,,the ,,influence ,,of    ,,darwin ,,on 
,,philosophy      ,and ,other ,essays in
 ,contemporary    ,thought      ,,by    
,,john ,,dewey    ,professor of         
,philosophy in ,columbia ,university    
,illustration      ,,new ,,york         
,,henry ,,holt ,,and ,,company          
,,copyright1 #aiaj1    ,,by    ,,henry  
,,holt ,,and ,,company        ,published
 ,april1 #aiaj          ,,preface       
,an elaborate preface to a philosophic  
work usually impresses one as a  last   
desperate effort on the part of its     
author to convey what he feels  he has  
not quite managed to say in the body of 
his book4 ,nevertheless1  a collection  
of essays on various topics written     
during a series  of years may perhaps   
find room for an independent word to    
indicate  the kind of unity they seem1  
to their writer1 to possess4 ,probably  
every one acquainted with present       
philosophic thought--found1 with  some  
notable exceptions1 in periodicals      
rather than in books--would  term it a  

philosophy of transition and            
reconstruction4 ,its various            
representatives agree in what they      
oppose--the orthodox ,british           
empiricism of two generations ago and   
the orthodox ,neo-,kantian idealism  of 
the last generation--rather than in what
 they proffer4    ,the essays of this   
volume belong1 ,i suppose1 to what has  
come  to be known 7since the earlier of 
them were written7 as the  pragmatic    
phase of the newer movement4 ,now a     
recent ,german critic  has described    
pragmatism as1 8,epistemologically1     
nominalism2  psychologically1           
voluntarism2 cosmologically1 energism2  
metaphysically1  agnosticism2 ethically1
 meliorism on the basis of the          
,bentham-,mill  utilitarianism40#a ,it  
may be that pragmatism will turn out to 
be all  of this formidable array2 but   
even should it1 the one who thus defines
  it has hardly come within earshot of  
it4 ,for whatever else pragmatism  is or
 is not1 the pragmatic spirit is        

primarily a revolt against that  habit  
of mind which disposes of anything      
whatever--even so humble an  affair as a
 new method in ,philosophy--by tucking  
it away1 after this  fashion1 in the    
pigeon holes of a filing cabinet4 ,there
 are other vital  phases of contemporary
 transition and revision2 there are1 for
 example1  a new realism and            
naturalistic idealism4 ,when ,i recall  
that ,i find  myself more interested    
7even though their representatives might
 decline  to reciprocate7 in such phases
 than in the systems marked by the      
labels  of our ,german critic1 ,i am    
confirmed in a belief that after all it 
is  better to view pragmatism quite     
vaguely as part and parcel of a general 
movement of intellectual reconstruction4
 ,for otherwise we seem to have  no     
recourse save to define pragmatism--as  
does our ,german author--in  terms of   
the very past systems against which it  
is a reaction2 or1 in  escaping that    
alternative1 to regard it as a fixed    

rival system making  like claim to      
completeness and finality4 ,and if1 as  
,i believe1 one of  the marked traits of
 the pragmatic movement is just the     
surrender of  every such claim1 how have
 we furthered our understanding of      
pragmatism8    ,classic philosophies    
have to be revised because they must be 
squared  up with the many social and    
intellectual tendencies that have       
revealed themselves since those         
philosophies matured4 ,the conquest  of 
the sciences by the experimental method 
of inquiry2 the injection  of           
evolutionary ideas into the study of    
life and society2 the  application of   
the historic method to religions and    
morals as well  as to institutions2 the 
creation of the sciences of 8origins0   
and  of the cultural development of     
mankind--how can such intellectual      
changes occur and leave philosophy what 
it was and where it was8 ,nor  can      
philosophy remain an indifferent        
spectator of the rise of what  may be   

termed the new individualism in art and 
letters1 with its  naturalistic method  
applied in a religious1 almost mystic   
spirit to  what is primitive1 obscure1  
varied1 inchoate1 and growing in nature 
and human character4 ,the age of        
,darwin1 ,helmholtz1 ,pasteur1 ,ibsen1  
,maeterlinck1 ,rodin1 and ,henry ,james 
must feel some uneasiness until  it has 
liquidated its philosophic inheritance  
in current intellectual  coin4 ,and to  
accuse those who are concerned in this  
transaction of  ignorant contempt for   
the classic past of philosophy is to    
overlook  the inspiration the movement  
of translation draws from the fact that 
the history of philosophy has become    
only too well understood4    ,any       
revision of customary notions with its  
elimination--instead of  8solution0--of 
many traditionary problems cannot hope1 
however1 for  any unity save that of    
tendency and operation4 ,elaborate and  
imposing  system1 the regimenting and   
uniforming of thoughts1 are1 at present1

  evidence that we are assisting at a   
stage performance in which  borrowed--or
 hired--figures are maneuvering4        
,tentatively and piecemeal  must the    
reconstruction of our stock notions     
proceed4 ,as a contribution  to such a  
revision1 the present collection of     
essays is submitted4 ,with  one or two  
exceptions1 their order is that of a    
reversed chronology1  the later essays  
coming first4 ,the facts regarding the  
conditions of  their first appearance   
are given in connection with each essay4
 ,i  wish to thank the ,editors of the  
,philosophical ,review1 of ,mind1  of   
the ,hibbert ,journal1 of the ,journal  
of ,philosophy1 ,psychology1  and       
,scientific ,methods1 and of the        
,popular ,science ,monthly1 and  the    
,directors of the ,press of ,chicago and
 ,columbia ,universities1  respectively1
 for permission to reprint such of the  
essays as appeared  originally under    
their several auspices4                 
,,john ,,dewey          ,,columbia      

,,university1    ,,new ,,york ,,city1   
,march #a1 #aiaj4          ,,contents   
,,page    ,,the ,,influence ,,of        
,,darwinism ,,on ,,philosophy           
#a      ,,nature ,,and ,,its ,,good3 ,a 
,,conversation                       #bj
      ,,intelligence ,,and ,,morals     
#df      ,,the ,,experimental ,,theory  
,,of ,,knowledge                        
#gg      ,,the ,,intellectualist        
,,criterion ,,for ,,truth               
#aab      ,a ,,short ,,catechism        
,,concerning ,,truth                    
#aed      ,,beliefs ,,and ,,existences  
#afi      ,,experience ,,and ,,objective
 ,,idealism                        #aih 
,,the ,,postulate ,,of ,,immediate      
,,empiricism                    #bbf    
8,,consciousness0 ,,and ,,experience    
#bdb      ,,the ,,significance ,,of     
,,the ,,problem ,,of ,,knowledge        
#bga          ,,the ,,influence ,,of    
,,darwinism ,,on ,,philosophy#b      ,i 
,that the publication of the 8,origin of
 ,species0 marked an epoch in  the      

development of the natural sciences is  
well known to the layman4  ,that the    
combination of the very words origin and
 species embodied  an intellectual      
revolt and introduced a new intellectual
 temper is  easily overlooked by the    
expert4 ,the conceptions that had       
reigned  in the philosophy of nature and
 knowledge for two thousand years1  the 
conceptions that had become the familiar
 furniture of the mind1  rested on the  
assumption of the superiority of the    
fixed and final2  they rested upon      
treating change and origin as signs of  
defect and  unreality4 ,in laying hands 
upon the sacred ark of absolute         
permanency1  in treating the forms that 
had been regarded as types of fixity and
  perfection as originating and passing 
away1 the 8,origin of ,species0         
introduced a mode of thinking that in   
the end was bound to transform  the     
logic of knowledge1 and hence the       
treatment of morals1 politics1  and     
religion4    ,no wonder1 then1 that the 

publication of ,darwin's book1 a half   
century  ago1 precipitated a crisis4    
,the true nature of the controversy is  
easily concealed from us1 however1 by   
the theological clamor that  attended   
it4 ,the vivid and popular features of  
the anti-,darwinian row  tended to leave
 the impression that the issue was      
between science  on one side and        
theology on the other4 ,such was not the
 case--the  issue lay primarily within  
science itself1 as ,darwin himself early
  recognized4 ,the theological outcry he
 discounted from the start1  hardly     
noticing it save as it bore upon the    
8feelings of his  female relatives40    
,but for two decades before final       
publication he  contemplated the        
possibility of being put down by his    
scientific peers  as a fool or as crazy2
 and he set1 as the measure of his      
success1  the degree in which he should 
affect three men of science3 ,lyell in  
geology1 ,hooker in botany1 and ,huxley 
in zoology4    ,religious considerations

 lent fervor to the controversy1 but    
they did  not provoke it4               
,intellectually1 religious emotions are 
not creative but  conservative4 ,they   
attach themselves readily to the current
 view of  the world and consecrate it4  
,they steep and dye intellectual fabrics
  in the seething vat of emotions2 they 
do not form their warp and woof4  ,there
 is not1 ,i think1 an instance of any   
large idea about the world  being       
independently generated by religion4    
,although the ideas that rose  up like  
armed men against ,darwinism owed their 
intensity to religious  associations1   
their origin and meaning are to be      
sought in science and  philosophy1 not  
in religion4      ,,ii    ,few words in 
our language foreshorten intellectual   
history as much  as does the word       
species4 ,the ,greeks1 in initiating the
 intellectual  life of ,europe1 were    
impressed by characteristic traits of   
the life of  plants and animals2 so     
impressed indeed that they made these   

traits the  key to defining nature and  
to explaining mind and society4 ,and    
truly1  life is so wonderful that a     
seemingly successful reading of its     
mystery  might well lead men to believe 
that the key to the secrets of heaven   
and earth was in their hands4 ,the      
,greek rendering of this mystery1  the  
,greek formulation of the aim and       
standard of knowledge1 was in  the      
course of time embodied in the word     
species1 and it controlled  philosophy  
for two thousand years4 ,to understand  
the intellectual  face-about expressed  
in the phrase 8,origin of ,species10 we 
must1 then1  understand the long        
dominant idea against which it is a     
protest4    ,consider how men were      
impressed by the facts of life4 ,their  
eyes fell  upon certain things slight in
 bulk1 and frail in structure4 ,to every
  appearance1 these perceived things    
were inert and passive4 ,suddenly1      
under certain circumstances1 these      
things--henceforth known as seeds  or   

eggs or germs--begin to change1 to      
change rapidly in size1 form1  and      
qualities4 ,rapid and extensive changes 
occur1 however1 in many  things--as when
 wood is touched by fire4 ,but the      
changes in the living  thing are        
orderly2 they are cumulative2 they tend 
constantly in one  direction2 they do   
not1 like other changes1 destroy or     
consume1 or  pass fruitless into        
wandering flux2 they realize and fulfil4
 ,each  successive stage1 no matter how 
unlike its predecessor1 preserves  its  
net effect and also prepares the way for
 a fuller activity on  the part of its  
successor4 ,in living beings1 changes do
 not happen  as they seem to happen     
elsewhere1 any which way2 the earlier   
changes  are regulated in view of later 
results4 ,this progressive organization 
does not cease till there is achieved a 
true final term1 a 1 a  completed1      
perfected end4 ,this final form         
exercises in turn a plenitude  of       
functions1 not the least noteworthy of  

which is production of germs  like those
 from which it took its own origin1     
germs capable of the same  cycle of     
self-fulfilling activity4    ,but the   
whole miraculous tale is not yet told4  
,the same drama is  enacted to the same 
destiny in countless myriads of         
individuals so  sundered in time1 so    
severed in space1 that they have no     
opportunity  for mutual consultation and
 no means of interaction4 ,as an old    
writer quaintly said1 8things of the    
same kind go through the same           
formalities0--celebrate1 as it were1 the
 same ceremonial rites4    ,this formal 
activity which operates throughout a    
series of changes and  holds them to a  
single course2 which subordinates their 
aimless flux to  its own perfect        
manifestation2 which1 leaping the       
boundaries of space  and time1 keeps    
individuals distant in space and remote 
in time to a  uniform type of structure 
and function3 this principle seemed to  
give  insight into the very nature of   

reality itself4 ,to it ,aristotle gave  
the name1 4 ,this term the scholastics  
translated as species4    ,the force of 
this term was deepened by its           
application to everything  in the       
universe that observes order in flux and
 manifests constancy  through change4   
,from the casual drift of daily weather1
 through the  uneven recurrence of      
seasons and unequal return of seed time 
and  harvest1 up to the majestic sweep  
of the heavens--the image of eternity   
in time--and from this to the unchanging
 pure and contemplative  intelligence   
beyond nature lies one unbroken         
fulfilment of ends4  ,nature as a whole 
is a progressive realization of purpose 
strictly  comparable to the realization 
of purpose in any single plant or       
animal4    ,the conception of 1 species1
 a fixed form and final cause1  was the 
central principle of knowledge as well  
as of nature4 ,upon  it rested the logic
 of science4 ,change as change is mere  
flux and  lapse2 it insults             

intelligence4 ,genuinely to know is to  
grasp a  permanent end that realizes    
itself through changes1 holding them    
thereby within the metes and bounds of  
fixed truth4 ,completely to  know is to 
relate all special forms to their one   
single end and good3  pure contemplative
 intelligence4 ,since1 however1 the     
scene of nature  which directly         
confronts us is in change1 nature as    
directly and  practically experienced   
does not satisfy the conditions of      
knowledge4  ,human experience is in     
flux1 and hence the instrumentalities of
  sense-perception and of inference     
based upon observation are condemned  in
 advance4 ,science is compelled to aim  
at realities lying behind and  beyond   
the processes of nature1 and to carry on
 its search for these  realities by     
means of rational forms transcending    
ordinary modes of  perception and       
inference4    ,there are1 indeed1 but   
two alternative courses4 ,we must either
 find the  appropriate objects and      

organs of knowledge in the mutual       
interactions  of changing things2 or    
else1 to escape the infection of change1
 we  must seek them in some transcendent
 and supernal region4 ,the human  mind1 
deliberately as it were1 exhausted the  
logic of the changeless1  the final1 and
 the transcendent1 before it essayed    
adventure on the  pathless wastes of    
generation and transformation4 ,we      
dispose all too  easily of the efforts  
of the schoolmen to interpret nature and
 mind in  terms of real essences1 hidden
 forms1 and occult faculties1 forgetful 
of the seriousness and dignity of the   
ideas that lay behind4 ,we dispose  of  
them by laughing at the famous gentleman
 who accounted for the  fact that opium 
put people to sleep on the ground it had
 a dormitive  faculty4 ,but the         
doctrine1 held in our own day1 that     
knowledge of the  plant that yields the 
poppy consists in referring the         
peculiarities  of an individual to a    
type1 to a universal form1 a doctrine so

 firmly  established that any other     
method of knowing was conceived to be   
unphilosophical and unscientific1 is a  
survival of precisely the same  logic4  
,this identity of conception in the     
scholastic and anti-,darwinian  theory  
may well suggest greater sympathy for   
what has become unfamiliar  as well as  
greater humility regarding the further  
unfamiliarities that  history has in    
store4    ,darwin was not1 of course1   
the first to question the classic       
philosophy  of nature and of knowledge4 
,the beginnings of the revolution are in
  the physical science of the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries4  ,when       
,galileo said3 8,it is my opinion that  
the earth is very noble  and admirable  
by reason of so many and so different   
alterations and  generations which are  
incessantly made therein10 he expressed 
the  changed temper that was coming over
 the world2 the transfer of interest    
from the permanent to the changing4     
,when ,descartes said3 8,the nature  of 

physical things is much more easily     
conceived when they are beheld  coming  
gradually into existence1 than when they
 are only considered as  produced at    
once in a finished and perfect state10  
the modern world  became self-conscious 
of the logic that was henceforth to     
control  it1 the logic of which         
,darwin's 8,origin of ,species0 is the  
latest  scientific achievement4 ,without
 the methods of ,copernicus1 ,kepler1   
,galileo1 and their successors in       
astronomy1 physics1 and chemistry1      
,darwin would have been helpless in the 
organic sciences4 ,but prior  to ,darwin
 the impact of the new scientific method
 upon life1 mind1  and politics1 had    
been arrested1 because between these    
ideal or moral  interests and the       
inorganic world intervened the kingdom  
of plants and  animals4 ,the gates of   
the garden of life were barred to the   
new ideas2  and only through this garden
 was there access to mind and politics4 
,the  influence of ,darwin upon         

philosophy resides in his having        
conquered the  phenomena of life for the
 principle of transition1 and thereby   
freed  the new logic for application to 
mind and morals and life4 ,when he said 
of species what ,galileo had said of the
 earth1 e pur si muove1 he  emancipated1
 once for all1 genetic and experimental 
ideas as an organon  of asking questions
 and looking for explanations4          
,,iii    ,the exact bearings upon       
philosophy of the new logical outlook   
are1 of  course1 as yet1 uncertain and  
inchoate4 ,we live in the twilight of   
intellectual transition4 ,one must add  
the rashness of the prophet to  the     
stubbornness of the partizan to venture 
a systematic exposition of  the         
influence upon philosophy of the        
,darwinian method4 ,at best1 we can  but
 inquire as to its general bearing--the 
effect upon mental temper  and          
complexion1 upon that body of           
half-conscious1 half-instinctive        
intellectual aversions and preferences  

which determine1 after all1 our  more   
deliberate intellectual enterprises4 ,in
 this vague inquiry there  happens to   
exist as a kind of touchstone a problem 
of long historic  currency that has also
 been much discussed in ,darwinian      
literature4  ,i refer to the old problem
 of design versus chance1 mind versus   
matter1 as the causal explanation1 first
 or final1 of things4    ,as we have    
already seen1 the classic notion of     
species carried with it  the idea of    
purpose4 ,in all living forms1 a        
specific type is present  directing the 
earlier stages of growth to the         
realization of its own  perfection4     
,since this purposive regulative        
principle is not visible  to the senses1
 it follows that it must be an ideal or 
rational force4  ,since1 however1 the   
perfect form is gradually approximated  
through the  sensible changes1 it also  
follows that in and through a sensible  
realm  a rational ideal force is working
 out its own ultimate manifestation4    

,these inferences were extended to      
nature3 7a7 ,she does nothing in  vain2 
but all for an ulterior purpose4 7b7    
,within natural sensible  events there  
is therefore contained a spiritual      
causal force1 which  as spiritual       
escapes perception1 but is apprehended  
by an enlightened  reason4 7c7 ,the     
manifestation of this principle brings  
about a  subordination of matter and    
sense to its own realization1 and this  
ultimate fulfilment is the goal of      
nature and of man4 ,the design  argument
 thus operated in two directions4       
,purposefulness accounted for  the      
intelligibility of nature and the       
possibility of science1 while  the      
absolute or cosmic character of this    
purposefulness gave sanction  and worth 
to the moral and religious endeavors of 
man4 ,science was  underpinned and      
morals authorized by one and the same   
principle1 and  their mutual agreement  
was eternally guaranteed4    ,this      
philosophy remained1 in spite of        

sceptical and polemic outbursts1  the   
official and the regnant philosophy of  
,europe for over two thousand  years4   
,the expulsion of fixed first and final 
causes from astronomy1  physics1 and    
chemistry had indeed given the doctrine 
something of  a shock4 ,but1 on the     
other hand1 increased acquaintance with 
the  details of plant and animal life   
operated as a counterbalance and        
perhaps even strengthened the argument  
from design4 ,the marvelous  adaptations
 of organisms to their environment1 of  
organs to the  organism1 of unlike parts
 of a complex organ--like the eye--to   
the  organ itself2 the foreshadowing by 
lower forms of the higher2 the          
preparation in earlier stages of growth 
for organs that only later had  their   
functioning--these things were          
increasingly recognized with the        
progress of botany1 zoology1            
paleontology1 and embryology4 ,together1
  they added such prestige to the design
 argument that by the late  eighteenth  

century it was1 as approved by the      
sciences of organic life1  the central  
point of theistic and idealistic        
philosophy4    ,the ,darwinian principle
 of natural selection cut straight under
 this  philosophy4 ,if all organic      
adaptations are due simply to constant  
variation and the elimination of those  
variations which are harmful  in the    
struggle for existence that is brought  
about by excessive  reproduction1 there 
is no call for a prior intelligent      
causal force  to plan and preordain     
them4 ,hostile critics charged ,darwin  
with  materialism and with making chance
 the cause of the universe4    ,some    
naturalists1 like ,asa ,gray1 favored   
the ,darwinian principle  and attempted 
to reconcile it with design4 ,gray held 
to what may be  called design on the    
installment plan4 ,if we conceive the   
8stream of  variations0 to be itself    
intended1 we may suppose that each      
successive  variation was designed from 
the first to be selected4 ,in that case1

  variation1 struggle1 and selection    
simply define the mechanism of          
8secondary causes0 through which the    
8first cause0 acts2 and the  doctrine of
 design is none the worse off because we
 know more of its  modus operandi4      
,darwin could not accept this mediating 
proposal4 ,he admits or rather he       
asserts that it is 8impossible to       
conceive this immense and wonderful     
universe including man with his capacity
 of looking far backwards and  far into 
futurity as the result of blind chance  
or necessity40#c ,but  nevertheless he  
holds that since variations are in      
useless as well as  useful directions1  
and since the latter are sifted out     
simply by the  stress of the conditions 
of struggle for existence1 the design   
argument  as applied to living beings is
 unjustifiable2 and its lack of support 
there deprives it of scientific value as
 applied to nature in general4  ,if the 
variations of the pigeon1 which under   
artificial selection give  the pouter   

pigeon1 are not preordained for the sake
 of the breeder1 by  what logic do we   
argue that variations resulting in      
natural species are  pre-designed8#d    
,,iv    ,so much for some of the more   
obvious facts of the discussion of      
design  versus chance1 as causal        
principles of nature and of life as a   
whole4  ,we brought up this discussion1 
you recall1 as a crucial instance4 ,what
  does our touchstone indicate as to the
 bearing of ,darwinian ideas  upon      
philosophy8 ,in the first place1 the new
 logic outlaws1 flanks1  dismisses--what
 you will--one type of problems and     
substitutes for  it another type4       
,philosophy forswears inquiry after     
absolute origins  and absolute          
finalities in order to explore specific 
values and the  specific conditions that
 generate them4    ,darwin concluded    
that the impossibility of assigning the 
world to  chance as a whole and to      
design in its parts indicated the       
insolubility  of the question4 ,two     

radically different reasons1 however1   
may be  given as to why a problem is    
insoluble4 ,one reason is that the      
problem  is too high for intelligence2  
the other is that the question in its   
very asking makes assumptions that      
render the question meaningless4  ,the  
latter alternative is unerringly pointed
 to in the celebrated  case of design   
versus chance4 ,once admit that the sole
 verifiable  or fruitful object of      
knowledge is the particular set of      
changes that  generate the object of    
study together with the consequences    
that then  flow from it1 and no         
intelligible question can be asked about
 what1  by assumption1 lies outside4 ,to
 assert--as is often asserted--that     
specific values of particular truth1    
social bonds and forms of beauty1  if   
they can be shown to be generated by    
concretely knowable conditions1  are    
meaningless and in vain2 to assert that 
they are justified only  when they and  
their particular causes and effects have

 all at once been  gathered up into some
 inclusive first cause and some         
exhaustive final  goal1 is intellectual 
atavism4 ,such argumentation is         
reversion to the  logic that explained  
the extinction of fire by water through 
the formal  essence of aqueousness and  
the quenching of thirst by water through
 the  final cause of aqueousness4       
,whether used in the case of the special
  event or that of life as a whole1 such
 logic only abstracts some  aspect of   
the existing course of events in order  
to reduplicate it as  a petrified       
eternal principle by which to explain   
the very changes of  which it is the    
formalization4    ,when ,henry ,sidgwick
 casually remarked in a letter that as  
he grew older  his interest in what or  
who made the world was altered into     
interest in  what kind of a world it is 
anyway1 his voicing of a common         
experience  of our own day illustrates  
also the nature of that intellectual    
transformation effected by the          

,darwinian logic4 ,interest shifts from 
the wholesale essence back of special   
changes to the question of  how special 
changes serve and defeat concrete       
purposes2 shifts from  an intelligence  
that shaped things once for all to the  
particular  intelligences which things  
are even now shaping2 shifts from an    
ultimate goal of good to the direct     
increments of justice and happiness     
that intelligent administration of      
existent conditions may beget and  that 
present carelessness or stupidity will  
destroy or forego4    ,in the second    
place1 the classic type of logic        
inevitably set  philosophy upon proving 
that life must have certain qualities   
and  values--no matter how experience   
presents the matter--because of some    
remote cause and eventual goal4 ,the    
duty of wholesale justification         
inevitably accompanies all thinking that
 makes the meaning of special           
occurrences depend upon something that  
once and for all lies behind  them4 ,the

 habit of derogating from present       
meanings and uses prevents  our looking 
the facts of experience in the face2 it 
prevents serious  acknowledgment of the 
evils they present and serious concern  
with the  goods they promise but do not 
as yet fulfil4 ,it turns thought to the 
business of finding a wholesale         
transcendent remedy for the one and     
guarantee for the other4 ,one is        
reminded of the way many moralists and  
theologians greeted ,herbert ,spencer's 
recognition of an unknowable  energy    
from which welled up the phenomenal     
physical processes without  and the     
conscious operations within4 ,merely    
because ,spencer labeled his  unknowable
 energy 8,god10 this faded piece of     
metaphysical goods was  greeted as an   
important and grateful concession to the
 reality of the  spiritual realm4 ,were 
it not for the deep hold of the habit of
 seeking  justification for ideal values
 in the remote and transcendent1 surely 
this reference of them to an unknowable 

absolute would be despised in           
comparison with the demonstrations of   
experience that knowable energies  are  
daily generating about us precious      
values4    ,the displacing of this      
wholesale type of philosophy will       
doubtless not  arrive by sheer logical  
disproof1 but rather by growing         
recognition  of its futility4 ,were it a
 thousand times true that opium produces
  sleep because of its dormitive energy1
 yet the inducing of sleep in  the      
tired1 and the recovery to waking life  
of the poisoned1 would not  be thereby  
one least step forwarded4 ,and were it a
 thousand times  dialectically          
demonstrated that life as a whole is    
regulated by a  transcendent principle  
to a final inclusive goal1 none the less
 truth  and error1 health and disease1  
good and evil1 hope and fear in the     
concrete1 would remain just what and    
where they now are4 ,to improve our     
education1 to ameliorate our manners1 to
 advance our politics1 we must  have    

recourse to specific conditions of      
generation4    ,finally1 the new logic  
introduces responsibility into the      
intellectual  life4 ,to idealize and    
rationalize the universe at large is    
after  all a confession of inability to 
master the courses of things that       
specifically concern us4 ,as long as    
mankind suffered from this  impotency1  
it naturally shifted a burden of        
responsibility that  it could not carry 
over to the more competent shoulders of 
the  transcendent cause4 ,but if insight
 into specific conditions of value  and 
into specific consequences of ideas is  
possible1 philosophy must  in time      
become a method of locating and         
interpreting the more serious  of the   
conflicts that occur in life1 and a     
method of projecting ways  for dealing  
with them3 a method of moral and        
political diagnosis and  prognosis4     
,the claim to formulate a priori the    
legislative constitution of the         
universe is by its nature a claim that  

may lead to elaborate dialectic         
developments4 ,but it is also one that  
removes these very conclusions  from    
subjection to experimental test1 for1 by
 definition1 these results  make no     
differences in the detailed course of   
events4 ,but a philosophy  that humbles 
its pretensions to the work of          
projecting hypotheses for  the education
 and conduct of mind1 individual and    
social1 is thereby  subjected to test by
 the way in which the ideas it propounds
 work out  in practice4 ,in having      
modesty forced upon it1 philosophy also 
acquires  responsibility4    ,doubtless 
,i seem to have violated the implied    
promise of my earlier  remarks and to   
have turned both prophet and partizan4  
,but in  anticipating the direction of  
the transformations in philosophy to  be
 wrought by the ,darwinian genetic and  
experimental logic1 ,i do not  profess  
to speak for any save those who yield   
themselves consciously  or unconsciously
 to this logic4 ,no one can fairly deny 

that at present  there are two effects  
of the ,darwinian mode of thinking4 ,on 
the one  hand1 there are making many    
sincere and vital efforts to revise our 
traditional philosophic conceptions in  
accordance with its demands4 ,on  the   
other hand1 there is as definitely a    
recrudescence of absolutistic           
philosophies2 an assertion of a type of 
philosophic knowing distinct  from that 
of the sciences1 one which opens to us  
another kind of  reality from that to   
which the sciences give access2 an      
appeal through  experience to something 
that essentially goes beyond experience4
 ,this  reaction affects popular creeds 
and religious movements as well as      
technical philosophies4 ,the very       
conquest of the biological sciences by  
the new ideas has led many to proclaim  
an explicit and rigid separation  of    
philosophy from science4    ,old ideas  
give way slowly2 for they are more than 
abstract  logical forms and categories4 
,they are habits1 predispositions1      

deeply engrained attitudes of aversion  
and preference4 ,moreover1  the         
conviction persists--though history     
shows it to be a  hallucination--that   
all the questions that the human mind   
has asked  are questions that can be    
answered in terms of the alternatives   
that  the questions themselves present4 
,but in fact intellectual progress      
usually occurs through sheer abandonment
 of questions together with  both of the
 alternatives they assume--an           
abandonment that results from  their    
decreasing vitality and a change of     
urgent interest4 ,we do not  solve them3
 we get over them4 ,old questions are   
solved by disappearing1  evaporating1   
while new questions corresponding to the
 changed attitude  of endeavor and      
preference take their place4 ,doubtless 
the greatest  dissolvent in contemporary
 thought of old questions1 the greatest 
precipitant of new methods1 new         
intentions1 new problems1 is the one    
effected by the scientific revolution   

that found its climax in the  8,origin  
of ,species40          ,,nature ,,and   
,,its ,,good3 ,a ,,conversation#e       
,a group of people are scattered near   
one another1 on the sands of an  ocean  
beach2 wraps1 baskets1 etc41 testify to 
a day's outing4 ,above the  hum of the  
varied conversations are heard the mock 
sobs of one of the  party4    ,various  
voices4 ,what's the matter1 ,eaton8     
,eaton4 ,matter enough4 ,i was watching 
a beautiful wave2 its lines were        
perfect2 at its crest1 the light        
glinting through its infinitely varied  
and delicate curves of foam made a      
picture more ravishing than any  dream4 
,and now it has gone2 it will never come
 back4 ,so ,i weep4    ,grimes4 ,that's 
right1 ,eaton2 give it to them4 ,of     
course well-fed and  well-read          
persons--with their possessions of      
wealth and of knowledge  both gained at 
the expense of others--finally get      
bored2 then they  wax sentimental over  
their boredom and are worried about     

8,nature0 and  its relation to life4    
,not everybody takes it out that way1 of
 course2  some take motor cars and      
champagne for that tired feeling4 ,but  
the  rest--those who aren't in that     
class financially1 or who consider      
themselves too refined for that kind of 
relief--seek a new sensation in         
speculating why that brute old world out
 there will not stand for what  you call
 spiritual and ideal values--for short1 
your egotisms4    ,the fact is that the 
whole discussion is only a symptom of   
the leisure  class disease4 ,if you had 
to work to the limit and beyond1 to keep
  soul and body together1 and1 more than
 that1 to keep alive the soul of  your  
family in its body1 you would know the  
difference between your  artificial     
problems and the genuine problem of     
life4 ,your philosophic  problems about 
the relation of 8the universe to moral  
and spiritual  good0 exist only in the  
sentimentalism that generates them4 ,the
  genuine question is why social        

arrangements will not permit the amply  
sufficient body of natural resources to 
sustain all men and women in  security  
and decent comfort1 with a margin for   
the cultivation of their  human         
instincts of sociability1 love of       
knowledge and of art4    ,as ,i read    
,plato1 philosophy began with some sense
 of its essentially  political basis and
 mission--a recognition that its        
problems were those  of the organization
 of a just social order4 ,but it soon   
got lost in  dreams of another world2   
and even those of you philosophers who  
pride  yourselves on being so advanced  
that you no longer believe in 8another  
world10 are still living and thinking   
with reference to it4 ,you may  not call
 it supernatural2 but when you talk     
about a realm of spiritual  or ideal    
values in general1 and ask about its    
relation to ,nature in  general1 you    
have only changed the labels on the     
bottles1 not the  contents in them4 ,for
 what makes anything                    

transcendental--that is1  in common     
language1 supernatural--is simply and   
only aloofness from  practical          
affairs--which affairs in their ultimate
 analysis are the  business of making a 
living4    ,eaton4 ,yes2 ,grimes has    
about hit off the point of my little    
parable--in one of its aspects at least4
 ,in matters of daily life you  say a   
man is 8off10 more or less insane1 when 
he deliberately goes  on looking for a  
certain kind of result from conditions  
which he has  already found to be such  
that they cannot possibly yield it4 ,if 
he  keeps on looking1 and then goes     
about mourning because stage money      
won't buy beefsteaks1 or because he     
cannot keep himself warm by burning  the
 sea-sands here1 you dismiss him as a   
fool or a hysteric4 ,if you  would      
condescend to reason with him at all1   
you would tell him to look  for the     
conditions that will yield the results2 
to occupy himself  with some of the     
countless goods of life for which1 by   

intelligently  directed search1 adequate
 means may be found4    ,well1 before   
lunch1 ,moore was reiterating the old   
tale4 8,modern science  has completely  
transformed our conceptions of ,nature4 
,it has stripped  the universe bare not 
only of all the moral values which it   
wore alike  to antique pagan and to our 
medieval ancestors1 but also of any     
regard1  any preference1 for such       
values4 ,they are mere incidents1       
transitory  accidents1 in her           
everlasting redistribution of matter in 
motion2 like  the rise and fall of the  
wave ,i lament1 or like a single musical
 note  that a screeching1 rumbling      
railway train might happen to emit40    
,this  is a one-sided view2 but suppose 
it were all so1 what is the moral8      
,surely1 to change our standpoint1 our  
angle of vision2 to stop looking  for   
results among conditions that we know   
will not yield them2 to turn  our gaze  
to the goods1 the values that exist     
actually and indubitably  in experience2

 and consider by what natural conditions
 these particular  values may be        
strengthened and widened4    ,insist1 if
 you please1 that ,nature as a whole    
does not stand for good  as a whole4    
,then1 in heaven's name1 just because   
good is both so plural  7so 8numerous07 
and so partial1 bend your energies of   
intelligence  and of effort to selecting
 the specific plural and partial natural
  conditions which will at least render 
values that we do have more  secure and 
more extensive4 ,any other course is the
 way of madness2 it  is the way of the  
spoilt child who cries at the seashore  
because the  waves do not stand still1  
and who cries even more frantically in  
the  mountains because the hills do not 
melt and flow4    ,but no4 ,moore and   
his school will not have it so3 we must 
8go back of  the returns40 ,all this    
science1 after all1 is a mode of        
knowledge4  ,examine knowledge itself   
and find it implies a complete          
all-inclusive  intelligence2 and then   

find 7by taking another tack7 that      
intelligence  involves sentiency1       
feeling1 and also will4 ,hence your very
 physical  science1 if you will only    
criticise it1 examine it1 shows that its
  object1 mechanical nature1 is itself  
an included and superseded element  in  
an all-embracing spiritual and ideal    
whole4 ,and there you are4    ,well1 ,i 
do not now insist that all this is mere 
dialectic  prestidigitation4 ,no2 accept
 it2 let it go at its face value4 ,but  
what of it8 ,is any value more          
concretely and securely in life than it 
was before8 ,does this perfect          
intelligence enable us to correct one   
single mis-step1 one paltry error1 here 
and now8 ,does this perfect             
all-inclusive goodness serve to heal one
 disease8 ,does it rectify one          
transgression8 ,does it even give the   
slightest inkling of how to go to  work 
at any of these things8 ,no2 it just    
tells you3 ,never mind1 for  they are   
already eternally corrected1 eternally  

healed in the eternal  consciousness    
which alone is really ,real4 ,stop3     
there is one evil1 one  pain1 which the 
doctrine mitigates--the hysteric        
sentimentalism which  is troubled       
because the universe as a whole does not
 sustain good as a  whole4 ,but that is 
the only thing it alters4 ,the 8pathetic
 fallacy0 of  ,ruskin magnified to the  
nth power is the motif of modern        
idealism4    ,moore4 ,certainly nobody  
will accuse ,eaton of                   
tender-mindedness--except in his logic1 
which1 as certainly1 is not             
tough-minded4 ,his excitement1 however1 
convinces me that he has at  least an   
inkling that he is begging the question2
 and like the true  pragmatist that he  
is1 is trying to prevent by action 7to  
wit1 his  flood of speech7 his false    
logic from becoming articulate to him4  
,the  question being whether the values 
we seem to apprehend1 the purposes  we  
entertain1 the goods we possess1 are    
anything more than transitory  waves1   

,eaton meets it by saying3 8,oh1 of     
course1 they are waves2 but  don't think
 about that--just sit down hard on the  
wave or get another  wave to buttress it
 with60 ,no wonder he recommends action 
instead  of thinking6 ,men have tried   
this method before1 as a counsel of     
desperation or as cynical pessimism4    
,but it remained for contemporary       
pragmatism to label the drowning of     
sorrow in the intoxication of           
thoughtless action1 the highest         
achievement of philosophic method1 and  
to preach wilful restlessness as a      
doctrine of hope and illumination4      
,meantime1 ,i prefer to be tender-minded
 in my attitude toward ,reality1  and to
 make that attitude more reasonable by a
 tough-minded logic4    ,eaton4 ,i am   
willing to be quiet long enough for you 
to translate your  metaphor into logic1 
and show how ,i have begged the         
question4    ,moore4 ,it is plain       
enough4 ,you bid us turn to the         
cultivation1 the  nurture1 of certain   

values in human life4 ,but the question 
is whether  these are or are not values4
 ,and that is a question of their       
relation  to the ,universe--to ,reality4
 ,if ,reality substantiates them1 then  
indeed  they are values2 if it mocks and
 flouts them--as it surely does if what 
mechanical science calls ,nature be     
ultimate and absolute--then they are    
not values4 ,you and your kind are      
really the sentimentalists1 because  you
 are sheer subjectivists4 ,you say3     
,accept the dream as real2 do not       
question about it2 add a little         
iridescence to its fog and extend it    
till it obscure even more of ,reality   
than it naturally does1 and all  is     
well6 ,i say3 ,perhaps the dream is no  
dream but an intimation of the  solidest
 and most ultimate of all realities2 and
 a thorough examination  of what the    
positivist1 the materialist1 accepts as 
solid1 namely1  science1 reveals as its 
own aim1 standard1 and presupposition   
that  ,reality is one all-exhaustive    

spiritual ,being4    ,eaton4 ,this is   
about the way ,i thought my begging of  
the question  would turn out4 ,you      
insist upon translating my position into
 terms of  your own2 ,i am not then     
surprised to hear that it would be a    
begging  of the question for you to hold
 my views4 ,my point is precisely  that 
it is only as long as you take the      
position that some ,reality             
beyond--some metaphysical or            
transcendental reality--is necessary to 
substantiate empirical values that you  
can even discuss whether the  latter are
 genuine or illusions4 ,drop the        
presupposition that you read  into      
everything ,i say1 the idea that the    
reality of things as they are  is       
dependent upon something beyond and     
behind1 and the facts of the  case just 
stare you in the eyes3 ,goods are1 a    
multitude of them--but1  unfortunately1 
evils also are2 and all grades1 pretty  
much1 of both4  ,not the contrast and   
relation of experience in toto to       

something  beyond experience drives men 
to religion and then to philosophy2 but 
the contrast within experience of the   
better and the worse1 and the           
consequent problem of how to            
substantiate the former and reduce the  
latter4 ,until you set up the notion of 
a transcendental reality at  large1 you 
cannot even raise the question of       
whether goods and evils  are1 or only   
seem to be4 ,the trouble and the joy1   
the good and the  evil1 is that they    
are2 the hope is that they may be       
regulated1  guided1 increased in one    
direction and minimized in another4     
,instead  of neglecting thought1 we 7,i 
mean the pragmatists7 exalt it1 because 
we say that intelligent discrimination  
of means and ends is the sole  final    
resource in this problem of all         
problems1 the control of the  factors of
 good and ill in life4 ,we say1 indeed1 
not merely that that  is what           
intelligence does1 but rather what it   
is4    ,historically1 it is quite       

possible to show how under certain      
social  conditions this human and       
practical problem of the relation of    
good and  intelligence generated the    
notion of the transcendental good and   
the  pure reason4 ,as ,grimes reminded  
us1 ,plato----    ,moore4 ,yes1 and     
,protagoras--don't forget him2 for      
unfortunately we  know both the origin  
and the consequences of your doctrine   
that being  and seeming are the same4   
,we know quite well that pure empiricism
 leads  to the identification of being  
and seeming1 and that is just why every 
deeply moral and religious soul from the
 time of ,plato and ,aristotle to  the  
present has insisted upon a transcendent
 reality4    ,eaton4 ,personally ,i     
don't need an absolute to enable me to  
distinguish between1 say1 the good of   
kindness and the evil of slander1  or   
the good of health and the evil of      
valetudinarianism4 ,in experience1      
things bear their own specific          
characters4 ,nor has the absolute       

idealist as yet answered the question of
 how the absolute reality  enables him  
to distinguish between being and seeming
 in one single  concrete case4 ,the     
trouble is that for him all ,being is on
 the other  side of experience1 and all 
experience is seeming4    ,grimes4 ,i   
think ,i heard you mention history4 ,i  
wish both of you  would drop dialectics 
and go to history4 ,you would find      
history to be  a struggle for           
existence--for bread1 for a roof1 for   
protected and  nourished offspring4 ,you
 would find history a picture of the    
masses  always going under--just        
missing--in the struggle1 because others
 have  captured the control of natural  
resources1 which in themselves1 if not  
as benign as the eighteenth century     
imagined1 are at least abundantly  ample
 for the needs of all4 ,but because of  
the monopolization of ,nature  by a few 
persons1 most men and women only stick  
their heads above the  welter just      
enough to catch a glimpse of better     

things1 then to be  shoved down and     
under4 ,the only problem of the relation
 of ,nature to  human good which is real
 is the economic problem of the         
exploitation  of natural resources in   
the equal interests of all1 instead of  
in the  unequal interests of a class4   
,the problem you two men are discussing 
has no existence--and never had         
any--outside of the heads of a few      
metaphysicians4 ,the latter would never 
have amounted to anything1  would never 
have had any career at all1 had not     
shrewd monopolists  or tyrants 7with the
 skill that characterizes them7 have    
seen that  these speculations about     
reality and a transcendental world could
 be  distilled into opiates and         
distributed among the masses to make    
them  less rebellious4 ,that1 if you    
would know1 ,eaton1 is the real historic
  origin of the ideal world beyond4     
,when you realize that1 you will        
perceive that the pragmatists are only  
half-way over4 ,you will see  that      

practical questions are practical1 and  
are not to be solved  merely by having a
 theory about theory different from the 
traditional  one--which is all your     
pragmatism comes to4    ,moore4 ,if you 
mean that your own crass ,philistinism  
is all that  pragmatism comes to1 ,i    
fancy you are about right4 ,forget that 
the  only end of action is to bring     
about an approximation to the complete  
inclusive consciousness2 make1 as the   
pragmatists do1 consciousness  a means  
to action1 and one form of external     
activity is just as  good as another4   
,art1 religion1 all the generous reaches
 of science  which do not show up       
immediately in the factory--these things
 become  meaningless1 and all that      
remains is that hard and dry            
satisfaction of  economic wants which is
 ,grimes's ideal4    ,grimes4 ,an ideal 
which exists1 by the way1 only in your  
imagination4  ,i know of no more        
convincing proof of the futile          
irrelevancy of  idealism than the       

damning way in which it narrows the     
content of actual  daily life in the    
minds of those who uphold idealism4 ,i  
sometimes think  ,i am the only true    
idealist4 ,if the conditions of an      
equitable and  ample physical existence 
for all were once secured1 ,i1 for one1 
have  no fears as to the bloom and      
harvest of art and science1 and all the 
8higher0 things of leisure4 ,life is    
interesting enough for me2 give it  a   
show for all4    ,arthur4 ,i find myself
 in a peculiar position in respect to   
this  discussion4 ,an analysis of what  
is involved in this peculiarity may     
throw some light on the points at issue1
 for ,i have to believe that  analysis  
and definition of what exists is the    
essential matter both  in resolution of 
doubts and in steps at reform4 ,for     
brevity1 not from  conceit1 ,i will put 
the peculiarity to which ,i refer in a  
personal  form4 ,i do not believe for a 
moment in some different ,reality beyond
  and behind ,nature4 ,i do not believe 

that a manipulation of the logical      
implications of science can give results
 which are to be put in the  place of   
those which ,science herself yields in  
her direct application4  ,i accept      
,nature as something which is1 not      
seems1 and ,science as her  faithful    
transcript4 ,yet because ,i believe     
these things1 not in spite  of them1 ,i 
believe in the existence of purpose and 
of good4 ,how ,eaton  can believe that  
fulfilment and the increasing           
realization of purpose  can exist in    
human consciousness unless they first   
exist in the world  which is revealed in
 that consciousness is as much beyond me
 as how  ,moore can believe that a      
manipulation of the method of knowledge 
can  yield considerations of a totally  
different order from those directly     
obtained by use of the method4 ,if      
purpose and fulfilment exist as  natural
 goods1 then1 and only then1 can        
consciousness itself be a  fulfilment of
 ,nature1 and be also a natural good4   

,any other view is  inexplicable to     
sound thinking--save1 historically1 as a
 product of  modern political           
individualism and literary romanticism  
which have  combined to produce that    
idealistic philosophy according to which
 the  mind in knowing the universe      
creates it4    ,the view that purpose   
and realization are profoundly natural1 
and that consciousness--or1 if you will1
 experience--is itself a  culmination   
and climax of ,nature1 is not a new     
view4 ,formulated by  ,aristotle1 it has
 always persisted wherever the          
traditions of sound  thinking have not  
been obscured by romanticism4 ,the      
modern scientific  doctrine of evolution
 confirms and specifies the metaphysical
 insight  of ,aristotle4 ,this doctrine 
sets forth in detail1 and in verified   
detail1 as a genuine characteristic of  
existence1 the tendency toward          
cumulative results1 the definite trend  
of things toward culmination and        
achievement4 ,it describes the universe 

as possessing1 in terms of and  by right
 of its own subject-matter 7not as an   
addition of subsequent  reflection71    
differences of value and                
importance--differences1  moreover1 that
 exercise selective influence upon the  
course of things1  that is to say1      
genuinely determine the events that     
occur4 ,it tells us  that consciousness 
itself is such a cumulative and         
culminating natural  event4 ,hence it is
 relevant to the world in which it      
dwells1 and its  determinations of value
 are not arbitrary1 not obiter dicta1   
but  descriptions of ,nature herself4   
,recall the words of ,spencer which     
,moore quoted this morning3 8,there is  
no pleasure in the consciousness of     
being an infinitesimal bubble on  a     
globe that is infinitesimal compared    
with the totality of things4  ,those on 
whom the unpitying rush of changes      
inflicts sufferings which  are often    
without remedy1 find no consolation in  
the thought that  they are at the mercy 

of blind forces1--which cause           
indifferently  now the destruction of a 
sun and now the death of an animalcule4 
,contemplation of a universe which is   
without conceivable beginning or  end   
and without intelligible purpose1 yields
 no satisfaction40 ,i am  nave enough to
 believe that the only question is      
whether the object  of our              
8consciousness10 of our 8thought10 of   
our 8contemplation10  is or is not as   
the quotation states it to be4 ,if the  
statement be  correct1 pragmatism1 like 
subjectivism 7of which ,i suspect it is 
only a variation1 putting emphasis upon 
will instead of idea71 is an  invitation
 to close our eyes to what is1 in order 
to encourage the  delusion that things  
are other than they are4 ,but the case  
is not so  desperate4 ,speaking         
dogmatically1 the account given of the  
universe  is just--not true4 ,and the   
doctrine of evolution of which ,spencer 
professedly made so much is the         
evidence4 ,a universe describable in    

evolutionary terms is a universe which  
shows1 not indeed design1 but  tendency 
and purpose2 which exhibits achievement1
 not indeed of a  single end1 but of a  
multiplicity of natural goods at whose  
apex is  consciousness4 ,no account of  
the universe in terms merely of the     
redistribution of matter in motion is   
complete1 no matter how true as  far as 
it goes1 for it ignores the cardinal    
fact that the character  of matter in   
motion and of its redistribution is such
 as cumulatively  to achieve ends--to   
effect the world of values we know4     
,deny this  and you deny evolution2     
admit it and you admit purpose in the   
only  objective--that is1 the only      
intelligible--sense of that term4 ,i do 
not  say that in addition to the        
mechanism there are other ideal causes  
or  factors which intervene4 ,i only    
insist that the whole story be told1    
that the character of the mechanism be  
noted--namely1 that it is such  as to   
produce and sustain good in a           

multiplicity of forms4 ,mechanism is    
the mechanism of achieving results4 ,to 
ignore this is to refuse to open  our   
eyes to the total aspects of existence4 
,among these multiple natural goods1 ,i 
repeat1 is consciousness itself4  ,one  
of the ends in which ,nature genuinely  
terminates is just awareness  of        
itself--of its processes and ends4 ,for 
note the implication as to  why         
consciousness is a natural good3 not    
because it is cut off and  exists in    
isolation1 nor yet because we may1      
pragmatically1 cut off and  cultivate   
certain values which have no existence  
beyond it2 but because  it is good that 
things should be known in their own     
characters4 ,and  this view carries with
 it a precious result3 to know things as
 they are  is to know them as           
culminating in consciousness2 it is to  
know that the  universe genuinely       
achieves and maintains its own          
self-manifestation4    ,a final word as 
to the bearing of this view upon        

,grimes's position4  ,to conceive of    
human history as a scene of struggle of 
classes for  domination1 a struggle     
caused by love of power or greed for    
gain1  is the very mythology of the     
emotions4 ,what we call history is      
largely non-human1 but so far as it is  
human1 it is dominated by  intelligence3
 history is the history of increasing   
consciousness4 ,not  that intelligence  
is actually sovereign in life1 but that 
at least it  is sovereign over          
stupidity1 error1 and ignorance4 ,the   
acknowledgment  of things as they       
are--that is the causal source of every 
step in  progress4 ,our present system  
of industry is not the product of greed 
or tyrannic lust of power1 but of       
physical science giving the mastery     
over the mechanism of ,nature's energy4 
,if the existing system is ever         
displaced1 it will be displaced not by  
good intentions and vague  sentiments1  
but by a more extensive insight into    
,nature's secrets4    ,modern           

sentimentalism is revolted at the frank 
naturalism of ,aristotle  in saying that
 some are slaves by nature and others   
free by nature4  ,but let socialism come
 to-morrow and somebody--not anybody1   
but  somebody--will be managing its     
machinery and somebody else will be     
managed by the machinery4 ,i do not     
wonder that my socialistic friends      
always imagine themselves active in the 
first capacity--perhaps by  way of      
compensation for doing all of the       
imagining and none of the  executive    
management at present4 ,but those who   
are managed1 who are  controlled1       
deserve at least a moment's attention4  
,would you not at  once agree that if   
there is any justice at all in these    
positions of  relative inferiority and  
superiority1 it is because those who are
  capable by insight deserve to rule1   
and those who are incapable on  account 
of ignorance1 deserve to be ruled8 ,if  
so1 how do you differ1  save verbally1  
from ,aristotle8    ,or do you think    

that all that men want in order to be   
men is to have  their bellies filled1   
with assurance of constant plenty and   
without too  much antecedent labor8 ,no2
 believe me1 ,grimes1 men are men1 and  
hence  their aspiration is for the      
divine--even when they know it not2     
their  desire is for the ruling element1
 for intelligence4 ,till they achieve   
that they will still be discontented1   
rebellious1 unruly--and hence           
ruled--shuffle your social cards as much
 as you may4    ,grimes 7after shrugging
 his shoulders contemptuously1 finally  
says73  ,there is one thing ,i like     
about ,arthur3 he is frank4 ,he comes   
out  with what you in all your hearts   
really believe--theory1 supreme and     
sublime4 ,all is to the good in this    
best of all possible worlds1 if  only   
some one be defining and classifying and
 syllogizing1 according to  the lines   
already laid down4 ,aristotle's ,god of 
pure intelligence 7as  he well knew7 was
 the glorification of leisure2 and      

