,,philosophical ,,studies ,by ,g4 ,e4 ,,moore1 ,litt4,d4 ,hon4 ,,ll4,d4 7,st4 ,andrews71 ,f4,b4,a4 ,lecturer in ,moral ,science in the ,university of ,cambridge ,author of ,principia ,ethica ,,london ,,routledge ,,kegan ,,paul ,,ltd ,,broadway ,,house3 #fh-gd ,,carter ,,lane1 ,e4,c4#d #aibb ,,contents ,i4 ,,the ,,refutation ,,of ,,idealism ,,ii4 ,,the ,,nature ,,and ,,reality ,,of ,,objects ,,of ,,perception ,,iii4 ,,william ,,james' ,,pragmatism ,,iv4 ,,hume',s ,,philosophy ,v4 ,,the ,,status ,,of ,,sense-,,data ,,vi4 ,,the ,,conception ,,of ,,reality ,,vii4 ,,some ,,judgments ,,of ,,perception ,,viii4 ,,the ,,conception ,,of ,,intrinsic ,,value ,,ix4 ,,external ,,and ,,internal ,,relations ,x4 ,,the ,,nature ,,of ,,moral ,,philosophy ,those of the papers in this volume1 which have been previously published1 originally appeared as follows3-- ,i4 ,the ,refutation of ,idealism in ,mind1 ,n4,s4 ,vol4 xii1 #aijc4 ,,ii4 ,the ,nature and ,reality of ,objects of ,perception in ,proceedings of the ,aristotelian ,society1 #aije-f4 ,,iii4 ,professor ,james' ',pragmatism' in ,proceedings of the ,aristotelian ,society1 #aijg-h4 ,,iv4 ,hume's ,philosophy in ,the ,new ,quarterly1 ,november1 #aiji4 ,v4 ,the ,status of ,sense-,data in ,proceedings of the ,aristotelian ,society1 #aiac-ad4 ,,vi4 ,the ,conception of ,reality in ,proceedings of the ,aristotelian ,society1 #aiag-ah4 ,,vii4 ,some ,judgments of ,perception in ,proceedings of the ,aristotelian ,society1 #aiah-ai4 ,,ix4 ,external and ,internal ,relations in ,proceedings of the ,aristotelian ,society1 #aiai-bj4 ,,preface ,all the papers contained in this volume1 except the two ethical ones 7,,viii and ,x71 have been previously published2 and of those which have been previously published all1 except that on ,external and ,internal ,relations 7,,ix71 are here re-printed without change4 ,they were written at various dates between #aijc and #aiba1 and all are here printed in the order in which they were written1 except that ,,viii on ,the ,conception of ,intrinsic ,value1 which was written earlier than ,,vi and ,,vii1 has been moved out of its proper place in order to bring it nearer to ,,ix and ,x1 to both of which it is closely related in subject4 ,all1 except ,,iv and ,x1 were primarily intended for an audience familiar with the writings of philosophers2 but ,i hope that they may nevertheless prove intelligible even to those who have read little or no philosophy1 since ,i make little use of technical terms1 and1 where ,i have done so1 have done my best to explain in ordinary language exactly what ,i mean by them4 ,the tone of ,x is somewhat different from that of the rest1 because it was written as a lecture for the ,leicester ,philosophical ,society1 with regard to which ,i was informed that ,i must not assume any previous acquaintance with philosophy in most of the audience4 ,it accordingly bears marks throughout of the kind of audience for which it was intended4 ,an attentive reader will easily discover that some of the views expressed in some of the papers are inconsistent with views expressed in others4 ,the fact is that some of the views expressed in some of the earlier ones are views with which ,i no longer agree2 and ,i feel that some apology is needed for nevertheless republishing them exactly as they stood4 ,in all cases1 except one1 my excuse is that the mistaken views in question are so embedded in the form and substance of the papers in which they occur1 that it would have been impossible to correct them without practically substituting new papers for the old ones2 and that1 in spite of these mistakes1 the old papers1 as they stand1 still seem to me1 on the whole1 to say things which are worth saying in a form which1 however defective it may be1 ,i doubt my own ability to improve upon4 ,the only case in which ,i doubt whether this excuse applies is that of the first paper--,the ,refutation of ,idealism4 ,this paper now appears to me to be very confused1 as well as to embody a good many down-right mistakes2 so ,i am doubtful whether ,i ought to have included it4 ,but in this case ,i have another excuse3 namely that it is a paper to which a good many allusions have been made by contemporary writers on philosophy2 and ,i was told that1 for some readers at all events1 it would be a convenience that it should be re-printed along with the rest1 if only for the sake of reference4 ,i said above that the only one of the previously published papers1 in which changes have been made1 is ,,ix on ,external and ,internal ,relations4 ,in this case the changes are not due to any change in my views1 but to the fact that1 in that part of the paper in which symbols are used1 ,i tried1 when it was first published in the ,proceedings of the ,aristotelian ,society1 to use the symbols adopted by ,whitehead and ,russell in ,principia ,mathematica1 and used them also without giving an explanation of their meaning which would be sufficient for readers not acquainted with that work4 ,the symbols in question are symbols which it is difficult for printers to reproduce2 and ,i have1 therefore1 thought it better1 on this occasion1 to use another set of symbols1 which seem to me to be adequate for the limited purpose ,i had in view4 ,i have tried to give an explanation of their meaning1 which will enable anyone to understand them2 and ,i have taken the opportunity of rewriting some of the parts of the paper in which they occur in a way which will1 ,i hope1 make some points clearer than they originally were4 ,i have to thank the ,committee of the ,aristotelian ,society for permission to reprint the large number of papers 7viz41 ,,ii1 ,,iii1 ,v1 ,,vi1 ,,vii and ,,ix71 which originally appeared in the ,proceedings of that ,society2 and the ,editor of the ,new ,quarterly for permission to reprint the article on ,hume's ,philosophy 7,,iv71 which appeared in that ,journal in ,november1 #aiji4 ,g4 ,e4 ,,moore4 ,,cambridge1 ,january1 #aibb4 ,philosophical ,studies ,,the ,,refutation ,,of ,,idealism ,modern ,idealism1 if it asserts any general conclusion about the universe at all1 asserts that it is spiritual4 ,there are two points about this assertion to which ,i wish to call attention4 ,these points are that1 whatever be its exact meaning1 it is certainly meant to assert 7#a7 that the universe is very different indeed from what it seems1 and 7#b7 that it has quite a large number of properties which it does not seem to have4 ,chairs and tables and mountains seem to be very different from us2 but1 when the whole universe is declared to be spiritual1 it is certainly meant to assert that they are far more like us than we think4 ,the idealist means to assert that they are in some sense neither lifeless nor unconscious1 as they certainly seem to be2 and ,i do not think his language is so grossly deceptive1 but that we may assume him to believe that they really are very different indeed from what they seem4 ,and secondly when he declares that they are spiritual1 he means to include in that term quite a large number of different properties4 ,when the whole universe is declared to be spiritual1 it is meant not only that it is in some sense conscious1 but that it has what we recognise in ourselves as the higher forms of consciousness4 ,that it is intelligent2 that it is purposeful2 that it is not mechanical2 all these different things are commonly asserted of it4 ,in general1 it may be said1 this phrase 'reality is spiritual' excites and expresses the belief that the whole universe possesses all the qualities the possession of which is held to make us so superior to things which seem to be inanimate3 at least1 if it does not possess exactly those which we possess1 it possesses not one only1 but several others1 which1 by the same ethical standard1 would be judged equal to or better than our own4 ,when we say it is spiritual we mean to say that it has quite a number of excellent qualities1 different from any which we commonly attribute either to stars or planets or to cups and saucers4 ,now why ,i mention these two points is that when engaged in the intricacies of philosophic discussion1 we are apt to overlook the vastness of the difference between this idealistic view and the ordinary view of the world1 and to overlook the number of different propositions which the idealist must prove4 ,it is1 ,i think1 owing to the vastness of this difference and owing to the number of different excellences which ,idealists attribute to the universe1 that it seems such an interesting and important question whether ,idealism be true or not4 ,but1 when we begin to argue about it1 ,i think we are apt to forget what a vast number of arguments this interesting question must involve3 we are apt to assume1 that if one or two points be made on either side1 the whole case is won4 ,i say this lest it should be thought that any of the arguments which will be advanced in this paper would be sufficient to disprove1 or any refutation of them sufficient to prove1 the truly interesting and important proposition that reality is spiritual4 ,for my own part ,i wish it to be clearly understood that ,i do not suppose that anything ,i shall say has the smallest tendency to prove that reality is not spiritual3 ,i do not believe it possible to refute a single one of the many important propositions contained in the assertion that it is so4 ,reality may be spiritual1 for all ,i know2 and ,i devoutly hope it is4 ,but ,i take ',idealism' to be a wide term and to include not only this interesting conclusion but a number of arguments which are supposed to be1 if not sufficient1 at least necessary1 to prove it4 ,indeed ,i take it that modern ,idealists are chiefly distinguished by certain arguments which they have in common4 ,that reality is spiritual has1 ,i believe1 been the tenet of many theologians2 and yet1 for believing that alone1 they should hardly be called ,idealists4 ,there are besides1 ,i believe1 many persons1 not improperly called ,idealists1 who hold certain characteristic propositions1 without venturing to think them quite sufficient to prove so grand a conclusion4 ,it is1 therefore1 only with ,idealistic arguments that ,i am concerned2 and if any ,idealist holds that no argument is necessary to prove that reality is spiritual1 ,i shall certainly not have refuted him4 ,i shall1 however1 attack at least one argument1 which1 to the best of my belief1 is considered necessary to their position by all ,idealists4 ,and ,i wish to point out a certain advantage which this procedure gives me--an advantage which justifies the assertion that1 if my arguments are sound1 they will have refuted ,idealism4 ,if ,i can refute a single proposition which is a necessary and essential step in all ,idealistic arguments1 then1 no matter how good the rest of these arguments may be1 ,i shall have proved that ,idealists have no reason whatever for their conclusion4 ,suppose we have a chain of argument which takes the form3 ,since ,a is ,b1 and ,b is ,c1 and ,c is ,d1 it follows ,a is ,d4 ,in such an argument1 though ',b is ,c' and ',c is ,d' may both be perfectly true1 yet if ',a is ,b' be false1 we have no more reason for asserting ,a is ,d than if all three were false4 ,it does not1 indeed1 follow that ,a is ,d is false2 nor does it follow that no other arguments would prove it to be true4 ,but it does follow that1 so far as this argument goes1 it is the barest supposition1 without the least bit of evidence4 ,i propose to attack a proposition which seems to me to stand in this relation to the conclusion ',reality is spiritual4' ,i do not propose to dispute that ',reality is spiritual2' ,i do not deny that there may be reasons for thinking that it is3 but ,i do propose to show that one reason upon which1 to the best of my judgment1 all other arguments ever used by ,idealists depend is false4 ,these other arguments may1 for all ,i shall say1 be eminently ingenious and true2 they are very many and various1 and different ,idealists use the most different arguments to prove the same most important conclusions4 ,some of these may be sufficient to prove that ,b is ,c and ,c is ,d2 but if1 as ,i shall try to show1 their ',a is ,b' is false the conclusion ,a is ,d remains a pleasant supposition4 ,i do not deny that to suggest pleasant and plausible suppositions may be the proper function of philosophy3 but ,i am assuming that the name ,idealism can only be properly applied where there is a certain amount of argument1 intended to be cogent4 ,the subject of this paper is1 therefore1 quite uninteresting4 ,even if ,i prove my point1 ,i shall have proved nothing about the ,universe in general4 ,upon the important question whether ,reality is or is not spiritual my argument will not have the remotest bearing4 ,i shall only attempt to arrive at the truth about a matter1 which is in itself quite trivial and insignificant1 and from which1 so far as ,i can see and certainly so far as ,i shall say1 no conclusions can be drawn about any of the subjects about which we most want to know4 ,the only importance ,i can claim for the subject ,i shall investigate is that it seems to me to be a matter upon which not ,idealists only1 but all philosophers and psychologists also1 have been in error1 and from their erroneous view of which they have inferred 7validly or invalidly7 their most striking and interesting conclusions4 ,and that it has even this importance ,i cannot hope to prove4 ,if it has this importance1 it will indeed follow that all the most striking results of philosophy--,sensationalism4 ,agnosticism and ,idealism alike--have1 for all that has hitherto been urged in their favour1 no more foundation than the supposition that a chimera lives in the moon4 ,it will follow that1 unless new reasons never urged hitherto can be found1 all the most important philosophic doctrines have as little claim to assent as the most superstitious beliefs of the lowest savages4 ,upon the question what we have reason to believe in the most interesting matters1 ,i do therefore think that my results will have an important bearing2 but ,i cannot too clearly insist that upon the question whether these beliefs are true they will have none whatever4 ,the trivial proposition which ,i propose to dispute is this3 that esse is percipi4 ,this is a very ambiguous proposition1 but1 in some sense or other1 it has been very widely held4 ,that it is1 in some sense1 essential to ,idealism1 ,i must for the present merely assume4 ,what ,i propose to show is that1 in all the senses ever given to it1 it is false4 ,but1 first of all1 it may be useful to point out briefly in what relation ,i conceive it to stand to ,idealistic arguments4 ,that wherever you can truly predicate esse you can truly predicate percipi1 in some sense or other1 is1 ,i take it1 a necessary step ,in all arguments1 properly to be called ,idealistic1 and1 what is more1 in all arguments hitherto offered for the ,idealistic conclusion4 ,if esse is percipi1 this is at once equivalent to saying that whatever is1 is experienced2 and this1 again1 is equivalent1 in a sense1 to saying that whatever is1 is something mental4 ,but this is not the sense in which the ,idealist conclusion must maintain that ,reality is mental4 ,the ,idealist conclusion is that esse is percipere2 and hence1 whether esse be percipi or not1 a further and different discussion is needed to show whether or not it is also percipere4 ,and again1 even if esse be percipere1 we need a vast quantity of further argument to show that what has esse has also those higher mental qualities which are denoted by spiritual4 ,this is why ,i said that the question ,i should discuss1 namely1 whether or not esse is percipi1 must be utterly insufficient either to prove or to disprove that reality is spiritual4 ,but1 on the other hand1 ,i believe that every argument ever used to show that reality is spiritual has inferred this 7validly or invalidly7 from 'esse is percipere' as one of its premisses2 and that this again has never been pretended to be proved except by use of the premiss that esse is percipi4 ,the type of argument used for the latter purpose is familiar enough4 ,it is said that since whatever is1 is experienced1 and since some things are which are not experienced by the individual1 these must at least form part of some experience4 ,or again that1 since an object necessarily implies a subject1 and since the whole world must be an object1 we must conceive it to belong to some subject or subjects1 in the same sense in which whatever is the object of our experience belongs to us4 ,or again1 that1 since thought enters into the essence of all reality1 we must conceive behind it1 in it1 or as its essence1 a spirit akin to ours1 who think3 that 'spirit greets spirit' in its object4 ,into the validity of these inferences ,i do not propose to enter3 they obviously require a great deal of discussion4 ,i only desire to point out that1 however correct they may be1 yet if esse is not percipi1 they leave us as far from a proof that reality is spiritual1 as if they were all false too4 ,but now3 ,is esse percipi8 ,there are three very ambiguous terms in this proposition1 and ,i must begin by distinguishing the different things that may be meant by some of them4 ,and first with regard to percipi4 ,this term need not trouble us long at present4 ,it was1 perhaps1 originally used to mean 'sensation' only2 but ,i am not going to be so unfair to modern ,idealists--the only ,idealists to whom the term should now be applied without qualification--as to hold that1 if they say esse is percipi1 they mean by percipi sensation only4 ,on the contrary ,i quite agree with them that1 if esse be percipi at all1 percipi must be understood to include not sensation only1 but that other type of mental fact1 which is called 'thought '2 and1 whether esse be percipi or not1 ,i consider it to be the main service of the philosophic school1 to which modern ,idealists belong1 that they have insisted on distinguishing 'sensation' and 'thought' and on emphasising the importance of the latter4 ,against ,sensationalism and ,empiricism they have maintained the true view4 ,but the distinction between sensation and thought need not detain us here4 ,for1 in whatever respects they differ1 they have at least this in common1 that they are both forms of consciousness or1 to use a term that seems to be more in fashion just now1 they are both ways of experiencing4 ,accordingly1 whatever esse is percipi may mean1 it does at least assert that whatever is1 is experienced4 ,and since what ,i wish to maintain is1 that even this is untrue1 the question whether it be experienced by way of sensation or thought or both is for my purpose quite irrelevant4 ,if it be not experienced at all1 it cannot be either an object of thought or an object of sense4 ,it is only if being involves 'experience' that the question1 whether it involves sensation or thought or both1 becomes important4 ,i beg1 therefore1 that percipi may be understood1 in what follows1 to refer merely to what is common to sensation and thought4 ,a very recent article states the meaning of esse is percipi with all desirable clearness in so far as percipi is concerned4 ',i will undertake to show1' says ,mr4 ,taylor1#a 'that what makes any piece of fact real can be nothing but its presence as an inseparable aspect of a sentient experience4' ,i am glad to think that ,mr4 ,taylor has been in time to supply me with so definite a statement that this is the ultimate premiss of ,idealism4 ,my paper will at least refute ,mr4 ,taylor's ,idealism1 if it refutes anything at all3 for ,i shall undertake to show that what makes a thing real cannot possibly be its presence as an inseparable aspect of a senient experience4 ,but ,mr4 ,taylor's statement though clear1 ,i think1 with regard to the meaning of percipi is highly ambiguous in other respects4 ,i will leave it for the present to consider the next ambiguity in the statement3 ,esse is percipi4 ,what does the copula mean8 ,what can be meant by saying that ,esse is percipi8 ,there are just three meanings1 one or other of which such a statement must have1 if it is to be true2 and of these there is only one which it can have1 if it is to be important4 7#a7 ,the statement may be meant to assert that the word 'esse' is used to signify nothing either more or less than the word 'percipi'3 that the two words are precise synonyms3 that they are merely different names for one and the same thing3 that what is meant by esse is absolutely identical with what is meant by percipi4 ,i think ,i need not prove that the principle esse is percipi is not thus intended merely to define a word2 nor yet that1 if it were1 it would be an extremely bad definition4 ,but if it does not mean this1 only two alternatives remain4 ,the second is 7#b7 that what is meant by esse1 though not absolutely identical with what is meant by percipi1 yet includes the latter as a part of its meaning4 ,if this were the meaning of 'esse is percipi1' then to say that a thing was real would not be the same thing as to say that it was experienced4 ,that it was real would mean that it was experienced and something else besides3 'being experienced' would be analytically essential to reality1 but would not be the whole meaning of the term4 ,from the fact that a thing was real we should be able to infer1 by the law of contradiction1 that it was experienced2 since the latter would be part of what is meant by the former4 ,but1 on the other hand1 from the fact a thing was experienced we should not be able to infer that it was real2 since it would not follow from the fact that it had one of the attributes essential to reality1 that it also had the other or others4 ,now1 if we understand esse is percipi in this second sense1 we must distinguish three different things which it asserts4 ,first of all1 it gives a definition of the word 'reality1' asserting that word stands for a complex whole1 of which what is meant by 'percipi' forms a part4 ,and secondly it asserts that 'being experienced' forms a part of a certain whole4 ,both these propositions may be true1 and at all events ,i do not wish to dispute them4 ,i do not1 indeed1 think that the word 'reality' is commonly used to include 'percipi'3 but ,i do not wish to argue about the meaning of words4 ,and that many things which are experienced are also something else--that to be experienced forms part of certain wholes1 is1 of course1 indisputable4 ,but what ,i wish to point out is1 that neither of these propositions is of any importance1 unless we add to them a third4 ,that 'real' is a convenient name for a union of attributes which sometimes occurs1 it could not be worth any one's while to assert3 no inferences of any importance could be drawn from such an assertion4 ,our principle could only mean that when a thing happens to have percipi as well as the other qualities included under esse1 it has percipi3 and we should never be able to infer that it was experienced1 except from a proposition which already asserted that it was both experienced and something else4 ,accordingly1 if the assertion that percipi forms part of the whole meant by reality is to have any importance1 it must mean that the whole is organic1 at least in this sense1 that the other constituent or constituents of it cannot occur without percipi1 even if percipi can occur without them4 ,let us call these other constituents x4 ,the proposition that esse includes percipi1 and that therefore from esse percipi can be inferred1 can only be important if it is meant to assert that percipi can be inferred from x4 ,the only importance of the question whether the whole esse includes the part percipi rests therefore on the question whether the part x is necessarily connected with the part percipi4 ,and this is 7#c7 the third possible meaning of the assertion esse is percipi3 and1 as we now see1 the only important one4 ,esse is percipi asserts that wherever you have x you also have percipi that whatever has the property x also has the property that it is experienced4 ,and this being so1 it will be convenient if1 for the future1 ,i may be allowed to use the term 'esse' to denote x alone4 ,i do not wish thereby to beg the question whether what we commonly mean by the word 'real' does or does not include percipi as well as x4 ,i am quite content that my definition of 'esse' to denote x1 should be regarded merely as an arbitrary verbal definition4 ,whether it is so or not1 the only question of interest is whether from x percipi can be inferred1 and ,i should prefer to be able to express this in the form3 can percipi be inferred from esse8 ,only let it be understood that when ,i say esse1 that term will not for the future include percipi3 it denotes only that x1 which ,idealists1 perhaps rightly1 include along with percipi under their term esse4 ,that there is such an x they must admit on pain of making the proposition an absolute tautology2 and that from this x percipi can be inferred they must admit1 on pain of making it a perfectly barren analytic proposition4 ,whether x done should or should not be called esse is not worth a dispute3 what is worth dispute is whether percipi is necessarily connected with x4 ,we have therefore discovered the ambiguity of the copula in esse is percipi1 so far as to see that this principle asserts two distinct terms to be so related1 that whatever has the one1 which ,i call esse1 has also the property that it is experienced4 ,it asserts a necessary connexion between esse on the one hand and percipi on the other2 these two words denoting each a distinct term1 and esse denoting a term in which that denoted by percipi is not included4 ,we have1 then in esse is percipi1 a necessary synthetic proposition which ,i have undertaken to refute4 ,and ,i may say at once that1 understood as such1 it cannot be refuted4 ,if the ,idealist chooses to assert that it is merely a self-evident truth1 ,i have only to say that it does not appear to me to be so4 ,but ,i believe that no ,idealist ever has maintained it to be so4 ,although this--that two distinct terms are necessarily related--is the only sense which 'esse is percipi' can have if it is to be true and important1 it can have another sense1 if it is to be an important falsehood4 ,i believe that ,idealists all hold this important falsehood4 ,they do not perceive that ,esse is percipi must1 if true1 be merely a self-evident synthetic truth3 they either identify with it or give as a reason for it another proposition which must be false because it is self-contradictory4 ,unless they did so1 they would have to admit that it was a perfectly unfounded assumption2 and if they recognised that it was unfounded1 ,i do not think they would maintain its truth to be evident4 ,esse is percipi1 in the sense ,i have found for it1 may indeed be true2 ,i cannot1 refute it3 but if this sense were clearly apprehended1 no one1 ,i think1 would believe that it was true4 ,idealists1 we have seen1 must assert that whatever is experienced1 is necessarily so4 ,and this doctrine they commonly express by saying that 'the object of experience is inconceivable apart from the subject4' ,i have hitherto been concerned with pointing out what meaning this assertion must have1 if it is to be an important truth4 ,i now propose to show that it may have an important meaning1 which must be false1 because it is self-contradictory4 ,it is a well-known fact in the history of philosophy that necessary truths in general1 but especially those of which it is said that the opposite is inconceivable1 have been commonly supposed to be analytic1 in the sense that the proposition denying them was self-contradictory4 ,it was in this way1 commonly supposed1 before ,kant1 that many truths could be proved by the law of contradiction alone4 ,this is1 therefore1 a mistake which it is plainly easy for the best philosophers to make4 ,even since ,kant many have continued to assert it2 but ,i am aware that among those ,idealists1 who most properly deserve the name1 it has become more fashionable to assert that truths are both analytic and synthetic4 ,now with many of their reasons for asserting this ,i am not concerned3 it is possible that in some connexions the assertion may bear a useful and true sense4 ,but if we understand 'analytic' in the sense just defined1 namely1 what is proved by the law of contradiction alone1 it is plain that1 if 'synthetic' means what is not proved by this alone1 no truth can be both analytic and synthetic4 ,now it seems to me that those who do maintain truths to be both1 do nevertheless maintain that they are so in this as well as in other senses4 ,it is1 indeed1 extremely unlikely that so essential a part of the historical meaning of 'analytic' and 'synthetic' should have been entirely discarded1 especially since we find no express recognition that it is discarded4 ,in that case it is fair to suppose that modern ,idealists have been influenced by the view that certain truths can be proved by the law of contradiction alone4 ,i admit they also expressly declare that they can not3 but this is by no means sufficient to prove that they do not also think they are2 since it is very easy to hold two mutually contradictory opinions4 ,what ,i suggest then is that ,idealists hold the particular doctrine in question1 concerning the relation of subject and object in experience1 because they think it is an analytic truth in this restricted sense that it is proved by the law of contradiction alone4 ,i am suggesting that the ,idealist maintains that object and subject are necessarily connected1 mainly because he fails to see that they are distinct1 that they are two1 at all4 ,when he thinks of 'yellow' and when he thinks of the 'sensation of yellow1' he fails to see that there is anything whatever in the latter which is not in the former4 ,this being so1 to deny that yellow can ever be apart from the sensation of yellow is merely to deny that yellow can ever be other than it is2 since yellow and the sensation of yellow are absolutely identical4 ,to assert that yellow is necessarily an object of experience is to assert that yellow is necessarily yellow--a purely identical proposition1 and therefore proved by the law of contradiction alone4 ,of course1 the proposition also implies that experience is1 after all1 something distinct from yellow--else there would be no reason for insisting that yellow is a sensation3 and that the argument thus both affirms and denies that yellow and sensation of yellow are distinct1 is what sufficiently refutes it4 ,but this contradiction can easily be overlooked1 because though we are convinced1 in other connexions1 that 'experience' does mean something and something most important1 yet we are never distinctly aware what it means1 and thus in every particular case we do not notice its presence4 ,the facts present themselves as a kind of antinomy3 7#a7 ,experience is something unique and different from anything else2 7#b7 ,experience of green is entirely indistinguishable from green2 two propositions which cannot both be true4 ,idealists1 holding both1 can only take refuge in arguing from the one in some connexions and from the other in others4 ,but ,i am well aware that there are many ,idealists who would repel it as an utterly unfounded charge that they fail to distinguish between a sensation or idea and what ,i will call its object4 ,and there are1 ,i admit1 many who not only imply1 as we all do1 that green is distinct from the sensation of green1 but expressly insist upon the distinction as an important part of their system4 ,they would perhaps only assert that the two form an inseparable unity4 ,but ,i wish to point out that many1 who use this phrase1 and who do admit the distinction1 are not thereby absolved from the charge that they deny it4 ,for there is a certain doctrine1 very prevalent among philosophers nowadays1 which by a very simple reduction may be seen to assert that two distinct things both are and are not distinct4 ,a distinction is asserted2 but it is also asserted that the things distinguished form an 'organic unity1' ,but1 forming such a unity1 it is held1 each would not be what it is apart from its relation to the other4 ,hence to consider either by itself is to make an illegitimate abstraction4 ,the recognition that there are 'organic unities' and 'illegitimate abstractions' in this sense is regarded as one of the chief conquests of modern philosophy4 ,but what is the sense attached to these terms8 ,an abstraction is illegitimate1 when and only when we attempt to assert of a part--of something abstracted--that which is true only of the whole to which it belongs3 and it may perhaps be useful to point out that this should not be done4 ,but the application actually made of this principle1 and what perhaps would be expressly acknowledged as its meaning1 is something much the reverse of useful4 ,the principle is used to assert that certain abstractions are in all cases illegitimate2 that whenever you try to assert anything whatever of that which is part of an organic whole1 what you assert can only be true of the whole4 ,and this principle1 so far from being a useful truth1 is necessarily false4 ,for if the whole can1 nay must1 be substituted for the part in all propositions and for all purposes1 this can only be because the whole is absolutely identical with the part4 ,when1 therefore1 we are told that green and the sensation of green are certainly distinct but yet are not separable1 or that it is an illegitimate abstraction to consider the one apart from the other1 what these provisos are used to assert is1 that though the two things are distinct yet you not only can but must treat them as if they were not4 ,many philosophers1 therefore1 when they admit a distinction1 yet 7following the lead of ,hegel7 boldly assert their right1 in a slightly more obscure form of words1 also to deny it4 ,the principle of organic unities1 like that of combined analysis and synthesis1 is mainly used to defend the practice of holding both of two contradictory propositions1 wherever this may seem convenient4 ,in this1 as in other matters1 ,hegel's main service to philosophy has consisted in giving a name to and erecting into a principle1 a type of fallacy to which experience had shown philosophers1 along with the rest of mankind1 to be addicted4 ,no wonder that he has followers and admirers4 ,i have shown then1 so far1 that when the ,idealist asserts the important principle ',esse is percipi' he must1 if it is to be true1 mean by this that3 ,whatever is experienced also must be experienced4 ,and ,i have also shown that he may identify with1 or give as a reason for1 this proposition1 one which must be false1 because it is self contradictory4 ,but at this point ,i propose to make a complete break in my argument4 ',esse is percipi1' we have seen1 asserts of two terms1 as distinct from one another as 'green' and 'sweet1' that whatever has the one has also the other3 it asserts that 'being' and 'being experienced' are necessarily connected3 that whatever is is also experienced4 ,and this1 ,i admit1 cannot be directly refuted4 ,but ,i believe it to be false2 and ,i have asserted that anybody who saw that 'esse and percipi' were as distinct as 'green' and 'sweet' would be no more ready to believe that whatever is is also experienced1 than to believe that whatever is green is also sweet4 ,i have asserted that no one would believe that 'esse is percipi' if they saw how different esse is from percipi3 but this ,i shall not try to prove4 ,i have asserted that all who do believe that 'esse is percipi' identify with it or take as a reason for it a self-contradictory proposition3 but this ,i shall not try to prove4 ,i shall only try to show that certain propositions which ,i assert to be believed1 are false4 ,that they are believed1 and that without this belief 'esse is percipi' would not be believed either1 ,i must leave without a proof4 ,i pass1 then1 from the uninteresting question ',is 'esse percipi8' to the still more uninteresting and apparently irrelevant question ',what is a sensation or idea8' ,we all know that the sensation of blue differs from that of green4 ,but it is plain that if both are sensations they also have some point in common4 ,what is it that they have in common8 ,and how is this common element related to the points in which they differ8 ,i will call the common element 'consciousness' without yet attempting to say what the thing ,i so call is4 ,we have then in every sensation two distinct terms1 7#a7 'consciousness1' in respect of which all sensations are alike2 and 7#b7 something else1 in respect of which one sensation differs from another4 ,it will be convenient if ,i may be allowed to call this second term the 'object' of a sensation3 this also without yet attempting to say what ,i mean by the word4 ,we have then in every sensation two distinct elements1 one which ,i call consciousness1 and another which ,i call the object of consciousness4 ,this must be so if the sensation of blue and the sensation of green1 though different in one respect1 are alike in another3 blue is one object of sensation and green is another1 and consciousness1 which both sensations have in common1 is different from either4 ,but1 further1 sometimes the sensation of blue exists in my mind and sometimes it does not2 and knowing1 as we now do1 that the sensation of blue includes two different elements1 namely consciousness and blue1 the question arises whether1 when the sensation of blue exists1 it is the consciousness which exists1 or the blue which exists1 or both4 ,and one point at least is plain3 namely that these three alternatives are all different from one another4 ,so that1 if any one tells us that to say ',blue exists' is the same thing as to say that ',both blue and consciousness exist1' he makes a mistake and a self-contradictory mistake4 ,but another point is also plain1 namely1 that when the sensation exists1 the consciousness1 at least1 certainly does exist2 for when ,i say that the sensations of blue and of green both exist1 ,i certainly mean that what is common to both and in virtue of which both are called sensations1 exists in each case4 ,the only alternative left1 then1 is that either both exist or the consciousness exists alone4 ,if1 therefore1 any one tells us that the existence of blue is the same thing as the existence of the sensation of blue he makes a mistake and a self-contradictory mistake1 for he asserts either that blue is the same thing as blue together with consciousness1 or that it is the same thing as consciousness alone4 ,accordingly to identify either blue or any other of what ,i have called objects of sensation1 with the corresponding sensation is in every case1 a self-contradictory error4 ,it is to identify a part either with the whole of which it is a part or else with the other part of the same whole4 ,if we are told that the assertion ,blue exists is meaningless unless we mean by it that ,the sensation of blue exists1 we are told what is certainly false and self-contradictory4 ,if we are told that the existence of blue is inconceivable apart from the existence of the sensation1 the speaker probably means to convey to us1 by this ambiguous expression1 what is a self-contradictory error4 ,for we can and must conceive the existence of blue as something quite distinct from the existence of the sensation4 ,we can and must conceive that blue might exist and yet the sensation of blue not exist4 ,for my own part ,i not only conceive this1 but conceive it to be true4 ,either therefore this terrific assertion of inconceivability means what is false and self-contradictory or else it means only that as a matter of fact blue never can exist unless the sensation of it exists also4 ,and at this point ,i need not conceal my opinion that no philosopher has ever yet succeeded in avoiding this self-contradictory error3 that the most striking results both of ,idealism and of ,agnosticism are only obtained by identifying blue with the sensation of blue3 that esse is held to be percipi1 solely because what is experienced is held to be identical with the experience of it4 ,that ,berkeley and ,mill committed this error will1 perhaps1 be granted3 that modern ,idealists make it will1 ,i hope1 appear more probable later4 ,but that my opinion is plausible1 ,i will now offer two pieces of evidence4 ,the first is that language offers us no means of referring to such objects as blue and green and sweet1 except by calling them sensations3 it is an obvious violation of language to call them things or objects or terms4 ,and similarly we have no natural means of referring to such objects as causality or likeness or identity1 except by calling them ideas or notions or conceptions4 ,but it is hardly likely that if philosophers had clearly distinguished in the past between a sensation or idea and what ,i have called its object1 there should have been no separate name for the latter4 ,they have always used the same name for these two different things 7if ,i may call them so73 and hence there is some probability that they have supposed these things not to be two and different1 but one and the same4 ,and1 secondly1 there is a very good reason why they should have supposed so1 in the fact that when we refer to introspection and try to discover what the sensation of blue is1 it is very easy to suppose that we have before us only a single term4 ,the term blue is easy enough to distinguish1 but the other element which ,i have called consciousness--that which sensation of blue has in common with sensation of green--is extremely difficult to fix4 ,that many people fail to distinguish it at all is sufficiently shown by the fact that there are materialists4 ,and1 in general1 that which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact seems to escape us3 it seems1 if ,i may use a metaphor1 to be transparent--we look through it and see nothing but the blue2 we may be convinced that there is something but what it is no philosopher1 ,i think1 has yet clearly recognised4 ,but this was a digression4 ,the point ,i had established so far was that in every sensation or idea we must distinguish two elements1 7#a7 the object1 or that in which one differs from another2 and 7#b7 consciousness1 or that which all have in common--that which makes them sensations or mental facts4 ,this being so1 it followed that when a sensation or idea exists1 we have to choose between the alternatives that either object alone1 or consciousness alone1 or both1 exist2 and ,i showed that of these alternatives one1 namely that the object only exists1 is excluded by the fact that what we mean to assert is certainly the existence of a mental fact4 ,there remains the question3 ,do both exist8 ,or does the consciousness alone8 ,and to this question one answer has hitherto been given universally3 ,that both exist4 ,this answer follows from the analysis hitherto accepted of the relation of what ,i have called object to consciousness in any sensation or idea4 ,it is held that what ,i call the object is merely the content of a sensation or idea4 ,it is held that in each case we can distinguish two elements and two only1 7#a7 the fact that there is feeling or experience1 and 7#b7 what is felt or experienced2 the sensation or idea1 it is said1 forms a whole1 in which we must distinguish two inseparable aspects1 content and existence4 ,i shall try to show that this analysis is false2 and for that purpose ,i must ask what may seem an extraordinary question3 namely what is meant by saying that one thing is content of another8 ,it is not usual to ask this question2 the term is used as if everybody must understand it4 ,but since ,i am going to maintain that blue is not the content of the sensation of blue1 and what is more important1 that1 even if it were this analysis would leave out the most important element in the sensation of blue1 it is necessary that ,i should try to explain precisely what it is that ,i shall deny4 ,what then is meant by saying that one thing is the content of another8 ,first of all ,i wish to point out that blue is rightly and properly said to be part of the content of a blue flower4 ,if1 therefore1 we also assert that it is part of the content of the sensation of blue1 we assert that it has to the other parts 7if any7 of this whole the same relation which it has to the other parts of a blue flower--and we assert only this3 we cannot mean to assert that it has to the sensation of blue any relation which it does not have to the blue flower4 ,and we have seen that the sensation of blue contains at least one other element beside blue--namely1 what ,i call consciousness1 which makes it a sensation4 ,so far then as we assert that blue is the content of the sensation1 we assert that it has to this consciousness the same relation which it has to the other parts of a blue flower3 we do assert this1 and we assert no more than this4 ,into the question what exactly the relation is between blue and a blue flower in virtue of which we call the former part of its content ,i do not propose to enter4 ,it is sufficient for my purpose to point out that it is the general relation most commonly meant when we talk of a thing and its qualities2 and that this relation is such that to say the thing exists implies that the qualities also exist4 ,the content of the thing is what we assert to exist1 when we assert that the thing exists4 ,when1 therefore1 blue is said to be part of the content of the sensation of blue1 the latter is treated as if it were a whole constituted in exactly the same way as any other thing4 ,the sensation of blue1 on this view1 differs from a blue bead or a blue beard1 in exactly the same way in which the two latter differ from one another3 the blue bead differs from the blue beard1 in that while the former contains glass1 the latter contains hair2 and the sensation of blue differs from both in that1 instead of glass or hair1 it contains consciousness4 ,the relation of the blue to the consciousness is conceived to be exactly the same as that of the blue to the glass or hair3 it is in all three cases the quality of a thing4 ,but ,i said just now that the sensation of blue was analysed into content and existence1 and that blue was said to be the content of the idea of blue4 ,there is an ambiguity in this and a possible error1 which ,i must note in passing4 ,the term content may be used in two senses4 ,if we use content as equivalent to what ,mr4 ,bradley calls the what--if we mean by it the whole of what is said to exist1 when the thing is said to exist1 then blue is certainly not the content of the sensation of blue3 part of the content of the sensation is1 in this sense of the term1 that other element which ,i have called consciousness4 ,the analysis of this sensation into the content blue1 on the one hand1 and mere existence on the other1 is therefore certainly false2 in it we have again the self-contradictory identification of ,blue exists with ,the sensation of blue exists1 ,but there is another sense in which blue might properly be said to be the content of the sensation--namely1 the sense in which content1 like is opposed to substance or matter4 ,for the element consciousness1 being common to all sensations1 may be and certainly is regarded as in some sense their substance1 and by the content of each is only meant that in respect of which one differs from another4 ,in this sense then blue might be said to be the content of the sensation2 but1 in that case1 the analysis into content and existence is1 at least1 misleading1 since under existence must be included what exists in the sensation other than blue4 ,we have it1 then1 as a universally received opinion that blue is related to the sensation or idea of blue1 as its content1 and that this view1 if it is to be true1 must mean that blue is part of what is said to exist when we say that the sensation exists4 ,to say that the sensation exists is to say both that blue exists and that consciousness1 whether we call it the substance of which blue is the content or call it another part of the content1 exists too4 ,any sensation or idea is a thing1 and what ,i have called its object is the quality of this thing4 ,such a thing is what we think of when we think of a mental image4 ,a mental image is conceived as if it were related to that of which it is the image 7if there be any such thing7 in exactly the same way as the image in a looking-glass is related to that of which it is the reflection2 in both cases there is identity of content1 and the image in the looking-glass differs from that in the mind solely in respect of the fact that in the one case the other constituent of the image is glass and in the other case it is consciousness4 ,if the image is of blue1 it is not conceived that this content has any relation to the consciousness but what it has to the glass3 it ,is conceived merely to be its content4 ,and owing to the fact that sensations and ideas are all considered to be wholes of this description--things in the mind--the question3 ,what do we know8 is considered to be identical with the question3 ,what reason have we for supposing that there are things outside the mind corresponding to these that are inside it8 ,what ,i wish to point out is 7#a7 that we have no reason for supposing that there are such things as mental images at all--for supposing that blue is part of the content of the sensation of blue1 and 7#b7 that even if there are mental images1 no mental image and no sensation or idea is merely a thing of this kind3 that 'blue1' even if it is part of the content of the image or sensation or idea of blue1 is always also related to it in quite another way1 and that this other relation1 omitted in the traditional analysis1 is the only one which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact at all4 ,the true analysis of a sensation or idea is as follows4 ,the element that is common to them all1 and which ,i have called consciousness1 really is consciousness4 ,a sensation is1 in reality1 a case of 'knowing' or 'being aware of' or 'experiencing' something4 ,when we know that the sensation of blue exists1 the fact we know is that there exists an awareness of blue4 ,and this awareness is not merely1 as we have hitherto seen it must be1 itself something distinct and unique1 utterly different from blue3 it also has a perfectly distinct and unique relation to blue1 a relation which is not that of thing or substance to content1 nor of one part of content to another part of content4 ,this relation is just that which we mean in every case by 'knowing4' ,to have in your mind 'knowledge' of blue1 is not to have in your mind a 'thing' or 'image' of which blue is the content4 ,to be aware of the sensation of blue is not to be aware of a mental image--of a thing1 of which 'blue' and some other element are constituent parts in the same sense in which blue and glass are constituents of a blue bead4 ,it is to be aware of an awareness of blue2 awareness being used1 in both cases1 in exactly the same sense4 ,this element1 we have seen1 is certainly neglected by the 'content' theory3 that theory entirely fails to express the fact that there is1 in the sensation of blue1 this unique relation between blue and the other constituent4 ,and what ,i contend is that this omission is not mere negligence of expression1 but is due to the fact that though philosophers have recognised that something distinct is meant by consciousness1 they have never yet had a clear conception of what that something is4 ,they have not been able to hold it and blue before their minds and to compare them1 in the same way in which they can compare blue and green4 ,and this for the reason ,i gave above3 namely that the moment we try to fix our attention upon consciousness and to see what1 distinctly1 it is1 it seems to vanish3 it seems as if we had before us a mere emptiness4 ,when we try to introspect the sensation of blue1 all we can see is the blue3 the other element is as if it were diaphanous4 ,yet it can be distinguished if we look attentively enough1 and if we know that there is something to look for4 ,my main object in this paragraph has been to try to make the reader see it2 but ,i fear ,i shall have succeeded very ill4 ,it being the case1 then1 that the sensation of blue includes in its analysis1 beside blue1 both a unique element 'awareness' and a unique relation of this element to blue1 ,i can make plain what ,i meant by asserting1 as two distinct propositions1 7#a7 that blue is probably not part of the content of the sensation at all1 and 7#b7 that1 even it were1 the sensation would nevertheless not be the sensation of blue1 if blue had only this relation to it4 ,the first hypothesis may now be expressed by saying that1 if it were true1 then1 when the sensation of blue exists1 there exists a blue awareness3 offence may be taken at the expression1 but yet it expresses just what should be and is meant by saying that blue is1 in this case1 a content of consciousness or experience4 ,whether or not1 when ,i have the sensation of blue1 my consciousness or awareness is thus blue1 my introspection does not enable me to decide with certainty3 ,i only see no reason for thinking that it is4 ,but whether it is or not1 the point is unimportant1 for introspection does enable me to decide that something else is also true3 namely that ,i am aware of blue1 and by this ,i mean1 that my awareness has to blue a quite different and distinct relation4 ,it is possible1 ,i admit1 that my awareness is blue as well as being of blue3 but what ,i am quite sure of is that it is of blue2 that it has to blue the simple and unique relation the existence of which alone justifies us in distinguishing knowledge of a thing from the thing known1 indeed in distinguishing mind from matter4 ,and this result ,i may express by saying that what is called the content of a sensation is in very truth what ,i originally called it--the sensation's object4 ,but1 if all this be true1 what follows8 ,idealists admit that some things really exist of which they are not aware3 there are some things1 they hold1 which are not inseparable aspects of their experience1 even if they be inseparable aspects of some experience4 ,they further hold that some of the things of which they are sometimes aware do really exist1 even when they are not aware of them3 they hold for instance that they are sometimes aware of other minds1 which continue to exist even when they are not aware of them4 ,they are1 therefore1 sometimes aware of something which is not an inseparable aspect of their own experience4 ,they do know some things which are not a mere part or content of their experience4 ,and what my analysis of sensation has been designed to show is1 that whenever ,i have a mere sensation or idea1 the fact is that ,i am then aware of something which is equally and in the same sense not an inseparable aspect of my experience4 ,the awareness which ,i have maintained to be included in sensation is the very same unique fact which constitutes every kind of knowledge3 blue is as much an object1 and as little a mere content1 of my experience1 when ,i experience it1 as the most exalted and independent real thing of which ,i am ever aware4 ,there is1 therefore1 no question of how we are to get outside the circle of our own ideas and sensations4 ,merely to have a sensation is already to be outside that circle4 ,it is to know something which is as truly and really not a part of my experience1 as anything which ,i can ever know4 ,now ,i think ,i am not mistaken in asserting that the reason why ,idealists suppose that everything which is must be an inseparable aspect of some experience1 is that they suppose some things1 at least1 to be inseparable aspects of their experience4 ,and there is certainly nothing which they are so firmly convinced to be an inseparable aspect of their experience as what they call the content of their ideas and sensations4 ,if1 therefore1 this turns out in every case1 whether it be also the content or not1 to be at least not an inseparable aspect of the experience of it1 it will be readily admitted that nothing else which we experience ever is such an inseparable aspect4 ,but if we never experience anything but what is not an inseparable aspect of that experience1 how can we infer that anything whatever1 let alone everything1 is an inseparable aspect of any experience8 ,how utterly unfounded is the assumption that esse is percipi appears in the clearest light4 ,but further ,i think it may be seen that if the object of an ,idealist's sensation were1 as he supposes1 not the object but merely the content of that sensation1 if1 that is to say1 it really were an inseparable aspect of his experience1 each ,idealist could never be aware either of himself or of any other real thing4 ,for the relation of a sensation to its object is certainly the same as that of any other instance of experience to its object2 and this1 ,i think1 is generally admitted even by ,idealists3 they state as readily that what is judged or thought or perceived is the content of that judgment or thought or perception1 as that blue ,is the content of the sensation of blue4 ,but1 if so1 then when any ,idealist thinks he is aware of himself or of any one else1 this cannot really be the case4 ,the fact ,is1 on his own theory1 that himself and that other person are in reality mere contents of an awareness1 which is aware of nothing whatever4 ,all that can be said is that there is an awareness in him1 with a certain content3 it can never be true that there is in him a consciousness of anything4 ,and similarly he is never aware either of the fact that he exists or that reality is spiritual4 ,the real fact1 which he describes in those terms1 is that his existence and the spirituality of reality are contents of an awareness1 which is aware of nothing--certainly not1 then1 of it own content4 ,and further if everything1 of which he thinks he is aware1 is in reality merely a content of his own experience he has certainly no reason for holding that anything does exist except himself3 it will1 of course1 be possible that other persons do exist2 solipsism will not be necessarily true2 but he cannot possibly infer from anything he holds that it is not true4 ,that he himself exists will of course follow from his premiss that many things are contents of his experience4 ,but since everything1 of which he thinks himself aware1 is in reality merely an inseparable aspect of that awareness2 this premiss allows no inference that any of these contents1 far less any other consciousness1 exists at all except as an inseparable aspect of his awareness1 that is1 as part of himself4 ,such1 and not those which he takes to follow from it1 are the consequences which do follow from the ,idealist's supposition that the object of an experience is in reality merely a content or inseparable aspect of that experience4 ,if1 on the other hand1 we clearly recognise the nature of that peculiar relation which ,i have called awareness of anything2 if we see that this is involved equally in the analysis of every experience--from the merest sensation to the most developed perception or reflexion1 and that this is in fact the only essential element in an experience--the only thing that is both common and peculiar to all experiences--the only thing which gives us reason to call any fact mental2 if1 further1 we recognise that this awareness is and must be in all cases of such a nature that its object1 when we are aware of it1 is precisely what it would be1 if we were not aware3 then it becomes plain that the existence of a table in space is related to my experience of it in precisely the same way as the existence of my own experience is related to my experience of that4 ,of both we are merely aware3 if we are aware that the one exists1 we are aware in precisely the same sense that the other exists2 and if it is true that my experience can exist1 even when ,i do not happen to be aware of its existence1 we have exactly the same reason for supposing that the table can do so also4 ,when1 therefore1 ,berkeley1 supposed that the only thing of which ,i am directly aware is my own sensations and ideas1 he supposed what was false2 and when ,kant supposed that the objectivity of things in space consisted in the fact that they were ,vorstellungen having to one another different relations from those which the same ,vorstellungen have to one another in subjective experience1 he supposed what was equally false4 ,i am as directly aware of the existence of material things in space as of my own sensations2 and what ,i am aware of with regard to each is exactly the same--namely that in one case the material thing1 and in the other case my sensation does really exist4 ,the question requiring to be asked about material things is thus not3 ,what reason have we for supposing that anything exists corresponding to our sensations8 but3 ,what reason have we for supposing that material things do not exist1 since their existence has precisely the same evidence as that of our sensations8 ,that either exist may be false2 but if it is a reason for doubting the existence of matter1 that it is an inseparable aspect of our experience1 the same reasoning will prove conclusively that our experience does not exist either1 since that must also be an inseparable aspect of our experience of it4 ,the only reasonable alternative to the admission that matter exists as well as spirit1 is absolute ,scepticism--that1 as likely as not nothing exists at all4 ,all other suppositions--the ,agnostic's1 that something1 at all events1 does exist1 as much as the ,idealist's1 that spirit does--are1 if we have no reason for believing in matter1 as baseless as the grossest superstitions4 #a ,international ,journal of ,ethics1 ,october1 #aijb4 ,,the ,,nature ,,and ,,reality ,,of ,,objects ,,of ,,perception ,there are two beliefs in which almost all philosophers1 and almost all ordinary people are agreed4 ,almost everyone believes that he himself and what he directly perceives do not constitute the whole of reality3 he believes that something other than himself and what he directly perceives exists or is real4 ,i do not mean to say that almost everyone believes that what he directly perceives is real3 ,i only mean that he does believe that1 whether what he directly perceives is real or not1 something other than it and other than himself certainly is so4 ,and not only does each of us thus agree in believing that something other than himself and what he directly perceives is real3 almost everyone also believes that among the real things1 other than himself and what he directly perceives1 are other persons who have thoughts and perceptions in some respects similar to his own4 ,that most people believe this ,i think ,i need scarcely try to show4 ,but since a good many philosophers may appear to have held views contradictory of this one1 ,i will briefly point out my reason for asserting that most philosophers1 even among those 7if any7 who have believed the contradictory of this1 have yet held this as well4 ,almost all philosophers tell us something about the nature of human knowledge and human perception4 ,they tell us that we perceive so and so2 that the nature or origin of our perceptions is such and such2 or 7as ,i have just been telling you7 that men in general have such and such beliefs4 ,it might1 indeed1 be said that we are not to interpret such language too strictly3 that1 though a philosopher talks about human knowledge and our perceptions1 he only means to talk about his own4 ,but in many cases a philosopher will leave no doubt upon this point1 by expressly assuming that there are other perceptions1 which differ in some respects from his own3 such1 for instance1 is the case when 7as is so common nowadays7 a philosopher introduces psycho-genetic considerations into his arguments --considerations concerning the nature of the perceptions of men who existed before and at a much lower stage of culture than himself4 ,any philosopher1 who uses such arguments1 obviously assumes that perceptions other than his own have existed or been real4 ,and even those philosophers who think themselves justified in the conclusion that neither their own perceptions nor any perceptions like theirs are ultimately real1 would1 ,i think admit1 that phenomenally1 at least1 they are real1 and are certainly more real than some other things4 ,almost everyone1 then1 does believe that some perceptions other than his own1 and which he himself does not directly perceive1 are real2 and believing this1 he believes that something other than himself and what he directly perceives is real4 ,but how do we know that anything exists except our own perceptions1 and what we directly perceive8 ,how do we know that there are any other people1 who have perceptions in some respects similar to our own8 ,i believe that these two questions express very exactly the nature of the problem which it is my chief object1 in this paper1 to discuss4 ,when ,i say these words to you1 they will at once suggest to your minds the very question1 to which ,i desire to find an answer2 they will convey to you the very same meaning which ,i have before my mind1 when ,i use the words4 ,you will understand at once what question it is that ,i mean to ask4 ,but1 for all that1 the words which ,i have used are highly ambiguous4 ,if you begin to ask yourselves what ,i do mean by them1 you will find that there are several quite different things which ,i might mean4 ,and there is1 ,i think1 great danger of confusing these different meanings with one another4 ,i think that philosophers1 when they have asked this question in one sense1 have often answered it in quite a different sense2 and yet have supposed that the answer which they have given is an answer to the very same question which they originally asked4 ,it is precisely because there is this ambiguity--this danger of confusion1 in the words which ,i have used1 that ,i have chosen to use them4 ,i wish to point out as clearly as ,i can1 not only what ,i do mean by them1 but also some things which ,i do not mean2 and ,i wish to make it clear that the questions which ,i do not mean to ask1 are different questions from that which ,i do mean to ask4 ,i will take the second of my two questions1 since there is in the other an additional ambiguity to which ,i do not now wish to call attention4 ,my second question was3 ,how do we know that there exist any other people who have perceptions in some respects similar to our own8 ,what does this question mean8 ,now ,i think you may have noticed that when you make a statement to another person1 and he answers ,how do you know that that is so8 he very often means to suggest that you do not know it4 ,and yet1 though he means to suggest that you do not know it1 he may not for a moment wish to suggest that you do not believe it1 nor even that you have not that degree or kind of conviction1 which goes beyond mere belief1 and which may be taken to be essential to anything which can properly be called knowledge4 ,he does not mean to suggest for a moment that you are saying something which you do not believe to be true1 or even that you are not thoroughly convinced of its truth4 ,what he does mean to suggest is that what you asserted was not true1 even though you may not only have believed it but felt sure that it was true4 ,he suggests that you don't know it1 in the sense that what you believe or feel sure of is not true4 ,now ,i point this out1 not because ,i myself mean to suggest that we don't know the existence of other persons1 but merely in order to show that the word know is sometimes used in a sense in which it is not merely equivalent to believe or feel sure of4 ,when the question ,how do you know that8 is asked1 the questioner does not merely mean to ask how do you come to believe that1 or to be convinced of it8 ,he sometimes1 and ,i think generally1 means to ask a question with regard to the truth1 and not with regard to the existence of your belief4 ,and similarly when ,i ask the question ,how do we know that other people exist8 ,i do not mean to ask ,how do we come to believe in or be convinced of their existence8 ,i do not intend to discuss this question at all4 ,i shall not ask what suggests to us our belief in the existence of other persons or of an external world2 ,i shall not ask whether we arrive at it by inference or by instinct or in any other manner1 which ever has been or may be suggested3 ,i shall discuss no question of any kind whatever with regard to its origin1 or cause1 or the way in which it arises4 ,these psychological questions are not what ,i propose to discuss4 ,when ,i ask the question ,how do we know that other people exist8 ,i do not mean3 ,how does our belief in their existence arise8 ,but if ,i do not mean this what do ,i mean ,p ,i have said that ,i mean to ask a question with regard to the truth of that belief2 and the particular question which ,i mean to ask might be expressed in the words3 ,what reason have we for our belief in the existence of other persons8 ,but these are words which themselves need some explanation1 and ,i will try to give it4 ,in the first place1 then1 when ,i talk of a reason1 ,i mean only a good reason and not a bad one4 ,a bad reason is1 no doubt1 a reason1 in one sense of the word2 but ,i mean to use the word reason exclusively in the sense in which it is equivalent to good reason4 ,but what1 then1 is meant by a good reason for a belief8 ,i think ,i can express sufficiently accurately what ,i mean by it in this connection1 as follows3--,a good reason for a belief is a proposition which is true1 and which would not be true unless the belief were also true4 ,we should1 ,i think1 commonly say that when a man knows such a proposition1 he has a good reason for his belief2 and1 when he knows no such proposition1 we should say that he has no reason for it4 ,when he knows such a proposition1 we should say he knows something which is a reason for thinking his belief to be true--something from which it could be validly inferred4 ,and if1 in answer to the question ,how do you know so and so8 he were to state such a proposition1 we should1 ,i think1 feel that he had answered the question which we meant to ask4 ,suppose1 for instance1 in answer to the question ,how do you know that8 he were to say ,i saw it in the ,times4 ,then1 if we believed that he had seen it in the ,times1 and also believed that it would not have been in the ,times1 unless it had been true1 we should admit that he had answered our question4 ,we should no longer doubt that he did know what he asserted1 we should no longer doubt that his belief was true4 ,but if1 on the other hand1 we believed that he had not seen it in the ,times--if1 for instance1 we had reason to believe that what he saw was not the statement which he made1 but some other statement which he mistook for it2 or if we believed that the kind of statement in question was one with regard to which there was no presumption that1 being in the ,times1 it would be true3 in either of these cases we should1 ,i think1 feel that he had not answered our question4 ,we should still doubt whether what he had said was true4 ,we should still doubt whether he knew what he asserted2 and since a man cannot tell you how he knows a thing unless he does know that thing1 we should think that1 though he might have told us truly how he came to believe it1 he had certainly not told us how he knew it4 ,but though we should thus hold that he had not told us how he knew what he had asserted1 and that he had given us no reason for believing it to be true2 we must yet admit that he had given us a reason in a sense--a bad reason1 a reason which was no reason because it had no tendency to show that what he believed was true2 and we might also be perfectly convinced that he had given us the reason why he believed it--the proposition by believing which he was induced also to believe his original assertion4 ,i mean1 then1 by my question1 ,how do we know that other people exist8 what1 ,i believe1 is ordinarily meant1 namely1 ,what reason have we for believing that they exist8 and by this again ,i mean1 what ,i also believe is ordinarily meant1 namely1 ,what proposition do we believe1 which is both true itself and is also such that it would not be true1 unless other people existed8 ,and ,i hope it is plain that this question1 thus explained1 is quite a different question from the psychological question1 which ,i said ,i did not mean to ask--from the question1 ,how does our belief in the existence of other people arise8 ,my illustration1 ,i hope1 has made this plain4 ,for ,i have pointed out that we may quite well hold that a man has told us how a belief of his arises1 and even what was the reason which made him adopt that belief1 and yet may have failed to give us any good reason for his belief--any proposition which is both true itself1 and also such that the truth of his belief follows from it4 ,and1 indeed1 it is plain that if any one ever believes what is false1 he is believing something for which there is no good reason1 in the sense which ,i have explained1 and for which1 therefore1 he cannot possibly have a good reason2 and yet it plainly does not follow that his belief did not arise in anyway whatever1 nor even that he had no reason for it--no bad reason4 ,it is plain that false beliefs do arise in some way or other--they have origins and causes3 and many people who hold them have bad reasons for holding them--their belief does arise 7by inference or otherwise7 from their belief in some other proposition1 which is not itself true1 or else is not a good reason for holding that1 which they infer from it1 or which1 in some other way1 it induces them to believe4 ,i submit1 therefore1 that the question1 ,what good reason have we for believing in the existence of other people8 is different from the question1 ,how does that belief arise8 ,but when ,i say this1 ,i must not be misunderstood2 ,i must not be understood to affirm that the answer to both questions may not1 in a sense1 be the same4 ,i fully admit that the very same fact1 which suggests to us the belief in the existence of other people1 may also be a good reason for believing that they do exist4 ,all that ,i maintain is that the question whether it is a good reason for that belief is a different question from the question whether it suggests that belief3 if we assert that a certain fact both suggests our belief in the existence of other persons and is also a good reason for holding that belief1 we are asserting two different things and not one only4 ,and hence1 when ,i assert1 as ,i shall assert1 that we have a good reason for our belief in the existence of other persons1 ,i must not be understood also to assert either that we infer the existence of other persons from this good reason1 or that our belief in that good reason suggests our belief in the existence of other persons in any other way4 ,it is plain1 ,i think1 that a man may believe two true propositions1 of which the one would not be true1 unless the other were true too1 without1 in any sense whatever1 having arrived at his belief in the one from his belief in the other2 and it is plain1 at all events1 that the question whether his belief in the one did arise from his belief in the other1 is a different question from the question whether the truth of the one belief follows from the truth of the other4 ,i hope1 then1 that ,i have made it a little clearer what ,i mean by the question3 ,what reason have we for believing in the existence of other people8 and that what ,i mean by it is at all events different from what is meant by the question3 ,how does our belief in the existence of other people arise8 ,but ,i am sorry to say that ,i have not yet reached the end of my explanations as to what my meaning is4 ,i am afraid that the subject may seem very tedious4 ,i can assure you that ,i have found it excessively tedious to try to make my meaning clear to myself4 ,i have constantly found that ,i was confusing one question with another1 and that1 where ,i had thought ,i had a good reason for some assertion1 ,i had in reality no good reason4 ,but ,i may perhaps remind you that this question1 ,how do we know so and so8 ,what reason have we for believing it8 is one of which philosophy is full2 and one to which the most various answers have been given4 ,philosophy largely consists in giving reasons2 and the question what are good reasons for a particular conclusion and what are bad1 is one upon which philosophers have disagreed as much as on any other question4 ,for one and the same conclusion different philosophers have given not only different1 but incompatible1 reasons2 and conversely different philosophers have maintained that one and the same fact is a reason for incompatible conclusions4 ,we are apt1 ,i think1 sometimes to pay too little attention to this fact4 ,when we have taken1 perhaps1 no little pains to assure ourselves that our own reasoning is correct1 and especially when we know that a great many other philosophers agree with us1 we are apt to assume that the arguments of those philosophers1 who have come to a contradictory conclusion1 are scarcely worthy of serious consideration4 ,and yet1 ,i think1 there is scarcely a single reasoned conclusion in philosophy1 as to which we shall not find that some other philosopher1 who has1 so far as we know1 bestowed equal pains on his reasoning1 and with equal ability1 has reached a conclusion incompatible with ours4 ,we may be satisfied that we are right1 and we may1 in fact1 be so2 but it is certain that both cannot be right3 either our opponent or we must have mistaken bad reasons for good4 ,and this being so1 however satisfied we may be that it is not we who have done so1 ,i think we should at least draw the conclusion that it is by no means easy to avoid mistaking bad reasons for good2 and that no process1 however laborious1 which is in the least likely to help us in avoiding this should be evaded4 ,but it is at least possible that one source of error lies in mistaking one kind of reason for another--in supposing that1 because there is1 in one sense1 a reason for a given conclusion1 there is also a reason in another1 or that because there is1 in one sense1 no reason for a given conclusion1 there is1 therefore1 no reason at all4 ,i believe myself that this is a very frequent source of error3 but it is at least a possible one4 ,and where1 as disagreements show1 there certainly is error on one side or the other1 and reason1 too1 to suppose that the error is not easy to detect1 ,i think we should spare no pains in investigating any source1 from which it is even possible that the error may arise4 ,for these reasons ,i think ,i am perhaps doing right in trying to explain as clearly as possible not only what reasons we have for believing in an external world1 