,transcriber's note3 ,boldface text is  
enclosed in equals signs2    italicized 
text is enclosed in underscores4 ,other 
notes will be    found at the end of    
this e,book4            ,,kant',s       
,,critique ,,of ,,judgement             
,,macmillan ,,and ,,co41 ,,limited      
,,london  ,,bombay  ,,calcutta          
,,melbourne      ,,the ,,macmillan      
,,company    ,,new ,,york  ,,boston     
,,chicago    ,,dallas  ,,san ,,francisco
      ,,the ,,macmillan ,,co4 ,,of      
,,canada1 ,,ltd4    ,,toronto           
,,kant',s ,,critique ,,of    ,,judgement
      ,,translated    ,,with            
,,introduction ,,and ,,notes      ,,by  
,j4 ,h4 ,,bernard1 ,d4,d41 ,d4,c4,l4    
,,bishop ,,of ,,ossory      ,,sometime  
,,fellow ,,of ,,trinity ,,college1 ,,and
 ,,archbishop ,,king',s ,,professor     
,,of ,,divinity ,,in ,,the ,,university 
,,of ,,dublin        ,,second ,,edition1
 ,,revised        ,,macmillan ,,and     
,,co41 ,,limited    ,,st4 ,,martin',s   
,,street1 ,,london    #aiad             

,,copyright      ,first ,edition #ahib  
,second ,edition #aiad                  
,,contents                              
,,page    ,,editor',s ,,introduction    
xi      ,,preface                       
#a      ,,introduction                  
#g           ,i4 ,of the division of    
,philosophy                             
#g          ,,ii4 ,of the realm of      
,philosophy in general                  
#aa         ,,iii4 ,of the ,critique of 
,judgement as a means of combining the  
two parts of ,philosophy into a whole   
#ad          ,,iv4 ,of ,judgement as a  
faculty legislating a priori            
#ag           ,v4 ,the principle of the 
formal purposiveness of nature is a     
transcendental principle of ,judgement  
#bj          ,,vi4 ,of the combination  
of the feeling of pleasure with the     
concept of the purposiveness of nature  
#bg         ,,vii4 ,of the aesthetical  
representation of the purposiveness of  
nature                                  
#cj        ,,viii4 ,of the logical      

representation of the purposiveness of  
nature                                  
#ce          ,,ix4 ,of the connexion of 
the legislation of ,understanding with  
that of ,reason by means of the         
,judgement                  #ci         
,,first ,,part4--,,critique ,,of ,,the  
,,aesthetical ,,judgement               
#dc      ,first ,division4--,analytic of
 the ,aesthetical ,judgement            
#de      ,first ,book4--,analytic of the
 ,beautiful                             
#de      ,first ,moment of the judgement
 of taste1 according to quality         
#de        #a4 ,the judgement of taste  
is aesthetical                          
#de        #b4 ,the satisfaction which  
determines the judgement of taste is    
disinterested                           
#df        #c4 ,the satisfaction in the 
pleasant is bound up with interest      
#dh        #d4 ,the satisfaction in the 
good is bound up with interest          
#ej        #e4 ,comparison of the three 
specifically different kinds of         

satisfaction                            
#ec      ,second ,moment of the         
judgement of taste1 viz4 according to   
quantity                                
#ee        #f4 ,the ,beautiful is that  
which apart from concepts is            
represented as the object of a universal
 satisfaction       #ee        #g4      
,comparison of the ,beautiful with the  
,pleasant and the ,good            by   
means of the above characteristic       
#eg        #h4 ,the universality of the 
satisfaction is represented in a        
judgement of ,taste only as subjective  
#ei        #i4 ,investigation of the    
question whether in a judgement of      
taste the feeling of pleasure precedes  
or follows the            judging of the
 object                                 
#fc      ,third ,moment of judgements of
 taste according to the relation      of
 the purposes which are brought into    
consideration therein      #fg          
#aj4 ,of purposiveness in general       
#fg       #aa4 ,the judgement of taste  

has nothing at its basis but the        
form of the purposiveness of an object  
7or of its mode of                      
representation7                         
#fi       #ab4 ,the judgement of taste  
rests on a priori grounds            #gj
       #ac4 ,the pure judgement of taste
 is independent of charm and            
emotion                                 
#gb       #ad4 ,elucidation by means of 
examples                                
#gc       #ae4 ,the judgement of taste  
is quite independent of the concept     
of perfection                           
#gg       #af4 ,the judgement of taste1 
by which an object is declared to       
be beautiful under the condition of a   
definite concept1            is not pure
                                        
#ha       #ag4 ,of the ,ideal of ,beauty
                                        
#hd      ,fourth ,moment of the         
judgement of taste1 according to the    
modality of the satisfaction in the     
object                        #ia       

#ah4 ,what the modality in a judgement  
of taste is                  #ia        
#ai4 ,the subjective necessity which we 
ascribe to the judgement            of  
taste is conditioned                    
#ib       #bj4 ,the condition of        
necessity which a judgement of taste    
asserts is the ,idea of a common sense  
#ib       #ba4 ,have we ground for      
presupposing a common sense8            
#ic       #bb4 ,the necessity of the    
universal agreement that is thought     
in a judgement of taste is a subjective 
necessity1 which            is          
represented as objective under the      
presupposition of a            common   
sense                                   
#id      ,general remark on the first   
section of the ,analytic                
#if      ,second ,book4--,analytic of   
the ,sublime                            
#aja       #bc4 ,transition from the    
faculty which judges of the ,beautiful  
to that which judges of the ,sublime    
#aja       #bd4 ,of the divisions of an 

investigation into the feeling of       
the ,sublime                            
#aje      ,a4--,of the ,mathematically  
,sublime                                
#ajf       #be4 ,explanation of the term
 8,sublime0                             
#ajf       #bf4 ,of that estimation of  
the magnitude of natural things         
which is requisite for the ,idea of the 
,sublime             #aaj       #bg4 ,of
 the quality of the satisfaction in our 
judgements upon            the ,sublime 
#aai      ,b4--,of the ,dynamically     
,sublime in ,nature                     
#abc       #bh4 ,of ,nature regarded as 
,might                                  
#abc       #bi4 ,of the modality of the 
judgement upon the sublime in           
nature                                  
#acj      ,general remark upon the      
exposition of the aesthetical           
reflective ,judgement                   
#acb      ,deduction of pure aesthetical
 judgements                       #aej  
#cj4 ,the ,deduction of aesthetical     

judgements on the objects of            
nature must not be directed to what we  
call ,sublime in            nature1 but 
only to the ,beautiful                  
#aej       #ca4 ,of the method of       
deduction of judgements of taste        
#aeb       #cb4 ,first peculiarity of   
the judgement of taste                  
#aed       #cc4 ,second peculiarity of  
the judgement of taste                  
#aeg       #cd4 ,there is no objective  
principle of taste possible             
#aei       #ce4 ,the principle of ,taste
 is the subjective principle of         
,judgement in general                   
#afa       #cf4 ,of the problem of a    
,deduction of judgements of ,taste      
#afb       #cg4 ,what is properly       
asserted a priori of an object in a     
judgement of taste                      
#afd       #ch4 ,deduction of judgements
 of taste                               
#afe       #ci4 ,of the communicability 
of a sensation                          
#afg       #dj4 ,of taste as a kind of  

sensus communis                         
#afi       #da4 ,of the empirical       
interest in the ,beautiful              
#agc       #db4 ,of the intellectual    
interest in the ,beautiful              
#agf       #dc4 ,of ,art in general     
#ahc       #dd4 ,of beautiful ,art      
#ahe       #de4 ,beautiful art is an art
 in so far as it seems like nature      
#ahg       #df4 ,beautiful art is the   
art of genius                           
#ahh       #dg4 ,elucidation and        
confirmation of the above explanation of
            ,genius                     
#aij       #dh4 ,of the relation of     
,genius to ,taste                       
#aic       #di4 ,of the faculties of the
 mind that constitute ,genius           
#aig       #ej4 ,of the combination of  
,taste with ,genius in the products of  
beautiful ,art                          
#bje       #ea4 ,of the division of the 
beautiful arts                          
#bjf       #eb4 ,of the combination of  
beautiful arts in one and the same      

product                                 
#bad       #ec4 ,comparison of the      
respective aesthetical worth of the     
beautiful arts                          
#bae       #ed4 ,remark                 
#bbj      ,second ,division4--,dialectic
 of the ,aesthetical ,judgement         
#bbi       #ee4                         
#bbi       #ef4 ,representation of the  
antinomy of ,taste                      
#bcj       #eg4 ,solution of the        
antinomy of ,taste                      
#bca       #eh4 ,of the ,idealism of the
 purposiveness of both ,nature and ,art 
as the unique principle of the          
aesthetical ,judgement       #bda       
#ei4 ,of ,beauty as the symbol of       
,morality                          #bdh 
#fj4 ,appendix3--,of the method of      
,taste                          #bec    
,,second ,,part4--,,critique ,,of ,,the 
,,teleological ,,judgement              
#beg       #fa4 ,of the objective       
purposiveness of ,nature                
#bei      ,first ,division4--,analytic  

of the ,teleological ,judgement         
#bfb       #fb4 ,of the objective       
purposiveness which is merely formal as 
distinguished from that which is        
material                  #bfb          
#fc4 ,of the relative1 as distinguished 
from the inner1            purposiveness
 of nature                              
#bfh       #fd4 ,of the peculiar        
character of things as natural purposes 
#bgb       #fe4 ,things regarded as     
natural purposes are organised beings   
#bge       #ff4 ,of the principle of    
judging of internal purposiveness in    
organised beings                        
#bhj       #fg4 ,of the principle of the
 teleological judging of nature in      
general as a system of purposes         
#bhb       #fh4 ,of the principle of    
,teleology as internal principle of     
natural science                         
#bhg      ,second ,division4--,dialectic
 of the ,teleological ,judgement        
#bib       #fi4 ,what is an antinomy of 
the ,judgement8                         

#bib       #gj4 ,representation of this 
antinomy                                
#bic       #ga4 ,preliminary to the     
solution of the above antinomy          
#bif       #gb4 ,of the different       
systems which deal with the             
purposiveness            of ,nature     
#bih       #gc4 ,none of the above      
systems give what they pretend          
#cjb       #gd4 ,the reason that we     
cannot treat the concept of a ,technic  
of nature dogmatically is the fact that 
a natural purpose            is         
inexplicable                            
#cjf       #ge4 ,the concept of an      
objective purposiveness of nature is a  
critical principle of ,reason for the   
reflective            ,judgement        
#cji       #gf4 ,remark                 
#cac       #gg4 ,of the peculiarity of  
the human ,understanding1 by means of   
which the concept of a natural purpose  
is possible         #cai       #gh4 ,of 
the union of the principle of the       
universal mechanism of            matter

 with the teleological principle in the 
,technic of            nature           
#cbf      ,appendix4--,methodology of   
the ,teleological ,judgement            
#ccd       #gi4 ,whether ,teleology must
 be treated as if it belonged to the    
doctrine of nature                      
#ccd       #hj4 ,of the necessary       
subordination of the mechanical to the  
teleological principle in the           
explanation of a thing as            a  
natural purpose                         
#ccf       #ha4 ,of the association of  
mechanism with the teleological         
principle in the explanation of a       
natural purpose as a            natural 
product                                 
#cdb       #hb4 ,of the teleological    
system in the external relations of     
organised beings                        
#cdf       #hc4 ,of the ultimate purpose
 of nature as a teleological system     
#ceb       #hd4 ,of the final purpose of
 the existence of a world1 i4e4         
of creation itself                      

#cei       #he4 ,of ,physico-theology   
#cfb       #hf4 ,of ,ethico-theology    
#cgj       #hg4 ,of the moral proof of  
the ,being of ,god                      
#cgg       #hh4 ,limitation of the      
validity of the moral proof             
#chd       #hi4 ,of the use of the moral
 argument                               
#cib       #ij4 ,of the kind of belief  
in a teleological proof of the ,being   
of ,god                                 
#cie       #ia4 ,of the kind of belief  
produced by a practical faith           
#djc      ,general remark on ,teleology 
#dad          ,,editor',s ,,introduction
      ,there are not wanting indications
 that public interest in the ,critical  
,philosophy has been quickened of recent
 days in these countries1 as  well as in
 ,america4 ,to lighten the toil of      
penetrating through the  wilderness of  
,kant's long sentences1 the ,english    
student has now many  aids1 which those 
who began their studies fifteen or      
twenty years  ago did not enjoy4        

,translations1 paraphrases1 criticisms1 
have been  published in considerable    
numbers2 so that if it is not yet true  
that  8he who runs may read10 it may at 
least be said that a patient student  of
 ordinary industry and intelligence has 
his way made plain before  him4 ,and yet
 the very number of aids is dangerous4  
,whatever may be the  value of short and
 easy handbooks in other departments of 
science1  it is certain that no man will
 become a philosopher1 no man will  even
 acquire a satisfactory knowledge of the
 history of philosophy1  without        
personal and prolonged study of the     
ipsissima verba of the  great masters of
 human thought4 8,above all10 said      
,schopenhauer1 8my  truth-seeking young 
friends1 beware of letting our          
professors tell  you what is contained  
in the ,critique of the ,pure ,reason02 
and the  advice has not become less     
wholesome with the lapse of years4 ,the 
fact1  however1 that many persons have  
not sufficient familiarity with ,german 

to enable them to study ,german         
,philosophy in the original with ease1  
makes translations an educational       
necessity2 and this translation of      
,kant's ,critique of the faculty of     
,judgement has been undertaken in the   
hope that it may promote a more general 
study of that masterpiece4 ,if  any     
reader wishes to follow ,schopenhauer's 
advice1 he has only to omit  the whole  
of this prefatory matter and proceed at 
once to the ,author's  laborious        
,introduction4    ,it is somewhat       
surprising that the ,critique of        
,judgement has never  yet been made     
accessible to the ,english reader4 ,dr4 
,watson has indeed  translated a few    
selected passages1 so also has ,dr4     
,caird in his  valuable account of the  
,kantian philosophy1 and ,i have found  
their  renderings of considerable       
service2 but the space devoted by both  
writers to the ,critique of ,judgement  
is very small in comparison  with that  
given to the ,critiques of ,pure and    

,practical ,reason4 ,and  yet the work  
is not an unimportant one4 ,kant himself
 regarded it as  the coping-stone of his
 critical edifice2 it even formed the   
point  of departure for his successors1 
,fichte1 ,schelling and ,hegel1 in the  
construction of their respective        
systems4 ,possibly the reason of  its   
comparative neglect lies in its         
repulsive style4 ,kant was never        
careful of style1 and in his later years
 he became more and more  enthralled by 
those technicalities and refined        
distinctions which deter  so many from  
the ,critical ,philosophy even in its   
earlier sections4  ,these 8symmetrical  
architectonic amusements10 as           
,schopenhauer called  them1 encumber    
every page of ,kant's later writings1   
and they are a  constant source of      
embarrassment to his unhappy translator4
 ,for1 as  every translator knows1 no   
single word in one language exactly     
covers  any single word in another2 and 
yet if ,kant's distinctions are to be   

preserved it is necessary to select with
 more or less arbitrariness  ,english   
equivalents for ,german technical terms1
 and retain them all  through4          
,instances of this will be given later  
on2 ,i only remark  here on the fact    
that ,kant's besetting sin of           
over-technicality is  especially        
conspicuous in this treatise4           
,another fault--an old fault of         
,kant--apparent after reading even a few
  pages1 is that repetitions are very   
frequent of the same thought in but     
slightly varied language4 ,arguments are
 repeated over and over again  until    
they become quite wearisome2 and then   
when the reader's attention  has        
flagged1 and he is glancing cursorily   
down the page1 some important  new point
 is introduced without emphasis1 as if  
the author were really  anxious to keep 
his meaning to himself at all hazards4  
,a book written  in such fashion rarely 
attracts a wide circle of readers4 ,and 
yet1 not  only did ,goethe think highly 

of it1 but it received a large measure  
of attention in ,france as well as in   
,germany on its first appearance4       
,originally published at ,berlin in     
#agij1 a ,second ,edition was called    
for in #agic2 and a ,french translation 
was made by ,imhoff in #agif4 ,other    
,french versions are those by ,keratry  
and ,weyland in #ahbc1 and by ,barni  in
 #ahdf4 ,this last ,i have had before me
 while performing my task1 but  ,i have 
not found it of much service2 the older 
,french translations  ,i have not seen4 
,the existence of these ,french         
versions1 when taken  in connexion with 
the absence until very recently of any  
systematic  account of the ,critique of 
,judgement in ,english1 may be perhaps  
explained by the lively interest that   
was taken on the ,continent in the      
,philosophy of ,art in the early part of
 the century2 whereas scientific        
studies on this subject received little 
attention in ,england during the  same  
period4    ,the student of the ,critique

 of ,pure ,reason will remember how     
closely1  in his ,transcendental ,logic1
 ,kant follows the lines of the ordinary
  logic of the schools4 ,he finds his   
whole plan ready made for him1 as  it   
were2 and he proceeds to work out the   
metaphysical principles which  underlie 
the process of syllogistic reasoning4   
,and as there are three  propositions in
 every syllogism1 he points out that1 in
 correspondence  with this triplicity1  
the higher faculties of the soul may be 
regarded  as threefold4 ,the            
,understanding or the faculty of        
concepts gives us our  major premise1 as
 it supplies us in the first instance   
with a general  notion4 ,by means of the
 ,judgement we see that a particular    
case comes  under the general rule1 and 
by the ,reason we draw our conclusion4  
,these1 as three distinct movements in  
the process of reasoning1  are regarded 
by ,kant as indicating three distinct   
faculties1 with  which the ,analytic of 
,concepts1 the ,analytic of ,principles1

 and the  ,dialectic are respectively   
concerned4 ,the full significance of    
this  important classification does not 
seem1 however1 to have occurred  to     
,kant at the time1 as we may see from   
the order in which he wrote  his great  
books4#a ,the first problem which       
arrests the attention  of all modern    
philosophers is1 of course1 the problem 
of knowledge1  its conditions and its   
proper objects4 ,and in the ,critique of
 ,pure  ,reason this is discussed1 and  
the conclusion is reached that nature   
as phenomenon is the only object of     
which we can hope to acquire any  exact 
knowledge4 ,but it is apparent that     
there are other problems which  merit   
consideration2 a complete philosophy    
includes practice as well  as theory2 it
 has to do not only with logic1 but with
 life4 ,and thus  the ,critique of      
,practical ,reason was written1 in which
 is unfolded  the doctrine of man's     
freedom standing in sharp contrast with 
the  necessity of natural law4 ,here1   

then1 it seems at first sight as if we  
had covered the whole field of human    
activity4 ,for we have investigated  the
 sources of knowledge1 and at the same  
time have pointed out the  conditions of
 practical life1 and have seen that the 
laws of freedom  are just as true in    
their own sphere as are the laws of     
nature4    ,but as we reflect on our    
mental states we find that here no      
proper  account has been given of the   
phenomena of feeling1 which play so     
large a part in experience4 ,and this   
,kant saw before he had proceeded  very 
far with the ,critique of ,practical    
,reason2 and in consequence  he adopted 
a threefold classification of the higher
 mental faculties  based on that given  
by previous psychologists4 ,knowledge1  
feeling1  desire1 these are the three   
ultimate modes of consciousness1 of     
which  the second has not yet been      
described4 ,and when we compare this    
with  the former triple division which  
we took up from the ,aristotelian       

logic1 we see that the parallelism is   
significant4 ,understanding is  par     
excellence the faculty of knowledge1 and
 ,reason the faculty of  desire 7these  
points are developed in ,kant's first   
two ,critiques74 ,and  this suggests    
that the ,judgement corresponds to the  
feeling of pleasure  and pain2 it       
occupies a position intermediate between
 ,understanding  and ,reason1 just as1  
roughly speaking1 the feeling of        
pleasure is  intermediate between our   
perception of an object and our desire  
to  possess it4    ,and so the ,critique
 of ,judgement completes the whole      
undertaking  of criticism2 its endeavour
 is to show that there are a priori     
principles at the basis of ,judgement   
just as there are in the case  of       
,understanding and of ,reason2 that     
these principles1 like the  principles  
of ,reason1 are not constitutive but    
only regulative of  experience1 i4e4    
that they do not teach us anything      
positive about  the characteristics of  

objects1 but only indicate the          
conditions under  which we find it      
necessary to view them2 and lastly1 that
 we are thus  furnished with an a priori
 philosophy of pleasure4    ,the        
fundamental principle underlying the    
procedure of the ,judgement is  seen to 
be that of the purposiveness of ,nature2
 nature is everywhere  adapted to ends  
or purposes1 and thus constitutes a 1 a 
well-ordered whole4 ,by this means1     
nature is regarded by us as if  its     
particular empirical laws were not      
isolated and disparate1 but  connected  
and in relation1 deriving their unity in
 seeming diversity  from an intelligence
 which is at the source of nature4 ,it  
is only  by the assumption of such a    
principle that we can construe nature   
to ourselves2 and the principle is then 
said to be a transcendental  condition  
of the exercise of our judging faculty1 
but valid only for  the reflective1 not 
for the determinant ,judgement4 ,it     
gives us pleasure  to view nature in    

this way2 just as the contemplation of  
chaos would be  painful4    ,but this   
purposiveness may be only formal and    
subjective1 or real  and objective4 ,in 
some cases the purposiveness resides in 
the felt  harmony and accordance of the 
form of the object with the cognitive   
faculties2 in others the form of the    
object is judged to harmonise  with the 
purpose in view in its existence4 ,that 
is to say1 in the one  case we judge the
 form of the object to be purposive1 as 
in the case  of a flower1 but could not 
explain any purpose served by it2 in the
  other case we have a definite notion  
of what it is adapted for4 ,in the      
former case the aesthetical ,judgement  
is brought to bear1 in the latter  the  
teleological2 and it thus appears that  
the ,critique of ,judgement  has two    
main divisions2 it treats first of the  
philosophy of ,taste1 the  ,beautiful   
and the ,sublime in ,nature2 and        
secondly1 of the ,teleology of  nature's
 working4 ,it is a curious literary     

parallel that ,st4 ,augustine  hints    
7,confessions iv4 #ae7 that he had      
written a book1 ,de ,pulchro  et pto1 in
 which these apparently distinct topics 
were combined2  8pulchrum esse1 quod per
 se ipsum2 aptum1 autem1 quod ad aliquid
  accommodatum deceret40 ,a beautiful   
object has no purpose external to       
itself and the observer2 but a useful   
object serves further ends4 ,both1      
however1 may be brought under the higher
 category of things that are  reckoned  
purposive by the ,judgement4    ,we have
 here then1 in the first place1 a basis 
for an a priori  ,philosophy of ,taste2 
and ,kant works out its details with    
great  elaboration4 ,he borrowed little 
from the writings of his predecessors1  
but struck out1 as was ever his plan1 a 
line of his own4 ,he quotes  with       
approval from ,burke's ,treatise on the 
,sublime and ,beautiful1  which was     
accessible to him in a ,german          
translation2 but is careful to  remark  
that it is as psychology1 not as        

philosophy1 that ,burke's work  has     
value4 ,he may have read in addition    
,hutcheson's ,inquiry which  had also   
been translated into ,german2 and he was
 complete master of  ,hume's opinions4  
,of other writers on ,beauty1 he only   
names ,batteux and  ,lessing4 ,batteux  
was a ,french writer of repute who had  
attempted a  twofold arrangement of the 
,arts as they may be brought under      
,space and  under ,time respectively1 a 
mode of classification which would      
naturally  appeal to ,kant4 ,he does not
 seem1 however1 to have read the ancient
  text-book on the subject1 ,aristotle's
 ,poetics1 the principles of  which     
,lessing declared to be as certain as   
,euclid4    ,following the guiding      
thread of the categories1 he declares   
that  the aesthetical judgement about   
,beauty is according to quality         
disinterested2 a point which had been   
laid down by such different  writers as 
,hutcheson and ,moses ,mendelssohn4 ,as 
to quantity1 the  judgement about beauty

 gives universal satisfaction1 although 
it is  based on no definite concept4    
,the universality is only subjective2   
but  still it is there4 ,the maxim      
,trahit sua quemque voluptas does not   
apply to the pleasure afforded by a pure
 judgement about beauty4 ,as to         
relation1 the characteristic of the     
object called beautiful is that  it     
betrays a purposiveness without definite
 purpose4 ,the pleasure is  a priori1   
independent on the one hand of the      
charms of sense or the  emotions of mere
 feeling1 as ,winckelmann had already   
declared2 and  on the other hand is a   
pleasure quite distinct from that taken 
which  we feel when viewing perfection1 
with which ,wolff and ,baumgarten had   
identified it4 ,by his distinction      
between free and dependent beauty1      
which we also find in the pages of      
,hutcheson1 ,kant further develops  his 
doctrine of the freedom of the pure     
judgement of taste from the  thraldom of
 concepts4    ,finally1 the satisfaction

 afforded by the contemplation of a     
beautiful  object is a necessary        
satisfaction4 ,this necessity is not1 to
 be sure1  theoretical like the         
necessity attaching to the ,law of      
,causality2 nor  is it a practical      
necessity as is the need to assume the  
,moral ,law as  the guiding principle of
 conduct4 ,but it may be called         
exemplary2  that is1 we may set up our  
satisfaction in a beautiful picture as  
setting an example to be followed by    
others4 ,it is plain1 however1  that    
this can only be assumed under certain  
presuppositions4 ,we must  presuppose   
the idea of a sensus communis or common 
sense in which all  men share4 ,as      
knowledge admits of being communicated  
to others1 so also  does the feeling for
 beauty4 ,for the relation between the  
cognitive  faculties requisite for      
,taste is also requisite for            
,intelligence or  sound ,understanding1 
and as we always presuppose the latter  
to be the  same in others as in         

ourselves1 so may we presuppose the     
former4    ,the analysis of the ,sublime
 which follows that of the ,beautiful is
  interesting and profound2 indeed      
,schopenhauer regarded it as the  best  
part of the ,critique of the            
,aesthetical ,judgement4 ,the general   
characteristics of our judgements about 
the ,sublime are similar to  those      
already laid down in the case of the    
,beautiful2 but there  are marked       
differences in the two cases4 ,if the   
pleasure taken in  beauty arises from a 
feeling of the purposiveness of the     
object in  its relation to the subject1 
that in sublimity rather expresses a    
purposiveness of the subject in respect 
of the object4 ,nothing in  nature is   
sublime2 and the sublimity really       
resides in the mind and  there alone4   
,indeed1 as true ,beauty is found1      
properly speaking1 only  in beauty of   
form1 the idea of sublimity is excited  
rather by those  objects which are      
formless and exhibit a violation of     

purpose4    ,a distinction not needed in
 the case of the ,beautiful becomes     
necessary when we proceed to further    
analyse the ,sublime4 ,for in           
aesthetical judgements about the        
,beautiful the mind is in restful       
contemplation2 but in the case of the   
,sublime a mental movement is  excited  
7pp4 #aje and #abj74 ,this movement1 as 
it is pleasing1 must  involve a         
purposiveness in the harmony of the     
mental powers2 and the  purposiveness   
may be either in reference to the       
faculty of cognition  or to that of     
desire4 ,in the former case the sublime 
is called the  ,mathematically          
,sublime--the sublime of mere           
magnitude--the absolutely  great2 in the
 latter it is the sublime of power1 the 
,dynamically  ,sublime4 ,gioberti1 an   
,italian writer on the philosophy of    
,taste1 has  pushed this distinction so 
far as to find in it an explanation of  
the  relation between ,beauty and       
,sublimity4 8,the dynamical ,sublime10  

he  says1 8creates the ,beautiful2 the  
mathematical ,sublime contains it10 a   
remark with which probably ,kant would  
have no quarrel4    ,in both cases1     
however1 we find that the feeling of the
 ,sublime awakens  in us a feeling of   
the supersensible destination of man4   
8,the very  capacity of conceiving the  
sublime10 he tells us1 8indicates a     
mental  faculty that far surpasses every
 standard of sense40 ,and to explain    
the necessity belonging to our          
judgements about the sublime1 ,kant     
points out that as we find ourselves    
compelled to postulate a sensus         
communis to account for the agreement of
 men in their appreciation of  beautiful
 objects1 so the principle underlying   
their consent in judging  of the sublime
 is 8the presupposition of the moral    
feeling in man40 ,the  feeling of the   
sublimity of our own moral destination  
is the necessary  prerequisite for      
forming such judgements4 ,the connexion 
between ,beauty  and ,goodness involved 

to a ,greek in the double sense of the  
word   is developed by ,kant with keen  
insight4 ,to feel interest in the beauty
  of ,nature he regards as a mark of a  
moral disposition1 though he will  not  
admit that the same inference may be    
drawn as to the character  of the art   
connoisseur 7 #db74 ,but it is specially
 with reference to  the connexion       
between the capacity for appreciating   
the ,sublime1 and  the moral feeling1   
that the originality of ,kant's         
treatment becomes  apparent4    ,the    
objects of nature1 he continues1 which  
we call sublime1 inspire us  with a     
feeling of pain rather than of pleasure2
 as ,lucretius has it--              ,me
 quaedam divina voluptas      ,percipit 
atque horror4    ,but this 8horror0 must
 not inspire actual fear4 ,as no        
extraneous  charm must mingle with the  
satisfaction felt in a beautiful object1
  if the judgement about beauty is to   
remain pure2 so in the case of  the     
sublime we must not be afraid of the    

object which yet in certain  aspects is 
fearful4    ,this conception of the     
feelings of sublimity excited by the    
loneliness  of an ,alpine peak or the   
grandeur of an earthquake is now a      
familiar  one2 but it was not so in     
,kant's day4 ,switzerland had not then  
become  the recreation-ground of        
,europe2 and though natural beauty was a
  familiar topic with poets and painters
 it was not generally recognised  that  
taste has also to do with the sublime4  
,de ,saussure's ,travels1  ,haller's    
poem ,die ,alpen1 and this work of      
,kant's mark the beginning  of a new    
epoch in our ways of looking at the     
sublime and terrible  aspects of        
,nature4 ,and it is not a little        
remarkable that the man who  could write
 thus feelingly about the emotions      
inspired by grand and  savage scenery1  
had never seen a mountain in his life4  
,the power and  the insight of his      
observations here are in marked contrast
 to the  poverty of some of his remarks 

about the characteristics of beauty4    
,for  instance1 he puts forward the     
curious doctrine that colour in a       
picture  is only an extraneous charm1   
and does not really add to the beauty   
of the form delineated1 nay rather      
distracts the mind from it4 ,his        
criticisms on this point1 if sound1     
would make ,flaxman a truer artist  than
 ,titian or ,paolo ,veronese4 ,but      
indeed his discussion of ,painting or   
,music is not very appreciative2 he was1
 to the end1 a creature of pure         
,reason4    ,upon the analysis he gives 
of the ,arts1 little need be said here4 
,fine  ,art is regarded as the ,art of  
,genius1 8that innate mental disposition
  through which ,nature gives the rule  
to ,art0 7 #df74 ,art differs  from     
,science in the absence of definite     
concepts in the mind of the  artist4 ,it
 thus happens that the great artist can 
rarely communicate  his methods2 indeed 
he cannot explain them even to himself4 
,poeta  nascitur1 non fit2 and the same 

is true in every form of fine art4      
,genius is1 in short1 the faculty of    
presenting aesthetical ,ideas2 an       
aesthetical ,idea being an intuition of 
the ,imagination1 to which no  concept  
is adequate4 ,and it is by the          
excitation of such ineffable  ,ideas    
that a great work of art affects us4 ,as
 ,bacon tells us1 8that is  the best    
part of ,beauty which a picture cannot  
express2 no1 nor the  first sight of the
 eye40 ,this characteristic of the      
artistic genius  has been noted by all  
who have thought upon art2 more is      
present in  its productions than can be 
perfectly expressed in language4 ,as    
,pliny  said of ,timanthus the painter  
of ,iphigenia1 8,in omnibus ejus        
operibus  intelligitur plus super quam  
pingitur40 ,but this genius requires to 
be  kept in check by taste2 quite in the
 spirit of the  of the  best ,greek art1
 ,kant remarks that if in a work of art 
some feature must  be sacrificed1 it is 
better to lose something of genius than 

to violate  the canons of taste4 ,it is 
in this self-mastery that 8the sanity of
  true genius0 expresses itself4    ,the
 main question with which the ,critique 
of ,judgement is concerned  is1 of      
course1 the question as to the          
purposiveness1 the  ,zweckmssigkeit1    
exhibited by nature4 ,that nature       
appears to be  full of purpose is mere  
matter of fact4 ,it displays            
purposiveness  in respect of our        
faculties of cognition1 in those of its 
phenomena  which we designate beautiful4
 ,and also in its organic products we   
observe methods of operation which we   
can only explain by describing  them as 
processes in which means are used to    
accomplish certain  ends1 as processes  
that are purposive4 ,in our observation 
of  natural phenomena1 as ,kuno ,fischer
 puts it1 we judge their forms          
aesthetically1 and their life           
teleologically4    ,as regards the first
 kind of ,zweckmssigkeit1 that which is 
ohne  ,zweck--the purposiveness of a    

beautiful object which does not seem to 
be directed to any external end--there  
are two ways in which we may  account   
for it4 ,we may either say that it was  
actually designed to  be beautiful by   
the ,supreme ,force behind ,nature1 or  
we may say that  purposiveness is not   
really resident in nature1 but that our 
perception  of it is due to the         
subjective needs of our judging faculty4
 ,we have  to contemplate beautiful     
objects as if they were purposive1 but  
they  may not be so in reality4 ,and    
this latter idealistic doctrine is what 
,kant falls back upon4 ,he appeals in   
support of it1 to the phenomena of      
crystallisation 7pp4 #bdc sqq471 in     
which many very beautiful forms  seem to
 be produced by merely mechanical       
processes4 ,the beauty of a  rock       
crystal is apparently produced without  
any forethought on the  part of nature1 
and he urges that we are not justified  
in asserting  dogmatically that any laws
 distinct from those of mechanism are   

needed  to account for beauty in other  
cases4 ,mechanism can do so much2 may it
  not do all8 ,and he brings forward as 
a consideration which ought to  settle  
the question1 the fact that in judging  
of beauty 8we invariably  seek its gauge
 in ourselves a priori02 we do not learn
 from nature1  but from ourselves1 what 
we are to find beautiful4 ,mr4 ,kennedy 
in his  ,donnellan ,lectures has here   
pointed out several weak spots in       
,kant's  armour4 ,in the first place1   
the fact that we seek the gauge of      
beauty  in our own mind 8may be shown   
from his own definition to be a         
necessary  result of the very nature of 
beauty40#b ,for ,kant tells us that the 
aesthetical judgement about beauty      
always involves 8a reference of the     
representation to the subject02 and this
 applies equally to judgements  about   
the beautiful in ,art and the beautiful 
in ,nature4 ,but no one  could maintain 
that from this definition it follows    
that we are not  compelled to postulate 

design in the mind of the artist who    
paints a  beautiful picture4 ,and thus  
as the fact that 8we always seek the    
gauge  of beauty0 in ourselves does not 
do away with the belief in a designing  
mind when we are contemplating works of 
art1 it cannot be said to  exclude the  
belief in a ,master ,hand which moulded 
the forms of ,nature4  ,as ,cicero has  
it1 nature is 8non artificiosa solum1   
sed plane artifex40  ,but the cogency of
 this reasoning1 for the details of     
which ,i must  refer the reader to ,mr4 
,kennedy's pages1 becomes more apparent 
when  we reflect on that second form of 
purposiveness1 viz4 adaptation to       
definite ends1 with which we meet in the
 phenomena of organic life4    ,if we   
watch1 e4g4 the growth of a tree we     
perceive that its various  parts are not
 isolated and unconnected1 but that on  
the contrary they  are only possible by 
reference to the idea of the whole4     
,each limb  affects every other1 and is 
reciprocally affected by it2 in short   

8in  such a product of nature every part
 not only exists by means of the  other 
parts1 but is thought as existing for   
the sake of the others  and the whole0  
7p4 #bgg74 ,the operations of nature in 
organised bodies  seem to be of an      
entirely different character from mere  
mechanical  processes2 we cannot        
construe them to ourselves except under 
the  hypothesis that nature in them is  
working towards a designed end4  ,the   
distinction between nature's 8,technic0 
or purposive operation1  and nature's   
,mechanism is fundamental for the       
explanation of natural  law4 ,the       
language of biology eloquently shows the
 impossibility of  eliminating at least 
the idea of purpose from our            
investigations into  the phenomena of   
life1 growth1 and reproduction4 ,and    
,kant dismisses  with scant respect that
 cheap and easy philosophy which would  
fain  deny the distinctiveness of       
nature's purposive operation4 ,a        
doctrine1  like that of ,epicurus1 in   

which every natural phenomenon is       
regarded  as the result of the blind    
drifting of atoms in accordance with    
purely  mechanical laws1 really explains
 nothing1 and least of all explains     
that illusion in our teleological       
judgements which leads us to assume     
purpose where really there is none4     
,it has been urged by ,kirchmann and    
others that this distinction  between   
,technic and ,mechanism1 on which ,kant 
lays so much stress1  has been disproved
 by the progress of modern science4 ,the
 doctrines1  usually associated with the
 name of ,darwin1 of ,natural ,selection
 and  ,survival of the ,fittest1 quite  
sufficiently explain1 it is said1 on    
mechanical principles the semblance of  
purpose with which nature mocks  us4    
,the presence of order is not due to any
 purpose behind the natural  operation1 
but to the inevitable disappearance of  
the disorderly4 ,it  would be absurd1 of
 course1 to claim for ,kant that he     
anticipated the  ,darwinian doctrines of

 development2 and yet passages are not  
wanting  in his writings in which he    
takes a view of the continuity of       
species  with which modern science would
 have little fault to find4 8,nature    
organises itself and its organised      
products in every species1 no  doubt    
after one general pattern but yet with  
suitable deviations1  which             
self-preservation demands according to  
circumstances0 7p4 #bgi74  8,the analogy
 of forms1 which with all their         
differences seem to have  been produced 
according to a common original type1    
strengthens our  suspicions of an actual
 relationship between them in their     
production  from a common parent1       
through the gradual approximation of one
 animal  genus to another--from those in
 which the principle of purposes seems  
to be best authenticated1 i4e4 from man1
 down to the polype and again  from this
 down to mosses and lichens1 and finally
 to crude matter4  ,and so the whole    
,technic of nature1 which is so         

incomprehensible to  us in organised    
beings that we believe ourselves        
compelled to think a  different         
principle for it1 seems to be derived   
from matter and its  powers according to
 mechanical laws 7like those by which it
 works in  the formation of crystals70  
7p4 #ccg74 ,such a theory he calls 8a   
daring  venture of reason10 and its     
coincidences with modern science are    
real  and striking4 ,but he is careful  
to add that such a theory1 even if      
established1 would not eliminate purpose
 from the universe2 it would  indeed    
suggest that certain special processes  
having the semblance of  purpose may be 
elucidated on mechanical principles1 but
 on the whole1  purposive operation on  
the part of ,mother ,nature it would    
still be  needful to assume 7p4 #cch74  
8,no finite ,reason can hope to         
understand  the production of even a    
blade of grass by mere mechanical       
causes0  7p4 #cbf74 8,it is absurd to   
hope that another ,newton will arise in 

the  future who shall make              
comprehensible by us the production of a
 blade of  grass according to natural   
laws which no design has ordered0 7p4   
#cab74    ,crude materialism thus       
affording no explanation of the         
purposiveness  in nature1 we go on to   
ask what other theories are logically   
possible4  ,we may dismiss at once the  
doctrine of ,hylozoism1 according to    
which  the purposes in nature are       
explained in reference to a world-soul1 
which is the inner principle of the     
material universe and constitutes  its  
life4 ,for such a doctrine is           
self-contradictory1 inasmuch as         
lifelessness1 inertia1 is the essential 
characteristic of matter1  and to talk  
of living matter is absurd 7p4 #cjd74 ,a
 much more plausible  system is that of 
,spinoza1 who aimed at establishing the 
ideality  of the principle of natural   
purposes4 ,he regarded the world whole  
as a complex of manifold determinations 
inhering in a single simple  substance2 

and thus reduced our concepts of the    
purposive in nature to  our own         
consciousness of existing in an         
all-embracing ,being4 ,but on           
reflection we see that this does not so 
much explain as explain away  the       
purposiveness of nature2 it gives us an 
unity of inherence in one  ,substance1  
but not an unity of causal dependence on
 one ,substance 7p4  #cjc74 ,and this   
latter would be necessary in order to   
explain the unity  of purpose which     
nature exhibits in its phenomenal       
working4 ,spinozism1  therefore1 does   
not give what it pretends to give2 it   
puts us off with  a vague and unfruitful
 unity of ground1 when what we seek is a
 unity  that shall itself contain the   
causes of the differences manifest in   
nature4    ,we have left then as the    
only remaining possible doctrine1       
,theism1  which represents natural      
purposes as produced in accordance with 
the  ,will and ,design of an            
,intelligent ,author and ,governor of   

,nature4  ,this theory is1 in the first 
place1 8superior to all other grounds   
of explanation0 7p4 #cje71 for it gives 
a full solution of the  problem before  
us and enables us to maintain the       
reality of the  ,zweckmssigkeit of      
nature4 8,teleology finds the           
consummation of its  investigations only
 in ,theology0 7p4 #caa74 ,to represent 
the world  and the natural purposes     
therein as produced by an intelligent   
,cause  is 8completely satisfactory from
 every human point of view for both  the
 speculative and practical use of our   
,reason0 7p4 #cab74 ,thus the           
contemplation of natural purposes1 i4e4 
the common ,argument from  ,design1     
enables us to reach a highest           
,understanding as ,cause of the  world  
8in accordance with the principles of   
the reflective ,judgement1  i4e4 in     
accordance with the constitution of our 
human faculty of  cognition0 7p4 #daf74 
,it is in this qualifying clause that   
,kant's negative attitude in  respect of

 ,theism betrays itself4 ,he regards it 
as a necessary  assumption for the      
guidance of scientific investigation1 no
 less than  for the practical needs of  
morals2 but he does not admit that we   
can  claim for it objective validity4   
,in the language of the ,critique of    
,pure ,reason1 the ,idea of ,god        
furnishes a regulative1 not a           
constitutive  principle of ,reason2 or  
as he prefers to put it in the present  
work1 it  is valid only for the         
reflective1 not for the determinant     
,judgement4 ,we  are not justified1     
,kant maintains1 in asserting           
dogmatically that ,god  exists2 there is
 only permitted to us the limited       
formula 8,we cannot  otherwise conceive 
the purposiveness which must lie at the 
basis of our  cognition of the internal 
possibility of many natural things1 than
 by  representing it and the world in   
general as produced by an intelligent   
cause1 i4e4 a ,god0 7p4 #cab74    ,we   
ask then1 whence arises this            

impossibility of objective statement8   
,it is in the true ,kantian spirit to   
assert that no synthetical  proposition 
can be made with reference to what lies 
above and behind  the world of sense2   
but there is a difficulty in carrying   
out this  principle into details4       
,kant's refusal to infer a designing    
,hand behind  the apparent order of     
nature is based1 he tells us1 on the    
fact that  the concept of a 8natural    
purpose0 is one that cannot be justified
 to  the speculative ,reason4 ,for all  
we know it may only indicate our way of 
looking at things1 and may point to no  
corresponding objective reality4  ,that 
we are forced by the limited nature of  
our faculties to view  nature as working
 towards ends1 as purposive1 does not   
prove that it is  really so4 ,we cannot 
justify such pretended insight into what
 is behind  the veil4    ,it is to be   
observed1 however1 that precisely       
similar arguments might  be urged       
against our affirmation of purpose1     

design1 will1 as the  spring of the     
actions of other human beings4#c ,for   
let us consider  why it is that1 mind   
being assumed as the basis of our own   
individual  consciousness1 we go on to  
attribute minds of like character to    
other  men4 ,we see that the external   
behaviour of other men is similar to our
  own1 and that the most reasonable way 
of accounting for such behaviour  is to 
suppose that they have minds like       
ourselves1 that they are  possessed of  
an active and spontaneously energising  
faculty1 which is  the seat of their    
personality4 ,but it is instructive to  
observe that  neither on ,kantian       
principles nor on any other can we      
demonstrate  this2 to cross the chasm   
which separates one man's personality   
from  another's requires a venture of   
faith just as emphatically as any       
theological formula4 ,i can by no means 
prove to the determinant  ,judgement    
that the complex of sensations which ,i 
constantly experience1  and which ,i    

call the ,prime ,minister1 is anything  
more than a  well-ordered machine4 ,it  
is improbable that this is the          
case--highly  improbable2 but the       
falsity of such an hypothesis cannot be 
proved in  the same way that we would   
prove the falsity of the assertion that 
two  and two make five4 ,but then though
 the hypothesis cannot be thus ruled    
out of court by demonstration of its    
absurdity1 it is not the simplest       
hypothesis1 nor is it that one which    
best accounts for the facts4 ,the       
assumption1 on the other hand1 that the 
men whom ,i meet every day have  minds  
like my own1 perfectly accounts for all 
the facts1 and is a very  simple        
assumption4 ,it merely extends by       
induction the sphere of a force  which  
,i already know to exist4 ,or in other  
words1 crude materialism not  giving me 
an intelligent account of my own        
individual consciousness1  ,i recognise 
mind1 1 as a vera causa1 as something   
which really  does produce effects in   

the field of experience1 and which      
therefore ,i  may legitimately put      
forward as the cause of those actions of
 other  men which externally so much    
resemble my own4 ,but1 as has been said 
before1 this argument1 though entirely  
convincing to any sane person1  is not  
demonstrative2 in ,kantian language and 
on ,kantian principles  the reasoning   
here used would seem to be valid only   
for the reflective  and not for the     
determinant ,judgement4 ,if the         
principle of design or  conscious       
adaptation of means to ends be not a    
constitutive principle  of experience1  
but only a regulative principle         
introduced to account  for the facts1   
what right have we to put it forward    
dogmatically as  affording an           
explanation of the actions of other     
human beings8    ,it cannot be said that
 ,kant's attempted answer to such a     
defence of  the ,design ,argument is    
quite conclusive4 ,in  #ij of the       
,methodology  7p4 #cii7 he pleads that  

though it is perfectly legitimate to    
argue by  analogy from our own minds to 
the minds of other men1--nay further1   
although we may conclude from those     
actions of the lower animals  which     
display plan1 that they are not1 as     
,descartes alleged1 mere  machines--yet 
it is not legitimate to conclude from   
the apparent  presence of design in the 
operations of nature that a conscious   
mind  directs those operations4 ,for1 he
 argues1 that in comparing the actions  
of men and the lower animals1 or in     
comparing the actions of one man  with  
those of another1 we are not pressing   
our analogy beyond the  limits of       
experience4 ,men and beasts alike are   
finite living beings1  subject to the   
limitations of finite existence2 and    
hence the law which  governs the one    
series of operations may be regarded by 
analogy as  sufficiently explaining the 
other series4 ,but the power at the     
basis of  ,nature is utterly above      
definition or comprehension1 and we are 

going  beyond our legitimate province if
 we venture to ascribe to it a mode  of 
operation with which we are only        
conversant in the case of beings        
subject to the conditions of space and  
time4 ,he urges in short that  when     
speaking about man and his mind we      
thoroughly understand what we  are      
talking about2 but in speaking of the   
,mind of ,deity we are dealing  with    
something of which we have no           
experience1 and of which therefore  we  
have no right to predicate anything4    
,but it is apparent that1 as has been   
pointed out1 even when we infer  the    
existence of another finite mind from   
certain observed operations1  we are    
making an inference about something     
which is as mysterious an  x as anything
 can be4 ,mind is not a thing that is   
subject to the  laws and conditions of  
the world of sense2 it is 8in the world 
but  not of the world40 ,and so to infer
 the existence of the mind of any       
individual except myself is a quite     

different kind of inference from  that  
by which1 for example1 we infer the     
presence of an electro-magnet  in a     
given field4 ,the action of the latter  
we understand to a large  extent2 but we
 do not understand the action of mind1  
which yet we  know from daily experience
 of ourselves does produce effects in   
the  phenomenal world1 often permanent  
and important effects4 ,briefly1  the   
action of mind upon matter 7to use the  
ordinary phraseology for  the sake of   
clearness7 is--we may assume for our    
present purpose--an  established fact4  
,hence the causality of mind is a vera  
causa2 we  bring it in to account for   
the actions of other human beings1 and  
by  precisely the same process of       
reasoning we invoke it to explain the   
operations of nature4    ,and it is     
altogether beside the point to urge1 as 
,kant does  incessantly1 that in the    
latter case the intelligence inferred is
  infinite2 in the former only finite4  
,all that the ,design ,argument         

undertakes to prove is that mind lies at
 the basis of nature4 ,it  is quite     
beyond its province to say whether this 
mind is finite or  infinite2 and thus   
,kant's criticisms on p4 #cfd are       
somewhat wide of  the mark4 ,there is   
always a difficulty in any argument     
which tries to  establish the operation 
of mind anywhere1 for mind cannot be    
seen or  touched or felt2 but the       
difficulty is not peculiar to that      
particular  form of argument with which 
theological interests are involved4     
,the real plausibility of this objection
 arises from a vague idea1  often       
present to us when we speak of infinite 
wisdom or infinite  intelligence1 namely
 that the epithet infinite in some way  
alters  the meaning of the attributes to
 which it is applied4 ,but the truth is 
that the word infinite1 when applied to 
wisdom or knowledge or any  other       
intellectual or moral quality1 can only 
properly have reference  to the number  
of acts of wisdom or knowledge that we  

suppose to have  been performed4 ,the   
only sense in which we have any right to
 speak of  infinite wisdom is that it is
 that which performs an infinite number 
of wise acts4 ,and so when we speak of  
infinite intelligence1 we have  not the 
slightest warrant1 either in logic or in
 common sense1 for  supposing that such 
intelligence is not similar in kind to  
that finite  intelligence which we know 
in man4    ,to understand ,kant's       
attitude fully1 we must also take into  
consideration the great weight that he  
attaches to the ,moral ,argument  for   
the existence of ,god4 ,the positive    
side of his teaching on ,theism  is     
summed up in the following sentence 7p4 
#chh73 8,for the theoretical  reflective
 ,judgement physical ,teleology         
sufficiently proves from the  purposes  
of ,nature an intelligent world-cause2  
for the practical  ,judgement moral     
,teleology establishes it by the concept
 of a final  purpose1 which it is forced
 to ascribe to creation40 ,that side of 

his  system which is akin to            
,agnosticism finds expression in his    
determined  refusal to admit anything   
more than this4 ,the existence of ,god  
is for  him a 8thing of faith02 and is  
not a fact of knowledge1 strictly so    
called4 8,faith0 he holds 7p4 #dji7 8is 
the moral attitude of ,reason as  to    
belief in that which is unattainable by 
theoretical cognition4 ,it  is therefore
 the constant principle of the mind to  
assume as true that  which it is        
necessary to presuppose as condition of 
the possibility of  the highest moral   
final purpose40 ,as he says elsewhere   
7,introduction  to ,logic1 ix4 p4 #fj71 
8,that man is morally unbelieving who   
does not  accept that which1 though     
impossible to know1 is morally necessary
  to suppose40 ,and as far as he goes a 
,theist may agree with him1 and he  has 
done yeoman's service to ,theism by his 
insistence on the absolute              
impossibility of any other working      
hypothesis as an explanation of the     

phenomena of nature4 ,but ,i have       
endeavoured to indicate at what points  
he does not seem to me to have gone as  
far as even his own declared  principles
 would justify him in going4 ,if the    
existence of a ,supreme  ,mind be a     
8thing of faith10 this may with equal   
justice be said of the  finite minds of 
the men all around us2 and his attempt  
to show that the  argument from analogy 
is here without foundation is not       
convincing4    ,kant1 however1 in the   
,critique of ,judgement is sadly        
fettered by  the chains that he himself 
had forged1 and frequently chafes under 
the restraints they impose4 ,he         
indicates more than once a point of     
view higher than that of the ,critique  
of ,pure ,reason1 from which  the       
phenomena of life and mind may be       
contemplated4 ,he had already  hinted in
 that work that the supersensible       
substrate of the ego and  the non-ego   
might be identical4 8,both kinds of     
objects differ from  each other1 not    

internally1 but only so far as the one  
appears  external to the other2 possibly
 what is at the basis of phenomenal     
matter as a thing in itself may not be  
so heterogeneous after all  as we       
imagine40#d ,this hypothesis which      
remains a bare undeveloped  possibility 
in the earlier work is put forward as a 
positive doctrine  in the ,critique of  
,judgement4 8,there must10 says ,kant1  
8be a ground  of the unity of the       
supersensible1 which lies at the basis  
of  nature1 with that which the concept 
of freedom practically contains0        
7,introduction1 p4 #ac74 ,that is to    
say1 he maintains that to explain  the  
phenomena of organic life and the       
purposiveness of nature we must  hold   
that the world of sense is not disparate
 from and opposed to the  world of      
thought1 but that nature is the         
development of freedom4  ,the connexion 
of nature and freedom is suggested by1  
nay is involved  in1 the notion of      
natural adaptation2 and although we can 

arrive  at no knowledge of the          
supersensible substrate of both1 yet    
such a  common ground there must be4    
,this principle is the starting-point of
  the systems which followed that of    
,kant2 and the philosophy of later      
,idealism is little more than a         
development of the principle in its     
consequences4    ,he approaches the same
 doctrine by a different path in the    
,critique of  the ,teleological         
,judgement 7 #gg71 where he argues that 
the distinction  between the mechanical 
and the teleological working of nature1 
upon  which so much stress has been     
justly laid1 depends for its validity   
upon the peculiar character of our      
,understanding4 ,when we give what may  
be called a mechanical elucidation of   
any natural phenomenon1 we begin  with  
its parts1 and from what we know of them
 we explain the whole4 ,but  in the case
 of certain objects1 e4g4 organised     
bodies1 this cannot be  done4 ,in their 
case we can only account for the parts  

by a reference to  the whole4 ,now1 were
 it possible for us to perceive a whole 
before its  parts and derive the latter 
from the former1#e then an organism     
would  be capable of being understood   
and would be an object of knowledge in  
the strictest sense4 ,but our           
,understanding is not able to do this1  
and  its inadequacy for such a task     
leads us to conceive the possibility of 
an ,understanding1 not discursive like  
ours1 but intuitive1 for which          
knowledge of the whole would precede    
that of the parts4 8,it is at  least    
possible to consider the material world 
as mere phenomenon1 and  to think as its
 substrate something like a thing in    
itself 7which is  not phenomenon71 and  
to attach to this a corresponding       
intellectual  intuition4 ,thus there    
would be1 although incognisable by us1 a
  supersensible real ground for nature1 
to which we ourselves belong0  7p4      
#cbe74 ,hence1 although ,mechanism and  
,technic must not be confused  and must 

ever stand side by side in our          
scientific investigation of  natural    
law1 yet must they be regarded as       
coalescing in a single higher  principle
 incognisable by us4 ,the ground of     
union is 8the supersensible  substrate  
of nature of which we can determine     
nothing positively1  except that it is  
the being in itself of which we merely  
know the  phenomenon40 ,thus1 then1 it  
appears that the whole force of ,kant's 
main argument has proceeded upon an     
assumption1 viz4 the permanent          
opposition between ,sense and           
,understanding1 which the progress of   
the  argument has shown to be unsound4  
8,kant seems10 says ,goethe1#f 8to  have
 woven a certain element of irony into  
his method4 ,for1 while at  one time he 
seemed to be bent on limiting our       
faculties of knowledge in  the narrowest
 way1 at another time he pointed1 as it 
were with a side  gesture1 beyond the   
limits which he himself had drawn40 ,the
 fact of  adaptation of means to ends   

observable in nature seems to break down
  the barrier between ,nature and       
,freedom2 and if we once relinquish the 
distinction between ,mechanism and      
,technic in the operations of nature  we
 are led to the ,idea of an absolute    
,being1 who manifests ,himself by       
action which1 though necessary1 is yet  
the outcome of perfect freedom4         
,kant1 however1 though he approaches    
such a position more than once1  can    
never be said to have risen to it4 ,he  
deprecates unceasingly the  attempt to  
combine principles of nature with the   
principles of freedom  as a task beyond 
the modest capacity of human reason2 and
 while  strenuously insisting on the    
practical force of the ,moral ,argument 
for  the ,being of ,god1 which is found 
in the witness of man's conscience1     
will not admit that it can in any way be
 regarded as strengthening the          
theoretical arguments adduced by        
,teleology4 ,the two lines of proof1 he 
holds1 are quite distinct2 and nothing  

but confusion and intellectual  disaster
 can result from the effort to combine  
them4 ,the moral proof  stands by       
itself1 and it needs no such crutches as
 the argument  from ,design can offer4  
,but1 as ,mr4 ,kennedy has pointed out  
in his  acute criticism#g of the        
,kantian doctrine of ,theism1 it would  
not  be possible to combine a           
theoretical disbelief in ,god with a    
frank  acceptance of the practical      
belief of ,his existence borne in upon  
us  by the ,moral ,law4 ,kant himself   
admits this3 8,a dogmatical unbelief10  
he says 7p4 #daa71 8cannot subsist      
together with a moral maxim dominant  in
 the mental attitude40 ,that is1 though 
the theoretical argument be  incomplete1
 we cannot reject the conclusion to     
which it leads1 for this  is confirmed  
by the moral necessities of conscience4 
,kant's position1 then1 seems to come to
 this1 that though he never  doubts the 
existence of ,god1 he has very grave    
doubts that ,he can  be theoretically   

known by man4 ,that ,he is1 is certain2 
what ,he  is1 we cannot determine4 ,it  
is a position not dissimilar to current 
,agnostic doctrines2 and as long as the 
antithesis between ,sense and           
,understanding1 between ,matter and     
,mind1 is insisted upon as expressing  a
 real and abiding truth1 ,kant's        
reasoning can hardly be refuted  with   
completeness4 ,no doubt it may be urged 
that since the practical  and           
theoretical arguments both arrive at the
 same conclusion1 the  cogency of our   
reasoning in the latter should confirm  
our trust in  the former4 ,but true     
conclusions may sometimes seem to follow
 from  quite insufficient premises2 and 
,kant is thus justified in demanding    
that each argument shall be submitted to
 independent tests4 ,i have  endeavoured
 to show above that he has not treated  
the theoretical line  of reasoning quite
 fairly1 and that he has underestimated 
its force2  but its value as an argument
 is not increased by showing that       

another  entirely different process of  
thought leads to the same result4 ,and  
that the witness of conscience affords  
the most powerful and convincing        
argument for the existence of a ,supreme
 ,being1 the source of law as of  love1 
is a simple matter of experience4       
,induction1 syllogism1 analogy1  do not 
really generate belief in ,god1 though  
they may serve to justify  to reason a  
faith that we already possess4 ,the poet
 has the truth of it3        ,wer ,gott 
nicht fhlt in sich und allen            
,lebenskreisen1      ,dem werdet ,ihr   
,ihn nicht beweisen mit ,beweisen4      
99       99       99       99       99  
,i give at the end of this ,introduction
 a ,glossary of the chief  philosophical
 terms used by ,kant2 ,i have tried to  
render them by the  same ,english       
equivalents all through the work1 in    
order to preserve1  as far as may be1   
the exactness of expression in the      
original4 ,i am  conscious that this    
makes the translation clumsy in many    

places1 but  have thought it best to    
sacrifice elegance to precision4 ,this  
course  is the more necessary to adopt1 
as ,kant cannot be understood unless    
his nice verbal distinctions be attended
 to4 ,thus real means quite  a different
 thing from wirklich2 ,hang from        
,neigung2 ,rhrung  from ,affekt or      
,leidenschaft2 ,anschauung from         
,empfindung  or ,wahrnehmung2 ,endzweck 
from letzter ,zweck2 ,idee from         
,vorstellung2 ,eigenschaft from         
,attribut or ,beschaffenheit2  ,schranke
 from ,grenze2 berreden from berzeugen1 
etc4 ,i am not  satisfied with          
8gratification0 and 8grief0 as the      
,english equivalents  for ,vergngen and 
,schmerz2 but it is necessary to        
distinguish these  words from ,lust and 
,unlust1 and 8mental pleasure10 8mental 
pain10  which would nearly hit the      
sense1 are awkward4 ,again1 the constant
  rendering of schn by beautiful        
involves the expression 8beautiful  art0
 instead of the more usual phrase 8fine 

art40 ,purposive is an  ugly word1 but  
it has come into use lately2 and its    
employment enables  us to preserve the  
connexion between ,zweck and zweckmssig4
 ,i  have printed ,judgement with a     
capital letter when it signifies  the   
faculty1 with a small initial when it   
signifies the act1 of  judging4 ,and in 
like manner ,i distinguish ,objekt from 
,gegenstand1  by printing the word      
8,object10 when it represents the       
former1 with a  large initial4    ,the  
text ,i have followed is1 in the main1  
that printed by ,hartenstein2  but      
occasionally ,rosenkranz preserves the  
better reading4 ,all important  variants
 between the ,first and ,second         
,editions have been indicated at  the   
foot of the page4 ,a few notes have been
 added1 which are enclosed  in square   
brackets1 to distinguish them from those
 which formed part  of the original     
work4 ,i have in general quoted ,kant's 
,introduction to  ,logic and ,critique  
of ,practical ,reason in ,dr4 ,abbott's 

translations4    ,my best thanks are due
 to ,rev4 ,j4 ,h4 ,kennedy and ,mr4 ,f4 
,purser for much  valuable aid during   
the passage of this translation through 
the press4  ,and ,i am under even       
greater obligations to ,mr4 ,mahaffy1   
who was good  enough to read through the
 whole of the proof2 by his acute and   
learned  criticisms many errors have    
been avoided4 ,others ,i have no doubt  
still  remain1 but for these ,i must be 
accounted alone responsible4            
,j4 ,h4 ,,bernard4      ,,trinity       
,,college1 ,,dublin1      ,may #bd1     
#ahib4           99       99       99   
99       99    ,more than twenty-one    
years have passed since the first       
edition of this  ,translation was       
published1 and during that time much has
 been written1  both in ,germany and in 
,england1 on the subject of ,kant's     
,critique  of ,judgement4 ,in           
particular1 the ,german text has been   
critically  determined by the labours of
 ,professor ,windelband1 whose fine     

edition  forms the fifth volume of      
,kant's ,collected ,works as issued by  
the ,royal  ,prussian ,academy of       
,sciences 7,berlin1 #aijh74 ,it will be 
indispensable  to future students4 ,an  
excellent account of the significance1  
in the  ,kantian system1 of the         
,urtheilskraft1 by ,mr4 ,r4 ,a4 ,c4     
,macmillan1  appeared in #aiab2 and ,mr4
 ,j4 ,c4 ,meredith has published        
recently an  ,english edition of the    
,critique of ,aesthetical ,judgement1   
with notes  and essays1 dealing with the
 philosophy of art1 which goes over the 
ground very fully4    ,some critics of  
my first edition took exception to the  
clumsiness  of the word 8representation0
 as the equivalent of ,vorstellung1 but 
,i have made no change in this respect1 
as it seems to me 7and so far  as ,i    
have observed to others who have worked 
on the ,critique of  ,judgement71 that  
it is necessary to preserve in ,english 
the relation  between the noun          
,vorstellung and the verb vorstellen1 if