,arthur's point of  view1 if ,arthur but
 knew it1 is as much the intellectual   
snobbery of a  leisure class economy1 as
 the luxury and display he condemns are 
its  material snobbery4 ,there is really
 nothing more to be said4    ,moore4 ,to
 get back into the game which ,grimes   
despises4 ,doesn't  ,arthur practically 
say that the universe is good because it
 culminates  in intelligence1 and that  
intelligence is good because it         
perceives  that the universe culminates 
in--itself8 ,and1 on this theory1 are   
ignorance and error1 and consequent     
evil1 any less genuine achievements  of 
,nature than intelligence and good8 ,and
 on what basis does he  call by the     
titles of achievement and end that which
 at best is an  infinitesimally         
fragmentary and transitory episode8 ,i  
said ,eaton  begged the question4       
,arthur seems to regard it as proof of a
 superior  intelligence 7one which      
realistically takes things as they are7 
to beg  the question4 ,what is this     

,nature1 this universe in which evil is 
as  stubborn a fact as good1 in which   
good is constantly destroyed by the     
very power that produces it1 in which   
there resides a temporary bird of       
passage--consciousness doomed to        
ultimate extinction--what is such a     
,nature 7all that ,arthur offers us7    
save the problem1 the contradiction     
originally in question8 ,a complacent   
optimism may gloss over its  intrinsic  
self-contradictions1 but a more serious 
mind is forced to go  behind and beyond 
this scene to a permanent good which    
includes and  transcends goods defeated 
and hopes suborned4 ,not because        
idealists  have refused to note the     
facts as they are1 but precisely because
  ,nature is1 on its face1 such a scene 
as ,arthur describes1 idealists  have   
always held that it is but ,appearance1 
and have attempted to mount  through it 
to ,reality4    ,stair4 ,i had not      
thought to say anything4 ,my attitude is
 so different  from that of any one of  

you that it seemed unnecessary to inject
  another varying opinion where already 
disagreement reigns4 ,but when  ,arthur 
was speaking1 ,i felt that perhaps this 
disagreement exists  precisely because  
the solvent word had not been uttered4  
,for1 at  bottom1 all of you agree with 
,arthur1 and that is the cause of your  
disagreement with him and one another4  
,you have agreed to make reason1        
intellect in some sense1 the final      
umpire4 ,but reason1 intellect1 is  the 
principle of analysis1 of division1 of  
discord4 ,when ,i appeal  to feeling as 
the ultimate organ of unity1 and hence  
of truth1 you  smile courteously2       
say--or think--mysticism2 and the case  
for you is  dismissed4 ,words like      
feeling1 sensation1 immediate           
appreciation1  self-communication of    
,being1 ,i must indeed use when ,i try  
to tell  the truth ,i see4 ,but ,i well 
know how inadequate the words are4 ,and 
why8 ,because language is the chosen    
tool of intelligence1 and hence         

inevitably bewrayeth the truth it would 
convey4 ,but remember that words  are   
but symbols1 and that intelligence must 
dwell in the realm of  symbols1 and you 
realize a way out4 ,these words1        
sensation1 feeling1  etc41 as ,i utter  
them are but invitations to woo you to  
put yourselves  into the one attitude   
that reveals truth--an attitude of      
direct vision4    ,the beatific vision8 
,yes1 and ,no4 ,no1 if you mean         
something rare1  extreme1 almost        
abnormal4 ,yes1 if you mean the         
commonest and most  convincing1 the only
 convincing self-impartation of the     
ultimate  good in the scale of goods2   
the vision of blessedness in ,god4 ,for 
this doctrine is empirical2 mysticism is
 the heart of all positive  empiricism1 
of all empiricism which is not more     
interested in denying  rationalism than 
in asserting itself4 ,the mystical      
experience marks  every man's           
realization of the supremacy of good1   
and hence measures  the distance that   

separates him from pure materialism4    
,and since the  unmitigated materialist 
is the rarest of creatures1 and the man 
with  faith in an unseen good the       
commonest1 every man is a mystic--and   
the  most so in his best moments4       
,what an idle contradiction that ,moore 
and ,arthur should try to  adduce proofs
 of the supremacy of ideal values in the
 universe6 ,the  sole possible proof is 
the proof that actually exists--the     
direct  unhindered realization of those 
values4 ,for each value brings with it  
of necessity its own depth of being4    
,let the pride of intellect and  the    
pride of will cease their clamor1 and in
 the silences ,being speaks  its own    
final word1 not an argument or external 
ground of belief1 but  the              
self-impartation of itself to the soul4 
,who are the prophets and  teachers of  
the ages8 ,those who have been          
accessible at the greatest  depths to   
these communications4    ,grimes4 ,i    
suppose that poverty--and possibly      

disease--are specially  competent       
ministers to the spiritual vision8 ,the 
moral is obvious4  ,economic changes are
 purely irrelevant1 because purely      
material and  external4 ,indeed1 upon   
the whole1 efforts at reform are        
undesirable1  for they distract         
attention from the fact that the final  
thing1 the  vision of good1 is totally  
disconnected from external circumstance4
  ,i do not say1 ,stair1 you personally 
believe this2 but is not such a         
quietism the logical conclusion of all  
mysticism8    ,stair4 ,this is not so   
true as to say that in your efforts at  
reform  you are really inspired by the  
divine vision of justice2 and that this 
mystic vision and not the mere increase 
of quantity of eatables and  drinkables 
is your animating motive4    ,grimes4   
,well1 to my mind this whole affair of  
mystical values and  experiences comes  
down to a simple straight-away          
proposition4 ,the  submerged masses do  
not occupy themselves with such         

questions as those  you are discussing4 
,they haven't the time even to consider 
whether  they want to consider them4    
,nor does the occasional free citizen   
who even now exists--a sporadic reminder
 and prophecy of ultimate               
democracy--bother himself about the     
relation of the cosmos to value4  ,why8 
,not from mystic insight any more than  
from metaphysical proof2  but because he
 has so many other interests that are   
worth while4  ,his friends1 his vocation
 and avocations1 his books1 his music1  
his  club--these things engage him and  
they reward him4 ,to multiply such  men 
with such interests--that is the genuine
 problem1 ,i repeat2 and  it is a       
problem to be solved only through an    
economic and material  redistribution4  
,eaton4 ,gladly1 ,stair1 do all of us   
absolve ourselves from the              
responsibility of having to create the  
goods that life--call it ,god  or       
,nature or ,chance--provides4 ,but we   
cannot1 if we would1 absolve  ourselves 

from responsibility for maintaining and 
extending these  goods when they have   
happened4 ,to find it very wonderful--as
 ,arthur  does--that intelligence       
perceives values as they are is trivial1
 for  it is only an elaborate way of    
saying that they have happened4 ,to     
invite us1 ceasing struggle and effort1 
to commune with ,being through  the     
moments of insight and joy that life    
provides1 is to bid us to               
self-indulgence--to enjoyment at the    
expense of those upon whom the  burden  
of conducting life's affairs falls4 ,for
 even the mystics still  need to eat and
 drink1 be clothed and housed1 and      
somebody must do  these unmystic things4
 ,and to ignore others in the interest  
of our own  perfection is not conducive 
to genuine unity of ,being4             
,intelligence is1 indeed1 as you say1   
discrimination1 distinction4  ,but why8 
,because we have to act in order to keep
 secure amid the  moving flux of        
circumstance1 some slight but precious  

good that ,nature  has bestowed2 and    
because1 in order to act successfully1  
we must act  after conscious            
selection--after discrimination of means
 and ends4  ,of course1 all goods       
arrive1 as ,arthur says1 as natural     
results1 but  so do all bads1 and all   
grades of good and bad4 ,to label the   
results  that occur culminations1       
achievements1 and then argue to a       
quasi-moral  constitution of ,nature    
because she effects such results1 is to 
employ  a logic which applies to the    
life-cycle of the germ that1 in         
achieving  itself1 kills man with       
malaria1 as well as to the process of   
human  life that in reaching its        
fullness cuts short the germ-fulfilment4
 ,it  is putting the cart before the    
horse to say that because ,nature is  so
 constituted as to produce results of   
all types of value1 therefore  ,nature  
is actuated by regard for differences of
 value1 ,nature1 till it  produces a    
being who strives and who thinks in     

order that he may strive  more          
effectively1 does not know whether it   
cares more for justice  or for cruelty1 
more for the ravenous wolf-like         
competition of the  struggle for        
existence1 or for the improvements      
incidentally introduced  through that   
struggle4 ,literally it has no mind of  
its own4 ,nor would  the mere           
introduction of a consciousness that    
pictured indifferently  the scene out of
 which consciousness developed1 add one 
iota of reason  for attributing         
eulogistically to ,nature regard for    
value4 ,but when the  sentient organism1
 having experienced natural values1 good
 and bad1  begins to select1 to prefer1 
and to make battle for its preference2  
and  in order that it may make the most 
gallant fight possible picks out  and   
gathers together in perception and      
thought what is favorable to  its aims  
and what hostile1 then and there ,nature
 has at last achieved  significant      
regard for good4 ,and this is the same  

thing as the birth  of intelligence4    
,for the holding an end in view and the 
selecting  and organizing out of the    
natural flux1 on the basis of this end1 
conditions that are means1 is           
intelligence4 ,not1 then1 when ,nature  
produces health or efficiency or        
complexity does ,nature exhibit regard  
for value1 but only when it produces a  
living organism that has settled        
preferences and endeavors4 ,the mere    
happening of complexity1 health1        
adjustment1 is all that ,nature effects1
 as rightly called accident as  purpose4
 ,but when ,nature produces an          
intelligence--ah1 then1 indeed  ,nature 
has achieved something4 ,not1 however1  
because this intelligence  impartially  
pictures the nature which has produced  
it1 but because  in human consciousness 
,nature becomes genuinely partial4      
,because in  consciousness an end is    
preferred1 is selected for maintenance1 
and  because intelligence pictures not a
 world just as it is in toto1  but      

images forth the conditions and         
obstacles of the continued  maintenance 
of the selected good4 ,for in an        
experience where values  are            
demonstrably precarious1 an intelligence
 that is not a principle  of emphasis   
and valuation 7an intelligence which    
defines1 describes1  and classifies     
merely for the sake of knowledge17 is a 
principle of  stupidity and catastrophe4
    ,as for ,grimes1 it is indeed true  
that problems are solved only where     
they arise--namely1 in action1 in the   
adjustments of behavior4 ,but1  for good
 or for evil1 they can be solved there  
only with method2 and  ultimately method
 is intelligence1 and intelligence is   
method4 ,the  larger1 the more human1   
the less technical the problem of       
practice1  the more open-eyed and       
wide-viewing must be the corresponding  
method4  ,i do not say that all things  
that have been called philosophy        
participate in this method2 ,i do say1  
however1 that a catholic and            

far-sighted theory of the adjustment of 
the conflicting factors of  life        
is--whatever it be called--philosophy4  
,and unless technical  philosophy is to 
go the way of dogmatic theology1 it must
 loyally  identify itself with such a   
view of its own aim and destiny4        
,,intelligence ,,and ,,morals#f         
8,except the blind forces of nature10   
said ,sir ,henry ,maine1 8nothing  moves
 in this world which is not ,greek in   
its origin40 ,and if we ask  why this is
 so1 the response comes that the ,greek 
discovered the  business of man to be   
pursuit of good1 and intelligence to be 
central  in this quest4 ,the utmost to  
be said in praise of ,plato and         
,aristotle  is not that they invented   
excellent moral theories1 but that they 
rose  to the opportunity which the      
spectacle of ,greek life afforded4 ,for 
,athens presented an all but complete   
microcosm for the study of the          
interaction of social organization and  
individual character4 ,a public  life of

 rich diversity in concentrated and     
intense splendor trained  the civic     
sense4 ,strife of faction and the rapid 
oscillations of types  of polity        
provided the occasion for intellectual  
inquiry and analysis4  ,the careers of  
dramatic personalities1 habits of       
discussion1 ease of  legislative change1
 facilities for personal ambitions1     
distraction by  personal rivalries1     
fixed attention upon the elements of    
character1  and upon consideration of   
the effect of individual character on   
social vitality and stability4 ,happy   
exemption from ecclesiastic             
preoccupations1 susceptibility to       
natural harmony1 and natural piety      
conspired with frank and open           
observation to acknowledgment of the rle
  played by natural conditions4 ,social 
instability and shock made equally      
pertinent and obvious the remark that   
only intelligence can confirm  the      
values that natural conditions generate1
 and that intelligence is  itself       

nurtured and matured only in a free and 
stable society4    ,in ,plato the       
resultant analysis of the mutual        
implications of the  individual1 the    
social and the natural1 converged in the
 ideas that  morals and philosophy are  
one3 namely1 a love of that wisdom which
  is the source of secure and social    
good2 that mathematics and the  natural 
sciences focused upon the problem of the
 perception of the good  furnish the    
materials of moral science2 that logic  
is the method of the  pregnant          
organization of social conditions with  
respect to good2 that  politics and     
psychology are sciences of one and the  
same human nature1  taken first in the  
large and then in the little4 ,so far   
that large and  expansive vision of     
,plato4    ,but projection of a better  
life must be based upon reflection of   
the  life already lived4 ,the inevitable
 limitations of the ,greek city-state   
were inevitably wrought into the texture
 of moral theory4    ,the business of   

thought was to furnish a substitute for 
customs which  were then relaxing from  
the pressure of contact and intercourse 
without  and the friction of strife     
within4 ,reason was to take the place of
  custom as a guide of life2 but it was 
to furnish rules as final1 as           
unalterable as those of custom4 ,in     
short1 the thinkers were fascinated  by 
the afterglow of custom4 ,they took for 
their own ideal the  distillation from  
custom of its essence--ends and laws    
which should be  rigid and invariable4  
,thus ,morals was set upon the track    
which it dared  not leave for nigh      
twenty-five hundred years3 search for   
the final  good1 and for the single     
moral force4    ,aristotle's assertions 
that the state exists by nature1 and    
that in the  state alone does the       
individual achieve independence and     
completeness  of life1 are indeed       
pregnant sayings4 ,but as uttered by    
,aristotle they  meant that1 in an      
isolated state1 the ,greek city-state1  

set a garlanded  island in the waste sea
 of barbaroi1 a community indifferent   
when not  hostile to all other social   
groupings1 individuals attain their full
  end4 ,in a social unity which         
signified social contraction1 contempt1 
and antagonism1 in a social order which 
despised intercourse and  glorified war1
 is realized the life of excellence6    
,there is likewise a profound saying of 
,aristotle's that the individual  who   
otherwise than by accident is not a     
member of a state is either a  brute or 
a god4 ,but it is generally forgotten   
that elsewhere ,aristotle  identified   
the highest excellence1 the chief       
virtue1 with pure thought1  and         
identifying this with the divine1       
isolated it in lonely grandeur  from the
 life of society4 ,that man1 so far as  
in him lay1 should be  godlike1 meant   
that he should be non-social1 because   
supra-civic4  ,plato the idealist had   
shared the belief that reason is the    
divine2  but he was also a reformer and 

a radical and he would have those who   
attained rational insight descend again 
into the civic cave1 and in  its        
obscurity labor patiently for the       
enlightenment of its blear-eyed         
inhabitants4 ,aristotle1 the            
conservative and the definer of what is1
  gloried in the exaltation of          
intelligence in man above civic         
excellence  and social need2 and thereby
 isolated the life of truest knowledge  
from contact with social experience and 
from responsibility for  discrimination 
of values in the course of life4        
,moral theory1 however1 accepted from   
social custom more than its  cataleptic 
rigidity1 its exclusive area of common  
good1 and its  unfructified and         
irresponsible reason4 ,the city-state   
was a superficial  layer of cultured    
citizens1 cultured through a            
participation in affairs  made possible 
by relief from economic pursuits1       
superimposed upon  the dense mass of    
serfs1 artizans1 and laborers4 ,for this

 division1  moral philosophy made itself
 spiritual sponsor1 and thus took it up 
into its own being4 ,plato wrestled     
valiantly with the class problem2  but  
his outcome was the necessity of        
decisive demarcation1 after  education1 
of the masses in whom reason was asleep 
and appetite much  awake1 from the few  
who were fit to rule because alertly    
wise4 ,the most  generously imaginative 
soul of all philosophy could not far    
outrun the  institutional practices of  
his people and his times4 ,this might   
have  warned his successors of the      
danger of deserting the sober path of a 
critical discernment of the better and  
the worse within contemporary  life for 
the more exciting adventure of a final  
determination of  absolute good and     
evil4 ,it might have taught the         
probability that some  brute residuum or
 unrationalized social habit would be   
erected into an  apotheosis of pure     
reason4 ,but the lesson was not learned4
 ,aristotle  promptly yielded to the    

besetting sin of all philosophers1 the  
idealization of the existent3 he        
declared that the class distinctions  of
 superiority and inferiority as between 
man and woman1 master and  slave1       
liberal-minded and base mechanic1 exist 
and are justified by  nature--a nature  
which aims at embodied reason4    ,what1
 finally1 is this ,nature to which the  
philosophy of society and  the          
individual so bound itself8 ,it is the  
nature which figures in  ,greek customs 
and myth2 the nature resplendent and    
adorned which  confronts us in ,greek   
poetry and art3 the animism of savage   
man purged  of grossness and generalized
 by unerring esthetic taste into beauty 
and system4 ,the myths had told of the  
loves and hates1 the caprices  and      
desertions of the gods1 and behind them 
all1 inevitable ,fate4  ,philosophy     
translated these tales into formul of   
the brute fluctuation  of rapacious     
change held in bounds by the final and  
supreme end3 the  rational good4 ,the   

animism of the popular mind died to     
reappear as  cosmology4    ,repeatedly  
in this course we have heard of sciences
 which began as  parts of philosophy and
 which gradually won their independence4
 ,another  statement of the same history
 is that both science and philosophy    
began  in subjection to mythological    
animism4 ,both began with acceptance of 
a nature whose irregularities displayed 
the meaningless variability  of foolish 
wants held within the limits of order   
and uniformity by an  underlying        
movement toward a final and stable      
purpose4 ,and when the  sciences        
gradually assumed the task of reducing  
irregular caprice to  regular           
conjunction1 philosophy bravely took    
upon itself the task of  substantiating1
 under the caption of a spiritual view  
of the universe1  the animistic         
survival4 ,doubtless ,socrates brought  
philosophy to earth2  but his injunction
 to man to know himself was incredibly  
compromised  in its execution by the    

fact that later philosophers submerged  
man in  the world to which philosophy   
was brought3 a world which was the heavy
  and sunken center of hierarchic       
heavens located in their purity and     
refinement as remotely as possible from 
the gross and muddy vesture of  earth4  
,the various limitations of ,greek      
custom1 its hostile indifference to  all
 outside the narrow city-state1 its     
assumption of fixed divisions of  wise  
and blind among men1 its inability      
socially to utilize science1  its       
subordination of human intention to     
cosmic aim--all of these  things were   
worked into moral theory4 ,philosophy   
had no active hand in  producing the    
condition of barbarism in ,europe from  
the fifth to the  fifteenth centuries4  
,by an unwitting irony which would have 
shocked  none so much as the lucid      
moralists of ,athens1 their philosophic 
idealization1 under captions of ,nature 
and ,reason1 of the inherent            
limitations of ,athenian society and    

,greek science1 furnished the           
intellectual tools for defining1        
standardizing1 and justifying all  the  
fundamental clefts and antagonisms of   
feudalism4 ,when practical  conditions  
are not frozen in men's imagination into
 crystalline truths1  they are naturally
 fluid4 ,they come and go4 ,but when    
intelligence fixes  fluctuating         
circumstances into final ideals1        
petrifaction is likely to  occur2 and   
philosophy gratuitously took upon itself
 the responsibility  for justifying the 
worst defects of barbarian ,europe by   
showing their  necessary connection with
 divine reason4    ,the division of     
mankind into the two camps of the       
redeemed and the  condemned had not     
needed philosophy to produce it4 ,but   
the ,greek  cleavage of men into        
separate kinds on the basis of their    
position  within or without the         
city-state was used to rationalize this 
harsh  intolerance4 ,the hierarchic     
organization of feudalism1 within church

  and state1 of those possessed of      
sacred rule and those whose sole        
excellence was obedience1 did not       
require moral theory to generate  or    
explain it4 ,but it took philosophy to  
furnish the intellectual  tools by which
 such chance episodes were emblazoned   
upon the cosmic  heavens as a grandiose 
spiritual achievement4 ,no2 it is all   
too easy  to explain bitter intolerance 
and desire for domination4 ,stubborn as 
they are1 it was only when ,greek moral 
theory had put underneath them  the     
distinction between the irrational and  
the rational1 between divine  truth and 
good and corrupt and weak human         
appetite1 that intolerance  on system   
and earthly domination for the sake of  
eternal excellence  were philosophically
 sanctioned4 ,the health and welfare of 
the body and  the securing for all of a 
sure and a prosperous livelihood were   
not  matters for which medieval         
conditions fostered care in any case4   
,but  moral philosophy was prevailed    

upon to damn the body on principle1  and
 to relegate to insignificance as merely
 mundane and temporal the  problem of a 
just industrial order4 ,circumstances of
 the times bore  with sufficient        
hardness upon successful scientific     
investigation2 but  philosophy added the
 conviction that in any case truth is so
 supernal  that it must be              
supernaturally revealed1 and so         
important that it must  be              
authoritatively imparted and enforced4  
,intelligence was diverted  from the    
critical consideration of the natural   
sources and social  consequences of     
better and worse into the channel of    
metaphysical  subtleties and systems1   
acceptance of which was made essential  
to participation in the social order and
 in rational excellence4  ,philosophy   
bound the once erect form of human      
endeavor and progress to  the chariot   
wheels of cosmology and theology4       
,since the ,renaissance1 moral          
philosophy has repeatedly reverted to   

the ,greek ideal of natural excellence  
realized in social life1 under  the     
fostering care of intelligence in       
action4 ,the return1 however1  has taken
 place under the influence of democratic
 polity1 commercial  expansion1 and     
scientific reorganization4 ,it has been 
a liberation  more than a reversion4    
,this combined return and emancipation1 
having  transformed our practice of life
 in the last four centuries1 will not   
be content till it has written itself   
clear in our theory of that  practice4  
,whether the consequent revolution in   
moral philosophy be  termed pragmatism  
or be given the happier title of the    
applied and  experimental habit of mind 
is of little account4 ,what is of moment
 is  that intelligence has descended    
from its lonely isolation at the remote 
edge of things1 whence it operated as   
unmoved mover and ultimate good1  to    
take its seat in the moving affairs of  
men4 ,theory may therefore  become      
responsible to the practices that have  

generated it2 the good be  connected    
with nature1 but with nature naturally1 
not metaphysically1  conceived1 and     
social life be cherished in behalf of   
its own immediate  possibilities1 not on
 the ground of its remote connections   
with a  cosmic reason and an absolute   
end4    ,there is a notion1 more        
familiar than correct1 that ,greek      
thought  sacrificed the individual to   
the state4 ,none has ever known better  
than the ,greek that the individual     
comes to himself and to his own  only in
 association with others4 ,but ,greek   
thought subjected1 as we  have seen1    
both state and individual to an external
 cosmic order2 and  thereby it          
inevitably restricted the free use in   
doubt1 inquiry1 and  experimentation1 of
 the human intelligence4 ,the anima     
libera1 the  free mind of the sixteenth 
century1 of ,galileo and his successors1
 was  the counterpart of the            
disintegration of cosmology and its     
animistic  teleology4 ,the lecturer on  

political economy reminded us that his  
subject began1 in the ,middle ,ages1 as 
a branch of ethics1 though1  as he      
hastened to show1 it soon got into      
better association4 ,well1  the same    
company was once kept by all the        
sciences1 mathematical and  physical as 
well as social4 ,according to all       
accounts it was the  integrity of the   
number one and the rectitude of the     
square that  attracted the attention of 
,pythagoras to arithmetic and geometry  
as  promising fields of study4          
,astronomy was the projected picture    
book of  a cosmic object lesson in      
morals1 ,dante's transcript of which is 
none  the less literal because poetic4  
,if physics alone remained outside the  
moral fold1 while noble essences        
redeemed chemistry1 occult forces       
blessed physiology1 and the immaterial  
soul exalted psychology1 physics  is the
 exception that proves the rule3 matter 
was so inherently immoral  that no      
high-minded science would demean itself 

by contact with it4    ,if we do not    
join with many in lamenting the         
stripping from nature  of those         
idealistic properties in which animism  
survived1 if we do  not mourn the       
secession of the sciences from ethics1  
it is because  the abandonment by       
intelligence of a fixed and static moral
 end was  the necessary precondition of 
a free and progressive science of both  
things and morals2 because the          
emancipation of the sciences from ready 
made1 remote1 and abstract values was   
necessary to make the sciences          
available for creating and maintaining  
more and specific values here  and now4 
,the divine comedy of modern medicine   
and hygiene is one of  the human epics  
yet to be written2 but when composed it 
may prove no  unworthy companion of the 
medieval epic of other worldly beatific 
visions4 ,the great ideas of the        
eighteenth century1 that expansive      
epoch of moral perception which ranks in
 illumination and fervor  along with    

classic ,greek thought1 the great ideas 
of the indefinitely  continuous progress
 of humanity and of the power and       
significance of  freed intelligence1    
were borne by a single                  
mother--experimental inquiry4    ,the   
growth of industry and commerce is at   
once cause and effect of  the growth in 
science4 ,democritus and other ancients 
conceived the  mechanical theory of the 
universe4 ,the notion was not only blank
 and  repellent1 because it ignored the 
rich social material which ,plato and   
,aristotle had organized into their     
rival idealistic views2 but it was      
scientifically sterile1 a piece of      
dialectics4 ,contempt for machines as   
the accouterments of despised mechanics 
kept the mechanical conception  aloof   
from these specific and controllable    
experiences which alone  could fructify 
it4 ,this conception1 then1 like the    
idealistic1 was  translated into a      
speculative cosmology and thrown like a 
vast net  around the universe at large1 

as if to keep it from coming to pieces4 
,it is from respect for the lever1 the  
pulley1 and the screw that modern       
experimental and mathematical mechanics 
derives itself4 ,motion1 traced  through
 the workings of a machine1 was followed
 out into natural  events and studied   
just as motion1 not as a poor yet       
necessary device  for realizing final   
causes4 ,so studied1 it was found to be 
available  for new machines and new     
applications1 which in creating new ends
  also promoted new wants1 and thereby  
stimulated new activities1 new          
discoveries1 and new inventions4 ,the   
recognition that natural energy  can be 
systematically applied1 through         
experimental observation1 to  the       
satisfaction and multiplication of      
concrete wants is doubtless the         
greatest single discovery ever imported 
into the life of man--save  perhaps the 
discovery of language4 ,science1        
borrowing from industry1  repaid the    
debt with interest1 and has made the    

control of natural  forces for the aims 
of life so inevitable that for the first
 time  man is relieved from overhanging 
fear1 with its wolflike scramble to     
possess and accumulate1 and is freed to 
consider the more gracious  question of 
securing to all an ample and liberal    
life4 ,the industrial  life had been    
condemned by ,greek exaltation of       
abstract thought and by  ,greek contempt
 for labor1 as representing the brute   
struggle of carnal  appetite for its own
 satiety4 ,the industrial movement1     
offspring of  science1 restored it to   
its central position in morals4 ,when   
,adam ,smith  made economic activity the
 moving spring of man's unremitting     
effort1  from the cradle to the grave1  
to better his own lot1 he recorded this 
change4 ,and when he made sympathy the  
central spring in man's conscious  moral
 endeavor1 he reported the effect which 
the increasing intercourse  of men1 due 
primarily to commerce1 had in breaking  
down suspicion and  jealousy and in     

liberating man's kindlier impulses4     
,democracy1 the crucial expression of   
modern life1 is not so much an  addition
 to the scientific and industrial       
tendencies as it is the  perception of  
their social or spiritual meaning4      
,democracy is an  absurdity where faith 
in the individual as individual is      
impossible2  and this faith is          
impossible when intelligence is regarded
 as a cosmic  power1 not an adjustment  
and application of individual           
tendencies4  ,it is also impossible when
 appetites and desires are conceived to 
be  the dominant factor in the          
constitution of most men's characters1  
and  when appetite and desire are       
conceived to be manifestations of the   
disorderly and unruly principle of      
nature4 ,to put the intellectual  center
 of gravity in the objective cosmos1    
outside of men's own  experiments and   
tests1 and then to invite the           
application of individual  intelligence 
to the determination of society1 is to  

invite chaos4  ,to hold that want is    
mere negative flux and hence requires   
external  fixation by reason1 and then  
to invite the wants to give free play to
  themselves in social construction and 
intercourse1 is to call down  anarchy4  
,democracy is estimable only through the
 changed conception of  intelligence1   
that forms modern science1 and of want1 
that forms modern  industry4 ,it is     
essentially a changed psychology4 ,the  
substitution1 for  a priori truth and   
deduction1 of fluent doubt and inquiry  
meant trust  in human nature in the     
concrete2 in individual honesty1        
curiosity1  and sympathy4 ,the          
substitution of moving commerce for     
fixed custom  meant a view of wants as  
the dynamics of social progress1 not as 
the  pathology of private greed4 ,the   
nineteenth century indeed turned sour   
on that somewhat complacent optimism in 
which the eighteenth century  rested3   
the ideas that the intelligent self-love
 of individuals would  conduce to social

 cohesion1 and competition among        
individuals usher in  the kingdom of    
social welfare4 ,but the conception of a
 social harmony  of interests in which  
the achievement by each individual of   
his own  freedom should contribute to a 
like perfecting of the powers of all1   
through a fraternally organized society1
 is the permanent contribution  of the  
industrial movement to morals--even     
though so far it be but the             
contribution of a problem4              
,intellectually speaking1 the centuries 
since the fourteenth are the  true      
middle ages4 ,they mark the transitional
 period of mental habit1  as the        
so-called medieval period represents the
 petrifaction1 under  changed outward   
conditions1 of ,greek ideas4 ,the       
conscious articulation  of genuinely    
modern tendencies has yet to come1 and  
till it comes the  ethic of our own life
 must remain undescribed4 ,but the      
system of morals  which has come nearest
 to the reflection of the movements of  

science1  democracy1 and commerce1 is   
doubtless the utilitarian4 ,scientific1 
after the modern mode1 it certainly     
would be4 ,newton's influence dyes  deep
 the moral thought of the eighteenth    
century4 ,the arrangements of  the solar
 system had been described in terms of a
 homogeneous matter  and motion1 worked 
by two opposed and compensating forces3 
all because  a method of analysis1 of   
generalization by analogy1 and of       
mathematical  deduction back to new     
empirical details had been followed4    
,the  imagination of the eighteenth     
century was a ,newtonian imagination2   
and  this no less in social than in     
physical matters4 ,hume proclaims that  
morals is about to become an            
experimental science4 ,just as1 almost  
in  our own day1 ,mill's interest in a  
method for social science led him to    
reformulate the logic of experimental   
inquiry1 so all the great men of  the   
,enlightenment were in search for the   
organon of morals which should  repeat  

the physical triumphs of ,newton4       
,bentham notes that physics has  had its
 ,bacon and ,newton2 that morals has had
 its ,bacon in ,helvtius1  but still    
awaits its ,newton2 and he leaves us in 
no doubt that at the  moment of writing 
he was ready1 modestly but firmly1 to   
fill the  waiting niche with its missing
 figure4    ,the industrial movement    
furnished the concrete imagery for this 
ethical  renovation4 ,the utilitarians  
borrowed from ,adam ,smith the notion   
that  through industrial exchange in a  
free society the individual pursuing    
his own good is led1 under the guidance 
of the 8invisible hand10 to  promote the
 general good more effectually than if  
he had set out to do  it4 ,this idea was
 dressed out in the atomistic psychology
 which ,hartley  built out from         
,locke--and was returned at usurious    
rates to later  economists4    ,from the
 great ,french writers who had sought to
 justify and promote  democratic        
individualism1 came the conception that1

 since it is  perverted political       
institutions which deprave individuals  
and bring  them into hostility1 nation  
against nation1 class against class1    
individual against individual1 the great
 political problem is such a  reform of 
law and legislation1 civil and criminal1
 of administration1  and of education as
 will force the individual to find his  
own interests  in pursuits conducing to 
the welfare of others4    ,tremendously 
effective as a tool of criticism1       
operative in  abolition and elimination1
 utilitarianism failed to measure up to 
the constructive needs of the time4 ,its
 theoretical equalization of  the good  
of each with that of every other was    
practically perverted  by its excessive 
interest in the middle and manufacturing
 classes4  ,its speculative defect of an
 atomistic psychology combined with this
  narrowness of vision to make light of 
the constructive work that  needs to be 
done by the state1 before all can have1 
otherwise than in  name1 an equal chance

 to count in the common good4 ,thus the 
age-long  subordination of economics to 
politics was revenged in the submerging 
of both politics and ethics in a narrow 
theory of economic profit2 and          
utilitarianism1 in its orthodox         
descendants1 proffered the disjointed   
pieces of a mechanism1 with a monotonous
 reiteration that looked at  aright they
 form a beautifully harmonious organism4
    ,prevision1 and to some extent      
experience1 of this failure1 conjoined  
with differing social traditions and    
ambitions1 evoked ,german idealism1  the
 transcendental morals of ,kant and his 
successors4 ,german thought  strove to  
preserve the traditions which bound     
culture to the past1  while revising    
these traditions to render them capable 
of meeting  novel conditions4 ,it found 
weapons at hand in the conceptions      
borrowed  by ,roman law from ,stoic     
philosophy1 and in the conceptions by   
which  ,protestant humanism had         
re-edited scholastic ,catholicism4      

,grotius had  made the idea of natural  
law1 natural right and obligation1 the  
central  idea of ,german morals1 as     
thoroughly as ,locke had made the       
individual  desire for liberty and      
happiness the focus of ,english and then
 of  ,french speculation4 ,materialized 
idealism is the happy monstrosity in    
which the popular demand for vivid      
imagery is most easily reconciled  with 
the equally strong demand for supremacy 
of moral values2 and the  complete      
idealistic materialism of ,stoicism has 
always given its ideas  a practical     
influence out of all proportion to their
 theoretical vogue  as a system4 ,to the
 ,protestant1 that is the ,german1      
humanist1 ,natural  ,law1 the bond of   
harmonious reason in nature1 the spring 
of social  intercourse among men1 the   
inward light of individual conscience1  
united ,cicero1 ,st4 ,paul1 and ,luther 
in blessed union2 gave a rational1  not 
superrational basis for morals1 and     
provided room for social  legislation   

which at the same time could easily be  
held back from too  ruthless application
 to dominant class interests4    ,kant  
saw the mass of empirical and hence     
irrelevant detail that had  found refuge
 within this liberal and diffusive      
reason4 ,he saw that the  idea of reason
 could be made self-consistent only by  
stripping it naked  of these empirical  
accretions4 ,he then provided1 in his   
critiques1 a  somewhat cumbrous moving  
van for transferring the resultant pure 
or  naked reason out of nature and the  
objective world1 and for locating  it in
 new quarters1 with a new stock of goods
 and new customers4 ,the  new quarters  
were particular subjects1 individuals2  
the stock of goods  were the forms of   
perception and the functions of thought 
by which  empirical flux is woven into  
durable fabrics2 the new customers were 
a  society of individuals in which all  
are ends in themselves4 ,there ought  to
 be an injunction issued that ,kant's   
saying about ,hume's awakening of  him  

should not be quoted save in connection 
with his other saying that  ,rousseau   
brought him to himself1 in teaching him 
that the philosopher  is of less account
 than the laborer in the fields unless  
he contributes  to human freedom4 ,but  
none the less1 the new tenant1 the      
universal  reason1 and the old          
homestead1 the empirical tumultuous     
individual1  could not get on together4 
,reason became a mere voice which1      
having  nothing in particular to say1   
said ,law1 ,duty1 in general1 leaving to
  the existing social order of the      
,prussia of ,frederick the ,great the   
congenial task of declaring just what   
was obligatory in the concrete4  ,the   
marriage of freedom and authority was   
thus celebrated with the  understanding 
that sentimental primacy went to the    
former and practical  control to the    
latter4    ,the effort to force a       
universal reason that had been used to  
the broad  domains of the cosmos into   
the cramped confines of individuality   

conceived as merely 8empirical10 a      
highly particularized creature of       
sense1 could have but one result3 an    
explosion4 ,the products of that        
explosion constitute the ,post-,kantian 
philosophies4 ,it was the work of       
,hegel to attempt to fill in the empty  
reason of ,kant with the concrete       
contents of history4 ,the voice sounded 
like the voice of ,aristotle1  ,thomas  
of ,aquino1 and ,spinoza translated into
 ,swabian ,german2 but the  hands were  
as the hands of ,montesquieu1 ,herder1  
,condorcet1 and the  rising historical  
school4 ,the outcome was the assertion  
that history  is reason1 and reason is  
history3 the actual is rational1 the    
rational  is the actual4 ,it gave the   
pleasant appearance 7which ,hegel did   
not  strenuously discourage7 of being   
specifically an idealization of the     
,prussian nation1 and incidentally a    
systematized apologetic for the         
universe at large4 ,but in intellectual 
and practical effect1 it lifted  the    

idea of process above that of fixed     
origins and fixed ends1 and  presented  
the social and moral order1 as well as  
the intellectual1 as a  scene of        
becoming1 and it located reason         
somewhere within the struggles  of life4
    ,unstable equilibrium1 rapid        
fermentation1 and a succession of       
explosive  reports are thus the chief   
notes of modern ethics4 ,scepticism and 
traditionalism1 empiricism and          
rationalism1 crude naturalisms and      
all-embracing idealisms1 flourish side  
by side--all the more flourish1  one    
suspects1 because side by side4 ,spencer
 exults because natural  science reveals
 that a rapid transit system of         
evolution is carrying  us automatically 
to the goal of perfect man in perfect   
society2 and  his ,english idealistic   
contemporary1 ,green1 is so disturbed by
 the  removal from nature of its moral  
qualities1 that he tries to show that   
this makes no difference1 since nature  
in any case is constituted and  known   

through a spiritual principle which is  
as permanent as nature is  changing4 ,an
 ,amiel genteelly laments the decadence 
of the inner life1  while his neighbor  
,nietzsche brandishes in rude ecstasy   
the banner of  brute survival as a happy
 omen of the final victory of nobility  
of  mind4 ,the reasonable conclusion    
from such a scene is that there is      
taking place a transformation of        
attitude towards moral theory rather    
than mere propagation of varieties among
 theories4 ,the classic theories  all   
agreed in one regard4 ,they all alike   
assumed the existence of  the end1 the  
summum bonum1 the final goal2 and of the
 separate  moral force that moves to    
that goal4 ,moralists have disputed as  
to  whether the end is an aggregate of  
pleasurable state of consciousness1     
enjoyment of the divine essence1        
acknowledgment of the law of duty1  or  
conformity to environment4 ,so they have
 disputed as to the path by  which the  
final goal is to be reached3 fear or    

benevolence8 reverence  for pure law or 
pity for others8 self-love or altruism8 
,but these very  controversies implied  
that there was but the one end and the  
one means4    ,the transformation in    
attitude1 to which ,i referred1 is the  
growing  belief that the proper business
 of intelligence is discrimination  of  
multiple and present goods and of the   
varied immediate means of  their        
realization2 not search for the one     
remote aim4 ,the progress of  biology   
has accustomed our minds to the notion  
that intelligence is not  an outside    
power presiding supremely but statically
 over the desires  and efforts of man1  
but is a method of adjustment of        
capacities and  conditions within       
specific situations4 ,history1 as the   
lecturer on  that subject told us1 has  
discovered itself in the idea of        
process4  ,the genetic standpoint makes 
us aware that the systems of the past   
are  neither fraudulent impostures nor  
absolute revelations2 but are the       

products of political1 economic1 and    
scientific conditions whose change      
carries with it change of theoretical   
formulations4 ,the recognition  that    
intelligence is properly an organ of    
adjustment in difficult  situations     
makes us aware that past theories were  
of value so far as  they helped carry to
 an issue the social perplexities from  
which they  emerged4 ,but the chief     
impact of the evolutionary method is    
upon the  present4 ,theory having       
learned what it cannot do1 is made      
responsible  for the better performance 
of what needs to be done1 and what only 
a  broadly equipped intelligence can    
undertake3 study of the conditions  out 
of which come the obstacles and the     
resources of adequate life1  and        
developing and testing the ideas that1  
as working hypotheses1 may  be used to  
diminish the causes of evil and to      
buttress and expand the  sources of     
good4 ,this program is indeed vague1 but
 only unfamiliarity  with it could lead 

one to the conclusion that it is less   
vague than the  idea that there is a    
single moral ideal and a single moral   
motive force4    ,from this point of    
view there is no separate body of moral 
rules2 no  separate system of motive    
powers2 no separate subject-matter of   
moral  knowledge1 and hence no such     
thing as an isolated ethical science4   
,if the business of morals is not to    
speculate upon man's final end  and upon
 an ultimate standard of right1 it is to
 utilize physiology1  anthropology1 and 
psychology to discover all that can be  
discovered of  man1 his organic powers  
and propensities4 ,if its business is   
not to  search for the one separate     
moral motive1 it is to converge all the 
instrumentalities of the social arts1 of
 law1 education1 economics1  and        
political science upon the construction 
of intelligent methods of  improving the
 common lot4    ,if we still wish to    
make our peace with the past1 and to sum
 up the  plural and changing goods of   

life in a single word1 doubtless the    
term  happiness is the one most apt4    
,but we should again exchange free      
morals  for sterile metaphysics1 if we  
imagine that 8happiness0 is any less    
unique than the individuals who         
experience it2 any less complex than    
the constitution of their capacities1 or
 any less variable than the  objects    
upon which their capacities are         
directed4    ,to many timid1 albeit     
sincere1 souls of an earlier century1   
the decay  of the doctrine that all true
 and worthful science is knowledge of   
final causes seemed fraught with danger 
to science and to morals4 ,the  rival   
conception of a wide open universe1 a   
universe without bounds in  time or     
space1 without final limits of origin or
 destiny1 a universe  with the lid off1 
was a menace4 ,we now face in moral     
science a similar  crisis and like      
opportunity1 as well as share in a like 
dreadful  suspense4 ,the abolition of a 
fixed and final goal and causal force in

  nature did not1 as matter of fact1    
render rational conviction less         
important or less attainable4 ,it was   
accompanied by the provision of  a      
technique of persistent and detailed    
inquiry in all special fields  of fact1 
a technique which led to the detection  
of unsuspected forces  and the          
revelation of undreamed of uses4 ,in    
like fashion we may  anticipate that the
 abolition of the final goal and the    
single  motive power and the separate   
and infallible faculty in morals1 will  
quicken inquiry into the diversity of   
specific goods of experience1 fix       
attention upon their conditions1 and    
bring to light values now dim and       
obscure4 ,the change may relieve men    
from responsibility for what they       
cannot do1 but it will promote          
thoughtful consideration of what they   
may do and the definition of            
responsibility for what they do amiss   
because of failure to think straight and
 carefully4 ,absolute goods  will fall  

into the background1 but the question of
 making more sure  and extensive the    
share of all men in natural and social  
goods will be  urgent1 a problem not to 
be escaped nor evaded4    ,morals1      
philosophy1 returns to its first love2  
love of the wisdom that  is nurse1 as   
nature is mother1 of good4 ,but it      
returns to the ,socratic  principle     
equipped with a multitude of special    
methods of inquiry and  testing2 with an
 organized mass of knowledge1 and with  
control of the  arrangements by which   
industry1 law1 and education may        
concentrate upon  the problem of the    
participation by all men and women1 up  
to their  capacity of absorption1 in all
 attained values4 ,morals may then well 
leave to poetry and to art1 the task 7so
 unartistically performed by  philosophy
 since ,plato7 of gathering together and
 rounding out1 into  one abiding        
picture1 the separate and special goods 
of life4 ,it may  leave this task with  
the assurance that the resultant        

synthesis will  not depict any final and
 all-inclusive good1 but will add just  
one more  specific good to the enjoyable
 excellencies of life4    ,humorous     
irony shines through most of the harsh  
glances turned towards  the idea of an  
experimental basis and career for       
morals4 ,some shiver  in the fear that  
morals will be plunged into anarchic    
confusion--a  view well expressed by a  
recent writer in the saying that if the 
a  priori and transcendental basis of   
morals be abandoned 8we shall have      
merely the same certainty that now      
exists in physics and chemistry06       
,elsewhere lurks the apprehension that  
the progress of scientific method  will 
deliver the purposive freedom of man    
bound hand and foot to the  fatal       
decrees of iron necessity1 called       
natural law4 ,the notion that  laws     
govern and forces rule is an animistic  
survival4 ,it is a product  of reading  
nature in terms of politics in order to 
turn around and then  read politics in  

the light of supposed sanctions of      
nature4 ,this idea  passed from medieval
 theology into the science of ,newton1  
to whom the  universe was the dominion  
of a sovereign whose laws were the laws 
of  nature4 ,from ,newton it passed into
 the deism of the eighteenth century1   
whence it migrated into the philosophy  
of the ,enlightenment1 to make  its last
 stand in ,spencer's philosophy of the  
fixed environment and the  static goal4 
,no1 nature is not an unchangeable      
order1 unwinding itself majestically    
from the reel of law under the control  
of deified forces4 ,it is an  indefinite
 congeries of changes4 ,laws are not    
governmental regulations  which limit   
change1 but are convenient formulations 
of selected  portions of change followed
 through a longer or shorter period of  
time1 and then registered in statistical
 forms that are amenable to             
mathematical manipulation4 ,that this   
device of shorthand symbolization       
presages the subjection of man's        

intelligent effort to fixity of law  and
 environment is interesting as a culture
 survival1 but is not  important for    
moral theory4 ,savage and child delight 
in creating  bogeys from which1 their   
origin and structure being conveniently 
concealed1 interesting thrills and      
shudders may be had4 ,civilized  man in 
the nineteenth century outdid these     
bugaboos in his image of  a fixed       
universe hung on a cast-iron framework  
of fixed1 necessary1  and universal     
laws4 ,knowledge of nature does not mean
 subjection to  predestination1 but     
insight into courses of change2 an      
insight which is  formulated in 8laws10 
that is1 methods of subsequent          
procedure4    ,knowledge of the process 
and conditions of physical and social   
change through experimental science and 
genetic history has one  result with a  
double name3 increase of control1 and   
increase of  responsibility2 increase of
 power to direct natural change1 and    
increase of responsibility for its      

equitable direction toward fuller  good4
 ,theory located within progressive     
practice instead of reigning  statically
 supreme over it1 means practice itself 
made responsible  to intelligence2 to   
intelligence which relentlessly         
scrutinizes the  consequences of every  
practice1 and which exacts liability by 
an  equally relentless publicity4 ,as   
long as morals occupies itself with     
mere ideals1 forces and conditions as   
they are will be good enough for        
8practical0 men1 since they are then    
left free to their own devices  in      
turning these to their own account4 ,as 
long as moralists plume  themselves upon
 possession of the domain of the        
categorical imperative  with its bare   
precepts1 men of executive habits will  
always be at  their elbows to regulate  
the concrete social conditions through  
which  the form of law gets its actual  
filling of specific injunctions4 ,when  
freedom is conceived to be              
transcendental1 the coercive restraint  

of  immediate necessity will lay its    
harsh hand upon the mass of men4    ,in 
the end1 men do what they can do4 ,they 
refrain from doing what they  cannot do4
 ,they do what their own specific powers
 in conjunction with  the limitations   
and resources of the environment permit4
 ,the effective  control of their powers
 is not through precepts1 but through   
the  regulation of their conditions4 ,if
 this regulation is to be not merely    
physical or coercive1 but moral1 it must
 consist of the intelligent  selection  
and determination of the environments in
 which we act2 and  in an intelligent   
exaction of responsibility for the use  
of men's  powers4 ,theorists inquire    
after the 8motive0 to morality1 to      
virtue and  the good1 under such        
circumstances4 ,what then1 one wonders1 
is their  conception of the make-up of  
human nature and of its relation to     
virtue  and to goodness8 ,the pessimism 
that dictates such a question1 if it be 
justified1 precludes any consideration  

of morals4    ,the diversion of         
intelligence from discrimination of     
plural and  concrete goods1 from noting 
their conditions and obstacles1 and from
  devising methods for holding men      
responsible for their concrete use  of  
powers and conditions1 has done more    
than brute love of power  to establish  
inequality and injustice among men4 ,it 
has done more1  because it has confirmed
 with social sanctions the principle of 
feudal  domination4 ,all men require    
moral sanctions in their conduct3 the   
consent of their kind4 ,not getting it  
otherwise1 they go insane to  feign it4 
,no man ever lived with the exclusive   
approval of his own  conscience4 ,hence 
the vacuum left in practical matters by 
the remote  irrelevancy of              
transcendental morals has to be filled  
in somehow4  ,it is filled in4 ,it is   
filled in with class-codes1             
class-standards1  class-approvals--with 
codes which recommend the practices and 
habits  already current in a given      

circle1 set1 calling1 profession1 trade1
  industry1 club1 or gang4 ,these       
class-codes always lean back upon  and  
support themselves by the professed     
ideal code4 ,this latter  meets them    
more than half-way4 ,being in its       
pretense a theory for  regulating       
practice1 it must demonstrate its       
practicability4 ,it is  uneasy in       
isolation1 and travels hastily to meet  
with compromise and  accommodation the  
actual situation in all its brute       
unrationality4  ,where the pressure is  
greatest--in the habitual practice of   
the  political and economic             
chieftains--there it accommodates the   
most4    ,class-codes of morals are     
sanctions1 under the caption of ideals1 
of  uncriticised customs2 they are      
recommendations1 under the head of      
duties1 of what the members of the class
 are already most given to  doing4 ,if  
there are to obtain more equable and    
comprehensive principles  of action1    
exacting a more impartial exercise of   

natural power and  resource in the      
interests of a common good1 members of a
 class must  no longer rest content in  
responsibility to a class whose         
traditions  constitute its conscience1  
but be made responsible to a society    
whose  conscience is its free and       
effectively organized intelligence4     
,in such a conscience alone will the    
,socratic injunction to man to know     
himself be fulfilled4          ,,the    
,,experimental ,,theory ,,of            
,,knowledge#g      ,it should be        
possible to discern and describe a      
knowing as one  identifies any object1  
concern1 or event4 ,it must have its own
 marks2  it must offer characteristic   
features--as much so as a thunder-storm1
  the constitution of a ,state1 or a    
leopard4 ,in the search for this        
affair1 we are first of all desirous for
 something which is for itself1         
contemporaneously with its occurrence1 a
 cognition1 not something  called       
knowledge by another and from           