but also in what sense ,i take them to be reasons4 ,i proceed1 then with my explanation4 ,and there is one thing1 which1 ,i think my illustration has shown that ,i do not mean4 ,i have defined a reason for a belief as a true proposition1 which would not be true unless the belief itself--what is believed--were also true2 and ,i have used1 as synonymous with this form of words1 the expressions3 ,a reason for a belief is a true proposition from which the truth of the belief follows from which it could be validly inferred4 ,now these expressions might suggest the idea that ,i mean to restrict the word reason1 to what1 in the strictest sense1 might be called a logical reason--to propositions from which the belief in question follows1 according to the rules of inference accepted by ,formal ,logic4 ,but ,i am not using the words follow1 validly inferred1 in this narrow sense2 ,i do not mean to restrict the words reason for a belief to propositions from which the laws of ,formal ,logic state that the belief could be deduced4 ,the illustration which ,i gave is inconsistent with this restricted meaning4 ,i said that the fact that a statement appeared in the ,times might be a good reason for believing that that statement was true4 ,and ,i am using the word reason in the wide and popular sense1 in which it really might be4 ,if1 for instance1 the ,times stated that the ,king was dead1 we should think that was a good reason for believing that the ,king was dead2 we should think that the ,times would not have made such a statement as that unless the ,king really were dead4 ,we should1 indeed1 not think that the statement in the ,times rendered it absolutely certain that the ,king was dead4 ,but it is extremely unlikely that the ,times would make a statement of this kind unless it were true2 and1 in that sense1 the fact of the statement appearing in the ,times would render it highly probable--much more likely than not--that the ,king was dead4 ,and ,i wish it to be understood that ,i am using the words reason for a belief in this extremely wide sense4 ,when ,i look for a good reason for our belief in the existence of other people1 ,i shall not reject any proposition merely on the ground that it only renders their existence probable--only shows it to be more likely than not that they exist4 ,provided that the proposition in question does render it positively probable that they exist1 then1 if it also conforms to the conditions which ,i am about to mention1 ,i shall call it a good reason4 ,but it is not every proposition which renders it probable that other people exist1 which ,i shall consider to be a good answer to my question4 ,i have just explained that my meaning is wide in one direction--in admitting some propositions which render a belief merely probable2 but ,i have now to explain that it is restricted in two other directions4 ,i do mean to exclude certain propositions which do render that belief probable4 ,when ,i ask3 ,what reason have we for believing in the existence of other people8 a certain ambiguity is introduced by the use of the plural we4 ,if each of several different persons has a reason for believing that he himself exists1 then it is not merely probable1 but certain1 according to the rules of ,formal ,logic1 that1 in a sense1 they have a reason for believing that several people exist2 each has a reason for believing that he himself exists2 and1 therefore1 all of them1 taken together1 have reasons for supposing that several persons exist4 ,if1 therefore1 ,i were asking the question3 ,what reason have we for believing in the existence of other persons8 in this sense1 it would follow that if each of us has a reason for believing in his own existence1 these reasons1 taken together1 would be a reason for believing in the existence of all of us4 ,but ,i am not asking the question in this sense3 it is plain that this is not its natural sense4 ,what ,i do mean to ask is3 ,does each single one of us know any proposition1 which is a reason for believing that others exist8 ,i am using we1 that is to say1 in the sense of each of us4 ,but again ,i do mean each of us3 ,i am not merely asking whether some one man knows a proposition which is a reason for believing that other men exist4 ,it would be possible that some one man1 or some few men1 should know such a proposition1 and yet the rest know no such proposition4 ,but ,i am not asking whether this is the case4 ,i am asking whether among propositions of the kind which 7as we commonly suppose7 all or almost all men know1 there is any which is a reason for supposing that other men exist4 ,and in asking this question ,i am not begging the question by supposing that all men do exist4 ,my question might1 ,i think1 be put quite accurately as follows4 ,there are certain kinds of belief which1 as we commonly suppose1 all or almost all men share4 ,i describe this kind of belief as our beliefs1 simply as an easy way of pointing out which kind of belief ,i mean1 but without assuming that all men do share them4 ,and ,i then ask3 ,supposing a single man to have beliefs of this kind1 which among them would be a good reason for supposing that other men existed having like beliefs8 ,this1 then1 is the first restriction which ,i put upon the meaning of my question4 ,and it is1 ,i think1 a restriction which1 in their natural meaning1 the words suggest4 ,when we ask3 ,what reason have we for believing that other people exist8 we naturally understand that question to be equivalent to3 ,what reason has each of us for that belief8 ,and this question again is naturally equivalent to the question3 ,which among the propositions that a single man believes1 but which are of the kind which 7rightly or wrongly7 we assume all men to believe1 are such that they would not be true unless some other person than that man existed8 ,but there is another restriction which1 ,i think1 the words of my question also naturally suggest4 ,if we were to ask anyone the question3 ,how do you know that you did see that statement in the ,times8 and he were to answer ,because ,i did see it in the ,times and in the ,standard too1 we should not think that he had given us a reason for the belief that he saw it in the ,times4 ,we should not think his answer a reason1 because it asserts the very thing for which we require a reason4 ,and similarly when ,i ask3 ,how do we know that any thing or person exists1 other than ourselves and what we directly perceive8 ,what reason have we for believing this8 ,i must naturally be understood to mean3 ,what proposition1 other than one which itself asserts or presupposes the existence of something beyond ourselves and our own perceptions1 is a reason for supposing that such a thing exists8 ,and this restriction obviously excludes an immense number of propositions of a kind which all of us do believe4 ,we all of us believe an immense number of different propositions about the existence of things which we do not directly perceive1 and many of these propositions are1 in my sense1 good reasons for believing in the existence of still other things4 ,the belief in the existence of a statement in the ,times1 when we have not seen that statement1 may1 as ,i implied1 be a good reason for believing that someone is dead4 ,but no such proposition can be a good answer to my question1 because it asserts the very kind of thing for which ,i require a reason3 it asserts the existence of something other than myself and what ,i directly perceive4 ,when ,i am asking3 ,what reason have ,i for believing in the existence of anything but myself1 my own perceptions1 and what ,i do directly perceive8 you would naturally understand me to mean3 ,what reason1 other than the existence of such a thing1 have ,i for this belief8 ,each of us1 then1 we commonly assume1 believes some true propositions1 which do not themselves assert the existence of anything other than himself1 his own perceptions1 or what he directly perceives4 ,each of us1 for instance1 believes that he himself has and has had certain particular perceptions3 and these propositions are propositions of the kind ,i mean--propositions which do not themselves assert the existence of anything other than himself1 his own perceptions1 and what he directly perceives3 they are1 ,i think1 by no means the only propositions of this kind1 which most of us believe3 but they are propositions of this kind4 ,but1 as ,i say1 ,i am not assuming that each of us--each of several different people--does believe propositions of this kind4 ,all that ,i assume is that at least one man does believe some such propositions4 ,and then ,i ask3 ,which among those true propositions1 which one man believes1 are such that they would probably not be true1 unless some other man existed and had certain particular perceptions8 ,which among them are such that it follows 7in the wide sense1 which ,i have explained7 from their truth1 that it is more likely than not that some other man has perceptions8 ,this is the meaning of my question1 so far as ,i have hitherto explained it3 and ,i hope this meaning is quite clear4 ,it is in this sense that ,i am asking3 ,what reason have we for believing that other people exist8 ,how do we know that they exist8 ,this1 indeed1 is not all that ,i mean by that question3 there is one other point--the most important one--which remains to be explained4 ,but this is part of what ,i mean to ask2 and before ,i go on to explain what else ,i mean1 ,i wish first to stop and enquire what is the answer to this part of my question4 ,what is the answer to the question3 ,which among the true propositions1 of a kind which 7as we commonly assume7 each of us believes1 and which do not themselves assert the existence of anything other than that person himself1 his own perceptions1 or what he directly perceives1 are such that they would probably not be true unless some other person existed1 who had perceptions in some respects similar to his own8 ,now to this question the answer is very obvious4 ,it is very obvious that in this sense we have reasons for believing in the existence of other persons1 and also what some of those reasons are4 ,but ,i wish to make it quite plain that this is so3 that in this sense one man has a reason for believing that another has certain perceptions4 ,all that ,i am asking you to grant1 is1 you see1 that some of you would not be having just those perceptions which you now have1 unless ,i1 as ,i read this paper1 were perceiving more or less black marks on a more or less white ground2 or that ,i on the other hand1 should not be having just those perceptions which ,i now have1 unless some other persons than myself were hearing the sounds of my voice4 ,and ,i am not asking you even to grant that this is certain--only that it is positively probable--more likely than not4 ,surely it is very obvious that this proposition is true4 ,but ,i wish to make it quite clear what would be the consequences of denying that any such propositions are true--propositions which assert that the existence of certain perceptions in one man are a reason for believing in the existence of certain perceptions in another man--which assert that one man would probably not have had just those perceptions which he did have1 unless some other man had had certain particular perceptions4 ,it is plain1 ,i think1 that1 unless some such propositions are true1 we have no more reason for supposing that ,alexander the ,great ever saw an elephant1 than for supposing that ,sindbad the ,sailor saw a ,roc2 we have no more reason for supposing that anybody saw ,julius ,caesar murdered in the ,senate ,house at ,rome1 than for supposing that somebody saw him carried up to ,heaven in a fiery chariot4 ,it is plain1 ,i think1 that if we have any reason at all for supposing that in all probability ,alexander the ,great did see an elephant1 and that in all probability no such person as ,sindbad the ,sailor ever saw a ,roc1 part of that reason consists in the assumption that some other person would probably not have had just those perceptions which he did have1 unless ,alexander the ,great had seen an elephant1 and unless ,sindbad the ,sailor had not seen a ,roc4 ,and most philosophers1 ,i think1 are willing to admit that we have some reason1 in some sense or other1 for such propositions as these4 ,they are willing to admit not only that some persons probably did see ,julius ,caesar murdered in the ,senate ,house2 but also that some persons1 other than those who saw it1 had and have some reason for supposing that some one else probably saw it4 ,some sceptical philosophers might1 indeed1 deny both propositions2 and to refute their views1 ,i admit1 other arguments are needed than any which ,i shall bring forward in this paper4 ,but most philosophers will1 ,i think1 admit not only that facts1 for which there is1 as we say1 good historical evidence1 are probably true2 but also that what we call good historical evidence really is in some sense a good reason for thinking them true4 ,accordingly ,i am going to assume that many propositions of the following kind are true4 ,propositions1 namely1 which assert that one man would probably not have certain perceptions which he does have1 unless some other man had certain particular perceptions4 ,that some of you1 for instance1 would probably not be having precisely the perceptions which you are having1 unless ,i were having the perception of more or less black marks on a more or less white ground4 ,and1 in this sense1 ,i say1 we certainly have reasons for supposing that other people have perceptions similar1 in some respects1 to those which we sometimes have4 ,but when ,i said ,i was going to ask the question3 ,what reason have we for supposing that other people exist8 you will certainly not have thought that ,i merely meant to ask the question which ,i have just answered4 ,my words will have suggested to you something much more important than merely this4 ,when1 for instance1 ,i said that to the question ,how do you know that8 the answer ,i saw it in the ,times would be a satisfactory answer1 you may have felt1 as ,i felt1 that it would not in all circumstances be regarded as such4 ,the person who asked the question might1 in some cases1 fairly reply3 ,that is no answer3 how do you know that1 because you saw a thing in the ,times1 it is therefore true8 ,in other words he might ask fora reason for supposing that the occurrence of a particular statement in the ,times was a reason for supposing that statement true4 ,and this is a question to which we all believe that there may be an answer4 ,we believe that1 with some kinds of statements which the ,times makes--some kinds of statements with regard to ,fiscal ,policy for example--the fact that the ,times makes them is no reason for supposing them to be true3 whereas with regard to other kinds of statements1 which it makes1 such a statement1 for instance1 as that the ,king was dead1 the fact that it makes them is a reason for supposing them true4 ,we believe that there are some kinds of statements1 which it is very unlikely the ,times would make1 unless they were true2 and others which it is not at all unlikely that the ,times might make1 although they were not true4 ,and we believe that a reason might be given for distinguishing1 in this way1 between the two different kinds of statement3 for thinking that1 in some cases 7on points1 for instance1 which1 as we should say1 are not simple questions of fact7 the ,times is fallible1 whereas in other cases1 it is1 though not absolutely infallible1 very unlikely to state what is not true4 ,now it is precisely in this further sense that ,i wish to consider3 what reason have we for believing that certain particular things1 other than ourselves1 our own perceptions1 and what we directly perceive1 are real8 ,i have asserted that ,i do have certain perceptions1 which it is very unlikely ,i should have1 unless some other person had certain particular perceptions2 that1 for instance1 it is very unlikely ,i should be having precisely those perceptions which ,i am now having unless someone else were hearing the sound of my voice4 ,and ,i now wish to ask3 ,what reason have ,i for supposing that this is unlikely8 ,what reason has any of us for supposing that any such proposition is true8 ,and ,i mean by having a reason precisely what ,i formerly meant4 ,i mean3 ,what other proposition do ,i know1 which would not be true1 unless my perception were connected with someone else's perception1 in the manner in which ,i asserted them to be connected8 ,here again ,i am asking for a good reason2 and am not asking a psychological question with regard to origin4 ,here again ,i am not asking for a reason1 in the strict sense of ,formal ,logic2 ,i am merely asking for a proposition which would probably not be true1 unless what ,i asserted were true4 ,here again ,i am asking for some proposition of a kind which each of us believes2 ,i am asking3 ,what reason has each of us for believing that some of his perceptions are connected with particular perceptions of other people in the manner ,i asserted8--for believing that he would not have certain perceptions that he does have1 unless some other person had certain particular perceptions8 ,and here again ,i am asking for a reason--,i am asking for some proposition other than one which itself asserts3 ,when one man has a perception of such and such a particular kind1 it is probable that another man has a perception or thought of this or that other kind4 ,but what kind of reason can be given for believing a proposition of this sort8 ,for believing a proposition which asserts that1 since one particular thing exists1 it is probable that another particular thing also exists8 ,one thing ,i think is plain1 namely that we can have no good reason for believing such a proposition1 unless we have good reason for believing some generalisation4 ,it is commonly believed1 for instance1 that certain so-called flint arrow-heads1 which have been discovered1 were probably made by prehistoric men2 and ,i think it is plain that we have no reason for believing this unless we have reason to suppose that objects which resemble these in certain particular respects are generally made by men--are more often made by men than by any other agency4 ,unless certain particular characteristics which those arrow-heads have were characteristics which belonged at least more frequently to articles of human manufacture than to any articles not made by men1 it would surely be just as likely as not that these arrowheads were not made by men--that they were1 in fact not arrow-heads4 ,that is to say1 unless we have reason to assert a generalisation--the generalisation that objects of a certain kind are generally made by men1 we have no reason to suppose that these particular objects1 which are of the kind in question1 were made by men4 ,and the same1 so far as ,i can see1 is true universally4 ,if we ever have any reason for asserting that1 since one particular thing exists1 another probably exists or existed or will exist also part of our reason1 at least1 must consist in reasons for asserting some generalisation--for asserting that the existence of things of a particular kind is1 more often than not1 accompanied or preceded or followed by the existence of things of another particular kind4 ,it is1 ,i think1 sometimes assumed that an alternative to this theory may be found in the theory that the existence of one kind of thing intrinsically points to1 or is intrinsically a sign or symbol of the existence of another thing4 ,it is suggested that when a thing which thus points to the existence of another thing exists1 then it is at least probable that the thing pointed to exists also4 ,but this theory1 ,i think1 offers no real alternative4 ,for1 in the first place1 when we say that the existence of one thing ,a is a sign of or points to the existence of another thing ,b1 we very commonly actually mean to say that when a thing like ,a exists1 a thing like ,b generally exists too4 ,we may1 no doubt1 mean something else too2 but this we do mean4 ,we say1 for instance1 that certain particular words1 which we hear or read1 are a sign that somebody has thought of the particular things which we call the meaning of those words4 ,but we should certainly hesitate to admit that the hearing or reading of certain words could be called a sign of the existence of certain thoughts1 unless it were true that when those words are heard or read1 the thoughts in question generally have existed4 ,if when those words were heard or read1 the thoughts had generally not existed1 we should say that1 in one sense of the word at all events1 the hearing of the words was not a sign of the existence of the thoughts4 ,in this sense1 therefore1 to say that the existence of ,a points to or is a sign of the existence of ,b is actually to say that when ,a exists1 ,b generally exists also4 ,but1 no doubt1 the words points to is a sign of may be used in some other sense3 they may1 for instance1 mean only that the existence of ,a suggests in some way the belief that ,b exists4 ,and in such a case we certainly might know that the existence of ,a pointed to the existence of ,b1 without knowing that when ,a existed ,b generally existed also4 ,let us suppose1 then1 that in some such sense ,a does point to the existence of ,b2 can this fact give us a reason for supposing it even probable that ,b existed4 ,certainly it can1 provided it is true that when ,a does point to the existence of ,b1 ,b generally exists4 ,but surely it can do so1 only on this condition4 ,if when ,a points to the existence of ,b1 ,b1 nevertheless1 does not generally exist1 then surely the fact that ,a points to the existence of ,b can constitute no probability that ,b does not exist3 on the contrary it will then be probable that1 even though ,a points to the existence of ,b1 ,b does not exist4 ,we have1 in fact1 only substituted the generalisation that ,a's pointing to ,b is generally accompanied by the existence of ,b1 for the generalisation that ,a's existence is generally accompanied by the existence of ,b4 ,if we are to have any reason for asserting that1 when ,a points to or is a sign of the existence of ,b1 ,b probably exists1 we must still have a reason for some generalisation--for a generalisation which asserts that when one thing points to the existence of another1 that other generally exists4 ,it is plain1 then1 ,i think1 that if we are to find a reason for the assertion that some particular perception of mine would probably not exist1 unless someone else were having or had had a perception of a kind which ,i can name1 we must find a reason for some generalisation4 ,and it is also plain1 ,i think1 that in many cases of this kind the generalisation must consist in an assertion that when one man has a certain kind of perception1 some other man generally has had some other perception or belief4 ,we assume1 for instance1 that when we hear or read certain words1 somebody besides ourselves has thought the thoughts1 which constitute the meaning of those words2 and it is plain1 ,i think1 that we have no reason for this assumption except one which is also a reason for the assumption that when certain words are heard or read1 somebody generally has had certain thoughts4 ,and my enquiry1 therefore1 at least includes the enquiry3 ,what reasons have we for such generalisations as these8 for generalisations which assert a connection between the existence of a certain kind of perception in one man1 and that of a certain kind of perception or belief in another man8 ,and to this question1 ,i think1 but one answer can be given4 ,if we have any reason for such generalisations at all1 some reason must be given1 in one way or another1 by observation--by observation1 understood in the wide sense in which it includes experiment4 ,no philosopher1 ,i think1 has ever failed to assume that observation does give a reason for some generalisations--for some propositions which assert that when one kind of thing exists1 another generally exists or has existed in a certain relation to it4 ,even those who1 like ,hume1 imply that observation cannot give a reason for anything1 yet constantly appeal to observation in support of generalisations of their own4 ,and even those who hold that observation can give no reason for any generalisation about the relation of one man's perceptions to another's1 yet hold that it can give a reason for generalisations about the relation of some to others among a man's own perceptions4 ,it is1 indeed1 by no means agreed how observation can give a reason for any generalisation4 ,nobody knows what reason we have1 if we have any1 for supposing that it can4 ,but that it can1 everyone1 ,i think1 assumes4 ,i think1 therefore1 most philosophers will agree1 that if we can find any reason at all for generalisations of the kind in which ,i am interested1 a reason for some of them at all events must be found in observation4 ,and what ,i propose to ask is3 ,what reason can be found in observation for even a single proposition of the kind ,i have described8 for a proposition which asserts that when one man has one kind of perception1 another man generally has or has had another4 ,but1 when it is said that observation gives us a reason for generalisations1 two things may be meant neither of which ,i mean4 ,in the first place1 we popularly use observation in a sense in which we can be said to observe the perceptions1 feelings and thoughts of other people3 in which1 therefore1 we can be said to observe the very things with regard to which ,i am asking what reason we have for believing in their existence4 ,but it is universally#a agreed that there is a sense in which no man can observe the perceptions1 feelings or thoughts of any other man4 ,and it is to this strict sense that ,i propose to confine the word4 ,i shall use it in a sense1 in which we can certainly be said to observe nothing but ourselves1 our own perceptions1 thoughts and feelings1 and what we directly perceive4 ,and in the second place1 it may be said that observations made by another person may give me a reason for believing some generalisation4 ,and it is certainly the case that for many of the generalisations in which we all believe1 if we have a reason in observation at all1 it is not in our own observation that we have it3 part of our reason1 at all events1 lies in things which other people have observed but which we ourselves have not observed4 ,but in asking this particular question1 ,i am not asking for reasons of this sort4 ,the very question that ,i am asking is3 ,what reason has any one of us for supposing that any other person whatever has ever made any observations8 ,and just as1 in the first meaning which ,i gave to this question1 it meant3 ,what thing1 that any single man observes is such that it would probably not have existed1 unless some other man had made a particular observation8 ,so now ,i am asking3 ,which among the things1 which one single man observes1 are such that they would probably not have existed1 unless it were true that some of them generally stood in certain relations to observations of some other person8 ,i am asking3 ,which among my own observations give me a reason for supposing that some of them are of a kind which are generally preceded or accompanied by observations of other people8 ,which1 for instance1 among my own observations give a good reason for the generalisation that when ,i hear certain words1 somebody else has generally had certain particular thoughts1 or that whenever anyone hears certain words1 somebody else has generally had the thoughts which constitute what we call the meaning of those words8 ,i am asking3 ,which among the vast series of observations1 which any one individual makes during his lifetime1 give a good reason for any generalisation whatever of this kind--a generalisation which asserts that some of them are generally preceded by certain thoughts1 perceptions or feelings in other persons8 ,i quite admit that there are some generalisations of this kind for which the observations of some particular men will not give a reason4 ,all that ,i ask is3 ,is there even one generalisation of this kind1 for which the kind of observations1 which 7as we commonly assume7 each man1 or nearly every man does make1 do give a reason8 ,among observations of the kind which 7as we commonly assume7 are common to you and to me1 do yours1 by themselves1 give any reason for even one such generalisation8 ,and do mine1 by themselves1 give any reason for even one such generalisation8 ,and if they do1 which1 among these observations1 is it which do so8 ,my question is1 then3 ,what reason do my own observations give me1 for supposing that any perception whatever1 which ,i have1 would probably not occur1 unless some other person had a certain kind of perception8 ,what reason do my own observations give me for supposing1 for instance1 that ,i should not be perceiving what ,i do now perceive1 unless someone were hearing the sound of my voice8 ,what reason do your own observations give you for supposing that you would not be perceiving just what you are perceiving1 unless ,i were perceiving more or less black marks on a more or less white ground8 ,the question does1 ,i think1 appear to be a reasonable one2 and most philosophers1 ,i think1 have assumed that there is an answer to it4 ,yet it may be said that there is no answer to it3 that my own observations give me no reason whatever for any single proposition of this kind4 ,there are certain philosophers 7even apart from thorough sceptics1 with whom1 as ,i have said1 ,i am not now arguing7 who have denied that they do4 ,there are certain philosophers who hold that nothing which any single one of us observes or can observe1 gives the slightest reason for supposing that any of his own perceptions are generally connected with certain perceptions in other people4 ,there are philosophers who hold that the only generalisations for which our own observations do give any warrant are generalisations concerning the manner in which our own perceptions1 thoughts and feelings do and probably will succeed one another2 and who conclude that1 this being so1 we have no reason whatever for believing in the existence of any other people4 ,and these philosophers are1 ,i think1 right in drawing this conclusion from this premiss4 ,it does not1 indeed1 follow from their premiss that we have not a reason in the sense which ,i first explained1 and in which1 ,i insisted1 it must be admitted that we have a reason4 ,it does not follow that some of our perceptions are not such as would probably not exist1 unless some other person had certain perceptions4 ,but1 as ,i have urged1 when we say that we have a reason for asserting the existence of something not perceived1 we commonly mean something more than this4 ,we mean not only that1 since what we perceive does exist1 the unperceived thing probably exists too2 we mean also that we have some reason for asserting this connection between the perceived and the unperceived4 ,and holding1 as we do1 that no reason can be given for asserting such a connection1 except observation1 we should say that1 if observation gives no reason for asserting it1 we have no reason for asserting it2 and having no reason for asserting this connection between the perceived and the unperceived1 we should say that we have none either for asserting the even probable existence of the unperceived4 ,this1 ,i think1 is what we commonly mean by saying that we have no reason to believe in the existence of a particular thing which we do not perceive4 ,and hence1 ,i think1 those philosophers who hold that our own observations give us no reason whatever for any generalisation whatever concerning the connection of any of them with those of other people1 are quite right in concluding that we have no reason to assert that any other person ever did have any particular thought or perception whatever4 ,i think that the words of this conclusion1 understood in their natural meaning1 express precisely what the premiss asserts4 ,we need not1 indeed1 conclude1 as many of these philosophers are inclined to do1 that1 because we have no reason for believing in the existence of other people1 it is therefore highly doubtful whether they do exist4 ,the philosophers who advocate this opinion commonly refute themselves by assigning the existence of other people as part of their reason for believing that it is very doubtful whether any other people exist4 ,that for which we have no reason may1 nevertheless1 be certainly true4 ,and1 indeed1 one of the philosophers who hold most clearly and expressly that we do know not only the existence of other people but also that of material objects1 is also one of those who deny most emphatically that our own observations can give any reason for believing either in the one or in the other4 ,i refer to ,thomas ,reid4 ,reid1 indeed1 allows himself to use not only the word observe1 but even the word perceive1 in that wide sense in which it might be said that we observe or perceive the thoughts and feelings of others3 and ,i think that the fact that he uses the words in this sense1 has misled him into thinking that his view is more plausible and more in accordance with ,common ,sense than it really is3 by using the words in this sense he is able to plead that observation really does give a reason for some of those generalisations1 for which ,common ,sense holds that observation 7in a narrower sense7 does give a reason4 ,but with regard to what we observe or perceive1 in the strict sense to which #a am confining those words1 he asserts quite explicitly that it gives us no reason either for believing in the existence of material objects or for believing in the existence of other minds4 ,berkeley1 he says1 has proved incontrovertibly that it gives us no reason for the one1 and ,hume that it gives us no reason for the other4 ,now these philosophers may be right in holding this4 ,it may1 perhaps1 be true that1 in this sense1 my own observations give me no reason whatever for believing that any other person ever has or will perceive anything like or unlike what ,i perceive4 ,but ,i think it is desirable we should realise how paradoxical are the consequences which must be admitted1 if this is true4 ,it must then be admitted that the very large part of our knowledge1 which we suppose to have some basis in experience1 is by no means based upon experience1 in the sense1 and to the extent1 which we suppose4 ,we do for instance1 commonly suppose that there is some basis in experience for the assertion that some people1 whom we call ,germans1 use one set of words to express much the same meaning which we express by using a different set of words4 ,but1 if this view be correct1 we must admit that no person's experience gives him any reason whatever for supposing that1 when he hears certain words1 any one else has ever heard or thought of the same words1 or meant anything by them4 ,the view admits1 indeed1 that ,i do know that when ,i hear certain words1 somebody else has generally had thoughts more or less similar to those which ,i suppose him to have had3 but it denies that my own observations could ever give me the least reason for supposing that this is so4 ,it admits that my own observations may give me reason for supposing that if anyone has ever had perceptions like mine in some respects1 he will also have had other perceptions like others of mine3 but it denies that they give me any reason for supposing that any one else has had a perception like one of mine4 ,it admits that my own observations may give me reason for supposing that certain perceptions and thoughts in one person 7if they exist7 will be followed or preceded by certain other perceptions and thoughts in that person3 but it denies that they give me any reason whatever for any similar generalisation concerning the connection of a certain kind of perception in one person with a certain kind of perception in another4 ,it admits that ,i should not have certain perceptions1 which ,i do have1 unless someone else had had certain other perceptions2 but it denies that my own observations can give me any reason for saying so--for saying that ,i should not have had this perception1 unless someone else had had that4 ,no observations of mine1 it holds1 can ever render it probable that such a generalisation is true2 no observation of mine can ever confirm or verify such a generalisation4 ,if we are to say that any such generalisation whatever is based upon observation1 we can only mean1 what ,reid means1 that it is based on a series of assumptions4 ,when ,i observe this particular thing1 ,i assume that that particular thing1 which ,i do not observe1 exists2 when ,i observe another particular thing1 ,i again assume that a second particular thing1 which ,i do not observe1 exists2 when ,i observe a third particular thing1 ,i again assume that a third particular thing1 which ,i do not observe1 exists4 ,these assumed facts--the assumed fact that one observation of mine is accompanied by the existence of one particular kind of thing1 and that another observation of mine is accompanied by the existence of a different particular kind of thing1 will then give me a reason for different generalisations concerning the connection of different perceptions of mine with different external objects--objects which ,i do not perceive4 ,but 7it is maintained7 nothing but a mass of such assumptions will give me a reason for any such generalisation4 ,now ,i think it must be admitted that there is something paradoxical in such a view4 ,i think it may be admitted that1 in holding it1 the philosopher of ,common ,sense departs from ,common ,sense at least as far in one direction as his opponents had done in another4 ,but ,i think that there is some excuse for those who hold it3 ,i think that1 in one respect1 they are more in the right than those who do not hold it--than those who hold that my own observations do give me a reason for believing in the existence of other people4 ,for those who hold that my observations do give me a reason1 have1 ,i believe1 universally supposed that the reason lies in a part of my observations1 in which no such reason is to be found4 ,this is why ,i have chosen to ask the question3 ,what reason do my observations give me for believing that any other person has any particular perceptions or beliefs8 ,i wish to consider which among the things which ,i observe will give such a reason4 ,for this is a question to which no answer1 that ,i have ever seen1 appears to me to be correct4 ,those who have asked it have1 so far as ,i know1 answered it either by denying that my observations give me any reason or by pointing to a part of my observations1 which1 as it seems to me1 really do give none4 ,those who deny are1 it seems to me1 right in holding that the reason given by those who affirm is no reason4 ,and their correct opinion on this point will1 ,i think1 partly serve to explain their denial4 ,they have supposed that if our observations give us any reason at all for asserting the existence of other people1 that reason must lie where it has been supposed to lie by those who hold that they do give a reason4 ,and then1 finding that this assigned reason is no reason1 they have assumed that there is no other4 ,i am proposing then to ask3 ,which among the observations1 which ,i make1 and which 7as we commonly suppose7 are similar in kind to those which all or almost all men make1 will give a reason for supposing that the existence of any of them is generally connected with the existence of certain kinds of perception or belief in other people8 ,and in order to answer this question1 it is obvious we must first consider two others4 ,we must consider1 in the first place3 ,of what nature must observations be1 if they are to give a reason for any generalisation asserting that the existence of one kind of thing is generally connected with that of another8 ,and we must consider in the second place3 ,what kinds of things do we observe8 ,now to the first of these questions ,i am not going to attempt to give a complete answer4 ,the question concerning the rules of ,inductive ,logic1 which is the question at issue1 is an immensely difficult and intricate question4 ,and ,i am not going to attempt to say1 what kind of observations are sufficient to justify a generalisation4 ,but it is comparatively easy to point out that a certain kind of observations are necessary to justify a generalisation3 and this is all that ,i propose to do4 ,i wish to point out certain conditions which observations must satisfy1 if they are to justify a generalisation2 without in any way implying that all observations which do satisfy these conditions1 will justify a generalisation4 ,the conditions1 ,i shall mention1 are ones which are certainly not sufficient to justify a generalisation2 but they are1 ,i think1 conditions1 without which no generalisation can be justified4 ,if a particular kind of observations do not satisfy these conditions1 we can say with certainty that those observations give us no reason for believing in the existence of other people2 though1 with regard to observations which do satisfy them1 we shall only be able to say that they may give a reason4 ,what conditions1 then1 must observations satisfy1 if they are to justify a generalisation8 ,let us suppose that the generalisation to be justified is one which asserts that the existence of a kind of object1 which we will call ,a1 is generally preceded1 accompanied1 or followed by the existence of a kind of object1 which we call ,b4 ,a1 for instance1 might be the hearing of a certain word by one person1 and ,b the thought of that which we call the meaning of the word1 in another person2 and the generalisation to be justified might be that when one person hears a word1 not spoken by himself1 someone else has generally thought of the meaning of that word4 ,what must ,i have observed1 if the generalisation that the existence of ,a is generally preceded by the existence of ,b1 is to be justified by my observations8 ,one first point1 ,i think1 is plain4 ,i must have observed both some object1 which is in some respects like ,a1 and which ,i will call 1 and also some object in some respects like ,b which ,i will call 3 ,i must have observed both and 1 and also ,i must have observed preceding 4 ,this1 at least1 ,i must have observed4 ,but ,i do not pretend to say how like and must be to ,a and ,b2 nor do ,i pretend to say how often ,i must have observed preceding 1 although it is generally held that ,i must have observed this more than once4 ,these are questions1 which would have to be discussed if we were trying to discover what observations were sufficient to justify the generalisation that the existence of ,a is generally preceded by that of ,b4 ,but ,i am only trying to lay down the minimum which is necessary to justify this generalisation2 and therefore ,i am content to say that we must have observed something more or less like ,b preceding something more or less like ,a1 at least once4 ,but there is yet another minimum condition4 ,if my observation of preceding is to justify the generalisation that the existence of ,a is generally preceded by the existence of ,b1 it is plain1 ,i think1 that both the and the 1 which ,i observed1 must have existed or been real2 and that also the existence of must really have preceded that of 4 ,it is plain that if1 when ,i observed and 1 existed but did not1 this observation could give me no reason to suppose that on another occasion when ,a existed1 would exist4 ,or again1 if1 when ,i observed preceding 1 both and existed1 but the existence of did not really precede that of 1 but1 on the contrary1 followed it1 this observation could certainly give me no reason to suppose that1 in general1 the existence of ,a was preceded by the existence of ,b4 ,indeed this condition that what is observed must have been real might be said to be included in the very meaning of the word observation4 ,we should1 in this connection1 say that we had not observed preceding 1 unless and were both real1 and had really preceded 4 ,if ,i say ,i have observed that1 on one occasion1 my hearing of the word 'moon' was followed by my imagining a luminous silvery disc1 ,i commonly mean to include in my statement the assertion that ,i did1 on that occasion1 really hear the word moon1 and really did have a visual image of a luminous disc1 and that my perception was really followed by my imagination4 ,if it were proved to me that this had not really happened1 ,i should admit that ,i had not really observed it4 ,but though this condition that1 if observation is to give reason for a generalisation1 what is observed must be real1 may thus be said to be implied in the very word observation1 it was necessary for me to mention the condition explicitly4 ,it was necessary1 because1 as ,i shall presently show1 we do and must also use the word observation in a sense in which the assertion ,i observe ,a by no means includes the assertion ,a exists--in a sense in which it may be true that though ,i did observe ,a1 yet ,a did not exist4 ,but there is also1 ,i think1 a third necessary condition which is very apt to be overlooked4 ,it may1 perhaps1 be allowed that observation gives some reason for the proposition that hens' eggs are generally laid by hens4 ,i do not mean to say that any one man's observation can give a reason for this proposition3 ,i do not assume either that it can or that it cannot4 ,nor do ,i mean to make any assumption as to what must be meant by the words hens and eggs1 if this proposition is to be true4 ,i am quite willing to allow for the moment that if it is true at all1 we must understand by hens and eggs1 objects very unlike that which we directly observe1 when we see a hen in a yard1 or an egg on the breakfast-table4 ,i am willing to allow the possibility that1 as some ,idealists would say1 the proposition ,hens lay eggs is false1 unless we mean by it3 ,a certain kind of collection of spirits or monads sometimes has a certain intelligible relation to another kind of collection of spirits or monads4 ,i am willing to allow the possibility that1 as ,reid and some scientists would say1 the proposition ,hens lay eggs is false1 if we mean by it anything more than that3 ,certain configurations of invisible material particles sometimes have a certain spatio-temporal relation to another kind of configuration of invisible material particles4 ,or again ,i am willing to allow1 with certain other philosophers1 that we must1 if it is to be true1 interpret this proposition as meaning that certain kinds of sensations have to certain other kinds a relation which may be expressed by saying that the one kind of sensations lay the other kind4 ,or again1 as other philosophers say1 the proposition ,hens lay eggs may possibly mean3 ,certain sensations of mine would1 under certain conditions1 have to certain other sensations of mine a relation which may be expressed by saying that the one set would lay the other set4 ,but whatever the proposition ,hens' eggs are generally laid by hens may mean1 most philosophers would1 ,i think1 allow that1 in some sense or other1 this proposition was true4 ,and they would also ,i think allow that we have some reason for it2 and that part of this reason at all events lies in observation3 they would allow that we should have no reason for it unless certain things had been observed1 which have been observed4 ,few1 ,i think1 would say that the existence of an egg intrinsically points to that of a hen1 in such a sense that1 even if we had had no experience of any kind concerning the manner in which objects like eggs are connected with animals like hens1 the mere inspection of an egg would justify the assertion3 ,a hen has probably existed4 ,i assume1 then1 that objects having all the characteristics which hens' eggs have 7whatever these may be7 are generally laid by hens 7whatever hens may be72 and ,i assume that1 if we have any reason for this generalisation at all1 observation gives us some reason for it4 ,but now1 let us suppose that the only observations we had made were those which we should commonly describe by saying that we had seen a hen laying an egg4 ,i do not say that any number of such observations1 by themselves1 would be sufficient to justify our generalisation3 ,i think it is plain that they would not4 ,but let us suppose1 for the moment1 that we had observed nothing else which bore upon the connection between hens and eggs2 and that1 if therefore our generalisation was justified by any observations at all1 it was justified by these4 ,we are supposing1 then1 that the observations which we describe as seeing hens lay eggs give some reason for the generalisation that eggs of that kind are generally laid by hens4 ,and if these observations give reason for this1 obviously in a sense they give reason for the generalisation that the existence of such an egg is generally preceded by that of a hen2 and hence also1 they give us reason to suppose that if such an egg exists1 a hen has probably existed also--that unless a hen had existed1 the egg would not have existed4 ,but the point to which ,i wish to call attention is that it is only in a limited sense that they do give reason for this4 ,they only give us reason to suppose that1 for each egg1 there has existed a hen1 which was at some time near the place where the egg in question then was1 and which existed at a time near to that at which the egg began to exist4 ,the only kind of hens1 whose existence they do give us reason to suppose1 are hens1 of which each was at some time in spatial and temporal proximity 7or1 if ,idealists prefer1 in the relations which are the intelligible counterparts of these7 to an egg4 ,they give us no information at all about the existence of hens 7if there are any7 which never came within a thousand miles of an egg1 or which were dead a thousand years before any egg existed4 ,that is to say1 they do give us reason to suppose that1 if a particular egg exists1 there has probably existed a hen which was at some time near that egg2 but they give us no reason to suppose that1 if a particular egg exists1 there must have existed a hen which never came near that egg4 ,they do give us reason to suppose that1 for each egg1 there has probably existed a hen which at some time stood to the egg in question in that relation which we have observed to hold between an egg and a hen1 when we observed the hen laying an egg4 ,but they give us no reason to infer from the existence of an egg any other kind of hen3 any hen which never stood to the egg in the relation in which we have observed that some hens do stand to eggs4 ,what ,i wish to suggest is that this condition is a universal condition for sound inductions4 ,if the observation of preceding can ever give us any reason at all for supposing that the existence of ,a is generally preceded by that of ,b1 it can at most only give us reason to suppose that the existence of an ,a is generally preceded by that of a ,b which stands to our ,a in the same relation in which has been observed to stand to 4 ,it cannot give the least reason for supposing that the existence of an ,a must have been preceded by that of a ,b1 which did not stand to ,a in the observed relation1 but in some quite different one4 ,if we are to have any reason to infer from the existence of an ,a the existence of such a ,b1 the reason must lie in some different observations4 ,that this is so1 in the case of hens' eggs and hens1 is1 ,i think1 obvious3 and1 if the rule is not universal1 some reason should at least be given for supposing that it does apply in one case and not in another4 ,having thus attempted to point out some conditions which seem to be necessary1 though not sufficient1 where observation is to give any reason for a generalisation1 ,i may now proceed to my second preliminary question4 ,what kinds of things do we observe8 ,in order to illustrate how much and how little ,i mean by observation or direct perception1 ,i will take as an instance a very common visual perception4 ,most of us are familiar with the experience which we should describe by saying that we had seen a red book and a blue book side by side upon a shelf4 ,what exactly can we be said to observe or directly perceive when we have such an experience8 ,we certainly observe one colour1 which we call blue1 and a different colour1 which we call red2 each of these we observe as having a particular size and shape2 and we observe also these two coloured patches as having to one another the spatial relation which we express by saying they are side by side4 ,all this we certainly see or directly perceive now1 whatever may have been the process by which we have come to perceive so much4 ,but when we say1 as in ordinary talk we should1 that the objects we perceive are books1 we certainly mean to ascribe to them properties1 which1 in a sense which we all understand1 are not actually seen by us1 at the moment when we are merely looking at two books on a shelf two yards off4 ,and all such properties ,i mean to exclude as not being then observed or directly perceived by us4 ,when ,i speak of what we observe1 when we see two books on a shelf1 ,i mean to limit the expression to that which is actually seen4 ,and1 thus understood1 the expression does include colours1 and the size and shape of colours1 and spatial relations in three dimensions between these patches of colour1 but it includes nothing else4 ,but ,i am also using observation in a sense in which we can be said actually to observe a movement4 ,we commonly say that we can sometimes see a red billiard ball moving towards a white one on a green table4 ,and1 here again1 ,i do not mean to include in what is directly perceived or observed1 all that we mean by saying that the two objects perceived are billiard-balls4 ,but ,i do mean to include what 7we should say7 we actually see4 ,we actually see a more or less round red patch moving towards a more or less round white patch2 we see the stretch of green between them diminishing in size4 ,and this perception is not merely the same as a series of perceptions--first a perception of a red patch with a green stretch of one size between it and the white2 then a perception of a red patch with a green stretch of a different size between it and the white2 and so on4 ,in order to perceive a movement we must have a different perception from any one of these or from the sum of them4 ,we must actually see the green stretch diminishing in size4 ,now it is undoubtedly difficult1 in some instances1 to decide precisely what is perceived in this sense and what is not4 ,but ,i hope ,i have said enough to show that ,i am using perceive and observe in a sense in which1 on a given occasion1 it is easy to decide that some things certainly are perceived1 and other things1 as certainly1 are not perceived4 ,i am using it in a sense in which we do perceive such a complex object as a white patch moving towards a red one on a green field2 but ,i am not using it in any sense in which we could be said to perceive or observe that what we saw moving was a billiard-ball4 ,and in the same way ,i think we can distinguish roughly between what1 on any given occasion1 we perceive1 as we say1 by any one of the other senses1 and what we do not perceive by it4 ,we can say with certainty that1 on any given occasion1 there are certain kinds of content which we are actually hearing1 and others which we are not actually hearing2 though with regard to some again it is difficult to say whether we are actually hearing them or not4 ,and similarly we can distinguish with certainty in some instances1 between what we are on a given occasion1 actually smelling or feeling1 and what we are not actually smelling or feeling4 ,but now1 besides these kinds of things1 objects1 or contents1 which we perceive1 as we say1 by the senses1 there is also another kind which we can be said to observe4 ,not only can ,i observe a red and blue book side by side2 ,i can also observe myself observing them4 ,i can perceive a red patch moving towards a white1 and ,i can also perceive my perception of this movement4 ,and what ,i wish to make as plain as ,i can is that my perception of the movement of a coloured patch can at least be distinguished from that movement itself4 ,i wish to make it plain that to observe a coloured patch moving is to observe one thing2 and to observe myself observing a coloured patch moving is another4 ,when ,i observe my own perception of a movement1 ,i observe something more than when ,i merely observe the movement1 and something very different from the movement4 ,i may perceive a red and a blue book side by side on a shelf2 and at another time ,i may perceive a red ball moving towards a white4 ,the red and blue patch1 of one shape1 at rest side by side1 are different from the red1 of another shape1 moving towards the white2 and yet1 when ,i say that both are perceived1 ,i mean by perceived one and the same thing4 ,and since1 thus1 two different things may both be perceived1 there must also be some difference between each of them and what is meant by saying that it is perceived4 ,indeed1 in precisely the same way ,in which ,i may observe a spatial relation between a red patch and a blue 7when ,i observe them side by side7 ,i do1 when ,i observe my own perception of them1 observe a spatial relation between it and them4 ,i observe a distance between my perception and the red and blue books which ,i perceive1 comparable in magnitude with the breadth or height of the blue book1 just as these are comparable in magnitude with one another4 ,and when ,i say ,i observe a distance between my perception of a red book and that red book itself1 ,i do not mean that ,i observe a distance between my eyes1 or any other part of what ,i call my body1 and the red patch in question4 ,i am talking not of my eyes1 but of my actual perception4 ,i observe my perception of a book to be near the book and further from the table1 in exactly the same sense in which ,i observe the book to be near the shelf on which it stands1 and further from the table4 ,and just as1 if the distance between a red patch and a white is to be perceived1 the red patch must be different from the white1 so1 if ,i perceive a certain distance between my perception and the red patch1 my perception must be different from the red patch which ,i perceive4 ,i assume1 then1 that we observe1 on the one hand1 coloured patches of certain shapes and sizes1 and their spatial relations to one another1 together with all the other kinds of contents1 which we should usually be said to perceive through the senses4 ,and1 on the other hand1 we also sometimes observe our own perceptions of such contents and our thoughts4 ,and these two kinds of content are different from one another3 my perception of a red patch with gold letters on it1 is not itself a red patch with gold letters on it2 and hence1 when ,i observe my perception of this patch1 ,i observe something different from that which ,i observe when ,i merely perceive the patch4 ,either of these two kinds of content--either colours1 moving or at rest1 sounds1 smells1 and all the rest--or1 on the other hand1 my perceptions of these--either of these two kinds1 or both1 might conceivably1 since both are observed1 give grounds for a generalisation concerning what exists4 ,but1 as ,i have said1 if observations are to give any ground for such a generalisation1 it must be assumed that what ,is observed exists or is real4 ,and since1 as ,i have insisted1 when ,i observe my perception of a red patch with gold letters on it1 ,i observe something different from what ,i observed when ,i merely observed a red patch with gold letters on it1 it follows that to assume the existence of my perception of this red and gold is not the same thing as to assume the existence of the red and gold itself4 ,but what1 it may be asked1 do ,i mean by this property of existence or reality1 which may1 it would seem1 belong to every content1 which ,i observe1 or may again belong to none1 or which may belong to some and not to others8 ,what is this property which may belong to my perception of a movement1 and yet not belong to the movement perceived1 or which may again belong to the movement perceived and not to my perception of it1 or which may again belong to both or to neither8 ,it is necessary1 ,i think1 to ask this question at this point1 because there are some philosophers who hold that1 in the case of some kinds of content1 at all events1 to say that they exist is to say that they are perceived4 ,some hold that to say ,a exists is to say neither more nor less than ,a is perceived--that the two expressions are perfect synonyms2 and others again would say that by ,a exists or is real we may mean more than that ,a is perceived1 but that we must at least mean this4 ,now1 ,i have hitherto used the word existence pretty freely1 and ,i think that1 when ,i used it1 ,i used it in its ordinary sense4 ,i think it will generally have suggested to you precisely what ,i meant to convey1 and ,i think that1 in some cases at all events1 it will not even have occurred to you to doubt whether you did understand what ,i meant by it4 ,but1 if these philosophers are right1 then1 if you have understood what ,i meant by it1 ,i have all along been using it in a sense1 which renders the end of my last paragraph perfect nonsense4 ,if these philosophers are right1 then1 when ,i assert that what is perceived may yet not exist1 ,i am really asserting that what is perceived may yet not be perceived--,i am contradicting myself4 ,i am1 of course1 quite unaware that ,i am doing so4 ,but these philosophers would say either you are contradicting yourself1 or you are not using the word exists in its ordinary sense4 ,and either of these alternatives would be fatal to my purpose4 ,if ,i am not using the word in its ordinary sense1 then ,i shall not be understood by anyone2 and1 if ,i am contradicting myself1 then what ,i say will not be worth understanding4 ,now1 with one class of these philosophers--the class to which1 ,i think1 ,berkeley belongs--,i think ,i can put myself right comparatively easily4 ,the philosophers ,i mean are those who say that it is only in the case of one particular class of contents 7the kind of content which ,berkeley calls ideas7 that to say the 'content' ,a exists is to say ,a is perceived1 and who admit that in the case of other contents--myself and my perceptions and thoughts1 for example--to say that these exist or are real1 is to say of them something different from this4 ,these philosophers admit1 that is to say1 that the word exists has two different senses3 and that in only one of these senses is it synonymous with the words is perceived4 ,when 7they hold7 ,i say of such a content as a red patch with gold letters on it that it exists ,i do mean that it is perceived2 but when ,i say of my perception of such a patch that it exists1 ,i do not mean that my perception is perceived but something different from this4 ,now1 it would be nothing strange that one and the same word should be used in two different senses2 many words are used in many different senses4 ,but it would1 ,i think1 be something very strange indeed1 if in the case of a word which we constantly apply to all sorts of different objects1 we should uniformly apply it to one large class of object in the one sense and the one sense only and the other large class in the other sense and the other sense only4 ,usually1 in the case of such ambiguous words1 it happens that1 in different contexts1 we apply it to one and the same object in both senses4 ,we sometimes wish to say of a given object that it has the one property1 and sometimes we wish to say of the same object that it has the other property2 and hence we apply the same word to the same object1 at one time in one sense1 and at another in the other4 ,i think1 therefore1 that1 even if there were these two different senses of the word existence1 it would be very unlikely that we should not commonly1 in some contexts1 apply it in the sense1 in which 7as is alleged7 it does apply to perceptions1 to contents which are not perceptions4 ,indeed1 ,i think1 it is quite plain that we constantly do ask1 with regard to what is not a perception1 whether it exists1 in precisely the same sense1 in which we ask1 with regard to a perception1 whether it exists4 ,we ask in precisely the same sense3 ,was the ,roc a real bird1 or merely an imaginary one8 and1 did ,sindbad's perception of the ,roc really exist1 or is it a fiction that he perceived a ,roc8 ,i think1 therefore1 that the sense in which these philosophers admit that we do apply the word existence to perceptions1 is one in which we also commonly apply it to contents other than perceptions4 ,but1 even if this is not the case1 ,i can set myself right with them by a simple explanation4 ,i need merely explain that the sense in which ,i am proposing to enquire whether a red patch exists1 is precisely the sense in which they admit that my perception of a red patch does exist4 ,and in this sense1 it is plain that to suppose that a thing may exist1 which is not perceived1 or that it may not exist1 although it is perceived1 is at least not self-contradictory4 ,but there may be other philosophers who will say that1 in the case of a perception also1 to say that it exists or is real is to say that it is perceived--either that alone or something more as well4 ,and to these philosophers ,i would first point out that they are admitting that the proposition ,this perception is real is significant4 ,there is some sense or other in which we may say3 ,alexander's perception of an elephant was real or did exist1 but ,sindbad's perception of a ,roc was not real--never did exist3 the latter proposition is1 in some sense or other1 not self-contradictory4 ,and then ,i would ask of them3 ,when they say1 that to call a perception real is to assert that it is perceived1 do they mean by this that to call it real is to assert that it is really perceived1 or not8 ,if they say ,no1 then they are asserting that to call a perception real is merely to say that it was perceived in the sense in which ,sindbad did perceive a ,roc3 they are asserting that to call it real is not to say1 in any sense1 that it was really perceived3 they are asserting that to call a perception real is to say that it was perceived1 in some sense quite other than that in which we ordinarily use the word3 for we certainly commonly mean1 when we say ,a was perceived1 that a perception of ,a was real3 we should commonly say that ,sindbad did not perceive a ,roc--meaning that no such perception ever did exist4 ,i do not think they do mean this2 and1 in any case1 if they do1 ,i think it is plain that they are wrong4 ,when we say that a perception is real1 we certainly do not mean merely that it is the object of another perception1 which may itself be quite unreal--purely ,imaginary4 ,i assume1 therefore1 that when they say3 ,to call a perception real is to say that it is perceived2 they mean1 what we should naturally understand1 namely1 that3 ,to call it real is to say that it is really perceived--to say that it is the object of another perception1 which is also real in the same sense4 ,and1 if they mean this1 then what they say is certainly untrue4 ,their definition of reality is circular4 ,it cannot be the case that the only sense in which a perception may be said to be real1 is one in which to call it so is to assert that not it alone1 but another perception is real also4 ,it cannot be the case that the assertion ,a is real is identical with the assertion ,a and ,b are both real1 where ,a and ,b are different1 and real is used in the same sense as applied to both4 ,if it is to be true that the assertion ,a is real ever1 in any sense1 includes the assertion ,a is really perceived1 there must be another sense of the word real1 in which to assert ,a is real is to assert less than ,a is really perceived--the sense1 namely1 in which we here assert that the perception of ,a is real4 ,we find1 therefore1 that the other class of philosophers were at least right in this3 they were right in allowing that the sense in which we commonly say that our perceptions exist is one in which exist does not include1 even as a part of its meaning1 is perceived4 ,we find that there is a common sense of the word existence1 in which to say ,a exists must mean less than ,a is really perceived3 since1 otherwise1 the only possible definition of the word existence would be a circular definition4 ,and ,i may point out that two other definitions1 which have been sometimes suggested by philosophers as giving what we commonly mean by reality or existence are vitiated by the same fault--they also are circular4 ,some philosophers have sometimes suggested that when we call a thing real1 we mean that it is systematically connected in some way with other things4 ,but1 when we look into their meaning1 we find that what they mean is 7what1 indeed1 is alone plausible7--systematically connected with other real things4 ,and it may possibly be the case that we sometimes use the word real in this sense3 but1 at least1 it must be certainly the case1 that1 if we do1 we also use it in another and simpler sense--the sense in which it is employed in the proposed definition4 ,and other philosophers have suggested that what we mean by real is--connected in some way with a purpose--helping or hindering1 or the object of a purpose4 ,but if we look into their meaning1 we find they mean--connected with a real purpose4 ,and hence1 even if we do sometimes mean by real1 connected with a real purpose1 it is plain we also sometimes mean by real something simpler than this--that namely1 which is meant by real in the proposed definition4 ,it is certain1 therefore1 that we do commonly use the word existence in a sense1 in which to say ,a exists is not to say ,a is perceived1 or ,a is systematically connected with other real things1 or ,a is purposive4 ,there is a simpler sense than any of these--the sense in which we say that our own perceptions do exist1 and that ,sindbad's perceptions did not exist4 ,but when ,i say this1 ,i am by no means denying that what exists1 in this simple sense1 may not always also exist in all the others2 and that what exists in any of them may not also always exist in this4 ,it is quite possible that what exists is always also perceived1 and that what is perceived always also exists4 ,all that ,i am saying is that1 even if this is so1 this proposition is significant--is not merely a proposition about the meaning of a word4 ,it is not self-contradictory to suppose that some things which exist are not perceived1 and that some things which are perceived do not exist4 ,but1 it may be asked3 ,what is this common simple sense of the word exists8 ,for my own part1 it seems to me to be so simple that it cannot be expressed in other words1 except those which are recognised as its synonyms4 ,i think we are all perfectly familiar with its meaning3 it is the meaning which you understood me to have throughout this paper1 until ,i began this discussion4 ,i think we can perceive at once what is meant by asserting that my perception of black marks on a white ground is real1 and that no such perception as ,sindbad's of a ,roc was ever real3 we are perfectly familiar with the property which the one perception is affirmed to possess1 and the other to be without4 ,and ,i think1 as ,i have said1 that this property is a simple one4 ,but1 whatever it is1 this1 which we ordinarily mean1 is what ,i mean by existence or reality4 ,and this property1 we have seen1 is certainly neither identical with nor inclusive of that complex one which we mean by the words is perceived4 ,i may now1 then1 at last approach the main question of my paper4 ,which among the contents which ,i observe will give me reason to suppose that my observation of some of them is generally preceded or accompanied or followed by the existence of certain particular perceptions1 thoughts or feelings in another person8 ,i have explained that the contents which ,i actually observe may be divided into two classes3 on the one hand1 those which1 as we commonly say1 we perceive through the senses2 and1 on the other hand1 my perceptions of these last1 my thoughts1 and my feelings4 ,i have explained that if any of these observed contents are to give reason for a generalisation about what exists1 they must exist4 ,and ,i have explained that with regard to both classes of contents ,i am using the word exist in precisely the same sense--a sense1 in which it is certainly not self-contradictory to suppose that what is perceived1 does not exist1 and that what is not perceived1 does exist2 and1 in which1 therefore1 the assumption that a red patch with gold letters on it exists1 is a different assumption from the assumption that my perception of a red patch with gold letters on it exists2 and the assumption that my perception of a red patch with gold letters on it exists1 is a different assumption from the assumption that a red patch with gold letters on it exists4 ,what1 then1 that we observe1 can give us any reason for believing that anyone else has certain particular perceptions1 thoughts or feelings8 ,it has1 ,i think1 been very commonly assumed that the observation of my own perceptions1 thoughts1 and feelings1 can1 by itself1 give me such a reason4 ,and ,i propose1 therefore1 to examine this assumption4 ,if1 as ,i hope to show1 it is false2 it will then follow1 that if our own observation gives us any reason whatever1 for believing in the existence of other persons1 we must assume the existence1 not only of our own perceptions1 thoughts and feelings1 but also of some1 at least1 among that other class of data1 which ,i may now1 for the sake of brevity1 call sense-contents2 we must assume that some of them exist1 in precisely the same sense in which we assume that our perceptions1 thoughts1 and feelings exist4 ,the theory which ,i propose to examine is1 then1 the following4 ,my observation of my own thoughts1 feelings1 and perceptions may1 it asserts1 give me some reason to suppose that another person has thoughts1 feelings1 and perceptions similar to some of mine4 ,let us assume1 accordingly1 that my own thoughts1 feelings1 and perceptions do exist2 but that none of the sense-contents1 which ,i also observe1 do so4 ,where among my perceptions am ,i to look for any which might conceivably give me a reason for supposing the existence of other perceptions similar to my own8 ,it is obvious where ,i must look4 ,i have perceptions which ,i call perceptions of other people's bodies2 and these are certainly similar in many respects to other perceptions of my own body4 ,but ,i also observe that certain kinds of perceptions of my own body are preceded by certain other perceptions1 thoughts1 or feelings of mine4 ,i may1 for instance1 observe that when ,i perceive my hand suddenly catch hold of my foot in a particular way1 this perception was preceded by a particular kind of feeling of pain4 ,i may1 perhaps1 observe this often enough to justify the generalisation that the perception of that particular motion of my body is generally preceded by that particular feeling of pain4 ,and in this way ,i may perhaps have reason for quite a number of generalisations which assert that particular kinds of perceptions of my own body are generally preceded by other particular kinds of perceptions1 thoughts1 or feelings of my own4 ,but ,i may also1 no doubt1 have the perception1 which ,i call the perception of another person's hand catching hold of his foot1 in a manner similar to that in which ,i have perceived my own hand catch hold of my own foot4 ,and my perception of another person's hand catching hold of his foot may undoubtedly be similar in many respects to my perception of my own hand catching hold of my own foot4 ,but ,i shall not observe the same kind of feeling of pain preceding my perception of his hand catching hold of his foot1 which ,i have observed preceding my perception of my hand catching hold of my foot4 ,will my generalisation1 then1 give me any reason to suppose that nevertheless my perception of his hand catching hold of his foot is preceded by a similar feeling of pain1 not in me but in him8 ,we undoubtedly do assume that when ,i perceive another person's body making movements similar to those which ,i have observed my own body making1 this perception has generally been preceded by some feeling or perception of his similar to that which ,i have observed to precede my perception of similar movements in my own body4 ,we do assume this2 and it is precisely the kind of generalisation1 which1 ,i have insisted1 must be admitted to be true4 ,but my present question is3 ,will such observations as ,i have described give any reason for thinking any such generalisation true8 ,i think it is plain that they will not give the slightest reason for thinking so4 ,in the first place1 all the perceptions which ,i call perceptions of another person's body differ very considerably from any of those which ,i call perceptions of my own4 ,but ,i am willing to waive this objection4 ,i am not offering any theory as to what degree of likeness is sufficient to justify a generalisation3 and therefore ,i will allow that the degree of likeness may be sufficient4 ,but there remains an objection which is1 ,i think1 quite fatal to the proposed inference4 ,this objection is that the inference in question plainly does not satisfy the third condition which ,i suggested above as necessary1 wherever any generalisation is to be justified by observation4 ,i am willing to allow that my observations of the fact that my perception of a certain movement in my own body is preceded by a certain feeling of pain1 will justify the generalisation that my perception of any such movement1 whether in my own body or in that of another person1 is generally preceded by a similar feeling of pain4 ,and ,i allow1 therefore1 that when ,i perceive a certain movement in another's body1 it is probable that the feeling of pain exists1 though ,i do not perceive it4 ,but1 if it is probable that such a feeling of pain exists1 such a feeling must stand in the same relation to my perception of the movement in another person's body1 in which a similar feeling of pain has been observed by me to stand to my perception of such a movement in my own body4 ,that is to say the only kind of feeling of pain1 which my observations do justify me in inferring1 if 7as ,i admit they may7 they justify me in inferring any at all1 is a feeling of pain of my own4 ,they cannot possibly justify the belief in the existence of any such feeling except one which stands to my perception in the same relation in which my feelings do stand to my perceptions--one1 that is to say1 which is my own4 ,i have no more reason to believe that the feeling