,,fundamental ,,philosophy4 ,,by ,,rev4 ,,james ,,balmes4 ,,translated ,,from ,,the ,,spanish ,,by ,,henry ,f4 ,,brownson1 ,m4,a4 ,,in ,,two ,,volumes4 ,,vol4 ,i4 ,new ,york3 ,d4 ,j4 ,,sadlier ,,co41 #afd ,,william ,,street1 ,,boston3--#abh ,,federal ,,street4 ,,montreal3--,,cor4 ,,of ,,notre ,,dame ,,and ,,st4 ,,francis ,,xavier ,,sts4 #ahef4 ,entered according to ,act of ,congress1 in the year #ahef1 ,by ,d4 ,j4 ,,sadlier ,,co41 ,in the ,clerk's ,office of the ,district ,court of the ,united ,states for the ,southern ,district of ,new ,york4 ,,new ,,york3 ,,billin ,,brother1 ,,printers1 ,,xx ,,north ,,william ,,st4 ,,contents ,,of ,,vol4 ,,ii4 ,,book ,,fourth4 ,,on ,,ideas4 ,,chapter ,,page ,i4 ,cursory ,view of ,sensism #c ,,ii4 ,condillac's ,statue #f ,,iii4 ,difference between ,geometrical ,ideas and the ,sensible ,representations which accompany them #ab ,,iv4 ,the ,idea and the ,intellectual ,act #ae ,v4 ,comparison of ,geometrical with ,non-,geometrical ,ideas #bj ,,vi4 ,in what the ,geometrical ,idea consists2 and what are its ,relations with ,sensible ,intuition #be ,,vii4 ,the ,acting ,intellect of the ,aristotelians #bi ,,viii4 ,kant and the ,aristotelians #cc ,,ix4 ,historical ,view of the ,value of ,pure ,ideas #db ,x4 ,sensible ,intuition #ej ,,xi4 ,two ,cognitions3 ,intuitive and ,discursive #ed ,,xii4 ,the ,sensism of ,kant #eg ,,xiii4 ,existence of ,pure ,intellectual ,intuition #ei ,,xiv4 ,value of ,intellectual ,conceptions4--,abstraction made from ,intellectual ,intuition #fb ,,xv4 ,illustrations of the ,value of ,general ,conceptions #fe ,,xvi4 ,value of ,principles1 independently of ,sensible ,intuition #fh ,,xvii4 ,relations of ,intuition with the rank of the ,perceptive ,being #ga ,,xviii4 ,aspirations of the ,human ,soul #gd ,,xix4 ,elements and variety of the characters of ,sensible ,representation #gf ,,xx4 ,intermediate ,representations between ,sensible ,intuition and the ,intellectual ,act #ha ,,xxi4 ,determinate and ,indeterminate ,ideas #hd ,,xxii4 ,limits of our ,intuition #hh ,,xxiii4 ,of the ,necessity involved in ,ideas #ib ,,xxiv4 ,existence of ,universal ,reason #if ,,xxv4 ,in what does ,universal ,reason consist8 #ii ,,xxvi4 ,remarks on the ,real ,foundation of ,pure ,possibility #ajb ,,xxvii4 ,individual and ,intellectual ,phenomena explained by the ,universal ,subsisting ,reason #aje ,,xxviii4 ,observations on the ,relation of ,language to ,ideas #ajh ,,xxix4 ,origin and ,character of the relation between ,language and ,ideas #aab ,,xxx4 ,innate ,ideas #aae ,,book ,,fifth4 ,,idea ,,of ,,being4 ,i4 ,idea of ,being #abe ,,ii4 ,simplicity and ,indeterminateness of the ,idea of ,being #abg ,,iii4 ,substantive and ,copulative ,being #abi ,,iv4 ,being1 the ,object of the ,understanding1 is not the ,possible1 ,inasmuch as ,possible #acd ,v4 ,a ,difficulty ,solved #ach ,,vi4 ,in what ,sense the ,idea of ,being is the ,form of the ,understanding #ada ,,vii4 ,all ,science is founded in the ,postulate of ,existence #adc ,,viii4 ,the foundation of ,pure ,possibility1 and the ,condition of its ,existence #adg ,,ix4 ,idea of ,negation #aej ,x4 ,identity2 ,distinction2 ,unity2 ,multiplicity #aec ,,xi4 ,origin of the ,idea of ,being #aee ,,xii4 ,distinction between ,essence and ,existence #afa ,,xiii4 ,kant's ,opinion of ,reality and ,negation #afd ,,xiv4 ,recapitulation and ,consequences of the ,doctrine concerning the ,idea of ,being #afh ,,book ,,sixth4 ,,unity ,,and ,,number4 ,i4 ,preliminary ,considerations on the ,idea of ,unity #age ,,ii4 ,what is ,unity8 #agf ,,iii4 ,unity and ,simplicity #ahj ,,iv4 ,origin of the ,tendency of our ,mind to ,unity #ahc ,v4 ,generation of the ,idea of ,number #ahg ,,vi4 ,connection of the ,ideas of ,number with their ,signs #aia ,,vii4 ,analysis of the ,idea of ,number in ,itself and its ,relations with ,signs #aid ,,book ,,seventh4 ,,on ,,time4 ,i4 ,importance and ,difficulty of the ,subject #bja ,,ii4 ,is ,time the ,measure of ,movement8 #bjc ,,iii4 ,similarities and ,differences between ,time and ,space #bjf ,,iv4 ,definition of ,time #baa ,v4 ,time is ,nothing ,absolute #bac ,,vi4 ,difficulties in the explanation of ,velocity #bae ,,vii4 ,fundamental ,explanation of ,succession #bai ,,viii4 ,what is ,co-existence8 #bbc ,,ix4 ,present1 ,past1 and ,future #bbf ,x4 ,application of the preceding ,doctrine to several important ,questions #bca ,,xi4 ,the ,analysis of the ,idea of ,time confirms its resemblance to the ,idea of ,space #bcd ,,xii4 ,relations of the ,idea of ,time to ,experience #bcf ,,xiii4 ,kant's ,opinion #bci ,,xiv4 ,fundamental ,explanation of the ,objective ,possibility and of the ,necessity of the ,idea of ,time #bdb ,,xv4 ,important ,corollaries #bdc ,,xvi4 ,pure ,ideal ,time and ,empirical ,time #bde ,,xvii4 ,relations of the ,idea of ,time and the ,principle of ,contradiction #bdg ,,xviii4 ,summing up #bed ,,xix4 ,a glance at the ,ideas of ,space1 ,number1 and ,time #beg ,,book ,,eighth4 ,,the ,,infinite4 ,i4 ,transitory ,view of the ,actual ,state of ,philosophy #bfc ,,ii4 ,importance and ,anomaly of the ,questions on the ,idea of the ,infinite #bfh ,,iii4 ,have we the ,idea of the ,infinite8 #bfi ,,iv4 ,the ,limit #bgb ,v4 ,considerations on the ,application of the ,idea of the ,infinite to continuous quantities1 and to ,discrete ,quantities1 in so far as these last are expressed in ,series #bgd ,,vi4 ,origin of the ,vagueness and ,apparent ,contradictions in the ,application of the ,idea of the ,infinite #bgh ,,vii4 ,fundamental ,explanation of the ,abstract ,idea of the ,infinite #bha ,,viii4 ,the ,definition of ,infinity confirmed by ,application to ,extension #bhe ,,ix4 ,conception of an ,infinite ,number #bhi ,x4 ,conception of ,infinite ,extension #bib ,,xi4 ,possibility of ,infinite ,extension #bid ,,xii4 ,solution of ,various ,objections against the ,possibility of an ,infinite ,extension #bif ,,xiii4 ,existence of ,infinite ,extension #cjb ,,xiv4 ,possibility of an ,actual ,infinite ,number #cjd ,,xv4 ,idea of ,absolutely ,infinite ,being #caa ,,xvi4 ,all the ,reality contained in ,indeterminate ,conceptions is affirmed of ,god #cae ,,xvii4 ,all that is not contradictory in ,intuitive ,ideas is affirmed of ,god #cag ,,xviii4 ,intelligence and the ,absolutely ,infinite ,being #cba ,,xix4 ,summing up #cbd ,,book ,,ninth4 ,,on ,,substance4 ,i4 ,name and ,general ,idea of ,substance #cca ,,ii4 ,application of the ,idea of ,substance to ,corporeal ,objects #ccc ,,iii4 ,definition of ,corporeal ,substance #cch ,,iv4 ,relation of ,corporeal ,substance to its ,accidents #cdj ,v4 ,considerations on ,corporeal ,substance in ,itself #cdd ,,vi4 ,substantiality of the ,human ,me #cdg ,,vii4 ,relation of the ,proposition1 ,i ,think1 to the ,substantiality of the ,me #cdi ,,viii4 ,remarks on the ,soul's ,intuition of ,itself #ceb ,,ix4 ,kant's ,opinion of the ,arguments proving the ,substantiality of the ,soul #cee ,x4 ,kant's ,opinion of the ,argument which he calls ,paralogism of ,personality #cff ,,xi4 ,simplicity of the ,soul #cgg ,,xii4 ,kant's ,opinion of the ,argument proving the ,simplicity of the ,soul #cha ,,xiii4 ,in what manner the ,idea of ,substance may be applied to ,god #cid ,,xiv4 ,an important ,remark1 and ,summary #cig ,,xv4 ,pantheism examined in the ,order of ,ideas #cii ,,xvi4 ,pantheism examined in the ,order of ,external ,facts #djc ,,xvii4 ,pantheism examined in the ,order of ,internal ,facts #djf ,,xviii4 ,fichte's ,pantheistic ,system #dji ,,xix4 ,relations of ,fichte's ,system to the ,doctrines of ,kant #dbd ,,xx4 ,contradiction of ,pantheism to the ,primary ,facts of the ,human ,mind #dbi ,,xxi4 ,rapid glances at the ,principal ,arguments of ,pantheists #dcd ,,book ,,tenth4 ,,necessity ,,and ,,causality4 ,i4 ,necessity #dci ,,ii4 ,the ,unconditioned #ddb ,,iii4 ,immutability of ,necessary and ,unconditioned ,being #dde ,,iv4 ,ideas of ,cause and ,effect #ddh ,v4 ,origin of the ,notion of ,causality #dea ,,vi4 ,formula and ,demonstration of the ,principle of ,causality #ded ,,vii4 ,the ,principle of ,precedency #deg ,,viii4 ,causality in ,itself4--,insufficiency and ,error of some ,explanations #dfg ,,ix4 ,necessary and sufficient ,conditions of true ,absolute ,causality #dgd ,x4 ,secondary ,causality #dgf ,,xi4 ,fundamental ,explanation of the ,origin of the ,obscurity of ,ideas in what relates to ,causality #dgi ,,xii4 ,causality of ,pure ,force of the ,will #dhc ,,xiii4 ,activity #dhf ,,xiv4 ,possibility of the ,activity of ,bodies #dic ,,xv4 ,conjectures as to the ,existence of ,corporeal ,activity #dif ,,xvi4 ,internal ,causality #ejj ,,xvii4 ,remarks on ,spontaneity #ejh ,,xviii4 ,final ,causality2--,morality #eac ,,xix4 ,various ,explanations of ,morality #ebj ,,xx4 ,fundamental ,explanation of the ,moral ,order #ebg ,,xxi4 ,a ,glance at the ,work #edc ,,book ,,fourth4 ,,on ,,ideas4 ,,fundamental ,,philosophy4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,,cursory ,,view ,,of ,,sensism4 #a4 ,having spoken of sensations1 we come now to ideas4 ,we must1 however1 before making this transition1 inquire if there be in our mind ought else than sensation1 if all the inward phenomena which we experience be ought else than sensations transformed4 ,man1 when he rises from the sphere of sensations1 from those phenomena which place him in relation with the external world1 meets a new order of phenomena1 of whose presence he is equally conscious4 ,he cannot reflect upon sensations without being conscious of something more than sensation2 nor on the recollection or the inward representation of sensations1 without discovering something distinct both from the recollection and from the representation4 #b4 ,according to ,aristotle1 there is nothing in the understanding which has not first been in the senses2 and the schools have for long ages re-echoed this thought of the philosopher3 nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu4 ,the order1 therefore1 of human knowledge1 is from the external to the internal4 ,descartes pretended that we ought to invert this order1 and proceed from the internal to the external4 ,malebranche1 his disciple1 went farther1 and was of opinion that the understanding1 enfolded in itself1 should hold only the least possible intercourse with the external world4 ,according to him1 no atmosphere is so fatal to intellectual health as that of the world of the senses2 sensations are an inexhaustible fountain of error1 and the imagination is an enchantress only the more dangerous because she has fixed her dwelling at the very portal of the intellect1 which1 with her seductive beauty and gorgeous ornaments1 she hopes to rule at her pleasure4 #c4 ,locke strove to rehabilitate the old ,aristotelian maxim1 joined1 however1 to the criterion of observation3 besides sensation he admitted only reflection1 but he taught that the mind was endowed with innate faculties4 ,his disciple1 ,condillac1 not satisfied with this1 taught that all the actions of our mind were simply sensations transformed3 instead of distinguishing with ,locke two sources of our ideas1 the senses and reflection1 he thought it more exact to admit only one1 as well because reflection is in its root only sensation1 as because it is rather the channel by which ideas originating in the senses pass1 than their source4 ,judgment1 reflection1 desires1 and passions are in ,condillac's estimation nothing else than sensation transformed in various modes4 ,it seemed to him1 therefore1 very idle to suppose the mind to have received immediately from nature the faculties with which it is endowed4 ,nature has given us organs which show us by pleasure or pain what we ought to seek or to avoid2 but here she stops1 and leaves to experience the task of leading us to contract habits and finish the work she has commenced4#a #a ,trait des ,sensations4 ,prface4 #d4 ,in view of this system1 in which not even natural faculties are conceded to the soul1 and those which it does possess are considered as only simple effects of sensation1 it is worthy of remark how soon its author contradicts himself2 for1 almost in the same breath1 he professes to be an occasionalist1 and pretends that the impressions of our organization are nothing more than the occasion of our sensations4 ,can there be a natural faculty more inexplicable than that of placing one's self in relation with objects which do not produce sensations1 but are only the occasion of their production4 ,if such a faculty as this be conceded to the mind1 why may we not admit others8 ,is not that a very singular natural faculty which perceives by means of causes operating only occasionally8 ,in this case1 is there not attributed to the mind a natural faculty of producing sensations on occasion of organic impressions1 or is it not supposed to be an immediate relation with another and superior being which produces them8 ,why may not this internal activity1 this receptivity1 apply itself to ideas8 ,why must not other innate faculties be conceded to the mind8 ,and why does he pretend not to suppose them1 when his whole argument is based upon the supposition of their existence8 ,hostile as he professes to be to hypotheses and systems1 ,condillac is eminently addicted both to systems and hypotheses4 ,he imagines an origin and a nature of ideas of his own1 and to them he insists that every thing must conform4 ,to give a better idea of ,condillac's opinions1 and to combat them at once successfully and loyally1 we will briefly analyze the groundwork of his ,treatise on ,sensations1 the book on which he most prides himself1 and in which he flatters himself to have given to his doctrine its highest degree of clearness and certainty4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,condillac',s ,,statue4 #e4 ,condillac supposes a statue1 which he animates successively with each of the senses3 then beginning with the sense of smell1 he says2 ,so long as our statue is limited to the sense of smell1 its knowledge cannot go beyond odors2 it can neither have any idea of extension1 of space1 or of any thing beyond itself1 nor of other sensations1 such as color1 sound1 taste4#b ,if1 according to the conditions of the supposition1 all activity and every faculty be denied to this statue1 it certainly can have no other idea or sensation1 and it may be added that even its sensation of smell will be for it no idea4 #b ,chap4 ,i4 ,if we present it a rose1 continues ,condillac1 to us it will be a statue which smells a rose2 but for itself it will be only the smell of a rose4 ,it will then be the smell of the rose1 the pink1 the jasmine1 or the violet1 according to the objects which operate upon its organ2 in a word1 with respect to it1 these odors are only its own modifications and manners of being1 and it cannot believe itself any thing else1 since these are the only sensations of which it is susceptible4 #f4 ,it is very obvious that at the first step1 the statue must take a great leap4 ,close upon the apparent simplicity of the sensible phenomenon1 reflection1 one of those acts which suppose the intellect already well developed1 is introduced4 ,first the statue believes itself something2 it believes itself the odor2 next consciousness of itself in relation to the impression it has just received1 is attributed to it2 then it is made to form a kind of judgment1 whereby it affirms the identity of itself with the sensation4 ,this1 however1 is impossible1 unless we have something besides bare sensation2 but we neither have nor can have at this stage any thing beyond this purely passive impression1 an isolated phenomenon1 upon which there can be no reflection of any kind whatever2 and the statue can have no other reflection of itself than this sensation1 which in the reflective order has no title to be so called4 ,condillac's hypothesis rigorously applied1 presents only a phenomenon leading to nothing2 and the moment he leaves sensation to develop it1 he admits an activity in the mind distinct and very different from sensation1 which destroys his whole system4 ,the statue confined to the sensation of smell will never believe itself smell2 such a belief is a judgment1 and supposes comparison1 no trace of which can be discovered in the sensible phenomenon1 considered in all its purity1 as ,condillac requires in his hypothesis4 ,he begins his analytical investigations by introducing conditions which he at the same time supposes to be eliminated4 ,he undertakes to explain every thing by sensation alone1 and his first step is to amalgamate sensation with operations of a very different order4 #g4 ,condillac calls the capacity of feeling1 when applied to the impression received1 attention4 ,so if there be but one sensation1 there can be but one attention4 ,if various sensations succeeding each other leave some trace in the memory of the statue1 the attention will1 when a new sensation is presented1 be divided between the present and the past4 ,the attention directed at one and the same time to two sensations becomes comparison4 ,similarities and differences are perceived by comparison1 and this perception is a judgment4 ,all this is done with sensations alone2 therefore attention1 memory1 comparison1 and judgment are nothing but sensations transformed4 ,in appearance nothing clearer1 more simple1 or more ingenuous2 in reality nothing more confused or false4 #h4 ,first of all1 this definition of attention is not exact4 ,the capacity of feeling1 by the very fact of being in exercise1 is applied to the impression4 ,it does not feel when the sensitive faculty is not in exercise1 and this is not in exercise except when applied to the impression4 ,consequently1 attention would be nothing but the act of feeling2 all sensation would be attention1 and all attention sensation2 a meaning which no one ever yet gave to these words4 #i4 ,attention is the application of the mind to something2 and this application supposes the exercise of an activity concentrated upon its object4 ,properly speaking1 when the mind holds itself entirely passive1 it is not attentive2 and with respect to sensations it is attentive when by a reflex act we know that we feel4 ,without this cognition there can be no attention1 but only sensation more or less active1 according to the degree in which it affects our sensibility4 ,if ,condillac means to call the more vivid sensation attention1 the word is improperly used2 for it ordinarily happens that they who feel with the greatest vividness are precisely those who are distinguished for their want of attention4 ,sensation is the affection of a passive faculty2 attention is the exercise of an activity2 and hence it is that brutes do not participate of it except inasmuch as they possess a principle of activity to direct their sensitive faculties to a determinate object4 #aj4 ,is the perception of the difference of the smell of the rose and that of the pink a sensation8 ,if we are answered that it is not1 we infer that the judgment is not the sensation transformed2 for it is not even a sensation4 ,if we are told that it is one sensation1 we then observe that if it be either that of the rose or that of the pink1 it follows that with one alone of these sensations we shall have comparative perception1 which is absurd4 ,if we are answered that it is both together1 we must either interpret this expression rigorously1 and then we shall have a sensation which will at once be that of the pink and that of the rose1 the one remaining distinct from the other so as to satisfy the conditions of comparison2 or we must interpret it so as to mean that the two sensations are united2 in which case we gain nothing1 for the difficulty will be to show how co-existence produces comparison1 and judgment1 or the perception of the difference4 ,the sensation of the pink is only that of the pink1 and that of the rose only that of the rose4 ,the instant you attempt to compare them1 you suppose in the mind an act by which it perceives the difference2 and if you attribute to it any thing more than pure sensation1 you add a faculty distinct from sensation1 namely that of comparing sensations1 and appreciating their similarities and differences4 #aa4 ,this comparison1 this intellectual force1 which calls the two extremes into a common arena1 without confounding them1 discovers the points in which they are alike or unlike each other1 and1 as it were1 comes in and decides between them1 is distinct from the sensation2 it is the effect of an activity of a different order1 and its development must depend on sensations as exciting causes1 as a condition sine qua non2 but this is all it has to do with sensations themselves2 it is essentially distinct from them1 and cannot be confounded with them without destroying the idea of comparison1 and rendering it impossible4 ,no judgment is possible without the ideas of identity or similarity1 and these ideas are not sensations4 ,sensations are particular facts which never leave their own sphere1 nor can be applied from one thing to another4 ,the ideas of similarity and identity have something in common applicable to many facts4 #ab4 ,what next happens to a being limited to the faculty of experiencing various sensations8 ,it will receive without comparing them4 ,it is certain that when it feels in one manner it will not feel in another1 that one sensation is not another2 but this sensitive being will take no notice of the variety4 ,sensations will succeed sensations1 but will not be compared with each other4 ,even supposing them to be remembered1 the memory of them will be nothing more than a less intense repetition of the same sensations4 ,if it be admitted that this sensitive being compares them1 and perceives their relations of identity or distinction1 of similarity or difference1 a series of reflex acts are admitted which are not sensations4 #ac4 ,nor can the memory1 properly so called1 of sensations1 be explained by them alone2 and here again ,condillac is wrong4 ,the statue may recollect to-day the sensation of the smell of the rose which it received yesterday1 and this recollection may exist in two ways3 first1 by the internal reproduction of the sensation without any external cause1 or relation to time past1 and consequently without any relation to the prior existence of a similar sensation2 and then this recollection is not for the statue a recollection properly so called1 but only a sensation more or less vivid3 secondly1 by an internal reproduction with relation to the existence of the same or another similar sensation at a preceding time1 in which recollection essentially consists2 and here there is something more than sensation2 here are the ideas of succession1 time1 priority1 and identity1 or similarity1 all distinct and separable from sensation4 ,two entirely distinct sensations may be referred to the same time in the memory2 and then the time will be identical1 and the sensations distinct4 ,the sensation may exist without any recollection of the time it before existed1 or even without any recollection of having ever existed2 consequently1 sensation involves no relation of time2 they are distinct and very different matters1 and ,condillac deceives himself when he undertakes to explain the memory of sensations by mere sensations4 #ad4 ,these reflections utterly refute ,condillac's system4 ,either he admits something besides sensation or he does not2 if he does1 he violates his own original supposition2 if he does not1 he cannot explain any abstract idea1 nor even the sensitive memory3 he will therefore be obliged to admit with ,locke reflection upon sensations1 and for the same reason1 other faculties of the soul4 #ae4 ,it is easy to comprehend why certain philosophers have maintained that all our ideas come from the senses1 if we understand them to mean that sensations awaken our internal activity1 and1 so to speak1 supply the intellect with materials3 but it is not so easy to see how it can be advanced as a certain1 clear1 and exceedingly simple truth that there is in our mind nothing but these materials1 these sensations4 ,we have only to fix our attention for a moment upon what passes within us to discover many phenomena distinct from sensation1 and various faculties which have nothing to do with sensation4 ,if ,condillac had been satisfied with maintaining that these faculties needed sensation as a kind of excitement in order to be developed1 he would have advanced nothing contrary to sound philosophy3 but for him to pretend that all that is excited and all that is developed is only the principle which excites1 and to insist that this is confirmed by actual observation1 is openly to contradict observation itself1 and to render it absolutely impossible for him to make the least progress in the explanation of intellectual activity1 unless he abandons the supposition upon which his whole system is founded4 ,nevertheless1 the author of the ,treatise on ,sensations seems to be perfectly satisfied with his system3 the actual impression is the sensation2 the recollection of the sensation is the intellectual idea4 ,if this is not sound1 it is at least deceptive3 with the appearance of nice observation he stops at the surface of things1 and does not fatigue the pupil4 ,every thing comes from sensation2 but this is because ,condillac makes his statue talk as he pleases1 without paying the least attention to his hypothesis of sensation alone4 #af4 ,this system1 by reason of its philosophical meagerness1 is fatal to all moral ideas4 ,what becomes of morality if there are no ideas1 except sensations8 ,what becomes of duty if every thing is reduced to sensible necessity1 to pleasure or pain8 ,and what becomes of ,god1 and of all man's relations to ,god8 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,difference ,,between ,,geometrical ,,ideas ,,and ,,the ,,sensible ,,representations ,,which ,,accompany ,,them4 #ag4 ,sensible representations always accompany our intellectual ideas4 ,this is why in reflecting upon the latter we are apt to confound them with the former4 ,we say1 in reflecting upon them1 not in making use of them4 ,we none of us1 have any trouble in making use of ideas according to circumstances2 the error lies in the reflex1 not in the direct act4 ,it will be well to bear this last observation in mind4 #ah4 ,it is next to impossible for the geometrician to meditate upon the triangle without revolving in his imagination1 the image of a triangle as he has seen it drawn a thousand times2 and he will1 for this reason1 be disposed to believe that the idea of the triangle is nothing else than this sensible representation4 ,were it thus1 ,condillac's assertion that the idea is only the recollection of the sensation would be verified in the idea of the triangle4 ,in fact1 this representation is the sensation repeated3 the only difference between the two affections of the mind is that the actual sensation is caused by the actual presence of its object1 wherefore it is more fixed and vivid4 ,to prove that the difference is not essential1 but consists only in degree1 it is sufficient to observe1 that if the imaginary representation attain a high degree of vividness we cannot distinguish it from sensation1 as it happens to the visionary1 and as we have all experienced in our dreams4 #ai4 ,by noticing the following facts1 we shall readily perceive how different the idea of the triangle is from its imaginary representation4 ,i4 ,the idea of the triangle is one1 and is common to all triangles of every size and kind2 the representation of it is multiple1 and varies in size and form4 ,,ii4 ,when we reason upon the properties of the triangle1 we proceed from a fixed and necessary idea2 the representation changes at every instant1 not so1 however1 the unity of the idea4 ,,iii4 ,the idea of a triangle of any kind in particular is clear and evident2 we see its properties in the clearest manner2 the representation on the contrary is vague and confused1 thus it is difficult to distinguish a right-angled from an acute-angled triangle1 or even a slightly inclined obtuse-angled triangle4 ,the idea corrects these errors or rather abstracts them2 it makes use of the imaginary figure only as an auxiliary1 in the same manner as we give our demonstrations when we draw figures upon paper1 abstracting their exactness or inexactness1 often when we know that they are not exact1 which they cannot always be4 ,,iv4 ,the idea of the triangle is the same to the man born blind and to him who has sight2 and the proof of this is that both1 in their arguments and geometrical uses1 develop it in precisely the same manner4 ,the representation is different1 for us it is a picture1 which it cannot be for the blind man4 ,when he meditates upon the triangle he neither has1 nor can have1 in his imagination1 the same sensible representation as we1 since he wants all that can relate to the sensation of sight4 ,if the blind man experiences any accompanying representation of the idea1 he can have received it only from the sense of touch2 and in the case of large triangles1 the three sides of which cannot be touched at the same time1 the representation must be a successive series of sensations of touch1 just as the recollection of a piece of music is essentially a successive representation4 ,with us the representation of the triangle is almost always simultaneous1 excepting the case of exceedingly large triangles1 much larger than we usually see1 in which case1 especially when we are unaccustomed to consider such1 it seems necessary to go on extending the lines successively4 #bj4 ,what has been said of the triangle1 the simplest of all figures1 may with still greater reason be said of all others1 many of which cannot be distinctly represented by the imagination1 as we see in many-sided figures2 and even the circle1 which for facility of representation rivals the triangle1 we cannot so perfectly imagine as to distinguish it from an ellipse whose foci are only at a trifling distance from each other4 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,the ,,idea ,,and ,,the ,,intellectual ,,act4 #ba4 ,having shown that geometrical ideas are not sensible representations1 we can safely conclude that no kind of ideas are4 ,could there be a difficulty concerning any1 it would be concerning geometrical ideas1 for the objects of the latter can be sensibly represented4 ,when objects have no figure1 they cannot be perceived by any of the senses2 to speak in such a case of sensible representations is to fall into a contradiction4 #bb4 ,these considerations draw a dividing line between the intellect and the imagination2 a line which all the scholastics drew1 which ,descartes and ,malebranche respected and made still more prominent1 but which ,locke began to efface1 and ,condillac entirely obliterated4 ,all the scholastics recognized this line2 but they1 like many others1 used a language which1 unless well understood1 was of a character to obscure it4 ,they called every idea an image of the object1 and explained the act of the understanding as if there were a kind of form in the understanding which expressed the object1 just as a picture presented to the eyes offers them the image of the thing pictured4 ,this language arose from the continual comparison which is very naturally made between seeing and understanding4 ,when objects are not present we make use of their pictures1 and thus1 since objects themselves cannot be present to our understanding1 we conceive an interior form which performs the part of a picture4 ,on the other hand1 sensible things are the only ones which are strictly susceptible of representation2 we never discover within ourselves the form in which the objects are portrayed1 except in the case of imaginary representations2 and therefore it was rash to call this an idea1 and every idea an imaginary representation1 in which the whole system of ,condillac consists4 #bc4 ,st4 ,thomas calls the representations of the imagination phantasmata1 and says that so long as the soul is united to the body we cannot understand except per conversionem ad phantasmata2 that is1 unless the representation of the imagination1 which serves as material for the formation of the idea1 and assists in clearing it up1 and heightening its colors1 precedes and accompanies the intellectual act4 ,experience teaches that whenever we understand1 certain sensible forms relative to the object which occupies us1 exist in our imagination4 ,now1 they are the images of the figure and color of the object1 if it have any2 now1 the images of those with which they are compared1 or the words which denote them in the language we habitually speak4 ,thus1 even when thinking of ,god1 the very act by which we affirm that he is most pure spirit1 offers a kind of representation to the imagination under a sensible form4 ,when we speak of eternity1 we see the ,ancient of days1 as we have often seen him represented in our churches2 when we speak of the infinite intelligence1 we imagine perhaps a sea of light2 infinite mercy1 we picture to ourselves as a pitying likeness2 justice1 with angry countenance4 ,to force ourselves to form some conception of the creation1 we fancy a spring whence light and life both flow1 and thus also we endeavor to render immensity sensible by imagining unlimited extension4 ,the imagination always accompanies the idea1 but is not itself the idea2 and we perceive the evident and unimpeachable proof of the distinction between the two1 if we ask ourselves1 while in the very act of imagining a sea of light1 an old man1 an angry or placid countenance1 a fountain or extension1 if ,god is any one of these1 or any thing resembling them2 for1 we very promptly answer1 no1 that this would be impossible4 ,all this demonstrates the existence of an idea which has no connection with these representations1 but essentially excludes what is contained in them4 #bd4 ,what we have said of the idea of ,god1 may be said of many other ideas4 ,rarely do we understand any thing into which the idea of relation does not enter as an indispensable element4 ,how then is relation represented8 ,in the imagination1 in a thousand different manners2 as the point of contact of two objects2 as the link which unites them4 ,but is relation any one of these8 ,no6 ,when we inquire in what it does consist1 is there the slightest shadow of doubt that it is no one of these8 ,certainly not4 #be4 ,it is an error to call every idea an image1 if you mean to consider ideas as something distinct from the intellectual act1 which places itself before the understanding when it is in the exercise of its functions4 ,an image is that which represents1 as a likeness3 and how1 ,i ask1 do we know that this representation or likeness exists8 ,and how do we know that in order to reason we need an internal form1 which is1 as it were1 a picture of the object8 ,what is a picture beyond the sensible order8 ,there are1 it is true1 similarities in the intellectual order1 but not in the sense in which we perceive them in the material order4 ,i think2 so does my neighbor3 here is a similarity1 since the same thing is found in both one and the other1 identical in species1 but not in number4 ,but this similarity is of a different order from that of sensible similarities4 #bf4 ,when we understand1 we know that which is in the object understood2 but whether this be understood by a simple act of the intellect1 or a medium be required to represent the similarity1 we do not know4 ,we understand the thing1 not the idea2 and it is as difficult to say how the intellect perceives without the idea1 as it is to say how the supposed representation refers to its object4 ,how does our idea refer to an object8 ,if by itself1 then by itself alone1 since it is purely internal1 it refers to the external1 and requires no intermediary to place the subject in relation with external objects4 ,what it does1 the intellectual act of itself alone can also do4 ,if we perceive the relation of the idea with the object by means of another idea1 this intermediate idea presents the same difficulty as the preceding idea2 and so at last we must come to a case in which there is a transition from the intellect to the object without any intermediary4 ,if we see an object which is the image of another not known1 we shall see the object in itself1 but we shall not know that it has the relation of image1 unless informed that it has3 we shall know its reality1 but not its representation4 ,the same will happen in ideas which are images2 these1 therefore1 do not at all explain how the transition from the internal act to the object is made2 for this would require them to do for the understanding that which we find them unable to do for themselves4 #bg4 ,there is something mysterious in the intellectual act1 which men seek to explain in a thousand different ways1 by rendering sensible what they inwardly experience4 ,hence so many metaphorical expressions1 useful only so long as they serve merely to call and fix the attention1 and give an account of the phenomenon1 but hurtful to science if they go beyond these limits1 if it be forgotten that they are metaphors1 and are never to be confounded with the reality4 ,by intelligence we see what there is in things1 we experience the act of perception2 but when we reflect upon it we grope in the dark1 as if there were a dense cloud about the very source of light1 preventing us from seeing it with clearness4 ,thus the firmament is at times flooded with the light of the sun1 although the sun is encircled with clouds and hidden from our view1 so that we cannot even determine its position upon the horizon4 #bh4 ,one cause of obscurity in this matter is the very effort to clear it up4 ,the act of the understanding is1 in its objective part1 exceedingly luminous1 since by it we see what there is in objects2 but in its subjective nature1 or in itself1 it is an internal fact1 simple indeed1 but incapable of being explained by words4 ,this is not a peculiarity of the intellectual act1 it is common to all internal phenomena4 ,what is it to see1 to taste1 to hear8 ,what is a sensation1 or feeling of any kind whatsoever8 ,it is an inward phenomenon1 of which we are conscious1 but which we cannot decompose into parts2 nor can we explain with words the combination of these parts4 ,a word is enough to indicate the phenomenon1 but this word has no meaning for him who does not now experience this phenomenon1 or has not oat some former time experienced it4 ,no possible explanations would ever enable a man born blind to understand color1 or a deaf man sound4 ,the act of understanding belongs to this class2 it is a simple fact which we can point out1 but not explain4 ,an explanation supposes various notions1 the combination of which may be expressed by language2 in the intellectual act there are none of these4 ,when we have said1 ,i think1 or1 ,i understand1 we have said all4 ,this simplicity is not destroyed by objective multiplicity2 the act by which we compare two or more objects is just as simple as the act by which we perceive a single object4 ,if one act be not enough1 more will follow2 and finally one act will unite or sum them all up2 but it will not be a composite act4 ,,chapter ,v4 ,,comparison ,,of ,,geometrical ,,with ,,non-,,geometrical ,,ideas4 #bi4 ,the idea is a very different thing from the sensible representation1 but it has certain necessary relations with it which it will be well to examine4 ,when we say necessary1 we speak only of the manner in which our mind1 in its actual state1 understands1 abstracting the intelligence of other spirits1 and even that of the human mind when subject to other conditions than those imposed by its present union with the body4 ,so soon as we quit the sphere in which our experience operates1 we must be very cautious how we lay down general propositions1 and take care not to extend to all intelligences qualities which are possibly peculiar to our own1 and which1 even with respect to it1 will perhaps be entirely changed in another life4 ,having made these previous observations1 which will be found of great utility to mark the limits of things there is danger of confounding1 we now proceed to examine the relations of our ideas with sensible representations4 #cj4 ,a classification of our ideas into geometrical and non-geometrical naturally occurs when we fix our attention upon the difference of objects to which our ideas may refer4 ,the former embrace the whole sensible world so far as it can be perceived in the representation of space2 the latter include every kind of being1 whether sensible or not1 and suppose a primitive element which is the representation of extension4 ,in their divisions and subdivisions the latter present simply the idea of extension1 limited and combined in different ways2 but they offer nothing in relation to the representation of space1 and even when they refer to it1 they only consider it inasmuch as numbered by the various parts into which it may be divided4 ,hence the line which in mathematics separates geometry from universal arithmetic2 the former is founded upon the idea of extension1 whereas the latter considers only numbers1 whether determinate1 as in arithmetic properly so called1 or indeterminate1 as in algebra4 #ca4 ,here we have to note the superiority of non-geometrical to geometrical ideas1--a superiority plainly visible in the two branches of mathematics1 universal arithmetic and geometry4 ,arithmetic never requires the aid of geometry1 but geometry at every step needs that of arithmetic4 ,arithmetic and algebra may both be studied from their simplest elementary notions to their highest complications without ever once involving the idea of extension1 and consequently without making use of one single geometrical idea4 ,even infinitesimal calculus1 in a manner originating in geometrical considerations1 has been emancipated from them and formed into a science perfectly independent of the idea of extension4 ,on the contrary1 geometry cannot take a single step without the aid of arithmetic4 ,the comparison of angles is a fundamental point in the science of geometry1 but it cannot be made except by measuring them2 and their measure is an arc of the circumference divided into a certain number of degrees1 which must be counted2 and thus we come to the idea of number1 the operation of counting1 that is1 into the field of arithmetic4 ,the very proof by superposition1 notwithstanding its eminently geometrical character1 stands in need of numeration1 inasmuch as the superposition is repeated4 ,we do not require the idea of number to demonstrate by means of superposition the equality of two arcs perfectly equal2 but in order to appreciate the relation of their quantity we compare two unequal arcs and follow the method of placing the less upon the greater several times1 we count1 we make use of the idea of number1 and find we have entered upon the ground of arithmetic4 ,we discover the equality of two radii of a circle1 when we compare them by superposition1 abstracting the idea of number2 but if we would know the relation of the diameter to the radii1 we employ the idea of two2 we say the diameter is twice the radius1 and again enter the domains of arithmetic4 ,as we proceed in the combination of geometrical ideas1 we make use of more and more arithmetical ideas4 ,thus the idea of the number three necessarily enters into the triangle2 and the sum of three and the sum of two both enter into one of its most essential properties2 the sum of the three angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles4 #cb4 ,the idea of number cannot be replaced by the sensible intuition of the figure whose properties and relations are under discussion4 ,in many cases this intuition is impossible1 as1 for example1 in many-sided figures4 ,we have little difficulty in representing to our imagination a triangle1 or even a quadrilateral figure1 but the difficulty is greater in the case of the pentagon1 and greater still in the hexagon and heptagon2 and when the figure attains a great number of sides1 one after another escapes the sensible intuition1 until it becomes utterly impossible to appreciate it by mere intuition4 ,who can distinctly imagine a thousand-sided figure8 #cc4 ,this superiority of non-geometrical over geometrical ideas is very remarkable1 since it shows that the sphere of intellectual activity expands in proportion as it rises above sensible intuition4 ,extension1 as we have before seen1#c serves as the basis not only of geometry1 but also of the natural sciences1 inasmuch as it represents in a sensible manner the intensity of certain phenomena2 but it can by no means enable us to penetrate their inmost nature1 and guide us from that which appears to that which is4 ,this and other subordinate ideas are1 so to speak1 inert1 and from them springs no vital principle to fecundate our understanding1 and still less the reality2 they are an unfathomable depth in which our intellectual activity may toil1 perfectly certain of never finding any thing in it which we ourselves have not placed there2 they are a lifeless object which lends itself to all imaginable combinations without ever being capable of producing any thing1 or of containing any thing not given to it4 ,the naturalists in considering inertness as a property of matter1 have perhaps regarded more than they are aware the idea of extension1 which presents the inertness most completely4 #c ,book ,,iii4 #cd4 ,the ideas of number1 cause1 and substance abound in results1 and are applicable to all branches of science4 ,we can scarcely speak without expressing them2 it might almost be said that they are constituent elements of intelligence1 since without them it vanishes like a passing illusion4 ,they extend to every thing1 apply to every thing1 and are necessary1 whenever objects are offered to the intellectual activity1 in order that the intellect can perceive and combine them4 ,it makes no difference whether the objects be sensible or insensible1 whether there be question of our intelligence or of others subject to different laws2 whenever we conceive the act of understanding we conceive also these primitive ideas as elements indispensable to the realization of the intellectual act4 ,they exist and are combined independently of the existence1 and even of the possibility1 of the sensible world2 and they would also exist in a world of pure intelligences1 even if the sensible universe were nothing but an illusion or an absurd chimera4 ,on the other hand1 take geometrical ideas and remove them from the sensible sphere2 and all that you base upon them will be only unmeaning words4 ,the ideas of substance1 cause1 and relation do not flow from geometrical ideas2 if we regard them alone1 we see an immense field extending into regions of unbounded space2 but the coldness and silence of death reign there4 ,if we would introduce beings1 life1 and motion into this field we must seek them elsewhere2 we must use other ideas1 and combine them1 so that life1 activity1 and motion may result from their combination1 in order that geometrical ideas may contain something besides this inert1 immovable1 and vacant mass1 such as we imagine the regions of space to be beyond the confines of the world4 #ce4 ,geometrical ideas1 properly so called1 as distinguished from sensible representations1 are not simple ideas1 since they necessarily involve the ideas of relation and number4 ,geometry cannot advance one step without comparing them2 and this comparison almost always takes place by the intervention of the idea of number4 ,hence it is that geometrical ideas1 apparently so unlike purely arithmetical ideas1 are really identical with them so far as their form or purely ideal character is concerned2 and are only distinguishable from them when they refer to a determinate matter1 such as extension as presented in its sensible representation4 ,the inferiority therefore of geometrical ideas already mentioned1 only refers to their matter1 or to their sensible representations1 which are presupposed to be an indispensable element4 #cf4 ,another consequence of this doctrine1 is the unity of the pure understanding1 and its distinction from the sensitive faculties4 ,for1 the very fact that the same ideas apply alike to sensible and to insensible objects1 with no other difference than that arising from the diversity of the matter perceived1 proves that above the sensitive faculties there is another faculty with an activity of its own1 and elements distinct from sensible representations4 ,this is the centre where all intellectual perceptions unite1 and where that intrinsic force resides1 which1 although excited by sensible representations1 develops itself by its own power1 makes itself master of these impressions1 and converts them1 so to speak1 by a mysterious assimilation1 into its own substance4 #cg4 ,here we repeat what we have already remarked1 concerning the profound ideological meaning involved in the acting intellect of the ,aristotelians1 so ridiculed because not understood4 ,but we leave this point and proceed to the careful analysis of geometrical ideas1 to discover1 if possible1 a glimpse of some ray of light amid the profound darkness which envelops the nature and origin of our ideas4 ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,in ,,what ,,the ,,geometrical ,,idea ,,consists2 ,,and ,,what ,,are ,,its ,,relations ,,with ,,sensible ,,intuition4 #ch4 ,in the preceding chapters we have distinguished between pure ideas and sensible representations1 and we seem to have sufficiently demonstrated the difference between them1 although we limited ourselves to the geometrical order4 ,but we have not explained the idea in itself2 we have said what it is not1 but not what it is2 and although we have shown the impossibility of explaining simple ideas1 and the necessity of our being satisfied with indicating them1 we do not wish to be confined to this observation1 which may seem to elude the difficulty rather than to solve it4 ,only after due investigations1 by which we shall be better able to understand what is meant by designate1 will it be allowable to confine ourselves to their designation1 for it will then be seen that we have not eluded the difficulty4 ,let us begin with geometrical ideas4 #ci4 ,is a geometrical idea1 without any accompanying or preceding sensible representation1 possible8 ,it would seem that we can have none4 ,what meaning has the idea of the triangle if not referred to lines forming angles and enclosing a space8 ,and what do lines1 angles1 and space mean1 without sensible intuition8 ,a line is a series of points1 but it represents nothing determinate1 nothing susceptible of geometrical combinations1 except it be referred to that sensible intuition in which the point appears to us as an element generating by its movement that continuity which we call a line4 ,what would become of angles without the real or possible representation of these lines8 ,what would become of the area of the triangle were we to abstract a space1 a surface which is or may be represented8 ,we might challenge all the ideologists in the world to assign any sense to the words used in geometry if absolute abstraction be made all sensible representation4 #dj4 ,geometrical ideas1 such as we conceive them1 have a necessary relation to sensible intuition4 ,in order the better to understand this relation1 let us define the triangle to be the figure enclosed by three right lines4 ,this definition involves the following ideas3 space1 enclosed1 three1 lines4 ,with a space and three lines which do not enclose the figure1 we have no triangle2 the word enclosed cannot therefore be omitted4 ,if you enclose a space1 but with more than three lines1 the result will not be a triangle2 and if you take less than three lines you can have no enclosure4 ,the idea of three is therefore necessary to the idea of the triangle4 ,it is useless to add that the idea of line is as necessary as the others1 since without it no triangle can be conceived4 ,different and distinct ideas1 it is true1 are here combined1 but they are all referred to one sensible intuition1 although in an indeterminate manner4 ,we here abstract the longness or shortness of the lines and their forming larger or smaller angles4 ,but we cannot thus abstract in the case of determinate intuitions2 for every determinate intuition has its own peculiar qualities2 otherwise it would not be a determinate representation1 and consequently not sensible as it is supposed to be4 ,but although the reference be to an indeterminate intuition1 it always supposes some intuition either actual or possible1 since otherwise the material of combination would be wanting to the understanding2 and the four ideas involved in the triangle would be empty and unmeaning forms1 and their combination extravagant if not absurd4 #da4 ,the idea then of the triangle seems to be simply the intellectual perception of the relation between the lines presented to the sensible intuition1 considered in all its generality1 without any determining circumstance limiting it to particular cases or species4 ,this explanation admits nothing intermediate between the sensible representation and the intellectual act1 which1 exercising its activity upon the materials presented by sensible intuition1 perceives their relations1 and this pure and simple perception constitutes the idea4 #db4 ,we shall understand this better if1 instead of the triangle1 we take a many-sided figure1 such as a polygon of a million sides1 which cannot be clearly presented to the sensible intuition4 ,the idea of this figure is as simple as that of the triangle2 we perceive it by an intellectual act1 express it by a single word1 and can calculate its properties and relations with the same exactness and certainty as we can those of the triangle1 although it is absolutely impossible to represent it distinctly to our imagination4 ,when we reflect upon what it offers to the intellectual act1 we notice the same elements as in the idea of the triangle1 with this single difference that the number three is changed into million4 ,we can have no sensible representation of all these lines2 but the understanding has sufficiently combined the idea of line with that of number to perceive its object1 a million4 ,here1 then1 we perceive the same elements as in the triangle2 but it is upon these elements1 considered in general without any other determination than results from the fixed number1 that the perceptive act operates4 #dc4 ,the idea of a polygon in general1 abstracting the number of its sides1 offers in its sensible representation1 nothing determinate to the mind1 nothing but the abstract idea of a right line1 the general idea of an enclosed space4 ,the relation which these objects of the intellectual1 act even in the midst of their indeterminateness1 have amongst themselves1 is perceived by the intellectual act4 ,this perceptive act is the idea4 ,every thing beyond this is useless1 and not only useless but affirmed without reason4 #dd4 ,it will perhaps be asked how the understanding can perceive what passes without it1 since sensible intuition is a function of a faculty distinct from the understanding8 ,in reply1 we shall abstract the questions discussed in the schools concerning the powers of the mind1 and be content to remark that whether these be really distinct among themselves1 or only one power exercising its activity upon different objects and in different manners1 it will be alike necessary to admit a consciousness common to all the faculties4 ,the soul which feels1 thinks1 recollects1 desires1 is one and the same1 and is alike conscious of all these acts4 ,whatever be the nature of the faculties by which she performs these acts1 she it is that performs them and knows that she performs them4 ,there is then in the soul a single consciousness1 the common centre where dwells the inward sense of every activity exercised1 and of every affection received1 to whatever order they may belong4 ,however1 supposing the case the most unfavorable to our theory1 that the faculty to which sensible intuition corresponds1 is really distinct from the faculty which perceives the relations of the objects offered by sensible intuition2 does it therefore follow that the understanding cannot without something intermediate exercise its activity upon objects presented by this intuition8 ,certainly not4 ,the act of pure understanding and that of sensible intuition1 are indeed different1 but they meet in consciousness1 as in a common field2 and there they come in contact1 the one exercising its perceptive activity upon the material supplied by the other4 ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,,the ,,acting ,,intellect ,,of ,,the ,,aristotelians4 #de4 ,i shall now briefly explain the scholastic theory of the manner in which the understanding knows material things4 ,this explanation will show how much reason we had to assert that this doctrine of the schools can be ridiculed only when not understood1 and that1 whatever its foundation1 it cannot be denied to possess an ideological importance4 #df4 ,the schoolmen began with this principle of ,aristotle1 nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu2 ,there is nothing in the understanding which has not previously been in the senses4 ,conformably to this principle they maintained that before the soul received impressions from the senses1 the understanding was like a clean table upon which nothing had been written3 sicut tabula rasa in qua nihil est scriptum4 ,according to this doctrine all our knowledge flows from the senses2 and at first sight the system of the schools might seem to be very similar to1 if not identical with1 that of ,condillac4 ,both seek the origin of our cognitions in sensation2 both teach that there is no idea in our understanding prior to sensation4 ,but the two systems are1 notwithstanding these apparent similarities1 very different1 and even diametrically opposed4 #dg4 ,the fundamental principle of ,condillac's theory is1 that sensation is the sole operation of the mind2 and that whatever exists in our mind is nothing more than the sensation transformed in various ways4 ,prior to sensible impressions1 this philosopher admits no faculty2 the development of sensation is all that fecundates the soul1 not by exciting its faculties1 but by generating them4 ,the school of the ,aristotelians took1 indeed1 sensations for the starting-point1 but did not consider them as producing intelligence2 on the contrary1 they were very careful to mark the limits of the sensitive faculties1 and of the understanding in which they recognized a peculiar and innate activity altogether superior to the faculties of the sensible order4 ,we have only to open any one of the innumerable works of this school1 to meet on every page such words as intellectual force1 light of reason1 participation in the divine light1 and others in the same style1 in which a primary activity of our mind1 not communicated by sensations1 but prior to them all1 is expressly recognized4 ,the acting intellect1 intellectus agens1 which figures so much in this ideological system1 was a standing condemnation of the system of transformed sensation advocated by ,condillac4 #dh4 ,the ,aristotelians1 governed by their favorite idea of explaining every thing by matter and form1 modified the meaning of these words according to the exigencies of the objects to which they applied them1 and considered the faculties of the soul as a class of forces incapable of acting unless united to a form which brought them into action4 ,thus they explained sensations by species1 or forms1 which placed the sensitive power in act4 ,the imagination was a force which1 although it sometimes rose above the external senses1 contained nothing but species of the sensible order1 subject also to the necessary conditions of this faculty4 ,these species were the forms which placed the imaginative force in act1 and without which it could not exercise its functions4 ,the ,aristotelians1 after having thus explained the phenomena of the external senses1 and of the imagination1 undertook to explain those of the intellectual order2 and in this they displayed their genius by inventing an auxiliary which they named the acting intellect4 ,the necessity of making two principles in seeming contradiction accord1 was the reason of this invention4 ,on the one hand the ,aristotelians held that our cognitions all flowed from the senses2 and on the other they asserted that there was an essential and intrinsic difference between feeling and understanding4 ,having drawn this dividing line1 the sensitive and intellectual orders were separated2 but as it was on the other side requisite to establish some communication between these two orders1 it was necessary for them1 if they wished to save the principle1 that all our ideas come from the senses1 to discover some point where the two channels might unite4 ,the cognition of material things could not be denied to the pure understanding2 but as this was not an innate cognition and could not be acquired by it1 they were under the necessity of establishing some communication by means of which the understanding might comprehend objects without soiling its purity by sensible species4 ,the imagination contained them1 already purified from the grossness of the external senses2 in it they existed more aerial1 purer1 and less remote from immateriality2 but they were still at an immense distance from the intellectual order1 and had themselves to support the burden of those material conditions which never allowed them to attain the altitude necessary to be put in communication with the pure understanding4 ,in order to know1 the understanding requires forms to unite themselves to it intimately2 and although it be true that it discerned them far down in the lower regions of the sensitive faculties1 yet it could descend to them without compromising its dignity1 and denying its own nature4 ,in this conflict they required a mediator2 it was the acting intellect4 ,we will now proceed to explain the attributes of this faculty4 #di4 ,the sensible species contained in the imagination1 the true picture of the external world1 were not of themselves intelligible1 because enveloped1 not with matter properly so called1 but with material forms1 to which the intellectual act could only indirectly refer4 ,if they could have discovered a faculty capable of rendering intelligible what is not intelligible1 this difficult problem would have been satisfactorily solved2 as in this case the mysterious transformer by applying its activity to the sensible species1 would elevate them from the category of imaginary species1 phantasmata1 to that of pure ideas or sensible species1 and thus make them serve the intellectual act4 ,this faculty is the acting intellect2 a real magician which possesses the wonderful secret of stripping sensible species of their material conditions1 of smoothing every roughness which prevents them from coming in contact with the pure understanding1 and transforms the gross food of the sensitive faculties into the purest ambrosia1 fit to be served at the repast of spirits4 #ej4 ,this invention merits to be called ingenious rather than extravagant1 poetical rather than ridiculous4 ,but its most remarkable feature is1 that it involves a profound philosophical sense1 as well because it marks an ideological fact of the highest importance1 as because it indicates the true way of explaining the phenomena of intelligence in their relations to the sensible world4 ,this remarkable fact is the difference1 even with respect to material objects1 between sensible representations and pure ideas4 ,the indication of the true way consists in presenting the intellectual activity as operating upon sensible species1 and converting them into food for the mind4 ,let us leave the poetical part to the explanation of the schools1 and see if what it involves be worth as much1 to say the least1 as what ,kant advanced when1 combating sensism1 he distinguished between the pure understanding and sensible intuitions4 ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,,kant ,,and ,,the ,,aristotelians4 #ea4 ,lest ,i be accused of levity in comparing ,kant's philosophy with that of the schools1 in what relates to the distinction between the sensitive and intellectual faculties1 ,i shall give a rapid examination of this philosopher's doctrine so far as the present matter is concerned4 ,since the ,german philosopher is in the habit of expressing himself with great obscurity1 and of using an obsolete language liable to different interpretations1 ,i shall insert his own words1 so that the reader may judge for himself1 and rectify any inaccuracies into which ,i may fall1 in comparing ,kant's doctrine with that of the ,aristotelians4 ,in whatever manner1 says ,kant1 and by whatever means a cognition may be referred to objects1 that which makes the cognition refer immediately to things1 and to which all thought is a means1 is intuition4 ,this intuition exists only inasmuch as the object is given us1 which is not possible1 at least for us men1 except so far as it affects the mind in some way4 ,the capacity of receiving impressions by the manner in which objects affect us is called sensibility4 ,by means of sensibility objects are given to us3 it alone supplies us with intuitions3 but they are thought by the understanding1 and from it arise conceptions4 ,all thought must ultimately be referred1 either directly1 or indirectly by means of certain signs1 to intuitions1 and consequently to sensibility1 since no object can be given to us in any other4 ,the action of an object upon the representative faculty1 so far as we are affected by it1 is sensation4 ,the intuition1 which is referred to an object by means of sensation1 is called empirical4 ,the immediate object of an empirical intuition is called a phenomenon4#d #d ,transcendental sthetics1 #a4 ,the distinction between the faculty of feeling and that of conceiving is fundamental in ,kant's system3 and we see that he gives it a hasty exposition before beginning his investigations on sthetics or the theory of sensibility4 ,further on1 in treating of the operations of the understanding1 he has more fully developed his doctrine3 and by the emphasis he puts upon it1 it would seem evident that he regarded it as of high importance1 and perhaps as a discovery of a region entirely unknown to the philosophical world4 ,thus he speaks of it in his ,transcendental ,logic3 ,our knowledge proceeds from two intellectual sources2 the first is the capacity of receiving representations1 7the receptivity of impressions17 the second is the faculty of knowing an object by these representations1 7the spontaneity of conceptions47 ,by the former the object is given to us2 by the latter1 it is thought in relation to this representation 7as mere determination of the mind47 ,intuition and conception constitute the elements of all our knowledge2 so that neither conceptions without an intuition in some manner corresponding to them1 nor an intuition without conceptions1 can give knowledge4 99 99 99 99 99 ,we call sensibility the capacity 7receptivity7 of our mind to receive representations1 so far as affected in any way whatever3 on the contrary1 the faculty of producing representations1 or the spontaneity of knowledge1 is called understanding4 ,our nature is such that there can be no intuition not sensible1 that is to say1 which only comprehends the manner in which we are affected by objects4 ,the understanding is the faculty of thinking the object of sensible intuition4 ,neither of these properties of the soul is preferable to the other4 ,without sensibility no object could be given to us2 without the understanding none could be thought4 ,thoughts without contents are empty2 intuitions without conceptions are blind4 ,it is1 then1 just as necessary to make conceptions sensible1--that is1 to give them an object in intuition1 as to make intuitions intelligible1 by subjecting them to conceptions4 ,these two faculties or capacities cannot interchange their functions4 ,the understanding can perceive nothing1#e and the senses can think nothing4 ,knowledge results only from their union4 ,their attributes1 therefore1 ought not to be confounded2 on the contrary1 there is every reason to distinguish them1 and to separate them with great care4 ,we distinguish then the science of the laws of sensibility in general1 that is to say1 sthetics1 from the science of the laws of the understanding in general1 that is1 from ,logic4#f #e ,he speaks of intuitive perception1 not of perception in general4 #f ,transcendental ,logic4 ,introduction4 ,mark well the meaning of this doctrine4 ,two facts are established2 sensible intuition1 and the conception of it2 consequently the existence of two faculties1 sensibility1 and the understanding1 is affirmed4 ,to the first correspond sensible representations2 to the latter conceptions4 ,these two faculties1 though different1 are closely interlinked2 and they are mutually necessary in order to produce cognitions4 ,but how do they give each other that mutual aid they stand in need of8 ,the understanding1 ,kant elsewhere says1 has been thus far defined only negatively1 as a not-sensible faculty of knowing4 ,but as we can have no intuition independently of sensibility1 it follows that the understanding is not a faculty of intuition4 ,excepting intuition1 there remains no way of knowing other than by conceptions2 wherefore we infer that the knowledge of every intellect1 at least every human intellect1 is a knowledge by conceptions2 not intuitive1 but discursive4 ,all intuitions1 as sensible1 rest upon affections1 and consequently1 all conceptions upon functions4 ,i understand by functions1 the unity of action necessary to arrange different representations under one common representation4 ,conceptions1 then1 are grounded on the spontaneity of thought1 as sensible intuitions on the receptivity of impressions4 ,the understanding can make no use of these conceptions except to judge by means of them1 and as intuition is the only representation which has an immediate object1 no conception can ever be immediately referred to an object1 but only to some other representation of this object1 whether this be an intuition1 or even a conception4 ,judgment is the mediate cognition of an object1 and consequently the representation of a representation of the object4 ,in every judgment there is a conception applicable to many things1 and under this plurality it comprises also a given representation1 immediately referable to the object4 ,thus1 in the judgment3 all bodies are divisible2 the conception of divisible is common to different conceptions1 among which that of body is the one it here particularly refers to4 ,but this conception of body relates to certain phenomena we have in view2 these objects are then mediately represented by the conception of divisibility4 ,all judgments are functions of unity in our representations1 since instead of one immediate representation1 there comes in another more elevated1 which includes the first and many others1 and conduces to the cognition of the object2 and a great number of possible cognitions are reduced to one alone4 ,but we may reduce all the operations of the understanding to judgment2 so that the understanding in general may be represented as a faculty of judging2 because1 from what has been said1 it is the faculty of thinking4 ,thought is cognition by conceptions2 but conceptions1 as predicates of possible judgments1 may be referred to any representation whatever of an object1 however indeterminate4 ,thus the conception of body signifies something1 for example1 a metal1 which may be known by this conception4 ,it is then a conception only because it contains in itself other representations by means of which it may be referred to objects4 ,it is then the attribute of a possible judgment1 for instance1 of this3 every metal is a body4#g #g ,transc4 ,log4 ,transc4 ,anal4 ,book ,i41 ,chap4 ,i41 ,sec4 ,i4 #eb4 ,there are in this doctrine of ,kant1 two things to be distinguished3 first1 the facts upon which it is based2 and secondly1 the manner in which he examines and applies them1 and the consequences he deduces from them4 ,we detect at once a radical difference1 as far as the observation of ideological facts is concerned1 between ,kant's system and that of ,condillac4 ,while the latter discovers in the mind no fact but sensation1 no immediate faculty more noble than that of feeling1 the former upholds as a fundamental principle the distinction between sensibility and the understanding4 ,and here the ,german triumphs over the ,french philosopher1 for in his support stand both observation and experience4 ,but this triumph over sensism had already been obtained by many philosophers1 the scholastics in particular4 ,with ,kant and ,condillac they admitted that all our cognitions came from the senses2 but they had also noted what ,kant afterwards saw1 but ,condillac did not discover that sensations by themselves alone could never suffice to explain all the phenomena of our soul1 and that1 besides the sensitive faculty1 it was necessary to admit another very different1 called understanding4 ,kant regarded sensations as materials furnished to the understanding1 which it combined in various ways1 and reduced to conceptions4 ,thoughts without contents1 he said1 are empty2 intuitions without conceptions are blind4 ,it is then just as necessary to make conceptions sensible1 that is1 to give them an object in intuition1 as to make intuitions intelligible by subjecting them to conceptions4 ,who does not perceive in this passage1 the acting intellect of the ,aristotelians1 although expressed in other words8 ,substitute sensible species for sensible intuition1 intelligible species for conception and we recognize a doctrine very like that of the scholastics4 ,let us see4 ,kant says3 to enable us to acquire knowledge1 the action of the senses1 or sensible experience is necessary4 ,the scholastics said3 there is nothing in the understanding which has not previously been in the senses3 nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu4 ,kant says3 sensible intuitions of themselves are blind4 ,the scholastics said3 sensible species1 or those of the imagination1 also called phantasmata1 are not intelligible4 ,kant says3 it is necessary to make conceptions sensible by giving them an object in intuition4 ,the scholastics said3 it is impossible to understand1 either by acquiring science1 or by using that already acquired1 unless the understanding directs itself to sensible species1 sine conversione ad phantasmata4 ,kant says3 it is indispensable to render intuitions intelligible by subjecting them to conceptions4 ,the scholastics said3 it is necessary to make sensible species intelligible in order that they may be the object of the understanding4 ,kant says3 we judge by means of conceptions2 and that judgment is the mediate cognition of an object1 and consequently its representation4 ,the scholastics said3 we know objects by means of an intelligible species1 which is derived from the sensible species1 and is its intelligible representation4 ,kant says1 that in every judgment there is a conception applicable to many things1 and that under this plurality it comprises also a given representation which is referred immediately to its object4 ,the scholastics said1 that the intelligible species was applicable to many things1 because universal2 that1 when separated from a sensible and particular species1 it abstracts from all material and individuating conditions1 and consequently embraces all individual objects in one common representation4 ,kant uses the words conception1 and to conceive1 to denote the intellectual act1 form1 or whatever it may be1 by which the understanding1 making use of sensible intuitions1 combines the materials offered by sensibility conformably to the laws of the intellectual order4 ,the scholastics likewise taught that the intelligible species1 called also species impressed1 fecundated the understanding by producing in it an intellectual conception1 whence resulted the word1 internal locution1 or species expressed1 which they also styled conception4 ,kant says1 that the cognition of human intelligence is a cognition by conceptions1 not intuitive1 but discursive and general1 and that out of the sphere of sensibility there is for us no true intuition4 ,the scholastics said3 our understanding1 in this life1 has a necessary relation to the nature of material things1 and for this reason it cannot primo et per se1 know immaterial substances3 hence it happens that we know them perfectly only by certain comparisons with material things1 and chiefly by way of removal1 per viam remotionis1 in a negative way4 #ec4 ,the sample we have just given is exceedingly interesting1 since it enables us to appreciate as they merit the points of similarity in these two systems1 which occupy a prominent place in the history of ideology1--a similarity which has not always hitherto been sufficiently noticed1 although apparent upon the simple perusal of the ,german philosopher4 ,nor is this extraordinary3 the study of the scholastics is exceedingly difficult2 one must accommodate one's self to the language1 the style1 the opinions1 and the prejudices of their epoch1 and travel over much useless ground to collect a little pure ore4 ,note well1 however1 that ,i do not pretend to discover the ,critic of ,pure ,reason in the works of the scholastics1 ,i would only mark a fact but little known2 it is that whatever is good1 fundamental1 and conclusive against the sensism of ,condillac1 in the ,german philosopher's system1 had been said ages before by the scholastics4 ,are we hence to infer that ,kant took his doctrine from these authors8 ,we cannot say2 but we believe it may1 with some reason1 be asserted1 that possibly the ,german philosopher1 a man of vast reading1 most retentive memory1 and very laborious1 may have received certain inspirations1 reminiscences of which glimmer through his doctrines4 ,a writer is not a plagiarist1 although he make ideas his own which have originated with others4 ,but it is often true that man imagines he creates1 when he only recollects4 #ed4 ,although the ,german philosopher agrees with the scholastics in the observation of the primitive faculties of our mind1 he differs from them in their application2 and whilst they go on preparing a philosophical dogmatism1 he marches towards a despairing skepticism4 ,nothing that all the most eminent philosophers have regarded as indisputable1 can stand in the eyes of the ,german philosopher4 ,true1 he has distinguished the sensible from the intelligible order2 he has recognized two primitive faculties in our soul2 sensibility and the understanding2 he has indicated the line which divides them1 and carefully remarked that it should never be effaced2 but1 on the other hand1 he has reduced the sensible world to a collection of pure phenomena1 and explains space in such a way as to render it extremely difficult to avoid the idealism of ,berkeley4 ,he has also1 so to speak1 walled in the understanding by preventing all communication with it1 excepting by sensible experience1 and has resolved all the elements that meet in it into empty forms1 which lead to nothing when there is question of applying them to the not-sensible1 and which can teach us nothing concerning the great ontological1 psychological1 and cosmological problems which have been the object of the meditations of the profoundest metaphysicians1 who1 to resolve them1 have published a vast amount of sublime doctrines1 just cause of a noble pride in the human mind which knows the dignity of its nature1 vindicates its lofty origin1 and discerns from afar the immensity of its destiny4 ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,,historical ,,view ,,of ,,the ,,value ,,of ,,pure ,,ideas4 #ee4 ,now that we have shown the points of similarity between ,kant's system and that of the scholastics1 we propose to note their differences chiefly in what concerns the application of these doctrines4 ,to give an idea of the gravity and transcendentalism of these differences1 we have only to remark the discrepancy of their results4 ,the ,aristotelians built upon their principles a whole system of metaphysical science1 which they considered the noblest of sciences1 and which1 like a rich and brilliant light1 fecundates and directs all others2 whereas ,kant1 starting with the same facts1 destroys metaphysical science by taking from it all power to know objects in themselves4 #ef4 ,we here find ,kant in opposition not only to the scholastics1 properly so called1 but also to all the most eminent metaphysicians who had preceded him4 ,on the side of the scholastics in this matter may be cited ,plato1 ,aristotle1 ,saint ,augustine1 ,saint ,anselm1 ,saint ,thomas1 ,descartes1 ,malebranche1 ,fenelon1 and ,leibnitz4 #eg4 ,no one can deny the transcendency of these questions1 if he be not totally ignorant how vital it is to the human mind to know if a science superior to the purely sensible order be possible1 whereby man may extend his activity beyond the phenomena offered by matter4 ,these questions are exceedingly profound1 and must not be lightly treated4 ,the difficulty and the great abstruseness of the objects treated1 the importance1 the transcendency of the consequences to which they lead1 according to the road followed1 demand that no labor whatever should be spared to penetrate these matters4 ,it is easy to assure one's self that upon these questions depends the conservation of sound ideas of ,god and of the human mind2 man's most important and lofty considerations4 ,to give this matter a thorough examination1 let us go back to the origin of the divergence of these philosophical opinions1 and let us investigate the reason why1 starting with the same facts1 they arrive at contradictory results4 ,this requires a clear exposition of the opposite doctrines4 #eh4 ,all philosophers agree in admitting the fact of sensibility2 concerning it there can be no doubt2 it is a phenomenon attested by consciousness in so palpable a manner1 that not even skeptics could ever deny the subjective reality of the appearance1 however much they called in question its objective reality4 ,idealists1 when they deny the existence of bodies1 do not deny their phenomenal appearance1 their appearance to the mental eye under a sensible form4 ,sensibility then1 and the phenomena it exhibits1 have in all ages been primary data in ideological and psychological problems2 there may be a discrepancy with respect to the nature and consequences of these data1 but there can be none as to their existence4 #ei4 ,the history of ideological science shows us two schools2 one of which admits nothing but sensation1 and explains all the affections and operations of the mind by the transformation of the senses2 while the other admits primitive facts distinct from sensation2 other faculties than that of feeling1 and recognizes in the mind a line dividing the sensible from the intellectual order4 #fj4 ,this latter school is divided into two others2 one of which regards the sensible order as not only distinct1 but also separate from the intellectual order1 and in some sense at war with it2 and it therefore maintains that the intellectual can receive nothing from the sensible order1 except malign exhortations which either mislead it1 or enervate its activity4 ,hence the system of innate ideas in all its purity2 hence the metaphysics of an intellectual order entirely exempt from sensible impressions1 metaphysics which1 cultivated by eminent geniuses1 has in modern times been professed by the author of the ,investigation of ,truth1 with sublime exaggeration4 ,the other ramification of the school also admits the pure intellectual order1 but does not hold it to be contaminated by being brought into communication with sensible phenomena2 on the contrary1 it is rather inclined to believe that the problems of human intelligence1 such as it exists in this life1 cannot be resolved without fixing the mind upon the aforesaid communication4 #fa4 ,experience teaches that this communication exists1 conformably to a law of the human mind1 and that to contend against the law is to struggle against a truth attested by consciousness3 to attempt to destroy it would be a rash undertaking1 a kind of mental suicide4 ,for this reason1 the school of which we have just spoken1 accepts the facts1 such as internal experience presents them1 and endeavors to explain them by indicating the points where the sensible and intellectual orders may come into communication without being destroyed or confounded4 #fb4 ,the school that admits the existence of the two orders1 the sensible and the intellectual1 and at the same time admits the possibility and the reality of their reciprocal communication and influence1 has1 for its fundamental principle1 that the origin of all cognition is in the senses1 these being the exciting causes of intellectual activity1 and a kind of laborers who supply it with materials1 which it then combines in the manner necessary to raise the scientifical structure4 #fc4 ,thus far1 ,kant and the scholastics agree2 but here they separate at a point of the greatest importance1 and the result is that they pass on to conflicting consequences4 ,the scholastics believed that there were in the understanding true ideas having true objects1 and that they might discuss them1 independently of the sensible order1 with perfect security4 ,they even admitted the principle that there can be nothing in the understanding which was not previously in the senses2 but pretended1 nevertheless1 that there really was something in the understanding1 which might conduce to the knowledge of the truth of immaterial1 as well as of material things in themselves4 ,the ideas of the purely intellectual order originate in the senses as movers of the intellectual activity2 but this activity1 by means of abstraction and other operations1 forms to itself ideas of its own1 by whose aid it may go beyond the sensible order in its search for truth4 #fd4 ,in their explanation of the purely intellectual order1 metaphysicians1 both scholastics and anti-scholastics agree1 so far as there is question of giving a real objective value to ideas1 and of making them a sure means of discovering truth independently of sensible phenomena4 ,however much these schools disagree as to the origin of ideas1 they agree in all that relates to their reality and value4 #fe4 ,kant1 at the same time that he admits the principle of the scholastics1 that all our cognitions come from the senses1 and recognizes with them the necessity of acknowledging a purely intellectual order1 a series of conceptions different from sensible intuition1 maintains that these conceptions are not pure cognitions1 but empty forms1 which of themselves mean nothing1 teach the mind nothing1 and cannot1 in the least1 aid us to know the reality of things4 ,these conceptions mean nothing unless filled1 so to speak1 with sensible intuitions4 ,if these intuitions are wanting1 they correspond to nothing1 and can be of none but a purely logical use2 that is to say1 the understanding will think upon and combine them1 without1 indeed1 falling into contradiction1 but also without ever coming to any conclusion4 ,that the understanding1 ,kant says1 can never make a transcendental1 but only an empirical use1 either of its a priori principles1 or of its conceptions1 is a principle which1 if known with conviction1 leads to the most important consequences4 ,the transcendental use of a conception in any principle1 consists in referring it to things1 in general1 and in themselves2 whilst the empirical use is in referring the conception to phenomena alone1 that is1 to the objects of a possible experience1 by which we may easily see that this latter use is the only one that can stand4 ,to every conception is necessary1 first of all1 a logical form of a conception in general1 of the thought3 and secondly1 the possibility of subjecting to it an object1 to which it may refer2 but without this object it wants all sense1 it contains nothing1 although it may involve the logical function necessary to form a conception by means of certain data4 ,the object cannot be given to a conception except in intuition2 and although pure intuition may be a priori possible before the object1 it cannot1 however1 receive its object1 and consequently its objective value1 otherwise than by the empirical intuition of which it is the form4 ,all conceptions and with them all principles1 although they be possible a priori1 do1 notwithstanding1 refer to empirical intuitions1 that is1 to data of possible experience4 ,without this they have no objective value2 they are nothing but a mere play1 whether of the imagination or of the understanding1 with the respective representations of the one or the other faculty4 99 99 99 99 99 ,that the same is the case with all the categories and principles formed from them1 is apparent from this1 that we cannot really define a single one of them2 that is to say1 we cannot render the possibility of their object intelligible without attending to the conditions of sensibility1 and consequently to the form of the appearances2 conditions to which these categories must be confined as to their sole objects4 ,if this condition be taken away1 all meaning1 that is1 all relation to the object is destroyed1 and by no example can we be made to conceive what is the proper meaning of these conceptions4 99 99 99 99 99 ,if no account be made of all the conditions of sensibility which denote them 7he is speaking of the categories7 as conceptions of a possible empirical use1 if they be taken to be conceptions of things in general1 and consequently1 of transcendental use1 nothing remains to be done1 so far as they are concerned1 but to preserve the logical functions in judgments1 as the condition of the possibility of the things themselves1 without being able to show in what case1 their application and their object1 and consequently they themselves1 may1 in the pure understanding1 and without the intervention of sensibility1 have a meaning and an objective value4 99 99 99 99 99 ,it incontestably follows from what has been said1 that pure conceptions of the understanding can never have a transcendental use1 but only an empirical use2 and that the principles of the pure understanding do not refer to the objects of the senses1 except when the senses are in relation with the general conditions of a possible experience2 but never to things in general1 without relation to the way in which we may perceive them4#h #h ,transcendental ,logic4 ,book ,,ii41 ,chap4 ,,iii4 #ff4 ,thus ,kant destroys all metaphysical science1 and1 involved in its deplorable ruins1 perish the most fundamental1 most precious1 and most sacred ideas of the human mind4 ,according to him1 transcendental analysis makes us see that the understanding can never pass the limits of sensibility1 the only limits within which objects are given to us in intuition4 ,these principles which were regarded as eternal pillars of the scientific edifice sink into empty forms1 into words without meaning1 so soon as they rise from the sphere of sensibility4 ,ontology1 with its transcendental doctrines1 avails not in the eyes of the ,german philosopher to explain the nature and origin of things4 ,these principles1 he says1 are simply principles of the exposition of phenomena2 and the proud name of an ontology which pretends to give an a priori1 synthetic cognition of things1 in a systematic doctrine1 for example1 the principle of causality1 ought to be replaced by the modest denomination of simple analysis of the pure understanding4 #fg4 ,it would be hard to find a more noxious doctrine4 ,what is left to the human mind when all means of rising from the sensible sphere are taken away8 ,to what is our understanding reduced1 if its most fundamental ideas1 and its noblest principles can teach nothing concerning the nature of things8 ,if the corporeal world is for us nothing but a collection of sensible phenomena1 beyond which we can know nothing1 our cognitions have nothing real1 they are all purely subjective2 the soul lives on illusions1 and vanishes with its imaginary creations1 to which there is nothing to correspond in reality4 ,space is but a subjective form2 time is but a subjective form2 pure ideas are empty conceptions1 and all in us is subjective4 ,we know nothing of objects1 we are totally ignorant of what is2 we know only what appears4 ,this is pure skepticism2 assuredly it was not necessary to consume so much time in analytical investigations to get thus far4 ,the doctrine of ,kant presents no extravagance so outrageous1 no error so hideous1 as the works of ,fichte1 ,schelling1 and ,hegel2 but it contains the germ of the greatest extravagance1 and of the most fatal errors4 ,he has made a philosophical revolution1 which some have incautiously deemed a progress2 but doubtless they did not detect the skepticism it contains1 which is the more dangerous1 the more it is enveloped in analytical forms4 #fh4 ,notwithstanding the importance justly attached to the refutation of the ,german philosopher's errors1 ,i do not deem it necessary to combat his doctrines step by step2 this system of refutation labors under the serious objection that it gives little satisfaction to the reader1 who seems to see one edifice torn down1 but not replaced by another4 ,i consider it more useful carefully to examine questions as they arise in the order of their subjects1 to establish my opinion as best ,i can1 and there to refute ,kant's errors as ,i find them obstructing the march of truth4 ,it is ordinarily very easy to say what a thing is not2 but it is not so easy to say what it is2 and it is not proper that the advocates of sound doctrine should be charged with impugning false doctrines1 and not caring to expose their own4 ,we believe that in these matters sound philosophy may be presented to the light of the day struggling against error1 and that it ought not to rest satisfied with being the instrument of war to overthrow its adversary1 but that it should aspire to found a noble and enduring edifice upon the very site the other occupied4 ,the minds of men are not satisfied with simple refutations2 they desire to have a doctrine substituted in the place of the one impugned4 ,whoever impugns1 denies2 and the understanding is not satisfied with negations2 it wants affirmation1 for it cannot live without positive truth4 ,we have permitted ourselves this brief digression1 which is indeed far from being useless2 for at the sight of the transcendency of the ,german philosopher's errors ,i have recollected the necessity of careful1 assiduous1 and profound labor to oppose this deluge of errors which threatens to inundate the whole field of truth2 and we could not do less than insist upon this point1 and observe that it is not enough to tear down1 but that it is also necessary to build up4 ,refutations will soon come2 but let positive doctrines abound4 ,it is not enough to cover the long line of frontiers where error makes its attacks1 with light and active troops which may fall upon the enemy2 it is necessary to found colonies1 foci of cultivation and civilization1 who will defend the country1 at the same time that they make it flourish and prosper4 ,,chapter ,x4 ,,sensible ,,intuition4 #fi4 ,intuition1 properly so called1 consists in the act of the soul by which it perceives an object that effects it3 this the signification of the ,latin word derived from the verb intueri1 to see a thing which is present1 indicates4 #gj4 ,intuition belongs only to perceptive powers1 to those by which the subject affected distinguishes between its affection and the object causing it4 ,we do not pretend to say that this must be a reflex distinction1 but simply that the internal act must refer to an object4 ,if we suppose a being to experience various affections1 but to neither refer them to any object1 nor reflect upon them itself2 this being can never with propriety be said to have true intuition1 for intuition seems to involve the exercise of an activity occupied with a present object4 ,the object of intuition need not always be an external being2 it may be an affection or action of the soul made objective by a reflex act4 #ga4 ,the sensations which are with the greatest propriety called intuitive1 are those of sight and touch2 for1 since it is impossible for us1 when we perceive extension1 to regard it as a purely subjective fact1 the acts of seeing and feeling necessarily involve relation to an object4 ,the other senses1 although they may have a certain relation to extension1 do not perceive it directly1 so that were they to stand alone1 they would partake more of the affective than of the intuitive2 that is1 the soul would be affected by the sensations1 but would be under no necessity of referring them to external objects4 ,if reflection made upon these sensations come to teach1 as in effect it would teach that their cause is a being distinct from those that experience them1 there would be no true intuition2 not for the senses1 because they would remain foreign to complex combinations2 nor for the understanding1 because it would then know the cause of the sensations1 not by intuition1 but by discursion4 #gb4 ,we infer from this1 that not every sensation is an intuition2 and that the imaginary reproductions of past sensations1 or the imaginary production of possible sensations1 although repeatedly styled intuitions1 are1 since they do not refer to an object1 unworthy of the name4 ,we ought1 nevertheless1 to observe that the phenomena of purely internal sensibility do1 perhaps1 owe to the habit of reflection their non-reference to objects4 ,reflection perceives the difference of time1 the more or less vividness of sensations1 their greater or less constant connection1 and also other circumstances2 and it is enabled by these to distinguish between representations which do really refer to an object1 such as external sensations1 and those that have only a past or possible object1 such as purely internal representations4 ,thus experience teaches us that the purely internal sensibility1 wholly abandoned to itself1 transfers whatever is presented to it to the external world1 without the aid of reflection1 and converts imaginary appearances into realities4 ,this is verified in sleep1 or even in our waking hours1 when by some cerebral inversion the sensibility works by itself alone1 and entirely free of reflection4 #gc4 ,the reason why the sensibility left to itself1 renders all its impressions objective1 is to be looked for in the fact1 that being a non-reflective faculty1 it cannot distinguish between a purely internal affection1 and one coming from without4 ,since comparison1 however inconsiderable it may be1 always implies reflection1 sensibility does not compare4 ,hence it happens that when the subject does nothing but feel1 it cannot appreciate the differences of sensations1 by calculating the degrees of their vividness1 nor ever perceive the existence or want of order and constancy in their connection4 ,the faculty of feeling is perfectly blind to all but its determinate object2 whatever it does not discover in this so far as it is its object1 does in no manner exist for it4 ,we can now see why1 when left to itself1 it will render its impressions objective1 and believe itself intuitive by converting simple appearances into realities4 #gd4 ,it is worthy of notice1 that of the sensitive faculties1 some would always be intuitive1 that is1 would always refer to an external object1 if reflection did not accompany them2 whilst others would never be intuitive1 not even if separated from reflection1 or unaccompanied by those which are by their nature intuitive4 ,to the former class belong the representative faculties1 properly so called1 that is1 those which affect the sensitive subject by presenting to it a form1 the real or apparent image of an object4 ,such are those of sight and of touch1 which can neither exist nor be conceived without this representation4 ,other sensations1 on the contrary1 offer no form to the sensitive subject2 they are simple affections of the subject1 although they proceed from an external cause2 if we refer them to objects1 this we do by reflection2 and when this warns us that we have in attributing to the object not only the principle of causality1 but also the sensation in itself1 carried the reference too far1 we easily recognize the illusion1 and lay it aside4 ,this does not occur in representative sensations2 no one1 no matter how great efforts he may make1 will ever be able to persuade himself that beyond himself there is nothing real1 nothing resembling the sensible representation in which objects are presented as extended4 #ge4 ,when we say that some sensations would not be intuitive were they not accompanied by reflection1 we do not mean to say that man refers them to an object1 after explicit reflection1 for we cannot forget what we have already said when explaining at length the instinctive way in which our faculties develop themselves prior to all reflection1 in their relations with the corporeal world2 but only that no necessary relation to an object as represented can be discovered in these sensations considered in themselves1 and in perfect isolation2 and that1 probably1 if a confused reflection be not mingled with the instinct which makes us render them objective1 there at least enters some influence of other sensations1 which are by their proper object representative4 ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,,two ,,cognitions3 ,,intuitive ,,and ,,discursive4 #gf4 ,now that ,i have explained sensible1 ,i pass to intellectual intuition4 ,there are two modes of knowing2 the one is intuitive1 the other discursive4 ,intuitive cognition is that in which the object is presented to the understanding1 such as it is1 and upon which the perceptive faculty has to exercise no function but that of contemplation2 it is therefore called intuition1 from intueri1 to see4 #gg4 ,this intuition may take place in two ways4 ,it may either present the object itself to the perceptive faculty1 and unite them without any intermediacy2 or by the intervention of an idea or representation1 capable of putting the perceptive faculty in action1 so that it may1 without the necessity of combination1 see the object in this representation4 ,the first requires the object perceived to be intelligible by itself1 since otherwise there could be no union of the object understood with the subject understanding2 the second needs a representation to supply the place of the object1 and consequently it is not indispensable that this should be immediately intelligible4#i #i ,see what has been said concerning representation1 immediate intelligibility1 and representation of causality and ideality1 in ,chapters ,x41 ,,xi41 ,,xii41 and ,,xiii41 of ,book ,i4 of this work4 #gh4 ,discursive cognition is that in which the understanding does not have the object itself present1 but forms it itself1 so to speak1 by uniting in one whole conception several partial conceptions1 whose connection in one subject it has found out by ratiocination4 ,in order to render more apparent the difference between intuitive and discursive cognition1 ,i will illustrate it by an example4 ,we see a man2 his physiognomy is presented to us1 such as it is2 no combinations are necessary1 none could possibly make him appear differently4 ,we see his characteristic features1 such as they are2 but the collection of them is not a thing produced by our combinations2 it is an object given to the perceptive faculty which has nothing to do but to perceive it4 ,when an object is offered to our understanding in this way1 the cognition we have of it will be intuitive4 ,we have said that the object of intellectual intuition may be united immediately to the perceptive faculty1 or that it may be presented to it by a medium which acts the part of the object4 ,keeping in view the same example1 we might say that these two classes of intuitions correspond to those of the man seen by himself1 or in his portrait4 ,there would be in both cases intuition of his physiognomy1 but no combination would be necessary1 and none could possibly form it4 ,but suppose some one to tell us of a person whom we have never seen1 and whose portrait cannot be shown to us4 ,he would be obliged1 in order to give us an idea of his physiognomy1 to enumerate one by one his characteristic features1 by the union of which we shall form an idea of the likeness he has just described4 ,to this imaginary representation may be compared discursive cognition1 by which1 although we do not see the object1 we in some sense construct it1 as it were1 from the assemblage of those ideas which we have by means of discursion interlinked1 and formed into one whole conception representing the object4 #gi4 ,kant1 in his ,critic of ,pure ,reason1 speaks repeatedly of intuitive and discursive cognition2 but he does not explain with perfect clearness the distinctive characteristics of these two classes of cognition4 ,let it not1 however1 be supposed that the discovery of these two ways of perceiving is due to the ,german philosopher4 ,many ages before him1 the theologians had known them2 nor could it be otherwise1 since the distinction between intuition and discursion is intimately connected with one of the fundamental dogmas of ,christianity4 ,it is well known that our religion admits the possibility and reality of a true cognition of ,god1 even in this life4 ,the sacred text tells us that we may know ,god by his works2 that the invisible things of ,god are manifested to us by his visible creatures2 that the heavens narrate his glory1 and the firmament announces the works of his hands2 that they who have thus known ,god are inexcusable1 because they have not glorified him as they ought2 but this same religion teaches us that the ,blessed1 in the life to come1 will know him in a very different manner1 will see him as he is1 face to face4 ,it was ,christianity then that marked the difference between intuitive and discursive cognitions1 between the cognition by which the understanding1 proceeding from effects to their cause1 and uniting in it the ideas of wisdom1 omnipotence1 goodness1 holiness1 and infinite perfection1 rises to ,god2 and the cognition in which the mind does not need to advance1 drawing its conclusions by aid of discursion1 from various conceptions1 in order to force from them an idea of ,god1 in which the ,infinite ,being will offer himself clearly to the eyes of the mind1 not in a conception elaborated by reason1 nor under the sublime mysteries of faith1 but such as he is1 in himself1 as an object given immediately to the perceptive faculty1 not as an object discovered by the force of discursion1 or presented under august shadows4 ,and here we find another proof of the great profoundness hidden under the dogmas of the ,christian religion4 ,this distinction is to be met with in the catechism1 and yet who would have suspected that religion had taught us a doctrine so important to ideological science8 ,if the child be asked1 who is ,god1 he replies by enumerating his perfections1 and showing thereby that he knows him4 ,if you ask this same child1 to what end man has been created1 he will answer1 to see ,god1 etc4 ,here again is the distinction between discursive cognition1 or by conceptions1 and intuitive cognitions2 with the former one is said1 simply to know1 with the latter to see4 ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,,the ,,sensism ,,of ,,kant4 #hj4 ,kant maintained that while in the present life1 we have only sensible intuition2 and he considers the possibility of a purely intellectual intuition1 whether for our own or for other minds doubtful4 ,but as we have seen elsewhere 7ch4 ,,ix47 that he does not attribute any value to conceptions separated from intuition1 we infer that he is1 notwithstanding his long dissertations upon the pure understanding1 a confirmed sensist2 and that the authors of the ,critic of ,pure ,reason1 and of the ,treatise on ,sensations1 differ much less than at first sight might be supposed4 ,if our mind has no other intuition than the sensible1 and the conceptions of the pure understanding are1 if they do not include some one of these intuitions1 nothing but empty forms2 if when we abstract these intuitions1 there are in the understanding only purely logical functions1 which mean nothing1 and in no sense deserve to be called cognitions2 it follows that there is in our mind nothing but sensations1 which may be methodically distributed in conceptions1 as if packed away in a kind of hut1 where they are registered and preserved4 ,according to this philosopher1 the understanding is reduced so low1 that ,condillac himself might admit it4 #ha4 ,indeed1 in the system of sensations transformed1 the mind is supposed to possess a transforming force1 since otherwise1 it would be impossible to explain all ideological phenomena by mere sensation1 and the very title of the system would be a contradiction4 ,this being so1 would any sensistic scruple have prevented ,condillac from admitting the synthesis of the imagination1 the relations of all sensible intuitions to the unity of apperception1 and finally1 a variety of logical functions1 to classify and compare sensible intuitions8 ,so far is this from being the case1 it would seem that the root of all these doctrines might be found in the system of the ,french philosopher1 whose fundamental principles1 when summed up1 amount to this3 that nothing can be seen in the mind besides sensations2 but he does not therefore deny it a force capable of transforming1 classifying1 and generalizing them4 #hb4 ,here1 then1 is another check to the originality of the ,german philosopher2 he has1 to combat sensism1 said in substance just what1 ages before1 all the schools repeated2 and now when he undertakes to follow a new road to the explanation of the purely intellectual order1 he falls into ,condillac's system4 ,his empty conceptions1 without meaning1 without application1 beyond the sensible order1 amount to no more than what ,condillac taught when analyzing the generation of ideas1 and showing how they flowed from sensations by means of successive transformations4 ,could there be any difficulty1 it would be concerning words1 not things3 no sensist ought to hesitate accepting whole and entire the ,critic of ,pure ,reason1 when once he has seen what applications the ,german spiritualist makes of his doctrines4 ,it would be very desirable for those who insist that the spiritualism of ,kant is decidedly destructive of ,condillac's sensism1 to weigh well these observations4 ,,chapter ,,xiii4 ,,existence ,,of ,,pure ,,intellectual ,,intuition4 #hc4 ,it is not true that the human mind even in this life has no intuition other than the sensible4 ,there are within us many non-sensible phenomena1 of which we are clearly conscious4 ,reflection1 comparison1 abstraction1 election1 and all the acts of the understanding and will1 include nothing of the sensible4 ,we should like to know1 to what species of sensibility1 abstract ideas1 and the acts by which we perceive them1 belong2 these among others3 ,i desire1 ,i do not desire1 ,i choose this1 ,i prefer this to that4 ,not one of these acts can be presented by sensible intuition2 they are facts of an order superior to the sphere of sensibility1 and yet we have in our mind a clear and lively consciousness of them2 we reflect upon them1 make them the object of our studies1 distinguish them one from another1 and classify them in a thousand different ways4 ,these facts are presented to us immediately2 we know them1 not by discursion1 but by intuition2 therefore it is false that the intuition of the soul refers to none but sensible phenomena1 for it encounters within itself an expanded series of non-sensible phenomena1 which are given to it in intuition4 #hd4 ,it is of no use to say that these internal phenomena are empty forms1 and mean nothing1 unless referred to a sensible intuition4 ,whatever they may be1 they are something distinct from this same sensible intuition2 and we perceive this something1 not by discursion1 but by intuition2 therefore1 besides sensible intuition1 there is another of the purely intellectual order4 ,the question is not whether these pure conceptions have1 or have not1 a certain power to enable us to know objects in themselves2 but it is simply to ascertain if they do exist1 and if they are sensible4 ,that they exist1 is certain2 consciousness attests this fact1 and all ideologists admit it4 ,that they are sensible1 cannot be maintained without destroying their nature2 and least of all can ,kant maintain this1 since he has so carefully distinguished between sensible intuition and these conceptions4 #he4 ,this sea of non-sensible phenomena1 which we experience within us1 is like a mirror wherein the depths of the intellectual world are reflected4 ,minds1 it is true1 are not presented immediately to our perception1 and to know them we need a discursive process2 but we shall1 upon careful examination1 find in this intuition of our inward phenomena the representation1 imperfect though it be1 of what is verified in intelligences of a superior order4 ,thus we have in a certain mode idea-images1 since there can be no better image of one thought than another thought1 nor of one act of the will than another act of the will4 ,thus we know minds distinct from our own1 by a kind of mediate1 not immediate1 intuition1 in so far as they are presented to our consciousness as the image in a mirror4 #hf4 ,the communication of minds by means of speech and other natural or conventional signs1 is a fact of experience intimately connected with all intellectual1 moral1 and physical necessities4 ,when a mind is put into communication with another1 the cognition it has of what passes in the other is not by mere general conceptions1 but by a kind of intuition1 which although mediate1 does not therefore fail to be true4 ,the thought1 or affection of another communicated to our mind by means of speech1 excites in us a thought1 or affection1 similar to that of the mind communicating them4 ,we do1 then1 not only know1 but see1 in our own consciousness1 the consciousness of another2 and so perfect is at times the likeness1 that we anticipate all that he is about to tell us1 and unroll within ourselves the same series of phenomena that are verified in the mind of him with whom we are in communication4 ,it happens thus when we say3 ,i understand perfectly what ,n4 thinks1 what he wants1 what he is trying to express4 #hg4 ,this observation seems to us of great service to place beyond all doubt that there are in our mind1 independently of the sensible order1 conceptions1 not empty1 but referable to a determinate object4 ,the cognition of the phenomena of the purely intellectual order1 transmitted to us by means of speech1 or other signs1 does not destroy the character of the intuition1 since we here find all the necessary conditions assembled2 internal representation1 and its relation to a determinate object affecting us4 #hh4 ,this analysis of ideological facts1 whose existence cannot be doubted1 demonstrates the falseness of ,kant's doctrine1 that there are in our mind none but sensible intuitions2 as well as the non-existence of the ,german philosopher's problem3 whether it is possible1 or not1 for objects to be given to other minds in an intuition other than the sensible4 ,this very problem is found solved within us1 since the attentive observation of the internal phenomena1 and the reciprocal communication of minds1 has given us to know not only the possibility1 but also the existence of intuitions different from the sensible4 ,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,,value ,,of ,,intellectual ,,conceptions4--,,abstraction ,,made ,,from ,,intellectual ,,intuition4 #hi4 ,although we should admit that our mind can have no intuition but the sensible1 it could not thence be inferred that conceptions of the purely intellectual order are empty forms1 and in nowise conducive to the knowledge of objects in themselves4 ,it has always been understood that general ideas are not intuitive1 since by the very fact that they are general they cannot be referred immediately to a determinate object2 and yet no one ever doubted that they could serve to give us true cognitions4 #ij4 ,it is certain that general ideas1 of themselves alone1 do not lead to any positive result2 or1 in other words1 they do not make us know existing beings2 but if they be joined to other particular ones1 a reciprocal influence is established between them1 from which cognition results4 ,when we make the general affirmation3 ,every contingent being requires a cause2 this proposition1 although very true1 means nothing in the order of facts1 if we abstract the existence of contingent beings and causes of every kind4 ,in such a case1 the proposition will express a relation of ideas1 not of facts3 the cognition which results therefrom will be merely ideal1 not positive4 #ia4 ,this relation of ideas tacitly involves a condition1 which gives them1 so far as facts are concerned1 a hypothetical value2 for1 when we affirm that every contingent being must have a cause1 we are not to be understood to affirm a relation of ideas destitute of all possible application2 but rather1 on the contrary1 to intend that if any contingent being exists1 it must have a cause4 #ib4 ,in order that this hypothetical value of ideas may be converted into a positive value1 nothing is necessary but that the condition involved in the general proposition3 ,every contingent being must have a cause1 be verified4 ,of itself alone this teaches us nothing concerning the real world2 but from the moment that experience shows us a single contingent being1 the general proposition1 before sterile1 becomes exceedingly fruitful4 ,so soon as experience shows us a contingent being1 we know the necessity of its cause2 we also infer the necessity of the proportions1 which the activity producing must preserve with the thing produced2 knowing the qualities of the latter1 we infer those which ought to be found in the former4 ,in this manner1 resting upon two bases1 one of which is ideal truth and the other real truth1 or data supplied by experience1 we construct a true positive science referred to determinate facts4 #ic4 ,since the being that thinks necessarily has consciousness of itself1 no thinking being can be limited to the cognition of purely ideal truths4 ,even if we were to suppose it perfectly isolated from all other beings1 in absolute non-communication with every thing not itself1 so as neither to exert any influence upon them1 nor to be influenced by them1 it could not be reduced to the cognition of a purely ideal order2 for1 by the very fact that it is thinking1 it is conscious of itself1 and consciousness is essentially a particular fact1 a cognition of a determinate being1 since without it there could be no consciousness4 #id4 ,this observation overturns to its very foundation the system which pretends to bar all communication between the real and ideal orders4 ,it shows also that experience is not only possible1 but absolutely necessary to every thinking being1 since consciousness is by its very nature an experience1 and the clearest and surest experience4 ,the truths of the ideal order are then necessarily interlinked with those of the real order3 to suppose all intercommunication between them impossible1 is to disown a fundamental fact of ideological and psychological science1 consciousness4 #ie4 ,to render the truth and exactness of the preceding doctrine more evident1 let us suppose a man1 or rather a human mind1 absolutely ignorant of the existence of an external world1 of every body1 and even of every spirit2 one that knows nothing concerning its own origin or destiny1 but one that would nevertheless at the same time exercise its intellectual activity1 without which it would be a lifeless thing1 and could offer no field to observation4 ,let us suppose him to have general ideas1 such as of being and of not-being1 of substance and accidents1 of the absolute and the conditioned1 of the necessary and contingent4 ,manifestly he may combine them in various ways1 and arrive at the same purely ideal results to which we ourselves arrive4 ,there is no supposition more favorable to a series of abstract cognitions independent of experience1 and yet not even in this case would the truths known be limited to the purely ideal order2 it would even here be impossible for them not to descend to the real order1 if the thinking being were not dispossessed of all consciousness of itself4 ,indeed1 by the very fact that a being is supposed capable of thinking1 it is supposed able to say to itself1 ,i think4 ,this act is eminently experimental1 and it needs only to be united with general truths in a common consciousness1 to enable the isolated being to rise above itself1 and