,,pragmatism  ,a ,new ,name for ,some   
,old ,ways of ,thinking  ,by ,william   
,james   ,to the ,memory of ,john       
,stuart ,mill  from whom ,i first       
learned the pragmatic openness of mind  
and whom my fancy likes to picture as   
our leader were he alive to-day4        
,preface  ,the lectures that follow were
 delivered at the ,lowell ,institute in 
,boston in ,november and ,december1     
#aijf1 and in ,january1 #aijg1 at       
,columbia ,university1 in ,new ,york4   
,they are printed as delivered1 without 
developments or notes4 ,the pragmatic   
movement1 so-called--,i do not like the 
name1 but apparently it is too late to  
change it--seems to have rather suddenly
 precipitated itself out of the air4 ,a 
number of tendencies that have always   
existed in philosophy have all at once  
become conscious of themselves          
collectively1 and of their combined     
mission2 and this has occurred in so    
many countries1 and from so many        
different points of view1 that much     

unconcerted statement has resulted4 ,i  
have sought to unify the picture as it  
presents itself to my own eyes1 dealing 
in broad strokes1 and avoiding minute   
controversy4 ,much futile controversy   
might have been avoided1 ,i believe1 if 
our critics had been willing to wait    
until we got our message fairly out4    
,if my lectures interest any reader in  
the general subject1 he will doubtless  
wish to read farther4 ,i therefore give 
him a few references4  ,in ,america1    
,john ,dewey's ',studies in ,logical    
,theory' are the foundation4 ,read also 
by ,dewey the articles in the           
,philosophical ,review1 vol4 xv1 pp4    
#aac and #dfe1 in ,mind1 vol4 xv1 p4    
#bic1 and in the ,journal of            
,philosophy1 vol4 iv1 p4 #aig4          
,probably the best statements to begin  
with however1 are ,f4 ,c4 ,s4           
,schiller's in his ',studies in         
,humanism1' especially the essays       
numbered i1 v1 vi1 vii1 xviii and xix4  
,his previous essays and in general the 

polemic literature of the subject are   
fully referred to in his footnotes4     
,furthermore1 see ,g4 ,milhaud3 le      
,rationnel1 #ahih1 and the fine articles
 by ,le ,roy in the ,revue de           
,metaphysique1 vols4 #g1 #h and #i4     
,also articles by ,blondel and de       
,sailly in the ,annales de ,philosophie 
,chretienne1 #dme ,serie1 vols4 #b and  
#c4 ,papini announces a book on         
,pragmatism1 in the ,french language1 to
 be published very soon4  ,to avoid one 
misunderstanding at least1 let me say   
that there is no logical connexion      
between pragmatism1 as ,i understand it1
 and a doctrine which ,i have recently  
set forth as 'radical empiricism4' ,the 
latter stands on its own feet4 ,one may 
entirely reject it and still be a       
pragmatist4  ,harvard ,university1      
,april1 #aijg4     ,contents  ,lecture  
,i  ,the ,present ,dilemma in           
,philosophy  ,chesterton quoted4        
,everyone has a philosophy4 ,temperament
 is a factor in all philosophizing4     

,rationalists and empiricists4 ,the     
tender-minded and the tough-minded4     
,most men wish both facts and religion4 
,empiricism gives facts without         
religion4 ,rationalism gives religion   
without facts4 ,the layman's dilemma4   
,the unreality in rationalistic systems4
 ,leibnitz on the damned1 as an example4
 ,m4 ,i4 ,swift on the optimism of      
idealists4 ,pragmatism as a mediating   
system4 ,an objection4 ,reply3          
philosophies have characters like men1  
and are liable to as summary judgments4 
,spencer as an example4  ,lecture ,,ii  
,what ,pragmatism ,means  ,the squirrel4
 ,pragmatism as a method4 ,history of   
the method4 ,its character and          
affinities4 ,how it contrasts with      
rationalism and intellectualism4 ,a     
'corridor theory4' ,pragmatism as a     
theory of truth1 equivalent to          
'humanism4' ,earlier views of           
mathematical1 logical1 and natural      
truth4 ,more recent views4 ,schiller's  
and ,dewey's 'instrumental' view4 ,the  

formation of new beliefs4 ,older truth  
always has to be kept account of4 ,older
 truth arose similarly4 ,the            
'humanistic' doctrine4 ,rationalistic   
criticisms of it4 ,pragmatism as        
mediator between empiricism and         
religion4 ,barrenness of transcendental 
idealism4 ,how far the concept of the   
,absolute must be called true4 ,the true
 is the good in the way of belief4 ,the 
clash of truths4 ,pragmatism unstiffens 
discussion4  ,lecture ,,iii  ,some      
,metaphysical ,problems ,pragmatically  
,considered  ,the problem of substance4 
,the ,eucharist4 ,berkeley's pragmatic  
treatment of material substance4        
,locke's of personal identity4 ,the     
problem of materialism4 ,rationalistic  
treatment of it4 ,pragmatic treatment4  
',god' is no better than ',matter' as a 
principle1 unless he promise more4      
,pragmatic comparison of the two        
principles4 ,the problem of design4     
',design' per se is barren4 ,the        
question is ,,what design4 ,the problem 

of 'free-will4' ,its relations to       
'accountability4' ,free-will a          
cosmological theory4 ,the pragmatic     
issue at stake in all these problems is 
what do the alternatives ,,promise4     
,lecture ,,iv  ,the ,one and the ,many  
,total reflection4 ,philosophy seeks not
 only unity1 but totality4              
,rationalistic feeling about unity4     
,pragmatically considered1 the world is 
one in many ways4 ,one time and space4  
,one subject of discourse4 ,its parts   
interact4 ,its oneness and manyness are 
co-ordinate4 ,question of one origin4   
,generic oneness4 ,one purpose4 ,one    
story4 ,one knower4 ,value of pragmatic 
method4 ,absolute monism4 ,vivekananda4 
,various types of union discussed4      
,conclusion3 ,we must oppose monistic   
dogmatism and follow empirical findings4
  ,lecture ,v  ,pragmatism and ,common  
,sense  ,noetic pluralism4 ,how our     
knowledge grows4 ,earlier ways of       
thinking remain4 ,prehistoric ancestors 
,,discovered the common sense concepts4 

,list of them4 ,they came gradually into
 use4 ,space and time4 ',things4'       
,kinds4 ',cause' and 'law4' ,common     
sense one stage in mental evolution1 due
 to geniuses4 ,the 'critical' stages3   
#a7 scientific and #b7 philosophic1     
compared with common sense4 ,impossible 
to say which is the more 'true4'        
,lecture ,,vi  ,pragmatism's ,conception
 of ,truth  ,the polemic situation4     
,what does agreement with reality mean8 
,it means verifiability4 ,verifiability 
means ability to guide us prosperously  
through experience4 ,completed          
verifications seldom needful4 ',eternal'
 truths4 ,consistency1 with language1   
with previous truths4 ,rationalist      
objections4 ,truth is a good1 like      
health1 wealth1 etc4 ,it is expedient   
thinking4 ,the past4 ,truth grows4      
,rationalist objections4 ,reply to them4
  ,lecture ,,vii  ,pragmatism and       
,humanism  ,the notion of ,,the ,truth4 
,schiller on ',humanism4' ,three sorts  
of reality of which any new truth must  

take account4 ,to 'take account' is     
ambiguous4 ,absolutely independent      
reality is hard to find4 ,the human     
contribution is ubiquitous and builds   
out the given4 ,essence of pragmatism's 
contrast with rationalism4 ,rationalism 
affirms a transempirical world4 ,motives
 for this4 ,tough-mindedness rejects    
them4 ,a genuine alternative4           
,pragmatism mediates4  ,lecture ,,viii  
,pragmatism and ,religion  ,utility of  
the ,absolute4 ,whitman's poem ',to     
,you4' ,two ways of taking it4 ,my      
friend's letter4 ,necessities versus    
possibilities4 ',possibility' defined4  
,three views of the world's salvation4  
,pragmatism is melioristic4 ,we may     
create reality4 ,why should anything    
,,be8 ,supposed choice before creation4 
,the healthy and the morbid reply4 ,the 
'tender' and the 'tough' types of       
religion4 ,pragmatism mediates4         
,,pragmatism     ,lecture ,i  ,the      
,present ,dilemma in ,philosophy  ,in   
the preface to that admirable collection

 of essays of his called ',heretics1'   
,mr4 ,chesterton writes these words3    
,there are some people--and ,i am one of
 them--who think that the most practical
 and important thing about a man is     
still his view of the universe4 ,we     
think that for a landlady considering a 
lodger1 it is important to know his     
income1 but still more important to know
 his philosophy4 ,we think that for a   
general about to fight an enemy1 it is  
important to know the enemy's numbers1  
but still more important to know the    
enemy's philosophy4 ,we think the       
question is not whether the theory of   
the cosmos affects matters1 but whether1
 in the long run1 anything else affects 
them4  ,i think with ,mr4 ,chesterton in
 this matter4 ,i know that you1 ladies  
and gentlemen1 have a philosophy1 each  
and all of you1 and that the most       
interesting and important thing about   
you is the way in which it determines   
the perspective in your several worlds4 
,you know the same of me4 ,and yet ,i   

confess to a certain tremor at the      
audacity of the enterprise which ,i am  
about to begin4 ,for the philosophy     
which is so important in each of us is  
not a technical matter2 it is our more  
or less dumb sense of what life honestly
 and deeply means4 ,it is only partly   
got from books2 it is our individual way
 of just seeing and feeling the total   
push and pressure of the cosmos4 ,i have
 no right to assume that many of you are
 students of the cosmos in the          
class-room sense1 yet here ,i stand     
desirous of interesting you in a        
philosophy which to no small extent has 
to be technically treated4 ,i wish to   
fill you with sympathy with a           
contemporaneous tendency in which ,i    
profoundly believe1 and yet ,i have to  
talk like a professor to you who are not
 students4 ,whatever universe a         
professor believes in must at any rate  
be a universe that lends itself to      
lengthy discourse4 ,a universe definable
 in two sentences is something for which

 the professorial intellect has no use4 
,no faith in anything of that cheap     
kind6 ,i have heard friends and         
colleagues try to popularize philosophy 
in this very hall1 but they soon grew   
dry1 and then technical1 and the results
 were only partially encouraging4 ,so my
 enterprise is a bold one4 ,the founder 
of pragmatism himself recently gave a   
course of lectures at the ,lowell       
,institute with that very word in its   
title-flashes of brilliant light        
relieved against ,cimmerian darkness6   
,none of us1 ,i fancy1 understood ,,all 
that he said--yet here ,i stand1 making 
a very similar venture4  ,i risk it     
because the very lectures ,i speak of   
,,drew--they brought good audiences4    
,there is1 it must be confessed1 a      
curious fascination in hearing deep     
things talked about1 even tho neither we
 nor the disputants understand them4 ,we
 get the problematic thrill1 we feel the
 presence of the vastness4 ,let a       
controversy begin in a smoking-room     

anywhere1 about free-will or ,god's     
omniscience1 or good and evil1 and see  
how everyone in the place pricks up his 
ears4 ,philosophy's results concern us  
all most vitally1 and philosophy's      
queerest arguments tickle agreeably our 
sense of subtlety and ingenuity4        
,believing in philosophy myself         
devoutly1 and believing also that a kind
 of new dawn is breaking upon us        
philosophers1 ,i feel impelled1 per fas 
aut nefas1 to try to impart to you some 
news of the situation4  ,philosophy is  
at once the most sublime and the most   
trivial of human pursuits4 ,it works in 
the minutest crannies and it opens out  
the widest vistas4 ,it 'bakes no bread1'
 as has been said1 but it can inspire   
our souls with courage2 and repugnant as
 its manners1 its doubting and          
challenging1 its quibbling and          
dialectics1 often are to common people1 
no one of us can get along without the  
far-flashing beams of light it sends    
over the world's perspectives4 ,these   

illuminations at least1 and the         
contrast-effects of darkness and mystery
 that accompany them1 give to what it   
says an interest that is much more than 
professional4  ,the history of          
philosophy is to a great extent that of 
a certain clash of human temperaments4  
,undignified as such a treatment may    
seem to some of my colleagues1 ,i shall 
have to take account of this clash and  
explain a good many of the divergencies 
of philosophers by it4 ,of whatever     
temperament a professional philosopher  
is1 he tries when philosophizing to sink
 the fact of his temperament4           
,temperament is no conventionally       
recognized reason1 so he urges          
impersonal reasons only for his         
conclusions4 ,yet his temperament really
 gives him a stronger bias than any of  
his more strictly objective premises4   
,it loads the evidence for him one way  
or the other1 making for a more         
sentimental or a more hard-hearted view 
of the universe1 just as this fact or   

that principle would4 ,he trusts his    
temperament4 ,wanting a universe that   
suits it1 he believes in any            
representation of the universe that does
 suit it4 ,he feels men of opposite     
temper to be out of key with the world's
 character1 and in his heart considers  
them incompetent and 'not in it1' in the
 philosophic business1 even tho they may
 far excel him in dialectical ability4  
,yet in the forum he can make no claim1 
on the bare ground of his temperament1  
to superior discernment or authority4   
,there arises thus a certain insincerity
 in our philosophic discussions3 the    
potentest of all our premises is never  
mentioned4 ,i am sure it would          
contribute to clearness if in these     
lectures we should break this rule and  
mention it1 and ,i accordingly feel free
 to do so4  ,of course ,i am talking    
here of very positively marked men1 men 
of radical idiosyncracy1 who have set   
their stamp and likeness on philosophy  
and figure in its history4 ,plato1      

,locke1 ,hegel1 ,spencer1 are such      
temperamental thinkers4 ,most of us     
have1 of course1 no very definite       
intellectual temperament1 we are a      
mixture of opposite ingredients1 each   
one present very moderately4 ,we hardly 
know our own preferences in abstract    
matters2 some of us are easily talked   
out of them1 and end by following the   
fashion or taking up with the beliefs of
 the most impressive philosopher in our 
neighborhood1 whoever he may be4 ,but   
the one thing that has ,,counted so far 
in philosophy is that a man should see  
things1 see them straight in his own    
peculiar way1 and be dissatisfied with  
any opposite way of seeing them4 ,there 
is no reason to suppose that this strong
 temperamental vision is from now onward
 to count no longer in the history of   
man's beliefs4  ,now the particular     
difference of temperament that ,i have  
in mind in making these remarks is one  
that has counted in literature1 art1    
government and manners as well as in    

philosophy4 ,in manners we find         
formalists and free-and-easy persons4   
,in government1 authoritarians and      
anarchists4 ,in literature1 purists or  
academicals1 and realists4 ,in art1     
classics and romantics4 ,you recognize  
these contrasts as familiar2 well1 in   
philosophy we have a very similar       
contrast expressed in the pair of terms 
'rationalist' and 'empiricist1'         
'empiricist' meaning your lover of facts
 in all their crude variety1            
'rationalist' meaning your devotee to   
abstract and eternal principles4 ,no one
 can live an hour without both facts and
 principles1 so it is a difference      
rather of emphasis2 yet it breeds       
antipathies of the most pungent         
character between those who lay the     
emphasis differently2 and we shall find 
it extraordinarily convenient to express
 a certain contrast in men's ways of    
taking their universe1 by talking of the
 'empiricist' and of the 'rationalist'  
temper4 ,these terms make the contrast  

simple and massive4  ,more simple and   
massive than are usually the men of whom
 the terms are predicated4 ,for every   
sort of permutation and combination is  
possible in human nature2 and if ,i now 
proceed to define more fully what ,i    
have in mind when ,i speak of           
rationalists and empiricists1 by adding 
to each of those titles some secondary  
qualifying characteristics1 ,i beg you  
to regard my conduct as to a certain    
extent arbitrary4 ,i select types of    
combination that nature offers very     
frequently1 but by no means uniformly1  
and ,i select them solely for their     
convenience in helping me to my ulterior
 purpose of characterizing pragmatism4  
,historically we find the terms         
'intellectualism' and 'sensationalism'  
used as synonyms of 'rationalism' and   
'empiricism4' ,well1 nature seems to    
combine most frequently with            
intellectualism an idealistic and       
optimistic tendency4 ,empiricists on the
 other hand are not uncommonly          

materialistic1 and their optimism is apt
 to be decidedly conditional and        
tremulous4 ,rationalism is always       
monistic4 ,it starts from wholes and    
universals1 and makes much of the unity 
of things4 ,empiricism starts from the  
parts1 and makes of the whole a         
collection-is not averse therefore to   
calling itself pluralistic4 ,rationalism
 usually considers itself more religious
 than empiricism1 but there is much to  
say about this claim1 so ,i merely      
mention it4 ,it is a true claim when the
 individual rationalist is what is      
called a man of feeling1 and when the   
individual empiricist prides himself on 
being hard-headed4 ,in that case the    
rationalist will usually also be in     
favor of what is called free-will1 and  
the empiricist will be a fatalist--,i   
use the terms most popularly current4   
,the rationalist finally will be of     
dogmatic temper in his affirmations1    
while the empiricist may be more        
sceptical and open to discussion4  ,i   

will write these traits down in two     
columns4 ,i think you will practically  
recognize the two types of mental       
make-up that ,i mean if ,i head the     
columns by the titles 'tender-minded'   
and 'tough-minded' respectively4  ,,the 
,,tender-,,minded  ,rationalistic 7going
 by 'principles'71 ,intellectualistic1  
,idealistic1 ,optimistic1 ,religious1   
,free-willist1 ,monistic1 ,dogmatical4  
,,the ,,tough-,,minded  ,empiricist     
7going by 'facts'71 ,sensationalistic1  
,materialistic1 ,pessimistic1           
,irreligious1 ,fatalistic1 ,pluralistic1
 ,sceptical4  ,pray postpone for a      
moment the question whether the two     
contrasted mixtures which ,i have       
written down are each inwardly coherent 
and self-consistent or not--,i shall    
very soon have a good deal to say on    
that point4 ,it suffices for our        
immediate purpose that tender-minded and
 tough-minded people1 characterized as  
,i have written them down1 do both      
exist4 ,each of you probably knows some 

well-marked example of each type1 and   
you know what each example thinks of the
 example on the other side of the line4 
,they have a low opinion of each other4 
,their antagonism1 whenever as          
individuals their temperaments have been
 intense1 has formed in all ages a part 
of the philosophic atmosphere of the    
time4 ,it forms a part of the           
philosophic atmosphere to-day4 ,the     
tough think of the tender as            
sentimentalists and soft-heads4 ,the    
tender feel the tough to be unrefined1  
callous1 or brutal4 ,their mutual       
reaction is very much like that that    
takes place when ,bostonian tourists    
mingle with a population like that of   
,cripple ,creek4 ,each type believes the
 other to be inferior to itself2 but    
disdain in the one case is mingled with 
amusement1 in the other it has a dash of
 fear4  ,now1 as ,i have already        
insisted1 few of us are tender-foot     
,bostonians pure and simple1 and few are
 typical ,rocky ,mountain toughs1 in    

philosophy4 ,most of us have a hankering
 for the good things on both sides of   
the line4 ,facts are good1 of           
course--give us lots of facts4          
,principles are good--give us plenty of 
principles4 ,the world is indubitably   
one if you look at it in one way1 but as
 indubitably is it many1 if you look at 
it in another4 ,it is both one and      
many--let us adopt a sort of pluralistic
 monism4 ,everything of course is       
necessarily determined1 and yet of      
course our wills are free3 a sort of    
free-will determinism is the true       
philosophy4 ,the evil of the parts is   
undeniable2 but the whole can't be evil3
 so practical pessimism may be combined 
with metaphysical optimism4 ,and so     
forth--your ordinary philosophic layman 
never being a radical1 never            
straightening out his system1 but living
 vaguely in one plausible compartment of
 it or another to suit the temptations  
of successive hours4  ,but some of us   
are more than mere laymen in philosophy4

 ,we are worthy of the name of amateur  
athletes1 and are vexed by too much     
inconsistency and vacillation in our    
creed4 ,we cannot preserve a good       
intellectual conscience so long as we   
keep mixing incompatibles from opposite 
sides of the line4  ,and now ,i come to 
the first positively important point    
which ,i wish to make4 ,never were as   
many men of a decidedly empiricist      
proclivity in existence as there are at 
the present day4 ,our children1 one may 
say1 are almost born scientific4 ,but   
our esteem for facts has not neutralized
 in us all religiousness4 ,it is itself 
almost religious4 ,our scientific temper
 is devout4 ,now take a man of this     
type1 and let him be also a philosophic 
amateur1 unwilling to mix a hodge-podge 
system after the fashion of a common    
layman1 and what does he find his       
situation to be1 in this blessed year of
 our ,lord #aijf8 ,he wants facts2 he   
wants science2 but he also wants a      
religion4 ,and being an amateur and not 

an independent originator in philosophy 
he naturally looks for guidance to the  
experts and professionals whom he finds 
already in the field4 ,a very large     
number of you here present1 possibly a  
majority of you1 are amateurs of just   
this sort4  ,now what kinds of          
philosophy do you find actually offered 
to meet your need8 ,you find an         
empirical philosophy that is not        
religious enough1 and a religious       
philosophy that is not empirical enough 
for your purpose4 ,if you look to the   
quarter where facts are most considered 
you find the whole tough-minded program 
in operation1 and the 'conflict between 
science and religion' in full blast4    
,either it is that ,rocky ,mountain     
tough of a ,haeckel with his            
materialistic monism1 his ether-god and 
his jest at your ,god as a 'gaseous     
vertebrate'2 or it is ,spencer treating 
the world's history as a redistribution 
of matter and motion solely1 and bowing 
religion politely out at the front      

door3--she may indeed continue to exist1
 but she must never show her face inside
 the temple4 ,for a hundred and fifty   
years past the progress of science has  
seemed to mean the enlargement of the   
material universe and the diminution of 
man's importance4 ,the result is what   
one may call the growth of naturalistic 
or positivistic feeling4 ,man is no     
law-giver to nature1 he is an absorber4 
,she it is who stands firm2 he it is who
 must accommodate himself4 ,let him     
record truth1 inhuman tho it be1 and    
submit to it6 ,the romantic spontaneity 
and courage are gone1 the vision is     
materialistic and depressing4 ,ideals   
appear as inert by-products of          
physiology2 what is higher is explained 
by what is lower and treated forever as 
a case of 'nothing but'--nothing but    
something else of a quite inferior sort4
 ,you get1 in short1 a materialistic    
universe1 in which only the tough-minded
 find themselves congenially at home4   
,if now1 on the other hand1 you turn to 

the religious quarter for consolation1  
and take counsel of the tender-minded   
philosophies1 what do you find8         
,religious philosophy in our day and    
generation is1 among us ,english-reading
 people1 of two main types4 ,one of     
these is more radical and aggressive1   
the other has more the air of fighting a
 slow retreat4 ,by the more radical wing
 of religious philosophy ,i mean the    
so-called transcendental idealism of the
 ,anglo-,hegelian school1 the philosophy
 of such men as ,green1 the ,cairds1    
,bosanquet1 and ,royce4 ,this philosophy
 has greatly influenced the more        
studious members of our protestant      
ministry4 ,it is pantheistic1 and       
undoubtedly it has already blunted the  
edge of the traditional theism in       
protestantism at large4  ,that theism   
remains1 however4 ,it is the lineal     
descendant1 through one stage of        
concession after another1 of the        
dogmatic scholastic theism still taught 
rigorously in the seminaries of the     

catholic church4 ,for a long time it    
used to be called among us the          
philosophy of the ,scottish school4 ,it 
is what ,i meant by the philosophy that 
has the air of fighting a slow retreat4 
,between the encroachments of the       
hegelians and other philosophers of the 
',absolute1' on the one hand1 and those 
of the scientific evolutionists and     
agnostics1 on the other1 the men that   
give us this kind of a philosophy1      
,james ,martineau1 ,professor ,bowne1   
,professor ,ladd and others1 must feel  
themselves rather tightly squeezed4     
,fair-minded and candid as you like1    
this philosophy is not radical in       
temper4 ,it is eclectic1 a thing of     
compromises1 that seeks a modus vivendi 
above all things4 ,it accepts the facts 
of darwinism1 the facts of cerebral     
physiology1 but it does nothing active  
or enthusiastic with them4 ,it lacks the
 victorious and aggressive note4 ,it    
lacks prestige in consequence2 whereas  
absolutism has a certain prestige due to

 the more radical style of it4  ,these  
two systems are what you have to choose 
between if you turn to the tender-minded
 school4 ,and if you are the lovers of  
facts ,i have supposed you to be1 you   
find the trail of the serpent of        
rationalism1 of intellectualism1 over   
everything that lies on that side of the
 line4 ,you escape indeed the           
materialism that goes with the reigning 
empiricism2 but you pay for your escape 
by losing contact with the concrete     
parts of life4 ,the more absolutistic   
philosophers dwell on so high a level of
 abstraction that they never even try to
 come down4 ,the absolute mind which    
they offer us1 the mind that makes our  
universe by thinking it1 might1 for     
aught they show us to the contrary1 have
 made any one of a million other        
universes just as well as this4 ,you can
 deduce no single actual particular from
 the notion of it4 ,it is compatible    
with any state of things whatever being 
true here below4 ,and the theistic ,god 

is almost as sterile a principle4 ,you  
have to go to the world which he has    
created to get any inkling of his actual
 character3 he is the kind of god that  
has once for all made that kind of a    
world4 ,the ,god of the theistic writers
 lives on as purely abstract heights as 
does the ,absolute4 ,absolutism has a   
certain sweep and dash about it1 while  
the usual theism is more insipid1 but   
both are equally remote and vacuous4    
,what you want is a philosophy that will
 not only exercise your powers of       
intellectual abstraction1 but that will 
make some positive connexion with this  
actual world of finite human lives4     
,you want a system that will combine    
both things1 the scientific loyalty to  
facts and willingness to take account of
 them1 the spirit of adaptation and     
accommodation1 in short1 but also the   
old confidence in human values and the  
resultant spontaneity1 whether of the   
religious or of the romantic type4 ,and 
this is then your dilemma3 you find the 

two parts of your quaesitum hopelessly  
separated4 ,you find empiricism with    
inhumanism and irreligion2 or else you  
find a rationalistic philosophy that    
indeed may call itself religious1 but   
that keeps out of all definite touch    
with concrete facts and joys and        
sorrows4  ,i am not sure how many of you
 live close enough to philosophy to     
realize fully what ,i mean by this last 
reproach1 so ,i will dwell a little     
longer on that unreality in all         
rationalistic systems by which your     
serious believer in facts is so apt to  
feel repelled4  ,i wish that ,i had     
saved the first couple of pages of a    
thesis which a student handed me a year 
or two ago4 ,they illustrated my point  
so clearly that ,i am sorry ,i cannot   
read them to you now4 ,this young man1  
who was a graduate of some ,western     
college1 began by saying that he had    
always taken for granted that when you  
entered a philosophic class-room you had
 to open relations with a universe      

entirely distinct from the one you left 
behind you in the street4 ,the two were 
supposed1 he said1 to have so little to 
do with each other1 that you could not  
possibly occupy your mind with them at  
the same time4 ,the world of concrete   
personal experiences to which the street
 belongs is multitudinous beyond        
imagination1 tangled1 muddy1 painful and
 perplexed4 ,the world to which your    
philosophy-professor introduces you is  
simple1 clean and noble4 ,the           
contradictions of real life are absent  
from it4 ,its architecture is classic4  
,principles of reason trace its         
outlines1 logical necessities cement its
 parts4 ,purity and dignity are what it 
most expresses4 ,it is a kind of marble 
temple shining on a hill4  ,in point of 
fact it is far less an account of this  
actual world than a clear addition built
 upon it1 a classic sanctuary in which  
the rationalist fancy may take refuge   
from the intolerably confused and gothic
 character which mere facts present4 ,it

 is no ,,explanation of our concrete    
universe1 it is another thing           
altogether1 a substitute for it1 a      
remedy1 a way of escape4  ,its          
temperament1 if ,i may use the word     
temperament here1 is utterly alien to   
the temperament of existence in the     
concrete4 ,,refinement is what          
characterizes our intellectualist       
philosophies4 ,they exquisitely satisfy 
that craving for a refined object of    
contemplation which is so powerful an   
appetite of the mind4 ,but ,i ask you in
 all seriousness to look abroad on this 
colossal universe of concrete facts1 on 
their awful bewilderments1 their        
surprises and cruelties1 on the wildness
 which they show1 and then to tell me   
whether 'refined' is the one inevitable 
descriptive adjective that springs to   
your lips4  ,refinement has its place in
 things1 true enough4 ,but a philosophy 
that breathes out nothing but refinement
 will never satisfy the empiricist      
temper of mind4 ,it will seem rather a  

monument of artificiality4 ,so we find  
men of science preferring to turn their 
backs on metaphysics as on something    
altogether cloistered and spectral1 and 
practical men shaking philosophy's dust 
off their feet and following the call of
 the wild4  ,truly there is something a 
little ghastly in the satisfaction with 
which a pure but unreal system will fill
 a rationalist mind4 ,leibnitz was a    
rationalist mind1 with infinitely more  
interest in facts than most rationalist 
minds can show4 ,yet if you wish for    
superficiality incarnate1 you have only 
to read that charmingly written         
',theodicee' of his1 in which he sought 
to justify the ways of ,god to man1 and 
to prove that the world we live in is   
the best of possible worlds4 ,let me    
quote a specimen of what ,i mean4       
,among other obstacles to his optimistic
 philosophy1 it falls to ,leibnitz to   
consider the number of the eternally    
damned4 ,that it is infinitely greater1 
in our human case1 than that of those   

saved he assumes as a premise from the  
theologians1 and then proceeds to argue 
in this way4 ,even then1 he says3  ,the 
evil will appear as almost nothing in   
comparison with the good1 if we once    
consider the real magnitude of the ,city
 of ,god4 ,coelius ,secundus ,curio has 
written a little book1 ',de ,amplitudine
 ,regni ,coelestis1' which was reprinted
 not long ago4 ,but he failed to compass
 the extent of the kingdom of the       
heavens4 ,the ancients had small ideas  
of the works of ,god4 444 ,it seemed to 
them that only our earth had            
inhabitants1 and even the notion of our 
antipodes gave them pause4 ,the rest of 
the world for them consisted of some    
shining globes and a few crystalline    
spheres4 ,but to-day1 whatever be the   
limits that we may grant or refuse to   
the ,universe we must recognize in it a 
countless number of globes1 as big as   
ours or bigger1 which have just as much 
right as it has to support rational     
inhabitants1 tho it does not follow that

 these need all be men4 ,our earth is   
only one among the six principal        
satellites of our sun4 ,as all the fixed
 stars are suns1 one sees how small a   
place among visible things our earth    
takes up1 since it is only a satellite  
of one among them4 ,now all these suns  
,,may be inhabited by none but happy    
creatures2 and nothing obliges us to    
believe that the number of damned       
persons is very great2 for a ,,very     
,,few ,,instances ,,and ,,samples       
,,suffice ,,for ,,the ,,utility ,,which 
,,good ,,draws ,,from ,,evil4 ,moreover1
 since there is no reason to suppose    
that there are stars everywhere1 may    
there not be a great space beyond the   
region of the stars8 ,and this immense  
space1 surrounding all this region1 444 
may be replete with happiness and glory4
 444 ,what now becomes of the           
consideration of our ,earth and of its  
denizens8 ,does it not dwindle to       
something incomparably less than a      
physical point1 since our ,earth is but 

a point compared with the distance of   
the fixed stars4 ,thus the part of the  
,universe which we know1 being almost   
lost in nothingness compared with that  
which is unknown to us1 but which we are
 yet obliged to admit2 and all the evils
 that we know lying in this             
almost-nothing2 it follows that the     
evils may be almost-nothing in          
comparison with the goods that the      
,universe contains4  ,leibnitz continues
 elsewhere3 ,there is a kind of justice 
which aims neither at the amendment of  
the criminal1 nor at furnishing an      
example to others1 nor at the reparation
 of the injury4 ,this justice is founded
 in pure fitness1 which finds a certain 
satisfaction in the expiation of a      
wicked deed4 ,the ,socinians and ,hobbes
 objected to this punitive justice1     
which is properly vindictive justice and
 which ,god has reserved for himself at 
many junctures4 444 ,it is always       
founded in the fitness of things1 and   
satisfies not only the offended party1  

but all wise lookers-on1 even as        
beautiful music or a fine piece of      
architecture satisfies a                
well-constituted mind4 ,it is thus that 
the torments of the damned continue1    
even tho they serve no longer to turn   
anyone away from sin1 and that the      
rewards of the blest continue1 even tho 
they confirm no one in good ways4 ,the  
damned draw to themselves ever new      
penalties by their continuing sins1 and 
the blest attract ever fresh joys by    
their unceasing progress in good4 ,both 
facts are founded on the principle of   
fitness1 444 for ,god has made all      
things harmonious in perfection as ,i   
have already said4  ,leibnitz's feeble  
grasp of reality is too obvious to need 
comment from me4 ,it is evident that no 
realistic image of the experience of a  
damned soul had ever approached the     
portals of his mind4 ,nor had it        
occurred to him that the smaller is the 
number of 'samples' of the genus        
'lost-soul' whom ,god throws as a sop to

 the eternal fitness1 the more          
unequitably grounded is the glory of the
 blest4 ,what he gives us is a cold     
literary exercise1 whose cheerful       
substance even hell-fire does not warm4 
,and do not tell me that to show the    
shallowness of rationalist              
philosophizing ,i have had to go back to
 a shallow wigpated age4 ,the optimism  
of present-day rationalism sounds just  
as shallow to the fact-loving mind4 ,the
 actual universe is a thing wide open1  
but rationalism makes systems1 and      
systems must be closed4 ,for men in     
practical life perfection is something  
far off and still in process of         
achievement4 ,this for rationalism is   
but the illusion of the finite and      
relative3 the absolute ground of things 
is a perfection eternally complete4  ,i 
find a fine example of revolt against   
the airy and shallow optimism of current
 religious philosophy in a publication  
of that valiant anarchistic writer      
,morrison ,i4 ,swift4 ,mr4 ,swift's     

anarchism goes a little farther than    
mine does1 but ,i confess that ,i       
sympathize a good deal1 and some of you1
 ,i know1 will sympathize heartily with 
his dissatisfaction with the idealistic 
optimisms now in vogue4 ,he begins his  
pamphlet on ',human ,submission' with a 
series of city reporter's items from    
newspapers 7suicides1 deaths from       
starvation and the like7 as specimens of
 our civilized regime4 ,for instance3   
',after trudging through the snow from  
one end of the city to the other in the 
vain hope of securing employment1 and   
with his wife and six children without  
food and ordered to leave their home in 
an upper east side tenement house       
because of non-payment of rent1 ,john   
,corcoran1 a clerk1 to-day ended his    
life by drinking carbolic acid4         
,corcoran lost his position three weeks 
ago through illness1 and during the     
period of idleness his scanty savings   
disappeared4 ,yesterday he obtained work
 with a gang of city snow shovelers1 but

 he was too weak from illness and was   
forced to quit after an hour's trial    
with the shovel4 ,then the weary task of
 looking for employment was again       
resumed4 ,thoroughly discouraged1       
,corcoran returned to his home late last
 night to find his wife and children    
without food and the notice of          
dispossession on the door4' ,on the     
following morning he drank the poison4  
,the records of many more such cases lie
 before me ,mr4 ,swift goes on2 an      
encyclopedia might easily be filled with
 their kind4 ,these few ,i cite as an   
interpretation of the universe4 ',we are
 aware of the presence of ,god in ,his  
world1' says a writer in a recent       
,english ,review4 ,the very presence of 
ill in the temporal order is the        
condition of the perfection of the      
eternal order1 writes ,professor ,royce 
7',the ,world and the ,individual1'     
,,ii1 #che74 ',the ,absolute is the     
richer for every discord1 and for all   
diversity which it embraces1' says ,f4  

