,,humboldt ,,library                    
,,of                         ,,popular  
,,science ,,literature4                 
,,the ,,scientific ,,basis              
,,of                                    
,,morals1                               
,,and ,,other ,,essays2        ,viz43   
,right and ,wrong2 ,the ,ethics of      
,belief2 ,the ,ethics of ,religion4     
,by ,,william ,,kingdon ,,clifford1     
,f4,r4,s4                ,i4 ,,on ,,the 
,,scientific ,,basis ,,of ,,morals4     
,by ,morals or ,ethic ,i mean the       
doctrine of a special kind of pleasure  
or  displeasure which is felt by the    
human mind in contemplating certain     
courses of conduct1 whereby they are    
felt to be right or wrong1  and of a    
special desire to do the right things   
and avoid the wrong  ones4 ,the pleasure
 or displeasure is commonly called the  
moral sense2  the corresponding desire  
might be called the moral appetite4     
,these  are facts1 existing in the      
consciousness of every man who need be  

considered in this discussion1 and      
sufficiently marked out by these  names2
 they need no further definition4 ,in   
the same way the sense  of taste is a   
feeling of pleasure or displeasure in   
things savory or  unsavory1 and is      
associated with a desire for the one and
 a repulsion  from the other4 ,we must  
assume that everybody knows what these  
words  mean2 the feelings they describe 
may be analyzed or accounted for1  but  
they cannot be more exactly defined as  
feelings4    ,the maxims of ethic are   
recommendations or commands of the form1
  ',do this particular thing because it 
is right1' or ',avoid this  particular  
thing because it is wrong4' ,they       
express the immediate  desire to do the 
right thing for itself1 not for the sake
 of anything  else3 on this account the 
mood of them is called the categorical  
imperative4 ,the particular things      
commanded or forbidden by such  maxims  
depend upon the character of the        
individual in whose mind they  arise4   

,there is a certain general agreement in
 the ethical code of  persons belonging 
to the same race at a given time1 but   
considerable  variations in different   
races and times4 ,to the question ',what
 is  right8' can therefore only be      
answered in the first instance1 ',that  
which pleases your moral sense4' ,but it
 may be further asked ',what  is        
generally thought right8' and the reply 
will specify the ethic of  a particular 
race and period4 ,but the ethical code  
of an individual1  like the standard of 
taste1 may be modified by habit and     
education2  and accordingly the question
 may be asked1 ',how shall ,i order my  
moral desires so as to be able to       
satisfy them most completely and        
continuously8 ,what ought ,i to feel to 
be right8' ,the answer to this  question
 must be sought in the study of the     
conditions under which  the moral sense 
was produced and is preserved2 in other 
words1 in the  study of its functions as
 a property of the human organism4 ,the 

maxims  derived from this study may be  
called maxims of abstract or absolute   
right2 they are not absolutely          
universal1 'eternal and immutable1'  but
 they are independent of the individual1
 and practically universal  for the     
present condition of the human species4 
,i mean by ,science the application of  
experience to new circumstances1  by the
 aid of an order of nature which has    
been observed in the  past1 and on the  
assumption that such order will continue
 in the  future4 ,the simplest use of   
experience as a guide to action is      
probably  not even conscious2 it is the 
association by continually-repeated     
selection of certain actions with       
certain circumstances1 as in the        
unconsciously-acquired craft of the     
maker of flint implements4 ,i  still    
call this science1 although it is only a
 beginning2 because  the physiological  
process is a type of what takes place in
 all later  stages4 ,the next step may  
be expressed in the form of a           

hypothetical  maxim1--',if you want to  
make brass1 melt your copper along with 
this  blue stone4' ,to a maxim of this  
sort it may always be replied1 ',i do   
not want to make brass1 and so ,i shall 
not do as you tell me4' ,this  reply is 
anticipated in the final form of        
science1 when it is expressed  as a     
statement or proposition3 brass is an   
alloy of copper and zinc1  and calamine 
is zinc carbonate4 ,belief in a general 
statement is  an artifice of our mental 
constitution1 whereby infinitely various
  sensations and groups of sensations   
are brought into connection with        
infinitely various actions and groups of
 actions4 ,on the phenomenal  side there
 corresponds a certain cerebral         
structure by which various  combinations
 of disturbances in the sensor tract are
 made to lead to  the appropriate       
combinations of disturbances in the     
motor tract4 ,the  important point is   
that science1 though apparently         
transformed into  pure knowledge1 has   

yet never lost its character of being a 
craft2  and that it is not the knowledge
 itself which can rightly be called     
science1 but a special way of getting   
and of using knowledge4 ,namely1        
science is the getting of knowledge from
 experience on the assumption  of       
uniformity in nature1 and the use of    
such knowledge to guide the  actions of 
men4 ,and the most abstract statements  
or propositions in  science are to be   
regarded as bundles of hypothetical     
maxims packed  into a portable shape and
 size4 ,every scientific fact is a      
shorthand  expression for a vast number 
of practical directions3 if you want    
so-and-so1 do so-and-so4    ,if with    
this meaning of the word ',science1'    
there is such a thing as  a scientific  
basis of ,morals1 it must be true       
that1--    #a4 ,the maxims of ,ethic are
 hypothetical maxims4    #b4 ,derived   
from experience4    #c4 ,on the         
assumption of uniformity in nature4     
,these propositions ,i shall now        

endeavor to prove2 and in conclusion1   
,i shall indicate the direction in which
 we may look for those general          
statements of fact whose organization   
will complete the likeness of  ethical  
and physical science4    ,the ,tribal   
,self4--,in the metaphysical sense1 the 
word 'self' is  taken to mean the       
conscious subject1 das ,ich1 the whole  
stream of  feelings which make up a     
consciousness regarded as bound together
 by  association and memory4 ,but1 in   
the more common and more restricted     
ethical sense1 what we call self is a   
selected aggregate of feelings  and of  
objects related to them1 which hangs    
together as a conception by  virtue of  
long and repeated association4 ,my self 
does not include all  my feelings1      
because habitually separate off some of 
them1 say they  do not properly belong  
to me1 and treat them as my enemies4 ,on
 the  other hand1 it does in general    
include my body regarded as an object1  
because of the feelings which occur     

simultaneously with events which  affect
 it4 ,my foot is certainly part of      
myself1 because ,i get hurt when        
anybody treads on it4 ,when we desire   
anything for its somewhat remote        
consequences1 it is not common for these
 to be represented to the mind  in the  
form of the actual feelings of pleasure 
which are ultimately to  flow from the  
satisfaction of the desire2 instead of  
this1 they are  replaced by a symbolic  
conception which represents the thing   
desired  as doing good to the complex   
abstraction self4 ,this abstraction     
serves  thus to support and hold        
together those complex and remote       
motives  which make up by far the       
greater part of the life of the         
intelligent  races4 ,when a thing is    
desired for no immediate pleasure that  
it  can bring1 it is generally desired  
on account of a certain symbolic        
substitute for pleasure1 the feeling    
that this thing is suitable to  the     
self4 ,and1 as in many like cases1 this 

feeling1 which at first  derived its    
pleasurable nature from the faintly     
represented simple  pleasures of which  
it was a symbol1 ceases after a time to 
recall  them and becomes a simple       
pleasure itself4 ,in this way the self  
becomes a sort of center about which our
 remoter motives revolve1  and to which 
they always have regard2 in virtue of   
which1 moreover1  they become immediate 
and simple1 from having been complex and
 remote4    ,if we consider now the     
simpler races of mankind1 we shall find 
not  only that immediate desires play a 
far larger part in their lives1  and so 
that the conception of self is less used
 and less developed1  but also that it  
is less definite and more wide4 ,the    
savage is not  only hurt when anybody   
treads on his foot1 but when anybody    
treads on  his tribe4 ,he may lose his  
hut1 and his wife1 and his opportunities
  of getting food4 ,in this way the     
tribe becomes naturally included in     
that conception of self which renders   

remote desires possible by making  them 
immediate4 ,the actual pains or         
pleasures which come from the woe  or   
weal of the tribe1 and which were the   
source of this conception1  drop out of 
consciousness and are remembered no     
more2 the symbol which  has replaced    
them becomes a center and goal of       
immediate desires1  powerful enough in  
many cases to override the strongest    
suggestions  of individual pleasure or  
pain4    ,here a helping cause comes in4
 ,the tribe1 qu tribe1 has to exist1    
and it can only exist by aid of such an 
organic artifice as the  conception of  
the tribal self in the minds of its     
members4 ,hence the  natural selection  
of those races in which this conception 
is the most  powerful and most          
habitually predominant as a motive over 
immediate  desires4 ,to such an extent  
has this proceeded that we may fairly   
doubt whether the selfhood of the tribe 
is not earlier in point of  development 
than that of the individual4 ,in the    

process of time it  becomes a matter of 
hereditary transmission1 and is thus    
fixed as  a specific character in the   
constitution of social man4 ,with the   
settlement of countries1 and the        
aggregation of tribes into nations1  it 
takes a wider and more abstract form2   
and in the highest natures the  tribal  
self is incarnate in nothing less than  
humanity4 ,short of these  heights1 it  
places itself in the family and in the  
city4 ,i shall call  that quality or    
disposition of man which consists in the
 supremacy  of the family or tribal self
 as a mark of reference for motives by  
its old name ,piety4 ,and ,i have now to
 consider certain feelings and          
conceptions to which the existence of   
piety must necessarily give rise4       
,before going further1 however1 it will 
be advisable to fix as  precisely as may
 be the sense of the words just used4   
,self1 then1 in  the ethical sense1 is a
 conception in the mind of the          
individual which  serves as a peg on    

which remote desires are hung and by    
which they are  rendered immediate4 ,the
 individual self is such a peg for the  
hanging  of remote desires which affect 
the individual only4 ,the tribal self   
is a conception in the mind of the      
individual which serves as a peg  on    
which those remote desires are hung     
which were implanted in him  by the need
 of the tribe as a tribe4 ,we must      
carefully distinguish  the tribal self  
from society1 or the 'common            
consciousness2' it is  something in the 
mind of each individual man which binds 
together  his gregarious instincts4     
,the word tribe is here used to mean a  
group of that size which in the         
circumstances considered is selected for
 survival or destruction as  a group4   
,self-regarding excellences are brought 
out by the natural  selection of        
individuals2 the tribal self is         
developed by the natural  selection of  
groups4 ,the size of the groups must    
vary at different  times2 and the extent

 of the tribal self must vary           
accordingly4    ,approbation and        
,conscience4--,the tribe has to exist4  
,such tribes  as saw no necessity for it
 have ceased to live4 ,to exist1 it must
  encourage piety2 and there is a method
 which lies ready to hand4    ,we do not
 like a man whose character is such that
 we may reasonably  expect injuries from
 him4 ,this dislike of a man on account 
of his  character is a more complex     
feeling than the mere dislike of        
separate  injuries4 ,a cat likes your   
hand and your lap1 and the food you give
  her2 but ,i do not think she has any  
conception of you4 ,a dog1 however1  may
 like you even when you thrash him1     
though he does not like the  thrashing4 
,now such likes and dislikes may be felt
 by the tribal  self4 ,if a man does    
anything generally regarded as good for 
the tribe1  my tribal self may say1 in  
the first place1 ',i like that thing    
that  you have done4' ,by such common   
approbation of individual acts the      

influence of piety as a motive becomes  
defined2 and natural selection  will in 
the long run preserve those tribes which
 have approved the  right things2       
namely1 those things which at that time 
gave the tribe  an advantage in the     
struggle for existence4 ,but in the     
second place1  a man may as a rule and  
constantly1 being actuated by piety1 do 
good  things for the tribe2 and in that 
case the tribal self will say1  ,i like 
you4 ,the feeling expressed by this     
statement on the part of  any           
individual1 ',in the name of the tribe1 
,i like you1' is what ,i  call          
approbation4 ,it is the feeling produced
 in pious individuals by  that sort of  
character which seems to them beneficial
 to the community4    ,now suppose that 
a man has done something obviously      
harmful to the  community4 ,either some 
immediate desire1 or his individual     
self1 has  for once proved stronger than
 the tribal self4 ,when the tribal self 
wakes up1 the man says1 ',in the name of

 the tribe1 ,i do not like this  thing  
that ,i1 as an individual1 have done4'  
,this ,self-judgment in the  name of the
 tribe is called ,conscience4 ,if the   
man goes further and  draws from this   
act and others an inference about his   
own character1  he may say1 ',in the    
name of the tribe1 ,i do not like my    
individual  self4' ,this is remorse4    
,mr4 ,darwin has well pointed out that  
immediate  desires are in general strong
 but of short duration1 and cannot be   
adequately represented to the mind after
 they have passed2 while  the social    
forces1 though less violent1 have a     
steady and continuous  action4    ,in a 
mind sufficiently developed to          
distinguish the individual from the     
tribal self1 conscience is thus a       
necessary result of the existence  of   
piety2 it is ready to hand as a means   
for its increase4 ,but to  account for  
the existence of piety and conscience in
 the elemental  form which we have      
hitherto considered is by no means to   

account for  the present moral nature of
 man4 ,we shall be led many steps in    
that  direction if we consider the way  
in which society has used these         
feelings of the individual as a means   
for its own preservation4    ,right and 
,responsibility4--,a like or a dislike  
is one thing2 the  expression of it is  
another4 ,it is attached to the feeling 
by links of  association2 and when this 
association has been selectively        
modified  by experience1 whether        
consciously or unconsciously1 the       
expression  serves a purpose of         
retaining or repeating the thing liked1 
and of  removing the thing disliked4    
,such a purpose is served by the        
expression  of tribal approbation or    
disapprobation1 however little it may be
 the  conscious end of such expression  
to any individual4 ,it is necessary to  
the tribe that the pious character      
should be encouraged and preserved1  the
 impious character discouraged and      
removed4 ,the process is of two  kinds2 

direct and reflex4 ,in the direct       
process the tribal dislike of  the      
offender is precisely similar to the    
dislike of a noxious beast2  and it     
expresses itself in his speedy removal4 
,but in the reflex  process we find the 
first trace of that singular and        
wonderful judgment  by analogy which    
ascribes to other men a consciousness   
similar to our  own4 ,if the process    
were a conscious one1 it might perhaps  
be described  in this way3 the tribal   
self says1 ',put yourself in this man's 
place2  he also is pious1 but he has    
offended1 and that proves that he is not
  pious enough4 ,still1 he has some     
conscience1 and the expression of  your 
tribal dislike to his character1        
awakening his conscience1 will  tend to 
change him and make him more pious4'    
,but the process is not a  conscious    
one3 the social craft or art of living  
together is learned  by the tribe and   
not by the individual1 and the purpose  
of improving  men's characters is       

provided for by complex social          
arrangements long  before it has been   
conceived by any conscious mind4 ,the   
tribal self  learns to approve certain  
expressions of tribal liking or         
disliking2  the actions whose open      
approval is liked by the tribal self are
 called  right actions1 and those whose 
open disapproval is liked are called    
wrong actions4 ,the corresponding       
characters are called good or bad1      
virtuous or vicious4    ,this introduces
 a further complication into the        
conscience4 ,self-judgment in the name  
of the tribe becomes associated  with   
very definite and material judgment by  
the tribe itself4 ,on the  one hand1    
this undoubtedly strengthens the        
motive-power of conscience  in an       
enormous degree4 ,on the other hand1 it 
tends to guide the  decisions of        
conscience2 and since the expression of 
public approval or  disapproval is made 
in general by means of some organized   
machinery of  government1 it becomes    

possible for conscience to be knowingly 
directed  by the wise or misdirected by 
the wicked1 instead of being driven     
along  the right path by the slow       
selective process of experience4 ,now   
right  actions are not those which are  
publicly approved1 but those whose      
public approbation a well-instructed    
tribal self would like4 ,still1 it  is  
impossible to avoid the guiding         
influence of expressed approbation  on  
the great mass of the people2 and in    
those cases where the machinery  of     
government is approximately a means of  
expressing the true public  conscience1 
that influence becomes a most powerful  
help to improvement4    ,let us note now
 the very important difference between  
the direct and  the reflex process4 ,to 
clear a man away as a noxious beast1 and
 to  punish him for doing wrong1 these  
are two very different things4 ,the     
purpose in the first case is merely to  
get rid of a nuisance2 the  purpose in  
the second case is to improve the       

character either of the  man himself or 
of those who will observe this public   
expression of  disapprobation4 ,the     
offense of which the man has been guilty
 leads  to an inference about his       
character1 and it is supposed that the  
community may contain other persons     
whose characters are similar to  his1 or
 tend to become so4 ,it has been found  
that the expression of  public          
disapprobation tends to awake the       
conscience of such people and  to       
improve their characters4 ,if the       
improvement of the man himself is  aimed
 at1 it is assumed that he has a        
conscience which can be worked  upon and
 made to deter him from similar offenses
 in future4    ,the word purpose has    
here been used in a sense to which it is
 perhaps  worth while to call attention4
 ,adaptation of means to an end may  be 
produced in two ways that we at present 
know of2 by processes of  natural       
selection1 and by the agency of an      
intelligence in which an  image or idea 

of the end preceded the use of the      
means4 ,in both cases  the existence of 
the adaptation is accounted for by the  
necessity or  utility of the end4 ,it   
seems to me convenient to use the word  
purpose  as meaning generally the end to
 which certain means are adapted1 both  
in these two cases1 and in any other    
that may hereafter become known1        
provided only that the adaptation is    
accounted for by the necessity  or      
utility of the end4 ,and there seems no 
objection to the use of  the phrase     
'final cause' in this wider sense1 if it
 is to be kept  at all4 ,the word       
'design' might then be kept for the     
special case  of adaptation by an       
intelligence4 ,and we may then say that 
since the  process of natural selection 
has been understood1 purpose has ceased 
to suggest design to instructed people1 
except in cases where the  agency of man
 is independently probable4    ,when a  
man can be punished for doing wrong with
 approval of the  tribal self1 he is    

said to be responsible4 ,responsibility 
implies  two things3--7#a7 ,the act was 
a product of the man's character and  of
 the circumstances1 and his character   
may to a certain extent be  inferred    
from the act2 7#b7 ,the man had a       
conscience which might have  been so    
worked upon as to prevent his doing the 
act4 ,unless the first  condition be    
fulfilled1 we cannot reasonably take any
 action at all  in regard to the man1   
but only in regard to the offense4 ,in  
the case  of crimes of violence1 for    
example1 we might carry a six-shooter to
  protect ourselves against similar     
possibilities1 but unless the fact  of a
 man's having once committed a murder   
made it probable that he  would do the  
like again1 it would clearly be absurd  
and unreasonable to  lynch the man4     
,that is to say1 we assume an uniformity
 of connection  between character and   
actions1 infer a man's character from   
his past  actions1 and endeavor to      
provide against his future actions      

either by  destroying him or by changing
 his character4 ,i think it will be     
found  that in all those cases where we 
not only deal with the offense but      
treat it with moral reprobation1 we     
imply the existence of a conscience     
which might have been worked upon to    
improve the character4 ,why1 for        
example1 do we not regard a lunatic as  
responsible8 ,because we are in         
possession of information about his     
character derived not only from  his one
 offense but from other facts1 whereby  
we know that even if he  had a          
conscience left1 his mind is so diseased
 that it is impossible  by moral        
reprobation alone to change his         
character so that it may be             
subsequently relied upon4 ,with his cure
 from disease and the restored  validity
 of this condition1 responsibility      
returns4 ,there are1 of  course1 cases  
in which an irresponsible person is     
punished as if he  were responsible1    
pour encourager les autres who are      

responsible4 ,the  question of the right
 or wrong of this procedure is the      
question of  its average effect on the  
character of men at any particular time4
    ,the ,categorical ,imperative4--,may
 we now say that the maxims of ,ethic   
are hypothetical maxims8 ,i think we    
may1 and that in showing why we  shall  
explain the apparent difference between 
them and other maxims  belonging to an  
early stage of science4 ,in the first   
place ethical  maxims are learned by the
 tribe and not by the individual4 ,those
 tribes  have on the whole survived in  
which conscience approved such actions  
as  tended to the improvement of men's  
characters as citizens and therefore  to
 the survival of the tribe4 ,hence it is
 that the moral sense of the            
individual1 though founded on the       
experience of the tribe1 is purely      
intuitive2 conscience gives no reasons4 
,notwithstanding this1 the  ethical     
maxims are presented to us as           
conditional2 if you want to live        

together in this complicated way1 your  
ways must be straight and not  crooked1 
you must seek the truth and love no lie4
 ,suppose we answer1 ',i  don't want to 
live together with other men in this    
complicated way2 and  so ,i shall not do
 as you tell me4' ,that is not the end  
of the matter1  as it might be with     
other scientific precepts4 ,for obvious 
reasons it  is right in this case to    
reply1 ',then in the name of my people  
,i do  not like you1' and to express    
this dislike by appropriate methods4    
,and  the offender1 being descended from
 a social race1 is unable to escape  his
 conscience1 the voice of his tribal    
self which says1 ',in the name  of the  
tribe1 ,i hate myself for this treason  
that ,i have done4'    ,there are two   
reasons1 then1 why ethical maxims appear
 to be  unconditional4 ,first1 they are 
acquired from experience not directly   
but by tribal selection1 and therefore  
in the mind of the individual  they do  
not rest upon the true reasons for them4

 ,secondly1 although  they are          
conditional1 the absence of the         
condition in one born of a  social race 
is rightly visited by moral reprobation4
    ,ethics are based on                
,uniformity4--,i have already observed  
that  to deal with men as a means of    
influencing their actions implies  that 
these actions are a product of character
 and circumstances2  and that moral     
reprobation and responsibility cannot   
exist unless  we assume the efficacy of 
certain special means of influencing    
character4 ,it is not necessary to point
 out that such considerations  involve  
that uniformity of nature which         
underlies the possibility  of even      
unconscious adaptations to experience1  
of language1 and of  general conceptions
 and statements4 ,it may be asked1 ',are
 you quite  sure that these observed    
uniformities between motive and action1 
between character and motive1 between   
social influence and change of          
character1 are absolutely exact in the  

form in which you state them1  or indeed
 that they are exact laws of any form8  
,may there not be very  slight          
divergences from exact laws1 which will 
allow of the action  of an uncaused     
will1 or of the interference of some    
extra-mundane  force8' ,i am sure ,i do 
not know4 ,but this ,i do know3 that our
 sense  of right and wrong is derived   
from such order as we can observe1 and  
not from such caprice of disorder as we 
may fancifully conjecture2 and  that to 
whatever extent a divergence from       
exactness became sensible1  to that     
extent it would destroy the most        
widespread and worthy of  the           
acquisitions of mankind4    ,the ,final 
,standard4--,by these views we are led  
to conclusions partly  negative1 partly 
positive2 of which1 as might be         
expected1 the negative  are the most    
definite4    ,first1 then1 ,ethic is a  
matter of the tribe or community1 and   
therefore  there are no 'self-regarding 
virtues4' ,the qualities of courage1    

prudence1 etc41 can only be rightly     
encouraged in so far as they are  shown 
to conduce to the efficiency of a       
citizen2 that is1 in so far  as they    
cease to be self-regarding4 ,the duty of
 private judgment1  of searching after  
truth1 the sacredness of belief which   
ought not  to be misused on unproved    
statements1 follow only on showing of   
the  enormous importance to society of a
 true knowledge of things4 ,and any     
diversion of conscience from its sole   
allegiance to the community is          
condemned  priori in the very nature of 
right and wrong4    ,next1 the end of   
,ethic is not the greatest happiness of 
the greatest  number4 ,your happiness is
 of no use to the community1 except in  
so  far as it tends to make you a more  
efficient citizen--that is to  say1     
happiness is not to be desired for its  
own sake1 but for the  sake of something
 else4 ,if any end is pointed to1 it is 
the end of  increased efficiency in each
 man's special work1 as well as in the  

social functions which are common to    
all4 ,a man must strive to be a  better 
citizen1 a better workman1 a better son1
 husband1 or father4    ,again1 ,piety  
is not ,altruism4 ,it is not the doing  
good to others as  others1 but the      
service of the community by a member of 
it1 who loses  in that service the      
consciousness that he is anything       
different from  the community4    ,the  
social organism1 like the individual1   
may be healthy or  diseased4 ,health and
 disease are very difficult things to   
define  accurately3 but for practical   
purposes1 there are certain states about
  which no mistake can be made4 ,when we
 have even a very imperfect  catalogue  
and description of states that are      
clearly and certainly  diseases1 we may 
form a rough preliminary definition of  
health  by saying that it means the     
absence of all these states4 ,now the   
health of society involves among other  
things1 that right is done by  the      
individuals composing it4 ,and certain  

social diseases consist  in a wrong     
direction of the conscience4 ,hence the 
determination  of abstract right depends
 on the study of healthy and diseased   
states of society4 ,how much light can  
be got for this end from the  historical
 records we possess8 ,a very great deal1
 if1 as ,i believe1  for ethical        
purposes the nature of man and of       
society may be taken  as approximately  
constant during the few thousand years  
of which we  have distinct records4     
,the matters of fact on which rational  
ethic must be founded are the  laws of  
modification of character1 and the      
evidence of history as  to those kinds  
of character which have most aided the  
improvement of  the race4 ,for although 
the moral sense is intuitive1 it must   
for the  future be directed by our      
conscious discovery of the tribal       
purpose  which it serves4               
,,ii4 ,,right ,,and ,,wrong3    ,,the   
,,scientific ,,ground ,,of ,,their      
,,distinction4 #a      ,the questions   

which are here to be considered are     
especially and  peculiarly everybody's  
questions4 ,it is not everybody's       
business to  be an engineer1 or a       
doctor1 or a carpenter1 or a soldier2   
but it  is everybody's business to be a 
citizen4 ,the doctrines and precepts    
which guide the practice of the good    
engineer are of interest to him  who    
uses them and to those whose business it
 is to investigate them by  mechanical  
science2 the rest of us neither obey nor
 disobey them4 ,but  the doctrines and  
precepts of morality1 which guide the   
practice of  the good citizen1 are of   
interest to all2 they must be either    
obeyed  or disobeyed by every human     
being who is not hopelessly and forever 
separated from the rest of mankind4 ,no 
one can say1 therefore1 that in  this   
inquiry we are not minding our own      
business1 that we are meddling  with    
other men's affairs4 ,we are in fact    
studying the principles of  our         
profession1 so far as we are able2 a    