 ,kant's  reasoning is to be exhibited  
clearly4 ,i have1 however1 abandoned the
  attempt to preserve the word ,kritik  
in ,english1 and have replaced it  by   
,critique or criticism1 throughout4 ,the
 other changes that have  been made are 
mere corrections or emendations of      
faulty or obscure  renderings1 with a   
few additional notes4 ,i have left my   
original  ,introduction as it was       
written in #ahib1 without attempting any
 fresh  examination of the problems that
 ,kant set himself4                     
,,john ,,ossory4      ,,the ,,palace1   
,,kilkenny1     ,january #f1 #aiad4     
,,glossary ,,of ,,kant',s               
,,philosophical ,,terms        ,absicht2
 design4    ,achtung2 respect4          
,affekt2 affection4    ,angenehm2       
pleasant4    ,anschauung2 intuition4    
,attribut2 attribute4    ,aufklrung2    
enlightenment4      ,begehr2 desire4    
,begriff2 concept4    ,beschaffenheit2  
constitution or characteristic4         
,bestimmen2 to determine4               

,darstellen2 to present4    ,dasein2    
presence or being4      ,eigenschaft2   
property4    ,empfindung2 sensation4    
,endzweck2 final purpose4               
,erkenntniss2 cognition or knowledge4   
,erklrung2 explanation4    ,erscheinung2
 phenomenon4    ,existenz2 existence4   
,frwahrhalten2 belief4      ,gebiet2    
realm4    ,gefhl2 feeling4              
,gegenstand2 object4    ,geist2 spirit4 
,geniessen2 enjoyment4                  
,geschicklichkeit2 skill4    ,geschmack2
 ,taste4    ,gesetzmssigkeit2 conformity
 to law4    ,gewalt2 dominion or        
authority4    ,glaube2 faith4           
,grenze2 bound4    ,grundsatz2          
fundamental proposition or principle4   
,hang2 propension4      ,idee2 ,idea4   
,leidenschaft2 passion4    ,letzter     
,zweck2 ultimate purpose4    ,lust2     
pleasure4      ,meinen2 opinion4        
,neigung2 inclination4      ,objekt2    
,object4      ,prinzip2 principle4      
,real2 real4    ,reich2 kingdom4        
,reiz2 charm4    ,rhrung2 emotion4      

,schein2 illusion4    ,schmerz2 grief4  
,schn2 beautiful4    ,schranke2 limit4  
,schwrmerei2 fanaticism4    ,seele2     
soul4      ,ueberreden2 to persuade4    
,ueberschwnglich2 transcendent4         
,ueberzeugen2 to convince4    ,unlust2  
pain4    ,urtheil2 judgement4           
,urtheilskraft2 ,judgement4             
,verbindung2 combination4    ,vergngen2 
gratification4    ,verknpfung2          
connexion4    ,vermgen2 faculty4        
,vernunft2 ,reason4    ,vernnftelei2    
sophistry or subtlety4    ,verstand2    
,understanding4    ,vorstellung2        
representation4      ,wahrnehmung2      
perception4    ,wesen2 being4           
,willkhr2 elective will4    ,wirklich2  
actual4    ,wohlgefallen2 satisfaction4 
,zufriedenheit2 contentment4    ,zweck2 
purpose4    ,zweckmssig2 purposive4     
,zweckverbindung2 purposive combination1
 etc4          ,,preface      ,we may   
call the faculty of cognition from      
principles a priori1 pure  ,reason1 and 
the inquiry into its possibility and    

bounds generally the  ,critique of pure 
,reason1 although by this faculty we    
only understand  ,reason in its         
theoretical employment1 as it appears   
under that name  in the former work2    
without wishing to inquire into its     
faculty1 as  practical ,reason1         
according to its special principles4    
,that ,critique  goes merely into our   
faculty of knowing things a priori1 and 
busies  itself therefore only with the  
cognitive faculty to the exclusion  of  
the feeling of pleasure and pain and the
 faculty of desire2 and of  the         
cognitive faculties it only concerns    
itself with ,understanding1  according  
to its principles a priori1 to the      
exclusion of ,judgement  and ,reason 7as
 faculties alike belonging to           
theoretical cognition71  because it is  
found in the sequel that no other       
cognitive faculty but  the              
,understanding can furnish constitutive 
principles of cognition a  priori4 ,the 
,critique1 then1 which sifts them all1  

as regards the share  which each of the 
other faculties might pretend to have in
 the clear  possession of knowledge from
 its own peculiar root1 leaves nothing  
but  what the ,understanding prescribes 
a priori as law for nature as  the      
complex of phenomena 7whose form also is
 given a priori74 ,it  relegates all    
other pure concepts under ,ideas1 which 
are transcendent  for our theoretical   
faculty of cognition1 but are not       
therefore useless  or to be dispensed   
with4 ,for they serve as regulative     
principles2  partly to check the        
dangerous pretensions of ,understanding1
 as if  7because it can furnish a priori
 the conditions of the possibility  of  
all things which it can know7 it had    
thereby confined within  these bounds   
the possibility of all things in        
general2 and partly to  lead it to the  
consideration of nature according to a  
principle of  completeness1 although it 
can never attain to this1 and thus to   
further  the final design of all        

knowledge4    ,it was then properly the 
,understanding which has its special    
realm in  the cognitive faculty1 so far 
as it contains constitutive principles  
of cognition a priori1 which by the     
,critique1 comprehensively called  the  
,critique of pure ,reason1 was to be    
placed in certain and sole  possession#h
 against all other competitors4 ,and so 
also to ,reason1  which contains        
constitutive principles a priori nowhere
 except simply  in respect of the       
faculty of desire1 should be assigned   
its place in  the ,critique of practical
 ,reason4    ,whether now the           
,judgement1 which in the order of our   
cognitive  faculties forms a mediating  
link between ,understanding and ,reason1
 has  also principles a priori for      
itself2 whether these are constitutive  
or merely regulative 7thus indicating no
 special realm72 and whether  they give 
a rule a priori to the feeling of       
pleasure and pain1 as the  mediating    
link between the cognitive faculty and  

the faculty of desire  7just as the     
,understanding prescribes laws a priori 
to the first1  ,reason to the second72  
these are the questions with which the  
present  ,critique of ,judgement is     
concerned4    ,a ,critique of pure      
,reason1 i4e4 of our faculty of judging 
a priori  according to principles1 would
 be incomplete1 if the ,judgement1 which
  as a cognitive faculty also makes     
claim to such principles1 were not      
treated as a particular part of it2     
although its principles in a  system of 
pure ,philosophy need form no particular
 part between the  theoretical and the  
practical1 but can be annexed when      
needful to one  or both as occasion     
requires4 ,for if such a system is one  
day to be  completed under the general  
name of ,metaphysic 7which it is        
possible  to achieve quite completely1  
and which is supremely important for the
  use of ,reason in every reference71   
the soil for the edifice must be        
explored by ,criticism as deep down as  

the foundation of the faculty of        
principles independent of experience1 in
 order that it may sink in no  part1 for
 this would inevitably bring about the  
downfall of the whole4    ,we can easily
 infer from the nature of the ,judgement
 7whose right use  is so necessarily and
 so universally requisite1 that by the  
name of  sound ,understanding nothing   
else but this faculty is meant71 that it
  must be attended with great           
difficulties to find a principle        
peculiar  to it2 7some such it must     
contain a priori in itself1 for         
otherwise  it would not be set apart by 
the commonest ,criticism as a special   
cognitive faculty74 ,this principle must
 not be derived a priori from  concepts1
 for these belong to the ,understanding1
 and ,judgement is only  concerned with 
their application4 ,it must1 therefore1 
furnish of itself  a concept1 through   
which1 properly speaking1 no thing is   
cognised1  but which only serves as a   
rule1 though not an objective one to    

which  it can adapt its judgement2      
because for this latter another faculty 
of ,judgement would be requisite1 in    
order to be able to distinguish  whether
 any given case is or is not the case   
for the rule4    ,this perplexity about 
a principle 7whether it is subjective or
  objective7 presents itself mainly in  
those judgements that we call           
aesthetical1 which concern the          
,beautiful and the ,sublime of ,nature  
or  of ,art4 ,and1 nevertheless1 the    
critical investigation of a principle   
of ,judgement in these is the most      
important part in a ,critique of  this  
faculty4 ,for although they do not by   
themselves contribute to  the knowledge 
of things1 yet they belong to the       
cognitive faculty  alone1 and point to  
an immediate reference of this faculty  
to the  feeling of pleasure or pain     
according to some principle a priori2   
without confusing this with what may be 
the determining ground of the  faculty  
of desire1 which has its principles a   

priori in concepts  of ,reason4--,in the
 logical judging of nature1 experience  
exhibits a  conformity to law in things1
 to the understanding or to the         
explanation  of which the general       
concept of the sensible does not attain2
 here the  ,judgement can only derive   
from itself a principle of the reference
 of  the natural thing to the unknowable
 supersensible 7a principle which it    
must only use from its own point of view
 for the cognition of nature74  ,and so1
 though in this case such a principle a 
priori can and must be  applied to the  
cognition of the beings of the world1   
and opens out  at the same time         
prospects which are advantageous for the
 practical  ,reason1 yet it has no      
immediate reference to the feeling of   
pleasure  and pain4 ,but this reference 
is precisely the puzzle in the principle
  of ,judgement1 which renders a special
 section for this faculty  necessary in 
the ,critique2 since the logical judging
 according to  concepts 7from which an  

immediate inference can never be drawn  
to the  feeling of pleasure and pain7   
along with their critical limitation1   
has  at all events been capable of being
 appended to the theoretical part of    
,philosophy4    ,the examination of the 
faculty of taste1 as the aesthetical    
,judgement1  is not here planned in     
reference to the formation or the       
culture of  taste 7for this will take   
its course in the future as in the past 
without any such investigations71 but   
merely in a transcendental point  of    
view4 ,hence1 ,i trust that as regards  
the deficiency of the former  purpose it
 will be judged with indulgence1 though 
in the latter point  of view it must be 
prepared for the severest scrutiny4 ,but
 ,i hope that  the great difficulty of  
solving a problem so involved by nature 
may  serve as excuse for some hardly    
avoidable obscurity in its solution1 if 
only it be clearly established that the 
principle is correctly stated4  ,i grant
 that the mode of deriving the phenomena

 of the ,judgement from  it has not all 
the clearness which might be rightly    
demanded elsewhere1  viz4 in the case of
 cognition according to concepts2 but ,i
 believe that  ,i have attained to it in
 the second part of this work4    ,here 
then ,i end my whole critical           
undertaking4 ,i shall proceed without   
delay to the doctrinal part in order to 
profit1 as far as is  possible1 by the  
more favourable moments of my increasing
 years4 ,it is  obvious that in this    
part there will be no special section   
for the  ,judgement1 because in respect 
of this faculty ,criticism serves       
instead  of ,theory2 but1 according to  
the division of ,philosophy 7and also of
  pure ,philosophy7 into theoretical and
 practical1 the ,metaphysic of  ,nature 
and of ,morals will complete the        
undertaking4          ,,introduction    
,i4 ,,of ,,the ,,division ,,of          
,,philosophy      ,we proceed quite     
correctly if1 as usual1 we divide       
,philosophy1 as  containing the         

principles of the rational cognition of 
things by means  of concepts 7not       
merely1 as logic does1 principles of the
 form of  thought in general without    
distinction of ,objects71 into          
theoretical  and practical4 ,but then   
the concepts1 which furnish their       
,object  to the principles of this      
rational cognition1 must be specifically
  distinct2 otherwise they would not    
justify a division1 which always        
presupposes a contrast between the      
principles of the rational cognition    
belonging to the different parts of a   
science4    ,now there are only two     
kinds of concepts1 and these admit as   
many  distinct principles of the        
possibility of their objects1 viz4      
natural  concepts and the concept of    
freedom4 ,the former render possible    
theoretical cognition according to      
principles a priori2 the latter  in     
respect of this theoretical cognition   
only supplies in itself a  negative     
principle 7that of mere contrast71 but  

on the other hand it  furnishes         
fundamental propositions which extend   
the sphere of the  determination of the 
will and are therefore called practical4
 ,thus  ,philosophy is correctly divided
 into two parts1 quite distinct in      
their principles2 the theoretical part  
or ,natural ,philosophy1 and  the       
practical part or ,moral ,philosophy    
7for that is the name given  to the     
practical legislation of ,reason in     
accordance with the concept  of         
freedom74 ,but up to the present a gross
 misuse of these expressions  has       
prevailed1 both in the division of the  
different principles and  consequently  
also of ,philosophy itself4 ,for what is
 practical according  to natural        
concepts has been identified with the   
practical according  to the concept of  
freedom2 and so with the like titles1   
#8theoretical'  and #8practical'        
,philosophy1 a division has been made1  
by which in  fact nothing has been      
divided 7for both parts might in such   

case have  principles of the same kind74
    ,the will1 regarded as the faculty  
of desire1 is 7in this view7 one  of the
 many natural causes in the world1 viz4 
that cause which acts  in accordance    
with concepts4 ,all that is represented 
as possible 7or  necessary7 by means of 
a will is called practically possible   
7or  necessary72 as distinguished from  
the physical possibility or necessity   
of an effect1 whose cause is not        
determined to causality by concepts     
7but in lifeless matter by mechanism and
 in animals by instinct74  ,here1 in    
respect of the practical1 it is left    
undetermined whether the  concept which 
gives the rule to the causality of the  
will1 is a natural  concept or a concept
 of freedom4    ,but the last           
distinction is essential4 ,for if the   
concept which  determines the causality 
is a natural concept1 then the          
principles are  technically practical2  
whereas1 if it is a concept of freedom  
they  are morally practical4 ,and as the

 division of a rational science  depends
 on the distinction between objects     
whose cognition needs  distinct         
principles1 the former will belong to   
theoretical ,philosophy  7doctrine of   
,nature71 but the latter alone will     
constitute the second  part1 viz4       
practical ,philosophy 7doctrine of      
,morals74    ,all technically practical 
rules 7i4e4 the rules of art and skill  
generally1 or of prudence regarded as   
skill in exercising an influence  over  
men and their wills71 so far as their   
principles rest on concepts1  must be   
reckoned only as corollaries to         
theoretical ,philosophy4 ,for  they     
concern only the possibility of things  
according to natural  concepts1 to which
 belong not only the means which are to 
be met  with in nature1 but also the    
will itself 7as a faculty of desire  and
 consequently a natural faculty71 so far
 as it can be determined  conformably to
 these rules by natural motives4        
,however1 practical  rules of this kind 

are not called laws 7like physical      
laws71 but only  precepts2 because the  
will does not stand merely under the    
natural  concept1 but also under the    
concept of freedom1 in relation to which
  its principles are called laws4 ,these
 with their consequences alone          
constitute the second or practical part 
of ,philosophy4    ,the solution of the 
problems of pure geometry does not      
belong to a  particular part of the     
science2 mensuration does not deserve   
the  name of practical1 in contrast to  
pure1 geometry1 as a second part  of    
geometry in general2 and just as little 
ought the mechanical  or chemical art of
 experiment or observation to be        
reckoned as a  practical part of the    
doctrine of ,nature4 ,just as little1 in
 fine1  ought housekeeping1 farming1    
statesmanship1 the art of conversation1 
the prescribing of diet1 the universal  
doctrine of happiness itself1  or the   
curbing of the inclinations and checking
 of the affections  for the sake of     

happiness1 to be reckoned as practical  
,philosophy1  or taken to constitute the
 second part of ,philosophy in general4 
,for all these contain only rules of    
skill 7and are consequently only        
technically practical7 for bringing     
about an effect that is possible        
according to the natural concepts of    
causes and effects1 which1 since  they  
belong to theoretical ,philosophy1 are  
subject to those precepts  as mere      
corollaries from it 7viz4 natural       
science71 and can therefore  claim no   
place in a special ,philosophy called   
practical4 ,on the other  hand1 the     
morally practical precepts1 which are   
altogether based on the  concept of     
freedom to the complete exclusion of the
 natural determining  grounds of the    
will1 constitute a quite special class4 
,these1 like the  rules which nature    
obeys1 are called simply laws1 but they 
do not1 like  them1 rest on sensuous    
conditions but on a supersensible       
principle2  and accordingly they require

 for themselves a quite different part  
of  ,philosophy1 called practical1      
corresponding to its theoretical part4  
,we hence see that a complex of         
practical precepts given by ,philosophy 
does not constitute a distinct part of  
,philosophy1 as opposed to the          
theoretical part1 because these precepts
 are practical2 for they might  be that1
 even if their principles were derived  
altogether from the  theoretical        
cognition of nature 7as technically     
practical rules74 ,a  distinct branch of
 ,philosophy is constituted only if     
their principle1  as it is not borrowed 
from the natural concept1 which is      
always  sensuously conditioned1 rests on
 the supersensible1 which alone makes   
the concept of freedom cognisable by    
formal laws4 ,these precepts are  then  
morally practical1 i4e4 not merely      
precepts or rules in this  or that      
aspect1 but1 without any preceding      
reference to purposes and  designs1 are 
laws4      ,,ii4 ,,of ,,the ,,realm ,,of

 ,,philosophy ,,in ,,general    ,so far 
as our concepts have a priori           
application1 so far extends  the use of 
our cognitive faculty according to      
principles1 and with it  ,philosophy4   
,but the complex of all objects1 to     
which those concepts are referred1  in  
order to bring about a knowledge of them
 where it is possible1  may be          
subdivided according to the adequacy or 
inadequacy of our  cognitive faculty to 
this design4    ,concepts1 so far as    
they are referred to objects1           
independently of the  possibility or    
impossibility of the cognition of these 
objects1 have  their field which is     
determined merely according to the      
relation that  their ,object has to our 
cognitive faculty in general4 ,the part 
of this  field in which knowledge is    
possible for us is a ground or territory
  7territorium7 for these concepts and  
the requisite cognitive faculty4  ,the  
part of this territory1 where they are  
legislative1 is the realm  7ditio7 of   

these concepts and of the corresponding 
cognitive  faculties4 ,empirical        
concepts have1 therefore1 their         
territory in  nature1 as the complex of 
all objects of sense1 but no realm1 only
  a dwelling-place 7domicilium72 for    
though they are produced in  conformity 
to law they are not legislative1 but the
 rules based on them  are empirical and 
consequently contingent4    ,our whole  
cognitive faculty has two realms1 that  
of natural concepts  and that of the    
concept of freedom2 for through both it 
is legislative  a priori4 ,in accordance
 with this1 ,philosophy is divided into 
theoretical and practical4 ,but the     
territory to which its realm extends    
and in which its legislation is         
exercised1 is always only the complex   
of objects of all possible experience1  
so long as they are taken for  nothing  
more than mere phenomena2 for otherwise 
no legislation of the  ,understanding in
 respect of them is conceivable4        
,legislation through natural concepts is

 carried on by means of the             
,understanding and is theoretical4      
,legislation through the concept of     
freedom is carried on by the ,reason and
 is merely practical4 ,it is  only in   
the practical sphere that the ,reason   
can be legislative2  in respect of      
theoretical cognition 7of nature7 it can
 merely 7as  acquainted with law by the 
,understanding7 deduce from given laws  
consequences which always remain within 
the limits of nature4 ,but on  the other
 hand1 ,reason is not always therefore  
legislative1 where  there are practical 
rules1 for they may be only technically 
practical4    ,understanding and ,reason
 exercise1 therefore1 two distinct      
legislations  in regard to one and the  
same territory of experience1 without   
prejudice to each other4 ,the concept of
 freedom as little disturbs  the        
legislation of nature1 as the natural   
concept influences the  legislation     
through the former4--,the possibility of
 at least thinking  without             

contradiction the co-existence of both  
legislations1 and of  the corresponding 
faculties in the same subject1 has been 
shown in the  ,critique of pure ,reason2
 for it annulled the objections on the  
other  side by exposing the dialectical 
illusion which they contain4    ,these  
two different realms then do not limit  
each other in their  legislation1 though
 they perpetually do so in the world of 
sense4  ,that they do not constitute one
 realm1 arises from this1 that the      
natural concept represents its objects  
in intuition1 not as things  in         
themselves1 but as mere phenomena2 the  
concept of freedom1 on the  other hand1 
represents in its ,object a thing in    
itself1 but not in  intuition4 ,hence1  
neither of them can furnish a           
theoretical knowledge  of its ,object   
7or even of the thinking subject7 as a  
thing in itself2  this would be the     
supersensible1 the ,idea of which we    
must indeed make  the basis of the      
possibility of all these objects of     

experience1 but  which we can never     
extend or elevate into a cognition4     
,there is1 then1 an unbounded but also  
inaccessible field for our whole        
cognitive faculty--the field of the     
supersensible--wherein we find no       
territory1 and1 therefore1 can have in  
it1 for theoretical cognition1  no realm
 either for concepts of ,understanding  
or ,reason4 ,this field we  must indeed 
occupy with ,ideas on behalf of the     
theoretical as well as  the practical   
use of ,reason1 but we can supply to    
them in reference to  the laws arising  
from the concept of freedom no other    
than practical  reality1 by which our   
theoretical cognition is not extended in
 the  slightest degree towards the      
supersensible4    ,now even if an       
immeasurable gulf is fixed between the  
sensible realm  of the concept of nature
 and the supersensible realm of the     
concept of  freedom1 so that no         
transition is possible from the first to
 the second  7by means of the           

theoretical use of ,reason71 just as if 
they were two  different worlds of which
 the first could have no influence upon 
the  second1 yet the second is meant to 
have an influence upon the first4  ,the 
concept of freedom is meant to actualise
 in the world of sense  the purpose     
proposed by its laws1 and consequently  
nature must be so  thought that the     
conformity to law of its form1 at least 
harmonises  with the possibility of the 
purposes to be effected in it according 
to  laws of freedom4--,there must1      
therefore1 be a ground of the unity  of 
the supersensible1 which lies at the    
basis of nature1 with that  which the   
concept of freedom practically contains2
 and the concept  of this ground1       
although it does not attain either      
theoretically or  practically to a      
knowledge of the same1 and hence has no 
peculiar  realm1 nevertheless makes     
possible the transition from the mode of
  thought according to the principles of
 the one to that according to the       

principles of the other4      ,,iii4    
,,of ,,the ,,critique ,,of ,,judgement  
,,as ,a ,,means ,,of ,,combining ,,the  
,,two ,,parts  ,,of ,,philosophy ,,into 
,a ,,whole4    ,the ,critique of the    
cognitive faculties1 as regards what    
they can  furnish a priori1 has properly
 speaking no realm in respect of        
,objects1 because it is not a doctrine1 
but only has to investigate  whether and
 how1 in accordance with the state of   
these faculties1 a  doctrine is possible
 by their means4 ,its field extends to  
all their  pretensions1 in order to     
confine them within their legitimate    
bounds4  ,but what cannot enter into the
 division of ,philosophy may yet enter1 
as a chief part1 into the ,critique of  
the pure faculty of cognition in        
general1 viz4 if it contains principles 
which are available neither for         
theoretical nor for practical use4      
,the natural concepts1 which contain the
 ground of all  theoretical knowledge a 
priori1 rest on the legislation of the  

,understanding4--,the concept of        
freedom1 which contains the ground of   
all sensuously-unconditioned practical  
precepts a priori1 rests on  the        
legislation of the ,reason4 ,both       
faculties1 therefore1 besides being     
capable of application as regards their 
logical form to principles of  whatever 
origin1 have also as regards their      
content1 their special  legislations    
above which there is no other 7a        
priori72 and hence the  division of     
,philosophy into theoretical and        
practical is justified4    ,but in the  
family of the higher cognitive faculties
 there is a middle  term between the    
,understanding and the ,reason4 ,this is
 the ,judgement1  of which we have cause
 for supposing according to analogy that
 it  may contain in itself1 if not a    
special legislation1 yet a special      
principle of its own to be sought       
according to laws1 though merely        
subjective a priori4 ,this principle1   
even if it have no field of  objects as 

its realm1 yet may have somewhere a     
territory with a certain  character1 for
 which no other principle can be valid4 
,but besides 7to judge by analogy7 there
 is a new ground for bringing  the      
,judgement into connexion with another  
arrangement of our  representative      
faculties1 which seems to be of even    
greater importance  than that of its    
relationship with the family of the     
cognitive  faculties4 ,for all faculties
 or capacities of the soul can be       
reduced  to three1 which cannot be any  
further derived from one common ground3 
the faculty of knowledge1 the feeling of
 pleasure and pain1 and the  faculty of 
desire4#i ,for the faculty of knowledge 
the ,understanding  is alone            
legislative1 if 7as must happen when it 
is considered by  itself without        
confusion with the faculty of desire7   
this faculty is  referred to nature as  
the faculty of theoretical knowledge2   
for in  respect of nature 7as           
phenomenon7 it is alone possible for us 

to give  laws by means of natural       
concepts a priori1 i4e4 by pure concepts
  of ,understanding4--,for the faculty  
of desire1 as a higher faculty          
according to the concept of freedom1 the
 ,reason 7in which alone this  concept  
has a place7 is alone a priori          
legislative4--,now between the          
faculties of knowledge and desire there 
is the feeling of pleasure1  just as the
 ,judgement is intermediate between the 
,understanding and  the ,reason4 ,we may
 therefore suppose provisionally that   
the ,judgement  likewise contains in    
itself an a priori principle4 ,and as   
pleasure  or pain is necessarily        
combined with the faculty of desire     
7either  preceding this principle as in 
the lower desires1 or following it as   
in the higher1 when the desire is       
determined by the moral law71 we may    
also suppose that the ,judgement will   
bring about a transition from the  pure 
faculty of knowledge1 the realm of      
natural concepts1 to the realm  of the  

concept of freedom1 just as in its      
logical use it makes possible  the      
transition from ,understanding to       
,reason4    ,although1 then1 ,philosophy
 can be divided only into two main      
parts1  the theoretical and the         
practical1 and although all that we may 
be  able to say of the special          
principles of ,judgement must be counted
 as  belonging in it to the theoretical 
part1 i4e4 to rational cognition  in    
accordance with natural concepts2 yet   
the ,critique of pure ,reason1  which   
must decide all this1 as regards the    
possibility of the system  before       
undertaking it1 consists of three parts2
 the ,critique of pure  ,understanding1 
of pure ,judgement1 and of pure ,reason1
 which faculties  are called pure       
because they are legislative a priori4  
,,iv4 ,,of ,,judgement ,,as ,a ,,faculty
 ,,legislating ,a ,,priori    ,judgement
 in general is the faculty of thinking  
the particular as  contained under the  
,universal4 ,if the universal 7the rule1

 the  principle1 the law7 be given1 the 
,judgement which subsumes the           
particular under it 7even if1 as        
transcendental ,judgement1 it furnishes 
a priori1 the conditions in conformity  
with which subsumption under  that      
universal is alone possible7 is         
determinant4 ,but if only the           
particular be given for which the       
universal has to be found1 the          
,judgement is merely reflective4    ,the
 determinant ,judgement only subsumes   
under universal transcendental  laws    
given by the ,understanding2 the law is 
marked out for it1 a  priori1 and it has
 therefore no need to seek a law for    
itself in  order to be able to          
subordinate the particular in nature to 
the  universal4--,but the forms of      
nature are so manifold1 and there  are  
so many modifications of the universal  
transcendental natural  concepts left   
undetermined by the laws given1 a       
priori1 by the pure                     
,understanding1--because these only     

concern the possibility of a nature  in 
general 7as an object of sense71--that  
there must be laws for these  forms     
also4 ,these1 as empirical1 may be      
contingent from the point  of view of   
our ,understanding1 and yet1 if they are
 to be called  laws 7as the concept of a
 nature requires71 they must be regarded
 as  necessary in virtue of a principle 
of the unity of the manifold1 though  it
 be unknown to us4--,the reflective     
,judgement1 which is obliged to  ascend 
from the particular in nature to the    
universal1 requires on that  account a  
principle that it cannot borrow from    
experience1 because its  function is to 
establish the unity of all empirical    
principles under  higher ones1 and hence
 to establish the possibility of their  
systematic  subordination4 ,such a      
transcendental principle1 then1 the     
reflective  ,judgement can only give as 
a law from and to itself4 ,it cannot    
derive  it from outside 7because then it
 would be the determinant ,judgement72  

nor can it prescribe it to nature1      
because reflection upon the laws  of    
nature adjusts itself by nature1 and not
 nature by the conditions  according to 
which we attempt to arrive at a concept 
of it which is  quite contingent in     
respect of these4    ,this principle can
 be no other than the following3 ,as    
universal laws  of nature have their    
ground in our ,understanding1 which     
prescribes  them to nature 7although    
only according to the universal concept 
of  it as nature72 so particular        
empirical laws1 in respect of what is in
  them left undetermined by these       
universal laws1 must be considered in   
accordance with such a unity as they    
would have if an ,understanding         
7although not our ,understanding7 had   
furnished them to our cognitive         
faculties1 so as to make possible a     
system of experience according  to      
particular laws of nature4 ,not as if1  
in this way1 such an  ,understanding    
must be assumed as actual 7for it is    

only our reflective  ,judgement to which
 this ,idea serves as a principle--for  
reflecting1 not  for determining72 but  
this faculty thus gives a law only to   
itself and  not to nature4    ,now the  
concept of an ,object1 so far as it     
contains the ground of  the actuality of
 this ,object1 is the purpose2 and the  
agreement  of a thing with that         
constitution of things1 which is only   
possible  according to purposes1 is     
called the purposiveness of its form4   
,thus  the principle of ,judgement1 in  
respect of the form of things of nature 
under empirical laws generally1 is the  
purposiveness of nature in its          
manifoldness4 ,that is1 nature is       
represented by means of this concept1   
as if an ,understanding contained the   
ground of the unity of the  manifold of 
its empirical laws4    ,the             
purposiveness of nature is therefore a  
particular concept1 a  priori1 which has
 its origin solely in the reflective    
,judgement4 ,for  we cannot ascribe to  

natural products anything like a        
reference of  nature in them to         
purposes2 we can only use this concept  
to reflect  upon such products in       
respect of the connexion of phenomena   
which is  given in nature according to  
empirical laws4 ,this concept is also   
quite  different from practical         
purposiveness 7in human art or in       
morals71  though it is certainly thought
 according to the analogy of these last4
      ,v4 ,,the ,,principle ,,of ,,the  
,,formal ,,purposiveness ,,of ,,nature  
,,is ,a  ,,transcendental ,,principle   
,,of ,,judgement4    ,a transcendental  
principle is one by means of which is   
represented1 a  priori1 the universal   
condition under which alone things can  
be in  general ,objects of our          
cognition4 ,on the other hand1 a        
principle is  called metaphysical if it 
represents the a priori condition under 
which alone ,objects1 whose concept must
 be empirically given1 can be  further  
determined a priori4 ,thus the principle

 of the cognition of  bodies as         
substances1 and as changeable           
substances1 is transcendental1  if      
thereby it is asserted that their       
changes must have a cause2 it is        
metaphysical if it asserts that their   
changes must have an external  cause4   
,for in the former case bodies need only
 be thought by means  of ontological    
predicates 7pure concepts of            
,understanding71 e4g4  substance1 in    
order to cognise the proposition a      
priori2 but in  the latter case the     
empirical concept of a body 7as a       
movable thing  in space7 must lie at the
 basis of the proposition1 although once
  this basis has been laid down1 it may 
be seen completely a priori  that this  
latter predicate 7motion only by        
external causes7 belongs  to            
body4--,thus1 as ,i shall presently     
show1 the principle of the              
purposiveness of nature 7in the         
manifoldness of its empirical laws7 is  
a transcendental principle4 ,for the    

concept of ,objects1 so far as they  are
 thought as standing under this         
principle1 is only the pure concept  of 
objects of possible empirical cognition 
in general and contains  nothing        
empirical4 ,on the other hand1 the      
principle of practical  purposiveness1  
which must be thought in the ,idea of   
the determination  of a free will1 is a 
metaphysical principle2 because the     
concept of a  faculty of desire as a    
will must be given empirically 7i4e4    
does not  belong to transcendental      
predicates74 ,both principles are1      
however1 not  empirical1 but a priori2  
because for the combination of the      
predicate  with the empirical concept of
 the subject of their judgements no     
further experience is needed1 but it can
 be apprehended completely a  priori4   
,that the concept of a purposiveness of 
nature belongs to transcendental        
principles can be sufficiently seen from
 the maxims of the ,judgement1  which   
lie at the basis of the investigation of

 nature a priori1  and yet do not go    
further than the possibility of         
experience1 and  consequently of the    
cognition of nature--not indeed nature  
in general1  but nature as determined   
through a variety of particular laws4   
,these  maxims present themselves in the
 course of this science often enough1   
though in a scattered way1 as sentences 
of metaphysical wisdom1  whose necessity
 we cannot demonstrate from concepts4   
8,nature takes  the shortest way 7lex   
parsimoniae72 at the same time it makes 
no  leaps1 either in the course of its  
changes or in the juxtaposition  of     
specifically different forms 7lex       
continui in natura72 its  great variety 
in empirical laws is yet unity under a  
few principles  7principia praeter      
necessitatem non sunt multiplicanda710  
etc4    ,if we propose to set forth the 
origin of these fundamental propositions
  and try to do so by the psychological 
method1 we violate their sense4  ,for   
they do not tell us what happens1 i4e4  

by what rule our cognitive  powers      
actually operate1 and how we judge1 but 
how we ought to judge2  and this logical
 objective necessity does not emerge if 
the principles  are merely empirical4   
,hence that purposiveness of nature for 
our  cognitive faculties and their use1 
which is plainly apparent from them1  is
 a transcendental principle of          
judgements1 and needs therefore also a  
,transcendental ,deduction1 by means of 
which the ground for so judging  must be
 sought in the sources of cognition a   
priori4    ,we find in the grounds of   
the possibility of an experience in the 
very first place something necessary1   
viz4 the universal laws without  which  
nature in general 7as an object of      
sense7 cannot be thought2  and these    
rest upon the ,categories1 applied to   
the formal conditions  of all intuition 
possible for us1 so far as it is also   
given a  priori4 ,now under these laws  
the ,judgement is determinant1 for it   
has nothing to do but to subsume under  

given laws4 ,for example1 the           
,understanding says that every change   
has its cause 7universal law of         
nature72 the transcendental ,judgement  
has nothing further to do than  to      
supply a priori the condition of        
subsumption under the concept  of the   
,understanding placed before it1 i4e4   
the succession in  time of the          
determinations of one and the same      
thing4 ,for nature in  general 7as an   
object of possible experience7 that law 
is cognised as  absolutely              
necessary4--,but now the objects of     
empirical cognition are  determined in  
many other ways than by that formal     
time-condition1  or1 at least as far as 
we can judge a priori1 are determinable4
  ,hence specifically different natures 
can be causes in an infinite  variety of
 ways1 as well as in virtue of what they
 have in common  as belonging to nature 
in general2 and each of these modes must
 7in  accordance with the concept of a  
cause in general7 have its rule1 which  

is a law and therefore brings necessity 
with it1 although we do not  at all     
comprehend this necessity1 in virtue of 
the constitution and  the limitations of
 our cognitive faculties4 ,we must      
therefore think  in nature1 in respect  
of its merely empirical laws1 a         
possibility of  infinitely various      
empirical laws1 which are1 as far as our
 insight  goes1 contingent 7cannot be   
cognised a priori71 and in respect of   
which we judge nature1 according to     
empirical laws and the possibility  of  
the unity of experience 7as a system    
according to empirical laws71  to be    
contingent4 ,but such a unity must be   
necessarily presupposed and  assumed1   
for otherwise there would be no         
thoroughgoing connexion of  empirical   
cognitions in a whole of experience4    
,the universal laws of  nature no doubt 
furnish such a connexion of things      
according to their  kind as things of   
nature in general1 but not specifically1
 as such  particular beings of nature4  

,hence the ,judgement must assume for   
its  special use this principle a       
priori1 that what in the particular     
7empirical7 laws of nature is from the  
human point of view contingent1  yet    
contains a unity of law in the          
combination of its manifold into an     
experience possible in itself--a unity  
not indeed to be fathomed by us1  but   
yet thinkable4 ,consequently as the     
unity of law in a combination1  which we
 cognise as contingent in itself1       
although in conformity with  a necessary
 design 7a need7 of ,understanding1 is  
represented as the  purposiveness of    
,objects 7here of nature72 so must the  
,judgement1 which  in respect of things 
under possible 7not yet discovered7     
empirical  laws is merely reflection1   
think of nature in respect of the latter
  according to a principle of           
purposiveness for our cognitive faculty1
  which then is expressed in the above  
maxims of the ,judgement4 ,this         
transcendental concept of a             

purposiveness of nature is neither a    
natural concept nor a concept of        
freedom1 because it ascribes nothing  to
 the ,object 7of nature71 but only      
represents the peculiar way in  which we
 must proceed in reflection upon the    
objects of nature in  reference to a    
thoroughly connected experience1 and is 
consequently a  subjective principle    
7maxim7 of the ,judgement4 ,hence1 as if
 it were a  lucky chance favouring our  
design1 we are rejoiced 7properly       
speaking1  relieved of a want71 if we   
meet with such systematic unity under   
merely  empirical laws2 although we must
 necessarily assume that there is such  
a unity without our comprehending it or 
being able to prove it4    ,in order to 
convince ourselves of the correctness of
 this ,deduction  of the concept before 
us1 and the necessity of assuming it as 
a  transcendental principle of          
cognition1 just consider the magnitude  
of  the problem4 ,the problem1 which    
lies a priori in our ,understanding1  is

 to make a connected experience out of  
given perceptions of a nature           
containing at all events an infinite    
variety of empirical laws4 ,the         
,understanding is1 no doubt1 in         
possession a priori of universal laws   
of nature1 without which nature could   
not be an object of experience2  but it 
needs in addition a certain order of    
nature in its particular  rules1 which  
can only be empirically known and which 
are1 as regards  the ,understanding1    
contingent4 ,these rules1 without which 
we could  not proceed from the universal
 analogy of a possible experience in    
general to the particular1 must be      
thought by it as laws 7i4e4 as          
necessary71 for otherwise they would not
 constitute an order of nature2         
although their necessity can never be   
cognised or comprehended by  it4        
,although1 therefore1 the ,understanding
 can determine nothing a  priori in     
respect of ,objects1 it must1 in order  
to trace out these  empirical so-called 

laws1 place at the basis of all         
reflection upon  ,objects an a priori   
principle1 viz4 that a cognisable order 
of nature  is possible in accordance    
with these laws4 ,the following         
propositions  express some such         
principle4 ,there is in nature a        
subordination of  genera and species    
comprehensible by us4 ,each one         
approximates to some  other according to
 a common principle1 so that a          
transition from one to  another and so  
on to a higher genus may be possible4   
,though it seems at  the outset         
unavoidable for our ,understanding to   
assume different kinds  of causality for
 the specific differences of natural    
operations1 yet  these different kinds  
may stand under a small number of       
principles1  with the investigation of  
which we have to busy ourselves4 ,this  
harmony  of nature with our cognitive   
faculty is presupposed a priori by the  
,judgement1 on behalf of its reflection 
upon nature in accordance with  its     

empirical laws2 whilst the              
,understanding at the same time cognises
  it objectively as contingent1 and it  
is only the ,judgement that  ascribes it
 to nature as a trancendental           
purposiveness 7in relation to  the      
cognitive faculty of the subject74 ,for 
without this presupposition  we should  
have no order of nature in accordance   
with empirical laws1  and consequently  
no guiding thread for an experience     
ordered by these  in all their variety1 
or for an investigation of them4    ,for
 it might easily be thought that1 in    
spite of all the uniformity of  natural 
things according to the universal laws1 
without which we should  not have the   
form of an empirical cognition in       
general1 the specific  variety of the   
empirical laws of nature including their
 effects might  yet be so great1 that it
 would be impossible for our            
,understanding1 to  detect in nature a  
comprehensible order2 to divide its     
products into  genera and species1 so as

 to use the principles which explain and
 make  intelligible one for the         
explanation and comprehension of        
another2 or  out of such confused       
material 7strictly we should say1 so    
infinitely  various and not to be       
measured by our faculty of              
comprehension7 to make  a connected     
experience4    ,the ,judgement has      
therefore also in itself a principle a  
priori of  the possibility of nature1   
but only in a subjective aspect2 by     
which  it prescribes1 not to nature     
7autonomy71 but to itself 7heautonomy7  
a law for its reflection upon nature4   
,this we might call the law of  the     
specification of nature in respect of   
its empirical laws4 ,the  ,judgement    
does not cognise this a priori in       
nature1 but assumes it  on behalf of a  
natural order cognisable by our         
,understanding in the  division which it
 makes of the universal laws of nature  
when it wishes  to subordinate to these 
the variety of particular laws4 ,if then

 we say  that nature specifies its      
universal laws according to the         
principles of  purposiveness for our    
cognitive faculty1 i4e4 in accordance   
with the  necessary business of the     
human ,understanding of finding the     
universal  for the particular which     
perception offers it1 and again of      
finding  connexion for the diverse      
7which however is a universal for each  
species7 in the unity of a              
principle1--we thus neither prescribe to
  nature a law1 nor do we learn one from
 it by observation 7although such  a    
principle may be confirmed by this      
means74 ,for it is not a principle  of  
the determinant but merely of the       
reflective ,judgement4 ,we only  require
 that1 be nature disposed as it may as  
regards its universal  laws1            
investigation into its empirical laws   
may be carried on in  accordance with   
that principle and the maxims founded   
thereon1 because  it is only so far as  
that holds that we can make any progress

 with the  use of our ,understanding in 
experience1 or gain knowledge4          
,,vi4 ,,of ,,the ,,combination ,,of     
,,the ,,feeling ,,of ,,pleasure ,,with  
,,the ,,concept ,,of  ,,the             
,,purposiveness ,,of ,,nature4    ,the  
thought harmony of nature in the variety
 of its particular laws  with our need  
of finding universality of principles   
for it1 must  be judged as contingent in
 respect of our insight1 but yet at the 
same time as indispensable for the needs
 of our ,understanding1 and             
consequently as a purposiveness by which
 nature is harmonised with our  design1 
which1 however1 has only knowledge for  
its aim4 ,the universal  laws of the    
,understanding1 which are at the same   
time laws of nature1  are just as       
necessary 7although arising from        
spontaneity7 as the  material laws of   
motion4 ,their production presupposes no
 design on the  part of our cognitive   
faculty1 because it is only by means of 
them  that we1 in the first place1      

attain a concept of what the cognition  
of things 7of nature7 is1 and attribute 
them necessarily to nature as  ,object  
of our cognition in general4 ,but1 so   
far as we can see1 it is  contingent    
that the order of nature according to   
its particular laws1  in all its variety
 and heterogeneity possibly at least    
transcending  our comprehension1 should 
be actually conformable to these laws4  
,the  discovery of this order is the    
business of the ,understanding which  is
 designedly borne towards a necessary   
purpose1 viz4 the bringing of  unity of 
principles into nature1 which purpose   
then the ,judgement must  ascribe to    
nature1 because the ,understanding      
cannot here prescribe any  law to it4   
,the attainment of that design is bound 
up with the feeling of pleasure1  and   
since the condition of this attainment  
is a representation  a priori1--as here 
a principle for the reflective          
,judgement in  general1--therefore the  
feeling of pleasure is determined by a  

ground  a priori and valid for every    
man1 and that merely by the reference of
  the ,object to the cognitive faculty1 
the concept of purposiveness here  not  
having the least reference to the       
faculty of desire4 ,it is thus  quite   
distinguished from all practical        
purposiveness of nature4    ,in fact1   
although from the agreement of          
perceptions with laws in  accordance    
with universal natural concepts 7the    
categories71 we do not  and cannot find 
in ourselves the slightest effect upon  
the feeling of  pleasure1 because the   
,understanding necessarily proceeds     
according to  its nature without any    
design2 yet1 on the other hand1 the     
discovery  that two or more empirical   
heterogeneous laws of nature may be     
combined  under one principle           
comprehending them both1 is the ground  
of a very  marked pleasure1 often even  
of an admiration1 which does not cease1 
though we may be already quite familiar 
with the objects of it4 ,we no  longer  

find1 it is true1 any marked pleasure in
 the comprehensibility  of nature and in
 the unity of its divisions into genera 
and species1  whereby are possible all  
empirical concepts1 through which we    
cognise  it according to its particular 
laws4 ,but this pleasure has certainly  
been present at one time1 and it is only
 because the commonest  experience would
 be impossible without it that it is    
gradually  confounded with mere         
cognition and no longer arrests         
particular  attention4 ,there is then   
something in our judgements upon nature 
which  makes us attentive to its        
purposiveness for our ,understanding--an
  endeavour to bring1 where possible1   
its dissimilar laws under higher  ones1 
though still always empirical--and thus1
 if successful1 makes  us feel pleasure 
in that harmony of these with our       
cognitive faculty1  which harmony we    
regard as merely contingent4 ,on the    
other hand1 a  representation of nature 
would altogether displease1 by which it 

should be foretold to us that in the    
smallest investigation beyond the       
commonest experience we should meet with
 a heterogeneity of its laws1  which    
would make the union of its particular  
laws under universal  empirical laws    
impossible for our ,understanding4 ,for 
this would  contradict the principle of 
the subjectively-purposive specification
 of  nature in its genera1 and also of  
our reflective ,judgement in respect  of
 such principle4    ,this presupposition
 of the ,judgement is1 however1 at the  
same time so  indeterminate as to how   
far that ideal purposiveness of nature  
for  our cognitive faculty should be    
extended1 that if we were told that  a  
deeper or wider knowledge of nature     
derived from observation must  lead at  
last to a variety of laws1 which no     
human ,understanding could  reduce to a 
principle1 we should at once acquiesce4 
,but still we more  gladly listen to one
 who offers hope that the more we know  
nature  internally1 and can compare it  

with external members now unknown to    
us1 the more simple shall we find it in 
its principles1 and that the  further   
our experience reaches the more uniform 
shall we find it amid  the apparent     
heterogeneity of its empirical laws4    
,for it is a mandate  of our ,judgement 
to proceed according to the principle of
 the harmony  of nature with our        
cognitive faculty so far as that        
reaches1 without  deciding 7because it  
is not the determinant ,judgement which 
gives us  this rule7 whether or not it  
is bounded anywhere4 ,for although in   
respect of the rational use of our      
cognitive faculty we can determine  such
 bounds1 this is not possible in the    
empirical field4      ,,vii4 ,,of ,,the 
,,aesthetical ,,representation ,,of     
,,the ,,purposiveness ,,of ,,nature4    
,that which in the representation of an 
,object is merely subjective1  i4e4     
which decides its reference to the      
subject1 not to the object1  is its     
aesthetical character2 but that which   

serves or can be used  for the          
determination of the object 7for        
cognition71 is its logical  validity4   
,in the cognition of an object of sense 
both references  present themselves4 ,in
 the sense-representation of external   
things  the quality of space wherein we 
intuite them is the merely subjective   
element of my representation 7by which  
it remains undecided what  they may be  
in themselves as ,objects71 on account  
of which reference  the object is       
thought thereby merely as phenomenon4   
,but space1  notwithstanding its merely 
subjective quality1 is at the same time 
an ingredient in the cognition of things
 as phenomena4 ,sensation1  again 7i4e4 
external sensation71 expresses the      
merely subjective  element of our       
representations of external things1 but 
it is also the  proper material 7reale7 
of them 7by which something existing is 
given71  just as space is the mere form 
a priori of the possibility of their    
intuition4 ,nevertheless1 however1      

sensation is also employed in the       
cognition of external ,objects4    ,but 
the subjective element in a             
representation which cannot be  an      
ingredient of cognition1 is the pleasure
 or pain which is  bound up with it2 for
 through it ,i cognise nothing in the   
object of  the representation1 although 
it may be the effect of some cognition4 
,now the purposiveness of a thing1 so   
far as it is represented in  perception1
 is no characteristic of the ,object    
itself 7for such cannot  be perceived71 
although it may be inferred from a      
cognition of things4  ,the              
purposiveness1 therefore1 which precedes
 the cognition of an  ,object1 and      
which1 even without our wishing to use  
the representation  of it for cognition1
 is1 at the same time1 immediately bound
 up  with it1 is that subjective element
 which cannot be an ingredient  in      
cognition4 ,hence the object is only    
called purposive1 when its              
representation is immediately combined  

with the feeling of pleasure2  and this 
very representation is an aesthetical   
representation of  purposiveness4--,the 
only question is whether there is1 in   
general1 such  a representation of      
purposiveness4    ,if pleasure is bound 
up with the mere apprehension           
7apprehensio7 of  the form of an object 
of intuition1 without reference to a    
concept for  a definite cognition1 then 
the representation is thereby not       
referred  to the ,object1 but simply to 
the subject2 and the pleasure can       
express  nothing else than its harmony  
with the cognitive faculties which come 
into play in the reflective ,judgement1 
and so far as they are in play2  and    
hence can only express a subjective     
formal purposiveness of the  ,object4   
,for that apprehension of forms in the  
,imagination can never  take place      
without the reflective ,judgement1      
though undesignedly1  at least comparing
 them with its faculty of referring     
intuitions to  concepts4 ,if now in this

 comparison the ,imagination 7as the    
faculty of  a priori intuitions7 is     
placed by means of a given              
representation  undesignedly in         
agreement with the ,understanding1 as   
the faculty of  concepts1 and thus a    
feeling of pleasure is aroused1 the     
object must  then be regarded as        
purposive for the reflective ,judgement4
 ,such a  judgement is an aesthetical   
judgement upon the purposiveness of the 
,object1 which does not base itself upon
 any present concept of the  object1 nor
 does it furnish any such4 ,in the case 
of an object whose  form 7not the matter
 of its representation1 as sensation71  
in the mere  reflection upon it 7without
 reference to any concept to be obtained
  of it71 is judged as the ground of a  
pleasure in the representation  of such 
an ,object1 this pleasure is judged as  
bound up with the  representation       
necessarily2 and1 consequently1 not only
 for the subject  which apprehends this 
form1 but for every judging being in    

general4 ,the  object is then called    
beautiful2 and the faculty of judging by
 means  of such a pleasure 7and1        
consequently1 with universal validity7  
is  called ,taste4 ,for since the ground
 of the pleasure is placed merely in    
the form of the object for reflection in
 general--and1 consequently1  in no     
sensation of the object1 and also       
without reference to any  concept which 
anywhere involves design--it is only the
 conformity  to law in the empirical use
 of the ,judgement in general 7unity of 
the ,imagination with the               
,understanding7 in the subject1 with    
which  the representation of the ,object
 in reflection1 whose conditions are    
universally valid a priori1 harmonises4 
,and since this harmony of the  object  
with the faculties of the subject is    
contingent1 it brings about  the        
representation of its purposiveness in  
respect of the cognitive  faculties of  
the subject4    ,here now is a pleasure1
 which1 like all pleasure or pain that  

is not  produced through the concept of 
freedom 7i4e4 through the preceding     
determination of the higher faculties of
 desire by pure ,reason71 can  never be 
comprehended from concepts1 as          
necessarily bound up with the           
representation of an object4 ,it must   
always be cognised as combined  with    
this only by means of reflective        
perception2 and1 consequently1  like all
 empirical judgements1 it can declare no
 objective necessity  and lay claim to  
no a priori validity4 ,but the judgement
 of taste  also claims1 as every other  
empirical judgement does1 to be valid   
for every one2 and in spite of its inner
 contingency this is always  possible4  
,the strange and irregular thing is that
 it is not an  empirical concept1 but a 
feeling of pleasure 7consequently not a 
concept at all71 which by the judgement 
of taste is attributed to every         
one1--just as if it were a predicate    
bound up with the cognition of the      
,object--and which is connected with the

 representation thereof4    ,a singular 
judgement of experience1 e4g41 when we  
perceive a moveable  drop of water in an
 ice-crystal1 may justly claim that     
every one  else should find it the same2
 because we have formed this judgement1 
according to the universal conditions of
 the determinant faculty of  ,judgement1
 under the laws of a possible experience
 in general4 ,just  in the same way he  
who feels pleasure in the mere          
reflection upon  the form of an object  
without respect to any concept1 although
 this  judgement be empirical and       
singular1 justly claims the agreement   
of every one2 because the ground of this
 pleasure is found in the  universal1   
although subjective1 condition of       
reflective judgements1  viz41 the       
purposive harmony of an object 7whether 
a product of nature  or of art7 with the
 mutual relations of the cognitive      
faculties 7the  ,imagination and the    
,understanding71 a harmony which is     
requisite for  every empirical          

cognition4 ,the pleasure1 therefore1 in 
the judgement  of taste is dependent on 
an empirical representation1 and cannot 
be  bound up a priori with any concept  
7we cannot determine a priori  what     
object is or is not according to taste2 
that we must find out  by experiment74  
,but the pleasure is the determining    
ground of this  judgement only because  
we are conscious that it rests merely on
  reflection and on the universal though
 only subjective conditions  of the     
harmony of that reflection with the     
cognition of ,objects in  general1 for  
which the form of the ,object is        
purposive4    ,thus the reason why      
judgements of taste according to their  
possibility  are subjected to a         
,critique is that they presuppose a     
principle a  priori1 although this      
principle is neither one of cognition   
for the  ,understanding nor of practice 
for the ,will1 and therefore is not in  
any  way determinant a priori4          
,susceptibility to pleasure from        

reflection upon the forms of things 7of 
,nature as well as of ,art71 indicates  
not only a purposiveness of the         
,objects in relation to the reflective  
,judgement1 conformably to the  concept 
of nature in the subject2 but also      
conversely a purposiveness  of the      
subject in respect of the objects       
according to their form or  even their  
formlessness1 in virtue of the concept  
of freedom4 ,hence  the aesthetical     
judgement is not only related as a      
judgement of taste  to the beautiful1   
but also as springing from a spiritual  
feeling is  related to the sublime2 and 
thus the ,critique of the aesthetical   
,judgement must be divided into two     
corresponding sections4      ,,viii4    
,,of ,,the ,,logical ,,representation   
,,of ,,the ,,purposiveness ,,of ,,nature
    ,purposiveness may be represented in
 an object given in experience  on a    
merely subjective ground1 as the harmony
 of its form1--in the  apprehension     
7apprehensio7 of it prior to any        

concept1--with the  cognitive faculties1
 in order to unite the intuition with   
concepts  for a cognition generally4 ,or
 it may be represented objectively as   
the harmony of the form of the object   
with the possibility of the  thing      
itself1 according to a concept of it    
which precedes and contains  the ground 
of this form4 ,we have seen that the    
representation of  purposiveness of the 
first kind rests on the immediate       
pleasure  in the form of the object in  
the mere reflection upon it4 ,but the   
representation of purposiveness of the  
second kind1 since it refers  the form  
of the ,object1 not to the cognitive    
faculties of the subject  in the        
apprehension of it1 but to a definite   
cognition of the object  under a given  
concept1 has nothing to do with a       
feeling of pleasure in  things1 but only
 with the ,understanding in its         
judgement upon them4  ,if the concept of
 an object is given1 the business of the
 ,judgement  in the use of the concept  

for cognition consists in presentation  
7exhibitio71 i4e4 in setting a          
corresponding intuition beside the      
concept4 ,this may take place either    
through our own ,imagination1 as  in    
,art when we realise a preconceived     
concept of an object which is  a purpose
 of ours2 or through ,nature in its     
,technic 7as in organised  bodies7 when 
we supply to it our concept of its      
purpose in order  to judge of its       
products4 ,in the latter case it is not 
merely the  purposiveness of nature in  
the form of the thing that is           
represented1  but this its product is   
represented as a natural                
purpose4--,although  our concept of a   
subjective purposiveness of nature in   
its forms  according to empirical laws  
is not a concept of the ,object1 but    
only  a principle of the ,judgement for 
furnishing itself with concepts amid    
the immense variety of nature 7and thus 
being able to ascertain its  own        
position71 yet we thus ascribe to nature

 as it were a regard to  our cognitive  
faculty according to the analogy of     
purpose4 ,thus we can  regard natural   
beauty as the presentation of the       
concept of the  formal 7merely          
subjective7 purposiveness1 and natural  
purposes as  the presentation of the    
concept of a real 7objective7           
purposiveness4  ,the former of these we 
judge of by ,taste 7aesthetically1 by   
the medium  of the feeling of pleasure71
 the latter by ,understanding and       
,reason  7logically1 according to       
concepts74    ,on this is based the     
division of the ,critique of ,judgement 
into the  ,critique of aesthetical and  
of teleological ,judgement4 ,by the     
first we understand the faculty of      
judging of the formal purposiveness     
7otherwise called subjective7 of ,nature
 by means of the feeling of  pleasure or
 pain2 by the second the faculty of     
judging its real  7objective7           
purposiveness by means of ,understanding
 and ,reason4    ,in a ,critique of     

,judgement the part containing the      
aesthetical  ,judgement is essential1   
because this alone contains a principle 
which the ,judgement places quite a     
priori at the basis of its  reflection  
upon nature2 viz41 the principle of a   
formal purposiveness  of nature1        
according to its particular 7empirical7 
laws1 for our  cognitive faculty1       
without which the ,understanding could  
not find  itself in nature4 ,on the     
other hand no reason a priori could be  
specified1--and even the possibility of 
a reason would not be apparent  from the
 concept of nature as an object of      
experience whether general  or          
particular1--why there should be        
objective purposes of nature1  i4e4     
things which are only possible as       
natural purposes2 but the  ,judgement1  
without containing such a principle a   
priori in itself1  in given cases 7of   
certain products71 in order to make use 
of the  concept of purposes on behalf of
 ,reason1 would only contain the rule   

according to which that transcendental  
principle has already prepared  the     
,understanding to apply to nature the   
concept of a purpose 7at least  as      
regards its form74    ,but the          
transcendental principle which          
represents a purposiveness of  nature   
7in subjective reference to our         
cognitive faculty7 in the form  of a    
thing as a principle by which we judge  
of nature1 leaves it quite  undetermined
 where and in what cases ,i have to     
judge of a product  according to a      
principle of purposiveness1 and not     
rather according to  universal natural  
laws4 ,it leaves it to the aesthetical  
,judgement  to decide by taste the      
harmony of this product 7of its form7   
with our  cognitive faculty 7so far as  
this decision rests not on any agreement
  with concepts but on feeling74 ,on the
 other hand1 the ,judgement             
teleologically employed furnishes       
conditions determinately under which    
something 7e4g4 an organised body7 is to

 be judged according to  the ,idea of a 
purpose of nature2 but it can adduce no 
fundamental  proposition from the       
concept of nature as an object of       
experience  authorising it to ascribe to
 nature a priori a reference to         
purposes1  or even indeterminately to   
assume this of such products in actual  
experience4 ,the reason of this is that 
we must have many particular            
experiences1 and consider them under the
 unity of their principle1 in  order to 
be able to cognise1 even empirically1   
objective purposiveness  in a certain   
object4--,the aesthetical ,judgement is 
therefore a special  faculty for judging
 of things according to a rule1 but not 
according  to concepts4 ,the            
teleological ,judgement is not a special
 faculty1 but  only the reflective      
,judgement in general1 so far as it     
proceeds1 as it  always does in         
theoretical cognition1 according to     
concepts2 but in  respect of certain    
objects of nature according to special  

principles1  viz41 of a merely          
reflective ,judgement1 and not of a     
,judgement that  determines ,objects4   
,thus as regards its application it     
belongs to  the theoretical part of     
,philosophy2 and on account of its      
special  principles which are not       
determinant1 as they must be in         
,doctrine1 it  must constitute a special
 part of the ,critique4 ,on the other   
hand1 the  aesthetical ,judgement       
contributes nothing towards the         
knowledge of  its objects1 and thus must
 be reckoned as belonging to the        
criticism  of the judging subject and   
its cognitive faculties1 only so far as 
they are susceptible of a priori        
principles1 of whatever other use       
7theoretical or practical7 they may be4 
,this is the propaedeutic of all        
,philosophy4      ,,ix4 ,,of ,,the      
,,connexion ,,of ,,the ,,legislation    
,,of ,,understanding ,,with ,,that ,,of 
,,reason ,,by ,,means ,,of ,,the        
,,judgement    ,the ,understanding      

legislates a priori for nature as an    
,object of  sense--for a theoretical    
knowledge of it in a possible           
experience4  ,reason legislates a priori
 for freedom and its peculiar casuality2
  as the supersensible in the subject1  
for an unconditioned practical          
knowledge4 ,the realm of the natural    
concept under the one legislation  and  
that of the concept of freedom under the
 other are entirely removed  from all   
mutual influence which they might have  
on one another 7each  according to its  
fundamental laws7 by the great gulf that
 separates  the supersensible from      
phenomena4 ,the concept of freedom      
determines  nothing in respect of the   
theoretical cognition of nature2 and the
  natural concept determines nothing in 
respect of the practical laws of        
freedom4 ,so far then it is not possible
 to throw a bridge from the one  realm  
to the other4 ,but although the         
determining grounds of causality        
according to the concept of freedom 7and

 the practical rules which it  contains7
 are not resident in nature1 and the    
sensible cannot determine  the          
supersensible in the subject1 yet this  
is possible conversely 7not1  to be     
sure1 in respect of the cognition of    
nature1 but as regards  the effects of  
the supersensible upon the sensible74   
,this in fact is  involved in the       
concept of a causality through freedom1 
the effect  of which is to take place in
 the world according to its formal laws4
  ,the word cause1 of course1 when used 
of the supersensible only  signifies the
 ground which determines the causality  
of natural  things to an effect in      
accordance with their proper natural    
laws1  although harmoniously with the   
formal principle of the laws of         
,reason4 ,although the possibility of   
this cannot be comprehended1 yet  the   
objection of a contradiction alleged to 
be found in it can be  sufficiently     
answered4#aj--,the effect in accordance 
with the concept  of freedom is the     

final purpose which 7or its phenomenon  
in the world  of sense7 ought to exist2 
and the condition of the possibility of 
this  is presupposed in nature 7in the  
nature of the subject as a sensible     
being1 that is1 as man74 ,the ,judgement
 presupposes this a priori and  without 
reference to the practical2 and thus    
furnishes the mediating  concept between
 the concepts of nature and that of     
freedom4 ,it makes  possible the        
transition from the conformity to law in
 accordance with  the former to the     
final purpose in accordance with the    
latter1 and this  by the concept of a   
purposiveness of nature4 ,for thus is   
cognised  the possibility of the final  
purpose which alone can be actualised in
  nature in harmony with its laws4      
,the ,understanding by the possibility  
of its a priori laws for  nature1 gives 
a proof that nature is only cognised by 
us as phenomenon2  and implies at the   
same time that it has a supersensible   
substrate1  though it leaves this quite 

undetermined4 ,the ,judgement by its a  
priori principle for the judging of     
nature according to its possible        
particular laws1 makes the supersensible
 substrate 7both in us and  without us7 
determinable by means of the            
intellectual faculty4 ,but  the ,reason 
by its practical a priori law determines
 it2 and thus  the ,judgement makes     
possible the transition from the realm  
of the  concept of nature to that of the
 concept of freedom4    ,as regards the 
faculties of the soul in general1 in    
their higher  aspect1 as containing an  
autonomy2 the ,understanding is that    
which  contains the constitutive        
principles a priori for the cognitive   
faculty 7the theoretical cognition of   
nature74 ,for the feeling of  pleasure  
and pain there is the ,judgement1       
independently of concepts  and          
sensations which relate to the          
determination of the faculty of  desire 
and can thus be immediately practical4  
,for the faculty of  desire there is the