,h4 ,bradley 7,appearance and ,reality1 
#bjd74 ,he means that these slain men   
make the universe richer1 and that is   
,philosophy4 ,but while ,professors     
,royce and ,bradley and a whole host of 
guileless thoroughfed thinkers are      
unveiling ,reality and the ,absolute and
 explaining away evil and pain1 this is 
the condition of the only beings known  
to us anywhere in the universe with a   
developed consciousness of what the     
universe is4 ,what these people         
experience ,,is ,reality4 ,it gives us  
an absolute phase of the universe4 ,it  
is the personal experience of those most
 qualified in all our circle of         
knowledge to ,,have experience1 to tell 
us ,,what is4 ,now1 what does ,,thinking
 ,,about the experience of these persons
 come to compared with directly1        
personally feeling it1 as they feel it8 
,the philosophers are dealing in shades1
 while those who live and feel know     
truth4 ,and the mind of mankind-not yet 
the mind of philosophers and of the     

proprietary class-but of the great mass 
of the silently thinking and feeling    
men1 is coming to this view4 ,they are  
judging the universe as they have       
heretofore permitted the hierophants of 
religion and learning to judge ,,them4  
444  ,this ,cleveland workingman1       
killing his children and himself another
 of the cited cases1 is one of the      
elemental1 stupendous facts of this     
modern world and of this universe4 ,it  
cannot be glozed over or minimized away 
by all the treatises on ,god1 and ,love1
 and ,being1 helplessly existing in     
their haughty monumental vacuity4 ,this 
is one of the simple irreducible        
elements of this world's life after     
millions of years of divine opportunity 
and twenty centuries of ,christ4 ,it is 
in the moral world like atoms or        
sub-atoms in the physical1 primary1     
indestructible4 ,and what it blazons to 
man is the 444 imposture of all         
philosophy which does not see in such   
events the consummate factor of         

conscious experience4 ,these facts      
invincibly prove religion a nullity4    
,man will not give religion two thousand
 centuries or twenty centuries more to  
try itself and waste human time2 its    
time is up1 its probation is ended4 ,its
 own record ends it4 ,mankind has not   
sons and eternities to spare for trying 
out discredited systems4444 ,footnote3  
,morrison ,i4 ,swift1 ,human            
,submission1 ,part ,second1             
,philadelphia1 ,liberty ,press1 #aije1  
pp4 #d-aj4  ,such is the reaction of an 
empiricist mind upon the rationalist    
bill of fare4 ,it is an absolute ',no1  
,i thank you4' ,religion1 says ,mr4     
,swift1 is like a sleep-walker to whom  
actual things are blank4 ,and such1 tho 
possibly less tensely charged with      
feeling1 is the verdict of every        
seriously inquiring amateur in          
philosophy to-day who turns to the      
philosophy-professors for the           
wherewithal to satisfy the fulness of   
his nature's needs4 ,empiricist writers 

give him a materialism1 rationalists    
give him something religious1 but to    
that religion actual things are blank4  
,he becomes thus the judge of us        
philosophers4 ,tender or tough1 he finds
 us wanting4 ,none of us may treat his  
verdicts disdainfully1 for after all1   
his is the typically perfect mind1 the  
mind the sum of whose demands is        
greatest1 the mind whose criticisms and 
dissatisfactions are fatal in the long  
run4  ,it is at this point that my own  
solution begins to appear4 ,i offer the 
oddly-named thing pragmatism as a       
philosophy that can satisfy both kinds  
of demand4 ,it can remain religious like
 the rationalisms1 but at the same time1
 like the empiricisms1 it can preserve  
the richest intimacy with facts4 ,i hope
 ,i may be able to leave many of you    
with as favorable an opinion of it as ,i
 preserve myself4 ,yet1 as ,i am near   
the end of my hour1 ,i will not         
introduce pragmatism bodily now4 ,i will
 begin with it on the stroke of the     

clock next time4 ,i prefer at the       
present moment to return a little on    
what ,i have said4  ,if any of you here 
are professional philosophers1 and some 
of you ,i know to be such1 you will     
doubtless have felt my discourse so far 
to have been crude in an unpardonable1  
nay1 in an almost incredible degree4    
,tender-minded and tough-minded1 what a 
barbaric disjunction6 ,and1 in general1 
when philosophy is all compacted of     
delicate intellectualities and          
subtleties and scrupulosities1 and when 
every possible sort of combination and  
transition obtains within its bounds1   
what a brutal caricature and reduction  
of highest things to the lowest possible
 expression is it to represent its field
 of conflict as a sort of               
rough-and-tumble fight between two      
hostile temperaments6 ,what a childishly
 external view6 ,and again1 how stupid  
it is to treat the abstractness of      
rationalist systems as a crime1 and to  
damn them because they offer themselves 

as sanctuaries and places of escape1    
rather than as prolongations of the     
world of facts4 ,are not all our        
theories just remedies and places of    
escape8 ,and1 if philosophy is to be    
religious1 how can she be anything else 
than a place of escape from the         
crassness of reality's surface8 ,what   
better thing can she do than raise us   
out of our animal senses and show us    
another and a nobler home for our minds 
in that great framework of ideal        
principles subtending all reality1 which
 the intellect divines8 ,how can        
principles and general views ever be    
anything but abstract outlines8 ,was    
,cologne cathedral built without an     
architect's plan on paper8 ,is          
refinement in itself an abomination8 ,is
 concrete rudeness the only thing that's
 true8  ,believe me1 ,i feel the full   
force of the indictment4 ,the picture ,i
 have given is indeed monstrously       
over-simplified and rude4 ,but like all 
abstractions1 it will prove to have its 

use4 ,if philosophers can treat the life
 of the universe abstractly1 they must  
not complain of an abstract treatment of
 the life of philosophy itself4 ,in     
point of fact the picture ,i have given 
is1 however coarse and sketchy1         
literally true4 ,temperaments with their
 cravings and refusals do determine men 
in their philosophies1 and always will4 
,the details of systems may be reasoned 
out piecemeal1 and when the student is  
working at a system1 he may often forget
 the forest for the single tree4 ,but   
when the labor is accomplished1 the mind
 always performs its big summarizing    
act1 and the system forthwith stands    
over against one like a living thing1   
with that strange simple note of        
individuality which haunts our memory1  
like the wraith of the man1 when a      
friend or enemy of ours is dead4  ,not  
only ,walt ,whitman could write who     
touches this book touches a man4 ,the   
books of all the great philosophers are 
like so many men4 ,our sense of an      

essential personal flavor in each one of
 them1 typical but indescribable1 is the
 finest fruit of our own accomplished   
philosophic education4 ,what the system 
pretends to be is a picture of the great
 universe of ,god4 ,what it is--and oh  
so flagrantly6--is the revelation of how
 intensely odd the personal flavor of   
some fellow creature is4 ,once reduced  
to these terms 7and all our philosophies
 get reduced to them in minds made      
critical by learning7 our commerce with 
the systems reverts to the informal1 to 
the instinctive human reaction of       
satisfaction or dislike4 ,we grow as    
peremptory in our rejection or          
admission1 as when a person presents    
himself as a candidate for our favor2   
our verdicts are couched in as simple   
adjectives of praise or dispraise4 ,we  
measure the total character of the      
universe as we feel it1 against the     
flavor of the philosophy proffered us1  
and one word is enough4  ,statt der     
lebendigen ,natur1 we say1 da ,gott die 

,menschen schuf hinein--that nebulous   
concoction1 that wooden1 that           
straight-laced thing1 that crabbed      
artificiality1 that musty schoolroom    
product1 that sick man's dream6 ,away   
with it4 ,away with all of them6        
,impossible6 ,impossible6  ,our work    
over the details of his system is indeed
 what gives us our resultant impression 
of the philosopher1 but it is on the    
resultant impression itself that we     
react4 ,expertness in philosophy is     
measured by the definiteness of our     
summarizing reactions1 by the immediate 
perceptive epithet with which the expert
 hits such complex objects off4 ,but    
great expertness is not necessary for   
the epithet to come4 ,few people have   
definitely articulated philosophies of  
their own4 ,but almost everyone has his 
own peculiar sense of a certain total   
character in the universe1 and of the   
inadequacy fully to match it of the     
peculiar systems that he knows4 ,they   
don't just cover ,,his world4 ,one will 

be too dapper1 another too pedantic1 a  
third too much of a job-lot of opinions1
 a fourth too morbid1 and a fifth too   
artificial1 or what not4 ,at any rate he
 and we know offhand that such          
philosophies are out of plumb and out of
 key and out of 'whack1' and have no    
business to speak up in the universe's  
name4 ,plato1 ,locke1 ,spinoza1 ,mill1  
,caird1 ,hegel--,i prudently avoid names
 nearer home6--,i am sure that to many  
of you1 my hearers1 these names are     
little more than reminders of as many   
curious personal ways of falling short4 
,it would be an obvious absurdity if    
such ways of taking the universe were   
actually true4 ,we philosophers have to 
reckon with such feelings on your part4 
,in the last resort1 ,i repeat1 it will 
be by them that all our philosophies    
shall ultimately be judged4 ,the finally
 victorious way of looking at things    
will be the most completely ,,impressive
 way to the normal run of minds4  ,one  
word more--namely about philosophies    

necessarily being abstract outlines4    
,there are outlines and outlines1       
outlines of buildings that are ,,fat1   
conceived in the cube by their planner1 
and outlines of buildings invented flat 
on paper1 with the aid of ruler and     
compass4 ,these remain skinny and       
emaciated even when set up in stone and 
mortar1 and the outline already suggests
 that result4 ,an outline in itself is  
meagre1 truly1 but it does not          
necessarily suggest a meagre thing4 ,it 
is the essential meagreness of ,,what   
,,is ,,suggested by the usual           
rationalistic philosophies that moves   
empiricists to their gesture of         
rejection4 ,the case of ,herbert        
,spencer's system is much to the point  
here4 ,rationalists feel his fearful    
array of insufficiencies4 ,his dry      
schoolmaster temperament1 the           
hurdy-gurdy monotony of him1 his        
preference for cheap makeshifts in      
argument1 his lack of education even in 
mechanical principles1 and in general   

the vagueness of all his fundamental    
ideas1 his whole system wooden1 as if   
knocked together out of cracked hemlock 
boards--and yet the half of ,england    
wants to bury him in ,westminster       
,abbey4  ,why8 ,why does ,spencer call  
out so much reverence in spite of his   
weakness in rationalistic eyes8 ,why    
should so many educated men who feel    
that weakness1 you and ,i perhaps1 wish 
to see him in the ,abbey                
notwithstanding8  ,simply because we    
feel his heart to be ,,in ,,the ,,right 
,,place philosophically4 ,his principles
 may be all skin and bone1 but at any   
rate his books try to mould themselves  
upon the particular shape of this1      
particular world's carcase4 ,the noise  
of facts resounds through all his       
chapters1 the citations of fact never   
cease1 he emphasizes facts1 turns his   
face towards their quarter2 and that is 
enough4 ,it means the right kind of     
thing for the empiricist mind4  ,the    
pragmatistic philosophy of which ,i hope

 to begin talking in my next lecture    
preserves as cordial a relation with    
facts1 and1 unlike ,spencer's           
philosophy1 it neither begins nor ends  
by turning positive religious           
constructions out of doors--it treats   
them cordially as well4  ,i hope ,i may 
lead you to find it just the mediating  
way of thinking that you require4       
,lecture ,,ii  ,what ,pragmatism ,means 
,some years ago1 being with a camping   
party in the mountains1 ,i returned from
 a solitary ramble to find everyone     
engaged in a ferocious metaphysical     
dispute4 ,the corpus of the dispute was 
a squirrel--a live squirrel supposed to 
be clinging to one side of a tree-trunk2
 while over against the tree's opposite 
side a human being was imagined to      
stand4 ,this human witness tries to get 
sight of the squirrel by moving rapidly 
round the tree1 but no matter how fast  
he goes1 the squirrel moves as fast in  
the opposite direction1 and always keeps
 the tree between himself and the man1  

so that never a glimpse of him is       
caught4 ,the resultant metaphysical     
problem now is this3 ,,does ,,the ,,man 
,,go ,,round ,,the ,,squirrel ,,or      
,,not8 ,he goes round the tree1 sure    
enough1 and the squirrel is on the tree2
 but does he go round the squirrel8 ,in 
the unlimited leisure of the wilderness1
 discussion had been worn threadbare4   
,everyone had taken sides1 and was      
obstinate2 and the numbers on both sides
 were even4 ,each side1 when ,i         
appeared1 therefore appealed to me to   
make it a majority4 ,mindful of the     
scholastic adage that whenever you meet 
a contradiction you must make a         
distinction1 ,i immediately sought and  
found one1 as follows3 ,which party is  
right1 ,i said1 depends on what you     
,,practically ,,mean by 'going round'   
the squirrel4 ,if you mean passing from 
the north of him to the east1 then to   
the south1 then to the west1 and then to
 the north of him again1 obviously the  
man does go round him1 for he occupies  

these successive positions4 ,but if on  
the contrary you mean being first in    
front of him1 then on the right of him1 
then behind him1 then on his left1 and  
finally in front again1 it is quite as  
obvious that the man fails to go round  
him1 for by the compensating movements  
the squirrel makes1 he keeps his belly  
turned towards the man all the time1 and
 his back turned away4 ,make the        
distinction1 and there is no occasion   
for any farther dispute4 ,you are both  
right and both wrong according as you   
conceive the verb 'to go round' in one  
practical fashion or the other4  ,altho 
one or two of the hotter disputants     
called my speech a shuffling evasion1   
saying they wanted no quibbling or      
scholastic hair-splitting1 but meant    
just plain honest ,english 'round1' the 
majority seemed to think that the       
distinction had assuaged the dispute4   
,i tell this trivial anecdote because it
 is a peculiarly simple example of what 
,i wish now to speak of as ,,the        

,,pragmatic ,,method4 ,the pragmatic    
method is primarily a method of settling
 metaphysical disputes that otherwise   
might be interminable4 ,is the world one
 or many8--fated or free8--material or  
spiritual8--here are notions either of  
which may or may not hold good of the   
world2 and disputes over such notions   
are unending4 ,the pragmatic method in  
such cases is to try to interpret each  
notion by tracing its respective        
practical consequences4 ,what difference
 would it practically make to anyone if 
this notion rather than that notion were
 true8 ,if no practical difference      
whatever can be traced1 then the        
alternatives mean practically the same  
thing1 and all dispute is idle4         
,whenever a dispute is serious1 we ought
 to be able to show some practical      
difference that must follow from one    
side or the other's being right4  ,a    
glance at the history of the idea will  
show you still better what pragmatism   
means4 ,the term is derived from the    

same ,greek word pi rho alpha gamma mu  
alpha1 meaning action1 from which our   
words 'practice' and 'practical' come4  
,it was first introduced into philosophy
 by ,mr4 ,charles ,peirce in #ahgh4 ,in 
an article entitled ',how to ,make ,our 
,ideas ,clear1' in the ',popular        
,science ,monthly' for ,january of that 
year ,footnote3 ,translated in the      
,revue ,philosophique for ,january1     
#ahgi 7vol4 vii74 ,mr4 ,peirce1 after   
pointing out that our beliefs are really
 rules for action1 said that to develope
 a thought's meaning1 we need only      
determine what conduct it is fitted to  
produce3 that conduct is for us its sole
 significance4 ,and the tangible fact at
 the root of all our                    
thought-distinctions1 however subtle1 is
 that there is no one of them so fine as
 to consist in anything but a possible  
difference of practice4 ,to attain      
perfect clearness in our thoughts of an 
object1 then1 we need only consider what
 conceivable effects of a practical kind

 the object may involve--what sensations
 we are to expect from it1 and what     
reactions we must prepare4 ,our         
conception of these effects1 whether    
immediate or remote1 is then for us the 
whole of our conception of the object1  
so far as that conception has positive  
significance at all4  ,this is the      
principle of ,peirce1 the principle of  
pragmatism4 ,it lay entirely unnoticed  
by anyone for twenty years1 until ,i1 in
 an address before ,professor ,howison's
 philosophical union at the university  
of ,california1 brought it forward again
 and made a special application of it to
 religion4 ,by that date 7#ahih7 the    
times seemed ripe for its reception4    
,the word 'pragmatism' spread1 and at   
present it fairly spots the pages of the
 philosophic journals4 ,on all hands we 
find the 'pragmatic movement' spoken of1
 sometimes with respect1 sometimes with 
contumely1 seldom with clear            
understanding4 ,it is evident that the  
term applies itself conveniently to a   

number of tendencies that hitherto have 
lacked a collective name1 and that it   
has 'come to stay4'  ,to take in the    
importance of ,peirce's principle1 one  
must get accustomed to applying it to   
concrete cases4 ,i found a few years ago
 that ,ostwald1 the illustrious ,leipzig
 chemist1 had been making perfectly     
distinct use of the principle of        
pragmatism in his lectures on the       
philosophy of science1 tho he had not   
called it by that name4  ,all realities 
influence our practice1 he wrote me1 and
 that influence is their meaning for us4
 ,i am accustomed to put questions to my
 classes in this way3 ,in what respects 
would the world be different if this    
alternative or that were true8 ,if ,i   
can find nothing that would become      
different1 then the alternative has no  
sense4  ,that is1 the rival views mean  
practically the same thing1 and meaning1
 other than practical1 there is for us  
none4 ,ostwald in a published lecture   
gives this example of what he means4    

,chemists have long wrangled over the   
inner constitution of certain bodies    
called 'tautomerous4' ,their properties 
seemed equally consistent with the      
notion that an instable hydrogen atom   
oscillates inside of them1 or that they 
are instable mixtures of two bodies4    
,controversy raged2 but never was       
decided4 ,it would never have begun1    
says ,ostwald1 if the combatants had    
asked themselves what particular        
experimental fact could have been made  
different by one or the other view being
 correct4 ,for it would then have       
appeared that no difference of fact     
could possibly ensue2 and the quarrel   
was as unreal as if1 theorizing in      
primitive times about the raising of    
dough by yeast1 one party should have   
invoked a 'brownie1' while another      
insisted on an 'elf' as the true cause  
of the phenomenon4 ,footnote3 ',theorie 
und ,praxis1' ,zeitsch4 des             
,oesterreichischen ,ingenieur u4        
,architecten-,vereines1 #aije1 ,nr4 #d  

u4 #f4 ,i find a still more radical     
pragmatism than ,ostwald's in an address
 by ,professor ,w4 ,s4 ,franklin3 ,i    
think that the sickliest notion of      
physics1 even if a student gets it1 is  
that it is 'the science of masses1      
molecules and the ether4' ,and ,i think 
that the healthiest notion1 even if a   
student does not wholly get it1 is that 
physics is the science of the ways of   
taking hold of bodies and pushing them6 
7,science1 ,january #b1 #aijc47  ,it is 
astonishing to see how many             
philosophical disputes collapse into    
insignificance the moment you subject   
them to this simple test of tracing a   
concrete consequence4 ,there can ,,be no
 difference any-where that doesn't      
,,make a difference elsewhere--no       
difference in abstract truth that       
doesn't express itself in a difference  
in concrete fact and in conduct         
consequent upon that fact1 imposed on   
somebody1 somehow1 somewhere and        
somewhen4 ,the whole function of        

philosophy ought to be to find out what 
definite difference it will make to you 
and me1 at definite instants of our     
life1 if this world-formula or that     
world-formula be the true one4  ,there  
is absolutely nothing new in the        
pragmatic method4 ,socrates was an adept
 at it4 ,aristotle used it methodically4
 ,locke1 ,berkeley and ,hume made       
momentous contributions to truth by its 
means4 ,shadworth ,hodgson keeps        
insisting that realities are only what  
they are 'known-as4' ,but these         
forerunners of pragmatism used it in    
fragments3 they were preluders only4    
,not until in our time has it           
generalized itself1 become conscious of 
a universal mission1 pretended to a     
conquering destiny4 ,i believe in that  
destiny1 and ,i hope ,i may end by      
inspiring you with my belief4           
,pragmatism represents a perfectly      
familiar attitude in philosophy1 the    
empiricist attitude1 but it represents  
it1 as it seems to me1 both in a more   

radical and in a less objectionable form
 than it has ever yet assumed4 ,a       
pragmatist turns his back resolutely and
 once for all upon a lot of inveterate  
habits dear to professional             
philosophers4 ,he turns away from       
abstraction and insufficiency1 from     
verbal solutions1 from bad a priori     
reasons1 from fixed principles1 closed  
systems1 and pretended absolutes and    
origins4 ,he turns towards concreteness 
and adequacy1 towards facts1 towards    
action1 and towards power4 ,that means  
the empiricist temper regnant1 and the  
rationalist temper sincerely given up4  
,it means the open air and possibilities
 of nature1 as against dogma1           
artificiality and the pretence of       
finality in truth4  ,at the same time it
 does not stand for any special results4
 ,it is a method only4 ,but the general 
triumph of that method would mean an    
enormous change in what ,i called in my 
last lecture the 'temperament' of       
philosophy4 ,teachers of the            

ultra-rationalistic type would be frozen
 out1 much as the courtier type is      
frozen out in republics1 as the         
ultramontane type of priest is frozen   
out in protestant lands4 ,science and   
metaphysics would come much nearer      
together1 would in fact work absolutely 
hand in hand4  ,metaphysics has usually 
followed a very primitive kind of quest4
 ,you know how men have always hankered 
after unlawful magic1 and you know what 
a great part1 in magic1 ,,words have    
always played4 ,if you have his name1 or
 the formula of incantation that binds  
him1 you can control the spirit1 genie1 
afrite1 or whatever the power may be4   
,solomon knew the names of all the      
spirits1 and having their names1 he held
 them subject to his will4 ,so the      
universe has always appeared to the     
natural mind as a kind of enigma1 of    
which the key must be sought in the     
shape of some illuminating or           
power-bringing word or name4 ,that word 
names the universe's ,,principle1 and to

 possess it is1 after a fashion1 to     
possess the universe itself4 ',god1'    
',matter1' ',reason1' 'the ,absolute1'  
',energy1' are so many solving names4   
,you can rest when you have them4 ,you  
are at the end of your metaphysical     
quest4  ,but if you follow the pragmatic
 method1 you cannot look on any such    
word as closing your quest4 ,you must   
bring out of each word its practical    
cash-value1 set it at work within the   
stream of your experience4 ,it appears  
less as a solution1 then1 than as a     
program for more work1 and more         
particularly as an indication of the    
ways in which existing realities may be 
,,changed4  ,,theories ,,thus ,,become  
,,instruments1 ,,not ,,answers ,,to     
,,enigmas1 ,,in ,,which ,,we ,,can      
,,rest4 ,we don't lie back upon them1 we
 move forward1 and1 on occasion1 make   
nature over again by their aid4         
,pragmatism unstiffens all our theories1
 limbers them up and sets each one at   
work4 ,being nothing essentially new1 it

 harmonizes with many ancient           
philosophic tendencies4 ,it agrees with 
nominalism for instance1 in always      
appealing to particulars2 with          
utilitarianism in emphasizing practical 
aspects2 with positivism in its disdain 
for verbal solutions1 useless questions1
 and metaphysical abstractions4  ,all   
these1 you see1 are                     
,,anti-,,intellectualist tendencies4    
,against rationalism as a pretension and
 a method1 pragmatism is fully armed and
 militant4 ,but1 at the outset1 at      
least1 it stands for no particular      
results4 ,it has no dogmas1 and no      
doctrines save its method4 ,as the young
 ,italian pragmatist ,papini has well   
said1 it lies in the midst of our       
theories1 like a corridor in a hotel4   
,innumerable chambers open out of it4   
,in one you may find a man writing an   
atheistic volume2 in the next someone on
 his knees praying for faith and        
strength2 in a third a chemist          
investigating a body's properties4 ,in a

 fourth a system of idealistic          
metaphysics is being excogitated2 in a  
fifth the impossibility of metaphysics  
is being shown4 ,but they all own the   
corridor1 and all must pass through it  
if they want a practicable way of       
getting into or out of their respective 
rooms4  ,no particular results then1 so 
far1 but only an attitude of            
orientation1 is what the pragmatic      
method means4 ,,the ,,attitude ,,of     
,,looking ,,away ,,from ,,first         
,,things1 ,,principles1 ',,categories1' 
,,supposed ,,necessities2 ,,and ,,of    
,,looking ,,towards ,,last ,,things1    
,,fruits1 ,,consequences1 ,,facts4  ,so 
much for the pragmatic method6 ,you may 
say that ,i have been praising it rather
 than explaining it to you1 but ,i shall
 presently explain it abundantly enough 
by showing how it works on some familiar
 problems4 ,meanwhile the word          
pragmatism has come to be used in a     
still wider sense1 as meaning also a    
certain theory of ,,truth4 ,i mean to   

give a whole lecture to the statement of
 that theory1 after first paving the    
way1 so ,i can be very brief now4 ,but  
brevity is hard to follow1 so ,i ask for
 your redoubled attention for a quarter 
of an hour4 ,if much remains obscure1 ,i
 hope to make it clearer in the later   
lectures4  ,one of the most successfully
 cultivated branches of philosophy in   
our time is what is called inductive    
logic1 the study of the conditions under
 which our sciences have evolved4       
,writers on this subject have begun to  
show a singular unanimity as to what the
 laws of nature and elements of fact    
mean1 when formulated by mathematicians1
 physicists and chemists4 ,when the     
first mathematical1 logical and natural 
uniformities1 the first ,,laws1 were    
discovered1 men were so carried away by 
the clearness1 beauty and simplification
 that resulted1 that they believed      
themselves to have deciphered           
authentically the eternal thoughts of   
the ,almighty4 ,his mind also thundered 

and reverberated in syllogisms4 ,he also
 thought in conic sections1 squares and 
roots and ratios1 and geometrized like  
,euclid4 ,he made ,kepler's laws for the
 planets to follow2 he made velocity    
increase proportionally to the time in  
falling bodies2 he made the law of the  
sines for light to obey when refracted2 
he established the classes1 orders1     
families and genera of plants and       
animals1 and fixed the distances between
 them4 ,he thought the archetypes of all
 things1 and devised their variations2  
and when we rediscover any one of these 
his wondrous institutions1 we seize his 
mind in its very literal intention4     
,but as the sciences have developed     
farther1 the notion has gained ground   
that most1 perhaps all1 of our laws are 
only approximations4 ,the laws          
themselves1 moreover1 have grown so     
numerous that there is no counting them2
 and so many rival formulations are     
proposed in all the branches of science 
that investigators have become          

accustomed to the notion that no theory 
is absolutely a transcript of reality1  
but that any one of them may from some  
point of view be useful4 ,their great   
use is to summarize old facts and to    
lead to new ones4 ,they are only a      
man-made language1 a conceptual         
shorthand1 as someone calls them1 in    
which we write our reports of nature2   
and languages1 as is well known1        
tolerate much choice of expression and  
many dialects4  ,thus human             
arbitrariness has driven divine         
necessity from scientific logic4 ,if ,i 
mention the names of ,sigwart1 ,mach1   
,ostwald1 ,pearson1 ,milhaud1 ,poincare1
 ,duhem1 ,ruyssen1 those of you who are 
students will easily identify the       
tendency ,i speak of1 and will think of 
additional names4  ,riding now on the   
front of this wave of scientific logic  
,messrs4 ,schiller and ,dewey appear    
with their pragmatistic account of what 
truth everywhere signifies4 ,everywhere1
 these teachers say1 'truth' in our     

ideas and beliefs means the same thing  
that it means in science4 ,it means1    
they say1 nothing but this1 ,,that      
,,ideas 7,,which ,,themselves ,,are     
,,but ,,parts ,,of ,,our ,,experience7  
,,become ,,true ,,just ,,in ,,so ,,far  
,,as ,,they ,,help ,,us ,,to ,,get      
,,into ,,satisfactory ,,relation ,,with 
,,other ,,parts ,,of ,,our ,,experience1
 to summarize them and get about among  
them by conceptual short-cuts instead of
 following the interminable succession  
of particular phenomena4 ,any idea upon 
which we can ride1 so to speak2 any idea
 that will carry us prosperously from   
any one part of our experience to any   
other part1 linking things              
satisfactorily1 working securely1       
simplifying1 saving labor2 is true for  
just so much1 true in so far forth1 true
 ,,instrumentally4 ,this is the         
'instrumental' view of truth taught so  
successfully at ,chicago1 the view that 
truth in our ideas means their power to 
'work1' promulgated so brilliantly at   

,oxford4  ,messrs4 ,dewey1 ,schiller and
 their allies1 in reaching this general 
conception of all truth1 have only      
followed the example of geologists1     
biologists and philologists4 ,in the    
establishment of these other sciences1  
the successful stroke was always to take
 some simple process actually observable
 in operation--as denudation by weather1
 say1 or variation from parental type1  
or change of dialect by incorporation of
 new words and pronunciations--and then 
to generalize it1 making it apply to all
 times1 and produce great results by    
summating its effects through the ages4 
,the observable process which ,schiller 
and ,dewey particularly singled out for 
generalization is the familiar one by   
which any individual settles into ,,new 
,,opinions4 ,the process here is always 
the same4 ,the individual has a stock of
 old opinions already1 but he meets a   
new experience that puts them to a      
strain4 ,somebody contradicts them2 or  
in a reflective moment he discovers that

 they contradict each other2 or he hears
 of facts with which they are           
incompatible2 or desires arise in him   
which they cease to satisfy4 ,the result
 is an inward trouble to which his mind 
till then had been a stranger1 and from 
which he seeks to escape by modifying   
his previous mass of opinions4 ,he saves
 as much of it as he can1 for in this   
matter of belief we are all extreme     
conservatives4 ,so he tries to change   
first this opinion1 and then that 7for  
they resist change very variously71     
until at last some new idea comes up    
which he can graft upon the ancient     
stock with a minimum of disturbance of  
the latter1 some idea that mediates     
between the stock and the new experience
 and runs them into one another most    
felicitously and expediently4  ,this new
 idea is then adopted as the true one4  
,it preserves the older stock of truths 
with a minimum of modification1         
stretching them just enough to make them
 admit the novelty1 but conceiving that 

in ways as familiar as the case leaves  
possible4 ,an outree explanation1       
violating all our preconceptions1 would 
never pass for a true account of a      
novelty4 ,we should scratch round       
industriously till we found something   
less excentric4 ,the most violent       
revolutions in an individual's beliefs  
leave most of his old order standing4   
,time and space1 cause and effect1      
nature and history1 and one's own       
biography remain untouched4 ,new truth  
is always a go-between1 a smoother-over 
of transitions4 ,it marries old opinion 
to new fact so as ever to show a minimum
 of jolt1 a maximum of continuity4 ,we  
hold a theory true just in proportion to
 its success in solving this 'problem of
 maxima and minima4' ,but success in    
solving this problem is eminently a     
matter of approximation4 ,we say this   
theory solves it on the whole more      
satisfactorily than that theory2 but    
that means more satisfactorily to       
ourselves1 and individuals will         

emphasize their points of satisfaction  
differently4 ,to a certain degree1      
therefore1 everything here is plastic4  
,the point ,i now urge you to observe   
particularly is the part played by the  
older truths4 ,failure to take account  
of it is the source of much of the      
unjust criticism leveled against        
pragmatism4 ,their influence is         
absolutely controlling4 ,loyalty to them
 is the first principle--in most cases  
it is the only principle2 for by far the
 most usual way of handling phenomena so
 novel that they would make for a       
serious rearrangement of our            
preconceptions is to ignore them        
altogether1 or to abuse those who bear  
witness for them4  ,you doubtless wish  
examples of this process of truth's     
growth1 and the only trouble is their   
superabundance4 ,the simplest case of   
new truth is of course the mere         
numerical addition of new kinds of      
facts1 or of new single facts of old    
kinds1 to our experience--an addition   

that involves no alteration in the old  
beliefs4 ,day follows day1 and its      
contents are simply added4 ,the new     
contents themselves are not true1 they  
simply ,,come and ,,are4 ,truth is what 
we say about them1 and when we say that 
they have come1 truth is satisfied by   
the plain additive formula4  ,but often 
the day's contents oblige a             
rearrangement4 ,if ,i should now utter  
piercing shrieks and act like a maniac  
on this platform1 it would make many of 
you revise your ideas as to the probable
 worth of my philosophy4 ',radium' came 
the other day as part of the day's      
content1 and seemed for a moment to     
contradict our ideas of the whole order 
of nature1 that order having come to be 
identified with what is called the      
conservation of energy4 ,the mere sight 
of radium paying heat away indefinitely 
out of its own pocket seemed to violate 
that conservation4 ,what to think8 ,if  
the radiations from it were nothing but 
an escape of unsuspected 'potential'    

energy1 pre-existent inside of the      
atoms1 the principle of conservation    
would be saved4 ,the discovery of       
'helium' as the radiation's outcome1    
opened a way to this belief4 ,so        
,ramsay's view is generally held to be  
true1 because1 altho it extends our old 
ideas of energy1 it causes a minimum of 
alteration in their nature4  ,i need not
 multiply instances4 ,a new opinion     
counts as 'true' just in proportion as  
it gratifies the individual's desire to 
assimilate the novel in his experience  
to his beliefs in stock4 ,it must both  
lean on old truth and grasp new fact2   
and its success 7as ,i said a moment    
ago7 in doing this1 is a matter for the 
individual's appreciation4 ,when old    
truth grows1 then1 by new truth's       
addition1 it is for subjective reasons4 
,we are in the process and obey the     
reasons4 ,that new idea is truest which 
performs most felicitously its function 
of satisfying our double urgency4 ,it   
makes itself true1 gets itself classed  

as true1 by the way it works2 grafting  
itself then upon the ancient body of    
truth1 which thus grows much as a tree  
grows by the activity of a new layer of 
cambium4  ,now ,dewey and ,schiller     
proceed to generalize this observation  
and to apply it to the most ancient     
parts of truth4 ,they also once were    
plastic4 ,they also were called true for
 human reasons4 ,they also mediated     
between still earlier truths and what in
 those days were novel observations4    
,purely objective truth1 truth in whose 
establishment the function of giving    
human satisfaction in marrying previous 
parts of experience with newer parts    
played no role whatever1 is nowhere to  
be found4 ,the reasons why we call      
things true is the reason why they ,,are
 true1 for 'to be true' ,,means only to 
perform this marriage-function4  ,the   
trail of the human serpent is thus over 
everything4 ,truth independent2 truth   
that we ,,find merely2 truth no longer  
malleable to human need2 truth          

incorrigible1 in a word2 such truth     
exists indeed superabundantly--or is    
supposed to exist by rationalistically  
minded thinkers2 but then it means only 
the dead heart of the living tree1 and  
its being there means only that truth   
also has its paleontology and its       
'prescription1' and may grow stiff with 
years of veteran service and petrified  
in men's regard by sheer antiquity4 ,but
 how plastic even the oldest truths     
nevertheless really are has been vividly
 shown in our day by the transformation 
of logical and mathematical ideas1 a    
transformation which seems even to be   
invading physics4 ,the ancient formulas 
are reinterpreted as special expressions
 of much wider principles1 principles   
that our ancestors never got a glimpse  
of in their present shape and           
formulation4  ,mr4 ,schiller still gives
 to all this view of truth the name of  
',humanism1' but1 for this doctrine too1
 the name of pragmatism seems fairly to 
be in the ascendant1 so ,i will treat it

 under the name of pragmatism in these  
lectures4  ,such then would be the scope
 of pragmatism--first1 a method2 and    
second1 a genetic theory of what is     
meant by truth4 ,and these two things   
must be our future topics4  ,what ,i    
have said of the theory of truth will1  
,i am sure1 have appeared obscure and   
unsatisfactory to most of you by reason 
of us brevity4 ,i shall make amends for 
that hereafter4 ,in a lecture on 'common
 sense' ,i shall try to show what ,i    
mean by truths grown petrified by       
antiquity4 ,in another lecture ,i shall 
expatiate on the idea that our thoughts 
become true in proportion as they       
successfully exert their go-between     
function4 ,in a third ,i shall show how 
hard it is to discriminate subjective   
from objective factors in ,truth's      
development4 ,you may not follow me     
wholly in these lectures2 and if you do1
 you may not wholly agree with me4 ,but 
you will1 ,i know1 regard me at least as
 serious1 and treat my effort with      

respectful consideration4  ,you will    
probably be surprised to learn1 then1   
that ,messrs4 ,schiller's and ,dewey's  
theories have suffered a hailstorm of   
contempt and ridicule4 ,all rationalism 
has risen against them4 ,in influential 
quarters ,mr4 ,schiller1 in particular1 
has been treated like an impudent       
schoolboy who deserves a spanking4 ,i   
should not mention this1 but for the    
fact that it throws so much sidelight   
upon that rationalistic temper to which 
,i have opposed the temper of           
pragmatism4 ,pragmatism is uncomfortable
 away from facts4 ,rationalism is       
comfortable only in the presence of     
abstractions4 ,this pragmatist talk     
about truths in the plural1 about their 
utility and satisfactoriness1 about the 
success with which they 'work1' etc41   
suggests to the typical intellectualist 
mind a sort of coarse lame second-rate  
makeshift article of truth4 ,such truths
 are not real truth4 ,such tests are    
merely subjective4 ,as against this1    

objective truth must be something       
non-utilitarian1 haughty1 refined1      
remote1 august1 exalted4 ,it must be an 
absolute correspondence of our thoughts 
with an equally absolute reality4 ,it   
must be what we ,,ought to think1       
unconditionally4 ,the conditioned ways  
in which we ,,do think are so much      
irrelevance and matter for psychology4  
,down with psychology1 up with logic1 in
 all this question6  ,see the exquisite 
contrast of the types of mind6 ,the     
pragmatist clings to facts and          
concreteness1 observes truth at its work
 in particular cases1 and generalizes4  
,truth1 for him1 becomes a class-name   
for all sorts of definite working-values
 in experience4 ,for the rationalist it 
remains a pure abstraction1 to the bare 
name of which we must defer4 ,when the  
pragmatist undertakes to show in detail 
just ,,why we must defer1 the           
rationalist is unable to recognize the  
concretes from which his own abstraction
 is taken4 ,he accuses us of ,,denying  

truth2 whereas we have only sought to   
trace exactly why people follow it and  
always ought to follow it4 ,your typical
 ultra-abstractionist fairly shudders at
 concreteness3 other things equal1 he   
positively prefers the pale and         
spectral4 ,if the two universes were    
offered1 he would always choose the     
skinny outline rather than the rich     
thicket of reality4 ,it is so much      
purer1 clearer1 nobler4  ,i hope that as
 these lectures go on1 the concreteness 
and closeness to facts of the pragmatism
 which they advocate may be what        
approves itself to you as its most      
satisfactory peculiarity4 ,it only      
follows here the example of the         
sister-sciences1 interpreting the       
unobserved by the observed4 ,it brings  
old and new harmoniously together4 ,it  
converts the absolutely empty notion of 
a static relation of 'correspondence'   
7what that may mean we must ask later7  
between our minds and reality1 into that
 of a rich and active commerce 7that    

anyone may follow in detail and         
understand7 between particular thoughts 
of ours1 and the great universe of other
 experiences in which they play their   
parts and have their uses4  ,but enough 
of this at present8 ,the justification  
of what ,i say must be postponed4 ,i    
wish now to add a word in further       
explanation of the claim ,i made at our 
last meeting1 that pragmatism may be a  
happy harmonizer of empiricist ways of  
thinking1 with the more religious       
demands of human beings4  ,men who are  
strongly of the fact-loving temperament1
 you may remember me to have said1 are  
liable to be kept at a distance by the  
small sympathy with facts which that    
philosophy from the present-day fashion 
of idealism offers them4 ,it is far too 
intellectualistic4 ,old fashioned theism
 was bad enough1 with its notion of ,god
 as an exalted monarch1 made up of a lot
 of unintelligible or preposterous      
'attributes'2 but1 so long as it held   
strongly by the argument from design1 it

 kept some touch with concrete          
realities4 ,since1 however1 darwinism   
has once for all displaced design from  
the minds of the 'scientific1' theism   
has lost that foothold2 and some kind of
 an immanent or pantheistic deity       
working ,,in things rather than above   
them is1 if any1 the kind recommended to
 our contemporary imagination4          
,aspirants to a philosophic religion    
turn1 as a rule1 more hopefully nowadays
 towards idealistic pantheism than      
towards the older dualistic theism1 in  
spite of the fact that the latter still 
counts able defenders4  ,but1 as ,i said
 in my first lecture1 the brand of      
pantheism offered is hard for them to   
assimilate if they are lovers of facts1 
or empirically minded4 ,it is the       
absolutistic brand1 spurning the dust   
and reared upon pure logic4 ,it keeps no
 connexion whatever with concreteness4  
,affirming the ,absolute ,mind1 which is
 its substitute for ,god1 to be the     
rational presupposition of all          

particulars of fact1 whatever they may  
be1 it remains supremely indifferent to 
what the particular facts in our world  
actually are4 ,be they what they may1   
the ,absolute will father them4 ,like   
the sick lion in ,esop's fable1 all     
footprints lead into his den1 but nulla 
vestigia retrorsum4 ,you cannot         
redescend into the world of particulars 
by the ,absolute's aid1 or deduce any   
necessary consequences of detail        
important for your life from your idea  
of his nature4 ,he gives you indeed the 
assurance that all is well with ,him1   
and for his eternal way of thinking2 but
 thereupon he leaves you to be finitely 
saved by your own temporal devices4     
,far be it from me to deny the majesty  
of this conception1 or its capacity to  
yield religious comfort to a most       
respectable class of minds4 ,but from   
the human point of view1 no one can     
pretend that it doesn't suffer from the 
faults of remoteness and abstractness4  
,it is eminently a product of what ,i   

have ventured to call the rationalistic 
temper4 ,it disdains empiricism's needs4
 ,it substitutes a pallid outline for   
the real world's richness4 ,it is       
dapper2 it is noble in the bad sense1 in
 the sense in which to be noble is to be
 inapt for humble service4 ,in this real
 world of sweat and dirt1 it seems to me
 that when a view of things is 'noble1' 
that ought to count as a presumption    
against its truth1 and as a philosophic 
disqualification4 ,the prince of        
darkness may be a gentleman1 as we are  
told he is1 but whatever the ,god of    
earth and heaven is1 he can surely be no
 gentleman4 ,his menial services are    
needed in the dust of our human trials1 
even more than his dignity is needed in 
the empyrean4  ,now pragmatism1 devoted 
tho she be to facts1 has no such        
materialistic bias as ordinary          
empiricism labors under4 ,moreover1 she 
has no objection whatever to the        
realizing of abstractions1 so long as   
you get about among particulars with    

their aid and they actually carry you   
somewhere4 ,interested in no conclusions
 but those which our minds and our      
experiences work out together1 she has  
no a priori prejudices against theology4
 ,,if ,,theological ,,ideas ,,prove ,,to
 ,,have ,a ,,value ,,for ,,concrete     
,,life1 ,,they ,,will ,,be ,,true1 ,,for
 ,,pragmatism1 ,,in ,,the ,,sense ,,of  
,,being ,,good ,,for ,,so ,,much4 ,,for 
,,how ,,much ,,more ,,they ,,are ,,true1
 ,,will ,,depend ,,entirely ,,on ,,their
 ,,relations ,,to ,,the ,,other ,,truths
 ,,that ,,also ,,have ,,to ,,be         
,,acknowledged4  ,what ,i said just now 
about the ,absolute of transcendental   
idealism is a case in point4 ,first1 ,i 
called it majestic and said it yielded  
religious comfort to a class of minds1  
and then ,i accused it of remoteness and
 sterility4 ,but so far as it affords   
such comfort1 it surely is not sterile2 
it has that amount of value2 it performs
 a concrete function4 ,as a good        
pragmatist1 ,i myself ought to call the 