create for itself a positive science1 by which to pass from the world of ideas to that of facts4 ,the instability of its thoughts1 and the permanence of the being that experiences them1 offer to it a practical case in which the general ideas of substance and accident are particularized4 ,the successive appearance and disappearance of its own conceptions will show to it the ideas of being and of not-being realized2 the recollection of the time when its own operations commenced1 beyond which the memory of its existence does not extend1 will enable it to know the contingency of his own being2 and this fact1 combined with the general principles which express the relations between contingent and necessary beings1 will suggest to the thought that there must be another that communicated to it its existence4 ,,chapter ,,xv4 ,,illustrations ,,of ,,the ,,value ,,of ,,general ,,conceptions4 #if4 ,however vague the ideas an isolated being would form of objects distinct from itself1 they will never be so vague as not to refer to a real thing4 ,the mind may not know the nature of this reality1 but it knows for certain that it exists4 ,a man blind from his birth can form no clear idea of colors1 nor of the sensation of seeing2 but is he therefore ignorant that sensation exists1 and that the words1 color1 seeing1 and others which refer to sight1 have a positive and determinate object8 ,certainly not4 ,the blind man does not know in what these things1 of which he hears1 consist1 but he knows that they are something2 those of his conceptions that refer to them may be called imperfect1 but they are not vain2 the words by which he expresses them1 have for him a positive1 although incomplete meaning4 #ig4 ,there is a great difference between incomplete and indeterminate conceptions2 the former may refer to a positive thing1 although imperfectly known2 the latter include nothing but a relation of ideas1 meaning nothing in the order of facts4 ,we will render this difference more apparent by explaining the example of the preceding paragraph4 ,a man blind from his birth has no intuition of colors1 nor of any thing that refers to the sense of sight2 but he is sure that there exist external facts which correspond to an internal affection called seeing4 ,this idea is incomplete1 but it has a determinate object4 ,the words of those who possess the sense of sight reveal to him its existence2 he knows not1 what it is1 but1 that it is2 in other words1 he does not know its essence1 but its existence4 ,let us now suppose the possibility of an order of sensations different from ours1 and in nowise resembling those which we experience1 to be called in question4 ,the conception referred to the new sensations would not only be incomplete1 but would have no relation to any real object4 ,the general idea1 then1 of affection of a sensitive being1 will be all that our mind will have2 but it will know nothing of its existence1 and can form only mere conjectures as to the conditions of its possibility4 ,this example illustrates our idea4 ,we find in the man blind from his birth1 who hears of what pertains to the sense of sight1 an incomplete conception1 but one to which the existence of a series of facts1 known to his mind1 corresponds4 ,but in ourselves1 if we reflect upon a kind of sensations different from our own1 we find conceptions1 having1 indeed1 a general object1 but of whose realization we know nothing4 #ih4 ,thus is it explained how our mind1 without having intuition of a thing1 can1 nevertheless1 know it1 and be perfectly certain of its existence4 ,we have here demonstrated that conceptions may1 although they do not refer to a sensible intuition1 have a value1 not only in the order of ideas1 but also in that of facts4 #ii4 ,in order to prove the sterility of all conception beyond sensible intuition1 ,kant adduces one reason1 which is1 that we cannot define the categories and the principles which flow from them without referring to the objects of sensibility4 ,this is no proof at all2 for1 in the first place1 the impossibility of a definition does not always arise from the fact that the conception to be defined is empty2 but it very frequently results from the conception being simple1 and consequently not susceptible of a division into parts that may be expressed by words4 ,how will he define the idea of being8 ,no matter how he attempts to define it1 the thing to be defined will enter into the definition3 the words1 thing1 reality1 existence1 all signify being4 ,it is very natural1 since sensible intuition is the basis of our relations with the external world1 and consequently with our fellow-men1 that when we purpose to express any relation whatever1 we should call to our aid sensible applications2 but we are not thence to infer that there is not in our mind1 independently of them1 a real truth contained in the conception which we wish to explain4 #ajj4 ,this capacity of knowing objects under general ideas1 is a characteristic property of our mind1 and we cannot1 in our inability to penetrate to the essence of things1 think without this indispensable auxiliary4 ,in the ordinary course of human affairs1 it often happens that we need to know the existence of a thing and of some of its attributes1 but do not require a perfect knowledge of it4 ,in such cases1 general ideas1 aided by some data of experience1 put us in mediate communication with the object not presented to our intuition4 ,but why cannot the same thing be verified with respect to non-sensible beings1 which alone are the object of intellectual intuitions8 ,i know not what exception can be taken to these observations1 founded as they are upon observation of internal phenomena1 and confirmed by common sense4 ,,chapter ,,xvi4 ,,value ,,of ,,principles1 ,,independently ,,of ,,sensible ,,intuition4 #aja4 ,the principle of contradiction1 indispensable condition of all certainty1 of all truth1 and without which the external world1 and intelligence itself1 would become a chaos1 offers us a good example of the intrinsic value of purely intellectual conceptions independent of sensible intuition4 ,no determinate idea is united to the conception of being when we affirm the impossibility of a thing being and not-being at the same time1 or the exclusion of not-being by being2 and so far we absolutely abstract all sensible intuition4 ,whatever be its object1 whatever its nature and the relations of its existence2 be it corporeal or incorporeal1 composite or simple1 accident or substance1 contingent or necessary1 finite or infinite1 always will it be found true that being excludes not-being2 the absolute incompatibility of these two extremes will always be verified1 so that the affirmation of the one is always1 in all cases1 and under all imaginable suppositions1 the negation of the other4 ,this being so1 to limit the value of these conceptions to sensible intuition1 would be to destroy the principle of contradiction4 ,the limitation of the principle is equivalent to its nullification4 ,its absolute universality is closely allied to its absolute necessity2 if it be curtailed1 it is made contingent2 for1 if the principle of contradiction may fail us in one instance1 it fails us in all4 ,to admit the possibility of what is absurd1 is to deny its absurdity4 ,if the contradiction of being and not-being does not exist in every supposition1 it exists in no supposition4 #ajb4 ,the difficulty is to know how the transition from the principle of contradiction to real truths1 is made2 because not affirming any thing determinate in it1 but solely the repugnance of yes to no1 and of no to yes1 we assert that it would be impossible to affirm either one of these extremes without denying the other2 and as on the other hand1 it is impossible1 if we confine ourselves to the principle of contradiction1 for it to include any thing more than the most general relation between two general ideas1 we conclude that it is of itself alone1 perfectly sterile and unable to conduct us to any positive result4 ,this is all true2 but it contradicts in no point what we have said concerning the intrinsic value of general conceptions4 ,we have remarked that truths of the purely ideal order have none but a hypothetical value1 and that in order to produce a positive science1 they require facts to which they may apply4 ,we have also remarked1 that experience furnishes these facts1 and that every thinking being possesses one at least1 consciousness of itself4 ,every thinking being will therefore1 provided it discover in its own consciousness facts to which it may apply it1 make a positive use of the principle of contradiction4 #ajc4 ,even were we to admit the supposition that there is in our mind no intuition but the sensible1 it could not therefore be concluded that general principles1 and more particularly that of contradiction1 can have no positive value2 because1 if we suppose these principles combined with sensible intuition to produce a cognition of other beings out of the order of sensibility1 it would follow that we really know them1 although they were not given to us in immediate intuition4 ,and this is verified in the human mind1 when it rises by discursion to the cognition of the non-sensible4 ,on the one hand1 the data furnished by experience1 and on the other1 general and necessary truths1 form a connection constituting a positive science1 which guides us with perfect security to the cognition of objects not subject to immediate experience4 ,this theory is so clear1 so evident1 so rooted in the consciousness of our own acts1 so perfectly in accordance with all that we observe in the proceedings of the human mind1 that it causes us a strange surprise to meet philosophers1 whose erroneous doctrines oblige us to explain and defend it4 #ajd4 ,the transition from the known to the unknown is a proceeding characteristic of our understanding2 and this transition is impossible if the reality of every cognition1 not referred to an intuition1 be denied4 ,whatever is presented to us in this latter way1 is given to us1 is present to our sight1 and we have no necessity of seeking it4 ,if1 therefore1 no object be really known1 unless offered in intuition1 all intellectual progress becomes impossible3 all the advances of our mind are reduced to combinations of the forms presented to the sensibility1 and even these lead to nothing whenever they cease to be intuitive2 that is1 when they no longer relate to determinate objects immediately perceived4 ,the ,critic of ,pure ,reason is the destruction of all reason3 for it examines itself with suicidal intent1 or in order to prove that it contains nothing positive4 ,science cannot survive the reduction of general principles to one only value relative to sensible intuitions4 ,what we have demonstrated concerning the principle of contradiction1 is a fortiori applicable to all other principles4 ,if this be not saved1 all must perish in the wreck4 ,moreover1 the very basis of the necessity involved in these principles is threatened4 ,we know nothing1 save that there is within us a series of phenomena which seem necessary4 ,but what use can we make of them beyond the subjective order8 ,none at all4 ,behold us then in the most perfect skepticism1 condemned to simple appearances1 with no means of knowing any reality4 #aje4 ,no6 the human mind is not condemned to so despairing a sterility3 reason is not an empty word2 ratiocination is not a puerile play1 only fit to serve as an amusement4 ,in the midst of the prepossessions1 errors1 and extravagance of human misery1 towers on high that force1 that admirable activity1 by which the mind springs beyond itself1 knows what it does not see1 and foresees what it will one day feel4 ,nature is veiled to our eyes2 impenetrable secrets surround us2 whichever way we turn deep shadows hide the reality of objects3 but through this darkness we discern from afar some scintillation of light4 ,notwithstanding the profound silence which reigns over the sea of beings1 whose surges toss us about like imperceptible atoms in the immensity of the ocean1 we hear at times mysterious voices tell us the course we must keep to reach unknown shores4 ,,chapter ,,xvii4 ,,relations ,,of ,,intuition ,,with ,,the ,,rank ,,of ,,the ,,perceptive ,,being4 #ajf4 ,the perfection of intelligence involves extension and clearness of its intuitions2 the more perfect it is1 the more intuitive it will be4 ,the infinite intelligence does not know by discursion1 but by intuition3 it does not need to seek objects3 it sees them all before itself4 ,it sees with intuition of identity what belongs to its own essence1 and with intuition of causality every thing that does or can exist outside of itself4 ,other minds have an intuition so much the more perfect as they are more elevated in the order to which they belong2 so that cognition by conceptions indicates an imperfection of intelligence4 #ajg4 ,the relations of one being with other beings will therefore depend upon the rank it holds in the scale of the universe4 ,god1 infinite being1 and the cause of all that does or can exist1 has intimate and immediate relations with the whole universe1 considered not only in its entireness but even in its smallest particles4 ,there is consequently in ,god a most perfect representation of all beings taken not only in their generality1 but also in their minutest differences4 ,the ,being1 cause of all1 does not know objects by vague conceptions1 by means of representations which only show what all beings have in common1 but as he has made their slightest differences1 they must be presented to him with perfect clearness4 ,his cognition is founded upon a reality which is himself2 his understanding does not fluctuate through an ideal and hypothetical world2 but1 fixed with clearest intuition upon infinite reality1 he sees all that the infinite being is1 and all that it can produce with its infinite activity4 ,for ,god there is no experience proceeding from without1 for nothing can exert any influence upon him2 all his experience consists in the knowledge and love of himself4 #ajh4 ,created beings1 occupying a determinate place in the scale of the universe1 relate to it only under certain aspects4 ,their relations with their fellow beings are brought to a point of view1 to which their perceptive faculties are subordinated4 ,the representativeness1 which they contain in themselves1 must be proportionate to the cognition that has to produce it4 ,hence it follows that every intelligent being will have its representativeness adapted to the functions it has to exercise in the universe4 ,if the being do not pertain to the order of intelligences1 its perceptive faculties will be limited to sensible intuitions1 in a measure corresponding to the place it is destined to occupy4 #aji4 ,we have seen that general ideas and the intuition of determinate objects fecundate the intellectual faculties4 ,from this we infer that every intelligence stands in need of intuitions1 if its cognitions are not to be limited to a purely hypothetical order4 ,the human mind1 destined to a union with the body1 and to a continual communication with the corporeal universe1 has received the gift of sensible intuition as the basis of its relations with bodies4 ,the same is the case with brutes4 ,sensible intuition has been given to them because they must have continual relations with the external world3 but1 being confined to the functions of animal life1 they have no intuitions superior to the sphere of sensibility1 nor do they possess the force necessary to convert sensible representations into objects of intellectual combinations4 #aaj4 ,there is an immense difference between brutes and man1 in the scale of beings4 ,since every intelligence is conscious of itself1 and can fix its attention upon its acts1 the human mind knows its own intuitively1 and therefore discovers in itself an intuition superior to the sensible4 ,besides these intuitions1 we have the power of discursion by which we form representations1 and by them attain to the cognition of objects not offered immediately to our perception4 ,thus1 starting with the data furnished by external and internal experience1 and aided by those general principles which involve the primary conditions of every intelligence and of every being1 we are enabled to penetrate to the world of reality1 and to know1 although imperfectly1 the assemblage of beings which constitute the universe1 and the infinite cause which made them all4 ,,chapter ,,xviii4 ,,aspirations ,,of ,,the ,,human ,,soul4 #aaa4 ,a close observation of internal phenomena shows that the human soul aspires to something far beyond all that it actually possesses4 ,not satisfied with the objects given to it in immediate intuition1 it darts forward in pursuit of others of a superior order2 and even in those that are offered to it immediately1 it is not contented with the aspect under which they appear1 but seeks to know what they are4 ,the purely individual does not satisfy the soul4 ,nailed to one point in the immense scale of beings1 it is unwilling to limit itself to the perception of those that are in its environs1 and form1 as it were1 the atmosphere wherein it must live2 it aspires to the cognition of those that precede and follow it1 and seeks to know the connection1 to discover the law from which results the ineffable harmony that presides over the creation4 ,it finds its purest pleasures in rising from the sphere where the limitation of its faculties holds it confined4 ,its activity is greater than its strength2 its desires superior to its being4 #aab4 ,we discover the same phenomenon in the sentiment and the will as in the understanding4 ,man has1 to satisfy his necessities1 and provide for the preservation of the individual and of the race1 sensations and sentiments which direct him to determinate objects2 but at the side of these affections1 limited to the sphere in which he is circumscribed1 he experiences sentiments of a more elevated character1 which make him spring beyond his orbit1 and absorb1 so to speak1 his individuality in the ocean of infinity4 ,when man comes in contact with nature in herself1 despoiled of all conditions relating to individuals1 he experiences an indefinable sentiment1 a kind of foretaste of the infinite4 ,go into an uninhabited region and sit down by the sea side2 hark to the deafening roar of the waves breaking at your feet1 and the whistling of the winds which have raised them2 with eyes fixed on this immensity1 see the azure line where the vault of heaven unites with the waters of the ocean3 stand on a vast and desert plain1 or in the heart of ancient forests2 contemplate in the silence of night the firmament studded with stars1 following their course in tranquillity1 as they have followed it for ages past1 and will follow it for ages to come3 without effort1 or labor of any kind1 abandon yourself to the spontaneous movements of your soul1 and you will see how sentiments spring up in it and move it to its very centre2 how they elevate it above itself1 and absorb it1 as it were1 in immensity4 ,its individuality vanishes from its own eyes1 as it feels the harmony presiding over that immense creation of which it forms but a most insignificant part4 ,in such solemn moments is it that inspired genius chants the glories of creation1 and lifts one corner of the veil that hides the resplendent throne of the supreme ,creator from the eye of mortals4 #aac4 ,that calm1 grave1 and profound sentiment which masters us on such occasions1 has no relation to individual objects2 it is an expansion of the soul at a touch of nature1 as the flower expands to the rays of the sun in the morning1 it is a divine attraction by which the author of all created things raises us above the dust in which we drag out our brief days4 ,thus the heart and the understanding harmonize2 thus the one foretastes what the other knows2 thus we are warned in different ways1 that the exercise of our faculties is not limited to the narrow orbit conceded to us upon this earth4 ,let us be on our guard1 lest the heart be frozen with the coldness of insensibility1 and the torch of the understanding quenched by the devastating blasts of skepticism4 ,,chapter ,,xix4 ,,elements ,,and ,,variety ,,of ,,the ,,characters ,,of ,,sensible ,,representation4 #aad4 ,i now come to examine the primitive elements of our mental combinations4 ,i shall begin with their sensible elements4 ,extension enters into every act of representative sensibility2 without it nothing is represented to us1 and sensations are reduced to mere affections of the soul1 having no relation to any object4 #aae4 ,extension1 of itself1 abstracted from its limitability1 is susceptible of no combination2 it only offers a vague1 indefinite1 immense representation1 from which nothing distinct of itself results4 ,but if limitability be joined to extension1 figurability1 that is1 the infinite field over which geometrical science extends1 will result4 #aaf4 ,extension and limitability are then the two elements of sensible intuition4 ,these elements may be offered to us in two ways1 either joined to sensations which present to us determinate objects1 or as productions of our own internal activity4 ,if we see the disc of the moon1 we have an intuition of the former class2 and if we study the properties of a circle by producing within ourselves its representation1 this will be an intuition of the latter class4 #aag4 ,this internal activity1 by which1 at our will or caprice1 we produce an indefinite number of representations1 with an indefinite variety of forms1 is an important phenomenon and one worthy of attention4 ,it shows us that the productive activity is not limited to the purely intellectual order1 since we detect it in the sensible order1 not in any way whatever1 but as unrolled on an infinite scale4 ,suppose a right line to be produced to infinity1 besides it and in the same plane1 we may infinite other lines2 the variety of angles in which we may consider the position of the different lines will extend to the infinite2 so that with right lines alone1 the productive activity in the order of sensibility will know no limit4 ,if we substitute curves for right lines1 their combinations in form1 in nature1 in their respective positions and relations with determinate axes1 will likewise be infinite3 so that without quitting the sensible order1 we discover within ourselves a force productive of infinite representations1 and one needing no elements besides terminable or figurable extension4 #aah4 ,the representative sensible faculty develops itself sometimes by the presence of an object2 at other times1 spontaneously1 without any dependence on the will2 and finally1 at other times1 in consequence of a free act4 ,this is not the place to examine in what way the phenomenon of representation is connected with the affections of the corporeal organs2 at present1 we propose only to designate and explain facts in the ideological sphere1 absolutely abstracting their physiological aspect4 ,among the sensible representations just classified1 which we may call passive1 spontaneous1 and free1 there are differences worthy of observation4 #aai4 ,passive representation is given to the soul1 independently of its activity4 ,if we be placed in presence of an object1 with our eyes open1 it will be impossible not to see it1 or even not to see it in a certain manner1 if we do not change the direction of our eyesight or other condition of vision4 ,for this reason1 the soul seems1 in the exercise of its senses1 to be purely passive1 since its representations necessarily depend on the conditions to which its corporeal organs in their relation to objects1 are subject4 #abj4 ,spontaneous representation1 or the faculty productive of sensible representations1 seems also1 since it operates independently of external objects and of the will1 to be more or less passive1 and its exercise to depend upon organic affections4 ,and the fact that these sensations are wont to exist without any order1 or at most1 if they are recollections of old sensations1 with that only which they had at another time1 appears to indicate it4 ,it is also worthy of note that these representations are sometimes offered to us1 in spite of all the efforts of the will to dissipate and forget them3 some are so tenacious as for a long time to triumph over all the resistance of freewill4 ,it is not easy to explain this phenomenon without recurring to organic causes1 which1 on determinate occasions1 produce the same effect upon the soul1 as the impressions of the external senses4 ,it is certain that the internal representation reaches1 in certain cases1 so high a point of vividness1 that the subject confounds it with the impressions of the senses4 ,this can only be explained by saying that the interior organic affection has become so powerful1 as to be equivalent to that which the impression of an object operating upon the external organ1 could have caused4 #aba4 ,in this spontaneous production it is to be remarked that present representations do not always correspond with others previously received2 but a power of combination is developed in them from which result imaginary objects entirely new4 ,this combination is sometimes exercised in a perfectly blind manner1 and then follow extravagant results2 but1 at other times1 this activity subjected to certain conditions produces1 independently of free will1 objects artistically beautiful and sublime4 ,genius is nothing else than the spontaneity of the imagination and sentiment1 developed in subordination to the conditions of the beautiful4 ,artists1 not gifted with genius1 do not lack strength of will to produce works of genius2 nor are they wanting in imagination to reproduce a beautiful object if they have once seen it2 they do not lack discernment and taste to distinguish and admire beautiful objects1 nor are they ignorant of the rules of art or of all that can be said to explain the character of beauty2 what they lack is that instinctively fine spontaneity which develops itself in the most recondite sinuosities of the soul1 and far from being dependent upon the free will of its possessor1 directs and domineers over him1 pursues him in sleep as in the hours of waking1 in the time of recreation as in that of business1 and often consumes the very existence of the privileged man1 as a furious fire bursts the sides of the frail cage that holds it4 #abb4 ,free production occurs when representations are offered to us by command of our will1 and under the conditions it prescribes1 as in works of art1 and in the combinations of those figures which constitute the object of the science of geometry4 #abc4 ,this a priori construction cannot be referred to a type existing in our imagination2 since1 as this type would then be the sensible representation itself1 it would not need to be constructed4 ,how then is it possible to form a representation of which we have not already the image8 ,it is not enough to possess the elements1 that is1 figurable extension1 since with them infinite figures may be constructed2 something else then is needed1 something to serve as a rule1 in order that the desired representation may result4 ,for the better understanding of this1 ,i would observe that sensible intuitions are allied to general conceptions1 by whose aid they may be reconstructed4 ,although1 in reality1 no sensible representation is offered to us1 of any figure whatsoever1 for example1 a regular hexagon2 the conception formed of the ideas1 six1 line1 equality of angles1 is all that we need to produce in our interior the sensible representation of the hexagon1 and to construct it within us1 if we require it4 ,this shows us that the free activity producing determinate sensible representations is based upon general conceptions1 which1 though independent of sensibility1 refer to it in an indeterminate manner4 ,hence1 also1 it follows1 that the understanding may1 if it observe the conditions to which the elements furnished by sensibility in their respective cases1 are subject1 conceive the sensible indeterminately1 without the intellectual act being referred to any determinate intuition4 #abd4 ,if we analyze the object of these general conceptions1 referred to sensible intuition1 also considered in general1 the understanding1 while occupied in them1 seems to be taken up with things not distinctly offered to it1 but retained only by certain signs2 confident1 however1 that it can develop whatever they involve1 and contemplate it with perfect clearness4 ,,chapter ,,xx4 ,,intermediate ,,representations ,,between ,,sensible ,,intuition ,,and ,,the ,,intellectual ,,act4 #abe4 ,the question now occurs1 whether the understanding1 in order to perceive the geometrical relations offered in sensible intuition1 does or does not need some intermediate representations which bring it into contact with the sensible order8#aj ,such a necessity would1 at first sight1 seem to exist1 since1 as the understanding is a non-sensible faculty1 sensible elements cannot be its immediate object4 ,but on maturer examination1 it seems more probable that there is no necessity of any thing intermediate1 except some sign to connect the sensible elements1 and to show the point where they must unite1 and the conditions to which they are subject4 ,as this sign may1 however1 be a word1 or something else1 susceptible of a sensible representation1 its mediation will not at all solve the difficulty2 since the question will always recur3 ,how is the understanding placed in communication with the sensible sign8 #aj ,see ,chap4 ,,vi4 ,this difficulty arises from the faculty of the soul being considered1 not only as distinct1 but also1 as separate1 and as exercising each one of its faculties in its own peculiar and exclusive sphere1 entirely isolated from that of all others4 ,this mode of considering the faculties of the soul1 though favorable to the classification of their operations1 does not accord with the teachings of experience4 ,it cannot be denied that we observe within ourselves1 affections and operations1 very unlike each other1 and arising from distinct objects1 and producing very different results4 ,this has led to a distinction of faculties1 and in some degree1 to a separation of their functions1 so as to prevent them from mixing together and being confounded4 ,but there can be no doubt that all the affections and operations of the soul are1 as consciousness reveals1 bound to a common centre4 ,whatever becomes of the distinction of the faculties among themselves1 it is very certain1 as consciousness tells us1 that it is one and the same being that thinks1 feels1 desires1 acts1 or suffers3 it is certain that this same consciousness reveals to us the intimate communication of all the operations of the soul4 ,we instantaneously reflect upon the impression received2 we instantaneously experience an agreeable or disagreeable sensation in consequence of a reflection which occurs to us3 we reflect upon the will2 we seek or repudiate the object of our thought2 there is1 so to speak1 within us a boiling spring of phenomena of different kinds1 all interlinked1 modified1 produced1 reproduced1 and mutually influenced by each other in their incessant communication4 ,we are conscious of all these2 we encounter them all in one common field1 which is the subject that experiences them4 ,what necessity1 then1 is there to imagine intermediate beings in order to bring the faculties of the soul into communication with each other8 ,why may it not with its activity1 called understanding1 occupy itself immediately with sensible representations and affections and with all that is in its consciousness8 ,supposing this consciousness in its indivisible unity to comprise all the variety of internal phenomena1 it does not therefore follow that the intellectual activity of the soul cannot be referred to whatever it contains of active or receptive1 without its being necessary to imagine species to serve as courtiers between the faculties1 to announce to one what has taken place in the other4 #abf4 ,the acting intellect of the ,aristotelians1 admissible in sound philosophy so far as it denotes an activity of the mind applied to sensible representations1 does not seem alike admissible1 if it be supposed to be the producer of new representations distinct from the intellectual act itself4 ,the understanding is all activity2 the receptivity of the soul has nothing to do with it1 but to proportion its materials2 and the conceptions elaborated in presence of these materials1 seem to be nothing else than the exercise of this same activity1 subject on the one hand to the conditions required by the thing understood1 and subordinated on the other hand to the general conditions of every intelligence4 #abg4 ,i do not mean to say that the intellectual act does not refer to any object4 ,i replace the idea by other acts of the soul1 or by affections or representations of some kind or other1 whether active or passive4 ,this being so1 if ,i am asked1 for example1 what is the immediate object of the intellectual act perceiving of determinate sensible intuition1 ,i reply that it is the intuition itself4 ,if the difficulty of explaining the union of such different things be urged1 ,i answer3 first1 that this union exists in the unity of consciousness1 as the internal sense attests3 second1 that the same difficulty militates against those who pretend that the understanding elaborates an intelligible species1 which it takes from the sensible intuition2 and how1 ,i may ask1 does the understanding place itself in contact with this intuition when it would elaborate its intelligible species4 ,if this immediate contact be impossible in the one case1 it will be equally so in the other2 and if they concede it to be possible in their own case1 they cannot deny it to be possible in ours also4 ,when the understanding refers to no determinate intuition1 but only to sensible intuitions in general1 its immediate object is their possibility also in general1 subject to the conditions of the object considered in general1 and to those of every intelligence2 among which1 the principle of contradiction holds a primary place4 ,,chapter ,,xxi4 ,,determinate ,,and ,,indeterminate ,,ideas4 #abh4 ,we must1 under pain of falling into sensism1 by limiting the understanding to the perception and combination of objects presented by sensibility1 admit other than intellectual acts referable to sensible objects in general4 ,and what1 in this case1 is the object of the intellectual act1 is a question as difficult as it is interesting4 #abi4 ,the pure understanding can exercise its functions either upon determinate or indeterminate ideas2 that is1 upon ideas which contain something determinate1 something realizable in a being1 that is or may be offered to our perception1 or upon ideas which represent general relations1 without application to any object4 ,care should be taken not to confound general with indeterminate1 or particular with determinate ideas4 ,every intermediate idea is a general idea1 but not vice versa4 ,the idea of being is general and indeterminate2 that of intelligence is general but determinate4 ,the particular idea refers to an individual2 the determinate to a property1 and it does not cease to be determinate although we abstract all relation in it to an existing individual4 ,this distinction opens the way to considerations of the highest importance4 #acj4 ,when the understanding proceeds by indeterminate conceptions1 its principal object seems to be being in its greatest universality4 ,this is the radical and fundamental idea1 round which all other ideas are grouped4 ,from the idea of being springs the principle of contradiction1 with its infinite applications to every class of objects2 from it also flow the ideas of substance and accidents1 of cause and effect1 of the necessary and the contingent1 and every thing contained in the science of ontology1 called for this very reason ontology1 or the science of being4 #aca4 ,there is nothing in those conceptions which express the general relations of all beings1 to characterize them until they quit their purely metaphysical sphere and descend into the field of reality4 ,in order to be able to conceive of a real being1 we require it to be presented to us with some property4 ,being and not-being1 substance and accidents1 cause and effect1 are1 when combined with something positive1 highly fruitful ideas2 but taken in general1 with nothing determinate assigned to them1 they do not offer us any existing1 or even possible object4 #acb4 ,the idea of being presents us that of a thing in the abstract2 but if we would conceive of this as existing or as possible1 we must imagine this thing to be something with characteristic properties4 ,whenever we hear an existing thing spoken of1 we instinctively ask what it is1 and what is its nature4 ,god is essentially being1 is infinite being2 but nothing would be represented to our mind were we to conceive of him only as of being1 and not also as intelligent1 active1 free being endowed with all the other perfections of his infinite essence4 #acc4 ,the idea of substance offers us that of a permanent being1 which does not1 like a modification1 inhere in another4 ,this idea1 taken in its generality without other determination than that added to the idea of being1 by that of subsistence1 offers us nothing real or realizable4 ,permanence in general1 subsistence by itself1 non-inherence in a subject1 do not suffice to enable a substance to exist or to be possible2 some characteristic mark1 some attribute is also needed1 as corporeal1 intelligent1 free1 or any other you please1 to determine the general idea of substance4 #acd4 ,the same may be said of the idea of cause1 or productive activity4 ,an active thing1 in general1 offers us nothing either real or possible4 ,in order to conceive an existing activity1 we must refer to a determinate activity2 the idea of acting1 or of being able to act1 in general1 does not suffice2 we must represent it to ourselves1 as exercising itself in one way or another1 referring to determinate objects1 producing1 not beings in general1 but beings having their own characteristic attributes4 ,true1 we do not need to know what these attributes are2 but we do need to know that they exist with their determinateness4 ,the most universal cause conceivable is ,god1 the first and infinite cause2 and although we do not conceive of him as of cause in the abstract1 regarding the simple idea of productive activity1 but we attach to the general idea of cause the ideas of free will and intelligence4 ,when we say that ,god is omnipotent1 we assign an infinite sphere to his power2 we do not know the characteristic attributes of all the beings which can be created by this infinite activity2 but we are certain that every existing or possible being must have a determinate nature2 and we do not conceive it to be possible for a being to be produced1 which1 without any determination1 would be nothing but being4 #ace4 ,we do not meet this determination1 indispensable as it is to us1 if we would conceive of the existence or possibility of a being1 in indeterminate ideas1 but must take it from experience2 wherefore1 if our understanding were limited to the combination of those relations offered in indeterminate conceptions1 it would be condemned to a perfectly sterile science4 ,we have already seen 7,chap4 ,,xiv47 that the absolute non-communication of the real with the ideal order is impossible if the intelligible order be not deprived of all consciousness of itself4 ,it is not enough to know1 that such a communication exists1 but we must ascertain in what points it is verified1 and how far it extends4 #acf4 ,before passing to this investigation1 we would observe1 that the doctrine explained in this chapter is not to be confounded with that of the fourteenth chapter4 ,there1 it was shown that general ideas of themselves alone1 have only a purely hypothetical value1 and lead to nothing because they are not combined with any thing positive1 furnished by experience2 here1 we have proved that indeterminate ideas of being1 substance1 and cause1 do not of themselves alone suffice to enable us to conceive of any thing either existing or possible1 if they be not accompanied by some determinate idea1 which gives a character to the general ideas4 ,there1 a hypothetical value1 with respect to their existence1 was allotted to general ideas3 here1 we affirm it to be necessary for these ideas to be accompanied by some property that shall render them capable of constituting an essence1 at least in the possible order4 ,these are very different things1 and must not be confounded2 hence the importance of not forgetting the distinction between general and indeterminate1 and between particular and determinate ideas4 ,,chapter ,,xxii4 ,,limits ,,of ,,our ,,intuition4 #acg4 ,could we assign limits to the field of experience1 and determine exactly how much they inclose1 we could also determine the characteristics by which a being may be presented to us as existing or as possible4 #ach4 ,passive sensibility1 active sensibility1 understanding1 and will1 are1 if we be not mistaken1 all that our understanding contains2 and this is why we cannot conceive of any attribute characteristic of being1 except these four4 ,let us examine these1 each in its turn1 and with the care required by the importance of the results which will follow this demarcation4 #aci4 ,by passive sensibility we understand the form under which bodies are presented4 ,as we have already explained it in several places1 this form is reducible to figured or bounded extension4 ,it cannot be denied that this attribute contains a true determination1 as there is nothing more determinate than objects presented to our senses1 with extension1 and figure1 and other properties annexed to these fundamental attributes4 ,motion and impenetrability are determinations which accompany extension1 or rather they are relations of extension4 ,to us1 motion is the change of the situations of a body in space1 or the alteration in the positions of the extension of a body1 with respect to the extension of space4 ,impenetrability is the reciprocal exclusion of two extensions4 ,the idea of solid and liquid1 of hard and soft1 and other similar ideas1 express relations of the extension of a body to their admission1 with greater or less resistance1 of the extension of another in one and the same place4 ,questions upon the nature of extension have no place here4 ,extension is1 so far as we are concerned1 a determinate object1 presented to us in the clearest intuition4 ,the attribute of passive sensibility has ever been regarded as one of the most characteristic determinations2 and this is why it has been made to enter as a fundamental classification in the scale of beings4 ,the distinctions of corporeal and incorporeal1 of material and immaterial1 of sensible and insensible1 are of as frequent use in ordinary language as in that of the schools2 and it is obvious that the words1 corporeal1 material1 and sensible1 although not perfectly synonymous under some aspects1 are usually taken to be such1 in so far as they express a kind of beings1 whose characteristic properties are those forms under which they are offered to our senses4 #adj4 ,active sensibility is the faculty of feeling2 and is to us an object of immediate experience1 since we have it within us4 ,from the clear presence of sensitive acts1 we may easily conceive what feeling is in other subjects than ourselves4 ,we have no consciousness of what passes in another subject when it sees2 but we know what it is to see2 it is in others the same as in ourselves4 ,in our own consciousness that of others is portrayed4 ,we well know what is spoken of1 when we hear a sensitive being mentioned2 and this too by a perfectly determinate1 not by a vague idea4 ,if the question be raised1 whether other senses are possible1 the idea of a being endowed with them1 loses a certain amount of its determinateness3 our understanding has no intuition of what it would be2 it discourses upon the reality or possibility by means of general conceptions4 #ada4 ,understanding1 or the force of conceiving and combining1 independently of the sensible order1 is another of the data furnished by our own experience4 ,as this is a fact of consciousness1 we know it by intuition1 not by abstract ideas2 it is the exercise of an activity which we feel within ourselves2 it is the me which we ourselves are4 ,this activity1 by reason of its very union1 its identity with the subject perceiving it1 is present to us in so intimate a manner that we find no difficulty in perceiving it4 ,the idea of understanding is intuitive to us1 not indeterminate1 since it presents an object which is immediately given to our perception in our soul itself4 ,when we speak of understanding1 we fix our views upon what passes within ourselves1 and we see greater or less perfection in the scale of intelligent beings portrayed in the gradation of the cognitions which we experience within ourselves2 and when we would conceive of a far higher understanding1 we enlarge and perfect the type we have discovered within ourselves2 just as we represent to ourselves greater1 more perfect1 and more beautiful sensible objects1 than those we see1 without quitting the sphere of sensibility1 but making use of the elements it furnishes to us1 and enlarging and embellishing them so as to attain to that ideal type already conceived of in our imagination4 #adb4 ,the will1 although an inseparable companion of the understanding1 and even necessary to its existence1 is nevertheless a very different faculty from it2 for the will offers to our intuition a series of phenomena very unlike the phenomena of the understanding4 ,to understand is not to will2 a thing may be known1 and yet not willed4 ,one and the same act of the understanding may unite at various times1 or in diverse subjects1 very different if not contradictory acts of the will2 to will and to not will2 or inclination and aversion4 ,the cognition of that series of phenomena called acts of the will1 is not a general but a particular1 not an abstract but an intuitive1 cognition4 ,what necessity is there of abstraction or discursion to ascertain what we will or do not will1 what we love or what we abhor8 ,this cognition is intuitive1 so far as the acts of our own will are concerned2 and although we have no immediate intuition of what the will of others is1 we know perfectly well what passes in them1 from seeing it in some degree manifested by what we ourselves experience4 ,when we hear the acts of another's will spoken of1 have we1 by chance1 any difficulty in conceiving the object in question8 ,are we obliged to proceed discursively by abstract ideas8 ,certainly not6 ,the same occurs in others as in ourselves4 ,when they will1 or do not will1 they experience just what we ourselves experience when we will or do not will4 ,the consciousness of our will is the image of all others existing or possible4 ,we conceive that will to be more or less perfect1 which unites in a higher or lower degree the actual or possible perfections of our own3 and if we would conceive a will of infinite perfection1 we must elevate to an infinite degree the actual or possible perfection which we discover in the finite will4 #adc4 ,when the ,sacred ,text tells us that man is created to the image and likeness of ,god1 it teaches us a truth highly luminous1 whether considered in a purely philosophical or in a supernatural aspect4 ,we discover in our soul1 in this image of infinite intelligence1 not only a multitude of general ideas which carry us beyond the limits of sensibility1 but also an admirable representation wherein we contemplate1 as in a mirror1 every thing that passes in that infinite sea which cannot be known by immediate intuition so long as we remain in this life4 ,this representation is imperfect1 is enigmatical2 but it is a true representation3 in its minutest particles1 infinitely increased1 we may contemplate the infinite2 its feeblest brilliance reflects back to us the splendor of infinity4 ,the slight spark struck from the flint may lead the imagination to that ocean of fire1 discovered by astronomers in the orb of day4 ,,chapter ,,xxiii4 ,,of ,,the ,,necessity ,,involved ,,in ,,ideas4 #add4 ,in all ideas1 even in those that relate to contingent facts1 there is something of the necessary1 something from which science may spring1 but something which cannot emanate from experience1 however multiplied we suppose it4 ,every induction resulting from experience is confined to a limited number of facts1--a number1 which1 even if augmented by all the experience of all men of all ages1 would still remain infinitely below universality1 which extends to all that is possible4 ,moreover1 however little we reflect upon the certainty of the truths intimately connected with experience1 such as are arithmetical and geometrical truths1 we cannot fail to perceive that the confidence with which we build upon them is not founded upon induction1 but that we assent to them independently of any particular fact1 and consider their truth as absolutely necessary1 although we cannot verify it by the touchstone of experience4 #ade4 ,the verification of ideas by facts is in many cases impossible1 because the weakness of our perception and of our senses1 and the coarseness of the instruments we use1 fail to render us certain that the facts correspond exactly to the ideas4 ,it is sometimes absolutely impossible to establish this proof1 since geometrical truth supposes conditions such as cannot be realized in practice4 #adf4 ,let us apply these observations to the simplest truths of geometry4 ,certainly no one will doubt the solidity of the proof called superposition3 that is to say1 if one of two lines1 or surfaces1 be placed upon the other1 and they exactly correspond1 they will be equal4 ,this truth cannot depend upon experience3 first1 because experience is limited to a certain number of cases1 whereas the proposition is general4 ,to say that one serves for all is to say that there is a general principal1 independent of experience1 since1 without recognizing an intrinsic necessity in this truth1 the universal could in no other way be deduced from the particular4 ,secondly1 because even where experience avails1 it is impossible for us to make it exact1 since superposition made in the most delicate manner imaginable1 can never attain to geometrical exactness1 which repudiates the minutest difference in any point4 ,it is an elementary theorem1 that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles4 ,this truth does not rest upon experience3 first1 because the universal cannot be deduced from the particular2 secondly1 because1 however delicate be the instruments for measuring angles1 they cannot measure them with geometrical exactness2 thirdly1 because geometry supposes conditions which we cannot realize in practice2 lines have no thickness1 and the vertices of angles are indivisible points4 #adg4 ,if general principles depended upon experience they would cease to be general1 and would be limited to a certain number of cases4 ,neither would their enunciation be absolute1 even for the cases already observed2 for it would of necessity be reduced to what had been observed1 that is to say1 to a little more or less1 but never be perfect exactness4 ,consequently we could not assert that the three angles of every triangle are equal to two right angles2 all that we could say would be1 that so far as our experience goes1 we have observed that in all triangles the three angles are very nearly equal to two right angles4 ,this would obviously destroy all necessary truths2 and even mathematical truths would be no more certain than the reports of adepts in any profession who recount to us their observations concerning their respective objects4 #adh4 ,there can be no science without necessary truths2 and even the cognition of contingent truths would become exceedingly difficult without them4 ,how do we collect the facts furnished by observation1 and adjust them8 ,is it not by applying certain general truths to them1 as1 for example1 those of numeration8 ,otherwise we could have no perfect confidence in them1 nor in the results of observation4 #adi4 ,human reason cannot live1 if it abandon this treasure of necessary truths which constitute its common patrimony4 ,individual reason could take no more than a few short steps1 overwhelmed as it constantly would be with the mass of observations2 distracted unceasingly by the verifications to which it would always have to recur2 in want of some light to serve for all objects2 and prohibited ever from simplifying1 by uniting the rays of science in a common centre4 ,general reason would also cease to be1 and men would no longer understand each other3 every one would be confined to his own experience3 and since there would be in the experiences of all men1 nothing necessary1 nothing to connect them1 there would be no unity in them all together3 all the sciences would be a field of confusion1 to which all restoration of order would be utterly impossible4 ,no language could have been formed2 or even if formed could be preserved4 ,we meet in the simplest enunciations of language1 as well as in the complication of a long discourse1 an abundance of general and necessary truths1 which serve as the woof for the weaving-in of contingent truths4 #aej4 ,to inquire1 therefore1 if there are necessary truths1 is to inquire1 if individual1 if general reason exists2 if what we call reason1 and discover in all men1 really exists1 or is but a fantastical illusion4 ,this reason does exist3 to deny it is to deny ourselves3 not to wish to admit it1 is to reject the testimony of our consciousness1 which assures us that it is in the depth of our soul2 it is to make impotent efforts to destroy a conviction irresistibly imposed by nature4 #aea4 ,and here ,i would remark that this community of reason among all men of all ages and of all climes2 this admirable unity1 discoverable in the midst of so much variety2 this fundamental accord which neither the diversity nor the contradiction of views can destroy1 evidently proves that all human souls have one common origin2 that thought is not a work of chance2 that1 besides human intelligences1 there is another which serves as their support1 illuminates them1 and has1 from the first moment of their existence1 endowed them with all the faculties needed to perceive1 and to know what they perceived4 ,the admirable order which reigns throughout the material world1 the concert1 the unity of plan discoverable in it1 are not a more conclusive proof of the existence of ,god1 than are the order1 the concert1 the unity1 offered by reason in its assent to necessary truths4 ,for our own part1 we ingenuously confess1 that we can discover no more solid1 more conclusive1 or more clear proof of the existence of ,god1 than that deduced from the world of intelligences4 ,beyond this it has another advantage1 which is1 that it takes for its point of departure the act most immediate to us1 the consciousness of our own acts4 ,it is true1 the proof best adapted to the capacity of ordinary men1 is the one founded on the admirable order reigning over the corporeal world3 but this is because they are unaccustomed to meditate upon insensible objects1 upon what passes within themselves2 wherefore it is that they abound more in direct cognitions than in power of reflection4 ,the atheist asks how we can be certain of the existence of ,god1 and demands an apparition of the divinity3 very well1 this apparition exists1 not without1 but within us3 and although it may be pardonable for men of little reflection not to perceive it1 most certainly it is not pardonable for those who pretend to be adepts in metaphysical science1 not even to endeavor to discover it4 ,the system of ,malebranche1 which makes men see every thing in ,god1 cannot be sustained1 but it shows a very profound thinker4 ,,chapter ,,xxiv4 ,,existence ,,of ,,universal ,,reason4 #aeb4 ,general truths have some relation to particular truths2 for since they are not a vain illusion1 they must of necessity be connected with some object either existing or possible4 ,whatever exists is particular2 not even possible being can be conceived of1 if it be not1 so to speak1 particularized in the regions of possibility4 ,god himself1 being by essence1 is not a being in abstract1 but an infinite reality4 ,in him1 the general idea of the plenitude of being1 of all perfection1 of infinity1 is1 so to speak1 particularized4 ,general truths would then be vain illusions did they not refer to something particular either existing or possible4 ,without this relation1 cognition would be a purely subjective phenomenon2 science would have no object2 knowledge would be had1 but there would be nothing known4 ,the appearance of knowing is never offered to us as a purely subjective fact2 that is to say1 when we think we know1 we think we know something either within or without us1 according to the matters which occupy us4 ,supposing1 then1 the phenomenon of cognition to be purely subjective1 and to become objective for itself1 we should have what would constantly lead us into error2 for the human reason would be infected with a radical vice1 which would oblige it to view these phenomena as means of perceiving the truth1 whereas they are only eternal sources of deception4 #aec4 ,there may arise a doubt in this correspondence of general with particular truth1 as to which is the principle2 that is1 whether general truth is truth by means of particular truths1 or the contrary4 ,all the diameters of a circle are equal2 this is a general truth4 ,if we suppose a circle to exist1 all its diameters will be equal4 ,we have already seen that the certainty of the general truth neither does nor can reach us through the particular truth2 but neither1 on the other hand1 does the particular stand in need of the general2 so that it seems1 that even when we abstract all intelligence1 capable of perceiving this general truth1 the existing circle will not cease to have all its diameters equal4 #aed4 ,moreover1 if the truth fail in one single instance1 it cannot be general2 but the particular may be true although it fail in general4 ,the equality of the diameters of an existing circle is1 then1 a condition necessary to the general truth2 but the general truth is not necessary to the equality of the diameters4 ,it is true in general that all diameters are equal1 since this is verified in all either existing or possible1 and the general truth is only the expression of this verification2 but yet it does not appear that the diameters1 in any one particular case1 are equal by reason of the general truth4 ,it is true that one particular whole is greater than one of its parts1 although considered in itself1 abstracted from all general truth2 but it would not be true that the whole is greater than one of its parts1 if in any one particular whole1 the axiom should fail4 #aee4 ,it would seem that from these observations we could infer that the truth of principles depends upon the truth of facts1 and not vice versa4 ,nevertheless1 if we reflect more upon this matter1 we shall discover that truth is not based upon particular facts1 but upon something superior to them4 ,i4 ,we cannot from a particular fact infer a universal truth2 but from universal truth we can infer the truth of all particular existing or possible facts4 ,the reason why this consequence is legitimate is found in the necessary connection of the predicate and subject2 and this necessity cannot be discovered in particular facts of their own nature contingent4 ,,ii4 ,neither can the reason of this necessity be found in the simple proposition enunciating it1 since this establishes nothing1 but only expresses4 ,the enunciation is true1 because it expresses the truth2 but the existence of the truth does not depend upon its enunciation4 ,,iii4 ,nor can it depend upon our ideas2 for these are not productive of things2 all imaginable perceptions cannot change one iota of reality4 ,the idea may express a thing1 but does not make it4 ,the relation of ideas with each other1 in so far avails as it expresses the relation of objects2 if for one moment we permit ourselves to doubt this correspondence1 our reason becomes reduced to utter impotence1 to a vain illusion of that which ought to be of no account4 ,the properties of the triangle are contained in the idea we have of it2 but if this idea were purely subjective1 if it had no exact or approximate relation to any real or possible object1 it and all that is built upon it1 would be mere phenomena of our mind1 would signify absolutely nothing1 and would have no more weight than the ravings of a madman4 ,,iv4 ,the reason of necessary truths can in nowise be discovered in our understanding2 every one perceives them1 without thinking of others or even of himself4 ,truth existed before any individual2 and when we shall have disappeared1 it will continue the same1 it will lose nothing4 ,v4 ,all men1 although they neither do nor can agree1 perceive certain necessary truths2 all individual intelligences1 therefore1 have drunk at some common fountain2 therefore universal reason exists4 ,,chapter ,,xxv4 ,,in ,,what ,,does ,,universal ,,reason ,,consist8 #aef4 ,what is universal reason8 ,if we consider it as a simple idea1 as an abstraction from individual reason1 as something separate from them1 but not real1 we strike upon the very rock we try to shun4 ,we endeavor to assign a cause of the unity of human reason2 and appeal to universal reason2 and then to explain in what universal reason consists1 we recur to an abstraction from individual reason4 ,evidently1 this is a vicious circle2 we place the cause of a fact so fruitful in an abstraction1 in a generalization of the very thing we have to explain2 we assign to a great effect a cause totally insufficient1 which has no existence out of our understanding1 and which only grows out of the very effect whose origin we are investigating4 #aeg4 ,a real fact must have a real principle2 a universal phenomenon must have a universal cause2 a phenomenon independent of all finite intelligence must spring from some cause independent of all finite intelligence4 ,there is1 then1 a universal reason1 the origin of all finite reason1 the source of all truth1 the light of all intelligences1 the bond of all beings4 ,there is1 then1 above all phenomena1 above all finite individuals1 a being1 in which is found the reason of all beings1 a great unity1 in which is found the bond of all order1 and of all the community of other beings4 ,the unity1 therefore1 of all human reason affords a complete demonstration of the existence of ,god4 ,the universal reason is2 but universal reason is an unmeaning word1 unless it denote an intelligent1 active being1 a being by essence1 the producer of all beings1 of all intelligences1 the cause of all1 and the light of all4 #aeh4 ,impersonal reason1 of which some philosophers speak1 is an unmeaning word4 ,either there exists a reason distinct from ours1 or there does not3 if it does exist1 it is not impersonal2 if it does not exist1 it is impossible to explain the community of human reason3 this community would be to us a phenomenon1 which we might call impersonal reason1 or any thing else we pleased1 without it therefore being possible for us to assign it any origin3 it would be an effect without a cause2 a fact without a sufficient reason4 #aei4 ,the understanding extends to a world of possibilities1 and there discovers a connection of necessary relations1 some of dependence1 others of contradiction3 but if there were no reality whereon to found the possibility1 this would be an absurdity2 if nothing existed1 nothing would be possible4 ,upon nothing1 nothing can be founded2 consequently1 not even possibility4 ,the connection of necessary relations which we discover in possible beings1 must have a primitive type to which they refer3 but in nothing there are no types4 #afj4 ,the assemblage of human understandings cannot establish possibility4 ,no one of them considered isolately is necessary to general truth2 and all together cannot have what no one of them has4 ,we conceive necessary truth1 absolutely abstracted from the human understanding3 individual understandings appear and disappear1 but work no change in the relations of possible beings3 on the contrary1 the understanding needs1 in order to exercise its functions1 a collection of pre-existing truths1 and without them it cannot work4 ,what any one individual understanding requires1 all require4 ,their union does not increase the strength of each one3 since this union is nothing more than an assemblage formed in our mind1 and may not correspond to any thing in reality except the individual understandings1 and their respective strength4 #afa4 ,necessary truths1 therefore1 exist before human reason2 but their pre-existence is an unmeaning word1 if they be not referred to a being1 the origin of all reality1 and the foundation of all possibility4 ,there is then no impersonal reason properly so called2 there is a community of reason in so far as one and the same light illumines all finite intelligences2 ,god the creator of them all4 ,,chapter ,,xxvi4 ,,remarks ,,on ,,the ,,real ,,foundation ,,of ,,pure ,,possibility4 #afb4 ,since the argument proving the necessity of a being in which is laid the foundation of all the relations in the possible order1 is one of the most transcendental in all metaphysics1 and at the same time one of the most difficult to be perfectly understood1 we judge it advisable to enlarge somewhat upon the considerations thrown out in the preceding chapter4 ,an example1 in which we undertake to establish the possibility of things1 independently of a being in which is found the reason of all1 will serve our purpose better than abstract reflections4 #afc4 ,two circles of equal diameters are equal4 ,this proposition is evidently true4 ,let us analyze its meaning4 ,the proposition refers to the possible order1 and abstracts absolutely the existence of the circles and of the diameters4 ,no case is excepted2 all are comprised in the proposition4 #afd4 ,neither does the truth refer to our mode of understanding2 but on the contrary1 we conceive it as independent of our thought4 ,were we asked1 what would become of this truth were we not to exist1 we should without hesitation reply that it would be the same1 that it acquired nothing by our existence1 that it would lose nothing by our extinction4 ,if we believed this truth to depend in any way upon us1 it would cease to be what it is1 it would no longer be a necessary but a contingent truth4 #afe4 ,nor is the corporeal world indispensable to the truth and necessity of the proposition3 on the contrary1 if we suppose no body to exist1 the proposition would lose none of its truth1 necessity1 or universality4 #aff4 ,what would happen1 if1 withdrawing all bodies1 all sensible representations1 and even all intelligences1 we should imagine absolute and universal nothing8 ,we see the truth of the proposition even on this supposition2 for it is impossible for us to hold it to be false4 ,on every supposition1 our understanding sees a connection which it cannot destroy3 the condition once established1 the result will infallibly follow4 #afg4 ,an absolutely necessary connection1 founded neither on us1 nor on the external world1 which exists before any thing we can imagine1 and subsists after we have annihilated all by an effort of our understanding1 must be based upon something1 it cannot have nothing for its origin3 to say this1 would be to assert a necessary fact without a sufficient reason4 #afh4 ,it is true that in the proposition now before us1 nothing real is affirmed2 but if we reflect carefully1 we find even here the greatest difficulty for those who deny a real foundation to pure possibility4 ,what is remarkable in this phenomenon1 is precisely this1 that our understanding feels itself forced to give its assent to a proposition which affirms an absolutely necessary connection without any relation to an existing object4 ,it is conceivable that an intelligence affected by other beings may know their nature and relations2 but it is not so easy of comprehension how it can discover their nature and relations in an absolutely necessary manner1 when it abstracts all existence1 when the ground upon which the eyes of the understanding are fixed1 is the abyss of nothing4 #afi4 ,we deceive ourselves when we imagine it possible to abstract all existence4 ,even when we suppose our mind to have lost sight of every thing1 a very easy supposition1 granting that we find in our consciousness the contingency of our being1 the understanding still perceives a possible order1 and imagines it to be all occupied with pure possibility1 independent of a being on which it is based4 ,we repeat1 that this is an illusion1 which disappears so soon as we reflect upon it4 ,in pure nothing1 nothing is possible2 there are no relations1 no connections of any kind2 in nothing there are no combinations1 it is a ground upon which nothing can be pictured4 #agj4 ,the objectivity of our ideas and the perception of necessary relations in a possible order1 reveal a communication of our understanding with a being on which is founded all possibility4 ,this possibility can be explained on no supposition except that which makes the communication consist in the action of ,god giving to our mind faculties perceptive of the necessary relation of certain ideas1 based upon necessary being1 and representative of his infinite essence4 #aga4 ,without this communication the order of pure possibility means nothing3 none of the combinations referable to it contain any truth3 and this ruins all science4 ,there can be no necessary relations if there be no necessity upon which they are based1 and where they are represented2 if this condition be wanting1 all cognitions must refer to something actually existing2 they are even limited to what appears1 to what affects us1 and they cannot affirm any thing beyond the actual order4 ,science1 in this supposition1 is unworthy of the name2 it is nothing but a collection of facts1 gathered together in the field of experience2 we cannot say3 ,this will be1 or will not be2 this may be1 or may not be2 we are necessarily limited to what is2 or1 rather1 we ought to confine ourselves to that which affects us by simple appearances1 and never be able to rise above the sphere of individual phenomena4 ,,chapter ,,xxvii4 ,,individual ,,and ,,intellectual ,,phenomena ,,explained ,,by ,,the ,,universal ,,subsisting ,,reason4 #agb4 ,starting from the phenomena observable in individual reason1 we have arrived at universal reason4 ,let us1 so to speak1 make the counterproof2 taking this universal subsisting reason1 let us see if individual reason in itself and in its phenomena can be explained by it4 ,i4 ,what are necessary truths8 ,they are the relations of beings1 such as they are represented in the being which contains the plenitude of being4 ,these necessary truths1 then1 stand in need of no individual finite reason2 their reason is found in an infinite being4 ,,ii4 ,the essence of all beings1 abstracted from all particular beings1 is something real1 not in itself1 and separately1 but in the being which contains the plenitude of every thing4 ,,iii4 ,on this supposition science is not full of empty words1 nor of mere creations of our reason1 but of necessary relations represented in a necessary being1 and known by it from all eternity4 ,,iv4 ,science is possible2 there is some necessity in contingent objects2 their destruction does not destroy the eternal types of all being1 the only object of science4 ,v4 ,all individual reason1 sprung from the same source1 participates in one same light1 lives one same life1 has one and the same patrimony1 is indivisible in the creative principle1 but divisible in creatures4 ,the unity1 then1 or rather the uniformity or community of human reason is possible1 is necessary4 ,,vi4 ,the reason1 then1 of all men is united by the infinite intelligence3 ,god then is in us2 and the most profound philosophical truth is contained in these words of the ,apostle3 ,in ipso vivimus1 movemur1 et sumus4 ,,vii4 ,all philosophy1 therefore1 which seeks to explain reason1 by isolating it1 considers only particular phenomena unconnected by a general bond1 pretends to construct the magnificent fabric of our reason upon particular facts alone1 but does not appeal to a common origin1 to one source of light whence all lights have sprung1 is a false philosophy1 is superficial1 at war with theory1 and in contradiction with facts4 ,when we reflect upon this1 we can but pity ,locke1 and still more ,condillac1 and their explanations of human reason by sensations alone4 ,,viii4 ,thus we understand why we cannot give the reason of many things2 we see them2 they are thus3 they are necessary2 more we cannot say4 ,a triangle is not a circle3 what reason can we assign for this8 ,none6 ,it is so2 this is all4 ,but why8 ,because there does actually exist an immediate necessity in the relation represented in the infinite being1 which is truth by essence4 ,the same infinite intelligence sees no greater reason of itself1 than in itself4 ,it finds every thing1 and the relations of all things in the plenitude of its being2 but beyond them is nothing4 ,he gave to individual reason1 when creating it1 an intuition of these relations3 no discursion proves them2 we see them2 this is all4 ,,ix4 ,some even who admit the subjective value of ideas1 either doubting or denying their objectivity1 lose sight of this fact4 ,they seek an argument1 where there is need only of a vision2 they demand degrees where there are none4 ,when human reason sees certain truths1 it cannot go farther and doubt of them4 ,it is subject to a primitive law of its nature1 which it cannot abstract without ceasing to be what it is4 ,by the very act of seeing the object it is sure of it2 the difference between subjectivity and objectivity falls within the space of inferences1 but not within that of immediate reason1 or the understanding of necessary truths4 #agc4 ,we leave it to the reader's judgment whether the preceding explanation is more satisfactory than that by impersonal reason2 the theory we have attempted to expound has been held by all the most eminent metaphysicians4 ,with ,god1 all is clear2 without ,god1 all is a chaos4 ,this is true in the order of facts1 and not less so in the order of ideas4 ,our perception is also a fact2 our ideas likewise are facts2 over all presides an admirable order2 a chain which cannot be destroyed unites all2 but neither this order nor this chain depends upon this4 ,the word reason has a profound meaning1 for it refers to the infinite intelligence4 ,what is true for the reason of one man cannot be false for the reason of another2 there are1 independently of all communication among human minds1 and of all intuition1 truths necessary for all4 ,we must1 if we would explain this unity1 rise above ourselves1 must elevate ourselves to that great unity in which every thing originates1 and to which every thing tends4 #agd4 ,this point of view is high1 but it is the only one2 if we depart from it we can see nothing1 but are forced to use unmeaning words4 ,sublime and consoling thought6 ,although man disputes upon ,god1 and perhaps denies him1 he has ,god in his understanding1 in his ideas1 in all that he is1 in all that he thinks2 the power of perception communicates ,god to him2 objective truth is founded on ,god2 he cannot affirm a single truth without affirming a thing represented in ,god4 ,this intimate communication of the finite with the infinite1 is one of the most certain truths of metaphysics4 ,although ideological investigations should produce no other result than the discovery of so important a truth1 we ought to consider the time spent in them well improved4 ,,chapter ,,xxviii4 ,,observations ,,on ,,the ,,relation ,,of ,,language ,,to ,,ideas4 #age4 ,the relation between thought and language is one of the most important ideological phenomena4 ,when we speak we think2 and when we think we speak with an internal language4 ,the understanding needs speech as a kind of guiding thread in the labyrinth of ideas4 #agf4 ,the connection of ideas by a sign seems necessary4 ,the most universal and most convenient of these signs is language2 but we must not forget that it is an arbitrary sign1 as is proved by the variety of words used in different languages to express the same idea4 #agg4 ,the phenomenon of the relation of ideas to language originates in the necessity of perpetuating ideas by determinate signs2 and the importance of speech results from its being the most general1 most convenient1 and most flexible sign4 ,and hence it is that when these circumstances can be united in another sign1 the same object is attained4 ,physically speaking1 written language is very different from language spoken2 nevertheless1 in very many cases it answers equally well4 #agh4 ,the internal language is1 sometimes1 rather a reflection in which the idea is enlarged and developed1 than an expression of it4 ,true1 we do not ordinarily think without speaking inwardly2 but as we have already observed1 speech is an arbitrary sign1 and consequently we cannot establish a perfectly exact parallel between ideas and the internal language4 #agi4 ,we think with instantaneousness1 which defies the succession of words1 however rapid we may suppose them to be4 ,it is true that the internal language is far more rapid than the external2 but it always involves succession1 and requires a greater or less time1 according to the words to be spoken4 ,this observation is important1 lest we too greatly exaggerate the relation of ideas to speech4 ,language is certainly a wonderful channel for the communication of ideas1 and a powerful auxiliary of our understanding2 but we can1 without ignoring these qualities1 take care to avoid that exaggeration which seems to pronounce all thought impossible1 if some word thought does not correspond to it4 #ahj4 ,we experience often enough the instantaneous occurrence of a multitude of ideas1 which we afterwards develop in our discourse4 ,we see this in those quick and lively replies excited by a word1 or a gesture1 which contradicts our opinions or wounds our feelings4 ,in replying1 it is impossible for us to speak inwardly1 since the instantaneousness with which we reply forbids it4 ,how often1 in listening to an argument1 do we instantly detect a fault1 which we could not explain with words without a long discourse8 ,how often1 in proposing a difficulty to ourselves1 do we catch its solution in an instant1 although we could not possibly explain it without many words8 ,how often do we at the very first glance discover the flaw in a proof1 the force of an argument1 or the ease with which it can be retorted upon the proposer of it1 and all this without occupying a moiety of the intervals necessary to either external or internal locution8 ,thus it happens that the sudden thought is not unfrequently expressed by a single gesture1 a glance of the eye1 a nod of the head1 a yes1 or a no1 an exclamation1 or any other similar sign2 all far more rapid than it is possible for the words expressive of our thought to be4 #aha4 ,let us illustrate this observation by a few examples4 ,some one says3 ,all men are naturally equal4 ,the sense of this proposition cannot be known until the word equal is pronounced4 ,how1 then1 is it that an enlightened and judicious man1 will1 by an instinctive impulse1 answer no1 will catch the word at the moment1 and refute the empty boast of the declaimer with a flow of reasons8 ,until after the word1 naturally the understanding remained in suspense2 there was nothing to show the meaning of the proposition1 since instead of equal1 might have been said weak1 mortal1 inconstant1 or any other such word2 but so soon as the word equal is pronounced1 the understanding says no1 without having had the time to use an internal or external locution4 ,the exact parallel which some suppose to exist between ideas and speech is1 therefore1 impossible2 and they who defend it are guilty of an exaggeration incompatible with experience4 ,another asserts1 justice to have no bounds but the limit of power4 ,all who have any idea of morality1 at once answer no3 do they1 forsooth1 need an inward locution8 ,true1 in order to explain what is expressed by this no1 and upon what it is based1 many words are required1 and that to reflect upon the proposition one must speak in inwardly2 but this is all independent of that intellectual act1 signified by the no1 and which would have been still more briefly expressed had it been possible4 ,another yet may say3 ,if this fact be attested by the senses1 it will be true2 and if it be true1 it will be attested by the senses4 ,the hearer assents to the former part1 but rests in suspense as to the latter part until the word attest is pronounced4 ,then an instantaneous no leaps from his lips1 or is expressed by a negative gesture4 ,does any interior locution precede8 ,none1 for none is possible4 ,the following would be the words expressive of this act3 ,it is not true that every fact must be attested by the senses2 since many facts are true1 which do not belong to the sphere of sensibility4 ,let us examine whether or not these words are compatible with the instantaneousness of the no4 #ahb4 ,it will1 perhaps1 be objected1 that the negation is one thing1 and the reason of the negation another3 that the simple no suffices for the former1 and that it is only for the latter that more words are needed4 ,but this is an equivocation4 ,when the no was said1 it was said for a reason1 and this reason was the sight of the inconsequence then expressed by the words4 ,otherwise it would be necessary to admit the negative to be a blind judgment1 and given without a reason4 ,this being so1 this reason founded upon the judgment1 although expressed in the most laconical mode possible1 would require some words1 to form which1 either interiorly or exteriorly1 there has been no time4 ,there is a question of calculation4 ,he who hears the proposition cannot know the meaning of it1 until the word attest is pronounced1 and the sentence brought to a full stop4 ,before reaching the word attest1 the sense of the proposition was unknown2 it was not possible to form any judgment1 since instead of saying1 ,if it be true the senses will attest it1 he might have said1 ,if it be true the senses will not belie it4 ,we have spoken of the full stop1 in order to show the instantaneousness of the perception and of the judgment1 which proves that the understanding does not determine until the last moment4 ,but let us suppose the same word attest to have been used indeed1 but instead of a full stop1 to have been followed by these other words1 if this fact falls under their jurisdiction4 ,the words are the same1 and yet they do not provoke a negative judgment2 and why8 ,simply because the speaker continued4 ,if he had ceased speaking1 or had used an inflection of voice indicative of a period1 the no would have risen like a flash4 ,a comma or a period in writing1 produce the same effect as a pause or an inflection of the voice in speaking4 ,when we see these signs1 we judge instantaneously1 with a velocity incomparably greater than any internal or external locution4 ,it would be easy to multiply examples showing the superiority of thought to speech1 so far as rapidity is concerned2 but those already adduced seem to us sufficient to prove that there is some exaggeration in saying that man before speaking his thought1 thinks his words1 if it be understood that all thought is impossible without a word thought4 ,,chapter ,,xxix4 ,,origin ,,and ,,character ,,of ,,the ,,relation ,,between ,,language ,,and ,,ideas4 #ahc4 ,many ideas seem to be like sensations and sentiments2 simple facts1 incapable of decomposition1 for which reason we cannot explain them with words4 ,words illustrate ideas2 but do they not sometimes also confuse them8 ,when we speak of an idea1 we reflect upon it1 and ,i have already remarked#aa that the reflective force of our perceptive ideas is much inferior to their direct force4 #aa ,see ,book ,i41 ,chs4 ,,iii4 and ,,xxiii4 #ahd4 ,we have sometimes thought that we do1 perhaps1 know things which we imagine we do not know1 and that we are ignorant of things we think we know4 ,it is certain that disputes have been had in all schools of philosophy upon many ideas1 without attaining any satisfactory result2 and yet these ideas ought to be sufficiently clear to our mind1 since we all use them every day without any equivocation4 ,philosophers have not1 as yet1 been able to agree upon the ideas of space and time1 but the most ignorant men1 nevertheless1 make use of these words1 and whenever the necessity occurs1 apply them with exactness4 ,this seems to prove that the difficulty is not in the idea but in its explanation4 #ahe4 ,it has been remarked that there is great truth and exactness in ordinary language1 so much so1 that the careful observer is astonished at the recondite wisdom hidden in a language2 to see how great1 how various1 and how delicate are the gradations into which the sense of words is distributed4 ,this is not the fruit of reflection2 it is the work of reason operating directly1 and consequently making use of ideas without reflecting upon them4 #ahf4 ,in ideological investigations some idea of the idea is sought1 and it is not noted that if this be necessary to science1 another idea of the other idea may be exacted1 and that thus an infinite process may be given4 ,it ought to be borne in mind that in treating of simple facts1 as well external as internal1 no other explanation of them can be demanded than an exposition4 #ahg4 ,idea-images are a font of error1 and probably all ideas explicable by words are not less so4 ,an idea-image induces the belief that there are in our mind no ideas but sensible representations1 and the supposition that every idea can be expressed by words1 makes us imagine that to be composite which is simple1 and attribute to the substance what belongs to the form4 #ahh4 ,a composite idea seems to be a union1 or rather a connected series of ideas1 which are either excited simultaneously1 or follow each other with great rapidity4 ,our understanding requires words to bind this collection1 to retain the thread which connects them2 and hence it is1 that when the idea is simple1 language is not indispensable4 ,it is said that speech is necessary in order to think1 it might sometimes be said with more propriety1 that it is necessary in order to recollect4 #ahi4 ,when the object occupying our attention is offered to the sensible intuition1 we have no need of speech4 ,we can1 when we reflect upon a right line1 an angle1 a triangle1 observe that their imaginary representation is all that we require1 and that we do not need to bind these objects together by words4 ,the same thing happens in thinking of unity1 or on the numbers two1 three1 and four1 which we easily represent to ourselves sensibly4 ,the necessity for speech begins when the imagination loses the distinct representation of objects1 and needs to combine various ideas4 ,did we not assign to a word the idea of a many-sided polygon1 we should be in the greatest confusion1 and it would be impossible for us to reason upon it4 #aij4 ,since1 on the one hand1 our perceptive faculties do not create their objects1 but are limited to the combining of them2 and1 on the other hand1 our perception is not capable of embracing many at one time1 it results that the exercise of our faculties is necessarily successive2 the unity of consciousness serving as the bond of union to our perceptions4 ,but consciousness has no other means of knowing what passes within it1 than to fix its operations by determinate signs1 whence flows the necessity of arbitrary signs1 which must be sensible1 by reason of the relation uniting our intelligence with the sensitive faculties3 and it is to be observed1 that for this reason1 every sign to which we assign an idea1 may be the object of one of the senses4 ,the great number and variety of ideas and their combinations1 require an exceedingly variable and flexible sign1 and this variety and flexibility require certain characters to simplify it1 and thus render its retention in the memory more easy1 whence the advantages of language3 in the midst of its astonishing variety it lays these characters in radical syllables4 ,the conjugation of a single verb alone offers us a considerable number of very different ideas1 the retention of which would be excessively difficult1 were they not joined by some tie such as the radical syllable3 as in the verb to speak1 the syllable speak4 ,we see this by the greater labor the irregular verbs cost us than do the regular verbs when learning a language3 and it may be remarked in children also1 who blunder on the irregularities4 ,we might compare language to the catalogue of a library1 which is the more perfect1 the more it unites simplicity with variety1 so as to designate exactly the classes of the books and the shelves whereon they are to be found4 #aia4 ,succession of ideas and operations2 here1 then1 originates the necessity of a sign by which to connect and recollect them3 relation of our understanding with the sensitive faculties1 is the reason why the signs must be sensible2 variety and simplicity of language constitutes its merit so far as the sign of ideas4#ab #ab ,see ,bk4 ,i41 ,ch4 ,,xxvi4 ,,chapter ,,xxx4 ,,innate ,,ideas4 #aib4 ,among the adversaries of innate ideas there exist profound differences4 ,the materialists maintain that man has received every thing through the senses1 in such a way as to make our understanding nothing more than the product of an organism which has been advancing in perfection1 just as a machine acquires1 by use1 a greater facility and delicacy of movement4 ,they suppose nothing but the faculty of sensation to pre-exist in the mind2 or1 to speak more correctly1 they admit no mind1 but only a corporeal being1 whose functions naturally produce what is called the intellectual development4 ,the sensists who do not attribute to matter the faculty of thinking1 do not admit innate ideas2 they confess the existence of the mind1 but concede to it non-sensitive faculties2 all that it owns must have come to it through the senses1 and it can be nothing else than a transformed sensation4 ,innate ideas counted other adversaries who were neither materialists nor sensists3 such were the scholastics1 who on the one hand defended the principle that there is nothing in the understanding which has not previously been in the senses2 but1 on the other hand1 combated both materialism and sensism4 ,the difference between the scholastics and the friends of innate ideas would not perhaps have been so great as it was supposed to be1 had the question been proposed in another manner4 #aic4 ,the scholastics regarded ideas as accidental forms1 in such a way that an understanding with ideas may be compared to a piece of canvas covered with figures4 ,the defenders of innate ideas said2 ,the figures already exist upon the canvas2 to see them we have only to raise the veil which covers them4 ,this explanation is somewhat forced1 since it openly contradicts experience1 which testifies3 first1 the necessity of the understanding being excited by sensations2 secondly1 the intellectual elaboration which we experience in thinking1 and which teaches us that there is within us a kind of production of ideas4 ,the canvas1 say the adversaries of innate ideas1 is all white1 and in proof witness the unceasing labor of the artist to cover it with figures4 ,but does their doctrine1 forsooth1 suppose that nothing exists before experience8 ,do they admit man to be the simple work of instruction1 of education8 ,do they maintain that our interior world is nothing more than a series of phenomena caused by impressions1 and that it would have been other than what it is1 had it had other impressions8 ,most certainly not4 ,they admit3 first1 an inward activity excited and improved by sensible experience3 secondly1 the necessity of first principles as well intellectual as moral3 thirdly1 an interior light1 to enable us to see them when presented1 and to assent to them by an irresistible necessity4 ,we find the words1 ,signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui ,domine1 cited upon every page of those authors4 #aid4 ,saint ,thomas says that first principles1 as well speculative as practical1 must be naturally communicated to us3 ,oportet igitur naturaliter nobis esse indita1 sicut principia speculabilium1 ita et principia operabilium4#ac ,in another place1 inquiring whether the soul knows immaterial things in their eternal reasons1 7in rationibus ternis17 he says that the intellectual light which is within us1 is nothing else than a certain participated likeness of the uncreated life1 in which the eternal reasons are contained3 ,ipsum enim lumen intellectuale1 quod est in nobis nihil est aliud1 quam qudam participata similitudo luminis increati1 in quo continentur rationes tern4#ad #ac ,p4 ,i41 ,q4 ,l4 ,,xxix4 ,a4 #ab4 #ad ,ib41 ,q4 ,l4 ,,xxxiv4 ,a4 #e4 #aie4 ,we find it1 in these passages1 expressly taught that there is within us something besides what we have acquired by experience1 in which point the scholastics all agree with the defenders of innate ideas4 ,the difference between them is this3 the former do not consider the intellectual light to suffice for knowledge1 if the forms or species upon which it may reflect are wanting2 the latter distinguish the light from the colors1 and them they make originate in the light itself4 #aif4 ,the question of innate ideas1 so warmly contested in the schools of philosophy1 would never have presented so great difficulties1 had it been stated with proper clearness4 ,to do this it was necessary to classify the inward phenomena called ideas in a corresponding manner1 and to determine with accuracy the sense of the word innate4 #aig4 ,according to what we have already said1 we hold that there are in our mind sensible representations2 intellectual action upon them1 or geometrical ideas2 ideas purely intellectual1 either intuitive or non-intuitive2 and general determinate and indeterminate ideas4 ,i will give examples of these cases that they may the better be understood4 ,a particular triangle is represented in our imagination2 here1 then1 is a sensible representation3 intellectual act perceiving the nature of the triangle considered in general2 here is a geometrical idea1 an idea relating to the sensible order3 cognition of one of our acts of understanding or will2 here is a pure and intuitive idea3 intelligence1 will1 conceived in general2 here is a general determinate idea3 substance2 here finally is a general indeterminate idea4#ae #ae ,see ,chs4 ,,xii4 and ,,xiii4 #aih4 ,what is understood by innate8 ,that which is not born1 which the mind possesses1 not acquired by its own labor1 nor by impressions coming from the exterior1 but by the immediate gift of the author of its nature2 the innate is opposed to the acquired1 and to inquire if there are innate ideas is to inquire if we have in our mind ideas1 before receiving any impressions or doing any act4 #aii4 ,it cannot be maintained that sensible representations are innate4 ,experience testifies that without the impressions of the organs we cannot have representations corresponding to them2 that once these are placed in action in a proper manner1 we cannot help experiencing them4 ,this is applicable to all sensations1 whether they be actual1 existing1 or only recollected4 ,they who undertake to maintain that sensible representations exist in our soul previously to all organic impressions1 also advance an opinion unsustainable either by facts of experience or by arguments a priori4 #bjj4 ,it is to be remarked1 that the argument founded upon the impossibility of the body's transmitting impressions to the mind1 proves nothing in favor of the opinion we combat4 ,even were the argument conclusive1 the necessity of innate ideas could not thence be inferred1 since the physical non-communication of the body and the mind would be saved in the system of occasional causes1 and it could at the same time be argued that there are no pre-existing ideas1 but that they have been caused in the presence1 and on occasion of organic affections4 #bja4 ,ideas relative to sensible representations seem to consist1 not in forms of the understanding1 but in its acts exercised upon these same representations4#af #af ,see ,ch4 ,,xx4 ,to call these ideas innate is to contradict experience1 and even to ignore their nature4 ,these acts cannot be performed if the object1 which is the sensible representation be wanting2 and this does not exist without an impression of the corporeal organs4 ,to call these ideas innate1 has then1 either no meaning at all1 or can mean nothing else than the pre-existence of the intellectual activity1 subsequently developed in the presence of sensible intuitions4 #bjb4 ,neither can those intuitive ideas1 not referable to sensibility1 such as are those we have when reflecting upon the acts of understanding and will1 be innate4 ,what in this case serves as the idea1 is the very same act of the understanding or of the will which is presented to our perception in consciousness3 to say1 then1 that these ideas are innate is equivalent to saying that these acts exist before they exist4 ,even when the perception does not refer to present acts1 but to past acts now recollected1 the argument retains the same force3 for it can have no recollection of them if they have not previously existed1 since our acts cannot exist before we have performed them4 #bjc4 ,hence it may be inferred that no intuitive idea is innate1 since intuition supposes an object presented to the faculty of perception4 #bjd4 ,general determinate ideas are those which refer to an intuition3 they cannot1 therefore1 exist before it3 and since1 on the other hand1 intuition is impossible without an act1 it follows that these ideas cannot be innate4 #bje4 ,last of all remain general indeterminate ideas1 that is to say1 those which of themselves alone offer to the mind1 nothing either existing or possible4#ag ,if we observe carefully the nature of these ideas1 we shall see that they are nothing else than perceptions of one aspect of an object considered under a general reason4 ,it cannot be doubted1 that one of the characteristics of intelligence is the perception of these aspects2 and it is no less indubitable1 that it does not thence follow1 that we must imagine these ideas to a kind of forms pre-existing in our mind1 and distinct from the acts by which it exercises its perceptive faculty4 ,we do not see what ground there can be for affirming these ideas to be innate1 and to have lain hidden in our mind previously to the development of all activity1 just like things stowed away in the corners of a museum1 closed however to the curiosity of spectators4 #ag ,see ,ch4 ,,xxi4 #bjf4 ,instead of abandoning ourselves to similar suppositions1 it would seem that we ought to recognize in the mind an innate activity1 subject to the laws imposed upon it by its ,creator1 the infinite intelligence4 ,even granting ideas to be distinct from perceptive acts1 it is not necessary to admit them as pre-existing4 ,true1 that in such a case it would be necessary to recognize in the mind a faculty productive of the representative species1 from which1 however1 we should not escape by identifying ideas with perceptions4 ,these last are acts springing1 so to speak1 from the very bottom of our soul1 and which appear and disappear like the flowers of a plant3 and thus we must in every way recognize in ourselves a power which in due circumstances will not fail to produce what before did not exist4 ,without this it is impossible to form any idea of what activity is4 #bjg4 ,resuming the doctrine thus far delivered upon innate ideas1 we can reduce it to a formula in the following manner3 ,i4 ,there are in us sensitive faculties which are developed by organic impressions1 either as cause or occasion4 ,,ii4 ,we perceive nothing by the senses not subject to the laws of organism4 ,,iii4 ,internal sensible representations cannot be formed of other elements than those furnished by sensations4 ,,iv4 ,whatever is said concerning the pre-existence of sensible representations to organic impressions1 besides being said without any reason1 is in contradiction with experience4 ,v4 ,geometrical ideas1 or ideas relating to sensible intuitions1 are not innate2 since they are the acts of the understanding which operates upon materials provided by the sensibility4 ,,vi4 ,intuitive ideas of the intellectual order are not innate1 because they are nothing else than the acts of the understanding or will1 presented to our perception in reflex consciousness4 ,,vii4 ,general determinate ideas are not innate1 since they are the representation of intuitions1 upon which some act has of necessity been performed4 ,,viii4 ,there is no ground of affirming that general indeterminate ideas1 which seem to be acts of the faculty perceptive of objects under a general reason1 are innate4 ,,ix4 ,all that there is of innate in our mind is sensitive and intellectual activity2 but both to be put into motion1 require objects to affect them4 ,x4 ,the development of this activity begins with organic affections2 and although it goes far beyond the sphere of sensibility1 it always remains more or less subject to the conditions imposed by the union of the soul and body4 ,,xi4 ,the intellectual activity has a priori conditions totally independent of sensibility1 and applicable to all objects1 no matter what impressions may have been their cause4 ,the principle of contradiction figures as the first among these conditions4 ,,xii4 ,there is then in our mind something a priori and absolute1 which cannot be altered1 even although all the impressions we receive from objects be totally varied1 nor if all the relations we have with them were to undergo a radical change4 ,,book ,,fifth4 ,,idea ,,of ,,being4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,,idea ,,of ,,being4 #a4 ,there is in our understanding the idea of being4 ,independent of sensations1 and in an order far superior to them1 there exist ideas in our understanding1 which extend to1 and are a necessary element of all thought4 ,the idea of being1 or of ens1 holds the first rank among these4 ,when the scholastics said that the object of the understanding was being1 objectum intellectus est ens1 they enunciated a profound truth1 and pointed out one of the most certain and important of all ideological facts4 #b4 ,being1 or ens in se1 abstracted from all modification and determination1 is1 considered in its greatest generality1 conceived by our understanding4 ,whatever may be the origin of this idea1 or the mode of its formation in our understanding1 certain it is that it exists4 ,it is of continual application1 and without it it is almost impossible for us to think4 ,the verb to be1 expressive of this idea1 is found in every language3 in every discourse1 even in the simplest1 we meet this expression3 the learned and the ignorant1 alike1 continually employ it in the same sense1 and with equal facility4 ,the only difference1 as to the use of this idea1 between the rustic and the philosopher1 is1 that the one does1 the other does not1 reflect upon it3 but the direct perception is the same in both1 equally clear in all cases4 ,such a thing is or is not2 was or was not2 will be or will not be2 there is something or nothing2 we had or did not have2 we shall have or shall not have1 are all applications of the idea of being1 applications made alike by all persons1 without the least shadow of obscurity2 all comprehend perfectly well the sense of these words1 and the mind consequently has the idea corresponding to them4 ,the difficulty1 if any there be1 begins with the reflex act1 in the perception1 not of being1 but of the idea of being4 ,so far as the direct act is concerned1 the conception is so perfectly clear as to leave nothing to be desired4 #c4 ,experience teaches this1 but it can also be proved by conclusive arguments4 ,all philosophers agree that the principle of contradiction is evident of itself to all men1 that it needs no application1 to understand the sense of the words sufficing2 which could not be true did not all men have the idea of being4 ,the principle is1 that it is impossible for a thing to be1 and not to be at same time4 ,here1 then1 is no question of any thing determinate2 neither of body nor of mind1 of substance nor of accidents1 of infinite nor of finite1 but of being1 of a thing1 whatever it may be1 in its greatest generality2 of which it is affirmed that it cannot both be and not be at the same time4 ,had we no idea of being1 the principle would mean nothing3 contradiction is inconceivable when we have no idea of the contradicting extremes1 and here the extremes are being and not-being4 #d4 ,the same is seen in another principle1 closely resembling1 if not identical with1 that of contradiction3 every thing either is or is not4 ,here1 also1 there is question of being in its greatest indeterminateness1 considered only as being1 as nothing more4 ,without the idea of being1 the axiom could have no meaning4 #e4 ,the principle of ,descartes1 ,i think1 therefore ,i am1 also includes the idea of being3 ,i am4 ,when he undertakes to explain it1 this philosopher relies upon the fact that what is not1 cannot act2 thus the idea of being enters not only into the principle of ,descartes1 but is even the foundation upon which he rests it4 #f4 ,whether we make the inward sense the basis of our cognitions1 or prefer the evidence by which one idea is contained in another1 it is always necessary to make the idea of being a primary element2 we must suppose the understanding to be before it can think2 we must suppose thought to be before we can make use of it2 we must suppose our sensations and sentiments1 the operations and affections of our souls1 to be1 before we can investigate their causes1 their origin1 and inquire into their nature2 we must suppose ourselves to be1 that we are1 before we can advance one step in any sense4 ,the idea of being does then exist in our mind1 and is an element indispensable to all intellectual acts4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,simplicity ,,and ,,indeterminateness ,,of ,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,being4 #g4 ,nothing can be conceived more simple than the idea of being4 ,it cannot be composed of elements4 ,it allows of nothing determinate1 since it is in itself absolutely indeterminate4 ,the instant that something determinate is made to enter it1 it is in a manner destroyed2 it is no longer the idea of being1 but of such a being2 an idea applied1 but not the idea of the being in all its generality4 #h4 ,how shall we make it understood what we would express by the word being1 or ens8 ,if we say that it comprises all1 even the most unlike and opposite things1 there is no reason why it may not be understood what it is4 ,to join to the idea of being any determination1 is to introduce into it a heterogeneous element1 which in no manner belongs to it1 and can only accompany it as a pure aggregation1 but can never combine with it1 without rendering it what it is not4 ,if the idea of subsistence be combined with that of being1 we no longer have the pure idea of being1 but that of subsistence4 #i4 ,the idea of being is then most simple2 it cannot be resolved into elements1 and cannot consequently spring from speech1 unless as from an exciting cause4 ,if we be asked1 for example1 what we understand by substance1 by modification1 cause or effect1 we explain it by uniting to the idea of being that of subsistence or inherence1 that of productive force1 or of a thing produced2 but it is impossible for us to explain being1 otherwise than by itself4 ,we may make use of the words1 something1 what is1 reality1 and the like1 but all these are inadequate to explain the thing itself2 they are but the efforts we make to excite in the understanding of others the idea we contemplate in our own4 ,if we would give further explanations by showing how the idea corresponding to the word being1 is applicable to every thing1 and in order to do this enumerate the different classes of being1 applying the idea to them all1 we only succeed in showing the use of the idea and the applications of which it is susceptible2 but we do not decompose it4 ,we say1 indeed1 that there is in all something corresponding to it1 but we do not decompose this something2 we only point it out4 #aj4 ,from this we infer that the idea of being is not intuitive to us1 and that by its very indeterminateness it excludes all that a determinate object can offer to our perception4 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,substantive ,,and ,,copulative ,,being4 #aa4 ,for the more thorough understanding of this matter1 it will be well to distinguish between the absolute and relative ideas of being2 that is between what is expressed by the word being1 when it designates reality1 simple existence1 and when it marks the union of a predicate and its subject4 ,in the two following propositions we see very closely the different meaning of the word is2 ,peter is2 ,peter is good4 ,in the former the word is designates the reality of ,peter1 or his existence2 in the latter1 it expresses the union of the predicate good with the subject ,peter4 ,in the former the verb to be is substantive1 in the latter it is copulative4 ,the substantive simply expresses the existence2 the copulative a determination1 a mode of existing4 ,the desk is1 signifies the simple existence of the desk2 the desk is high1 expresses a mode of being1 height4 #ab4 ,purely substantive being1 is nowhere met with1 except in the following proposition3 being is1 or what is is2 in all other propositions there is involved1 even in the subject itself1 some predicate which determines the mode4 ,when we say1 the desk is1 notwithstanding that the direct predicate of the proposition is the word is1 there yet enters into the subject desk a determination of the being of which we speak1 and that is of a being which is a desk4 ,we were1 then1 right in saying that the verb to be1 in its purely substantive meaning1 is met with in no other proposition than this3 being is4 ,this is perfectly identical1 absolutely necessary and convertible1 that is1 the predicate may be observed of all subjects1 and the subject of all predicates4 ,suppose we give the proposition a different form2 being is existing2 we can still say all being is existing1 or the existing is being2 that is1 all that exists is being4 #ac4 ,if it be objected that possible being does not exist1 we answer that purely possible being is not1 strictly speaking1 being2 but that it does exist1 in the same mode in which it is1 that is1 in the possible order4 ,as we shall1 however1 treat this question more fully hereafter1 we now turn to the propositions in which being is copulative4 ,the desk is1 is equivalent to this1 the desk is existing4 ,it is true that every real desk is existing1 but real is the same as existing2 and thus it might1 in one sense1 be said that the proposition resembles this other3 all being is4 ,but here we detect a difference2 it consists in this1 that the idea of existence does not necessarily enter into that of desk1 for we can conceive of a desk which does not exist1 but we cannot conceive of a being as such without a being1 that is1 of a being which is not being4 ,a very notable difference is every way perceptible between the two propositions2 in the former1 the subject may be affirmed of all predicates by saying1 all that is existing is being2 but it is evident that we cannot say all that is existing is desk4 #ad4 ,the reason of this is that the proposition1 being is1 is absolutely identical2 it is the expression of a pure conception reduced to the form of a proposition2 and1 consequently1 the terms which serve as extremes may be taken indiscriminately the one for the other2 being is1 whatever is1 is being2 being is existing2 every thing existing is being4 ,but different orders of ideas are combined in all other propositions2 and1 although the common idea of being is applicable to all1 as this idea is essentially indeterminate1 it does not thence follow that one of the things to which the general idea corresponds is identical with the other1 alike entering into the same general idea4 ,being belongs to every existing desk2 but not1 therefore1 is every thing a desk4 #ae4 ,copulative being may be applied without the substantive2 thus when we say that the ellipse is curvilinear1 we abstract both the existence and non-existence of any one ellipse2 and the proposition would be true although no ellipse at all were to exist4 ,the reason is that the verb to be1 when copulative1 expresses the relation of two ideas4 #af4 ,this relation is of identity1 but in such a way that more than the union of the two is needed before a predicate can be affirmed of a subject4 ,the head is united to the man1 but it cannot1 therefore1 be said1 man is his head2 the sensibility is united to the reason in the same man1 but we cannot say1 sensibility is reason2 whiteness is in union with the wall1 but we cannot say the wall is whiteness4 ,the affirmation1 then1 of a predicate expresses the relation of identity1 and this is why1 when this identity does not exist with respect to the predicate in the abstract1 it is expressed in the concrete1 in order that something involving identity may enter into it4 ,the wall is whiteness3 this proposition is false1 because it affirms an identity which does not exist2 the wall is white3 this proposition is true1 because white means something which has whiteness1 and the wall is really something which has whiteness2 here1 then1 is the identity which the proposition affirms4#ah #ah ,see ,bk4 ,i41 ,chs4 ,,xxxvi41 ,,xxvii41 and ,,xviii4 #ag4 ,the predicate is1 then1 in every affirmative proposition1 identified with the subject4 ,when we perceive1 therefore1 we affirm the identity4 ,judgment1 then1 is the perception of the identity4 ,we do not1 however1 deny that in what we call assent there is often something more than the simple perception of identity2 but we do not understand how we need any thing more than to see it evidently in order to assent to it4 ,what we call assent1 adhesion of the understanding1 seems to be a kind of metaphor1 as if the understanding would adhere1 would yield itself to the truth1 if it were presented2 but in reality we very much doubt if1 with respect to what is evident1 there be any thing but perception of the identity4 #ah4 ,hence it follows1 that if the same ideas were to correspond in the very same manner to the same words1 the opposition and diversity of judgments in different understandings would be impossible4 ,when1 then1 this diversity or opposition does exist1 there is always a discrepancy in the ideas4 #ai4 ,we conceive of things1 and reason upon them abstracted from their existence or non-existence2 or we even suppose them not to exist1 that is1 conceive of relations between predicates and subjects without the existence of either predicates or subjects4 ,and as all contingent beings may either be or cease to be1 and even the first moment of their being be designated1 it follows that science1 or the knowledge of the nature and relations of beings1 founded upon certain and evident principles1 has nothing contingent for its object inasmuch as it exists4 ,there is1 then1 an infinite world of truths beyond contingent reality4 ,we conclude1 from our reflections upon this1 that there must be beyond the contingent world a necessary being in which may be founded that necessary truth which is the object of science4 ,science cannot have nothing for its object2 but contingent beings1 if we abstract their existence1 are pure nothing4 ,there can be no essence1 no properties1 no relations in what is pure nothing2 something therefore is necessary whereon to base the necessary truth of those natures1 properties1 and relations which the understanding conceives of in contingent beings themselves4 ,there is1 then1 a ,god2 and to deny him1 is to make science a pure illusion4 ,the unity of human reason furnishes us one proof of this truth2 the necessity of human science furnishes a second1 and confirms the first4#ai #ai ,see ,bk4 ,,iv41 ,ch4 ,,xxiii4 to ,ch4 ,,xxvii4 #bj4 ,we find a conditional proposition involved in every necessary proposition1 wherein substantive being is not affirmed nor denied1 but the relative1 as in this2 all the diameters of a circle are equal4 ,thus1 the one we have just cited is equivalent to this one2 if there exists a circle all its diameters are equal4 ,for in reality did no circle exist1 there would be no diameters1 no equality1 or any thing else2 nothing can have no properties2 wherefore in all that is thus affirmed we must understand the condition of its existence4 #ba4 ,in general propositions the union conceived of two objects is affirmed2 but we must take good care to notice that although we are wont to say that what is affirmed is the union of two ideas2 this is not1 therefore1 perfectly exact4 ,when we assert that all the diameters of a circle are equal1 we do not mean that this is so only in ideas1 that we conceive it so to be1 but that it really is so1 beyond our own understanding and in reality1 and this abstracting our ideas and even our own existence4 ,our understanding sees then a relation1 a union of the objects2 and it affirms that whenever these exist1 there will also really exist the union1 provided the conditions under which the object is conceived be fulfilled4 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,being1 ,,the ,,object ,,of ,,the ,,understanding1 ,,is ,,not ,,the ,,possible1 ,,inasmuch ,,as ,,possible4 #bb4 ,one very important point concerning the idea of being remains to be illustrated1 and that is1 whether this idea has possible or real being for its object4 ,the scholastics taught that the object of the understanding was being2 nor were they altogether without reason in so doing1 since one of the things we conceive of with the greatest distinctness1 and which is found to be the most fundamental in all our ideas1 is the idea of being1 containing as it does in a certain manner all other ideas4 ,but as being is distinguished into actual and possible1 a difficulty occurs as to which of these categories the idea of being1 the chief object of our understanding1 is applicable to4 #bc4 ,the ,abbate ,rosmini1 in his ,nuovo ,saggio sull' origine delle idee1 pretends that the form and the light of our understanding1 and the origin of all our ideas1 consists in the idea1 not of real1 but of possible being4 ,the simple idea of being1 he says1 is not the perception of any existing thing1 but the intuition of some possible thing2 it is no more than the idea of the possibility of the thing4#bj #bj ,sec4 #e1 ,p4 #a1 ,c4 #c1 ,a4 #a1 #b4 ,i very much doubt the truth of this2 and there seems also to be some confusion of ideas here4 ,he ought to have defined possibility itself for us1 before making the idea of it enter into that of being4 ,i will myself give a definition of it1 and this may serve greatly to facilitate the understanding of the whole matter4 #bd4 ,what is possibility8 ,the idea of possibility1 abstracted from its classifications1 offers us a general idea of the non-repugnance1 or non-exclusion1 of two things with respect to each other2 just as the idea of impossibility presents us such a repugnance or exclusion4 ,a triangle cannot be a circle4 ,a triangle may be equilateral4 ,in the former case we affirm the repugnance of the ideas of the triangle and of the circle3 in the latter1 the non-repugnance of a triangle having its three sides equal4 ,it may be said that in these cases there is no question of the existence of the triangle or of the circle2 and that the possibility or impossibility is referred to the repugnance of their essences1 abstracted from their existence or non-existence1 although ideal impossibility draws along with it real impossibility4 #be4 ,since1 whenever impossibility is asserted1 repugnance also1 is asserted1 and there can be no repugnance of a thing with itself1 it follows that impossibility is only possible when two or more ideas are compared4 ,on the other hand1 when there is no repugnance there is possibility2 then1 no simple idea1 of itself alone1 can offer to us an impossible object4 ,the object1 therefore1 of every simple idea is always possible1 that is1 is not repugnant4 #bf4 ,those things only are intrinsically impossible which involve the being and the not-being of the same thing2 wherefore they are styled contradictory4 ,when an absurdity of this nature