without--whether this other be          
logician1 psychologist1 or              
epistemologist4 ,the 8knowledge0 may    
turn  out false1 and hence no knowledge2
 but this is an after-affair2 it may    
prove to be rich in fruitage of wisdom1 
but if this outcome be only  wisdom     
after the event1 it does not concern us4
 ,what we want is just  something which 
takes itself as knowledge1 rightly or   
wrongly4      ,i    ,this means a       
specific case1 a sample4 ,yet instances 
are proverbially  dangerous--so navely  
and graciously may they beg the         
questions at  issue4 ,our recourse is to
 an example so simple1 so much on its   
face  as to be as innocent as may be of 
assumptions4 ,this case we shall        
gradually complicate1 mindful at each   
step to state just what new  elements   
are introduced4 ,let us suppose a smell1
 just a floating  odor4 ,this odor may  
be anchored by supposing that it moves  
to action2  it starts changes that end  
in picking and enjoying a rose4 ,this   

description is intended to apply to the 
course of events witnessed and          
recounted from without4 ,what sort of a 
course must it be to constitute  a      
knowledge1 or to have somewhere within  
its career that which  deserves this    
title8 ,the smell1 imprimis1 is there2  
the movements  that it excites are      
there2 the final plucking and           
gratification are  experienced4 ,but1   
let us say1 the smell is not the smell  
of the rose2  the resulting change of   
the organism is not a sense of walking  
and  reaching2 the delicious finale is  
not the fulfilment of the movement1     
and1 through that1 of the original      
smell2 8is not10 in each case  meaning  
is 8not experienced as0 such4 ,we may   
take1 in short1 these  experiences in a 
brutely serial fashion4 ,the smell1 ,s1 
is replaced  7and displaced7 by a felt  
movement1 ,k1 this is replaced by the   
gratification1 ,g4 ,viewed from without1
 as we are now regarding it1  there is  
,s-,k-,g4 ,but from within1 for itself1 

it is now ,s1 now  ,k1 now ,g1 and so on
 to the end of the chapter4 ,nowhere is 
there  looking before and after2 memory 
and anticipation are not born4 ,such an 
experience neither is1 in whole or in   
part1 a knowledge1 nor does it  exercise
 a cognitive function4    ,here1        
however1 we may be halted4 ,if there is 
anything present in  8consciousness0 at 
all1 we may be told 7at least we        
constantly are so  told7 there must be  
knowledge of it as present--present1 at 
all events1  in 8consciousness40 ,there 
is1 so it is argued1 knowledge at least 
of a simple apprehensive type1 knowledge
 of the acquaintance order1  knowledge  
that1 even though not knowledge what4   
,the smell1 it is  admitted1 does not   
know about anything else1 nor is        
anything known  about the smell 7the    
same thing1 perhaps72 but the smell is  
known1  either by itself1 or by the     
mind1 or by some subject1 some          
unwinking1  unremitting eye4 ,no1 we    
must reply2 there is no apprehension    

without  some 7however slight7 context2 
no acquaintance which is not either     
recognition or expectation4             
,acquaintance is presence honored with  
an  escort2 presence is introduced as   
familiar1 or an associate springs up  to
 greet it4 ,acquaintance always implies 
a little friendliness2 a trace  of      
re-knowing1 of anticipatory welcome or  
dread of the trait to follow4    ,this  
claim cannot be dismissed as trivial4   
,if valid1 it carries with  it the      
distance between being and knowing3 and 
the recognition of  an element of       
mediation1 that is1 of art1 in all      
knowledge4 ,this  disparity1 this       
transcendence1 is not something which   
holds of our  knowledge1 of finite      
knowledge1 just marking the gap between 
our  type of consciousness and some     
other with which we may contrast it     
after the manner of the agnostic or the 
transcendentalist 7who hold  so much    
property in joint ownership671 but      
exists because knowing is  knowing1 that

 way of bringing things to bear upon    
things which we call  reflection--a     
manipulation of things experienced in   
the light one of  another4              
8,feeling10 ,i read in a recent article1
 8feeling is immediately  acquainted    
with its own quality1 with its own      
subjective being40#h ,how  and whence   
this duplication in the inwards of      
feeling into feeling  the knower and    
feeling the known8 into feeling as being
 and feeling  as acquaintance8 ,let us  
frankly deny such monsters4 ,feeling is 
its own quality2 is its own specific    
7whence and why1 once more1             
subjective87 being4 ,if this statement  
be dogmatism1 it is at least  worth     
insistent declaration1 were it only by  
way of counter-irritant  to that other  
dogmatism which asserts that being in   
8consciousness0 is  always presence for 
or in knowledge4 ,so let us repeat once 
more1 that  to be a smell 7or anything  
else7 is one thing1 to be known as      
smell1  another2 to be a 8feeling0 one  

thing1 to be known as a 8feeling0       
another4#i ,the first is thinghood2     
existence indubitable1 direct2  in this 
way all things are that are in          
8consciousness0 at all4#aj  ,the second 
is reflected being1 things indicating   
and calling for  other things--something
 offering the possibility of truth and  
hence  of falsity4 ,the first is genuine
 immediacy2 the second is 7in the       
instance discussed7 a pseudo-immediacy1 
which in the same breath that  it       
proclaims its immediacy smuggles in     
another term 7and one which  is         
unexperienced both in itself and in its 
relation7 the subject or                
8consciousness10 to which the immediate 
is related4#aa    ,but we need not      
remain with dogmatic assertions4 ,to be 
acquainted  with a thing or with a      
person has a definite empirical meaning2
 we  have only to call to mind what it  
is to be genuinely and empirically      
acquainted1 to have done forever with   
this uncanny presence which1  though    

bare and simple presence1 is yet known1 
and thus is clothed  upon and           
complicated4 ,to be acquainted with a   
thing is to be assured  7from the       
standpoint of the experience itself7    
that it is of such and  such a          
character2 that it will behave1 if given
 an opportunity1 in  such and such a    
way2 that the obviously and flagrantly  
present trait  is associated with fellow
 traits that will show themselves1 if   
the  leadings of the present trait are  
followed out4 ,to be acquainted is  to  
anticipate to some extent1 on the basis 
of prior experience4 ,i am1  say1 barely
 acquainted with ,mr4 ,smith3 then ,i   
have no extended body of  associated    
qualities along with those palpably     
present1 but at least  some one         
suggested trait occurs2 his nose1 his   
tone of voice1 the  place where ,i saw  
him1 his calling in life1 an interesting
 anecdote  about him1 etc4 ,to be       
acquainted is to know what a thing is   
like in  some particular4 ,if one is    

acquainted with the smell of a flower it
  means that the smell is not just      
smell1 but reminds one of some other    
experienced thing which stands in       
continuity with the smell4 ,there is    
thus supplied a condition of control    
over or purchase upon what is  present1 
the possibility of translating it into  
terms of some other  trait not now      
sensibly present4    ,let us return to  
our example4 ,let us suppose that ,s is 
not just  displaced by ,k and then by   
,g4 ,let us suppose it persists2 and    
persists not as an unchanged ,s         
alongside ,k and ,g1 nor yet as  fused  
with them into a new further quale ,j4  
,for in such events1 we  have only the  
type already considered and rejected4   
,for an observer  the new quale might be
 more complex1 or fuller of meaning1    
than the  original ,s1 ,k1 or ,g1 but   
might not be experienced as complex4 ,we
  might thus suppose a composite        
photograph which should suggest nothing 
of the complexity of its origin and     

structure4 ,in this case we should  have
 simply another picture4    ,but we may 
also suppose that the blur of the       
photograph suggests  the superimposition
 of pictures and something of their     
character4  ,then we get another1 and   
for our problem1 much more fruitful kind
 of  persistence4 ,we will imagine that 
the final ,g assumes this form3         
,gratification-terminating-movement-indu
ced-by-smell4 ,the smell is still       
present2 it has persisted4 ,it is not   
present in its original form1  but is   
represented with a quality1 an office1  
that of having excited  activity and    
thereby terminating its career in a     
certain quale of  gratification4 ,it is 
not ,s1 but 2 that is ,s with an        
increment of  meaning due to maintenance
 and fulfilment through a process4 ,s is
 no  longer just smell1 but smell which 
has excited and thereby secured4        
,here we have a cognitive1 but not a    
cognitional thing4 ,in saying that  the 
smell is finally experienced as meaning 

gratification 7through  intervening     
handling1 seeing1 etc47 and meaning it  
not in a hapless  way1 but in a fashion 
which operates to effect what is meant1 
we  retrospectively attribute           
intellectual force and function to the  
smell--and this is what is signified by 
8cognitive40 ,yet the smell is  not     
cognitional1 because it did not         
knowingly intend to mean this2 but  is  
found1 after the event1 to have meant   
it4 ,nor again is the final  experience1
 the  or transformed ,s1 a knowledge4   
,here again the statement may be        
challenged4 ,those who agree with the   
denial that bare presence of a quale in 
8consciousness0 constitutes             
acquaintance and simple apprehension1   
may now turn against us1 saying  that   
experience of fulfilment of meaning is  
just what we mean by  knowledge1 and    
this is just what the  of our           
illustration is4 ,the  point is         
fundamental4 ,as the smell at first was 
presence or being1 less  than knowing1  

so the fulfilment is an experience that 
is more than  knowing4 ,seeing and      
handling the flower1 enjoying the full  
meaning of  the smell as the odor of    
just this beautiful thing1 is not       
knowledge  because it is more than      
knowledge4    ,as this may seem         
dogmatic1 let us suppose that the       
fulfilment1  the realization1           
experience1 is a knowledge4 ,then how   
shall it be  distinguished from and yet 
classed with other things called        
knowledge1  viz41 reflective1 discursive
 cognitions8 ,such knowledges are what  
they are precisely because they are not 
fulfilments1 but intentions1  aims1     
schemes1 symbols of overt fulfilment4   
,knowledge1 perceptual and  conceptual1 
of a hunting dog is prerequisite in     
order that ,i may really  hunt with the 
hounds4 ,the hunting in turn may        
increase my knowledge of  dogs and their
 ways4 ,but the knowledge of the dog1   
qua knowledge1  remains                 
characteristically marked off from the  

use of that knowledge  in the fulfilment
 experience1 the hunt4 ,the hunt is a   
realization of  knowledge2 it alone1 if 
you please1 verifies1 validates1        
knowledge1 or  supplies tests of truth4 
,the prior knowledge of the dog1 was1 if
 you  wish1 hypothetical1 lacking in    
assurance or categorical certainty4 ,the
  hunting1 the fulfilling1 realizing    
experience alone gives knowledge1       
because it alone completely assures2    
makes faith good in works4    ,now there
 is and can be no objection to this     
definition of knowledge1  provided it is
 consistently adhered to4 ,one has as   
much right to  identify knowledge with  
complete assurance1 as ,i have to       
identify it  with anything else4        
,considerable justification in the      
common use of  language1 in common      
sense1 may be found for defining        
knowledge as  complete assurance4 ,but  
even upon this definition1 the          
fulfilling  experience is not1 as such1 
complete assurance1 and hence not a     

knowledge4 ,assurance1 cognitive        
validation1 and guaranteeship1 follow   
from it1 but are not coincident with its
 occurrence4 ,it gives1  but is not1    
assurance4 ,the concrete construction of
 a story1 the  manipulation of a        
machine1 the hunting with the dogs1 is  
not1 so far as  it is fulfilment1 a     
confirmation of meanings previously     
entertained  as cognitional2 that is1 is
 not contemporaneously experienced as   
such4 ,to think of prior schemes1       
symbols1 meanings1 as fulfilled in a    
subsequent experience1 is reflectively  
to present in their relations  to one   
another both the meanings and the       
experiences in which they  are1 as a    
matter of fact1 embodied4 ,this         
reflective attitude cannot  be identical
 with the fulfilment experience itself2 
it occurs only  in retrospect when the  
worth of the meanings1 or cognitive     
ideas1 is  critically inspected in the  
light of their fulfilment2 or it occurs 
as an interruption of the fulfilling    

experience4 ,the hunter stops  his      
hunting as a fulfilment to reflect that 
he made a mistake in his  idea of his   
dog1 or again1 that his dog is          
everything he thought he  was--that his 
notion of him is confirmed4 ,or1 the man
 stops the actual  construction of his  
machine and turns back upon his plan in 
correction  or in admiring estimate of  
its value4 ,the fulfilling experience is
 not  of itself knowledge1 then1 even if
 we identify knowledge with fulness  of 
assurance or guarantee4 ,moreover it    
gives1 affords1 assurance only  in      
reference to a situation which we have  
not yet considered4#ab    ,before the   
category of confirmation or refutation  
can be introduced1  there must be       
something which means to mean something 
and which  therefore can be guaranteed  
or nullified by the issue--and this  is 
precisely what we have not as yet found4
 ,we must return to our  instance and   
introduce a further complication4 ,let  
us suppose that  the smell quale recurs 

at a later date1 and that it recurs     
neither  as the original ,s nor yet as  
the final  but as an ,s' which is  fated
 or charged with the sense of the       
possibility of a fulfilment  like unto 4
 ,the ,s' that recurs is aware of       
something else which  it means1 which it
 intends to effect through an operation 
incited  by it and without which its own
 presence is abortive1 and1 so to  say1 
unjustified1 senseless4 ,now we have an 
experience which is  cognitional1 not   
merely cognitive2 which is              
contemporaneously aware  of meaning     
something beyond itself1 instead of     
having this meaning  ascribed by another
 at a later period4 ,the odor knows the 
rose2 the  rose is known by the odor2   
and the import of each term is          
constituted  by the relationship in     
which it stands to the other4 ,that is1 
the  import of the smell is the         
indicating and demanding relation which 
it  sustains to the enjoyment of the    
rose as its fulfilling experience2      

while this enjoyment is just the content
 or definition of what the  smell       
consciously meant1 i4e41 meant to mean4 
,both the thing  meaning and the thing  
meant are elements in the same          
situation4 ,both  are present1 but both 
are not present in the same way4 ,in    
fact1 one  is present                   
as-not-present-in-the-same-way-in-which-
the-other-is4  ,it is present as        
something to be rendered present in the 
same way  through the intervention of an
 operation4 ,we must not balk at a      
purely  verbal difficulty4 ,it suggests 
a verbal inconsistency to speak of  a   
thing present-as-absent4 ,but all ideal 
contents1 all aims 7that  is1 things    
aimed at7 are present in just such      
fashion4 ,things can  be presented as   
absent1 just as they can be presented as
 hard or  soft1 black or white1 six     
inches or fifty rods away from the body4
  ,the assumption that an ideal content 
must be either totally absent1  or else 
present in just the same fashion as it  

will be when it is  realized1 is not    
only dogmatic1 but self-contradictory4  
,the only  way in which an ideal content
 can be experienced at all is to be     
presented as not-present-in-the-same-way
 in which something else is  present1   
the latter kind of presence affording   
the standard or type  of satisfactory   
presence4 ,when present in the same way 
it ceases to  be an ideal content4 ,not 
a contrast of bare existence over       
against  non-existence1 or of present   
consciousness over against reality out  
of  present consciousness1 but of a     
satisfactory with an unsatisfactory     
mode of presence makes the difference   
between the 8really0 and the  8ideally0 
present4    ,in terms of our            
illustration1 handling and enjoying the 
rose are  present1 but they are not     
present in the same way that the smell  
is  present4 ,they are present as going 
to be there in the same way1  through an
 operation which the smell stands       
sponsor for4 ,the situation  is         

inherently an uneasy one--one in which  
everything hangs upon the  performance  
of the operation indicated2 upon the    
adequacy of movement  as a connecting   
link1 or real adjustment of the thing   
meaning and  the thing meant4           
,generalizing from the instance1 we get 
the following  definition3 ,an          
experience is a knowledge1 if in its    
quale there is an  experienced          
distinction and connection of two       
elements of the following  sort3 one    
means or intends the presence of the    
other in the same  fashion in which     
itself is already present1 while the    
other is that  which1 while not present 
in the same fashion1 must become so     
present  if the meaning or intention of 
its companion or yoke-fellow is to be   
fulfilled through the operation it sets 
up4      ,,ii    ,we now return briefly 
to the question of knowledge as         
acquaintance1 and  at greater length to 
that of knowledge as assurance1 or as   
fulfilment  which confirms and          

validates4 ,with the recurrence of the  
odor as  meaning something beyond       
itself1 there is apprehension1 knowledge
  that4 ,one may now say ,i know what a 
rose smells like2 or ,i know  what this 
smell is like2 ,i am acquainted with the
 rose's agreeable  odor4 ,in short1 on  
the basis of a present quality1 the odor
 anticipates  and forestalls some       
further trait4    ,we have also the     
conditions of knowledge of the          
confirmation and  refutation type4 ,in  
the working out of the situation just   
described1  in the transformation1      
self-indicated and self-demanded1 of the
  tensional into a harmonious or        
satisfactory situation1 fulfilment  or  
disappointment results4 ,the odor either
 does or does not fulfil  itself in the 
rose4 ,the smell as intention is borne  
out by the facts1  or is nullified4 ,as 
has already been pointed out1 the       
subsequent  experience of the fulfilment
 type is not primarily a confirmation or
  refutation4 ,its import is too vital1 

too urgent to be reduced in  itself just
 to the value of testing an intention or
 meaning4#ac  ,but it gets in reflection
 just such verificatory significance4   
,if the smell's intention is            
unfulfilled1 the discrepancy may throw  
one back1 in reflection1 upon the       
original situation4 ,interesting        
developments then occur4 ,the smell     
meant a rose2 and yet it did not  7so it
 turns out7 mean a rose2 it meant       
another flower1 or something1  one can't
 just tell what4 ,clearly there is      
something else which  enters in2        
something else beyond the odor as it was
 first experienced  determined the      
validity of its meaning4 ,here then1    
perhaps1 we have a  transcendental1 as  
distinct from an experimental reference8
 ,only if  this something else makes no 
difference1 or no detectable difference1
  in the smell itself4 ,if the utmost   
observation and reflection can find  no 
difference in the smell quales that fail
 and those that succeed  in executing   

their intentions1 then there is an      
outside controlling  and disturbing     
factor1 which1 since it is outside of   
the situation1  can never be utilized in
 knowledge1 and hence can never be      
employed  in any concrete testing or    
verifying4 ,in this case1 knowing       
depends  upon an extra-experimental or  
transcendental factor4 ,but this very   
transcendental quality makes both       
confirmation and refutation1            
correction1 criticism1 of the           
pretensions or meanings of things1      
impossible4 ,for the conceptions of     
truth and error1 we must1 upon  the     
transcendental basis1 substitute those  
of accidental success or  failure4      
,sometimes the intention chances upon   
one1 sometimes upon  another4 ,why or   
how1 the gods only know--and they only  
if to them  the extra-experimental      
factor is not extra-experimental1 but   
makes  a concrete difference in the     
concrete smell4 ,but fortunately the    
situation is not one to be thus         

described4 ,the factor that determines  
the success or failure1 does institute a
 difference in the thing which  means   
the object1 and this difference is      
detectable1 once attention1  through    
failure1 has been called to the need of 
its discovery4 ,at the  very least1 it  
makes this difference3 the smell is     
infected with an  element of uncertainty
 of meaning--and this as a part of the  
thing  experienced1 not for an observer4
 ,this additional awareness at least    
brings about an additional wariness4    
,meaning is more critical1 and          
operation more cautious4    ,but we need
 not stop here4 ,attention may be fully 
directed to the  subject of smells4     
,smells may become the object of        
knowledge4 ,they  may take1 pro         
tempore1#ad the place which the rose    
formerly  occupied4 ,one may1 that is1  
observe the cases in which odors mean   
other things than just roses1 may       
voluntarily produce new cases for  the  
sake of further inspection1 and thus    

account for the cases where  meanings   
had been falsified in the issue2        
discriminate more carefully  the        
peculiarities of those meanings which   
the event verified1 and  thus safeguard 
and bulwark to some extent the employing
 of similar  meanings in the future4    
,superficially1 it may then seem as if  
odors  were treated after the fashion of
 ,locke's simple ideas1 or ,hume's      
8distinct ideas which are separate      
existences40 ,smells apparently  assume 
an independent1 isolated status during  
this period of  investigation4          
8,sensations10 as the laboratory        
psychologist and the  analytic          
psychologist generally studies them1 are
 examples of just  such detached things4
 ,but egregious error results if we     
forget that  this seeming isolation and 
detachment is the outcome of a          
deliberate  scientific device--that it  
is simply a part of the scientific      
technique  of an inquiry directed upon  
securing tested conclusions4 ,just and  

only because odors 7or any group of     
qualities7 are parts of a connected     
world are they signs of things beyond   
themselves2 and only because they  are  
signs is it profitable and necessary to 
study them as if they  were complete1   
self-enclosed entities4    ,in the      
reflective determination of things with 
reference to their  specifically meaning
 other things1 experiences of           
fulfilment1  disappointment1 and going  
astray inevitably play an important and 
recurrent rle4 ,they also are realistic 
facts1 related in realistic  ways to the
 things that intend to mean other things
 and to the things  intended4 ,when     
these fulfilments and refusals are      
reflected upon  in the determinate      
relations in which they stand to their  
relevant  meanings1 they obtain a       
quality which is quite lacking to them  
in their  immediate occurrence as just  
fulfilments or disappointments2 viz41   
the property of affording assurance and 
correction--of confirming  and refuting4

 ,truth and falsity are not properties  
of any experience  or thing1 in and of  
itself or in its first intention2 but of
 things  where the problem of assurance 
consciously enters in4 ,truth and       
falsity present themselves as           
significant facts only in situations  in
 which specific meanings and their      
already experienced fulfilments  and    
non-fulfilments are intentionally       
compared and contrasted with  reference 
to the question of the worth1 as to     
reliability of meaning1  of the given   
meaning or class of meanings4 ,like     
knowledge itself1  truth is an          
experienced relation of things1 and it  
has no meaning  outside of such         
relation1#ae any more than such         
adjectives as  comfortable applied to a 
lodging1 correct applied to speech1     
persuasive  applied to an orator1 etc41 
have worth apart from the specific      
things  to which they are applied4 ,it  
would be a great gain for logic and     
epistemology1 if we were always to      

translate the noun 8truth0 back into    
the adjective 8true10 and this back into
 the adverb 8truly02 at least1  if we   
were to do so until we have familiarized
 ourselves thoroughly  with the fact    
that 8truth0 is an abstract noun1       
summarizing a quality  presented by     
specific affairs in their own specific  
contents4      ,,iii    ,i have         
attempted1 in the foregoing pages1 a    
description of the function  of         
knowledge in its own terms and on its   
merits--a description which  in         
intention is realistic1 if by realistic 
we are content to mean  naturalistic1 a 
description undertaken on the basis of  
what ,mr4  ,santayana has well called   
8following the lead of the              
subject-matter40  ,unfortunately at the 
present time all such undertakings      
contend with  a serious extraneous      
obstacle4 ,accomplishing the undertaking
 has  difficulties enough of its own to 
reckon with2 and first attempts  are    
sure to be imperfect1 if not radically  

wrong4 ,but at present the  attempts are
 not1 for the most part1 even listened  
to on their own  account1 they are not  
examined and criticised as naturalistic 
attempts4  ,they are compared with      
undertakings of a wholly different      
nature1 with  an epistemological theory 
of knowledge1 and the assumptions of    
this  extraneous theory are taken as a  
ready-made standard by which to test    
their validity4 ,literally of course1   
8epistemology0 means only theory  of    
knowledge2 the term might therefore have
 been employed simply as  a synonym for 
a descriptive logic2 for a theory that  
takes knowledge  as it finds it and     
attempts to give the same kind of an    
account of it  that would be given of   
any other natural function or           
occurrence4 ,but  the mere mention of   
what might have been only accentuates   
what is4  ,the things that pass for     
epistemology all assume that knowledge  
is not  a natural function or event1 but
 a mystery4    ,epistemology starts from

 the assumption that certain conditions 
lie  back of knowledge4 ,the mystery    
would be great enough if knowledge  were
 constituted by non-natural conditions  
back of knowledge1 but the  mystery is  
increased by the fact that the          
conditions are defined so  as to be     
incompatible with knowledge4 ,hence the 
primary problem of  epistemology is3    
,how is knowledge berhaupt1 knowledge at
 large1  possible8 ,because of the      
incompatibility between the concrete    
occurrence and function of knowledge and
 the conditions back of it to  which it 
must conform1 a second problem arises3  
,how is knowledge in  general1 knowledge
 berhaupt1 valid8 ,hence the complete   
divorce  in contemporary thought between
 epistemology as theory of knowledge    
and logic as an account of the specific 
ways in which particular  beliefs that  
are better than other alternative       
beliefs regarding the  same matters are 
formed2 and also the complete divorce   
between a  naturalistic1 a biological   

and social psychology1 setting forth how
  the function of knowledge is evolved  
out of other natural activities1  and   
epistemology as an account of how       
knowledge is possible anyhow4    ,it is 
out of the question to set forth in this
 place in detail the  contrast between  
transcendental epistemology and an      
experimental theory  of knowledge4 ,it  
may assist the understanding of the     
latter1 however1  if ,i point out1      
baldly and briefly1 how1 out of the     
distinctively  empirical situation1     
there arise those assumptions which make
  knowledge a mystery1 and hence a topic
 for a peculiar branch of               
philosophizing4    ,as just pointed out1
 epistemology makes the possibility of  
knowledge a  problem1 because it assumes
 back of knowledge conditions           
incompatible  with the obvious traits of
 knowledge as it empirically exists4    
,these  assumptions are that the organ  
or instrument of knowledge is not a     
natural object1 but some ready-made     

state of mind or consciousness1         
something purely 8subjective10 a        
peculiar kind of existence which  lives1
 moves1 and has its being in a realm    
different from things to  be known2 and 
that the ultimate goal and content of   
knowledge is a  fixed1 ready-made thing 
which has no organic connections with   
the  origin1 purpose1 and growth of the 
attempt to know it1 some kind of        
,ding-an-sich or absolute1              
extra-empirical 8,reality40    7#a7 ,it 
is not difficult to see at what point in
 the development  of natural knowledge1 
or the signifying of one thing by       
another1  there arises the notion of the
 knowing medium as something radically  
different in the order of existence from
 the thing to be known4 ,it  arises     
subsequent to the repeated experience of
 non-fulfilment1 of  frustration and    
disappointment4 ,the odor did not after 
all mean the  rose2 it meant something  
quite different2 and yet its indicative 
function was exercised so forcibly that 

we could not help--or at least  did not 
help--believing in the existence of the 
rose4 ,this is a  familiar and typical  
kind of experience1 one which very early
 leads  to the recognition that 8things 
are not what they seem40 ,there are  two
 contrasted methods of dealing with this
 recognition3 one is the  method        
indicated above 7p4 #ic74 ,we go more   
thoroughly1 patiently1 and  carefully   
into the facts of the case4 ,we employ  
all sorts of methods1  invented for the 
purpose1 of examining the things that   
are signs and  the things that are      
signified1 and we experimentally produce
 various  situations1 in order that we  
may tell what smells mean roses when    
roses are meant1 what it is about the   
smell and the rose that led us  into    
error2 and that we may be able to       
discriminate those cases in  which a    
suspended conclusion is all that        
circumstances admit4 ,we simply  do the 
best we can to regulate our system of   
signs so that they become  as           

instructive as possible1 utilizing for  
this purpose 7as indicated  above7 all  
possible experiences of success and of  
failure1 and  deliberately instituting  
cases which will throw light on the     
specific  empirical causes of success   
and failure4    ,now it so happens that 
when the facts of error were consciously
  generalized and formulated1 namely in 
,greek thought1 such a technique  of    
specific inquiry and rectification did  
not exist--in fact1 it hardly  could    
come into existence until after error   
had been seized upon as  constituting a 
fundamental anomaly4 ,hence the method  
just outlined of  dealing with the      
situation was impossible4 ,we can       
imagine disconsolate  ghosts willing to 
postpone any professed solution of the  
difficulty  till subsequent generations 
have thrown more light on the question  
itself2 we can hardly imagine passionate
 human beings exercising  such reserve4 
,at all events1 ,greek thought provided 
what seemed a  satisfactory way out3    

there are two orders of existence1 one  
permanent  and complete1 the noumenal   
region1 to which alone the              
characteristic  of ,being is properly   
applicable1 the other transitory1       
phenomenal1  sensible1 a region of      
non-,being1 or at least of mere         
,coming-to-be1 a  region in which ,being
 is hopelessly mixed with non-,being1   
with the  unreal4 ,the former alone is  
the domain of knowledge1 of truth2 the  
latter is the territory of opinion1     
confusion1 and error4 ,in short1 the    
contrast within experience of the cases 
in which things successfully  and       
unsuccessfully maintained and executed  
the meanings of other things  was       
erected into a wholesale difference of  
status in the intrinsic  characters of  
the things involved in the two types of 
cases4    ,with the beginnings of modern
 thought1 the region of the 8unreal10   
the  source of opinion and error1 was   
located exclusively in the individual4  
,the object was all real and all        

satisfactory1 but the 8subject0  could  
approach the object only through his own
 subjective states1  his 8sensations0   
and 8ideas40 ,the ,greek conception of  
two orders of  existence was retained1  
but instead of the two orders           
characterizing  the 8universe0 itself1  
one was the universe1 the other was the 
individual mind trying to know that     
universe4 ,this scheme would  obviously 
easily account for error and            
hallucination2 but how could  knowledge1
 truth1 ever come about such a basis8   
,the ,greek problem of  the possibility 
of error became the modern problem of   
the possibility  of knowledge4          
,putting the matter in terms that are   
independent of history1  experiences of 
failure1 disappointment1 non-fulfilment 
of the  function of meaning and         
contention may lead the individual to   
the  path of science--to more careful   
and extensive investigation of  the     
things themselves1 with a view to       
detecting specific sources  of error1   

and guarding against them1 and          
regulating1 so far as  possible1 the    
conditions under which objects are      
bearers of meanings  beyond themselves4 
,but impatient of such slow and         
tentative methods  7which insure not    
infallibility but increased probability 
of  valid conclusions71 by reason of    
disappointment a person may turn        
epistemologist4 ,he may then take the   
discrepancy1 the failure of the  smell  
to execute its own intended meaning1 as 
a wholesale1 rather  than as a specific 
fact3 as evidence of a contrast in      
general between  things meaning and     
things meant1 instead of as evidence of 
the need  of a more cautious and        
thorough inspection of odors and        
execution of  operations indicated by   
them4 ,one may then say3 ,woe is me2    
smells are  only my smells1 subjective  
states existing in an order of being    
made  out of consciousness1 while roses 
exist in another order made out of a    
radically different sort of stuff2 or1  

odors are made out of 8finite0          
consciousness as their stuff1 while the 
real things1 the objects which  fulfil  
them1 are made out of an 8infinite0     
consciousness as their  material4 ,hence
 some purely metaphysical tie has to be 
called in to  bring them into connection
 with each other4 ,and yet this tie does
 not  concern knowledge2 it does not    
make the meaning of one odor any more   
correct than that of another1 nor enable
 us to discriminate relative  degrees of
 correctness4 ,as a principle of        
control1 this transcendental  connection
 is related to all alike1 and hence     
condemns and justifies  all alike4#af   
,it is interesting to note that the     
transcendentalist almost invariably     
first falls into the psychological      
fallacy2 and then having himself  taken 
the psychologist's attitude 7the        
attitude which is interested in         
meanings as themselves self-inclosed    
8ideas07 accuses the empiricist  whom he
 criticises of having confused mere     

psychological existence  with logical   
validity4 ,that is1 he begins by        
supposing that the smell  of our        
illustration 7and all the cognitional   
objects for which this  is used as a    
symbol7 is a purely mental or psychical 
state1 so that  the question of logical 
reference or intention is the problem of
 how  the merely mental can 8know0 the  
extra-mental4 ,but from a strictly      
empirical point of view1 the smell which
 knows is no more merely mental  than is
 the rose known4 ,we may1 if we please1 
say that the smell when  involving      
conscious meaning or intention is       
8mental10 but this term  8mental0 does  
not denote some separate type of        
existence--existence  as a state of     
consciousness4 ,it denotes only the fact
 that the smell1  a real and            
non-psychical object1 now exercises an  
intellectual  function4 ,this new       
property involves1 as ,james has pointed
 out1 an  additive relation--a new      
property possessed by a non-mental      

object1  when that object1 occurring in 
a new context1 assumes a further  office
 and use4#ag ,to be 8in the mind0 means 
to be in a situation  in which the      
function of intending is directly       
concerned4#ah ,will  not some one who   
believes that the knowing experience is 
ab origine  a strictly 8mental0 thing1  
explain how1 as matter of fact1 it does 
get a specific1 extra-mental reference1 
capable of being tested1  confirmed1 or 
refuted8 ,or1 if he believes that       
viewing it as merely  mental expresses  
only the form it takes for psychological
 analysis1  will he not explain why he  
so persistently attributes the          
inherently  8mental0 characterization of
 it to the empiricist whom he           
criticises8  ,an object becomes meaning 
when used empirically in a certain way2 
and1 under certain circumstances1 the   
exact character and worth of  this      
meaning becomes an object of solicitude4
 ,but the transcendental  epistemologist
 with his purely psychical 8meanings0   

and his purely  extra-empirical 8truths0
 assumes a ,deus ex ,machina whose      
mechanism  is preserved a secret4 ,and  
as if to add to the arbitrary character 
of  his assumption1 he has to admit that
 the transcendental a priori  faculty by
 which mental states get objective      
reference does not in the  least help us
 to discriminate1 in the concrete1      
between an objective  reference that is 
false and one that is valid4    7#b7    
,the counterpart assumption to that of  
pure aboriginal 8mental  states0 is1 of 
course1 that of an ,absolute ,reality1  
fixed and complete  in itself1 of which 
our 8mental states0 are bare transitory 
hints1  their true meaning and their    
transcendent goal being the ,truth in   
rerum natura4 ,if the organ and medium  
of knowing is a self-inclosed  order of 
existence different in kind from the    
,object to be known1  then that ,object 
must stand out there in complete        
aloofness from the  concrete purpose and
 procedure of knowing it4 ,but if we go 

back to  the knowing as a natural       
occurrence1 capable of description1 we  
find  that just as a smell does not mean
 ,rose in general 7or anything else  at 
large71 but means a specific group of   
qualities whose experience  is intended 
and anticipated1 so the function of     
knowing is always  expressed in         
connections between a given experience  
and a specific  possible wanted         
experience4 ,the 8rose0 that is meant in
 a particular  situation is the rose of 
that situation4 ,when this experience is
  consummated1 it is achieved as the    
fulfilment of the conditions in  which  
just that intention was entertained--not
 as the fulfilment of  a faculty of     
knowledge or a meaning in general4      
,subsequent meanings  and subsequent    
fulfilments may increase1 may enrich the
 consummating  experience2 the object or
 content of the rose as known may be    
other and  fuller next time and so on4  
,but we have no right to set up 8a rose0
 at  large or in general as the object  

of the knowing odor2 the object of a    
knowledge is always strictly correlative
 to that particular thing which  means  
it4 ,it is not something which can be   
put in a wholesale way over  against    
that which cognitively refers to it1 as 
when the epistemologist  puts the 8real0
 rose 7object7 over against a merely    
phenomenal or  empirical rose which this
 smell happens to mean4 ,as the meaning 
gets  more complex1 fuller1 more finely 
discriminated1 the object which         
realizes or fulfils the meaning grows   
similarly in quality4 ,but we  cannot   
set up a rose1 an object of fullest1    
complete1 and exhaustive  content as    
that which is really meant by any and   
every odor of a  rose1 whether it       
consciously meant to mean it or not4    
,the test of  the cognitional rectitude 
of the odor lies in the specific object 
which it sets out to secure4 ,this is   
the meaning of the statement that  the  
import of each term is found in its     
relationship to the other4  ,it applies 

to object meant as well as to the       
meaning4 ,fulfilment1  completion are   
always relative terms4 ,hence the       
criterion of the truth  or falsity of   
the meaning1 of the adequacy1 of the    
cognitional thing  lies within the      
relationships of the situation and not  
without4 ,the  thing that means another 
by means of an intervening operation    
either  succeeds or fails in            
accomplishing the operation indicated1  
while this  operation either gives or   
fails to give the object meant4 ,hence  
the  truth or falsity of the original   
cognitional object4      ,,iv    ,from  
this excursion1 ,i return in conclusion 
to a brief general  characterization of 
those situations in which we are aware  
that  things mean other things and are  
so critically aware of it that1 in      
order to increase the probability of    
fulfilment and to decrease the  chance  
of frustration1 all possible pains are  
taken to regulate the  meanings that    
attach to things4 ,these situations     

define that type of  knowing which we   
call scientific4 ,there are things that 
claim to  mean other experiences2 in    
which the trait of meaning other objects
  is not discovered ab extra1 and after 
the event1 but is part of the  thing    
itself4 ,this trait of the thing is as  
realistic1 as specific1  as any other of
 its traits4 ,it is1 therefore1 as open 
to inspection  and determination as to  
its nature1 as is any other trait4      
,moreover1  since it is upon this trait 
that assurance 7as distinct from        
accident7  of fulfilment depends1 an    
especial interest1 an absorbing         
interest1  attaches to its              
determination4 ,hence the scientific    
type of knowledge  and its growing      
domination over other sorts4    ,we     
employ meanings in all intentional      
constructions of experience--in  all    
anticipations1 whether artistic1        
utilitarian or technological1  social or
 moral4 ,the success of the anticipation
 is found to depend  upon the character 

of the meaning4 ,hence the stress upon a
 right  determination of these meanings4
 ,since they are the instruments upon   
which fulfilment depends so far as that 
is controlled or other than  accidental1
 they become themselves objects of      
surpassing interest4 ,for  all persons  
at some times1 and for one class of     
persons 7scientists7  at almost all     
times1 the determination of the meanings
 employed in  the control of fulfilments
 7of acting upon meanings7 is central4  
,the  experimental or pragmatic theory  
of knowledge explains the dominating    
importance of science2 it does not      
depreciate it or explain it away4       
,possibly pragmatic writers are to blame
 for the tendency of their  critics to  
assume that the practice they have in   
mind is utilitarian  in some narrow     
sense1 referring to some preconceived   
and inferior  use--though ,i cannot     
recall any evidence for this admission4 
,but  what the pragmatic theory has in  
mind is precisely the fact that  all the

 affairs of life which need             
regulation--all values of all           
types--depend upon utilizations of      
meanings4 ,action is not to be  limited 
to anything less than the carrying out  
of ideas1 than the  execution1 whether  
strenuous or easeful1 of meanings4      
,hence the  surpassing importance which 
comes to attach to the careful1         
impartial  construction of the meanings1
 and to their constant survey and       
resurvey  with reference to their value 
as evidenced by experiences of          
fulfilment  and deviation4    ,that     
truth denotes truths1 that is1 specific 
verifications1  combinations of meanings
 and outcomes reflectively viewed1 is1  
one may say1 the central point of the   
experimental theory4 ,truth1  in general
 or in the abstract1 is a just name for 
an experienced  relation among the      
things of experience3 that sort of      
relation in  which intents are          
retrospectively viewed from the         
standpoint of the  fulfilment which they

 secure through their own natural       
operation  or incitement4 ,thus the     
experimental theory explains directly   
and  simply the absolutistic tendency to
 translate concrete true things  into   
the general relationship1 ,truth1 and   
then to hypostatize this  abstraction   
into identity with real being1 ,truth   
per se and in se1  of which all         
transitory things and events--that is1  
all experienced  realities--are only    
shadowy futile approximations4 ,this    
type of  relationship is central for    
man's will1 for man's conscious         
endeavor4  ,to select1 to conserve1 to  
extend1 to propagate those meanings     
which  the course of events has         
generated1 to note their peculiarities1 
to  be in advance on the alert for them1
 to search for them anxiously1 to       
substitute them for meanings that eat up
 our energy in vain1 defines  the aim of
 rational effort and the goal of        
legitimate ambition4 ,the  absolutistic 
theory is the transfer of this moral or 

voluntary law of  selective action into 
a quasi-physical 7that is1 metaphysical7
 law of  indiscriminate being4 ,identify
 metaphysical being with significant    
excellent being--that is1 with those    
relationships of things which1 in  our  
moments of deepest insight and largest  
survey1 we would continue  and          
reproduce--and the experimentalist1     
rather than the absolutist1  is he who  
has a right to proclaim the supremacy of
 ,truth1 and the  superiority of the    
life devoted to ,truth for its own sake 
over that of  8mere0 activity4 ,but to  
read back into an order of things which 
exists  without the participation of our
 reflection and aim1 the quality which  
defines the purpose of our thought and  
endeavor is at one and the same  stroke 
to mythologize reality and to deprive   
the life of thoughtful  endeavor of its 
ground for being4          ,,the        
,,intellectualist ,,criterion ,,for     
,,truth#ai      ,i    ,among the        
influences that have worked in          

contemporary philosophy  towards        
disintegration of intellectualism of the
 epistemological type1  and towards the 
substitution of a philosophy of         
experience1 the work of  ,mr4 ,bradley  
must be seriously counted4 ,one has1 for
 example1 only to  compare his          
metaphysics with the two fundamental    
contentions of ,t4 ,h4  ,green1 namely1 
that reality is a single1 eternal1 and  
all-inclusive  system of relations1 and 
that this system of relations is one in 
kind  with that process of relating     
which constitutes our thinking1 to be   
instantly aware of a changed atmosphere4
 ,much of ,bradley's writings  is a     
sustained and deliberate polemic against
 intellectualism of the  ,neo-,kantian  
type4 ,when1 however1 we find conjoined 
to this criticism  an equally sustained 
contention that the philosophic         
conception of  reality must be based on 
an exclusively intellectual criterion1 a
  criterion belonging to and confined to
 theory1 we have a situation  that is   

thought-provoking4 ,the situation grows 
in interest when it is  remembered that 
there is a general and growing tendency 
among those  who appeal in philosophy to
 a strictly intellectualistic method of 
defining 8reality10 to insist that the  
reality reached by this method  has a   
super-intellectual content3 that        
intellectual1 affectional1  and         
volitional features are all joined and  
fused in 8ultimate0  reality4 ,the      
curious character of the situation is   
that ,reality is  an 8absolute          
experience0 of which the intellectual is
 simply one  partial and transmuted     
moment4 ,yet this reality is attained   
unto1  in philosophic method1 by        
exclusive emphasis upon the intellectual
  aspect of present experience and by   
systematic exclusion of exactly  the    
emotional1 volitional features which    
with respect to content are  insisted   
upon6 ,under such circumstances the     
cynically-minded are moved  to wonder   
whether this tremendous insistence upon 

one factor in present  experience at the
 expense of others1 is not because this 
is the only  way to maintain the notion 
of 8,absolute ,experience10 and to      
prevent  it from collapsing into        
ordinary everyday experience4 ,this     
paradox is  not peculiar to ,mr4        
,bradley4 ,looking at the ,neo-,kantian 
movement in  the broad in its modern    
form1 one might almost say that its     
prominent  feature is its insistence    
upon reaching a 8,reality0 that includes
  extra-intellectual factors and phases1
 traits that are ideal in a moral  and  
emotional sense1 by an exclusive        
recognition of the function of          
knowledge in its isolation4    ,such    
being the case1 an examination of ,mr4  
,bradley's method and  criterion may    
have far-reaching implications4 ,first1 
let us set  before ourselves the general
 points of ,mr4 ,bradley's indictment of
  intellectualism4#bj ,knowledge or     
judgment works by means of thought2  it 
is predication of idea 7meaning7 of     

existence as its subject4 ,its  final   
aim is to effect a complete union or    
harmony of existence and  meaning4 ,but 
it is fore-doomed to failure1 for in    
realizing its end  it must employ means 
which contradict its own purpose4 ,this 
inherent  incapacity lurks in judgment  
with respect to subject1 predicate1 and 
copula4 ,the predicate or meaning       
necessary to complete the reality       
presented in the subject can be referred
 to the latter and united with  it only 
by being itself alienated from          
existence4 ,it heals the wounds  or     
deficiencies of its own subject 7and in 
the end all deficiencies are  to the    
modern idealist discrepancies7 only on  
condition of inflicting  another        
wound1--only by sundering meaning from a
 prior union with  existence in some    
other phase4 ,this latter existence1    
therefore1 is  always left out in the   
cold4 ,it is as if we wanted to get all 
the cloth  in the world into one garment
 and our only way of accomplishing this 

were to tear off a portion from one     
piece of goods in order to patch it  on 
to another4    ,the subject of the      
judgment1 moreover1 as well as the      
predicate1  stands in the way of        
judgment fulfilling its own task4 ,it   
has  8sensuous infinitude0 and it has   
8immediacy10 but these two traits       
contradict each other4 ,the details of  
the subject always go beyond  itself1   
being indefinitely related to something 
beyond4 8,in its given  content it has  
relations which do not terminate within 
that content0  7ibid41 p4 #agf71 while  
in its immediacy it presents an         
undivided  union of existence and       
meaning4 ,no subject can be mere        
existence any  more than it can be mere 
meaning4 ,it is always existent or      
embodied  meaning4 ,as such it claims   
individuality or the character of a     
single  subsistent whole4 ,but this     
indispensable claim is inconsistent with
 its  ragged-edged character1 its       
indefinite external reference1 which is 

indispensable to it as subject that it  
may require and receive further  meaning
 from predication4    ,with respect to  
the copula the following quotation from 
the  8,principles0 of ,logic 7p4 #aj7   
may serve3 8,judgment proper is the  act
 which refers the ideal content         
7recognized as such7 to the  reality    
beyond the act40 ,in other words1       
judgment as act 7and it is  the act     
which is expressed in the copula7 must  
always fall outside  of the content of  
knowledge as such2 yet since this act   
certainly  falls within reality1 it     
would have to be recognized and stated  
by  any knowledge pretending to         
competency with respect to reality as a 
whole4 ,these considerations1 stated in 
this way1 are highly technical  and     
presuppose a knowledge not merely of    
,mr4 ,bradley's own logic1 but  also of 
the logical analysis of knowledge       
initiated by ,kant and carried  on by   
,herbart1 ,lotze1 and others4 ,their    
main import may1 however1 be  stated in 

comparatively non-technical form4 ,human
 experience is full of  discrepancies4  
,were experience purely a matter of     
brute existence 7such  as we sometimes  
imagine the animals' experience to be7  
it would be  totally lacking in meaning 
and there would be no problems1 no      
thinking1  no occasion for thinking1 and
 hence no philosophy4 ,on the other     
hand1  if experience were a complete1   
tight-jointed union of existence and    
meaning1 there would be no              
dissatisfaction1 no problems1 no cause  
for  efforts to patch up defects and    
contradictions4 ,existences1 things1    
would embody all the meanings that they 
suggest2 while abstract  meanings1      
values that are merely ideal1 that are  
projected or thought  of but not        
fulfilled1 would be totally unheard of4 
,but our experience  stands in marked   
contrast to both these types of         
experience4 ,it  is neither an affair of
 meaningless existence nor of existence 
self-luminous with fulfilled meaning4   

,all things that we experience  have    
some meaning1 but that meaning is always
 so partially embodied  in things that  
we cannot rest in them4 ,they point     
beyond themselves2  they indicate       
meanings which they do not fulfil2 they 
suggest values  which they fail to      
embody1 and when we go to other things  
for the  fruition of what is denied1 we 
either find the same situation of       
division over again1 or we find even    
more positive disappointment  and       
frustration--we find contrary meanings  
set up4 ,now all thinking  grows out of 
this discrepancy between existence and  
the meaning which  it partially embodies
 and partially refuses1 which it        
suggests but  declines to express4 ,yet 
thinking1 the mode of bringing existence
 and  meaning into harmony with each    
other1 always works by selection1 by    
abstraction2 it sets up and projects    
meanings which are ideal only1          
footless1 in the air1 matters of thought
 only1 not of sentiency or  immediate   

existence4 ,it emphasizes the ideal of a
 completed union  of existence and      
meaning1 but is helpless to effect it4  
,and this  helplessness 7according to   
,mr4 ,bradley7 is not due to external   
pressure  but to the very structure of  
thought itself4    ,from every point of 
view knowledge operates under           
conditions1 7and  these not externally  
imposed but inherent in its own nature  
as  judgment17 that render it incapable 
of realizing its aim of complete  union 
of existence and meaning4 ,granted the  
argument1 and it is  difficult to       
imagine a more serious indictment       
against the pretensions  of philosophy  
to reach 8,reality0 via the exclusive   
path of knowledge4    ,the presence of  
contradiction is ,mr4 ,bradley's        
criterion for  8appearance10 just as its
 absence is his criterion for 8reality40
 ,it  thus goes without saying that     
knowledge and truth which we can attain 
are matters of appearance4              
,contradiction between existence and    

meaning  is its last word4 ,this is not 
merely a logical deduction from ,mr4    
,bradley's position1 but is expressly   
stated by him4 8,thus the truth  belongs
 to existence1 but it does not as such  
exist4444 ,truth shows  a dissection but
 never an actual life0 78,appearance and
 ,reality10 p4  #afg74 ,again1 8every   
truth is appearance since in it we have 
divorce  of quality from being0 7ibid41 
p4 #ahg74 8,even absolute truth seems   
in the end to turn out erroneous4444    
,internal discrepancy belongs           
irremovably to truth's proper           
character4444 ,truth is one aspect of   
experience and is therefore made        
imperfect and limited by what it fails  
to include0 7ibid41 pp4 #edd-ede74      
,nothing could be more explicit as  to  
the inherently contradictory character  
of truth1 both as an ideal  and as an   
accomplished fact2 nothing more positive
 as to the unreality  or                
appearance-character of truth4 ,we      
cannot1 on ,mr4 ,bradley's method1  stop

 here4 ,not only is knowledge--working  
as it does through thought  which is    
always partial1 selective1              
abstractive--doomed to failure  in      
accomplishing its task1 but the         
existence of the contradiction  between 
the suggestion of meanings by existence 
and this realization in  existence is   
itself due to thought4    ,speaking of  
thought he says3 8,the relational form  
is a compromise on  which thought stands
 and which it develops40 ,and all the   
particular  antinomies which he         
discusses are interpreted as having     
their basis  in the category of relation
 7ibid41 p4 #ahj74 ,in his section on   
,appearance he goes through various     
aspects and distinctions of the  world1 
such as primary and secondary qualities1
 substance and its  properties1 relation
 and qualitative elements1 space and    
time1 motion  and change1 causation1    
etc41 pointing out irreconcilable       
discrepancies  in them4 ,he does not1 in
 a generalized way1 expressly refer them

  to any common source or root4 ,but it 
seems a fair inference that the         
relational character of thought is at   
the bottom of the whole trouble3  so    
that we have in the cases mentioned     
precisely the same situation  in        
concreto which is set forth in abstracto
 in the discussion of  thought4 ,the    
contradictions brought up are in every  
case resolved  into the fundamental     
discrepancy supposed to exist between   
relations  and elements related4 ,in    
each case there is the ideal of a final 
unity in which relations and elements as
 such disappear1 while in  every case   
the nature of relation is such as to    
prevent the desired  consummation4 ,in  
at least one place1 it is expressly     
declared that it  is the knowledge      
function which is responsible for the   
degradation of  reality to appearance4  
8,we do not suggest that the thing      
always itself  is an appearance4 ,we    
mean its character is such that it      
becomes one as  soon as we judge it4    