necessary thing for every  man who      
wishes to do good work in it4    ,along 
with the character of universal interest
 which belongs to  our subject there    
goes another4 ,what is everybody's      
practical  business is also to a large  
extent what everybody knows2 and it  may
 be reasonably expected that a discourse
 about ,right and ,wrong  will be full  
of platitudes and truisms4 ,the         
expectation is a just  one4 ,the        
considerations ,i have to offer are of  
the very oldest and  the very simplest  
commonplace and common sense2 and no one
 can be  more astonished than ,i am that
 there should be any reason to speak of 
them at all4 ,but there is reason to    
speak of them1 because platitudes  are  
not all of one kind4 ,some platitudes   
have a definite meaning  and a practical
 application1 and are established by the
 uniform and  long-continued experience 
of all people4 ,other platitudes1 having
  no definite meaning and no practical  
application1 seem not to be  worth      

anybody's  while to test2 and these are 
quite sufficiently  established by mere 
assertion1 if it is audacious enough to 
begin  with and persistent enough       
afterward4 ,it is in order to           
distinguish  these two kinds of         
platitude from one another1 and to make 
sure that  those which we retain form a 
body of doctrine consistent with itself 
and with the rest of our beliefs1 that  
we undertake this examination  of       
obvious and widespread principles4      
,first of all1 then1 what are the facts8
    ,we say that it is wrong to murder1 
to steal1 to tell lies1 and that it  is 
right to take care of our families4     
,when we say in this sense that  one    
action is right and another wrong1 we   
have a certain feeling toward  the      
action which is peculiar and not quite  
like any other feeling4 ,it  is clearly 
a feeling toward the action and not     
toward the man who does  it2 because we 
speak of hating the sin and loving the  
sinner4 ,we might  reasonably dislike a 

man whom we knew or suspected to be a   
murderer1  because of the natural fear  
that he might murder us2 and we might   
like  our own parents for taking care of
 us4 ,but everybody knows that these    
feelings are something quite different  
from the feeling which condemns  murder 
as a wrong thing1 and approves parental 
care as a right thing4 ,i  say nothing  
here about the possibility of analyzing 
this feeling1 or  proving that it arises
 by combination of other feelings2 all  
,i want  to notice is that it is as     
distinct and recognizable as the feeling
  of pleasure in a sweet taste or of    
displeasure at a toothache4 ,in         
speaking of right and wrong1 we speak of
 qualities of action which  arouse      
definite feelings that everybody knows  
and recognizes4 ,it is  not necessary1  
then1 to give a definition at the       
outset2 we are going  to use familiar   
terms which have a definite meaning in  
the same sense  in which everybody uses 
them4 ,we may ultimately come to        

something  like a definition2 but what  
we have to do first is to collect the   
facts and see what can be made of them1 
just as if we were going to  talk about 
limestone1 or parents and children1 or  
fuel4    ,it is easy to conceive that   
murder and theft and neglect of the     
young  might be considered wrong in a   
very simple state of society4 ,but  we  
find at present that the condemnation of
 these actions does not  stand alone2 it
 goes with the condemnation of a great  
number of other  actions which seem to  
be included with the obviously criminal 
action1  in a sort of general rule4 ,the
 wrongness of murder1 for example1      
belongs in a less degree to any form of 
bodily injury that one man  may inflict 
on another2 and it is even extended so  
as to include  injuries to his          
reputation or his feelings4 ,i make     
these more refined  precepts follow in  
the train of the more obvious and rough 
ones1  because this appears to have been
 the traditional order of their         

establishment4 ',he that makes his      
neighbor blush in public1' says  the    
,mishna1 'is as if he had shed his      
blood4' ,in the same way the  rough     
condemnation of stealing carries with it
 a condemnation of  more refined forms  
of dishonesty3 we do not hesitate to say
 that it  is wrong for a tradesman to   
adulterate his goods1 or for a laborer  
to scamp his work4 ,we not only say that
 it is wrong to tell lies1  but that it 
is wrong to deceive in other more       
ingenious ways2 wrong  to use words so  
that they shall have one sense to some  
people and  another sense to other      
people2 wrong to suppress the truth when
 that  suppression leads to false belief
 in others4 ,and again1 the duty of     
parents toward their children is seen to
 be a special case of a very  large and 
varied class of duties toward that great
 family to which we  belong--to the     
fatherland and them that dwell therein4 
,the word duty  which ,i have here used1
 has as definite a sense to the general 

mind  as the words right and wrong2 we  
say that it is right to do our duty1    
and wrong to neglect it4 ,these duties  
to the community serve in our  minds to 
explain and define our duties to        
individuals4 ,it is wrong to  kill any  
one2 unless we are an executioner1 when 
it may be our duty  to kill a criminal2 
or a soldier1 when it may be our duty to
 kill the  enemy of our country2 and in 
general it is wrong to injure any man in
  any way in our private capacity and   
for our own sakes4 ,thus if a man       
injures us1 it is only right to         
retaliate on behalf of other men4 ,of   
two men in a desert island1 if one takes
 away the other's cloak1 it  may or may 
not be right for the other to let him   
have his coat also2  but if a man takes 
away my cloak while we both live in     
society1 it  is my duty to use such     
means as ,i can to prevent him from     
taking away  other people's cloaks4     
,observe that ,i am endeavoring to      
describe the  facts of the moral        

feelings of ,englishmen1 such as they   
are now4    ,the last remark leads us to
 another platitude of exceedingly       
ancient  date4 ,we said that it was     
wrong to injure any man in our private  
capacity and for our own sakes4 ,a rule 
like this differs from all the  others  
that we have considered1 because it not 
only deals with physical  acts1 words   
and deeds which can be observed and     
known by others1 but  also with thoughts
 which are known only to the man        
himself4 ,who can  tell whether a given 
act of punishment was done from a       
private or from  a public motive8 ,only 
the agent himself4 ,and yet if the      
punishment  was just and within the law1
 we should condemn the man in the one   
case and approve him in the other4 ,this
 pursuit of the actions of  men to their
 very sources1 in the feelings which    
they only can know1  is as ancient as   
any morality we know of1 and extends to 
the whole  range of it4 ,injury to      
another man arises from anger1 malice1  

hatred1  revenge2 these feelings are    
condemned as wrong4 ,but feelings are   
not  immediately under our control1 in  
the same way that overt actions are3  ,i
 can shake anybody by the hand if ,i    
like1 but ,i cannot always feel         
friendly to him4 ,nevertheless we can   
pay attention to such aspects  of the   
circumstances1 and we can put ourselves 
into such conditions1  that our feelings
 get gradually modified in one way or   
the other2 we  form a habit of checking 
our anger by calling up certain images  
and  considerations1 whereby in time the
 offending passion is brought into      
subjection and control4 ,accordingly we 
say that it is right to acquire  and to 
exercise this control2 and the control  
is supposed to exist  whenever we say   
that one feeling or disposition of mind 
is right and  another wrong4 ,thus1 in  
connection with the precept against     
stealing1  we condemn envy and          
covetousness2 we applaud a sensitive    
honesty which  shudders at anything     

underhand or dishonorable4 ,in          
connection with the  rough precept      
against lying1 we have built up and are 
still building  a great fabric of       
intellectual morality1 whereby a man is 
forbidden  to tell lies to himself1 and 
is commanded to practice candor and     
fairness and open-mindedness in his     
judgments1 and to labor zealously  in   
pursuit of the truth4 ,in connection    
with the duty to our families1  we say  
that it is right to cultivate public    
spirit1 a quick sense of  sympathy1 and 
all that belongs to a social            
disposition4    ,two other words are    
used in this connection which it seems  
necessary  to mention4 ,when we regard  
an action as right or wrong for         
ourselves1  this feeling about the      
action impels us to do it or not to do  
it1  as the case may be4 ,we may say    
that the moral sense acts in this case  
as a motive2 meaning by moral sense only
 the feeling in regard to an  action    
which is considered as right or wrong1  

and by motive something  which impels us
 to act4 ,of course there may be other  
motives at work at  the same time1 and  
it does not at all follow that we shall 
do the right  action or abstain from the
 wrong one4 ,this we all know to our    
cost4 ,but  still our feeling about the 
rightness or wrongness of an action does
  operate as a motive when we think of  
the action as being done by us2  and    
when so operating it is called          
conscience4 ,i have nothing to do  at   
present with the questions about        
conscience1 whether it is a result  of  
education1 whether it can be explained  
by self-love1 and so forth2  ,i am only 
concerned in describing well-known      
facts1 and in getting  as clear as ,i   
can about the meaning of well-known     
words4 ,conscience1  then1 is the whole 
aggregate of our feelings about actions 
as being  right or wrong1 regarded as   
tending to make us do the right actions 
and  avoid the wrong ones4 ,we also say 
sometimes1 in answer to the question1   

',how do you know that this is right or 
wrong8' ',my conscience tells me  so4'  
,and this way of speaking is quite      
analogous to other expressions  of the  
same form2 thus if ,i put my hand into  
water1 and you ask me how  ,i know that 
it is hot1 ,i might say1 ',my feeling of
 warmth tells me so4'    ,when we       
consider a right or a wrong action as   
done by another  person1 we think of    
that person as worthy of moral          
approbation or  reprobation4 ,he may be 
punished or not2 but in any case this   
feeling  toward him is quite different  
from the feeling of dislike toward a    
person injurious to us1 or of           
disappointment at a machine which will  
not go4    ,whenever we can morally     
approve or disapprove a man for his     
action1 we  say that he is morally      
responsible for it1 and vice vers4 ,to  
say that  a man is not morally          
responsible for his actions is the same 
thing as  to say that it would be       
unreasonable to praise or blame him for 

them4    ,the statement that we         
ourselves are morally responsible is    
somewhat  more complicated1 but the     
meaning is very easily made out2 namely1
  that another person may reasonably    
regard our actions as right or  wrong1  
and may praise or blame us for them4    
,we can now1 ,i suppose1 understand one 
another pretty clearly in using  the    
words right and wrong1 conscience1      
responsibility2 and we have  made a     
rapid survey of the facts of the case in
 our own country at  the present time4  
,of course ,i do not pretend that this  
survey in any  way approaches to        
completeness2 but it will supply us at  
least with  enough facts to enable us to
 deal always with concrete examples     
instead  of remaining in generalities2  
and it may serve to show pretty fairly  
what the moral sense of an ,englishman  
is like4 ,we must next consider  what   
account we can give of these facts by   
the scientific method4    ,but first let
 us stop to note that we really have    

used the scientific  method in making   
this first step2 and also that to the   
same extent  the method has been used by
 all serious moralists4 ,some would have
  us define virtue1 to begin with1 in   
terms of some other thing which  is not 
virtue1 and then work out from our      
definition all the details  of what we  
ought to do4 ,so ,plato said that virtue
 was knowledge1  ,aristotle that it was 
the golden mean1 and ,bentham said that 
the  right action was that which        
conduced to the greatest happiness of   
the  greatest number4 ,but so also1 in  
physical speculations1 ,thales said     
that everything was ,water1 and         
,heraclitus said it was ,all-becoming1  
and ,empedocles said it was made out of 
,four ,elements1 and ,pythagoras  said  
it was ,number4 ,but we only began to   
know about things when people  looked   
straight at the facts1 and made what    
they could out of them2  and that is the
 only way in which we can know anything 
about right  and wrong4 ,moreover1 it is

 the way in which the great moralists   
have  set to work1 when they came to    
treat of verifiable things and not of   
theories all in the air4 ,a great many  
people think of a prophet as a  man who1
 all by himself1 or from some secret    
source1 gets the belief  that this thing
 is right and that thing wrong4 ,and    
then 7they imagine7  he gets up and goes
 about persuading other people to feel  
as he does  about it2 and so it becomes 
a part of their conscience1 and a new   
duty  is created4 ,this may be in some  
cases1 but ,i have never met with any   
example of it in history4 ,when         
,socrates puzzled the ,greeks by asking 
them what they precisely meant by       
,goodness and ,justice and ,virtue1  the
 mere existence of the words shows that 
the people1 as a whole1  possessed a    
moral sense1 and felt that certain      
things were right and  others wrong4    
,what the moralist did was to show the  
connection between  different virtues1  
the likeness of virtue to certain other 

things1  the implications which a       
thoughtful man could find in the common 
language4 ,wherever the ,greek moral    
sense had come from1 it was there in    
the people before it could be enforced  
by a prophet or discussed by a          
philosopher4 ,again1 we find a wonderful
 collection of moral aphorisms  in those
 shrewd sayings of the ,jewish fathers  
which are preserved in  the ,mishna or  
oral law4 ,some of this teaching is     
familiar to us all  from the popular    
exposition of it which is contained in  
the three  first ,gospels4 ,but the very
 plainness and homeliness of the        
precepts  shows that they are just acute
 statements of what was already felt  by
 the popular common sense2 protesting1  
in many cases1 against the  formalism of
 the ceremonial law with which they are 
curiously mixed  up4 ,the ,rabbis even  
show a jealousy of prophetic            
interference1 as if  they knew well that
 it takes not one man1 but many men1 to 
feel what  is right4 ,when a certain    

,rabbi ,eliezer1 being worsted in       
argument1  cried out1 ',if ,i am right1 
let heaven pronounce in my favor6' there
  was heard a ,bath-kol or voice from   
the skies1 saying1 ',do you venture  to 
dispute with ,rabbi ,eliezer1 who is an 
authority on all religious  questions8' 
,but ,rabbi ,joshua rose and said1 ',our
 law is not in heaven1  but in the book 
which dates from ,sinai1 and which      
teaches us that in  matters of          
discussion the majority makes the law4' 
#b    ,one of the most important        
expressions of the moral sense for all  
time  is that of the ,stoic philosophy1 
especially after its reception among    
the ,romans4 ,it is here that we find   
the enthusiasm of humanity--the  caritas
 generis humani--which is so large and  
important a feature in  all modern      
conceptions of morality1 and whose      
widespread influence  upon ,roman       
citizens may be traced in the ,epistles 
of ,st4 ,paul4 ,in  the ,stoic emperors1
 also1 we find probably the earliest    

example of  great moral principles      
consciously applied to legislation on a 
large  scale4 ,but are we to attribute  
this to the individual insight of  the  
,stoic philosophers8 ,it might seem at  
first sight that we must1  if we are to 
listen to that vulgar vituperation of   
the older culture  which has descended  
to us from those who had everything to  
gain by  its destruction4 #c ,we hear   
enough of the luxurious feasting of  the
 ,roman capital1 how it would almost    
have taxed the resources of a  modern   
pastry-cook2 of the cruelty of          
gladiatorial shows1 how they  were      
nearly as bad as autos-da-f1 except that
 a man had his fair  chance and was not 
tortured for torture's sake2 of the     
oppression of  provincials by people    
like ,verres1 of whom it may even be    
said that if  they had been the ,east   
,india ,company they could not have been
 worse2  of the complaints of ,tacitus  
against bad and mad emperors 7as ,sir   
,henry ,maine says72 and of the still   

more serious complaints of the  modern  
historian against the excessive taxation
 #d which was one great  cause of the   
fall of the empire4 ,of all this we are 
told a great deal2  but we are not told 
of the many thousands of honorable men  
who carried  civilization to the ends of
 the known world1 and administered a    
mighty  empire so that it was loved and 
worshiped to the furthest corner of  it4
 ,it is to these men and their common   
action that we must attribute  the      
morality which found its organized      
expression in the writings of  the      
,stoic philosophers4 ,from these three  
cases we may gather that  ,right is a   
thing which must be done before it can  
be talked about1  although after that it
 may only too easily be talked about    
without  being done4 ,individual effort 
and energy may insist upon getting that 
done which was already felt to be right2
 and individual insight and  acumen may 
point out consequences of an action     
which bring it under  previously known  

moral rules4 ,there is another dispute  
of the ,rabbis  that may serve to show  
what is meant by this4 ,it was forbidden
 by  the law to have any dealings with  
the ,saban idolaters during the  week   
preceding their idolatrous feasts4 ,but 
the doctors discussed the  case in which
 one of these idolaters owes you a bill2
 are you to let  him pay it during that 
week or not8 ,the school of ,shammai    
said ',no2  for he will want all his    
money to enjoy himself at the feast4'   
,but  the school of ,hillel said1 ',yes1
 let him pay it2 for how can he enjoy   
his feast while his bills are unpaid8'  
,the question here is about the         
consequences of an action2 but there is 
no dispute about the moral  principle1  
which is that consideration and kindness
 are to be shown  to idolaters1 even in 
the matter of their idolatrous rites4   
,it seems1 then1 that we are no worse   
off than anybody else who has  studied  
this subject1 in finding our materials  
ready made for us2  sufficiently        

definite meanings given in the common   
speech to the  words right and wrong1   
good and bad1 with which we have to     
deal2  a fair body of facts familiarly  
known1 which we have to organize and    
account for as best we can4 ,but our    
special inquiry is1 what account  can be
 given of these facts by the scientific 
method8 to which end  we cannot do      
better than fix our ideas as well as we 
can upon the  character and scope of    
that method4    ,now the scientific     
method is a method of getting knowledge 
by  inference1 and that of two different
 kinds4 ,one kind of inference is  that 
which is used in the physical and       
natural sciences1 and it enables  us to 
go from known phenomena to unknown      
phenomena4 ,because a stone is  heavy in
 the morning1 ,i infer that it will be  
heavy in the afternoon2  and ,i infer   
this by assuming a certain uniformity of
 nature4 ,the sort  of uniformity that  
,i assume depends upon the extent of my 
scientific  education2 the rules of     

inference become more and more definite 
as we  go on4 ,at first ,i might assume 
that all things are always alike2 this  
would not be true1 but it has to be     
assumed in a vague way1 in order  that a
 thing may have the same name at        
different times4 ,afterward ,i  get the 
more definite belief that certain       
particular qualities1 like  weight1 have
 nothing to do with the time of day2 and
 subsequently  ,i find that weight has  
nothing to do with the shape of the     
stone1  but only with the quantity of   
it4 ,the uniformity which we assume1    
then1 is not that vague one that we     
started with1 but a chastened  and      
corrected uniformity4 ,i might go on to 
suppose1 for example1  that the weight  
of the stone had nothing to do with the 
place where  it was2 and a great deal   
might be said for this supposition4 ,it 
would1  however1 have to be corrected   
when it was found that the weight varies
  slightly in different latitudes4 ,on  
the other hand1 ,i should find that     

this variation was just the same for my 
stone as for a piece of iron  or wood2  
that it had nothing to do with the kind 
of matter4 ,and so ,i  might be led to  
the conclusion that all matter is heavy1
 and that the  weight of it depends only
 on its quantity and its position       
relative to  the earth4 ,you see here   
that ,i go on arriving at conclusions   
always  of this form2 that some one     
circumstance or quality has nothing  to 
do with some other circumstance or      
quality4 ,i begin by assuming  that it  
is independent of everything2 ,i end by 
finding that it is  independent of some 
definite things4 ,that is1 ,i begin by  
assuming  a vague uniformity4 ,i always 
use this assumption to infer from some  
one fact a great number of other facts2 
but as my education proceeds1  ,i get to
 know what sort of things may be        
inferred and what may not4 ,an  observer
 of scientific mind takes note of just  
those things from which  inferences may 
be drawn1 and passes by the rest4 ,if an

 astronomer1  observing the sun1 were to
 record the fact that at the moment when
  a sun-spot began to shrink there was a
 rap at his front door1 we  should know 
that he was not up to his work4 ,but if 
he records that  sun-spots are thickest 
every eleven years1 and that this is    
also  the period of extra cloudiness in 
,jupiter1 the observation may or  may   
not be confirmed1 and it may or may not 
lead to inferences of  importance2 but  
still it is the kind of thing from which
 inferences  may be drawn4 ,there is    
always a certain instinct among         
instructed  people which tells them in  
this way what kinds of inferences may be
  drawn2 and this is the unconscious    
effect of the definite uniformity  which
 they have been led to assume in nature4
 ,it may subsequently be  organized into
 a law or general truth1 and no doubt   
becomes a surer  guide by that process4 
,then it goes to form the more precise  
instinct  of the next generation4       
,what we have said about this first kind

 of inference1 which goes  from         
phenomena to phenomena1 is shortly this4
 ,it proceeds upon an  assumption of    
uniformity in nature2 and this          
assumption is not fixed  and made once  
for all1 but is a changing and growing  
thing1 becoming  more definite as we go 
on4    ,if ,i were told to pick out some
 one character which especially colors  
this guiding conception of uniformity in
 our present stage of science1  ,i      
should certainly reply1 ,atomism4 ,the  
form of this with which we are  most    
familiar is the molecular theory of     
bodies2 which represents  all bodies as 
made up of small elements of uniform    
character1 each  practically having     
relations only with the adjacent ones1  
and these  relations the same all       
through--namely1 some simple mechanical 
action upon each other's motions4 ,but  
this is only a particular  case4 ,a     
palace1 a cottage1 the tunnel of the    
underground railway1  and a factory     
chimney1 are all built of bricks2 the   

bricks are alike  in all these cases1   
each brick is practically related only  
to the  adjacent ones1 and the relation 
is throughout the same1 namely1 two     
flat sides are stuck together with      
mortar4 ,there is an atomism in the     
sciences of number1 of quantity1 of     
space2 the theorems of geometry  are    
groupings of individual points1 each    
related only to the adjacent  ones by   
certain definite laws4 ,but what        
concerns us chiefly at present  is the  
atomism of human physiology4 ,just as   
every solid is built up  of molecules1  
so the nervous system is built up of    
nerve-threads and  nerve-corpuscles4 ,we
 owe to ,mr4 ,lewes our very best thanks
 for the  stress which he has laid on   
the doctrine that nerve-fiber is uniform
  in structure and function1 and for the
 word neurility1 which expresses  its   
common properties4 ,and similar         
gratitude is due to ,dr4 ,hughlings     
,jackson for his long defense of the    
proposition that the element  of nervous

 structure and function is a            
sensori-motor process4 ,in  structure1  
this is two fibers or bundles of fibers 
going to the same  gray corpuscle2 in   
function it is a message traveling up   
one fiber or  bundle to the corpuscle1  
and then down the other fiber or bundle4
 ,out  of this1 as a brick1 the house of
 our life is built4 ,all these simple   
elementary processes are alike1 and each
 is practically related only  to the    
adjacent ones2 the relation being in all
 cases of the same kind1  viz41 the     
passage from a simple to a complex      
message1 or vice vers4    ,the result of
 atomism in any form1 dealing with any  
subject1 is that  the principle of      
uniformity is hunted down into the      
elements of things2  it is resolved into
 the uniformity of these elements or    
atoms1 and of  the relations of those   
which are next to each other4 ,by an    
element or  an atom we do not here mean 
something absolutely simple or          
indivisible1  for a molecule1 a brick1  

and a nerve-process are all very complex
  things4 ,we only mean that1 for the   
purpose in hand1 the properties of  the 
still more complex thing which is made  
of them have nothing to do  with the    
complexities or the differences of these
 elements4 ,the solid  made of          
molecules1 the house made of bricks1 the
 nervous system made  of sensori-motor  
processes1 are nothing more than        
collections of these  practically       
uniform elements1 having certain        
relations of nextness1  and behavior    
uniformly depending on that nextness4   
,the inference of phenomena from        
phenomena1 then1 is based upon an       
assumption of uniformity1 which in the  
present stage of science may  be called 
an atomic uniformity4    ,the other mode
 of inference which belongs to the      
scientific method is  that which is used
 in what are called the mental and moral
 sciences2  and it enables us to go from
 phenomena to the facts which underlie  
phenomena1 and which are themselves not 

phenomena at all4 ,if ,i pinch  your    
arm1 and you draw it away and make a    
face1 ,i infer that you have  felt pain4
 ,i infer this by assuming that you have
 a consciousness  similar to my own1 and
 related to your perception of your body
 as  my consciousness is related to my  
perception of my body4 ,now is this  the
 same assumption as before1 a mere      
assumption of the uniformity of  nature8
 ,it certainly seems like it at first2  
but if we think about it  we shall find 
that there is a very profound difference
 between them4 ,in  physical inference  
,i go from phenomena to phenomena2 that 
is1 from the  knowledge of certain      
appearances or representations actually 
present  to my mind ,i infer certain    
other appearances that might be present 
to  my mind4 ,from the weight of a stone
 in the morning--that is1 from my       
feeling of its weight1 or my perception 
of the process of weighing  it1 ,i infer
 that the stone will be heavy in the    
afternoon--that is1  ,i infer the       

possibility of similar feelings and     
perceptions in me at  another time4 ,the
 whole process relates to me and my     
perceptions1 to  things contained in my 
mind4 ,but when ,i infer that you are   
conscious  from what you say or do1 ,i  
pass from that which is my feeling or   
perception1 which is in my mind and part
 of me1 to that which is  not my feeling
 at all1 which is outside me altogether1
 namely1 your  feelings and perceptions4
 ,now there is no possible physical     
inference1  no inference of phenomena   
from phenomena1 that will help me over  
that gulf4 ,i am obliged to admit that  
this second kind of inference  depends  
upon another assumption1 not included in
 the assumption of  the uniformity of   
phenomena4    ,how does a dream differ  
from waking life8 ,in a fairly coherent 
dream  everything seems quite real1 and 
it is rare1 ,i think1 with most  people 
to know in a dream that they are        
dreaming4 ,now1 if a dream is           
sufficiently vivid and coherent1 all    

physical inferences are just  as valid  
in it as they are in waking life4 ,in a 
hazy or imperfect  dream1 it is true1   
things melt into one another            
unexpectedly and  unaccountably2 we fly1
 remove mountains1 and stop runaway     
horses  with a finger4 ,but there is    
nothing in the mere nature of a dream to
  hinder it from being an exact copy of 
waking experience4 ,if ,i find  a stone 
heavy in one part of my dream1 and infer
 that it is heavy  at some subsequent   
part1 the inference will be verified if 
the dream  is coherent enough2 ,i shall 
go to the stone1 lift it up1 and find it
  as heavy as before4 ,and the same     
thing is true of all inferences of      
phenomena from phenomena4 ,for physical 
purposes a dream is just as  good as    
real life2 the only difference is in    
vividness and coherence4    ,what1 then1
 hinders us from saying that life is all
 a dream8 ,if the  phenomena we dream of
 are just as good and real phenomena as 
those  we see and feel when we are      