of pain which probably precedes my perception of a movement in another person's body can be the feeling of another person1 than1 in my former example1 ,i had reason to suppose that the hen1 whose existence probably preceded that of a given egg1 could be a hen1 which had never been near the egg in question4 ,the two cases are exactly analogous4 ,i observe a feeling of pain of my own preceding a perception of my own4 ,i observe the two1 that is to say1 as standing to one another1 in those relations 7whatever they may be7 in which any perception of mine stands to any other thought1 perception or feeling of mine1 and which are1 at all events1 different from any relation in which a perception or feeling of another person can stand to one of mine4 ,i never perceive the feeling and the perception as standing in any other relation4 ,in any case1 therefore1 where ,i do observe something like the perception1 but do not observe the feeling1 ,i can only be justified 7if justified in inferring any feeling at all71 in inferring an unperceived feeling of my own4 ,for this reason ,i think that no observations of my own perceptions1 feelings or thoughts can give me the slightest reason for supposing a connection between any of them and any feeling1 perception1 or thought in another person4 ,the argument is perfectly general1 since all my perceptions1 feelings and thoughts do have to one another those relations in virtue of which ,i call them mine2 and which1 when ,i talk of a perception1 feeling or thought as being another persons1 ,i mean to say that it has not got to any of mine4 ,i can1 therefore1 merely from observation of this class of data never obtain the slightest reason for belief in the existence of a feeling1 perception1 or thought which does not stand in these relations to one of mine--which is1 that is to say1 the feeling1 perception or thought1 of another person4 ,but how different is the case1 if we adopt the hypothesis1 which ,i wish to recommend--if we assume the existence of that other class of data which ,i have called sense-contents6 ,on this hypothesis1 that which ,i perceive1 when ,i perceive a movement of my own body1 is real2 that which ,i perceive when ,i perceive a movement of another's body is real also4 ,i can now observe not merely the relation between my perception of a movement of my body and my own feelings1 but also a relation between a real movement of my body and my own feelings4 ,and there is no reason why ,i should not be justified in inferring that another person's feelings stand in the same relation to the real movements of his body1 in which ,i observe my own feelings to stand to similar real movements of mine4 ,but there is another argument which may still be urged by those who hold that my own perceptions1 thoughts1 and feelings1 by themselves1 may be sufficient to justify a belief in the existence of other persons4 ,it may be said3 ,our observation of our own perceptions may be sufficient to verify or confirm the hypothesis that other persons exist4 ,this hypothesis is one which works4 ,the assumption that other persons have particular thoughts1 feelings and perceptions enables us to predict that they will have others and that our own perceptions will be modified accordingly3 it enables us to predict future perceptions of our own2 and we find that these predictions are constantly verified4 ,we observe that we do have the perceptions1 which the hypothesis leads us to expect we should have4 ,in short1 our perceptions occur just as they would do1 if the hypothesis were true2 our perceptions behave as if other persons had the perceptions1 thoughts and feelings which we suppose them to have4 ,surely1 then1 they confirm the truth of the hypothesis--they give some reason to think it probably true8 ,all this1 which ,i have supposed an opponent to urge1 ,i admit to be true4 ,i admit that the fact that an hypothesis works may give some reason to suppose it true4 ,i admit that my perceptions occur just as they would do1 if other people had the perceptions which ,i suppose them to have4 ,i admit that that assumption enables me to make predictions as to future perceptions of my own1 and that ,i observe these predictions to come true4 ,i admit all this4 ,but ,i admit it only in a sense in which it in no way conflicts with the position which ,i am maintaining4 ,the words1 which ,i have put into the mouth of a supposed opponent1 may1 in fact1 mean three different things1 which it is worth while to distinguish4 ,in two of those meanings1 which ,i shall admit to be true and which are what make them seem plausible1 they do not deny what ,i assert4 ,only in the third sense are they an objection to my position3 and in that sense they are false4 ,one of the meanings which ,i admit to be true is as follows3--,i have not only admitted but insisted that some of my perceptions are just such as would occur if another person had certain particular feelings3 ,i have insisted that ,i should not have just those perceptions which ,i do have1 unless some other person had certain feelings and perceptions which ,i suppose him to have4 ,and ,i admit further that the fact that ,i have one of the perceptions in question--for instance1 that of another person's hand catching hold of his foot--this fact1 together with the true assumption that ,i should not have this perception1 unless some other person felt pain1 will justify the assertion that another person has felt pain4 ,in this sense1 ,i admit1 the fact that ,i perceive what ,i do perceive will give me reason to suppose that another person has felt pain4 ,and1 on the other hand1 ,i also admit that the fact that ,i have this perception1 together with the true assumption that when ,i have it another person has felt pain1 may help to justify the assumption that the perception in question is one which ,i should not have had unless another person had felt pain--it helps to justify the generalisation that certain of my perceptions are just what would occur1 if another person had felt pain4 ,in general terms1 that is to say1 ,i admit that the occurrence of ,b1 together with the assumption that ,b is just the sort of thing which would occur if ,a existed1 will justify the assertion that ,a exists in that particular instance4 ,and ,i also admit that the occurrence of ,b1 together with the assumption that ,a exists in that particular instance1 may help to justify the assumption that ,b is just the sort of thing which would exist1 if ,a existed4 ,in other words3 ,when it is said that the observation of ,b's existence confirms or verifies the assumption that ,a exists1 either of two things may be meant4 ,it may be meant that1 assuming ,b to be the sort of thing which would exist if ,a existed1 the observation of ,b confirms the assumption that ,a exists in this particular instance4 ,or1 on the other hand1 it may be meant that1 assuming ,a to exist in this particular instance1 the observation of ,b may confirm the generalisation1 that ,b is just the sort of thing which would exist1 if ,a existed4 ,either the one or the other of these two things is1 ,i think1 what is generally assumed1 when it is assumed that what we do observe confirms or verifies the assumption that there exists some particular thing which we don't observe4 ,and ,i am admitting that both these assumptions are true4 ,but neither of them conflicts in any way with the position ,i am maintaining4 ,what ,i am maintaining is that no observation of my own perceptions1 by itself1 can confirm the generalisation that any one of them is just what would occur if another person had a particular feeling4 ,i admit this generalisation to be true2 and ,i admit that my observation of my own perceptions and feelings may give me reason to suppose that if another person has certain perceptions or feelings he will also have certain others4 ,what ,i deny is that they give me the slightest reason to suppose that the existence of any such feeling or perception in another has any connection with the existence of any perception of my own--to suppose that any perception of my own is the sort of thing which would occur if another person had a particular feeling4 ,what therefore1 my opponent must affirm is that the observation of a perception of my own without the assumption 7which ,reid makes7 that in that particular instance any feeling or perception of another person1 of any kind whatever1 has preceded it1 may give me reason to suppose that that perception of my own is of a kind which is generally preceded by a particular kind of feeling in another person4 ,and this1 ,i think1 is plainly false4 ,but there is yet a third thing which may be meant1 and which ,i am willing to admit may be true4 ,it may be said3 ,i believe many generalisations of the following kind4 ,i believe that when ,i have a perception ,a1 some other person has generally had a feeling ,x2 ,i believe that the existence of the feeling ,x is generally followed1 in the same person1 by that of the feeling ,y2 and ,i believe also that when another person has the feeling ,y1 ,i generally have the perception ,b4 ,i believe all this4 ,and it must1 ,i think1 be admitted that we do believe generalisations of this kind1 and generalisations in which there are not merely two steps between ,a and ,b1 but a great number of steps4 ,but then1 it may be said1 my belief in this generalisation causes me1 when ,i observe my perception ,a1 to expect that ,i shall have the perception ,b2 and such expectations1 ,i observe1 are constantly realised4 ,and this also1 ,i think1 must be admitted to be true4 ,but1 finally1 it may be said1 beliefs which produce expectations which are constantly realised are generally true4 ,and hence the fact that these beliefs of mine about the connection of feelings in other persons with perceptions of my own do lead to expectations which are realised1 gives me reason to suppose that these generalisations are true and hence that other persons do have particular kinds of feelings4 ,and ,i am willing to admit that this also is true4 ,i am willing to admit that true predictions can1 as a rule1 only be produced by true beliefs4 ,the generalisation that this is so1 is1 indeed1 one which can only be justified by the observations of beliefs1 which are1 in some way1 independently proved to be true2 and hence1 if it is to be justified1 without assuming the existence of anything other than my own perceptions1 thoughts1 and feelings1 it can only be justified by my observation that beliefs with regard to the manner in which these succeed one another generally lead to true predictions4 ,whether the observation of such beliefs alone could give sufficient reason for it1 is1 ,i think1 doubtful2 but ,i am willing to admit that it may be so4 ,one thing1 however1 is1 ,i think1 quite plain3 namely1 that this generalisation ,beliefs which lead to true predictions are generally true cannot be true1 unless some other of the contents which ,i observe1 beside my own perceptions1 thoughts1 and feelings1 do exist4 ,that is to say1 in giving a reason for supposing the existence of other people1 this generalisation also gives a reason for the very theory which ,i am advocating1 namely1 that some of those data which ,i have called sense-contents do exist4 ,it does this1 because it is quite certain that beliefs in generalisations about the existence of sense-contents can 7and do7 constantly lead to true predictions4 ,the belief that when ,i have observed a fire of a certain size in my grate1 something similar to what ,i have observed will continue to exist for a certain time1 can1 and constantly does1 lead to the true prediction that1 when ,i come back to my room in half an hour's time1 ,i shall observe a fire of a certain size still burning4 ,we make predictions on such grounds1 ,i think1 every day and all day long4 ,and hence unless such beliefs as that what ,i observe when ,i see a fire burning does exist1 are true1 we certainly have no reason to suppose that beliefs which lead to true predictions are generally true4 ,and hence on this hypothesis also it remains true3 that1 unless some of the contents which ,i observe other than my own perceptions1 thoughts1 and feelings1 do exist1 ,i cannot have the slightest reason for supposing that the existence of certain perceptions of my own is generally connected with that of certain perceptions1 thoughts1 or feelings in any other person4 ,i conclude therefore that1 unless some of the observed data which ,i have called sense-contents do exist1 my own observations cannot give me the slightest reason for believing that anybody else has ever had any particular perception1 thought1 or feeling4 ,and1 having arrived so far towards an answer to my first question3 ,how do we know that any other persons exist8 ,i may now point out that precisely the same answer must be given to my second question3 ,how do we know that any particular kind of thing exists1 other than ourselves1 our perceptions1 thoughts1 and feelings1 and what we directly perceive8 ,there is a view concerning what exists1 which deserves1 ,i think1 much more respect than it generally receives from philosophers nowadays4 ,the view ,i mean is the view that material objects1 such as they are conceived by physical science1 do really exist4 ,it is held by some persons 7and ,reid is among them7 that we do know of the existence1 not only of other persons1 but also of the movements of matter in space4 ,it is held that we do know1 with considerable precision1 what kinds of movements of matter generally precede my perception1 when ,i have a particular perception4 ,it is held1 for instance1 that when ,i perceive a red and blue book side by side on a shelf1 at a certain distance from me1 there have existed1 between two material objects1 which may be called books1 and another kind of material object1 which may be called my eyes1 certain wave-like motions of a material medium2 that there have existed two different sets of waves1 of which the one is connected with my perception of red and the other with my perception of blue2 and that the relative heights and breadths of the two different sets of waves1 and the relative velocity of their movements are very exactly known4 ,it is held that some men have a vast amount of very precise information about the existence of objects of this kind2 and ,i think the view that this is so deserves a great deal of respect4 ,but what ,i wish now to point out is that no one's observation of his own perceptions1 thoughts and feelings1 can1 by itself1 give him the slightest reason for believing in the existence of any such material objects4 ,all the arguments by which ,i have tried to show that this kind of observation alone can give me no reason to believe in the existence of any kind of perception or feeling in another person1 apply1 with at least equal force1 to show that it can give me no reason to believe in the existence of any kind of material object4 ,on the other hand1 if we are to admit the principle that ,beliefs which lead to true predictions1 are generally true1 this principle will give us at least as much reason to believe in the existence of certain kinds of material objects as to believe in the existence of other persons2 since one of the most remarkable facts about beliefs in the existence of such objects is that they do so often lead to true predictions4 ,but it must be remembered that we can have no reason for believing this principle itself1 unless our own perceptions1 thoughts and feelings are not the only kind of observed content which really does exist3 we can have no reason for it1 unless some such things as what ,i perceive1 when ,i see a red and blue book side by side1 do really exist4 ,it would seem1 therefore1 that if my own observations do give me any reason whatever for believing in the existence either of any perception in any other person or of any material object1 it must be true that not only my own perceptions1 thoughts and feelings1 but also some of the other kinds of things which ,i directly perceive--colours1 sounds1 smells1 etc4--do really exist3 it must be true that some objects of this kind exist or are real in precisely the same simple sense in which my perceptions of them exist or are real4 ,is there then any reason to think that this is not true8 ,is there any reason to think1 for instance1 that none of the colours which ,i perceive as occupying areas of certain shapes and sizes really exist in the areas which they appear to occupy8 ,this is a question which ,i wished to discuss at length1 because ,i think that it is one in which there are real difficulties4 ,but ,i have given so much space to other questions1 that ,i can only deal with it very briefly here4 ,some philosophers are very fond of asserting that a colour cannot exist except when it is perceived2 and it might possibly be thought that when ,i suggest that colours do really exist1 ,i am suggesting that they do exist when they are not perceived4 ,i wish1 therefore1 briefly to point out that the question whether anything does exist1 when it is not perceived1 is one which ,i have not argued and shall not attempt to argue in this paper4 ,i have1 indeed1 tried to show that since exists does not mean is perceived1 it is1 at least1 conceivable that things should exist1 when they are not perceived4 ,but ,i have admitted that it is quite possible none do so3 it may be the case that whenever a thing exists1 it is also at the same time perceived1 for anything that ,i have said or shall say to the contrary4 ,i think1 indeed1 that1 if such things as colours do exist1 my observation of their behaviour will justify me in concluding that they also exist when ,i myself am1 at least1 not aware of perceiving them3 but since ,i have not attempted to determine what kinds of observation are sufficient to justify a generalisation1 ,i do not pretend to say whether this is so or not3 and still less do ,i pretend to say whether1 if they exist when ,i do not perceive them1 we are justified in supposing that someone else must be perceiving them4 ,the question whether anything exists1 when it is not perceived1 and1 if so1 what things1 seems to me to be one which can only be settled by observation2 and thus1 ,i conceive1 observation might justify us in concluding that certain kinds of things--pains1 for example1 do not exist1 when they are not perceived and that other kinds of things--colours1 for example1 do exist1 when they are not perceived4 ,the only way1 in which1 so far as ,i am aware1 the theory ,i am advocating does conflict with ordinary ,idealistic conclusions1 is that it does suggest that things1 which are not spiritual1 do sometimes exist1 as really and as truly1 as things which are4 ,the theory1 therefore1 that nothing exists1 except when it is perceived1 is no objection 7even if it be true7 to the supposition that colours do exist4 ,what objections are there to this supposition8 ,all serious objections to it are1 ,i think1 of one type4 ,they all rest upon the assumption that1 if a certain kind of thing exists at a certain time in a certain place1 certain other kinds of things cannot exist at the same time in the same place4 ,they are all1 that is to say1 of the same type as ,berkeley's argument3 that1 though the same body of water may appear to be simultaneously both hot and cold 7if one of the hands we plunge into it is warm and the other cold71 yet the heat and the cold cannot both really be in the same body at the same time4 ,and it is worth noticing that anyone who uses this argument must admit that he understands what is meant by really existing in a given place1 and that he means by it something other than being perceived as in a given place4 ,for the argument itself admits that both the heat and the cold are really perceived as being in the same place1 and that there is no difficulty in supposing that they are so2 whereas ,it urges that there is a difficulty in supposing that they both really exist in it4 ,now there is one obvious defect in this type of argument1 if designed to prove that no sensible quality exists at any place where it is perceived as being--a defect1 which ,berkeley himself admits in his ,principles1 though he omits to notice it where he repeats the argument in his ,hylas4 ,even if we assume that the heat and the cold cannot both exist in the same place 7and ,i admit that1 in this case1 the contrary assumption does seem repugnant to ,common ,sense71 it does not follow that neither exists there4 ,that is to say this type of argument1 even if we grant its initial assumption1 will only entitle us to conclude that some sensible qualities which we perceive as being in a certain place at a certain time1 do not exist in that place at that time4 ,and this conclusion1 ,i am inclined to think1 is true4 ,in the case1 for instance1 of the so-called images which we perceive in a looking-glass1 we may very readily admit that the colours and shapes which we perceive do not exist at the places where they appear to be--namely at various distances behind the glass4 ,but yet1 so far as ,i can see1 we have no reason whatever for supposing that they do not1 except the assumption that our observations give us reason to believe that other sensible qualities do exist in those positions behind the glass2 and the assumption that where these other sensible qualities do exist1 those which we see in the glass do not exist4 ,i should1 therefore1 admit that some sensible qualities which we perceive as being in certain places1 do not exist in those places1 while still retaining my belief that others do4 ,and perhaps this explanation is the one which should also be adopted in the case of sensible qualities which appear to be at a great distance from us4 ,when1 for instance1 7as we say71 we see the moon1 what we perceive 7if the moon be full7 is a round bright silver disc1 of a small size1 at a place very distant from us4 ,does that silver disc exist at that place8 ,with what suppositions does the assumption that it does conflict8 ,only1 so far as ,i can see1 with the supposition that the place in question is really occupied by a body such as science has taught us to suppose that the moon really is--a spherical body immensely larger than objects1 in comparison with which the silver disc which we perceive is small2 or else with the supposition that the place in question is really occupied by some part of our atmosphere1 or some part of the medium which science supposes to exist between our atmosphere and the moon2 or else with the supposition that the place in question is really occupied by what we might see1 if the moon were nearer to us by many thousands of miles4 ,unless we suppose that some other object is in the place1 in which the silver disc appears to be1 and that this object is of a kind which cannot occupy the same place which is occupied by a silver disc1 we have no reason to suppose that the silver disc does not really exist in the place where it appears to be4 ,and1 in this case1 we perhaps have reason for both suppositions and should therefore conclude that the silver disc1 which we perceive1 does not exist in any real place4 ,part1 therefore1 of these objections to our theory may1 ,i think1 be met by admitting that some of the 444 sensible qualities which we perceive do not exist at the places where they appear to exist1 though ethers do4 ,but there is1 ,i think1 another class of cases1 in which we may be justified in denying that two things which 7it is asserted7 cannot occupy the same space1 really cannot4 ,i will take an instance which is1 ,i think1 typical4 ,when we look at a drop of blood with the naked eye1 we perceive a small red spot1 uniformly red all over4 ,but when 7as we say7 we look at the same object under a microscope of a certain power1 ,i am informed that we see a much larger spot1 of similar shape1 indeed1 but not uniformly red--having1 in fact1 small red spots at different positions in a yellowish field4 ,and if we were again to look at the same object through a microscope of much higher power still1 we might perceive yet a third different arrangement of colours4 ,is there any fatal objection to supposing that all three appearances--the uniform red spot1 the yellowish field with reddish spots in it1 and the third1 whatever that may be--do all really occupy the same real spatial area8 ,i cannot see that there is4 ,we are familiar with the idea that a given spatial area may contain parts which are invisible to us4 ,and hence1 ,i think it is quite conceivable that parts of a given area may be really occupied by one colour1 while the whole is really occupied by another4 ,and this1 ,i think1 is what we actually do believe in many cases4 ,at all events1 we certainly believe that the area which appears to be occupied by one colour really is the same area as that which appears to be occupied by another4 ,and1 unless we assume that the area1 in both cases1 really is the same1 we can certainly have no reason to deny that each colour does really occupy the area which it appears to occupy4 ,for these reasons ,i think that the difficulties in the way of supposing that some of the sensible qualities which we perceive as being in certain places1 really exist in the places in which we perceive them to be1 are not insuperable4 ,i have indeed not done justice to these difficulties2 but then1 neither have ,i done justice to what is to be said on the other side4 ,at all events1 ,i think it is plain that we have no reason to assert1 in any case whatever1 that a perceived colour does not really exist in the place where it is perceived as being1 unless we assume that that very same place really is occupied by something else--either by some different sensible qualities or by material objects such as physical science supposes to exist4 ,but what reason can we give for such an assumption8 ,i have tried to show that our own observations can give us none1 unless we assume that some of the sensible qualities1 which we observe as occupying certain places1 do really exist in those places4 ,and1 if this is so1 then we must admit that neither he who believes 7with ,reid7 in the existence of other minds and of matter also1 nor he who believes in the existence of other minds and denies that of matter1 can have1 in his own observations1 the slightest reason either for his assertion or for his denial3 we must admit that he can have no reason for either assertion or denial1 except one which consists in the assumption of the existence or nonexistence of something which he does not observe--something1 therefore1 of the very same kind as that for which he gives it as a reason4 ,i am very unwilling to suppose that this is the case3 ,i am very unwilling to suppose that he who believes that ,sindbad the ,sailor really saw what the ,arabian ,nights represent him as seeing1 has just as good reason 7so far as his own observation goes7 for believing this as he who denies it has for denying it4 ,still this may be the case4 ,we must1 perhaps1 be content to assume as certain that for which our observation gives no reason3 to assume such propositions as that ,sindbad did not see a ,roc1 and that you do hear my voice4 ,but if it is said that these things are certain2 then it also appears to me to be certain that the colours which ,i perceive do exist 7some of them7 where ,i perceive them4 ,the more ,i look at objects round me1 the more ,i am unable to resist the conviction that what ,i see does exist1 as truly and as really1 as my perception of it ,the conviction is overwhelming4 ,this being1 then1 the state of the case1 ,i think ,i may at least plead that we have grounds for suspense of judgment as to whether what ,i see does not really exist2 grounds1 too1 for renewed enquiry1 more careful than such enquiry has sometimes been in the past4 #a ,not now in #aiba4 ,,william ,,james ,my object in this paper is to discuss some of the things which ,prof4 ,william ,james says about truth in the recent book1 to which he has given the above name4#a ,in ,lecture ,,vi he professes to give an account of a theory1 which he calls the pragmatist theory of truth2 and he professes to give a briefer preliminary account of the same theory in ,lecture ,,ii4 ,moreover1 in ,lecture ,,vii1 he goes on to make some further remarks about truth4 ,in all these ,lectures he seems to me to make statements to which there are very obvious objections2 and my main object is to point out1 as clearly and simply as ,i can1 what seem to me to be the principal objections to some of these statements4 ,we may1 ,i think1 distinguish three different things which he seems particularly anxious to assert about truth4 7,i7 ,in the first place1 he is plainly anxious to assert some connection between truth and verification or utility4 ,our true ideas1 he seems to say1 are those that work1 in the sense that they are or can be verified1 or are useful4 7,,ii7 ,in the second place1 he seems to object to the view that truth is something static or immutable4 ,he is anxious to assert that truths are in some sense mutable4 7,,iii7 ,in the third place1 he asserts that to an unascertainable extent our truths are man-made products 7p4 #bdb74 ,to what he asserts under each of these three heads there are1 ,i think1 serious objections2 and ,i now propose to point out what seem to me to be the principal ones1 under each head separately4 7,i7 ,professor ,james is plainly anxious to assert some connection between truth and verification or utility4 ,and that there is some connection between them everybody will admit4 ,that many of our true ideas are verified2 that many of them can be verified2 and that many of them are useful1 is1 ,i take it1 quite indisputable4 ,but ,professor ,james seems plainly to wish to assert something more than this4 ,and one more thing which he wishes to assert is1 ,i think1 pretty plain4 ,he suggests1 at the beginning of ,lecture ,,vi1 that he is going to tell us in what sense it is that our true ideas agree with reality4 ,truth1 he says1 certainly means their agreement with reality2 the only question is as to what we are to understand by the words agreement and reality in this proposition4 ,and he first briefly considers the theory1 that the sense in which our true ideas agree with reality1 is that they copy some reality4 ,and he affirms that some of our true ideas really do do this4 ,but he rejects the theory1 as a theory of what truth means1 on the ground that they do not all do so4 ,plainly1 therefore1 he implies that no theory of what truth means will be correct1 unless it tells us of some property which belongs to all our true ideas without exception4 ,but his own theory is a theory of what truth means4 ,apparently1 therefore1 he wishes to assert that not only many but all our true ideas are or can be verified2 that all of them are useful4 ,and it is1 ,i think1 pretty plain that this is one of the things which he wishes to assert4 ,apparently1 therefore1 ,professor ,james wishes to assert that all our true ideas are or can be verified--that all are useful4 ,and certainly this is not a truism like the proposition that many of them are so4 ,even if this were all that he meant1 it would be worth discussing4 ,but even this1 ,i think1 is not all4 ,the very first proposition in which he expresses his theory is the following4 ,true ideas1 he says 7p4 #bja7 are those that we can assimilate1 validate1 corroborate and verify4 ,false ideas are those that we cannot4 ,and what does this mean8 ,let us1 for brevity's sake1 substitute the word verify alone for the four words which ,professor ,james uses1 as he himself subsequently seems to do4 ,he asserts1 then1 that true ideas are those which we can verify4 ,and plainly he does not mean by this merely that some of the ideas which we can verify are true1 while plenty of others1 which we can verify1 are not true4 ,the plain meaning of his words is that all the ideas which we can verify are true4 ,no one would use them who did not mean this4 ,apparently1 therefore1 ,professor ,james means to assert not merely that we can verify all our true ideas2 but also that all the ideas1 which we can verify1 are true4 ,and so1 too1 with utility or usefulness4 ,he seems to mean not merely that all our true ideas are useful2 but that all those which are useful are true4 ,this would follow1 for one thing1 from the fact that he seems to use the words verification or verifiability and usefulness as if they came to the same thing4 ,but1 in this case too1 he asserts it in words that have but one plain meaning4 ,the true he says 7p4 #bbb7 is only the expedient in the way of our thinking4 ,the true is the expedient3 that is1 all expedient thinking is true4 ,or again3 ,an idea is 'true' so long as to believe it is profitable to our lives 7p4 #ge74 ,that is to say1 every idea1 which is profitable to our lives1 is1 while it is so1 true4 ,these words certainly have a plain enough meaning4 ,apparently1 therefore1 ,professor ,james means to assert not merely that all true ideas are useful1 but also that all useful ideas are true4 ,professor ,james' words1 then1 do at least suggest that he wishes to assert all four of the following propositions4 ,he wishes to assert1 it would seem-- 7#a7 ,that we can verify all those of our ideas1 which are true4 7#b7 ,that all those among our ideas1 which we can verify1 are true4 7#c7 ,that all our true ideas are useful4 7#d7 ,that all those of our ideas1 which are useful1 are true4 ,these four propositions are what ,i propose first to consider4 ,he does mean to assert them1 at least4 ,very likely he wishes to assert something more even than these4 ,he does1 in fact1 suggest that he means to assert1 in addition1 that these properties of verifiability and utility are the only properties 7beside that of being properly called true7 which belong to all our true ideas and to none but true ideas4 ,but this obviously cannot be true1 unless all these four propositions are true4 ,and therefore we may as well consider them first4 ,first1 then1 can we verify all our true ideas8 ,i wish only to point out the plainest and most obvious reasons why ,i think it is doubtful whether we can4 ,we are very often in doubt as to whether we did or did not do a certain thing in the past4 ,we may have the idea that we did1 and also the idea that we did not2 and we may wish to find out which idea is the true one4 ,very often1 indeed1 ,i may believe very strongly1 that ,i did do a certain thing2 and somebody else1 who has equally good reason to know1 may believe equally strongly that ,i did not4 ,for instance1 ,i may have written a letter1 and may believe that ,i used certain words in it4 ,but my correspondent may believe that ,i did not4 ,can we always verify either of these ideas8 ,certainly sometimes we can4 ,the letter may be produced1 and prove that ,i did use the words in question4 ,and ,i shall then have verified my idea4 ,or it may prove that ,i did not use them4 ,and then we shall have verified my correspondent's idea4 ,but1 suppose the letter has been destroyed2 suppose there is no copy of it1 nor any trustworthy record of what was said in it2 suppose there is no other witness as to what ,i said in it1 beside myself and my correspondent8 ,can we then always verify which of our ideas is the true one8 ,i think it is very doubtful whether we can nearly always4 ,certainly we may often try to discover any possible means of verification1 and be quite unable1 for a time at least1 to discover any4 ,such cases1 in which we are unable1 for a time at least1 to verify either of two contradictory ideas1 occur very commonly indeed4 ,let us take an even more trivial instance than the last4 ,bad whist-players often do not notice at all carefully which cards they have among the lower cards in a suit4 ,at the end of a hand they cannot be certain whether they had or had not the seven of diamonds1 or the five of spades4 ,and1 after the cards have been shuffled1 a dispute will sometimes arise as to whether a particular player had the seven of diamonds or not4 ,his partner may think that he had1 and he himself may think that he had not4 ,both may be uncertain1 and the memory of both1 on such a point1 may be well known to be untrustworthy4 ,and1 moreover1 neither of the other players may be able to remember any better4 ,is it always possible to verify which of these ideas is the true one8 ,either the player did or did not have the seven of diamonds4 ,this much is certain4 ,one person thinks that he did1 and another thinks he did not2 and both1 so soon as the question is raised1 have before their minds both of these ideas--the idea that he did1 and the idea that he did not4 ,this also is certain4 ,and it is certain that one or other of these two ideas is true4 ,but can they always verify either of them8 ,sometimes1 no doubt1 they can1 even after the cards have been shuffled4 ,there may have been a fifth person present1 overlooking the play1 whose memory is perfectly trustworthy1 and whose word may be taken as settling the point4 ,or the players may themselves be able1 by recalling other incidents of play1 to arrive at such a certainty as may be said to verify the one hypothesis or the other4 ,but very often neither of these two things will occur4 ,and1 in such a case1 is it always possible to verify the true idea8 ,perhaps1 theoretically1 it may be still possible4 ,theoretically1 ,i suppose1 the fact that one player1 and not any of the other three1 had the card in his hand1 may have made some difference to the card1 which might be discovered by some possible method of scientific investigation4 ,perhaps some such difference may remain even after the same card has been repeatedly used in many subsequent games4 ,but suppose the same question arises again1 a week after the original game was played4 ,did you1 or did you not1 last week have the seven of diamonds in that particular hand8 ,the question has not been settled in the meantime2 and now1 perhaps1 the original pack of cards has been destroyed4 ,is it still possible to verify either idea8 ,theoretically1 ,i suppose1 it may be still possible4 ,but even this1 ,i think1 is very doubtful4 ,and surely it is plain that1 humanly and practically speaking1 it will often have become quite impossible to verify either idea4 ,in all probability it never will be possible for any man to verify whether ,i had the card or not on this particular occasion4 ,no doubt we are here speaking of an idea1 which some man could have verified at one time4 ,but the hypothesis ,i am considering is the hypothesis that we never have a true idea1 which we can not verify2 that is to say1 which we cannot verify after the idea has occurred4 ,and with regard to this hypothesis1 it seems to me quite plain that very often indeed we have two ideas1 one or other of which is certainly true2 and yet that1 in all probability1 it is no longer possible and never will be possible for any man to verify either4 ,it seems to me1 then1 that we very often have true ideas which we cannot verify2 true ideas1 which1 in all probability1 no man ever will be able to verify4 ,and1 so far1 ,i have given only comparatively trivial instances4 ,but it is plain that1 in the same sense1 historians are very frequently occupied with true ideas1 which it is doubtful whether they can verify4 ,one historian thinks that a certain event took place1 and another that it did not2 and both may admit that they cannot verify their idea4 ,subsequent historians may1 no doubt1 sometimes be able to verify one or the other4 ,new evidence may be discovered or men may learn to make a better use of evidence already in existence4 ,but is it certain that this will always happen8 ,is it certain that every question1 about which historians have doubted1 will some day be able to be settled by verification of one or the other hypothesis8 ,surely the probability is that in the case of an immense number of events1 with regard to which we should like to know whether they happened or not1 it never will be possible for any man to verify either the one hypothesis or the other4 ,yet it may be certain that either the events in question did happen or did not4 ,here1 therefore1 again1 we have a large number of ideas--cases where many men doubt whether a thing did happen or did not1 and have therefore the idea both of its having happened and of its not having happened--with regard to which it is certain that half of them are true1 but where it seems highly doubtful whether any single one of them will ever be able to be verified4 ,no doubt it is just possible that men will some day be able to verify every one of them4 ,but surely it is very doubtful whether they will4 ,and the theory against which ,i am protesting is the positive assertion that we can verify all our true ideas--that some one some day certainly will be able to verify every one of them4 ,this theory1 ,i urge1 has all probability against it4 ,and so far ,i have been dealing only with ideas with regard to what happened in the past4 ,these seem to me to be the cases which offer the most numerous and most certain exceptions to the rule that we can verify our true ideas4 ,with regard to particular past events1 either in their own lives or in those of other people1 men very frequently have ideas1 which it seems highly improbable that any man will ever be able to verify4 ,and yet it is certain that a great many of these ideas are true1 because in a great many cases we have both the idea that the event did happen and also the idea that it did not1 when it is certain that one or other of these ideas is true4 ,and these ideas with regard to past events would by themselves be sufficient for my purpose4 ,if1 as seems certain1 there are many true ideas with regard to the past1 which it is highly improbable that anyone will ever be able to verify1 then1 obviously1 there is nothing in a true idea which makes it certain that we can verify it4 ,but it is1 ,i think1 certainly not only in the case of ideas1 with regard to the past1 that it is doubtful whether we can verify all the true ideas we have4 ,in the case of many generalisations dealing not only with the past but with the future1 it is1 ,i think1 obviously doubtful whether we shall ever be able to verify all those which are true2 although here1 perhaps1 in most cases1 the probability that we shall not is not so great4 ,but is it quite certain1 that in all cases where scientific men have considered hypotheses1 one or other of which must be true1 either will ever be verified8 ,it seems to be obviously doubtful4 ,take1 for instance1 the question whether our actual space is ,euclidean or not4 ,this is a case where the alternative has been considered2 and where it is certain that1 whatever be meant by our actual space1 it either is ,euclidean or is not4 ,it has been held1 too1 that the hypothesis that it is not ,euclidean might1 conceivably1 be verified by observations4 ,but it is doubtful whether it ever will be4 ,and though it would be rash to say that no man ever will be able to verify either hypothesis2 it is also rash to assert positively that we shall--that we certainly can verify the true hypotheses4 ,there are1 ,i believe1 ever so many similar cases1 where alternative hypotheses1 one or other of which must be true1 have occurred to men of science1 and where yet it is very doubtful whether either ever will be verified4 ,or take1 again1 such ideas as the idea that there is a ,god1 or the idea that we are immortal4 ,many men have had not only contradictory ideas1 but contradictory beliefs1 about these matters4 ,and here we have cases where it is disputed whether these ideas have not actually been verified4 ,but it seems to me doubtful whether they have been4 ,and there is a view1 which seems to me to deserve respect1 that1 in these matters1 we never shall be able to verify the true hypothesis4 ,is it perfectly certain that this view is a false one8 ,i do not say that it is true4 ,i think it is quite possible that we shall some day be able to verify either the belief that we are immortal or the belief that we are not4 ,but it seems to me doubtful whether we shall4 ,and for this reason alone ,i should refuse to assent to the positive assertion that we certainly can verify all our true ideas4 ,when1 therefore1 ,professor ,james tells us that ,true ideas are those that we can assimilate1 validate1 corroborate and verify4 ,false ideas are those that we cannot1 there seems to be a serious objection to part of what these words imply4 ,they imply that no idea of ours is true1 unless we can verify it4 ,they imply1 therefore1 that whenever a man wonders whether or not he had the seven of diamonds in the third hand at whist last night1 neither of these ideas is true unless he can verify it4 ,but it seems certain that in this1 and an immense number of similar cases1 one or other of the two ideas is true4 ,either1 he did have the card in his hand or he did not4 ,if anything is a fact1 this is one4 ,either1 therefore1 ,professor ,james' words imply the denial of this obvious fact1 or else he implies that in all such cases we can verify one or other of the two ideas4 ,but to this the objection is that1 in any obvious sense of the words1 it seems very doubtful whether we can4 ,on the contrary it seems extremely probable that in a very large number of such cases no man ever will be able to verify either of the two ideas4 ,there is1 therefore1 a serious objection to what ,professor ,james' words imply4 ,whether he himself really means to assert these things which his words imply ,i do not know4 ,perhaps he would admit that1 in this sense1 we probably cannot verify nearly all our true ideas4 ,all that ,i have wished to make plain is that there is1 at least1 an objection to what he says1 whether to what he means or not4 ,there is ample reason why we should refuse assent to the statement that none of our ideas are true1 except those which we can verify4 ,but to another part of what he implies by the words quoted above1 there is1 ,i think1 no serious objection4 ,there is reason to object to the statement that we can verify all our true ideas2 but to the statement that all ideas1 which we can assimilate1 validate1 corroborate and verify1 are true1 ,i see no serious objection4 ,here1 ,i think1 we might say simply that all ideas which we can verify are true4 ,to this1 which is the second of the four propositions1 which ,i distinguished above 7p4 #ce7 as what ,professor ,james seems to wish to assert1 there is1 ,i think1 no serious objection1 if we understand the word verify in its proper and natural sense4 ,we may1 no doubt1 sometimes say that we have verified an idea or an hypothesis1 when we have only obtained evidence which proves it to be probable1 and does not prove it to be certain4 ,and1 if we use the word in this loose sense for incomplete verification1 it is obviously the case that we may verify an idea which is not true4 ,but it seems scarcely necessary to point this out4 ,and where we really can completely verify an idea or an hypothesis1 there1 undoubtedly1 the idea which we can verify is always true4 ,the very meaning of the word verify is to find evidence which does really prove an idea to be true2 and where an idea can be really proved to be true1 it is of course1 always true4 ,this is all ,i wish to say about ,professor ,james' first two propositions1 namely3-- 7#a7 ,that no ideas of ours are true1 except those which we can verify4 7#b7 ,that all those ideas1 which we can verify1 are true4 ,the first seems to me extremely doubtful--in fact1 almost certainly untrue2 the second on the other hand1 certainly true1 in its most obvious meaning4 ,and ,i shall say no more about them4 ,the fact is1 ,i doubt whether either of them expresses anything which ,professor ,james is really anxious to assert4 ,i have mentioned them1 only because his words do1 in fact1 imply them and because he gives those words a very prominent place4 ,but ,i have already had occasion to notice that he seems to speak as if to say that we can verify an idea came to the same thing as saying it is useful to us4 ,and it is the connection of truth with usefulness1 not its connection with verification1 that he is1 ,i think1 really anxious to assert4 ,he talks about verification only1 ,i believe1 because he thinks that what he says about it will support his main view that truth is what works1 is useful1 is expedient1 pays4 ,it is this main view we have now to consider4 ,we have to consider the two propositions3-- 7#c7 ,that all our true ideas are useful4 7#d7 ,that all ideas1 which are useful1 are true4 ,first1 then3 is it the case that all our true ideas are useful8 ,is it the case that none of our ideas are true1 except those which are useful8 ,i wish to introduce my discussion of this question by quoting a passage in which ,professor ,james seems to me to say something which is indisputably true4 ,towards the end of ,lecture ,,vi1 he attacks the view that truths have an unconditional claim to be recognised4 ,and in the course of his attack the following passage occurs3-- ,must ,i1 he says1 constantly be repeating the truth 'twice two are four' because of its eternal claim on recognition8 or is it sometimes irrelevant8 ,must my thoughts dwell night and day on my personal sins and blemishes1 because ,i truly have them8--or may ,i sink and ignore them in order to be a decent social unit1 and not a mass of morbid melancholy and apology8 ,it is quite evident1 he goes on1 that our obligation to acknowledge truth1 so far from being unconditional1 is tremendously conditional4 ,truth with a big ,t1 and in the singular1 claims abstractly to be recognised1 of course2 but concrete truths in the plural need be recognised only when their recognition is expedient4 7pp4 #bca-bcb74 ,what ,professor ,james says in this passage seems to me so indisputably true as fully to justify the vigour of his language4 ,it is as clear as anything can be that it would not be useful for any man's mind to be always occupied with the true idea that he had certain faults and blemishes2 or to be always occupied with the idea that twice two are four4 ,it is clear1 that is1 that1 if there are times at which a particular true idea is useful1 there certainly are other times at which it would not be useful1 but positively in the way4 ,this is plainly true of nearly all1 if not quite all1 our true ideas4 ,it is plainly true with regard to nearly all of them that1 even if the occasions on which their occurrence is useful are many1 the occasions on which their occurrence would not be useful are many more4 ,with regard to most of them it is true that on most occasions they will1 as ,professor ,james says elsewhere1 be practically irrelevant1 and had better remain latent4 ,it is1 then1 quite clear that almost any particular true idea would not be useful at all times and that the times at which it would not be useful1 are many more than the times at which it would4 ,and what we have to consider is whether1 in just this sense in which it is so clear that most true ideas would not be useful at most times1 it is nevertheless true that all our true ideas are useful4 ,is this so8 ,are all our true ideas useful8 ,professor ,james1 we see1 has just told us that there are ever so many occasions upon which a particular true idea1 such as that #b #b #d1 would not be useful--when1 on the contrary1 it would be positively in the way4 ,and this seems to be indisputably clear4 ,but is not something else almost equally clear8 ,is it not almost equally clear that cases1 such as he says would not be useful1 do sometimes actually happen8 ,is it not clear that we do actually sometimes have true ideas1 at times when they are not useful1 but are positively in the way8 ,it seems to me to be perfectly clear that this does sometimes occur2 and not sometimes only1 but very commonly4 ,the cases in which true ideas occur at times when they are useful1 are1 perhaps1 far more numerous2 but1 if we look at men in general1 the cases in which true ideas occur1 at times when they are not useful1 do surely make up positively a very large number4 ,is it not the case that men do sometimes dwell on their faults and blemishes1 when it is not useful for them to do so8 when they would much better be thinking of something else8 ,is it not the case that they are often unable to get their minds away from a true idea1 when it is harmful for them to dwell on it8 ,still more commonly1 does it not happen that they waste their time in acquiring pieces of information which are no use to them1 though perhaps very useful to other people8 ,all this seems to me to be undeniable--just as undeniable as what ,professor ,james himself has said2 and1 if this is so1 then1 in one sense of the words1 it is plainly not true that all1 or nearly all1 our true ideas are useful4 ,in one sense of the words4 ,for if ,i have the idea that #bbd on one day1 and then have it again the next1 ,i may certainly1 in a sense1 call the idea ,i have on one day one idea1 and the idea ,i have on the next another4 ,i have had two ideas that #bbd1 and not one only4 ,or if two different persons both think that ,i have faults1 there have been two ideas of this truth and not one only4 ,and in asking whether all our true ideas are useful1 we might mean to ask whether both of these ideas were useful and not merely whether one of them was4 ,in this sense1 then1 it is plainly not true that all our true ideas are useful4 ,it is not true1 that is1 that every true idea is useful1 whenever it occurs4 ,in one sense1 then1 it is plainly not true that all our true ideas are useful4 ,but there still remains a perfectly legitimate sense in which it might be true4 ,it might be meant1 that is1 not that every occurrence of a true idea is useful1 but that every true idea is useful on at least one of the occasions when it occurs4 ,but is this1 in fact1 the case8 ,it seems to me almost as plain that it is not1 as that the other was not4 ,we have seen that true ideas are not by any means always useful on every occasion when they occur2 though most that do occur many times over and to many different people are1 no doubt1 useful on some of these occasions4 ,but there seems to be an immense number of true ideas1 which occur but once and to one person1 and never again either to him or to anyone else4 ,i may1 for instance1 idly count the number of dots on the back of a card1 and arrive at a true idea of their number2 and yet1 perhaps1 ,i may never think of their number again1 nor anybody else ever know it4 ,we are all1 it seems to me1 constantly noticing trivial details1 and getting true ideas about them1 of which we never think again1 and which nobody else ever gets4 ,and is it quite certain that all these true ideas are useful8 ,it seems to me perfectly clear1 on the contrary1 that many of them are not4 ,just as it is clear that many men sometimes waste their time in acquiring information which is useful to others but not to them1 surely it is clear that they sometimes waste their time in acquiring information1 which is useful to nobody at all1 because nobody else ever acquires it4 ,i do not say that it is never useful idly to count the number of dots on the back of a card4 ,plainly it is sometimes useful to be idle1 and one idle employment may often be as good as another4 ,but surely it is true that men sometimes do these things when their time would have been better employed otherwise8 ,surely they sometimes get into the habit of attending to trivial truths1 which it is as great a disadvantage that they should attend to as that they should constantly be thinking of their own thoughts and blemishes8 ,i cannot see my way to deny that this is so2 and therefore ,i cannot see my way to assert positively that all our true ideas are useful1 even so much as on one occasion4 ,it seems to me that there are many true ideas which occur but once1 and which are not useful when they do occur4 ,and if this be so1 then it is plainly not true that all our true ideas are useful in any sense at all4 ,these seem to me to be the most obvious objections to the assertion that all our true ideas are useful4 ,it is clear1 we saw to begin with1 that true ideas1 which are sometimes useful1 would not be useful at all times4 ,and it seemed almost equally clear that they do sometimes occur at times when they are not useful4 ,our true ideas1 therefore are not useful at every time when they actually occur4 ,but in just this sense in which it is so clear that true ideas which are sometimes useful1 nevertheless sometimes occur at times when they are not1 it seems pretty plain that true ideas1 which occur but once1 are1 some of them1 not useful4 ,if an idea1 which is sometimes useful1 does sometimes occur to a man at a time when it is irrelevant and in the way1 why should not an idea1 which occurs but once1 occur at a time when it is irrelevant and in the way8 ,it seems hardly possible to doubt that this does sometimes happen4 ,but1 if this be so1 then it is not true that all our true ideas are useful1 even so much as on one occasion4 ,it is not true that none of our ideas are true1 except those which are useful4 ,but now1 what are we to say of the converse proposition--the proposition that all those among our ideas1 which are useful1 are true8 ,that we never have a useful idea1 which is not true8 ,i confess the matter seems to me equally clear here4 ,the assertion should mean that every idea1 which is at any time useful1 is true2 that no idea1 which is not true1 is ever useful4 ,and it seems hardly possible to doubt that this assertion is false4 ,it ,is1 in the first place1 commonly held that it is sometimes right positively to deceive another person4 ,in war1 for instance it is held that one army is justified in trying to give the enemy a false idea as to where it will be at a given time4 ,such a false idea is sometimes given1 and it seems to me quite clear that it is sometimes useful4 ,in such a case1 no doubt1 it may be said that the false idea is useful to the party who have given it1 but not useful to those who actually believe in it4 ,and the question whether it is useful on the whole will depend upon the question which side it is desirable should win4 ,but it seems to me unquestionable that the false idea is sometimes useful on the whole4 ,take1 for instance1 the case of a party of savages1 who wish to make a night attack and massacre a party of ,europeans but are deceived as to the position in which the ,europeans are encamped4 ,it is surely plain that such a false idea is sometimes useful on the whole4 ,but quite apart from the question whether deception is ever justifiable1 it is not very difficult to think of cases where a false idea1 not produced by deception1 is plainly useful--and useful1 not merely on the whole1 but to the person who has it as well4 ,a man often thinks that his watch is right1 when1 in fact1 it is slow1 and his false idea may cause him to miss his train4 ,and in such cases1 no doubt1 his false idea is generally disadvantageous4 ,but1 in a particular case1 the train which he would have caught but for his false idea may be destroyed in a railway accident1 or something may suddenly occur at home1 which renders it much more useful that he should be there1 than it would have been for him to catch his train4 ,do such cases never occur8 ,and is not the false idea sometimes useful in some of them8 ,it seems to me perfectly clear that it is sometimes useful for a man to think his watch is right when it is wrong4 ,and such instances would be sufficient to show that it is not the case that every idea of ours1 which is ever useful1 is a true idea4 ,but let us take cases1 not1 like these1 of an idea1 which occurs but a few times or to one man1 but of ideas which have occurred to many men at many times4 ,it seems to me very difficult to be sure that the belief in an eternal hell has not been often useful to many men1 and yet it may be doubted whether this idea is true4 ,and so1 too1 with the belief in a happy life after death1 or the belief in the existence of a ,god2 it is1 ,i think1 very difficult to be sure that these beliefs have not been1 and are not still1 often useful1 and yet it may be doubted whether they are true4 ,these beliefs1 of course1 are matters of controversy4 ,some men believe that they are both useful and true2 and others1 again1 that they are neither4 ,and ,i do not think we are justified in giving them as certain instances of beliefs1 which are not true1 but1 nevertheless1 have often been useful4 ,but there is a view that these beliefs1 though not true1 have1 nevertheless1 been often useful2 and this view seems to me to deserve respect1 especially since1 as we have seen1 some beliefs1 which are not true1 certainly are sometimes useful4 ,are we justified in asserting positively that it is false8 ,is it perfectly certain that beliefs1 which have often been useful to many men1 may not1 nevertheless1 be untrue8 ,is it perfectly certain that beliefs1 which are not true1 have not often been useful to many men8 ,the certainty may at least be doubted1 and in any case it seems certain that some beliefs1 which are not true1 are1 nevertheless1 sometimes useful4 ,for these reasons1 it seems to me almost certain that both the assertions which ,i have been considering are false4 ,it is almost certainly false that all our true ideas are useful1 and almost certainly false that all our useful ideas are true4 ,but ,i have only urged what seem to me to be the most obvious objections to these two statements2 ,i have not tried to sustain these objections by elaborate arguments1 and ,i have omitted elaborate argument1 partly because of a reason which ,i now wish to state4 ,the fact is1 ,i am not at all sure that ,professor ,james would not himself admit that both these statements are false4 ,i think it is quite possible he would admit that they are1 and would say that he never meant either to assert or to imply the contrary4 ,he complains that some of the critics of ,pragmatism are unwilling to read any but the silliest of possible meanings into the statements of ,pragmatism2 and1 perhaps1 he would say that this is the case here4 ,i certainly hope that he would4 ,i certainly hope he would say that these statements1 to which ,i have objected1 are silly4 ,for it does seem to me intensely silly to say that we can verify all our true ideas2 intensely silly to say that every one of our true ideas is at some time useful2 intensely silly to say that every idea which is ever useful is true4 ,i hope ,professor ,james would admit all these things to be silly1 for if he and other ,pragmatists would admit even as much as this1 ,i think a good deal would be gained4 ,but it by no means follows that because a philosopher would admit a view to be silly1 when it is definitely put before him1 he has not himself been constantly holding and implying that very view4 ,he may quite sincerely protest that he never has either held or implied it1 and yet he may all the time have been not only implying it but holding it--vaguely1 perhaps1 but really4 ,a man may assure us1 quite sincerely that he is not angry2 he may really think that he is not1 and yet we may be able to judge quite certainly from what he says that he really is angry4 ,he may assure us quite sincerely that he never meant anything to our discredit by what he said--that he was not thinking of anything in the least discreditable to us1 and yet it may be plain from his words that he was actually condemning us very severely4 ,and so with a philosopher4 ,he may protest1 quite angrily1 when a view is put before him in other words than his own1 that he never either meant or implied any such thing1 and yet it may be possible to judge1 from what he says1 that this very view1 wrapped up in other words1 was not only held by him but was precisely what made his thoughts seem to him to be interesting and important4 ,certainly he may quite often imply a given thing which1 at another time1 he denies4 ,unless it were possible for a philosopher to do this1 there would be very little inconsistency in philosophy1 and surely everyone will admit that other philosophers are very often inconsistent4 ,and so in this case1 even if ,professor ,james would say that he never meant to imply the things to which ,i have been objecting1 yet in the case of two of these things1 ,i cannot help thinking that he does actually imply them--nay more1 that he is frequently actually vaguely thinking of them1 and that his theory of truth owes its interest1 in very great part1 to the fact that he is implying them4 ,in the case of the two views that all our true ideas are useful1 and that all our useful ideas are true1 ,i think this is so1 and ,i do not mean merely that his words imply them4 ,a man's words may often imply a thing1 when he himself is in no way1 however vaguely1 thinking either of that thing or of anything which implies it2 he may simply have expressed himself unfortunately4 ,but in the case of the two views that all our true ideas are useful1 and all our useful ideas true1 ,i do not think this is so with ,professor ,james4 ,i think that his thoughts seem interesting to him and others1 largely because he is thinking1 not merely of words1 but of things which imply these two views1 in the very form in which ,i have objected to them4 ,and ,i wish now to give some reasons for thinking this4 ,professor ,james certainly wishes to assert that there is some connection between truth and utility4 ,and the connection which ,i have suggested that he has vaguely before his mind is this3 that every true idea is1 at some time or other1 useful1 and conversely that every idea1 which is ever useful1 is true4 ,and ,i have urged that-there are obvious objections to both these views4 ,but now1 supposing ,professor ,james does not mean to assert either of these two things1 what else can he mean to assert8 ,what else can he mean1 that would account for the interest and importance he seems to attach to his assertion of connection between truth and utility8 ,let us consider the alternatives4 ,and1 first of all1 he might mean that most of our true ideas are useful1 and most of our useful ideas true4 ,he might mean that most of our true ideas are useful at some time or other2 and even that most of them are useful1 whenever they actually occur4 ,and he might mean1 moreover1 that if we consider the whole range of ideas1 which are useful to us1 we shall find that by far the greater number of them are true ones2 that true ideas are far more often useful to us1 than those which are not true4 ,and all this1 ,i think1 may be readily admitted to be true4 ,if this were all that he meant1 ,i do not think that anyone would be very anxious to dispute it4 ,but is it conceivable that this is all that he means8 ,is it conceivable that he should have been so anxious to insist upon this admitted commonplace8 ,is it conceivable that he should have been offering us this1 and nothing more1 as a theory of what truth means1 and a theory worth making a fuss about1 and being proud of8 ,it seems to me quite inconceivable that this should have been all that he meant4 ,he must have had something more than this in his mind4 ,but1 if so1 what more8 ,in the passage which ,i quoted at the beginning1 as showing that he does mean to assert that all useful ideas are true1 he immediately goes on to assert a qualification1 which must now be noticed4 ,the true1 he says1 is only the expedient in the way of our thinking 7p4 #bbb74 ,but he immediately adds3 ,expedient in the long run1 and on the whole1 of course2 for what meets expediently all the experience in sight won't necessarily meet all further experiences equally satisfactorily4 ,here1 therefore1 we have something else that he might mean4 ,what is expedient in the long run1 he means to say1 is true4 ,and what exactly does this mean8 ,it seems to mean that an idea1 which is not true1 may be expedient for some time4 ,that is to say1 it may occur once1 and be expedient then2 and again1 and be expedient then2 and so on1 over a considerable period4 ,but 7,professor ,james seems to prophesy7 if it is not true1 there will come a time1 when it will cease to be expedient4 ,if it occurs again and again over a long enough period1 there will at last1 if it is not true1 come a time when it will 7for once at least7 fail to be useful1 and will 7perhaps he means7 never be useful again4 ,this is1 #a think1 what ,professor ,james means in this passage4 ,he means1 ,i think1 that though an idea1 which is not true1 may for some time be repeatedly expedient1 there will at last come a time when its occurrence will1 perhaps1 never be expedient again1 certainly will1 for a time1 not be generally expedient4 ,and this a view which1 it seems to me1 may possibly be true4 ,it is certainly possible that a time may come1 in the far future1 when ideas1 which are not true1 will hardly ever1 if ever1 be expedient4 ,and this is all that ,professor ,james seems here positively to mean4 ,he seems to mean that1 if you take time enough1 false ideas will some day cease to be expedient4 ,and it is very difficult to be sure that this is not true2 since it is very difficult to prophesy as to what may happen in the far future4 ,i am sure ,i hope that this prophesy will come true4 ,but in the meantime 7,professor ,james seems to admit7 ideas1 which are not true1 may1 for an indefinitely long time1 again and again be expedient4 ,and is it conceivable that a theory1 which admits this1 is all that he has meant to assert8 ,is it conceivable that what interests him1 in his theory of truth1 is merely the belief that1 some day or other1 false ideas will cease to be expedient8 ,in the long run1 of course1 he says1 as if this were what he had meant all along4 ,but ,i think it is quite plain that this is not all that he has meant4 ,this may be one thing which he is anxious to assert1 but it certainly does not explain the whole of his interest in his theory of truth4 ,and1 in fact1 there is quite a different theory which he seems plainly to have in his mind in other places4 ,when ,professor ,james says1 in the long run1 of course1 he implies that ideas which are expedient only for a short run1 are very often not true4 ,but in what he says elsewhere he asserts the very opposite of this4 ,he says elsewhere that a belief is true so long as to believe it is profitable to our lives 7p4 #ge74 ,that is to say1 a belief will be true1 so long as it is useful1 even if it is not useful in the long run6 ,this is certainly quite a different theory2 and1 strictly speaking1 it implies that an idea1 which is useful even on one occasion1 will be true4 ,but perhaps this is only a verbal implication4 ,i think very likely that here ,professor ,james was only thinking of ideas1 which can be said to have a run1 though only a comparatively short one--of ideas1 that is1 which are expedient1 not merely on one occasion1 but for some time4 ,that is to say1 the theory which he now suggests1 is that ideas1 which occur again and again1 perhaps to one man only1 perhaps to several different people1 over some space of time are1 if they are expedient on most occasions within that space of time1 true4 ,this is a view which he is1 ,i think1 really anxious to assert2 and if it were true1 it would1 ,i think1 be important4 ,and it is difficult to find instances which show1 with certainty1 that it is false4 ,i believe that it is false2 but it is difficult to prove it1 because1 in the case of some ideas it is so difficult to be certain that they ever were useful1 and in the case of others so difficult to be certain that they are not true4 ,a belief such as ,i spoke of before--the belief in eternal hell--is an instance4 ,i think this belief has been1 for a long time1 useful1 and that yet it is false4 ,but it is1 perhaps1 arguable that it never has been useful2 and many people on the other hand1 would still assert that it is true4 ,it cannot1 therefore1 perhaps1 fairly be used as an instance of a belief1 which is certainly not true1 and yet has for some time been useful4 ,but whether this view that all beliefs1 which are expedient for some time1 are true1 be true or false2 can it be all that ,professor ,james means to assert8 ,can it constitute the whole of what interests him in his theory of truth8 ,i do not think it can4 ,i think it is plain that he has in his mind something more than any of these alternatives1 or than all of them taken together4 ,and ,i think so partly for the following reason4 ,he speaks from the outset as if he intended to tell us what distinguishes true ideas from those which are not true2 to tell us1 that is to say1 not merely of some property which belongs to all our true ideas2 nor yet merely of some property1 which belongs to none but true ideas2 but of some property which satisfies both these requirements at once--which both belongs to all our true ideas1 and also belongs to none but true ones4 ,truth1 he says to begin with1 means the agreement of our ideas with reality2 and he adds as falsity their disagreement4 ,and he explains that he is going to tell us what property it is that is meant by these words agreement with reality4 ,so again in the next passage which ,i quoted3 ,true ideas1 he says are those that we can assimilate1 validate1 corroborate and verify4 ,but1 he also adds1 ,false ideas are those that we cannot4 ,and no one1 ,i think1 could possibly speak in this way1 who had not in his head the intention of telling us what property it is which distinguishes true ideas from those which are not true1 and which1 therefore1 not only belongs to all ideas which are true1 but also to none that are not4 ,and that he has this idea in his head and thinks that the property of being useful or paying is such a property1 is again clearly shown by a later passage4 ,our account of truth1 he says 7p4 #bah7 is an account of truths in the plural1 of processes of leading1 realised in rebus1 and having only this quality in common1 that they pay4 ,only this quality in common6 ,if this be so1 the quality must obviously be one1 which is not shared by any ideas which are not true2 for1 if true ideas have any quality in common at all1 they must have at least one such quality1 which is not shared by those which are not true4 ,plainly1 therefore1 ,professor ,james is intending to tell us of a property which belongs both to all true ideas and only to true ideas4 ,and this property1 he says1 is that of paying4 ,but now let us suppose that he means by paying1 not paying once at least1 but1 according to the alternative he suggests1 paying in the long run or paying for some time4 ,can he possibly have supposed that these were properties which belonged both to all true ideas and also to none but true ones8 ,they may1 perhaps1 be properties which belong to none but true ones4 ,i doubt1 as ,i have said1 whether the latter does2 but still it is difficult to prove the opposite4 ,but even if we granted that they belong to none but true ones1 surely it is only too obvious that they do not fulfil the other requirement--that they do not belong to nearly all true ones4 ,can anyone suppose that all our true ideas pay in the long run or repeatedly for some time8 ,surely it is plain that an enormous number do not for the simple reason that an enormous number of them have no run at all1 either long or short1 but occur but once1 and never recur4 ,i believe truly that a certain book is on a particular shelf about #aj4ae p4m4 on ,december #bast1 #aijg2 and this true belief serves me well and helps me to find it ,but the belief that that book is there at that particular time occurs to no one else1 and never again to me4 ,surely there are thousands of useful true beliefs which1 like this1 are useful but once1 and never occur again2 and it would1 therefore1 be preposterous to say that every true idea is useful in the long run or repeatedly for some time4 ,if1 therefore1 we supposed ,professor ,james to mean that paying in the long run or paying repeatedly over a considerable period were properties which belonged to all true ideas and to none but true ones1 we should be supposing him to mean something still more monstrous than if we suppose him to mean that paying at least once was such a property4 ,to sum up then3 ,i think there is no doubt that ,professor ,james' interest in the pragmatist theory of truth is largely due to the fact that he thinks it tells us what distinguishes true ideas from those which are not true4 ,and he thinks the distinction is that true ideas pay1 and false ones don't4 ,the most natural interpretation of this view is3 ,that every true idea pays at least once2 and that every idea1 which pays at least once1 is true4 ,these were the propositions ,i considered first1 and ,i gave reasons for thinking that both are false4 ,but ,professor ,james suggested elsewhere that what he means by paying is paying in the long run4 ,and here it seems possibly true that all ideas which pay in the long run are true2 but it is certainly false that all our true ideas pay in the long run1 if by this be meant anything more than pay at least once4 ,again1 he suggested that what he meant by paying was paying for some time4 ,and here1 again1 even if it is true 7and it seems very doubtful7 that all ideas which pay for some time are true1 it is certainly false that all our true ideas pay for some time1 if by this be meant anything more than that they pay at least once4 ,this1 ,i think1 is the simplest and most obvious objection to ,professor ,james' instrumental view of truth--the view that truth is what works1 pays1 is useful4 ,he seems certainly to have in his mind the idea that this theory tells us what distinguishes true ideas from false ones1 and to be interested in it mainly for this reason4 ,he has vaguely in his mind that he has told us of some property which belongs to all true ideas and to none but true ones2 and that this property is that of paying4 ,and the objection is1 that1 whatever we understand by paying1 whether paying at least once1 or paying in the long run1 or paying for some time1 it seems certain that none of these properties will satisfy both requirements4 ,as regards the first1 that of paying at least once1 it seems almost certain that it satisfies neither3 it is neither true that all our true ideas pay at least once1 nor yet that every idea which pays at least once1 is true4 ,on the contrary1 many true ideas never pay at all2 and many ideas1 which are not true1 do pay on at least one occasion4 ,and as regards the others1 paying in the long run and paying for some time1 even if these do belong to none but true ideas 7and even this seems very doubtful71 they certainly neither of them satisfy the other requirement--neither of them belong to all our true ideas4 ,for1 in order that either of them may belong to an idea1 that idea must pay at least once2 and1 as we have seen1 many true ideas do not pay even once1 and cannot1 therefore1 pay either in the long run or for some time4 ,and1 moreover1 many true ideas1 