,and this character we have seen        
throughout our  work1 is ideality4      
,appearance consists in the looseness of
 content from  existence4444 ,and we    
have found that everywhere throughout   
the world  such ideality prevails0      
7ibid41 p4 #dhf1 italics not in the     
original74  ,it is not then strictly    
true that the divorce of meaning and    
existence  instigates thought2 rather   
thought is the unruly member that       
creates  the divorce and then engages in
 the task 7in which it is self-condemned
  to failure7 of trying to establish the
 unity which it has gratuitously        
destroyed4 ,thinking1                   
self-consciousness1 is disease of the   
nave unity  of thoughtless experience4  
,on the one hand there is a systematic  
discrediting of the ultimate  claims of 
the knowledge function1 and this not    
from external  physiological or         
psychological reasons such as are       
sometimes alleged  against its capacity1
 but on the basis of its own interior   

logic4 ,but  on the other hand1 a       
strictly logical criterion is           
deliberately adopted  and employed as   
the fundamental and final criterion for 
the philosophic  conception of reality4 
,long familiarity has not dulled my     
astonishment  at finding exactly the    
same set of considerations which in the 
earlier  portion of the book are        
employed to condemn things as           
experienced by us  to the region of     
,appearance1 employed in the latter     
portion of the book  to afford a        
triumphant demonstration of the         
existence and character of  ,absolute   
,reality4 ,the argument ,i take up first
 on its formal side1 and  then with     
reference to material considerations4#ba
    ,the positive conception of ,reality
 is reached by the conception that      
8ultimate reality must be such that it  
does not contradict itself2  here is an 
absolute criterion4 ,and it is proved   
absolute by the fact  that either in    
endeavoring to deny it or even in       

attempting to doubt  it1 we tacitly     
assume its validity0 7ibid41 pp4        
#acf-acg74 ,that is  to say1 when one   
sets out to think one must avoid        
self-contradiction2  this avoidance1 or1
 put positively1 the attainment of      
consistency1  harmony1 is the basic law 
of all thinking4 ,since in thinking we  
set out to attain reality1 it follows   
that reality itself must be             
self-consistent1 and that its           
self-consistency determines the law  of 
thought4 ,or1 as ,mr4 ,bradley again    
puts the matter1 8,in order to  think at
 all you must subject yourself to the   
standard1 a standard  which implies an  
absolute knowledge of reality2 and while
 you doubt  this1 you accept it1 and    
obey1 while you rebel0 7ibid41 p4 #aec74
 ,the  absolute knowledge referred to   
is1 of course1 the knowledge of the     
thoroughly self-consistent1             
non-contradictory character of reality4 
,every reader of ,mr4 ,bradley's book   
knows how he goes on from this point  to

 supply positive content to reality2 to 
give an outline sketch of the           
characters it must possess and the way  
in which it must possess them  in order 
to maintain its thoroughly              
self-consistent character4 ,it is1      
however1 only the strictly formal aspect
 of the matter that ,i am here          
concerned with4    ,on this side we     
reach1 ,i think1 the heart of the matter
 by asking1  in reference to the first  
quotation3 ,absolute for what8 ,surely  
absolute for the process under          
consideration1 that is absolute for     
thought4 ,but the significance of this  
absolute for thought is1 one  may say1  
8absolutely0 7since we are here         
confessedly in the realm  just of       
thought7 determined by the nature of    
thought itself4 ,now  this nature has   
been already referred by considerations 
8belonging  irremovably to truth's      
proper character10 to the world of      
appearance  and of internal discrepancy4
 ,yes1 one may say 7speaking formally71 

the criterion of thought is             
absolute--that is to say absolute or    
final  for thought2 but how can one     
imagine that this in any way alters the 
essential nature and value of thought8  
,if knowledge works by thought1  and    
thought institutes appearance over      
against reality1 any further  fact about
 thought--such as a statement of its    
criterion--falls wholly  within the     
limits of this situation4 ,it is comical
 to suppose that a  special trait of    
thought can be employed to alter the    
fundamental and  essential nature of    
thought4 ,the criterion of thought must 
be infected  by the nature of thought1  
instead of being a redeeming angel which
 at  a critical juncture transforms the 
fragile creature1 thought1 into an      
ambassador with power plenipotentiary to
 the court of the ,absolute4    ,there  
really seems to be ground for supposing 
that the whole argument  turns on an    
ambiguity in the use of the word        
8absolute40 ,keeping  strictly within   

the limits of the argument1 it means    
nothing more than  that thinking has a  
certain principle1 a law of its own2    
that it has  an appropriate mode of     
procedure which must not be violated4   
,it means1  in short1 whatever is       
finally controlling for the             
thought-function4  ,but ,mr4 ,bradley   
immediately takes the word to mean      
absolute in the  sense of describing a  
reality which by its very nature is     
totally  contradistinguished from       
appearance--that is to say1 from the    
realm  of thought4 ,upon the ambiguity  
of a word1 the systematic indictment  of
 intellectualism becomes the cornerstone
 of a systematically  intellectualistic 
method of conceiving reality6    ,mr4   
,bradley has himself recognized the     
seeming contradiction between  his      
indictment of thought and his use of the
 criterion of thought as  the exclusive 
path to a philosophic notion of the     
real4 ,in dealing  with it1 he 7to my   
mind7 comes within an ace of stating a  

truer  doctrine1 and also exhibits even 
more clearly the weakness of his own    
position4 ,he goes so far as to put the 
following words into the mouth  of an   
objector1 and to accept their general   
import3 8,all axioms1 as  a matter of   
fact1 are practical 444 for none of them
 in the end can  amount to more than the
 impulse to behave in a certain way4    
,and they  cannot express more than this
 impulse1 together with the             
impossibility  of satisfaction unless it
 is complied with0 7p4 #aea74 ,after    
accepting  this 7p4 #aeb7 he goes on to 
say3 8,take for example the law of      
avoiding  contradiction4 ,when two      
elements will not remain quietly        
together1  but collide and struggle1 we 
cannot rest satisfied with that state4  
,our impulse is to alter it and1 on the 
theoretical side1 to bring  the content 
to such shape that the variety remains  
peaceably in one4  ,and this inability  
to rest otherwise and this tendency to  
alter in a  certain way and direction   

is1 when reflected upon and made        
explicit1  our axiom and our            
intellectual standard0 7p4 #aeb2 italics
 mine74    ,the retort is obvious3 if   
the intellectual criterion1 the         
principle  of non-contradiction on which
 his whole ,absolute ,reality rests1 is 
itself a practical principle1 then      
surely the ultimate criterion for       
regulating intellectual undertakings is 
practical4 ,to this obvious  answer ,mr4
 ,bradley makes reply as follows3 8,you 
may call the intellect1  if you like1 a 
mere tendency to a movement1 but you    
must remember that  it is a movement of 
a very special kind4444 ,thinking is the
 attempt  to satisfy a special impulse1 
and the attempt implies an assumption   
about reality4444 ,but why1 it may be   
objected1 is this assumption  better    
than what holds for practice8 ,why is   
the theoretical to be  superior to the  
practical end8 ,i have never said that  
this is so1 only  here1 that is1 in     
metaphysics1 ,i must be allowed to      

reply1 we are  acting theoretically4444 
,the theoretical standard within theory 
must  surely be absolute0 7p4 #aec4 ,the
 italics again are mine2 compare with   
the quotation this1 from p4 #dhe3 8,our 
attitude1 however1 in metaphysics  must 
be theoretical40 ,so1 also1 p4 #aed1    
8,since metaphysics is mere  theory and 
since theory from its nature must be    
made by the intellect1  it is here the  
intellect alone which is to be          
satisfied074    ,grant that intellect is
 a special movement or mode of practice2
 grant  that we are not merely acting   
7are we ever merely acting87 but are    
8specially occupied and therefore       
subject to special conditions10  and the
 problem remains what special kind of   
activity is thinking8  what is its      
experienced differentia from other      
kinds8 what is its  commerce with them8 
,when the problem is what special kind  
of an  activity is thinking and of what 
nature is the consistency which  is its 
criterion1 somehow we do not get forward

 by being told that  thinking is a      
special mode of practice and that its   
criterion is  consistency4 ,the         
unquestioned presupposition of ,mr4     
,bradley is that  thinking is such a    
wholly separate activity 7the 8intellect
 alone0  which has to be satisfied71    
that to give it autonomy is to say that 
it1  and its criterion1 have nothing to 
do with other activities2 that it is    
8independent0 as to criterion1 in a way 
which excludes interdependence  in      
function and outcome4 ,unless the term  
8special0 be interpreted to  mean       
isolated1 to say that thinking is a     
special mode of activity  no more       
nullifies the proposition that it arises
 in a practical contest  and operates   
for practical ends1 than to say that    
blacksmithing is a  special activity1   
negates its being one connected mode of 
industrial  activity4    ,his underlying
 presupposition of the separate         
character of thought  comes out in the  
passage last quoted4 8,our impulse10 he 

says1 8is to  alter the conflicting     
situation and1 on the theoretical side1 
to  bring its contents into peaceable   
unity40 ,if one substitutes for the     
word 8on0 the word 8through10 one gets a
 conception of theory and of  thinking  
that does justice to the autonomy of the
 operation and yet so  connects it with 
other activities as to give it a serious
 business1  real purpose1 and concrete  
responsibility and hence testibility4   
,from this point of view the theoretical
 activity is simply the form  that      
certain practical activities take after 
colliding1 as the most  effective and   
fruitful way of securing their own      
harmonization4  ,the collision is not   
theoretical2 the issue in 8peaceable    
unity0  is not theoretical4 ,but theory 
names the type of activity by which  the
 transformation from war to peace is    
most amply and securely  effected4#bb   
,admit1 however1 the force of ,mr4      
,bradley's contention on its own terms  
and see how futile is the result4 ,it is

 quite true1 as ,mr4 ,bradley  says 7p4 
#aec71 that if a man sits down to play  
the metaphysical game1  he must abide by
 the rules of thinking2 but if thinking 
be already1  with respect to reality1 an
 idle and futile game1 simply abiding by
  the rules does not give additional    
value to its stakes4 ,grant the         
premises as to the character of thought1
 and the assertion of the  final        
character of the theoretical standard   
within metaphysics--since  metaphysics  
is a form of theory--is a warning       
against metaphysics4 ,if  the intellect 
involves self-contradiction1 it is      
either impossible that  it should be    
satisfied1 or else self-contradiction is
 its satisfaction4      ,,ii    ,let us1
 however1 turn from ,mr4 ,bradley's     
formal proof that the  criterion of     
philosophic truth must be exclusively a 
canon of formal  thought4 ,let us ignore
 the contradiction involved in first    
making the  work of thought to be the   
producing of appearance and then making 

the law of this thought the law of an   
,absolute ,reality4 ,what about  the    
intellectualist criterion8 ,the         
intellectualism of ,mr4 ,bradley's      
philosophy is represented in the        
statement that it is 8the theoretical   
standard which guarantees that reality  
is a self-consistent system0  7p4 #adh74
 ,but how can the fact that the         
criterion of thinking is  consistency be
 employed to determine the nature of the
 consistency of  its object8            
,consistency in one sense1 consistency  
of reasoning with  itself1 we know2 but 
what is the nature of the consistency of
 reality  which this consistency        
necessitates8 ,thinking without doubt   
must be  logical2 but does it follow    
from this that the reality about which  
one thinks1 and about which one must    
think consistently if one is to  think  
to any purpose1 must itself be already  
logical8 ,the pivot of  the argument is1
 of course1 the old ontological         
argument1 stripped of  all theological  

irrelevancies and reduced to its        
fighting weight as  a metaphysical      
proposition4 ,those who question this   
basic principle  of intellectualism     
will1 of course1 question it here4 ,they
 will urge  that1 instead of the        
consistency of 8reality0 resting on the 
basis of  consistency in the reasoning  
process the latter derives its meaning  
from the material consistency at which  
it aims4 ,they will say that  the       
definition of the nature of the         
consistency which is the end of         
thinking and which prescribes its       
technique is to be reached from  inquiry
 into such questions as these3 ,what    
sort of an activity in the  concrete is 
thinking8 what are the specific         
conditions which it has  to fulfil8 what
 is its use2 its relevancy2 its purport 
in present  concrete experiences8 ,the  
more it is insisted that the theoretical
  standard--consistency--is final within
 theory1 the more germane and  the more 
urgent is the question3 ,what then in   

the concrete is theory8  and of what    
nature is the material consistency which
 is the test of  its formal             
consistency8#bc    ,take the instance of
 a man who wishes to deny the criterion 
of  self-consistency in thinking4 ,is he
 refuted by pointing to the 8fact0  that
 eternal reality is eternally           
self-consistent8 ,would not his  obvious
 answer to such a mode of refutation be3
 8,what of it8 ,what is  the relevancy  
of that proposition to my procedure in  
thinking here  and now8 ,doubtless      
absolute reality may be a great number  
of things1  possibly very sublime and   
precious things2 but what ,i am         
concerned with  is a particular job of  
thinking1 and until you show me the     
intermediate  terms which link that job 
to the asserted self-consistent         
character  of absolute reality1 ,i fail 
to see what difference this doubtless   
wholly amiable trait of reality has to  
make in what ,i am here and now         
concerned with4 ,you might as well quote

 any other irrelevant fact1 such  as the
 height of the ,empress of ,china40 ,we 
take another tack in dealing  with the  
man in question4 ,we call his attention 
to his specific aim in  the situation   
with reference to which he is thinking1 
and point out the  conditions that have 
to be observed if that aim is to fulfil 
itself4 ,we  show that if he does not   
observe the conditions imposed by his   
aim his  thinking will go on so wildly  
as to defeat itself4 ,it is to          
consistency  of means with the end of   
the concrete activity that we appeal4   
8,try  thinking10 we tell such a man1   
8experiment with it1 taking pains       
sometimes to have your reasonings       
consistent with one another1 and at     
other times deliberately introducing    
inconsistencies2 then see what  you get 
in the two cases and how the result     
reached is related to your  purpose in  
thinking40 ,we point out that since that
 purpose is to reach  a settled         
conclusion1 that purpose will be        

defeated unless the steps of  reasoning 
are kept consistent with one another4   
,we do not appeal from  the mere        
consistency of the reasoning            
process--the intellectual aspect  of the
 matter--to an absolute self-consistent 
reality2 but we appeal  from the        
material character of the end to be     
reached to the type of the  formal      
procedure necessary to accomplish it4   
,with all our heart1 then1 the standard 
of thinking is absolute  7that is final7
 within thinking4 ,but what is thinking8
 ,the standard  of blacksmithing must be
 absolute within blacksmithing1 but what
 is  blacksmithing8 ,no prejudice       
prevents acknowledging that             
blacksmithing  is one practical activity
 existing as a distinct and relevant    
member  of a like system of activities3 
that it is because men use horses to    
transport persons and goods that horses 
need to be shod4 ,the ultimate          
criterion of blacksmithing is producing 
a good shoe1 but the nature  of a good  

shoe is fixed1 not by blacksmithing1 but
 by the activities  in which horses are 
used4 ,the end is ultimate 7absolute7   
for the  operation1 but this very       
finality is evidence that the operation 
is not  absolute and self-inclosed1 but 
is related and responsible4 ,why must   
the fact that the end of thinking is    
ultimate for thought stand on any       
different footing8    ,let us then1 by  
way of experiment1 follow this          
suggestion4 ,let us  assume that among  
real objects in their values and        
significances1 real  oppositions and    
incompatibilities exist2 that these     
conflicts are both  troublesome in      
themselves1 and the source of all manner
 of further  difficulties--so much so   
that they may be suspected of being the 
source  of all man's woe1 of all        
encroachment upon and destruction of    
value1  of good4 ,suppose that thinking 
is1 not accidentally but essentially1  a
 way1 and the only way that proves      
adequate1 of dealing with these         

predicaments--that being 8in a hole10 in
 difficulty1 is the fundamental         
8predicament0 of intelligence4 ,suppose 
when effort is made in a brute  way to  
remove these oppositions and to secure  
an arrangement of things  which means   
satisfaction1 fulfilment1 happiness1    
that the method of  brute attack1 of    
trying directly to force warrings into  
peace fails2  suppose then an effort to 
effect the transformation by an indirect
  method--by inquiry into the disordered
 state of affairs and by framing  views1
 conceptions1 of what the situation     
would be like were it reduced  to       
harmonious order4 ,finally1 suppose that
 upon this basis a plan of  action is   
worked out1 and that this plan1 when    
carried into overt  effect1 succeeds    
infinitely better than the brute method 
of attack in  bringing about the desired
 consummation4 ,suppose again this      
indirection  of activity is precisely   
what we mean by thinking4 ,would it not 
hold  that harmony is the end and the   

test of thinking8 that observations are 
pertinent and ideas correct just in so  
far as1 overtly acted upon1 they        
succeed in removing the undesirable1 the
 inconsistent4    ,but1 it is said1 the 
very process of thinking makes a certain
  assumption regarding the nature of    
reality1 viz41 that reality is          
self-consistent4 ,this statement puts   
the end for the beginning4 ,the         
assumption is not that 8reality0 is     
self-consistent1 but that by  thinking  
it may1 for some special purpose1 or as 
respects some  concrete problem1 attain 
greater consistency4 ,why should the    
assumption  regarding 8reality0 be other
 than that specific realities with which
  thought is concerned are capable of   
receiving harmonization8 ,to say  that  
thought must assume1 in order to go on1 
that reality already  possesses harmony 
is to say that thought must begin by    
contradicting  its own direct data1 and 
by assuming that its concrete aim is    
vain and  illusory4 ,why put upon       

thought the onus of introducing         
discrepancies  into reality in order    
just to give itself exercise in the     
gymnastic  of removing them8 ,the       
assumption that concrete thinking makes 
about  8reality0 is that things just as 
they exist may acquire through          
activity1 guided by thinking1 a certain 
character which it is  excellent for    
them to possess2 and may acquire it more
 liberally and  effectively than by     
other methods4 ,one might as well say   
that the  blacksmith could not think to 
any effect concerning iron1 without a   
,platonic archetypal horseshoe1 laid up 
in the heavens4 ,his thinking  also     
makes an assumption about present1 given
 reality1 viz41 that  this piece of     
iron1 through the exercise of           
intelligently directed  activity1 may be
 shaped into a satisfactory horseshoe4  
,the assumption  is practical3 the      
assumption that a specific thing may    
take on in a  specific way a specific   
needed value4 ,the test1 moreover1 of   

this  assumption is practical2 it       
consists in acting upon it to see if it 
will do what it pretends it can do1     
namely1 guide activities to the         
required result4 ,the assumption about  
reality is not something in  addition to
 the idea1 which an idea already in     
existence makes2 some  assumption about 
the possibility of a change in the state
 of things as  experienced is the       
idea--and its test or criterion is      
whether this  possible change can be    
effected when the idea is acted upon in 
good  faith4    ,in any case1 how much  
simpler the case becomes when we stick  
by the  empirical facts4 ,according to  
them there is no wholesale discrepancy  
of existence and meaning2 there is      
simply a 8loosening0 of the two  when   
objects do not fulfil our plans and meet
 our desires2 or when we  project       
inventions and cannot find immediately  
the means for their  realization4 ,the  
8collisions0 are neither physical1      
metaphysical1 nor  logical2 they are    

moral and practical4 ,they exist between
 an aim and  the means of its execution4
 ,consequently the object of thinking is
  not to effect some wholesale and      
8,absolute0 reconciliation of meaning   
and existence1 but to make a specific   
adjustment of things to our  purposes   
and of our purposes to things at just   
the crucial point of  the crisis4       
,making the utmost concessions to ,mr4  
,bradley's account  of the discrepancy  
of meaning and existence in our         
experience1 to  his statement of the    
relation of this to the function of     
judgment  7as involving namely an       
explicit statement at once of the actual
  sundering and the ideal union7 and to 
his account of consistency as  the goal 
and standard1 there is still not a      
detail of the account  that is not met  
amply and with infinitely more empirical
 warrant by  the conception that the    
8collision0 in which thinking starts and
 the  8consistency0 in which it         
terminates are practical and human4     

,,iii    ,this brings us explicitly to  
the question of truth1 8truth0 being    
confessedly the end and standard of     
thinking4 ,i confess to being much  at a
 loss to realize just what the          
intellectualists conceive to be the     
relation of truth to ideas on one side  
and to 8reality0 on the other4  ,my     
difficulty occurs1 ,i think1 because    
they describe so little in  analytical  
detail2 in writing of truth they seem   
rather to be under a  strong emotional  
influence--as if they were victims of an
 uncritical  pragmatism--which leaves   
much of their thought to be guessed at4 
,the  implication of their discussions  
assigns three distinct values to the    
term 8truth40 ,on the one hand1 truth is
 something which characterizes  ideas1  
theories1 hypotheses1 beliefs1          
judgments1 propositions1  assertions1   
etc41--anything whatsoever involving    
intellectual  statement4 ,from this     
standpoint a criterion of truth means   
the test  of the worth of the           

intellectual intent1 import1 or claim of
 any  intellectual statement as         
intellectual4 ,this is an intelligible  
sense  of the term truth4 ,in the second
 place1 it seems to be assumed that  a  
certain kind of reality is already1     
apart from ideas or meanings1  ,truth1  
and that this ,truth is the criterion of
 that lower and more  unworthy kind of  
truth that may be possessed or aimed at 
by ideas4  ,but we do not stop here4    
,the conception that all truth must have
 a  criterion haunts the                
intellectualist1 so that the reality1   
which1 as  contrasted with ideas1 is    
taken to be ,the ,truth 7and the        
criterion  of their truth7 is treated as
 if it itself had to have support and   
warrant from some other ,reality1 lying 
back of it1 which is its  criterion4    
,this1 then1 gives the third type of    
truth1 ,the ,absolute  ,truth4 7,just   
why this process should not go on       
indefinitely is not  clear1 but the     
necessity of infinite regress may be    

emotionally  prevented by always        
referring to this last type of truth as 
,absolute74  ,now this scheme may be    
8true10 but it is not self-explanatory  
or even  easily apprehensible4 ,in just 
what sense1 truth is 7#a7 that to which 
ideas as ideas lay claim and yet is 7#b7
 ,reality which as reality is  the      
criterion of truth of ideas1 and yet    
again is 7#c7 a ,reality which          
completely annuls and transcends all    
reference to ideas1 is not in the  least
 clear to me3 nor1 till better informed1
 shall ,i believe it to be  clear to any
 one4    ,in his more strictly logical  
discussions1 ,mr4 ,bradley sets out from
  the notion that truth refers to       
intellectual statements and positions   
as such4 ,but the ,truth soon becomes a 
sort of transcendent essence  on its own
 account4 ,the identification of reality
 and truth on page  #adf may be a mere  
casual phrase1 but the distinction drawn
 between  validity and absolute truth   
7p4 #cfb71 and the discussion of        

,degrees  of ,truth and ,reality1       
involve assumptions of an identity of   
truth and  reality4 ,truth in this sense
 turns out to be the criterion for the  
truth1 the truth1 that is1 of ideas4    
,but1 again 7p4 #ede71 a distinction  is
 made between 8,finite ,truth10 that is1
 a view of reality which would          
completely satisfy intelligence as such1
 and 8,absolute ,truth10 which is       
obtained only by passing beyond         
intelligence--only when intelligence  as
 such is absorbed in some ,absolute in  
which it loses its distinctive          
character4    ,it would advance the     
state of discussion1 ,i am sure1 if     
there were  more explicit statements    
regarding the relations of 8true idea10 
8truth10 8the criterion of truth0 and   
8reality10 to one another4 ,a  more     
explicit exposition also of the view    
that is held concerning the  relation of
 verification and truth could hardly    
fail to be of value4  ,not infrequently 
the intellectualist admits that the     

process of  verification is             
experimental1 consisting in setting on  
foot various  activities that express   
the intent of the idea and confirm or   
refute  it according to the changes     
effected4 ,this seems to mean that truth
  is simply the tested or verified      
belief as such4 ,but then a curious     
reservation is introduced2 the          
experimental process finds1 it is  said1
 that an idea is true1 while the error  
of the pragmatist is to  take the       
process by which truth is found as one  
by which it is made4  ,the claim of     
8making truth0 is treated as blasphemy  
against the very  notion of truth3 such 
are the consequences of venturing to    
translate  the ,latin 8verification0    
into the ,english 8making true40    ,if 
we face the bogie thus called up1 it    
will be found that the horror  is       
largely sentimental4 ,suppose we stick  
to the notion that truth is a  character
 which belongs to a meaning so far as   
tested through action  that carries it  

to successful completion4 ,in this case1
 to make an idea  true is to modify and 
transform it until it reaches this      
successful  outcome3 until it initiates 
a mode of response which in its issue   
realizes its claim to be the method of  
harmonizing the discrepancies of  a     
given situation4 ,the meaning is remade 
by constantly acting upon it1  and by   
introducing into its content such       
characters as are indicated  by any     
resulting failures to secure harmony4   
,from this point of view1  verification 
and truth are two names for the same    
thing4 ,we call it  8verification0 when 
we regard it as process2 when the       
development of  the idea is strung out  
and exposed to view in all that makes it
 true4  ,we call it 8truth0 when we take
 it as product1 as process telescoped   
and condensed4    ,suppose the idea to  
be an invention1 say of the telephone4  
,in this  case1 is not the verification 
of the idea and the construction of  the
 device which carries out its intent one

 and the same8 ,in this  case1 does the 
truth of the idea mean anything else    
than that the  issue proves the idea can
 be carried into effect8 ,there are     
certain  intellectualists who are not of
 the absolutist type2 who do not believe
  that all of men's aims1 designs1      
projects1 that have to do with action1  
whether industrial1 social1 or moral in 
scope1 have been from all  eternity     
registered as already accomplished in   
reality4 ,how do such  persons dispose  
of this problem of the truth of         
practical ideas8    ,is not the truth of
 such ideas an affair of making them    
true by  constructing1 through          
appropriate behavior1 a condition that  
satisfies  the requirements of the case8
 ,if1 in this case1 truth means the     
effective capacity of the idea 8to make 
good10 what is there in the  logic of   
the case to forbid the application of   
analogous considerations  to any idea8  
,i hear a noise in the street4 ,it      
suggests as its meaning a street-car4   

,to test this idea ,i go to the window  
and through listening and  looking      
intently--the listening and the looking 
being modes of  behavior--organize into 
a single situation elements of existence
 and  meaning which were previously     
disconnected4 ,in this way an idea is   
made  true2 that which was a proposal or
 hypothesis is no longer merely a       
propounding or a guess4 ,if ,i had not  
reacted in a way appropriate to  the    
idea it would have remained a mere idea2
 at most a candidate for  truth that1   
unless acted upon upon the spot1 would  
always have remained  a theory4 ,now in 
such a case--where the end to be        
accomplished is the  discovery of a     
certain order of facts--would the       
intellectualist claim  that apart from  
the forming and entertaining of some    
interpretation1  the category of truth  
has either existence or meaning8 ,will  
he claim  that without an original      
practical uneasiness introducing a      
practical  aim of inquiry there must    

have been1 whether or no1 an idea8 ,must
  the world for some purely intellectual
 reason be intellectually  reduplicated8
 ,could not that occurrence which ,i now
 identify as a noisy  street-car have   
retained1 so far as pure intelligence is
 concerned1  its unidentified status of 
being mere physical alteration in a vast
  unidentified complex of               
matter-in-motion8 ,was there any        
intellectual  necessity that compelled  
the event to arouse just this judgment1 
that it meant a street-car8 ,was there  
any physical or metaphysical  necessity8
 ,was there any necessity save a need of
 characterizing  it for some purpose of 
our own8 ,and why should we be          
mealy-mouthed  about calling this need  
practical8 ,if the necessity which led  
to the  formation and development of an 
intellectual judgment was purely        
objective 7whether physical or          
metaphysical7 why should not the thing  
have also to be characterized in        
countless millions of other ways2 for   

example1 as to its distance from some   
crater in the moon1 or its effect  upon 
the circulation of my blood1 or upon my 
irascible neighbor's  temper1 or bearing
 upon the ,monroe ,doctrine8 ,in short1 
do not  intellectual positions and      
statements mean new and significant     
events  in the treatment of things8     
,it is perhaps dangerous to attempt to  
follow the inner workings of  the       
processes by which truth is first       
identified with some superior  type of  
,reality1 and then this ,truth is taken 
as the criterion of the  truth of ideas2
 while all the time it is held that     
truth is something  already possessed by
 ideas as purely intellectual4 ,but     
there seems  to be some ground for      
believing that this identification is   
due to a  twofold confusion1 one having 
to do with ideas1 and the other with    
things4 ,as to the first point3 ,after  
an idea is made true1 we naturally  say1
 in retrospect1 8it was true all the    
time40 ,now this truism is  quite       

innocuous as a truism1 being just a     
restatement of the fact that  the idea  
has1 as matter of fact1 worked          
successfully4 ,but it may be  regarded  
not as a truism but as furnishing some  
additional knowledge2  as if it were1   
indeed1 the dawning of a revelation     
regarding truth4  ,then it is said that 
the idea worked or was verified because 
it was  already inherently1 just as     
idea1 the truth2 the pragmatist1 so it  
is said1 making the error of supposing  
that it is true because it  works4 ,if  
one remembers that what the             
experimentalist means is that  the      
effective working of an idea and its    
truth are one and the same  thing--this 
working being neither the cause nor the 
evidence of truth  but its nature--it is
 hard to see the point of this          
statement4 ,a  man under peculiarly     
precarious circumstances has been       
rescued from  drowning4 ,a by-stander   
remarks that now he is a saved man4     
8,yes10  replies some one1 8but he was a

 saved man all the time1 and the process
  of rescuing1 while it gives evidence  
of that fact1 does not constitute  it40 
,now even such a statement as pure      
tautology1 as characterizing the  entire
 process in terms of its issue1 is      
objectionable only in the fact  that1   
like all tautology1 it seems to say     
something but does not4 ,but  if it be  
regarded as revealing the earlier       
condition of affairs1 apart  from the   
active process by which it was carried  
to a happy conclusion1  such a statement
 would be monstrously false2 and would  
declare its  falsity in the fact that1  
if acted upon1 the man would have been  
left  to drown4 ,in like fashion1 to    
say1 after the event1 that a given  idea
 was true all the time1 is to lose sight
 of what makes an idea an  idea1 its    
hypothetical character2 and thereby     
deliberately to transform  it into brute
 dogma--something to which no canon of  
verification can  ever be applied4 ,the 
intellectualist almost always treats the

 pragmatic  account as if it were1 from 
the standpoint of the pragmatist as well
 as  from his own1 a denial of the      
existence of truth1 while it is nothing 
but a statement of its nature4 ,when the
 intellectualist realizes this1  he     
will1 ,i hope1 ask himself3 ,what1 then1
 on the pragmatic basis is  meant by the
 proposition that an idea is true all   
the time8 ,if the  statement that an    
idea was true all the time has no       
meaning except that  the idea was one   
which as matter of fact succeeded       
through action in  achieving its intent1
 mere reiteration that the idea was true
 all the  time or it could not have     
succeeded1 does not take us far4#bd     
,on the side of things1 reality is      
identified with truth2 then on the      
principle that two things that are equal
 to the same thing are equal  to each   
other1 truth as idea and truth as       
reality are taken to be one  and the    
same thing4 ,wherever there is an       
improved or tested idea1 an  idea which 

has made good1 there is a concrete      
existence in the way of a  completed or 
harmonized situation4 ,the same activity
 which proves the  idea constructs an   
inherently satisfied situation out of an
 inherently  dissentient one1--for it is
 precisely the capacity of the idea as  
an  aim and method of action to         
determine such transformation that is   
the  criterion of its truth4 ,now unless
 all the elements in the situation  are 
held steadily in view1 the specific way 
in which the harmonized  reality affords
 the criterion of truth 7namely1 through
 its function of  being the last term of
 a process of active determination7 is  
lost from  sight2 and the achieved      
existence in its merely existent        
character1  apart from its practical or 
fulfilment character1 is treated as ,the
  ,truth4 ,but when the reality is thus 
separated from the process by which  it 
is achieved1 when it is taken just as   
given1 it is neither truth  nor a       
criterion of truth4 ,it is a state of   

facts like any other4 ,the  achieved    
telephone is a criterion of the validity
 of a certain prior  idea in so far as  
it is the fulfilment of activities that 
embody the  nature of that idea1 but    
just as telephone1 as a machine actually
 in  existence1 it is no more truth nor 
criterion of truth than is a crack  in  
the wall or a cobble-stone on the       
street4    ,the intervening term that   
mediates and completes the confusion of 
truth  with ideas on one hand and       
8reality0 on the other1 is1 ,i think1   
the  fact that ideas after they have    
been tested in action are employed  in  
the development and grounding of further
 beliefs4 ,there are cases  in which an 
idea ceases to exist as idea as soon as 
it is made true2  this is so as matter  
of fact and it is impossible to conceive
 any  reason why it should not be so in 
point of theory4 ,such is the case1 ,i  
take it1 with a large part--possibly the
 major portion--of the ideas  that      
mediate the smaller and transient crises

 of daily practice4  ,i cannot imagine  
the situation in which the truth to     
which ,i have  referred above--the      
verification of a certain idea about a  
certain  noise--would ever function     
again as truth--save as ,i have given it
 a  function in this paper by using it  
as a corroboration of a certain  theory4
 ,such ideas mostly cease1 giving way to
 a matter-of-fact status3  say1 the     
perception of the noisy street-car4 ,one
 at the time may say  8,my idea         
regarding that noise was a true idea02  
or one may not even  go so far as that1 
he may just stop with the eventual      
perception4  ,but the tested idea need  
not ever recur as a factor of proof in  
any  other problem4 ,such1 however1 is  
conspicuously not the case with  our    
scientific ideas4 ,in its first value1  
the idea or hypothesis of  gravitation  
entertained by ,newton1 stood1 when     
verified1 on exactly  the same level as 
the hypothesis regarding the noise in   
the street4  ,theoretically1 that truth 

might have been so isolated that its    
truth  character would disappear from   
thought as soon as a certain factual    
condition was ascertained4 ,but         
practically quite the opposite has      
happened4 ,the idea operates in many    
other inquiries1 and operates no  longer
 as mere idea1 but as proved idea4 ,such
 truths get an 8eternal0  status2--one  
irrespective of application just now and
 here1 because  there are so many nows  
and heres in which they are useful4     
,just as to  say an idea was true all   
the time is a way of saying in          
retrospect  that it has come out in a   
certain fashion1 so to say that an idea 
is  8eternally true0 is to indicate     
prospective modes of application  which 
are indefinitely anticipated4 ,its      
meaning1 therefore1 is  strictly        
pragmatic4 ,it does not indicate a      
property inherent in the  idea as       
intellectualized existence1 but denotes 
a property of use and  employment4      
,always at hand when needed is a good   

enough eternal for  reasonably minded   
persons4      ,,iv    ,i have gone from 
the very general considerations which   
occupied us in  the earlier portions of 
this article to matters which relatively
 at  least are specific4 ,i conclude    
with a summary in the hope that it may  
bind together the earlier and the later 
parts of this paper4    #a4 ,the        
condition which antecedes and provokes  
any particular exercise  of reflective  
knowing is always one of discrepancy1   
struggle1  8collision40 ,this condition 
is practical1 for it involves the habits
  and interests of the organism1 an     
agent4 ,this does not mean that the     
struggle is merely personal1 or         
subjective1 or psychological4 ,the      
agent or individual is one factor in the
 situation--not the situation  something
 subsisting in the individual4 ,the     
individual has to be  identified in the 
situation1 before any situation can be  
referred--as  in psychology--to the     
individual4 ,but the discrepancy calls  

out and  controls reflective knowing    
only as the fortunes of an agent are    
implicated in the crisis4 ,certain      
elements stand out as obstacles1  as    
interferences1 as deficiencies--in short
 as unsatisfactory and as  requiring    
something for their completion4 ,other  
elements stand out  as wanted--as       
required1 as a satisfaction which does  
not exist4 ,this  clash 7an             
accompaniment of all desire7 between the
 given and the  wanted1 between the     
present and the absent1 is at once the  
root and  the type of that peculiar     
paradoxical relation between existence  
and  meaning which ,bradley insists upon
 as the essence of judgment4 ,it  is not
 irrational in the sense that we are    
dealing with appearance  wholesale1 but 
it is non-rational--an evidence that we 
are dealing with  a practical affair4   
#b4 ,the intellectual or reflective and 
logical is a statement of  this         
conflict3 an attempt to describe and    
define it4 ,it is1 as it  were1 the     

practical clash held off at arm's length
 for inspection  and investigation4 ,in 
this way brute blind reaction against   
the  unsatisfactoriness of the situation
 is suspended4 ,action is turned  into  
the channel of observing1 of inferring1 
of reasoning1 or defining  means and    
end4 ,it is this change in the quality  
of activity1 from  directly overt1 to   
indirect1 or inquiring with view to     
stating1 that  constitutes the specific 
nature of reflective practice to which  
,mr4  ,bradley calls attention4 ,the    
discovery of the nature of the conflict 
supplies materials for the fact or      
existence side of the judgement4  ,the  
conception or projection of the object  
in which the conflict  would be         
terminated furnishes material for the   
meaning side of the  judgment4 ,it is   
ideal because anticipatory1 just as the 
fact side  is existential1 because      
reminiscent or recording4 ,hence the two
 are  necessarily both distinguished    
from and yet referred to each other3    

only through location of a problem can a
 solution be conceived2 only  in        
reference to the intent of finding a    
solution can the elements of  a problem 
be selected and interpreted4 ,in origin 
and in destiny1 this  correlative       
determination of existence and meaning  
is tentative and  experimental4 ,the aim
 of the subject of the judgment is not  
to include  all possible reality1 but to
 select those elements of a reality that
  are useful in locating the source and 
nature of the difficulty in  hand4 ,the 
aim of the predicate is not to bunch all
 possible meaning  and refer it in one  
final act indiscriminately to all       
existence1 but  to state the standpoint 
and method through which the difficulty 
of the  particular situation may most   
effectively be dealt with4 ,the         
selection  of what is relevant to the   
characterization of the problem and the 
projection of the method of dealing with
 it are theoretic1 hypothetic1          
intellectual3--that is1 they are        

tentative ways of viewing the matter    
for the sake of guiding1 economizing1   
and freeing the activities  through     
which it may really be dealt with4      
#c4 ,the criterion of the worth of the  
idea is thus the capacity of  the idea  
7as a definition of the end or outcome  
in terms of what is  likely to be       
serviceable as a method7 to operate in  
fulfilling the  object for the sake of  
which it was projected4 ,capacity of    
operation  in this fashion is the test1 
measure1 or criterion of truth4 ,hence  
the  criterion is practical in the most 
overt sense of that term4 ,we may1  if  
we choose1 regard the object in which   
the idea terminates through  its use in 
guiding action1 as the criterion2 but if
 we so choose1 it is  at our peril that 
we forget that this object serves as    
criterion in its  capacity of fulfilment
 and not as sheer objective existence4  
#d4 ,difficulties overlap2 problems     
recur which resemble each other  in the 
kind of treatment they demand for       

solution4 ,various modes of  activity   
with their respective ends1 going on at 
some time more or  less independently1  
get organized into single comprehensive 
systems of  behavior4 ,the solution of  
one problem is found to create          
difficulties  elsewhere2 or the truth   
that is made in the solution of one     
problem  is found to afford an effective
 method of dealing with questions       
arising apparently from unallied        
sources4 ,thus certain tested ideas  in 
performing a constant or recurrent      
function secure a certain  permanent    
status4 ,the prospective use of such    
truths1 the satisfaction  that we       
anticipate in their employ1 the         
assurance of control that we  feel in   
their possession1 becomes relatively    
much more important than  the           
circumstances under which they were     
first made true4 ,in becoming  permanent
 resources1 such tested ideas get a     
generalized energy of  position4 ,they  
are truths in general1 truths 8in       

themselves0 or in the  abstract1 truths 
to which positive value is assigned on  
their own  account4 ,such truths are the
 8eternal truths0 of current discussion4
  ,they naturally and properly add to   
their intellectual and to their         
practical worth a certain esthetic      
quality4 ,they are interesting to       
contemplate1 and their contemplation    
arouses emotions of admiration  and     
reverence4 ,to make these emotions the  
basis of assigning peculiar  inherent   
sanctity to them apart from their       
warrant in use1 is simply  to give way  
to that mood which in primitive man is  
the cause of  attributing magical       
efficacy to physical things4            
,esthetically such  truths are more than
 instrumentalities4 ,but to ignore both 
the  instrumental and the esthetic      
aspect1 and to ascribe values due to an 
instrumental and esthetic character to  
some interior and a priori  constitution
 of truth is to make fetishes of them4  
,we may not exaggerate the permanence   

and stability of such truths with       
respect to their recurring and          
prospective use4 ,it is only relatively 
that they are unchanging4 ,when applied 
to new cases1 used as resources  for    
coping with new difficulties1 the oldest
 of truths are to some  extent remade4  
,indeed it is only through such         
application and such  remaking that     
truths retain their freshness and       
vitality4 ,otherwise  they are relegated
 to faint reminiscences of an antique   
tradition4 ,even  the truth that two and
 two make four has gained a new meaning1
 has had  its truth in some degree      
remade1 in the development of the modern
  theory of number4 ,if we put ourselves
 in the attitude of a scientific        
inquirer in asking what is the meaning  
of truth per se1 there spring  up before
 us those ideas which are actively      
employed in the mastery  of new fields1 
in the organization of new materials4   
,this is the  essential difference      
between truth and dogma2 between the    

living and  the dead and decaying4      
,above all1 it is in the region of moral
 truth  that this perception stands out4
 ,moral truths that are not recreated in
  application to the urgencies of the   
passing hour1 no matter how true  in the
 place and time of their origin1 are    
pernicious and misleading1  i4e41 false4
 ,and it is perhaps through emphasizing 
this fact1  embodied in one form or     
another in every system of morals and in
 every  religion of moral import1 that  
one most readily realizes the character 
of truth4          ,a ,,short           
,,catechism ,,concerning ,,truth#be     
,pupil4 ,i am desirous1 respected       
teacher1 of forming an independent      
judgment concerning the novel theory of 
truth that you are said to  profess4 ,my
 eagerness is whetted because the theory
 as expounded  to me by my old teacher1 
,professor ,purus ,intellectus1 so      
obviously  contravenes common sense1    
science1 and philosophy that ,i do not  
understand how it can be advanced in    

good faith by any reasonable man4       
,teacher4 ,as you are already somewhat  
acquainted with the theory 7or  at least
 with what it purports to be71 perhaps  
if you will set forth  in order your    
objections1 it will appear that the     
theory that you are  acquainted with is 
not advanced by any reasonable persons1 
and that by  understanding the theory as
 it is you will also be led to embrace  
it4    ,pupil3 ,objection ,one4         
,pragmatism makes truth a subjective    
affair1  namely the satisfaction        
afforded individuals by ideas1 while    
everybody  knows that the truth of ideas
 depends upon their relation to things4 
,teacher3 ,reply4 ,if ,i were to reply  
that ,i hold to existences  independent 
of ideas1 existences prior to1          
synchronous with1 and  subsequent to    
ideas1 that might seem to you to express
 only my personal  opinion and to have  
no logical connection with pragmatism4  
,so ,i beg  to remind you that1         
according to pragmatism1 ideas          

7judgments and  reasonings being        
included for convenience in this term7  
are attitudes  of response taken toward 
extra-ideal1 extra-mental things4       
,instinct and  habit express1 for       
instance1 modes of response1 but modes  
inadequate  for a progressive being1 or 
for adaptation to an environment        
presenting  novel and unmastered        
features4 ,under such conditions1 ideas 
are  their surrogates4 ,the origin of an
 idea is thus in some empirical1        
extra-mental situation which provokes   
ideas as modes of response1 while  their
 meaning is found in the                
modifications--the 8differences0--they  
make in this extra-mental situation4    
,their validity is in turn measured  by 
their capacity to effect the            
transformation they intend4 ,origin1    
content1 and value--all alike are       
extra-ideational4 ,the satisfaction     
upon which the pragmatist dwells is just
 the better adjustment of  living beings
 to their environment effected by       

transformations of the  environment     
through forming and applying ideas4     
,pupil3 ,objection ,two4 ,but1 as ,i    
understand it and as you have  yourself 
confessed in your language1 these       
external things1 while they  may be     
external to the particular idea in      
question1 are empirical2  they are just 
other experiences and so mental after   
all4 ,you hold1 ,i  have been informed1 
that truth is an experienced relation1  
instead  of a relation between          
experience and what transcends it2 why  
then be  mealy-mouthed 7pardon my       
eagerness if it leads me astray7 in     
admitting  that the whole business is   
intra-mental8    ,teacher3 ,reply4 ,your
 objection combines and confuses two    
things4  ,to disentangle them is to     
answer the objection4 7#a7 ,the notion  
of  transcendence has a double meaning2 
first1 it denotes that which lies       
inherently and essentially beyond       
experience4 ,it is interesting to note  
that the opponents of pragmatism have   

been forced by the exigencies  of their 
hostility to resuscitate a doctrine     
supposedly dead3 the  doctrine of       
unexperienceable1 unknowable 8,things in
 ,themselves40 ,and  as if this were not
 enough1 they identify ,truth with      
relationship to  this unknowable4       
,thereby in behalf of the notion of     
,truth in general1  they land in        
scepticism with reference to the        
possibility of any truth  in particular4
 ,the pragmatist is bound to deny such  
transcendence4  7#b7 ,that he is thereby
 landed in pure subjectivism or the     
reduction of  every existence to the    
purely mental1 follows only if          
experience means  only mental states4   
,the critic appears to hold the ,humian 
doctrine  that experience is made up of 
states of mind1 of sensations and       
ideas4 ,it is then for him to decide    
how1 on his basis1 he escapes           
subjective idealism1 or 8mentalism40    
,the pragmatist starts from a  much more
 commonplace notion of experience1 that 

of the plain man who  never dreams that 
to experience a thing is first to       
destroy the thing  and then to          
substitute a mental state for it4 ,more 
particularly1 the  pragmatist has       
insisted that experience is a matter of 
functions and  habits1 of active        
adjustments and re-adjustments1 of      
co-ordinations  and activities1 rather  
than of states of consciousness4 ,to    
criticise  the pragmatist by reading    
into him exactly the notion of          
experience  that he denies and replaces1
 may be psychological and unregenerately
  8pragmatic10 but it is hardly         
8intellectual40    ,pupil3 ,objection   
,three4 ,you remind me1 curiously       
enough1 of a  contention of my old      
instructor to the effect that the       
pragmatist1  when criticised1 always    
shifts his ground4 ,to avoid solipsism  
and  subjectivism1 he falls back on     
things independent of ideas1 adducing   
them in order to pass upon the truth or 
falsity of the latter4 ,but  thereby he 

only covertly recognizes the            
intellectualistic standard4  ,thus he   
swings unevenly between a denial of     
science and a clamorous  reiteration1 in
 new phraseology1 of what all           
philosophers hold4    ,teacher3 ,reply4 
,your words have indeed a familiar      
sound4 ,apparently1  the average        
intellectualist has got so accustomed to
 taking truth as a  ,relation at ,large1
 without specification or analysis1 that
 any attempt  at a concrete statement of
 just what the relationship is appears  
to  be a denial of the relation itself2 
in which case1 he interprets an         
occasional reminder from the pragmatist 
that the latter is1 after all1          
attempting to specify the nature of the 
relation1 to be a surrender of  the     
pragmatist's own case1 since it admits  
after all that there is some  relation6 
,however that may be1 the pragmatist    
holds that the relation in  question is 
one of correspondence between existence 
and thought2  but he holds that         

correspondence instead of being an      
ultimate and  unanalyzable mystery1 to  
be defined by iteration1 is precisely a 
matter of cor-respondence in its plain1 
familiar sense4 ,a condition of  dubious
 and conflicting tendencies calls out   
thinking as a method of  handling it4   
,this condition produces its own        
appropriate consequences1  bearing its  
own fruits of weal and woe4 ,the        
thoughts1 the estimates1  intents1 and  
projects it calls out1 just because they
 are attitudes  of response and of      
attempted adjustment 7not mere 8states  
of  consciousness071 produce their      
effects also4 ,the kind of interlocking1
  of interadjustment that then occurs   
between these two sorts of  consequences
 constitutes the correspondence that    
makes truth1 just as  failure to respond
 to each other1 to work together1       
constitutes mistake  and                
error--mishandling and wandering4 ,this 
account may1 of course1 be  wrong--may  
involve a maladjustment of              

consequences--but the error in  the     
account1 if it exists1 must be specific 
and empirical1 and cannot  be located by
 general epistemological accusations4   
,pupil3 ,objection ,four4 ,well1 even   
admitting this version of  pragmatism1  
you cannot deny it still contravenes    
common sense2 for1  according to you1   
the correspondence that constitutes     
truth does not  exist till after ideas  
have worked1 while common sense         
perceives and  knows that it is the     
antecedent agreement of the ideas with  
reality  that enables them to work4 ,if 
you make the truth of the existence of a
  ,carboniferous age1 or the landing of 
,columbus in #adib1 depend upon a       
future working of an idea about them1   
you commit yourself to the most         
fantastic of philosophies4    ,teacher3 
,reply4 ,may ,i recall to your attention
 the accusation of  8shifting ground0   
when hard pressed8 ,the intellectualist 
began1 if ,i  remember correctly1 with  
conceiving truth as a relation of       

thought  and existence2 has he not1 in  
your last objection1 substituted for    
this conception an identification of the
 bare existence or event with  truth8   
,which does he mean8 ,how will he have  
it8 ,the existence of the               
,carboniferous age1 the discovery of    
,america by ,columbus are not  truths2  
they are events4 ,some conviction1 some 
belief1 some judgment  with reference to
 them is necessary to introduce the     
category of truth  and falsity4 ,and    
since the conviction1 the judgment1 is  
as matter of  fact subsequent to the    
event1 how can its truth consist in the 
kind of  blank1 wholesale relationship  
the intellectualist contends for8 ,how  
can the present belief jump out of its  
present skin1 dive into the  past1 and  
land upon just the one event 7that as   
past is gone forever7  which1 by        
definition1 constitutes its truth8 ,i do
 not wonder the  intellectualist has    
much to say about 8transcendence0 when  
he comes to  dealing with the truth of  

judgments about the past2 but why does  
he not  tell us how we manage to know   
when one thought lands straight on the  
devoted head of something past and gone1
 while another thought comes  down on   
the wrong thing in the past8    ,pupil4 
,well1 of course1 knowledge of the past 
is very mysterious1 but  how is the     
pragmatist any better off8    ,teacher4 
,the reply to that may be inferred from 
what has already been  said4 ,the past  
event has left effects1 consequences1   
that are present  and that will continue
 in the future4 ,our belief about it1 if
 genuine1  must also modify action in   
some way and so have objective effects4 
,if  these two sets of effects interlock
 harmoniously1 then the judgment is     
true4 ,if perchance the past event had  
no discoverable consequences or  our    
thought of it can work out to no        
assignable difference anywhere1  then   
there is no possibility of genuine      
judgment4    ,pupil4 ,you have1 perhaps1
 anticipated my next objection1 which   

was  that upon the pragmatic theory 7by 
which truth is constituted by future    
consequences7 there are no truths about 
what is past and gone1 since  in respect
 to that ideas can make no difference4  
,for1 ,i suppose1 you  would say that   
the difference made is in the effects   
that continue1  since ideas may work out
 to facilitate or to confuse our        
relations to  these effects4            
,nevertheless1 ,i am not quite          
satisfied4 ,for when ,i say  it is true 
that it rained yesterday1 surely the    
object of my judgment  is something     
past1 not future1 while pragmatism makes
 all objects of  judgment future4       
,teacher3 ,reply4 ,you confuse the      
content of a judgment with  the         
reference of that content4 ,the content 
of any idea about  yesterday's rain     
certainly involves past time1 but the   
distinctive or  characteristic aim of   
judgment is none the less to give this  
content a  future reference and         
function4    ,pupil3 ,objection ,five4  