awake1 what right have we to say that   
the  material universe has any more     
existence apart from our minds than the 
things we see and feel in our dreams8   
,the answer which ,berkeley gave  to    
that question was1 ,no right at all4    
,the physical universe which  ,i see and
 feel1 and infer1 is just my dream and  
nothing else2 that  which you see is    
your dream2 only it so happens that all 
our dreams  agree in many respects4     
,this doctrine of ,berkeley's has now   
been so  far confirmed by the physiology
 of the senses1 that it is no longer  a 
metaphysical speculation1 but a         
scientifically established fact4    ,but
 there is a difference between dreams   
and waking life1 which is of  far too   
great importance for any of us to be in 
danger of neglecting  it4 ,when ,i see a
 man in my dream1 there is just as good 
a body as if ,i  were awake2 muscles1   
nerves1 circulation1 capability of      
adapting means  to ends4 ,if only the   
dream is coherent enough1 no physical   

test can  establish that it is a dream4 
,in both cases ,i see and feel the same 
thing4 ,in both cases ,i assume the     
existence of more than ,i can see and   
feel1 namely1 the consciousness of this 
other man4 ,but now here is a  great    
difference1 and the only difference--in 
a dream this assumption  is wrong2 in   
waking life it is right4 ,the man ,i see
 in my dream is  a mere machine1 a      
bundle of phenomena with no underlying  
reality2  there is no consciousness     
involved except my consciousness1 no    
feeling  in the case except my feelings4
 ,the man ,i see in waking life is more 
than a bundle of phenomena2 his body and
 its actions are phenomena1  but these  
phenomena are merely the symbols and    
representatives in my  mind of a reality
 which is outside my mind1 namely1 the  
consciousness  of the man himself which 
is represented by the working of his    
brain1  and the simpler quasi-mental    
facts1 not woven into his consciousness1
  which are represented by the working  

of the rest of his body4 ,what  makes   
life not to be a dream is the existence 
of those facts which we  arrive at by   
our second process of inference2 the    
consciousness of men  and the higher    
animals1 the sub-consciousness of lower 
organisms and  the quasi-mental facts   
which go along with the motions of      
inanimate  matter4 ,in a book which is  
very largely and deservedly known by    
heart1  ',through the ,looking-glass1'  
there is a very instructive discussion  
upon this point4 ,alice has been taken  
to see the ,red ,king as he  lies       
snoring2 and ,tweedledee asks1 ',do you 
know what he is dreaming  about8'       
',nobody can guess that1' replies       
,alice4 ',why1 about you1'  he says     
triumphantly4 ',and if he stopped       
dreaming about you1 where do  you       
suppose you'd be8' ',where ,i am now of 
course1' said ,alice4 ',not  you1' said 
,tweedledee1 'you'd be nowhere4 ,you are
 only a sort of thing  in his dream4'   
',if that there ,king was to wake1'     

added ,tweedledum1  'you'd go out1 bang6
 just like a candle4' ,alice was quite  
right in  regarding these remarks as    
unphilosophical4 ,the fact that she     
could  see1 think1 and feel was proof   
positive that she was not a sort  of    
thing in anybody's dream4 ,this is the  
meaning of that saying1  ,cogito ergo   
sum1 of ,descartes4 ,by him1 and by     
,spinoza after him1  the verb cogito and
 the substantive cogitatio were used to 
denote  consciousness in general1 any   
kind of feeling1 even what we now call  
sub-consciousness4 ,the saying means    
that feeling exists in and for  itself1 
not as a quality or modification or     
state or manifestation  of anything     
else4    ,we are obliged in every hour  
of our lives to act upon beliefs which  
have been arrived at by inferences of   
these two kinds2 inferences based  on   
the assumption of uniformity in nature1 
and inferences which add to  this the   
assumption of feelings which are not our
 own4 ,by organizing  the 'common sense'

 which embodies the first class of      
inferences1 we  build up the physical   
sciences2 that is to say1 all those     
sciences  which deal with the physical1 
material1 or phenomenal universe1       
whether animate or inanimate4 ,and so by
 organizing the common sense  which     
embodies the second class of inferences1
 we build up various  sciences of mind4 
,the description and classification of  
feelings1 the  facts of their           
association with each other1 and of     
their simultaneity  with phenomena of   
nerve-action1--all this belongs to      
psychology1  which may be historical and
 comparative4 ,the doctrine of certain  
special classes of feelings is organized
 into the special sciences  of those    
feelings2 thus the facts about the      
feelings which we are now  considering1 
about the feelings of moral approbation 
and reprobation1  are organized into the
 science of ethics and the facts about  
the  feeling of beauty or ugliness are  
organized into the science of  sthetics1

 or1 as it is sometimes called1 the     
philosophy of art4 ,for  all of these   
the uniformity of nature has to be      
assumed as a basis  of inference2 but   
over and above that it is necessary to  
assume  that other men are conscious in 
the same way that ,i am4 ,now in these  
sciences of mind1 just as in the        
physical sciences1 the uniformity  which
 is assumed in the inferred mental facts
 is a growing thing which  becomes more 
definite as we go on1 and each          
successive generation of  observers     
knows better what to observe and what   
sort of inferences  may be drawn from   
observed things4 ,but1 moreover1 it is  
as true of  the mental sciences as of   
the physical ones that the uniformity is
 in  the present stage of science an    
atomic uniformity4 ,we have learned to  
regard our consciousness as made up of  
elements practically alike1  having     
relations of succession in time and of  
contiguity at each  instant1 which      
relations are in all cases practically  

the same4 ,the  element of consciousness
 is the transference of an impression   
into  the beginning of action4 ,our     
mental life is a structure made out of  
such elements1 just as the working of   
our nervous system is made out  of      
sensori-motor processes4 ,and           
accordingly the interaction of the  two 
branches of science leads us to regard  
the mental facts as the  realities or   
things-in-themselves1 of which the      
material phenomena are  mere pictures or
 symbols4 ,the final result seems to be 
that atomism is  carried beyond         
phenomena into the realities which      
phenomena represent2  and that the      
observed uniformities of nature1 in so  
far as they can  be expressed in the    
language of atomism1 are actual         
uniformities of  things in themselves4  
,so much for the two things which ,i    
have promised to bring together2 the    
facts of our moral feelings1 and the    
scientific method4 ,it may appear  that 
the latter has been expounded at more   

length than was necessary  for the      
treatment of this particular subject2   
but the justification for  this length  
is to be found in certain common        
objections to the claims  of science to 
be the sole judge of mental and moral   
questions4 ,some  of the chief of these 
objections ,i will now mention4    ,it  
is sometimes said that science can only 
deal with what is1  but that art and    
morals deal with what ought to be4 ,the 
saying is  perfectly true1 but it is    
quite consistent with what is equally   
true1  that the facts of art and morals 
are fit subject-matter of science4 ,i   
may describe all that ,i have in my     
house1 and ,i may state everything  that
 ,i want in my house2 these are two very
 different things1 but they  are equally
 statements of facts4 ,one is a         
statement about phenomena1  about the   
objects which are actually in my        
possession2 the other is  a statement   
about my feelings1 about my wants and   
desires4 ,there are  facts1 to be got at

 by common sense1 about the kind of     
thing that a  man of a certain character
 and occupation will like to have in his
  house1 and these facts may be         
organized into general statements on the
  assumption of uniformity in nature4   
,now the organized results of common    
sense dealing with facts are just       
science and nothing else4 ,and in the   
same way ,i may say what men do at the  
present day1 how we live now1  or ,i may
 say what we ought to do1 namely1 what  
course of conduct1  if adopted1 we      
should morally approve2 and no doubt    
these would be  two very different      
things4 ,but each of them would be a    
statement of  facts4 ,one would belong  
to the sociology of our time2 in so far 
as  men's deeds could not be adequately 
described to us without some  account of
 their feelings and intentions1 it would
 involve facts  belonging to psychology 
as well as facts belonging to the       
physical  sciences4 ,but the other would
 be an account of a particular class of 

our feelings1 namely1 those which we    
feel toward an action when it is        
regarded as right or wrong4 ,these facts
 may be organized by common  sense on   
the assumption of uniformity in nature  
just as well as any  other facts4 ,and  
we shall see farther on that not only in
 this sense1  but in a deeper and more  
abstract sense1 'what ought to be done' 
is a question for scientific inquiry4   
,the same objection is sometimes put    
into another form4 ,it is said  that    
laws of chemistry1 for example1 are     
general statements about  what happens  
when bodies are treated in a certain    
way1 and that such  laws are fit matter 
for science2 but that moral laws are    
different1  because they tell us to do  
certain things1 and we may or may not   
obey  them4 ,the mood of the one is     
indicative1 of the other imperative4    
,now  it is quite true that the word law
 in the expression 'law of nature1'  and
 in the expressions 'law of morals1'    
'law of the land1' has two  totally     

different meanings1 which no educated   
person will confound2 and  ,i am not    
aware that any one has rested the claim 
of science to judge  moral questions on 
what is no better than a stale and      
unprofitable  pun4 ,but two different   
things may be equally matters of        
scientific  investigation1 even when    
their names are alike in sound4 ,a      
telegraph  post is not the same thing as
 a post in the ,war ,office1 and yet the
  same intelligence may be used to      
investigate the conditions of the  one  
and the other4 ,that such and such      
things are right or wrong1  that such   
and such laws are laws of morals or laws
 of the land1  these are facts1 just as 
the laws of chemistry are facts2 and all
  facts belong to science1 and are her  
portion forever4    ,again1 it is       
sometimes said that moral questions have
 been  authoritatively settled by other 
methods2 that we ought to accept this   
decision1 and not to question it by any 
method of scientific inquiry2  and that 

reason should give way to revelation on 
such matters4 ,i  hope before ,i have   
done to show just cause why we should   
pronounce on  such teaching as this no  
light sentence of moral condemnation3   
first1  because it is our duty to form  
those beliefs which are to guide our    
actions by the two scientific modes of  
inference1 and by these alone2  and1    
secondly1 because the proposed mode of  
settling ethical questions  by authority
 is contrary to the very nature of right
 and wrong4    ,leaving this1 then1 for 
the present1 ,i pass on to the most     
formidable  objection that has been made
 to a scientific treatment of ethics4   
,the  objection is that the scientific  
method is not applicable to human       
action1 because the rule of uniformity  
does not hold good4 ,whenever  a man    
exercises his will1 and makes a         
voluntary choice of one out of  various 
possible courses1 an event occurs whose 
relation to contiguous  events cannot be
 included in a general statement        

applicable to all  similar cases4 ,there
 is something wholly capricious and     
disorderly1  belonging to that moment   
only2 and we have no right to conclude  
that if the circumstances were exactly  
repeated1 and the man himself           
absolutely unaltered1 he would choose   
the same course4    ,it is clear that if
 the doctrine here stated is true1 the  
ground is  really cut from under our    
feet1 and we cannot deal with human     
action  by the scientific method4 ,i    
shall endeavor to show1 moreover1 that  
in  this case1 although we might still  
have a feeling of moral approbation  or 
reprobation toward actions1 yet we could
 not reasonably praise or  blame men for
 their deeds1 nor regard them as morally
 responsible4 ,so  that1 if my          
contention is just1 to deprive us of the
 scientific method  is practically to   
deprive us of morals altogether4 ,on    
both grounds1  therefore1 it is of the  
greatest importance that we should      
define  our position in regard to this  

controversy2 if1 indeed1 that can be    
called a controversy in which the       
practical belief of all mankind  and the
 consent of nearly all serious writers  
are on one side4    ,let us in the first
 place consider a little more closely   
the connection  between conscience and  
responsibility4 ,words in common use1   
such as  these two1 have their meanings 
practically fixed before difficult      
controversies arise2 but after the      
controversy has arisen each party  gives
 that slight tinge to the meaning which 
best suits its own view  of the         
question4 ,thus it appears to each that 
the common language  obviously supports 
their own view1 that this is the natural
 and primary  view of the matter1 and   
that the opponents are using words in a 
new  meaning and wrestling them from    
their proper sense4 ,now this is just   
my position4 ,i have endeavored so far  
to use all words in their common        
every-day sense1 only making this as    
precise as ,i can2 and1 with two        

exceptions1 of which due warning will be
 given1 ,i shall do my best  to continue
 this practice in future4 ,i seem to    
myself to be talking  the most obvious  
platitudes2 but it must be remembered   
that those who  take the opposite view  
will think ,i am perverting the ,english
 language4    ,there is a common meaning
 of the word 'responsible1' which though
  not the same as that of the phrase    
'morally responsible1' may throw  some  
light upon it4 ,if we say of a book1 ',a
 is responsible for the  preface and the
 first half1 and ,b is responsible for  
the rest1'  we mean that ,a wrote the   
preface and the first half4 ,if two     
people  go into a shop and choose a blue
 silk dress together1 it might be  said 
that ,a was responsible for its being   
silk and ,b for its being  blue4 ,before
 they chose1 the dress was undetermined 
both in color  and in material4 ,a's    
choice fixed the material1 and then it  
was  undetermined only in color4 ,b's   
choice fixed the color2 and if we       

suppose that there were no more variable
 conditions 7only one blue  silk dress  
in the shop71 the dress was then        
completely determined4 ,in  this sense  
of the word we say that a man is        
responsible for that part  of an event  
which was undetermined when he was left 
out of account1  and which became       
determined when he was taken account of4
 ,suppose  two narrow streets1 one lying
 north and south1 one east and west1    
and crossing one another4 ,a man is put 
down where they cross1 and  has to walk4
 ,then he must walk either north1 south1
 east1 or west1  and he is not          
responsible for that2 what he is        
responsible for is the  choice of one of
 these four directions4 ,may we not say 
in the present  sense of the word that  
the external circumstances are          
responsible for  the restriction on his 
choice8 ,we should mean only that the   
fact of  his going in one or other of   
the four directions was due to external 
circumstances1 and not to him4 ,again1  

suppose ,i have a number of  punches of 
various shapes1 some square1 some       
oblong1 some oval1 some  round1 and that
 ,i am going to punch a hole in a piece 
of paper4 ,where  ,i shall punch the    
hole may be fixed by any kind of        
circumstances2  but the shape of the    
hole depends on the punch ,i take4 ,may 
we not say  that the punch is           
responsible for the shape of the hole1  
but not for  the position of it8    ,it 
may be said that this is not the whole  
of the meaning of the word              
'responsible1' even in its loosest      
sense2 that it ought never to be  used  
except of a conscious agent4 ,still this
 is part of its meaning2  if we regard  
an event as determined by a variety of  
circumstances1  a man's choice being    
among them1 we say that he is           
responsible for  just that choice which 
is left him by the other circumstances4 
,when we ask the practical question1    
',who is responsible for  so-and-so8' we
 want to find out who is to be got at in

 order that  so-and-so may be altered4  
,if ,i want to change the shape of the  
hole  ,i make in my paper1 ,i must      
change my punch2 but this will be of  no
 use if ,i want to change the position  
of the hole4 ,if ,i want the  color of  
the dress changed from blue to green1 it
 is ,b1 and not ,a1  that ,i must       
persuade4    ,we mean something more    
than this when we say that a man is     
morally  responsible for an action4 ,it 
seems to me that moral responsibility   
and conscience go together1 both in     
regard to the man and in regard  to the 
action4 ,in order that a man may be     
morally responsible for an  action1 the 
man must have a conscience1 and the     
action must be one in  regard to which  
conscience is capable of acting as a    
motive1 that is1  the action must be    
capable of being right or wrong4 ,if a  
child were  left on a desert island and 
grew up wholly without a conscience1 and
  then were brought among men1 he would 
not be morally responsible for  his     

actions until he had acquired a         
conscience by education4 ,he would  of  
course be responsible1 in the sense just
 explained1 for that part  of them which
 was left undetermined by external      
circumstances1 and  if we wanted to     
alter his actions in these respects we  
should have  to do it by altering him4  
,but it would be useless and            
unreasonable  to attempt to do this by  
means of praise or blame1 the expression
 of  moral approbation or               
disapprobation1 until he had acquired a 
conscience  which could be worked upon  
by such means4    ,it seems1 then1 that 
in order that a man may be morally      
responsible  for an action1 three things
 are necessary3--    #a4 ,he might have 
done something else2 that is to say1 the
 action was  not wholly determined by   
external circumstances1 and he is       
responsible  only for the choice which  
was left him4    #b4 ,he had a          
conscience4    #c4 ,the action was one  
in regard to the doing or not doing of  

which  conscience might be a sufficient 
motive4    ,these three things are      
necessary1 but it does not follow that  
they  are sufficient4 ,it is very       
commonly said that the action must be a 
voluntary one4 ,it will be found1 ,i    
think1 that this is contained in my     
third condition1 and also that the form 
of statement ,i have adopted  exhibits  
more clearly the reason why the         
condition is necessary4 ,we  may say    
that an action is involuntary either    
when it is instinctive1  or when one    
motive is so strong that there is no    
voluntary choice  between motives4 ,an  
involuntary cough produced by irritation
 of  the glottis is no proper subject   
for blame or praise4 ,a man is not      
responsible for it1 because it is done  
by a part of his body without           
consulting him4 ,what is meant by him in
 this case will require further         
investigation4 ,again1 when a           
dipsomaniac has so great and            
overmastering  an inclination to drink  

that we cannot conceive of conscience   
being  strong enough to conquer it1 he  
is not responsible for that act1 though 
he may be responsible for having got    
himself into the state4 ,but if  it is  
conceivable that a very strong          
conscience fully brought to bear  might 
succeed in conquering the inclination1  
we may take a lenient  view of the fall 
and say there was a very strong         
temptation1 but we  shall still regard  
it as a fall1 and say that the man is   
responsible  and a wrong has been done4 
,but since it is just in this           
distinction between voluntary and       
involuntary action that the whole crux  
of the matter lies1 let  us examine more
 closely into it4 ,i say that when ,i   
cough or sneeze  involuntarily1 it is   
really not ,i that cough or sneeze1 but 
a part of  my body which acts without   
consulting me4 ,this action is          
determined  for me by the circumstances1
 and is not part of the choice that  is 
left to me1 so that ,i am not           

responsible for it4 ,the question  comes
 then to determining how much is to be  
called circumstances1  and how much is  
to be called me4 ,now ,i want to        
describe what happens  when ,i          
voluntarily do anything1 and there are  
two courses open to  me4 ,i may describe
 the things in themselves1 my feelings  
and the  general course of my           
consciousness1 trusting to the analogy  
between  my consciousness and yours to  
make me understood2 or ,i may describe  
these things as nature describes them to
 your senses1 namely in terms  of the   
phenomena of my nervous system1         
appealing to your memory of  phenomena  
and your knowledge of physical action4  
,i shall do both1  because in some      
respects our knowledge is more complete 
from the  one source1 and in some       
respects from the other4 ,when ,i look  
back  and reflect upon a voluntary      
action1 ,i seem to find that it differs 
from an involuntary action in the fact  
that a certain portion of my  character 

has been consulted4 ,there is always a  
suggestion of some  sort1 either the end
 of a train of thought or a new         
sensation2 and  there is an action      
ensuing1 either the movement of a muscle
 or set  of muscles1 or the fixing of   
attention upon something4 ,but between  
these two there is a consultation1 as it
 were1 of my past history4 ,the         
suggestion is viewed in the light of    
everything bearing on it that ,i  think 
of at the time1 and in virtue of this   
light it moves me to act in  one or more
 ways4 ,let us first suppose that no    
hesitation is involved1  that only one  
way of acting is suggested1 and ,i yield
 to this impulse  and act in the        
particular way4 ,this is the simplest   
kind of voluntary  action4 ,it differs  
from involuntary or instinctive action  
in the fact  that with the latter there 
is no such conscious consultation of    
past  history4 ,if we describe these    
facts in terms of the phenomena which   
picture them to other minds1 we shall   

say that in involuntary action a        
message passes straight through from the
 sensory to the motor center1  and so on
 to the muscles1 without consulting the 
cerebrum2 while  involuntary action the 
message is passed on from the sensory   
center  to the cerebrum1 there          
translated into appropriate motor       
stimuli1  carried down to the motor     
center1 and so on to the muscles4 ,there
  may be other differences1 but at least
 there is this difference4 ,now  on the 
physical side that which determines1    
what groups of cerebral  fibers shall be
 set at work by the given message1 and  
what groups of  motor stimuli shall be  
set at work by these1 is the mechanism  
of my  brain at the time2 and on the    
mental side that which determines what  
memories shall be called up by the given
 sensation1 and what motives  these     
memories shall bring into action1 is my 
mental character4 ,we  may say1 then1 in
 this simplest case of voluntary action1
 that when  the suggestion is given it  

is the character of me which determines 
the character of the ensuing action2 and
 consequently that ,i am  responsible   
for choosing that particular course out 
of those which  were left open to me by 
the external circumstances4    ,this is 
when ,i yield to the impulse4 ,but      
suppose ,i do not2 suppose  that the    
original suggestion1 viewed in the light
 of memory1 sets  various motives in    
action1 each motive belonging to a      
certain class  of things which ,i       
remember4 ,then ,i choose which of these
 motives  shall prevail4 ,those who     
carefully watch themselves find out that
 a  particular motive is made to prevail
 by the fixing of the attention  upon   
that class of remembered things which   
calls up the motive4 ,the  physical side
 of this is the sending of blood to a   
certain set of  nerves--namely1 those   
whose action corresponds to the memories
 which  are to be attended to4 ,the     
sending of blood is accomplished by the 
pinching of arteries2 and there are     

special nerves1 called vaso-motor       
nerves1 whose business it is to carry   
messages to the walls of the  arteries  
and get them pinched4 ,now this act of  
directing the attention  may be         
voluntary or involuntary just like any  
other act4 ,when the  transformed and   
re-enforced nerve-message gets to the   
vaso-motor  center1 some part of it may 
be so predominant that a message goes   
straight off to the arteries1 and sends 
a quantity of blood to the  nerves      
supplying that part2 or the call for    
blood may be sent back  for revision by 
the cerebrum1 which is thus again       
consulted4 ,to say  the same thing in   
terms of my feelings1 a particular class
 of memories  roused by the original    
suggestion may seize upon my attention  
before ,i  have time to choose what ,i  
will attend to2 or the appeal may be    
carried  to a deeper part of my         
character dealing with wider and more   
abstract  conceptions1 which views the  
conflicting motives in the light of a   

past experience of motives1 and by that 
light is drawn to one or the  other of  
them4    ,we thus get to a sort of      
motive of the second order or motive of 
motives4 ,is there any reason why we    
should not go on to a motive of  the    
third order1 and the fourth1 and so on8 
,none whatever that ,i know  of1 except 
that no one has ever observed such a    
thing4 ,there seems  plenty of room for 
the requisite mechanism on the physical 
side2  and no one can say1 on the mental
 side1 how complex is the working  of   
his consciousness4 ,but we must         
carefully distinguish between the       
intellectual deliberation about motives1
 which applies to the future  and the   
past1 and the practical choice of       
motives in the moment of  will4 ,the    
former may be a train of any length and 
complexity3 we have  no reason to       
believe that the latter is more than    
engine and tender4    ,we are now in a  
position to classify actions in respect 
of the kind  of responsibility which    

belongs to them2 namely we have--    #a4
 ,involuntary or instinctive actions4   
#b4 ,voluntary actions in which the     
choice of motives is involuntary4    #c4
 ,voluntary actions in which the choice 
of motives is voluntary4    ,in each of 
these cases what is responsible is that 
part of my character  which determines  
what the action shall be4 ,for          
instinctive actions we  do not say that 
,i am responsible1 because the choice is
 made before  ,i know anything about it4
 ,for voluntary actions ,i am           
responsible1  because ,i make the       
choice2 that is1 the character of me is 
what  determines the character of the   
action4 ,in me1 then1 for this purpose1 
is included the aggregate of links of   
association which determines  what      
memories shall be called up by a given  
suggestion1 and what  motives shall be  
set at work by these memories4 ,but we  
distinguish  this mass of passions and  
pleasures1 desire and knowledge and     
pain1  which makes up most of my        

character at the moment1 from that inner
  and deeper motive-choosing self which 
is called ,reason1 and the ,will1  and  
the ,ego2 which is only responsible when
 motives are voluntarily  chosen by     
directing attention to them4 ,it is     
responsible only for  the choice of one 
motive out of those presented to it1 not
 for the  nature of the motives which   
are presented4    ,but again1 ,i may    
reasonably be blamed for what ,i did    
yesterday1  or a week ago1 or last year4
 ,this is because ,i am permanent2 in   
so far as from my actions of that date  
an inference may be drawn  about my     
character now1 it is reasonable that ,i 
should be treated as  praiseworthy or   
blamable4 ,and within certain limits ,i 
am for the same  reason responsible for 
what ,i am now1 because within certain  
limits  ,i have made myself4 ,even      
instinctive actions are dependent in    
many  cases upon habits which may be    
altered by proper attention and care2   
and still more the nature of the        

connections between sensation and       
action1 the associations of memory and  
motive1 may be voluntarily  modified if 
,i choose to try4 ,the habit of choosing
 among motives  is one which may be     
acquired and strengthened by practice1  
and the  strength of particular motives1
 by continually directing attention  to 
them1 may be almost indefinitely        
increased or diminished4 ,thus1  if by  
me is meant not the instantaneous me of 
this moment1 but the  aggregate me of my
 past life1 or even of the last year1   
the range of  my responsibility is very 
largely increased4 ,i am responsible for
 a  very large portion of the           
circumstances which are now external to 
me2  that is to say1 ,i am responsible  
for certain of the restrictions on  my  
own freedom4 ,as the eagle was shot with
 an arrow that flew on its  own feather1
 so ,i find myself bound with fetters of
 my proper forging4    ,let us now      
endeavor to conceive an action which is 
not determined in  any way by the       

character of the agent4 ,if we ask1     
',what makes it to be  that action and  
no other8' we are told1 ',the man's     
,ego4' ,the words are  here used1 it    
seems to me1 in some non-natural sense1 
if in any sense  at all4 ,one thing     
makes another to be what it is when the 
characters  of the two things are       
connected together by some general      
statement  or rule4 ,but we have to     
suppose that the character of the action
 is  not connected with the character of
 the ,ego by any general statement  or  
rule4 ,with the same ,ego and the same  
circumstances of all kinds1  anything   
within the limits imposed by the        
circumstances may happen  at any moment4
 ,i find myself unable to conceive any  
distinct sense  in which responsibility 
could apply in this case2 nor do ,i see 
at  all how it would be reasonable to   
use praise or blame4 ,if the action     
does not depend on the character1 what  
is the use of trying to alter  the      
character8 ,suppose1 however1 that this 

indeterminateness is only  partial2 that
 the character does add some            
restrictions to those already  imposed  
by circumstances1 but leaves the choice 
between certain actions  undetermined1  
and to be settled by chance or the      
transcendental ,ego4 ,is  it not clear  
that the man would be responsible for   
precisely that part  of the character of
 the action which was determined by his 
character1  and not for what was left   
undetermined by it8 ,for it is just that
  part which was determined by his      
character which it is reasonable to  try
 to alter by altering him4    ,we who   
believe in uniformity are not the only  
people unable to conceive               
responsibility without it4 ,these are   
the words of ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton1  as    
quoted by ,mr4 ,j4 ,s4 ,mill3-- #e      
',nay1 were we even to admit as true    
what we cannot think as possible1  still
 the doctrine of a motiveless volition  
would be only casualism2  and the free  
acts of an indifferent are1 morally and 

rationally1  as worthless as the        
pre-ordered passions of a determined    
will4'    ',that1 though inconceivable1 
a motiveless volition would1 if         
conceived1  be conceived as morally     
worthless1 only shows our impotence more
  clearly4'    ',is the person an       
original undetermined cause of the      
determination  of his will8 ,if he be   
not1 then he is not a free agent1 and   
the  scheme of ,necessity is admitted4  
,if he be1 in the first place1 it is    
impossible to conceive the possibility  
of this2 and in the second1  if the     
fact1 though inconceivable1 be allowed1 
it is impossible to  see how a cause1   
undetermined by any motive1 can be a    
rational1 moral1  and accountable       
cause4'    ,it is true that ,hamilton   
also says that the scheme of necessity  
is  inconceivable1 because it leads to  
an infinite non-commencement2  and that 
'the possibility of morality depends on 
the possibility of  liberty2 for if a   
man be not a free agent1 he is not the  

author of his  actions1 and has1        
therefore1 no responsibility--no moral  
personality  at all4'    ,i know nothing
 about necessity2 ,i only believe that  
nature is  practically uniform even in  
human action4 ,i know nothing about  an 
infinitely distant past2 ,i only know   
that ,i ought to base on  uniformity    
those inferences which are to guide my  
actions4 ,but that  man is a free agent 
appears to me obvious1 and that in the  
natural  sense of the words4 ,we need   
ask for no better definition than       
,kant's3--    ',will is a kind of       
causality belonging to living agents1 in
 so  far as they are rational2 and      
freedom is such a property of that      
causality as enables them to be         
efficient agents independently of       
outside causes determining them2 as1 on 
the other hand1 necessity               
7,naturnothwendigkeit7 is that property 
of all irrational beings which  consists
 in their being determined to activity  
by the influence of  outside causes4'   