is presented to us1 we at once recollect the principle of contradiction1 and say1 this cannot be1 since it would be and would not be at the same time4 ,why is a circular triangle impossible8 ,because it would be and it would not be a triangle at one and the same time4 ,the idea of not-being does then enter into that of impossibility3 without it1 there can be no exclusion of being1 and consequently1 neither contradiction nor impossibility4 #bg4 ,possibility may be understood in two ways3 ,i41 inasmuch as it expresses only simple non-repugnance2 and then what does not exist1 is not only possible when it does not involve any contradiction1 but also1 the existing1 the actual2 ,,ii41 inasmuch as it expresses non-repugnance1 united to the idea of not being realized2 and then it is only applicable to non-existing things4 ,the possible taken in the former sense1 is opposed to the impossible2 in the latter1 it is opposed to the existing2 it involves1 however1 the condition of non-repugnance4 ,in the former case we have possibility simply so called2 in the second1 pure possibility4 ,from these remarks we conclude that the idea of possibility adds something to that of being1 that is1 non-repugnance1 non-exclusion2 and if there be question of pure possibility1 the non-existence of the possible being is likewise added4 #bh4 ,when the understanding perceives being in itself1 it cannot distinguish whether there is or is not repugnance2 this is only discoverable by comparison2 for the idea of being1 in itself simple1 does not include comparable terms4 ,the idea of being can encounter no repugnance if it be not applied to some determinate thing1 to an essence in which contradictory conditions are imagined1 as may be verified by seeking to apply being to a circular triangle4 #bi4 ,so far is the idea of being in itself from being susceptible of abstraction from the idea of existence1 that it is rather the idea itself of existence4 ,when we conceive of being1 in all its abstractness1 we conceive of nothing else than of existence2 these two words denote one and the same idea4 #cj4 ,we can1 in determinate things1 conceive of the essence without existence2 thus also we can very easily consider all imaginable geometrical figures and examine their properties and relations1 abstracted from their existence or non-existence2 but the idea of being1 as something absolutely indeterminate1 if it be abstracted from existence1 is also abstracted from itself1 is annihilated4 ,i should be much obliged to any one who would tell me to what the idea of being in general corresponds1 abstracted from existence4 ,if1 after abstracting all determination1 we also abstract being itself1 what remains8 ,some one may answer1 there remains a thing which may be4 ,what does a thing mean8 ,in case we abstract every thing determinate1 thing can only signify a being2 we should have a thing which may be1 and this is equivalent to a being which may be4 ,this is very well3 but when we speak of a being which may be1 is there only a question of an impure possibility8 then we do not abstract existence1 and the conditions of the supposition are not kept4 ,is there question of pure possibility8 then existence is denied1 and the proposition is equivalent to this3 a being which is not1 but which involves no repugnance4 ,let us examine the meaning of this expression3 a being which is not4 ,what does the subject1 a being1 mean8 a thing1 or rather1 that which is4 ,what does a thing mean8 a being3 then abstraction is made from every thing determinate4 ,therefore1 either the subject of the proposition means nothing1 or the proposition is absurd1 since it is equivalent to this1 a thing which is1 which is not1 but which involves no repugnance4 #ca4 ,the origin of the equivocation we combat consists in applying to the idea itself of being that which belongs only to things that are something determinate1 conceivable without existence4 ,pure being1 in all its abstractness1 is inconceivable without actual being1 it is existence itself4 #cb4 ,nor does pure possibility mean any thing except in order to existence4 ,what is possible being if it cannot be realized1 cannot exist8 ,the idea of being is therefore independent of the idea of possibility2 and the latter is only applicable in relation to the former4 #cc4 ,the idea1 then1 of being is the very idea of existence1 of realization4 ,if we conceive of pure being1 without mixture or modification1 and subsisting in itself1 we conceive of the infinite1 we conceive of ,god3 but if we consider the idea of being as participated in a contingent manner1 by application to finite things1 we then conceive of their actuality or realization4 #cd4 ,when we apply the idea of being to things1 we have no intention of applying to them that of possibility1 but that of reality4 ,if we say the desk is1 we affirm of the subject desk the predicate contained in the idea of being3 and still we do not mean to say that the desk is possible1 but that it really exists4 #ce4 ,nevertheless1 the idea of being excludes that of not-being1 in such a way that if the idea of being were only of the possible1 it would not exclude that of not-being1 since the purely possible even includes not-being2 possibility1 therefore1 does not enter into the sole idea of being2 and this idea expresses simply existence1 reality4 ,,chapter ,v4 ,a ,,difficulty ,,solved4 #cf4 ,what means the idea of purely possible being8 ,if we maintain that the object of the idea of being is reality1 these two ideas1 being1 and purely possible1 would seem to be contradictory3 reality is not purely possible1 for were it purely possible1 it would not exist1 and in the non-existing there is no reality4 ,let us examine this difficulty1 and investigate the origin of the idea of pure possibility4 #cg4 ,surrounded as we are by contingent beings1 contingent beings ourselves1 we are incessantly aware of the destruction of some1 and the production of others1 that is to say1 of the transition from being to not-being1 and from not-being to being4 ,our inward sense attests to us this transition from not-being to being2 we have ourselves experienced it2 all our recollections are limited to a very brief term1 before which the world already existed4 ,thus1 then1 reason1 experience1 and inward sense show us that there are some objects which are1 and then disappear1 and that others1 which before were not1 now appear4 ,in those things in which we witness this change1 we perceive properties and relations which give occasion to a certain combination of our ideas1 and this combination subsists whether the objects to which they refer continue or cease to exist4 ,in this way we form a general idea of things which1 although they do not exist1 may exist2 but this subject things1 does not express being1 but in general finite1 determinate objects4 #ch4 ,here1 then1 is the solution of the difficulty4 ,purely possible being1 such as we conceive it to be in the manner explained1 involves no contradiction2 it does not denote a reality which is not a reality1 but an object1 or a finite1 determinate thing1 the idea of which we have1 although it do not exist1 and whose existence involves no contradiction1 or repugnance with any of the conditions contained in its idea4 ,the expression1 then1 purely possible being1 if it be explained in this manner1 is nothing more than the generalization of these and other similar propositions4 ,a desk which is not is possible4 ,what do we mean by this8 ,simply that in the idea of desk there is nothing repugnant to its existing2 and purely possible being signifies nothing more than that we have many ideas of finite things which may exist without repugnance4 ,the expression refers to determinate things conceived of by us1 but we abstract in this case whether this or that be the essence of which we speak1 and comprise all those which offer no repugnance4 #ci4 ,if it be objected that an infinite1 non-existing being would then be a contradictory thing1 we admit it without hesitation4 ,if an infinite being do not exist it is an absurdity2 and if1 when we compare these two ideas1 infinity and non-existence1 we do not see the repugnance between them with perfect clearness1 it is because we do not comprehend the nature of infinity4 ,this is the only reason why the demonstration of the existence of ,god founded simply on his idea1 has been and still is exposed to difficulties4 ,but it is certain that if the infinite being did not exist1 it would be impossible4 ,for that is impossible which cannot exist2 and did it not already exist it could not exist4 ,this existence could not come from another1 since the infinite cannot be a being produced2 nor from itself1 since it would not exist4 ,we do1 it is true1 imagine the infinite in its essence1 abstracted from its existence2 but ,i repeat that this abstraction is only possible to us because we cannot well comprehend the infinite2 could we comprehend it1 we should see the repugnance between these terms1 infinity and non-existence1 with the same clearness as we see that of the triangle and circle4 ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,in ,,what ,,sense ,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,being ,,is ,,the ,,form ,,of ,,the ,,understanding4 #dj4 ,when it is asserted that the object of the understanding is being1 there is room to doubt whether it is meant that the idea of being is the general form of all conceptions1 or only that all the understanding conceives is being2 or1 in other words1 whether the quality of object is attributed to being1 as being1 in such a way that under this form alone objects are conceivable1 or only that the quality of being belongs to all that the understanding conceives4 ,in the first case the proposition might be taken in a reduplicative sense1 and would then be equivalent to this3 ,the understanding conceives nothing save inasmuch as it is being2 in the second it might be taken formally1 and be equivalent to this3 whatever the understanding conceives is being4 #da4 ,we are of opinion that it cannot be said that the object of the understanding is being only inasmuch as being2 in such a way as to make the idea of being the only form of the understanding's conceiving2 but that this form is an essential condition to all perception4 #db4 ,if we remark that the idea of being1 in itself considered1 neither includes any determination or variety1 nor expresses any thing more than being1 in its greatest abstractness1 we shall not fail clearly to perceive that this idea of being is not the only form conceived by the understanding2 if1 therefore1 the understanding do not perceive any thing besides this idea in its objects1 it cannot know their differences2 nor can its perception go beyond that which is common to all1 being4 #dc4 ,if it be said that the differences perceived are modes of being1 modifications of that which is represented in the general idea1 it is at once agreed that being in itself is not the only form perceived2 since both modification and mode of being add something to the idea of being4 ,the rectangular triangle is a kind of triangle3 its idea is a modification of the general idea1 and no one will pretend that the idea of rectangular adds nothing to that of triangle1 or that they are both the same thing4 ,the same is verified in the idea of being and its modifications4 #dd4 ,we have already seen#ba that indeterminate ideas by themselves alone do not lead to positive cognitions2 and certainly no idea better merits the name of indeterminate than that of being4 ,were our understanding limited to it1 perception would be nothing but a vague conception1 incapable of any combination4 #ba ,see ,book ,,iv41 ,ch4 ,,xxi4 #de4 ,negation itself1 as we shall hereafter see1 is known to us1 but this it could not be were we to admit that the understanding knows nothing save inasmuch as it is being2 in which case the indispensable condition of all cognition1 the principle of contradiction1 would deceive us4 #df4 ,these reasons suffice to place beyond all doubt what we have proposed to show1 but as this point is intimately connected with what is most transcendental in logic and metaphysics1 we will endeavor to explain it more at large in the following chapter4 ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,,all ,,science ,,is ,,founded ,,in ,,the ,,postulate ,,of ,,existence4 #dg4 ,we have said that the idea of being is not the sole form perceived1 but that it is a form necessary to all perception4 ,we do not mean by this to say that we cannot perceive without the actually existing2 but that existence enters in some degree as a condition of every thing perceived4 ,we will explain ourselves4 ,when we simply perceive an object1 and affirm nothing of it1 it is always offered to us as a reality4 ,our idea certainly expresses something1 but it has nothing excepting reality4 ,even the perception of the essential relations of things involves the condition that they exist4 ,thus1 when we say that in the same circle or in equal circles equal arcs are subtended by equal chords1 we suppose impliedly this condition1 if a circle exists4 #dh4 ,since this manner of explaining the cognition of the essential relations of things may seem far-fetched1 we will endeavor to present it under the clearest possible point of view4 ,when we affirm or deny an essential relation of two things1 do we affirm or deny it of our own ideas or of the things8 ,clearly of the things1 not of our ideas4 ,if we say1 the ellipse is a curve1 we do not say this of our idea1 but of the object of our idea4 ,we are well aware that our ideas are not ellipses1 that there are none in our head1 and that when we reflect1 for example1 upon the orbit of the earth1 that this orbit is not within us4 ,of what1 then1 do we speak8 ,not of the idea1 but of its object2 not of what is in us1 but of what is without us4 #di4 ,nor do we mean that we see it thus1 but that it is thus2 when we say the circumference is greater than the diameter1 we do not mean that we see it thus1 but that it is thus4 ,so far are we from speaking of our idea1 that we should assert it to be true although we did not see it1 and even although it were not to exist4 ,we speak of our idea only when we doubt of its correspondence with the object2 then we do not speak of reality1 but of appearance1 and in such cases our language is admirably exact1 for we do not say1 it is1 but1 it seems to us4 #ej4 ,our affirmations and negations1 therefore1 refer to their objects4 ,now1 we argue thus3 what does not exist is pure nothing1 and nothing can either be affirmed or denied of nothing1 since it has no property or relation of any kind1 but is a pure negation of every thing2 therefore1 nothing can be affirmed or denied2 there can be no combination1 no comparison1 no perception1 except on condition of existence4 ,we say on condition1 because we know the properties and relations of many things which do not exist2 but in all that we do know of them1 this condition always enters3 if they exist4 #ea4 ,hence it follows that our science rests always on a postulate2 and we purposely use this mathematical expression in order to show that those sciences which are called exact by antonomasy do not disdain this condition which we exact from all science4 ,the greater part of them commence with this postulate3 ,let a line be drawn1 c41 ,suppose ,b to be a right angle1 c41 ,take a quantity ,a greater than ,b1 c4 ,this is the way the mathematician1 with all his rigor1 always supposes the condition of existence4 #eb4 ,it is necessary to suppose this existence1 otherwise nothing could be explained4 ,common sense teaches us what has escaped some metaphysicians4 ,to prove it1 let us see how a mathematician1 who never dipped into metaphysics1 would talk4 ,we will suppose the interlocutor to set out to demonstrate to us that in a rectangular triangle the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the base and perpendicular2 and that we1 in order to exercise his intelligence1 or rather to make him show us1 without himself being aware of it1 what is passing in his own mind with respect to the perception of its object1 put various questions to him1 in reality searching1 although apparently asked out of ignorance4 ,we will adopt the form of a dialogue for the sake of greater clearness1 and will suppose the demonstration to be given from memory1 without the aid of figures4 ,demonstration4 ,drop a perpendicular from the right angle to the hypothenuse4 ,where8 ,why1 in the triangle of which we speak1 of course4 ,but1 sir1 if there be no such triangle---- ,why then1 what are we talking of8 ,we are talking of a rectangular triangle1 and the case supposed is that there is none4 ,is not1 but can be4 ,take paper1 a pencil1 and ruler1 and we will have one right away4 ,that is to say1 you speak of the triangle we may make8 ,yes1 sir4 ,ah1 ,i understand2 but then we should have it2 now1 we have not got it4 ,all in good time4 ,but if we had drawn it1 could we not drop the perpendicular8 ,certainly4 ,that is all ,i meant to say4 ,but you were saying drop---- ,no doubt we cannot drop a perpendicular in a triangle unless the triangle exists1 since then there is neither vertex of a right angle1 hypothenuse1 nor any thing else2 but when ,i say1 drop a perpendicular1 ,i always suppose a triangle2 and as it is evident that the triangle may exist1 ,i do not express the supposition1 but understand it4 ,i comprehend this2 but then we should drop the perpendicular only in this triangle1 but you spoke as if we might drop it in all triangles4 ,i only took this triangle for an example2 we can clearly do with all others what we can do with this one4 ,with all8 ,certainly4 ,can you not see how1 in every rectangular triangle1 a perpendicular may be drawn from the right angle to the hypothenuse8 ,yes1 in your figure2 but since what is in my head is not a triangle1 for ,i imagine some with sides a thousand miles long1 and there is not in my head room enough-- ,there is no question of what is in your head1 but of triangles themselves-- ,but these triangles do not exist2 therefore1 we can say nothing of them4 ,yes2 but may they not exist8 ,who doubts it8 ,well then1 if they do exist1 be they large or small1 in one position or another1 here or there1 is it not true that a perpendicular may be drawn from the vertex of the right angle to the hypothenuse8 ,evidently4 ,i have then only to say that1 in every rectangular triangle1 this perpendicular may be drawn4 ,then you do not speak of those which do not exist8 ,is it not so8 ,i speak of all1 whether they do or do not exist4 ,but a perpendicular cannot be drawn in a triangle which does not exist4 ,what does not exist is nothing4 ,but perhaps that which does not exist may exist2 and ,i see with perfect clearness how every thing said would be verified1 supposing it to exist4 ,thus we can and do speak of all existences and non-existences without any exception4 ,we leave it to the reader to judge if we have not1 while thus rudely troubling our good mathematician with our importunate questions1 made him reply as would have replied every one not at all acquainted with metaphysics4 ,it is evident that these replies ought to be accepted as reasonable1 as satisfactory1 and as the only ones in this case that all the mathematicians in the world could give4 ,this being so1 all that we have advanced is found in these replies and explications4 ,all science is founded on the postulate of existence2 every argument1 to demonstrate even the most essential properties and relations of things1 must start with the supposition of their existence4 ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,,the ,,foundation ,,of ,,pure ,,possibility1 ,,and ,,the ,,condition ,,of ,,its ,,existence4 #ec4 ,we have said that the foundation of the pure possibility of things1 and of their properties and relations1 is founded in the essence of ,god1 wherein is the reason of every thing4#bb ,and it may at first sight seem that science needs only this foundation1 and does not require to rest upon the condition of the existence of things2 because1 if essences are represented in ,god1 the object of science is found in the ,divine essence2 and consequently1 the argument founded upon the impossibility of asserting any thing of nothing1 is not conclusive4 ,supposing there to be such a representation1 science is not occupied with a pure nothing1 but with a real thing2 and it has consequently in view a positive object1 even when it abstracts the reality of the thing considered4 #bb ,see ,l4 ,,iv41 ,c4 ,,xxiii4 to ,,xxvii4 ,let us see how we can solve this difficulty4 #ed4 ,the necessary relations of things1 independently of their existence1 must have a sufficient reason2 and this can only be in necessary being4 ,the condition1 therefore1 of existence1 presupposes the representation of the essence of the contingent being in necessary being2 the condition1 therefore1 if it exist1 cannot be brought in unless it presupposes the foundation of possibility4 #ee4 ,this remark shows that there are two questions3--#ast3 ,what is the foundation of the intrinsic possibility of things8 #b;d3 ,supposing possibility1 what condition is involved in so much as it is affirmed or denied of the possible object8 ,the foundation of the possibility is ,god2 and the condition is the existence of the objects considered4 ,both are requisite to science2 if the foundation of intrinsic possibility be wanting1 the condition of existence cannot come in2 and if1 admitting the possibility1 we omit the condition1 science has no object4 #ef4 ,we would remark1 for the better understanding of this whole subject1 that we do not1 in affirming or denying the relations of beings represented in ,god1 treat of what these beings are in ,god1 but of what they would be in themselves were they to exist4 ,in ,god1 all are the same ,god2 for all that is in ,god1 is identical with ,god4 ,if1 then1 we consider things only as they are in him1 we shall have ,god1 not the things1 for object4 ,certain it is1 that in ,god is the foundation1 or the sufficient reason1 of geometrical truths3 but geometry does not consider them such as they are in ,god1 but such as they are or may be realized4 ,in ,god1 there are neither lines nor dimensions of any kind2 he1 therefore1 is not the object of geometry properly so called4 ,geometrical truths have in him an objective value or representative value1 but not subjective2 we should otherwise be obliged to say that ,god is extensive4 #eg4 ,here1 then1 is seen that what we said above in the place cited1 does not conflict with what we have here established2 and that to make ,god the foundation of all possibility1 does not exclude the scientific necessity of the condition of existence4 #eh4 ,we will1 in order to place this beyond all doubt1 present the question under another aspect1 by showing that when ,god knows finite truths1 he sees in them this condition likewise3 ,if they exist4 ,god knows the truth of this proposition3 ,triangles of equal base and altitude are of equal superfices3 this is true as well in the eyes of infinite intelligence1 as in ours2 were it not thus the proposition would not be true in itself1 and we should be in error4 ,this being so1 there are in ,god1 who is most simple being1 no true figures1 although he has the intellectual perception of them4 ,the cognition1 then1 of ,god1 in what relates to finite things1 refers to their possible existence1 and consequently involves the condition that they exist4 ,the cognition of ,god does not refer to their purely ideal representation1 but to their actual or possible reality2 when ,god knows a truth of finite beings1 he does not know it from the sole representation of those truths which he has in himself1 but from that which they would be were they to exist4 #ei4 ,every object may be considered either in the real or in the ideal order4 ,the ideal is their representation in an understanding1 which has a value only inasmuch as it refers to possible or actual reality4 ,in this manner alone can the idea have objectiveness1 since otherwise it could only be a purely subjective fact1 of which1 excepting the purely subjective1 nothing could be either affirmed or denied4 ,the idea which we have of the triangle aids us1 in so far as it has a real or possible object1 to know and combine3 we refer what we affirm or deny of it to its object3 if this disappear1 the idea is converted into a purely subjective fact1 to which we cannot apply the properties of a triangular figure without an open contradiction4 ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,,idea ,,of ,,negation4 #fj4 ,it is said that the understanding does not conceive nothing3 this is true in the sense that we do not conceive nothing as something1 which would be a contradiction2 but it does not therefore follow1 that we do not in any mode conceive nothing4 ,not-being is nothing1 and yet we conceive not-being4 ,this perception is necessary to us2 without it we could not perceive contradiction2 for which reason the principle of contradiction3 ,it is impossible for a thing to exist and not to exist at the same time3 fundamental as it is in our cognitions1 would fail us4 #fa4 ,it may be said that to conceive nothing1 not-being1 is not to conceive1 but to not-conceive3 this1 however1 is false1 for it is not the same thing to conceive that a thing is not1 and not to conceive it4 ,the former involves a negative judgment1 and may be expressed by a negative proposition2 and the latter is the simple absence of the act of perception2 the former is objective1 the latter subjective4 ,we do not when asleep perceive things2 but this non-perception is by no means equivalent to perceiving that they are not4 ,it may be said of a stone that it does not perceive another stone2 but not that it perceives the non-being of the other stone4 #fb4 ,the perception of not-being is a positive act2 and it would be a contradiction to say that it is the very perception of being2 for it would follow1 that whenever we perceive being1 we perceive its negation1 not-being1 and vice versa1 which is an absurdity4 #fc4 ,when we perceive not-being1 we do1 it is true1 perceive it in relation to being2 and it is equally true1 an understanding perceiving absolute not-being1 without any idea of being1 is altogether inconceivable2 but this does not prove the two ideas not to be distinct and contradictory4 #fd4 ,it is remarkable that the idea of negation1 besides entering into the fundamental principles of our understanding3 ,it is impossible for a thing to be and not to be at the same time3 ,every thing either is or is not3 is also necessary to almost all of our perceptions4 ,we do not conceive distinct beings without conceiving that one is not the other1 and we cannot form a negative judgment into which negation does not enter4 ,hence it results that just as the idea of being is absolute and relative1 also is the idea of not-being3 thus1 we say1 ,the sun is2 ,all the diameters of a circle are equal2 and we also say1 ,the phnix is not3 ,the diameters of an ellipse are not equal4 #fe4 ,we may ask those who hold that every idea is the image of the object1 what sort of an image the idea of not-being would form8 ,this confirms what we have already advanced1 that it is a mistake to imagine all ideas as a kind of types1 similar to things1 and that we cannot oftentimes explain any of those inward phenomena1 called ideas1 notwithstanding we know and explain their objects by them4 #ff4 ,it is also said that the object of the understanding is being2 but this is inexplicable in the sense that the understanding does not perceive not-being2 and can be understood only in the sense that we perceive not-being as coordinated to being1 and that not-being of itself alone1 cannot be the origin of any cognition4 ,remark here an important difference4 ,by the idea of being every thing may be understood2 and the more of being there is in the idea1 the more do we understand2 and if an idea be supposed to represent a being without any limitation1 or1 which is the same thing1 without any negation1 we should have a cognition of an infinite being4 ,on the contrary1 the perception of not-being teaches us nothing1 save inasmuch as it shows us the limitation of determinate beings and their relations2 and if we suppose the idea of not-being to be gradually extended1 we shall see that in proportion as it approaches its limits1 that is1 pure not-being1 absolute nothing1 the understanding loses its object2 the points of comparison and the elements of combination fail2 all light goes out1 and intelligence dies4 #fg4 ,we know universal1 absolute nothing1 only as a momentary condition which we imagine1 but do not admit4 ,in it we see that it is impossible that something should not exist2 for1 could any one instant be designated in which nothing existed1 nothing could now exist4 ,in this imaginary nothing1 we discover no point of departure for the understanding2 all combinations become impossible and absurdities2 the mind sees itself perishing in the vacuum it has itself created4 #fh4 ,if the idea of negation be not combined with that of being1 it is perfectly sterile2 but thus combined1 it has a kind of fecundity peculiar to itself4 ,the ideas of distinction1 of limitation1 and of determination1 involve a relative negation1 for we do not conceive distinct beings without conceiving that one is not another2 nor limited beings1 without conceiving that they are wanting1 that is1 that in some sense they are not2 nor determinate beings1 without conceiving something which makes them what they are and not others4 ,,chapter ,x4 ,,identity2 ,,distinction2 ,,unity2 ,,multiplicity4 #fi4 ,let us examine how we may draw from the idea of not-being the explication of the ideas of identity and distinction1 unity and multiplicity4 ,let us conceive a being1 and fix our attention solely on it1 and compare it with nothing which is not it1 nor permit any idea of not-being to come in2 we shall then1 with respect to it1 have the ideas of identity and unity2 or1 to speak more exactly1 these ideas of identity and unity will be nothing else than ideas of this same being4 ,ideas of unity and identity are for this reason inexplicable by themselves alone2 they are simple1 or are confounded with a simple idea in which can be no comparison1 and into which if negation enter1 it is not noted1 nor can be made the object of reflection4 ,thus1 for instance1 the idea of not-being enters in some manner into the perception of every limited being2 but we can abstract this negation1 and consider what the object is1 not what it is not4 #gj4 ,if we perceive a being1 and afterwards another being1 the perception that one is not the other gives the idea of distinction1 and consequently that also of multiplicity4 ,there is1 then1 no distinction or number without perception of relative not-being combined with being2 but this perception is all that is requisite to distinction and number4 #ga4 ,the ideas of identity and unity are simple1 those of distinction and number composite2 the former involve no negation1 the latter imply a negative judgment2 this is not that4 ,it is impossible for ,a to be presented to us as distinct from ,b1 if we do not perceive that ,b is not ,a2 and on the other hand1 we need only to know that ,b is not ,a1 in order to enable us to say they are distinct4 ,these expressions1 ,a is not ,b1 or1 ,a and ,b are distinct1 are perfectly identical4 #gb4 ,from this we infer that the primary combination of our intelligence consists in the perception of being and not-being4 ,by it we perceive identity and distinction1 unity and number2 by it we compare1 affirm1 or deny2 without it we cannot even think4 ,without the perception of negation1 we can have only the perception of being1 that is1 an intuition fixed upon an identical object1 one and immutable1 such as we conceive the ,divine ,intelligence to be1 contemplating the infinity of being in the infinite essence4 #gc4 ,does ,god know negations8 ,certainly2 for when a being ceases to exist1 ,god knows this truth1 in which there is a negation4 ,he knows the truth of all negative propositions1 whether it expresses substantive or relative being2 therefore1 he knows negation4 ,but this is no imperfection1 since it cannot be an imperfection to know truth2 the imperfection is in the objects1 which1 by the very fact of being finite1 include negation1 being combined with not-being4 ,were ,god not to know negation1 it would be because negation is in itself impossible2 which would be equivalent to the impossibility of the existence of the finite1 and would lead to the absolute and exclusive necessity of one sole infinite being4 ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,,origin ,,of ,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,being4 #gd4 ,if it be impossible to think without the idea of being1 it exists prior to any reflex act1 and it cannot have sprung from reflection4 ,the idea of being must therefore be innate4 ,let us investigate this question4 #ge4 ,we have shown in the preceding chapter that we cannot think without the idea of being2 let whoever doubts this consult his own experience1 and make1 if he can1 a reflex act into which the idea of being will not enter4 ,we have already seen that we cannot exclude it in the conception of first principles1 and beyond these it is certain no one will go4 #gf4 ,can this idea have come to us from sensation8 ,sensation in itself offers us only determinate objects1 whereas the idea of being is an indeterminate thing3 sensation offers us only particular things1 whereas the idea of being is the most general it is possible to have3 sensation teaches us nothing1 tells us nothing1 except what it is1 a simple affection of our soul1 whereas the idea of being is a vast idea1 extending to all1 and1 fecundating our mind in an admirable manner1 is the element of all reflection and alone sufficient to found a science3 sensation never leaves itself1 nor extends to another sensation2 the sense of touch has nothing to do with that of hearing2 all belong to an instant of time1 and only exist during it1 whereas the idea of being guides the mind through every class of beings1 the corporeal and the incorporeal1 the real and the possible1 the temporal and the eternal1 the finite and the infinite4 ,if we discover any thing by sensations1 if they produce any intellectual fruit1 it is because we reflect upon them2 but reflection is impossible without the idea of being4 #gg4 ,neither does it seem that the idea of being can be formed by abstraction4 ,to abstract is of necessity to reflect2 and reflection is impossible without this idea2 therefore1 it is necessary to abstraction1 and consequently cannot have abstraction for its cause4 #gh4 ,on the other hand1 an exceedingly simple explication of the method in which abstraction is made1 may be opposed to this argument apparently so conclusive4 ,we see the paper upon which we write2 this sensation involves two things1 whiteness and extension4 ,were we limited to simple sensation1 here we should stop1 and receive only the impression1 extension and whiteness4 ,but having within ourselves a faculty distinct from that of feeling1 which makes us capable of reflecting upon the very sensation we experience1 we can consider that this sensation has some similarity to others which we recollect to have experienced4 ,we can then consider extension and whiteness in themselves1 abstracting the actual affection which they produce in us4 ,afterwards we can reflect upon the fact that these sensations have something in common with others1 inasmuch as they all affect us in a certain manner1 and then we have the idea of sensation in general4 ,if1 then1 we consider that these sensations all have something in common with all that is in us1 in so far as they modify us in a certain manner1 we shall form an idea of a modification of the me1 making abstraction1 however1 of its being a sensation1 a thought1 or an act of the will2 and if1 finally1 we abstract from these things being in us1 their being substances or modifications1 and attend only to the fact that they are something1 we shall have attained the idea of being4 ,this idea may1 therefore1 be formed by abstraction4 ,this explication1 seductive as it is by reason of its simplicity1 is open to grave objections4 #gi4 ,from the very beginning of this process we make use1 without adverting to it1 of the idea of being2 we therefore deceive ourselves when we imagine that we form it4 ,we cannot reflect upon extension and whiteness without remarking that they exist1 that they are something similar to other sensations4 ,when we think upon what affects us1 we know that we are1 that that which affects us is1 and we speak of its being or not being1 of its having or not having something common2 and finally1 when we abstract the modifications of our mind as being this or that1 and regard them only as thing1 as something1 as a being1 we evidently cannot so consider them if there does not exist in us the idea of something in general1 that is1 of being4 ,thus being is a predicate which we apply to things2 we do1 therefore1 know this predicate4 ,we only collect in one general and indeterminate idea1 particular and determinate things1 already existing in our understanding4 ,the successive operations made by means of abstraction are only a decomposition of the object1 a classification of it in various general ideas so as to attain to the superior idea of being4 #hj4 ,it is difficult in view of these reasons1 which are all strong1 to decide without danger of erring for either of the opinions advanced4 ,nevertheless1 we shall give our own in accordance with the principles we have laid down in different parts of this work4 ,we hold that the idea of being is not innate1 in the sense that it pre-exists in our understanding as a type anterior to all sensation and to all intellectual acts2#bc but we see no impropriety in calling it innate1 if nothing more be meant than the innate faculty of our understanding to perceive objects under the general reason of being or existence1 so often as it reflects upon them4 ,thus the idea does not flow from sensations2 it is recognized as a primary element of pure understanding2 but it is not formed by abstraction1 which separates it from others1 and purifies it1 so to speak1 itself contributing to this purification4 ,in this sense it may exist before reflection1 and yet be the fruit of reflection1 according to the various stages in which we consider it4 ,inasmuch as it is mixed and confused with other ideas1 it exists before reflection2 but inasmuch as it has been separated and purified1 it is the fruit of the same reflection4 #bc ,see ,l4 ,,iv41 ,c4 ,,xxx4 #ha4 ,we must1 in order to give a complete solution of the difficulties proposed1 give our ideas precision and exactness4 ,the idea of being is not only general but also indeterminate2 it offers to the mind nothing real or even possible1 since we do not conceive that a being1 which is only being1 does or can exist1 if no property besides that of being can be affirmed of it4 ,in ,god is the plenitude of being2 he is his own being2 with reason does he call himself1 ,i ,,am1 ,,who ,,am2 but we also affirm of him1 with all truth1 that he is intelligent1 that he is free1 and that he possesses other perfections not expressed in the pure and general idea of being4 ,from this we infer that we ought not to regard the idea of being as a type representing to us something determinate1 even something in general4 #hb4 ,the act by which we perceive being1 existence1 reality1 is necessary to our understanding1 but it is confounded with all other intellectual acts1 as a condition sine qua non of them all1 until reflection comes to separate it from them1 purifying it1 and making it the object of our perception4 ,since1 when we perceive1 we perceive something1 it is evident that the reason of being is always involved in all our perceptions2 by the simple fact of knowing we know being1 that is1 we know a thing4 ,but as we do not always1 when we fix our perception upon an object1 distinguish the various reasons into which it may be decomposed1 although the idea of being is contained in every object perceived1 it is not directly perceived by our understanding until reflection separates it from all else4 #hc4 ,if we reflect upon an azure object1 evidently the idea of color enters into that of azure2 but without reflection we shall not distinguish the genus1 color1 and the difference1 azure4 ,these two things are not really distinguished in the object perceived2 for it would be ridiculous to pretend that in a particular azure-colored object1 color is one thing and azure another4 ,nevertheless we can1 when we reflect upon the object1 very easily distinguish between the two ideas of color and azure1 and we can discuss one without paying attention to the other4 ,must we say we have the idea of color in general1 prior to the sensible representation8 ,most certainly not3 it is only necessary to recognize an innate force of the mind to generalize what is presented to it in particular1 and to decompose a simple object into various ideas or aspects4 #hd4 ,our understanding is endowed with an intellectual force1 by virtue of which it can conceive unity under the idea of multiplicity1 and multiplicity under the idea of unity4 ,we discover an example of the latter when we unite what is really multiple in a single conception4 ,our understanding may be compared to a prism which decomposes a ray of light into many colors2 hence different conceptions relating to one simple object4 ,when multiplicity is to be reduced to unity1 the intellectual force operates in an altogether contrary manner2 instead of dispersing1 it unites2 the variety of colors disappears1 and the ray of light is restored in all its purity and simplicity4 #he4 ,our mind1 from the fact that it is limited to know many things by conceptions only1 and not by intuitions1 requires the faculty of composing and decomposing1 of seeing a simple thing under distinct aspects1 and of joining different things under a common reason4 ,we must not fail to observe that the power of generalizing and of dividing1 given to our understanding1 is a great help to it1 indicating1 however1 its weakness in the intellectual order1 and continually warning it to proceed with due circumspection1 when it has to decide upon the intimate nature of things4 #hf4 ,according to this doctrine1 general1 and more particularly indeterminate ideas result from the exercise of reflection upon our own perceptive acts2 and there is in the general idea nothing more than is seen in the particular perception1 excepting its own generality produced by the elimination of all individuating conditions4 ,this is especially verified in the idea of being1 which1 as we have seen1 enters as a necessary condition into all our perceptions1 and is1 moreover1 requisite to all operations as well of composition as of decomposition4 ,we cannot conceive1 without conceiving some thing1 a being2 and this is substantive being4 ,we cannot affirm or deny without saying1 is1 or is not2 and this is copulative being4 ,the idea of being is1 therefore1 less an idea than a condition necessary to enable our understanding to exercise its functions2 it is not a type representing nothing determinate2 it is rather the very condition of its life1 without which it cannot possibly exercise its activity4 #hg4 ,but we can1 by reflection1 perceive this condition of all our thoughts2 the idea of being1 standing1 as it does1 involved with the others1 is then presented purified to our eyes1 and we conceive that general reason of being1 or thing1 which enters into all our perceptions1 but which we had not previously distinguished with sufficient clearness4 ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,,distinction ,,between ,,essence ,,and ,,existence4 #hh4 ,it has been much disputed in the schools whether existence is distinct from essence4 ,at first sight1 this seems an indifferent question2 but such it is not1 if we attend to the consequences which1 in the opinion of respectable authors1 flow from it2 for they pretend to no less than establishing upon the distinction between essence and existence a characteristic note of the finite1 attributing to infinite being alone1 the identity of its essence with its existence4 #hi4 ,that we distinguish between the essence and the existence of things is beyond all doubt2 for inasmuch as we know an object realized1 we conceive its existence2 and inasmuch as we know that this object exists with this or that determination1 constituting it in such or such a species1 we conceive its essence4 ,the idea of existence represents to us pure reality2 the idea of essence offers us the determination of this reality4 ,the schools1 however1 not satisfied with this1 have endeavored to transfer to things that distinction which we discover in our conceptions2 but their opinion seems to be subtle rather than solid4 #ij4 ,the essence of a thing is that which makes it what it is1 and distinguishes it from all else2 and existence is the act which gives being to essence1 or that by which essence exists4 ,it would appear1 from these definitions1 that there really is no distinction between essence and existence4 ,to render two things distinct1 it is requisite that one be not the other2 but since essence1 abstracted from existence1 is nothing1 we cannot say that there is a real distinction between them4 ,to what is the essence of a man1 if we abstract his existence1 reduced8 ,to nothing2 and therefore1 no relation between them is admissible4 ,we grant that when we abstract the existence of man1 we do yet conceive the essence of man2 but the question is not whether we distinguish between the idea of man and his existence1 but whether there is a real distinction between his own essence and existence4 #ia4 ,in ,god are the essences of all things1 and in this sense they may be said to be distinguished from finite existence2 this does not1 however1 if we consider it well1 at all affect the present question4 ,when things exist in ,god1 they are not any thing distinct from him2 they are represented in the ,infinite ,intelligence1 which is1 with all its representations1 the infinite essence itself4 ,to compare1 therefore1 the finite existence of things with their essence1 as this is in ,god1 is entirely to change the state of the question1 and to seek the relation of things1 not with their particular essences1 but with the representations of the ,divine understanding4 #ib4 ,it may be objected that1 if the existence of finite beings is the same as their essence1 it will follow that existence will be essential to these beings2 for1 since nothing is more essential than essence itself1 finite beings would exist of necessity1 as all that pertains to essence is necessary4 ,the radii of a circle are all equal1 for equality is contained in the essence of the circle2 and in like manner1 if existence belong to the essence of things1 they must exist1 and non-existence would be a veritable contradiction4 ,this difficulty rests upon the ambiguous meaning of the word essence1 and the want of exactness in joining the ideas of essential and necessary4 ,the relation of essential properties is necessary1 for we cannot destroy it without falling into contradiction4 ,the radii of a circle are equal1 because equality is involved in the very idea of the circle2 consequently1 if this be denied1 it would be affirmed and denied at one and the same time4 ,there is1 however1 no contradiction when some properties are not compared with others2 but this comparison is not made when there is question of essence and existence1 for in this case one thing is not compared with another1 but with itself2 if the distinction be introduced1 it does not refer to two things1 but to one and the same thing considered under two aspects1 or in two different states1 in the ideal order and in the real4 ,when we consider essence abstracted from existence1 the object is the union of the properties which give to beings such or such a nature2 we abstract their existence or non-existence1 and attend only to what they would be were they to exist4 ,the condition of existence is either expressly or impliedly involved in all that we affirm or deny of properties2 but when we consider essence realized or existing1 we do not compare property with property but the thing with itself4 ,in this case1 non-existence does not imply contradiction2 for when existence disappears1 the essence also disappears1 with all that it included4 ,there would be a contradiction were we to assert that essence implies existence1 and to endeavor1 while the former remains1 to make the latter disappear1 which is not verified in this supposition4 ,the equality of the radii of a circle cannot fail1 so long as the circle does not fail2 and the contradiction would be to make the radii unequal while the circle continues to be a circle2 but were the circle to cease to be a circle1 there would be no reason why the radii should not be unequal4 ,essence is the same as existence2 so long as there is essence1 so long will there be existence2 if the essence fail the existence will likewise fail2 where1 then1 is the contradiction8 ,life is of the essence of man1 and yet man dies2 we may then say man is destroyed1 and therefore there is in this no contradiction4 ,if the essence cease to exist1 it also will be destroyed1 and existence1 which is identified with it1 may fail without any contradiction4 #ic4 ,the scholastics taught that the being whose essence was the same as its existence would be infinite and absolutely immutable1 because1 since existence is the complement in the line of being or of act1 it could receive nothing more4 ,this difficulty also originates in the equivocal sense of words4 ,what is meant by complement in the line of being or act8 ,if it mean that nothing can supervene to essence identified with existence1 here is a begging of the question1 since what was to be proved is asserted4 ,if it mean that existence is the complement in the line of being or act in the sense that1 given it1 nothing more is wanted to make the things1 whose existence it is1 really existing1 an indubitable truth is advanced1 but not one from which what was to be demonstrated can be inferred4 #id4 ,it would seem1 therefore1 that there is no real distinction in things corresponding to the distinction between essence and existence in our conceptions4 ,essence is not distinguished from existence1 but it does not therefore cease to be finite1 nor existence to be contingent4 ,in ,god existence is identified with essence2 but in such a manner1 that his non-existence implies contradiction1 and his essence is infinite4 ,,chapter ,,xiii4 ,,kant',s ,,opinion ,,of ,,reality ,,and ,,negation4 #ie4 ,kant numbers among his categories reality and negation1 or existence and non-existence1 and1 conformably to his principles1 defines them thus3 ,reality is a pure conception of the understanding2 it is what corresponds1 in general1 to any sensation whatever1 consequently that whose conception denotes a being in itself1 in time4 ,negation is that whose conception represents a not-being in time4 ,the opposition of these two things consists in the difference of the same time1 as full or void4 ,since then1 time consists solely in the form of the intuition1 and consequently in the form of the objects as phenomena1 it follows that that which in them corresponds to the sensation1 is the transcendental matter of all objects1 as things in themselves1 essential reality4 ,every sensation has a degree or intensity1 by which it may fill more or less the same time1 that is1 the inward sense relatively to the representation of an object1 until it be reduced to nothing #j negation4 ,there is in this passage a fundamental error which ruins the whole basis of all intelligence3 there is also much confusion in his application of the idea of time4 #if4 ,according to ,kant1 reality alone refers to sensations2 therefore the idea of being will be the idea of the phenomena of sensibility in general2 this idea will mean nothing1 if applied to the non-sensible2 the very principle of contradiction will necessarily be limited to the sphere of sensibility2 and we neither shall know1 or be able to know any thing without the sensible order4 ,such are the consequences of this doctrine2 let us now examine the solidity of the principle from which they flow4 #ig4 ,were the idea of reality only the idea of the sensible in general1 we could never apply it to non-sensible things1 which1 however1 experience teaches we can do4 ,we speak incessantly of the possibility and even of the existence of non-sensible beings1 and we even distinguish the phenomena of our mind into those belonging to sensibility1 and those which correspond to the purely intellectual order4 ,the idea of being1 therefore1 for us1 denotes a general conception non-circumscribed by the sensible order4 #ih4 ,kant will answer that the applications we make of this idea1 extending it beyond the sphere of sensibility1 are vain illusions expressed in unmeaning words4 ,to this we reply4 ,i4 ,there is now no question of ascertaining whether the applications of the idea of being or reality beyond the sensible order be founded or unfounded2 there is question only of ascertaining what it is that this idea represents to us1 whether the object represented be illusory or not4 ,kant1 when defining reality1 regards it as one of his categories1 and consequently1 as one of the pure conceptions of the understanding4 ,to make his definition good1 he ought to employ this conception in its greatest possible extent3 but as he has demonstrated that conception1 in itself1 is not limited to the sphere of sensibility1 it must follow that his definition is inadmissible4 ,had he said that the applications of the conception beyond the sensible order were unfounded1 he would indeed have erred1 but would not have destroyed conception itself2 yet he equivocates not only in the uses of conception1 but also in its nature1 which he can only ruin1 if he limit it to the sphere of sensibility4 ,,ii4 ,the principle of contradiction is founded in the idea of being1 and extends as well to the non-sensible as to the sensible4 ,it would follow1 were we to admit ,kant's doctrine1 that the principle of contradiction1 ,it is impossible for a thing to be and not to be at the same time1 would be equivalent to this proposition2 ,it is impossible for a phenomenon of sensibility to appear and not to appear at the same time4 ,evidently neither philosophy nor common sense ever gave such a meaning to the principle of contradiction4 ,when the impossibility of a thing's being and not being at the same time is affirmed1 this is asserted in general1 and abstraction is absolutely made of the things pertaining or not pertaining to the sensible order4 ,were it not thus1 we should be obliged to say that non-sensible beings are absolutely impossible1 which even ,kant does not venture to maintain1 or1 supposing them to exist1 to doubt whether the principle of contradiction is applicable to them4 ,who sees not the absurdity of such a doubt1 and that1 if it be admitted for a single instant1 all intelligence is destroyed8 ,if we limit the generality of the principle of contradiction1 the impossibility is no longer absolute3 and supposing it to fail in certain cases1 who shall assure us that it does not in all8 ,,iii4 ,kant himself admits the distinction between the phenomena of sensibility and purely intellectual conceptions3 with him1 therefore1 reality comprises something more than the sensible4 ,purely intellectual conceptions are a reality1 are something at least as subjective phenomena of our mind1 and yet are not sensible1 as ,kant himself confesses2 he therefore falls into a contradiction1 when he limits the idea of reality to the purely sensible4 #ii4 ,kant conceives reality and negation only as filling1 or leaving void1 time1 which1 in his opinion1 is the primitive form of our intuitions1 and a kind of back-ground upon which the mind sees all objects1 even its own operations4 ,according to this doctrine1 the ideas of time precede those of reality and negation1 since only in relation to it are the two latter conceivable4 ,and now we see the singularity of a form1 or whatever else it be called1 to which the ideas of reality and negation are made to refer when nothing is conceivable without the idea of reality4 ,kant1 scrupulous as he is in the analysis of the elements of our mind1 and contemptuous as he is towards all metaphysicians who preceded him1 ought to have explained to us the nature of this form in which we see reality1 and which1 nevertheless1 is not contained in the idea of reality4 ,if it is something1 it will be a reality2 and if it is not something1 it will be a pure nothing2 and consequently1 it cannot be a form which can1 by filling and becoming void1 present to our mind the ideas of reality or negation4 ,it would be easy to show1 by an abundance of reason1 the ,german philosopher's equivocation1 when he so inexactly determines the relations between time and the idea of being2 but as we propose to explain at length the idea of time1 we will pass over here what belongs to another part of this work4 ,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,,recapitulation ,,and ,,consequences ,,of ,,the ,,doctrine ,,concerning ,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,being4 #ajj4 ,we wish now to recapitulate the doctrine brought out in the preceding chapters1 so that it may be seen at a glance in all its bearings and connections4 ,the idea of being is so fruitful in results1 that we must sound it under all its aspects1 and never lose sight of it in investigating transcendental philosophy4 #aja4 ,we have the idea of ens1 or of being in general2 reason and our inward sense both attest it4 #ajb4 ,this idea is simple1 and cannot be resolved into other elements3 it expresses a general reason of things1 and its nature is in a certain manner destroyed if it be mingled with particular ideas4 ,it is intuitive1 but indeterminate to such a degree that1 by itself alone1 it affords us no idea of a real or possible being4 ,we not only know that every being is1 but that it is some thing which is its predicate3 even the ,infinite ,being is not only a being1 but is an intelligent and free being1 and formally possesses all perfections which imply no imperfection4 #ajc4 ,the idea of being may express either simple existence1 in which case it is substantive1 or the relation of a predicate with a subject1 and then it is copulative4 ,in the proposition1 the sun is1 being is substantive1 that is1 expresses existence2 in the proposition1 the sun is luminous1 being is copulative1 that is1 it denotes the relation of the predicate with a subject4 #ajd4 ,the ideas of identity and distinction originate in the ideas of being and of not-being2 and thus the idea of copulative being1 which affirms the identity of a predicate with a subject1 flows also in a manner from the idea of substantive being4 #aje4 ,being1 which is the principal object of the understanding1 is not the possible inasmuch as possible4 ,we conceive possibility only in order to actuality4 ,possibility flows from actuality1 not actuality from possibility4 ,we could not conceive pure possibility1 that is1 possibility without existence1 did we not conceive finite beings in whose idea being is not of necessity involved1 and of whose appearance and disappearance we are incessantly reminded by experience4 #ajf4 ,the understanding perceives being1 and this is a condition indispensable to all its perceptions2 but the idea of being is not the only one offered to it1 since it knows different modes of being1 which1 by the very fact that they are modes1 add something to the general and absolute idea of existence4 #ajg4 ,when we consider the essences of things1 and abstract their reality1 our cognitions always involve this condition1--if they exist4 ,there can be only a conditional science of the purely possible1 insomuch as it is not2 that is1 provided the object pass from possibility to reality4 ,we must1 in order to establish pure possibility so that it may have necessary relations1 subject to the condition of existence1 have recourse to a necessary being1 origin of all truth4 #ajh4 ,the essences of things in the abstract mean nothing1 nor can they become the object of affirmation or negation1 unless we suppose a necessary being in which is the reason of the relations of things1 and of the possibility of their existence4 #aji4 ,pure truth1 independent of all understanding1 of all being created or uncreated1 is an illusion1 or rather an absurdity4 ,with pure nothing there is no truth4 ,truth cannot be atheistic2 without ,god there is no truth4 #aaj4 ,we not only know being1 but also not-being4 ,we have an idea of negation1 and it always refers to some being4 ,absolute nothing cannot be the object of intelligence4 ,the idea of not-being has its own peculiar fecundity2 combined with that of being1 it gives the principle of contradiction1 engenders the ideas of distinction and multiplicity1 and makes negative judgments possible4 #aaa4 ,the idea of being does not flow from sensations2 neither is it innate1 in the sense that it pre-exists in our understanding as a type prior to all perceptions4 ,there is no reason why it may not be called innate1 if this mean only a condition sine qua non of all our intellectual acts1 and consequently of the exercise of our innate faculties4 ,the idea of being is mingled in every intellectual perception1 but it is not offered to us with perfect clearness and distinctness until we separate it by reflection from the particular ideas which accompany it4 #aab4 ,essence is not distinguished from existence even in finite beings4 ,it is a distinction in conceptions1 to which there is no real distinction corresponding4 #aac4 ,the identity of essence with existence does not involve the necessity of finite things4 ,the arguments by which some pretend to establish this consequence are founded upon an ambiguous meaning of words4 #aad4 ,kant's opinion1 which limits the idea of reality1 and that also of negation1 to the purely sensible order1 would destroy all intelligence1 since it overthrows the very principle of contradiction4 ,this doctrine of the ,german philosopher is also in opposition with what he himself taught concerning purely intellectual conceptions1 distinct from sensible representations4 ,when he refers the ideas of reality and negation to that of time1 as the primitive form of the inward sense1 he leaves out of the idea of reality what no less pertains to it1 and presents the idea of time under a point of view wholly equivocal4 #aae4 ,as sensible representation is based upon the finite intuition of extension1 so the perceptive faculties of the pure understanding receive the idea of being as their foundation4 ,in the same manner that extension is presented to sensibility as limitable1 and from limitability results figurability1 and consequently all the objects of geometrical science2 so also does the idea of not-being1 combined with that of being1 fecundate in a manner the metaphysical sciences4 ,the parallelism of the two ideas1 extension and being1 is not of such a nature as to render the former independent of the latter4 ,so far as science is concerned1 the idea of extension is sterile1 if it be not combined with the general idea of being and not-being4 ,this may be shown in many ways2 but it will suffice to recollect that geometry cannot take a single step without the principle of contradiction1 into which the ideas of being and of not-being enter4#bd #bd ,see ,l4 ,,iv41 ,c4 ,v4 #aaf4 ,all our cognitions flow from the idea of being and not-being1 combined with intuitive ideas4 ,we shall have occasion in the following books to remark this admirable fecundity of an idea1 which1 although it cannot of itself teach any thing1 can yet1 when united with others1 and modified itself in various ways1 so illuminate the intellectual world as to merit to be called the object of understanding4 ,,book ,,sixth4 ,,unity ,,and ,,number4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,,preliminary ,,considerations ,,on ,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,unity4 #a4 ,before analyzing the idea of number1 let us examine its simplest element1 unity4 ,number is a connection of unities4 ,we cannot know what number is1 if we do not know what unity is4#be #be ,see ,l4 ,v41 ,c4 ,x4 #b4 ,what is unity8 ,when is a thing one8 ,we all seem to know what unity is1 since upon it we found the fabric of all our arithmetic cognitions4 ,we all know when a thing is one1 and we never equivocate on the meaning of the word4 ,in this the learned and the unlearned stand on the same footing4 ,the word one1 in our language1 has only one meaning for all who understand it4 ,the same may be said of the word which in other languages expresses the same idea4 ,when we meet the figure #a1 which corresponds to this idea1 and expresses it in a general manner1 abstracting the difference of idioms1 all men understand and apply it in the same manner4 #c4 ,the idea of unity is the same in all men2 it is a common patrimony of the human race4 ,it is not bound to this or that object1 nor to this or that act of the mind2 it extends to all in the same manner4 ,even composite and multiple things are called one only1 inasmuch as they participate in a general idea4 ,the indivisible point is one4 ,the line composed of many points could not be one were there not a contiguous enchainment of these points1 and did they not all unite to form one object1 which gives us one impression1 and is submitted to one act of our understanding4 #d4 ,the idea of unity is not a particular sensation1 since it applies to all2 neither is it sensation in general1 since it pertains to what is not sensation4 ,the sensation of color is one2 so1 also1 the consciousness of the me is one1 although this is not a sensation4 ,the size of the rectangle which ,i see is one1 and the relation of the equality of its angles is also one1 but is not a sensation4 #e4 ,the idea of unity is a simple idea1 and accompanies our mind from its first steps2 we find it everywhere1 and understand it well1 but cannot explain it as we would1 because it is simple1 and cannot be decomposed and expressed by various words4 ,we do not mean to say1 however1 that we must abjure all explanation of it2 we only propose to warn the reader of the kind of explanation he may expect1 which can be no other than the analysis of the fact1 inasmuch as it is an object1 and of the phenomenon as presented to our mind4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,what ,,is ,,unity4 #f4 ,the scholastics were right in teaching that every being is one1 and that whatever is one is being4 ,unity is a general attribute of every being1 but is not distinct from it4 ,however little we reflect1 we cannot fail to perceive that unity and being are not distinguished3 the unity of unity1 by itself1 offers us nothing real or even possible4 ,what then would become of unity1 if nothing but unity8 ,this idea is involved in that of being2 it is an aspect of it1 a reason under which being is presented to the understanding4 #g4 ,but what is the conception of unity under which beings are presented to us8 ,there is unity in the object when there is no distinction in the conception presenting it2 and there is no distinction1 when the perception of relative not-being is not combined in the object with that of being4 ,we have unity whenever we perceive an object simply4 ,suppose that we perceive the object ,b4 ,no matter what ,b is1 it will to us be always one1 unless we perceive it as composed of ,c1 ,d1 one of which is not the other4 ,if we perceive in the object ,b1 a distinction between ,c and ,d1 unity disappears4 ,evidently when we are aware of this composition we can abstract it and simply consider the result1 the whole1 ,b2 and then unity appears anew4 #h4 ,we see by this that unity may be either real or fictitious4 ,it is real and existing when there is no distinction in the thing either real or apparent2 it is fictitious in those composites which of themselves include distinct things that may be offered to the understanding1 inasmuch as they are subordinated to one unity of order1 abstraction made of the real distinction contained in them4 #i4 ,the schoolmen sometimes defined what is one to be1 ens indivisum in se1 et divisum ab aliis4 ,the former part seems sufficiently exact if by indivisum is meant non-distinctum and not non-separatum2 but the second part must be regarded at the best as superfluous4 ,if there existed only one most simple and sole being1 it would yet be one1 although we could not say that it was divided from others1 divisum ab aliis2 for as there would be no others it could not be divided from them4 ,this part of the definition is therefore superfluous4 #aj4 ,it is no solution of the difficulty to say that this one being is divided from others1 real or possible1 and that in the supposition of one only being1 others are possible although not real4 ,the only being would be really one1 and the division from others would be only possible2 since there can be no real distinction between two terms when one of them is only possible4 ,the division from others1 divisis ab aliis1 therefore is not a necessary element of unity1 because unity is real1 and this element is only possible4 #aa4 ,however1 in confirmation of this doctrine1 we may remark1 that in common parlance1 unity is opposed to distinction1 and there is no unity where there is no distinction4 ,if the only being be not conceived as multiple there can be no distinction2 and this is so independently of its being compared with the rest4 ,the words1 others1 and the rest1 suppose single beings2 the idea of unity precedes that of distinction2 beings are not considered as distinct between themselves until after they are conceived as individually single4 #ab4 ,it seems1 therefore1 that a single being ought to be defined as ens indivisum in se1 or a being which includes no division4 ,unity1 then1 will depend upon non-distinction4 ,if non-division denote non-distinction1 there will be real unity2 but if it denote non-separation or re-union1 we shall only have a fictitious unity4 ,the molecules without extension1 of which many suppose matter to be composed1 would be really one1 because there is no distinction in them4 ,bodies are fictitiously one because their composite parts though united are really distinct4 #ac4 ,a difficulty may be raised by asking whether a being1 indivisible in itself1 but not divided from others1 would be really one1 for in case it would not be one1 it might be inferred that we had unjustly censured the definition of the schoolmen1 since whatever wants the second property required by the definition would not be one4 ,we reply1 then1 a being that includes no distinction in itself1 and is not distinguished from others1 would indeed be one1 but in such a case there would be no others1 since they cannot be when there is no distinction4 ,in such an hypothesis1 there would be only one unity1 the unity of pantheism1 the great all1 the absolute in which all things would be identified4 #ad4 ,we have already said that the unity which is confounded with being1 is not the unity which originates number4 ,we here in fact encounter two different conceptions of unity1 the one marking only want of distinction1 and the other expressing the property of engendering number4 ,but we are not thence to infer that the one which is identified with being is distinct from that which engenders number4 ,all beings1 one in themselves1 but distinct from each other1 no matter what they may be1 may be conceived under the idea of number4 ,the number three enters into the august mystery of the ,trinity1 and we say with all truth that in ,god there are three persons4 #ae4 ,it is not necessary that the unity which engenders number should be real2 it suffices if it be fictitious4 ,when we take a foot measure for unity1 we employ a fictitious unity1 since the foot is composed of parts1 but the number which results therefrom is1 nevertheless1 a true number4 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,unity ,,and ,,simplicity4 #af4 ,real unity and simplicity are identical4 ,what is really one has no distinction in itself2 nor is it composed of parts1 of which it can be said1 this is not that4 ,evidently simplicity requires nothing more2 the simple is opposed to the composite1 to what is formed of many beings whereof one is not the other4 #ag4 ,we meet this simplicity in none of the objects of our intuitions1 excepting the acts of our own mind2 so that even when we know1 by discursion1 that there are substances really one or simple1 we do not see them in themselves4 ,extension consists essentially of parts2 whence it happens that we never encounter real unity or simplicity in the corporeal world as object of our sensibility4 ,but as the composite must be resolved into the simple1 as it is hard to proceed ad infinitum1 we infer that the corporeal universe itself is a union of substances which1 whether called points without extension1 or any thing else1 cannot be decomposed into others2 for which reason they are really one1 or simple4 #ah4 ,hence we conclude that substances may be said to be in a certain manner simple2 and that things called composite are unions of substances1 which in their turn form a third substance by virtue of a law presiding over them and giving them that unity which we call factitious4 #ai4 ,we cannot1 then1 do less than to remark that the transcendental analysis refutes those who deny simplicity to thinking beings1 since we have seen that simplicity is prior to composition1 which can neither be nor be conceived if it be not presupposed4 ,simplicity is a necessary law of every being3 a composite being ought to be called a union of beings1 rather than a being4 #bj4 ,we have said that simple substances are not objects of our intuition1 which has none worthy to be called simple excepting the acts of our mind4 ,the reason of this is1 that the principal medium of our intuition is sensibility1 which is founded upon representations1 themselves based upon extension4 ,there can be no doubt that the acts of our mind1 given us by intuition1 in the inward sense are perfectly simple2 for who can decompose a perception1 a judgment1 an act of the reason or of the will8 #ba4 ,the perception of a certain object requires preparatory acts2 and the same may be said of judgments and ratiocinations2 yet these operations are in themselves exceedingly simple1 and cannot be divided into various parts4 ,simplicity is met with alike in the acts of the will1 whether of the pure1 intellectual1 or sensible will4 ,how shall we divide such acts as these into parts3 ,i desire1 ,i do not desire1 ,i love1 ,i abhor1 ,i suffer1 ,i rejoice8 #bb4 ,we must take care not to confound the multiplicity of the acts with the acts themselves2 there may be many acts1 but in themselves they are simple4 ,thoughts1 impressions and affections continually succeed one another in our mind2 these phenomena are all distinct from each other1 as is proved by their existing at different times1 some at one time without the others1 and by some being incompatible with others1 because contradictory2 but each individual phenomenon is by itself incapable of decomposition1 and admits in itself no distinction into various parts2 wherefore1 it is simple4 #bc4 ,true unity1 therefore1 is only found in simplicity2 where there is no true simplicity1 there may be factitious1 but not real1 unity2 since even when there is no separation1 there may be distinction between the various parts of which the composite is formed4 #bd4 ,it may be inferred from this that indistinctum ought1 perhaps1 to take the place of indivisum in the definition of a one being2 because distinction is opposed to unity of identity1 and division to union4 ,absence of division is all that factitious unity requires2 but real unity demands that there be no distinction4 ,however closely united two things may be1 if one is not the other they are distinct1 and cannot1 in strict metaphysical language1 be called one4 #be4 ,the object of these observations is only to fix our ideas1 not to modify our language4 ,in common parlance1 the idea of unity is used in a less rigorous sense1 and1 far from opposing this use1 we readily accord it a reasonable foundation4 ,there results from the union of two really distinct things1 a conjunction1 rightly called one so far as it also is subjected to a certain unity2 and1 were it not permitted to use this word in a sense less rigorous than that exacted by metaphysical analysis1 we should be under the necessity of excluding unity from the great mass of objects4 ,simple substances1 we have said1 are not offered to us in immediate intuition1 and we see compositions rather than their component elements4 ,could we apply unity only to simple elements1 science would be greatly reduced1 language would be impoverished1 and literature and the fine arts would be despoiled of unity1 one of their characteristic perfections4 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,origin ,,of ,,the ,,tendency ,,of ,,our ,,mind ,,to ,,unity4 #bf4 ,since we encounter multiplicity in all sensible objects1 which are those chiefly demanding our attention1 how does our mind acquire the idea of unity8 ,in science1 in literature1 in the arts1 and in every thing1 we seek unity2 and whence this irresistible tendency towards unity1 which makes us seek a factitious when we cannot find a real unity1 and this1 too1 notwithstanding the multiplicity presented by all the objects of our perception8 #bg4 ,two origins1 if we mistake not1 may be assigned to this tendency towards unity1 the one objective1 the other subjective4 ,the former consists in the very character of unity in which the object of the understanding is mainly comprised2 the other is the unity found in the intelligent being1 and which it experiences in itself4 ,we will explain these ideas more at length4 #bh4 ,unity is being2 every being is one2 and1 properly speaking1 being is not found without unity4 ,let us take a composite object3 in it we discover two things2 the simple component elements of it1 and the union of them4 ,the being1 properly speaking1 does not consist in the union1 but in the united elements4 ,the union is a mere relation1 not even possible without the elements to be united4 ,on the other hand1 these elements in themselves1 abstracted from their union1 are true beings1 existed before1 and will exist after their union4 ,what is an organized body8 ,an aggregation of molecules united under a certain law1 conformably to a principle presiding over their organization4 ,the parts existed before their organization1 and will continue to exist after its destruction4 ,the being1 therefore1 properly consisted in the elements2 and the organization was a relation of them among themselves4 #bi4 ,organization requires a principle to rule it1 and subject its functions to determinate laws4 ,thus we see that even relation is subject to unity1 to the unity of end and to the unity of a ruling and directing principle4 #cj4 ,it is inconceivable how the union of distinct things can have any meaning1 or lead to any result1 if unity do not preside over it4 ,in objects submitted to our experience1 things are united in three ways3 by juxtaposition in space2 by co-existence in time2 and by association in the exercise of their activity4 ,the elements constitutive of extension are united in the first way2 all objects belonging to the same time1 in the second2 and in the third all those which unite their forces and direct them to one and the same end4 #ca4 ,the union consisting in the continuity of elements in space1 has no value in the eyes of science1 save inasmuch as there is an intelligent being who perceives the forms resulting from this continuity1 by reducing them to unity under ideal types4 ,four lines of points1 so disposed as to form a quadrilateral figure1 have no scientific meaning until there comes an intelligence and perceives the form of a quadrilateral figure under the aspect of unity4 ,we do not deny that the quadrilateral figure exists independently of intellectual perception3 these lines will certainly exist1 and be arranged in the same manner1 although we prescind all intelligence2 but this disposition in the quadrilateral form is a relation1 not a being distinct from the aggregation of the elements disposed2 and this relation1 of itself alone1 is no object of intelligence except inasmuch as presented to it under the unity of the quadrilateral form4 ,the intelligence in search of a true being1 can find none1 save in elements2 and if it wishes to perceive their relation1 it must recur to the unity of form4 #cb4 ,co-existence in time1 is a relation1 which1 of itself alone1 neither gives any thing to1 nor takes any thing from objects4 ,these exist independently of this relation2 for they must1 of necessity1 exist1 in order to co-exist4 ,this relation denotes something perceptible to the understanding1 only as it is presented to it under unity1 which1 in this case1 is unity of time1 as in the former it was unity of space4 #cc4 ,neither has the association of activities any meaning1 except when it expresses the convergence of forces towards one and the same object4 ,if unity be wanting to the point of their direction1 their union will express nothing1 and the intelligence will have for its object only scattered and unrelated activities4 #cd4 ,we have then shown that unity is a law of our understanding1 founded upon the very nature of things4 ,absolute being is never found in the composite1 but only in the simple1 and relative being is not even conceivable1 if it be not submitted to unity4 #ce4 ,we discover in the very nature of our mind1 the second origin of its tendency to unity4 ,it in itself is one1 is simple1 and therefore disposed to assimilate every thing to itself under this same unity and simplicity4 ,it feels that it is one in the midst of multiplicity1 permanent even in succession1 and under all the immense variety of sensible phenomena1 intellectual and moral1 which it unceasingly experiences4 ,the inward sense attests with irresistible certainty the identity of the me4 ,this unity1 this identity1 is as certain1 as evident to the child who begins to feel pleasure or pain1 and is sure that he is one and the same that experiences both impressions1 as they are to the philosopher who has spent long years in profoundly investigating the idea of the me and the unity of consciousness4 ,the unity and simplicity which we experience in ourselves force us to reduce the composite to the simple1 the multiple to the one4 ,the perception of things the most composite refers to a consciousness essentially one3 even were we to perceive the whole complicated universe by a single act1 this act would be most simple1 since otherwise the me could not say1 ,i perceive4 #cf4 ,two reasons1 then1 exist why our mind in all things seeks unity4 ,objects are unintelligible1 except so far as subjected to a certain perceptible unity1 to a form1 under which the multiple is made one1 and the composite simple4 ,the object of the understanding is being1 and being consists in the simple4 ,the composite involves an aggregation of simple elements with the relation called union2 but unless this be presented under a certain unity1 it does not constitute a perceptible object4 ,without the indivisible unity of consciousness1 no intelligent subject is conceivable4 ,every intelligent being requires this link to unite the variety of phenomena of which it is the subject4 ,if this unity fail1 the phenomena become an informal aggregation1 unrelated among themselves3 intellectual acts without an intelligent being4 ,the tendency to unity originates in the perfection of our mind1 and is itself a perfection2 but it needs to be carefully watched1 lest it go astray1 and seek real unity there1 where only a factitious unity can be found4 ,this exaggeration is the cause of pantheism1 the fatal error of our day4 ,our mind is one1 so also is the infinite essence1 cause of all finite beings2 but the aggregation of these beings is not one1 for even when united by many ties1 they cease not to be distinct4 ,there is in the world unity of order1 of harmony1 of origin1 and of end2 but there is no absolute unity4 ,number also enters into unity of harmony1 but it is incompatible with absolute unity1 as reason and experience both show4 ,,chapter ,v4 ,,generation ,,of ,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,number4 #cg4 ,unity is the first element of number1 but does not of itself alone constitute number1 which is not unity1 but the collection of unities4 #ch4 ,two is a number4 ,what is our idea of the number two8 ,evidently it is not confounded with its sign1 for signs are many and very different1 but it is one and always the same4 #ci4 ,it would seem at first sight that the idea of two is independent of the mode of its generation1 and that1 being one1 it may be formed by addition or subtraction1 by adding one to one1 or taking one from three3 #a #a #b2 #c-a #b4 ,but if we reflect upon these two expressions1 we shall see that the latter is impossible without the former4 ,we should not know that #c-a #b if we did not previously know that two entered into the composition of three1 and how it entered4 ,we could know nothing of this had we not already the idea of two1 and this idea is nothing else than the perception of this sum4 #dj4 ,the idea of two is no sensation1 for it extends alike to the sensible and the non-sensible1 to the simultaneous and the successive4 ,in itself it is simple1 its object is composite4 #da4 ,since the collection of objects is small in two1 the imagination can easily figure to itself what the understanding perceives2 and the idea seems clearer to us because made sensible by a representation4 ,the idea of addition made1 in facto1 that is1 the idea of the sum1 enters into that of two1 but not of addition in fieri4 ,our idea of this number is perfectly clear1 and yet we do not continually think of one plus one4 #db4 ,the idea of two refers to the simultaneous as well as to the successive2 but our mind does not discover it until after it has the idea of succession4 ,the object of this perception is the relation of united things2 the understanding perceives them as such1 and then only has it the idea of two4 #dc4 ,neither the successive nor simultaneous perception of two objects unaccompanied by relation is the idea of two4 ,hence the saying3 a man and a horse do not make two1 but only one and one2 and the reason of this is that the man and the horse are represented to the understanding by their difference1 not by their resemblance2 and things must be presented to the mind under a common idea in order to give number4 ,thus1 if we abstract their difference1 and consider them only as animals1 or corporeal beings1 or beings simply1 or things1 they will make two4 #dd4 ,in objects1 then1 totally unlike1 or not comprehended under some common idea1 there can be no number4 ,abstract number is number by excellence2 because it eliminates all that distinguishes the things numbered1 and considers them only as beings1 consequently as similar1 as contained in the general idea of being4 ,concrete numbers are only numbers so far as they participate in this property4 ,two is applicable to one horse and another horse1 but not to a horse and a man1 unless we identify them under the idea of animal1 and abstract rationality and irrationality4 ,concrete number requires a common denomination2 otherwise it is not number4 #de4 ,the idea of distinction1 that is1 that the one is not the other1 enters into the idea of two1 so that this idea necessarily involves an affirmation and a negation4 ,the affirmation is of the real1 possible1 or imaginary existence of the things counted2 the negation is of the one with respect to the other4 ,affirmation without distinction or negation involves identity4 ,the idea of two1 as well as that of every other number1 includes the ideas of identity and distinction4 ,the identity is of each extreme with itself2 the distinction is of the extremes among themselves4 ,identity in the thing is the thing itself3 identity in the idea is the simple perception of the thing4 ,distinction in the thing is the negation of it with respect to others3 distinction in the idea is the perception of negation4 ,we always perceive a thing as identical1 and consequently every perception includes the idea of unity4 ,but we do not always1 when we perceive a thing1 observe its negation with respect to others1 and consequently do not always perceive number4 ,the idea of number originates in comparison1 when we see an object which is not another4 #df4 ,the ideas of being1 distinction1 and similarity enter into that of two4 ,the idea of being1 because nothing cannot be counted3 that of distinction1 or negation of the one being the other1 because the identical does not constitute number3 that of similarity1 because things are only numbered when abstraction is made of their difference4 ,being is the basis of perception2 distinction1 of comparison2 and similarity1 of union4 ,perception begins with unity1 proceeds with distinction1 and ends with similarity1 which is a kind of unity4 ,the perception of this similarity unites what is distinct2 but the union need not always be of the things1 but may be in the idea comprising them4 ,there are two poles of the world1 but they are not united4 ,the perception of the number two requires something more than the simple perception of objects2 they must be susceptible of comparison1 and consequently united in a common idea4 ,this perception1 therefore1 demands comparison and abstraction1 and this is why animals cannot numerate2 they can neither compare nor generalize4 #dg4 ,the analysis of the idea of two is the analysis of all numbers2 the difference is not of nature1 but of more and less2 in the repetition of the same perception4 #dh4 ,if any one now ask whether number be in the things1 or in the mind alone1 we reply that it is in things as in its foundation1 because both distinction and similarity are in the things2 that is1 the one is not the other1 and both have something in common2 but it is the mind that sees all this4 #di4 ,after having perceived the distinction and union of two objects1 we can also perceive another object1 which will be neither the one nor the other of them1 and will yet be comprehended in one general idea with them4 ,this is the perception or idea of the number three4 ,no matter how many numbers be imagined1 nothing will ever be discovered in any of them except a simultaneous perception of objects1 distinction of objects1 and similarity of objects4 ,if these be determinate1 we shall have concrete number2 if they be comprised in the general idea of being1 of thing1 we shall have abstract number4 #ej4 ,the limits of our mind prevent it from comparing many objects at one time1 and from easily recollecting the comparisons it has already made4 ,to assist the memory1 and the perception of these relations1 we make use of signs4 ,when we pass beyond three or four1 our power of simultaneous perception fails1 and we divide the object into groups which serve us as new units1 and are expressed by signs4 ,ten is clearly the general group in the decimal system2 but before we reach the number ten we have already formed other subalternate groups2 since to count ten1 we do not say one and one and one1 etc41 but one and one1 two2 two and one1 three2 three and one1 four1 etc4 ,each unit added forms a new group1 which1 in its turn1 serves to form another4 ,with two1 we form three2 with three1 four1 and so on4 ,this affords an idea of the relation of numbers with their signs2 but1 as this matter is too important to be here dismissed1 we will further develop it in the following chapters4 ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,connection ,,of ,,the ,,ideas ,,of ,,number ,,with ,,their ,,signs4 #ea4 ,the connection of ideas and impressions1 in a sign1 is a most wonderful intellectual phenomenon1 and at the same time of the greatest help to our mind4 ,were it not for this connection1 we could scarcely reflect at all upon objects somewhat complex1 and above all our memory would be exceedingly limited4#bf #bf ,see ,l4 ,,iv41 ,c4 ,,xxviii4 and ,,xxix4 #eb4 ,condillac made some excellent remarks upon this matter3 in his opinion1 we cannot1 unaided by signs1 count more than three or four4 ,if1 indeed1 we had no sign but that of unity1 we could readily count two1 saying one and one4 ,having only two ideas1 we could easily satisfy ourselves that we had twice repeated one4 ,but it is not so easy to be certain of the exactness of our repetition when we have to count three1 by saying one and one and one2 still1 this is not difficult4 ,it is more so to count four1 and next to impossible to go as far as ten4 ,if we undertake to abstract the signs1 we shall find that it is impossible to form an idea of ten by repeating one2 and that it will be alike impossible1 if we employ no sign1 to make sure that we have repeated one exactly ten times4 #ec4 ,suppose the sign two1 and one half of the difficulty is obviated2 thus it will be much easier to say two and one1 than one and one and one4 ,in this supposition four will be no more difficult than was two1 since1 just as we before said1 one and one1 two2 we now say1 two and two1 four4 ,the attention before divided four times by the repetition of one1 is now only divided twice4 ,six was before a hard number to count1 but1 in the present supposition1 it is as easy as three was before2 for1 if we repeat two and two and two1 we shall have six4 ,the attention before distracted by six signs1 is now distracted only by three4 ,evidently1 if we continue to form the numbers three1 four1 and so on1 expressive of distinct collections1 we shall gradually facilitate numeration1 until we attain the decimal simplicity now in use4 #ed4 ,it may here be asked if the actual system be the most perfect possible8 ,and if facility depend upon the distribution of collections in signs1 can there be any thing more perfect than this distribution8 ,either there is question of new signs to denote new collections1 or of the combination of signs4 ,there can be no number which we cannot express with our present system1 and consequently there is no need of inventing any thing to denote new collections4 ,new signs might perhaps be invented for these collections1 and these collections might possibly be distributed in a simpler and more convenient manner4 ,in this case we admit an amelioration to be possible1 though very difficult2 but none in the former4 ,in a word1 the only possible progress would be in expressing better1 not in expressing more4 #ee4 ,the sign connects many ideas which1 without it1 would be isolated2 hence its necessity in many cases1 its utility in all cases4 ,with the word hundred1 or its numerical representative1 #ajj1 we know that we have one repeated a hundred times4 ,were this help to fail1 we could not speak of a hundred1 base calculations upon it1 or even form it4 ,it is1 however1 well said that we do not succeed in forming it except by tens1 by repeating the calculation ten ten times4 #ef4 ,let it not1 therefore1 be thought that the idea of the number is the idea of the sign2 for evidently the same idea of ten corresponds to the word ten1 whether written1 spoken1 or numerically represented by the figures #aj1 although these three signs are very different4 ,every language has a word of its own to express ten1 and all people have the same idea of it4 #eg4 ,this last remark creates a difficulty as to what the idea of ten consists in4 ,we cannot say that it is the recollection of the repetition of one ten times2 first1 because we do not think of this recollection when thinking of ten2 and second1 because1 according to what has already been said1 a clear recollection of this repetition is impossible4 ,neither is it the idea of the sign1 for the idea signified existed before the sign was invented1 otherwise the invention would have had no object1 and would even have been impossible4 ,there can be no sign where there is nothing to signify4 ,the idea of number includes more difficulties than ,condillac ever imagined2 who1 if he had1 after his close analysis of what facilitates numeration1 profoundly meditated upon the idea itself1 would not so readily have censured ,st4 ,augustine1 ,malebranche1 and the whole ,platonic school1 for having said that numbers perceived by the pure understanding are something superior to those perceived by the senses4 ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,,analysis ,,of ,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,number ,,in ,,itself ,,and ,,in ,,its ,,relations ,,with ,,signs4 #eh4 ,in order clearly to conceive the idea of number1 and the way it is engendered in our mind1 let us study its formation in a deaf and dumb person4 ,we have no better way of giving such a one an idea of unity than by presenting an object to him4 ,now1 if we would convey to him the idea of two1 we show him two fingers1 then two oranges1 then two books1 and in each of these operations make a sign which must be always the same4 ,if we repeat this operation a number of times1 the deaf and dumb person will associate the idea of two with that of the sign1 and one will suggest the others2 and he will endeavor to show us that he has seen two objects of some kind1 by uniting the expression of the object with the sign of two4 ,the same will take place with three1 or four4 ,when we reach higher numbers1 the sign becomes more indispensable2 since the less easily the idea of number is represented1 the more necessary is the sign to secure it4 ,but what we do to convey an idea of number to the deaf and dumb person1 what he himself must do to express the number which he conceives1 we must all do if we would obtain the idea4 #ei4 ,numeration is a repetition of operations2 and the art of facilitating it consists in instituting signs which recall to our memory what we have done4 ,it is an exceedingly complicated labyrinth1 and we cannot trust ourselves to its windings with any expectation of finding our way out again1 if we do not take care to mark the path we have followed4 ,it is to the admirable simplicity of the decimal system1 united to its inexhaustible variety1 that the facility and fecundity of our arithmetic are due4 ,algebra1 going a step beyond1 expresses without determining numbers1 and presents the results of its operations without effacing its footsteps on the road travelled1 is far superior to arithmetic1 and has made the human mind take gigantic strides4 ,but how8 ,solely by aiding the memory4 ,thus1 the very principle that enables the child to say four and one1 five1 instead of adding unity five times to unity1 the dumb man to express five by a hand1 a hundred by a grain1 enables the algebraist to express the result of his longest operations by a formula easy of retention by the memory4 ,both attain their object simply by aiding the memory4 ,a grain of wheat denotes to the dumb man the idea of hundred1 and this he applies to all similar collections2 a few letters combined in a simple manner designate to the mathematician a property of certain quantities1 and this he applies to all which are found in the same case4 #fj4 ,numeration is only an aggregation of formulas2 and the more easy these are of mutual transformation with a slight modification1 the more perfect will be the numeration4 ,the better one knows the relations of these formulas and the manner of transforming them1 the better will he know how to count4 ,the greater a person's intellectual power of fixing simultaneously the attention upon many formulas1 and of composing them1 the more perfect arithmetician will he be1 because the simultaneous comparison of many1 leads to the perception of new relations4 #fa4 ,what is our idea of hundred8 ,the union of the units composing it1 a union which we have made more or less frequently when learning to count4 ,but how do we know that it is the same union8 ,because we have a formula called a hundred1 expressed by a sign #ajj4 ,this formula is so easily recollected that we have no difficulty in recollecting the idea of hundred and all the properties connected with it4 ,we may be asked if a hundred is more than ninety4 ,were we under the necessity counting one and one and one1 we should be bewildered1 and never succeed in distinguishing the greater2 but knowing as we do that to reach the formula hundred1 we must pass by another formula ninety1 and that this was in ascending1 we know1 once for all1 that hundred expresses ninety and something more1 that is1 a hundred is more than ninety4 ,and if it be further inquired what is the excess1 we shall not undertake to ascertain this by adding units1 but by the two formulas ninety and ten which compose the formula hundred4 #fb4 ,by generalization we unite many similar things in one idea4 ,the general idea is a kind of formula4 ,numeration unites in one sign many things contained in a general idea1 but this sign has1 at the same time1 its own distinctive character4 ,thus the general idea belongs as a predicate to each of its particular objects2 number belongs to no one in particular1 but to all joined4 ,we perceive in abstraction a common property1 and lay aside all the particular objects which it presents2 in numeration1 we perceive similarity1 but always with distinction4 ,abstraction is the result of comparison1 but not comparison4 ,numeration implies a permanent comparison1 or the recollection of it4 #fc4 ,the idea of number is not conventional2 a hundred is always a hundred with all its properties and relations1 and this1 too1 prior to all convention and even to all human perception4 ,the sign1 and the sign only1 is conventional4 ,were there no intellectual creature1 and a hundred beings distinct among themselves were to exist1 there would really be this number4 ,the number three exists in the august mystery of the ,trinity1 from all eternity1 and of absolute necessity4 ,number requires only the existence of distinct things2 since1 however unlike they may be1 they always have something in common being1 which may be included in a general idea1 and consequently they fulfil the two conditions necessary to number4 #fd4 ,the perception of being and of distinction1 that is1 of substantive being and of relative not-being1 is the perception of number4 ,the science of the relations of every collection1 with its measure1 which is unity1 is the science of numbers4 ,,book ,,seventh4 ,,on ,,time4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,,importance ,,and ,,difficulty ,,of ,,the ,,subject4 #a4 ,the explanation of the idea of time is not a matter of mere curiosity1 but of the highest importance4 ,to convince ourselves of this we have only to consider that the explanation of the whole edifice of human cognitions is based upon it4 ,the most fundamental and indispensable principle which supports all others1 includes the idea of time4 ,a thing cannot be and not be at the same time3 impossibile est idem simul esse et non esse4 ,the impossibility of being and of not-being regards only the simul1 the same time4 ,therefore1 the idea of time necessarily enters into the very principle of contradiction4 #b4 ,the idea of time is involved in all our perceptions2 it extends to many more objects than does the idea of space4 ,we estimate not only the movements of bodies by time1 but also the operations of the mind4 ,we know that a series of thoughts may be measured by time the same as a series of corporal movements4 #c4 ,the idea of succession necessarily enters into that of time1 and vice versa1 the idea of time into that of succession4 ,we may conceive that one thing succeeds another2 but this would be impossible without succession1 without a before and after1 that is1 without time4 ,this reasoning1 apparently vicious1 shows1 perhaps1 that we must not explain the ideas of time and succession1 the one by the other1 since they are identical4 #d4 ,time does not seem to be distinct from things2 for who can imagine duration without that which lasts1 or a succession without that which succeeds8 ,is it a substance8 ,is it a modification inherent in things1 or distinct from them8 ,whatever is something exists2 and yet we nowhere meet time existing4 ,its nature is composed of instants divisible to infinity1 essentially successive1 and consequently incapable of simultaneousness4 ,imagine the minutest instant you can1 and it does not exist1 for it is composed of others infinitely minute1 which cannot exist united4 ,to conceive an existing time1 we must conceive it as actual1 and in order to do this1 we must surprise it in an indivisible instant2 but even this is not time2 it involves no succession2 it is not duration1 containing a before and an after4 #e4 ,nothing is easier than to calculate time1 and nothing more difficult than to conceive it in its essence4 ,as to the former the learned and the ignorant are on the same footing2 both have equally clear ideas2 the latter is excessively difficult even to the most eminent men4 ,the passage in the ,confessiones of ,st4 ,augustine1 in which the ,holy ,doctor endeavors to penetrate this mystery is well known4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,is ,,time ,,the ,,measure ,,of ,,movement8 #f4 ,time is said by many philosophers to be the measure of movement4 ,this idea is fruitful1 but it needs to be illustrated4 ,when we measure movement we refer to something fixed4 ,thus we measure the rapidity with which we have traversed a certain space by noticing the time denoted by a watch4 ,but how do we measure time by a watch8 ,by the space passed over by the hand on the dial4 ,if we reflect carefully1 we shall see that this is purely conventional1 or rather1 that it depends upon an arbitrary condition4 ,for if we suppose the time marked to be an hour1 the space passed over by the minute hand1 that is1 the circumference of the dial1 has no relation with the hour except what the artificer gave it by so constructing the watch that the minute hand would make one revolution every hour4 ,if the watchmaker had constructed it differently1 as he did the hour hand1 the time would be the same1 but the space passed over is very different4 #g4 ,the time1 therefore1 indicated by the watch is no measure1 save as itself is subject to another measure2 consequently it is not the primitive measure4 ,the same can evidently be said of all other watches which must have been regulated one after another1 until we come to the first of all watches4 ,there was no other watch to regulate this2 it follows1 therefore1 that no one of the measures furnished by art is the primitive measure4 #h4 ,not finding this measure in the works of man1 we must seek it in nature2 and here we discover fixed measures4 ,if we regard the course of the sun1 and take for unity the time it requires from the time it leaves the meridian until it returns1 we shall have the day2 this divided into twenty-four parts gives us the hours4 ,here we have a great watch which will serve to regulate all others4 #i4 ,nevertheless1 however lightly we reflect upon this1 we cannot help seeing that the solution is not so satisfactory as it seems at first sight4 ,solar time and sidereal time do not agree4 ,thus1 if we note the moment when a star is in the meridian conjointly with the sun1 we shall the next day see that the star reaches the meridian a little before the sun4 ,which is right8 ,has the star taken just twenty-four hours1 or the sun8 ,if time be a fixed thing independently of movement1 neither of these measures corresponds exactly to time4 #aj4 ,this argument1 which may be called practical1 is corroborated by another purely theoretical4 ,if we take celestial movement for the measure of time1 will it be true that whenever the movement1 which serves as the rule1 shall be verified1 that there has passed a fixed and determinate time8 ,if we be answered in the affirmative1 we must infer1 that even were this movement to be accelerated or retarded1 as1 for instance1 if a solar revolution were to be made with a half1 or with twice its ordinary velocity1 it would continue to mark the same time1 which1 however1 is absurd4 ,if it be said that the movement is supposed to be uniform1 we reply1 that this is a begging of the question4 ,uniformity of movement consists in equal times recurring after equal intervals4 ,did time1 then1 in its nature depend upon the movement of the sun1 or of any star1 as primitive measure1 neither uniformity nor variety would have any meaning4 ,if the space of twenty-four hours depended upon a revolution's being made1 no matter in what manner whether at a snail's pace1 or with the velocity of light1 we should never have more or less than twenty-four hours4 ,but if these depend upon another measure1 if prior to them1 there was a time which measured the velocity of movement1 and determined whether it had been accelerated or retarded1 then the movement of the stars is not the primitive measure2 they are in the same category as our watches1 they marked the time passed1 but time has not passed because they mark it4 ,time is the measure of their movement1 not their movement the measure of time4 ,movement is in time1 not time in movement4 #aa4 ,to appeal to the movement of the superior heavens1 is evidently no solution of this difficulty1 for what has been said of the sun1 may also be said of the remotest star in the firmament4 ,whether we appeal to annual1 solar1 or sidereal movements1 the same difficulty remains4 ,would sidereal years be the same1 if the movement be made with greater or less velocity4 ,if they would1 an absurdity would follow2 if not1 this is not the primitive measure4 #ab4 ,moreover1 we perceive1 when considering movement1 that we seem to conceive of greater and less velocity2 and thus the idea of time1 of necessity1 enters into that of velocity1 since velocity is the relation of space passed over in a given time4 ,the idea of time is therefore prior to1 consequently independent of1 every particular measure4 #ac4 ,we measure time by movement1 and in order to measure the velocity of movement we need that of time4 ,here then1 perhaps1 is a vicious circle2 but possibly this only shows that these are correlative ideas1 the one explanatory of the other2 or1 rather1 they are different aspects of one and the same idea4 ,the difficulty of separating them1 and the intimate union which unites them on the one hand as much as it divides them on the other1 confirms this conjecture4 ,to show this1 we ask1 what time has passed8 ,two hours4 ,how do we know this8 ,by our time-piece4 ,but what if it be too fast or too slow8 ,the measure fails4 ,this time is thus to us as a fixed measure1 prior to that of the watch by which we undertake to measure it4 ,but what are these two hours1 if we abstract the measure of the watch1 that also of the stars1 and every other measure8 ,two hours1 in the abstract1 can be found in no category of real or possible beings2 and we cannot1 without a measure1 give any idea of them1 nor form one for ourselves4 ,the idea of hour refers to a determinate movement of known bodies2 and this in its turn refers to others2 and finally1 we come to one in which we can discover no reason why it should be exempted from the general law to which the others are subject4 ,no farther reference being possible1 all measure fails2 and this failing1 time1 by the force of analysis1 vanishes4 #ad4 ,therefore1 the referring of time to movement1 explains nothing2 it only expresses a thing known1 and that is1 the mutual relation between time and movement1 a relation known to the unlearned1 and of constant and common use2 but the philosophic idea stands intact2 the same difficulty remains2 what is time8 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,similarities ,,and ,,differences ,,between ,,time ,,and ,,space4 #ae4 ,time seems to us to be something fixed4 ,an hour is neither more nor less than an hour1 no matter how our time-pieces go1 or the world itself2 just as a cubic foot of space is always a cubic foot1 neither more nor less1 whether occupied or not occupied by bodies4 #af4 ,time exists independent of all movement1 of all succession2 if it is something absolute1 has a determinate value of its own1 is applicable to all that changes without itself changing1 the measure of all succession without itself being measured1 what is it8 ,that it is something accidental cannot be reconciled with its immutability and universality4 ,every thing lives in it1 but it lives in nothing2 every thing dies in it1 but death has no power over it4 ,when the substance perishes1 the accident perishes2 but time continues the same although no substance exist4 ,before all created beings1 we conceive ages and ages1 that is1 time2 and after the destruction1 the annihilation of all beings1 we still conceive a successive although unending succession1 which is time4 ,the idea1 then1 of time1 does not demand that of the universe2 it existed before it1 and will survive it3 but without time the universe is inconceivable4 #ag4 ,the idea of time seems to be independent of the idea of any being2 of all duration in it2 every thing may endure in it2 but it does not begin or end with what endures in itself2 it is applicable to all that endures1 but it is not itself an endurable thing4 ,we imagine it to be one in the multiple1 uniform in the various1 fixed in the movable1 eternal in the perishable2 and it even seems to contain some features of the attributes of ,divinity2 but it is1 on the other hand1 essentially despoiled of every property excepting that of succession in its abstractest signification4 ,it is essentially sterile1 has no power of its own1 no condition of being or action1 and consequently leads to the highest imaginations of what a pure idea really is1 an abstraction1 which1 like space1 we have imagined in the presence of things4 #ah4 ,the points of similarity between time and space are worthy of our attention4 ,both are infinite1 immovable2 both are a general measure2 both essentially composed of continuous and inseparable parts4 ,limit them you cannot1 determine any limit you chose1 and beyond it you will see an ocean extended4 ,your powers are impotent2 beyond the highest heaven are unbounded abysses of space2 before the beginning of things there was a long chain of interminable ages4 ,in vain would you undertake to move space2 you can only move yourself in it1 or survey its various points4 ,its points are all fixed2 you may mark out distances and directions with respect to them1 but you cannot change them4 ,the result will be analogous if you attempt to move time4 ,the present instant is not the one just past1 nor the one next to succeed2 they are of necessity distinct1 and of necessity exclude each other4 ,their very nature is to succeed each other4 ,if their place be changed with respect to time1 it ceases to be the same4 ,imagine1 if you can1 that to-morrow is to-day1 that to-day is yesterday4 ,it is impossible for that which was at a certain time not to have then been2 but this would not be impossible if time could be moved2 for in order that what was yesterday may not be1 it is necessary to convert yesterday into to-morrow2 but this would be an absurdity4 ,the past1 the present1 and the future1 are essentially distinct things4 ,a simple space1 a space without parts1 is no space at all1 it is a contradiction2 neither is a simple time1 a time without parts1 a time1 but is a contradiction4 ,a space whose parts are not continuous1 is not a space2 neither is a time whose parts are not continuous1 a time4 ,the parts of space are inseparable2 you may distinguish them one from another1 count them one after the other1 compare them one with another1 and consider them one after another1 but you cannot separate them4 ,all imaginable bodies may exist in the apartment where we write1 one or many1 at rest or in motion2 but the space which we conceive is one1 fixed1 and always the same2 we can estimate its extent in cubic feet1 if we choose1 but these feet are fixed and inseparable2 we cannot separate one cubic foot from another1 even if we would2 for even while we annihilate it1 it is present to us1 and in the same distance that we need in order to conceive separation4 ,we cannot conceive separation1 if we do not conceive distance2 nor conceive distance1 if we do not conceive space4 ,we separate bodies from each other1 but not one space from another4 ,space remains with the same continuity when bodies are separated1 and it is by this continuity remaining unalterable that we measure the extent of their separation4 ,the same happens with time2 it is a chain which cannot be broken4 ,can we conceive three successive1 immediate instants1 ,a1 ,b1 ,c1 and then suppress ,b8 ,certainly not2 such a suppression would be impossible1 or it would be a poor diversion4 ,we destroy ,b in our caprice1 and ,a and ,c are continuous2 since being only separated by ,b1 when it disappears the extremes meet4 ,but in this case it is no longer ,a1 but ,b1 for ,b is the instant which precedes ,c4 ,we have no other distinction than that of priority with respect to ,c1 and continuity with ,a4 ,when1 then1 by the imaginary disappearance of ,b1 ,a is brought into contact with ,c1 it is converted into ,b4 ,moreover1 ,a is not only connected with ,c1 but is preceded by others2 if1 then1 by the disappearance of ,b1 it makes a step1 so also must the whole infinite chain which precedes it4 ,each one is then a soldier1 or rather no soldiery is possible1 for we have taken an instant from the infinite chain1 and so rendered it finite4 ,or1 more distinctly2 can we conceive yesterday or to-morrow without to-day1 a future or a past without the present8 ,evidently we cannot4 ,time1 then1 is essentially composed of inseparable parts4 #ai4 ,this similarity between time and space naturally leads us to believe that time is an abstract idea just as space is4 ,what we have said of space is applicable to time1 only with a few modifications exacted by the very nature of the thing4 ,it can in no case be without utility1 in scientific investigations1 to approximate and compare these great ideas1 which are as immense receptacles wherein our mind deposits its treasures4 ,the actual corporeal universe1 and all possible universes1 are included in the idea of space2 and all finite beings1 corporeal or incorporeal1 are included in that of time4 #bj4 ,we may well suspect that these ideas1 so intimately united to our perceptions1 are formed in a similar manner2 for it is probable that they belong to the order of those primitive laws which govern the development of our intellect4 #ba4 ,the similarity between space and time must not make us ignore the differences which distinguish them4 ,i4 ,all the parts of space are co-existent2 otherwise1 that continuity which is essential to them1 would be inconceivable4 ,time is composed of successive parts2 to imagine them co-existent1 is to destroy the essence of time4 ,,ii4 ,space refers solely to the corporeal world1 under only one aspect1 that of continuity4 ,time extends to all that is successive1 corporeal or incorporeal4 ,,iii4 ,consequently1 the idea of space exists only in the geometrical order1 of which it is the basis4 ,the idea of time is mingled with every thing1 and more especially with our own acts4 ,,iv4 ,our soul1 when reflecting upon itself1 can totally prescind space1 and forget all its relations with extended objects2 but it cannot prescind time1 which it finds necessary even to its own operations4 ,this last difference is a great help to the understanding in what the idea of time consists2 and we venture to recommend it to the attention and memory of the reader4 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,definition ,,of ,,time4 #bb4 ,time is duration2 but duration without something which endures1 is an absurdity4 ,there can then be no time without something existing4 ,the duration which we conceive1 after reducing every thing to nihility1 is a vain imagination2 it is not an idea1 but is rather in contradiction with ideas4 ,an important consequence flows from this2 it is1 that time in itself1 cannot be defined with absolute elimination of every thing to which it refers4 ,time1 then1 has no proper existence2 and separated from beings is annihilated4 #bc4 ,hence1 also1 it follows that that infinity which we attribute to time1 has no rational foundation4 ,we have no other reason to affirm this infinity than a vague conception1 which presents it as such2 but we cannot fail to perceive that this conception also exists1 even if we suppose all to be reduced to nothing4 ,if1 then1 there is in this supposition a vain diversion of the imagination1 it is not an idea1 but a contradiction with ideas2 and what has once deceived us1 no longer deserves