4 ,according to the ,socratic principle1 nothing has any value to men to which the spirit does not testify4 ,man in it is free1 is at home with himself1 and that is the subjectivity of spirit4 ,as it is said in the ,bible1 8,flesh of my flesh1 and bone of my bone10 that which is held by me as truth and right is spirit of my spirit4 ,but what spirit derives from itself must come from it as from the spirit which acts in a universal manner1 and not from its passions1 likings1 and arbitrary desires4 ,these1 too1 certainly come from something inward which is 8implanted in us by nature10 but which is only in a natural way our own1 for it belongs to the particular2 high above it is true thought1 the ,notion1 the rational4 ,socrates opposed to the contingent and particular inward1 that universal1 true inward of thought4 ,and ,socrates awakened this real conscience1 for he not only said that man is the measure of all things1 but man as thinking is the measure of all things4 ,with ,plato we shall1 later on1 find it formulated that what man seems to receive he only remembers4 ,as to the question of what is the ,good1 ,socrates recognized its determination as being not only a determination in particularity to the exclusion of the natural side1 as determination is understood in empirical science1 but even in relation to the actions of men1 he holds the ,good to be still undetermined1 and the ultimate determinateness1 or the determining1 is what we may call subjectivity generally4 ,that the ,good should be determined1 primarily signifies that while1 at first1 in opposition to the ,being of reality1 it was a general maxim only1 that to which the activity of individuality was still wanting1 in the second place it was not permitted to be inert1 to be mere thought1 but had to be present as the determining and actual1 and thus as the effectual4 ,it is such only through subjectivity1 through the activity of man4 ,that the ,good is a determinate thus further means that individuals know what the ,good is1 and we call this standpoint reflective morality1 while natural morality does right unconsciously4 ,thus to ,socrates virtue is perception4 ,for to the proposition of the ,platonic ,protagoras that all other virtues have a relationship to one another1 but that it is not so with valour1 since many brave men are to be found who are the most irreligious1 unjust1 intemperate and uncultured of people 7such as a band of robbers71 ,plato makes ,socrates answer that valour1 like all virtues1 also is a science1 that is1 it is the knowledge and the right estimation of what is to be feared4#abg ,by this the distinctive qualities of valour are certainly not unfolded4 ,the naturally moral and upright man is such without his having considered the matter at all2 it is his character1 and what is good is securely rooted within him4 ,when1 on the other hand1 consciousness is concerned1 the question arises as to whether ,i directly desire the good or not4 ,hence this consciousness of morality easily becomes dangerous1 and causes the individual to be puffed up by a good opinion of himself1 which proceeds from the consciousness of his own power to decide for the good4 ,the #8,i' is then the master1 he who chooses the ,good1 and in that there is the conceit of my knowing that ,i am an excellent man4 ,with ,socrates this opposition of the good and the subject as choosing is not reached1 for what is dealt with is only the determination of the ,good and the connection therewith of subjectivity2 this last1 as an individual person who can choose1 decides upon the inward universal4 ,we have here on the one side the knowledge of the ,good1 but1 on the other1 it is implied that the subject is good1 since this is his ordinary character2 and the fact that the subject is such1 was by the ancients called virtue4 ,we understand from this the following criticism which ,aristotle makes 7,magna ,mor4 ,i4 #a7 on the quality of virtue as expounded by ,socrates4 ,he says3 8,socrates spoke better of virtue than did ,pythagoras1 but not quite justly1 for he made virtues into a science 774 ,but this is impossible1 since1 though all knowledge has some basis 77 this basis only exists in thought4 ,consequently1 he places all the virtues in the thinking 77 side of the soul4 ,hence it comes to pass that he does away with the feeling 77 part of the soul1 that is1 the inclination 77 and the habits 7710 which1 however1 also pertain to virtue4 8,but ,plato rightly distinguished the thinking and the feeling sides of the soul40 ,this is a good criticism4 ,we see that what ,aristotle misses in the determination of virtue in ,socrates1 is the side of subjective actuality1 which we now call the heart4 ,certainly virtue is determination in accordance with universal1 and not with particular ends1 but perception is not the only element in virtue4 ,for in order that the good perceived should be virtue1 it must come to pass that the whole man1 the heart and mind1 should be identical with it1 and this aspect of ,being or of realization generally1 is what ,aristotle calls 4 ,if we understand the reality of the good as universal morality1 substantiality is wanting to the perception2 but matter1 when we regard the inclination of the individual subjective will as this reality4 ,this double want may also be considered as a want of content and of activity1 in so far as to the universal development is wanting2 and in the latter case1 determining activity comes before us as negative only in reference to the universal4 ,socrates thus omits1 in characterizing virtue1 just what we saw had also disappeared in actuality1 that is1 first the real spirit of a people1 and then reality as the sympathies of the individual4 ,for it is just when consciousness is not yet turned back into itself1 that the universal good appears to the individual as the object of his sympathy4 ,to us1 on the other hand1 because we are accustomed to put on one side the good or virtue as practical reason1 the other side1 which is opposed to a reflective morality1 is an equally abstract sensuousness1 inclination1 passion1 and hence the bad4 ,but in order that the universal should be reality1 it must be worked out through consciousness as individual1 and the carrying into effect pertains to this individuality4 ,a passion1 as for example1 love1 ambition1 is the universal itself1 as it is self-realizing1 not in perception1 but in activity2 and if we did not fear being misunderstood1 we should say that for the individual the universal is his own interests4 ,yet this is not the place in which to unravel all the false ideas and contradictions present in our culture4 ,aristotle 7,eth4 ,nicom4 ,,vi4 #ac71 supplementing the one-sidedness of ,socrates1 further says of him3 8,socrates in one respect worked on right lines1 but not in the other4 ,for to call virtue scientific knowledge is untrue1 but to say that it is not without scientific basis is right4 ,socrates made virtues into perceptions 771 but we say that virtue exists with perception40 ,this is a very true distinction2 the one side in virtue is that the universal of end belongs to thought4 ,but in virtue1 as character1 the other side1 active individuality1 real soul1 must necessarily come forth2 and indeed with ,socrates the latter appears in a characteristic form of which we shall speak below 7p4 #dba et seq474 b4 ,if we consider the universal first1 it has within it a positive and a negative side1 which we find both united in ,xenophon's 8,memorabilia10 a work which aims at justifying ,socrates4 ,and if we inquire whether he or ,plato depicts ,socrates to us most faithfully in his personality and doctrine1 there is no question that in regard to the personality and method1 the externals of his teaching1 we may certainly receive from ,plato a satisfactory1 and perhaps a more complete representation of what ,socrates was4 ,but in regard to the content of his teaching and the point reached by him in the development of thought1 we have in the main to look to ,xenophon4 ,the fact that the reality of morality had become shaken in the mind of the people1 came to consciousness in ,socrates2 he stands so high because he gave expression to what was present in the times4 ,in this consciousness he elevated morality into perception1 but this action is just the bringing to consciousness of the fact that it is the power of the ,notion which sublates the determinate existence and the immediate value of moral laws and the sacredness of their implicitude4 ,when perception likewise positively acknowledges as law that which was held to be law 7for the positive subsists through having recourse to laws71 this acknowledgment of them always passes through the negative mode1 and no longer has the form of absolute being-in-itself3 it is1 however1 just as far from being a ,platonic ,republic4 ,to the ,notion too1 because to it the determinateness of laws in the form in which they have value to unperceiving consciousness has dissolved1 only the purely implicit universal ,good is the true4 ,but since this is empty and without reality1 we demand1 if we are not satisfied with a dull monotonous round1 that again a movement should be made towards the extension of the determination of the universal4 ,now because ,socrates remains at the indeterminateness of the good1 its determination means for him simply the expression of the particular good4 ,then it comes to pass that the universal results only from the negation of the particular good2 and since this last is just the existing laws of ,greek morality1 we have here the doubtlessly right1 but dangerous element in perception1 the showing in all that is particular only its deficiencies4 ,the inconsistency of making what is limited into an absolute1 certainly becomes unconsciously corrected in the moral man2 this improvement rests partly on the morality of the subject and partly on the whole of the social life2 and unfortunate extremes resulting in conflict are unusual and unfrequent4 ,but since the dialectic sublates the particular1 the abstract universal also becomes shaken4 4 ,now as regards the positive side1 ,xenophon tells us in the fourth book of the ,memorabilia 7c4 #b1 #dj71 how ,socrates1 once having made the need for perception sensible to the youths1 then actually instructed them1 and no longer wandered through mere subtleties in his talk1 but taught them the good in the clearest and most open way4 ,that is1 he showed them the good and true in what is determined1 going back into it because he did not wish to remain in mere abstraction4 ,xenophon gives an example of this 7,memorab4 ,,iv4 c4 #d1 #ab-af1 #be7 in a dialogue with the ,sophist ,hippias4 ,socrates there asserts that the just man is he who obeys the law1 and that these laws are divine4 ,xenophon makes ,hippias reply by asking how ,socrates could declare it to be an absolute duty to obey the laws1 for the people and the governors themselves often condemn them by changing them1 which is allowing that they are not absolute4 ,but ,socrates answers by demanding if those who conduct war do not again make peace1 which is not1 any more than in the other case1 to condemn war1 for each was just in its turn4 ,socrates thus says1 in a word1 that the best and happiest ,state is that in which the citizens are of one mind and obedient to law4 ,now this is the one side in which ,socrates looks away from the contradiction and makes laws and justice1 as they are accepted by each individually1 to be the affirmative content4 ,but if we here ask what these laws are1 they are1 we find1 just those which have a value at some one time1 as they happen to be present in the ,state and in the idea2 at another time they abrogate themselves as determined1 and are not held to be absolute4 4 ,we hence see this other negative side in the same connection when ,socrates brings ,euthydemus into the conversation1 for he asks him whether he did not strive after the virtue without which neither the private man nor the citizen could be useful to himself or to his people or the ,state4 ,euthydemus declares that this undoubtedly is so4 ,but without justice1 replies ,socrates1 this is not possible1 and he further asks whether ,euthydemus had thus attained to justice in himself4 ,euthydemus answers affirmatively1 for he says that he thinks he is no less just than any other man4 ,socrates now replies1 8,just as workmen can show their work1 the just will be able to say what their works are40 ,this he also agrees to1 and replies that he could easily do so4 ,socrates now proposes if this is so to write1 8on the one hand under the actions of the just1 and on the other1 under 1 those of the unjust80 ,with the approbation of ,euthydemus1 lies1 deceit1 robbery1 making a slave of a free man1 thus fall on the side of the unjust4 ,now ,socrates asks1 8,but if a general subdues the enemy's ,state1 would this not be justice80 ,euthydemus says 8,yes40 ,socrates replies1 8,likewise if he deceives and robs the enemy and makes slaves80 ,euthydemus has to admit the justice of this4 ,it is thus shown 8that the same qualities come under the determination both of justice and of injustice40 ,here it strikes ,euthydemus to add the qualification that he intended that ,socrates should understand the action to be only in reference to friends2 as regards them it is wrong4 ,socrates accepts this1 but proceeds1 8,if a general at the decisive moment of the battle saw his own army in fear1 and he deceived them by falsely saying that help was coming in order to lead them on to victory1 could it be deemed right80 ,euthydemus acknowledges that it could4 ,socrates says1 8,if a father gives a sick child a medicine which it does not wish to take1 in its food1 and makes it well through deceit1 is this right80 ,euthydemus--8,yes40 ,socrates--8,or is anyone wrong who takes arms from his friend secretly or by force1 when he sees him in despair1 and in the act of taking his own life80 ,euthydemus has to admit that this is not wrong4#abh ,thus it is again shown here1 that as regards friends also1 the same determinations have to hold good on both sides1 as justice as well as injustice4 ,here we see that abstention from lying1 deceit1 and robbery1 that which we naturally hold to be established1 contradicts itself by being put into connection with something different1 and something which holds equally good4 ,this example further explains how through thought1 which would lay hold of the universal in the form of the universal only1 the particular becomes uncertain4 4 ,the positive1 which ,socrates sets in the place of what was fixed and has now become vacillating1 in order to give a content to the universal1 is1 on the one hand1 and in opposition to this last1 obedience to law 7p4 #daf71 that is1 the mode of thought and idea which is inconsistent2 and1 on the other hand1 since such determinations do not hold good for the ,notion1 it is perception1 in which the immediately posited has now1 in the mediating negation1 to justify itself as a determination proceeding out of the constitution of the whole4 ,but it is both true that we do not find this perception present in ,socrates1 for it remains in its content undetermined1 and that in reality it is a contingent1 which is seen in the fact1 that the universal commands1 such as 8,thou shalt not kill10 are connected with a particular content which is conditioned4 ,now whether the universal maxim in this particular case has value or not1 depends first on the circumstances2 and it is the perception which discovers the conditions and circumstances whereby exceptions to this law of unconditioned validity arise4 ,however1 because through this contingency in the instances1 the fixed nature of the universal principle disappears1 since it1 too1 appears as a particular only1 the consciousness of ,socrates arrives at pure freedom in each particular content4 ,this freedom1 which does not leave the content as it is in its dissipated determination to the natural consciousness1 but makes it to be penetrated by the universal1 is the real mind which1 as unity of the universal content and of freedom1 is the veritable truth4 ,thus if we here consider further what is the true in this consciousness1 we pass on to the mode in which the realization of the universal appeared to ,socrates himself4 ,even the uneducated mind does not follow the content of its consciousness as this content appears in it2 but1 as mind1 it corrects that which is wrong in its consciousness1 and is thus implicitly1 if not explicitly as consciousness1 free4 ,that is1 though this consciousness expresses the universal law1 8,thou shalt not kill10 as a duty1 that consciousness--if no cowardly spirit dwells within it--will still bravely attack and slay the enemy in war4 ,here1 if it is asked whether there is a command to kill one's enemies1 the reply would be affirmative1 as likewise when a hangman puts to death a criminal4 ,but when in private life we become involved with adversaries1 this command to kill one's enemies will not occur to us4 ,we may thus call this the mind which thinks at the right time1 first of the one1 and then of the other2 it is spirit1 but an unspiritual consciousness4 ,the first step towards reaching a spiritual consciousness is the negative one of acquiring freedom for one's consciousness4 ,for since perception attempts to prove individual laws1 it proceeds from a determination to which1 as a universal basis1 particular duty is submitted2 but this basis is itself not absolute1 and falls under the same dialectic4 ,for example1 were moderation commanded as a duty on the ground that intemperance undermined the health1 health is the ultimate which is here considered as absolute2 but it is at the same time not absolute1 for there are other duties which ordain that health1 and even life itself1 should be risked and sacrificed4 ,the so-called conflict of duties is nothing but duty1 which is expressed as absolute1 showing itself as not absolute2 in the constant contradiction morals become unsettled4 ,for a consciousness which has become consistent1 law1 because it has then been brought into contact with its opposite1 has been sublated4 ,for the positive truth has not yet become known in its determination4 ,but to know the universal in its determination1 i4e4 the limitation of the universal which comes to us as fixed and not contingent1 is only possible in connection with the whole system of actuality4 ,thus if with ,socrates the content has become spiritualized1 yet manifold independent grounds have merely taken the place of manifold laws4 ,for the perception is not yet expressed as the real perception of these grounds over which it rules2 but the truth of consciousness simply is this very movement of pure perception4 ,the true ground is1 however1 spirit1 and the spirit of the people--a perception of the constitution of a people1 and the connection of the individual with this real universal spirit4 ,laws1 morals1 the actual social life1 thus have in themselves their own corrective against the inconsistent1 which consists of the expression of a definite content as absolute4 ,in ordinary life we merely forget this limitation of universal principles1 and these still hold their place with us2 but the other point of view is thus when the limitation comes before our consciousness4 ,when we have the perfect consciousness that in actual life fixed duties and actions do not exist1 for each concrete case is really a conflict of many duties which separate themselves in the moral understanding1 but which mind treats as not absolute1 comprehending them in the unity of its judgment1 we call this pure1 deciding individuality1 the knowledge of what is right1 or conscience1 just as we call the pure universal of consciousness not a particular but an all-comprehensive one1 duty4 ,now both sides here present1 the universal law and the deciding spirit which is in its abstraction the active individual1 are also necessary to the consciousness of ,socrates as the content and the power over this content4 ,that is1 because with ,socrates the particular law has become vacillating1 there now comes in the place of the universal single mind1 which1 with the ,greeks1 was unconscious determination through unreflective morality1 individual mind as individuality deciding for itself4 ,thus with ,socrates the deciding spirit is transformed into the subjective consciousness of man1 since the power of deciding originates with himself2 and the first question now is1 how this subjectivity appears in ,socrates himself4 ,because the person1 the individual1 now gives the decision1 we come back to ,socrates as person1 as subject1 and what follows is a development of his personal relations4 ,but since the moral element is generally placed in the personality of ,socrates1 we see the contingent nature of the instruction and of the culture which was obtained through ,socrates' character2 for it was the actual basis on which men fortified