7',metaphysics of ,ethics1' chap4 iii47 
,i believe that ,i am a free agent when 
my actions are independent of  the      
control of circumstances outside me2 and
 it seems a misuse of  language to call 
me a free agent if my actions are       
determined by a  transcendental ,ego who
 is independent of the circumstances    
inside  me--that is to say1 of my       
character4 ,the expression 'free will'  
has  unfortunately been imported into   
mental science from a theological       
controversy rather different from the   
one we are now considering4 ,it  is     
surely too much to expect that good and 
serviceable ,english words  should be   
sacrificed to a phantom4    ,in an      
admirable book1 ',the ,methods of       
,ethics1' ,mr4 ,henry ,sidgwick  has    
stated1 with supreme fairness and       
impartiality1 both sides  of this       
question4 ,after setting forth the      
'almost overwhelming  cumulative proof' 
of uniformity in human action1 he says  
that it  seems 'more than balanced by a 

single argument on the other side3  the 
immediate affirmation of consciousness  
in the moment of deliberate  volition4' 
',no amount of experience of the sway of
 motives ever tends  to make me distrust
 my intuitive consciousness that in     
resolving1  after deliberation1 ,i      
exercise free choice as to which of the 
motives  acting upon me shall prevail4' 
,the only answer to this argument is    
that it is not 'on the other  side4'    
,there is no doubt about the deliverance
 of consciousness2 and  even if our     
powers of self-observation had not been 
acute enough to  discover it1 the       
existence of some choice between motives
 would be  proved by the existence of   
vaso-motor nerves4 ,but perhaps the most
  instructive way of meeting arguments  
of this kind is to inquire what         
consciousness ought to say in order that
 its deliverances may be of  any use in 
the controversy4 ,it is affirmed1 on the
 side of uniformity1  that the feelings 
in my consciousness in the moment of    

voluntary choice  have been preceded by 
facts out of my consciousness which are 
related  to them in a uniform manner1 so
 that if the previous facts had been    
accurately known the voluntary choice   
might have been predicted4 ,on  the     
other side this is denied4 ,to be of any
 use in the controversy1  then1 the     
immediate deliverance of my             
consciousness must be competent  to     
assure me of the non-existence of       
something which by hypothesis  is not in
 my consciousness4 ,given an absolutely 
dark room1 can my  sense of sight assure
 me that there is no one but myself in  
it8 ,can  my sense of hearing assure me 
that nothing inaudible is going on8 ,as 
little can the immediate deliverance of 
my consciousness assure me  that the    
uniformity of nature does not apply to  
human actions4    ,it is perhaps        
necessary1 in connection with this      
question1 to refer  to that singular    
,materialism of high authority and      
recent date which  makes consciousness a

 physical agent1 'correlates' it with   
,light  and ,nerve-force1 and so reduces
 it to an objective phenomenon4 ,this   
doctrine is founded on a common and very
 useful mode of speech1 in  which we    
say1 for example1 that a good fire is a 
source of pleasure  on a cold day1 and  
that a man's feeling of chill may make  
him run to  it4 ,but so also we say that
 the sun rises and sets every morning   
and  night1 although the man in the moon
 sees clearly that this is due  to the  
rotation of the earth4 ,one cannot be   
pedantic all day4 ,but  if we choose for
 once to be pedantic1 the matter is     
after all very  simple4 ,suppose that ,i
 am made to run by feeling a chill4     
,when ,i  begin to move my leg1 ,i may  
observe if ,i like a double series of   
facts4 ,i have the feeling of effort1   
the sensation of motion in  my leg2 ,i  
feel the pressure of my foot on the     
ground4 ,along with  this ,i may see    
with my eyes1 or feel with my hands1 the
 motion of  my leg as a material object4

 ,the first series of facts belongs to  
me alone2 the second may be equally     
observed by anybody else4 ,the  mental  
series began first2 ,i willed to move my
 leg before ,i saw it  move4 ,but when  
,i know more about the matter1 ,i can   
trace the material  series further back1
 and find nerve-messages going to the   
muscles of  my leg to make it move4 ,but
 ,i had a feeling of chill before ,i    
chose  to move my leg4 ,accordingly1 ,i 
can find nerve-messages1 excited by  the
 contraction due to the low temperature1
 going to my brain from  the chilled    
skin4 ,assuming the uniformity of       
nature1 ,i carry forward  and backward  
both the mental and the material series4
 ,a uniformity  is observed in each1 and
 a parallelism is observed between them1
  whenever observations can be made4    
,but sometimes one series is known      
better1 and sometimes the other2 so that
 in telling a story we quite  naturally 
speak sometimes of mental facts and     
sometimes of material  facts4 ,a feeling

 of chill made a man run2 strictly      
speaking1 the  nervous disturbance which
 co-existed with that feeling of chill  
made  him run1 if we want to talk about 
material facts2 or the feeling of  chill
 produced the form of sub-consciousness 
which co-exists with  the motion of     
legs1 if we want to talk about mental   
facts4 ,but we  know nothing about the  
special nervous disturbance which       
co-exists  with a feeling of chill1     
because it has not yet been localized in
 the  brain2 and we know nothing about  
the form of sub-consciousness which     
co-exists with the motion of legs2      
although there is very good reason  for 
believing in the existence of both4 ,so 
we talk about the feeling  of chill and 
the running1 because in one case we know
 the mental side1  and in the other the 
material side4 ,a man might show me a   
picture of  the battle of ,gravelotte1  
and say1 ',you can't see the battle1    
because  it's all over1 but there is a  
picture of it4' ,and then he might put  

a chassepot into my hand1 and say1 ',we 
could not represent the whole           
construction of a chassepot in the      
picture1 but you can examine this  one1 
and find it out4' ,if ,i now insisted on
 mixing up the two modes  of            
communication of knowledge1 if ,i       
expected that the chassepots  in the    
picture would go off1 and said that the 
one in my hand was  painted on heavy    
canvas1 ,i should be acting exactly in  
the spirit  of the new materialism4 ,for
 the material facts are a representation
  or symbol of the mental facts1 just as
 a picture is a representation  or      
symbol of a battle4 ,and my own mind is 
a reality from which ,i can  judge by   
analogy of the realities represented by 
other men's brains1  just as the        
chassepot in my hand is a reality from  
which ,i can judge by  analogy of the   
chassepots represented in the picture4  
,when1 therefore1  we ask1 ',what is the
 physical link between the ingoing      
message from  chilled skin and the      

outgoing message which moves the leg8'  
and the  answer is1 ',a man's ,will1' we
 have as much right to be amused as  if 
we had asked our friend with the picture
 what pigment was used  in painting the 
cannon in the foreground1 and received  
the answer1  ',wrought iron4' ,it will  
be found excellent practice in the      
mental  operations required by this     
doctrine to imagine a train1 the fore   
part  of which is an engine and three   
carriages linked with iron couplings1   
and the hind part three other carriages 
linked with iron couplings2  the bond   
between the two parts being made out of 
the sentiments of  amity subsisting     
between the stoker and the guard4    ,to
 sum up3 the uniformity of nature in    
human actions has been  denied on the   
ground that it takes away               
responsibility1 that it is  contradicted
 by the testimony of consciousness1 and 
that there is a  physical correlation   
between mind and matter4 ,we have       
replied that  the uniformity of nature  

is necessary to responsibility1 that it 
is  affirmed by the testimony of        
consciousness whenever consciousness is 
competent to testify1 and that matter is
 the phenomenon or symbol of  which mind
 or quasi-mind is the symbolized and    
represented thing4 ,we  are now free to 
continue our inquiries on the           
supposition that nature  is uniform4    
,we began by describing the moral sense 
of an ,englishman4 ,no doubt  the       
description would serve very well for   
the more civilized nations  of ,europe2 
most closely for ,germans and ,dutch4   
,but the fact that we  can speak in this
 way discloses that there is more than  
one moral  sense1 and that what ,i feel 
to be right another man may feel to  be 
wrong4 ,thus we cannot help asking      
whether there is any reason  for        
preferring one moral sense to another2  
whether the question1  ',what is right  
to do8' has in any one set of           
circumstances a single  answer which can
 be definitely known4    ,clearly1 in   

the first rough sense of the word1 this 
is not true4 ,what  is right for me to  
do now1 seeing that ,i am here with a   
certain  character1 and a certain moral 
sense as part of it1 is just what  ,i   
feel to be right4 ,the individual       
conscience is1 in the moment  of        
volition1 the only possible judge of    
what is right2 there is  no conflicting 
claim4 ,but if we are deliberating about
 the future1  we know that we can modify
 our conscience gradually by associating
  with people1 reading certain books1   
and paying attention to certain  ideas  
and feelings2 and we may ask ourselves1 
',how shall we modify  our conscience1  
if at all8 what kind of conscience shall
 we try to  get8 what is the best       
conscience8' ,we may ask similar        
questions about  our sense of taste4    
,there is no doubt at present that the  
nicest things  to me are the things ,i  
like2 but ,i know that ,i can train     
myself to  like some things and dislike 
others1 and that things which are very  

nasty at one time may come to be great  
delicacies at another4 ,i may  ask1     
',how shall ,i train myself8 ,what is   
the best taste8' ,and this  leads very  
naturally to putting the question in    
another form1 namely1  ',what is taste  
good for8 ,what is the purpose or       
function of taste8' ,we  should probably
 find as the answer to that question    
that the purpose or  function of taste  
is to discriminate wholesome food from  
unwholesome2  that it is a matter of    
stomach and digestion4 ,it will follow  
from  this that the best taste is that  
which prefers wholesome food1 and  that 
by cultivating a preference for         
wholesome and nutritious things  ,i     
shall be training my palate in the way  
it should go4 ,in just the  same way our
 question about the best conscience will
 resolve itself  into a question about  
the purpose or function of the          
conscience--why  we have got it1 and    
what it is good for4    ,now to my mind 
the simplest and clearest and most      

profound philosophy  that was ever      
written upon this subject is to be found
 in the #b;d and  #c;d chapters of ,mr4 
,darwin's ',descent of ,man4' ,in these 
chapters it  appears that just as most  
physical characteristics of organisms   
have  been evolved and preserved because
 they were useful to the individual  in 
the struggle for existence against other
 individuals and other  species1 so this
 particular feeling has been evolved and
 preserved  because it is useful to the 
tribe or community in the struggle for  
existence against other tribes1 and     
against the environment as a  whole4    
,the function of conscience is the      
preservation of the tribe  as a tribe4  
,and we shall rightly train our         
consciences if we learn  to approve     
those actions which tend to the         
advantage of the community  in the      
struggle for existence4    ,there are   
here some words1 however1 which require 
careful  definition4 ,and first the word
 purpose4 ,a thing serves a purpose     

when it is adapted to some end2 thus a  
corkscrew is adapted to the  end of     
extracting corks from bottles1 and our  
lungs are adapted to  the end of        
respiration4 ,we may say that the       
extraction of corks is  the purpose of  
the corkscrew1 and that respiration is  
the purpose  of the lungs4 ,but here we 
shall have used the word in two         
different  senses4 ,a man made the      
corkscrew with a purpose in his mind1   
and he  knew and intended that it should
 be used for pulling out corks4 ,but    
nobody made our lungs with a purpose in 
his mind1 and intended that  they should
 be used for breathing4 ,the respiratory
 apparatus was  adapted to its purpose  
by natural selection--namely1 by the    
gradual  preservation of better and     
better adaptations1 and the killing off 
of  the worse and imperfect adaptations4
 ,in using the word purpose for  the    
result of this unconscious process of   
adaptation by survival of  the fittest1 
,i know that ,i am somewhat extending   

its ordinary sense1  which implies      
consciousness4 ,but it seems to me that 
on the score  of convenience there is a 
great deal to be said for this extension
  of meaning4 ,we want a word to express
 the adaptation of means to an  end1    
whether involving consciousness or not2 
the word purpose will do  very well1 and
 the adjective purposive has already    
been used in this  sense4 ,but if the   
use is admitted1 we must distinguish two
 kinds of  purpose4 ,there is the       
unconscious purpose which is attained by
 natural  selection1 in which no        
consciousness need be concerned2 and    
there  is the conscious purpose of an   
intelligence which designs a thing  that
 it may serve to do something which he  
desires to be done4 ,the  distinguishing
 mark of this second kind1 design or    
conscious purpose1  is that in the      
consciousness of the agent there is an  
image or symbol  of the end which he    
desires1 and this precedes and          
determines the use  of the means4 ,thus 

the man who first invented a corkscrew  
must have  previously known that corks  
were in bottles1 and have desired to get
  them out4 ,we may describe this if we 
like in terms of matter1 and say  that a
 purpose of the second kind implies a   
complex nervous system1  in which there 
can be formed an image or symbol of the 
end1 and that  this symbol determines   
the use of the means4 ,the nervous image
 or  symbol of anything is that mode of 
working of part of my brain which  goes 
on simultaneously and is correlated with
 my thinking of the thing4    ,aristotle
 defines an organism as that in which   
the part exists for the  sake of the    
whole4 ,it is not that the existence of 
the part depends  on the existence of   
the whole1 for every whole exists only  
as an  aggregate of parts related in a  
certain way2 but that the shape and     
nature of the part are determined by the
 wants of the whole4 ,thus  the shape   
and nature of my foot are what they are1
 not for the sake  of my foot itself1   

but for the sake of my whole body1 and  
because it  wants to move about4 ,that  
which the part has to do for the whole  
is  called its function4 ,thus the      
function of my foot is to support me1   
and assist in locomotion4 ,not all the  
nature of the part is necessarily  for  
the sake of the whole3 the comparative  
callosity of the skin of  my sole is for
 the protection of my foot itself4      
,society is an organism1 and man in     
society is part of an organism          
according to this definition1 in so far 
as some portion of the  nature of man is
 what it is for the sake of the         
whole--society4 ,now  conscience is such
 a portion of the nature of man1 and its
 function  is the preservation of       
society in the struggle for existence4  
,we may  be able to define this function
 more closely when we know more about   
the way in which conscience tends to    
preserve society4    ,next let us       
endeavor to make precise the meaning of 
the words community  and society4 ,it is

 clear that at different times men may  
be divided  into groups of greater or   
less extent--tribes1 clans1 families1   
nations1 towns4 ,if a certain number of 
clans are struggling for  existence1    
that portion of the conscience will be  
developed which  tends to the           
preservation of the clan2 so1 if towns  
or families are  struggling1 we shall   
get a moral sense adapted to the        
advantage of the  town or the family4   
,in this way different portions of the  
moral sense  may be developed at        
different stages of progress4 ,now it is
 clear that  for the purpose of the     
conscience the word community at any    
time will  mean a group of that size and
 nature which is being selected or not  
selected for survival as a whole4       
,selection may be going on at the  same 
time among many different kinds of      
groups4 ,and ultimately the  moral sense
 will be composed of various portions   
relating to various  groups1 the        
function or purpose of each portion     

being the advantage  of that group to   
which it relates in the struggle for    
existence4 ,thus  we have a sense of    
family duty1 of municipal duty1 of      
national duty1  and of duties toward all
 mankind4    ,it is to be noticed that  
part of the nature of a smaller group   
may  be what it is for the sake of a    
larger group to which it belongs2  and  
then we may speak of the function of the
 smaller group4 ,thus it  appears       
probable that the family1 in the form in
 which it now exists  among us1 is      
determined by the good of the nation2   
and we may say  that the function of the
 family is to promote the advantage of  
the  nation or larger society in some   
certain ways4 ,but ,i do not think it   
would be right to follow ,auguste ,comte
 in speaking of the function  of        
humanity2 because humanity is obviously 
not a part of any larger  organism for  
whose sake it is what it is4    ,now    
that we have cleared up the meanings of 
some of our words1 we  are still a great

 way from the definite solution of our  
question1  ',what is the best           
conscience8 or what ought ,i to think   
right8' ,for  we do not yet know what is
 for the advantage of the community in  
the  struggle for existence4 ,if we     
choose to learn by the analogy of an    
individual organism1 we may see that no 
permanent or final answer can  be given1
 because the organism grows in          
consequence of the struggle1  and       
develops new wants while it is          
satisfying the old ones4 ,but  at any   
given time it has quite enough to do to 
keep alive and to  avoid dangers and    
diseases4 ,so we may expect that the    
wants and even  the necessities of the  
social organism will grow with its      
growth1  and that it is impossible to   
predict what may tend in the distant    
future to its advantage in the struggle 
for existence4 ,but still1  in this     
vague and general statement of the      
functions of conscience1  we shall find 
that we have already established a great

 deal4    ,in the first place1 right is 
an affair of the community1 and must not
  be referred to anything else4 ,to go  
back to our analogy of taste3 if  ,i    
tried to persuade you that the best     
palate was that which preferred  things 
pretty to look at1 you might condemn me 
priori without any  experience1 by      
merely knowing that taste is an affair  
of stomach and  digestion--that its     
function is to select wholesome food4   
,and so1  if any one tries to persuade  
us that the best conscience is that     
which thinks it right to obey the will  
of some individual1 as a deity  or a    
monarch1 he is condemned  priori in the 
very nature of right  and wrong4 ,in    
order that the worship of a deity may be
 consistent  with natural ethics1 he    
must be regarded as the friend and      
helper of  humanity1 and his character  
must be judged from his actions by a    
moral  standard which is independent of 
him4 ,and this1 it must be admitted1  is
 the position which has been taken by   

most ,english divines1 as long  as they 
were ,englishmen first and divines      
afterward4 ,the worship of  a deity who 
is represented as unfair or unfriendly  
to any portion of  the community is a   
wrong thing1 however great may be the   
threats and  promises by which it is    
commended4 ,and still worse1 the        
reference of  right and wrong to his    
arbitrary will as a standard1 the       
diversion  of the allegiance of the     
moral sense from the community to him1  
is  the most insidious and fatal of     
social diseases4 ,it was against this   
that the ,teutonic conscience protested 
in the ,reformation4 ,again1 in         
monarchical countries1 in order that    
allegiance to the sovereign may  be     
consistent with natural ethics1 he must 
be regarded as the servant  and symbol  
of the national unity1 capable of       
rebellion and punishable  for it4 ,and  
this has been the theory of the ,english
 constitution from  time immemorial4    
,the first principle of natural ethics1 

then1 is the sole and supreme           
allegiance of conscience to the         
community4 ,i venture to call this piety
  in accordance with the older meaning  
of the word4 ,even if it should  turn   
out impossible to sever it from the     
unfortunate associations which  have    
clung to its later meaning1 still it    
seems worth while to try4    ,an        
immediate deduction from our principle  
is that there are no  self-regarding    
virtues properly so called2 those       
qualities which  tend to the advantage  
and preservation of the individual being
 only  morally right in so far as they  
make him a more useful citizen4 ,and    
this conclusion is in some cases of     
great practical importance4 ,the  virtue
 of purity1 for example1 attains in this
 way a fairly exact  definition3 purity 
in a man is that course of conduct which
 makes him  to be a good husband and    
father1 in a woman that which makes her 
to be  a good wife and mother1 or which 
helps other people so to prepare and    

keep themselves4 ,it is easy to see how 
many false ideas and pernicious         
precepts are swept away by even so      
simple a definition as that4    ,next1  
we may fairly define our position in    
regard to that moral  system which has  
deservedly found favor with the great   
mass of our  countrymen4 ,in the common 
statement of utilitarianism the end of  
right action is defined to be the       
greatest happiness of the greatest      
number4 ,it seems to me that the reason 
and the ample justification  of the     
success of this system is that it       
explicitly sets forth the  community as 
the object of moral allegiance4 ,but our
 determination  of the purpose of the   
conscience will oblige us to make a     
change in  the statement of it4         
,happiness is not the end of right      
action4 ,my  happiness is of no use to  
the community except in so far as it    
makes  me a more efficient citizen2 that
 is to say1 it is rightly desired as  a 
means and not as an end4 ,the end may be

 described as the greatest  efficiency  
of all citizens as such4 ,no doubt      
happiness will in the  long run accrue  
to the community as a consequence of    
right conduct2  but the right is        
determined independently of the         
happiness1 and1  as ,plato says1 it is  
better to suffer wrong than to do wrong4
    ,in conclusion1 ,i would add some   
words on the relation of ,veracity to   
the first principle of ,piety4 ,it is   
clear that veracity is founded on  faith
 in man2 you tell a man the truth when  
you can trust him with it  and are not  
afraid4 ,this perhaps is made more      
evident by considering  the case of     
exception allowed by all                
moralists--namely1 that if a man  asks  
you the way with a view to committing a 
murder1 it is right to  tell a lie and  
misdirect him4 ,the reason why he must  
not have the truth  told him is that he 
would make a bad use of it2 he cannot be
 trusted  with it4 ,about these cases of
 exception an important remark must be  

made in passing4 ,when we hear that a   
man has told a lie under such           
circumstances1 we are indeed ready to   
admit that for once it was right1       
mensonge admirable2 but we always have a
 sort of feeling that it must  not occur
 again4 ,and the same thing applies to  
cases of conflicting  obligations1 when 
for example the family conscience and   
the national  conscience disagree4 ,in  
such cases no general rule can be laid  
down2 we  have to choose the less of two
 evils2 but this is not right altogether
  in the same sense as it is right to   
speak the truth4 ,there is something    
wrong in the circumstances1 that we     
should have to choose an evil at  all4  
,the actual course to be pursued will   
vary with the progress of  society2 that
 evil which at first was greater will   
become less1 and  in a perfect society  
the conflict will be resolved into      
harmony4 ,but  meanwhile these cases of 
exception must be carefully kept        
distinct  from the straightforward cases

 of right and wrong1 and they always    
imply an obligation to mend the         
circumstances if we can4    ,veracity to
 an individual is not only enjoined by  
piety in virtue of  the obvious         
advantage which attends a               
straightforward and mutually  trusting  
community as compared with others1 but  
also because deception  is in all cases 
a personal injury4 ,still more is this  
true of veracity  to the community      
itself4 ,the conception of the universe 
or aggregate  of beliefs which forms the
 link between sensation and action for  
each individual is a public and not a   
private matter2 it is formed  by society
 and for society4 ,of what enormous     
importance it is to the  community that 
this should be a true conception ,i need
 not attempt  to describe4 ,now to the  
attainment of this true conception two  
things  are necessary4    ,first1 if we 
study the history of those methods by   
which true beliefs  and false beliefs   
have been attained1 we shall see that it

 is our duty  to guide our beliefs by   
inference from experience on the        
assumption  of uniformity of nature and 
consciousness in other men1 and by this 
only4 ,only upon this moral basis can   
the foundations of the empirical  method
 be justified4    ,secondly1 veracity to
 the community depends upon faith in    
man4 ,surely  ,i ought to be talking    
platitudes when ,i say that it is not   
,english to  tell a man a lie1 or to    
suggest a lie by your silence or your   
actions1  because you are afraid that he
 is not prepared for the truth1 because 
you don't quite know what he will do    
when he knows it1 because perhaps  after
 all this lie is a better thing for him 
than the truth would  be1 this same man 
being all the time an honest            
fellow-citizen whom  you have every     
reason to trust4 ,surely ,i have heard  
that this craven  crookedness is the    
object of our national detestation4 ,and
 yet it is  constantly whispered that it
 would be dangerous to divulge certain  

truths to the masses4 ',i know the whole
 thing is untrue3 but then  it is so    
useful for the people2 you don't know   
what harm you might  do by shaking their
 faith in it4' ,crooked ways are none   
the less  crooked because they are meant
 to deceive great masses of people      
instead of individuals4 ,if a thing is  
true1 let us all believe it1  rich and  
poor1 men1 women1 and children4 ,if a   
thing is untrue1 let  us all disbelieve 
it1 rich and poor1 men1 women1 and      
children4 ,truth  is a thing to be      
shouted from the housetops1 not to be   
whispered over  rose-water after dinner 
when the ladies are gone away4    ,even 
in those whom ,i would most reverence1  
who would shrink with  horror from such 
actual deception as ,i have just        
mentioned1 ,i find  traces of a want of 
faith in man4 ,even that noble thinker1 
to whom  we of this generation owe more 
than ,i can tell1 seemed to say in  one 
of his posthumous essays that in regard 
to questions of great  public importance