 ,reason which is practical without the 
mediation  of any pleasure whatever4 ,it
 determines for the faculty of desire1  
as a superior faculty1 the final purpose
 which carries with it the  pure        
intellectual satisfaction in the        
,object4--,the concept formed by        
,judgement of a purposiveness of nature 
belongs to natural concepts1  but only  
as a regulative principle of the        
cognitive faculty2 although  the        
aesthetical judgement upon certain      
objects 7of ,nature or ,art7  which     
occasions it is1 in respect of the      
feeling of pleasure or pain1  a         
constitutive principle4 ,the spontaneity
 in the play of the cognitive           
faculties1 the harmony of which contains
 the ground of this pleasure1  makes the
 above concept of the purposiveness of  
nature fit to be the  mediating link    
between the realm of the natural concept
 and that of the  concept of freedom in 
its effects2 whilst at the same time it 
promotes  the sensibility of the mind   

for moral feeling4--,the following table
 may  facilitate the review of all the  
higher faculties according to their     
systematic unity4#aa                    
,all the faculties of the mind          
,cognitive faculties4                   
,faculties of desire4                   
,feeling of pleasure and pain4          
,cognitive faculties    ,understanding4 
,judgement4                     ,reason4
                             ,a priori  
principles    ,conformity to law4       
,purposiveness4            ,final       
purpose4                                
,application to    ,nature4             
,art4                       ,freedom4   
,,the ,,critique ,,of ,,judgement       
,,part ,i    ,,critique ,,of ,,the      
,,aesthetical ,,judgement               
,,first ,,division    ,,analytic ,,of   
,,the ,,aesthetical ,,judgement         
,,first ,,book    ,,analytic ,,of ,,the 
,,beautiful          ,,first ,,moment   
,,of ,,the ,,judgement ,,of ,,taste#ab  
,,according ,,to ,,quality       #a4    

,the judgement of taste is aesthetical  
,in order to decide whether anything is 
beautiful or not1 we refer the          
representation1 not by the              
,understanding to the ,object for       
cognition  but1 by the ,imagination     
7perhaps in conjunction with the        
,understanding7  to the subject1 and its
 feeling of pleasure or pain4 ,the      
judgement of  taste is therefore not a  
judgement of cognition1 and is          
consequently  not logical but           
aesthetical1 by which we understand that
 whose  determining ground can be no    
other than subjective4 ,every reference 
of representations1 even that of        
sensations1 may be objective 7and  then 
it signifies the real in an empirical   
representation72 save only  the         
reference to the feeling of pleasure and
 pain1 by which nothing in  the ,object 
is signified1 but through which there is
 a feeling in the  subject1 as it is    
affected by the representation4    ,to  
apprehend a regular1 purposive building 

by means of one's  cognitive faculty    
7whether in a clear or a confused way of
  representation7 is something quite    
different from being conscious of  this 
representation as connected with the    
sensation of satisfaction4  ,here the   
representation is altogether referred to
 the subject and  to its feeling of     
life1 under the name of the feeling of  
pleasure  or pain4 ,this establishes a  
quite separate faculty of distinction   
and of judgement1 adding nothing to     
cognition1 but only comparing  the given
 representation in the subject with the 
whole faculty of  representations1 of   
which the mind is conscious in the      
feeling of  its state4 ,given           
representations in a judgement can be   
empirical  7consequently1 aesthetical72 
but the judgement which is formed by    
means  of them is logical1 provided they
 are referred in the judgement to the   
,object4 ,conversely1 if the given      
representations are rational1 but are   
referred in a judgement simply to the   

subject 7to its feeling71 the  judgement
 is so far always aesthetical4       #b4
 ,the satisfaction which determines the 
judgement of taste is  disinterested    
,the satisfaction which we combine with 
the representation of the  existence of 
an object is called interest4 ,such     
satisfaction always  has reference to   
the faculty of desire1 either as its    
determining  ground or as necessarily   
connected with its determining ground4  
,now  when the question is if a thing is
 beautiful1 we do not want to know      
whether anything depends or can depend  
on the existence of the thing  either   
for myself or for any one else1 but how 
we judge it by mere  observation        
7intuition or reflection74 ,if any one  
asks me if ,i find  that palace         
beautiful which ,i see before me1 ,i may
 answer3 ,i do not  like things of that 
kind which are made merely to be stared 
at4 ,or ,i  can answer like that        
,iroquois sachem who was pleased in     
,paris by  nothing more than by the     

cook-shops4 ,or again after the manner  
of  ,rousseau ,i may rebuke the vanity  
of the great who waste the sweat of  the
 people on such superfluous things4 ,in 
fine ,i could easily convince  myself   
that if ,i found myself on an           
uninhabited island without the  hope of 
ever again coming among men1 and could  
conjure up just such  a splendid        
building by my mere wish1 ,i should not 
even give myself  the trouble if ,i had 
a sufficiently comfortable hut4 ,this   
may all be  admitted and approved2 but  
we are not now talking of this4 ,we wish
  only to know if this mere             
representation of the object is         
accompanied  in me with satisfaction1   
however indifferent ,i may be as regards
 the  existence of the object of this   
representation4 ,we easily see that  in 
saying it is beautiful and in showing   
that ,i have taste1 ,i am  concerned1   
not with that in which ,i depend on the 
existence of the  object1 but with that 
which ,i make out of this representation

 in  myself4 ,every one must admit that 
a judgement about beauty1 in which  the 
least interest mingles1 is very partial 
and is not a pure judgement  of taste4  
,we must not be in the least prejudiced 
in favour of the  existence of the      
things1 but be quite indifferent in this
 respect1 in  order to play the judge in
 things of taste4    ,we cannot1        
however1 better elucidate this          
proposition1 which is of  capital       
importance1 than by contrasting the pure
 disinterested#ac  satisfaction in      
judgements of taste1 with that which is 
bound up with  an interest1 especially  
if we can at the same time be certain   
that  there are no other kinds of       
interest than those which are now to be 
specified4       #c4 ,the satisfaction  
in the ,,pleasant is bound up with      
interest    ,that which pleases the     
senses in sensation is ,,pleasant4 ,here
 the  opportunity presents itself of    
censuring a very common confusion of    
the double sense which the word         

sensation can have1 and of calling      
attention to it4 ,all satisfaction 7it  
is said or thought7 is itself  sensation
 7of a pleasure74 ,consequently         
everything that pleases is  pleasant    
because it pleases 7and according to its
 different degrees  or its relations to 
other pleasant sensations it is         
agreeable1  lovely1 delightful1         
enjoyable1 etc474 ,but if this be       
admitted1  then impressions of ,sense   
which determine the inclination1        
fundamental  propositions of ,reason    
which determine the ,will1 mere         
reflective forms  of intuition which    
determine the ,judgement1 are quite the 
same1 as  regards the effect upon the   
feeling of pleasure4 ,for this would be 
pleasantness in the sensation of one's  
state1 and since in the end all  the    
operations of our faculties must issue  
in the practical and unite  in it as    
their goal1 we could suppose no other   
way of estimating things  and their     
worth than that which consists in the   

gratification that  they promise4 ,it is
 of no consequence at all how this is   
attained1 and  since then the choice of 
means alone could make a difference1 men
 could  indeed blame one another for    
stupidity and indiscretion1 but never   
for  baseness and wickedness4 ,for all1 
each according to his own way of  seeing
 things1 seek one goal1 that is1        
gratification4    ,if a determination of
 the feeling of pleasure or pain is     
called  sensation1 this expression      
signifies something quite different from
  what ,i mean when ,i call the         
representation of a thing 7by sense1 as 
a  receptivity belonging to the         
cognitive faculty7 sensation4 ,for in   
the  latter case the representation is  
referred to the ,object1 in the former  
simply to the subject1 and is available 
for no cognition whatever1 not  even for
 that by which the subject cognises     
itself4    ,in the above elucidation we 
understand by the word sensation1  an   
objective representation of sense2 and  

in order to avoid  misinterpretation1 we
 shall call that1 which must always     
remain merely  subjective and can       
constitute absolutely no representation 
of an  object1 by the ordinary term     
8feeling40 ,the green colour of the     
meadows  belongs to objective sensation1
 as a perception of an object of  sense2
 the pleasantness of this belongs to    
subjective sensation by  which no object
 is represented1 i4e4 to feeling1 by    
which the object  is considered as an   
,object of satisfaction 7which does not 
furnish a  cognition of it74    ,now    
that a judgement about an object1 by    
which ,i describe it as  pleasant1      
expresses an interest in it1 is plain   
from the fact that by  sensation it     
excites a desire for objects of that    
kind2 consequently  the satisfaction    
presupposes not the mere judgement about
 it1 but the  relation of its existence 
to my state1 so far as this is affected 
by such an ,object4 ,hence we do not    
merely say of the pleasant1 it  pleases2

 but1 it gratifies4 ,i give to it no    
mere approval1 but  inclination is      
aroused by it2 and in the case of what  
is pleasant  in the most lively fashion1
 there is no judgement at all upon the  
character of the ,object1 for those who 
always lay themselves out only  for     
enjoyment 7for that is the word         
describing intense gratification7  would
 fain dispense with all judgement4      
#d4 ,the satisfaction in the ,,good is  
bound up with interest    ,whatever by  
means of ,reason pleases through the    
mere concept is ,,good4  ,that which    
pleases only as a means we call good for
 something 7the  useful72 but that which
 pleases for itself is good in itself4  
,in both  there is always involved the  
concept of a purpose1 and consequently  
the relation of ,reason to the 7at least
 possible7 volition1 and thus a         
satisfaction in the presence of an      
,object or an action1 i4e4 some  kind of
 interest4    ,in order to find anything
 good1 ,i must always know what sort of 

a  thing the object ought to be1 i4e4 ,i
 must have a concept of it4 ,but  there 
is no need of this1 to find a thing     
beautiful4 ,flowers1 free  delineations1
 outlines intertwined with one another  
without design  and called foliage1 have
 no meaning1 depend on no definite      
concept1  and yet they please4 ,the     
satisfaction in the beautiful must      
depend  on the reflection upon an       
object1 leading to any concept 7however 
indefinite72 and it is thus             
distinguished from the pleasant which   
rests  entirely upon sensation4    ,it  
is true1 the ,pleasant seems in many    
cases to be the same as the  ,good4     
,thus people are accustomed to say that 
all gratification  7especially if it    
lasts7 is good in itself2 which is very 
much the  same as to say that lasting   
pleasure and the good are the same4 ,but
  we can soon see that this is merely a 
confusion of words2 for the  concepts   
which properly belong to these          
expressions can in no way be            

interchanged4 ,the pleasant1 which1 as  
such1 represents the object  simply in  
relation to ,sense1 must first be       
brought by the concept of  a purpose    
under principles of ,reason1 in order to
 call it good1 as an  object of the     
,will4 ,but that there is involved a    
quite different  relation to            
satisfaction in calling that which      
gratifies at the same  time good1 may be
 seen from the fact that in the case of 
the good the  question always is1       
whether it is mediately or immediately  
good 7useful  or good in itself72 but on
 the contrary in the case of the        
pleasant  there can be no question about
 this at all1 for the word always       
signifies something which pleases       
immediately4 7,the same is applicable   
to what ,i call beautiful47    ,even in 
common speech men distinguish the       
,pleasant from the ,good4  ,of a dish   
which stimulates the taste by spices and
 other condiments  we say unhesitatingly
 that it is pleasant1 though it is at   

the same  time admitted not to be good2 
for though it immediately delights  the 
senses1 yet mediately1 i4e4 considered  
by ,reason which looks to  the after    
results1 it displeases4 ,even in the    
judging of health we  may notice this   
distinction4 ,it is immediately pleasant
 to every one  possessing it 7at least  
negatively1 i4e4 as the absence of all  
bodily  pains74 ,but in order to say    
that it is good1 it must be considered  
by ,reason with reference to purposes2  
viz4 that it is a state which  makes us 
fit for all our business4 ,finally in   
respect of happiness  every one believes
 himself entitled to describe the       
greatest sum of  the pleasantnesses of  
life 7as regards both their number and  
their  duration7 as a true1 even as the 
highest1 good4 ,however ,reason is      
opposed to this4 ,pleasantness is       
enjoyment4 ,and if we were concerned    
with this alone1 it would be foolish to 
be scrupulous as regards the  means     
which procure it for us1 or to care     

whether it is obtained  passively by the
 bounty of nature or by our own activity
 and work4  ,but ,reason can never be   
persuaded that the existence of a man   
who  merely lives for enjoyment 7however
 busy he may be in this point of  view71
 has a worth in itself2 even if he at   
the same time is conducive  as a means  
to the best enjoyment of others1 and    
shares in all their  gratifications by  
sympathy4 ,only what he does1 without   
reference to  enjoyment1 in full freedom
 and independently of what nature can   
procure  for him passively1 gives an    
absolute#ad worth to his being1 as the  
existence of a person2 and happiness1   
with the whole abundance of its         
pleasures1 is far from being an         
unconditioned good4#ae    ,however1     
notwithstanding all this difference     
between the pleasant and  the good1 they
 both agree in this that they are always
 bound up with an  interest in their    
object4 ,this is true not only of the   
pleasant7 #c71  and the mediate good    

7the useful7 which is pleasing as a     
means towards  pleasantness somewhere1  
but also of that which is good          
absolutely and  in every aspect1 viz4   
moral good1 which brings with it the    
highest  interest4 ,for the good is the 
,object of will 7i4e4 of a faculty of   
desire determined by ,reason74 ,but to  
will something1 and to have a           
satisfaction in its existence1 i4e4 to  
take an interest in it1 are  identical4 
#e4 ,comparison of the three            
specifically different kinds of         
satisfaction    ,the pleasant and the   
good have both a reference to the       
faculty  of desire2 and they bring with 
them--the former a satisfaction         
pathologically conditioned 7by impulses1
 stimuli7--the latter a  pure practical 
satisfaction1 which is determined not   
merely by the  representation of the    
object1 but also by the represented     
connexion  of the subject with the      
existence of the object4 ,it is not     
merely  the object that pleases1 but    

also its existence4#af ,on the other    
hand1 the judgement of taste is merely  
contemplative2 i4e4 it is  a judgement  
which1 indifferent as regards the being 
of an object1  compares its character   
with the feeling of pleasure and pain4  
,but this  contemplation itself is not  
directed to concepts2 for the judgement 
of  taste is not a cognitive judgement  
7either theoretical or practical71  and 
thus is not based on concepts1 nor has  
it concepts as its  purpose4    ,the    
,pleasant1 the ,beautiful1 and the      
,good1 designate then1 three  different 
relations of representations to the     
feeling of pleasure and  pain1 in       
reference to which we distinguish from  
each other objects or  methods of       
representing them4 ,and the expressions 
corresponding to  each1 by which we mark
 our complacency in them1 are not the   
same4 ,that  which ,,gratifies a man is 
called pleasant2 that which merely      
,,pleases  him is beautiful2 that which 
is ,,esteemed or approved#ag by  him1   

i4e4 that to which he accords an        
objective worth1 is good4  ,pleasantness
 concerns irrational animals also2 but  
,beauty only  concerns men1 i4e4 animal1
 but still rational1 beings--not merely 
qu rational 7e4g4 spirits71 but qu      
animal also2 and the ,good  concerns    
every rational being in general4 ,this  
is a proposition which  can only be     
completely established and explained in 
the sequel4 ,we may  say that of all    
these three kinds of satisfaction1 that 
of taste in  the ,beautiful is alone a  
disinterested and free satisfaction2 for
 no  interest1 either of ,sense or of   
,reason1 here forces our assent4 ,hence 
we may say of satisfaction that it is   
related in the three aforesaid  cases to
 inclination1 to favour1 or to respect4 
,now favour is  the only free           
satisfaction4 ,an object of inclination1
 and one that  is proposed to our desire
 by a law of ,reason1 leave us no       
freedom in  forming for ourselves       
anywhere an object of pleasure4 ,all    

interest  presupposes or generates a    
want2 and1 as the determining ground of 
assent1 it leaves the judgement about   
the object no longer free4    ,as       
regards the interest of inclination in  
the case of the ,pleasant1  every one   
says that hunger is the best sauce1 and 
everything that is  eatable is relished 
by people with a healthy appetite2 and  
thus a  satisfaction of this sort does  
not indicate choice directed by taste4  
,it is only when the want is appeased   
that we can distinguish which of  many  
men has or has not taste4 ,in the same  
way there may be manners  7conduct7     
without virtue1 politeness without      
goodwill1 decorum without  modesty1 etc4
 ,for where the moral law speaks there  
is no longer1  objectively1 a free      
choice as regards what is to be done2   
and to  display taste in its fulfilment 
7or in judging of another's fulfilment  
of it7 is something quite different from
 manifesting the moral attitude  of     
thought4 ,for this involves a command   

and generates a want1 whilst  moral     
taste only plays with the objects of    
satisfaction1 without  attaching itself 
to one of them4      ,,explanation ,,of 
,,the ,,beautiful ,,resulting ,,from    
,,the ,,first ,,moment    ,taste is the 
faculty of judging of an object or a    
method of  representing it by an        
entirely disinterested satisfaction  or 
dissatisfaction4 ,the object of such    
satisfaction is called  beautiful4#ah   
,,second ,,moment    ,,of ,,the         
,,judgement ,,of ,,taste1 ,,viz4        
,,according ,,to ,,quantity       #f4   
,the beautiful is that which apart from 
concepts is represented as  the object  
of a universal satisfaction    ,this    
explanation of the beautiful can be     
derived from the preceding  explanation 
of it as the object of an entirely      
disinterested  satisfaction4 ,for the   
fact of which every one is conscious1   
that the  satisfaction is for him quite 
disinterested1 implies in his judgement 
a  ground of satisfaction for every one4

 ,for since it does not rest on any     
inclination of the subject 7nor upon any
 other premeditated interest71  but     
since he who judges feels himself quite 
free as regards the  satisfaction which 
he attaches to the object1 he cannot    
find the ground  of this satisfaction in
 any private conditions connected with  
his own  subject2 and hence it must be  
regarded as grounded on what he can     
presuppose in every other man4          
,consequently he must believe that he   
has  reason for attributing a similar   
satisfaction to every one4 ,he will     
therefore speak of the beautiful1 as if 
beauty were a characteristic  of the    
object and the judgement logical        
7constituting a cognition of  the       
,object by means of concepts of it72    
although it is only aesthetical  and    
involves merely a reference of the      
representation of the object to  the    
subject4 ,for it has this similarity to 
a logical judgement that we  can        
presuppose its validity for every one4  

,but this universality cannot  arise    
from concepts2 for from concepts there  
is no transition to the  feeling of     
pleasure or pain 7except in pure        
practical laws1 which bring  an interest
 with them such as is not bound up with 
the pure judgement  of taste74          
,consequently the judgement of taste1   
accompanied with the  consciousness of  
separation from all interest1 must claim
 validity for  every one1 without this  
universality depending on ,objects4     
,that is1  there must be bound up with  
it a title to subjective universality4  
#g4 ,comparison of the ,beautiful with  
the ,pleasant and the ,good by  means of
 the above characteristic    ,as regards
 the ,pleasant every one is content that
 his judgement1 which  he bases upon    
private feeling1 and by which he says of
 an object that  it pleases him1 should 
be limited merely to his own person4    
,thus he  is quite contented that if he 
says 8,canary wine is pleasant10 another
  man may correct his expression and    

remind him that he ought to say 8,it  is
 pleasant to me40 ,and this is the case 
not only as regards the  taste of the   
tongue1 the palate1 and the throat1 but 
for whatever is  pleasant to any one's  
eyes and ears4 ,to one violet colour is 
soft and  lovely1 to another it is faded
 and dead4 ,one man likes the tone of   
wind  instruments1 another that of      
strings4 ,to strive here with the design
 of  reproving as incorrect another     
man's judgement which is different from 
our own1 as if the judgements were      
logically opposed1 would be folly4  ,as 
regards the pleasant therefore the      
fundamental proposition is valid1  every
 one has his own taste 7the taste of    
,sense74    ,the case is quite different
 with the ,beautiful4 ,it would 7on the 
contrary7 be laughable if a man who     
imagined anything to his own taste1     
thought to justify himself by saying3   
8,this object 7the house we see1  the   
coat that person wears1 the concert we  
hear1 the poem submitted  to our        

judgement7 is beautiful for me40 ,for he
 must not call it  beautiful if it      
merely pleases himself4 ,many things may
 have for  him charm and pleasantness2  
no one troubles himself at that2 but if 
he gives out anything as beautiful1 he  
supposes in others the same             
satisfaction--he judges not merely for  
himself1 but for every one1  and speaks 
of beauty as if it were a property of   
things4 ,hence he says  8the thing is   
beautiful02 and he does not count on the
 agreement of  others with this his     
judgement of satisfaction1 because he   
has found  this agreement several times 
before1 but he demands it of them4 ,he  
blames them if they judge otherwise and 
he denies them taste1 which he          
nevertheless requires from them4 ,here  
then we cannot say that each man  has   
his own particular taste4 ,for this     
would be as much as to say that  there  
is no taste whatever2 i4e4 no           
aesthetical judgement1 which can  make a
 rightful claim upon every one's assent4

    ,at the same time we find as regards
 the ,pleasant that there is an         
agreement among men in their judgements 
upon it1 in regard to which  we deny    
,taste to some and attribute it to      
others2 by this not meaning  one of our 
organic senses1 but a faculty of judging
 in respect of the  pleasant generally4 
,thus we say of a man who knows how to  
entertain  his guests with pleasures 7of
 enjoyment for all the senses71 so that 
they are all pleased1 8he has taste40   
,but here the universality is only      
taken comparatively2 and there emerge   
rules which are only general  7like all 
empirical ones71 and not universal2     
which latter the  judgement of ,taste   
upon the beautiful undertakes or lays   
claim to4 ,it  is a judgement in        
reference to sociability1 so far as this
 rests on  empirical rules4 ,in respect 
of the ,good it is true that judgements 
make  rightful claim to validity for    
every one2 but the ,good is represented 
only by means of a concept as the       

,object of a universal satisfaction1    
which is the case neither with the      
,pleasant nor with the ,beautiful4      
#h4 ,the universality of the            
satisfaction is represented in a        
judgement of ,taste only as subjective  
,this particular determination of the   
universality of an aesthetical          
judgement1 which is to be met with in a 
judgement of taste1 is  noteworthy1 not 
indeed for the logician1 but for the    
transcendental  philosopher4 ,it        
requires no small trouble to discover   
its origin1 but  we thus detect a       
property of our cognitive faculty which 
without this  analysis would remain     
unknown4    ,first1 we must be fully    
convinced of the fact that in a         
judgement  of taste 7about the          
,beautiful7 the satisfaction in the     
object is  imputed to every one1 without
 being based on a concept 7for then  it 
would be the ,good74 ,further1 this     
claim to universal validity so          
essentially belongs to a judgement by   

which we describe anything as           
beautiful1 that if this were not thought
 in it1 it would never come  into our   
thoughts to use the expression at all1  
but everything which  pleases without a 
concept would be counted as pleasant4   
,in respect  of the latter every one has
 his own opinion2 and no one assumes1 in
  another1 agreement with his judgement 
of taste1 which is always the  case in a
 judgement of taste about beauty4 ,i may
 call the first the  taste of ,sense1   
the second the taste of ,reflection2 so 
far as the  first lays down mere private
 judgements1 and the second judgements  
supposed to be generally valid 7public71
 but in both cases aesthetical  7not    
practical7 judgements about an object   
merely in respect of the  relation of   
its representation to the feeling of    
pleasure and pain4  ,now here is        
something strange4 ,as regards the taste
 of ,sense not only  does experience    
show that its judgement 7of pleasure or 
pain connected  with anything7 is not   

valid universally1 but every one is     
content not  to impute agreement with it
 to others 7although actually there is  
often found a very extended concurrence 
in these judgements74 ,on the  other    
hand1 the taste of ,reflection has its  
claim to the universal  validity of its 
judgements 7about the beautiful7        
rejected often  enough1 as experience   
teaches2 although it may find it        
possible 7as it  actually does7 to      
represent judgements which can demand   
this universal  agreement4 ,in fact for 
each of its judgements of taste it      
imputes  this to every one1 without the 
persons that judge disputing as to the  
possibility of such a claim2 although in
 particular cases they cannot  agree as 
to the correct application of this      
faculty4    ,here we must1 in the first 
place1 remark that a universality which 
does not rest on concepts of ,objects   
7not even on empirical ones7 is  not    
logical but aesthetical1 i4e4 it        
involves no objective quantity  of the  

judgement but only that which is        
subjective4 ,for this ,i use  the       
expression general validity which       
signifies the validity of the  reference
 of a representation1 not to the        
cognitive faculty but1 to the  feeling  
of pleasure and pain for every subject4 
7,we can avail ourselves  also of the   
same expression for the logical quantity
 of the judgement1  if only we prefix   
objective to 8universal validity10 to   
distinguish  it from that which is      
merely subjective and aesthetical47     
,a judgement with objective universal   
validity is also always valid           
subjectively2 i4e4 if the judgement     
holds for everything contained  under a 
given concept1 it holds also for every  
one who represents an  object by means  
of this concept4 ,but from a subjective 
universal  validity1 i4e4 aesthetical   
and resting on no concept1 we cannot    
infer that which is logical2 because    
that kind of judgement does not  extend 
to the ,object4 ,hence the aesthetical  

universality which is  ascribed to a    
judgement must be of a particular kind1 
because it does  not unite the predicate
 of beauty with the concept of the      
,object1  considered in its whole       
logical sphere1 and yet extends it to   
the whole  sphere of judging persons4   
,in respect of logical quantity all     
judgements of taste are singular        
judgements4 ,for because ,i must refer  
the object immediately to my  feeling of
 pleasure and pain1 and that not by     
means of concepts1 they  cannot have the
 quantity of objective generally valid  
judgements4  ,nevertheless if the       
singular representation of the ,object  
of the  judgement of taste in accordance
 with the conditions determining the    
latter1 were transformed by comparison  
into a concept1 a logically  universal  
judgement could result therefrom4 ,e4g4 
,i describe by  a judgement of taste the
 rose1 that ,i see1 as beautiful4 ,but  
the  judgement which results from the   
comparison of several singular          

judgements1 8,roses in general are      
beautiful0 is no longer described       
simply as aesthetical1 but as a logical 
judgement based on an  aesthetical one4 
,again the judgement 8,the rose is      
pleasant0 7to smell7  is1 although      
aesthetical and singular1 not a         
judgement of ,taste but  of ,sense4 ,it 
is distinguished from the former by the 
fact that the  judgement of ,taste      
carries with it an aesthetical quantity 
of  universality1 i4e4 of validity for  
every one2 which cannot be found  in a  
judgement about the ,pleasant4 ,it is   
only judgements about the ,good         
which--although they also determine     
satisfaction in an object1--have        
logical and not merely aesthetical      
universality2 for they are valid of  the
 ,object1 as cognitive of it1 and thus  
are valid for every one4    ,if we judge
 ,objects merely according to concepts1 
then all  representation of beauty is   
lost4 ,thus there can be no rule        
according  to which any one is to be    

forced to recognise anything as         
beautiful4  ,we cannot press upon others
 by the aid of any reasons or           
fundamental  propositions our judgement 
that a coat1 a house1 or a flower is    
beautiful4 ,we wish to submit the       
,object to our own eyes1 as if the      
satisfaction in it depended on          
sensation2 and yet if we then call the  
object beautiful1 we believe that we    
speak with a universal voice1 and  we   
claim the assent of every one1 although 
on the contrary all private  sensation  
can only decide for the observer himself
 and his satisfaction4    ,we may see   
now that in the judgement of taste      
nothing is postulated but  such a       
universal voice1 in respect of the      
satisfaction without the  intervention  
of concepts2 and thus the possibility of
 an aesthetical  judgement that can1 at 
the same time1 be regarded as valid for 
every  one4 ,the judgement of taste     
itself does not postulate the agreement 
of every one 7for that can only be done 

by a logically universal  judgement     
because it can adduce reasons72 it only 
imputes this  agreement to every one1 as
 a case of the rule in respect of which 
it  expects1 not confirmation by        
concepts1 but assent from others4 ,the  
universal voice is1 therefore1 only an  
,idea 7we do not yet inquire  upon what 
it rests74 ,it may be uncertain whether 
or not the man1 who  believes that he is
 laying down a judgement of taste1 is1  
as a matter  of fact1 judging in        
conformity with that ,idea2 but that he 
refers his  judgement thereto1 and1     
consequently1 that it is intended to be 
a  judgement of taste1 he announces by  
the expression 8beauty40 ,he can  be    
quite certain of this for himself by the
 mere consciousness of the  separation  
of everything belonging to the ,pleasant
 and the ,good from  the satisfaction   
which is left2 and this is all for which
 he promises  himself the agreement of  
every one--a claim which would be       
justifiable  under these conditions1    

provided only he did not often make     
mistakes1  and thus lay down an         
erroneous judgement of taste4       #i4 
,investigation of the question whether  
in the judgement of taste  the feeling  
of pleasure precedes or follows the     
judging of the object    ,the solution  
of this question is the key to the      
,critique of ,taste1 and  so is worthy  
of all attention4    ,if the pleasure in
 the given object precedes1 and it is   
only its  universal communicability that
 is to be acknowledged in the judgement 
of taste about the representation of the
 object1 there would be a               
contradiction4 ,for such pleasure would 
be nothing different from the  mere     
pleasantness in the sensation1 and so in
 accordance with its  nature could have 
only private validity1 because it is    
immediately  dependent on the           
representation through which the object 
is given4    ,hence1 it is the universal
 capability of communication of the     
mental  state in the given              

representation which1 as the subjective 
condition of  the judgement of taste1   
must be fundamental1 and must have the  
pleasure  in the object as its          
consequent4 ,but nothing can be         
universally  communicated except        
cognition and representation1 so far as 
it belongs  to cognition4 ,for it is    
only thus that this latter can be       
objective2  and only through this has it
 a universal point of reference1 with   
which the representative power of every 
one is compelled to harmonise4  ,if the 
determining ground of our judgement as  
to this universal  communicability of   
the representation is to be merely      
subjective1  i4e4 is conceived          
independently of any concept of the     
object1 it can  be nothing else than the
 state of mind1 which is to be met with 
in the  relation of our representative  
powers to each other1 so far as they    
refer a given representation to         
cognition in general4    ,the cognitive 
powers1 which are involved by this      

representation1  are here in free play1 
because no definite concept limits them 
to a  particular#ai rule of cognition4  
,hence1 the state of mind in this       
representation must be a feeling of the 
free play of the representative  powers 
in a given representation with reference
 to a cognition in  general4 ,now a     
representation by which an object is    
given1 that is  to become a cognition in
 general1 requires ,imagination1 for the
  gathering together the manifold of    
intuition1 and ,understanding1 for  the 
unity of the concept uniting the        
representations4 ,this state of  free   
play of the cognitive faculties in a    
representation by which an  object is   
given1 must be universally communicable2
 because cognition1  as the             
determination of the ,object with which 
given representations  7in whatever     
subject7 are to agree1 is the only kind 
of representation  which is valid for   
every one4    ,the subjective universal 
communicability of the mode of          

representation  in a judgement of taste1
 since it is to be possible without     
presupposing a definite concept1 can    
refer to nothing else than the  state of
 mind in the free play of the           
,imagination and the ,understanding  7so
 far as they agree with each other1 as  
is requisite for cognition  in general74
 ,we are conscious that this subjective 
relation1 suitable  for cognition in    
general1 must be valid for every one1   
and thus must  be universally           
communicable1 just as if it were a      
definite cognition1  resting always on  
that relation as its subjective         
condition4    ,this merely subjective   
7aesthetical7 judging of the object1 or 
of the  representation by which it is   
given1 precedes the pleasure in it1  and
 is the ground of this pleasure in the  
harmony of the cognitive  faculties2 but
 on the universality of the subjective  
conditions for  judging of objects is   
alone based the universal subjective    
validity of  the satisfaction bound up  

by us with the representation of the    
object  that we call beautiful4    ,the 
power of communicating one's state of   
mind1 even though only in  respect of   
the cognitive faculties1 carries a      
pleasure with it1 as we  can easily show
 from the natural propension of man     
towards sociability  7empirical and     
psychological74 ,but this is not enough 
for our design4  ,the pleasure that we  
feel is1 in a judgement of taste1       
necessarily  imputed by us to every one 
else2 as if1 when we call a thing       
beautiful1  it is to be regarded as a   
characteristic of the object which is   
determined in it according to concepts2 
though beauty1 without a  reference to  
the feeling of the subject1 is nothing  
by itself4 ,but we  must reserve the    
examination of this question until we   
have answered  another1 viz4 8,if and   
how aesthetical judgements are possible 
a  priori80    ,we now occupy ourselves 
with the easier question1 in what way we
 are  conscious of a mutual subjective  

harmony of the cognitive powers  with   
one another in the judgement of taste2  
is it aesthetically by  mere internal   
sense and sensation8 or is it           
intellectually by the  consciousness of 
our designed activity1 by which we bring
 them into  play8    ,if the given      
representation1 which occasions the     
judgement of taste1  were a concept     
uniting ,understanding and ,imagination 
in the judging  of the object1 into a   
cognition of the ,object1 the           
consciousness of  this relation would be
 intellectual 7as in the objective      
schematism  of the ,judgement of which  
the ,critique#bj treats74 ,but then the 
judgement would not be laid down in     
reference to pleasure and pain1 and     
consequently would not be a judgement of
 taste4 ,but the judgement of  taste1   
independently of concepts1 determines   
the ,object in respect of  satisfaction 
and of the predicate of beauty4         
,therefore that subjective  unity of    
relation can only make itself known by  

means of sensation4  ,the excitement of 
both faculties 7,imagination and        
,understanding7 to  indeterminate1 but  
yet1 through the stimulus of the given  
sensation1  harmonious activity1 viz4   
that which belongs to cognition in      
general1  is the sensation whose        
universal communicability is postulated 
by the  judgement of taste4 ,an         
objective relation can only be thought1 
but  yet1 so far as it is subjective    
according to its conditions1 can be     
felt in its effect on the mind2 and1 of 
a relation based on no concept  7like   
the relation of the representative      
powers to a cognitive faculty  in       
general71 no other consciousness is     
possible than that through the          
sensation of the effect1 which consists 
in the more lively play of both  mental 
powers 7the ,imagination and the        
,understanding7 when animated by  mutual
 agreement4 ,a representation which1 as 
singular and apart from  comparison with
 others1 yet has an agreement with the  

conditions of  universality which it is 
the business of the ,understanding to   
supply1  brings the cognitive faculties 
into that proportionate accord which  we
 require for all cognition1 and so      
regard as holding for every one  who is 
determined to judge by means of         
,understanding and ,sense in            
combination 7i4e4 for every man74       
,,explanation ,,of ,,the ,,beautiful    
,,resulting ,,from ,,the ,,second       
,,moment    ,the beautiful is that which
 pleases universally1 without a concept4
          ,,third ,,moment    ,,of      
,,judgements ,,of ,,taste1 ,,according  
,,to ,,the ,,relation ,,of ,,the        
,,purposes ,,which  ,,are ,,brought     
,,into ,,consideration ,,therein4       
#aj4 ,of purposiveness in general    ,if
 we wish to explain what a purpose is   
according to its transcendental         
determinations 7without presupposing    
anything empirical like the  feeling of 
pleasure7 we say that the purpose is the
 object of a  concept1 in so far as the 

concept is regarded as the cause of the 
object 7the real ground of its          
possibility72 and the causality of a    
concept in respect of its ,object is its
 purposiveness 7forma  finalis74 ,where 
then not merely the cognition of an     
object1 but the  object itself 7its form
 and existence7 is thought as an effect 
only  possible by means of the concept  
of this latter1 there we think a        
purpose4 ,the representation of the     
effect is here the determining  ground  
of its cause and precedes it4 ,the      
consciousness of the causality  of a    
representation1 for maintaining the     
subject in the same state1  may here    
generally denote what we call pleasure2 
while on the other  hand pain is that   
representation which contains the ground
 of the  determination of the state of  
representations into their opposite of  
restraining or removing them#ba4    ,the
 faculty of desire1 so far as it is     
determinable only through  concepts1    
i4e4 to act in conformity with the      

representation of a  purpose1 would be  
the ,will4 ,but an ,object1 or a state  
of mind1 or even  an action1 is called  
purposive1 although its possibility does
 not  necessarily presuppose the        
representation of a purpose1 merely     
because  its possibility can be         
explained and conceived by us only so   
far as we  assume for its ground a      
causality according to purposes1 i4e4 a 
will  which would have so disposed it   
according to the representation of a    
certain rule4 ,there can be1 then1      
purposiveness without#bb purpose1  so   
far as we do not place the causes of    
this form in a will1 but yet  can only  
make the explanation of its possibility 
intelligible to  ourselves by deriving  
it from a will4 ,again1 we are not      
always forced  to regard what we observe
 7in respect of its possibility7 from   
the  point of view of ,reason4 ,thus we 
can at least observe a purposiveness    
according to form1 without basing it on 
a purpose 7as the material of  the nexus

 finalis71 and we can notice it in      
objects1 although only  by reflection4  
#aa4 ,the judgement of taste has nothing
 at its basis but the form of  the      
purposiveness of an object 7or of its   
mode of representation7    ,every       
purpose1 if it be regarded as a ground  
of satisfaction1 always  carries with it
 an interest--as the determining ground 
of the  judgement--about the object of  
pleasure4 ,therefore no subjective      
purpose can lie at the basis of the     
judgement of taste4 ,but neither  can   
the judgement of taste be determined by 
any representation of an  objective     
purpose1 i4e4 of the possibility of the 
object itself in  accordance with       
principles of purposive combination1 and
 consequently  it can be determined by  
no concept of the good2 because it is an
  aesthetical and not a cognitive       
judgement4 ,it therefore has to do with 
no concept of the character and internal
 or external possibility of  the object 
by means of this or that cause1 but     

merely with the relation  of the        
representative powers to one another1 so
 far as they are  determined by a       
representation4    ,now this relation in
 the determination of an object as      
beautiful  is bound up with the feeling 
of pleasure1 which is declared by the   
judgement of taste to be valid for every
 one2 hence a pleasantness1             
accompanying the representation1 can as 
little contain the determining  ground  
of the judgement as the representation  
of the perfection of  the object and the
 concept of the good can4 ,therefore it 
can be nothing  else than the subjective
 purposiveness in the representation of 
an  object without any purpose 7either  
objective or subjective72 and thus  it  
is the mere form of purposiveness in the
 representation by which  an object is  
given to us1 so far as we are conscious 
of it1 which  constitutes the           
satisfaction that we without a concept  
judge to be  universally communicable2  
and1 consequently1 this is the          

determining  ground of the judgement of 
taste4       #ab4 ,the judgement of     
taste rests on a priori grounds    ,to  
establish a priori the connexion of the 
feeling of a pleasure  or pain as an    
effect1 with any representation whatever
 7sensation or  concept7 as its cause1  
is absolutely impossible2 for that would
 be a  particular#bc causal relation    
which 7with objects of experience7  can 
always only be cognised a posteriori1   
and through the medium  of experience   
itself4 ,we actually have1 indeed1 in   
the ,critique of  practical ,reason1    
derived from universal moral concepts a 
priori the  feeling of respect 7as a    
special and peculiar modification of    
feeling  which will not strictly        
correspond either to the pleasure or the
 pain  that we get from empirical       
objects74 ,but there we could go beyond 
the bounds of experience and call in a  
causality which rested on a             
supersensible attribute of the subject1 
viz4 freedom4 ,and even there1  properly

 speaking1 it was not this feeling which
 we derived from the  ,idea of the moral
 as cause1 but merely the determination 
of the will4  ,but the state of mind    
which accompanies any determination of  
the will  is in itself a feeling of     
pleasure and identical with it1 and     
therefore  does not follow from it as   
its effect4 ,this last must only be     
assumed  if the concept of the moral as 
a good precede the determination of the 
will by the law2 for in that case the   
pleasure that is bound up with  the     
concept could not be derived from it as 
from a mere cognition4    ,now the case 
is similar with the pleasure in         
aesthetical judgements1  only that here 
it is merely contemplative and does not 
bring about  an interest in the ,object1
 which on the other hand in the moral   
judgement it is practical4#bd ,the      
consciousness of the mere formal        
purposiveness in the play of the        
subject's cognitive powers1 in a        
representation through which an object  

is given1 is the pleasure  itself2      
because it contains a determining ground
 of the activity of  the subject in     
respect of the excitement of its        
cognitive powers1  and therefore an     
inner causality 7which is purposive7 in 
respect of  cognition in general without
 however being limited to any definite  
cognition2 and consequently contains a  
mere form of the subjective             
purposiveness of a representation in an 
aesthetical judgement4 ,this  pleasure  
is in no way practical1 neither like    
that arising from the  pathological     
ground of pleasantness1 nor that from   
the intellectual  ground of the         
represented good4 ,but yet it involves  
causality1 viz4 of  maintaining the     
state of the representation itself1 and 
the exercise  of the cognitive powers   
without further design4 ,we linger over 
the  contemplation of the beautiful1    
because this contemplation strengthens  
and reproduces itself1 which is         
analogous to 7though not of the same    

kind as7 that lingering which takes     
place when a physical charm in  the     
representation of the object repeatedly 
arouses the attention1 the  mind being  
passive4       #ac4 ,the pure judgement 
of taste is independent of charm and    
emotion    ,every interest spoils the   
judgement of taste and takes from its   
impartiality1 especially if the         
purposiveness is not1 as with the       
interest of ,reason1 placed before the  
feeling of pleasure but grounded  on it4
 ,this last always happens in an        
aesthetical judgement upon  anything so 
far as it gratifies or grieves us4      
,hence judgements so  affected can lay  
no claim at all to a universally valid  
satisfaction1  or at least so much the  
less claim1 in proportion as there are  
sensations of this sort among the       
determining grounds of taste4  ,that    
taste is still barbaric which needs a   
mixture of charms and  emotions in order
 that there may be satisfaction1 and    
still more so  if it make these the     

measure of its assent4    ,nevertheless 
charms are often not only taken account 
of in the case  of beauty 7which        
properly speaking ought merely to be    
concerned with  form7 as contributory to
 the aesthetical universal satisfaction2
 but  they are passed off as in         
themselves beauties1 and thus the matter
 of  satisfaction is substituted for the
 form4 ,this misconception1 however1    
like so many others which have something
 true at their basis1 may be  removed by
 a careful definition of these concepts4
    ,a judgement of taste on which charm
 and emotion have no influence          
7although they may be bound up with the 
satisfaction in the  beautiful71--which 
therefore has as its determining ground 
merely the  purposiveness of the        
form1--is a pure judgement of taste4    
#ad4 ,elucidation by means of examples  
,aesthetical judgements can be divided  
just like theoretical 7logical7         
judgements into empirical and pure4 ,the
 first assert pleasantness or           

unpleasantness2 the second assert the   
beauty of an object or of the  manner of
 representing it4 ,the former are       
judgements of ,sense 7material          
aesthetical judgements72 the latter as  
formal#be are alone strictly  judgements
 of ,taste4    ,a judgement of taste is 
therefore pure1 only so far as no merely
  empirical satisfaction is mingled with
 its determining ground4 ,but this      
always happens if charm or emotion have 
any share in the judgement by  which    
anything is to be described as          
beautiful4    ,now here many objections 
present themselves1 which fallaciously  
put  forward charm not merely as a      
necessary ingredient of beauty1 but  as 
alone sufficient to justify a thing's   
being called beautiful4  ,a mere colour1
 e4g4 the green of a grass plot1 a mere 
tone 7as  distinguished from sound and  
noise7 like that of a violin1 are by    
most  people described as beautiful in  
themselves2 although both seem to  have 
at their basis merely the matter of     

representations1 viz4 simply  sensation1
 and therefore only deserve to be called
 pleasant4 ,but we  must at the same    
time remark that the sensations of      
colours and of tone  have a right to be 
regarded as beautiful only in so far as 
they are  pure4 ,this is a determination
 which concerns their form1 and is the  
only element of these representations   
which admits with certainty of          
universal communicability2 for we cannot
 assume that the quality of  sensations 
is the same in all subjects1 and we can 
hardly say that the  pleasantness of one
 colour or the tone of one musical      
instrument is  judged preferable to that
 of another in the same#bf way by every 
one4    ,if we assume with ,euler that  
colours are isochronous vibrations      
7pulsus7 of the aether1 as sounds are of
 the air in a state of  disturbance1    
and1--what is most important1--that the 
mind not only  perceives by sense the   
effect of these in exciting the organ1  
but also  perceives by reflection the   

regular play of impressions 7and thus   
the  form of the combination of         
different representations7 which ,i     
still  do not doubt#bg--then colours and
 tone cannot be reckoned as mere        
sensations1 but as the formal           
determination of the unity of a manifold
  of sensations1 and thus as beauties in
 themselves4    ,but 8pure0 in a simple 
mode of sensation means that its        
uniformity is  troubled and interrupted 
by no foreign sensation1 and it belongs 
merely  to the form2 because here we can
 abstract from the quality of that  mode
 of sensation 7abstract from the colours
 and tone1 if any1 which  it            
represents74 ,hence all simple colours1 
so far as they are pure1  are regarded  
as beautiful2 composite colours have not
 this advantage1  because1 as they are  
not simple1 we have no standard for     
judging  whether they should be called  
pure or not4    ,but as regards the     
beauty attributed to the object on      
account of its  form1 to suppose it to  

be capable of augmentation through the  
charm  of the object is a common error1 
and one very prejudicial to genuine1    
uncorrupted1 well-founded taste4 ,we can
 doubtless add these charms to  beauty1 
in order to interest the mind by the    
representation of the  object1 apart    
from the bare satisfaction received2 and
 thus they may  serve as a              
recommendation of taste and its         
cultivation1 especially when  it is yet 
crude and unexercised4 ,but they        
actually do injury to the  judgement of 
taste if they draw attention to         
themselves as the grounds  for judging  
of beauty4 ,so far are they from adding 
to beauty that they  must only be       
admitted by indulgence as aliens2 and   
provided always that  they do not       
disturb the beautiful form1 in cases    
when taste is yet weak  and untrained4  
,in painting1 sculpture1 and in all the 
formative arts--in architecture1  and   
horticulture1 so far as they are        
beautiful arts--the delineation  is the 

essential thing2 and here it is not what
 gratifies in sensation  but what       
pleases by means of its form that is    
fundamental for taste4  ,the colours    
which light up the sketch belong to the 
charm2 they may  indeed enliven#bh the  
object for sensation1 but they cannot   
make it  worthy of contemplation and    
beautiful4 ,in most cases they are      
rather  limited by the requirements of  
the beautiful form2 and even where charm
  is permissible it is ennobled solely  
by this4    ,every form of the objects  
of sense 7both of external sense and    
also  mediately of internal7 is either  
figure or play4 ,in the latter case  it 
is either play of figures 7in space1    
viz4 pantomime and dancing71 or  the    
mere play of sensations 7in time74 ,the 
charm of colours or of the  pleasant    
tones of an instrument may be added2 but
 the delineation  in the first case and 
the composition in the second constitute
 the  proper object of the pure         
judgement of taste4 ,to say that the    

purity  of colours and of tones1 or     
their variety and contrast1 seems to add
  to beauty1 does not mean that they    
supply a homogeneous addition to  our   
satisfaction in the form because they   
are pleasant in themselves2  but they do
 so1 because they make the form more    
exactly1 definitely1  and completely1   
intuitible1 and besides by their charm  
excite the  representation1 whilst      
they#bi awaken and fix our attention on 
the  object itself4    ,even what we    
call ornaments parerga#bi1 i4e4 those   
things which  do not belong to the      
complete representation of the object   
internally  as elements but only        
externally as complements1 and which    
augment the  satisfaction of taste1 do  
so only by their form2 as for example   
the  frames of pictures1#bi or the      
draperies of statues or the colonnades  
of palaces4 ,but if the ornament does   
not itself consist in beautiful  form1  
and if it is used as a golden frame is  
used1 merely to recommend  the painting 

by its charm1 it is then called finery  
and injures  genuine beauty4            
,emotion1 i4e4 a sensation in which     
pleasantness is produced by  means of a 
momentary checking and a consequent more
 powerful outflow of  the vital force1  
does not belong at all to beauty4 ,but  
sublimity with  which the feeling of    
emotion is bound up#bi requires a       
different  standard of judgement from   
that which is at the foundation of      
taste2  and thus a pure judgement of    
taste has for its determining ground    
neither charm nor emotion1 in a word1 no
 sensation as the material of  the      
aesthetical judgement4       #ae4 ,the  
judgement of taste is quite independent 
of the concept of  perfection           
,objective purposiveness can only be    
cognised by means of the  reference of  
the manifold to a definite purpose1 and 
therefore only  through a concept4 ,from
 this alone it is plain that the        
,beautiful1 the  judging of which has at
 its basis a merely formal              

purposiveness1 i4e4  a purposiveness    
without purpose1 is quite independent of
 the concept of  the ,good2 because the 
latter presupposes an objective         
purposiveness1  i4e4 the reference of   
the object to a definite purpose4       
,objective purposiveness is either      
external1 i4e4 the utility1 or          
internal1 i4e4 the perfection of the    
object4 ,that the satisfaction  in an   
object1 on account of which we call it  
beautiful1 cannot rest on  the          
representation of its utility1 is       
sufficiently obvious from the two       
preceding sections2 because in that case
 it would not be an immediate           
satisfaction in the object1 which is the
 essential condition of a  judgement    
about beauty4 ,but objective internal   
purposiveness1 i4e4  perfection1 comes  
nearer to the predicate of beauty2 and  
it has been  regarded by celebrated     
philosophers#cj as the same as beauty1  
with the  proviso1 if it is thought in a
 confused way4 ,it is of the greatest   

importance in a ,critique of ,taste to  
decide whether beauty can thus  actually
 be resolved into the concept of        
perfection4    ,to judge of objective   
purposiveness we always need not only   
the  concept of a purpose1 but 7if that 
purposiveness is not to be external     
utility but internal7 the concept of an 
internal purpose which shall  contain   
the ground of the internal possibility  
of the object4 ,now  as a purpose in    
general is that whose concept can be    
regarded as  the ground of the          
possibility of the object itself2 so1 in
 order to  represent objective          
purposiveness in a thing1 the concept of
 what sort  of thing it is to be must   
come first4 ,the agreement of the       
manifold  in it with this concept 7which
 furnishes the rule for combining the   
manifold7 is the qualitative perfection 
of the thing4 ,quite different  from    
this is quantitative perfection1 the    
completeness of a thing  after its kind1
 which is a mere concept of magnitude   

7of totality74#ca  ,in this what the    
thing ought to be is conceived as       
already  determined1 and it is only     
asked if it has all its requisites4 ,the
  formal element in the representation  
of a thing1 i4e4 the agreement  of the  
manifold with a unity 7it being         
undetermined what this ought  to be71   
gives to cognition no objective         
purposiveness whatever4 ,for  since     
abstraction is made of this unity as    
purpose 7what the thing  ought to be71  
nothing remains but the subjective      
purposiveness of  the representations in
 the mind of the intuiting subject4 ,and
 this1  although it furnishes a certain 
purposiveness of the representative     
state of the subject1 and so a facility 
of apprehending a given form  by the    
,imagination1 yet furnishes no          
perfection of an ,object1 since  the    
,object is not here conceived by means  
of the concept of a purpose4  ,for      
example1 if in a forest ,i come across a
 plot of sward1 round which  trees stand

 in a circle1 and do not then represent 
to myself a purpose1  viz4 that it is   
intended to serve for country dances1   
not the least  concept of perfection is 
furnished by the mere form4 ,but to     
represent  to oneself a formal objective
 purposiveness without purpose1 i4e4    
the mere form of a perfection 7without  
any matter and without  the concept of  
that with which it is accordant1 even if
 it were  merely the ,idea of conformity
 to law in general#cb7 is a veritable   
contradiction4    ,now the judgement of 
taste is an aesthetical judgement1 i4e4 
such  as rests on subjective grounds1   
the determining ground of which  cannot 
be a concept1 and consequently cannot be
 the concept of a  definite purpose4    
,therefore in beauty1 regarded as a     
formal subjective  purposiveness1 there 
is in no way thought a perfection of the
 object1  as a would-be formal          
purposiveness1 which yet is objective4  
,and thus to  distinguish between the   
concepts of the ,beautiful and the      

,good1 as if  they were only different  
in logical form1 the first being a      
confused1  the second a clear concept of
 perfection1 but identical in content   
and  origin1 is quite fallacious4 ,for  
then there would be no specific         
difference between them1 but a judgement
 of taste would be as much a  cognitive 
judgement as the judgement by which a   
thing is described as  good2 just as    
when the ordinary man says that fraud is
 unjust he bases  his judgement on      
confused grounds1 whilst the philosopher
 bases it  on clear grounds1 but both on
 identical principles of ,reason4 ,i    
have  already1 however1 said that an    
aesthetical judgement is unique of its  
kind1 and gives absolutely no cognition 
7not even a confused cognition7  of the 
,object2 this is only supplied by a     
logical judgement4 ,on the  contrary1 it
 simply refers the representation1 by   
which an ,object is  given1 to the      
subject2 and brings to our notice no    
characteristic  of the object1 but only 

the purposive form in the determination 
of  the representative powers which are 
occupying themselves therewith4  ,the   
judgement is called aesthetical just    
because its determining  ground is not a
 concept1 but the feeling 7of internal  
sense7 of that  harmony in the play of  
the mental powers1 so far as it can be  
felt in  sensation4 ,on the other hand1 
if we wish to call confused concepts and
  the objective judgement based on them1
 aesthetical1 we shall have an          
,understanding judging sensibly or a    
,sense representing its ,objects by     
means of concepts both of which are     
contradictory4#cc ,the faculty  of      
concepts1 be they confused or clear1 is 
the ,understanding2 and  although       
,understanding has to do with the       
judgement of taste1 as an  aesthetical  
judgement 7as it has with all           
judgements71 yet it has to  do with it  
not as a faculty by which an object is  
cognised1 but as the  faculty which     
determines the judgement and its        

representation 7without  any concept7 in
 accordance with its relation to the    
subject and the  subject's internal     
feeling1 in so far as this judgement may
 be possible  in accordance with a      
universal rule4       #af4 ,the         
judgement of taste1 by which an object  
is declared to be  beautiful under the  
condition of a definite concept1 is not 
pure    ,there are two kinds of beauty2 
free beauty 7pulchritudo vaga7  or      
merely dependent beauty 7pulchritudo    
adhaerens74 ,the first  presupposes no  
concept of what the object ought to be2 
the second  does presuppose such a      
concept and the perfection of the object
 in  accordance therewith4 ,the first is
 called the 7self-subsistent7  beauty of
 this or that thing2 the second1 as     
dependent upon a concept  7conditioned  
beauty71 is ascribed to ,objects which  
come under the  concept of a particular 
purpose4    ,flowers are free natural   
beauties4 ,hardly any one but a botanist
  knows what sort of a thing a flower   

ought to be2 and even he1 though        
recognising in the flower the           
reproductive organ of the plant1 pays no
  regard to this natural purpose if he  
is passing judgement on the flower  by  
,taste4 ,there is then at the basis of  
this judgement no perfection  of any    
kind1 no internal purposiveness1 to     
which the collection of the  manifold is
 referred4 ,many birds 7such as the     
parrot1 the humming bird1  the bird of  
paradise71 and many sea shells are      
beauties in themselves1  which do not   
belong to any object determined in      
respect of its purpose  by concepts1 but
 please freely and in themselves4 ,so   
also delineations   la grecque1 foliage 
for borders or wall-papers1 mean nothing
  in themselves2 they represent         
nothing--no ,object under a definite    
concept1--and are free beauties4 ,we can
 refer to the same class what  are      
called in music phantasies 7i4e4 pieces 
without any theme71 and  in fact all    
music without words4    ,in the judging 

of a free beauty 7according to the mere 
form7 the  judgement of taste is pure4  
,there is presupposed no concept of any 
purpose1 for which the manifold should  
serve the given ,object1 and  which     
therefore is to be represented therein4 
,by such a concept the  freedom of the  
,imagination which disports itself in   
the contemplation  of the figure would  
be only limited4    ,but human beauty   
7i4e4 of a man1 a woman1 or a child71   
the beauty of  a horse1 or a building   
7be it church1 palace1 arsenal1 or      
summer-house7  presupposes a concept of 
the purpose which determines what the   
thing is  to be1 and consequently a     
concept of its perfection2 it is        
therefore  adherent beauty4 ,now as the 
combination of the ,pleasant 7in        
sensation7  with ,beauty1 which properly
 is only concerned with form1 is a      
hindrance  to the purity of the         
judgement of taste2 so also is its      
purity injured  by the combination with 
,beauty of the ,good 7viz4 that manifold

 which is  good for the thing itself in 
accordance with its purpose74    ,we    
could add much to a building which would
 immediately please the eye1  if only it
 were not to be a church4 ,we could     
adorn a figure with all  kinds of       
spirals and light but regular lines1 as 
the ,new ,zealanders do  with their     
tattooing1 if only it were not the      
figure of a human being4  ,and again    
this could have much finer features and 
a more pleasing and  gentle cast of     
countenance provided it were not        
intended to represent a  man1 much less 
a warrior4    ,now the satisfaction in  
the manifold of a thing in reference to 
the  internal purpose which determines  
its possibility is a satisfaction       
grounded on a concept2 but the          
satisfaction in beauty is such as       
presupposes no concept1 but is          
immediately bound up with the           
representation through which the object 
is given 7not through which it  is      
thought74 ,if now the judgement of      