themselves in associating with ,socrates1 by actual communication with him and by their manner of life4 ,thus it was true that 8the intercourse with his friends was1 on the whole1 beneficial and instructive to them1 but in many cases they became unfaithful to ,socrates10#abi because not everyone attains to perception1 and he who possesses it may remain at the negative4 ,the education of the citizens1 life in the people1 is quite a fresh force in the individual1 and does not mean that he educates himself through arguments2 hence1 however truly educative the intercourse with ,socrates was1 this contingency still entered into it4 ,we thus see as an unhappy symptom of disorder1 how ,socrates' greatest favourites1 and those endowed with the most genial natures 7such as ,alcibiades1 that genius of levity1 who played with the ,athenian people1 and ,critias1 the most active of the ,thirty7 afterwards experienced the fate of being judged in their own country1 one as an enemy and traitor to his fellows1 and the other as an oppressor and tyrant of the ,state4 ,they lived according to the principle of subjective perception1 and thus cast a bad light on ,socrates1 for it is shown in this how the ,socratic principle in another form brought about the ruin of ,greek life4#acj c4 ,the characteristic form in which this subjectivity--this implicit and deciding certainty--appears in ,socrates1 has still to be mentioned4 ,that is1 since everyone here has this personal mind which appears to him to be his mind1 we see how in connection with this1 we have what is known under the name of the ,genius 77 of ,socrates2 for it implies that now man decides in accordance with his perception and by himself4 ,but in this ,genius of ,socrates--notorious as a much discussed bizarrerie of his imagination--we are neither to imagine the existence of protective spirit1 angel1 and such-like1 nor even of conscience4 ,for conscience is the idea of universal individuality1 of the mind certain of itself1 which is at the same time universal truth4 ,but the ,genius of ,socrates is rather all the other and necessary sides of his universality1 that is1 the individuality of mind which came to consciousness in him equally with the former4 ,his pure consciousness stands over both sides4 ,the deficiency in the universal1 which lies in its indeterminateness1 is unsatisfactorily supplied in an individual way1 because ,socrates' judgment1 as coming from himself1 was characterized by the form of an unconscious impulse4 ,the ,genius of ,socrates is not ,socrates himself1 not his opinions and conviction1 but an oracle which1 however1 is not external1 but is subjective1 his oracle4 ,it bore the form of a knowledge which was directly associated with a condition of unconsciousness2 it was a knowledge which may also appear under other conditions as a magnetic state4 ,it may happen that at death1 in illness and catalepsy1 men know about circumstances future or present1 which1 in the understood relations of things1 are altogether unknown4 ,these are facts which are usually rudely denied4 ,that in ,socrates we should discover what comes to pass through reflection in the form of the unconscious1 makes it appear to be an exceptional matter1 revealed to the individual only1 and not as being what it is in truth4 ,thereby it certainly receives the stamp of imagination1 but there is nothing more of what is visionary or superstitious to be seen in it1 for it is a necessary manifestation1 though ,socrates did not recognize the necessity1 this element being only generally before his imagination4 ,in connection with what follows1 we must yet further consider the relationship of the ,genius to the earlier existent form of decision1 and that into which it led ,socrates2 regarding both ,xenophon expresses himself in his history most distinctly4 ,because the standpoint of the ,greek mind was natural morality1 in which man did not yet determine himself1 and still less was what we call conscience present1 since laws were1 in their fundamental principles1 regarded as traditional1 these last now presented an appearance of being sanctioned by the gods4 ,we know that the ,greeks undoubtedly had laws on which to form their judgments1 but on the other hand1 both in private and public life1 immediate decisions had to be made4 ,but in them the ,greeks1 with all their freedom1 did not decide from the subjective will4 ,the general or the people did not take upon themselves to decide as to what was best in the ,state1 nor did the individual do so in the family4 ,for in making these decisions1 the ,greeks took refuge in oracles1 sacrificial animals1 soothsayers1 or1 like the ,romans1 asked counsel of birds in flight4 ,the general who had to fight a battle was guided in his decision by the entrails of animals1 as we often find in ,xenophon's ,anabasis4 ,pausanias tormented himself thus a whole day long before he gave the command to fight4#aca ,this element1 the fact that the people had not the power of decision but were determined from without1 was a real factor in ,greek consciousness2 and oracles were everywhere essential where man did not yet know himself inwardly as being sufficiently free and independent to take upon himself to decide as we do4 ,this subjective freedom1 which was not yet present with the ,greeks1 is what we mean in the present day when we speak of freedom2 in the ,platonic ,republic we shall see more of it4 ,our responsibility for what we do is a characteristic of modern times2 we wish to decide according to grounds of common sense1 and consider this as ultimate4 ,the ,greeks did not possess the knowledge of this infinitude4 ,in the first book of ,xenophon's ,memorabilia 7chap4 ,i1 #g-i71 on the occasion of the defence by ,socrates of his 1 ,socrates says at the very beginning3 8,the gods have reserved to themselves what is most important in knowledge4 ,architecture1 agriculture1 forging1 are human arts1 as also government1 the science of law1 management of the household and generalship4 ,in all this man can attain to skill1 but for the other1 divination is necessary4 ,he who cultivates a field does not know who will enjoy the fruit1 nor does he who builds a house know who will inhabit it2 the general does not know whether the army should be brought into the field2 he who rules a ,state whether it is good for him0 7the individual7 8or bad4 ,nor does he who marries a wife know whether he will experience happiness or whether grief and sorrow will not come through this to him2 neither can he who has powerful relations in the ,state1 know whether1 on account of these1 he may not be banished from the ,state4 ,because of this uncertainty1 men have to take refuge in divination40 ,regarding it ,xenophon expresses himself 7ibid4 #c1 #d7 to the effect that it manifests itself in different ways through oracles1 sacrifices1 flight of birds1 c41 but to ,socrates this oracle is his ,genius4 ,to hold the future1 or what is foreseen by the somnambulist or at death to be a higher kind of insight1 is a perversion which easily arises even in our ideas2 but looked at more closely1 we find in this the particular interests of individuals merely1 and the knowledge of what is right and moral is something much higher4 ,if anyone wishes to marry or to build a house1 c41 the result is important to the individual only4 ,the truly divine and universal is the institution of agriculture1 the state1 marriage1 c42 compared to this it is a trivial matter to know whether1 when ,i go to sea1 ,i shall perish or not4 ,the ,genius of ,socrates moreover reveals itself in him through nothing other than the counsel given respecting these particular issues1 such as when and whether his friends ought to travel4 ,to anything true1 existing in and for itself in art and science1 he made no reference1 for this pertains to the universal mind1 and these dmonic revelations are thus much more unimportant than those of his thinking mind4 ,there is certainly something universal in them1 since a wise man can often foresee whether anything is advisable or not4 ,but what is truly divine pertains to all1 and though talents and genius are also personal characteristics1 they find their first truth in their works which are universal4 ,now because with ,socrates judgment from within first begins to break free from the external oracle1 it was requisite that this return into itself should1 in its first commencement1 still appear in physiological guise 7supra1 pp4 #cij1 #cia74 ,the ,genius of ,socrates stands midway between the externality of the oracle and the pure inwardness of the mind2 it is inward1 but it is also presented as a personal genius1 separate from human will1 and not yet as the wisdom and free will of ,socrates himself4 ,the further investigation of this ,genius consequently presents to us a form which passes into somnambulism1 into this double of consciousness2 and in ,socrates there clearly appears to be something of the kind1 or something which is magnetic1 for1 as we already mentioned 7p4 #cij71 he is said often to have fallen into trances and catalepsy4 ,in modern times we have seen this in the form of a rigid eye1 an inward knowledge1 perception of this thing and that1 of what is gone1 of what is best to do1 c42 but magnetism carries science no further than this4 ,the ,genius of ,socrates is thus to be taken as an actual state1 and is remarkable because it is not morbid but was necessarily called up through a special condition of his consciousness4 ,for the turning point in the whole world-famed change of views constituting the principle of ,socrates1 is that in place of the oracle1 the testimony of the mind of the individual has been brought forward and that the subject has taken upon itself to decide4 #c4 ,the ,fate of ,socrates4 ,with this ,genius of ,socrates as one of the chief points of his indictment1 we now enter upon the subject of his fate1 which ends with his condemnation4 ,we may find this fate out of harmony with his professed business of instructing his fellow-citizens in what is good1 but taken in connection with what ,socrates and his people were1 we shall recognize the necessity of it4 ,the contemporaries of ,socrates1 who came forward as his accusers before the ,athenian people1 laid hold on him as the man who made known that what was held as absolute was not absolute4 ,socrates1 with this new principle1 and as one who was an ,athenian citizen whose express business was this form of instruction1 came1 through this his personality1 into relationship with the whole ,athenian people2 and this relationship was not merely with a certain number or with a commanding number1 but it was a living relationship with the spirit of the ,athenian people4 ,the spirit of this people in itself1 its constitution1 its whole life1 rested1 however1 on a moral ground1 on religion1 and could not exist without this absolutely secure basis4 ,thus because ,socrates makes the truth rest on the judgment of inward consciousness1 he enters upon a struggle with the ,athenian people as to what is right and true4 ,his accusation was therefore just1 and we have to consider this accusation as also the end of his career4 ,the attacks which ,socrates experienced are well known1 and were from two sources2 ,aristophanes attacked him in the 8,clouds10 and then he was formally accused before the people4 ,aristophanes regarded the ,socratic philosophy from the negative side1 maintaining that through the cultivation of reflecting consciousness1 the idea of law had been shaken1 and we cannot question the justice of this conception4 ,aristophanes' consciousness of the one-sidedness of ,socrates may be regarded as a prelude to his death2 the ,athenian people likewise certainly recognized his negative methods in condemning him4 ,it is known that ,aristophanes brought upon the stage along with ,socrates1 not only such men as ,aeschylus1 and more specially ,euripides1 but also the ,athenians generally and their generals--the personified ,athenian people and the gods themselves--a freedom which we would not dream of were it not historically authenticated4 ,we have not here to consider the real nature of the ,comedy of ,aristophanes1 nor the wanton way in which he was said to have treated ,socrates4 ,as to the first1 it should not startle us1 nor do we require to justify ,aristophanes or to excuse him4 ,the ,comedy of ,aristophanes is in itself as real a part of the ,athenian people1 and ,aristophanes is as essential a figure1 as were the sublime ,pericles1 the happy ,alcibiades1 the divine ,sophocles1 and the moral ,socrates1 for he belongs as much as any other to this circle of luminaries 7,vol4 ,i41 p4 #cbb74 ,thus much can alone be said1 that it certainly goes against our ,german seriousness to see how ,aristophanes brings on the boards men living in the ,state1 by name1 in order to make a jest of them2 and we feel this specially in regard to so upright a man as ,socrates4 ,by chronological considerations1 some have tried hard to refute the fact that ,aristophanes' representations had no influence on the condemnation of ,socrates4 ,it is seen that1 on the one hand1 ,socrates was treated quite unjustly2 but then we must recognize the merit of ,aristophanes1 who in his 8,clouds0 was perfectly right4 ,this poet1 who exposed ,socrates to scorn in the most laughable and bitter way1 was thus no ordinary joker and shallow wag who mocked what is highest and best1 and sacrificed all to wit with a view to making the ,athenians laugh4 ,for everything has to him a much deeper basis1 and in all his jokes there lies a depth of seriousness4 ,he did not wish merely to mock2 and moreover to mock what was worthy of honour would be perfectly bald and flat4 ,it is a pitiful wit which has no substance1 and does not rest on contradictions lying in the matter itself4 ,but ,aristophanes was no bad jester4 ,it is1 generally speaking1 not possible to joke in an external way about what does not contain matter for joking or irony in itself4 ,for what really is comic is to show a man or a thing as they disclose themselves in their extent2 and if the thing is not itself its contradiction1 the comic element is superficial and groundless4 ,hence1 when ,aristophanes makes merry over the ,democracy1 there is a deep political earnestness at heart1 and from all his works it appears what a noble1 excellent1 true ,athenian citizen he was4 ,we thus have a real patriot before us1 who1 though it involved the punishment of death1 did not fear in one of his works to counsel peace4 ,in him1 as one who had a patriotism of the most enlightened kind1 we find the blissful self-satisfied enjoyment of a people giving free rein to itself4 ,there is1 in what is humorous1 a self-security which1 though with all seriousness it strives after some particular thing1 while the opposite of what it aims at always comes to pass1 never has for that reason any doubts nor any reflection about itself1 since it remains perfectly certain of itself and of what concerns it4 ,we enjoy in ,aristophanes this side of the free ,athenian spirit1 this perfect enjoyment of itself in loss1 this untroubled certainty of itself in all miscarriage of the result in real life1 and this is the height of humour4 ,in the 8,clouds0 we do not indeed see this natural humour1 but a contradiction with definite intention4 ,aristophanes indeed depicts ,socrates humorously too1 for he brings forth in his moral works the opposite of that from which he starts1 and his scholars derive delight from the far-extending discoveries reached through him1 which they think are made by their own good luck1 but which afterwards turn hateful to them1 and become the very opposite of what they intended4 ,the wonderful perception which the followers of ,socrates are here represented as having attained1 is just a perception of the nullity of the laws of the determinate good as it is to the natural consciousness4 ,aristophanes made fun of the fact that ,socrates occupied himself with elementary researches as to how far fleas spring1 and of his putting wax on their feet in order to discover this4 ,this is not historic1 but it is well known that ,socrates had in his philosophy the side which ,aristophanes showed up with such acrimony4 ,shortly1 the fable of the 8,clouds0 is this3 ,strepsiades1 an honourable ,athenian citizen of the old school1 had great trouble with his new-fashioned extravagant son1 who1 spoiled by mother and uncle1 kept horses and led a life out of keeping with his position4 ,the father thus got into trouble with his creditors1 and went in distress to ,socrates1 and became his disciple4 ,there the old man learned that not this or that1 but another is the right1 or rather he learned the stronger 77 and weaker reasons 7 74 ,he learned the dialectic of laws1 and how1 by reasoning1 the payment of debts can be disregarded1 and he then required that his son should go to the ,school of ,socrates2 and the latter likewise profited from his wisdom4 ,but we find the result ensuing from the universal which has now through the ,socratic dialectic become empty1 in the private interest or the wrong spirit of ,strepsiades and his son1 which spirit is merely the negative consciousness of the content of laws4 ,equipped with this new wisdom of reasons1 and the discovery of reasons1 ,strepsiades is armed against the chief evil that presses on him1 as regards his threatening creditors4 ,these now come one after another to obtain payment4 ,but ,strepsiades knows how to put them off with excellent reasons1 and to argue them away1 for he pacifies them by all sorts of titulos1 and shows them that he does not need to pay them2 indeed he even mocks them1 and is very glad that he learned all this from ,socrates4 ,but soon the scene changes1 and the whole affair alters4 ,the son comes1 behaves in a very unseemly way to his father1 and finally beats him4 ,the father cries to the supreme power1 as if this were the last indignity1 but the son shows him1 with equally good reasons1 obtained by the method derived by him from ,socrates1 that he had a perfect right to strike him4 ,strepsiades ends the comedy with execrations on the ,socratic dialectic1 with a return to his old ways1 and with the burning of ,socrates' house4 ,the exaggeration which may be ascribed to ,aristophanes1 is that he drove this dialectic to its bitter end1 but it cannot be said that injustice is done to ,socrates by this representation4 ,indeed we must admire the depth of ,aristophanes in having recognized the dialectic side in ,socrates as being a negative1 and--though after his own way--in having presented it so forcibly4 ,for the power of judging in ,socrates' method is always placed in the subject1 in conscience1 but where this is bad1 the story of ,strepsiades must repeat itself4 ,with regard to the formal public accusation of ,socrates1 we must not1 like ,tennemann 7,vol4 ,,ii41 p4 #ci seq471 say of ,socrates' treatment1 that 8it is revolting to humanity that this excellent man had to drink the cup of poison as a sacrifice to cabals--so numerous in democracies4 ,a man like ,socrates1 who had made right0 7right is not being discussed1 but we may ask what right8 ,the right of moral freedom7 8the sole standard of his action1 and did not stray from the straight path1 must necessarily make many enemies0 7,why8 ,this is foolish2 it is a moral hypocrisy to pretend to be better than others who are then called enemies7 8who are accustomed to act from quite different motives4 ,when we think of the corruption1 and of the rule of the thirty tyrants1 we must simply wonder that he could have worked on to his sixtieth year unmolested4 ,but since the ,thirty did not venture to lay hands on him themselves1 it is the more to be wondered at that in the reconstituted and just rule and freedom which followed the overthrow of despotism0--in that very way the danger in which their principle was1 came to be known--8a man like ,socrates could be made a sacrifice to cabals4 ,this phenomenon is probably explained by the fact that the enemies of ,socrates had first of all to gain time in order to obtain a following1 and that under the rule of the ,thirty1 they played too insignificant a part10 and so on4 ,now1 as regards the trial of ,socrates1 we have to distinguish two points1 the one the matter of the accusation1 the judgment of the court1 and the other the relation of ,socrates to the sovereign people4 ,in the course of justice there are thus these two parts--the relation of the accused to the matter on account of which he is accused1 and his relation to the competency of the people1 or the recognition of their majesty4 ,socrates was found guilty by the judges in respect of the content of his accusation1 but was condemned to death because he refused to recognize the competency and majesty of the people as regards the accused4 a4 ,the accusation consisted of two points3 8,that ,socrates did not consider as gods those who were held to be such