,but your argument requires an absurd   
identification of truth and             
verification4 ,to verify ideas is to    
find  out that they were already true2  
or possessed of the truth relation      
prior to its discovery in verification4 
,but the pragmatist holds that  the act 
of finding out that ideas are true      
creates the thing that is  found4 ,in   
short1 you confuse the psychology of    
finding out with the  reality found out4
    ,teacher3 ,reply4 ,many             
intellectualists have now gone so far as
  to admit that verification is the     
testing of a judgment by the            
consequence it imports1 the difference  
it makes--its working4 ,but  they still 
deny any organic connection between the 
8antecedent0 truth  property of ideas   
and the verification 7or 8making true07 
process4  ,surely they admit either too 
much or too little4 7i7 ,if an idea     
about a past event is already true      
because of some mysterious static       
correspondence that it possesses to that

 past event1 how in the world  can its  
truth be proved by the future           
consequences of that idea8  ,why is it  
that the intellectualist has not        
produced any positive  theory about the 
relation of verification to his notion  
of truth8  7ii7 ,moreover1 if           
verification consists in the            
experimental working  out of a belief1  
the intellectualist thereby admits that 
his own  theory of truth can be known to
 be true only as it is verified by  its 
workings4 ,but if the theory that truth 
is a ready-made static  property of     
judgments is true1 how in the world can 
it be verified  by making any specific  
differences in the course of events8    
,everywhere  we have to proceed as if   
the pragmatic theory were the right one4
  7iii7 ,if he admits that the pragmatic
 theory of verification is true1  what  
meaning remains to the statement that   
the idea had the truth  property in     
advance8 ,why1 simply that it had the   
property of ability  to work--an ability

 revealed by its actual working4 ,how   
can a given  fact be an objection to the
 pragmatic theory when that fact has a  
definitely assignable meaning on the    
pragmatic theory1 while upon  the       
anti-pragmatic theory it just has to be 
accepted as an ultimate1  unanalyzable  
fact8    ,as to your remark about       
verification being merely psychological1
 ,i have  something to say4 ,colleagues 
of mine are steadily at work in various 
laboratories on various researches1     
forming hypotheses1 experimenting1      
testing1 corroborating1 refuting1       
modifying ideas4 ,one of them1 for      
example1 recently put an immense        
pendulum in place in order to repeat    
and test ,foucault's experiment with    
reference to the earth's rotation4  ,do 
you regard such verification processes  
as merely psychological8    ,pupil4 ,i  
don't know4 ,why do you ask8            
,teacher4 ,because if the objector means
 that such experimental  provings are   
merely psychological1 he has of course  

relegated to the  merely psychological  
7wherever that may be7 all the technique
 of all  the physical sciences--a rather
 high price to pay for the confutation  
of the pragmatist4 ,the intellectualist 
is thus in the dilemma either  of       
conceding to the pragmatist the whole   
sphere of concrete scientific  logic or 
else of himself regarding all science as
 merely subjective8  ,which horn does he
 choose8    ,pupil3 ,objection ,six4 ,i 
noticed a moment ago that you spoke of  
the  pragmatic theory of truth being    
true4 ,surely the pragmatist does not   
live up to his reputation of having a   
sense of humor when he claims  assent to
 his theory on the ground that it is    
true4 ,what is this but to  admit       
intellectualism8    ,teacher3 ,reply4   
,my son1 we are evidently nearing the   
end4 ,naturally1  the pragmatist claims 
his theory to be true in the pragmatic  
sense of  truth3 it works1 it clears up 
difficulties1 removes obscurities1 puts 
individuals into more experimental1 less

 dogmatic1 and less arbitrarily         
sceptical relations to life2 aligns     
philosophic with scientific  method2    
does away with self-made problems of    
epistemology2 clarifies  and reorganizes
 logical theory1 etc4 ,he is quite      
content to have the  truth of his theory
 consist in its working in these various
 ways1 and  to leave to the             
intellectualist the proud possession of 
a static1  unanalyzable1 unverifiable1  
unworking property4    ,pupil3          
,objection ,seven4 ,nevertheless1 the   
pragmatist is always  appealing to the  
judgments of others to corroborate his  
own judgment4  ,surely this admits the  
principle of a judgment that is correct1
 true1  in se4    ,teacher3 ,reply4 ,the
 pragmatist says that judgment is       
pragmatic1  i4e41 originated under      
conditions of need for a survey and     
statement1  and tested by efficiency in 
meeting this need4 ,and then you think  
you have refuted him by saying that any 
appeal to judgment is                   

intellectualistic6 ,such begging of the 
question convinces me that the  radical 
difficulty of the intellectualist is    
that he conceives of the  pragmatist as 
beginning with a theory of truth1 when  
in reality the  latter begins with a    
theory about judgments and meanings of  
which the  theory of truth is a         
corollary4    ,pupil3 ,objection ,eight4
 ,nevertheless1 you are endeavoring to  
convert  your opponent to a certain     
theory4 ,surely that is an intellectual 
undertaking1 and in theory 7at least7   
the theoretical criterion1 as ,mr4      
,bradley has well said1 must be supreme4
    ,teacher3 ,reply4 ,a little         
reflection will convince you that you   
are  going around in the same old       
circle4 ,since men have to act together1
  since the individual subsists in      
social bonds and activities1 to  convert
 another to a certain way of looking at 
things is to make social  ties and      
functions better adapted1 more          
prosperous in their workings4  ,only if 

the pragmatist held the                 
intellectualist's position1 would  he   
appeal to other than what is ultimately 
a practical need and a  practical       
criterion in endeavoring to convert     
others4    ,pupil3 ,objection ,nine4    
,still the pragmatic criterion1 being   
satisfactory working1 is purely personal
 and subjective4 ,whatever works  so as 
to please me is true4 ,either this is   
your result 7in which case  your        
reference to social relations only      
denotes at bottom a number of  purely   
subjectivistic satisfactions7 or else   
you unconsciously assume  an            
intellectual department of our nature   
that has to be satisfied2 and  whose    
satisfaction is truth4 ,thereby you     
admit the intellectualistic  criterion4 
,teacher3 ,reply4 ,we seem to have got  
back to our starting-point1 the  nature 
of satisfaction4 ,the intellectualist   
seems to think that because  the        
pragmatist insists upon the factor of   
human want1 purpose1 and  realization in

 the making and testing of judgments1   
the impersonal  factor is therefore     
denied4 ,but what the pragmatist does is
 to insist  that the human factor must  
work itself out in co-operation with    
the environmental factor1 and that their
 co-adaptation is both  8correspondence0
 and 8satisfaction40 ,as long as the    
human factor  is ignored and denied1 or 
is regarded as merely psychological     
7whatever1 once more1 that means71 this 
human factor will assert  itself in     
irresponsible ways4 ,so long as1        
particularly in philosophy1  a          
flagrantly unchastened pragmatism       
reigns1 we shall find1 as at  present1  
the most ambitious intellectualistic    
systems accepted simply  because of the 
personal comfort they yield those who   
contrive and  accept them4 ,once        
recognize the human factor1 and         
pragmatism is at  hand to insist that   
the believer must accept the full       
consequences of  his beliefs1 and that  
his beliefs must be tried out1 through  

acting  upon them1 to discover what is  
their meaning or consequence4 ,till so  
tested1 he insists that beliefs1 no     
matter how noble and seemingly          
edifying1 are dogmas1 not truths4 ,till 
the testing has been worked out  very   
completely and patiently1 he holds his  
beliefs as but provisional1  as working 
hypotheses1 as methods3--and he         
recognizes the probability  that1 as    
additional modes of testing develop1    
more and more so-called  truths will be 
relegated to the category of working    
hypotheses--till  the dogmatic mind is  
crowded out and starved out4 ,at        
present1 the  ignoring by philosophers  
of the part played by personal          
education1  temperament1 and preference 
in their philosophies is the chief      
source  of pretentiousness and          
insincerity in their systems1 and is the
 ground  of the popular disregard for   
them4    ,pupil4 ,what you say calls to 
mind something of ,chesterton's that ,i 
read recently3 8,i agree with the       

pragmatists that apparent objective     
truth is not the whole matter2 that     
there is an authoritative need to       
believe the things that are necessary to
 the human mind4 ,but ,i say  that one  
of those necessities precisely is a     
belief in objective truth4  ,pragmatism 
is a matter of human needs and one of   
the first of human  needs is to be      
something more than a pragmatist40 ,you 
would say1 if ,i  understand you aright1
 that to fall back upon a supposed      
necessity of  the 8human mind0 to       
believe in certain absolute truths1 is  
to evade a  proper demand for testing   
the human mind and all its works4       
,teacher4 ,my son1 ,i am glad to leave  
the last word with you4 ,this  enfant   
terrible of intellectualism has revealed
 that the chief  objection of           
absolutists to the pragmatic doctrine of
 the personal 7or  8subjective07 factor 
in belief is that the pragmatist has    
spilled the  personal milk in the       
absolutist's cocoanut4                  

,,beliefs ,,and ,,existences#bf      ,i 
,beliefs look both ways1 towards persons
 and toward things4 ,they are  the      
original ,mr4 ,facing-both-ways4 ,they  
form or judge--justify or  condemn--the 
agents who entertain them and who insist
 upon them4 ,they  are of things whose  
immediate meanings form their content4  
,to believe  is to ascribe value1 impute
 meaning1 assign import4 ,the collection
 and  interaction of these appraisals   
and assessments is the world of the     
common man1--that is1 of man as an      
individual and not as a professional    
being or class specimen4 ,thus things   
are characters1 not mere entities2  they
 behave and respond and provoke4 ,in the
 behavior that exemplifies  and tests   
their character1 they help and hinder2  
disturb and pacify2  resist and comply2 
are dismal and mirthful1 orderly and    
deformed1 queer  and commonplace2 they  
agree and disagree2 are better and      
worse4    ,thus the human world1 whether
 or no it have core and axis1 has       

presence  and transfiguration4 ,it means
 here and now1 not in some transcendent 
sphere4 ,it moves1 of itself1 to varied 
incremental meaning1 not to some  far   
off event1 whether divine or diabolic4  
,such movement constitutes  conduct1 for
 conduct is the working out of the      
commitments of belief4  ,that believed  
better is held to1 asserted1 affirmed1  
acted upon4 ,the  moments of its crucial
 fulfilment are the natural             
8transcendentals02  the decisive1 the   
critical1 standards of further          
estimation1 selection1  and rejection4  
,that believed worse is fled1 resisted1 
transformed into  an instrument for the 
better4 ,characters1 in being           
condensations of  belief1 are thus at   
once the reminders and the              
prognostications of  weal and woe2 they 
concrete and they regulate the terms of 
effective  apprehension and             
appropriation of things4 ,this general  
regulative  function is what we mean in 
calling them characters1 forms4    ,for 

beliefs1 made in the course of          
existence1 reciprocate by making        
existence still farther1 by developing  
it4 ,beliefs are not made  by existence 
in a mechanical or logical or           
psychological sense4  8,reality0        
naturally instigates belief4 ,it        
appraises itself and  through this      
self-appraisal manages its affairs4 ,as 
things are  surcharged valuations1 so   
8consciousness0 means ways of believing 
and  disbelieving4 ,it is               
interpretation2 not merely existence    
aware of  itself as fact1 but existence 
discerning1 judging itself1 approving   
and  disapproving4    ,this double      
outlook and connection of belief1 its   
implication1 on one  side1 with beings  
who suffer and endeavor1 and1 its       
complication on  the other1 with the    
meanings and worths of things1 is its   
glory or  its unpardonable sin4 ,we     
cannot keep connection on one side and  
throw  it away on the other4 ,we cannot 
preserve significance and decline the   

personal attitude in which it is        
inscribed and operative1 any more than  
we can succeed in making things 8states0
 of a 8consciousness0 whose  business is
 to be an interpretation of things4     
,beliefs are personal  affairs1 and     
personal affairs are adventures1 and    
adventures are1 if  you please1 shady4  
,but equally discredited1 then1 is the  
universe of  meanings4 ,for the world   
has meaning as somebody's1 somebody's at
 a  juncture1 taken for better or worse1
 and you shall not have completed  your 
metaphysics till you have told whose    
world is meant and how and  what for--in
 what bias and to what effect4 ,here is 
a cake that is had  only by eating it1  
just as there is digestion only for life
 as well  as by life4    ,so far the    
standpoint of the common man4 ,but the  
professional man1  the philosopher1 has 
been largely occupied in a systematic   
effort  to discredit the standpoint of  
the common man1 that is1 to disable     
belief as an ultimately valid principle4

 ,philosophy is shocked at  the frank1  
almost brutal1 evocation of beliefs by  
and in natural  existence1 like witches 
out of a desert heath--at a mode of     
production  which is neither logical1   
nor physical1 nor psychological1 but    
just  natural1 empirical4 ,for modern   
philosophy is1 as every college senior  
recites1 epistemology2 and epistemology1
 as perhaps our books and  lectures     
sometimes forget to tell the senior1 has
 absorbed ,stoic dogma4  ,passionless   
imperturbability1 absolute detachment1  
complete subjection  to a ready-made and
 finished reality--physical it may be1  
mental it  may be1 logical it may be--is
 its professed ideal4 ,forswearing the  
reality of affection1 and the gallantry 
of adventure1 the genuineness  of the   
incomplete1 the tentative1 it has taken 
an oath of allegiance to  ,reality1     
objective1 universal1 complete2 made    
perhaps of atoms1 perhaps  of           
sensations1 perhaps of logical meanings4
 ,this ready-made reality1  already     

including everything1 must of course    
swallow and absorb  belief1 must produce
 it psychologically1 mechanically1 or   
logically1  according to its own nature2
 must in any case1 instead of acquiring 
aid and support from belief1 resolve it 
into one of its own preordained         
creatures1 making a desert and calling  
it harmony1 unity1 totality4#bg         
,philosophy has dreamed the dream of a  
knowledge which is other than  the      
propitious outgrowth of beliefs that    
shall develop aforetime their  ulterior 
implications in order to recast them1 to
 rectify their errors1  cultivate their 
waste places1 heal their diseases1      
fortify their  feeblenesses3--the dream 
of a knowledge that has to do with      
objects  having no nature save to be    
known4    ,not that their philosophers  
have admitted the concrete realizability
  of their scheme4 ,on the contrary1 the
 assertion of the absolute  8,reality0  
of what is empirically unrealizable is a
 part of the scheme2  the ideal of a    

universe of pure1 cognitional objects1  
fixed elements  in fixed relations4     
,sensationalist and idealist1 positivist
 and  transcendentalist1 materialist and
 spiritualist1 defining this object  in 
as many differing ways as they have     
different conceptions of the  ideal and 
method of knowledge1 are at one in their
 devotion to an  identification of      
,reality with something that connects   
monopolistically  with passionless      
knowledge1 belief purged of all personal
 reference1  origin1 and outlook4#bh    
,what is to be said of this attempt to  
sever the cord which naturally  binds   
together personal attitudes and the     
meaning of things8 ,this much  at least3
 the effort to extract meanings1 values1
 from the beliefs that  ascribe them1   
and to give the former absolute         
metaphysical validity  while the latter 
are sent to wander as scapegoats in the 
wilderness  of mere phenomena1 is an    
attempt1 which1 as long as 8our         
interest's  on the dangerous edge of    

things10 will attract an admiring1 even 
if  suspicious1 audience4 ,moreover1 we 
may admit that the attempt to  catch the
 universe of immediate experience1 of   
action and passion1  coming and going1  
to damn it in its present body in order 
expressly  to glorify its spirit to all 
eternity1 to validate the meaning of    
beliefs by discrediting their natural   
existence1 to attribute absolute  worth 
to the intent of human convictions just 
because of the absolute  worthlessness  
of their content--that the performance  
of this feat  of virtuosity has         
developed philosophy to its present     
wondrous1 if  formidable1 technique4    
,but can we claim more than a succs     
d'estime8 ,consider again the  nature of
 the effort4 ,the world of immediate    
meanings1 of the world  empirically     
sustained in beliefs1 is to be sorted   
out into two  portions1 metaphysically  
discontinuous1 one of which shall alone 
be  good and true 8,reality10 the fit   
material of passionless1 beliefless     

knowledge2 while the other part1 that   
which is excluded1 shall be  referred   
exclusively to belief and treated as    
mere appearance1  purely subjective1    
impressions or effects in consciousness1
 or as  that ludicrously abject modern  
discovery--an epiphenomenon4 ,and this  
division into the real and the unreal is
 accomplished by the very  individual   
whom his own 8absolute0 results reduce  
to phenomenality1  in terms of the very 
immediate experience which is infected  
with  worthlessness1 and on the basis of
 preference1 of selection that are      
declared to be unreal6 ,can the thing be
 done8    ,anyway1 the snubbed and      
excluded factor may always reassert     
itself4  ,the very pushing it out of    
8,reality0 may but add to its potential 
energy1 and invoke a more violent       
recoil4 ,when affections and  aversions1
 with the beliefs in which they record  
themselves and the  efforts they exact1 
are reduced to epiphenomena1 dancing an 
idle  attendance upon a reality complete

 without them1 to which they vainly     
strive to accommodate themselves by     
mirroring1 then may the emotions        
flagrantly burst forth with the claim   
that1 as a friend of mine puts  it1     
reason is only a fig leaf for their     
nakedness4 ,when one  man says that     
need1 uncertainty1 choice1 novelty1 and 
strife have  no place in ,reality1 which
 is made up wholly of established things
  behaving by foregone rules1 then may  
another man be provoked to reply  that  
all such fixities1 whether named atoms  
or ,god1 whether they be  fixtures of a 
sensational1 a positivistic1 or an      
idealistic system1  have existence and  
import only in the problems1 needs1     
struggles1 and  instrumentalities of    
conscious agents and patients4 ,for home
 rule may  be found in the unwritten    
efficacious constitution of experience4 
,that contemporaneously we are in the   
presence of such a reaction is          
apparent4 ,let us1 in pursuit of our    
topic1 inquire how it came about  and   

why it takes the form that it takes4    
,this consideration may not  only occupy
 the hour1 but may help diagram some    
future parallelogram  of forces4 ,the   
account calls for some sketching 7#a7 of
 the historical  tendencies which have  
shaped the situation in which a ,stoic  
theory of  knowledge claims metaphysical
 monopoly1 and 7#b7 of the tendencies   
that  have furnished the despised       
principle of belief opportunity and     
means  of reassertion4      ,,ii        
,imagination readily travels to a period
 when a gospel of intense1  and1 one may
 say1 deliberate passionate disturbance 
appeared to be  conquering the ,stoic   
ideal of passionless reason2 when the   
demand  for individual assertion by     
faith against the established1 embodied 
objective order was seemingly subduing  
the idea of the total  subordination of 
the individual to the universal4 ,by    
what course  of events came about the   
dramatic reversal1 in which an ethically
  conquered ,stoicism became the        

conqueror1 epistemologically1 of        
,christianity8    ,how are our          
imaginations haunted by the idea of what
 might have  happened if ,christianity  
had found ready to its hand intellectual
  formulations corresponding to its     
practical proclamations6    ,that the   
ultimate principle of conduct is        
affectional and volitional2  that ,god  
is love2 that access to the principle is
 by faith1 a personal  attitude2 that   
belief1 surpassing logical basis and    
warrant1 works  out through its own     
operation its own fulfilling evidence3  
such was  the implied moral metaphysic  
of ,christianity4 ,but this implication 
needed to become a theory1 a theology1 a
 formulation2 and in this  need1 it     
found no recourse save to philosophies  
that had identified  true existence with
 the proper object of logical reason4   
,for1 in ,greek  thought1 after the     
valuable meanings1 the meanings of      
industry and art  that appealed to      
sustained and serious choice1 had given 

birth and  status to reflective reason1 
reason denied its ancestry of organized 
endeavor1 and proclaimed itself in its  
function of self-conscious  logical     
thought to be the author and warrant of 
all genuine things4  ,yet how nearly    
,christianity had found prepared for it 
the needed means  of its own            
intellectual statement6 ,we recall      
,aristotle's account  of moral knowing1 
and his definition of man4 ,man as man1 
he tells  us1 is a principle that may be
 termed either desiring thought or      
thinking desire4 ,not as pure           
intelligence does man know1 but as an   
organization of desires effected through
 reflection upon their own  conditions  
and consequences4 ,what if ,aristotle   
had only assimilated  his idea of       
theoretical to his notion of practical  
knowledge6 ,because  practical thinking 
was so human1 ,aristotle rejected it in 
favor of  pure1 passionless cognition1  
something superhuman4 ,thinking desire  
is  experimental1 is tentative1 not     

absolute4 ,it looks to the future and   
to the past for help in the future4 ,it 
is contingent1 not necessary4  ,it      
doubly relates to the individual3 to the
 individual thing as  experienced by an 
individual agent2 not to the universal4 
,hence  desire is a sure sign of defect1
 of privation1 of non-being1 and  seeks 
surcease in something which knows it    
not4 ,hence desiring reason  culminating
 in beliefs relating to imperfect       
existence1 stands forever  in contrast  
with passionless reason functioning in  
pure knowledge1  logically complete1 of 
perfect being4    ,i need not remind you
 how through ,neo-,platonism1 ,st4      
,augustine1 and the  ,scholastic        
renaissance1 these conceptions became   
imbedded in ,christian  philosophy2 and 
what a reversal occurred of the original
 practical  principle of ,christianity4 
,belief is henceforth important because 
it is the mere antecedent in a finite   
and fallen world1 a temporal  and       
phenomenal world infected with          

non-being1 of true knowledge to  be     
achieved only in a world of completed   
,being4 ,desire is but the              
self-consciousness of defect striving to
 its own termination in  perfect        
possession1 through perfect knowledge of
 perfect being4 ,i  need not remind you 
that the prima facie subordination of   
reason to  authority1 of knowledge to   
faith1 in the medieval code1 is1 after  
all1  but the logical result of the     
doctrine that man as man 7since only    
reasoning desire7 is merely phenomenal2 
and has his reality in ,god1 who  as    
,god is the complete union of rational  
insight and being--the term  of man's   
desire1 and the fulfilment of his feeble
 attempts at knowing4  ,authority1      
8faith0 as it then had to be conceived1 
meant just that this  ,being comes      
externally to the aid of man1 otherwise 
hopelessly doomed  to misery in long    
drawn out error and non-being1 and      
disciplines him  till1 in the next world
 under more favoring auspices1 he may   

have his  desires stilled in good1 and  
his faith may yield to knowledge3--for  
we  forget that the doctrine of         
immortality was not an appendage1 but an
  integral part of the theory that since
 knowledge is the true function  of man1
 happiness is attained only in          
knowledge1 which itself exists  only in 
achievement of perfect ,being or ,god4  
,for my part1 ,i can but think that     
medieval absolutism1 with its  provision
 for authoritative supernatural         
assistance in this world and  assertion 
of supernatural realization in the next1
 was more logical1  as well as more     
humane1 than the modern absolutism1     
that1 with the  same logical premises1  
bids man find adequate consolation and  
support  in the fact that1 after all1   
his strivings are already eternally     
fulfilled1 his errors already eternally 
transcended1 his partial  beliefs       
already eternally comprehended4    ,the 
modern age is marked by a refusal to be 
satisfied with the  postponement of the 

exercise and function of reason to      
another and  supernatural sphere1 and by
 a resolve to practise itself upon its  
present object1 nature1 with all the    
joys thereunto appertaining4 ,the  pure 
intelligence of ,aristotle1 thought     
thinking itself1 expresses  itself as   
free inquiry directed upon the present  
conditions of its  own most effective   
exercise4 ,the principle of the inherent
 relation  of thought to being was      
preserved intact1 but its practical     
locus was  moved down from the next     
world to this4 ,spinoza's 8,god or      
,nature0 is  the logical outcome2 as is 
also his strict correlation of the      
attribute  of matter with the attribute 
of thought2 while his combination of    
thorough distrust of passion and faith  
with complete faith in reason  and      
all-absorbing passion for knowledge is  
so classic an embodiment of  the whole  
modern contradiction that it may awaken 
admiration where less  thorough-paced   
formulations call out irritation4    ,in

 the practical devotion of present      
intelligence to its present  object1    
nature1 science was born1 and also its  
philosophical  counterpart1 the theory  
of knowledge4 ,epistemology only        
generalized in  its loose1 although     
narrow and technical way1 the question  
practically  urgent in ,europe3 ,how is 
science possible8 ,how can intelligence 
actively and directly get at its object8
    ,meantime1 through ,protestantism   
the values1 the meanings formerly       
characterizing the next life 7the       
opportunity for full perception  of     
perfect being71 were carried over into  
present-day emotions and  responses4    
,the dualism between faith              
authoritatively supported as the        
principle of  this life1 and knowledge  
supernaturally realized as the principle
 of  the next1 was transmuted into the  
dualism between intelligence now and    
here occupied with natural things1 and  
the affections and accompanying         
beliefs1 now and here realizing         

spiritual worths4 ,for a time this      
dualism operated as a convenient        
division of labor4 ,intelligence1 freed 
from responsibility for and             
preoccupation with supernatural truths1 
could occupy itself the more fully and  
efficiently with the world  that now is2
 while the affections1 charged with the 
values evoked in  the medieval          
discipline1 entered into the present    
enjoyment of the  delectations          
previously reserved for the saints4     
,directness took the  place of          
systematic intermediation2 the present  
of the future2 the  individual's        
emotional consciousness of the          
supernatural institution4  ,between     
science and faith1 thus conceived1 a    
bargain was struck4  ,hands off2 each to
 his own1 was the compact2 the natural  
world to  intelligence1 the moral1 the  
spiritual world to belief4 ,this        
7natural7  world for knowledge2 that    
7supernatural7 world for belief4 ,thus  
the  antithesis1 unexpressed1 ignored1  

within experience1 between belief  and  
knowledge1 between the purely objective 
values of thought and the  personal     
values of passion and volition1 was more
 fundamental1 more  determining1 than   
the opposition1 explicit and harassing1 
within  knowledge1 between subject and  
object1 mind and matter4    ,this latent
 antagonism worked out into the open4   
,in scientific detail1  knowledge       
encroached upon the historic traditions 
and opinions with  which the moral and  
religious life had identified itself4   
,it made  history to be as natural1 as  
much its spoil1 as physical nature4 ,it 
turned itself upon man1 and proceeded   
remorselessly to account for  his       
emotions1 his volitions1 his opinions4  
,knowledge1 in its general  theory1 as  
philosophy1 went the same way4 ,it was  
pre-committed to  the old notion3 the   
absolutely real is the object of        
knowledge1  and hence is something      
universal and impersonal4 ,so1 whether  
by the  road of sensationalism or       

rationalism1 by the path of             
mechanicalism  or objective idealism1 it
 came about that concrete selves1       
specific  feeling and willing beings1   
were relegated with the beliefs in which
  they declare themselves to the        
8phenomenal40      ,,iii    ,so much for
 the situation against which some       
contemporary tendencies  are a          
deliberate protest4    ,what of the     
positive conditions that give us not    
mere protest1 like  the unreasoning     
revolt of heart against head found at   
all epochs1 but  something articulate   
and constructive8 ,the field is only too
 large1  and ,i shall limit myself to   
the evolution of the knowledge          
standpoint  itself4 ,i shall suggest1   
first1 that the progress of intelligence
  directed upon natural materials has   
evolved a procedure of knowledge  that  
renders untenable the inherited         
conception of knowledge2 and1  secondly1
 that this result is reinforced by the  
specific results of  some of the special

 sciences4    #a4 ,first1 then1 the very
 use of the knowledge standpoint1 the   
very  expression of the knowledge       
preoccupation1 has produced methods and 
tests that1 when formulated1 intimate a 
radically different conception  of      
knowledge1 and of its relation to       
existence and belief1 than the  orthodox
 one4    ,the one thing that stands out 
is that thinking is inquiry1 and that   
knowledge as science is the outcome of  
systematically directed inquiry4  ,for a
 time it was natural enough that inquiry
 should be interpreted  in the old      
sense1 as just change of subjective     
attitudes and opinions  to make them    
square up with a 8reality0 that is      
already there in  ready-made1 fixed1 and
 finished form4 ,the rationalist had one
 notion  of the reality1 i4e41 that it  
was of the nature of laws1 genera1  or  
an ordered system1 and so thought of    
concepts1 axioms1 etc41  as the         
indicated modes of representation4 ,the 
empiricist1 holding  reality to be a lot

 of little discrete particular lumps1   
thought of  disjointed sensations as its
 appropriate counterpart4 ,but both     
alike  were thorough conformists4 ,if   
8reality0 is already and completely     
given1 and if knowledge is just         
submissive acceptance1 then1 of  course1
 inquiry is only a subjective change in 
the human 8mind0 or in                  
8consciousness10--these being subjective
 and 8unreal40    ,but the very         
development of the sciences served to   
reveal a peculiar  and intolerable      
paradox4 ,epistemology1 having condemned
 inquiry once  for all to the region of 
subjectivity in an invidious sense1     
finds  itself in flat opposition in     
principle and in detail to the          
assumption  and to the results of the   
sciences4 ,epistemology is bound to deny
 to  the results of the special sciences
 in detail any ulterior objectivity     
just because they always are in a       
process of inquiry--in solution4  ,while
 a man may not be halted at being told  

that his mental activities1  since his1 
are not genuinely real1 many men will   
draw violently back  at being told that 
all the discoveries1 conclusions1       
explanations1  and theories of the      
sciences share the same fate1 being the 
products  of a discredited mind4 ,and1  
in general1 epistemology1 in relegating 
human thinking as inquiry to a merely   
phenomenal region1 makes concrete       
approximation and conformity to         
objectivity hopeless4 ,even if it did   
square itself up to and by 8reality0 it 
never could be sure of it4  ,the ancient
 myth of ,tantalus and his effort to    
drink the water before  him seems to be 
ingeniously prophetic of modern         
epistemology4 ,the  thirstier1 the      
needier of truth the human mind1 and the
 intenser the  efforts put forth to     
slake itself in the ocean of being just 
beyond  the edge of consciousness1 the  
more surely the living waters of truth  
recede6    ,when such self-confessed    
sterility is joined with consistent     

derogation  of all the special results  
of the special sciences1 some one is    
sure to  raise the cry of 8dog in the   
manger10 or of 8sour grapes40 ,a        
revision  of the theory of thinking1 of 
inquiry1 would seem to be inevitable2  a
 revision which should cease trying to  
construe knowledge as an  attempted     
approximation to a reproduction of      
reality under conditions  that condemn  
it in advance to failure2 a revision    
which should start  frankly from the    
fact of thinking as inquiring1 and      
purely external  realities as terms in  
inquiries1 and which should construe    
validity1  objectivity1 truth1 and the  
test and system of truths1 on the basis 
of  what they actually mean and do      
within inquiry4    ,such a standpoint   
promises ample revenge for the long     
damnation and  longer neglect to which  
the principle of belief has been        
subjected4  ,the whole procedure of     
thinking as developed in those extensive
 and  intensive inquiries that          

constitute the sciences1 is but         
rendering  into a systematic technique1 
into an art deliberately and            
delightfully  pursued1 the rougher and  
cruder means by which practical human   
beings  have in all ages worked out the 
implications of their beliefs1 tested   
them1 and endeavored in the interests of
 economy1 efficiency1 and  freedom1 to  
render them coherent with one another4  
,belief1 sheer1  direct1 unmitigated    
belief1 reappears as the working        
hypothesis2 action  that at once        
develops and tests belief reappears in  
experimentation1  deduction1            
demonstration2 while the machinery of   
universals1 axioms1  a priori truths1   
etc41 becomes a systematization of the  
way in which  men have always worked    
out1 in anticipation of overt action1   
the  implications of their beliefs1 with
 a view to revising them1 in the        
interests of obviating unfavorable1 and 
securing welcome consequences4          
,observation1 with its machinery of     

sensations1 measurements1 etc41  is the 
resurrection of the way in which agents 
have always faced and  tried to define  
the problems that face them2 truth is   
the union of  abstract postulated       
meanings and of concrete brute facts in 
a way that  circumvents the latter by   
judging them from a new standpoint1     
while it  tests concepts by using them  
as methods in the same active           
experience4  ,it all comes to experience
 personally conducted and personally    
consummated4    ,let consciousness of   
these facts dawn a little more brightly 
over the  horizon of epistemological    
prejudices1 and it will be seen that    
nothing  prevents admitting the         
genuineness both of thinking activities 
and of  their characteristic results1   
except the notion that belief itself is 
not a genuine ingredient of existence--a
 notion which itself is not  only a     
belief1 but a belief which1 unlike the  
convictions of the common  man and the  
hypotheses of science1 finds its proud  

proof in the fact  that it does not     
demean itself so unworthily as to work4 
,once believe that beliefs themselves   
are as 8real0 as anything else  can ever
 be1 and we have a world in which       
uncertainty1 doubtfulness1  really      
inhere2 and in which personal attitudes 
and responses are real  both in their   
own distinctive existence1 and as the   
only ways in which  an as yet           
undetermined factor of reality takes on 
shape1 meaning1  value1 truth4 ,if 8to  
wilful men the injuries that they       
themselves  procure1 must be their      
schoolmasters0--and all beliefs are     
wilful--then  by the same token the     
propitious evolutions of meaning1 which 
wilful  men secure to an expectant      
universe1 must be their compensation and
  their justification4 ,in a doubtful   
and needy universe elements must be     
beggarly1 and the development of        
personal beliefs into experimentally    
executed systems of actions1 is the     
organized bureau of philanthropy  which 

confers upon a travailing universe the  
meaning for which it cries  out4 ,the   
apostrophe of the poet is above all to  
man the thinker1 the  inquirer1 the     
knower3        ,o ,dreamer6 ,o ,desirer1
 goer down      ,unto untraveled seas in
 untried ships1      ,o crusher of the  
unimagined grape1      ,on unconceivd   
lips4    #b4 ,biology1 psychology1 and  
the social sciences proffer an imposing 
body of concrete facts that also point  
to the rehabilitation of  belief--to the
 interpretation of knowledge as a human 
and practical  outgrowth of belief1 not 
to belief as the state to which         
knowledge is  condemned in a merely     
finite and phenomenal world4 ,i need    
not1 as ,i  cannot1 here summarize the  
psychological revision which the notions
 of  sensation1 perception1 conception1 
cognition in general have undergone1    
all to one intent4 8,motor0 is writ     
large on their face4 ,the testimony  of 
biology is unambiguous to the effect    
that the organic instruments  of the    

whole intellectual life1 the            
sense-organs and brain and their        
connections1 have been developed on a   
definitely practical basis and  for     
practical aims1 for the purpose of such 
control over conditions  as will sustain
 and vary the meanings of life4 ,the    
historic sciences  are equally explicit 
in their evidence that knowledge as a   
system of  information and instruction  
is a coperative social achievement1 at  
all times socially toned1 sustained1 and
 directed2 and that logical  thinking is
 a reweaving through individual activity
 of this social  fabric at such points  
as are indicated by prevailing needs and
 aims4    ,this bulky and coherent body 
of testimony is not1 of course1 of      
itself  philosophy4 ,but it supplies1 at
 all events1 facts that have scientific 
backing1 and that are as worthy of      
regard as the facts pertinent to any    
science4 ,at the present time these     
facts seem to have some peculiar  claim 
just because they present traits largely

 ignored in prior  philosophic          
formulations1 while those belonging to  
mathematics and  physics have so largely
 wrought their sweet will on systems4   
,again1 it  would seem as if in         
philosophies built deliberately upon the
 knowledge  principle1 any body of known
 facts should not have to clamor for    
sympathetic attention4    ,such being   
the case1 the reasons for ruling        
psychology and sociology  and allied    
sciences out of competency to give      
philosophic testimony  have more        
significance than the bare denial of    
jurisdiction4 ,they are  evidences of   
the deep-rooted preconception that      
whatever concerns a  particular         
conscious agent1 a wanting1 struggling1 
satisfied and  dissatisfied being1 must 
of course be only 8phenomenal0 in       
import4    ,this aversion is the more   
suggestive when the professed idealist  
appears as the special champion of the  
virginity of pure knowledge4  ,the      
idealist1 so content with the notion    

that consciousness determines  reality1 
provided it be done once for all1 at a  
jump and in lump1 is  so uneasy in      
presence of the idea that empirical     
conscious beings  genuinely determine   
existences now and here6 ,one is        
reminded of the  story told1 ,i think1  
by ,spencer4 ,some committee had        
organized and  contended1 through a long
 series of parliaments1 for the passage 
of  a measure4 ,at last one of their    
meetings was interrupted with news  of  
success4 ,consternation was the result4 
,what was to become of the  occupation  
of the committee8 ,so1 one asks1 what is
 to become of  idealism at large1 of the
 wholesale unspecifiable determination  
of  8reality0 by or in 8consciousness10 
if specific conscious beings1 ,john     
,smiths1 and ,susan ,smiths 7to say     
nothing of their animal relations71     
beings with bowels and brains1 are found
 to exercise influence upon the         
character and existence of reals8       
,one would be almost justified in       

construing idealism as a ,pickwickian   
scheme1 so willing is it to idealize the
 principle of intelligence  at the      
expense of its specific undertakings1   
were it not that this  reluctance is the
 necessary outcome of the ,stoic basis  
and tenor of  idealism--its             
preoccupation with logical contents and 
relations in  abstraction from their    
situs and function in conscious living  
beings4      ,,iv    ,i have suggested  
to you the nave conception of the       
relation of beliefs  to realities3 that 
beliefs are themselves real without     
discount1  manifesting their reality in 
the usual proper way1 namely1 by        
modifying  and shaping the reality of   
other things1 so that they connect the  
bias1  the preferences and affections1  
the needs and endeavors of personal     
lives with the values1 the characters   
ascribed to things3--the latter  thus   
becoming worthy of human acquaintance   
and responsive to human  intercourse4   
,this was followed by a sketch of the   

history of thought1  indicating how     
beliefs and all they insinuate were     
subjected to  preconceived notions of   
knowledge and of 8reality0 as a         
monopolistic  possession of pure        
intellect4 ,then ,i traced some of the  
motifs that  make for reconsideration of
 the supposed uniquely exclusive        
relation  of logical knowledge and      
8reality02 motifs that make for a less  
invidiously superior attitude towards   
the convictions of the common man4      
,in concluding1 ,i want to say a word or
 two to mitigate--for escape is         
impossible--some misunderstandings4     
,and1 to begin with1 while possible     
doubts inevitably troop with actual     
beliefs1 the doctrine in question  is   
not particularly sceptical4 ,the radical
 empiricist1 the humanist1  the         
pragmatist1 label him as you will1      
believes not in fewer but in  more      
8realities0 than the orthodox           
philosophers warrant4 ,he is not        
concerned1 for example1 in discrediting 

objective realities and logical  or     
universal thinking2 he is interested in 
such a reinterpretation of  the sort of 
8reality0 which these things possess as 
will accredit1  without depreciation1   
concrete empirical conscious centers of 
action  and passion4    ,my second      
remark is to the opposite effect4 ,the  
intent is not  especially credulous1    
although it starts from and ends with   
the radical  credulity of all knowledge4
 ,to suppose that because the sciences  
are  ultimately instrumental to human   
beliefs1 we are therefore to be         
careless of the most exact possible use 
of extensive and systematic  scientific 
methods1 is like supposing that because 
a watch is made to  tell present time1  
and not to be an exemplar of            
transcendent1 absolute  time1 watches   
might as well be made of cheap stuffs1  
casually wrought  and clumsily put      
together4 ,it is the task of telling    
present time1 with  all its urgent      
implications1 that brings home1         

steadies1 and enlarges  the             
responsibility for the best possible use
 of intelligence1 the  instrument4      
,for one1 ,i have no interest in the    
old1 old scheme of derogating from  the 
worth of knowledge in order to give an  
uncontrolled field for some  special    
beliefs to run riot in1--be these       
beliefs even faith in  immortality1 in  
some special sort of a ,deity1 or in    
some particular  brand of freedom4 ,any 
one of our beliefs is subject to        
criticism1  revision1 and even ultimate 
elimination through the development of  
its  own implications by intelligently  
directed action4 ,because reason is  a  
scheme of working out the meanings of   
convictions in terms of one  another and
 of the consequences they import in     
further experience1  convictions are the
 more1 not the less1 amenable and       
responsible to the  full exercise of    
reason4#bi    ,thus we are put on the   
road to that most desirable thing1--the 
union  of acknowledgment of moral powers

 and demands with thoroughgoing         
naturalism4 ,no one really wants to lame
 man's practical nature2 it is  the     
supposed exigencies of natural science  
that force the hand4 ,no one  really    
bears a grudge against naturalism for   
the sake of obscurantism4  ,it is the   
need of some sacred reservation for     
moral interests that  coerces4 ,we all  
want to be as naturalistic as we can be4
 ,but the 8can  be0 is the rub4 ,if we  
set out with a fixed dualism of belief  
and  knowledge1 then the uneasy fear    
that the natural sciences are going  to 
encroach and destroy 8spiritual values0 
haunts us4 ,so we build  them a citadel 
and fortify it2 that is1 we isolate1    
professionalize1  and thereby weaken    
beliefs4 ,but if beliefs are the most   
natural1 and  in that sense1 the most   
metaphysical of all things1 and if      
knowledge  is an organized technique for
 working out their implications and     
interrelations1 for directing their     
formation and employ1 how  unnecessary1 

how petty the fear and the caution4     
,because freedom of  belief is ours1    
free thought may exercise itself2 the   
freer the thought  the more sure the    
emancipation of belief4 ,hug some       
special belief and  one fears knowledge2
 believe in belief and one loves and    
cleaves to  knowledge4    ,we have here1
 too1 the possibility of a common       
understanding1 in  thought1 in language1
 in outlook1 of the philosopher and the 
common  man4 ,what would not the        
philosopher give1 did he not have to    
part  with some of his common humanity  
in order to join a class8 ,does he  not 
always1 when challenged1 justify himself
 with the contention that  all men      
naturally philosophize1 and that he but 
does in a conscious  and orderly way    
what leads to harm when done in an      
indiscriminate  and irregular way8 ,if  
philosophy be at once a natural history 
and  a logic--an art--of beliefs1 then  
its technical justification is at  one  
with its human justification4 ,the      

natural attitude of man1 said  ,emerson1
 is believing2 8the philosopher1 after  
some struggle1 having  only reasons for 
believing40 ,let the struggle then      
enlighten and  enlarge beliefs2 let the 
reasons kindle and engender new beliefs4
    ,finally1 it is not a solution1 but 
a problem which is presented4 ,as       
philosophers1 our disagreements as to   
conclusions are trivial compared  with  
our disagreement as to problems4 ,to see
 the problem another  sees1 in the same 
perspective and at the same angle--that 
amounts to  something4 ,agreement in    
solutions is in comparison perfunctory4 
,to  experience the same problem another
 feels--that perhaps is agreement4  ,in 
a world where distinctions are as       
invidious as comparisons are  odious1   
and where intellect works only by       
comparison and distinction1  pray what  
is one to do8    ,but beliefs are       
personal matters1 and the person1 we may
 still  believe1 is social4 ,to be a man
 is to be thinking desire2 and the      

agreement of desires is not in oneness  
of intellectual conclusion1  but in the 
sympathies of passion and the concords  
of action3--and yet  significant union  
in affection and behavior may depend    
upon a consensus  in thought that is    
secured only by discrimination and      
comparison4          ,,experience ,,and 
,,objective ,,idealism#cj      ,i       
,idealism as a philosophic system stands
 in such a delicate relation  to        
experience as to invite attention4 ,in  
its subjective form1 or  sensationalism1
 it claims to be the last word of       
empiricism4 ,in its  objective1 or      
rational form1 it claims to make good   
the deficiencies of  the subjective     
type1 by emphasizing the work of thought
 that supplies  the factors of          
objectivity and universality lacking in 
sensationalism4  ,with reference to     
experience as it now is1 such idealism  
is half  opposed to empiricism and half 
committed to it1--antagonistic1 so  far 
as existing experience is regarded as   

tainted with a sensational  character2  
favorable1 so far as this experience is 
even now prophetic  of some final1      
all-comprehensive1 or absolute          
experience1 which in  truth is one with 
reality4    ,that this combination of   
opposition to present experience with   
devotion  to the cause of experience in 
the abstract leaves objective idealism  
in a position of unstable equilibrium   
from which it can find release  only by 
euthanasia in a thorough-going          
empiricism seems evident4  ,some of the 
reasons for this belief may be readily  
approached by  a summary sketch of three
 historic episodes in which have emerged
  important conceptions of experience   
and its relation to reason4 ,the  first 
takes us to classic ,greek thought4     
,here experience means the              
preservation1 through memory1 of the net
 result of a multiplicity of  particular
 doings and sufferings2 a preservation  
that affords positive  skill in         
maintaining further practice1 and       

promise of success in new  emergencies4 
,the craft of the carpenter1 the art of 
the physician  are standing examples of 
its nature4 ,it differs from instinct   
and  blind routine or servile practice  
because there is some knowledge of      
materials1 methods1 and aims1 in their  
adjustment to one another4  ,yet the    
marks of its passive1 habitual origin   
are indelibly stamped  upon it4 ,on the 
knowledge side it can never aspire      
beyond opinion1  and if true opinion be 
achieved1 it is only by happy chance4   
,on the  active side it is limited to   
the accomplishment of a special work or 
a particular product1 following some    
unjustified1 because assumed1  method4  
,thus it contrasts with the true        
knowledge of reason1 which  is direct   
apprehension1 self-revealing and        
self-validating1 of an  eternal and     
harmonious content4 ,the regions in     
which experience and  reason            
respectively hold sway are thus         
explained4 ,experience has to do  with  

production1 which1 in turn1 is relative 
to decay4 ,it deals with  generation1   
becoming1 not with finality1 being4     
,hence it is infected  with the trait of
 relative non-being1 of mere            
imitativeness2 hence its  multiplicity1 
its logical inadequacy1 its relativity  
to a standard and  end beyond itself4   
,reason1 per contra1 has to do with     
meaning1 with  significance 7ideas1     
forms71 that is eternal and ultimate4   
,since the  meaning of anything is the  
worth1 the good1 the end of that thing1 
experience presents us with partial and 
tentative efforts to achieve  the       
embodiment of purpose1 under conditions 
that doom the attempt to                
inconclusiveness4 ,it has1 however1 its 
meed of reality in the degree in  which 
its results participate in meaning1 the 
good1 reason4    ,from this classic     
period1 then1 comes the antithesis of   
experience as  the historically achieved
 embodiments of meaning1 partial1       
multiple1  insecure1 to reason as the   

source1 author1 and container of        
meaning1  permanent1 assured1 unified4  
,idealism means ideality1 experience    
means  brute and broken facts4 ,that    
things exist because of and for the     
sake of meaning1 and that experience    
gives us meaning in a servile1          
interrupted1 and inherently deficient   
way--such is the standpoint4            
,experience gives us meaning in process 
of becoming2 special and  isolated      
instances in which it happens1          
temporally1 to appear1 rather  than     
meaning pure1 undefiled1 independent4   
,experience presents purpose1  the good1
 struggling against obstacles1 8involved
 in matter40    ,just how much the vogue
 of modern neo-,kantian idealism1       
professedly  built upon a strictly      
epistemological instead of upon a       
cosmological  basis1 is due1 in days of 
a declining theology1 to a vague sense  
that  affirming the function of reason  
in the constitution of a knowable  world
 7which in its own constitution as      

logically knowable may be1  morally and 
spiritually1 anything you please71      
carries with it an  assurance of the    
superior reality of the good and the    
beautiful as  well as of the 8true10 it 
would be hard to say4 ,certainly unction
  seems to have descended upon          
epistemology1 in apostolic succession1  
from classic idealism2 so that          
neo-,kantianism is rarely without a tone
  of edification1 as if feeling itself  
the patron of man's spiritual  interests
 in contrast to the supposed crudeness  
and insensitiveness  of naturalism and  
empiricism4 ,at all events1 we find here
 one element  in our problem3           
,experience considered as the summary of
 past episodic  adventures and          
happenings in relation to fulfilled and 
adequately  expressed meaning4    ,the  
second historic event centers about the 
controversy of innate  ideas1 or pure   
concepts4 ,the issue is between         
empiricism and  rationalism as theories 
of the origin and validation of         

scientific  knowledge4 ,the empiricist  
is he who feels that the chief obstacle 
which prevents scientific method from   
making way is the belief in  pure       
thoughts1 not derived from particular   
observations and hence not  responsible 
to the course of experience4 ,his       
objection to the 8high a  priori road0  
is that it introduces in irresponsible  
fashion a mode  of presumed knowledge   
which may be used at any turn to stand  
sponsor  for mere tradition and         
prejudice1 and thus to nullify the      
results of  science resting upon and    
verified by observable facts4           
,experience  thus comes to mean1 to use 
the words of ,peirce1 8that which is    
forced  upon a man's recognition        
will-he1 nill-he1 and shapes his        
thoughts  to something quite different  
from what they naturally would have     
taken40#ca ,the same definition is found
 in ,james1 in his chapter on           
,necessary ,truths3 8,experience means  
experience of something foreign         

supposed to impress us whether          
spontaneously or in consequence of our  
own exertions and acts40#cb ,as ,peirce 
points out1 this notion of  experience  
as the foreign element that forces the  
hand of thought and  controls its       
efficacy1 goes back to ,locke4          
,experience is 8observation  employed   
either about external sensible objects1 
or about the internal  operations of our
 minds0#cc--;as furnishing in short all 
the valid  data and tests of thinking   
and knowledge4 ,this meaning1 thinks    
,peirce1  should be accepted 8as a      
landmark which it would be a crime to   
disturb  or displace40    ,the          
contention of idealism1 here bound up   
with rationalism1 is that  perception   
and observation cannot guarantee        
knowledge in its honorific  sense       
7science72 that the peculiar differentia
 of scientific knowledge  is a          
constancy1 a universality1 and necessity
 that contrast at every  point with     
perceptual data1 and that indispensably 

require the  function of conception4#cd 
,in short1 qualitative transformation   
of facts 7data of perception71 not their
 mechanical subtraction  and            
recombination1 is the difference between
 scientific and  perceptual knowledge4  
,here the problem which emerges is1 of  
course1  the significance of perception 
and of conception in respect to         
experience4#ce    ,the third episode    
reverses in a curious manner 7which     
confuses present  discussion7 the notion
 of experience as a foreign1 alien1     
coercive  material4 ,it regards         
experience as a fortuitous association1 
by merely  psychic connections1 of      
individualistic states of consciousness4
  ,this is due to the ,humian           
development of ,locke4 ,the 8objects0   
and 8operations10 which to ,locke were  
just given and secured in  observation1 
become shifting complexes of subjective 
sensations and  ideas1 whose apparent   
permanency is due to discoverable       
illusions4  ,this1 of course1 is the    

empiricism which made ,kant so uneasily 
toss  in his dogmatic slumbers 7a       
tossing that he took for an awakening72 
and which1 by reaction1 called out the  
conception of thought as a  function    
operating both to elevate perceptual    
data to scientific  status1 and also to 
confer objective status1 or knowable    
character1  upon even sensational data  
and their associative combinations4#cf  
,here emerges the third element in our  
problem3 ,the function of thought  as   
furnishing objectivity to any experience
 that claims cognitive  reference or    
capacity4    ,summing up the matter1    
idealism stands forth with its assertion
 of  thought or reason as 7#a7 the      
sponsor for all significance1 ideality1 
purpose1 in experience1--the author of  
the good and the beautiful  as well as  
the true2 7#b7 the power1 located in    
pure conceptions1  required to elevate  
perceptive or observational material to 
the plane  of science2 and 7#c7 the     
constitution that gives objectivity1    

even the  semblance of order1 system1   
connection1 mutual reference1 to sensory
  data that without its assistance are  
mere subjective flux4      ,,ii    ,i   
begin the discussion with the last-named
 function4 ,thought is  here conceived  
as a priori1 not in the sense of        
particular innate  ideas1 but of a      
function that constitutes the very      
possibility  of any objective           
experience1 any experience involving    
reference  beyond its own mere          
subjective happening4 ,i shall try to   
show that  idealism is condemned to move
 back and forth between two inconsistent
  interpretations of this a priori      
thought4 ,it is taken to mean both  the 
organized1 the regulated1 the informed1 
established character  of experience1 an
 order immanent and constitutional2 and 
an agency  which organizes1 regulates1  
forms1 synthesizes1 a power operative   
and  constructive4 ,and the oscillation 
between and confusion of these two      
diverse senses is necessary to          