any credit4 ,those infinite ages of time which we conceive prior to the creation1 are not nothing2 they are an imaginary time1 similar to an imaginary space4 #bd4 ,time has no necessary relation with movement1 since if nothing were to move1 or even no bodies to exist1 we should nevertheless conceive time in the succession of operations of our soul4 ,this last is indispensable2 we must have some succession of things in order to conceive time4 ,if we suppose nothing to change or to be altered1 a being subject to no external or internal change1 having one single thought always the same1 one single will always the same1 having no succession of ideas or acts of any kind whatever1 we conceive nothing to which the idea of time is applicable4 ,time is a measure2 but what is it to measure in a being of this kind8 ,succession8 ,but there is no succession4 ,duration8 ,but what is there to measure in a duration always the same1 which is only the same being8 ,duration must have parts given to it before it can be measured2 but what parts has it8 ,those of time8 ,but this would be a begging of the question1 since time is applied to it when we are inquiring whether time is applicable to it4 ,when theologians say that the existence of ,god cannot be measured by time1 that there is no succession in eternity1 but that all is united in a single point1 they utter a profound truth2 and ,clarke1 before ridiculing it1 should have studied to understand it4 #be4 ,time commences with mutable things2 if they perish1 it perishes with them4 ,there is no succession without mutation2 and consequently1 no time4 #bf4 ,what1 then1 is time8 ,the succession of things considered in the abstract4 ,what is succession8 ,being and not-being4 ,a thing exists2 it ceases to exist2 here we have succession4 ,whenever time can be calculated1 there is succession2 and whenever succession can be calculated a being and a not-being are considered4 ,the perception of this relation1 of this being and not-being1 is the idea of time4 #bg4 ,time cannot exist without being and not-being2 because in this1 succession consists2 wherever there is succession1 there is some mutation2 and there is no mutation without something being in another manner1 and this other manner is not possible unless the prior manner ceases to be4 ,substances1 modifications1 and appearances have no succession without this being and not-being4 ,what is motion8 ,the succession of the positions of a body with respect to various points2 and this succession is verified by occupying some of these positions and destroying others4 ,what is the succession of thoughts or affections of our mind8 ,the not-being of some which were1 and the being of others which were not4 #bh4 ,time1 then1 in things1 is their succession1 their being and not-being4 ,time in the understanding1 is the perception of this mutation1 this being and not-being4 ,,chapter ,v4 ,,time ,,is ,,nothing ,,absolute4 #bi4 ,is time something absolute8 ,the definition given in the last chapter shows clearly enough that it is not4 ,time in things is not being only1 nor not-being only1 but the relation of being and not-being4 ,time in the understanding1 is the perception of this relation4 ,the measure of time is nothing else than the comparison of mutations among themselves4 ,to us1 those mutations which seem to be unalterably uniform serve as the primitive measure4 ,for this we have taken the movement of the sun4 ,this movement varies when compared with that of the stars1 and ceases to be the primitive measure when referred to this3 and it was upon this the scholastics rested when they taught that the movement of the first heavens was the primitive measure of time4 #cj4 ,but what if the velocity of the sun were augmented1 and it should make its revolution in one half of its time8 ,would the hours continue the same8 ,we distinguish4 ,if this alteration should be verified solely in the solar movement1 we should perceive the discordance between this and all other movements2 and perceiving this alteration in the sun1 we should continue to refer our hours as things fixed to other measures1 to our own movements1 to our time-pieces1 or to other heavenly bodies4 ,but if we suppose every thing to be changed at one and the same time1 and in the same proportion2 the movement of all the heavens and of every thing terrestrial to be doubly accelerated1 but in such a way as not to increase the rapidity of our thoughts2 we should indeed discover an alteration1 but we should not know whether to attribute it to the world or to ourselves2 we should perceive a discrepancy between our thoughts and these movements1 but should not know whether these were accelerated or our thoughts retarded4 ,if this rapidity be also communicated to us1 so that such or such a series of thoughts formerly corresponding to so many minutes is now made in one half the number1 we should then witness a perfect correspondence in all things2 we could perceive no mutation4 ,an hour1 for example1 is to us only the perception of the relation of certain mutations3 so long as this relation continues the same1 there will be no alteration in the hour4 #ca4 ,to take away from time every idea of absolute1 seems an absurdity to the imagination1 but not to reason4 ,this case will make this evident4 ,not the man1 the best skilled in perceiving the succession of time1 can1 if he look at no time-piece1 nor refer to any measure for twelve hours1 say whether eleven hours and a half or twelve hours have passed4 ,if he live long in this way1 he will become totally incapable of estimating time2 if locked up in a dark dungeon for several months1 he will believe he has spent years there4 ,the idea1 therefore1 of the measure of time1 is nothing absolute2 it is essentially relative2 it is the perception of the relations between various mutations4 ,so long as these relations remain whole and intact1 time will be to us the same4 ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,difficulties ,,in ,,the ,,explanation ,,of ,,velocity4 #cb4 ,here arises a serious difficulty3 if time be nothing absolute1 greater or less velocity is inexplicable4 ,this seems to result even from what we have said1 that if the relation of movements be not changed1 any augmentation or diminution of velocity is impossible2 because1 if velocity be in necessary relation to time1 and time itself be nothing but the relation of mutations1 it is inconceivable how time1 and consequently how velocity1 can be changed without changing the relation of mutations4 ,thus it would be impossible for the velocity of the whole mechanism of the universe to be changed1 just as it would be absurd to say that the stars and every thing that exists may now experience the same changes of velocity4 ,this would destroy the very idea of velocity2 at least if taken as something absolute1 wherein different grades may be considered4 #cc4 ,let us now examine this difficulty1 which indeed deserves to be examined1 for it seems to contradict our most common ideas4 ,first of all1 we must premise that velocity is not something absolute1 but a relation4 ,physicists and mathematicians express it by a fraction whose numerator is the space run over and whose denominator is the time consumed4 ,making ,v the velocity1 ,s the space1 and ,t the time1 we shall have ,v ,s_/,t4 ,this shows the velocity to be essentially a relation2 for it cannot be otherwise expressed than by the ratio of the space to the time4 #cd4 ,this mathematic formula expresses the idea we all have of velocity2 it expresses in three letters what the unlettered man repeatedly says to himself4 ,the velocity of two horses is ascertained not solely by the space they have passed over1 nor solely by the time they have consumed in their career1 but by the greater or less space passed over in a given time2 or by the longer or shorter time required to pass over a given space4 ,to deny1 then1 to velocity an absolute nature1 is nothing new2 for we all of us make it essentially consist in a relation4 #ce4 ,in the expression ,v ,s_/,t two terms enter1 space and time4 ,viewing the former in the real order1 abstraction made of that of phenomena1 we more easily come to regard it as something fixed2 and we comprehend it in a given case without any relation4 ,a foot is at all times a foot2 and a yard1 a yard4 ,these are quantities existing in reality2 and if we refer them to other quantities1 it is only to make sure that they are so2 not because their reality depends upon the relation4 ,a cubic foot of water is not a cubic foot because the measure so says1 but on the contrary1 the measure so says because there is a cubit foot4 ,the measure itself is also an absolute quantity2 and in general1 all extensions are absolute1 for otherwise1 we should be obliged to seek measure of measure1 and so on to infinity4 ,true1 to call things large or small depends upon comparison2 but this does not change their own quantity4 ,the diameter of the earth1 compared with an inch measure1 is immense2 but it is an almost imperceptible point compared with the distance of the fixed stars2 yet this does not prevent the inch measure1 the diameter of the earth1 and the distance to the fixed stars1 from being values in themselves determinate1 and independent of each other4#bg #bg ,see ,lib4 ,,iii41 ,ch4 ,,xx4 ,if the denominator in ,s_/,t were a quantity of the same kind as space1 that is1 having determinate values1 existing and conceivable by themselves alone1 the velocity1 although still a relation1 might also have determinate values1 not indeed1 wholly absolute1 but only in the supposition that the two terms1 ,s and ,t1 having fixed values1 are compared4 ,thus1 if we require a velocity of #d1 we have only to take a fixed quantity of space1 and another fixed quantity of time1 having the relation to each other of #d to #a2 and this is quite easy1 when ,s and ,t are both absolute quantities4 ,if1 in this supposition1 an acceleration or delay be required in the whole universe1 nothing more would be required than to augment or diminish the time in which each part would have to traverse its respective space4 ,but from the difficulties which we have on the one hand seen presented to the consideration of time as an absolute thing1 and from the fact that1 on the other hand1 no solid proof can be adduced to show such a property to have any foundation1 it follows that we know not how to consider velocity as absolute1 even in the sense above explained4 #cf4 ,hence a consequence not less important than striking1 as to the possibility of a universal acceleration or retardation4 ,if we would have an acceleration or retardation of the whole machine of the universe1 and should abandon all motion to which we might refer time1 should at once change all1 not excluding the operations of our own soul1 we should have a problem proposed to us that appears insolvable1 nothing less than the realization of an impossibility2 the relation of many terms would have to be changed without undergoing any change4 ,if velocity be only the relation of space and time1 and time only the relation of spaces traversed1 it is the same thing to change them all in the same proportion1 and not to change them at all2 it is to leave every thing as it is4 #cg4 ,the singularity of such consequences ought not to be a sufficient excuse for abandoning them4 ,we must not forget that we are examining the common ideas of time and velocity in their most transcendental aspect1 and that it is by no means astonishing that our mind finds itself1 as it leaves its ordinary walks1 in an entirely new atmosphere1 wherein it seems to discover contradictions4 ,when we examine the ideas of time and velocity1 we unwittingly fall into the error of uniting them in the same explanation4 ,we would prescind them2 but this we do only with great difficulty1 and we often fall into a vicious circle4 ,hence it is that when1 by a great effort1 we succeed in really prescinding1 the consequences that follow seem contradictory2 but this apparent contradiction arises solely from our not having persevered with due firmness in our prescision2 and as1 in this case1 the understanding starts from two different suppositions1 whereas it believes that it starts from one alone1 the results seem to it contradictory1 which in reality they may not be4 ,the same thing occurs in the examination of the idea of space4#bh #bh ,see ,lib4 ,,iii41 ,chs4 ,,xii41 ,,xiii41 and ,,xiv4 ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,,fundamental ,,explanation ,,of ,,succession4 #ch4 ,the reasons that destroy the absolute nature of time1 inasmuch as it is subject to measure1 do not seem fully to obviate another difficulty1 arising from the consideration of time in itself4 ,if indeed time be succession1 what is this succession8 ,it is evident that things succeed each other2 but if there be no before or after1 that is1 time existing before succession1 since succession consists in some things coming after others1 what is the meaning of succeeding each other8 ,thus1 time is explained by succession1 and succession by time4 ,what is afterwards but a part of time that is in relation with a heretofore8 #ci4 ,what we said in the fourth chapter does not seem completely to solve the difficulty2 for being and not-being do not form succession1 save only inasmuch as one comes after the other1 that is1 inasmuch as it presupposes the time to be explained already to exist4 ,there may be a simultaneous being and not-being of distinct things2 and there is in one and the same thing no repugnance between being and not-being1 if not referred to the same time4 ,in such a case1 therefore1 this is always presupposed so to be2 since in one and the same thing1 being and not-being are inconceivable unless at different instants of time4 ,hence it follows that being and not-being do not sufficiently explain time4 #dj4 ,this difficulty is indeed grave2 and we must1 in order to solve it1 elaborate a fundamental explanation of succession4 ,this we shall endeavor to do1 and without in any sense supposing the idea of time4 #da4 ,there are things which exclude1 and things which do not exclude each other4 ,when we have existence of things which exclude each other1 we have succession4 ,if in a line a--------b--------c1 a body be at a1 it cannot pass to b1 without ceasing to be at a4 ,the situation at b excludes that at a2 and so also that at c excludes that at b4 ,when we see things exist notwithstanding this reciprocal exclusion1 we find succession4 #db4 ,succession is1 in reality1 the existence of things mentally exclusive of each other4 ,what each involves is the being of that which excludes1 and the not-being of that which is excluded4 #dc4 ,this exclusion prevails in all variations2 and therefore1 we find succession in every variation4 ,variation is the mutation of states2 the loss of one1 and the acquisition of another2 therefore1 there is exclusion1 for being excludes not-being1 and not-being1 being4 #dd4 ,when we perceive these distinctions1 these exclusions realized1 we perceive succession1 time4 ,when we compute these exclusions1 these distinctions in which distinct and exclusive things are offered to us1 such as being and not-being1 we compute time4 #de4 ,here arises a difficulty4 ,if succession involves exclusion1 and there is no succession without exclusion1 it follows that things which do not exclude each other are simultaneous2 and from this we infer the absurdity of saying1 that the things happening in the time of ,adam1 which do not exclude those of our own time1 are simultaneous4 ,the motion of the plants of ,paradise excludes not that of plants in gardens now existing2 this motion1 then1 is simultaneous with that2 the motion that was then is the present2 and the present motion was then2 which is inconceivably absurd4 ,this difficulty is serious3 it seems to be based upon a reason founded in evident truths2 but it is not impossible to give a solution of it4 #df4 ,were there to exist one thing which excluded nothing1 and was excluded by nothing1 it would be simultaneous with every thing4 ,know you what this thing is8 ,there is but one1 ,god4 ,it is therefore that the theologians say1 with great truth1 and with a profoundness which has not1 perhaps1 been at all times understood even by those who have made the remark1 that ,god is present to all times2 that to him there is no succession1 no before or after2 that to him every thing is present1 is now4 #dg4 ,of ,god alone is this true2 in all else there is some exclusion1 being and not-being1 and therefore succession4 ,let us now1 for example1 examine how the motion of the plants in our gardens is excluded by that of the garden of ,eden4 ,how are those of our gardens moved8 ,by existing1 and also by being subject to conditions necessary to motion4 ,how do they exist8 ,by a development of the germs they themselves contain4 ,what is this development8 ,a series of motions1 of being and of not-being1 and consequently of things that exclude each other4 ,there is1 then1 no simultaneousness between those of the garden of ,eden and those of our own gardens2 for between the former and the first germ1 there was no mediation other than the movement of the first development2 whereas1 between the movements of those of our gardens and the first germ1 many others have intervened4 ,here we have exclusion1 being and not-being4 ,the number of exclusions necessary to existence is very different in the two cases2 therefore1 there is no simultaneousness4 ,considering all the developments1 and all the changes of the orb1 as a dilated series of terms interlaced by a mutual dependence1 as in fact they are by the laws of nature2 and calling these terms ,a1 ,b1 ,c1 ,d1 ,e1--,n1 the plants of the garden of ,eden belong to the term ,a1 and those of ours1 to the term ,n4 #dh4 ,the non-simultaneousness of motion is proved in the same manner as the non-simultaneousness of existence1 for motion is a manner of existing4 ,moreover1 the air which agitates the plants of our gardens has been moved by another1 and this other by yet another2 and these motions1 subject to all the fixed and constant laws of nature1 are all interlinked from the very first motion1 just as the wheels are interlocked in a system of machinery4 ,but as the curvature of one wheel is not that of the other1 so these motions are different1 and exclude one another down to the last1 which is the air which moves the present plants4 #di4 ,this explanation of succession and time1 throws much light on the idea of eternity2 and shows that eternity1 or the simultaneousness of all existence1 belongs only to the immutable being4 ,all mutable beings1 which necessarily imply a transition from not-being to being1 and from being to not-being1 involve a succession1 if not in their substance1 at least in their modifications4 #ej4 ,this explains how the idea of time is found in almost all our conceptions1 and is expressed in all languages4 ,man continually perceives being and not-being in all around him4 ,he perceives it within him1 in the multitude of his thoughts and affections2 at one time agreeing1 at another disagreeing2 sometimes connected1 and sometimes separated2 but always distinguished from one another1 always producing different modifications in the mind3 they therefore exclude each other1 and cannot co-exist2 because the existence of one excludes the existence of the other4 ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,,what ,,is ,,co-,,existence8 #ea4 ,if the succession of time involves exclusion1 there must be co-existence where there is no exclusion3 therefore1 supposing that ,god has created other worlds1 they must necessarily be contemporaneous with the present2 for it is evident that they would not be excluded2 and as they have not the mutual relation of cause and effect like the phenomena of the present world1 we cannot apply to them the explanation which we gave to show that the motion of the plants of ,paradise was not contemporaneous with the motion of the plants in our gardens4 ,we must1 therefore1 hold that it would have been impossible for another world to exist before the present world2 and that though ,god might create as many beings as he pleased1 yet1 so long as they do not exclude each other1 they must be contemporaneous4 #eb4 ,this difficulty is not easy to solve1 unless we have perfectly understood the meaning of the word exclusion4 ,by exclusion is meant1 not only the intrinsical repugnance of one being to another1 but that1 for one reason or another1 whether intrinsical or extrinsical1 the existence of one implies the negation of the existence of the other4 ,this explanation solves the difficulty4 #ec4 ,two worlds1 entirely independent of one another1 could have been subjected to this exclusion by the will of ,god4 ,god can create one without creating the other2 in this case1 we find the existence of the first and the negation of the existence of the other4 ,god can cease to preserve the first1 and create the second2 we then find the existence of the second and the negation of the first4 ,in both these cases1 there is before and after1 a succession in existence4 ,god can create both2 we can conceive the existence of both without the negation of the existence of either2 this is co-existence4 #ed4 ,we shall understand the whole question much better1 if we examine for a moment the meaning of co-existence4 ,two beings co-exist1 or exist at the same time1 when there is no succession of one to the other1 when both exist1 when there is not the existence of one and the negation of the other4 ,in order to conceive co-existence1 we need only conceive the existence of two beings3 we form the idea of succession1 by combining with the idea of the existence of one the idea of the negation of the other4 ,the co-existence of two beings is their existence2 their succession is the being of one1 and the not-being of the other4 ,being refers only to the present2 the past and the future are not being4 ,that only is which is1 not that which was1 or which will be4 ,there is a profound truth1 a sound philosophy1 and an admirable ontology in those words of the sacred text3 ,i ,,am ,,who ,,am4 ,he who is1 hath sent me to you4 #ee4 ,without being and not-being1 there is no succession1 there is no time1 there is only the present1 there is eternity4 ,to a being immutable in itself1 and in all its acts1 one in its intelligence1 one in its will1 always its own object1 unchangeable1 in the plenitude of its being1 without any kind of negation1--to such a being there is neither before nor after2 there is only now4 ,if you give to it the succession of instants1 you apply to it1 without any ground1 the work of your imagination4 ,reflect well on the meaning of before and after1 in that which can change in nothing1 by nothing1 and for nothing1 and you will see that succession is in this case a word without any meaning4 ,we attribute to it succession because we judge the object by our perceptions1 and our perceptions are successive2 they have an alternative of being and not-being1 even when applied to an immutable object4 #ef4 ,every one may experience this in his own mind4 ,conceive two beings to exist2 add to this thought nothing accessory1 neither the negation of being1 nor of time1 nor of any thing else1--merely conceive the existence of two beings1 and see if any thing is wanting to complete your idea of their co-existence4 ,if1 on the contrary1 you wish to perceive succession1 or difference of instants1 you must perceive the existence of one1 and the negation of the existence of the other4 ,therefore1 the idea of co-existence is simple1 and implies only the existence of the beings1 but the idea of succession is composed of the combination of being with not-being4 #eg4 ,i must here call attention to the fruitfulness of the idea of being1 which1 combined with the idea of not-being1 furnishes the idea of time4 ,we have before seen1 that the ideas of unity and number were favored in the same manner1 and we shall soon have occasion to observe1 how1 from the ideas of being and not-being1 spring others1 which1 although secondary in respect to these1 are the most important of all the ideas which the human mind possesses4 ,i call attention to this1 from a desire that the reader may become accustomed to refer all ideas to a few points where they are united1 not by a factitious chain imposed by arbitrary methods1 but by the internal nature of things themselves4 ,what extension is1 in relation to sensible intuitions1 the idea of being is1 in relation to conceptions4 ,the intuition of extension1 and the idea of being1 are the two fundamental points in all ideological and ontological science2 they are two primitive data possessed by the mind1 by means of which it can solve all problems1 either in the sensible order1 or in the purely intellectual4 ,regarded from this point of view1 every thing becomes clear1 and is arranged in the most logical order1 because it is the order of nature4 #eh4 ,i wish to make one observation on the method which ,i have followed in this work4 ,i did not think it well to explain separately my opinion of these general connections of all ideas2 for then it would have been necessary to treat philosophy in a systematic order1 placing at the beginning what ought to be at the end1 and trying to establish as a preliminary doctrine1 what ought only to be the result of a collection of doctrines4 ,to attain my object1 it was necessary to go on analyzing in succession facts and ideas1 without reference to system1 without doing violence to them1 in order to make them conform to a system1 but only examining them1 in order to ascertain their result4 ,this1 undoubtedly1 is the best method4 ,we thus obtain the knowledge of truth as a fruit of our labors on facts1 and are not obliged to alter objects for the sake of forcing them to bend to the author's opinion4 ,after the application which we have been making of the ideas of being1 and not-being1 to one of the most abstruse points of metaphysics1 it is not out of place to call the reader's attention to this for a moment1 so that he may be able to see the connection of doctrines4 ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,,present1 ,,past1 ,,and ,,future4 #ei4 ,after explaining the idea of co-existence1 we came to the definition of the various relations which time presents4 ,they are principally three3 present1 past1 and future4 ,all others are combinations of these4 #fj4 ,the present is the only absolute time3 by this ,i mean1 that it needs no relation1 in order to be conceived4 ,the present is conceived without relation to the past or to the future4 ,neither the past nor the future can be conceived without relation to the present4 #fa4 ,the past is an essentially relative idea4 ,when we speak of the past1 we have to take some point to which it refers1 and in respect to which we say it is past4 ,this point is the present1 either in reality1 or in the ideal order2 that is to say1 that by the understanding1 we place ourselves in that point1 and make it present to us1 and in reference to it1 we speak of the past4 ,to prove that the idea of past is essentially relative1 we may observe1 that by varying the points of reference1 the past may cease to be considered as such1 and may be presented as present or future4 ,speaking of the events of the time of ,alexander1 they are presented to us as past1 because we consider them in relation to the present moment2 but if we are speaking of the empire of ,sesostris1 the epoch of ,alexander ceases to be past1 and is converted into future4 ,if we were relating events contemporary with the deeds of ,alexander1 this epoch would cease to be past or future1 and would become present4 ,the past1 therefore1 is always in reference to a present point1 taken in the course of time1 and it is only in respect to this1 that any thing is said to have been1 to be past2 without this relation1 the idea of past is absurd1 and it is impossible to conceive it4 #fb4 ,what is the relation of past8 ,according to the definition which we have given of time1 when we perceive the being of any thing1 and then its not-being1 and the being of something else1 we say the first is past in relation to the second4 #fc4 ,what would take place1 then1 if we should perceive the being of something1 and then its not-being1 without relation to any other being8 ,this hypothesis is absurd2 for we must always have this other being1 if we perceive being and not-being4 ,but it may be replied that we may suppose the disappearance of ourselves1 and then the objection would be good4 ,even though we should disappear1 there would still remain intelligences capable of perceiving being and not-being4 ,if there were no finite intelligence1 there would still be the infinite intelligence4 #fd4 ,here arises a new difficulty2 for it may be asked whether the thing would be passed with relation to the infinite intelligence4 ,if we admit that it would be1 we seem to introduce time with the duration of ,god1 by which we destroy his eternity1 which excludes all succession4 ,if we say that to the eyes of the infinite intelligence the thing would not be past1 then it would not be past in reality2 for things are as ,god knows them4 ,then there would be the idea of being and of not-being1 and still there would not be the idea of past4 ,this difficulty arises from a confusion of terms4 ,let us suppose that ,god had created only one being1 and this being had ceased to exist2 and let us see what would be the result of this hypothesis4 ,god knows the existence and the non-existence of the object4 ,this intellectual act is most simple2 there can be no succession in it4 ,there is properly no past with respect to ,god1 and applied to the object this idea can only mean its non-existence in relation to its existence which is destroyed4 ,when the ideas are presented in this light it is easy to understand that there is no past in ,god1 but that there is the knowledge of past things4 #fe4 ,on this hypothesis1 how can the time of only one creature be measured8 ,by its changes4 ,but if it has none8 ,on this imaginary supposition there would be no time4 ,this conclusion is absolutely necessary1 although it may at first sight seem strange4 ,we must either abandon our definition of time1 or else admit that there is no time where there is no change4 #ff4 ,whatever conclusions we form on questions founded on imaginary suppositions1 this1 at least1 is certain--that the idea of past is essentially relative1 and that on no supposition can we conceive the past1 if we take from it all relation4 ,the expression has been implies both being and not-being1--the succession which constitutes time4 ,in this relation the order is such that not-being is perceived after being1 and this is why it is called past4 #fg4 ,the idea of the future is also relative to the present4 ,the future is inconceivable without this relation4 ,the future is that which is to come1--that which is to be with respect to a real or hypothetical now2 for we may apply to the future what we said of the past1 that it is changed by changing the point of its reference4 ,the future for us will be past to those who come after us2 that which was future to those past1 is present or past to us4 ,the point of reference of the future is always a present moment2 it cannot be referred to the past as its ultimate term2 for it is in itself referred equally to the present4 #fh4 ,therefore all that we find in the idea of time that is absolute is the present4 ,the present needs no relation4 ,it not only needs none1 but it admits none4 ,we can neither refer it to the past nor to the future1 because these two times both presuppose the idea of the present1 without which they cannot even be conceived4 #fi4 ,time is a chain whose links are infinitely divisible4 ,there is no time which we cannot divide into other times4 ,the indivisible instant represents something analogous to the indivisible point2 a limit which we approach without ever reaching1 an unextended element producing extension4 ,a geometrical point must be moved in order to generate a line2 but no motion is conceived as possible unless we presuppose space in which the point moves2 or in other words1 when we treat of the generation of extension1 we commence by presupposing it4 ,a similar thing happens in relation to time4 ,we imagine an indivisible instant1 from the fluxion of which results the continuity of duration which we call time4 ,but this fluxion is impossible1 unless we suppose a time in which it flows4 ,we wish to examine the generation of time1 and we suppose it already existing1 prolonged infinitely1 as an immense line on which the fluxion of the instant takes place4 ,what are we to infer from these apparent contradictions8 ,nothing but a strong confirmation of the doctrine which we have established4 ,time distinguished from things is nothing4 ,duration in the abstract1 distinguished from that which endures1 is a being of reason1--a work which our understanding produces from the materials furnished by reality4 ,all being is present4 ,that which is not present is not-being4 ,the present instant1 the now1 is the reality of the thing2 it is not sufficient to constitute time1 but it is necessary to time4 ,there can be present without either past or future2 but there can be neither past nor future without the present4 ,when besides being there is not-being1 and this relation is perceived1 time begins4 ,to conceive past and future without the alternation of being and not-being1 as a sort of line infinitely produced in two opposite directions1 is to take an empty play of the phantasy for a philosophical idea1 and to apply to time the illusion of imaginary space4 #gj4 ,therefore1 if there is only being1 there is only absolute1 present duration2 therefore no past nor future1 and1 consequently1 no time4 ,time is in its essence a successive1 flowing quantity2 it cannot be seized in its actuality2 for it is always divisible1 and every division in time constitutes past and future4 ,this is a demonstration that time is a mere relation1 and in so far as it is in things1 it only expresses being and not-being4 ,,chapter ,x4 ,,application ,,of ,,the ,,preceding ,,doctrine ,,to ,,several ,,important ,,questions4 #ga4 ,this theory will be much better understood by its application to the solution of several questions4 ,i4 ,how long a time had passed before the creation8 ,none4 ,as there was no succession1 there was only the present1 the eternity of ,god4 ,all else that we imagine is a mere illusion1 contrary to sound philosophy4 ,,ii4 ,was it possible for another world to have existed when this world's existence began8 ,undoubtedly it was2 this would only require that ,god had created it1 without creating this world2 it would only require the being of the one and the not-being of the other4 ,and as there was not-being because there was no creation1 it follows that if ,god had created the one without creating the other1 and had ceased to preserve the first when he created the second1 there would have been succession and priority of time4 ,,iii4 ,here is another question which is somewhat strange1 and at first seems very difficult4 ,was the existence of a world prior to this possible in any time8 or1 in other words1 could another world have ceased to exist some time before the beginning of the existence of this world8 ,this question implies a contradiction4 ,it supposes an interval of time1 that is1 of succession1 without any thing to succeed4 ,if a world had ceased to exist1 and no new world should exist1 there would be nothing but ,god2 there would then be no succession1 there would be only eternity4 ,to ask1 therefore1 how long a time they were apart1 is to suppose that there is time1 where there is none4 ,the proper answer is1 that the question is absurd4 ,but we shall be asked1 were they distant1 or were they not8 ,there is no distance of time where there is no time2 this distance is a mere illusion1 by which we imagine time1 while1 by the state of the question1 we suppose that there is no time4 ,then it may be objected1 that the two successive worlds must be necessarily immediate1 that is to say1 that the first instant of one must be immediately connected with the last instant of the other4 ,i deny it4 ,for immediateness of instants supposes the succession of beings mutually connected in a certain order2 the two worlds in question would have no mutual relation2 consequently1 there would be neither distance nor immediateness between them4 ,but1 it may be replied1 there is no medium between being and not-being1 and distance being the negation of immediateness1 and immediateness the negation of distance1 by denying one1 we affirm the other2 they must1 therefore1 either be distant or immediate4 ,this reply also supposes something which we deny4 ,it speaks of distance and immediateness1 that is1 of time1 as though it were something positive1 distinct from the beings themselves4 ,the principle1 that every thing is1 or is not1 quodlibet est vel non est1 is applicable only when there is something2 but when there is nothing1 there is no disjunctive4 ,the time of the two worlds is nothing1 as distinguished from them2 it is the succession of their respective phenomena2 the succession of the two worlds1 the one to the other1 is nothing distinguished from them2 it is the being of the one1 and the negation of the other1 and the being of the second and the negation of the first4 ,god sees this2 an intelligent creature would also see it1 if he could survive the annihilation of the first world4 ,to the eyes of ,god1 who sees the reality1 succession would be simply the respective existence and non-existence of the two objects4 ,the intelligent creature would say1 that the two worlds are immediate1 if to the perception of the last instant of the annihilated world1 the perception of a new existing world had followed without another intermediate perception2 and he would say1 that there is distance1 if he had experienced various perceptions between the annihilation of the old and the perception of the new creation4 ,the measure of this time would be taken from the changes of perceptions of this creature1 and would be longer or shorter1 according to the number of these perceptions4 #gb4 ,the idea of time is essentially relative1 as it is the ordered perception of being and not-being4 ,the mere perception of one of the two extremes1 would not be sufficient to produce the idea of time in our mind2 for this idea necessarily implies comparison4 ,the same is true of the idea of space1 which has always a great resemblance to time4 ,we cannot conceive space1 or extension of any kind1 without juxtaposition2 that is to say1 without relations of various objects4 ,multiplicity necessarily enters into the ideas of both space and time4 ,hence1 we may say1 that if we conceive a being1 absolutely simple1 with no multiplicity1 either in its essence1 or in its acts1 but in which all is identified with its essence1 there is no room for the ideas of space and time2 and1 consequently1 they are mere fictions of the imagination1 when we attribute to them any thing real1 beyond the corporeal world1 and before the existence of the created4 ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,,the ,,analysis ,,of ,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,time ,,confirms ,,its ,,resemblance ,,to ,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,space4 #gc4 ,having explained the idea of time1 and applied it to the most difficult questions1 we may explain this doctrine still farther1 by examining what we have already intimated concerning the resemblance between time and space4#bi ,there is analogy in the difficulties2 analogy in the definitions of both ideas2 analogy in the illusions which hinder the knowledge of the truth4 ,what we announced before with respect to these two ideas1 considering the idea of time as only what it appeared at first sight1 we may now assert as the secure result of analytical investigations4 ,i call attention in particular to the following parallel1 because it greatly explains the ideas of both4 #bi ,see ,ch4 ,,iii4 #gd4 ,space is nothing in itself1 distinguished from bodies2 it is only the extension of bodies3 time is nothing in itself1 distinguished from things4 ,it is only the succession of things4 #ge4 ,the idea of space is the idea of extension in general2 the idea of time is the idea of succession in general4 #gf4 ,where there are no bodies1 there is no space3 where there are no things which succeed each other1 there is no time4 #gg4 ,an infinite space1 before the existence of bodies1 or outside of bodies1 is an illusion of the imagination3 an infinite time before the existence of things1 or outside of them1 is also an illusion4 #gh4 ,space is continuous3 so is time4 #gi4 ,one part of space excludes all others2 one part of time also excludes all others4 #hj4 ,a pure space1 in which bodies are situated1 is imaginary3 a succession1 a time1 in which things succeed1 is also imaginary4 #ha4 ,that which is entirely simple has no need of space1 and can exist without it3 that which is immutable has no need of time1 and can exist without it4 #hb4 ,the simple and infinite is present to all points of space1 without losing its infinity3 the immutable and infinite is present to all instants of time1 without altering its eternity4 #hc4 ,two things are distant in space1 because there are bodies placed between them2 this distance is only the extension of the bodies themselves3 two beings are distant in time1 because there are other beings placed between them2 this distance is the existence of the beings which are placed between4 #hd4 ,extension needs no other extension1 in which to be placed1 otherwise we should have a processus in infinitum3 the succession of things1 for the same reason1 needs no other succession in which to succeed4 #he4 ,just as we form the idea of continued succession in space by distinguishing different parts of extension1 and perceiving that one excludes the others1 so we also form the idea of continued succession of time by distinguishing different facts and perceiving that one excludes the others4 #hf4 ,in order to form determinate ideas of the parts of space1 we must take a measure and refer to it3 to form an idea of the parts of time we also need a measure4 ,the measure of space is the extension of some body which we know3 the measure of time is some series of changes which we know4 ,to measure space we seek for fixed things1 as far as possible2 for the want of something better1 men have recourse to the parts of the body1 the hand1 the foot1 the yard1 and the pace1 which give an approximate1 if not an exact measure4 ,the exact sciences having advanced1 they have taken for their measure the forty-millionth part of the meridian of the earth3 time is measured by the motion of the celestial bodies1 by the diurnal motion1 the lunar1 solar1 and sidereal year4 #hg4 ,the idea of number is necessary in order to determine space and compare its different parts3 the same idea is necessary in the same manner to time4 ,the discrete quantity explains the continuous4 ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,,relations ,,of ,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,time ,,to ,,experience4 #hh4 ,if time is nothing distinct from things1 how does it happen that we conceive it in the abstract1 independently of things themselves8 ,how does it happen that it presents itself to us as an absolute being1 subject to no transformation or motion1 while within it every thing is moved and transformed8 ,if it is a subjective fact1 why do we apply it to things8 ,if it is objective1 why is it mingled with all our perceptions8 ,because it contains a necessity sufficient to be the object of science4 ,the idea of time1 whatever it may be1 seems prior to all perception of transformation1 the consciousness of all internal acts included4 ,it is impossible for us to know any of these things1 unless time serves as a receptacle in which we may place our own changes and those of others4 #hi4 ,the idea of time is not the result of observation2 for in that case it would be the expression of a contingent fact1 and could not be the principle of science4 ,we measure time with the same exactness as we do space1 and it is one of the most fundamental ideas of the exact sciences1 in so far as they have any application to the objects of nature4 #ij4 ,it might seem to follow from this that the idea of time is innate in our mind2 and that it is prior to all ideas1 and even sensations2 for both are necessarily involved in successive duration4 #ia4 ,the necessity of the idea of time seems to prove that time is independent of transitory things2 in this case we are obliged to convert it into a purely subjective fact1 or else to grant it an objective reality1 independent of that which is changeable4 ,by the former we destroy it2 by the latter we make it an attribute of the divinity4 ,to deny time is to deny the light of the sun2 to raise it to the rank of an attribute of divinity is to admit change in an immutable being4 ,if we make it purely subjective1 we deny it2 if objective1 we make it divine3 is there no middle way8 #ib4 ,i agree that the idea of time is not derived from mere experience2 for experience could not furnish an element so solid and so fixed1 on which we may with perfect security rest all the observations of science4 ,still less can it be maintained1 that the idea of time is derived from purely sensible experience1 or that it is in itself a sensation4 #ic4 ,the idea of time is not a sensation2 for it is relative1 and sensation is an affection of our being1 without any reference to or comparison with any thing4 ,when we experience sensations1 if we had only the sensitive faculty1 we should be limited to pure sensation1 without any consideration of before or after1 or any relation of any kind4 ,sensation1 being limited to certain objects1 cannot1 like the idea of time1 extend to all objects4 ,by time1 we measure not only the external world1 but also the internal2 not only the affections of the body1 but also the most concealed and abstract actions of our mind4 ,time is1 in itself1 succession1 and1 in our mind1 it is the perception of this succession2 it cannot1 therefore1 present any object to the mind2 even when time refers to objects1 and is1 as it were1 the link between them1 it is not itself either these objects themselves1 nor the intuition of them4 ,the idea of the time which measures the succession of a sound or of a sight1 clearly is not either the sound or the sight1 but the perception of their succession1 of their connection4 ,if it were the sight alone1 or the sound alone1 either the sight or the sound would alone be sufficient in order to perceive time1 which is absurd2 for there is no time without succession1 and consequently there can be no time which measures two sensations without these sensations4 ,the idea of time is independent of either of the two2 it is superior to them2 it is a sort of universal form1 independent of this or that matter2 so that1 if after the sound1 instead of the sight1 another sound should be perceived by us1 the measure of the succession would be the same1 and this measure is nothing more than the idea of time4 ,sensations being mere contingent facts1 cannot be the foundation of necessary and universal truths1 they cannot serve as the basis of a science4 ,but the idea of time is one of the principal ideas in all the physical sciences1 and1 like extension1 is subjected to a very rigorous calculation2 therefore1 it is not a sensation1 and it is not derived from sensation4 #id4 ,purely experimental cognitions are confined to the sphere of experience2 the idea of time extends to the whole real and possible order1 it teaches us not only what is1 but what may1 and what must be2 its relations are of absolute necessity1 and may be subjected to the strictest calculation2 therefore it contains something more than the elements furnished by sensible or insensible experience4 ,it is not otherwise possible to explain the necessity which it involves1 or to pass beyond a collection of contingent facts to arrive at the possession of an element of science4 #ie4 ,let us observe1 as we pass1 that here is found another proof that the system of ,condillac is neither true nor subsistent4 ,his system has been found insufficient to explain any fundamental idea1 and it does not explain the idea of time1 any more than the rest1 although it seems as though this idea must have the most intimate relations to the sensible order4 #if4 ,if the idea of time is not merely experimental1 how explain the priority and necessity of time8 ,,chapter ,,xiii4 ,,kant',s ,,opinion4 #ig4 ,kant uses the same theory to explain time that he used to explain space4 ,time1 according to him1 is nothing in itself1 neither is it any thing in things2 it is a subjective condition of intuition1 a form of the internal sense1 by means of which phenomena are presented to us as successive1 just as space was the form by which they are presented as continuous4 ,to speak frankly1 it seems to me that this is saying nothing2 it affirms a well-known fact1 but does not explain it4 ,who does not know that what we perceive we perceive in succession--that we perceive even our own perceptions in succession8 ,but what is succession8 ,this is what he ought to have explained4 #ih4 ,kant says that time is only in us2 but ,i should like to ask him1 if succession is only in us4 ,he pretends that we know nothing of the external world1 but that we perceive certain appearances1 or phenomena2 but he does not deny that beyond the appearance there may be a reality4 ,if this reality is possible1 changes are possible in it2 and change cannot be conceived without succession1 nor succession without time4 #ii4 ,according to ,kant1 the ideas of space and time are priori1 they cannot be empirical1 or experimental2 for in that case they could not be the basis of science2 we could only affirm what we had experienced1 and this only with respect to the cases in which we have experienced it4 ,this is true1 and ,i have demonstrated it in the last chapter2 but1 conceding this priority1 it proves nothing in favor of ,kant's system4 ,the ideas of space and time1 although priori1 may nevertheless correspond to something in reality1 as follows from the theory by which ,i have explained them4 #ajj4 ,time is not any thing which subsists by itself1 but it is not equally certain that it does not belong1 as an objective determination1 to things1 and that nothing remains of it1 if we abstract it from all the subjective impressions of intuition4 ,i have demonstrated that time does not subsist by itself1 and that a duration without any thing which endures1 is an absurdity2 but it does not follow from this that the order represented by the idea of time is not something real in the objects4 ,abstracting it from our intuition1 there still remains something which verifies the propositions by which we express the properties of time4 #aja4 ,the ,german philosopher makes time purely subjective1 and relies on the following argument3 ,if time were a condition belonging to the things themselves1 or an order1 it could not precede the objects as a condition of them1 and be known and perceived priori by synthetical judgments4 ,this last is easily explained if time is nothing but the subjective condition under which all intuitions are possible in us4 ,for then this form of the internal intuition can be represented before the objects1 and consequently priori4444 ,if we abstract our manner of perceiving ourselves internally1 and of embracing1 by means of this intuition1 all external intuitions in the faculty of representation1 and consequently take objects just as they may be in themselves1 time is nothing4444 ,i can say that my representations are successive1 but this only means that we are conscious of them in a succession1--that is1 in a form of the internal sense4 ,time would not therefore be any thing in itself1 nor a determination inherent in things4#cj #cj ,trans4 sth4 ,,ii41 ,a4 #f4 w4 f4 #ajb4 ,it is easy to see that the philosopher is struggling between two difficulties4 ,the first is1 how to explain the necessity involved in the idea of time1 if he makes it proceed from experience4 ,the second is1 how1 if it is not derived from experience1 it can be found really in things1 or1 at least1 how we can know that it is found in them4 ,hence1 he concludes1 that it is not possible to save the necessity involved in the idea of time1 unless by making it a purely subjective fact1 a form of an intuition1 entirely independent of the reality of things4 ,it seems to me1 that by attending to the principles established above1 we can give an objective value to time1 independently of our intuition1 and explain its relations to experience1 without destroying the necessity contained in its idea4 ,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,,fundamental ,,explanation ,,of ,,the ,,objective ,,possibility ,,and ,,of ,,the ,,necessity ,,of ,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,time4 #ajc4 ,things in themselves1 abstracted from our intuition1 are susceptible of change4 ,where there is change1 there is succession1 and where there is succession1 there is a certain order in the things which succeed1--an order which is really in the things themselves1 although it does not subsist by itself1 separated from them4 ,kant might object to this1 that perhaps the changes are not in things1 but in the phenomena1 or the manner in which they are presented to our intuition4 ,but he cannot deny1 that whether these changes are in the reality1 or not1 they are1 at least1 possible1 independently of the phenomena4 ,therefore1 he asserts1 without reason1 that time in the things is nothing1 and that it is only the form of our internal sense4 ,if he admits the possibility of real changes1 he must also admit the possibility of a real time2 if he denies that it is possible for the things in themselves to be really changed1 we would ask him how he came to know this impossibility1--he1 who limits all our knowledge to the purely phenomenal order4 ,we cannot know that a thing is impossible in an order1 if we know nothing of this order2 if ,kant maintains that we know nothing of things in themselves1 he cannot prove that we know the impossibility of their really changing4 #ajd4 ,it is then demonstrated that time1 or a real order in things1 is1 at least1 possible4 ,therefore1 we cannot say that time is a purely subjective condition1 to which nothing can correspond in the reality4 #aje4 ,admitting the possibility of an objective value of the idea of time1 not only in reference to the purely phenomenal order1 but also to the transcendental1 or rather to things considered in themselves1 and abstracted from our intuition2 we shall see how the objectiveness of the idea of time and its relations to experience can be shown1 without destroying the intrinsic necessity which makes it one of the principal elements of the exact sciences4 #ajf4 ,time1 considered in things1 is the order of their being1 and their not-being4 ,the idea of time is the perception of this order in its greatest generality and abstracted from the objects which are contained in it4 ,as our understanding evidently can consider a purely possible order of things1 the idea of time extends to the possibility as well as the reality4 ,this is why we conceive time before and after the present world1 similar to the space which we imagine beyond the limits of the universe4 ,the idea of being1 elevated to a purely possible region1 in which it is abstracted from all individual phenomena1 is freed from the instability to which the objects of our experience are subject3 it can then be an absolutely necessary element of science2 for it expresses a relation which is not affected by any thing contingent4 ,these observations are a solution of all difficulties4 ,,chapter ,,xv4 ,,important ,,corollaries4 #ajg4 ,is the idea of time derived from experience8 ,this question is answered by what we said of the idea of being4 ,it is not a type existing previous to all sensation and to all intellectual act2 it is a perception of being and not-being which accompanies all our acts1 but is not presented to us separately until reflection eliminates from it all that does not belong to it4 ,this perception is the exercise of an innate activity1 which is subjected to the conditions of experience in all that concerns the beginning and the continuation of its acts1 but not with respect to its laws which are characteristic of it1 and correspond to the pure intellectual order4 ,this activity is unfolded in the presence of causes or occasions which excite it1 and its exercise ceases when these conditions are wanting2 but while the activity acts1 it exercises its functions in accordance with fixed laws which are independent of the objects exciting it4 #ajh4 ,it is therefore clear that the idea of time is not strictly derived from experience1 except inasmuch as the mind is excited to develop its activity by experience4 ,neither is it entirely independent of experience2 for without experience we should have no knowledge of change1 and consequently the intellect would not perceive the order of being and not-being1 in which the essence of time consists4 #aji4 ,hence the idea of time is not a form of the sensibility1 but of the pure intellectual order2 and although it descends to the field of sensible experience1 it does so after the manner of other general conceptions4 #aaj4 ,the idea of time is one of the most universal and indeterminate ideas which our mind possesses2 for it is the combination of the two most general and most indeterminate ideas1 being and not-being4 ,here is the reason why the idea of time is common to all men1 and is presented to us as a form of all our conceptions and of all the objects known4 ,the ideas of being and not-being1 entering as primitive elements into all our perceptions1 generate the idea of time4 ,we therefore find this idea in the inmost recesses of our soul as a condition from which we cannot withdraw ourselves1 and from which we exempt the ,infinite ,being himself only by an effort of reflection4 #aaa4 ,the transition from the purely intellectual order to the field of experience takes place in the idea of time1 in the same manner as in the other intellectual conceptions4 ,i have1 therefore1 nothing to add to what ,i have already said on this point when explaining it elsewhere4#ca #ca ,see ,bk4 ,,iv41 ,chapters ,,xiv4 and ,,xv4 ,,chapter ,,xvi4 ,,pure ,,ideal ,,time ,,and ,,empyrical ,,time4 #aab4 ,time is not only conceived as a general order of change1 or as a relation of being and not-being2 but also as something fixed1 which can be measured with exactness4 ,thus1 before the creation of the world1 we conceive not only an abstract order1 or time1 but a time composed of years1 of centuries1 or some other terms4 ,but this1 if we closely examine it1 is only an idea in which we conceive the phenomena of experience under a general view1 taking them out of actuality and contemplating them in the sphere of possibility4 ,neither the years nor the centuries existed when there was nothing by which they could be measured4 ,if we imagine a sort of vague line of duration prolonged to infinity1 abstracting it from the measure and the object measured1 we become the sport of our imagination1 and are entangled in contradictions from which it is difficult to extricate ourselves4 #aac4 ,the pure and abstract idea of time admits no measure2 it is a mere relation of being and not-being4 ,the measure is possible only when the idea of time is combined with the phenomena of experience4 ,subject as we are to change1 and situated amid beings as changeable as ourselves1 we should certainly fall into the greatest confusion of our ideas1 if in this ebb and flow of external as well as internal existences which appear to us1 we had not the greatest facility in referring them to fixed measures1 which are the thread that guides us in this labyrinth of continual variations4 #aad4 ,two things are required for this measure3 first1 a suitable phenomenon1 and secondly1 the idea of number4 ,the common idea of time which serves for the ordinary purposes of life of these three elements3 the pure idea of time1 or the relation of being and not-being2 secondly1 a suitable phenomenon to which we apply this pure idea2 and thirdly1 the numeration of the changes of this phenomenon4 ,apply this observation to all the measures of time1 and you will find these three elements always sufficient1 but always indispensable also4 #aae4 ,from this we deduce the necessity of time1 even considered empirically2 for it involves two ideas1 the one metaphysical1 and the other mathematical1 applied to a fact4 ,the metaphysical idea is the relation of being and not-being2 the mathematical idea is number2 and the fact is the sensible phenomenon1 as1 for example1 the solar1 or human motion4 ,metaphysics and arithmetic take charge of the absolute certainty2 the fact observed answers for the experimental certainty2 and as1 on the other hand1 this phenomenon is supposed to be certain1 because1 in case it were necessary we could abstract it from the reality1 and attend only to the possibility2 it follows that time1 even considered empirically1 may become the object of the exact sciences4 #aaf4 ,this theory does not make time a purely subjective condition1 nor grant it a nature independent of things2 it reconciles the pure intellectual order with the order of experience2 and places man in communication with the real world1 without creating a contradiction in his ideas4 ,,chapter ,,xvii4 ,,relations ,,of ,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,time ,,and ,,the ,,principle ,,of ,,contradiction4 #aag4 ,let us explain the true meaning of the principle of contradiction4 ,it is impossible for any thing to be and not be at the same time4 ,the connection of the ideas contained in this principle seems at first sight to be explained without any difficulty2 so that1 to raise questions as to its true sense is to place ourselves in contradiction with one of the fundamental truths on which rests the edifice of our knowledge4 ,for1 if there be any doubt as to the true meaning of the principle1 it may be understood in several ways1 and then there will be another doubt as to whether the generality of men understand it as they ought to1 and whether1 consequently1 it is for them a solid foundation of knowledge4 ,this difficulty ceases to be one when we reflect that the most evident axioms may be considered in two manners3 empirically1 or scientifically2 or in other words1 inasmuch as they are the application1 or the object of analytical examination4 ,in the first manner1 they are equally certain and equally clear to all men2 in the second1 they are subject to difficulties4 ,the principle1--things equal to a third are equal to each other1--considered empirically1 is absolutely certain and evident to all men3 all men1 from the wisest to the most ignorant1 compare things with a third1 when they wish to ascertain their equality or inequality2 this is only an application of the principle4 ,if you ask them the reason of this proceeding1 although they may not enunciate the axiom in its precise terms1 they refer to it in different ways3 ,these two tables are equal1 because ,i have measured them1 and they are each four feet square4 ,probably the generality of men1 not accustomed to reflect on their knowledge1 would not express the principle in universal and precise terms2 as1 ,these two tables are equal1 because they have a common measure1 and things equal to a third are equal to each other4 ,yet they are just as clearly certain of the principle1 and apply it1 without any danger of error1 in all real and possible cases4 ,this is what ,i call the empirical knowledge of principles1--a knowledge which is perfect in the direct order1 and is defective only in the reflex order4#cb #cb ,see ,bk4 ,i41 ,ch4 ,,iii4 ,it is very easy to reconcile the difficulty in the analysis of the principle1 with its clearness when applied to ordinary purposes1 or to those of science4 ,thus1 in the example given1 the analysis of the term equal leads to the analysis of the term quantity3 reflection can discover in this difficulties which1 although they do not disturb mankind in the possession of truth1 are difficulties notwithstanding4 ,geometry is undoubtedly a science perfectly evident and certain2 but who can deny that the idea of extension presents serious difficulties1 when examined before the tribunal of metaphysics8 ,universal arithmetic is1 beyond all doubt1 a science2 yet the ideas of quantity and number1 which are indispensable to it1 give rise to the most abstruse questions of metaphysics and ideology4 ,in general1 it may be said that there is no branch of our knowledge which is exempt from difficulties1 considered in its root2 but these difficulties1 arising from reflection1 do not in any way lessen the certainty of direct knowledge4 ,hence it is no objection that the analysis of the principle of contradiction presents difficulties2 nor are we therefore to fear for the firmness of the edifice of our knowledge4 ,it would be of no service to us not to attend to these difficulties1 if they really existed2 a difficulty does not vanish because we shut our eyes so as not to see it4 ,let us not1 therefore1 vainly fear to examine the true sense of the principle of contradiction4 #aah4 ,it seems that this principle either does not exist1 or has no meaning1 unless we presuppose the idea of time2 and1 on the other hand1 we cannot conceive time1 unless we presuppose the principle of contradiction4 ,do we thus fall into a vicious circle1 and this too in the fundamental principle of all our knowledge8 ,this is a difficulty which ,i shall first develop and present more clearly4 ,the principle of contradiction presupposes the idea of time1 because there would be no contradiction if being and not-being were not referred to the same time4 ,this last condition is altogether indispensable2 for1 suppressing the simultaneousness1 there is no contradiction in a thing both being and not-being4 ,not only is there no contradiction in this1 but it is a thing which we constantly meet with1 in every thing around us4 ,we see being and not-being in things which pass from existence to non-existence1 or from non-existence to existence4 ,although the simultaneousness may not be expressed in the principle of contradiction1 it is always understood1 so that we should gain nothing by adopting ,kant's formula4#cc ,in whatever terms the principle may be enunciated1 it is always true that the same thing cannot both be and not be at the same time1 but may very well be at one time and not be at another time4 #cc ,see ,bk4 ,i41 ,ch4 ,,xx4 ,the idea of time is therefore necessary in order that the contradiction may follow in some cases1 and disappear in others4 ,if the time implies simultaneousness1 it generates the contradiction2 if it implies succession1 it destroys the contradiction2 because being and not-being are impossible1 unless we presuppose a successive duration1 among the different parts of which1 things that would otherwise be contradictory are distributed4 #aai4 ,the idea of time also presupposes the principle of contradiction2 for1 if time1 in things1 is only being and not-being1 and in the intellect1 the perception of this being and not-being2 we cannot perceive time without having perceived being and not-being2 and as these ideas1 without succession1 involve a contradiction1 we must perceive the principle of contradiction when we perceive time4 ,i have said that succession implies the mutual exclusion of the things which succeed2 now1 the first exclusion is the principle of contradiction3 in perceiving time1 we perceive succession2 therefore we have already perceived the contradiction4 #abj4 ,these remarks might incline us to believe it necessary to choose between a vicious circle1 which is inadmissible in the foundation of all our knowledge1 and an explanation of time1 independently of being and not-being4 ,if we conceived time as existing by itself1 as a sort of line prolonged to infinity2 as a form of things1 but distinct from them all2 as a vague capacity in which successive beings might be placed1 just as we situate co-existences in space1--then the idea of time would not be explained by the principle of contradiction1 and we could only say that it was completed by it4 ,when we say that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not be at the same time1 but that it is possible for the same thing to be and not be at different times1 the contradiction is affirmed or taken away1 accordingly as the being and not-being are referred to the same point or to different points in this vague extension1 this infinite line1 which we call successive duration1 and in which we conceive changeable things to be distributed4 ,this explanation is convenient2 but it has a defect1 that it cannot stand a philosophical examination1 as we have seen in the preceding chapters4 ,we must therefore have recourse to another class of considerations4 #aba4 ,to solve this difficulty1 it is necessary to determine precisely the meaning of our ideas4 ,the expression of vicious circle is improperly applied to this case4 ,if we understand this1 the whole difficulty is solved at once4 ,in explaining things1 which are not identical1 a circle is a defect1 and is called vicious2 but when two things are identical at bottom1 although they appear distinct1 because presented under various aspects1 it is impossible to explain one without stumbling1 so to speak1 on the other1 or to approach one without meeting the other4 ,because they are presented under different aspects we are led to believe them distinct2 but examining them analytically1 we abstract the difference of aspect1 and penetrate to the reality1 and discover the point where they are united1 or1 rather1 where they are absolutely identified4 #abb4 ,we may draw from these observations a criterion which we may use in a great many cases4 ,when1 in explaining two objects1 we find ourselves led alternately from the one to the other1 without any possibility of avoiding a circle1 we may suspect that objects1 which appear distinct1 are not so in reality1 and that the objects presented to the eyes of our understanding are not two objects1 but only one object perceived in different ways4 #abc4 ,this is true in the present instance4 ,in explaining the principle of contradiction we encounter the idea of time1 and in defining time we encounter the principle of contradiction1 or the ideas of being and not-being4 ,this is a circle1 but an inevitable one2 and therefore it ceases to be vicious4 #abd4 ,what is the meaning of the principle of contradiction8 ,its true meaning is1 that being excludes not-being1 and not-being excludes being2 that the nature of these conceptions is such that the affirmation of one implies the negation of the other1 not only in the order of our ideas1 but in reality4 ,let us call ,a any being whatever3 the principle of contradiction means that ,a excludes not-,a1 and not-,a excludes ,a4 ,if we think ,a1 the conception of not-,a disappears2 and if we think not-,a1 the conception of ,a disappears4 ,if we affirm ,a in reality1 we deny not-,a1 and if we affirm not-,a in reality1 we deny ,a4 ,this is the true meaning of the principle of contradiction4 ,if we reflect1 we shall find that1 as far as possible1 we have abstracted the idea of time2 for we have only considered the mutual exclusion of ,a and not-,a1 in reference to a simul1 an indivisible point of duration1 which1 involving no succession1 does not give us the idea of time4 ,i said1 as far as possible2 because as soon as we think ,a and not-,a1 the idea of succession1 and consequently of time1 arises in our mind4 #abe4 ,a and not-,a imply contradiction2 but not so that they absolutely cannot be realized4 ,the exclusion is conditional2 that is1 it exists as long as the contradictory extremes are simultaneous1 or referred to an indivisible now2 but we discover no intrinsic necessity of existence in the idea of ,a3 consequently1 although we know that while ,a is1 not-,a cannot be1 we can very well conceive that ,a may cease to be1 and not-,a may begin to be4 ,there is1 in1 that case1 no contradiction1 and we can easily reconcile in our mind the two ideas of ,a and not-,a1 by referring them to different instants4 #abf4 ,hence the perception of time implies the perception of beings that are not necessary1--of beings which1 when they exist1 may cease to exist1 and when they do not exist1 may begin to exist4 ,the difference between necessary and contingent being is1 that the existence of the former absolutely excludes its non-existence1 while the existence of the latter excludes its non-existence only conditionally1 or on the supposition of simultaneousness4 #abg4 ,this is why the principle of contradiction requires the condition of time4 ,the objects which we perceive are changeable2 there is nothing either in their nature or in their modifications which involves existence4 ,if they are1 they may cease to be2 and if this change does not constantly occur in their substance1 it does in their accidents4 ,therefore we cannot affirm the absolute1 but only the conditional contradiction of their being and not-being2 it exists only on the supposition of simultaneousness4 #abh4 ,if we conceived only necessary being1 we could have no idea of time3 its existence absolutely excludes its non-existence1 and therefore the contradiction would be always absolute1 never conditional4 #abi4 ,a most important consequence results from this analysis4 ,the perception of time with us implies the perception of the non-necessity of things4 ,when we perceive a being which is not necessary1 we perceive a being which may cease to be1 in which case we have the idea of succession1 of real or possible time4 ,here another reflection arises which is also important3 the idea of time is the idea of contingency3 the consciousness of time is the consciousness of our weakness4 #acj4 ,the idea of time is so deep in our mind1 that without it we could not form the idea of the me4 ,the consciousness of the identity of the me supposes a link#cd which it is impossible to find without memory4 ,memory necessarily involves the relation of past1 and1 consequently1 the idea of time4 #cd ,see ,bk4 ,i41 ,ch4 ,,xxv4 ,,chapter ,,xviii4 ,,summing ,,up4 ,let us collect together the doctrines of the preceding chapters4 #aca4 ,time is a question difficult to explain4 ,whoever denies this difficulty shows that he has meditated but superficially on the matter4 #acb4 ,motion is measured by time2 but it is not a sufficient definition of time to call it the measure of motion4 #acc4 ,it is impossible to find a primitive measure of motion2 we must1 at last1 take some measure or another1 and although arbitrarily chosen1 we must refer motion to it4 ,it should be the most uniform measure possible4 #acd4 ,the resemblance between the ideas of time and space creates a suspicion that they ought to be explained in a similar manner4 #ace4 ,there is no duration without something which endures2 therefore there is no duration separate from things4 ,if nothing existed1 there could be no duration4 #acf4 ,there is no succession without things which succeed3 therefore succession cannot be realized as a form independent of things1 although it may be conceived in the abstract by itself4 #acg4 ,time implies before and after1 and1 consequently1 succession4 ,it is succession itself1 because in conceiving succession1 we conceive time4 #ach4 ,succession involves the exclusion of some things by others4 ,this exclusion may either be founded on the essence of things1 or be derived from an external cause4 #aci4 ,time1 therefore1 involves exclusion3 it is the general idea of the order of changes1 or of the mutual relation of being and not-being4 #adj4 ,if there were no change there would be no time4 #ada4 ,no time had passed before the existence of the world4 ,there was no other duration than eternity4 #adb4 ,eternity is the existence of the infinite being1 without any alteration either actual or possible4 #adc4 ,time is not any thing absolute and independent of things1 but is really in them4 ,it is the order between being and not-being4 #add4 ,co-existence is merely the existence of various beings4 ,to conceive many beings without the idea of the negation of being1 is to have the perception of co-existence4 #ade4 ,time may be considered under three aspects2 the present1 the past1 and the future4 ,all other relations of time1 differently expressed in different idioms1 are only combinations of these4 #adf4 ,the present is the only absolute time3 it is conceived without relation to the past or the future2 but the past and the future are not conceived without relation to the present4 #adg4 ,the idea of present accompanies the very idea of being2 or rather1 it is confounded with the idea of existence2 that which has no present existence is not being4 #adh4 ,the idea of past time is the perception of not-being1 or of a being that has been destroyed1 in relation to a present being3 the idea of future time is the perception of a possible being proceeding from a cause already determined1 and in relation to a present being4 #adi4 ,the idea of time is excited by experience2 but it cannot be called a fact of mere observation2 for this would be opposed to its intrinsic necessity1 by virtue of which it is the object of the exact sciences4 #aej4 ,still less can we say1 that this idea is confined to the sensible order1 since it includes every manner of change in general1 whether sensible or supersensible4 #aea4 ,the idea of time being the perception of the order between being and not-being1 this relation1 considered in general1 belongs to the pure intellectual order4 ,the transition to experience is realized in the same manner as in other general and indeterminate conceptions4 #aeb4 ,it is necessary to make a distinction between pure ideal time and empirical time3 pure ideal time is the relation between being and not-being1 considered in the greatest generality and the most complete indeterminateness2 empirical time is the same relation subjected to a sensible measure4 #aec4 ,to measure this succession1 three things are necessary1 and their union forms the idea of empirical time4 ,they are1 first1 the pure idea of being and not-being1 or of change2 secondly1 the application of this idea to a sensible phenomenon1 as1 for example1 the solar motion2 and thirdly1 the idea of number applied to the determining of the changes of this phenomenon4 #aed4 ,we thus conceive why empirical time implies a true necessity1 and is the object of science4 ,of the three elements which compose it1 the first is a metaphysical idea1 the second1 a mathematical idea1 and the third1 a fact of observation1 to which these ideas are applied4 ,if this fact be not real1 it must1 at least1 be possible1 in order to save the necessity of the calculation which is based upon it4 #aee4 ,there is a close relation between the idea of time and the principle of contradiction4 ,each is explained by the other1 yet this is not a vicious circle4 ,the principle of contradiction consists in the mutual exclusion of being and not-being1 and the idea of time is the perception of the order between being and not-being4 ,analysis must therefore lead to a part which is identical in both1 to the comparison of the ideas of being and not-being4 #aef4 ,without the idea of time1 memory would be impossible2 consequently also1 the unity of consciousness4 ,,chapter ,,xix4 ,a ,,glance ,,at ,,the ,,ideas ,,of ,,space1 ,,number1 ,,and ,,time4 #aeg4 ,we may now mark out and determine with perfect exactness the necessary elements which form the object of the natural and exact sciences4 ,this is not only curious1 but highly important2 for it presents under the simplest aspect1 an immense field of knowledge1 the limits of which expand1 as we advance2 so that1 it is impossible to assign a limit to progress4 #aeh4 ,space1 number1 and time1 are the three elements of all the natural and exact sciences4 ,all else contained in them pertains to mere experience1 to the order of contingent facts1 which involve no necessity1 and cannot strictly be the objects of science4 #aei4 ,universal arithmetic is founded on the idea of numbers1 geometry on that of space1 and the idea of time places us in communication with the sensible world1 so as to determine the relations of its phenomena4 ,these phenomena are isolated contingent facts1 and cannot become the object of science1 until subjected to the general ideas of space1 number1 and time4 #afj4 ,hence1 there are two parts in every natural science2 the theoretic1 and the experimental4 ,the former is founded on necessary ideas1 the latter on contingent facts2 the first without the second1 would not come down to the real world2 the second without the first1 would not rise to the regions of science4 #afa4 ,the natural sciences merit the name of science1 in proportion to the quantity of necessary elements which they contain1 and the closeness of the connection by which they unite with them contingent facts4 ,but as no natural science can be conceived1 without contingent facts1 so there is none entirely free from the contingency which they communicate4 #afb4 ,these observations reveal a great simplicity in the elements of science1 and we may push this simplicity much farther1 if we recollect what has been said when analyzing the ideas of number and time4 #afc4 ,the idea of number arises from the idea of being and not-being3 the same is also true of the idea of time2 therefore1 at bottom1 these ideas are but one1 though presented under different aspects4 #afd4 ,hence1 all the natural and exact sciences may be reduced to two elements3 the intuition of extension1 and the general conception of being4 ,extension is the basis of all sensible intuitions3 externally1 it is a necessary condition of the relations which we conceive in the corporeal world2 internally1 it is a perception1 without which the sensibility could not represent external objects4 ,the conception of being1 is the basis of all conceptions2 developed in different ways1 it generates the ideas of number and time2 and these1 combined with extension1 constitute the necessary part of all the natural and exact sciences4 #afe4 ,the ideas of space1 number1 and time are common to all men2 the proof that they are identical to all is1 that1 in their application1 all are led to the same results1 and in speaking of them they all use the same expressions4 ,all men measure space1 and its various dimensions2 they all count1 they all conceive time3 why1 then1 is there so great difficulty in explaining these ideas8 why such difference of opinion among philosophers8 ,here we have a confirmation of what we have said#ce of the strength of direct perception1 and the weakness of reflex4 ,when we content ourselves with the direct perception of space1 of number1 and of time1 our ideas are clear1 and the understanding feels its strength and energy1 it extends the sphere of its knowledge beyond all limits1 and raises the edifice of the mathematical and exact sciences4 ,but as soon as it turns upon itself1 and1 leaving the direct perception1 passes to the reflex1 endeavoring to perceive its perception1 its strength fails1 and it falls into a confusion which gives rise to interminable disputes4 ,we scarce perceive that idea1 which1 a moment ago1 we applied to every thing1 which penetrated all our cognitions1 and circulated1 like our life1 through all our perceptions2 but in its isolation1 and its purity1 it continually escapes from us2 mingled with all things1 we see that it is something distinct from them2 we separate it from one1 and it unites with another2 we make an effort to cut it off from all that is not itself1 and the mind feels a kind of dizziness come over it1 every thing vanishes from before it1 and1 unable to reach the reality1 it is forced to be contented with names1 which it pronounces and repeats a thousand times1 turning over in them the little reality which they contain4 #ce ,see ,bk4 ,i41 ,chap4 ,,iii4 #afg4 ,one of the causes of this weakness and of the errors which are its ordinary consequence1 is1 as ,i have before said1 our mad desire of representing every idea as an internal form1 or image1 whereas we ought to consider that in many cases there is only a perception1 a simple act in the lowest depth of our mind1--an act1 which can be represented by nothing1 which resembles nothing1 and which cannot be explained in words1 because it cannot be decomposed1 and it is only present as a simple fact of consciousness4 ,but this fact of consciousness is an active fact2 by it we penetrate into things1 and see what they have in common1 and separate it from what is particular1 establishing in our mind1 as it were1 a central1 culminating point1 from which we contemplate the internal and the external world1 and roam through the boundless regions of possibility4 ,,book ,,eighth4 ,,the ,,infinite4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,,transitory ,,view ,,of ,,the ,,actual ,,state ,,of ,,philosophy4 #a4 ,in the works on transcendental philosophy which have been published of late years1 we find the words infinite1 absolute1 indeterminate1 unconditioned1 frequently repeated1 and made to play a very prominent part in the explanation of the most recondite secrets which can be presented to the consideration of man4 ,the words finite1 relative1 determinate1 conditional1 are easily combined with these2 and from this combination they pretend that a ray of light will arise to dissipate the darkness of philosophical questions4 #b4 ,in spite of the bad use many make of such words1 we must confess that the fact indicated is consoling by reason of the great desire there is to use them4 ,this desire marks an effort in the human mind to raise itself from the mire in which the impious school of the last century has sunk it4 #c4 ,what was the world in the eyes of the false philosophers who preceded the ,french revolution8 ,a mass of matter1 subject to simple mechanical laws of motion1 the whole explanation of which was given in two words1 blind necessity4 ,what was the human mind8 ,nothing but matter4 ,what was thought8 ,a modification of matter4 ,in what did the difference between thinking and non-thinking matter consist8 ,in a little greater or less subtilty1 in a more or less happy disposition of atoms4 ,what was morality8 ,an illusion4 ,what were sentiments8 ,a material phenomenon4 ,what was the origin of man8 ,that of matter1--a phenomenon offered by a quantity of molecules1 which at one moment happen to be disposed one way1 and a moment after in a very different way4 ,if you inquired if there were a destiny beyond the grave1 ,we argue that question6 they would answer with a scornful smile4 ,have you such a word as religion8 ,the scorn increased and changed into contempt4 ,do you recognize the dignity of the human race8 ,o1 yes6 we admit this dignity1 and we are of opinion that it is of the same nature as that of the brutes1 only it has reached a higher degree of perfection4 ,we do not deny that your form may be more noble and elegant than that of the monkey1 nor do we dispute the superiority of your intelligence2 but we would have you take good care not to make pretensions to a nobler origin or a loftier destiny4 ,the course of ages may develop and perfect the monkey form1 and render it equal with yours2 it may develop and perfect his cerebral organs1 so that from this very monkey1 whose extravagant motions and ridiculous attitudes now amuse1 men will be born such as were ,plato1 ,saint ,augustine1 ,leibnitz1 or ,bossuet4 #d4 ,with such a system1 it was useless to deal in ideas3 they retained only sensations4 ,whatever could occupy the mind of man1 whether the most imbecile or endowed with the loftiest genius1 was nothing more than a sensation transformed4 ,the very brutes possessed all the elements of human intelligence2 to think was only to feel more perfectly4 ,such was the last term of their analysis2 such the result of their most accurate observation2 such the solution their profoundest philosophy gave to the problems of man's understanding4 ,plato1 ,aristotle1 ,saint ,augustine1 ,saint ,thomas1 ,descartes1 ,malebranche and ,leibnitz were nothing but sublime dreamers1 whose genius strongly contrasted with their ignorance of the true nature of things4 ,none of them knew any thing about ideology or metaphysics2 these sciences were an unknown world until ,locke and ,condillac came and discovered them4 #e4 ,this school1 as fatal as frivolous1 has involved and stifled mind in matter4 ,the butterfly could not unfold his wings of fair and various colors2 he was forced to lay them off and to change into a stupid and filthy worm1 entangled in a covering as loathsome and unclean as itself4 ,in this consisted progress4 ,the limit of ideological perfection was to deny ideas2 that of metaphysical studies1 to deny spirits2 that of morals1 to deny morality2 that of society1 to deny authority2 that of politics1 to establish license2 that of religion1 to deny ,god4 ,thus1 human reason1 thinking to advance1 marched in a retrograde direction2 and proposed to raise the edifice of its knowledge1 when there was nothing left to demolish3 thus they imagined to attain a scientific result by denying every thing1 and by finally denying themselves4 #f4 ,at present1 there is a reaction against so degrading a philosophy4 ,we have only to open the writings of the philosophers of this age to convince ourselves of this consoling truth4 ,we everywhere meet the word idea in contraposition to that of sensation2 that of mind to that of matter2 that of activity of thought to that of bodily motion2 those of cause1 order1 liberty1 of free will1 morality1 infinity4 ,the ideas which accompany them are sometimes inexact1 sometimes extravagant2 but at the bottom of all this we distinguish an anxious desire to rise from the abyss down to which an atheistical and material philosophy had dragged the human mind4 ,some who have contributed to the reaction do not admit a free and intelligent ,god1 distinct from the universe4 ,what we have said above is therefore true1 that pantheism is atheism in disguise2 nevertheless1 the atheism of the pantheist now-a-days is an atheism which is ashamed to confess itself such1 and which sometimes1 perhaps1 deceives itself1 being persuaded that it is not4 #g4 ,the atheism of modern philosophers unites itself with the infinite3 it does not reject those great ideas which as relics of a primitive tradition were common in the old world1 and were afterwards fixed1 cleared up and elevated by the superior teaching of ,christianity4 ,the philosophy of the last century sat down in the darkness and shadow of death and declared itself alone in possession of light and life4 ,philosophy now still remains in obscurity1 but it is not satisfied with it1 and gropes about in the dark1 seeking some outlet to the regions of light4 ,hence those desperate efforts to resolve itself1 not into matter1 but into the focus of intelligence1 into the me1 that is1 the mind3 hence the continual use of the words absolute1 unconditional1 infinite1 words which1 notwithstanding they ordinarily lead to absurdities1 do yet indicate a sublime aspiration4 #h4 ,these observations show that we do not confound the philosophy of to-day with that of the past century2 that we do not regard the pantheism of to-day as a pure materialism1 and that1 notwithstanding the atheism of which we accuse the doctrine of certain philosophers1 we do not deny that they have1 even in the midst of their extravagance1 preserved a kind of horror of it1 and that1 lost as they are in the labyrinth of their speculations1 they seek the thread which shall conduct them to the gates of truth4 #i4 ,this act of justice we willingly render to modern philosophers1 but it will not prevent us from combating their pretension to a merit they do not possess4 ,they style themselves restorers of the spirituality of the soul1 and of human liberty2 and when they speak of ,god they almost exact a tribute of gratitude from him for having replaced him upon his throne4 ,before making such proud pretensions they ought to have considered that they are even yet far from the truth with respect both to ,god and to man1 not only as ,christianity has at all times taught it1 but also as the most illustrious modern philosophers have professed it4 ,they are ambitious to be called restorers1 but their restoration with its licentious frequency is a new revolution1 at times as terrible as the evil it attempts to combat4 #aj4 ,another consideration ought to have moderated their zeal to be thought inventors1 which is that they have said nothing concerning ,god1 the human mind1 thought1 ideas1 the liberty of freewill1 which may not be read in all the works of the philosophers who flourished before1 or even in the beginning of1 the eighteenth century4 ,open the text-books of the schools1 and you will find many things which they would have us believe to be important discoveries4 ,the great philosophers gloried in knowing what they had before learned when children4 ,the philosophical tradition of sound ideas was not interrupted during the past century4 ,in many parts of ,europe schools existed which taught them with scrupulous fidelity4 ,and besides human schools1 there was that of the ,god-,man1 the ,church of ,jesus ,christ1 which1 among its supernatural dogmas1 preserved even natural truths1 notwithstanding the senseless efforts which have been made to obliterate them4 #aa4 ,to what1 then1 are the invention and restoration reduced8 ,invention there is not1 either with respect to ,god1 to the human mind1 or to morality1 for nothing true has been said of them which had not already been said4 ,restoration1 properly so called1 there is not2 for what does not perish cannot be restored4 ,the truth exists2 and has been known and revered during the whole six thousand years it has refused to bow the knee to ,baal4 ,let not deserters say1 when they turn and come back to the truth that they have restored it1 but that they have recovered it2 not that they give1 but that they receive it2 not that they enlighten the world1 but that they are blind1 and that it is the goodness of ,providence which opens their eyes to the light4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,importance ,,and ,,anomaly ,,of ,,the ,,questions ,,on ,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,the ,,infinite4 #ab4 ,the examination of the idea of the infinite is of the highest importance1 not only because we meet it in various sciences1 the exact sciences among others1 but because it is one of the principal characteristics by which we distinguish ,god from creatures4 ,a finite ,god would be no ,god2 an infinite creature would not be a creature4 ,in the scale of finite beings we discover a gradation1 by which they are interlinked2 the less perfect1 as they are perfected1 go on approaching the perfect2 and there are1 preserving the limits of each one's nature1 points of comparison by which we may measure their respective distances4 ,between the finite and the infinite there is no comparison2 all measures are inadequate and as nothing4 ,we pass from an imperceptible drop to an immense ocean2 from the atom which escapes observation to the abundance of matter diffused through all space2 and much as these transitions express1 they are as nothing to the transition from the finite to the infinite2 these oceans1 compared with the infinite truth1 become in their turn imperceptible drops1 and thus an interminable scale baffles the efforts of the mind in search of something to correspond to its idea4 ,the examination of the idea of the infinite ought to occupy an important place in the study of philosophy1 although it served for no other purpose than the contemplation of infinite greatness4 #ac4 ,the disputes on the idea of the infinite1 not only in relation to its nature1 but also to its existence1 present a strange anomaly4 ,if it exists in our mind it ought to fill it entirely1 so that it must be impossible to cease to perceive it4 ,yet it is well known that philosophers dispute even on the existence of this idea2 although it is an infinite treasure1 those who possess it doubt its reality--just as the heroes in romance1 when they find themselves in a castle richly and splendidly adorned1 imagine it the effect of enchantment4 #ad4 ,the mere dispute as to whether the idea of the infinite be positive or negative1 is equivalent to the question of its existence4 ,if it is negative1 it expresses an absence of being2 if positive1 the plenitude of being4 ,what question can be more vital to an idea than the dispute whether it represents the absence or the plenitude of being8 #ae4 ,here again we meet the fact which we have observed in the preceding discussions4 ,reason1 after digging at its own foundations1 is threatened with death under the ruins of its loftiest edifices4 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,have ,,we ,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,the ,,infinite8 #af4 ,if we had no idea of the infinite1 the word would have no meaning to us1 and when used it would not be understood4 #ag4 ,whatever may be the nature and perfection of our idea of the infinite1 it is certain that it involves something fixed1 and common to all intelligences4 ,we apply the idea to things of very different orders1 and it is always understood in the same sense by all men4 ,even the difficulty we find in attempting to explain it1 in itself or in its applications1 proceeds from the idea itself2 it is a difficulty which we all meet with1 because we all conceive in the same manner what is understood by the infinite1 taken in general4 #ah4 ,infinite and indefinite express very different meanings4 ,the infinite implies the absence of limits2 the indefinite implies that these limits retire continually from us2 it abstracts their existence1 and only says that they cannot be assigned4 #ai4 ,whatever exists is finite or infinite2 for it either has limits or it has not3 in the first case1 it is finite2 in the second1 infinite3 there is no medium between yes and no4 #bj4 ,hence1 properly speaking1 there is in reality nothing indefinite2 this word only expresses a mode of conceiving things1 or rather a vagueness in the conception1 or indecision in the judgment4 ,when we do not know the limits of any thing1 and1 on the other hand1 do not dare to affirm its infinity1 we call it indefinite4 ,thus1 space is called indefinite by those who see no way of assigning a limit to it1 and yet are unwilling to say that it is infinite4 ,even in ordinary language we call a thing indefinite which has no limits assigned to it2 thus1 we say a concession has been made for an indefinite time1 although it is limited to some time which has not been determined4 #ba4 ,the idea of the infinite does not consist in conceiving that another quantity may always be added to a given quantity1 or that a perfection may be made more intense2 this expresses only the possibility of a series of conceptions by which we endeavor to approach the absolute idea of the infinite4 ,it is easy to see that the absolute idea is something distinct from those conceptions1 because we regard it as a type to which the series of connections is referred1 but which it can never equal1 no matter how greatly prolonged4 #bb4 ,let us consider the words in which we naturally express what passes within us when we think of the infinite4 ,what is an infinite line8 ,a line which has no limits4 ,is it a million1 or a billion miles in length8 ,there is no number to express its length2 it will always be greater than the number4 ,but do we not approach the infinite in proportion as we prolong a finite line8 ,certainly1 in so far as approaching means only placing quantities which are found in what we approach2 but not in so far as it means that this difference can be assigned4 ,there is no comparison between the finite and the infinite2 and therefore it is not possible to assign the difference between them4 ,would an infinite line be formed by the addition of all finite lines8 ,no2 for we can conceive the multiplication of each of the terms of the addition1 and therefore an increase in the infinite1 which would be absurd4 ,would the infinity of the line consist in our not knowing its limits1 or not thinking of them8 ,no2 but in its not having them4 #bc4 ,thus1 we see1 that the idea of the infinite1 is in the reach of the most common intellects1 and expresses only what any person of ordinary understanding would say1 even though he had never occupied himself with philosophical studies2 that the idea of the infinite is in our understanding1 as a constant type1 to which all finite representations are unable to arrive4 ,we know the conditions which must be fulfilled1 but at the same time1 we see the impossibility of fulfilling them4 ,when any one tries to persuade us of the contrary1 we reflect on the idea of the infinite1 and say3 ,no2 it is a contradiction of infinity2 it is not infinite1 but finite4 ,we distinguish perfectly well between the absence of the perception of the limit and its non-existence4 ,if any one tries to make us confound these two ideas1 we answer1 ,no2 they must not be confounded2 there is a great difference between our not perceiving an object and the non-existence of that object1 and we are not now examining whether we conceive the limit1 but whether it exists4 ,though the limit retire and hide itself1 so to speak1 from our eyes1 we are not deceived3 it exists1 or does not exist4 ,if it exists1 the condition involved in the conception of infinity is not fulfilled1 and the object is not infinite1 but finite2 if it does not exist1 there is true infinity1--the condition is complied with4 #bd4 ,when the idea of the infinite is considered in general1 it can never be confounded with the idea of the finite4 ,there is a line which divides them1 and which prevents all error2 for it is the principle of contradiction itself2 it is the distinction between yes and no4 ,when we say finite1 we affirm the limit2 when we say infinite1 we deny it4 ,no ideas can be clearer or more exact4 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,the ,,limit4 #be4 ,the word infinite is equivalent to not finite1 and seems to express a negation4 ,but negations are not always truly such1 although the terms imply it2 for if that which is denied1 be a negation1 the denial of it is an affirmation4 ,this is the reason why two negatives are said to be equivalent to an affirmative4 ,if ,i say1 it has not varied1 and you deny it1 you deny my negation2 for it is the same thing to deny that it has not varied1 as to affirm that it has varied4 ,in order1 therefore1 to determine whether the word infinite expresses a true negative1 we must know what is meant by the word finite4 #bf4 ,the finite is that which has a limit4 ,a limit is the term beyond which there is nothing of the object limited4 ,the limits of a line1 are the points beyond which the line does not extend2 the limit of a number1 is the extreme where the number stops2 the limit of human knowledge1 is the point to which we may arrive1 but which we cannot go beyond4 ,a limit being a negation1 to deny a limit1 is to deny a negation1 and is consequently an affirmation4 #bg4 ,it is easy to see from these examples1 that a limit in the ordinary sense1 expresses an idea distinct from what mathematicians define it4 ,they call a limit every expression1 whether finite1 infinite1 or a nullity1 which a quantity may continually approach without ever reaching4 ,thus1 the value #j_/;a is the limit of the decrement of a fraction1 the numerator of which is variable x_/a2 because1 if we suppose ,x to be constantly diminishing1 the fraction will approach the expression #j_/;a1 without ever being confounded with it1 so long as ,x does not entirely disappear4 ,if we suppose 7b x7_/a an expression in which ,x is decreasing1 the expression will continually approach 7b #j7_/;a b_/a1 which will be the limit of the fraction4 ,if we suppose the expression a_/x1 in which ,x is decreasing1 we shall continually approach the expression a_/#j 1 an infinite value which the fraction can never attain1 until ,x becomes #j1 which cannot happen1 because ,x is a true quantity4 ,these examples show that mathematicians admit limits which are finite1 infinite1 or a nullity1 and prove that mathematicians employ the word limit in a different sense from its ordinary as well as philosophical meaning4 #bh4 ,a limit1 therefore1 expresses a true negation1 and the word finite1 or limited1 necessarily involves a negative idea4 ,that which is not1 is not limited2 therefore the finite is not an absolute negation4 ,an absolute negation is nothing1 and we do not call the finite nothing4 ,therefore1 in the idea of finite are contained being1 and a negation of another being4 ,a line one foot in length1 involves the positive value of one foot1 and the negation of all value of more than a foot4 ,therefore1 the finite1 in so far as finite1 involves a negation relatively to a being4 ,if we could express this idea in the abstract1 using the word finity1 as we have the word infinity1 we should say that finity in itself expresses only the negation of being relatively to a being4 #bi4 ,hence1 the word infinite is not negative2 for it is the negation of a negation4 ,the infinite is the not-finite2 it is that which has no negation of being1 consequently that which possesses all being4 #cj4 ,we have1 therefore1 an idea of the infinite1 and this idea is not a pure negation4 ,but it must not be supposed that we have arrived at the last term of the analysis of the infinite4 ,we are still far from it1 and it is even doubtful whether we shall obtain any satisfactory result after long investigations4 ,,chapter ,v4 ,,considerations ,,on ,,the ,,application ,,of ,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,the ,,infinite ,,to ,,continuous ,,quantities1 ,,and ,,to ,,discrete ,,quantities1 ,,in ,,so ,,far ,,as ,,these ,,last ,,are ,,expressed ,,in ,,series4 #ca4 ,one of the characteristic properties of the idea of the infinite is application to different orders4 ,this gives occasion to some important considerations which greatly assist to make this idea clear in our mind4 #cb4 ,from the point where ,i am situated ,i draw a line in the direction of the north2 it is evident that ,i may prolong this line infinitely4 ,this line is greater than any finite line can be2 for the finite line must have a determinate value1 and therefore1 if placed on the infinite line1 will reach only to a certain point4 ,this line1 therefore1 seems to be strictly infinite in all the force of the word1 because there is no medium between the finite and the infinite1 and we have shown that it is not finite1 since it is greater than any finite line2 therefore it must be infinite4 ,this demonstration seems to leave nothing to be desired2 yet there is a conclusive argument against the infinity of this line4 ,the infinite has no limits1 and this line has a limit1 because1 starting from the point from which it is drawn in the direction of the north1 it does not extend in the direction of the south4 #cc4 ,this line is greater than any finite line2 but we may find another line greater still4 ,if we suppose it produced in the direction of the south1 it will be greater by how much it is produced towards the south2 and if it be infinitely produced in this direction1 its length will be twice that of the first line4 #cd4 ,by the infinite prolongation of a line in two opposite directions we seem to obtain an absolutely infinite line2 for we cannot conceive a lineal value greater than that of a right line infinitely prolonged in opposite directions4 ,but it is not so3 by the side of this right line another may be drawn1 either finite or infinite1 and the sum of the two will form a lineal value greater than that of the first line2 therefore that line is not infinite1 because it is possible to find another still greater4 ,and as1 on the other hand1 we may draw infinite lines and prolong them infinitely1 it follows that none of them can form an infinite lineal value1 because it is only a part of the lineal sum resulting from the addition of all the lines4 #ce4 ,reflecting on this apparent contradiction in our ideas1 we discover that the idea of the infinite is indeterminate1 and consequently susceptible of different applications4 ,thus1 in the present instance1 it cannot be doubted that the right line1 prolonged to infinity1 has some infinity1 since it is certain that it has no limit in its respective directions4 #cf4 ,this example would lead us to believe that the idea of the infinite represents nothing absolute to us2 because even among those objects which are presented the most clearly to our mind1 such as the objects of sensible intuition1 we find infinity under one aspect which is contradicted one by another4 #cg4 ,what we have observed of lineal values is also true of numerical values expressed in series4 ,mathematics speak of infinite series1 but there can be no such series4 ,let the series be a1 b1 c1 d1 e1 44443 it is called infinite if its terms continue ad infinitum4 ,it cannot be denied that the series is infinite under one aspect2 for there is no limit which puts an end to it in one sense2 but it is evident that the number of its terms will never be infinite1 because there are others greater2 such1 for instance1 is the series continued from left to right1 if continued from right to left at the same time1 in this manner3 4444444444 e1 d1 c1 b1 a1 b1 c1 d1 e1 4444444444 ,in this case the number of terms is evidently twice as great as in the first series4 ,therefore the series which are called infinite are not infinite1 and cannot be so1 in the strict sense of the term4 #ch4 ,but what is still more strange is1 that the series is not infinite1 even though we suppose it continued in opposite directions2 for by its side we may imagine another1 and the sum of the terms of both will be greater than the terms of either2 therefore neither will be infinite4 ,as it is evident that whatever be the series1 we can always imagine others1 it follows that there can be no infinite series in the sense in which mathematicians use the word series to express a continuation of terms1 not excluding the possibility of other continuations besides the supposed infinite continuation4 #ci4 ,the objections against lineal infinity apply equally to surfaces4 ,if we suppose an infinite plane1 it is evident that we can describe an infinity of planes distinct from the first plain and intersecting it in a variety of angles2 the sum of all these surfaces will be greater than any one of them4 ,therefore the infinite extension of a plain in all directions does not constitute a truly infinite surface4 #dj4 ,a solid expanding in all directions seems to be infinite2 but if we consider that the mathematical idea of a solid does not involve impenetrability1 we shall see that inside of the first solid a second may be placed1 which1 added to the first1 will give a value double that of the first alone4 ,let ,s be the empty space which we imagine to be infinite2 and let ,w be a world of equal extension placed in it and filling it2 it is evident that ,s ,w are greater than ,s alone4 ,therefore1 although we suppose ,s to be infinite1 1 ,w also 2 therefore ,s ,w #b 4 ,and as this value expresses the size1 the first is not infinite because it can be doubled4 ,if we take the impenetrability1 the operation may proceed ad infinitum4 ,therefore the first infinite1 far from being infinite1 seems to be a quantity susceptible of infinite increase4 ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,origin ,,of ,,the ,,vagueness ,,and ,,apparent ,,contradictions ,,in ,,the ,,application ,,of ,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,the ,,infinite4 #da4 ,the difficulties in the application of the idea of infinity1 seem on the one hand1 to prove that either this idea does not exist in us1 or is very confused2 and on the other hand1 that we possess it1 and in a very perfect degree4 ,why do we discover that numbers are not infinite1 although at first they seem to be8 ,why do we deny the infinity of certain dimensions1 notwithstanding their infinite prolongation in one sense8 ,because1 on examining these objects1 we find that they do not correspond to the type of infinity4 ,if this type did not exist in our mind1 how could it be possible for us to make use of it8 ,how could we compare beings with it1 if we did not know it8 ,is it possible to know when any thing arrives at a turn1 if we have no idea of that turn8 ,it is comparing without a point of comparison2 that is1 it is exercising a contradictory act4 #db4 ,although these arguments in favor of the existence of the idea of the infinite1 if we examine our own mind1 we cannot deny that we find there a certain vagueness and confusion which inspire strong doubts as to the reality of this idea4 ,what is presented to our mind1 when we think of the infinite8 ,the imagination abandoned to itself1 extends space1 expands dimensions1 multiplies numbers indefinitely1 but it offers nothing to the intellect which has the marks of infinity4 ,if we leave the imagination1 and regard the understanding only1 it gives a type by which to judge of the infinity or not-infinity of the objects presented to it1 but if we reflect on the type itself1 it loses the clearness it possessed before1 and we even ask if the type really exists4 #dc4 ,do we1 therefore1 deny the existence of this idea8 are we going to renounce our intention of explaining it8 ,we do neither4 ,i believe that it is necessary to admit the idea1 that it is not impossible to explain it1 and that we may even point out the reason of its obscurity4 #dd4 ,before passing further1 ,i wish to observe1 that one of the causes of the difficulties in the explanation of the idea of the infinite1 arises from our not distinguishing the intuitive from the abstract cognition4#cf ,many difficulties would be avoided by attending to this distinction4 ,when we say that the idea of the infinite is not intuitive1 but abstract1 we give the key to the solution of the principal objections brought against it4 #cf ,see ,book ,v41 ,ch4 ,,xi4 #de4 ,we have no intuitive idea of infinity2 that is to say1 this idea does not present to our mind an infinite object2 we can have this intuition only when we see the essence of ,god1 which will happen in a future life4 #df4 ,if we had now the intuition of an infinite object1 we should see its perfections as they are1 with their true marks2 or rather1 we should see how all the perfections dispersed among limited beings1 are united in one infinite perfection4 ,we could not refer the idea of the infinite to determinate objects1 as1 for example1 to extension1 because these objects contradict the idea4 ,it would be impossible for us to modify the idea in different ways1 and apply it first in one sense1 and then in another very different sense4 ,the idea is one1 and simple2 it would1 therefore1 always relate to an object which is also one and simple1 not vague and indeterminate1 as now1 but with the determination of a necessary existence and an infinite perfection4 ,we should have intuition of infinite being1 as we have intuition of the facts of our consciousness3 our cognition of it would be that of an object eminently incommunicable1 as predicate to any order of finite beings2 and it would be as manifest a contradiction1 to apply the idea of this infinity to any number or extension1 as it would be to identify an act of our consciousness with external objects4 #dg4 ,the indeterminate character in which the idea of the infinite is presented us1 and the ease with which we modify it in various ways1 and apply it to different objects1 in different senses1 proves that this idea is not intuitive1 but abstract and indeterminate1 that it is one of those general conceptions1 by the aid of which the mind obtains a certain knowledge not afforded by intuition4 ,this will explain the origin of the vagueness of our idea of infinity4 ,indeterminate conceptions1 and because they are indeterminate1 relate to no particular object1 or quality1 which may be conceived by itself alone1 as something which may be realized2 they do not contain those determinations which fix our cognition in an absolute manner4 ,the indeterminate manner in which they present any property of beings1 causes a difference in the application1 accordingly as the particular properties1 which are combined with the general1 are different4 ,if we take a right-angle triangle1 in which we know the measure of all the sides and angles1 the determinateness of the idea avoids the vagueness of the intellect1 and prevents the application of this idea to cases different from that which is determinate and fixed4 ,but if we take a right-angle1 in general1 without determining the value of its sides and angles1 its applications may be infinite4 ,the more general and indeterminate the idea of a triangle becomes1 the greater is the variety of its applications4 #dh4 ,indeterminate ideas1 in order to represent any thing1 must be applied to some property which is the condition of their actual or possible realization4 ,until this application is made1 they are pure intellectual forms1 which represent nothing determinate4 ,i do not mean by this1 that these ideas are empty conceptions1 which cannot be applied outside of the sensible order1 as was maintained by ,kant2#cg but only that granting them an universal value1 ,i deny that they have by themselves alone a value representative of any thing that can be realized1 beyond the property which they express4 ,the idea of a pure triangle can not be realized1 for every real triangle would contain something more than is in the idea3 it would be a right-angled or oblique-angled1 etc41 all which1 the pure idea abstracts4 ,the object will be indeterminate1 in proportion to the indeterminateness of the properties contained in the conception2 consequently1 that which is presented to the understanding will also be more vague1 and the applications which may be made of the idea1 will be more varied and numerous1 as is the case in the ideas of being1 not-being1 limit1 and the like4 #cg ,see ,book ,v41 ,chapters ,,xiv41 ,,xv41 and ,,xvi4 ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,,fundamental ,,explanation ,,of ,,the ,,abstract ,,idea ,,of ,,the ,,infinite4 #di4 ,supposing that our idea of the infinite is not intuitive but abstract1 let us see how its true nature may be explained4 ,we have the ideas of being and of its opposite1 not-being2 these ideas considered in themselves are general1 indeterminate1 and may be applied to every thing which is subjected to our experience4 ,we may affirm and deny something of every limited being3 we may affirm what it is3 we may deny what it is not3 the limit is only conceived as such when something is denied of it4 #ej4 ,the activity of our being is unceasing1 but it is limited by the absence or the resistance of objects2 the external world is an assemblage of beings presenting a great variety of limitations4 ,therefore both internal and external experience give us the idea of the finite1 that is1 of a being which involves some not-being4 ,the brute has sensible perception1 but no understanding3 it is sensitive1 and herein it has being2 it is not intelligent1 and herein it is limited4 ,man is sensitive and intelligent2 the limit of the brute is not the limit of man4 ,among intelligent beings some understand more than others2 therefore the limit of all is not the same4 #ea4 ,since we find a limit in both internal and external experience1 it is evident that we can form the general idea of limit1 that is1 of a negation applied to an object4 #eb4 ,the same experience teaches that what is the limit of some things is not the limit of others1 and that the limit applied to one object must be denied of another4 ,when we compare different beings together1 we frequently find ourselves denying certain limits4 ,as our understanding has the faculty of generalizing1 it is evident that we may conceive in general the negation of certain limits1 and form an indeterminate conception1 including the two ideas of negation and limit4 #ec4 ,i do not see what objection can be made either to the possibility or to the existence of this conception2 but as this fact is necessary for the explanation of the idea of infinity1 ,i shall make some further observations for the purpose of confirming it4 ,we have an idea of negation in general2 this is a primitive fact of our mind3 without it no negative judgments would be possible1 nor could we even know the principle of contradiction4 ,it is impossible for any thing to be and not be at the same time2 when we say not be we express a negation1 we therefore have the conception of negation4 ,this conception is