which do pay on one occasion1 seem to pay on one occasion and one only4 ,and1 if ,professor ,james does not mean to assert any of these things1 what is there left for him to mean8 ,there is left in the first place1 the theory that most of our true ideas do pay2 and that most of the ideas which pay are true4 ,this seems to me to be true1 and1 indeed1 to be all that is certainly true in what he says4 ,but is it conceivable that this is all he has meant8 ,obviously1 these assertions tell us of no property at all which belongs to all true ideas1 and to none but true ones2 and1 moreover1 it seems impossible that he should have been so anxious to assert this generally admitted commonplace4 ,what a very different complexion his whole discussion would have worn1 had he merely asserted this--this quite clearly1 and nothing but this1 while admitting openly that many true ideas do not pay1 and that many1 which do pay1 are not true6 ,and1 besides this commonplace1 there is only left for him to mean two one-sided and doubtful assertions to the effect that certain properties belong to none but true ideas4 ,there is the assertion that all ideas which pay in the long run are true1 and the assertion that all ideas which pay for some considerable time are true4 ,and as to the first1 it may be true2 but it may also be doubted1 and ,professor ,james gives us no reason at all for thinking that it is true4 ,assuming that religious ideas have been useful in the past1 is it quite certain that they may not permanently continue to be useful1 even though they are false8 ,that1 in short1 even though they are not true1 they nevertheless will be useful1 not only for a time1 but in the long run8 ,and as for the assertion that all ideas1 which pay for a considerable time1 are true1 this is obviously more doubtful still4 ,whether certain religious ideas will or will not be useful in the long run1 it seems difficult to doubt that many of them have been useful for a considerable time4 ,and why should we be told dogmatically that all of these are true8 ,this1 it seems to me1 is by far the most interesting assertion1 which is left for ,professor ,james to make1 when we have rejected the theory that the property of being useful belongs to all true ideas1 as well as to none but true ones4 ,but he has given no reason for asserting it4 ,he seems1 in fact1 to base it merely upon the general untenable theory1 that utility belongs to all true ideas1 and to none but true ones2 that this is what truth means4 ,these1 then1 seem to me the plainest and most obvious objections to what ,professor ,james says about the connection between truth and utility4 ,and there are only two further points1 in what he says under this head1 that ,i wish to notice4 ,in the first place1 we have hitherto been considering only whether it is true1 as a matter of empirical fact1 that all our true ideas are useful1 and those which are not true1 never4 ,professor ,james seems1 at least1 to mean that1 as a matter of fact1 this is so2 and ,i have only urged hitherto that as a matter of fact1 it is not so4 ,but as we have seen1 he also asserts something more than this--he also asserts that this property of utility is the only one which belongs to all our true ideas4 ,and this further assertion cannot possibly be true1 if1 as ,i have urged1 there are many true ideas which do not possess this property2 or if1 as ,i have urged1 many ideas1 which do possess it1 are nevertheless not true4 ,the objections already considered are1 then1 sufficient to overthrow this further assertion also4 ,if there are any true ideas1 which are not useful1 or if any1 which are useful1 are not true1 it cannot be the case that utility is the only property which true ideas have in common4 ,there must be some property1 other than utility1 which is common to all true ideas2 and a correct theory as to what property it is that does belong to all true ideas1 and to none but true ones1 is still to seek4 ,the empirical objections1 hitherto given1 are then sufficient objections to this further assertion also2 but they are not the only objections to it4 ,there is another and still more serious objection to the assertion that utility is the only property which all true ideas have in common4 ,for this assertion does not merely imply that1 as a matter of fact1 all our true ideas and none but true ideas are useful4 ,it does1 indeed1 imply this2 and therefore the fact that these empirical assertions are not true is sufficient to refute it4 ,but it also implies something more4 ,if utility were the only property which all true ideas had in common1 it would follow not merely that all true ideas are useful1 but also that any idea1 which was useful1 would be true no matter what other properties it might have or might fail to have4 ,there can1 ,i think1 be no doubt that ,professor ,james does frequently speak as if this were the case2 and there is an independent and still more serious objection to this implication4 ,even if it were true 7as it is not7 that all our true ideas and none but true ideas are1 as a matter of fact1 useful1 we should still have a strong reason to object to the statement that any idea1 which was useful1 would be true4 ,for it implies that if such an idea as mine1 that ,professor ,james exists1 and has certain thoughts1 were useful1 this idea would be true1 even if no such person as ,professor ,james ever did exist4 ,it implies that1 if the idea that ,i had the seven of diamonds in my hand at cards last night1 were useful1 this idea would be true1 even if1 in fact1 ,i did not have that card in my hand4 ,and we can1 ,i think1 see quite plainly that this is not the case4 ,with regard to some kinds of ideas1 at all events--ideas with regard to the existence of other people1 or with regard to past experiences of our own--it seems quite plain that they would not be true1 unless they agreed with reality in some other sense than that which ,professor ,james declares to be the only one in which true ideas must agree with it4 ,even if my idea that ,professor ,james exists were to agree with reality1 in the sense that1 owing to it1 ,i handled other realities better than ,i should have done without it1 it would1 ,i think1 plainly not be true1 unless ,professor ,james really did exist--unless he were a reality4 ,and this1 ,i think1 is one of the two most serious objections to what he seems to hold about the connection of truth with utility4 ,he seems to hold that any idea1 which was useful1 would be true1 no matter what other properties it might fail to have4 ,and with regard to some ideas1 at all events1 it seems plain that they cannot be true1 unless they have the property that what they believe to exist1 really does or did exist4 ,beliefs in the existence of other people might be useful to me1 even if ,i alone existed2 but1 nevertheless1 in such a case1 they would not be true4 ,and there is only one other point1 in what ,professor ,james says in connection with the instrumental view of truth1 upon which ,i wish to remark4 ,we have seen that he seems sometimes to hold that beliefs are true1 so long as they are profitable to our lives4 ,and this implies1 as we have seen1 the doubtful proposition than any belief which is useful for some length of time1 is true4 ,but this is not all that it implies4 ,it also implies that beliefs are true only so long as they are profitable4 ,nor does ,professor ,james appear to mean by this that they occur1 only so long as they are profitable4 ,he seems to hold1 on the contrary1 that beliefs1 which are profitable for some time1 do sometimes finally occur at a time when they are not profitable4 ,he implies1 therefore1 that a belief1 which occurs at several different times1 may be true at some of the times at which it occurs1 and yet untrue at others4 ,i think there is no doubt that this view is what he is sometimes thinking of4 ,and this1 we see1 constitutes a quite new view as to the connection between truth and utility--a view quite different from any that we have hitherto considered4 ,this view asserts not that every true idea is useful at some time1 or in the long run1 or for a considerable period2 but that the truth of an idea may come and go1 as its utility comes and goes4 ,it admits that one and the same idea sometimes occurs at times when it is useful1 and sometimes at times when it is not2 but it maintains that this same idea is true1 at those times when it is useful1 and not true1 at those when it is not4 ,and the fact that ,professor ,james seems to suggest this view1 constitutes1 ,i think1 a second most serious objection to what he says about the connection of truth and utility4 ,it seems so obvious that utility is a property which comes and goes--which belongs to a given idea at one time1 and does not belong to it at another1 that anyone who says that the true is the useful naturally seems not to be overlooking this obvious fact1 but to be suggesting that truth is a property which comes and goes in the same way4 ,it is1 in this way ,i think1 that the instrumental view of truth is connected with the view that truth is mutable4 ,professor ,james does1 ,i think1 imply that truth is mutable in just this sense--namely1 that one and the same idea may be true at some of the times at which it occurs1 and not true at others1 and this is the view which ,i have next to consider4 7,,ii7 ,professor ,james seems to hold1 generally1 that truth is mutable4 ,and by this he seems sometimes to mean that an idea which1 when it occurs at one time1 is true1 may1 when it occurs at another time1 not be true4 ,he seems to hold that one and the same idea may be true at one time and false at another4 ,that it may be1 for ,i do not suppose he means that all ideas do actually undergo this change from true to false4 ,many true ideas seem to occur but once1 and1 if so1 they1 at least1 will not actually be true at one time and false at another1 though1 even with regard to these1 perhaps ,professor ,james means to maintain that they might be false at another time1 if they were to occur at it4 ,but ,i am not sure that he even means to maintain this with regard to all our true ideas4 ,perhaps he does not mean to say1 with regard to all of them1 even that they can change from true to false4 ,he speaks1 generally1 indeed1 as if truth were mutable2 but1 in one passage1 he seems to insist that there is a certain class of true ideas1 none of which are mutable in this respect4 ,relations among purely mental ideas1 he says 7p4 #bji71 form another sphere where true and false beliefs obtain1 and here the beliefs are absolute or unconditional4 ,when they are true they bear the name either of definitions or of principles4 ,it is either a principle or a definition that #a and #a make #b1 that #b and #a make #c1 and so on2 that white differs less from grey than it does from black2 that when the cause begins to act the effect also commences4 ,such propositions hold of all possible 'ones1' of all conceivable 'whites1' 'greys1' and 'causes4' ,the objects here are mental objects4 ,their relations are perceptually obvious at a glance1 and no sense-verification is necessary4 ,moreover1 once true1 always true1 of those same mental objects4 ,truth here has an 'eternal' character4 ,if you can find a concrete thing anywhere that is 'one' or 'white' or 'grey' or an 'effect1' then your principles will everlastingly apply to it4 ,professor ,james does seem here to hold that there are true ideas1 which once true1 are always true4 ,perhaps1 then1 he does not hold that all true ideas are mutable4 ,perhaps he does not even hold that all true ideas1 except ideas of this kind1 are so4 ,but he does seem to hold at least that many of our true ideas are mutable4 ,and even this proposition seems to me to be disputable4 ,it seems to me that there is a sense in which it is the case with every true idea that1 if once true1 it is always true4 ,that is to say1 that every idea1 which is true once1 would be true at any other time at which it were to occur2 and that every idea which does occur more than once1 if true once1 is true at every time at which it does occur4 ,there seems to me1 ,i say1 to be a sense in which this is so4 ,and this seems to me to be the sense in which it is most commonly and most naturally maintained that all truths are immutable4 ,professor ,james seems to mean to deny it1 even in this sense4 ,he seems to me constantly to speak as if there were no sense in which all truths are immutable4 ,and ,i only wish to point out what seems to me to be the plainest and most obvious objection to such language4 ,and1 first of all1 there is one doctrine1 which he seems to connect with this of his that truths are mutable1 with regard to which ,i fully agree with him4 ,he seems very anxious to insist that reality is mutable3 that it does change1 and that it is not irrational to hope that in the future it will be different from and much better than it is now4 ,and this seems to me to be quite undeniable4 ,it seems to me quite certain that ,i do have ideas at one time which ,i did not have at another2 that change1 therefore1 does really occur4 ,it seems to me quite certain that in the future many things will be different from what they are now2 and ,i see no reason to think that they may not be much better4 ,there is much misery in the world now2 and ,i think it is quite possible that some day there will really be much less4 ,this view that reality is mutable1 that facts do change1 that some things have properties at one time which they do not have at other times1 seems to me certainly true4 ,and so far1 therefore1 as ,professor ,james merely means to assert this obvious fact1 ,i have no objection to his view4 ,some philosophers1 ,i think1 have really implied the denial of this fact4 ,all those who deny the reality of time do seem to me to imply that nothing really changes or can change--that1 in fact1 reality is wholly immutable4 ,and so far as ,professor ,james is merely protesting against this view1 ,i should1 therefore1 agree with him4 ,but ,i think it is quite plain that he does not mean merely this1 when he says that truth is mutable4 ,no one would choose this way of expressing himself if he merely meant to say that some things are mutable4 ,truth1 ,professor ,james has told us1 is a property of certain of our ideas4 ,and those of our ideas1 which are true or false1 are certainly only a part of the ,universe4 ,other things in the ,universe might1 therefore1 change1 even if our ideas never changed in respect of this property4 ,and our ideas themselves do undoubtedly change in some respects4 ,a given idea exists in my mind at one moment and does not exist in it at another4 ,at one moment it is in my mind and not in somebody else's1 and at another in somebody else's and not in mine4 ,i sometimes think of the truth that twice two are four when ,i am in one mood1 and sometimes when ,i am in another4 ,i sometimes think of it in connection with one set of ideas and sometimes in connection with another set4 ,ideas1 then1 are constantly changing in some respects4 ,they come and go2 and at one time they stand in a given relation to other things or ideas1 to which at another time they do not stand in that relation4 ,in this sense1 any given idea may certainly have a property at one time which it has not got at another time4 ,all this seems obvious2 and all this cannot be admitted1 without admitting that reality is mutable--that some things change4 ,but obviously it does not seem to follow from this that there is no respect in which ideas are immutable4 ,it does not seem to follow that because ideas1 and other things1 change some of their properties1 they necessarily change that one which we are considering--namely1 truth4 ,it does not follow that a given idea1 which has the property of truth at one time1 ever exists at any other time without having that property4 ,and yet that this does happen seems to be part of what is meant by saying that truth is mutable4 ,plainly1 therefore1 to say this is to say something quite different from saying that some things are mutable4 ,even1 therefore1 if we admit that some things are mutable1 it is still open to consider whether truth is so4 ,and this is what ,i want now to consider4 ,is it the case that an idea which exists at one time1 and is true then1 ever exists at any other time1 without being true8 ,is it the case that any idea ever changes from true to false8 ,that it has the property of being true on one of the occasions when it exists1 and that it has not this property1 but that of being false instead1 on some other occasion when it exists8 ,in order to answer this question clearly1 it is1 ,i think1 necessary to make still another distinction4 ,it does certainly seem to be true1 in a sense1 that a given idea may be true on one occasion and false on another4 ,we constantly speak as if there were cases in which a given thing was true on one occasion and false on another2 and ,i think it cannot be denied that1 when we so speak1 we are often expressing in a perfectly proper and legitimate manner something which is undeniably true4 ,it is true now1 ,i might say1 that ,i am in this room2 but to-morrow this will not be true4 ,it is true now that men are often very miserable2 but perhaps in some future state of society this will not be true4 ,these are perfectly natural forms of expression1 and what they express is something which certainly may be true4 ,and yet what they do apparently assert is that something or other1 which is true at one time1 will not1 or perhaps will not1 be true at another4 ,we constantly use such expressions1 which imply that what is true at one time is not true at another2 and it is certainly legitimate to use them4 ,and hence1 ,i think1 we must admit that1 in a sense1 it is true that a thing may be true at one time which is not true at another2 in that sense1 namely1 in which we use these expressions4 ,and it is1 ,i think1 also plain that these things1 which may be true at one time and false at another1 may1 in a sense1 be ideas4 ,we might even say3 ,the idea that ,i am in this room1 is true now2 but to-morrow it will not be true4 ,we might say this without any strain on language4 ,in any ordinary book--indeed1 in any philosophical book1 where the subject we are at present discussing was not being expressly discussed--such expressions do1 ,i think1 constantly occur4 ,and we should pass them1 without any objection4 ,we should at once understand what they meant1 and treat them as perfectly natural expressions of things undeniably true4 ,we must1 then1 ,i think1 admit that1 in a sense1 an idea may be true at one time1 and false at another4 ,the question is3 ,in what sense8 ,what is the truth for which these perfectly legitimate expressions stand8 ,it seems to me that in all these cases1 so far as we are not merely talking of facts1 but of true ideas1 that the idea which we truly say to be true at one time and false at another1 is merely the idea of a sentence--that is1 of certain words4 ,and we do undoubtedly call words true4 ,the words ,i am at a meeting of the ,aristotelian ,society are true1 if ,i use them now2 but if ,i use the same words to-morrow1 they would not be true4 ,the words ,george ,,iii is king of ,england were true in #ahjj1 but they are not true now4 ,that is to say1 a given set of words may undoubtedly be true at one time1 and false at another2 and since we may have ideas of words as well as of other things1 we may1 in this sense1 say the same of certain of our ideas4 ,we may say that some of our ideas 7namely those of words7 are true at one time and not true at another4 ,but is it conceivable that ,professor ,james merely meant to assert that the same words are sometimes true at one time and false at another8 ,can this be all he means by saying that truth is mutable8 ,i do not think it can possibly be so4 ,no one1 ,i think1 in definitely discussing the mutability of truth1 could say that true ideas were mutable1 and yet mean 7although he did not say so7 that this proposition applied solely to ideas of words4 ,professor ,james must1 ,i think1 have been sometimes thinking that other ideas1 and not merely ideas of words1 do sometimes change from true to false4 ,and this is the proposition which ,i am concerned to dispute4 ,it seems to me that if we mean by an idea1 not merely the idea of certain words1 but the kind of idea which words express1 it is very doubtful whether such an idea ever changes from true to false--whether any such idea is ever true at one time and false at another4 ,and plainly1 in the first place1 the mere fact that the same set of words1 as in the instances ,i have given1 really are true at one time and false at another1 does not afford any presumption that anything which they stand for is true at one time and false at another4 ,for the same words may obviously be used in different senses at different times2 and hence though the same words1 which formerly expressed a truth1 may cease to express one1 that may be because they now express a different idea1 and not because the idea which they formerly expressed has ceased to be true4 ,and that1 in instances such as ,i have given1 the words do change their meaning according to the time at which they are uttered or thought of1 is ,i think1 evident4 ,if ,i use now the words ,i am in this room1 these words certainly express 7among other things7 the idea that my being in this room is contemporary with my present use of the words2 and if ,i were to use the same words to-morrow1 they would express the idea that my being in this room to-morrow1 was contemporary with the use of them then4 ,and since my use of them then would not be the same fact as my use of them now1 they would certainly then express a different idea from that which they express now4 ,and in general1 whenever we use the present tense in its primary sense1 it seems to me plain that we do mean something different by it each time we use it4 ,we always mean 7among other things7 to express the idea that a given event is contemporary with our actual use of it2 and since our actual use of it on one occasion is always a different fact from our actual use of it on another1 we express by it a different idea each time we use it4 ,and similarly with the past and future tenses4 ,if anybody had said in #ahjg ,napoleon is dead1 he would certainly have meant by these words something different from what ,i mean by them when ,i use them now4 ,he would have meant that ,napoleon's death occurred at a time previous to his use of those words2 and this would not have been true4 ,but in this fact there is nothing to show that if he had meant by them what ,i mean now1 his idea would not have been as true then as mine is now4 ,and so1 if ,i say ,it will rain to-morrow1 these words have a different meaning to-day from what they would have if ,i used them to-morrow4 ,what we mean by to-morrow is obviously a different day1 when we use the word on one day1 from what we mean by it when we use it on another4 ,but in this there is nothing to show that if the idea1 which ,i now mean by ,it will rain to-morrow1 were to occur again to-morrow1 it would not be true then1 if it is true now4 ,all this is surely very obvious4 ,but1 if we take account of it1 and if we concentrate our attention not on the words but on what is meant by them1 is it so certain that what we mean by them on any one occasion ever changes from true to false8 ,if there were to occur to me to-morrow the very same idea which ,i now express by the words ,i am in this room1 is it certain that this idea would not be as true then as it is now8 ,it is perhaps true that the whale of what ,i mean by such a phrase as this never does recur4 ,but part of it does1 and that a part which is true4 ,part of what ,i mean is ,certainly identical with part of what ,i should mean to-morrow by saying ,i was in that room last night4 ,and this part would be as true then1 as it is now4 ,and is there any part1 which1 if it were to recur at any time1 would not then be true1 though it ,is true now8 ,in the case of all ideas or parts of ideas1 which ever do actually recur1 can we find a single instance of one1 which is plainly true at one of the times when it occurs1 and yet not true at another8 ,i cannot think of any such instance4 ,and on the other hand this very proposition that any idea 7other than mere words7 which is true once1 would be true at any time1 seems to me to be one of those truths of which ,professor ,james has spoken as having an eternal1 absolute1 unconditional character--as being perceptually obvious at a glance and needing no sense-verification4 ,just as we know that1 if a particular colour differs more from black than from grey at one time1 the same colour would differ more from black than from grey at any time1 so1 it seems to me1 we can see that1 if a particular idea is true at one time1 the same idea would be true at any time4 ,it seems to me1 then1 that if we mean by an idea1 not mere words1 but the kind of idea which words express1 any idea1 which is true at one time when it occurs1 would be true at any time when it were to occur2 and that this is so1 even though it is an idea1 which refers to facts which are mutable4 ,my being in this room is a fact which is now1 but which certainly has not been at every time and will not be at every time4 ,and the words ,i am in this room1 though they express a truth now1 would not have expressed one if ,i had used them yesterday1 and will not if ,i use them to-morrow4 ,but if we consider the idea which these words now express--namely1 the idea of the connection of my being in this room with this particular time--it seems to me evident that anybody who had thought of that connection at any time in the past1 would have been thinking truly1 and that anybody who were to think of it at any time in the future would be thinking truly4 ,this seems to me to be the sense in which truths are immutable--in which no idea can change from true to false4 ,and ,i think ,professor ,james means to deny of truths generally1 if not of all truths1 that they are immutable even in this sense4 ,if he does not mean this there seems nothing left for him to mean1 when he says that truths are mutable1 except 7#a7 that some facts are mutable1 and 7#b7 that the same words may be true at one time and false at another4 ,and it seems to me impossible that he could speak as he does1 if he meant nothing more than these two things4 ,i believe1 therefore1 that he is really thinking that ideas which have been once true 7ideas1 and not merely words7 do sometimes afterwards become false3 that the very same idea is at one time true and at another false4 ,but he certainly gives no instance which shows that this does ever occur4 ,and how far does he mean his principle to carry him8 ,does he hold that this idea that ,julius ,caesar was murdered in the ,senate-,house1 though true now1 may1 at some future time cease to be true1 if it should be more profitable to the lives of future generations to believe that he died in his bed8 ,things like this are what his words seem to imply2 and1 even if he does hold that truths like this are not mutable1 he never tries to tell us to what kinds of truths he would limit mutability1 nor how they differ from such as this4 7,,iii7 ,finally1 there remains the view that to an unascertainable extent our truths are man-made products4 ,and the only point ,i want to make about this view may be put very briefly4 ,it is noticeable that all the instances which ,professor ,james gives of the ways in which1 according to him1 our truths are made are instances of ways in which our beliefs come into existence4 ,in many of these ways1 it would seem1 false beliefs sometimes come into existence as well as true ones2 and ,i take it ,professor ,james does not always wish to deny this4 ,false beliefs1 ,i think he would say1 are just as much man-made products as true ones3 it is sufficient for his purpose if true beliefs do come into existence in the ways he mentions4 ,and the only point which seems to be illustrated by all these instances1 is that in all of them the existence of a true belief does depend in some way or other upon the previous existence of something in some man's mind4 ,they are all of them cases in which we may truly say3 ,this man would not have had just that belief1 had not some man previously had such and such experiences1 or interests1 or purposes4 ,in some cases they are instances of ways in which the existence of a particular belief in a man depends upon his own previous experiences or interests or volitions4 ,but this does not seem to be the case in all4 ,professor ,james seems also anxious to illustrate the point that one man's beliefs often depend upon the previous experiences or interests or volitions of other men4 ,and1 as ,i say1 the only point which seems to be definitely illustrated in all cases is that the existence of a true belief does depend1 in some way or other1 upon something which has previously existed in some man's mind4 ,almost any kind of dependence1 it would seem1 is sufficient to illustrate ,professor ,james' point4 ,and as regards this general thesis that almost all our beliefs1 true as well as false1 depend1 in some way or other1 upon what has previously been in some human mind1 it will1 ,i think1 be readily admitted4 ,it is a commonplace1 which1 so far as ,i know1 hardly anyone would deny4 ,if this is all that is to be meant by saying that our true beliefs are man-made1 it must1 ,i think1 be admitted that almost all1 ,if not quite all1 really are man-made4 ,and this is all that ,professor ,james' instances seem to me1 in fact1 to show4 ,but is this all that ,professor ,james means1 when he says that our truths are man-made8 ,is it conceivable that he only means to insist upon this undeniable1 and generally admitted1 commonplace8 ,it seems to me quite plain that this is not all that he means4 ,i think he certainly means to suggest that1 from the fact that we make our true beliefs1 something else follows4 ,and ,i think it is not hard to see one thing more which he does mean4 ,i think he certainly means to suggest that we not only make our true beliefs1 but also that we make them true4 ,at least as much as this is certainly naturally suggested by his words4 ,no one would persistently say that we make our truths1 unless he meant1 at least1 not merely that we make our true beliefs1 but also that we make them true--unless he meant not merely that the existence of our true beliefs1 but also that their truth1 depended upon human conditions4 ,this1 it seems to me1 is one consequence which ,professor ,james means us to draw from the commonplace that the existence of our true beliefs depends upon human conditions4 ,but does this consequence1 in fact1 follow from that commonplace8 ,from the fact that we make our true beliefs1 does it follow that we make them true8 ,in one sense1 undoubtedly1 even this does follow4 ,if we say 7as we may say7 that no belief can be true1 unless it exists1 then it follows that1 in a sense1 the truth of a belief must always depend upon any conditions upon which its existence depends4 ,if1 therefore1 the occurrence of a belief depends upon human conditions1 so1 too1 must its truth4 ,if the belief had never existed1 it would never have been true2 and therefore its truth must1 in a sense1 depend upon human conditions in exactly the same degree in which its existence depends upon them4 ,this is obvious4 ,but is this all that is meant8 ,is this all that would be suggested to us by telling us that we make our beliefs true8 ,it is easy to see that it is not4 ,i may have the belief that it will rain to-morrow4 ,and ,i may have made myself have this belief4 ,it may be the case that ,i should not have had it1 but for peculiarities in my past experiences1 in my interests and my volitions4 ,it may be the case that ,i should not have had it1 but for a deliberate attempt to consider the question whether it will rain or not4 ,this may easily happen4 ,and certainly this particular belief of mine would not have been true1 unless it existed4 ,its truth1 therefore1 depends1 in a sense1 upon any conditions upon which its existence depends4 ,and this belief may be true4 ,it will be true1 if ,it does rain to-morrow4 ,but1 in spite of all these reasons1 would anyone think of saying that1 in case it is true1 ,i had made it true8 ,would anyone say that ,i had had any hand at all in making it true8 ,plainly no one would4 ,we should say that ,i had a hand in making it true1 if and only ,if ,i had a hand in making the rain fall4 ,in every case in which we believe in the existence of anything1 past or future1 we should say that we had helped to make the belief true1 if and only if we had helped to cause the existence of the fact which1 in that belief1 we believed did exist or would exist4 ,surely this is plain4 ,i may believe that the sun will rise to-morrow4 ,and ,i may have had a hand in making this belief2 certainly it often depends for its existence upon what has been previously in my mind4 ,and if the sun does rise1 my belief will have been true4 ,i have1 therefore1 had a hand in making a true belief4 ,but would anyone say that1 therefore1 ,i had a hand in making this belief true8 ,certainly no one would4 ,no one would say that anything had contributed to make this belief true1 except those conditions 7whatever they may be7 which contributed to making the sun actually rise4 ,it is plain1 then1 that by making a belief true1 we mean something quite different from what ,professor ,james means by making that belief4 ,conditions which have a hand in making a given true belief1 may 7it appears7 have no hand at all in making it true2 and conditions which have a hand in making it true may have no hand at all in making it4 ,certainly this is how we use the words4 ,we should never say that we had made a belief true1 merely because we had made the belief4 ,but now1 which of these two things does ,professor ,james mean8 ,does he mean merely the accepted commonplace that we make our true beliefs1 in the sense that almost all of them depend for their existence on what has been previously in some human mind8 ,or does he mean also that we make them true--that their truth also depends on what has been previously in some human mind8 ,i cannot help thinking that he has the latter1 and not only the former in his mind4 ,but1 then1 what does this involve8 ,if his instances of truth-making are to be anything to the purpose1 it should mean that1 whenever ,i have a hand in causing one of my own beliefs1 ,i always have to that extent a hand in making it true4 ,that1 therefore1 ,i have a hand in actually making the sun rise1 the wind blow1 and the rain fall1 whenever ,i cause my beliefs in these things4 ,nay1 more1 it should mean that1 whenever ,i make a true belief about the past1 ,i must have had a hand in making this true4 ,and if so1 then certainly ,i must have had a hand in causing the ,french ,revolution1 in causing my father's birth1 in making ,professor ,james write this book4 ,certainly he implies that some man or other must have helped in causing almost every event1 in which any man ever truly believed4 ,that it was we who made the planets revolve round the sun1 who made the ,alps rise1 and the floor of the ,pacific sink--all these things1 and others like them1 seem to be involved4 ,and it is these consequences which seem to me to justify a doubt whether1 in fact our truths are to an unascertainable extent man-made4 ,that some of our truths are man-made--indeed1 a great many--,i fully admit4 ,we certainly do make some of our beliefs true4 ,the ,secretary probably had a belief that ,i should write this paper1 and ,i have made his belief true by writing it4 ,men certainly have the power to alter the world to a certain extent2 and1 so far as they do this1 they certainly make true any beliefs1 which are beliefs in the occurrence of these alterations4 ,but ,i can see no reason for supposing that they make true nearly all those of their beliefs which are true4 ,and certainly the only reason which ,professor ,james seems to give for believing this--namely1 that the existence of almost all their beliefs depends on them--seems to be no reason for it at all4 ,for unquestionably a man does not make true nearly every belief whose existence depends on him2 and if so1 the question which of their beliefs and how many1 men do make true must be settled by quite other considerations4 ,in conclusion1 ,i wish to sum up what seems to me to be the most important points about this pragmatist theory of truth1 as ,professor ,james represents it4 ,it seems to me that1 in what he says about it1 he has in his mind some things which are true and others which are false2 and ,i wish to tabulate separately the principal ones which ,i take to be true1 and the principal ones which ,i take to be false4 ,the true ones seem to me to be these3-- ,that most of our true beliefs are useful to us2 and that most of the beliefs that are useful to us are true4 ,that the world really does change in some respects2 that facts exist at one time1 which didn't and won't exist at others2 and that hence the world may be better at some future time than it is now or has been in the past4 ,that the very same words may be true at one time and false at another--that they may express a truth at one time and a falsehood at another4 ,that the existence of most1 if not all1 of our beliefs1 true as well as false1 does depend upon previous events in our mental history2 that we should never have had the particular beliefs we do have1 had not our previous mental history been such as it was4 ,that the truth1 and not merely the existence1 of some of our beliefs1 does depend upon us4 ,that we really do make some alterations in the world1 and that hence we do help to make true all those of our beliefs which are beliefs in the existence of these alterations4 ,to all of these propositions ,i have no objection to offer4 ,and they seem to me to be generally admitted commonplaces4 ,a certain class of philosophers do1 indeed1 imply the denial of every one of them--namely1 those philosophers who deny the reality of time4 ,and ,i think that part of ,professor ,james' object is to protest against the views of these philosophers4 ,all of these propositions do constitute a protest against such views2 and so far they might be all that ,professor ,james meant to assert4 ,but ,i do not think that anyone1 fairly reading through what he says1 could get the impression that these things1 and nothing more1 were what he had in his mind4 ,what gives colour and interest to what he says1 seems to be obviously something quite different4 ,and1 if we try to find out what exactly the chief things are which give his discussion its colour and interest1 it seems to me we may distinguish that what he has in his mind1 wrapped up in more or less ambiguous language1 are the following propositions1 to all of which ,i have tried to urge what seem to me the most obvious objections3-- ,that utility is a property which distinguishes true beliefs from those which are not true2 that1 therefore1 all true beliefs are useful1 and all beliefs1 which are useful1 are true--by utility being sometimes meant utility on at least one occasion1 sometimes utility in the long run1 sometimes utility for some length of time4 ,that all beliefs which are useful for some length of time are true4 ,that utility is the only property which all true beliefs have in common3 that1 therefore1 if it were useful to me to believe in ,professor ,james' existence1 this belief would be true1 even if he didn't exist2 and that1 if it were not useful to me to believe this1 the belief would be false1 even if he did4 ,that the beliefs1 which we express by words1 and not merely the words themselves1 may be true at one time and not true at another2 and that this is a general rule1 though perhaps there may be some exceptions4 ,that whenever the existence of a belief depends to some extent on us1 then also the truth of that belief depends to some extent on us2 in the sense in which this implies1 that1 when the existence of my belief that a shower will fall depends upon me1 then1 if this belief is true1 ,i must have had a hand in making the shower fall3 that1 therefore1 men must have had a hand in making to exist almost every fact which they ever believe to exist4 #a ,pragmatism3 ,a ,new ,name for some ,old ,ways of ,thinking3 ,popular ,lectures on ,philosophy4 ,by ,william ,james4 ,longmans1 ,green1 and ,co41 #aijg ,,hume',s ,,philosophy ,in both of his two books on the ,human ,understanding1 ,hume had1 ,i think1 one main general object4 ,he tells us that it was his object to discover the extent and force of human understanding1 to give us an exact analysis of its powers and capacity4 ,and we may1 ,i think1 express what he meant by this in the following way4 ,he plainly held 7as we all do7 that some men sometimes entertain opinions which they cannot know to be true4 ,and he wished to point out what characteristics are possessed by those of our opinions which we can know to be true1 with a view of persuading us that any opinion which does not possess any of these characteristics is of a kind which we cannot know to be so4 ,he thus tries to lay down certain rules to the effect that the only propositions which we can1 any of us1 know to be true are of certain definite kinds4 ,it is in this sense1 ,i think1 that he tries to define the limits of human understanding4 ,with this object he1 first of all1 divides all the propositions1 which we can even so much as conceive1 into two classes4 ,they are all1 he says1 either propositions about relations of ideas or else about matters of fact4 ,by propositions about relations of ideas he means such propositions as that twice two are four1 or that black differs from white2 and it is1 ,i think1 easy enough to see1 though by no means easy to define1 what kind of propositions it is that he means to include in this division4 ,they are1 he says1 the only kind of propositions with regard to which we can have intuitive or demonstrative certainty4 ,but the vast majority of the propositions in which we believe and which interest us most1 belong to the other division3 they are propositions about matters of fact4 ,and these again he divides into two classes4 ,so far as his words go1 this latter division is between matters of fact1 beyond the present testimony of our senses1 or the records of our memory1 on the one hand1 and matters of fact for which we have the evidence of our memory or senses1 on the other4 ,but it is1 ,i think1 quite plain that these words do not represent quite accurately the division which he really means to make4 ,he plainly intends to reckon along with facts for which we have the evidence of our senses all facts for which we have the evidence of direct observation--such facts1 for instance1 as those which ,i observe when ,i observe that ,i am angry or afraid1 and which cannot be strictly said to be apprehended by my senses4 ,the division1 then1 which he really intends to make is 7to put it quite strictly7 into the two classes--7#a7 propositions which assert some matter of fact which ,i am 7in the strictest sense7 observing at the moment1 or which ,i have so observed in the past and now remember2 and 7#b7 propositions which assert any matter of fact which ,i am not now observing and never have observed1 or1 if ,i have1 have quite forgotten4 ,we have1 then1 the three classes--7#a7 propositions which assert relations of ideas2 7#b7 propositions which assert matters of fact for which we have the evidence of direct observation or personal memory2 7#c7 propositions which assert matters of fact for which we have not this evidence4 ,and as regards propositions of the first two classes1 ,hume does not seem to doubt our capacity for knowledge4 ,he does not doubt that we can know some 7though1 of course1 not all7 propositions about relations of ideas to be true2 he never doubts1 for instance1 that we can know that twice two are four4 ,and he generally assumes also that each of us can know the truth of all propositions which merely assert some matter of fact which we ourselves are1 in the strictest sense1 directly observing1 or which we have so observed and now remember4 ,he does1 indeed1 in one place1 suggest a doubt whether our memory is ever to be implicitly trusted1 but he generally assumes that it always can4 ,it is with regard to propositions of the third class that he is chiefly anxious to determine which of them 7if any7 we can know to be true and which not4 ,in what cases can any man know any matter of fact which he himself has not directly observed8 ,it is ,hume's views on this question which form1 ,i think1 the main interest of his philosophy4 ,he proposes1 first of all1 by way of answer to it1 a rule1 which may1 ,i think1 be expressed as follows3 ,no man1 he says1 can ever know any matter of fact1 which he has not himself observed1 unless he can know that it is connected by the relation of cause and effect1 with some fact which he has observed4 ,and no man can ever know that any two facts are connected by this relation1 except by the help of his own past experience4 ,in other words1 if ,i am to know any fact1 ,a1 which ,i have not myself observed1 my past experience must give me some foundation for the belief that ,a is causally connected with some fact1 ,b1 which ,i have observed4 ,and the only kind of past experience which can give me any foundation for such a belief is1 ,hume seems to say1 as follows3 ,i must1 he says1 have found facts like ,a constantly conjoined in the past with facts like ,b4 ,this is what he says2 but we must not1 ,i think1 press his words too strictly4 ,i may1 for instance1 know that ,a is probably a fact1 even where the conjunction of facts like it with facts like ,b has not been quite constant4 ,or instead of observing facts like ,a conjoined with facts like ,b1 ,i may have observed a whole series of conjunctions--for instance1 between ,a and ,c1 ,c and ,d1 ,d and ,e1 and ,e and ,b2 and such a series1 however long1 will do quite as well to establish a causal connection between ,a and ,b1 as if ,i had directly observed conjunctions between ,a and ,b themselves4 ,such modifications as this1 ,hume would1 ,i think1 certainly allow4 ,but1 allowing for them1 his principle is1 ,i think1 quite clear4 ,i can1 he holds1 never know any fact whatever1 which ,i have not myself observed1 unless ,i have observed similar facts in the past and have observed that they were conjoined 7directly or indirectly7 with facts similar to some fact which ,i do now observe or remember4 ,in this sense1 he holds1 all our knowledge of facts1 beyond the reach of our own observation1 is founded on experience4 ,this is ,hume's primary principle4 ,but what consequences does he think will follow from it1 as to the kind of facts1 beyond our own observation1 which we can know8 ,we may1 ,i think1 distinguish three entirely different views as to its consequences1 which he suggests in different parts of his work4 ,in the first place1 where he is specially engaged in explaining this primary principle1 he certainly seems to suppose that all propositions of the kind1 which we assume most universally in everyday life1 may be founded on experience in the sense required4 ,he supposes that we have this foundation in experience for such beliefs as that a stone will fall1 or fire burn2 that ,julius ,caesar was murdered2 that the sun will rise to-morrow2 that all men are mortal ,he speaks as if experience did not merely render such beliefs probable1 but actually proved them to be true4 ,the arguments from experience in their favour are1 he says1 such as leave no room for doubt or opposition4 ,the only kinds of belief1 which he definitely mentions as not founded on experience1 are popular superstitions on the one hand1 and certain religious and philosophical beliefs1 on the other4 ,he seems to suppose that a few 7a very few7 religious beliefs may1 perhaps1 be founded on experience4 ,but as regards most of the specific doctrines of ,christianity1 for example1 he seems to be clear that they are not so founded4 ,the belief in miracles is not founded on experience2 nor is the philosophical belief that every event is caused by the direct volition of the ,deity4 ,in short1 it would seem1 that in this doctrine that our knowledge of unobserved facts is confined to such as are founded on experience1 he means to draw the line very much where it is drawn by the familiar doctrine which is called ,agnosticism4 ,we can know such facts as are asserted in books on history1 geography or astronomy1 or on politics1 physics and chemistry1 because such assertions may be founded on experience2 but we cannot know the greater part of the facts asserted in books of divinity or school metaphysics1 because such assertions have no foundation in experience4 ,this1 ,i think1 was clearly one of ,hume's views4 ,he meant to fix the limits of our knowledge at a point which would exclude most religious propositions and a great many philosophical ones1 as incapable of being known2 but which would include all the other kinds of propositions1 which are most universally accepted by common-sense1 as capable of being known4 ,and he thought that1 so far as matters of fact beyond the reach of our personal observation are concerned1 this point coincided with that at which the possibility of foundation on experience ceases4 ,but1 if we turn to another part of his work1 we find a very different view suggested4 ,in a quite distinct section of both his books1 he investigates the beliefs which we entertain concerning the existence of external objects4 ,and he distinguishes two different kinds of belief which may be held on this subject4 ,almost all mankind1 and philosophers themselves1 for the greatest part of their lives1 believe1 he says1 that the very things they feel and see are external objects1 in the sense that they continue to exist1 even when we cease to feel or see them4 ,philosophers1 on the other hand1 have been led to reject this opinion and to suppose 7when they reflect7 that what we actually perceive by the senses never exists except when we perceive it1 but that there are other external objects1 which do exist independently of us1 and which cause us to perceive what we do perceive4 ,hume investigates both of these opinions1 at great length in the ,treatise1 and much more briefly in the ,enquiry1 and comes to the conclusion1 in both books1 that neither of them can be founded on experience1 in the sense he has defined4 ,as regards the first of them1 the vulgar opinion1 he does seem to admit in the ,treatise that it is1 in a sense1 founded on experience2 but not1 he insists1 in the sense defined4 ,and he seems also to think that1 apart from this fact1 there are conclusive reasons for holding that the opinion cannot be true4 ,and as regards the philosophical opinion1 he says that any belief in external objects1 which we never perceive but which cause our perceptions1 cannot possibly be founded on experience1 for the simple reason that if it were1 we should need to have directly observed some of these objects and their conjunction with what we do perceive1 which ex hypothesi1 we cannot have done1 since we never do directly observe any external object4 ,hume1 therefore1 concludes1 in this part of his work1 that we cannot know of the existence of any external object whatever4 ,and though in all that he says upon this subject1 he is plainly thinking only of material objects1 the principles by which he tries to prove that we cannot know these must1 ,i think1 prove equally well that we cannot know any external object whatever--not even the existence of any other human mind4 ,his argument is3 ,we cannot directly observe any object whatever1 except such as exist only when we observe them2 we cannot1 therefore1 observe any constant conjunctions except between objects of this kind3 and hence we can have no foundation in experience for any proposition which asserts the existence of any other kind of object1 and cannot1 therefore1 know any such proposition to be true4 ,and this argument must plainly apply to all the feelings1 thoughts and perceptions of other men just as much as to material objects4 ,i can never know that any perception of mine1 or anything which ,i do observe1 must have been caused by any other man1 because ,i can never directly observe a constant conjunction between any other man's thoughts or feelings or intentions and anything which ,i directly observe3 ,i cannot1 therefore1 know that any other man ever had any thoughts or feelings--or1 in short1 that any man beside myself ever existed4 ,the view1 therefore1 which ,hume suggests in this part of his work1 flatly contradicts the view which he at first seemed to hold4 ,he now says we cannot know that a stone will fall1 that fire will burn1 or the sun will rise to-morrow4 ,all that ,i can possibly know1 according to his present principles1 is that ,i shall see a stone fall1 shall feel the fire burn1 shall see the sun rise to-morrow4 ,i cannot even know that any other men will see these things2 for ,i cannot know that any other men exist4 ,for the same reason1 ,i cannot know that ,julius ,caesar was murdered1 or that all men are mortal4 ,for these are propositions asserting external facts--facts which don't exist only at the moment when ,i observe them2 and1 according to his present doctrine1 ,i cannot possibly know any such proposition to be true4 ,no man1 in short1 can know any proposition about matters of fact to be true1 except such as merely assert something about his own states of mind1 past1 present or future--about these or about what he himself has directly observed1 is observing1 or will observe4 ,here1 therefore1 we have a very different view suggested1 as to the limits of human knowledge4 ,and even this is not all4 ,there is yet a third view1 inconsistent with both of these1 which ,hume suggests in some parts of his work4 ,so far as we have yet seen1 he has not in any way contradicted his original supposition that we can know some matters of fact1 which we have never ourselves observed4 ,in the second theory1 which ,i have just stated1 he does not call in question the view that ,i can know all such matters of fact as ,i know to be causally connected with facts which ,i have observed1 nor the view that ,i can know some facts to be thus causally connected4 ,all that he has done is to question whether ,i can know any external fact to be causally connected with anything which ,i observe2 he would still allow that ,i may be able to know that future states of my own1 or past states1 which ,i have forgotten1 are causally connected with those which ,i now observe or remember2 and that ,i may know therefore1 in some cases1 what ,i shall experience in the future1 or have experienced in the past but have now forgotten4 ,but in some parts of his work he does seem to question whether any man can know even as much as this3 he seems to question whether we can ever know any fact whatever to be causally connected with any other fact4 ,for1 after laying it down1 as we saw above1 that we cannot know any fact1 ,a1 to be causally connected with another1 ,b1 unless we have experienced in the past a constant conjunction between facts like ,a and facts like ,b1 he goes on to ask what foundation we have for the conclusion that ,a and ,b are causally connected1 even when we have in the past experienced a constant conjunction between them4 ,he points out that from the fact that ,a has been constantly conjoined with ,b in the past1 it does not follow that it ever will be so again4 ,it does not follow1 therefore1 that the two really are causally connected in the sense that1 when the one occurs1 the other always will occur also4 ,and he concludes1 for this and other reasons1 that no argument can assure us that1 because they have been constantly conjoined in the past1 therefore they really are causally connected4 ,what1 then1 he asks1 is the foundation for such an inference8 ,custom1 he concludes1 is the only foundation4 ,it is nothing but custom which induces us to believe that1 because two facts have been constantly conjoined on many occasions1 therefore they will be so on all occasions4 ,we have1 therefore1 no better foundation than custom for any conclusion whatever as to facts which we have not observed4 ,and can we be said really to know any fact1 for which we have no better foundation than this8 ,hume himself1 it must be observed1 never says that we can't4 ,but he has been constantly interpreted as if the conclusion that we can't really know any one fact to be causally connected with any other1 did follow from this doctrine of his4 ,and there is1 ,i think1 certainly much excuse for this interpretation in the tone in which he speaks4 ,he does seem to suggest that a belief which is merely founded on custom1 can scarcely be one which we know to be true4 ,and1 indeed1 he owns himself that1 when he considers that this is our only foundation for any such belief1 he is sometimes tempted to doubt whether we do know any fact whatever1 except those which we directly observe4 ,he does1 therefore1 at least suggest the view that every man's knowledge is entirely confined to those facts1 which he is directly observing at the moment1 or which he has observed in the past1 and now remembers4 ,we see1 then1 that ,hume suggests1 at least1 three entirely different views as to the consequences of his original doctrine4 ,his original doctrine was that1 as regards matters of fact beyond the reach of our own actual observation1 the knowledge of each of us is strictly limited to those for which we have a basis in our own experience4 ,and his first view as to the consequences of this doctrine was that it does show us to be incapable of knowing a good many religious and philosophical propositions1 which many men have claimed that they knew2 but that it by no means denies our capacity of knowing the vast majority of facts beyond our own observation1 which we all commonly suppose that we know4 ,his second view1 on the other hand1 is that it cuts off at once all possibility of our knowing the vast majority of these facts2 since he implies that we cannot have any basis in experience for asserting any external fact whatever--any fact1 that is1 except facts relating to our own actual past and future observations4 ,and his third view is more sceptical still1 since it suggests that we cannot really know any fact whatever1 beyond the reach of our present observation or memory1 even where we have a basis in experience for such a fact3 it suggests that experience cannot ever let us know that any two things are causally connected1 and therefore that it cannot give us knowledge of any fact based on this relation4 ,what are we to think of these three views1 and of the original doctrine from which ,hume seems to infer them8 ,as regards the last two views1 it may perhaps be thought that they are too absurd to deserve any serious consideration4 ,it is1 in fact1 absurd to suggest that ,i do not know any external facts whatever2 that ,i do not know1 for instance1 even that there are any men beside myself4 ,and ,hume himself1 it might seem1 does not seriously expect or wish us to accept these views4 ,he points out1 with regard to all such excessively sceptical opinions that we cannot continue to believe them for long together--that1 at least1 we cannot1 for long together1 avoid believing things flatly inconsistent with them4 ,the philosopher may believe1 when he is philosophising1 that no man knows of the existence of any other man or of any material object2 but at other times he will inevitably believe1 as we all do1 that he does know of the existence of this man and of that1 and even of this and that material object4 ,there can1 therefore1 be no question of making all our beliefs consistent with such views as this of never believing anything that is inconsistent with them4 ,and it may1 therefore1 seem useless to discuss them4 ,but in fact1 it by no means follows that1 because we are not able to adhere consistently to a given view1 therefore that view is false2 nor does it follow that we may not sincerely believe it1 whenever we are philosophising1 even though the moment we cease to philosophise1 or even before1 we may be forced to contradict it4 ,and philosophers do1 in fact1 sincerely believe such things as this--things which flatly contradict the vast majority of the things which they believe at other times4 ,even ,hume1 ,i think1 does sincerely wish to persuade us that we cannot know of the existence of external material objects--that this is a philosophic truth1 which we ought1 if we can1 so long as we are philosophising1 to believe4 ,many people1 ,i think1 are certainly tempted1 in their philosophic moments1 to believe such things2 and1 since this is so1 it is1 ,i think1 worth while to consider seriously what arguments can be brought against such views4 ,it is worth while to consider whether they are views which we ought to hold as philosophical opinions1 even if it be quite certain that we shall never be able to make the views which we entertain at other times consistent with them4 ,and it is the more worth while1 because the question how we can prove or disprove such extreme views as these1 has a bearing on the question how we can1 in any case whatever1 prove or disprove that we do really know1 what we suppose ourselves to know4 ,what arguments1 then1 are there for or against the extreme view that no man can know any external fact whatever2 and the still more extreme view that no man can know any matter of fact whatever1 except those which he is directly observing at the moment1 or has observed in the past and now remembers8 ,it may be pointed out1 in the first place1 that1 if these views are true1 then at least no man can possibly know them to be so4 ,what these views assert is that ,i cannot know any external fact whatever4 ,it follows1 therefore1 that ,i cannot know that there are any other men1 beside myself1 and that they are like me in this respect4 ,any philosopher who asserts positively that other men1 equally with himself1 are incapable of knowing any external facts1 is1 in that very assertion1 contradicting himself1 since he implies that he does know a great many facts about the knowledge of other men4 ,no one1 therefore1 can be entitled to assert positively that human knowledge is limited in this way1 since1 in asserting it positively1 he is implying that his own knowledge is not so limited4 ,it cannot be proper1 even in our philosophic moments1 to take up such an attitude as this4 ,no one1 therefore1 can know positively that men in general1 are incapable of knowing external facts4 ,but still1 although we cannot know it1 it remains possible that the view should be a true one4 ,nay1 more1 it remains possible that a man should know that he himself is incapable of knowing any external facts1 and that1 if there are any other men whose faculties are only similar to his own1 they also must be incapable of knowing any4 ,the argument just used obviously does not apply against such a position as this4 ,it only applies against the position that men in general positively are incapable of knowing external facts3 it does not apply against the position that the philosopher himself is incapable of knowing any1 or against the position that there are possibly other men in the same case1 and that1 if their faculties are similar to the philosopher's1 they certainly would be in it4 ,i do not contradict myself by maintaining positively that ,i know no external facts1 though ,i do contradict myself if ,i maintain that ,i am only one among other men1 and that no man knows any external facts4 ,so far1 then1 as ,hume merely maintains that he is incapable of knowing any external facts1 and that there may be other men like him in this respect1 the argument just used is not valid against his position4 ,can any conclusive arguments be found against it8 ,it seems to me that such a position must1 in a certain sense1 be quite incapable of disproof4 ,so much must be granted to any sceptic who feels inclined to hold it4 ,any valid argument which can be brought against it must be of the nature of a petitio principii3 it must beg the question at issue4 ,how is the sceptic to prove to himself that he does know any external facts8 ,he can only do it by bringing forward some instance of an external fact1 which he does know2 and1 in assuming that he does know this one1 he is1 of course1 begging the question4 ,it is therefore quite impossible for any one to prove1 in one strict sense of the term1 that he does know any external facts4 ,i can only prove that ,i do1 by assuming that in some particular instance1 ,i actually do know one4 ,that is to say1 the so-called proof must assume the very thing which it pretends to prove4 ,the only proof that we do know external facts lies in the simple fact that we do know them4 ,and the sceptic can1 with perfect internal consistency1 deny that he does know any4 ,but it can1 ,i think1 be shown that he has no reason for denying it4 ,and in particular it may1 ,i think1 be easily seen that the arguments which ,hume uses in favour of this position have no conclusive force4 ,to begin with1 his arguments1 in both cases1 depend upon the two original assumptions1 7#a7 that we cannot know any fact1 which we have not observed1 unless we know it to be causally connected with some fact which we have observed1 and 7#b7 that we have no reason for assuming any causal connection1 except where we have experienced some instances of conjunction between the two facts connected4 ,and both of these assumptions may1 of course1 be denied4 ,it is just as easy to deny them1 as to deny that ,i do know any external facts4 ,and1 if these two assumptions did really lead to the conclusion that ,i cannot know any1 it would1 ,i think1 be proper to deny them3 we might fairly regard the fact that they led to this absurd conclusion as disproving them4 ,but1 in fact1 ,i think it may be easily seen that they do not lead to it4 ,let us consider1 first of all1 ,hume's most sceptical argument 7the argument which he merely suggests74 ,this argument suggests that1 since our only reason for supposing two facts to be causally connected is that we have found them constantly conjoined in the past1 and since it does not follow from the fact that they have been conjoined ever so many times1 that they always will be so1 therefore we cannot know that they always will be so1 and hence cannot know that they are causally connected4 ,but obviously the conclusion does not follow4 ,we must1 ,i think1 grant the premiss that1 from the fact that two things have been conjoined1 no matter how often1 it does not strictly follow that they always are conjoined4 ,but it by no means follows from this that we may not know that1 as a matter of fact1 when two things are conjoined sufficiently often1 they are also always conjoined4 ,we may quite well know many things which do not logically follow from anything else which we know4 ,and so1 in this case1 we may know that two things are causally connected1 although this does not logically follow from our past experience1 nor yet from anything else that we know4 ,and1 as for the contention that our belief in causal connections is merely based on custom1 we may1 indeed1 admit that custom would not be a sufficient reason for concluding the belief to be true4 ,but the mere fact 7if it be a fact7 that the belief is only caused by custom1 is also no sufficient reason for concluding that we can not know it to be true4 ,custom may produce beliefs1 which we do know to be true1 even though it be admitted that it does not necessarily produce them4 ,and as for ,hume's argument to prove that we can never know any external object to be causally connected with anything which we actually observe1 it is1 ,i think1 obviously fallacious4 ,in order to prove this1 he has1 as he recognises1 to disprove both of two theories4 ,he has1 first of all1 to disprove what he calls the vulgar theory--the theory that we can know the very things which we see or feel to be external objects2 that is to say1 can know that these very things exist at times when we do not observe them4 ,and even here1 ,i think1 his arguments are obviously inconclusive4 ,but we need not stay to consider them1 because1 in order to prove that we cannot know any external objects1 he has also to disprove what he calls the philosophic theory--the theory that we can know things which we do observe1 to be caused by external objects which we never observe4 ,if1 therefore1 his attempt to disprove this theory fails1 his proof that we cannot know any external objects also fails2 and ,i think it is easy to see that his disproof does fail4 ,it amounts merely to this3 ,that we cannot1 ex hypothesi1 ever observe these supposed external objects1 and therefore cannot observe them to be constantly conjoined with any objects which we do observe4 ,but what follows from this8 ,his own theory about the knowledge of causal connection is not that in order to know ,a to be the cause of ,b1 we must have observed ,a itself to be conjoined with ,b2 but only that we must have observed objects like ,a to be constantly conjoined with objects like ,b4 ,and what is to prevent an external object from being like some object which we have formerly observed8 ,suppose ,i have frequently observed a fact like ,a to be conjoined with a fact like ,b3 and suppose ,i now observe ,b1 on an occasion when ,i do not observe anything like ,a4 ,there is no reason1 on ,hume's principles1 why ,i should not conclude that ,a does exist on this occasion1 even though ,i do not observe it2 and that it is1 therefore1 an external object4 ,it will1 of course1 differ from any object which ,i have ever observed1 in respect of the simple fact that it is not observed by me1 whereas they were4 ,there is1 therefore1 this one respect in which it must be unlike anything which ,i have ever observed4 ,but ,hume has never said anything to show that unlikeness in this single respect is sufficient to invalidate the inference4 ,it may quite well be like objects which ,i have observed in all other respects2 and this degree of likeness may1 according to his principles1 be quite sufficient to justify us in concluding its existence4 ,in short1 when ,hume argues that we cannot possibly learn by experience of the existence of any external objects1 he is1 ,i think1 plainly committing the fallacy of supposing that1 because we cannot1 ex hypothesis have ever observed any object which actually is external1 therefore we can never have observed any object like an external one4 ,but plainly we may have observed objects like them in all respects except the single one that these have been observed whereas the others have not4 ,and even a less degree of likeness than this would1 according to his principles1 be quite sufficient to justify an inference of causal connection4 ,hume does not1 therefore1 bring forward any arguments at all sufficient to prove either that he cannot know any one object to be causally connected with any other or that he cannot know any external fact4 ,and1 indeed1 ,i think it is plain that no conclusive argument could possibly be advanced in favour of these positions4 ,it would always be at least as easy to deny the argument as to deny that we do know external facts4 ,we may1 therefore1 each one of us1 safely conclude that we do know external facts2 and1 if we do1 then there is no reason why we should not also know that other men do the same4 ,there is no reason why we should not1 in this respect1 make our philosophical opinions agree with what we necessarily believe at other times4 ,there is no reason why ,i should not confidently assert that ,i do really know some external facts1 although ,i cannot prove the assertion except by simply assuming that ,i do4 ,i am1 in fact1 as certain of this as of anything2 and as reasonably certain of it4 ,but just as ,i am certain that ,i do know some external facts1 so ,i am also certain that there are others which ,i do not know4 ,and the question remains3 ,does the line between the two fall1 where ,hume says it falls8 ,is it true that the only external facts ,i know are facts for which ,i have a basis in my own experience8 ,and that ,i cannot know any facts whatever1 beyond the reach of my own observation and memory1 except those for which ,i have such a basis8 ,this1 it seems to me1 is the most serious question which ,hume raises4 ,and it should be observed that his own attitude towards it is very different from his attitude towards the sceptical views which we have just been considering4 ,these sceptical views he did not expect or wish us to accept1 except in philosophic moments4 ,he declares that we cannot1 in ordinary life1 avoid believing things which are inconsistent with them2 and1 in so declaring1 he1 of course1 implies incidentally that they are false3 since he implies that he himself has a great deal of knowledge as to what we can and cannot believe in ordinary life4 ,but1 as regards the view that our knowledge of matters of fact beyond our own observation is entirely confined to such as are founded on experience1 he never suggests that it is impossible that all our beliefs should be consistent with this view1 and he does seem to think it eminently desirable that they should be4 ,he declares that any assertion with regard to such matters1 which is not founded on experience1 can be nothing but sophistry and illusion2 and that all books which are composed of such assertions should be committed to the flames4 ,he seems1 therefore1 to think that here we really have a test by which we may determine what we should or should not believe1 on all occasions3 any view on such matters1 for which we have no foundation in experience1 is a view which we cannot know to be even probably true1 and which we should never accept1 if we can help it4 ,is there any justification for this strong view8 ,it is1 of course1 abstractly possible that we do really know1 without the help of experience1 some matters of fact1 which we never have observed4 ,just as we know matters of fact1 which we have observed1 without the need of any further evidence1 and just as we know1 for instance1 that #bbd1 without the need of any proof1 it is possible that we may know1 directly and immediately1 without the need of any basis in experience1 some facts which we never have observed4 ,this is certainly possible1 in the same sense in which it is possible that ,i do not really know any external facts3 no conclusive disproof can be brought against either position4 ,we must make assumptions as to what facts we do know and do not know1 before we can proceed to discuss whether or not all of the former are based on experience2 and none of these assumptions can1 in the last resort1 be conclusively proved4 ,we may offer one of them in proof of another2 but it will always be possible to dispute the one which we offer in proof4 ,but there are1 in fact1 certain kinds of things which we universally assume that we do know or do not know1 just as we assume that we do know some external facts2 and if among all the things which we know as certainly as this1 there should turn out to be none for which we have no basis in experience1 ,hume's view would ,i think1 be as fully proved as it is capable of being4 ,the question is3 ,can it be proved in this sense8 ,among all the facts beyond our own observation1 which we know most certainly1 are there any which are certainly not based upon experience8 ,for my part1 ,i confess1 ,i cannot feel certain what is the right answer to this question3 ,i cannot tell whether ,hume was right or wrong4 ,but if he was wrong--if there are any matters of fact1 beyond our own observation1 which we know for certain1 and which yet we know directly and immediately1 without any basis in experience1 we are1 ,i think1 faced with an eminently interesting problem4 ,for it is1 ,i think1 as certain as anything can be that there are some kinds of facts with regard to which ,hume was right--that there are some kinds of facts which we cannot know without the evidence of experience4 ,i could not know1 for instance1 without some such evidence1 such a fact as that ,julius ,caesar was murdered4 ,for such a fact ,i must1 in the first instance1 have the evidence of other persons2 and if ,i am to know that their evidence is trustworthy1 ,i must have some ground in experience for supposing it to be so4 ,there are1 therefore1 some kinds of facts which we cannot know without the evidence of experience and observation4 ,and if it is to be maintained that there are others1 which we can know without any such evidence1 it ought to be pointed out exactly what kind of facts these are1 and in what respects they differ from those which we cannot know without the help of experience4 ,hume gives us a very clear division of the kinds of propositions which we can know to be true4 ,there are1 first of all1 some propositions which assert relations of ideas 2 there are1 secondly1 propositions which assert matters of fact which we ourselves are actually observing1 or have observed and now remember2 and there are1 thirdly1 propositions which assert matters of fact which we have never actually observed1 but for believing in which we have some foundation in our past observations4 ,and it is1 ,i think1 certain that some propositions1 which we know as certainly as we know anything1 do belong to each of these three classes4 ,i know1 for instance1 that twice two are four2 ,i know by direct observation that ,i am now seeing these words1 that ,i am writing1 and by memory that this afternoon ,i saw ,st4 ,paul's2 and ,i know also that ,julius ,caesar was murdered1 and ,i have some foundation in experience for this belief1 though ,i did not myself witness the murder4 ,do any of those propositions1 which we know as certainly as we know these and their like1 not belong to either of these three classes8 ,must we add a fourth class consisting of propositions which resemble the two last1 in respect of the fact that they do assert matters of fact1 but which differ from them1 in that we know them neither by direct observation nor by memory1 nor yet as a result of previous observations8 ,there may1 perhaps1 be such a fourth class2 but1 if there is1 it is1 ,i think1 eminently desirable that it should be pointed out exactly what propositions they are which we do know in this way2 and this1 so far as ,i know1 has never yet been done1 at all clearly1 by any philosopher4 ,,the ,,status ,,of ,,sense-,,data ,the term sense-data is ambiguous2 and therefore ,i think ,i had better begin by trying to explain what the class of entities is whose status ,i propose to discuss4 ,there are several different classes of mental events1 all of which1 owing to their intrinsic resemblance to one another in certain respects1 may1 in a wide sense1 be