,neo-,kantian idealism4    ,when ,kant  
compared his work in philosophy to that 
of the men who  introduced construction 
into geometry1 and experimentation into 
physics  and chemistry1 the point of his
 remarks depends upon taking the a      
priori worth of thought in a regulative1
 directive1 controlling sense1  thought 
as consciously1 intentionally1 making an
 experience different  in a determinate 
sense and manner4 ,but the point of his 
answer to  ,hume consists in taking the 
a priori in the other sense1 as         
something  which is already immanent in 
any experience1 and which accordingly   
makes no determinate difference to any  
one experience as compared with  any    
other1 or with any past or future form  
of itself4 ,the concept is  treated     
first as that which makes an experience 
actually different1  controlling its    
evolution towards consistency1          
coherency1 and objective  reliability2  
then1 it is treated as that which has   
already effected  the organization of   

any and every experience that comes to  
recognition  at all4 ,the fallacy from  
which he never emerges consists in      
vibrating  between the definition of a  
concept as a rule of constructive       
synthesis  in a differential sense1 and 
the definition of it as a static        
endowment lurking in 8mind10 and giving 
automatically a hard and fixed  law for 
the determination of every experienced  
object4 ,the a priori  conceptions of   
,kant as immanent fall1 like the rain1  
upon the just and  the unjust2 upon     
error1 opinion1 and hallucination4 ,but 
,kant slides  into these a priori       
functions the preferential values       
exercised  by empirical reflective      
thought4 ,the concept of triangle1 taken
  geometrically1 means doubtless a      
determinate method of construing space  
elements2 but to ,kant it also means    
something that exists in the mind  prior
 to all such geometrical constructions  
and that unconsciously  lays down the   
law not only for their conscious        

elaboration1 but also  for any space    
perception1 even for that which takes a 
rectangle to  be a triangle4 ,the first 
of the meanings is intelligible1 and    
marks a  definite contribution to the   
logic of science4 ,but it is not        
8objective  idealism02 it is a          
contribution to a revised empiricism4   
,the second is  a dark saying4    ,that 
organization of some sort exists in     
every experience ,i make no  doubt4     
,that isolation1 discrepancy1 the       
fragmentary1 the incompatible1  are     
brought to recognition and to logical   
function only with reference  to some   
prior existential mode of organization  
seems clear4 ,and  it seems equally     
clear that reflection goes on with      
profit only  because the materials with 
which it deals have already some degree 
of organization1 or exemplify various   
relationships4 ,as against  ,hume1 or   
even ,locke1 we may be duly grateful to 
,kant for enforcing  acknowledgment of  
these facts4 ,but the acknowledgment    

means simply an  improved and revised   
empiricism4    ,for1 be it noted1 this  
organization1 first1 is not the work of 
reason  or thought1 unless 8reason0 be  
stretched beyond all identification2    
and1 secondly1 it has no sacrosanct or  
finally valid and worthful  character4  
7#a7 ,experience always carries with it 
and within it certain  systematized     
arrangements1 certain classifications   
7using the term  without                
intellectualistic prejudice71 coexistent
 and serial4 ,if we  attribute these to 
8thought0 then the structure of the     
brain of a  ,mozart which hears and     
combines sounds in certain groupings1   
the  psycho-physical visual habit of the
 ,greek1 the locomotor apparatus of  the
 human body in the laying-out and       
plotting of space is 8thought40  ,social
 institutions1 established political    
customs1 effect and  perpetuate modes of
 reaction and of perception that compel 
a certain  grouping of objects1         
elements1 and values4 ,a national       

constitution  brings about a definite   
arrangement of the factors of human     
action  which holds even physical things
 together in certain determinate        
orders4 ,every successful economic      
process1 with its elaborate divisions   
and adjustments of labor1 of materials  
and instruments1 is just such  an       
objective organization4 ,now it is one  
thing to say that thought has  played a 
part in the origin and development of   
such organizations1 and  continues to   
have a rle in their judicious employment
 and application2  it is another to say 
that these organizations are thought1 or
  are its exclusive product4 ,thought   
that functions in these ways is         
distinctively reflective thought1       
thought as practical1 volitional1       
deliberately exercised for specific     
aims--thought as an act1 an art of      
skilled mediation4 ,as reflective       
thought1 its end is to terminate its    
own first and experimental forms1 and to
 secure an organization which1  while it

 may evoke new reflective thinking1 puts
 an end to the thinking  that secured   
the organization4 ,as organizations1 as 
established1  effectively controlling   
arrangements of objects in experience1  
their  mark is that they are not        
thoughts1 but habits1 customs of        
action4#cg    ,moreover1 such reflective
 thought as does intervene in the       
formation  and maintenance of these     
practical organizations harks back to   
prior  practical organizations1         
biological and social in nature4 ,it    
serves  to valuate organizations already
 existent as biological functions  and  
instincts1 while1 as itself a biological
 activity1 it redirects  them to new    
conditions and results4 ,recognize1 for 
example1 that a  geometric concept is a 
practical locomotor function of         
arranging  stimuli in reference to      
maintenance of life activities brought  
into  consciousness1 and then serving as
 a center of reorganization of  such    
activities to freer1 more varied        

flexible and valuable forms2  recognize 
this1 and we have the truth of the      
,kantian idea1 without  its excrescences
 and miracles4 ,the concept is the      
practical activity  doing consciously   
and artfully what it had aforetime done 
blindly and  aimlessly1 and thereby not 
only doing it better but opening up a   
freer  world of significant activities4 
,thought as such a reorganization  of   
natural functions does naturally what   
,kantian forms and  schematizations do  
only supernaturally4 ,in a word1 the    
constructive  or organizing activity of 
8thought0 does not inhere in thought as 
a  transcendental function1 a form or   
mode of some supra-empirical ego1  mind1
 or consciousness1 but in thought as    
itself vital activity4 ,and  in any case
 we have passed to the idea of thought  
as reflectively  reconstructive and     
directive1 and away from the notion of  
thought as  immanently constitutional   
and organizational4 ,to make this       
passage  and yet to ignore its existence

 and import is essential to objective   
idealism4    7#b7 ,no final or ultimate 
validity attaches to these original     
arrangements and institutionalizations  
in any case4 ,their value is            
teleological and experimental1 not      
fixedly ontological4 8,law and  order0  
are good things1 but not when they      
become rigidity1 and create  mechanical 
uniformity or routine4 ,prejudice is the
 acme of the a  priori4 ,of the a priori
 in this sense we may say what is always
  to be said of habits and institutions3
 ,they are good servants1 but  harsh and
 futile masters4 ,organization as       
already effected is always  in danger of
 becoming a mortmain2 it may be a way of
 sacrificing  novelty1 flexibility1     
freedom1 creation to static standards4  
,the  curious inefficiency of idealism  
at this point is evident in the fact    
that genuine thought1 empirical         
reflective thought1 is required         
precisely for the purpose of re-forming 
established and set formations4    ,in  

short1 7a7 a priori character is no     
exclusive function of  thought4 ,every  
biological function1 every motor        
attitude1 every vital  impulse as the   
carrying vehicle of experience is thus  
apriorily  regulative in prospective    
reference2 what we call apperception1   
expectation1 anticipation1 desire1      
demand1 choice1 are pregnant with  this 
constitutive and organizing power4 7b7  
,in so far as 8thought0  does exercise  
such reorganizing power1 it is because  
thought is itself  still a vital        
function4 7c7 ,objective idealism       
depends not only  upon ignoring the     
existence and capacity of vital         
functions1 but upon a  profound         
confusion of the constitutional a       
priori1 the unconsciously  dominant1    
with empirically reflective thought4 ,in
 the sense in which  the a priori is    
worth while as an attribute of thought1 
thought  cannot be what the objective   
idealist defines it as being4 ,plain1   
ordinary1 everyday empirical            

reflections1 operating as centers of    
inquiry1 of suggestion1 of              
experimentation1 exercise the valuable  
function of regulation1 in an auspicious
 direction1 of subsequent  experiences4 
,the categories of accomplished         
systematization cover alike the just    
and the unjust1 the false and the true1 
while 7unlike ,god's rain7 they         
exercise no specific or differential    
activity of stimulation and  control4   
,error and inefficiency1 as well as     
value and energy1 are  embodied in our  
objective institutional classifications4
 ,as a special  favor1 will not the     
objective idealist show how1 in some one
 single  instance1 his immanent 8reason0
 makes any difference as respects  the  
detection and elimination of error1 or  
gives even the slightest  assistance in 
discovering and validating the truly    
worthful8 ,this  practical work1 the    
life blood of intelligence in everyday  
life and  in critical science1 is done  
by the despised and rejected matter of  

concrete empirical contexts and         
functions4 ,generalizing the issue3 ,if 
the immanent organization be ascribed to
 thought1 why should its work  be such  
as to demand continuous correction and  
revision8 ,if specific  reflective      
thought1 as empirical1 be subject to all
 the limitations  supposed to inhere in 
experience as such1 how can it assume   
the burden  of making good1 of          
supplementing1 reconstructing1 and      
developing  meanings8 ,the logic of the 
case seems to be that ,neo-,kantian     
idealism  gets its status against       
empiricism by first accepting the       
,humian idea  of experience1 while the  
express import of its positive          
contribution  is to show the            
non-existence 7not merely the cognitive 
invalidity7  of anything describable as 
mere states of subjective consciousness4
  ,thus in the end it tends to destroy  
itself and to make way for a more       
adequate empiricism4      ,,iii    ,in  
the above discussion1 ,i have           

unavoidably anticipated the second      
problem3 the relation of conceptual     
thought to perceptual data4  ,a distinct
 aspect still remains1 however4         
,perception1 as well as  apriority1 is a
 term harboring a fundamental ambiguity4
 ,it may mean  7#a7 a distinct type of  
activity1 predominantly practical in    
character1  though carrying at its heart
 important cognitive and esthetic       
qualities2 or 7#b7 a distinctively      
cognitional experience1 the function  of
 observation as explicitly logical--a   
factor in science qua science4    ,in   
the first sense1 as recent functional   
empiricism 7working in  harmony with    
psychology1 but not itself peculiarly   
psychological7 has  abundantly shown1   
perception is primarily an act of       
adjustment of  organism and environment1
 differing from a mere reflex or        
instinctive  adaptation in that1 in     
order to compensate for the failure of  
the  instinctive adjustment1 it requires
 an objective or discriminative         

presentation of conditions of action3   
the negative conditions or  obstacles1  
and the positive conditions or means and
 resources4#ch  ,this1 of course1 is its
 cognitive phase4 ,in so far as the     
material  thus presented not only serves
 as a direct cue to further successful  
activity 7successful in the overcoming  
of obstacles to the maintenance  of the 
function entered upon7 but presents     
auxiliary collateral  objects and       
qualities that give additional range and
 depth of meaning  to the activity of   
adjustment1 perceiving is esthetic as   
well as  intellectual4#ci    ,now such  
perception cannot be made antithetical  
to thought1 for it may  itself be       
surcharged with any amount of           
imaginatively supplied and  reflectively
 sustained ideal factors--such as are   
needed to determine  and select relevant
 stimuli and to suggest and develop an  
appropriate  plan and course of         
behavior4 ,the amount of such saturating
 intellectual  material depends upon the

 complexity and maturity of the behaving
  agent4 ,such perception1 moreover1 is 
strictly teleological1 since it  arises 
from an experienced need and functions  
to fulfil the purpose  indicated by this
 need4 ,the cognitional content is1     
indeed1 carried by  affectional and     
intentional contexts4    ,then we have  
perception as scientific observation4   
,this involves the  deliberate1 artful  
exclusion of affectional and purposive  
factors as  exercising mayhap a         
vitiating influence upon the cognitive  
or objective  content2 or1 more strictly
 speaking1 a transformation of the more 
ordinary or 8natural0 emotional and     
purposive concomitants1 into what  ,bain
 calls 8neutral0 emotion1 and a purpose 
of finding out what the  present        
conditions of the problem are4 7,the    
practical feature is not  thus denied or
 eliminated1 but the overweening        
influence of a present  dominating end  
is avoided1 so that change of the       
character of the end  may be effected1  

if found desirable47 ,here observation  
may be opposed  to thought1 in the sense
 that exact and minute description may  
be set  over against interpretation1    
explanation1 theorizing1 and inference4 
,in the wider sense of thought as       
equaling reflective process1 the work   
of observation and description forms a  
constituent division of labor  within   
thought4 ,the impersonal demarcation and
 accurate registration  of what is      
objectively there or present occurs for 
the sake 7a7 of  eliminating meaning    
which is habitually but uncritically    
referred1 and  7b7 of getting a basis   
for a meaning 7at first purely          
inferential  or hypothetical7 that may  
be consistently referred2 and that 7c71 
resting upon examination and not upon   
mere a priori custom1 may  weather the  
strain of subsequent experiences4 ,but  
in so far as  thought is identified with
 the conceptual phase as such of the    
entire  logical function1 observation   
is1 of course1 set over against thought3

  deliberately1 purposely1 and artfully 
so4    ,it is not uncommon to hear it   
said that the ,lockeian movement was    
all well enough for psychology1 but went
 astray because it invaded  the field of
 logic4 ,if we mean by psychology a     
natural history of  what at any time    
passes for knowledge1 and by logic      
conscious  control in the direction of  
grounded assurance1 this remark appears 
to reverse the truth4 ,as a natural     
history of knowledge in the sense  of   
opinion and belief1 ,locke's account of 
discrete1 simple ideas or  meanings1    
which are compounded and then           
distributed1 does palpable  violence to 
the facts4 ,but every line of ,locke    
shows that he was  interested in        
knowledge in its honorific              
sense--controlled certainty1  or1 where 
this is not feasible1 measured          
probability4 ,and to logic  as an       
account of the way in which we by art   
build up a tested  assurance1 a         
rationalized conviction1 ,locke makes an

 important positive  contribution4 ,the 
pity is that he inclined to take it for 
the whole  of the logic of science1#dj  
not seeing that it was but a correlative
  division of labor to the work of      
hypotheses or inference2 and that he    
tended to identify it with a natural    
history or psychology4 ,the latter      
tendency exposed ,locke to the ,humian  
interpretation1 and permanently         
sidetracked the positive contribution of
 his theory to logic1 while it  led to  
that confusion of an untrue psychology  
with a logic valid within  limits1 of   
which ,mill is the standard example4    
,in analytic observation1 it is a       
positive object to strip off all        
inferential meaning so far as may be--to
 reduce the facts as nearly  as may be  
to derationalized data1 in order to make
 possible a new and  better             
rationalization4 ,in and because of this
 process1 the perceptual  data approach 
the limit of a disconnected manifold1 of
 the brutely  given1 of the merely      

sensibly present2 while meaning stands  
out as  a searched for principle of     
unification and explanation1 that is1   
as a thought1 a concept1 an hypothesis4 
,the extent to which this is  carried   
depends wholly upon the character of the
 specific situation and  problem2 but1  
speaking generally1 or of limiting      
tendencies1 one may  say it is carried  
to mere observation1 pure brute         
description1 on the  one side1 and to   
mere thought1 that is hypothetical      
inference1 on the  other4    ,so far as 
,locke ignored this instrumental        
character of observation1 he  naturally 
evoked and strengthened rationalistic   
idealism2 he called  forth its assertion
 of the need of reason1 of concepts1 of 
universals1  to constitute knowledge in 
its eulogistic sense4 ,but two contrary 
errors do not make a truth1 although    
they suggest and determine the  nature  
of some relevant truth4 ,this truth is  
the empirical origin1 in  a determinate 
type of situation1 of the contrast of   

observation and  conception2 the        
empirical relevancy and the empirical   
worth of this  contrast in controlling  
the character of subsequent experiences4
 ,to  suppose that perception as it     
concretely exists1 either in the early  
experiences of the animal1 the race1 or 
the individual1 or in its  later refined
 and expanded experiences1 is identical 
with the sharply  analyzed1 objectively 
discriminated and internally            
disintegrated  elements of scientific   
observation1 is a perversion of         
experience2 a  perversion for which1    
indeed1 professed empiricists set the   
example1  but which idealism must       
perpetuate if it is not to find its end 
in an  improved1 functional             
empiricism4#da      ,,iv    ,we come now
 to the consideration of the third      
element in our problem2  ideality1      
important and normative value1 in       
relation to experience2  the antithesis 
of experience as a tentative1           
fragmentary1 and  ineffectual embodiment

 of meaning over against the perfect1   
eternal  system of meanings which       
experience suggests even in nullifying  
and  mutilating4    ,that from the      
memory standpoint experience presents   
itself as a  multiplicity of episodic   
events with just enough continuity among
  them to suggest principles true 8on   
the whole0 or usually1 but  without     
furnishing instruction as to their exact
 range and bearing1  seems obvious      
enough4 ,why should it not8 ,the motive 
which leads to  reflection on past      
experience could be satisfied in no     
other way4  ,continuities1 connecting   
links1 dynamic transitions drop out     
because1  for the purpose of the        
recollection1 they would be hindrances  
if now  repeated2 or because they are   
now available only when themselves      
objectified in definite terms and thus  
given a quasi independent1 a  quasi     
atomistic standing of their own4 ,this  
is the only alternative  to what the    
psychologists term 8total reminiscence10

 which1 so far  as total1 leave us with 
an elephant on our hands4 ,unless we are
  going to have a wholesale             
revivification of the past1 giving us   
just  another embarrassing present      
experience1 illusory because irrelevant1
  memory must work by retail--by        
summoning distinct cases1 events1       
sequences1 precedents4 ,dis-membering is
 a positively necessary part  of        
re-membering4 ,but the resulting        
disjecta membra are in no sense         
experience as it was or is2 they are    
simply elements held apart1 and  yet    
tentatively implicated together1 in     
present experience for the  sake of its 
most favorable evolution2 evolution in  
the direction of  the most excellent    
meaning or value conceived4 ,if the     
remembering is  efficacious and         
pertinent1 it reveals the possibilities 
of the present2  that is to say1 it     
clarifies the transitive1 transforming  
character  that belongs inherently to   
the present4 ,the dismembering of the   

vital  present into the disconnected    
past is correlative to an anticipation1 
an idealization of the future4          
,moreover1 the contingent character of  
the principle or rule that  emerges from
 a survey of cases1 instances1 as       
distinct from a fixed or  necessary     
character1 secures just what is wanted  
in the exigency of  a prospective       
idealization1 or refinement of          
excellence4 ,it is just  this character 
that secures flexibility and variety of 
outlook1 that  makes possible a         
consideration of alternatives and an    
attempt to select  and to execute the   
more worthy among them4 ,the fixed or   
necessary law  would mean a future like 
the past--a dead1 an unidealized future4
 ,it  is exasperating to imagine how    
completely different would have been    
,aristotle's valuation of 8experience0  
with respect to its contingency1  if he 
had but once employed the function of   
developing and perfecting  value1       
instead of the function of knowing an   

unalterable object1 as the  standard by 
which to estimate and measure           
intelligence4    ,the one constant trait
 of experience from its crudest to its  
most  mature forms is that its contents 
undergo change of meaning1 and  of      
meaning in the sense of excellence1     
value4 ,every experience  is            
in-course1#db in course of becoming     
worse or better as to  its contents1 or 
in course of conscious endeavor to      
sustain some  satisfactory level of     
value against encroachment or lapse4 ,in
 this  effort1 both precedent1 the      
reduction of the present idealization1  
the anticipation of the possible1 though
 doubtful1 future1 emerge4  ,without    
idealization1 that is1 without          
conception of the favorable  issue that 
the present1 defined in terms of        
precedents1 may portend in  its         
transition1 the recollection of         
precedents1 and the formulation  of     
tentative rules is nonsense4 ,but       
without the identification of  the      

present in terms of elements suggested  
by the past1 without  recognition1 the  
ideal1 the value projected as end1      
remains inert1  helpless1 sentimental1  
without means of realization4           
,resembling cases  and anticipation1    
memory and idealization1 are the        
corresponding terms  in which a present 
experience has its transitive force     
analyzed into  reciprocally pertinent   
means and ends4    ,that an experience  
will change in content and value is the 
one thing  certain4 ,how it will change 
is the one thing naturally uncertain4   
,hence the import of the art of         
reflection and invention4 ,control of   
the character of the change in the      
direction of the worthful is the  common
 business of theory and practice4 ,here 
is the province of the  episodic        
recollection of past history and of the 
idealized foresight  of possibilities4  
,the irrelevancy of an objective        
idealism lies in the  fact that it      
totally ignores the position and        

function of ideality in  sustained and  
serious endeavor4 ,were values          
automatically injected and  kept in the 
world of experience by any force not    
reflected in human  memories and        
projects1 it would make no difference   
whether this force  were a ,spencerian  
environment or an ,absolute ,reason4    
,did purpose ride  in a cosmic          
automobile toward a predestined goal1 it
 would not cease to  be physical and    
mechanical in quality because labeled   
,divine ,idea1 or  ,perfect ,reason4    
,the moral would be 8let us eat1 drink1 
and be merry10  for to-morrow--or if not
 this to-morrow1 then upon some         
to-morrow1  unaffected by our empirical 
memories1 reflections1 inventions1 and  
idealizations--the cosmic automobile    
arrives4 ,spirituality1 ideality1       
meaning as purpose1 would be the last   
things to present themselves if         
objective idealism were true4 ,values   
cannot be both ideal and given1  and    
their 8given0 character is emphasized1  

not transformed1 when they  are called  
eternal and absolute4 ,but natural      
values become ideal the  moment their   
maintenance is dependent upon the       
intentional activities  of an empirical 
agent4 ,to suppose that values are ideal
 because  they are so eternally given is
 the contradiction in which objective   
idealism has intrenched itself4         
,objective ontological teleology  spells
 machinery4 ,reflective and volitional1 
experimental teleology  alone spells    
ideality4#dc ,objective1 rationalistic  
idealism breaks  upon the fact that it  
can have no intermediary between a      
brutally  achieved embodiment of meaning
 7physical in character or else of that 
peculiar quasi-physical character which 
goes generally by the name  of          
metaphysical7 and a total opposition of 
the given and the ideal1  connoting     
their mutual indifference and           
incapacity4 ,an empiricism  that        
acknowledges the transitive character of
 experience1 and that  acknowledges the 

possible control of the character of the
 transition  by means of intelligent    
effort1 has abundant opportunity to     
celebrate  in productive art1 genial    
morals1 and impartial inquiry the grace 
and  the severity of the ideal4         
,,the ,,postulate ,,of ,,immediate      
,,empiricism#dd      ,the criticisms    
made upon that vital but still unformed 
movement  variously termed radical      
empiricism1 pragmatism1 humanism1       
functionalism1 according as one or      
another aspect of it is uppermost1  have
 left me with a conviction that the     
fundamental difference is  not so much  
in matters overtly discussed as in a    
presupposition that  remains tacit3 a   
presupposition as to what experience is 
and means4 ,to  do my little part in    
clearing up the confusion1 ,i shall try 
to make  my own presupposition explicit4
 ,the object of this paper is1 then1 to 
set forth what ,i understand to be the  
postulate and the criterion of          
immediate empiricism4#de    ,immediate  

empiricism postulates that              
things--anything1 everything1 in  the   
ordinary or non-technical use of the    
term 8thing0--are what they  are        
experienced as4 ,hence1 if one wishes to
 describe anything truly1  his task is  
to tell what it is experienced as being4
 ,if it is a horse  that is to be       
described1 or the equus that is to be   
defined1 then  must the horse-trader1 or
 the jockey1 or the timid family man who
  wants a 8safe driver10 or the         
zoologist or the paleontologist tell us 
what the horse is which is experienced4 
,if these accounts turn out  different  
in some respects1 as well as congruous  
in others1 this is  no reason for       
assuming the content of one to be       
exclusively 8real10  and that of others 
to be 8phenomenal02 for each account of 
what is  experienced will manifest that 
it is the account of the horse-dealer1  
or of the zoologist1 and hence will give
 the conditions requisite  for          
understanding the differences as well as

 the agreements of the  various         
accounts4 ,and the principle varies not 
a whit if we bring in  the              
psychologist's horse1 the logician's    
horse1 or the metaphysician's  horse4   
,in each case1 the nub of the question  
is1 what sort of experience is  denoted 
or indicated3 a concrete and determinate
 experience1 varying1  when it varies1  
in specific real elements1 and agreeing1
 when it  agrees1 in specific real      
elements1 so that we have a contrast1   
not  between a ,reality1 and various    
approximations to1 or phenomenal        
representations of ,reality1 but between
 different reals of experience4  ,and   
the reader is begged to bear in mind    
that from this standpoint1  when 8an    
experience0 or 8some sort of experience0
 is referred to1 8some  thing0 or 8some 
sort of thing0 is always meant4    ,now1
 this statement that things are what    
they are experienced to be  is usually  
translated into the statement that      
things 7or1 ultimately1  ,reality1      

,being7 are only and just what they are 
known to be or that  things are1 or     
,reality is1 what it is for a conscious 
knower--whether  the knower be conceived
 primarily as a perceiver or as a       
thinker  being a further1 and secondary1
 question4 ,this is the root-paralogism 
of all idealisms1 whether subjective or 
objective1 psychological  or            
epistemological4 ,by our postulate1     
things are what they are  experienced to
 be2 and1 unless knowing is the sole and
 only genuine  mode of experiencing1 it 
is fallacious to say that ,reality is   
just and  exclusively what it is or     
would be to an all-competent all-knower2
 or  even that it is1 relatively and    
piecemeal1 what it is to a finite  and  
partial knower4 ,or1 put more           
positively1 knowing is one mode of      
experiencing1 and the primary           
philosophic demand 7from the standpoint 
of immediatism7 is to find out what sort
 of an experience knowing  is--or1      
concretely how things are experienced   

when they are experienced  as known     
things4#df ,by concretely is meant1     
obviously enough  7among other things71 
such an account of the experience of    
things as  known that will bring out the
 characteristic traits and distinctions 
they possess as things of a knowing     
experience1 as compared with  things    
experienced esthetically1 or morally1 or
 economically1 or  technologically4 ,to 
assume that1 because from the standpoint
 of  the knowledge experience things are
 what they are known to be1  therefore1 
metaphysically1 absolutely1 without     
qualification1  everything in its       
reality 7as distinct from its           
8appearance10 or  phenomenal occurrence7
 is what a knower would find it to be1  
is1 from  the immediatist's standpoint1 
if not the root of all philosophic evil1
  at least one of its main roots4 ,for  
this leaves out of account what  the    
knowledge standpoint is itself          
experienced as4    ,i start and am      
flustered by a noise heard4             

,empirically1 that noise  is fearsome2  
it really is1 not merely phenomenally or
 subjectively  so4 ,that is what it is  
experienced as being4 ,but1 when ,i     
experience  the noise as a known thing1 
,i find it to be innocent of harm4 ,it  
is the tapping of a shade against the   
window1 owing to movements of  the wind4
 ,the experience has changed2 that is1  
the thing experienced  has changed--not 
that an unreality has given place to a  
reality1 nor  that some transcendental  
7unexperienced7 ,reality has changed1#dg
  not that truth has changed1 but just  
and only the concrete reality           
experienced has changed4 ,i now feel    
ashamed of my fright2 and the noise  as 
fearsome is changed to noise as a       
wind-curtain fact1 and hence            
practically indifferent to my welfare4  
,this is a change of experienced        
existence effected through the medium of
 cognition4 ,the content of the  latter 
experience cognitively regarded is      
doubtless truer than the  content of the

 earlier2 but it is in no sense more    
real4 ,to call it  truer1 moreover1     
must1 from the empirical standpoint1    
mean a concrete  difference in actual   
things experienced4#dh ,again1 in many  
cases1  only in retrospect is the prior 
experience cognitionally regarded at    
all4 ,in such cases1 it is only in      
regard to contrasted content in a       
subsequent experience that the          
determination 8truer0 has force4        
,perhaps some reader may now object that
 as matter of fact the entire           
experience is cognitive1 but that the   
earlier parts of it are only            
imperfectly so1 resulting in a          
phenomenon that is not real2 while  the 
latter part1 being a more complete      
cognition1 results in what  is          
relatively1 at least1 more real4#di ,in 
short1 a critic may say  that1 when ,i  
was frightened by the noise1 ,i knew ,i 
was frightened2  otherwise there would  
have been no experience at all4 ,at this
 point1 it  is necessary to make a      

distinction so simple and yet so        
all-fundamental  that ,i am afraid the  
reader will be inclined to pooh-pooh it 
away as  a mere verbal distinction4 ,but
 to see that to the empiricist this     
distinction is not verbal1 but genuine1 
is the precondition of any              
understanding of him4 ,the immediatist  
must1 by his postulate1 ask  what is the
 fright experienced as4 ,is what is     
actually experienced1                   
,i-know-,i-am-frightened1 or            
,i-am-frightened8 ,i see absolutely no  
reason for claiming that the experience 
must be described by the  former phrase4
 ,in all probability 7and all the       
empiricist logically  needs is just one 
case of this sort7 the experience is    
simply and just  of fright-at-the-noise4
 ,later one may 7or may not7 have an    
experience  describable as              
,i-know-,i-am-7or-was7 and improperly or
 properly1  frightened4 ,but this is a  
different experience--that is1 a        
different  thing4 ,and if the critic    

goes on to urge that the person 8really0
  must have known that he was           
frightened1 ,i can only point out that  
the  critic is shifting the venue4 ,he  
may be right1 but1 if so1 it is only    
because the 8really0 is something not   
concretely experienced 7whose  nature   
accordingly is the critic's business72  
and this is to depart  from the         
empiricist's point of view1 to attribute
 to him a postulate he  expressly       
repudiates4    ,the material point may  
come out more clearly if ,i say that we 
must  make a distinction between a thing
 as cognitive1 and one as  cognized4#ej 
,i should define a cognitive experience 
as one that has  certain bearings or    
implications which induce1 and fulfil   
themselves  in1 a subsequent experience 
in which the relevant thing is          
experienced  as cognized1 as a known    
object1 and is thereby transformed1 or  
reorganized4 ,the fright-at-the-noise in
 the case cited is obviously  cognitive1
 in this sense4 ,by description1 it     

induces an investigation  or inquiry in 
which both noise and fright are         
objectively stated or  presented--the   
noise as a shade-wind fact1 the fright  
as an organic  reaction to a sudden     
acoustic stimulus1 a reaction that under
 the  given circumstances was useless or
 even detrimental1 a maladaptation4     
,now1 pretty much all of experience is  
of this sort 7the 8is0 meaning1  of     
course1 is experienced as71 and the     
empiricist is false to his  principle if
 he does not duly note this fact4#ea    
,but he is equally  false to his        
principle if he permits himself to be   
confused as to the  concrete differences
 in the two things experienced4         
,there are two little words through     
explication of which the  empiricist's  
position may be brought out--8as0 and   
8that40 ,we may  express his            
presupposition by saying that things are
 what they are  experienced as being2 or
 that to give a just account of anything
  is to tell what that thing is         

experienced to be4 ,by these words ,i   
want to indicate the absolute1 final1   
irreducible1 and inexpugnable  concrete 
quale which everything experienced not  
so much has as  is4 ,to grasp this      
aspect of empiricism is to see what the 
empiricist  means by objectivity1 by the
 element of control4 ,suppose we take1  
as a crucial case for the empiricist1 an
 out and out illusion1 say  of ,zllner's
 lines4 ,these are experienced as       
convergent2 they are  8truly0 parallel4 
,if things are what they are experienced
 as being1  how can the distinction be  
drawn between illusion and the true     
state  of the case8 ,there is no answer 
to this question except by sticking  to 
the fact that the experience of the     
lines as divergent is a  concrete       
qualitative thing or that4 ,it is that  
experience which  it is1 and no other4  
,and if the reader rebels at the        
iteration of  such obvious tautology1 ,i
 can only reiterate that the realization
 of  the meaning of this tautology is   

the key to the whole question of  the   
objectivity of experience1 as that      
stands to the empiricist4 ,the  lines of
 that experience are divergent2 not     
merely seem so4 ,the  question of truth 
is not as to whether ,being or          
,non-,being1 ,reality or  mere          
,appearance1 is experienced1 but as to  
the worth of a certain  concretely      
experienced thing4 ,the only way of     
passing upon this  question is by       
sticking in the most uncompromising     
fashion to that  experience as real4    
,that experience is that two lines with 
certain  cross-hatchings are apprehended
 as convergent2 only by taking that     
experience as real and as fully real1 is
 there any basis for1 or way of  going  
to1 an experienced knowledge that the   
lines are parallel4 ,it is  in the      
concrete thing as experienced that all  
the grounds and clues  to its own       
intellectual or logical rectification   
are contained4 ,it is  because this     
thing1 afterwards adjudged false1 is a  

concrete that1  that it develops into a 
corrected experience 7that is1          
experience of a  corrected thing--we    
reform things just as we reform         
ourselves or a bad  boy7 whose full     
content is not a whit more real1 but    
which is true or  truer4#eb    ,if any  
experience1 then a determinate          
experience2 and this  determinateness is
 the only1 and is the adequate1         
principle of  control1 or 8objectivity40
 ,the experience may be of the vaguest  
sort4  ,i may not see anything which ,i 
can identify as a familiar object--a    
table1 a chair1 etc4 ,it may be dark2 ,i
 may have only the vaguest  impression  
that there is something which looks like
 a table4 ,or ,i may  be completely     
befogged and confused1 as when one rises
 quickly from  sleep in a pitch-dark    
room4 ,but this vagueness1 this         
doubtfulness1  this confusion is the    
thing experienced1 and1 qua real1 is as 
8good0  a reality as the self-luminous  
vision of an ,absolute4 ,it is not just 

vagueness1 doubtfulness1 confusion1 at  
large or in general4 ,it is  this       
vagueness1 and no other2 absolutely     
unique1 absolutely what  it is4#ec      
,whatever gain in clearness1 in         
fullness1 in trueness of  content is    
experienced must grow out of some       
element in the experience  of this      
experienced as what it is4 ,to return to
 the illusion3 ,if  the experience of   
the lines as convergent is illusory1 it 
is because of  some elements in the     
thing as experienced1 not because of    
something  defined in terms of          
externality to this particular          
experience4 ,if the  illusoriness can be
 detected1 it is because the thing      
experienced  is real1 having within its 
experienced reality elements whose own  
mutual tension effects its              
reconstruction4 ,taken concretely1 the  
experience of convergent lines contains 
within itself the elements  of the      
transformation of its own content4 ,it  
is this thing1 and  not some separate   

truth1 that clamors for its own reform4 
,there is1  then1 from the empiricist's 
point of view1 no need to search for    
some  aboriginal that to which all      
successive experiences are attached1    
and which is somehow thereby undergoing 
continuous change4 ,experience  is      
always of thats2 and the most           
comprehensive and inclusive  experience 
of the universe that the philosopher    
himself can obtain  is the experience of
 a characteristic that4 ,from the       
empiricist's  point of view1 this is as 
true of the exhaustive and complete     
insight  of a hypothetical all-knower as
 of the vague1 blind experience of the  
awakened sleeper4 ,as reals1 they stand 
on the same level4 ,as trues1  the      
latter has by definition the better of  
it2 but if this insight is  in any way  
the truth of the blind awakening1 it is 
because the latter  has1 in its own     
determinate quale1 elements of real     
continuity  with the former2 it is1 ex  
hypothesi1 transformable through a      

series  of experienced reals without    
break of continuity1 into the absolute  
thought-experience4 ,there is no need of
 logical manipulation to effect  the    
transformation1 nor could any logical   
consideration effect it4  ,if effected  
at all it is just by immediate          
experiences1 each of which  is just as  
real 7no more1 no less7 as either of the
 two terms between  which they lie4     
,such1 at least1 is the meaning of the  
empiricist's  contention4 ,so1 when he  
talks of experience1 he does not mean   
some  grandiose1 remote affair that is  
cast like a net around a succession  of 
fleeting experiences2 he does not mean  
an indefinite total1  comprehensive     
experience which somehow engirdles an   
endless flux2 he  means that things are 
what they are experienced to be1 and    
that every  experience is some thing4   
,from the postulate of empiricism1 then 
7or1 what is the same thing1  from a    
general consideration of the concept of 
experience71 nothing  can be deduced1   

not a single philosophical              
proposition4#ed ,the  reader may hence  
conclude that all this just comes to the
 truism that  experience is experience1 
or is what it is4 ,if one attempts to   
draw  conclusions from the bare concept 
of experience1 the reader is quite      
right4 ,but the real significance of the
 principle is that of a method  of      
philosophical analysis--a method        
identical in kind 7but differing  in    
problem and hence in operation7 with    
that of the scientist4 ,if you  wish to 
find out what subjective1 objective1    
physical1 mental1 cosmic1  psychic1     
cause1 substance1 purpose1 activity1    
evil1 being1 quality--any  philosophic  
term1 in short--means1 go to experience 
and see what the  thing is experienced  
as4    ,such a method is not            
spectacular2 it permits of no offhand   
demonstrations of ,god1 freedom1        
immortality1 nor of the exclusive       
reality of matter1 or ideas1 or         
consciousness1 etc4 ,but it supplies a  

way of telling what all these terms     
mean4 ,it may seem insignificant1  or   
chillingly disappointing1 but only upon 
condition that it be not  worked4       
,philosophic conceptions have1 ,i       
believe1 outlived their  usefulness     
considered as stimulants to emotion1 or 
as a species of  sanctions2 and a       
larger1 more fruitful and more valuable 
career awaits  them considered as       
specifically experienced meanings4      
,,note3 ,the reception of this essay    
proved that ,i was unreasonably         
sanguine in thinking that the foot-note 
of warning1 appended      to the title1 
would forfend radical misapprehension4  
,i see now      that it was unreasonable
 to expect that the word 8immediate0    
in a philosophic writing could be       
generally understood to      apply to   
anything except knowledge1 even though  
the body of      the essay is a protest 
against such limitation4 ,but ,i venture
      to repeat that the essay is not a 
denial of the necessity of              

8mediation10 or reflection1 in          
knowledge1 but is an assertion      that
 the inferential factor must exist1 or  
must occur1 and      that all existence 
is direct and vital1 so that philosophy 
can      pass upon its nature--as upon  
the nature of all of the rest of        
its subject-matter--only by first       
ascertaining what it exists or          
occurs as4        ,i venture to repeat  
also another statement of the text3 ,i  
do not      mean by 8immediate          
experience0 any aboriginal stuff out of 
which      things are evolved1 but ,i   
use the term to indicate the necessity  
of employing in philosophy the direct   
descriptive method that      has now    
made its way in all the natural         
sciences1 with such      modifications1 
of course1 as the subject itself        
entails4        ,there is nothing in the
 text to imply that things exist      in
 experience atomically or in isolation4 
,when it is said      that a thing as   
cognized is different from an earlier   

non-cognitionally experienced thing1 the
 saying no more implies      lack of    
continuity between the things1 than the 
obvious remark      that a seed is      
different from a flower or a leaf denies
 their      continuity4 ,the amount and 
kind of continuity or discreteness      
that exists is to be discovered by      
recurring to what actually      occurs  
in experience4        ,finally1 there is
 nothing in the text that denies the    
existence      of things temporally     
prior to human experiencing of them4    
,indeed1 ,i should think it fairly      
obvious that we experience most         
things as temporally prior to our       
experiencing of them4 ,the      import  
of the article is to the effect that we 
are not entitled      to draw           
philosophic 7as distinct from           
scientific7 conclusions      as to the  
meaning of prior temporal existence till
 we have      ascertained what it is to 
experience a thing as past4 ,these four 
disclaimers cover1 ,i think1 all the    

misapprehensions disclosed in      the  
four or five controversial articles     
7noted below7 that the      original    
essay evoked4 ,one of these articles    
7that of ,professor      ,woodbridge71  
raised a point of fact1 holding that    
cognitional      experience tells us1   
without alteration1 just what the things
      of other types of experience are1 
and in that sense transcends      other 
experiences4 ,this is too fundamental an
 issue to discuss      in a note1 and ,i
 content myself with remarking that with
 respect      to it1 the bearing of the 
article is that the issue must be       
settled by a careful descriptive survey 
of things as experienced1      to see   
whether modifications do not occur in   
existences when      they are           
experienced as known2 i4e41 as true or  
false in      character4 ,the reader    
interested in following up this         
discussion      is referred to the      
following articles3 ,vol4 ,,ii4 of the  
,journal      of ,philosophy1           

,psychology1 and ,scientific ,methods1  
two articles      by ,bakewell1 p4 #ebj 
and p4 #fhg2 one by ,bode1 p4 #feh2 one 
by      ,woodbridge1 p4 #egc2 ,vol4     
,,iii4 of the same ,journal1 by         
,leighton1      p4 #agd4                
8,,consciousness0 ,,and ,,experience#ee 
,every science in its final standpoint  
and working aims is controlled  by      
conditions lying outside                
itself--conditions that subsist in the  
practical life of the time4 ,with no    
science is this as obviously true  as   
with psychology4 ,taken without nicety  
of analysis1 no one would  deny that    
psychology is specially occupied with   
the individual2 that  it wishes to find 
out those things that proceed peculiarly
 from the  individual1 and the mode of  
their connection with him4 ,now1 the way
  in which the individual is conceived1 
the value that is attributed to  him1   
the things in his make-up that arouse   
interest1 are not due at the  outset to 
psychology4 ,the scientific view regards

 these matters in a  reflected1 a       
borrowed1 medium4 ,they are revealed in 
the light of social  life4 ,an          
autocratic1 an aristocratic1 a          
democratic society propound  such       
different estimates of the worth and    
place of individuality2  they procure   
for the individual as an individual such
 different sorts  of experience2 they   
aim at arousing such different impulses 
and  at organizing them according to    
such different purposes1 that the       
psychology arising in each must show a  
different temper4    ,in this sense1    
psychology is a political science4      
,while the professed  psychologist1 in  
his conscious procedure1 may easily cut 
his  subject-matter loose from these    
practical ties and references1 yet the  
starting point and goal of his course   
are none the less socially set4  ,in    
this conviction ,i venture to introduce 
to an audience that could  hardly be    
expected to be interested in the        
technique of psychology1 a  technical   

subject1 hoping that the human meaning  
may yet appear4    ,there is at present 
a strong1 apparently a growing tendency 
to conceive  of psychology as an account
 of the consciousness of the individual1
  considered as something in and by     
itself2 consciousness1 the assumption   
virtually runs1 being of such an order  
that it may be analyzed1  described1 and
 explained in terms of just itself4 ,the
 statement1 as  commonly made1 is that  
psychology is an account of             
consciousness1 qua  consciousness2 and  
the phrase is supposed to limit         
psychology to a  certain definite sphere
 of fact that may receive adequate      
discussion  for scientific purposes1    
without troubling itself with what lies 
outside4 ,now if this conception be     
true1 there is no intimate1 no          
important connection of psychology and  
philosophy at large4 ,that  philosophy1 
whose range is comprehensive1 whose     
problems are catholic1  should be held  
down by a discipline whose voice is as  

partial as its  material is limited1 is 
out of the range of intelligent         
discussion4    ,but there is another    
possibility4 ,if the individual of whom 
psychology  treats be1 after all1 a     
social individual1 any absolute setting 
off and  apart of a sphere of           
consciousness as1 even for scientific   
purposes1  self-sufficient1 is condemned
 in advance4 ,all such limitation1 and  
all inquiries1 descriptions1            
explanations that go with it1 are only  
preliminary4 8,consciousness0 is but a  
symbol1 an anatomy whose life is  in    
natural and social operations4 ,to know 
the symbol1 the psychical  letter1 is   
important2 but its necessity lies not   
within itself1 but  in the need of a    
language for reading the things         
signified4 ,if this  view be correct1 we
 cannot be so sure that psychology is   
without large  philosophic significance4
 ,whatever meaning the individual has   
for the  social life that he both       
incorporates and animates1 that meaning 

has  psychology for philosophy4    ,this
 problem is too important and too large 
to suffer attack in  an evening's       
address4 ,yet ,i venture to consider a  
portion of it1  hoping that such things 
as appear will be useful clues in       
entering  wider territory4 ,we may ask  
what is the effect upon psychology of   
considering its material as something so
 distinct as to be capable  of treatment
 without involving larger issues4 ,in   
this inquiry we  take as representative 
some such account of the science as     
this3  ,psychology deals with           
consciousness 8as such0 in its various  
modes and  processes4 ,it aims at an    
isolation of each such as will permit   
accurate  description3 at statement of  
its place in the serial order such as   
will  enable us to state the laws by    
which one calls another into being1  or 
as will give the natural history of its 
origin1 maturing1 and  dissolution4 ,it 
is both analytic and synthetic--analytic
 in that it  resolves each state into   

its constituent elements2 synthetic in  
that it  discovers the processes by     
which these elements combine into       
complex  wholes and series4 ,it leaves  
alone--it shuts out--questions          
concerning  the validity1 the objective 
import of these modifications3 of their 
value in conveying truth1 in effecting  
goodness1 in constituting  beauty4 ,for 
it is just with such questions of worth1
 of validity1 that  philosophy has to   
do4    ,some such view as this is held  
by the great majority of working        
psychologists to-day4 ,a variety of     
reasons have conspired to bring  about  
general acceptance4 ,such a view seems  
to enroll one in the ranks  of the      
scientific men rather than of the       
metaphysicians--and there are  those who
 distrust the metaphysicians4 ,others   
desire to take problems  piecemeal and  
in detail1 avoiding that excursion into 
ultimates1 into  that never-ending      
panorama of new questions and new       
possibilities  that seems to be the fate

 of the philosopher4 ,while no temperate
  mind can do other than sympathize with
 this view1 it is hardly more  than an  
expedient4 ,for1 as ,mr4 ,james remarks1
 after disposing of  the question of    
free-will by relegating it to the domain
 of the  metaphysician3--8,metaphysics  
means only an unusually obstinate       
attempt  to think clearly and           
consistently0--and clearness and        
consistency are  not things to be put   
off beyond a certain point4 ,when the   
metaphysician  chimes in with this      
new-found modesty of the psychologist1  
so different  from the disposition of   
,locke and ,hume and the ,mills1 salving
 his  metaphysical conscience with the  
remark--it hardly possesses the  dignity
 of a conviction--that the partial      
sciences1 just because they  are        
partial1 are not expected to be coherent
 with themselves nor with  one another2 
when the metaphysician1 ,i say1 praises 
the psychologist  for sticking to his   
last1 we are reminded that another      

motive is  also at work4 ,there is a    
half-conscious irony in this abnegation 
of  psychology4 ,it is not the first    
time that science has assumed the work  
of ,cinderella2 and1 since ,mr4 ,huxley 
has happily reminded her1 she is  not   
altogether oblivious1 in her modesty1 of
 a possible future check to  the pride  
of her haughty sister1 and of a certain 
coronation that shall  mark her coming  
to her own4    ,but1 be the reasons as  
they may1 there is little doubt of the  
fact4  ,almost all our working          
psychologists admit1 nay1 herald this   
limitation  of their work4 ,i am not    
presumptuous enough to set myself       
against this  array4 ,i too proclaim    
myself of those who believe that        
psychology has  to do 7at a certain     
point1 that is7 with 8consciousness as  
such40 ,but  ,i do not believe that the 
limitation is final4 ,quite the         
contrary3  if 8consciousness0 or 8state 
of consciousness0 be given intelligible 
meaning1 ,i believe that this conception

 is the open gateway into the  fair     
fields of philosophy4 ,for1 note you1   
the phrase is an ambiguous  one4 ,it may
 mean one thing to the metaphysician who
 proclaims3 ,here  finally we have      
psychology recognizing her due metes and
 bounds1  giving bonds to trespass no   
more4 ,it may mean quite another thing  
to  the psychologist in his             
work--whatever he may happen to say     
about it4  ,it may be that the          
psychologist deals with states of       
consciousness  as the significant1 the  
analyzable and describable form1 to     
which he  reduces the things he is      
studying4 ,not that they are that       
existence1  but that they are its       
indications1 its clues1 in shape for    
handling  by scientific methods4 ,so1   
for example1 does the paleontologist    
work4 ,those curiously shaped and marked
 forms to which he is devoted  are not  
life1 nor are they the literal termini  
of his endeavor2 but  through them as   
signs and records he construes a life4  

,and again1 the  painter-artist might   
well say that he is concerned only with 
colored  paints as such4 ,yet none the  
less through them as registers and      
indices1 he reveals to us the mysteries 
of sunny meadow1 shady forest1  and     
twilight wave4 ,these are the           
things-in-themselves of which the oils  
on his palette are phenomena4    ,so the
 preoccupation of the psychologist with 
states of consciousness  may signify    
that they are the media1 the concrete   
conditions to which  he purposely       
reduces his material1 in order1 through 
them1 as  methodological helps1 to get  
at and understand that which is anything
  but a state of consciousness4 ,to him1
 however1 who insists upon the  fixed   
and final limitation of psychology1 the 
state of consciousness is  not the shape
 some fact takes from the exigency of   
investigation2 it  is literally the full
 fact itself4 ,it is not an intervening 
term2 it  bounds the horizon4 ,here1    
then1 the issue defines itself4 ,i      

conceive  that states of consciousness  
7and ,i hope you will take the phrase   
broadly enough to cover all the specific
 data of psychology7 have no  existence 
before the psychologist begins to work4 
,he brings them into  existence4 ,what  
we are really after is the process of   
experience1 the  way in which it arises 
and behaves4 ,we want to know its       
course1 its  history1 its laws4 ,we want
 to know its various typical forms2 how 
each originates2 how it is related to   
others2 the part it plays in            
maintaining an inclusive1 expanding1    
connected course of experience4  ,our   
problem as psychologists is to learn its
 modus operandi1 its  method4    ,the   
paleontologist is again summoned to our 
aid4 ,in a given district  he finds a   
great number and variety of footprints4 
,from these he goes  to work to         
construct the structure and the life    
habits of the animals  that made them4  
,the tracks exist undoubtedly2 they are 
there2 but yet  he deals with them not  

as final existences but as signs1       
phenomena in  the literal sense4        
,imagine the hearing that the critic    
would receive  who should inform the    
paleontologist that he is transcending  
his  field of scientific activity2 that 
his concern is with footprints  as such1
 aiming to describe each1 to analyze it 
into its simplest  forms1 to compare the
 different kinds with one another so as 
to detect  common elements1 and finally1
 thereby1 to discover the laws of their 
arrangement in space6    ,yet the       
immediate data are footprints1 and      
footprints only4 ,the  paleontologist   
does in a way do all these things that  
our imaginary  critic is urging upon    
him4 ,the difference is not that he     
arbitrarily  lugs in other data2 that he
 invents entities and faculties that are
  not there4 ,the difference is in his  
standpoint4 ,his interest is in  the    
animals1 and the data are treated in    
whatever way seems likely to  serve this
 interest4 ,so with the psychologist4   