,taste in respect of the beauty  of a   
thing is made dependent on the purpose  
in its manifold1 like a  judgement of   
,reason1 and thus limited1 it is no     
longer a free and pure  judgement of    
,taste4    ,it is true that taste gains 
by this combination of aesthetical with 
intellectual satisfaction1 inasmuch as  
it becomes fixed2 and though  it is not 
universal1 yet in respect to certain    
purposively determined  ,objects it     
becomes possible to prescribe rules for 
it4 ,these1 however1  are not rules of  
taste1 but merely rules for the         
unification of ,taste  with ,reason1    
i4e4 of the ,beautiful with the ,good1  
by which the former  becomes available  
as an instrument of design in respect of
 the latter4  ,thus the tone of mind    
which is self-maintaining and of        
subjective  universal validity is       
subordinated to the way of thinking     
which can  be maintained only by painful
 resolve1 but is of objective universal 
validity4 ,properly speaking1 however1  

perfection gains nothing by  beauty or  
beauty by perfection2 but1 when we      
compare the representation  by which an 
object is given to us with the ,object  
7as regards what it  ought to be7 by    
means of a concept1 we cannot avoid     
considering along  with it the sensation
 in the subject4 ,and thus when both    
states of mind  are in harmony our whole
 faculty of representative power gains4 
,a judgement of taste1 then1 in respect 
of an object with a definite  internal  
purpose1 can only be pure1 if either the
 person judging  has no concept of this 
purpose1 or else abstracts from it in   
his  judgement4 ,such a person1 although
 forming an accurate judgement of  taste
 in judging of the object as free       
beauty1 would yet by another  who       
considers the beauty in it only as a    
dependent attribute 7who looks  to the  
purpose of the object7 be blamed1 and   
accused of false taste2  although both  
are right in their own way1 the one in  
reference to what  he has before his    

eyes1 the other in reference to what he 
has in his  thought4 ,by means of this  
distinction we can settle many disputes 
about  beauty between judges of taste2  
by showing that the one is speaking of  
free1 the other of dependent1           
beauty1--that the first is making a     
pure1  the second an applied1 judgement 
of taste4       #ag4 ,of the ,ideal of  
beauty    ,there can be no objective    
rule of taste which shall determine by  
means of concepts what is beautiful4    
,for every judgement from this  source  
is aesthetical2 i4e4 the feeling of the 
subject1 and not  a concept of the      
,object1 is its determining ground4 ,to 
seek for a  principle of taste which    
shall furnish1 by means of definite     
concepts1  a universal criterion of the 
beautiful1 is fruitless trouble2 because
  what is sought is impossible and      
self-contradictory4 ,the universal      
communicability of sensation            
7satisfaction or dissatisfaction7       
without  the aid of a concept--the      

agreement1 as far as is possible1 of all
  times and peoples as regards this     
feeling in the representation of        
certain objects--this is the empirical  
criterion1 although weak and  hardly    
sufficing for probability1 of the       
derivation of a taste1 thus  confirmed  
by examples1 from the deep-lying grounds
 of agreement common  to all men1 in    
judging of the forms under which objects
 are given to  them4    ,hence1 we      
consider some products of taste as      
exemplary4 ,not that  taste can be      
acquired by imitating others2 for it    
must be an original  faculty4 ,he who   
imitates a model shows1 no doubt1 in so 
far as he  attains to it1 skill2 but    
only shows taste in so far as he can    
judge  of this model itself4#cd ,it     
follows from hence that the highest     
model1 the archetype of taste1 is a mere
 ,idea1 which every one must  produce in
 himself2 and according to which he must
 judge every ,object  of taste1 every   
example of judgement by taste1 and even 

the taste  of every one4 ,idea properly 
means a rational concept1 and ,ideal    
the representation of an individual     
being1 regarded as adequate to  an      
,idea4#ce ,hence that archetype of      
taste1 which certainly rests on  the    
indeterminate ,idea that ,reason has of 
a maximum1 but which cannot  be         
represented by concepts1 but only in an 
individual presentation1  is better     
called the ,ideal of the beautiful4     
,although we are not in  possession of  
this1 we yet strive to produce it in    
ourselves4 ,but  it can only be an      
,ideal of the ,imagination1 because it  
rests on a  presentation and not on     
concepts1 and the ,imagination is the   
faculty of  presentation4--,how do we   
arrive at such an ,ideal of beauty8 ,a  
priori1  or empirically8 ,moreover1 what
 species of the beautiful is susceptible
  of an ,ideal8    ,first1 it is well to
 remark that the beauty for which an    
,ideal is to  be sought cannot be vague 
beauty1 but is fixed by a concept of    

objective purposiveness2 and thus it    
cannot appertain to the ,object  of a   
quite pure judgement of taste1 but to   
that of a judgement of  taste which is  
in part intellectual4 ,that is1 in      
whatever grounds of  judgement an ,ideal
 is to be found1 an ,idea of ,reason in 
accordance with  definite concepts must 
lie at its basis2 which determines a    
priori  the purpose on which the        
internal possibility of the object      
rests4  ,an ,ideal of beautiful flowers1
 of a beautiful piece of furniture1  of 
a beautiful view1 is inconceivable4 ,but
 neither can an ,ideal be  represented  
of a beauty dependent on definite       
purposes1 e4g4 of a  beautiful          
dwelling-house1 a beautiful tree1 a     
beautiful garden1 etc42  presumably     
because their purpose is not            
sufficiently determined and  fixed by   
the concept1 and thus the purposiveness 
is nearly as free as  in the case of    
vague beauty4 ,the only being which has 
the purpose of  its existence in itself 

is man1 who can determine his purposes  
by  ,reason2 or1 where he must receive  
them from external perception1 yet  can 
compare them with essential and         
universal purposes1 and can judge  this 
their accordance aesthetically4 ,this   
man is1 then1 alone of all  objects in  
the world1 susceptible of an ,ideal of  
beauty2 as it is  only humanity in his  
person1 as an intelligence1 that is     
susceptible  of the ,ideal of           
perfection4    ,but there are here two  
elements4 ,first1 there is the          
aesthetical  normal ,idea1 which is an  
individual intuition 7of the            
,imagination71  representing the        
standard of our judgement upon man as a 
thing  belonging to a particular animal 
species4 ,secondly1 there is the        
rational ,idea which makes the purposes 
of humanity1 so far as they  cannot be  
sensibly represented1 the principle for 
judging of a figure  through which1 as  
their phenomenal effect1 those purposes 
are revealed4  ,the normal ,idea of the 

figure of an animal of a particular race
 must  take its elements from           
experience4 ,but the greatest           
purposiveness  in the construction of   
the figure1 that would be available for 
the  universal standard of aesthetical  
judgement upon each individual of  this 
species--the image which is as it were  
designedly at the basis of  nature's    
,technic1 to which only the whole race  
and not any isolated  individual is     
adequate--this lies merely in the ,idea 
of the judging  subject4 ,and this1 with
 its proportions1 as an aesthetical     
,idea1 can  be completely presented in  
concreto in a model4 ,in order to make  
intelligible in some measure 7for who   
can extract her whole secret  from      
nature87 how this comes to pass1 we     
shall attempt a psychological           
explanation4    ,we must remark that1 in
 a way quite incomprehensible by us1 the
  ,imagination can not only recall1 on  
occasion1 the signs for concepts  long  
past1 but can also reproduce the image  

of the figure of the object  out of an  
unspeakable number of objects of        
different kinds or even of  the same    
kind4 ,further1 if the mind is concerned
 with comparisons1 the  ,imagination    
can1 in all probability1 actually though
 unconsciously let  one image glide into
 another1 and thus by the concurrence of
 several of  the same kind come by an   
average1 which serves as the common     
measure  of all4 ,every one has seen a  
thousand full-grown men4 ,now if you    
wish  to judge of their normal size1    
estimating it by means of comparison1   
the ,imagination 7as ,i think7 allows a 
great number of images 7perhaps  the    
whole thousand7 to fall on one another4 
,if ,i am allowed to apply  here the    
analogy of optical presentation1 it is  
in the space where  most of them are    
combined and inside the contour1 where  
the place is  illuminated with the most 
vivid colours1 that the average size is 
cognisable2 which1 both in height and   
breadth1 is equally far removed  from   

the extreme bounds of the greatest and  
smallest stature4 ,and this  is the     
stature of a beautiful man4 7,we could  
arrive at the same thing  mechanically1 
by adding together all thousand         
magnitudes1 heights1  breadths1 and     
thicknesses1 and dividing the sum by a  
thousand4 ,but the  ,imagination does   
this by means of a dynamical effect1    
which arises  from the various          
impressions of such figures on the organ
 of internal  sense47 ,if now in a      
similar way for this average man we seek
 the  average head1 for this head the   
average nose1 etc41 such figure is at   
the basis of the normal ,idea in the    
country where the comparison is         
instituted4 ,thus necessarily under     
these empirical conditions a negro  must
 have a different normal ,idea of the   
beauty of the human figure  from a white
 man1 a ,chinaman a different normal    
,idea from a ,european1  etc4 ,and the  
same is the case with the model of a    
beautiful horse or  dog 7of a certain   

breed74--,this normal ,idea is not      
derived from  proportions got from      
experience and regarded as definite     
rules2 but  in accordance with it rules 
for judging become in the first instance
  possible4 ,it is the image for the    
whole race1 which floats among all  the 
variously different intuitions of       
individuals1 which nature takes  as     
archetype in her productions of the same
 species1 but which seems  not to be    
fully reached in any individual case4   
,it is by no means the  whole archetype 
of beauty in the race1 but only the form
 constituting  the indispensable        
condition of all beauty1 and thus merely
  correctness in the mental presentation
 of the race4 ,it is1 like the          
celebrated ,doryphorus of               
,polycletus1#cf the rule 7,myron's#cg   
,cow might also be used thus for its    
kind74 ,it can therefore contain        
nothing specifically characteristic1 for
 otherwise it would not be  the normal  
,idea for the race4 ,its presentation   

pleases1 not by its  beauty1 but merely 
because it contradicts no condition1    
under which  alone a thing of this kind 
can be beautiful4 ,the presentation is  
merely  correct4#ch    ,we must yet     
distinguish the normal ,idea of the     
beautiful from the  ,ideal1 which       
latter1 on grounds already alleged1 we  
can only expect  in the human figure4   
,in this the ,ideal consists in the     
expression  of the moral1 without which 
the object would not please universally 
and thus positively 7not merely         
negatively in a correct presentation74  
,the visible expression of moral ,ideas 
that rule men inwardly1 can  indeed only
 be got from experience2 but to make its
 connexion with  all which our ,reason  
unites with the morally good in the     
,idea of the  highest                   
purposiveness1--goodness of heart1      
purity1 strength1 peace1  etc41--visible
 as it were in bodily manifestation 7as 
the effect of  that which is internal71 
requires a union of pure ,ideas of      

,reason with  great imaginative power1  
even in him who wishes to judge of it1  
still  more in him who wishes to present
 it4 ,the correctness of such an ,ideal 
of beauty is shown by its permitting no 
sensible charm to mingle with  the      
satisfaction in the ,object and yet     
allowing us to take a great  interest   
therein4 ,this shows that a judgement in
 accordance with such  a standard can   
never be purely aesthetical1 and that a 
judgement in  accordance with an ,ideal 
of beauty is not a mere judgement of    
taste4      ,,explanation ,,of ,,the    
,,beautiful ,,derived ,,from ,,this     
,,third ,,moment    ,beauty is the form 
of the purposiveness of an object1 so   
far as  this is perceived in it without 
any representation of a purpose4#ci     
,,fourth ,,moment    ,,of ,,the         
,,judgement ,,of ,,taste1 ,,according   
,,to ,,the ,,modality ,,of ,,the        
,,satisfaction ,,in ,,the ,,object      
#ah4 ,what the modality in a judgement  
of taste is    ,i can say of every      

representation that it is at least      
possible  that 7as a cognition7 it      
should be bound up with a pleasure4 ,of 
a  representation that ,i call pleasant 
,i say that it actually excites         
pleasure in me4 ,but the beautiful we   
think as having a necessary  reference  
to satisfaction4 ,now this necessity is 
of a peculiar kind4  ,it is not a       
theoretical objective necessity2 in     
which case it would be  cognised a      
priori that every one will feel this    
satisfaction in  the object called      
beautiful by me4 ,it is not a practical 
necessity2  in which case1 by concepts  
of a pure rational will serving as a    
rule  for freely acting beings1 the     
satisfaction is the necessary result of 
an objective law and only indicates that
 we absolutely 7without any  further    
design7 ought to act in a certain way4  
,but the necessity which  is thought in 
an aesthetical judgement can only be    
called exemplary2  i4e4 a necessity of  
the assent of all to a judgement which  

is  regarded as the example of a        
universal rule that we cannot state4    
,since  an aesthetical judgement is not 
an objective cognitive judgement1 this  
necessity cannot be derived from        
definite concepts1 and is therefore  not
 apodictic4 ,still less can it be       
inferred from the universality of       
experience 7of a complete agreement of  
judgements as to the beauty  of a       
certain object74 ,for not only would    
experience hardly furnish  sufficiently 
numerous vouchers for this2 but also1 on
 empirical  judgements we can base no   
concept of the necessity of these       
judgements4       #ai4 ,the subjective  
necessity1 which we ascribe to the      
judgement of  taste1 is conditioned     
,the judgement of taste requires the    
agreement of every one2 and he  who     
describes anything as beautiful claims  
that every one ought  to give his       
approval to the object in question and  
also describe it  as beautiful4 ,the    
ought in the aesthetical judgement is   

therefore  pronounced in accordance with
 all the data which are required for    
judging and yet is only conditioned4 ,we
 ask for the agreement of every  one    
else1 because we have for it a ground   
that is common to all2 and we  could    
count on this agreement1 provided we    
were always sure that the  case was     
correctly subsumed under that ground as 
rule of assent4       #bj4 ,the         
condition of necessity which a judgement
 of taste asserts is  the ,idea of a    
common sense    ,if judgements of taste 
7like cognitive judgements7 had a       
definite  objective principle1 then the 
person who lays them down in accordance 
with this latter would claim an         
unconditioned necessity for his         
judgement4 ,if they were devoid of all  
principle1 like those of the  mere taste
 of sense1 we would not allow them in   
thought any necessity  whatever4 ,hence 
they must have a subjective principle   
which determines  what pleases or       
displeases only by feeling and not by   

concepts1 but  yet with universal       
validity4 ,but such a principle could   
only be  regarded as a common sense1    
which is essentially different from     
common ,understanding which people      
sometimes call common ,sense 7sensus    
communis72 for the latter does not judge
 by feeling but always  by concepts1    
although ordinarily only as by obscurely
 represented  principles4    ,hence it  
is only under the presupposition that   
there is a common sense  7by which we do
 not understand an external sense1 but  
the effect  resulting from the free play
 of our cognitive powers7--it is only   
under  this presupposition1 ,i say1 that
 the judgement of taste can be laid     
down4       #ba4 ,have we ground for    
presupposing a common sense8            
,cognitions and judgements must1 along  
with the conviction that  accompanies   
them1 admit of universal                
communicability2 for otherwise  there   
would be no harmony between them and the
 ,object1 and they would  be            

collectively a mere subjective play of  
the representative powers1  exactly as  
scepticism would have it4 ,but if       
cognitions are to admit of              
communicability1 so must also the state 
of mind1--i4e4 the accordance  of the   
cognitive powers with a cognition       
generally1 and that proportion  of them 
which is suitable for a representation  
7by which an object is  given to us7 in 
order that a cognition may be made out  
of it--admit of  universal              
communicability4 ,for without this as   
the subjective condition  of cognition1 
knowledge as an effect could not arise4 
,this actually  always takes place when 
a given object by means of ,sense       
excites the  ,imagination to collect the
 manifold1 and the ,imagination in its  
turn  excites the ,understanding to     
bring about a unity of this collective  
process in concepts4 ,but this          
accordance of the cognitive powers has  
a different proportion according to the 
variety of the ,objects which  are      

given4 ,however1 it must be such that   
this internal relation1 by  which one   
mental faculty is excited by another1   
shall be generally the  most beneficial 
for both faculties in respect of        
cognition 7of given  objects72 and this 
accordance can only be determined by    
feeling 7not  according to concepts74   
,since now this accordance itself must  
admit  of universal communicability1 and
 consequently also our feeling of it    
7in a given representation71 and since  
the universal communicability  of a     
feeling presupposes a common sense1 we  
have grounds for assuming  this latter4 
,and this common sense is assumed       
without relying on  psychological       
observations1 but simply as the         
necessary condition of  the universal   
communicability of our knowledge1 which 
is presupposed in  every ,logic and in  
every principle of knowledge that is not
 sceptical4       #bb4 ,the necessity of
 the universal agreement that is thought
 in a  judgement of taste is a          

subjective necessity1 which is          
represented as  objective under the     
presupposition of a common sense    ,in 
all judgements by which we describe     
anything as beautiful1 we  allow no one 
to be of another opinion2 without       
however grounding our  judgement on     
concepts but only on our feeling1 which 
we therefore  place at its basis not as 
a private1 but as a communal feeling4#dj
  ,now this common sense cannot be      
grounded on experience2 for it aims at  
justifying judgements which contain an  
ought4 ,it does not say that  every one 
will agree with my judgement1 but that  
he ought4 ,and so  common sense1 as an  
example of whose judgement ,i here put  
forward my  judgement of taste and on   
account of which ,i attribute to the    
latter an  exemplary validity1 is a mere
 ideal norm1 under the supposition of   
which ,i have a right to make into a    
rule for every one a judgement that     
accords therewith1 as well as the       
satisfaction in an ,object expressed  in

 such judgement4 ,for the principle1    
which concerns the agreement of         
different judging persons1 although only
 subjective1 is yet assumed as          
subjectively universal 7an ,idea        
necessary for every one72 and thus can  
claim universal assent 7as if it were   
objective7 provided we are sure  that we
 have correctly subsumed the particulars
 under it4    ,this indeterminate norm  
of a common sense is actually           
presupposed by  us2 as is shown by our  
claim to lay down judgements of taste4  
,whether  there is in fact such a common
 sense1 as a constitutive principle of  
the possibility of experience1 or       
whether a yet higher principle of       
,reason makes it only into a regulative 
principle for producing in us  a common 
sense for higher purposes3 whether      
therefore ,taste is an  original and    
natural faculty1 or only the ,idea of an
 artificial one yet  to be acquired1 so 
that a judgement of taste with its      
assumption of a  universal assent in    

fact1 is only a requirement of ,reason  
for producing  such harmony of          
sentiment2 whether the 8ought10 i4e4 the
 objective  necessity of the confluence 
of the feeling of any one man with that 
of  every other1 only signifies the     
possibility of arriving at this accord1 
and the judgement of taste only affords 
an example of the application  of this  
principle3 these questions we have      
neither the wish nor the  power to      
investigate as yet2 we have now only to 
resolve the faculty of  taste into its  
elements in order to unite them at last 
in the ,idea of  a common sense4        
,,explanation ,,of ,,the ,,beautiful    
,,resulting ,,from ,,the ,,fourth       
,,moment    ,the beautiful is that which
 without any concept is cognised as the 
object of a necessary satisfaction4     
,,general ,,remark ,,on ,,the ,,first   
,,section ,,of ,,the ,,analytic    ,if  
we seek the result of the preceding     
analysis we find that everything  runs  
up into this concept of ,taste1 that it 

is a faculty for judging  an object in  
reference to the ,imagination's free    
conformity to law4  ,now if in the      
judgement of taste the ,imagination must
 be considered in  its freedom1 it is in
 the first place not regarded as        
reproductive1  as it is subject to the  
laws of association1 but as productive  
and  spontaneous 7as the author of      
arbitrary forms of possible intuition74 
,and although in the apprehension of a  
given object of sense it is  tied to a  
definite form of this ,object1 and so   
far has no free play  7such as that of  
poetry7 yet it may readily be conceived 
that the  object can furnish it with    
such a form containing a collection of  
the manifold1 as the ,imagination       
itself1 if it were left free1 would     
project in accordance with the          
conformity to law of the ,understanding 
in general4 ,but that the imaginative   
power should be free and yet  of itself 
conformed to law1 i4e4 bringing autonomy
 with it1 is a  contradiction4 ,the     

,understanding alone gives the law4 ,if1
 however1  the ,imagination is compelled
 to proceed according to a definite law1
  its product in respect of form is     
determined by concepts as to what  it   
ought to be4 ,but then1 as is above     
shown1 the satisfaction is not  that in 
the ,beautiful1 but in the ,good 7in    
perfection1 at any rate  in mere formal 
perfection72 and the judgement is not a 
judgement of  taste4 ,hence it is a     
conformity to law without a law2 and a  
subjective  agreement of the            
,imagination and                        
,understanding1--without such an        
objective agreement as there is when the
 representation is referred  to a       
definite concept of an object1--can     
subsist along with the  free conformity 
to law of the ,understanding 7which is  
also called  purposiveness without      
purpose7 and with the peculiar feature  
of a  judgement of taste4    ,now       
geometrically regular figures1 such as a
 circle1 a square1 a  cube1 etc41 are   

commonly adduced by critics of taste as 
the simplest  and most indisputable     
examples of beauty2 and yet they are    
called  regular1 because we can only    
represent them by regarding them as mere
  presentations of a definite concept   
which prescribes the rule for the       
figure 7according to which alone it is  
possible74 ,one of these two must  be   
wrong1 either that judgement of the     
critic which ascribes beauty to  the    
said figures1 or ours1 which regards    
purposiveness apart from a  concept as  
requisite for beauty4    ,hardly any one
 will say that a man must have taste in 
order that he  should find more         
satisfaction in a circle than in a      
scrawled outline1  in an equilateral and
 equiangular quadrilateral than in one  
which is  oblique1 irregular1 and as it 
were deformed1 for this belongs to the  
ordinary ,understanding and is not      
,taste at all4 ,where1 e4g4 our  design 
is to judge of the size of an area1 or  
to make intelligible  the relation of   

the parts of it1 when divided1 to one   
another and  to the whole1 then regular 
figures and those of the simplest kind  
are needed1 and the satisfaction does   
not rest immediately on  the aspect of  
the figure1 but on its availability for 
all kinds  of possible designs4 ,a room 
whose walls form oblique angles1 or a   
parterre of this kind1 even every       
violation of symmetry in the figure  of 
animals 7e4g4 being one-eyed71 of       
buildings1 or of flower beds1           
displeases1 because it contradicts the  
purpose of the thing1 not only          
practically in respect of a definite use
 of it1 but also when we pass  judgement
 on it as regards any possible design4  
,this is not the case  in the judgement 
of taste1 which when pure combines      
satisfaction  or                        
dissatisfaction1--without any reference 
to its use or to a  purpose1--with the  
mere consideration of the object4       
,the regularity which leads to the      
concept of an object is indeed the      

indispensable condition 7conditio sine  
qua non7 for grasping the  object in a  
single representation and determining   
the manifold in its  form4 ,this        
determination is a purpose in respect of
 cognition1 and  in reference to this it
 is always bound up with satisfaction   
7which  accompanies the execution of    
every1 even problematical1 design74     
,there  is here1 however1 merely the    
approval of the solution satisfying a   
problem1 and not a free and indefinite  
purposive entertainment of the  mental  
powers with what we call beautiful1     
where the ,understanding is  at the     
service of ,imagination and not vice    
versa4    ,in a thing that is only      
possible by means of design1--a         
building1 or  even an animal1--the      
regularity consisting in symmetry must  
express  the unity of the intuition that
 accompanies the concept of purpose1    
and this regularity belongs to          
cognition4 ,but where only a free play  
of the representative powers 7under the 

condition1 however1 that the            
,understanding is to suffer no shock    
thereby7 is to be kept up1 in  pleasure 
gardens1 room decorations1 all kinds of 
tasteful furniture1  etc41 regularity   
that shows constraint is avoided as much
 as possible4  ,thus in the ,english    
taste in gardens1 or in bizarre taste in
 furniture1  the freedom of the         
,imagination is pushed almost near to   
the grotesque1  and in this separation  
from every constraint of rule we have   
the case1  where taste can display its  
greatest perfection in the enterprises  
of  the ,imagination4    ,all stiff     
regularity 7such as approximates to     
mathematical regularity7  has something 
in it repugnant to taste2 for our       
entertainment in  the contemplation of  
it lasts for no length of time1 but it  
rather1  in so far as it has not        
expressly in view cognition or a        
definite  practical purpose1 produces   
weariness4 ,on the other hand that with 
which ,imagination can play in an       

unstudied and purposive manner  is      
always new to us1 and one does not get  
tired of looking at it4  ,marsden in his
 description of ,sumatra makes the      
remark that the  free beauties of nature
 surround the spectator everywhere and  
thus  lose their attraction for him4#da 
,on the other hand a pepper-garden1     
where the stakes on which this plant    
twines itself form parallel rows1  had  
much attractiveness for him1 if he met  
with it in the middle of a  forest4 ,and
 hence he infers that wild beauty1      
apparently irregular1  only pleases as a
 variation from the regular beauty of   
which one has  seen enough4 ,but he need
 only have made the experiment of       
spending  one day in a pepper-garden1 to
 have been convinced that1 once the     
,understanding1 by the aid of this      
regularity1 has put itself in accord    
with the order that it always needs1 the
 object will not entertain for          
long1--nay rather it will impose a      
burdensome constraint upon the          

,imagination4 ,on the other hand1       
nature1 which there is prodigal in  its 
variety even to luxuriance1 that is     
subjected to no constraint of           
artificial rules1 can supply constant   
food for taste4--,even the song  of     
birds1 which we can bring under no      
musical rule1 seems to have more        
freedom1 and therefore more for taste1  
than a song of a human being  which is  
produced in accordance with all the     
rules of music2 for we  very much sooner
 weary of the latter1 if it is repeated 
often and at  length4 ,here1 however1 we
 probably confuse our participation in  
the  mirth of a little creature that we 
love1 with the beauty of its song2  for 
if this were exactly imitated by man 7as
 sometimes the notes of the  nightingale
 are7#db it would seem to our ear quite 
devoid of taste4    ,again1 beautiful   
objects are to be distinguished from    
beautiful  views of objects 7which often
 on account of their distance cannot be 
clearly recognised74 ,in the latter case

 taste appears not so much in  what the 
,imagination apprehends in this field1  
as in the impulse it  thus gets to      
fiction1 i4e4 in the peculiar fancies   
with which the  mind entertains itself1 
whilst it is continually being aroused  
by the  variety which strikes the eye4  
,an illustration is afforded1 e4g4  by  
the sight of the changing shapes of a   
fire on the hearth or of a  rippling    
brook2 neither of these has beauty1 but 
they bring with them a  charm for the   
,imagination1 because they entertain it 
in free play4          ,,second ,,book  
,,analytic ,,of ,,the ,,sublime         
#bc4 ,transition from the faculty which 
judges of the ,beautiful to  that which 
judges of the ,sublime    ,the          
,beautiful and the ,sublime agree in    
this1 that both please in  themselves4  
,further1 neither presupposes a         
judgement of sense nor  a judgement     
logically determined1 but a judgement of
 reflection4  ,consequently the         
satisfaction belonging to them does not 

depend  on a sensation1 as in the case  
of the ,pleasant1 nor on a definite     
concept1 as in the case of the ,good2   
but it is nevertheless referred  to     
concepts although indeterminate ones4   
,and so the satisfaction is  connected  
with the mere presentation of the object
 or with the  faculty of presentation2  
so that in the case of a given intuition
 this  faculty or the ,imagination is   
considered as in agreement with the     
faculty of concepts of ,understanding or
 ,reason 7in its furtherance of  these  
latter74 ,hence both kinds of judgements
 are singular1 and yet  announce        
themselves as universally valid for     
every subject2 although  they lay claim 
merely to the feeling of pleasure and   
not to any  knowledge of the object4    
,but there are also remarkable          
differences between the two4 ,the       
,beautiful in nature is connected with  
the form of the object1 which  consists 
in having boundaries4 ,the ,sublime1 on 
the other hand1 is to  be found in a    

formless object1 so far as in it or by  
occasion of it  boundlessness is        
represented1 and yet its totality is    
also present to  thought4 ,thus the     
,beautiful seems to be regarded as the  
presentation  of an indefinite concept  
of ,understanding2 the ,sublime as that 
of a  like concept of ,reason4          
,therefore the satisfaction in the one  
case is  bound up with the              
representation of quality1 in the other 
with that  of quantity4 ,and the latter 
satisfaction is quite different in kind 
from the former1 for this the           
,beautiful#dc directly brings with  it a
 feeling of the furtherance of life1 and
 thus is compatible with  charms and    
with the play of the ,imagination4 ,but 
the other the feeling  of the           
,sublime#dc is a pleasure that arises   
only indirectly2 viz4  it is produced by
 the feeling of a momentary checking of 
the vital  powers and a consequent      
stronger outflow of them1 so that it    
seems to  be regarded as emotion1--not  

play1 but earnest in the exercise of the
  ,imagination4--,hence it is           
incompatible with charms2 and as the    
mind  is not merely attracted by the    
object but is ever being alternately    
repelled1 the satisfaction in the       
sublime does not so much involve a      
positive pleasure as admiration or      
respect1 which rather deserves to be    
called negative pleasure4    ,but the   
inner and most important distinction    
between the ,sublime  and ,beautiful is1
 certainly1 as follows4 7,here1 as we   
are entitled  to do1 we only bring under
 consideration in the first instance the
  sublime in natural ,objects2 for the  
sublime of ,art is always limited  by   
the conditions of agreement with        
,nature47 ,natural beauty 7which is     
self-subsisting7 brings with it a       
purposiveness in its form by which  the 
object seems to be1 as it were1         
pre-adapted to our ,judgement1 and  thus
 constitutes in itself an object of     
satisfaction4 ,on the other  hand1 that 

which excites in us1 without any        
reasoning about it1 but in  the mere    
apprehension of it1 the feeling of the  
sublime1 may appear as  regards its form
 to violate purpose in respect of the   
,judgement1 to be  unsuited to our      
presentative faculty1 and1 as it were1  
to do violence  to the ,imagination2 and
 yet it is judged to be only the more   
sublime4    ,now from this we may see   
that in general we express ourselves    
incorrectly if we call any object of    
nature sublime1 although we can  quite  
correctly call many objects of nature   
beautiful4 ,for how can that  be marked 
by an expression of approval1 which is  
apprehended in itself  as being a       
violation of purpose8 ,all that we can  
say is that the object  is fit for the  
presentation of a sublimity which can be
 found in the  mind2 for no sensible    
form can contain the sublime properly   
so-called4  ,this concerns only ,ideas  
of the ,reason1 which1 although no      
adequate  presentation is possible for  

them1 by this inadequacy that admits of 
sensible presentation1 are aroused and  
summoned into the mind4 ,thus the  wide 
ocean1 agitated by the storm1 cannot be 
called sublime4 ,its aspect  is         
horrible2 and the mind must be already  
filled with manifold ,ideas  if it is to
 be determined by such an intuition to a
 feeling itself  sublime1 as it is      
incited to abandon sensibility and to   
busy itself  with ,ideas that involve   
higher purposiveness4                   
,self-subsisting natural beauty         
discovers to us a ,technic of nature1   
which represents it as a system in      
accordance with laws1 the principle  of 
which we do not find in the whole of our
 faculty of ,understanding4  ,that      
principle is the principle of           
purposiveness1 in respect of the use  of
 our ,judgement in regard to phenomena2 
which requires that these  must not be  
judged as merely belonging to nature in 
its purposeless  mechanism1 but also as 
belonging to something analogous to art4

 ,it1  therefore1 actually extends1 not 
indeed our cognition of natural         
,objects1 but our concept of nature2    
which is now not regarded as  mere      
mechanism but as art4 ,this leads to    
profound investigations as to  the      
possibility of such a form4 ,but in what
 we are accustomed to call  sublime     
there is nothing at all that leads to   
particular objective  principles and    
forms of nature corresponding to them2  
so far from it  that for the most part  
nature excites the ,ideas of the sublime
 in its  chaos or in its wildest and    
most irregular disorder and desolation1 
provided size and might are perceived4  
,hence1 we see that the concept  of the 
,sublime is not nearly so important or  
rich in consequences  as the concept of 
the ,beautiful2 and that in general it  
displays  nothing purposive in nature   
itself1 but only in that possible use of
  our intuitions of it by which there is
 produced in us a feeling of  a         
purposiveness quite independent of      

nature4 ,we must seek a ground  external
 to ourselves for the ,beautiful of     
nature2 but seek it for  the ,sublime   
merely in ourselves and in our attitude 
of thought which  introduces sublimity  
into the representation of nature4 ,this
 is a  very needful preliminary remark1 
which quite separates the ,ideas of  the
 sublime from that of a purposiveness of
 nature1 and makes the  theory of the   
sublime a mere appendix to the          
aesthetical judging of  that            
purposiveness2 because by means of it no
 particular form is  represented in     
nature1 but there is only developed a   
purposive use  which the ,imagination   
makes of its representation4       #bd4 
,of the divisions of an investigation   
into the feeling of the  sublime    ,as 
regards the division of the moments of  
the aesthetical judging of  objects in  
reference to the feeling of the sublime1
 the ,analytic can  proceed according to
 the same principle as was adapted in   
the analysis  of judgements of taste4   

,for as an act of the aesthetical       
reflective  ,judgement1 the satisfaction
 in the ,sublime must be represented    
just as  in the case of the             
,beautiful1--according to quantity as   
universally  valid1 according to quality
 as devoid of interest1 according to    
relation as subjective purposiveness1   
and according to modality as  necessary4
 ,and so the method here will not       
diverge from that of the  preceding     
section2 unless1 indeed1 we count it a  
difference that in  the case where the  
aesthetical ,judgement is concerned with
 the form of  the ,object we began with 
the investigation of its quality1 but   
here1  in view of the formlessness which
 may belong to what we call sublime1  we
 shall begin with quantity1 as the first
 moment of the aesthetical  judgement as
 to the sublime4 ,the reason for this   
may be seen from the  preceding         
paragraph4    ,but the analysis of the  
,sublime involves a division not needed 
in the  case of the ,beautiful1 viz4 a  

division into the mathematically and    
the dynamically sublime4    ,for the    
feeling of the ,sublime brings with it  
as its characteristic  feature a        
movement of the mind bound up with the  
judging of the  object1 while in the    
case of the ,beautiful taste presupposes
 and  maintains the mind in restful     
contemplation4 ,now this movement  ought
 to be judged as subjectively purposive 
7because the sublime  pleases us71 and  
thus it is referred through the         
,imagination either  to the faculty of  
cognition or of desire4 ,in either      
reference  the purposiveness of the     
given representation ought to be judged 
only in respect of this faculty 7without
 purpose or interest72 but  in the first
 case it is ascribed to the ,object as a
 mathematical  determination of the     
,imagination1 in the second as          
dynamical4 ,and  hence we have this     
twofold way of representing the sublime4
      ,a4--,,of ,,the ,,mathematically  
,,sublime       #be4 ,explanation of the

 term 8sublime0    ,we call that sublime
 which is absolutely great4 ,but to be  
great1  and to be a great something are 
quite different concepts 7magnitudo  and
 quantitas74 ,in like manner to say     
simply 7simpliciter7  that anything is  
great is quite different from saying    
that it is  absolutely great 7absolute1 
non comparative magnum74 ,the latter  is
 what is great beyond all               
comparison4--,what now is meant by the  
expression that anything is great or    
small or of medium size8 ,it is not  a  
pure concept of ,understanding that is  
thus signified2 still less is  it an    
intuition of ,sense1 and just as little 
is it a concept of ,reason1  because it 
brings with it no principle of          
cognition4 ,it must therefore  be a     
concept of ,judgement or derived from   
one2 and a subjective  purposiveness of 
the representation in reference to the  
,judgement must  lie at its basis4 ,that
 anything is a magnitude 7quantum7 may  
be  cognised from the thing itself1     

without any comparison of it with other 
things2 viz4 if there is a multiplicity 
of the homogeneous constituting  one    
thing4 ,but to cognise how great it is  
always requires some other  magnitude as
 a measure4 ,but because the judging of 
magnitude depends  not merely on        
multiplicity 7number71 but also on the  
magnitude of the  unit 7the measure71   
and since1 to judge of the magnitude of 
this latter  again requires another as  
measure with which it may be compared1  
we  see that the determination of the   
magnitude of phenomena can supply no    
absolute concept whatever of magnitude1 
but only a comparative one4    ,if now  
,i say simply that anything is great1 it
 appears that ,i have no  comparison in 
view1 at least none with an objective   
measure2 because  it is thus not        
determined at all how great the object  
is4 ,but although  the standard of      
comparison is merely subjective1 yet the
 judgement none  the less claims        
universal assent2 8this man is          

beautiful10 and 8he is  tall10 are      
judgements not limited merely to the    
judging subject1 but1  like theoretical 
judgements1 demanding the assent of     
every one4    ,in a judgement by which  
anything is designated simply as great1 
it  is not merely meant that the object 
has a magnitude1 but that this          
magnitude is superior to that of many   
other objects of the same kind1         
without1 however1 any exact             
determination of this superiority4 ,thus
  there is always at the basis of our   
judgement a standard which we  assume as
 the same for every one2 this1 however1 
is not available for  any logical       
7mathematically definite7 judging of    
magnitude1 but only  for aesthetical    
judging of the same1 because it is a    
merely subjective  standard lying at the
 basis of the reflective judgement upon 
magnitude4 ,it may be empirical1 as1    
e4g4 the average size of the men  known 
to us1 of animals of a certain kind1    
trees1 houses1 mountains1  etc4 ,or it  

may be a standard given a priori1 which 
through the  defects of the judging     
subject is limited by the subjective    
conditions  of presentation in concreto2
 as1 e4g4 in the practical sphere1 the  
greatness of a certain virtue1 or of the
 public liberty and justice in  a       
country2 or1 in the theoretical sphere1 
the greatness of the accuracy  or the   
inaccuracy of an observation or         
measurement that has been made1  etc4   
,here it is remarkable that1 although we
 have no interest whatever in an        
,object1--i4e4 its existence is         
indifferent to us1--yet its mere size1  
even if it is considered as formless1   
may bring a satisfaction with it  that  
is universally communicable1 and that   
consequently involves the  consciousness
 of a subjective purposiveness in the   
use of our cognitive  faculty4 ,this is 
not indeed a satisfaction in the ,object
 7because  it may be formless71 as in   
the case of the ,beautiful1 in which the
  reflective ,judgement finds itself    

purposively determined in reference  to 
cognition in general2 but a satisfaction
 in the extension of the  ,imagination  
by itself4    ,if 7under the above      
limitation7 we say simply of an object  
8it is  great10 this is no              
mathematically definite judgement but a 
mere  judgement of reflection upon the  
representation of it1 which is          
subjectively purposive for a certain use
 of our cognitive powers in  the        
estimation of magnitude2 and we always  
then bind up with the  representation a 
kind of respect1 as also a kind of      
contempt for what  we simply call       
8small40 ,further1 the judging of things
 as great or  small extends to          
everything1 even to all their           
characteristics2 thus  we describe      
beauty as great or small4 ,the reason of
 this is to be  sought in the fact that 
whatever we present in intuition        
according to  the precept of the        
,judgement 7and thus represent          
aesthetically7 is  always a phenomenon  

and thus a quantum4    ,but if we call  
anything not only great1 but absolutely 
great in every  point of view 7great    
beyond all comparison71 i4e4 sublime1 we
 soon  see that it is not permissible to
 seek for an adequate standard of this  
outside itself1 but merely in itself4   
,it is a magnitude which is like  itself
 alone4 ,it follows hence that the      
sublime is not to be sought in  the     
things of nature1 but only in our       
,ideas2 but in which of them it  lies   
must be reserved for the ,deduction4    
,the foregoing explanation can be thus  
expressed3 the sublime is that  in      
comparison with which everything else is
 small4 ,here we easily see  that       
nothing can be given in nature1 however 
great it is judged by us  to be1 which  
could not if considered in another      
relation be reduced  to the infinitely  
small2 and conversely there is nothing  
so small1  which does not admit of      
extension by our ,imagination to the    
greatness  of a world1 if compared with 

still smaller standards4 ,telescopes    
have  furnished us with abundant        
material for making the first remark1   
microscopes for the second4 ,nothing1   
therefore1 which can be an object  of   
the senses1 is1 considered on this      
basis1 to be called sublime4  ,but      
because there is in our ,imagination a  
striving towards infinite  progress1 and
 in our ,reason a claim for absolute    
totality1 regarded as  a real ,idea1    
therefore this very inadequateness for  
that ,idea in our  faculty for          
estimating the magnitude of things of   
sense1 excites in  us the feeling of a  
supersensible faculty4 ,and it is not   
the object  of sense1 but the use which 
the ,judgement naturally makes of       
certain  objects on behalf of this      
latter feeling1 that is absolutely      
great2 and  in comparison every other   
use is small4 ,consequently it is the   
state  of mind produced by a certain    
representation with which the reflective
  ,judgement is occupied1 and not the   

,object1 that is to be called sublime4  
,we may therefore append to the         
preceding formulas explaining the       
sublime this other3 the sublime is that1
 the mere ability to think  which1 shows
 a faculty of the mind surpassing every 
standard of ,sense4       #bf4 ,of that 
estimation of the magnitude of natural  
things which is  requisite for the ,idea
 of the ,sublime    ,the estimation of  
magnitude by means of concepts of number
 7or their  signs in ,algebra7 is       
mathematical2 but that in mere intuition
 7by the  measurement of the eye7 is    
aesthetical4 ,now we can come by        
definite  concepts of how great a thing 
is1 only#dd by numbers1 of which the    
unit is the measure 7at all events by   
series of numbers progressing  to       
infinity72 and so far all logical       
estimation of magnitude is              
mathematical4 ,but since the magnitude  
of the measure must then be  assumed    
known1 and this again is only to be     
estimated mathematically  by means of   

numbers1--the unit of which must be     
another smaller  measure1--we can never 
have a first or fundamental measure1 and
  therefore can never have a definite   
concept of a given magnitude4 ,so  the  
estimation of the magnitude of the      
fundamental measure must consist  in    
this1 that we can immediately apprehend 
it in intuition and use it  by the      
,imagination for the presentation of    
concepts of number4 ,that  is1 all      
estimation of the magnitude of the      
objects of nature is in the  end        
aesthetical 7i4e4 subjectively and not  
objectively determined74    ,now for the
 mathematical estimation of magnitude   
there is1 indeed1 no  maximum 7for the  
power of numbers extends to infinity72  
but for its  aesthetical estimation     
there is always a maximum1 and of this  
,i say  that if it is judged as the     
absolute measure than which no greater  
is  possible subjectively 7for the      
judging subject71 it brings with it the 
,idea of the sublime and produces that  

emotion which no mathematical           
estimation of its magnitude by means of 
numbers can bring about 7except  so far 
as the aesthetical fundamental measure  
remains vividly in the  ,imagination74  
,for the former only presents relative  
magnitude by means  of comparison with  
others of the same kind2 but the latter 
presents  magnitude absolutely1 so far  
as the mind can grasp it in an          
intuition4    ,in receiving a quantum   
into the ,imagination by intuition1 in  
order  to be able to use it for a       
measure or as a unit for the estimation 
of magnitude by means of numbers1 there 
are two operations of  the ,imagination 
involved3 apprehension 7apprehensio7 and
  comprehension 7comprehensio           
aesthetica74 ,as to apprehension there  
is no difficulty1 for it can go on ad   
infinitum2 but comprehension  becomes   
harder the further apprehension         
advances1 and soon attains to  its      
maximum1 viz4 the aesthetically greatest
 fundamental measure for  the estimation

 of magnitude4 ,for when apprehension   
has gone so far that  the partial       
representations of sensuous intuition at
 first apprehended  begin to vanish in  
the ,imagination1 whilst this ever      
proceeds to the  apprehension of others1
 then it loses as much on the one side  
as it  gains on the other2 and in       
comprehension there is a maximum beyond 
which it cannot go4    ,hence can be    
explained what ,savary#de remarks in his
 account of  ,egypt1 viz4 that we must  
keep from going very near the ,pyramids 
just  as much as we keep from going too 
far from them1 in order to get the  full
 emotional effect from their size4 ,for 
if we are too far away1  the parts to be
 apprehended 7the stones lying one over 
the other7 are  only obscurely          
represented1 and the representation of  
them produces no  effect upon the       
aesthetical judgement of the subject4   
,but if we are  very near1 the eye      
requires some time to complete the      
apprehension of  the tiers from the     

bottom up to the apex2 and then the     
first tiers are  always partly forgotten
 before the ,imagination has taken in   
the last1  and so the comprehension of  
them is never complete4--,the same thing
  may sufficiently explain the          
bewilderment or1 as it were1 perplexity 
which1 it is said1 seizes the spectator 
on his first entrance into  ,st4        
,peter's at ,rome4 ,for there is here a 
feeling of the inadequacy  of his       
,imagination for presenting the ,ideas  
of a whole1 wherein the  ,imagination   
reaches its maximum1 and1 in striving to
 surpass it1 sinks  back into itself1 by
 which1 however1 a kind of emotional    
satisfaction  is produced4    ,i do not 
wish to speak as yet of the ground of   
this satisfaction1  which is bound up   
with a representation from which we     
should least  of all expect it1 viz4 a  
representation which lets us remark its 
inadequacy and consequently its         
subjective want of purposiveness for    
the ,judgement in the estimation of     

magnitude4 ,i only remark that if  the  
aesthetical judgement is pure 7i4e4     
mingled with no teleological  judgement 
or judgement of ,reason7 and is to be   
given as a completely  suitable example 
of the ,critique of the aesthetical     
,judgement1 we  must not exhibit the    
sublime in products of art 7e4g4        
buildings1  pillars1 etc47 where human  
purpose determines the form as well as  
the size2 nor yet in things of nature   
the concepts of which bring  with them a
 definite purpose 7e4g4 animals with a  
known natural  destination72 but in rude
 nature 7and in this only in so far as  
it  does not bring with it any charm or 
emotion produced by actual danger7      
merely as containing magnitude4 ,for in 
this kind of representation  nature     
contains nothing monstrous 7either      
magnificent or horrible72  the magnitude
 that is apprehended may be increased as
 much as you  wish provided it can be   
comprehended in a whole by the          
,imagination4  ,an object is monstrous  

if by its size it destroys the purpose  
which  constitutes the concept of it4   
,but the mere presentation of a concept 
is called colossal1 which is almost too 
great for any presentation  7bordering  
on the relatively monstrous72 because   
the purpose of  the presentation of a   
concept is made harder to realise by the
  intuition of the object being almost  
too great for our faculty of            
apprehension4--,a pure judgement upon   
the sublime must1 however1 have  no     
purpose of the ,object as its           
determining ground1 if it is to be      
aesthetical and not mixed up with any   
judgement of ,understanding or  ,reason4
           99       99       99       99
       99    ,because everything which  
is to give disinterested pleasure to the
  merely reflective ,judgement must     
bring with the representation  of it1   
subjective and1 as subjective1          
universally valid                       
purposiveness--although no purposiveness
 of the form of the  object lies 7as in 

the case of the ,beautiful7 at the      
ground of the  judgement--the question  
arises 8what is this subjective         
purposiveness80  ,and how does it come  
to be prescribed as the norm by which a 
ground  for universally valid           
satisfaction is supplied in the mere    
estimation  of magnitude1 even in that  
which is forced up to the point where   
our  faculty of ,imagination is         
inadequate for the presentation of the  
concept of magnitude8    ,in the process
 of combination requisite for the       
estimation of  magnitude1 the           
,imagination proceeds of itself to      
infinity without  anything hindering it2
 but the ,understanding guides it by    
means  of concepts of number1 for which 
the ,imagination must furnish the       
schema4 ,and in this procedure1 as      
belonging to the logical estimation  of 
magnitude1 there is indeed something    
objectively purposive1--in  accordance  
with the concept of a purpose 7as all   
measurement is71--but  nothing purposive

 and pleasing for the aesthetical       
,judgement4 ,there is  also in this     
designed purposiveness nothing which    
would force us to  push the magnitude of
 the measure1 and consequently the      
comprehension  of the manifold in an    
intuition1 to the bounds of the faculty 
of  ,imagination1 or as far as ever this
 can reach in its presentations4  ,for  
in the estimation of magnitude by the   
,understanding 7,arithmetic7  we only go
 to a certain point whether we push the 
comprehension of  the units up to the   
number #aj 7as in the decimal scale7 or 
only up to  #d 7as in the quaternary    
scale72 the further production of       
magnitude  proceeds by combination or1  
if the quantum is given in intuition1 by
  apprehension1 but merely by way of    
progression 7not of comprehension7  in  
accordance with an assumed principle of 
progression4 ,in this  mathematical     
estimation of magnitude the             
,understanding is equally  served and   
contented whether the ,imagination      

chooses for unit a  magnitude that we   
can take in in a glance1 e4g4 a foot or 
rod1 or a  ,german mile or even the     
earth's diameter1--of which the         
apprehension  is indeed possible1 but   
not the comprehension in an intuition of
 the  ,imagination 7not possible by     
comprehensio aesthetica1 although quite 
possible by comprehensio logica in a    
concept of number74 ,in both  cases the 
logical estimation of magnitude goes on 
without hindrance to  infinity4    ,but 
now the mind listens to the voice of    
,reason which1 for every given          
magnitude1--even for those that can     
never be entirely apprehended1  although
 7in sensible representation7 they are  
judged as entirely  given1--requires    
totality4 ,reason consequently desires  
comprehension in  one intuition1 and so 
the presentation of all these members of
 a  progressively increasing series4 ,it
 does not even exempt the infinite      
7space and past time7 from this         
requirement2 it rather renders it       

unavoidable to think the infinite 7in   
the judgement of common ,reason7  as    
entirely given 7according to its        
totality74    ,but the infinite is      
absolutely 7not merely comparatively7   
great4  ,compared with it everything    
else 7of the same kind of magnitudes7 is
  small4 ,and what is most important is 
that to be able only to think it  as a  
whole indicates a faculty of mind which 
surpasses every standard  of ,sense4    
,for to represent it sensibly would     
require a comprehension  having for unit
 a standard bearing a definite relation1
 expressible  in numbers1 to the        
infinite2 which is impossible4          
,nevertheless1 the  bare capability of  
thinking this infinite without          
contradiction  requires in the human    
mind a faculty itself supersensible4    
,for it  is only by means of this       
faculty and its ,idea of a              
noumenon1--which  admits of no          
intuition1 but which yet serves as the  
substrate for the  intuition of the     

world1 as a mere phenomenon1--that the  
infinite of  the world of sense1 in the 
pure intellectual estimation of         
magnitude1  can be completely           
comprehended under a concept1 although  
in the  mathematical estimation of      
magnitude by means of concepts of number
  it can never be completely thought4   
,the faculty of being able to think  the
 infinite of supersensible intuition as 
given 7in its intelligible  substrate71 
surpasses every standard of sensibility1
 and is great  beyond all comparison    
even with the faculty of mathematical   
estimation2  not of course in a         
theoretical point of view and on behalf 
of the  cognitive faculty1 but as an    
extension of the mind which feels itself
  able in another 7practical7 point of  
view to go beyond the limit of          
sensibility4    ,nature is therefore    
sublime in those of its phenomena1 whose
 intuition  brings with it the ,idea of 
their infinity4 ,this last can only come
 by  the inadequacy of the greatest     

effort of our ,imagination to estimate  
the magnitude of an object4 ,but now in 
mathematical estimation of  magnitude   
the ,imagination is equal to providing a
 sufficient measure  for every object2  
because the numerical concepts of the   
,understanding1  by means of            
progression1 can make any measure       
adequate to any given  magnitude4       
,therefore it must be the aesthetical   
estimation of  magnitude in which it is 
felt that the effort towards            
comprehension  surpasses the power of   
the ,imagination to grasp in a whole of 
intuition  the progressive apprehension2
 and at the same time is perceived the  
inadequacy of this faculty1 unbounded in
 its progress1 for grasping  and using1 
for the estimation of magnitude1 a      
fundamental measure  which could be made
 available by the ,understanding with   
little  trouble4 ,now the proper        
unchangeable fundamental measure of     
nature is  its absolute whole2 which1   
regarding nature as a phenomenon1 would 

be infinity comprehended4 ,but since    
this fundamental measure is a           
self-contradictory concept 7on account  
of the impossibility of the  absolute   
totality of an endless progress71 that  
magnitude of a natural  ,object1 on     
which the ,imagination fruitlessly      
spends its whole faculty  of            
comprehension1 must carry our concept of
 nature to a supersensible  substrate   
7which lies at its basis and also at the
 basis of our faculty  of thought74 ,as 
this1 however1 is great beyond all      
standards of sense1  it makes us judge  
as sublime1 not so much the object1 as  
our own  state of mind in the estimation
 of it4    ,therefore1 just as the      
aesthetical ,judgement in judging the   
,beautiful  refers the ,imagination in  
its free play to the ,understanding1 in 
order to harmonise it with the concepts 
of the latter in general  7without any  
determination of them72 so does the same
 faculty when  judging a thing as       
,sublime refer itself to the ,reason in 

order that  it may subjectively be in   
accordance with its ,ideas 7no matter   
what  they are73--i4e4 that it may      
produce a state of mind conformable  to 
them and compatible with that brought   
about by the influence of  definite     
7practical7 ,ideas upon feeling4    ,we 
hence see also that true sublimity must 
be sought only in the mind  of the      
subject judging1 not in the natural     
,object1 the judgement upon  which      
occasions this state4 ,who would call   
sublime1 e4g4 shapeless  mountain masses
 piled in wild disorder upon each other 
with their  pyramids of ice1 or the     
gloomy raging sea8 ,but the mind feels  
itself  elevated in its own judgement   
if1 while contemplating them without    
any reference to their form1 and        
abandoning itself to the ,imagination   
and to the ,reason--which although      
placed in combination with the          
,imagination without any definite       
purpose1 merely extends it--it yet      
finds the whole power of the            

,imagination inadequate to its ,ideas4  
,examples of the mathematically ,sublime
 of nature in mere intuition are  all   
the cases in which we are given1 not so 
much a larger numerical  concept as a   
large unit for the measure of the       
,imagination 7for  shortening the       
numerical series74 ,a tree1 the height  
of which we  estimate with reference to 
the height of a man1 at all events gives
  a standard for a mountain2 and if this
 were a mile high1 it would  serve as   
unit for the number expressive of the   
earth's diameter1 so  that the latter   
might be made intuitible4 ,the earth's  
diameter would  supply a unit for the   
known planetary system2 this again for  
the  ,milky ,way2 and the immeasurable  
number of milky way systems called      
nebulae1--which presumably constitute a 
system of the same kind among           
themselves--lets us expect no bounds    
here4 ,now the ,sublime in the          
aesthetical judging of an immeasurable  
whole like this lies not so much  in the

 greatness of the number of units1 as in
 the fact that in our  progress we ever 
arrive at yet greater units4 ,to this   
the systematic  division of the universe
 contributes1 which represents every    
magnitude  in nature as small in its    
turn2 and represents our ,imagination   
with  its entire freedom from bounds1   
and with it ,nature1 as a mere nothing  
in comparison with the ,ideas of        
,reason1 if it is sought to furnish a   
presentation which shall be adequate to 
them4       #bg4 ,of the quality of the 
satisfaction in our judgements upon the 
,sublime    ,the feeling of our         
incapacity to attain to an ,idea1 which 
is a law for  us1 is ,,respect4 ,now the
 ,idea of the comprehension of every    
phenomenon  that can be given us in the 
intuition of a whole1 is an ,idea       
prescribed  to us by a law of ,reason1  
which recognises no other measure1      
definite1  valid for every one1 and     
invariable1 than the absolute whole4    
,but  our ,imagination1 even in its     

greatest efforts1 in respect of that    
comprehension1 which we expect from it1 
of a given object in a whole of         
intuition 7and thus with reference to   
the presentation of the ,idea of        
,reason71 exhibits its own limits and   
inadequacy2 although at the same  time  
it shows that its destination is to make
 itself adequate to this  ,idea regarded
 as a law4 ,therefore the feeling of the
 ,sublime in nature  is respect for our 
own destination1 which by a certain     
subreption we  attribute to an ,object  
of nature 7conversion of respect for the
 ,idea of  humanity in our own subject  
into respect for the ,object74 ,this    
makes  intuitively evident the          
superiority of the rational             
determination of  our cognitive         
faculties to the greatest faculty of our
 ,sensibility4    ,the feeling of the   
,sublime is therefore a feeling of pain1
 arising  from the want of accordance   
between the aesthetical estimation of   
magnitude formed by the ,imagination and

 the estimation of the same  formed by  
,reason4 ,there is at the same time a   
pleasure thus excited1  arising from the
 correspondence with rational ,ideas of 
this very  judgement of the inadequacy  
of our greatest faculty of ,sense2 in so
  far as it is a law for us to strive   
after these ,ideas4 ,in fact it is  for 
us a law 7of ,reason71 and belongs to   
our destination1 to estimate  as small1 
in comparison with ,ideas of ,reason1   
everything which nature1  regarded as an
 object of ,sense1 contains that is     
great for us2 and  that which arouses in
 us the feeling of this supersensible   
destination  agrees with that law4 ,now 
the greatest effort of the ,imagination 
in  the presentation of the unit for the
 estimation of magnitude indicates  a   
reference to something absolutely great2
 and consequently a  reference to the   
law of ,reason1 which bids us take this 
alone as  the supreme measure of        
magnitude4 ,therefore the inner         
perception of  the inadequacy of all    

sensible standards for rational         
estimation of  magnitude indicates a    
correspondence with rational laws2 it   
involves a  pain1 which arouses in us   
the feeling of our supersensible        
destination1  according to which it is  
purposive and therefore pleasurable to  
find  every standard of ,sensibility    
inadequate to the ,ideas of             
,understanding4    ,the mind feels      
itself moved in the representation of   
the ,sublime  in nature2 whilst in      
aesthetical judgements about the        
,beautiful it  is in restful            
contemplation4 ,this movement may       
7especially in  its beginnings7 be      
compared to a vibration1 i4e4 to a      
quickly  alternating attraction towards1
 and repulsion from1 the same ,object4  
,the transcendent 7towards which the    
,imagination is impelled in its         
apprehension of intuition7 is for the   
,imagination like an abyss in  which it 
fears to lose itself2 but for the       
rational ,idea of the  supersensible it 

is not transcendent but in conformity   
with law to  bring about such an effort 
of the ,imagination1 and consequently   
here  there is the same amount of       
attraction as there was of repulsion for
  the mere ,sensibility4 ,but the       
judgement itself always remains in this 
case only aesthetical1 because--without 
having any determinate concept  of the  
,object at its basis--it merely         
represents the subjective play  of the  
mental powers 7,imagination and ,reason7
 as harmonious through  their very      
contrast4 ,for just as ,imagination and 
,understanding1 in  judging of the      
,beautiful1 generate a subjective       
purposiveness of the  mental powers by  
means of their harmony1 so here#df      
,imagination and  ,reason do so by means
 of their conflict4 ,that is1 they bring
 about a  feeling that we possess pure  
self-subsistent ,reason1 or a faculty   
for  the estimation of magnitude1 whose 
pre-eminence can be made intuitively    
evident only by the inadequacy of that  

faculty ,imagination which  is itself   
unbounded in the presentation of        
magnitudes 7of sensible  objects74      
,the measurement of a space 7regarded as
 apprehension7 is at the same  time a   
description of it1 and thus an objective
 movement in the act  of ,imagination   
and a progress4 ,on the other hand1 the 
comprehension  of the manifold in the   
unity1--not of thought but of           
intuition1--and  consequently the       
comprehension of the successively       
apprehended  elements in one glance1 is 
a regress1 which annihilates the        
condition  of time in this progress of  
the ,imagination and makes coexistence  
intuitible4#dg ,it is therefore 7since  
the time-series is a condition  of the  
internal sense and of an intuition7 a   
subjective movement of  the             
,imagination1 by which it does violence 
to the internal sense2  this must be the
 more noticeable1 the greater the       
quantum is which the  ,imagination      
comprehends in one intuition4 ,the      

effort1 therefore1 to  receive in one   
single intuition a measure for          
magnitudes that requires  an appreciable
 time to apprehend1 is a kind of        
representation1 which1  subjectively    
considered1 is contrary to purpose3 but 
objectively1 as  requisite for the      
estimation of magnitude1 it is          
purposive4 ,thus that  very violence    
which is done to the subject through the
 ,imagination is  judged as purposive in
 reference to the whole determination of
 the  mind4    ,the quality of the      
feeling of the ,sublime is that it is a 
feeling  of pain in reference to the    
faculty by which we judge aesthetically 
of an object1 which pain1 however1 is   
represented at the same time as         
purposive4 ,this is possible through the
 fact that the very incapacity  in      
question discovers the consciousness of 
an unlimited faculty of  the same       
subject1 and that the mind can only     
judge of the latter  aesthetically by   
means of the former4    ,in the logical 

estimation of magnitude the             
impossibility of ever  arriving at      
absolute totality1 by means of the      
progress of the  measurement of things  
of the sensible world in time and space1
 was  cognised as objective1 i4e4 as an 
impossibility of thinking the  infinite 
as entirely given2 and not as merely    
subjective or that there  was only an   
incapacity to grasp it4 ,for there we   
have not to do with  the degree of      
comprehension in an intuition1 regarded 
as a measure1  but everything depends on
 a concept of number4 ,but in           
aesthetical  estimation of magnitude the
 concept of number must disappear or be 
changed1 and the comprehension of the   
,imagination in reference to the  unit  
of measure 7thus avoiding the concepts  
of a law of the successive  production  
of concepts of magnitude7 is alone      
purposive for it4--,if now  a magnitude 
almost reaches the limit of our faculty 
of comprehension  in an intuition1 and  
yet the ,imagination is invited by means

 of  numerical magnitudes 7in respect of
 which we are conscious that our        
faculty is unbounded7 to aesthetical    
comprehension in a greater unit1  then  
we mentally feel ourselves confined     
aesthetically within bounds4  ,but      
nevertheless the pain in regard to the  
necessary extension of the  ,imagination
 for accordance with that which is      
unbounded in our faculty  of ,reason1   
viz4 the ,idea of the absolute whole1   
and consequently the  very              
unpurposiveness of the faculty of       
,imagination for rational ,ideas  and   
the arousing of them1 are represented as
 purposive4 ,thus it is that  the       
aesthetical judgement itself is         
subjectively purposive for the  ,reason 
as the source of ,ideas1 i4e4 as the    
source of an intellectual  comprehension
 for which all aesthetical comprehension
 is small2 and  there accompanies the   
reception of an object as sublime a     
pleasure1  which is only possible       
through the medium of a pain4           