,absolute true 'in so far forth1' then2 
and ,i unhesitatingly now do so4  ,but  
what does ,,true ,,in ,,so ,,far ,,forth
 mean in this case8 ,to answer1 we need 
only apply the pragmatic method4 ,what  
do believers in the ,absolute mean by   
saying that their belief affords them   
comfort8 ,they mean that since in the   
,absolute finite evil is 'overruled'    
already1 we may1 therefore1 whenever we 
wish1 treat the temporal as if it were  
potentially the eternal1 be sure that we
 can trust its outcome1 and1 without    
sin1 dismiss our fear and drop the worry
 of our finite responsibility4 ,in      
short1 they mean that we have a right   
ever and anon to take a moral holiday1  
to let the world wag in its own way1    
feeling that its issues are in better   
hands than ours and are none of our     
business4  ,the universe is a system of 
which the individual members may relax  
their anxieties occasionally1 in which  
the don't-care mood is also right for   
men1 and moral holidays in order--that1 

if ,i mistake not1 is part1 at least1 of
 what the ,absolute is 'known-as1' that 
is the great difference in our          
particular experiences which his being  
true makes for us1 that is part of his  
cash-value when he is pragmatically     
interpreted4 ,farther than that the     
ordinary lay-reader in philosophy who   
thinks favorably of absolute idealism   
does not venture to sharpen his         
conceptions4 ,he can use the ,absolute  
for so much1 and so much is very        
precious4 ,he is pained at hearing you  
speak incredulously of the ,absolute1   
therefore1 and disregards your          
criticisms because they deal with       
aspects of the conception that he fails 
to follow4  ,if the ,absolute means     
this1 and means no more than this1 who  
can possibly deny the truth of it8 ,to  
deny it would be to insist that men     
should never relax1 and that holidays   
are never in order4 ,i am well aware how
 odd it must seem to some of you to hear
 me say that an idea is 'true' so long  

as to believe it is profitable to our   
lives4 ,that it is ,,good1 for as much  
as it profits1 you will gladly admit4   
,if what we do by its aid is good1 you  
will allow the idea itself to be good in
 so far forth1 for we are the better for
 possessing it4 ,but is it not a strange
 misuse of the word 'truth1' you will   
say1 to call ideas also 'true' for this 
reason8  ,to answer this difficulty     
fully is impossible at this stage of my 
account4 ,you touch here upon the very  
central point of ,messrs4 ,schiller's1  
,dewey's and my own doctrine of truth1  
which ,i cannot discuss with detail     
until my sixth lecture4 ,let me now say 
only this1 that truth is ,,one ,,species
 ,,of ,,good1 and not1 as is usually    
supposed1 a category distinct from good1
 and co-ordinate with it4 ,,the ,,true  
,,is ,,the ,,name ,,of ,,whatever       
,,proves ,,itself ,,to ,,be ,,good ,,in 
,,the ,,way ,,of ,,belief1 ,,and ,,good1
 ,,too1 ,,for ,,definite1 ,,assignable  
,,reasons4 ,surely you must admit this1 

that if there were ,,no good for life in
 true ideas1 or if the knowledge of them
 were positively disadvantageous and    
false ideas the only useful ones1 then  
the current notion that truth is divine 
and precious1 and its pursuit a duty1   
could never have grown up or become a   
dogma4 ,in a world like that1 our duty  
would be to ,,shun truth1 rather4 ,but  
in this world1 just as certain foods are
 not only agreeable to our taste1 but   
good for our teeth1 our stomach and our 
tissues2 so certain ideas are not only  
agreeable to think about1 or agreeable  
as supporting other ideas that we are   
fond of1 but they are also helpful in   
life's practical struggles4 ,if there be
 any life that it is really better we   
should lead1 and if there be any idea   
which1 if believed in1 would help us to 
lead that life1 then it would be really 
,,better ,,for ,,us to believe in that  
idea1 ,,unless1 ,,indeed1 ,,belief ,,in 
,,it ,,incidentally ,,clashed ,,with    
,,other ,,greater ,,vital ,,benefits4   

',what would be better for us to        
believe'6 ,this sounds very like a      
definition of truth4 ,it comes very near
 to saying 'what we ,,ought to believe'3
 and in ,,that definition none of you   
would find any oddity4 ,ought we ever   
not to believe what it is ,,better ,,for
 ,,us to believe8 ,and can we then keep 
the notion of what is better for us1 and
 what is true for us1 permanently apart8
  ,pragmatism says no1 and ,i fully     
agree with her4 ,probably you also      
agree1 so far as the abstract statement 
goes1 but with a suspicion that if we   
practically did believe everything that 
made for good in our own personal lives1
 we should be found indulging all kinds 
of fancies about this world's affairs1  
and all kinds of sentimental            
superstitions about a world hereafter4  
,your suspicion here is undoubtedly well
 founded1 and it is evident that        
something happens when you pass from the
 abstract to the concrete1 that         
complicates the situation4  ,i said just

 now that what is better for us to      
believe is true ,,unless ,,the ,,belief 
,,incidentally ,,clashes ,,with ,,some  
,,other ,,vital ,,benefit4 ,now in real 
life what vital benefits is any         
particular belief of ours most liable to
 clash with8 ,what indeed except the    
vital benefits yielded by ,,other       
,,beliefs when these prove incompatible 
with the first ones8 ,in other words1   
the greatest enemy of any one of our    
truths may be the rest of our truths4   
,truths have once for all this desperate
 instinct of self-preservation and of   
desire to extinguish whatever           
contradicts them4 ,my belief in the     
,absolute1 based on the good it does me1
 must run the gauntlet of all my other  
beliefs4 ,grant that it may be true in  
giving me a moral holiday4              
,nevertheless1 as ,i conceive it1--and  
let me speak now confidentially1 as it  
were1 and merely in my own private      
person1--it clashes with other truths of
 mine whose benefits ,i hate to give up 

on its account4 ,it happens to be       
associated with a kind of logic of which
 ,i am the enemy1 ,i find that it       
entangles me in metaphysical paradoxes  
that are inacceptable1 etc41 etc44 ,but 
as ,i have enough trouble in life       
already without adding the trouble of   
carrying these intellectual             
inconsistencies1 ,i personally just give
 up the ,absolute4 ,i just ,,take my    
moral holidays2 or else as a            
professional philosopher1 ,i try to     
justify them by some other principle4   
,if ,i could restrict my notion of the  
,absolute to its bare holiday-giving    
value1 it wouldn't clash with my other  
truths4 ,but we cannot easily thus      
restrict our hypotheses4 ,they carry    
supernumerary features1 and these it is 
that clash so4 ,my disbelief in the     
,absolute means then disbelief in those 
other supernumerary features1 for ,i    
fully believe in the legitimacy of      
taking moral holidays4  ,you see by this
 what ,i meant when ,i called pragmatism

 a mediator and reconciler and said1    
borrowing the word from ,papini1 that he
 unstiffens our theories4 ,she has in   
fact no prejudices whatever1 no         
obstructive dogmas1 no rigid canons of  
what shall count as proof4 ,she is      
completely genial4 ,she will entertain  
any hypothesis1 she will consider any   
evidence4 ,it follows that in the       
religious field she is at a great       
advantage both over positivistic        
empiricism1 with its anti-theological   
bias1 and over religious rationalism1   
with its exclusive interest in the      
remote1 the noble1 the simple1 and the  
abstract in the way of conception4  ,in 
short1 she widens the field of search   
for ,god4 ,rationalism sticks to logic  
and the empyrean4 ,empiricism sticks to 
the external senses4 ,pragmatism is     
willing to take anything1 to follow     
either logic or the senses1 and to count
 the humblest and most personal         
experiences4 ,she will count mystical   
experiences if they have practical      

consequences4 ,she will take a ,god who 
lives in the very dirt of private       
fact-if that should seem a likely place 
to find him4  ,her only test of probable
 truth is what works best in the way of 
leading us1 what fits every part of life
 best and combines with the collectivity
 of experience's demands1 nothing being 
omitted4 ,if theological ideas should do
 this1 if the notion of ,god1 in        
particular1 should prove to do it1 how  
could pragmatism possibly deny ,god's   
existence8 ,she could see no meaning in 
treating as 'not true' a notion that was
 pragmatically so successful4 ,what     
other kind of truth could there be1 for 
her1 than all this agreement with       
concrete reality8  ,in my last lecture  
,i shall return again to the relations  
of pragmatism with religion4 ,but you   
see already how democratic she is4 ,her 
manners are as various and flexible1 her
 resources as rich and endless1 and her 
conclusions as friendly as those of     
mother nature4     ,lecture ,,iii  ,some

 ,metaphysical ,problems ,pragmatically 
,considered  ,i am now to make the      
pragmatic method more familiar by giving
 you some illustrations of its          
application to particular problems4 ,i  
will begin with what is driest1 and the 
first thing ,i shall take will be the   
problem of ,substance4 ,everyone uses   
the old distinction between substance   
and attribute1 enshrined as it is in the
 very structure of human language1 in   
the difference between grammatical      
subject and predicate4 ,here is a bit of
 blackboard crayon4 ,its modes1         
attributes1 properties1 accidents1 or   
affections1--use which term you         
will1--are whiteness1 friability1       
cylindrical shape1 insolubility in      
water1 etc41 etc4 ,but the bearer of    
these attributes is so much chalk1 which
 thereupon is called the substance in   
which they inhere4 ,so the attributes of
 this desk inhere in the substance      
'wood1' those of my coat in the         
substance 'wool1' and so forth4 ,chalk1 

wood and wool1 show again1 in spite of  
their differences1 common properties1   
and in so far forth they are themselves 
counted as modes of a still more primal 
substance1 matter1 the attributes of    
which are space occupancy and           
impenetrability4 ,similarly our thoughts
 and feelings are affections or         
properties of our several souls1 which  
are substances1 but again not wholly in 
their own right1 for they are modes of  
the still deeper substance 'spirit4'    
,now it was very early seen that all we 
know of the chalk is the whiteness1     
friability1 etc41 all ,,we ,,know of the
 wood is the combustibility and fibrous 
structure4 ,a group of attributes is    
what each substance here is known-as1   
they form its sole cash-value for our   
actual experience4 ,the substance is in 
every case revealed through ,,them2 if  
we were cut off from ,,them we should   
never suspect its existence2 and if ,god
 should keep sending them to us in an   
unchanged order1 miraculously           

annihilating at a certain moment the    
substance that supported them1 we never 
could detect the moment1 for our        
experiences themselves would be         
unaltered4 ,nominalists accordingly     
adopt the opinion that substance is a   
spurious idea due to our inveterate     
human trick of turning names into       
things4 ,phenomena come in groups--the  
chalk-group1 the wood-group1 etc4--and  
each group gets its name4 ,the name we  
then treat as in a way supporting the   
group of phenomena4 ,the low thermometer
 to-day1 for instance1 is supposed to   
come from something called the          
'climate4' ,climate is really only the  
name for a certain group of days1 but it
 is treated as if it lay ,,behind the   
day1 and in general we place the name1  
as if it were a being1 behind the facts 
it is the name of4 ,but the phenomenal  
properties of things1 nominalists say1  
surely do not really inhere in names1   
and if not in names then they do not    
inhere in anything4 ,they ,a,dhere1 or  

,c,ohere1 rather1 ,,with ,,each ,,other1
 and the notion of a substance          
inaccessible to us1 which we think      
accounts for such cohesion by supporting
 it1 as cement might support pieces of  
mosaic1 must be abandoned4 ,the fact of 
the bare cohesion itself is all that the
 notion of the substance signifies4     
,behind that fact is nothing4           
,scholasticism has taken the notion of  
substance from common sense and made it 
very technical and articulate4 ,few     
things would seem to have fewer         
pragmatic consequences for us than      
substances1 cut off as we are from every
 contact with them4 ,yet in one case    
scholasticism has proved the importance 
of the substance-idea by treating it    
pragmatically4 ,i refer to certain      
disputes about the mystery of the       
,eucharist4 ,substance here would appear
 to have momentous pragmatic value4     
,since the accidents of the wafer don't 
change in the ,lord's supper1 and yet it
 has become the very body of ,christ1 it

 must be that the change is in the      
substance solely4 ,the bread-substance  
must have been withdrawn1 and the divine
 substance substituted miraculously     
without altering the immediate sensible 
properties4 ,but tho these don't alter1 
a tremendous difference has been made1  
no less a one than this1 that we who    
take the sacrament1 now feed upon the   
very substance of divinity4 ,the        
substance-notion breaks into life1 then1
 with tremendous effect1 if once you    
allow that substances can separate from 
their accidents1 and exchange these     
latter4  ,this is the only pragmatic    
application of the substance-idea with  
which ,i am acquainted2 and it is       
obvious that it will only be treated    
seriously by those who already believe  
in the 'real presence' on independent   
grounds4  ,,material ,,substance was    
criticized by ,berkeley with such       
telling effect that his name has        
reverberated through all subsequent     
philosophy4 ,berkeley's treatment of the

 notion of matter is so well known as to
 need hardly more than a mention4 ,so   
far from denying the external world     
which we know1 ,berkeley corroborated   
it4 ,it was the scholastic notion of a  
material substance unapproachable by us1
 ,,behind the external world1 deeper and
 more real than it1 and needed to       
support it1 which ,berkeley maintained  
to be the most effective of all reducers
 of the external world to unreality4    
,abolish that substance1 he said1       
believe that ,god1 whom you can         
understand and approach1 sends you the  
sensible world directly1 and you confirm
 the latter and back it up by his divine
 authority4 ,berkeley's criticism of    
'matter' was consequently absolutely    
pragmatistic4 ,matter is known as our   
sensations of colour1 figure1 hardness  
and the like4 ,they are the cash-value  
of the term4 ,the difference matter     
makes to us by truly being is that we   
then get such sensations2 by not being1 
is that we lack them4 ,these sensations 

then are its sole meaning4 ,berkeley    
doesn't deny matter1 then2 he simply    
tells us what it consists of4 ,it is a  
true name for just so much in the way of
 sensations4  ,locke1 and later ,hume1  
applied a similar pragmatic criticism to
 the notion of ,,spiritual ,,substance4 
,i will only mention ,locke's treatment 
of our 'personal identity4' ,he         
immediately reduces this notion to its  
pragmatic value in terms of experience4 
,it means1 he says1 so much             
consciousness1' namely the fact that at 
one moment of life we remember other    
moments1 and feel them all as parts of  
one and the same personal history4      
,rationalism had explained this         
practical continuity in our life by the 
unity of our soul-substance4 ,but ,locke
 says3 suppose that ,god should take    
away the consciousness1 should ,,we be  
any the better for having still the     
soul-principle8 ,suppose he annexed the 
same consciousness to different souls1  
should we1 as ,,we realize ,,ourselves1 

be any the worse for that fact8 ,in     
,locke's day the soul was chiefly a     
thing to be rewarded or punished4 ,see  
how ,locke1 discussing it from this     
point of view1 keeps the question       
pragmatic3  ,suppose1 he says1 one to   
think himself to be the same soul that  
once was ,nestor or ,thersites4 ,can he 
think their actions his own any more    
than the actions of any other man that  
ever existed8 ,but  let him once find   
himself ,,conscious of any of the       
actions of ,nestor1 he then finds       
himself the same person with ,nestor4   
444 ,in this personal identity is       
founded all the right and justice of    
reward and punishment4 ,it may be       
reasonable to think1 no one shall be    
made to answer for what he knows nothing
 of1 but shall receive his doom1 his    
consciousness accusing or excusing4     
,supposing a man punished now for what  
he had done in another life1 whereof he 
could be made to have no consciousness  
at all1 what difference is there between

 that punishment and being created      
miserable8  ,our personal identity1     
then1 consists1 for ,locke1 solely in   
pragmatically definable particulars4    
,whether1 apart from these verifiable   
facts1 it also inheres in a spiritual   
principle1 is a merely curious          
speculation4 ,locke1 compromiser that he
 was1 passively tolerated the belief in 
a substantial soul behind our           
consciousness4 ,but his successor ,hume1
 and most empirical psychologists after 
him1 have denied the soul1 save as the  
name for verifiable cohesions in our    
inner life4 ,they redescend into the    
stream of experience with it1 and cash  
it into so much small-change value in   
the way of 'ideas' and their peculiar   
connexions with each other4 ,as ,i said 
of ,berkeley's matter1 the soul is good 
or 'true' for just ,,so ,,much1 but no  
more4  ,the mention of material         
substance naturally suggests the        
doctrine of 'materialism1' but          
philosophical materialism is not        

necessarily knit up with belief in      
'matter1' as a metaphysical principle4  
,one may deny matter in that sense1 as  
strongly as ,berkeley did1 one may be a 
phenomenalist like ,huxley1 and yet one 
may still be a materialist in the wider 
sense1 of explaining higher phenomena by
 lower ones1 and leaving the destinies  
of the world at the mercy of its blinder
 parts and forces4 ,it is in this wider 
sense of the word that materialism is   
opposed to spiritualism or theism4 ,the 
laws of physical nature are what run    
things1 materialism says4 ,the highest  
productions of human genius might be    
ciphered by one who had complete        
acquaintance with the facts1 out of     
their physiological conditions1         
regardless whether nature be there only 
for our minds1 as idealists contend1 or 
not4 ,our minds in any case would have  
to record the kind of nature it is1 and 
write it down as operating through blind
 laws of physics4 ,this is the          
complexion of present day materialism1  

which may better be called naturalism4  
,over against it stands 'theism1' or    
what in a wide sense may be termed      
'spiritualism4' ,spiritualism says that 
mind not only witnesses and records     
things1 but also runs and operates them3
 the world being thus guided1 not by its
 lower1 but by its higher element4      
,treated as it often is1 this question  
becomes little more than a conflict     
between aesthetic preferences4 ,matter  
is gross1 coarse1 crass1 muddy2 spirit  
is pure1 elevated1 noble2 and since it  
is more consonant with the dignity of   
the universe to give the primacy in it  
to what appears superior1 spirit must be
 affirmed as the ruling principle4 ,to  
treat abstract principles as finalities1
 before which our intellects may come to
 rest in a state of admiring            
contemplation1 is the great rationalist 
failing4 ,spiritualism1 as often held1  
may be simply a state of admiration for 
one kind1 and of dislike for another    
kind1 of abstraction4 ,i remember a     

worthy spiritualist professor who always
 referred to materialism as the         
'mud-philosophy1' and deemed it thereby 
refuted4  ,to such spiritualism as this 
there is an easy answer1 and ,mr4       
,spencer makes it effectively4 ,in some 
well-written pages at the end of the    
first volume of his ,psychology he shows
 us that a 'matter' so infinitely       
subtile1 and performing motions as      
inconceivably quick and fine as those   
which modern science postulates in her  
explanations1 has no trace of grossness 
left4 ,he shows that the conception of  
spirit1 as we mortals hitherto have     
framed it1 is itself too gross to cover 
the exquisite tenuity of nature's facts4
 ,both terms1 he says1 are but symbols1 
pointing to that one unknowable reality 
in which their oppositions cease4  ,to  
an abstract objection an abstract       
rejoinder suffices2 and so far as one's 
opposition to materialism springs from  
one's disdain of matter as something    
'crass1' ,mr4 ,spencer cuts the ground  

from under one4 ,matter is indeed       
infinitely and incredibly refined4 ,to  
anyone who has ever looked on the face  
of a dead child or parent the mere fact 
that matter ,,could have taken for a    
time that precious form1 ought to make  
matter sacred ever after4 ,it makes no  
difference what the ,,principle of life 
may be1 material or immaterial1 matter  
at any rate co-operates1 lends itself to
 all life's purposes4 ,that beloved     
incarnation was among matter's          
possibilities4  ,but now1 instead of    
resting in principles after this        
stagnant intellectualist fashion1 let us
 apply the pragmatic method to the      
question4 ,what do we ,,mean by matter8 
,what practical difference can it make  
,,now that the world should be run by   
matter or by spirit8 ,i think we find   
that the problem takes with this a      
rather different character4  ,and first 
of all ,i call your attention to a      
curious fact4 ,it makes not a single jot
 of difference so far as the ,,past of  

the world goes1 whether we deem it to   
have been the work of matter or whether 
we think a divine spirit was its author4
  ,imagine1 in fact1 the entire contents
 of the world to be once for all        
irrevocably given4 ,imagine it to end   
this very moment1 and to have no future2
 and then let a theist and a materialist
 apply their rival explanations to its  
history4 ,the theist shows how a ,god   
made it2 the materialist shows1 and we  
will suppose with equal success1 how it 
resulted from blind physical forces4    
,then let the pragmatist be asked to    
choose between their theories4 ,how can 
he apply his test if the world is       
already completed8 ,concepts for him are
 things to come back into experience    
with1 things to make us look for        
differences4 ,but by hypothesis there is
 to be no more experience and no        
possible differences can now be looked  
for4 ,both theories have shown all their
 consequences and1 by the hypothesis we 
are adopting1 these are identical4 ,the 

pragmatist must consequently say that   
the two theories1 in spite of their     
different-sounding names1 mean exactly  
the same thing1 and that the dispute is 
purely verbal4 ,i am opposing1 of       
course1 that the theories ,,have been   
equally successful in their explanations
 of what is4  ,for just consider the    
case sincerely1 and say what would be   
the ,,worth of a ,god if he ,,were      
there1 with his work accomplished and   
his world run down4 ,he would be worth  
no more than just that world was worth4 
,to that amount of result1 with its     
mixed merits and defects1 his creative  
power could attain1 but go no farther4  
,and since there is to be no future2    
since the whole value and meaning of the
 world has been already paid in and     
actualized in the feelings that went    
with it in the passing1 and now go with 
it in the ending2 since it draws no     
supplemental significance 7such as our  
real world draws7 from its function of  
preparing something yet to come2 why    

then1 by it we take ,god's measure1 as  
it were4 ,he is the ,being who could    
once for all do ,,that2 and for that    
much we are thankful to him1 but for    
nothing more4 ,but now1 on the contrary 
hypothesis1 namely1 that the bits of    
matter following their laws could make  
that world and do no less1 should we not
 be just as thankful to them8 ,wherein  
should we suffer loss1 then1 if we      
dropped ,god as an hypothesis and made  
the matter alone responsible8 ,where    
would any special deadness1 or          
crassness1 come in8 ,and how1 experience
 being what is once for all1 would      
,god's presence in it make it any more  
living or richer8  ,candidly1 it is     
impossible to give any answer to this   
question4 ,the actually experienced     
world is supposed to be the same in its 
details on either hypothesis1 the same1 
for our praise or blame1 as ,browning   
says4 ,it stands there indefeasibly3 a  
gift which can't be taken back4 ,calling
 matter the cause of it retracts no     

single one of the items that have made  
it up1 nor does calling ,god the cause  
augment them4 ,they are the ,god or the 
atoms1 respectively1 of just that and no
 other world4 ,the ,god1 if there1 has  
been doing just what atoms could        
do--appearing in the character of atoms1
 so to speak--and earning such gratitude
 as is due to atoms1 and no more4 ,if   
his presence lends no different turn or 
issue to the performance1 it surely can 
lend it no increase of dignity4 ,nor    
would indignity come to it were he      
absent1 and did the atoms remain the    
only actors on the stage4 ,when a play  
is once over1 and the curtain down1 you 
really make it no better by claiming an 
illustrious genius for its author1 just 
as you make it no worse by calling him a
 common hack4  ,thus if no future detail
 of experience or conduct is to be      
deduced from our hypothesis1 the debate 
between materialism and theism becomes  
quite idle and insignificant4 ,matter   
and ,god in that event mean exactly the 

same thing--the power1 namely1 neither  
more nor less1 that could make just this
 completed world--and the wise man is he
 who in such a case would turn his back 
on such a supererogatory discussion4    
,accordingly1 most men instinctively1   
and positivists and scientists          
deliberately1 do turn their backs on    
philosophical disputes from which       
nothing in the line of definite future  
consequences can be seen to follow4 ,the
 verbal and empty character of          
philosophy is surely a reproach with    
which we are1 but too familiar4 ,if     
pragmatism be true1 it is a perfectly   
sound reproach unless the theories under
 fire can be shown to have alternative  
practical outcomes1 however delicate and
 distant these may be4 ,the common man  
and the scientist say they discover no  
such outcomes1 and if the metaphysician 
can discern none either1 the others     
certainly are in the right of it1 as    
against him4 ,his science is then but   
pompous trifling2 and the endowment of a

 professorship for such a being would be
 silly4  ,accordingly1 in every genuine 
metaphysical debate some practical      
issue1 however conjectural and remote1  
is involved4 ,to realize this1 revert   
with me to our question1 and place      
yourselves this time in the world we    
live in1 in the world that ,,has a      
future1 that is yet uncompleted whilst  
we speak4 ,in this unfinished world the 
alternative of 'materialism or theism8' 
is intensely practical2 and it is worth 
while for us to spend some minutes of   
our hour in seeing that it is so4  ,how1
 indeed1 does the program differ for us1
 according as we consider that the facts
 of experience up to date are           
purposeless configurations of blind     
atoms moving according to eternal laws1 
or that on the other hand they are due  
to the providence of ,god8 ,as far as   
the past facts go1 indeed there is no   
difference4 ,those facts are in1 are    
bagged1 are captured2 and the good      
that's in them is gained1 be the atoms  

or be the ,god their cause4 ,there are  
accordingly many materialists about us  
to-day who1 ignoring altogether the     
future and practical aspects of the     
question1 seek to eliminate the odium   
attaching to the word materialism1 and  
even to eliminate the word itself1 by   
showing that1 if matter could give birth
 to all these gains1 why then matter1   
functionally considered1 is just as     
divine an entity as ,god1 in fact       
coalesces with ,god1 is what you mean by
 ,god4 ,cease1 these persons advise us1 
to use either of these terms1 with their
 outgrown opposition4 ,use a term free  
of the clerical connotations1 on the one
 hand2 of the suggestion of gross-ness1 
coarseness1 ignobility1 on the other4   
,talk of the primal mystery1 of the     
unknowable energy1 of the one and only  
power1 instead of saying either ,god or 
matter4 ,this is the course to which    
,mr4 ,spencer urges us2 and if          
philosophy were purely retrospective1 he
 would thereby proclaim himself an      

excellent pragmatist4  ,but philosophy  
is prospective also1 and1 after finding 
what the world has been and done and    
yielded1 still asks the further question
 'what does the world ,,promise8' ,give 
us a matter that promises ,,success1    
that is bound by its laws to lead our   
world ever nearer to perfection1 and any
 rational man will worship that matter  
as readily as ,mr4 ,spencer worships his
 own so-called unknowable power4 ,it not
 only has made for righteousness up to  
date1 but it will make for righteousness
 forever2 and that is all we need4      
,doing practically all that a ,god can  
do1 it is equivalent to ,god1 its       
function is a ,god's function1 and is   
exerted in a world in which a ,god would
 now be superfluous2 from such a world a
 ,god could never lawfully be missed4   
',cosmic emotion' would here be the     
right name for religion4  ,but is the   
matter by which ,mr4 ,spencer's process 
of cosmic evolution is carried on any   
such principle of never-ending          

perfection as this8 ,indeed it is not1  
for the future end of every cosmically  
evolved thing or system of things is    
foretold by science to be death and     
tragedy2 and ,mr4 ,spencer1 in confining
 himself to the aesthetic and ignoring  
the practical side of the controversy1  
has really contributed nothing serious  
to its relief4 ,but apply now our       
principle of practical results1 and see 
what a vital significance the question  
of materialism or theism immediately    
acquires4  ,theism and materialism1 so  
indifferent when taken retrospectively1 
point1 when we take them prospectively1 
to wholly different outlooks of         
experience4 ,for1 according to the      
theory of mechanical evolution1 the laws
 of redistribution of matter and motion1
 tho they are certainly to thank for all
 the good hours which our organisms have
 ever yielded us and for all the ideals 
which our minds now frame1 are yet      
fatally certain to undo their work      
again1 and to redissolve everything that

 they have once evolved4 ,you all know  
the picture of the last state of the    
universe which evolutionary science     
foresees4 ,i cannot state it better than
 in ,mr4 ,balfour's words3 ,the energies
 of our system will decay1 the glory of 
the sun will be dimmed1 and the earth1  
tideless and inert1 will no longer      
tolerate the race which has for a moment
 disturbed its solitude4 ,man will go   
down into the pit1 and all his thoughts 
will perish4 ,the uneasy1 consciousness 
which in this obscure corner has for a  
brief space broken the contented silence
 of the universe1 will be at rest4      
,matter will know itself no longer4     
',imperishable monuments' and 'immortal 
deeds1' death itself1 and love stronger 
than death1 will be as though they had  
never been4 ,nor will anything that is1 
be better or be worse for all that the  
labour1 genius1 devotion1 and suffering 
of man have striven through countless   
generations to effect4 ,footnote3 ,the  
,foundations of ,belief1 p4 #cj4  ,that 

is the sting of it1 that in the vast    
driftings of the cosmic weather1 tho    
many a jeweled shore appears1 and many  
an enchanted cloud-bank floats away1    
long lingering ere it be dissolved--even
 as our world now lingers1 for our      
joy-yet when these transient products   
are gone1 nothing1 absolutely ,,nothing 
remains1 of represent those particular  
qualities1 those elements of            
preciousness which they may have        
enshrined4 ,dead and gone are they1 gone
 utterly from the very sphere and room  
of being4 ,without an echo2 without a   
memory2 without an influence on aught   
that may come after1 to make it care for
 similar ideals4 ,this utter final wreck
 and tragedy is of the essence of       
scientific materialism as at present    
understood4 ,the lower and not the      
higher forces are the eternal forces1 or
 the last surviving forces within the   
only cycle of evolution which we can    
definitely see4 ,mr4 ,spencer believes  
this as much as anyone2 so why should he

 argue with us as if we were making     
silly aesthetic objections to the       
'grossness' of 'matter and motion1' the 
principles of his philosophy1 when what 
really dismays us is the                
disconsolateness of its ulterior        
practical results8  ,no the true        
objection to materialism is not positive
 but negative4 ,it would be farcical at 
this day to make complaint of it for    
what it ,,is for 'grossness4' ,grossness
 is what grossness ,,does--we now know  
,,that4 ,we make complaint of it1 on the
 contrary1 for what it is ,,not--not a  
permanent warrant for our more ideal    
interests1 not a fulfiller of our       
remotest hopes4  ,the notion of ,god1 on
 the other hand1 however inferior it may
 be in clearness to those mathematical  
notions so current in mechanical        
philosophy1 has at least this practical 
superiority over them1 that it          
guarantees an ideal order that shall be 
permanently preserved4 ,a world with a  
,god in it to say the last word1 may    

indeed burn up or freeze1 but we then   
think of him as still mindful of the old
 ideals and sure to bring them elsewhere
 to fruition2 so that1 where he is1     
tragedy is only provisional and partial1
 and shipwreck and dissolution not the  
absolutely final things4 ,this need of  
an eternal moral order is one of the    
deepest needs of our breast4 ,and those 
poets1 like ,dante and ,wordsworth1 who 
live on the conviction of such an order1
 owe to that fact the extraordinary     
tonic and consoling power of their      
verse4 ,here then1 in these different   
emotional and practical appeals1 in     
these adjustments of our concrete       
attitudes of hope and expectation1 and  
all the delicate consequences which     
their differences entail1 lie the real  
meanings of materialism and             
spiritualism--not in hair-splitting     
abstractions about matter's inner       
essence1 or about the metaphysical      
attributes of ,god4 ,materialism means  
simply the denial that the moral order  

is eternal1 and the cutting off of      
ultimate hopes2 spiritualism means the  
affirmation of an eternal moral order   
and the letting loose of hope4 ,surely  
here is an issue genuine enough1 for    
anyone who feels it2 and1 as long as men
 are men1 it will yield matter for a    
serious philosophic debate4  ,but       
possibly some of you may still rally to 
their defence4 ,even whilst admitting   
that spiritualism and materialism make  
different prophecies of the world's     
future1 you may yourselves pooh-pooh the
 difference as something so infinitely  
remote as to mean nothing for a sane    
mind4 ,the essence of a sane mind1 you  
may say1 is to take shorter views1 and  
to feel no concern about such chimaeras 
as the latter end of the world4 ,well1  
,i can only say that if you say this1   
you do injustice to human nature4       
,religious melancholy is not disposed of
 by a simple flourish of the word       
insanity4 ,the absolute things1 the last
 things1 the overlapping things1 are the

 truly philosophic concerns2 all        
superior minds feel seriously about     
them1 and the mind with the shortest    
views is simply the mind of the more    
shallow man4  ,the issues of fact at    
stake in the debate are of course       
vaguely enough conceived by us at       
present4 ,but spiritualistic faith in   
all its forms deals with a world of     
,,promise1 while materialism's sun sets 
in a sea of disappointment4 ,remember   
what ,i said of the ,absolute3 it grants
 us moral holidays4 ,any religious view 
does this4 ,it not only incites our more
 strenuous moments1 but it also takes   
our joyous1 careless1 trustful moments1 
and it justifies them4 ,it paints the   
grounds of justification vaguely enough1
 to be sure4 ,the exact features of the 
saving future facts that our belief in  
,god insures1 will have to be ciphered  
out by the interminable methods of      
science3 we can ,,study our ,god only by
 studying his ,creation4 ,but we can    
,,enjoy our ,god1 if we have one1 in    

advance of all that labor4 ,i myself    
believe that the evidence for ,god lies 
primarily in inner personal experiences4
 ,when they have once given you your    
,god1 his name means at least the       
benefit of the holiday4 ,you remember   
what ,i said yesterday about the way in 
which truths clash and try to 'down'    
each other4 ,the truth of ',god' has to 
run the gauntlet of all our other       
truths4 ,it is on trial by them and they
 on trial by it4 ,our ,,final opinion   
about ,god can be settled only after all
 the truths have straightened themselves
 out together4 ,let us hope that they   
shall find a modus vivendi6  ,let me    
pass to a very cognate philosophic      
problem1 the ,,question of ,,design ,,in
 ,,nature4 ,god's existence has from    
time immemorial been held to be proved  
by certain natural facts4 ,many facts   
appear as if expressly designed in view 
of one another4 ,thus the woodpecker's  
bill1 tongue1 feet1 tail1 etc41 fit him 
wondrously for a world of trees with    

grubs hid in their bark to feed upon4   
,the parts of our eye fit the laws of   
light to perfection1 leading its rays to
 a sharp picture on our retina4 ,such   
mutual fitting of things diverse in     
origin argued design1 it was held2 and  
the designer was always treated as a    
man-loving deity4  ,the first step in   
these arguments was to prove that the   
design existed4 ,nature was ransacked   
for results obtained through separate   
things being co-adapted4 ,our eyes1 for 
instance1 originate in intra-uterine    
darkness1 and the light originates in   
the sun1 yet see how they fit each      
other4 ,they are evidently made ,,for   
each other4 ,vision is the end designed1
 light and eyes the separate means      
devised for its attainment4  ,it is     
strange1 considering how unanimously our
 ancestors felt the force of this       
argument1 to see how little it counts   
for since the triumph of the darwinian  
theory4 ,darwin opened our minds to the 
power of chance-happenings to bring     

forth 'fit' results if only they have   
time to add themselves together4 ,he    
showed the enormous waste of nature in  
producing results that get destroyed    
because of their unfitness4 ,he also    
emphasized the number of adaptations    
which1 if designed1 would argue an evil 
rather than a good designer4 ,here all  
depends upon the point of view4 ,to the 
grub under the bark the exquisite       
fitness of the woodpecker's organism to 
extract him would certainly argue a     
diabolical designer4  ,theologians have 
by this time stretched their minds so as
 to embrace the darwinian facts1 and yet
 to interpret them as still showing     
divine purpose4 ,it used to be a        
question of purpose ,,against mechanism1
 of one ,,or the other4 ,it was as if   
one should say ,my shoes are evidently  
designed to fit my feet1 hence it is    
impossible that they should have been   
produced by machinery4 ,we know that    
they are both3 they are made by a       
machinery itself designed to fit the    

feet with shoes4 ,theology need only    
stretch similarly the designs of ,god4  
,as the aim of a football-team is not   
merely to get the ball to a certain goal
 7if that were so1 they would simply get
 up on some dark night and place it     
there71 but to get it there by a fixed  
,,machinery ,,of ,,conditions--the      
game's rules and the opposing players2  
so the aim of ,god is not merely1 let us
 say1 to make men and to save them1 but 
rather to get this done through the sole
 agency of nature's vast machinery4     
,without nature's stupendous laws and   
counterforces1 man's creation and       
perfection1 we might suppose1 would be  
too insipid achievements for ,god to    
have designed them4  ,this saves the    
form of the design-argument at the      
expense of its old easy human content4  
,the designer is no longer the old      
man-like deity4 ,his designs have grown 
so vast as to be incomprehensible to us 
humans4 ,the ,,what of them so          
overwhelms us that to establish the mere