,he is continually and  perforce        
occupied with minute and empirical      
investigation of special  facts--states 
of consciousness1 if you please4 ,but   
these neither define  nor exhaust his   
scientific problem4 ,they are his       
footprints1 his  clues through which he 
places before himself the life-process  
he is  studying--with the further       
difference that his footprints are not  
after  all given to him1 but are        
developed by his investigation4#ef      
,the supposition that these states are  
somehow existent by themselves  and in  
this existence provide the psychologist 
with ready-made  material is just the   
supreme case of the 8psychological      
fallacy03 the  confusion of experience  
as it is to the one experiencing with   
what the  psychologist makes out of it  
with his reflective analysis4    ,the   
psychologist begins with certain        
operations1 acts1 functions as  his     
data4 ,if these fall out of sight in the
 course of discussion1 it  is only      

because having been taken for granted1  
they remain to control  the whole       
development of the inquiry1 and to      
afford the sterling medium  of          
redemption4 ,acts such as perceiving1   
remembering1 intending1 loving  give the
 points of departure2 they alone are    
concrete experiences4  ,to understand   
these experiences1 under what conditions
 they arise1  and what effects they     
produce1 analysis into states of        
consciousness  occurs4 ,and the modes of
 consciousness that are figured remain  
unarranged and unimportant1 save as they
 may be translated back into  acts4     
,to remember is to do something1 as much
 as to shoe a horse1 or to  cherish a   
keepsake4 ,to propose1 to observe1 to be
 kindly affectioned1  are terms of      
value1 of practice1 of operation2 just  
as digestion1  respiration1 locomotion  
express functions1 not observable       
8objects40  ,but there is an object that
 may be described3 lungs1 stomach1      
leg-muscles1 or whatever4 ,through the  

structure we present to  ourselves the  
function2 it appears laid out before us1
 spread forth  in detail--objectified in
 a word4 ,the anatomist who devotes     
himself  to this detail may1 if he      
please 7and he probably does please to  
concentrate his devotion7 ignore the    
function3 to discover what  is there1 to
 analyze1 to measure1 to describe1 gives
 him outlet  enough4 ,but nevertheless  
it is the function that fixed the point 
of departure1 that prescribed the       
problem and that set the limits1        
physical as well as intellectual1 of    
subsequent investigation4  ,reference to
 function makes the details discovered  
other than a  jumble of incoherent      
trivialities4 ,one might as well devote 
himself  to the minute description of a 
square yard of desert soil were it not  
for this translation4 ,states of        
consciousness are the morphology of     
certain functions4#eg ,what is true of  
analysis1 of description1 is  true      
equally of classification4 ,knowing1    

willing1 feeling1 name states  of       
consciousness not in terms of           
themselves1 but in terms of acts1       
attitudes1 found in experience4#eh      
,explanation1 even of an 8empirical     
sort0 is as impossible as  determination
 of a 8state0 and its classification1   
when we  rigidly confine ourselves to   
modifications of consciousness as  a    
self-existent4 ,sensations are always   
defined1 classified1 and  explained by  
reference to conditions which1 according
 to the theory1  are                    
extraneous--sense-organs and stimuli4   
,the whole physiological  side assumes a
 ludicrously anomalous aspect on this   
basis4#ei ,while  experimentation is    
retained1 and even made much of1 it is  
at the cost  of logical coherence4 ,to  
experiment with reference to a bare     
state  of consciousness is a performance
 of which one cannot imagine the        
nature1 to say nothing of doing it2     
while to experiment with reference  to  
acts and the conditions of their        

occurrence is a natural and             
straightforward undertaking4 ,such      
simple processes as association are     
concretely inexplicable when we assume  
states of consciousness as  existences  
by themselves4 ,as recent psychology    
testifies1 we again have  to resort to  
conditions that have no place nor       
calling on the basis  of the theory--the
 principle of habit1 of neural action1  
or else some  connection in the         
object4#fj    ,we have only to note that
 there are two opposing schools in      
psychology  to see in what an           
unscientific status is the subject4 ,we 
have only  to consider that these two   
schools are the result of assuming      
states  of consciousness as existences  
per se to locate the source of  the     
scientific scandal4 ,no matter what the 
topic1 whether memory  or association or
 attention or effort1 the same dualisms 
present  themselves1 the same necessity 
of choosing between two schools4 ,one1  
lost in the distinctions that it has    

developed1 denies the function  because 
it can find objectively presented only  
states of consciousness4  ,so it        
abrogates the function1 regarding it as 
a mere aggregate of  such states1 or as 
a purely external and factitious        
relation between  them4 ,the other      
school1 recognizing that this procedure 
explains away  rather than explains1 the
 values of experience1 attempts to even 
up  by declaring that certain functions 
are themselves immediately given  data  
of consciousness1 existing side by side 
with the 8states10 but  indefinitely    
transcending them in worth1 and         
apprehended by some higher  organ4 ,so  
against the elementary contents and     
external associations of  the analytic  
school in psychology1 we have the       
complicated machinery  of the           
intellectualist school1 with its pure   
self-consciousness as a  source of      
ultimate truths1 its hierarchy of       
intuitions1 its ready-made  faculties4  
,to be sure1 these 8spiritual faculties0

 are now largely  reduced to some one   
comprehensive form--,apperception1 or   
,will1 or  ,attention1 or whatever the  
fashionable term may be4 ,but the       
principle  remains the same2 the        
assumption of a function as a given     
existent1  distinguishable in itself and
 acting upon other existences--as if    
the functions digestion and vision were 
regarded as separate from  organic      
structures1 somehow acting upon them    
from the outside so as  to bring        
co-operation and harmony into them6#fa  
,this division into  psychological      
schools is as reasonable as would be one
 of botanists  into rootists and        
flowerists2 of those proclaiming the    
root to be  the rudimentary and         
essential structure1 and those asserting
 that  since the function of            
seed-bearing is the main thing1 the     
flower is  really the controlling       
8synthetic0 principle4 ,both            
sensationalist and  intellectualist     
suppose that psychology has some special

 sphere of  8reality0 or of experience  
marked off for it within which the data 
are  just lying around1 self-existent   
and ready-made1 to be picked up and     
assorted as pebbles await the visitor on
 the beach4 ,both alike fail to         
recognize that the psychologist first   
has experience to deal with2 the  same  
experience that the zoologist1          
geologist1 chemist1 mathematician1  and 
historian deal with1 and that what      
characterizes his specialty is  not some
 data or existences which he may call   
uniquely his own2 but the  problem      
raised--the problem of the course of the
 acts that constitute  experiencing4    
,here psychology gets its revenge upon  
those who would rule it out of          
possession of important philosophical   
bearing4 ,as a matter of fact1  the     
larger part of the questions that are   
being discussed in current  epistemology
 and what is termed metaphysic of logic 
and ethic arise  out of 7and are        
hopelessly compromised by7 this original

 assumption  of 8consciousness as       
such0--in other words1 are provoked by  
the exact  reason that is given for     
denying to psychology any essential     
meaning  for epistemology and           
metaphysic4 ,such is the irony of the   
situation4  ,the epistemologist's       
problem is1 indeed1 usually put as the  
question of  how the subject can so far 
8transcend0 itself as to get valid      
assurance  of the objective world4 ,the 
very phraseology in which the problem is
  put reveals the thoroughness of the   
psychologist's revenge4 ,just and  only 
because experience has been reduced to  
8states of consciousness0  as           
independent existences1 does the        
question of self-transcendence  have any
 meaning4 ,the entire epistemological   
industry is one--shall  ,i say it--of a 
,sisyphean nature4 ,mutatis mutandis1   
the same holds  of the metaphysic of    
logic1 ethic1 and esthetic4 ,in each    
case1 the  basic problem has come to be 
how a mere state of consciousness can be

  the vehicle of a system of truth1 of  
an objectively valid good1 of  beauty   
which is other than agreeable feeling4  
,we may1 indeed1 excuse  the            
psychologist for not carrying on the    
special inquiries that are  the business
 of logical1 ethical1 and esthetical    
philosophy2 but can  we excuse ourselves
 for forcing his results into such a    
shape as to  make philosophic problems  
so arbitrary that they are soluble only 
by  arbitrarily wrenching scientific    
facts8    ,undoubtedly we are between   
two fires4 ,in placing upon psychology  
the responsibility of discovering the   
method of experience1 as a  sequence of 
acts and passions1 do we not destroy    
just that limitation  to concrete detail
 which now constitutes it a science8    
,will not the  psychologist be the first
 to repudiate this attempt to mix him up
  in matters philosophical8 ,we need    
only to keep in mind the specific  facts
 involved in the term ,course or        
,process of ,experience to avoid  this  

danger4 ,the immediate preoccupation of 
the psychologist is with  very definite 
and empirical facts--questions like the 
limits of  audition1 of the origin of   
pitch1 of the structure and conditions  
of  the musical scale1 etc4 ,just so the
 immediate affair of the geologist  is  
with particular rock-structures1 of the 
botanist with particular  plants1 and so
 on4 ,but through the collection1       
description1 location1  classification  
of rocks the geologist is led to the    
splendid story  of world-forming4 ,the  
limited1 fixed1 and separate piece of   
work is  dissolved away in the fluent   
and dynamic drama of the earth4 ,so1 the
  plant leads with inevitableness to the
 whole process of life and its          
evolution4    ,in form1 the botanist    
still studies the genus1 the species1   
the  plant--hardly1 indeed1 that2 rather
 the special parts1 the structural      
elements1 of the plant4 ,in reality1 he 
studies life itself2 the  structures are
 the indications1 the signature through 

which he  renders transparent the       
mystery of life growing in the changing 
world4 ,it was doubtless necessary for  
the botanist to go through the  ,linnean
 period--the period of engagement with  
rigid detail and fixed  classifications2
 of tearing apart and piecing together2 
of throwing  all emphasis upon          
peculiarities of number1 size1 and      
appearance of  matured structure2 of    
regarding change1 growth1 and function  
as  external1 more or less interesting1 
attachments to form4 ,examination  of   
this period is instructive2 there is    
much in contemporary  investigation and 
discussion that is almost unpleasantly  
reminiscent in  its suggestiveness4 ,the
 psychologist should profit by the      
intervening  history of science4 ,the   
conception of evolution is not so much  
an  additional law as it is a           
face-about4 ,the fixed structure1 the   
separate  form1 the isolated element1 is
 henceforth at best a mere              
stepping-stone  to knowledge of process1

 and when not at its best1 marks the end
 of  comprehension1 and betokens failure
 to grasp the problem4    ,with the     
change in standpoint from self-included 
existence to including  process1 from   
structural unit of composition to       
controlling unity  of function1 from    
changeless form to movement in growth1  
the whole  scheme of values is          
transformed4 ,faculties are definite    
directions of  development2 elements are
 products that are starting-points for  
new  processes2 bare facts are indices  
of change2 static conditions are  modes 
of accomplished adjustment4 ,not that   
the concrete1 empirical  phenomenon     
loses in worth1 much less that          
unverifiable 8metaphysical0  entities   
are impertinently introduced2 but that  
our aim is the  discovery of a process  
of actions in its adaptations to        
circumstance4  ,if we apply this        
evolutionary logic in psychology1 where 
shall we  stop8 ,questions of limits of 
stimuli in a given sense1 say hearing1  

are in reality questions of temporary   
arrests1 adjustments marking the        
favorable equilibrium of the whole      
organism2 they connect with the         
question of the use of sensation in     
general and auditory sensations  in     
particular for life-habits2 of the      
origin and use of localized and         
distinguished perception2 and this1 in  
turn1 involves within itself  the whole 
question of space and time recognition2 
the significance  of the                
thing-and-quality experience1 and so on4
 ,and when we are told  that the        
question of the origin of space         
experience has nothing at all  to do    
with the question of the nature and     
significance of the space  experienced1 
the statement is simply evidence that   
the one who makes  it is still at the   
static standpoint2 he believes that     
things1 that  relations1 have existence 
and significance apart from the         
particular  conditions under which they 
come into experience1 and apart from the

  special service rendered in those     
particular conditions4    ,of course1 ,i
 am far from saying that every          
psychologist must make the  whole       
journey4 ,each individual may contract1 
as he pleases1 for any  section or      
subsection he prefers2 and undoubtedly  
the well-being of  the science is       
advanced by such division of labor4 ,but
 psychology  goes over the whole ground 
from detecting every distinct act of    
experiencing1 to seeing what need calls 
out the special organ fitted to  cope   
with the situation1 and discovering the 
machinery through which it  operates to 
keep a-going the course of action4      
,but1 ,i shall be told1 the wall that   
divides psychology from philosophy      
cannot be so easily treated as          
non-existent4 ,psychology is a matter of
  natural history1 even though it may be
 admitted that it is the natural        
history of the course of experience4    
,but philosophy is a matter of  values2 
of the criticism and justification of   

certain validities4 ,one  deals1 it is  
said1 with genesis1 with conditions of  
temporal origin  and transition2 the    
other with analysis1 with eternal       
constitution4 ,i  shall have to repeat  
that just this rigid separation of      
genesis and  analysis seems to me a     
survival from a pre-evolutionary1 a     
pre-historic  age4 ,it indicates not so 
much an assured barrier between         
philosophy  and psychology as the       
distance dividing philosophy from all   
science4  ,for the lesson that          
mathematicians first learned1 that      
physics and  chemistry pondered over1 in
 which the biological disciplines were  
finally tutored1 is that sure and       
delicate analysis is possible only      
through the patient study of conditions 
of origin and development4  ,the method 
of analysis in mathematics is the method
 of construction4  ,the experimental    
method is the method of making1 of      
following the  history of production2   
the term 8cause0 that has 7when taken as

 an  existent entity7 so hung on the    
heels of science as to impede its       
progress1 has universal meaning when    
read as condition of appearance  in a   
process4 ,and1 as already intimated1 the
 conception of evolution  is no more and
 no less the discovery of a general law 
of life than it  is the generalization  
of all scientific method4 ,everywhere   
analysis  that cannot proceed by        
examining the successive stages of its  
subject1  from its beginning up to its  
culmination1 that cannot control this   
examination by discovering the          
conditions under which successive stages
  appear1 is only preliminary4 ,it may  
further the invention of proper  tools  
of inquiry1 it may help define problems1
 it may serve to suggest  valuable      
hypotheses4 ,but as science it breathes 
an air already tainted4  ,there is no   
way to sort out the results flowing from
 the subject-matter  itself from those  
introduced by the assumptions and       
presumptions of  our own reflection4    

,not so with natural history when it is 
worthy of  its name4 ,here the analysis 
is the unfolding of the existence       
itself4  ,its distinctions are not      
pigeon-holes of our convenience2 they   
are  stakes that mark the parting of the
 ways in the process itself4 ,its       
classifications are not a grasp at      
factors resisting further analysis2     
they are the patient tracings of the    
paths pursued4 ,nothing is more  out of 
date than to suppose that interest in   
genesis is interest in  reducing higher 
forms to cruder ones3 it is interest in 
locating the  exact and objective       
conditions under which a given fact     
appears1 and  in relation to which      
accordingly it has its meaning4 ,nothing
 is more  nave than to suppose that in  
pursuing 8natural history0 7term of     
scorn  in which yet resides the dignity 
of the world-drama7 we simply learn     
something of the temporal conditions    
under which a given value appears1      
while its own eternal essential quality 

remains as opaque as before4  ,nature   
knows no such divorce of quality and    
circumstance4 ,things come  when they   
are wanted and as they are wanted2 their
 quality is precisely  the response they
 give to the conditions that call for   
them1 while  the furtherance they afford
 to the movement of their whole is their
  meaning4 ,the severance of analysis   
and genesis1 instead of serving as  a   
ready-made test by which to try out the 
empirical1 temporal events  of          
psychology from the rational abiding    
constitution of philosophy1  is a brand 
of philosophic dualism3 the supposition 
that values are  externally obtruded and
 statically set in irrelevant rubbish4  
,there are those who will admit that    
8states of consciousness0 are  but the  
cross-sections of flow of behavior1     
arrested for inspection1  made in order 
that we may reconstruct experience in   
its lifehistory4  ,yet in the knowledge 
of the course and method of our         
experience1  they will hold that we are 

far from the domain proper of           
philosophy4  ,experience1 they say1 is  
just the historic achievement of finite 
individuals2 it tells the tale of       
approach to the treasures of truth1  of 
partial victory1 but larger defeat1 in  
laying hold of the treasure4  ,but1 they
 say1 reality is not the path to        
reality1 and record of  devious         
wanderings in the path is hardly a safe 
account of the goal4  ,psychology1 in   
other words1 may tell us something of   
how we mortals  lay hold of the world of
 things and truths2 of how we           
appropriate  and assimilate its         
contents2 and of how we react4 ,it may  
trace the  issues of such approaches and
 apprehensions upon the course of our   
own individual destinies4 ,but it cannot
 wisely ignore nor sanely deny  the     
distinction between these individual    
strivings and achievements1  and the    
8,reality0 that subsists and supports   
its own structure  outside these finite 
futilities4 ,the processes by which we  

turn over  ,the ,reality into terms of  
our fragmentary unconcluded1            
inconclusive  experiences are so        
extrinsic to the ,reality itself as to  
have no  revealing power with reference 
to it4 ,there is the ordo ad universum1 
the subject of philosophy2 there is the 
ordo ad individuum1 the  subject of     
psychology4    ,some such assumption as 
this lies latent1 ,i am convinced1 in   
all  forswearings of the kinship of     
psychology and philosophy4 ,two         
conceptions hang together4 ,the opinion 
that psychology is an account  only and 
finally of states of consciousness1 and 
therefore can throw  no light upon the  
objects with which philosophy deals1 is 
twin to  the doctrine that the whole    
conscious life of the individual is not 
organic to the world4 ,the philosophic  
basis and scope of this doctrine  lie   
beyond examination here4 ,but even in   
passing one cannot avoid  remarking that
 the doctrine is almost never           
consistently held2 the  doctrine        

logically carried out leads so directly 
to intellectual and  moral scepticism   
that the theory usually prefers to work 
in the dark  background as a disposition
 and temper of thought rather than to   
make a  frank statement of itself4 ,even
 in the half-hearted expositions of the 
process of human experience as something
 merely annexed to the reality  of the  
universe1 we are brought face to face to
 the consideration with  which we set   
out3 the dependence of theories of the  
individual upon  the position at a given
 time of the individual practical and   
social4  ,the doctrine of the           
accidental1 futile1 transitory          
significance of the  individual's       
experience as compared with eternal     
realities2 the notion  that at best the 
individual is simply realizing for and  
in himself  what already has fixed      
completeness in itself is congruous only
 with  a certain intellectual and       
political scheme and must modify itself 
as  that shifts4 ,when such             

rearrangement comes1 our estimate of the
 nature  and importance of psychology   
will mirror the change4    ,when man's  
command of the methods that control     
action was precarious  and disturbed2   
when the tools that subject the world of
 things and  forces to use and operation
 were rare and clumsy1 it was           
unavoidable  that the individual should 
submit his perception and purpose       
blankly to  the blank reality beyond4   
,under such circumstances1 external     
authority  must reign2 the belief that  
human experience in itself is           
approximate1  not intrinsic1 is         
inevitable4 ,under such circumstances1  
reference to  the individual1 to the    
subject1 is a resort only for explaining
 error1  illusion1 and uncertainty4 ,the
 necessity of external control and      
external redemption of experience       
reports itself in a low valuation of    
the self1 and of all the factors and    
phases of experience that spring  from  
the self4 ,that the psychology of       

medievalism should appear only as  a    
portion of its theology of sin and      
salvation is as obvious as that  the    
psychology of the ,greeks should be a   
chapter of cosmology4    ,as against all
 this1 the assertion is ventured that   
psychology1  supplying us with knowledge
 of the behavior of experience1 is a    
conception of democracy4 ,its postulate 
is that since experience  fulfils itself
 in individuals1 since it administers   
itself through  their instrumentality1  
the account of the course and method of 
this  achievement is a significant and  
indispensable affair4    ,democracy is  
possible only because of a change in    
intellectual  conditions4 ,it implies   
tools for getting at truth in detail1   
and day  by day1 as we go along4 ,only  
such possession justifies the surrender 
of fixed1 all-embracing principles to   
which1 as universals1 all  particulars  
and individuals are subject for         
valuation and regulation4  ,without such
 possession1 it is only the courage of  

the fool that would  undertake the      
venture to which democracy has committed
 itself--the  ordering of life in       
response to the needs of the moment in  
accordance  with the ascertained truth  
of the moment4 ,modern life involves the
  deification of the here and the now2  
of the specific1 the particular1  the   
unique1 that which happens once and has 
no measure of value save  such as it    
brings with itself4 ,such deification is
 monstrous fetishism1  unless the deity 
be there2 unless the universal lives1   
moves1 and has  its being in experience 
as individualized4#fb ,this conviction  
of the  value of the individualized     
finds its further expression in         
psychology1  which undertakes to show   
how this individualization proceeds1 and
 in  what aspect it presents itself4    
,of course1 such a conception means     
something for philosophy as well  as for
 psychology2 possibly it involves for   
philosophy the larger  measure of       
transformation4 ,it involves surrender  

of any claim on  the part of philosophy 
to be the sole source of some truths and
 the  exclusive guardian of some values4
 ,it means that philosophy be a  method2
 not an assurance company1 nor a knight 
errant4 ,it means an  alignment with    
science4 ,philosophy may not be         
sacrificed to the  partial and          
superficial clamor of that which        
sometimes officiously  and pretentiously
 exhibits itself as ,science4 ,but there
 is a sense  in which philosophy must go
 to school to the sciences2 must have no
  data save such as it receives at their
 hands2 and be hospitable to no  method 
of inquiry or reflection not akin to    
those in daily use among  the sciences4 
,as long as it claims for itself special
 territory of  fact1 or peculiar modes  
of access to truth1 so long must it     
occupy a  dubious position4 ,yet this   
claim it has to make until psychology   
comes  to its own4 ,there is something  
in experience1 something in things1     
which the physical and the biological   

sciences do not touch2 something1       
moreover1 which is not just more        
experiences or more existences2  but    
without which their materials are       
inexperienced1 unrealized4  ,such       
sciences deal only with what might be   
experienced2 with the  content of       
experience1 provided and assumed there  
be experience4 ,it is  psychology which 
tells us how this possible experience   
loses its barely  hypothetical          
character1 and is stamped with          
categorical unquestioned                
experiencedness2 how1 in a word1 it     
becomes here and now in some  uniquely  
individualized life4 ,here is the       
necessary transition of  science into   
philosophy2 a passage that carries the  
verified and solid  body of the one into
 the large and free form of the other4  
,,note3 ,i have let this paper stand    
much as written1 though now             
conscious that much more is crowded into
 it than could properly      be         
presented in one paper4 ,the drift of   

the ten years from '#ii to      '#ji has
 made1 ,i venture to believe1 for       
increased clearness in      the main    
positions of the paper3 ,the revival of 
a naturalistic      realism1 the denial 
of the existence of 8consciousness10 the
      development of functional and     
dynamic psychology 7accompanied      by 
aversion to interpretation of functions 
as faculties of a                       
soul-substance7--all of these tendencies
 are sympathetic with      the aim of   
the paper4 ,there is another reason for 
letting it      stand3 the new          
functional and pragmatic empiricism     
proffered      in this volume has been  
constantly objected to on the ground    
that its conceptions of knowledge and   
verification lead only      to          
subjectivism and solipsism4 ,the paper  
may indicate that the                   
identification of experience with bare  
states of consciousness      represents 
the standpoint of the critic1 not of the
 empiricism      criticised1 and that it

 is for him1 not for me1 to fear the    
subjective implications of such a       
position4 ,the paper also      clearly  
raises the question as to how far the   
isolation of      8consciousness0 from  
nature and social life1 which           
characterizes      the procedure of many
 psychologists of to-day1 is responsible
 for      keeping alive quite unreal    
problems in philosophy4          ,,the  
,,significance ,,of ,,the ,,problem ,,of
 ,,knowledge#fc      ,it is now         
something over a century since ,kant    
called upon philosophers  to cease their
 discussion regarding the nature of the 
world and the  principles of existence  
until they had arrived at some          
conclusion  regarding the nature of the 
knowing process4 ,but students of       
philosophy  know that ,kant formulated  
the question 8how knowledge is possible0
  rather than created it4 ,as matter of 
fact1 reflective thought for two        
centuries before ,kant had been         
principally interested in just this     

problem1 although it had not generalized
 its own interest4 ,kant brought  to    
consciousness the controlling motive4   
,the discussion1 both in ,kant  himself 
and in his successors1 often seems      
scholastic1 lost in useless  subtlety1  
scholastic argument1 and technical      
distinctions4 ,within the  last decade  
in particular there have been signs of a
 growing weariness  as to epistemology1 
and a tendency to turn away to more     
fertile  fields4 ,the interest shows    
signs of exhaustion4    ,students of    
philosophy will recognize what ,i mean  
when ,i say that this  growing          
conviction of futility and consequent   
distaste are associated  with the       
outcome of the famous dictum of ,kant1  
that perception without  conception is  
blind1 while conception without         
perception is empty4 ,the  whole course 
of reflection since ,kant's time has    
tended to justify this  remark4 ,the    
sensationalist and the rationalist have 
worked themselves  out4 ,pretty much all

 students are convinced that we can     
reduce  knowledge neither to a set of   
associated sensations1 nor yet to a     
purely rational system of relations of  
thought4 ,knowledge is judgment1  and   
judgment requires both a material of    
sense perception and an  ordering1      
regulating principle1 reason2 so much   
seems certain1 but we  do not get any   
further4 ,sensation and thought         
themselves seem to stand  out more      
rigidly opposed to each other in their  
own natures than ever4  ,why both are   
necessary1 and how two such opposed     
factors coperate in  bringing about the 
unified result of science1 becomes more 
and more of  a mystery4 ,it is the      
continual running up against this       
situation which  accounts for the       
flagging of interest and the desire to  
direct energy  where it will have more  
outcome4    ,this situation creates a   
condition favorable to taking stock of  
the  question as it stands2 to inquiring
 what this interest1 prolonged  for over

 three centuries1 in the possibility and
 nature of knowledge1  stands for2 what 
the conviction as to the necessity of   
the union of  sensation and thought1    
together with the inability to reach    
conclusions  regarding the nature of the
 union1 signifies4    ,i propose then to
 raise this evening precisely this      
question3 ,what  is the meaning of the  
problem of knowledge8 ,what is its      
meaning1 not  simply for reflective     
philosophy or in terms of epistemology  
itself1  but what is its meaning in the 
historical movement of humanity and as  
a part of a larger and more             
comprehensive experience8 ,my thesis is 
perhaps sufficiently indicated in the   
mere taking of this point of  view4 ,it 
implies that the abstractness of the    
discussion of knowledge1  its remoteness
 from everyday experience1 is one of    
form1 rather than of  substance4 ,it    
implies that the problem of knowledge is
 not a problem  that has its origin1 its
 value1 or its destiny within itself4   

,the  problem is one which social life1 
the organized practice of mankind1  has 
had to face4 ,the seemingly technical   
and abstruse discussion of the          
philosophers results from the           
formulation and statement of the        
question4    ,i suggest that the problem
 of the possibility of knowledge is but 
an aspect of the question of the        
relation of knowing to acting1 of       
theory to practice4 ,the distinctions   
which the philosophers raise1 the       
oppositions which they erect1 the weary 
treadmill which they pursue  between    
sensation and thought1 subject and      
object1 mind and matter1 are  not       
invented ad hoc1 but are simply the     
concise reports and condensed  formula  
of points of view and practical         
conflicts having their source  in the   
very nature of modern life1 conflicts   
which must be met and  solved if modern 
life is to go on its way untroubled1    
with clear  consciousness of what it is 
about4 ,as the philosopher has received 

his  problem from the world of action1  
so he must return his account there  for
 auditing and liquidation4    ,more     
especially1 ,i suggest that the tendency
 of all the points at issue  to         
precipitate in the opposition of        
sensationalism and rationalism  is due  
to the fact that sensation and reason   
stand for the two  forces contending for
 mastery in social life3 the radical and
 the  conservative4 ,the reason that the
 contest does not end1 the reason for   
the necessity of the combination of the 
two in the resultant statement1  is that
 both factors are necessary in action2  
one stands for stimulus1  for           
initiative2 the other for control1 for  
direction4    ,i cannot hope1 in the    
time at my command this evening1 to     
justify  these wide and sweeping        
assertions regarding either the origin1 
the  work1 or the final destiny of      
philosophic reflection4 ,i simply hope1 
by reference to some of the chief       
periods of the development of           

philosophy1 to illustrate to you        
something of what ,i mean4    ,at the   
outset we take a long scope in our      
survey and present to  ourselves the    
epoch when philosophy was still         
consciously1 and not  simply by         
implication1 human1 when reflective     
thought had not developed  its own      
technique of method1 and was in no      
danger of being caught in  its own      
machinery--the time of ,socrates4 ,what 
does the assertion of  ,socrates that an
 unexamined life is not one fit to be   
led by man2 what  does his injunction   
8,know thyself0 mean8 ,it means that the
 corporate  motives and guarantees of   
conduct are breaking down4 ,we have got 
away  from the time when the individual 
could both regulate and justify his     
course of life by reference to the      
ideals incarnate in the habits of  the  
community of which he is a member4 ,the 
time of direct and therefore            
unconscious union with corporate life1  
finding therein stimuli1 codes1  and    

values1 has departed4 ,the development  
of industry and commerce1 of  war and   
politics1 has brought face to face      
communities with different  aims and    
diverse habits2 the development of myth 
and animism into crude  but genuine     
scientific observation and imagination  
has transformed  the physical widening  
of the horizon1 brought about by        
commerce  and intercourse1 into an      
intellectual and moral expansion4 ,the  
old  supports fail precisely at the time
 when they are most needed--before  a   
widening and more complex scene of      
action4 ,where1 then1 shall the  agent  
of action turn8 ,the 8,know thyself0 of 
,socrates is the reply to  the practical
 problem which confronted ,athens in his
 day4 ,investigation  into the true ends
 and worths of human life1 sifting and  
testing of all  competing ends1 the     
discovery of a method which should      
validate the  genuine and dismiss the   
spurious1 had henceforth to do for man  
what  consolidated and incorporate      

custom had hitherto presented as a free 
and precious gift4    ,with ,socrates   
the question is as direct and practical 
as the question  of making one's living 
or of governing the state2 it is indeed 
the  same question put in its general   
form4 ,it is a question that the flute  
player1 the cobbler1 and the politician 
must face no more and no less  than the 
reflective philosopher4 ,the question is
 addressed by ,socrates  to every       
individual and to every group with which
 he comes in contact4  ,because the     
question is practical it is individual  
and direct4 ,it is a  question which    
every one must face and answer for      
himself1 just as in  the ,protestant    
scheme every individual must face and   
solve for himself  the question of his  
final destiny4    ,yet the very attitude
 of ,socrates carried with it the       
elements of its  own destruction4       
,socrates could only raise the question1
 or rather  demand of every individual  
that he raise it for himself4 ,of the   

answer  he declared himself to be as    
ignorant as was any one4 ,the result    
could be only a shifting of the center  
of interest4 ,if the question is  so    
all-important1 and yet the wisest of all
 men must confess that he  only knows   
his own ignorance as to its answer1 the 
inevitable point  of further            
consideration is the discovery of a     
method which shall  enable the question 
to be answered4 ,this is the            
significance of ,plato4  ,the problem is
 the absolutely inevitable outgrowth of 
the ,socratic  position2 and yet it     
carried with it just as inevitably the  
separation  of philosopher from         
shoemaker and statesman1 and the        
relegation of  theory to a position     
remote for the time being from conduct4 
,if the ,socratic command1 8,know       
thyself10 runs against the dead wall of 
inability to conduct this knowledge1    
some one must take upon himself  the    
discovery of how the requisite knowledge
 may be obtained4 ,a new  profession is 

born1 that of the thinker4 ,at this time
 the means1  the discovery of how the   
aims and worths of the self may be known
  and measured1 becomes1 for this class1
 an end in itself4 ,theory is           
ultimately to be applied to practice2   
but in the meantime the theory  must be 
worked out as theory or else no         
application4 ,this represents  the      
peculiar equilibrium and the peculiar   
point of contradiction in  the ,platonic
 system4 ,all philosophy is simply for  
the sake of the  organization and       
regulation of social life2 and yet the  
philosophers  must be a class by        
themselves1 working out their peculiar  
problems  with their own particular     
tools4    ,with ,aristotle the attempted
 balance failed4 ,social life is        
disintegrating beyond the point of hope 
of a successful reorganization1  and    
thinking is becoming a fascinating      
pursuit for its own sake4 ,the  world of
 practice is now the world of compromise
 and of adjustment4  ,it is relative to 

partial aims and finite agents4 ,the    
sphere of  absolute and enduring truth  
and value can be reached only in and    
through thought4 ,the one who acts      
compromises himself with the animal     
desire that inspires his action and with
 the alien material that forms  its     
stuff4 ,in two short generations the    
divorce of philosophy from  life1 the   
isolation of reflective theory from     
practical conduct1 has  completed       
itself4 ,so great is the irony of       
history that this sudden and  effective 
outcome was the result of the attempt to
 make thought the  instrument of action1
 and action the manifestation of truth  
reached by  thinking4    ,but this      
statement must not be taken too         
literally4 ,it is impossible  that men  
should really separate their ideas from 
their acts4 ,if we  look ahead a few    
centuries we find that the philosophy of
 ,plato and  ,aristotle has             
accomplished1 in an indirect and        
unconscious way1  what perhaps it could 

never have effected by the more         
immediate and  practical method of      
,socrates4 ,philosophy became an organ  
of vision1  an instrument of            
interpretation2 it furnished the medium 
through which  the world was seen and   
the course of life estimated4           
,philosophy died  as philosophy1 to rise
 as the set and bent of the human mind4 
,through  a thousand and devious and    
roundabout channels1 the thoughts of the
  philosophers filtered through the     
strata of human consciousness and       
conduct4 ,through the teachings of      
grammarians1 rhetoricians1 and a        
variety of educational schools1 they    
were spread in diluted form  through the
 whole ,roman ,empire and were again    
precipitated in the  common forms of    
speech4 ,through the earnestness of the 
moral propaganda  of the ,stoics they   
became the working rules of life for the
 more  strenuous and earnest spirits4   
,through the speculations of the        
,sceptics  and ,epicureans they became  

the chief reliance and consolation of a 
large number of highly cultured         
individuals amid social turmoil and     
political disintegration4 ,all these    
influences and many more finally  summed
 themselves up in the two great media   
through which ,greek  philosophy finally
 fixed the intellectual horizon of man1 
determined  the values of its           
perspective1 and meted out the          
boundaries and  divisions of the scene  
of human action4    ,these two          
influences were the development of      
,christian theology  and moral theory1  
and the organization of the system of   
,roman  jurisprudence4 ,there is perhaps
 no more fascinating chapter in  the    
history of humanity than the slow and   
tortuous processes by  which the ideas  
set in motion by that ,athenian citizen 
who faced  death as serenely as he      
conversed with a friend1 finally became 
the  intellectually organizing centers  
of the two great movements that  bridge 
the span between ancient civilization   

and modern4 ,as the  personal and       
immediate force and enthusiasm of the   
movement initiated  by ,jesus began to  
grow fainter and the commanding         
influence of his own  personality       
commenced to dim1 the ideas of the world
 and of life1 of  ,god and of man1      
elaborated in ,greek philosophy1 served 
to transform  moral enthusiasm and      
personal devotion to the redemption of  
humanity1  into a splendid and coherent 
view of the universe2 a view that       
resisted  all disintegrating influences 
and gathered into itself the permanent  
ideas and progressive ideals thus far   
developed in the history of man4    ,we 
have only a faint idea of how this was  
accomplished1 or of the  thoroughness of
 the work done4 ,we have perhaps even   
more inadequate  conceptions of the     
great organizing and centralizing work  
done by ,greek  thought in the political
 sphere4 ,when the military and         
administrative  genius of ,rome brought 
the whole world in subjection to itself1

 the  most pressing of practical        
problems was to give unity of practical 
aim and harmony of working machinery to 
the vast and confused  mass of local    
custom and tradition1 religious1 social1
 economic1  and intellectual1 as well as
 political4 ,in this juncture the great 
administrators and lawyers of ,rome     
seized with avidity upon the  results of
 the intellectual analysis of social and
 political relations  elaborated in     
,greek philosophy4 ,caring naught for   
these results in  their reflective and  
theoretical character1 they saw in them 
the  possible instrument of introducing 
order into chaos and of transforming    
the confused and conflicting medley of  
practice and opinion into a  harmonious 
social structure4 ,roman law1 that      
formed the vertebral  column of         
civilization for a thousand years1 and  
which articulated the  outer order of   
life as distinctly as ,christianity     
controlled the inner1  was the outcome4 
,thought was once more in unity with    

action1 philosophy had become the       
instrument of conduct4 ,mr4 ,bosanquet  
makes the pregnant remark 8that  the    
weakness of medieval science and        
philosophy are connected rather  with   
excess of practice than with excess of  
theory4 ,the subordination  of          
philosophy to theology is a             
subordination of science to a formulated
  conception of human welfare4 ,its     
essence is present1 not wherever there  
is metaphysics but wherever the spirit  
of truth is subordinated to any         
preconceived practical intent40         
78,history of ,esthetics10 p4 #adf47    
,once more the irony of history displays
 itself4 ,thought has become  practical1
 it has become the regulator of         
individual conduct and  social          
organization1 but at the expense of its 
own freedom and power4  ,the defining   
characteristic of medievalism in state  
and in church1 in  political and        
spiritual life1 is that truth presents  
itself to the  individual only through  

the medium of organized authority4      
,there was a historical necessity on the
 external as well as the  internal side4
 ,we have not the remotest way of       
imagining what the  outcome would       
finally have been if1 at the time when  
the intellectual  structure of the      
,christian church and the legal         
structure of the  ,roman ,empire had got
 themselves thoroughly organized1 the   
barbarians  had not made their inroads  
and seized upon all this accumulated and
  consolidated wealth as their own      
legitimate prey4 ,but this was what did 
happen4 ,as a result1 truths originally 
developed by the freest possible        
criticism and investigation became      
external1 and imposed themselves  upon  
the mass of individuals by the mere     
weight of authoritative law4  ,the      
external1 transcendental1 and           
supernatural character of spiritual     
truth and of social control during the  
,middle ,ages is naught but  the mirror1
 in consciousness1 of the relation      

existing between the  eager1 greedy1    
undisciplined horde of barbarians on one
 side1 and the  concentrated            
achievements of ancient civilization on 
the other4 ,there  was no way out save  
that the keen barbarian whet his        
appetite upon  the rich banquet spread  
before him4 ,but there was equally no   
way out  so far as the continuity of    
civilization was concerned save that the
  very fullness and richness of this    
banquet set limits to the appetite1  and
 finally1 when assimilated and digested1
 it be transformed into the  flesh and  
blood1 the muscles and sinew of him who 
sat at the feast4  ,thus the barbarian  
ceased to be a barbarian and a new      
civilization  arose4    ,but the time   
came when the work of absorption was    
fairly complete4  ,the northern         
barbarians had eaten the food and drunk 
the wine of  ,grco-,roman civilization4 
,the authoritative truth embodied in    
medieval  state and church succeeded1 in
 principle1 in disciplining the         

untrained  masses4 ,its very success    
issued its own death warrant4 ,to say   
that it  had succeeded means that the   
new people had finally eaten their way  
into the heart of the ideas offered     
them1 had got from them what they       
wanted1 and were henceforth prepared to 
go their own way and make their  own    
living4 ,here a new rhythm of the       
movement of thought and action  begins  
to show itself4    ,the beginning of    
this change in the swing of thought and 
action forms  the transition from the   
,middle ,ages to the modern times4 ,it  
is the  epoch of the ,renaissance4 ,the 
individual comes to a new birth and     
asserts his own individuality and       
demands his own rights in the way  of   
feeling1 doing1 and knowing for himself4
 ,science1 art1 religion1  political    
life1 must all be made over on the basis
 of recognizing the  claims of the      
individual4    ,pardon me these         
commonplaces1 but they are necessary to 
the course of  the argument4 ,by        

historic fallacy we often suppose1 or   
imagine that  we suppose1 that the      
individual had been present as a        
possible center  of action all through  
the ,middle ,ages1 but through some     
external  and arbitrary interference had
 been weighted down by political and    
intellectual despotism4 ,all this       
inverts the true order of the case4     
,the very possibility of the individual 
making such unlimited demands  for      
himself1 claiming to be the legitimate  
center of all action and  standard for  
all organization1 was dependent1 as ,i  
have already  indicated1 upon the       
intervening medievalism4 ,save as having
 passed  through this period of         
tremendous discipline1 and having       
gradually  worked over into his own     
habits and purposes the truths embodied 
in  the church and state that controlled
 his conduct1 the individual could  be  
only a source of disorder and a         
disturber of civilization4 ,the very    
maintenance of the spiritual welfare of 

mankind was bound up in the  extent to  
which the claim of truth and reality to 
be universal and  objective1 far above  
all individual feeling and thought1     
could make  itself valid4 ,the logical  
realism and universalism of scholastic  
philosophy simply reflect the actual    
subjection of the individual to  that   
associated and corporate life which1 in 
conserving the past1  provided the      
principle of control4    ,but the eager1
 hungry barbarian was there1 implicated 
in this  universalism4 ,he must be      
active in receiving and in absorbing the
  truth authoritatively doled out to    
him4 ,even the most rigid forms of      
medieval ,christianity could not avoid  
postulating the individual will  as     
having a certain initiative with        
reference to its own salvation4 ,the    
impulses1 the appetite1 the instinct of 
the individual were all assumed  in     
medieval morals1 religion1 and politics4
 ,the imagined medieval  tyranny took   
them for granted as completely as does  

the modern herald  of liberty and       
equality4 ,but the medieval civilization
 knew that the  time had not come when  
these appetites and impulses could be   
trusted to  work themselves out4 ,they  
must be controlled by the incorporate   
truths  inherited from ,athens and      
,rome4    ,the very logic of the        
relationship1 however1 required that the
 time  come when the individual makes   
his own the objective and universal     
truths4 ,he is now the incorporation of 
truth4 ,he now has the control as  well 
as the stimulus of action within        
himself4 ,he is the standard and  the   
end1 as well as the initiator and the   
effective force of execution4  ,just    
because the authoritative truth of      
medievalism has succeeded1 has          
fulfilled its function1 the individual  
can begin to assert himself4            
,contrast this critical period1 finding 
its expression equally in  the art of   
the ,renaissance1 the revival of        
learning1 the ,protestant  ,reformation1

 and political democracy1 with ,athens  
in the time of  ,socrates4 ,then        
individuals felt their own social life  
disintegrated1  dissolving under their  
very feet4 ,the problem was how the     
value of that  social life was to be    
maintained against the external and     
internal  forces that were threatening  
it4 ,the problem was on the side neither
  of the individual nor of progress2    
save as the individual was seen  to be  
an intervening instrument in the        
reconstruction of the social  unity4    
,but with the individual of the         
fourteenth century1 it was not  his own 
intimate community life which was       
slipping away from him4 ,it  was an     
alien and remote life which had finally 
become his own2 which  had passed over  
into his own inner being4 ,the problem  
was not how a  unity of social life     
should be conserved1 but what the       
individual  should do with the wealth of
 resources of which he found himself the
  rightful heir and administrator4 ,the 

problem looked out upon the  future1 not
 back to the past4 ,it was how to create
 a new order1 both  of modes of         
individual conduct and forms of social  
life that should  be the appropriate    
manifestations of the vigorous and      
richly endowed  individual4    ,hence   
the conception of progress as a ruling  
idea2 the conception of  the individual 
as the source and standard of rights2   
and the problem  of knowledge1 were all 
born together4 ,given the freed         
individual1 who  feels called upon to   
create a new heaven and a new earth1 and
 who  feels himself gifted with the     
power to perform the task to which he is
  called3--and the demand for science1  
for a method of discovering and         
verifying truth1 becomes imperious4 ,the
 individual is henceforth to  supply    
control1 law1 and not simply stimulation
 and initiation4 ,what  does this mean  
but that instead of any longer receiving
 or assimilating  truth1 he is now to   
search for and create it8 ,having no    

longer the  truth imposed by authority  
to rely upon1 there is no resource save 
to secure the authority of truth4 ,the  
possibility of getting at and  utilizing
 this truth becomes therefore the       
underlying and conditioning  problem of 
modern life4 ,strange as it may sound1  
the question which  was formulated by   
,kant as that of the possibility of     
knowledge1 is the  fundamental political
 problem of modern life4    ,science and
 metaphysics or philosophy1 though      
seeming often to be at  war1 with their 
respective adherents often throwing     
jibes and slurs  at each other1 are     
really the most intimate allies4 ,the   
philosophic  movement is simply the     
coming to consciousness of this claim of
 the  individual to be able to discover 
and verify truth for himself1  and      
thereby not only to direct his own      
conduct1 but to become an  influential  
and decisive factor in the organization 
of life itself4  ,modern philosophy is  
the formulation of this creed1 both in  

general and  in its more specific       
implications4 ,we often forget that the 
technical  problem 8how knowledge is    
possible10 also means 8how knowledge is 
possible02 how1 that is1 shall the      
individual be able to back himself  up  
by truth which has no authority save    
that of its own intrinsic  truthfulness4
 ,science1 on the other hand1 is simply 
this general faith  or creed asserting  
itself in detail2 it is the practical   
faith at work  engaged in subjugating   
the foreign territory of ignorance and  
falsehood  step by step4 ,if the        
ultimate outcome depends upon this      
detailed and  concrete work1 we must not
 forget that the earnestness and        
courage1 as  well as the intelligence   
and clearness with which the task has   
been  undertaken1 have depended largely 
upon the wider1 even if vaguer1         
operation of philosophy4    ,but the    
student of philosophy knows more than   
that the problem of  knowledge has been 
with increasing urgency and definiteness

 the  persistent and comprehensive      
problem4 ,so conscious is he of the two 
opposed theories regarding the nature of
 science1 that he often forgets  the    
underlying bond of unity of which we    
have been speaking4 ,these two  opposing
 schools are those which we know as the 
sensationalist and the  intellectualist1
 the empiricist and the rationalist4    
,admitting that the  dominance of the   
question of the possibility and nature  
of knowledge is  at bottom a fundamental
 question of practice and of social     
direction1  is this distinction anything
 more than the clash of scholastic      
opinions1 a rivalry of ideas meaningless
 for conduct8    ,i think it is4 ,having
 made so many sweeping assertions ,i    
must venture  one more4 ,fanciful and   
forced as it may seem1 ,i would say that
 the  sensational and empirical schools 
represent in conscious and reflective   
form the continuation of the principle  
of the northern and barbarian  side of  
medieval life2 while the intellectualist

 and the rationalist  stand for the     
conscious elaboration of the principle  
involved in the  ,grco-,roman tradition4
    ,once more1 as ,i cannot hope to    
prove1 let me expand and illustrate4    
,the sensationalist has staked himself  
upon the possibility of  explaining and 
justifying knowledge by conceiving it as
 the grouping  and combination of the   
qualities directly given us in          
sensation4 ,the  special reasons        
advanced in support of this position are
 sufficiently  technical and remote4    
,but the motive which has kept the      
sensationalist  at work1 which animated 
,hobbes and ,locke1 ,hume and ,john     
,stuart ,mill1  ,voltaire and ,diderot1 
was a human not a scholastic one4 ,it   
was the  belief that only in sensation  
do we get any personal contact with     
reality1 and hence1 any genuine         
guarantee of vital truth4 ,thought is   
pale1 and remote from the concrete stuff
 of knowledge and experience4  ,it only 
formulates and duplicates2 it only      

divides and recombines that  fullness of
 vivid reality got directly and at first
 hand in sense  experience4 ,reason1    
compared with sense1 is indirect1       
emasculate1 and  faded4    ,moreover1   
reason and thought in their very        
generality seem to lie  beyond and      
outside the individual4 ,in this        
remoteness1 when they claim  any final  
value1 they violate the very first      
principle of the modern  consciousness4 
,what is the distinguishing             
characteristic of modern  life1 unless  
it be precisely that the individual     
shall not simply  get1 and reason about1
 truth in the abstract1 but shall make  
it his  own in the most intimate and    
personal way8 ,he has not only to know  
the truth in the sense of knowing about 
it1 but he must feel it4 ,what  is      
sensation but the answer to this demand 
for the most individual  and intimate   
contact with reality8 ,show me a        
sensationalist and ,i  will show you not
 only one who believes that he is on the

 side of  concreteness and definiteness1
 as against washed-out abstractions and 
misty general notions3 but also one who 
believes that he is identified  with the
 cause of the individual as distinct    
from that of external  authority4 ,we   
have only to go to our ,locke and our   
,mill to see that  opposition to the    
innate and the a priori was felt to be  
opposition  to the deification of       
hereditary prejudice and to the         
reception of  ideas without examination 
or criticism4 ,personal contact with    
reality  through sensation seemed to be 
the only safeguard from opinions which1 
while masquerading in the guise of      
absolute and eternal truth1 were in     
reality but the prejudices of the past  
become so ingrained as to insist  upon  
being standards of truth and action4    
,positively as well as negatively1 the  
sensationalists have felt  themselves to
 represent the side of progress4 ,in its
 supposed eternal  character1 a general 
notion stands ready made1 fixed forever1

 without  reference to time1 without the
 possibility of change or diversity4    
,as distinct from this1 the sensation   
represents the never-failing  eruption  
of the new4 ,it is the novel1 the       
unexpected1 that which  cannot be       
reasoned out in eternal formula1 but    
must be hit upon in the  ever-changing  
flow of our experience4 ,it thus        
represents stimulation1  excitation1    
momentum onwards4 ,it gives a constant  
protest against the  assumption of any  
theory or belief to possess finality2   
and it supplies  the ever-renewed       
presentation of material out of which to
 build up new  objects and new laws4    
,the sensationalist appears to have a   
good case4 ,he stands for  vividness and
 definiteness against abstraction2 for  
the engagement  of the individual in    
experience as against the remote and    
general  thought about experience2 and  
for progress and for variety against the
  eternal fixed monotony of the concept4
 ,but what says the rationalist8  ,what 