general1 because it involves no determination2 we speak of not-being without applying it to any particular object1 nor even to any determinate species or genus4 ,therefore the conception of negation is general and absolutely undetermined4 #ed4 ,we have the idea of limit2 for1 as we have seen1 it is a negation applied to a being4 ,we have also the idea of the negation of limit2 for just as we conceive the limit as applied or applicable1 we may and do conceive it as not applied or not applicable4 ,at every moment we deny certain limits2 this idea generalized becomes the negation in general of limit in general4 #ee4 ,after these remarks we may establish what is contained in the idea of the infinite4 ,this idea is a general conception involving the conception of being in general1 and the negation of limit in general4 ,the union of these two conceptions constitutes the abstract idea of the infinite4 #ef4 ,the general conception of the negation of limit gives us an idea of infinity in the abstract1 but not any infinite thing4 ,without the intuitive cognition of an infinite object1 and with only a very imperfect idea of it1 we may speak of infinity without falling into contradiction1 and determine the cases in which it may be applied to a being or to an order of beings1 whether real or possible4 ,man has many ideas of this vague kind1 which nevertheless answer his necessities4 ,we shall make this palpable by examples4 #eg4 ,suppose we take an uneducated person and point out to him a number of learned men1 telling him that one of them knows more than all the rest4 ,the uneducated person has no idea of what the man knows who knows the most1 nor the man who knows the least2 he has no idea of the degrees of science1 nor of what science itself is2 but he possesses the general ideas of degree1 of more and less1 and also of knowledge1 and this enables him to speak1 without contradiction or confusion1 of the greater science of the one and the less science of the others1 and even to solve with certainty the questions concerning the science of those individuals1 in so far as these questions are contained in the general idea that the science of one is greater than that of all the others4 ,a servant in an establishment where the most beautiful products of art are collected1 may speak of them all without contradiction or confusion1 although he may be incapable of knowing their merit1 and entirely ignorant of the circumstances which constitute the beauty of the objects4 ,it is sufficient for him to have the idea of perfection or beauty in general1 and to arrange by certain arbitrary signs the degrees of perfection or beauty of the objects1 in order to be able to point them out to visitors1 and talk of the greater skill of one artist1 the poorer success of another2 the greater effect and value of the works of the former1 and the inferiority of those of the second1 and to make other remarks of a similar nature1 which at first might make us suppose him a consummate artist1 or1 at the least1 an amateur of a great intellect and exquisite taste4 #eh4 ,it would be easy to show by other examples1 how fruitful some general ideas are1 and how they may undergo innumerable combinations1 without presenting any thing determinate to the intellect4 ,this is precisely what happens with the idea of the infinite3 in vain we ask what there is within us which corresponds to it3 the conception of being in general and of the negation of limit present nothing fixed1 except certain abstract conditions to which we continually reduce the objects which come under our intuition1 or are presented to us with certain characteristic properties which permit us to form a less vague idea of the negation of limit4 ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,,the ,,definition ,,of ,,infinity ,,confirmed ,,by ,,application ,,to ,,extension4 #ei4 ,we have explained the idea of infinity in general1 by the indeterminate conceptions of being and the negation of limit4 ,in order to assure ourselves that the explanation is well grounded1 and that we have pointed out the essential marks of the conception1 let us examine whether their application to determinate objects corresponds to what we have established in general4 ,if the idea of infinity is what we have defined it to be1 we may apply it to all objects of sensible intuition or of the pure understanding1 and we shall obtain the results which we ought to obtain1 including the anomalies already referred to4#ch #ch ,see ,chap4 ,v4 #fj4 ,the anomalies1 or1 rather1 the contradictions which we seem to find in the applications of the idea of the infinite1 when any thing is presented to us as infinite which we afterwards discover not to be so1 originate in the application of this idea under different conditions4 ,this variety would not be possible if the idea represented any thing determinate2 but as it only contains the negation of limit in general joined to being in general1 it follows that we subject this negation to particular conditions in each case1 and therefore when we pass to other conditions1 the general idea cannot give us the same result4 #fa4 ,a line drawn from the point where we are situated in the direction of the north1 and produced infinitely1 gives us an infinite and a not-infinite4 ,this contradiction is only apparent2 there is really only the difference of result caused by the condition under which the general idea is applied4 ,when we consider a line infinitely produced towards the north1 we do not apply the idea of the infinite to a lineal value in the abstract1 but to a right line starting from a point and produced only in one direction4 ,the result is what it should be4 ,the negation of limit is affirmed under a condition2 the infinite which results is subject to that condition4 ,it may be said that there is no medium between the infinite and the not-infinite2 but it is easy to solve this difficulty1 if we observe that yes and no1 to be contradictory1 must be referred to the same thing1 which is not the case when the conditions of the object are changed4 #fb4 ,if instead of a line produced in one direction only1 we had wished to apply the negation of limit to a right line in general1 it is evident that we should have been obliged to produce the line in the two opposite directions3 which would have given us another infinite under a new condition4 ,we have before seen that not even in this case can we have a lineal value strictly infinite2 because this right line only forms a part of the sum of lines which we can imagine4 ,is it then infinite1 or is it not8 ,it is both1 if we make the proper distinction4 ,it will be infinite1 or we shall have the idea of infinity or negation of limit1 applied to a right line alone2 but if instead of one right line alone1 we take a lineal value1 without any condition1 the supposed line will not be infinite2 the negation of the limit is not applied under that condition2 the result must therefore be different4 #fc4 ,we find the same anomaly1 if we take two lines alone4 ,let us suppose a right line infinitely produced in both directions1 and by its side let us describe a curve with continual undulations extending infinitely in a direction parallel to the right line4 ,both lines will be infinite if we consider only their direction1 abstracting their lineal value2 but if we regard this value the curve is greater than the straight line2 for it is evident if we take a part of the curve corresponding to a part of the straight line1 and extend or straighten this part of the curve1 it will be greater than the corresponding part of the straight line2 as this may be done throughout the whole length of the lines1 the lineal value of the curve must be greater than that of the straight line in proportion to the law of its undulations4 #fd4 ,this may suffice to show how the idea of infinity may be applied under different conditions and produce different results1 without any contradiction4 ,what is infinite under one aspect is not so under another aspect2 hence we have the orders of infinities which figure so largely in mathematics2 but ,i say again that these contradictions are not susceptible of any explanation if we attribute an absolute value to the idea of the infinite1 instead of considering it as the abstract representation of the negation of limit4 #fe4 ,is it possible to conceive in a right line or curve an absolutely infinite length or lineal value1 to which we may apply the negation of limit absolutely8 ,i think not3 for whatever be the line under consideration we can always draw others1 which1 added to the first1 will give a value greater than that of the first above4 ,this is a case in which there is a contradiction between the negation of limit and the condition to which it is subjected4 ,you demand a lineal value to which the negation of limit may be applied absolutely2 and on the other hand you require that this lineal value should be found in a determinate line1 which by the fact of its being determinate1 excludes the absolute negation of limit4 ,the problem supposes contradictory data2 therefore the result must be a contradiction4 #ff4 ,what must we suppose in order to conceive an absolutely infinite lineal value8 ,we need only suppose no condition which excludes the absolute negation of limit4 ,we must here distinguish between the pure conception and the sensible intuition in which it is expressed4 ,the conception of infinite lineal value exists from the moment that we unite the two general conceptions of lineal value and negation of limit4 ,but the sensible intuition1 which may represent this conception1 is not so easy to imagine1 even in general4 ,to arrive at it we must imagine a space without any limit2 and then considering in general all the lines whether right lines or curves1 which may be drawn in it1 in all directions1 and under all possible conditions1 we must take the sum of all these lineal values2 and the result will be an absolutely infinite lineal value2 for we shall have applied the negation of limit without any restriction4 #fg4 ,we may obtain in the same way an infinite superficial value2 for it is evident that we may apply to it all that we have said of lineal values4 #fh4 ,in all these cases we apply the negation of limit to extension considered only in some of its dimensions4 ,if we wish to obtain an absolutely infinite extension1 we must abstract no dimension2 consequently the absolutely infinite of this order1 is extension in all its dimensions with the absolute negation of limit4 ,but it is also to be observed that we must presuppose an absolutely infinite value of extension in order to obtain an absolutely infinite value of lines or surfaces2 because it is equivalent to presupposing an infinite space in which the lines and surfaces may be drawn in all directions and under all possible conditions4 ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,,conception ,,of ,,an ,,infinite ,,number4 #fi4 ,can we conceive an infinite number8 ,on one side1 it seems not2 because we doubt its possibility1 and if we possessed this idea we should have no doubt of its existence4 ,on the other side1 it seems that we can conceive an infinite number2 for we know immediately when a number is not infinite1 and we could not know this if we had not the idea of infinite number4 ,our observations on infinite series would seem to prove that the idea of infinite number is an illusion2 for we find those numbers which we believed infinite1 not to be so4 ,i think this question may be solved on the same principles as those of the last chapter4 ,i see no difficulty in admitting the idea of an infinite number1 nor how any contradiction can proceed from it4 #gj4 ,number is a collection of units2 it is a general idea1 because to conceive the number1 we do not need to know of what class1 or how many the units may be4 ,the idea of number in general abstracts absolutely all such determinations4 ,it is evident that1 whatever number we imagine1 we can always conceive another still greater1 and if we assign a limit to a number1 we can always remove it indefinitely1 so that the limit of one is not the limit of the other4 ,to the idea of number1 we unite the idea of a limit and of the negation of another limit4 ,therefore1 if we unite to the idea of number in general1 the idea of the negation of limit in general1 we shall obtain the idea of an infinite number4 #ga4 ,what does this idea represent8 ,it represents nothing determinate3 it is an entirely abstract conception1 formed of two other abstract conceptions1 those of number and the negation of limit4 ,no determinate object corresponds to it2 it is a work of our understanding referred to objects in general1 without a determination of any sort4 ,we may now solve the difficulties previously intimated4 #gb4 ,why is a series of terms presented to us as infinite1 which1 when we examine it closely1 we find wants some of the marks of infinity8 ,because1 in the first instance1 we apply the negation of limit under a condition which we take no notice of in the second instance4 ,set us the series a1 b1 c1 d1 e1 4444444444 ,it is evident that we may continue it infinitely1 and conceive the negation of all limit of this continuation3 in this sense1 the number of terms is infinite2 for the idea of the negation of limit is really applied to the series4 ,when we ask if the number of terms is absolutely infinite1 we abstract the condition under which we had united the negation of limit4 ,that1 therefore1 which is infinite in one instance is not so in another4 ,still there is not any contradiction because the yes and the no refer to different suppositions4 #gc4 ,let us take a line and measure it by feet4 ,producing this line we multiply the number of feet2 and we may conceive the negation of all limit of this multiplication4 ,the number of feet will then be infinite4 ,if instead of a foot we take an inch as the unit of measure1 we shall have a number twelve times as great4 ,this number would also be infinite1 and thus we should have two infinite numbers1 one of them greater than the other4 ,is there any contradiction in this8 ,certainly not3 there is only a different combination of ideas4 ,in the first case1 the idea of the negation of limit was subordinated to the condition of the division of the line into feet3 whereas1 in the second case1 we introduce a different condition2 the division of the line into inches4 #gd4 ,but1 it may be said1 these numbers1 considered in themselves1 abstracted from their relation to feet or inches1 are equal or they are not equal2 consequently they are infinite or not infinite4 ,the objection vanishes as soon as we correct the error which supports it4 ,when we abstract all relation to determinate divisions1 we consider number in general2 on this supposition there are not two cases1 but only one2 there cannot then be a relation of greater or less4 ,we have only the conception of number in general combined with the idea of the negation of limit in general2 therefore the result must be an infinite number in the abstract4 ,the difficulty consists in a contradiction which escapes our sight at first4 ,we abstract particular conditions in order to know if the numbers are in themselves infinite or not2 and at the same time we do not abstract them1 because it is only in reference to them that the objection has any meaning1 since it supposes the division into various kinds of units4 ,when1 therefore1 we speak of particular numbers1 and at the same time pretend to consider them in themselves1 we fall into a contradiction1 because we take the numbers both with and without particular conditions at the same time4 #ge4 ,from all that has been said1 we may conclude that the conception of infinite number1 abstracted from the nature and relations of the things numbered1 involves no contradiction1 since it contains only the two ideas of number1 as a collection of beings1 and of the absolute negation of limit2 but we cannot affirm from this alone1 that an infinite number can be realized4 ,infinite number cannot become actual without an infinite collection of beings2 and these beings1 when realized1 cannot be abstract beings1 which contain nothing else but being2 they must have characteristic qualities1 and must be subject to the conditions imposed by these qualities4 ,as we absolutely abstract these conditions in the general conception1 it is not possible to discover1 from the conception alone1 the contradiction which they may imply4 ,hence1 although there is no contradiction contained in the conception1 there may still be in the reality4 ,in the same manner1 certain mechanical theories are perfectly conceivable1 but they cannot be reduced to practice on account of the opposition of the matter to which they should be applied4 ,finite beings are the matter on which indeterminate and metaphysical conceptions are to be realized2 the possibility of the conceptions does not absolutely prove the possibility of the beings4 ,the reality may draw with it certain determinations involving a contradiction which was latent in the general conception1 and is made manifest by the reality4 ,,chapter ,x4 ,,conception ,,of ,,infinite ,,extension4 #gf4 ,is infinite extension conceivable8 ,this conception includes two ideas3 the idea of extension1 and the idea of the negation of limit4 ,the idea of extension is a general conception1 referring to the intuition which1 whatever may be in itself and in its object1 represents extension and the union of the three dimensions1 the pure form of which is space4 ,it is evident that we can unite1 in one conception1 the two ideas of extension in general and the negation of limit2 and if this is what is called the idea of infinite extension1 it is clear that we have this idea4 ,this conception of infinite extension1 abstracts all conditions of the reality2 we do not know whether there be1 in the nature of extended things1 any thing which prevents the absolute infinity of their extension2 consequently1 we are ignorant whether there is or is not any latent contradiction1 which the general conception does not reveal to us4 #gg4 ,it must be remembered that ,i am speaking of the idea and not of the sensible representation of extension2 for although ,i hold that it is possible for us to have the conception of an infinite extension1 ,i do not think the same with respect to its sensible representation4 ,the latter may be indefinitely expanded1 but it cannot become infinite4 ,reason demonstrates this impossibility which consciousness makes known to us4 ,internal sensible representations are only the repetition of the external1 or at least are formed from the elements which these latter furnish4 ,sight and touch are the two senses which produced the representation of extension1 and they both imply a limit4 ,touch only reaches that which is immediate to it1 and sight cannot see with a limit which sends the rays of light to it4 ,internal sensible representations must always retain this limitation2 their object may be expanded1 or the limit removed to a greater distance1 but to destroy this limit would be to destroy themselves4 ,therefore1 the imagination of an infinite extension is impossible to every sensitive being4 #gh4 ,i have proposed above 7 #dj7 an objection against the infinity of extension1 in so far as we may represent it as a size without limits4 ,the objection was1 that as the idea of impenetrability is not contained in the conception of a solid1 we may imagine an infinite series of infinites placed one inside of another4 ,this difficulty is only conclusive when speaking of the conception of a solid which contains something more than the pure idea of extension4 ,the idea of extension necessarily implies that some parts are outside of others1 and it is not possible to conceive extension otherwise4 ,it is certain that a body may be situated in a part of space2 taking from this body its impenetrability1 we may put another body in the same place1 and so on to infinity2 but in that case we conceive something besides pure extension1 we unite something1 although in a general and indeterminate manner1 to the idea of things situated in space2 otherwise we should not distinguish the space1 representing pure extension1 from the solids placed in it1 nor should we distinguish these solids from one another1 if we did not recognize in them some difference1 although general and undetermined4 #gi4 ,it seems most probable that the pure idea of an infinite extension is contained in the idea of an infinite size1 which is nothing more than the idea of space4 ,whatever else is introduced into the idea is a foreign element1 adding to pure extension something which does not belong to it1 such is the difference between extended beings1 although conceived in an indeterminate manner4 ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,,possibility ,,of ,,infinite ,,extension4 #hj4 ,what are we to think as to the possibility of the infinities which we conceive8 ,let us examine the question4 ,is an infinite extension possible8 ,there is no incompatibility between the idea of extension and the negation of limit1 at least1 according to our way of conceiving them4 ,it is more difficult for us to conceive extension absolutely limited1 than to conceive it unlimited3 beyond all limit1 we imagine space without end4 #ha4 ,neither do we discover any impossibility in the existence of an unlimited extension1 if we consider the question in relation to the divine omnipotence4 ,beyond all extension ,god can create another extension2 if we suppose that he has applied his creative power to all the extension possible1 he must have created an infinite extension4 #hb4 ,here a difficulty arises4 ,if ,god had created an infinite extension he could not create another extension2 his power would be exhausted1 and consequently it would not be infinite4 ,this difficulty proceeds from understanding infinite power in a false sense4 ,when we say that ,god can do all things1 we do not mean that he can do things that are contradictory3 omnipotence is not an absurd attribute1 as it would be if applied to things that are absurd4 ,an absolutely infinite extension is contradictory in relation to another distinct extension2 for1 being absolutely infinite1 it contains all possible extensions4 ,if we suppose it to exist1 no other is possible3 to affirm that ,god could not produce another1 is not to limit his omnipotence1 but only to say that he cannot do a thing which is absurd4 #hc4 ,we will make this solution clearer4 ,the intelligence of ,god is infinite2 and he cannot understand more than he now understands2 all progress would suppose imperfection1 because it would involve a change from a less to a greater intelligence4 ,if1 then1 we say that ,god will never understand more than he does now1 do we limit his intelligence8 ,certainly not4 ,he cannot understand more1 because he understands all that is real and all that is possible1 and we cannot1 without contradiction1 conceive that he can understand more than he now does3 this is not to limit his intelligence1 but to affirm its infinity3 it is not susceptible of perfection1 because it is infinite4 ,this will enable us to understand the expression cannot1 as applied to ,god4 ,what is denied is not a perfection1 but an absurdity3 wherefore ,st4 ,thomas very opportunely observes1 that we should much better say that the thing cannot be done1 than that ,god cannot do it4 ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,,solution ,,of ,,various ,,objections ,,against ,,the ,,possibility ,,of ,,an ,,infinite ,,extension4 #hd4 ,the discussions on the possibility of an infinite extension are of a very ancient date4 ,how could it be otherwise8 ,must not the glorious spectacle of the universe1 and the space which we imagine beyond the boundaries of all worlds1 naturally have given rise to questions as to the existence or possibility of a limit to this immensity8 ,some philosophers think an infinite extension impossible4 ,let us see on what they found their opinion4 #he4 ,extension is a property of a finite substance1 and that which belongs to a finite thing cannot be infinite2 therefore it is impossible to conceive infinity of any kind in a finite being4 ,this argument is not conclusive4 ,it is true that an extended substance is finite1 in the sense that it does not possess absolute infinity such as is conceived in the ,supreme ,being2 but it does not follow from this that it cannot be infinite under certain aspects4 ,neither is it correct to say that no finite substance can have an infinite property1 because the properties flow from the substance1 and the infinite cannot proceed from the finite4 ,in order that this argument may be valid1 it is necessary to prove that all the properties of a being emanate from its substance3 figures are accidental properties of bodies1 and yet many of them have no relation to the substance1 and are mere accidents which appear or disappear1 not by the internal force of the substance1 but by the action of an external cause4 ,we see extension in bodies2 but as we know not the essence of corporeal substance1 we cannot say how far this property is connected with the substance1 whether it is an emanation from it1 or only something which has been given to it and may be taken from it without any essential alteration4#ci #ci ,see ,bk4 ,,iii41 ,chaps4 ,,xix41 ,,xxi41 ,,xxiv41 ,,xxv41 ,,xxvi41 ,,xxvii4 and ,,xxviii4 ,moreover1 when we say that the infinite cannot proceed from the finite1 we do not deny that an infinite property may proceed from a substance finite in its essence4 ,when we admit the infinite property1 we admit at the same time all that is necessary in the substance in order that this property may have its root in it1 so long as we do not deny the character of finite which essentially belongs to every creature4 ,when we deny that creatures are or can be infinite1 we speak of essential infinity1 of that infinity which implies necessity of being and absolute independence under every aspect2 but we do not deny them a relative infinity1 such as that of extension4 ,to undertake to prove that infinite extension is impossible1 because every property of a finite substance must be finite1 is equivalent to supposing the very thing in dispute2 for the precise question is1 whether one of these properties1 namely1 extension1 can be infinite4 ,in order to establish the negative proposition1 ,no property of a finite substance can be infinite1 it is necessary to prove this of extension4 ,hence the argument which we are imposing implies1 in some manner1 a begging of the question1 when they found it on a general proposition which can only be certain when the present question is solved4 #hf4 ,infinite extension ought to be the greatest of all extensions1 but there is no such extension4 ,from any given extension ,god can take away a certain quantity2 for example1 a yard3 in that case the infinite extension would become finite1 for it would be less than the first2 and as the difference between the two extensions is only a yard1 it is clear that not even the first could be infinite2 for it is impossible that there should be only the difference of one yard between the finite and the infinite4 ,this difficulty merits a serious consideration3 at first sight it seems so conclusive that no possibility of a satisfactory solution is conceivable4 ,the proposition that the difference between the finite and the infinite cannot be finite1 is not wholly correct4 ,we must first of all take notice that the difference between two quantities1 whether finite or infinite1 cannot be absolutely infinite1 in the sense of diminution4 ,difference is the excess of one quantity over another1 and necessity implies a limit2 for as the excess only is considered1 the quantity exceeded is not contained in the difference4 ,calling the difference ,d1 the greater quantity ,a1 and the smaller a1 ,i say that ,d can in no hypothesis be infinite4 ,by the supposition ,d ,a - a2 therefore ,d a ,a2 in order that ,d may equal ,a it is necessary to add to it a2 therefore ,d cannot be infinite4 ,if we suppose ,a 1 we shall have ,d ,a - a - a1 or ,d a 4 ,therefore to make ,d infinite we must add to it a1 and we can never have ,d unless a #j2 but in that case there would be no true difference1 since the equation1 ,d ,a - a1 would be converted into ,d ,a - #j ,a1 and the difference would not be real but imaginary4 ,it follows from this that no difference between two positive quantities can be absolutely infinite2 if it is so in some sense1 it is not so in the sense of diminution2 and the union of these two ideas of difference and infinity results in a contradiction4#dj #dj ,i am speaking of the difference between positive quantities2 for with regard to other quantities we may express an infinite difference algebraically4 ,let the two quantities be 7 - a7 and 7-a74 ,the difference between them will be expressed in this equation1 ,d7 - a7 - 7-a7 - a a 4 ,the difference between an infinite quantity and a given finite quantity cannot be another given finite quantity1 but it must be infinite in some sense4 ,let us suppose an infinite line and a given finite line1 the difference between them cannot be expressed by a given finite lineal value4 ,for supposing the second line to be a finite and a given line1 we may place it upon the infinite line in any of its directions1 and from any point in it it will reach a certain point of the infinite line4 ,if we suppose a second given finite line1 representing the difference between the other two lines1 we ought to place it upon the infinite line at the point where the other terminates2 and it is evident that it will terminate at another point determined by its length2 therefore it will not measure the whole of the difference between the infinite and the finite lines4 ,we obtain the same result in algebraic expressions4 ,if ,a be a given finite value1 the difference between ,a and cannot be another given finite value4 ,for1 expressing the difference by ,d1 we shall have - ,d ,a ,d4 ,therefore1 ,d ,a 2 consequently1 if both were given finite values1 an infinite would result from two given finite values1 which is absurd4 ,hence1 a difference may be in some sense infinite1 according to the meaning we attach to the term infinity4 ,if from the point where we are situated1 we draw a line towards the north and produce it infinitely1 and then produce it1 also1 infinitely towards the south1 the difference between either of these lines and the sum of them both1 will be infinite only in a certain sense4 ,this is also verified by algebraic expressions4 ,if we have the infinite value equal #b1 and compare it with 1 the result is #b - 4 ,in general1 from any infinite value we may subtract any finite difference in relation to it1 so long as the subtrahend is not a given finite value4 ,let be the infinite value1--,i say that we can find in it any finite value2 for1 being an infinite value1 ,a contains all finite values of the same order2 therefore it contains the finite value1 ,a2 consequently we may form the equation1 - ,a ,b4 ,whatever be the value of ,b1 the relation of ,b to is ,a2 for by only adding ,a to ,b we obtain 4 ,the equation1 - ,a ,b1 gives ,b ,a 1 and also - ,b ,a2 and as ,a is a given value according to the supposition1 and ,a is the given finite difference between and ,b1 it follows that we may find a finite difference to every infinite value4 ,we may infer from this that the possibility of assigning a finite difference to an infinite extension1 does not prove any thing against its true infinity4 ,the infinite1 and because it is infinite1 contains all that belongs to the order in which it is infinite4 ,we may take any sure value1 and considering it as a difference1 and we shall obtain a finite difference4 ,but far from proving the absence of infinity1 this confirms its existence2 for it shows that all the finite is contained in the infinite4 ,in this case1 the subtrahend would be infinite under a certain aspect2 but not in the order of diminution1 because it wants the quantity which is taken from it4 #hg4 ,there is another argument against the absolute infinity of extension1 which seems to have more weight than any of those which precede1 and ,i cannot see why it has never occurred to those who argue against this possibility4 ,it is this1--we suppose an infinite extension to exist4 ,god can annihilate it1 and then create another equally infinite4 ,the sum of both is greater than either alone2 therefore neither of them alone is infinite4 ,this annihilation we may suppose as often as we wish2 hence we may have a series of infinite extensions4 ,the terms of this series cannot exist at the same time1 since one actual infinite extension excludes all others4 ,therefore1 as the sum of the extensions is greater than any number of particular extensions1 the absolute infinite extension must be found1 not in the particular extensions1 but in the sum1 and hence an actual infinite extension is intrinsically impossible4 ,to solve this difficulty we must distinguish between extension and the thing extended3 the whole question turns on the intrinsic possibility of the infinity of extension1 considered in itself1 abstracting absolutely the subject in which it is found4 ,the difficulty places before our sight a series of successive infinite extensions2 but in reality this succession is in the beings which are extended1 and the number of which goes on increasing2 but not in the extension itself4 ,the pure idea of infinite extension in the one case1 is not increased by the new extensions which are produced2 the extension appears1 disappears1 reappears1 and again disappears1 but is not increased4 ,the succession shows the intrinsic possibility of its appearance and its disappearance1 its essential contingency1 because it is not repugnant for it to cease to exist when it exists1 or to pass again from non-existence to existence4 ,if we examine our ideas1 we shall find that we cannot increase the infinite extension which we conceive1 by any imaginable supposition2 and that whatever we may do1 is reduced to a succession of productions and annihilations4 ,the idea of infinite extension seems to be a primitive part of our mind2 the infinity which we imagine in space1 is only the attempt which our mind makes to express its idea in reality4 ,created with sensible intuition1 we have received the power of expanding this intuition on an infinite scale1--to do this we require the idea of an infinite extension4 ,,chapter ,,xiii4 ,,existence ,,of ,,infinite ,,extension4 #hh4 ,the question of the possibility of an infinite extension is very different from that of its existence4 ,the first we answer in the affirmative1 the second in the negative4 ,descartes maintained that the extension of the world is indefinite2 but this is a term which1 although it has a very rational meaning when it refers to the compass of our understanding1 has no meaning when applied to things4 ,there is no objection to saying that the extension of the world is indefinite1 if it only means that we cannot assign its limits2 but in the reality1 the limits exist or do not exist1 indifferently of our power of assigning them2 there is no medium between yes and no2 therefore there is no medium between the existence and the non-existence of these limits4 ,if they exist1 the extension of the world is finite2 if they do not exist1 it is infinite2--in either case1 the word indefinite expresses nothing4 ,the argument of ,descartes proves nothing1 or it proves the true infinity of the world4 ,for1 if we must remove its limits indefinitely because we always conceive indefinitely an extension beyond every other extension1 as1 on the other hand1 we know that this series of conceptions has no limit1 we may at once transfer the unlimitedness to the object which corresponds to those conceptions1 and affirm that the extension of the world is absolutely infinite4 ,unfortunately1 the argument of ,descartes is without any basis2 for it consists in a transition from the ideal1 or1 rather1 imaginary order1 to the real order1 which is contrary to good logic4#da #da ,see ,book ,,iii41 ,chapter ,,viii4 #hi4 ,leibnitz maintained1 that although ,god could have made the material universe finite in its extension1 it is more in conformity with his wisdom not to have done so4 ,thus ,i do not say1 he writes1#db as is here imputed to me1 that ,god cannot give limits to the extension of matter2 but the appearance is that he does not wish it1 but preferred to give it more4 ,the opinion of ,leibnitz is founded on his system of optimism1 which is open to a multitude of objections1 but it is not the place here to examine them4 #db ,lettres entre ,leibnitz et ,clarke1 ,vime crit4 de ,leibnitz1 #gc4 #ij4 ,to speak frankly my own opinion1 ,i say that this is a question which cannot be solved on purely philosophic principles2 for1 as the ideas contain no intrinsic necessity1 either for or against the existence of an infinite extension1 we must look for its solution to what experience teaches us4 ,all the time occupied in attempting to solve this question is lost4 ,what we can assert is1 that the extension of the world exceeds all appreciation2 and as the science of astronomy advances1 greater depths are discovered in the ocean of space4 ,where is the shore8 or is there any8 ,reason cannot answer such questions4 ,what do we1 poor insects1 know1 whose life is but a momentary dwelling on this little ball of dust1 which we call the globe of the earth8 ,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,,possibility ,,of ,,an ,,actual ,,infinite ,,number4 #ia4 ,is an infinite number possible8 ,does the union of the idea of number with the idea of the absolute negation of limit1 involve any contradiction which prevents the realization of the conception8 ,whatever number we may conceive1 we can always conceive one still greater3 this seems to show that no existing number can be absolutely infinite4 ,if we suppose this number to be realized1 an intelligence may know it1 and may multiply it by two1 three1 or any other number2 therefore the number may be increased1 and consequently it is not infinite4 ,this difficulty is far from being conclusive1 if we examine it carefully4 ,the intellectual act of which it speaks1 would be impossible on the supposition of the existence of an infinite number4 ,if the intelligence should not know the infinity of the number1 it might make the multiplication1 but it would fall into a contradiction through its ignorance2 for the number being absolutely infinite1 could not be increased2 its multiplication would be an absurdity1 and the intelligence making it1 would combine two ideas which would still be repugnant1 although not known to be so by the intelligence4 ,if the absolute infinity of the existing number were known to the intelligence1 the idea of multiplication could never be associated with it2 for the intelligence would know that all possible products already exist4 #ib4 ,an absolutely infinite number cannot be expressed in the algebraic or geometrical values2 the attempt so to express it limits it in a certain sense1 and therefore destroys its absolute infinity4 ,if the expression 1 represented an absolutely infinite number1 it would not be susceptible of any combination which would increase it3 to suppose that it may be multiplied by other numbers1 finite or infinite1 is to take its infinity in another than an absolute sense4 ,the fraction a_/#j does not express an infinite value in all the strictness of the word2 for it is evident that whatever be the value of a_/#j it will always be less than #b;a_/#j or1 in general1 less than na_/#j n representing a value greater than unity4 #ic4 ,neither can an infinite number be represented in geometrical values4 ,let us take a line one foot long4 ,it is evident that if we produce this line infinitely in opposite directions1 the number of feet will be in some sense infinite1 since the foot is supposed to be repeated infinite times3 the expression of the number of the feet will be the expression of an infinite value4 ,now1 ,i say that this number is not infinite1 because there are other numbers still greater4 ,in each foot there are twelve inches2 therefore1 the number of inches contained in the line will be twelve times as great as the number of feet2 consequently the number of feet is not infinite4 ,neither is the number of inches infinite2 for they in their turn may be divided into lines1 the lines into points2 and it is evident that the number of the smaller quantities will be proportionally greater than the number of the greater quantities4 ,there will be twelve times as many inches as feet1 twelve times as many lines as inches1 and twelve times as many points as lines2 and this progression can never end1 because the value of a line is infinitely divisible4 #id4 ,pushing to infinity the divisibility of an infinite line1 we seem to have an infinite number in the elements which constitute it2 but a slight reflection will dissipate this illusion4 ,for it is evident that we can draw other infinite lines by the side of the supposed infinite line2 and since according to the supposition1 each of them may be infinitely divided1 it follows that the sum of the elements of all the lines will give a greater number than the sum of the elements of any one of them4 #ie4 ,if we wish to find an infinite number of parts in values of extension1 we must suppose a solid infinite in all its dimensions1 with all its parts infinitely divided4 ,but not even then should we have an absolutely infinite number1 although we should have the greatest which can be represented in values of extension4 ,conceding that an infinite extension existed which is infinitely divisible1 the number of its parts would not be absolutely infinite2 for we can conceive other beings besides extended beings1 and considering both under the general idea of being1 we might unite them in a number which would be greater than that of extended beings alone4 #if4 ,no imaginable species of beings infinitely multiplied1 can give an absolutely infinite number4 ,the reason is the same as that given in the last paragraph3 the existence of beings of one species does not render the existence of beings of another species impossible4 ,therefore1 besides the supposed infinity of the number of beings of a determinate species1 there are other numbers which1 united with this1 produce a number greater than the pretended infinity4 #ig4 ,the existence of an absolutely infinite number requires3 first1 the existence of infinite species of beings2 and secondly1 the existence of infinite individuals of each species4 ,let us see if these conditions can be realized4 #ih4 ,there seems to be no doubt of the intrinsic possibility of infinite species4 ,the scale of beings is between two extremes1 nothing and infinite perfection3 the space between these extremes is infinite2 and beings may be distributed on it in an infinite gradation4 #ii4 ,admitting the intrinsic possibility of an infinite gradation in the scale of beings1 the question occurs1 whether their possibility is only ideal1 or also real1 that is1 may be realized4 ,god is infinitely powerful2 if the infinite gradation is intrinsically possible1 ,god can produce it2 for whatever is intrinsically possible falls within the reach of divine omnipotence4 ,on the other hand1 supposing1 as we must1 the liberty of ,god1 there is no doubt but ,god is free to create all that he can create4 ,if then there is nothing repugnant in an infinity of the species of beings distributed in an infinite gradation1 these beings may exist if ,god will it4 ,therefore denying all limit to the number of species and of individuals of each species1 it seems that the infinite number would exist1 since it is impossible to imagine any increase or limitation in the collection of all beings4 ,on this supposition the most perfect created beings possible would exist1 and no more perfect being in the sphere of creatures could be conceived4 ,all that can be imagined would already exist1 from nothing to infinite perfection4 #ajj4 ,still it must be observed that the collection of created beings1 whatever be their perfection1 are necessarily subject to the condition of dependence on another being2 a condition from which the infinite being above is essentially exempt4 ,this condition involves limitation2 therefore1 all created beings must be finite4 #aja4 ,does the character of finite1 which is met with in all created beings1 involve a determinate limit beyond which they cannot pass8 ,if this limit exists1 is not the number of possible species also limited8 ,and if these species are not infinite1 is not an infinite number an illusion8 ,although the intrinsic possibility of the infinite scale of beings seems beyond a doubt1 we must beware of solving too quickly the present question4 ,with respect to indeterminate conceptions1 we see no possible limit2 but would this still be so1 if we had an intuitive knowledge of the species8 ,are we sure that in the particular qualities of beings1 combined with limitation and dependence1 which are essential to them1 we should not discover a term beyond which they cannot go1 by reason of the constitution of their nature8 ,how impotent philosophy is to solve such questions6 #ajb4 ,whatever may be concluded as to this infinity of species and their respective perfection1 ,i do not believe that an actually infinite number can exist4 ,among these species must be counted intelligences which exercise their acts in succession4 ,this is evidently so2 for in this number are included human minds which think and wish in a successive manner4 ,the acts of these intelligences may be numbered3 this we know from consciousness4 ,therefore there would never be an infinite number1 because these acts1 being successive1 can never be all at the same time4 #ajc4 ,it may be answered that in this case we might suppose that spirits1 including our own1 have only one act of intelligence and will4 ,to this ,i reply1 that besides contradicting the nature of created beings1 which1 because they are finite1 must be subject to change1 it is also open to another objection1 inasmuch as it eliminates at once many species of beings1 and thus1 instead of preserving the infinity1 renders it impossible4 ,who can deny the possibility of that which exists8 ,if1 as our experience informs us1 there now exist beings of successive activity1 why would not these beings be possible on the supposition that the divine omnipotence had exerted all its infinite creative power8 #ajd4 ,this difficulty1 which is founded on the nature of finite intelligences1 seems to render the existence of an infinite number impossible1 and it becomes still stronger if we examine the question under a more general aspect4 ,the existence of an absolutely infinite number excludes the existence of any other number4 ,that which is numbered is not substance alone1 but its modifications also4 ,this has already been demonstrated with regard to intelligences1 and is true in general of all finite beings4 ,every finite being is changeable1 and its changes may be counted4 ,the modifications produced by the changes cannot all exist at once1 for some of them exclude others4 ,therefore1 an actual infinite number is never possible4 #aje4 ,let us apply these considerations to the sensible world4 ,motion is a modification to which bodies are subject4 ,this modification is essentially successive4 ,a motion1 the parts of which co-exist1 is absurd4 ,the co-existence of different states1 which result from different motions1 is also absurd3 things that are contradictory cannot exist at the same time1 and many of these situations are contradictory1 because one of them necessarily involves the negation of others4 ,if a line falling on another line revolve around a point1 it will successively describe different angles4 ,when it forms an angle of #de degrees1 it will not form an angle of #cj degrees1 nor of #dj1 nor #gj1 nor #hj2 these angles mutually exclude one another4 ,a portion of matter will form different figures1 according to the arrangement which is given to the parts of which it is composed4 ,when these parts form a globe1 they will not form a cube2 these two solids cannot exist at the same time1 formed of the same portion of matter4 #ajf4 ,this variety of motion and form can be numbered4 ,at every step we measure motion1 applying to it the idea of number2 at every instant we count the forms of a portion of matter1 as for example1 a piece of wax1 to which different forms have been given successively3 whatever be the number of the beings which we suppose to exist1 every one of them will be susceptible of transformations which may be counted4 ,therefore1 in the very nature of things1 there is an intrinsic impossibility of the existence of an actual infinite number4 #ajg4 ,i believe that these arguments fully demonstrate the impossibility of an actual infinite number2 and if ,i do not dare to say that ,i am sure of having given a complete demonstration1 it is because the nature of the question presents so many and so great difficulties1 it so bewilders and confounds the weak understanding of man1 that there is always reason to fear that even those arguments1 which seem the clearest and most conclusive1 may conceal some fault which vitiates their force1 and makes an illusion appear an incontestible truth4 ,still ,i cannot but observe that to combat this demonstration1 it seems1 to me that it would be necessary to deny our primary ideas1 the exclusion of being and not-being1 and the necessity of succession1 of time1 to the realization of contradictory things4 #ajh4 ,perhaps it may be objected to me that contradictory modifications are not a part of the infinite number1 which only relates to the possible3 but this does not destroy my demonstration2 it rather confirms it4 ,for as the absolute infinite number implies the absolute negation of all limit1 when1 in treating of the realization of this conception1 ,i meet with things that are contradictory1 ,i say that the realization of the conception is contradictory1 because the general and indeterminate conception is more extended than all possible number4 #aji4 ,the origin of their greater conception is1 that the indeterminate conception abstracts all conditions1 that of time included2 but the reality does not and cannot abstract these conditions4 ,hence arises the conflict between the conception and its realization1 and this explains why the conception is not contradictory1 although its realization is impossible4 ,let us suppose a number realized containing all the species and individuals possible1 we may reflect on the conception of the infinite number1 and say that the true infinity of the number requires the absolute negation of all limit2 but thinking of the collection of things which exists1 we can find it a limit1 for concerning this collection of units in general1 we may add to it another number expressing the new modifications which may be produced4 ,at the instant ,a1 the number of units may be expressed by ,m4 ,at the instant ,b1 there will be a new collection of units which may be expressed by ,n4 ,the sum of ,m ,n will be greater than either ,m or ,n alone4 ,therefore1 neither ,m nor ,n will be absolutely infinite4 ,the indeterminate conception abstracts instants and relates to the sum above2 hence it includes things which cannot co-exist4 ,,chapter ,,xv4 ,,idea ,,of ,,absolutely ,,infinite ,,being4 #aaj4 ,we are entering on a difficult question4 ,serious difficulties are found in the idea of the infinite in general2 the idea of absolutely infinite being is not less difficult4 ,we have seen that there are different orders of infinities1 each one of which is a conception formed by the association of the two ideas of a particular being and the negation of limit4 ,but it is easy to see that none of the infinities hitherto examined can be called infinite in the strict sense of the term3 they are all limited under many aspects1--none of them is an infinitely perfect being4 ,the idea of this being is not fully possessed by us while in this life2 still it may be analyzed and explained with more clearness than it is by most authors4 ,the great difficulties1 which we meet with in this attempt1 show the necessity of deep meditation1 and the transcendency of the errors which originate in a wrong understanding of the word infinite when applied to ,god4 #aaa4 ,what is an absolutely infinite being8 ,it might seem that we had said all that is necessary in defining the absolutely infinite being to be that which has no negation of being3 but this is a common notion which leaves much to be desired4 ,it is an indisputable truth that the infinite being has no negation of being2 but it is a truth so far beyond our reach that it presents to our weak understanding only a gloomy confusion1 as soon as we attempt to determine exactly its true sense4 #aab4 ,if the absolutely infinite being has no negation of being1 it seems that nothing can be denied1 but that everything may be affirmed of it1 for it must be all2 in this case pantheism results from the idea of infinity4 ,if a true negative proposition can be established in relation to the infinite being1 there is in it a negation of being1 or of the predicate which is denied in the proposition4 ,it cannot be said that when negative propositions are applied to ,god1 only a negation is denied1 for in reality positive things are denied of ,god4 ,when ,i say that ,god is not extended1 ,i deny of him a reality which is extension4 ,when ,i say ,god is not the universe1 ,i deny of him the reality of the universe4 ,therefore negative propositions1 as applied to ,god1 deny not only negations1 but also realities4 ,it does not seem to solve the difficulty to say that the realities denied involve imperfection1 and are1 consequently1 repugnant to ,god4 ,this is very true1 but we are treating at present of the explanation of the idea of the absolutely infinite1 and the difficulty militates against the supposition that the idea of the absolutely infinite is to be explained by the absolute absence of negation of being4 ,if these realities are any thing1 when denied of ,god some being is denied2 and since the proposition cannot be true if there is not in ,god the negation of the being denied1 it follows that it is incorrect to say that the absolutely infinite being is that which has no negation of being4 #aac4 ,it also seems that a being of this nature could have no properties2 for some positive properties exclude others3 thus1 intelligence and extension1 freedom of will and necessity with respect to the same thing are positive properties which mutually exclude one another4 ,therefore the infinite being cannot have all properties1 unless we make it a collection of absurdities1 after the fashion of pantheists4 #aad4 ,the infinite being must have all being which involves no imperfection4 ,this is very true1 but there still remain serious difficulties to be solved4 ,what is perfection8 ,what is imperfection8 ,these are questions which it is not easy to answer1 and yet we cannot advance a step until we have determined their meaning4 #aae4 ,the idea of perfection implies being3 nothing cannot be perfect1 a perfect not-being is a manifest contradiction4 #aaf4 ,not all being is absolute perfection2 for there are modes of being which involve imperfection3 what is perfection for one being is imperfection for another4 #aag4 ,in finite beings perfection is relative2 a very perfect barn would be a very imperfect church2 a painting may be an ornament in a gallery which would be a profanation if placed in the sanctuary4 ,perfection seems to consist in a property being conducive to its end4 ,this idea is not applicable to the infinite being which can have no other end than itself4 ,therefore1 perfection in the absolutely infinite being cannot be relative1 but must be absolute4 #aah4 ,if perfection is being1 it seems that the perfection of the infinite being must consist in certain properties which are found formally in it1 and therefore exclude all imperfection4 ,an absolutely indeterminate being1 that is1 a being without any property1 is impossible4 ,what conception can we form of a thing without intelligence1 without will1 and without liberty8 ,the propositions in which these properties are affirmed of ,god1 are true2 therefore these properties really exist in the subject of which they are affirmed4 #aai4 ,an infinitely perfect being must have all perfection2 but in what sense are we to understand all8 ,does it mean all possible perfections8 ,but what perfections are possible8 ,those which are not repugnant4 ,to what is the repugnance to be referred8 ,it must be either a mutual repugnance1 or a repugnance to a third3 if the first1 it is necessary to presuppose one of the two extremes1 in order that the other may be repugnant to it2 in that case1 which is to be preferred8 ,if the second1 what is the third to which they are repugnant8 ,on what is it founded8 ,if by all perfection is meant all that we can conceive1 the same difficulty remains4 ,for if we speak of the conception of a finite being1 the conception is not infinite2 if of the conception of an infinite being1 it is a begging of the question1 because in explaining the perfections of the infinite being we appeal to its conception4 ,these difficulties can only be solved by determining more precisely the meaning of these ideas4 #abj4 ,a thing may be denied of another in two manners3 by referring the negation to a property1 or to an individual4 ,when ,i say a surface is not a triangle1 ,i may refer the predicate either to the species of triangle in general1 or to an individual triangle4 ,in the first instance1 ,i deny that the figure is triangular2 in the second1 ,i deny that the figure is another given triangle4 ,when ,i say ,god is not extended1 ,i deny a property2 when ,i say ,god is not the world1 ,i deny an individual4 ,it is evident that in order to attribute absolute infinity to any being1 it is necessary that no being should be denied of it1 either with respect to properties or to individuals1 and that the predicate should be affirmed without destroying the principle of contradiction4 ,this exception is absolutely indispensable1 unless we wish to make the infinite being the greatest of all absurdities1 a jumble of contradictions4 ,i believe that this will explain to a great extent the idea of absolute infinity1 not considered in the abstract1 but applied to a really existent being4 ,,chapter ,,xvi4 ,,all ,,the ,,reality ,,contained ,,in ,,indeterminate ,,conceptions ,,is ,,affirmed ,,of ,,god4 #aba4 ,we have seen that our cognitions are of two classes3 some are general and indeterminate1 others intuitive4 ,all the objects which we know1 whether indeterminately or intuitively1 may be affirmed of ,god1 provided they involve no contradiction4 #abb4 ,general and indeterminate conceptions are the ideas of being and not-being1 substance and accidents1 simple and composite1 cause and effect4 ,all that is real in these conceptions is affirmed of ,god4 #abc4 ,being or that which really exists1 is affirmed of ,god4 ,that which is not has no property4 #abd4 ,substance1 or being subsistent in itself1 is also affirmed of ,god4 ,i do not enter into the discussion of the question greatly disputed in the schools1 whether the ideas of being and substance are applied in the same sense1 or1 as logicians say1 univoce1 to ,god and creatures4 ,it is sufficient for my purpose that the idea of being is applied to the infinite being1 as opposed to the idea of not-being1 and the idea of substance as opposed to accidents1 or rather1 as implying a thing which contains all that is necessary in order to subsist by itself without inhering in any other4 #abe4 ,the idea of accident cannot be applied to the infinite being2 but this is not to deny it any thing positive1 but rather to affirm a perfection2 for we say that it has no need of being inherent in another4 ,this is a perfection2 it is being3 to deny the quality of accident is to remove a negation4 ,to say that a being is a substance is to deny that it is an accident3 these two ideas are contradictory and cannot be attributed to the same subject at the same time4 #abf4 ,simplicity is affirmed of ,god4 ,this attribute denies nothing2 to be convinced of this we need only recollect what simplicity is4 ,the simple is one2 the composite is a union of beings4 ,if the parts are real1 as they must be if there is a true composition1 the resultant is a collection of beings subordinated to a certain law of unity4 ,when1 therefore1 we say that ,god is simple1 we say that ,god is not a collection of beings1 but one being4 ,this involves no negation3 but on the contrary it is the affirmation of an existence not divided into various beings4 #abg4 ,the idea of cause1 that is1 of activity which produces in another the transition from not-being to being1 or from one mode of being to another1 is also affirmed of ,god4 ,this involves no negation1 but is an affirmation of being2 for a cause is not only being1 but a being which so abounds in perfection as to communicate it to others4 #abh4 ,the idea of effect cannot be applied to ,god2 but this is an affirmation1 not a negation4 ,every effect is a thing produced1 which has1 consequently1 passed from not-being to being3 to deny the quality of effect is to remove the negation of being1 and affirm the fulness of being4 #abi4 ,what has been said of the ideas of cause and effect1 may be extended to the ideas of necessary and contingent4 ,the negative proposition1 ,god is not contingent1 is an affirmation2 for contingency is the possibility of not-being4 ,to deny this possibility is to affirm the necessity of being1 which is the fulness of perfection4 ,,chapter ,,xvii4 ,,all ,,that ,,is ,,not ,,contradictory ,,in ,,intuitive ,,ideas ,,is ,,affirmed ,,of ,,god4 #acj4 ,we have seen that all that is positive in general and indeterminate conceptions is affirmed of ,god4 ,let us see if the same is true of intuitive ideas4 ,these ideas1 in all that touches our understanding1 may be reduced to these four2 passive sensibility1 active sensibility1 intelligence1 and will4 #aca4 ,passive sensibility1 or the form under which the objects of the external world are presented to our senses1 cannot be attributed to the infinite being4 ,this negative proposition1 the infinite being is not passively sensible1 is strictly true4 ,does this proposition deny any thing positive of ,god8 ,let us examine it4 ,the form of passive sensibility is extension1 which necessarily implies multiplicity4 ,the extended is necessarily a collection of parts3 to deny extension of ,god is to affirm his simplicity2 to deny that he is a collection of beings1 and to affirm the indivisible unity of his nature4 #acb4 ,besides extension1 there is in the passive sensibility of objects only the relation of causes which produce in us the effects called sensations4 ,this causality can and must be affirmed of ,god3 for it is certain that the infinite cause is capable of producing in us all sensations without the intervention of any medium4 #acc4 ,the negative proposition3 the infinite being is not material1 means nothing more than the other2 the infinite being is not passively sensible4 ,we do not know the intrinsic nature of matter3 all we know is1 that it is presented in intuition to our sensibility under the form of extension1 as an essentially multiplex object4 ,when we deny that ,god is material or corporeal1 we deny that he is passively sensible1 or that he is multiple under the form of extension4 #acd4 ,the other properties of matter1 such as mobility1 impenetrability1 and divisibility1 relate to extension1 or to a particular impression caused on our senses4 ,the difficulties that may be raised on these points are solved by the preceding paragraphs4 ,inertness1 or indifference to rest or motion1 is a purely negative property4 ,it is the incapacity of all action1 the absence of an internal principle productive of change1 the purely passive disposition to receive all that is communicated to it4 #ace4 ,it therefore remains demonstrated that to deny to ,god passive sensibility1 or corporeal nature1 is to affirm his undivided nature1 his productive activity1 and the impossibility of his suffering any kind of change4 #acf4 ,active sensibility1 or the faculty of perceiving1 presents two characteristics which must be defined4 ,there are in sensation two things3 the affection caused in the sensitive being by the sensible object1 and the internal representation of the sensible being4 ,the first is purely passive1 and supposes the possibility of being affected by an object1 and1 consequently1 of being subject to change4 ,this cannot be attributed to the infinite being3 to deny it is to affirm immutability1 or the necessity of remaining always in the same state4 ,the second is a sort of inferior order of cognition1 by which the sensitive being perceives the sensible object4 ,the representation of all objects must necessarily be found in the infinite being1 consequently all that is intuitively perceptive in the sensitive faculty must be contained in the perception of the infinite being2 that is to say1 all that sensibility presents to us of external objects1 all that it transfers to our intuition of external existence1 must be contained in the representation which the infinite intelligence has within itself4 ,man cannot know under what form objects are presented to the intuition of the infinite being2 but it is certain that all the truth contained in sensitive representation is presented to this intuition4 #acg4 ,intelligence1 or the perception of objects without the forms of sensibility1 implies the perception of beings and of their relations1 which is something positive4 ,in us it is often accompanied by the negative circumstance1 of the absence of determinate objects to which the general conception may be referred4 ,the infinite being sees in a single intuition all that exists and all that can exist1 and contains all that is positive in intelligence1 without what is negative1 which is an imperfection4 #ach4 ,it is evident that will must be affirmed of ,god2 for we cannot deny the infinite being that internal1 spontaneous activity which is called to will1 and the nature of which involves no imperfection4 #aci4 ,the will of ,god1 although one and most simple1 is distinguished into free and necessary1 according to the objects to which it is referred4 ,this gives rise to various negative propositions1 which it is well to examine4 ,we say3 ,god cannot will moral evil2 this proposition1 apparently negative1 is1 logically considered1 affirmative4 ,god cannot will moral evil1 because his will is invariably fixed on good1 on that sublime type of all holiness which he contemplates in his infinite essence4 ,the impotence of moral evil is in ,god an infinite perfection of his infinite holiness4 #adj4 ,the divine will may be referred to external objects1 which1 being finite1 can be combined in different manners1 and the existence or non-existence of these combinations depends on the end proposed by the agent which produces or modifies them4 ,the will of ,god exerted on these objects is free2 and to say that he has no necessity of doing this or that is to deny nothing1 but to affirm a perfection1 namely1 the faculty of willing or not willing1 or willing in different manners1 objects which1 on account of their finite nature1 cannot bind the infinite will4 #ada4 ,hence all the reality contained in general ideas1 whether indeterminate or intuitive1 that is not contradictory1 is affirmed of the absolutely infinite being4 ,as to individual realities1 it is evident that those which are finite cannot be affirmed of the infinite being without contradiction4 ,the proposition3 the infinite being is the corporeal universe1 is equivalent to this3 the infinite being is an essentially finite being4 ,the same contradiction will be met with in every proposition where the subject is the infinite being1 and the predicate an individual reality distinct from the infinite being4 ,this remark will suffice for the present3 they will be more clearly understood when we come to treat of the multitude of substances1 in refuting the error of pantheists4 ,,chapter ,,xviii4 ,,intelligence ,,and ,,the ,,absolutely ,,infinite ,,being4 #adb4 ,the infinite being is not a vague object presented in the general idea of being1 but is possessed of true properties which1 without ceasing to be real1 are identified with its infinite essence4 ,a being which is not something1 of which some property cannot be affirmed1 is a dead being1 which we conceive only under the general idea of thing1 and is presented to us as something which cannot be realized4 ,such is not the conception which mankind form of the infinite being2 the idea of activity has always been associated with the idea of ,god3 this is not a general1 but a fixed and determinate activity2 internally1 it is the activity of intelligence2 externally1 the activity which produces beings4 #adc4 ,the idea of activity in general does not exclude all imperfection3 activity to do evil is an imperfect activity3 the activity by which some sensible beings act on others1 is subject to the conditions of motion and extension1 and is1 consequently1 not exempt from imperfection4 ,pure1 internal activity1 considered in itself1 involves no imperfection2 this is intellectual activity4 ,it is an inoffensive activity1 and of itself does no harm2 it is an immaculate faculty1 and of itself is never stained4 #add4 ,to know good1 is good2 to know evil1 is also good2 to wish good is good2 to wish evil is evil2 here is a difference between the understanding and the will2 the will may be defiled by its object1 the understanding never4 ,the moralist considers1 examines1 and analyzes the greatest iniquities1 and studies the details of the most degrading corruption2 the politician knows the passions1 the miseries1 and the crimes of society2 the lawyer witnesses injustice under all its aspects2 the naturalist and the physician contemplate the most filthy and loathsome objects2 and in all this no stain attaches to the intelligence4 ,god himself knows all the evil there is or can be in the physical or in the moral order1 and yet his intelligence remains immaculate4 #ade4 ,created beings abuse liberty as such2 for it is essentially a principle of action1 and may be directed to evil2 but the intelligence1 as regards itself alone1 cannot be abused4 ,it is essentially an immanent or intransitive act in which are represented real or possible objects2 the abuse does not commence until the free will combines the acts of the intelligence and directs them to a bad action2 there is no evil knowledge until the act of the will is introduced into the combinations of the understanding4 ,a collection of stratagems to commit the most horrible crimes1 may be the innocent object of intellectual contemplation4 #adf4 ,a wonderful thing is intelligence4 ,with it there is relation1 order1 rule1 science1 art2 without intelligence there is nothing4 ,conceive1 if you can1 the world without the pre-existence of intelligence2 all is chaos2 imagine the order which now exists1 destroy intelligence1 and the universe is a beautiful picture placed before the extinguished sight of a corpse4 #adg4 ,we conceive beings as more perfect accordingly as they are higher in the order of intelligence4 ,leaving the sphere of the insensible and entering the order of sensitive representation1 a new world commences4 ,the first degree is the animal in which sensations are limited to a small number of objects1 and the summit is intelligence4 ,morality flows from intelligence1 or1 rather1 is one of its laws1 it is the prescription of conformity to an infinitely perfect type4 ,morality is explained with intelligence2 without intelligence it is an absurdity4 ,the intelligence has its laws1 its duties1 but they proceed from itself1 as the sun enlightens itself by its own light4 ,liberty is explained with intelligence2 without it1 liberty is an absurdity4 ,without intelligence causality is presented to us as a farce operating without an object or a direction1 without a sufficient reason1 and is consequently the greatest of absurdities4 ,when some theologians said that the constitutive attribute of the essence of ,god is intelligence1 they expressed an idea which contains a wonderfully profound philosophical meaning4 #adh4 ,by the intellectual act being does not go out of itself3 intelligence is an immanent act which may be extended to infinity1 and exercised with infinite intensity without the intelligent leaving itself4 ,the more profound its understanding is1 the more profound is its concentration on the abyss of its consciousness4 ,intelligence is essentially active3 it is activity4 ,see what happens in man3 he thinks1 and his will awakes and acts3 he thinks1 and his body moves3 he thinks1 and his strength is multiplied1 all his faculties are subject to his thought4 ,let us imagine an intelligence infinite in extension and in intensity1 an intelligence in which there is no alternation of action and rest1 of energy and abatement1 an infinite intelligence which knows itself infinitely1 and knows infinite1 real1 or possible objects with an infinitely perfect knowledge2 an intelligence1 the source of all light without any darkness1 the origin of all truth without any mixture of error2 we may then form some idea of the absolutely infinite being4 ,by this infinite intelligence ,i conceive an infinitely perfect will2 ,i conceive creation1 a pure act of will calling into existence1 from nothing1 the types which pre-existed in the infinite intelligence2 ,i conceive infinite holiness1 and all the perfections identified in that ocean of light4 ,without intelligence ,i conceive nothing3 the absolute being1 which is in the origin of all things1 seems the old chaos1 and ,i try in vain to induce some order into it4 ,the ideas of being1 of substance1 and of necessity are knocked about in the greatest confusion in my understanding2 the infinite is not a focus of light for me1 but an abyss of darkness3 ,i know not whether ,i am immerged in an infinite reality1 or lost in the imaginary space of a vague and empty conception4 ,,chapter ,,xix4 ,,summing ,,up4 #adi4 ,the examination of the idea of the infinite is of the greatest importance1 because it is inseparably united with the idea of ,god4 #aej4 ,we have the idea of the infinite2 but the disputes concerning its nature1 and even its existence1 denote its obscurity4 #aea4 ,the finite is that which has limits4 #aeb4 ,the infinite is not the same as the indefinite4 ,the infinite is that which has no limits--the not-finite2 the indefinite is that to which no limits are assigned--the not-defined4 #aec4 ,the difference between the infinite and the finite is founded on the principle of contradiction3 the finite affirms limits2 the infinite denies them3 there is no medium between yes and no4 #aed4 ,limit is the negation of a being1 or of something real1 applied to a being3 the limit of a line is the point which terminates it2 the limit of a force is the point beyond which it does not extend4 #aee4 ,the idea of the infinite1 denying limit1 denies a negation2 therefore it is an affirmative idea3 the idea of the finite is negative1 because it affirms a negation4 #aef4 ,the idea of the infinite is applied to many orders of beings1 and presents strange anomalies1 which seem contradictions4 ,a line produced to infinity in only one direction appears infinite1 since it is greater than all finite lines2 and it is not infinite1 because it has a limit in the point where it starts4 ,the same thing is verified in surfaces and solids4 ,to explain these anomalies we must attend to the following observations4 #aeg4 ,the idea of the infinite is not intuitive4 ,we have no intuition of an object either absolutely or relatively infinite4 #aeh4 ,the idea of the infinite is an indeterminate conception formed by the union of the two indeterminate ideas of being in general1 and the negation of limit in general4 #aei4 ,the indeterminate conception of the infinite gives us no knowledge of any thing infinite4 #afj4 ,the anomalies and apparent contradictions1 which we find in the application of the idea of the infinite1 vanish when we reflect that the difference of the results depends on the different conditions under which we apply the idea of the infinite4 ,things which would be infinite under one condition cease to be so when considered under other conditions3 the apparent contradiction is caused by one not remarking the change of conditions4 #afa4 ,we have the conception of infinite number1 for we can unite in our mind the two indeterminate conceptions of number and the negation of limit4 #afb4 ,we have the conception of infinite extension1 for we can unite the two indeterminate ideas of extension and the negation of limit4 #afc4 ,the possibility or non-contradiction of conceptions in the purely ideal order does not prove their possibility in the real order4 ,when the conceptions are realized1 their reality is not in an abstract extension or an abstract number1 but in individual extended beings1 or individual numbers3 the determinateness implied by the reality may involve contradiction to the true infinity1 although it be impossible for us to discover any contradiction in the indeterminate conception1 which abstracts the conditions of their realization4 #afd4 ,although we have the conception of infinite extension1 it is impossible for us to imagine it4 #afe4 ,no extrinsic or intrinsic repugnance can be discovered in the existence of infinite extension4 #aff4 ,we cannot know by purely philosophical means whether the extension of the universe is infinite or finite4 #afg4 ,although an absolutely infinite number may be indeterminately conceived1 it is not susceptible of any arithmetical or geometrical expression3 no series of what mathematicians call infinite expresses an absolutely infinite number4 #afh4 ,the intrinsic impossibility of an actual infinite number may be demonstrated from the intrinsic repugnance of the co-existence of certain things which may be numbered4 #afi4 ,the idea of the absolutely infinite real being cannot be indeterminate3 it necessarily involves positive and formal perfections4 #agj4 ,all that does not imply a contradiction must be affirmed of the infinite being4 ,that which is absurd is not a perfection4 #aga4 ,analyzing indeterminate and intuitive ideas1 we find that all the reality contained in them is affirmed of ,god4 #agb4 ,the absolutely infinite being must be intelligent4 #agc4 ,intelligence is a perfection which does not imply contradiction4 #agd4 ,will and liberty must also be found in the absolutely infinite being4 #age4 ,the indeterminate idea of the infinite is favored by the combination of the ideas of being and not-being4 #agf4 ,the idea of an absolutely infinite being consists in the idea of a union of all being that involves no contradiction4 #agg4 ,the indeterminate idea of a real infinite being1 or of ,god1 is formed from the idea of an absolutely infinite being1 combined with the intuitive ideas of intelligence1 will1 liberty1 causality1 and all others that can be conceived without imperfection1 in any infinite degree4 ,,book ,,ninth4 ,,on ,,substance4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,,name ,,and ,,general ,,idea ,,of ,,substance4 #a4 ,what is substance8 ,have we a clear and distinct idea of it8 ,the disputes of philosophers concerning the idea of substance and the continual applications which we make of it1 prove two things3 first1 that the idea of substance exists2 and secondly1 that its clearness and distinctness are not all that could be desired4 ,a mere name1 containing no idea1 could not so strongly draw the attention of all philosophers1 nor be used so generally1 even in ordinary language2 a clear and distinct idea could not give occasion to so much dispute4 #b4 ,the importance of this idea may be seen in the results to which philosophers are led1 according to the way in which they explain it4 ,the entire system of ,spinosa is founded on wrong definition of substance4 #c4 ,in the present question as in many others1 it does not seem to be the shortest way to begin with a definition1 unless the thing defined is only a name3 to define a thing is to explain it1 and we cannot explain it if we are ignorant of what it is1 and we are ignorant1 or are supposed to be ignorant of this1 when we enter on investigations in order to ascertain what it is4 ,if philosophers1 at the beginning of their treatises1 would not say1 substance is this1 but only1 this is what ,i understand by substance1 they would escape a number of difficulties4 #d4 ,after defining the name of substance1 and making a clear and distinct idea correspond to it1 it is still necessary to show how far the idea represents objects really existing1 or1 whether it belongs to the class of ideas expressing only the relation of different ideas1 without our having any means of ascertaining whether this relation is found in the positive world or not2 that is to say1 whether the idea of substance is only the work of our understanding1 a mere result of the combination of certain ideas1 or is furnished us by experience itself4 ,i shall try not to fall into any of these faults2 ,i know not1 however1 whether ,i can escape them4 ,for this purpose1 ,i shall first analyze the word1 with respect to its etymological sense1 and then examine the various meanings which have been given to it4 ,the analysis of words is very useful for the analysis of ideas3 words often contain a great deal of truth1 which we lose by not attending to their common meaning4 #e4 ,the word substance1 substantia1 implies something which is under1 substat1 which is the subject on which other things are placed2 just as its correlative1 accident or modification1 expresses something which happens to the subject1 accidit2 something which modifies it1 which is in it1 as a mode of being1 modus4 #f4 ,by substance we seem to understand something constant in the midst of variation1 something which1 although it is in various ways successively1 according to the variety of modifications which affect it1 remains constant and identical under different transformations4 ,when we say that the substance has received any new modification1 although we understand by this that the substance is1 in a new mode1 we do not mean that it is different in itself1 that it has lost its internal primitive being1 and taken a new being2 but we only consider this change as external1 and as leaving untouched a certain base1 which is what we call substance4 ,if it were not so1 if we did not conceive something constant and identical under modifications1 we could not distinguish substance from its modifications4 ,the modification passes from not-being to being1 and from being to not-being2 now it is1 and now it resigns its post to another and very different modification4 ,but the substance is the same under different modifications2 it does not pass from not-being to being with the succession of its modifications4 ,from the moment that we attribute to substance the instability which belongs to its modifications1 it ceases to be distinguishable from them4 ,ordinary language confirms this truth4 ,when there is a variation of modifications we say that the substance changes1 that is1 we conceive something which existed before the change1 and exists after it4 ,we say that a modification has entirely disappeared2 we do not say this of the substance1 but only that it is1 or is presented to us1 in a different manner4 ,we therefore conceive something which remains constant and identical under different modifications3 the subject in which these changes occur1 this something which does not disappear with the disappearance of the modifications1 which is not changed internally with these changes1 we call substance1 substantia1 substratum4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,application ,,of ,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,substance ,,to ,,corporeal ,,objects4 #g4 ,let us apply the ideas contained in that of substance to a corporeal object3 this will help explain these ideas1 and perhaps suggest others4 ,the paper on which ,i am writing is susceptible of various modifications3 ,i may write on it a thousand different things1 in various characters1 and in different colors2 ,i may fold it in various ways1 and give it an infinite variety of positions in relation to the objects around it1 and ,i may move it in all imaginable directions4 ,under this infinity of changes there is something constant1 something which does not change4 ,there are many new things1 but there is one which is not new1 which is always the same4 ,there is one which suffers these changes1 but retains something which does not change4 ,if ,i make the paper blue and then red1 that which is now red is the same that was blue1 and before that white1 and to this which is constant all those changes are referred4 ,if a white paper is shown me1 and then another paper that is blue1 and then one that is red1 it is clear that it is not the same as though ,i gave all these transformations to the same paper4 ,the impression which the color produces in me remains the same2 in what1 then1 does the difference consist8 ,the difference is1 that in the one case there is something permanent1 which has passed through successive changes2 in the other case this something is not the same1 but is another and different thing4 ,in the one case there are different modifications2 in the other there are different substances4 #h4 ,let us go deeper into the matter4 ,if we only received the successive impressions without any means of referring them to the same object1 to connect them in a common point1 we should find no difference between the two cases of which we have been speaking4 ,if a piece of white paper be placed before us1 and1 after turning our eyes aside for a moment1 we find a blue paper in the same place1 with the same dimensions1 and after again turning our eyes aside we find a red paper3 it is clear that it would be impossible for us to distinguish1 by the mere succession of the visual impressions1 whether the same paper has been differently colored in succession1 or different papers have been substituted for the first4 ,but if we keep our eyes on the place where the paper is1 we see whether the paper is colored or changed4 ,in the first case1 the appearance of the new color will continue with the same sensation of the paper1 unmoved1 the transformation is made without our losing sight of it1 and the paper receives the continued succession of its motions and positions under the hand of the one who colors it4 ,we are then sure that the paper is the same1 because there has been a continuity of sensation1 or rather a connection of the different colors with a third1 resulting from the situation of the paper and its motions1 and from all that by which we know what is common to the first and the second4 ,but if there is no new coloring of the paper1 but a substitution of a differently colored paper1 we see that the first paper is taken away2 the whole order of the sensation is interrupted1 and new sensations are presented4 ,these last have no connection with the first2 there is1 consequently1 for us a different thing4 #i4 ,this shows how the idea of substance with respect to bodies is generated in us1 or1 to speak more properly1 how we apply the idea of substance to bodies4 ,when we discover a link which unites the different sensations in one point1 we call that in which they are united1 substance4 ,and as we meet in nature with many of these points which are independent of one another1 we naturally say there are many corporeal substances4 #aj4 ,when we perceive an impression we never call it a substance1 if we refer it to an object1 or consider it as objective3 for the object is not1 of itself alone1 capable of connecting various sensations4 ,we receive the sensations of red1 and not only ordinary people1 but even philosophers1 when not philosophizing1 make the color objective1 and consider the red1 not as a simple sensation1 but as an external quality4 ,no one would call this quality by itself a substance2 for it is not capable1 of itself alone1 of connecting other impressions or qualities4 ,if there is a change of color the red disappears1 and the new impression is connected in the order of time with the sensation of the red1 but does not reside in it4 ,if there is a change of form1 although the red continues1 we do not conceive this color as the necessary link between the two forms1 because we know that the continuance of the red is indifferent to the variety of form1 which may be changed with or without the continuance of this color4 ,as in general we have experienced that no sensation is necessarily connected with another1 and that among sensations connected at a common point1 some disappear without the rest disappearing1 we infer that none of them is a necessary link2 and therefore1 although we make them objective1 we do not give them the character of a substance1 of any thing remaining identical through changes1 of which it is1 as it were1 the recipient4 #aa4 ,there is a property in bodies which is necessary to all sensations1 or at least1 to the two principal sensations of sight and touch4 ,this property is extension1 which1 whether considered subjectively or objectively1 we regard as a recipient of all sensations4 ,we neither see nor imagine the white or black2 we neither touch nor imagine the hard or the soft1 the warm or the cold1 without the extension in which the whiteness or blackness1 the hardness or softness1 the warmth or the cold reside4 ,thus extension might perhaps merit the honor of substance1 if it were not subject to another condition1 which deprives it of this title4 ,although when we conceive extension in general1 in the abstract1 considering it as a mere continuity1 we absolutely abstract it from all form2 when we have need of an applied extension as the recipient of sensations1 it is impossible to find it without a determinate form and figure4 ,we do not see a color simply1 but we see it in a circular1 triangular1 or other extension4 ,these forms are confounded with extension itself as its applications2 and do not serve as a link for other sensations4 ,sometimes1 it is true1 the same figure receives different colors1 different positions1 different degrees of heat or cold1 etc41 but the contrary also sometimes occurs1 and with the same color1 and the same degree of heat or cold1 with the same continuance of the other sensations1 the object changes its form2 just as a red circle may become a green circle1 a red object may become circular1 and afterwards triangular4 ,in the first case1 the circular figure is the link connecting the sensations of the colors2 in the second1 the color is the link connecting the figures4 #ab4 ,having deprived extension of the honor of substance1 as well as all other sensations1 in so far as objective2 we may observe that all these variations in the objects are successive1 and the sensations are connected with each other4 ,thus the same circle may take different colors2 and the same color different figures2 the colors may be again changed1 and the first reproduced1 the figure remaining the same2 or the first figure may be reproduced1 the colors remaining the same4 ,we conclude that under this variety there is something constant1 that under this multiplicity there is something which is one2 that under this succession of being and not-being there is something permanent2 and this which is constant1 one1 and permanent1 the recipient of these changes1 the point outside of us which connects them1 and enables us to conceive them connected1--this is what we call substance4 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,definition ,,of ,,corporeal ,,substance4 #ac4 ,what is the permanent subject of transformations in the sensible order8 ,is it a pure illusion8 ,is it a reality8 ,what reality can it be8 ,does it not seem rather an abstraction8 ,a thing which is no color1 but lends itself all colors2 which is none of the qualities which we experience1 but the subject and cause of them all2 which is no form1 but accommodates itself to all forms2 which is not pure extension1 because this is an abstraction1 and it is something which serves as the ground of other things2 a corporeal object which1 in itself1 can affect none of the senses2 what is it8 ,is it what the ,aristotelians call an occult quality1 a mysterious1 and fantastic being1 a mere illusion8 ,let us examine it by the light of experience4 #ad4 ,let us take a piece of wax and without letting it go out of our hands paint it different colors successively1 subject it to different degrees of temperature1 softening it by warming1 and then cooling it2 let us give it different forms1 of a globe1 a cylinder1 a parallelopipedon1 a table1 a vase1 or a statue2 do all these changes take place in the same thing8 ,yes4 ,is this thing not a color1 or a figure1 or a degree of temperature8 ,no2 because all these qualities were and ceased to be whilst the thing remained the same4 ,how do ,i know that the thing remained the same8 ,because there was a continuity of sensation in the eye fixed upon the object2 in the touch which1 although it felt the modifications of warm and cold1 hard and soft1 experienced also an uninterrupted sensation of an object1 which remained constantly in the hand1 and the weight of which was continuously felt4 ,therefore there is something there which is not the modifications1 but is that which is modified1 something common to them all1 which receives and connects them1 outside of me and within me4 #ae4 ,examining one conception of this permanent something1 we find that1 after abstracting its qualities1 we have3 ,i4 ,the idea of being4 ,we say the thing1 the something1 the subject1 etc41 we therefore speak of a being1 of a quality4 ,without the reality there is nothing2 and nothing cannot be the subject of modifications1 or the link connecting impressions4 ,,ii4 ,the idea of being1 which we here find1 is not pure1 it is not being alone4 ,the qualities exist1 are beings1 and still we do not confound them with the subject4 ,,iii4 ,that which accompanies the idea of being is the idea of permanence amidst succession1 and the relation of this permanence as the point of connection1 the immovable centre in the midst of succession4 #af4 ,if1 therefore1 we wished to define substance1 we could only say that it is a permanent being in which occur the changes which are presented to us in the sensible phenomena4 ,our knowledge is all reduced to this2 all that we can add beside1 is only hypothesis or conjecture4 ,in vain you ask me1 what is this being8 ,give me the intuition of the essence of corporeal things1 and ,i will tell you2 but while ,i know them only by their effects1 that is1 the impressions which they produce in me1 ,i cannot answer you4 ,i know that it is something2 ,i know its relation to its forms2 ,i know that the forms are in the subject1 and are not the subject2 but here is the limit of my knowledge4 ,the object corresponding to the idea composed of a permanent being and its relation to various forms is what ,i call corporeal substance4 #ag4 ,since the substance changes its accidents1 remaining the same itself1 it follows that its existence is independent of the accidents4 ,abstracting1 for the present1 whether it can or cannot exist without any1 ,i only affirm that none in particular is necessary to it4 ,here we must take note of the difference between substance in itself1 and in the medium by which it is manifested to us1 and placed in active or passive communication with us4 ,the accidents are this medium2 they are the transitory forms it puts on4 ,how can we know the existence of bodies1 except by sensations8 ,the object of sensation is not substance in its inner nature1 but only its qualities as affecting us4 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,relation ,,of ,,corporeal ,,substance ,,to ,,its ,,accidents4 #ah4 ,in the idea of corporeal substance the idea of permanence is perfectly included1 the idea of unity only imperfectly4 ,the unity which we conceive in every corporeal substance is a factitious unity2 since that which is constant is not one but an aggregate of many1 as is proved by the divisibility of matter2 out of every corporeal substance we may make many which will have the same right as the first to be called substances4 ,a piece of wood is a substance2 but we may slit it into several pieces which will be equally substances4 ,these pieces1 joined together1 formed what are called one substance2 but it is clear that this unity was very imperfect1 and was rather a union than a unity1 and that if we consider it as one1 it was in relation to the unity of effect which it produced in us1 by the connection which it gave to our sensations and to the phenomena which resulted from it4 #ai4 ,hence1 every corporeal substance involves multiplicity1 or combination of the elements which compose it4 ,experience informs us that this combination is not permanent2 there is1 consequently1 no corporeal substance which does not imply at least one modification1 namely1 the arrangement of its parts4 ,abstracting the changes which this modification may undergo1 it can never be confounded with the substance3 although the bodies might be presented constantly to our senses with the same arrangement of the parts1 the permanent being would be in the parts1 not in their arrangement4 ,the latter is something external which is added to the thing existing2 there can be no union and combination without parts which are united and combined4 #bj4 ,a difference which we observe between the substance and its modifications is1 that the substance is independent of the modifications1 but the modifications are not independent of the substance4 ,the substance1 while remaining the same1 changes its accidents1 but an accident cannot change its substance and remain the same4 ,the same block may receive different figures successively2 but a figure1 numerically the same1 cannot pass from one block to another4 ,two blocks may have a similar or a different figure1 whether cubic1 spherical1 or pyramidal1 and one may take the figure of the other2 but in that case1 the figures are not identical1 but similar1 they are specifically but not numerically the same4 #ba4 ,if ,i am asked how ,i know that there is only similarity and not numerical identity in the figures which bodies take successively1 that there is no permanence in the figures which change their subject1 and consequently that the same figure cannot pass from one substance to another1 in the same manner that the same substance passes from one figure to another2 ,i shall not find it difficult to prove what ,i assert4 ,there is no one who does not see what an extravagant thing it would be for a cubic figure to leave a body and pass to another4 ,what is this figure separated from the body8 ,how is it preserved during the transition8 ,why is it not exactly the same in both1 but presented with slight modifications8 ,has it undergone a modification in its passage from one body to another8 ,then there would be a modification of a modification1 and the figure in itself abstracted from all body1 would be a kind of substance of a secondary order1 permanent under modifications4 ,these are but absurd dreams in which that is applied to the concrete which belongs to the idea only in the abstract4 ,this transition of the forms would suppose their separate existence1 and thus we might have all kinds of abstract figures1 cubes1 spheres1 circles1 triangles1 etc41 subsisting in themselves without application to any thing figured4 #bb4 ,a still stricter demonstration of this truth is possible4 ,if we suppose a figure1 numerically the same1 to pass from one body to another2 the block ,a1 which loses the cubic form1 transmits it to the body ,b4 ,now1 this individual form cannot be in both at the same time4 ,suppose that after the cubic form has left the block ,a1 we turn it back before it has touched the body ,b1 evidently it will not be the same in both3 therefore the body ,b has not acquired the same1 but only a similar form4 ,it is also evident that in order to give the cubic form1 we need not take it from another2 therefore1 the form of one is not individually that of the other2 otherwise we should have to say that it is and is not1 that it is preserved and ceases to exist at the same time4 #bc4 ,the term transmission or communication of motion1 which is so much used in physical science1 expresses something real so long as limited to the phenomenon which is under calculation2 but it would be an absurdity1 if it meant that the same motion which was in one body has passed to another4 ,the sum of the quantities of motion is the same in elastic bodies after impact as before it2 the velocity being divided between them1 and the one gaining what the other loses4 ,this is proved by calculation1 and confirmed by experience4 ,but it is evident that one body does not impart the same individual velocity which it contained to the other body2 for not only can the velocity not be separated from the body and pass from one subject to another2 but it cannot even be conceived except as a relation1 the idea of which includes the ideas of a body moved1 of space1 and of time4 ,it is true that ,q representing the quantity of the motion before impact1 the value of ,q remains the same after impact2 but this only expresses the phenomenon in relation to its effects1 as subject to calculation2 not that the velocity in the second member of the equation is composed of the parts of the first4 ,let ,a and ,b represent two bodies1 the individual masses of which are expressed by these two letters2 and ,v1 v their respective velocities before impact4 ,the quantity of motion will be ,q ,a ,v ,b v4 ,after impact there will be a new velocity which we may call w1 and the quantity of motion will be ,q ,a w ,b u4 ,mathematically speaking1 the value of ,q will be the same2 but this only means that if the results of the motion be expressed in lines or numbers1 we shall have the same after impact as before it2 it does not and cannot mean that in the velocity u1 considered as united to the subject1 there is a portion of velocity which has been detached from ,v to be joined to v4 #bd4 ,hence1 we do not conceive the accidents of bodies as possible without a subject in which they are inherent2 and that substances are not inherent in another being1 but are conceived and really exist without this inherence4 ,a figure cannot exist without a thing figured1 but the thing figured may still exist1 through all other things are destroyed4 ,the analysis of the nature of substance shows that its existence supposes the existence of another being which produced it2 but relation between them is that of cause and effect1 not of inherence1 or that of the subject and its modification4 #be4 ,these last observations explain another mark of corporeal substances4 ,in the third chapter of this book we found the three characteristics of being1 the relation of the permanent to the variable1 and the subject of the variations2 we now find a fourth1 which is a negation1 non-inherence in another4 ,this negative characteristic is included in the positive one1 permanent subject of variations2 for it is clear that in conceiving a subject permanent amid variations we do not include inherence1 but rather deny it1 at least implicitly4 ,non-inherence supposes something positive1 something on which is founded the denial of the necessity of being inherent4 ,what is this something8 ,we know not4 ,we know that it exists1 but its explanation is beyond our reach4 ,it is probably inexplicable without the intuition of the essence of things2--an intuition which we have not4 ,,chapter ,v4 ,,considerations ,,on ,,corporeal ,,substance ,,in ,,itself4 #bf4 ,the idea of substance1 such as we have thus far explained it1 implies a relation to accidents in general4 ,the idea we are now examining is not that of an indeterminate substance1 but of corporeal substance2 and it must be confessed that it is difficult to conceive a particular corporeal substance without any accident4 ,if ,i take from the paper1 on which ,i am writing1 its figure1 extension1 and all that relates to my senses1 what is there left for me to conceive something particular and determinate1 something which is not the idea of being in general1 but of this being in particular8 ,it is clear that1 in order that the object may not disappear altogether1 and losing its individuality be confounded in the universal idea1 ,i must reserve something by which ,i can say this3 that is to say1 that which is here1 or which has affected me in this or that manner1 or has been the subject of such or such modifications4 ,i consider at least its position with respect to other bodies1 or its causality in relation to the effects which it has produced in me1 or its nature as the subject of determinate accidents4 ,just as the idea of finite substance in general involves relation to certain accidents in general1 the idea of a particular substance involves relation to particular accidents4 #bg4 ,we find this relation in our mode of conceiving corporeal substance2 we cannot assert that it is involved in the nature of the substance4 ,this nature is unknown to us1 and when we attempt to examine it1 we pass to another question1 that of the essence of bodies4 #bh4 ,neither can we say how far the identity of the corporeal substance continues under its different transformations4 ,the partisans of corpuscular philosophy consider all transformations as mere local motions1 and all the variations which we see in bodies as mere results of the different position of the corpuscles among themselves4 ,leibnitz resolved matter into an infinity of monads1 differing from the atoms of ,epicurus1 but conducing to the substantial invariability of bodies1 which are only a collection of indivisible substances1 which he calls monads4 ,the ,aristotelians believed that1 of the changes of bodies1 some were accidental1 as figure1 motion1 density1 warmth1 cold1 etc42 others substantial1 as the change of wood to ashes4 ,but in all the variety of systems1 all admit something permanent1 the subject of the changes4 ,the ,atomists and ,leibnitz evidently admitted the identity of the subject4 ,as to the ,aristotelians1 although the change which introduced a substantial form different from the first substantially transformed the being1 so that after the change of the substantial form it could not be said that one was substantially the other1 they still thought there was a common subject in these substantial transformations1 and this was what they called the first matter1 materia prima4 ,all systems of philosophy admit this clear and evident truth1 that in the midst of the transformations of the corporeal world1 there is something permanent4 #bi4 ,this corporeal substance being a reality1 must not only exist1 but it must be something determinate4 ,this substantial determination of the body1 which makes it this particular thing1 and distinguishes it in its internal nature1 in its essence1 from all other bodies of other species1 the ,aristotelians called the substantial form4 ,the subject of this form1 or actuality1 which was common to all bodies1 they called the materia prima1 which was a pure potentiality1 a sort of medium between pure nothing and actual being4 #cj4 ,ever since there have been schools of philosophy1 these points have been disputed2 and it is probable they always will be2 but it is to very little purpose4 ,we know the existence of the corporeal world1 we know its relations to ourselves1 we know its properties and its laws1 so far as they are subject to our observation2 but its intrinsic nature is beyond the reach of our senses1 or our instruments4 ,increased acuteness of observation and improvement in the power and delicacy of instruments1 discovers new mysteries1 and man finds the barriers which he believed the ne plus ultra1 removed from him as he advances4 ,will he ever be able to pass them8 ,will he ever make the entire circuit of this scientific world8 ,is the knowledge of the intrinsic nature of the subject of this infinity of phenomena which astonish us1 reserved to the future8 ,it is hard to believe it4 ,the telescope1 becoming more perfect1 extends the limits of the universe1 and seems to behold the infinitely great2 the perfection of the microscope1 advancing in the opposite direction1 regards the infinitely little4 ,where are the limits8 ,it is probable that man is not permitted to reach them while in this world4 ,the mind of man in its fruitful activity1 struggles alternately after the two extremes1 but just as he flatters himself he is reaching the last limit1 he feels that something stronger than himself withholds him from attaining the object of his noble desires2 it is the chain that binds him to the mortal body1 and obstructs the flight of his pure spirit4 ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,substantiality ,,of ,,the ,,human ,,me4 #ca4 ,we have not found perfect unity in corporeal substances3 all that are subject to our senses may be resolved into a number of others equally substances in their turn2 a body is rather an aggregate of substances1 than one substance4 ,we do not find the unity in the bodies2 we attribute it to them either inasmuch as they form a common link of our sensations1 or inasmuch as we consider the different substances subordinated to one being and governing substance4 ,thus the parts of an animated body constitute a sort of unity1 inasmuch as they are subordinate to the principle which animates them4 #cb4 ,we do not conclude from this that true unity does not exist in bodies2 if we could know their essence1 we should doubtless discover it1 whether in the monads1 as maintained by ,leibnitz1 or in something else more or less resembling them4 ,although this knowledge of their essence is denied us1 reason leads us to this unity4 ,the composite is formed of parts2 if these parts are in turn formed of others1 we must at last come to something which has no parts2 here we find the indivisible1 or rather1 the true unity4 ,this reasoning is equally valid1 even though we suppose matter to be infinitely divisible4 ,infinite divisibility would suppose an infinity of parts into which any body may be divided3 these parts would therefore exist2 these infinitesimal elements would be real3 the unity would be in them4 #cc4 ,independently of the external world1 we find the idea of substance in ourselves2 consciousness reveals its real application and perfect unity4 ,consciousness makes known to us that we think1 desire1 feel1 and experience an infinity of affections1 some of which are subject to our will and are the product of the internal activity of our soul2 others are independent of us1 they come without our will1 and often against it1 and it is not always in our power to reproduce them even if we wish it4 ,this ebb and flow of ideas1 volitions1 and sentiments1 have a point in which they are connected1 a subject which receives them1 remembers them1 combines them1 and seeks or avoids them2 this being1 of which we are internally conscious1 philosophers have called the me4 ,it is one and identical under all transformations2 this unity1 this identity1 is an indisputable fact which consciousness reveals to us4 ,who could make us doubt that the me which thinks at the present moment is not the same which thought yesterday1 which thought years ago8 ,notwithstanding the variety of thoughts and desires1 the changes of opinion and will1 who could deprive us of the firm and deep conviction which we have that we are the same who experience them all1 that there is something here within us which is the subject of them all8 #cd4 ,if there were not something in us permanent in the midst of this variety1 the consciousness of the me would be impossible4 ,memory and combination would also be impossible2 for there would be within us only a succession of unconnected phenomena4 ,thinking is impossible without something which thinks and remains identical under the variety of the forms of thought4 ,there is1 therefore1 within us a simple subject which connects all the changes which occur in it3 there is a substance4 ,in it there is unity3 the unity which we only find in corporeal substances after an infinite series of decompositions1 is presented to us in the spiritual substance1 at the first instant1 as a simple internal fact1 without which1 all the phenomena which we perceive within us are absurd1 and all experience of the external world impossible4 ,without the unity of the me there can be no sensation1 and without sensation no experience of the beings around us4 ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,,relation ,,of ,,the ,,proposition1 ,i ,,think1 ,,to ,,the ,,substantiality ,,of ,,the ,,me4 #ce4 ,the proposition1 ,i think1 can have no sense unless we admit that the soul is a substance4 ,philosophy loses its resting-point1 and all that experience within us is a series of unconnected phenomena1 incapable of being observed1 or subjected to any rule4 #cf4 ,my present thought is not individually my thought of yesterday1 as my thought of to-morrow will not be my thought of to-day4 ,these thoughts1 considered in themselves and abstracted from a subject in which they are found1 have no connection with one another3 perhaps their objects are without any relation to each other1 or even contradictory2 perhaps the thought of to-day is the denial of the thought of yesterday4 #cg4 ,the same is true of all thoughts1 all acts of the will1 of all sentiments1 imaginary representations1 and sensations1 and1 in general1 of all that ,i experience within myself4 ,turning my attention to all internal affections1 whatever they may be1 ,i see in them only a series of phenomena1 a sort of current of existences passing away and disappearing1 some never to return1 others to reappear at a different time1 expressly presenting this difference4 ,the reappearance is not individual1 but similar3 the affection which is repeated is not the same1 but another resembling it4 ,when the affection returns1 ,i am conscious of its presence at the time1 and conscious of its presence at a previous time2 this double consciousness constitutes recollection1 makes me distinguish between the two affections1 and necessarily implies the judgment that one is not the other4 ,there would be no recollection1 if the affection recalling were identified with the affection recalled4 ,a thing presents itself1 but does not recall itself4 #ch4 ,therefore every thing passes away within us never to return1 the disappearance is real1 the reappearance but apparent2 that which ceases to be can never return to be again2 there may be a similar thing1 but not the same2 that which was1 is passed1 and time does not retrace its steps4 #ci4 ,therefore1 the series of internal phenomena1 considered in themselves and abstracted from the subject in which they reside1 are necessarily unconnected1 and there is no way of subordinating the terms of the series to any law1 or connecting link4 #dj4 ,still this law exists in all our intellectual acts2 reason1 without laws which govern it1 would be the greatest of absurdities2 this link is found in all our affections4 ,that they pass from us with their distinction and difference and resemblance is a fact of our mind1 to which we are subjected1 as to a primitive and inevitable condition of our existence4 #da4 ,the proposition1 ,i think1 in the sense in which the word think includes all internal affections1 does not relate to isolated phenomena alone1 but it necessarily implies a point1 which we call the me1 in which these phenomena are connected4 ,if this point does not exist1 if it is not one and identical1 the thought of to-day can have no connection with the thought of yesterday3 they are two distinct things1 at different times1 and perhaps contradictory3 when ,i say to-day1 ,i think1 and mean that the ,i is the same as in the proposition1 ,i thought yesterday1 my language would be absurd2 if they are mere phenomena1 two thoughts without any connecting link1 the me is nothing1 ,i cannot say1 ,i thought1 ,i think2 but ,i must say there was thought1 there is thought4 ,if1 then1 you ask me1 where8 in whom8 ,i must reply1 that there is no where1 no who2 ,i must deny the supposition1 and confine myself to repeating1 there was thought1 there is thought4 #db4 ,to say me1 it is necessary to suppose a permanent reality2 a reality1 because that which is not real is nothing2 permanent1 because that which passes away disappears1 ceases to be1 and cannot serve as the point to unite other things4 ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,,remarks ,,on ,,the ,,soul',s ,,intuition ,,of ,,itself4 #dc4 ,the permanent reality of the me1 considered in itself and abstracted from the things which pass within it1 is a fact which we perceive in our intuition1 and which we express in all our words4 ,if this presence1 this internal experience1 be what is called the intuition of the soul1 then we have intuition of our soul4 ,this intuition is reproduced in every particular intuition1 and in all internal affections in general2 for1 although they are isolated phenomena1 they imply the intuition of the me1 because they imply the consciousness of themselves4 #dd4 ,the variety of isolated phenomena instead of proving any thing against the unity of the intuition of the me1 on the contrary1 evidently confirms it4 ,if we conceived only one fixed and identical thought1 there would be less necessity of uniting with it the idea of a subject in which it resides2 but when there is a multitude of different phenomena1 which cannot co-exist without contradiction1 we must refer them to something constant1 or else the internal world is converted into an absolute chaos4 #de4 ,the soul has1 therefore1 an intuition of itself2 that is to say1 it is conscious of its unity in multiplicity1 of its identity in diversity1 of its permanence in succession1 of its constant duration in the appearance and disappearance of phenomena4 ,either we must admit this1 or we must renounce the legitimacy of all testimony of consciousness1 and embrace the most complete skepticism that ever existed1 extending it both to the internal and to the external world4 #df4 ,we find within us the realization of the indeterminate conceptions of being1 unity1 permanence1 and subject of modifications2 this realization is revealed by consciousness1 and is confirmed by the logical analysis of the series of phenomena in their relation to a point of connection4 #dg4 ,all that is included in the idea of finite substance is contained in these four terms3 being1 one1 permanent1 and the subject of modifications4 ,all this is in our soul1 and we perceive by experience that we are internally affected by it4 ,if this perception is called intuition1 we have intuition of the substantiality of our soul4 #dh4 ,the thinking being not only perceives itself but it knows itself as a real object1 to which1 by means of reflection1 it applies the ideas of being1 unity1 permanence1 and the subject of modifications4 ,therefore the soul may be the true predicate of propositions resting on logic and consciousness4 #di4 ,have we any other intuition of the soul1 besides that which has just been explained8 ,to this ,i answer1 that we have not while in this life1 and at the same time ,i ask whether any other than that of consciousness is possible4 ,accustomed as we are to sensible intuitions which imply extension in space1 we ask what the soul is in itself1 and we do not seem to be satisfied without seeing its image4 ,leaving the order of sensibility and rising to the purely intellectual sphere1 who knows whether we can say that there is no other intuition of the soul than that which we now have2 whether the soul in itself1 in the unity and simplicity of its entity1 is the force which we perceive2 whether this force is the subject of the modifications1 the substance1 without its being necessary to imagine another support in which this force might reside8 ,why may not this force be subsistent8 ,why must we imagine another substratum to support it8 ,if it were so1 if we must apply to the substance of the soul what the great ,leibnitz thought applicable to all substances1 making the idea of substance to consist in the idea of force2 why may we not say that the pressure of the internal sense1 the consciousness of itself1 is all the intuition of itself which the soul can have8 #ej4 ,you may ask me1 what is the soul separated from the body8 ,what will it perceive and know of itself1 when it exists alone8 ,as though it did not now perceive and know alone1 or as though the organs1 which it uses1 could perceive or think4 ,does it1 perchance1 know how it uses them1 or even know otherwise than by experience that it uses them at all8 ,is it not alone in the depths of its activity with its thoughts and the acts of its will1 