by the ,athenian people1 but introduced new ones2 and that he also led young men astray40#acb ,the leading away of youth was his casting doubt on what was held to be immediate truth4 ,the first accusation has in part the same foundation1 for he made it evident that what was usually so considered1 was not acceptable to the gods2 and in part it is to be taken in connection with his ,dmon1 not that he called this his god4 ,but with the ,greeks this was the direction which the individuality of judgment took2 they took it to be a contingency of the individual1 and hence1 as contingency of circumstances is an external1 they also made the contingency of judgment into something external1 i4e4 they consulted their oracles--conscious that the individual will is itself a contingent4 ,but ,socrates1 who placed the contingency of judgment in himself1 since he had his ,dmon in his own consciousness1 thereby abolished the external universal ,dmon from which the ,greeks obtained their judgments4 ,this accusation1 as also ,socrates' defence1 we wish now to examine further2 ,xenophon represents both to us1 and ,plato has also supplied us with an ,apology4 ,meanwhile we may not rest content with saying that ,socrates was an excellent man who suffered innocently1 c4 7p4 #dcj71 for in this accusation it was the popular mind of ,athens that rose against the principle which became fatal to him4 4 ,as regards the first point of the accusation1 that ,socrates did not honour the national gods1 but introduced new ones1 ,xenophon#acc makes him answer that he always brought the same sacrifices as others to the public altars1 as all his fellow-citizens could see--his accusers likewise4 ,but as to the charge that he introduced new ,dmons1 in that he heard the voice of ,god showing him what he should do1 he appealed to them whether by soothsayers the cry and flight of birds1 the utterances of men 7like the voice of ,pythia71 the position of the entrails of sacrificial animals1 and even thunder and lightning were not accepted as divine revelations4 ,that ,god knows the future beforehand1 and1 if ,he wishes1 reveals it in these ways1 all believe with him2 but ,god can also reveal the future otherwise4 ,he could show that he did not lie in maintaining that he heard the voice of ,god1 from the testimony of his friends1 to whom he often announced what was said2 and in its results this was always found to be true4 ,xenophon 7,memorab4 ,i4 c4 #a1 #aa7 adds1 8,no one ever saw or heard ,socrates do or say anything godless or impious1 for he never tried to find out the nature of the ,universe1 like most of the others1 when they sought to understand how what the ,sophists called the world began40 ,that is1 from them came the earlier atheists1 who1 like ,anaxagoras1 held that the sun was a stone4#acd ,the effect which the defence against this part of the accusation made on the judges is expressed thus by ,xenophon3#ace 8,one section of them was displeased because they did not believe what ,socrates said1 and the other part because they were envious that he was more highly honoured of the gods than they40 ,this effect is very natural4 ,in our times this also happens in two ways4 ,either the individual is not believed when he boasts of special manifestations1 and particularly of manifestations which have to do with individual action and life2 it is neither believed that such manifestations took place at all1 or that they happened to this subject4 ,or if anyone does have dealings with such divinations1 rightly enough his proceedings are put an end to1 and he is shut up4 ,by this it is not denied in a general way that ,god foreknows everything1 or that ,he can make revelations to individuals2 this may be admitted in abstracto1 but not in actuality1 and it is believed in no individual cases4 ,men do not believe that to him1 to this individual1 there has been a revelation4 ,for why to him more than to others8 ,and why just this trifle1 some quite personal circumstances--as to whether someone should have a successful journey1 or whether he should converse with another person1 or whether or not he should in a speech properly defend himself8 ,and why not others amongst the infinitely many things which may occur to the individual8 ,why not much more important things1 things concerning the welfare of whole ,states8 ,hence it is not believed of an individual1 in spite of the fact that if it is possible1 it must be to the individual that it happens4 ,this unbelief1 which thus does not deny the general fact and general possibility1 but believes it in no particular case1 really does not believe in the actuality and truth of the thing4 ,it does not believe it because the absolute consciousness--and it must be such--certainly knows nothing of a positive kind of trivialities such as form the subject of these divinations and also those of ,socrates2 in spirit such things immediately vanish away4 ,the absolute consciousness does not know about the future as such1 any more than about the past2 it knows only about the present4 ,but because in its present1 in its thought1 the opposition of future and past to present becomes apparent1 it likewise knows about future and past1 but of the past as something which has taken shape4 ,for the past is the preservation of the present as reality1 but the future is the opposite of this1 the ,becoming of the present as possibility1 and thus the formless4 ,from out of this formlessness the universal first comes into form in the present2 and hence in the future no form can be perceived4 ,men have the dim feeling that when ,god acts it is not in a particular way1 nor for particular objects4 ,such things are held to be too paltry to be revealed by ,god in a particular case4 ,it is acknowledged that ,god determines the individual1 but by this the totality of individuality1 or all individualities1 is understood2 hence it is said that ,god's way of working is found in universal nature4 ,now while with the ,greeks judgment had the form of a contingency externally posited through the flight and cries of birds1 in our culture we decide by an inward contingency1 because ,i myself desire to be this contingency1 and the knowledge of individuality is likewise a consciousness of this contingency4 ,but if the ,greeks1 for whom the category of the contingency of consciousness was an existent1 a knowledge of it as an oracle1 had this individuality as a universal knowledge of which everyone could ask counsel1 in ,socrates--in whom what was here externally established had become inward consciousness1 as with us1 though not yet fully1 being still represented as an actual voice1 and conceived of as something which he separated from his individuality--the decision of the single individual had the form of personality as a particular1 and it was not a universal individuality4 ,this his judges could not in justice tolerate1 whether they believed it or not4 ,with the ,greeks such revelations had to have a certain nature and method2 there were1 so to speak1 official oracles 7not subjective71 such as ,pythia1 a tree1 etc4 ,hence when this appeared in any particular person like a common citizen1 it was considered incredible and wrong2 the ,dmon of ,socrates was a medium of a different kind to any formerly respected in the ,greek ,religion4 ,it is so much the more noteworthy1 that nevertheless the oracle of the ,delphian ,apollo1 ,pythia1 declared ,socrates to be the wisest ,greek4#acf ,socrates it was who carried out the command of the ,god of knowledge1 8,know ,thyself10 and made it the motto of the ,greeks1 calling it the law of the mind1 and not interpreting it as meaning a mere acquaintanceship with the particular nature of man4 ,thus ,socrates is the hero who established in the place of the ,delphic oracle1 the principle that man must look within himself to know what is ,truth4 ,now seeing that ,pythia herself pronounced that utterance1 we find in it a complete revolution in the ,greek mind1 and the fact that in place of the oracle1 the personal self-consciousness of every thinking man has come into play4 ,this inward certainty1 however1 is undoubtedly another new god1 and not the god of the ,athenians existing hitherto1 and thus the accusation of ,socrates was quite just4 4 ,if we now consider the second point of the accusation1 that ,socrates led youth astray1 we find that he first sets against it the fact that the oracle of ,delphi declared that none could be nobler1 juster or wiser than he4#acg ,and then he sets against this accusation his whole manner of life1 and asks whether by the example that he gave1 particularly to those with whom he went about1 he ever led any into evil4#ach ,the general accusation had to be further defined and witnesses came forward4 8,melitus said that he knew some whom he advised to obey him rather than their parents10#aci ,this point of the accusation principally related to ,anytus1 and since he made it good by sufficient testimony1 the point was undoubtedly proved1 in accordance with law4 ,socrates explained himself further on this point when he left the court4 ,for ,xenophon tells us 7,apol4 ,socr4 #bg1 #bi--ca7 that ,anytus was inimical to ,socrates1 because he said to ,anytus1 a respected citizen1 that he should not bring up his son to the trade of a tanner1 but in manner befitting a free man4 ,anytus was himself a tanner1 and although his business was mostly conducted by slaves1 it was in itself not ignominious1 and ,socrates' expression was hence wrong1 although1 as we have seen 7p4 #cff71 quite in the spirit of ,greek thought4 ,socrates added that he had made acquaintance with this son of ,anytus and discovered no evil in him1 but he prophesied that he would not remain at this servile work to which his father kept him4 ,nevertheless1 because he had no rational person near to look after him1 he would come to have evil desires and be brought into dissolute ways4 ,xenophon added that ,socrates' prophecy had come to pass literally1 and that the young man gave himself up to drink1 and drank day and night1 becoming totally depraved4 ,this can be easily understood1 for a man who feels himself to be fit for something better 7whether truly so or not7 and through this discord in his mind is discontented with the circumstances in which he lives1 yet capable of attaining to no other1 is led out of this disgust into listlessness1 and is thus on the way to the evil courses which so often ruin men4 ,the prediction of ,socrates is thus quite natural4 7,supra1 p4 #dbd47 ,to this definite accusation that he led sons into disobedience to their parents1 ,socrates replied by asking the question whether in selecting men for public offices1 such as that of general1 parents1 or those experienced in war1 were selected4 ,similarly in all cases those most skilful in an art or science are picked out4 ,he demanded whether it was not matter of astonishment that he should be brought before a judge because he was preferred to parents by the sons in their aspirations after the highest human good which is to be made a noble man4#adj ,this reply of ,socrates is1 on the one hand1 quite just1 but we see at the same time that we cannot call it exhaustive1 for the real point of the accusation is not touched4 ,what his judges found unjust was the intrusion morally of a third into the absolute relation between parents and children4 ,on the whole not much can be said on this point1 for all depends on the mode of intervention1 and if it is necessary in certain cases1 it need not take place generally1 and least of all when some private individual takes that liberty4 ,children must have the feeling of unity with their parents2 this is the first immediately moral relationship2 every teacher must respect it1 keep it pure1 and cultivate the sense of being thus connected4 ,hence when a third person is called into this relation between parents and children1 what happens through the new element introduced1 is that the children are for their own good prevented from confiding in their parents1 and made to think that their parents are bad people who harm them by their intercourse and training2 and hence we find this revolting4 ,the worst thing which can happen to children in regard to their morality and their mind1 is that the bond which must ever be held in reverence should become loosened or even severed1 thereby causing hatred1 disdain1 and ill-will4 ,whoever does this1 does injury to morality in its truest form4 ,this unity1 this confidence1 is the mother's milk of morality on which man is nurtured2 the early loss of parents is therefore a great misfortune4 ,the son1 like the daughter1 must indeed come out of his natural unity with the family and become independent1 but the separation must be one which is natural or unforced1 and not defiant and disdainful4 ,when a pain like this has found a place in the heart1 great strength of mind is required to overcome it and to heal the wound4 ,if we now speak of the example given us by ,socrates1 he seems1 through his intervention1 to have made the young man dissatisfied with his position4 ,anytus' son might1 indeed1 have found his work generally speaking uncongenial1 but it is another thing when such dislike is brought into consciousness and established by the authority of a man such as ,socrates4 ,we may very well conjecture that if ,socrates had to do with him1 he strengthened and developed in him the germ of the feeling of incongruity4 ,socrates remarked on the subject of his capacities1 saying that he was fit for something better1 and thus established a feeling of dissatisfaction in the young man1 and strengthened his dislike to his father1 which thus became the reason of his ruin4 ,hence this accusation of having destroyed the relationship of parents and children may be regarded as not unfounded1 but as perfectly well established4 ,it was also thought very bad in ,socrates' case particularly1 and made a matter of reproach that he had such followers as ,critias and ,alcibiades1 who brought ,athens almost to the brink of ruin 7supra1 p4 #dba74 ,for when he mixed himself in the education which others gave their children1 men were justified in the demand that the result should not belie what he professed to do for the education of youth4 ,the only question now is1 how the people came to take notice of this1 and in how far such matters can be objects of legislation and be brought into court4 ,in our law1 as regards the first part of the accusation1 divination such as ,cagliostro's is illegal1 and it would be forbidden as it formerly was by the ,inquisition4 ,respecting the second point1 such a moral interference is no doubt more recognized with us1 where there is a particular office having this duty laid upon it2 but this interference must keep itself general1 and dare not go so far as to call forth disobedience to parents1 which is the first immoral principle4 ,but should such questions come before the court8 ,this first of all brings up the question of what is the right of the ,state1 and here great laxity is now allowed4 ,nevertheless1 when some professor or preacher attacks a particular religion1 the legislature would certainly take notice of it1 and it would have a complete right to do so1 although there would be an outcry when it did it4 ,there is undoubtedly a limit which in liberty of thought and speech is difficult to define and rests on tacit agreement2 but there is a point beyond which we find what is not allowed1 such as direct incitement to insurrection4 ,it is indeed said1 that 8bad principles destroy themselves by themselves and find no entrance40 ,but that is only true in part1 for with the populace the eloquence of sophistry stirs up their passions4 ,it is also said1 8,this is only theoretic1 no action follows40 ,but the ,state really rests on thought1 and its existence depends on the sentiments of men1 for it is a spiritual and not a physical kingdom4 ,hence it has in so far maxims and principles which constitute its support1 and if these are attacked1 the ,government must intervene4 ,added to this1 it was the case that in ,athens quite a different state of things was present than with us2 in order to be able to judge rightly of ,socrates' case we must first consider the ,athenian ,state and its customs4 ,according to ,athenian laws1 i4e4 according to the spirit of the absolute ,state1 both these things done by ,socrates were destructive of this spirit1 while in our constitution the universal of the states is a stronger universal1 which last undoubtedly permits of individuals having freer play1 since they cannot be so dangerous to this universal4 ,hence it would undoubtedly in the first place mean the subversion of the ,athenian ,state1 if this public religion on which everything was built and without which the ,state could not subsist1 went to pieces2 with us the ,state may be called an absolute and independent power4 ,the ,dmon is now1 in fact1 a deity differing from any known1 and because it stood in contradiction to the public religion1 it gave to it a subjective arbitrariness4 ,but since established religion was identified with public life so closely that it constituted a part of public law1 the introduction of a new god who formed self-consciousness into a principle and occasioned disobedience1 was necessarily a crime4 ,we may dispute with the ,athenians about this1 but we must allow that they are consistent4 ,in the second place1 the moral connection between parents and children is stronger1 and much more the moral foundation of life with the ,athenians than with us1 where subjective freedom reigns2 for family piety is the substantial key-note of the ,athenian ,state4 ,socrates thus attacked and destroyed ,athenian life in two fundamental points2 the ,athenians felt and became conscious of it4 ,is it then to be wondered at that ,socrates was found guilty8 ,we might say that it had to be so4 ,tennemann 7,vol4 ,,ii41 p4 #da7 says3 8,though these charges contained the most palpable untruths1 ,socrates was condemned to death because his mind was too lofty for him to descend to the common unworthy means1 by which the judgment of the court was usually perverted40 ,but all this is false2 he was found guilty of these deeds1 but not for that reason condemned to death4 b4 ,we here come to the second occurrence in his history4 ,in accordance with ,athenian laws1 the accused had1 after the ,heliasts 7resembling the ,english jury7 pronounced him guilty1 the liberty of suggesting 77 a penalty different from the punishment which the accuser proposed2 this implied a mitigation of the punishment without a formal appeal--an excellent provision in ,athenian law1 testifying to its humanity4 ,in this penalty the punishment in itself is not brought into question1 but only the kind of punishment2 the judges had decided that ,socrates deserved punishment4 ,but when it was left to the accused to determine what his punishment should be1 it might not be arbitrary1 but must be in conformity with the crime1 a money or bodily punishment 71 74#ada ,but it was implied in the guilty persons constituting himself his own judge1 that he submitted himself to the decision of the court and acknowledged himself to be guilty4 ,now ,socrates declined to assign a punishment for himself consisting either of fine or banishment1 and he had the choice between these and death1 which his accusers proposed4 ,he declined to choose the former punishment because he1 according to ,xenophon's account 7,apol4 ,socr4 #bc71 in the formality of the exchange-penalty 7 71 as he said1 would acknowledge guilt2 but there was no longer any question as to the guilt1 but only as to the kind of punishment4 ,this silence may indeed be considered as moral greatness1 but1 on the other hand1 it contradicts in some measure what ,socrates says later on in prison1 that he did not wish to flee1 but remained there1 because it seemed better to the ,athenians and better to him to submit to the laws 7,vol4 ,i41 p4 #cdb74 ,but the first submission would have meant that as the ,athenians had found him guilty1 he respected this decision1 and acknowledged himself as guilty4 ,consistently he would thus have held it better to impose his punishment1 since thereby he would not only have submitted himself to the laws1 but also to the judgment4 ,we see in ,sophocles 7,antig4 verses #ibe1 #ibf71 the heavenly ,antigone1 that noblest of figures that ever appeared on earth1 going to her death1 her last words merely stating-- 8,if this seems good unto the gods1 ,suffering1 we may be made to know our error40 ,pericles also submitted himself to the judgment of the people as sovereign2 we saw him 7,vol4 ,i41 p4 #cbh7 going round the citizens entreating for ,aspasia and ,anaxagoras4 ,in the ,roman ,republic we likewise find the noblest men begging of the citizens4 ,there is nothing dishonouring to the individual in this1 for he must bend before the general power1 and the real and noblest power is the people4 ,this acknowledgment the people must have direct from those who raise themselves amongst them4 ,here1 on the contrary1 ,socrates disclaims the submission to1 and humiliation before the power of the people1 for he did not wish to ask for the remission of his punishment4 ,we admire in him a moral independence which1 conscious of its own right1 insists upon it and does not bend either to act otherwise1 or to recognize as wrong what it itself regards as right4 ,socrates hence exposed himself to death1 which could not be regarded as the punishment for the fault of which he was found guilty2 for the fact that he would not himself determine the punishment1 and thus disdained the juridical power of the people1 was foremost in leading to his condemnation4 ,in a general way he certainly recognized the sovereignty of the people1 but not in this individual case2 it has1 however1 to be recognized1 not only in general1 but in each separate case4 ,with us the competency of the court is presupposed1 and the criminal judged without further ado2 to-day the whole matter is also open to the light of day and accepted as an acknowledged fact4 ,but with the ,athenians we find the characteristic request that the prisoner should1 through the act of imposing on himself a penalty1 sanction the judge's sentence of guilt4 ,in ,england this is certainly not the case1 but there still remains a like form of asking the accused by what law he wishes to be judged4 ,he then answers1 by the law of the land and by the judges of his country4 ,here we have the recognition of legal operations4 ,socrates thus set his conscience in opposition to the judges' sentence1 and acquitted himself before its tribunal4 ,but no people1 and least of all a free people like the ,athenians1 has by this freedom to recognize a tribunal of conscience which knows no consciousness of having fulfilled its duty excepting its own consciousness4 ,to this government and law1 the universal spirit of the people1 may reply3 8,if you have the consciousness of having done your duty1 we must also have the consciousness that you have so done40 ,for the first principle of a ,state is that there is no reason or conscience or righteousness or anything else1 higher than what the ,state recognizes as such4 ,quakers1 ,anabaptists1 c41 who resist any demands made on them by the ,state1 such as to defend the ,fatherland1 cannot be tolerated in a true ,state4 ,this miserable freedom of thinking and believing what men will1 is not permitted1 nor any such retreat behind personal consciousness of duty4 ,if this consciousness is no mere hypocrisy1 in order that what the individual does should be recognized as duty1 it must be recognized as such by all4 ,if the people can make mistakes the individual may do so much more easily1 and he must be conscious that he can do this much more easily than the people4 ,now law also has a conscience and has to speak through it2 the law-court is the privileged conscience4 ,now if the miscarriage of justice in a trial is shown by every conscience clamouring for something different1 the conscience of the court alone possesses any value as being the universal legalized conscience1 which does not require to recognize the particular conscience of the accused4 ,men are too easily convinced of having fulfilled their duty1 but the judge finds out whether duty is in fact fulfilled1 even if men have the consciousness of its being so4 ,we should expect nothing else of ,socrates than that he should go to meet his death in the most calm and manly fashion4 ,plato's account of the wonderful scene his last hours presented1 although containing nothing very special1 forms an elevating picture1 and will be to us a permanent representation of a noble deed4 ,the last dialogue of ,plato is popular philosophy1 for the immortality of the soul is here first brought forward2 yet it brings no consolation1 for1 as ,homer makes ,achilles say in the nether world1 he would prefer to be a ploughboy on the earth4 ,but though the people of ,athens asserted through the execution of this judgment the rights of their law as against the attacks of ,socrates1 and had punished the injury caused to their moral life by ,socrates1 ,socrates was still the hero who possessed for himself the absolute right of the mind1 certain of itself and of the inwardly deciding consciousness1 and thus expressed the higher principle of mind with consciousness4 ,now because1 as has been said1 this new principle by effecting an entrance into the ,greek world1 has come into collision with the substantial spirit and the existing sentiments of the ,athenian people1 a reaction had to take place1 for the principle of the ,greek world could not yet bear the principle of subjective reflection4 ,the ,athenian people were thus1 not only justified1 but also bound to react against it according to their law1 for they regarded this principle as a crime4 ,in general history we find that this is the position of the heroes through whom a new world commences1 and whose principle stands in contradiction to what has gone before and disintegrates it3 they appear to be violently destroying the laws4 ,hence individually they are vanquished1 but it is only the individual1 and not the principle1 which is negated in punishment1 and the spirit of the ,athenian people did not in the removal of the individual1 recover its old position4 ,the false form of individuality is taken away1 and that1 indeed1 in a violent way1 by punishment2 but the principle itself will penetrate later1 if in another form1 and elevate itself into a form of the world-spirit4 ,this universal mode in which the principle comes forth and permeates the present is the true one2 what was wrong was the fact that the principle came forth only as the peculiar possession of one individual4 ,his own world could not comprehend ,socrates1 but posterity can1 in as far as it stands above both4 ,it may be conceived that the life of ,socrates had no need to have such an end1 for ,socrates might have lived and died a private philosopher1 and his teaching might have been quietly accepted by his disciples1 and have spread further still without receiving any notice from ,state or people2 the accusation thus would seem to have been contingent4 ,but it must be said that it was through the manner of that event that this principle became so highly honoured4 ,the principle is not merely something new and peculiar to itself1 but it is an absolutely essential moment in the self-developing consciousness of self which is designed to bring to pass as a totality1 a new and higher actuality4 ,the ,athenians perceived correctly that this principle not only meant opinion and doctrine1 for its true attitude was that of a direct and even hostile and destructive relation to the actuality of the ,greek mind2 and they proceeded in accordance with this perception4 ,hence1 what follows in ,socrates' life is not contingent1 but necessarily follows upon his principle4 ,or the honour of having recognized that relation1 and indeed of having felt that they themselves were tinged with this principle1 is due to the ,athenians4 c4 ,the ,athenians likewise repented of their condemnation of ,socrates1 and punished some of his accusers with death itself1 and others with banishment2 for according to ,athenian laws1 the man who made an accusation1 and whose accusation was found to be false1 usually underwent the same punishment that otherwise the criminal would have borne4 ,this is the last act in this drama4 ,on the one hand the ,athenians recognized through their repentance the individual greatness of the man2 but on the other 7and this we find by looking closer7 they also recognized that this principle in ,socrates1 signifying the introduction of new gods and disrespect to parents1 has--while destructive and hostile to it--been introduced even into their own spirit1 and that they themselves are in the dilemma of having in ,socrates only condemned their own principle4 ,in that they regretted the just judgment of ,socrates1 it seems to be implied that they wished that it had not occurred4 ,but from the regret it does not follow that in itself it should not have occurred1 but only that it should not have happened for their consciousness4 ,both together constitute the innocence which is guilty and atones for its guilt2 it would only be senseless and despicable if there were no guilt4 ,an innocent person who comes off badly is a simpleton2 hence it is a very flat and uninteresting matter when tyrants and innocent persons are represented in tragedies1 just because this is an empty contingency4 ,a great man would be guilty and overcome the great crisis that ensues2 ,christ thus gave up his individuality1 but what was brought forth by him remained4 ,the fate of ,socrates is hence really tragic1 not in the superficial sense of the word and as every misfortune is called tragic4 ,the death of an estimable individual must1 in such a sense1 be specially tragic1 and thus it is said of ,socrates1 that because he was innocent and condemned to death1 his fate was tragic4 ,but such innocent suffering would only be sad and not tragic1 for it would not be a rational misfortune4 ,misfortune is only rational when it is brought about by the will of the subject1 who must be absolutely justified and moral in what he does1 like the power against which he wars--which must therefore not be a merely natural power1 or the power of a tyrannic will4 ,for it is only in such a case that man himself has any part in his misfortune1 while natural death is only an absolute right which nature exercises over men4 ,hence1 in what is truly tragic there must be valid moral powers on both the sides which come into collision2 this was so with ,socrates4 ,his is likewise not merely a personal1 individually romantic lot2 for we have in it the universally moral and tragic fate1 the tragedy of ,athens1 the tragedy of ,greece4 ,two opposed rights come into collision1 and the one destroys the other4 ,thus both suffer loss and yet both are mutually justified2 it is not as though the one alone were right and the other wrong4 ,the one power is the divine right1 the natural morality whose laws are identical with the will which dwells therein as in its own essence1 freely and nobly2 we may call it abstractly objective freedom4 ,the other principle1 on the contrary1 is the right1 as really divine1 of consciousness or of subjective freedom2 this is the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil1 i4e4 of self-creative reason2 and it is the universal principle of ,philosophy for all successive times4 ,it is these two principles which we see coming into opposition in the life and the philosophy of ,socrates4 ,the ,athenian people had come into a period of culture1 in which this individual consciousness made itself independent of the universal spirit and became for itself4 ,this was perceived by them in ,socrates1 but at the same time it was felt that it meant ruin1 and thus they punished an element which was their own4 ,the principle of ,socrates is hence not the transgression of one individual1 for all were implicated2 the crime was one that the spirit of the people committed against itself4 ,through this perception the condemnation of ,socrates was retracted2 ,socrates appeared to have committed no crime1 for the spirit of the people has now generally reached the consciousness which turns back from the universal into itself4 ,this meant the disintegration of this people1 whose mind and spirit consequently soon disappeared from the world1 but yet out of its ashes a higher took its rise1 for the world-spirit had raised itself into a higher consciousness4 ,the ,athenian ,state1 indeed1 endured for long1 but the bloom of its character soon faded4 ,it is characteristic of ,socrates that he grasped the principle of the inwardness of knowledge1 not practically merely1 as did ,critias and ,alcibiades 7supra1 pp4 #dba1 #dch71 but in thought1 making it valid to thought1 and this is the higher method4 ,knowledge brought about the ,fall1 but it also contains the principle of ,redemption4 ,thus what to others was only ruin1 to ,socrates1 because it was the principle of knowledge1 was also a principle of healing4 ,the development of this principle1 which constitutes the content of all successive history1 is explicitly the reason that the later philosophers withdrew from the affairs of the ,state1 restricted themselves to cultivating an inner world1 separated from themselves the universal aim of the moral culture of the people1 and took up a position contrary to the spirit of ,athens and the ,athenians4 ,from this it came to pass that particularity of ends and interests now became powerful in ,athens4 ,this has1 in common with the ,socratic principle1 the fact that what seems right and duty1 good and useful to the subject in relation to himself as well as to the ,state1 depends on his inward determination and choice1 and not on the constitution and the universal4 ,this principle of self-determination for the individual has1 however1 become the ruin of the ,athenian people1 because it was not yet identified with the constitution of the people2 and thus the higher principle must in every case appear to bring ruin with it where it is not yet identified with the substantial of the people4 ,the ,athenian life became weak1 and the ,state outwardly powerless1 because its spirit was divided within itself4 ,hence it was dependent on ,lacedmon1 and we finally see the external subordination of these ,states to the ,macedonians4 ,we are done with ,socrates4 ,i have been more detailed here because all the features of the case have been so completely in harmony1 and he constitutes a great historic turning point4 ,socrates died at sixty-nine years of age1 in ,olympiad #ie1 #a 7#cii-djj ,b4,c471 an ,olympiad after the end of the ,peloponnesian war1 twenty-nine years after the death of ,pericles1 and forty-four years before the birth of ,alexander4 ,he saw ,athens in its greatness and the beginning of its fall2 he experienced the height of its bloom and the beginning of its misfortunes4 ,c4 ,,the ,,socratics4 ,the result of the death of ,socrates was1 that the little company of his friends went off from ,athens to ,megara1 where ,plato also came4 ,euclides had settled there and received them gladly4#adb ,when ,socrates' condemnation was retracted and his accusers punished1 certain of the ,socratics returned1 and all was again brought into equilibrium4 ,the work of ,socrates was far-reaching and effectual in the kingdom of ,thought1 and the stimulation of a great amount of interest is always the principal service of a teacher4 ,subjectively1 ,socrates had the formal effect of bringing about a discord in the individual2 the content was subsequently left to the free-will and liking of each person1 because the principle was subjective consciousness and not objective thought4 ,socrates himself only came so far as to express for consciousness generally the simple existence of one's own thought as the ,good1 but as to whether the particular conceptions of the ,good really properly defined that of which they were intended to express the essence1 he did not inquire4 ,but because ,socrates made the ,good the end of the living man1 he made the whole world of idea1 or objective existence in general1 rest by itself1 without seeking to find a passage from the ,good1 the real essence of what is known as such1 to the thing1 and recognizing real essence as the essence of things4 ,for when all present speculative philosophy expresses the universal as essence1 this1 as it first appears1 has the semblance of being a single determination1 beside which there are a number of others4 ,it is the complete movement of knowledge that first removes this semblance1 and the system of the universe then shows forth its essence as ,notion1 as a connected whole4 ,the most varied schools and principles proceeded from this doctrine of ,socrates1 and this was made a reproach against him1 but it was really due to the indefiniteness and abstraction of his principle4 ,and in this way it is only particular forms of this principle which can at first be recognized in philosophic systems which we call ,socratic4 ,under the name of ,socratic1 ,i understand1 however1 those schools and methods which remained closer to ,socrates and in which we find nothing but the one-sided understanding of ,socratic culture4 ,one part of these kept quite faithfully to the direct methods of ,socrates1 without going any further4 ,a number of his friends are mentioned as being of this description1 and these1 inasmuch as they were authors1 contented themselves with correctly transcribing dialogues after his manner1 which were partly those he actually had held with them1 and partly those they had heard from others2 or else with working out similar dialogues in his method4 ,but for the rest they abstained from speculative research1 and by directing their attention to what was practical1 adhered firmly and faithfully to the fulfilment of the duties of their position and circumstances1 thereby maintaining calm and satisfaction4 ,xenophon is the most celebrated of those mentioned1 but besides him a number of other ,socratics wrote dialogues4 schines1 some of whose dialogues have come down to us1 ,phdo1 ,antisthenes and others are mentioned1 and amongst them a shoemaker1 ,simon1 8with whom ,socrates often spoke at his workshop1 and who afterwards carefully wrote out what ,socrates said to him40 ,the title of his dialogues1 as also those of the others which are left to us1 are to be found in ,diogenes ,lartius 7,,ii4 #abb1 #abc2 #fj1 #fa2 #aje2 ,,vi4 #ae-ah72 they have1 however1 only a literary interest1 and hence ,i will pass them by4 ,but another section of the ,socratics went further than ,socrates1 inasmuch as they1 starting from him1 laid hold of and matured one of the particular aspects of his philosophy and of the standpoint to which philosophic knowledge was brought through him4 ,this standpoint maintained the absolute character of self-consciousness within itself1 and the relation of its self-existent universality to the individual4 ,in ,socrates1 and from him onward1 we thus see knowledge commencing1 the world raising itself into the region of conscious thought1 and this becoming the object4 ,we no longer hear question and answer as to what ,nature is1 but as to what ,truth is2 or real essence has determined itself not to be the implicit1 but to be what it is in knowledge4 ,we hence have the question of the relationship of self-conscious thought to real essence coming to the front as what concerns us most4 ,the true and essence are not the same2 the true is essence as thought1 but essence is the simply implicit4 ,this simple is1 indeed1 thought1 and is in thought1 but when it is said that essence is pure ,being or ,becoming1 as the being-for-self of the atomists1 and then that the ,notion is thought generally 7the of ,anaxagoras71 or finally measure1 this is asserted directly1 and in an objective manner4 ,or it is the simple unity of the objective and of thought2 it is not purely objective--for ,being cannot be seen1 heard1 c42 nor is it pure thought in opposition to the existent--for this is the explicitly existent self-consciousness which separates itself from essence4 ,it is finally not the unity going back into itself from the difference in the two sides1 which is understanding and knowledge4 ,in these self-consciousness on the one hand presents itself as being-for-self1 and on the other1 as ,being2 it is conscious of this difference1 and from this difference turns back into the unity of both4 ,this unity1 the result1 is the known1 the true4 ,one element in the true is the certainty of itself2 this moment has attained to reality--in consciousness and for consciousness4 ,it is through this movement and the investigation of the subject1 that the succeeding period of ,philosophy is distinguished1 because it does not contemplate essence as left to itself1 and as purely objective1 but as in unity with the certainty of itself4 ,it is not to be understood by this that such knowledge had itself been made into essence1 so that it is held to be the content and definition of absolute essence1 or that essence had been determined for the consciousness of these philosophers as the unity of ,being and ,thought1 i4e4 as if they had thought of it thus2 but they could merely no longer speak of essence and actuality without this element of self-certainty4 ,and this period is hence1 so to speak1 the middle period1 which is really the movement of knowledge1 and considers knowledge as the science of essence1 which first brings about that unity4 ,from what has been said1 it can now be seen what philosophic systems can come before us4 ,that is to say1 because in this period the relation of ,thought to ,being1 or of the universal to the individual1 is made explicit1 we see1 on the one hand1 as the