 ,,that of a designer for them becomes  
of very little consequence in           
comparison4 ,we can with difficulty     
comprehend the character of a cosmic    
mind whose purposes are fully revealed  
by the strange mixture of goods and     
evils that we find in this actual       
world's particulars4 ,or rather we      
cannot by any possibility comprehend it4
 ,the mere word 'design' by itself has1 
we see1 no consequences and explains    
nothing4 ,it is the barrenest of        
principles4 ,the old question of        
,,whether there is design is idle4 ,the 
real question is ,,what is the world1   
whether or not it have a designer--and  
that can be revealed only by the study  
of all nature's particulars4  ,remember 
that no matter what nature may have     
produced or may be producing1 the means 
must necessarily have been adequate1    
must have been ,,fitted ,,to ,,that     
,,production4 ,the argument from fitness
 to design would consequently always    
apply1 whatever were the product's      

character4 ,the recent ,mont-,pelee     
eruption1 for example1 required all     
previous history to produce that exact  
combination of ruined houses1 human and 
animal corpses1 sunken ships1 volcanic  
ashes1 etc41 in just that one hideous   
configuration of positions4 ,france had 
to be a nation and colonize ,martinique4
 ,our country had to exist and send our 
ships there4 ,,if ,god aimed at just    
that result1 the means by which the     
centuries bent their influences towards 
it1 showed exquisite intelligence4 ,and 
so of any state of things whatever1     
either in nature or in history1 which we
 find actually realized4 ,for the parts 
of things must always make ,,some       
definite resultant1 be it chaotic or    
harmonious4 ,when we look at what has   
actually come1 the conditions must      
always appear perfectly designed to     
ensure it4 ,we can always say1          
therefore1 in any conceivable world1 of 
any conceivable character1 that the     
whole cosmic machinery ,,may have been  

designed to produce it4  ,pragmatically1
 then1 the abstract word 'design' is a  
blank cartridge4 ,it carries no         
consequences1 it does no execution4     
,what sort of design8 and what sort of a
 designer8 are the only serious         
questions1 and the study of facts is the
 only way of getting even approximate   
answers4 ,meanwhile1 pending the slow   
answer from facts1 anyone who insists   
that there is a designer and who is sure
 he is a divine one1 gets a certain     
pragmatic benefit from the term--the    
same1 in fact which we saw that the     
terms ,god1 ,spirit1 or the ,absolute1  
yield us ',design1' worthless tho it be 
as a mere rationalistic principle set   
above or behind things for our          
admiration1 becomes1 if our faith       
concretes it into something theistic1 a 
term of ,,promise4 ,returning with it   
into experience1 we gain a more         
confiding outlook on the future4 ,if not
 a blind force but a seeing force runs  
things1 we may reasonably expect better 

issues4 ,this vague confidence in the   
future is the sole pragmatic meaning at 
present discernible in the terms design 
and designer4 ,but if cosmic confidence 
is right not wrong1 better not worse1   
that is a most important meaning4 ,that 
much at least of possible 'truth' the   
terms will then have in them4  ,let me  
take up another well-worn controversy1  
,,the ,,free-,,will ,,problem4 ,most    
persons who believe in what is called   
their free-will do so after the         
rationalistic fashion4 ,it is a         
principle1 a positive faculty or virtue 
added to man1 by which his dignity is   
enigmatically augmented4 ,he ought to   
believe it for this reason4             
,determinists1 who deny it1 who say that
 individual men originate nothing1 but  
merely transmit to the future the whole 
push of the past cosmos of which they   
are so small an expression1 diminish    
man4 ,he is less admirable1 stripped of 
this creative principle4 ,i imagine that
 more than half of you share our        

instinctive belief in free-will1 and    
that admiration of it as a principle of 
dignity has much to do with your        
fidelity4  ,but free-will has also been 
discussed pragmatically1 and1 strangely 
enough1 the same pragmatic              
interpretation has been put upon it by  
both disputants4 ,you know how large a  
part questions of ,,accountability have 
played in ethical controversy4 ,to hear 
some persons1 one would suppose that all
 that ethics aims at is a code of merits
 and demerits4 ,thus does the old legal 
and theological leaven1 the interest in 
crime and sin and punishment abide with 
us4 ',who's to blame8 whom can we       
punish8 whom will ,god punish8'--these  
preoccupations hang like a bad dream    
over man's religious history4  ,so both 
free-will and determinism have been     
inveighed against and called absurd1    
because each1 in the eyes of its        
enemies1 has seemed to prevent the      
'imputability' of good or bad deeds to  
their authors4 ,queer antinomy this6    

,free-will means novelty1 the grafting  
on to the past of something not involved
 therein4 ,if our acts were             
predetermined1 if we merely transmitted 
the push of the whole past1 the         
free-willists say1 how could we be      
praised or blamed for anything8 ,we     
should be 'agents' only1 not            
'principals1' and where then would be   
our precious imputability and           
responsibility8  ,but where would it be 
if we ,,had free-will8 rejoin the       
determinists4 ,if a 'free' act be a     
sheer novelty1 that comes not ,,from me1
 the previous me1 but ex nihilo1 and    
simply tacks itself on to me1 how can   
,i1 the previous ,i1 be responsible8    
,how can ,i have any permanent          
,,character that will stand still long  
enough for praise or blame to be        
awarded8 ,the chaplet of my days tumbles
 into a cast of disconnected beads as   
soon as the thread of inner necessity is
 drawn out by the preposterous          
indeterminist doctrine4 ,messrs4        

,fullerton and ,mc,taggart have recently
 laid about them doughtily with this    
argument4  ,it may be good ad hominem1  
but otherwise it is pitiful4 ,for ,i ask
 you1 quite apart from other reasons1   
whether any man1 woman or child1 with a 
sense for realities1 ought not to be    
ashamed to plead such principles as     
either dignity or imputability4         
,instinct and utility between them can  
safely be trusted to carry on the social
 business of punishment and praise4 ,if 
a man does good acts we shall praise    
him1 if he does bad acts we shall punish
 him--anyhow1 and quite apart from      
theories as to whether the acts result  
from what was previous in him or are    
novelties in a strict sense4 ,to make   
our human ethics revolve about the      
question of 'merit' is a piteous        
unreality--,god alone can know our      
merits1 if we have any4 ,the real ground
 for supposing free-will is indeed      
pragmatic1 but it has nothing to do with
 this contemptible right to punish which

 had made such a noise in past          
discussions of the subject4  ,free-will 
pragmatically means ,,novelties ,,in    
,,the ,,world1 the right to expect that 
in its deepest elements as well as in   
its surface phenomena1 the future may   
not identically repeat and imitate the  
past4 ,that imitation en masse is there1
 who can deny8 ,the general 'uniformity 
of nature' is presupposed by every      
lesser law4 ,but nature may be only     
approximately uniform2 and persons in   
whom knowledge of the world's past has  
bred pessimism 7or doubts as to the     
world's good character1 which become    
certainties if that character be        
supposed eternally fixed7 may naturally 
welcome free-will as a ,,melioristic    
doctrine4 ,it holds up improvement as at
 least possible2 whereas determinism    
assures us that our whole notion of     
possibility is born of human ignorance1 
and that necessity and impossibility    
between them rule the destinies of the  
world4  ,free-will is thus a general    

cosmological theory of ,,promise1 just  
like the ,absolute1 ,god1 ,spirit or    
,design4 ,taken abstractly1 no one of   
these terms has any inner content1 none 
of them gives us any picture1 and no one
 of them would retain the least         
pragmatic value in a world whose        
character was obviously perfect from the
 start4 ,elation at mere existence1 pure
 cosmic emotion and delight1 would1 it  
seems to me1 quench all interest in     
those speculations1 if the world were   
nothing but a lubberland of happiness   
already4 ,our interest in religious     
metaphysics arises in the fact that our 
empirical future feels to us unsafe1 and
 needs some higher guarantee4 ,if the   
past and present were purely good1 who  
could wish that the future might        
possibly not resemble them8 ,who could  
desire free-will8 ,who would not say1   
with ,huxley1 let me be wound up every  
day like a watch1 to go right fatally1  
and ,i ask no better freedom4 ',freedom'
 in a world already perfect could only  

mean freedom to ,,be ,,worse1 and who   
could be so insane as to wish that8 ,to 
be necessarily what it is1 to be        
impossibly aught else1 would put the    
last touch of perfection upon optimism's
 universe4 ,surely the only             
,,possibility that one can rationally   
claim is the possibility that things may
 be ,,better4 ,that possibility1 ,i need
 hardly say1 is one that1 as the actual 
world goes1 we have ample grounds for   
desiderating4  ,free-will thus has no   
meaning unless it be a doctrine of      
,,relief4 ,as such1 it takes its place  
with other religious doctrines4 ,between
 them1 they build up the old wastes and 
repair the former desolations4 ,our     
spirit1 shut within this courtyard of   
sense-experience1 is always saying to   
the intellect upon the tower3           
',watchman1 tell us of the night1 if it 
aught of promise bear1' and the         
intellect gives it then these terms of  
promise4  ,other than this practical    
significance1 the words ,god1 free-will1

 design1 etc41 have none4 ,yet dark tho 
they be in themselves1 or               
intellectualistically taken1 when we    
bear them into life's thicket with us   
the darkness ,,there grows light about  
us4 ,if you stop1 in dealing with such  
words1 with their definition1 thinking  
that to be an intellectual finality1    
where are you8 ,stupidly staring at a   
pretentious sham6 ,deus est ,ens1 a se1 
extra et supra omne genus1 necessarium1 
unum1 infinite perfectum1 simplex1      
immutabile1 immensum1 aeternum1         
intelligens1 etc41--wherein is such a   
definition really instructive8 ,it means
 less1 than nothing1 in its pompous robe
 of adjectives4 ,pragmatism alone can   
read a positive meaning into it1 and for
 that she turns her back upon the       
intellectualist point of view           
altogether4 ',god's in his heaven2 all's
 right with the world6'--,,that',s the  
heart of your theology1 and for that you
 need no rationalist definitions4  ,why 
shouldn't we all of us1 rationalists as 

well as pragmatists1 confess this8      
,pragmatism1 so far from keeping her    
eyes bent on the immediate practical    
foreground1 as she is accused of doing1 
dwells just as much upon the world's    
remotest perspectives4  ,see then how   
all these ultimate questions turn1 as it
 were1 up their hinges2 and from looking
 backwards upon principles1 upon an     
erkenntnisstheoretische ,ich1 a ,god1 a 
,kausalitaetsprinzip1 a ,design1 a      
,free-will1 taken in themselves1 as     
something august and exalted above      
facts1--see1 ,i say1 how pragmatism     
shifts the emphasis and looks forward   
into facts themselves4 ,the really vital
 question for us all is1 ,what is this  
world going to be8 ,what is life        
eventually to make of itself8 ,the      
centre of gravity of philosophy must    
therefore alter its place4 ,the earth of
 things1 long thrown into shadow by the 
glories of the upper ether1 must resume 
its rights4 ,to shift the emphasis in   
this way means that philosophic         

questions will fall to be treated by    
minds of a less abstractionist type than
 heretofore1 minds more scientific and  
individualistic in their tone yet not   
irreligious either4 ,it will be an      
alteration in 'the seat of authority'   
that reminds one almost of the          
protestant reformation4 ,and as1 to     
papal minds1 protestantism has often    
seemed a mere mess of anarchy and       
confusion1 such1 no doubt1 will         
pragmatism often seem to                
ultra-rationalist minds in philosophy4  
,it will seem so much sheer trash1      
philosophically4 ,but life wags on1 all 
the same1 and compasses its ends1 in    
protestant countries4 ,i venture to     
think that philosophic protestantism    
will compass a not dissimilar           
prosperity4     ,lecture ,,iv  ,the ,one
 and the ,many  ,we saw in the last     
lecture that the pragmatic method1 in   
its dealings with certain concepts1     
instead of ending with admiring         
contemplation1 plunges forward into the 

river of experience with them and       
prolongs the perspective by their means4
 ,design1 free-will1 the absolute mind1 
spirit instead of matter1 have for their
 sole meaning a better promise as to    
this world's outcome4 ,be they false or 
be they true1 the meaning of them is    
this meliorism4 ,i have sometimes       
thought of the phenomenon called 'total 
reflexion' in optics as a good symbol of
 the relation between abstract ideas and
 concrete realities1 as pragmatism      
conceives it4 ,hold a tumbler of water a
 little above your eyes and look up     
through the water at its surface--or    
better still look similarly through the 
flat wall of an aquarium4 ,you will then
 see an extraordinarily brilliant       
reflected image say of a candle-flame1  
or any other clear object1 situated on  
the opposite side of the vessel4 ,no    
candle-ray1 under these circumstances   
gets beyond the water's surface3 every  
ray is totally reflected back into the  
depths again4 ,now let the water        

represent the world of sensible facts1  
and let the air above it represent the  
world of abstract ideas4 ,both worlds   
are real1 of course1 and interact2 but  
they interact only at their boundary1   
and the locus of everything that lives1 
and happens to us1 so far as full       
experience goes1 is the water4 ,we are  
like fishes swimming in the sea of      
sense1 bounded above by the superior    
element1 but unable to breathe it pure  
or penetrate it4 ,we get our oxygen from
 it1 however1 we touch it incessantly1  
now in this part1 now in that1 and every
 time we touch it we are reflected back 
into the water with our course          
re-determined and re-energized4 ,the    
abstract ideas of which the air         
consists1 indispensable for life1 but   
irrespirable by themselves1 as it were1 
and only active in their re-directing   
function4 ,all similes are halting but  
this one rather takes my fancy4 ,it     
shows how something1 not sufficient for 
life in itself1 may nevertheless be an  

effective determinant of life elsewhere4
  ,in this present hour ,i wish to      
illustrate the pragmatic method by one  
more application4 ,i wish to turn its   
light upon the ancient problem of 'the  
one and the many4' ,i suspect that in   
but few of you has this problem         
occasioned sleepless nights1 and ,i     
should not be astonished if some of you 
told me it had never vexed you4 ,i      
myself have come1 by long brooding over 
it1 to consider it the most central of  
all philosophic problems1 central       
because so pregnant4 ,i mean by this    
that if you know whether a man is a     
decided monist or a decided pluralist1  
you perhaps know more about the rest of 
his opinions than if you give him any   
other name ending in ,,ist4 ,to believe 
in the one or in the many1 that is the  
classification with the maximum number  
of consequences4 ,so bear with me for an
 hour while ,i try to inspire you with  
my own interest in the problem4         
,philosophy has often been defined as   

the quest or the vision of the world's  
unity4 ,we never hear this definition   
challenged1 and it is true as far as it 
goes1 for philosophy has indeed         
manifested above all things its interest
 in unity4 ,but how about the ,,variety 
in things8 ,is that such an irrelevant  
matter8 ,if instead of using the term   
philosophy1 we talk in general of our   
intellect and its needs we quickly see  
that unity is only one of these4        
,acquaintance with the details of fact  
is always reckoned1 along with their    
reduction to system1 as an indispensable
 mark of mental greatness4 ,your        
'scholarly' mind1 of encyclopedic1      
philological type1 your man essentially 
of learning1 has never lacked for praise
 along with your philosopher4 ,what our 
intellect really aims at is neither     
variety nor unity taken singly but      
totality4,footnote3 ,compare ,a4        
,bellanger3 ,les concepts de ,cause1 et 
l'activite intentionelle de l',esprit4  
,paris1 ,alcan1 #aije1 p4 #gi ff4 ,in   

this1 acquaintance with reality's       
diversities is as important as          
understanding their connexion4 ,the     
human passion of curiosity runs on all  
fours with the systematizing passion4   
,in spite of this obvious fact the unity
 of things has always been considered   
more illustrious1 as it were1 than their
 variety4 ,when a young man first       
conceives the notion that the whole     
world forms one great fact1 with all its
 parts moving abreast1 as it were1 and  
interlocked1 he feels as if he were     
enjoying a great insight1 and looks     
superciliously on all who still fall    
short of this sublime conception4 ,taken
 thus abstractly as it first comes to   
one1 the monistic insight is so vague as
 hardly to seem worth defending         
intellectually4 ,yet probably everyone  
in this audience in some way cherishes  
it4 ,a certain abstract monism1 a       
certain emotional response to the       
character of oneness1 as if it were a   
feature of the world not coordinate with

 its manyness1 but vastly more excellent
 and eminent1 is so prevalent in        
educated circles that we might almost   
call it a part of philosophic common    
sense4 ,of ,,course the world is one1 we
 say4 ,how else could it be a world at  
all8 ,empiricists as a rule1 are as     
stout monists of this abstract kind as  
rationalists are4  ,the difference is   
that the empiricists are less dazzled4  
,unity doesn't blind them to everything 
else1 doesn't quench their curiosity for
 special facts1 whereas there is a kind 
of rationalist who is sure to interpret 
abstract unity mystically and to forget 
everything else1 to treat it as a       
principle2 to admire and worship it2 and
 thereupon to come to a full stop       
intellectually4  ',the world is         
,one6'--the formula may become a sort of
 number-worship4 ',three' and 'seven'   
have1 it is true1 been reckoned sacred  
numbers2 but1 abstractly taken1 why is  
'one' more excellent than 'forty-three1'
 or than 'two million and ten'8 ,in this

 first vague conviction of the world's  
unity1 there is so little to take hold  
of that we hardly know what we mean by  
it4  ,the only way to get forward with  
our notion is to treat it pragmatically4
 ,granting the oneness to exist1 what   
facts will be different in consequence8 
,what will the unity be known-as8 ,the  
world is one--yes1 but ,,how one8 ,what 
is the practical value of the oneness   
for ,,us8  ,asking such questions1 we   
pass from the vague to the definite1    
from the abstract to the concrete4 ,many
 distinct ways in which oneness         
predicated of the universe might make a 
difference1 come to view4 ,i will note  
successively the more obvious of these  
ways4  #a4 ,first1 the world is at least
 ,,one ,,subject ,,of ,,discourse4 ,if  
its manyness were so irremediable as to 
permit ,,no union whatever of it parts1 
not even our minds could 'mean' the     
whole of it at once3 the would be like  
eyes trying to look in opposite         
directions4 ,but in point of fact we    

mean to cover the whole of it by our    
abstract term 'world' or 'universe1'    
which expressly intends that no part    
shall be left out4 ,such unity of       
discourse carries obviously no farther  
monistic specifications4 ,a 'chaos1'    
once so named1 has as much unity of     
discourse as a cosmos4 ,it is an odd    
fact that many monists consider a great 
victory scored for their side when      
pluralists say 'the universe is many4'  
',the universe'6 they chuckle--his      
speech bewrayeth him4 ,he stands        
confessed of monism out of his own      
mouth4 ,well1 let things be one in that 
sense6 ,you can then fling such a word  
as universe at the whole collection of  
them1 but what matters it8 ,it still    
remains to be ascertained whether they  
are one in any other sense that is more 
valuable4  #b4 ,are they1 for example1  
,,continuous8 ,can you pass from one to 
another1 keeping always in your one     
universe without any danger of falling  
out8 ,in other words1 do the parts of   

our universe ,,hang together1 instead of
 being like detached grains of sand8    
,even grains of sand hang together      
through the space in which they are     
embedded1 and if you can in any way move
 through such space1 you can pass       
continuously from number one of them to 
number two4 ,space and time are thus    
vehicles of continuity1 by which the    
world's parts hang together4 ,the       
practical difference to us1 resultant   
from these forms of union1 is immense4  
,our whole motor life is based upon     
them4  #c4 ,there are innumerable other 
paths of practical continuity among     
things4 ,lines of ,,influence can be    
traced by which they together4          
,following any such line you pass from  
one thing to another till you may have  
covered a good part of the universe's   
extent4 ,gravity and heat-conduction are
 such all-uniting influences1 so far as 
the physical world goes4 ,electric1     
luminous and chemical influences follow 
similar lines of influence4 ,but opaque 

and inert bodies interrupt the          
continuity here1 so that you have to    
step round them1 or change your mode of 
progress if you wish to get farther on  
that day4 ,practically1 you have then   
lost your universe's unity1 ,,so ,,far  
,,as ,,it ,,was ,,constituted ,,by      
,,those ,,first ,,lines ,,of            
,,influence4 ,there are innumerable     
kinds of connexion that special things  
have with other special things2 and the 
,,ensemble of any one of these          
connexions forms one sort of system by  
which things are conjoined4 ,thus men   
are conjoined in a vast network of      
,,acquaintanceship4 ,brown knows ,jones1
 ,jones knows ,robinson1 etc42 and ,,by 
,,choosing ,,your ,,farther             
,,intermediaries ,,rightly you may carry
 a message from ,jones to the ,empress  
of ,china1 or the ,chief of the ,african
 ,pigmies1 or to anyone else in the     
inhabited world4 ,but you are stopped   
short1 as by a non-conductor1 when you  
choose one man wrong in this experiment4

 ,what may be called love-systems are   
grafted on the acquaintance-system4 ,a  
loves 7or hates7 ,b2 ,b loves 7or hates7
 ,c1 etc4 ,but these systems are smaller
 than the great acquaintance-system that
 they presuppose4  ,human efforts are   
daily unifying the world more and more  
in definite systematic ways4 ,we found  
colonial1 postal1 consular1 commercial  
systems1 all the parts of which obey    
definite influences that propagate      
themselves within the system but not to 
facts outside of it4 ,the result is     
innumerable little hangings-together of 
the world's parts within the larger     
hangings-together1 little worlds1 not   
only of discourse but of operation1     
within the wider universe4 ,each system 
exemplifies one type or grade of union1 
its parts being strung on that peculiar 
kind of relation1 and the same part may 
figure in many different systems1 as a  
man may hold several offices and belong 
to various clubs4 ,from this            
'systematic' point of view1 therefore1  

the pragmatic value of the world's unity
 is that all these definite networks    
actually and practically exist4 ,some   
are more enveloping and extensive1 some 
less so2 they are superposed upon each  
other2 and between them all they let no 
individual elementary part of the       
universe escape4 ,enormous as is the    
amount of disconnexion among things 7for
 these systematic influences and        
conjunctions follow rigidly exclusive   
paths71 everything that exists is       
influenced in ,,some way by something   
else1 if you can only pick the way out  
rightly ,loosely speaking1 and in       
general1 it may be said that all things 
cohere and adhere to each other         
,,somehow1 and that the universe exists 
practically in reticulated or           
concatenated forms which make of it a   
continuous or 'integrated' affair4 ,any 
kind of influence whatever helps to make
 the world one1 so far as you can follow
 it from next to next4 ,you may then say
 that 'the world ,,is ,one'--meaning in 

these respects1 namely1 and just so far 
as they obtain4 ,but just as definitely 
is it ,,not one1 so far as they do not  
obtain2 and there is no species of      
connexion which will not fail1 if1      
instead of choosing conductors for it1  
you choose non-conductors4 ,you are then
 arrested at your very first step and   
have to write the world down as a pure  
,,many from that particular point of    
view4 ,if our intellect had been as much
 interested in disjunctive as it is in  
conjunctive relations1 philosophy would 
have equally successfully celebrated the
 world's ,,disunion4  ,the great point  
is to notice that the oneness and the   
manyness are absolutely co-ordinate     
here4 ,neither is primordial or more    
essential or excellent than the other4  
,just as with space1 whose separating of
 things seems exactly on a par with its 
uniting of them1 but sometimes one      
function and sometimes the other is what
 come home to us most1 so1 in our       
general dealings with the world of      

influences1 we now need conductors and  
now need non-conductors1 and wisdom lies
 in knowing which is which at the       
appropriate moment4  #d4 ,all these     
systems of influence or non-influence   
may be listed under the general problem 
of the world's ,,causal ,,unity4 ,if the
 minor causal influences among things   
should converge towards one common      
causal origin of them in the past1 one  
great first cause for all that is1 one  
might then speak of the absolute causal 
unity of the world4 ,god's fiat on      
creation's day has figured in           
traditional philosophy as such an       
absolute cause and origin4              
,transcendental ,idealism1 translating  
'creation' into 'thinking' 7or 'willing 
to' think'7 calls the divine act        
'eternal' rather than 'first'2 but the  
union of the many here is absolute1 just
 the same--the many would not ,,be1 save
 for the ,one4 ,against this notion of  
the unity of origin of all there has    
always stood the pluralistic notion of  

an eternal self-existing many in the    
shape of atoms or even of spiritual     
units of some sort4 ,the alternative has
 doubtless a pragmatic meaning1 but     
perhaps1 as far as these lectures go1 we
 had better leave the question of unity 
of origin unsettled4  #e4 ,the most     
important sort of union that obtains    
among things1 pragmatically speaking1 is
 their ,,generic ,,unity4 ,things exist 
in kinds1 there are many specimens in   
each kind1 and what the 'kind' implies  
for one specimen1 it implies also for   
every other specimen of that kind4 ,we  
can easily conceive that every fact in  
the world might be singular1 that is1   
unlike any other fact and sole of its   
kind4 ,in such a world of singulars our 
logic would be useless1 for logic works 
by predicating of the single instance   
what is true of all its kind4 ,with no  
two things alike in the world1 we should
 be unable to reason from our past      
experiences to our future ones4 ,the    
existence of so much generic unity in   

things is thus perhaps the most         
momentous pragmatic specification of    
what it may mean to say 'the world is   
,one4' ,,absolute generic unity would   
obtain if there were one summum genus   
under which all things without exception
 could be eventually subsumed4          
',beings1' 'thinkables1' 'experiences1' 
would be candidates for this position4  
,whether the alternatives expressed by  
such words have any pragmatic           
significance or not1 is another question
 which ,i prefer to leave unsettled just
 now4  #f4 ,another specification of    
what the phrase 'the world is ,one' may 
mean is ,,unity ,,of ,,purpose4 ,an     
enormous number of things in the world  
subserve a common purpose4 ,all the     
man-made systems1 administrative1       
industrial1 military1 or what not1 exist
 each for its controlling purpose4      
,every living being pursues its own     
peculiar purposes4 ,they co-operate1    
according to the degree of their        
development1 in collective or tribal    

purposes1 larger ends thus enveloping   
lesser ones1 until an absolutely single1
 final and climacteric purpose subserved
 by all things without exception might  
conceivably be reached4 ,it is needless 
to say that the appearances conflict    
with such a view4 ,any resultant1 as ,i 
said in my third lecture1 ,,may have    
been purposed in advance1 but none of   
the results we actually know in is world
 have in point of fact been purposed in 
advance in all their details4 ,men and  
nations start with a vague notion of    
being rich1 or great1 or good4 ,each    
step they make brings unforeseen chances
 into sight1 and shuts out older vistas1
 and the specifications of the general  
purpose have to be daily changed4 ,what 
is reached in the end may be better or  
worse than what was proposed1 but it is 
always more complex and different4  ,our
 different purposes also are at war with
 each other4 ,where one can't crush the 
other out1 they compromise2 and the     
result is again different from what     

anyone distinctly proposed beforehand4  
,vaguely and generally1 much of what was
 purposed may be gained2 but everything 
makes strongly for the view that our    
world is incompletely unified           
teleologically and is still trying to   
get its unification better organized4   
,whoever claims ,,absolute teleological 
unity1 saying that there is one purpose 
that every detail of the universe       
subserves1 dogmatizes at his own risk4  
,theologians who dogmalize thus find it 
more and more impossible1 as our        
acquaintance with the warring interests 
of the world's parts grows more         
concrete1 to imagine what the one       
climacteric purpose may possibly be     
like4 ,we see indeed that certain evils 
minister to ulterior goods1 that the    
bitter makes the cocktail better1 and   
that a bit of danger or hardship puts us
 agreeably to our trumps4 ,we can       
vaguely generalize this into the        
doctrine that all the evil in the       
universe is but instrumental to its     

greater perfection4 ,but the scale of   
the evil actually in sight defies all   
human tolerance2 and transcendental     
idealism1 in the pages of a ,bradley or 
a ,royce1 brings us no farther than the 
book of ,job did--,god's ways are not   
our ways1 so let us put our hands upon  
our mouth4 ,a ,god who can relish such  
superfluities of horror is no ,god for  
human beings to appeal to4 ,his animal  
spirits are too high4 ,in other words   
the ',absolute' with his one purpose1 is
 not the man-like ,god of common people4
  #g4 ,,aesthetic ,,union among things  
also obtains1 and is very analogous to  
ideological union4 ,things tell a story4
 ,their parts hang together so as to    
work out a climax4 ,they play into each 
other's hands expressively4             
,retrospectively1 we can see that altho 
no definite purpose presided over a     
chain of events1 yet the events fell    
into a dramatic form1 with a start1 a   
middle1 and a finish4 ,in point of fact 
all stories end2 and here again the     

point of view of a many is that more    
natural one to take4 ,the world is full 
of partial stories that run parallel to 
one another1 beginning and ending at odd
 times4 ,they mutually interlace and    
interfere at points1 but we cannot unify
 them completely in our minds4 ,in      
following your life-history1 ,i must    
temporarily turn my attention from my   
own4 ,even a biographer of twins would  
have to press them alternately upon his 
reader's attention4  ,it follows that   
whoever says that the whole world tells 
one story utters another of those       
monistic dogmas that a man believes at  
his risk4 ,it is easy to see the world's
 history pluralistically1 as a rope of  
which each fibre tells a separate tale2 
but to conceive of each cross-section of
 the rope as an absolutely single fact1 
and to sum the whole longitudinal series
 into one being living an undivided     
life1 is harder4 ,we have indeed the    
analogy of embryology to help us4 ,the  
microscopist makes a hundred flat       

cross-sections of a given embryo1 and   
mentally unites them into one solid     
whole4 ,but the great world's           
ingredients1 so far as they are beings1 
seem1 like the rope's fibres1 to be     
discontinuous cross-wise1 and to cohere 
only in the longitudinal direction4     
,followed in that direction they are    
many4 ,even the embryologist1 when he   
follows the ,,development of his object1
 has to treat the history of each single
 organ in turn4 ,,absolute aesthetic    
union is thus another barely abstract   
ideal4 ,the world appears as something  
more epic than dramatic4  ,so far1 then1
 we see how the world is unified by its 
many systems1 kinds1 purposes1 and      
dramas4 ,that there is more union in all
 these ways than openly appears is      
certainly true4 ,that there ,,may be one
 sovereign purpose1 system1 kind1 and   
story1 is a legitimate hypothesis4 ,all 
,i say here is that it is rash to affirm
 this dogmatically without better       
evidence than we possess at present4    

#h4 ,the ,,great monistic ,,denkmittel  
for a hundred years past has been the   
notion of ,,the ,,one ,,knower4 ,the    
many exist only as objects for his      
thought--exist in his dream1 as it were2
 and ,,as ,,he ,,knows them1 they have  
one purpose1 form one system1 tell one  
tale for him4 ,this notion of an        
,,all-,,enveloping ,,noetic ,,unity in  
things is the sublimest achievement of  
intellectualist philosophy4 ,those who  
believe in the ,absolute1 as the        
all-knower is termed1 usually say that  
they do so for coercive reasons1 which  
clear thinkers cannot evade4 ,the       
,absolute has far-reaching practical    
consequences1 some of which ,i drew     
attention in my second lecture4 ,many   
kinds of difference important to us     
would surely follow from its being true4
 ,i cannot here enter into all the      
logical proofs of such a ,being's       
existence1 farther than to say that none
 of them seem to me sound4 ,i must      
therefore treat the notion of an        