value has experience1 he inquires1 if it
 is simply a chaos of  disintegrated and
 floating dbris8 ,what is the worth of  
personality and  individuality when they
 are reduced to crudity of brute feeling
 and  sheer intensity of impulsive      
reaction8 ,what is there left in        
progress  that we should desire it1 when
 it has become a mere unregulated flux  
of  transitory sensations1 coming and   
going without reasonable motivation  or 
rational purpose8    ,thus the          
intellectualist has endeavored to frame 
the structure of  knowledge as a        
well-ordered economy1 where reason is   
sovereign1 where  the permanent is the  
standard of reference for the changing1 
and where  the individual may always    
escape from his own mere individuality  
and find support and reinforcement in a 
system of relations that  lies outside  
of and yet gives validity to his own    
passing states of  consciousness4 ,thus 
the rationalists hold that we must find 
in a  universal intelligence a source of

 truth and guarantee of value that is   
sought in vain in the confused and      
flowing mass of sensations4    ,the     
rationalist1 in making the concept or   
general idea the  all-important thing in
 knowledge1 believes himself to be      
asserting the  interests of order as    
against destructive caprice and the     
license of  momentary whim4 ,he finds   
that his cause is bound up with that of 
the  discovery of truth as the necessary
 instrument and method for action4      
,only by reference to the general and   
the rational can the individual  find   
perspective1 secure direction for his   
appetites and impulses1 and  escape from
 the uncontrolled and ruinous reactions 
of his own immediate  tendency4    ,the 
concept1 once more1 in its very         
generality1 in its elevation above  the 
intensities and conflicts of momentary  
passions and interests1 is  the         
conserver of the experience of the past4
 ,it is the wisdom of the  past put into
 capitalized and funded form to enable  

the individual to  get away from the    
stress and competition of the needs of  
the passing  moment4 ,it marks the      
difference between barbarism and        
civilization1  between continuity and   
disintegration1 between the sequence of 
tradition that is the necessity of      
intelligent thought and action1 and  the
 random and confused excitation of the  
hour4    ,when we thus consider not the 
details of the positions of the         
sensationalist and rationalist1 but the 
motives that have induced them  to      
assume these positions1 we discover what
 is meant in saying that the  question  
is still a practical1 a social one1 and 
that the two schools  stand for certain 
one-sided factors of social life4 ,if we
 have on one  side the demand for       
freedom1 for personal initiation into   
experience1  for variety and progress1  
we have on the other side the demand for
  general order1 for continuous and     
organized unity1 for the conservation   
of the dearly bought resources of the   

past4 ,this is what ,i mean by  saying  
that the sensationalist abstracts in    
conscious form the position  and        
tendency of the ,germanic element in    
modern civilization1 the  factor of     
appetite and impulse1 of keen enjoyment 
and satisfaction1 of  stimulus and      
initiative4 ,just so the rationalist    
erects into conscious  abstraction the  
principle of the ,grco-,roman world1    
that of control1 of  system1 of order   
and authority4    ,that the principles  
of freedom and order1 of past and       
future1 or  conservation and progress1  
of incitement to action and control of  
that  incitation1 are correlative1 ,i   
shall not stop to argue4 ,it may be     
worth while1 however1 to point out that 
exactly the same correlative  and       
mutually implicating connection exists  
between sensationalism and  rationalism1
 considered as philosophical accounts of
 the origin and  nature of knowledge4   
,the strength of each school lies in the
 weakness of its opponent4  ,the more   

the sensationalist appears to succeed in
 reducing knowledge  to the associations
 of sensation1 the more he creates a    
demand for  thought to introduce        
background and relationship4 ,the more  
consistent  the sensationalist1 the more
 openly he reveals the sensation in its 
own nakedness crying aloud for a        
clothing of value and meaning which     
must be borrowed from reflective and    
rational interpretation4 ,on the  other 
hand1 the more reason and the system of 
relations that make up  the functioning 
of reason are magnified1 the more is    
felt the need of  sensation to bring    
reason into some fruitful contact with  
the materials  of experience4 ,reason   
must have the stimulus of this contact  
in order  to be incited to its work and 
to get materials to operate with4 ,the  
cause1 then1 why neither school can come
 to rest in itself is precisely  that   
each abstracts one essential factor of  
conduct4    ,this suggests1 finally1    
that the next move in philosophy is     

precisely  to transfer attention from   
the details of the position assumed1 and
  the arguments used in these two       
schools1 to the practical motives that  
have unconsciously controlled the       
discussion4 ,the positions have been    
sufficiently elaborated4 ,within the    
past one hundred years1 within          
especially the last generation1 each has
 succeeded in fully stating  its case4  
,the result1 if we remain at this point1
 is practically a  deadlock4 ,each can  
make out its case against the other4 ,to
 stop at such  a point is a patent      
absurdity4 ,if we are to get out of the 
cul-de-sac  it must be by bringing into 
consciousness the tacit reference to    
action  that all the time has been the  
controlling factor4    ,in a word1      
another great rhythmic movement is seen 
to be approaching  its end4 ,the demand 
for science and philosophy was the      
demand for  truth and a sure standard of
 truth which the new-born individual    
might  employ in his efforts to build up

 a new world to afford free scope  to   
the powers stirring within him4 ,the    
urgency and acuteness of this  demand   
caused1 for the time being1 the transfer
 of attention from the  nature of       
practice to that of knowledge4 ,the     
highly theoretical and  abstract        
character of modern epistemology1       
combined with the fact that  this highly
 abstract and theoretic problem has     
continuously engaged the  attention of  
thought for more than three centuries1  
is1 to my mind1  proof positive that the
 question of knowledge was for the time 
being  the point in which the question  
of practice centered1 and through which 
it must find outlet and solution4    ,we
 return1 then1 to our opening problem3  
the meaning of the question  of the     
possibility of knowledge raised by ,kant
 a century ago1 and of  his assertion   
that sensation without thought is blind1
 thought without  sensation empty4 ,once
 more ,i recall to the student of       
philosophy  how this assertion of ,kant 

has haunted and determined the course of
  philosophy in the intervening         
years--how his solution at once seems   
inevitable and unsatisfactory4 ,it is   
inevitable in that no one can  fairly   
deny that both sense and reason are     
implicated in every fruitful  and       
significant statement of the world2     
unconvincing because we are  after all  
left with these two opposed things still
 at war with each  other1 plus the      
miracle of their final combination4     
,when ,i say that the only way out is to
 place the whole modern industry  of    
epistemology in relation to the         
conditions that gave it birth and  the  
function it has to fulfil1 ,i mean that 
the unsatisfactory character  of the    
entire neo-,kantian movement lies in its
 assumption that  knowledge gives birth 
to itself and is capable of affording   
its own  justification4 ,the solution   
that is always sought and never found so
  long as we deal with knowledge as a   
self-sufficing purveyor of reality1     

reveals itself when we conceive of      
knowledge as a statement of action1     
that statement being necessary1         
moreover1 to the successful ongoing of  
action4    ,the entire problem of       
medieval philosophy is that of          
absorption1  of assimilation4 ,the      
result was the creation of the          
individual4  ,hence the problem of      
modern life is that of reconstruction1  
reform1  reorganization4 ,the entire    
content of experience needs to be passed
  through the alembic of individual     
agency and realization4 ,the  individual
 is to be the bearer of civilization2   
but this involves a  remaking of the    
civilization that he bears4 ,thus we    
have the dual  question3 ,how can the   
individual become the organ of corporate
 action8  ,how can he make over the     
truth authoritatively embodied in       
institutions  of church and state into  
frank1 healthy1 and direct expressions  
of  the simple act of free living8 ,on  
the other hand1 how can civilization    

preserve its own integral value and     
import when subordinated to the  agency 
of the individual instead of exercising 
supreme sway over him8    ,the question 
of knowledge1 of the discovery and      
statement of truth1  gives the answer to
 this question2 and it alone gives the  
answer4  ,admitting that the practical  
problem of modern life is the           
maintenance  of the moral values of     
civilization through the medium of the  
insight  and decision of the individual1
 the problem is foredoomed to futile    
failure save as the individual in       
performing his task can work with  a    
definite and controllable tool4 ,this   
tool is science4 ,but this  very fact1  
constituting the dignity of science and 
measuring the  importance of the        
philosophic theory of knowledge1        
conferring upon  them the religious     
value once attaching to dogma and the   
disciplinary  significance once         
belonging to political rules1 also sets 
their limit4  ,the servant is not above 

his master4    ,when a theory of        
knowledge forgets that its value rests  
in solving the  problem out of which it 
has arisen1 viz41 that of securing a    
method of  action2 when it forgets that 
it has to work out the conditions under 
which the individual may freely direct  
himself without loss to the  historic   
values of civilization--when it forgets 
these things it begins  to cumber the   
ground4 ,it is a luxury1 and hence a    
social nuisance and  disturber4 ,of     
course1 in the very nature of things1   
every means or  instrument will for a   
while absorb attention so that it       
becomes the  end4 ,indeed it is the end 
when it is an indispensable condition of
  onward movement4 ,but when once the   
means have been worked out they must    
operate as such4 ,when the nature and   
method of knowledge are fairly          
understood1 then interest must transfer 
itself from the possibility of          
knowledge to the possibility of its     
application to life4    ,the            

sensationalist has played his part in   
bringing to effective  recognition the  
demand in valid knowledge for           
individuality of  experience1 for       
personal participation in materials of  
knowledge4  ,the rationalist has served 
his time in making it clear once for all
  that valid knowledge requires         
organization1 and the operation of a    
relatively permanent and general factor4
 ,the ,kantian epistemologist  has      
formulated the claims of both schools in
 defining judgment as  the relation of  
perception and conception4 ,but when it 
goes on to  state that this relation is 
itself knowledge1 or can be found in    
knowledge1 it stultifies itself4        
,knowledge can define the percept and   
elaborate the concept1 but their union  
can be found only in action4 ,the       
experimental method of modern science1  
its erection into the ultimate  mode of 
verification1 is simply this fact       
obtaining recognition4 ,only  action can
 reconcile the old1 the general1 and the

 permanent with the  changing1 the      
individual1 and the new4 ,it is action  
as progress1 as  development1 making    
over the wealth of the past into capital
 with which  to do an enlarging and     
freer business1 that alone can find its 
way  out of the cul-de-sac of the theory
 of knowledge4 ,each of the older       
movements passed away because of its own
 success1 failed because it did  its    
work1 died in accomplishing its purpose4
 ,so also with the modern  philosophy of
 knowledge2 there must come a time when 
we have so much  knowledge in detail1   
and understand so well its method in    
general1  that it ceases to be a        
problem4 ,it becomes a tool4 ,if the    
problem of  knowledge is not            
intrinsically meaningless and absurd it 
must in course  of time be solved4 ,then
 the dominating interest becomes the use
 of  knowledge2 the conditions under    
which and ways in which it may be most  
organically and effectively employed to 
direct conduct4    ,thus the ,socratic  

period recurs2 but recurs with the      
deepened meaning  of the intervening    
weary years of struggle1 confusion1 and 
conflict  in the growth of the          
recognition of the need of patient and  
specific  methods of interrogation4 ,so1
 too1 the authoritative and             
institutional  truth of scholasticism   
recurs1 but recurs borne up upon the    
vigorous  and conscious shoulders of the
 freed individual who is aware of his   
own intrinsic relations to truth1 and   
who glories in his ability to  carry    
civilization--not merely to carry it1   
but to carry it on4 ,thus  another swing
 in the rhythm of theory and practice   
begins4    ,how does this concern us as 
philosophers8 ,for the world it means   
that  philosophy is henceforth a method 
and not an original fountain head of    
truth1 nor an ultimate standard of      
reference4 ,but what is involved for    
philosophy itself in this change8 ,i    
make no claims to being a prophet1  but 
,i venture one more and final unproved  

statement1 believing1 with  all my      
heart1 that it is justified both by the 
moving logic of the  situation1 and by  
the signs of the times4 ,i refer to the 
growing  transfer of interest from      
metaphysics and the theory of knowledge 
to  psychology and social               
ethics--including in the latter term all
 the  related concrete social sciences1 
so far as they may give guidance to     
conduct4    ,there are those who see in 
psychology only a particular science    
which they are pleased to term purely   
empirical 7unless it happen to  restate 
in changed phraseology the metaphysics  
with which they are  familiar74 ,they   
see in it only a more or less incoherent
 mass of facts1  interesting because    
relating to human nature1 but below the 
natural  sciences in point of certainty 
and definiteness1 as also far below     
pure philosophy as to comprehensiveness 
and ability to deal with  fundamental   
issues4 ,but if ,i may be permitted to  
dramatize a little  the position of the 

psychologist1 he can well afford to     
continue  patiently at work1 unmindful  
of the occasional supercilious sneers of
  the epistemologist4 ,the cause of     
modern civilization stands and falls    
with the ability of the individual to   
serve as its agent and bearer4  ,and    
psychology is naught but the account of 
the way in which individual  life is    
thus progressively maintained and       
reorganized4 ,psychology  is the attempt
 to state in detail the machinery of the
 individual  considered as the          
instrument and organ through which      
social action  operates4 ,it is the     
answer to ,kant's demand for the formal 
phase of  experience--how experience as 
such is constituted4 ,just because the  
whole burden and stress1 both of        
conserving and advancing experience is  
more and more thrown upon the           
individual1 everything which sheds light
  upon how the individual may weather   
the stress and assume the burden is     
precious and imperious4    ,social      

ethics in inclusive sense is the        
correlative science4 ,dealing  not with 
the form or mode or machinery of action1
 it attempts rather  to make out its    
filling and make up the values that are 
necessary to  constitute an experience  
which is worth while4 ,the sociologist1 
like  the psychologist1 often presents  
himself as a camp follower of genuine   
science and philosophy1 picking up      
scraps here and there and piecing  them 
together in somewhat of an aimless      
fashion--fortunate indeed1 if  not vague
 and over-ambitious4 ,yet social ethics 
represents the attempt  to translate    
philosophy from a general and therefore 
abstract method  into a working and     
specific method2 it is the change from  
inquiring  into the nature of value in  
general to inquiring as to the          
particular  values that ought to be     
realized in the life of every one1 and  
as to  the conditions which render      
possible this realization4    ,there are
 those who will see in this conception  

of the outcome of a  four-hundred-year  
discussion concerning the nature and    
possibility  of knowledge a derogation  
from the high estate of philosophy4     
,there  are others who will see in it a 
sign that philosophy1 after wandering   
aimlessly hither and yon in a wilderness
 without purpose or outcome1  has       
finally come to its senses--has given up
 metaphysical absurdities  and          
unverifiable speculations1 and become a 
purely positive science  of phenomena4  
,but there are yet others who will see  
in this movement  the fulfilment of its 
vocation1 the clear consciousness of a  
function  that it has always striven to 
perform2 and who will welcome it as a   
justification of the long centuries when
 it appeared to sit apart1 far  from the
 common concerns of man1 busied with    
discourse of essence and  cause1        
absorbed in argument concerning subject 
and object1 reason and  sensation4 ,to  
such this outcome will appear the       
inevitable sequel of  the saying of     

,socrates that 8an unexamined life is   
not one fit to be  led by man02 and a   
better response to his injunction 8,know
 thyself40      ,,the ,,end             
,,index        ,absolutism1 #ah1 #be1   
#ih1 #ajb1 #aji-aaj1 #aba-abc1 #acj-acb2
      ,essay ,,iv41 #adb-aec1 #agf1     
#ahj-aha      ,acquaintance1 and        
knowledge1 #gi-hb      ,action1 and     
problem of knowledge1 ,essay ,,xi41     
#bga-cjd      ,a priori1 #bjf-bac1      
#bib-bid      ,appearance1 and reality1 
#bf-bh1 #aah-aba      ,aristotle1       
referred to1 #e1 #cb1 #ce1 #cg1 #dh1    
#ej1 #gh1 #bba1 #bgh      ,assurance1   
#he-hh      ,awareness1 #ic             
,behavior1 and intelligence1 #dd        
,belief1 ,essay ,,vi41 #afi-aig         
,bosanquet1 ,b41 #bha      ,bradley1 ,f4
 ,h41 ,essay ,,iv41 #aab-aec            
,change1 its supposed unreality1 #a2    
in modern science1 #h-i2      and law1  
#gb2      and thought1 #acc2      of    
truth1 #aec2      of experience1        
#bbb-bbd1 #bei-bfj2      ,christianity1 

metaphysic of1 #agh      ,cognitive1    
#hd-he1 #bcj-bcc      ,conflict1 and    
thinking1 #aaf-aag1 #abf-abg1 #acb1     
#adh-adi      ,consistency1 as          
criterion1 #abh-acf      ,consciousness1
 as end of nature1 #cd-ce2      is      
partial1 #dc2      and knowledge1       
#gi-hj1 #ajb1 #aga2      ,essay ,x41    
#bdb-bgj2      non-existence of1        
#bdg-bdh      ,correspondence1 #aeh     
,cosmology1 and morals1 #ed             
,custom1 as background of morals1 #dh1  
#eb        ,darwin1 his influence on    
philosophy1 ,essay ,i41 #a-ai2          
quoted1 #b1 #ab      ,democracy1 moral  
meaning of1 #ei-fj1 #bff-bfg            
,descartes1 #h      ,design1 see        
,teleology        ,economic ,struggle1  
#ba1 #bi1 #ce1 #da1 #ej      ,economics1
 influences on morals1 #eg-ei           
,empiricism1 #bjj-bjb2      ,essay      
,,ix41 #bbf-bda1 #bhi-bia               
,epistemology1 versus logic1 #ie-ajg1   
#agb1 #ahe1 #bja1 #bif-bih      ,error1 
and becoming1 #ajj      ,evolution1 of  

species1 #a1 #h2      and design1       
#ab-ac2      and teleology1 #cb-ce2     
and intelligence1 #db-dc                
,experience1 ,essay ,,vii41 #aih-bbe    
,experiment1 and knowledge1 ,essay      
,,iv41 #gg-aaa      ,feeling1 #hj-ha    
,final ,cause1 see ,teleology           
,functions1 true data of psychology1    
#bej-bee        ,galileo1 #h            
,genesis1 and value1 #bfa-bfd           
,good1 is concrete and plural1 #ae-ag1  
#bc1 #bg2      of ,nature1 ,essay ,,ii41
 #bj-de2      and evolution1 #ca-ce1    
#dc2      and mysticism1 #ci1 #db2      
,greek view of1 #df-ej2      medieval   
view of1 #eb-ed2      as fixed1 #fg     
,gordon1 ,k41 #bae n4      ,gray1 ,asa1 
on evolution and design1 #ab            
,happiness1 nature of1 #fi      ,hegel1 
#fe1 #agd n4      ,hobbes1 #bjc n4      
,hume1 #hb n41 #bjd n4        ,idealism1
 #bh1 #ch1 #aia2      ,essay ,,vii41    
#aih-bbe1 #bbh      ,ideality1 #hi1     
#abj1 #bai-bbe      ,ideas1 nature of1  
#acd1 #aee2      their verification1    

#ada ff42      are hypothetical1 #add1  
#aej-aea1 #ahg      ,individual1 #bdd1  
#bfe-fh1 #bhe1 #big                     
,intellectualism1 ,essay ,,iv41         
#aab-aec1 #aei      ,intelligence1 is   
discriminative1 #ci1 #db1 #ge2      is  
the good of nature1 #dd2      and       
,morals1 ,essay ,,iii41 #df-gf2         
cosmic and personal1 #ee1 #ei2      as  
biological instrument1 #fh2             
indirection of activity1 #acc1 #adi     
,introspection1 #bej n4        ,james1  
,wm41 #ajd1 #aid n41 #bjb1 #bbb n41 #bdf
      ,judgment1 ,bradley's theory of1  
#aad-aag2      of the past1 #afj-fa1    
#afe2      ,kant's theory of1 #bgb      
,kant1 #fc-fe1 #bjf-bac1 #bga           
,knowledge1 its proper object1 #f1 #aj1 
#ad2      and nature1 #da2      and     
freedom1 #gc2      ,the ,experimental   
,theory of1 ,essay ,,iv41 #gg-aaa2      
defined1 #ij2      and inquiry1         
#ahd-ahi2      ,essay ,,xi41 problem of1
 #bga-cjd        ,locke1 #ic1 #bjb-bjd1 
#bag-bah        ,maine1 ,sir ,henry1    

quoted1 #df      ,meaning1 and          
knowledge1 #hg-ij2      and judgment1   
#aaf-aag1 #bjj      ,mechanism1 #bc1    
#cd1 #eg      ,memory1 #bbj      ,moore1
 ,a4 ,w41 #ia n4      ,morals1 ,essay   
,,iii41 #df-gf      ,mysticism1 #ch-dj1 
#db        ,naturalism1 #aie            
,nature1 teleology of1 #aj2      ,the   
,good of1 ,essay ,,ii41 #bj-de2         
animistic character of1 #ea2      change
 in1 #gb      ,newton1 influence of1    
#fa1 #gb        ,organization1 of       
experience1 #bjh-baa        ,perception1
 ambiguity of term1 #bad-bai            
,philosophy1 changes in1 #ad-ai2        
political nature of1 #ba2      defined1 
#de2      and science1 #ea2      and    
psychology1 #ahi-aia2      ,essay ,x41  
#bdb-bgj      ,plato1 #ba1 #dg1 #di1    
#gb1 #bai n41 #bgh      ,pragmatism1    
#be1 #ca1 #cc1 #ee1 #ie n41 #aji1 #acj  
n41 #add2      ,essay ,v41 #aed-afh1    
#aic      ,psychical1 #ha n41 #ajd      
,psychology1 and philosophy1 ,essay ,x41
 #bdb-bgj1 #cja        ,rationalism1    

,essay ,,xi41 #bga-cjd      8,reality10 
#ih1 #aje1 #aac1 #abi1 #afi n41 #agb1   
#bbh1 #bfd      ,relation1 and          
appearance1 #aai-abj        ,santayana1 
,g41 #if1 #bbd n4      ,sciences1       
developed out of morals1 #ef2      and  
industry1 #eg-eh2      as mode of       
knowledge1 #ajh2      and philosophy1   
#bfh-bgj1 #bhg      ,sensation1 #id1    
#bfb n4      ,sensationalism1 ,essay    
,,xi41 #bga-cjd      ,social ,ethics1   
#cjb-cjd      ,socrates1 #ea1 #gf1 #bge1
 #cjd      ,species1 equivalent to      
scholastic form1 #c-d2      as eternal  
and teleological1 #d-e2      basis of   
knowledge1 #f-g      ,spencer1 ,herbert1
 #af1 #cc1 #ff      ,spinoza1 #aha      
,stoicism1 #agb1 #bgi      ,stuart1 ,h4 
,w41 #bad n4      ,subjective1 #ih1     
#aee1 #bjd n41 #bgj        ,teleology1  
of life1 #d2      of nature1 #aj1 #cb2  
basis of idealism1 #aa2      concrete1  
#ae1 #bb2      and evolution1 #cb-ce2   
subjective1 #bbc-bbd      ,theory1      
#abd-abg      ,thinking1 practical      

character of1 #abd-abg      ,tolstoi1   
#agc n4      ,transcendence1 of         
knowledge1 #ajc n41 #aef-aeg            
,transcendental1 and supernatural1 #bb1 
#bi1 #bhb2      view of knowledge1 #bd1 
#bg2      freedom1 #gd      ,truth1     
criterion of1 #ib1 #ie1 #ajg-aaa2       
,essay ,,iv41 #aab-aec2      absolute1  
#acg2      identified with existence1   
#ach1 #ade2      eternal1 #adg1 #aeb2   
,essay ,v41 #aed-afh2      #bcj-bca1    
#bcg1 #bhb        ,utilitarianism1 #fb  
,verification1 making true1 #aci ff41   
#afb-afd        ,woodbridge1 ,f4 ,j4    
,e41 #ajd n41 #bdj n4                   
,,footnotes      #a ,the affair is even 
more portentous in the ,german with its 
capital letters and series of muses3    
8,gewiss ist der ,pragmatismus          
erkenntnisstheoretisch ,nominalismus1   
psychologisch ,voluntarismus1           
naturphilosophisch ,energismus1         
metaphysisch ,agnosticismus1 ethisch    
,meliorismus auf ,grundlage des         
,bentham-,millschen ,utilitarismus40    

#b ,a lecture in a course of public     
lectures on 8,charles ,darwin and ,his  
,influence on ,science10 given at       
,columbia ,university in the winter and 
spring of #aiji4 ,reprinted from the    
,popular ,science ,monthly for ,july1   
#aiji4    #c 8,life and ,letters10 ,vol4
 ,i41 p4 #bhb2 cf4 #bhe4    #d 8,life   
and ,letters10 ,vol4 ,,ii41 pp4 #adf1   
#agj1 #bde2 ,vol4 ,i41 pp4  #bhc-hd4    
,see also the closing portion of his    
8,variations of ,animals and  ,plants   
under ,domestication40    #e ,reprinted 
from the ,hibbert ,journal1 ,vol4       
,,vii41 ,no4 #d1 ,july1 #aiji4    #f ,a 
public lecture delivered at ,columbia   
,university in ,march1 #aijh1  under the
 title of 8,ethics10 in a series of     
lectures on 8,science1  ,philosophy1 and
 ,art40 ,reprinted from a monograph     
published by the  ,columbia ,university 
,press4    #g ,reprinted1 with          
considerable change in the arrangement  
and in the  matter of the latter        
portion1 from ,mind1 ,vol4 ,,xv41       

,n4,s41 ,july1 #aijf4    #h ,i must     
remind the reader again of a point      
already suggested4 ,it  is the          
identification of presence in           
consciousness with knowledge as  such   
that leads to setting up a mind 7ego1   
subject7 which has the  peculiar        
property of knowing 7only so often it   
knows wrong671 or else  that leads to   
supplying 8sensations0 with the peculiar
 property of  surveying their own       
entrails4 ,given the correct feeling    
that knowledge  involves relationship1  
there being1 by supposition1 no other   
thing to  which the thing in            
consciousness is related1 it is         
forthwith related  to a soul substance1 
or to its ghostly offspring1 a          
8subject10 or to  8consciousness0       
itself4    #i ,let us further recall    
that this theory requires either that   
things  present shall already be        
psychical things 7feelings1 sensations1 
etc471 in order to be assimilated to the
 knowing mind1 subject to               

consciousness2 or else translates       
genuinely nave realism into the  miracle
 of a mind that gets outside itself to  
lay its ghostly hands  upon the things  
of an external world4    #aj ,this means
 that things may be present as known1   
just as they  be present as hard or     
soft1 agreeable or disgusting1 hoped for
 or  dreaded4 ,the mediacy1 or the art  
of intervention1 which characterizes    
knowledge1 indicates precisely the way  
in which known things as known  are     
immediately present4    #aa ,if ,hume   
had had a tithe of the interest in the  
flux of  perceptions and in             
habit--principles of continuity and of  
organization--which he had in distinct  
and isolated existences1 he  might have 
saved us both from ,german              
,erkenntnisstheorie1 and from  that     
modern miracle play1 the psychology of  
elements of consciousness1  that under  
the gis of science1 does not hesitate to
 have psychical  elements compound and  
breed1 and in their agile intangibility 

put to  shame the performances of their 
less acrobatic cousins1 physical atoms4 
#ab ,in other words1 the situation as   
described is not to be confused  with   
the case of hunting on purpose to test  
an idea regarding the dog4    #ac ,dr4  
,moore1 in an essay in 8,contributions  
to ,logical ,theory0 has  brought out   
clearly1 on the basis of a criticism of 
the theory of  meaning and fulfilment   
advanced in ,royce's 8,world and        
,individual10 the  full consequences of 
this distinction4 ,i quote one sentence 
7p4 #cej73  8,surely there is a pretty  
discernible difference between          
experience as  a purposive idea1 and the
 experience which fulfils this purpose4 
,to  call them both #8ideas' is at least
 confusing40 ,the text above simply     
adds that there is also a discernible   
and important difference between        
experiences which1 de facto1 are        
purposing and fulfilling 7that is1  are 
seen to be such ab extra71 and those    
which meant to be such1 and  are found  

to be what they meant4    #ad ,the      
association of science and philosophy   
with leisure1 with a  certain economic  
surplus1 is not accidental4 ,it is      
practically worth  while to postpone    
practice2 to substitute theorizing1 to  
develop a new  and fascinating mode of  
practice4 ,but it is the excess         
achievement of  practice which makes    
this postponement and substitution      
possible4    #ae ,it is the failure to  
grasp the coupling of truth of meaning  
with  a specific promise1 undertaking1  
or intention expressed by a thing  which
 underlies1 so far as ,i can see1 the   
criticisms passed upon the  experimental
 or pragmatic view of the truth4 ,it is 
the same failure  which is responsible  
for the wholly at large view of truth   
which  characterizes the absolutists4   
#af ,the belief in the metaphysical     
transcendence of the object of          
knowledge seems to have its real origin 
in an empirical transcendence  of a very
 specific and describable sort4 ,the    

thing meaning is one  thing2 the thing  
meant is another thing1 and is 7as      
already pointed  out7 a thing presented 
as not given in the same way as is the  
thing  which means4 ,it is something to 
be so given4 ,no amount of careful  and 
thorough inspection of the indicating   
and signifying things can  remove or    
annihilate this gap4 ,the probability of
 correct meaning may  be increased in   
varying degrees--and this is what we    
mean by control4  ,but final certitude  
can never be reached except             
experimentally--except  by performing   
the operations indicated and discovering
 whether or  no the intended meaning is 
fulfilled in propria persona4 ,in this  
experimental sense1 truth or the object 
of any given meaning is always  beyond  
or outside of the cognitional thing that
 means it4 ,error as well  as truth is a
 necessary function of knowing4 ,but the
 non-empirical  account of this         
transcendent 7or beyond7 relationship   
puts all the  error in one place 7our   

knowledge71 and all the truth in another
  7absolute consciousness or else a     
thing-in-itself74    #ag ,compare his   
essay1 8,does ,consciousness ,exist80 in
 the ,journal of  ,philosophy1          
,psychology1 and ,scientific ,methods1  
,vol4 ,i41 p4 #dhj4    #ah ,compare the 
essay on the 8,problem of               
,consciousness10 by ,professor          
,woodbridge1 in the ,garman ,memorial   
,volume1 entitled 8,studies in          
,philosophy and ,psychology40    #ai    
,reprinted1 with many changes1 from an  
article in ,mind1 ,vol4  ,,xvi41 ,n4,s41
 ,july #aijg4 ,although the changes have
 been made to render  the article less  
technical1 it still remains1 ,i fear1   
too technical  to be intelligible to    
those not familiar with recent          
discussions of  logical theory4    #bj  
,i follow chiefly ,chapter ,,xv4 of     
8,appearance and ,reality0--the  chapter
 on 8,thought and ,reality40    #ba ,the
 crux of the argument is contained in   
,chapters ,,xiii4 and ,,xiv41  on the   

8,general ,nature of ,reality40    #bb  
,the same point comes out in ,mr4       
,bradley's treatment of the way in      
which the practical demand for the good 
or satisfaction is to be taken  account 
of in a philosophical conception of the 
nature of reality4  ,he admits that it  
comes in2 but holds that it enters not  
directly1  but because if left outside  
it indirectly introduces a feature of   
8discontent0 on the intellectual side   
7see p4 #aee74 ,this1 as an  argument   
for the supremacy of the isolated       
theoretical standard1 loses  all its    
force if we cease to conceive of        
intellect as from the start an          
independent function1 and realize that  
intellectual discontent is the          
practical conflict becoming deliberately
 aware of itself as the most  effective 
means of its own rectification4    #bc  
,this suggests that many of the stock   
arguments against pragmatism  fail to   
take its contention seriously enough4   
,they proceed from the  assumption that 

it is an account of truth which leaves  
untouched  current notions of the nature
 of intelligence4 ,but the essential    
point of pragmatism is that it bases its
 changed account of truth on  a changed 
conception of the nature of             
intelligence1 both as to its  objective 
and its method4 ,now this different     
account of intelligence  may be wrong1  
but controversy which leaves standing   
the conventionally  current theories    
about thought and merely discusses      
8truth0 will not  go far4 ,since truth  
is the adequate fulfilment of the       
function of  intelligence1 the question 
turns on the nature of the latter4      
#bd ,such a statement as1 for example1  
,mr4 ,bradley's 7,mind1 ,vol4  ,,xiii41 
,no4 #ea1 ,n4,s41 p4 #c1 article on     
8,truth and ,practice07 8,the idea      
works 444 but is able to work because ,i
 have chosen the right idea0  surely    
loses any argumentative force it may    
seem to have1 when it is  recalled that1
 upon the theory argued against1 ability

 to work and  rightness are one and the 
same thing4 ,if the wording is changed  
to  read 8,the idea is able to work     
because ,i have chosen an idea which is 
able to work0 the question-begging      
character of the implied criticism  is  
evident4 ,the change of phraseology also
 may suggest the crucial and  pregnant  
question3 ,how does any one know that an
 idea is able to work  excepting by     
setting it at work8    #be ,a paper read
 in the spring of #aiji before the      
,philosophical ,club  of ,smith ,college
 and not previously published4    #bf   
,read as the ,presidential ,address at  
the fifth annual meeting of  the        
,american ,philosophical ,association1  
at ,cambridge1 ,december #bh1  #aije1   
and reprinted with verbal revisions from
 the ,philosophical  ,review1 ,vol4     
,,xv41 ,march1 #aijf4 ,the substitution 
of the word  8,existences0 for the word 
8,realities0 7in the original title7 is 
due  to a subsequent recognition on my  
part that the eulogistic historic       

associations with the word 8,reality0   
7against which the paper was a  protest7
 infected the interpretation of the     
paper itself1 so that the  use of some  
more colorless word was desirable4      
#bg ,since writing the above ,i have    
read the following words of a  candidly 
unsympathetic friend of philosophy3     
8,neither philosophy nor  science can   
institute man's relation to the         
universe1 because such  reciprocity must
 have existed before any kind of science
 or philosophy  can begin2 since each   
investigates phenomena by means of the  
intellect1  and independent of the      
position and feeling of the             
investigator2  whereas the relation of  
man to the universe is defined1 not by  
the  intellect alone1 but by his        
sensitive perception aided by all his   
spiritual powers4 ,however much one may 
assure and instruct a man that  all real
 existence is an idea1 that matter is   
made up of atoms1 that  the essence of  
life is corporality or will1 that heat1 

light1 movement1  electricity1 are      
different manifestations of one and the 
same energy1  one cannot thereby explain
 to a being with pains1 pleasures1      
hopes1 and  fears his position in the   
universe40 ,tolstoi1 essay on 8,religion
 and  ,morality10 in 8,essays1 ,letters1
 and ,miscellanies40    #bh ,hegel may  
be excepted from this statement4 ,the   
habit of  interpreting ,hegel as a      
,neo-,kantian1 a ,kantian enlarged and  
purified1  is a purely ,anglo-,american 
habit4 ,this is no place to enter into  
the  intricacies of ,hegelian exegesis1 
but the subordination of both logical   
meaning and of mechanical existence to  
,geist1 to life in its own  developing  
movement1 would seem to stand out in any
 unbiased view of  ,hegel4 ,at all      
events1 ,i wish to recognize my own     
personal debt to ,hegel  for the view   
set forth in this paper1 without1 of    
course1 implying that  it represents    
,hegel's own intention4    #bi ,there   
will of course come in time with the    

development of this  point of view an   
organon of beliefs4 ,the signs of a     
genuine as against  a simulated belief  
will be studied2 belief as a vital      
personal reaction  will be discriminated
 from habitual1 incorporate1            
unquestioned  7because unconsciously    
exercised7 traditions of social classes 
and  professions4 ,in his 8,will to     
,believe0 ,professor ,james has already 
laid down two traits of genuine belief  
7viz41 8forced option10 and  acceptance 
of responsibility for results7 which are
 almost always  ignored in criticisms   
7really caricatures7 of his position4   
,in the  light of such an organon1 one  
might come to doubt whether belief  in1 
say1 immortality 7as distinct from hope 
on one side and a sort  of intellectual 
balance of probability of opinion on the
 other7 can  genuinely exist at all4    
#cj ,reprinted1 with slight verbal      
changes1 from the ,philosophical        
,review1 ,vol4 ,,xv4 7#aijf74    #ca ,c4
 ,s4 ,peirce1 ,monist1 ,vol4 ,,xvi41 p4 

#aej4    #cb ,psychology1 ,vol4 ,,ii41  
p4 #fah4    #cc 8,essay concerning      
,human ,understanding10 ,book ,,ii41    
,chapter ,,ii41   #b4 ,locke doubtless  
derived this notion from ,bacon4    #cd 
,it is hardly necessary to refer to the 
stress placed upon  mathematics1 as well
 as upon fundamental propositions in    
logic1 ethics1  and cosmology4    #ce   
,of course there are internal historic  
connections between  experience as      
effective 8memory10 and experience as   
8observation40  ,but the motivation and 
stress1 the problem1 has quite shifted4 
,it  may be remarked that ,hobbes still 
writes under the influence of the       
,aristotelian conception4 8,experience  
is nothing but ,memory0 78,elements  of 
,philosophy10 ,part ,i41 ,chapter ,i41  
#b71 and hence is opposed to  science4  
#cf ,there are1 of course1 anticipations
 of ,hume in ,locke4 ,but to  regard    
,lockeian experience as equivalent to   
,humian is to pervert  history4 ,locke1 
as he was to himself and to the century 

succeeding him1  was not a subjectivist1
 but in the main a common sense         
objectivist4  ,it was this that gave him
 his historic influence4 ,but so        
completely  has the ,hume-,kant         
controversy dominated recent thinking   
that it is  constantly projected        
backward4 ,within a few weeks ,i have   
seen three  articles1 all insisting that
 the meaning of the term experience must
  be subjective1 and stating or implying
 that those who take the term           
objectively are subverters of           
established usage6 ,but a casual study  
of  the dictionary will reveal that     
experience has always meant 8what  is   
experienced10 observation as a source of
 knowledge1 as well as the  act1 fact1  
or mode of experiencing4 ,in the ,oxford
 ,dictionary1 the  7obsolete7 sense of  
8experimental testing10 of actual       
8observation  of facts and events10 and 
8the fact of being consciously affected 
by  an act0 have almost contemporaneous 
datings1 viz41 #achd1 #acgg1 and  #achb 

respectively4 ,a usage almost more      
objective than the second1 the          
,baconian use1 is 8what has been        
experienced2 the events that have taken 
place within the knowledge of an        
individual1 a community1 mankind at     
large1 either during a particular period
 or generally40 ,this dates back  to    
#afjg4 ,let us have no more captious    
criticisms and plaints based  on        
ignorance of linguistic usage4 ,this    
pious wish has not been met4  ,j4 ,d41  
#aiji4    #cg ,the relationship of      
organization and thought is precisely   
that  which we find psychologically     
typified by the rhythmic functions of   
habit and attention1 attention being    
always1 ab quo1 a sign of the  failure  
of habit1 and1 ad quem1 a reconstructive
 modification of  habit4    #ch         
,compare1 for example1 ,dr4 ,stuart's   
paper in the 8,studies in  ,logical     
,theory10 pp4 #bec-bef4 ,i may here     
remark that ,i remain  totally unable to
 see how the interpretation of          

objectivity to  mean controlling        
conditions of action 7negative and      
positive as  above7 derogates at all    
from its nave objectivity1 or how it    
connotes cognitive subjectivity1 or is  
in any way incompatible with a          
common-sense realistic theory of        
perception4    #ci ,for this suggested  
interpretation of the esthetic as       
surprising1  or unintended1 gratuitous  
collateral reinforcement1 see ,gordon1  
8,psychology of ,meaning40    #dj ,this1
 however1 is not strictly true1 since   
,locke goes far  to supply the means of 
his own correction in his account of the
  8workmanship of the understanding40   
#da ,plato1 especially in his           
8,thetetus10 seems to have begun the    
procedure of blasting the good name of  
perceptive experience by  identifying a 
late and instrumental distinction1      
having to do with  logical control1 with
 all experience whatsoever4    #db      
,compare ,james1 8,continuous transition
 is one sort of conjunctive  relation2  

and to be a radical empiricist means to 
hold fast to this  conjunctive relation 
of all others1 for this is the strategic
 point1  the position through which1 if 
a hole be made1 all the corruptions  of 
dialectics and all the metaphysical     
fictions pour into our                  
philosophy40--,journal of ,philosophy1  
,psychology1 and ,scientific  ,methods1 
,vol4 ,i41 p4 #ecf4    #dc ,one of the  
not least of the many merits of         
,santayana's 8,life of  ,reason0 is the 
consistency and vigor with which is     
upheld the doctrine  that significant   
idealism means idealization4    #dd     
,reprinted1 with very slight change1    
from the ,journal of  ,philosophy1      
,psychology1 and ,scientific ,methods1  
,vol4 ,,ii41 ,no4 #ae1  ,july1 #aije4   
#de ,all labels are1 of course1         
obnoxious and misleading4 ,i hope1      
however1 the term will be taken by the  
reader in the sense in which  it is     
forthwith explained1 and not in some    
more usual and familiar  sense4         

,empiricism1 as herein used1 is as      
antipodal to sensationalistic           
empiricism1 as it is to                 
transcendentalism1 and for the same     
reason4  ,both of these systems fall    
back on something which is defined in   
non-directly-experienced terms in order 
to justify that which is  directly      
experienced4 ,hence ,i have criticised  
such empiricism  7,philosophical        
,review1 ,vol4 ,,xi41 ,no4 #d1 p4 #cfd7 
as essentially  absolutistic in         
character2 and also 78,studies in       
,logical ,theory10  pp4 #cj1 #eh7 as an 
attempt to build up experience in terms 
of certain  methodological checks and   
cues of attaining certainty4    #df ,i  
hope the reader will not therefore      
assume that from the  empiricist's      
standpoint knowledge is of small worth  
or import4 ,on the  contrary1 from the  
empiricist's standpoint it has all the  
worth which  it is concretely           
experienced as possessing--which is     
simply tremendous4  ,but the exact      

nature of this worth is a thing to be   
found out in  describing what we mean by
 experiencing objects as known--the     
actual  differences made or found in    
experience4    #dg ,since the           
non-empiricist believes in              
things-in-themselves 7which  he may term
 8atoms10 8sensations10 transcendental  
unities1 a priori  concepts1 an absolute
 experience1 or whatever71 and since he 
finds  that the empiricist makes much of
 change 7as he must1 since change is    
continuously experienced7 he assumes    
that the empiricist means his  own      
non-empirical ,realities are in         
continual flux1 and he naturally        
shudders at having his divinities so    
violently treated4 ,but1 once  recognize
 that the empiricist doesn't have any   
such ,realities at all1  and the entire 
problem of the relation of change to    
reality takes a  very different aspect4 
#dh ,it would lead us aside from the    
point to try to tell just what  is the  
nature of the experienced difference we 

call truth4 ,professor  ,james's recent 
articles may well be consulted4 ,the    
point to bear in  mind here is just what
 sort of a thing the empiricist must    
mean by  true1 or truer 7the noun ,truth
 is1 of course1 a generic name for all  
cases of 8,trues074 ,the adequacy of any
 particular account is not a  matter to 
be settled by general reasoning1 but by 
finding out what sort  of an experience 
the truth-experience actually is4    #di
 ,i say 8relatively10 because the       
transcendentalist still holds  that     
finally the cognition is imperfect1     
giving us only some symbol  or          
phenomenon of ,reality 7which is only in
 the ,absolute or in some               
,thing-in-,itself7--otherwise the       
curtain-wind fact would have as  much   
ontological reality as the existence of 
the ,absolute itself3 a  conclusion at  
which the non-empiricist perhorresces1  
for no reason  obvious to me--save that 
it would put an end to his              
transcendentalism4    #ej ,in general1  

,i think the distinction between -ive   
and -ed one  of the most fundamental of 
philosophic distinctions1 and one of the
  most neglected4 ,the same holds of    
-tion and -ing4    #ea ,what is         
criticised1 now as 8geneticism0 7if ,i  
may coin the word7  and now as          
8pragmatism0 is1 in its truth1 just the 
fact that the  empiricist does take     
account of the experienced 8drift1      
occasion1 and  contexture0 of things    
experienced--to use ,hobbes's phrase4   
#eb ,perhaps the point would be clearer 
if expressed in this way3  ,except as   
subsequent estimates of worth are       
introduced1 8real0  means only existent4
 ,the eulogistic connotation that makes 
the term  ,reality equivalent to true or
 genuine being has great pragmatic      
significance1 but its confusion with    
reality as existence is the point  aimed
 at in the above paragraph4    #ec ,one 
does not so easily escape medieval      
,realism as one thinks4  ,either every  
experienced thing has its own           

determinateness1 its own                
unsubstitutable1 unredeemable reality1  
or else 8generals0 are  separate        
existences after all4    #ed ,excepting1
 of course1 some negative ones4 ,one    
could say that  certain views are       
certainly not true1 because1 by         
hypothesis1  they refer to nonentities1 
i4e41 non-empiricals4 ,but even here    
the empiricist must go slowly4 ,from his
 own standpoint1 even the  most         
professedly transcendental statements   
are1 after all1 real as  experiences1   
and hence negotiate some transaction    
with facts4 ,for  this reason1 he       
cannot1 in theory1 reject them in toto1 
but has to  show concretely how they    
arose and how they are to be corrected4 
,in a  word1 his logical relationship to
 statements that profess to relate to   
things-in-themselves1 unknowables1      
inexperienced substances1 etc41 is      
precisely that of the psychologist to   
the ,zllner lines4    #ee ,delivered as 
a public address before the ,philosophic

 ,union of the  ,university of          
,california1 with the title 8,psychology
 and ,philosophic  ,method10 ,may1      
#ahii1 and published in the ,university 
,chronicle for  ,august1 #ahii4         
,reprinted1 with slight verbal changes1 
mostly excisions4    #ef ,this is a fact
 not without its bearings upon the      
question of the  nature and value of    
introspection4 ,the objection that      
introspection  8alters0 the reality and 
hence is untrustworthy1 most writers    
dispose  of by saying that1 after all1  
it need not alter the reality so very   
much--not beyond repair--and that1      
moreover1 memory assists in  restoring  
the ruins4 ,it would be simpler to admit
 the fact3 that the  purpose of         
introspection is precisely to effect the
 right sort of  alteration4 ,if         
introspection should give us the        
original experience  again1 we should   
just be living through the experience   
over again in  direct fashion2 as       
psychologists we should not be forwarded

 one bit4  ,reflection upon this obvious
 proposition may bring to light various 
other matters worthy of note4    #eg    
,thus to divorce 8structure psychology0 
from 8function psychology0  is to leave 
us without possibility of scientific    
comprehension of  function1 while it    
deprives us of all standard of reference
 in  selecting1 observing1 and          
explaining the structure4    #eh ,the   
following answer may fairly be          
anticipated3 8,this is true of  the     
operations cited1 but only because      
complex processes have been  selected4  
,such a term as #8knowing' does of      
course express a function  involving a  
system of intricate references4 ,but1   
for that very reason1  we go back to the
 sensation which is the genuine type of 
the #8state of  consciousness' as such1 
pure and unadulterate and               
unsophisticated40 ,the  point is large  
for a footnote1 but the following       
considerations are  instructive3 7#a7   
,the same psychologist will go on to    

inform us that  sensations1 as we       
experience them1 are networks of        
reference--they  are perceptual1 and    
more or less conceptual even4 ,from     
which it  would appear that whatever    
else they are or are not1 the           
sensations1  for which self-inclosed    
existence is claimed1 are not states of 
consciousness4 ,and 7#b7 we are told    
that these are reached by scientific    
abstraction in order to account for     
complex forms4 ,from which it would     
appear that they are hypothecated as    
products of interpretation and for      
purposes of further interpretation4     
,only the delusion that the more        
complex forms are just aggregates       
7instead of being acts1 like seeing1    
hoping1 etc47 prevents recognition of   
the point in question--that the  8state 
of consciousness0 is an instrument of   
inquiry or methodological  appliance4   
#ei ,on the other hand1 if what we are  
trying to get at is just the  course and
 procedure of experiencing1 of course   

any consideration that  helps           
distinguish and make comprehensible that
 process is thoroughly  pertinent4      
#fj ,it may avoid misunderstanding if ,i
 anticipate here a subsequent  remark3  
that my point is not in the least that  
8states of  consciousness0 require some 
8synthetic unity0 or faculty of         
substantial  mind to effect their       
association4 ,quite the contrary2 for   
this theory  also admits the 8states of 
consciousness0 as existences in         
themselves  also4 ,my contention is that
 the 8state of consciousness0 as such is
  always a methodological product1      
developed in the course and for the     
purposes of psychological analysis4     
#fa ,the 8functions0 are in truth       
ordinary everyday acts and attitudes3   
seeing1 smelling1 talking1 listening1   
remembering1 hoping1 loving1  fearing4  
#fb ,this is perhaps a suitable moment  
to allude to the absence1 in  this      
discussion1 of reference to what is     
sometimes termed rational               

psychology--the assumption of a         
separate1 substantialized ego1 soul1  or
 whatever1 existing side by side with   
particular experiences and  8states of  
consciousness10 acting upon them and    
acted upon by them4 ,in  ignoring this  
and confining myself to the 8states of  
consciousness0  theory and the 8natural 
history0 theory1 ,i may appear not only 
to have  unduly narrowed the concerns at
 issue1 but to have weakened my own     
point1 as this doctrine seems to offer a
 special vantage ground whence  to      
defend the close relationship of        
psychology and philosophy4 ,the         
8narrowing10 if such it be1 will have to
 pass--from limits of time and  other   
matters4 ,but the other point ,i cannot 
concede4 ,the independently  existing   
soul restricts and degrades             
individuality1 making of it a  separate 
thing outside of the full flow of       
things1 alien to things  experienced and
 consequently in either mechanical or   
miraculous  relations to them4 ,it is   

vitiated by just the quality already    
objected  to--that psychology has a     
separate piece of reality apportioned to
  it1 instead of occupying itself with  
the manifestation and operation  of any 
and all existences in reference to      
concrete action4 ,from this  point of   
view1 the 8states of consciousness0     
attitude is a much more  hopeful and    
fruitful one4 ,it ignores certain       
considerations1 to be  sure2 and when it
 turns its ignoring into denial1 it     
leaves us with  curious hieroglyphics4  
,but after all1 there is a key2 these   
symbols  can be read2 they may be       
translated into terms of the course of  
experience4 ,when thus translated1      
selfhood1 individuality1 is neither     
wiped out nor set up as a miraculous and
 foreign entity2 it is seen as  the     
unity of reference and function involved
 in all things when fully               
experienced--the pivot about which they 
turn4    #fc ,delivered before the      
,philosophical ,club of the ,university 

of  ,michigan1 in the winter of #ahig1  
and reprinted with slight change from  a
 monograph in the 8,university of       
,chicago ,contributions to ,philosophy10
  #ahig4          ,transcriber's ,notes 
,punctuation1 hyphenation1 and spelling 
were made consistent when a  predominant
 preference was found in this book2     
otherwise they were not  changed4       
,simple typographical errors were       
corrected2 occasional unbalanced        
quotation marks retained4    ,ambiguous 
hyphens at the ends of lines were       
retained4    ,index not checked for     
proper alphabetization or correct page  
references4    ,page #bd3               
8transgression0 was misprinted as       
8trangression02 changed here4    ,page  
#ci3 8bewrayeth0 was printed that way4  
,page #aeh3 8cor-respondence0 was       
printed with the hyphen4