object of ,philosophy1 the contradiction of consciousness coming to consciousness--a contradiction as to which the ordinary modes of thought have no knowledge1 for they are in a state of confusion1 seeing that they go on unthinkingly4 ,on the other hand we have ,philosophy as perceiving knowledge itself1 which1 however1 does not get beyond its ,notion1 and which1 because it is the unfolding of a more extensive knowledge of a content1 cannot give itself this content1 but can only think it1 i4e4 determine it in a simple manner4 ,of those ,socratics who hold a place of their own1 there are1 according to this1 three schools worthy of consideration2 first the ,megaric ,school1 at whose head stands ,euclid of ,megara1 and then the ,cyrenaic and ,cynic ,schools2 and from the fact that they all three differ very much from one another1 it is clearly shown that ,socrates himself was devoid of any positive system4 ,with these ,socratics the determination of the subject for which the absolute principle of the true and good likewise appears as end1 came into prominence2 this end demands reflection and general mental cultivation1 and also requires that men should be able to tell what the good and true really are4 ,but though these ,socratic schools as a whole rest at saying that the subject itself is end1 and reaches its subjective end through the cultivation of its knowledge1 the form of determination in them is still the universal1 and it is also so that it does not remain abstract1 for the development of the determinations of the universal gives real knowledge4 ,the ,megarics were most abstract1 because they held to the determination of the good which1 as simple1 was to them the principle2 the unmoved and self-related simplicity of thought becomes the principle of consciousness as individual1 as it is of conscious knowledge4 ,the ,megaric school associated with the assertion of the simplicity of the good1 the dialectic1 that all that was defined and limited is not true4 ,but because with the ,megarics the principal point was to know the universal1 and this universal was to them the ,absolute which had to be retained in this form of the universal1 this thought1 as ,notion which holds a negative position in relation to all determinateness and thus to that of ,notion also1 was equally turned against knowledge and perception4 ,the ,cyrenaics take knowledge in its subjective signification1 and as signifying individuality as certainty of self1 or feeling2 to this as to that which is essential1 they restrict the exercise of consciousness1 and1 generally speaking1 make existence for consciousness consist therein4 ,now because they thereby sought to define the ,good more closely1 they called it simply pleasure or enjoyment1 by which1 however1 anything can be understood4 ,this principle of the ,cyrenaic school would seem to have been far removed from that of ,socrates1 since we at once think of the transient existence of feeling as directly in opposition to the ,good2 this1 however1 is not the case4 ,the ,cyrenaics likewise upheld the universal1 for1 if it is asked what the ,good is1 we find they certainly made pleasurable feeling1 which presents the appearance of a determinate1 to be its content1 but seeing that a cultured mind is also requisite1 enjoyment1 as it is obtained through thought1 is here indicated4 ,the ,cynics also further defined the principle of the ,good1 but in another way from the ,cyrenaics2 its content1 they said1 lay in man's keeping to what is in conformity with nature and to the simple needs of nature4 ,they similarly call all that is particular and limited in the aims of men that which is not to be desired4 ,to the ,cynics1 too1 mental culture through the knowledge of the universal is the principle2 but through this knowledge of the universal the individual end must be attained1 and this is1 that the individual should keep himself in abstract universality1 in freedom and independence1 and be indifferent to all he formerly esteemed4 ,thus we see pure thought recognized in its movement with the individual1 and the manifold transformations of the universal coming to consciousness4 ,these three schools are not to be treated at length4 ,the principle of the ,cyrenaics became later on more scientifically worked out in ,epicureanism1 as that of the ,cynics did in ,stoicism4 #a4 ,,the ,,megarics4 ,because ,euclides 7who is regarded as the founder of the ,megaric way of thinking7 and his school held to the forms of universality1 and1 above all1 sought1 and with success1 to show forth the contradictions contained in all particular conceptions1 they were reproached with having a rage for disputation1 and hence the name of ,eristics was given them4 ,the instrument for bringing all that is particular into confusion and annulling this particular1 was supplied by dialectic1 which1 indeed1 was brought by them to very great perfection1 but1 as was privately stated1 they did it in a kind of anger1 so that others said that they should not be called a ,school 77 but a gall 774#adc ,with a dialectic thus constituted1 we find them taking the place of the ,eleatic ,school and of the ,sophists2 and it seems as though the ,eleatic ,school had merely been reproduced1#add since they were essentially identical with it4 ,but this was only partly true--in that the ,eleatic dialecticians maintained ,being as the one existence in relation to which nothing particular is a truth1 and the ,megarics considered ,being as the ,good4 ,the ,sophists1 on the other hand1 did not seek their impulse in simple universality as fixed and as enduring2 and similarly we shall find in the ,sceptics1 dialecticians who maintain that the subjective mind rests within itself4 ,besides ,euclides1 ,diodorus and ,menedemus are mentioned as distinguished ,eristics1 but particularly ,eubulides1 and later on ,stilpo1 whose dialectic likewise related to contradictions which appeared in external conception and in speech1 so that it in great measure passed into a mere play upon words4 a4 ,,euclides4 ,euclides1 who is not to be confused with the mathematician1 is he of whom it is said that during the enmity between ,athens and his birthplace1 ,megara1 and in the period of most violent animosity1 he often secretly went to ,athens1 dressed as a woman1 not fearing even the punishment of death in order to be able to hear ,socrates and be in his company4#ade ,euclides is said1 in spite of his stubborn manner of disputing1 to have been1 even in his disputation1 a most peaceful man4 ,it is told that once in a quarrel his opponent was so irritated1 that he exclaimed1 8,i will die if ,i do not revenge myself upon you60 ,euclides replied1 8,and ,i will die if ,i do not soften your wrath so much by the mildness of my speech that you will love me as before40#adf ,it was ,euclides who said that 8the ,good is one10 and it alone is1 8though passing under many names2 sometimes it is called ,understanding1 sometimes ,god2 at another time ,thought 771 and so on4 ,but what is opposed to the good does not exist40#adg ,this doctrine ,cicero 7ibid47 calls noble1 and says that it differs but little from the ,platonic4 ,since the ,megarics make the ,good1 as the simple identity of the true1 into a principle1 it is clearly seen that they expressed the ,good as the absolute existence in a universal sense1 as did ,socrates2 but they no longer1 like him1 recognized all the approximate conceptions1 or merely opposed them as being indifferent to the interests of man1 for they asserted definitely that they were nothing at all4 ,thus they come into the category of the ,eleatics1 since they1 like them1 showed that only ,being is1 and that all else1 as negative1 does not exist4 ,while the dialectic of ,socrates was thus incidental1 in that he merely shook some current moral ideas1 or the very first conceptions of knowledge1 the ,megarics1 on the contrary1 raised their philosophic dialectic into something more universal and real1 for they applied themselves more to what is formal in idea and speech1 though not yet1 like the later ,sceptics1 to the determinations of pure ,notions2 for knowledge1 thought1 was not yet present in abstract conceptions4 ,of their own dialectic not much is told1 but more is said of the embarrassment into which they brought ordinary consciousness1 for they were in all kinds of ways alert in involving others in contradictions4 ,thus they applied dialectic after the manner of an ordinary conversation1 just as ,socrates applied his mind to every side of ordinary subjects1 and as we also1 in our conversation1 try to make an assertion interesting and important4 ,a number of anecdotes are told of their disputations1 from which we see that what we call joking was their express business4 ,others of their puzzles certainly deal with a positive category of thought2 they take these and show how1 if they are held to be true1 they bring about a contradiction4 b4 ,,eubulides4 ,of the innumerable multitude of ways in which they tried to confuse our knowledge in the categories1 many are preserved with their names1 and the principal of these are the ,sophisms1 whose discovery is ascribed to ,eubulides of ,miletus1 a pupil of ,euclides4#adh ,the first thing which strikes us when we hear them is that they are common sophisms which are not worth contradiction1 and scarcely of being heard1 least of all have they a real scientific value4 ,hence we call them stupid1 and look at them as dreary jokes1 but it is in fact easier to set them aside than to refute them4 ,we let ordinary speech pass1 and are content with it1 so long as everyone knows what the other means 7when this is not so--we trust that ,god understands us71 but these sophisms seem in a way to mislead common speech1 for they show the contradictory and unsatisfactory nature of it when taken strictly as it is spoken4 ,to confuse ordinary language so that we do not know how to reply1 seems foolish1 as leading to formal contradictions1 and if it is done we are blamed for taking mere empty words and playing upon them4 ,our ,german seriousness1 therefore1 dismisses this play on words as shallow wit1 but the ,greeks honoured the word in itself1 and the mere treatment of a proposition as well as the matter4 ,and if word and thing are in opposition1 the word is the higher1 for the unexpressed thing is really irrational1 since the rational exists as speech alone4 ,it is in ,aristotle1 and in his ,sophistical ,elenchi that we first find numerous examples of these contradictions 7coming from the old ,sophists equally with the ,eristics71 and also their solutions4 ,eubulides1 therefore1 likewise wrote against ,aristotle1#adi but none of this has come down to us4 ,in ,plato we also find1 as we saw before 7p4 #cgj71 similar jokes and ambiguities mentioned to make the ,sophists ridiculous1 and to show with what insignificant matters they took up their time4 ,the ,eristics went yet further1 for they1 like ,diodorus1 became jesters to courts1 such as to that of the ,ptolemies4#aej ,from historic facts we see that this dialectic operation of confusing others and showing how to extricate them again was a general amusement of the ,greek philosophers1 both in public places and at the tables of kings4 ,just as the ,queen of the ,east came to ,solomon to put riddles to him1 we find at the tables of kings witty conversation and assemblages of philosophers joking and making merry over one another4 ,the ,greeks were quite enamoured of discovering contradictions met with in speech and in ordinary ideas4 ,the contradiction does not make its appearance as a pure contradiction in the conception1 but only as interwoven with concrete ideas2 such propositions neither apply to the concrete content nor to the pure ,notion4 ,subject and predicate1 of which every proposition consists1 are different1 but in the ordinary idea we signify their unity2 this simple unity1 which does not contradict itself1 is to ordinary ideas the truth4 ,but in fact1 the simple self-identical proposition is an unmeaning tautology2 for in any affirmation1 differences are present1 and because their diversity comes to consciousness1 there is contradiction4 ,but the ordinary consciousness is then at an end1 for only where there is a contradiction is there the solution1 self-abrogation4 ,ordinary consciousness has not the conception that only the unity of opposites is the truth--that in every statement there is truth and falsehood1 if truth is to be taken in the sense of the simple1 and falsehood in the sense of the opposed and contradictory2 in it the positive1 the first unity1 and the negative1 this last opposition1 fall asunder4 ,in ,eubulides' propositions the main point was that because the truth is simple1 a simple answer is required2 that thus the answer should not1 as happened in ,aristotle 7,de ,sophist4 ,elench4 c4 #bd71 have regard to certain special considerations2 and1 after all1 this is really the demand of the understanding4 ,thus the mistake is to desire an answer of yes or no1 for since no one ventures on either1 perplexity ensues1 because it is a fool's part not to know what to reply4 ,the simplicity of the truth is thus grasped as the principle4 ,with us this appears in the form of making such statements as that one of opposites is true1 the other false2 that a statement is either true or not true2 that an object cannot have two opposite predicates4 ,that is the first principle of the understanding1 the principium exclusi tertii1 which is of great importance in all the sciences4 ,this stands in close connection with the principle of ,socrates and ,plato 7supra1 pp4 #dee1 #def71 8,the true is the universal20 which is abstractly the identity of understanding1 according to which what is said to be true cannot contradict itself4 ,this comes more clearly to light in ,stilpo 7p4 #dfd74 ,the ,megarics thus kept to this principle of our logic of the understanding1 in demanding the form of identity for the ,truth4 ,now in the cases that they put1 they did not keep to the universal1 but sought examples in ordinary conception1 by means of which they perplexed people2 and this they formed into a kind of system4 ,we shall bring forward some examples that are preserved to us2 some are more important1 but others are insignificant4 4 ,one ,elench was called the ,liar 772 in it the question is put3 8,if a man acknowledges that he lies1 does he lie or speak the truth80#aea ,a simple answer is demanded1 for the simple whereby the other is excluded1 is held to be the true4 ,if it is said that he tells the truth1 this contradicts the content of his utterance1 for he confesses that he lies4 ,but if it is asserted that he lies1 it may be objected that his confession is the truth4 ,he thus both lies and does not lie2 but a simple answer cannot be given to the question raised4 ,for here we have a union of two opposites1 lying and truth1 and their immediate contradiction2 in different forms this has at all times come to pass1 and has ever occupied the attention of men4 ,chrysippus1 a celebrated ,stoic1 wrote six books on the subject1#aeb and another1 ,philetas of ,cos1 died in the decline which he contracted through over-study of these paradoxes4#aec ,we have the same thing over again when1 in modern times1 we see men worn out by absorbing themselves in the squaring of the circle--a proposition which has well nigh become immortal4 ,they seek a simple relation from something incommensurable1 i4e4 they fall into the error of demanding a simple reply where the content is contradictory4 ,that little history has perpetuated and reproduced itself later on2 in ,don ,quixote the very same thing appears4 ,sancho1 governor of the island of ,barataria1 was tested by many insidious cases as he sat in judgment1 and1 amongst others1 with the following3 ,in his domain there was a bridge which a rich man had erected for the good of passengers--but with a gallows close by4 ,the crossing of the bridge was restricted by the condition that everyone must say truly where he was going1 and if he lied1 he would be hung upon the gallows4 ,now one man came to the bridge1 and to the question whither he went1 answered that he had come here to be hung on the gallows4 ,the bridge-keepers were much puzzled by this4 ,for if they hanged him1 he would have spoken the truth and ought to have passed1 but if he crossed he would have spoken an untruth4 ,in this difficulty they applied to the wisdom of the governor1 who uttered the wise saying that in such dubious cases the mildest measures should be adopted1 and thus the man should be allowed to pass4 ,sancho did not break his head over the matter4 ,the result which the statement was to have1 is made its content1 with the condition that the opposite of the content should be the consequence4 ,hanging1 understanding it to be truly expressed1 should not have hanging as result2 non-hanging as an event1 should1 on the other hand1 have hanging as result4 ,thus death is made the consequence of suicide1 but by suicide death itself is made into the content of the crime1 and cannot thus be the punishment4 ,i will give another similar example along with the answer4 ,menedemus was asked whether he had ceased to beat his father4 ,this was an attempt to place him in a difficulty1 since to answer either yes or no1 would be equally risky4 ,for if he said #8yes1' then he once beat him1 and if #8no1' then he still beats him4 ,menedemus hence replied that he neither ceased to beat him1 nor had beaten him2 and with this his opponents were not satisfied4#aed ,through this answer1 which is two-sided1 the one alternative1 as well as the other1 being set aside1 the question is in fact answered2 and this is also so in the former question as to whether the man spoke truly who said he lied1 when the reply is made1 8,he speaks the truth and lies at the same time1 and the truth is this contradiction40 ,but a contradiction is not the true1 and cannot enter into our ordinary conceptions2 hence ,sancho ,panza likewise set it aside in his judgment4 ,if the consciousness of opposition is present1 our ordinary ideas keep the contradictory sides apart2 but in fact the contradiction appears in sensuous things1 such as space1 time1 c41 and has in them only to be demonstrated4 ,these sophisms thus not only appear to be contradictory1 but are so in truth3 this choice between two opposites1 which is set before us in the example1 is itself a contradiction4 4 ,the ,concealed one 77 and the ,electra#aee proceed from the contradiction of knowing and not knowing someone at the same time4 ,i ask someone #8,do you know your father8' ,he replies #8,yes4' ,i then ask #8,now if ,i show you someone hidden behind a screen1 will you know him8' #8,no4' #8,but it is your father1 and thus you do not know your father4' ,it is the same in the ,electra4 #8,can it be said that she knows her brother ,orestes who stands before her or not8' ,these twists and turns seem superficial1 but it is interesting to consider them further4 77 ,to know means1 on the one hand1 to have someone as #8this one1' and not vaguely and in general4 ,the son thus knows his father when he sees him1 i4e4 when he is a #8this' for him2 but hidden1 he is not a #8this' for him1 but a #8this' abrogated4 ,the hidden one as a #8this' in ordinary conception1 becomes a general1 and loses his sensuous being1 thereby is in fact not a true #8this4' ,the contradiction that the son both knows and does not know his father1 thus becomes dissolved through the further qualification that the son knows the father as a sensuous #8this1' and not as a #8this' of idea4 77 ,on the other hand ,electra knows ,orestes1 not as a sensuous #8this1' but in her own idea2 the #8this' of idea and the #8this' here1 are not the same to her4 ,in this way there enters into these histories the higher opposition of the universal and of the #8this1' in as far as to have in the ordinary idea1 means in the element of the universal2 the abrogated #8this' is not only an idea1 but has its truth in the universal4 ,the universal is thus found in the unity of opposites1 and thus it is in this development of ,philosophy the true existence1 in which the sensuous being of the #8this' is negated4 ,it is the consciousness of this in particular which1 as we shall soon see 7p4 #dfe71 is indicated by ,stilpo4 4 ,other quibbles of the same kind have more meaning1 like the arguments which are called the ,sorites 77 and the ,bald 774#aef ,both are related to the false infinite1 and the quantitative progression which can reach no qualitative opposite1 and yet at the end finds itself at a qualitative absolute opposite4 ,the ,bald head is the reverse of the problem of the ,sorites4 ,it is asked1 8,does one grain of corn make a heap1 or does one hair less make a bald head80 ,the reply is 8,no40 8,nor one again80 8,no1 it does not40 ,this question is now always repeated while a grain is always added1 or a hair taken away4 ,when at last it is said that there is