 we might encourage a hope in excess of 
the evidence  7which would infallibly   
grow into a belief and defy evidence7 if
  we found that life was made easier by 
it4 ,as if we should not lose           
infinitely more by nourishing a tendency
 to falsehood than we could  gain by the
 delusion of a pleasing fancy4 ,life    
must first of all be  made straight and 
true2 it may get easier through the help
 this brings  to the commonwealth4 ,and 
,lange1 the great historian of          
materialism1  says that the amount of   
false belief necessary to morality in a 
given  society is a matter of taste4 ,i 
cannot believe that any falsehood       
whatever is necessary to morality4 ,it  
cannot be true of my race and  yours    
that to keep ourselves from becoming    
scoundrels we must needs  believe a lie4
 ,the sense of right grew up among      
healthy men and was  fixed by the       
practice of comradeship4 ,it has never  
had help from  phantoms and falsehoods1 
and it never can want any4 ,by faith in 

man  and piety toward men we have taught
 each other the right hitherto2 with    
faith in man and piety toward men we    
shall never more depart from it4        
,,iii4 ,,the ,,ethics ,,of ,,belief4    
,i4 ,the ,duty of ,inquiry4--,a         
shipowner was about to send to sea an   
emigrant-ship4 ,he knew that she was    
old1 and not over-well built at the     
first2 that she had seen many seas and  
climes1 and often had needed  repairs4  
,doubts had been suggested to him that  
possibly she was not  seaworthy4 ,these 
doubts preyed upon his mind1 and made   
him unhappy2  he thought that perhaps he
 ought to have her thoroughly overhauled
  and refitted1 even though this should 
put him to great expense4 ,before  the  
ship sailed1 however1 he succeeded in   
overcoming these melancholy             
reflections4 ,he said to himself that   
she had gone safely through  so many    
voyages and weathered so many storms    
that it was idle to  suppose she would  
not come safely home from this trip     

also4 ,he would  put his trust in       
,providence1 which could hardly fail to 
protect all  these unhappy families that
 were leaving their fatherland to seek  
for  better times elsewhere4 ,he would  
dismiss from his mind all ungenerous    
suspicions about the honesty of builders
 and contractors4 ,in such ways  he     
acquired a sincere and comfortable      
conviction that his vessel was          
thoroughly safe and seaworthy2 he       
watched her departure with a light      
heart1 and benevolent wishes for the    
success of the exiles in their  strange 
new home that was to be2 and he got his 
insurance-money when  she went down in  
mid-ocean and told no tales4    ,what   
shall we say of him8 ,surely this1 that 
he was verily guilty of  the death of   
those men4 ,it is admitted that he did  
sincerely believe in  the soundness of  
his ship2 but the sincerity of his      
conviction can in  no wise help him1    
because he had no right to believe on   
such evidence  as was before him4 ,he   

had acquired his belief not by honestly 
earning  it in patient investigation1   
but by stifling his doubts4 ,and        
although  in the end he may have felt so
 sure about it that he could not think  
otherwise1 yet inasmuch as he had       
knowingly and willingly worked  himself 
into that frame of mind1 he must be held
 responsible for it4    ,let us alter   
the case a little1 and suppose that the 
ship was not  unsound after all2 that   
she made her voyage safely1 and many    
others  after it4 ,will that diminish   
the guilt of her owner8 ,not one jot4   
,when  an action is once done1 it is    
right or wrong forever2 no accidental   
failure of its good or evil fruits can  
possibly alter that4 ,the  man would not
 have been innocent1 he would only have 
been not found  out4 ,the question of   
right or wrong has to do with the origin
 of his  belief1 not the matter of it2  
not what it was1 but how he got it2  not
 whether it turned out to be true or    
false1 but whether he had a  right to   

believe on such evidence as was before  
him4    ,there was once an island in    
which some of the inhabitants professed 
a religion teaching neither the doctrine
 of original sin nor that of  eternal   
punishment4 ,a suspicion got abroad that
 the professors of this  religion had   
made use of unfair means to get their   
doctrines taught  to children4 ,they    
were accused of wresting the laws of    
their country  in such a way as to      
remove children from the care of their  
natural  and legal guardians2 and even  
of stealing them away and keeping them  
concealed from their friends and        
relations4 ,a certain number of men     
formed themselves into a society for the
 purpose of agitating the  public about 
this matter4 ,they published grave      
accusations against  individual citizens
 of the highest position and character1 
and did  all in their power to injure   
these citizens in the exercise of their 
professions4 ,so great was the noise    
they made1 that a ,commission  was      

appointed to investigate the facts2 but 
after the ,commission  had carefully    
inquired into all the evidence that     
could be got1  it appeared that the     
accused were innocent4 ,not only had    
they been  accused on insufficient      
evidence1 but the evidence of their     
innocence  was such as the agitators    
might easily have obtained1 if they had 
attempted a fair inquiry4 ,after these  
disclosures the inhabitants  of that    
country looked upon the members of the  
agitating society1  not only as persons 
whose judgment was to be distrusted1 but
 also as  no longer to be counted       
honorable men4 ,for although they had   
sincerely  and conscientiously believed 
in the charges they had made1 yet they  
had  no right to believe on such        
evidence as was before them4 ,their     
sincere  convictions1 instead of being  
honestly earned by patient inquiring1   
were stolen by listening to the voice of
 prejudice and passion4    ,let us vary 
this case also1 and suppose1 other      

things remaining as  before1 that a     
still more accurate investigation proved
 the accused  to have been really       
guilty4 ,would this make any difference 
in the  guilt of the accusers8 ,clearly 
not2 the question is not whether their  
belief was true or false1 but whether   
they entertained it on wrong  grounds4  
,they would no doubt say1 ',now you see 
that we were right  after all2 next time
 perhaps you will believe us4' ,and they
 might be  believed1 but they would not 
thereby become honorable men4 ,they     
would  not be innocent1 they would only 
be not found out4 ,every one of them1   
if he chose to examine himself in foro  
conscienti1 would know that he  had     
acquired and nourished a belief1 when he
 had no right to believe  on such       
evidence as was before him2 and therein 
he would know that  he had done a wrong 
thing4    ,it may be said1 however1 that
 in both of these supposed cases it is  
not the belief which is judged to be    
wrong1 but the action following  upon   

it4 ,the shipowner might say1 ',i am    
perfectly certain that my  ship is      
sound1 but still ,i feel it my duty to  
have her examined1  before trusting the 
lives of so many people to her4' ,and it
 might be  said to the agitator1        
',however convinced you were of the     
justice of  your cause and the truth of 
your convictions1 you ought not to have 
made a public attack upon any man's     
character until you had examined  the   
evidence on both sides with the utmost  
patience and care4'    ,in the first    
place1 let us admit that1 so far as it  
goes1 this  view of the case is right   
and necessary2 right1 because even when 
a man's belief is so fixed that he      
cannot think otherwise1 he still  has a 
choice in regard to the action suggested
 by it1 and so cannot  escape the duty  
of investigating on the ground of the   
strength of his  convictions2 and       
necessary1 because those who are not yet
 capable  of controlling their feelings 
and thoughts must have a plain rule     

dealing with overt acts4    ,but this   
being premised as necessary1 it becomes 
clear that it is not  sufficient1 and   
that our previous judgment is required  
to supplement  it4 ,for it is not       
possible so to sever the belief from the
 action it  suggests as to condemn the  
one without condemning the other4 ,no   
man  holding a strong belief on one side
 of a question1 or even wishing  to hold
 a belief on one side1 can investigate  
it with such fairness  and completeness 
as if he were really in doubt and       
unbiased2 so that  the existence of a   
belief not founded on fair inquiry      
unfits a man  for the performance of    
this necessary duty4    ,nor is that    
truly a belief at all which has not some
 influence upon  the actions of him who 
holds it4 ,he who truly believes that   
which  prompts him to an action has     
looked upon the action to lust after it1
  he has committed it already in his    
heart4 ,if a belief is not realized     
immediately in open deeds1 it is stored 

up for the guidance of the  future4 ,it 
goes to make a part of that aggregate of
 beliefs which  is the link between     
sensation and action at every moment of 
all our  lives1 and which is so         
organized and compacted together that no
 part  of it can be isolated from the   
rest1 but every new addition modifies   
the structure of the whole4 ,no real    
belief1 however trifling and            
fragmentary it may seem1 is ever truly  
insignificant2 it prepares  us to       
receive more of its like1 confirms those
 which resembled it  before1 and weakens
 others2 and so gradually it lays a     
stealthy train  in our inmost thoughts1 
which may some day explode into overt   
action1  and leave its stamp upon our   
character forever4    ,and no one man's 
belief is in any case a private matter  
which concerns  himself alone4 ,our     
lives are guided by that general        
conception of  the course of things     
which has been created by society for   
social  purposes4 ,our words1 our       

phrases1 our forms and processes and    
modes  of thought1 are common property1 
fashioned and perfected from age  to    
age2 an heirloom which every succeeding 
generation inherits as a  precious      
deposit and a sacred trust to be handed 
on to the next one1  not unchanged but  
enlarged and purified1 with some clear  
marks of its  proper handiwork4 ,into   
this1 for good or ill1 is woven every   
belief  of every man who has speech of  
his fellows4 ,an awful privilege1 and   
an awful responsibility1 that we should 
help to create the world in  which      
posterity will live4    ,in the two     
supposed cases which have been          
considered1 it has been  judged wrong to
 believe on insufficient evidence1 or to
 nourish belief  by suppressing doubts  
and avoiding investigation4 ,the reason 
of this  judgment is not far to seek3 it
 is that in both these cases the belief 
held by one man was of great importance 
to other men4 ,but forasmuch  as no     
belief held by one man1 however         

seemingly trivial the belief1  and      
however obscure the believer1 is ever   
actually insignificant or  without its  
effect on the fate of mankind1 we have  
no choice but to  extend our judgment to
 all cases of belief whatever4 ,belief1 
that  sacred faculty which prompts the  
decisions of our will1 and knits  into  
harmonious working all the compacted    
energies of our being1  is ours not for 
ourselves1 but for humanity4 ,it is     
rightly used on  truths which have been 
established by long experience and      
waiting  toil1 and which have stood in  
the fierce light of free and fearless   
questioning4 ,then it helps to bind men 
together1 and to strengthen and  direct 
their common action4 ,it is desecrated  
when given to unproved  and unquestioned
 statements1 for the solace and private 
pleasure of  the believer2 to add a     
tinsel splendor to the plain straight   
road of  our life and display a bright  
mirage beyond it2 or even to drown the  
common sorrows of our kind by a         

self-deception which allows them not    
only to cast down1 but also to degrade  
us4 ,whoso would deserve well of  his   
fellows in this matter will guard the   
purity of his belief with  a very       
fanaticism of jealous care1 lest at any 
time it should rest  on an unworthy     
object1 and catch a stain which can     
never be wiped away4    ,it is not only 
the leader of men1 statesman1           
philosopher1 or poet1  that owes this   
bounden duty to mankind4 ,every rustic  
who delivers  in the village alehouse   
his slow1 infrequent sentences1 may help
 to  kill or keep alive the fatal       
superstitions which clog his race4      
,every  hard-worked wife of an artisan  
may transmit to her children beliefs    
which shall knit society together1 or   
rend it in pieces4 ,no simplicity  of   
mind1 no obscurity of station1 can      
escape the universal duty of            
questioning all that we believe4    ,it 
is true that this duty is a hard one1   
and the doubt which comes out  of it is 

often a very bitter thing4 ,it leaves us
 bare and powerless  where we thought   
that we were safe and strong4 ,to know  
all about  anything is to know how to   
deal with it under all circumstances4   
,we  feel much happier and more secure  
when we think we know precisely  what to
 do1 no matter what happens1 than when  
we have lost our way and  do not know   
where to turn4 ,and if we have supposed 
ourselves to know  all about anything1  
and to be capable of doing what is fit  
in regard  to it1 we naturally do not   
like to find that we are really ignorant
  and powerless1 that we have to begin  
again at the beginning1 and try  to     
learn what the thing is and how it is to
 be dealt with--if indeed  anything can 
be learnt about it4 ,it is the sense of 
power attached  to a sense of knowledge 
that makes men desirous of believing1   
and  afraid of doubting4    ,this sense 
of power is the highest and best of     
pleasures when the  belief on which it  
is founded is a true belief1 and has    

been fairly  earned by investigation4   
,for then we may justly feel that it is 
common  property1 and holds good for    
others as well as for ourselves4 ,then  
we may be glad1 not that ,i have learned
 secrets by which ,i am safer  and      
stronger1 but that we men have got      
mastery over more of the  world2 and we 
shall be strong1 not for ourselves1 but 
in the name  of ,man and in his         
strength4 ,but if the belief has been   
accepted on  insufficient evidence1 the 
pleasure is a stolen one4 ,not only does
  it deceive ourselves by giving us a   
sense of power which we do not  really  
possess1 but it is sinful1 because it is
 stolen in defiance of  our duty to     
mankind4 ,that duty is to guard         
ourselves from such beliefs  as from a  
pestilence1 which may shortly master our
 own body and then  spread to the rest  
of the town4 ,what would be thought of  
one who1  for the sake of a sweet fruit1
 should deliberately run the risk of    
bringing a plague upon his family and   

his neighbors8    ,and1 as in other such
 cases1 it is not the risk only which   
has to  be considered2 for a bad action 
is always bad at the time when it is    
done1 no matter what happens afterward4 
,every time we let ourselves  believe   
for unworthy reasons1 we weaken our     
powers of self-control1  of doubting1 of
 judicially and fairly weighing         
evidence4 ,we all suffer  severely      
enough from the maintenance and support 
of false beliefs  and the fatally wrong 
actions which they lead to1 and the evil
 born  when one such belief is          
entertained is great and wide4 ,but a   
greater  and wider evil arises when the 
credulous character is maintained  and  
supported1 when a habit of believing for
 unworthy reasons is  fostered and made 
permanent4 ,if ,i steal money from any  
person1  there may be no harm done by   
the mere transfer of possession2 he  may
 not feel the loss1 or it may prevent   
him from using the money  badly4 ,but ,i
 cannot help doing this great wrong     

toward ,man1 that  ,i make myself       
dishonest4 ,what hurts society is not   
that it should  lose its property1 but  
that it should become a den of thieves2 
for  then it must cease to be society4  
,this is why we ought not to do  evil   
that good may come2 for at any rate this
 great evil has come1  that we have done
 evil and are made wicked thereby4 ,in  
like manner1  if ,i let myself believe  
anything on insufficient evidence1 there
 may  be no great harm done by the mere 
belief2 it may be true after all1  or ,i
 may never have occasion to exhibit it  
in outward acts4 ,but ,i  cannot help   
doing this great wrong toward ,man1 that
 ,i make myself  credulous4 ,the danger 
to society is not merely that it should 
believe  wrong things1 though that is   
great enough2 but that it should become 
credulous1 and lose the habit of testing
 things and inquiring into  them2 for   
then it must sink back into savagery4   
,the harm which is done by credulity in 
a man is not confined to the  fostering 

of a credulous character in others1 and 
consequent support  of false beliefs4   
,habitual want of care about what ,i    
believe leads to  habitual want of care 
in others about the truth of what is    
told to  me4 ,men speak the truth to one
 another when each reveres the truth  in
 his own mind and in the other's mind2  
but how shall my friend  revere the     
truth in my mind when ,i myself am      
careless about it1  when ,i believe     
things because ,i want to believe them1 
and because  they are comforting and    
pleasant8 ,will he not learn to cry1    
',peace1'  to me1 when there is no      
peace8 ,by such a course ,i shall       
surround  myself with a thick atmosphere
 of falsehood and fraud1 and in that ,i 
must live4 ,it may matter little to me1 
in my cloud-castle of sweet  illusions  
and darling lies2 but it matters much to
 ,man that ,i have  made my neighbors   
ready to deceive4 ,the credulous man is 
father to  the liar and the cheat2 he   
lives in the bosom of this his family1  

and it is no marvel if he should become 
even as they are4 ,so closely  are our  
duties knit together1 that whoso shall  
keep the whole law1  and yet offend in  
one point1 he is guilty of all4    ,to  
sum up3 it is wrong always1 everywhere  
and for any one1 to believe  anything   
upon insufficient evidence4    ,if a    
man1 holding a belief which he was      
taught in childhood or  persuaded of    
afterward1 keeps down and pushes away   
any doubts which  arise about it in his 
mind1 purposely avoids the reading of   
books and  the company of men that call 
in question or discuss it1 and regards  
as impious those questions which cannot 
easily be asked without  disturbing     
it--the life of that man is one long sin
 against mankind4    ,if this judgment  
seems harsh when applied to those simple
 souls who  have never known better1 who
 have been brought up from the cradle   
with a horror of doubt1 and taught that 
their eternal welfare depends  on what  
they believe1 then it leads to the very 

serious question1  ,who hath made       
,israel to sin8    ,it may be permitted 
me to fortify this judgment with the    
sentence  of ,milton--    ',a man may be
 a heretic in the truth2 and if he      
believe things only  because his pastor 
says so1 or the assembly so determine1  
without  knowing other reason1 though   
his belief be true1 yet the very truth  
he holds becomes his heresy4'    ,and   
with this famous aphorism of            
,coleridge--    ',he who begins by      
loving ,christianity better than ,truth1
 will proceed  by loving his own sect or
 ,church better than ,christianity1 and 
end  in loving himself better than all4'
    ,inquiry into the evidence of a     
doctrine is not to be made once for     
all1 and then taken as finally settled4 
,it is never lawful to stifle a  doubt2 
for either it can be honestly answered  
by means of the inquiry  already made1  
or else it proves that the inquiry was  
not complete4    ',but1' says one1 ',i  
am a busy man2 ,i have no time for the  

long course  of study which would be    
necessary to make me in any degree a    
competent  judge of certain questions1  
or even able to understand the nature of
  the arguments4' ,then he should have  
no time to believe4    ,,ii4 ,the       
,weight of ,authority4--,are we then to 
become universal skeptics1  doubting    
everything1 afraid always to put one    
foot before the other  until we have    
personally tested the firmness of the   
road8 ,are we  to deprive ourselves of  
the help and guidance of that vast body 
of  knowledge which is daily growing    
upon the world1 because neither  we nor 
any other one person can possibly test a
 hundredth part of  it by immediate     
experiment or observation1 and because  
it would not  be completely proved if we
 did8 ,shall we steal and tell lies     
because  we have had no personal        
experience wide enough to justify the   
belief  that it is wrong to do so8      
,there is no practical danger that such 
consequences will ever follow  from     

scrupulous care and self-control in the 
matter of belief4 ,those  men who have  
most nearly done their duty in this     
respect have found  that certain great  
principles1 and these most fitted for   
the guidance  of life1 have stood out   
more and more clearly in proportion to  
the  care and honesty with which they   
were tested1 and have acquired in  this 
way a practical certainty4 ,the beliefs 
about right and wrong  which guide our  
actions in dealing with men in society1 
and the beliefs  about physical nature  
which guide our actions in dealing with 
animate  and inanimate bodies1 these    
never suffer from investigation2 they   
can take care of themselves1 without    
being propped up by 'acts of  faith1'   
the clamor of paid advocates1 or the    
suppression of contrary  evidence4      
,moreover there are many cases in which 
it is our duty  to act upon             
probabilities1 although the evidence is 
not such as to  justify present belief2 
because it is precisely by such action1 

and  by observation of its fruits1 that 
evidence is got which may justify       
future belief4 ,so that we have no      
reason to fear lest a habit of          
conscientious inquiry should paralyze   
the actions of our daily life4    ,but  
because it is not enough to say1 ',it is
 wrong to believe on  unworthy          
evidence1' without saying also what     
evidence is worthy1  we shall now go on 
to inquire under what circumstances it  
is lawful  to believe on the testimony  
of others2 and then1 further1 we shall  
inquire more generally when and why we  
may believe that which goes  beyond our 
own experience1 or even beyond the      
experience of mankind4    ,in what      
cases1 then1 let us ask in the first    
place1 is the testimony  of a man       
unworthy of belief8 ,he may say that    
which is untrue either  knowingly or    
unknowingly4 ,in the first case he is   
lying1 and his moral  character is to   
blame2 in the second case he is ignorant
 or mistaken1  and it is only his       

knowledge or his judgment which is in   
fault4 ,in  order that we may have the  
right to accept his testimony as ground 
for  believing what he says1 we must    
have reasonable grounds for trusting    
his veracity1 that he is really trying  
to speak the truth so far as he  knows  
it2 his knowledge1 that he has had      
opportunities of knowing the  truth     
about this matter2 and his judgment1    
that he has made proper use  of those   
opportunities in coming to the          
conclusion which he affirms4    ,however
 plain and obvious these reasons may be1
 so that no man of  ordinary            
intelligence1 reflecting upon the       
matter1 could fail to  arrive at them1  
it is nevertheless true that a great    
many persons  do habitually disregard   
them in weighing testimony4 ,of the two 
questions1 equally important to the     
trustworthiness of a witness1  ',is he  
dishonest8' and ',may he be mistaken8'  
the majority of mankind  are perfectly  
satisfied if one can1 with some show of 

probability1  be answered in the        
negative4 ,the excellent moral character
 of a man  is alleged as ground for     
accepting his statements about things   
which  he cannot possibly have known4 ,a
 ,mohammedan1 for example1 will tell  us
 that the character of his ,prophet was 
so noble and majestic that  it commands 
the reverence even of those who do not  
believe in his  mission4 ,so admirable  
was his moral teaching1 so wisely put   
together  the great social machine which
 he created1 that his precepts have not 
only been accepted by a great portion of
 mankind1 but have actually  been       
obeyed4 ,his institutions have on the   
one hand rescued the negro  from        
savagery1 and on the other hand have    
taught civilization to the  advancing   
,west2 and although the races which held
 the highest forms  of his faith1 and   
most fully embodied his mind and        
thought1 have all  been conquered and   
swept away by barbaric tribes1 yet the  
history  of their marvellous attainments

 remains as an imperishable glory to    
,islam4 ,are we to doubt the word of a  
man so great and so good8 ,can we       
suppose that this magnificent genius1   
this splendid moral hero1 has  lied to  
us about the most solemn and sacred     
matters8 ,the testimony of  ,mohammed is
 clear1 that there is but one ,god1 and 
that he1 ,mohammed1  is his prophet2    
that if we believe in him we shall enjoy
 everlasting  felicity1 but that if we  
do not we shall be damned4 ,this        
testimony  rests on the most awful of   
foundations1 the revelation of heaven   
itself2 for was he not visited by the   
angel ,gabriel1 as he fasted and  prayed
 in his desert cave1 and allowed to     
enter into the blessed fields  of       
,paradise8 ,surely ,god is ,god and     
,mohammed is the ,prophet of ,god4      
,what should we answer to this          
,mussulman8 ,first1 no doubt1 we should 
be tempted to take exception against his
 view of the character  of the ,prophet 
and the uniformly beneficial influence  

of ,islam3  before we could go with him 
altogether in these matters it might    
seem  that we should have to forget many
 terrible things of which we have  heard
 or read4 ,but if we chose to grant him 
all these assumptions1  for the sake of 
argument1 and because it is difficult   
both for the  faithful and for infidels 
to discuss them fairly and without      
passion1  still we should have something
 to say which takes away the ground  of 
his belief1 and therefore shows that it 
is wrong to entertain  it4 ,namely this3
 the character of ,mohammed is excellent
 evidence  that he was honest and spoke 
the truth so far as he knew it2 but it  
is no evidence at all that he knew what 
the truth was4 ,what means  could he    
have of knowing that the form which     
appeared to him to be  the angel        
,gabriel was not a hallucination1 and   
that his apparent  visit to ,paradise   
was not a dream8 ,grant that he himself 
was fully  persuaded and honestly       
believed that he had the guidance of    

heaven1  and was the vehicle of a       
supernatural revelation1 how could he   
know  that this strong conviction was   
not a mistake8 ,let us put ourselves  in
 his place2 we shall find that the more 
completely we endeavor  to realize what 
passed through his mind1 the more       
clearly we shall  perceive that the     
,prophet could have had no adequate     
ground for the  belief in his own       
inspiration4 ,it is most probable that  
he himself  never doubted of the matter1
 or thought of asking the question2 but 
we are in the position of those to whom 
the question has been asked1  and who   
are bound to answer it4 ,it is known to 
medical observers that  solitude and    
want of food are powerful means of      
producing delusion  and of fostering a  
tendency to mental disease4 ,let us     
suppose1 then1  that ,i1 like ,mohammed1
 go into desert places to fast and pray2
 what  things can happen to me which    
will give me the right to believe that  
,i  am divinely inspired8 ,suppose that 