,b4--,,of ,,the ,,dynamically ,,sublime 
,,in ,,nature       #bh4 ,of ,nature    
regarded as ,might    ,might is that    
which is superior to great hindrances4  
,it is called  dominion if it is        
superior to the resistance of that which
 itself  possesses might4 ,nature       
considered in an aesthetical judgement  
as might  that has no dominion over us1 
is dynamically sublime4    ,if nature is
 to be judged by us as dynamically      
sublime1 it must be  represented as     
exciting fear 7although it is not true  
conversely  that every object which     
excites fear is regarded in our         
aesthetical  judgement as sublime74 ,for
 in aesthetical judgements 7without the 
aid  of concepts7 superiority to        
hindrances can only be judged according 
to the greatness of the resistance4 ,now
 that which we are driven to  resist is 
an evil1 and1 if we do not find our     
faculties a match for it1  is an object 
of fear4 ,hence nature can be regarded  
by the aesthetical  ,judgement as might1

 and consequently as dynamically        
sublime1 only so  far as it is          
considered an object of fear4    ,but we
 can regard an object as fearful1       
without being afraid of  it2 viz4 if we 
judge of it in such a way that we merely
 think a case  in which we would wish to
 resist it1 and yet in which all        
resistance  would be altogether vain4   
,thus the virtuous man fears ,god       
without being  afraid of ,him2 because  
to wish to resist ,him and ,his         
commandments1 he  thinks is a case as to
 which he need not be anxious4 ,but in  
every  such case that he thinks as not  
impossible1 he cognises ,him as fearful4
    ,he who fears can form no judgement 
about the ,sublime in nature2 just  as  
he who is seduced by inclination and    
appetite can form no judgement  about   
the ,beautiful4 ,the former flies from  
the sight of an object which  inspires  
him with awe2 and it is impossible to   
find satisfaction in  a terror that is  
seriously felt4 ,hence the              

pleasurableness arising  from the       
cessation of an uneasiness is a state of
 joy4 ,but this1 on  account of the     
deliverance from danger which is        
involved1 is a state  of joy conjoined  
with the resolve not to expose ourselves
 to the danger  again2 we cannot        
willingly look back upon our sensations 
of danger1  much less seek the occasion 
for them again4    ,bold1 overhanging1  
and as it were threatening1 rocks2      
clouds piled up  in the sky1 moving with
 lightning flashes and thunder peals2   
volcanoes  in all their violence of     
destruction2 hurricanes with their track
  of devastation2 the boundless ocean in
 a state of tumult2 the lofty  waterfall
 of a mighty river1 and such like2 these
 exhibit our faculty  of resistance as  
insignificantly small in comparison with
 their might4  ,but the sight of them is
 the more attractive1 the more fearful  
it  is1 provided only that we are in    
security2 and we readily call these     
objects sublime1 because they raise the 

energies of the soul above  their       
accustomed height1 and discover in us a 
faculty of resistance of  a quite       
different kind1 which gives us courage  
to measure ourselves  against the       
apparent almightiness of nature4        
,now1 in the immensity of nature1 and in
 the inadequacy of our faculties  for   
adopting a standard proportionate to the
 aesthetical estimation of  the         
magnitude of its realm1 we find our own 
limitation2 although at  the same time  
in our rational faculty we find a       
different1 non-sensuous  standard1 which
 has that infinity itself under it as a 
unit1 and in  comparison with which     
everything in nature is small4 ,thus in 
our mind  we find a superiority to      
nature even in its immensity4 ,and so   
also  the irresistibility of its might1 
while making us recognise our own       
physical#dh impotence1 considered as    
beings of nature1 discloses  to us a    
faculty of judging independently of1 and
 a superiority over1  nature2 on which  

is based a kind of self-preservation1   
entirely  different from that which can 
be attacked and brought into danger by  
external nature4 ,thus1 humanity in our 
person remains unhumiliated1  though the
 individual might have to submit to this
 dominion4 ,in this  way nature is not  
judged to be sublime in our aesthetical 
judgements1  in so far as it excites    
fear2 but because it calls up that power
 in  us 7which is not nature7 of        
regarding as small the things about     
which  we are solicitous 7goods1 health1
 and life71 and of regarding its  might 
7to which we are no doubt subjected in  
respect of these things71  as           
nevertheless without any dominion over  
us and our personality to  which we must
 bow where our highest fundamental      
propositions1 and  their assertion or   
abandonment1 are concerned4 ,therefore  
nature is  here called sublime merely   
because it elevates the ,imagination to 
a  presentation of those cases in which 
the mind can make felt the proper       

sublimity of its destination1 in        
comparison with nature itself4    ,this 
estimation of ourselves loses nothing   
through the fact that  we must regard   
ourselves as safe in order to feel this 
inspiriting  satisfaction2 and that     
hence1 as there is no seriousness in the
  danger1 there might be also 7as might 
seem to be the case7 just as  little    
seriousness in the sublimity of our     
spiritual faculty4 ,for  the            
satisfaction here concerns only the     
destination of our faculty  which       
discloses itself in such a case1 so far 
as the tendency to this  destination    
lies in our nature1 whilst its          
development and exercise  remain        
incumbent and obligatory4 ,and in this  
there is truth1 however  conscious the  
man may be of his present actual        
powerlessness1 when he  stretches his   
reflection so far4    ,no doubt this    
principle seems to be too far-fetched   
and too subtly  reasoned1 and           
consequently seems to go beyond the     

scope of an  aesthetical judgement2 but 
observation of men proves the opposite1 
and  shows that it may lie at the root  
of the most ordinary judgements1        
although we are not always conscious of 
it4 ,for what is that which is1  even to
 the savage1 an object of the greatest  
admiration8 ,it is a man  who shrinks   
from nothing1 who fears nothing1 and    
therefore does not  yield to danger1 but
 rather goes to face it vigorously with 
the fullest  deliberation4 ,even in the 
most highly civilised state this        
peculiar  veneration for the soldier    
remains1 though only under the condition
  that he exhibit all the virtues of    
peace1 gentleness1 compassion1 and  even
 a becoming care for his own person2    
because even by these it  is recognised 
that his mind is unsubdued by danger4   
,hence whatever  disputes there may be  
about the superiority of the respect    
which is  to be accorded them1 in the   
comparison of a statesman and a general1
  the aesthetical judgement decides for 

the latter4 ,war itself1 if it  is      
carried on with order and with a sacred 
respect for the rights of  citizens1 has
 something sublime in it1 and makes the 
disposition of the  people who carry it 
on thus1 only the more sublime1 the more
 numerous  are the dangers to which they
 are exposed1 and in respect of which   
they behave with courage4 ,on the other 
hand1 a long peace generally  brings    
about a predominant commercial spirit1  
and along with it1 low  selfishness1    
cowardice1 and effeminacy1 and debases  
the disposition of  the people4#di      
,it appears to conflict with this       
solution of the concept of the  sublime1
 so far as sublimity is ascribed to     
might1 that we are  accustomed to       
represent ,god as presenting ,himself in
 ,his wrath and  yet in ,his sublimity1 
in the tempest1 the storm1 the          
earthquake1 etc42  and that it would be 
foolish and criminal to imagine a       
superiority of  our minds over these    
works of ,his1 and1 as it seems1 even   

over the  designs of such might4 ,hence 
it would appear that no feeling of the  
sublimity of our own nature1 but rather 
subjection1 abasement1 and a  feeling of
 complete powerlessness1 is a fitting   
state of mind before  the manifestation 
of such an object1 and this is generally
 bound up  with the ,idea of it during  
natural phenomena of this kind4         
,generally in  religion1 prostration1   
adoration with bent head1 with contrite1
 anxious  demeanour and voice1 seems to 
be the only fitting behaviour in        
presence  of the ,godhead2 and hence    
most peoples have adopted and still     
observe  it4 ,but this state of mind is 
far from being necessarily bound up with
  the ,idea of the sublimity of a       
religion and its object4 ,the man who   
is actually afraid1 because he finds    
reasons for fear in himself1  whilst    
conscious by his culpable disposition of
 offending against a  ,might whose will 
is irresistible and at the same time    
just1 is not in  the frame of mind for  

admiring the divine greatness4 ,for this
 a mood of  calm contemplation and a    
quite free judgement are needed4 ,only  
if he is  conscious of an upright       
disposition pleasing to ,god do those   
operations  of might serve to awaken in 
him the ,idea of the sublimity of this  
,being1 for then he recognises in       
himself a sublimity of disposition      
conformable to ,his will2 and thus he is
 raised above the fear of such          
operations of nature1 which he no longer
 regards as outbursts of ,his  wrath4   
,even humility1 in the shape of a stern 
judgement upon his own  faults1--which  
otherwise1 with a consciousness of good 
intentions1  could be easily palliated  
from the frailty of human nature1--is a 
sublime state of mind1 consisting in a  
voluntary subjection of himself  to the 
pain of remorse1 in order that its      
causes may be gradually  removed4 ,in   
this way religion is essentially        
distinguished from  superstition4 ,the  
latter establishes in the mind1 not     

reverence for the  ,sublime1 but fear   
and apprehension of the all-powerful    
,being to whose  will the terrified man 
sees himself subject1 without according 
,him any  high esteem4 ,from this       
nothing can arise but a seeking of      
favour1 and  flattery1 instead of a     
religion which consists in a good       
life4#ej    ,sublimity1 therefore1 does 
not reside in anything of nature1 but   
only  in our mind1 in so far as we can  
become conscious that we are superior   
to nature within1 and therefore also to 
nature without us 7so far  as it        
influences us74 ,everything that excites
 this feeling in us1  e4g4 the might of 
nature which calls forth our forces1 is 
called  then 7although improperly7      
sublime4 ,only by supposing this ,idea  
in  ourselves1 and in reference to it1  
are we capable of attaining to the      
,idea of the sublimity of that ,being1  
which produces respect in us1 not       
merely by the might that it displays in 
nature1 but rather by means  of the     

faculty which resides in us of judging  
it fearlessly and of  regarding our     
destination as sublime in respect of it4
       #bi4 ,of the modality of the     
judgement upon the sublime in nature    
,there are numberless beautiful things  
in nature about which we can  assume and
 even expect1 without being far         
mistaken1 the harmony of  every one's   
judgement with our own4 ,but in respect 
of our judgement  upon the sublime in   
nature1 we cannot promise ourselves so  
easily  the accordance of others4 ,for a
 far greater culture1 as well of the    
aesthetical ,judgement as of the        
cognitive faculties which lie at its    
basis1 seems requisite in order to be   
able to pass judgement on this          
pre-eminent quality of natural objects4 
,that the mind be attuned to feel the   
sublime postulates a  susceptibility of 
the mind for ,ideas4 ,for in the very   
inadequacy of  nature to these latter1  
and thus only by presupposing them and  
by  straining the ,imagination to use   

nature as a schema for them1 is to  be  
found that which is terrible to         
sensibility and yet is attractive4  ,it 
is attractive because ,reason exerts a  
dominion over sensibility  in order to  
extend it in conformity with its own    
realm 7the practical7  and to make it   
look out into the ,infinite1 which is   
for it an abyss4 ,in  fact1 without     
development of moral ,ideas1 that which 
we1 prepared by  culture1 call sublime1 
presents itself to the uneducated man   
merely as  terrible4 ,in the indications
 of the dominion of nature in           
destruction1  and in the great scale of 
its might1 in comparison with which his 
own  is a vanishing quantity1 he will   
only see the misery1 danger1 and        
distress which surround the man who is  
exposed to it4 ,so the good1  and indeed
 intelligent1 ,savoyard peasant 7as     
,herr von ,saussure#ea  relates7        
unhesitatingly called all lovers of     
snow-mountains fools4 ,and  who knows1  
whether he would have been so completely

 wrong1 if ,saussure  had undertaken the
 danger to which he exposed himself     
merely1 as most  travellers do1 from    
amateur curiosity1 or that he might be  
able to give  a pathetic account of     
them8 ,but his design was the           
instruction of men2  and this excellent 
man gave the readers of his ,travels1   
soul-stirring  sensations such as he    
himself had1 into the bargain4    ,but  
although the judgement upon the ,sublime
 in nature needs culture  7more than the
 judgement upon the ,beautiful71 it is  
not therefore  primarily produced by    
culture and introduced in a merely      
conventional  way into society4 ,rather 
has it root in human nature1 even in    
that  which1 alike with common          
,understanding1 we can impute to and    
expect of  every one1 viz4 in the       
tendency to the feeling for 7practical7 
,ideas1  i4e4 to the moral feeling4     
,hereon is based the necessity of that  
agreement of the judgement of  others   
about the sublime with our own which we 

include in the latter4  ,for just as we 
charge with want of taste the man who is
 indifferent  when passing judgement    
upon an object of nature that we regard 
as  beautiful2 so we say of him who     
remains unmoved in the presence of that 
which we judge to be sublime1 he has no 
feeling4 ,but we claim both  from every 
man1 and we presuppose them in him if he
 has any culture at  all2 only with the 
difference1 that we expect the former   
directly of  every one1 because in it   
the ,judgement refers the ,imagination  
merely to  the ,understanding1 the      
faculty of concepts2 but the latter1    
because  in it the ,imagination is      
related to the ,reason1 the faculty of  
,ideas1  only under a subjective        
presupposition 7which1 however1 we      
believe we  are authorised in imputing  
to every one71 viz4 the presupposition  
of  the moral feeling in man4#eb ,thus  
it is that we ascribe necessity to  this
 aesthetical judgement also4    ,in this
 modality of aesthetical judgements1    

viz4 in the necessity  claimed for them1
 lies an important moment of the        
,critique of  ,judgement4 ,for it       
enables us to recognise in them an a    
priori  principle1 and raises them out  
of empirical psychology1 in which       
otherwise they would remain buried      
amongst the feelings of  gratification  
and grief 7only with the unmeaning      
addition of being  called finer         
feelings74 ,thus it enables us too to   
place the ,judgement  among those       
faculties that have a priori principles 
at their basis1  and so to bring it into
 ,transcendental ,philosophy4           
,,general ,,remark ,,upon ,,the         
,,exposition ,,of ,,the ,,aesthetical   
,,reflective  ,,judgement      ,in      
reference to the feeling of pleasure an 
object is to be classified  as either   
pleasant1 or beautiful1 or sublime1 or  
good  7absolutely71 7jucundum1 pulchrum1
 sublime1 honestum74    ,the pleasant1  
as motive of desire1 is always of one   
and the same  kind1 no matter whence it 

comes and however specifically different
  the representation 7of sense1 and     
sensation objectively considered7  may  
be4 ,hence in judging its influence on  
the mind1 account is taken  only of the 
number of its charms 7simultaneous and  
successive71 and  so only of the mass1  
as it were1 of the pleasant sensation2  
and this  can be made intelligible only 
by quantity4 ,it has no reference  to   
culture1 but belongs to mere            
enjoyment4--,on the other hand1 the     
beautiful requires the representation of
 a certain quality of  the ,object1 that
 can be made intelligible and reduced to
 concepts  7although it is not so       
reduced in an aesthetical judgement72   
and it  cultivates us1 in that it       
teaches us to attend to the             
purposiveness  in the feeling of        
pleasure4--,the sublime consists merely 
in the  relation by which the sensible  
in the representation of nature is      
judged available for a possible         
supersensible use4--,the absolutely     

good1 subjectively judged according to  
the feeling that it inspires  7the      
,object of the moral feeling71 as       
capable of determining the powers  of   
the subject through the representation  
of an absolutely compelling  law1 is    
specially distinguished by the modality 
of a necessity that  rests a priori upon
 concepts4 ,this necessity involves not 
merely  a claim1 but a command for the  
assent of every one1 and belongs  in    
itself to the pure intellectual1 rather 
than to the aesthetical  ,judgement2 and
 is by a determinant and not a mere     
reflective judgement  ascribed not to   
,nature but to ,freedom4 ,but the       
determinability of  the subject by means
 of this ,idea1 and especially of a     
subject  that can feel hindrances in    
sensibility1 and at the same time its   
superiority to them by their subjugation
 involving a modification of  its       
state--i4e4 the moral feeling1--is yet  
so far cognate to the  aesthetical      
,judgement and its formal conditions    

that it can serve to  represent the     
conformity to law of action from duty as
 aesthetical1  i4e4 as sublime or even  
as beautiful1 without losing its purity4
 ,this  would not be so1 if we were to  
put it in natural combination with the  
feeling of the pleasant4    ,if we take 
the result of the foregoing exposition  
of the two kinds  of aesthetical        
judgements1 there arise therefrom the   
following short  explanations3    ,the  
,beautiful is what pleases in the mere  
judgement 7and therefore  not by the    
medium of sensation in accordance with a
 concept of the  ,understanding74 ,it   
follows at once from this that it must  
please apart  from all interest4    ,the
 ,sublime is what pleases immediately   
through its opposition to the  interest 
of sense4    ,both1 as explanations of  
aesthetical universally valid judging1  
are referred to subjective grounds2 in  
the one case to grounds of  sensibility1
 in favour of the contemplative         
,understanding2 in the other  case in   

opposition to sensibility1 but on behalf
 of the purposes  of practical ,reason4 
,both1 however1 united in the same      
subject1 are  purposive in reference to 
the moral feeling4 ,the ,beautiful      
prepares  us to love disinterestedly    
something1 even nature itself2 the      
,sublime  prepares us to esteem         
something highly even in opposition to  
our own  7sensible7 interest4    ,we may
 describe the ,sublime thus3 it is an   
object 7of nature7  the representation  
of which determines the mind to think   
the  unattainability of nature regarded 
as a presentation of ,ideas4            
,literally taken and logically          
considered1 ,ideas cannot be presented4 
,but if we extend our empirical         
representative faculty 7mathematically  
or dynamically7 to the intuition of     
nature1 ,reason inevitably  intervenes1 
as the faculty expressing the           
independence of absolute  totality1#ec  
and generates the effort of the mind1   
vain though it  be1 to make the         

representation of the senses adequate to
 this4 ,this  effort1--and the feeling  
of the unattainability of the ,idea by  
means  of the ,imagination1--is itself a
 presentation of the subjective         
purposiveness of our mind in the        
employment of the ,imagination for  its 
supersensible destination2 and forces   
us1 subjectively1 to  think nature      
itself in its totality as a presentation
 of something  supersensible1 without   
being able objectively to arrive at this
  presentation4    ,for we soon see that
 nature in space and time entirely lacks
 the  unconditioned1 and1 consequently1 
that absolute magnitude1 which yet is   
desired by the most ordinary ,reason4   
,it is by this that we are reminded     
that we only have to do with nature as  
phenomenon1 and that it must  be        
regarded as the mere presentation of a  
nature in itself 7of which  ,reason has 
the ,idea74 ,but this ,idea of the      
supersensible1 which we can  no further 
determine1--so that we cannot know but  

only think nature  as its               
presentation1--is awakened in us by     
means of an object1 whose  aesthetical  
appreciation strains the ,imagination to
 its utmost bounds1  whether of         
extension 7mathematical7 or of its might
 over the mind  7dynamical74 ,and this  
judgement is based upon a feeling of the
 mind's  destination1 which entirely    
surpasses the realm of the former 7i4e4 
upon the moral feeling71 in respect of  
which the representation of the  object 
is judged as subjectively purposive4    
,in fact1 a feeling for the ,sublime in 
nature cannot well be thought  without  
combining therewith a mental disposition
 which is akin to the  ,moral4 ,and     
although the immediate pleasure in the  
,beautiful of nature  likewise          
presupposes and cultivates a certain    
liberality in our  mental attitude1 i4e4
 a satisfaction independent of mere     
sensible  enjoyment1 yet freedom is thus
 represented as in play rather than  in 
that law-directed occupation which is   

the genuine characteristic  of human    
morality1 in which ,reason must exercise
 dominion over  ,sensibility4 ,but in   
aesthetical judgements upon the ,sublime
 this  dominion is represented as       
exercised by the ,imagination1 regarded 
as an  instrument of ,reason4    ,the   
satisfaction in the ,sublime of nature  
is then only negative  7whilst that in  
the ,beautiful is positive72 viz4 a     
feeling that the  ,imagination is       
depriving itself of its freedom1 while  
it is purposively  determined according 
to a different law from that of its     
empirical  employment4 ,it thus acquires
 an extension and a might greater than  
it  sacrifices1--the ground of which1   
however1 is concealed from itself2      
whilst yet it feels the sacrifice or the
 deprivation and1 at the  same time1 the
 cause to which it is subjected4        
,astonishment1 that  borders upon       
terror1 the dread and the holy awe which
 seizes the  observer at the sight of   
mountain peaks rearing themselves to    

heaven1  deep chasms and streams raging 
therein1 deep-shadowed solitudes that   
dispose one to melancholy               
meditations--this1 in the safety in     
which we  know ourselves to be1 is not  
actual fear1 but only an attempt to feel
  fear by the aid of the ,imagination2  
that we may feel the might of this      
faculty in combining with the mind's    
repose the mental movement thereby      
excited1 and being thus superior to     
internal nature1--and therefore  to     
external1--so far as this can have any  
influence on our feeling of  well-being4
 ,for the ,imagination by the laws of   
,association makes our  state of        
contentment dependent on physical       
causes2 but it also1  by the principles 
of the ,schematism of the ,judgement    
7being so far1  therefore1 ranked under 
freedom71 is the instrument of ,reason  
and its  ,ideas1 and1 as such1 has might
 to maintain our independence of natural
  influences1 to regard as small what in
 reference to them is great1 and  so to 

place the absolutely great only in the  
proper destination of the  subject4 ,the
 raising of this reflection of the      
aesthetical ,judgement  so as to be     
adequate to ,reason 7though without a   
definite concept of  ,reason7 represents
 the object as subjectively purposive1  
even by the  objective want of          
accordance between the ,imagination in  
its greatest  extension and the ,reason 
7as the faculty of ,ideas74    ,we must 
here1 generally1 attend to what has been
 already noted1 that  in the            
,transcendental ,aesthetic of ,judgement
 we must speak solely of  pure          
aesthetical judgements2 consequently our
 examples are not to be  taken from such
 beautiful or sublime objects of ,nature
 as presuppose  the concept of a        
purpose4 ,for1 if so1 the purposiveness 
would be  either teleological1 or would 
be based on mere sensations of an object
  7gratification or grief72 and thus    
would be in the former case not         
aesthetical1 in the latter not merely   

formal4 ,if then we call the sight  of  
the starry heaven sublime1 we must not  
place at the basis of our  judgement    
concepts of worlds inhabited by rational
 beings1 and regard  the bright points1 
with which we see the space above us    
filled1 as  their suns moving in circles
 purposively fixed with reference to    
them2  but we must regard it1 just as we
 see it1 as a distant1 all-embracing    
vault4 ,only under such a representation
 can we range that sublimity  which a   
pure aesthetical judgement ascribes to  
this object4 ,and in  the same way1 if  
we are to call the sight of the ocean   
sublime1 we  must not think of it as we 
ordinarily do1 endowed as we are with   
all kinds of knowledge 7not contained1  
however1 in the immediate  intuition74  
,for example1 we sometimes think of the 
ocean as a vast  kingdom of aquatic     
creatures2 or as the great source of    
those vapours  that fill the air with   
clouds for the benefit of the land2 or  
again  as an element which1 though      

dividing continents from each other1 yet
  promotes the greatest communication   
between them3 but these furnish  merely 
teleological judgements4 ,to call the   
ocean sublime we must  regard it as     
poets do1 merely by what strikes the    
eye2 if it is at  rest1 as a clear      
mirror of water only bounded by the     
heaven2 if it is  restless1 as an abyss 
threatening to overwhelm everything4    
,the like is  to be said of the ,sublime
 and ,beautiful in the human figure4 ,we
 must  not regard as the determining    
grounds of our judgement the concepts   
of the purposes which all our limbs     
serve1 and we must not allow this       
coincidence to influence our aesthetical
 judgement 7for then it would  no longer
 be pure72 although it is certainly a   
necessary condition of  aesthetical     
satisfaction that there should be no    
conflict between them4  ,aesthetical    
purposiveness is the conformity to law  
of the ,judgement in  its freedom4 ,the 
satisfaction in the object depends on   

the relation  in which we wish to place 
the ,imagination2 always provided that  
it by  itself entertains the mind in    
free occupation4 ,if1 on the other hand1
  the judgement be determined by        
anything else1--whether sensation or    
concept1--although it may be conformable
 to law1 it cannot be the act  of a free
 ,judgement4    ,if then we speak of    
intellectual beauty or sublimity1 these 
expressions  are1 first1 not quite      
accurate1 because beauty and sublimity  
are  aesthetical modes of               
representation1 which would not be found
 in us at  all if we were pure          
intelligences 7or even regarded         
ourselves as such  in thought74         
,secondly1 although both1 as objects of 
an intellectual  7moral7 satisfaction1  
are so far compatible with aesthetical  
satisfaction that they rest upon no     
interest1 yet they are difficult  to    
unite with it1 because they are meant to
 produce an interest4  ,this1 if its    
presentation is to harmonise with the   

satisfaction in the  aesthetical        
judgement1 could only arise by means of 
a sensible interest  that we combine    
with it in the presentation2 and thus   
damage would be  done to the            
intellectual purposiveness1 and it would
 lose its purity4    ,the object of a   
pure and unconditioned intellectual     
satisfaction is  the ,moral ,law in that
 might which it exercises in us over all
 mental  motives that precede it4 ,this 
might only makes itself aesthetically   
known to us through sacrifices 7which   
causing a feeling of deprivation1       
though on behalf of internal freedom1 in
 return discloses in us an  unfathomable
 depth of this supersensible faculty1   
with consequences  extending beyond our 
ken72 thus the satisfaction on the      
aesthetical  side 7in relation to       
sensibility7 is negative1 i4e4 against  
this  interest1 but regarded from the   
intellectual side it is positive and    
combined with an interest4 ,hence it    
follows that the intellectual1  in      

itself purposive1 7moral7 good1         
aesthetically judged1 must be           
represented as sublime rather than      
beautiful1 so that it rather awakens    
the feeling of respect 7which disdains  
charm7 than that of love and  familiar  
inclination2 for human nature does not  
attach itself to this  good             
spontaneously1 but only by the authority
 which ,reason exercises  over          
,sensibility4 ,conversely also1 that    
which we call sublime in  nature1       
whether external or internal 7e4g4      
certain affections71 is  only           
represented as a might in the mind to   
overcome certain#ed  hindrances of the  
,sensibility by means of moral          
fundamental  propositions1 and only thus
 does it interest4    ,i will dwell a   
moment on this latter point4 ,the ,idea 
of the ,good  conjoined with affection  
is called enthusiasm4 ,this state of    
mind  seems to be sublime1 to the extent
 that we commonly assert that  nothing  
great could be done without it4 ,now    

every affection#ee is  blind1 either in 
the choice of its purpose1 or1 if this  
be supplied  by ,reason1 in its         
accomplishment2 for it is a mental      
movement which  makes it impossible to  
exercise a free deliberation about      
fundamental  propositions so as to      
determine ourselves thereby4 ,it can    
therefore in  no way deserve the        
approval of the ,reason4 ,nevertheless1 
aesthetically1  enthusiasm is sublime1  
because it is a tension of forces       
produced  by ,ideas1 which give an      
impulse to the mind1 that operates far  
more  powerfully and lastingly than the 
impulse arising from sensible           
representations4 ,but 7which seems      
strange7 the absence of affection       
7apatheia1 phlegma in significatu bono7 
in a mind that vigorously  follows its  
unalterable principles is sublime1 and  
in a far preferable  way1 because it has
 also on its side the satisfaction of   
pure  ,reason4#ef ,it is only a mental  
state of this kind that is called       

noble2 and this expression is           
subsequently applied to things1 e4g4 a  
building1 a garment1 literary style1    
bodily presence1 etc41 when these  do   
not so much arouse astonishment 7the    
affection produced by the               
representation of novelty exceeding our 
expectations71 as admiration            
7astonishment that does not cease when  
the novelty disappears72 and  this is   
the case when ,ideas agree in their     
presentation undesignedly  and artlessly
 with the aesthetical satisfaction4     
,every affection of the ,,strenuous kind
 7viz4 that excites the  consciousness  
of our power to overcome every          
obstacle--animi strenui7  is            
aesthetically sublime1 e4g4 wrath1 even 
despair 7i4e4 the  despair of           
indignation1 not of faintheartedness74  
,but affections of  the ,,languid kind  
7which make the very effort of          
resistance an object  of pain--animum   
languidum7 have nothing noble in        
themselves1 but  they may be reckoned   

under the sensuously beautiful4         
,emotions1  which may rise to the       
strength of affections1 are very        
different4  ,we have both spirited and  
tender emotions4 ,the latter1 if they   
rise to the height of affections1 are   
worthless2 the propensity to  them is   
called sentimentality4 ,a sympathetic   
grief that will not  admit of           
consolation1 or one referring to        
imaginary evils to which  we            
deliberately surrender ourselves--being 
deceived by fancy--as if  they were     
actual1 indicates and produces a        
tender1#eg though weak1  soul--which    
shows a beautiful side and which can be 
called fanciful1  though not            
enthusiastic4 ,romances1 lacrymose      
plays1 shallow moral  precepts1 which   
toy with 7falsely7 so-called moral      
dispositions1 but  in fact make the     
heart languid1 insensible to the severe 
precept of  duty1 and incapable of all  
respect for the worth of humanity in our
  own person1 and for the rights of men 

7a very different thing from  their     
happiness71 and in general incapable of 
all steady principle2  even a religious 
discourse1#eh which recommends a        
cringing1 abject  seeking of favour and 
ingratiation of ourselves1 which        
proposes the  abandonment of all        
confidence in our own faculties in      
opposition to  the evil within us1      
instead of a sturdy resolution to       
endeavour to  overcome our inclinations 
by means of those powers which with all 
our  frailty yet remain to us2 that     
false humility which sets the only  way 
of pleasing the ,supreme ,being in      
self-depreciation1 in whining           
hypocritical repentance and in a mere   
passive state of mind--these are  not   
compatible with any frame of mind that  
can be counted beautiful1  still less   
with one which is to be counted sublime4
    ,but even stormy movements of mind  
which may be connected under the  name  
of edification with ,ideas of religion1 
or--as merely belonging  to             

culture--with ,ideas containing a social
 interest1 can in no way1  however they 
strain the ,imagination1 lay claim to   
the honour of  being sublime            
presentations1 unless they leave after  
them a mental  mood which1 although only
 indirectly1 has influence upon the     
mind's  consciousness of its strength1  
and its resolution in reference to that 
which involves pure intellectual        
purposiveness 7the supersensible74 ,for 
otherwise all these emotions belong only
 to motion1 which one would  fain enjoy 
for the sake of health4 ,the pleasant   
exhaustion1 consequent  upon such       
disturbance produced by the play of the 
affections1 is an  enjoyment of our     
well-being arising from the restored    
equilibrium of  the various vital       
forces4 ,this in the end amounts to the 
same thing as  that state which ,eastern
 voluptuaries find so delightful1 when  
they  get their bodies as it were       
kneaded and all their muscles and joints
  softly pressed and bent2 only that in 

this case the motive principle  is for  
the most part external1 in the other    
case it is altogether  internal4 ,many a
 man believes himself to be edified by a
 sermon1 when  indeed there is no       
edification at all 7no system of good   
maxims72 or  to be improved by a        
tragedy1 when he is only glad at his    
ennui being  happily dispelled4 ,so the 
,sublime must always have reference to  
the  disposition1 i4e4 to the maxims    
which furnish to the intellectual  part 
and to the ,ideas of ,reason a          
superiority over sensibility4    ,we    
need not fear that the feeling of the   
sublime will lose by so  abstract a mode
 of presentation1--which is quite       
negative in respect  of what is         
sensible1--for the ,imagination1        
although it finds nothing  beyond the   
sensible to which it can attach itself1 
yet feels itself  unbounded by this     
removal of its limitations2 and thus    
that very  abstraction is a presentation
 of the ,infinite1 which can be nothing 

but a mere negative presentation1 but   
which yet expands the soul4  ,perhaps   
there is no sublimer passage in the     
,jewish ,law than the  command1 ,thou   
shalt not make to thyself any graven    
image1 nor the  likeness of anything    
which is in heaven or on the earth or   
under the  earth1 etc4 ,this command    
alone can explain the enthusiasm that   
the  ,jewish people in their moral      
period felt for their religion1 when    
they  compared themselves with other    
peoples2 or explain the pride which     
,mahommedanism inspires4 ,the same is   
true of the moral law and of the        
tendency to morality in us4 ,it is quite
 erroneous to fear that if we  deprive  
this tendency of all that can recommend 
it to sense it will  only involve a cold
 lifeless assent and no moving force or 
emotion4 ,it  is quite the other way1   
for where the senses see nothing more   
before  them1 and the unmistakable and  
indelible ,idea of morality remains1  it
 would be rather necessary to moderate  

the impetus of an unbounded             
,imagination1 to prevent it from rising 
to enthusiasm1 than through fear  of the
 powerlessness of these ,ideas to seek  
aid for them in images and  childish    
ritual4 ,thus governments have willingly
 allowed religion to be  abundantly     
provided with the latter accessories2   
and seeking thereby  to relieve their   
subjects of trouble1 they have also     
sought to deprive  them of the faculty  
of extending their spiritual powers     
beyond the  limits that are arbitrarily 
assigned to them1 and by means of which 
they can be the more easily treated as  
mere passive#ei beings4    ,this pure1  
elevating1 merely negative presentation 
of morality brings  with it1 on the     
other hand1 no danger of fanaticism1    
which is a  delusion that we can will   
ourselves to see something beyond all   
bounds  of sensibility1 i4e4 to dream in
 accordance with fundamental            
propositions 7or to go mad with         
,reason72 and this is so just because   

this presentation is merely negative4   
,for the inscrutableness of the  ,idea  
of ,freedom quite cuts it off from any  
positive presentation2 but  the moral   
law is in itself sufficiently and       
originally determinant  in us1 so that  
it does not permit us to cast a glance  
at any ground  of determination external
 to itself4 ,if enthusiasm is comparable
 to  madness1 fanaticism is comparable  
to monomania2 of which the latter  is   
least of all compatible with the        
sublime1 because in its detail it  is   
ridiculous4 ,in enthusiasm1 regarded as 
an affection1 the ,imagination  is      
without bridle2 in fanaticism1 regarded 
as an inveterate1 brooding  passion1 it 
is without rule4 ,the first is a        
transitory accident which  sometimes    
befalls the soundest ,understanding2 the
 second is a disease  which unsettles   
it4    ,simplicity 7purposiveness       
without art7 is as it were the style of 
,nature in the sublime1 and so also of  
,morality which is a second             

7supersensible7 nature2 of which we only
 know the laws without being  able to   
reach by intuition that supersensible   
faculty in ourselves  which contains the
 ground of the legislation4    ,now the 
satisfaction in the ,beautiful1 like    
that in the ,sublime1  is not alone     
distinguishable from other aesthetical  
judgements by  its universal            
communicability1 but also because1      
through this  very property1 it acquires
 an interest in reference to society 7in
  which this communication is possible74
 ,we must1 however1 remark that         
separation from all society is regarded 
as sublime1 if it rests  upon ,ideas    
that overlook all sensible interest4 ,to
 be sufficient for  oneself1 and        
consequently to have no need of society1
 without at the  same time being        
unsociable1 i4e4 without flying from it1
 is something  bordering on the sublime2
 as is any dispensing with wants4 ,on   
the other  hand1 to fly from men from   
misanthropy1 because we bear ill-will to

  them1 or from anthropophoby 7shyness71
 because we fear them as foes1  is      
partly hateful1 partly contemptible4    
,there is indeed a misanthropy  7very   
improperly so-called71 the tendency to  
which frequently appears  with old age  
in many right-thinking men2 which is    
philanthropic enough  as far as goodwill
 to men is concerned1 but which through 
long and  sad experience is far removed 
from satisfaction with men4 ,evidence of
  this is afforded by the propensity to 
solitude1 the fantastic wish for  a     
secluded country seat1 or 7in the case  
of young persons7 by the dream  of the  
happiness of passing one's life with a  
little family upon some  island unknown 
to the rest of the world2 a dream of    
which story-tellers  or writers of      
,robinsonades know how to make good use4
 ,falsehood1  ingratitude1 injustice1   
the childishness of the purposes        
regarded by  ourselves as important and 
great1 in the pursuit of which men      
inflict  upon each other all imaginable 

evils1 are so contradictory to the ,idea
  of what men might be if they would1   
and conflict so with our lively  wish to
 see them better1 that1 in order that we
 may not hate them  7since we cannot    
love them71 the renunciation of all     
social joys seems  but a small          
sacrifice4 ,this sadness--not the       
sadness 7of which sympathy  is the      
cause7 for the evils which fate brings  
upon others1--but for  those things     
which men do to one another 7which      
depends upon an  antipathy in           
fundamental propositions71 is sublime1  
because it rests  upon ,ideas1 whilst   
the former can only count as            
beautiful4--,the  brilliant and thorough
 ,saussure1#fj in his account of his    
,alpine  travels1 says of one of the    
,savoy mountains1 called ,bonhomme1     
8,there  reigns there a certain insipid 
sadness40 ,he therefore recognised an   
interesting sadness1 that the sight of a
 solitude might inspire1 to  which men  
might wish to transport themselves that 

they might neither  hear nor experience 
any more of the world2 which1 however1  
would not  be quite so inhospitable that
 it would offer only an extremely       
painful  retreat4--,i make this remark  
solely with the design of indicating    
again that even depression 7not dejected
 sadness7 may be counted among  the     
sturdy affections1 if it has its ground 
in moral ,ideas4 ,but if it  is grounded
 on sympathy and1 as such1 is amiable1  
it belongs merely to  the languid       
affections4 ,i make this remark to call 
attention to the  state of mind which is
 sublime only in the first case4        
99       99       99       99       99  
,we can now compare the above           
,transcendental ,exposition of          
aesthetical  judgements with the        
,physiological worked out by ,burke and 
by many  clear-headed men among us1 in  
order to see whither a merely empirical 
exposition of the ,sublime and          
,beautiful leads4 ,burke1 who deserves  
to be regarded as the most important    

author who adopts this mode of          
treatment1 infers by this method 8that  
the feeling of the ,sublime  rests on   
the impulse towards self-preservation   
and on fear1 i4e4  on a pain1 which not 
going so far as actually to derange the 
parts of  the body1 produces movements  
which1 since they purify the finer or   
grosser vessels of dangerous or         
troublesome stoppages1 are capable  of  
exciting pleasant sensations2 not indeed
 pleasure1 but a kind of  satisfying    
horror1 a certain tranquillity tinged   
with terror40#fa ,the  ,beautiful1 which
 he founded on love 7which he wishes to 
keep quite  separate from desire71 he   
reduces to 8the relaxing1 slackening1   
and  enervating of the fibres of the    
body1 and a consequent weakening1       
languor1 and exhaustion1 a fainting1    
dissolving1 and melting away for        
enjoyment40#fb ,and he confirms this    
explanation not only by cases in  which 
the ,imagination in combination with the
 ,understanding can excite  in us the   

feeling of the ,beautiful or of the     
,sublime1 but by cases in  which it is  
combined with sensation4--,as           
psychological observations1  these      
analyses of the phenomena of our mind   
are exceedingly beautiful1  and afford  
rich material for the favourite         
investigations of empirical             
anthropology4 ,it is also not to be     
denied that all representations  in us1 
whether1 objectively viewed1 they are   
merely sensible or are  quite           
intellectual1 may yet subjectively be   
united to gratification  or grief1      
however imperceptible either may be2    
because they all  affect the feeling of 
life1 and none of them1 so far as it is 
a  modification of the subject1 can be  
indifferent4 ,and so1 as ,epicurus      
maintained1 all gratification or grief  
may ultimately be corporeal1  whether it
 arises from the representations of the 
,imagination or the  ,understanding2    
because life without a feeling of bodily
 organs would be  merely a consciousness

 of existence1 without any feeling of   
well-being  or the reverse1 i4e4 of the 
furthering or the checking of the vital 
powers4 ,for the mind is by itself alone
 life 7the principle of life71  and     
hindrances or furtherances must be      
sought outside it and yet in  the man1  
consequently in union with his body4    
,if1 however1 we place the satisfaction 
in the object altogether in  the fact   
that it gratifies us by charm or        
emotion1 we must not assume  that any   
other man agrees with the aesthetical   
judgement which we  pass2 for as to     
these each one rightly consults his own 
individual  sensibility4 ,but in that   
case all censorship of taste would      
disappear1  except indeed the example   
afforded by the accidental agreement of 
others in their judgements were regarded
 as commanding our assent2  and this    
principle we should probably resist1 and
 should appeal to the  natural right of 
subjecting the judgement1 which rests on
 the immediate  feeling of our own      

well-being1 to our own sense and not to 
that of any  other man4    ,if then the 
judgement of taste is not to be valid   
merely  egoistically1 but according to  
its inner nature1--i4e4 on account  of  
itself and not on account of the        
examples that others give of their      
taste1--to be necessarily valid         
pluralistically1 if we regard it  as a  
judgement which may exact the adhesion  
of every one2 then there  must lie at   
its basis some a priori principle       
7whether objective or  subjective7 to   
which we can never attain by seeking out
 the empirical  laws of mental changes4 
,for these only enable us to know how we
 judge1  but do not prescribe to us how 
we ought to judge4 ,they do not supply  
an  unconditioned command1#fc such as   
judgements of taste presuppose1         
inasmuch as they require that the       
satisfaction be immediately  connected  
with the representation4 ,thus the      
empirical exposition of  aesthetical    
judgements may be a beginning of a      

collection of materials  for a higher   
investigation2 but a transcendental     
discussion of this  faculty is also     
possible1 and is an essential part of   
the ,critique of  ,taste4 ,for if it had
 not a priori principles1 it could not  
possibly  pass sentence on the          
judgements of others1 and it could not  
approve or  blame them with any         
appearance of right4    ,the remaining  
part of the ,analytic of the            
,aesthetical ,judgement  contains first 
the      ,,deduction ,,of ,,pure#fd     
,,aesthetical ,,judgements     #cj4 ,the
 ,deduction of aesthetical judgements on
 the objects of nature  must not be     
directed to what we call ,sublime in    
nature1 but only to the  ,beautiful4    
,the claim of an aesthetical judgement  
to universal validity for every  subject
 requires1 as a judgement resting on    
some a priori principle1  a ,deduction  
7or legitimatising of its pretensions7  
in addition to its  ,exposition2 if it  
is concerned with satisfaction or       

dissatisfaction  in the form of the     
,object4 ,of this kind are judgements of
 taste  about the ,beautiful in ,nature4
 ,for in that case the purposiveness    
has its ground in the ,object and in its
 figure1 although it does not  indicate 
the reference of this to other objects  
according to concepts  7for a cognitive 
judgement71 but merely has to do in     
general with the  apprehension of this  
form1 so far as it shows itself         
conformable in the  mind to the faculty 
of concepts and to that of their        
presentation  7which is identical with  
that of apprehension74 ,we can thus1 in 
respect  of the ,beautiful in nature1   
suggest many questions touching the     
cause  of this purposiveness of their   
forms1 e4g4 to explain why nature has   
scattered abroad beauty with such       
profusion1 even in the depth of the     
ocean1 where the human eye 7for which   
alone that purposiveness exists7  but   
seldom penetrates4    ,but the ,sublime 
in nature--if we are passing upon it a  

pure aesthetical  judgement1 not mixed  
up with any concepts of perfection or   
objective  purposiveness1 in which case 
it would be a teleological              
judgement--may  be regarded as quite    
formless or devoid of figure1 and yet as
 the  object of a pure satisfaction2 and
 it may display a subjective            
purposiveness in the given              
representation4 ,and we ask if1 for an  
aesthetical judgement of this           
kind1--over and above the ,exposition   
of what is thought in it1--a ,deduction 
also of its claim to any  7subjective7 a
 priori principle may be demanded8      
,to which we may answer that the        
,sublime in nature is improperly so     
called1 and that properly speaking the  
word should only be applied  to a state 
of mind1 or rather to its foundation in 
human nature4 ,the  apprehension of an  
otherwise formless and unpurposive      
object gives  merely the occasion1      
through which we become conscious of    
such a state2  the object is thus       

employed as subjectively purposive1 but 
is not  judged as such in itself and on 
account of its form 7it is1 as it  were1
 a species finalis accepta1 non data74  
,hence our ,exposition of  judgements   
concerning the ,sublime in nature was at
 the same time their  ,deduction4 ,for  
when we analysed the reflection of the  
,judgement in such  acts1 we found in   
them a purposive relation of the        
cognitive faculties1  which must be     
ascribed ultimately to the faculty of   
purposes 7the  will71 and hence is      
itself purposive a priori4 ,this then   
immediately  involves the ,deduction1   
i4e4 the justification of the claim of  
such a  judgement to universal and      
necessary validity4    ,we shall        
therefore only have to seek for the     
deduction of judgements  of ,taste1 i4e4
 of judgements about the ,beauty of     
natural things2  we shall thus treat    
satisfactorily the problem with which   
the whole  faculty of aesthetical       
,judgement is concerned4       #ca4 ,of 

the method of deduction of judgements of
 ,taste    ,a ,deduction1 i4e4 the      
guarantee of the legitimacy of a class  
of judgements1 is only obligatory if the
 judgement lays claim to  necessity4    
,this it does1 if it demands even       
subjective universality or  the         
agreement of every one1 although it is  
not a judgement of cognition  but only  
one of pleasure or pain in a given      
object2 i4e4 it assumes a  subjective   
purposiveness thoroughly valid for every
 one1 which must not  be based on any   
concept of the thing1 because the       
judgement is one of  taste4    ,we have 
before us in the latter case no         
cognitive judgement--neither a          
theoretical one based on the concept of 
a ,nature in general formed  by the     
,understanding1 nor a 7pure7 practical  
one based on the ,idea of  ,freedom1 as 
given a priori by ,reason4 ,therefore we
 have to justify  a priori the validity 
neither of a judgement which represents 
what  a thing is1 nor of one which      

prescribes that ,i ought to do something
  in order to produce it4 ,we have      
merely to prove for the ,judgement      
generally the universal validity of a   
singular judgement that  expresses the  
subjective purposiveness of an empirical
 representation  of the form of an      
object2 in order to explain how it is   
possible that  a thing can please in the
 mere act of judging it 7without        
sensation or  concept71 and how the     
satisfaction of one man can be          
proclaimed as a  rule for every other2  
just as the act of judging of an object 
for the  sake of a cognition in general 
has universal rules4    ,if now this    
universal validity is not to be based on
 any collecting of  the suffrages of    
others1 or on any questioning of them as
 to the kind  of sensations they have1  
but is to rest1 as it were1 on an       
autonomy of  the judging subject in     
respect of the feeling of pleasure 7in  
the given  representation71 i4e4 on his 
own taste1 and yet is not to be derived 

from concepts2 then a judgement like    
this--such as the judgement of  taste   
is1 in fact--has a twofold logical      
peculiarity4 ,first1 there is  its a    
priori universal validity1 which is not 
a logical universality  in accordance   
with concepts1 but the universality of a
 singular  judgement4 ,secondly1 it has 
a necessity 7which must always rest on  
a priori grounds71 which however does   
not depend on any a priori  grounds of  
proof1 through the representation of    
which the assent that  every one        
concedes to the judgement of taste could
 be exacted4    ,the solution of these  
logical peculiarities1 wherein a        
judgement  of taste is different from   
all cognitive judgements--if we at the  
outset abstract from all content1 viz4  
from the feeling of pleasure1  and      
merely compare the aesthetical form with
 the form of objective  judgements as   
logic prescribes it--is sufficient by   
itself for the  deduction of this       
singular faculty4 ,we shall then        

represent and  elucidate by examples    
these characteristic properties of      
taste4       #cb4 ,first peculiarity of 
the judgement of ,taste    ,the         
judgement of taste determines its object
 in respect of satisfaction  7in its    
beauty7 with an accompanying claim for  
the assent of every  one1 just as if it 
were objective4    ,to say that 8this   
flower is beautiful0 is the same as to  
assert its  proper claim to satisfy     
every one4 ,by the pleasantness of its  
smell  it has no such claim4 ,a smell   
which one man enjoys gives another a    
headache4 ,now what are we to presume   
from this except that beauty is  to be  
regarded as a property of the flower    
itself1 which does not  accommodate     
itself to any diversity of persons or of
 their sensitive  organs1 but to which  
these must accommodate themselves if    
they are to  pass any judgement upon it8
 ,and yet this is not so4 ,for a        
judgement  of taste consists in calling 
a thing beautiful just because of that  

characteristic in respect of which it   
accommodates itself to our mode  of     
apprehension4    ,moreover1 it is       
required of every judgement which is to 
prove the  taste of the subject1 that   
the subject shall judge by himself1     
without  needing to grope about         
empirically among the judgements of     
others1 and  acquaint himself previously
 as to their satisfaction or            
dissatisfaction  with the same object2  
thus his judgement should be pronounced 
a  priori1 and not be a mere imitation  
because the thing actually gives        
universal pleasure4 ,one would think1   
however1 that an a priori  judgement    
must contain a concept of the ,object1  
for the cognition of  which it contains 
the principle2 but the judgement of     
taste is not  based upon concepts at    
all1 and is in general not a cognitive  
but an  aesthetical judgement4    ,thus 
a young poet does not permit himself to 
be dissuaded from his  conviction that  
his poem is beautiful1 by the judgement 

of the public  or of his friends2 and if
 he gives ear to them he does so1 not   
because  he now judges differently1 but 
because1 although 7in regard to him7    
the whole public has false taste1 in his
 desire for applause he finds  reason   
for accommodating himself to the common 
error 7even against his  judgement74 ,it
 is only at a later time1 when his      
,judgement has been  sharpened by       
exercise1 that he voluntarily departs   
from his former  judgements2 just as he 
proceeds with those of his judgements   
which rest  upon ,reason4 ,taste        
merely#fe claims autonomy4 ,to make the 
judgements  of others the determining   
grounds of his own would be heteronomy4 
,that we1 and rightly1 recommend the    
works of the ancients as models  and    
call their authors classical1 thus      
forming among writers a kind  of noble  
class who give laws to the people by    
their example1 seems  to indicate a     
posteriori sources of taste1 and to     
contradict the  autonomy of taste in    

every subject4 ,but we might just as    
well say  that the old                  
mathematicians1--who are regarded up to 
the present day  as supplying models not
 easily to be dispensed with for the    
supreme  profundity and elegance of     
their synthetical methods1--prove that  
our  ,reason is only imitative1 and that
 we have not the faculty of producing   
from it in combination with intuition   
rigid proofs by means of the            
construction of concepts4#ff ,there is  
no use of our powers1 however  free1 no 
use of ,reason itself 7which must create
 all its judgements  a priori from      
common sources7 which would not give    
rise to faulty  attempts1 if every      
subject had always to begin anew from   
the rude basis  of his natural state1   
and if others had not preceded him with 
their  attempts4 ,not that these make   
mere imitators of those who come after  
them1 but rather by their procedure they
 put others on the track of  seeking in 
themselves principles and so of pursuing

 their own course1  often a better one4 
,even in religion--where certainly every
 one has  to derive the rule of his     
conduct from himself1 because he remains
  responsible for it and cannot shift   
the blame of his transgressions  upon   
others1 whether his teachers or his     
predecessors--there is never  as much   
accomplished by means of universal      
precepts1 either obtained  from priests 
or philosophers or got from oneself1 as 
by means of  an example of virtue or    
holiness which1 exhibited in history1   
does  not dispense with the autonomy of 
virtue based on the proper and  original
 ,idea of morality 7a priori71 or change
 it into a mechanical  imitation4       
,following1 involving something         
precedent1 not 8imitation10  is the     
right expression for all influence that 
the products of an  exemplary author may
 have upon others4 ,and this only means 
that we  draw from the same sources as  
our predecessor did1 and learn from him 
only the way to avail ourselves of them4

 ,but of all faculties and  talents     
,taste1 because its judgement is not    
determinable by concepts  and precepts1 
is just that one which most needs       
examples of what has  in the progress of
 culture received the longest approval2 
that it may  not become again           
uncivilised and return to the crudeness 
of its first  essays4       #cc4 ,second
 peculiarity of the judgement of ,taste 
,the judgement of taste is not          
determinable by grounds of proof1 just  
as  if it were merely subjective4    ,if
 a man1 in the first place1 does not    
find a building1 a prospect1  or a poem 
beautiful1 a hundred voices all highly  
praising it will not  force his inmost  
agreement4 ,he may indeed feign that it 
pleases him in  order that he may not be
 regarded as devoid of taste2 he may    
even begin  to doubt whether he has     
formed his taste on a knowledge of a    
sufficient  number of objects of a      
certain kind 7just as one1 who believes 
that  he recognises in the distance as a

 forest1 something which all others     
regard as a town1 doubts the judgement  
of his own sight74 ,but he  clearly sees
 that the agreement of others gives no  
valid proof of the  judgement about     
beauty4 ,others might perhaps see and   
observe for him2  and what many have    
seen in one way1 although he believes   
that he has  seen it differently1 might 
serve him as an adequate ground of proof
  of a theoretical and consequently     
logical judgement4 ,but that a thing    
has pleased others could never serve as 
the basis of an aesthetical  judgement4 
,a judgement of others which is         
unfavourable to ours may  indeed rightly
 make us scrutinise our own with care1  
but it can never  convince us of its    
incorrectness4 ,there is therefore no   
empirical  ground of proof which would  
force a judgement of taste upon any one4
    ,still less1 in the second place1   
can an a priori proof determine         
according to definite rules a judgement 
about beauty4 ,if a man reads  me a poem

 of his or brings me to a play1 which   
does not after all suit  my taste1 he   
may bring forward in proof of the beauty
 of his poem  ,batteux#fg or ,lessing or
 still more ancient and famous critics  
of taste1 and all the rules laid down by
 them2 certain passages which  displease
 me may agree very well with rules of   
beauty 7as they have  been put forth by 
these writers and are universally       
recognised73 but  ,i stop my ears1 ,i   
will listen to no arguments and no      
reasoning2 and ,i  will rather assume   
that these rules of the critics are     
false1 or at  least that they do not    
apply to the case in question1 than     
admit that  my judgement should be      
determined by grounds of proof a priori4
 ,for  it is to be a judgement of ,taste
 and not of ,understanding or ,reason4  
,it seems that this is one of the chief 
reasons why this aesthetical  faculty of
 judgement has been given the name of   
,taste4 ,for though a  man enumerate to 
me all the ingredients of a dish1 and   

remark that  each is separately pleasant
 to me and further extol with justice   
the  wholesomeness of this particular   
food--yet am ,i deaf to all these       
reasons2 ,i try the dish with my tongue 
and my palate1 and thereafter  7and not 
according to universal principles7 do ,i
 pass my judgement4    ,in fact the     
judgement of ,taste always takes the    
form of a singular  judgement about an  
,object4 ,the ,understanding can form a 
universal  judgement by comparing the   
,object in point of the satisfaction it 
affords with the judgement of others    
upon it3 e4g4 8all tulips are           
beautiful40 ,but then this is not a     
judgement of taste but a logical        
judgement1 which takes the relation of  
an ,object to taste as the  predicate of
 things of a certain species4 ,that     
judgement1 however1 in  which ,i find an
 individual given tulip beautiful1 i4e4 
in which  ,i find my satisfaction in it 
to be universally valid1 is alone a     
judgement of taste4 ,its peculiarity    

consists in the fact that1 although  it 
has merely subjective validity1 it      
claims the assent of all  subjects1     
exactly as it would do if it were an    
objective judgement  resting on grounds 
of knowledge1 that could be established 
by a proof4       #cd4 ,there is no     
objective principle of ,taste possible  
,by a principle of taste ,i mean a      
principle under the condition of  which 
we could subsume the concept of an      
object and thus infer by  means of a    
syllogism that the object is beautiful4 
,but that is  absolutely impossible4    
,for ,i must feel the pleasure          
immediately in the  representation of   
the object1 and of that ,i can be       
persuaded by no  grounds of proof       
whatever4 ,although1 as ,hume says1#fh  
all critics  can reason more plausibly  
than cooks1 yet the same fate awaits    
them4  ,they cannot expect the          
determining ground of their judgement to
 be  derived from the force of the      
proofs1 but only from the reflection  of

 the subject upon its own proper state  
7of pleasure or pain71 all  precepts and
 rules being rejected4    ,but although 
critics can and ought to pursue their   
reasonings so that  our judgements of   
taste may be corrected and extended1 it 
is not with  a view to set forth the    
determining ground of this kind of      
aesthetical  judgements in a universally
 applicable formula1 which is           
impossible2  but rather to investigate  
the cognitive faculties and their       
exercise in  these judgements1 and to   
explain by examples the reciprocal      
subjective  purposiveness1 the form of  
which1 as has been shown above1 in a    
given  representation1 constitutes the  
beauty of the object4 ,therefore the    
,critique of ,taste is only subjective  
as regards the representation  through  
which an ,object is given to us2 viz4 it
 is the art or science  of reducing to  
rules the reciprocal relation between   
the ,understanding  and the ,imagination
 in the given representation 7without   

reference  to any preceding sensation or
 concept74 ,that is1 it is the art or   
science of reducing to rules their      
accordance or discordance1 and of       
determining them with regard to their   
conditions4 ,it is an art1 if  it only  
shows this by examples2 it is a science 
if it derives the  possibility of such  
judgements from the nature of these     
faculties1  as cognitive faculties in   
general4 ,we have here1 in              
,transcendental  ,criticism1 only to do 
with the latter4 ,it should develop and 
justify  the subjective principle of    
taste1 as an a priori principle of  the 
,judgement4 ,this ,critique1 as an art1 
merely seeks to apply1 in  the judging  
of objects1 the physiological 7here     
psychological71 and  therefore empirical
 rules1 according to which taste        
actually proceeds  7without taking any  
account of their possibility72 and it   
criticises  the products of beautiful   
art just as1 regarded as a science1 it  
criticises the faculty by which they are

 judged4       #ce4 ,the principle of   
,taste is the subjective principle of   
,judgement  in general    ,the judgement
 of taste is distinguished from a       
logical judgement in  this1 that the    
latter subsumes a representation under  
the concept  of the ,object1 while the  
former does not subsume it under any    
concept2 because otherwise the necessary
 universal agreement in  these          
judgements would be capable of being    
enforced by proofs4  ,nevertheless it is
 like the latter in this1 that it claims
 universality  and necessity1 though not
 according to concepts of the ,object1  
and  consequently a merely subjective   
necessity4 ,now1 because the concepts   
in a judgement constitute its content   
7what belongs to the cognition  of the  
,object71 but the judgement of taste is 
not determinable by  concepts1 it is    
based only on the subjective formal     
condition of a  judgement in general4   
,the subjective condition of all        
judgements is  the faculty of ,judgement

 itself4 ,this when used with reference 
to a  representation by which an object 
is given1 requires the accordance  of   
two representative powers3 viz4         
,imagination 7for the intuition and     
comprehension of the manifold7 and      
,understanding 7for the concept as  a   
representation of the unity of this     
comprehension74 ,now because no  concept
 of the ,object lies here at the basis  
of the judgement1 it can  only consist  
in the subsumption of the ,imagination  
itself 7in the case  of a representation
 by which an object is given7 under the 
conditions  that the ,understanding     
requires to pass from intuition to      
concepts4  ,that is1 because the freedom
 of the ,imagination consists in the    
fact  that it schematises without any   
concept1 the judgement of taste must    
rest on a mere sensation of the         
reciprocal activity of the ,imagination 
in its freedom and the ,understanding   
with its conformity to law4  ,it must   
therefore rest on a feeling1 which makes

 us judge the object  by the            
purposiveness of the representation 7by 
which an object is  given7 in respect of
 the furtherance of the cognitive       
faculty in its  free play4 ,taste1 then1
 as subjective ,judgement1 contains a   
principle  of subsumption1 not of       
intuitions under concepts1 but of the   
faculty  of intuitions or presentations 
7i4e4 the ,imagination7 under the       
faculty of the concepts 7i4e4 the       
,understanding72 so far as the  former  
in its freedom harmonises with the      
latter in its conformity  to law4    ,in
 order to discover this ground of       
legitimacy by a ,deduction of the       
judgements of taste we can only take as 
a clue the formal peculiarities  of this
 kind of judgements1 and consequently   
can only consider their  logical form4  
#cf4 ,of the problem of a ,deduction of 
judgements of ,taste    ,the concept of 
an ,object in general can immediately be
 combined with  the perception of an    
object1 containing its empirical        

predicates1 so  as to form a cognitive  
judgement2 and it is thus that a        
judgement  of experience is produced4#fi
 ,at the basis of this lie a priori     
concepts of the synthetical unity of the
 manifold of intuition1 by  which the   
manifold is thought as the determination
 of an ,object4 ,these  concepts 7the   
,categories7 require a ,deduction1 which
 is given in the  ,critique of pure     
,reason2 and by it we can get the       
solution of the  problem1 how are       
synthetical a priori cognitive          
judgements possible8  ,this problem     
concerns then the a priori principles of
 the pure  ,understanding and its       
theoretical judgements4    ,but with a  
perception there can also be combined a 
feeling of pleasure  7or pain7 and a    
satisfaction1 that accompanies the      
representation  of the ,object and      
serves instead of its predicate2 thus   
there can  result an aesthetical        
non-cognitive judgement4 ,at the basis  
of  such a judgement--if it is not a    

mere judgement of sensation but a       
formal judgement of reflection1 which   
imputes the same satisfaction           
necessarily to every one1--must lie some
 a priori principle2 which  may be      
merely subjective 7if an objective one  
should prove impossible  for judgements 
of this kind71 but also as such may need
 a ,deduction1  that we may thereby     
comprehend how an aesthetical judgement 
can lay  claim to necessity4 ,on this is
 founded the problem with which we are  
now occupied1 how are judgements of     
taste possible8 ,this problem  then has 
to do with the a priori principles of   
the pure faculty of  ,judgement in      
aesthetical judgements2 i4e4 judgements 
in which it  has not 7as in theoretical 
ones7 merely to subsume under objective 
concepts of ,understanding1 and in which
 it is subject to a law1 but in  which  
it is1 itself1 subjectively1 both object
 and law4    ,this problem then may be  
thus represented3 how is a judgement    
possible1  in which merely from our own 

feeling of pleasure in an object1       
independently of its concept1 we judge  
that this pleasure attaches to  the     
representation of the same ,object in   
every other subject1 and  that a priori 
without waiting for the accordance of   
others8    ,it is easy to see that      
judgements of taste are synthetical1    
because  they go beyond the concept and 
even beyond the intuition of the        
,object1 and add to that intuition as   
predicate something that is not a       
cognition1 viz4 a feeling of pleasure   
7or pain74 ,although the predicate  7of 
the personal pleasure bound up with the 
representation7 is  empirical1          
nevertheless1 as concerns the required  
assent of every one  the judgements are 
a priori1 or desire to be regarded as   
such2 and  this is already involved in  
the expressions of this claim4 ,thus    
this  problem of the ,critique of       
,judgement belongs to the general       
problem of  transcendental philosophy1  
how are synthetical a priori judgements 

possible8       #cg4 ,what is properly  
asserted a priori of an object in a     
judgement  of ,taste    ,that the       
representation of an object is          
immediately bound up with  pleasure can 
only be internally perceived1 and if we 
did not wish to  indicate anything more 
than this it would give a merely        
empirical  judgement4 ,for ,i cannot    
combine a definite feeling 7of pleasure 
or  pain7 with any representation except
 where there is at bottom an a  priori  
principle in the ,reason determining the
 ,will4 ,in that case the  pleasure 7in 
the moral feeling7 is the consequence of
 the principle1  but cannot be compared 
with the pleasure in taste1 because it  
requires  a definite concept of a law2  
and the latter pleasure1 on the         
contrary1  must be bound up with the    
mere act of judging1 prior to all       
concepts4  ,hence also all judgements of
 taste are singular judgements1 because 
they do not combine their predicate of  
satisfaction with a concept1  but with a

 given individual empirical             
representation4    ,and so it is not the
 pleasure1 but the universal validity of
 this  pleasure1 perceived as mentally  
bound up with the mere judgement upon   
an object1 which is represented a priori
 in a judgement of taste as  a universal
 rule for the ,judgement and valid for  
every one4 ,it is an  empirical         
judgement to say that ,i perceive and   
judge an object with  pleasure4 ,but it 
is an a priori judgement to say that ,i 
find it  beautiful1 i4e4 ,i attribute   
this satisfaction necessarily to every  
one4       #ch4 ,deduction of judgements
 of ,taste    ,if it be admitted that in
 a pure judgement of taste the          
satisfaction  in the object is combined 
with the mere act of judging its form1  
it is  nothing else than its subjective 
purposiveness for the ,judgement which  
we feel to be mentally combined with the
 representation of the object4  ,the    
,judgement1 as regards the formal rules 
of its action1 apart from  all matter   