a heap or a bald head1 it is found that the last added grain or last abstracted hair has made the heap or the baldness1 and this was at first denied4 ,but how can a grain form a heap which already consists of so many grains8 ,the assertion is that one grain does not make a heap2 the contradiction1 that one thus added or taken away brings about the change into the opposite--the many4 ,for to repeat one is just to obtain many1 the repetition causes certain #8many' grains to come together4 ,the one thus becomes its opposite1--a heap1 and the taking of one away brings about baldness4 ,one and a heap are opposed to one another1 but yet one2 or the quantitative progression seems not to change but merely to increase or diminish1 yet at last it has passed into its opposite4 ,we always separate quality and quantity from one another1 and only accept in the many a quantitative difference2 but this indifferent distinction of number or size here turns finally into qualitative distinction1 just as an infinitely small or infinitely great greatness is no longer greatness at all4 ,this characteristic of veering round is of the greatest importance1 although it does not come directly before our consciousness4 ,to give one penny or one shilling is said to be nothing1 but with all its insignificance the purse becomes emptied1 which is a very qualitative difference4 ,or1 if water is always more and more heated1 it suddenly1 at #hj ,reamur1 turns into steam4 ,the dialectic of this passing into one another of quantity and quality is what our understanding does not recognize2 it is certain that qualitative is not quantitative1 and quantitative not qualitative4 ,in those examples which seem like jokes1 there is in this way genuine reflection on the thought-determinations which are in question4 ,the examples which ,aristotle brings forward in his ,elenchi1 all show a very formal contradiction1 appearing in speech1 since even in it the individual is taken into the universal4 8,who is that8 ,it is ,coriscus4 ,is ,coriscus not masculine8 ,yes4 ,that is neuter sex1 and thus ,coriscus is said to be neuter40#aeg ,or else ,aristotle 7,de ,sophist4 ,elench4 c4 #bd7 quotes the argument3 8,to thee a dog is father 7 74 ,thou art thus a dog20 that is what ,plato1 as we already mentioned 7p4 #cgj71 made a ,sophist say3 it is the wit of a journeyman such as we find in ,eulenspiegel4 ,aristotle is really at great pains to remove the confusion1 for he says the #8thy' and the #8father' are only accidentally 7 71 and not in substance 7 7 joined to one another4 ,in the invention of such witticisms1 the ,greeks of that and of later times were quite indefatigable4 ,with the ,sceptics we shall later on see the dialectic side further developed and brought to a higher standpoint4 c4 ,,stilpo4 ,stilpo1 a native of ,megara1 is one of the most celebrated of the ,eristics4 ,diogenes tells us that 8he was a very powerful debater1 and excelled all so greatly in readiness of speech that all ,greece1 in looking to him1 was in danger 7 7 of becoming ,megareans40 ,he lived in the time of ,alexander the ,great1 and after his death 7,ol4 #aad1 #a2 #cbd ,b4,c47 in ,megara1 when ,alexander's generals fought together4 ,ptolemy ,soter1 ,demetrius ,poliorcetes1 ,antigonus' son1 when they conquered ,megara1 bestowed many honours on him4 8,in ,athens all came out of their work-places to see him1 and when anyone said that they admired him like a strange animal1 he replied1 ,no1 but like a true man40#aeh ,with ,stilpo it was pre-eminently true that the universal was taken in the sense of the formal abstract identity of the understanding4 ,the main point in his examples is1 however1 always the fact of his having given prominence to the form of universality as opposed to the particular4 4 ,diogenes 7,,ii4 #aai7 first quotes from him in relation to the opposition of the #8this' and the universal1 8,whoever speaks of any man 7 71 speaks of no one1 for he neither speaks of this one nor that4 ,for why should it rather be of this one than that8 ,hence it is not of this one40 ,that man is the universal1 and that no one is specially indicated1 everyone readily acknowledges1 but some one still remains present to us in our conception4 ,but ,stilpo says that the #8this' does not exist at all1 and cannot be expressed--that the universal only exists4 ,diogenes ,lartius certainly understands this as though 8,stilpo abolished distinction of genera 7 710 and ,tennemann 7,vol ,,ii41 p4 #aeh7 supports him4 ,but from what is quoted from him the opposite may clearly be deduced--that he upheld the universal and did away with the individual4 ,and the fact that the form of universality is maintained1 is further expressed in a number of anecdotes which are taken by ,stilpo from common life4 ,thus he says3 8,the cabbage is not what is here shown 7 74 ,for the cabbage has existed for many thousand years1 and hence this 7what is seen7 is not cabbage10 i4e4 the universal only is1 and this cabbage is not4 ,if ,i say this cabbage1 ,i say quite another thing from what ,i mean1 for ,i say all other cabbages4 ,an anecdote is told in the same reference4 8,he was conversing with ,crates1 a ,cynic1 and broke off to buy some fish20 ,crates said1 8,what1 you would avoid the question80 7for even in ordinary life anyone is laughed at or thought stupid who is unable to reply1 and here where the subject was so important and where it would seem better to reply anything than nothing at all1 no answer was forthcoming74 ,stilpo replied1 8,by no means1 for ,i have the conversation1 but ,i leave you1 since the conversation remains but the fish will be sold40 ,what is indicated in these simple examples seems trivial1 because the matter is trivial1 but in other forms it seems important enough to be the subject of further inquiry4 ,that the universal should in ,philosophy be given a place of such importance that only the universal can be expressed1 and the #8this' which is meant1 cannot1 indicates a state of consciousness and thought which the philosophic culture of our time has not yet reached4 ,as regards the ordinary human understanding1 or the scepticism of our times1 or in general the ,philosophy which asserts that sensuous certainty 7that which we see1 hear1 c471 is the truth1 or else that it is true that there are sensuous things outside of us--as to these1 nothing1 so far as the reasons for disbelieving them are concerned1 need be said4 ,for because the direct assertion that the immediate is the true is made1 such statements only require to be taken with respect to what they say1 and they will always be found to say something different from what they mean4 ,what strikes us most is that they cannot say what they mean2 for if they say the sensuous1 this is a universal2 it is all that is sensuous1 a negative of the #8this1' or #8this' is all #8these4' ,thought contains only the universal1 the #8this' is only in thought2 if ,i say #8this' it is the most universal of all4 ,for example1 here is that which ,i show2 now ,i speak2 but here and now is all here and now4 ,similarly when ,i say #8,i1' ,i mean myself1 this individual separated from all others4 ,but ,i am even thus that which is thought of and cannot express the self which ,i mean at all4 #8,i' is an absolute expression which excludes every other #8,i1' but everyone says #8,i' of himself1 for everyone is an #8,i4' ,if we ask who is there1 the answer #8,i' indicates every #8,i4' ,the individual also is thus the universal only1 for in the word as an existence born of the mind1 the individual1 if it is meant1 cannot find a place1 since actually only the universal is expressed4 ,if ,i would distinguish myself and establish my individuality by my age1 my place of birth1 through what ,i have done and where ,i have been or am at a particular time1 it is the same thing4 ,i am now so many years old1 but this very now which ,i say is all now4 ,if ,i count from a particular period such as the birth of ,christ1 this epoch is again only fixed by the #8now' which is ever displaced4 ,i am now thirty-five years old1 and now is #ahje ,a4,d42 each period is fixed only through the other1 but the whole is undetermined4 ,that #8now' #ahje years have passed since ,christ's birth1 is a truth which soon will become empty sound1 and the determinateness of the #8now' has a before and after of determinations without beginning or end4 ,similarly everyone is at a #8here'--this here1 for everyone is in a #8here4' ,this is the nature of universality1 which makes itself evident in speech4 ,we hence help ourselves through names with which we define perfectly anything individual1 but we allow that we have not expressed the thing in itself4 ,the name as name1 is no expression which contains what ,i am2 it is a symbol1 and indeed a contingent symbol1 of the lively recollection4 4 ,inasmuch as ,stilpo expressed the universal as the independent1 he disintegrated everything4 ,simplicius says 7in ,phys4 ,arist4 p4 #bf71 8,since the so-called ,megarics took it as ascertained that what has different determinations is different 7 1 71 and that the diverse are separated one from the other 7 71 they seemed to prove that each thing is separated from itself 7 74 ,hence since the musical ,socrates is another determination 77 from the wise ,socrates1 ,socrates was separated from himself40 ,that means that because the qualities of things are determinations for themselves1 each of these is fixed independently1 but yet the thing is an aggregate of many independent universalities4 ,stilpo asserted this4 ,now because1 according to him1 universal determinations are in their separation only the true reality1 and the individual is the unseparated unity of different ideas1 to him nothing individual has any truth4 4 ,it is very remarkable that this form of identity came to be known in ,stilpo1 and he in this way only wished to know propositions identically expressed4 ,plutarch quotes from him3 8,a different predicate may in no case be attributed to any object 7 74 ,thus we could not say that the man is good or the man is a general1 but simply that man is only man1 good is only good1 the general is only the general4 ,nor could we say ten thousand knights1 but knights are only knights1 ten thousand are only ten thousand1 c4 ,when we speak of a horse running1 he says that the predicate is not identical with the object to which it is attributed4 ,for the concept-determination man is different 7 7 from the concept-determination good4 ,similarly horse and running are distinct3 when we are asked for a definition of either1 we do not give the same for both4 ,hence those who say something different of what is different are wrong4 ,for if man and good were the same1 and likewise horse and running1 how could good be used of bread and physic1 and running of lions and dogs08#aei ,plutarch remarks here that ,colotes attacks ,stilpo in a bombastic manner 7 7 as though he ignored common life 7 74 8,but what man10 ,plutarch reflects1 8lived any the worse for this8 ,is there any man who hears this said1 and who does not know that it is an elaborate joke 7 780 #b4 ,,the ,,cyrenaic ,,school4 ,the ,cyrenaics took their name from ,aristippus of ,cyrene in ,africa1 the originator and head of the school4 ,just as ,socrates wished to develop himself as an individual1 his disciples1 or those of the ,cyrenaic and ,cynic ,schools1 made individual life and practical philosophy their main object4 ,now if the ,cyrenaics did not rest content with the determination of good in general1 seeing that they inclined to place it in the enjoyment of the individual1 the ,cynics appear to be opposed to the whole doctrine1 for they expressed the particular content of satisfaction as natural desires in a determination of negativity with regard to what is done by others4 ,but as the ,cyrenaics thereby satisfied their particular subjectivity1 so also did the ,cynics1 and both schools have hence on the whole the same end--the freedom and independence of the individual4 ,because we are accustomed to consider happiness1 which the ,cyrenaics made the highest end of man1 to be contentless1 because we obtain it in a thousand ways1 and it may be the result of most various causes1 this principle appears at first to us as trivial1 and indeed1 generally speaking1 it is so2 we are likewise accustomed to believe that there is something higher than pleasure4 ,the philosophic development of this principle which1 for the rest1 has not much in it1 is mainly ascribed to ,aristippus' follower1 ,aristippus the younger4 ,but ,theodorus1 ,hegesias1 and ,anniceris1 of the later ,cyrenaics1 are specially mentioned as having scientifically worked out the ,aristippian principle1 until it degenerated and merged into ,epicureanism4 ,but the consideration of the further progress of the ,cyrenaic principle is specially interesting because this progression1 in the essential nature of things1 is carried quite beyond the principle1 and has really abrogated it4 ,feeling is the indeterminate individual4 ,but if thought1 reflection1 mental culture1 are given a place in this principle1 through the principle of the universality of thought that principle of contingency1 individuality1 mere subjectivity1 disappears2 and the only really remarkable thing in this school is that this greater consistency in the universal is therefore an inconsistency as regards the principle4 a4 ,,aristippus4 ,aristippus went about with ,socrates for a long time1 and educated himself under him1 although at the same time he was a strong and highly cultivated man before he sought out ,socrates at all4 ,he heard of him either in ,cyrene or at the ,olympian ,games1 which1 as ,greeks1 the ,cyrenians likewise visited4 ,his father was a merchant1 and he himself came to ,athens on a journey which had commerce as its object4 ,he was first amongst the ,socratics to ask money of those whom he instructed2 he also sent money to ,socrates1 who1 however1 returned it4#afj ,he did not content himself with the general expressions1 good and beautiful1 to which ,socrates adhered1 but took existence reflected in consciousness in its extreme determinateness as individuality2 and because universal existence1 as thought1 was to him1 from the side of reality1 individual consciousness1 he fixed on enjoyment as the only thing respecting which man had rationally to concern himself4 ,the character and personality of ,aristippus is what is most important1 and what is preserved to us in his regard is his manner and life rather than his philosophic doctrines4 ,he sought after enjoyment as a man of culture1 who in that very way had raised himself into perfect indifference to all that is particular1 all passions and bonds of every kind4 ,when pleasure is made the principle1 we immediately have the idea before us that in its enjoyment we are dependent1 and that enjoyment is thus opposed to the principle of freedom4 ,but neither of the ,cyrenaic teaching1 nor the ,epicurean1 whose principle is on the whole the same1 can this be stated4 ,for by itself the end of enjoyment may well be said to be a principle in opposition to ,philosophy2 but when it is considered in such a way that the cultivation of thought is made the only condition under which enjoyment can be attained1 perfect freedom of spirit is retained1 since it is inseparable from culture4 ,aristippus certainly esteemed culture at its highest1 and proceeded from this position--that pleasure is only a principle for men of philosophic culture2 his main principle thus was that what is found to be pleasant is not known immediately but only by reflection4 ,aristippus lived in accordance with these principles1 and what in him interests us most is the number of anecdotes told about him1 because they contain traces of a mentally rich and free disposition4 ,since in his life he went about to seek enjoyment1 not without understanding 7and thereby he was in his way a philosopher71 he sought it partly with the discretion which does not yield itself to a momentary happiness1 because a greater evil springs therefrom2 and partly 7as if philosophy were merely preservation from anxiety7 without that anxiety which on every side fears possible evil and bad results2 but above all without any dependence on things1 and without resting on anything which is itself of a changeable nature4 ,he enjoyed1 says ,diogenes1 the pleasures of the moment1 without troubling himself with those which were not present2 he suited himself to every condition1 being at home in all2 he remained the same whether he were in regal courts or in the most miserable conditions4 ,plato is said to have told him that it was given to him alone to wear the purple and the rags4 ,he was specially attached to ,dionysius1 being very popular with him2 he certainly clung to him1 but always retained complete independence4 ,diogenes1 the ,cynic1 for this reason called him the royal dog4 ,when he demanded fifty drachms from someone who wished to hand over to him his son1 and the man found the sum too high1 saying that he could buy a slave for it1 ,aristippus answered1 8,do so1 and you will have two40 ,when ,socrates asked him1 8,how do you have so much money80 he replied1 8,how do you have so little80 ,when a courtesan said to him that she had a child by him1 he replied1 8,you know as little whether it is mine as1 were you walking through briars1 would you know which thorn pricked you40 ,a proof of his perfect indifference is given in the following3 ,when ,dionysius once spat at him1 he bore it patiently1 and when blamed1 said1 8,the fishermen let themselves be wet by the sea to catch the little fish1 and ,i1 should ,i not bear this to catch such a good one80 ,when ,dionysius asked him to choose one of three courtesans1 he took them all with him1 observing that it had been a dangerous thing even to ,paris to choose out one2 but after leading them to the vestibule of the house1 he let all three go4 ,he made nothing of the possession of money as contrasted with the results which appear to follow from pursuing pleasure1 and hence he wasted it on dainties4 ,he once bought a partridge at fifty drachms 7about twenty florins74 ,when someone rebuked him1 he asked1 8,would you not buy it for a farthing80 ,and when this was acknowleged1 he answered1 8,now fifty drachms are no more than that to me40 ,similarly in journeying in ,africa1 the slave thought it hard to be troubled with a sum of money4 ,when ,aristippus knew this he said1 8,throw away what is too much and carry what you can40 ,as regards the value of culture1 he replied to the question as to how an educated man differs from an uneducated1 that a stone would not fit in with the other1 i4e4 the difference is as great as that of a man from the stone4 ,this is not quite wrong1 for man is what he ought to be as man1 through culture2 it is his second nature through which he first enters into possession of that which he has by nature1 and thus for the first time he is ,mind4 ,we may not1 however1 think in this way of our uncultured men1 for with us such men through the whole of their conditions1 through customs and religion1 partake of a source of culture which places them far above those who do not live in such conditions4 ,those who carry on other sciences and neglect ,philosophy1 ,aristippus compares to the wooers of ,penelope in the ,odyssey1 who might easily have ,melantho and the other maidens1 but who could not obtain the queen4#afa ,the teaching of ,aristippus and his followers is very simple1 for he took the relation of consciousness to existence in its most superficial and its earliest form1 and expressed existence as ,being as it is immediately for consciousness1 i4e4 as feeling simply4 ,a distinction is now made between the true1 the valid1 what exists in and for itself1 and the practical and good1 and what ought to be our end2 but in regard to both the theoretic and practical truth1 the ,cyrenaics make sensation what determines4 ,hence their principle is more accurately not the objective itself1 but the relation of consciousness to the objective2 the truth is not what is in sensation the content1 but is itself sensation1 it is not objective1 but the objective subsists only in it4 8,thus the ,cyrenaics say1 sensations form the real criterion2 they alone can be known1 and are infallible1 but what produces feeling is neither knowable nor infallible4 ,thus when we perceive a white and sweet1 we may assert this condition as ours with truth and certainty4 ,but that the causes of these feelings are themselves a white and sweet object we cannot with certainty affirm4 ,what these men say about ends is also in harmony with this1 for sensations also extend to ends4 ,the sensations are either pleasant or unpleasant or neither of the two4 ,now they call the unpleasant feelings the bad1 the end of which is pain2 the pleasant is the good1 whose invariable end is happiness4 ,thus feelings are the criteria of knowledge and the ends for action4 ,we