,i get information1 apparently from  a  
celestial visitor1 which upon being     
tested is found to be correct4 ,i       
cannot be sure1 in the first place1 that
 the celestial visitor is not  a figment
 of my own mind1 and that the           
information did not come to me1  unknown
 at the time to my consciousness1       
through some subtle channel of  sense4  
,but if my visitor were a real visitor1 
and for a long time gave  me information
 which was found to be trustworthy1 this
 would indeed  be good ground for       
trusting him in the future as to such   
matters as  fall within human powers of 
verification2 but it would not be ground
  for trusting his testimony as to any  
other matters4 ,for although his  tested
 character would justify me in believing
 that he spoke the truth  so far as he  
knew1 yet the same question would       
present itself--what  ground is there   
for supposing that he knows8    ,even if
 my supposed visitor had given me such  
information1 subsequently  verified by  

me1 as proved him to have means of      
knowledge about  verifiable matters far 
exceeding my own2 this would not justify
 me in  believing what he said about    
matters that are not at present capable 
of verification by man4 ,it would be    
ground for interesting conjecture1  and 
for the hope that1 as the fruit of our  
patient inquiry1 we might  by and by    
attain to such a means of verification  
as should rightly  turn conjecture into 
belief4 ,for belief belongs to man1 and 
to the  guidance of human affairs3 no   
belief is real unless it guide our      
actions1 and those very actions supply a
 test of its truth4    ,but1 it may be  
replied1 the acceptance of ,islam as a  
system is  just that action which is    
prompted by belief in the mission of the
  ,prophet1 and which will serve for a  
test of its truth4 ,is it possible  to  
believe that a system which has         
succeeded so well is really founded     
upon a delusion8 ,not only have         
individual saints found joy and peace in

  believing1 and verified those         
spiritual experiences which are promised
  to the faithful1 but nations also have
 been raised from savagery or  barbarism
 to a higher social state4 ,surely we   
are at liberty to say  that the belief  
has been acted upon1 and that it has    
been verified4    ,it requires1 however1
 but little consideration to show that  
what  has really been verified is not at
 all the supernal character of the      
,prophet's mission1 or the              
trustworthiness of his authority in     
matters  which we ourselves cannot test1
 but only his practical wisdom in       
certain very mundane things4 ,the fact  
that believers have found joy  and peace
 in believing gives us the right to say 
that the doctrine  is a comfortable     
doctrine1 and pleasant to the soul2 but 
it does not  give us the right to say   
that it is true4 ,and the question which
 our  conscience is always asking about 
that which we are tempted to believe  is
 not1 ',is it comfortable and pleasant8'

 but1 ',is it true8' ,that  the ,prophet
 preached certain doctrines1 and        
predicted that spiritual  comfort would 
be found in them1 proves only his       
sympathy with human  nature and his     
knowledge of it2 but it does not prove  
his superhuman  knowledge of theology4  
,and if we admit for the sake of        
argument 7for it seems that we cannot   
do more7 that the progress made by      
,moslem nations in certain cases  was   
really due to the system formed and sent
 forth into the the world  by ,mohammed1
 we are not at liberty to conclude from 
this that he was  inspired to declare   
the truth about things which we cannot  
verify4 ,we  are only at liberty to     
infer the excellence of his moral       
precepts1  or of the means which he     
devised for so working upon men as to   
get  them obeyed1 or of the social and  
political machinery which he set  up4   
,and it would require a great amount of 
careful examination into  the history of
 those nations to determine which of    

these things  had the greater share in  
the result4 ,so that here again it is   
the  ,prophet's knowledge of human      
nature1 and his sympathy with it1 that  
are verified2 not his divine            
inspiration1 or his knowledge of        
theology4    ,if there were only one    
,prophet1 indeed1 it might well seem a  
difficult  and even an ungracious task  
to decide upon what points we would     
trust him1 and on what we would doubt   
his authority2 seeing what help  and    
furtherance all men have gained in all  
ages from those who saw  more clearly1  
who felt more strongly1 and who sought  
the truth with  more single heart than  
their weaker brethren4 ,but there is not
 only  one ,prophet2 and while the      
consent of many upon that which1 as men1
  they had real means of knowing and did
 know1 has endured to the end1  and been
 honorably built into the great fabric  
of human knowledge1  the diverse witness
 of some about that which they did not  
and could  not know remains as a warning

 to us that to exaggerate the prophetic 
authority is to misuse it1 and to       
dishonor those who have sought  only to 
help and further us after their power4  
,it is hardly in human  nature that a   
man should quite accurately gauge the   
limits of his own  insight2 but it is   
the duty of those who profit by his work
 to consider  carefully where he may    
have been carried beyond it4 ,if we must
 needs  embalm his possible errors along
 with his solid achievements1 and use   
his authority as an excuse for believing
 what he cannot have known1  we make of 
his goodness an occasion to sin4    ,to 
consider only one other such witness3   
the followers of the ,buddha  have at   
least as much right to appeal to        
individual and social  experience in    
support of the authority of the ,eastern
 saviour4 ,the  special mark of his     
religion1 it is said1 that in which it  
has never  been surpassed1 is the       
comfort and consolation which it gives  
to  the sick and sorrowful1 the tender  

sympathy with which it soothes and      
assuages all the natural griefs of men4 
,and surely no triumph of social        
morality can be greater or nobler than  
that which has kept nearly half  the    
human race from persecuting in the name 
of religion4 ,if we are to  trust the   
accounts of his early followers1 he     
believed himself to have  come upon     
earth with a divine and cosmic mission  
to set rolling the  wheel of the law4   
,being a prince1 he divested himself of 
his kingdom1  and of his free will      
became acquainted with misery1 that he  
might  learn how to meet and subdue it4 
,could such a man speak falsely about   
solemn things8 ,and as for his          
knowledge1 was he not a man miraculous  
with powers more than man's8 ,he was    
born of woman without the help  of man2 
he rose into the air and was            
transfigured before his kinsmen2  at    
last he went up bodily into heaven from 
the top of ,adam's ,peak4 ,is  not his  
word to be believed in when he testifies

 of heavenly things8    ,if there were  
only he1 and no other1 with such claims6
 ,but there  is ,mohammed with his      
testimony2 we cannot choose but listen  
to them  both4 ,the ,prophet tells us   
that there is one ,god1 and that we     
shall  live forever in joy or misery1   
according as we believe in the ,prophet 
or not4 ,the ,buddha says that there is 
no ,god1 and that we shall be           
annihilated by and by if we are good    
enough4 ,both cannot be infallibly      
inspired2 one or the other must have    
been the victim of a delusion1  and     
thought he knew that which he really did
 not know4 ,who shall dare  to say      
which8 and how can we justify ourselves 
in believing that the  other was not    
also deluded8    ,we are led1 then1 to  
these judgments following4 ,the goodness
 and  greatness of a man do not justify 
us in accepting a belief upon the       
warrant of his authority1 unless there  
are reasonable grounds for  supposing   
that he knew the truth of what he was   

saying4 ,and there  can be no grounds   
for supposing that a man knows that     
which we1  without ceasing to be men1   
could not be supposed to verify4    ,if 
a chemist tells me1 who am no chemist1  
that a certain substance can  be made by
 putting together other substances in   
certain proportions and  subjecting them
 to a known process1 ,i am quite        
justified in believing  this upon his   
authority1 unless ,i know anything      
against his character  or his judgment4 
,for his professional training is one   
which tends to  encourage veracity and  
the honest pursuit of truth1 and to     
produce a  dislike of hasty conclusions 
and slovenly investigation4 ,and ,i have
  reasonable ground for supposing that  
he knows the truth of what he  is       
saying1 for although ,i am no chemist1  
,i can be made to understand  so much of
 the methods and processes of the       
science as makes it  conceivable to me  
that1 without ceasing to be man1 ,i     
might verify the  statement4 ,i may     

never actually verify it1 or even see   
any experiment  which goes toward       
verifying it2 but still ,i have quite   
reason enough  to justify me in         
believing that the verification is      
within the reach  of human appliances   
and powers1 and in particular that it   
has been  actually performed by my      
informant4 ,his result1 the belief to   
which he  has been led by his inquiries1
 is valid not only for himself but for  
others2 it is watched and tested by     
those who are working in the same       
ground and who know that no greater     
service can be rendered to science  than
 the purification of accepted results   
from the errors which may  have crept   
into them4 ,it is in this way that the  
result becomes common  property1 a right
 object of belief1 which is a social    
affair and matter  of public business4  
,thus it is to be observed that his     
authority is  valid because there are   
those who question it and verify it2    
that it  is precisely this process of   

examining and purifying that keeps alive
  among investigators the love of that  
which shall stand all possible  tests1  
the sense of public responsibility as of
 those whose work1  if well done1 shall 
remain as the enduring heritage of      
mankind4    ,but if my chemist tells me 
that an atom of oxygen has existed      
unaltered  in weight and rate of        
vibration throughout all time1 ,i have  
no right  to believe this on his        
authority1 for it is a thing which he   
cannot  know without ceasing to be man4 
,he may quite honestly believe that     
this statement is a fair inference from 
his experiments1 but in that  case his  
judgment is at fault4 ,a very simple    
consideration of the  character of      
experiments would show him that they    
never can lead to  results of such a    
kind2 that being themselves only        
approximate and  limited1 they cannot   
give us knowledge which is exact and    
universal4 ,no  eminence of character   
and genius can give a man authority     

enough to  justify us in believing him  
when he makes statements implying exact 
or universal knowledge4    ,again1 an   
,arctic explorer may tell us that in a  
given latitude and  longitude he has    
experienced such and such a degree of   
cold1 that the  sea was of such a depth1
 and the ice of such a character4 ,we   
should  be quite right to believe him1  
in the absence of any stain upon his    
veracity4 ,it is conceivable that we    
might1 without ceasing to be men1  go   
there and verify his statement2 it can  
be tested by the witness of  his        
companions1 and there is adequate ground
 for supposing that he  knows the truth 
of what he is saying4 ,but if an old    
whaler tells us  that the ice is three  
hundred feet thick all the way up to the
 ,pole1  we shall not be justified in   
believing him4 ,for although the        
statement  may be capable of            
verification by man1 it is certainly not
 capable  of verification by him1 with  
any means and appliances which he has   

possessed2 and he must have persuaded   
himself of the truth of it by  some     
means which does not attach any credit  
to his testimony4 ,even if1  therefore1 
the matter affirmed is within the reach 
of human knowledge1  we have no right to
 accept it upon authority unless it is  
within the  reach of our informant's    
knowledge4    ,what shall we say of that
 authority1 more venerable and august   
than any  individual witness1 the       
time-honored tradition of the human     
race8 ,an  atmosphere of beliefs and    
conceptions has been formed by the      
labors  and struggles of our            
forefathers1 which enables us to breathe
 amid the  various and complex          
circumstances of our life4 ,it is around
 and about  us and within us2 we cannot 
think except in the forms and processes 
of thought which it supplies4 ,is it    
possible to doubt and to test  it8 and  
if possible1 is it right8    ,we shall  
find reason to answer that it is not    
only possible and  right1 but our       

bounden duty2 that the main purpose of  
the tradition  itself is to supply us   
with the means of asking questions1 of  
testing  and inquiring into things2 that
 if we misuse it1 and take it as a      
collection of cut-and-dried statements1 
to be accepted without further  inquiry1
 we are not only injuring ourselves     
here1 but by refusing  to do our part   
toward the building up of the fabric    
which shall be  inherited by our        
children1 we are tending to cut off     
ourselves and  our race from the human  
line4    ,let us first take care to     
distinguish a kind of tradition which   
especially requires to be examined and  
called in question1 because  it         
especially shrinks from inquiry4        
,suppose that a medicine-man in         
,central ,africa tells his tribe that a 
certain powerful medicine in his  tent  
will be propitiated if they kill their  
cattle2 and that the tribe  believe him4
 ,whether the medicine was propitiated  
or not1 there are  no means of          

verifying1 but the cattle are gone4     
,still the belief may  be kept up in the
 tribe that propitiation has been       
effected in this  way2 and in a later   
generation it will be all the easier for
 another  medicine-man to persuade them 
to a similar act4 ,here the only reason 
for belief is that everybody has        
believed the thing for so long that  it 
must be true4 ,and yet the belief was   
founded on fraud1 and has  been         
propagated by credulity4 ,that man will 
undoubtedly do right1  and be a friend  
of men who shall call it in question and
 see that  there is no evidence for it1 
help his neighbors to see as he does1   
and even1 if need be1 go into the holy  
tent and break the medicine4    ,the    
rule1 which should guide us in such     
cases is simple and obvious  enough3    
that the aggregate testimony of our     
neighbors is subject  to the same       
conditions as the testimony of any one  
of them4 ,namely1  we have no right to  
believe a thing true because everybody  

says so1  unless there are good grounds 
for believing that some one person  at  
least has the means of knowing what is  
true1 and is speaking the  truth so far 
as he knows it4 ,however many nations   
and generations of  men are brought into
 the witness-box1 they cannot testify to
 anything  which they do not know4      
,every man who has accepted the         
statement from  somebody else1 without  
himself testing and verifying it1 is out
 of  court2 his word is worth nothing at
 all4 ,and when we get back at last  to 
the true birth and beginning of the     
statement1 two serious questions  must  
be disposed of in regard to him who     
first made it3 was he mistaken  in      
thinking that he knew about this matter1
 or was he lying8    ,this last question
 is unfortunately a very actual and     
practical one  even to us at this day   
and in this country4 ,we have no        
occasion to  go to ,la ,salette1 or to  
,central ,africa1 or to ,lourdes1 for   
examples  of immoral and debasing       

superstition4 ,it is only too possible  
for  a child to grow up in ,london      
surrounded by an atmosphere of beliefs  
fit only for the savage1 which have in  
our own time been founded in  fraud and 
propagated by credulity4    ,laying     
aside1 then1 such tradition as is handed
 on without testing  by successive      
generations1 let us consider that which 
is truly built  up out of the common    
experience of mankind4 ,this great      
fabric is for  the guidance of our      
thoughts1 and through them of our       
actions1 both in  the moral and in the  
material world4 ,in the moral world1 for
 example1  it gives us the conceptions  
of right in general1 of justice1 of     
truth1  of beneficence1 and the like4   
,these are given as conceptions1 not as 
statements or propositions2 they answer 
to certain definite instincts1  which   
are certainly within us1 however they   
came there4 ,that it is  right to be    
beneficent is matter of immediate       
personal experience2  for when a man    

retires within himself and there finds  
something1  wider and more lasting than 
his solitary personality which says1    
',i want to do right1' as well as1 ',i  
want to do good to man1' he can  verify 
by direct observation that one instinct 
is founded upon and  agrees fully with  
the other4 ,and it is his duty so to    
verify this  and all similar statements4
    ,the tradition says also1 at a      
definite place and time1 that such and  
such actions are just1 or true1 or      
beneficent4 ,for all such rules a       
further inquiry is necessary1 since they
 are sometimes established  by an       
authority other than that of the moral  
sense founded on  experience4 ,until    
recently1 the moral tradition of our own
 country--and  indeed of all            
,europe--taught that it was beneficent  
to give money  indiscriminately to      
beggars4 ,but the questioning of this   
rule1 and  investigation into it1 led   
men to see that true beneficence is that
  which helps a man to do the work which

 he is most fitted for1 not that  which 
keeps and encourages him in idleness2   
and that to neglect this  distinction in
 the present is to prepare pauperism and
 misery for  the future4 ,by this       
testing and discussion1 not only has    
practice  been purified and made more   
beneficent1 but the very conception  of 
beneficence has been made wider and     
wiser4 ,now here the great  social      
heirloom consists of two parts3 the     
instinct of beneficence1  which makes a 
certain side of our nature1 when        
predominant1 wish  to do good to men2   
and the intellectual conception of      
beneficence1  which we can compare with 
any proposed course of conduct and ask1 
',is this beneficent or not8' ,by the   
continual asking and answering  of such 
questions the conception grows in       
breadth and distinctness1  and the      
instinct becomes strengthened and       
purified4 ,it appears then  that the    
great use of the conception1 the        
intellectual part of the  heirloom1 is  

to enable us to ask questions2 that it  
grows and is kept  straight by means of 
these questions2 and if we do not use it
 for that  purpose we shall gradually   
lose it altogether1 and be left with a  
mere  code of regulations which cannot  
rightly be called morality at all4      
,such considerations apply even more    
obviously and clearly1 if possible1  to 
the store of beliefs and conceptions    
which our fathers have amassed  for us  
in respect of the material world4 ,we   
are ready to laugh at the  rule of thumb
 of the ,australian1 who continues to   
tie his hatchet to  the side of the     
handle1 although the ,birmingham fitter 
has made a  hole on purpose for him to  
put the handle in4 ,his people have tied
  up hatchets so for ages3 who is he    
that he should set himself up  against  
their wisdom8 ,he has sunk so low that  
he cannot do what some  of them must    
have done in the far distant past--call 
in question an  established usage1 and  
invent or learn something better4 ,yet  

here1  in the dim beginning of          
knowledge1 where science and art are    
one1  we find only the same simple rule 
which applies to the highest and        
deepest growths of that cosmic ,tree2 to
 its loftiest flower-tipped  branches as
 well as to the profoundest of its      
hidden roots2 the rule1  namely1 that   
what is stored up and handed down to us 
is rightly used  by those who act as the
 makers acted1 when they stored it up2  
those  who use it to ask further        
questions1 to examine1 to investigate2  
who try honestly and solemnly to find   
out what is the right way of  looking at
 things and of dealing with them4    ,a 
question rightly asked is already half  
answered1 said ,jacobi2 we may  add that
 the method of solution is the other    
half of the answer1 and  that the actual
 result counts for nothing by the side  
of these two4 ,for  an example let us go
 to the telegraph1 where theory and     
practice1  grown each to years of       
discretion1 are marvelously wedded for  

the  fruitful service of men4 ,ohm found
 that the strength of an electric       
current is directly proportional to the 
strength of the battery which  produces 
it1 and inversely as the length of the  
wire along which it  has to travel4     
,this is called ,ohm's law2 but the     
result1 regarded  as a statement to be  
believed1 is not the valuable part of   
it4 ,the  first half is the question3   
what relation holds good between these  
quantities8 ,so put1 the question       
involves already the conception of      
strength of current1 and of strength of 
battery1 as quantities to be  measured  
and compared2 it hints clearly that     
these are the things to  be attended to 
in the study of electric currents4 ,the 
second half  is the method of           
investigation2 how to measure these     
quantities1  what instruments are       
required for the experiment1 and how are
 they  to be used8 ,the student who     
begins to learn about electricity is not
  asked to believe in ,ohm's law3 he is 

made to understand the question1  he is 
placed before the apparatus1 and he is  
taught to verify it4 ,he  learns to do  
things1 not to think he knows things2 to
 use instruments  and to ask questions1 
not to accept a traditional statement4  
,the  question which required a genius  
to ask it rightly is answered by a      
tyro4 ,if ,ohm's law were suddenly lost 
and forgotten by all men1 while  the    
question and the method of solution     
remained1 the result could  be          
rediscovered in an hour4 ,but the result
 by itself1 if known to a  people who   
could not comprehend the value of the   
question or the means  of solving it1   
would be like a watch in the hands of a 
savage who could  not wind it up1 or an 
iron steam-ship worked by ,spanish      
engineers4    ,in regard1 then1 to the  
sacred tradition of humanity1 we learn  
that it consists1 not in propositions or
 statements which are to  be accepted   
and believed on the authority of the    
tradition1 but  in questions rightly    

asked1 in conceptions which enable us to
 ask  further questions1 and in methods 
of answering questions4 ,the value  of  
all these things depends on their being 
tested day by day4 ,the  very sacredness
 of the precious deposit imposes upon us
 the duty and  the responsibility of    
testing it1 of purifying and enlarging  
it to  the utmost of our power4 ,he who 
makes use of its results to stifle  his 
own doubts1 or to hamper the inquiry of 
others1 is guilty of a  sacrilege which 
centuries shall never be able to blot   
out4 ,when the  labors and questionings 
of honest and brave men shall have built
 up  the fabric of known truth to a     
glory which we in this generation can   
neither hope for nor imagine1 in that   
pure and holy temple he shall  have no  
part nor lot1 but his name and his works
 shall be cast out  into the darkness of
 oblivion forever4    ,,iii4 ,the       
,limits of ,inference4--,the question in
 what cases we may  believe that which  
goes beyond our experience1 is a very   

large and  delicate one1 extending to   
the whole range of scientific method1   
and  requiring a considerable increase  
in the application of it before it  can 
be answered with anything approaching to
 completeness4 ,but one  rule1 lying on 
the threshold of the subject1 of extreme
 simplicity  and vast practical         
importance1 may here be touched upon and
 shortly  laid down4    ,a little       
reflection will show us that every      
belief1 even the simplest  and most     
fundamental1 goes beyond experience when
 regarded as a guide  to our actions4 ,a
 burnt child dreads the fire1 because it
 believes  that the fire will burn it   
to-day just as it did yesterday2 but    
this  belief goes beyond experience1 and
 assumes that the unknown fire  of      
to-day is like the known fire of        
yesterday4 ,even the belief that  the   
child was burnt yesterday goes beyond   
present experience1 which  contains only
 the memory of a burning1 and not the   
burning itself2  it assumes1 therefore1 

that this memory is trustworthy1        
although we  know that a memory may     
often be mistaken4 ,but if it is to be  
used as a  guide to action1 as a hint of
 what the future is to be1 it must      
assume  something about that future1    
namely1 that it will be consistent with 
the supposition that the burning really 
took place yesterday2 which  is going   
beyond experience4 ,even the fundamental
 ',i am1' which cannot  be doubted1 is  
no guide to action until it takes to    
itself ',i shall  be1' which goes beyond
 experience4 ,the question is not1      
therefore1  ',may we believe what goes  
beyond experience8' for this is involved
  in the very nature of belief2 but     
',how far and in what manner may we  add
 to our experience in forming our       
beliefs8'    ,and an answer1 of utter   
simplicity and universality1 is         
suggested by  the example we have taken3
 a burnt child dreads the fire4 ,we may 
go  beyond experience by assuming that  
what we do not know is like what  we do 

know2 or1 in other words1 we may add to 
our experience on the  assumption of a  
uniformity in nature4 ,what this        
uniformity precisely  is1 how we grow in
 the knowledge of it from generation to 
generation1  these are questions which  
for the present we lay aside1 being     
content  to examine two instances which 
may serve to make plainer the nature  of
 the rule4    ,from certain observations
 made with the spectroscope1 we infer   
the  existence of hydrogen in the sun4  
,by looking into the spectroscope when  
the sun is shining on its slit1 we see  
certain definite bright lines3  and     
experiments made upon bodies on the     
earth have taught us that when  these   
bright lines are seen hydrogen is the   
source of them4 ,we assume1  then1 that 
the unknown bright lines in the sun are 
like the known  bright lines of the     
laboratory1 and that hydrogen in the sun
 behaves  as hydrogen under similar     
circumstances would behave on the earth4
    ,but are we not trusting our        

spectroscope too much8 ,surely1 having  
found  it to be trustworthy for         
terrestrial substances1 where its       
statements  can be verified by man1 we  
are justified in accepting its testimony
  in other like cases2 but not when it  
gives us information about things  in   
the sun1 where its testimony cannot be  
directly verified by man8    ,certainly1
 we want to know a little more before   
this inference can  be justified2 and   
fortunately we do know this4 ,the       
spectroscope  testifies to exactly the  
same thing in the two cases2 namely1    
that  light-vibrations of a certain rate
 are being sent through it4 ,its        
construction is such that if it were    
wrong about this in one case1  it would 
be wrong in the other4 ,when we come to 
look into the matter1  we find that we  
have really assumed the matter of the   
sun to be like  the matter of the earth1
 made up of a certain number of distinct
  substances2 and that each of these1   
when very hot1 has a distinct rate  of  

vibration1 by which it may be recognized
 and singled out from the  rest4 ,but   
this is the kind of assumption which we 
are justified in  using when we add to  
our experience4 ,it is an assumption of 
uniformity  in nature1 and can only be  
checked by comparison with many similar 
assumptions which we have to make in    
other such cases4    ,but is this a true
 belief1 of the existence of hydrogen in
 the sun8 ,can  it help in the right    
guidance of human action8    ,certainly 
not1 if it is accepted on unworthy      
grounds1 and without  some understanding
 of the process by which it is got at4  
,but when  this process is taken in as  
the ground of the belief1 it becomes a  
very serious and practical matter4 ,for 
if there is no hydrogen in  the sun1 the
 spectroscope--that is to say1 the      
measurement of rates  of vibration--must
 be an uncertain guide in recognizing   
different  substances2 and consequently 
it ought not to be used in chemical     
analysis--in assaying1 for example--to  

the great saving of time1  trouble1 and 
money4 ,whereas the acceptance of the   
spectroscopic  method as trustworthy1   
has enriched us not only with new       
metals1  which is a great thing1 but    
with new processes of investigation1    
which is vastly greater4    ,for another
 example1 let us consider the way in    
which we infer  the truth of an         
historical event--say the siege of      
,syracuse in the  ,peloponnesian war4   
,our experience is that manuscripts     
exist which  are said to be and which   
call themselves manuscripts of the      
history  of ,thucydides2 that in other  
manuscripts1 stated to be by later      
historians1 he is described as living   
during the time of the war2 and  that   
books1 supposed to date from the revival
 of learning1 tell us how  these        
manuscripts had been preserved and were 
then acquired4 ,we find  also that men  
do not1 as a rule1 forge books and      
histories without a  special motive2 we 
assume that in this respect men in the  

past were  like men in the present2 and 
we observe that in this case no special 
motive was present4 ,that is1 we add to 
our experience on the assumption  of a  
uniformity in the characters of men4    
,because our knowledge of  this         
uniformity is far less complete and     
exact than our knowledge of  that which 
obtains in physics1 inferences of the   
historical kind are  more precarious and
 less exact than inferences in many     
other sciences4    ,but if there is any 
special reason to suspect the character 
of the  persons who wrote or transmitted
 certain books1 the case becomes        
altered4 ,if a group of documents give  
internal evidence that they  were       
produced among people who forged books  
in the names of others1  and who1 in    
describing events1 suppressed those     
things which did not  suit them1 while  
they amplified such as did suit them2   
who not only  committed these crimes1   
but gloried in them as proofs of        
humility and  zeal2 then we must say    

that upon such documents no true        
historical  inference can be founded1   
but only unsatisfactory conjecture4     
,we may1 then1 add to our experience on 
the assumption of a uniformity  in      
nature2 we may fill in our picture of   
what is and has been1 as  experience    
gives it us1 in such a way as to make   
the whole consistent  with this         
uniformity4 ,and practically            
demonstrative inference--that  which    
gives us a right to believe in the      
result of it--is a clear  showing that  
in no other way than by the truth of    
this result can  the uniformity of      
nature be saved4    ,no evidence1       
therefore1 can justify us in believing  
the truth of  a statement which is      
contrary to1 or outside of1 the         
uniformity  of nature4 ,if our          
experience is such that it cannot be    
filled up  consistently with uniformity1
 all we have a right to conclude is that
  there is something wrong somewhere2   
but the possibility of inference  is    

taken away2 we must rest in our         
experience1 and not go beyond it at     
all4 ,if an event really happened which 
was not a part of the uniformity  of    
nature1 it would have two properties3 no
 evidence could give the  right to      
believe it to any except those whose    
actual experience it was2  and no       
inference worthy of belief could be     
founded upon it at all4    ,are we then 
bound to believe that nature is         
absolutely and universally  uniform8    
,certainly not2 we have no right to     
believe anything of this  kind4 ,the    
rule only tells us that in forming      
beliefs which go beyond  our experience1
 we may make the assumption that nature 
is practically  uniform so far as we are
 concerned4 ,within the range of human  
action  and verification1 we may form1  
by help of this assumption1 actual      
beliefs2 beyond it1 only those          
hypotheses which serve for the more     
accurate asking of questions4    ,to sum
 up3--    ,we may believe what goes     

beyond our experience1 only when it is  
inferred from that experience by the    
assumption that what we do not  know is 
like what we know4    ,we may believe   
the statement of another person1 when   
there is  reasonable ground for         
supposing that he knows the matter of   
which he  speaks1 and that he is        
speaking the truth so far as he knows   
it4    ,it is wrong in all cases to     
believe on insufficient evidence2 and   
where it is presumption to doubt and to 
investigate1 there it is  worse than    
presumption to believe4                 
,,iv4 ,,the ,,ethics ,,of ,,religion4   
,the word religion is used in many      
different meanings1 and there have  been
 not a few controversies in which the   
main difference between the  contending 
parties was only this1 that they        
understood by religion  two different   
things4 ,i will therefore begin by      
setting forth as  clearly as ,i can one 
or two of the meanings which the word   
appears  to have in popular speech4     