its sentiments1 its joy and its sadness1 its pleasures and its pains8 ,say1 then1 that perhaps we do not form sufficiently clear ideas of the mode of consciousness which we shall have of ourselves after this life2 say that perhaps other intuitions of our self are possible2 but do not imagine the soul as inconceivable alone4 ,leave me thought1 will1 sentiment1 all that is internally present to my consciousness1 to find myself2 ,i ask no more4 ,give me communication with other beings1 which affect me or are affected by me1 which transmit to me thoughts and wills1 which cause me pleasure or pain2 ,i need nothing more in order to have a world which ,i can very well conceive4 ,i am ignorant of the quality of the things1 not of their possibility3 the soul changes its state1 not its nature4 ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,,kant',s ,,opinion ,,of ,,the ,,arguments ,,proving ,,the ,,substantiality ,,of ,,the ,,soul4 #ea4 ,the psychological arguments in favor of the substantiality of the soul are mere paralogisms1 in ,kant's opinion2 although they prove an ideal substance1 they can never lead to a real substance4 ,besides the arguments with which this philosopher attacks the psychological proof of the substantiality of the soul1 he had also a personal argument1 which1 considering the weakness of the human heart1 was very powerful4 ,he had either to place the substantiality of the soul in doubt1 or else consent to the ruin of his whole system4 ,it would be1 he says1 a great and even the only stumbling-block in our whole critique1 if there were a possibility of demonstrating a priori that all thinking beings are in themselves simple substances1 and 7which is a consequence of the principle of this demonstration7 are inseparably accompanied by personality and the consciousness of their existence distinct from all matter4 ,for1 in this case1 if we had taken a single step out of the world of the senses1 we should have entered into the field of the noumena1 and no one would dispute our right to extend farther into it1 to build in it1 and1 according to each one's good luck1 to take possession of it4#dc #dc ,von den ,paralogismen der reinen ,vernunft1 p4 #big4 #eb4 ,in ,kant's conception1 the first paralogism of pure psychology in favor of the substantiality of the soul is the following3--,every thing1 the representation of which is the absolute substance of our judgments1 and which cannot serve as a determination of any thing else1 is a substance4 ,the me1 as thinking being1 is the absolute substance of all possible judgments1 and this representation of itself cannot be the predicate of any thing else2 therefore the me1 as thinking being1 is a substance4 ,these are the terms in which he presents the psychological reasoning which he proposes to attack1 in the first edition of his ,critic of ,pure ,reason2 in the second edition1 wishing to be more clear1 or1 perhaps1 more obscure1 he expresses the same argument in these words3--,that which cannot be thought otherwise than as subject1 does not exist otherwise than as subject1 and is therefore substance4 ,now a thinking being1 regarded merely as such1 cannot be thought otherwise than as subject4 ,therefore it exists only as such1 that is1 as substance4 ,we must confess that if psychology could find no clearer expounders than ,kant1 and should have to use in its demonstrations the forms which this philosopher employs in these passages1 it would have but a small number of proselytes1 for the simple reason that very few could understand its language4 ,i am sure that but few readers would be convinced by the syllogisms proving the substantiality of the soul1 such as ,kant presents them2 in this way there is a great advantage in the position of the philosopher2 for he has to prove that an argument1 the force of which has not been felt1 has no force4 ,but let us suppose the philosopher to descend from the ,olympus of incomprehensible abstractions1 and deign to use the humble language of mortals1 presenting the psychological argument under a more simple form1 who knows but what the conviction which it would produce would be somewhat more difficult to destroy8 ,let us see4 #ec4 ,a substance is a being remaining identical with itself1 a permanent reality in which different modifications occur4 ,but there is within me this reality which1 remaining identical1 has a variety of thoughts1 acts of the will1 sentiments1 and sensations1 as is revealed by consciousness4 ,therefore that which is within me is a substance4 ,i defy all the philosophers in the world to point out a false1 or even a doubtful proposition in this syllogism1 or to show a fault in the consequence1 without placing themselves in open contradiction with the testimony of consciousness on the one hand1 and with all the laws of human reason on the other4 #ed4 ,kant pretends that the argument in favor of the substantiality of the soul is not conclusive1 because the pure categories1 and consequently that of substance also1 have absolutely no objective value1 except in so far as applied to the diversity of an intuition subject to them3 that is to say1 the conception of substance is a purely logical function1 without any objective value or meaning except as referred to sensible things1 and as soon as we leave the sphere of sensibility1 it can lead to no result4 ,it is evident that the substantiality of the soul cannot be the object of sensible intuition2 consequently1 to apply to the soul the idea of substance is to extend the conception beyond what its nature allows4 ,it must be confessed that ,kant's reasoning is conclusive1 if we admit his principles2 and here we have a proof of the necessity of combating certain theories1 which1 because they are in the realm of abstractions1 seem innocent1 but in reality are most dangerous1 on account of the results to which they lead4 ,such is the system of ,kant as denying the objective value of the pure categories1 and this is why ,i have combated it1#dd demonstrating3 ,i4 ,that indeterminate conceptions1 and the general principles founded on them1 have an objective value beyond the field of sensible experience1 in respect to beings which are in nowise subject to our intuition2 ,,ii4 ,that it is not true that we have only sensible intuition1 for we have intuitive knowledge of a pure intellectual order1 above the sphere of sensibility4 ,this doctrine overthrows the whole of ,kant's argument1 for it destroys its foundation4 #dd ,see ,bk4 ,,iv41 ,chs4 ,,xiii41 ,,xiv41 ,,xv41 ,,xvi41 ,,xxi41 ,,xxii4 #ee4 ,the ,german philosopher seems to have perceived the weak point in his reasoning1 and therefore he tries to give the psychological argument in such terms as to show a transition from the ideal order to the real1 keeping out of sight the point which unites things so distant4 ,his language is purely ideological3 ,every thing1 the representation of which is the absolute substance of our judgments1 and which cannot serve as a determination of any thing else1 is a substance4 ,observe that he defines substance by the representation and the incapacity of serving as a determination of any thing else2 that is1 by purely ideological or dialectic attributes4 ,the form which he employs in the second edition suffers from the same defect4 ,that which cannot be thought otherwise than as subject1 does not exist otherwise than as subject1 and is1 therefore1 substance4 ,why does he not tell us that the substance here spoken of is a permanent being1 in which the modifications are realized1 but which remains identical with itself8 ,why does he speak only of representation1 of thought1 of the determination or predicate8 ,because it helped his purpose to present the argument as a sophism in which there is a transition from one order to another entirely different order2 because it was for his interest to give an obscure form1 so that he could make the following observations3--,in the major1 a being is spoken of which can be thought under any view in general1 and consequently1 also1 as it is given in the intuition4 ,but1 in the minor1 the same being is spoken of in so far as it is regarded as subject1 in relation only to thought and the unity of consciousness1 but not at the same time in relation to the intuition by which the unity is given to the thought as its object4 ,consequently the conclusion follows only by a fallacy1 per sophisma figur dictionis4 ,and in a note he says3 ,thought is taken in the two premises in an entirely different sense2 in the major1 as belonging to an object in general1 and such1 consequently1 as it may be given in the intuition2 but in the minor only as it is in relation to the consciousness of self1 where it is not thought in any object1 but is merely represented in relation to itself1 as subject1 as the form of the thought4 ,in the first case1 a thing is spoken of which can only be thought as subject2 but1 in the second1 thought is spoken of1 not things1 since abstraction is made of all objects2 and in the thought the me always serves as subject of the consciousness2 hence the conclusion which follows is not1 that ,i cannot exist otherwise than as subject1 but only1 that ,i cannot make use of myself in the thought of my existence1 otherwise than as subject of the judgment1 which is an identical proposition1 revealing absolutely nothing concerning the manner of my existence4#de ,it makes one indignant to see a man attempt1 by such a confusion of ideas and of words1 to rob the human mind of its existence2 for it amounts to the same thing1 to deny that it is a substance4 ,it makes one indignant to see a philosopher pretend1 by such an absurd confusion1 to attack one of the clearest1 most evident1 and most irresistible arguments which can be presented to human reason4 ,i thought yesterday1 ,i think to-day3 in all the variety of my situations1 ,i find myself the same and not another2 this reality1 which remains identical in the midst of diversity1 ,i call my soul2 therefore my soul is a permanent reality1 the subject of modifications2 therefore it is a substance4 ,can any thing be clearer8 #de ,critik der reinen ,vernunft1 p4 #bih4 #ef4 ,psychology does1 it is true1 make use of the general idea of substance in proving the substantiality of the soul3 but it appeals to a fact of experience1 to the testimony of consciousness1 in order to apply this idea to the present case4 ,what does ,kant mean when he pretends to have demonstrated that the conception of a thing which can exist of itself as subject1 but not as mere attribute1 does not involve any objective reality8 ,when he speaks of subject1 does he mean a real subject1 the subject of modifications8 ,then the soul is a subject2 but we do not say that it is a subject only2 we conceive its reality under this aspect without1 therefore1 denying that it has other characters3 on the contrary1 we expressly acknowledge that it is an active principle1 which implies something more that the mere subject of modifications1 for this last is a passive1 rather than an active1 quality4 ,if by subject ,kant understands the logical subject1 we deny that this is exclusively the character of the soul in such a way that it cannot logically be the attribute or predicate of a proposition4 #eg4 ,the conception of a thing1 says ,kant1 which can exist as its own subject1 but not as a mere predicate1 draws with it no objective reality2 that is1 one cannot know whether any object corresponds to it1 since one cannot conceive the possibility of such a manner of existing1 consequently there is absolutely no cognition4 ,in order that it may indicate under the denomination of substance1 an object which may be given1 in order that it may be a cognition1 a constant intuition must be placed at the foundation1 as the indispensable condition of the objective reality of a conception1 namely1 that by which alone the object is given4 ,but we have nothing constant in the internal intuition1 for the me is only the consciousness of my thought2 if1 therefore1 we confine ourselves to the thought alone1 the necessary condition of the application of the conception of substance1 that is1 of a subject subsisting in itself as thinking being4#df #df ,critik der reinen ,vernunft1 p4 #bii4 ,no argument could be more common-place and sophistical4 ,kant does not admit the substantiality of the soul1 because we cannot take the substance itself and present it in sensible intuition2 but then he ought not to speak of pure intellectual conceptions of logical functions1 or of ideas2 for all these are things which are out of the order of sensibility1 and therefore cannot be given us in the sensible intuition4 ,yet they really exist as internal phenomena1 as subjective facts1 of which ,kant is continually talking1 and to which he devotes the greater part of his ,critic of ,pure ,reason4 ,will it1 perchance1 be said that the pure idea of relation means nothing1 because we cannot present an abstract relation in sensible intuition8 ,will it be said that the principles from which proceed the phenomena of attraction1 affinity1 electricity1 magnetism1 galvanism1 light1 and all that charms or astonishes us in nature1--will it be said that they do not exist1 that they are not permanent things1 but empty words1 because we cannot represent them in sensible intuition8 ,such a manner of arguing is unworthy of a philosopher4 ,it might be excusable in an uneducated person1 accustomed only to the phenomena of sensibility1 who had never descended to the depths of the soul in the sphere of pure intelligence1--such a person might be pardoned if1 when we speak of a spirit1 a cause1 or a substance1 he should ask1 what is it8 and require us to show the insensible under a sensible form3 but one who pretends to excel all philosophers1 ancient or modern1 one who from the inaccessible height of his wisdom looks down with such sovereign contempt on all the arguments which were before regarded as conclusive1 ought to produce some other title of his superiority than merely saying3 one cannot conceive the possibility of such a manner of existing3 we have no internal intuition of this permanent thing which you speak of2 the me is only the consciousness of my thought4 ,what then6 is any thing more necessary in order to prove what we propose1 than this consciousness4 ,is not this consciousness one amid the variety of our thoughts8 ,is there not a point connecting yesterday's1 to-day's1 and to-morrow's thought8 ,different and contradictory as they are1 do they not all belong to the same thing1 to this thing which we call the me1 and which authorizes us to say3 ,i who think to-day1 am the same who thought yesterday1 and who will think to-morrow8 ,can any reasoning be clearer or more convincing than affirming the real permanence which we perceive in the internal testimony of our consciousness8 ,i do not see my substance1 you may say1 ,i have no intuition of it2 ,i only perceive my consciousness4 ,what more do you want8 ,this consciousness which you experience1 which is one amid multiplicity1 identical amid distinction1 constant amid variety1 and permanent in the midst of the succession of the phenomena which appear and disappear2 this consciousness1 which is no one of your individual thoughts1 which endures while they pass away1 not to return2 this consciousness presents to you the substantiality of your soul1 it presents it in a certain manner in intuition1 not in the intuition of sensations1 but in the intuition of the internal sense1 as a thing affecting you deeply1 and the presence of which you cannot doubt1 as you do not doubt the pleasure or pain in the act by which you experience it4 #eh4 ,in attacking the psychological for the substantiality of the soul1 ,kant supposes that those who make use of it1 attempt to prove the substantiality of the soul by starting from the pure and simple category of substance4 ,this mistake might have occasioned the form in which ,kant presents this argument2 but we have seen that1 whether intentionally or not1 this form is arranged in the best manner for affording weak points for the attacks of the philosopher4 ,open any treatise on psychology and you will find that although the general idea of substance is employed1 it is only made use of after it has been legitimated by a fact of experience2 it is not inferred from the pure category of substance that the soul is a substance2 but only after we have established the idea of substance as a general type1 we scrutinize the depth of consciousness to see if there is any thing there to which this type may apply4 ,this is what has been done in the preceding paragraphs1 and if ,kant had wished to be more exact in his account of the opinions of his adversaries1 he would not have said that the first argument of rational psychology only gives a light1 which is pretended to be true1 when it presents the constant logical subject of the thought1 as the cognition of the real subject of the inherence4 ,far from its being possible1 he says1 to infer these properties from the pure and simple category of a substance1 on the contrary1 the permanence of a given object cannot be taken as a principle1 except by starting from experience1 when we wish to apply to it the empirically general conception of a substance4 ,the philosopher is right3 the properties of the pure and simple category of a substance cannot take us out of the ideal order1 unless we rest on a fact of experience2 but he forgets a part of the psychological argument when he adds that in the present case we have not placed at the foundation any experience1 and that we have only drawn our conclusions from the conception of the relation of every thought to the me as the common subject with which this thought is connected4 ,the experience exists in this very consciousness of the relation of all thoughts to the me2 in this point with which they are all connected2 the relation to the me is not possible if the me is not something2 thoughts cannot be connected in the me if the me is a pure nothing4 ,referring the thought to the me1 ,kant goes on to say1 we cannot establish this permanence by a certain observation2 because1 although the me is found at the bottom of every thought1 besides that there is no intuition to distinguish it from every other perceptible object1 it is connected with this representation4 ,it is true that we do not perceive the permanent me in the same manner that we do the objects of the other intuitions2 but we perceive it by the internal sense1 by that presence1 of which we cannot doubt1 and which1 as ,kant himself confesses1 makes us refer all thoughts to the me as to a common subject which connects them4 #ei4 ,it may be observed1 he says1 that this representation 7that of the me7 is constantly reproduced in every thought2 but not that it is a fixed and permanent intuition in which variable thoughts succeed each other4 ,there is an evident contradiction in this passage4 ,the representation of the me is constantly reproduced in every thought3 but the me either means nothing1 or it means something identical with itself2 for if the me which thinks to-day is not the me which thought yesterday1 the word me means something very different from what all the world understands by it2 therefore1 if the representation of the me returns in every thought1 the me is the same in every thought2 therefore the me is fixed and permanent1 and consequently the me is a substance in which all variable thoughts succeed4 #fj4 ,i cannot see any answer to this argument1 founded on ,kant's own words when establishing a phenomenon1 the existence of which he was unable to place in doubt1 namely1 the presence of the me in every thought4 ,this is not the place to examine the philosophical questions on the uninterruptedness of consciousness1 or whether there is any time in which the soul does not think1 and is not conscious of itself4 ,many philosophers believe there is such an interruption2 and they rest their opinion on our experience when asleep1 and our not recollecting what happens to us in that state2 but ,leibnitz thinks that thought is never entirely extinguished1 that there is never an absolute pause of consciousness1 that our thought is a light which sheds but little lustre at times1 but which never goes entirely out4 ,whichever of these opinions be the true one1 the permanence of the substance of the soul is beyond a doubt2 and it is worthy of remark that the interruption of thought and of consciousness1 far from favoring those who oppose the permanence of the soul1 confounds them in a most conclusive manner4 ,for if it is impossible to conceive1 without supposing something permanent1 how different phenomena1 continued in an uninterrupted series1 are connected in consciousness2 it is still more inconceivable how they can be connected1 if we suppose this series to be interrupted1 and a certain space of time to intervene between the existence of the connected phenomena4 #fa4 ,let ,a1 ,b1 ,c1 ,d be thoughts which are continued without any interval of time between them1 and ,q the consciousness through which they pass2 if this ,q is not something1 it is impossible to conceive how the terms of the series can be connected1 and1 how1 notwithstanding their difference and diversity1 there is found at the bottom of them all something constant and identical1 which we call the me1 and by virtue of which we can say3 ,i1 who think ,d1 am the same who thought ,c1 and ,b1 and ,a4 ,but if the consciousness is interrupted1 if some hours have passed between ,c and ,d1 during which there was no thought1 no consciousness1 it is still more inconceivable how at the bottom of the thought me there is found the same me which was in the thought ,c2 it is still more inconceivable1 because in thinking ,d we may say3 ,i1 who think ,d1 am the same who thought ,c1 and who have been for a certain time deprived of thought4 ,without something permanent1 something which lasts during the succession1 how explain this connection8 ,are we1 perchance1 speaking of unknown facts8 ,is not this our daily experience on awaking8 ,if this is not conclusive1 let us deny consciousness1 let us deny reason2 but let us not waste time in talking philosophy4 ,,chapter ,x4 ,,kant',s ,,opinion ,,of ,,the ,,argument ,,which ,,he ,,calls ,,paralogism ,,of ,,personality4 #fb4 ,kant attacks the argument founded on the testimony of consciousness in a particular manner in the examination of what he calls the ,paralogism of ,personality4 ,he gives the argument in this form2 ,whatever has the consciousness of its numerical identity at different times is1 by this fact alone1 a person2 this is verified of the soul2 therefore soul is a person4 ,kant uses the word person in a very incorrect sense3 it not only means an intelligent substance1 but one that is the complete principle of its actions1 independently of all connection with any other substance1 or a union with a supposition4 ,at any rate1 the ,german philosopher understands here by person an intelligent substance2 and in this sense he proposes to combat the argument proving the personality of the soul4 #fc4 ,if ,i wish1 he says1 to know by experience the numerical identity of any external object1 ,i apply my attention to that which is constant in the phenomenon1 to which all the rest is referred1 as a determination to its subject2 and ,i observe the identity of the subject at the time in which the determination changes4 ,i am an object of the internal sense1 and time is only the form of this sense2 ,i therefore refer all my successive determinations1 and each one of them in particular1 to that which is numerically identical1 in all time1 that is1 in the form of the internal intuition of myself4 ,hence the personality of the soul ought only to be deduced or concluded as a proposition perfectly identical with consciousness in time2 consequently1 this proposition is valid a priori1 because it does not really announce any thing else than that in all the time in which ,i am conscious of myself1 ,i am conscious of this time as a thing1 which is a part of my unity4 ,this is the same as to say3 ,all this time is in me as individual unity1 or rather1 ,i am in all this time with numerical identity4 ,it would have been desirable if ,kant had shown why the internal sense of the numerical identity may be expressed by the proposition2 all this time is in me as an individual unity1 or in this other2 in all the time in which ,i am conscious of myself1 ,i am conscious of this time as a thing1 which is a part of my unity4 ,it is true that the numerical unity is perceived in the diversity of time2 but it is not true that we are conscious of time as a thing which is a part of us4 ,he is treating of the consciousness of self1 as it is found in the greatest part of mankind1 who1 far from considering time as a thing which is a part of themselves1 regard it as a sort of vague extension or succession in which they and all that is variable exist4 ,it is well known that philosophers themselves dispute on the true nature of time2 and that it is the form of the internal sense is an opinion of ,kant's1 which is not accepted by many others1 and which1 as ,i have shown1#dg he explains badly and proves still worse1 although he pretends to have raised his theory to the height of an incontestible doctrine4 ,whether time is an internal or an external form1 whether1 even1 it is an illusion or a reality1 we perceive our numerical identity in its succession2 therefore when the ,german philosopher bases himself on his theory of time1 in order to attack the solidity of the argument of consciousness1 he rests on a supposition which we are not required to admit1 and what is more1 he explains this sentiment of identity in terms which no one ever used before him4 ,if he wishes to make time enter into the sentiment of numerical identity1 he might say3 ,i find myself in all this time in a numerical identity1 or3 all this time has passed over me as over an individual unit2 but not that we are conscious of time as a thing which is a part of ourselves4 ,if we look to consciousness1 we should rather be inclined to believe that time is a sort of successive extension1 in which we live1 and by which our existence is measured4 #dg ,see ,book ,,viii41 ,chapters ,,xii4 and ,,xiv4 #fd4 ,the identity of the person1 continues ,kant1 must inevitably be found in my consciousness2 but if ,i regard myself from the point of view of another 7as the object of his external intuition7 this other observer conceives me only in time2 for1 in the apperception1 time is not strictly represented except within me2 therefore he will not conclude my objective permanence from the me1 which he admits1 and which accompanies all representations in all time in my consciousness1 and in a perfect identity4 ,the time in which the observer places me not being the same which is found in my own sensibility1 but that which accompanies his intuition1 it follows that the identity which is necessarily joined to my consciousness1 is not joined to his1 that is1 to the external intuition of my subject4 ,it is difficult to understand precisely what ,kant means in this passage1 and it seems very doubtful whether he understood it himself2 however1 let us see what can be deduced from it against the permanence of the soul4 ,the ,german philosopher admits that the identity of the person is inevitably found in our consciousness2 that is1 the me finds itself numerically identical in the diversity of time4 ,it is also true that a strange observer conceives the me only in time1 that is1 if one man reflects on the soul of another man1 he conceives it only in time4 ,but this does not show why ,kant says that the observer would not infer from this the objective permanence of the soul observed4 ,what would happen would be this4 ,if the man who reflects on the soul of another man believes that same passes in the soul of this man which he perceives within himself1 he will infer that the other soul is permanent1 for the same reason that he affirms the permanence of his own soul4 ,it is true that as he cannot enter into the consciousness of the other1 he can only know it by external marks2 but if he is convinced that these marks are sufficient to denote a series of phenomena of consciousness similar to those which he experiences in himself1 he will infer that the soul which he observes is as permanent as his own4 ,what does ,kant mean then1 when he says that the identity which is necessarily connected with my consciousness1 is not connected with that of the observer8 ,who ever doubted this truth8 ,who ever supposed that the perception of the identity in relation to one's own consciousness is not very different from that which relates to another's8 ,our own identity is revealed to us by immediate consciousness2 the identity of another is shown to us by a series of external phenomena which lead us by reasoning and analogy to the conviction that outside of us there are beings similar to ourselves4 #fe4 ,the identity of the consciousness of myself at different times1 ,kant goes on to say1 is only a formal condition of my thoughts and their connection2 but it does not prove the numerical identity of my subject1 in which1 notwithstanding the logical identity of the me1 such a change may take place1 as to render it impossible to preserve the identity of this me1 which does not prevent our always attributing to it the identical me1 which me may still preserve in another state1 and even in the metamorphosis of the subject1 the thought of the previous subject1 and transmit to it all that comes afterwards4 ,this is precisely what ,kant ought to have explained2 because the phenomenon of the sentiment of identity in the midst of continual variety1 is what irresistibly inclines us to believe that the me is something permanent4 ,it is not true that we have only the topical identity of the me1 for we are not speaking of the subject of a proposition1 but of a real subject1 experienced1 perceived in the depth of our consciousness4 ,kant imagines that he can explain this sentiment of identity with great simplicity4 ,i will try to express his strange opinion in an intelligible manner4 ,let ,a1 ,b1 ,c1 ,d1 ,e1 444 be instants of time1 and let a1 b1 c1 d1 e1 444 be thoughts or any other internal phenomena1 corresponding to them4 ,at the instant ,a1 the thought a exists4 ,at the instant ,b1 the thought b succeeds4 ,at the instant ,b1 the soul which existed at the instant ,a1 no longer exists4 ,the soul at the instant ,b1 is something entirely new2 it is not a but b4 ,the same is true of all the rest4 ,but how1 you will say1 is it possible for the soul at all these instants to believe itself the same8 ,it is very simple3 the subject a transmits the thought to the subject b2 b transmits its own and a's to c4 ,nothing remains identical2 but the consciousness of the identity always lasts4 ,does not such an hypothesis seem truly wonderful and philosophical8 ,what could be imagined clearer and more satisfactory8 ,the reader may perhaps think that ,i am jesting1 and that ,i present ,kant's opinion under a ridiculous aspect for the sake of combating it more easily2 but it is just the reverse2 the exposition which ,i have just made of ,kant's philosophy is more serious than his own4 ,these are his words3 ,one elastic ball striking another in a right line1 communicates to the latter its whole motion1 and consequently its whole state 7considering only their positions in space74 ,admit now1 by analogy with these bodies1 certain substances1 of which one transmits representations to another1 with the consciousness which accompanies them2 we may then conceive a whole series of such representations1 in which the first communicates its state1 and the consciousness of its state to the second2 the second communicates its state1 together with that of the preceding substance1 to the third2 the third1 in like manner1 communicates the states of both of the preceding substances together with its own1 and the consciousness which accompanies them to the fourth4 ,the last of the series will then have the consciousness of all the states of the substances which preceded it1 as of its own2 because these states1 and the consciousness of these states have been transmitted to it4 ,still it will not have been the same person in all these states4 ,kant1 in trying to refute the psychological argument founded on consciousness1 overthrows and destroys the character of consciousness3 a transmitted consciousness is not a true consciousness2 it is only the cognition of a previous thought4 ,these substances1 existing successively and transmitting their consciousness from one to another1 would be something distinct from the act of consciousness1 or they would not4 ,if distinct1 we must admit a subject of the consciousness1 which in itself1 and as subject1 does not come under the sensible intuition2 and consequently we may argue ad hominem1 and retort ,kant's objection against himself4 ,if these transitory substances are only the act of the consciousness1 when the act ceases1 nothing remains of the substances1 and therefore1 there is nothing transmissible4 ,transmission supposes something which may be transmitted2 if1 then1 the act of consciousness is transmitted1 it must be something permanent in itself1 in the midst of the succession of the substances2 and this is a very strange conclusion to which the ,german philosopher is brought by his theory of transmission4 ,all psychologists had said that the substance of the soul is permanent1 and its phenomena transitory2 now1 on the contrary1 we find that the transitory is the substance1 and that which is permanent is the phenomenon1 or the act of consciousness which is transmitted4 #ff4 ,perhaps it may be answered that by transmission is not meant the communication of any thing constant1 but merely the succession of phenomena united by any tie among themselves4 ,thus1 supposing the instants ,a1 ,b1 ,c1 ,d1 the acts of consciousness1 a1 b1 c1 d1 corresponding to them1 will not be strictly identical in number1 but successive1 and connected4 ,but this reply1 which avoids the necessity of admitting the permanence of the act of consciousness1 explains nothing1 and makes it incomprehensible1 how1 at the instant ,d1 for example1 there can be consciousness of the acts c1 b1 a1 which there is an irresistible inclination to believe have at bottom something numerically identical4 ,when d exists there is no longer any thing of c left2 there is no substance remaining1 because1 by the supposition there either is no such substance1 or it is something transitory2 there is no act of consciousness remaining1 because a is numerically distinct from c1 and besides1 we have seen that the permanence of the phenomena cannot be admitted4 ,therefore it is absolutely impossible to explain or to comprehend how there can be in the act a the representation of c4 #fg4 ,to say that the phenomena are united by any tie whatever is to elude the difficulty by a foolish play upon words4 ,what is the meaning1 in this case1 of uniting1 of a tie8 ,they are metaphors which if they mean any thing must express the permanence of some thing amid the variety of the phenomena2 the tie1 the bond1 must extend to the various things which it connects and unites3 therefore it must be common to them all2 and this something1 whatever it be1 which remains constant in variety1 we call substance4 #fh4 ,the mere succession of the phenomena or acts of consciousness is not sufficient to transmit the belief of the numerical identity2 if it were1 all men would be conscious of the previous acts of others4 ,let a1 b1 be two successive acts of consciousness3 if1 in order that the act b1 which is numerically distinct from a1 may represent the numerical identity of consciousness1 it is sufficient that b should succeed a2 since this succession is met with in the acts of consciousness of different men1 it must follow that all men have consciousness of all the acts of the others4 ,risum tematis8 ,and yet this conclusion is absolutely necessary3 it cannot be avoided by saying that there is a form of the internal sense1 and that the succession takes place in each man in his respective internal sense1 and that therefore the succession of the internal phenomena of one is in a different time1 in a different form from what it is in another4 ,the words1 respective internal sense1 internal form of each man1 have a meaning1 if we admit something permanent in our interior2 but if there is nothing but successive phenomena1 the word respective is absurd1 because there can be no respective internal sense if there is nothing to which it can refer4 ,suppose the man ,m1 and the man ,n be merely a succession of phenomena1 and in each one there is only a mere succession3 there is the same reason why the phenomena of ,n should be connected with each other as with those of ,m4 ,therefore1 if there is a community of consciousness in the phenomena of ,m1 without any other sufficient reason than the mere succession1 this community should be found in all the phenomena1 because they all have the same sufficient reason4 #fi4 ,it must be observed that in all this argument1 ,i abstract the nature of the substance of the soul1 and only purpose to demonstrate that we must admit something constant in the midst of the variety of the phenomena1 and common to them all4 ,call it a tie1 a form1 an act of consciousness1 or what you will1 it is either something real or it is not4 ,if it is not something real1 whoever expresses it1 employs a word without any meaning3 if it is something real1 the substantiality of the soul is acknowledged1 because a permanent reality is admitted in the midst of the variety of the phenomena4 ,we1 who admit this substantiality1 do not pretend that the soul can be given in sensible intuition1 nor that we can express in an exact definition its internal properties abstracted from the phenomena which we experience in it4 ,what we say is1 that we know its real existence1 its permanence1 and its numerical identity in the midst of the succession and diversity of the phenomena4 ,therefore from the moment that it is admitted that there is within us something real1 permanent1 and numerically identical in the midst of diversity1 the substantiality of the soul1 which we defend1 is admitted4 ,disputes may arise on the distinctive character of its nature2 whether it is or is not a force1 as ,leibnitz maintained1 whether its essence consists in thought1 as was the opinion of ,descartes3 but these questions are foreign to the matter now in hand4 ,is there something real and permanent amid the variety of internal phenomena8 ,if there is not1 the consciousness of numerical identity is absurd2 if there is1 then the substantiality of the soul is demonstrated4 #gj4 ,the opinion of some ancient philosophers1 says ,kant1 that all is transitory and nothing constant in the world1 although it cannot be maintained if we admit substances1 still it cannot be refuted by the unity of consciousness2 because we cannot even judge by consciousness1 whether1 as something1 we are or are not permanent2 for we attribute to our identical me only that of which we have consciousness1 and thus we must necessarily judge that we are precisely the same in all the durations of which we are conscious4 ,kant expressly acknowledges that the judgment that we are the same is necessary1 that is1 that the identity of the me is for us a necessary fact of consciousness4 ,it would be difficult to imagine a confession more injurious and more conclusive against the arguments of the ,german philosopher4 ,if we are forced to judge ourselves identical1 if consciousness tell us so1 can we deny or doubt this identity without destroying the fundamental fact of all psychological investigations1 and consequently falling into the most complete skepticism8 ,if the testimony of consciousness is not valid1 if the judgment to which it necessarily forces us is not certain1 what shall we catch hold of in order that we may not be precipitated into the most absolute skepticism8 where shall we look for a solid foundation for the edifice of our knowledge8 #ga4 ,but1 ,kant continues1 from the point of view of another1 we cannot hold this judgment valid1 because1 finding in the soul no other constant phenomenon than the representation of the me which accompanies and unites all the other phenomena1 we can never decide that this me 7a simple thought7 is not as fleeting as the other thoughts1 which are respectively connected by it4 ,do not1 then1 admit that the representation of the me1 although essentially representing an identity1 is valid2 say that1 although transitory it necessarily brings us to the illusion of permanence2 but draw also all the consequences of this doctrine1 and maintain that human reason avails nothing1 absolutely nothing2 say that recollection is a pure illusion1 that although we are necessarily induced to believe that the thought which we now have is the recollection of another previous thought1 that all this is pure illusion2 that we are not sure that there is the relation of recollection1 and that we only know that at present we have the consciousness of a thought which seems to us connected with another previous thought2 say too that reasoning has no validity1 for all conviction of ideas is impossible without memory2 and that1 although an internal representation necessarily produces an assent1 we must distrust the judgment which necessity demands3 say too that all that we think1 all that we perceive1 all that we will1 all that we experience within us1 cannot enable us to know any thing1 that we are condemned to a complete impotence of acquiring any certainty of any thing2 and that the language of every philosopher should be the following3 ,this now seems so2 ,i am conscious of it2 ,i know nothing further2 ,i experience a necessity of believing it1 but perhaps this belief is a pure illusion2 ,i know nothing of the external world2 ,i know nothing either of the internal world2 all knowledge is denied me2 ,i myself am only a succession of phenomena which pass away and disappear2 an irresistible necessity impels me to believe that these phenomena have a common tie1 but this tie is nothing2 because when a phenomenon disappears nothing is before it2 if ,i acknowledge any reality1 no matter what1 ,i fall into the substantiality of the soul1 which ,i have resolved not to admit2 all is illusion1 all is nothing1 because1 as ,i am not even certain of the facts of consciousness1 ,i am not certain even of the illusion4 ,who can encounter such consequences8 ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,,simplicity ,,of ,,the ,,soul4 #gb4 ,i have confined myself in the preceding chapters to proving the substantiality of the soul2 to do which it was only necessary to demonstrate by the testimony of consciousness that there is within us a permanent reality1 the subject of the modifications which we experience4 ,i shall now demonstrate that this substance is simple4 ,to proceed methodically1 let us fix the meaning of the word simple4 ,when many beings are united and form a collection1 the result is called a composite being2 so that there is a true composition wherever beings substantially distinct are united2 the band which unites them may be of different species1 which produces the diversity of compositions4 ,simplicity is opposed to composition2 the idea of simplicity essentially excludes the idea of composition2 as this last includes a number of distinct things which are united to form a whole1 the idea of simplicity essentially excludes the idea of number of things united to form a whole4 ,therefore the simple is strictly one1 and there is simplicity in a substance when it is not a collection of substances4 ,when1 therefore1 we say the substance of the soul is simple1 we mean that it is not a collection of substances1 but one substance4 #gc4 ,the idea of simplicity thus determined with exactness1 let us see if it belongs to our soul4 ,as the soul is not given us in intuition after the manner of sensible things1 and we only know it by the presence of the internal sense1 and by the phenomena which we experience in the depths of our consciousness1 we must examine these two sources to see if we can find simplicity in them4 ,it is an indisputable fact that in all our acts1 in all our internal affections1 we perceive the identity of the me4#dh ,there is no identity between things that are distinct3 consequently the internal sense at once rejects the multiplicity of the soul4 ,it may be said that this identity does not exist between distinct substances1 but that a composite substance is identical with itself1 and perhaps the identity revealed by consciousness is only the identity of a composite with itself3 but this reply is destroyed by merely examining the testimony of consciousness4 ,that which we perceive as various and multiple is not the me1 but that which takes place in the me3 we think1 we will1 we perceive different things2 but consciousness attests that what thinks them1 wills them1 and perceives them1 is one and the same1 the me4 ,therefore1 the testimony of consciousness alone proves the simplicity of the soul2 for it is impossible to explain otherwise how we perceive within us the permanent unity amid the multitude of internal phenomena4 #dh ,see ,chaps4 ,,vi41 ,,vii41 ,,viii41 ,,ix41 and ,x4 #gd4 ,abstracting the testimony of the internal sense1 and looking only at the nature of the internal phenomena1 it may be demonstrated that the subject of them is a simple substance4 ,if it were not so1 the thinking substance would be composed of various substances2 let us see what would follow from this supposition4 ,let the component substances be three1 for example1 ,a1 ,b1 ,c2 ,i say that this collection cannot think4 ,to demonstrate it with the most complete evidence1 let us take this judgment3 metal is a body1 and let us see if it is possible for the collection of ,a1 ,b1 ,c1 to form this judgment4 ,let us suppose the representation of the subject1 metal1 to be in the substance ,a2 the idea of the predicate1 body1 to be in ,b2 and the general idea of the relation of the predicate to the subject1 or the copula1 is1 to be in ,c2 can a judgment be the result8 ,by no means4 ,a will perceive the metal1 ,b the body1 and ,c the general idea of the copula1 is4 ,each of these substances will have consciousness of its own2 but as it is not conscious of what is in the other two1 it can form no judgment1 for this essentially consists in the relation of the predicate to the subject4 #ge4 ,if you say that each of the substances contains the representations of the three things1 we shall have three judgments1 and there will not be one thinking being1 but three4 ,besides1 either of the three substances ,a1 ,b1 ,c1 is composed of others1 or it is not4 ,if it is not1 is simple1 and we have a simple and perceptive substance1 why then suppose three when one is enough8 ,if it is composed of others1 the difficulty is increased2 for supposing ,a to be formed of two substances1 which we may call m1 n2 the representation of metal which was in ,a will be distributed between m and n1 in which case1 far from obtaining a judgment1 we should not even have a subject2 for it would not be possible to form the representation of metal1 supposing it to be divided between m and n4 ,if it is not possible to form a judgment1 or even the idea of one term1 it is evident that all reasoning and thought would be impossible2 for reasoning implies a connection of judgments from which it deduces the conclusion contained in the premises4 #gf4 ,acts of the will are also impossible in a composite substance2 there is no will where there is no cognition1 and this latter is1 as we have just seen1 inseparable from simplicity4 ,but we may extend the demonstration still further4 ,an act of the will implies an inclination1 tendency1 or whatever it may be called1 towards an object known4 ,let us suppose the two substances ,a and ,b to compose a substance which has a will2 and let us suppose all that is necessary for the act of willing to be divided between them in such manner that the knowledge of the object willed is in it1 and the inclination or tendency in ,b2 ,i say such an act or will is absurd4 ,to feel the force of this truth let us suppose that the act of the will is to be formed of the cognition of one man1 and the inclination of another towards the object known by the first2 the pure cognition of one is not the act of the will1 and the inclination of the other towards an object is impossible unless he has the cognition of the object towards which he is inclined1 because this is equivalent to supposing a relation without any term to which it relates4 ,these contradictions must be admitted by every one who denies the simplicity of the substances which will2 for either the inclination and the cognition must be divided between the parts of the substances1 or all concentrated in one part1 and then the others are unnecessary4 ,moreover1 the substances composing the substance which will are either simple or composite2 if simple1 then there are simple substances which know and will2 if composite1 each act of the will would be an aggregate of the action of the parts1 and what would an act of the will be which should consist in an aggregate8 #gg4 ,the union which we conceive in distinct substances is either juxtaposition in space1 simultaneousness in time1 or the concourse of forces producing a common effect3 juxtaposition in space or simultaneousness of time does not help us to explain thought1 the act of the will1 nor any internal phenomena2 and neither does the concourse of forces producing a common effect solve the problem4 ,on this supposition we should have to conceive internal phenomena as the products of an elaboration to which various substances have occurred4 ,let us for a moment admit this absurdity2 we advance nothing by it1 for we then ask1 where does the phenomenon reside8 ,if in all the substances jointly it must be in itself composite1 and its consciousness would also be composite2 none of the component substances could say ,i with respect to this phenomenon2 there would1 therefore1 be a multiplicity of consciousnesses4 ,either these consciousnesses would be united in a point in order to form a common consciousness1 or they would not4 ,if they are united1 their point of union must be a simple substance1 or we relapse into the multiplicity of consciousnesses3 if they are not united1 the different internal consciousnesses of each man will be like the consciousnesses of different men2 each substance will think its own1 without knowing what the other thinks4 #gh4 ,finally1 this divisibility of substance and of consciousness will extend to infinity1 or it will not2 if the former1 instead of one thinking being1 there will be an infinite number of thinking beings within each one of us2 if the latter1 we must come to simple substances with thought and consciousness1 which is precisely what our adversaries are opposed to4 ,infinite divisibility does not save them from simplicity2 the division separates the parts1 but it supposes them distinct2 therefore1 infinite division must suppose an infinite number of simple beings which make the division possible4 ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,,kant',s ,,opinion ,,of ,,the ,,argument ,,proving ,,the ,,simplicity ,,of ,,the ,,soul4 #gi4 ,kant calls the argument1 by which we have just proved the simplicity of the soul1 the second paralogism of psychology4 ,he gives it in these terms3 ,every thing1 the action of which can never be conceived as the concurrence of many agents1 is simple3 the soul or thinking substance is of this nature2 therefore the soul is simple4 ,the ,german philosopher admits that this argument is not a mere sophism1 invented by some dogmatist for the purpose of giving his assertions a slight appearance of truth2 and he confesses that it seems to defy the most attentive examination and the most profound reflection4 ,still he flatters himself that he can expose its fallacy1 showing that this principal support of rational psychology is a false foundation1 and that1 consequently1 the whole edifice of this science is built in the air4 #hj4 ,kant observes that the nervus probandi of the argument is in the fact that many representations cannot form a thought1 except inasmuch as they are contained in the absolute unity of the thinking subject2 but no one1 he says1 can prove this proposition by conceptions4 ,where could he begin8 ,the proposition3 ',a thought can only be the effect of the absolute unity of the thinking subject1' cannot be analyzed2 the unity of thought 7and even thought results from many representations7 is collective2 and as to simple conceptions1 their unity may just as well be referred to the collective unity of substances which contribute to produce the thought 7just as the motion of a body is the motion of all its parts7 as to the absolute unity of the subject4 ,the necessity of the supposition of a simple substance cannot consequently be known by the rule of identity in a composite thought4 ,no one who understands the reason of the possibility of synthetic judgments a priori1 as we have explained them above1 will dare to affirm that this proposition can be known synthetically1 and perfectly a priori1 or by pure conceptions4 ,this reasoning is pure sophistry1 and will vanish in the light of evidence4 #ha4 ,in the first place1 it is not correct to say that all thoughts result from many representations2 in the perception of a simple idea1 as of being1 for example1 there are not many representations2 therefore ,kant's argument fails at the first step2 for if there be even one thought which requires simplicity1 it has already been demonstrated that1 if the soul is simple in one instance it cannot cease to be so in another4 #hb4 ,let us now examine how the diversity of representations enter into those thoughts which admit of this diversity4 ,when these representations form what is called a thought1 they are united1 as it were1 in a point which requires the unity of the perception and of the subject perceiving4 ,in the thought called judgment various representations are combined1 that of the subject and that of the object2 but these different representations do not constitute the thought called judgment1 except inasmuch as they are presented as connected with the relation which authorizes us to affirm or deny the predicate of the subject2 therefore at the bottom of the diversity there is unity1 that is to say1 the relation2 therefore the thought by which this relation is perceived is one1 and the action of perceiving is essentially one1 notwithstanding the variety of the representations4 #hc4 ,there is no order in our thoughts except as we compare them with each other3 all our intellectual acts are reduced to the perception and comparison of ideas2 in perception there is simplicity1 as there must also be in comparisons1 since there can be no comparison of that which is varied1 except by reducing the varied to that which is one1 that is1 to the relation which is perceived in the comparison4 ,therefore in every thought there is unity2 thought can never be conceived as the concurrence of many agents2 therefore the proposition1 which ,kant considered indemonstrable1 is demonstrated1--that many representations cannot form a thought except in so far as they are contained in the absolute unity of a thinking subject4 #hd4 ,let us present the same demonstration under a stricter form4 ,suppose ,a1 ,b1 ,c1 to be the three agents concurring in the formation of the thought2 each part will yield its contingent2 let us suppose a to correspond to the first1 b to the second1 and c to the third1 the result will be the union composed of a1 b1 and c2 this will be the thought2 it will therefore be triple and can never constitute a point of comparison2 therefore1 we must either reject this hypothesis1 or deny thought4 ,kant's sophism proceeds from his attending solely to the diversity of the representations1 and abstracting the unity which is always met with in the perception of this diversity2 hence it is nothing strange that he does not find unity in the conception of thought4 ,he presents this conception incompletely1 or rather1 falsely2 he presents thought as a collection of representations1 and not as a most simple point in which representations unite1 in order to be perceived in the relation which they have among themselves4 ,the diversity of the representations does not form a collection after the manner of sensible objects2 the thought1 in which the relation of two different triangles is known1 cannot be expressed by the sum of the figures of the two triangles2 it is something different from them2 something which is in the midst of them2 which unites them by comparing them1 and which joins their diversity in the unity of their relation4 #he4 ,the example brought by ,kant manifests the rudeness of his idea of the character of the union of the representations in the formation of a whole thought4 ,the unity of the thought is1 he says1 collective1 and may be referred to the collective unity of many substances1 just as the motion of a body is the motion composed of all the parts of the body4 ,here we see clearly wherein ,kant's equivocation consists2 he takes the collection of the representations for the thought which relates to them1 and therefore it is no wonder that he cannot see the unity implied in the diversity1 on the supposition that this diversity has to be thought4 ,to carry conviction to the farthest point1 let us take this example of motion1 and suppose a cube to be moved4 ,let us call its eight verticles ,a1 ,b1 ,c1 ,d1 ,e1 ,f1 ,g1 ,h2 they all move1 and the collection of their motions1 with those of the points which are between them1 forms the whole motion4 ,what is there common in the result of this concurrence of agents8 ,nothing1 except juxtaposition in space1 and the relation which they preserve by the equal velocity of the motion4 ,but the motion of the vertex ,h is not the motion of the vertex ,a1 as is evident if we consider that the vertex ,a may be cut off from the cube1 and remain at rest without discontinuing or altering the motion of the vertex ,h2 therefore1 the two motions are things absolutely distinct4 ,it is evident that the same holds true with respect to the other points2 therefore the unity of the composite motion is purely factitious2 what there is1 in reality1 is a multiplicity of substances1 and of motions1 without any other than a purely extrinsical connection1 the relation of positions in space4 ,let us change the vertices into representations1 and see what will be the result4 ,do they exist without any other connection than their co-existence8 ,then they do not form a thought1 but only a collection of phenomena which may be considered as a union of things1 but not a thought2 in that case the sum of all the representations will be similar to the sum of the motions2 but it will produce no result in relation to the object which we are now examining4 ,if we give these representations a point of union1 that is1 the relation under which they are perceived1 we shall have a thought2 but what has this act1 which is one and most simple1 in common with1 the totality of a number of points in motion8 #hf4 ,if ,kant had wished to present a more seductive example1 he ought to have made use of a theory in mechanics1 the application of which to the present case presents1 if not more difficulty1 at least a more deceitful appearance2 ,i mean the resultant of a system of forces and their point of application4 ,when several forces act upon a line1 a plane1 or a solid1 they produce an effect equal to that one force alone1 which is called the resultant3 this force has a determinate direction and a point of application1 as though it were simple or had not emanated from others2 why cannot this be applied to thought8 ,why may not a thing1 although it is simple1 be the product of the concurrence of various agents8 ,this example is more specious1 because it presents the result of the composition concentrated in a point1 but if we examine it well1 we shall find that it proves nothing against us4 ,the disparity is this3 thought is a simple act in itself1 whilst the resultant of the forces is so only in its relation to the effect experienced1 which is all that comes under our calculation4 ,if two forces are applied at the two extremities of an inflexible right line the effect will be the same as though we applied one force equal to the sum of them both at one point of the line1 at a distance from either extremity inversely proportioned to the value of the first forces4 ,but the unity of this effect depends on the cohesion of the parts1 which1 not permitting isolated motions1 must make the force act on a single point2 but the component forces do not cease to be distinct and separate1 so that at the moment the cohesion should cease1 the respective parts would each feel the action of the force corresponding to it1 and move in the direction and with the velocity which the force impresses on them4 ,if1 while the cohesion lasts1 it were possible to give each of the component forces the consciousness of its action1 there would be two consciousnesses really distinct1 which could never form one common consciousness1 and could only be united in the production of an effect4 ,if the point of their application should have the consciousness of the action which it experiences1 it might have a consciousness similar to that of the action of one force1 equal to the sum of the components1 if it did not know the manner in which their action is transmitted to it2 but from the moment that it becomes conscious of their respective action1 it would know that the result is owing to the impossibility of each of them producing its effect in an isolated manner4 ,if1 therefore1 we compare the thinking subject to this point of application of the forces1 we must attribute to this subject the consciousness of the origin of the representations which concur in the production of the whole effect4 ,perhaps it may be said that by the very analysis of the example1 we have prepared the way for the triumph of the adversaries of the simplicity of the soul2 because after arbitrary suppositions we have at last come to a simple effect inherent in a simple thing1 and produced by the concurrence of various agents2 but if we look closer to it1 we shall find that this pretended triumph was never farther from being realized than it is in the last result to which we are led by the analysis of the forces4 ,for1 in order to arrive at a simple result produced by the concurrence of various forces1 we also require a simple point in which this result is concentrated4 ,then1 and precisely because we have arrived at this simplicity1 we can abstract the component forces1 and consider the result as a simple effect1 produced by a simple force1 and inherent in a simple subject1 which is the indivisible point1 to which we consider the force as applied4 ,therefore1 continuing the comparison1 we ought to say that1 whatever may be the number of the agents concurring in the production of the thought1 this thought must reside in a simple subject1 and in that case the simplicity of the soul is admitted4 ,it is true that we should then suppose a certain number of agents acting on the soul in order to produce the thought2 but the thought once produced1 the soul alone would be the thinking subject1 just as the indivisible point is the only one which unites the action of the component forces4 ,thus all that our adversaries would have gained would be the burden of the ridiculous invention of the concurrence of agents1 and be forced notwithstanding1 to admit a simple thinking substance1 which is all that we proposed to demonstrate4 #hg4 ,kant pretends that it is impossible to deduce from experience the necessary unity of the thinking subject1 as the condition of the possibility of all thought1 because experience reveals no necessity1 and the conception of absolute unity belongs to an order different from that which we are here considering4 ,it is certain that experience alone does not reveal any necessity2 for it is limited to particular1 contingent facts1 and does not reach the universal reason of objects2 but this is not true of experience regarded objectively1 or in relation to the cognition of the general reasons of things2 for although this cognition1 considered subjectively as an individual act1 is a contingent fact1 still inasmuch as it exists it represents a true necessity in certain objects2 unless we wish to renounce the certainty of all the sciences1 mathematics included4 ,it is clear that in speaking of thought and the thinking subject1 we cannot forget experience1 since it is impossible to abstract the basis of all psychological investigations1--,i think1--a proposition which expresses a fact of consciousness1 an act of internal experience2 but with this experience is combined the idea of unity in general1 or the exclusion of distinction and multiplicity from the act of thought and from the thinking subject4 ,thus the demonstration of the simplicity of the soul follows in the same path as all demonstrations which are confined to the purely ideal order1 and which consequently are formed of one premise which contains a necessary truth1 and another which establishes a fact of experience4 ,in the present instance1 the necessary premise is the very definition of unity and simplicity2 the other expresses the fact experienced1 that is1 the nature of the thought1 as it is revealed in consciousness4 #hh4 ,hence the demonstration of the simplicity of thinking beings is not limited to the human mind1 but extends to all the subjects in which the fact of consciousness exists4 ,when ,kant says we cannot extend this demonstration1 because we then go out of the field of experience1 we reply with this argument3 our demonstration is founded on the idea of unity and the fact of consciousness2 the idea of unity is general1 and consequently is valid in all cases2 the fact of consciousness is a thing which is found in every thinking being1 since thought is inconceivable without a subject1 which may say1 ,i think2 therefore1 we proceed legitimately in extending the demonstration of simplicity1 unless you mean to give to the word think a very different meaning from that which we all give to it1 in which case we go out of the arena of philosophy and enter on a discussion of words4 #hi4 ,we must have received the idea of a thinking being from internal experience3 we may expand or restrict this idea1 increasing or decreasing its perfection2 but at bottom it remains always the same1 and we cannot conceive thought in another being without attributing to it something similar to what we experience in ourselves4 ,in this respect ,kant is therefore right when he says that if we wish to represent to ourselves a thinking being we must put ourselves in the place of the object4 ,according to him1 we require for thought the absolute unity of the subject1 only because without this unity it would be impossible to say1 ,i think2 since1 although the totality of the thought may be distributed among the various subjects1 the subjective me cannot be divided or separated1 and every thought supposes this me4 ,the proposition1 ,i think1 is the foundation on which psychology raises the edifice of its knowledge3 ,kant admits this1 but ,i cannot understand why1 admitting that this proposition is the form of the apperception which is joined with and precedes all experience1 he still says that it is not experimental2 as though the thought were not just as subject to a real experience as its form2 whereas if we closely examine it1 we should rather say that the form is experienced than the thought itself1 on the supposition that the latter is distinct whilst the form is identical in every instance2 for the form in itself is only the consciousness of the unity identical in the midst of diversity4 #ij4 ,in conceiving this absolute unity in the me1 we do not1 as ,kant pretends1 conceive a topical unity1 but a real unity1 if we suppose it to remain really the same through the variety of thought4 ,when we enunciate this unity in the proposition1 ,i think1 we do not speak of a form in the abstract1 common to all perceptions1 but of something positive which is within us1 and the reality of which is indispensable to the possibility of thought4 #ia4 ,the ,german philosopher further says3 ,this subjective condition of all knowledge cannot with propriety be converted into a condition of the possibility of a knowledge of the objects2 that is1 into a conception of thinking being in general1 since we cannot represent this being to ourselves without putting ourselves in its place by the formula of our consciousness4 ,i do not believe that the psychologists who have pretended that they could demonstrate the simplicity of the soul1 ever flattered themselves with arriving at a perfect idea of thinking beings1 or denied that we obtain the type of this idea from our own experience2 what they have pretended is1 that reason leads them to infer that there is absolute unity of the subject wherever there is a thinking being2 whether its thought may belong to a higher or lower order than our own4 #ib4 ,when ,kant observes that the subject in which the thought inheres is only indicated in a transcendental way1 without its properties being discovered1 and that1 therefore1 we do not know the simplicity of the subject itself1 he declares a fact which is in some sense admissible1 but he deduces from it a false consequence4 ,it is true that we only know the substance of the soul by the presence of the internal sense1 and by its relation to its acts2 and consequently that the soul in itself abstracted from all the phenomena which we experience1 is not given in immediate intuitions1 and that when we arrive at this point we are reduced to the idea of a simple being1 but this indeterminateness1 and vagueness1 in the knowledge of the substance of the soul1 does not prevent our knowing its simplicity1 if this simplicity is revealed by the internal sense1 and also by the nature of the phenomena by which we know the thinking subject4 #ic4 ,some persons may believe that the indeterminateness of the knowledge of the substance of the soul is a fact recently discovered by the ,german philosopher2 but it is easy to show that it had been observed long before1 and is laid down in a very special and interesting manner in the writings of ,st4 ,thomas4 ,this eminent metaphysician proposes the question whether the intellectual soul knows itself by its essence1 utrum anima intellectiva seipsam cognoscat per suam essentiam1 and after the various remarks on intelligence1 and the intelligibility of objects1 he solves it in these remarkable words3 ,our understanding does not know itself by its essence1 but by its act2 and this in two ways3 in one way1 in particular2 inasmuch as ,sortes or ,plato perceives that he has an intellectual soul1 because he perceives that he understands3 in the second way1 in general2 inasmuch as we consider the nature of the human mind in the act of the understanding4 ,but it is true that we derive the judgment and efficacy of the knowledge by which we know the nature of the soul1 by the light of the divine truth of which our intellect participates1 and in which are contained the reasons of all things1 as was said above4 ,hence1 ,augustine says1 in the ninth book on the ,trinity3 ,we have intuition of the inviolable truth by which we perfectly determine1 as far as possible1 not what the mind of each man is1 but what it should be according to the eternal reasons4 ,but there is a difference between these two cognitions1 for1 to have the first1 we only need the presence of the mind1 which is the principle of the act by which the mind perceives itself1 and1 therefore1 we say that it knows itself by its presence2 but for the second1 the presence of the mind is not sufficient1 but a careful and subtile investigation is necessary4 ,hence many are ignorant of the nature of the soul1 and many also have erred on the nature of the soul2 wherefore in the tenth book on the ,trinity1 ,augustine1 speaking of this investigation1 says3 ,the soul should not try to see itself as something absent1 but endeavor to distinguish itself as something present2 that is1 to know its difference from other things1 which is to know its quiddity and nature4#di #di ,non ergo per essentiam suam1 sed per actum suum se cognoscit intellectus noster1 et hoc dupliciter4 ,uno quidem modo particulariter1 secundum quod ,sortes1 vel ,plato percipit se habere animam intellectivam ex hoc1 quod percipit se intelligere4 ,alio modo in universali1 secundum quod naturam mentis human ex actu intellectus consideramus4 ,sed verum est quod judicium1 et efficacia hujus cognitionis per quam naturam anim cognoscimus1 competit nobis secundum derivationem luminis intellectus nostri a veritate divina1 in qua rationes omnium rerum continentur1 sicut supra dictum est4 ,unde ,august4 dicit in #i de ,trin4 ,intuemur inviolabilem veritatem1 ex qua perfecte quantum possumus1 deffinimus1 non qualis sit uniuscujusque hominis mens1 sed qualis esse sempiternis rationibus debeat4 ,est autem differentia inter has duas cognitiones2 nam ad primam cognitionem de mente habendam sufficit ipsa mentis prsentia1 qu est principium actus1 ex quo meus percipit seipsam3 et ideo dicitur se cognoscere per suam prsentiam4 ,sed ad secundam cognitionem de mente habendam1 non sufficit ejus prsentia3 sed requiritur diligens1 et subtilis inquisitio4 ,unde et multi naturam anim ignorant1 et multi etiam circa naturam anim erraverunt4 ,propter quod ,august4 dicit #aj de ,trin4 de tali inquisitione mentis1 ,non velut absentem se qurat mens cernere2 sed prsentem qurat discernere2 id est cognoscere differentiam suam ab aliis rebus1 quod est cognoscere quidditatem1 et naturam suam4 ,s4 ,thom4 ,sum4 ,theol4 ,p4 ,i4 ,q41 ,,lxxxvii41 ,a4 #a4 #id4 ,it is to be observed that ,st4 ,thomas admits two cognitions of the soul by itself2--that of its presence1 as we perceive it in perceiving our thought1 percipit se habere animam intellectivam ex hoc quod percipit se intelligere2 and another which we deduce from the analysis of the intellectual act reasoning from general considerations1 and reflecting on the light which the eternal reasons shed upon this fact of experience4 ,this is how ,st4 ,thomas explains the knowledge of presence or consciousness contained in the proposition1 ,i think2 and the general knowledge which we deduce from the same intellectual act in its relations to the unity of the subject exercising it4 ,that this last contains something abstract and indeterminate no one denies2 and when ,kant calls attention to it1 he tells us nothing which the holy ,doctor had not already told us when he expressly affirmed that the soul knows itself not in its essence1 but in its acts4 ,these few laconic words express all the truth which is contained in ,kant's diffuse explanation of the limitation of our cognition to the acts of consciousness1 and the absence of the intuitive knowledge of the substance of the soul1 the transcendental subject of the thought4 ,,chapter ,,xiii4 ,,in ,,what ,,manner ,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,substance ,,may ,,be ,,applied ,,to ,,god4 #ie4 ,in the idea of substance as formed from the beings around us and from the testimony of our consciousness we find the relation to changes which occur in it as their subject or recipient4 ,but we have before remarked that besides this relation there is a negation of inherence in another as the modifications are inherent in the substance2 this negation implies a perfection which exempts it from the necessity of inherence to which the changeable and transitory beings which we call accidents or modifications are subject4 ,as we are ignorant of the intrinsic essence of substances1 we do not know what this perfection is2 yet we cannot doubt that it exists in the very nature of the subject1 and is independent of the modifications which transform it4 ,if then the essence of the substance must consist in any thing1 it must be in this perfection of which we have a knowledge1 but not an intuitive cognition4 ,when therefore substance is defined in relation to accidents1 quod substat accidentibus1 it is rather defined by the manner in which it is presented to us than by what it is in itself4 #if4 ,hence1 of the two definitions usually received in the schools3 ,ens per se subsistens1 a being subsisting by itself1 and1 id quod substat accidentibus1 the subject of accidents2 the first is the more correct1 because it comes nearer the expression of what it is in itself4 ,although we know finite substances only inasmuch as revealed by accidents1 and even our own mind knows itself only in its acts1 reason tells us that in order to be known things must exist1 and in order that our mind may find in them something permanent1 it is necessary that this something should be in them4 ,our knowledge does not produce its objects2 in order to be known they must exist4 #ig4 ,these reflections manifest the possibility of the existence of a substance not subject to accidents or change of any kind2 and that this substance not only does not lose the character of substance by being immutable1 but possesses it in a much more perfect degree4 ,the perfection of substance is not in its changes but in what is permanent in it1 not in having a succession of modifications inherent in it1 but in existing in such a manner as not to need to inhere in another4 ,the substance which should possess this permanence1 this perfection enabling it to exist by itself1 and at the same time should have no modification1 should experience no change1 would be infinitely superior to all other substances4 ,this substance is ,god4 #ih4 ,now it is easy to answer the question whether when applied to ,god the idea of substance is understood in the same sense as when applied to creatures2 or1 to speak in the terms of the schools1 whether it is taken univocally or analogously4 #ii4 ,in the idea of every substance is contained the idea of being2 what does not exist cannot be a substance4 ,inasmuch as we conceive being as a reality1 as opposed to nothingness1 the idea of being belongs both to ,god and to creatures3 ,god is1 that is to say1 ,god is a real thing1 not nothing4 ,but if from this general idea1 such as we conceive it in opposition to nothingness1 we pass to its realization in objects1 to the manner of its application1 so to speak1 we find all the difference that there is between the contingent and the necessary1 the finite and the infinite4 ,although we do not intuitively see the infinite being1 nor the essence of finite beings1 still we have evident knowledge that the word being applied to the infinite means something very different from what it does when applied to the finite4 #ajj4 ,in the idea of substance is also contained the idea of something permanent2 this permanence belongs also to ,god3 the infinite being is essentially permanent4 #aja4 ,in the substances around us we find this permanence combined with the succession of the modifications which affect them2 these changes are impossible in ,god4 ,the relation to modifications is a characteristic quality of finite substances4 #ajb4 ,substances are not inherent in others as modifications are inherent in them2 this non-inherence also belongs to the divine substance4 #ajc4 ,substances must contain something which exempts them from the necessity of inherence and raises them above the things which so rapidly succeed each other1 and in their existence always need another to sustain them2 this perfection is found in the divine substance which is being essentially1 the fountain of perfection4 #ajd4 ,it follows from this analysis that all the perfection contained in the idea of substance may be applied to the infinite being2 and that all that is contained in this idea which cannot be applied to this being is what implies negation or imperfection4 ,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,,an ,,important ,,remark1 ,,and ,,summary4 #aje4 ,when we say1 that a substance is a being subsisting by itself1 we do not mean that it is a being which has absolutely no need of another for its existence4 ,to confound these two things would produce a frightful confusion of ideas1 and is itself produced by a not less frightful confusion of the relation of cause and effect with the relation of substance and accidents4 #ajf4 ,the relation of cause and effect consists in the cause giving the effect its being2 the relation of substance and accident consists in the substance serving as subject to the accident4 ,so great is the difference between these two relations that not only does reason show them to be distinct1 but at every moment experience presents them as separate4 ,our soul is the subject of many accidents in the production of which it has no part1 but on the contrary opposed to their production as far as it is able4 ,such are all painful sensations1 all disagreeable impressions1 all troublesome thoughts which present themselves in spite of us1 and when we wish to think of something else4 ,in these cases the soul is the subject1 and not the cause3 it has the relation of substance to things of which it is not the cause1 and with respect to which it is entirely passive4 ,if ,i am not greatly mistaken1 this example is conclusive1 and marks the line which divides causality from substance1 effect from accident4 #ajg4 ,to be subsistent by itself expresses an exclusion2 if this exclusion is referred to causality1 to be subsistent by itself is to be not caused2 if referred to inherence1 it means to be not inherent in another as accidents are in their substance4 ,when substance is defined a being subsistent in itself1 it is understood in the second sense1 not in the first1 and this distinction is sufficient to overthrow the whole system of ,spinoza1 and all the pantheists1 whatever be the aspect under which they present their error4 #ajh4 ,in order to enter on the question of pantheism free from all confusion1 let us sum up in a few words all that reason and experience teach concerning substance4 ,i4 ,within us there is a being1 one1 simple1 identical1 permanent1 the subject of the phenomena which we experience4 ,,ii4 ,outside of us there are objects which preserve something constant through the variety of this phenomena4 ,,iii4 ,in the idea of substance are contained the ideas of permanence and non-inherence in another as a modification4 ,,iv4 ,the relation of a subject to its modifications1 is found in all finite substances4 ,v4 ,relation to modifications is not inseparable from the ideas of being1 permanence1 and non-inherence in another4 ,,vi4 ,an immutable substance implies no contradiction4 ,,vii4 ,to subsist by itself is not the same as to be independent of all other beings4 ,the relation of cause and effect ought not to be confounded with the relation of substance and accident4 ,,viii4 ,non-inherence in another is characteristic of substance2 but this negative idea must be founded on something positive2 on the force to subsist by itself without the necessity of adhering to another4 ,,chapter ,,xv4 ,,pantheism ,,examined ,,in ,,the ,,order ,,of ,,ideas4 #aji4 ,the idea of substance and all its applications1 as well to the external as to the internal world1 are far from leading us to infer the existence of a single substance2 on the contrary1 reason according with experience forces us to acknowledge a multitude of substances4 ,why should we admit only one substance8 ,this is one of the most important questions of philosophy1 and from the most ancient times has given occasion to the most serious errors2 it consequently deserves a careful investigation4 #aaj4 ,those who admit only one substance must found their opinion either on the idea of substance or on experience2 our mind can have no other recourse than to its primitive ideas1 or the teachings of experience4 ,let us begin with the a priori method or that which is founded on the idea4 #aaa4 ,what do you understand by substance8 we ask4 ,if by substance you understand a being subsisting by itself1 and by this subsistence you mean that it has no need of another1 and never had any need of another in order to exist1 then you are speaking of a being that is not caused1 of a necessary being which has in itself the sufficient and necessary reason of its existence4 ,if you say this being is only one1 or that there is no other of its kind1 we agree with you1 only we tell you that you take the name of substance in an improper sense4 ,but at bottom the difference would be only in the name2 and in order to come to a mutual understanding it is only necessary for us to know that by substance you understand an absolutely necessary1 and consequently absolutely independent being4 ,but if you assert that this being is the only one in the sense that there is nothing1 and can be nothing beside it1 then your assertion is gratuitous and we ask for joint proof4 ,why should the necessary being exclude the possibility of other beings8 ,is it not more reasonable to conclude that it contains the reason of their possibility and existence8 ,the being which has in itself the necessity of existing1 must possess activity1 and the external term of this activity is production4 ,why may not other beings be the result of this production8 ,inasmuch as produced they would be distinct from the being producing them4 #aab4 ,without going beyond our ideas we find contingency and multiplicity4 ,experience reveals a continual succession of forms within us2 these appearances are something2 they cannot be a pure nothing1 for they must be something1 though only appearances4 ,in them we behold a continual transition from not-being to being1 and from being to not-being2 therefore there is a production of something which is not necessary1 since it is1 and ceases to be2 therefore there is something besides the being which is supposed the only one4 ,this argument is founded on the purely internal phenomena1 and1 therefore1 is valid even against the idealists1 against those who take from the external world all reality1 and reduce it to mere appearances1 to simple phenomena of our mind4 ,these appearances exist at least as appearances2 they are then something1 they are contingent1 they are not therefore necessary being4 ,therefore besides this being there is something which is not it2 therefore the system which asserts the existence of only one being is not sustainable4 ,the idea of a being absolutely independent by reason of its absolute necessity does not exclude the existence of contingent beings2 it only shows that the necessary being is the only necessary being1 not that it is the only being4 #aac4 ,neither does it follow from the idea of necessary being that there cannot be contingent beings1 caused1 and yet subsisting by themselves in the sense that they are not inherent as modifications in others4 ,not to be caused and not to be inherent are two very distinct things2 the first implies the second1 but the second does not imply the first4 ,every being not caused must be free from inherence1 because if it is not caused it is necessary1 and contains in itself all that is necessary in order not to inhere in another4 ,if necessary1 it must be absolutely independent of all others1 which it would not be if it needed them as a modification needs a substance4 ,but not every thing which is not inherent is necessarily not caused1 for its cause may have made it such that it does not need to be inherent as a modification in another4 ,it would then depend on another as an effect on its cause1 but not as an accident on its substance2 there would be between them the relation of causality1 but not that of substance2 things which we have shown in the last chapter to be very distinct4 #aad4 ,never will the pantheists be able to prove that because a thing is not a modification it must be not caused2 and this is precisely what they must prove in order to carry their system through in triumph4 ,once prove that whatever subsists in itself is not caused1 and you will have proved whatever subsists in itself to be necessary4 ,and as the necessary being must be only one1 you will have proved that there is only one substance4 #aae4 ,the secret of pantheism is the confounding of non-inherence with absolute independence2 and the means of overthrowing its arguments is always to distinguish these two things4 ,all that is not caused is substance1 but not all that is substance is uncaused4 ,all that is not caused is necessary and therefore not inherent1 but not every substance is necessary4 ,finite substance is not inherent in another being1 but it is caused by another being4 ,it cannot exist without this other being1 it is true2 but this dependence is not the dependence of a modification on its substance1 but that of an effect on its cause4 ,the cause gives being to the effect2 the substance sustains the accident3 the cause is not modified by the effect2 the substance is modified by the accident4 ,these ideas are clear and distinct2 by them pantheism is destroyed in all its transformations1 and forced1 as old ,proteus was by ,menelaus1 to resume its primitive form4 ,atheism is its nature1 and should be its name4 ,many of the erroneous systems which disturb the ideal world are founded on an equivocation2 to oppose them with success1 we must fix ourselves on the point which clears up their equivocation1 and not go out of it4 ,the equivocation will assume different forms1 but we must not suffer ourselves to be deceived or confounded by it2 we must always return to the same distinction and make that the battle-ground4 ,the passage of the immortal poet in the place just alluded to1 might be taken as a fable giving an excellent method of defeating sophisms3 ,collect all your strength and courage1 says the goddess ,idothea to ,menelaus1 and1 throwing yourself upon him1 hold him tightly despite all his efforts2 for he will metamorphose himself in a thousand ways in order to escape from you3 he will take the semblance of all the most savage animals4 ,he will also change himself into water2 he will become fire3 but let none of these frightful forms terrify you1 or force you to let him go2 on the contrary1 hold him and strain him the more tightly4 ,but as soon as he returns to the first form in which1 he was1 444 then use no more violence1 but let him go4#ej ,so it is with pantheism1 it will speak of matter1 of mind1 of the reality of phenomenal1 of the me1 of the not-me1 of subsistence and non-subsistence1 of the necessary and the contingent2 but do not allow it to go beyond the fundamental ideas1 lead it to them2 it will at last return to its first form1 and when it has returned to this1 then let it go1 showing it to the world as it is1 saying3 ,see it in its horrible deformity2 it has always been what it is now2 notwithstanding all its transformations1 it is nothing but atheism4 #ej ,odyss41 ,bk4 ,,iv4 ,,chapter ,,xvi4 ,,pantheism ,,examined ,,in ,,the ,,order ,,of ,,external ,,facts4 #aaf4 ,if pantheism is unsustainable in the region of ideas1 it is not less so in the field of experience4 ,the latter1 far from leading us to the exclusive unity of substance1 shows us on all sides multiplicity4 #aag4 ,there is unity where there is no division1 when in the thing that is one no others can be distinguished1 when it admits no negative judgment4 ,nothing of all this is observed in the external world2 but a constant experience presents directly the contrary4 #aah4 ,in the external world division is visible1 palpable2 there is no other unity than that of order1 of direction to an end2 besides this1 all is multiplicity4 ,the only medium by which we are placed in communication with the external world are the senses1 and they encounter multiplicity on every side--sensations distinct in number1 diverse in species1 graduated in a thousand different ways1 distributed into infinite groups1 which1 although they are connected in this or that point1 may be divided and are divided in a thousand others4 #aai4 ,multiplicity is as truly revealed by the testimony of the senses as the very existence of objects4 ,if we deny the competency of their testimony in the first1 we must deny it also in the second4 ,they not only tell us that such a body exists1 but that it is not another body4 ,we know nothing with more certainty than that an external object corresponds to a sensation1 that the objects of two distinct sensations are distinct4 ,to say that the senses are not good judges in this matter1 because they are limited to mere sensation1 and consequently cannot judge of the objects of the sensation1 is to appeal to idealism1 for by the same reason we may assert that the senses1 limited to mere sensation1 cannot give us certainty of the existence of their respective objects4 #abj4 ,to establish unity outside of ourselves is to annihilate the corporeal world4 ,the idea of extension contradicts unity4 ,in that which is extended some parts are not the others4 ,this is evident1 and whoever attempts to doubt it attacks the basis of the certainty of geometry4 ,if the world is something real1 it is extended2 if it is not extended1 we cannot be certain that it is any thing real4 ,we have the same certainty of its extension as of its existence4 ,its very existence is manifested by the extension presented to our senses4 ,if1 then1 this extension does not exist1 sensations are a mere internal phenomenon1 a pure illusion1 in so far as we attribute to them a correspondence to the exterior4 #aba4 ,this argument seems to me one of the most conclusive than can be brought against ,spinosa1 who1 together with the oneness of the substance admits extension1 as one of its attributes4 ,the extended is essentially multiplex2 it always involves the distinction between its parts2 we can always say of it3 ,the part ,a is not the part ,b4 ,pantheism cannot escape this argument except by taking refuge in pure idealism2 and in this respect ,fichte and ,hegel are more logical than most persons give them credit for being4 ,in order to maintain the exclusive oneness of substance1 it is necessary to convert the external world into mere phenomena1 whose only reality consists in their being thus presented to us4 ,this is to absorb the world in the me1 and concentrate the reality in the idea2 but this absorption1 this concentration1 notwithstanding its obscurity1 is a necessary and logical consequence of the principle established4 ,there is absurdity1 but there is at least the consequence of the absurdity4 #abb4 ,those who call ,spinosa the disciple of ,descartes1 have not observed that there is a necessary contradiction between the two systems4 ,the argument founded on extension1 which ,i have just presented1 although conclusive under every hypothesis1 is still more so against those who admit with ,descartes1 that the essence of bodies consists in extension4 ,in that case1 the various parts of extension are essentially distinct1 since each part constitutes an essence4 ,the essential and substantial multiplicity of bodies would be in proportion to the multiplicity of extension4 #abc4 ,if you maintain that extension is not the essence of bodies1 but an attribute or modification of bodies1 whether a determination founded on their essence or an accidental determination1 and pretend that this modification or attribute may belong to the only substance1 we ask you whether this substance in itself abstracted from extension is simple or composite4 ,if composite1 it implies multiplicity1 and ,spinosa coincides with the common opinion of a corporeal world1 composed of many parts1 one of which will have no more right than another to be the true substance4 ,for then there would not be a single substance1 but one composed of many2 and the corporeal universe cannot be called a substance except in the sense in which it is commonly called one1 that is1 not taking the oneness in a strict sense1 but inasmuch as all its parts are connected together1 and disposed in a certain order to conspire to the same end4 ,if the substance1 the subject of extension is simple1 the result will be a simple substance determined or modified by extension1 a simple extended substance1 which is a contradiction4 ,a thing cannot be conceived as a modification of another unless it is modified by it2 this is what the words express4 ,a modification modifies1 giving to the thing modified the form of the modification1 applying itself to the thing modified4 ,extension cannot modify except by making the thing modified extended2 and to be extended1 and to have extension1 are absolutely identical expressions4 ,therefore it is repugnant for a simple substance to have extension for one of its modifications2 therefore ,spinosa's system is absurd4 ,,chapter ,,xvii4 ,,pantheism ,,examined ,,in ,,the ,,order ,,of ,,internal ,,facts4 #abd4 ,the multiplicity of substances is no less attested by the consciousness of ourselves1 or of the internal world4 ,our first reflex act reveals within us something which is one1 indivisible1 and remaining always the same through all the transformations of our being4 ,this unity of the me is indispensable to the connection of all the phenomena in a point2 without it all memory1 all combination1 and all consciousness are impossible2 our own being disappears1 and there remains only a series of unconnected phenomena4 ,but this unity1 which we must take as an internal fact which consciousness places beyond all doubt1 and the conviction of which it is impossible for us to withstand1--this unity produces the knowledge of multiplicity4 ,there is something which affects us and which is not ourselves4 ,our will1 our activity1 is impotent to resist other activities which act upon us2 there is1 then1 something which is not ourselves1 which is independent of us4 ,there is something which is not a modification of ourselves1 because very often it does not affect us1 does not modify us4 ,this something is a reality1 for nothing cannot affect any thing4 ,it is not inherent in us2 it is1 then1 in itself1 or in something which is not ourselves4 ,there is1 therefore1 a substance which is not our substance2 and the me and the not-me which have made so much noise in ,german philosophy1 far from leading to the unity of the substance1 lead to multiplicity2 and destroy pantheism entrenched behind idealism4 #abe4 ,at the very first we meet at least with duality1 the me and the not-me2 but carrying our observations a little farther1 we find a striking multiplicity4 ,our mind is not alone3 the consciousness of what we daily experience proves our communication with other minds1 which1 like our own1 have the consciousness of themselves--a sphere of activity of their own1 and1 like our own mind1 are subjected to other activities without their will1 and sometimes even against it4 ,the me and the not-me existing for our consciousness1 exists also for theirs2 what in us alone was duality becomes a wonderful multiplicity by means of the repetition of the same fact which we have experienced in ourselves4 #abf4 ,to attribute this variety of consciousnesses to the same being1 to take them as modifications of the same substance1 as revelations of itself to its own eyes1 is a gratuitous assertion2 and not only gratuitous but absurd4 ,with full confidence ,i can defy the greatest philosopher of the world to assign any reason1 ,i do not say satisfactory1 but even a specious reason1 proving that two individual consciousnesses belong to a common consciousness1 or are consciousnesses of the same being4 #abg4 ,in the first place1 this doctrine is in contradiction to common sense1 and is rejected with irresistible force by the internal sense of every man4 ,the sentiment of our existence is always accompanied by the sentiment of our distinction from other beings like us4 ,we are not only certain that we exist1 but that we are distinct from others2 and if in any thing the sentiment of this distinction is profoundly marked1 it is in what regards the phenomena of our consciousness4 ,never at any time1 in any country or phase of society1 could men be persuaded that the consciousness of all their acts and impressions belonged to one and the same being in which individual consciousnesses were united4 ,it is a bad philosophy which begins by struggling against humanity1 and placing itself in open contradiction to an irresistible sentiment of nature4 #abh4 ,the very idea of consciousness excludes this monstrous absurdity1 which attempts to transform individual consciousnesses into modifications of one universal consciousness4 ,consciousness1 that is1 the internal sentiment of what a being experiences1 is essentially individual1 it is1 so to speak1 incommunicable to every other4 ,to others we communicate the knowledge of our consciousness1 but not our consciousness itself4 ,it is an intuition or a sentiment which is completed in the innermost recesses of our being1 in that which is most our own4 ,what1 then1 would that consciousness be which does not belong to us as individuals1 which is not our own which is nothing of what we believe it to be1 but only a property of an unknown being1--a being of which we have no knowledge1 and of which we are only a phenomenon1 a passing modification8 ,where would be the unity of consciousness in the midst of such diversity1 opposition1 and mutual exclusion8 ,this being1 modified by so many consciousnesses1 would have no consciousness of its own1 for it could give itself no account of what it experiences4 ,,chapter ,,xviii4 ,,fichte',s ,,pantheistic ,,system4 #abi4 ,i am going to fulfil a promise made in the beginning of this work1#ea to explain and refute the system of ,fichte4 ,we have seen the cabalistic forms employed by the ,german philosopher to obtain a simple result1 which amounted to neither more nor less than ,descartes' principle1 ,i think1 therefore1 ,i am4 ,the reader could never imagine that any one should attempt to found pantheism on this fact of consciousness1 and that the human mind1 because it finds itself1 should have the arrogance to maintain that nothing exists beside itself1 that whatever there is1 proceeds from itself1 and what is still more extraordinary1 that it is itself produced by itself4 ,in order to believe that such things have been written we have to see them1 and therefore in explaining ,fichte's system1 ,i shall copy his own words4 #ea ,see ,bk4 ,i41 ,chap4 ,,vii4 ,thus1 although he may suffer a little from the foreign garb1 and the reader may be fatigued with deciphering enigmas1 he will have an idea of the matter and of the form of the system1 which he could not have1 if we should take from the philosopher his extravagant originality1 which1 however1 relates to the form1 rather than to the substance4 #acj4 ,this act1 namely ,x ,i am1 is founded on no higher principle4#eb #eb ,grundlage der gesammten ,wissensehaftslehre4 ,erst4 ,th4 #a4 #f4 b4 ,this is true to a certain extent1 inasmuch as it affirms that in the series of the facts of consciousness1 we come to our own existence as the last limit1 and can go no farther4 ,the reflex act1 by which we perceive our existence1 is expressed by the proposition1 ,i am1 or1 ,i exist2 but this proposition by itself alone1 tells us nothing as to the nature of the me1 and is very far from proving our absolute independence4 ,on the contrary1 from the moment that we begin to reflect1 internal facts are presented to us which incline us to believe that our being is dependent on another2 and in proportion as we continue to reflect1 we acquire a deep conviction of this truth1 arising from a rigorous demonstration4 ,in no way can we affirm that the act1 ,i am1 does not depend on any higher principle1 if we mean by that1 that the act does not spring from any principle of action1 and that by itself alone1 it produces existence4 ,besides plainly contradicting common sense1 this assertion is without any proof1 and is also opposed to the most fundamental notions of sound philosophy4 #aca4 ,fichte thinks differently1 and without knowing why1 he deduces from the above propositions these consequences3 ,therefore it 7the act1 ,x ,i am7 is supposed absolutely1 and founded on itself1 as the principle of a certain 7and1 as will be seen by the whole ,doctrine of ,science1 of every7 act of the human mind1 consequently1 also of its pure character1--the pure character of activity in itself1 abstracted from its particular empirical conditions4 ,it is no great discovery that the character of act is activity2 but this character is not pure1 since in us no act is pure activity1 but it is always a particular exercise of activity4 ,consequently1 he continues1 the supposition of the me by itself is its pure activity4 ,the me supposes itself1 and it is1 in virtue of this mere supposition by itself2 and on the other hand1 the me is and it supposes its being1 by virtue of its mere being4 ,it is at the same time the acting1 and the product of the act2 the active1 and that which is brought about by the activity2 act and fact are one and precisely the same thing2 and1 therefore1 ,i am is the expression of an act1 and also of the only one possible1 as must be seen from the whole ,doctrine of ,science4 ,he that can1 may understand what is the meaning of a being which is at the same time producing and produced1 principle and term of the same action1 cause and effect of the same thing4 ,he that can1 may understand the meaning of existing in virtue of a mere action1 and exercising this action in virtue of existence4 ,if these be not contradictions1 ,i know not what is4 ,in ,god1 who is infinite being1 essence1 existence1 and action are identical2 but we cannot say that the action produces his being1 that he supposes himself by his action2 we say that he exists necessarily1 and that it is therefore impossible that he should have been produced1 that he should have passed from not-being to being4 #acb4 ,there occurs to me here a rational explanation of ,fichte's language1 an explanation which even if admissible would not excuse the philosopher for expressing very simple things in contradictory terms4 ,however1 it is this4 ,the soul is an activity2 its essence consists in thought1 by which it is manifested to its own eyes1 and finds itself in the act of consciousness4 ,in this sense we may say that the soul supposes itself1 that is1 knows itself1 takes itself as subject of a proposition to which it applies the predicate of existence4 ,the soul is the principle of its act of consciousness2 and thus it is productive2 it is also presented in the act of consciousness as object1 hence it may also be said1 though inexactly1 that in the ideal order it is produced2 in this way it is the principle and the term of the action1 but under different respects4 ,this explanation1 whether more or less founded1 is at least reasonable and even intelligible1 and the basis on which it rests1 that the essence of the soul consists in thought1 has the name of ,descartes in its favor4 ,thus although we do not defend the words of ,fichte1 we might at least defend his ideas4 ,but unfortunately1 the philosopher has taken good care to prevent even this2 his words could not have been more opposed to it4 ,we now consider once more1 he says1 the proposition3 me is me4 ,the me is supposed absolutely4 ,if it is admitted that the me which in the above proposition stands in the place of the formal subject is the me supposed absolutely2 and that in the place of the predicate means the existing me2 it is expressed in the judgment which is absolutely valid1 that both are completely one1 or supposed absolutely2 that the me is1 because it has supposed itself4 ,every judgment implies identity of the predicate and the subject2 but in the proposition3 me is me1 the identity is not only implied but explicitly asserted2 for which reason1 the proposition belongs to the class of what are termed identical propositions1 because its predicate explains nothing concerning the idea of the subject1 but only repeats it4 ,whence then does ,fichte deduce that the me exists because it has supposed itself8 ,so far we have only the me saying3 me is me2 it affirms itself and thus supposes itself as subject and predicate of a proposition3 but it is clearer than day-light that to suppose by affirming is altogether different from supposing by producing3 on the contrary1 common sense and reason alike teach that the existence of the thing affirmed is necessary to the legitimacy of the affirmation4 ,to confound these two ideas1 to consider it the same thing to affirm as to suppose by producing1 is an inconceivable absurdity4#ec #ec ,here1 as elsewhere1 in the examination of ,fichte's system1 ,i have translated the ,german word setzen and the ,spanish poner by the verb to suppose4 ,had ,i known any better word ,i should have used it1 but ,i think this sufficiently explains the philosopher's meaning4 ,i have also found the ,french word poser which exactly corresponds to it1 and which ,m4 ,cousin uses in his sketch of ,fichte's system1 translated suppose by ,mr4 ,ripley1 in the ,specimens of ,foreign ,literature4--,,translator4 #acc4 ,explaining this in a note1 ,fichte adds what follows3 ,it is also certainly so according to the logical form of every proposition4 ,in the proposition ,a ,a1 the first ,a is that which is supposed in the me either absolutely as the me itself1 or on any other ground as every determined not-me4 ,in this case the me represents the absolute subject1 and hence the first ,a is called the subject4 ,the second ,a denotes what the me1 which takes itself as the object of reflection1 finds as supposed in itself because it has first supposed it in itself4 ,the judging me predicates something1 not properly of ,a1 but of itself1 namely1 that it finds an ,a in itself2 and hence the second ,a is called the predicate4 ,so in the proposition3 ,a ,b1 ,a denotes that which is supposed now2 ,b that which is found already supposed4 ,it represents the transition of the me from the act of supposing to the reflection on that which is supposed4 ,what does ,fichte mean by this comparison of ideas and of language8 ,does he mean that in this proposition the me is subject and predicate according to the different aspects under which it is considered8 ,does he mean that the me1 in so far as it occupies the place of subject1 expresses simply existence1 and that as predicate it is presented as an object of reflection8 ,what does he mean by the word suppose8 ,if he means by it to produce1 how is it possible for a thing which is not to produce itself8 ,if he means by it the manifestation of itself1 so that the object manifested may serve as the logical term of a proposition1 why does he tell us that the me exists because it supposes itself8 ,but let us follow the ,german philosopher in his wandering deductions4 #acd4 ,the me in the first acceptation and that in the second must be absolutely the same4 ,we can therefore invert the above proposition and say3 the me supposes itself1 absolutely because it is4 ,it supposes itself by its mere being1 and is by its mere supposition4 ,without defining the sense of the word suppose1 without saying any thing more than what all the world knows2 that the me is the me2 he infers that the me exists because it supposes itself1 and supposes itself because it exists3 he identifies existence with supposition without even noticing that at least some preliminary remarks were necessary before placing himself in direct opposition with common sense and the doctrines of all philosophers1 including ,descartes1 who make existence necessary for action1 and regard it as a contradiction for a thing to be active without existing4 ,leibnitz thought that there was nothing and could be nothing without a sufficient reason2 but thanks to the author of the ,doctrine of ,science1 we may henceforth people the world at pleasure with finite or infinite beings1 and if asked whence they came1 we may answer that they have been supposed2 if we are further asked why they have been supposed1 we may answer2 because they exist2 and if still again asked why they exist1 we may say1 because they have been supposed2 thus we may pass from supposition to existence1 and from existence to supposition1 without any danger of refutation4 #ace4 ,although this philosophy is any thing but clear1 it seems to have satisfied its author1 who goes on with admirable gravity to say3 ,thus1 then1 it is perfectly clear in what sense we here use the word me1 and we are led to a determinate explanation of the me as absolute subject4 ,every thing whose being 7existence7 consists solely in its supposing itself as being1 is the me1 as absolute subject4 ,so far as it supposes itself1 it is2 and so far as it is1 it supposes itself2 and the me is therefore absolute and necessary for the me4 ,that which is not for itself is no me4 ,ideal pantheism could not be established more explicitly1 and at the same time more gratuitously2 one is astonished to find one's self seriously occupied with such extravagances4 ,they have made a noise1 because they have not been known2 they ought therefore to be presented to the reader as they are1 even at the risk of fatiguing him4 #acf4 ,fichte tries to make his ideas clearer1 but we may be always sure that each explanation will add to their obscurity4 ,let us permit him to continue3 ,explanation6 ,one often hears the question asked1 what was ,i before ,i came to the consciousness of myself8 ,the natural answer to this is3 ,i was nothing at all2 for ,i was not the me4 ,the me is only in so far as it is conscious of itself4 ,the possibility of this question is founded on a confusion of the me as subject1 and the me as object of the reflection of the absolute subject1 and is entirely inadmissible4 ,the me represents itself1 takes itself so far under the form of the representation1 and is now for the first time something1 an object2 consciousness receives under this form a substratum which is1 and although without actual consciousness1 is here thought corporeally4 ,such a case is considered1 and it is asked3 what was then the me2 that is1 what is the substratum of consciousness8 ,but even then we think the absolute subject as that which has intuition of this substratum1 together with it1 although we do not take note of it2 we also1 without taking note of it1 at the same time think that which we pretended to abstract1 and thus fall into a contradiction4 ,we can think absolutely nothing without at the same time thinking the me as conscious of of itself2 we can never abstract our own consciousness3 hence all questions of this kind are unanswerable2 for they would be1 if well understood1 unaskable4 ,that the me did not exist as the object of its reflection before it had consciousness of itself1 is an evident truth2 before thinking itself1 it does not think itself2 who ever doubted it8 ,but the difficulty is1 whether the me is any thing1 independently of its own reflections or its objectiveness in relation to itself2 that is1 whether there is in the me any thing more than the being thought by itself4 ,the question is not contradictory1 but it is one which naturally presents itself to reason and to common sense2 for reason as well as common sense resist the taking as identical1 that which exists1 and that which is known2 that which knows itself1 and that which produces itself4 ,we are not now examining whether we have or have not a clear idea of the substratum of consciousness2 but it is curious to hear the ,german philosopher remark that when we do not conceive the me as the object of reflection1 we conceive it under a bodily form4 ,this is to confound imagination with ideas1 things1 as ,i have elsewhere#ed shown1 which are very different4 #ed ,see ,bk4 ,,iv41 from ,ch4 ,i4 to ,x4 #acg4 ,it follows from ,fichte's doctrine that the existence of the me consists in its supposing itself by means of consciousness2 and that if consciousness should not exist1 the me would not exist4 ,in this case to be and to be known are the same thing4 ,although ,i might ask ,fichte for his proofs of so extravagant an assertion1 ,i shall confine myself to insisting on the difficulty which he proposes1 and which he only eludes by a confusion of ideas4 ,what would the me be1 if it were not conscious of itself8 ,if to exist is to have consciousness1 when there is no consciousness there is no existence4 ,fichte answers that the me without consciousness is not the me1 in which case1 it does not exist2 but that the question rests on an impossible supposition1 the abstraction of consciousness4 ,we can think absolutely nothing1 he says1 without at the same time thinking the me as conscious of itself2 we can never abstract our own consciousness4 ,i say again2 these words do not solve the difficulty2 they only elude it4 ,i pass over his assertion that consciousness is the same as existence3 but it is certain that we conceive an instant in which the me is not conscious of itself4 ,has this conception never been realized8 ,has there1 or has there not1 been an instant in which the me was not conscious of itself8 ,if we admit this instant1 we must admit that at this instant the me did not exist2 therefore it never could have existed1 unless ,fichte will concede that the me depends on a superior being1 and thus admit the doctrine of creation4 ,if we do not admit this instant1 the me has always existed1 and with the consciousness of itself2 therefore the me is an eternal and immutable intelligence2 it is ,god4 ,there is no way for ,fichte to escape this dilemma4 ,there is no room here for the distinction between the me as subject and the me as object3 we are speaking of the me as having consciousness of itself1--that consciousness in which ,fichte makes its existence consist1--and we ask whether this me has always existed or not2 if the first1 the me is ,god2 if the second1 you must either acknowledge creation1 or hold that a being which does not exist can give itself existence4 #ach4 ,fichte does not retreat from the first consequence1 and although he does not call me ,god1 he gives it all the attributes of divinity4 ,if the me1 he says1 is only in so far as it supposes itself1 it is only for the supposing1 and supposes only for being4 ,the me is for the me1--but if it supposes itself absolutely as it is1 it supposes itself necessary1 and is necessary1 for the me4 ,i am only for myself2 but ,i am necessary for myself--7in saying for myself ,i always suppose my being47 ,to suppose itself1 and to be1 are1 speaking of the me1 entirely the same4 ,the proposition3 ,i am1 because ,i have supposed myself1 can1 therefore1 be also expressed in this manner3 ,i am absolutely1 because ,i am4 ,moreover1 the me which supposes itself1 and the me which is1 are entirely identical2 they are one and the same thing4 ,the me is for that which it supposes itself2 and it supposes itself as that which it is4 ,therefore1 ,i am absolutely1 what ,i am4 ,the immediate expression of the act which we have now developed would be the following formula3 ,i am absolutely1 that is1 ,i am absolutely1 because ,i am2 and am absolutely1 what ,i am2 both for the me4 ,but if the enunciation of this act is intended to be placed at the head of a doctrine of science1 it should be expressed somewhat in the following manner3 ,the me originally supposes its own being absolutely4#ee #ee ,grundlage der gesammten ,wissenschaftslehre1 ,i4 ,theil1 ,i41 pp4 #ig-ih4 ,there is only one fact which is clear in all this extravagance of expression2 and that is1 the pantheism openly professed by ,fichte2 the deification of the me1 and1 consequently1 the absorption of all reality in the me4 ,the me ceases to be a limited spirit2 it is an infinite reality4 ,fichte does not deny it3 ,the me determines itself1 the absolute totality of reality is ascribed to the me4 ,the me can determine itself only as reality1 for it is supposed absolutely as reality1 and no negation whatever is supposed in it4#ef #ef ,ib41 ,,ii41 ,th4 #d4 ,b41 p4 #abi4 ,but reality is supposed in the me4 ,therefore the me must be supposed as the absolute totality of reality1 7therefore as a quantity1 which contains all quantities1 and which may be a measure for them all27 and this1 too1 originally and absolutely1 if the synthesis1 which we have just explained problematically1 be possible1 and the contradiction is to be solved in a satisfactory manner4 ,therefore3 ,the me supposes absolutely1 without any foundation1 and under no possible condition1 the absolute totality of reality1 as a quantity1 than which1 by virtue of this supposition1 none greater is possible2 and this absolute maximum of reality it supposes in itself4 ,all that is supposed in the me is reality3 and all reality that is1 is supposed in the me4444 99 99 99 99 99 444 ,the conception of reality is similar to the conception of activity4 ,all reality is supposed in the me1 is the same as3 ,all activity is supposed in the me1 and reversely2 all in the me is reality1 is the same as3 ,the me is only active2 it is the me only in so far as it is active2 and in so far as it is not