live because we follow them from testimony 77 received and satisfaction 77 experienced1 the former in accordance with theoretic intuitions 7 71 and the latter with what gives us pleasure40#afb ,that is to say1 as end1 feeling is no longer a promiscuous variety of sensuous affections 7 71 but the setting up of the ,notion as the positive or negative relation to the object of action1 which is just the pleasant or the unpleasant4 ,here we enter on a new sphere where two kinds of determinations constitute the chief points of interest2 these are everywhere treated of in the many ,socratic schools which were being formed1 and though not by ,plato and ,aristotle1 they were specially so by the ,stoics1 the new ,academy1 c4 ,that is to say1 the one point is determination itself in general1 the criterion2 and the second is what determination for the subject is4 ,and thus the idea of the wise man results--what the wise do1 who the wise are1 c4 ,the reason that these two expressions are now so prominent is one which rests on what has gone before4 ,on the one hand the main interest is to find a content for the good1 for else men may talk about it for years4 ,this further definition of the good is just the criterion4 ,on the other hand the interest of the subject appears1 and that is the result of the revolution in the ,greek mind made by ,socrates4 ,when the religion1 constitution1 laws of a people1 are held in esteem1 and when the individual members of a people are one with them1 the question of what the individual has to do on his own account1 will not be put4 ,in a moralized1 religious condition of things we are likely to find the end of man in what is present1 and these morals1 religion and laws are also present in him4 ,when1 on the contrary1 the individual exists no longer in the morality of his people1 no longer has his substantial being in the religion1 laws1 c41 of his land1 he no longer finds what he desires1 and no longer satisfies himself in his present4 ,but if this discord has arisen1 the individual must immerse himself in himself1 and there seek his end4 ,now this is really the cause that the question of what is the essential for the individual arises4 ,after what end must he form himself and after what strive8 ,thus an ideal for the individual is set up1 and this is the wise man3 what was called the ideal of the wise man is the individuality of self-consciousness which is conceived of as universal essence4 ,the point of view is the same when we now ask1 ,what can ,i know8 ,what should ,i believe8 ,what ought ,i to hope8 ,what is the highest interest of the subject8 ,it is not what is truth1 right1 the universal end of the world1 for instead of asking about the science of the implicitly and explicitly objective1 the question is what is true and right in as far as it is the insight and conviction of the individual1 his end and a mode of his existence8 ,this talk about wise men is universal amongst the ,stoics1 ,epicureans1 c41 but is devoid of meaning4 ,for the wise man is not in question1 but the wisdom of the universe1 real reason4 ,a third definition is that the universal is the good2 the real side of things is enjoyment and happiness as a simple existence and immediate actuality4 ,how then do the two agree8 ,the philosophic schools which now arise and their successors have set forth the harmony of both determinations1 which are the higher ,being and thought4 b4 ,,theodorus4 ,of the later ,cyrenaics1 ,theodorus must be mentioned first2 he is famous for having denied the existence of the gods1 and being1 for this reason1 banished from ,athens4 ,such a fact can1 however1 have no further interest or speculative significance1 for the positive gods which ,theodorus denied1 are themselves not any object of speculative reason4 ,he made himself remarkable besides for introducing the universal more into the idea of that which was existence for consciousness1 for 8he made joy and sorrow the end1 but in such a way that the former pertained to the understanding and the latter to want of understanding4 ,he defined the good as understanding and justice1 and the bad as the opposite2 enjoyment and pain1 however1 were indifferent40#afc ,when we reach the consciousness that the individual sensuous feeling1 as it is immediately1 is not to be considered as real existence1 it is then said that it must be accepted with understanding2 i4e4 feeling1 just as it is1 is not reality4 ,for the sensuous generally1 as sensation1 theoretic or practical1 is something quite indeterminate1 this or that unit2 a criticism of this unit is hence required1 i4e4 it must be considered in the form of universality1 and hence this last necessarily reappears4 ,but this advance on individuality is culture1 which1 through the limitation of individual feelings and enjoyments1 tries to make these harmonious1 even though it first of all only calculates as to that by which the greater pleasure is to be found4 ,now1 to the question as to which of the many enjoyments which ,i1 as a many-sided man1 can enjoy1 is the one which is in completest harmony with me1 and in which ,i thus find the greatest satisfaction1 it must be replied that the completest harmony with me is only found in the accordance of my particular existence and consciousness with my actual substantial ,being4 ,theodorus comprehended this as understanding and justice1 in which we know where to seek enjoyment4 ,but when it is said that felicity must be sought by reflection1 we know that these are empty words and thoughtless utterances4 ,for the feeling in which felicity is contained1 is in its conception the individual1 self-changing1 without universality and subsistence4 ,thus the universal1 understanding1 as an empty form1 adheres to a content quite incongruous with it2 and thus ,theodorus distinguished the ,good in its form1 from the end as the ,good in its nature and content4 c4 ,,hegesias4 ,it is remarkable that another ,cyrenaic1 ,hegesias1 recognized this incongruity between sensation and universality1 which last is opposed to the individual1 having what is agreeable as well as disagreeable within itself4 ,because1 on the whole1 he took a firmer grasp of the universal and gave it a larger place1 there passed from him all determination of individuality1 and with it really the ,cyrenaic principle4 ,it came to his knowledge that individual sensation is in itself nothing2 and1 as he nevertheless made enjoyment his end1 it became to him the universal4 ,but if enjoyment is the end1 we must ask about the content2 if this content is investigated1 we find every content a particular which is not in conformity with the universal1 and thus falls into dialectic4 ,hegesias followed the ,cyrenaic principle as far as to this consequence of thought4 ,that universal is contained in an expression of his which we often enough hear echoed1 8,there is no perfect happiness4 ,the body is troubled with manifold pains1 and the soul suffers along with it2 it is hence a matter of indifference whether we choose life or death4 ,in itself nothing is pleasant or unpleasant40 ,that is to say1 the criterion of being pleasant or unpleasant1 because its universality is removed1 is thus itself made quite indeterminate2 and because it has no objective determinateness in itself1 it has become unmeaning2 before the universal1 which is thus held secure1 the sum of all determinations1 the individuality of consciousness as such1 disappears1 but with it even life itself as being unreal4 8,the rarity1 novelty1 or excess of enjoyment begets in some cases enjoyment and in others discontent4 ,poverty and riches have no meaning for what is pleasant1 since we see that the rich do not enjoy pleasures more than the poor4 ,similarly1 slavery and liberty1 noble and ignoble birth1 fame and lack of fame1 are equivalent as regards pleasure4 ,only to a fool can living be a matter of moment2 to the wise man it is indifferent10 and he is consequently independent4 8,the wise man acts only after his own will1 and he considers none other equally worthy4 ,for even if he attain from others the greatest benefits1 this does not equal what he gives himself4 ,hegesias and his friends also take away sensation1 because it gives no sufficient knowledge10 which really amounts to scepticism4 8,they say further that we ought to do what we have reason to believe is best4 ,the sinner should be forgiven1 for no one willingly sins1 but is conquered by a passion4 ,the wise man does not hate1 but instructs2 his endeavours go not so much to the attainment of good1 as to the avoidance of evil1 for his aim is to live without trouble and sorrow40#afd ,this universality1 which proceeds from the principle of the freedom of the individual self-consciousness1 ,hegesias expressed as the condition of the perfect indifference of the wise men--an indifference to everything into which we shall see all philosophic systems of the kind going forth1 and which is a surrendering of all reality1 the complete withdrawal of life into itself4 ,it is told that ,hegesias1 who lived in ,alexandria1 was not allowed to teach the ,ptolemies of the time1 because he inspired many of his hearers with such indifference to life that they took their own4#afe d4 ,,anniceris4 ,we also hear of ,anniceris and his followers1 who1 properly speaking1 departed from the distinctive character of the principle of the ,cyrenaic school1 and thereby gave philosophic culture quite another direction4 ,it is said of them that 8they acknowledged friendship in common life1 along with gratitude1 honour to parents1 and service for one's country4 ,and although the wise man has1 by so doing1 to undergo hardship and work1 he can still be happy1 even if he therein obtains few pleasures4 ,friendships are not to be formed on utilitarian grounds alone1 but because of the good will that develops2 and out of love to friends1 even burdens and difficulties are to be undertaken40#aff ,the universal1 the theoretically speculative element in the school1 is thus lost2 it sinks more into what is popular4 ,this is then the second direction which the ,cyrenaic school has taken2 the first was the overstepping of the principle itself4 ,a method of philosophizing in morals arises1 which later on prevailed with ,cicero and the ,peripatetics of his time1 but the interest has disappeared1 so far as any consistent system of thought is concerned4 #c4 ,,the ,,cynic ,,school4 ,there is nothing particular to say of the ,cynics1 for they possess but little ,philosophy1 and they did not bring what they had into a scientific system2 it was only later that their tenets were raised by the ,stoics into a philosophic discipline4 ,with the ,cynics1 as with the ,cyrenaics1 the point was to determine what should be the principle for consciousness1 both as regards its knowledge and its actions4 ,the ,cynics also set up the ,good as a universal end1 and asked in what1 for individual men1 it is to be sought4 ,but if the ,cyrenaic1 in accordance with his determinate principle1 made the consciousness of himself as an individual1 or feeling1 into real existence for consciousness1 the ,cynic took this individuality1 in as far as it has the form of universality directly for me1 i4e4 in as far as ,i am a free consciousness1 indifferent to all individuality4 ,thus they are opposed to the ,cyrenaics for while to these feeling1 which1 because it has to be determined through thought1 is undoubtedly extended into universality and perfect freedom1 is made the principle1 the former begin with perfect freedom and independence as the property of man4 ,but since this is the same indifference of self-consciousness which ,hegesias expressed as real existence1 the extremes in the ,cynic and ,cyrenaic modes of thought destroy themselves by their own consequences1 and pass into one another4 ,with the ,cyrenaics there is the impulse to turn things back into consciousness1 according to which nothing is real existence for me2 the ,cynics had also only to do with themselves1 and the individual self-consciousness was likewise principle4 ,but the ,cynic1 at least in the beginning1 set up for the guidance of men the principle of freedom and indifference1 both in regard to thought and actual life1 as against all external individuality1 particular ends1 needs1 and enjoyments2 so that culture not only sought after indifference to these and independence within itself1 as with the ,cyrenaics1 but for express privation1 and for the limitation of needs to what is necessary and what nature demands4 ,the ,cynics thus maintained as the content of the good1 the greatest independence of nature1 i4e4 the slightest possible necessities2 this meant a rebound from enjoyment1 and from the pleasures of feeling4 ,the negative is here the determining2 later on this opposition of ,cynics and ,cyrenaics likewise appeared between ,stoics and ,epicureans4 ,but the same negation which the ,cynics made their principle1 had already shown itself in the further development which the ,cyrenaic philosophy had taken4 ,the ,school of the ,cynics had no scientific weight2 it only constitutes an element which must necessarily appear in the knowledge of the universal1 and which is that consciousness must know itself in its individuality1 as free from all dependence on things and on enjoyment4 ,to him who relies upon riches or enjoyment such dependence is in fact real consciousness1 or his individuality is real existence4 ,but the ,cynics so enforced that negative moment that they placed freedom in actual renunciation of so-called superfluities2 they only recognized this abstract unmoving independence1 which did not concern itself with enjoyment or the interests of an ordinary life4 ,but true freedom does not consist in flying from enjoyment and the occupations which have as their concern other men and other ends in life2 but in the fact that consciousness1 though involved in all reality1 stands above it and is free from it4 a4 ,,antisthenes4 ,antisthenes1 an ,athenian and friend of ,socrates1 was the first who professed to be a ,cynic4 ,he lived at ,athens1 and taught in a gymnasium1 called ,cynosarges1 and he was called the 8simple dog0 774 ,his mother was ,thracian1 which was often made a reproach to him--a reproach which to us would be unmeaning4 ,he replied that the mother of the gods was a ,phrygian1 and that the ,athenians1 who make so much of their being native born1 are in no way nobler than the native fish and grasshoppers4 ,he educated himself under ,gorgias and ,socrates1 and went daily from the ,pirus to the city to hear ,socrates4 ,he wrote several works1 the titles of which ,diogenes mentions1 and1 according to all accounts1 was esteemed a highly cultivated and upright man4#afg ,antisthenes' principles are simple1 because the content of his teaching remains general2 it is hence superfluous to say anything further about it4 ,he gives general rules1 which consist of such excellent maxims as that 8virtue is self-sufficing1 and requires nothing more than a ,socratic strength of character4 ,the good is excellent1 the bad discreditable4 ,virtue consists of works1 and does not require many reasons or theories4 ,the end of man is a virtuous life4 ,the wise man is contented with himself1 for he possesses everything that others seem to possess4 ,his own virtue satisfies him2 he is at home all over the world4 ,if he lacks fame1 this is not to be regarded as an evil1 but as a good10 c4#afh ,we here1 once more1 have the tedious talk about the wise man1 which by the ,stoics1 as also by the ,epicureans1 was even more spun out and made more tedious4 ,in this ideal1 where the determination of the subject is in question1 its satisfaction is placed in simplifying its needs4 ,but when ,antisthenes says that virtue does not require reasons and theories1 he forgets that he himself acquired1 through the cultivation of mind1 its independence and the power of renouncing all that men desire4 ,we see directly that virtue has now obtained another signification2 it no longer is unconscious virtue1 like the simple virtue of a citizen of a free people1 who fulfils his duties to fatherland1 place1 and family1 as these relationships immediately require4 ,the consciousness which has gone beyond itself must1 in order to become ,mind1 now lay hold of and comprehend all reality1 i4e4 be conscious of it as its own4 ,but conditions such as are called by names like innocence or beauty of soul1 are childish conditions1 which are certainly to be praised in their own place1 but from which man1 because he is rational1 must come forth1 in order to re-create himself from the sublated immediacy4 ,the freedom and independence of the ,cynics1 however1 which consists only in lessening to the utmost the burden imposed by wants1 is abstract1 because it1 as negative in character1 has really to be a mere renunciation4 ,concrete freedom consists in maintaining an indifferent attitude towards necessities1 not avoiding them1 but in their satisfaction remaining free1 and abiding in morality and in participation in the moral life of man4 ,abstract freedom1 on the contrary1 surrenders its morality1 because the individual withdraws into his subjectivity1 and is consequently an element of immorality4 ,yet ,antisthenes bears a high place in this ,cynical philosophy4 ,but the attitude he adopted comes very near to that of rudeness1 vulgarity of conduct and shamelessness2 and later on ,cynicism passed into such4 ,hence comes the continual mockery of1 and the constant jokes against the ,cynics2 and it is only their individual manners and individual strength of character which makes them interesting4 ,it is even told of ,antisthenes that he began to attribute value to external poverty of life4 ,cynicism adopted a simple wardrobe--a thick stick of wild olive1 a ragged double mantle without any under garment1 which served as bed by night1 a beggar's sack for the food that was required1 and a cup with which to draw water4#afi ,this was the costume with which these ,cynics used to distinguish themselves4 ,that on which they placed highest value was the simplification of their needs2 it seems very plausible to say that this produces freedom4 ,for needs are certainly dependence upon nature1 and this is antagonistic to freedom of spirit2 the reduction of that dependence to a minimum is thus an idea which commends itself4 ,but at the same time this minimum is itself undetermined1 and if such stress is laid on thus merely following nature1 it follows that too great a value is set on the needs of nature and on the renunciation of others4 ,this is what is also evident in the monastic principle4 ,the negative likewise contains an affirmative bias towards what is renounced2 and the renunciation and the importance of what is renounced is thus made too marked4 ,socrates hence declares the clothing of the ,cynics to be vanity4 ,for 8when ,antisthenes turned outside a hole in his cloak1 ,socrates said to him1 ,i see thy vanity through the hole in thy cloak40#agj ,clothing is not a thing of rational import1 but is regulated through needs that arise of themselves4 ,in the ,north the clothing must be different from that in ,central ,africa2 and in winter we do not wear cotton garments4 ,anything further is meaningless1 and is left to chance and to opinion2 in modern times1 for instance1 old-fashioned clothing had a meaning in relation to patriotism4 ,the cut of my coat is decided by fashion1 and the tailor sees to this2 it is not my business to invent it1 for mercifully others have done so for me4 ,this dependence on custom and opinion is certainly better than were it to be on nature4 ,but it is not essential that men should direct their understanding to this2 indifference is the point of view which must reign1 since the thing itself is undoubtedly perfectly indifferent4 ,men are proud that they can distinguish themselves in this1 and try to make a fuss about it1 but it is folly to set oneself against the fashion4 ,in this matter ,i must hence not decide myself1 nor may ,i draw it within the radius of my interests1 but simply do what is expected of me4 b4 ,,diogenes4 ,diogenes of ,sinope1 the best known ,cynic1 distinguished himself even more than ,antisthenes by the life he led1 as also by his biting and often clever hits1 and bitter and sarcastic retorts2 but he likewise received replies which were often aimed as well4 ,he is called the ,dog1 just as ,aristippus was called by him the royal ,dog1 for ,diogenes bore the same relation to idle boys as ,aristippus did to kings4 ,diogenes is only famed for his manner of life2 with him1 as with the moderns1 ,cynicism came to signify more a mode of living than a philosophy4 ,he confined himself to the barest necessities1 and tried to make fun of others who did not think as he1 and who laughed at his ways4 ,that he threw away his cup when he saw a boy drinking out of his hands is well known4 ,to have no wants1 said ,diogenes1 is divine2 to have as few as possible