,first1 then1 it may mean a body of     
doctrines1 as in the common  phrase1    
',the truth of the ,christian religion2'
 or in this sentence1  ',the religion of
 the ,buddha teaches that the soul is   
not a distinct  substance4' ,opinions   
differ upon the question what doctrines 
may  properly be called religious2 some 
people holding that there can be no     
religion without belief in a ,god and in
 a future life1 so that in their        
judgment the body of doctrines must     
necessarily include these two2  while   
others would insist upon other special  
dogmas being included1  before they     
could consent to call the system by this
 name4 ,but the  number of such people  
is daily diminishing1 by reason of the  
spread and  the increase of our         
knowledge about distant countries and   
races4 ,to me1  indeed1 it would seem   
rash to assert of any doctrine or its   
contrary  that it might not form part of
 a religion4 ,but1 fortunately1 it is   
not necessary to any part of the        

discussion on which ,i propose to  enter
 that this question should be settled4  
,secondly1 religion may mean a          
ceremonial or cult1 involving an        
organized priesthood and a machinery of 
sacred things and places4 ,in  this     
sense we speak of the clergy as         
ministers of religion1 or of  a state as
 tolerating the practice of certain     
religions4 ,there is  a somewhat wider  
meaning which it will be convenient to  
consider  together with this one1 and as
 a mere extension of it1 namely1 that   
in which religion stands for the        
influence of a certain priesthood4 ,a   
religion is sometimes said to have been 
successful when it has got its  priests 
into power2 thus some writers speak of  
the wonderfully rapid  success of       
,christianity4 ,a nation is said to have
 embraced a religion  when the          
authorities of that nation have granted 
privileges to the  clergy1 have made    
them as far as possible the leaders of  
society1  and have given them a         

considerable share in the management of 
public  affairs4 ,so the northern       
nations of ,europe are said to have     
embraced  the ,catholic religion at an  
early date4 ,the reason why it seems to 
me convenient to take these two meanings
 together is1 that they are  both       
related to the priesthood4 ,although the
 priesthood itself is  not called       
religion1 so far as ,i know1 yet the    
word is used for the  general influence 
and professional acts of the priesthood4
    ,thirdly1 religion may mean a body  
of precepts or code of rules1  intended 
to guide human conduct1 as in this      
sentence of the authorized  version of  
the ,new ,testament3 ',pure religion and
 undefiled before  ,god and the ,father 
is this1 to visit the fatherless and    
widows in  their affliction1 and to keep
 himself unspotted from the world'      
7,james1 i4 #bg74 ,it is sometimes      
difficult to draw the line between  this
 meaning and the last1 for it is a mark 
of the great majority of  religions that

 they confound ceremonial observances   
with duties having  real moral          
obligation4 ,thus in the ,jewish        
decalogue the command to  do no work on 
,saturdays is found side by side with   
the prohibition of  murder and theft4   
,it might seem to be the more correct as
 well as the  more philosophical course 
to follow in this matter the distinction
  made by ,butler between moral and     
positive commands1 and to class all     
those precepts which are not of         
universal moral obligation under  the   
head of ceremonial4 ,and1 in fact1 when 
we come to examine the  matter from the 
point of view of morality1 the          
distinction is of the  utmost           
importance4 ,but from the point of view 
of religion there are  difficulties in  
making it4 ,in the first place1 the     
distinction is not  made1 or is not     
understood1 by religious folk in        
general4 ,innumerable  tracts and pretty
 stories impress upon us that           
,sabbath-breaking is  rather worse than 

stealing1 and leads naturally on to     
materialism  and murder4 ,less than a   
hundred years ago sacrilege was         
punishable  by burning in ,france1 and  
murder by simple decapitation4 ,in the  
next  place1 if we pick out a religion  
at haphazard1 we shall find that it is  
not at all easy to divide its precepts  
into those which are really of  moral   
obligation and those which are          
indifferent and of a ceremonial         
character4 ,we may find precepts        
unconnected with any ceremonial1 and    
yet positively immoral2 and ceremonials 
may be immoral in themselves1  or       
constructively immoral on account of    
their known symbolism4 ,on the  whole1  
it seems to me most convenient to draw  
the plain and obvious  distinction      
between those actions which a religion  
prescribes to all  its followers1       
whether the actions are ceremonial or   
not1 and those  which are prescribed    
only as professional actions of a       
sacerdotal  class4 ,the latter will come

 under what ,i have called the second   
meaning of religion1 the professional   
acts and the influence of a  priesthood4
 ,in the third meaning will be included 
all that practically  guides the life of
 a layman1 in so far as this guidance is
 supplied  to him by his religion4      
,fourthly1 and lastly1 there is a       
meaning of the word religion which  has 
been coming more and more prominently   
forward of late years1  till it has even
 threatened to supersede all the others4
 ,religion has  been defined as morality
 touched with emotion4 ,i will not here 
adopt  this definition1 because ,i wish 
to deal with the concrete in the first  
place1 and only to pass on to the       
abstract in so far as that previous     
study appears to lead to it4 ,i wish to 
consider the facts of religion  as we   
find them1 and not ideal possibilities4 
',yes1 but1' every one  will say1 'if   
you mean my own religion1 it is already1
 as a matter  of fact1 morality touched 
with emotion4 ,it is the highest        

morality  touched with the purest       
emotion1 an emotion directed toward the 
most  worthy of objects4' ,unfortunately
 we do not mean your religion alone1    
but all manner of heresies and          
heathenisms along with it3 the religions
  of the ,thug1 of the ,jesuit1 of the  
,south ,sea cannibal1 of ,confucius1  of
 the poor ,indian with his untutored    
mind1 of the ,peculiar ,people1  of the 
,mormons1 and of the old cat-worshiping 
,egyptian4 ,it must be  clear that we   
shall restrict ourselves to a very      
narrow circle of  what are commonly     
called religious facts1 unless we       
include in our  considerations not only 
morality touched with emotion1 but also 
immorality touched with emotion4 ,in    
fact1 what is really touched  with      
emotion in any case is that body of     
precepts for the guidance  of a layman's
 life which we have taken to be the     
third meaning of  religion4 ,in that    
collection of precepts there may be some
 agreeable  to morality1 and some       

repugnant to it1 and some indifferent1  
but being  all enjoined by the religion 
they will all be touched by the same    
religious emotion4 ,shall we then say   
that religion means a feeling1 an       
emotion1 an habitual attitude of mind   
toward some object or objects1  or      
toward life in general1 which has a     
bearing upon the way in which  men      
regard the rules of conduct8 ,i think   
the last phrase should be  left out4 ,an
 habitual attitude of mind1 of a        
religious character1  does always have  
some bearing upon the way in which men  
regard the  rules of conduct2 but it    
seems sometimes as if this were an      
accident1  and not the essence of the   
religious feeling4 ,some devout people  
prefer  to have their devotion pure and 
simple1 without admixture of any such   
application--they do not want to listen 
to 'cauld morality4' ,and it  seems as  
if the religious feeling of the ,greeks1
 and partly also of  our own ancestors1 
was so far divorced from morality that  

it affected  it only1 as it were1 by a  
side-wind1 through the influence of the 
character and example of the ,gods4 ,so 
that it seems only likely to  create    
confusion if we mix up morality with    
this fourth meaning of  religion4       
,sometimes religion means a code of     
precepts1 and sometimes  it means a     
devotional habit of mind2 the two things
 are sometimes  connected1 but also they
 are sometimes quite distinct4 ,but that
 the  connection of these two things is 
more and more insisted on1 that it  is  
the keynote of the apparent revival of  
religion which has taken  place in this 
century1 is a very significant fact1    
about which there  is more to be said4  
,as to the nature of this devotional    
habit of mind1 there are no doubt  many 
who would like a closer definition4 ,but
 ,i am not at all prepared  to say what 
attitude of mind may properly be called 
religious1  and what may not4 ,some will
 hold that religion must have a person  
for its object2 but the ,buddha was     

filled with religious feeling1  and yet 
he had no personal object4 ,spinoza1 the
 ,god-intoxicated man1  had no personal 
object for his devotion4 ,it might be   
possible to  frame a definition which   
would fairly include all cases1 but it  
would  require the expenditure of vast  
ingenuity and research1 and would not1  
,i am inclined to think1 be of much use 
when it was obtained4    ,nor is the    
difficulty to be got over by taking any 
definite and  well-organized sect1 whose
 principles are settled in black and    
white2  for example1 the ,roman         
,catholic ,church1 whose seamless unity 
has just  been exhibited and protected  
by an ,o,ecumenical ,council4 ,shall we 
listen  to ,mr4 ,mivart1 who 'execrates 
without reserve ,marian persecutions1   
the  ,massacre of ,st4 ,bartholomew1 and
 all similar acts'8 or to the editor  of
 the ,dublin ,review1 who thinks that a 
teacher of false doctrines  'should be  
visited by the law with just that amount
 of severity which  the public sentiment

 will bear'8 ,for assuredly common-sense
 morality  will pass very different     
judgments on these two distinct         
religions1  although it appears that    
experts have found room for both of them
  within the limits of the ,vatican     
definitions4    ,moreover1 there is very
 great good to be got by widening our   
view  of what may be contained in       
religion4 ,if we go to a man and propose
  to test his own religion by the canons
 of common-sense morality1 he  will be1 
most likely1 offended1 for he will say  
that his religion is  far too sublime   
and exalted to be affected by           
considerations of that  sort4 ,but he   
will have no such objection in the case 
of other people's  religion4 ,and when  
he has found that in the name of        
religion other  people1 in other        
circumstances1 have believed in         
doctrines that were  false1 have        
supported priesthoods that were social  
evils1 have taken  wrong for right1 and 
have even poisoned the very sources of  

morality1  he may be tempted to ask     
himself1 ',is there no trace of any of  
these  evils in my own religion1 or at  
least in my own conception and practice 
of it8' ,and that is just what we want  
him to do4 ,bring your doctrines1  your 
priesthoods1 your precepts1 yea1 even   
the inner devotion of your  soul1 before
 the tribunal of conscience2 she is no  
man's and no ,god's  vicar1 but the     
supreme judge of men and ,gods4    ,let 
us inquire1 then1 what morality has to  
say in regard to religious  doctrines4  
,it deals with the manner of religious  
belief directly1  and with the matter   
indirectly4 ,religious beliefs must be  
founded on  evidence2 if they are not so
 founded1 it is wrong to hold them4 ,the
  rule of right conduct in this matter  
is exactly the opposite of  that implied
 in the two famous texts3 ',he that     
believeth not shall  be damned1' and    
',blessed are they that have not seen   
and yet have  believed4' ,for a man who 
clearly felt and recognized the duty of 

intellectual honesty1 of carefully      
testing every belief before he  received
 it1 and especially before he           
recommended it to others1 it  would be  
impossible to ascribe the profoundly    
immoral teaching of  these texts to a   
true prophet or worthy leader of        
humanity4 ,it will  comfort those who   
wish to preserve their reverence for the
 character  of a great teacher to       
remember that one of these sayings is in
 the  well-known forged passage at the  
end of the second gospel1 and that  the 
other occurs only in the late and       
legendary fourth gospel2 both  being    
described as spoken under utterly       
impossible circumstances4 ,these        
precepts belong to the ,church and not  
to the ,gospel4 ,but whoever wrote      
either of them down as a deliverance of 
one whom he supposed to be  a divine    
teacher1 has thereby written down       
himself as a man void of  intellectual  
honesty1 as a man whose word cannot be  
trusted1 as a  man who would accept and 

spread about any kind of baseless       
fiction  for fear of believing too      
little4    ,so far as to the manner of  
religious belief4 ,let us now inquire   
what bearing morality has upon its      
matter4 ,we may see at once that  this  
can only be indirect2 for the rightness 
or wrongness of belief  in a doctrine   
depends only upon the nature of the     
evidence for it1  and not upon what the 
doctrine is4 ,but there is a very       
important  way in which religious       
doctrine may lead to morality or        
immorality1  and in which1 therefore1   
morality has a bearing upon doctrine4   
,it is  when that doctrine declares the 
character and actions of the ,gods  who 
are regarded as objects of reverence and
 worship4 ,if a ,god is  represented as 
doing that which is clearly wrong1 and  
is still held  up to the reverence of   
men1 they will be tempted to think that 
in  doing this wrong thing they are not 
so very wrong after all1 but are  only  
following an example which all men      

respect4 ,so says ,plato3--    ',we must
 not tell a youthful listener that he   
will be doing nothing  extraordinary if 
he commit the foulest crimes nor yet if 
he chastise  the crimes of a father in  
the most unscrupulous manner1 but will  
simply be doing what the first and      
greatest of the ,gods have done  before 
him4444    ',nor yet is it proper to say
 in any case--what is indeed            
untrue--that  ,gods wage war against    
,gods1 and intrigue and fight among     
themselves2  that is1 if the future     
guardians of our state are to deem it a 
most  disgraceful thing to quarrel      
lightly with one another3 far less ought
  we to select as subjects for fiction  
and embroidery the battles of  the      
giants1 and numerous other feuds of all 
sorts1 in which ,gods  and heroes fight 
against their own kith and kin4 ,but if 
there is any  possibility of persuading 
them that to quarrel with one's fellow  
is a  sin of which no member of a state 
was ever guilty1 such ought rather  to  

be the language held to our children    
from the first1 by old men and  old     
women1 and all elderly persons2 and such
 is the strain in which  our poets must 
be compelled to write4 ,but stories like
 the chaining  of ,hera by her son1 and 
the flinging of ,hephaistos out of      
heaven for  trying to take his mother's 
part when his father was beating her1   
and all those battles of the ,gods which
 are to be found in ,homer1  must be    
refused admittance into our state1      
whether they be allegorical  or not4    
,for a child cannot discriminate between
 what is allegory and  what is not2 and 
whatever at that age is adopted as a    
matter of belief  has a tendency to     
become fixed and indelible1 and         
therefore1 perhaps1  we ought to esteem 
it of the greatest importance that the  
fictions  which children first hear     
should be adapted in the most perfect   
manner  to the promotion of             
virtue4'--7,rep4 ii4 #cgh4 ,tr4 ,davies 
and ,vaughan47    ,and ,seneca says the 

same thing1 with still more reason in   
his day  and country3 ',what else is    
this appeal to the precedent of the     
,gods  for1 but to inflame our lusts1   
and to furnish license and excuse  for  
the corrupt act under the divine        
protection8' ,and again1 of the         
character of ,jupiter as described in   
the popular legends3 ',this has  led to 
no other result than to deprive sin of  
its shame in man's eyes1  by showing him
 the ,god no better than himself4' ,in  
,imperial ,rome1 the  sink of all       
nations1 it was not uncommon to find    
'the intending sinner  addressing to the
 deified vice which he contemplated a   
prayer for the  success of his design2  
the adulteress imploring of ,venus the  
favors of  her paramour2 444 the thief  
praying to ,hermes ,dolios for aid in   
his  enterprise1 or offering up to him  
the first fruits of his plunder2  444   
youths entreating ,hercules to expedite 
the death of a rich uncle4'    ,when we 
reflect that criminal deities were      

worshiped all over the  empire1 we      
cannot but wonder that any good people  
were left2 that  man could still be     
holy1 although every ,god was vile4 ,yet
 this was  undoubtedly the case2 the    
social forces worked steadily on        
wherever  there was peace and a settled 
government and municipal freedom2 and   
the wicked stories of theologians were  
somehow explained away and  disregarded4
 ,if men were no better than their      
religions1 the world  would be a hell   
indeed4    ,it is very important1       
however1 to consider what really ought  
to be  done in the case of stories like 
these4 ,when the poet sings that  ,zeus 
kicked ,hephaistos out of heaven for    
trying to help his mother1  ,plato says 
that this fiction must be suppressed by 
law4 ,we cannot  follow him there1 for  
since his time we have had too much of  
trying  to suppress false doctrines by  
law4 ,plato thinks it quite obviously   
clear that ,god cannot produce evil1 and
 he would stop everybody's  mouth who   

ventured to say that he can4 ,but in    
regard to the doctrine  itself1 we can  
only ask1 ',is it true8' ,and that is a 
question to be  settled by evidence4    
,did ,zeus commit this crime1 or did he 
not8 ,we  must ask the apologists1 the  
reconcilers of religion and science1    
what evidence they can produce to prove 
that ,zeus kicked ,hephaistos  out of   
heaven4 ,that a doctrine may lead to    
immoral consequences is  no reason for  
disbelieving it4 ,but whether the       
doctrine were true  or false1 one thing 
does clearly follow from its moral      
character3  namely this1 that if ,zeus  
behaved as he is said to have behaved he
  ought not to be worshiped4 ,to those  
who complain of his violence and        
injustice it is no answer to say that   
the divine attributes are far  above    
human comprehension2 that the ways of   
,zeus are not our ways1  neither are his
 thoughts our thoughts4 ,if he is to be 
worshiped1 he  must do something vaster 
and nobler and greater than good men do1

 but  it must be like what they do in   
its goodness4 ,his actions must not be  
merely a magnified copy of what bad men 
do4 ,so soon as they are thus           
represented1 morality has something to  
say4 ,not indeed about the fact2  for it
 is not conscience1 but reason1 that has
 to judge matters of  fact2 but about   
the worship of a character so           
represented4 ,if there  really is good  
evidence that ,zeus kicked ,hephaistos  
out of heaven1 and  seduced ,alkmene by 
a mean trick1 say so by all means2 but  
say also that  it is wrong to salute his
 priests or to make offerings in his    
temple4    ,when men do their duty in   
this respect1 morality has a very       
curious  indirect effect on the         
religious doctrine itself4 ,as soon as  
the  offerings become less frequent1 the
 evidence for the doctrine begins to    
fade away2 the process of theological   
interpretation gradually brings  out the
 true inner meaning of it1 that ,zeus   
did not kick ,hephaistos  out of heaven1

 and did not seduce ,alkmene4    ,is    
this a merely theoretical discussion    
about far-away things8 ,let us  come    
back for a moment to our own time and   
country1 and think whether  there can be
 any lesson for us in this refusal of   
common-sense morality  to worship a     
deity whose actions are a magnified copy
 of what bad men  do4 ,there are three  
doctrines which find very wide          
acceptance among  our countrymen at the 
present day3 the doctrines of original  
sin1  of a vicarious sacrifice1 and of  
eternal punishments4 ,we are not        
concerned with any refined evaporations 
of these doctrines which are  exhaled by
 courtly theologians1 but with the naked
 statements which  are put into the     
minds of children and of ignorant       
people1 which are  taught broadcast and 
without shame in denominational schools4
 ,father  ,faber1 good soul1 persuaded  
himself that after all only a very few  
people would be really damned1 and      
,father ,oxenham gives one the          

impression that it will not hurt even   
them very much4 ,but one learns  the    
practical teaching of the ,church from  
such books as ',a ,glimpse  of ,hell1'  
where a child is described as thrown    
between the bars upon  the burning      
coals1 there to writhe forever4 ,the    
masses do not get the  elegant          
emasculations of ,father ,faber and     
,father ,oxenham2 they get  'a ,glimpse 
of ,hell4'    ,now to condemn all       
mankind for the sin of ,adam and ,eve2  
to let the  innocent suffer for the     
guilty2 to keep any one alive in torture
  forever and ever2 these actions are   
simply magnified copies of what  bad men
 do4 ,no juggling with 'divine justice  
and mercy' can make them  anything else4
 ,this must be said to all kinds and    
conditions of men3  that if ,god holds  
all mankind guilty for the sin of ,adam1
 if he has  visited upon the innocent   
the punishment of the guilty1 if he is  
to  torture any single soul forever1    
then it is wrong to worship him4    ,but

 there is something to be said also to  
those who think that  religious beliefs 
are not indeed true1 but are useful for 
the masses2  who deprecate any open and 
public argument against them1 and think 
that all skeptical books should be      
published at a high price2 who  go to   
church1 not because they approve of it  
themselves1 but to set  an example to   
the servants4 ,let us ask them to ponder
 the words of  ,plato1 who1 like them1  
thought that all these tales of the     
,gods were  fables1 but still fables    
which might be useful to amuse children 
with3  ',we ought to esteem it of the   
greatest importance that the fictions   
which children first hear should be     
adapted in the most perfect  manner to  
the promotion of virtue4' ,if we grant  
to you that it is  good for poor people 
and children to believe some of these   
fictions1  is it not better1 at least1  
that they should believe those which are
  adapted to the promotion of virtue8   
,now the stories which you send  your   

servants and children to hear are       
adapted to the promotion of  vice4 ,so  
far as the remedy is in your own hands1 
you are bound to apply  it2 stop your   
voluntary subscriptions and the moral   
support of your  presence from any place
 where the criminal doctrines are       
taught4 ,you  will find more men and    
better men to preach that which is      
agreeable  to their conscience1 than to 
thunder out doctrines under which their 
minds are always uneasy1 and which only 
a continual self-deception  can keep    
them from feeling to be wicked4    ,let 
us now go on to inquire what morality   
has to say in the matter of  religious  
ministrations1 the official acts and the
 general influence  of a priesthood4    
,this question seems to me a more       
difficult one than  the former2 at any  
rate it is not so easy to find general  
principles  which are at once simple in 
their nature and clear to the conscience
  of any man who honestly considers     
them4 ,one such principle1 indeed1      

there is1 which can hardly be stated in 
a ,protestant country without  meeting  
with a cordial response2 being indeed   
that characteristic  of our race which  
made the ,reformation a necessity1 and  
became the  soul of the ,protestant     
movement4 ,i mean the principle which   
forbids  the priest to come between a   
man and his conscience4 ,if it be true1 
as our daily experience teaches us1 that
 the moral sense gains in  clearness and
 power by exercise1 by the constant     
endeavor to find out  and to see for    
ourselves what is right and what is     
wrong1 it must  be nothing short of a   
moral suicide to delegate our conscience
 to  another man4 ,it is true that when 
we are in difficulties and do not       
altogether see our way1 we quite rightly
 seek counsel and advice of  some friend
 who has more experience1 more wisdom   
begot by it1 more  devotion to the right
 than ourselves1 and who1 not being     
involved in  the difficulties which     
encompass us1 may more easily see the   

way out  of them4 ,but such counsel does
 not and ought not to take the place of 
our private judgment2 on the contrary1  
among wise men it is asked and  given   
for the purpose of helping and          
supporting private judgment4 ,i  should 
go to my friend1 not that he may tell me
 what to do1 but that  he may help me to
 see what is right4    ,now1 as we all  
know1 there is a priesthood whose       
influence is not to  be made light of1  
even in our own land1 which claims to do
 two things3  to declare with infallible
 authority what is right and what is    
wrong1  and to take away the guilt of   
the sinner after confession has been    
made to it4 ,the second of these claims 
we shall come back upon in  connection  
with another part of the subject4 ,but  
that claim is one  which1 as it seems to
 me1 ought to condemn the priesthood    
making it  in the eyes of every         
conscientious man4 ,we must take care to
 keep  this question to itself1 and not 
to let it be confused with quite        

different ones4 ,the priesthood in      
question1 as we all know1 has taught    
that as right which is not right1 and   
has condemned as wrong some  of the     
holiest duties of mankind4 ,but this is 
not what we are here  concerned with4   
,let us put an ideal case of a          
priesthood which1 as a  matter of fact1 
taught a morality agreeing with the     
healthy conscience  of all men at a     
given time2 but which1 nevertheless1    
taught this as  an infallible           
revelation4 ,the tendency of such       
teaching1 if really  accepted1 would be 
to destroy morality altogether1 for it  
is of the  very essence of the moral    
sense that it is a common perception by 
men of what is good for man4 ,it arises1
 not in one man's mind by a  flash of   
genius or a transport of ecstasy1 but in
 all men's minds1  as the fruit of their
 necessary intercourse and united labor 
for a  common object4 ,when an          
infallible authority is set up1 the     
voice of  this natural human conscience 

must be hushed and schooled1 and made   
to speak the words of a formula4        
,obedience becomes the whole duty of    
man2 and the notion of right is attached
 to a lifeless code of rules1  instead  
of being the informing character of a   
nation4 ,the natural  consequence is    
that it fades gradually out and ends by 
disappearing  altogether4 ,i am not     
describing a purely conjectural state of
 things1  but an effect which has       
actually been produced at various times 
and in  considerable populations by the 
influence of the ,catholic ,church4 ,it 
is true that we cannot find an actually 
crucial instance of a pure  morality    
taught as an infallible revelation1 and 
so in time ceasing  to be morality for  
that reason alone4 ,there are two       
circumstances  which prevent this4 ,one 
is that the ,catholic priesthood has    
always  practically taught an imperfect 
morality1 and that it is difficult  to  
distinguish between the effects of      
precepts which are wrong in  themselves1

 and precepts which are only wrong      
because of the manner in  which they are
 enforced4 ,the other circumstance is   
that the priesthood  has very rarely    
found a population willing to place     
itself completely  and absolutely under 
priestly control4 ,men must live        
together and  work for common objects   
even in priest-ridden countries2 and    
those  conditions which in the course of
 ages have been able to create the      
moral sense cannot fail in some degree  
to recall it to men's minds  and        
gradually to re-enforce it4 ,thus it    
comes about that a great  and increasing
 portion of life breaks free from       
priestly influences1  and is governed   
upon right and rational grounds4 ,the   
goodness of men  shows itself in time   
more powerful than the wickedness of    
some of  their religions4    ,the       
practical inference is1 then1 that we   
ought to do all in our  power to        
restrain and diminish the influence of  
any priesthood which  claims to rule    