7whether sensation or concept71 can only
 be directed to the  subjective         
conditions of its employment in general 
7it is applied#gj  neither to a         
particular mode of sense nor to a       
particular concept of  the              
,understanding72 and consequently to    
that subjective element which  we can   
presuppose in all men 7as requisite for 
possible cognition in  general74 ,thus  
the agreement of a representation with  
these conditions  of the ,judgement must
 be capable of being assumed as valid a 
priori  for every one4 ,i4e4 we may     
rightly impute to every one the pleasure
  or the subjective purposiveness of the
 representation for the relation        
between the cognitive faculties in the  
act of judging a sensible object  in    
general4#ga      ,remark    ,this       
,deduction is thus easy1 because it has 
no need to justify the  objective       
reality of any concept1 for ,beauty is  
not a concept of the  ,object and the   
judgement of taste is not cognitive4 ,it

 only maintains  that we are justified  
in presupposing universally in every man
 those  subjective conditions of the    
,judgement which we find in ourselves2  
and  further1 that we have rightly      
subsumed the given ,object under these  
conditions4 ,the latter has indeed      
unavoidable difficulties which do  not  
beset the logical ,judgement4 ,there we 
subsume under concepts1  but in the     
aesthetical ,judgement under a merely   
sensible relation  between the          
,imagination and ,understanding mutually
 harmonising in  the representation of  
the form of the ,object1--in which case 
the  subsumption may easily be          
fallacious4 ,yet the legitimacy of the  
claim of the ,judgement in counting upon
 universal assent is not thus  annulled2
 it reduces itself merely to the        
correctness of the principle  of judging
 validly for every one from subjective  
grounds4 ,for as to  the difficulty or  
doubt concerning the correctness of the 
subsumption  under that principle1 it   

makes the legitimacy of the claim of an 
aesthetical judgement in general to such
 validity and the principle  of the     
same1 as little doubtful1 as the like   
faulty 7though neither  so commonly nor 
readily faulty7 subsumption of the      
logical ,judgement  under its principle 
can make the latter1 an objective       
principle1  doubtful4 ,but if the       
question were to be1 how is it possible 
to assume  nature a priori to be a      
complex of objects of taste8 this       
problem  has reference to ,teleology1   
because it must be regarded as a purpose
  of nature essentially belonging to its
 concept to exhibit forms that  are     
purposive for our ,judgement4 ,but the  
correctness of this latter  assumption  
is very doubtful1 whereas the efficacy  
of natural beauties  is patent to       
experience4       #ci4 ,of the          
communicability of a ,sensation    ,if  
sensation1 as the real in perception1 is
 related to knowledge1 it  is called    
sensation of the senses2 and its        

specific quality may be  represented as 
generally communicable in a uniform way1
 if we assume  that every one has senses
 like our own4 ,but this cannot at all  
be  presupposed of any single sensation4
 ,to a man who is deficient in the      
sense of smell1 this kind of sensation  
cannot be communicated2 and  even if it 
is not wholly deficient1 we cannot be   
certain that he gets  exactly the same  
sensation from a flower that we have4   
,but even more  must we represent men as
 differing in respect of the            
pleasantness  or unpleasantness involved
 in the sensation from the same object  
of  sense2 and it is absolutely not to  
be required that every man should  take 
pleasure in the same objects4 ,pleasure 
of this kind1 because it  comes into the
 mind through the senses1 in respect of 
which therefore  we are passive1 we may 
call the pleasure of enjoyment4         
,satisfaction in an action because of   
its moral character is on the  other    
hand not the pleasure of enjoyment1 but 

of spontaneity and its  accordance with 
the ,idea of its destination4 ,but this 
feeling1 called  moral1 requires        
concepts1 and presents not free         
purposiveness1 but  purposiveness that  
is conformable to law2 it therefore     
admits of being  universally            
communicated only by means of ,reason1  
and1 if the pleasure  is to be          
homogeneous for every one1 by very      
definite practical concepts  of ,reason4
    ,pleasure in the ,sublime in nature1
 regarded as a pleasure of rational     
contemplation1 also makes claim to      
universal participation2 but  it        
presupposes1 besides1 a different       
feeling1 viz4 that of our  supersensible
 destination1 which1 however obscurely1 
has a moral  foundation4 ,but that other
 men will take account of it1 and will  
find  a satisfaction in the             
consideration of the wild greatness of  
nature  7that certainly cannot be       
ascribed to its aspect1 which is rather 
terrifying71 ,i am not absolutely       

justified in supposing4 ,nevertheless1  
in consideration of the fact that on    
every suitable occasion regard  should  
be had to these moral dispositions1 ,i  
can impute such  satisfaction to every  
man1 but only by means of the moral law 
which on  its side again is based on    
concepts of ,reason4    ,on the         
contrary1 pleasure in the ,beautiful is 
neither a pleasure  of enjoyment nor of 
a law-abiding activity1 nor even of     
rational  contemplation in accordance   
with ,ideas1 but of mere reflection4    
,without  having as rule any purpose or 
fundamental proposition1 this pleasure  
accompanies the ordinary apprehension of
 an object by the ,imagination1  as     
faculty of intuition1 in relation with  
the ,understanding1 as faculty  of      
concepts1 by means of a procedure of the
 ,judgement which it must  also exercise
 on behalf of the commonest experience2 
only that in  the latter case it is in  
order to perceive an empirical objective
  concept1 in the former case 7in       

aesthetical judgements7 merely to       
perceive the accordance of the          
representation with the harmonious      
7subjectively purposive7 activity of    
both cognitive faculties in their       
freedom1 i4e4 to feel with pleasure the 
mental state produced by  the           
representation4 ,this pleasure must     
necessarily depend for every  one on the
 same conditions1 for they are          
subjective conditions of the            
possibility of a cognition in general2  
and the proportion between  these       
cognitive faculties requisite for ,taste
 is also requisite for  that ordinary   
sound ,understanding which we have to   
presuppose in  every one4 ,therefore he 
who judges with taste 7if only he does  
not go  astray in this act of           
consciousness and mistake matter for    
form or  charm for beauty7 may impute to
 every one subjective purposiveness1    
i4e4 his satisfaction in the ,object1   
and may assume his feeling to be        
universally communicable and that       

without the mediation of concepts4      
#dj4 ,of ,taste as a kind of sensus     
communis    ,we often give to the       
,judgement1 if we are considering the   
result rather  than the act of its      
reflection1 the name of a sense1 and we 
speak of  a sense of truth1 or of a     
sense of decorum1 of justice1 etc4 ,and 
yet  we know1 or at least we ought to   
know1 that these concepts cannot  have  
their place in ,sense1 and further1 that
 ,sense has not the least  capacity for 
expressing universal rules2 but that no 
representation  of truth1 fitness1      
beauty1 or justice1 and so forth1 could 
come into  our thoughts if we could not 
rise beyond ,sense to higher faculties  
of cognition4 ,the common ,understanding
 of men1 which1 as the mere  sound 7not 
yet cultivated7 ,understanding1 we      
regard as the least to  be expected from
 any one claiming the name of man1 has  
therefore the  doubtful honour of being 
given the name of common sense 7sensus  
communis72 and in such a way that by the

 name common 7not merely  in our        
language1 where the word actually has a 
double signification1  but in many      
others7 we understand vulgar1 that which
 is everywhere  met with1 the possession
 of which indicates absolutely no merit 
or  superiority4    ,but under the      
sensus communis we must include the     
,idea of a  communal sense1 i4e4 of a   
faculty of judgement1 which in its      
reflection takes account 7a priori7 of  
the mode of representation  of all other
 men in thought2 in order as it were to 
compare its  judgement with the         
collective ,reason of humanity1 and thus
 to escape  the illusion arising from   
the private conditions that could be so 
easily taken for objective1 which would 
injuriously affect the  judgement4 ,this
 is done by comparing our judgement with
 the possible  rather than the actual   
judgements of others1 and by putting    
ourselves  in the place of any other    
man1 by abstracting from the limitations
  which contingently attach to our own  

judgement4 ,this1 again1 is  brought    
about by leaving aside as much as       
possible the matter of our              
representative state1 i4e4 sensation1   
and simply having respect to  the formal
 peculiarities of our representation or 
representative state4  ,now this        
operation of reflection seems perhaps   
too artificial to be  attributed to the 
faculty called common sense2 but it only
 appears  so1 when expressed in abstract
 formulae4 ,in itself there is nothing  
more natural than to abstract from charm
 or emotion if we are seeking a         
judgement that is to serve as a         
universal rule4    ,the following       
,maxims of common human ,understanding  
do not properly  come in here1 as parts 
of the ,critique of ,taste2 but yet they
 may  serve to elucidate its fundamental
 propositions4 ,they are3 #a to  think  
for oneself2 #b to put ourselves in     
thought in the place of  every one else2
 #c always to think consistently4 ,the  
first is the  maxim of unprejudiced     

thought2 the second of enlarged thought2
  the third of consecutive thought4#gb  
,the first is the maxim of a  ,reason   
never passive4 ,the tendency to such    
passivity1 and therefore  to heteronomy 
of the ,reason1 is called prejudice2 and
 the greatest  prejudice of all is to   
represent nature as not subject to the  
rules  that the ,understanding places at
 its basis by means of its own          
essential law1 i4e4 is superstition4    
,deliverance from superstition  is      
called enlightenment2#gc because        
although this name belongs to           
deliverance from prejudices in general1 
yet superstition specially  7in sensu   
eminenti7 deserves to be called a       
prejudice4 ,for the  blindness in which 
superstition places us1 which it even   
imposes on  us as an obligation1 makes  
the need of being guided by others1 and 
the consequent passive state of our     
,reason1 peculiarly noticeable4 ,as     
regards the second maxim of the mind1 we
 are otherwise wont to call  him limited

 7born1 the opposite of enlarged7 whose 
talents attain  to no great use         
7especially as regards intensity74 ,but 
here we are not  speaking of the faculty
 of cognition1 but of the mode of       
thought  which makes a purposive use    
thereof4 ,however small may be the area 
or the degree to which a man's natural  
gifts reach1 yet it indicates  a man of 
enlarged thought if he disregards the   
subjective private  conditions of his   
own judgement1 by which so many others  
are confined1  and reflects upon it from
 a universal standpoint 7which he can   
only  determine by placing himself at   
the standpoint of others74 ,the third   
maxim1 viz4 that of consecutive thought1
 is the most difficult to  attain1 and  
can only be attained by the combination 
of both the former1  and after the      
constant observance of them has grown   
into a habit4 ,we  may say that the     
first of these maxims is the maxim of   
,understanding1  the second of          
,judgement1 and the third of ,reason4   

,i take up again the threads interrupted
 by this digression1 and ,i say  that   
,taste can be called sensus communis    
with more justice than sound            
,understanding can2 and that the        
aesthetical ,judgement rather than the  
intellectual may bear the name of a     
communal sense1#gd if we are  willing to
 use the word 8sense0 of an effect of   
mere reflection upon  the mind3 for then
 we understand by sense the feeling of  
pleasure4 ,we  could even define ,taste 
as the faculty of judging of that which 
makes  universally communicable1 without
 the mediation of a concept1 our        
feeling in a given representation4      
,the skill that men have in             
communicating their thoughts requires   
also  a relation between the            
,imagination and the ,understanding in  
order to  associate intuitions with     
concepts1 and concepts again with those 
concepts1 which then combine in a       
cognition4 ,but in that case the        
agreement of the two mental powers is   

according to law1 under the  constraint 
of definite concepts4 ,only where the   
,imagination in its  freedom awakens the
 ,understanding1 and is put by it into  
regular play  without the aid of        
concepts1 does the representation       
communicate itself  not as a thought but
 as an internal feeling of a purposive  
state of the  mind4    ,taste is then   
the faculty of judging a priori of the  
communicability  of feelings that are   
bound up with a given representation    
7without the  mediation of a concept74  
,if we could assume that the mere       
universal communicability of a feeling  
must carry in itself an interest for us 
with it 7which1 however1 we are  not    
justified in concluding from the        
character of a merely reflective        
,judgement71 we should be able to       
explain why the feeling in the          
judgement of taste comes to be imputed  
to every one1 so to speak1 as a  duty4  
#da4 ,of the empirical interest in the  
,beautiful    ,that the judgement of    

taste by which something is declared    
beautiful  must have no interest as its 
determining ground has been sufficiently
  established above4 ,but it does not   
follow that after it has been  given as 
a pure aesthetical judgement1 no        
interest can be combined  with it4 ,this
 combination1 however1 can only be      
indirect1 i4e4 taste  must first of all 
be represented as combined with         
something else1 in  order that we may   
unite with the satisfaction of mere     
reflection upon  an object a pleasure in
 its existence 7as that wherein all     
interest  consists74 ,for here also in  
aesthetical judgements what we say in   
cognitive judgements 7of things in      
general7 is valid2 a posse ad esse  non 
valet consequentia4 ,this something else
 may be empirical1 viz4 an  inclination 
proper to human nature1 or intellectual1
 as the property  of the ,will of being 
capable of a priori determination by    
,reason4  ,both these involve a         
satisfaction in the presence of an      

,object1 and so  can lay the foundation 
for an interest in what has by itself   
pleased  without reference to any       
interest whatever4    ,empirically the  
,beautiful interests only in society4   
,if we admit  the impulse to society as 
natural to man1 and his fitness for it1 
and  his propension towards it1 i4e4    
sociability1 as a requisite for  man as 
a being destined for society1 and so as 
a property belonging  to humanity1 we   
cannot escape from regarding taste as a 
faculty for  judging everything in      
respect of which we can communicate our 
feeling  to all other men1 and so as a  
means of furthering that which every    
one's natural inclination desires4    ,a
 man abandoned by himself on a desert   
island would adorn neither his  hut nor 
his person2 nor would he seek for       
flowers1 still less would he  plant     
them1 in order to adorn himself         
therewith4 ,it is only in society  that 
it occurs to him to be not merely a man1
 but a refined man after  his kind 7the 

beginning of civilisation74 ,for such do
 we judge him to  be who is both        
inclined and apt to communicate his     
pleasure to others1  and who is not     
contented with an ,object if he cannot  
feel satisfaction  in it in common with 
others4 ,again1 every one expects and   
requires from  every one else this      
reference to universal communication of 
pleasure1  as it were from an original  
compact dictated by humanity itself4    
,thus1  doubtless1 in the beginning only
 those things which attracted the       
senses1 e4g4 colours for painting       
oneself 7roucou among the ,carabs  and  
cinnabar among the ,iroquois71 flowers1 
mussel shells1 beautiful  feathers1     
etc41--but in time beautiful forms also 
7e4g4 in their  canoes1 and clothes1    
etc471 which bring with them no         
gratification1 or  satisfaction of      
enjoyment--were important in society1   
and were combined  with great interest4 
,until at last civilisation1 having     
reached its  highest point1 makes out of

 this almost the main business of       
refined  inclination2 and sensations are
 only regarded as of worth in so far as 
they can be universally communicated4   
,here1 although the pleasure which      
every one has in such an object is      
inconsiderable and in itself without    
any marked interest1 yet the ,idea of   
its universal communicability  increases
 its worth in an almost infinite degree4
    ,but this interest that indirectly  
attaches to the ,beautiful through  our 
inclination to society1 and consequently
 is empirical1 is of no  importance for 
us here2 because we have only to look to
 what may have  a reference1 although   
only indirectly1 to the judgement of    
taste a  priori4 ,for if even in this   
form an interest bound up therewith     
should  discover itself1 taste would    
discover a transition of our judging    
faculty from sense-enjoyment to moral   
feeling2 and so not only would  we be   
the better guided in employing taste    
purposively1 but there  would be thus   

presented a link in the chain of the    
human faculties a  priori1 on which all 
legislation must depend4 ,we can only   
say thus  much about the empirical      
interest in objects of taste and in     
taste  itself4 ,since it is subservient 
to inclination1 however refined the     
latter may be1 it may easily be         
confounded with all the inclinations    
and passions1 which attain their        
greatest variety and highest degree in  
society2 and the interest in the        
,beautiful1 if it is grounded thereon1  
can only furnish a very ambiguous       
transition from the ,pleasant to the    
,good4 ,but whether this can or cannot  
be furthered by taste1 taken in  its    
purity1 is what we now have to          
investigate4       #db4 ,of the         
intellectual interest in the ,beautiful 
,with the best intentions those persons 
who refer all activities1 to  which     
their inner natural dispositions impel  
men1 to the final purpose  of humanity1 
viz4 the morally good1 have regarded the

 taking an  interest in the ,beautiful  
in general as a mark of good moral      
character4  ,but it is not without      
reason that they have been contradicted 
by others  who rely on experience2 for  
this shows that connoisseurs in taste1  
not only often but generally1 are given 
up to idle1 capricious1 and  mischievous
 passions1 and that they could perhaps  
make less claim than  others to any     
pre-eminent attachment to moral         
principles4 ,thus it would  seem that   
the feeling for the ,beautiful is not   
only 7as actually is  the case7         
specifically different from the ,moral  
feeling2 but that the  interest which   
can be bound up with it is hardly       
compatible with moral  interest1 and    
certainly has no inner affinity         
therewith4    ,now ,i admit at once that
 the interest in the ,beautiful of ,art 
7under  which ,i include the artificial 
use of natural beauties for adornment   
and so for vanity7 furnishes no proof   
whatever of a disposition  attached to  

the morally good or even inclined       
thereto4 ,but on the  other hand1 ,i    
maintain that to take an immediate      
interest in the  ,beauty of ,nature 7not
 merely to have taste in judging it7 is 
always  a mark of a good soul2 and that 
when this interest is habitual it at    
least indicates a frame of mind         
favourable to the moral feeling1 if it  
is voluntarily bound up with the        
contemplation of nature4 ,it is to  be  
remembered1 however1 that ,i here speak 
strictly of the beautiful  forms of     
,nature1 and ,i set aside the charms1   
that she is wont to  combine so         
abundantly with them2 because1 though   
the interest in the  latter is indeed   
immediate1 it is only empirical4    ,he 
who by himself 7and without any design  
of communicating his  observations to   
others7 regards the beautiful figure of 
a wild flower1  a bird1 an insect1 etc41
 with admiration and love--who would not
  willingly miss it in ,nature1 although
 it may bring him some hurt1 who  still 

less wants any advantage from it--he    
takes an immediate and  also an         
intellectual interest in the beauty of  
,nature4 ,i4e4 it is not  merely the    
form of the product of nature which     
pleases him1 but its  very presence     
pleases him1 the charms of sense having 
no share in this  pleasure and no       
purpose whatever being combined with it4
    ,but it is noteworthy that if we    
secretly deceived this lover of the     
beautiful by planting in the ground     
artificial flowers 7which can be        
manufactured exactly like natural ones71
 or by placing artificially  carved     
birds on the boughs of trees1 and he    
discovered the deceit1 the  immediate   
interest that he previously took in them
 would disappear  at once2 though1      
perhaps1 a different interest1 viz4 the 
interest of  vanity in adorning his     
chamber with them for the eyes of       
others1 would  take its place4 ,this    
thought then must accompany our         
intuition and  reflection on beauty1    

viz4 that nature has produced it2 and on
 this  alone is based the immediate     
interest that we take in it4 ,otherwise1
  there remains a mere judgement of     
taste1 either devoid of all interest1   
or bound up with a mediate interest1    
viz4 in that it has reference to        
society2 which latter interest furnishes
 no certain indications of a  morally   
good disposition4    ,this superiority  
of natural to artificial beauty in that 
it alone  arouses an immediate interest1
 although as regards form the first  may
 be surpassed by the second1 harmonises 
with the refined and  well-grounded     
habit of thought of all men who have    
cultivated their  moral feeling4 ,if a  
man who has taste enough to judge of the
 products  of beautiful ,art with the   
greatest accuracy and refinement        
willingly  leaves a chamber where are to
 be found those beauties that minister  
to  vanity or to any social joys1 and   
turns to the beautiful in ,nature in    
order to find1 as it were1 delight for  

his spirit in a train of thought  that  
he can never completely evolve1 we will 
regard this choice of his  with         
veneration1 and attribute to him a      
beautiful soul1 to which no  connoisseur
 or lover of ,art can lay claim on      
account of the interest  he takes in his
 artistic objects4--,what now is the    
difference in  our estimation of these  
two different kinds of ,objects1 which  
in the  judgement of mere taste it is   
hard to compare in point of superiority8
    ,we have a faculty of mere          
aesthetical ,judgement by which we judge
 forms  without the aid of concepts1 and
 find a satisfaction in this mere act   
of judgement2 this we make into a rule  
for every one1 without this  judgement  
either being based on or producing any  
interest4--,on the  other hand1 we have 
also a faculty of intellectual          
,judgement which  determines an a priori
 satisfaction for the mere forms of     
practical  maxims 7so far as they are in
 themselves qualified for universal     

legislation72 this we make into a law   
for every one1 without our  judgement   
being based on any interest whatever1   
though in this case  it produces such an
 interest4 ,the pleasure or pain in the 
former  judgement is called that of     
taste1 in the latter1 that of moral     
feeling4    ,but it also interests      
,reason that the ,ideas 7for which in   
moral feeling  it arouses an immediate  
interest7 should have objective reality2
 i4e4  that nature should at least show 
a trace or give an indication that  it  
contains in itself some ground for      
assuming a regular agreement of  its    
products with our entirely disinterested
 satisfaction 7which we  recognise a    
priori as a law for every one1 without  
being able to base  it upon proofs74    
,hence ,reason must take an interest in 
every expression  on the part of nature 
of an agreement of this kind4           
,consequently1 the  mind cannot ponder  
upon the beauty of ,nature without      
finding itself  at the same time        

interested therein4 ,but this interest  
is akin to  moral1 and he who takes such
 an interest in the beauties of nature  
can do so only in so far as he          
previously has firmly established his   
interest in the morally good4 ,if1      
therefore1 the beauty of ,nature        
interests a man immediately we have     
reason for attributing to him1 at       
least1 a basis for a good moral         
disposition4    ,it will be said that   
this account of aesthetical judgements1 
as akin  to the moral feeling1 seems far
 too studied to be regarded as the  true
 interpretation of that cipher through  
which ,nature speaks to us  figuratively
 in her beautiful forms4 ,however1 in   
the first place1  this immediate        
interest in the beautiful is actually   
not common2 but  is peculiar to those   
whose mental disposition either has     
already been  cultivated in the         
direction of the good or is eminently   
susceptible  of such cultivation4 ,in   
that case the analogy between the pure  

judgement of taste which1 independently 
of any interest1 causes us to  feel a   
satisfaction1 and also represents it a  
priori as suitable  to humanity in      
general1 and the moral judgement that   
does the same  thing from concepts      
without any clear1 subtle1 and          
premeditated  reflection--this analogy  
leads to a similar immediate interest in
 the  objects of the former as in those 
of the latter2 only that in the  one    
case the interest is free1 in the other 
it is based on objective  laws4 ,to this
 is to be added our admiration for      
,nature1 which displays  itself in its  
beautiful products as ,art1 not merely  
by chance1 but  as it were designedly1  
in accordance with a regular            
arrangement1 and  as purposiveness      
without purpose4 ,this latter1 as we    
never meet with  it outside ourselves1  
we naturally seek in ourselves2 and1 in 
fact1  in that which constitutes the    
ultimate purpose of our being1 viz4  our
 moral destination4 7,of this question  

as to the ground of the  possibility of 
such natural purposiveness we shall     
first speak in the  ,teleology47    ,it 
is easy to explain why the satisfaction 
in the pure aesthetical  judgement in   
the case of beautiful ,art is not       
combined with an  immediate interest as 
it is in the case of beautiful ,nature4 
,for the  former is either such an      
imitation of the latter that it reaches 
the  point of deception and then        
produces the same effect as natural     
beauty  7for which it is taken72 or it  
is an art obviously directed designedly 
to our satisfaction4 ,in the latter case
 the satisfaction in the product  would1
 it is true1 be brought about           
immediately by taste1 but it would  be  
only a mediate interest in the cause    
lying at its root1 viz4 an art  that can
 only interest by means of its purpose  
and never in itself4  ,it will1 perhaps1
 be said that this is also the case1 if 
an ,object  of nature interests us by   
its beauty only so far as it is         

associated  with a moral ,idea4 ,but it 
is not the ,object itself which         
immediately  interests us1 but its      
character in virtue of which it is      
qualified for  such association1 which  
therefore essentially belongs to it4    
,the charms in beautiful ,nature1 which 
are so often found1 as it  were1 blended
 with beautiful forms1 may be referred  
to modifications  either of light       
7colours7 or of sound 7tones74 ,for     
these are the only  sensations that     
imply not merely a sensible feeling but 
also reflection  upon the form of these 
modifications of ,sense2 and thus they  
involve  in themselves as it were a     
language by which nature speaks to us1  
which thus seems to have a higher sense4
 ,thus the white colour of  lilies seems
 to determine the mind to ,ideas of     
innocence2 and the seven  colours in    
order from the red to the violet seem to
 suggest the ,ideas  of 7#a7 ,sublimity1
 7#b7 ,intrepidity1 7#c7 ,candour1 7#d7 
,friendliness1 7#e7  ,modesty1 7#f7     

,constancy1 7#g7 ,tenderness4 ,the song 
of birds proclaims  gladsomeness and    
contentment with existence4 ,at least so
 we interpret  nature1 whether it have  
this design or not4 ,but the interest   
which  we here take in beauty has only  
to do with the beauty of ,nature2 it    
vanishes altogether as soon as we notice
 that we are deceived and  that it is   
only ,art--vanishes so completely that  
taste can no longer  find the thing     
beautiful or sight find it charming4    
,what is more  highly praised by poets  
than the bewitching and beautiful note  
of the  nightingale in a lonely copse on
 a still summer evening by the soft     
light of the moon8 ,and yet we have     
instances of a merry host1 where no     
such songster was to be found1 deceiving
 to their great contentment  the guests 
who were staying with him to enjoy the  
country air1 by  hiding in a bush a     
mischievous boy who knew how to produce 
this sound  exactly like nature 7by     
means of a reed or a tube in his mouth74

 ,but  as soon as we are aware that it  
is a cheat1 no one will remain long     
listening to the song which before was  
counted so charming4 ,and it is  just   
the same with the songs of all other    
birds4 ,it must be ,nature or  be       
regarded as ,nature1 if we are to take  
an immediate interest in the  ,beautiful
 as such2 and still more is this the    
case if we can require  that others     
should take an interest in it too4 ,this
 happens as a matter  of fact when we   
regard as coarse and ignoble the mental 
attitude of  those persons who have no  
feeling for beautiful ,nature 7for thus 
we  describe a susceptibility to        
interest in its contemplation71 and who 
confine themselves to eating and        
drinking--to the mere enjoyments of     
sense4       #dc4 ,of ,art in general   
7#a74 ,art is distinguished from        
,nature1 as doing 7facere7 is           
distinguished from acting or working    
generally 7agere71 and as the  product  
or result of the former is distinguished

 as work 7opus7  from the working       
7effectus7 of the latter4    ,by right  
we ought only to describe as ,art1      
production through freedom1  i4e4       
through a will that places ,reason at   
the basis of its actions4  ,for although
 we like to call the product of bees    
7regularly built  cells of wax7 a work  
of art1 this is only by way of analogy3 
as soon  as we feel that this work of   
theirs is based on no proper rational   
deliberation1 we say that it is a       
product of ,nature 7of instinct71 and   
as ,art only ascribe it to their        
,creator4    ,if1 as sometimes happens1 
in searching through a bog we come upon 
a bit  of shaped wood1 we do not say3   
this is a product of ,nature1 but1 of   
,art4 ,its producing cause has conceived
 a purpose to which the bit of  wood    
owes its form4 ,elsewhere too we should 
see art in everything which  is made so 
that a representation of it in its cause
 must have preceded  its actuality 7as  
even in the case of the bees71 though   

the effect  could not have been thought 
by the cause4 ,but if we call anything  
absolutely a work of art in order to    
distinguish it from a natural  effect1  
we always understand by that a work of  
man4    7#b74 ,art regarded as human    
skill differs from science 7as can  from
 know7 as a practical faculty does from 
a theoretical1 as ,technic  does from   
,theory 7as mensuration from geometry74 
,and so what we can  do1 as soon as we  
merely know what ought to be done and   
therefore  are sufficiently cognisant of
 the desired effect1 is not called      
,art4 ,only that which a man1 even if he
 knows it completely1 may not  therefore
 have the skill to accomplish1 belongs  
to ,art4 ,camper#ge  describes very     
exactly how the best shoes must be made1
 but he  certainly could not make       
one4#gf    7#c74 ,art also differs from 
handicraft2 the first is called free1   
the other may be called mercenary4 ,we  
regard the first as if it could  only   
prove purposive as play1 i4e4 as        

occupation that is pleasant in  itself4 
,but the second is regarded as if it    
could only be compulsorily  imposed upon
 one as work1 i4e4 as occupation which  
is unpleasant 7a  trouble7 in itself1   
and which is only attractive on account 
of its  effect 7e4g4 the wage74 ,whether
 or not in the graded list of the       
professions we ought to count           
watchmakers as artists1 but smiths only 
as handicraftsmen1 would require another
 point of view from which to  judge than
 that which we are here taking up2 viz4 
we should have to  consider the         
proportion of talents which must be     
assumed requisite in  these several     
occupations4 ,whether or not1 again1    
under the so-called  seven free arts    
some may be included which ought to be  
classed as  sciences1 and many that are 
akin rather to handicraft1 ,i shall not 
here discuss4 ,but it is not inexpedient
 to recall that in all free  arts there 
is yet requisite something compulsory1  
or1 as it is called1  mechanism1 without

 which the spirit1 which must be free in
 art and  which alone inspires the work1
 would have no body and would evaporate 
altogether2 e4g4 in poetry there must be
 an accuracy and wealth of  language1   
and also prosody and metre4 ,it is not  
inexpedient1 ,i say1  to recall this1   
for many modern educators believe that  
the best way  to produce a free art is  
to remove it from all constraint1 and   
thus to  change it from work into mere  
play4       #dd4 ,of beautiful ,art     
,there is no ,science of the ,beautiful1
 but only a ,critique of it2 and  there 
is no such thing as beautiful ,science1 
but only beautiful ,art4  ,for as       
regards the first point1 if it could be 
decided scientifically1  i4e4 by proofs1
 whether a thing was to be regarded as  
beautiful or  not1 the judgement upon   
beauty would belong to science and would
 not  be a judgement of taste4 ,and as  
far as the second point is concerned1  a
 science which should be beautiful as   
such is a nonentity4 ,for if  in such a 

science we were to ask for grounds and  
proofs1 we would be  put off with       
tasteful phrases 7bon-mots74--,the      
source of the common  expression1       
beautiful science1 is without doubt     
nothing else than  this1 as it has been 
rightly remarked1 that for beautiful art
 in its  entire completeness much       
science is requisite2 e4g4 a knowledge  
of ancient languages1 a learned         
familiarity with classical authors1     
history1 a knowledge of antiquities1    
etc4 ,and hence these historical        
sciences1 because they form the         
necessary preparation and basis for     
beautiful art1 and also partly because  
under them is included the  knowledge of
 the products of beautiful art 7rhetoric
 and poetry71 have  come to be called   
beautiful sciences by a confusion of    
words4    ,if art which is adequate to  
the cognition of a possible object      
performs the actions requisite therefore
 merely in order to make it  actual1 it 
is mechanical art2 but if it has for its

 immediate design  the feeling of       
pleasure1 it is called aesthetical art4 
,this is again  either pleasant or      
beautiful4 ,it is the first1 if its     
purpose is  that the pleasure should    
accompany the representations of the    
object  regarded as mere sensations2 it 
is the second if they are regarded as   
modes of cognition4    ,pleasant arts   
are those that are directed merely to   
enjoyment4 ,of  this class are all those
 charming arts that can gratify a       
company at  table2 e4g4 the art of      
telling stories in an entertaining way1 
of  starting the company in frank and   
lively conversation1 of raising them  by
 jest and laugh to a certain pitch of   
merriment2#gg when1 as people  say1     
there may be a great deal of gossip at  
the feast1 but no one  will be          
answerable for what he says1 because    
they are only concerned  with momentary 
entertainment1 and not with any         
permanent material  for reflection or   
subsequent discussion4 7,among these are

 also to be  reckoned the way of        
arranging the table for enjoyment1 and1 
at great  feasts1 the management of the 
music4 ,this latter is a wonderful      
thing4  ,it is meant to dispose to      
gaiety the minds of the guests1 regarded
  solely as a pleasant noise1 without   
any one paying the least attention  to  
its composition2 and it favours the free
 conversation of each  with his         
neighbour47 ,again1 to this class belong
 all games which  bring with them no    
further interest than that of making the
 time pass  imperceptibly4    ,on the   
other hand1 beautiful art is a mode of  
representation which is  purposive for  
itself1 and which1 although devoid of   
definite purpose1  yet furthers the     
culture of the mental powers in         
reference to social  communication4     
,the universal communicability of a     
pleasure carries with it in its very    
concept that the pleasure is not one of 
enjoyment1 from mere sensation1  but    
must be derived from reflection2 and    

thus aesthetical art1 as  the art of    
beauty1 has for standard the reflective 
,judgement and not  sensation4          
#de4 ,beautiful ,art is an art1 in so   
far as it seems like nature    ,in a    
product of beautiful art we must become 
conscious that it is ,art  and not      
,nature2 but yet the purposiveness in   
its form must seem to be  as free from  
all constraint of arbitrary rules as if 
it were a product  of mere nature4 ,on  
this feeling of freedom in the play of  
our cognitive  faculties1 which must at 
the same time be purposive1 rests that  
pleasure which alone is universally     
communicable1 without being based  on   
concepts4 ,nature is beautiful because  
it looks like ,art2 and ,art can  only  
be called beautiful if we are conscious 
of it as ,art while yet it  looks like  
,nature4    ,for whether we are dealing 
with natural or with artificial beauty  
we  can say generally3 ,that is         
beautiful which pleases in the mere act 
of  judging it 7not in the sensation of 

it1 or by means of a concept74 ,now  art
 has always a definite design of        
producing something4 ,but if this       
something were bare sensation 7something
 merely subjective71 which is  to be    
accompanied with pleasure1 the product  
would please in the act  of judgement   
only by mediation of sensible feeling4  
,and again1 if the  design were directed
 towards the production of a definite   
,object1 then1  if this were attained by
 art1 the ,object would only please by  
means of  concepts4 ,but in both cases  
the art would not please in the mere act
  of judging2 i4e4 it would not please  
as beautiful1 but as mechanical4        
,hence the purposiveness in the product 
of beautiful art1 although it  is       
designed1 must not seem to be designed2 
i4e4 beautiful art must  look like      
nature1 although we are conscious of it 
as art4 ,but a  product of art appears  
like nature when1 although its agreement
 with  the rules1 according to which    
alone the product can become what it    

ought to be1 is punctiliously observed1 
yet this is not painfully  apparent2 the
 form of the schools does not obtrude   
itself#gh--;it  shows no trace of the   
rule having been before the eyes of the 
artist  and having fettered his mental  
powers4       #df4 ,beautiful ,art is   
the art of genius    ,genius is the     
talent 7or natural gift7 which gives the
 rule to ,art4  ,since talent1 as the   
innate productive faculty of the artist1
 belongs  itself to ,nature1 we may     
express the matter thus3 ,genius is the 
innate mental disposition 7ingenium7    
through which ,nature gives the  rule to
 ,art4    ,whatever may be thought of   
this definition1 whether it is merely   
arbitrary or whether it is adequate to  
the concept that we are  accustomed to  
combine with the word genius 7which is  
to be examined  in the following        
paragraphs71 we can prove already       
beforehand that  according to the       
signification of the word here adopted1 
beautiful arts  must necessarily be     

considered as arts of genius4    ,for   
every art presupposes rules by means of 
which in the first instance  a product1 
if it is to be called artistic1 is      
represented as possible4  ,but the      
concept of beautiful art does not permit
 the judgement upon the  beauty of a    
product to be derived from any rule1    
which has a concept  as its determining 
ground1 and therefore has at its basis a
 concept  of the way in which the       
product is possible4 ,therefore1        
beautiful art  cannot itself devise the 
rule according to which it can bring    
about its  product4 ,but since at the   
same time a product can never be called 
,art  without some precedent rule1      
,nature in the subject must 7by the     
harmony  of its faculties7 give the rule
 to ,art2 i4e4 beautiful ,art is only   
possible as a product of ,genius4    ,we
 thus see 7#a7 that genius is a talent  
for producing that for which  no        
definite rule can be given2 it is not a 
mere aptitude for what can  be learnt by

 a rule4 ,hence originality must be its 
first property4  7#b7 ,but since it also
 can produce original nonsense1 its     
products  must be models1 i4e4          
exemplary2 and they consequently ought  
not  to spring from imitation1 but must 
serve as a standard or rule of          
judgement for others4 7#c7 ,it cannot   
describe or indicate scientifically  how
 it brings about its products1 but it   
gives the rule just as nature  does4    
,hence the author of a product for which
 he is indebted to his  genius does not 
himself know how he has come by his     
,ideas2 and he has  not the power to    
devise the like at pleasure or in       
accordance with a  plan1 and to         
communicate it to others in precepts    
that will enable them  to produce       
similar products4 7,hence it is probable
 that the word genius  is derived from  
genius1 that peculiar guiding and       
guardian spirit  given to a man at his  
birth1 from whose suggestion these      
original  ,ideas proceed47 7#d7 ,nature 

by the medium of genius does not        
prescribe  rules to ,science1 but to    
,art2 and to it only in so far as it is 
to be  beautiful ,art4       #dg4       
,elucidation and confirmation of the    
above explanation of ,genius    ,every  
one is agreed that genius is entirely   
opposed to the spirit of  imitation4    
,now since learning is nothing but      
imitation1 it follows  that the greatest
 ability and teachableness 7capacity7   
regarded qu  teachableness1 cannot avail
 for genius4 ,even if a man thinks or   
invents  for himself1 and does not      
merely take in what others have taught1 
even if he discovers many things in art 
and science1 this is not the  right     
ground for calling such a 7perhaps      
great7 head1 a genius 7as  opposed to   
him who because he can only learn and   
imitate is called a  shallow-pate74 ,for
 even these things could be learned1    
they lie in  the natural path of him who
 investigates and reflects according to 
rules2 and they do not differ           

specifically from what can be acquired  
by industry through imitation4 ,thus we 
can readily learn all that  ,newton has 
set forth in his immortal work on the   
,principles of  ,natural ,philosophy1   
however great a head was required to    
discover it2  but we cannot learn to    
write spirited poetry1 however express  
may be  the precepts of the art and     
however excellent its models4 ,the      
reason  is that ,newton could make all  
his steps1 from the first elements  of  
geometry to his own great and profound  
discoveries1 intuitively  plain and     
definite as regards consequence1 not    
only to himself but  to every one else4 
,but a ,homer or a ,wieland cannot show 
how his  ,ideas1 so rich in fancy and   
yet so full of thought1 come together in
  his head1 simply because he does not  
know and therefore cannot teach  others4
 ,in ,science then the greatest         
discoverer only differs in degree  from 
his laborious imitator and pupil2 but he
 differs specifically  from him whom    

,nature has gifted for beautiful ,art4  
,and in this there  is no depreciation  
of those great men to whom the human    
race owes so  much gratitude1 as        
compared with nature's favourites in    
respect of  the talent for beautiful    
art4 ,for in the fact that the former   
talent  is directed to the              
ever-advancing greater perfection of    
knowledge and  every advantage depending
 on it1 and at the same time to the     
imparting  this same knowledge to       
others--in this it has a great          
superiority  over the talent of those   
who deserve the honour of being called  
geniuses4 ,for art stands still at a    
certain point2 a boundary is set to  it 
beyond which it cannot go1 which        
presumably has been reached long  ago   
and cannot be extended further4 ,again1 
artistic skill cannot be  communicated2 
it is imparted to every artist          
immediately by the hand  of nature2 and 
so it dies with him1 until nature endows
 another in the  same way1 so that he   

only needs an example in order to put in
 operation  in a similar fashion the    
talent of which he is conscious4    ,if 
now it is a natural gift which must     
prescribe its rule to art 7as  beautiful
 art71 of what kind is this rule8 ,it   
cannot be reduced to  a formula and     
serve as a precept1 for then the        
judgement upon the  beautiful would be  
determinable according to concepts2 but 
the rule  must be abstracted from the   
fact1 i4e4 from the product1 on which   
others may try their own talent by using
 it as a model1 not to be  copied but to
 be imitated4 ,how this is possible is  
hard to explain4  ,the ,ideas of the    
artist excite like ,ideas in his pupils 
if nature has  endowed them with a like 
proportion of their mental powers4      
,hence  models of beautiful art are the 
only means of handing down these ,ideas 
to posterity4 ,this cannot be done by   
mere descriptions1 especially not  in   
the case of the arts of speech1 and in  
this latter classical models  are only  

to be had in the old dead languages1 now
 preserved only as  8the learned        
languages40    ,although mechanical and 
beautiful art are very different1 the   
first  being a mere art of industry and 
learning and the second of genius1 yet  
there is no beautiful art in which there
 is not a mechanical element  that can  
be comprehended by rules and followed   
accordingly1 and in  which therefore    
there must be something scholastic as an
 essential  condition4 ,for in every art
 some purpose must be conceived2        
otherwise  we could not ascribe the     
product to art at all1 and it would be a
 mere  product of chance4 ,but in order 
to accomplish a purpose1 definite rules 
from which we cannot dispense ourselves 
are requisite4 ,now since the           
originality of the talent constitutes an
 essential 7though not the  only7       
element in the character of genius1     
shallow heads believe that  they cannot 
better show themselves to be full-blown 
geniuses than by  throwing off the      

constraint of all rules2 they believe1  
in effect1 that  one could make a braver
 show on the back of a wild horse than  
on the  back of a trained animal4       
,genius can only furnish rich material  
for  products of beautiful art2 its     
execution and its form require talent   
cultivated in the schools1 in order to  
make such a use of this material  as    
will stand examination by the           
,judgement4 ,but it is quite ridiculous 
for a man to speak and decide like a    
genius in things which require  the most
 careful investigation by ,reason4 ,one 
does not know whether to  laugh more at 
the impostor who spreads such a mist    
round him that we  cannot clearly use   
our ,judgement and so use our           
,imagination the more1  or at the public
 which navely imagines that his         
inability to cognise  clearly and to    
comprehend the masterpiece before him   
arises from new  truths crowding in on  
him in such abundance that details 7duly
 weighed  definitions and accurate      

examination of fundamental propositions7
 seem  but clumsy work4       #dh4 ,of  
the relation of ,genius to ,taste       
,for judging of beautiful objects as    
such1 taste is requisite2  but for      
beautiful art1 i4e4 for the production  
of such objects1  genius is requisite4  
,if we consider genius as the talent for
 beautiful art 7which the  special      
meaning of the word implies7 and in this
 point of view analyse  it into the     
faculties which must concur to          
constitute such a talent1 it  is        
necessary in the first instance to      
determine exactly the difference        
between natural beauty1 the judging of  
which requires only ,taste1 and         
artificial beauty1 whose possibility 7to
 which reference must be made  in       
judging such an object7 requires        
,genius4    ,a natural beauty is a      
beautiful thing2 artificial beauty is a 
beautiful representation of a thing4    
,in order to judge of a natural beauty  
as such ,i need not have  beforehand a  

concept of what sort of thing the object
 is to be2 i4e4  ,i need not know its   
material purposiveness 7the purpose71   
but its mere  form pleases by itself in 
the act of judging it without any       
knowledge  of the purpose4 ,but if the  
object is given as a product of art1 and
 as  such is to be declared beautiful1  
then1 because art always supposes a     
purpose in the cause 7and its           
causality71 there must be at bottom in  
the first instance a concept of what the
 thing is to be4 ,and as the  agreement 
of the manifold in a thing with its     
inner destination1 its  purpose1        
constitutes the perfection of the thing1
 it follows that in  judging of         
artificial beauty the perfection of the 
thing must be taken  into account2 but  
in judging of natural beauty 7as such7  
there is no  question at all about      
this4--,it is true that in judging of   
objects of  nature1 especially objects  
endowed with life1 e4g4 a man or a      
horse1  their objective purposiveness   

also is commonly taken into             
consideration  in judging of their      
beauty2 but then the judgement is no    
longer purely  aesthetical1 i4e4 a mere 
judgement of taste4 ,nature is no longer
  judged inasmuch as it appears like    
art1 but in so far as it is actual      
7although superhuman7 art2 and the      
teleological judgement serves as the    
basis and condition of the aesthetical1 
as a condition to which the  latter must
 have respect4 ,in such a case1 e4g4 if 
it is said 8that is  a beautiful woman10
 we think nothing else than this3 nature
 represents  in her figure the purposes 
in view in the shape of a woman's       
figure4  ,for we must look beyond the   
mere form to a concept1 if the object   
is to be thought in such a way by means 
of a logically conditioned  aesthetical 
judgement4    ,beautiful art shows its  
superiority in this1 that it describes  
as  beautiful things which may be in    
nature ugly or displeasing4#gi  ,the    
,furies1 diseases1 the devastations of  

war1 etc41 may even  regarded as        
calamitous1#hj be described as very     
beautiful1 and even  represented in a   
picture4 ,there is only one kind of     
ugliness which  cannot be represented in
 accordance with nature1 without        
destroying  all aesthetical satisfaction
 and consequently artificial beauty2    
viz4 that which excites disgust4 ,for in
 this peculiar sensation1  which rests  
on mere imagination1 the object is      
represented as it  were obtruding itself
 for our enjoyment while we strive      
against it  with all our might4 ,and the
 artistic representation of the object  
is no longer distinguished from the     
nature of the object itself in  our     
sensation1 and thus it is impossible    
that it can be regarded as  beautiful4  
,the art of sculpture again1 because in 
its products art is  almost             
interchangeable with nature1 excludes   
from its creations the  immediate       
representation of ugly objects2 e4g4 it 
represents death  by a beautiful genius1

 the warlike spirit by ,mars1 and       
permits all  such things to be          
represented only by an allegory or      
attribute#ha  that has a pleasing       
effect1 and thus only indirectly by the 
aid of the  interpretation of ,reason1  
and not for the mere aesthetical        
,judgement4    ,so much for the         
beautiful representation of an object1  
which is  properly only the form of the 
presentation of a concept1 and the means
  by which the latter is communicated   
universally4--,but to give this form  to
 the product of beautiful art1 mere     
taste is requisite4 ,by taste1  after he
 has exercised and corrected it by      
manifold examples from art  or nature1  
the artist checks his work2 and after   
many1 often toilsome1  attempts to      
content taste he finds the form which   
satisfies him4 ,hence  this form is not1
 as it were1 a thing of inspiration or  
the result of a  free swing of the      
mental powers1 but of a slow and even   
painful process  of improvement1 by     

which he seeks to render it adequate to 
his thought1  without detriment to the  
freedom of the play of his powers4      
,but taste is merely a judging and not a
 productive faculty2 and what  is       
appropriate to it is not therefore a    
work of beautiful art4 ,it  may be only 
a product belonging to useful and       
mechanical art or even  to science1     
produced according to definite rules    
that can be learned  and must be exactly
 followed4 ,but the pleasing form that  
is given to  it is only the vehicle of  
communication1 and a mode1 as it were1  
of  presenting it1 in respect of which  
we remain free to a certain extent1     
although it is combined with a definite 
purpose4 ,thus we desire that  table    
appointments1 a moral treatise1 even a  
sermon1 should have  in themselves this 
form of beautiful art1 without it       
seeming to be  sought3 but we do not    
therefore call these things works of    
beautiful  art4 ,under the latter class 
are reckoned a poem1 a piece of music1 a

  picture gallery1 etc42 and in some    
would-be works of beautiful art  we find
 genius without taste1 while in others  
we find taste without  genius4          
#di4 ,of the faculties of the mind that 
constitute ,genius    ,we say of certain
 products of which we expect that they  
should at  least in part appear as      
beautiful art1 they are without         
spirit#hb2  although we find nothing to 
blame in them on the score of taste4 ,a 
poem  may be very neat and elegant1 but 
without spirit4 ,a history may be  exact
 and well arranged1 but without spirit4 
,a festal discourse may be  solid and at
 the same time elaborate1 but without   
spirit4 ,conversation  is often not     
devoid of entertainment1 but yet without
 spirit3 even of  a woman we say that   
she is pretty1 an agreeable talker1 and 
courteous1  but without spirit4 ,what   
then do we mean by spirit8    ,spirit1  
in an aesthetical sense1 is the name    
given to the animating  principle of the
 mind4 ,but that whereby this principle 

animates the  soul1 the material which  
it applies to that purpose1 is that     
which  puts the mental powers           
purposively into swing1 i4e4 into such a
  play as maintains itself and          
strengthens the mental powers in their  
exercise4    ,now ,i maintain that this 
principle is no other than the faculty  
of  presenting aesthetical ,ideas4 ,and 
by an aesthetical ,idea ,i understand   
that representation of the ,imagination 
which occasions much thought1  without1 
however1 any definite thought1 i4e4 any 
concept1 being  capable of being        
adequate to it2 it consequently cannot  
be completely  compassed and made       
intelligible by language4--,we easily   
see that it is  the counterpart         
7pendant7 of a rational ,idea1 which    
conversely is a  concept to which no    
intuition 7or representation of the     
,imagination7  can be adequate4    ,the 
,imagination 7as a productive faculty of
 cognition7 is very powerful  in        
creating another nature1 as it were1 out

 of the material that  actual nature    
gives it4 ,we entertain ourselves with  
it when experience  proves too          
commonplace1 and by it we remould       
experience1 always indeed  in accordance
 with analogical laws1 but yet also in  
accordance with  principles which occupy
 a higher place in ,reason 7laws too    
which are  just as natural to us as     
those by which ,understanding           
comprehends  empirical nature74 ,thus we
 feel our freedom from the law of       
association  7which attaches to the     
empirical employment of ,imagination71  
so that  the material which we borrow   
from nature in accordance with this law 
can be worked up into something         
different which surpasses nature4       
,such representations of the            
,imagination we may call ,ideas1 partly 
because they at least strive after      
something which lies beyond the  bounds 
of experience1 and so seek to           
approximate to a presentation of        
concepts of ,reason 7intellectual       

,ideas71 thus giving to the latter the  
appearance of objective reality1--but   
especially because no concept can  be   
fully adequate to them as internal      
intuitions4 ,the poet ventures to       
realise to sense1 rational ,ideas of    
invisible beings1 the kingdom of  the   
blessed1 hell1 eternity1 creation1 etc42
 or even if he deals with  things of    
which there are examples in             
experience1--e4g4 death1 envy  and all  
vices1 also love1 fame1 and the         
like1--he tries1 by means of            
,imagination1 which emulates the play of
 ,reason in its quest after a  maximum1 
to go beyond the limits of experience   
and to present them  to ,sense with a   
completeness of which there is no       
example in nature4  ,it is1 properly    
speaking1 in the art of the poet1 that  
the faculty  of aesthetical ,ideas can  
manifest itself in its full measure4    
,but  this faculty1 considered in       
itself1 is properly only a talent 7of   
the  ,imagination74    ,if now we place 

under a concept a representation of the 
,imagination  belonging to its          
presentation1 but which occasions solely
 by itself  more thought than can ever  
be comprehended in a definite concept1  
and which therefore enlarges            
aesthetically the concept itself in an  
unbounded fashion1--the ,imagination is 
here creative1 and it brings  the       
faculty of intellectual ,ideas 7the     
,reason7 into movement2 i4e4 a          
movement1 occasioned by a               
representation1 towards more thought    
7though  belonging1 no doubt1 to the    
concept of the object7 than can be      
grasped  in the representation or made  
clear4    ,those forms which do not     
constitute the presentation of a given  
concept  itself but only1 as approximate
 representations of the ,imagination1   
express the consequences bound up with  
it and its relationship to  other       
concepts1 are called 7aesthetical7      
attributes of an object1  whose concept 
as a rational ,idea cannot be adequately

 presented4  ,thus ,jupiter's eagle with
 the lightning in its claws is an       
attribute  of the mighty king of heaven1
 as the peacock is of its magnificent   
queen4 ,they do not1 like logical       
attributes1 represent what lies in  our 
concepts of the sublimity and majesty of
 creation1 but something  different1    
which gives occasion to the ,imagination
 to spread itself  over a number of     
kindred representations1 that arouse    
more thought  than can be expressed in a
 concept determined by words4 ,they     
furnish  an aesthetical ,idea1 which for
 that rational ,idea takes the place  of
 logical presentation2 and thus as their
 proper office they enliven  the mind by
 opening out to it the prospect into an 
illimitable field  of kindred           
representations4 ,but beautiful art does
 this not only in  the case of painting 
or sculpture 7in which the term         
8attribute0 is  commonly employed73     
poetry and rhetoric also get the spirit 
that  animates their works simply from  

the aesthetical attributes of the       
object1 which accompany the logical and 
stimulate the ,imagination1 so  that it 
thinks more by their aid1 although in an
 undeveloped way1 than  could be        
comprehended in a concept and therefore 
in a definite form of  words4-- ,for the
 sake of brevity ,i must limit myself to
 a few examples  only4    ,when the     
great ,king#hc in one of his poems      
expresses himself as  follows3          
8,oui1 finissons sans trouble et mourons
 sans regrets1      ,en laissant        
l'univers combl de nos bienfaits4       
,ainsi l'astre du jour au bout de sa    
carrire1      ,rpand sur l'horizon une  
douce lumire2      ,et les derniers     
rayons qu'il darde dans les airs1       
,sont les derniers soupirs qu'il donne  
l'univers20    he quickens his rational 
,idea of a cosmopolitan disposition at  
the end  of life by an attribute which  
the ,imagination 7in remembering all the
  pleasures of a beautiful summer day   
that are recalled at its close  by a    

serene evening7 associates with that    
representation1 and which  excites a    
number of sensations and secondary      
representations for which  no expression
 is found4 ,on the other hand1 an       
intellectual concept may  serve         
conversely as an attribute for a        
representation of sense and  so can     
quicken this latter by means of the     
,idea of the supersensible2  but only by
 the aesthetical element1 that          
subjectively attaches to  the concept of
 the latter1 being here employed4 ,thus1
 for example1 a  certain poet#hd says1  
in his description of a beautiful       
morning3              8,the sun arose   
,as calm from virtue springs40    ,the  
consciousness of virtue1 even if one    
only places oneself in  thought in the  
position of a virtuous man1 diffuses in 
the mind a  multitude of sublime and    
restful feelings and a boundless        
prospect of  a joyful future1 to which  
no expression measured by a definite    
concept  completely attains4#he    ,in a

 word the aesthetical ,idea is a        
representation of the ,imagination      
associated with a given concept1 which  
is bound up with such a  multiplicity of
 partial representations in its free    
employment1 that  for it no expression  
marking a definite concept can be found2
 and such  a representation1 therefore1 
adds to a concept much ineffable        
thought1  the feeling of which quickens 
the cognitive faculties1 and with       
language1 which is the mere letter1     
binds up spirit also4    ,the mental    
powers1 therefore1 whose union 7in a    
certain relation7  constitutes genius   
are ,imagination and ,understanding4 ,in
 the  employment of the ,imagination for
 cognition it submits to the  constraint
 of the ,understanding and is subject to
 the limitation of  being conformable to
 the concept of the latter4 ,on the     
other hand1 in  an aesthetical point of 
view it is free to furnish unsought1    
over and  above that agreement with a   
concept1 abundance of undeveloped       

material  for the ,understanding2 to    
which the ,understanding paid no regard 
in its  concept1 but which it applies1  
though not objectively for cognition1   
yet subjectively to quicken the         
cognitive powers and therefore also     
indirectly to cognitions4 ,thus genius  
properly consists in the happy  relation
 between these faculties1 which no      
science can teach and no  industry can  
learn1 by which ,ideas are found for a  
given concept2 and  on the other hand1  
we thus find for these ,ideas the       
expression1 by  means of which the      
subjective state of mind brought about  
by them1  as an accompaniment of the    
concept1 can be communicated to others4 
,the latter talent is properly speaking 
what is called spirit2 for  to express  
the ineffable element in the state of   
mind implied by a  certain              
representation and to make it           
universally communicable--whether  the  
expression be in speech or painting or  
statuary--this requires  a faculty of   

seizing the quickly passing play of     
,imagination and of  unifying it in a   
concept 7which is even on that account  
original  and discloses a new rule that 
could not have been inferred from any   
preceding principles or examples71 that 
can be communicated without any         
constraint of rules4#hf           99    
99       99       99       99    ,if    
after this analysis we look back to the 
explanation given above  of what is     
called genius1 we find3 first1 that it  
is a talent for  ,art1 not for ,science1
 in which clearly known rules must go   
beforehand  and determine the procedure4
 ,secondly1 as an artistic talent it    
presupposes a definite concept of the   
product1 as the purpose1 and  therefore 
,understanding2 but it also presupposes 
a representation  7although an          
indeterminate one7 of the material1 i4e4
 of the  intuition1 for the presentment 
of this concept2 and1 therefore1 a      
relation between the ,imagination and   
the ,understanding4 ,thirdly1 it  shows 

itself not so much in the accomplishment
 of the proposed purpose  in a          
presentment of a definite concept1 as in
 the enunciation or  expression of      
aesthetical ,ideas1 which contain       
abundant material for  that very design2
 and consequently it represents the     
,imagination as  free from all guidance 
of rules and yet as purposive in        
reference to  the presentment of the    
given concept4 ,finally1 in the fourth  
place1  the unsought undesigned         
subjective purposiveness in the free    
accordance  of the ,imagination with the
 legality of the ,understanding         
presupposes  such a proportion and      
disposition of these faculties as no    
following of  rules1 whether of science 
or of mechanical imitation1 can bring   
about1  but which only the nature of the
 subject can produce4    ,in accordance 
with these suppositions genius is the   
exemplary  originality of the natural   
gifts of a subject in the free          
employment  of his cognitive faculties4 

,in this way the product of a genius 7as
  regards what is to be ascribed to     
genius and not to possible learning  or 
schooling7 is an example1 not to be     
imitated 7for then that which  in it is 
genius and constitutes the spirit of the
 work would be lost71  but to be        
followed1 by another genius2 whom it    
awakens to a feeling of  his own        
originality and whom it stirs so to     
exercise his art in freedom  from the   
constraint of rules1 that thereby a new 
rule is gained for  art1 and thus his   
talent shows itself to be exemplary4    
,but because a  genius is a favourite of
 nature and must be regarded by us as a 
rare  phenomenon1 his example produces  
for other good heads a school1 i4e4  a  
methodical system of teaching according 
to rules1 so far as these can  be       
derived from the peculiarities of the   
products of his spirit4 ,for  such      
persons beautiful art is so far         
imitation1 to which nature through  the 
medium of a genius supplied the rule4   

,but this imitation becomes a mere      
aping1 if the scholar copies  everything
 down to the deformities1 which the     
genius must have let  pass only because 
he could not well remove them without   
weakening his  ,idea4 ,this mental      
characteristic is meritorious only in   
the case of  a genius4 ,a certain       
audacity in expression--and in general  
many a  departure from common           
rules--becomes him well1 but it is in no
 way  worthy of imitation2 it always    
remains a fault in itself which we  must
 seek to remove1 though the genius is as
 it were privileged to  commit it1      
because the inimitable rush of his      
spirit would suffer  from over-anxious  
carefulness4 ,mannerism is another kind 
of aping1  viz4 of mere peculiarity     
7originality7 in general2 by which a man
  separates himself as far as possible  
from imitators1 without however         
possessing the talent to be at the same 
time exemplary4--,there  are indeed in  
general two ways 7modi7 in which such a 

man may put  together his notions of    
expressing himself2 the one is called a 
manner 7modus aestheticus71 the other a 
method 7modus logicus74  ,they differ in
 this1 that the former has no other     
standard than the  feeling of unity in  
the presentment1 but the latter follows 
definite  principles2 hence the former  
alone avails for beautiful art4 ,but an 
artistic product is said to show        
mannerism only when the exposition  of  
the artist's ,idea is founded on its    
very singularity1 and is not  made      
appropriate to the ,idea itself4 ,the   
ostentatious 7prcieux71  contorted1 and 
affected manner1 adopted to             
differentiate oneself from  ordinary    
persons 7though devoid of spirit7 is    
like the behaviour of a  man of whom we 
say1 that he hears himself talk1 or who 
stands and moves  about as if he were on
 a stage in order to be stared at2 this 
always  betrays a bungler4       #ej4   
,of the combination of ,taste with      
,genius in the products of  beautiful   