,all-,knower simply as an hypothesis1   
exactly on a par logically with the     
pluralist notion that there is no point 
of view1 no focus of information extant1
 from which the entire content of the   
universe is visible at once4 ,god's     
consciousness1 says ,professor          
,royce1,footnote3 ,the ,conception of   
,god1 ,new ,york1 #ahig1 p4 #bib4 forms 
in its wholeness one luminously         
transparent conscious moment--this is   
the type of noetic unity on which       
rationalism insists4 ,empiricism on the 
other hand is satisfied with the type of
 noetic unity that is humanly familiar4 
,everything gets known by ,,some knower 
along with something else2 but the      
knowers may in the end be irreducibly   
many1 and the greatest knower of them   
all may yet not know the whole of       
everything1 or even know what he does   
know at one single stroke3--he may be   
liable to forget4 ,whichever type       
obtained1 the world would still be a    
universe noetically4 ,its parts would be

 conjoined by knowledge1 but in the one 
case the knowledge would be absolutely  
unified1 in the other it would be strung
 along and overlapped4  ,the notion of  
one instantaneous or eternal            
,knower--either adjective here means the
 same thing--is1 as ,i said1 the great  
intellectualist achievement of our time4
 ,it has practically driven out that    
conception of ',substance' which earlier
 philosophers set such store by1 and by 
which so much unifying work used to be  
done--universal substance which alone   
has being in and from itself1 and of    
which all the particulars of experience 
are but forms to which it gives support4
 ,substance has succumbed to the        
pragmatic criticisms of the ,english    
school4 ,it appears now only as another 
name for the fact that phenomena as they
 come are actually grouped and given in 
coherent forms1 the very forms in which 
we finite knowers experience or think   
them together4 ,these forms of          
conjunction are as much parts of the    

tissue of experience as are the terms   
which they connect2 and it is a great   
pragmatic achievement for recent        
idealism to have made the world hang    
together in these directly representable
 ways instead of drawing its unity from 
the 'inherence' of its parts--whatever  
that may mean--in an unimaginable       
principle behind the scenes4  ',the     
world is one1' therefore1 just so far as
 we experience it to be concatenated1   
one by as many definite conjunctions as 
appear4 ,but then also ,,not one by just
 as many definite ,d,i,sjunctions as we 
find4 ,the oneness and the manyness of  
it thus obtain in respects which can be 
separately named4 ,it is neither a      
universe pure and simple nor a          
multiverse pure and simple4 ,and its    
various manners of being one suggest1   
for their accurate ascertainment1 so    
many distinct programs of scientific    
work4 ,thus the pragmatic question      
',what is the oneness known-as8 ,what   
practical difference will it make8'     

saves us from all feverish excitement   
over it as a principle of sublimity and 
carries us forward into the stream of   
experience with a cool head4 ,the stream
 may indeed reveal far more connexion   
and union than we now suspect1 but we   
are not entitled on pragmatic principles
 to claim absolute oneness in any       
respect in advance4  ,it is so difficult
 to see definitely what absolute oneness
 can mean1 that probably the majority of
 you are satisfied with the sober       
attitude which we have reached4         
,nevertheless there are possibly some   
radically monistic souls among you who  
are not content to leave the one and the
 many on a par4 ,union of various       
grades1 union of diverse types1 union   
that stops at non-conductors1 union that
 merely goes from next to next1 and     
means in many cases outer nextness only1
 and not a more internal bond1 union of 
concatenation1 in short2 all that sort  
of thing seems to you a halfway stage of
 thought4 ,the oneness of things1       

superior to their manyness1 you think   
must also be more deeply true1 must be  
the more real aspect of the world4 ,the 
pragmatic view1 you are sure1 gives us a
 universe imperfectly rational4 ,the    
real universe must form an unconditional
 unit of being1 something consolidated1 
with its parts co-implicated through and
 through4 ,only then could we consider  
our estate completely rational4 ,there  
is no doubt whatever that this          
ultra-monistic way of thinking means a  
great deal to many minds4 ,one ,life1   
,one ,truth1 one ,love1 one ,principle1 
,one ,good1 ,one ,god--,i quote from a  
,christian ,science leaflet which the   
day's mail brings into my hands--beyond 
doubt such a confession of faith has    
pragmatically an emotional value1 and   
beyond doubt the word 'one' contributes 
to the value quite as much as the other 
words4 ,but if we try to realize        
,,intellectually what we can possibly   
,,mean by such a glut of oneness we are 
thrown right back upon our pragmatistic 

determinations again4 ,it means either  
the mere name ,one1 the universe of     
discourse2 or it means the sum total of 
all the ascertainable particular        
conjunctions and concatenations2 or1    
finally1 it means some one vehicle of   
conjunction treated as all-inclusive1   
like one origin1 one purpose1 or one    
knower4 ,in point of fact it always     
means one ,,knower to those who take it 
intellectually to-day4 ,the one knower  
involves1 they think1 the other forms of
 conjunction4 ,his world must have all  
its parts co-implicated in the one      
logical-aesthetical-teleological        
unit-picture which is his eternal dream4
  ,the character of the absolute        
knower's picture is however so          
impossible for us to represent clearly1 
that we may fairly suppose that the     
authority which absolute monism         
undoubtedly possesses1 and probably     
always will possess over some persons1  
draws its strength far less from        
intellectual than from mystical grounds4

 ,to interpret absolute monism worthily1
 be a mystic4 ,mystical states of mind  
in every degree are shown by history1   
usually tho not always1 to make for the 
monistic view4 ,this is no proper       
occasion to enter upon the general      
subject of mysticism1 but ,i will quote 
one mystical pronouncement to show just 
what ,i mean4 ,the paragon of all       
monistic systems is the ,vedanta        
philosophy of ,hindostan1 and the       
paragon of ,vedantist missionaries was  
the late ,swami ,vivekananda who visited
 our shores some years ago4 ,the method 
of ,vedantism is the mystical method4   
,you do not reason1 but after going     
through a certain discipline ,,you      
,,see1 and having seen1 you can report  
the truth4 ,vivekananda thus reports the
 truth in one of his lectures here3     
,where is any more misery for him who   
sees this ,oneness in the               
,universe444this ,oneness of life1      
,oneness of everything8 444,this        
separation between man and man1 man and 

woman1 man and child1 nation from       
nation1 earth from moon1 moon from sun1 
this separation between atom and atom is
 the cause really of all the misery1 and
 the ,vedanta says this separation does 
not exist1 it is not real4 ,it is merely
 apparent1 on the surface4 ,in the heart
 of things there is ,unity still4 ,if   
you go inside you find that ,unity      
between man and man1 women and children1
 races and races1 high and low1 rich and
 poor1 the gods and men3 all are ,one1  
and animals too1 if you go deep enough1 
and he who has attained to that has no  
more delusion4 444 ,where is any more   
delusion for him8 ,what can delude him8 
,he knows the reality of everything1 the
 secret of everything4 ,where is there  
any more misery for him8 ,what does he  
desire8 ,he has traced the reality of   
everything unto the ,lord1 that centre1 
that ,unity of everything1 and that is  
,eternal ,bliss1 ,eternal ,knowledge1   
,eternal ,existence4 ,neither death nor 
disease1 nor sorrow nor misery1 nor     

discontent is there 444 in the centre1  
the reality1 there is no one to be      
mourned for1 no one to be sorry for4 ,he
 has penetrated everything1 the ,pure   
,one1 the ,formless1 the ,bodiless1 the 
,stainless1 ,he the ,knower1 ,he the    
,great ,poet1 the ,self-,existent1 ,he  
who is giving to everyone what he       
deserves4  ,observe how radical the     
character of the monism here is4        
,separation is not simply overcome by   
the ,one1 it is denied to exist4 ,there 
is no many4 ,we are not parts of the    
,one2 ,it has no parts2 and since in a  
sense we undeniably ,,are1 it must be   
that each of us is the ,one1 indivisibly
 and totally4 ,,an ,,absolute ,,one1    
,,and ,i ,,that ,,one--surely we have   
here a religion which1 emotionally      
considered1 has a high pragmatic value2 
it imparts a perfect sumptuosity of     
security4 ,as our ,swami says in another
 place3  ,when man has seen himself as  
one with the infinite ,being of the     
universe1 when all separateness has     

ceased1 when all men1 all women1 all    
angels1 all gods1 all animals1 all      
plants1 the whole universe has been     
melted into that oneness1 then all fear 
disappears4 ,whom to fear8 ,can ,i hurt 
myself8 ,can ,i kill myself8 ,can ,i    
injure myself8 ,do you fear yourself8   
,then will all sorrow disappear4 ,what  
can cause me sorrow8 ,i am the ,one     
,existence of the universe4 ,then all   
jealousies will disappear2 of whom to be
 jealous8 ,of myself8 ,then all bad     
feelings disappear4 ,against whom will  
,i have this bad feeling8 ,against      
myself8 ,there is none in the universe  
but me4 444 ,kill out this              
differentiation2 kill out this          
superstition that there are many4 ',he  
who1 in this world of many1 sees that   
,one2 he who in this mass of insentiency
 sees that ,one ,sentient ,being2 he who
 in this world of shadow catches that   
,reality1 unto him belongs eternal      
peace1 unto none else1 unto none else4' 
,we all have some ear for this monistic 

music3 it elevates and reassures4 ,we   
all have at least the germ of mysticism 
in us4 ,and when our idealists recite   
their arguments for the ,absolute1      
saying that the slightest union admitted
 anywhere carries logically absolute    
,oneness with it1 and that the slightest
 separation admitted anywhere logically 
carries disunion remediless and         
complete1 ,i cannot help suspecting that
 the palpable weak places in the        
intellectual reasonings they use are    
protected from their own criticism by a 
mystical feeling that1 logic or no      
logic1 absolute ,oneness must somehow at
 any cost be true4 ,oneness overcomes   
,,moral separateness at any rate4 ,in   
the passion of love we have the mystic  
germ of what might mean a total union of
 all sentient life4 ,this mystical germ 
wakes up in us on hearing the monistic  
utterances1 acknowledges their          
authority1 and assigns to intellectual  
considerations a secondary place4  ,i   
will dwell no longer on these religious 

and moral aspects of the question in    
this lecture4 ,when ,i come to my final 
lecture there will be something more to 
say4  ,leave then out of consideration  
for the moment the authority which      
mystical insights may be conjectured    
eventually to possess2 treat the problem
 of the ,one and the ,many in a purely  
intellectual way2 and we see clearly    
enough where pragmatism stands4 ,with   
her criterion of the practical          
differences that theories make1 we see  
that she must equally abjure absolute   
monism and absolute pluralism4 ,the     
world is one just so far as its parts   
hang together by any definite connexion4
 ,it is many just so far as any definite
 connexion fails to obtain4 ,and finally
 it is growing more and more unified by 
those systems of connexion at least     
which human energy keeps framing as time
 goes on4  ,it is possible to imagine   
alternative universes to the one we     
know1 in which the most various grades  
and types of union should be embodied4  

,thus the lowest grade of universe would
 be a world of mere ,,withness1 of which
 the parts were only strung together by 
the conjunction 'and4' ,such a universe 
is even now the collection of our       
several inner lives4 ,the spaces and    
times of your imagination1 the objects  
and events of your day-dreams are not   
only more or less incoherent inter se1  
but are wholly out of definite relation 
with the similar contents of anyone     
else's mind4 ,our various reveries now  
as we sit here compenetrate each other  
idly without influencing or interfering4
 ,they coexist1 but in no order and in  
no receptacle1 being the nearest        
approach to an absolute 'many' that we  
can conceive4 ,we cannot even imagine   
any reason why they ,,should be known   
all together1 and we can imagine even   
less1 if they were known together1 how  
they could be known as one systematic   
whole4  ,but add our sensations and     
bodily actions1 and the union mounts to 
a much higher grade4 ,our audita et visa

 and our acts fall into those           
receptacles of time and space in which  
each event finds its date and place4    
,they form 'things' and are of 'kinds'  
too1 and can be classed4 ,yet we can    
imagine a world of things and of kinds  
in which the causal interactions with   
which we are so familiar should not     
exist4 ,everything there might be inert 
towards everything else1 and refuse to  
propagate its influence4 ,or gross      
mechanical influences might pass1 but no
 chemical action4 ,such worlds would be 
far less unified than ours4 ,again there
 might be complete physico-chemical     
interaction1 but no minds2 or minds1 but
 altogether private ones1 with no social
 life2 or social life limited to        
acquaintance1 but no love2 or love1 but 
no customs or institutions that should  
systematize it4 ,no one of these grades 
of universe would be absolutely         
irrational or disintegrated1 inferior   
tho it might appear when looked at from 
the higher grades4 ,for instance1 if our

 minds should ever become               
'telepathically' connected1 so that we  
knew immediately1 or could under certain
 conditions know immediately1 each what 
the other was thinking1 the world we now
 live in would appear to the thinkers in
 that world to have been of an inferior 
grade4  ,with the whole of past eternity
 open for our conjectures to range in1  
it may be lawful to wonder whether the  
various kinds of union now realized in  
the universe that we inhabit may not    
possibly have been successively evolved 
after the fashion in which we now see   
human systems evolving in consequence of
 human needs4 ,if such an hypothesis    
were legitimate1 total oneness would    
appear at the end of things rather than 
at their origin4 ,in other words the    
notion of the ',absolute' would have to 
be replaced by that of the ',ultimate4' 
,the two notions would have the same    
content--the maximally unified content  
of fact1 namely--but their              
time-relations would be positively      

reversed4 ,footnote3 ,compare on the    
,ultimate1 ,mr4 ,schiller's essay       
,activity and ,substance1 in his book   
entitled ,humanism1 p4 #bjd4  ,after    
discussing the unity of the universe in 
this pragmatic way1 you ought to see why
 ,i said in my second lecture1 borrowing
 the word from my friend ,g4 ,papini1   
that pragmatism tends to ,,unstiffen all
 our theories4 ,the world's oneness has 
generally been affirmed abstractly only1
 and as if anyone who questioned it must
 be an idiot4 ,the temper of monists has
 been so vehement1 as almost at times to
 be convulsive2 and this way of holding 
a doctrine does not easily go with      
reasonable discussion and the drawing of
 distinctions4 ,the theory of the       
,absolute1 in particular1 has had to be 
an article of faith1 affirmed           
dogmatically and exclusively4 ,the ,one 
and ,all1 first in the order of being   
and of knowing1 logically necessary     
itself1 and uniting all lesser things in
 the bonds of mutual necessity1 how     

could it allow of any mitigation of its 
inner rigidity8 ,the slightest suspicion
 of pluralism1 the minutest wiggle of   
independence of any one of its parts    
from the control of the totality1 would 
ruin it4 ,absolute unity brooks no      
degrees--as well might you claim        
absolute purity for a glass of water    
because it contains but a single little 
cholera-germ4 ,the independence1 however
 infinitesimal1 of a part1 however      
small1 would be to the ,absolute as     
fatal as a cholera-germ4  ,pluralism on 
the other hand has no need of this      
dogmatic rigoristic temper4 ,provided   
you grant ,,some separation among       
things1 some tremor of independence1    
some free play of parts on one another1 
some real novelty or chance1 however    
minute1 she is amply satisfied1 and will
 allow you any amount1 however great1 of
 real union4 ,how much of union there   
may be is a question that she thinks can
 only be decided empirically4 ,the      
amount may be enormous1 colossal2 but   

absolute monism is shattered if1 along  
with all the union1 there has to be     
granted the slightest modicum1 the most 
incipient nascency1 or the most residual
 trace1 of a separation that is not     
'overcome4'  ,pragmatism1 pending the   
final empirical ascertainment of just   
what the balance of union and disunion  
among things may be1 must obviously     
range herself upon the pluralistic side4
 ,some day1 she admits1 even total      
union1 with one knower1 one origin1 and 
a universe consolidated in every        
conceivable way1 may turn out to be the 
most acceptable of all hypotheses4      
,meanwhile the opposite hypothesis1 of a
 world imperfectly unified still1 and   
perhaps always to remain so1 must be    
sincerely entertained4 ,this latter     
hypothesis is pluralism's doctrine4     
,since absolute monism forbids its being
 even considered seriously1 branding it 
as irrational from the start1 it is     
clear that pragmatism must turn its back
 on absolute monism1 and follow         

pluralism's more empirical path4  ,this 
leaves us with the common-sense world1  
in which we find things partly joined   
and partly disjoined4 ',things1' then1  
and their 'conjunctions'--what do such  
words mean1 pragmatically handled8 ,in  
my next lecture1 ,i will apply the      
pragmatic method to the stage of        
philosophizing known as ,common ,sense4 
,lecture ,v  ,pragmatism and ,common    
,sense  ,in the last lecture we turned  
ourselves from the usual way of talking 
of the universe's oneness as a          
principle1 sublime in all its blankness1
 towards a study of the special kinds of
 union which the universe enfolds4 ,we  
found many of these to coexist with     
kinds of separation equally real4 ,how  
far am ,i verified8 is the question     
which each kind of union and each kind  
of separation asks us here1 so as good  
pragmatists we have to turn our face    
towards experience1 towards 'facts4'    
,absolute oneness remains1 but only as  
an hypothesis1 and that hypothesis is   

reduced nowadays to that of an          
omniscient knower who sees all things   
without exception as forming one single 
systematic fact4 ,but the knower in     
question may still be conceived either  
as an ,absolute or as an ,ultimate2 and 
over against the hypothesis of him in   
either form the counter-hypothesis that 
the widest field of knowledge that ever 
was or will be still contains some      
ignorance1 may be legitimately held4    
,some bits of information always may    
escape4  ,this is the hypothesis of     
,,noetic ,,pluralism1 which monists     
consider so absurd4 ,since we are bound 
to treat it as respectfully as noetic   
monism1 until the facts shall have      
tipped the beam1 we find that our       
pragmatism1 tho originally nothing but a
 method1 has forced us to be friendly to
 the pluralistic view4 ,it ,,may be that
 some parts of the world are connected  
so loosely with some other parts as to  
be strung along by nothing but the      
copula ,,and4 ,they might even come and 

go without those other parts suffering  
any internal change4 ,this pluralistic  
view1 of a world of ,,additive          
constitution1 is one that pragmatism is 
unable to rule out from serious         
consideration4 ,but this view leads one 
to the farther hypothesis that the      
actual world1 instead of being complete 
'eternally1' as the monists assure us1  
may be eternally incomplete1 and at all 
times subject to addition or liable to  
loss4  ,it ,,is at any rate incomplete  
in one respect1 and flagrantly so4 ,the 
very fact that we debate this question  
shows that our ,,knowledge is incomplete
 at present and subject to addition4 ,in
 respect of the knowledge it contains   
the world does genuinely change and     
grow4 ,some general remarks on the way  
in which our knowledge completes        
itself--when it does complete           
itself--will lead us very conveniently  
into our subject for this lecture1 which
 is ',common ,sense4'  ,to begin with1  
our knowledge grows ,,in ,,spots4 ,the  

spots may be large or small1 but the    
knowledge never grows all over3 some old
 knowledge always remains what it was4  
,your knowledge of pragmatism1 let us   
suppose1 is growing now4 ,later1 its    
growth may involve considerable         
modification of opinions which you      
previously held to be true4 ,but such   
modifications are apt to be gradual4 ,to
 take the nearest possible example1     
consider these lectures of mine4 ,what  
you first gain from them is probably a  
small amount of new information1 a few  
new definitions1 or distinctions1 or    
points of view4 ,but while these special
 ideas are being added1 the rest of your
 knowledge stands still1 and only       
gradually will you 'line up' your       
previous opinions with the novelties ,i 
am trying to instil1 and modify to some 
slight degree their mass4  ,you listen  
to me now1 ,i suppose1 with certain     
prepossessions as to my competency1 and 
these affect your reception of what ,i  
say1 but were ,i suddenly to break off  

lecturing1 and to begin to sing ',we    
won't go home till morning' in a rich   
baritone voice1 not only would that new 
fact be added to your stock1 but it     
would oblige you to define me           
differently1 and that might alter your  
opinion of the pragmatic philosophy1 and
 in general bring about a rearrangement 
of a number of your ideas4 ,your mind in
 such processes is strained1 and        
sometimes painfully so1 between its     
older beliefs and the novelties which   
experience brings along4  ,our minds    
thus grow in spots2 and like            
grease-spots1 the spots spread4 ,but we 
let them spread as little as possible3  
we keep unaltered as much of our old    
knowledge1 as many of our old prejudices
 and beliefs1 as we can4 ,we patch and  
tinker more than we renew4 ,the novelty 
soaks in2 it stains the ancient mass2   
but it is also tinged by what absorbs   
it4 ,our past apperceives and           
co-operates2 and in the new equilibrium 
in which each step forward in the       

process of learning terminates1 it      
happens relatively seldom that the new  
fact is added ,,raw4 ,more usually it is
 embedded cooked1 as one might say1 or  
stewed down in the sauce of the old4    
,new truths thus are resultants of new  
experiences and of old truths combined  
and mutually modifying one another4 ,and
 since this is the case in the changes  
of opinion of to-day1 there is no reason
 to assume that it has not been so at   
all times4 ,it follows that very ancient
 modes of thought may have survived     
through all the later changes in men's  
opinions4 ,the most primitive ways of   
thinking may not yet be wholly expunged4
 ,like our five fingers1 our ear-bones1 
our rudimentary caudal appendage1 or our
 other 'vestigial' peculiarities1 they  
may remain as indelible tokens of events
 in our race-history4 ,our ancestors may
 at certain moments have struck into    
ways of thinking which they might       
conceivably not have found4 ,but once   
they did so1 and after the fact1 the    

inheritance continues4 ,when you begin a
 piece of music in a certain key1 you   
must keep the key to the end4 ,you may  
alter your house ad libitum1 but the    
ground-plan of the first architect      
persists--you can make great changes1   
but you cannot change a ,gothic church  
into a ,doric temple4 ,you may rinse and
 rinse the bottle1 but you can't get the
 taste of the medicine or whiskey that  
first filled it wholly out4  ,my thesis 
now is this1 that ,,our ,,fundamental   
,,ways ,,of ,,thinking ,,about ,,things 
,,are ,,discoveries ,,of ,,exceedingly  
,,remote ,,ancestors1 ,,which ,,have    
,,been ,,able ,,to ,,preserve           
,,themselves ,,throughout ,,the         
,,experience ,,of ,,all ,,subsequent    
,,time4 ,they form one great stage of   
equilibrium in the human mind's         
development1 the stage of common sense4 
,other stages have grafted themselves   
upon this stage1 but have never         
succeeded in displacing it4 ,let us     
consider this common-sense stage first1 

as if it might be final4  ,in practical 
talk1 a man's common sense means his    
good judgment1 his freedom from         
excentricity1 his ,,gumption1 to use the
 vernacular word4 ,in philosophy it     
means something entirely different1 it  
means his use of certain intellectual   
forms or categories of thought4 ,were we
 lobsters1 or bees1 it might be that our
 organization would have led to our     
using quite different modes from these  
of apprehending our experiences4 ,it    
,,might be too 7we cannot dogmatically  
deny this7 that such categories1        
unimaginable by us to-day1 would have   
proved on the whole as serviceable for  
handling our experiences mentally as    
those which we actually use4  ,if this  
sounds paradoxical to anyone1 let him   
think of analytical geometry4 ,the      
identical figures which ,euclid defined 
by intrinsic relations were defined by  
,descartes by the relations of their    
points to adventitious co-ordinates1 the
 result being an absolutely different   

and vastly more potent way of handling  
curves4 ,all our conceptions are what   
the ,germans call denkmittel1 means by  
which we handle facts by thinking them4 
,experience merely as such doesn't come 
ticketed and labeled1 we have first to  
discover what it is4 ,kant speaks of it 
as being in its first intention a       
gewuehl der erscheinungen1 a rhapsodie  
der wahrnehmungen1 a mere motley which  
we have to unify by our wits4 ,what we  
usually do is first to frame some system
 of concepts mentally classified1       
serialized1 or connected in some        
intellectual way1 and then to use this  
as a tally by which we 'keep tab' on the
 impressions that present themselves4   
,when each is referred to some possible 
place in the conceptual system1 it is   
thereby 'understood4' ,this notion of   
parallel 'manifolds' with their elements
 standing reciprocally in 'one-to-one   
relations1' is proving so convenient    
nowadays in mathematics and logic as to 
supersede more and more the older       

classificatory conceptions4 ,there are  
many conceptual systems of this sort2   
and the sense manifold is also such a   
system4 ,find a one-to-one relation for 
your sense-impressions ,,anywhere among 
the concepts1 and in so far forth you   
rationalize the impressions4 ,but       
obviously you can rationalize them by   
using various conceptual systems4  ,the 
old common-sense way of rationalizing   
them is by a set of concepts of which   
the most important are these3  ,thing2  
,the same or different2  ,kinds2        
,minds2  ,bodies2  ,one ,time2  ,one    
,space2  ,subjects and attributes2      
,causal influences2  ,the fancied2  ,the
 real4  ,we are now so familiar with the
 order that these notions have woven for
 us out of the everlasting weather of   
our perceptions that we find it hard to 
realize how little of a fixed routine   
the perceptions follow when taken by    
themselves4 ,the word weather is a good 
one to use here4 ,in ,boston1 for       
example1 the weather has almost no      

routine1 the only law being that if you 
have had any weather for two days1 you  
will probably but not certainly have    
another weather on the third4           
,weather-experience as it thus comes to 
,boston1 is discontinuous and chaotic4  
,in point of temperature1 of wind1 rain 
or sunshine1 it ,,may change three times
 a day4 ,but the ,washington            
weather-bureau intellectualizes this    
disorder by making each successive bit  
of ,boston weather ,,episodic4 ,it      
refers it to its place and moment in a  
continental cyclone1 on the history of  
which the local changes everywhere are  
strung as beads are strung upon a cord4 
,now it seems almost certain that young 
children and the inferior animals take  
all their experiences very much as      
uninstructed ,bostonians take their     
weather4 ,they know no more of time or  
space as world-receptacles1 or of       
permanent subjects and changing         
predicates1 or of causes1 or kinds1 or  
thoughts1 or things1 than our common    

people know of continental cyclones4 ,a 
baby's rattle drops out of his hand1 but
 the baby looks not for it4 ,it has     
'gone out' for him1 as a candle-flame   
goes out2 and it comes back1 when you   
replace it in his hand1 as the flame    
comes back when relit4 ,the idea of its 
being a 'thing1' whose permanent        
existence by itself he might interpolate
 between its successive apparitions has 
evidently not occurred to him4 ,it is   
the same with dogs4 ,out of sight1 out  
of mind1 with them4 ,it is pretty       
evident that they have no ,,general     
tendency to interpolate 'things4' ,let  
me quote here a passage from my         
colleague ,g4 ,santayana's book4  ,if a 
dog1 while sniffing about contentedly1  
sees afar off his master arriving after 
long absence444the poor brute asks for  
no reason why his master went1 why he   
has come again1 why he should be loved1 
or why presently while lying at his feet
 you forget him and begin to grunt and  
dream of the chase--all that is an utter

 mystery1 utterly unconsidered4 ,such   
experience has variety1 scenery1 and a  
certain vital rhythm2 its story might be
 told in dithyrambic verse4 ,it moves   
wholly by inspiration2 every event is   
providential1 every act unpremeditated4 
,absolute freedom and absolute          
helplessness have met together3 you     
depend wholly on divine favour1 yet that
 unfathomable agency is not             
distinguishable from your own life4     
444,but the figures even of that        
disordered drama have their exits and   
their entrances2 and their cues can be  
gradually discovered by a being capable 
of fixing his attention and retaining   
the order of events4 444,in proportion  
as such understanding advances each     
moment of experience becomes            
consequential and prophetic of the rest4
 ,the calm places in life are filled    
with power and its spasms with resource4
 ,no emotion can overwhelm the mind1 for
 of none is the basis or issue wholly   
hidden2 no event can disconcert it      

altogether1 because it sees beyond4     
,means can be looked for to escape from 
the worst predicament2 and whereas each 
moment had been formerly filled with    
nothing but its own adventure and       
surprised emotion1 each now makes room  
for the lesson of what went before and  
surmises what may be the plot of the    
whole4,footnote3 ,the ,life of ,reason3 
,reason in ,common ,sense1 #aije1 p4    
#ei4  ,even to-day science and          
philosophy are still laboriously trying 
to part fancies from realities in our   
experience2 and in primitive times they 
made only the most incipient            
distinctions in this line4 ,men believed
 whatever they thought with any         
liveliness1 and they mixed their dreams 
with their realities inextricably4 ,the 
categories of 'thought' and 'things' are
 indispensable here--instead of being   
realities we now call certain           
experiences only 'thoughts4' ,there is  
not a category1 among those enumerated1 
of which we may not imagine the use to  

have thus originated historically and   
only gradually spread4  ,that one ,time 
which we all believe in and in which    
each event has its definite date1 that  
one ,space in which each thing has its  
position1 these abstract notions unify  
the world incomparably2 but in their    
finished shape as concepts how different
 they are from the loose unordered      
time-and-space experiences of natural   
men6 ,everything that happens to us     
brings its own duration and extension1  
and both are vaguely surrounded by a    
marginal 'more' that runs into the      
duration and extension of the next thing
 that comes4 ,but we soon lose all our  
definite bearings2 and not only do our  
children make no distinction between    
yesterday and the day before yesterday1 
the whole past being churned up         
together1 but we adults still do so     
whenever the times are large4 ,it is the
 same with spaces4 ,on a map ,i can     
distinctly see the relation of ,london1 
,constantinople1 and ,pekin to the place

 where ,i am2 in reality ,i utterly fail
 to ,,feel the facts which the map      
symbolizes4 ,the directions and         
distances are vague1 confused and mixed4
 ,cosmic space and cosmic time1 so far  
from being the intuitions that ,kant    
said they were1 are constructions as    
patently artificial as any that science 
can show4 ,the great majority of the    
human race never use these notions1 but 
live in plural times and spaces1        
interpenetrant and ,,durcheinander4     
,permanent 'things' again2 the 'same'   
thing and its various 'appearances' and 
'alterations'2 the different 'kinds' of 
thing2 with the 'kind' used finally as a
 'predicate1' of which the thing remains
 the 'subject'--what a straightening of 
the tangle of our experience's immediate
 flux and sensible variety does this    
list of terms suggest6 ,and it is only  
the smallest part of his experience's   
flux that anyone actually does          
straighten out by applying to it these  
conceptual instruments4 ,out of them all

 our lowest ancestors probably used     
only1 and then most vaguely and         
inaccurately1 the notion of 'the same   
again4' ,but even then if you had asked 
them whether the same were a 'thing'    
that had endured throughout the unseen  
interval1 they would probably have been 
at a loss1 and would have said that they
 had never asked that question1 or      
considered matters in that light4       
,kinds1 and sameness of kind--what      
colossally useful ,,denkmittel for      
finding our way among the many6 ,the    
manyness might conceivably have been    
absolute4 ,experiences might have all   
been singulars1 no one of them occurring
 twice4 ,in such a world logic would    
have had no application2 for kind and   
sameness of kind are logic's only       
instruments4 ,once we know that whatever
 is of a kind is also of that kind's    
kind1 we can travel through the universe
 as if with seven-league boots4 ,brutes 
surely never use these abstractions1 and
 civilized men use them in most various 

amounts4  ,causal influence1 again6     
,this1 if anything1 seems to have been  
an antediluvian conception2 for we find 
primitive men thinking that almost      
everything is significant and can exert 
influence of some sort4 ,the search for 
the more definite influences seems to   
have started in the question3 ,who1 or  
what1 is to blame8--for any illness1    
namely1 or disaster1 or untoward thing4 
,from this centre the search for causal 
influences has spread4 ,hume and        
',science' together have tried to       
eliminate the whole notion of influence1
 substituting the entirely different    
,,denkmittel of 'law4' ,but law is a    
comparatively recent invention1 and     
influence reigns supreme in the older   
realm of common sense4  ,the 'possible1'
 as something less than the actual and  
more than the wholly unreal1 is another 
of these magisterial notions of common  
sense4 ,criticize them as you may1 they 
persist2 and we fly back to them the    
moment critical pressure is relaxed4    

',self1' 'body1' in the substantial or  
metaphysical sense--no one escapes      
subjection to ,,those forms of thought4 
,in practice1 the common-sense          
,,denkmittel are uniformly victorious4  
,everyone1 however instructed1 still    
thinks of a 'thing' in the common-sense 
way1 as a permanent unit-subject that   
'supports' its attributes               
interchangeably4 ,no one stably or      
sincerely uses the more critical notion1
 of a group of sense-qualities united by
 a law4 ,with these categories in our   
hand1 we make our plans and plot        
together1 and connect all the remoter   
parts of experience with what lies      
before our eyes4 ,our later and more    
critical philosophies are mere fads and 
fancies compared with this natural      
mother-tongue of thought4  ,common sense
 appears thus as a perfectly definite   
stage in our understanding of things1 a 
stage that satisfies in an              
extraordinarily successful way the      
purposes for which we think4 ',things'  

do exist1 even when we do not see them4 
,their 'kinds' also exist4 ,their       
'qualities' are what they act by1 and   
are what we act on2 and these also      
exist4 ,these lamps shed their quality  
of light on every object in this room4  
,we intercept ,,it on its way whenever  
we hold up an opaque screen4 ,it is the 
very sound that my lips emit that       
travels into your ears4 ,it is the      
sensible heat of the fire that migrates 
into the water in which we boil an egg2 
and we can change the heat into coolness
 by dropping in a lump of ice4 ,at this 
stage of philosophy all non-,european   
men without exception have remained4 ,it
 suffices for all the necessary         
practical ends of life2 and1 among our  
own race even1 it is only the highly    
sophisticated specimens1 the minds      
debauched by learning1 as ,berkeley     
calls them1 who have ever even suspected
 common sense of not being absolutely   
true4  ,but when we look back1 and      
speculate as to how the common-sense    

categories may have achieved their      
wonderful supremacy1 no reason appears  
why it may not have been by a process   
just like that by which the conceptions 
due to ,democritus1 ,berkeley1 or       
,darwin1 achieved their similar triumphs
 in more recent times4 ,in other words1 
they may have been successfully         
,,discovered by prehistoric geniuses    
whose names the night of antiquity has  
covered up2 they may have been verified 
by the immediate facts of experience    
which they first fitted2 and then from  
fact to fact and from man to man they   
may have ,,spread1 until all language   
rested on them and we are now incapable 
of thinking naturally in any other      
terms4 ,such a view would only follow   
the rule that has proved elsewhere so   
fertile1 of assuming the vast and remote
 to conform to the laws of formation    
that we can observe at work in the small
 and near4  ,for all utilitarian        
practical purposes these conceptions    
amply suffice2 but that they began at   

special points of discovery and only    
gradually spread from one thing to      
another1 seems proved by the exceedingly
 dubious limits of their application    
to-day4 ,we assume for certain purposes 
one 'objective' ,time that              
,,aequabiliter ,,fluit1 but we don't    
livingly believe in or realize any such 
equally-flowing time4 ',space' is a less
 vague notion2 but 'things1' what are   
they8 ,is a constellation properly a    
thing8 or an army8 or is an ,,ens       
,,rationis such as space or justice a   
thing8 ,is a knife whose handle and     
blade are changed the 'same'8 ,is the   
'changeling1' whom ,locke so seriously  
discusses1 of the human 'kind'8 ,is     
'telepathy' a 'fancy' or a 'fact'8 ,the 
moment you pass beyond the practical use
 of these categories 7a use usually     
suggested sufficiently by the           
circumstances of the special case7 to a 
merely curious or speculative way of    
thinking1 you find it impossible to say 
within just what limits of fact any one 

of them shall apply4  ,the peripatetic  
philosophy1 obeying rationalist         
propensities1 has tried to eternalize   
the common-sense categories by treating 
them very technically and articulately4 
,a 'thing' for instance is a being1 or  
,,ens4 ,an ,,ens is a subject in which  
qualities 'inhere4' ,a subject is a     
substance4 ,substances are of kinds1 and
 kinds are definite in number1 and      
discrete4 ,these distinctions are       
fundamental and eternal4 ,as terms of   
,,discourse they are indeed             
magnificently useful1 but what they     
mean1 apart from their use in steering  
our discourse to profitable issues1 does
 not appear4 ,if you ask a scholastic   
philosopher what a substance may be in  
itself1 apart from its being the support
 of attributes1 he simply says that your
 intellect knows perfectly what the word
 means4  ,but what the intellect knows  
clearly is only the word itself and its 
steering function4 ,so it comes about   
that intellects ,,sibi ,,permissi1      

intellects only curious and idle1 have  
forsaken the common-sense level for what
 in general terms may be called the     
'critical' level of thought4 ,not merely
 ,,such intellects either--your ,humes  
and ,berkeleys and ,hegels2 but         
practical observers of facts1 your      
,galileos1 ,daltons1 ,faradays1 have    
found it impossible to treat the ,,naifs
 sense-termini of common sense as       
ultimately real4 ,as common sense       
interpolates her constant 'things'      
between our intermittent sensations1 so 
science ,e,x,t,r,apolates her world of  
'primary' qualities1 her atoms1 her     
ether1 her magnetic fields1 and the     
like1 beyond the common-sense world4    
,the 'things' are now invisible         
impalpable things2 and the old visible  
common-sense things are supposed to     
result from the mixture of these        
invisibles4 ,or else the whole ,,naif   
conception of thing gets superseded1 and
 a thing's name is interpreted as       
denoting only the law or ,,regel ,,der  

,,verbindung by which certain of our    
sensations habitually succeed or        
coexist4  ,science and critical         
philosophy thus burst the bounds of     
common sense4 ,with science ,,naif      
realism ceases3 ',secondary' qualities  
become unreal2 primary ones alone       
remain4 ,with critical philosophy1 havoc
 is made of everything4 ,the            
common-sense categories one and all     
cease to represent anything in the way  
of ,,being2 they are but sublime tricks 
of human thought1 our ways of escaping  
bewilderment in the midst of sensation's
 irremediable flow4  ,but the scientific
 tendency in critical thought1 tho      
inspired at first by purely intellectual
 motives1 has opened an entirely        
unexpected range of practical utilities 
to our astonished view4 ,galileo gave us
 accurate clocks and accurate           
artillery-practice2 the chemists flood  
us with new medicines and dye-stuffs2   
,ampere and ,faraday have endowed us    
with the ,new ,york subway and with     