consciences4 ,but when we attempt to go 
beyond this plain  ,protestant          
principle1 we find that the question is 
one of history and  politics4 ,the      
question which we want to ask           
ourselves--',is it right  to support    
this or that priesthood8'--can only be  
answered by this  other question1 ',what
 has it done or got done8'    ,in asking
 this question1 we must bear in mind    
that the word priesthood1  as we have   
used it hitherto1 has a very wide       
meaning--namely1 it means  any body of  
men who perform special ceremonies in   
the name of religion2  a ceremony being 
an act which is prescribed by religion  
to that body  of men1 but not on account
 of its intrinsic rightness or          
wrongness4 ,it  includes1 therefore1 not
 only the priests of ,catholicism1 or of
 the ,obi  rites1 who lay claim to a    
magical character and powers1 but the   
more  familiar clergymen or ministers of
 ,protestant denominations1 and the     
members of monastic orders4 ,but there  

is a considerable difference1  pointed  
out by ,hume1 between a priest who lays 
claim to a magical  character and       
powers1 and a clergymen1 in the ,english
 sense1 as it  was understood in ,hume's
 day1 whose office was to remind people 
of  their duties every ,sunday1 and to  
represent a certain standard of  culture
 in remote country districts4 ,it will1 
perhaps1 conduce to  clearness if we use
 the word priest exclusively in the     
first sense4    ,there is another       
confusion which we must endeavor to     
avoid1 if we  would really get at the   
truth of this matter4 ,when one ventures
 to  doubt whether the ,catholic clergy 
has really been an unmixed blessing  to 
,europe1 one is generally met by the    
reply1 ',you cannot find any  fault with
 the ,sermon on the ,mount4' ,now it    
would be too much to say  that this has 
nothing to do with the question we were 
proposing to  ask1 for there is a sense 
in which the ,sermon on the ,mount and  
the  ,catholic clergy have something to 

do with each other4 ,the ,sermon on the 
,mount is admitted on all hands to be   
the best and most precious thing  that  
,christianity has offered to the world2 
and it cannot be doubted  that the      
,catholic clergy of ,east and ,west were
 the only spokesmen  of ,christianity   
until the ,reformation1 and are the     
spokesmen of the  vast majority of      
,christians at this moment4 ,but it must
 surely be  unnecessary to say in a     
,protestant country that the ,catholic  
,church  and the ,gospel are two very   
different things4 ,the moral teaching of
  ,christ1 as partly preserved in the   
three first gospels1 or--which  is the  
same thing--the moral teaching of the   
great ,rabbi ,hillel1  as partly        
preserved in the ,pirke ,aboth1 is the  
expression of the  conscience of a      
people who had fought long and          
heroically for their  national          
existence4 ,in that terrible conflict   
they had learned the  supreme and       
overwhelming importance of conduct1 the 

necessity for  those who would survive  
of fighting manfully for their lives and
  making a stand against the hostile    
powers around2 the weakness and         
uselessness of solitary and selfish     
efforts1 the necessity for a man  who   
would be a man to lose his poor single  
personality in the being of  a greater  
and nobler combatant--the nation4 ,and  
they said all this1  after their fashion
 of short and potent sayings1 perhaps   
better than  any other men have said it 
before or since4 ',if ,i am not for     
myself1'  said the great ,hillel1 'who  
is for me8 ,and if ,i am only for       
myself1  where is the use of me8 ,and if
 not now1 when8' ,it would be hard to   
find a more striking contrast than      
exists between the sturdy unselfish     
independence of this saying1 and the    
abject and selfish servility of  the    
priest-ridden claimant of the skies4 ,it
 was this heroic people that  produced  
the morality of the ,sermon on the      
,mount4 ,but it was not they  who       

produced the priests and the dogmas of  
,catholicism4 ,shaven crowns1  linen    
vestments1 and the claim to priestly    
rule over consciences1  these were      
dwellers on the banks of the ,nile4 ,the
 gospel indeed came  out of ,juda1 but  
the ,church and her dogmas came out of  
,egypt4 ,not1  as it is written1 ',out  
of ,egypt have ,i called my son1' but   
',out of  ,egypt have ,i called my      
daughter4' ,st4 ,gregory of ,nazianzum  
remarked  with wonder that ,egypt1      
having so lately worshiped bulls1 goats1
 and  crocodiles1 was now teaching the  
world the worship of the ,trinity in    
its truest form4 ,poor1 simple ,st4     
,gregory6 it was not that ,egypt had    
risen higher1 but that the world had    
sunk lower4 ,the empire1 which  in the  
time of ,augustus had dreaded1 and with 
reason1 the corrupting  influence of    
,egyptian superstitions1 was now eaten  
up by them1 and  rapidly rotting away4  
,then1 when we ask what has been the    
influence of the ,catholic clergy  upon 

,european nations1 we are not inquiring 
about the results of  accepting the     
morality of the ,sermon on the ,mount2  
we are inquiring  into the effect of    
attaching an ,egyptian priesthood1 which
 teaches  ,egyptian dogmas1 to the life 
and sayings of a ,jewish prophet4    ,in
 this inquiry1 which requires the       
knowledge of facts beyond our  own      
immediate experience1 we must make use  
of the great principle  of authority1   
which enables us to profit by the       
experience of other  men4 ,the great    
civilized countries on the continent of 
,europe at the  present day--,france1   
,germany1 ,austria1 and ,italy--have had
 an extensive  experience of the        
,catholic clergy for a great number of  
centuries1 and  they are forced by      
strong practical reasons to form a      
judgment upon  the character and        
tendencies of an institution which is   
sufficiently  powerful to command the   
attention of all who are interested in  
public  affairs4 ,we might add the      

experience of our forefathers three     
centuries  ago1 and of ,ireland at this 
moment2 but home politics are apt to be 
looked upon with other eyes than those  
of reason4 ,let us hear1 then1  the     
judgment of the civilized people of     
,europe on this question4    ,it is a   
matter of notoriety that an aider and   
abettor of clerical  pretensions is     
regarded in ,france as an enemy of      
,france and of  ,frenchmen2 in ,germany 
as an enemy of ,germany and of ,germans2
 in ,austria  as an enemy of ,austria   
and ,hungary1 of both ,austrians and    
,magyars2 and  in ,italy as an enemy of 
,italy and the ,italians4 ,he is so     
regarded1 not  by a few wild and        
revolutionary enthusiasts who have cast 
away all the  beliefs of their childhood
 and all bonds connecting them with the 
past1  but by a great and increasing    
majority of sober and conscientious men 
of all creeds and persuasions1 who are  
filled with a love for their  country1  
and whose hopes and aims for the future 

are animated and  guided by the examples
 of those who have gone before them1 and
 by a  sense of the continuity of       
national life4 ,the profound conviction 
and  determination of the people in all 
these countries1 that the clergy  must  
be restricted to a purely ceremonial    
province1 and must not be  allowed to   
interfere1 as clergy1 in public         
affairs--this conviction  and           
determination1 ,i say1 are not the      
effect of a rejection of the  ,catholic 
dogmas4 ,such rejection has not in fact 
been made in ,catholic  countries by the
 great majority4 ,it involves many      
difficult speculative  questions1 the   
profound disturbance of old habits of   
thought1 and  the toilsome consideration
 of abstract ideas4 ,but such is the    
happy  inconsistency of human nature1   
that men who would be shocked and pained
  by a doubt about the central doctrines
 of their religions are far more  really
 and practically shocked and pained by  
the moral consequences  of clerical     

ascendency4 ,about the dogmas they do   
not know2 they were  taught them in     
childhood1 and have not inquired into   
them since1 and  therefore they are not 
competent witnesses to the truth of     
them4 ,but  about the priesthood they do
 know1 by daily and hourly experience2  
and to its character they are competent 
witnesses4 ,no man can express  his     
convictions more forcibly than by acting
 upon them in a great  and solemn matter
 of national importance4 ,in all these  
countries  the conviction of the serious
 and sober majority of the people  is   
embodied1 and is being daily embodied1  
in special legislation1  openly and     
avowedly intended to guard against      
clerical aggression4 ,the  more closely 
the legislature of these countries      
reflects the popular  will1 the more    
clear and pronounced does this tendency 
become4 ,it  may be thwarted or evaded  
for the moment by constitutional devices
  and parliamentary tricks1 but sooner  
or later the nation will be  thoroughly 

represented in all of them3 and as to   
what is then to be  expected1 let the   
panic of the clerical parties make      
answer4    ,this is a state of opinion  
and of feeling which we in our own      
country find it hard to understand1     
although it is one of the most          
persistent characters of our nation in  
past times4 ,we have spoken  so plainly 
and struck so hard in the past1 that we 
seem to have won  the right to let this 
matter alone4 ,we think our enemies are 
dead1  and we forget that our neighbor's
 enemies are plainly alive3 and  then we
 wonder that he does not sit down and be
 quiet as we are4 ,we  are not much     
accustomed to be afraid1 and we never   
know when we are  beaten4 ,but those who
 are nearer to the danger feel a very   
real and1  it seems to me1 well-grounded
 fear4 ,the whole structure of modern   
society1 the fruit of long and painful  
efforts1 the hopes of further           
improvement1 the triumphs of justice1 of
 freedom1 and of light1  the bonds of   

patriotism which make each nation one1  
the bonds of  humanity which bring      
different nations together--all these   
they see  to be menaced with a great and
 real and even pressing danger4 ,for    
myself ,i confess that ,i cannot help   
feeling as they feel4 ,it seems to  me  
quite possible that the moral and       
intellectual culture of ,europe1  the   
light and the right1 what makes life    
worth having and men worthy  to have it1
 may be clean swept away by a revival of
 superstition4 ,we  are1 perhaps1       
ourselves not free from such a domestic 
danger2 but  no one can doubt that the  
danger would speedily arise if all      
,europe  at our side should become again
 barbaric1 not with the weakness and    
docility of a barbarism which has never 
known better1 but with the  strength of 
a past civilization perverted to the    
service of evil4    ,those who know     
best1 then1 about the ,catholic         
priesthood at present1  regard it as a  
standing menace to the state and to the 

moral fabric  of society4    ,some would
 have us believe that this condition of 
things is quite new1  and has in fact   
been created by the ,vatican ,council4  
,in the ,middle  ,ages1 they say1 the   
,church did incalculable service2 or    
even if you  do not allow that1 yet the 
ancient ,egyptian priesthood invented   
many  useful arts2 or if you have read  
anything which is not to their credit1  
there were the ,babylonians and         
,assyrians who had priests1 thousands of
  years ago2 and in fact1 the more you  
go back into prehistoric ages1  and the 
further you go away into distant        
countries1 the less you can  find to say
 against the priesthoods of those times 
and places4 ,this  statement1 for which 
there is certainly much foundation1 may 
be put  into another form3 the more you 
come forward into modern times and      
neighboring countries1 where the facts  
can actually be got at1 the  more       
complete is the evidence against the    
priesthoods of these times  and places4 

,but the whole argument is founded upon 
what is at least a  doubtful view of    
human nature and of society4 ,just as an
 early school  of geologists were       
accustomed to explain the present state 
of the  earth's surface by supposing    
that in primitive ages the processes of 
geologic change were far more violent   
and rapid than they are now--so         
catastrophic1 indeed1 as to constitute a
 thoroughly different state of          
things--so there is a school of         
historians who think that the intimate  
structure of human nature1 its          
capabilities of learning and of adapting
  itself to society1 have so far altered
 within the historic period as  to make 
the present processes of social change  
totally different in  character from    
those even of the moderately distant    
past4 ,they think  that institutions and
 conditions which are plainly harmful to
 us now  have at other times and places 
done good and serviceable work4 ,war1   
pestilence1 priestcraft1 and slavery    

have been represented as positive  boons
 to an early state of society4 ,they are
 not blessings to us1  it is true2 but  
then times have altered very much4      
,on the other hand1 a later school of   
geologists have seen reason to  think   
that the processes of change have never1
 since the earth finally  solidified1   
been very different from what they are  
now4 ,more rapid1  indeed1 they must    
have been in early times1 for many      
reasons2 but  not so very much more     
rapid as to constitute an entirely      
different  state of things4 ,and it does
 seem to me in like manner that a wider 
and more rational view of history will  
recognize more and more of  the         
permanent1 and less and less of the     
changeable1 element in human  nature4   
,no doubt our ancestors of a thousand   
generations back were very  different   
beings from ourselves2 perhaps fifty    
thousand generations  back they were not
 men at all4 ,but the historic period is
 hardly to  be stretched beyond two     

hundred generations2 and it seems       
unreasonable  to expect that in such a  
tiny page of our biography we can trace 
with  clearness the growth and progress 
of a long life4 ,compare ,egypt in  the 
time of ,king ,menes1 say six thousand  
years ago1 with ,spain in this  present 
century1 before ,englishmen made any    
railways there3 ,i suppose  the main    
difference is that the ,egyptians washed
 themselves4 ,it seems  more analogous  
to what we find in other fields of      
inquiry to suppose  that there are      
certain great broad principles of human 
life which have  been true all along2   
that certain conditions have always been
 favorable  to the health of society1   
and certain other conditions always     
hurtful4    ,now1 although ,i have many 
times asked for it from those who said  
that somewhere and at some time mankind 
had derived benefits from a  priesthood 
laying claim to a magical character and 
powers1 ,i have  never been able to get 
any evidence for their statement4       

,nobody  will give me a date1 and a     
latitude and longitude1 that ,i may     
examine into the matter4 ',in the       
,middle ,ages the priests and monks     
were the sole depositaries of learning4'
 ,quite so2 a man burns your  house to  
the ground1 builds a wretched hovel on  
the ruins1 and then  takes credit for   
whatever shelter there is about the     
place4 ,in the  ,middle ,ages nearly all
 learned men were obliged to become     
priests and  monks4 ',then again1 the   
bishops have sometimes acted as tribunes
 of  the people1 to protect them against
 the tyranny of kings4' ,no doubt1  when
 ,pope and ,csar fall out1 honest men   
may come by their own4 ,if  two men rob 
you in a dark lane1 and then quarrel    
over the plunder1  so that you get a    
chance to escape with your life1 you    
will of course  be very grateful to each
 of them for having prevented the other 
from  killing you2 but you would be much
 more grateful to a policeman who       
locked them both up4 ,two powers have   

sought to enslave the people1  and have 
quarreled with each other2 certainly we 
are very much obliged  to them for      
quarreling1 but a condition of still    
greater happiness  and security would be
 the non-existence of both4    ,i can   
find no evidence that seriously         
militates against the rule  that the    
priest is at all times and in all places
 the enemy of all  men--,sacerdos       
semper1 ubique1 et omnibus inimicus4 ,i 
do not deny  that the priest is very    
often a most earnest and conscientious  
man1  doing the very best that he knows 
of as well as he can do it4 ,lord       
,amberley is quite right in saying that 
the blame rests more with the  laity    
than with the priesthood2 that it has   
insisted on magic and  mysteries1 and   
has forced the priesthood to produce    
them4 ,but then1  how dreadful is the   
system that puts good men to such uses6 
,and although it is true that in its    
origin a priesthood is the effect  of an
 evil already existing1 a symptom of    

social disease rather than  a cause of  
it1 yet1 once being created and made    
powerful1 it tends in  many ways to     
prolong and increase the disease which  
gave it birth4 ,one  of these ways is so
 marked and of such practical importance
 that we  are bound to consider it here3
 ,i mean the education of children4 ,if 
there is one lesson which history forces
 upon us in every page1 it is  this3    
,keep your children away from the       
priest1 or he will make them the        
enemies of mankind4 ,it is not the      
,catholic clergy and those like them    
who are alone to be dreaded in this     
matter2 even the representatives  of    
apparently harmless religions may do    
incalculable mischief if they  get      
education into their hands4 ,to the     
early ,mohammedans the mosque was  the  
one public building in every place where
 public business could be  transacted2  
and so it was naturally the place of    
primary education1  which they held to  
be a matter of supreme importance4 ,by  

and by1  as the clergy grew up1 the     
mosque was gradually usurped by them1   
and primary education fell into their   
hands4 ,then ensued a 'revival  of      
religion2' religion became a fanaticism3
 books were burnt and  universities were
 closed2 the empire rotted away in ,east
 and ,west1  until it was conquered by  
,turkish savages in ,asia and by        
,christian  savages in ,spain4    ,the  
labors of students of the early history 
of institutions--notably  ,sir ,henry   
,maine and ,m4 de ,laveleye--have       
disclosed to us an element  of society  
which appears to have existed in all    
times and places1 and  which is the     
basis of our own social structure4 ,the 
village community1  or commune1 or      
township1 found in tribes of the most   
varied race and  time1 has so modified  
itself as to get adapted in one place or
 another  to all the different          
conditions of human existence4 ,this    
union of men  to work for a common      
object has transformed them from wild   

animals into  tame ones4 ,century by    
century the educating process of the    
social life  has been working at human  
nature2 it has built itself into our    
inmost  soul4 ,such as we are--moral and
 rational beings--thinking and talking  
in general conceptions about the facts  
that make up our life1 feeling  a       
necessity to act1 not for ourselves1 but
 for ,ourself1 for the larger  life of  
,man in which we are elements2 such     
moral and rational beings1  ,i say1 ,man
 has made us4 ,by ,man ,i mean men      
organized into a society1  which fights 
for its life1 not only as a mere        
collection of men who  must separately  
be kept alive1 but as a society4 ,it    
must fight not  only against external   
enemies1 but against treason and        
disruption  within it4 ,hence comes the 
unity of interest of all its members2   
each of them has to feel that he is not 
himself only but a part of  all the     
rest4 ,conscience--the sense of right   
and wrong--springs out  of the habit of 

judging things from the point of view of
 all and not  of one4 ,it is ,ourself1  
not ourselves1 that makes for           
righteousness4    ,the codes of         
morality1 then1 which are adopted into  
various religions1  and afterward taught
 as parts of religious systems1 are     
derived from  secular sources4 ,the most
 ancient version of the ,ten            
,commandments1  whatever the            
investigations of scholars may make it  
out to be1  originates1 not in the      
thunders of ,sinai1 but in the peaceful 
life of  men on the plains of ,chalda4  
,conscience is the voice of ,man        
ingrained  into our hearts1 commanding  
us to work for ,man4    ,religions      
differ in the treatment which they give 
to this most  sacred heirloom of our    
past history4 ,sometimes they invert its
  precepts--telling men to be submissive
 under oppression because the  powers   
that be are ordained of ,god2 telling   
them to believe where they  have not    
seen1 and to play with falsehood in     

order that a particular  doctrine may   
prevail1 instead of seeking for truth   
whatever it may be2  telling them to    
betray their country for the sake of    
their church4 ,but  there is one great  
distinction to which ,i wish1 in        
conclusion1 to  call special            
attention--a distinction between two    
kinds of religious  emotion which bear  
upon the conduct of men4    ,we said    
that conscience is the voice of ,man    
within us1 commanding  us to work for   
,man4 ,we do not know this immediately  
by our own  experience2 we only know    
that something within us commands us to 
work  for ,man4 ,this fact men have     
tried to explain2 and they have thought1
  for the most part1 that this voice was
 the voice of a ,god4 ,but the          
explanation takes two different forms3  
the ,god may speak in us for  ,man's    
sake1 or for his own sake4 ,if he speaks
 for his own sake--and  this is what    
generally happens when he has priests   
who lay claim to  a magical character   

and powers--our allegiance is apt to be 
taken  away from ,man1 and transferred  
to the ,god4 ,when we love our brother  
for the sake of our brother1 we help all
 men to grow in the right2  but when we 
love our brother for the sake of        
somebody else1 who is  very likely to   
damn our brother1 it very soon comes to 
burning him  alive for his soul's       
health4 ,when men respect human life for
 the sake  of ,man1 tranquillity1 order 
and progress go hand in hand2 but those 
who only respected human life because   
,god had forbidden murder have  set     
their mark upon ,europe in fifteen      
centuries of blood and fire4    ,these  
are only two examples of a general rule4
 ,wherever the allegiance  of men has   
been diverted from ,man to some divinity
 who speaks to men  for his own sake and
 seeks his own glory1 one thing has     
happened4 ,the  right precepts might be 
enforced1 but they were enforced upon   
wrong  grounds1 and they were not       
obeyed4 ,but right precepts are not     

always  enforced2 the fact that the     
fountains of morality have been poisoned
  makes it easy to substitute wrong     
precepts for right ones4    ,to this    
same treason against humanity belongs   
the claim of the  priesthood to take    
away the guilt of a sinner after        
confession has  been made to it4 ,the   
,catholic priest professes to act as an 
embassador  for his ,god1 and to absolve
 the guilty man by conveying to him the 
forgiveness of heaven4 ,if his          
credentials were ever so sure1 if he    
were indeed the embassador of a         
superhuman power1 the claim would be    
treasonable4 ,can the favor of the ,czar
 make guiltless the murderer of  old men
 and women and children in ,circassian  
valleys8 ,can the pardon  of the ,sultan
 make clean the bloody hands of a       
,pasha8 ,as little can  any ,god forgive
 sins committed against man4 ,when men  
think he can1  they compound for old    
sins which the ,god did not like by     
committing  new ones which he does like4

 ,many a remorseful despot has atoned   
for  the levities of his youth by the   
persecution of heretics in his old  age4
 ,that frightful crime1 the adulteration
 of food1 could not possibly  be so     
common among us if men were not taught  
to regard it as merely  objectionable   
because it is remotely connected with   
stealing1 of which  ,god has expressed  
his disapproval in the ,decalogue2 and  
therefore  as quite1 naturally set right
 by a punctual attendance at church  on 
,sundays4 ,when a ,ritualist breaks his 
fast before celebrating the  ,holy      
,communion1 his deity can forgive him if
 he likes1 for the matter  concerns     
nobody else2 but no deity can forgive   
him for preventing his  parishioners    
from setting up a public library and    
reading-room for  fear they should read 
,mr4 ,darwin's works in it4 ,that sin is
 committed  against the people1 and a   
,god cannot take it away4    ,i call    
those religions which undermine the     
supreme allegiance of the  conscience to

 ,man ultramontane religions1 because   
they seek their  springs of action ultra
 montes1 outside of the common          
experience and  daily life of man4 ,and 
,i remark about them that they are      
especially  apt to teach wrong precepts1
 and that even when they command men to 
do the right things they put the command
 upon wrong motives1 and do  not get the
 things done4    ,but there are forms of
 religious emotion which do not thus    
undermine  the conscience4 ,far be it   
from me to under-value the help and     
strength  which many of the bravest of  
our brethren have drawn from the thought
  of an unseen helper of men4 ,he who1  
wearied or stricken in the fight  with  
the powers of darkness1 asks himself in 
a solitary place1 ',is  it all for      
nothing8 shall we indeed be             
overthrown8'--he does find  something   
which may justify that thought4 ,in such
 a moment of utter  sincerity1 when a   
man has bared his own soul before the   
immensities  and the eternities1 a      

presence in which his own poor          
personality is  shriveled into          
nothingness arises within him1 and says1
 as plainly  as words can say1 ',i am   
with thee1 and ,i am greater than thou4'
 ,many  names of ,gods1 of many shapes1 
have men given to this presence2        
seeking by names and pictures to know   
more clearly and to remember  more      
continually the guide and the helper of 
men4 ,no such comradeship  with the     
,great ,companion shall have anything   
but reverence from me1  who have known  
the divine gentleness of ,denison       
,maurice1 the strong  and healthy       
practical instinct of ,charles          
,kingsley1 and who now revere  with all 
my heart the teaching of ,james         
,martineau4 ,they seem to me1  one and  
all1 to be reaching forward with loving 
anticipation to a  clearer vision which 
is yet to come--tendentesque manus rip  
ulterioris  amore4 ,for1 after all1 such
 a helper of men1 outside of humanity1  
the truth will not allow us to see4 ,the

 dim and shadowy outlines of  the       
superhuman deity fade slowly away from  
before us2 and as the mist  of his      
presence floats aside1 we perceive with 
greater and greater  clearness the shape
 of a yet grander and nobler figure--of 
,him who  made all ,gods and shall      
unmake them4 ,from the dim dawn of      
history1  and from the inmost depth of  
every soul1 the face of our father ,man 
looks out upon us with the fire of      
eternal youth in his eyes1 and says1    
',before ,jehovah was1 ,i am6'          
,,contents4                             
,,page          ,i4 ,the ,scientific    
,basis of ,morals      #a       ,,ii4   
,right and ,wrong                     #g
      ,,iii4 ,the ,ethics of ,belief    
#be       ,,iv4 ,the ,ethics of         
,religion             #cf               
,,notes      #a ,sunday ,lecture        
,society1 ,november #g1 #ahge4    #b    
,treatise ,baba ,bathra1 #ei b4    #c   
,compare these passages from ,merivale  
7',romans under the ,empire1'  vi471 to 

whom 'it seems a duty to protest against
 the common tendency  of ,christian     
moralists to dwell only on the dark side
 of ,pagan society1  in order to        
heighten by contrast the blessings of   
the ,gospel'3--    ',much candor and    
discrimination are required in comparing
 the sins  of one age with those of     
another 444 the cruelty of our          
inquisitions  and sectarian             
persecutions1 of our laws against       
sorcery1 our serfdom  and our slavery2  
the petty fraudulence we tolerate in    
almost every  class and calling of the  
community2 the bold front worn by our   
open  sensuality2 the deeper degradation
 of that which is concealed2 all  these 
leave us little room for boasting of our
 modern discipline1 and  must deter the 
thoughtful inquirer from too confidently
 contrasting  the morals of the old     
world and the new4'    ',even at ,rome1 
in the worst of times 444 all the       
relations of life  were adorned in turn 
with bright instances of devotion1 and  

mankind  transacted their business with 
an ordinary confidence in the force of  
conscience and right reason4 ,the steady
 development of enlightened  legal      
principles conclusively proves the      
general dependence upon  law as a guide 
and corrector of manners4 ,in the camp1 
however1  more especially1 as the chief 
sphere of this purifying activity1  the 
great qualities of the ,roman character 
continued to be plainly  manifested4    
,this history of the ,csars presents to 
us a constant  succession of brave1     
patient1 resolute1 and faithful         
soldiers1 men  deeply impressed with a  
sense of duty1 superior to vanity1      
despisers  of boasting1 content to toil 
in obscurity and shed their blood at    
the frontiers of the empire1 unrepining 
at the cold mistrust of their  masters1 
not clamorous for the honors so         
sparingly awarded to them1  but         
satisfied in the daily work of their    
hands1 and full of faith in  the        
national destiny which they were daily  

accomplishing4'    #d ,finlay1 ',greece 
under the ,romans4'    #e ,examination1 
p4 #die1 #b;d ed4