,art    ,to ask whether it is more      
important for the things of beautiful   
art  that ,genius or ,taste should be   
displayed1 is the same as to ask whether
  in it more depends on ,imagination or 
on ,judgement4 ,now1 since in  respect  
of the first an art is rather said to be
 full of spirit1 but  only deserves to  
be called a beautiful art on account of 
the second2  this latter is at least1 as
 its indispensable condition 7conditio  
sine  qua non71 the most important thing
 to which one has to look in the        
judging of art as beautiful art4        
,abundance and originality of ,ideas    
are less necessary to beauty than the   
accordance of the ,imagination in  its  
freedom with the conformity to law of   
the ,understanding4 ,for all  the       
abundance of the former produces in     
lawless freedom nothing but  nonsense2  
on the other hand1 the ,judgement is the
 faculty by which it  is adjusted to the
 ,understanding4    ,taste1 like the    
,judgement in general1 is the discipline

 7or training7  of ,genius2 it clips its
 wings closely1 and makes it cultured   
and  polished2 but1 at the same time1 it
 gives guidance as to where and  how far
 it may extend itself1 if it is to      
remain purposive4 ,and while  it brings 
clearness and order into the multitude  
of the thoughts1 it  makes the ,ideas   
susceptible of being permanently and1 at
 the same time1  universally assented   
to1 and capable of being followed by    
others1 and  of an ever-progressive     
culture4 ,if1 then1 in the conflict of  
these two  properties in a product      
something must be sacrificed1 it should 
be  rather on the side of genius2 and   
the ,judgement1 which in the things of  
beautiful art gives its decision from   
its own proper principles1 will  rather 
sacrifice the freedom and wealth of the 
,imagination than permit  anything      
prejudicial to the ,understanding4      
,for beautiful art1 therefore1          
,imagination1 ,understanding1 ,spirit1  
and ,taste are requisite4#hg       #ea4 

,of the division of the beautiful arts  
,we may describe beauty in general      
7whether natural or artificial7 as  the 
expression of aesthetical ,ideas2 only  
that in beautiful ,art this  ,idea must 
be occasioned by a concept of the       
,object2 whilst in beautiful  ,nature   
the mere reflection upon a given        
intuition1 without any concept  of what 
the object is to be1 is sufficient for  
the awakening and  communicating of the 
,idea of which that ,object is regarded 
as the  expression4    ,if1 then1 we    
wish to make a division of the beautiful
 arts1 we  cannot choose a more         
convenient principle1 at least          
tentatively1  than the analogy of art   
with the mode of expression of which men
  avail themselves in speech1 in order  
to communicate to one another  as       
perfectly as possible not merely their  
concepts but also their                 
sensations4#hh--,this is done by word1  
deportment1 and tone  7articulation1    
gesticulation1 and modulation74 ,it is  

only by the  combination of these three 
kinds of expression that communication  
between the speaker and his hearers can 
be complete4 ,for thus  thought1        
intuition1 and sensation are transmitted
 to others  simultaneously and          
conjointly4    ,there are1 therefore1   
only three kinds of beautiful arts2 the 
arts of  speech1 the formative arts1 and
 the art of the play of sensations  7as 
external sensible impressions74 ,we may 
also arrange a division by  dichotomy2  
thus beautiful art may be divided into  
the art of expression  of thoughts and  
of intuitions2 and these further        
subdivided in  accordance with their    
form or their matter 7sensation74 ,but  
this would  appear to be too abstract1  
and not so accordant with ordinary      
concepts4    7#a7 ,the arts of ,,speech 
are rhetoric and poetry4 ,rhetoric is   
the  art of carrying on a serious       
business of the ,understanding as if it 
were a free play of the ,imagination2   
poetry1 the art of conducting a  free   

play of the ,imagination as if it were a
 serious business of the                
,understanding4    ,the orator1 then1   
promises a serious business1 and in     
order to  entertain his audience        
conducts it as if it were a mere play   
with  ,ideas4 ,the poet merely promises 
an entertaining play with ,ideas1  and  
yet it has the same effect upon the     
,understanding as if he had  only       
intended to carry on its business4 ,the 
combination and harmony of  both        
cognitive faculties1 ,sensibility and   
,understanding1 which cannot  dispense  
with one another1 but which yet cannot  
well be united without  constraint and  
mutual prejudice1 must appear to be     
undesigned and so  to be brought about  
by themselves3 otherwise it is not      
beautiful  art4 ,hence1 all that is     
studied and anxious must be avoided in  
it1 for  beautiful art must be free art 
in a double sense4 ,it is not a work    
like  that of a tradesman1 the magnitude
 of which can be judged1 exacted1 or    

paid for1 according to a definite       
standard2 and again1 though the mind  is
 occupied1 still it feels itself        
contented and stimulated1 without       
looking to any other purpose            
7independently of reward47    ,the      
orator therefore gives something which  
he does not promise1 viz4  an           
entertaining play of the ,imagination2  
but he also fails to supply  what he did
 promise1 which is indeed his announced 
business1 viz4 the  purposive occupation
 of the ,understanding4 ,on the other   
hand1 the poet  promises little and     
announces a mere play with ,ideas2 but  
he supplies  something which is worth   
occupying ourselves with1 because he    
provides  in this play food for the     
,understanding1 and by the aid of       
,imagination  gives life to his         
concepts4 ,thus the orator on the whole 
gives less1  the poet more1 than he     
promises4#hi    7#b7 ,the ,,formative   
arts1 or those by which expression is   
found for ,ideas  in sensible intuition 

7not by representations of mere         
,imagination  that are aroused by       
words71 are either arts of sensible     
truth or  of sensible illusion4 ,the    
former is called ,plastic1 the latter   
,painting4 ,both express ,ideas by      
figures in space2 the former makes      
figures cognisable by two senses1 sight 
and touch 7although not by  the latter  
as far as beauty is concerned72 the     
latter only by one1  the first of these4
 ,the aesthetical ,idea 7the archetype  
or original  image7 is fundamental for  
both in the ,imagination1 but the figure
 which  expresses this 7the ectype or   
copy7 is either given in its bodily     
extension 7as the object itself exists71
 or as it paints itself on the  eye     
7according to its appearance when       
projected on a flat surface74 ,in  the  
first case#ij the condition given to    
reflection may be either the  reference 
to an actual purpose or only the        
semblance of it4    ,to ,plastic1 the   
first kind of beautiful formative ,art1 

belong  ,sculpture and ,architecture4   
,the first presents corporeally         
concepts of things1 as they might have  
existed in nature 7though  as beautiful 
art it has regard to aesthetical        
purposiveness74 ,the  second is the art 
of presenting concepts of things that   
are possible  only through ,art1 and    
whose form has for its determining      
ground not  nature but an arbitrary     
purpose1 with the view of presenting    
them with  aesthetical purposiveness4   
,in the latter the chief point is a     
certain  use of the artistic object1 by 
which condition the aesthetical ,ideas  
are limited4 ,in the former the main    
design is the mere expression of        
aesthetical ,ideas4 ,thus statues of    
men1 gods1 animals1 etc41 are of  the   
first kind2 but temples1 splendid       
buildings for public assemblies1  even  
dwelling-houses1 triumphal arches1      
columns1 mausoleums1 and the  like1     
erected in honourable remembrance1      
belong to ,architecture4 ,indeed  all   

house furniture 7upholsterer's work and 
such like things which are  for use7 may
 be reckoned under this art2 because the
 suitability of a  product for a certain
 use is the essential thing in an       
architectural  work4 ,on the other hand1
 a mere piece of sculpture1 which is    
simply  made for show and which is to   
please in itself1 is as a corporeal     
presentation a mere imitation of nature1
 though with a reference to  aesthetical
 ,ideas2 in it sensible truth is not to 
be carried so far  that the product     
ceases to look like art and looks like a
 product of  the elective will4         
,painting1 as the second kind of        
formative art1 which presents a         
sensible illusion artificially combined 
with ,ideas1 ,i would divide  into the  
art of the beautiful depicting of nature
 and that of the  beautiful arrangement 
of its products4 ,the first is painting 
proper1 the second is the art of        
landscape gardening4 ,the first  gives  
only the illusory appearance of         

corporeal extension2 the second  gives  
this in accordance with truth1 but only 
the appearance of  utility and          
availableness for other purposes than   
the mere play of  the ,imagination in   
the contemplation of its forms4#ia ,this
 latter is  nothing else than the       
ornamentation of the soil with a variety
 of  those things 7grasses1 flowers1    
shrubs1 trees1 even ponds1 hillocks1    
and dells7 which nature presents to an  
observer1 only arranged  differently and
 in conformity with certain ,ideas4     
,but1 again1 the  beautiful arrangement 
of corporeal things is only apparent to 
the  eye1 like painting2 the sense of   
touch cannot supply any intuitive       
presentation of such a form4 ,under     
painting in the wide sense ,i would     
reckon the decoration of rooms by the   
aid of tapestry1 bric-a-brac1 and  all  
beautiful furniture which is merely     
available to be looked at2  and the same
 may be said of the art of tasteful     
dressing 7with rings1  snuff-boxes1     

etc474 ,for a bed of various flowers1 a 
room filled with  various ornaments     
7including under this head even ladies' 
finery71 make  at a fte a kind of       
picture2 which1 like pictures properly  
so-called  7that are not intended to    
teach either history or natural         
science71  has in view merely the       
entertainment of the ,imagination in    
free play  with ,ideas1 and the         
occupation of the aesthetical ,judgement
 without  any definite purpose4 ,the    
detailed work in all this decoration may
 be  quite distinct in the different    
cases and may require very different    
artists2 but the judgement of taste upon
 whatever is beautiful in  these various
 arts is always determined in the same  
way3 viz4 it only  judges the forms     
7without any reference to a purpose7 as 
they present  themselves to the eye     
either singly or in combination1        
according to the  effect they produce   
upon the ,imagination4--,but that       
formative art may  be compared 7by      

analogy7 with deportment in speech is   
justified by the  fact that the spirit  
of the artist supplies by these figures 
a bodily  expression to his thought and 
its mode1 and makes the thing itself as 
it were speak in mimic language4 ,this  
is a very common play of our  fancy1    
which attributes to lifeless things a   
spirit suitable to their  form by which 
they speak to us4    7#c7 ,the art of   
the ,,beautiful ,,play ,,of ,,sensations
 7externally  stimulated71 which admits 
at the same time of universal           
communication1  can be concerned with   
nothing else than the proportion of the 
different degrees of the disposition    
7tension7 of the sense1 to which  the   
sensation belongs1 i4e4 with its tone4  
,in this far-reaching  signification of 
the word it may be divided into the     
artistic play of  the sensations of     
hearing and sight1 i4e4 into ,music and 
the ,art  of colour4--,it is noteworthy 
that these two senses1 besides their    
susceptibility for impressions so far as

 these are needed to gain  concepts of  
external objects1 are also capable of a 
peculiar sensation  bound up therewith1 
of which we cannot strictly decide      
whether it is  based on sense or        
reflection4 ,this susceptibility may    
sometimes be  wanting1 although in other
 respects the sense1 as regards its use 
for  the cognition of ,objects1 is not  
at all deficient but is peculiarly      
fine4 ,that is1 we cannot say with      
certainty whether colours or tones      
7sounds7 are merely pleasant sensations 
or whether they form in  themselves a   
beautiful play of sensations1 and as    
such bring with them  in aesthetical    
judgement a satisfaction in their form4 
,if we think  of the velocity of the    
vibrations of light1 or in the second   
case  of the air1 which probably far    
surpasses all our faculty of judging    
immediately in perception the time      
interval between them1 we must  believe 
that it is only the effect of these     
vibrations upon the  elastic parts of   

our body that is felt1 but that the time
 interval  between them is not remarked 
or brought into judgement2 and thus that
  only pleasantness and not beauty of   
composition is bound up with  colours   
and tones4 ,but on the other hand1      
first1 we think of the  mathematical    
element which enables us to pronounce on
 the proportion  between these          
oscillations in music and thus to judge 
of them2 and by  analogy with which we  
easily may judge of the distinctions    
between  colours4 ,secondly1 we recall  
instances 7although they are rare7 of   
men who with the best sight in the world
 cannot distinguish colours1  and with  
the sharpest hearing cannot distinguish 
tones2 whilst for  those who can do this
 the perception of an altered quality   
7not merely  of the degree of sensation7
 in the different intensities in the    
scale  of colours and tones is definite2
 and further1 the very number of these  
is fixed by intelligible differences4   
,thus we may be compelled to see  that  

both kinds of sensations are to be      
regarded not as mere sensible           
impressions1 but as the effects of a    
judgement passed upon the form  in the  
play of divers sensations4 ,the         
difference in our definition1  according
 as we adopt the one or the other       
opinion in judging of the  grounds of   
,music1 would be just this3 either1 as  
we have done1 we  must explain it as the
 beautiful play of sensations 7of       
hearing71 or  else as a play of pleasant
 sensations4 ,according to the former   
mode  of explanation music is           
represented altogether as a beautiful   
art2  according to the latter1 as a     
pleasant art 7at least in part74        
#eb4 ,of the combination of beautiful   
arts in one and the same product        
,rhetoric may be combined with a        
pictorial presentation of its subjects  
and objects in a theatrical piece2      
poetry may be combined with music  in a 
song1 and this again with pictorial     
7theatrical7 presentation in  an opera2 

the play of sensations in music may be  
combined with the  play of figures in   
the dance1 and so on4 ,even the         
presentation of  the sublime1 so far as 
it belongs to beautiful art1 may combine
 with  beauty in a tragedy in verse1 in 
a didactic poem1 in an oratorio2  and in
 these combinations beautiful art is yet
 more artistic4 ,whether  it is also    
more beautiful may in some of these     
cases be doubted 7since  so many        
different kinds of satisfaction cross   
one another74 ,yet in  all beautiful art
 the essential thing is the form1 which 
is purposive  as regards our observation
 and judgement1 where the pleasure is at
  the same time cultivation and disposes
 the spirit to ,ideas1 and  consequently
 makes it susceptible of still more of  
such pleasure and  entertainment4 ,the  
essential element is not the matter of  
sensation  7charm or emotion71 which has
 only to do with enjoyment2 this leaves 
behind nothing in the ,idea1 and it     
makes the spirit dull1 the object       

gradually distasteful1 and the mind1 on 
account of its consciousness of  a      
disposition that conflicts with purpose 
in the judgement of ,reason1            
discontented with itself and peevish4   
,if the beautiful arts are not brought  
into more or less close  combination    
with moral ,ideas1 which alone bring    
with them a  self-sufficing             
satisfaction1 this latter fate must     
ultimately be  theirs4 ,they then serve 
only as a distraction1 of which we are  
the  more in need the more we avail     
ourselves of them to disperse the       
discontent of the mind with itself2 so  
that we thus render ourselves  ever more
 useless and ever more discontented4    
,the beauties of nature  are generally  
of most benefit in this point of view1  
if we are early  accustomed to observe1 
appreciate1 and admire them4       #ec4 
,comparison of the respective           
aesthetical worth of the beautiful  arts
    ,of all the arts poetry 7which owes 
its origin almost entirely to  genius   

and will least be guided by precept or  
example7 maintains  the first rank4 ,it 
expands the mind by setting the         
,imagination at  liberty2 and by        
offering within the limits of a given   
concept amid  the unbounded variety of  
possible forms accordant therewith1 that
  which unites the presentment of this  
concept with a wealth of thought1  to   
which no verbal expression is completely
 adequate2 and so rising  aesthetically 
to ,ideas4 ,it strengthens the mind by  
making it feel its  faculty--free1      
spontaneous and independent of natural  
determination--of  considering and      
judging nature as a phenomenon in       
accordance with  aspects which it does  
not present in experience either for    
,sense or  ,understanding1 and therefore
 of using it on behalf of1 and as a sort
  of schema for1 the supersensible4 ,it 
plays with illusion1 which it  produces 
at pleasure1 but without deceiving by   
it2 for it declares  its exercise to be 
mere play1 which however can be         

purposively used  by the                
,understanding4--,rhetoric1 in so far as
 this means the art of  persuasion1 i4e4
 of deceiving by a beautiful show 7ars  
oratoria71  and not mere elegance of    
speech 7eloquence and style71 is a      
,dialectic1  which borrows from poetry  
only so much as is needful to win minds 
to the side of the orator before they   
have formed a judgement1 and  to deprive
 them of their freedom2 it cannot       
therefore be recommended  either for the
 law courts or for the pulpit4 ,for if  
we are dealing  with civil law1 with the
 rights of individual persons1 or with  
lasting  instruction and determination  
of people's minds to an accurate        
knowledge and a conscientious observance
 of their duty1 it is unworthy  of so   
important a business to allow a trace of
 any exuberance of wit  and imagination 
to appear1 and still less any trace of  
the art of  talking people over and of  
captivating them for the advantage of   
any  chance person4 ,for although this  

art may sometimes be directed to        
legitimate and praiseworthy designs1 it 
becomes objectionable1 when in  this way
 maxims and dispositions are spoiled in 
a subjective point of  view1 though the 
action may objectively be lawful4 ,it is
 not enough to  do what is right2 we    
should practise it solely on the ground 
that it  is right4 ,again1 the mere     
concept of this species of matters of   
human  concern1 when clear and combined 
with a lively presentation of it in     
examples1 without any offence against   
the rules of euphony of speech  or      
propriety of expression1 has by itself  
for ,ideas of ,reason 7which            
collectively constitute eloquence71     
sufficient influence upon human  minds2 
so that it is not needful to add the    
machinery of persuasion1  which1 since  
it can be used equally well to beautify 
or to hide vice  and error1 cannot quite
 lull the secret suspicion that one is  
being  artfully overreached4 ,in poetry 
everything proceeds with honesty and    

candour4 ,it declares itself to be a    
mere entertaining play of the           
,imagination1 which wishes to proceed as
 regards form in harmony with  the laws 
of the ,understanding2 and it does not  
desire to steal upon  and ensnare the   
,understanding by the aid of sensible   
presentation4#ib    ,after poetry1 if we
 are to deal with charm and mental      
movement1 ,i  would place that art which
 comes nearest to the art of speech and 
can  very naturally be united with it1  
viz4 the art of tone4 ,for although  it 
speaks by means of mere sensations      
without concepts1 and so does  not1 like
 poetry1 leave anything over for        
reflection1 it yet moves  the mind in a 
greater variety of ways and more        
intensely1 although  only transitorily4 
,it is1 however1 rather enjoyment than  
culture 7the  play of thought that is   
incidentally excited by its means is    
merely  the effect of a kind of         
mechanical association72 and in the     
judgement  of ,reason it has less worth 

than any other of the beautiful arts4   
,hence1 like all enjoyment1 it desires  
constant change1 and does not  bear     
frequent repetition without producing   
weariness4 ,its charm1 which  admits of 
universal communication1 appears to rest
 on this1 that every  expression of     
speech has in its context a tone        
appropriate to the  sense4 ,this tone   
indicates more or less an affection of  
the speaker1  and produces it also in   
the hearer2 which affection excites in  
its  turn in the hearer the ,idea that  
is expressed in speech by the tone  in  
question4 ,thus as modulation is as it  
were a universal language of  sensations
 intelligible to every man1 the art of  
tone employs it by  itself alone in its 
full force1 viz4 as a language of the   
affections1  and thus communicates      
universally according to the laws of    
association  the aesthetical ,ideas     
naturally combined therewith4 ,now these
  aesthetical ,ideas are not concepts or
 determinate thoughts4 ,hence the  form 

of the composition of these sensations  
7harmony and melody7 only  serves       
instead of the form of language1 by     
means of their proportionate            
accordance1 to express the aesthetical  
,idea of a connected whole of an        
unspeakable wealth of thought1          
corresponding to a certain theme which  
produces the dominating affection in the
 piece4 ,this can be brought            
mathematically under certain rules1     
because it rests in the case of  tones  
on the relation between the number of   
vibrations of the air in  the same time1
 so far as these tones are combined     
simultaneously or  successively4 ,to    
this mathematical form1 although not    
represented by  determinate concepts1   
alone attaches the satisfaction that    
unites  the mere reflection upon such a 
number of concomitant or consecutive    
sensations with this their play1 as a   
condition of its beauty valid for  every
 man4 ,it is this alone which permits   
,taste to claim in advance a  rightful  

authority over every one's judgement4   
,but in the charm and mental movement   
produced by ,music1 ,mathematic  has    
certainly not the slightest share4 ,it  
is only the indispensable  condition    
7conditio sine qua non7 of that         
proportion of the  impressions in their 
combination and in their alternation by 
which  it becomes possible to gather    
them together and prevent them from     
destroying one another1 and to harmonise
 them so as to produce a  continual     
movement and animation of the mind1 by  
means of affections  consonant          
therewith1 and thus a delightful        
personal enjoyment4    ,if1 on the other
 hand1 we estimate the worth of the     
,beautiful ,arts  by the culture they   
supply to the mind1 and take as a       
standard  the expansion of the faculties
 which must concur in the ,judgement    
for cognition1 ,music will have the     
lowest place among them 7as  it has     
perhaps the highest among those arts    
which are valued for  their             

pleasantness71 because it merely plays  
with sensations4 ,the  formative arts   
are far before it in this point of view2
 for in putting  the ,imagination in a  
free play1 which is also accordant with 
the  ,understanding1 they at the same   
time carry on a serious business4  ,this
 they do by producing a product that    
serves for concepts as a  permanent     
self-commendatory vehicle for promoting 
their union with  sensibility and thus1 
as it were1 the urbanity of the higher  
cognitive  powers4 ,these two species of
 art take quite different courses2 the  
first proceeds from sensations to       
indeterminate ,ideas1 the second  from  
determinate ,ideas to sensations4 ,the  
latter produce permanent1  the former   
only transitory impressions4 ,the       
,imagination can recall  the one and    
entertain itself pleasantly therewith2  
but the other  either vanish entirely1  
or if they are recalled involuntarily by
 the  ,imagination they are rather      
wearisome than pleasant4#ic ,besides1   

there attaches to ,music a certain want 
of urbanity from the fact  that1 chiefly
 from the character of its instruments1 
it extends its  influence further than  
is desired 7in the neighbourhood71 and  
so as it  were obtrudes itself1 and does
 violence to the freedom of others who  
are not of the musical company4 ,the    
,arts which appeal to the eyes do  not  
do this2 for we need only turn our eyes 
away1 if we wish to avoid  being        
impressed4 ,the case of music is almost 
like that of the delight  derived from a
 smell that diffuses itself widely4 ,the
 man who pulls his  perfumed            
handkerchief out of his pocket attracts 
the attention of all  round him1 even   
against their will1 and he forces them1 
if they are to  breathe at all1 to enjoy
 the scent2 hence this habit has gone   
out of  fashion4#id    ,among the       
formative arts ,i would give the palm to
 painting2 partly  because as the art of
 delineation it lies at the root of all 
the other  formative arts1 and partly   

because it can penetrate much further   
into the region of ,ideas1 and can      
extend the field of intuition in        
conformity with them further than the   
others can4       #ed4 ,remark    ,as we
 have often shown1 there is an essential
 difference between what  satisfies     
simply in the act of judging it1 and    
that which gratifies  7pleases in       
sensation74 ,we cannot ascribe the      
latter to every one1  as we can the     
former4 ,gratification 7the causes of   
which may even  be situate in ,ideas7   
appears always to consist in a feeling  
of the  furtherance of the whole life of
 the man1 and consequently1 also of his 
bodily well-being1 i4e4 his health2 so  
that ,epicurus1 who gave out  that all  
gratification was at bottom bodily      
sensation1 may1 perhaps1  not have been 
wrong1 but only misunderstood himself   
when he reckoned  intellectual and even 
practical satisfaction under            
gratification4 ,if we  have this        
distinction in view we can explain how a

 gratification may  dissatisfy the man  
who sensibly feels it 7e4g4 the joy of a
 needy but  well-meaning man at becoming
 the heir of an affectionate but        
penurious  father72 or how a deep grief 
may satisfy the person experiencing it  
7the sorrow of a widow at the death of  
her excellent husband72 or how  a       
gratification can in addition satisfy   
7as in the sciences that we  pursue72 or
 how a grief 7e4g4 hatred1 envy1        
revenge7 can moreover  dissatisfy4 ,the 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction here    
depends on ,reason1  and is the same as 
approbation or disapprobation2 but      
gratification  and grief can only rest  
on the feeling or prospect of a possible
 7on  whatever grounds7 well-being or   
its opposite4    ,all changing free play
 of sensations 7that have no design at  
their  basis7 gratifies1 because it     
promotes the feeling of health4 ,in the 
judgement of ,reason we may or may not  
have any satisfaction in its  object or 
even in this gratification2 and this    

latter may rise to the  height of an    
affection1 although we take no interest 
in the object1  at least none that is   
proportionate to the degree of the      
affection4  ,we may subdivide this free 
play of sensations into the play of     
fortune games of chance1 the play of    
tone music1 and the play  of thought    
wit4 ,the first requires an interest1   
whether of  vanity or of selfishness2   
which1 however1 is not nearly so great  
as the  interest that attaches to the   
way in which we are striving to procure 
it4 ,the second requires merely the     
change of sensations1 all of  which have
 a relation to affection1 though they   
have not the degree of  affection1 and  
excite aesthetical ,ideas4 ,the third   
springs merely  from the change of      
representations in the ,judgement2 by   
it1 indeed1 no  thought that brings an  
interest with it is produced1 but yet   
the mind  is animated thereby4    ,how  
much gratification games must afford1   
without any necessity of  placing at    

their basis an interested design1 all   
our evening parties  show2 for hardly   
any of them can be carried on without a 
game4 ,but the  affections of hope1     
fear1 joy1 wrath1 scorn1 are put in play
 by them1  alternating every moment2 and
 they are so vivid that by them1 as by  
a kind of internal motion1 all the vital
 processes of the body seem  to be      
promoted1 as is shown by the mental     
vivacity excited by them1  although     
nothing is gained or learnt thereby4    
,but as the beautiful does  not enter   
into games of chance1 we will here set  
them aside4 ,on the  other hand1 music  
and that which excites laughter are two 
different  kinds of play with           
aesthetical ,ideas1 or with             
representations of the  ,understanding  
through which ultimately nothing is     
thought2 and yet  they can give lively  
gratification merely by their changes4  
,thus we  recognise pretty clearly that 
the animation in both cases is merely   
bodily1 although it is excited by ,ideas

 of the mind2 and that the  feeling of  
health produced by a motion of the      
intestines corresponding  to the play in
 question makes up that whole           
gratification of a gay  party1 which is 
regarded as so refined and so spiritual4
 ,it is not the  judging the harmony in 
tones or sallies of wit1--which serves  
only  in combination with their beauty  
as a necessary vehicle1--but the        
furtherance of the vital bodily         
processes1 the affection that moves  the
 intestines and the diaphragm1 in a     
word1 the feeling of health  7which     
without such inducements one does not   
feel7 that makes up the  gratification  
felt by us2 so that we can thus reach   
the body through  the soul and use the  
latter as the physician of the former4  
,in music this play proceeds from bodily
 sensations to aesthetical ,ideas  7the 
,objects of our affections71 and then   
from these back again to the  body with 
redoubled force4 ,in the case of jokes  
7the art of which1  just like music1    

should rather be reckoned as pleasant   
than beautiful7  the play begins with   
the thoughts which together occupy the  
body1 so  far as they admit of sensible 
expression2 and as the ,understanding   
stops suddenly short at this            
presentment1 in which it does not find  
what it expected1 we feel the effect of 
this slackening in the body  by the     
oscillation of the organs1 which        
promotes the restoration of  equilibrium
 and has a favourable influence upon    
health4    ,in everything that is to    
excite a lively convulsive laugh there  
must  be something absurd 7in which the 
,understanding1 therefore1 can find  no 
satisfaction74 ,laughter is an affection
 arising from the sudden  transformation
 of a strained expectation into         
nothing4#ie ,this  transformation1 which
 is certainly not enjoyable by the      
,understanding1  yet indirectly gives it
 very active enjoyment for a moment4    
,therefore  its cause must consist in   
the influence of the representation upon

 the  body1 and the reflex effect of    
this upon the mind2 not1 indeed1 through
  the representation being objectively  
an object of gratification#if  7for how 
could a delusive expectation gratify871 
but simply through it  as a mere play of
 representations bringing about an      
equilibrium of the  vital powers in the 
body4    ,suppose this story to be told3
 ,an ,indian at the table of an         
,englishman  in ,surat1 when he saw a   
bottle of ale opened and all the beer   
turned  into froth and overflowing1     
testified his great astonishment with   
many  exclamations4 ,when the           
,englishman asked him1 8,what is there  
in this  to astonish you so much80 he   
answered1 8,i am not at all astonished  
that it should flow out1 but ,i do      
wonder how you ever got it in40 ,at     
this story we laugh1 and it gives us    
hearty pleasure2 not because  we deem   
ourselves cleverer than this ignorant   
man1 or because of  anything else in it 
that we note as satisfactory to the     

,understanding1  but because our        
expectation was strained for a time and 
then was  suddenly dissipated into      
nothing4 ,again3 ,the heir of a rich    
relative  wished to arrange for an      
imposing funeral1 but he lamented that  
he  could not properly succeed2 8for0   
7said he7 8the more money ,i give  my   
mourners to look sad1 the more cheerful 
they look60#ig ,when we  hear this story
 we laugh loud1 and the reason is that  
an expectation  is suddenly transformed 
into nothing4 ,we must note well that it
  does not transform itself into the    
positive opposite of an expected        
object--for then there would still be   
something1 which might even be  a cause 
of grief--but it must be transformed    
into nothing4 ,for if a  man arouses    
great expectations in us when telling a 
story1 and at the  end we see its       
falsehood immediately1 it displeases us2
 e4g4 the  story of the people whose    
hair in consequence of great grief      
turned  gray in one night4 ,but if a    

wag1 to repair the effect of this story1
  describes very circumstantially the   
grief of the merchant returning  from   
,india to ,europe with all his wealth in
 merchandise who was forced  to throw it
 overboard in a heavy storm1 and who    
grieved thereat so  much that his wig   
turned gray the same night--we laugh and
 it gives  us gratification4 ,for we    
treat our own mistake in the case of an 
object otherwise indifferent to us1 or  
rather the ,idea which we are  following
 out1 as we treat a ball which we knock 
to and fro for a  time1 though our only 
serious intention is to seize it and    
hold it  fast4 ,it is not the mere      
rebuff of a liar or a simpleton that    
arouses  our gratification2 for the     
latter story told with assumed          
seriousness  would set a whole company  
in a roar of laughter1 while the former 
would  ordinarily not be regarded as    
worth attending to4    ,it is remarkable
 that in all such cases the jest must   
contain something  that is capable of   

deceiving for a moment4 ,hence1 when the
 illusion is  dissipated1 the mind turns
 back to try it once again1 and thus    
through  a rapidly alternating tension  
and relaxation it is jerked back and    
put into a state of oscillation4 ,this1 
because the strain on the cord  as it   
were is suddenly 7and not gradually7    
relaxed1 must occasion a  mental        
movement1 and an inner bodily movement  
harmonising therewith1  which continues 
involuntarily and fatigues1 even while  
cheering us 7the  effects of a motion   
conducive to health74    ,for if we     
admit that with all our thoughts is     
harmonically combined  a movement in the
 organs of the body1 we shall easily    
comprehend how  to this sudden          
transposition of the mind1 now to one   
now to another  standpoint in order to  
contemplate its object1 may correspond  
an  alternating tension and relaxation  
of the elastic portions of our          
intestines1 which communicates itself to
 the diaphragm 7like that which         

ticklish people feel74 ,in connexion    
with this the lungs expel the  air at   
rapidly succeeding intervals1 and thus  
bring about a movement  beneficial to   
health2 which alone1 and not what       
precedes it in the  mind1 is the proper 
cause of the gratification in a thought 
that at  bottom represents              
nothing4--,voltaire said that heaven had
 given us  two things to counterbalance 
the many miseries of life1 hope and     
sleep4#ih ,he could have added laughter1
 if the means of exciting  it in        
reasonable men were only as easily      
attainable1 and the requisite  wit or   
originality of humour were not so rare1 
as the talent is common  of imagining   
things which break one's head1 as mystic
 dreamers do1 or  which break one's     
neck1 as your genius does1 or which     
break one's  heart1 as sentimental      
romance-writers 7and even moralists of  
the same  kidney7 do4    ,we may        
therefore1 as it seems to me1 readily   
concede to ,epicurus  that all          

gratification1 even that which is       
occasioned through concepts1  excited by
 aesthetical ,ideas1 is animal1 i4e4    
bodily sensation2  without the least    
prejudice to the spiritual feeling of   
respect for  moral ,ideas1 which is not 
gratification at all but an esteem for  
self  7for humanity in us71 that raises 
us above the need of gratification1  and
 even without the slightest prejudice to
 the less noble feeling of  taste4      
,we find a combination of these two last
 in naivet1 which is the  breaking out  
of the sincerity originally natural to  
humanity in  opposition to that art of  
dissimulation which has become a second 
nature4 ,we laugh at the simplicity that
 does not understand how  to dissemble2 
and yet we are delighted with the       
simplicity of the  nature which thwarts 
that art4 ,we look for the commonplace  
manner of  artificial utterance devised 
with foresight to make a fair show2 and 
behold6 it is the unspoiled innocent    
nature which we do not expect to  find1 

and which he who displays it did not    
think of disclosing4 ,that  the fair but
 false show which generally has so much 
influence upon  our judgement is here   
suddenly transformed into nothing1 so   
that1 as  it were1 the rogue in us is   
laid bare1 produces a movement of the   
mind in two opposite directions1 which  
gives a wholesome shock to the  body4   
,but the fact that something infinitely 
better than all assumed  manner1 viz4   
purity of disposition 7or at least the  
tendency thereto71  is not quite        
extinguished yet in human nature1 blends
 seriousness and  high esteem with this 
play of the ,judgement4 ,but because it 
is only  a transitory phenomenon and the
 veil of dissimulation is soon drawn    
over it again1 there is mingled         
therewith a compassion which is an      
emotion of tenderness2 this1 as play1   
readily admits of combination  with a   
good-hearted laugh1 and ordinarily is   
actually so combined1 and  withal is    
wont to compensate him who supplies its 

material for the  embarrassment which   
results from not yet being wise after   
the manner  of men4--,an art that is to 
be naive is thus a contradiction2 but   
the  representation of naivet in a      
fictitious personage is quite possible1 
and is a beautiful though a rare art4   
,naivet must not be confounded  with    
open-hearted simplicity1 which does not 
artificially spoil nature  solely       
because it does not understand the art  
of social intercourse4    ,the humorous 
manner again may be classified as that  
which1 as  exhilarating us1 is near akin
 to the gratification that proceeds     
from laughter2 and belongs to the       
originality of spirit1 but not to  the  
talent of beautiful art4 ,humour in the 
good sense means the  talent of being   
able voluntarily to put oneself into a  
certain mental  disposition1 in which   
everything is judged quite differently  
from the  ordinary method 7reversed1 in 
fact71 and yet in accordance with       
certain  rational principles in such a  

frame of mind4 ,he who is involuntarily 
subject to such mutations is called a   
man of humours launisch2 but  he who can
 assume them voluntarily and purposively
 7on behalf of a  lively presentment    
brought about by the aid of a contrast  
that excites  a laugh7--he and his      
manner of speech are called humorous    
launigt4  ,this manner1 however1 belongs
 rather to pleasant than to beautiful   
art1  because the object of the latter  
must always exhibit intrinsic worth1    
and hence requires a certain seriousness
 in the presentation1 as taste  does in 
the act of judgement4          ,,second 
,,division    ,,dialectic ,,of ,,the    
,,aesthetical ,,judgement       #ee     
,a faculty of ,judgement that is to be  
dialectical must in the  first place be 
rationalising1 i4e4 its judgements must 
claim  universality#ii and that a       
priori2 for it is in the opposition of  
such judgements that ,dialectic         
consists4 ,hence the incompatibility of 
aesthetical judgements of ,sense 7about 

the pleasant and the unpleasant7  is not
 dialectical4 ,and again1 the conflict  
between judgements of  ,taste1 so far as
 each man depends merely on his own     
taste1 forms no  ,dialectic of taste2   
because no one proposes to make his own 
judgement a  universal rule4 ,there     
remains therefore no other concept of a 
,dialectic  which has to do with taste  
than that of a ,dialectic of the        
,critique  of taste 7not of taste       
itself7 in respect of its principles2   
for  here concepts that contradict one  
another 7as to the ground of  the       
possibility of judgements of taste in   
general7 naturally and  unavoidably     
present themselves4 ,the transcendental 
,critique of taste  will therefore      
contain a part which can bear the name  
of a ,dialectic  of the aesthetical     
,judgement1 only if and so far as there 
is found an  antinomy of the principles 
of this faculty which renders its       
conformity  to law1 and consequently    
also its internal possibility1 doubtful4

       #ef4 ,representation of the      
antinomy of ,taste    ,the first        
commonplace of taste is contained in the
 proposition1 with  which every         
tasteless person proposes to avoid      
blame3 every one has  his own taste4    
,that is as much as to say that the     
determining ground  of this judgement is
 merely subjective 7gratification or    
grief71 and  that the judgement has no  
right to the necessary assent of others4
    ,the second commonplace invoked even
 by those who admit for judgements  of  
taste the right to speak with validity  
for every one is3 there  is no disputing
 about taste4 ,that is as much as to say
 that the  determining ground of a      
judgement of taste may indeed be        
objective1 but  that it cannot be       
reduced to definite concepts1 and that  
consequently  about the judgement itself
 nothing can be decided by proofs1      
although  much may rightly be contested4
 ,for contesting quarrelling and        
disputing controversy are doubtless the 

same in this1 that by means  of the     
mutual opposition of judgements they    
seek to produce their  accordance2 but  
different in that the latter hopes to   
bring this about  according to definite 
concepts as determining grounds1 and    
consequently  assumes objective concepts
 as grounds of the judgement4 ,but where
  this is regarded as impracticable1    
controversy is regarded as alike        
impracticable4    ,we easily see that   
between these two commonplaces there is 
a  proposition wanting1 which1 though it
 has not passed into a proverb1  is yet 
familiar to every one1 viz4 there may be
 a quarrel about  taste 7although there 
can be no controversy74 ,but this       
proposition  involves the contradictory 
of the former one4 ,for wherever        
quarrelling  is permissible1 there must 
be a hope of mutual reconciliation2 and 
consequently we can count on grounds of 
our judgement that have not  merely     
private validity1 and therefore are not 
merely subjective4 ,and  to this the    

proposition1 every one has his own      
taste1 is directly  opposed4    ,there  
emerges therefore in respect of the     
principle of taste the  following       
,antinomy3--    7#a7 ,thesis4 ,the      
judgement of taste is not based upon    
concepts2 for  otherwise it would admit 
of controversy 7would be determinable by
  proofs74    7#b7 ,antithesis4 ,the    
judgement of taste is based on concepts2
 for  otherwise1 despite its diversity1 
we could not quarrel about it 7we  could
 not claim for our judgement the        
necessary assent of others74       #eg4 
,solution of the antinomy of ,taste     
,there is no possibility of removing the
 conflict between these  principles that
 underlie every judgement of taste      
7which are nothing  else than the two   
peculiarities of the judgement of taste 
exhibited  above in the ,analytic71     
except by showing that the concept to   
which we  refer the ,object in this kind
 of judgement is not taken in the same  
sense in both maxims of the aesthetical 

,judgement4 ,this twofold sense  or     
twofold point of view is necessary to   
our transcendental ,judgement2  but also
 the illusion which arises from the     
confusion of one with the  other is     
natural and unavoidable4    ,the        
judgement of taste must refer to some   
concept2 otherwise it could  make       
absolutely no claim to be necessarily   
valid for every one4 ,but  it is not    
therefore capable of being proved from a
 concept2 because  a concept may be     
either determinable or in itself        
undetermined and  undeterminable4 ,the  
concepts of the ,understanding are of   
the former  kind2 they are determinable 
through predicates of sensible intuition
  which can correspond to them4 ,but the
 transcendental rational concept  of the
 supersensible1 which lies at the basis 
of all sensible  intuition1 is of the   
latter kind1 and therefore cannot be    
theoretically  determined further4      
,now the judgement of taste is applied  
to objects of ,sense1 but not with  a   

view of determining a concept of them   
for the ,understanding2 for  it is not a
 cognitive judgement4 ,it is thus only a
 private judgement1  in which a singular
 representation intuitively perceived is
 referred  to the feeling of pleasure2  
and so far would be limited as regards  
its  validity to the individual judging4
 ,the object is for me an object of     
satisfaction2 by others it may be       
regarded quite differently--every one   
has his own taste4    ,nevertheless     
there is undoubtedly contained in the   
judgement of taste  a wider reference of
 the representation of the ,object 7as  
well as of  the subject71 whereon we    
base an extension of judgements of this 
kind  as necessary for every one4 ,at   
the basis of this there must necessarily
  be a concept somewhere2 though a      
concept which cannot be determined      
through intuition4 ,but through a       
concept of this sort we know nothing1   
and consequently it can supply no proof 
for the judgement of taste4  ,such a    

concept is the mere pure rational       
concept of the supersensible  which     
underlies the object 7and also the      
subject judging it71 regarded  as an    
,object of sense and thus as            
phenomenon4#ajj ,for if we do  not admit
 such a reference1 the claim of the     
judgement of taste to  universal        
validity would not hold good4 ,if the   
concept on which it is  based were only 
a mere confused concept of the          
,understanding1 like that  of           
perfection1 with which we could bring   
the sensible intuition of the           
,beautiful into correspondence1 it would
 be at least possible in itself  to base
 the judgement of taste on proofs2 which
 contradicts the thesis4    ,but all    
contradiction disappears if ,i say3 the 
judgement of taste is  based on a       
concept 7viz4 the concept of the general
 ground of the  subjective purposiveness
 of nature for the ,judgement72 from    
which1  however1 nothing can be known   
and proved in respect of the ,object1   

because it is in itself undeterminable  
and useless for knowledge4 ,yet  at the 
same time and on that very account the  
judgement has validity  for every one   
7though of course for each only as a    
singular judgement  immediately         
accompanying his intuition72 because its
 determining ground  lies perhaps in the
 concept of that which may be regarded  
as the  supersensible substrate of      
humanity4    ,the solution of an        
antinomy only depends on the possibility
 of showing  that two apparently        
contradictory propositions do not       
contradict  one another in fact1 but    
that they may be consistent2 although   
the  explanation of the possibility of  
their concept may transcend our         
cognitive faculties4 ,that this illusion
 is natural and unavoidable  by human   
,reason1 and also why it is so1 and     
remains so1 although it  ceases to      
deceive after the analysis of the       
apparent contradiction1 may  be thus    
explained4    ,in the two contradictory 

judgements we take the concept1 on which
 the  universal validity of a judgement 
must be based1 in the same sense2 and   
yet we apply to it two opposite         
predicates4 ,in the ,thesis we mean that
  the judgement of taste is not based   
upon determinate concepts2 and  in the  
,antithesis that the judgement of taste 
is based upon a concept1  but an        
indeterminate one 7viz4 of the          
supersensible substrate of  phenomena74 
,between these two there is no          
contradiction4    ,we can do nothing    
more than remove this conflict between  
the claims and  counter-claims of taste4
 ,it is absolutely impossible to give a 
definite  objective principle of taste1 
in accordance with which its judgements 
could be derived1 examined1 and         
established2 for then the judgement     
would not be one of taste at all4 ,the  
subjective principle1 viz4 the          
indefinite ,idea of the supersensible in
 us1 can only be put forward as  the    
sole key to the puzzle of this faculty  

whose sources are hidden  from us3 it   
can be made no further intelligible4    
,the proper concept of taste1 that is of
 a merely reflective aesthetical        
,judgement1 lies at the basis of the    
antinomy here exhibited and  adjusted4  
,thus the two apparently contradictory  
principles are  reconciled--both can be 
true2 which is sufficient4 ,if1 on the  
other  hand1 we assume1 as some do1     
pleasantness as the determining ground  
of taste 7on account of the singularity 
of the representation which  lies at the
 basis of the judgement of taste71 or1  
as others will  have it1 the principle  
of perfection 7on account of the        
universality  of the same71 and settle  
the definition of taste accordingly2    
then  there arises an antinomy which it 
is absolutely impossible to adjust      
except by showing that both the contrary
 7though not contradictory7             
propositions are false4 ,and this would 
prove that the concept on  which they   
are based is self-contradictory4 ,hence 

we see that the  removal of the antinomy
 of the aesthetical ,judgement takes a  
course  similar to that pursued by the  
,critique in the solution of the        
antinomies of pure theoretical ,reason4 
,and thus here1 as also in the          
,critique of practical ,reason1 the     
antinomies force us against our will  to
 look beyond the sensible and to seek in
 the supersensible the point  of union  
for all our a priori faculties2 because 
no other expedient  is left to make our 
,reason harmonious with itself4         
,remark ,i4    ,as we so often find     
occasion in ,transcendental ,philosophy 
for  distinguishing ,ideas from concepts
 of the ,understanding1 it may be of    
use to introduce technical terms to     
correspond to this distinction4  ,i     
believe that no one will object if ,i   
propose some4--,in the most  universal  
signification of the word1 ,ideas are   
representations referred  to an object1 
according to a certain 7subjective or   
objective7  principle1 but so that they 

can never become a cognition of it4     
,they are either referred to an         
intuition1 according to a merely        
subjective principle of the mutual      
harmony of the cognitive powers  7the   
,imagination and the ,understanding71   
and they are then called  aesthetical2  
or they are referred to a concept       
according to an  objective principle1   
although they can never furnish a       
cognition of  the object and are called 
rational ,ideas4 ,in the latter case the
  concept is a transcendent one1 which  
is different from a concept of  the     
,understanding1 to which an adequately  
corresponding experience can  always be 
supplied1 and which therefore is called 
immanent4    ,an aesthetical ,idea      
cannot become a cognition1 because it is
 an  intuition 7of the ,imagination7 for
 which an adequate concept can  never be
 found4 ,a rational ,idea can never     
become a cognition1 because  it involves
 a concept 7of the supersensible71      
corresponding to which an  intuition can

 never be given4    ,now ,i believe we  
might call the aesthetical ,idea an     
inexponible  representation of the      
,imagination1 and a rational ,idea an   
indemonstrable concept of ,reason4 ,it  
is assumed of both that they are  not   
generated without grounds1 but          
7according to the above explanation  of 
an ,idea in general7 in conformity with 
certain principles of the  cognitive    
faculties to which they belong          
7subjective principles in the  one case1
 objective in the other74    ,concepts  
of the ,understanding must1 as such1    
always be demonstrable  if by           
demonstration we understand1 as in      
anatomy1 merely  presentation2#aja i4e4 
the object corresponding to them must   
always be capable of being given in     
intuition 7pure or empirical72 for  thus
 alone could they become cognitions4    
,the concept of magnitude  can be given 
a priori in the intuition of space1 e4g4
 of a right  line1 etc42 the concept of 
cause in impenetrability1 in the        

collision  of bodies1 etc4 ,consequently
 both can be authenticated by means of  
an empirical intuition1 i4e4 the thought
 of them can be proved  7demonstrated1  
verified7 by an example2 and this must  
be possible1  for otherwise we should   
not be certain that the concept was not 
empty1  i4e4 devoid of any ,object4     
,in ,logic we ordinarily use the        
expressions demonstrable or             
indemonstrable only in respect of       
propositions1 but these might  be better
 designated by the titles respectively  
of mediately and  immediately certain   
propositions2 for pure ,philosophy has  
also  propositions of both kinds1 i4e4  
true propositions1 some of which  are   
susceptible of proof and others not4 ,it
 can1 as philosophy1 prove  them on a   
priori grounds1 but it cannot           
demonstrate them2 unless  we wish to    
depart entirely from the proper meaning 
of this word1  according to which to    
demonstrate 7ostendere1 exhibere7 is    
equivalent to presenting a concept in   

intuition 7whether in proof or  merely  
in definition74 ,if the intuition is a  
priori this is called  construction2 but
 if it is empirical1 then the ,object is
 displayed by  means of which objective 
reality is assured to the concept4 ,thus
 we say  of an anatomist that he        
demonstrates the human eye1 if by a     
dissection  of this organ he makes      
intuitively evident the concept which he
 has  previously treated discursively4  
,it hence follows that the rational     
concept of the supersensible  substrate 
of all phenomena in general1 or even of 
that which must be  placed at the basis 
of our arbitrary will in respect of the 
moral law1  viz4 of transcendental      
freedom1 is already1 in kind1 an        
indemonstrable  concept and a rational  
,idea2 while virtue is so1 in degree4   
,for there  can be given in experience1 
as regards its quality1 absolutely      
nothing  corresponding to the former2   
whereas in the latter case no empirical 
product attains to the degree of that   

causality1 which the rational  ,idea    
prescribes as the rule4    ,as in a     
rational ,idea the ,imagination with its
 intuitions does  not attain to the     
given concept1 so in an aesthetical     
,idea the  ,understanding by its        
concepts never attains completely to    
that  internal intuition which the      
,imagination binds up with a given      
representation4 ,since1 now1 to reduce a
 representation of the  ,imagination to 
concepts is the same thing as to expound
 it1 the  aesthetical ,idea may be      
called an inexponible representation of 
the  ,imagination 7in its free play74 ,i
 shall have occasion in the sequel to   
say something more of ,ideas of this    
kind2 now ,i only note that both  kinds 
of ,ideas1 rational and aesthetical1    
must have their principles2  and must   
have them in ,reason--the one in the    
objective1 the other in  the subjective 
principles of its employment4    ,we can
 consequently explain genius as the     
faculty of aesthetical  ,ideas2 by which

 at the same time is shown the reason   
why in the  products of genius it is the
 nature 7of the subject7 and not a      
premeditated purpose that gives the rule
 to the art 7of the production  of the  
beautiful74 ,for since the beautiful    
must not be judged by  concepts1 but by 
the purposive attuning of the           
,imagination to agreement  with the     
faculty of concepts in general1 it      
cannot be rule and precept  which can   
serve as the subjective standard of that
 aesthetical but  unconditioned         
purposiveness in beautiful art1 that can
 rightly claim  to please every one4 ,it
 can only be that in the subject which  
is  nature and cannot be brought under  
rules or concepts1 i4e4 the             
supersensible substrate of all his      
faculties 7to which no concept of  the  
,understanding extends71 and            
consequently that with respect to which 
it is the final purpose given by the    
intelligible part of our nature  to     
harmonise all our cognitive faculties4  

,thus alone is it possible  that there  
should be a priori at the basis of this 
purposiveness1 for  which we can        
prescribe no objective principle1 a     
principle subjective  and yet of        
universal validity4      ,remark ,,ii4  
,the following important remark occurs  
here3 ,there are three kinds of         
,antinomies of pure ,reason1 which1     
however1 all agree in this1 that  they  
compel us to give up the otherwise very 
natural hypothesis that  objects of     
sense are things in themselves1 and     
force us to regard them  merely as      
phenomena1 and to supply to them an     
intelligible substrate  7something      
supersensible of which the concept is   
only an ,idea1 and  supplies no proper  
knowledge74 ,without such antinomies    
,reason could  never decide upon        
accepting a principle narrowing so much 
the field of  its speculation1 and could
 never bring itself to sacrifices by    
which so  many otherwise brilliant hopes
 must disappear4 ,for even now when1 by 

way of compensation for these losses1 a 
greater field in a practical  aspect    
opens out before it1 it appears not to  
be able without grief to  part from     
those hopes1 and disengage itself from  
its old attachment4    ,that there are  
three kinds of antinomies has its ground
 in this1 that  there are three         
cognitive faculties1--,understanding1   
,judgement1 and  ,reason2 of which each 
7as a superior cognitive faculty7 must  
have  its a priori principles4 ,for     
,reason1 in so far as it judges of      
these principles and their use1         
inexorably requires1 in respect of  them
 all1 the unconditioned for the given   
conditioned2 and this can  never be     
found if we consider the sensible as    
belonging to things  in themselves1 and 
do not rather supply to it1 as mere     
phenomenon1  something supersensible    
7the intelligible substrate of nature   
both  external and internal7 as the     
reality in itself ,sache an sich selbst4
  ,there are then3 7#a7 ,for the        

cognitive faculty an antinomy of ,reason
  in respect of the theoretical         
employment of the ,understanding        
extended  to the unconditioned2 7#b7 for
 the feeling of pleasure and pain an    
antinomy of ,reason in respect of the   
aesthetical employment of the           
,judgement2 and 7#c7 for the faculty of 
desire an antinomy in respect  of the   
practical employment of the             
self-legislative ,reason2 so far as  all
 these faculties have their superior    
principles a priori1 and1 in  conformity
 with an inevitable requirement of      
,reason1 must judge and be  able to     
determine their ,object1 unconditionally
 according to those  principles4    ,as 
for the two antinomies of the           
theoretical and practical employment  of
 the superior cognitive faculties1 we   
have already shown their                
unavoidableness1 if judgements of this  
kind are not referred to  a             
supersensible substrate of the given    
,objects1 as phenomena2 and  also the   

possibility of their solution1 as soon  
as this is done4  ,and as for the       
antinomies in the employment of the     
,judgement1 in  conformity with the     
requirements of ,reason1 and their      
solution which  is here given1 there are
 only two ways of avoiding them4        
,either3  we must deny that any a priori
 principle lies at the basis of the     
aesthetical judgement of taste2 we must 
maintain that all claim to  necessary   
universal agreement is a groundless and 
vain fancy1 and that  a judgement of    
taste only deserves to be regarded as   
correct because  it happens that many   
people agree about it2 and this1 not    
because we  assume an a priori principle
 behind this agreement1 but because  7as
 in the taste of the palate7 of the     
contingent similar organisation  of the 
different subjects4 ,or3 we must assume 
that the judgement of  taste is really a
 disguised judgement of ,reason upon the
 perfection  discovered in a thing and  
the reference of the manifold in it to a

  purpose1 and is consequently only     
called aesthetical on account of the    
confusion here attaching to our         
reflection1 although it is at bottom    
teleological4 ,in the latter case we    
could declare the solution of the       
antinomies by means of transcendental   
,ideas to be needless and without       
point1 and thus could harmonise these   
laws of taste with ,objects of  sense1  
not as mere phenomena but as things in  
themselves4 ,but we have  shown in      
several places in the exposition of     
judgements of taste how  little either  
of these expedients will satisfy4       
,however1 if it be granted that our     
deduction at least proceeds by the      
right method1 although it be not yet    
plain enough in all its parts1  three   
,ideas manifest themselves4 ,first1     
there is the ,idea of the  supersensible
 in general1 without any further        
determination of it1 as  the substrate  
of nature4 ,secondly1 there is the ,idea
 of the same  as the principle of the   

subjective purposiveness of nature for  
our  cognitive faculty4 ,and thirdly1   
there is the ,idea of the same as the   
principle of the purposes of freedom1   
and of the agreement of freedom  with   
its purposes in the moral sphere4       
#eh4 ,of the ,idealism of the           
purposiveness of both ,nature and ,art  
as  the unique principle of the         
aesthetical ,judgement    ,to begin     
with1 we can either place the principle 
of taste in the fact  that it always    
judges in accordance with grounds which 
are empirical  and therefore are only   
given a posteriori by sense1 or concede 
that  it judges on a priori grounds4    
,the former would be the empiricism  of 
the ,critique of ,taste2 the latter its 
rationalism4 ,according to  the former  
the ,object of our satisfaction would   
not differ from  the pleasant2 according
 to the latter1 if the judgement rests  
on  definite concepts1 it would not     
differ from the good4 ,thus all  beauty 
would be banished from the world1 and   

only a particular name1  expressing     
perhaps a certain mingling of the two   
above-named kinds of  satisfaction1     
would remain in its place4 ,but we have 
shown that there  are also a priori     
grounds of satisfaction which can       
subsist along  with the principle of    
rationalism1 although they cannot be    
comprehended  in definite concepts4     
,on the other hand1 the rationalism of  
the principle of taste is either  that  
of the realism of the purposiveness1 or 
of its idealism4  ,because a judgement  
of taste is not a cognitive judgement1  
and beauty  is not a characteristic of  
the ,object1 considered in itself1 the  
rationalism of the principle of taste   
can never be placed in the fact  that   
the purposiveness in this judgement is  
thought as objective1  i4e4 that the    
judgement theoretically1 and therefore  
also logically  7although only in a     
confused way71 refers to the perfection 
of the  ,object4 ,it only refers        
aesthetically to the agreement of the   

representation of the ,object in the    
,imagination with the essential         
principles of ,judgement in general in  
the subject4 ,consequently1 even        
according to the principle of           
rationalism1 the judgement of taste  and
 the distinction between its realism and
 idealism can only be  settled thus4    
,either in the first case1 this         
subjective purposiveness  is assumed as 
an actual 7designed7 purpose of nature  
7or art7  harmonising with our          
,judgement2 or1 in the second case1 as a
 purposive  harmony with the needs of   
,judgement1 in respect of nature and its
 forms  produced according to particular
 laws1 which shows itself1 without      
purpose1 spontaneously1 and             
contingently4    ,the beautiful         
formations in the kingdom of organised  
nature speak  loudly for the realism of 
the aesthetical purposiveness of nature2
  since we might assume that behind the 
production of the beautiful there  is an
 ,idea of the beautiful in the producing

 cause1 viz4 a purpose  in respect of   
our ,imagination4 ,flowers1 blossoms1   
even the shapes  of entire plants2 the  
elegance of animal formations of all    
kinds1  unneeded for their proper use1  
but1 as it were1 selected for our taste2
  especially the charming variety so    
satisfying to the eye and the           
harmonious arrangement of colours 7in   
the pheasant1 in shell-fish1 in         
insects1 even in the commonest flowers71
 which1 as it only concerns the  surface
 and not the figure of these creations  
7though perhaps requisite  in regard of 
their internal purposes71 seems to be   
entirely designed  for external         
inspection2 these things give great     
weight to that mode of  explanation     
which assumes actual purposes of nature 
for our aesthetical  ,judgement4    ,on 
the other hand1 not only is ,reason     
opposed to this assumption in  its      
maxims1 which bid us always avoid as far
 as possible unnecessary  multiplication
 of principles2 but nature everywhere   

shows in its  free formations much      
mechanical tendency to the productions  
of forms  which seem1 as it were1 to be 
made for the aesthetical exercise of    
our ,judgement1 without affording the   
least ground for the supposition  that  
there is need of anything more than its 
mechanism1 merely as  nature1 according 
to which1 without any ,idea lying at    
their root1  they can be purposive for  
our judgement4 ,but ,i understand by    
free  formations of nature those whereby
 from a fluid at rest1 through  the     
volatilisation or separation of a       
portion of its constituents  7sometimes 
merely of caloric71 the remainder in    
becoming solid  assumes a definite shape
 or tissue 7figure or texture71 which is
  different according to the specific   
difference of the material1 but  in the 
same material is constant4 ,here it is  
always presupposed that  we are speaking
 of a perfect fluid1 i4e4 that the      
material in it  is completely dissolved1
 and that it is not a mere medley of    

solid  particles in a state of          
suspension4    ,formation1 then1 takes  
place by a shooting together1 i4e4 by a 
sudden solidification1 not by a gradual 
transition from the fluid to  the solid 
state1 but all at once by a saltus2     
which transition is  also called        
crystallisation4 ,the commonest example 
of this kind of  formation is the       
freezing of water1 where first icicles  
are produced1  which combine at angles  
of #fj1 while others attach themselves  
to each  vertex1 until it all becomes   
ice2 and so that1 while this is going   
on1 the water does not gradually become 
viscous1 but is as perfectly  fluid as  
if its temperature were far higher1     
although it is absolutely  ice-cold4    
,the matter that disengages itself1     
which is dissipated  suddenly at the    
moment of solidification1 is a          
considerable quantum  of caloric1 the   
disappearance of which1 as it was only  
required for  preserving fluidity1      
leaves the new ice not in the least     

colder than  the water which shortly    
before was fluid4    ,many salts1 and   
also rocks1 of a crystalline figure1 are
 produced thus  from a species of earth 
dissolved in water1 we do not exactly   
know  how4 ,thus are formed the         
glandular configurations of many        
minerals1  the cubical sulphide of lead1
 the ruby silver ore1 etc41 in all      
probability in water and by the shooting
 together of particles1 as they  become 
forced by some cause to dispense with   
this vehicle and to unite  in definite  
external shapes4    ,but also all kinds 
of matter1 which have been kept in a    
fluid state  by heat1 and have become   
solid by cooling1 show internally1 when 
fractured1 a definite texture4 ,this    
makes us judge that if their own  weight
 or the disturbance of the air had not  
prevented it1 they would  also have     
exhibited on the outer surface their    
specifically peculiar  shapes4 ,this has
 been observed in some metals on their  
inner surface1  which have been hardened

 externally by fusion but are fluid in  
the  interior1 by the drawing off the   
internal fluid and the consequent       
undisturbed crystallisation of the      
remainder4 ,many of these mineral       
crystallisations1 such as spars1        
hematite1 arragonite1 etc41 often       
present beautiful shapes1 the like of   
which art can only conceive2 and  the   
halo in the cavern of ,antiparos#ajb is 
merely produced by water  trickling down
 strata of gypsum4    ,the fluid state  
is1 to all appearance1 older than the   
solid state1 and  plants as well as     
animal bodies are fashioned out of fluid
 nutritive  matter1 so far as this forms
 itself in a state of rest4 ,this last  
of course primarily combines and forms  
itself in freedom according  to a       
certain original disposition directed   
towards purposes 7which1  as will be    
shown in ,part ,,ii41 must not be judged
 aesthetically but  teleologically      
according to the principle of realism71 
but also perhaps  in conformity with the