is to come nearest to the divine4 ,he lived in all sorts of places1 in the streets of ,athens1 in the market in tubs2 and he usually resided and slept in ,jupiter's ,stoa in ,athens2 he hence remarked that the ,athenians had built him a splendid place of residence4#aga ,thus the ,cynics thought not only of dress1 but also of other wants4 ,but a mode of life such as that followed by the ,cynics1 which professed to be a result of culture1 is really conditioned by the culture of the mind4 ,the ,cynics were not anchorites2 their consciousness was still essentially related to other consciousness4 ,antisthenes and ,diogenes lived in ,athens1 and could only exist there4 ,but in culture the mind is also directed to the most manifold needs1 and to the methods of satisfying these4 ,in more recent times the needs have much increased1 and hence a division of the general wants into many particular wants and modes of satisfaction has arisen2 this is the function of the activity of the understanding1 and in its application luxury has a place4 ,we may declaim against the morality of this1 but in a ,state all talents1 natural inclinations and customs must have free scope and be brought into exercise1 and every individual may take what part he will1 only he must in the main make for the universal4 ,thus the chief point is to place no greater value on such matters than what is demanded1 or generally1 to place no importance either on possessing or dispensing with them4 ,of ,diogenes we have only anecdotes to relate4 ,in a voyage to gina he fell into the hands of sea-robbers1 and was to be sold as a slave in ,crete4 ,being asked what he understood1 he replied1 8,to command men10 and told the herald to call out1 8,who will buy a ruler80 ,a certain ,xeniades of ,corinth bought him1 and he instructed his sons4 ,there are very many stories told of his residence in ,athens4 ,there he presented a contrast in his rudeness and disdainfulness to ,aristippus' fawning philosophy4 ,aristippus set no value on his enjoyments any more than on his wants1 but ,diogenes did so on his poverty4 ,diogenes was once washing his greens when ,aristippus passed by1 and he called out1 8,if you knew how to wash your greens yourself1 you would not run after kings40 ,aristippus replied very aptly1 8,if you knew how to associate with men1 you would not wash greens40 ,in ,plato's house he once walked on the beautiful carpets with muddy feet1 saying1 8,i tread on the pride of ,plato40 8,yes1 but with another pride10 replied ,plato1 as pointedly4 ,when ,diogenes stood wet through with rain1 and the bystanders pitied him1 ,plato said1 8,if you wish to compassionate him1 just go away4 ,his vanity is in showing himself off and exciting surprise2 it is what made him act in this way1 and the reason would not exist if he were left alone40 ,once when he got a thrashing1 as anecdotes often tell1 he laid a large plaster on his wounds1 and wrote on it the names of those who had struck him in order that they might be blamed of all4 ,when youths standing by him said1 8,we are afraid that you will bite us10 he replied1 8,don't mind1 a dog never eats turnips40 ,at a feast a guest threw bones to him like a dog1 and he went up to him and behaved to him like a dog4 ,he gave a good answer to a tyrant who asked him from what metal statues should be cast3 8,from the metal from which the statues of ,harmodius and ,aristogiton were cast40 ,he tried to eat raw meat1 which did not1 however1 agree with him2 he could not digest it1 and died at a very great age1 as he lived--in the streets4#agb c4 ,,later ,,cynics4 ,antisthenes and ,diogenes1 as already mentioned1 were men of great culture4 ,the succeeding ,cynics are not any the less conspicuous by their exceeding shamelessness1 but they were1 generally speaking1 nothing more than swinish beggars1 who found their satisfaction in the insolence which they showed to others4 ,they are worthy of no further consideration in ,philosophy1 and they deserve in its full the name of dogs1 which was early given to them2 for the dog is a shameless animal4 ,crates1 of ,thebes1 and ,hipparchia1 a ,cynic1 celebrated their nuptials in the public market4#agc ,this independence of which the ,cynics boasted1 is really subjection1 for while every other sphere of active life contains the affirmative element of free intelligence1 this means the denying oneself the sphere in which the element of freedom can be enjoyed4 ,,footnotes3 #a ,zur ,philosophie und ,geschichte4 ,pt4 ,v4 pp4 #ahd--ahf4 7,edition of #ahbh1 in #ab vols47 #b ,s4 ,marheineke3 8,lehrbuch des ,christlichen ,glaubens und ,lebens40 ,berlin1 #ahbc4 #acc1 #acd4 #c 8,meinung ist mein40 #d ,cf4 ,hegels ,werke1 vol4 ,,vi4 #ac1 pp4 #ba1 #bb4 #e ,flatt3 ,de ,theismo ,thaleti ,milesio abjudicando4 ,tub4 #aghe4 #d4 #f ,grundzge des gegenwrtigen ,zeitalters1 pp4 #baa1 #bab2 cf4 ,anweisung zum ,seligen ,leben1 pp4 #agh1 #cdh4 #g ,sanchuniathonis ,fragm4 ed4 ,rich4 ,cumberland1 ,lond4 #agbj1 #h2 ,german by ,j4 ,p4 ,kassel1 ,magdeburg1 #agee1 #h1 pp4 #a-d4 #h ,that is to say in the ,lectures preceding these1 delivered in the ,winter ,session #ahbe--ahbf4 #i ,confucius1 ,sinarum philosophus1 s4 scientia ,sinensis1 latine exposita studio et opera ,prosperi ,juonetta1 ,herdtrich1 ,rougemont1 ,couplet1 ,,pp4 ,s4 ,j41 ,paris1 #afhg1 fol4 #aj ,mmoires concernant les ,chinois 7,paris1 #aggf1 sqq471 ,vol4 ,,ii41 pp4 #a-cfa4 ,antiquit des ,chinois1 par le ,pre ,amiot1 pp4 #bj1 #ed1 c4 #aa ,die ,philosophie im ,fortgang der ,weltgeschichte1 ,vol4 ,i41 p4 #aeg4 #ab ,cf4 ,windischmann1 ibid41 p4 #abe4 #ac ,mmoire sur la vie et les opinions de ,lao-,tseu1 par ,abel ,rmusat 7,paris1 #ahbc71 p4 #ah sqq42 ,extrait d'une lettre de ,mr4 ,amiot1 #af ,octobre1 #aghg1 de ,peking 7,mmoires concernant les ,chinois1 ,t4 xv471 p4 #bjh1 sqq4 #ad ,dr4 ,legge states in 8,the ,religions of ,china0 that ,to was not the name of a person1 but of a concept or idea4 ,of the ,english terms most suitable for it1 he suggests the ,way in the sense of ,method4--,translator's note4 #ae ,abel ,rmusat1 l4c4 p4 #ca1 seq42 ,lettre sur les caractres des ,chinois 7,mmoires concernant les ,chinois1 ,tome #a7 p4 #bii1 seq4 #af ,rmusat thought that he discovered in these three syllables the word ,jehovah4--,translator's note4 #ag ,transactions of the ,royal ,asiatic ,society of ,great ,britain and ,ireland1 ,vol4 ,i41 ,part ,i4 ,london1 #ahbd1 pp4 #ai-dc4 7,,ii41 on the ,philosophy of the ,hindus1 ,part ,i41 by ,henry ,thomas ,colebrooke1 read ,june #ba1 #ahbc74 #ah ,transactions of the ,royal ,asiatic ,society1 ,vol4 i41 ,part ,i41 pp4 #ib--aah4 7,,vii4 ,essay on the ,philosophy of the ,hindus1 ,part ,,ii41 by ,henry ,thomas ,colebrooke47 #ai ,brucker1 ,hist4 ,phil4 ,t4 ,i4 p4 #dfj2 ,plutarch1 ,de plac4 phil4 ,i4 #c4 #bj ,herod4 ,,ii4 #bj2 ,senec4 ,qust4 natur4 ,,iv4 #b2 ,diog4 ,laert4 ,i4 #cg4 #ba ,diog4 ,laert4 #a4 #cd1 et ,menag4 ad4 h4 #a4 #bb ,cf4 ,ritter3 ,geschichte der ,ionischen ,philosophie1 p4 #ae4 #bc ,plutarch1 ,de plac4 phil4 ,i4 #c2 ,cicero1 ,de ,natura ,deorum1 ,i4 #aj4 ,aristot4 ,phys4 ,,iii4 #d4 #bd ,cf4 ,aristot4 ,phys4 ,i4 #d4 #be ,simplicius ad ,arist4 ,phys4 7,i4 #b71 p4 #e1 #f4 #bf ,stobi ,eclog4 ,physic4 c4 #aa41 p4 #bid1 ed4 ,heeren4 #bg ,simplicius ad ,phys4 ,arist4 p4 #f1 b4 #bh ,cf4 ,plutarch ,qust4 convival4 ,,viii4 #h4 #bi ,diog4 ,laert4 ,i4 #aai2 ,menagius ad h4 #a4 #cj ,in irrisione gentilium1 c4 #ab 7citante ,fabricio ad ,sext4 ,emp4 ,hyp4 ,pyrrh4 ,,iii4 #d1 #cj74 #ca ,cf4 ,porphyr4 ,de vita ,pythag41 #ad1 #ae2 et ,ritterhus1 ad4 h4 ,i4 #cb ,cf4 ,porphyr4 ,de vita ,pyth4 #f1 ,iamblich4 ,de vita ,pyth4 ,,xxix4 #aeh4 #cc ,diog4 ,laert4 ,i4 #ab2 ,,viii4 #h2 ,iamblich4 ,,viii4 #dd2 ,,xii4 #eh4 #cd ,porphyr4 ,de vita ,pyth4 #be1 #ba1 #bb2 ,iamblich4 ,de vita ,pyth4 #cf2 ,,vii4 #cc1 #cd2 ,,xxxii4 #bbj-bbb4 #ce ,diog4 ,laert4 ,,viii4 #aa1 ,porphyr41 #ah-bj2 ,iamblich4 ,,ii4 #i1 #aj1 ,,xxiv4 #ajh1 #aji2 ,menag4 et ,casaub4 ad ,diog4 ,laert4 ,,viii4 #ai4 #cf ,porphyr4 #cg2 ,iamblich4 ,,xvii4 #ga-gd2 ,,xviii4 #hj-hb2 ,,xxviii4 #aej2 ,,xx4 #id1 #ie2 ,diog4 ,laert4 ,,viii4 #aj4 #cg ,iamblich4 ,,xxi4 #ajj2 ,,xxix4 #afe2 ,diog4 ,laert4 ,,viii4 #bb2 ,porphyr4 #dj4 #ch ,porphyr4 #cb-cd2 ,iamblich4 ,,xxix4 #afc1 #afd2 ,,xx4 #if2 ,,xxi4 #ig2 ,,xxiv4 #ajg2 ,diog4 ,laert4 ,,viii4 #ai1 #ba1 #ci4 #ci ,diog4 ,laert41 ,,viii4 #ci1 #dj2 ,iamblich4 ,,xxxv4 #bdh-bfd2 ,porphyrius1 #ed-ei2 ,anonym4 ,de vita ,pyth4 7apud ,photium71 #b4 #dj ,cf4 ,platon4 ,timum1 p4 #bj1 ,steph4 7p4 #h1 ed4 ,bekk474 #da ,sext4 ,pyrrh4 ,hyp4 ,,iii4 #ah1 #aeb2 adv4 ,math4 ,x4 #bej1 #bea4 #db ,mathem4 c4 #e1 p4 #cj1 ed4 ,bullialdi3 cf4 ,aristoxen4 ap4 ,stob4 ,ecl4 ,phys4 #b1 p4 #af4 #dc ,gnomicorum poetarum opera3 ,vol4 ,i4 ,pythagoreorum aureum carmen1 ed4 ,glandorf ,fragm4 ,i4 v4 #de-dh2 ,sext4 ,empir4 adv4 ,math4 ,,iv4 #b1 et ,fabric4 ad h4 #a4 #dd ,burney points out the fallacy of this statement in his ,history of ,music4 ,translator's note4 #de ,sext4 ,empiricus ,pyrrh4 ,hyp4 ,,iii4 #ah1 #aee2 adv4 ,math4 ,,iv4 #f1 #g2 ,,vii4 #ie-ig2 ,x4 #bhc4 #df ,diog4 ,laert4 ,,viii4 #d1 #e1 #ad2 ,porphyrius1 #bf1 #bg2 ,iamblichus1 c4 ,,xiv4 #fc4 7,homer's ,iliad ,,xvi4 v4 #hjf-hjh2 ,,xvii4 v4 #de1 seq474 #dg ,gnomicorum potarum opera1 ,vol4 ,i4 ,pyth4 aureum carmen1 ed4 ,glandorf4 ,fragm4 ,i4 v4 #a-d4 #dh ,sext4 ,empir4 ,pyrrh4 ,hyp4 ,i4 #cc1 #bbe2 ,simpl4 ad ,phys4 ,arist4 pp4 #e1 #f2 ,plut4 de plac4 philos4 ,,ii4 #d4 #di ,that ,xenophanes is here meant is shown from the titles of the collected ,becker manuscripts1 as also from comparing this passage with the verses remaining to us1 which are by ,xenophanes1 though they were earlier ascribed to ,zeno2 this was done by ,hegel when he did not1 as in many lectures1 take the ,eleatic passages together4 ,the editor found a justification in this for placing the passage in its proper place4 ,note by editor4 #ej ,adv4 ,math4 ,,vii4 #dg-eb2 #aaj1 #aaa2 ,,viii4 #cbf2 ,pyrrh4 ,hyp4 ,,ii4 #d1 #ah4 #ea ,sext4 ,empir4 adv4 ,math4 ,x4 #cac1 #cad2 ,simplic4 in ,phys4 ,arist41 p4 #da4 #eb ,platon4 ,theaet4 p4 #ahc4 ,steph4 7p4 #bfc1 ed4 ,bekk472 ,sophist1 p4 #bag 7p4 #abg74 #ec ,diog4 ,laert4 ,,ix4 #bc2 et ,casaubonus ad4 h4 #a4 #ed ,plutarch1 ,de plac4 phil4 ,,ii4 #g2 ,euseb4 ,,xv4 #ch2 ,stob4 ,ecl4 ,phys4 c4 #bc1 p4 #dhb-dhd2 ,simplicius in ,arist4 ,phys4 p4 #i a1 #g b2 ,arist4 ,met4 ,i4 #d2 ,brandis ,comment4 ,eleat4 p4 #afb4 #ee ,de ,sensu1 p4 #a1 ed4 ,steph4 #aeeg 7citante ,flleborn1 p4 #ib74 #ef ,this obscure clause has been differently interpreted4 ,dr4 ,hutchison ,stirling1 in his annotations on ,schwegler's 8,history of ,philosophy10 says3 8,zeller accepts 7and ,hegel1 by quoting and translating the whole passage1 already countenanced him in advance7 the equivalent of ,theophrastus for 1 namely1 and interprets the clause itself thus3--#8,the preponderating element of the two is thought occasions and determines the ideas2' that is as is the preponderating element 7the warm or the cold7 so is the state of mind4 ,in short1 the more is the thought is the linguistic equivalent of the time for according to the more is the thought40 ,translator's note4 #eg ,as a matter of fact1 since a comparison of this reasoning with the fragments of ,melissus which ,simplicius 7in ,arist4 ,physica and ,de ,clo7 has retained1 places this conjecture beyond doubt1 the editor is constrained to place it here1 although ,hegel1 when he dealt with the ,eleatics separately1 put it under the heading of ,xenophanes4 ,note by ,editor4 #eh ,cf4 ,plat4 ,parmenid4 pp4 #abf1 #abg1 ,steph4 7pp4 #c--e ,bekk474 #ei ,diog4 ,laert4 ,,ix4 #bf1 #bg1 et ,menag4 ad h4 #a4 ,valer4 ,max4 ,,iii4 #c ext4 #b1 #c4 #fj ,diog4 ,laert4 ,,vi4 #ci1 ,sext4 ,empir4 ,pyrrh4 ,hyp4 ,,iii4 #h1 #ff4 #fa ,plat4 ,cratyl4 p4 #djb1 ,steph4 7p4 #db1 ,bekk472 ,aristot4 ,met4 ,i4 #f1 ,,xiii4 #d4 #fb ,johannes ,philoponus ad ,aristot4 de ,anima 7,i4 #b7 fol4 #d a4 #fc ,clemens ,alex43 ,stromata ,v4 #ad1 p4 #gab1 ed4 ,pott4 7cit4 ,steph4 ,pos4 phil4 p4 #aca74 #fd ,cf4 ,stobaei ,ecl4 ,phys4 #bb1 p4 #ded4 #fe ,diog4 ,lart4 ,,ix4 #g2 ,simplic4 ad ,arist4 ,phys4 p4 #f2 ,stob4 ,eclog4 ,phys4 c4 #c1 p4 #eh-fj4 #ff ,plutarch4 de plac4 phil4 ,i4 #bh4 #fg ,heraclides2 ,allegori ,homeric1 pp4 #ddb1 #ddc1 ed4 ,gale4 #fh ,in writing of them ,hegel very seldom separates these two philosophers1 though he does so in the ,jena edition4 #fi ,see ,hegel's 8,werke10 ,vol4 ,,iii4 p #aha1 et seq4 #gj ,ib4 p4 #aab4 #ga ,plutarch1 de plac4 phil4 ,i41 #bf2 ,stobi ,ecl4 ,phys4 #bj1 p4 #cid4 7,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,i4 p4 #bgh47 #gb ,empedocles ,agrigentinus4 ,de vita et philosophia ejus exposuit1 carminum reliquias ex antiquis scriptoribus collegit1 recensuit1 illustravit1 prfationem et indices adjecit ,magister ,frid4 ,guil4 ,sturz1 ,lipsi1 #ahje4 #gc ,empedoclis et ,parmenidis fragmenta1 c41 restituta et illustrata ab ,amadeo ,peyron4 #gd ,cf4 ,plat4 ,parmenid4 p4 #abg 7p4 #d74 #ge ,metaph4 ,i4 #c and #h2 ,de gener4 et corrupt4 ,i4 #a4 #gf ,adv4 ,math4 ,,vii4 #abj2 ,,ix4 #aj2 ,x4 #cag4 #gg ,arist4 ,de anim4 ,i4 #b2 ,fabricius ad ,sext4 adv4 ,math4 ,,vii4 #ib1 p4 #chi1 not4 ,t2 ,sextus adv4 ,math4 ,i4 #cjc2 ,,vii4 #aba4 #gh ,hegel certainly used in his lectures1 to follow the usual order1 and treat ,empedocles before the ,atomists4 ,but since1 in the course of his treatment of them1 he always connected the ,atomists with the ,eleatics and ,heraclitus1 and took ,empedocles1 in so far as he anticipated design1 as the forerunner of ,anaxagoras1 the present transposition is sufficiently justified4 ,if we further consider that ,empedocles swayed to and fro between the ,one of ,heraclitus and the ,many of ,leucippus1 without1 like them1 adhering to either of these one-sided determinations1 it is clear that both moments are assumptions through whose variations he opened a way for the ,anaxagorean conception of end1 which1 by comprehending them1 is the essential unity from which proceeds the manifold of phenomena1 as from their immanent source4--,note by ,editor4 #gi ,anaxagor ,clazomenii fragmenta1 qu supersunt omnia1 edita ab ,e4 ,schaubach1 ,lipsi1 #ahbg4 #hj ,plin4 ,hist4 ,nat4 ,,vii4 #ec2 ,brucker1 ,t4 ,i4 pp4 #dic1 #did1 not4 #ha ,diog4 ,laert4 ,,ii4 #af2 ,plutarch in ,lysandro1 #ab4 #hb ,diog4 ,laert4 ,,ii41 #ab-ad2 ,plutarch1 in ,pericle1 c4 #cb4 #hc ,cf4 ,aristot4 ,phys4 ,,viii4 #e2 ,met4 ,,xii4 #aj4 #hd ,cf4 ,sext4 ,empiric4 ,hypotyp ,pyrrh4 ,,iii4 #d1 #cc4 #he ,diog4 ,laert4 ,,ii4 #f2 ,sext4 ,emp4 adv4 ,math4 ,,ix4 #f2 ,arist4 ,phys4 ,,viii4 #a4 #hf ,platonis ,protagoras1 pp4 #caj-cad1 ,steph4 7pp4 #aea-aei1 ,bekk474 #hg ,plat4 ,protag41 pp4 #cad-cag 7pp4 #aei-afd74 #hh ,plat4 ,protag4 pp4 #cah-cbj 7pp4 #aff-agj74 #hi ,plat4 ,protag4 pp4 #cbj-cbc 7pp4 #agj-agf74 #ij ,ibid4 pp4 #cbc1 #cbd 7pp4 #agf-agh74 #ia ,plat4 ,protag4 pp4 #cbd-cbh 7pp4 #agh-ahd47 #ib ,plat4 ,meno41 p4 #ia 7p4 #cga74 #ic ,plat4 ,gorg4 pp4 #deb et #deg 7pp4 #ae et #bd74 #id ,plat4 ,euthydem4 pp4 #bhc1 #bhd 7pp4 #daf-dah74 #ie ,ibid4 p4 #bih 7p4 #ddf74 #if ,xenoph4 ,memorab4 ,,ii4 c4 #a1 #ba seq4 #ig ,diog4 ,laert4 ,,ix4 #ej4 #ih ,ibid4 #ed4 #ii ,plat4 ,protag4 p4 #cch fin4 7p4 #bjd74 #ajj ,plutarch in ,pericle1 c4 #cf4 #aja ,diog4 ,lart4 ,,ix4 #ea1 #eb2 #ee1 #ef 7,sext4 ,empir4 adv4 ,math4 ,,ix4 #ef74 #ajb ,plat4 ,thetet4 p4 #aeb 7p4 #aie72 ,sext4 ,emp4 ,pyrrh4 ,hyp4 ,i1 c4 #cb1 #baf4 #ajc ,sext4 ,empir4 adv4 ,math4 ,,vii4 #chh1 #fj2 ,plat4 ,thetet4 p4 #aeb4 7p4 #aie-aig74 #ajd ,plat4 ,thetet4 p4 #aed 7p4 #bja74 #aje ,plat4 ,thet4 pp4 #aec1 #aed 7pp4 #aii1 #bjj72 pp4 #aef1 #aeg 7pp4 #bjd-bjf72 pp4 #aeh-afj 7pp4 #bjh-bac74 #ajf ,sext4 ,empir4 ,pyrrh4 ,hyp4 ,i4 c4 #cb1 #bag-bai4 #ajg ,diodorus ,siculus3 ,,xii4 p4 #ajf 7ed4 ,wesseling74 #ajh ,sext4 ,empir4 adv4 ,math4 ,,vii4 #ff4 #aji ,ibid4 #fg4 #aaj ,aristotel4 de ,xenophane1 ,zenone et ,gorgia1 c4 #e4 #aaa ,sext4 ,empir4 adv4 ,math4 ,,vii4 #fh-gj4 #aab ,ibid4 #ga4 #aac ,sext4 ,empir4 adv4 ,math4 ,,vii4 #gc1 #gd4 #aad ,ibid4 #ge1 #gf4 #aae ,sext4 ,empir4 adv4 ,math4 ,,vii4 #gg-hj4 #aaf ,sext4 ,empir4 adv4 ,math4 ,,vii4 #hc1 #hd4 #aag ,the distinction between these two words is a very important one4 ,schwegler1 in explaining ,hegel's position in his 8,history of ,philosophy10 states that ,hegel asserts that ,socrates set ,moralitt1 the subjective morality of individual conscience1 in the place of ,sittlichkeit1 8the spontaneous1 natural1 half-unconscious 7almost instinctive7 virtue that rests in obedience to established custom 7use and wont1 natural objective law1 that is at bottom1 according to ,hegel1 rational1 though not yet subjectively cleared1 perhaps1 into its rational principles740 ,as ,dr4 ,stirling says in his ,annotations to the same work 7p4 #cid71 8,there is a period in the history of the ,state when people live in tradition2 that is a period of unreflected ,sittlichkeit1 or natural observance4 ,then there comes a time when the observances are questioned1 and when the right or truth they involve is reflected into the subject4 ,this is a period of ,aufklrung1 and for ,sittlichkeit there is substituted ,moralitt1 subjective morality3 the subject will approve nought but what he finds inwardly true to himself1 to his conscience40--,,translator',s ,,note4 #aah ,diog4 ,laert4 ,,ii1 #dd 7cf4 ,menag4 ad h4 #a72 #ah-bj1 #bb4 #aai ,diog4 ,laert4 ,,ii4 #bb1 #bc2 ,plat4 ,apol4 ,socr4 p4 #bh 7p4 #aac74 #abj ,diog4 ,laert4 ,,ii4 #bd2 ,xenoph4 ,memorab4 ,i4 c4 #a1 #ah2 ,plat4 ,apol4 ,socrat4 p4 #cb 7pp4 #abj-abb72 ,epist4 ,,vii4 pp4 #cbd1 #cbe 7p4 #dbi74 #aba ,plat4 ,convivium1 pp4 #bab1 #agf1 #bac1 #bad1 #bbc 7pp4 #ddg1 #cgf-cgh1 #ddi1 #dej1 #dfh1 #dfi74 #abb ,xenoph4 ,memorab4 ,i4 c4 #a1 #aj4 #abc ,xenoph4 ,memorab4 ,i4 c4 #a1 #aa-af2 ,aristot4 ,metaph4 ,i4 #f4 #abd ,aristot4 ,metaph4 ,,xiii4 #d #abe ,from the ,lectures of the winter #ahbe-ahbf4--7,,note ,,by ,,editor47 #abf ,platonis ,thetetus1 p4 #baj 7p4 #cbb74 #abg ,plat4 ,protag4 p4 #cdi 7pp4 #bbd1 #bbe72 pp4 #cfj1 #cfa 7pp4 #bde-bdg74 #abh ,xenoph4 ,memorab4 ,,iv4 c4 #b1 #aa-ag4 #abi ,xenoph4 ,memorab4 ,,iv4 c4 #a1 #a2 c4 #b1 #dj4 #acj ,cf4 ,xenoph4 ,memorab4 ,i4 c4 #b1 #ab-af1 sqq4 #aca ,herodot4 ,,ix4 #cc1 seq4 #acb ,xenoph4 ,apologia ,socrat4 #aj2 ,memorab4 ,i4 c4 #a1 #a ,plat4 ,apologia ,socrat4 p4 #bd 7p4 #ajd74 #acc ,apologia ,socrat4 #aa--ac2 ,memorab4 ,i4 c4 #a1 #b--f2 #ai4 #acd ,plat4 ,apol4 ,socrat4 p4 #bf 7#ajh1 #aji74 #ace ,apologia ,socrat4 #ad 7cf4 ,memorab4 ,i4 c4 #a1 #ag74 #acf ,plato4 ,apol4 ,socrat4 p4 #ba 7p4 #ig74 #acg ,xenoph4 ,apol4 ,socrat4 #ad4 #ach ,xenoph4 ,apol4 ,socrat4 #af--ai2 ,memorab4 ,i4 c4 #b1 #a--h4 #aci ,xenoph4 ,apol4 ,socrat4 #bj2 cf4 ,memorab4 ,i4 c4 #b1 #di seq4 #adj ,xenoph4 ,apol4 ,socrat4 #bj1 #ba2 ,memorab4 ,i4 c4 #b1 #ea--ee2 ,plat4 ,apol4 ,socrat4 pp4 #bd--bf 7pp4 #ajc--ajg74 #ada ,meier und ,schmann3 ,der ,attische ,process1 pp4 #agc-agg4 #adb ,diog4 ,lart4 ,,ii4 #ajf4 #adc ,diog4 ,lart4 ,,vi4 #bd4 #add ,cicer4 ,acad4 ,qust4 ,,ii4 #db4 #ade ,menag4 ad ,diog4 ,lart4 ,,ii4 #ajf2 ,aul4 ,gellius3 ,noct4 ,attic1 ,,vi4 #aj4 #adf ,plutarch4 de fraterno amore1 p4 #dhi1 ,d4 7ed4 ,xyl472 ,stobi ,sermones3 ,,lxxxiv4 #ae 7,t4 ,,iii4 p4 #afj1 ed4 ,gaisford72 ,brucker4 ,hist4 ,crit4 ,philos4 ,t4 ,i4 p4 #faa4 #adg ,diog4 ,lart4 ,,ii4 #ajf4 #adh ,diog4 ,lart4 ,,ii4 #ajh4 #adi ,diog4 ,lart4 ,,ii4 #aji4 #aej ,diog4 ,lart4 ,,ii4 #aaa1 #aab4 #aea ,diog4 ,lart4 ,,ii4 #ajh2 ,cicero1 ,acad4 ,qust4 ,,iv4 #bi2 ,de divinat4 ,,ii4 #d4 #aeb ,diog4 ,lart4 ,,vii4 #aif4 #aec ,athenus ,,ix4 p4 #dja 7ed4 ,casaubon1 #aeig72 ,suidas1 s4 v4 1 ,t4 ,,iii4 p4 #fjj2 ,menag4 ad ,diog4 ,lart4 ,,ii4 #ajh4 #aed ,diog4 ,lart4 ,,ii4 #ace4 #aee ,diog4 ,lart4 ,,ii4 #ajh2 ,bruckeri ,hist4 ,crit4 ,phil4 ,t4 ,i4 p4 #fac4 #aef ,diog4 ,lart4 ,,ii4 #ajh2 ,cicer4 ,acad4 ,qust4 ,,iv4 #bi2 ,bruck4 ,hist4 ,crit4 ,philos4 ,t4 ,i4 p4 #fad1 not4 s4 #aeg ,aristoteles3 ,de ,soph4 ,elench4 c4 #ad2 ,buhle ad h4 #a4 argumentum1 p4 #eab4 #aeh ,diog4 ,lart4 ,,ii4 #aac1 #aae1 #aai4 #aei ,plutarch1 advers4 ,coloten4 c4 #bb1 #bc1 pp4 #aaai1 #aabj1 ed4 ,xyl4 pp4 #agd-agf1 ,vol4 ,,xiv4 ed4 ,hutten4 #afj ,diog4 ,lart4 ,,ii4 #fe2 ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,ii4 p4 #ajc3 ,bruck4 ,hist4 ,crit4 ,philos4 ,t4 ,i4 p4 #ehd1 seq4 #afa ,diog4 ,lart4 ,,ii4 #ff1 #fg1 #gb1 #gg 7,horat4 ,serm4 ,,ii4 #c1 v4 #aja71 #gi-ha4 #afb ,sext4 ,empir4 adv4 ,math4 ,,vii4 #aia1 #aii1 #bjj4 #afc ,diog4 ,lart4 ,,ii4 #ig1 #ih 7#aja1 #ajb74 #afd ,diog4 ,lart4 ,,ii4 #ic-ie4 #afe ,cic4 ,tusc4 ,quest4 ,i4 #cd2 ,val4 ,max4 ,,viii4 #i4 #aff ,diog4 ,lart4 ,,ii4 #if1 #ig4 #afg ,diog4 ,lart4 ,,vi4 #ac1 #a1 #b1 #ae-ah4 #afh ,diog4 ,lart4 ,,vi4 #aa1 #ab 7#ajd74 #afi ,diog4 ,lart4 ,,vi4 #ac1 #f1 #bb1 #cg2 ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,ii4 p4 #hi4 #agj ,diog4 ,lart4 ,,vi4 #h2 ,,ii4 #cf4 #aga ,diog4 ,lart4 ,,vi4 #gd1 #fa1 #cg1 #aje1 #bb4 #agb ,diog4 ,lart4 ,,vi4 #bi1 #cj 7#gd72 ,,ii4 #fh2 ,,vi4 #bf1 #da1 #cc1 #de1 #df1 #ej1 #gf1 #gg 7#cd74 #agc ,diog4 ,lart4 ,,vi4 #he1 #if1 #ig4 ,,transcriber',s ,,note3 --,obvious print and punctuation errors were corrected4