active1 it is the not-me4#eg #eg ,ib41 ,d41 pp4 #acg-h4 ,only in the understanding is there reality2 it is the faculty of the actual2 in it the ideal first becomes real4#eh #eh ,ib41 ,deduction der ,vorstellung1 ,,iii41 pp4 #bcc-d4 ,the me is only that which it supposes itself2 it is infinite2 that is1 it supposes itself infinite4444 ,without the infinity of the me1--without a productive faculty whose tendency is unlimited and illimitable1--it is impossible to explain the possibility of representation4 #aci4 ,let us give a glance at these ravings4 ,psychology starts from a fundamental fact--the testimony of consciousness4 ,the human mind cannot think without finding itself2 the starting-point of its psychological investigations is the proposition1 ,i think2 in this is found the identity of which ,fichte speaks--the me is the me4 ,all thought1 from the first moment that it exists1 perceives itself subject to a law2 the perception of every thing involves the perception1 either explicit or implicit1 of the identity of the thing perceived4 ,in this sense1 the most simple formula in which we can express the first law of our perception is3 ,a is ,a2 but this formula is as sterile as it is simple2 and it is impossible to conceive how any one could pretend to raise upon it a system of philosophy4 ,this formula1 supposing it to be enunciated1 involves the existence of the me which enunciates it4 ,it cannot be said that ,a is ,a1 if there is not a being in which the relation of identity is supposed4 ,if the proposition ,a ,a is true1 it is necessary to suppose an ,a1 or a being in which it exists4 ,a purely ideal truth1 without any foundation in a real truth1 is an absurdity1 as we have elsewhere proved and explained at great length4#ei #ei ,see ,bk4 ,,iv41 ,chs4 ,,xxiii41 ,,xxiv41 ,,xxv41 ,,xxvi41 and ,,xxvii42 and ,bk4 ,v41 ,chs4 ,,vii4 and ,,viii4 #adj4 ,but the existence of an ideal truth1 in so far as it is represented in us1 that is to say1 in so far as it is a fact of our consciousness1 is not necessary1 but hypothetical1 it exists when it exists2 but when it exists it may not exist1 or when it does not exist it may exist4 ,necessity cannot be inferred from existence3 the testimony of consciousness assures us of the fact2 but in this consciousness we find no proof that the fact is necessary1 that it has not depended on a higher agent2 quite the contrary1 the sentiment of our weakness1 the shortness of the time to which the recollections of our consciousness extend1 the natural and periodical interruptions of them which we experience during sleep1 every thing shows that the fact of consciousness is not necessary1 and that the being which experiences it has but a little while ago commenced its existence1 and might lose it again as soon as the infinite being should cease to preserve it4 ,the me which we perceive within us knows itself1 affirms itself2 the word supposes itself has no reasonable meaning1 unless it mean that the me affirms its existence2 but this knowing itself is not producing itself2 whoever asserts such an absurdity is under obligation to prove it4 #ada4 ,in truth it requires all the gravity of ,fichte to pretend to connect such a collection of extravagant absurdities into science4 ,it was reserved for modern times to see a man seriously occupied with a system whose existence will1 with difficulty1 be believed by those who read the history of the aberrations of the human mind4 ,the system of ,fichte is already judged by all thinking men1 and there is no surer means to make it forgotten than to expose it to the eyes of the judicious reader4 #adb4 ,having established the necessary and absolute existence of the me1 ,fichte proposes to demonstrate that from the me proceeds the not-me1 that is to say2 all that is not the me4 ,but the not-me can only be supposed in so far as a me1 to which it is opposed1 is supposed in the me 7in the identical consciousness74 ,but the not-me must be supposed in the identical consciousness4 ,therefore the me must also be supposed in it in so far as the not-me is supposed in it4 444 ,if me me1 all is supposed which is supposed in the me4444 ,the me and the not-me are both products of original acts of the me1 and the consciousness itself is a product of the first original act of the me1 of the supposition of the me by itself4#fj #fj ,ib41 #c41 pp4 #ajf-g4 ,this1 then1 is how according to ,fichte1 the not-me1 that is to say2 this which we call the external world1 and all that is not the me1 is born of the me2 the distinction of one thing from another is a pure illusion1 a play of relations by which the me conceives itself as not-me in so far as it limits itself2 but the me and the not-me are absolutely identical4 ,the me and the not-me inasmuch as they are supposed identical and opposed by the conception of mutual limitation1 are something in the me 7accidents7 as divisible substances1 supposed by the me1 the absolute and illimitable subject1 to which nothing is identical and nothing opposed4 ,there all judgments1 the logical subject of which is the limitable or determinable me1 or something which defines the me1 must be limited or defined by something higher2 but all judgments1 the logical subject of which is the absolutely illimitable me1 cannot be determined by any thing higher1 because the absolute me is not determined by any thing they are founded on1 and defined absolutely by themselves4 ,this is the last result of ,fichte's system1 the me converted into an absolute being1 which is determined by nothing above itself1 into an unlimited and illimitable subject1 an infinite being1 into ,god4 ,every thing emanates from this absolute subject4 ,in so far as the me supposes itself as infinite1 its activity 7that of supposing itself7 is spent on the me itself1 and on nothing else than the me4 ,its whole activity is spent on the me1 and this activity is the ground and the compass of all being4 ,the me is therefore infinite in so far as its activity returns to itself1 and consequently so far also is its activity infinite as its product1 the me1 is infinite4 7,infinite product1 infinite activity2 infinite activity1 infinite product2 this is a circle1 but not a vicious one1 for it is one from which reason escapes1 for it expresses that which is absolutely certain by itself1 and for its own sake4 ,product1 activity1 and active are here one and the same thing1 and we separate them only in order to express ourselves47 ,the pure activity of the me alone1 and the pure me alone are infinite4 ,but pure activity is that which has no object1 but returns to itself4 ,in so far as the me supposes limits1 and1 according to what we have said1 supposes itself in these limits1 its activity is not spent immediately on itself1 but on a not-me which is to be opposed to it4#fa #fa ,ib41 ,,iii41 ,th4 #e1 ,,ii41 p4 #bef4 ,how shall we sum up this doctrine8 ,in the words of ,fichte3 ,in so far as the me is absolute1 it is infinite and unlimited4 ,it supposes all that is2 and that which is not supposed1 is not 7for it2 and out of it there is nothing74 ,but all that it supposes1 it supposes as me2 and it supposes the me as all that it supposes4 ,hence in this respect the me contains in itself all1 that is1 an infinite1 unlimited reality4 ,in so far as the me opposes to itself a not-me1 it necessarily supposes limits1 and supposes itself in these limits4 ,it divides the totality of the being supposed in general between the me and the not-me2 so far supposes itself necessarily as finite4#fb #fb ,ib41 p4 #bee4 #adc4 ,thus ,fichte in a few words destroys the reality of the external world1 converting it into a modification or development of the activity of the me4 ,is it necessary to stop any longer to refute such an absurd doctrine1 one1 too1 founded on no proof8 ,i believe not3 especially since ,i have established on solid principles the demonstration of the existence of an external world1 and have explained the origin and character of the facts of consciousness1 without having recourse to such extravagant absurdities4#fc #fc ,see ,bks4 ,,ii41 ,,iii41 and ,,iv4 ,,chapter ,,xix4 ,,relations ,,of ,,fichte',s ,,system ,,to ,,the ,,doctrines ,,of ,,kant4 #add4 ,i have already shown#fd how ,kant's system leads to ,fichte's4 ,when a dangerous principle is established1 there is never wanting an author bold enough to deduce its consequences1 whatever they may be4 ,the author of the ,doctrine of ,science1 led astray by the doctrines of ,kant1 establishes the most extravagant pantheism that was ever invented4 ,in concluding his work1 he says that he leaves the reader at the point where ,kant takes him2 he ought rather to have said that he takes the reader at the point where ,kant leaves him4 ,the author of the ,critic of ,pure ,reason1 by converting space into a purely subjective fact1 destroys the reality of extension1 and opens the door to those who wish to deduce all nature from the me2 and by making time a simple form of the internal sense1 he causes the succession of phenomena in time to be considered as mere modifications of the me to the form of which they relate4 #fd ,see ,bk4 ,,iii41 ,ch4 ,,xvii4 #ade4 ,but it is far from being necessary for us to hunt after deductions2 the philosopher himself1 in the midst of his obscurity and enigmatical language1 does not cease to lay down in the most precise manner this monstrous doctrine4 ,let us hear how he speaks in his transcendental ,logic1 where he proposes to explain the relation of the understanding to objects in general1 and the possibility of knowing them a priori4 ,the order and regularity in phenomena1 that which we call nature1 is consequently our own work2 we should not find it there if we had not placed it there by the nature of our mind2 for this natural unity must be a necessary unity1 that is to say1 a certain unity a priori of the connection of the phenomena4 ,but how could we produce a synthetic unity a priori1 if there were not in the primitive sources of our mind subjective reasons of this unity a priori1 and if these subjective conditions were not at the same time objectively valid1 since they are the grounds of the possibility of knowing in general an object in experience8#fe ,who does not see in these words the germ of ,fichte's system1 which deduces from the me the not-me1 that is to say1 the world1 and gives to nature no other validity than that which it has received from the me8 #fe ,kant1 ,critik der reinen ,vernunft1 ,trause4 ,log4 #adf4 ,but ,kant is still more explicit1 where he is explaining the nature and attributes of the understanding4 ,he says3 ,we have before defined the understanding in different ways2 we have called it a spontaneity of knowledge1 7in opposition to the receptivity of sensibility17 a faculty of thought1 or rather1 a faculty of conceptions or judgments2 these definitions1 rightly explained1 are but one4 ,we may now characterize it as a faculty of rules4 ,this character is more fruitful1 and comes nearer to the essence of the thing3 sensibility gives us forms 7of intuition7 and the understanding rules4 ,the latter is always applied to the observation of phenomena in order to find in them some rule4 ,the rules1 if objective1 7if1 consequently1 necessarily united to the knowledge of the object17 are called laws4 ,although we know many laws by experience1 still these laws are only particular determinations of other higher laws1 the highest of which 7to which all the others are subjected7 proceed a priori from the understanding itself1 and are not taken from experience1 but1 on the contrary1 they give to the phenomena their validity1 and therefore make experience possible4 ,the understanding1 then1 is not simply a faculty of making rules for itself1 and comparing phenomena2 it is also the legislation for nature2 that is to say1 that without the understanding there would be no nature1 or synthetic unity of the multiplicity of phenomena according to certain rules4 ,for the phenomena1 as such1 cannot exist out of us2 on the contrary1 they only exist in our sensibility2 but this1 as the object of the knowledge in an experience1 with all that it can contain1 is only possible in the unity of the apperception4 ,the unity of the apperception is the transcendental foundation of the necessary legitimacy of all the phenomena in an experience2 this unity of the apperception in relation to the multiplicity of the representations 7in order to determine the multiplicity by starting from only one7 is the rule1 and the faculty of these rules is the understanding4 ,all phenomena1 then1 as possible experiences1 are a priori in the understanding1 and from it they derive their formal possibility1 in the same manner that they are pure intuitions in the sensibility1 and are only possible by it in relation to the form4 ,in the deduction of the pure conceptions of the understanding1 ,kant not only pretends that the objects of our knowledge are not things in themselves1 but that it is impossible that they should be1 because we could not then have conceptions a priori4 ,he adds1 that the representation of all these phenomena1 consequently all objects which we know1 are all in the me1 and are determinations of my identical me1 which expresses the necessity of a universal unity of these determinations in only one and the same apperception4 #adg4 ,from these passages it clearly follows that ,fichte's system1 or the ideal pantheism which reduces every thing to modifications of the me1 accords with the principles established in the ,critic of ,pure ,reason1 and is even expressly laid down1 although it does not form its principal object in that work4 ,for the sake of impartiality ,i cannot do less than refer the reader to the seventeenth chapter of the third book1 where ,i have intimated that the ,german philosopher attempts to explain his expressions so as to escape idealism1 which he professes to refute4 ,but this he seems to me to do only by an inconsequence4 #adh4 ,however1 my opinion of the connection of modern pantheism with the ,critik der reinen ,vernunft is confirmed even by the ,germans4 ,from these depths1 says ,rosenkranz1 speaking of this work1 the results of the transcendental sthetics and logic receive a new importance in the great problems of theology1 cosmology1 morals1 and psychology1 which was not even suspected by the dull sense of the greater part of its admirers4 ,they know nothing of the chain which unites ,fichte's ,doctrine of ,science1 ,schelling's ,system of ,transcendental ,idealism1 ,hegel's ,phenomenology and ,logic1 and ,herbart's ,metaphysics1 with ,kant's ,critic4444 ,i may say that the ,english and ,french in particular will understand nothing of the development of ,german philosophy since ,kant1 until they have penetrated the ,critic of ,pure ,reason1 for we ,germans always look to that4444 ,just as we use the houses1 the palaces1 the churches1 but most of all the towers which rise over every thing to guide us in a large city2 so also in contemporary philosophy1 amid the labyrinth of its quarrels it is impossible to take a single step with security unless we keep our sight fixed on ,kant's ,critic4 ,fichte1 ,schelling1 ,hegel1 and ,herbart made this work the great centre of their operations for attack or defence4#ff #ff ,preface of the edition of ,leipsic1 #ahch4 #adi4 ,i do not mean by this that the ,german philosophers since ,kant have added nothing to the ,critic of ,pure ,reason3 ,i have already observed 7in the seventh chapter of the first book7 that the cause of the greater obscurity which is found in ,fichte's words1 proceeds from his having gone farther than ,kant in his abstraction of all objectiveness both external and internal1 placing himself in ,i know not what pure primitive act1 from which he pretends to deduce every thing2 in which he differs from the author of the ,critic of ,pure ,reason1 whose labors did not so absolutely annihilate the objectiveness of the internal world1 and therefore his observations are less incomprehensible1 and even present here and there some few luminous points3 ,i only wished to show the baneful importance of ,kant's works1 to place those incautious persons on their guard1 who1 judging from what they have heard1 are inclined to regard him as the great restorer of spiritualism and sound philosophy1 when1 in reality1 he is the founder of the most pernicious schools which the history of the human mind has known1 and would be one of the most dangerous writers that ever existed1 were it not that the obscurity of his ideas1 increased by the obscurity of their expression1 renders him intolerable to the immense majority of readers1 even of those versed in philosophical studies4 ,,chapter ,,xx4 ,,contradiction ,,of ,,pantheism ,,to ,,the ,,primary ,,facts ,,of ,,the ,,human ,,mind4 #aej4 ,i do not know how any philosopher who has meditated on the human mind can incline to pantheism4 ,the deeper we go into the me from which it is pretended to deduce such an absurd system1 the more we discover the contradiction in which pantheism appears in respect to the primary ideas and facts of our mind4 ,my development of this observation will be brief1 for it turns on questions largely examined in their respective places4 #aea4 ,we have seen 7,bk4 ,,vi41 ,ch4 ,v47 that the idea of number is found in every understanding1 and experience teaches that we employ it explicitly or implicitly in almost all our words4 ,we scarcely speak without using the plural1 and this can have no meaning without the supposition of the idea of number4 ,pantheism reduces all existence to an absolute unity2 multiplicity either has no real existence1 or is limited to phenomena1 which1 in the judgment of some followers of this system1 contain no reality of any sort1 and1 in the opinion of all pantheists1 can contain no substantial reality4 ,according to them1 therefore1 the idea of number either has no correspondence in the reality1 or it relates only to modes of being1 to the various modifications of the same being1 and therefore does not extend to the beings themselves1 for in this system there is only one being4 ,if this be so1 how is it that the idea of number exists in our understanding8 how is it that we conceive not only many modes of being1 but many beings8 ,in the system of the pantheists not only is there no multiplicity of beings1 but it is impossible that there should be2 why1 then1 has our understanding this radical vice which necessarily leads it to conceive the multiplicity of things1 if this multiplicity is absurd8 why is this ideal defect confirmed by experience which also necessarily leads us to believe that there are many distinct things8 #aeb4 ,in the system of the pantheists our understanding is only a modification1 a manifestation of the only substance2 but it is impossible to explain this disagreement between the phenomenon and the reality1 this necessary error into which the phenomenon of the substance leads us in respect to the substance itself4 ,if we are a mere manifestation of the unity1 why do we find the idea of multiplicity as a primitive fact within us8 ,why this continual contradiction between the being and its appearances8 ,if we are all one same unit1 whence do we obtain the idea of number8 ,if the phenomena of experience are only evolutions1 so to speak1 of this one unit1 why do we feel ourselves irresistibly inclined to suppose multiplicity in the phenomena1 and to multiply the things in which they succeed8 #aec4 ,the idea of distinction opposed to that of unity is also fundamental in our mind2#fg yet pantheism gives it no correspondence in the reality4 ,if there is only being1 if all is identical1 there is nothing distinct1 and the idea of distinction is a pure chimera4 ,in this system distinction not only does not exist1 but it is impossible2 consequently the idea of distinction is absurd2 therefore one of the primary facts of our mind is a contradiction4 #fg ,see ,bk4 ,v41 ,chs4 ,,ix4 and ,x4 #aed4 ,negative judgments form a considerable part of the wealth of our understanding2#fh pantheism destroys them4 ,in this system the proposition3 ,a is not ,b1 can never be true2 for1 if all is identical1 one thing cannot be denied of another1 there would be no distinct things1 there would be no one or another2 all would be one2 the negative judgment must be limited to the following3 in reality ,a is the same as ,b1 there is only the appearance of distinction2 ,b is ,a existing or presented differently4 #fh ,see ,bk4 ,v41 ,ch4 ,,ix4 #aee4 ,the idea of relation is also absurd in the pantheistic system2 there is no relation without a term of reference1 and there is no reference without distinction4 ,according to the pantheists the subject referred and the term of the reference are absolutely identical2 there are1 consequently1 no true1 but only apparent1 relations2 thus we find another of the primary facts of our understanding radically absurd1 because it is in contradiction with the reality1 and even with the possibility4 #aef4 ,the support of all our knowledge1 the principle of contradiction1 it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time1 is without meaning1 and can have no real or possible application1 if the doctrine of pantheism be admitted4 ,when we say that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not be at the same time1 we understand that there is the possibility of not-being2 in our mind the idea of being excludes that of not-being only with respect to the same thing and at the same time4 ,if there is only one being1 and all other being is impossible1 it follows that the idea of not-being is absolutely contradictory1 and all the propositions in which it is expressed are absurd4 ,there is in this case only one being which is every thing1 to this being negation of being can never be applied2 this negation1 then1 is absolutely absurd1 and another idea of our mind is absolutely contradictory4 #aeg4 ,the idea of contingency is also contradictory if pantheism be admitted2 all that can be is1 and all that does not exist is impossible2 therefore when we distinguish contingency from necessity we contradict both the reality and the possibility4 ,hence there is another primary illusion of our mind which presents to us as possible1 and even existent1 that which in itself is absurd4 #aeh4 ,neither can the ideas of finite and infinite co-exist in the system4 ,one of them must be contradictory2 if the only being is infinite1 there is and can be nothing finite2 therefore the opposition between the finite and the infinite is a chimera of our mind1 to which there is nothing in reality corresponding4 ,there is only one thing2 it must be finite or infinite2 in either case1 one of these terms must disappear1 one of these ideas is contradictory1 since it is in opposition to an absolute necessity4 #aei4 ,the system of absolute unity destroys the idea of order4 ,in this idea is contained the arrangement of distinct things1 distributed in a convenient manner to conspire to an end4 ,if there is no distinction there is no order1 and the distinction is impossible if there is absolute unity4 ,the idea of order is still one of the fundamental ideas of our mind2 literary and artistic unity1 and in general that of all sensible beauty1 is the unity of order3 substitute for this absolute unity1 and you destroy all beauty of the imagination2 art becomes absorbed by chaos4 #afj4 ,it is useless to add that pantheism destroys liberty of will2 this liberty of which we are so clearly and vividly conscious1 and which accompanies us through every moment of our existence4 ,in this monstrous system absolute unity is inseparable from absolute necessity2 the existent and the possible are confounded2 nothing which is can cease to be2 nothing which is not can be4 ,the action must spring from the only substance by a spontaneous development2 understanding by spontaneity the absence of an external cause2 but this action cannot but exist1 it will be an irradiation1 as it were1 of the only substance1 just as light radiates from luminous bodies4 ,without liberty of will merit is absurd2 a being that acts by absolute necessity can have no merit or demerit4 ,then laws are to no purpose1 rewards and punishments useless2 the history of individuals as of all mankind is only a history of the phases of the only substance1 which goes on eternally developing itself in subjection to absolutely necessary conditions which have no other foundation than the substance itself4 #afa4 ,pantheism not only destroys freedom of will1 but it renders unintelligible all affections which relate to another4 ,if there is only one being1 what mean the sentiments of love1 respect1 gratitude1 and in general1 all those which suppose a person distinct from the me which experiences them8 ,no matter how distinct we suppose the term of these affections1 they can never have any2 and although they seem to proceed from different principles1 they spring from only one4 ,the man who loves one man and hates another is the me loving and hating itself2 appearances denote diversity and opposition1 but at bottom there is unity1 identity4 ,who can accept such absurdities8 #afb4 ,thus pantheism1 after destroying the intellectual man1 annihilates the moral man2 after declaring the fundamental ideas of our mind contradictory1 it attacks the most precious fact of our consciousness1--the freedom of will2 it destroys the sentiments of the heart1 denying our individuality1 it precipitates us all into the deep abyss of the only substance1 the absolute being1 confounding and identifying us with it1 till we lose within it our own existence1 as the molecules of a grain of dust are lost in the immensity of space4 ,,chapter ,,xxi4 ,,rapid ,,glances ,,at ,,the ,,principal ,,arguments ,,of ,,pantheists4 #afc4 ,the principal arguments on which pantheism rests are founded on the unity of science1 the universality of the idea of being1 the absoluteness and exclusiveness of the idea of substance1 and the absoluteness and exclusiveness of the conception of the infinite4 #afd4 ,science must be one1 say the pantheists1 and it cannot be completely so1 unless there is unity of being4 ,science must be certain1 and there cannot be absolute certainty1 unless there is identity of the being which knows with the thing known4 ,the solution of these difficulties consists in denying the gratuitous propositions on which they are founded4 ,it is not true that human science must be one1 nor that unity of being is necessary for the unity of science4 ,they must prove both these assertions2 to triumph in a discussion it is not enough to assert4 ,far from either of them being sufficiently proved1 they are both contradicted by reason and by experience4 ,it is unnecessary to repeat here1 what ,i have explained at full length when treating of the possibility and existence of transcendental science as well in the absolute intellectual order as in the human4 ,for this ,i refer the reader to the fourth1 fifth1 sixth1 and seventh chapters of the first book4 ,the second proposition which exacts the identity of the subject knowing with the object known1 has also been sufficiently refuted4 ,i have elsewhere shown that the system of universal identity does not help to explain the problem of representation1 and ,i have proved by incontestible arguments1 that besides the representation of identity1 there are the representations of causality and ideality4#fi ,i have also demonstrated the objective value of ideas1 in so far as distinguished from objects1 founding my proof on the unity of consciousness4#gj #fi ,see ,bk4 ,i41 ,ch4 ,,viii4 to ,,xiv4 #gj ,see ,bk4 ,i41 ,ch4 ,,xxv4 ,the doctrines of ,kant which convert the external world into a purely subjective fact1 and thus give rise to ,fichte's transcendental idealism1 are refuted in the second book1 where ,i have demonstrated the objectiveness of sensations1--in the third book1 where ,i have proved the reality of extension1 and in the seventh book1 where ,i have proved that time is not a pure form of the internal sense4 #afe4 ,the argument founded on the idea of the universality of being1 that is1 the impossibility of more than one being1 because the idea of being is absolute and embraces every thing1 is a sophism in which there is a transition from the ideal order to the real1 by which an indeterminate and abstract idea is converted into an absolute being4 ,to form a perfect conception of this idea and its relations to the reality1 see what has been said in the fifth book1 when treating of the idea of being4 #aff4 ,spinosa1 ,fichte1 ,cousin1 ,krause1 and all who have taught pantheism under one form or another1 start with a wrong definition of substance4 ,it is impossible to overrate the necessity of acquiring clear and distinct ideas of this definition1 for there is no doubt but that here is the origin of the error of the pantheists1 and the secret to put a stop to their progress4 ,when one examines profoundly the principles of systems which have made so much noise in the philosophical world1 one is surprised at contemplating their insubsistency in its nakedness4 ,the doctrines summed up in ,chapter ,,xiv4 should be kept always in sight4 #afg4 ,in the importance and transcendency of the definition1 the notion of the infinite may compete with that of substance4 ,it is incredible to what extent this word has been abused without any care to explain its different senses1 or its origin1 or the legitimacy of its applications4 ,all the arguments which the pantheists pretend to found on the idea of the infinite vanish like smoke when we clearly understand the character1 the origin1 and the application of this idea4#ga #ga ,see the whole of ,book ,,viii4 #afh4 ,i will conclude with one remark4 ,i am profoundly convinced that the most baneful systems in philosophy arise in great part from confusion of ideas1 and the superficiality with which the most fundamental points of ontology1 ideology1 and psychology are examined4 ,my ruling idea in the present work is to prevent this evil2 this is why ,i have so greatly extended the part of fundamental philosophy1 abstracting1 as far as possible1 all secondary questions4 ,these last are easily answered1 after we have once acquired a clear and exact knowledge of the fundamental ideas of human science4 7#d7 ,,book ,,tenth4 ,,necessity ,,and ,,causality4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,,necessity4 #a4 ,beings are divided into two classes3 necessary and contingent2 necessary being is that which cannot but be2 contingent is that which may be and cease to be4 ,in these definitions every thing is said2 but their laconism does not permit all that is expressed in them to be easily understood4 ,necessity and contingency may refer to different aspects and give rise to very diverse considerations4 ,this makes a careful analysis of the ideas expressed by them necessary4 #b4 ,what is meant by necessity8 ,in general that is called necessary which cannot but be2 but the expression cannot1 may be taken in different senses3 in a moral sense1 as when we say3 ,i cannot but fulfil this duty2 in a physical1 as in this proposition2 a paralytic cannot move himself2 and in a metaphysical sense1 as3 ,a triangle cannot be a quadrilateral4 ,in the first example1 the obstacle is founded on a law2 in the second1 it arises from nature2 in the third1 it follows from the essence of the things4 ,in all these suppositions1 necessity implies the impossibility of the contrary1 and this impossibility results from the necessity4 #c4 ,hence it follows that the ideas necessity and impossibility are correlative1 and that is metaphysically necessary whose opposite is metaphysically impossible4 ,impossibility consists in the exclusion of one thing by another2 thus1 a circular triangle is impossible1 means the same as the nature of a triangle excludes the nature of a circle4 ,in all impossibility1 therefore1 there is a term denied2 as in all necessity there is a term affirmed2 the metaphysically necessary is that whose opposite is contradictory2 the existence of the absurd is impossible1 the non-existence of the necessary is absurd4 ,it is contradictory for a triangle to have four sides2 and it is absurd for a triangle not to have three angles4 #d4 ,in the purely ideal order we see many necessities without any relation to existence2 such are all geometrical truths4 ,even in the real order we conceive many hypothetical necessities in contingent beings3 such are those which are obtained by applying absolute principles to any hypothesis furnished by experience4 ,the principle of contradiction serves in an infinity of cases to found a certain necessity even in contingent beings4 ,there is no absolute necessity of the existence of extended beings2 but on the supposition that they exist1 it is necessary for them to have the properties proceeding from extension4 #e4 ,in no finite being can there be an absolute necessity2 the only necessity which it can have is hypothetical4 ,the relation of its essential attributes is necessary2 but1 as its essence does not exist necessarily1 whatever is necessary in it is so only hypothetically1 that is1 on the supposition that it exists4 #f4 ,we must then distinguish two necessities3 one absolute1 the other hypothetical4 ,the latter relates to the essences of things1 abstracting their existence1 although implying it as a condition1 and supposing another necessary as the ground of its possibility2#gb the former relates to the existence of the thing4 ,the absolutely necessary is that whose existence is absolutely necessary4 #gb ,see ,bk4 ,,iv41 ,chs4 ,,xxiii41 ,,xxiv41 ,,xxv41 ,,xxvi41 and ,,xxvii4 #g4 ,the essence of the necessary being must contain existence2 its idea must involve the idea of existence1 not only logical and conceptual1 but also realized4 #h4 ,we can conceive the existence of the necessary being distinct from its essence1 but the reason of this is in the imperfection of the idea1 which with us is not intuitive1 but discursive2 and consequently1 we can distinguish between the logical order and the real order4 ,here we find the defect of ,descartes' argument by which he pretends to demonstrate the existence of ,god from the fact that the predicate1 existence1 is included in the idea of a necessary and infinite being4 ,the idea of necessary being involves existence1 but not real existence1 only logical and conceptual2 since after we have the idea of the necessary being1 it still remains to be proved that there is an object which corresponds to this idea2 the predicate belongs to the subject according to the manner in which the subject is taken1 and as this is only in the purely ideal order1 the predicate is also purely ideal4 #i4 ,the reality of the necessary idea cannot be demonstrated from its idea alone2 but it may be demonstrated with complete evidence by introducing into the argument other elements which experience furnishes us4 ,something exists2 at least ourselves2 at least this perception which we have in this act2 at least the appearance of this act4 ,i leave aside for the present all the questions disputed between the dogmatists and the skeptics2 ,i only suppose a datum which no one can deny me1 though he carry skepticism to the utmost exaggeration4 ,when ,i say that something exists1 ,i only mean to affirm that not every thing is a pure nothing4 ,if something exists1 something has always existed1 or there is no moment in which it could be said with truth3 there is nothing4 ,if such a moment of universal nothingness had ever been1 nothing would now exist1 there never could have been any thing4 ,let us imagine a universal and absolute nothingness2 ,i then ask3 ,is it possible that any thing should come from nothing8 ,evidently not2 therefore on the supposition of universal nothingness reality is absurd4 #aj4 ,therefore something has always existed1 with a cause1 without a condition on which it depends2 therefore there is a necessary being4 ,its existence is supposed always1 without relation to any hypothesis2 therefore its not-being is always excluded under all conditions2 therefore there exists an absolutely necessary being1 that is1 a being whose not-being implies a contradiction4 #aa4 ,summing up the doctrine which precedes1 we may say3 ,i4 ,that we have the idea of a necessary being4 ,,ii4 ,that we deduce its existence from its idea alone4 ,,iii4 ,that in order to demonstrate the existence of a necessary being1 it is sufficient to know that something exists4 ,,iv4 ,we know by experience that something exists2 for experience presents to us1 if nothing else1 the existence of our own thought4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,the ,,unconditioned4 #ab4 ,the words1 conditioned and unconditioned1 are greatly used in modern philosophy2 as the ideas which these terms express have a great analogy to those explained in the last chapter1 ,i will briefly consider them here4 #ac4 ,the conditioned is that which depends on a condition2 that is to say1 that which is supposed if another thing1 which is called the condition1 is supposed4 ,if the sun is above the horizon1 there is light2 here the light is the conditioned1 the sun the condition4 ,the unconditioned is that which supposes no condition1 as its name expresses4 #ad4 ,the universe is an assemblage of conditioned beings2 this is manifested by both internal and external experience3 does any thing unconditioned exist8 ,yes4 #ae4 ,representing the universe by a series ,a1 ,b1 ,c1 ,d1 ,e1 ,f1 444 etc41 the condition of ,f is in ,e2 the condition of ,e in ,d2 that of ,d in ,c2 that of ,c in ,b1 and so on successively4 ,if there is nothing unconditioned this retrogression will extend to infinity1 and we shall have an infinite series of conditioned terms4 ,to arrive at any term1 for example1 ,b1 it will have been necessary to pass through the infinite conditions which precede it3 the infinite series will have been exhausted3 this is contradictory4 ,and as what is said of ,b may be said of ,a1 or of any other of the preceding or succeeding terms1 it follows that they are all impossible3 therefore the series is absurd4 #af4 ,in the supposed series all is conditioned1 there is nothing unconditioned2 and still the existence of its successive totality is necessary4 ,therefore the series in itself is unconditioned2 therefore a collection of conditioned terms is unconditioned1 although it is supposed impossible to assign any thing1 out of the series1 which is unconditioned4 ,who would admit such an absurdity8 #ag4 ,let us give a more precise formula to the argument4 ,taking any three terms in the series2 ,a 444 ,f 444 ,n1 we may form the following propositions4 ,if ,a exists1 ,f and ,n will exist4 ,if ,n exists1 ,f and ,a have existed4 ,if ,f exists1 ,a has existed and ,n will exist4 ,objections4--,i4 ,whence arises the connection of the conditions with one another8 ,,ii4 ,why should any one of them be supposed8 #ah4 ,by admitting a necessary1 unconditioned being which contains the condition of whatever exists1 every thing is explained4 ,to the first objection it may be answered1 that the connection of the conditioned conditions depends on the unconditioned condition4 ,to the second1 it may be said that the primitive condition has no need of any other condition1 supposing it to be a necessary being4 ,to ask why it should be supposed1 is to fall into a contradiction2 since it is unconditioned it has no why1 the reason of its existence is in itself4 #ai4 ,but if we admit nothing necessary1 nothing unconditioned1 neither the terms nor their connection can be explained4 ,infinite terms would exist1 necessarily connected1 with any internal or external sufficient reason4 ,there would be no more reason for the existence of the universe than for its non-existence2 being and nonentity would be indifferent to it2 and it cannot be conceived why existence should have prevailed4 ,for nothing it is evident that nothing is required2 why then is there not an absolute and eternal nothing8 #bj4 ,the more we examine the necessity of the connection of the conditions1 one with another1 the stronger this difficulty becomes2 for if it be said that one condition cannot exist without another2 with still more reason we ask why a first condition is not necessary for the collection of the conditions1 or the entire series4 #ba4 ,therefore the conditioned supposes the unconditioned2 the first given1 we can conclude the second4 ,the conditioned is given us in the external and in the internal world4 ,therefore there exists an unconditioned being1 whose existence has no reason in any thing outside of itself4 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,immutability ,,of ,,necessary ,,and ,,unconditioned ,,being4 #bb4 ,the absolutely necessary and unconditioned is immutable4 ,for its existence is1 or1 to speak in modern language1 is supposed absolutely1 by intrinsic necessity1 without any condition2 and with this existence its state is also supposed4 ,we abstract for the present the nature of this state1 whether it be of this or that perfection1 this or that degree1 or even finite or infinite4 ,its existence being supposed unconditionally1 its state is supposed unconditionally also2 therefore as its non-existence is contradictory1 7,ch4 ,i47 its no-state is also contradictory4 ,change is only a transition from one state to another state which implies the no-state of the first2 therefore change in the necessary is contradictory4 #bc4 ,in order to present this in a clearer and more precise manner1 we will call ,e the necessary and unconditioned being4 ,as ,e is supposed absolutely by intrinsic necessity1 without any condition1 the not-,e must be contradictory4 ,e is not abstract but real being1 consequently it must have certain perfections1 as intelligence1 will1 activity1 or any other whatever2 and it must have these perfections in a certain degree1 abstracting for the present1 whether it be greater or less1 finite or infinite4 ,with the absolute existence of ,e a state of perfection1 which we shall call ,n1 is also supposed4 ,what has determined the state ,n8 ,by the supposition1 it can have been determined by nothing2 since the state is unconditioned4 ,therefore1 if the state ,n is absolutely and necessarily1 the not-,n is contradictory4 ,therefore the change by which ,e would pass from ,n to not-,n is contradictory4 #bd4 ,but let us for a moment suppose a change in the necessary being1 and suppose it to have proceeded from this being itself4 ,as the reason of the change must be necessary and eternal1 we should have to admit an infinite series of evolutions1 and should again fall into the impossibility of reconciling the infinity of the series with the existence of any one of its terms4#gc #gc ,see ,ch4 ,,ii4 #be4 ,thus it is demonstrated that the necessary and unconditioned being can suffer no change which would cause it to lose its primitive state4 ,the necessary being can lose nothing2 it cannot pass from ,n to not-,n2 but who knows but what it is possible that without losing ,n1 or passing to not-,n1 it might acquire something which could be united to ,n in one way or another4 ,in other words2 ,n being given1 not-,n is contradictory1 but would ,n ,p be contradictory1 ,p expressing a perfection1 or degree of perfection8 ,this would be impossible2 because ,p which is added must emanate from ,n2 therefore all that is in ,p was already in ,n2 therefore there has been no change1 and to suppose it is contradictory4 #bf4 ,it may be replied that ,p was in ,n virtually1 and that the new state only adds a new form4 ,but does this form1 as such1 involve something new in reality8 ,either it does or it does not3 if it does not1 there is no change2 if it does1 it was either contained in ,n or not contained in it2 if contained in it1 there is no change2 if not contained in it1 whence does it come8 #bg4 ,to elude this demonstration1 some have imagined various necessary beings acting on each other1 and mutually producing changes in each other1--by this means they attempt to explain whence the new states come4 ,but these are not only fictions1 and evidently groundless cavils in contradiction with the principles of ontology1 but they may be destroyed by one conclusive argument4 ,let ,a1 ,b1 ,c1 ,d1 be the necessary and unconditioned beings2 each is supposed absolutely1 and with primitive states1 which we shall respectively call a1 b1 c1 d4 ,then1 taking them in their primitive state1 the collection of the existences will be united with a collection of necessary and unconditioned states1 which we may represent in this formula3 ,aa1 ,bb1 ,cc1 ,dd1 7#a47 ,this expression represents a primitive1 necessary1 and unconditioned state3 now ,i ask3 whence come the changes8 ,all is unconditioned2 how then is the conditioned1 the mutable introduced8 #bh4 ,the force of the argument is not weakened by supposing the primitive and mutual action of ,a1 ,b1 ,c1 ,d1 to be implied in the primitive states a1 b1 c1 d4 ,for the mutual actions1 being primitive and absolute1 would produce primitively and absolutely a result in their respective terms4 ,this result would be primitively necessary1 and would be contained in the formula4 7#a47 ,therefore the formula would suffer no variation by the new supposition2 and consequently there would have been no change of any kind4 #bi4 ,by imagining that the mutual action does not suppose a primitive state1 but a successive series of states1 we fall into the infinite series1 and consequently into the impossibility of arriving at any term of it1 without supposing the infinity to be exhausted1 7,ch4 ,,ii474 #cj4 ,again1 the essences of the necessary and unconditioned beings ,a1 ,b1 ,c1 ,d1 being distinct1 what reason is there for supposing them to be in relations of activity8 ,what is the ground of this relation if they are all four necessary1 unconditioned1 and therefore independent of each other8 #ca4 ,but let us leave such absurdities1 and go on with our analysis of the idea of a necessary and unconditioned being4 ,immutability excludes perfectibility1 so that it is necessary either to suppose the summit of perfection primitively in the necessary being1 or to admit that it can never attain this perfection4 ,perfectibility is one of the characteristics of the contingent1 which improves its mode of being by a series of transformations2 the absolutely necessary is what it is1 and can be nothing else4 #cb4 ,the contingent must emanate from the necessary1 the conditioned from the unconditioned2 therefore all perfections1 of whatever order1 must be found in the necessary and unconditioned being2 therefore all the perfections of existing reality must be in it1 at least1 virtually1 and those which imply no imperfection must be contained in it formally4#gd #gd ,see ,bk4 ,,viii41 ,ch4 ,,xx4 to the end4 #cc4 ,the possibility of the non-existent must have a foundation2#ge possible perfections must exist in a real being1 if their idea is possible2 therefore the infinite scale of perfections1 which we conceive in the order of pure possibility1 besides those which exist1 must be realized in the necessary and unconditioned being4 #ge ,see ,bk4 ,,iv41 ,chs4 ,,xxii4 to ,,xxviii41 and ,bk4 ,v41 ,chs4 ,,vii4 and ,,viii4 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,ideas ,,of ,,cause ,,and ,,effect4 #cd4 ,we have the idea of cause2 the continual use which we are always making of it shows this4 ,philosophers do not alone possess it2 it is the inheritance of mankind4 ,but what do we understand by cause8 ,all that makes any thing pass from not-being to being1 as the effect is all that which passes from not-being to being4 ,i am not now considering whether that which passes from not-being to being is substance or accident1 nor the manner in which the cause influences this transition4 ,hence the definition includes every class of cause1 and every species of causality4 #ce4 ,the idea of cause contains3 ,i4 ,the idea of being4 ,,ii4 ,the relation to that which passes from not-being to being1 as of a condition to the conditioned4 ,the idea of effect contains3 ,i4 ,the idea of being4 ,,ii4 ,the idea of the transition from not-being to being4 ,,iii4 ,the relation to the cause1 as of the conditioned to the condition4 #cf4 ,axiom ,i4--,nothing cannot be a cause2 or in other terms3 every cause is a being1 or exists4 #cg4 ,i say that this is an axiom1 because it cannot be demonstrated1 since the predicate existence1 is evidently contained in the idea of cause4 ,that which is a cause1 is2 if it is not1 it is not a cause4 ,to affirm the cause and deny that it is1 is to affirm and deny at the same time4 ,therefore this proposition is an axiom4 ,to be convinced of its truth1 we need only to attend to the ideas of cause and effect1 and we see the idea of being evidently contained in the idea of cause4 ,the explanation which ,i give must not be regarded as a demonstration1 but as an illustration1 for the purpose of better comparing the two ideas4 ,whoever compares them as he ought will want no demonstration1 he will see it intuitively1 and this is what constitutes the character of an axiom4 #ch4 ,axiom ,,ii4--,there is no effect without a cause4 #ci4 ,to understand the sense of this axiom it must be observed1 that here the word effect only means that which passes from not-being to being1 whether it be caused or not2 for1 if by effect was meant a thing caused1 the axiom would be an identical and useless proposition4 ,substituting for effect its meaning1 it would be1 ,there is nothing caused without being caused1--which is very true1 but of no use4 ,the sense then is this3 whatever passes from not-being to being1 requires something distinct from itself1 which produces this transition4 #dj4 ,i say that this proposition is an axiom1 and to be convinced of it1 we need only fix our attention upon the ideas contained in it4 ,let us consider a thing that is1 and transfer it to the time when it was not4 ,let us abstract all that which is not it1 let us suppose no other being which may have produced it or taken part in its production2 ,i assert that we see evidently that the transition to being1 will never be made4 ,not only is it impossible for us to make the object emanate from the pure idea of its not-being1 but we also see that it can never emanate from it4 ,there is no being1 no action1 no production of any kind2 there is pure nothing2 whence will the being emanate8 ,the truth1 of the proposition is then intuitively presented to us3 we not only do not see the possibility of the apparition of being in the pure idea of not-being by itself1 but we see in this idea the impossibility of this apparition4 ,they are ideas which exclude each other2 not-being is possible only by the exclusion of being1 and vice versa4 #da4 ,when we conceive a productive action1 we either refer it to the thing which from not-being must pass to being1 or to something distinct from this4 ,in the first case1 we fall into contradiction2 because we suppose an action and do not suppose it1 since there is no action in pure nothing4 ,let us suppose that the thing is cause before being2 we then find ourselves in contradiction with ,axiom ,i1 7 #cf74 ,in the second case1 we already conceive the cause1 since cause is only that which produces the transition from not-being to being4 #db4 ,the common expression1 ex nihilo nihil fit1 is a truth1 if understood in the sense of ,axiom ,,ii4 ,,chapter ,v4 ,,origin ,,of ,,the ,,notion ,,of ,,causality4 #dc4 ,are there in the world any cause and effect8 ,this is equivalent to asking whether there is any change in the world4 ,all change involves a transition from not-being to being4 ,the least change is inconceivable without this transition4 ,whatever is changed is1 after changing1 in another way than it was before the change2 therefore it has this mode of being which it had not before4 ,this mode did not exist before1 it exists now2 it has passed1 therefore1 from not-being to being4 #dd4 ,even if we were not in relation with the external world1 and our mind was confined to internal facts alone1 to the consciousness of the me and its modifications1 we should know that there is transition from not-being to being1 by the testimony of the successive appearance of new perceptions and affections4 ,within ourselves we experience the ebb and flow of modifications which pass from not-being to being1 and from being to not-being4 #de4 ,it is clear1 from what has been said1 that the ideas of cause and effect suppose a real or possible order of contingent beings4 ,if there were only necessary and immutable beings1 there could be no causes and effects4 #df4 ,i said 7,chap4 ,,iv47 that the idea of cause contains the idea of being and the idea of relation to the not-being which has passed or passes to being4 ,the idea of cause is not a simple idea2 it is composed of these two4 ,the idea of being alone is not sufficient to constitute it2 for we may conceive being without conceiving cause4 ,what the idea of cause adds to the idea of being is something distinct from the idea of being1 and not contained in it2 it may be called causality1 power1 productive force1 activity1 or any such term2 they all express the relation of one being to realize in another the transition from not-being to being4 #dg4 ,in the idea of causality is likewise included another simple idea1 which1 though accompanying the idea of being1 must not be confounded with it4 ,if any one should call it a modification of the idea of being1 ,i should have no objection4 #dh4 ,whence does the idea of causality arise8 ,the mere intuition of the idea of being does not seem sufficient to produce it4 ,the idea of being is simple1 it expresses nothing but being2 we can1 therefore1 find in it no relation to the transition from not-being to being4 #di4 ,does it1 perchance1 spring from experience8 ,here we must distinguish between the idea of causality1 and the knowledge of the existence of the cause4 ,experience reveals the succession of beings1 that is1 their transition from not-being to being1 and vice versa4 ,we have already remarked that in the intuition of not-being with relation to being we see the impossibility of a transition1 without the mediation of some being which executes it2 therefore the certainty of the existence of the cause arises from experience1 combined with the intuition of the ideas of being and not-being4 #ej4 ,if this experience did not exist1 we should not know that causality is possible2 because in the idea of being1 as we possess it1 we do not see the idea of force3 we might perhaps conceive the force1 but we could not know whether any thing in reality corresponds to it4 ,we should thus have the notion of the force1 but not the notice of its existence1 nor even the certainty of its possibility4 #ea4 ,but if we examine it well1 this want of experience is an impossible supposition2 because a limited intelligent being1 as uniting intelligence with limitation1 feels the succession of its perceptions1 and1 consequently1 experiences within itself the transition from a not-being to being4 ,and as1 on the other hand1 it perceives its power of combining ideas1 it perceives within itself the existence of causality1 of a power which produces its reflections4 #eb4 ,the exercise of our will1 whether with respect to internal or external acts1 likewise gives us the knowledge of the dependence of some things upon others2 and the impressions which we receive without our will1 or against it1 confirm us in this conviction4 ,without this experience we should see the succession of the phenomena1 but should not know their relations of causality2 for it is clear that the inclination to assign as the cause of a phenomenon that which preceded it1 supposes the idea of cause and the knowledge of the dependence of the phenomena in the relation of causes and effects4 #ec4 ,some philosophers say that man has no idea of the creation1 from which1 without intending it1 they come to the conclusion that we have not the idea of any cause4 ,by creation is meant the transition of a substance from not-being to being1 by virtue of the productive action of another substance4 ,i hold that this is only the idea of causality in its highest degree1 that is1 as applied to the production of a substance2 but since therefore we have the idea of cause1 the idea of creation is not a new and inconceivable idea1 but a perfection of an idea which is common to all mankind4 ,we have seen that the idea of cause contains the idea of producing a transition from not-being to being2 this power is an attribute of every active being1 but with this difference1 that finite causes have only the power to produce modifications1 whilst the infinite cause has also the power to produce substances4 #ed4 ,here we find the same thing as in other branches of our philosophical cognitions3 the idea of the essence pertains to reason1 the knowledge of its existence depends on experience4 ,the first is independent of the second1 and we may reason on the essence by means of the condition of existence1 that is1 by means of a postulate4#gf ,we always have this postulate1 if in nothing else1 at least in the phenomena of our consciousness4 #gf ,see ,bk4 ,v41 ,chs4 ,,vii4 and ,,viii4 ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,formula ,,and ,,demonstration ,,of ,,the ,,principle ,,of ,,causality4 #ee4 ,the principle of causality1 or the proposition3 all that commences must have a cause2 has been somewhat disputed latterly2 hence it is necessary for us to place it beyond the reach of attack4 ,i believe it possible to do this1 by presenting the doctrine of the preceding chapters under a clear point of view1 which shall drive away all doubt and clear up all difficulty4 ,i beg the reader's attention for a few moments to the argument which ,i am going to propose4 #ef4 ,let us take any being1 ,a4 ,in order that the principle of causality may be applied to it it is necessary that it should have begun to be1 and that it should not have existed before2 for1 if we do not suppose this beginning1 ,a must have existed always4 ,we can then assign a duration in which ,a was not1 and in which there was not-,a4 ,therefore in the order of duration there has been a little series of two terms3 not-,a 444 ,a4 ,to begin is to pass from the first term1 not-,a to ,a4 ,the principle of causality says3 the transition from the first term to the second is not possible without the intervention of a third term1 ,b1 which must be something real4 #eg4 ,what does the term not-,a represent by itself alone8 the pure negation of ,a1 the mere nonentity of ,a4 ,in the conception of not-,a1 instead of ,a1 we find its contradictory term2 so that1 instead of the second being contained in the former1 they mutually exclude each other1 and make the proposition3 it is impossible for not-,a and ,a to exist at the same time1 absolutely true4 ,thus it is impossible for ,a ever to emanate from the conception not-,a1 and consequently without a real term to produce the transition it is impossible to pass from not-,a to ,a1 even in the purely ideal order4 #eh4 ,observe1 however1 that ,i do not pretend to say that1 conceiving not-,a so as to deny ,a as known1 it would be impossible to conceive ,a2 for it is evident that whoever conceives not-,a1 must have just conceived ,a1 and he might conceive it entirely alone1 by simply destroying the negation2 but ,i say that on the supposition that there is an absolute conception of not-,a1 conformed to the absolute objective not-,a1 ,a could never emanate from this conception2 and if we reflect on it we shall see that there could not even be this conception1 since the thought of pure negation is no thought1 no conception4 ,there would then be an absolute absence of conception2 and in the purely ideal order1 we should find ourselves in the first term of the series1 in a pure negation1 in not-,a1 without any means of passing to the second term1 ,a4 #ei4 ,those1 then1 who deny the principle of causality1 conceive the transition from not-,a to ,a without any reason1 or any intermediary3 those who deny creation1 admit what is a thousand times more incomprehensible than creation4 ,whence do they infer the possibility of this transition8 ,not from experience2 because experience presents only succession1 and therefore not absolute appearance in the manner which they suppose3 not from reason2 because reason cannot make a positive conception emanate from a pure negation4 #fj4 ,how is the transition from not-,a to ,a effected8 ,those who admit the principle of causality1 say it is effected by the action of ,b1 which they call the cause4 ,if it is a substance which is produced1 they suppose the intervention of an infinite power4 ,but those who deny the principle of causality can only answer that the transition from not-,a to ,a is made absolutely4 ,they imagine the instant ,m1 in which ,a did not exist2 and then the instant ,n1 in which ,a exists4 ,but why8 ,they allege no reason3 without their knowing how1 ,a has arisen from nothing1 without the action of any thing4 ,this is a manifest contradiction4 #fa4 ,the principle of causality is founded on the pure ideas of being and not-being4 ,suppose only not-being1 and we see evidently that being cannot begin4 ,the principle then is purely ontological3 those who1 in order to establish1 or oppose it1 appeal only to reasons of experience1 put the question badly2 they take it from its true field2 they confound the notice of causality with the notion or idea of causality4 ,those philosophers who keep within the sensible order1 cannot give a solid foundation to this principle2 for this reason1 they who admit no other ideas than sensations1 have all fallen into errors or doubts on this point2 and all sensists would have fallen into the same doubt if they had only been logical enough to draw the last consequences of their doctrine4 ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,,the ,,principle ,,of ,,precedency4 #fb4 ,the transition from not-being to being implies succession3 to conceive that something begins1 we must conceive that something did not exist4 ,the series not-,a1 ,a1 has no sense if either term is wanting2 and these terms1 inasmuch as they are contradictory1 cannot exist at the same time4 #fc4 ,let us imagine absolute nothingness4 ,the first term1 not-,a1 stands alone4 ,all existence is denied3 nothing can be affirmed without contradicting the supposition4 ,then there is no time2 for time being only the succession of things1 or of being and not-being1#gg cannot exist when there is nothing which can succeed4 ,if we suppose any thing to begin1 we establish the series not-,a1 ,a2 in which case we imagine two different instants ,m and ,n1 to which the terms of the series respectively correspond in this manner3 #gg ,see ,bk4 ,,vii4 not-,a 44 ,a4 ,m 4444 ,n4 ,it may be said with truth3 ,m is not ,n4 ,what is the meaning of this proposition8 ,since time and duration in general is not distinct from the things that endure#gh1 ,n can only represent the existence of ,a1 in relation to not-,a2 ,m in the same manner can represent only not-,a1 in relation to ,a4 ,hence the conception of ,a1 in so far as it begins1 contains the relation to not-,a1 without which it could not be conceived as begun4 #gh ,see ,bk4 ,,vii41 ,chs4 ,,iv4 and ,v4 #fd4 ,what we have explained is conceivable on the supposition at least of one intelligence2 because this intelligence would refer not-,a and ,a to their proper duration1 successively1 if this duration were successive like ours2 in some other way1 if this duration were not successive4 ,but if there is absolutely nothing1 the series1 not-,a 444 ,a1 is inconceivable1 since the relation of ,a1 in so far as it begins1 has no real or conceived term of comparison1 unless we imagine a pure time1 entirely empty1 in which we suppose the terms of the series to be placed4 #fe4 ,thus it seems that by the mere fact of thinking ,a1 in so far as begun1 we think also a preceding existence1 because there is no beginning unless not-,a preceded ,a2 and this precedence means nothing unless there is an existence to which it relates1 either as to a successive series1 or as to an immutable duration4 #ff4 ,if ,a must be preceded by an existence ,b1 then nothing can begin independently of a preceding existence1 or unless something already exists2 or the simple conception of succession implies the necessity of something always existing1 in order that something may begin4 #fg4 ,as duration is nothing distinct from things1 the two terms of the series1 ,b1 ,a1 of which one precedes the other1 cannot be placed in an absolute duration distinct from the things themselves1 as in two distinct instants1 independently of the things4 ,the relation1 then1 which exists between ,b and ,a is not a relation of one instant to another1 since the instants in themselves are nothing1 but of one thing to another4 ,therefore ,a1 inasmuch as it begins1 has a necessary relation to ,b4 ,therefore ,b is the necessary condition of the existence of ,a4 ,therefore it is demonstrated that every being which begins1 depends on an existent being4 #fh4 ,this demonstration1 though differently developed1 is found in the works of ,baron ,pascual ,galuppi1 ,professor of ,philosophy in the ,university of ,naples2#gi and although it is impossible to deny that it is very profound1 still it does not leave the understanding wholly satisfied4 ,these are the words of the ,italian philosopher3 #gi ,lett4 filos4 sulle vicissit4 della filosofia1 ,lettera ,,xiv4 ,is the proposition3 there is no effect without a cause1 an identical proposition8 ,i have demonstrated its identity in this manner3 whatever has a beginning of existence must have been preceded either by an empty time or by a being2 because otherwise the thing of which we are speaking would be the first existence1 and the first letter of the alphabet of beings1 and it could not be said that it begins to be1 for the notion of beginning of existence implies a priority in relation to the being which begins4 ,these two notions1 existence begun1 and existence preceded by another1 are then identical2 but is it possible for an existence to be preceded by an empty time8 ,i have proved that an empty duration is a chimera1 a product of the imagination1 without any reality4 ,the development of this proof1 which ,i shall not give in this place1 may be found in my ,essays on the ,critique of ,knowledge4 ,i have there established that time is nothing else than the number of productions4 ,aristotle said that time was the number of motion4 ,therefore an existence begun is an existence preceded by another existence4 ,this proposition is identical2 but how can an existence be preceded by another8 ,is that which precedes1 perchance1 found in an instant of time prior to that in which that which is preceded is found8 ,then we fall again into the doctrine of a time distinct from existent things4 ,thus we must admit that the existence which precedes is such as to make the existence preceded existence begun4 ,it is not begun because it is preceded2 the priority of the existence which precedes1 is a priority of nature1 an objective priority1 which makes the beginning of the existence which is preceded2 it is therefore the efficient cause of this existence4 ,thus the great principle of causality stands invincibly demonstrated1--it is an identical proposition4 #fi4 ,i say again that this demonstration does not leave one wholly satisfied2 not because it is not conclusive in itself1 but because it needs greater development4 ,the nerve of the proof is in the impossibility of conceiving a beginning1 without conceiving something pre-existent2 or to conceive precedency1 without the relation of that which begins to that which pre-exists4 ,it is not easy to conceive how from this may be inferred the intrinsic dependence of the things2 and founding the argument upon so difficult an idea as that of time1 greatly increases the doubt4 #gj4 ,let us suppose the world to exist1 and something to begin now4 ,precedence is then conceived without dependence4 ,this1 in fact1 happens continually2 since beings are continually beginning which are preceded by others on which they do not depend4 ,it may be said that they do not depend on all those which precede them1 but still they depend on one of them4 ,this is precisely what is to be proved4 ,in order to prove that the principle of causality is demonstrated by the mere idea of the order of duration1 it is necessary to prove that the relation of precedence is a relation of dependence4 ,that which begins supposes something3 certainly2 but it remains to be proved that it depends on this thing as on something producing it1 and not only as on a condition which makes the conception of beginning possible for us4 ,until it is proved that the action of a being is indispensable for the transition from not-being to being1 the principle of causality does not seem to be proved1 but only that of precedency2 and as the order of things in duration1 as priority and posteriority1 can represent no other dependence than that of pure succession1 it would follow that if we should confine ourselves to precedency1 we should not prove that every thing that begins must depend on another1 but that every thing that begins must succeed another2 this last is not the principle of causality1 but of succession4 #ga4 ,we will make these ideas clearer4 ,the difficulty raised against the former demonstration will be better understood1 if we observe that those who reject the principle of causality1 do not conceive it impossible for any thing to begin at any moment without any cause4 ,let us represent the successive beings of the universe by the series 444 ,a1 ,b1 ,c1 ,d1 ,e1 444 and the times in which they exist1 by the series 444 a1 b1 c1 d1 e4444 ,according to the demonstration which we are examining1 no term could have begun1 unless another had preceded it2 wherefore1 ,d begun means the same as ,d preceded4 ,therefore ,d has a necessary relation to ,c1 because the instants d and c are nothing in themselves1 as distinguished from ,d and ,c4 ,any one who does not admit the principle of causality will say that ,d may begin without any dependence on ,c2 and that in order that the conception of beginning may be possible1 it is only necessary that there should always have been something existing1 although the terms preceding and those preceded have no relation to each other4 ,thus as the order of beings is represented by the series 444 ,a1 ,b1 ,c1 ,d1 ,e1 444 another series 444 ,m1 ,n1 ,p1 ,q1 ,r1 444 may be imagined1 to both of which the series 444 a1 b1 c1 d1 e1 444 corresponds4 ,then ,d may begin without any necessary dependence on ,c1 for it is sufficient that ,p pre-exists at the instant c1 in order to make the conception of beginning possible for us2 in which case1 ,d will have no necessary relation1 either to ,c or to ,p2 since the precedence of either is sufficient4 ,and as it is evident that what we have said of ,c and ,p may be said of any other terms of these or other series1 it follows that the demonstration only leads us to the necessity of conceiving something pre-existent2 and this only in order to make the conception of a beginning possible4 ,if to this we add the peculiar difficulty proceeding from the nature of the ideas of time and of all duration1 ,i think we must conclude that the demonstration is not so satisfactory as might be desired4 ,those who have not examined the idea of time very profoundly will scarcely understand the meaning of the proof2 the others will see the contradiction involved in an absolute beginning demonstrated1 and therefore the necessity of something having been always existing2 but not the intrinsic dependence implied in the relation of an effect to a cause4 ,these difficulties render a more rigorous and profound examination necessary4 #gb4 ,the principle of precedency leads us to an important result4 ,our understanding conceives absolutely an external existence2 since it is impossible for it to conceive an absolute beginning without a preceding being4 #gc4 ,the conception of absolute nothing is impossible4 ,i4 ,because this conception would be entirely void1 or rather1 the absence of all conception4 ,we conceive negation relatively to an existence1#hj but not absolutely4 ,,ii4 ,because a conception is not possible without consciousness1 and consciousness implies the idea of a being1 of something1 and this is contradictory of absolute nothing4 #hj ,see ,book ,v41 ,chap4 ,,ix4 #gd4 ,unable to conceive absolute nothing1 we always conceive something existing2 and since1 as we have demonstrated1 we cannot conceive an absolute beginning1 it follows that we cannot think without our thought implying an eternal existence4 ,how luminous a truth6 ,what reflections it inspires6 ,let us continue to meditate on it4 #ge4 ,hence the necessity of thinking the necessary and eternal is a primitive fact of our mind1 and the confusion which we feel in thinking on duration in the abstract1 and the inclination to imagine time before the world existed1 arise from the necessity of conceiving the eternal1--a necessity1 from which our mind cannot emancipate itself so long as it thinks4 #gf4 ,the basis of the principle of contradiction1 the idea of being1 is found in our conceptions in an absolute manner2 its opposite1 the conception of not-being is found only in relation to the contingent1 and is a sort of condition implied by contingency4 #gg4 ,every thing contingent includes some not-being1 so far as contingent it can not be1 and therefore its not-being is at least in the order of possibility4 ,but these transitions from not-being to being are not even conceivable without presupposing something existing1 necessary1 and eternal4 #gh4 ,thus in our ideas we find being as absolute1 and not-being only as relative2 and we can conceive being which has proceeded from not-being1 or has begun1 only in relation to an absolute being4 #gi4 ,this relation considered objectively does not seem at first sight to be the relation of causality1 but only of succession2 but it presents a subjective fact which brings us to the knowledge of the objective truth4 ,our conceptions of not-being and being are connected in such sort that we cannot conceive the transition from not-being to being without conceiving a pre-existent being3 here we find a reflex of objective causality which is revealed to us in subjective facts4 ,duration1 as distinct from things1 is a pure imagination2 the relation of durations is therefore a relation of beings4 ,true1 in this relation of durations we discover only succession1 and not intrinsic dependence2 but this dependence1 though not known intuitively1 is represented in the very connection in which we conceive beings in duration4 ,it is certain that we can imagine different series2 but that of time is a pure imagination in so far as we conceive it distinct from others4 ,if the series of times disappears1 there remains only the series of things3 the relation between the terms will be the relation between the things2 and what is called the dependence of succession will be the dependence of reality4 ,the real relation of that which passes from not-being to being1 with that which is absolutely1 is a dependence of causality4 #hj4 ,let us imagine any series of realities4 ,a1 ,b1 ,c1 ,d1 ,e1 444 ,m1 ,n1 ,p1 ,q1 ,r4444 ,the series of times a1 b1 c1 d1 e1 in so far as distinct from the others1 means nothing4 ,in this case it may be eliminated1 and all the relations of some of the terms on others will be relations of things1 not of time4 ,now1 it has been demonstrated that a term1 ,d1 for example1 cannot be conceived as passing from not-being to being1 or as beginning1 without a relation1 and it has been shown that this relation is a real relation of ,d to any of the terms4 ,it has been objected that ,d1 in order to begin1 requires only a term which would make the conception of priority1 and consequently1 of beginning1 possible1 which term might be sought in another distinct series2 but this is really only to change a name2 for1 if the term which is necessary for the beginning is found in another series1 the cause is found in it also1 for in it is found that which is necessary for the effect4 #ha4 ,all the terms begun presuppose another1 either one or more1 for we here abstract their unity2 therefore we must come at last to one or more terms not begun4 ,those which have begun could not have begun without the existence of those which have not begun2 therefore the existence of these is necessary for the existence of those4 ,therefore the existence of these last contains the reasons of the beginning of the existence of the others2 therefore they contain true causality4 #hb4 ,the difficulties opposed to this demonstration arise from inadvertently violating the supposition by attributing to duration an existence distinct from the beings4 ,in order to perceive the whole force of the proof1 it is necessary to eliminate entirely the imaginary conception of pure duration3 and then it will be seen that the dependence represented as the relation of duration is the dependence of the beings themselves1--a dependence which represents nothing else than the relation expressed by the principle of causality4 #hc4 ,after completely eliminating the conception of pure duration as a thing distinct from the beings1 there remains only the transition from not-being to being as all that is expressed by the word1 beginning4 ,in this case we find that the principle of precedency is the same as the principle of causality2 and as we have had to abstract entirely duration in itself in order to solve the difficulties1 we find that if the principle of causality is to be placed beyond all doubt1 and to be regarded as an axiom1 it can only rest on the contradiction between not-being and being1 or the impossibility of conceiving a being which suddenly makes its appearance1 without any thing more than a pure not-being preceding it4 #hd4 ,thus1 after examining the question on every side1 we come to what we established in the preceding chapters3 a not-being cannot arrive at being without the intervention of a being3 the series not-,a1 ,a1 is impossible without the intervention of a being1 ,b4 ,we find it so even in our ideas1 and to contradict this truth is to deny our reason4 ,i believe1 then1 that the principle of causality is completely explained only in the manner in which we have treated it in the preceding chapters4 ,to begin supposes a not-being of that which begins2 and it is impossible and contradictory to deduce being from the conception of not-being4 ,the principle is true subjectively1 because it is founded on our ideas2 but it is also true objectively1 because in these cases objectiveness is necessarily joined with subjectiveness4#ha ,the being which suddenly appears1 without a cause1 without a reason1 without any thing1 is an absurd representation which our intellect rejects as instantly and as strongly as it accepts the principle of contradiction4 #ha ,see ,bk4 ,i41 ,chap4 ,,xxv4 ,as time is the relation of not-being to being--the order of the variable--it is a contradiction to conceive succession without any thing which pre-exists2 and thus the principle of precedency confirms the principle of causality2 or rather1 it shows that the two are one1 though presented under different aspects3 the principle of precedency relates to duration1 that of causality to being2 but both of them express an application of the fundamental principle3 it is impossible for the same thing to be and not be at the same time4 ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,,causality ,,in ,,itself4--,,insufficiency ,,and ,,error ,,of ,,some ,,explanations4 #he4 ,causality implies relation3 if in exercise1 it implies actual relation2 considered not in exercise1 but in potentia1 it implies a possible relation4 ,nothing causes itself2 causality always relates to another4 ,there is no cause where there is no effect2 and there is no effect where there is no transition from not-being to being4 ,if this transition takes place in a substance which was not1 but begins to be1 it is called creation2 and is said to be passive1 relatively to the effect1 and active1 in relation to the cause4 ,if the transition is of accidents only1 the effect is a new modification2 we do not then say that there is a new being1 but that the being is in another manner4 #hf4 ,from this it may be inferred that causality is not the same as activity3 all causality is activity1 but not all activity is causality4 ,god is active in himself2 but he is cause only in relation to the external4 ,his intelligence and his will are certainly infinite activity1 considered in themselves1 and abstracted from creation1 as we conceive ,god from all eternity before the beginning of the world2 yet1 inasmuch as they are purely immanent1 they are causality1 for they produce nothing new in ,god4 ,his intelligence is a pure act1 infinitely perfect1 and can never suffer any change2 the same must be said of his will3 therefore the divine intelligence and will with respect to ,god himself are not acts of causality4 ,even as referred to external objects1 they are a producing cause in reality1 only by subjection to the free will of the ,creator2 for otherwise we should have to admit that ,god created the world necessarily4 ,activity in creatures1 even in immanent operations1 is always causality2 for they cannot exercise their activity without producing new modifications4 ,acts of understanding and will are the exercise of an immanent activity1 and yet they modify us in different ways4 ,when we think or will we are in a different manner from that in which we are when we do not think or will2 and when we pass from thinking or willing one thing to think or will another1 this transition cannot take place without our experiencing new modes of being4 #hg4 ,in what does the relation of efficient causality consist8 ,what is the meaning of the dependence of the effect in relation to the cause8 ,this is a difficult and a profound question2 one of the most difficult and most profound which can be presented to science4 ,the majority of men and even of philosophers imagine that they can solve it1 by using words which1 rightly analyzed1 explain nothing4 #hh4 ,to cause1 it is said1 is to give being4 ,what means to give8 ,to give is here synonymous with to produce4 ,what means to produce8 ,with this the explanations are at an end1 unless one should wish to fall into a vicious circle1 saying that to produce is to cause or give being4 ,a cause1 it is also said1 is that from which a thing results4 ,what is understood by resulting8 ,to emanate4 ,what is to emanate8 ,to emanate is to proceed1 to flow from another4 ,always the same thing3 metaphorical expressions which at bottom have all the same meaning4 ,it is said that a cause is that which gives1 produces1 makes1 communicates1 generates1 etc41 and that an effect is that which receives1 proceeds1 emanates1 results1 flows1 comes1 springs1 etc4 #hi4 ,causality implies succession1 but is not identified with it4 ,we can clearly conceive that ,b is after ,a1 without ,a being the cause of ,b4 ,internal and external experience present continual examples of succession distinct from causality4 ,a man goes out into the field1 another follows him3 between the going out of both there is succession1 but there may be no causality4 ,the two phenomena1 whether considered objectively in themselves1 or subjectively1 as known by us1 are connected by the relation of succession1 but not by that of causality4 ,there is as great a difference in philosophy as in ordinary language between post and propter1 after and because of4 ,the same is true in purely internal phenomena4 ,i think of a question of philosophy1 and then pass to a literary question3 the two thoughts are successive1 but one is not the cause of the other4 #ij4 ,the relation of causality is not the connection of the ideas of things4 ,the representations of ,a and ,b may be strongly connected in our mind without our even thinking of the relation of causality4 ,we have seen in a place a scene which made a profound impression on us2 ever afterwards the remembrance of the place recalls the scene1 and the recollection of the scene reminds us of the place2 here we find two internal representations strongly connected1 without our therefore attributing to the objects the relation of causality4 ,we know that two persons arrive at the same place and without the coming of the one influencing the coming of the other4 ,the idea of the coming of the one will be associated in the mind with the idea of the coming of the other4 ,there will then be a connection of representations1 although we deny to the objects the relation of causality4 #ia4 ,although the connection of the ideas in our understanding may1 in consequence of a constant experience1 be such that one is always preceded by the other1 as the conditioned is by the condition1 this is not enough for true causality4 ,an observer may have remarked the correspondence of the ebb and flow of the tide with the motion of the moon2 but whether for reasons of philosophy1 or because it has never occurred to him that the motion of the moon could influence the motion of the sea1 he considers these phenomena entirely independent of one another1 although he may try hard to explain so strange a coincidence4 ,in the mind of this observer the two phenomena will be always joined1 in such a way that the phenomenon of the moon will always be that of the ebb and flow1 without its being possible to invert the order and make the ebb and flow precede the motion of the moon4 ,here then is a necessary priority in an idea1 and yet true causality is not attributed to the object4 #ib4 ,there is a fact in the history of philosophy which proves with the greatest evidence the truth of what ,i have just said4 ,this fact is the system of occasional causes maintained by eminent philosophers4 ,if a body1 they say1 strike another body at rest1 it will communicate to it its motion2 but this communication does not imply a true causality1 but that the motion of the impinging body is a mere occasion of the motion of the body impinged4 ,here then a thing is conceived as a necessary condition of the existence of another1 and yet it is denied that there is between them the relation of causality4 ,in thinking of the two phenomena we cannot invert the order1 and conceive the motion of the body impinged as the condition of the motion of the impinging body1 yet we can deny the relation of causality between the condition and the conditioned4 ,therefore the idea of causality represents something besides the necessary order of things among themselves4 #ic4 ,this brings us to a new phasis of the question4 ,is the relation of causality faithfully represented in the conditional proposition3 if ,a exists1 ,b will exist8 ,the connection expressed by this proposition is not the relation of causality4 ,if the fruit-tree ,n flourishes in a certain country1 ,m will flourish4 ,a constant experience proves it4 ,the conditional proposition in this case does not express the relation of causality of the flourishing of ,n with respect to the flourishing of ,m2 yet the proposition is true4 ,one phenomenon may be the sign of the immediate approach of another1 without being its cause4 #id4 ,conditional propositions1 in which the existence of one object is affirmed as the condition of the existence of another1 express a connection2 but this may not be a connection of the objects with each other1 but with a third4 ,if a gentleman's servant goes to a place1 and then another servant of the same gentleman goes to the same place1 the cause of the going of the second may not be the going of the first1 but simply that their master wished them to go one after the other4 ,the crops in one field indicate the state of the crops of another field1 and this indication may be expressed by a conditional proposition4 ,why so8 ,is it on account of the causality of the crops in one field in relation to those in another8 ,certainly not2 but because the circumstances of the climate and the soil produce a sufficiently fixed order between them to verify the conditional proposition1 without the intervention of the idea of the causality of one in relation to the other4 #ie4 ,there are many cases in which the relation between the condition is necessary1 and yet the condition neither is1 nor can be1 the cause of the conditioned4 ,we are here treating of efficient cause1 of that which gives being to the thing1 and it would often be absurd to attribute this kind of causality to conditions which on the other side are necessarily connected with the conditioned4 ,take away the pillar on which a body rests1 and the body will fall2 the connection of the condition with the conditioned1 or of the taking away the pillar with the fall of the body is necessary2 the proposition in which this connection is expressed is true and necessary in the natural order2 and still it cannot be said that the removal of the pillar is the efficient cause of the fall of the body4 #if4 ,even a purely occasional connection is all that is necessary for the truth of the conditional proposition2 and no one ever confounds the occasion with the cause4 ,in the present example1 the body cannot fall unless the pillar is removed2 and it must necessarily fall if it is removed2 but the cause of the fall is not in the removal of the pillar1 but in the weight of the body1 as is evident if we suppose the specific gravity of the body to be equal to that of the fluid in which it is submerged1 since in that case1 the removal of the pillar is not followed by the fall of the body4 #ig4 ,causality cannot express a necessary relation of the condition to the conditioned1 unless we deny all free causes4 ,supposing the idea of causality to be correctly expressed in this proposition3 if ,a exists1 ,b will exist2 by substituting ,god and the world for ,a and ,b1 it will become3 if ,god exists the world will exist2 which would lead us into the error of the necessity of the creation4 ,by substituting man and determinate actions for ,a and ,b1 we shall have the proposition3 if man exists1 his determinate actions will exist1 which implies necessity1 and destroys free will4 #ih4 ,here arises the question3 would the relation of causality be correctly expressed by a conditional proposition1 taken in an inverse sense1 or with the effect1 as the condition and the cause as the conditioned1 7not conditioned in the order of existence1 but only as a thing necessarily supposed17 that is1 if1 instead of saying3 if ,a exists1 ,b will exist1 we say3 if ,b exists1 ,a exists8 ,in this case1 the proposition may be applied even to the dependence of creatures on ,god1 and in general of all free actions on their causes2 for we can say with truth3 if the world exists1 ,god exists2 if there is a free action1 there is a free agent4 #ii4 ,although at first sight this seems to explain the relation of causality1 this new formula cannot be regarded as correct4 ,for1 though it is true in general1 that if there is an effect there is a cause1 it is also certain that oftentimes one thing supposes another1 not as its cause1 but as a mere occasion1 as a condition sine qua non2 which is far from being true causality4 ,supposing the body supported by the pillar to be so placed that it cannot fall unless the pillar is removed1 we might form the conditional proposition3 if the body has fallen1 the pillar has been taken away2 the proposition is true1 although the removal of the pillar is not the efficient cause of the fall of the body4 #ajj4 ,god could have so created the world that creatures would have no true action of causality upon one another1 and yet have so arranged them that the phenomena would correspond with each other in the same manner as they now do4 ,this is the opinion of defenders of the doctrine of occasional causes1 and to this is reduced the pre-established harmony of ,leibnitz1 according to which all the monads constituting the universe are like so many clocks1 which1 though independent of one another1 agree with admirable exactness4 ,on this hypothesis we might form infinite conditional propositions expressing the correspondence of the phenomena without the idea of causality entering into any of them4 #aja4 ,from what has been said we must infer that this idea is something distinct from the necessary connection1 and that it is not correctly expressed in all its purity by the relation contained in the conditional propositions1 whether the cause be taken as the condition or as the conditioned4 ,the dependence of the effect on its cause is something more than the simple connection4 ,to say that whatever is necessarily connected1 even successively and in a fixed order1 is connected by the relation of causality1 is to confound the ideas of common language as well as those of philosophy4 ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,,necessary ,,and ,,sufficient ,,conditions ,,of ,,true ,,absolute ,,causality4 #ajb4 ,we have just seen that the necessary connection of two objects is not enough to establish the character of causality2 what circumstances are then necessary8 #ajc4 ,if we conceive an object1 ,b1 which begins1 and suppose that the object ,a was necessary to its existence1 and that of itself alone it was sufficient for the existence of ,b1 we find in the relation of ,a to ,b the true character of the relation of a cause to its effect4 ,for the complete character of absolute cause1 two conditions are indispensable3 ,i4 ,the necessity of the existence of ,a for the existence of ,b4 ,,ii4 ,that the existence of ,a be sufficient for the existence of ,b1 without any thing more being requisite4 ,these conditions may be expressed in the following propositions or formulas3 ,if ,b exists1 ,a exists4 ,the existence of ,a alone is sufficient for the existence of ,b4 ,when the relation between two objects is such that both these propositions are true at the same time1 there is a relation of absolute causality4 #ajd4 ,from this explanation it is evident that the character of cause must be denied to all mere occasions1 since the second proposition cannot be applied to them4 ,when two facts are occasionally connected1 it may be said that if the one exists the other must exist1 and the first proposition is verified in this case2 but it cannot be said that the existence of the one is sufficient for the existence of the other2 and therefore the second proposition fails of its application4 ,if two men have agreed that the one shall fire a pistol when the other gives a signal with his hand1 it may be said that if the signal is given the pistol will be fired1 but not that the signal alone contains what is sufficient for the firing of the pistol4 ,for1 supposing the man with the pistol to be asleep1 the signal may be repeated a number of times without the firing of the pistol4 #aje4 ,the character of cause must also be denied to every condition which is only the removal of an obstacle 7removens prohibens74 ,to such the first proposition is applicable1 but not the second4 ,in the case of a body resting on a pillar so that it cannot fall unless the pillar be removed1 we may say3 if the body has fallen1 the pillar has been taken away2 but not that the removal of the pillar is sufficient for the fall of the body2 because if the body were of a less specific gravity than the fluid in which it is submerged1 or united to another body which would prevent its falling1 it would not fall4 ,it is evident that the removal of the obstacle is not sufficient for the fall1 but that something more is required1 as the force of gravity1 or an impulse4 #ajf4 ,all phenomena connected in succession of time necessarily and in a fixed order1 must be denied the relation of cause and effect1 unless the application of these ideas is made legitimate by something else2 because1 although the constant order authorizes us to say that if ,a happens1 ,b will happen1 and then ,c1 and then ,d1 and so on successively1 it cannot be said that in the existence of ,a is contained that which is sufficient for the existence of ,b1 nor in the existence of ,b what is sufficient for the existence of ,c1 since we suppose an indispensable condition outside of the series4 #ajg4 ,the first proposition3 if ,b exists1 ,a exists2 is true of every cause whether necessary or free4 ,the second proposition is likewise applicable to both these classes of causes4 ,it is necessary to observe with care that the proposition does not say that if ,a exists1 ,b will exist2 but that the existence of ,a is all that is requisite in order that ,b may exist4 ,if1 supposing ,a1 ,b is necessarily supposed also1 the cause is necessary2 but if1 supposing ,a1 only that which is sufficient for the existence of ,b is supposed1 the cause remains free2 because the existence of ,b is not affirmed1 but only the possibility of its existence4 #ajh4 ,let us apply this doctrine to the first cause4 ,if the world exists1 ,god exists3 this proposition is absolutely true4 ,if ,god exists1 the world exists2 this proposition is false1 because1 ,god existing1 the world might not have existed4 ,if ,god exists1 the world may exist2 that is1 in the existence of ,god is contained that which is sufficient for the possibility of the existence of the world3 this proposition is true2 because in the infinite being is contained the possibility of finite beings1 and in him is found sufficient power to give them existence1 if he thus freely wills it4 ,,chapter ,x4 ,,secondary ,,causality4 #aji4 ,in determining in the last chapter the conditions of true causality1 ,i spoke only of absolute causality2 the reason of this1 which ,i shall now explain1 turns on the difference between the first cause and second causes4 #aaj4 ,we have seen that the pure idea of absolute causality is the perception of three conditions3 the necessity of one thing for the existence of another2 the sufficiency of the first alone for the existence of the second2 and lastly 7when the cause is free7 the act of the will necessary for the production of the effect4 ,these three conditions are fulfilled absolutely in the first cause1 since nothing can exist unless ,god exists2 and for the existence of any object the existence of ,god1 with the free will of creating the object1 is sufficient4 ,it is evident that causality cannot be applied in the same sense to second causes2 of none of them can it be said that its existence is absolutely necessary for the existence of the effect1 since ,god could have produced it either by means of another secondary agent1 or immediately by himself2 neither is its existence alone sufficient for the existence of the effect1 since whatever exists presupposes and requires the existence of the first cause4 #aaa4 ,thus1 then1 the idea of causality applied to ,god has a very different meaning from that which it has when applied to second causes3 it is necessary to bear this in mind1 and not to raise questions concerning second causes before the meaning of the word cause is strictly defined4 ,it is certain that the relation of an effect to its cause is a relation of dependence2 but we have seen that the words dependence1 connection1 condition1 etc41 are susceptible of different meanings2 if they are not clearly and strictly determined it is impossible to give any solution to these questions4 #aab4 ,what then is meant by secondary causality8 ,after the observations which we have made1 it is not difficult to say4 ,in the order of created beings ,a will be the cause of ,b when the following conditions are fulfilled4 ,i4 ,that the existence of ,a is necessary 7according to the order established7 for the existence of ,b2 which may be expressed by this formula3 if ,b exists1 ,a exists or has existed4 ,,ii4 ,that in the order established ,b and ,a form a series which goes back to the first cause1 without the concurrence of the terms of any other series being requisite4 ,this last condition will not1 perhaps1 be understood1 unless explained by some examples4 #aac4 ,the motion of my pen is the effect of the motion of my hand2 here ,i have the true relation of secondary causality1 for ,i pass through a series of conditions1 which do not require the conditions of any other series3 the motion of the pen depends on the motion of my hand2 that of my hand depends on the animal spirits 7or whatever cause physiologists may please to assign72 that of the animal spirits depends on the command of my will2 and my will depends on ,god1 who created it1 and preserves it4 ,i here find a series of second causes to which ,i give the true character of causality1 in so far as it can exist in a secondary order2 and the efficient cause1 the principal among secondary causes is my will2 because in the secondary order of it is the first term of the series4 ,the motion of the pen of my secretary depends on my will1 not however as its true efficient cause1 but as its occasion2 because in the secretary is found the same series as in the former example3 the first term of this series is his will1 which ,i cannot absolutely determine1 since being free1 it determines itself4 ,there is true efficient causality in the will of the secretary2 because there ends the series whose first term is at my disposal only in an improper sense1 that is to say1 so long as the secretary pleases4 #aad4 ,the body1 ,a1 in motion strikes upon the body1 ,b at rest3 the motion of the body ,a is the cause of the motion of the body ,b1 and the causality will be found in all the terms of the series1 that is1 in all the motions whose successive communication has been necessary in order that the motion might reach the body ,b4 ,let us suppose that in the series of these communications obstacles have been removed which impeded the communication of the motion2 the removal of the obstacles is an indispensable condition on the supposition that they existed1 but it is not a true cause1 since it is a term foreign to the series of the communications1 and might not have existed1 without the motion therefore ceasing to exist4 ,for1 supposing there had been no obstacles1 they would not have been removed1 and yet the motion would have been communicated4 ,but it is not the same with respect to the terms which form the series of the communications2 for if we represent them by ,a4 ,b4 ,c4 ,d4 ,e4 ,f4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 the motion of ,a cannot reach ,f if one of the intermediate bodies serving as the vehicle of the communication be taken away4 #aae4 ,from this theory it follows that the idea of secondary causality represents a concatenation of various objects forming a series1 which terminates in the first cause1 whether by a necessary order1 as in the phenomena of corporeal nature1 or by the medium of a first term in the secondary order with a determination of its own1 as is the case in things which depend on free will4 ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,,fundamental ,,explanation ,,of ,,the ,,origin ,,of ,,the ,,obscurity ,,of ,,ideas ,,in ,,what ,,relates ,,to ,,causality4 #aaf4 ,it may be asked1 of what nature is this connection of the terms of the series2 how one communicates with another2 what it is which is communicated2 by virtue of what quality they are placed in relation4 ,all these questions arise from a confusion of ideas which has been the occasion of interminable disputes4 ,in order to avoid them we must remember the difference between intuitive and discursive knowledge1 and between determinate and indeterminate1 intuitive and not-intuitive ideas1 as explained in its proper place4#hb #hb ,see ,bk4 ,,iv41 ,chaps4 ,,xi41 ,,xiii41 ,,xiv41 ,,xv41 ,,xvi41 ,,xix41 ,,xx41 ,,xxi41 and ,,xxii4 #aag4 ,i there said#hc that the pure intellect may exercise its functions by indeterminate ideas1 or those representing general relations which are not applied to any real or possible object1 until a determination furnished by experience is added to them4#hd ,the idea of cause is indeterminate2#he and1 consequently1 taken in general1 it cannot be presented to us without the relation of being and not-being1 or of beings united among themselves by a certain necessity1 but in an absolute indeterminate manner4#hf ,therefore the idea of cause is not enough to determine the character of this activity and its means of communication2 this idea by itself can tell us nothing of the particular2 it can only teach us certain truths a priori2 the application of these truths to beings rests on experience4 #hc ,see ,bk4 ,,iv41 ,chap4 ,,xxi4 #hd ,ib41 #ace4 #he ,ib41 #acd4 #hf ,ib41 #acj4 #aah4 ,i said#hg that our intuition is confined to passive sensibility1 active sensibility1 intelligence1 and will2 whatever lies outside of this sphere we can know only by indeterminate conceptions1 and1 consequently1 it is impossible for us to expose to the intuition of another that which we feel to be wanting to our own4 ,we may develop this doctrine farther by applying it to the philosophical questions on causality4 #hg ,ib41 ,chap4 ,,xxii4 #aai4 ,there have been great disputes as to whether bodies exercise a true action on each other2 and those who hold the negative are always asking1 how one body can cause any thing in another8 what that is which is transmitted1 and what is the character of its active quality8 ,various replies have been made2 but ,i greatly doubt if it is possible to make any which is satisfactory1 without considering the doctrine which ,i have just explained1--what answer1 then1 can be made8 ,it is this3 we know nothing intuitively of bodies except passive sensibility1 which1 in the last result1 is only extension with its various modifications4#hh ,now these modifications are reduced to figure and motion2 whatever would make us depart from these two intuitions1 requiring an explanation with characteristic determinations1 would ask for that which is beyond the power of man4 ,the limits of our intuition on this point are confined to extension and motion1 and their relations to our sensibility2 we must1 therefore1 be contented with observing the phenomena of bodies1 and subjecting them to calculation within the circle of this intuition3 all beyond this is impossible4 ,we know that the body ,a moves with a certain velocity1 which we measure by the relation of space to time2 when it arrives at the place where it meets ,b1 ,b moves in a corresponding direction and with a corresponding velocity4 ,here there is a succession of phenomena in time and space2 the phenomena are subject to constant laws1 which are known by experience4 ,our intuitive cognitions go no farther2 when we attempt to go beyond this we find the general relations of being and not-being1 of being before and being after1 of condition and conditioned1 which present nothing determinate by which we can explain the true character of secondary causality4 #hh ,ib41 #aci4 #abj4 ,philosophy1 when treating of bodies1 is limited to what is strictly called physics2 when it attempts to rise to the region of metaphysics bodies disappear1 in so far as they are phenomena subject to sensible observation1 and there remains only the general and indeterminate ideas of them4 #aba4 ,as regards the sensitive faculty1 we are in some sort passive1 inasmuch as we receive the impressions which we call sensations4 ,whatever activity we possess in sensation does not depend on our free will1 supposing that we are subject to the conditions of sensibility4 ,if you put your hand in the fire it is impossible for you not to experience the sensation of heat4 ,in what regards the causality which we have as to the reproduction of past sensations or the production of new sensible sensations1 it is vain to ask us the manner in which we exercise this activity3 its exercise is a part of consciousness2 all we know about it is that it exists in such or such a manner in our consciousness4 #abb4 ,the same may be said of the elaboration of ideas4 ,none of the philosophers can explain the manner of this immanent production2 ideological investigations go no farther than the characterizing and classifying these phenomena and showing the order of their succession2 they can tell us nothing concerning the manner in which they are produced4 #abc4 ,the exercise of the will presents to our intuition1 or if you please1 to our consciousness1 another series of phenomena1 of the manner of the production of which we know nothing4 ,consciousness testifies that the free principle which exercises this activity is within us3 this is all that we know about it4 ,these phenomena are found at times connected with motions of our bodies1 which a constant experience presents as depending on our will1 but how things so different are connected1 we know not3 philosophy will never know4 ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,,causality ,,of ,,pure ,,force ,,of ,,the ,,will4 #abd4 ,in what does creation consist8 ,how can ,god produce things from nothing8 ,such a thing is incomprehensible4 ,this is the language of many who do not reflect that the same incomprehensibility is found in the exercise of secondary causality1 both in the corporeal and in the incorporeal world4 ,if we knew ,god in the intuitive manner in which1 according to the ,catholic dogma1 the blessed see him in the mansion of glory1 we might know intuitively the manner of the creation4 ,as it is1 we say that in so far as we can form any idea of the action of the ,creator1 he produces all things from nothing by the force of his will2 which besides according with the teachings of religion1 is in harmony with what we experience in ourselves4 ,god wills1 and the universe springs up out of nothing3 how can this be understood8 ,to him who asks this1 ,i say3 man wills1 and his arm rises2 he wills1 and his whole body is in motion4 ,how can this be understood8 ,here is a small1 weak1 and incomplete1 but true image of the ,creator3 an intelligent being which wills1 and a fact which appears4 ,where is the connection8 ,if you cannot explain it to us in so far as concerns finite beings1 how can you ask us to explain it with respect to the infinite being8 ,the incomprehensibility of the conception of the motion of the body with the force of the will does not authorize us to deny the connection2 therefore the incomprehensibility of the connection of a being which appears for the first time with the force of the infinite will cannot authorize us to deny the truth of the creation3 on the contrary1 the finding a similar thing in ourselves greatly strengthens the ontological arguments which demonstrate its necessity4 ,in the dogmas of the ,christian religion1 besides what they reveal that is supernatural1 we find at every step philosophical truths as profound as they are important4 #abe4 ,the causality which relates to purely possible effects can only be understood by placing it in an intelligence4 ,the cause which does not produce an effect1 but which may produce it1 involves a relation of the existent to the non-existent2 the cause exists1 the effect does not exist2 the cause does not produce it1 but may produce it2 what is the relation of that which exists to that which does not exist8 is not a relation without a term to which it relates1 a contradiction8 ,it is certainly1 if abstracted from the intelligence3 the intelligence alone can relate to that which does not exist2 for it can think the non-existent4 ,a body can have no relation to a body which does not exist2 but an intelligence may have a relation to that which does not exist1 even knowing that it does not exist2 we may ourselves wander at pleasure through the regions of pure possibility4 #abf4 ,the will also participates of this character of the intellect4 ,desire relates to an enjoyment which is not1 but which may be2 we will and will not1 we love and hate things that are often purely ideal1 and whose identity we know perfectly well1 still this does not prevent our willing them4 ,thus we desire things to happen which are not1 and we may even desire things which we know to be impossible4 ,we may wish to recover that which we know is lost forever2 we may wish for the presence of a friend whom we know to be at so great a distance as to render his coming impossible2 we may wish that time would stop or hurry on in conformity to our wants or our caprices4 #abg4 ,thus we find both the intellect and the will in relation to that which does not exist2--a relation which is not even conceivable in a being destitute of intellect4 ,this leads to an important result4 ,the absolute beginning of any thing is not possible unless we conceive causality as having its root in the intellect4 ,that which begins passes from not-being to being1 and how is it possible that a being has produced in another a transition from not-being to being1 if the relation to the other before it existed was intrinsically impossible8 ,an intelligent being may think another although the other does not exist2 but for an unintelligent being if the other does not exist in reality it does not exist at all2 consequently no relation to it is possible1 any such relation that may be imagined is contradictory1 and therefore it is absurd to suppose that which is not to begin to be4 #abh4 ,this reasoning proves that in the origin of things there is an intelligent being1 the cause of every thing1 and that without this intelligence nothing could have begun4 ,if something has begun1 something must have existed from all eternity2 and that which began was known by that which existed4 ,not admitting intelligence1 beginning is absurd4 ,imagine in the origin of things a being without intelligence1 its relations can only be to that which exists2 it can have no relation to the non-existent2 how then is it possible for the non-existent to begin to exist1 through the action of the existent8 ,in order that the non-existent may begin to be1 some reason is necessary2 for otherwise the beginning of one thing or of another1 and even its beginning or not-beginning would be indifferent4 ,unless we suppose a being which knows that which does not exist1 and may establish1 so to speak1 a communication with nothing1 the being which does not exist can never exist4 ,,chapter ,,xiii4 ,,activity4 #abi4 ,to understand more clearly the idea of causality1 it will be useful to reflect on the ideas of activity and action1 as also on those of inertness1 or inactivity1 and inaction4 #acj4 ,an absolutely inactive being is a being without intelligence1 without will1 without sensibility1 without any kind of consciousness1 containing in itself nothing which can change its own state or that of any thing else4 ,thus absolute inactivity or inertness requires the following conditions3 ,i4 ,the absolute denial of all principle1 of intelligence1 of will1 of sensibility1 and in general of every thing which is accompanied by consciousness4 ,,ii4 ,the absolute denial of all principle of change in itself4 ,,iii4 ,the absolute denial of all principle of change in others4 ,the union of these three conditions forms the idea of absolute inactivity or inertness3 the state of such a being is that of absolute inaction4 #aca4 ,a being of this nature1 regarded in general1 presents only the idea of an existing thing3 we may also consider it as a substance1 supposing it not to inhere as a modification in another1 or rather1 supposing it as a substratum capable of receiving modifications by the action of other beings upon it4 ,the only means by which we can characterize to a certain extent this general idea1 so that it may be presented to our intuition1 is to add to it the idea of extension1 by which we make in some manner the idea of inert matter4 #acb4 ,after the ideas of inertness and inaction are explained1 their opposites1 the ideas of activity and action1 are clearly understood4 ,when we conceive a being which has the reason of its changes within itself1 we conceive an active being4 ,when we conceive a being which has within itself the reason of the changes of other beings1 we conceive an active being4 ,when we conceive a being which knows1 wills1 perceives1 or has consciousness in any way1 we conceive an active being4 ,hence activity may represent three things to us3 the origin of its own changes2 the origin of the changes of others2 and consciousness4 #acc4 ,the first kind of activity can belong only to changeable beings2 the second also to immutable beings1 which are causes2 the third is an activity which belongs to mutable or immutable beings1 abstracting absolutely the idea of causality4 #acd4 ,the general relation of principle of its own or another's changes1 is an indeterminate idea2 consequently the only activity of which we can have an intuitive idea is that of intelligence1 of will1 and in general of whatever relates to the phenomena which require the perception called consciousness4 #ace4 ,we must consider consciousness as an activity1 and include in this order the idea of intelligence and will abstracted from all relation to their own or another's changes1 unless we mean to say that ,god was from all eternity an inactive being1 because he had no other action than the immanent acts of knowing and willing4 #acf4 ,therefore not all activity is transient1 but there is a true immanent activity1 of which we have an intuitive knowledge in the phenomena of our consciousness4 #acg4 ,the activity which we can conceive in bodies is reduced to a principle of their own changes or those of some other being2 it is therefore something of which we can have no intuitive knowledge4 ,in fact1 we are in relation with bodies only by means of the senses1 which present but two orders of facts with respect to corporeal nature2 subjective facts1 or the impressions which we experience and call sensations1 and which we believe to emanate from the action of bodies upon our organs2 and objective facts1 that is1 extension motion1 and the different modifications which the senses discover in extended things which move4 ,neither the first class of facts nor the second give us an intuitive idea of the activity of corporeal beings4 ,subjective facts or sensations are immanent1 that is1 are in us1 not in the things2 and inasmuch as subjective tell us nothing of what is outside of us1 but only what is within us4 ,even supposing sensations to be a true effect of the activity of bodies1 this activity is not presented in the effect4 ,when our hand is warmed by the fire we have the intuitive perception of the sensation of heat1 inasmuch as it is in us2 if we suppose that this sensation is really an effect of the activity of the fire1 we know the relation of our sensation to this activity considered in general1 and indeterminately as the origin of our sensation2 but we do not know the activity intuitively in itself1 because as such it is not represented in our sensation4 ,neither do objective facts1 that is1 extension1 motion1 and whatever we conceive which is not in our sensation1 but in the object itself1 give us any intuitive idea of the activity of corporeal things4 ,the modifications of extension1 or figures1 motion with all its accidents1 and in general all that presents the corporeal world to our senses1 are the changes themselves and their relations1 but not the principle of these relations or of these changes4 ,the body ,a1 which is in motion1 strikes upon the body ,b at rest2 ,b after the impact begins to move3 without considering whether the impact of ,a is the cause of the motion of ,b1 that which we are certain of is1 that we have no intuition of the activity producing the motion4 ,what do the senses tell us of the body ,a8 ,they only tell us that it has moved with a certain velocity towards the point ,m where the body ,b was situated4 ,what do they tell us of the body ,b8 ,only that it began to move the instant the body ,a reached the point ,m3 so far we have only the relations of space and time between the two extended objects ,a and ,b4 ,where is the intuition of the activity of ,a1 and of its action on ,b8 ,we see absolutely nothing of it4 ,by reasoning1 by analogy1 by considerations of order1 of agreement1 and such like1 we may prove with more or less evidence that in the body ,a there is an activity which causes the motion of the body ,b2 but this gives us only an indeterminate idea1 not an intuition of activity4 #ach4 ,these considerations are conclusive as applied to all the phenomena of corporeal nature4 ,take any one you please1 select that one which leads us most strongly to imagine a true activity2 analyze it well1 and you will find our intuition limited to relations of extension in space and in time4 ,that all bodies are heavy is a fact of experience2 do we know intuitively the principle from which the phenomena of weight proceed8 ,by no means4 ,let us examine it in the subjective order and in the objective4 ,what does weight as perceived by us present to us8 ,only that affection which we call heaviness1 that is1 the pressure on the members of the body4 ,what does it present objectively8 ,only the direction of bodies towards a centre with a certain velocity depending on circumstances4 ,we find in all this only a purely internal fact1 which is the unpleasant sensation of weight or heaviness1 or the pure relations of extended objects in