called sensory experiences1 although only some among them would usually be called sensations4 ,there are 7#a7 those events1 happening in our minds while we are awake1 which consist in the experiencing of one of those entities1 which are usually called images1 in the narrowest sense of the term4 ,everybody distinguishes these events from sensations proper2 and yet everybody admits that images intrinsically resemble the entities which are experienced in sensations proper in some very important respect4 ,there are 7#b7 the sensory experiences we have in dreams1 some of which would certainly be said to be experiences of images1 while others might be said to be sensations4 ,there are 7#c7 hallucinations1 and certain classes of illusory sensory experiences4 ,there are 7#d7 those experiences1 which used to be called the having of after-images1 but which psychologists now say ought rather to be called after-sensations4 ,and there are1 finally1 7#e7 that class of sensory experiences1 which are immensely commoner than any of the above1 and which may be called sensations proper1 if we agree to use this term in such a way as to exclude experiences of my first four sorts4 ,every event1 of any one of these five classes1 consists in the fact that an entity1 of some kind or other1 is experienced4 ,the entity which is experienced may be of many different kinds2 it may1 for instance1 be a patch of colour1 or a sound1 or a smell1 or a taste1 etc2 or it may be an image of a patch of colour1 an image of a sound1 an image of a smell1 an image of a taste1 etc4 ,but1 whatever be its nature1 the entity which is experienced must in all cases be distinguished from the fact or event which consists in its being experienced2 since by saying that it is experienced we mean that it has a relation of a certain kind to something else4 ,we can1 therefore1 speak not only of experiences of these five kinds1 but also of the entities which are experienced in experiences of these kinds2 and the entity which is experienced in such an experience is never identical with the experience which consists in its being experienced4 ,but we can speak not only of the entities which are experienced in experiences of this kind1 but also of the sort of entities which are experienced in experiences of this kind2 and these two classes may again be different4 ,for a patch of colour1 even if it were not actually experienced1 would be an entity of the same sort as some which are experienced in experiences of this kind3 and there is no contradiction in supposing that there are patches of colour1 which yet are not experienced2 since by calling a thing a patch of colour we merely make a statement about its intrinsic quality1 and in no way assert that it has to anything else any of the relations which may be meant by saying that it is experienced4 ,in speaking1 therefore1 of the sort of entities which are experienced in experiences of the five kinds ,i have mentioned1 we do not necessarily confine ourselves to those which actually are experienced in some such experience3 we leave it an open question whether the two classes are identical or not4 ,and the class of entities1 whose status ,i wish to discuss1 consists precisely of all those1 whether experienced or not1 which are of the same sort as those which are experienced in experiences of these five kinds4 ,i intend to call this class of entities the class of sensibles2 so that the question ,i am to discuss can be expressed in the form3 ,what is the status of sensibles8 ,and it must be remembered that images and after-images are just as much sensibles1 in my sense of the term1 as the entities which are experienced in sensations proper2 and so1 too1 are any patches of colour1 or sounds1 or smells1 etc1 7if such there be71 which are not experienced at all4 ,in speaking of sensibles as the sort of entities which are experienced in sensory experiences ,i seem to imply that all the entities which are experienced in sensory experiences have some common characteristic other than that which consists in their being so experienced4 ,and ,i cannot help thinking that this is the case1 in spite of the fact that it is difficult to see what intrinsic character can be shared in common by entities so different from one another as are patches of colour1 sounds1 smells1 tastes1 etc4 ,for1 so far as ,i can see1 some non-sensory experiences may be exactly similar to sensory ones in all intrinsic respects1 except that what is experienced in them is different in kind from what is experienced in any sensory experience3 the relation meant by saying that in them something is experienced may be exactly the same in kind1 and so may the experient4 ,and1 if this be so1 it seems to compel us to admit that the distinction between sensory and non-sensory experiences is derived from that between sensibles1 and non-sensibles and not vice vers4 ,i am inclined1 therefore1 to think that all sensibles1 in spite of the great differences between them1 have some common intrinsic property1 which we recognise1 but which is unanalysable2 and that1 when we call an experience sensory1 what we mean is not only that in it something is experienced in a particular way1 but also that this something has this unanalysable property4 ,if this be so1 the ultimate definition of sensibles would be merely all entities which have this unanalysable property4 ,it seems to me that the term sense-data is often used1 and may be correctly used1 simply as a synonym for sensibles2 and everybody1 ,i think1 would expect me1 in discussing the status of sense-data1 to discuss1 among other things1 the question whether there are any sensibles which are not given4 ,it is true that the etymology of the term sense-data suggests that nothing should be called a sense-datum1 but what is given2 so that to talk of a non-given sense-datum would be a contradiction in terms4 ,but1 of course1 etymology is no safe guide either as to the actual or the correct use of terms2 and it seems to me that the term sense-data is often1 and quite properly1 used merely for the sort of entities that are given in sense1 and not in any way limited to those which are actually given4 ,but though ,i think ,i might thus have used sense-data quite correctly instead of sensibles1 ,i think the latter term is perhaps more convenient2 because though nobody ought to be misled by etymologies1 so many people in fact are so4 ,moreover the term sense-data is sometimes limited in yet another way1 viz1 to the sort of sensibles which are experienced in sensations proper2 so that in this sense images would not be sense-data4 ,for both these reasons1 ,i think it is perhaps better to drop the term sense-data altogether1 and to speak only of sensibles4 ,my discussion of the status of sensibles will be divided into two parts4 ,i shall first consider how1 in certain respects1 they are related to our minds2 and then ,i shall consider how1 in certain respects1 they are related to physical objects4 7,i7 7#a7 ,we can1 ,i think1 distinguish pretty clearly at least one kind of relation which sensibles1 of all the kinds ,i have mentioned1 do undoubtedly sometimes have to our minds4 ,i do now see certain blackish marks on a whitish ground1 and ,i hear certain sounds which ,i attribute to the ticking of my clock4 ,in both cases ,i have to certain sensibles--certain blackish marks1 in the one case1 and certain sounds1 in the other--a kind of relation with which we are all perfectly familiar1 and which may be expressed1 in the one case1 by saying that ,i actually see the marks1 and in the other1 by saying that ,i actually hear the sounds4 ,it seems to me quite evident that the relation to the marks which ,i express by saying that ,i see them1 is not different in kind from the relation to the sounds which ,i express by saying that ,i hear them4 ,seeing and hearing1 when thus used as names for a relation which we may have to sensibles1 are not names for different relations1 but merely express the fact that1 in the one case1 the kind of sensible to which ,i have a certain kind of relation is a patch of colour1 while1 in the other case1 the kind of sensible to which ,i have the same kind of relation is a sound4 ,and similarly when ,i say that ,i feel warm or smell a smell these different verbs do not express the fact that ,i have a different kind of relation to the sensibles concerned1 but only that ,i have the same kind of relation to a different kind of sensible4 ,even when ,i call up a visual image of a sensible ,i saw yesterday1 or an auditory image of a sound ,i heard yesterday1 ,i have to those images exactly the same kind of relation which ,i have to the patches of colour ,i now see and which ,i had yesterday to those ,i saw then4 ,but this kind of relation1 which ,i sometimes have to sensibles of all sorts of different kinds1 images as well as others1 is evidently quite different in kind from another relation which ,i may also have to sensibles4 ,after looking at this black mark1 ,i may turn away my head or close my eyes1 and then ,i no longer actually see the mark ,i saw just now4 ,i may1 indeed1 have 7,i myself actually do have at this moment7 a visual image of the mark before my mind2 and to this image ,i do now have exactly the same kind of relation which ,i had just now to the mark itself4 ,but the image is not identical with the mark of which it is an image2 and to the mark itself it is quite certain that ,i have not now got the same kind of relation as ,i had just now1 when ,i was actually seeing it4 ,and yet ,i certainly may now have to that mark itself a kind of relation1 which may be expressed by saying that ,i am thinking of it or remembering it4 ,i can now make judgments about it itself--the very sensible which ,i did see just now and am no longer seeing3 as1 for instance1 that ,i did then see it and that it was different from the image of it which ,i am now seeing4 ,it is1 therefore1 quite certain that there is a most important difference between the relation ,i have to a sensible when ,i am actually seeing or hearing it1 and any relation 7for there may be several7 which ,i may have to the same sensible when ,i am only thinking or or remembering it4 ,and ,i want to express this difference by using a particular term for the former relation4 ,i shall express this relation1 which ,i certainly do have to a sensible when ,i actually see or hear it1 and most certainly do not have to it1 when ,i only think of or remember it1 by saying that there is in my mind a direct apprehension of it4 ,i have expressly chosen this term because1 so far as ,i know1 it has not been used hitherto as a technical term2 whereas all the terms which have been so used1 such as presented1 given1 perceived1 seem to me to have been spoilt by ambiguity4 ,people sometimes1 no doubt1 use these terms as names for the kind of relation ,i am concerned with4 ,but you can never be sure1 when an entity is said to be given or presented or perceived1 that what is meant is simply and solely that it has to someone that relation which sensibles do undoubtedly have to me when ,i actually see or hear them1 and which they do not have to me when ,i only think of or remember them4 ,i have used the rather awkward expression ,there is in my mind a direct apprehension of this black mark1 because ,i want to insist that though1 when ,i see the mark1 the mark certainly has to something the fundamental relation which ,i wish to express by saying that it is directly apprehended1 and though the event which consists in its being directly apprehended by that something is certainly a mental act of mine or which occurs in my mind1 yet the something which directly apprehends it may quite possibly not be anything which deserves to be called ,i or me4 ,it is quite possible1 ,i think1 that there is no entity whatever which deserves to be called ,i or me or my mind2 and hence that nothing whatever is ever directly apprehended by me4 ,whether this is so or not1 depends on the nature of that relation which certainly does hold between all those mental acts which are mine1 and does not hold between any of mine and any of yours2 and which holds again between all those mental acts which are yours1 but does not hold between any of yours and any of mine4 ,and ,i do not feel at all sure what the correct analysis of this relation is4 ,it may be the case that the relation which unites all those acts of direct apprehension which are mine1 and which is what we mean to say that they have to one another when we say they are all mine1 really does consist in the fact that one and the same entity is what directly apprehends in each of them3 in which case this entity could properly be called me1 and it would be true to say that1 when ,i see this black mark1 ,i directly apprehend it4 ,but it is also quite possible 7and this seems to me to be the view which is commonest amongst psychologists7 that the entity which directly apprehends1 in those acts of direct apprehension which are mine1 is numerically different in every different act2 and that what ,i mean by calling all these different acts mine is either merely that they have some kind of relation to one another or that they all have a common relation to some other entity1 external to them1 which may or may not be something which deserves to be called me4 ,on any such view1 what ,i assert to be true of this black mark1 when ,i say that it is seen by me1 would not be simply that it is directly apprehended by me1 but something more complex in which1 besides direct apprehension1 some other quite different relation was also involved4 ,i should be asserting both 7#a7 that the black mark is being directly apprehended by something1 and 7#b7 that this act of direct apprehension has to something else1 external to it1 a quite different relation1 which is what makes it an act of mine4 ,i do not know how to decide between these views1 and that is why ,i wished to explain that the fundamental relation which ,i wish to call direct apprehension1 is one which quite possibly never holds between me and any sensible4 ,but1 once this has been explained1 ,i think no harm can result from using the expression ,i directly apprehend ,a as a synonym for ,a direct apprehension of ,a occurs in my mind4 ,and in future ,i shall so speak1 because it is much more convenient4 ,the only other point1 which seems to me to need explanation1 in order to make it quite clear what the relation ,i call direct apprehension is1 concerns its relation to attention2 and as to this ,i must confess ,i don't feel clear4 ,in every case where it is quite clear to me that ,i am directly apprehending a given entity1 it seems also clear to me that ,i am1 more or less1 attending to it2 and it seems to me possible that what ,i mean by direct apprehension may be simply identical with what is meant by attention1 in one of the senses in which that word can be used4 ,that it can1 at most1 only be identical with one of the relations meant by attention seems to me clear1 because ,i certainly can be said to attend1 in some sense or other1 to entities1 which ,i am not directly apprehending3 ,i may1 for instance1 think1 with attention1 of a sensible1 which ,i saw yesterday1 and am certainly not seeing now4 ,it is1 therefore1 clear that to say ,i am attending to a thing and yet am not directly apprehending it1 is not a contradiction in terms3 and this fact alone is sufficient to justify the use of the special term direct apprehension4 ,but whether to say that ,i am directly apprehending a given thing and yet am not attending to it1 in any degree at all1 is or is not a contradiction in terms1 ,i admit ,i don't feel clear4 ,however that may be1 one relation1 in which sensibles of all sorts do sometimes stand to our minds1 is the relation constituted by the fact that we directly apprehend them3 or1 to speak more accurately1 by the fact that events which consist in their being directly apprehended are in our minds1 in the sense in which to say that an event is in our minds means merely that it is a mental act of ours--that it has to our other mental acts that relation 7whatever it may be7 which we mean by saying that they are all mental acts of the same individual4 ,and it is clear that to say of a sensible that it is directly apprehended by me1 is to say of it something quite different from what ,i say of a mental act of mine1 when ,i say that this mental act is in my mind3 for nothing is more certain than that an act of direct apprehension or belief may be in my mind1 without being itself directly apprehended by me4 ,if1 therefore1 by saying that a sensible is in our minds or is ours1 we mean merely that it is directly apprehended by us1 we must recognise that we are here using the phrases in our minds or ours in quite a different sense from that in which we use them when we talk of our mental acts being in our minds or ours4 ,and why ,i say this is because ,i think that these two relations are very apt to be confused4 ,when1 for instance1 we say of a given entity that it is experienced1 or when the ,germans say that it is erlebt1 it is sometimes meant1 ,i think1 merely that it is directly apprehended1 but sometimes that it is in my mind1 in the sense in which1 when ,i entertain a belief1 this act of belief is in my mind4 ,but 7#b7 it seems to me to be commonly held that sensibles are often in our minds in some sense quite other than that of being directly apprehended by us or that of being thought of by us4 ,this seems to me to be often what is meant when people say that they are immediately experienced or are subjective modifications2 though1 of course1 both expressions are so ambiguous1 that when people say that a given entity is immediately experienced or is a subjective modification1 they may mean merely that it is directly apprehended4 ,and since ,i think this view is held1 ,i want to explain that ,i see no reason whatever for thinking that sensibles ever are experienced by us in any other sense than that of being directly apprehended by us4 ,two kinds of argument1 ,i think1 are sometimes used to show that they are4 7a7 ,it is a familiar fact that1 when1 for instance1 we are in a room with a ticking clock1 we may seem suddenly to become aware of the ticks1 whereas1 so far as we can tell1 we had previously not heard them at all4 ,and it may be urged that in these cases1 since the same kind of stimulus was acting on our ears all the time1 we must have experienced the same kind of sensible sounds1 although we did not directly apprehend them4 ,but ,i think most psychologists are now agreed that this argument is quite worthless4 ,there seem to me to be two possible alternatives to the conclusion drawn4 ,it may1 ,i think1 possibly be the case that we did directly apprehend the ticks all the time1 but that we cannot afterwards remember that we did1 because the degree of attention 7if any7 with which we heard them was so small1 that in ordinary life we should say that we did not attend to them at all4 ,but1 what1 ,i think1 is much more likely is that1 though the same stimulus was acting on our ears1 it failed to produce any mental effect whatever1 because our attention was otherwise engaged4 7b7 ,it is said that sometimes when we suddenly become aware1 say1 of the eighth stroke of a striking clock1 we can remember earlier strokes1 although we seem to ourselves not to have directly apprehended them4 ,i cannot say that ,i have ever noticed this experience in myself1 but ,i have no doubt that it is possible4 ,and people seem inclined to argue that1 since we can remember the earlier strokes1 we must have experienced them1 though we did not directly apprehend them4 ,but here again1 the argument does not seem to me at all conclusive4 ,i should say1 again1 that it is possible that we did directly apprehend them1 but only with a very slight degree of attention 7if any74 ,and1 as an alternative1 ,i should urge that there is no reason why we should not be able to remember a thing1 which we never experienced at all4 ,i do not know what other arguments can be used to show that we sometimes experience sensibles in a sense quite other than that of directly apprehending them4 ,but ,i do not know how to show that we do not2 and since people whose judgment ,i respect1 seem to hold that we do1 ,i think it is worth while to say something as to what this sense of experience can be1 in case it does occur4 ,i have said that sometimes when people say that a given entity is experienced they seem to mean that it belongs to some individual1 in the sense in which my acts of belief belong to me4 ,to say that sensibles were experienced by me in this sense would1 therefore1 be to say that they sometimes have to my acts of belief and acts of direct apprehension the same relation which these have to one another--the relation which constitutes them mine4 ,but that sensibles ever have this kind of relation to my mental acts1 is a thing which ,i cannot believe4 ,those who hold that they are ever experienced at all1 in some sense other than that of being directly apprehended1 always hold1 ,i think1 that1 whenever they are directly apprehended by us1 they also1 at the same time1 have to us this other relation as well4 ,and it seems to me pretty clear that when ,i do directly apprehend a sensible1 it does not have to me the same relation which my direct apprehension of it has4 ,if1 therefore1 sensibles are ever experienced by us at all1 in any sense other than that of being directly apprehended by us1 we must1 ,i think1 hold that they are so in an entirely new sense1 quite different both from that in which to be experienced means to be directly apprehended1 and from that in which to be experienced means to occur in some individual's mind4 ,and ,i can only say that ,i see no reason to think that they ever are experienced in any such sense4 ,if they are1 the fact that they are so is presumably open to the inspection of us all2 but ,i cannot distinguish any such fact as occurring in myself1 as ,i can distinguish the fact that they are directly apprehended4 ,on the other hand1 ,i see no way of showing that they are not experienced in some such sense2 and perhaps somebody will be able to point it out to me4 ,i do not wish to assume1 therefore1 that there is no such sense2 and hence1 though ,i am inclined to think that the only sense in which they are experienced is that of being directly apprehended1 ,i shall1 in what follows1 use the phrase experienced to mean either directly apprehended or having to something this supposed different relation1 if such a relation there be4 7#c7 ,we may now1 therefore1 raise the question3 ,do sensibles ever exist at times when they are not being experienced at all8 ,to this question it is usual to give a negative answer1 and two different a priori reasons may be urged in favour of that answer4 ,the first is what should be meant by ,berkeley's dictum that the esse of sensibles is percipi4 ,this should mean1 whatever else it may mean1 at least this3 that to suppose a sensible to exist and yet not to be experienced in self-contradictory4 ,and this at least seems to me to be clearly false4 ,anything which was a patch of colour would be a sensible2 and to suppose that there are patches of colour which are not being experienced is clearly not self-contradictory1 however false it may be4 ,it may1 however1 be urged 7and this is the second argument7 that1 though to suppose a thing to be a sensible and yet not experienced is not self-contradictory1 yet we can clearly see that nothing can have the one property without having the other4 ,and ,i do not see my way to deny that we may be able to know1 a priori that such a connection holds between two such properties4 ,in the present case1 however1 ,i cannot see that it does hold1 and therefore1 so far as a priori reasons go1 ,i conclude that there is no reason why sensibles should not exist at times when they are not experienced4 ,it may1 however1 be asked3 ,is there any reason to suppose that they ever do8 ,and the reason1 which weighs with me most1 is one which applies1 ,i think1 to a certain class of sensibles only2 a class which ,i will try to define by saying that it consists of those which would 7under certain conditions which actually exist7 be experienced in a sensation proper1 if only a living body1 having a certain constitution1 existed under those conditions in a position in which no such body does actually exist4 ,i think it is very probable that this definition does not define at all accurately the kind of sensibles ,i mean2 but ,i think that what the definition aims at will become clearer when ,i proceed to give my reasons for supposing that sensibles1 of a kind to be defined in some such way1 do exist unexperienced4 ,the reason is simply that1 in ,hume's phrase1 ,i have a strong propensity to believe that1 e4g41 the visual sensibles which ,i directly apprehend in looking at this paper1 still exist unchanged when ,i merely alter the position of my body by turning away my head or closing my eyes1 provided that the physical conditions outside my body remain unchanged4 ,in such a case it is certainly true in some sense that ,i should see sensibles like what ,i saw the moment before1 if only my head were still in the position it was at that moment or my eyes unclosed4 ,but if1 in such a case1 there is reason to think that sensibles which ,i should see1 if the position of my body were altered1 exist in spite of the fact that ,i do not experience them1 there is1 ,i think1 an equal reason to suppose it in other cases4 ,we must1 for instance1 suppose that the sensibles which ,i should see now1 if ,i were at the other end of the room1 or if ,i were looking under the table1 exist at this moment1 though they are not being experienced4 ,and similarly we must suppose that the sensibles which you would see1 if you were in the position in which ,i am now1 exist at this moment1 in spite of the fact that they may be more or less different from those which ,i see1 owing to the different constitution of our bodies4 ,all this implies of course1 that a vast number of sensibles exist at any moment1 which are not being experienced at all4 ,but still it implies this only with regard to sensibles of a strictly limited class1 namely sensibles which would be experienced in a sensation proper1 if a body1 having a certain constitution1 were in a position in which it is not1 under the given physical conditions4 ,it does not1 for instance1 imply that any images1 of which it may be true that ,i should have them1 under present physical conditions1 if the position of my body were altered1 exist now2 nor does it imply that sensibles which would be experienced by me now in a sensation proper1 if the physical conditions external to my body were different from what they are1 exist now4 ,i feel1 of course1 that ,i have only succeeded in defining miserably vaguely the kind of sensibles ,i mean2 and ,i do not know whether the fact that ,i have a strong propensity to believe that sensibles of a kind to be defined in some such way1 do exist unexperienced1 is any good reason for supposing that they actually do4 ,the belief may1 of course1 be a mere prejudice4 ,but ,i do not know of any certain test by which prejudices can be distinguished from reasonable beliefs4 ,and ,i cannot help thinking that there may be a class of sensibles1 capable of definition in some such way1 which there really is reason to think exist unexperienced4 ,but1 if ,i am not mistaken1 there is an empirical argument which1 though1 even if it were sound1 it would have no tendency whatever to show that no sensibles exist unexperienced1 would1 if it were sound1 show that this very class of sensibles1 to which alone my argument for unexperienced existence applies1 certainly do not so exist4 ,this1 it seems to me1 is the most weighty argument which can be used upon the subject2 and ,i want1 therefore1 to give my reasons for thinking that it is fallacious4 ,the argument is one which asserts that there is abundant empirical evidence in favour of the view that the existence of the sensibles which we experience at any time1 always depends upon the condition of our nervous system3 so that1 even where it also depends upon external physical conditions1 we can safely say that sensibles1 which we should have experienced1 if only our nervous system had been in a different condition1 certainly do not exist1 when it is not in that condition4 ,and the fallacy of this argument seems to me to lie in the fact that it does not distinguish between the existence of the sensibles which we experience and the fact that we experience them4 ,what there is evidence for is that our experience of sensibles always depends upon the condition of our nervous system2 that1 according as the condition of the nervous system changes1 different sensibles are experienced1 even where other conditions are the same4 ,but obviously the fact that our experience of a given sensible depends upon the condition of our nervous system does not directly show that the existence of the sensible experienced always also so depends4 ,the fact that ,i am now experiencing this black mark is certainly a different fact from the fact that this black mark now exists4 ,and hence the evidence which does tend to show that the former fact would not have existed if my nervous system had been in a different condition1 has no tendency to show that the latter would not have done so either4 ,i am sure that this distinction ought to be made2 and hence1 though ,i think there may be other reasons for thinking that the very existence of the sensibles1 which we experience1 and not merely the fact that we experience them does always depend upon the condition of our nervous systems1 it seems to me certain that this particular argument constitutes no such reason4 ,and ,i think that those who suppose that it does are apt to be influenced by an assumption1 for which also1 so far as ,i can see1 there is no reason4 ,i have admitted that the only reason ,i can see for supposing that sensibles which we experience ever exist unexperienced1 seems to lead to the conclusion that the sensibles which would be seen by a colour-blind man1 if he occupied exactly the position which ,i1 who am not colour-blind1 now occupy1 exist now1 just as much as those which ,i now see4 ,and it may be thought that this implies that the sensibles1 which he would see1 and which would certainly be very different from those which ,i see1 are nevertheless at this moment in exactly the same place as those which ,i see4 ,now1 for my part1 ,i am not prepared to admit that it is impossible they should be in the same place4 ,but the assumption against which ,i wish to protest1 is the assumption that1 if they exist at all1 they must be in the same place4 ,i can see no reason whatever for this assumption4 ,and hence any difficulties there may be in the way of supposing that they could be in the same place at the same time as the sensibles which ,i see1 do not at all apply to my hypothesis1 which is only that they exist now1 not that they exist in the same place in which mine do4 ,on this question1 therefore1 as to whether sensibles ever exist at times when they are not experienced1 ,i have only to say 7#a7 that ,i think there is certainly no good reason whatever for asserting that no sensibles do2 and 7#b7 that ,i think perhaps a certain amount of weight ought to be attached to our instinctive belief that certain kinds of sensibles do2 and that here again any special arguments which may be brought forward to show that1 whether some sensibles exist unexperienced or not1 this kind certainly do not1 are1 so far as ,i can see1 wholly inconclusive4 7,,ii7 ,i now pass to the question how sensibles are related to physical objects4 ,and here ,i want to say1 to begin with1 that ,i feel extremely puzzled about the whole subject4 ,i find it extremely difficult to distinguish clearly from one another the different considerations which ought to be distinguished2 and all ,i can do is to raise1 more or less vaguely1 certain questions as to how certain particular sensibles are related to certain particular physical objects1 and to give the reasons which seem to me to have most weight for answering these questions in one way rather than another4 ,i feel that all that ,i can say is very tentative4 ,to begin with1 ,i do not know how physical object is to be defined1 and ,i shall not try to define it4 ,i shall1 instead1 consider certain propositions1 which everybody will admit to be propositions about physical objects1 and which ,i shall assume that ,i know to be true4 ,and the question ,i shall raise is as to how these propositions are to be interpreted--in what sense they are true2 in considering which1 we shall at the same time consider how they are related to certain sensibles4 ,i am looking at two coins1 one of which is a half-crown1 the other a florin4 ,both are lying on the ground2 and they are situated obliquely to my line of sight1 so that the visual sensibles which ,i directly apprehend in looking at them are visibly elliptical1 and not even approximately circular4 ,moreover1 the half-crown is so much farther from me than the florin that its visual sensible is visibly smaller than that of the florin4 ,in these circumstances ,i am going to assume that ,i know the following propositions to be true2 and no one1 ,i think1 will deny that we can know such propositions to be true1 though1 as we shall see1 extremely different views may be taken as to what they mean4 ,i know 7a7 that1 in the ordinary sense of the word see ,i am really seeing two coins2 an assertion which includes1 if it is not identical with1 the assertion that the visual experiences1 which consist in my direct apprehension of those two elliptical patches of colour1 are sensations proper1 and are not either hallucinations nor mere experiences of images2 7b7 that the upper sides of the coins are really approximately circular1 and not merely elliptical like the visual sensibles2 7c7 that the coins have another side1 and an inside1 though ,i don't see it2 7d7 that the upper side of the half-crown is really larger than that of the florin1 though its visual sensible is smaller than the visual sensible of the upper side of the florin3 7e7 that both coins continue to exist1 even when ,i turn away my head or shut my eyes2 but in saying this1 ,i do not1 of course1 mean to say that there is absolutely no change in them2 ,i daresay there must be some change1 and ,i do not know how to define exactly what ,i do mean4 ,but we can1 ,i think1 say at least this3 viz41 that propositions 7h71 7c71 and 7d7 will still be true1 although proposition 7a7 has ceased to be true4 ,now all these propositions are1 ,i think1 typical propositions of the sort which we call propositions about physical objects2 and the two coins themselves are physical objects1 if anything is4 ,my question is3 ,in what sense are these propositions true8 ,and in considering this question1 there are1 ,i think1 two principles which we can lay down as certain to begin with2 though they do not carry us very far4 ,the one is 7a7 that the upper side of the coin1 which ,i am said to see1 is not simply identical with the visual sensible which ,i directly apprehend in seeing it4 ,that this is so might be thought to follow absolutely from each of the two facts which ,i have called 7b7 and 7d72 but ,i am not quite sure that it does follow from either of these or from both together3 for it seems to me just possible that the two sensibles in question1 though not circular in my private space1 may yet be circular in physical space2 and similarly that though the sensible of the half-crown is smaller than that of the florin in my private space1 it may be larger in physical space4 ,but what ,i think it does follow from is the fact that another person may be seeing the upper side of the coin in exactly the same sense in which ,i am seeing it1 and yet his sensible be certainly different from mine4 ,from this it follows absolutely that the upper side of the coin cannot be identical with both sensibles1 since they are not identical with one another4 ,and though it does not follow absolutely that it may not be identical with one of the two1 yet it does follow that we can get a case in which it is not identical with mine and ,i need only assume that the case ,i am taking is such a case4 ,from this it follows that we must distinguish that sense of the word see in which we can be said to see a physical object1 from that sense of the word in which see means merely to directly apprehend a visual sensible4 ,in a proposition of the form ,i see ,a1 where ,a is a name or description of some physical object1 though1 if this proposition is to be true1 there must be some visual sensible1 ,b1 which ,i am directly apprehending1 yet the proposition ,i see ,a is certainly not always1 and probably never1 identical in meaning with the proposition ,i directly apprehend ,b4 ,in asserting ,i see ,a we are asserting not only that we directly apprehend some sensible but also something else about this sensible--it may be only some proposition of the form1 and this sensible has certain other properties1 or it may be some proposition of the form and ,i know this sensible to have certain other properties4 ,indeed we have not only to distinguish that sense of the word perceive in which it is equivalent to directly apprehend1 from one sense in which we can be said to perceive a physical object2 we have also to distinguish at least two different senses in which we can be said to perceive physical objects1 different both from one another and from directly apprehend4 ,for it is obvious that though ,i should be said to be now seeing the half-crown1 there is a narrower1 and more proper1 sense1 in which ,i can only be said to see one side of it--not its lower side or its inside1 and not therefore the whole half-crown4 ,the other principle1 which we can lay down to start with is 77 that my knowledge of all the five propositions 7a7 to 7e71 is based1 in the last resort1 on experiences of mine consisting in the direct apprehension of sensibles and in the perception of relations between directly apprehended sensibles4 ,it is based on these1 in at least this sense1 that ,i should never have known any of these propositions if ,i had never directly apprehended any sensibles nor perceived any relations between them4 ,what1 in view of these two principles1 can be the sense in which my five propositions are true8 7#a7 ,it seems to me possible that the only true interpretation which can be given to any of them is an interpretation of a kind which ,i can only indicate rather vaguely as follows3 ,namely1 that all of them express only a kind of fact which we should naturally express by saying that1 if certain conditions were fulfilled1 ,i or some other person1 should directly apprehend certain other sensibles4 ,for instance the only true thing that can be meant by saying that ,i really see coins may be some such thing as that1 if ,i were to move my body in certain ways1 ,i should directly apprehend other sensibles1 e4g4 tactual ones1 which ,i should not directly apprehend as a consequence of these movements1 if these present visual experiences of mine were mere hallucinations or experiences of images4 ,again1 the only true thing that can be meant by saying that the upper sides of the coins are really approximately circular may be some such thing as that1 if ,i were looking straight at them1 ,i should directly apprehend circular sensibles4 ,and similarly1 the only true interpretation of 7c7 may be some such fact as that1 if ,i were to turn the coins over1 or break them up1 ,i should have certain sensations1 of a sort ,i can imagine very well2 of 7d7 that if ,i were at an equal distance from the half-crown and the florin1 the sensible1 ,i should then see corresponding to the half-crown would be bigger than that corresponding to the florin1 whereas it is now smaller2 of 7e7 that1 if1 when my eyes were closed1 they had been open instead1 ,i should have seen certain sensibles4 ,it is obvious1 indeed1 that if any interpretation on these lines is the only true interpretation of our five propositions1 none of those which ,i have vaguely suggested comes anywhere near to expressing it in its ultimate form4 ,they cannot do so for the simple reason that1 in them1 the conditions under which ,i should experience certain other sensibles are themselves expressed in terms of physical objects1 and not in terms of sensibles and our experience of them4 ,the conditions are expressed in such terms as if ,i were to move my body1 if ,i were to look straight at the coins1 if ,i were to turn the coins over1 etc42 and all these are obviously propositions1 which must themselves again be interpreted in terms of sensibles1 if our original five propositions need to be so4 ,it is obvious1 therefore1 that any ultimate interpretation of our five propositions1 on these lines1 would be immensely complicated2 and ,i cannot come anywhere near to stating exactly what it would be4 ,but it seems to me possible that some such interpretation could be found1 and that it is the only true one4 ,the great recommendation of this view seems to me to be that it enables us to see1 more clearly than any other view can1 how our knowledge of physical propositions can be based on our experience of sensibles1 in the way in which principle 77 asserts it to be4 ,if1 when ,i know that the coins are round1 all that ,i know is some such thing as that if1 after experiencing the sensibles ,i do now experience1 ,i were to experience still others1 ,i should finally experience a third set1 we can understand1 as clearly as we can understand how any knowledge can be obtained by induction at all1 how such a knowledge could be based on our previous experience of sensibles1 and how it could be verified by our subsequent experience4 ,on the other hand1 apart from the difficulty of actually giving any interpretation on these lines1 which will meet the requirements1 the great objection to it seems to me to be this4 ,it is obvious that1 on this view1 though we shall still be allowed to say that the coins existed before ,i saw them1 are circular etc41 all these expressions1 if they are to be true1 will have to be understood in a ,pickwickian sense4 ,when ,i know that the coins existed before ,i saw them1 what ,i know will not be that anything whatever existed at that time1 in the sense in which those elliptical patches of colour exist now4 ,all that ,i know will be simply that1 since the elliptical patches exist now1 it is true1 that1 if certain unrealised conditions had been realised1 ,i should have had certain sensations that ,i have not had2 or1 if certain conditions1 which may or may not be realised in the future1 were to be so1 ,i should have certain experiences4 ,something like this will actually be the only true thing that can be meant by saying that the coins existed before ,i saw them4 ,in other words1 to say of a physical object that it existed at a given time will always consist merely in saying of some sensible1 not that it existed at the time in question1 but something quite different and immensely complicated4 ,and thus1 though1 when ,i know that the coins exist1 what ,i know will be merely some proposition about these sensibles which ,i am directly apprehending1 yet this view will not contradict principle 7a7 by identifying the coins with the sensibles4 ,for it will say that to assert a given thing of the coins is not equivalent to asserting the same thing of the sensibles1 but only to asserting of them something quite different4 ,the fact that these assertions that the coins exist1 are round1 etc41 will1 on this view1 only be true in this outrageously ,pickwickian sense1 seems to me to constitute the great objection to it4 ,but it seems to me to be an objection only1 so far as ,i can see1 because ,i have a strong propensity to believe that1 when ,i know that the coins existed before ,i saw them1 what ,i know is that something existed at that time1 in the very same sense in which those elliptical patches now exist4 ,and1 of course1 this belief may be a mere prejudice4 ,it may be that when ,i believe that ,i now have1 in my body1 blood and nerves and brain1 what ,i believe is only true1 if it does not assert1 in the proper sense of the word existence1 the present existence of anything whatever1 other than sensibles which ,i directly apprehend1 but only makes assertions as to the kind of experiences a doctor would have1 if he dissected me4 ,but ,i cannot feel at all sure that my belief1 that1 when ,i know of the present ,existence of these things 7as ,i think ,i do71 ,i am knowing of the present existence 7in the proper sense7 of things other than any sensibles which ,i or any one else am now directly apprehending1 is a mere prejudice4 ,and therefore ,i think it is worth while to consider what1 if it is not1 these things1 of whose existence ,i know1 can be4 7#b7 ,it is certain that if1 when ,i know that that half-crown existed before ,i saw it1 ,i am knowing that something existed at that time in other than a ,pickwickian sense1 ,i only know this something by description2 and it seems pretty clear that the description by which ,i know it is as the thing which has a certain connection with this sensible which ,i am now directly apprehending4 ,but what connection8 ,we cannot simply say1 as many people have said1 that by that half-crown ,i mean the thing which caused my experience of this sensible2 because events which happen between the half-crown and my eyes1 and events in my eyes1 and optic nerves1 and brains are just as much causes of my experiences as the half-crown itself4 ,but it may perhaps be the case that the half-crown has some particular kind of causal relation to my experience1 which these other events have not got--a kind which may be expressed1 perhaps1 by saying that it is its source4 ,and hence1 when ,i know that that half-crown is circular1 ,i may perhaps be knowing that the source of this experience is circular4 ,but what sort of a thing can this source be8 ,one kind of view1 which ,i think is very commonly held1 is that it is something spiritual in its nature1 or something whose nature is utterly unknown to us4 ,and those who hold this view are apt to add1 that it is not really circular1 in any sense at all2 nor is the source of my half-crown experience1 in any sense at all1 bigger than that of my florin experience4 ,but if this addition were seriously meant1 it would1 of course1 amount to saying that propositions 7b7 and 7d7 are not true1 in any sense at all2 and ,i do not think that those who make it1 really mean to say this4 ,i think that what they mean is only that the only sense in which those sources are circular1 and one bigger than the other1 is one in which to say this merely amounts to saying that the sensibles1 which they would cause us to experience1 under certain conditions1 would be circular1 and one bigger than the other4 ,in other words1 in order to give a true interpretation to the propositions that the coins are circular and one bigger than the other1 they say that we must interpret them in the same kind of way in which view 7#a7 interpreted them2 and the only difference between their view and view 7#a71 is that1 whereas that said that you must give a ,pickwickian interpretation both to the assertion that the coins exist1 and to the assertion that they are circular1 they say that you must not give it to the former assertion1 and must to the latter4 ,to this view my objection is only that any reason there may be for saying that the sources exist in other than a ,pickwickian sense1 seems to me to be also a reason for saying that they are circular in a sense that is not ,pickwickian4 ,i have just as strong a propensity to believe that they are really circular1 in a simple and natural sense1 as that they exist in such a sense3 and ,i know of no better reason for believing either4 7#c7 ,it may be suggested1 next1 that these sources1 instead of being something spiritual in their nature or something of a nature utterly unknown1 consist simply of sensibles1 of a kind which ,i have previously tried to define2 namely of all those sensibles1 which anybody would1 under the actual physical conditions1 experience in sensations proper of which the half-crown and the florin were the source1 if their bodies were in any of the positions relatively to those coins1 in which they would get sensations from them at all4 ,we saw before that it seems possible that all these sensibles do really exist at times when they are not experienced1 and that some people1 at all events1 seem to have a strong propensity to believe that they do4 ,and in favour of the view that some such huge collection of sensibles is the upper side of the half-crown1 is the fact that we do seem to have a strong propensity to believe that any particular sensible1 which we directly apprehend in looking at the upper side of the half-crown1 and of our direct apprehension of which the upper side is the source1 is in the place in which the upper side is4 ,and that some sense might be given to the expression in the same place as1 in which it could be true that sensibles of all sorts of different shapes and sizes1 and of all sorts of different colours1 were in the same place at the same time1 seems to me to be possible4 ,but the objection to this view seems to me to be the same as to the last2 namely that if the upper side of the half-crown were identical with such a collection of sensibles1 then the only sense in which it could be said to be circular1 or bigger than that of the florin1 would certainly be very ,pickwickian1 though not the same as on that view4 7#d7 ,if1 for the reasons given1 we reject both 7#a71 7#b71 and 7#c7 as interpretations of our five propositions1 the only alternative ,i can think of that remains1 is one which is roughly identical1 so far as ,i can see1 with ,locke's view4 ,it is a view which asserts that the half-crown and the florin really did exist 7in the natural sense7 before ,i saw them2 that they really are approximately circular 7again in the natural sense72 that1 therefore1 they are not composed of sensibles which ,i or others should directly apprehend under other conditions2 and that therefore also neither these sensibles 7even if such do now exist7 nor those which ,i am now directly apprehending are in the place in which the coins are4 ,it holds1 therefore1 that the coins do really resemble some sensibles1 in respect of the primary qualities which these have2 that they really are round1 and one larger than the other1 in much the same sense in which some sensibles are round and some larger than others4 ,but it holds also that no sensibles which we ever do directly apprehend1 or should directly apprehend1 if at a given time we were in other positions1 are parts of those coins2 and that1 therefore1 there is no reason to suppose that any parts of the coins have any of the secondary qualities--colour1 etc4--which any of these sensibles have4 ,on this view1 it is plain1 there is nothing to prevent us from holding that1 as suggested in ,i 7#c71 all sorts of unexperienced sensibles do exist4 ,we are only prevented from holding that1 if they do1 those which have the same source all exist in the same place as their source4 ,and the natural view to take as to the status of sensibles generally1 relatively to physical objects1 would be that none of them1 whether experienced or not1 were ever in the same place as any physical object4 ,that none1 therefore1 exist anywhere in physical space2 while1 at the same time1 we can also say1 as argued in ,i 7#b71 that none exist in the mind1 except in the sense that some are directly apprehended by some minds4 ,and the only thing that would need to be added1 is that some1 and some only1 resemble the physical objects which are their source1 in respect of their shape4 ,to this view ,i can see no objection except the serious one that it is difficult to answer the questions3 ,how can ,i ever come to know that these sensibles have a source at all8 ,and how do ,i know that these sources are circular8 ,it would seem that1 if ,i do know these things at all1 ,i must know immediately1 in the case of some sensibles1 both that they have a source and what the shape of this source is4 ,and to this it may be objected that this is a kind of thing which ,i certainly cannot know immediately4 ,the argument in favour of an interpretation of type 7i7 seems to me to rest wholly on the assumption that there are only certain kinds of facts which ,i can know immediately2 and hence that if ,i believe ,i know a fact1 which is not of this kind1 and which also ,i cannot have learnt immediately1 my belief must be a mere prejudice4 ,but ,i do not know how it can be shown that an assertion of the form3 ,facts of certain kinds are the only ones you can know immediately2 is itself not a prejudice4 ,i do not think1 therefore1 that the fact that1 if this last view were true1 we should have to admit that we know immediately facts of a kind which many people think we cannot know immediately1 is a conclusive objection to it4 ,,the ,,conception ,,of ,,reality ,the fourth chapter of ,mr4 ,bradley's ,appearance and ,reality is a chapter headed ,space and ,time1 and he begins the chapter as follows3-- ,the object of this chapter is far from being an attempt to discuss fully the nature of space or of time4 ,it will content itself with stating our main justification for regarding them as appearances4 ,it will explain why we deny that1 in the character which they exhibit1 they either have or belong to reality4#a ,here1 it will be seen1 ,mr4 ,bradley states that1 in his opinion1 ,time1 in a certain character1 neither has nor belongs to reality2 this is the conclusion he wishes to maintain4 ,and to say that ,time has not reality would seem to be plainly equivalent to saying that ,time is not real4 ,however1 if anybody should doubt whether the two phrases are meant to be equivalent1 the doubt may be easily set at rest by a reference to the concluding words of the same chapter1 where ,mr4 ,bradley uses the following very emphatic expression3 ,time1 he says1 like space1 has most evidently proved not to be real1 but to be a contradictory appearance 7p4 #dc74 ,mr4 ,bradley does1 then1 say here1 in so many words1 that ,time is not real4 ,but there is one other difference between this statement at the end of the chapter1 and the statement at the beginning of it1 which we must not forget to notice4 ,in the statement at the beginning he carefully qualifies the assertion ,time neither has nor belongs to reality by saying ,time1 in the character which it exhibits1 neither has nor belongs to reality1 whereas in the final statement this qualification is not inserted2 here he says simply ,time is not real4 ,this qualification1 which is inserted in the one place and omitted in the other1 might1 of course1 be meant to imply that1 in some other character--some character which it does not exhibit--,time has reality and does belong to it4 ,and ,i shall presently have something to say about this distinction between ,time in one character and ,time in another1 because it might be thought that this distinction is the explanation of the difficulty as to ,mr4 ,bradley's meaning1 which ,i am going to point out4 ,however1 so far it is clear that ,mr4 ,bradley holds that in some sense1 at all events1 the whole proposition ,time is not real can be truly asserted4 ,and1 now1 ,i want to quote a passage in which he says things which1 at first sight1 seem difficult to reconcile with this view4 ,this new passage is a passage in which he is not talking of ,time in particular1 but of appearances in general4 ,but1 as we have seen1 he does regard ,time as one among appearances1 and ,i think there is no doubt that what he here declares to be true of all appearances is meant to be true of ,time1 among the rest4 ,this new passage is as follows3-- ,for the present1 he says1#b we may keep a fast hold upon this1 that appearances exist4 ,that is absolutely certain1 and to deny it is nonsense4 ,and whatever exists must belong to reality4 ,this is also quite certain1 and its denial once more is self-contradictory4 ,our appearances1 no doubt1 may be a beggarly show1 and their nature to an unknown extent may be something which1 as it is1 is not true of reality4 ,that is one thing1 and it is quite another thing to speak as if these facts had no actual existence1 or as if there could be anything but reality to which they might belong4 ,and ,i must venture to repeat that such an idea would be sheer nonsense4 ,what appears1 for that sole reason1 most indubitably is2 and there is no possibility of conjuring its being away from it4 ,that is the passage which seems to me to raise a difficulty as to his meaning when contrasted with the former passage4 ,and the reason why it seems to me to raise one is this4 ,in the former passage ,mr4 ,bradley declared most emphatically that ,time is not real2 he said3 ,time has most evidently proved not to be real4 ,whereas in this one he seems to declare equally emphatically that ,time does exist1 and is4 ,and his language here again is as strong as possible4 ,he says it is sheer nonsense to suppose that ,time does not exist1 is not a fact1 does not belong to reality4 ,it looks1 therefore1 as if he meant to make a distinction between being real on the one hand1 and existing1 being a fact1 and being on the other hand--as if he meant to say that a thing may exist1 and be1 and be a fact1 and yet not be real4 ,and ,i think there is1 at all events1 some superficial difficulty in understanding this distinction4 ,we might naturally think that to say ,time exists1 is a fact1 and is1 is equivalent to saying that it is real4 ,what more1 we might ask1 can a man who says that ,time is real mean to maintain about it than that it exists1 is a fact1 and is8 ,all that most people would mean by saying that time is real could1 it would seem1 be expressed by saying ,there is such a thing as ,time4 ,and it might1 therefore1 appear from this new passage as if ,mr4 ,bradley fully agreed with the view that most people would express by saying ,time is real--as if he did not at all mean to contradict anything that most people believe about ,time4 ,but1 if so1 then what are we to make of his former assertion that1 nevertheless1 ,time is not real8 ,he evidently thinks that1 in asserting this1 he is asserting something which is not mere nonsense2 and he certainly would not have chosen this way of expressing what he means1 unless he had supposed that what he is here asserting about ,time is incompatible with what people often mean when they say ,time is real4 ,yet1 we have seen that he thinks that what he is asserting is not incompatible with the assertions that ,time is1 and is a fact1 and exists4 ,he must1 therefore1 think that when people say ,time is real they often1 at least1 mean something more than merely that there is such a thing as ,time1 something therefore1 which may be denied1 without denying this4 ,all the same1 there is1 ,i think1 a real difficulty in seeing that they ever do mean anything more1 and1 if they do1 what more it is that they can mean4 ,the two expressions ,there is such a thing as so and so and ,so and so is real are certainly sometimes and quite naturally used as equivalents1 even if they are not always so used4 ,and ,mr4 ,bradley's own language implies that this is so4 ,for1 as we have seen1 in the first passage1 he seems to identify belonging to reality with being real4 ,the conclusion which he expresses in one place by saying that ,time does not belong to reality he expresses in another by saying that it is not real2 whereas in the second passage he seems to identify the meaning of the same phrase belonging to reality with existing2 he says that whatever exists must belong to reality1 and that it is self-contradictory to deny this4 ,but if both being real and existing are identical with belonging to reality1 it would seem they must be identical with one another4 ,and1 indeed1 in another passage in the ,appendix to the #bnd ,edition 7p4 #eee7 we find ,mr4 ,bradley actually using the following words3 ,anything1 he says1 that in any sense is1 qualifies the absolute reality and so is real4 ,moreover1 as we have seen1 he declares it to be nonsense to deny that ,time is2 he must1 therefore1 allow that1 in a sense1 at all events1 it is nonsense to deny that ,time is real4 ,and yet this denial is the very one he has made4 ,mr4 ,bradley1 therefore1 does seem himself to allow that the word real may1 sometimes at all events1 be properly used as equivalent to the words exists1 is a fact1 is4 ,and yet his two assertions cannot both be true1 unless there is some sense in which the whole proposition ,time is real is not equivalent to and cannot be inferred from ,time is1 or ,time exists1 or ,time is a fact4 ,it seems1 then1 pretty clear that ,mr4 ,bradley must be holding that the statement ,time is real is in one sense1 not equivalent to ,time exists2 though he admits that1 in another sense1 it is4 ,and ,i will only quote one other passage which seems to make this plain4 ,if1 he says later on 7p4 #bjf7 ,time is not unreal1 ,i admit that our ,absolute is a delusion2 but1 on the other side1 it will be urged that time cannot be mere appearance4 ,the change in the finite subject1 we are told1 is a matter of direct experience2 it is a fact1 and hence it cannot be explained away4 ,and so much of course is indubitable4 ,change is a fact and1 further1 this fact1 as such1 is not reconcilable with the ,absolute4 ,and1 if we could not in any way perceive how the fact can be unreal1 we should be placed1 ,i admit1 in a hopeless dilemma4444 ,but our real position is very different from this4 ,for time has been shown to contradict itself1 and so to be appearance4 ,with this1 its discord1 we see at once1 may pass as an element into a wider harmony4 ,and with this1 the appeal to fact at once becomes worthless4 ,it is mere superstition to suppose that an appeal to experience can prove reality4 ,that ,i find something in existence in the world or in my self1 shows that this something exists1 and it cannot show more4 ,any deliverance of consciousness--whether original or acquired--is but a deliverance of consciousness4 ,it is in no case an oracle and a revelation which we have to accept as it is a fact1 like other facts1 to be dealt with2 and there is no presumption anywhere that any fact is better than appearance4 ,here ,mr4 ,bradley seems plainly to imply that to be real is something more and other than to be a fact or to exist4 ,this is the distinction which ,i think he means to make1 and which1 ,i think1 is the real explanation of his puzzling language1 and this is the distinction which ,i am going presently to discuss4 ,but ,i want first to say something as to that other distinction1 which ,i said might be supposed to be the explanation of the whole difficulty--the distinction implied by the qualification ,time1 in the character which it exhibits2 the suggestion that1 when we talk of ,time1 we may sometimes mean ,time in one character1 sometimes in another1 and that what is true of it in the one character may not be true of it in the other4 ,it might1 ,i think1 be suggested that this is the explanation of the whole difficulty4 ,and ,i want briefly to point out why ,i think it cannot be the only explanation4 ,stated very badly and crudely1 the difficulty which requires explanation is this3 ,mr4 ,bradley says1 ,it is sheer nonsense to say ,time is not real4 ,but this thing which he says it is sheer nonsense to say is the very thing which he himself had formerly said4 ,he had said1 ,time has most evidently proved not to be real4 ,now1 ,mr4 ,bradley certainly does not mean to say that this proposition of his own is sheer nonsense2 and yet he says1 in words1 that it is sheer nonsense4 ,this is the difficulty4 ,what is the explanation8 ,quite obviously1 the explanation can only take one possible form4 ,mr4 ,bradley must be holding that the words ,time is real may have two different senses4 ,in one sense1 the denial of them is sheer nonsense2 in the other sense1 so far from being sheer nonsense1 denial of them is1 according to him1 evidently true4 ,now1 what are these two different senses1 between which the difference is so enormous8 ,it is here that the two different explanations come in4 ,the first and1 as ,i think1 the wrong explanation 7though ,i think ,mr4 ,bradley's words do give some colour to it7 is this4 ,it might be said3 ,the whole business is perfectly easy to explain4 ,when ,mr4 ,bradley says that ,time is not real1 what he means is that ,time1 in the character which it exhibits1 is not real4 ,whereas1 when he says1 ,time does exist1 is a fact1 and is1 and that it is nonsense to deny this1 what he means is that ,time does exist1 in some other character--some character other than that which it exhibits4 ,he does not mean to make any distinction1 such as you suppose1 between two meanings of the word ,i real '--the one of them merely equivalent to 'exists1' 'is1' 'is a fact1' and the other meaning something very different from this4 ,the only distinction he means to make is a distinction between two meanings of ',time' or of the whole sentence ',time is real4' ,he distinguishes between the meaning of this sentence1 when it means1 ',time in the character which it exhibits1 is real1' which meaning1 he says1 is evidently false2 and its meaning when it means1 ',time in some other character1 is real1' and this meaning1 he says1 is evidently true4 ,this is the complete explanation of your supposed puzzle1 which is1 in fact1 therefore1 very easy to solve4 ,this1 ,i think1 might be offered as an explanation of ,mr4 ,bradley's meaning4 ,and it must be admitted that it would furnish a complete explanation of the particular puzzle ,i have just stated1 it would completely absolve ,mr4 ,bradley from the charge of inconsistency2 and would show that where he appears to contradict himself about the reality of ,time1 the contradiction is verbal only and not real4 ,we might1 indeed1 object to this distinction between ,time in one character and ,time in another2 on the ground that anything which has not got the character which ,time exhibits1 but only some other character1 ought not to be called ,time at all4 ,we are1 indeed1 perfectly familiar with the conception that one and the same thing may at one time possess a character which it does not possess at another1 so that what is true of it at one time may not be true of it at another4 ,we are1 that is1 familiar with the idea of a thing changing its character4 ,but ,time itself as a whole obviously cannot change its character in this sense4 ,mr4 ,bradley cannot mean to say that it possesses the character which it exhibits and in which it is unreal at one time1 and possesses some other character1 in which it is real1 at some other time4 ,and hence we might say it is certainly wrong to speak as if ,time itself could have two incompatible characters2 since nothing can have two incompatible characters1 unless it has them at different times4 ,and this is an objection which does seem to apply to ,mr4 ,bradley's doctrine in any case1 since he does in any case seem to imply this distinction between ,time in one character and ,time in another1 whether this distinction is the complete explanation of our particular puzzle or not4 ,yet this objection would not necessarily be more than an objection to ,mr4 ,bradley's words2 it would not necessarily be an objection to his meaning4 ,where he seems to imply that ,time1 in some character other than that which it exhibits1 may be fully real1 he may only mean that something completely different from ,time1 but which does in some sense correspond to it1 is fully real2 and if he does mean this1 our objection would only amount to an objection to his giving the name of ,time to this supposed counterpart of ,time2 we might say1 and ,i think justly1 that it is misleading to speak of this counterpart of ,time as if it were ,time itself in some other character2 but this would go no way at all to show that there may not really be such a counterpart of ,time1 which is real1 while ,time itself is unreal4 ,we might ask1 too1 what this supposed counterpart of ,time is like1 or 7to put it in ,mr4 ,bradley's way7 what the precise character is1 in which ,time ,areal8 ,and ,i think ,mr4 ,bradley would admit that he cannot tell us4 ,but this1 you see1 would also be no objection to his actual doctrine4 ,he might quite well know1 and be right in saying1 that there is and must be a real counterpart of ,time1 completely different in character from ,time1 as we know it1 even though he has not the least idea what this counterpart is like4 ,we must1 therefore1 admit that this proposed explanation of our puzzle would be a complete explanation of it4 ,it would completely vindicate ,mr4 ,bradley from the charge of inconsistency1 and would give us1 as his doctrine1 a doctrine to which we have hitherto found no objection except verbal ones4 ,but1 nevertheless1 ,i think it is a wrong explanation1 and ,i want to explain why4 ,if we were to suppose that this distinction between ,time in one character and ,time in another were the only one on which ,mr4 ,bradley meant to rely1 we should have as his doctrine this3 ,we should have to suppose him to affirm most emphatically that ,time1 in the character which it exhibits1 neither is real1 nor exists1 nor is a fact1 nor is4 ,we should have to suppose him to be using all these four expressions always as strict equivalents1 and to mean that it is only in its other character that ,time either exists1 or is a fact1 or is4 ,and if he did mean this1 there would1 of course1 be no doubt whatever that he does mean to contradict the common view with regard to ,time2 since1 of course1 what most people mean by ,time is what he chooses to call ,time in the character which it exhibits4 ,yet1 his language1 even in the passages that ,i quoted1 seems to me to indicate that he does not mean this4 ,i think1 on the contrary1 he means to affirm emphatically that ,time even in the character which it exhibits1 does exist1 is a fact1 and indubitably is1 though it is not real in that character4 ,in the second passage1 for instance1 where he insists so emphatically that appearances do exist1 are facts1 and indubitably are1 he is1 ,i think1 plainly talking of appearances1 in the character which they exhibit--or1 as he there puts it1 their nature1 as it is--he does1 ,i think1 mean that appearances1 even in this character1 are facts1 exist1 and are1 though1 in this character1 they are not true of reality4 ,and1 so again in the third passage1 where he says1 ,change is a fact1 and this fact1 as such1 is not reconcilable with the ,absolute2 this language is surely quite inexcusable1 unless he means that ,change1 as such--change1 in the character which it exhibits--change1 as it is1 is a fact3 though1 of course1 he holds that in this character it certainly is not real4 ,i think1 therefore1 we have to assume that ,mr4 ,bradley means to make a distinction not merely between ,time1 in one character1 and ,time in another1 but also between real1 in one sense1 and real in another4 ,his meaning is not so simple as it would be1 if he were merely making a distinction between ,time in one character and ,time in another1 and it is not1 after all1 at all plain whether he means to contradict what ordinary people hold about ,time or not4 ,he does not mean to assert that ,time1 as such1 neither is real1 nor exists1 nor is a fact1 nor is2 but1 on the contrary1 that ,time1 even as such1 does exist1 is a fact1 and is2 but1 nevertheless1 is not real4 ,this1 at least1 is what ,i am going to assume him to mean4 ,and on this assumption1 we are brought face to face with the question as to the meaning of the word real1 and also as to the meaning of these other words exists1 is a fact1 and is4 ,mr4 ,bradley seems to admit1 we have seen1 that real may sometimes be properly used as merely equivalent to these other phrases4 ,we are1 however1 now supposing that he also holds that in another sense they are not equivalent1 but that real means something more than the others1 so that it is quite consistent to maintain that ,time is not real1 and yet does exist1 is a fact1 and is4 ,in holding this ,i think he is mistaken2 and what ,i want to do is to explain1 as clearly as ,i can1 what sort of a mistake ,i take him to be making1 and what seems to me to be the source of this mistake4 ,i may1 perhaps1 be quite wrong in thinking that ,mr ,bradley has made this mistake1 and that it is in any degree the source of the distinction he seems to draw between reality and existence4 ,to maintain that it is so is no part of my main object4 ,my main object is simply to make clear the nature of this particular mistake1 whether committed by ,mr4 ,bradley or not1 and that it is a mistake2 because it seems to me that it is a mistake which it is very easy to make1 and very important to avoid4 ,i am1 of course1 not concerned at all to discuss the question whether ,time is real or not1 but only to discuss the question what sort of things would have to be true1 if it were unreal1 and whether if those things were true it could still be true that ,time either exists1 or is1 or is a fact4 ,now1 to begin with1 ,i think ,i know pretty well1 in part at least1 what ,mr4 ,bradley means when he says that it is unreal4 ,i think that part at least of what he means is just what he ought to mean--just what anyone else would mean if he said that ,time was unreal1 and what any ordinary person would understand to be meant1 if he heard those words4 ,but ,i can conceive that1 when ,i have explained as well as ,i can what this is that he ought to mean1 some people may be inclined to dispute whether he means any such thing at all4 ,they may say that he is using the word real exclusively in some highly unusual and special sense1 so that in asserting that ,time is unreal he is by no means denying any part of what ordinary people would mean by saying that ,time is real4 ,and that some special sense may come in to his meaning ,i am prepared to admit4 ,i do think it is possible that part of what ,mr4 ,bradley is asserting may be something which no unsophisticated person would think of expressing in the same way1 and ,i will admit1 therefore1 that he does not1 very likely1 mean by ,time is unreal merely what other people would mean by this phrase1 but something else as well4 ,what1 however1 ,i cannot help thinking is that1 even if he means something more1 he does mean what ordinary people would mean as well3 that what they would mean is at least a part of his meaning4 ,and if even this is disputed1 if it is maintained that he is using the words exclusively in some special sense1 ,i own ,i do not know how to argue the question4 ,if anybody really does take the view that1 when he says ,time is unreal1 absolutely all that he means is something which is in no way incompatible with what most people would mean by saying ,time is real1 ,i do not know how to show that this view is wrong4 ,i can only say that if this had been all that he meant1 ,i cannot believe that he would have expressed his view in the form ,time is unreal4 ,the only further argument ,i shall bring in favour of my view that he does mean what he ought to mean will take the form of an answer to one possible argument which might be brought against it4 ,when ,i nave explained what he ought to mean by saying that ,time is unreal1 it will be quite clear that this is something which is in fact incompatible with the truth of the propositions that ,time is1 or exists1 or is a fact4 ,and it might be urged that the fact that it is thus incompatible is a strong argument against the view that ,mr4 ,bradley does mean what he ought to mean1 since1 if he had meant it1 he could hardly have failed to perceive that what he meant was inconsistent with these propositions1 whereas1 as we have seen1 he certainly does not perceive this4 ,i have an answer to that argument1 which consists in giving an explanation1 which ,i think a plausible one1 as to how he could come to think that the propositions are not inconsistent1 when in fact they are4 ,what1 then1 ought ,mr4 ,bradley to mean by ,time is unreal8 ,what would most people mean by this proposition8 ,i do not think there is much difficulty in discovering what sort of thing they would mean by it4 ,of course1 ,time1 with a big ,t1 seems to be a highly abstract kind of entity1 and to define exactly what can be meant by saying of an entity of that sort that it is unreal does seem to offer difficulties4 ,but if you try to translate the proposition into the concrete1 and to ask what it implies1 there is1 ,i think1 very little doubt as to the sort of thing it implies4 ,the moment you try to do this1 and think what it really comes to1 you at once begin thinking of a number of different kinds of propositions1 all of which plainly must be untrue1 if ,time is unreal4 ,if ,time is unreal1 then plainly nothing ever happens before or after anything else2 nothing is ever simultaneous with anything else2 it is never true that anything is past2 never true that anything will happen in the future2 never true that anything is happening now2 and so on4 ,you can at once think of a considerable number of kinds of propositions 7and you could easily add to the list71 the falsehood of all of which is plainly implied by saying that ,time is unreal4 ,and it is clear1 also1 that to say that the falsehood of all propositions of these kinds is implied is equivalent to saying that there are no facts of certain corresponding kinds--no facts which consist in one event happening before another2 none which consist in an event being past or future1 and so on4 ,that is to say1 what ,time is unreal implies is that1 in the case of a large number of different properties which are such that1 if they did belong to anything1 what they belonged to would be facts having some common characteristic1 which we might express by calling them temporal facts1 the properties in question do1 in fact1 belong to nothing4 ,it implies that the property of being a fact which consists in one event following another belongs to nothing2 that that of being a past event belongs to nothing1 and so on4 ,and why it implies that all those different special properties belong to nothing is1 ,i think we may say1 because what it means is that the general property which ,i have called that of being a temporal fact belongs to nothing4 ,to say that the property of being a temporal fact belongs to nothing does imply that such special properties as that of being a fact which consists in one event following another1 or that of being a fact which consists in something being past1 also belong to nothing2 in exactly the same way as to say that the property of being coloured belongs to nothing implies with regard to the