,marconi telegrams4 ,the hypothetical   
things that such men have invented1     
defined as they have defined them1 are  
showing an extraordinary fertility in   
consequences verifiable by sense4 ,our  
logic can deduce from them a consequence
 due under certain conditions1 we can   
then bring about the conditions1 and    
presto1 the consequence is there before 
our eyes4 ,the scope of the practical   
control of nature newly put into our    
hand by scientific ways of thinking     
vastly exceeds the scope of the old     
control grounded on common sense4 ,its  
rate of increase accelerates so that no 
one can trace the limit2 one may even   
fear that the ,,being of man may be     
crushed by his own powers1 that his     
fixed nature as an organism may not     
prove adequate to stand the strain of   
the ever increasingly tremendous        
functions1 almost divine creative       
functions1 which his intellect will more
 and more enable him to wield4 ,he may  
drown in his wealth like a child in a   

bath-tub1 who has turned on the water   
and who cannot turn it off4  ,the       
philosophic stage of criticism1 much    
more thorough in its negations than the 
scientific stage1 so far gives us no new
 range of practical power4 ,locke1      
,hume1 ,berkeley1 ,kant1 ,hegel1 have   
all been utterly sterile1 so far as     
shedding any light on the details of    
nature goes1 and ,i can think of no     
invention or discovery that can be      
directly traced to anything in their    
peculiar thought1 for neither with      
,berkeley's tar-water nor with ,kant's  
nebular hypothesis had their respective 
philosophic tenets anything to do4 ,the 
satisfactions they yield to their       
disciples are intellectual1 not         
practical2 and even then we have to     
confess that there is a large minus-side
 to the account4  ,there are thus at    
least three well-characterized levels1  
stages or types of thought about the    
world we live in1 and the notions of one
 stage have one kind of merit1 those of 

another stage another kind4 ,it is      
impossible1 however1 to say that any    
stage as yet in sight is absolutely more
 ,,true than any other4 ,common sense is
 the more ,,consolidated stage1 because 
it got its innings first1 and made all  
language into its ally4 ,whether it or  
science be the more ,,august stage may  
be left to private judgment4 ,but       
neither consolidation nor augustness are
 decisive marks of truth4 ,if common    
sense were true1 why should science have
 had to brand the secondary qualities1  
to which our world owes all its living  
interest1 as false1 and to invent an    
invisible world of points and curves and
 mathematical equations instead8 ,why   
should it have needed to transform      
causes and activities into laws of      
'functional variation'8 ,vainly did     
scholasticism1 common sense's           
college-trained younger sister1 seek to 
stereotype the forms the human family   
had always talked with1 to make them    
definite and fix them for eternity4     

,substantial forms 7in other words our  
secondary qualities7 hardly outlasted   
the year of our ,lord #afjj4 ,people    
were already tired of them then2 and    
,galileo1 and ,descartes1 with his 'new 
philosophy1' gave them only a little    
later their coup de grace4  ,but now if 
the new kinds of scientific 'thing1' the
 corpuscular and etheric world1 were    
essentially more 'true1' why should they
 have excited so much criticism within  
the body of science itself8 ,scientific 
logicians are saying on every hand that 
these entities and their determinations1
 however definitely conceived1 should   
not be held for literally real4 ,it is  
,,as ,,if they existed2 but in reality  
they are like co-ordinates or           
logarithms1 only artificial short-cuts  
for taking us from one part to another  
of experience's flux4 ,we can cipher    
fruitfully with them2 they serve us     
wonderfully2 but we must not be their   
dupes4  ,there is no ,,ringing          
conclusion possible when we compare     

these types of thinking1 with a view to 
telling which is the more absolutely    
true4 ,their naturalness1 their         
intellectual economy1 their fruitfulness
 for practice1 all start up as distinct 
tests of their veracity1 and as a result
 we get confused4 ,common sense is      
,,better for one sphere of life1 science
 for another1 philosophic criticism for 
a third2 but whether either be ,,truer  
absolutely1 ,heaven only knows4 ,just   
now1 if ,i understand the matter        
rightly1 we are witnessing a curious    
reversion to the common-sense way of    
looking at physical nature1 in the      
philosophy of science favored by such   
men as ,mach1 ,ostwald and ,duhem4      
,according to these teachers no         
hypothesis is truer than any other in   
the sense of being a more literal copy  
of reality4 ,they are all but ways of   
talking on our part1 to be compared     
solely from the point of view of their  
,,use4 ,the only literally true thing is
 ,,reality2 and the only reality we know

 is1 for these logicians1 sensible      
reality1 the flux of our sensations and 
emotions as they pass4 ',energy' is the 
collective name 7according to ,ostwald7 
for the sensations just as they present 
themselves 7the movement1 heat1 magnetic
 pull1 or light1 or whatever it may be7 
when they are measured in certain ways4 
,so measuring them1 we are enabled to   
describe the correlated changes which   
they show us1 in formulas matchless for 
their simplicity and fruitfulness for   
human use4 ,they are sovereign triumphs 
of economy in thought4  ,no one can fail
 to admire the 'energetic' philosophy4  
,but the hypersensible entities1 the    
corpuscles and vibrations1 hold their   
own with most physicists and chemists1  
in spite of its appeal4 ,it seems too   
economical to be all-sufficient4        
,profusion1 not economy1 may after all  
be reality's key-note4  ,i am dealing   
here with highly technical matters1     
hardly suitable for popular lecturing1  
and in which my own competence is small4

 ,all the better for my conclusion1     
however1 which at this point is this4   
,the whole notion of truth1 which       
naturally and without reflexion we      
assume to mean the simple duplication by
 the mind of a ready-made and given     
reality1 proves hard to understand      
clearly4 ,there is no simple test       
available for adjudicating offhand      
between the divers types of thought that
 claim to possess it4 ,common sense1    
common science or corpuscular           
philosophy1 ultra-critical science1 or  
energetics1 and critical or idealistic  
philosophy1 all seem insufficiently true
 in some regard and leave some          
dissatisfaction4 ,it is evident that the
 conflict of these so widely differing  
systems obliges us to overhaul the very 
idea of truth1 for at present we have no
 definite notion of what the word may   
mean4 ,i shall face that task in my next
 lecture1 and will add but a few words1 
in finishing the present one4  ,there   
are only two points that ,i wish you to 

retain from the present lecture4 ,the   
first one relates to common sense4 ,we  
have seen reason to suspect it1 to      
suspect that in spite of their being so 
venerable1 of their being so universally
 used and built into the very structure 
of language1 its categories may after   
all be only a collection of             
extraordinarily successful hypotheses   
7historically discovered or invented by 
single men1 but gradually communicated1 
and used by everybody7 by which our     
forefathers have from time immemorial   
unified and straightened the            
discontinuity of their immediate        
experiences1 and put themselves into an 
equilibrium with the surface of nature  
so satisfactory for ordinary practical  
purposes that it certainly would have   
lasted forever1 but for the excessive   
intellectual vivacity of ,democritus1   
,archimedes1 ,galileo1 ,berkeley1 and   
other excentric geniuses whom the       
example of such men inflamed4 ,retain1  
,i pray you1 this suspicion about common

 sense4  ,the other point is this4      
,ought not the existence of the various 
types of thinking which we have         
reviewed1 each so splendid for certain  
purposes1 yet all conflicting still1 and
 neither one of them able to support a  
claim of absolute veracity1 to awaken a 
presumption favorable to the            
pragmatistic view that all our theories 
are ,,instrumental1 are mental modes of 
,,adaptation to reality1 rather than    
revelations or gnostic answers to some  
divinely instituted world-enigma8 ,i    
expressed this view as clearly as ,i    
could in the second of these lectures4  
,certainly the restlessness of the      
actual theoretic situation1 the value   
for some purposes of each thought-level1
 and the inability of either to expel   
the others decisively1 suggest this     
pragmatistic view1 which ,i hope that   
the next lectures may soon make entirely
 convincing4 ,may there not after all be
 a possible ambiguity in truth8         
,lecture ,,vi  ,pragmatism's ,conception

 of ,truth  ,when ,clerk ,maxwell was a 
child it is written that he had a mania 
for having everything explained to him1 
and that when people put him off with   
vague verbal accounts of any phenomenon 
he would interrupt them impatiently by  
saying1 ,yes2 but ,i want you to tell me
 the ,,particular ,,go of it6 ,had his  
question been about truth1 only a       
pragmatist could have told him the      
particular go of it4 ,i believe that our
 contemporary pragmatists1 especially   
,messrs4 ,schiller and ,dewey1 have     
given the only tenable account of this  
subject4 ,it is a very ticklish subject1
 sending subtle rootlets into all kinds 
of crannies1 and hard to treat in the   
sketchy way that alone befits a public  
lecture4 ,but the ,schiller-,dewey view 
of truth has been so ferociously        
attacked by rationalistic philosophers1 
and so abominably misunderstood1 that   
here1 if anywhere1 is the point where a 
clear and simple statement should be    
made4  ,i fully expect to see the       

pragmatist view of truth run through the
 classic stages of a theory's career4   
,first1 you know1 a new theory is       
attacked as absurd2 then it is admitted 
to be true1 but obvious and             
insignificant2 finally it is seen to be 
so important that its adversaries claim 
that they themselves discovered it4 ,our
 doctrine of truth is at present in the 
first of these three stages1 with       
symptoms of the second stage having     
begun in certain quarters4 ,i wish that 
this lecture might help it beyond the   
first stage in the eyes of many of you4 
,truth1 as any dictionary will tell you1
 is a property of certain of our ideas4 
,it means their 'agreement1' as falsity 
means their disagreement1 with          
'reality4' ,pragmatists and             
intellectualists both accept this       
definition as a matter of course4 ,they 
begin to quarrel only after the question
 is raised as to what may precisely be  
meant by the term 'agreement1' and what 
by the term 'reality1' when reality is  

taken as something for our ideas to     
agree with4  ,in answering these        
questions the pragmatists are more      
analytic and painstaking1 the           
intellectualists more offhand and       
irreflective4 ,the popular notion is    
that a true idea must copy its reality4 
,like other popular views1 this one     
follows the analogy of the most usual   
experience4 ,our true ideas of sensible 
things do indeed copy them4 ,shut your  
eyes and think of yonder clock on the   
wall1 and you get just such a true      
picture or copy of its dial4 ,but your  
idea of its 'works' 7unless you are a   
clock-maker7 is much less of a copy1 yet
 it passes muster1 for it in no way     
clashes with the reality4 ,even tho it  
should shrink to the mere word 'works1' 
that word still serves you truly2 and   
when you speak of the 'time-keeping     
function' of the clock1 or of its       
spring's 'elasticity1' it is hard to see
 exactly what your ideas can copy4  ,you
 perceive that there is a problem here4 

,where our ideas cannot copy definitely 
their object1 what does agreement with  
that object mean8 ,some idealists seem  
to say that they are true whenever they 
are what ,god means that we ought to    
think about that object4 ,others hold   
the copy-view all through1 and speak as 
if our ideas possessed truth just in    
proportion as they approach to being    
copies of the ,absolute's eternal way of
 thinking4  ,these views1 you see1      
invite pragmatistic discussion4 ,but the
 great assumption of the                
intellectualists is that truth means    
essentially an inert static relation4   
,when you've got your true idea of      
anything1 there's an end of the matter4 
,you're in possession2 you ,,know2 you  
have fulfilled your thinking destiny4   
,you are where you ought to be mentally2
 you have obeyed your categorical       
imperative2 and nothing more need follow
 on that climax of your rational        
destiny4 ,epistemologically you are in  
stable equilibrium4  ,pragmatism1 on the

 other hand1 asks its usual question4   
,grant an idea or belief to be true1 it 
says1 what concrete difference will its 
being true make in anyone's actual life8
 ,how will the truth be realized8 ,what 
experiences will be different from those
 which would obtain if the belief were  
false8 ,what1 in short1 is the truth's  
cash-value in experiential terms8  ,the 
moment pragmatism asks this question1 it
 sees the answer3 ,,true ,,ideas ,,are  
,,those ,,that ,,we ,,can ,,assimilate1 
,,validate1 ,,corroborate ,,and         
,,verify4 ,,false ,,ideas ,,are ,,those 
,,that ,,we ,,cannot4 ,that is the      
practical difference it makes to us to  
have true ideas2 that1 therefore1 is the
 meaning of truth1 for it is all that   
truth is known-as4  ,this thesis is what
 ,i have to defend4 ,the truth of an    
idea is not a stagnant property inherent
 in it4 ,truth ,,happens to an idea4 ,it
 ,,becomes true1 is ,,made true by      
events4 ,its verity is in fact an event1
 a process3 the process namely of its   

verifying itself1 its veri-,,fication4  
,its validity is the process of its     
valid-,,ation4  ,but what do the words  
verification and validation themselves  
pragmatically mean8 ,they again signify 
certain practical consequences of the   
verified and validated idea4 ,it is hard
 to find any one phrase that            
characterizes these consequences better 
than the ordinary                       
agreement-formula--just such            
consequences being what we have in mind 
whenever we say that our ideas 'agree'  
with reality4 ,they lead us1 namely1    
through the acts and other ideas which  
they instigate1 into or up to1 or       
towards1 other parts of experience with 
which we feel all the while-such feeling
 being among our potentialities--that   
the original ideas remain in agreement4 
,the connexions and transitions come to 
us from point to point as being         
progressive1 harmonious1 satisfactory4  
,this function of agreeable leading is  
what we mean by an idea's verification4 

,such an account is vague and it sounds 
at first quite trivial1 but it has      
results which it will take the rest of  
my hour to explain4  ,let me begin by   
reminding you of the fact that the      
possession of true thoughts means       
everywhere the possession of invaluable 
instruments of action2 and that our duty
 to gain truth1 so far from being a     
blank command from out of the blue1 or a
 'stunt' self-imposed by our intellect1 
can account for itself by excellent     
practical reasons4  ,the importance to  
human life of having true beliefs about 
matters of fact is a thing too          
notorious4 ,we live in a world of       
realities that can be infinitely useful 
or infinitely harmful4 ,ideas that tell 
us which of them to expect count as the 
true ideas in all this primary sphere of
 verification1 and the pursuit of such  
ideas is a primary human duty4 ,the     
possession of truth1 so far from being  
here an end in itself1 is only a        
preliminary means towards other vital   

satisfactions4 ,if ,i am lost in the    
woods and starved1 and find what looks  
like a cow-path1 it is of the utmost    
importance that ,i should think of a    
human habitation at the end of it1 for  
if ,i do so and follow it1 ,i save      
myself4 ,the true thought is useful here
 because the house which is its object  
is useful4 ,the practical value of true 
ideas is thus primarily derived from the
 practical importance of their objects  
to us4 ,their objects are1 indeed1 not  
important at all times4 ,i may on       
another occasion have no use for the    
house2 and then my idea of it1 however  
verifiable1 will be practically         
irrelevant1 and had better remain       
latent4 ,yet since almost any object may
 some day become temporarily important1 
the advantage of having a general stock 
of extra truths1 of ideas that shall be 
true of merely possible situations1 is  
obvious4 ,we store such extra truths    
away in our memories1 and with the      
overflow we fill our books of reference4

 ,whenever such an extra truth becomes  
practically relevant to one of our      
emergencies1 it passes from cold-storage
 to do work in the world1 and our belief
 in it grows active4 ,you can say of it 
then either that 'it is useful because  
it is true' or that 'it is true because 
it is useful4' ,both these phrases mean 
exactly the same thing1 namely that here
 is an idea that gets fulfilled and can 
be verified4 ,true is the name for      
whatever idea starts the                
verification-process1 useful is the name
 for its completed function in          
experience4 ,true ideas would never have
 been singled out as such1 would never  
have acquired a class-name1 least of all
 a name suggesting value1 unless they   
had been useful from the outset in this 
way4  ,from this simple cue pragmatism  
gets her general notion of truth as     
something essentially bound up with the 
way in which one moment in our          
experience may lead us towards other    
moments which it will be worth while to 

have been led to4 ,primarily1 and on the
 common-sense level1 the truth of a     
state of mind means this function of ,a 
,,leading ,,that ,,is ,,worth ,,while4  
,when a moment in our experience1 of any
 kind whatever1 inspires us with a      
thought that is true1 that means that   
sooner or later we dip by that thought's
 guidance into the particulars of       
experience again and make advantageous  
connexion with them4 ,this is a vague   
enough statement1 but ,i beg you to     
retain it1 for it is essential4  ,our   
experience meanwhile is all shot through
 with regularities4 ,one bit of it can  
warn us to get ready for another bit1   
can 'intend' or be 'significant of' that
 remoter object4 ,the object's advent is
 the significance's verification4       
,truth1 in these cases1 meaning nothing 
but eventual verification1 is manifestly
 incompatible with waywardness on our   
part4 ,woe to him whose beliefs play    
fast and loose with the order which     
realities follow in his experience3 they

 will lead him nowhere or else make     
false connexions4  ,by 'realities' or   
'objects' here1 we mean either things of
 common sense1 sensibly present1 or else
 common-sense relations1 such as dates1 
places1 distances1 kinds1 activities4   
,following our mental image of a house  
along the cow-path1 we actually come to 
see the house2 we get the image's full  
verification4 ,,such ,,simply ,,and     
,,fully ,,verified ,,leadings ,,are     
,,certainly ,,the ,,originals ,,and     
,,prototypes ,,of ,,the                 
,,truth-,,process4 ,experience offers   
indeed other forms of truth-process1 but
 they are all conceivable as being      
primary verifications arrested1         
multiplied or substituted one for       
another4  ,take1 for instance1 yonder   
object on the wall4 ,you and ,i consider
 it to be a 'clock1' altho no one of us 
has seen the hidden works that make it  
one4 ,we let our notion pass for true   
without attempting to verify4 ,if truths
 mean verification-process essentially1 

ought we then to call such unverified   
truths as this abortive8 ,no1 for they  
form the overwhelmingly large number of 
the truths we live by4 ,indirect as well
 as direct verifications pass muster4   
,where circumstantial evidence is       
sufficient1 we can go without           
eye-witnessing4 ,just as we here assume 
,japan to exist without ever having been
 there1 because it ,,works to do so1    
everything we know conspiring with the  
belief1 and nothing interfering1 so we  
assume that thing to be a clock4 ,we    
,,use it as a clock1 regulating the     
length of our lecture by it4 ,the       
verification of the assumption here     
means its leading to no frustration or  
contradiction4 ,verifi,a,b,i,l,i,t,y of 
wheels and weights and pendulum is as   
good as verification4 ,for one          
truth-process completed there are a     
million in our lives that function in   
this state of nascency4 ,they turn us   
,,towards direct verification2 lead us  
into the ,,surroundings of the objects  

they envisage2 and then1 if everything  
runs on harmoniously1 we are so sure    
that verification is possible that we   
omit it1 and are usually justified by   
all that happens4  ,truth lives1 in     
fact1 for the most part on a credit     
system4 ,our thoughts and beliefs       
'pass1' so long as nothing challenges   
them1 just as bank-notes pass so long as
 nobody refuses them4 ,but this all     
points to direct face-to-face           
verifications somewhere1 without which  
the fabric of truth collapses like a    
financial system with no cash-basis     
whatever4 ,you accept my verification of
 one thing1 ,i yours of another4 ,we    
trade on each other's truth4 ,but       
beliefs verified concretely by          
,,somebody are the posts of the whole   
superstructure4  ,another great         
reason--beside economy of time--for     
waiving complete verification in the    
usual business of life is that all      
things exist in kinds and not singly4   
,our world is found once for all to have

 that peculiarity4 ,so that when we have
 once directly verified our ideas about 
one specimen of a kind1 we consider     
ourselves free to apply them to other   
specimens without verification4 ,a mind 
that habitually discerns the kind of    
thing before it1 and acts by the law of 
the kind immediately1 without pausing to
 verify1 will be a 'true' mind in       
ninety-nine out of a hundred            
emergencies1 proved so by its conduct   
fitting everything it meets1 and getting
 no refutation4  ,,indirectly ,,or      
,,only ,,potentially ,,verifying        
,,processes ,,may ,,thus ,,be ,,true    
,,as ,,well ,,as ,,full                 
,,verification-,,processes4 ,they work  
as true processes would work1 give us   
the same advantages1 and claim our      
recognition for the same reasons4 ,all  
this on the common-sense level of1      
matters of fact1 which we are alone     
considering4  ,but matters of fact are  
not our only stock in trade4 ,,relations
 ,,among ,,purely ,,mental ,,ideas form 

another sphere where true and false     
beliefs obtain1 and here the beliefs are
 absolute1 or unconditional4 ,when they 
are true they bear the name either of   
definitions or of principles4 ,it is    
either a principle or a definition that 
#a and #a make #b1 that #b and #a make  
#c1 and so on2 that white differs less  
from gray than it does from black2 that 
when the cause begins to act the effect 
also commences4 ,such propositions hold 
of all possible 'ones1' of all          
conceivable 'whites' and 'grays' and    
'causes4' ,the objects here are mental  
objects4 ,their relations are           
perceptually obvious at a glance1 and no
 sense-verification is necessary4       
,moreover1 once true1 always true1 of   
those same mental objects4 ,truth here  
has an 'eternal' character4 ,if you can 
find a concrete thing anywhere that is  
'one' or 'white' or 'gray1' or an       
'effect1' then your principles will     
everlastingly apply to it4 ,it is but a 
case of ascertaining the kind1 and then 

applying the law of its kind to the     
particular object4 ,you are sure to get 
truth if you can but name the kind      
rightly1 for your mental relations hold 
good of everything of that kind without 
exception4 ,if you then1 nevertheless1  
failed to get truth concretely1 you     
would say that you had classed your real
 objects wrongly4  ,in this realm of    
mental relations1 truth again is an     
affair of leading4 ,we relate one       
abstract idea with another1 framing in  
the end great systems of logical and    
mathematical truth1 under the respective
 terms of which the sensible facts of   
experience eventually arrange           
themselves1 so that our eternal truths  
hold good of realities also4 ,this      
marriage of fact and theory is endlessly
 fertile4 ,what we say is here already  
true in advance of special verification1
 ,,if ,,we ,,have ,,subsumed ,,our      
,,objects ,,rightly4 ,our ready-made    
ideal framework for all sorts of        
possible objects follows from the very  

structure of our thinking4 ,we can no   
more play fast and loose with these     
abstract relations than we can do so    
with our sense-experiences4 ,they coerce
 us2 we must treat them consistently1   
whether or not we like the results4 ,the
 rules of addition apply to our debts as
 rigorously as to our assets4 ,the      
hundredth decimal of pi1 the ratio of   
the circumference to its diameter1 is   
predetermined ideally now1 tho no one   
may have computed it4 ,if we should ever
 need the figure in our dealings with an
 actual circle we should need to have it
 given rightly1 calculated by the usual 
rules2 for it is the same kind of truth 
that those rules elsewhere calculate4   
,between the coercions of the sensible  
order and those of the ideal order1 our 
mind is thus wedged tightly4 ,our ideas 
must agree with realities1 be such      
realities concrete or abstract1 be they 
facts or be they principles1 under      
penalty of endless inconsistency and    
frustration4 ,so far1 intellectualists  

can raise no protest4 ,they can only say
 that we have barely touched the skin of
 the matter4  ,realities mean1 then1    
either concrete facts1 or abstract kinds
 of things and relations perceived      
intuitively between them4 ,they         
furthermore and thirdly mean1 as things 
that new ideas of ours must no less take
 account of1 the whole body of other    
truths already in our possession4 ,but  
what now does 'agreement' with such     
three-fold realities mean8--to use again
 the definition that is current4  ,here 
it is that pragmatism and               
intellectualism begin to part company4  
,primarily1 no doubt1 to agree means to 
copy1 but we saw that the mere word     
'clock' would do instead of a mental    
picture of its works1 and that of many  
realities our ideas can only be symbols 
and not copies4 ',past time1' 'power1'  
'spontaneity'--how can our mind copy    
such realities8  ,to 'agree' in the     
widest sense with a reality1 ,,can      
,,only ,,mean ,,to ,,be ,,guided        

,,either ,,straight ,,up ,,to ,,it ,,or 
,,into ,,its ,,surroundings1 ,,or ,,to  
,,be ,,put ,,into ,,such ,,working      
,,touch ,,with ,,it ,,as ,,to ,,handle  
,,either ,,it ,,or ,,something          
,,connected ,,with ,,it ,,better ,,than 
,,if ,,we ,,disagreed4 ,better either   
intellectually or practically6 ,and     
often agreement will only mean the      
negative fact that nothing contradictory
 from the quarter of that reality comes 
to interfere with the way in which our  
ideas guide us elsewhere4 ,to copy a    
reality is1 indeed1 one very important  
way of agreeing with it1 but it is far  
from being essential4 ,the essential    
thing is the process of being guided4   
,any idea that helps us to ,,deal1      
whether practically or intellectually1  
with either the reality or its          
belongings1 that doesn't entangle our   
progress in frustrations1 that ,,fits1  
in fact1 and adapts our life to the     
reality's whole setting1 will agree     
sufficiently to meet the requirement4   

,it will hold true of that reality4     
,thus1 ,,names are just as 'true' or    
'false' as definite mental pictures are4
 ,they set up similar                   
verification-processes1 and lead to     
fully equivalent practical results4     
,all human thinking gets discursified2  
we exchange ideas2 we lend and borrow   
verifications1 get them from one another
 by means of social intercourse4 ,all   
truth thus gets verbally built out1     
stored up1 and made available for       
everyone4 ,hence1 we must ,,talk        
consistently just as we must ,,think    
consistently3 for both in talk and      
thought we deal with kinds4 ,names are  
arbitrary1 but once understood they must
 be kept to4 ,we mustn't now call ,abel 
',cain' or ,cain ',abel4' ,if we do1 we 
ungear ourselves from the whole book of 
,genesis1 and from all its connexions   
with the universe of speech and fact    
down to the present time4 ,we throw     
ourselves out of whatever truth that    
entire system of speech and fact may    

embody4  ,the overwhelming majority of  
our true ideas admit of no direct or    
face-to-face verification-those of past 
history1 for example1 as of ,cain and   
,abel4 ,the stream of time can be       
remounted only verbally1 or verified    
indirectly by the present prolongations 
or effects of what the past harbored4   
,yet if they agree with these           
verbalities and effects1 we can know    
that our ideas of the past are true4    
,,as ,,true ,,as ,,past ,,time ,,itself 
,,was1 so true was ,julius ,caesar1 so  
true were antediluvian monsters1 all in 
their proper dates and settings4 ,that  
past time itself was1 is guaranteed by  
its coherence with everything that's    
present4 ,true as the present is1 the   
past was also4  ,agreement thus turns   
out to be essentially an affair of      
leading--leading that is useful because 
it is into quarters that contain objects
 that are important4 ,true ideas lead us
 into useful verbal and conceptual      
quarters as well as directly up to      

useful sensible termini4 ,they lead to  
consistency1 stability and flowing human
 intercourse4 ,they lead away from      
excentricity and isolation1 from foiled 
and barren thinking4 ,the untrammeled   
flowing of the leading-process1 its     
general freedom from clash and          
contradiction1 passes for its indirect  
verification2 but all roads lead to     
,rome1 and in the end and eventually1   
all true processes must lead to the face
 of directly verifying sensible         
experiences ,,somewhere1 which          
somebody's ideas have copied4  ,such is 
the large loose way in which the        
pragmatist interprets the word          
agreement4 ,he treats it altogether     
practically4 ,he lets it cover any      
process of conduction from a present    
idea to a future terminus1 provided only
 it run prosperously4 ,it is only thus  
that 'scientific' ideas1 flying as they 
do beyond common sense1 can be said to  
agree with their realities4 ,it is1 as  
,i have already said1 as if reality were

 made of ether1 atoms or electrons1 but 
we mustn't think so literally4 ,the term
 'energy' doesn't even pretend to stand 
for anything 'objective4' ,it is only a 
way of measuring the surface of         
phenomena so as to string their changes 
on a simple formula4  ,yet in the choice
 of these man-made formulas we cannot be
 capricious with impunity any more than 
we can be capricious on the common-sense
 practical level4 ,we must find a theory
 that will ,,work2 and that means       
something extremely difficult2 for our  
theory must mediate between all previous
 truths and certain new experiences4 ,it
 must derange common sense and previous 
belief as little as possible1 and it    
must lead to some sensible terminus or  
other that can be verified exactly4 ,to 
'work' means both these things2 and the 
squeeze is so tight that there is little
 loose play for any hypothesis4 ,our    
theories are wedged and controlled as   
nothing else is4 ,yet sometimes         
alternative theoretic formulas are      

equally compatible with all the truths  
we know1 and then we choose between them
 for subjective reasons4 ,we choose the 
kind of theory to which we are already  
partial2 we follow 'elegance' or        
'economy4' ,clerk ,maxwell somewhere    
says it would be poor scientific taste  
to choose the more complicated of two   
equally well-evidenced conceptions2 and 
you will all agree with him4 ,truth in  
science is what gives us the maximum    
possible sum of satisfactions1 taste    
included1 but consistency both with     
previous truth and with novel fact is   
always the most imperious claimant4  ,i 
have led you through a very sandy       
desert4 ,but now1 if ,i may be allowed  
so vulgar an expression1 we begin to    
taste the milk in the cocoanut4 ,our    
rationalist critics here discharge their
 batteries upon us1 and to reply to them
 will take us out from all this dryness 
into full sight of a momentous          
philosophical alternative4  ,our account
 of truth is an account of truths in the

 plural1 of processes of leading1       
realized in rebus1 and having only this 
quality in common1 that they ,,pay4     
,they pay by guiding us into or towards 
some part of a system that dips at      
numerous points into sense-percepts1    
which we may copy mentally or not1 but  
with which at any rate we are now in the
 kind of commerce vaguely designated as 
verification4 ,truth for us is simply a 
collective name for                     
verification-processes1 just as health1 
wealth1 strength1 etc41 are names for   
other processes connected with life1 and
 also pursued because it pays to pursue 
them4 ,truth is ,,made1 just as health1 
wealth and strength are made1 in the    
course of experience4  ,here rationalism
 is instantaneously up in arms against  
us4 ,i can imagine a rationalist to talk
 as follows3  ,truth is not made1 he    
will say2 it absolutely obtains1 being a
 unique relation that does not wait upon
 any process1 but shoots straight over  
the head of experience1 and hits its    

reality every time4 ,our belief that yon
 thing on the wall is a clock is true   
already1 altho no one in the whole      
history of the world should verify it4  
,the bare quality of standing in that   
transcendent relation is what makes any 
thought true that possesses it1 whether 
or not there be verification4 ,you      
pragmatists put the cart before the     
horse in making truth's being reside in 
verification-processes4 ,these are      
merely signs of its being1 merely our   
lame ways of ascertaining after the     
fact1 which of our ideas already has    
possessed the wondrous quality4 ,the    
quality itself is timeless1 like all    
essences and natures4 ,thoughts partake 
of it directly1 as they partake of      
falsity or of irrelevancy4 ,it can't be 
analyzed away into pragmatic            
consequences4  ,the whole plausibility  
of this rationalist tirade is due to the
 fact to which we have already paid so  
much attention4 ,in our world1 namely1  
abounding as it does in things of       

similar kinds and similarly associated1 
one verification serves for others of   
its kind1 and one great use of knowing  
things is to be led not so much to them 
as to their associates1 especially to   
human talk about them4 ,the quality of  
truth1 obtaining ante rem1 pragmatically
 means1 then1 the fact that in such a   
world innumerable ideas work better by  
their indirect or possible than by their
 direct and actual verification4 ,truth 
ante rem means only verifiability1 then2
 or else it is a case of the stock      
rationalist trick of treating the ,,name
 of a concrete phenomenal reality as an 
independent prior entity1 and placing it
 behind the reality as its explanation4 
,professor ,mach quotes somewhere an    
epigram of ,lessing's3  ,sagt ,hanschen 
,schlau zu ,vetter ,fritz1 ,wie kommt   
es1 ,vetter ,fritzen1 ,dass grad' die   
,reichsten in der ,welt1 ,das meiste    
,geld besitzen8  ,hanschen ,schlau here 
treats the principle 'wealth' as        
something distinct from the facts       

denoted by the man's being rich4 ,it    
antedates them2 the facts become only a 
sort of secondary coincidence with the  
rich man's essential nature4  ,in the   
case of 'wealth' we all see the fallacy4
 ,we know that wealth is but a name for 
concrete processes that certain men's   
lives play a part in1 and not a natural 
excellence found in ,messrs4            
,rockefeller and ,carnegie1 but not in  
the rest of us4  ,like wealth1 health   
also lives in rebus4 ,it is a name for  
processes1 as digestion1 circulation1   
sleep1 etc41 that go on happily1 tho in 
this instance we are more inclined to   
think of it as a principle and to say   
the man digests and sleeps so well      
,,because he is so healthy4  ,with      
'strength' we are1 ,i think1 more       
rationalistic still1 and decidedly      
inclined to treat it as an excellence   
pre-existing in the man and explanatory 
of the herculean performances of his    
muscles4  ,with 'truth' most people go  
over the border entirely1 and treat the 

rationalistic account as self-evident4  
,but really all these words in ,,th are 
exactly similar4 ,truth exists ante rem 
just as much and as little as the other 
things do4  ,the scholastics1 following 
,aristotle1 made much of the distinction
 between habit and act4 ,health in actu 
means1 among other things1 good sleeping
 and digesting4 ,but a healthy man need 
not always be sleeping1 or always       
digesting1 any more than a wealthy man  
need be always handling money1 or a     
strong man always lifting weights4 ,all 
such qualities sink to the status of    
'habits' between their times of         
exercise2 and similarly truth becomes a 
habit of certain of our ideas and       
beliefs in their intervals of rest from 
their verifying activities4 ,but those  
activities are the root of the whole    
matter1 and the condition of there being
 any habit to exist in the intervals4   
',the true1' to put it very briefly1 is 
only the expedient in the way of our    
thinking1 just as 'the right' is only   

the expedient in the way of our         
behaving4 ,expedient in almost any      
fashion2 and expedient in the long run  
and on the whole of course2 for what    
meets expediently all the experience in 
sight won't necessarily meet all farther
 experiences equally satisfactorily4    
,experience1 as we know1 has ways of    
,,boiling ,,over1 and making us correct 
our present formulas4  ,the 'absolutely'
 true1 meaning what no farther          
experience will ever alter1 is that     
ideal vanishing-point towards which we  
imagine that all our temporary truths   
will some day converge4 ,it runs on all 
fours with the perfectly wise man1 and  
with the absolutely complete experience2
 and1 if these ideals are ever realized1
 they will all be realized together4    
,meanwhile we have to live to-day by    
what truth we can get to-day1 and be    
ready to-morrow to call it falsehood4   
,ptolemaic astronomy1 euclidean space1  
aristotelian logic1 scholastic          
metaphysics1 were expedient for         

centuries1 but human experience has     
boiled over those limits1 and we now    
call these things only relatively true1 
or true within those borders of         
experience4 ',absolutely' they are      
false2 for we know that those limits    
were casual1 and might have been        
transcended by past theorists just as   
they are by present thinkers4  ,when new
 experiences lead to retrospective      
judgments1 using the past tense1 what   
these judgments utter ,,was true1 even  
tho no past thinker had been led there4 
,we live forwards1 a ,danish thinker has
 said1 but we understand backwards4 ,the
 present sheds a backward light on the  
world's previous processes4 ,they may   
have been truth-processes for the actors
 in them4 ,they are not so for one who  
knows the later revelations of the      
story4  ,this regulative notion of a    
potential better truth to be established
 later1 possibly to be established some 
day absolutely1 and having powers of    
retroactive legislation1 turns its face1

 like all pragmatist notions1 towards   
concreteness of fact1 and towards the   
future4 ,like the half-truths1 the      
absolute truth will have to be ,,made1  
made as a relation incidental to the    
growth of a mass of                     
verification-experience1 to which the   
half-true ideas are all along           
contributing their quota4  ,i have      
already insisted on the fact that truth 
is made largely out of previous truths4 
,men's beliefs at any time are so much  
experience funded4 ,but the beliefs are 
themselves parts of the sum total of the
 world's experience1 and become matter1 
therefore1 for the next day's funding   
operations4 ,so far as reality means    
experienceable reality1 both it and the 
truths men gain about it are            
everlastingly in process of             
mutation-mutation towards a definite    
goal1 it may be--but still mutation4    
,mathematicians can solve problems with 
two variables4 ,on the ,newtonian       
theory1 for instance1 acceleration      

varies with distance1 but distance also 
varies with acceleration4 ,in the realm 
of truth-processes facts come           
independently and determine our beliefs 
provisionally4 ,but these beliefs make  
us act1 and as fast as they do so1 they 
bring into sight or into existence new  
facts which re-determine the beliefs    
accordingly4 ,so the whole coil and ball
 of truth1 as it rolls up1 is the       
product of a double influence4 ,truths  
emerge from facts2 but they dip forward 
into facts again and add to them2 which 
facts again create or reveal new truth  
7the word is indifferent7 and so on     
indefinitely4 ,the 'facts' themselves   
meanwhile are not ,,true4 ,they simply  
,,are4 ,truth is the function of the    
beliefs that start and terminate among  
them4  ,the case is like a snowball's   
growth1 due as it is to the distribution
 of the snow on the one hand1 and to the
 successive pushes of the boys on the   
other1 with these factors co-determining
 each other incessantly4  ,the most     

fateful point of difference between     
being a rationalist and being a         
pragmatist is now fully in sight4       
,experience is in mutation1 and our     
psychological ascertainments of truth   
are in mutation--so much rationalism    
will allow2 but never that either       
reality itself or truth itself is       
mutable4 ,reality stands complete and   
ready-made from all eternity1           
rationalism insists1 and the agreement  
of our ideas with it is that unique     
unanalyzable virtue in them of which she
 has already told us4 ,as that intrinsic
 excellence1 their truth has nothing to 
do with our experiences4 ,it adds       
nothing to the content of experience4   
,it makes no difference to reality      
itself2 it is supervenient1 inert1      
static1 a reflexion merely4 ,it doesn't 
,,exist1 it ,,holds or ,,obtains1 it    
belongs to another dimension from that  
of either facts or fact-relations1      
belongs1 in short1 to the               
epistemological dimension--and with that

 big word rationalism closes the        
discussion4  ,thus1 just as pragmatism  
faces forward to the future1 so does    
rationalism here again face backward to 
a past eternity4 ,true to her inveterate
 habit1 rationalism reverts to          
'principles1' and thinks that when an   
abstraction once is named1 we own an    
oracular solution4  ,the tremendous     
pregnancy in the way of consequences for
 life of this radical difference of     
outlook will only become apparent in my 
later lectures4 ,i wish meanwhile to    
close this lecture by showing that      
rationalism's sublimity does not save it
 from inanity4  ,when1 namely1 you ask  
rationalists1 instead of accusing       
pragmatism of desecrating the notion of 
truth1 to define it themselves by saying
 exactly what ,,they understand by it1  
the only positive attempts ,i can think 
of are these two3  #a4 ,truth is just   
the system of propositions which have an
 un-conditional claim to be recognized  
as valid4 ,footnote3 ,a4 ,e4 ,taylor1   