space and time4 #aci4 ,the fire burns objects and reduces them to ashes2 nothing could be better suited to give us the idea of activity4 ,still we cannot say that we know it intuitively4 ,in the subjective order we have the painful sensation of burning1 which thus far is a purely internal fact2 in the objective order we have the disorganization of the bodies burnt1 which presents to the senses only a change in the size1 figure1 color1 and other qualities relative to our senses--all this may be the effect of the activity1 but it is not the activity itself4 #adj4 ,the light reflected from an object strikes our eyes1 painting on the retina the object which reflects it4 ,have we in this case an intuition of the activity of light4 ,not at all4 ,in the subjective order we find the sensation called seeing2 in the objective order1 we find the size1 figure1 and other qualities of the object in space4 ,if we consider the light itself1 we find a fluid whose rays have this or that direction in subjection to determinate laws1 but we have no intuitive knowledge of its activity2 and in order to persuade ourselves that the activity exists1 we reason from principles which are not within the sphere of our intuition4 #ada4 ,the four intuitions of passive sensibility1 active sensibility1 intelligence1 and will1 may be reduced to two3#hi extension and consciousness2 including in extension all its modifications1 and in consciousness all the internal phenomena of a sensitive or intellectual being2 in so far as they have the common ground of consciousness4 ,we therefore know intuitively two modes of being3 consciousness and extension2 consciousness is within us1 it is a subjective fact2 extension is external1 its existence is revealed by sensations1 particularly those of sight and touch4 #hi ,see ,book ,,iv41 ,ch4 ,,xxii4 #adb4 ,the classification of these two intuitions is important beyond measure for the distinction of the active from the inert4 ,in consciousness we find a type of true activity2 in extension1 as such1 we have a type of true inertness4 ,in thinking of consciousness1 we think of something active without adding any other idea2 when we think of extension1 it presents to us the image of a thing susceptible of various modifications1 the principle of none of which is contained in extension2 in order to think of a corporeal activity we have to go out of the pure idea of extension1 and consider a principle of change in general1 which is not the object of the intuition of the extended4 #adc4 ,thus the only activity which we know intuitively is that of consciousness2 for we have only indeterminate ideas of corporeal activity4 ,the words action1 reaction1 force1 resistance1 impulse1 express only indeterminate relations1 and represent something fixed and determinate1 only in their effects4 ,mechanists express forces by lines or numbers1 that is1 by results subject to calculation4 ,even ,newton1 in establishing his system of universal attraction1 declares his ignorance of the immediate cause of the phenomenon1 and confines himself to assigning the laws to which the motions of bodies are subjected4 #add4 ,activity in changeable beings represents a principle of their own and others' changes1 a sort of superabundance of being which constantly develops itself1 and1 in proportion as it is developed1 perfects itself4 ,we find an example of this development in our own mind4 ,the child at its birth receives in a confused manner the impressions of all that surrounds it4 ,by the repetition of these impressions its activity is developed2 that which was obscure becomes clear1 the confusion is put into order1 that which was feeble becomes strong1 thought arises1 comparison begins1 reflection is unfolded1 and the being which was torpid and almost inert becomes perhaps a genius which astonishes the world4 ,materials have come to it from without1 but of what use would they have been without that living fire of activity which transformed them and deduced from them new and valuable products8 ,the same phenomena of nature are presented to the eyes of brute animals as to ,kepler or ,newton2 but what for the first is only a sensible impression is for the latter a starting-point of sublime and wonderful theories4 #ade4 ,the active being possesses virtually the perfections which it is to acquire2 it may be compared to the acorn which contains the mighty oak1 whose development depends on circumstances of soil and climate4 ,on the other hand1 the inactive being can give itself nothing2 it has a state1 and it preserves it till some other changes it2 and it remains in this new state until another action from without takes it away and communicates another4 #adf4 ,activity is a principle of its own or another's changes2 this activity may operate in two ways3 with intelligence and without it4 ,when the being is intelligent its inclination to that which is known is called will4 ,the will is inclined to the object necessarily or not necessarily3 in the first case1 it is a necessary spontaneity2 in the second1 it is a free spontaneity4 ,liberty1 then1 does not consist solely in the absence of coaction2 it requires the absence of all1 even spontaneous1 necessity2 the will must be able to will or not will the object2 if this condition is wanting there is no freewill4 #adg4 ,it is worthy of remark that our intuition of the external relates only to the inactive1 to extension2 and that internal intuition relates principally to activity1 to consciousness4 ,by the first we know a substratum of changes1 since all change seems to take place in extension2 by the second we know no subject intuitively1 but only the changes themselves4 ,we prove the unity of their subject by reasoning1 but we do not see it intuitively4#ij ,extension1 as such1 is presented to us as simply passive3 consciousness1 as such1 is always active2 for1 even in those cases in which it is most passive1 as in sensations1 in so far as there is consciousness1 it implies activity2 for by it the subject gives itself an account1 explicitly or implicitly1 of the affection experienced4 #ij ,see ,bk4 ,,ix41 ,chs4 ,,vi41 ,,vii41 ,,ix41 and ,,xi4 ,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,,possibility ,,of ,,the ,,activity ,,of ,,bodies4 #adh4 ,having marked the limits of our intuitive knowledge with respect to causality and activity1 it is easy to answer the objections against secondary causality1 which arise from confounding intuitive and indeterminate ideas2 but we have still to examine whether there are true second causes1 that is1 whether there really is in finite beings a principle of their own and others' changes4 ,some philosophers1 among others the illustrious ,malebranche1 have denied the efficacy of second causes1 thus reducing them to mere occasions4 ,the author of the ,investigation de la ,vrit goes so far as to maintain that secondary causality not only does not exist1 but is impossible4 #adi4 ,the universe contains two classes of beings1--immaterial beings1 and corporeal beings3 each presents difficulties which it will be well to examine separately4 ,let us begin with matter4 ,it is said that matter is incapable of all activity1 that its essence is indifferent to every thing1 susceptible of any sort of modification4 ,i cannot discover on what this general proposition is founded1 nor do ,i see how it is possible to prove it either by reason or by experience4 #aej4 ,in order to maintain that matter is completely inactive1 or incapable of any activity1 it would be necessary to know its essence2 but this we do not know4 ,by what right do we deny the possibility of an attribute when we are ignorant of the nature of the object to which it should belong1 when we do not know even one of its properties to which this attribute is repugnant8 ,it is true that we deny to matter the possibility of thought1 and even of sensation2 but we can do so only because we know enough of matter1 to establish this impossibility4 ,in matter1 whatever may be its intrinsic essence1 there are parts1 consequently there is multiplicity2 and the facts of consciousness necessarily require a being which is one and simple4#ia #ia ,see ,bk4 ,,ix4 ,it is not the same with respect to activity2 for activity1 when it does not present the intuitive idea of consciousness1 gives us only the indeterminate conception of a principle of changes in itself or in other beings4 ,this does not contradict the idea of multiplicity4 ,suppose bodies in motion to have a true activity which really produces motion in others1 there is no contradiction in this activity being distributed among the different parts of the other body1 which at the moment of impact produce their respective effects1 causing motion in the parts of the other body with which they come in contact4 #aea4 ,consequently1 examining the question a priori1 or considering the idea of body1 we can find no reason for denying the possibility of its being active4 ,it is true that the extension of bodies1 inasmuch as extension1 is presented to us as something without life1 indifferent to all figures and to all motions1 and that we do not discover in it any principle of activity2#ib but this can prove nothing1 unless we suppose that the essence of bodies consists in extension1 and that extension contains nothing more than is presented to our senses1 that it includes nothing on which its activity can be founded4 ,the first is an opinion1 but one without any foundation2 the second can never be demonstrated1 because it escapes all observation1 and cannot be the object of investigations a priori4 #ib ,see ,ch4 ,,xiii4 #aeb4 ,how can it be proved that the essence of bodies consists in extension8#ic ,what we may say is1 that we experience it1 and that all corporeal nature is presented to us under the form of extended4 ,if we assert any thing more than this we do so without any foundation1 we substitute for the reality a play of our fancy4 ,the essence of any thing is that which constitutes it what it is1 that which serves as the internal ground or root of the properties3 who can say that we know this ground1 this root1 in corporeal objects8 ,our senses1 it is true1 perceive nothing not extended3 we cannot conceive to what bodies would be reduced if deprived of extension2 but from this we can only infer that extension is a form under which bodies are presented to our senses2 that this form is a necessary condition of the affection of our sensibility2 but not that the form is the essence of the thing1 not that there is in the object nothing more intimate in which the form itself has its root4 #ic ,see ,bk4 ,,iii4 #aec4 ,if the essence of bodies consisted in extension1 such as it appears to our senses1 extension being equal there would be equality of essence2 the essences of bodies might be measured like their dimensions2 two globes of equal diameters1 would be two essentially equal bodies4 ,experience1 and even common sense are opposed to this4 ,it may be said1 that pure dimension1 in so far as subject to measure1 is not enough to form equality of essence2 but that the equality of nature of the extension of both bodies is also requisite2 but what1 ,i ask1 is the meaning of the nature of extension8 ,if the word nature here means any thing1 it must mean something distinct from extension1 in so far as subject to our sensibility2 in which case ,i infer that just as in order to diversify the essences of bodies something is imagined which is not contained in extension in so far as subject to sensible intuition1 something may in the same manner be supposed which is capable of activity1 and which offers to our understanding an accessory idea giving life1 so to speak1 to the dead matter which we find in extension1 considered as the simple object of purely geometrical ideas4 #aed4 ,experience cannot demonstrate the impossibility of the activity of bodies4 ,absolute inactivity cannot affect us1 and therefore cannot be known by experience4 ,we can only experience action1 or the exercise of activity2 inaction1 or the state of an absolutely inactive thing1 cannot be the object of experience without a contradiction4 ,,chapter ,,xv4 ,,conjectures ,,as ,,to ,,the ,,existence ,,of ,,corporeal ,,activity4 #aee4 ,experience1 far from authorizing us to infer the absolute inertness of bodies1 on the contrary inclines us to believe that they are endowed with activity4 ,although the senses do not give us intuition of any corporeal activity1 they present a continuous series of changes in a fixed order in the phenomena of the corporeal world2 and if the true activity of some on others can be inferred from the coincidence of their relations in space and time1 from the constant succession in which we see some follow others1 and the invariable experience that the existence of some suffices for the existence of others2 then we must admit true activity in bodies4 ,whatever this argument may be worth at the tribunal of metaphysics1 it has always been sufficiently powerful to convince the majority of mankind1 and hence it is that the denial of the activity of bodies is contrary to common sense4 #aef4 ,if we consider our relations to the corporeal world1 we are equally led to believe that there is true activity in bodies4 ,whatever may be our ignorance of the manner in which sensations are produced within us1 it is certain that we experience them in the presence of bodies which are connected with us in space and time1 and in a fixed and constant order1 which authorizes us to prognosticate with safety what will follow in our senses if such or such bodies are placed in relation with our organs4 ,the idea of activity presents to us the idea of a principle of changes in other beings2 bodies are continually producing real or apparent changes in us4 ,the exercise of the sensitive faculties implies a communication with corporeal beings2 in this communication the sensitive being receives from bodies a multitude of impressions causing continual changes4 #aeg4 ,it is said that experience shows bodies to be indifferent to rest or motion1 and some works on physics at the very beginning lay it down as a thing beyond all doubt1 that a body placed at rest would remain in the same state for all eternity1 and if put in motion it would move for all eternity in a right line1 and always with the same velocity which it at first received4 ,i do not know how they could have learned this from experience2 and ,i maintain that not only they could not know it1 but experience seems to prove directly the contrary4 #aeh4 ,where was there ever a body that was indifferent to rest or motion8 ,in all terrestrial bodies we find a tendency to motion1 if no other1 at least that of gravitation towards the centre of the earth4 ,celestial bodies1 so far as our observation extends1 are all in motion2 calculation agrees with experience in showing them to be subject to universal attraction3 where1 then1 is the indifference to rest or motion1 revealed by experience8 ,we should rather say that experience reveals a general inclination of bodies to be in motion4 #aei4 ,it would be objected that this inclination does not flow from any activity in the bodies1 but that it is a simple effect of a law imposed by the ,creator4 ,let it be so3 but at least do not tell us that experience presents bodies as indifferent to motion or rest2 explain motion1 if you will1 without activity1 maintain that there is no activity1 despite the appearances of experience2 but do not tell us that these appearances show the absence of activity4 #afj4 ,if ,i place a body on my table1 it remains at rest1 ,i find it there the next day1 and if ,i return after many years ,i still find it there4 ,but this body is not indifferent to motion or rest2 here it is at rest1 but it is continually exercising its activity1 as is evident from its pressure on the table which supports it4 ,this exercise is incessant1 it is experienced at every moment2 try to raise it and it offers resistance1 take away the table and it falls1 place your hand under it and it will press upon your hand1 and it changes the form of soft bodies on which it rests4 #afa4 ,to say that the attraction of the centre of the earth acts upon the body1 proves nothing against corporeal activity but rather confirms it2 for this centre is another body1 and thus you take activity from one body to give it to another4 ,moreover1 all observations show that attraction is mutual1 and therefore attractive activity is a property of all bodies4 #afb4 ,the corporeal world1 far from appearing to us as an inert mass1 presents the appearance of an activity developing its colossal forces4 ,the mass of bodies which move in space is colossal2 the orbit which they describe is colossal2 their velocity is colossal2 the influence1 at least apparent1 which they exercise upon each other1 is colossal2 the distance at which they communicate is colossal4 ,where is the want of activity revealed by experience8 ,rays of light inundate space1 producing in sensitive beings the wonderful phenomena of sight3 rays of heat extend in all directions1 and motion and life spring up on all sides2 where is the want of activity revealed by experience8 ,do not the vegetation which covers our globe1 the phenomena of life which we experience within us1 and in the animals around us1 require a continual motion of matter1 an ebb and flow1 so to speak1 of action and reaction of bodies on each other1 in reality or in appearance8 ,do not the phenomena of electricity1 of magnetism1 of galvanism1 appear to be principles of great activity1 the origin of motion wherever they exist1 rather than objects indifferent to motion or rest8 ,the ideas of activity1 of force1 of impulse1 are not alone suggested to us by our internal activity1 but also by the experience of the corporeal world1 which displays before our eyes1 and in obedience to constant laws1 a continual variety of magnificent scenes1 whose origin seems to indicate a fund of activity surpassing all calculations4 #afc4 ,with how little reason then do you appeal to experience to combat the existence of causality in bodies1 and how much more in accordance with experience are those philosophers who give a true activity to bodies1 is apparent from what ,i have said4 ,in assigning the limits of our intuition in relation to causality and activity in themselves1#id ,i said enough to show that ,i do not judge it possible to demonstrate metaphysically the existence of activity in the corporeal world2 yet ,i cannot but insist that if the constant relation of phenomena in space and time1 and the invariable succession of some things after others1 prove any thing in favor of causality1 we must admit the opinion which holds that there is true activity in bodies2 that in a secondary order the reason of the changes of some is contained in others2 and that consequently there is in the corporeal world a chain of second causes which reaches back to the first cause1 the origin and the reason of all that is4 #id ,see ,chs4 ,,xi4 and ,,xiii4 ,,chapter ,,xvi4 ,,internal ,,causality4 #afd4 ,consciousness reveals the existence of a faculty within us which produces certain internal phenomena4 ,if we concentrate our attention by means of a free act of our will1 we experience the production of images and ideas4 ,the works of the imagination are an irrefutable proof of our internal activity4 ,sensations furnish the materials2 but the fancy builds edifices with them4 ,who1 if not ourselves1 gave them their new form8 ,we must confess that if we are absolutely without activity1 nature completely deludes us1 making us believe that we are active4 ,our recollections offer another proof of true activity4 ,we propose to think of a country which we have visited1 and wish to recollect its details2 at the command of the will the imagination is aroused and displays to our intuition the scenes which we once saw4 ,but these images already existed1 it will be said1 and it was only necessary to awaken them2 but it cannot be said that they existed in act1 for we had no actual consciousness of them2 and the command of our will was necessary and sufficient in order to force them to reappear4 ,this new presence adds something to our habitual state1 and is produced within us by the mere act of the will4 ,it is true that we do not know the manner of this production2 but it is certain that consciousness assures us that it immediately follows an act of our will2 and we have1 to say the least1 a strong proof that there is in us a force which produces the transition of these images from their habitual to an actual state4 ,the same may be said of all recollections2 and if we often find that we cannot recollect all that we wish to1 this only proves that our active faculties are limited by certain conditions from which they cannot free themselves4 #afe4 ,without considering recollections1 every one knows how ideas are elaborated in meditation4 ,our ideas are not the same when we begin to reflect on any subject1 as after we have meditated for a long time on it4 ,sometimes without the assistance obtained by reading any new work or hearing any new observation1 by the mere force of our own reflection we have made clear and distinct what was before only a confused idea4 ,to say that the new ideas are the result of others which already existed in our mind only proves that our understanding has a true activity2 for this result1 whatever its origin1 is something new1 it produces a new state in the soul1 since it now knows perfectly what before it either knew not at all1 or only in a confused manner4 ,the relations of the sub-secant to the secant1 and of the sub-tangent to the tangent1 are geometrical ideas within the reach of the most ordinary intellects3 so also are the similarity of the triangles which are imagined for the purpose of comparing lines with each other1 and the successive approximation of the sub-secant to the sub-tangent1 and of the secant to the tangent2 but to reduce those elements to the point where the wonderful theory of infinitesimal calculus shines forth with the strongest light1 an immense distance has to be passed over4 ,shall we say that those geniuses who first crossed over this distance thought nothing new1 because they already had the elements from the combination of which this theory results8 #aff4 ,if this productive activity is clearly seen in any phenomena1 it is certainly in the acts of freewill4 ,what becomes of freedom1 if the soul does not produce its volitions8 ,freedom means nothing1 if they are only phenomena produced by another being1 in which the soul has no other part than that it is the subject in which they are produced4 ,it is a contradiction to say that the soul is free1 and at the same time deny that it is the principle of its determinations4 #afg4 ,mere intelligence1 even mere sensibility1 and in general1 every phenomenon implying consciousness1 seems to be the exercise of an activity2 and in this sense ,i have shown#ie that we have intuition of an internal activity4 ,if to know1 to will1 to have consciousness of a sensation1 are not actions1 ,i know not where the type of a true action can be found4 ,to perceive a thing1 to will it1 the imperative act of the will which makes me seek the means of obtaining it1 are undoubtedly actions2 and action is the exercise of activity4 ,the idea of life represents activity in its most perfect degree2 and among the phenomena of life1 the most perfect are those which imply consciousness2 if we do not call these actions1 we must say that we have no idea of action or of activity4 #ie ,see,ch4 ,,xii4 ,although we do not know the manner of the production1 we are conscious of it1 we have intuition of the action in itself4 ,when we see a bodily motion we behold a passive modification2 but when we experience within ourselves the phenomena of consciousness1 we behold an action1 and consequently have an intuition of our activity4 #afh4 ,here an objection arises4 ,if internal phenomena are truly actions1 why are they so often independent of our will8 ,we suffer despite ourselves2 ideas come upon us which we would fain cast off2 thoughts arise so quickly and spontaneously as to seem rather inspirations than the fruit of labor4 ,where in such cases is the activity8 ,are we not forced to say that these phenomena are wholly passive8 #afi4 ,this objection1 apparently so conclusive1 proves nothing against internal activity4 ,in the first place1 we might answer that the soul being passive in some cases1 does not prove that it is so in all2 and that in order to affirm the existence of internal activity1 we require only certain phenomena to be produced by it4 ,but it is not even necessary to admit that activity is not found in the cases proposed by the objection2 for1 if we carefully examine them1 we shall find that even there the soul exercises a true activity4 ,the force of the objection rests on the appearance within us of certain phenomena without the concurrence of our will1 and at times in spite of it2 but this only leads us to infer that there are other functions in the soul independent of freewill without obliging us to believe that these functions are not active4 ,with this observation the difficulty at once disappears4 ,there are within us certain phenomena which we neither willed before nor after they appeared2 so far ,i concede4 ,therefore there are within us phenomena in which the soul is purely passive2 this ,i deny4 ,the consequence is illegitimate2 all that could logically be deduced is1 that certain phenomena appear and are continued in the soul without the concurrence of our will4 ,the same thing happens with the body3 there are functions which it exercises independently of our freewill1 such as the circulation of the blood1 respiration1 digestion1 assimilation of food1 transpiration1 and others2 but there are others which are only performed at the command of the will1 as eating1 walking1 and in general whatever relates to the motion and position of the members4 ,why may not a similar thing happen in the soul8 ,why may not the soul have active faculties which are developed1 and produce various phenomena1 without the concurrence of the will8 ,i do not believe any reply to this solution possible4 ,still ,i propose to strengthen it by some remarks on the character of the phenomena in which it is pretended that the soul is purely passive4 #agj4 ,the objection speaks of painful sensations1 in which apparently the soul has no activity4 ,who will say that a man to whom ,i apply a burning iron1 and who suffers horrid pain1 exercises in this the activity of his soul8 ,is it not more reasonable to say that the soul is here purely passive1 and in a state very like that of the body when pressed down by the weight of another body8 ,if any activity is exercised in such a case it is rather that of reaction against a painful sensation4 ,reflect well upon these observations1 and you will find that they contain no difficulty whose solution cannot be found in the preceding paragraph4 ,i admit that the painful sensation does not depend on the freewill of the sufferer1 and that his free action is opposed to this sensation2 but despite all this1 the soul may have a true activity in the mere fact of perceiving3 it only shows that the exercise of this activity is subject to necessary conditions which when they exist are more powerful for its development than is our will to prevent it4 ,nothing is more certain than the development of certain active faculties independently of our freewill4 ,what more active than violent passions8 ,and yet it is often impossible for us not to feel them2 and it requires all the command of our freewill to restrain them within the bounds of reason4 #aga4 ,sensation in itself cannot be all passive2 and those who maintain that it is1 show that they have meditated but little on the facts of consciousness4 ,these facts are essentially individual1 and inasmuch as they are facts of consciousness1 absolutely incommunicable4 ,another may feel a pain very like1 and even equal to1 that which ,i suffer2 but he cannot experience the same numerically considered2 for my pain is so essentially mine1 that if it is not mine it does not exist4 ,therefore pain cannot be communicated as an individual entity to me1 and all that can be done to produce it in me1 is to excite my sensitive power so as to experience it4 ,this observation shows that sensations cannot be merely passive facts4 ,a passive modification is all received2 the subject suffering does nothing4 ,from the moment that the subject has in itself some principle of its modification1 it is not purely passive4 ,sensation cannot be all received2 it must be born in the subject under some influence or other1 on this or that occasion2 but the being which experiences it must contain a principle of its own experience2 otherwise it would be a lifeless being1 and could not perceive4 #agb4 ,the objection speaks of painful sensations as though their necessity were an exception from the general rule2 whereas all sensations1 pleasant or unpleasant1 are equally necessary1 provided the sensitive faculties are placed in the conditions necessary for their exercise4 ,there is the same necessity in the pain which ,i feel if a burning coal is placed in my hand1 as in the sight of a beautiful painting placed before my eyes4 #agc4 ,the spontaneousness of internal phenomena1 in the pure intellectual order1 or in that of imagination or sentiment1 confirms the existence of an activity independent of our freewill1 and by no means indicates that these phenomena are purely passive4 ,there is an important circumstance to be observed here4 ,the exercise of the functions of the soul is connected with the phenomena of the organization4 ,experience teaches that the soul perceives with more or less activity1 according to the disposition of the body2 and it is a fact known from all antiquity that certain liquors have an inspiring power4 ,the state of the digestion causes heavy dreams and torments the fancy with horrible forms2 fever raises or depresses the imagination2 sometimes it increases the strength of the understanding1 and sometimes it produces a stupor in which intelligence is extinguished4 ,these phenomena offer a greater field to observation when they reach a very high degree1 as happens when the organic functions are greatly disturbed2 but this shows that there is an immense scale passed over before arriving at the extremity2 so that some phenomena1 whose spontaneous appearance seems inexplicable1 perhaps depend on certain unknown conditions to which our organization is subject4 ,whatever opinion be adopted as to the equality or inequality of human souls1 no one has any doubt but that the differences of organization may have an influence on the talent or character1 and that certain minds of extraordinary faculties owe a part of their endowments to a privileged organization4 ,hence it may be inferred that what is called the spontaneity of the soul1 and which has attracted so much attention from some modern philosophers1 is a phenomenon very generally known1 and one which neither destroys internal activity nor tells us any thing new as to its character4 ,it is certain that there are certain phenomena in our soul which are independent of our freewill2 but there is no doubt that their presence is sometimes sudden and unexpected1 because the conditions of our organization with which they are connected are unknown4 ,but this is only extending to a greater number of cases what we have frequently remarked in psychological facts1 the effects of disease1 and what we constantly experience in sensations4 ,what is a sensation but a sudden appearance of a phenomenon in our soul1 produced by a change in the state of the organs8 #agd4 ,i do not mean by this to say that all spontaneous thoughts1 and in general all phenomena which suddenly appear within us without any known preparation1 arise from affections of the organization2 ,i only wished to recall a physiological and psychological fact1 the neglect of which might produce useless and even dangerous speculations4 ,in reading the works of some modern philosophers who treat this point1 it seems as though their object were to prepare the way for maintaining that the individual reason is only a phenomenon of the universal and absolute reason2 and that inspirations1 and in general all spontaneous phenomena independent of freewill1 are only indications of the absolute reason appearing to itself in the human reason2 that what we call our me is a modification of the absolute being2 and the personality of our being is only a phasis of the absolute and impersonal reason4 #age4 ,what is called spontaneity1 the intuition of former times1 to the eyes of reason and of criticism can only be the primitive teaching which the human race received from ,god3 whatever some modern philosophers say to the contrary is only a partly disguised repetition of the sophisms of the incredulous of every epoch1 presented in a deceitful dress by men who abuse the talents which they possess4 ,read with reflection the writings to which we allude1 strip them of some high-sounding and enigmatical terms1 and you will find in them nothing more than what ,lucretius and ,voltaire had already said after their own fashion4 ,,chapter ,,xvii4 ,,remarks ,,on ,,spontaneity4 #agf4 ,there is nothing easier than to write a few brilliant pages on the phenomenon of spontaneity2 some philosophers of our day discourse of the genius of the poets1 of the artists1 and of the captains of all ages1 the fabulous and the heroic times1 mysticism and religion1 in books which are neither philosophy1 nor history1 nor poetry1 but which can only be regarded as a flood of agreeable and harmonious words with which writers of sparkling fancy and inexhaustible eloquence deluge the overpowered intellect of the ingenuous reader4 ,and after all1 what is this spontaneity1 this inspiration of which they tell us so much8 ,let us fix our ideas by establishing and classifying facts4 #agg4 ,reason properly so called is not developed in the human mind when completely isolated from other minds2 the sight of nature is not sufficient to arouse it4 ,the stupidness of children found in the woods and the scanty intelligence of deaf-mutes are undeniable evidence of this truth4 #agh4 ,the human mind1 when placed in communication with other minds1 experiences a development in part direct and spontaneous1 in part reflex and elaborate4 ,this is another fact which we all perceive within ourselves4 ,minds are developed with greater spontaneousness in proportion as their qualities are more advanced4 #agi4 ,of the thoughts which occur to us suddenly and which seem to us purely spontaneous1 not a few are reminiscences1 more or less faithful1 of what we have before read1 heard1 or thought2 and consequently they proceed from a preparatory fact1 which we do not remember4 ,this explains how labor perfects the inventive faculty4 #ahj4 ,as the organization of our body exercises a powerful influence in the development of the soul's faculties1 we may say that the spontaneity of some internal phenomena is connected with certain changes of our organization4 #aha4 ,there is no philosophical difficulty in admitting an immediate communication of our mind with another mind of a higher order2 and consequently there is none in admitting that some internal spontaneous phenomena arise from the direct influence of this higher mind upon ours4 #ahb4 ,the human race did not originally have a spontaneous development independent of the action of the ,creator2 philosophy shows us the necessity of a primitive teaching1 without which the human race would have remained in a state of brute-like stupidity4 ,this last remark requires a further explanation4 #ahc4 ,religion reveals a primitive instruction and education of the human race given by ,god himself to the person of the first man2 this is in perfect conformity with what both reason and experience assert4 ,our mind possesses innumerable germs1 but their growth requires an external cause4 ,what would a man be who had been alone from his infancy8 ,little more than a brute3 the precious stone would be covered with coarse earth which would prevent its glistening4 ,language does not and cannot produce ideas2 this is certain3 the reason of ideas is not in language1 but the reason of language is in ideas4 ,words are signs2 and that which is not conceived can have no sign4 ,but this sign1 this instrument is of a wonderful use2 words are to the understanding what wheels are to the power of a machine2 the power imparts motion1 but the machine would not go without wheels4 ,the understanding might have some motion without language1 but very slow1 very imperfect1 very heavy4 #ahd4 ,the ,bible represents man as speaking as soon as created2 language was therefore taught him by ,god4 ,this is another wonderful fact which reason fully confirms4 ,man could not invent language4 ,this invention surpasses all that can be imagined1 and would you attribute it to beings so stupid as men without language8 ,better to say that a ,hottentot could suddenly invent infinitesimal calculus4 #ahe4 ,the most ignorant man who knows a language possesses an incredible treasure of ideas4 ,in the simplest conversation we may find many physical1 metaphysical1 and moral ideas4 ,take the following sentence1 which is within the comprehension of the lowest mind3 ,i did not wish to pursue the beast farther for fear that1 becoming irritated1 he might do harm4 ,here are the ideas of time1 act of the will1 action1 continuity1 space1 causality1 analogy1 end1 and morality4 ,time past3--,i did not2 ,act of the will3--wish2 ,action3--to pursue2 ,continuity and space3--farther2 ,analogy3--becoming irritated2 since from irritation in other instances1 it is inferred in the present2 and it is also known from what happens to ourselves if molested4 ,motive and end3--for fear1 that irritated1 etc42 ,causality3--he might do harm2 ,morality3--not to harm others4 #ahf4 ,science is discovering the affinity of languages1 finding them united in great centres4 ,the dialects of savages are not elements1 but fragments2 they are not the lisping speech of infancy1 but the torpid and extravagant jargon of degradation and ebriety4 #ahg4 ,language cannot produce in the mind the idea of a sensation which it has not3 all the words in the world could not give one born blind the idea of color4 ,still less could pure ideas1 distinct from all sensation1 result from language2 and this is a strong argument in favor of innate ideas4 #ahh4 ,the ideas of unity1 number1 time1 and causality express things which are not sensible2 therefore they cannot be produced in us by any sensible representation expressed in language4 ,yet these ideas exist in us as germs susceptible of a great development1 first by sensible experience1 and then by reflection4 ,the child who burns his hand in the fire begins to perceive the relation of causality1 which he afterwards generalizes and purifies4 ,the great ideas of ,leibnitz on causality were the ideas of ,leibnitz the child4 ,the difference was in the development4 ,thus the organization of the giant oak is contained within the shell of the acorn4 ,some have said that man's understanding is like a blank tablet on which nothing is yet written2 others that it was a book which he had only to open in order to read2 ,i believe it may be compared to a letter written in invisible ink1 which looks white until rubbed with a mysterious liquid which brings out the black characters4 ,the magic liquid is instruction and education4 #ahi4 ,show me a single nation which of itself has emerged from a savage or a barbarous state4 ,all known civilizations are subordinated one to another in an uninterrupted chain4 ,european civilization owes much to ,christianity1 and something to the ,roman2 the ,roman to the ,greek2 the ,greek to the ,egyptian2 the ,egyptian to the ,oriental2 and over the ,oriental civilization hangs a veil which can be lifted only by the first chapters of ,genesis4 #aij4 ,in order to know the human mind it is necessary to study the history of humanity2 whoever isolates objects too much runs in danger of mutilating them2 hence so many ideological frivolities which have passed for profound investigations1 although they were as far from true metaphysics as the art of arranging a museum symmetrically is from the science of the naturalist4 #aia4 ,if innate ideas be defended1 it is impossible to deny to our understanding a power to form new ideas accordingly as objects1 especially language1 excite it2 otherwise it would be necessary to say that we do not learn any thing1 and cannot learn any thing2 that we have every thing beforehand in our mind1 as if written in a book4 ,our understanding seems to resemble a case containing all kinds of types2 but1 in order that they may mean any thing1 the hand of the compositor is necessary4 ,this image of printer's types reminds me of an important ideological fact3 ,i mean the scanty number of ideas which are in our mind1 and the great variety of combinations of which they are susceptible4 ,all that is in the intellectual order1 or is contained in the categories1 whether we adopt those of ,kant or those of ,aristotle1 or any others1 may be reduced to a very few4 ,each of those ideas which we call generative is like a ray of light which1 passing successively through innumerable prisms and refracted on a number of spectra1 presents an infinite variety of colors1 shades1 and figures4 ,as our thought is almost entirely reduced to combination1 and as this combination may be made in various ways1 there is a wonderful agreement in the fundamental combinations which all minds have4 ,in the secondary points there is divergence1 but not in the principal4 ,this proves that the human mind1 in its existence and in its development1 depends on an infinite intelligence1 which is the cause and master of all minds4 #aib4 ,reject these doctrines so accordant with philosophy and with history1 and spontaneity1 whether of the individual or the race1 either means nothing1 or it expresses the vague and absurd theories of ideal pantheism4 ,,chapter ,,xviii4 ,,final ,,causality2--,,morality4 #aic4 ,those beings which act by intelligence must have1 besides their efficient activity1 a moral principle of their determinations4 ,in order to will1 the faculty of willing is not alone sufficient2 it is necessary to know that which is willed1 for nothing is willed without being known4 ,hence arises final causality1 which is essentially distinct from efficient causality1 and can exist only in beings endowed with intelligence4 #aid4 ,recalling what was said in the tenth chapter of this book1 we may observe that final causes form a series distinct from that of efficient causes2 what in the latter is physical action1 is in the former1 moral influence4 ,in a painting1 the series of efficient causes is the pencil1 the hand1 the muscles1 the animal spirits1 and the command of the will4 ,this series1 which is necessary for the execution of the painting1 may be combined with different series of final causes4 ,the artist may purpose by the brilliancy of his genius to acquire renown1 and by renown to enjoy the happiness of a great name4 ,another series may be1 to please a person for whom he is working2 and this in order that the person may pay him a sum of money2 and the money in order to gratify the artist's wants or pleasures4 ,a third series may be1 in order to seek in painting a distraction from a grief2 and this in order to preserve his health4 ,it is evident that many series of a purely moral or intellectual influence may be imagined1 and which concur in the production of the effect only1 in so far as combined with the series of efficient causes1 they influence the artist's determination4 #aie4 ,this moral influence may be exerted in two ways3 either necessarily bending the will1 or leaving it free to will or not will2 in the first case1 there is a voluntary1 but necessary spontaneousness2 in the second1 there is a free spontaneousness4 ,every free act is voluntary1 but not every voluntary act is free4 ,god freely wills the conservation of creatures2 but he necessarily wills virtue1 and cannot will iniquity4 #aif4 ,regarding only efficient causality1 we have only the relations of cause and effect2 but considering final causality1 a new order of ideas and facts is presented1 which is morality4 ,let us first of all establish the existence of the fact4 #aig4 ,good and evil1 moral1 immoral1 just1 unjust1 right1 duty1 obligation1 command1 prohibition1 lawful1 unlawful1 virtue1 and vice1 are words which we all use continually1 and apply to the whole course of life1 to all the relations of man with ,god1 with himself1 and with his fellow-men1 without any doubt as to their true meaning1 and perfectly understanding each other1 just as when we speak of color1 light1 or other sensible objects4 ,when the term lawful or unlawful is applied to an act1 who ever asks what it means8 ,when this man is called virtuous1 that vicious1 who does not know the meaning of these expressions8 ,is there any one who finds a difficulty in understanding the expressions which follow3 he has a right to perform this act2 he is obliged to comply with that circumstance2 this is his duty2 he has neglected his duty2 this is commanded2 that is prohibited2 this is right2 that is wrong3 this is a heroic virtue2 that is a crime8 ,no ideas are more common1 more ordinarily used1 by the ignorant as by the learned2 by barbarous as by civilized nations2 in the youth of societies as in their infancy1 and in their old age2 in the midst of pure customs1 as of the most revolting corruption2 they express something primitive1 innate in the human mind and indispensable to its existence1 something which it cannot throw off while it retains the exercise of its faculties4 ,there may be more or less error and extravagance in the application of these ideas to certain particular cases3 but the generative ideas of good and evil1 just and unjust1 lawful and unlawful1 are the same at all times1 and in all countries2 they form1 as it were1 an atmosphere in which the human mind lives and breathes4 #aih4 ,it is remarkable that even those who deny the distinction between good and evil1 are forced to admit it in practice4 ,a philosopher1 with his pen in his hand1 laughs at what he calls the prejudices of the human race concerning the difference between good and evil2 but say to him3 ,it seems to me1 ,sir ,philosopher1 that you are a detestable wretch1 to spend your time in destroying that which is most holy on earth2 and you will see how soon he will forget his philosophy and all that he has said of the empty meaning of the words virtue and vice1 become indignant at being thus addressed1 warmly defend himself1 and attempt to prove to you that he is the most virtuous man in the world1 giving repeated arguments of honesty1 sincerity1 and honor4 ,it matters little that in his lofty theories1 honor1 sincerity1 and honesty1 are unmeaning words1 since they can have no sense unless the word order is admitted2 the philosopher is not staggered by an inconsequence1 or rather1 he takes no notice of it2 moral ideas and sentiments are awakened in his mind as soon as he hears himself called immoral1 he ceases to be a sophist1 and becomes a man again4 #aii4 ,can the idea of this moral order be a prejudice1 which1 without any thing in reality corresponding to it1 or any foundation in human nature1 owes its origin to education1 so that it would have been possible for men to have lived without moral ideas1 or with others directly contrary to those which we now have8 ,if it is a prejudice1 how comes it that it is general to all times and countries8 ,who communicated it to the human race8 who was strong and powerful enough to make all men adopt it8 ,how did it happen that the passions1 when in possession of their liberty1 renounced it1 and suffered a bridle to be put on them8 ,who was that extraordinary man who subdued all times and all countries1 the most brutal customs1 the most violent passions1 the most obtuse understandings1 and diffused the idea of a moral order over the whole face of the earth1 notwithstanding the diversity of climates1 languages1 customs1 and necessities1 and the differences in the social condition of nations1 and gave to this idea of the moral order such force and consistency that it has been preserved through the most complete revolutions1 amid the ruins of empires1 and the fluctuations and transmigrations of civilization1 remaining firm as a rock1 unmoved by the furious waves of the river of ages8 ,here is not the hand of man2 a phenomenon of this sort does not spring from human combinations2 it is founded on nature1 and it is indestructible because it is natural2 thus1 and thus only1 is it possible to explain its universality and permanence4 #bjj4 ,to deny all difference between good and evil is to place one's self in open contradiction with the ideas the most deeply rooted in the human mind1 with all its most profound and most powerful sentiments2 all the sophisms of the world could not persuade any one1 not even the sophist himself1 that there is no difference between consoling one who is afflicted1 and adding to his afflictions2 between assisting the unfortunate1 and increasing their misfortunes2 between being grateful for a favor1 and doing evil to the benefactor2 between fulfilling a promise1 and breaking it2 between giving alms1 and taking what belongs to another2 between being faithful to a friend1 and betraying him2 between dying for one's country1 and selling it to the enemy2 between respecting the laws of modesty1 and violating them without shame2 between sobriety and drunkenness2 between temperance and moderation in all the acts of life1 and the disorder of unbridled passions4 ,no argument1 nor genius1 nor cavil can destroy the dividing line4 ,the sophist discusses1 imagines1 feigns1 subtilizes1 but in vain2 nature is there2 she says to senseless man3 ,so far mayst thou go1 but here shall thy pride be broken4 #bja4 ,if there is no intrinsic difference between good and evil1 and all that is said of the morality and immorality of actions is a collection of words which have no meaning1 or only such as they have received from human convention2 how is it that whilst the just man sleeps securely in his bed1 the evil-doer is tossed about with a heart struggling with remorse8 ,whence come those sentiments of love and respect inspired by what we call virtue1 and the aversion created by what is called vice8 ,do not the love of children1 the veneration of parents1 fidelity to friends1 compassion for suffering1 gratitude towards benefactors1 the horror which all men have for a cruel father1 a parricide son1 an unfaithful wife1 a dishonest friend1 a traitor to his country1 a hand red with the blood of its victim1 oppression of the weak1 desertion of the orphan1 do not all these sentiments show clearer than the light of day the hand of the ,almighty engraving in our souls the ideas of the moral order1 and strengthening us with sentiments which instinctively show us1 even when we have not time to reflect1 the path which we should follow8 #bjb4 ,i do not deny that serious difficulties are encountered in examining the grounds of morality2 ,i admit that the analysis of the knowledge of good and evil is one of the most hidden points of philosophy2 but these difficulties prove nothing against the difference we have established4 ,no one denies the existence of a building because he cannot see how deep its foundations go3 its depth is a proof of its solidity1 a guaranty of its duration4 ,the difference between good and evil demonstrated a priori by the interior sentiments of the heart1 is strengthened with further evidence if we regard the consequences of its existence or non-existence4 ,let us admit the moral order1 and suppose all men to regulate their conduct conformably to this prejudice4 ,what will be the result8 ,the world becomes a paradise2 men live like brothers1 using with moderation the gifts of nature1 dividing with each other their happiness1 and aiding one another to bear misfortune2 the most lovely harmony reigns in the individual1 the family1 and society2 if the moral order is a prejudice1 let us confess that never did prejudice have more grand1 beneficial1 and delightful consequences2 if virtue is a lie1 never was there one more useful1 fairer1 or more sublime4 #bjc4 ,but let us make the counterproof4 ,let us suppose this prejudice to disappear1 and all men to be convinced that the moral order is a vain illusion which they must banish from their understanding1 their will1 and their acts2 what will be the result this time8 ,the moral order destroyed1 the physical alone remains2 every one thinks and acts according to his views1 passions1 or caprices2 man has no other guide than the blind instinct of nature or the cold speculations of egotism2 the individual becomes a monster1 all the ties of family are broken asunder2 and society1 sunk in a frightful chaos1 rapidly advances to complete destruction4 ,these are the necessary consequences of the rejection of the prejudice4 ,language would be horridly mutilated if the ideas of the moral order should disappear2 good and bad conduct would be words without meaning2 praise and blame would have no object2 even vanity would lose a great part of its food2 flattery would be forced to confine itself to natural qualities1 considered in the purely physical order2 to pronounce the word merit1 would be forbidden under pain of falling into absurdity4 #bjd4 ,see1 then1 if any objection could be sufficient to make such consequences admissible4 ,whoever1 frightened at the difficulties accompanying the examination of the first principles of morality1 should undertake to deny morality1 would be as foolish as the husbandman who1 seeing the stream which waters his fields1 should insist on denying the existence of its waters because inaccessible crags prevent his approach to their source4 ,,chapter ,,xix4 ,,various ,,explanations ,,of ,,morality4 #bje4 ,there have been many disputes concerning the origin and character of the morality of actions2 the same happening here as elsewhere1 that the understanding becomes perplexed and confused whenever it attempts to penetrate into the first principles of things4 ,as ,i am not going to write a treatise on morals1 but only to analyze the foundations of this science1 ,i shall confine myself to giving the character1 as far as possible1 of the primitive ideas and sentiments of the moral order1 without descending to their application4 ,in this ,i shall proceed1 as usual1 on the analytic method1 decomposing the fact established in the preceding chapter1 glancing at the various explanations which have been given of it1 showing the insufficiency and inexactness of some of them1 before coming to the only one which appears to me true and complete4 #bjf4 ,what is good8 what is evil8 why are things good or evil8 in what does goodness or evil consist8 what is their origin8 ,we are told that good is that which is conformed to reason1 that which is in harmony with the eternal laws1 that which is pleasing to ,god1 and that evil is that which is opposed to reason1 that which contradicts the eternal law1 that which displeases ,god4 ,this is true1 but does it completely solve the question on a scientific ground8 ,the moral worth of the dictate of reason depends on its conformity to the eternal law2 when1 therefore1 to found the moral order1 you call in the former1 you also appeal to the latter2 they are not therefore two solutions of the question1 but only one4 ,acts cannot please or displease ,god1 except as conformed to the eternal law2 therefore1 to judge of the goodness or evil of acts by their relation to the pleasure or displeasure of ,god1 is to judge of them by their conformity to the eternal law4 ,from this it may be inferred that1 although an act conformed to reason1 one agreeing with the eternal law1 and one displeasing to ,god1 express different aspects of an idea1 they all mean the same when used in explaining the foundations of the moral order4 #bjg4 ,the rules of the eternal law do not depend on the free will of ,god1 since1 in that case1 ,god could make good evil1 and evil good4 ,the eternal law cannot be any thing else than the eternal reason1 or the representation of the moral order in the divine intellect4 ,morality thus seems1 according to our mode of conception1 to precede its representation2 that is to say1 morality seems to be represented in the divine intellect because it is2 but not that it is because it is represented4 ,in the moral order we come to something resembling metaphysical and geometrical science4 ,geometrical truths are eternal1 inasmuch as they are represented in the eternal reason2 and this representation supposes an intrinsic and necessary truth in them1 since the representation would otherwise be false4 ,as this truth must have some eternal foundation1#if and this foundation cannot be in any finite being1 it must be sought for in the essentially infinite being1 which contains the reason of all things4 ,the infinite intellect represents the truth1 and is1 therefore1 true2 but this truth is itself founded on the essence of the infinite being which knows it4 #if ,see ,bk4 ,,iv41 ,chs4 ,,xxiv41 ,,xxv41 ,,xxvi41 and ,,xxvii4 #bjh4 ,moral truths are not distinguished in this respect from metaphysical2 their origin is in ,god1 moral science cannot be atheistic4 ,why are some things represented in ,god as good and others as evil8 ,to ask the reason of this is like asking why triangles are not represented as circles1 and circles as triangles4 ,if there is an intrinsic necessity1 either we can assign no reason for it or we must at any rate come to a reason which can be explained by no other reason4 ,it will in any case1 be necessary for us to come to a point where we can only say3 ,it is so4 ,any further satisfaction1 which we might desire1 is beyond our reach1 as we do not intuitively see the infinite essence which contains the first and ultimate reason of all things4 #bji4 ,it is necessary first to suppose good and evil before things can be represented as such1 or even conceived as so represented4 ,what is a good thing8 ,if we say it is being represented as good in the divine mind1 the thing defined is contained in the definition2 the difficulty still remains3 what is it to be represented as good8 ,goodness cannot consist in the simple representation1 so that whatever is represented in ,god is good2 for then every thing would be good1 as every thing is represented in ,god4 ,therefore1 in order that a thing may be good1 it must not only be represented1 but represented under such or such a character which makes it good2 but still the difficulty remains3 what is this character8 #baj4 ,let us make these ideas clearer by comparing a metaphysical with a moral truth4 ,all the diameters of the same circle are equal2 this truth does not depend on any particular circle1 it is founded on the essence of all circles2 this essence is in turn represented eternally in the infinite essence1 where with the plenitude of being1 is contained the representation and knowledge of all the finite participations in which the wisdom and power of ,god may be exercised4 ,all the participations are subject to the principle of contradiction1 in none of them can being cease to exclude not-being1 or not-being to exclude being2 hence proceeds the necessity of all the properties and relations1 without which the principle of contradiction cannot subsist2 among these is the equality of all the diameters of the same circle4 #baa4 ,these considerations suggest the question3 is it possible to explain the moral order like the metaphysical and mathematical1 by showing it contained in the principle of contradiction8 #bab4 ,it is easy to see that in all metaphysical and mathematical truths1 identity is expressed or denied4 ,all formulas are reduced to ,a is ,b1 or ,a is not ,b2 this is the general formula of all truths of an absolute order4 ,but it is otherwise in the moral order1 where nothing is ever expressed absolutely1 as is shown by the very form of the propositions4 ,god is good1 expresses a metaphysical truth1 ,god must be loved1 or in other words1 we ought to love ,god1 expresses a moral truth4 ,note the difference3 in one case we say is absolutely2 in the other1 must be1 ought to be1 there is obligation1 etc41 using different expressions which all mean the same thing2 but in all1 the verb to be1 as an absolute affirmation1 disappears4 ,it seems that no moral proposition could be thus expressed1 if we regard the primitive elements of our moral ideas2 for all these propositions express the idea of duty1 which is essentially a relative idea4 #bac4 ,to love ,god is good4 ,this is a moral proposition whose structure seems to contradict what ,i have just established4 ,here an absolute affirmation is found expressed simply by is1 as in metaphysical or mathematical propositions4 ,still1 the least reflection will suffice to show that this absolute character is destroyed by the nature of the predicate4 ,what is the meaning of good8 ,here we have an essentially relative idea which communicates this character to the proposition4 ,to love ,god is good1 is the same as3 to love ,god is a thing conformed to reason1 or to the eternal law1 or pleasing to ,god1 or a thing which we are under obligation to do2 it is always a relative idea1 and never absolute1 like being1 not-being1 a triangle1 a circle1 etc4 #bad4 ,good1 say some1 is that which leads to the end which corresponds to intelligent beings4 ,this explanation must not be confounded with the theory of private interest2--a theory alike rejected by religion and by the sentiments of the heart1 and combated by the most profound thinkers2--here1 in speaking of end1 the last end is meant1 which is something superior to what is understood by the expression1 private interest4 ,without doubt1 to arrive at the last end1 is a great interest of every intelligent being2 but at least this interest is taken in an elevated sense1 and does not promote the development of a paltry egotism4 ,having thus designated the difference between these doctrines1 ,i say that not even the latter seems to me admissible4 ,moral good must lead to the end2 but this does not constitute the character of morality4 ,for1 what is meant by end8 ,if ,god himself is meant1 a moral act is that which leads to ,god2 in which case the difficulty still remains1 for we again ask1 what is meant by leading8 ,if it means to conduce to the happiness which consists in a union with ,god1 how does it conduce to this happiness8 ,by the performance of what ,god has commanded2--certainly2 but then we ask3 ,i4 ,why does doing what ,god has commanded conduce to happiness8 ,,ii4 ,why has ,god commanded some things and prohibited others8--which is equivalent to putting anew the question of intrinsic morality4 #bae4 ,besides1 the idea of happiness represents something very different from the idea of morality4 ,imagining a being which sacrifices all that it possessed for the sake of other beings1 we have the idea of a highly moral being1 but not a happy being4 ,if morality consisted in happiness1 the participation of happiness would be the participation of morality2 every enjoyment would be a moral act2 and could only be immoral because too short or feeble4 ,in proportion as we rose to the idea of a stronger and more lasting enjoyment1 we should form the idea of a more elevated morality2 the enjoyment the most free from trouble would be the purest act of morality2 who does not see that this overthrows all our moral ideas1 and is repugnant to every sentiment of the heart8 #baf4 ,it is not enough to say that a moral being will obtain happiness1 and that its happiness will be great in proportion to its morality2 this only proves that happiness is the reward of morality2 it does not authorize us to confound the two1 the guerdon with the merit4 #bag4 ,to confound morality with happiness is to reduce morality to a calculation1 to strip virtue of the pure lustre which charms and attracts us1 and makes it appear more beautiful accordingly as it is joined with greater suffering4 ,if we identify happiness with morality1 disinterestedness becomes a calculation of interest1 a sacrifice of a smaller to a greater interest1 a loss for the present to gain in the future4 ,no6 the morality of actions is not an affair of calculation3 the virtuous man obtains a reward2 but1 in order that the act may be virtuous1 something more is necessary than a combination for the purpose of obtaining it2 there must be something which makes the act merit the reward2 and we cannot even conceive that a reward can be reserved for any act1 unless the act is in itself meritorious4 ,when ,god prepared punishment for some acts and rewards for others1 he must have found an intrinsic difference in them2 and therefore he gave them different destinies2 but1 according to the systems which we are opposing1 acts could be good only inasmuch as they lead to a reward1 and there would be no reason why some should lead to it rather than others4 ,this reason must be found in an intrinsic difference in the acts themselves2 or we fall into the absurdity of saying that all actions are in themselves indifferent1 and the good may be evil1 and the evil good4 #bah4 ,to lead to the good of mankind is another incomplete character of the morality of actions4 ,it is clear that this morality would be only human1 and would not include the intrinsic morality which we consider common to all intelligent beings4 #bai4 ,what1 too1 is the good which is spoken of8 ,in what state are mankind considered8 ,do you mean a society constituted as a nation1 or mankind1 properly so called2 one generation or many2 their destiny on earth or hereafter in another life8 ,are you speaking of their well-being1 or of their development and perfection abstracted from their greater or less well-being8 ,if the morality of actions is to be placed in their conduciveness1 so to speak1 to the general good of mankind1 in what does this supreme good consist8 ,is it the development of the understanding1 of the imagination1 or of the heart2 or in the perfection of the arts1 which secure material enjoyments8 ,you must not1 then1 place moral perfection as the end2 for by the supposition it is only the means2 and the actions will be more moral accordingly as they are more useful means of obtaining the general good4 #bbj4 ,to say that morality is only the object of sentiment1 and that no other mark of what is good can be given than the mysterious perfection which we find in virtue1 is to banish morality as a science1 and to shut the door against all investigation4 ,i do not deny that there is in us a moral sentiment1 or that our heart feels mysterious sympathy for virtue2 but ,i believe the scientific study of the foundations of the moral order to be compatible with this fact4 ,it is necessary to acknowledge the primitive character of some facts of our mind1 and not attempt to explain every thing2 but we must guard against exaggeration in this respect1 which is only the more dangerous when covered with the cloak of modesty4 ,,chapter ,,xx4 ,,fundamental ,,explanation ,,of ,,the ,,moral ,,order4 #bba4 ,there must be something absolute in morality4 ,it is not possible to conceive any thing all relative1 without something absolute on which it is founded4 ,moreover1 every relation implies a term to which it relates1 and1 consequently1 though we suppose a series of relations1 we must come to a last term4 ,this shows why purely relative explanations of morality do not satisfy the understanding2 reason1 and even sentiment seek an absolute basis4 ,besides1 this purely ontological argument in favor of the absolute in morality1 there are others not less conclusive1 and which are within the reach of ordinary men4 #bbb4 ,in the infinitely perfect being we conceive infinite holiness1 independently of the existence of creatures2 and what is infinite holiness but moral perfection in an infinite degree8 ,this argument is decisive for all the world1 excepting atheists3 whoso admits the existence of ,god must admit his holiness2 the contrary is repugnant to reason1 to the heart1 to common sense4 ,therefore something absolutely moral exists2 therefore morality in itself cannot be explained by any relation of creatures to end1 since morality in an infinite degree would exist though there had never been any creature4 #bbc4 ,in conceiving a created intelligent being1 we also conceive morality as an inflexible law to which the actions of this being must be subjected4 ,it is to be observed that we conceive this morality1 even supposing only one intelligent being2 therefore morality cannot be explained by the relations of creatures to each other4 ,imagine one man all alone on the earth1 can you conceive him exempt from all morality8 ,would he be equally beautiful in the moral order1 whether he labored to perfect his intellect and develop his faculties harmoniously1 or abandoned himself to his coarse instincts1 lowering himself to the level of the beasts by his stupidity and debasement8 ,imagine the earth1 the whole corporeal universe1 and all created beings1 except one intelligence1 to disappear2 can you conceive this creature wholly exempt from all moral law8 ,can you suppose all his thoughts and acts of the will to be indifferent1 and that morality is for him an unmeaning word8 ,impossible1 unless you place yourself in open struggle with our primary ideas1 with our profoundest sentiments1 with the common sense of mankind4 ,this1 then1 is another proof that in the moral order there is something absolute1 an intrinsic perfection1 independent of the mutual relations of creatures2 that certain acts of an intelligent and free creature have a beauty of their own4 #bbd4 ,the imputability of actions offers another argument in confirmation of this truth4 ,morality is never measured by the result2 its perfection is appreciated by what is immanent1 that is1 by the motives which have impelled the will1 by the greater or less deliberation which preceded the act of the will1 by the greater or less intensity of the act4 ,if the result is sometimes considered1 all its moral worth arises from the interior of the soul4 ,whether the result was foreseen or unforeseen2 whether it was possible or not to foresee it2 whether it was willed or not2 whether it was proposed as the principal or secondary object2 whether it was desired or accepted with sorrow2 these and other such considerations are present when the merit or demerit of an action which has had such or such result1 is weighed and appreciated4 ,hence this result has no weight in the moral order except in so far as it is the expression of the act of the will4 #bbe4 ,this character of immanence1 which is essential to all moral acts1 overthrows all the theories which found morality on external combinations2 and shows that the act of a free and intelligent being is good or bad in itself1 absolutely abstracted from its good or bad consequences1 which were not contained in the internal act in one way or another4 ,a man1 who1 by an act which he did not and could not foresee1 should seriously injure the whole human race1 would be innocent2 and another who with an evil intention should benefit mankind1 would be guilty4 ,it is not a virtuous act to save one's country through a motive of vanity or ambition2 and the unfortunate man1 who with a pure and disinterested intention and with an ardent desire to save his country1 should by an error produce its downfall1 would not cease to be virtuous2 the very act whose result is so sad1 is considered an act of virtue4 #bbf4 ,in what1 then1 does absolute morality consist8 ,where is the hidden source of this ray of beauty which we all perceive1 which penetrates every thing1 making all things beautiful1 and without which the world of intelligences would wither and fade away8 ,it seems to me that on this point1 as on many others1 science has not paid sufficient regard to the admirable profoundness of the ,christian religion1 which answers with one word1 as full of tenderness as of meaning3 ,love4 ,i particularly call the attention of my readers to the theory which ,i am going to unfold4 ,after so many difficulties as we have hitherto encountered concerning the moral order1 we must try to gain some light on so important a subject4 ,this light will more and more confirm a truth which science reveals4 ,when we come to the principles or the last results of science1 the ideas of ,christianity are not useless2 they throw light on the foundation and on the summit of the edifice of human knowledge4 ,let not the reader imagine that instead of a scientific theory1 ,i am going to offer him a chapter of mysticism4 ,i am sure that in the end the reader will be convinced that1 even under a purely scientific aspect1 this doctrine is much more exact and profound than that of those authors who carefully avoid using the word ,god1 as though this august name would be a blot on the pages of science4 #bbg4 ,absolute morality is the love of ,god2 all moral ideas and sentiments are applications and participations of this love4 ,let us give a proof of this by carrying this principle to all the parts of the moral world4 ,what is absolute morality in ,god8 ,what is the attribute of the infinite being1 which we call holiness8 ,the love of himself1 of his infinite perfection4 ,in ,god there is no duty1 properly so called1 there is an absolute necessity of being holy2 for he is under the absolute necessity of loving his infinite perfection4 ,thus morality in its most absolute sense1 in its highest degree1 is infinite holiness2 it is independent of all freewill4 ,god cannot cease to be holy4 #bbh4 ,but it may be asked1 why must ,god love himself8 ,this question has no meaning if the matter is rightly understood2 for it supposes that what is entirely absolute can be exactly expressed in relative terms4 ,the proposition3 ,god must love himself is not exact2 strict exactness is expressed only in this3 ,god loves himself2 for it expresses an absolute fact in an absolute manner4 ,if it is now asked1 why ,god loves himself2 ,i answer that it might as well be asked1 why ,god knows himself1 why he knows the truth1 or why he exists2 when we come to these questions1 we have arrived at the primitive origin1 at absolute1 unconditioned things2 therefore every why is absurd4 #bbi4 ,morality can1 therefore1 be expressed in an absolute proposition4 ,it is in itself1 in an infinite degree1 an absolute truth2 it implies an identity whose opposite is contradictory3 it is not less connected with the principle of contradiction than all metaphysical and geometrical truths4 ,its simplest formula is3 the infinite loves itself4 #bcj4 ,god in his intelligence sees from all eternity an infinity of possible creatures4 ,containing in himself the ground of their possibility and of all their relations among themselves or to their ,creator1 nothing can exist independent of him2 hence it is not possible for any being to cease to be directed to ,god4 ,the end which ,god proposed in the creation can be no other than himself2 since before the creation only ,god existed1 and after the creation there were no perfections in creatures which were not contained in ,god in an infinite degree1 either formally or virtually4 ,therefore this direction of all creatures to ,god as their last end1 is a condition inseparable from them1 and seen by ,god from eternity in all possible worlds4 ,whatever is created or may be created is a realization of a divine idea1 of that which was represented in the infinite mind1 with the absolute or relative properties which pre-existed in that representation4 ,therefore whatever exists or may exist must be subject to this condition1 it must be directed to ,god1 without whom its existence would be impossible4 #bca4 ,among the creatures1 in which is realized the representation pre-existing in the divine mind1 there are some endowed with will1 which is an inclination to what is known1 and1 by means of an act of the understanding1 becomes a principle of its own determinations4 ,if the creature knew ,god intuitively1 the acts of its will would be necessarily moral2 for it would necessarily be an act of the love of ,god4 ,the rectitude of the created will would then be a constant reflection of the infinite holiness1 or of the love which ,god bears himself4 ,the moral perfection of the creature would not in that case be free1 though it would still be an eminent degree of moral perfection4 ,there would be a perpetual conformity of the created will to the will of ,god1 for the creature loving ,god by a happy necessity1 could will nothing but what ,god wills4 ,the morality of the created will would be this constant conformity to the divine will1 which conformity would not be distinguished from the essentially moral and holy act1 by which the creature would love the infinite being4 ,but since the knowledge of ,god is not intuitive1 since the idea which the creature has of ,god is an incomplete conception involving many indeterminate notions1 the infinite good is not loved by necessity1 because it is not known in its essence4 ,the will has an inclination to good1 but to good indeterminately2 and therefore it does not feel a necessary inclination to any real object4 ,the good is presented under a general and indeterminate idea1 with various applications1 and to none of them is the will inclined necessarily2 hence proceeds its freedom to depart from the order seen by ,god as conformed to his sovereign designs2 when freedom1 far from being a perfection1 is a defect arising from the weakness of the knowledge of the being which possesses it4 #bcb4 ,the rational creature conforming in its acts to the will of ,god1 realizes the order which ,god wills2 loving this order1 it loves what ,god loves4 ,if1 although realizing this order1 the creature in its freedom does not love the order1 but acts from motives independent of it1 its will1 performing the act materially1 does not love what ,god loves2 and here is the line which divides morality from immorality4 ,the proper morality of an act consists in explicit or implicit conformity of the created will to the divine will2 the mysterious perfections of moral acts1 that loveliness in them which charms and attracts us1 is nothing else than conformity to the will of ,god2 the absolute character which we find in morality is the explicit or implicit love of ,god1 and1 consequently1 a reflection of the infinite holiness1 or of the love by which ,god loves himself4 ,by applying this doctrine to facts1 we shall see more clearly still its perfect exactness4 #bcc4 ,to love ,god is a morally good act2 to hate ,god is a morally evil act1 and of the most detestable character4 ,where is the morality of the act of loving ,god8 ,in the act itself1 the reflection of the infinite holiness1 which consists in the love which ,god has for his infinite perfection2 here is a palpable proof of the truth of our theory4 ,the love of the creature for the ,creator has always been regarded as an essentially moral act1 as the purest morality2 which shows that in the secondary and finite order1 this act is the purest and most faithful expression of absolute morality4 #bcd4 ,if we ask why we must love ,god1 we are ordinarily reminded of the benefits which he has conferred upon us1 of the love which he bears us1 and even of the example of the love which we owe to our friends and benefactors1 and especially our parents2 these reasons are certainly very useful in order to make the morality of the act in some sense palpable1 and to move our heart2 but they are not completely satisfactory in the field of science4 ,for1 if we could doubt that we ought to love the infinite ,being1 the author of all beings1 it is clear that we should also doubt that we ought to love our parents1 our friends1 or our benefactors4 ,therefore our love for them must be founded on something higher1 or else1 when asked why we love them1 we must remain without an answer4 #bce4 ,to wish to perfect the understanding is a moral act in itself4 ,whence proceeds the morality of this act8 ,god1 in giving us intelligence1 evidently wished us to use it4 ,its use1 therefore1 enters into the order known and willed by ,god2 in willing this order1 we will what ,god wills2 we love this order which ,god loved from all eternity1 as a realization of his supreme designs2 if1 on the contrary1 the creature does not perfect his intellectual faculties1 and making use of his freedom leaves these faculties unexercised1 he departs from the order established by ,god1 he does not will what ,god wills1 he does not love what ,god loves4 #bcf4 ,a man may perfect these faculties merely for the sake of obtaining the pleasure of being praised by others2 in this case he realizes the order in the perfection of his understanding1 but he does not do so from love of the order in itself1 but from love of something distinct which does not enter into the order willed by ,god2 for it is evident that ,god did not endow us with intellectual faculties for the fruitless object of obtaining each other's praise4 ,here1 then1 is the difference which we know1 which we perceive between two equal actions done with different ends3 the will in one perfects the understanding as a simple realization of the divine order2 perhaps we may not be able to explain what there is there1 but we know for certain that this will is right2 in the other the will is the same1 it wills the same thing1 but it suffers something foreign to this order to mingle with it2 and the understanding and the heart both tell us this act which does something good1 is not good1 it is not virtue1--it is meanness4 #bcg4 ,there is a person in great want1 but who1 nevertheless1 has every probability of soon improving his fortunes1 ,lentulus and ,julius each give him an alms4 ,lentulus gives his1 because he hopes that when the poor man is better off he will remember his benefactor1 and assist him if necessary4 ,the action of ,lentulus can have no moral value2 in judging of it we see a calculation1 not a virtuous act4 ,julius gives the alms solely in order to succor the unfortunate man1 who excites his pity1 without thinking of the return which may be made2 the action of ,julius is morally beautiful1 it is virtuous4 ,whence this difference8 ,lentulus does good1 assisting the needy2 but not from love of the internal order of the act2 he bends this order towards himself4 ,god1 willing that men should stand in need of each other1 also willed that they should mutually help one another2 to help one1 therefore1 simply in order to alleviate his wants is to realize simply the order willed by ,god2 to help one for a particular end1 is to realize this order not as it is established by ,god1 but as combined by man4 ,there is a complication of view1 the simplicity of intention is wanting1--this simplicity so recommended by ,christianity1 and even in philosophy containing a profound meaning4 #bch4 ,regarding the purely natural order1 we find that all moral obligations have in the last result a useful object2 as all prohibitions are directed to prevent an injury2 but it does not suffice for morality1 that we will its utility1 we must will the order itself from which the utility results2 for the greater the reflection1 and the love with which this order is willed1 without any mixture of heterogeneous views1 the more moral is the act4 ,to help the poor with the simple view of assisting them1 out of love for them1 is a virtuous act2 to help them1 out of this love1 and with the explicit reflection that it is complying with a duty of humanity1 is still more virtuous2 to help them1 for the thought of ,god1 because you see in the poor man the image of ,god1 who commands you to love him1 is a still more virtuous act than either of the other two2 to help them1 even against the inclination of your own heart1 excited by resentment against them1 or moved by other passions1 to subdue yourself with a firm will for the love of ,god1 is an act of heroic virtue4 ,observe that the moral perfection of the act increases in proportion as the thing in itself is willed with greater reflection and love2 and arrives at the highest point when1 in the thing loved1 it is ,god himself that is loved4 ,if the views are selfish the order is perverted1 and morality is banished2 when there are no selfish views1 but the act is prompted principally by sentiment1 the action is beautiful1 but belongs rather to sensibility than to morality2 when the sacrifice tears the heart1 but the will preceded by reflection commands the sacrifice1 and the duty is performed because it is a duty2 or perhaps an act not obligatory is done for the love of its moral goodness1 and because it is agreeable to ,god1 we see in the action something so fair1 so lovely1 so deserving of praise1 that we should be confounded if asked the reason of the sentiment of respect which we feel for the person who for such noble motives sacrifices himself for his fellow-men4 ,conformably to these principles we may clearly and exactly determine the ideas of morality4 #bci4 ,absolute morality1 and consequently the origin and type of the moral order1 is the act by which the infinite ,being loves his infinite perfection4 ,this is an absolute fact of which we can give no reason a priori4 ,in ,god there is1 strictly speaking1 no duty2 there is the absolute necessity of being holy4 #bdj4 ,the act essentially moral in creatures is the love of ,god4 ,it is impossible to found the morality of this act on the morality of any other act4 #bda4 ,the acts of creatures are moral in so far as they participate of this love1 explicitly or implicitly4 #bdb4 ,creatures which see ,god intuitively1 love him necessarily2 and thus all their acts1 stamped with this august mark1 are necessarily moral4 #bdc4 ,creatures which do not see ,god intuitively necessarily love good in general1 or under an indeterminate idea2 but they do not love necessarily any object in particular4 #bdd4 ,in this love of good in general1 these free acts are moral1 when their will wills the order which ,god has willed1 without mingling with this order foreign or contrary combinations4 #bde4 ,in order that an act may be moral1 it is not necessary that the one who performs it should think explicitly of ,god1 nor that his will should love him explicitly4 #bdf4 ,the act is more moral1 in proportion as it is accompanied with greater reflection on its morality and its conformity to the will of ,god4 #bdg4 ,moral sentiment was given us in order that we might perceive the beauty of the order willed by ,god2 it is1 so to speak1 an instinct of love of ,god4 #bdh4 ,as this sentiment is innate1 indelible1 and independent of reflection1 even atheists experience it4 #bdi4 ,the idea of moral obligation or duty results from two ideas3 the order willed by ,god1 and the physical freedom to depart from this order4 ,god granting us life1 wills us to try to preserve it2 but man is free1 and sometimes kills himself4 ,he that preserves his life fulfils a duty2 he that destroys himself1 infringes it4 ,thus the idea of duty contains the idea of physical freedom1 which cannot be exercised1 in a certain sense1 without departing from the order which ,god has established4 #bej4 ,punishment is a sanction of the moral order2 it serves to supply the necessity which is impossible in free beings4 ,creatures that act without knowledge1 fulfil their destiny by an absolute necessity2 free beings do not fulfil their destiny by an absolute necessity1 but by that kind of necessity produced by the sight of a painful result4 #bea4 ,here may be seen the difference between physical evil and moral evil even in the same free being2 physical evil is pain2 moral evil is the departure from the order willed by ,god4 #beb4 ,unlawful is what is contrary to a duty4 #bec4 ,lawful is what is not opposed to any duty4 #bed4 ,the eternal law is the order of intelligent beings1 willed by ,god conformably to his infinite holiness4 #bee4 ,intrinsically moral acts are those which form a part of the order which ,god 7supposing the will to create such or such beings7 has willed necessarily1 by force of the love of his infinite perfection4 ,such actions are commanded because they are good4 #bef4 ,the actions which are good because they are commanded are those which form a part of the order which ,god has willed freely1 and of which he has given creatures knowledge4 #beg4 ,the command of ,god is his will communicated to creatures4 ,if this will is necessary1 the precept is natural1 if free1 the precept is positive4 #beh4 ,regarding the natural only1 the order willed by ,god is that which leads to the preservation and perfection of created beings4 ,actions are moral when conformed to this order4 #bei4 ,the natural perfection of beings consists in using their faculties for the end for which their nature shows them to be destined4 #bfj4 ,nature has charged each individual to take care of his own preservation and perfection4 #bfa4 ,the natural impossibility of man's living alone1 shows that the preservation and perfection of individuals must be obtained in society4 #bfb4 ,the first society is the family4 #bfc4 ,parents must support and educate their children2 for without this the human race could not be preserved4 #bfd4 ,conjugal duties arise from the order necessary for the preservation and perfection of the society of the family1 which is indispensable for the preservation of the human race4 #bfe4 ,the more necessary the connection of an act with the preservation and perfection of the family1 the more necessary is its morality1 and consequently the less subject to modifications4 #bff4 ,the immorality of acts contrary to chastity1 and especially of those against nature1 is founded on great reasons of an order indispensable for the preservation of the individual and the species4 #bfg4 ,passions1 because they are blind1 are evidently given us as means1 not as ends4 #bfh4 ,therefore1 when the gratification of the passions is taken1 not as a means1 but as the end1 the act is immoral4 ,a simple example will explain this idea4 ,the pleasure of eating has a very useful object in the preservation of the individual2 thus to eat with pleasure is not evil1 but good2 to eat for the pleasure of eating is to invert the order3 the act is not good4 ,the same action which in the first case is very reasonable1 in the second1 is an act of gluttony4 ,common sense renders any proof of this superfluous4 #bfi4 ,if a man lived all alone1 the use of his physical freedom could never injure any one but himself2 the moral limit of his freedom would be to satisfy his wants and desires in conformity to the dictates of reason4 ,but as men live in society1 the exercise of the physical freedom of one necessarily interferes with the freedom of others2 to prevent disorder it is necessary that the physical freedom of each one should be restricted a little1 and that all should be subjected to an order conformed to reason and conducive to the general good2 hence the necessity of civil legislation4 ,but as the legislation cannot be established or preserved by itself alone1 a public power becomes necessary4 ,the object of society is the general good1 in subjection to the principles of eternal morality2 the same is the object of the public power4 #bgj4 ,this theory explains satisfactorily the double character presented by the moral order3 the absolute1 and the relative4 ,the heart1 reason1 and common sense force us to acknowledge in the moral order something absolute and independent of the consideration of utility2 this is explained by rising to an absolute act of absolute perfection1 and regarding the morality of creatures as a participation of that act4 ,reason and experience teach that the morality of actions has useful results2 this is explained by observing that the absolute act includes the love of the order which must rule among created beings in order that they may fulfil their destinies4 ,this order1 then1 is at the same time willed by ,god1 and conducive to the special end of each creature2 therefore it is at the same time both moral and useful4 #bga4 ,but these two characters are always kept essentially distinct2 the first we perceive2 the second we calculate4 ,when the first is wanting1 we are evil2 when the second fails1 we are unfortunate4 ,the painful result is punishment when our will has knowingly violated the order2 otherwise1 it is simply misfortune4 #bgb4 ,i hope ,i may flatter myself that this theory is somewhat more satisfactory than those invented by some modern philosophers for the purpose of explaining the absolute nature of morality4 ,i had need of the idea of ,god1 it is true2 but ,i conceive no moral order1 if ,god be taken from the world4 ,without ,god morality is nothing but a blind sentiment1 as absurd in its object as in itself2 the philosophy which does not found it on ,god1 can never explain it scientifically2 it must confine itself to establishing the fact as a necessity whose character and origin they know nothing of4 #bgc4 ,i shall add one observation which is an epitome of my whole theory1 and will show wherein it differs from others which likewise acknowledge that the foundation of the moral order is in ,god1 and that the love of ,god is the first of all duties4 ,the systems to which ,i refer1 suppose the idea of morality to be distinct from the idea of the love of ,god2 but ,i say that the love of ,god is the essence of morality4 ,thus ,i assert that the infinite holiness is essentially the love with which ,god loves himself2 that the first and essentially moral act of creatures is the love of ,god2 that the morality of all their actions consists in explicit or implicit conformity to the will of ,god1 which is the same as the explicit or implicit love of ,god4 ,one of the most remarkable results of this theory which places the essence of morality in the love of ,god1 or of the infinite good1 is that it destroys the difference of form of moral and metaphysical propositions1 showing that the must and ought of the former is reduced to the absolute is of the latter4#ig ,the explanation of this important result is the following4 ,the proposition3 to love ,god is good morally1 is an absolute and identical proposition2 for moral goodness is the same thing as the love of ,god4 #ig ,see #baj1 #baa1 #bab1 and #bac4 ,the proposition3 to love our neighbor is good1 is reduced to the former1 since to love our neighbor is1 in a certain sense1 to love ,god4 ,the proposition3 to help our neighbor is good1 is reduced to the last1 for to help is to love4 ,the proposition3 man ought to preserve his life1 is explained by this absolute proposition3 the preservation of man's life is willed by ,god4 ,thus the word ought expresses the necessity that man should preserve his life1 if he does not mean to oppose the order willed by ,god4 ,these examples are enough to show how easily moral propositions may be reduced to an absolute form4 ,i cannot see how this is possible1 if instead of saying that the love of ,god is morality1 we distinguish between morality and love1 saying that the love of ,god is a moral act4 #bgd4 ,whatever judgment may be formed of this explanation1 it cannot be denied that by it1 a profound wisdom1 even in the natural and philosophical order1 is recognized in that admirable doctrine of our divine ,master1 in which he calls the love of ,god the first and greatest of the commandments2 and in which1 when he wishes to point out the character of the moral good1 he especially designates the fulfilment of the divine will4 #bge4 ,if we place the essence of morality in love1 that which is moral must appear beautiful1 since nothing is more beautiful than love2 it must be agreeable to the soul1 since nothing is more pleasing than love4 ,we see also why the ideas of disinterestednessss and sacrifice seem so beautiful in the moral order1 and make us instinctively reject the theory of self-interest2 nothing more disinterested than love1 nothing more capable of great sacrifices4 #bgf4 ,thus egotism is banished from the moral order3 ,god loves himself1 because he is infinitely perfect2 outside of him there is nothing to love which he has not created4 ,the love which he has for creatures is completely disinterested1 since he can receive nothing from them4 ,the creature loves itself and also others2 but what it loves in itself and in other creatures1 is the reflection of the infinite good4 ,it desires to be united to the supreme good1 and in this it places its last happiness2 but this desire is united with the love of the supreme good in itself1 which the creature does not love precisely for the reason that thence results its own happiness4 ,,chapter ,,xxi4 ,a ,,glance ,,at ,,the ,,work4 #bgg4 ,i have approached the term of my labor2 and it is well to cast a glance over the long path which ,i have travelled4 ,i proposed to examine the fundamental ideas of our mind1 whether considered in themselves1 or in their relations to the world4 #bgh4 ,with regard to objects1 we have found in our mind two primitive facts2 the intuition of extension1 and the idea of being4 ,all objective sensibility is founded on the intuition of extension2 all the pure intellectual order in what relates to indeterminate ideas1 is founded on the idea of being4 ,we have seen that from the idea of being proceed the ideas of identity1 distinction1 unity1 number1 duration1 time1 simplicity1 composition1 the finite1 the infinite1 the necessary1 the contingent1 the mutable1 the immutable1 substance1 accident1 cause1 and effect4 #bgi4 ,we find in the subjective order1 as facts of consciousness1 sensibility1 or sensitive being1 7including1 in this1 sentiment as well as sensation17 intelligence1 and will2 whence we have intuitive ideas of determinate modes of being1 distinct from extended beings4 #bhj4 ,thus all the elements of our mind are reduced to the intuitive ideas of extension1 sensibility1 intelligence1 and will1 and the indeterminate ideas which are all founded on the idea of being4 #bha4 ,from the idea of being1 combined with not-being1 springs the principle of contradiction1 which of itself produces only indeterminate cognitions4 ,in order that science should have an object that could be realized1 the idea of being must be presented under some form4 ,our intuition gives two3 extension1 and consciousness4 #bhb4 ,consciousness presents three modes of being3 sensibility1 or sensitive being2 intelligence1 and will4 #bhc4 ,extension1 considered in all its purity1 as we imagine it in space1 is the basis of geometry4 #bhd4 ,the same extension modified in various ways1 and placed in relation with our sensibility1 is the basis of all the natural sciences1 of all those which have for their object1 the corporeal universe4 #bhe4 ,intelligence gives rise to ideology and psychology4 #bhf4 ,the will1 in so far as moved by ends1 gives rise to the moral sciences4 #bhg4 ,the idea of being begets the principle of contradiction2 and1 by this principle1 the general and indeterminate ideas1 whose combination produces ontology1 which circulates1 like a life-giving fluid1 through all the other sciences4 #bhh4 ,such ,i conceive the tree of human science3 to examine its roots was the object of the ,fundamental ,philosophy4 ,,notes ,,to ,,book ,,seventh4 ,,on ,,chapter ,i4 ,there are not wanting those who have believed that time is a thing very easily explained4 ,such is the opinion of ,buffier in his celebrated ,trait des premires verits4#ih ,after explaining in his own way in what duration and time consist1 he adds3 #ih ,part ,,ii41 ch4 xxiii4 ,de la dure et du temps4 ,j'admire donc que tant de philosophes aient parl du temps et de la dure comme de choses inexplicables ou incomprhensibles3 si non rogas1 intelligo1 leur fait-on dire1 et selon la paraphrase de ,locke1 plus je m'applique dcouvrir la nature du temps1 moins je la conois4 ,le temps qui dcouvre toutes les choses ne saurait tre compris lui-mme4 ,cependant1 quoi se rduisent tous ces mystres8 ,a deux mots que nous venons d'exposer4 ,it is strange that so distinguished a writer should not have known1 or should not have remembered1 that the difficulty of explaining time was acknowledged not only by the philosophers of whom he speaks1 but even by so eminent a man as ,st4 ,augustine4 ,the words to which he alludes are from ,st4 ,augustine1 and are found in the fourteenth chapter of the second book of his confessions3 ,quid enim est tempus1 quis hoc facile1 breviterque explicaverit8 ,quis hoc ad verbum de illo proferendum vel cognatione comprehenderit 444 quid ergo est tempus8 ,si nemo ex me qurat scio1 si qurenti explicare velim nescio4 ,what is time8 ,if no one ask me1 ,i know1 but if ,i wish to explain it1 ,i know it not4 ,the great doctor discovered here a profound question1 and like all great geniuses when they find themselves in sight of a deep abyss1 he felt a strong desire to know what was hidden in its bottom4 ,full of a holy enthusiasm1 he turns to ,god1 and begs him to explain this mystery3 ,exarsit animus meus nosse istud implicatissimum enigma4 ,noli claudere1 ,domine ,deus1 bone pater2 per ,christum obsecro1 noli claudere desiderio meo ista et usitata1 et abdita1 quominus in ea penetret1 et dilucescant allucente misericordia tua1 ,domine6 ,quem percunctabor de his8 et cui fructuosius confitebor imperitiam meam nisi tibi1 cui non sunt molesta studia mea flammantia vehementer in scripturas tuas8 ,da quod amo2 amo enim1 et hoc tu dedisti4 ,da1 pater1 qui vere nosti data bona dare filiis tuis4 ,da1 quoniam suscepi cognoscere te2 et labor est ante me donec aperias4 ,per ,christum obsecro1 in nomine ejus sancti sanctorum nemo mihi obstrepat4 ,et ego credidi propter quod et loquor4 ,hc est spes mea1 ad hanc vivo1 ut contempler delectationes ,domini4 ,ecce veteres posuisti dies meos1 et transeunt2 et quomodo1 nescio4 ,et dicimus1 ,tempus et tempus1 tempora et tempora4 ,quamdiu dixit hoc ille2 quamdiu fecit hoc ille2 et quam longo tempore illud non vidi2 et duplum temporis habet hc syllaba2 ad illam simplam brevem4 ,dicimus hc1 et audimus hc3 et intelligimur1 et intelligimus4 ,manifestissima et usitatissima sunt1 et eadem rursus nimis latent1 et nova est inventio eorum4 7,lib4 ,,xi41 cap4 xxii47 ,video igitur tempus quamdam esse distensionem1 sed video an videre mihi videor8 ,tu demonstrabis lux1 veritas4 7,cap4 xxiii47 ,et confiteor tibi 7,domine7 ignorare me adhuc quid sit tempus2 et rursus confiteor tibi 7,domine7 scire me in tempore ista dicere1 et diu me jam loqui de tempore1 atque idipsum diu1 non esse nisi moram temporis4 ,quomodo igitur hoc sciam1 quando quid sit tempus nescio8 an forte nescio quemadmodum dicam quod scio8 ,hei mihi qui nescio saltem quid nesciam6 ,ecce ,deus meus coram te1 quia non mentior2 sicut loquor ita est cor meum4 ,tu illuminabis lucernam meam1 ,domine ,deus meus2 illuminabis tenebras meas4 7,cap4 xxv47 ,to present as easy things which seemed difficult to the greatest men1 is1 to say the least of it1 rather bold4 ,the author flatters himself1 in such instances that he has settled the question when he has not penetrated beyond its surface4 ,it often happens that objects seem very clear at first1 and we only discover the difficulty which they present1 when we examine them more closely4 ,ask a man unskilled in questions of philosophy1 what extension is1 or space1 or time1 and he will wonder that you find any difficulty in things so clear4 ,and why8 ,because his first reflex act does not go beyond the ordinary idea of these objects1 or rather1 the use of this idea4 ,father ,buffier says1 in the chapter from which we quoted before3 ,dans toutes ces recherches de mtaphysique1 si embarasses en apparence1 il ne faut1 comme je l'ai dit d'abord1 que distinguer les ides les plus simples que nous avons dans l'esprit d'avec les noms qui y sont attachs par l'usage1 pour y dcouvrir ce qui nous doit tenir lieu de premire vrit leur sujet4 ,i do not deny that this observation presents a useful criterion2 but ,i cannot see in it so simple a means of solving the most difficult questions of philosophy4 ,for the difficulty is in distinguishing with exactness these simple ideas1 which1 because they constitute the foundation of our knowledge1 are1 for this very reason1 generally placed at a greater depth1 and covered over with a thousand different objects1 which hinder us from perceiving them clearly and distinctly1 ,father ,buffier was led astray by the very clearness of his explanation of time1 and believed he saw the bottom of the abyss1 when he only saw the reflection on its surface3 ,qu'est-ce que durer8 ,c'est exister sans tre dtruit3 voil l'explication la plus nette qu'on puisse donner de la dure2 mais le simple mot de dure fait comprendre la chose aussi clairement que cette explication4 ,outre l'ide de la dure1 nous avons l'ide de la mesure de la dure1 qui n'est pas la dure elle-mme1 bien que nous confondions souvent l'une avec l'autre2 comme il arrive d'ordinaire de confondre nos sentiments ou avec leurs effets1 ou avec leurs causes1 ou avec leurs autres circonstances4 ,or1 cette mesure de la dure n'est autre chose que ce que nous appelons le temps2 et le temps n'est que la rvolution rgulire de quelque chose de sensible1 comme du cours annuel du soleil1 ou du cours mensuel de la lune1 ou diurnal d'une aiguille sur le cadran d'une horloge4 ,l'attention que nous avons cette rvolution rgulire fait prcisment en nous l'ide du temps4 ,l'intervalle de cette rvolution se divisant en de moindres intervalles forme l'ide des parties du temps1 auxquelles nous donnons aussi le nom de temps plus long ou plus court1 selon les divers intervalles de la rvolution4 ,quand nous avons une fois acquis cette ide du temps1 nous l'appliquons toute la dure que nous concevons ou que nous supposons rpondre tel intervalle de la rvolution rgulire1 et par l nous donnons la dure mme le nom de temps1 appliquant le nom de de la mesure la chose mesure2 mais sans que la dure qu'on mesure soit au fond le temps auquel on la mesure1 et qui est une rvolution4 ,ainsi1 ,dieu a dur avant le temps1 c'est--dire a t sans cesser d'tre avant la cration du monde1 et avant la rvolution rgulire d'aucun corps4 ,here follows the passage already quoted1 where the author shows his surprise that the explanation of time has been found so difficult4 ,after giving his rule that the simplest ideas must be separated from the terms which custom has joined to them1 he concludes with these words3 ,par ces deux moyens nous trouvons tout d'un coup l'ide ou la notion de dure et de temps3 j'ai l'ide d'un tre en tant qu'il ne cesse pas d'tre1 c'est ce qui s'appelle dure2 j'ai l'ide de cette dure en tant qu'elle est mesure par la rvolution rgulire d'un corps ou par les intervalles de cette rvolution1 c'est ce que j'appelle temps4 ,il me semble que ces notions sont aussi claires qu'elles peuvent l'tre1 et celui qui cherche les claircir davantage est peu prs aussi peu sens que celui qui voudrait claircir comment deux fois deux font quatre et ne font pas cinq4 ,what explanation is contained in these passages8 ,i can see none4 ,duration1 says ,buffier1 is uninterrupted succession1 and time is the measure of this duration4 ,but he ought to have reflected that only what has quantity can be measured2 and consequently duration cannot he measured1 unless he supposes a length before the measure4 ,this is precisely what the difficulty consists in4 ,it is well known that time is measured by reference to the revolution of some quantity4 ,but what he ought to have explained was1 the nature of that which is measured1 of this quantity1 or length1 independently of the measure4 ,measure requires a greater and a less1 and this greater and less exists independently of all measure4 ,what1 then1 is the nature of this quantity1 of this greater and less8 ,father ,buffier observes1 that although there were no succession of thought in us1 and we should have only one thought1 we should still have the idea of duration as much as ever4 ,this is true1 if we make the idea of duration the same as the idea of uninterrupted existence4 ,but on this hypothesis we could not measure this duration1 and consequently could not have the idea of time4 ,in ,god1 says ,buffier1 there is no succession1 for1 does not his being endure always8 ,no doubt of it2 but this argument instead of confirming his doctrine1 only shows its weakness4 ,the duration of ,god cannot be measured unless we suppose a greater and less in the duration of necessary and infinite being4 ,therefore1 the idea of duration1 or uninterrupted existence1 does not give us the idea of time1 or of a duration that can be measured4 ,,on ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,the denial of all succession in eternity1 and making it all present1 without any past or future1 must not be regarded as a vain subtlety of the schools4 ,long before the scholastics this had been taught by the most eminent authors4 ,st4 ,augustine says3 ,idipsum enim tempus tu feceras3 nec prterire potuerunt tempora antequam faceres tempora4 ,si autem ante clum et terram nullum erat tempus1 cur quritur quid tunc faciebas8 ,non enim erat tunc1 ubi non erat tempus2 nec in tempore tempora prcedis2 alioquin non omnia tempora prcederes4 ,sed prcedis omnia tempora prterita1 celsitudine semper prsentis ternitatis3 et superas omnia futura2 quia et illa futura sunt2 et cum venerint prterita erunt2 tu autem idem ipse es1 et anni tui non deficient4 ,anni tui nec eunt1 nec veniunt3 isti autem nostri1 et eunt1 et veniunt1 ut omnes veniant4 ,anni tui omnes simul stant1 quoniam stant2 nec euntes venientibus excluduntur1 quia non transeunt3 isti autem nostri omnes erunt cum omnes non erunt4 ,anni tui dies unus3 et dies tuus non quotidie1 sed hodie3 quia hodiernus tuus non cedit crastino neque succedit hesterno4 ,hodiernus tuus ternitas2 ideo coternum genuisti1 cui dixisti3 ,ego hodie genui te4 ,omnia tempora tu fecisti1 et ante omnia tempora tu es1 nec aliquo tempore non erat tempus4 7,conf4 ,lib4 ,,xi41 cap4 xiii47 ,in another place we find the same doctrine in these terms3 ,anni ,dei ternitas ,dei est4 ternitas ipsa ,dei substantia est1 qu nihil habet mutabile4 ,ibi nihil est prteritum1 quasi jam non sit2 nihil est futurum1 quasi nondum sit4 ,non est ibi1 nisi est4 ,non est ibi1 fuit et erit1 quia et quod fuit jam non est2 et quod erit nondum est2 sed quidquid ibi est1 non nisi est4 7,in ,psal4 #aja2 ,serm4 #b1 num4 #aj47 ,plato was not ignorant of this truth1 and the holy fathers have constantly taught it4 ,when the scholastics adopted the definition of ,bothius1 that eternity is interminabilis vit tota simul et perfecta possessio1 they only embraced a doctrine as solid as it was universal4 ,it is difficult to explain these sublime ideas in a more lofty or a more profound manner than ,fenelon does in his ,treatise on the ,existence of ,god4#ii #ii ,,ii4 part1 ch4 ii41 #i4 ,c'est retomber dans l'ide du temps1 et confondre tout1 que de vouloir imaginer en ,dieu rien qui ait rapport aucune succession4 ,en lui rien ne dure1 parce que rien ne passe3 tout est fixe2 tout est la fois2 tout est immobile4 ,en ,dieu rien n'a t1 rien ne sera2 mais tout est4 ,supprimons donc pour lui toutes les questions que l'habitude et la faiblesse de l'esprit fini1 qui veut embrasser l'infini sa mode troite et raccourcie1 me tenterait de faire4 ,dirai-je1 mon ,dieu1 que vous aviez dj une ternit d'existence en vous-mme avant que vous m'eussiez cr1 et qu'il vous reste encore une autre ternit1 aprs ma cration1 o vous existez toujours8 ,ces mots de dj et d'aprs sont indignes de celui qui est4 ,vous ne pouvez souffrir aucun pass et aucun avenir en vous4 ,c'est une folie que de vouloir diviser votre ternit1 qui est une permanence indivisible3 c'est vouloir que le rivage s'enfuie1 parce qu'en descendant le long d'un fleuve1 je m'loigne toujours de ce rivage qui est immobile4 ,insens que je suis6 ,je veux1 immobile vrit1 vous attribuer l'tre born1 changeant et successif de votre crature6 ,vous n'avez en vous aucune mesure dont on puisse mesurer votre existence2 car elle n'a ni bornes ni parties2 vous n'avez rien de mesurable3 les mesures mme qu'on peut tirer des tres borns1 changeants1 divisibles et successifs1 ne peuvent servir vous mesurer1 vous qui tes infini1 indivisible1 immuable et permanent4 ,comment dirai-je donc que la courte dure de la crature est par rapport votre ternit8 ,n'tiez-vous pas avant moi8 ,ne serez-vous pas aprs moi8 ,ces paroles tendent signifier quelque vrit2 mais elles sont la rigueur indignes et impropres4 ,ce qu'elles ont de vrai1 c'est que l'infini surpasse infiniment le fini2 qu'ainsi votre existence infinie surpasse infiniment en tout sens mon existence1 qui1 tant borne1 a un commencement1 un prsent et un futur4 ,mais il est faux que la cration de votre ouvrage partage votre ternit en deux ternits4 ,deux ternits ne feraient pas plus qu'une seule3 une ternit partage1 qui aurait une partie antrieure et une partie postrieure1 ne serait plus une vritable ternit3 en voulant la multiplier1 on la dtruirait1 parce qu'une partie serait ncessairement la borne de l'autre par le bout o elles se toucheraient4 ,qui dit ternit1 s'il entend ce qu'il dit1 ne dit que ce qui est1 et rien au del2 car tout ce qu'on ajoute cette infinie simplicit l'anantit4 ,qui dit ternit ne souffre plus le langage du temps4 ,le temps et l'ternit sont incommensurables1 ils ne peuvent tre compars2 et on est sduit par sa propre faiblesse toutes les fois qu'on imagine quelque rapport entre des choses si disproportionnes4 ,vous avez nanmoins1 mon ,dieu1 fait quelque chose hors de vous2 car je ne suis pas vous1 et il s'en faut infiniment4 ,quand est-ce donc que vous m'avez fait8 ,est-ce que vous n'tiez pas avant que de me faire8 ,mais que dis-je8 ,me voil dj retomb dans mon illusion et dans les questions du temps4 ,je parle de vous comme de moi1 ou comme de quelque autre tre passager que je pourrais mesurer avec moi4 ,ce qui passe peut tre mesur avec ce qui passe2 mais ce qui ne passe point est hors de toute mesure et de toute comparaison avec ce qui passe3 il n'est permis de demander ni quand il a t1 ni s'il tait avant ce qui n'est pas1 ou qui n'est qu'en passant4 ,vous tes1 et c'est tout4 ,o que j'aime cette parole1 et qu'elle me remplit pour tout ce que j'ai connatre de vous6 ,vous tes celui qui est4 ,tout ce qui n'est point cette parole vous dgrade4 ,il n'y a qu'elle qui vous ressemble4 ,eu n'ajoutant rien au mot d'tre1 elle ne diminue rien de votre grandeur4 ,elle est1 je l'ose dire1 cette parole1 infiniment parfaite comme vous4 ,il n'y a que vous qui puissiez parler ainsi1 et renfermer votre infini dans trois mots si simples4 ,je ne suis pas1 mon ,dieu1 ce qui est4 ,hlas6 je suis presque ce qui n'est pas4 ,je me vois comme un milieu incomprhensible entre le nant et l'tre4 ,je suis celui qui a t2 je suis celui qui sera2 je suis celui qui n'est plus ce qu'il a t2 je suis celui qui n'est pas encore ce qu'il sera2 et dans cet entre-deux que je suis1 un je ne sais quoi qui ne peut s'arrter en soi1 qui n'a aucune consistance1 qui s'coule rapidement comme l'eau2 un je ne sais quoi que je ne puis saisir1 qui s'enfuit de mes propres mains1 qui n'est plus ds que je le veux saisir ou l'apercevoir2 un je ne sais quoi qui finit dans l'instant mme o il commence2 en sorte que je ne puis jamais un seul moment me trouver moi-mme1 fixe et prsent moi-mme1 pour dire simplement3 ,je suis4 ,ainsi1 ma dure n'est qu'une dfaillance perptuelle4 ,o que je suis loin de votre ternit qui est indivisible1 infinie1 et toujours prsente tout entire6 ,que je suis mme bien loign de la comprendre6 ,elle m'chappe force d'tre vraie1 simple et immense2 comme mon tre m'chappe force d'tre compos de parties1 ml de vrit et de mensonge1 d'tre et de nant4 ,c'est trop peu que de dire de vous que vous tiez des sicles infinis avant que je fusse4 ,j'aurais honte de parler ainsi2 car c'est mesurer l'infini avec le fini qui est un demi-nant4 ,quand je crains de dire que vous tiez avant que je fusse1 ce n'est pas pour douter que vous existant1 vous ne m'ayez cr1 moi qui n'existais pas3 mais c'est pour loigner de moi toutes les ides imparfaites qui sont au-dessus de vous4 ,dirai-je que vous tiez avant moi8 ,non2 car voil deux termes que je ne puis souffrir4 ,il ne faut pas dire1 vous tiez2 car vous tiez marque un temps pass et une succession4 ,vous tes3 et il n'y a qu'un prsent1 immobile1 indivisible et infini que l'on puisse vous attribuer1 pour parler dans la rigueur des termes4 ,il ne faut point dire que vous avez toujours t1 il faut dire que vous tes2 et ce terme de toujours1 qui est si fort pour la crature1 est trop faible pour vous2 car il marque une continuit et non une permanence4 ,il vaut mieux dire simplement et sans restriction1 que vous tes4 ,o ,etre6 ,etre6 votre ternit1 qui n'est que votre tre mme1 m'tonne2 mais elle me console4 ,je me trouve devant vous comme si je n'tais pas2 je m'abme dans votre infini2 et loin de mesurer votre permanence1 par rapport ma fluidit continuelle1 je commence me perdre de vue1 ne me trouver plus1 et ne voir en tout que ce qui est2 je veux dire vous-mme4 ,ce que j'ai dit du pass1 je le dis de mme de l'avenir4 ,on ne peut point dire que vous serez aprs ce qui passe2 car vous ne passez point4 ,ainsi1 vous ne serez prsent en parlant de vous4 ,on ne dit point d'un rivage immobile1 qu'il devance ou qu'il suit les flots d'une rivire3 il ne devance ni ne suit2 car il ne marche point4 ,ce que je remarque de ce rivage par rapport l'immobilit locale1 je le dois dire de l'tre infini par rapport l'immobilit d'existence4 ,ce qui passe a t et sera1 et passe du prtrit au futur par un prsent imperceptible1 qu'on ne peut jamais assigner4 ,mais ce qui ne passe point existe absolument1 et n'a qu'un prsent infini3 il est1 et c'est tout ce qu'il est permis d'en dire3 il est sans temps dans tous les temps de la cration4 ,quiconque sort de cette simplicit1 tombe de l'ternit dans le temps4 ,,note ,,to ,,book ,,eighth4 7#c7 ,perhaps some of my readers1 who are not well acquainted with the history of philosophy1 may think that ,i have extended the explanation of the idea of the infinite to too great length1 and consider these questions as serving rather to subtilize1 than to acquire solid knowledge4 ,this is a great mistake4 ,at all times the philosophical questions of the idea of the infinite have held a prominent position1 and at the present time there is scarcely any which require to be more carefully examined1 if we wish to stay the progress of pantheism4 ,i shall not cease to repeat that a great many of the most serious errors have their birth in a confusion in their fundamental ideas2 if one is well grounded in these ideas1 he has nothing to fear from certain works whose secret in leading one astray1 consists in using incomprehensible words1 or in giving a false sense to those which can be understood4 ,however this may be1 ,i would remind those who believe these questions mere scholastic cavils1 that they must regard as cavillers the most eminent philosophers of ancient and modern times4 ,,note ,,to ,,book ,,ninth4 7#d7 ,i know that some modern philosophers1 and more especially ,m4 ,cousin1 reject the accusation of pantheism1 and explain in their own way those passages of their works in which this error is professed4 ,as it is not possible for me to examine at any length1 a question which would require the insertion of long extracts1 ,i merely refer the reader to what ,i have said in the body of the work1 and with respect to ,m4 ,cousin1 to the extracts which ,i have made in my ,letters to a ,skeptic in ,matters of ,religion1 ,letter ,i4 ,it is not the fault of ,m4 ,cousin's adversaries that he has used such clear expressions that no man of sound judgment can doubt that they contain a full profession of pantheism4 ,leaving to the philosopher the responsibility of his intentions1 ,i shall only beg our young men not to judge lightly of the disputes of the neighboring kingdom1 which are not always received here through faithful organs2 and to withhold their faith from those who would attempt to persuade them that there is no ground for the alarms of men of sound philosophical doctrine4 ,,the ,,end4 99 99 99 99 99 ,transcriber's ,notes ,obvious typographical errors have been silently corrected4 ,variations in hyphenation have been standardised1 but other variations in spelling1 accents and punctuation are as in the original4 ,italics are represented thus italic4 #ah1 ,book ,,vii1 fourth paragraph ,a space whose parts are not continuous1 is not a space2 neither is a time whose parts are not continuous1 a space4 ,the final space has been changed to time4 ,footnote #fa read ,,iii4 ,th4 #e1 ,,ii41 p4 #bef44 ,from the context it appears that ,ib41 was omitted4 ,book ,x ,chapter #a4 ,the first sentence read #a4 ,beings are divided into two classes3 necessary and contingent2 necessary being is that which cannot be2 ,this has been changed to cannot but be2 ,the repetition of the title of each book on consecutive pages at the beginning has been removed4