special properties being red1 being blue1 etc41 that they also belong to nothing4 ,we may1 then1 ,i think1 say that what ,time is unreal means is simply ,the property of being a temporal fact belongs to nothing1 or1 to express this in the way in which it would be expressed in ordinary life1 ,there are no temporal facts4 ,and this being so1 we have explained the usage of unreal1 where it is predicated of ,time with a capital ,t1 by reference to a much more common and perfectly familiar usage of the term4 ,the use of is unreal in the phrase ,time is unreal has been defined by reference to its use in the phrase ,temporal facts are unreal4 ,and its use in this phrase is1 so far as ,i can see1 exactly the same as in hosts of phrases with which we are perfectly familiar2 it is1 ,i think1 the commonest and by far the most important use of the term unreal4 ,the use is that in which we use it when we say1 ,unicorns are unreal1 ,griffins are unreal1 ,chimras are unreal1 and so on4 ,it is the usage in which unreal is equivalent to imaginary2 and in which to say ,unicorns are unreal means the same as ,there are no unicorns or ,unicorns do not exist4 ,in just the same way the proposition ,temporal facts are unreal1 into which we have translated ,time is unreal1 means the same as ,there are no temporal facts1 or ,temporal facts do not exist1 or ,temporal facts are imaginary4 ,i think1 then1 that what ,mr4 ,bradley ought to mean by ,time is unreal can be defined by reference to one particular usage of the word real --or1 if you like to put it that way1 to one particular one among the conceptions for which the term reality may stand4 ,and this particular conception seems to me to be by far the commonest and most important of those for which the term does stand4 ,i want1 therefore1 before going on1 to dwell a little upon its nature2 although ,i daresay that all that ,i have to say is perfectly familiar and perfectly well understood by every one here4 ,of course1 it has often been said before1 but ,i think it is still very far from being generally understood4 ,i think1 perhaps1 the point ,i want to insist on can be brought out in this way4 ,i have just said that we have pointed out one particular one1 and that the most important1 among the conceptions for which the term reality may stand2 and that is an excusable way of saying what we have done4 ,but it would1 ,i think1 be more correct to say that we have pointed out one particular1 and that the most important1 usage of the terms real and unreal1 and that one of the peculiarities of this usage is that it is such that the terms real and unreal cannot1 when used in this way1 be properly said to stand for any conception whatever4 ,i will try to explain what ,i mean4 ,we have said that what ,lions are real means is that some particular property or other--,i will say1 for the sake of brevity1 the property of being a lion1 though that is not strictly accurate1 does ,in fact belong to some-thing--that there are things which have it1 or1 to put it in another way1 that the conception of being a lion is a conception which does apply to some things--that there are things which fall under it4 ,and similarly what ,unicorns are unreal means is that the property of being a unicorn belongs to nothing4 ,now1 if this is so1 then it seems to me1 in a very important sense1 real and unreal do not in this usage stand for any conceptions at all4 ,the only conceptions which occur in the proposition ,lions are real are1 on this interpretation1 plainly1 7#a7 the conception of being a lion1 and 7#b7 the conception of belonging to something1 and perfectly obviously real does not stand for either of these4 ,in the case of the first that is obvious2 but it is worth while pointing out that it is also true of the second4 ,for if is real did stand for belongs to something1 then the proposition ,lions are real would stand1 not for the assertion that the property of being a lion belongs to something1 but for the assertion that lions themselves are properties which belong to something2 and it is quite obvious that what we mean to assert is not any such nonsense as this4 ,real1 therefore1 does not1 in this proposition1 stand for the conception of belonging to something nor yet1 quite plainly1 does it stand for the conception of being a lion4 ,and hence1 since these are the only two conceptions which do occur in the proposition1 we may1 ,i think1 say that real1 in this usage1 does not stand for any conception at all4 ,to say that it did would be to imply that it stood for some property of which we are asserting that everything which has the property of being a lion also has this other property4 ,but we are not1 in fact1 asserting any such thing4 ,we are not asserting of any property called reality that it belongs to lions1 as in the proposition ,lions are mammalian we are asserting of the property of being a mammal that it belongs to lions4 ,the two propositions ,lions are real and ,lions are mammalian1 though grammatically similar1 are in reality of wholly different forms2 and one difference between them may be expressed by saying that whereas mammalian does stand for a property or conception1 the very point of this usage of real is that it does not4 ,to return to ,mr4 ,bradley4 ,time is unreal ought to mean1 according to me1 ,temporal facts are unreal1 in the sense ,i have tried to explain4 ,and ,i cannot help thinking that this which he ought to mean is1 in part at least1 what ,mr4 ,bradley does mean when he says ,time is unreal1 though possibly be also means something else as well4 ,but if so1 it is quite clear1 ,i think1 that what he means is inconsistent with its being true that ,time exists or that there is such a thing as ,time4 ,to say that ,time exists or that there is such a thing1 is to assert at least1 that there are some temporal facts3 it may assert more than this1 but it does assert this1 at least4 ,and this1 we have seen1 is exactly what is denied when it is said that ,time is unreal4 ,time is unreal just means ,temporal facts are unreal1 or there are no temporal facts1 or ,temporal facts do not exist4 ,and just this is also what is meant by ,time does not exist or ,there is no such thing as ,time4 ,there is1 in fact1 nothing1 else for these expressions to mean4 ,what1 therefore1 ,mr4 ,bradley ought to mean and 7according to me7 does mean by ,time is unreal is1 in fact1 inconsistent with what he ought to mean by ,time exists or by ,time is4 ,and yet plainly he does not think that it is so4 ,is it possible to explain why he should have failed to perceive the inconsistency8 ,i think his failure can be explained as follows4 ,it may have been noticed that1 in the passages ,i quoted from him1 he insists in one place1 that to deny that appearances exist is not merely false but self-contradictory1 and in another appeals to the principle that any deliverance of consciousness is but a deliverance of consciousness in support of his contention that what is a fact need1 nevertheless1 not be real4 ,and the fact that he does these two things does1 ,i think1 give colour to the suggestion that the reason why he thinks that what is unreal may yet exist1 and be a fact1 and be1 is the following4 ,it is undoubtedly the case that1 even if temporal facts are unreal1 i4e41 there are no such things1 we can and do think of them1 just as it is undoubtedly the case that1 though unicorns are unreal1 we can and do imagine them4 ,in other words1 temporal facts and unicorns are both quite certainly deliverances of consciousness1 at least in the sense that they are objects of thought2 being objects of thought they are1 in a wide sense1 appearances also1 and ,i cannot help thinking that ,mr4 ,bradley supposes that1 merely because they are so1 they must at least ,,be4 ,how 7,i imagine he would ask7 can a thing 'appear' or even 'be thought of' unless it is there to appear and to be thought of8 ,to say that it appears or is thought of1 and that yet there is no such thing1 is plainly self-contradictory4 ,a thing cannot have a property1 unless it is there to have it1 and1 since unicorns and temporal facts do have the property of being thought of1 there certainly must be such things4 ,when ,i think of a unicorn1 what ,i am thinking of is certainly not nothing2 if it were nothing1 then1 when ,i think of a griffin1 ,i should also be thinking of nothing1 and there would be no difference between thinking of a griffin and thinking of a unicorn4 ,but there certainly is a difference2 and what can the difference be except that in the one case what ,i am thinking of is a unicorn1 and in the other a griffin8 ,and if the unicorn is what ,i am thinking of1 then there certainly must be a unicorn1 in spite of the fact that unicorns are unreal4 ,in other words1 though in one sense of the words there certainly are no unicorns--that sense1 namely1 in which to assert that there are would be equivalent to asserting that unicorns are real--yet there must be some other sense in which there are such things2 since1 if there were not1 we could not think of them4 ,perhaps1 it may be thought that the fallacy involved in this argument is too gross for it to be possible that ,mr4 ,bradley should have been guilty of it4 ,but there are other passages in ,appearance and ,reality--particularly what he says about ,error --which look to me as if he certainly was guilty of it4 ,i suppose it will be quite obvious to everyone here that it is a fallacy2 that the fact that we can think of unicorns is not sufficient to prove that1 in any sense at all1 there are any unicorns4 ,yet1 ,i am not sure that ,i know myself what is the mistake involved in thinking that it is sufficient1 and ,i am going1 therefore1 to try to put as clearly as ,i can1 what ,i think it is1 in the hope that somebody may be able1 if ,i am wrong1 to correct me4 ,the main mistake1 ,i suppose1 is the mistake of thinking that the proposition ,unicorns are thought of is a proposition of the same form as ,lions are hunted2 or the proposition ,i am thinking of a unicorn of the same form as ,i am hunting a lion2 or the proposition ,unicorns are objects of thought of the same form as ,lions are objects of the chase4 ,of the second proposition in each of these three pairs1 it is in fact the case that it could not be true unless there were lions--at least one4 ,each of them does1 in fact1 assert both with regard to a certain property--which we will call that of being a lion--that there are things which possess it1 and also with regard to another--that of being hunted--that some of the things which possess the former possess this property too4 ,but it is obvious enough to common sense that the same is by no means true of the first proposition in each pair1 in spite of the fact that their grammatical expression shows no trace of the difference4 ,it is perfectly obvious that if ,i say ,i am thinking of a unicorn1 ,i am not saying both that there is a unicorn and that ,i am thinking of it1 although1 if ,i say ,i am hunting a lion1 ,i am saying both that there is a lion1 and that ,i am hunting it4 ,in the former case1 ,i am not asserting that the two properties of being a unicorn and of being thought of by me both belong to one and the same thing2 whereas1 in the latter case1 ,i am asserting that the two properties of being a lion and of being hunted by me do belong to one and the same thing4 ,it is quite clear that there is in fact1 this difference between the two propositions2 although no trace of it appears in their verbal expression4 ,and why we should use the same form of verbal expression to convey such different meanings is more than ,i can say4 ,it seems to me very curious that language1 in this1 as in the other instance which we have just considered of ,lions are real and ,lions are mammalian1 should have grown up just as if it were expressly designed to mislead philosophers2 and ,i do not know why it should have4 ,yet1 it seems to me there is no doubt that in ever so many instances it has4 ,moreover1 exactly what is meant by saying ,i am thinking of a unicorn is not by any means clear to me4 ,i think we can assert at least this3 ,in order that this proposition should be true1 it is necessary 7#a7 that ,i should be conceiving1 with regard to a certain property1 the hypothesis that there ,is something which possesses it1 and 7#b7 that the property in question should be such that1 if anything did possess it there would be a unicorn4 ,although this is plainly true1 it does not give us completely what is meant by the statement1 ,i am thinking of a unicorn2 and ,i do not know what the complete meaning is4 ,it is certainly not that ,i am conceiving with regard to the property of being a unicorn1 that there is something which possesses it2 since ,i may be thinking of a unicorn1 without ever having conceived the property of being a unicorn at all4 ,whatever it does mean1 the point which concerns us is that it is certainly not necessary for its truth1 that the property of being a unicorn should1 in fact1 belong to anything whatever1 or1 therefore1 that there should in any sense whatever be a unicorn4 ,and the fallacy ,i am attributing to ,mr4 ,bradley is that of supposing that1 in some sense1 it must imply this latter4 ,this1 then1 is what ,i imagine to be at least one of the reasons which have led ,mr4 ,bradley to suppose that the proposition ,time is unreal1 must be consistent with the proposition ,there is such a thing as ,time4 ,put shortly1 it is that he sees 7what is perfectly true7 that ,time is unreal must be consistent with ,we do think of ,time2 he thinks 7falsely7 that ,we do think of ,time must imply1 in some sense1 ,there is such a thing as ,time2 and finally1 infers 7correctly7 from this true and this false premiss1 that there must be some sense of the proposition ,there is such a thing as ,time which is consistent with ,time is unreal4 ,it follows1 then1 that if ,mr4 ,bradley means what he ought mean both by ,time is unreal and by ,time exists1 he is contradicting himself when he combines these two propositions4 ,and ,i have said ,i feel convinced that he does mean what he ought to mean by the former4 ,but ,i feel a good deal of doubt as to whether1 all the same1 he is contradicting himself1 because it does seem to me doubtful whether he means what he ought to mean by the latter4 ,the kind of thing which ,i imagine may be happening to him when he insists so strongly that ,time does exist1 is a fact1 and is1 is that1 properly speaking1 he is not attaching to these phrases any meaning whatever--not1 therefore1 that which they properly bear4 ,it seems to me very possible that he has so strongly convinced himself of the false proposition that there must be some sense in which1 if ,i think of a unicorn1 there must be a unicorn1 that wherever he knows the former proposition holds1 he allows himself to use the latter form of words1 without attaching any meaning to them4 ,what he is really asserting so emphatically may1 ,i think1 be not anything which his words stand for1 but simply this verbal proposition that there must be some sense in which they are true4 #a ,appearance and ,reality 7#bnd edn471 p4 #ce4 ,the ,italics are mine4 #b ,op4 cit4 pp4 #aca-b4 ,,some ,,judgments ,,of ,,perception ,i want to raise some childishly simple questions as to what we are doing when we make judgments of a certain kind1 which we all do in fact exceedingly commonly make4 ,the kind of judgments ,i mean are those which we make when1 with regard to something which we are seeing1 we judge such things as ',that is an inkstand1 ,that is a tablecloth1 ,that is a door1 etc41 etc42 or when1 with regard to something which we are feeling with our hands1 we judge such things as ,this is cloth1 ,this is a finger1 ,this is a coin1 etc41 etc4 ,it is scarcely possible1 ,i think1 to exaggerate the frequency with which we make such judgments as these1 nor yet the certainty with which we are able to make vast numbers of them4 ,any man1 who is not blind1 can1 at almost any moment of his waking life1 except when he is in the dark1 make a large number of judgments of the first kind1 with the greatest certainty4 ,he has only to look about him1 if he is indoors1 to judge with regard to various things which he is seeing1 such things as ,that is a window1 ,that is a chair1 ,this is a book2 or1 if he is out-of-doors1 such things as ,that is a house1 ,that is a motor-car1 ,that is a man1 or ,that is a stone1 ,that is a tree1 ,that is a cloud4 ,and all of us1 who are not blind1 do in fact constantly make such judgments1 even if1 as a rule1 we only make them as parts of more complicated judgments4 ,what ,i mean is that1 when we make such judgments as ,hullo6 that clock has stopped1 or ,this chair is more comfortable than that one1 or ,that man looks like a foreigner1 judgments of the simpler kind with which ,i am concerned are1 so far as ,i can see1 actually a part of what we are judging4 ,in judging ,that clock has stopped1 part of what ,i am actually judging is1 so far as ,i can see1 ,that is a clock2 and similarly if ,i judge ,that tree is taller than this one1 my judgment actually contains the two simpler judgments ,that is a tree1 and ,this is a tree4 ,perhaps most judgments which we make1 of the kind ,i mean1 are1 in this way1 only parts of more complicated judgments3 ,i do not know whether this is so or not4 ,but in any case there can be no doubt that we make them exceedingly commonly4 ,and even a blind man1 or a man in the dark1 can and does1 very frequently1 make judgments of the second kind--judgments about things which he is feeling with his hands4 ,all of us1 for instance1 at almost any moment of our waking life1 whether we are in the dark or not1 have only to feel certain parts of our own bodies or of our clothes1 in order to make1 with great certainty1 such judgments as ,this is a finger1 ,this is a nose1 ,this is cloth4 ,and similarly ,i have only to feel in my pockets to judge1 with regard to objects which ,i meet with there1 such things as ,this is a coin1 ,this is a pencil1 ,this is a pipe4 ,judgments of this kind would1 ,i think1 commonly1 and rightly1 be taken to be judgments1 the truth of which involves the existence of material things or physical objects4 ,if ,i am right in judging that this is an inkstand1 it follows that there is at least one inkstand in the ,universe2 and if there is an inkstand in the ,universe1 it follows that there is in it at least one material thing or physical object4 ,this may1 of course1 be disputed4 ,berkeley1 if ,i understand him rightly1 was clearly of opinion that there was no inconsistency in maintaining that there were in the ,universe thousands of inkstands and trees and stones and stars1 and that yet there was in it no such thing as matter4 ,and perhaps the definition of matter1 which he adopted1 was such that there really was no inconsistency in maintaining this4 ,perhaps1 similarly1 other philosophers have sometimes adopted definitions of the expressions material things and physical objects1 which were such that all the judgments of this kind that we make might quite well be true1 without its being true that there are in the ,universe any material things whatever4 ,perhaps1 even1 there may be some justification for adopting definitions of those terms which would yield the surprising result that we may1 with perfect consistency1 maintain that the world is full of minerals and vegetables and animals1 of all sorts of different kinds1 and that yet there is not to be found in it a single material thing4 ,i do not know whether there is or is not any utility in using the terms material thing or physical object in such a sense as this4 ,but1 whether there is or not1 ,i cannot help thinking that there is ample justification for using them in another sense--a sense in which from the proposition that there are in the ,universe such things as inkstands or fingers or clouds1 it strictly follows that there are in it at least as many material things1 and in which1 therefore1 we can not consistently maintain the existence of inkstands1 fingers1 and clouds1 while denying that of material things4 ,the kinds of judgment which ,i have mentioned1 and thousands of others which might easily be mentioned1 are obviously all of the same sort in one very important respect--a respect in which1 for instance1 such judgments as ,this is an emotion1 ,this is a judgment1 ,this is a colour1 are not of the same sort as they are4 ,and it seems to me that we are certainly using the term material thing in a correct and useful way1 if we express this important common property which they have1 by saying that of each of them the same can truly be said as was said of the judgment ,that is an inkstand3 that1 just as from the proposition ,there is an inkstand it follows that there is at least one material thing1 so from the proposition ,there is a tablecloth1 it follows that there is at least one material thing2 and similarly in all the other cases4 ,we can certainly use the expression ,things such as inkstands1 tablecloths1 fingers1 clouds1 stars1 etc41 to mean things such as these in a certain very important respect1 which we all understand1 though we may not be able to define it4 ,and the term material thing certainly is and can be correctly used to mean simply things such as these in that respect--whatever it may be4 ,some term is certainly required to mean merely things such as these in that important respect2 and1 so far as ,i can see1 there is no term which can be naturally used in this sense except the term material things and its equivalents4 ,thus understood1 the term material thing certainly does stand for an important notion1 which requires a name4 ,and1 if we agree to use the term in this sense1 then it is obvious that no more can be necessary for the truth of the assertion that there are material things1 than is necessary for the truth of judgments of the kind with which ,i propose to deal4 ,but no more can be necessary for the truth of these judgments than is actually asserted in or logically implied by them4 ,and if we approach the question what is necessary for the truth of the assertion that there are material things1 by asking what it is that we actually assert when we make such judgments as these1 certain reasons for doubting how much is necessary are1 ,i think1 brought out much more clearly1 than if we approach the question in any other way4 ,many philosophers have told us a very great deal as to what they suppose to be involved in the existence of material things2 and some1 at least1 among them seem to have meant by material things such things as inkstands1 fingers and clouds4 ,but ,i can think of only one type of view as to the constitution of material things1 which is such that it is tolerably clear what answer those who hold it would give to the simple question2 ,what is it that ,i am judging1 when ,i judge1 as ,i now do1 that that is an inkstand8 ,the type of view ,i mean is that to which the view that ,mill suggests1 when he explains what he means by saying that ,matter is a ,permanent ,possibility of ,sensation1 and also the view or views which ,mr4 ,russell seems to suggest in his ,our ,knowledge of the ,external ,world1 seem to belong4 ,in the case of views of this kind1 it is1 ,i think1 tolerably clear what answer those who hold them would give to all the questions ,i want to raise about judgments of the kind ,i have described4 ,but it does not seem to me at all certain that any view of this type is true2 and certainly many philosophers have held and do hold that all views of this type are false4 ,but in the case of those who do hold them to be false1 ,i do not know1 in any single case1 what answer would be given to all the questions which ,i want to raise4 ,in the case of philosophers1 who do not accept any view of the ,mill-,russell type1 none1 so far as ,i know1 has made it clear what answer he would give to all my questions3 some have made it clear what answer they would give to some of them2 but many1 ,i think1 have not even made it clear what answer they would give to any4 ,perhaps there is some simple and satisfactory answer1 which has escaped me1 that such philosophers could give to all my questions2 but ,i cannot help thinking that assumptions as to the nature of material things have too often been made1 without its even occurring to those who made them to ask1 what1 if they were true1 we could be judging when we make such judgments as these2 and that1 if this question had been asked1 it would have become evident that those assumptions were far less certain than they appeared to be4 ,i do not know that there is any excuse whatever for calling all judgments of the kind ,i mean judgments of perception4 ,all of them are1 of course1 judgments about things which we are at the moment perceiving1 since1 by definition1 they are judgments about things which we are seeing or feeling with our hands2 and all of them are1 no doubt1 also based upon something which we perceive about the thing in question4 ,but the mere fact that a judgment is both about a thing which ,i am perceiving1 and also based upon something which ,i perceive about that thing1 does not seem to be a sufficient reason for calling it a judgment of perception2 and ,i do not know that there is any other reason than this for calling all judgments of the kind ,i mean judgments of perception4 ,i do not want therefore1 to assert that all of them are so4 ,but it seems to me quite plain that enormous numbers of them are so1 in a perfectly legitimate sense4 ,this judgment1 which ,i now make1 to the effect that that is a door1 seems to me quite plainly to be a judgment of perception1 in the simple sense that ,i make it because ,i do1 in fact1 see that that is a door1 and assert in it no more than what ,i see2 and what ,i see ,i1 of course1 perceive4 ,in every case in which ,i judge1 with regard to something which ,i am seeing or feeling with my hands1 that it is a so-and-so1 simply because ,i do perceive1 by sight or touch1 that it is in fact a thing of that kind1 we can1 ,i think1 fairly say that the judgment in question is a judgment of perception4 ,and enormous numbers of judgments of the kind ,i mean are1 quite plainly1 judgments of perception in this sense4 ,they are not all1 for the simple reason that some of them are mistaken4 ,i may1 for instance1 judge1 with regard to an animal which ,i see at a distance1 that it is a sheep1 when in fact it is a pig4 ,and here my judgment is certainly not due to the fact that ,i see it to be a sheep2 since ,i cannot possibly see a thing to be a sheep1 unless it is one4 ,it1 therefore1 is not a judgment of perception in this sense4 ,and moreover1 even where such a judgment is true1 it may not always be a judgment of perception1 for the reason that1 whereas ,i only see the thing in question1 the kind of thing which ,i judge it to be is of such a nature1 that it is impossible for any one1 by sight alone1 to perceive anything to be of that kind4 ,how to draw the line between judgments of this kind1 which are judgments of perception1 and those which are not1 ,i do not know4 ,that is to say1 ,i do not know what conditions must be fulfilled in order that ,i may be truly said to be perceiving1 by sight or touch1 such things as that that is a door1 this is a finger1 and not merely inferring them4 ,some people may no doubt think that it is very unphilosophical in me to say that we ever can perceive such things as these4 ,but it seems to me that we do1 in ordinary life1 constantly talk of seeing such things1 and that1 when we do so1 we are neither using language incorrectly1 nor making any mistake about the facts--supposing something to occur which never does in fact occur4 ,the truth seems to me to be that we are using the term perceive in a way which is both perfectly correct and expresses a kind of thing which constantly does occur1 only that some philosophers have not recognised that this is a correct usage of the term and have not been able to define it4 ,i am not1 therefore1 afraid to say that ,i do now perceive that that is a door1 and that that is a finger4 ,only1 of course1 when ,i say that ,i do1 ,i do not mean to assert that part of what ,i perceive1 when ,i perceive these things1 may not be something which1 in an important sense1 is known to me only by inference4 ,it would be very rash to assert that perception1 in this sense of the word1 entirely excludes inference4 ,all that seems to me certain is that there is an important and useful sense of the word perception1 which is such that the amount and kind of inference1 if inference there be1 which is involved in my present perception that that is a door1 is no bar to the truth of the assertion that ,i do perceive that it is one4 ,vast numbers1 then1 of the kind of judgments with which ,i propose to deal seem to me to be1 in an important and legitimate sense1 judgments of perception2 although ,i am not prepared to define1 any further than ,i have done1 what that sense is4 ,and though it is true that the questions which ,i shall raise apply just as much to those of them which are not judgments of perception as to those which are1 it is1 of course1 also true that they apply just as much to those which are as to those which are not2 so that ,i shall be really dealing with a large and important class among judgments of perception4 ,it is true that1 if certain views which1 if ,i understand them rightly1 some ,philosophers have seriously entertained1 were true ones1 it would be quite impossible that any of them should be judgments of perception4 ,for some philosophers seem to me to have denied that we ever do in fact know such things as these1 and others not only that we ever know them but also that they are ever true4 ,and1 if1 in fact1 ,i never do know such a thing1 or if it is never true1 it will of course1 follow that ,i never perceive such a thing2 since ,i certainly cannot1 in this sense1 perceive anything whatever1 unless ,i both know it and it is true4 ,but it seems to me a sufficient refutation of such views as these1 simply to point to cases in which we do know such things4 ,this1 after all1 you know1 really is a finger3 there is no doubt about it3 ,i know it1 and you all know it4 ,and ,i think we may safely challenge any philosopher to bring forward any argument in favour either of the proposition that we do not know it1 or of the proposition that it is not true1 which does not at some point1 rest upon some premiss which is1 beyond comparison1 less certain than is the proposition which it is designed to attack4 ,the questions whether we do ever know such things as these1 and whether there are any material things1 seem to me1 therefore1 to be questions which there is no need to take seriously3 they are questions which it is quite easy to answer1 with certainty1 in the affirmative4 ,what does1 ,i think1 need to be taken seriously1 and what is really dubious1 is not the question1 whether this is a finger1 or whether ,i know that it is1 but the question what1 in certain respects1 ,i am knowing1 when ,i know that it is4 ,and this is the question to which ,i will now address myself4 ,to begin with there is one thing which seems to me to be very certain indeed about such judgments4 ,it is unfortunately a thing which ,i do not know how properly to express4 ,there seem to me to be objections to every way of expressing it which ,i can think of4 ,but ,i hope ,i may be able to make my meaning clear1 in spite of the inadequacy of my expression4 ,the thing ,i mean is a thing which may to some people seem so obvious as to be scarcely worth saying4 ,but ,i cannot help thinking that it is not always clearly recognised1 and even that some philosophers1 to judge from what they say1 might perhaps dispute it4 ,it seems to me to be an assumption which is silently made in many treatments of the subject1 and1 as ,i say1 it seems to me to be very certain indeed4 ,but ,i think it is at all events worth while to try to make the assumption explicit1 in case it should be disputed4 ,if it really is not true1 then the other questions to which ,i shall go on1 and which seem to me really dubious and difficult1 do not1 ,i think1 arise at all4 ,i will try to express this fundamental assumption1 which seems to me so very certain1 by saying it is the assumption that1 in all cases in which ,i make a judgment of this sort1 ,i have no difficulty whatever in picking out a thing1 which is1 quite plainly1 in a sense in which nothing else is1 the thing about which ,i am making my judgment2 and that yet1 though this thing is the thing about which ,i am judging1 ,i am1 quite certainly1 not1 in general1 judging with regard to it1 that it is a thing of that kind for which the term1 which seems to express the predicate of my judgment1 is a name4 ,thus1 when ,i judge1 as now1 that ,that is an inkstand1 ,i have no difficulty whatever in picking out1 from what1 if you like1 you can call my total field of presentation at the moment1 an object1 which is undoubtedly1 in a sense in which nothing else is1 the object about which ,i am making this judgment2 and yet it seems to me quite certain that of this object ,i am not judging that it is a whole inkstand4 ,and similarly when ,i judge1 with regard to something which ,i am feeling in my pocket1 ,this is a coin1 ,i have no difficulty in picking out1 from my field of presentation1 an object1 which is undoubtedly the object with which my judgment is concerned2 and yet ,i am certainly not judging with regard to this object that it is a whole coin4 ,i say that alwayst when ,i make such a judgment1 ,i can pick out the one1 among the objects presented to me at the time1 about which ,i am making it2 but ,i have only said that in general ,i am not judging with regard to this object that it is a thing of the kind1 for which the term1 which seems to express the predicate of my judgment1 is a name4 ,and ,i have limited my second proposition in this way1 because there are cases1 in which it does not1 at first sight1 seem quite so certain that ,i am not doing this1 as in the two instances ,i have just given4 ,when1 for instance1 ,i judge with regard to something1 which ,i am seeing1 ,this is a soap-bubble1 or ,this is a drop of water1 or even when ,i judge ,this is a spot of ink1 it may not seem quite so plain1 that ,i may not be judging1 with regard to the very object presented to me1 that it is1 itself1 a whole soap-bubble1 a whole drop of water1 or a whole spot of ink1 as it always is1 in the case of an inkstand1 or a coin1 that ,i never take the presented object1 about which ,i am judging1 to be a whole inkstand1 or a whole coin4 ,the sort of reason why ,i say this will1 of course1 be obvious to any one1 and it is obviously of a childish order4 ,but ,i cannot say that it seems to me quite obvious that in such a case ,i am not judging of the presented object that it is a whole drop of water1 in the way in which it does seem to be obvious that ,i am not judging of this presented object that it is an inkstand4 ,that is why ,i limit myself to saying that1 in general1 when ,i judge ,that is a so-and-so ,i am not judging with regard to the presented object1 about which my judgment is that it is a thing of the kind in question4 ,as much as this seems to me to be a thing which any child can see4 ,nobody will suppose1 for a moment1 that when he judges such things as ,this is a sofa1 or ,this is a tree1 he is judging1 with regard to the presented object about which his judgment plainly is1 that it is a whole sofa or a whole tree3 he can1 at most1 suppose that he is judging it to be a part of the surface of a sofa or a part of the surface of a tree4 ,and certainly in the case of most judgments of this kind which we make1 whether in the case of all or not1 this is plainly the case3 we are not judging1 with regard to the presented object about which our judgment plainly is1 that it is a thing of the kind1 for which the term which appears to express the predicate of our judgment1 is a name4 ,and that this should be true of most judgments of this kind1 whether of all or not1 is quite sufficient for my purpose4 ,this much1 then1 seems to me to be very certain indeed4 ,but ,i will try to make clearer exactly what ,i mean by it1 by mentioning a ground on which ,i imagine it might perhaps be disputed4 ,the object of which ,i have spoken as the object1 about which1 in each particular case1 such a judgment as this always is a judgment1 is1 of course1 always an object of the kind which some philosophers would call a sensation1 and others would call a sense-datum4 ,whether all philosophers1 when they talk of sensations1 mean to include among them such objects as these1 ,i do not know4 ,some1 who have given a great deal of attention to the subject1 and for whom ,i have a great respect1 talk of sensations in such a way1 that ,i cannot be sure what they are talking about at all or whether there are such things4 ,but many1 ,i think1 undoubtedly do mean to include such subjects as these4 ,no doubt1 in general1 when they call them sensations1 they mean to attribute to them properties1 which it seems to me extremely doubtful whether they possess4 ,and perhaps even those who call them sense-data1 may1 in part1 be attributing to them properties which it may be doubtful whether they possess4 ,if we want to define a sensation or a sense-datum1 in a manner which will leave it not open to doubt what sort of things we are talking of1 and that there are such things1 ,i do not know that we can do it better than by saying that sense-data are the sort of things1 about which such judgments as these always seem to be made--the sort of things which seem to be the real or ultimate subjects of all such judgments4 ,such a way of defining how the term sense-datum is used1 may not seem very satisfactory2 but ,i am inclined to think it may be as satisfactory as any which can be found4 ,and it is certainly calculated to obviate some misunderstandings which may arise2 since everybody can see1 ,i think1 what the thing is which ,i am describing as the thing about which he is making his judgment1 when he judges ,that is an inkstand1 and that there is such a thing1 even if he does not agree that this description applies to it4 ,i can1 in fact1 imagine that some of those who would call this thing a sensation would deny that my judgment is about it at all4 ,it would sometimes be spoken of as the sensation which mediates my perception of this inkstand in this instance4 ,and ,i can imagine that some of those who would so speak of it might be inclined to say that when ,i judge ,this is an inkstand1 my judgment is about this inkstand which ,i perceive1 and not1 in any sense at all1 about the sensation which mediates my perception of it4 ,they may perhaps imagine that the sensation mediates my perception of the inkstand only in the sense that it brings the inkstand before my mind in such a way that1 once it is before my mind1 ,i can make a judgment about it1 which is not a judgment about the mediating sensation at all2 and that such a judgment is the one ,i am actually expressing when ,i say ,this is an inkstand4 ,such a view1 if it is held1 seems to me to be quite certainly false1 and is what ,i have intended to deny4 ,and perhaps ,i can put most clearly the reason why it seems to me false1 by saying that1 if 7which may be doubted7 there is anything which is this inkstand1 that thing is certainly not given to me independently of this sense-datum1 in such a sense that ,i can possibly make a judgment about it which is not a judgment about this sense-datum4 ,i am not1 of course1 denying that ,i do perceive this inkstand1 and that my judgment is1 in a sense1 a judgment about it4 ,both these things seem to me to be quite obviously true4 ,i am only maintaining that my judgment is also1 in another sense1 a judgment about this sense-datum which mediates my perception of the inkstand4 ,those who say that this sense-datum does mediate my perception of the inkstand1 would1 of course1 admit that my perception of the inkstand is1 in a sense1 dependent upon the sense-datum2 that it is dependent is implied in the mere statement that it is mediated by it4 ,but it might be maintained that it is dependent on it only in the sense in which1 when the idea of one object is called up in my mind1 through association1 by the idea of another1 the idea which is called up is dependent on the idea which calls it up4 ,what ,i wish to maintain1 and what seems to me to be quite certainly true1 is that my perception of this inkstand is dependent on this sense-datum1 in a quite different and far more intimate sense than this4 ,it is dependent on it in the sense that1 if there is anything which is this inkstand1 then1 in perceiving that thing1 ,i am knowing it only as the thing which stands in a certain relation to this sense-datum4 ,when the idea of one object is called up in my mind by the idea of another1 ,i do not know the second object only as the thing which has a certain relation to the first3 on the contrary1 ,i can make a judgment about the second object1 which is not a judgment about the first4 ,and similarly in the case of two sense-data which are presented to me simultaneously1 ,i do not know the one only as a thing which has a certain relation to the other4 ,but in the case of this sense-datum and this inkstand the case seems to me to be plainly quite different4 ,if there be a thing which is this inkstand at all1 it is certainly only known to me as the thing which stands in a certain relation to this sense-datum4 ,it is not given to me1 in the sense in which this sense-datum is given4 ,if there be such a thing at all1 it is quite certainly only known to me by description1 in the sense in which ,mr4 ,russell uses that phrase2 and the description by which it is known is that of being the thing which stands to this sense-datum in a certain relation4 ,that is to say1 when ,i make such a judgment as ,this inkstand is a good big one2 what ,i am really judging is3 ,there is a thing which stands to this in a certain relation1 and which is an inkstand1 and that thing is a good big one--where this stands for this presented object4 ,i am referring to or identifying the thing which is this inkstand1 if there be such a thing at all1 only as the thing which stands to this sense-datum in a certain relation2 and hence my judgment1 though in one sense it may be said to be a judgment about the inkstand1 is quite certainly also1 in another sense1 a judgment about this sense-datum4 ,this seems to me so clear1 that ,i wonder how anyone can deny it2 and perhaps nobody would4 ,but ,i cannot help thinking that it is not clear to everybody2 partly because1 so far as ,i can make out1 nobody before ,mr4 ,russell had pointed out the extreme difference there is between a judgment about a thing known only by description to the individual who makes the judgment1 and a judgment about a thing not known to him only in this way2 and partly because so many people seem still utterly to have failed to understand what the distinction is which he expresses in this way4 ,i will try to make the point clear1 in a slightly different way4 ,suppose ,i am seeing two coins1 lying side by side1 and am not perceiving them in any other way except by sight4 ,it will be plain to everybody1 ,i think1 that1 when ,i identify the one as ,this one and the other as ,that one1 ,i identify them only by reference to the two visual presented objects1 which correspond respectively to the one and to the other4 ,but what may not1 ,i think1 be realised1 is that the sense in which ,i identify them by reference to the corresponding sense-data1 is one which involves that every judgment which ,i make about the one is a judgment about the sense-datum which corresponds to it1 and every judgment ,i make about the other1 a judgment about the sense-datum which corresponds to it3 ,i simply cannot make a judgment about either1 which is not a judgment about the corresponding sense-datum4 ,but if the two coins were given to me1 in the sense in which the two sense-data are1 this would certainly not be the case4 ,i can identify and distinguish the two sense-data directly1 this as this one1 and that as that one3 ,i do not need to identify either as the thing which has this relation to this other thing4 ,but ,i certainly cannot thus directly identify the two coins4 ,i have not four things presented to me 7#a7 this sense-datum1 7#b7 that sense-datum1 7#c7 this coin1 and 7#d7 that coin1 but two only--this sense-datum and that sense-datum4 ,when1 therefore1 ,i judge ,this is a coin1 my judgment is certainly a judgment about the one sense-datum1 and when ,i judge ,and that is also a coin1 it is certainly a judgment about the other4 ,only1 in spite of what my language might seem to imply1 ,i am certainly not judging either of the one sense-datum that it is a whole coin1 nor yet of the other that it is one4 ,this1 then1 seems to me fundamentally certain about judgments of this kind4 ,whenever we make such a judgment we can easily pick out an object 7whether we call it a sensation or a sense-datum1 or not71 which is1 in an easily intelligible sense1 the object which is the real or ultimate subject of our judgment2 and yet1 in many cases at all events1 what we are judging with regard to this object is certainly not that it is an object of the kind1 for which the term which appears to express the predicate of our judgment is a name4 ,but if this be so1 what is it that ,i am judging1 in all such cases1 about the presented object1 which is the real or ultimate subject of my judgment8 ,it is at this point that we come to questions which seem to me to be really uncertain and difficult to answer4 ,to begin with1 there is one answer which is naturally suggested by the reason ,i have given for saying that1 in this case1 it is quite obvious that ,i am not judging1 with regard to this presented object1 that it is an inkstand1 whereas it is not in the same way1 quite obvious that1 in making such a judgment as ,this is a soap-bubble or ,this is a drop of water1 ,i may not be judging1 of the object about which my judgment is1 that that very object really is a soap-bubble or a drop of water4 ,the reason ,i gave is that it is quite obvious that ,i do not take this presented object to be a whole inkstand3 that1 at most1 ,i only take it to be part of the surface of an inkstand4 ,and this reason naturally suggests that the true answer to our question may be that what ,i am judging of the presented object is just that it is a part of the surface of an inkstand4 ,this answer seems to me to be obviously on quite a different level from the suggestion that ,i am judging it really to be an inkstand4 ,it is not childishly obvious that ,i am not judging it to be part of the surface of an inkstand1 as it is that ,i am not judging it to be an inkstand--a whole one4 ,on this view1 when ,i say such things as ,that is an inkstand1 ,that is a door1 ,this is a coin1 these expressions would really only be a loose way of saying ,that is part of the surface of an inkstand1 ,that is part of the surface of a door1 ,this is part of the surface of a coin4 ,and there would1 ,i think1 plainly be nothing surprising in the fact that we should use language thus loosely4 ,what1 at first sight1 appears to be a paradox1 namely that1 whereas ,i appear to be asserting of a given thing that it is of a certain kind1 ,i am not really asserting of the thing in question that it is of that kind at all1 would be susceptible of an easy explanation4 ,and moreover1 if this view were true1 it would offer an excellent illustration of the difference between a thing known only by description and a thing not so known1 and would show how entirely free from mystery that distinction is4 ,on this view1 when ,i judge ,that inkstand is a good big one ,i shall in effect be judging3 ,there is one and only one inkstand of which this is part of the surface1 and the inkstand of which this is true is a good big one4 ,it would be quite clear that the part of the surface of the inkstand was given to me in a sense in which the whole was not1 just as it is in fact clear that ,i do now see this part of the surface of this inkstand1 in a sense in which ,i do not see the whole2 and that my judgment1 while it is1 in fact1 about both the whole inkstand1 and also about one particular part of its surface1 is about them in two entirely different senses4 ,this view is one1 which it is at first sight1 ,i think1 very natural to suppose to be true4 ,but before giving the reasons1 why1 nevertheless1 it seems to me extremely doubtful1 ,i think it is desirable to try to explain more precisely what ,i mean by it4 ,the word part is one which is often used extremely vaguely in philosophy2 and ,i can imagine that some people would be willing to assent to the proposition that this sense-datum really is1 in some sense or other1 a part of this inkstand1 and that what ,i am judging with regard to it1 when ,i judge ,this is an inkstand1 is1 in effect1 ,there is an inkstand1 of which this is a part1 who would be far from allowing that this can possibly be what ,i am judging1 when once they understand what the sense is in which ,i am here using the word part4 ,what this sense is1 ,i am quite unable to define2 but ,i hope ,i may be able to make my meaning sufficiently clear1 by giving instances of things which are undoubtedly parts of other things in the sense in question4 ,there is1 it seems to me1 a sense of the word part1 in which we all constantly use the word with perfect precision1 and1 which1 therefore1 we all understand very well1 however little we may be able to define it4 ,it is the sense in which the trunk of any tree is undoubtedly a part of that tree2 in which this finger of mine is undoubtedly a part of my hand1 and my hand a part of my body4 ,this is a sense in which every part of a material thing or physical object is itself a material thing or physical object2 and it is1 so far as ,i can see1 the only proper sense in which a material thing can be said to have parts4 ,the view which ,i wish to discuss is the view that ,i am judging this presented object to be a part of an inkstand1 in this sense4 ,and the nature of the view can perhaps be brought out more clearly1 by mentioning one important corollary which would follow from it4 ,i am1 of course1 at this moment1 seeing many parts of the surface of this inkstand4 ,but all these parts1 except one1 are1 in fact1 themselves parts of that one4 ,that one is the one of which we should naturally speak as the part of the surface that ,i am now seeing or as this part of the surface of this inkstand4 ,there is only one part of the surface of this inkstand1 which does thus contain1 as parts1 all the other parts that ,i am now seeing4 ,and1 if it were true that ,i am judging this presented object to be a part of the surface of an inkstand at all1 in the sense ,i mean1 it would follow that this presented object must1 if my judgment ,this is an inkstand be true 7as it certainly is71 be identical with this part1 which contains all the other parts which ,i am seeing2 since there is plainly no other part with which it could possibly be identified4 ,that is to say1 if ,i am really judging of this presented object that it is part of the surface of an inkstand1 in the sense ,i mean1 it must be the case that everything which is true of what ,i should call this part of the surface of this inkstand is1 in fact1 true of this presented object4 ,this view1 therefore1 that what we are judging of the ultimate subject of our judgment1 when we judge ,this is a so-and-so1 is1 in general1 merely that the subject in question is a part of a thing of the kind in question1 can1 ,i think1 be most clearly discussed1 by asking whether1 in this case1 this presented object can really be identical with this part of the surface of this inkstand4 ,if it can't1 then most certainly ,i am not judging of it that it is a part of the surface of an inkstand at all4 ,for my judgment1 whatever it is1 is true4 ,and yet1 if this presented object is not identical with this part of the surface of this inkstand1 it certainly is not a part of an inkstand at all2 since there is no other part1 either of this inkstand or of any other1 with which it could possibly be supposed to be identical4 ,can we1 then1 hold that this sense-datum really is identical with this part of the surface of this inkstand8 ,that everything which is true of the one is true of the other8 ,an enormous number of very familiar arguments have been used by various philosophers1 which1 if they were sound1 would show that we can not4 ,some of these arguments seem to me to be quite clearly not sound--all1 for instance1 which rest either on the assumption that this sense-datum can only exist so long as it is perceived1 or on the assumption that it can only exist so long as it is perceived by me4 ,of others ,i suspect that they may have some force1 though ,i am quite unable to see that they have any4 ,such1 for instance1 are all those which assume either that this sense-datum is a sensation or feeling of mine1 in a sense which includes the assertion that it is dependent on my mind in the very same sense in which my perception of it obviously is so2 or that it is causally dependent on my body in the sense in which my perception of it admittedly is so4 ,but others do seem to me to have great force4 ,i will1 however1 confine myself to trying to state one1 which seems to me to have as much as any4 ,it will be found that this one involves an assumption1 which does seem to me to have great force1 but which yet seems to me to be doubtful4 ,so far as ,i know1 all good arguments against the view that this sense-datum really is identical with this part of the surface of the inkstand1 do involve this same assumption1 and have no more force than it has4 ,but in this1 of course1 ,i may be wrong4 ,perhaps some one will be able to point out an argument1 which is obviously quite independent of it1 and which yet has force4 ,the argument ,i mean involves considerations which are exceedingly familiar1 so familiar that ,i am afraid every one may be sick of hearing them alluded to4 ,but1 in spite of this fact1 it seems to me not quite easy to put it quite precisely1 in a way which will distinguish it clearly from other arguments involving the same familiar considerations1 but which do not seem to me to be equally cogent4 ,i want1 therefore1 to try to put it with a degree of precision1 which will prevent irrelevant objections from being made to it--objections which would1 ,i think1 be relevant against some of these other arguments1 but are not1 ,i think1 relevant against it4 ,the fact is that we all1 exceedingly commonly1 when1 at each of two times1 separated by a longer or shorter interval1 we see a part of the surface of a material thing1 in the sense in which ,i am now seeing this part of the surface of this inkstand1 or when at one time we see such a surface and at another perceive one by touch1 make1 on the second occasion1 the judgment ,this part of a surface is the same part of the surface of the same thing1 as that which ,i was seeing 7or perceiving by touch7 just now4 ,how commonly we all do this can scarcely be exaggerated4 ,i look at this inkstand1 and then ,i look again1 and on the second occasion ,i judge ,this part of the surface of this inkstand is the same as1 or at least contains a part which is the same as a part of1 the part of its surface which ,i was seeing just now4 ,or ,i look at this finger and then ,i touch it1 and ,i judge1 on the second occasion1 ,this part of the surface of this finger is the same as one of those ,i was seeing just now4 ,we all thus constantly identify a part of a surface of a material thing which we are perceiving at one time with a part which we were perceiving at another4 ,now1 when we do this--when we judge ,this is the same part of the same thing as ,i was seeing or touching just now1 we1 of course1 do not mean to exclude the possibility that the part in question may have changed during the interval2 that it is really different1 on the second occasion1 either in shape or size or quality1 or in all three1 from what it was on the first4 ,that is to say1 the sense of sameness which we are here concerned with is one which clearly does not exclude change4 ,we may even be prepared to assert1 on general grounds1 in all such cases1 that the surface in question certainly must have changed4 ,but nevertheless there is a great difference in one respect1 between two kinds of such cases1 both of which occur exceedingly commonly4 ,if ,i watch somebody blowing air into a child's balloon1 it constantly happens1 at certain stages in the process1 that ,i judge with regard to the part of the surface which ,i am seeing at that stage1 not only that it is larger than it was at an earlier stage1 but that it is perceptibly larger4 ,or1 if ,i pull the face of an india-rubber doll1 ,i may judge at a certain stage in the process that the patch of red colour on its cheek not only is different in shape from what it was at the beginning1 but is perceptibly so2 it may1 for instance1 be a perceptibly flatter ellipse than it was to start with4 ,or1 if ,i watch a person blushing1 ,i may judge at a certain stage that a certain part of the surface of his face not only is different in colour from what it was1 when ,i saw it before he began to blush1 but is perceptibly so--perceptibly redder4 ,in enormous numbers of cases we do thus judge of a surface seen at a given time that it is thus perceptibly different in size1 or in shape1 or in colour1 from what it was when we saw it before4 ,but cases are at least equally numerous in which1 though we might1 on general grounds be prepared to assert that it must have changed in some respect1 we should not be prepared to assert that it had1 in any respect whatever1 changed perceptibly4 ,of this part of this surface of this inkstand1 for instance1 ,i am certainly not prepared to assert that it is now perceptibly different in any respect from what it was when ,i saw it just now4 ,and similar cases are so numerous that ,i need not give further instances4 ,we can1 therefore1 divide cases1 in which we judge1 of a part of a surface which we are seeing1 ,this is the same part of the surface of the same material thing as the one ,i saw just now1 into cases where we should also judge ,but it is perceptibly different from what it was then1 and cases in which1 even though we might assert ,it must be different1 we are certainly not prepared to assert that it is perceptibly so4 ,but now let us consider the cases in which we are not prepared to assert that the surface in question has changed perceptibly4 ,the strange fact1 from which the argument ,i mean is drawn1 is that1 in a very large number of such cases1 it seems as if it were unmistakably true that the presented object1 about which we are making our judgment when we talk of ,this surface at the later time1 is perceptibly different1 from that about which we are making it when we talk of the surface ,i saw just now4 ,if1 at the later time1 ,i am at a sufficiently greater distance from the surface1 the presented object which corresponds to it at the time seems to be perceptibly smaller1 than the one which corresponded to it before4 ,if ,i am looking at it from a sufficiently oblique angle1 the later presented object often seems to be perceptibly different in shape--a perceptibly flatter ellipse1 for instance4 ,if ,i am looking at it1 with blue spectacles on1 when formerly ,i had none1 the later presented object seems to be perceptibly different in colour from the earlier one4 ,if ,i am perceiving it by touch alone1 whereas formerly ,i was perceiving it by sight alone1 the later presented object seems to be perceptibly different from the earlier1 in respect of the fact that it is not coloured at all1 whereas the earlier was1 and that1 on the other hand1 it has certain tactual qualities1 which the earlier had not got4 ,all this seems to be as plain as it can be1 and yet it makes absolutely no difference to the fact that of the surface in question we are not prepared to judge that it is perceptibly different from what it was4 ,sometimes1 of course1 where there seems to be no doubt that the later presented object is perceptibly different from the earlier1 we may not notice that it is so4 ,but even where we do notice the apparent difference1 we do still continue to judge of the surface in question3 ,this surface is not1 so far as ,i can tell with certainty by perception1 in any way different from what it was when ,i saw it or touched it just now2 ,i am not prepared to assert that it has changed perceptibly4 ,it seems1 therefore1 to be absolutely impossible that the surface seen at the later time should be identical with the object presented then1 and the surface seen at the earlier identical with the object presented then1 for the simple reason that1 whereas with regard to the later seen surface ,i am not prepared to judge that it is in any way perceptibly different from that seen earlier1 it seems that with regard to the later sense-datum ,i cannot fail to judge that it is perceptibly different from the earlier one3 the fact that they are perceptibly different simply stares me in the face4 ,it seems1 in short1 that when1 in such a case1 ,i judge3 ,this surface is not1 so far as ,i can tell1 perceptibly different from the one ,i saw just now1 ,i cannot possibly be judging of the presented object ,this is not1 so far as ,i can tell1 perceptibly different from that object which was presented to me just now1 for the simple reason that ,i can tell1 as certainly1 almost1 as ,i can tell anything1 that it is perceptibly different4 ,that is the argument1 as well as ,i can put it1 for saying that this presented object1 is not identical with this part of the surface of this inkstand2 and that1 therefore1 when ,i judge ,this is part of the surface of an inkstand1 ,i am not judging of this presented object1 which nevertheless is the ultimate subject of my judgment1 that it is part of the surface of an inkstand4 ,and this argument does seem to me to be a very powerful one4 ,but nevertheless it does not seem to me to be quite conclusive1 because it rests on an assumption1 which1 though it seems to me to have great force1 does not seem to me quite certain4 ,the assumption ,i mean is the assumption that1 in such cases as those ,i have spoken of1 the later presented object really is perceptibly different from the earlier4 ,this assumption has1 if ,i am not mistaken1 seemed to many philosophers to be quite unquestionable2 they have never even thought of questioning it2 and ,i own that it used to be so with me4 ,and ,i am still not sure that ,i may not be talking sheer nonsense in suggesting that it can be questioned4 ,but1 if ,i am1 ,i am no longer able to see that ,i am4 ,what now seems to me to be possible is that the sense-datum which corresponds to a tree1 which ,i am seeing1 when ,i am a mile off1 may not really be perceived to be smaller than the one1 which corresponds to the same tree1 when ,i see it from a distance of only a hundred yards1 but that it is only perceived to seem smaller2 that the sense-datum which corresponds to a penny1 which ,i am seeing obliquely1 is not really perceived to be different in shape from that which corresponded to the penny1 when ,i was straight in front of it1 but is only perceived to seem different--that all that is perceived is that the one seems elliptical and the other circular2 that the sense-datum presented to me when ,i have the blue spectacles on is not perceived to be different in colour from the one presented to me when ,i have not1 but only to seem so2 and finally that the sense-datum presented when ,i touch this finger is not perceived to be different in any way from that presented to me when ,i see it1 but only to seem so that ,i do not perceive the one to be coloured and the other not to be so1 but only that the one seems coloured and the other not4 ,if such a view is to be possible1 we shall have1 of course1 to maintain that the kind of experience which ,i have expressed by saying one seems different from the other--seems circular1 seems blue1 seems coloured1 and so on--involves an ultimate1 not further analysable1 kind of psychological relation1 not to be identified either with that involved in being perceived to be so and so1 or with that involved in being judged to be so and so2 since a presented object might1 in this sense1 seem to be elliptical1 seem to be blue1 etc41 when it is neither perceived to be so1 nor judged to be so4 ,but there seems to me to be no reason why there should not be such an ultimate relation4 ,the great objection to such a view seems to me to be the difficulty of believing that ,i don't actually perceive this sense-datum to be red1 for instance1 and that other to be elliptical2 that ,i only perceive1 in many cases1 that it seems so4 ,i cannot1 however1 now persuade myself that it is quite clear that ,i do perceive it to be so4 ,and1 if ,i don't1 then it seems really possible that this presented object really is identical with this part of the surface of this inkstand2 since1 when ,i judge1 as in the cases supposed1 that the surface in question is not1 so far as ,i can tell1 perceptibly different from what it was1 ,i might really be judging of the two sense-data that they also were not1 so far as ,i can tell1 perceptibly different1 the only difference between the two that is perceptible1 being that the one seems to be of a certain size1 shape or colour1 and the other to be of a different and incompatible size1 shape or colour4 ,of course1 in those cases1 as in that of the balloon being blown up1 where ,i perceive that the surface has changed1 e4g4 in size1 it would have to be admitted that ,i do perceive of the two sense-data not merely that they seem different in size1 but that they are so4 ,but ,i think it would be possible to maintain that the sense in which1 in these cases1 ,i perceive them to be different1 is a different one from that in which1 both in these and in the others1 ,i perceive them to seem so4 ,possibly in making this suggestion that sense-data1 in cases where most philosophers have assumed unhesitatingly that they are perceived to be different1 are only really perceived to seem different1 ,i am1 as ,i said1 talking sheer nonsense1 though ,i cannot1 at the moment1 see that ,i am4 ,and possibly1 even if this suggestion itself is not nonsense1 even if it is true1 there may be other fatal objections to the view that this presented object really is identical with this part of the surface of this inkstand4 ,but what seems to me certain is that1 unless this suggestion is true1 then this presented object is certainly not identical with this part of the surface of this inkstand4 ,and since it is doubtful whether it is not nonsense1 and still more doubtful whether it is true1 it must1 ,i think1 be admitted to be highly doubtful whether the two are identical4 ,but1 if they are not identical1 then what ,i am judging with regard to this presented object1 when ,i judge ,this is an inkstand1 is certainly not that it is itself part of the surface of an inkstand2 and hence1 it is worth while to inquire further1 what1 if ,i am not judging this1 ,i can be judging with regard to it4 ,and here1 ,i think1 the first natural suggestion to make is that just as1 when ,i talk of this inkstand1 what ,i seem really to mean is the inkstand of which this is part of the surface1 so that the inkstand is only known to me by description as the inkstand of which this material surface is part of the surface1 so again when ,i talk of this material surface1 what ,i really mean is the material surface to which this 7presented object7 has a certain relation1 so that this surface is1 in its turn1 only known to me by description as the surface which has a certain relation to this presented object4 ,if that were so1 then what ,i should be judging of this presented object1 when ,i judge ,this is part of the surface of an inkstand1 would be not that it is itself such a part1 but that the thing which stands to it in a certain relation is such a part3 in short1 what ,i should be judging with regard to it1 would be ,there's one thing and one only which stands to this in this relation1 and the thing which does so is part of the surface of an inkstand4 ,but if we are to adopt the view that something of this sort is what we are judging1 there occurs at once the pressing question3 ,what on earth can the relation be with regard to which we are judging1 that one and only one thing stands in it to this presented object8 ,and this is a question to which1 so far as ,i know1 none of those philosophers1 who both hold 7as many do7 that this presented object is not identical with this part of the surface of this inkstand1 and also that there really is something of which it could be truly predicated that it is this part of the surface of this inkstand 7that is to say1 who reject all views of the ,mill-,russell type71 have given anything like a clear answer4 ,it does not seem to have occurred to them that it requires an answer1 chiefly1 ,i think1 because it has not occurred to them to ask what we can be judging when we make judgments of this sort4 ,there are only two answers1 that ,i can think of1 which might be suggested with any plausibility4 ,many philosophers1 who take the view that the presented objects about which we make these judgments are sensations of ours1 and some even who do not1 are in the habit of talking of the causes of these objects as if we knew1 in the case of each1 that it had one and only one cause2 and many of them seem to think that this part of the surface of this inkstand could be correctly described as the cause of this presented object4 ,they suggest1 therefore1 the view that what ,i am judging in this case might be3 ,this presented object has one and only one cause1 and that cause is part of the surface of an inkstand4 ,it seems to me quite obvious that this view1 at all events1 is utterly untenable4 ,i do not believe for a moment1 nor does any one1 and certainly therefore do not judge1 that this presented object has only one cause3 ,i believe that it has a whole series of different causes4 ,i do1 in fact1 believe that this part of the surface of this inkstand is one among the causes of my perception of this presented object3 that seems to me to be a very well established scientific proposition4 ,and ,i am prepared to admit that there may be good reasons for thinking that it is one among the causes of this presented object itself1 though ,i cannot myself see that there are any4 ,but that it is the only cause of this presented object ,i certainly do not believe1 nor1 ,i think1 does anybody1 and hence my judgment certainly cannot be ,the cause of this is part of the surface of an inkstand4 ,it might no doubt1 be possible to define some kind of causal relation1 such that it might be plausibly held that it and it alone causes this presented object in that particular way4 ,but any such definition would1 so far as ,i can see1 be necessarily very complicated4 ,and1 even when we have got it1 it seems to me it would be highly improbable we could truly say that what we are judging in these cases is3 ,this presented object has one and only one cause1 of this special kind4 ,still1 ,i do not wish to deny that some such view may possibly be true4 ,the only other suggestion ,i can make is that there may be some ultimate1 not further definable relation1 which we might for instance1 call the relation of being a manifestation of1 such that we might conceivably be judging3 ,there is one and only one thing of which this presented object is a manifestation1 and that thing is part of the surface of an inkstand4 ,and here again1 it seems to me just possible that this may be a true account of what we are judging2 only ,i cannot find the slightest sign that ,i am in fact aware of any such relation4 ,possibly other suggestions could be made as to what the relation is1 with regard to which it could be plausibly supposed that in all cases1 where we make these judgments we are in fact judging of the presented object ,there is one and only one thing which stands to this object in this relation4 ,but it seems to me at least very doubtful whether there is any such relation at all2 whether1 therefore1 our judgment really is of this form1 and whether therefore1 this part of the surface of this inkstand really is known to me by description as the thing which stands in a certain relation to this presented object4 ,but if it isn't1 and if1 also1 we cannot take the view that what ,i am judging is that this presented object itself is a part of the surface of an inkstand1 there would seem to be no possible alternative but that we must take some view of what ,i have called the ,mill-,russell type4 ,views of this type1 if ,i understand them rightly1 are distinguished from those which ,i have hitherto considered1 by the fact that1 according to them1 there is nothing whatever in the ,universe of which it could truly be predicated that it is this part of the surface of this inkstand1 or indeed that it is a part of the surface of an inkstand1 or an inkstand1 at all4 ,they hold1 in short1 that though there are plenty of material things in the ,universe1 there is nothing in it of which it could truly be asserted that it is a material thing3 that1 though1 when ,i assert ,this is an inkstand1 my assertion is true1 and is such that it follows from it that there is in the ,universe at least one inkstand1 and1 therefore1 at least one material thing1 yet it does not follow from it that there is anything which is a material thing4 ,when ,i judge ,this is an inkstand1 ,i am judging this presented object to possess a certain property1 which is such that1 if there are things1 which possess that property1 there are inkstands and material things1 but which is such that nothing which possesses it is itself a material thing2 so that in judging that there are material things1 we are really always judging of some other property1 which is not that of being a material thing1 that there are things which possess it4 ,it seems to me quite possible1 of course1 that some view of this type is the true one4 ,indeed1 this paper may be regarded1 if you like1 as an argument in favour of the proposition that some such view must be true4 ,certainly one of my main objects in writing it was to put as plainly as ,i can some grave difficulties which seem to me to stand in the way of any other view2 in the hope that some of those1 who reject all views of the ,mill-,russell type1 may explain clearly which of the alternatives ,i have suggested they would adopt1 or whether1 perhaps1 some other which has not occurred to me4 ,it does not seem to me to be always sufficiently realised how difficult it is to find any answer to my question ,what are we judging in these cases8 to which there are not very grave objections1 unless we adopt an answer of the ,mill-,russell type4 ,that an answer of this type is the true one1 ,i am not myself1 in spite of these objections1 by any means convinced4 ,the truth is ,i am completely puzzled as to what the true answer can be4 ,at the present moment1 ,i am rather inclined to favour the view that what ,i am judging of this presented object is that it is itself a part of the surface of an inkstand--that1 therefore1 it really is identical with this part of the surface of this inkstand1 in spite of the fact that this involves the view that1 where1 hitherto1 ,i have always supposed myself to be perceiving of two presented objects that they really were different1 ,i was1 in fact1 only perceiving that they seemed to be different4 ,but1 as ,i have said1 it seems to me quite possible that this view is1 as ,i have hitherto supposed1 sheer nonsense2 and1 in any case1 there are1 no doubt1 other serious objections to the view that this presented object is this part of the surface of this inkstand4 ,,the ,,conception ,,of ,,intrinsic ,,value ,my main object in this paper is to try to define more precisely the most important question1 which1 so far as ,i can see1 is really at issue when it is disputed with regard to any predicate of value1 whether it is or is not a subjective predicate4 ,there are three chief cases in which this controversy is apt to arise4 ,it arises1 first1 with regard to the conceptions of right and wrong1 and the closely allied conception of duty or what ought to be done4 ,it arises1 secondly1 with regard to good and evil1 in some sense of those words in which the conceptions for which they stand are certainly quite distinct from the conceptions of right and wrong1 but in which nevertheless it is undeniable that ethics has to deal with them4 ,and it arises1 lastly1 with regard to certain aesthetic conceptions1 such as beautiful and ugly2 or good and bad1 in the sense in which these words are applied to works of art1 and in which1 therefore1 the question what is good and bad is a question not for ethics but for aesthetics4 ,in all three cases there are people who maintain that the predicates in question are purely subjective1 in a sense which can1 ,i think1 be fairly easily defined4 ,i am not here going to attempt a perfectly accurate definition of the sense in question2 but1 as the term subjective is so desperately ambiguous1 ,i had better try to indicate roughly the sense ,i am thinking of4 ,take the word beautiful for example4 ,there is a sense of the term subjective1 such that to say that beautiful stands for a subjective predicate1 means1 roughly1 that any statement of the form ,this is beautiful merely expresses a psychological assertion to the effect that some particular individual or class of individuals either actually has1 or would1 under certain circumstances1 have1 a certain kind of mental attitude towards the thing in question4 ,and what ,i mean by having a mental attitude towards a thing1 can be best explained by saying that to desire a thing is to have one kind of mental attitude towards it1 to be pleased with it is to have another1 to will it is to have another2 and in short that to have any kind of feeling or emotion towards it is to have a certain mental attitude towards it--a different one in each case4 ,thus anyone who holds that when we say that a thing is beautiful1 what we mean is merely that we ourselves or some particular class of people actually do1 or would under certain circumstances1 have1 or permanently have1 a certain feeling towards the thing in question1 is taking a subjective view of beauty4 ,but in all three cases there are also a good many people who hold that the predicates in question are not1 in this sense subjective2 and ,i think that those who hold this are apt to speak as if the view which they wish to maintain in opposition to it consisted simply and solely in holding its contradictory--in holding1 that is1 that the predicates in question are objective1 where objective simply