,philosophical ,review1 vol4 xiv1 p4    
#bhh4  #b4 ,truth is a name for all     
those judgments which we find ourselves 
under obligation to make by a kind of   
imperative duty4 ,footnote3 ,h4         
,rickert1 ,der ,gegenstand der          
,erkenntniss1 chapter on ',die          
,urtheilsnothwendigkeit4'  ,the first   
thing that strikes one in such          
definitions is their unutterable        
triviality4 ,they are absolutely true1  
of course1 but absolutely insignificant 
until you handle them pragmatically4    
,what do you mean by 'claim' here1 and  
what do you mean by 'duty'8 ,as summary 
names for the concrete reasons why      
thinking in true ways is overwhelmingly 
expedient and good for mortal men1 it is
 all right to talk of claims on         
reality's part to be agreed with1 and of
 obligations on our part to agree4 ,we  
feel both the claims and the            
obligations1 and we feel them for just  
those reasons4  ,but the rationalists   
who talk of claim and obligation        

,,expressly ,,say ,,that ,,they ,,have  
,,nothing ,,to ,,do ,,with ,,our        
,,practical ,,interests ,,or ,,personal 
,,reasons4 ,our reasons for agreeing are
 psychological facts1 they say1 relative
 to each thinker1 and to the accidents  
of his life4 ,they are his evidence     
merely1 they are no part of the life of 
truth itself4 ,that life transacts      
itself in a purely logical or           
epistemological1 as distinguished from a
 psychological1 dimension1 and its      
claims antedate and exceed all personal 
motivations whatsoever4 ,tho neither man
 nor ,god should ever ascertain truth1  
the word would still have to be defined 
as that which ,,ought to be ascertained 
and recognized4  ,there never was a more
 exquisite example of an idea abstracted
 from the concretes of experience and   
then used to oppose and negate what it  
was abstracted from4  ,philosophy and   
common life abound in similar instances4
 ,the 'sentimentalist fallacy' is to    
shed tears over abstract justice and    

generosity1 beauty1 etc41 and never to  
know these qualities when you meet them 
in the street1 because there the        
circumstances make them vulgar4 ,thus ,i
 read in the privately printed biography
 of an eminently rationalistic mind3 ,it
 was strange that with such admiration  
for beauty in the abstract1 my brother  
had no enthusiasm for fine architecture1
 for beautiful painting1 or for flowers4
 ,and in almost the last philosophic    
work ,i have read1 ,i find such passages
 as the following3 ,justice is ideal1   
solely ideal4 ,reason conceives that it 
ought to exist1 but experience shows    
that it can-not4 444 ,truth1 which ought
 to be1 cannot be4 444 ,reason is       
deformed by experience4 ,as soon as     
reason enters experience1 it becomes    
contrary to reason4  ,the rationalist's 
fallacy here is exactly like the        
sentimentalist's4 ,both extract a       
quality from the muddy particulars of   
experience1 and find it so pure when    
extracted that they contrast it with    

each and all its muddy instances as an  
opposite and higher nature4 ,all the    
while it is ,,their nature4 ,it is the  
nature of truths to be validated1       
verified4 ,it pays for our ideas to be  
validated4 ,our obligation to seek truth
 is part of our general obligation to do
 what pays4 ,the payments true ideas    
bring are the sole why of our duty to   
follow them4  ,identical whys exist in  
the case of wealth and health4 ,truth   
makes no other kind of claim and imposes
 no other kind of ought than health and 
wealth do4 ,all these claims are        
conditional2 the concrete benefits we   
gain are what we mean by calling the    
pursuit a duty4 ,in the case of truth1  
untrue beliefs work as perniciously in  
the long run as true beliefs work       
beneficially4 ,talking abstractly1 the  
quality 'true' may thus be said to grow 
absolutely precious1 and the quality    
'untrue' absolutely damnable3 the one   
may be called good1 the other bad1      
unconditionally4 ,we ought to think the 

true1 we ought to shun the false1       
imperatively4  ,but if we treat all this
 abstraction literally and oppose it to 
its mother soil in experience1 see what 
a preposterous position we work         
ourselves into4  ,we cannot then take a 
step forward in our actual thinking4    
,when shall ,i acknowledge this truth   
and when that8 ,shall the acknowledgment
 be loud8--or silent8 ,if sometimes     
loud1 sometimes silent1 which ,,now8    
,when may a truth go into cold-storage  
in the encyclopedia8 and when shall it  
come out for battle8 ,must ,i constantly
 be repeating the truth 'twice two are  
four' because of its eternal claim on   
recognition8 or is it sometimes         
irrelevant8 ,must my thoughts dwell     
night and day on my personal sins and   
blemishes1 because ,i truly have        
them8--or may ,i sink and ignore them in
 order to be a decent social unit1 and  
not a mass of morbid melancholy and     
apology8  ,it is quite evident that our 
obligation to acknowledge truth1 so far 

from being unconditional1 is            
tremendously conditioned4 ,truth with a 
big ,t1 and in the singular1 claims     
abstractly to be recognized1 of course2 
but concrete truths in the plural need  
be recognized only when their           
recognition is expedient4 ,a truth must 
always be preferred to a falsehood when 
both relate to the situation2 but when  
neither does1 truth is as little of a   
duty as falsehood4 ,if you ask me what  
o'clock it is and ,i tell you that ,i   
live at #ie ,irving ,street1 my answer  
may indeed be true1 but you don't see   
why it is my duty to give it4 ,a false  
address would be as much to the purpose4
  ,with this admission that there are   
conditions that limit the application of
 the abstract imperative1 ,,the         
,,pragmatistic ,,treatment ,,of ,,truth 
,,sweeps ,,back ,,upon ,,us ,,in ,,its  
,,fulness4 ,our duty to agree with      
reality is seen to be grounded in a     
perfect jungle of concrete expediencies4
  ,when ,berkeley had explained what    

people meant by matter1 people thought  
that he denied matter's existence4 ,when
 ,messrs4 ,schiller and ,dewey now      
explain what people mean by truth1 they 
are accused of denying ,,its existence4 
,these pragmatists destroy all objective
 standards1 critics say1 and put        
foolishness and wisdom on one level4 ,a 
favorite formula for describing ,mr4    
,schiller's doctrines and mine is that  
we are persons who think that by saying 
whatever you find it pleasant to say and
 calling it truth you fulfil every      
pragmatistic requirement4  ,i leave it  
to you to judge whether this be not an  
impudent slander4 ,pent in1 as the      
pragmatist more than anyone else sees   
himself to be1 between the whole body of
 funded truths squeezed from the past   
and the coercions of the world of sense 
about him1 who so well as he feels the  
immense pressure of objective control   
under which our minds perform their     
operations8 ,if anyone imagines that    
this law is lax1 let him keep its       

commandment one day1 says ,emerson4 ,we 
have heard much of late of the uses of  
the imagination in science4 ,it is high 
time to urge the use of a little        
imagination in philosophy4 ,the         
unwillingness of some of our critics to 
read any but the silliest of possible   
meanings into our statements is as      
discreditable to their imaginations as  
anything ,i know in recent philosophic  
history4 ,schiller says the true is that
 which 'works4' ,thereupon he is treated
 as one who limits verification to the  
lowest material utilities4 ,dewey says  
truth is what gives 'satisfaction4' ,he 
is treated as one who believes in       
calling everything true which1 if it    
were true1 would be pleasant4  ,our     
critics certainly need more imagination 
of realities4 ,i have honestly tried to 
stretch my own imagination and to read  
the best possible meaning into the      
rationalist conception1 but ,i have to  
confess that it still completely baffles
 me4 ,the notion of a reality calling on

 us to 'agree' with it1 and that for no 
reasons1 but simply because its claim is
 'unconditional' or 'transcendent1' is  
one that ,i can make neither head nor   
tail of4 ,i try to imagine myself as the
 sole reality in the world1 and then to 
imagine what more ,i would 'claim' if ,i
 were allowed to4 ,if you suggest the   
possibility of my claiming that a mind  
should come into being from out of the  
void inane and stand and ,,copy me1 ,i  
can indeed imagine what the copying     
might mean1 but ,i can conjure up no    
motive4 ,what good it would do me to be 
copied1 or what good it would do that   
mind to copy me1 if farther consequences
 are expressly and in principle ruled   
out as motives for the claim 7as they   
are by our rationalist authorities7 ,i  
cannot fathom4 ,when the ,irishman's    
admirers ran him along to the place of  
banquet in a sedan chair with no bottom1
 he said1 ,faith1 if it wasn't for the  
honor of the thing1 ,i might as well    
have come on foot4 ,so here3 but for the

 honor of the thing1 ,i might as well   
have remained uncopied4 ,copying is one 
genuine mode of knowing 7which for some 
strange reason our contemporary         
transcendentalists seem to be tumbling  
over each other to repudiate72 but when 
we get beyond copying1 and fall back on 
unnamed forms of agreeing that are      
expressly denied to be either copyings  
or leadings or fittings1 or any other   
processes pragmatically definable1 the  
,,what of the 'agreement' claimed       
becomes as unintelligible as the why of 
it4 ,neither content nor motive can be  
imagined for it4 ,it is an absolutely   
meaningless abstraction4 ,footnote3 ,i  
am not forgetting that ,professor       
,rickert long ago gave up the whole     
notion of truth being founded on        
agreement with reality4 ,reality1       
according to him1 is whatever agrees    
with truth1 and truth is founded solely 
on our primal duty4 ,this fantastic     
flight1 together with ,mr4 ,joachim's   
candid confession of failure in his book

 ,the ,nature of ,truth1 seems to me to 
mark the bankruptcy of rationalism when 
dealing with this subject4 ,rickert     
deals with part of the pragmatistic     
position under the head of what he calls
 ',relativismus4' ,i cannot discuss his 
text here4 ,suffice it to say that his  
argumentation in that chapter is so     
feeble as to seem almost incredible in  
so generally able a writer4  ,surely in 
this field of truth it is the           
pragmatists and not the rationalists who
 are the more genuine defenders of the  
universe's rationality4     ,lecture    
,,vii  ,pragmatism and ,humanism  ,what 
hardens the heart of everyone ,i        
approach with the view of truth sketched
 in my last lecture is that typical idol
 of the tribe1 the notion of ,,the      
,truth1 conceived as the one answer1    
determinate and complete1 to the one    
fixed enigma which the world is believed
 to propound4 ,for popular tradition1 it
 is all the better if the answer be     
oracular1 so as itself to awaken wonder 

as an enigma of the second order1       
veiling rather than revealing what its  
profundities are supposed to contain4   
,all the great single-word answers to   
the world's riddle1 such as ,god1 the   
,one1 ,reason1 ,law1 ,spirit1 ,matter1  
,nature1 ,polarity1 the ,dialectic      
,process1 the ,idea1 the ,self1 the     
,oversoul1 draw the admiration that men 
have lavished on them from this oracular
 role4 ,by amateurs in philosophy and   
professionals alike1 the universe is    
represented as a queer sort of petrified
 sphinx whose appeal to man consists in 
a monotonous challenge to his divining  
powers4 ,,the ,truth3 what a perfect    
idol of the rationalistic mind6 ,i read 
in an old letter--from a gifted friend  
who died too young--these words3 ,in    
everything1 in science1 art1 morals and 
religion1 there ,,must be one system    
that is right and ,,every other wrong4  
,how characteristic of the enthusiasm of
 a certain stage of youth6 ,at          
twenty-one we rise to such a challenge  

and expect to find the system4 ,it never
 occurs to most of us even later that   
the question 'what is ,,the truth8' is  
no real question 7being irrelative to   
all conditions7 and that the whole      
notion of ,,the truth is an abstraction 
from the fact of truths in the plural1 a
 mere useful summarizing phrase like    
,,the ,latin ,language or ,,the ,law4   
,common-law judges sometimes talk about 
the law1 and school-masters talk about  
the latin tongue1 in a way to make their
 hearers think they mean entities       
pre-existent to the decisions or to the 
words and syntax1 determining them      
unequivocally and requiring them to     
obey4 ,but the slightest exercise of    
reflexion makes us see that1 instead of 
being principles of this kind1 both law 
and latin are results4 ,distinctions    
between the lawful and the unlawful in  
conduct1 or between the correct and     
incorrect in speech1 have grown up      
incidentally among the interactions of  
men's experiences in detail2 and in no  

other way do distinctions between the   
true and the false in belief ever grow  
up4 ,truth grafts itself on previous    
truth1 modifying it in the process1 just
 as idiom grafts itself on previous     
idiom1 and law on previous law4 ,given  
previous law and a novel case1 and the  
judge will twist them into fresh law4   
,previous idiom2 new slang or metaphor  
or oddity that hits the public          
taste3--and presto1 a new idiom is made4
 ,previous truth2 fresh facts3--and our 
mind finds a new truth4  ,all the while1
 however1 we pretend that the eternal is
 unrolling1 that the one previous       
justice1 grammar or truth is simply     
fulgurating1 and not being made4 ,but   
imagine a youth in the courtroom trying 
cases with his abstract notion of 'the' 
law1 or a censor of speech let loose    
among the theatres with his idea of     
'the' mother-tongue1 or a professor     
setting up to lecture on the actual     
universe with his rationalistic notion  
of 'the ,truth' with a big ,t1 and what 

progress do they make8 ,truth1 law1 and 
language fairly boil away from them at  
the least touch of novel fact4 ,these   
things ,,make ,,themselves as we go4    
,our rights1 wrongs1 prohibitions1      
penalties1 words1 forms1 idioms1        
beliefs1 are so many new creations that 
add themselves as fast as history       
proceeds4 ,far from being antecedent    
principles that animate the process1    
law1 language1 truth are but abstract   
names for its results4  ,laws and       
languages at any rate are thus seen to  
be man-made3 things4 ,mr4 ,schiller     
applies the analogy to beliefs1 and     
proposes the name of ',humanism' for the
 doctrine that to an unascertainable    
extent our truths are man-made products 
too4 ,human motives sharpen all our     
questions1 human satisfactions lurk in  
all our answers1 all our formulas have a
 human twist4 ,this element is so       
inextricable in the products that ,mr4  
,schiller sometimes seems almost to     
leave it an open question whether there 

be anything else4 ,the world1 he says1  
is essentially u lambda nu1 it is what  
we make of it4 ,it is fruitless to      
define it by what it originally was or  
by what it is apart from us2 it ,,is    
what is made of it4 ,hence 444 the world
 is ,,plastic4 ,footnote3 ,personal     
,idealism1 p4 #fj4 ,he adds that we can 
learn the limits of the plasticity only 
by trying1 and that we ought to start as
 if it were wholly plastic1 acting      
methodically on that assumption1 and    
stopping only when we are decisively    
rebuked4  ,this is ,mr4 ,schiller's     
butt-end-foremost statement of the      
humanist position1 and it has exposed   
him to severe attack4 ,i mean to defend 
the humanist position in this lecture1  
so ,i will insinuate a few remarks at   
this point4  ,mr4 ,schiller admits as   
emphatically as anyone the presence of  
resisting factors in every actual       
experience of truth-making1 of which the
 new-made special truth must take       
account1 and with which it has perforce 

to 'agree4' ,all our truths are beliefs 
about ',reality'2 and in any particular 
belief the reality acts as something    
independent1 as a thing ,,found1 not    
manufactured4 ,let me here recall a bit 
of my last lecture4  ',,reality' ,,is   
,,in ,,general ,,what ,,truths ,,have   
,,to ,,take ,,account ,,of2 ,footnote3  
,mr4 ,taylor in his ,elements of        
,metaphysics uses this excellent        
pragmatic definition4 and the ,,first   
part of reality from this point of view 
is the flux of our sensations4          
,sensations are forced upon us1 coming  
we know not whence4 ,over their nature1 
order1 and quantity we have as good as  
no control4 ,,they are neither true nor 
false2 they simply ,,are4 ,it is only   
what we say about them1 only the names  
we give them1 our theories of their     
source and nature and remote relations1 
that may be true or not4  ,the ,,second 
part of reality1 as something that our  
beliefs must also obediently take       
account of1 is the ,,relations that     

obtain between our sensations or between
 their copies in our minds4 ,this part  
falls into two sub-parts3 #a7 the       
relations that are mutable and          
accidental1 as those of date and place2 
and #b7 those that are fixed and        
essential because they are grounded on  
the inner natures of their terms--such  
as likeness and unlikeness4 ,both sorts 
of relation are matters of immediate    
perception4 ,both are 'facts4' ,but it  
is the latter kind of fact that forms   
the more important sub-part of reality  
for our theories of knowledge4 ,inner   
relations namely are 'eternal1' are     
perceived whenever their sensible terms 
are compared2 and of them our           
thought--mathematical and logical       
thought1 so-called--must eternally take 
account4  ,the ,,third part of reality1 
additional to these perceptions 7tho    
largely based upon them71 is the        
,,previous ,,truths of which every new  
inquiry takes account4 ,this third part 
is a much less obdurately resisting     

factor3 it often ends by giving way4 ,in
 speaking of these three portions of    
reality as at all times controlling our 
belief's formation1 ,i am only reminding
 you of what we heard in our last hour4 
,now however fixed these elements of    
reality may be1 we still have a certain 
freedom in our dealings with them4 ,take
 our sensations4 ,,that they are is     
undoubtedly beyond our control2 but     
,,which we attend to1 note1 and make    
emphatic in our conclusions depends on  
our own interests2 and1 according as we 
lay the emphasis here or there1 quite   
different formulations of truth result4 
,we read the same facts differently4    
',waterloo1' with the same fixed        
details1 spells a 'victory' for an      
englishman2 for a frenchman it spells a 
'defeat4' ,so1 for an optimist          
philosopher the universe spells victory1
 for a pessimist1 defeat4  ,what we say 
about reality thus depends on the       
perspective into which we throw it4 ,the
 ,,that of it is its own2 but the ,,what

 depends on the ,,which2 and the which  
depends on ,,us4 ,both the sensational  
and the relational parts of reality are 
dumb3 they say absolutely nothing about 
themselves4 ,we it is who have to speak 
for them4 ,this dumbness of sensations  
has led such intellectualists as ,t4,h4 
,green and ,edward ,caird to shove them 
almost beyond the pale of philosophic   
recognition1 but pragmatists refuse to  
go so far4 ,a sensation is rather like a
 client who has given his case to a     
lawyer and then has passively to listen 
in the courtroom to whatever account of 
his affairs1 pleasant or unpleasant1 the
 lawyer finds it most expedient to give4
  ,hence1 even in the field of          
sensation1 our minds exert a certain    
arbitrary choice4 ,by our inclusions and
 omissions we trace the field's extent2 
by our emphasis we mark its foreground  
and its background2 by our order we read
 it in this direction or in that4 ,we   
receive in short the block of marble1   
but we carve the statue ourselves4      

,this applies to the 'eternal' parts of 
reality as well3 we shuffle our         
perceptions of intrinsic relation and   
arrange them just as freely4 ,we read   
them in one serial order or another1    
class them in this way or in that1 treat
 one or the other as more fundamental1  
until our beliefs about them form those 
bodies of truth known as logics1        
geometries1 or arithmetics1 in each and 
all of which the form and order in which
 the whole is cast is flagrantly        
man-made4  ,thus1 to say nothing of the 
new ,,facts which men add to the matter 
of reality by the acts of their own     
lives1 they have already impressed their
 mental forms on that whole third of    
reality which ,i have called 'previous  
truths4' ,every hour brings its new     
percepts1 its own facts of sensation and
 relation1 to be truly taken account of2
 but the whole of our ,,past dealings   
with such facts is already funded in the
 previous truths4 ,it is therefore only 
the smallest and recentest fraction of  

the first two parts of reality that     
comes to us without the human touch1 and
 that fraction has immediately to become
 humanized in the sense of being        
squared1 assimilated1 or in some way    
adapted1 to the humanized mass already  
there4 ,as a matter of fact we can      
hardly take in an impression at all1 in 
the absence of a pre-conception of what 
impressions there may possibly be4      
,when we talk of reality 'independent'  
of human thinking1 then1 it seems a     
thing very hard to find4 ,it reduces to 
the notion of what is just entering into
 experience1 and yet to be named1 or    
else to some imagined aboriginal        
presence in experience1 before any      
belief about the presence had arisen1   
before any human conception had been    
applied4 ,it is what is absolutely dumb 
and evanescent1 the merely ideal limit  
of our minds4 ,we may glimpse it1 but we
 never grasp it2 what we grasp is always
 some substitute for it which previous  
human thinking has peptonized and cooked

 for our consumption4 ,if so vulgar an  
expression were allowed us1 we might say
 that wherever we find it1 it has been  
already ,,faked4 ,this is what ,mr4     
,schiller has in mind when he calls     
independent reality a mere unresisting u
 lambda nu1 which ,,is only to be made  
over by us4  ,that is ,mr4 ,schiller's  
belief about the sensible core of       
reality4 ,we 'encounter' it 7in ,mr4    
,bradley's words7 but don't possess it4 
,superficially this sounds like ,kant's 
view2 but between categories fulminated 
before nature began1 and categories     
gradually forming themselves in nature's
 presence1 the whole chasm between      
rationalism and empiricism yawns4 ,to   
the genuine ',kantianer' ,schiller will 
always be to ,kant as a satyr to        
,hyperion4  ,other pragmatists may reach
 more positive beliefs about the        
sensible core of reality4 ,they may     
think to get at it in its independent   
nature1 by peeling off the successive   
man-made wrappings4 ,they may make      

theories that tell us where it comes    
from and all about it2 and if these     
theories work satisfactorily they will  
be true4 ,the transcendental idealists  
say there is no core1 the finally       
completed wrapping being reality and    
truth in one4 ,scholasticism still      
teaches that the core is 'matter4'      
,professor ,bergson1 ,heymans1 ,strong1 
and others1 believe in the core and     
bravely try to define it4 ,messrs4      
,dewey and ,schiller treat it as a      
'limit4' ,which is the truer of all     
these diverse accounts1 or of others    
comparable with them1 unless it be the  
one that finally proves the most        
satisfactory8 ,on the one hand there    
will stand reality1 on the other an     
account of it which proves impossible to
 better or to alter4 ,if the            
impossibility prove permanent1 the truth
 of the account will be absolute4 ,other
 content of truth than this ,i can find 
nowhere4 ,if the anti-pragmatists have  
any other meaning1 let them for heaven's

 sake reveal it1 let them grant us      
access to it6  ,not ,,being reality1 but
 only our belief ,,about reality1 it    
will contain human elements1 but these  
will ,,know the non-human element1 in   
the only sense in which there can be    
knowledge of anything4 ,does the river  
make its banks1 or do the banks make the
 river8 ,does a man walk with his right 
leg or with his left leg more           
essentially8 ,just as impossible may it 
be to separate the real from the human  
factors in the growth of our cognitive  
experience4  ,let this stand as a first 
brief indication of the humanistic      
position4 ,does it seem paradoxical8 ,if
 so1 ,i will try to make it plausible by
 a few illustrations1 which will lead to
 a fuller acquaintance with the subject4
  ,in many familiar objects everyone    
will recognize the human element4 ,we   
conceive a given reality in this way or 
in that1 to suit our purpose1 and the   
reality passively submits to the        
conception4 ,you can take the number #bg

 as the cube of #c1 or as the product of
 #c and #i1 or as #bf ,,plus #a1 or #ajj
 ,,minus #gc1 or in countless other     
ways1 of which one will be just as true 
as another4 ,you can take a chessboard  
as black squares on a white ground1 or  
as white squares on a black ground1 and 
neither conception is a false one4 ,you 
can treat the adjoined figure ,figure of
 a ',star of ,david' as a star1 as two  
big triangles crossing each other1 as a 
hexagon with legs set up on its angles1 
as six equal triangles hanging together 
by their tips1 etc4 ,all these          
treatments are true treatments--the     
sensible ,,that upon the paper resists  
no one of them4 ,you can say of a line  
that it runs east1 or you can say that  
it runs west1 and the line per se       
accepts both descriptions without       
rebelling at the inconsistency4  ,we    
carve out groups of stars in the        
heavens1 and call them constellations1  
and the stars patiently suffer us to do 
so--tho if they knew what we were doing1

 some of them might feel much surprised 
at the partners we had given them4 ,we  
name the same constellation diversely1  
as ,charles's ,wain1 the ,great ,bear1  
or the ,dipper4 ,none of the names will 
be false1 and one will be as true as    
another1 for all are applicable4  ,in   
all these cases we humanly make an      
addition to some sensible reality1 and  
that reality tolerates the addition4    
,all the additions 'agree' with the     
reality2 they fit it1 while they build  
it out4 ,no one of them is false4 ,which
 may be treated as the more true1       
depends altogether on the human use of  
it4 ,if the #bg is a number of dollars  
which ,i find in a drawer where ,i had  
left #bh1 it is #bh minus #a4 ,if it is 
the number of inches in a shelf which ,i
 wish to insert into a cupboard #bf     
inches wide1 it is #bf plus #a4 ,if ,i  
wish to ennoble the heavens by the      
constellations ,i see there1 ',charles's
 ,wain' would be more true than         
',dipper4' ,my friend ,frederick ,myers 

was humorously indignant that that      
prodigious star-group should remind us  
,americans of nothing but a culinary    
utensil4  ,what shall we call a ,,thing 
anyhow8 ,it seems quite arbitrary1 for  
we carve out everything1 just as we     
carve out constellations1 to suit our   
human purposes4 ,for me1 this whole     
'audience' is one thing1 which grows now
 restless1 now attentive4 ,i have no use
 at present for its individual units1 so
 ,i don't consider them4 ,so of an      
'army1' of a 'nation4' ,but in your own 
eyes1 ladies and gentlemen1 to call you 
'audience' is an accidental way of      
taking you4 ,the permanently real things
 for you are your individual persons4   
,to an anatomist1 again1 those persons  
are but organisms1 and the real things  
are the organs4 ,not the organs1 so much
 as their constituent cells1 say the    
histologists2 not the cells1 but their  
molecules1 say in turn the chemists4    
,we break the flux of sensible reality  
into things1 then1 at our will4 ,we     

create the subjects of our true as well 
as of our false propositions4  ,we      
create the predicates also4 ,many of the
 predicates of things express only the  
relations of the things to us and to our
 feelings4 ,such predicates of course   
are human additions4 ,caesar crossed the
 ,rubicon1 and was a menace to ,rome's  
freedom4 ,he is also an ,american       
school-room pest1 made into one by the  
reaction of our schoolboys on his       
writings4 ,the added predicate is as    
true of him as the earlier ones4  ,you  
see how naturally one comes to the      
humanistic principle3 you can't weed out
 the human contribution4 ,our nouns and 
adjectives are all humanized heirlooms1 
and in the theories we build them into1 
the inner order and arrangement is      
wholly dictated by human considerations1
 intellectual consistency being one of  
them4 ,mathematics and logic themselves 
are fermenting with human               
rearrangements2 physics1 astronomy and  
biology follow massive cues of          

preference4 ,we plunge forward into the 
field of fresh experience with the      
beliefs our ancestors and we have made  
already2 these determine what we notice2
 what we notice determines what we do2  
what we do again determines what we     
experience2 so from one thing to        
another1 altho the stubborn fact remains
 that there ,,is a sensible flux1 what  
is true of it seems from first to last  
to be largely a matter of our own       
creation4  ,we build the flux out       
inevitably4 ,the great question is3 does
 it1 with our additions1 rise or fall in
 value8 ,are the additions ,,worthy or  
,,unworthy8 ,suppose a universe composed
 of seven stars1 and nothing else but   
three human witnesses and their critic4 
,one witness names the stars ',great    
,bear'2 one calls them ',charles's      
,wain'2 one calls them the ',dipper4'   
,which human addition has made the best 
universe of the given stellar material8 
,if ,frederick ,myers were the critic1  
he would have no hesitation in          

'turning-down' the ,american witness4   
,lotze has in several places made a deep
 suggestion4 ,we naively assume1 he     
says1 a relation between reality and our
 minds which may be just the opposite of
 the true one4 ,reality1 we naturally   
think1 stands ready-made and complete1  
and our intellects supervene with the   
one simple duty of describing it as it  
is already4 ,but may not our            
descriptions1 ,lotze asks1 be themselves
 important additions to reality8 ,and   
may not previous reality itself be      
there1 far less for the purpose of      
reappearing unaltered in our knowledge1 
than for the very purpose of stimulating
 our minds to such additions as shall   
enhance the universe's total value4 ,die
 erhohung des vorgefundenen daseins is a
 phrase used by ,professor ,eucken      
somewhere1 which reminds one of this    
suggestion by the great ,lotze4  ,it is 
identically our pragmatistic conception4
 ,in our cognitive as well as in our    
active life we are creative4 ,we ,,add1 

both to the subject and to the predicate
 part of reality4 ,the world stands     
really malleable1 waiting to receive its
 final touches at our hands4 ,like the  
kingdom of heaven1 it suffers human     
violence willingly4 ,man ,,engenders    
truths upon it4  ,no one can deny that  
such a role would add both to our       
dignity and to our responsibility as    
thinkers4 ,to some of us it proves a    
most inspiring notion4 ,signer ,papini1 
the leader of italian pragmatism1 grows 
fairly dithyrambic over the view that it
 opens1 of man's divinely-creative      
functions4  ,the import of the          
difference between pragmatism and       
rationalism is now in sight throughout  
its whole extent4 ,the essential        
contrast is that for rationalism reality
 is ready-made and complete from all    
eternity1 while for pragmatism it is    
still in the making1 and awaits part of 
its complexion from the future4 ,on the 
one side the universe is absolutely     
secure1 on the other it is still        

pursuing its adventures4  ,we have got  
into rather deep water with this        
humanistic view1 and it is no wonder    
that misunderstanding gathers round it4 
,it is accused of being a doctrine of   
caprice4 ,mr4 ,bradley1 for example1    
says that a humanist1 if he understood  
his own doctrine1 would have to hold any
 end however perverted to be rational if
 ,i insist on it personally1 and any    
idea however mad to be the truth if only
 some one is resolved that he will have 
it so4 ,the humanist view of 'reality1' 
as something resisting1 yet malleable1  
which controls our thinking as an energy
 that must be taken 'account' of        
incessantly 7tho not necessarily merely 
,,copied7 is evidently a difficult one  
to introduce to novices4 ,the situation 
reminds me of one that ,i have          
personally gone through4 ,i once wrote  
an essay on our right to believe1 which 
,i unluckily called the ,,will to       
,believe4 ,all the critics1 neglecting  
the essay1 pounced upon the title4      

,psychologically it was impossible1     
morally it was iniquitous4 ,the will to 
deceive1 the will to make-believe1 were 
wittily proposed as substitutes for it4 
,,the ,,alternative ,,between           
,,pragmatism ,,and ,,rationalism1 ,,in  
,,the ,,shape ,,in ,,which ,,we ,,now   
,,have ,,it ,,before ,,us1 ,,is ,,no    
,,longer ,a ,,question ,,in ,,the       
,,theory ,,of ,,knowledge1 ,,it         
,,concerns ,,the ,,structure ,,of ,,the 
,,universe ,,itself4  ,on the pragmatist
 side we have only one edition of the   
universe1 unfinished1 growing in all    
sorts of places1 especially in the      
places where thinking beings are at     
work4  ,on the rationalist side we have 
a universe in many editions1 one real   
one1 the infinite folio1 or edition de  
luxe1 eternally complete2 and then the  
various finite editions1 full of false  
readings1 distorted and mutilated each  
in its own way4  ,so the rival          
metaphysical hypotheses of pluralism and
 monism here come back upon us4 ,i will 

develope their differences during the   
remainder of our hour4  ,and first let  
me say that it is impossible not to see 
a temperamental difference at work in   
the choice of sides4 ,the rationalist   
mind1 radically taken1 is of a          
doctrinaire and authoritative           
complexion3 the phrase 'must be' is ever
 on its lips4 ,the belly-band of its    
universe must be tight4 ,a radical      
pragmatist on the other hand is a       
happy-go-lucky anarchistic sort of      
creature4 ,if he had to live in a tub   
like ,diogenes he wouldn't mind at all  
if the hoops were loose and the staves  
let in the sun4  ,now the idea of this  
loose universe affects your typical     
rationalists in much the same way as    
'freedom of the press' might affect a   
veteran official in the russian bureau  
of censorship2 or as 'simplified        
spelling' might affect an elderly       
schoolmistress4 ,it affects him as the  
swarm of protestant sects affects a     
papist onlooker4 ,it appears as         

backboneless and devoid of principle as 
'opportunism' in politics appears to an 
old-fashioned french legitimist1 or to a
 fanatical believer in the divine right 
of the people4  ,for pluralistic        
pragmatism1 truth grows up inside of all
 the finite experiences4 ,they lean on  
each other1 but the whole of them1 if   
such a whole there be1 leans on nothing4
 ,all 'homes' are in finite experience2 
finite experience as such is homeless4  
,nothing outside of the flux secures the
 issue of it4 ,it can hope salvation    
only from its own intrinsic promises and
 potencies4  ,to rationalists this      
describes a tramp and vagrant world1    
adrift in space1 with neither elephant  
nor tortoise to plant the sole of its   
foot upon4 ,it is a set of stars hurled 
into heaven without even a centre of    
gravity to pull against4 ,in other      
spheres of life it is true that we have 
got used to living in a state of        
relative insecurity4 ,the authority of  
'the ,state1' and that of an absolute   