means the same as not subjective4 ,but in fact ,i think this is hardly ever really the case4 ,in the case of goodness and beauty1 what such people are really anxious to maintain is by no means merely that these conceptions are objective1 but that1 besides being objective1 they are also1 in a sense which ,i shall try to explain1 intrinsic kinds of value4 ,it is this conviction--the conviction that goodness and beauty are intrinsic kinds of value1 which is1 ,i think1 the strongest ground of their objection to any subjective view4 ,and indeed1 when they speak of the objectivity of these conceptions1 what they have in mind is1 ,i believe1 always a conception which has no proper right to be called objectivity1 since it includes as an essential part this other characteristic which ,i propose to call that of being an intrinsic kind of value4 ,the truth is1 ,i believe1 that though1 from the proposition that a particular kind of value is intrinsic it does follow that it must be objective1 the converse implication by no means holds1 but on the contrary it is perfectly easy to conceive theories of e4g4 goodness1 according to which goodness would1 in the strictest sense1 be objective1 and yet would not be intrinsic4 ,there is1 therefore1 a very important difference between the conception of objectivity1 and that which ,i will call internality but yet1 if ,i am not mistaken1 when people talk about the objectivity of any kind of value1 they almost always confuse the two1 owing to the fact that most of those who deny the internality of a given kind of value1 also assert its subjectivity4 ,how great the difference is1 and that it is a fact that those who maintain the objectivity of goodness do1 as a rule1 mean by this not mere objectivity1 but internality1 as well1 can1 ,i think1 be best brought out by considering an instance of a theory1 according to which goodness would be objective but would not be intrinsic4 ,let us suppose it to be held1 for instance1 that what is meant by saying that one type of human being ,a is better than another type ,b1 is merely that the course of evolution tends to increase the numbers of type ,a and to decrease those of type ,b4 ,such a view has1 in fact1 been often suggested1 even if it has not been held in this exact form2 it amounts merely to the familiar suggestion that better means better fitted to survive4 ,obviously better1 on this interpretation of its meaning1 is in no sense a subjective conception3 the conception of belonging to a type which tends to be favoured by the struggle for existence more than another is as objective as any conception can be4 ,but yet1 if ,i am not mistaken1 all those who object to a subjective view of goodness1 and insist upon its objectivity1 would object just as strongly to this interpretation of its meaning as to any subjective interpretation4 ,obviously1 therefore1 what they are really anxious to contend for is not merely that goodness is objective1 since they are here objecting to a theory which is objective2 but something else4 ,and this something else is1 ,i think1 certainly just that it is intrinsic--a character which is just as incompatible with this objective evolutionary interpretation as with any and every subjective interpretation4 ,for if you say that to call type ,a better than type ,b means merely that it is more favoured in the struggle for existence1 it follows that the being better is a predicate which does not depend merely on the intrinsic nature of ,a and ,b respectively4 ,on the contrary1 although here and now ,a may be more favoured than ,b1 it is obvious that under other circumstances or with different natural laws the very same type ,b might be more favoured than ,a1 so that the very same type which1 under one set of circumstances1 is better than ,b1 would1 under another set1 be worse4 ,here1 then1 we have a case where an interpretation of goodness1 which does make it objective1 is incompatible with its being intrinsic4 ,and it is just this same fact--the fact that1 on any subjective interpretation1 the very same kind of thing which1 under some circumstances1 is better than another1 would1 under others1 be worse--which constitutes1 so far as ,i can see1 the fundamental objection to all subjective interpretations4 ,obviously1 therefore1 to express this objection by saying that goodness is objective is very incorrect2 since goodness might quite well be objective and yet not possess the very characteristic which it is mainly wished to assert that it has4 ,in the case1 therefore1 of ethical and aesthetic goodness1 ,i think that what those who contend for the objectivity of these conceptions really wish to contend for is not mere objectivity at all1 but principally and essentially that they are intrinsic kinds of value4 ,but in the case of right and wrong and duty1 the same cannot be said1 because many of those who object to the view that these conceptions are subjective1 nevertheless do not hold that they are intrinsic4 ,we cannot1 therefore1 say that what those who contend for the objectivity of right and wrong really mean is always chiefly that those conceptions are intrinsic1 but we can1 ,i think1 say that what they do mean is certainly not objectivity in this case any more than the other2 since here1 just as there1 it would be possible to find certain views1 which are in every sense objective1 to which they would object just as strongly as to any subjective view4 ,and though what is meant by objectivity in this case1 is not that right and wrong are themselves intrinsic1 what is1 ,i think1 meant here too is that they have a fixed relation to a kind of value which is intrinsic4 ,it is this fixed relation to an intrinsic kind of value1 so far as ,i can see1 which gives to right and wrong that kind and degree of fixity and impartiality which they actually are felt to possess1 and which is what people are thinking of when they talk of their objectivity4 ,here1 too1 therefore1 to talk of the characteristic meant as objectivity is just as great a misnomer as in the other cases2 since though it is a characteristic which is incompatible with any kind of subjectivity1 it is also incompatible1 for the same reason1 with many kinds of objectivity4 ,for these reasons ,i think that what those who contend for the objectivity of certain kinds of value1 or for the objectivity of judgments of value1 commonly have in mind is not really objectivity at all1 but either that the kinds of value in question are themselves intrinsic1 or else that they have a fixed relation to some kind that is so4 ,the conception upon which they really wish to lay stress is not that of objective value1 but that of intrinsic value1 though they confuse the two4 ,and ,i think this is the case to a considerable extent not only with the defenders of so-called objectivity1 but also with its opponents4 ,many of those who hold strongly 7as many do7 that all kinds of value are subjective certainly object to the so-called objective view1 not so much because it is objective1 as because it is not naturalistic ox positivistic--a characteristic which does naturally follow from the contention that value is intrinsic1 but does not follow from the mere contention that it is objective4 ,to a view which is at the same time both naturalistic or positivistic and also objective1 such as the ,evolutionary view which ,i sketched just now1 they do not feel at all the same kind or degree of objection as to any so-called objective view4 ,with regard to so-called objective views they are apt to feel not only that they are false1 but that they involve a particularly poisonous kind of falsehood--the erecting into a metaphysical entity of what is really susceptible of a simple naturalistic explanation4 ,they feel that to hold such a view is not merely to make a mistake1 but to make a superstitious mistake4 ,they feel the same kind of contempt for those who hold it1 which we are apt to feel towards those whom we regard as grossly superstitious1 and which is felt by certain persons for what they call metaphysics4 ,obviously1 therefore1 what they really object to is not simply the view that these predicates are objective1 but something else--something which does not at all follow from the contention that they are objective1 but which does follow from the contention that they are intrinsic4 ,in disputes1 therefore1 as to whether particular kinds of value are or are not subjective1 ,i think that the issue which is really felt to be important1 almost always by one side1 and often by both1 is not really the issue between subjective and non-subjective1 but between intrinsic and non-intrinsic4 ,and not only is this felt to be the more important issue2 ,i think it really is so4 ,for the difference that must be made to our view of the ,universe1 according as we hold that some kinds of value are intrinsic or that none are1 is much greater than any which follows from a mere difference of opinion as to whether some are non-subjective1 or all without exception subjective4 ,to hold that any kinds of value are intrinsic entails the recognition of a kind of predicate extremely different from any we should otherwise have to recognise and perhaps unique2 whereas it is in any case certain that there are objective predicates as well as subjective4 ,but now what is this internality of which ,i have been speaking8 ,what is meant by saying with regard to a kind of value that it is intrinsic8 ,to express roughly what is meant is1 ,i think1 simple enough2 and everybody will recognise it at once1 as a notion which is constantly in people's heads2 but ,i want to dwell upon it at some length1 because ,i know of no place where it is expressly explained and defined1 and because1 though it seems very simple and fundamental1 the task of defining it precisely is by no moans easy and involves some difficulties which ,i must confess that ,i do not know how to solve4 ,i have already given incidentally the main idea in speaking of that evolutionary interpretation of goodness1 according to which1 as ,i said1 goodness would be objective but would not be intrinsic4 ,i there used as equivalent to the assertion that 'better1' on that definition1 would not be 'intrinsic1' the assertion that the question whether one type of being ,a was better than another ,b would not depend solely on the intrinsic natures of ,a and ,b1 but on circumstances and the laws of nature4 ,and ,i think that this phrase will in fact suggest to everybody just what ,i do mean by intrinsic value4 ,we can1 in fact1 set up the following definition4 ,to say that a kind of value is intrinsic means merely that the question whether a thing possesses it1 and in what degree it possesses it1 depends solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing in question4 ,but though this definition does1 ,i think1 convey exactly what ,i mean1 ,i want to dwell upon its meaning1 partly because the conception of 'differing in intrinsic nature which ,i believe to be of fundamental importance1 is liable to be confused with other conceptions1 and partly because the definition involves notions1 which ,i do not know how to define exactly4 ,when ,i say1 with regard to any particular kind of value1 that the question whether and in what degree anything possesses it depends solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing in question1 ,i mean to say two different things at the same time4 ,i mean to say 7#a7 that it is impossible for what is strictly one and the same thing to possess that kind of value at one time1 or in one set of circumstances1 and not to possess it at another2 and equally impossible for it to possess it in one degree at one time1 or in one set of circumstances1 and to possess it in a different degree at another1 or in a different set4 ,this1 ,i think1 is obviously part of what is naturally conveyed by saying that the question whether and in what degree a thing possesses the kind of value in question always depends solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing4 ,for if x and y have different intrinsic natures1 it follows that x cannot be quite strictly one and the same thing as y2 and hence if x and y can have a different intrinsic value1 only where their intrinsic natures are different1 it follows that one and the same thing must always have the same intrinsic value4 ,this1 then1 is part of what is meant2 and about this part ,i think ,i need say no more1 except to call attention to the fact that it involves a conception1 which as we shall see is also involved in the other part1 and which involves the same difficulty in both cases--,i mean1 the conception which is expressed by the word 'impossible4' 7#b7 ,the second part of what is meant is that if a given thing possesses any kind of intrinsic value in a certain degree1 then not only must that same thing possess it1 under all circumstances1 in the same degree1 but also anything exactly like it1 must1 under all circumstances1 possess it in exactly the same degree4 ,or to put it in the corresponding negative form3 ,it is impossible that of two exactly similar things one should possess it and the other not1 or that one should possess it in one degree1 and the other in a different one4 ,i think this second proposition also is naturally conveyed by saying that the kind of value in question depends solely on the intrinsic nature of what possesses it4 ,for we should naturally say of two things which were exactly alike intrinsically1 in spite of their being two1 that they possessed the same intrinsic nature4 ,but it is important to call attention expressly to the fact that what ,i mean by the expression 'having a different intrinsic nature' is equivalent to 'not exactly alike' because here there is real risk of confusion between this conception and a different one4 ,this comes about as follows4 ,it is natural to suppose that the phrase 'having a different intrinsic nature' is equivalent to the phrase 'intrinsically different' or 'having different intrinsic properties4' ,but1 if we do make this identification1 there is a risk of confusion4 ,for it is obvious that there is a sense in which1 when things are exactly like1 they must be 'intrinsically different' and have different intrinsic properties1 merely because they are two4 ,for instance1 two patches of colour may be exactly alike1 in spite of the fact that each possesses a constituent which the other does not possess1 provided only that their two constituents are exactly alike4 ,and yet1 in a certain sense1 it is obvious that the fact that each has a constituent1 which the other has not got1 does constitute an intrinsic difference between them1 and implies that each has an intrinsic property which the other has not got4 ,and even where the two things are simple the mere fact that they are numerically different does in a sense constitute an intrinsic difference between them1 and each will have at least one intrinsic property which the other has not got--namely that of being identical with itself4 ,it is obvious therefore that the phrases 'intrinsically different' and 'having different intrinsic properties' are ambiguous4 ,they may be used in such a sense that to say of two things that they are intrinsically different or have different intrinsic properties does not imply that they are not exactly alike1 but only that they are numerically different4 ,or they may be used in a sense in which two things can be said to be intrinsically different1 and to have different intrinsic properties only when they are not exactly alike4 ,it is1 therefore1 extremely important to insist that when ,i say3 ,two things can differ in intrinsic value1 only when they have different intrinsic natures1 ,i am using the expression 'having different intrinsic natures' in the latter sense and not the former3--in a sense in which the mere fact that two things are two1 or differ numerically1 does not imply that they have different intrinsic natures1 but in which they can be said to have different intrinsic natures1 only where1 besides differing numerically1 they are also not exactly alike4 ,but as soon as this is explained1 another risk of confusion arises owing to the fact that when people contrast mere numerical difference with a kind of intrinsic difference1 which is not merely numerical1 they are apt to identify the latter with qualitative difference4 ,it might1 therefore1 easily be thought that by 'difference in intrinsic nature' ,i mean 'difference in quality4' ,but this identification of difference in quality with difference in intrinsic nature would also be a mistake4 ,it is true that what is commonly meant by difference of quality1 in the strict sense1 always is a difference of intrinsic nature3 two things cannot differ in quality without differing in intrinsic nature2 and that fact is one of the most important facts about qualitative difference4 ,but the converse is by no means also true3 although two things cannot differ in quality without differing in intrinsic nature1 they can differ in intrinsic nature without differing in quality2 or1 in other words1 difference in quality is only one species of difference in intrinsic nature4 ,that this is so follows from the fact that1 as ,i explained1 ,i am using the phrase 'different in intrinsic nature' as equivalent to 'not exactly like for it is quite plain that two things may not be exactly alike1 in spite of the fact that they don't differ in quality1 e4g4 if the only difference between them were in respect of the degree in which they possess some quality they do possess4 ,nobody would say that a very loud sound was exactly like a very soft one1 even if they were exactly like in quality2 and yet it is plain there is a sense in which their intrinsic nature is different ,for this reason alone qualitative difference cannot be identified with difference in intrinsic nature4 ,and there are still other reasons4 ,difference in size1 for instance may be a difference in intrinsic nature1 in the sense ,i mean1 but it can hardly be called a difference in quality4 ,or take such a difference as the difference between two patterns consisting in the fact that the one is a yellow circle with a red spot in the middle1 and the other a yellow circle with a blue spot in the middle4 ,this difference would perhaps be loosely called a difference of quality2 but obviously it would be more accurate to call it a difference which consists in the fact that the one pattern has a constituent which is qualitatively different from any which the other has2 and the difference between being qualitatively different and having qualitatively different constituents is important both because the latter can only be defined in terms of the former1 and because it is possible for simple things to differ from one another in the former way1 whereas it is only possible for complex things to differ in the latter4 ,i hope this is sufficient to make clear exactly what the conception is which ,i am expressing by the phrase different in intrinsic nature4 ,the important points are 7#a7 that it is a kind of difference which does not hold between two things1 when they are merely numerically different1 but only when1 besides being numerically different1 they are also not exactly alike and 7#b7 that it is not identical with qualitative difference2 although qualitative difference is one particular species of it4 ,the conception seems to me to be an extremely important and fundamental one1 although1 so far as ,i can see1 it has no quite simple and unambiguous name3 and this is the reason why ,i have dwelt on it at such length4 ,not exactly like is the least ambiguous way of expressing it2 but this has the disadvantage that it looks as if the idea of exact likeness were the fundamental one from which this was derived1 whereas ,i believe the contrary to be the case4 ,for this reason it is perhaps better to stick to the cumbrous phrase different in intrinsic nature4 ,so much for the question what is meant by saying of two things that they differ in intrinsic nature4 ,we have now to turn to the more difficult question as to what is meant by the words impossible and necessary in the statement3 ,a kind of value is intrinsic if and only if1 it is impossible that x and y should have different values of the kind1 unless they differ in intrinsic nature2 and in the equivalent statement3 ,a kind of value is intrinsic if and only if1 when anything possesses it1 that same thing or anything exactly like it would necessarily or must always1 under all circumstances1 possess it in exactly the same degree4 ,as regards the meaning of this necessity and impossibility1 we may begin by making two points clear4 7#a7 ,it is sometimes contended1 and with some plausibility1 that what we mean by saying that it is possible for a thing which possesses one predicate ,f to possess another ,g1 is1 sometimes at least1 merely that some things which possess ,f do in fact also possess ,g4 ,and if we give this meaning to possible1 the corresponding meaning of the statement it is impossible for a thing which possesses ,f to possess ,g will be merely3 ,things which possess ,f never do in fact possess ,g4 ,if1 then1 we understood impossible in this sense1 the condition for the internality of a kind of value1 which ,i have stated by saying that if a kind of value is to be intrinsic it must be impossible for two things to possess it in different degrees1 if they are exactly like one another1 will amount merely to saying that no two things which are exactly like one another ever do1 in fact1 possess it in different degrees4 ,it follows1 that1 if this were all that were meant1 this condition would be satisfied1 if only it were true 7as for all ,i know it may be7 that1 in the case of all things which possess any particular kind of intrinsic value1 there happens to be nothing else in the ,universe exactly like any one of them2 for if this were so1 it would1 of course1 follow that no two things which are exactly alike did in fact possess the kind of value in question in different degrees1 for the simple reason that everything which possessed it at all would be unique in the sense that there was nothing else exactly like it4 ,if this were all that were meant1 therefore1 we could prove any particular kind of value to satisfy this condition1 by merely proving that there never has in fact and never will be anything exactly like any one of the things which possess it3 and our assertion that it satisfied this condition would merely be an empirical generalisation4 ,moreover if this were all that was meant it would obviously be by no means certain that purely subjective predicates could not satisfy the condition in question2 since it would be satisfied by any subjective predicate of which it happened to be true that everything which possessed it was1 in fact1 unique--that there was nothing exactly like it2 and for all ,i know there may be many subjective predicates of which this is true4 ,it is1 therefore1 scarcely necessary to say that ,i am not using impossible in this sense4 ,when ,i say that a kind of value1 to be intrinsic1 must satisfy the condition that it must be impossible for two things exactly alike to possess it in different degrees1 ,i do not mean by this condition anything which a kind of value could be proved to satisfy1 by the mere empirical fact that there was nothing else exactly like any of the things which possessed it4 ,it is1 of course1 an essential part of my meaning that we must be able to say not merely that no two exactly similar things do in fact possess it in different degrees1 but that1 if there had been or were going to be anything exactly similar to a thing which does possess it1 even though1 in fact1 there has not and won't be any such thing1 that thing would have possessed or would possess the kind of value in question in exactly the same degree4 ,it is essential to this meaning of impossibility that it should entitle us to assert what would have been the case1 under conditions which never have been and never will be realised2 and it seems obvious that no mere empirical generalisation can entitle us to do this4 ,but 7#b7 to say that ,i am not using 'necessity' in this first sense1 is by no means sufficient to explain what ,i do mean4 ,for it certainly seems as if causal laws 7though this is disputed7 do entitle us to make assertions of the very kind that mere empirical generalisations do not entitle us to make4 ,in virtue of a causal law we do seem to be entitled to assert such things as that1 if a given thing had had a property or were to have a property ,f which it didn't have or won't have1 it would have had or would have some other property ,g4 ,and it might1 therefore1 be thought that the kind of 'necessity' and 'impossibility' ,i am talking of is this kind of causal 'necessity' and 'impossibility4' ,it is1 therefore1 important to insist that ,i do not mean this kind either4 ,if this were all ,i meant1 it would again be by no means obvious1 that purely subjective predicates might not satisfy our second condition4 ,it may1 for instance1 for all ,i know1 be true that there are causal laws which insure that in the case of everything that is 'beautiful1' anything exactly like any of these things would1 in this ,universe1 excite a particular kind of feeling in everybody to whom it were presented in a particular way3 and if that were so1 we should have a subjective predicate which satisfied the condition that1 when a given thing possesses that predicate1 it is impossible 7in the causal sense7 that any exactly similar thing should not also possess it4 ,the kind of necessity ,i am talking of is not1 therefore1 mere causal necessity either4 ,when ,i say that if a given thing possesses a certain degree of intrinsic value1 anything precisely similar to it would necessarily have possessed that value in exactly the same degree1 ,i mean that it would have done so1 even if it had existed in a ,universe in which the causal laws were quite different from what they are in this one4 ,i mean1 in short1 that it is impossible for any precisely similar thing to possess a different value1 in precisely such a sense as that1 in which it is1 ,i think1 generally admitted that it is not impossible that causal laws should have been different from what they are--a sense of impossibility1 therefore1 which certainly does not depend merely on causal laws4 ,that there is such a sense of necessity--a sense which entitles us to say that what has ,f would have ,g1 even if causal laws were quite different from what they are--is1 ,i think1 quite clear from such instances as the following4 ,suppose you take a particular patch of colour1 which is yellow4 ,we can1 ,i think1 say with certainty that any patch exactly like that one1 would be yellow1 even if it existed in a ,universe in which causal laws were quite different from what they are in this one4 ,we can say that any such patch must be yellow1 quite unconditionally1 whatever the circumstances1 and whatever the causal laws4 ,and it is in a sense similar to this1 in respect of the fact that it is neither empirical nor causal1 that ,i mean the 'must' to be understood1 when ,i say that if a kind of value is to be 'intrinsic1' then1 supposing a given-thing possesses it in a certain degree1 anything exactly like that thing must possess it in exactly the same degree4 ,to say1 of 'beauty' or 'goodness' that they are 'intrinsic' is only1 therefore1 to say that this thing which is obviously true of 'yellowness' and 'blueness' and 'redness' is true of them4 ,and if we give this sense to 'must' in our definition1 then ,i think it is obvious that to say of a given kind of value that it is intrinsic is inconsistent with its being 'subjective4' ,for there is1 ,i think1 pretty clearly no subjective predicate of which we can say thus unconditionally1 that1 if a given thing possesses it1 then anything exactly like that thing1 would1 under any circumstances1 and under any causal laws1 also possess it4 ,for instance1 whatever kind of feeling you take1 it is plainly not true that supposing ,i have that feeling towards a given thing ,a1 then ,i should necessarily under any circumstances have that feeling towards anything precisely similar to ,a3 for the simple reason that a thing precisely similar to ,a might exist in a ,universe in which ,i did not exist at all4 ,and similarly it is not true of any feeling whatever1 that if somebody has that feeling towards a given thing ,a1 then1 in arty ,universe1 in which a thing precisely similar to ,a existed1 somebody would have that feeling towards it4 ,nor finally is it even true1 that if it is true of a given thing ,a1 that1 under actual causal laws1 any one to whom ,a were presented in a certain way would have a certain feeling towards it1 then the same hypothetical predicate would1 in any ,universe1 belong to anything precisely similar to ,a3 in every case it seems to be possible that there might be a ,universe1 in which the causal laws were such that the proposition would not be true4 ,it is1 then1 because in my definition of 'intrinsic' value the 'must' is to be understood in this unconditional sense1 that ,i think that the proposition that a kind of value is 'intrinsic' is inconsistent with its being subjective4 ,but it should be observed that in holding that there is this inconsistency1 ,i am contradicting a doctrine which seems to be held by many philosophers4 ,there are1 as you probably know1 some philosophers who insist strongly on a doctrine which they express by saying that no relations are purely external4 ,and so far as ,i can make out one thing which they mean by this is just that1 whenever r has any relation whatever which y has not got1 x and y cannot be exactly alike3 ,that any difference in relation necessarily entails a difference in intrinsic nature4 ,there is1 ,i think1 no doubt that when these philosophers say this1 they mean by their 'cannot' and 'necessarily' an unconditional 'cannot' and 'must4' ,and hence it follows they are holding that1 if1 for instance1 a thing ,a pleases me now1 then any other thing1 ,b1 precisely similar to ,a1 must1 under any circumstances1 and in any ,universe1 please me also3 since1 if ,b did not please me1 it would not possess a relation which ,a does possess1 and therefore1 by their principle1 could not be precisely similar to ,a--must differ from it in intrinsic nature4 ,but it seems to me to be obvious that this principle is false4 ,if it were true1 it would follow that ,i can know a priori such things as that no patch of colour which is seen by you and is not seen by me is ever exactly like any patch which is seen by me and is not seen by you2 or that no patch of colour which is surrounded by a red ring is ever exactly like one which is not so surrounded4 ,but it is surely obvious1 that1 whether these things are true or not they are things which ,i cannot know a priori4 ,it is simply not evident a priori that no patch of colour which is seen by ,a and not by ,b is ever exactly like one which is seen by ,b and not by ,a1 and that no patch of colour which is surrounded by a red ring is ever exactly like one which is not4 ,and this illustration serves to bring out very well both what is meant by saying of such a predicate as 'beautiful 'that it is intrinsic1' and why1 if it is1 it cannot be subjective4 ,what is meant is just that if ,a is beautiful and ,b is not1 you could know a priori that ,a and ,b are not exactly alike2 whereas1 with any such subjective predicate1 as that of exciting a particular feeling in me1 or that of being a thing which would excite such a feeling in any spectator1 you cannot tell a priori that a thing ,a which did possess such a predicate and a thing ,b which did not1 could not be exactly alike4 ,it seems to me1 therefore1 quite certain1 in spite of the dogma that no relations are purely external1 that there are many predicates1 such for instance as most 7if not all7 subjective predicates or the objective one of being surrounded by a red ring1 which do not depend solely on the intrinsic nature of what possesses them3 or1 in other words1 of which it is not true that if x possesses them and y does not1 x and y must differ in intrinsic nature4 ,but what precisely is meant by this unconditional 'must1' ,i must confess ,i don't know4 ,the obvious thing to suggest is that it is the logical 'must1' which certainly is unconditional in just this sense3 the kind of necessity1 which we assert to hold1 for instance1 when we say that whatever is a right-angled triangle must be a triangle1 or that whatever is yellow must be either yellow or blue4 ,but ,i must say ,i cannot see that all unconditional necessity is of this nature4 ,i do not see how it can be deduced from any logical law that1 if a given patch of colour be yellow1 then any patch which were exactly like the first would be yellow too4 ,and similarly in our case of 'intrinsic' value1 though ,i think it is true that beauty1 for instance1 is 'intrinsic1' ,i do not see how it can be deduced from any logical law1 that if ,a is beautiful1 anything that were exactly like ,a would be beautiful too1 in exactly the same degree4 ,moreover1 though ,i do believe that both yellow 7in the sense in which it applies to sense-data7 and beautiful are predicates which1 in this unconditional sense1 depend only on the intrinsic nature of what possesses them1 there seems to me to be an extremely important difference between them which constitutes a further difficulty in the way of getting quite clear as to what this unconditional sense of must is4 ,the difference ,i mean is one which ,i am inclined to express by saying that though both yellowness and beauty are predicates which depend only on the intrinsic nature of what possesses them1 yet while yellowness is itself an intrinsic predicate1 beauty is not4 ,indeed it seems to me to be one of the most important truths about predicates of value1 that though many of them are intrinsic kinds of value1 in the sense ,i have defined1 yet none of them are intrinsic properties1 in the sense in which such properties as yellow or the property of being a state of pleasure or being a state of things which contains a balance of pleasure are intrinsic properties4 ,it is obvious1 for instance1 that1 if we are to reject all naturalistic theories of value1 we must not only reject those theories1 according to which no kind of value would be intrinsic1 but must also reject such theories as those which assert1 for instance1 that to say that a state of mind is good is to say that it is a state of being pleased2 or that to say that a state of things is good is to say that it contains a balance of pleasure over pain4 ,there are1 in short1 two entirely different types of naturalistic theory1 the difference between which may be illustrated by the difference between the assertion1 ,a is good means ,a is pleasant and the assertion ,a is good means ,a is a state of pleasure4 ,theories of the former type imply that goodness is not an intrinsic kind of value1 whereas theories of the latter type imply equally emphatically that it is3 since obviously such predicates as that of being a state of pleasure1 or containing a balance of pleasure1 are predicates like yellow in respect of the fact that if a given thing possesses them1 anything exactly like the thing in question must possess them4 ,it seems to me equally obvious that both types of theory are false3 but ,i do not know how to exclude them both except by saying that two different propositions are both true of goodness1 namely3 7#a7 that it does depend only on the intrinsic nature of what possesses it--which excludes theories of the first type and 7#b7 that1 though this is so1 it is yet not itself an intrinsic property--which excludes those of the second4 ,it was for this reason that ,i said above that1 if there are any intrinsic kinds of value1 they would constitute a class of predicates which is1 perhaps1 unique2 for ,i cannot think of any other predicate which resembles them in respect of the fact1 that though not itself intrinsic1 it yet shares with intrinsic properties the characteristics of depending solely on the intrinsic nature of what possesses it4 ,so far as ,i know1 certain predicates of value are the only non-intrinsic properties which share with intrinsic properties this characteristic of depending only on the intrinsic nature of what possesses them4 ,if1 however1 we are thus to say that predicates of value1 though dependent solely on intrinsic properties1 are not themselves intrinsic properties1 there must be some characteristic belonging to intrinsic properties which predicates of value never possess4 ,and it seems to me quite obvious that there is2 only ,i can't see what it is4 ,it seems to me quite obvious that if you assert of a given state of things that it contains a balance of pleasure over pain1 you are asserting of it not only a different predicate1 from what you would be asserting of it if you said it was good--but a predicate which is of quite a different kind2 and in the same way that when you assert of a patch of colour that it is yellow1 the predicate you assert is not only different from beautiful1 but of quite a different kind1 in the same way as before4 ,and of course the mere fact that many people have thought that goodness and beauty were subjective is evidence that there is some great difference of kind between them and such predicates as being yellow or containing a balance of pleasure4 ,but what the difference is1 if we suppose1 as ,i suppose1 that goodness and beauty are not subjective1 and that they do share with yellowness and containing pleasure1 the property of depending solely on the intrinsic nature of what possesses them1 ,i confess ,i cannot say4 ,i can only vaguely express the kind of difference ,i feel there to be by saying that intrinsic properties seem to describe the intrinsic nature of what possesses them in a sense in which predicates of value never do4 ,if you could enumerate all the intrinsic properties a given thing possessed1 you would have given a complete description of it1 and would not need to mention any predicates of value it possessed2 whereas no description of a given thing could be complete which omitted any intrinsic property4 ,but1 in any case1 owing to the fact that predicates of intrinsic value are not themselves intrinsic properties1 you cannot define intrinsic property1 in the way which at first sight seems obviously the right one4 ,you cannot say that an intrinsic property is a property such that1 if one thing possesses it and another does not1 the intrinsic nature of the two things must be different4 ,for this is the very thing which we are maintaining to be true of predicates of intrinsic value1 while at the same time we say that they are not intrinsic properties4 ,such a definition of intrinsic property would therefore only be possible if1 we could say that the necessity there is that1 if x and y possess different intrinsic properties1 their nature must be different1 is a necessity of a different kind from the necessity there is that1 if x and y are of different intrinsic values1 their nature must be different1 although both necessities are unconditional4 ,and it seems to me possible that this is the true explanation4 ,but1 if so1 it obviously adds to the difficulty of explaining the meaning of the unconditional must1 since1 in this case1 there would be two different meanings of must1 both unconditional1 and yet neither1 apparently1 identical with the logical must4 ,,external ,,and ,,internal ,,relations ,propositions and terms surrounded by are over-ligned in original4 ,in the index to ,appearance and ,reality 7,first ,edition7 ,mr4 ,bradley declares that all relations are intrinsical2 and the following are some of the phrases by means of which he tries to explain what he means by this assertion4 ,a relation must at both ends affect1 and pass into1 the being of its terms 7p4 #cfd74 ,every relation essentially penetrates the being of its terms1 and is1 in this sense1 intrinsical 7p4 #cib74 ,to stand in a relation and not to be relative1 to support it and yet not to be infected and undermined by it1 seems out of the question 7p4 #adb74 ,and a good many other philosophers seem inclined to take the same view about relations which ,mr4 ,bradley is here trying to express4 ,other phrases which seem to be sometimes used to express it1 or a part of it1 are these3 ,no relations are purely external2 ,all relations qualify or modify or make a difference to the terms between which they hold2 ,no terms are independent of any of the relations in which they stand to other terms4 7,see e4g41 ,joachim1 ,the ,nature of ,truth1 pp4 #aa1 #ab1 #df74 ,it is1 ,i think1 by no means easy to make out exactly what these philosophers mean by these assertions4 ,and the main object of this paper is to try to define clearly one proposition1 which1 even if it does not give the whole of what they mean1 seems to me to be always implied by what they mean1 and to be certainly false4 ,i shall try to make clear the exact meaning of this proposition1 to point out some of its most important consequences1 and to distinguish it clearly from certain other propositions which are1 ,i think1 more or less liable to be confused with it4 ,and ,i shall maintain that1 if we give to the assertion that a relation is internal the meaning which this proposition would give to it1 then1 though1 in that sense1 some relations are internal1 others1 no less certainly1 are not1 but are purely external4 ,to begin with1 we may1 ,i think1 clear the ground1 by putting on one side two propositions about relations1 which1 though they seem sometimes to be confused with the view we are discussing1 do1 ,i think1 quite certainly not give the whole meaning of that view4 ,the first is a proposition which is quite certainly and obviously true of all relations1 without exception1 and which1 though it raises points of great difficulty1 can1 ,i think1 be clearly enough stated for its truth to be obvious4 ,it is the proposition that1 in the case of any relation whatever1 the kind of fact which we express by saying that a given term ,a has that relation to another term ,b1 or to a pair of terms ,b and ,c1 or to three terms ,b1 ,c1 and ,d1 and so on1 in no case simply consists in the terms in question together with the relation4 ,thus the fact which we express by saying that ,edward ,,vii was father of ,george ,v1 obviously does not simply consist in ,edward1 ,george1 and the relation of fatherhood4 ,in order that the fact may be1 it is obviously not sufficient that there should merely be ,george and ,edward and the relation of fatherhood2 it is further necessary that the relation should relate ,edward to ,george1 and not only so1 but also that it should relate them in the particular way which we express by saying that ,edward was father of ,george1 and not merely in the way which we should express by saying that ,george was father of ,edward4 ,this proposition is1 ,i think1 obviously true of all relations without exception3 and the only reason why ,i have mentioned it is because1 in an article in which ,mr4 ,bradley criticises ,mr4 ,russell 7,mind1 #aiaj1 p4 #agi71 he seems to suggest that it is inconsistent with the proposition that any relations are merely external1 and because1 so far as ,i can make out1 some other people who maintain that all relations are internal seem sometimes to think that their contention follows from this proposition4 ,the way in which ,mr4 ,bradley puts it is that such facts are unities which are not completely analysable2 and this is1 of course1 true1 if it means merely that in the case of no such fact is there any set of constituents of which we can truly say3 ,this fact is identical with these constituents4 ,but whether from this it follows that all relations are internal must of course depend upon what is meant by the latter statement4 ,if it be merely used to express this proposition itself1 or anything which follows from it1 then1 of course1 there can be no doubt that all relations are internal4 ,but ,i think there is no doubt that those who say this do not mean by their words merely this obvious proposition itself2 and ,i am going to point out something which ,i think they always imply1 and which certainly does not follow from it4 ,the second proposition which1 ,i think1 may be put aside at once as certainly not giving the whole of what is meant1 is the proposition which is1 ,i think1 the natural meaning of the phrases ,all relations modify or affect their terms or ,all relations make a difference to their terms4 ,there is one perfectly natural and intelligible sense in which a given relation may be said to modify a term which stands in that relation1 namely1 the sense in which we should say that1 if1 by putting a stick of sealing-wax into a flame1 we make the sealing-wax melt1 its relationship to the flame has modified the sealing-wax4 ,this is a sense of the word modify in which part of what is meant by saying of any term that it is modified1 is that it has actually undergone a change3 and ,i think it is clear that a sense in which this is part of its meaning is the only one in which the word modify can properly be used4 ,if1 however1 those who say that all relations modify their terms were using the word in this1 its proper1 sense1 part of what would be meant by this assertion would be that all terms which have relations at all actually undergo changes4 ,such an assertion would be obviously false1 for the simple reason that there are terms which have relation8 and which yet never change at all4 ,and ,i think it is quite clear that those who assert that all relations are internal1 in the sense we are concerned with1 mean by this something which could be consistently asserted to be true of all relations without exception1 even if it were admitted that some terms which have relations do not change4 ,when1 therefore1 they use the phrase that all relations modify their terms as equivalent to all relations are internal1 they must be using modify in some metaphorical sense other than its natural one4 ,i think1 indeed1 that most of them would be inclined to assert that in every case in which a term ,a comes to have to another term ,b a relation1 which it did not have to ,b in some immediately preceding interval1 its having of that relation to that term causes it to undergo some change1 which it would not have undergone if it had not stood in precisely that relation to ,b and ,i think perhaps they would think that this proposition follows from some proposition which is true of all relations1 without exception1 and which is what they mean by saying that all relations are internal4 ,the question whether the coming into a new relation does thus always cause some modification in the term which comes into it is one which is often discussed1 as if it had something to do with the question whether all relations are internal as when1 for instance1 it is discussed whether knowledge of a thing alters the thing known4 ,and for my part ,i should maintain that this proposition is certainly not true4 ,but what ,i am concerned with now is not the question whether it is true1 but simply to point out that1 so far as ,i can see1 it can have nothing to do with the question whether all relations are internal1 for the simple reason that it cannot possibly follow from any proposition with regard to all relations without exception4 ,it asserts with regard to all relational properties of a certain kind1 that they have a certain kind of effect2 and no proposition of this sort can1 ,i think follow from any universal proposition with regard to all relations4 ,we have1 therefore1 rejected as certainly not giving the whole meaning of the dogma that all relations are internal3 7#a7 the obviously true proposition that no relational facts are completely analysable1 in the precise sense which ,i gave to that assertion2 and 7#b7 the obviously false proposition that all relations modify their terms1 in the natural sense of the term modify1 in which it always has as part of its meaning cause to undergo a change4 ,and we have also seen that this false proposition that any relation which a term comes to have always causes it to undergo a change is wholly irrelevant to the question whether all relations are internal or not4 ,we have seen finally that if the assertion that all relations modify their terms is to be understood as equivalent to the assertion that all are internal1 modify must be understood in some metaphorical sense4 ,the question is3 ,what is this metaphorical sense8 ,and one point is1 ,i think1 pretty clear to begin with4 ,it is obvious that1 in the case of some relations1 a given term ,a may have the relation in question1 not only to one other term1 but to several different terms4 ,if1 for instance1 we consider the relation of fatherhood1 it is obvious that a man may be father1 not only of one1 but of several different children4 ,and those who say that all relations modify their terms always mean1 ,i think1 not merely that every different relation which a term has modifies it2 but also that1 where the relation is one which the term has to several different other terms1 then1 in the case of each of these terms1 it is modified by the fact that it has the relation in question to that particular term4 ,if1 for instance1 ,a is father of three children1 ,b1 ,c1 and ,d1 they mean to assert that he is modified1 not merely by being a father1 but by being the father of ,b1 also by being the father of ,c1 and also by being the father of ,d4 ,the mere assertion that all relations modify their terms does not1 of course1 make it quite clear that this is what is meant2 but ,i think there is no doubt that it is always meant2 and ,i think we can express it more clearly by using a term1 which ,i have already introduced1 and saying the doctrine is that all relational properties modify their terms1 in a sense which remains to be defined4 ,i think there is no difficulty in understanding what ,i mean by a relational property4 ,if ,a is father of ,b1 then what you assert of ,a when you say that he is so is a relational property--namely the property of being father of ,b2 and it is quite clear that this property is not itself a relation1 in the same fundamental sense in which the relation of fatherhood is so2 and also that1 if ,c is a different child from ,b1 then the property of being father of ,c is a different relational property from that of being father of ,b1 although there is only one relation1 that of fatherhood1 from which both are derived4 ,so far as ,i can make out1 those philosophers who talk of all relations being internal1 often actually mean by relations relational properties2 when they talk of all the relations of a given term1 they mean all its relational properties1 and not merely all the different relations1 of each of which it is true that the term has that relation to something4 ,it will1 ,i think1 conduce to clearness to use a different word for these two entirely different uses of the term relation to call fatherhood a relation1 and fatherhood of ,b a relational property4 ,and the fundamental proposition1 which is meant by the assertion that all relations are internal1 is1 ,i think1 a proposition with regard to relational properties1 and not with regard to relations properly so-called4 ,there is no doubt that those who maintain this dogma mean to maintain that all relational properties are related in a peculiar way to the terms which possess them--that they modify or are internal to them1 in some metaphorical sense4 ,and once we have defined what this sense is in which a relational property can be said to be internal to a term which possesses it1 we can easily derive from it a corresponding sense in which the relations1 strictly so called1 from which relational properties are derived1 can be said to be internal4 ,our question is then3 ,what is the metaphorical sense of modify in which the proposition that all relations are internal is equivalent to the proposition that all relational properties modify the terms which possess them8 ,i think it is clear that the term modify would never have been used at all to express the relation meant1 unless there had been some analogy between this relation and that which we have seen is the proper sense of modify1 namely1 causes to change4 ,and ,i think we can see where the analogy comes in by considering the statement1 with regard to any particular term ,a and any relational property ,p which belongs to it1 that ,a would have been different from what it is if it had not had ,p3 the statement1 for instance1 that ,edward ,,vii would have been different if he had not been father of ,george ,v4 ,this is a thing which we can obviously truly say of ,a and ,p1 in some sense1 whenever it is true of ,p that it modified ,a in the proper sense of the word3 if the being held in the flame causes the sealing-wax to melt1 we can truly say 7in some sense7 that the sealing-wax would not have been in a melted state if it had not been in the flame4 ,but it seems as if it were a thing which might also be true of ,a and ,p1 where it is not true that the possession of ,p caused ,a to change2 since the mere assertion that ,a would have been different1 if it had not had ,p1 does not necessarily imply that the possession of ,p caused ,a to have any property which it would not have had otherwise4 ,and those who say that all relations are internal do sometimes tend to speak as if what they meant could be put in the form3 ,in the case of every relational property which a thing has1 it is always true that the thing which has it would have been different if it had not had that property2 they sometimes say even3 ,if ,p be a relational property and ,a a term which has it1 then it is always true that ,a would not have been ,a if it had not had ,p4 ,this is1 ,i think1 obviously a clumsy way of expressing anything which could possibly be true1 since1 taken strictly1 it implies the self-contradictory proposition that if ,a had not had ,p1 it would not have been true that ,a did not have ,p4 ,but it is nevertheless a more or less natural way of expressing a proposition which might quite well be true1 namely1 that1 supposing ,a has ,p1 then anything which had not had ,p would necessarily have been different from ,a4 ,this is the proposition which ,i wish to suggest as giving the metaphorical meaning of ,p modifies ,a1 of which we are in search4 ,it is a proposition to which ,i think a perfectly precise meaning can be given1 and one which does not at all imply that the possession of ,p caused any change in ,a1 but which might conceivably be true of all terms and all the relational properties they have1 without exception4 ,and it seems to me that it is not unnatural that the proposition that this is true of ,p and ,a1 should have been expressed in the form1 ,p modifies ,a1 since it can be more or less naturally expressed in the perverted form1 ,if ,a had not had ,p it would have been different1--a form of words1 which1 as we saw1 can also be used whenever ,p does1 in the proper sense1 modify ,a4 ,i want to suggest1 then1 that one thing which is always implied by the dogma that1 ,all relations are internal1 is that1 in the case of every relational property1 it can always be truly asserted of any term ,a which has that property1 that any term which had not had it would necessarily have been different from ,a4 ,this is the proposition to which ,i want to direct attention4 ,and there are two phrases in it1 which require some further explanation4 ,the first is the phrase would necessarily have been4 ,and the meaning of this can be explained1 in a preliminary way1 as follows3--,to say of a pair of properties ,p and ,q1 that any term which had had ,p would necessarily have had ,q1 is equivalent to saying that1 in every case1 from the proposition with regard to any given term that it has ,p1 it follows that that term has ,q3 follows being understood in the sense in which from the proposition with regard to any term1 that it is a right angle1 it follows that it is an angle1 and in which from the proposition with regard to any term that it is red it follows that it is coloured4 ,there is obviously some very important sense in which from the proposition that a thing is a right angle1 it does follow that it is an angle1 and from the proposition that a thing is red it does follow that it is coloured4 ,and what ,i am maintaining is that the metaphorical sense of modify1 in which it is maintained that all relational properties modify the subjects which possess them1 can be defined by reference to this sense of follows4 ,the definition is3 ,to say of a given relational property ,p that it modifies or is internal to a given term ,a which possesses it1 is to say that from the proposition that a thing has not got ,p it follows that that thing is different from ,a4 ,in other words1 it is to say that the property of not possessing ,p1 and the property of being different from ,a are related to one another in the peculiar way in which the property of being a right-angled triangle is related to that of being a triangle1 or that of being red to that of being coloured4 ,to complete the definition it is necessary1 however1 to define the sense in which different from ,a is to be understood4 ,there are two different senses which the statement that ,a is different from ,b may bear4 ,it may be meant merely that ,a is numerically different from ,b1 other than ,b1 not identical with ,b4 ,or it may be meant that not only is this the case1 but also that ,a is related to ,b in a way which can be roughly expressed by saying that ,a is qualitatively different from ,b4 ,and of these two meanings1 those who say ,all relations make a difference to their terms1 always1 ,i think1 mean difference in the latter sense and not merely in the former4 ,that is to say1 they mean1 that if ,p be a relational property which belongs to ,a1 then the absence of ,p entails not only numerical difference from ,a1 but qualitative difference4 ,but1 in fact1 from the proposition that a thing is qualitatively different from ,a1 it does follow that it is also numerically different4 ,and hence they are maintaining that every relational property is internal to its terms in both of two different senses at the same time4 ,they are maintaining that1 if ,p be a relational property which belongs to ,a1 then ,p is internal to ,a both in the sense 7#a7 that the absence of ,p entails qualitative difference from ,a2 and 7#b7 that the absence of ,p entails numerical difference from ,a4 ,it seems to me that neither of these propositions is true2 and ,i will say something about each in turn4 ,as for the first1 ,i said before that ,i think some relational properties really are internal to their terms1 though by no means all are4 ,but1 if we understand internal to in this first sense1 ,i am not really sure that any are4 ,in order to get an example of one which was1 we should have1 ,i think1 to say that any two different qualities are always qualitatively different from one another3 that1 for instance1 it is not only the case that anything which is pure red is qualitatively different from anything which is pure blue1 but that the quality pure red itself is qualitatively different from the quality pure blue4 ,i am not quite sure that we can say this1 but ,i think we can2 and if so1 it is easy to get an example of a relational property which is internal in our first sense4 ,the quality orange is intermediate in shade between the qualities yellow and red4 ,this is a relational property1 and it is quite clear that1 on our assumption1 it is an internal one4 ,since it is quite clear that any quality which were not intermediate between yellow and red1 would necessarily be other than orange2 and if any quality other than orange must be qualitatively different from orange1 then it follows that intermediate between yellow and red is internal to orange4 ,that is to say1 the absence of the relational property intermediate between yellow and red1 entails the property different in quality from orange4 ,there is then1 ,i think1 a difficulty in being sure that any relational properties are internal in this first sense4 ,but1 if what we want to do is to show that some are not1 and that therefore the dogma that all relations are internal is false1 ,i think the most conclusive reason for saying this is that if all were internal in this first sense1 all would necessarily be internal in the second1 and that this is plainly false4 ,i think1 in fact1 the most important consequence of the dogma that all relations are internal1 is that it follows from it that all relational properties are internal in this second sense4 ,i propose1 therefore1 at once to consider this proposition1 with a view to bringing out quite clearly what it means and involves1 and what are the main reasons for saying that it is false4 ,the proposition in question is that1 if ,p be a relational property and ,a a term to which it does in fact belong1 then1 no matter what ,p and ,a may be1 it may always be truly asserted of them1 that any term which had not possessed ,p would necessarily have been other than--numerically different from--,a3 or in other words1 that ,a would necessarily1 in all conceivable circumstances1 have possessed ,p4 ,and with this sense of internal1 as distinguished from that which says qualitatively different1 it is quite easy to point out some relational properties which certainly are internal in this sense4 ,let us take as an example the relational property which we assert to belong to a visual sense-datum when we say of it that it has another visual sense-datum as a spatial part3 the assertion1 for instance1 with regard to a coloured patch half of which is red and half yellow4 ,this whole patch contains this patch 7where this patch is a proper name for the red half74 ,it is here1 ,i think1 quite plain that1 in a perfectly clear and intelligible sense1 we can say that any whole1 which had not contained that red patch1 could not have been identical with the whole in question3 that from the proposition with regard to any term whatever that it does not contain that particular patch it follows that that term is other than the whole in question--though not necessarily that it is qualitatively different from it4 ,that particular whole could not have existed without having that particular patch for a part4 ,but it seems no less clear1 at first sight1 that there are many other relational properties of which this is not true4 ,in order to get an example1 we have only to consider the relation which the red patch has to the whole patch1 instead of considering as before that which the whole has to it4 ,it seems quite clear that1 though the whole could not have existed without having the red patch for a part1 the red patch might perfectly well have existed without being part of that particular whole4 ,in other words1 though every relational property of the form having this for a spatial part is internal in our sense1 it seems equally clear that every property of the form is a spatial part of this whole is not internal1 but purely external4 ,yet this last1 according to me1 is one of the things which the dogma of internal relations denies4 ,it implies that it is just as necessary that anything1 which is in fact a part of a particular whole1 should be a part of that whole1 as that any whole1 which has a particular thing for a part1 should have that thing for a part4 ,it implies1 in fact1 quite generally1 that any term which does in fact have a particular relational property1 could not have existed without having that property4 ,and in saying this it obviously flies in the face of common sense4 ,it seems quite obvious that in the case of many relational properties which things have1 the fact that they have them is a mere matter of fact3 that the things in question might have existed without having them4 ,that this1 which seems obvious1 is true1 seems to me to be the most important thing that can be meant by saying that some relations are purely external4 ,and the difficulty is to see how any philosopher could have supposed that it was not true3 that1 for instance1 the relation of part to whole is no more external than that of whole to part4 ,i will give at once one main reason which seems to me to have led to the view1 that all relational properties are internal in this sense4 ,what ,i am maintaining is the common-sense view1 which seems obviously true1 that it may be true that ,a has in fact got ,p and yet also true that ,a might have existed without having ,p4 ,and ,i say that this is equivalent to saying that it may be true that ,a has ,p1 and yet not true that from the proposition that a thing has not got ,p it follows that that thing is other than ,a--numerically different from it4 ,and one reason why this is disputed is1 ,i think1 simply because it is in fact true that if ,a has ,p1 and x has not1 it does follow that x is other than ,a4 ,these two propositions1 the one which ,i admit to be true 7#a7 that if ,a has ,p1 and x has not1 it does follow that x is other than ,a1 and the one which ,i maintain to be false 7#b7 that if ,a has ,p1 then from the proposition with regard to any term x that it has not got ,p1 it follows that x is other than ,a1 are1 ,i think1 easily confused with one another4 ,and it is in fact the case that if they are not different1 or if 7#b7 follows from 7#a71 then no relational properties are external4 ,for 7#a7 is certainly true1 and 7#b7 is certainly equivalent to asserting that none are4 ,it is therefore absolutely essential1 if we are to maintain external relations1 to maintain that 7#b7 does not follow from 7#a74 ,these two propositions 7#a7 and 7#b71 with regard to which ,i maintain that 7#a7 is true1 and 7#b7 is false1 can be put in another way1 as follows3 7#a7 asserts that if ,a has ,p1 then any term which has not1 must be other than ,a4 7#b7 asserts that if ,a has ,p1 then any term which had not1 would necessarily be other than ,a4 ,and when they are put in this form1 it is1 ,i think1 easy to see why they should be confused3 you have only to confuse must or is necessarily with would necessarily be4 ,and their connexion with the question of external relations can be brought out as follows3 ,to maintain external relations you have to maintain such things as that1 though ,edward ,,vii was in fact father of ,george ,v1 he might have existed without being father of ,george ,v4 ,but to maintain this1 you have to maintain that it is not true that a person who was not father of ,george would necessarily have been other than ,edward4 ,yet it is1 in fact1 the case1 that any person who was not the father of ,george1 must have been other than ,edward4 ,unless1 therefore1 you can maintain that from this true proposition it does not follow that any person who was not father of ,george would necessarily have been other than ,edward1 you will have to give up the view that ,edward might have existed without being father of ,george4 ,by far the most important point in connexion with the dogma of internal relations seems to me to be simply to see clearly the difference between these two propositions 7#a7 and 7#b71 and that 7#b7 does not follow from 7#a74 ,if this is not understood1 nothing in connexion with the dogma1 can1 ,i think1 be understood4 ,and perhaps the difference may seem so clear1 that no more need be said about it4 ,but ,i cannot help thinking it is not clear to everybody1 and that it does involve the rejection of certain views1 which are sometimes held as to the meaning of follows4 ,so ,i will try to put the point again in a perfectly strict form4 ,let ,p be a relational property1 and ,a a term to which it does in fact belong4 ,i propose to define what is meant by saying that ,p is internal to ,a 7in the sense we are now concerned with7 as meaning that from the proposition that a thing has not got ,p1 it follows that it is other than ,a4 ,that is to say1 this proposition asserts that between the two properties not having ,p and other than ,a1 there holds that relation which holds between the property being a right angle and the property being an angle1 or between the property red and the property coloured1 and which we express by saying that1 in the case of any thing whatever1 from the proposition that that thing is a right angle it follows1 or is deducible1 that it is an angle4 ,let us now adopt certain conventions for expressing this proposition4 ,we require1 first of all1 some term to express the converse of that relation which we assert to hold between a particular proposition q and a particular proposition p1 when we assert that q follows from or is deducible from p4 ,let us use the term entails to express the converse of this relation4 ,we shall then be able to say truly that p entails q1 when and only when we are able to say truly that q follows from p or is deducible from p1 in the sense in which the conclusion of a syllogism in ,barbara follows from the two premisses1 taken as one conjunctive proposition2 or in which the proposition ,this is coloured follows from ,this is red4 p entails q will be related to q follows from1 p in the same way in which ,a is greater than ,b is related to ,b is less than ,a4 ,we require1 next1 some short and clear method of expressing the proposition1 with regard to two properties ,p and ,q1 that any proposition which asserts of a given thing that it has the property ,p entails the proposition that the thing in question also has the property ,q4 ,let us express this proposition in the form x,p entails x,q ,that is to say x,p entails x,q is to mean the same as ,each one of all the various propositions1 which are alike in respect of the fact that each asserts with regard to some given thing that that thing has ,p1 entails that one among the various propositions1 alike in respect of the fact that each asserts with regard to some given thing that that thing has ,q1 which makes this assertion with regard to the same thing1 with regard to which the proposition of the first class asserts that it has ,p4 ,in other words x,p entails x,q is to be true1 if and only if the proposition ,,ap entails ,,aq is true1 and if also all propositions which resemble this1 in the way in which ,,bp entails ,,bq resembles it1 are true also2 where ,,ap means the same as ,a has ,p1 ,,aq the same as ,a has ,q etc41 etc4 ,we require1 next1 some way of expressing the proposition1 with regard to two properties ,p and ,q1 that any proposition which denies of a given thing that it has ,p entails the proposition1 with regard to the thing in question1 that it has ,q4 ,let us1 in the case of any proposition1 p1 express the contradictory of that proposition by p4 ,the proposition ,it is not the case that ,a has ,p will then be expressed by ,,ap2 and it will then be natural1 in accordance with the last convention to express the proposition that any proposition which denies of a given thing that it has ,p entails the proposition1 with regard to the thing in question1 that it has ,q1 by x,p entails x,q4 ,and we require1 finally1 some short way of expressing the proposition1 with regard to two things ,b and ,a1 that ,b is other than 7or not identical with7 ,a4 ,let us express ,b is identical with ,a by ,b ,a2 and it will then be natural1 according to the last convention1 to express ,b is not identical with ,a by ,b ,a4 ,we have now got everything which is required for expressing1 in a short symbolic form1 the proposition1 with regard to a given thing ,a and a given relational property ,p1 which ,a in fact possesses1 that ,p is internal to ,a4 ,the required expression is x,p entails 7x ,a7 which is to mean the same as ,every proposition which asserts of any given thing that it has not got ,p entails the proposition1 with regard to the thing in question1 that it is other than ,a4 ,and this proposition is1 of course1 logically equivalent to 7x ,a7 entails x ,p where we are using logically equivalent1 in such a sense that to say of any proposition p that it is logically equivalent to another proposition q is to say that both p entails q and q entails p4 ,this last proposition again1 is1 so far as ,i can see1 either identical with or logically equivalent to the propositions expressed by anything which were identical with ,a would1 in any conceivable universe1 necessarily have ,p or by ,a could not have existed in any possible world without having ,p2 just as the proposition expressed by ,in any possible world a right angle must be an angle is1 ,i take it1 either identical with or logically equivalent to the proposition 7x is a right angle7 entails 7r is an angle74 ,we have now1 therefore1 got a short means of symbolising1 with regard to any particular thing ,a and any particular property ,p1 the proposition that ,p is internal to ,a in the second of the two senses distinguished on p4 #bhf4 ,but we still require a means of symbolising the general proposition that every relational property is internal to any term which possesses it--the proposition1 namely1 which was referred to on p4 #bhg1 as the most important consequence of the dogma of internal relations1 and which was called 7#b7 on p4 #bhi4 ,in order to get this1 let us first get a means of expressing with regard to some one particular relational property ,p1 the proposition that ,p is internal to any term which possesses it4 ,this is a proposition which takes the form of asserting with regard to one particular property1 namely ,p1 that any term which possesses that property also possesses another--namely the one expressed by saying that ,p is internal to it4 ,it is1 that is to say1 an ordinary universal proposition1 like ,all men are mortal4 ,but such a form of words is1 as has often been pointed out1 ambiguous4 ,it may stand for either of two different propositions4 ,it may stand merely for the proposition ,there is nothing1 which both is a man1 and is not mortal--a proposition which may also be expressed by ,if anything is a man1 that thing is mortal1 and which is distinguished by the fact that it makes no assertion as to whether there are any men or not2 or it may stand for the conjunctive proposition ,if anything is a man1 that thing is mortal1 and there are men4 ,it will be sufficient for our purposes to deal with propositions of the first kind--those namely1 which assert with regard to some two properties1 say ,q and ,r1 that there is nothing which both does possess ,q and does not possess ,r1 without asserting that anything does possess ,q4 ,such a proposition is obviously equivalent to the assertion that any pair of propositions which resembles the pair ,,aq and ,,ar1 in respect of the fact that one of them asserts of some particular thing that it has ,q and the other1 of the same thing1 that it has ,r1 stand to one another in a certain relation3 the relation1 namely1 which1 in the case of ,,aq and ,,ar1 can be expressed by saying that ,it is not the case both that ,a has ,q and that ,a has not got ,r4 ,when we say ,there is nothing which does possess ,q and does not possess ,r we are obviously saying something which is either identical with or logically equivalent to the proposition ,in the case of every such pair of propositions it is not the case both that the one which asserts a particular thing to have ,q is true1 and that the one which asserts it to have ,r is false4 ,we require1 therefore1 a short way of expressing the relation between two propositions p and q1 which can be expressed by ,it is not the case that p is true and q false4 ,and ,i am going1 quite arbitrarily to express this relation by writing p 99 q for ,it is not the case that p is true and q false4 ,the relation in question is one which logicians have sometimes expressed by p implies q4 ,it is1 for instance1 the one which ,mr4 ,russell in the ',principles of ,mathematics calls material implication1 and which he and ,dr4 ,whitehead in ,principia ,mathematica call simply implication4 ,and if we do use implication to stand for this relation1 we1 of course1 got the apparently paradoxical results that every false proposition implies every other proposition1 both true and false1 and that every true proposition implies every other true proposition3 since it is quite clear that if p is false then1 whatever q may be1 it is not the case that p is true and q false1 and quite clear also1 that if p and q are both true1 then also it is not the case that p is true and q false4 ,and these results1 it seems to me1 appear to be paradoxical1 solely because1 if we use implies in any ordinary sense1 they are quite certainly false4 ,why logicians should have thus chosen to use the word implies as a name for a relation1 for which it never is used by any one else1 ,i do not know4 ,it is partly1 no doubt1 because the relation for which they do use it--that expressed by saying ,it is not the case that p is true and q false--is one for which it is very important that they should have a short name1 because it is a relation which is very fundamental and about which they need constantly to talk1 while 7so far as ,i can discover7 it simply has no short name in ordinary life4 ,and it is partly1 perhaps1 for a reason which leads us back to our present reason for giving some name to this relation4 ,it is1 in fact1 natural to use p implies q to mean the same as ,if p1 then q4 ,and though ,if p then q is hardly ever1 if ever1 used to mean the same as ,it is not the case that p is true and q false2 yet the expression ,if anything has ,q1 it has ,r may1 ,i think1 be naturally used to express the proposition that1 in the case of every pair of propositions which resembles the pair ,a ,q and ,a ,r in respect of the fact that the first of the pair asserts of some particular thing that it has ,q and the second1 of the same thing1 that it has ,r1 it is not the case that the first is true and the second false4 ,that is to say1 if 7as ,i propose to do7 we express ,it is not the case both that ,,aq is true and ,,ar false by ,,aq 99 ,,ar1 and if1 further 7on the analogy of the similar case with regard to entails71 we express the proposition that of every pair of propositions which resemble ,a ,q and ,a ,r in the respect just mentioned1 it is true that the first has the relation 99 to the second by x,q 99 x,r then1 it is natural to express x,q 99 x,r1 by ,if anything has ,q1 then that thing has ,r4 ,and logicians may1 ,i think1 have falsely inferred that since it is natural to express x,q 99 x,r by ,if anything has ,q1 then that thing has ,r1 it must be natural to express ,,aq 99 ,,ar by ,if ,,aq1 then ,,ar1 and therefore also by ,,aq implies ,,ar4 ,if this has been their reason for expressing p 99 q by p implies q then obviously their reason is a fallacy4 ,and1 whatever the reason may have been1 it seems to me quite certain that ,,aq 99 ,,ar cannot be properly expressed either by ,,aq implies ,,ar or by ,if ,,aq1 then ,,ar1 although r,q 99 x,r can be properly expressed by ,if anything has ,q1 then that thing has ,r4 ,i am going1 then1 to express the universal proposition1 with regard to two particular properties ,q and ,r1 which asserts that ,whatever has ,q1 has ,r or ,if anything has ,q1 it has ,r1 without asserting that anything has ,q1 by x,q 99 x,r --a means of expressing it1 which since we have adopted the convention that p 99 q is to mean the same as ,it is not the case that p is true and q false1 brings out the important fact that this proposition is either identical with or logically equivalent to the proposition that of every such pair of propositions as ,,aq and ,,ar1 it is true that it is not the case that the first is true and the second false4 ,and having adopted this convention1 we can now see how1 in accordance with it1 the proposition1 with regard to a particular property ,p1 that ,p is internal to everything which possesses it1 is to be expressed4 ,we saw that ,p is internal to ,a is to be expressed by x,p entails 7x ,a7 or by the logically equivalent proposition 7x ,a7 entails x,p ,and we have now only to express the proposition that anything that has ,p1 has also the property that ,p is internal to it4 ,the required expression is obviously as follows4 ,just as ,anything that has ,q1 has ,r is to be expressed by x,q 99 x,r so ,anything that has ,p1 has also the property that ,p is internal to it will be expressed by x,p 99 y,p entails 7y x7 or by x,p 99 7v x7 entails y,p4 ,we have thus got1 in the case of any particular property ,p1 a means of expressing the proposition that it is internal to every term that possesses it1 which is both short and brings out clearly the notions that are involved in it4 ,and we do not need1 ,i think1 any further special convention for symbolising the proposition that every relational property is internal to any term which possesses it--the proposition1 namely1 which ,i called 7#b7 above 7pp4 #bhi1 #bij71 and which on p4 #bhg1 ,i called the most important consequence of the dogma of internal relations4 ,we can express it simply enough as follows3-- 7#b7 ,what we assert of ,p when we say x,p 99 y,p entails 7y x7 can be truly asserted of every relational property4 ,and now1 for the purpose of comparing 7#b7 with 7#a71 and seeing exactly what is involved in my assertion that 7#b7 does not follow from 7#a71 let us try to express 7#a7 by means of the same conventions4 ,let us first take the assertion with regard to a particular thing ,a and a particular relational property ,p that1 from the proposition that ,a has ,p it follows that nothing which has not got ,p is identical with ,a4 ,this is an assertion which is quite certainly true2 since1 if anything which had not got ,p were identical with ,a1 it would follow that ,,ap2 and from the proposition ,,ap1 it certainly follows that ,,ap is false1 and therefore also that ,something which has not got ,p is identical with ,a is false1 or that ,nothing which has not got ,p is identical with ,a is true4 ,and this assertion1 in accordance with the conventions we have adopted1 will be expressed by ,,ap entails x,p 99 7x ,a7 ,we want1 next1 in order to express 7#a71 a means of expressing with regard to a particular relational property ,p1 the assertion that1 from the proposition1 with regard to anything whatever1 that that thing has got ,p1 it follows that nothing which has not got ,p is identical with the thing in question4 ,this also is an assertion which is quite certainly true2 since it merely asserts 7what is obviously true7 that what ,,ap entails x,p 99 7x ,a7 asserts of ,a1 can be truly asserted of anything whatever4 ,and this assertion1 in accordance with the conventions we have adopted1 will be expressed by x,p entails y,p 99 7y x74 ,the proposition1 which ,i meant to call 7#a71 but which ,i expressed before rather clumsily1 can now be expressed by 7#a7 ,what we assert of ,p1 when we say1 x,p entails y,p 99 7y x7 can be truly asserted of every relational property4 ,this is a proposition which is again quite certainly true2 and1 in order to compare it with 7#b71 there is1 ,i think1 no need to adopt any further convention for expressing it1 since the questions whether it is or is not different from 7#b71 and whether 7#b7 does or does not follow from it1 will obviously depend on the same questions with regard to the two propositions1 with regard to the particular relational property1 ,p1 x,p entails y,p 99 7y x7 and x,p 99 y,p entails 7y x7 ,now what ,i maintain with regard to 7#a7 and 7#b7 is that1 whereas 7#a7 is true1 7#b7 is false4 ,i maintain1 that is to say1 that the proposition ,what we assert of ,p1 when we say x,p 99 y,p entails 7y x74 is true of every relational property is false1 though ,i admit that what we here assert of ,p is true of some relational properties4 ,those of which it is true1 ,i propose to call internal relational properties1 those of which it is false external relational properties4 ,the dogma of internal relations1 on the other hand1 implies that 7#b7 is true2 that is to say1 that every relational property is internal and that there are no external relational properties4 ,and what ,i suggest is that the dogma of internal relations has been held only because 7#b7 has been falsely thought to follow from 7#a74 ,and that 7#b7 does not follow from 7#a71 can1 ,i think1 be easily seen as follows4 ,it can follow from 7#a7 only if from any proposition of the form p entails 7q 99 r7 there follows the corresponding proposition of the form p 99 7q entails r71 ,and that this is not the case can1 ,i think1 be easily seen by considering the following three propositions4 ,let p ,all the books on this shelf are blue1 let q ,my copy of the ,principles of ,mathematics is a book on this shelf1 and let r ,my copy of the ,principles of ,mathematics is blue4 ,now p here does absolutely entail 7q 99 r74 ,that is to say1 it absolutely follows from p that ,my copy of the ,principles is on this shelf1 and ,my copy of the ,principles is not blue1 are not1 as a matter of fact1 both true4 ,but it by no means follows from this that p 99 7q entails r74 ,for what this latter proposition means is ,it is not the case both that p is true and that 7q entails r7 is false4 ,and1 as a matter of fact1 7q entails r7 is quite certainly false2 for from the proposition ,my copy of the ,principles is on this shelf the proposition ,my copy of the ,principles is blue does not follow4 ,it is simply not the case that the second of these two propositions can be deduced from the first by itself3 it is simply not the case that it stands to it in the relation in which it does stand to the conjunctive proposition ,all the books on this shelf are blue and1 my copy of the ,principles is on this shelf4 ,this conjunctive proposition really does entail ,my copy of the ,principles is blue4 ,but ,my copy of the ,principles is on this shelf1 by itself quite certainly does not entail ,my copy of the ,principles is blue4 ,it is simply not the case that my copy of the ,principles couldn't have been on this shelf without being blue1 7q entails r7 is1 therefore1 false4 ,and hence p 99 7q entails r71 can only follow from p entails 7q 99 r71 if from this latter proposition p follows4 ,but p quite certainly does not follow from this proposition3 from the fact that 7q 99 r7 is deducible from p1 it does not in the least follow that p is true4 ,it is1 therefore1 clearly not the case that every proposition of the form p entails 7q 99 r7 entails the corresponding proposition of the form p 99 q entails r1 since we have found one particular proposition of the first form which does not entail the corresponding proposition of the second4 ,to maintain1 therefore1 that 7#b7 follows from 7#a7 is mere confusion4 ,and one source of the confusion is1 ,i think1 pretty plain4 7#a7 does allow you to assert that1 if ,,ap is true1 then the proposition y,p 99 7y ,a7 must be true4 ,what the must here expresses is merely that this proposition follows from ,,ap1 not that it is in itself a necessary proposition4 ,but it is supposed1 through confusion1 that what is asserted is that it is not the case both that ,,ap is true and that y,p 99 7y ,a7 is not1 in itself1 a necessary proposition2 that is to say1 it is supposed that what is asserted is ,,ap y,p entails 7y ,a72 since to say that y,p 99 7y ,a7 is1 in itself1 a necessary proposition is the same thing as to say that y,p entails 7y ,a7 is also true4 ,in fact it seems to me pretty plain that what is meant by saying of propositions of the form x,p 99 x,q that they are necessary 7or apodeictic7 propositions1 is merely that the corresponding proposition of the form x,p entails x,q is also true1 x,p entails x,q is not itself a necessary proposition2 but1 if x,p entails x,q is true1 then x,p 99 x,q is a necessary proposition--and a necessary truth1 since no false propositions are necessary in themselves4 ,thus what is meant by saying that ,whatever is a right angle1 is also an angle is a necessary truth1 is1 so far as ,i can see1 simply that the proposition 7x is a right angle7 entails 7x is an angle7 is also true4 ,this seems to me to give what has1 in fact1 been generally meant in philosophy by necessary truths1 e4g4 by ,leibniz2 and to point out the distinction between them and those true universal propositions which are mere matters of fact4 ,and if we want to extend the meaning of the name necessary truth in such a way that some singular propositions may also be said to be necessary truths1 we can1 ,i think1 easily do it as follows4 ,we can say that ,,ap is itself a necessary truth1 if and only if the universal proposition 7x ,a7 99 x,p 7which1 as we have seen1 follows from ,,ap7 is a necessary truth3 that is to say1 if and only if 7x ,a7 entails x,p4 ,with this definition1 what the dogma of internal relations asserts is that in every case in which a given thing actually has a given relational property1 the fact that it has that property is a necessary truth2 whereas what ,i am asserting is that1 if the property in question is an internal property1 then the fact in question will be a necessary truth1 whereas if the property in question is external1 then the fact in question will be a mere matter of fact4 ,so much for the distinction between 7#a7 which is true1 and 7#b71 or the dogma of internal relations1 which ,i hold to be false4 ,but ,i said above1 in passing1 that my contention that 7#b7 does not follow from 7#a71 involves the rejection of certain views that have sometimes been held as to the meaning of follows2 and ,i think it is worth while to say something about this4 ,it is obvious that the possibility of maintaining that 7#b7 does not follow from 7#a71 depends upon its being true that from x,p 99 x,q the proposition x,p entails x,q does not follow4 ,and this has sometimes been disputed1 and is1 ,i think1 often not clearly seen4 ,to begin with1 ,mr4 ,russell1 in the ,principles of ,mathematics 7p4 #cd71 treats the phrase q can be deduced from p as if it meant exactly the same thing as p 99 q or p materially implies q2 and has repeated the same error elsewhere1 e4g4 in ,philosophical ,essays 7p4 #aff71 where he is discussing what he calls the axiom of internal relations4 ,and ,i am afraid a good many people have been led to suppose that1 since ,mr4 ,russell has said this1 it must be true4 ,if it were true1 then1 of course1 it would be impossible to distinguish between 7#a7 and 7#b71 and it would follow that1 since 7#a7 certainly is true1 what ,i am calling the dogma of internal relations is true too4 ,but ,i imagine that ,mr4 ,russell himself would now be willing to admit that1 so far from being true1 the statement that q can be deduced from p means the same as p 99 q is simply an enormous howler2 and ,i do not think ,i need spend any time in trying to show that it is so4 ,but it may be held that1 though p entails q does not mean the same as p 99 q1 yet nevertheless from x,p 99 x,q the proposition x,p entails x,q does follow1 for a somewhat more subtle reason2 and1 if this were so1 it would again follow that what ,i am calling the dogma of internal relations must be true4 ,it may be held1 namely1 that though ,,ap entails ,,aq does not mean simply ,,ap 99 ,,aq yet what it does mean is simply the conjunction ,,ap 99 ,,aq and this proposition is an instance of a true formal implication 7the phrase formal implication being understood in ,mr4 ,russell's sense1 in which x,p 99 x,q asserts a formal implication74 ,this view as to what ,,ap entails ,,aq means1 has1 for instance1 if ,i understand him rightly1 been asserted by ,mr4 ,o4 ,strachey in ,mind1 ,n4,s41 #ic4 ,and the same view has been frequently suggested 7though ,i do not know that he has actually asserted it7 by ,mr4 ,russell himself 7e4g41 ,principia ,mathematica1 p4 #ba74 ,if this view were true1 then1 though x,p entails x,q would not be identical in meaning with x,p 99 x,q1 yet it would follow from it2 since1 if x,p 99 x,q were true1 then every particular assertion of the form ,,ap 99 ,,aq1 would not only be true1 but would be an instance of a true formal implication 7namely x,p 99 x,q7 and this1 according to the proposed definition1 is all that x,p entails x,q asserts4 ,if1 therefore1 it were true1 it would again follow that all relational properties must be internal4 ,but that this view also is untrue appears to me perfectly obvious4 ,the proposition that ,i am in this room does materially imply that ,i am more than five years old1 since both are true2 and the assertion that it does is also an instance of a true formal implication1 since it is in fact true that all the persons in this room are more than five years old2 but nothing appears to me more obvious than that the second of these two propositions can not be deduced from the first--that the kind of relation which holds between the premisses and conclusion of a syllogism in ,barbara does not hold between them4 ,to put it in another way3 it seems to me quite obvious that the properties being a person in this room and being more than five years old are not related in the kind of way in which being a right angle is related to being an angle1 and which we express by saying that1 in the case of every term1 the proposition that that term is an angle can be deduced from the proposition that it is a right angle4 ,these are the only two suggestions as to the meaning of p entails q known to me1 which1 if true1 would yield the result that 7#b7 does follow from 7#a71 and that therefore all relational properties are internal2 and both of these1 it seems to me1 are obviously false4 ,all other suggested meanings1 so far as ,i know1 would leave it true that 7#b7 does not follow from 7#a71 and therefore that ,i may possibly be right in maintaining that some relational properties are external4 ,it might1 for instance1 be suggested that the last proposed definition should be amended as follows--that we should say3 p entails q means p 99 q and this proposition is an instance of a formal implication1 which is not merely true but self-evident1 like the laws of ,formal ,logic4 ,this proposed definition would avoid the paradoxes involved in ,mr4 ,strachey's definition1 since such true formal implications as all the persons in this room are more than five years old are certainly not self-evident2 and1 so far as ,i4 can see1 it may state something which is in fact true of p and q1 whenever and only when p entails q4 ,i do not myself think that it gives the meaning of p entails q1 since the kind of relation which ,i see to hold between the premisses and conclusion of a syllogism seems to me to be one which is purely objective in the sense that no psychological term1 such as is involved in the meaning of self-evident1 is involved in its definition 7if it has one74 ,i am not1 however1 concerned to dispute that some such definition of p entails q as this may be true4 ,since it is evident that1 even if it were1 my proposition that x,p entails x,q does not follow from x,p 99 x,q1 would still be true2 and hence also my contention that 7#b7 does not follow from 7#a74 ,so much by way of arguing that we are not bound to hold that all relational properties are internal in the particular sense1 with which we are now concerned1 in which to say that they are means that in every case in which a thing ,a has a relational property1 it follows from the proposition that a term has not got that property that the term in question is other than ,a4 ,but ,i have gone further and asserted that some relational properties certainly are not internal4 ,and in defence of this proposition ,i do not know that ,i have anything to say but that it seems to me evident in many cases that a term which has a certain relational property might quite well not have had it3 that1 for instance1 from the mere proposition that this is this1 it by no means follows that this has to other things all the relations which it in fact has4 ,everybody1 of course1 must admit that if all the propositions which assert of it that it has these properties1 do in fact follow from the proposition that this is this1 we cannot see that they do4 ,and so far as ,i can see1 there is no reason of any kind for asserting that they do1 except the confusion which ,i have exposed4 ,but it seems to me further that we can see in many cases that the proposition that this has that relation does not follow from the fact that it is this3 that1 for instance1 the proposition that ,edward ,,vii was father of ,george ,v is a mere matter of fact4 ,i want now to return for a moment to that other meaning of internal1 7p4 #bhf7 in which to say that ,p is internal to ,a means not merely that anything which had not ,p would necessarily be other than ,a1 but that it would necessarily be qualitatively different4 ,i said that this was the meaning of internal in which the dogma of internal relations holds that all relational properties are internal2 and that one of the most important consequences which followed from it1 was that all relational properties are internal in the less extreme sense that we have just been considering4 ,but1 if ,i am not mistaken1 there is another important consequence which also follows from it1 namely1 the ,identity of ,indiscernibles4 ,for if it be true1 in the case of every relational property1 that any term which had net that property would necessarily be qualitatively different from any which had1 it follows of course that1 in the case of two terms one of which has a relational property1 which the other has not the two are qualitatively different4 ,but1 from the proposition that x is other than y1 it does follow that x has some relational property which y has not2 and hence1 if the dogma of internal relations be true1 it will follow that if x is other than y1 x is always also qualitatively different from y1 which is the principle of ,identity of ,indiscernibles4 ,this is1 of course1 a further objection to the dogma of internal relations1 since ,i think it is obvious that the principle of ,identity of ,indiscernibles is not true4 ,indeed1 so far as ,i can see1 the dogma of internal relations essentially consists in the joint assertion of two indefensible propositions3 7#a7 the proposition that in the case of no relational property is it true of any term which has got that property1 that it might not have had it and 7#b7 the ,identity of ,indiscernibles4 ,i want1 finally1 to say something about the phrase which ,mr4 ,russell uses in the ,philosophical ,essays to express the dogma of internal relations4 ,he says it may be expressed in the form ,every relation is grounded in the natures of the related terms 7p4 #afj74 ,and it can be easily seen1 if the account which ,i have given be true1 in what precise sense it does hold this4 ,mr4 ,russell is uncertain as to whether by the nature of a term is to be understood the term itself or something else4 ,for my part it seems to me that by a term's nature is meant1 not the term itself1 but what may roughly be called all its qualities as distinguished from its relational properties4 ,but whichever meaning we take1 it will follow from what ,i have said1 that the dogma of internal relations does imply that every relational property which a term has is1 in a perfectly precise sense1 grounded in its nature4 ,it will follow that every such property is grounded in the term1 in the sense that1 in the case of every such property1 it follows from the mere proposition that that term is that term that it has the property in question4 ,and it will also follow that any such property is grounded in the qualities which the term has1 in the sense1 that if you take all the qualities which the term has1 it will again follow in the case of each relational property1 from the proposition that the term has all those qualities that it has the relational property in question2 since this is implied by the proposition that in the case of any such property1 any term which had not had it would necessarily have been different in quality from the term in question4 ,in both of these two senses1 then1 the dogma of internal relations does1 ,i think1 imply that every relational property is grounded in the nature of every term which possesses it2 and in this sense that proposition is false4 ,yet it is worth noting1 ,i think1 that there is another sense of grounded in which it may quite well be true that every relational property is grounded in the nature of any term which possesses it4 ,namely that1 in the case of every such property1 the term in question has some quality without which it could not have had the property4 ,in other words that the relational property entails some quality in the term1 though no quality in the term entails the relational property4 ,,the ,,nature ,,of ,,moral ,,philosophy ,i should like1 if ,i can1 to interest you to-night in one particular question about ,moral ,philosophy4 ,it is a question which resembles most philosophical questions1 in respect of the fact that philosophers are by no means agreed as to what is the right answer to it3 some seem to be very strongly convinced that one answer is correct1 while others are equally strongly convinced of the opposite4 ,for my own part ,i do feel some doubt as to which answer is the right one1 although1 as you will see1 ,i incline rather strongly to one of the two alternatives4 ,i should like very much1 if ,i could1 to find some considerations which seemed to me absolutely convincing on the one side or the other2 for the question seems to me in itself to be an exceedingly interesting one4 ,i have said that the question is a question about ,moral ,philosophy2 and it seems to me in fact to be a very large and general question which affects the whole of ,moral ,philosophy4 ,in asking it1 we are doing no less than asking what it is that people are doing when they study ,moral ,philosophy at all3 we are asking what sort of questions it is which it is the business of ,moral ,philosophy to discuss and try to find the right answer to4 ,but ,i intend1 for the sake of simplicity1 to confine myself to asking it in two particular instances4 ,moral ,philosophy has1 in fact1 to discuss a good many different ideas2 and though ,i think this same question may be raised with regard to them all1 ,i intend to pick out two1 which seem to me particularly fundamental1 and to ask it with regard to them only4 ,my first business must be to explain what these two ideas are4 ,the name ,moral ,philosophy naturally suggests that what is meant is a department of philosophy which has something to do with morality4 ,and we all understand roughly what is meant by morality4 ,we are accustomed to the distinction between moral good and evil1 on the one hand1 and what is sometimes called physical good and evil on the other4 ,we all make the distinction between a man's moral character1 on the one hand1 and his agreeableness or intellectual endowments1 on the other4 ,we feel that to accuse a man of immoral conduct is quite a different thing from accusing him merely of bad taste or bad manners1 or from accusing him merely of stupidity or ignorance4 ,and no less clearly we distinguish between the idea of being under a moral obligation to do a thing1 and the idea of being merely under a legal obligation to do it4 ,it is a commonplace that the sphere of morality is much wider than the sphere of law3 that we are morally bound to do and avoid many things1 which are not enjoined or forbidden by the laws of our country2 and it is also sometimes held that1 if a particular law is unjust or immoral1 it may even be a moral duty to disobey it--that is to say that there may be a positive conflict between moral and legal obligation2 and the mere fact that this is held1 whether truly or falsely1 shows1 at all events1 that the one idea is quite distinct from the other4 ,the name ,moral ,philosophy1 then1 naturally suggests that it is a department of philosophy concerned with morality in this common sense4 ,and it is1 in fact1 true that one large department of ,moral ,philosophy is so concerned4 ,but it would be a mistake to think that the whole subject is only concerned with morality4 ,another important department of it is1 as ,i shall try to show1 concerned with ideas which are not moral ideas1 in this ordinary sense1 though1 no doubt1 they may have something to do with them4 ,and of the two ideas which ,i propose to pick out for discussion1 while one of them is a moral idea1 the other belongs to that department of ,moral ,philosophy1 which is not concerned solely with morality1 and is not1 ,i think1 properly speaking1 a moral idea at all4 ,let us begin with the one of the two1 which is a moral idea4 ,the particular moral idea which ,i propose to pick out for discussion is the one which ,i have called above the idea of moral obligation--the idea of being morally bound to act in a particular way on a particular occasion4 ,but what is1 so far as ,i can see1 precisely the same idea is also called by several other names4 ,to say that ,i am under a moral obligation to do a certain thing is1 ,i think1 clearly to say the same thing as what we commonly express by saying that ,i ought to do it1 or that it is my duty to do it4 ,that is to say1 the idea of moral obligation is identical with the idea of the moral ought and with the idea of duty4 ,and it also seems at first sight as if we might make yet another identification4 ,the assertion that ,i ought to do a certain thing seems as if it meant much the same as the assertion that it would be wrong of me not to do the thing in question3 at all events it is quite clear that1 whenever it is my duty to do anything1 it would be wrong of me not to do it1 and that whenever it would be wrong of me to do anything1 then it is my duty to refrain from doing it4 ,in the case of these two ideas1 the idea of what is wrong1 and the idea of what is my duty or what ,i ought to do1 different views may be taken as to whether the one is more fundamental than the other1 or whether both are equally so2 and on the question3 ,if one of the two is more fundamental than the other1 which of the two is so8 ,thus some people would say1 that the idea of wrong is the more fundamental1 and that the idea of duty is to be defined in terms of it3 that1 in fact1 the statement ,it is my duty to keep that promise merely means ,it would be wrong of me not to keep it2 and the statement ,it is my duty not to tell a lie merely means ,it would be wrong of me to tell one4 ,others again would apparently say just the opposite3 that duty is the more fundamental notion1 and wrong is to be defined in terms of it4 ,while others perhaps would hold that neither is more fundamental than the other2 that both are equally fundamental1 and that the statement it would be wrong to do so and so is only equivalent to1 not identical in meaning with1 ,i ought not to do it4 ,but whichever of these three views be the true one1 there is1 ,i think1 no doubt whatever about the equivalence notion of the two ideas2 and no doubt1 therefore1 that whatever answer be given to the question ,i am going to raise about the one1 the same answer must be given to the corresponding question about the other4 ,the moral idea1 then1 which ,i propose to discuss1 is the idea of duty or moral obligation1 or1 what comes to the same thing1 the idea of what is wrong--morally wrong4 ,everybody would agree that this idea--or1 to speak more accurately1 one or both of these two ideas--is among the most fundamental of our moral ideas1 whether or not they would admit that all others1 for example the ideas of moral goodness1 involve a reference to this one in their definition1 or would hold that we have some others which are independent of it1 and equally fundamental with it4 ,but there is a good deal of difficulty in getting clear as to what this idea of moral obligation itself is4 ,is there in fact only one idea which we call by this name8 ,or is it possible that on some occasions when we say that so and so is a duty1 we mean something different by this expression from what we do on others8 ,and that similarly when we say that so and so is morally wrong1 we sometimes use this name morally wrong for one idea and sometimes for another2 so that one and the same thing may be morally wrong in one sense of the word1 and yet not morally wrong in another8 ,i think1 in fact1 there are two different senses in which we use these terms2 and to point out the difference between them1 will help to bring out clearly more the nature of each4 ,and ,i think perhaps the difference can be brought out most clearly by considering the sort of moral rules with which we are all of us familiar4 ,everybody knows that moral teachers are largely concerned in laying down moral rules1 and in disputing the truth of rules which have been previously accepted4 ,and moral rules seem to consist1 to a very large extent1 in assertions to the effect that it is always wrong to do certain actions or to refrain from doing certain others2 or 7what comes to the same thing7 that it is always your duty to refrain from certain actions1 and positively to do certain others4 ,the ,ten ,commandments for example1 are instances of moral rules2 and most of them are examples of what are called negative rules--that is to say rules which assert merely that it is wrong to do certain positive actions1 and therefore our duty to refrain from these actions2 instead of rules which assert of certain positive actions1 that it is our duty to do them and therefore wrong to refrain from doing them4 ,the fifth commandment1 which tells us to honour our father and mother1 is apparently an exception2 it seems to be a positive rule4 ,it is not1 like the others1 expressed in the negative form ,thou shalt not do so and so1 and it is apparently really meant to assert that we ought to do certain positive actions1 not merely that there are some positive action from which we ought to refrain4 ,the difference between this one and the rest will thus serve as an example of the difference between positive and negative moral rules1 a difference which is sometimes treated as if it were of great importance4 ,and ,i do not wish to deny that there may be some important difference between seeing only that certain positive actions are wrong1 and seeing also that1 in certain cases1 to refrain from doing certain actions is just as wrong as positively to do certain others4 ,but this distinction between positive and negative rules is certainly of much less importance than another which is1 ,i think1 liable to be confused with it4 ,so far as this distinction goes it is only a distinction between an assertion that it is wrong to do a positive action and an assertion that it is wrong to refrain from doing one3 and each of these assertions is equivalent to one which asserts a duty--the first with an assertion that it is a duty to refrain1 the second with an assertion that a positive action is a duty4 ,but there is another distinction between some moral rules and others1 which is of much greater importance than this one1 and which does1 ,i think1 give a reason for thinking that the term moral obligation is actually used in different senses on different occasions4 ,i have said that moral rules seem to consist1 to a large extent1 in assertions to the effect that it is always wrong to do certain actions or to refrain from doing certain others1 or the equivalent assertions in terms of duty4 ,but there is a large class of moral rules1 with which we are all of us very familiar1 which do not come under this definition4 ,they are rules which are concerned not with our actions1 in the natural sense of the word1 but with our feelings1 thoughts and desires4 ,an illustration of this kind of rule can again be given from the ,ten ,commandments4 ,most of the ten1 as we all know1 are concerned merely with actions2 but the tenth at least is clearly an exception4 ,the tenth says ,thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's house1 nor his wife1 nor his servant1 nor his ox1 nor his ass1 nor anything that is his1 and1 unless covet is merely a mistranslation of a word which stands for some kind of action1 we plainly have here a rule which is concerned with our feelings and not with our actions4 ,and one reason which makes the distinction between rules of this kind and rules concerned with actions important1 is that our feelings are not1 as a rule1 directly within the control of our will in the sense in which many of our actions are4 ,i cannot1 for instance1 by any single act of will directly prevent from arising in my mind a desire for something that belongs to some one else1 even if1 when once the desire has arrived1 ,i can by my will prevent its continuance2 and even this last ,i can hardly do directly but only by forcing myself to attend to other considerations which may extinguish the desire4 ,but though ,i thus cannot prevent myself altogether from coveting my neighbour's possessions1 ,i can altogether prevent myself from stealing them4 ,the action of stealing1 and the feeling of covetousness1 are clearly on a very different level in this respect4 ,the action is directly within the control of my will1 whereas the feeling is not4 ,if ,i will not to take the thing 7though of course some people may find a great difficulty in willing this7 it does in general follow directly that ,i do not take it2 whereas1 it ,i will not to desire it1 it emphatically does not1 even in general1 follow directly that no desire for it will be there4 ,this distinction between the way in which our feelings and our actions are under the control of our wills is1 ,i think1 a very real one indeed2 we cannot help constantly recognising that it exists4 ,and it has an important bearing on the distinction between those moral rules which deal with actions and those which deal with feelings1 for the following reason4 ,the philosopher ,kant laid down a well-known proposition to the effect that ought implies can3 that is to say1 that it cannot be true that you ought to do a thing1 unless it is true that you could do it1 if you chose4 ,and as regards one of the senses in which we commonly use the words ought and duty1 ,i think this rule is plainly true4 ,when we say absolutely of ourselves or others1 ,i ought to do so and so or you ought to1 we imply1 ,i think1 very often that the thing in question is a thing which we could do1 if we chose2 though of course it may often be a thing which it is very difficult to choose to do4 ,thus it is clear that ,i cannot truly say of anyone that he ought to do a certain thing1 if it is a thing which it is physically impossible for him to do1 however desirable it may be that the thing should be done4 ,and in this sense it is clear that it cannot be truly said of me that ,i ought not to have a certain feeling1 or that ,i ought not to have had it1 if it is a feeling which ,i could not1 by any effort of my will1 prevent myself from having4 ,the having or the prevention of a certain feeling is not1 of course1 strictly ever a physical impossibility1 but it is very often impossible1 in exactly the same sense1 in which actions are physically impossible--that is to say that ,i could not possibly get it or prevent it1 even if ,i would4 ,but this being so1 it is plain that such a moral rule as that ,i ought not to covet my neighbour's possessions is1 if it means to assert that ,i ought not1 in that sense in which ought implies can1 a rule which cannot possibly be true4 ,what it appears to assert is1 absolutely universally1 of every feeling of covetousness1 that the feeling in question is one which the person who felt it ought not to have felt4 ,but in fact a very large proportion of such feelings 7,i am inclined to say the vast majority7 are feelings which the person who felt them could not have prevented feeling1 if he would3 they were beyond the control of his will4 ,and hence it is quite emphatically not true that none of these feelings ought to have been felt1 if we are using ought in the sense which implies that the person who felt them could have avoided them4 ,so far from its being true that absolutely none of them ought to have been felt1 this is only true of those among them1 probably a small minority1 which the person who felt them could have avoided feeling4 ,if1 therefore1 moral rules with regard to feelings are to have a chance of being nearly true1 we must understand the ought which occurs in them in some other sense4 ,but with moral rules that refer to actions the case is very different4 ,take stealing for example4 ,here again what the ,eighth ,commandment appears to imply is that absolutely every theft which has ever occurred was an act which the agent ought not to have done2 and1 if the ought is the one which implies can1 it implies1 therefore1 that every theft was an act which the agent1 if he had chosen1 could have avoided4 ,and this statement that every theft which has been committed was an act which the thief1 if he had so willed1 could have avoided1 though it may be doubted if it is absolutely universally true1 is not a statement which is clearly absurd1 like the statement that every covetous desire could have been avoided by the will of the person who felt it4 ,it is probable that the vast majority of acts of theft have been acts which it was in the power of the thief to avoid1 if he had willed to do so2 whereas this is clearly not true of the vast majority of covetous desires4 ,it is1 therefore1 quite possible that those who believe we ought never to steal are using ought in a sense which implies that stealing always could have been avoided2 whereas it is ,i think quite certain that many of those who believe that we ought to avoid all covetous desires1 do not believe for a moment that every covetous desire that has ever been felt was a desire which the person who felt it could have avoided feeling1 if he had chosen4 ,and yet they certainly do believe1 in some sense or other1 that no covetous desire ought ever to have been felt4 ,the conclusion is1 therefore1 it seems to me1 unavoidable that we do use ought1 the moral ought1 in two different senses2 the one a sense in which to say that ,i ought to have done so and so does really imply that ,i could have done it1 if ,i had chosen1 and the other a sense in which it carries with it no such implication4 ,i think perhaps the difference between the two can be expressed in this way4 ,if we express the meaning of the first ought1 the one which does imply can1 by saying that ,i ought to have done so and so means ,it actually was my duty to do it2 we can express the meaning of the second by saying that e4g4 ,i ought not to have felt so and so means not it was my duty to avoid that feeling1 but it would have been my duty to avoid it1 if ,i had been able4 ,and corresponding to these two meanings of ought we should1 ,i think1 probably distinguish two different sorts of moral rules1 which though expressed in the same language1 do in fact mean very different things4 ,the one is a set of rules which assert 7whether truly or falsely7 that it always actually is a duty to do or to refrain from certain actions1 and assert therefore that it always is in the power of the agent's will to do or to refrain from them2 whereas the other sort only assert that so and so would be a duty1 if it were within our power1 without at all asserting that it always is within our power4 ,we may1 perhaps1 give a name to the distinction ,i mean1 by calling the first kind of rules--those which do assert that something actually is a duty--rules of duty1 and by calling the second kind--those which recommend or condemn something not in the control of our wills--ideal rules3 choosing this latter name because they can be said to inculcate a moral ideal--something the attainment of which is not directly within the power of our wills4 ,as a further example of the difference between ideal rules and rules of duty we may take the famous passage from the ,new ,testament 7,luke #f1 #bg7 ,love your enemies1 do good to them that hate you1 bless them that curse you1 pray for them that despitefully use you4 ,of these four rules1 the three last may be rules of duty1 because they refer to things which are plainly1 as a rule1 at least1 in the power of your will2 but the first1 if love be understood in its natural sense as referring to your feelings1 is plainly only an ideal rule1 since such feelings are obviously not directly under our own control1 in the same way in which such actions as doing good to1 blessing or praying for a person are so4 ,to love certain people1 or to feel no anger against them1 is a thing which it is quite impossible to attain directly by will1 or perhaps ever to attain completely at all4 ,whereas your behaviour towards them is a matter within your own control3 even if you hate a person1 or feel angry with him1 you can so control yourself as not to do him harm1 and even to confer benefits upon him4 ,to do good to your enemies may1 then1 really be your duty2 but it cannot1 in the strict sense1 be your duty not to have evil feelings towards them3 all that can possibly be true is that it would be your duty if you were able4 ,yet ,i think there can be no doubt that what ,christ meant to condemn was the occurrence of such feelings altogether2 and since1 if what he meant to assert about them in condemning them1 would have been certainly false1 if he had meant to say that you could avoid ever feeling them1 ,i think it is clear that what he meant to assert was not this1 or not this only1 but something else1 which may quite possibly be true4 ,that is to say1 he was asserting an ideal rule1 not merely a rule of duty4 ,it will be seen that this distinction which ,i am making coincides1 roughly at all events1 with the distinction which is often expressed as the distinction between rules which tell you what you ought to be and rules which tell you merely what you ought to do2 or as the distinction between rules which are concerned with your inner life--with your thoughts and feelings--and those which are concerned only with your external actions4 ,the rules which are concerned with what you ought to be or with your inner life are1 for the most part at all events1 ideal rules2 while those which are concerned with what you ought to do or your external actions are very often1 at least1 rules of duty4 ,and it is often said that one great difference between the ,new ,testament and the ,old is its comparatively greater insistence on ideal rules--upon a change of heart--as opposed to mere rules of duty4 ,and that there is a comparatively greater insistence on ideal rules ,i do not wish to deny4 ,but that there are plenty of ideal rules in the ,old ,testament too must not be forgotten4 ,i have already given an example from the ,ten ,commandments3 namely the rule which says you ought not to covet anything which belongs to your neighbour4 ,and another is supplied by the ,old ,testament commandment1 ,love thy neighbour as thyself1 if by love is here meant a feeling which is not within our own control1 and not merely that the ,jew is to help other ,jews by his external actions4 ,indeed1 however great may be the difference between the ,old ,testament and the ,new in respect of comparative insistence on ideal rules rather than rules of duty1 ,i am inclined to think that there is at least as great a difference1 illustrated by this very rule1 in another1 quite different1 respect--namely in the kind of rules1 both ideal and of duty1 which are insisted on4 ,for whereas by thy neighbour in the ,old ,testament there is plainly meant only other ,jews1 and it is not conceived either that it is the duty of a ,jew to help foreigners in general1 or an ideal for him to love them2 in the ,new ,testament1 where the same words are used1 my neighbour plainly is meant to include all mankind4 ,and this distinction between the view that beneficent action and benevolent feelings should be confined to those of our own nation1 and the view that both should be extended equally to all mankind1--a distinction which has nothing to do with the distinction between being and doing1 between inner and outer1 but affects both equally--is1 ,i am inclined to think1 at least as important a difference between ,new ,testament and ,old1 as the comparatively greater insistence on ideal rules4 ,however1 the point upon which ,i want at present to insist is the distinction between ideal rules and rules of duty4 ,both kinds are commonly included among moral rules1 and1 as my examples have shown1 are often mentioned together as if no great difference were seen between them4 ,what ,i want to insist on is that there is a great difference between them3 that whereas rules of duty do directly assert of the idea of duty1 in the sense in which to say that something is your duty implies that you can do it1 that certain things are duties1 the ideal rules do not assert this1 but something different4 ,yet the ideal rules certainly do1 in a sense1 assert a moral obligation4 ,and hence we have to recognise that the phrase moral obligation is not merely a name for one idea only1 but for two very different ideas2 and the same will1 of course1 be true of the corresponding phrase morally wrong4 ,when1 therefore1 ,i say that the idea of moral obligation is one of the fundamental ideas with which ,moral ,philosophy is concerned1 ,i think we must admit that this one name really stands for two different ideas4 ,but it does not matter for my purpose which of the two you take4 ,each of them is undoubtedly a moral idea1 and whatever answer be given to the question we are going to raise about the one1 will also certainly apply to the other4 ,but it is now time to turn to the other idea1 with which ,i said that ,moral ,philosophy has been largely concerned1 though it is not1 strictly speaking1 a moral idea1 at all4 ,and ,i think1 perhaps1 a good way of bringing out what this idea is1 is to refer to the ,ethics of ,aristotle4 ,everybody would admit that the fundamental idea1 with which ,aristotle's ,ethics is concerned1 is an idea which it is the business of ,moral ,philosophy to discuss2 and yet ,i think it is quite plain that this idea is not a moral idea at all4 ,aristotle does not set out from' the idea of moral obligation or duty 7indeed throughout his treatise he only mentions this idea quite incidentally72 nor even from the idea of moral goodness or moral excellence1 though he has a good deal more to say about that2 but from the idea of what he calls the human good1 or good for man4 ,he starts by raising the question what the good for man is1 and his whole book is arranged in the form of giving a detailed answer to that question4 ,and ,i think we can gather pretty well what the idea is1 which he calls by this name1 by considering what he says about it4 ,there are two points1 in particular1 which he insists upon from the outset3 first1 that nothing can be good1 in the sense he means1 unless it is something which is worth having for its own sake1 and not merely for the sake of something else2 it must be good in itself2 it must not1 like wealth 7to use one example which he gives7 be worth having merely for the sake of what you can do with it2 it must be a thing which is worth having even if nothing further comes of it4 ,and secondly 7what partly covers the former1 but also1 ,i think1 says something more7 it must1 he says1 be something that is self-sufficient3 something which1 even if you had nothing else would make your life worth having4 ,and further light is thrown upon his meaning when he comes to tell you what he thinks the good for man is3 the good1 he says1 is mental1 activity--where such activity is of an excellent kind1 or1 if there are several different kinds of excellent mental activity1 that which has the best and most perfect kind of excellence2 and also 7he significantly adds7 mental activity which lasts through a sufficiently long life4 ,the word which ,i have here translated excellence is what is commonly translated virtue2 but it does not mean quite the same as we mean by virtue1 and that in a very important respect4 ,virtue has come to mean exclusively moral excellence2 and if that were all ,aristotle meant1 you might think that what he means by good came very near being a moral idea4 ,but it turns out that he includes among excellences1 intellectual excellence1 and even that he thinks that the best and most perfect excellence of which he speaks is a particular kind of intellectual excellence1 which no one would think of calling a moral quality1 namely1 the sort of excellence which makes a man a good philosopher4 ,and as for the word which ,i have translated activity1 the meaning of this can be best brought out by mentioning the reason which ,aristotle himself gives for saying that mere excellence itself is not 7as some of the ,greeks had said7 the good for man4 ,he says1 truly enough1 that a man may possess the greatest excellence--he may be a very excellent man--even when he is asleep1 or is doing nothing2 and he points out that the possession of excellence when you are asleep is not a thing that is desirable for its own sake--obviously only for the sake of the effects it may produce when you wake up4 ,it is not therefore1 he thinks1 mere mental excellence1 but the active exercise of mental excellence--the state of a man's mind1 when he not only possesses excellent faculties1 moral or intellectual1 but is actively engaged in using them1 which really constitutes the human good4 ,now1 when ,aristotle talks of the good for man1 there is1 ,i think1 as my quotation is sufficient to show1 a certain confusion in his mind between what is good for man and what is best for man4 ,what he really holds is that any mental activity which exhibits excellence and is pleasurable is a good2 and when he adds that1 if there are many excellences1 the good must be mental activity which exhibits the best of them1 and that it must last through a sufficiently long life1 he only means that this is necessary if a man is to get the best he can get1 not that this is the only good he can get4 ,and the idea which ,i wish to insist on is not1 therefore1 the idea of the human good1 but the more fundamental idea of good 2 the idea1 with regard to which he holds that the working of our minds in some excellent fashion is the only good thing that any of us can possess2 and the idea of which better is the comparative1 when he says that mental activity which exhibits some sorts of excellence is better than mental activity which exhibits others1 though both are good1 and that excellent mental activity continued over a longer time is better than the same continued for a shorter4 ,this idea of what is good1 in the sense in which ,aristotle uses it in these cases1 is an idea which we all of us constantly use1 and which is certainly an idea which it is the business of ,moral ,philosophy to discuss1 though it is not a moral idea4 ,the main difficulty with regard to it is to distinguish it clearly from other senses in which we use the same word4 ,for1 when we say that a thing is good1 or one thing better than another1 we by no means always mean that it is better in this sense4 ,often1 when we call a thing good we are not attributing to it any characteristic which it would possess if it existed quite alone1 and if nothing further were to come of it2 but are merely saying of it that it is a sort of thing from which other good things do in fact come1 or which is such that1 when accompanied by other things1 the whole thus formed is good in ,aristotle's sense1 although1 by itself1 it is not4 ,thus a man may be good1 and his character may be good1 and yet neither are good in this fundamental sense1 in which goodness is a characteristic which a thing would possess1 if it existed quite alone4 ,for1 as ,aristotle says1 a good man may exist1 and may have a good character1 even when he is fast asleep2 and yet if there were nothing in the ,universe but good men1 with good characters1 all fast asleep1 there would be nothing in it which was good in the fundamental sense with which we are concerned4 ,thus moral goodness1 in the sense of good character1 as distinguished from the actual working of a good character in various forms of mental activity1 is certainly not good in the sense in which good means good for its own sake4 ,and even with regard to the actual exercise of certain forms of moral excellence1 it seems to me that in estimating the value of such exercise relatively to other things1 we are apt to take into account1 not merely its intrinsic value--the sort of value which it would possess1 if it existed quite alone--but also its effects3 we rate it higher than we should do if we were considering only its intrinsic value1 because we take into account the other good things which we know are apt to flow from it4 ,certain things which have intrinsic value are distinguished from others1 by the fact that more good consequences are apt to flow from them2 and where this is the case1 we are apt1 ,i think1 quite unjustly1 to think that their intrinsic value must be higher too4 ,one thing1 ,i think1 is clear about intrinsic value--goodness in ,aristotle's sense--namely that it is only actual occurrences1 actual states of things over a certain period of time--not such things as men1 or characters1 or material things1 that can have any intrinsic value at all4 ,but even this is not sufficient to distinguish intrinsic value clearly from other sorts of goodness3 since even in the case of actual occurrences1 we often call them good or bad for the sake of their effects or their promise of effects4 ,thus we all hope that the state of things in ,england1 as a whole1 will really be better some day than it has been in the past--that there will be progress and improvement3 we hope1 for instance1 that1 if we consider the whole of the lives lived in ,england during some year in the next century1 it may turn out that the state of things1 as a whole1 during that year will be really better than it ever has been in any past year4 ,and when we use better in this way--in the sense in which progress or improvement means a change to a better state of things--we are certainly thinking partly of a state of things which has a greater intrinsic value4 ,and we certainly do not mean by improvement merely moral improvement4 ,an improvement in moral conditions1 other things being equal1 may no doubt be a gain in intrinsic value2 but we should certainly hold that1 moral conditions being equal1 there is yet room for improvement in other ways--in the diminution of misery and purely physical evils1 for example4 ,but in considering the degree of a real change for the better in intrinsic value1 there is certainly danger of confusion between the degree in which the actual lives lived are really intrinsically better1 and the degree in which there is improvement merely in the means for living a good life4 ,if we want to estimate rightly what would constitute an intrinsic improvement in the state of things in our imagined year next century1 and whether it would on the whole be really good at all1 we have to consider what value it would have if it were to be the last year of life upon this planet2 if the world were going to come to an end1 as soon as it was over2 and therefore to discount entirely all the promises it might contain of future goods4 ,this criterion for distinguishing whether the kind of goodness which we are attributing to anything is really intrinsic value or not1 the criterion which consists in considering whether it is a characteristic which the thing would possess1 if it were to have absolutely no further consequences or accompaniments1 seems to me to be one which it is very necessary to apply if we wish to distinguish clearly between different meanings of the word good4 ,and it is only the idea of what is good1 where by good is meant a characteristic which has this mark1 that ,i want now to consider4 ,the two ideas1 then1 with regard to which ,i want to raise a question1 are first the moral idea of moral obligation or duty1 and secondly the non-moral idea of good in this special sense4 ,and the question with regard to them1 which ,i want to raise1 is this4 ,with regard to both ideas many philosophers have thought and still think--not only think1 but seem to be absolutely convinced1 that when we apply them to anything--when we assert of any action that it ought not to have been done1 or of any state of things that it was or would be good or better than another1 then it must be the case that all that we are asserting of the thing or things in question is simply and solely that some person or set of persons actually does have1 or has a tendency to have a certain sort of feeling towards the thing or things in question3 that there is absolutely no more in it than this4 ,while others seem to be convinced1 no less strongly1 that there is more in it than this3 that when we judge that an action is a duty or is really wrong1 we are not merely making a judgment to the effect that some person or set of persons1 have1 or tend to have a certain sort of feeling1 when they witness or think of such actions1 and that similarly when we judge that a certain state of things was or would be better than another1 we are not merely making a judgment about the feelings which some person or set of persons would have1 in witnessing or thinking of the two states of things1 or in comparing them together4 ,the question at issue between these two views is often expressed in other less clear forms4 ,it is often expressed as the question whether the ideas of duty and of good or value1 are or are not1 objective ideas3 as the problem as to the objectivity of duty and intrinsic value4 ,the first set of philosophers would maintain that the notion of the objectivity of duty and of value is a mere chimera2 while the second would maintain that these ideas really are objective4 ,and others express it as the question whether the ideas of duty and of good are absolute or purely relative3 whether there is any such thing as an absolute duty or an absolute good1 or whether good and duty are purely relative to human feelings and desires4 ,but both these ways of expressing it are1 ,i think1 apt to lead to confusion4 ,and another even less clear way in which it is put is by asking the question3 ,is the assertion that such and such a thing is a duty1 or has intrinsic value1 ever a dictate of reason8 ,but so far as ,i can gather1 the question really at issue1 and expressed in these obscure ways1 is the one which ,i have tried to state4 ,it is the question whether when we judge 7whether truly or falsely7 that an action is a duty or a state of things good1 all that we are thinking about the action or the state of things in question1 is simply and solely that we ourselves or others have or tend to have a certain feeling towards it when we contemplate or think of it4 ,and the question seems to me to be of great interest1 because1 if this is all1 then it is evident that all the ideas with which ,moral ,philosophy is concerned are merely psychological ideas2 and all moral rules1 and statements as to what is intrinsically valuable1 merely true or false psychological statements2 so that the whole of ,moral ,philosophy and ,ethics will be merely departments of ,psychology4 ,whereas1 if the contrary is the case1 then these two ideas of moral obligation and intrinsic value1 will be no more purely psychological ideas than are the ideas of shape or size or number2 and ,moral ,philosophy will be concerned with characteristics of actions and feelings and states of affairs1 which these actions and feelings and states of affairs would or might have possessed1 even if human psychology had been quite different from what it is4 ,which1 then1 of these two views is the true one8 ,are these two ideas merely psychological ideas in the sense which ,i have tried to explain1 or are they not8 ,as ,i have said1 ,i feel some doubts myself whether they are or not3 it does not seem to me to be a matter to dogmatize upon4 ,but ,i am strongly inclined to think that they are not merely psychological2 that ,moral ,philosophy and ,ethics are not mere departments of ,psychology4 ,in favour of the view that the two ideas in question are merely psychological1 there is1 so far as ,i am aware1 nothing whatever to be said1 except that so many philosophers have been absolutely convinced that they are4 ,none of them seem to me to have succeeded in bringing forward a single argument in favour of their view4 ,and against the view that they are1 there seem to me to be some quite definite arguments1 though ,i am not satisfied that any of these arguments are absolutely conclusive4 ,i will try to state briefly and clearly what seem to me the main arguments against the view that these are merely psychological ideas2 although1 in doing so1 ,i am faced with a certain difficulty4 ,for though1 as ,i have said1 many philosophers are absolutely convinced1 that duty and good do merely stand for psychological ideas1 they are by no means agreed what the psychological ideas are for which they stand4 ,different philosophers have hit on very different ideas as being the ideas for which they stand2 and this very fact that1 if they are psychological ideas at all1 it is so difficult to agree as to what ideas they are1 seems to me in itself to be an argument against the view that they are so4 ,let me take each of the two ideas separately1 and try to exhibit the sort of objection there seems to be to the view that it is merely a psychological idea4 ,take first the idea of moral obligation4 ,what purely psychological assertion can ,i be making about an action1 when ,i assert that it was wrong1 that it ought not to have been done8 ,in this case1 one view1 which is in some ways the most plausible that can be taken1 is that in every case ,i am merely making an assertion about my own psychology4 ,but what assertion about my own psychology can ,i be making8 ,let us take as an example1 the view of ,prof4 ,westermarck1 which is as plausible a view of this type as any that ,i know of4 ,he holds that what ,i am judging when ,i judge an action to be wrong1 is merely that it is of a sort which tends to excite in me a peculiar kind of feeling--the feeling of moral indignation or disapproval4 ,he does not say that what ,i am judging is that the action in question is actually exciting this feeling in me4 ,for it is obviously not true that1 when ,i judge an action to be much more wrong than another1 ,i am always actually feeling much indignation at the thought of either1 or much more indignation at the thought of the one than at that of the other2 and it is inconceivable that ,i should constantly be making so great a mistake as to my own psychology1 as to think that ,i am actually feeling great indignation when ,i am not4 ,but he thinks it is plausible to say that ,i am making a judgment as to the tendency of such actions to excite indignation in me2 that1 for instance1 when ,i judge that one is much more wrong than the other1 ,i am merely asserting the fact1 taught me by my past experience1 that1 if ,i were to witness the two actions1 under similar circumstances1 ,i should feel a much more intense indignation at the one than at the other4#a ,but there is one very serious objection to such a view1 which ,i think that those who take it are apt not fully to realise4 ,if this view be true1 then when ,i judge an action to be wrong1 ,i am merely making a judgment about my own feelings towards it2 and when you judge it to be wrong1 you are merely making a judgment about yours4 ,and hence the word wrong in my mouth1 means something entirely different from what it does in yours2 just as the word ,i in my mouth stands for an entirely different person from what it does in yours--in mine it stands for me1 in yours it stands for you4 ,that is to say when ,i judge of a given action that it was wrong1 and you perhaps of the very same action that it was not1 we are not in fact differing in opinion about it at all2 any more than we are differing in opinion if ,i make the judgment ,i came from ,cambridge to-day and you make the judgment ,i did not come from ,cambridge to-day4 ,when ,i say ,that was wrong ,i am merely saying ,that sort of action excites indignation in me1 when ,i see it2 and when you say ,no2 it was not wrong you are merely saying ,it does not excite indignation in me1 when ,i see it4 ,and obviously both judgments may perfectly well be true together2 just as my judgment that ,i did come from ,cambridge to-day and yours that you did not1 may perfectly well be true together4 ,in other words1 and this is what ,i want to insist on1 if this view be true1 then there is absolutely no such thing as a difference of opinion upon moral questions4 ,if two persons think they differ in opinion on a moral question 7and it certainly seems as if they sometimes think so71 they are always1 on this view1 making a mistake1 and a mistake so gross that it seems hardly possible that they should make it3 a mistake as gross as that which would be involved in thinking that when you say ,i did not come from ,cambridge to-day you are denying what ,i say when ,i say ,i did4 ,and this seems to me to be a very serious objection to the view4 ,don't people1 in fact1 sometimes really differ in opinion on a moral question8 ,certainly all appearances are in favour of the view that they do3 and yet1 if they do1 that can only be if when ,i think a thing to be wrong1 and you think it not to be wrong1 ,i mean by wrong the very same characteristic which you mean1 and am thinking that the action possesses this characteristic while you are thinking it does not4 ,it must be the very same characteristic which we both mean2 it cannot be1 as this view says it is1 merely that ,i am thinking that it has to my feelings the very same relation1 which you are thinking that it has not got to yours2 since1 if this were all1 then there would be no difference of opinion between us4 ,and this view that when we talk of wrong or duty1 we are not merely1 each of us1 making a statement about the relation of the thing in question to our own feelings1 may be reinforced by another consideration4 ,it is commonly believed that some moral rules exhibit a higher morality than others3 that1 for instance a person who believes that it is our duty to do good to our enemies1 has a higher moral belief1 than one who believes that he has no such duty1 but only a duty to do good to his friends or fellow-countrymen4 ,and ,westermarck himself believes that1 some moral beliefs1 mark a stage of higher refinement in the evolution of the moral consciousness4#b ,but what1 on his view can be meant by saying that one moral belief is higher than another8 ,if ,a believes that it is his duty to do good to his enemies and ,b believes that it is not1 in what sense can ,a's belief be higher than ,b's8 ,not1 on this view1 in the sense that what ,a believes is true1 and what ,b believes is not2 for what ,a is believing is merely that the idea of not doing good to your enemies tends to excite in him a feeling of moral indignation1 and what ,b believes is merely that it does not tend to excite this feeling in him3 and both beliefs may perfectly well be true2 it may really be true that the same actions do excite the feeling in ,a1 and that they don't in ,b4 ,what then1 could ,westermarck mean by saying that ,a's morality is higher than ,b's8 ,so far as ,i can see1 what1 on his own views1 he would have to mean is merely that he himself1 ,westermarck1 shares ,a's morality and does not share ,b's3 that it is true of him1 as of ,a1 that neglecting to do good to enemies excites his feelings of moral indignation and not true of him as it is of ,b1 that it does not excite such feelings in him4 ,in short he would have to say that what he means by calling ,a's morality the higher is merely ,a's morality is my morality1 and ,b's is not4 ,but it seems to me quite clear that when we say one morality is higher than another1 we do not merely mean that it is our own4 ,we are not merely asserting that it has a certain relation to our own feelings1 but are asserting1 if ,i may say so1 that the person who has it has a better moral taste than the person who has not4 ,and whether or not this means merely1 as ,i think1 that what the one believes is true1 and what the other believes is false1 it is at all events inconsistent with the view that in all cases we are merely making a statement about our own feelings4 ,for these reasons it seems to me extremely difficult to believe that when we judge things to be wrong1 each of us is merely making a judgment about his own psychology4 ,but if not about our own1 then about whose8 ,i have already said that the view that1 if the judgment is merely a psychological one at all1 it is a judgment about our own psychology1 is in some ways more plausible than any other view4 ,and ,i think we can now see that any other view is not plausible4 ,the alternatives are that ,i should be making a judgment about the psychology of all mankind1 or about that of some particular section of it4 ,and that the first alternative is not true1 is1 ,i think1 evident from the fact that1 when ,i judge an action to be wrong1 ,i may emphatically not believe that it is true of all mankind that they would regard it with feelings of moral disapproval4 ,i may know perfectly well that some would not4 ,most philosophers1 therefore1 have not ventured to say that this is the judgment ,i am making2 they say1 for instance1 that ,i am making a judgment about the feelings of the particular society to which ,i belong--about1 for instance1 the feelings of an impartial spectator in that society4 ,but1 if this view be taken1 it is open to the same objections as the view that ,i am merely making a judgment about my own feelings4 ,if we could say that every man1 when he judges a thing to be wrong1 was making a statement about the feelings of all mankind1 then when ,a says ,this is wrong and ,b says ,no1 it isn't1 they would really be differing in opinion1 since ,a would be saying that all mankind feel in a certain way towards the action1 and ,b would be saying that they don't4 ,but if ,a is referring merely to his society and ,b to his1 and their societies are different1 then obviously they are not differing in opinion at all3 it may perfectly well be true both that an impartial spectator in ,a's society does have a certain sort of feeling towards actions of the sort in question1 and that an impartial spectator in ,b's does not4 ,this view1 therefore1 implies that it is impossible for two men belonging to different societies ever to differ in opinion on a moral question4 ,and this is a view which ,i find it almost as hard to accept as the view that no two men ever differ in opinion on one4 ,for these reasons ,i think there are serious objections to the view that the idea of moral obligation is merely a psychological idea4 ,but now let us briefly consider the idea of good1 in ,aristotle's sense1 or intrinsic value4 ,as regards this idea1 there is again a difference of opinion among those who hold that it is a psychological idea1 as to what idea it is4 ,the majority seem to hold that it is to be defined1 somehow1 in terms of desire2 while others have held that what we are judging when we judge that one state of things is or would be intrinsically better than another1 is rather that the belief that the one was going to be realized would1 under certain circumstances1 give more pleasure to some man or set of men1 than the belief that the other was4 ,but the same objections seem to me to apply whichever of these two views be taken4 ,let us take desire4 ,about whose desires am ,i making a judgment1 when ,i judge that one state of things would be better than another8 ,here again1 it may be said1 first of all1 that ,i am merely making a judgment about my own4 ,but in this case the view that my judgment is merely about my own psychology is1 ,i think1 exposed to an obvious objection to which ,westermarck's view that my judgments of moral obligation are about my own psychology was not exposed4 ,the obvious objection is that it is evidently not true that ,i do in fact always desire more1 what ,i judge to be better3 ,i may judge one state of things to be better than another1 even when ,i know perfectly well not only that ,i don't desire it more1 but that ,i have no tendency to do so4 ,it is a notorious fact that men's strongest desires are1 as a rule1 for things in which they themselves have some personal concern2 and yet the fact that this is so1 and that they know it to be so1 does not prevent them from judging that changes1 which would not affect them personally1 would constitute a very much greater improvement in the world's condition1 than changes which would4 ,for this reason alone the view that when ,i judge one state of things to be better than another ,i am merely making a judgment about my own psychology1 must1 ,i think1 be given up3 it is incredible that we should all be making such mistakes about our feelings1 as1 on this view1 we should constantly be doing4 ,and there is1 of course1 besides1 the same objection1 as applied in the case of moral obligation3 namely that1 if this view were true1 no two men could ever differ in opinion as to which of two states was the better1 whereas it appears that they certainly sometimes do differ in opinion on such an issue4 ,my judgment1 then1 is not merely a judgment about my own psychology3 but1 if so1 about whose psychology is it a judgment8 ,it cannot be a judgment that all men desire the one state more than the other2 because that would include the judgment that ,i myself do so1 which1 as we have seen1 ,i often know to be false1 even while ,i judge that the one state really is better4 ,and it cannot1 ,i think1 be a judgment merely about the feelings or desires of an impartial spectator in my own society2 since that would involve the paradox that men belonging to different societies could never differ in opinion as to what was better4 ,but we have here to consider an alternative1 which did not arise in the case of moral obligation4 ,it is a notorious fact that the satisfaction of some of our desires is incompatible with the satisfaction of others1 and the satisfaction of those of some men with the satisfaction of those of others4 ,and this fact has suggested to some philosophers that what we mean by saying that one state of things would be better than another1 is merely that it is a state in which more of the desires1 of those who were in it1 would be satisfied at once1 than would be the case with the other4 ,but to this view the fundamental objection seems to me to be that whether the one state was better than the other would depend not merely upon the number of desires that were simultaneously satisfied in it1 but upon what the desires were desires for4 ,i can imagine a state of things in which all desires were satisfied1 and yet can judge of it that it would not be so good as another in which some were left unsatisfied4 ,and for this reason ,i cannot assent to the view that my judgment1 that one state of things is better than another is merely a judgment about the psychology of the people concerned in it4 ,this is why ,i find it hard to believe that either the idea of moral obligation or the idea of intrinsic value is merely a psychological idea4 ,it seems to me that ,moral ,philosophy cannot be merely a department of ,psychology4 ,but no doubt there may be arguments on the other side to which ,i have not done justice4 #a ,e ,westermarck1 ,the ,origin and ,development of ,moral ,ideas1 ,vol4 ,i1 pp4 #d1 #ac1 #ag-ah1 #ajj-aja4 ,on p4 #aje1 however1 ,westermarck suggests a view inconsistent with this one2 namely that1 when ,i judge an action to be wrong1 ,i am not merely asserting that it has a tendency to excite moral indignation in me1 but am also asserting that other people would be convinced that it has a tendency to excite moral indignation in them1 if they knew the act and all its attendant circumstances as well as ,i do1 and if1 at the same time their emotions were as refined as mine4 #b ,ibid4 p4 #hi4 ,,the ,,end ,,index ,abstractions1 illegitimate ,agnosticism ,analytic truths ,apprehension1 direct ,aristotle's ,ethics ,attention ,awareness ,being and ,reality ,berkeley ,bradley ,causal connection necessity ,consciousness ,content ,deduction ,difference1 numerical and qualitative intrinsic ,direct apprehension observation perception ,duty and ,wrong objectivity of ,entails and implies ,esse and percipi1 ,existence and reality of physical objects ,experience1 ambiguity of ,external objects and facts relations ,fact1 matters of ,follows ,given1 ambiguity of ,good1 ambiguity of objectivity of for man ,hegel ,hume ,i4 ,idealism ,ideas ,identity of ,indiscernibles ,implication1 ,indiscernibles1 ,identity of ,induction1 conditions necessary for ,internal relations1 dogma of two senses of ,intrinsic difference nature predicates value ,james1 ,william ,joachim1 ,h4 ,h4 ,kant ,knowledge and belief by description ,leibniz ,manifestation of ,material objects or things ,mill4 ,j4 ,s4 ,minds1 in our ,modify ,moral rules1 two kinds of ,necessary truths ,necessity1 three senses of logical unconditional ,objectivity1 ambiguity of of kinds of value ,objects1 external material physical1 and sensibles ,observation ,organic unities ,ought1 two meanings of objectivity of and wrong ,part1 physical and whole ,perception1 ambiguity of direct ,percipi and esse ,physical objects and sensibles ,pickwickian senses ,possible1 three senses of ,pragmatist theory of truth ,presented1 ambiguity of ,reality ,reason1 dictates of ,reasons ,reid1 ,t4 ,relational properties ,relations1 dogma of internal external internal ,right1 objectivity of ,russell1 ,b4 ,see1 ambiguity of ,seems ,sensations proper ,sense-data ,sensibles ,solipsism ,spiritual ,strachey1 ,o4 ,subjective ,synthetic truths ,taylor1 ,a4 ,e41 #h ,time ,truth1 and mutability pragmatist theory of and utility and verification of words ,truths1 analytic and synthetic man-made necessary ,value1 intrinsic objectivity of ,westermarck1 ,e4 ,wrong1 objectivity of and ought