'moral law1' have resolved themselves   
into expediencies1 and holy church has  
resolved itself into 'meeting-houses4'  
,not so as yet within the philosophic   
class-rooms4 ,a universe with such as   
,,us contributing to create its truth1 a
 world delivered to ,,our opportunisms  
and ,,our private judgments6 ,home-rule 
for ,ireland would be a millennium in   
comparison4 ,we're no more fit for such 
a part than the ,filipinos are 'fit for 
self-government4' ,such a world would   
not be ,,respectable1 philosophically4  
,it is a trunk without a tag1 a dog     
without a collar1 in the eyes of most   
professors of philosophy4  ,what then   
would tighten this loose universe1      
according to the professors8  ,something
 to support the finite many1 to tie it  
to1 to unify and anchor it4 ,something  
unexposed to accident1 something eternal
 and unalterable4 ,the mutable in       
experience must be founded on           
immutability4 ,behind our de facto      
world1 our world in act1 there must be a

 de jure duplicate fixed and previous1  
with all that can happen here already   
there in posse1 every drop of blood1    
every smallest item1 appointed and      
provided1 stamped and branded1 without  
chance of variation4 ,the negatives that
 haunt our ideals here below must be    
themselves negated in the absolutely    
,real4 ,this alone makes the universe   
solid4 ,this is the resting deep4 ,we   
live upon the stormy surface2 but with  
this our anchor holds1 for it grapples  
rocky bottom4 ,this is ,wordsworth's    
central peace subsisting at the heart of
 endless agitation4 ,this is            
,vivekananda's mystical ,one of which ,i
 read to you4 ,this is ,reality with the
 big ,r1 reality that makes the timeless
 claim1 reality to which defeat can't   
happen4 ,this is what the men of        
principles1 and in general all the men  
whom ,i called tender-minded in my first
 lecture1 think themselves obliged to   
postulate4  ,and this1 exactly this1 is 
what the tough-minded of that lecture   

find themselves moved to call a piece of
 perverse abstraction-worship4 ,the     
tough-minded are the men whose alpha and
 omega are ,,facts4 ,behind the bare    
phenomenal facts1 as my tough-minded old
 friend ,chauncey ,wright1 the great    
,harvard empiricist of my youth1 used to
 say1 there is ,,nothing4 ,when a       
rationalist insists that behind the     
facts there is the ,,ground of the      
facts1 the ,,possibility of the facts1  
the tougher empiricists accuse him of   
taking the mere name and nature of a    
fact and clapping it behind the fact as 
a duplicate entity to make it possible4 
,that such sham grounds are often       
invoked is notorious4 ,at a surgical    
operation ,i heard a bystander ask a    
doctor why the patient breathed so      
deeply4 ,because ether is a respiratory 
stimulant1 the doctor answered4 ,ah6    
said the questioner1 as if relieved by  
the explanation4 ,but this is like      
saying that cyanide of potassium kills  
because it is a 'poison1' or that it is 

so cold to-night because it is 'winter1'
 or that we have five fingers because we
 are 'pentadactyls4' ,these are but     
names for the facts1 taken from the     
facts1 and then treated as previous and 
explanatory4 ,the tender-minded notion  
of an absolute reality is1 according to 
the radically tough-minded1 framed on   
just this pattern4 ,it is but our       
summarizing name for the whole          
spread-out and strung-along mass of     
phenomena1 treated as if it were a      
different entity1 both one and previous4
  ,you see how differently people take  
things4 ,the world we live in exists    
diffused and distributed1 in the form of
 an indefinitely numerous lot of eaches1
 coherent in all sorts of ways and      
degrees2 and the tough-minded are       
perfectly willing to keep them at that  
valuation4 ,they can stand that kind of 
world1 their temper being well adapted  
to its insecurity4 ,not so the          
tender-minded party4 ,they must back the
 world we find ourselves born into by   

another and a better world in which the 
eaches form an ,all and the ,all a ,one 
that logically presupposes1             
co-implicates1 and secures each ,,each  
without exception4  ,must we as         
pragmatists be radically tough-minded8  
or can we treat the absolute edition of 
the world as a legitimate hypothesis8   
,it is certainly legitimate1 for it is  
thinkable1 whether we take it in its    
abstract or in its concrete shape4  ,by 
taking it abstractly ,i mean placing it 
behind our finite life as we place the  
word 'winter' behind to-night's cold    
weather4 ',winter' is only the name for 
a certain number of days which we find  
generally characterized by cold weather1
 but it guarantees nothing in that line1
 for our thermometer to-morrow may soar 
into the #gj's4 ,nevertheless the word  
is a useful one to plunge forward with  
into the stream of our experience4 ,it  
cuts off certain probabilities and sets 
up others3 you can put away your        
straw-hats2 you can unpack your arctics4

 ,it is a summary of things to look for4
 ,it names a part of nature's habits1   
and gets you ready for their            
continuation4 ,it is a definite         
instrument abstracted from experience1 a
 conceptual reality that you must take  
account of1 and which reflects you      
totally back into sensible realities4   
,the pragmatist is the last person to   
deny the reality of such abstractions4  
,they are so much past experience       
funded4  ,but taking the absolute       
edition of the world concretely means a 
different hypothesis4 ,rationalists take
 it concretely and ,,oppose it to the   
world's finite editions4 ,they give it a
 particular nature4 ,it is perfect1     
finished4 ,everything known there is    
known along with everything else2 here1 
where ignorance reigns1 far otherwise4  
,if there is want there1 there also is  
the satisfaction provided4 ,here all is 
process2 that world is timeless4        
,possibilities obtain in our world2 in  
the absolute world1 where all that is   

,,not is from eternity impossible1 and  
all that ,,is is necessary1 the category
 of possibility has no application4 ,in 
this world crimes and horrors are       
regrettable4 ,in that totalized world   
regret obtains not1 for the existence of
 ill in the temporal order is the very  
condition of the perfection of the      
eternal order4  ,once more1 either      
hypothesis is legitimate in pragmatist  
eyes1 for either has its uses4          
,abstractly1 or taken like the word     
winter1 as a memorandum of past         
experience that orients us towards the  
future1 the notion of the absolute world
 is indispensable4 ,concretely taken1 it
 is also indispensable1 at least to     
certain minds1 for it determines them   
religiously1 being often a thing to     
change their lives by1 and by changing  
their lives1 to change whatever in the  
outer order depends on them4  ,we cannot
 therefore methodically join the tough  
minds in their rejection of the whole   
notion of a world beyond our finite     

experience4 ,one misunderstanding of    
pragmatism is to identify it with       
positivistic tough-mindedness1 to       
suppose that it scorns every            
rationalistic notion as so much jabber  
and gesticulation1 that it loves        
intellectual anarchy as such and prefers
 a sort of wolf-world absolutely unpent 
and wild and without a master or a      
collar to any philosophic class-room    
product1 whatsoever4 ,i have said so    
much in these lectures against the      
over-tender forms of rationalism1 that  
,i am prepared for some misunderstanding
 here1 but ,i confess that the amount of
 it that ,i have found in this very     
audience surprises me1 for ,i have      
simultaneously defended rationalistic   
hypotheses so far as these re-direct you
 fruitfully into experience4  ,for      
instance ,i receive this morning this   
question on a post-card3 ,is a          
pragmatist necessarily a complete       
materialist and agnostic8 ,one of my    
oldest friends1 who ought to know me    

better1 writes me a letter that accuses 
the pragmatism ,i am recommending1 of   
shutting out all wider metaphysical     
views and condemning us to the most     
terre-a-terre naturalism4 ,let me read  
you some extracts from it4  ,it seems to
 me1 my friend writes1 that the         
pragmatic objection to pragmatism lies  
in the fact that it might accentuate the
 narrowness of narrow minds4  ,your call
 to the rejection of the namby-pamby and
 the wishy-washy is of course inspiring4
 ,but although it is salutary and       
stimulating to be told that one should  
be responsible for the immediate issues 
and bearings of his words and thoughts1 
,i decline to be deprived of the        
pleasure and profit of dwelling also on 
remoter bearings and issues1 and it is  
the ,,tendency of pragmatism to refuse  
this privilege4  ,in short1 it seems to 
me that the limitations1 or rather the  
dangers1 of the pragmatic tendency1 are 
analogous to those which beset the      
unwary followers of the 'natural        

sciences4' ,chemistry and physics are   
eminently pragmatic and many of their   
devotees1 smugly content with the data  
that their weights and measures furnish1
 feel an infinite pity and disdain for  
all students of philosophy and          
meta-physics1 whomsoever4 ,and of course
 everything can be expressed--after a   
fashion1 and 'theoretically'--in terms  
of chemistry and physics1 that is1      
,,everything ,,except ,,the ,,vital     
,,principle ,,of ,,the ,,whole1 and     
that1 they say1 there is no pragmatic   
use in trying to express2 it has no     
bearings--,,for ,,them4 ,i for my part  
refuse to be persuaded that we cannot   
look beyond the obvious pluralism of the
 naturalist and the pragmatist to a     
logical unity in which they take no     
interest4  ,how is such a conception of 
the pragmatism ,i am advocating         
possible1 after my first and second     
lectures8 ,i have all along been        
offering it expressly as a mediator     
between tough-mindedness and            

tender-mindedness4 ,if the notion of a  
world ante rem1 whether taken abstractly
 like the word winter1 or concretely as 
the hypothesis of an ,absolute1 can be  
shown to have any consequences whatever 
for our life1 it has a meaning4 ,if the 
meaning works1 it will have ,,some truth
 that ought to be held to through all   
possible reformulations1 for pragmatism4
  ,the absolutistic hypothesis1 that    
perfection is eternal1 aboriginal1 and  
most real1 has a perfectly definite     
meaning1 and it works religiously4 ,to  
examine how1 will be the subject of my  
next and final lecture4     ,lecture    
,,viii  ,pragmatism and ,religion  ,at  
the close of the last lecture ,i        
reminded you of the first one1 in which 
,i had opposed tough-mindedness to      
tender-mindedness and recommended       
pragmatism as their mediator4           
,tough-mindedness positively rejects    
tender-mindedness's hypothesis of an    
eternal perfect edition of the universe 
coexisting with our finite experience4  

,on pragmatic principles we cannot      
reject any hypothesis if consequences   
useful to life flow from it4 ,universal 
conceptions1 as things to take account  
of1 may be as real for pragmatism as    
particular sensations are4 ,they have   
indeed no meaning and no reality if they
 have no use4 ,but if they have any use 
they have that amount of meaning4 ,and  
the meaning will be true if the use     
squares well with life's other uses4    
,well1 the use of the ,absolute is      
proved by the whole course of men's     
religious history4 ,the eternal arms are
 then beneath4 ,remember ,vivekananda's 
use of the ,atman3 it is indeed not a   
scientific use1 for we can make no      
particular deductions from it4 ,it is   
emotional and spiritual altogether4  ,it
 is always best to discuss things by the
 help of concrete examples4 ,let me read
 therefore some of those verses entitled
 ,to ,you by ,walt ,whitman--,you of    
course meaning the reader or hearer of  
the poem whosoever he or she may be4    

,whoever you are1 now ,i place my hand  
upon you1 that you be my poem2 ,i       
whisper with my lips close to your ear1 
,i have loved many women and men1 but ,i
 love none better than you4   ,o ,i have
 been dilatory and dumb2 ,i should have 
made my way straight to you long ago2 ,i
 should have blabb'd nothing but you1 ,i
 should have chanted nothing but you4   
,i will leave all1 and come and make the
 hymns of you2 ,none have understood    
you1 but ,i understand you2 ,none have  
done justice to you--you have not done  
justice to yourself2 ,none but have     
found you imperfect--,i only find no    
imperfection in you4   ,o ,i could sing 
such grandeurs and glories about you6   
,you have not known what you are--you   
have slumber'd upon yourself all your   
life2 ,what you have done returns       
already in mockeries4   ,but the        
mockeries are not you2 ,underneath them1
 and within them1 ,i see you lurk2 ,i   
pursue you where none else has pursued  
you2 ,silence1 the desk1 the flippant   

expression1 the night1 the accustom'd   
routine1 if these conceal you from      
others1 or from yourself1 they do not   
conceal you from me2 ,the shaved face1  
the unsteady eye1 the impure complexion1
 if these balk others1 they do not balk 
me1 ,the pert apparel1 the deform'd     
attitude1 drunkenness1 greed1 premature 
death1 all these ,i part aside4   ,there
 is no endowment in man or woman that is
 not tallied in you2 ,there is no       
virtue1 no beauty1 in man or woman1 but 
as good is in you2 ,no pluck1 no        
endurance in others1 but as good is in  
you2 ,no pleasure waiting for others1   
but an equal pleasure waits for you4    
,whoever you are6 claim your own at any 
hazard6 ,these shows of the east and    
west are tame1 compared to you2 ,these  
immense meadows--these interminable     
rivers--you are immense and interminable
 as they2 ,you are he or she who is     
master or mistress over them1 ,master or
 mistress in your own right over        
,nature1 elements1 pain1 passion1       

dissolution4   ,the hopples fall from   
your ankles--you find an unfailing      
sufficiency2 ,old or young1 male or     
female1 rude1 low1 rejected by the rest1
 whatever you are promulges itself2     
,through birth1 life1 death1 burial1 the
 means are provided1 nothing is scanted2
 ,through angers1 losses1 ambition1     
ignorance1 ennui1 what you are picks its
 way4  ,verily a fine and moving poem1  
in any case1 but there are two ways of  
taking it1 both useful4  ,one is the    
monistic way1 the mystical way of pure  
cosmic emotion4 ,the glories and        
grandeurs1 they are yours absolutely1   
even in the midst of your defacements4  
,whatever may happen to you1 whatever   
you may appear to be1 inwardly you are  
safe4 ,look back1 ,,lie back1 on your   
true principle of being6 ,this is the   
famous way of quietism1 of              
indifferentism4 ,its enemies compare it 
to a spiritual opium4 ,yet pragmatism   
must respect this way1 for it has       
massive historic vindication4  ,but     

pragmatism sees another way to be       
respected also1 the pluralistic way of  
interpreting the poem4 ,the you so      
glorified1 to which the hymn is sung1   
may mean your better possibilities      
phenomenally taken1 or the specific     
redemptive effects even of your         
failures1 upon yourself or others4 ,it  
may mean your loyalty to the            
possibilities of others whom you admire 
and love so1 that you are willing to    
accept your own poor life1 for it is    
that glory's partner4 ,you can at least 
appreciate1 applaud1 furnish the        
audience1 of so brave a total world4    
,forget the low in yourself1 then1 think
 only of the high4 ,identify your life  
therewith2 then1 through angers1 losses1
 ignorance1 ennui1 whatever you thus    
make yourself1 whatever you thus most   
deeply are1 picks its way4  ,in either  
way of taking the poem1 it encourages   
fidelity to ourselves4 ,both ways       
satisfy2 both sanctify the human flux4  
,both paint the portrait of the ,,you on

 a gold-background4 ,but the background 
of the first way is the static ,one1    
while in the second way it means        
possibles in the plural1 genuine        
possibles1 and it has all the           
restlessness of that conception4  ,noble
 enough is either way of reading the    
poem2 but plainly the pluralistic way   
agrees with the pragmatic temper best1  
for it immediately suggests an          
infinitely larger number of the details 
of future experience to our mind4 ,it   
sets definite activities in us at work4 
,altho this second way seems prosaic and
 earthborn in comparison with the first 
way1 yet no one can accuse it of        
tough-mindedness in any brutal sense of 
the term4 ,yet if1 as pragmatists1 you  
should positively set up the second way 
,,against the first way1 you would very 
likely be misunderstood4 ,you would be  
accused of denying nobler conceptions1  
and of being an ally of tough-mindedness
 in the worst sense4  ,you remember the 
letter from a member of this audience   

from which ,i read some extracts at our 
previous meeting4 ,let me read you an   
additional extract now4 ,it shows a     
vagueness in realizing the alternatives 
before us which ,i think is very        
widespread4  ,i believe1 writes my      
friend and correspondent1 in pluralism2 
,i believe that in our search for truth 
we leap from one floating cake of ice to
 another1 on an infinite sea1 and that  
by each of our acts we make new truths  
possible and old ones impossible2 ,i    
believe that each man is responsible for
 making the universe better1 and that if
 he does not do this it will be in so   
far left undone4  ,yet at the same time 
,i am willing to endure that my children
 should be incurably sick and suffering 
7as they are not7 and ,i myself stupid  
and yet with brains enough to see my    
stupidity1 only on one condition1       
namely1 that through the construction1  
in imagination and by reasoning1 of a   
,,rational ,,unity ,,of ,,all ,,things1 
,i can conceive my acts and my thoughts 

and my troubles as ,,supplemented3 ,,by 
,,all ,,the ,,other ,,phenomena ,,of    
,,the ,,world1 ,,and ,,as               
,,forming--,,when ,,thus                
,,supplemented--,a ,,scheme ,,which ,i  
,,approve ,,and ,,adopt ,,as ,,my ,i    
,,own2 and for my part ,i refuse to be  
persuaded that we cannot look beyond the
 obvious pluralism of the naturalist and
 pragmatist to a logical unity in which 
they take no interest or stock4  ,such a
 fine expression of personal faith warms
 the heart of the hearer4 ,but how much 
does it clear his philosophic head8     
,does the writer consistently favor the 
monistic1 or the pluralistic1           
interpretation of the world's poem8 ,his
 troubles become atoned for ,,when      
,,thus ,,supplemented1 he says1         
supplemented1 that is1 by all the       
remedies that ,,the ,,other ,,phenomena 
may supply4 ,obviously here the writer  
faces forward into the particulars of   
experience1 which he interprets in a    
pluralistic-melioristic way4  ,but he   

believes himself to face backward4 ,he  
speaks of what he calls the rational    
,,unity of things1 when all the while he
 really means their possible empirical  
,,unification4 ,he supposes at the same 
time that the pragmatist1 because he    
criticizes rationalism's abstract ,one1 
is cut off from the consolation of      
believing in the saving possibilities of
 the concrete many4 ,he fails in short  
to distinguish between taking the       
world's perfection as a necessary       
principle1 and taking it only as a      
possible terminus ad quem4  ,i regard   
the writer of this letter as a genuine  
pragmatist1 but as a pragmatist sans le 
savoir4 ,he appears to me as one of that
 numerous class of philosophic amateurs 
whom ,i spoke of in my first lecture1 as
 wishing to have all the good things    
going1 without being too careful as to  
how they agree or disagree4 ,rational   
unity of all things is so inspiring a   
formula1 that he brandishes it offhand1 
and abstractly accuses pluralism of     

conflicting with it 7for the bare names 
do conflict71 altho concretely he means 
by it just the pragmatistically unified 
and ameliorated world4 ,most of us      
remain in this essential vagueness1 and 
it is well that we should2 but in the   
interest of clear-headedness it is well 
that some of us should go farther1 so ,i
 will try now to focus a little more    
discriminatingly on this particular     
religious point4  ,is then this you of  
yous1 this absolutely real world1 this  
unity that yields the moral inspiration 
and has the religious value1 to be taken
 monistically or pluralistically8 ,is it
 ante rem or in rebus8 ,is it a         
principle or an end1 an absolute or an  
ultimate1 a first or a last8 ,does it   
make you look forward or lie back8 ,it  
is certainly worth while not to clump   
the two things together1 for if         
discriminated1 they have decidedly      
diverse meanings for life4  ,please     
observe that the whole dilemma revolves 
pragmatically about the notion of the   

world's possibilities4 ,intellectually1 
rationalism invokes its absolute        
principle of unity as a ground of       
possibility for the many facts4         
,emotionally1 it sees it as a container 
and limiter of possibilities1 a         
guarantee that the upshot shall be good4
 ,taken in this way1 the absolute makes 
all good things certain1 and all bad    
things impossible 7in the eternal1      
namely71 and may be said to transmute   
the entire category of possibility into 
categories more secure4 ,one sees at    
this point that the great religious     
difference lies between the men who     
insist that the world ,,must ,,and      
,,shall ,,be1 and those who are         
contented with believing that the world 
,,may ,,be1 saved4 ,the whole clash of  
rationalistic and empiricist religion is
 thus over the validity of possibility4 
,it is necessary therefore to begin by  
focusing upon that word4 ,what may the  
word 'possible' definitely mean8  ,to   
unreflecting men the possible means a   

sort of third estate of being1 less real
 than existence1 more real than         
non-existence1 a twilight realm1 a      
hybrid status1 a limbo into which and   
out of which realities ever and anon are
 made to pass4 ,such a conception is of 
course too vague and nondescript to     
satisfy us4 ,here1 as elsewhere1 the    
only way to extract a term's meaning is 
to use the pragmatic method on it4 ,when
 you say that a thing is possible1 what 
difference does it make8  ,it makes at  
least this difference that if anyone    
calls it impossible you can contradict  
him1 if anyone calls it actual you can  
contradict ,,him1 and if anyone calls it
 necessary you can contradict him too4  
,but these privileges of contradiction  
don't amount to much4 ,when you say a   
thing is possible1 does not that make   
some farther difference in terms of     
actual fact8  ,it makes at least this   
negative difference that if the         
statement be true1 it follows that there
 is nothing extant capable of preventing

 the possible thing4 ,the absence of    
real grounds of interference may thus be
 said to make things not impossible1    
possible therefore in the bare or       
abstract sense4  ,but most possibles are
 not bare1 they are concretely grounded1
 or well-grounded1 as we say4 ,what does
 this mean pragmatically8 ,it means1 not
 only that there are no preventive      
conditions present1 but that some of the
 conditions of production of the        
possible thing actually are here4 ,thus 
a concretely possible chicken means3    
7#a7 that the idea of chicken contains  
no essential self-contradiction2 7#b7   
that no boys1 skunks1 or other enemies  
are about2 and 7#c7 that at least an    
actual egg exists4 ,possible chicken    
means actual egg--plus actual sitting   
hen1 or incubator1 or what not4 ,as the 
actual conditions approach completeness 
the chicken becomes a                   
better-and-better-grounded possibility4 
,when the conditions are entirely       
complete1 it ceases to be a possibility1

 and turns into an actual fact4  ,let us
 apply this notion to the salvation of  
the world4 ,what does it pragmatically  
mean to say that this is possible8 ,it  
means that some of the conditions of the
 world's deliverance do actually exist4 
,the more of them there are existent1   
the fewer preventing conditions you can 
find1 the better-grounded is the        
salvation's possibility1 the more       
,,probable does the fact of the         
deliverance become4  ,so much for our   
preliminary look at possibility4  ,now  
it would contradict the very spirit of  
life to say that our minds must be      
indifferent and neutral in questions    
like that of the world's salvation4     
,anyone who pretends to be neutral      
writes himself down here as a fool and a
 sham4 ,we all do wish to minimize the  
insecurity of the universe2 we are and  
ought to be unhappy when we regard it as
 exposed to every enemy and open to     
every life-destroying draft4            
,nevertheless there are unhappy men who 

think the salvation of the world        
impossible4 ,theirs is the doctrine     
known as pessimism4  ,optimism in turn  
would be the doctrine that thinks the   
world's salvation inevitable4  ,midway  
between the two there stands what may be
 called the doctrine of meliorism1 tho  
it has hitherto figured less as a       
doctrine than as an attitude in human   
affairs4 ,optimism has always been the  
regnant ,,doctrine in european          
philosophy4 ,pessimism was only recently
 introduced by ,schopenhauer and counts 
few systematic defenders as yet4        
,meliorism treats salvation as neither  
inevitable nor impossible4 ,it treats it
 as a possibility1 which becomes more   
and more of a probability the more      
numerous the actual conditions of       
salvation become4  ,it is clear that    
pragmatism must incline towards         
meliorism4 ,some conditions of the      
world's salvation are actually extant1  
and she cannot possibly close her eyes  
to this fact3 and should the residual   

conditions come1 salvation would become 
an accomplished reality4 ,naturally the 
terms ,i use here are exceedingly       
summary4 ,you may interpret the word    
'salvation' in any way you like1 and    
make it as diffuse and distributive1 or 
as climacteric and integral a phenomenon
 as you please4  ,take1 for example1 any
 one of us in this room with the ideals 
which he cherishes1 and is willing to   
live and work for4 ,every such ideal    
realized will be one moment in the      
world's salvation4 ,but these particular
 ideals are not bare abstract           
possibilities4 ,they are grounded1 they 
are ,,live possibilities1 for we are    
their live champions and pledges1 and if
 the complementary conditions come and  
add themselves1 our ideals will become  
actual things4 ,what now are the        
complementary conditions8 ,they are     
first such a mixture of things as will  
in the fulness of time give us a chance1
 a gap that we can spring into1 and1    
finally1 ,,our ,,act4  ,does our act    

then ,,create the world's salvation so  
far as it makes room for itself1 so far 
as it leaps into the gap8 ,does it      
create1 not the whole world's salvation 
of course1 but just so much of this as  
itself covers of the world's extent8    
,here ,i take the bull by the horns1 and
 in spite of the whole crew of          
rationalists and monists1 of whatever   
brand they be1 ,i ask ,,why ,,not8 ,our 
acts1 our turning-places1 where we seem 
to ourselves to make ourselves and grow1
 are the parts of the world to which we 
are closest1 the parts of which our     
knowledge is the most intimate and      
complete4 ,why should we not take them  
at their face-value8 ,why may they not  
be the actual turning-places and        
growing-places which they seem to be1 of
 the world--why not the workshop of     
being1 where we catch fact in the       
making1 so that nowhere may the world   
grow in any other kind of way than this8
  ,irrational6 we are told4 ,how can new
 being come in local spots and patches  

which add themselves or stay away at    
random1 independently of the rest8      
,there must be a reason for our acts1   
and where in the last resort can any    
reason be looked for save in the        
material pressure or the logical        
compulsion of the total nature of the   
world8 ,there can be but one real agent 
of growth1 or seeming growth1 anywhere1 
and that agent is the integral world    
itself4 ,it may grow all-over1 if growth
 there be1 but that single parts should 
grow per se is irrational4  ,but if one 
talks of rationality and of reasons for 
things1 and insists that they can't just
 come in spots1 what ,,kind of a reason 
can there ultimately be why anything    
should come at all8 ,talk of logic and  
necessity and categories and the        
absolute and the contents of the whole  
philosophical machine-shop as you will1 
the only ,,real reason ,i can think of  
why anything should ever come is that   
someone wishes it to be here4 ,it is    
,,demanded1 demanded1 it may be1 to give

 relief to no matter how small a        
fraction of the world's mass4 ,this is  
living reason1 and compared with it     
material causes and logical necessities 
are spectral things4  ,in short the only
 fully rational world would be the world
 of wishing-caps1 the world of          
telepathy1 where every desire is        
fulfilled instanter1 without having to  
consider or placate surrounding or      
intermediate powers4 ,this is the       
,absolute's own world4 ,he calls upon   
the phenomenal world to be1 and it ,,is1
 exactly as he calls for it1 no other   
condition being required4 ,in our world1
 the wishes of the individual are only  
one condition4 ,other individuals are   
there with other wishes and they must be
 propitiated first4 ,so ,being grows    
under all sorts of resistances in this  
world of the many1 and1 from compromise 
to compromise1 only gets organized      
gradually into what may be called       
secondarily rational shape4 ,we approach
 the wishing-cap type of organization   

only in a few departments of life4 ,we  
want water and we turn a faucet4 ,we    
want a kodak-picture and we press a     
button4 ,we want information and we     
telephone4 ,we want to travel and we buy
 a ticket4 ,in these and similar cases1 
we hardly need to do more than the      
wishing--the world is rationally        
organized to do the rest4  ,but this    
talk of rationality is a parenthesis and
 a digression4 ,what we were discussing 
was the idea of a world growing not     
integrally but piecemeal by the         
contributions of its several parts4     
,take the hypothesis seriously and as a 
live one4 ,suppose that the world's     
author put the case to you before       
creation1 saying3 ,i am going to make a 
world not certain to be saved1 a world  
the perfection of which shall be        
conditional merely1 the condition being 
that each several agent does its own    
'level best4' ,i offer you the chance of
 taking part in such a world4 ,its      
safety1 you see1 is unwarranted4 ,it is 

a real adventure1 with real danger1 yet 
it may win through4 ,it is a social     
scheme of co-operative work genuinely to
 be done4 ,will you join the procession8
 ,will you trust yourself and trust the 
other agents enough to face the risk8   
,should you in all seriousness1 if      
participation in such a world were      
proposed to you1 feel bound to reject it
 as not safe enough8 ,would you say     
that1 rather than be part and parcel of 
so fundamentally pluralistic and        
irrational a universe1 you preferred to 
relapse into the slumber of nonentity   
from which you had been momentarily     
aroused by the tempter's voice8  ,of    
course if you are normally constituted1 
you would do nothing of the sort4 ,there
 is a healthy-minded buoyancy in most of
 us which such a universe would exactly 
fit4 ,we would therefore accept the     
offer--,top6 und schlag auf schlag6 ,it 
would be just like the world we         
practically live in2 and loyalty to our 
old nurse ,nature would forbid us to say

 no4 ,the world proposed would seem     
'rational' to us in the most living way4
  ,most of us1 ,i say1 would therefore  
welcome the proposition and add our fiat
 to the fiat of the creator4 ,yet       
perhaps some would not2 for there are   
morbid minds in every human collection1 
and to them the prospect of a universe  
with only a fighting chance of safety   
would probably make no appeal4 ,there   
are moments of discouragement in us all1
 when we are sick of self and tired of  
vainly striving4 ,our own life breaks   
down1 and we fall into the attitude of  
the prodigal son4 ,we mistrust the      
chances of things4 ,we want a universe  
where we can just give up1 fall on our  
father's neck1 and be absorbed into the 
absolute life as a drop of water melts  
into the river or the sea4  ,the peace  
and rest1 the security desiderated at   
such moments is security against the    
bewildering accidents of so much finite 
experience4 ,nirvana means safety from  
this everlasting round of adventures of 

which the world of sense consists4 ,the 
hindoo and the buddhist1 for this is    
essentially their attitude1 are simply  
afraid1 afraid of more experience1      
afraid of life4  ,and to men of this    
complexion1 religious monism comes with 
its consoling words3 ,all is needed and 
essential--even you with your sick soul 
and heart4 ,all are one with ,god1 and  
with ,god all is well4 ,the everlasting 
arms are beneath1 whether in the world  
of finite appearances you seem to fail  
or to succeed4 ,there can be no doubt   
that when men are reduced to their last 
sick extremity absolutism is the only   
saving scheme4 ,pluralistic moralism    
simply makes their teeth chatter1 it    
refrigerates the very heart within their
 breast4  ,so we see concretely two     
types of religion in sharp contrast4    
,using our old terms of comparison1 we  
may say that the absolutistic scheme    
appeals to the tender-minded while the  
pluralistic scheme appeals to the tough4
 ,many persons would refuse to call the 

pluralistic scheme religious at all4    
,they would call it moralistic1 and     
would apply the word religious to the   
monistic scheme alone4 ,religion in the 
sense of self-surrender1 and moralism in
 the sense of self-sufficingness1 have  
been pitted against each other as       
incompatibles frequently enough in the  
history of human thought4  ,we stand    
here before the final question of       
philosophy4 ,i said in my fourth lecture
 that ,i believed the                   
monistic-pluralistic alternative to be  
the deepest and most pregnant question  
that our minds can frame4 ,can it be    
that the disjunction is a final one8    
that only one side can be true8 ,are a  
pluralism and monism genuine            
incompatibles8 ,so that1 if the world   
were really pluralistically constituted1
 if it really existed distributively and
 were made up of a lot of eaches1 it    
could only be saved piecemeal and de    
facto as the result of their behavior1  
and its epic history in no wise         

short-circuited by some essential       
oneness in which the severalness were   
already 'taken up' beforehand and       
eternally 'overcome'8 ,if this were so1 
we should have to choose one philosophy 
or the other4 ,we could not say 'yes1   
yes' to both alternatives4 ,there would 
have to be a 'no' in our relations with 
the possible4 ,we should confess an     
ultimate disappointment3 we could not   
remain healthy-minded and sick-minded in
 one indivisible act4  ,of course as    
human beings we can be healthy minds on 
one day and sick souls on the next2 and 
as amateur dabblers in philosophy we may
 perhaps be allowed to call ourselves   
monistic pluralists1 or free-will       
determinists1 or whatever else may occur
 to us of a reconciling kind4 ,but as   
philosophers aiming at clearness and    
consistency1 and feeling the            
pragmatistic need of squaring truth with
 truth1 the question is forced upon us  
of frankly adopting either the tender or
 the robustious type of thought4 ,in    

particular ,,this query has always come 
home to me3 ,may not the claims of      
tender-mindedness go too far8 ,may not  
the notion of a world already saved in  
toto anyhow1 be too saccharine to stand8
 ,may not religious optimism be too     
idyllic8 ,must ,,all be saved8 ,is ,,no 
price to be paid in the work of         
salvation8 ,is the last word sweet8 ,is 
all 'yes1 yes' in the universe8 ,doesn't
 the fact of 'no' stand at the very core
 of life8 ,doesn't the very             
'seriousness' that we attribute to life 
mean that ineluctable noes and losses   
form a part of it1 that there are       
genuine sacrifices somewhere1 and that  
something permanently drastic and bitter
 always remains at the bottom of its    
cup8  ,i can not speak officially as a  
pragmatist here2 all ,i can say is that 
my own pragmatism offers no objection to
 my taking sides with this more         
moralistic view1 and giving up the claim
 of total reconciliation4 ,the          
possibility of this is involved in the  

pragmatistic willingness to treat       
pluralism as a serious hypothesis4 ,in  
the end it is our faith and not our     
logic that decides such questions1 and  
,i deny the right of any pretended logic
 to veto my own faith4 ,i find myself   
willing to take the universe to be      
really dangerous and adventurous1       
without therefore backing out and crying
 'no play4' ,i am willing to think that 
the prodigal-son attitude1 open to us as
 it is in many vicissitudes1 is not the 
right and final attitude towards the    
whole of life4 ,i am willing that there 
should be real losses and real losers1  
and no total preservation of all that   
is4 ,i can believe in the ideal as an   
ultimate1 not as an origin1 and as an   
extract1 not the whole4 ,when the cup is
 poured off1 the dregs are left behind  
forever1 but the possibility of what is 
poured off is sweet enough to accept4   
,as a matter of fact countless human    
imaginations live in this moralistic and
 epic kind of a universe1 and find its  

disseminated and strung-along successes 
sufficient for their rational needs4    
,there is a finely translated epigram in
 the greek anthology which admirably    
expresses this state of mind1 this      
acceptance of loss as unatoned for1 even
 tho the lost element might be one's    
self3  ,a shipwrecked sailor1 buried on 
this coast1 ,bids you set sail4 ,full   
many a gallant bark1 when we were lost1 
,weathered the gale4  ,those puritans   
who answered 'yes' to the question3 ,are
 you willing to be damned for ,god's    
glory8 were in this objective and       
magnanimous condition of mind4 ,the way 
of escape from evil on this system is   
,,not by getting it 'aufgehoben1' or    
preserved in the whole as an element    
essential but 'overcome4' ,it is by     
dropping it out altogether1 throwing it 
overboard and getting beyond it1 helping
 to make a universe that shall forget   
its very place and name4  ,it is then   
perfectly possible to accept sincerely a
 drastic kind of a universe from which  

the element of 'seriousness' is not to  
be expelled4 ,whoso does so is1 it seems
 to me1 a genuine pragmatist4 ,he is    
willing to live on a scheme of          
uncertified possibilities which he      
trusts2 willing to pay with his own     
person1 if need be1 for the realization 
of the ideals which he frames4  ,what   
now actually ,,are the other forces     
which he trusts to co-operate with him1 
in a universe of such a type8 ,they are 
at least his fellow men1 in the stage of
 being which our actual universe has    
reached4 ,but are there not superhuman  
forces also1 such as religious men of   
the pluralistic type we have been       
considering have always believed in8    
,their words may have sounded monistic  
when they said there is no ,god but     
,god2 but the original polytheism of    
mankind has only imperfectly and vaguely
 sublimated itself into monotheism1 and 
monotheism itself1 so far as it was     
religious and not a scheme of class-room
 instruction for the metaphysicians1 has

 always viewed ,god as but one helper1  
primus inter pares1 in the midst of all 
the shapers of the great world's fate4  
,i fear that my previous lectures1      
confined as they have been to human and 
humanistic aspects1 may have left the   
impression on many of you that          
pragmatism means methodically to leave  
the superhuman out4 ,i have shown small 
respect indeed for the ,absolute1 and ,i
 have until this moment spoken of no    
other superhuman hypothesis but that4   
,but ,i trust that you see sufficiently 
that the ,absolute has nothing but its  
superhumanness in common with the       
theistic ,god4 ,on pragmatistic         
principles1 if the hypothesis of ,god   
works satisfactorily in the widest sense
 of the word1 it is true4 ,now whatever 
its residual difficulties may be1       
experience shows that it certainly does 
work1 and that the problem is to build  
it out and determine it1 so that it will
 combine satisfactorily with all the    
other working truths4 ,i cannot start   

upon a whole theology at the end of this
 last lecture2 but when ,i tell you that
 ,i have written a book on men's        
religious experience1 which on the whole
 has been regarded as making for the    
reality of ,god1 you will perhaps exempt
 my own pragmatism from the charge of   
being an atheistic system4 ,i firmly    
disbelieve1 myself1 that our human      
experience is the highest form of       
experience extant in the universe4 ,i   
believe rather that we stand in much the
 same relation to the whole of the      
universe as our canine and feline pets  
do to the whole of human life4 ,they    
inhabit our drawing-rooms and libraries4
 ,they take part in scenes of whose     
significance they have no inkling4 ,they
 are merely tangent to curves of history
 the beginnings and ends and forms of   
which pass wholly beyond their ken4 ,so 
we are tangents to the wider life of    
things4 ,but1 just as many of the dog's 
and cat's ideals coincide with our      
ideals1 and the dogs and cats have daily

 living proof of the fact1 so we may    
well believe1 on the proofs that        
religious experience affords1 that      
higher powers exist and are at work to  
save the world on ideal lines similar to
 our own4  ,you see that pragmatism can 
be called religious1 if you allow that  
religion can be pluralistic or merely   
melioristic in type4 ,but whether you   
will finally put up with that type of   
religion or not is a question that only 
you yourself can decide4 ,pragmatism has
 to postpone dogmatic answer1 for we do 
not yet know certainly which type of    
religion is going to work best in the   
long run4 ,the various overbeliefs of   
men1 their several faith-ventures1 are  
in fact what are needed to bring the    
evidence in4 ,you will probably make    
your own ventures severally4 ,if        
radically tough1 the hurly-burly of the 
sensible facts of nature will be enough 
for you1 and you will need no religion  
at all4 ,if radically tender1 you will  
take up with the more monistic form of  

religion3 the pluralistic form1 with its
 reliance on possibilities that are not 
necessities1 will not seem to afford you
 security enough4  ,but if you are      
neither tough nor tender in an extreme  
and radical sense1 but mixed as most of 
us are1 it may seem to you that the type
 of pluralistic and moralistic religion 
that ,i have offered is as good a       
religious synthesis as you are likely to
 find4 ,between the two extremes of     
crude naturalism on the one hand and    
transcendental absolutism on the other1 
you may find that what ,i take the      
liberty of calling the pragmatistic or  
melioristic type of theism is exactly   
what you require4   ,the ,end