 universal law of the affinity of       
materials4  ,again1 the watery fluids   
dissolved in an atmosphere that is a    
mixture  of different gases1 if they    
separate from the latter on account of  
cooling1 produce snow figures1 which in 
correspondence with the  character of   
the special mixture of gases1 often seem
 very artistic and  are extremely       
beautiful4 ,so1 without detracting from 
the teleological  principle by which we 
judge of organisation1 we may well think
 that  the beauty of flowers1 of the    
plumage of birds1 or of shell-fish1     
both in shape and colour1 may be        
ascribed to nature and its faculty  of  
producing forms in an aesthetically     
purposive way1 in its freedom1  without 
particular purposes adapted thereto1    
according to chemical laws  by the      
arrangement of the material requisite   
for the organisation in  question4      
,but what shows the principle of the    
,ideality of the purposiveness in  the  
beauty of nature1 as that which we      

always place at the basis of  an        
aesthetical judgement1 and which allows 
us to employ1 as a ground  of           
explanation for our representative      
faculty1 no realism of purpose1  is the 
fact that in judging beauty we          
invariably seek its gauge in  ourselves 
a priori1 and that our aesthetical      
,judgement is itself  legislative in    
respect of the judgement whether        
anything is beautiful  or not4 ,this    
could not be1 on the assumption of the  
,realism of the  purposiveness of       
nature2 because in that case we must    
have learned from  nature what we ought 
to find beautiful1 and the aesthetical  
judgement  would be subjected to        
empirical principles4 ,for in such an   
act of  judging the important point is  
not1 what nature is1 or even1 as a      
purpose1 is in relation to us1 but how  
we take it4 ,there would be an          
objective purposiveness in nature if it 
had fashioned its forms for our         
satisfaction2 and not a subjective      

purposiveness which depended upon  the  
play of the ,imagination in its freedom1
 where it is we who receive  nature with
 favour1 not nature which shows us      
favour4 ,the property  of nature that   
gives us occasion to perceive the inner 
purposiveness  in the relation of our   
mental faculties in judging certain of  
its  products--a purposiveness which is 
to be explained on supersensible        
grounds as necessary and                
universal--cannot be a natural purpose  
or be  judged by us as such2 for        
otherwise the judgement hereby          
determined  would not be free1 and would
 have at its basis heteronomy1 and not1 
as  beseems a judgement of taste1       
autonomy4    ,in beautiful ,art the     
principle of the ,idealism of           
purposiveness  is still clearer4 ,as in 
the case of the beautiful in ,nature1 an
  aesthetical ,realism of this          
purposiveness cannot be perceived by    
sensations 7for then the art would be   
only pleasant1 not beautiful74  ,but    

that the satisfaction produced by       
aesthetical ,ideas must not depend  on  
the attainment of definite purposes 7as 
in mechanically designed  art71 and that
 consequently1 in the very rationalism  
of the principle1  the ideality of the  
purposes and not their reality must be  
fundamental1  appears from the fact that
 beautiful ,art1 as such1 must not be   
considered as a product of              
,understanding and ,science1 but of     
,genius1  and therefore must get its    
rule through aesthetical ,ideas1 which  
are  essentially different from rational
 ,ideas of definite purposes4    ,just  
as the ideality of the objects of sense 
as phenomena is the only  way of        
explaining the possibility of their     
forms being susceptible  of a priori    
determination1 so the idealism of       
purposiveness1 in  judging the beautiful
 in nature and art1 is the only         
hypothesis under  which ,criticism can  
explain the possibility of a judgement  
of taste  which demands a priori        

validity for every one 7without         
grounding on  concepts the purposiveness
 that is represented in the ,object74   
#ei4 ,of ,beauty as the symbol of       
,morality    ,intuitions are always     
required to establish the reality of our
  concepts4 ,if the concepts are        
empirical1 the intuitions are called    
examples4 ,if they are pure concepts of 
,understanding1 the intuitions  are     
called schemata4 ,if we desire to       
establish the objective reality  of     
rational concepts1 i4e4 of ,ideas1 on   
behalf of theoretical  cognition1 then  
we are asking for something impossible1 
because  absolutely no intuition can be 
given which shall be adequate to them4  
,all hypotyposis 7presentation1         
subjectio sub adspectum71 or  sensible  
illustration1 is twofold4 ,it is either 
schematical1 when to  a concept         
comprehended by the ,understanding the  
corresponding intuition  is given a     
priori2 or it is symbolical4 ,in the    
latter case to a  concept only thinkable

 by the ,reason1 to which no sensible   
intuition  can be adequate1 an intuition
 is supplied with which accords a       
procedure of the ,judgement analogous to
 what it observes in schematism3  it    
accords with it1 that is1 in respect of 
the rule of this procedure  merely1 not 
of the intuition itself2 consequently in
 respect of the  form of reflection     
merely1 and not of its content4         
,there is a use of the word symbolical  
that has been adopted by modern         
logicians1 which is misleading and      
incorrect1 i4e4 to speak of the         
symbolical mode of representation as if 
it were opposed to the  intuitive2 for  
the symbolical is only a mode of the    
intuitive4 ,the  latter 7the intuitive71
 that is1 may be divided into the       
schematical  and the symbolical modes of
 representation4 ,both are hypotyposes1 
i4e4 presentations 7exhibitiones72 not  
mere characterisations1 or  designations
 of concepts by accompanying sensible   
signs which contain  nothing belonging  

to the intuition of the ,object1 and    
only serve as a  means for reproducing  
the concepts1 according to the law of   
association  of the ,imagination1 and   
consequently in a subjective point of   
view4  ,these are either words1 or      
visible 7algebraical1 even mimetical7   
signs1  as mere expressions for         
concepts4#ajc    ,all intuitions1 which 
we supply to concepts a priori1 are     
therefore  either schemata or symbols1  
of which the former contain direct1  the
 latter indirect1 presentations of the  
concept4 ,the former do  this           
demonstratively2 the latter by means of 
an analogy 7for which  we avail         
ourselves even of empirical intuitions7 
in which the  ,judgement exercises a    
double function2 first applying the     
concept  to the object of a sensible    
intuition1 and then applying the mere   
rule of the reflection made upon that   
intuition to a quite different  object  
of which the first is only the symbol4  
,thus a monarchical  state is           

represented by a living body1 if it is  
governed by national  laws1 and by a    
mere machine 7like a hand-mill7 if      
governed by an  individual absolute     
will2 but in both cases only            
symbolically4  ,for between a despotic  
state and a hand-mill there is1 to be   
sure1  no similarity2 but there is a    
similarity in the rules according to    
which we reflect upon these two things  
and their causality4 ,this  matter has  
not been sufficiently analysed hitherto1
 for it deserves  a deeper              
investigation2 but this is not the place
 to linger over it4  ,our language i4e4 
,german is full of indirect             
presentations of  this sort1 in which   
the expression does not contain the     
proper schema  for the concept1 but     
merely a symbol for reflection4 ,thus   
the words  ground 7support1 basis71 to  
depend 7to be held up from above71 to   
flow from something 7instead of1 to     
follow71 substance 7as ,locke  expresses
 it1 the support of accidents71 and     

countless others1 are not  schematical  
but symbolical hypotyposes and          
expressions for concepts1  not by means 
of a direct intuition1 but only by      
analogy with it1  i4e4 by the           
transference of reflection upon an      
object of intuition  to a quite         
different concept to which perhaps an   
intuition can never  directly           
correspond4 ,if we are to give the name 
of cognition to a mere  mode of         
representation 7which is quite          
permissible if the latter is  not a     
principle of the theoretical            
determination of what an object is  in  
itself1 but of the practical            
determination of what the ,idea of it   
should be for us and for its purposive  
use71 then all our knowledge  of ,god is
 merely symbolical2 and he who regards  
it as schematical1  along with the      
properties of ,understanding1 ,will1    
etc41 which only  establish their       
objective reality in beings of this     
world1 falls into  ,anthropomorphism1   

just as he who gives up every intuitive 
element  falls into ,deism1 by which    
nothing at all is cognised1 not even in 
a  practical point of view4    ,now ,i  
say the ,beautiful is the symbol of the 
morally ,good1 and that it  is only in  
this respect 7a reference which is      
natural to every man and  which every   
man postulates in others as a duty7 that
 it gives pleasure  with a claim for the
 agreement of every one else4 ,by this  
the mind  is made conscious of a certain
 ennoblement and elevation above the    
mere sensibility to pleasure received   
through sense1 and the worth of  others 
is estimated in accordance with a like  
maxim of their ,judgement4  ,that is the
 intelligible1 to which1 as pointed out 
in the preceding  paragraph1 ,taste     
looks2 with which our higher cognitive  
faculties are  in accord2 and without   
which a downright contradiction would   
arise  between their nature and the     
claims made by taste4 ,in this faculty  
the  ,judgement does not see itself1 as 

in empirical judging1 subjected to  a   
heteronomy of empirical laws2 it gives  
the law to itself in respect  of the    
objects of so pure a satisfaction1 just 
as the ,reason does in  respect of the  
faculty of desire4 ,hence1 both on      
account of this inner  possibility in   
the subject and of the external         
possibility of a nature  that agrees    
with it1 it finds itself to be referred 
to something within  the subject as well
 as without him1 something which is     
neither nature  nor freedom1 but which  
yet is connected with the supersensible 
ground  of the latter4 ,in this         
supersensible ground1 therefore1 the    
theoretical  faculty is bound together  
in unity with the practical1 in a way   
which  though common is yet unknown4 ,we
 shall indicate some points of this     
analogy1 while at the same time we shall
 note the differences4    7#a7 ,the     
beautiful pleases immediately 7but only 
in reflective  intuition1 not1 like     
morality1 in its concept74 7#b7 ,it     

pleases apart  from any interest 7the   
morally good is indeed necessarily bound
 up  with an interest1 though not with  
one which precedes the judgement upon   
the satisfaction1 but with one which is 
first of all produced by it74  7#c7 ,the
 freedom of the ,imagination 7and       
therefore of the sensibility  of our    
faculty7 is represented in judging the  
beautiful as harmonious  with the       
conformity to law of the ,understanding 
7in the moral judgement  the freedom of 
the will is thought as the harmony of   
the latter with  itself according to    
universal laws of ,reason74 7#d7 ,the   
subjective  principle in judging the    
beautiful is represented as universal1  
i4e4 as valid for every man1 though not 
cognisable through any  universal       
concept4 7,the objective principle of   
morality is also  expounded as          
universal1 i4e4 for every subject and   
for every action  of the same subject1  
and thus as cognisable by means of a    
universal  concept74 ,hence the moral   

judgement is not only susceptible of    
definite  constitutive principles1 but  
is possible only by grounding its maxims
  on these in their universality4    ,a 
reference to this analogy is usual even 
with the common ,understanding  of men1 
and we often describe beautiful objects 
of nature or art by  names that seem to 
put a moral appreciation at their basis4
 ,we call  buildings or trees majestic  
and magnificent1 landscapes laughing and
  gay2 even colours are called innocent1
 modest1 tender1 because they  excite   
sensations which have something         
analogous to the consciousness  of the  
state of mind brought about by moral    
judgements4 ,taste makes  possible the  
transition1 without any violent leap1   
from the charm of  ,sense to habitual   
moral interest2 for it represents the   
,imagination  in its freedom as capable 
of purposive determination for the      
,understanding1 and so teaches us to    
find even in objects of sense a  free   
satisfaction apart from any charm of    

sense4          ,,appendix       #fj4   
,of the method of ,taste    ,the        
division of a ,critique into            
,elementology and ,methodology1 as      
preparatory to science1 is not          
applicable to the ,critique of taste1   
because there neither is nor can be a   
science of the ,beautiful1 and  the     
judgement of taste is not determinable  
by means of principles4 ,as  for the    
scientific element in every art1 which  
regards truth in the  presentation of   
its ,object1 this is indeed the         
indispensable condition  7conditio sine 
qua non7 of beautiful art1 but not      
beautiful art  itself4 ,there is        
therefore for beautiful art only a      
manner 7modus71  not a method of        
teaching 7methodus74 ,the master must   
show what the  pupil is to do and how he
 is to do it2 and the universal rules1  
under  which at last he brings his      
procedure1 serve rather for bringing the
  main points back to his remembrance   
when occasion requires1 than for        

prescribing them to him4 ,nevertheless  
regard must be had here to a  certain   
ideal1 which art must have before its   
eyes1 although it cannot  be completely 
attained in practice4 ,it is only       
through exciting the  ,imagination of   
the pupil to accordance with a given    
concept1 by making  him note the        
inadequacy of the expression for the    
,idea1 to which the  concept itself does
 not attain because it is an aesthetical
 ,idea1 and  by severe criticism1 that  
he can be prevented from taking the     
examples  set before him as types and   
models for imitation1 to be subjected to
  no higher standard or independent     
judgement4 ,it is thus that genius1  and
 with it the freedom of the             
,imagination1 is stifled by its very    
conformity to law2 and without these no 
beautiful art1 and not even an          
accurately judging individual taste1 is 
possible4    ,the propaedeutic to all   
beautiful art1 regarded in the highest  
degree  of its perfection1 seems to lie1

 not in precepts1 but in the culture  of
 the mental powers by means of those    
elements of knowledge called  humaniora1
 probably because humanity on the one   
side indicates  the universal feeling of
 sympathy1 and on the other the faculty 
of being able to communicate universally
 our inmost feelings4  ,for these       
properties taken together constitute the
 characteristic  social spirit#ajd of   
humanity by which it is distinguished   
from the  limitations of animal life4   
,the age and peoples1 in which the      
impulse  towards a law-abiding social   
life1 by which a people becomes a       
permanent community1 contended with the 
great difficulties presented by  the    
difficult problem of uniting freedom    
7and therefore equality also7  with     
compulsion 7rather of respect and       
submission from a sense of duty  than of
 fear7--such an age and such a people   
naturally first found out  the art of   
reciprocal communication of ,ideas      
between the cultivated  and uncultivated

 classes and thus discovered how to     
harmonise the  large-mindedness and     
refinement of the former with the       
natural  simplicity and originality of  
the latter4 ,in this way they first     
found  that mean between the higher     
culture and simple nature which         
furnishes  that true standard for taste 
as a sense common to all men which no   
universal rules can supply4    ,with    
difficulty will a later age dispense    
with those models1 because  it will be  
always farther from nature2 and in fine1
 without having  permanent examples     
before it1 a concept will hardly be     
possible1 in one  and the same people1  
of the happy union of the law-abiding   
constraint  of the highest culture with 
the force and truth of free nature which
  feels its own proper worth4    ,now   
taste is at bottom a faculty for judging
 of the sensible  illustration of moral 
,ideas 7by means of a certain analogy   
involved  in our reflection upon both   
these72 and it is from this faculty also

  and from the greater susceptibility   
grounded thereon for the feeling        
arising from the latter 7called moral   
feeling71 that the pleasure is  derived 
which taste regards as valid for mankind
 in general and not  merely for the     
private feeling of each4 ,hence it      
appears plain that the  true            
propaedeutic for the foundation of taste
 is the development of  moral ,ideas and
 the culture of the moral feeling2      
because it is only  when sensibility is 
brought into agreement with this that   
genuine taste  can assume a definite    
invariable form4          ,,the         
,,critique ,,of ,,judgement    ,,part   
,,ii    ,,critique ,,of ,,the           
,,teleological ,,judgement       #fa4   
,of the objective purposiveness of      
,nature    ,we have on transcendental   
principles good ground to assume a      
subjective  purposiveness in nature1 in 
its particular laws1 in reference to its
  comprehensibility by human ,judgement 
and to the possibility of the  connexion

 of particular experiences in a system4 
,this may be expected  as possible in   
many products of nature1 which1 as if   
they were devised  quite specially for  
our ,judgement1 contain a specific form 
conformable  thereto2 which through     
their manifoldness and unity serve at   
once to  strengthen and to sustain the  
mental powers 7that come into play in   
the  employment of this faculty72 and to
 which therefore we give the name of    
beautiful forms4    ,but that the things
 of nature serve one another as means to
 purposes1  and that their possibility  
is only completely intelligible through 
this kind of causality--for this we have
 absolutely no ground in the  universal 
,idea of nature1 as the complex of the  
objects of sense4 ,in  the              
above-mentioned case1 the representation
 of things1 because it  is something in 
ourselves1 can be quite well thought a  
priori as  suitable and useful for the  
internally purposive determination of   
our  cognitive faculties2 but that      

purposes1 which neither are our own  nor
 belong to nature 7for we do not regard 
nature as an intelligent  being71 could 
or should constitute a particular kind  
of causality1 at  least a quite special 
conformity to law1--this we have        
absolutely no  a priori reason for      
presuming4 ,yet more1 experience itself 
cannot  prove to us the actuality of    
this2 there must then have preceded a   
rationalising subtlety which only       
sportively introduces the concept of    
purpose into the nature of things1 but  
which does not derive it from  ,objects 
or from their empirical cognition4 ,to  
this latter it is of  more service to   
make nature comprehensible according to 
analogy with  the subjective ground of  
the connexion of our representations1   
than to  cognise it from objective      
grounds4    ,further1 objective         
purposiveness1 as a principle of the    
possibility of  things of nature1 is so 
far removed from necessary connexion    
with  the concept of nature1 that it is 

much oftener precisely that upon  which 
one relies to prove the contingency of  
nature and of its form4  ,when1 e4g4 we 
adduce the structure of a bird1 the     
hollowness of its  bones1 the           
disposition of its wings for motion and 
of its tail for  steering1 etc41 we say 
that all this is contingent in the      
highest  degree according to the mere   
nexus effectivus of nature1 without     
calling in the aid of a particular kind 
of causality1 namely that of  purpose   
7nexus finalis74 ,in other words1       
nature1 considered as mere  mechanism1  
could have produced its forms in a      
thousand other ways  without stumbling  
upon the unity which is in accordance   
with such a  principle4 ,it is not in   
the concept of nature but quite apart   
from it  that we can hope to find the   
least ground a priori for this4         
,nevertheless the teleological act of   
judgement is rightly brought to  bear1  
at least problematically1 upon the      
investigation of nature2  but only in   

order to bring it under principles of   
observation and  inquiry according to   
the analogy with the causality of       
purpose1  without any pretence to       
explain it thereby4 ,it belongs         
therefore to  the reflective and not to 
the determinant judgement4 ,the concept 
of  combinations and forms of nature in 
accordance with purposes is then  at    
least one principle more for bringing   
its phenomena under rules  where the    
laws of simply mechanical causality do  
not suffice4 ,for we  bring in a        
teleological ground1 where we attribute 
causality in respect  of an ,object to  
the concept of an ,object1 as if it were
 to be found in  nature 7not in         
ourselves72 or rather when we represent 
to ourselves the  possibility of the    
,object after the analogy of that       
causality which  we experience in       
ourselves1 and consequently think nature
 technically  as through a special      
faculty4 ,if we did not ascribe to it   
such a  method of action1 its causality 

would have to be represented as blind   
mechanism4 ,if1 on the contrary1 we     
supply to nature causes acting          
designedly1 and consequently place at   
its basis teleology1 not merely  as a   
regulative principle for the mere       
judging of phenomena1 to  which nature  
can be thought as subject in its        
particular laws1 but as a  constitutive 
principle of the derivation of its      
products from their  causes2 then would 
the concept of a natural purpose no     
longer belong  to the reflective but to 
the determinant ,judgement4 ,then1 in   
fact1 it  would not belong specially to 
the ,judgement 7like the concept of     
beauty  regarded as formal subjective   
purposiveness71 but as a rational       
concept  it would introduce into natural
 science a new causality1 which we only 
borrow from ourselves and ascribe to    
other beings1 without meaning to  assume
 them to be of the same kind with       
ourselves4          ,,first ,,division  
,,analytic ,,of ,,the ,,teleological    

,,judgement       #fb4 ,of the objective
 purposiveness which is merely formal as
  distinguished from that which is      
material    ,all geometrical figures    
drawn on a principle display a manifold1
  oft admired1 objective purposiveness2 
i4e4 in reference to  their usefulness  
for the solution of several problems by 
a single  principle1 or of the same     
problem in an infinite variety of ways4 
,the  purposiveness is here obviously   
objective and intellectual1 not merely  
subjective and aesthetical4 ,for it     
expresses the suitability of the  figure
 for the production of many intended    
figures1 and is cognised  through       
,reason4 ,but this purposiveness does   
not make the concept of the  object     
itself possible1 i4e4 it is not regarded
 as possible merely  with reference to  
this use4    ,in so simple a figure as  
the circle lies the key to the solution 
of a  multitude of problems1 each of    
which would demand various appliances2  
whereas the solution results of itself1 

as it were1 as one of the  infinite     
number of elegant properties of this    
figure4 ,are we1 for  example1 asked to 
construct a triangle1 being given the   
base and  vertical angle8 ,the problem  
is indeterminate1 i4e4 it can be solved 
in an infinite number of ways4 ,but the 
circle embraces them altogether  as the 
geometrical locus of the vertices of    
triangles satisfying  the given         
conditions4 ,again1 suppose that two    
lines are to cut one  another so that   
the rectangle under the segments of the 
one should be  equal to the rectangle   
under the segments of the other2 the    
solution  of the problem from this point
 of view presents much difficulty4 ,but 
all chords intersecting inside a circle 
divide one another in this  proportion4 
,other curved lines suggest other       
purposive solutions  of which nothing   
was thought in the rule that furnished  
their  construction4 ,all conic sections
 in themselves and when compared with   
one another are fruitful in principles  

for the solution of a number of         
possible problems1 however simple is the
 definition which determines  their     
concept4--,it is a true joy to see the  
zeal with which the old  geometers      
investigated the properties of lines of 
this class1 without  allowing themselves
 to be led astray by the questions of   
narrow-minded  persons1 as to what use  
this knowledge would be4 ,thus they     
worked out  the properties of the       
parabola without knowing the law of     
gravitation1  which would have suggested
 to them its application to the         
trajectory of  heavy bodies 7for the    
motion of a heavy body can be seen to be
 parallel  to the curve of a parabola74 
,again1 they found out the properties   
of an ellipse without surmising that any
 of the heavenly bodies had  weight1 and
 without knowing the law of force at    
different distances  from the point of  
attraction1 which causes it to describe 
this curve  in free motion4 ,while they 
thus unconsciously worked for the       

science  of the future1 they delighted  
themselves with a purposiveness in  the 
essential being of things which yet they
 were able to present  completely a     
priori in its necessity4 ,plato1 himself
 master of  this science1 hinted at such
 an original constitution of things in  
the discovery of which we can dispense  
with all experience1 and at  the power  
of the mind to produce from its         
supersensible principle the  harmony of 
beings 7where the properties of number  
come in1 with which  the mind plays in  
music74 ,this he touches upon in the    
inspiration  that raised him above the  
concepts of experience to ,ideas1 which 
seem  to him to be explicable only      
through an intellectual affinity with   
the  origin of all beings4 ,no wonder   
that he banished from his school the    
man who was ignorant of geometry1 since 
he thought he could derive  from pure   
intuition1 which has its home in the    
human spirit1 that  which ,anaxagoras   
drew from empirical objects and their   

purposive  combination4 ,for in the very
 necessity of that which is purposive1  
and is constituted just as if it were   
designedly intended for our  use1--but  
at the same time seems to belong        
originally to the being  of things      
without any reference to our use--lies  
the ground of our  great admiration of  
nature1 and that not so much external as
 in our  own ,reason4 ,it is surely     
excusable that this admiration should   
through  misunderstanding gradually rise
 to the height of fanaticism4    ,but   
this intellectual purposiveness1        
although no doubt objective 7not        
subjective like aesthetical             
purposiveness71 is in reference to its  
possibility merely formal 7not real74   
,it can only be conceived as            
purposiveness in general without any    
definite purpose being assumed  as its  
basis1 and consequently without         
teleology being needed for it4  ,the    
figure of a circle is an intuition which
 is determined by means  of the         

,understanding according to a principle4
 ,the unity of this  principle which ,i 
arbitrarily assume and use as           
fundamental concept1  applied to a form 
of intuition 7space7 which is met with  
in myself as  a representation and yet a
 priori1 renders intelligible the unity 
of  many rules resulting from the       
construction of that concept1 which are 
purposive for many possible designs4    
,but this purposiveness does not  imply 
a purpose or any other ground whatever4 
,it is quite different  if ,i meet with 
order and regularity in complexes of    
things1 external  to myself1 enclosed   
within certain boundaries2 as1 e4g4 in a
 garden1  the order and regularity of   
the trees1 flower-beds1 and walks4      
,these  ,i cannot expect to derive a    
priori from my bounding of space made   
after a rule of my own2 for this order  
and regularity are existing  things     
which must be given empirically in order
 to be known1 and not  a mere           
representation in myself determined a   

priori according to a  principle4 ,so   
then the latter 7empirical7             
purposiveness1 as real1 is  dependent on
 the concept of a purpose4    ,but the  
ground of admiration for a perceived    
purposiveness1 although  it be in the   
being of things 7so far as their        
concepts can be  constructed71 may very 
well be seen1 and seen to be legitimate4
  ,the manifold rules whose unity       
7derived from a principle7 excites      
admiration1 are all synthetical and do  
not follow from the concept  of the     
,object1 e4g4 of a circle2 but require  
this ,object to be  given in intuition4 
,hence this unity gets the appearance of
 having  empirically an external basis  
of rules distinct from our              
representative  faculty2 as if therefore
 the correspondence of the ,object to   
that  need of rules which is proper to  
the ,understanding were contingent in   
itself1 and therefore only possible by  
means of a purpose expressly  directed  
thereto4 ,now because this harmony1     

notwithstanding all  this purposiveness1
 is not cognised empirically but a      
priori1 it  should bring us of itself to
 this point--that space1 through whose  
determination 7by means of the          
,imagination1 in accordance with a      
concept7 the ,object is alone possible1 
is not a characteristic of  things      
external to me1 but a mere mode of      
representation in myself4  ,hence1 in   
the figure which ,i draw in conformity  
with a concept1  i4e4 in my own mode of 
representing that which is given to me  
externally1 whatever it may be in       
itself1 it is ,i that introduce  the    
purposiveness2 ,i get no empirical      
instruction from the ,object  about the 
purposiveness1 and so ,i require in it  
no particular purpose  external to      
myself4 ,but because this consideration 
already calls for  a critical employment
 of ,reason1 and consequently cannot be 
involved  in the judging of the ,object 
according to its properties2 so this    
latter judging suggests to me           

immediately nothing but the unification 
of heterogeneous rules 7even according  
to their very diversity7 in  a          
principle4 ,this principle1 without     
requiring any particular a  priori basis
 external to my concept1 or indeed1     
generally speaking1  to my              
representation1 is yet cognised a priori
 by me as true4 ,now  wonder is a shock 
of the mind arising from the            
incompatibility of a  representation1   
and the rule given by its means1 with   
the principles  already lying at its    
basis2 which provokes a doubt as to     
whether  we have rightly seen or rightly
 judged4 ,admiration1 however1 is       
wonder which ever recurs1 despite the   
disappearance of this doubt4            
,consequently the latter is a quite     
natural effect of that observed         
purposiveness in the being of things 7as
 phenomena74 ,it cannot  indeed be      
censured1 whilst the unification of the 
form of sensible  intuition             
7space7--with the faculty of concepts   

7the ,understanding7--is  inexplicable  
to us2 and that not only on account of  
the union being  just of the kind that  
it is1 but because it is enlarging for  
the mind  to surmise the existence of   
something lying outside our sensible    
representations in which1 although      
unknown to us1 the ultimate  ground of  
that agreement may be met with4 ,we are1
 it is true1 not  necessitated to       
cognise this if we have only to do a    
priori with the  formal purposiveness of
 our representations2 but the fact that 
we are  compelled to look out beyond it 
inspires at the same time an admiration 
for the object that impels us thereto4  
,we are accustomed to speak of the      
above-mentioned properties of           
geometrical figures or of numbers as    
beautiful1 on account of a  certain a   
priori purposiveness they have for all  
kinds of cognitive  uses1 this          
purposiveness being quite unexpected on 
account of the  simplicity of the       
construction4 ,we speak1 e4g4 of this or

 that  beautiful property of the circle1
 which was discovered in this or  that  
way4 ,but there is no aesthetical act of
 judgement through which we  find it    
purposive1 no act of judgement without a
 concept which renders  noticeable a    
mere subjective purposiveness in the    
free play of our  cognitive faculties2  
but an intellectual act according to    
concepts  which enables us clearly to   
cognise an objective purposiveness1     
i4e4 availableness for all kinds of     
7infinitely manifold7 purposes4  ,we    
must rather call this relative          
perfection than a beauty of the         
mathematical figure4 ,to speak thus of  
an intellectual beauty cannot  in       
general be permissible2 for otherwise   
the word beauty would lose  all         
determinate significance1 or the        
intellectual satisfaction all           
superiority over the sensible4 ,we      
should rather call a demonstration  of  
such properties beautiful1 because      
through it the ,understanding  as the   

faculty of concepts1 and the            
,imagination as the faculty of          
presenting them1 feel themselves        
strengthened a priori4 7,this1 when     
viewed in connexion with the precision  
introduced by ,reason1 is spoken  of as 
elegant47 ,here1 however1 the           
satisfaction1 although it is based  on  
concepts1 is subjective2 while          
perfection brings with itself an        
objective satisfaction4       #fc4 ,of  
the relative1 as distinguished from the 
inner1 purposiveness  of nature         
,experience leads our ,judgement to the 
concept of an objective and  material   
purposiveness1 i4e4 to the concept of a 
purpose of nature1  only when#aje we    
have to judge of a relation of cause to 
effect which  we find ourselves able to 
apprehend as legitimate only by         
presupposing  the ,idea of the effect of
 the causality of the cause as the      
fundamental  condition1 in the cause1 of
 the possibility of the effect4 ,this   
can  take place in two ways4 ,we may    

regard the effect directly as an art    
product1 or only as material for the art
 of other possible natural  beings2 in  
other words1 either as a purpose or as a
 means towards the  purposive employment
 of other causes4 ,this latter          
purposiveness is  called utility 7for   
man7 or mere advantage 7for other       
creatures71 and  is merely relative2    
while the former is an inner            
purposiveness of the  natural being4    
,for example1 rivers bring down with    
them all kinds of earth serviceable  for
 the growth of plants which sometimes is
 deposited inland1 often  also at their 
mouths4 ,the tide brings this mud to    
many coasts over  the land or deposits  
it on the shore2 and so1 more especially
 if men  give their aid so that the ebb 
shall not carry it back again1 the      
fruit-bearing land increases in area1   
and the vegetable kingdom gains  the    
place which formerly was the habitation 
of fish and shells4 ,in  this way has   
nature itself brought about most of the 

extensions of the  land1 and still      
continues to do so1 although very       
slowly4--,now the  question is whether  
this is to be judged a purpose of       
nature1 because  it contains utility for
 men4 ,we cannot put it down to the     
account of  the vegetable kingdom1      
because just as much is subtracted from 
sea-life  as is added to land-life4     
,or1 to give an example of the          
advantageousness of certain natural     
things as means for other creatures 7if 
we suppose them to be means71  no soil  
is more suitable to pine trees than a   
sandy soil4 ,now the deep  sea1 before  
it withdrew from the land1 left behind  
large tracts of sand  in our northern   
regions1 so that on this soil1 so       
unfavourable for all  cultivation1      
widely extended pine forests were       
enabled to grow1 for the  unreasoning   
destruction of which we frequently blame
 our ancestors4  ,we may ask if this    
original deposit of tracts of sand was a
 purpose  of nature for the benefit of  

the possible pine forests8 ,so much is  
clear1 that if we regard this as a      
purpose of nature1 we must also  regard 
the sand as a relative purpose1 in      
reference to which the ocean  strand and
 its withdrawal were means3 for in the  
series of the mutually  subordinated    
members of a purposive combination1     
every member must be  regarded as a     
purpose 7though not as a final purpose71
 to which its  proximate cause is the   
means4 ,so too if cattle1 sheep1 horses1
 etc41  are to exist1 there must be     
grass on the earth1 but there must also 
be saline plants in the desert if camels
 are to thrive2 and again  these and    
other herbivorous animals must be met   
with in numbers if  there are to be     
wolves1 tigers1 and lions4 ,consequently
 the objective  purposiveness1 which is 
based upon advantage1 is not an         
objective  purposiveness of things in   
themselves2 as if the sand could not be 
conceived for itself as an effect of a  
cause1 viz4 the sea1 without            

attributing to the latter a purpose1 and
 regarding the effect1 namely1  the     
sand1 as a work of art4 ,it is a merely 
relative purposiveness  contingent upon 
the thing to which it is ascribed2 and  
although in the  examples we have cited1
 the different kinds of grass are to be 
judged  as in themselves organised      
products of nature1 and consequently as 
artificial1 yet are they to be regarded1
 in reference to the beasts  which feed 
upon them1 as mere raw material4    ,but
 above all1 though man1 through the     
freedom of his causality1 finds  certain
 natural things of advantage for his    
designs--designs often  foolish1 such as
 using the variegated plumage of birds  
to adorn his  clothes1 or coloured      
earths and the juices of plants for     
painting his  face2 often again         
reasonable as when the horse is used for
 riding1 the  ox or 7as in ,minorca7 the
 ass or pig for ploughing--yet we cannot
 even  here assume a relative natural   
purpose4 ,for his ,reason knows how to  

give things a conformity with his own   
arbitrary fancies for which he  was not 
at all predestined by nature4 ,only1 if 
we assume that men are  to live upon the
 earth1 then the means must be there    
without which they  could not exist as  
animals1 and even as rational animals   
7in however  low a degree of            
rationality72 and thereupon those       
natural things1  which are indispensable
 in this regard1 must be considered as  
natural  purposes4    ,we can hence     
easily see that external purposiveness  
7advantage of one  thing in respect of  
others7 can be regarded as an external  
natural  purpose only under the         
condition1 that the existence of that   
being1  to which it is immediately or   
distantly advantageous1 is in itself a  
purpose of nature4 ,since that can never
 be completely determined by  mere      
contemplation of nature1 it follows that
 relative purposiveness1  although it   
hypothetically gives indications of     
natural purposes1 yet  justifies no     

absolute teleological judgement4        
,snow in cold countries protects the    
crops from the frost2 it makes  human   
intercourse easier 7by means of         
sleighs74 ,the ,laplander finds in  his 
country animals by whose aid this       
intercourse is brought about1  i4e4     
reindeer1 who find sufficient sustenance
 in a dry moss which  they have to      
scratch out for themselves from under   
the snow1 and who  are easily tamed and 
readily permit themselves to be deprived
 of that  freedom in which they could   
have remained if they chose4 ,for other 
people in the same frozen regions marine
 animals afford rich stores2  in        
addition to the food and clothing which 
are thus supplied1 and the  wood which  
is floated in by the sea to their       
dwellings1 these marine  animals provide
 material for fuel by which their huts  
are warmed4 ,here  is a wonderful       
concurrence of many references of nature
 to one purpose2  and all this applies  
to the cases of the ,greenlander1 the   

,lapp1 the  ,samoyede1 the inhabitant of
 ,yakutsk1 etc4 ,but then we do not see 
why1  generally1 men must live there at 
all4 ,therefore to say that vapour      
falls out of the atmosphere in the form 
of snow1 that the sea has its  currents 
which float down wood that has grown in 
warmer lands1 and that  there are in it 
great sea monsters filled with oil1     
because the idea  of advantage for      
certain poor creatures is fundamental   
for the cause  which collects all these 
natural products1 would be a very       
venturesome  and arbitrary judgement4   
,for even if there were none of this    
natural  utility1 we should miss nothing
 as regards the adequateness of natural 
causes to nature's constitution2 much   
more even to desire such a  tendency in1
 and to attribute such a purpose to1    
nature would be the  part of a          
presumptuous and inconsiderate fancy4   
,for indeed it might be  observed that  
it could only have been the greatest    
unsociability among  men which thus     

scattered them into such inhospitable   
regions4       #fd4 ,of the peculiar    
character of things as natural purposes 
,in order to see that a thing is only   
possible as a purpose1 that is1  to be  
forced to seek the causality of its     
origin not in the mechanism  of nature  
but in a cause whose faculty of action  
is determined through  concepts1 it is  
requisite that its form be not possible 
according to  mere natural laws1 i4e4   
laws which can be cognised by us through
 the  ,understanding alone when applied 
to objects of ,sense2 but that even the 
empirical knowledge of it as regards its
 cause and effect presupposes  concepts 
of ,reason4 ,this contingency of its    
form in all empirical  natural laws in  
reference to ,reason affords a ground   
for regarding its  causality as possible
 only through ,reason4 ,for ,reason1    
which must  cognise the necessity of    
every form of a natural product in order
 to  comprehend even the conditions of  
its genesis1 cannot assume such  natural

 necessity in that particular given     
form4 ,the causality of its  origin is  
then referred to the faculty of acting  
in accordance with  purposes 7a will72  
and the ,object which can only thus be  
represented as  possible is represented 
as a purpose4    ,if in a seemingly     
uninhabited country a man perceived a   
geometrical  figure1 say a regular      
hexagon1 inscribed on the sand1 his     
reflection  busied with such a concept  
would attribute1 although obscurely1 the
  unity in the principle of its genesis 
to ,reason1 and consequently would  not 
regard as a ground of the possibility of
 such a shape the sand1 or  the         
neighbouring sea1 or the winds1 or      
beasts with familiar footprints1  or any
 other irrational cause4 ,for the chance
 against meeting with  such a concept1  
which is only possible through ,reason1 
would seem so  infinitely great1 that it
 would be just as if there were no      
natural  law1 no cause in the mere      
mechanical working of nature capable of 

producing it2 but as if only the concept
 of such an ,object1 as a  concept which
 ,reason alone can supply and with which
 it can compare the  thing1 could       
contain the causality for such an       
effect4 ,this then would  be regarded as
 a purpose1 but as a product of art1 not
 as a natural  purpose 7vestigium       
hominis video74#ajf    ,but in order to 
regard a thing cognised as a natural    
product as a  purpose also--consequently
 as a natural purpose1 if this is not a 
contradiction--something more is        
required4 ,i would say provisionally3  a
 thing exists as a natural purpose1 if  
it is although in a double  sense#ajg   
both cause and effect of itself4 ,for   
herein lies a  causality the like of    
which cannot be combined with the mere  
concept  of a nature without attributing
 to it a purpose2 it can certainly be   
thought without contradiction1 but      
cannot be comprehended4 ,we shall       
elucidate the determination of this     
,idea of a natural purpose by an        

example1 before we analyse it           
completely4    ,in the first place1 a   
tree generates another tree according to
 a  known natural law4 ,but the tree    
produced is of the same genus2 and so   
it produces itself generically4 ,on the 
one hand1 as effect it is  continually  
self-produced2 on the other hand1 as    
cause it continually  produces itself1  
and so perpetuates itself generically4  
,secondly1 a tree produces itself as an 
individual4 ,this kind of  effect no    
doubt we call growth2 but it is quite   
different from any  increase according  
to mechanical laws1 and is to be        
reckoned as  generation1 though under   
another name4 ,the matter that the tree 
incorporates it previously works up into
 a specifically peculiar  quality1 which
 natural mechanism external to it cannot
 supply2 and  thus it develops itself by
 aid of a material which1 as compounded1
  is its own product4 ,no doubt1 as     
regards the constituents got from       
nature without1 it must only be regarded

 as an educt2 but yet in  the separation
 and recombination of this raw material 
we see such  an originality in the      
separating and formative faculty of this
 kind  of natural being1 as is          
infinitely beyond the reach of art1 if  
the  attempt is made to reconstruct such
 vegetable products out of elements     
obtained by their dissection or material
 supplied by nature for their           
sustenance4    ,thirdly1 each part of a 
tree generates itself in such a way that
 the  maintenance of any one part       
depends reciprocally on the maintenance 
of  the rest4 ,a bud of one tree        
engrafted on the twig of another        
produces  in the alien stock a plant of 
its own kind1 and so also a scion       
engrafted on a foreign stem4 ,hence we  
may regard each twig or leaf of  the    
same tree as merely engrafted or        
inoculated into it1 and so as an        
independent tree attached to another and
 parasitically nourished by  it4 ,at the
 same time1 while the leaves are        

products of the tree they  also in turn 
give support to it2 for the repeated    
defoliation of a tree  kills it1 and its
 growth thus depends on the action of   
the leaves upon  the stem4 ,the         
self-help of nature in case of injury in
 the vegetable  creation1 when the want 
of a part that is necessary for the     
maintenance  of its neighbours is       
supplied by the remaining parts2 and the
 abortions  or malformations in growth1 
in which certain parts1 on account of   
casual defects or hindrances1 form      
themselves in a new way to maintain     
what exists1 and so produce an anomalous
 creature1 ,i shall only mention  in    
passing1 though they are among the most 
wonderful properties of  organised      
creatures4       #fe4 ,things regarded  
as natural purposes are organised beings
    ,according to the character alleged 
in the preceding section1 a thing1      
which1 though a natural product1 is to  
be cognised as only possible as  a      
natural purpose1 must bear itself       

alternately as cause and as effect4     
,this1 however1 is a somewhat inexact   
and indeterminate expression  which     
needs derivation from a determinate     
concept4    ,causal combination as      
thought merely by the ,understanding is 
a  connexion constituting an            
ever-progressive series 7of causes and  
effects72 and things which as effects   
presuppose others as causes  cannot be  
reciprocally at the same time causes of 
these4 ,this sort  of causal combination
 we call that of effective causes 7nexus
  effectivus74 ,but on the other hand1 a
 causal combination according to  a     
concept of ,reason 7of purposes7 can    
also be thought1 which regarded  as a   
series would lead either forwards or    
backwards2 in this the thing  that has  
been called the effect may with equal   
propriety be termed the  cause of that  
of which it is the effect4 ,in the      
practical department of  human art we   
easily find connexions such as this2    
e4g4 a house1 no  doubt1 is the cause of

 the money received for rent1 but also  
conversely  the representation of this  
possible income was the cause of        
building  the house4 ,such a causal     
connexion we call that of final causes  
7nexus  finalis74 ,we may perhaps       
suitably name the first the connexion of
  real causes1 the second of those which
 are ideal2 because from this           
nomenclature it is at once comprehended 
that there can be no more than  these   
two kinds of causality4    ,for a thing 
to be a natural purpose in the first    
place it is  requisite that its parts   
7as regards their being and their form7 
are  only possible through their        
reference to the whole4 ,for the thing  
itself is a purpose and so is           
comprehended under a concept or an ,idea
  which must determine a priori all that
 is to be contained in it4  ,but so far 
as a thing is only thought as possible  
in this way1 it is  a mere work of art2 
i4e4 a product of one rational cause    
distinct  from the matter 7of the       

parts71 whose causality 7in the         
collection and  combination of the      
parts7 is determined through its ,idea  
of a whole  possible by their means 7and
 consequently not through external      
nature74    ,but if a thing as a natural
 product is to involve in itself and in 
its  internal possibility a reference to
 purposes1--i4e4 to be possible  only as
 a natural purpose1 and without the     
causality of the concepts of  rational  
beings external to itself1--then it is  
requisite secondly  that its parts      
should so combine in the unity of a     
whole that they are  reciprocally cause 
and effect of each other's form4 ,only  
in this way  can the ,idea of the whole 
conversely 7reciprocally7 determine the 
form  and combination of all the parts2 
not indeed as cause--for then it  would 
be an artificial product--but as the    
ground of cognition1 for him  who is    
judging it1 of the systematic unity and 
combination of all the  manifold        
contained in the given material4    ,for

 a body then which is to be judged in   
itself and its internal  possibility as 
a natural purpose1 it is requisite that 
its parts  mutually depend upon each    
other both as to their form and their   
combination1 and so produce a whole by  
their own causality2 while  conversely  
the concept of the whole may be regarded
 as its cause  according to a principle 
7in a being possessing a causality      
according  to concepts adequate to such 
a product74 ,in this case then the      
connexion of effective causes may be    
judged as an effect through  final      
causes4    ,in such a product of nature 
every part not only exists by means  of 
the other parts1 but is thought as      
existing for the sake of  the others and
 the whole1 that is as an 7organic7     
instrument4 ,thus1  however1 it might be
 an artificial instrument1 and so might 
be  represented only as a purpose that  
is possible in general2 but also  its   
parts are all organs reciprocally       
producing each other4 ,this can  never  

be the case with artificial instruments1
 but only with nature  which supplies   
all the material for instruments 7even  
for those of  art74 ,only a product of  
such a kind can be called a natural     
purpose1  and this because it is an     
organised and self-organising being4    
,in a watch one part is the instrument  
for moving the other parts1 but  the    
wheel is not the effective cause of the 
production of the others2  no doubt one 
part is for the sake of the others1 but 
it does not exist  by their means4 ,in  
this case the producing cause of the    
parts and of  their form is not         
contained in the nature 7of the         
material71 but is  external to it in a  
being which can produce effects         
according to ,ideas  of a whole possible
 by means of its causality4 ,hence a    
watch wheel  does not produce other     
wheels1 still less does one watch       
produce other  watches1 utilising       
7organising7 foreign material for that  
purpose2  hence it does not replace of  

itself parts of which it has been       
deprived1 nor does it make good what is 
lacking in a first formation by  the    
addition of the missing parts1 nor if it
 has gone out of order does  it repair  
itself--all of which1 on the contrary1  
we may expect from  organised           
nature4--,an organised being is then not
 a mere machine1 for  that has merely   
moving power1 but it possesses in itself
 formative  power of a self-propagating 
kind which it communicates to its       
materials  though they have it not of   
themselves2 it organises them1 in fact1 
and  this cannot be explained by the    
mere mechanical faculty of motion4      
,we say of nature and its faculty in    
organised products far too little  if we
 describe it as an analogon of art2 for 
this suggests an  artificer 7a rational 
being7 external to it4 ,much rather does
 it  organise itself and its organised  
products in every species1 no doubt     
after one general pattern but yet with  
suitable deviations1 which              

self-preservation demands according to  
circumstances4 ,we perhaps  approach    
nearer to this inscrutable property1 if 
we describe it as  an analogon of life2 
but then we must either endow matter1 as
 mere  matter1 with a property which    
contradicts its very being 7hylozoism71 
or associate therewith an alien         
principle standing in communion with  it
 7a soul74 ,but in the latter case we   
must1 if such a product is to be  a     
natural product1 either presuppose      
organised matter as the instrument  of  
that soul1 which does not make the soul 
a whit more comprehensible2  or regard  
the soul as artificer of this structure 
and so remove  the product from         
7corporeal7 nature4 ,to speak strictly1 
then1 the  organisation of nature has in
 it nothing analogous to any causality  
we  know4#ajh ,beauty in nature can be  
rightly described as an analogon of     
art1 because it is ascribed to objects  
only in reference to reflection  upon   
their external aspect1 and consequently 

only on account of the  form of their   
external surface4 ,but internal natural 
perfection1  as it belongs to those     
things which are only possible as       
natural  purposes1 and are therefore    
called organised beings1 is not         
analogous  to any physical1 i4e4        
natural1 faculty known to us2 nay even1 
regarding ourselves as1 in the widest   
sense1 belonging to nature1 it  is not  
even thinkable or explicable by means of
 any exactly fitting  analogy to human  
art4    ,the concept of a thing as in   
itself a natural purpose is therefore no
  constitutive concept of ,understanding
 or of ,reason1 but it can serve  as a  
regulative concept for the reflective   
,judgement1 to guide our  investigation 
about objects of this kind by a distant 
analogy with our  own causality         
according to purposes generally1 and in 
our meditations  upon their ultimate    
ground4 ,this latter use1 however1 is   
not in  reference to the knowledge of   
nature or of its original ground1 but   

rather to our own practical faculty of  
,reason1 in analogy with which we       
considered the cause of that            
purposiveness4    ,organised beings are 
then the only beings in nature which1   
considered  in themselves and apart from
 any relation to other things1 can be   
thought as possible only as purposes of 
nature4 ,hence they first  afford       
objective reality to the concept of a   
purpose of nature1 as  distinguished    
from a practical purpose2 and so they   
give to the science  of nature the basis
 for a teleology1 i4e4 a mode of        
judgement about  natural ,objects       
according to a special principle which  
otherwise we  should in no way be       
justified in introducing 7because we    
cannot see a  priori the possibility of 
this kind of causality74       #ff4 ,of 
the principle of judging of internal    
purposiveness in  organised beings      
,this principle1 which is at the same   
time a definition1 is as follows3  ,an  
organised product of nature is one in   

which every part is  reciprocally       
purpose1 end and means4 ,in it nothing  
is vain1 without  purpose1 or to be     
ascribed to a blind mechanism of nature4
    ,this principle1 as regards its     
occasion1 is doubtless derived from     
experience1 viz4 from that methodised   
experience called observation2  but on  
account of the universality and         
necessity which it ascribes to  such    
purposiveness it cannot rest solely on  
empirical grounds1 but  must have at its
 basis an a priori principle1 although  
it be merely  regulative and these      
purposes lie only in the idea of the    
judging  subject and not in an effective
 cause4 ,we may therefore describe  the 
aforesaid principle as a maxim for      
judging of the internal  purposiveness  
of organised beings4    ,it is an       
acknowledged fact that the dissectors of
 plants and animals1  in order to       
investigate their structure and to find 
out the reasons1  why and for what end  
such parts1 such a disposition and      

combination  of parts1 and just such an 
internal form have been given them1     
assume  as indisputably necessary the   
maxim that nothing in such a creature   
is vain2 just as they lay down as the   
fundamental proposition of  the         
universal science of nature1 that       
nothing happens by chance4  ,in fact1   
they can as little free themselves from 
this teleological  proposition as from  
the universal physical proposition2 for 
as without  the latter we should have no
 experience at all1 so without the      
former  we should have no guiding thread
 for the observation of a species of    
natural things which we have thought    
teleologically under the concept  of    
natural purposes4    ,now this concept  
brings the ,reason into a quite         
different order of  things from that of 
a mere mechanism of nature1 which is no 
longer  satisfying here4 ,an ,idea is to
 be the ground of the possibility  of   
the natural product4 ,but because this  
is an absolute unity of  representation1

 instead of the material being a        
plurality of things  that can supply by 
itself no definite unity of             
composition1--if that  unity of the     
,idea is to serve at all as the a priori
 ground of  determination of a natural  
law of the causality of such a form of  
composition1--the purpose of nature must
 be extended to everything  included in 
its product4 ,for if we once refer      
action of this sort on  the whole to any
 supersensible ground of determination  
beyond the  blind mechanism of nature1  
we must judge of it altogether according
 to  this principle2 and we have then no
 reason to regard the form of such  a   
thing as partly dependent on            
mechanism--for by such mixing up of     
disparate principles no certain rule of 
judging would be left4    ,for example1 
it may be that in an animal body many   
parts can be  conceived as concretions  
according to mere mechanical laws 7as   
the  hide1 the bones1 the hair74 ,and   
yet the cause which brings together the 

required matter1 modifies it1 forms it1 
and puts it in its appropriate  place1  
must always be judged of teleologically2
 so that here everything  must be       
considered as organised1 and everything 
again in a certain  relation to the     
thing itself is an organ4       #fg4 ,of
 the principle of the teleological      
judging of nature in  general as a      
system of purposes    ,we have already  
said above that the external            
purposiveness of natural  things affords
 no sufficient warrant for using them as
 purposes of  nature in order to explain
 their presence1 and for regarding their
  contingently purposive effects as the 
grounds of their presence  according to 
the principle of final causes4 ,thus we 
cannot take  for natural purposes1      
rivers because they promote intercourse 
among inland peoples1 mountains because 
they contain the sources  of the rivers 
and for their maintenance in rainless   
seasons have a  store of snow1 or the   
slope of the land which carries away the

  water and leaves the country dry2     
because although this shape of the      
earth's surface be very necessary for   
the origin and maintenance of  the      
vegetable and animal kingdoms1 it has   
nothing in itself for the  possibility  
of which we are forced to assume a      
causality according to  purposes4 ,the  
same is true of plants which man uses   
for his needs or  his pleasures2 of     
beasts1 the camel1 the ox1 the horse1   
dog1 etc41  which are indispensable to  
him as well for food as because they are
  used in his service in many different 
ways4 ,in the case of things  which we  
have no reason for regarding in         
themselves as purposes1 such  external  
relation can only be hypothetically     
judged as purposive4    ,to judge of a  
thing as a natural purpose on account of
 its internal  form is something very   
different from taking the existence of  
that  thing to be a purpose of nature4  
,for the latter assertion we require    
not merely the concept of a possible    

purpose1 but the knowledge of  the final
 purpose 7scopus7 of nature4 ,but this  
requires a reference  of such knowledge 
to something supersensible far          
transcending all our  teleological      
knowledge of nature1 for the purpose of 
the existence  of#aji nature must itself
 be sought beyond nature4 ,the internal 
form  of a mere blade of grass is       
sufficient to show that for our human   
faculty of judgement its origin is      
possible only according to the  rule of 
purposes4 ,but if we change our point of
 view and look to the  use which other  
natural beings make of it1 abandon the  
consideration  of its internal          
organisation and only look to its       
externally purposive  references1 we    
shall arrive at no categorical purpose2 
all this  purposive reference rests on  
an ever more distant condition1 which1  
as  unconditioned 7the presence of a    
thing as final purpose71 lies quite     
outside the physico-teleological view of
 the world4 ,for example1 grass  is     

needful for the ox1 which again is      
needful for man as a means of           
existence1 but then we do not see why it
 is necessary that men should  exist 7a 
question this1 which we shall not find  
so easy to answer if we  sometimes cast 
our thoughts on the ,new ,hollanders or 
the inhabitants  of ,tierra del ,fuego74
 ,so conceived1 the thing is not even a 
natural  purpose1 for neither it 7nor   
its whole genus7 is to be regarded as a 
natural product4    ,hence it is only so
 far as matter is organised that it     
necessarily  carries with it the concept
 of a natural purpose1 because this its 
specific form is at the same time a     
product of nature4 ,but this concept    
leads necessarily to the ,idea of       
collective nature as a system in        
accordance with the rule of purposes1 to
 which ,idea all the mechanism  of      
nature must be subordinated according to
 principles of ,reason 7at  least in    
order to investigate natural phenomena  
therein74 ,the principle  of ,reason    

belongs to it only as a subjective      
principle or a maxim3 viz4  everything  
in the ,world is some way good for      
something2 nothing is vain  in it4 ,by  
the example that nature gives us in its 
organic products we  are justified1 nay 
called upon1 to expect of it and of its 
laws nothing  that is not purposive on  
the whole4    ,it is plain that this is 
not a principle for the determinant but 
only for the reflective ,judgement2 that
 it is regulative and not  constitutive2
 and that we derive from it a clue by   
which we consider  natural things in    
reference to an already given ground of 
determination  according to a new       
law-abiding order2 and extend our       
natural science  according to a         
different principle1 viz4 that of final 
causes1 but  yet without prejudice to   
the principle of mechanical causality4  
,furthermore1 it is in no wise thus     
decided1 whether anything of which  we  
judge by this principle1 is a designed  
purpose of nature2 whether  the grass is

 for the ox or the sheep1 or whether    
these and the other  things of nature   
are here for men4 ,it is well also from 
this side  to consider the things which 
are unpleasant to us and are contrary   
to purpose in particular references4    
,thus1 for example1 we can say3  ,the   
vermin that torment men in their        
clothes1 their hair1 or their  beds1 may
 be1 according to a wise appointment of 
nature1 a motive to  cleanliness which  
is in itself an important means for the 
preservation  of health4 ,or again the  
mosquitoes and other stinging insects   
that  make the wildernesses of ,america 
so oppressive to the savages1 may be  so
 many goads to activity for these       
primitive men1 inducing them to  drain  
the marshes and bring light into the    
forests which intercept  every breath of
 air1 and in this way1 as well as by    
cultivating the  soil1 to make their    
habitations more healthy4 ,the same     
thing1 which  appears to men            
contradictory to nature in its inner    

organisation1 if  viewed in this light  
gives an entertaining1 sometimes an     
instructive1  outlook into a            
teleological order of things1 to which1 
without such  a principle1 mere physical
 observation would not lead us by       
itself4  ,thus some persons regard the  
tapeworm as given to the men or animals 
in whom it resides1 as a kind of set-off
 for some defect in their  vital organs2
 now ,i would ask if dreams 7without    
which we never sleep1  though we seldom 
remember them7 may not be a purposive   
ordinance of  nature8 ,for during the   
relaxation of all the moving powers of  
the body1  they serve to excite         
internally the vital organs by the      
medium of the  ,imagination and its     
great activity 7which in this state     
generally rises  to the height of       
affection74 ,during sleep the           
,imagination commonly is  more actively 
at play when the stomach is overloaded1 
in which case  this excitement is the   
more necessary4 ,consequently1 then1    

without this  internal power of motion  
and this fatiguing unrest1 on account of
 which  we complain about our dreams    
7though in fact they are rather         
remedial71  sleep even in a sound state 
of health would be a complete extinction
 of  life4    ,also the beauty of       
nature1 i4e4 its connexion with the free
 play of  our cognitive faculties in    
apprehending and judging of its         
appearance1  can be regarded as a kind  
of objective purposiveness of nature in 
its  whole content as a system of which 
man is a member2 if once the            
teleological judging of the same by     
means of the natural purposes which     
organised beings suggest to us1 has     
justified for us the ,idea of a  great  
system of purposes of nature4 ,we can   
regard it as a favour#aaj  which nature 
has felt for us1 that in addition to    
what is useful it  has so profusely     
dispensed beauty and charm2 and we can  
therefore love  it1 as well as regard it
 with respect on account of its         

immensity1  and feel ourselves ennobled 
by such regard2 just as if nature had   
established and adorned its splendid    
theatre precisely with this view4    ,we
 shall say only one thing more in this  
paragraph4 ,if we have once  discovered 
in nature a faculty of bringing forth   
products that can  only be thought by us
 in accordance with the concept of final
 causes1  we go further still4 ,we      
venture to judge that things belong to a
  system of purposes1 which yet do not  
7either in themselves or in their       
purposive relations7 necessitate our    
seeking for any principle of  their     
possibility beyond the mechanism of     
causes working blindly4 ,for  the first 
,idea1 as concerns its ground1 already  
brings us beyond the  world of sense2   
since the unity of the supersensible    
principle must be  regarded as valid in 
this way not merely for certain species 
of natural  beings1 but for the whole of
 nature as a system4       #fh4 ,of the 
principle of ,teleology as internal     

principle of natural  science    ,the   
principles of a science are either      
internal to it and are then  called     
domestic 7principia domestica71 or are  
based on concepts that  can only find   
their place outside it and so are       
foreign principles  7peregrina74        
,sciences that contain the latter1 place
 at the basis of  their doctrines       
auxiliary propositions 7lemmata71 i4e4  
they borrow  some concept1 and with it a
 ground of arrangement1 from another    
science4    ,every science is in itself 
a system1 and it is not enough in it to 
build in accordance with principles and 
thus to employ a technical  procedure1  
but we must go to work with it          
architectonically1 as a  building       
subsisting for itself2 we must not treat
 it as an additional  wing or part of   
another building1 but as a whole in     
itself1 although we  may subsequently   
make a passage from it into that other  
or conversely4    ,if then we introduce 
into the context of natural science the 

concept of  ,god in order to explain the
 purposiveness in nature1 and           
subsequently  use this purposiveness to 
prove that there is a ,god1 there is no 
internal consistency in either science  
i4e4 either in natural  science or      
theology2 and a delusive circle brings  
them both into  uncertainty1 because    
they have allowed their boundaries to   
overlap4    ,the expression1 a purpose  
of nature1 already sufficiently prevents
 the  confusion of mixing up natural    
science and the occasion that it gives  
for judging teleologically of its       
objects1 with the consideration of      
,god1 and so of a theological derivation
 of them4 ,we must not regard  it as    
insignificant1 if one interchanges this 
expression with that of  a divine       
purpose in the ordering of nature1 or   
gives out the latter  as more suitable  
and proper for a pious soul1 because it 
must come in  the end to deriving these 
purposive forms in nature from a wise   
author  of the world4 ,on the contrary1 

we must carefully and modestly limit    
ourselves to the expression1 a purpose  
of nature1 which asserts exactly  as    
much as we know4 ,before we ask after   
the cause of nature itself1 we  find in 
nature1 and in the course of its        
development1 products of the  same kind 
which are developed in it according to  
known empirical laws1  in accordance    
with which natural science must judge of
 its objects1  and1 consequently1 must  
seek in nature their causality according
 to  the rule of purposes4 ,so then it  
must not transgress its bounds in  order
 to introduce into itself as a domestic 
principle that1 to whose  concept no    
experience can be commensurate1 upon    
which we are only  entitled to venture  
after the completion of natural science4
    ,natural characteristics which      
demonstrate themselves a priori1 and    
consequently admit of insight into their
 possibility from universal  principles 
without any admixture of experience1    
although they carry  with them a        

technical purposiveness1 yet cannot1    
because they are  absolutely necessary1 
be referred to the ,teleology of nature1
 as to a  method belonging to ,physic   
for solving its problems4 ,arithmetical 
or  geometrical analogies1 as well as   
universal mechanical laws1--however     
strange and admirable may seem to us the
 union of different rules1  quite       
independent of one another according to 
all appearance1 in a  single            
principle1--possess on that account no  
claim to be teleological  grounds of    
explanation in ,physic4 ,even if they   
deserve to be brought  into             
consideration in the universal theory of
 the purposiveness  of things of nature1
 yet they belong to another science1    
i4e4  ,metaphysic1 and constitute no    
internal principle of natural science2  
as with the empirical laws of natural   
purposes in organised beings1 it  is not
 only permissible but unavoidable to use
 the teleological mode  of judging as a 
principle of the doctrine of nature in  

regard to a  particular class of its    
objects4    ,so to the end that ,physic 
may keep within its own bounds1 it      
abstracts itself entirely from the      
question1 whether natural purposes  are 
designed or undesigned2 for that would  
be to meddle in an  extraneous business1
 in ,metaphysic4 ,it is enough that     
there are  objects1 alone explicable    
according to natural laws which we  can 
only think by means of the ,idea of     
purposes as principle1 and  also alone  
internally cognisable as concerns their 
internal form1  in this way4 ,in order1 
therefore1 to remove the suspicion of   
the  slightest assumption1--as if we    
wished to mix with our grounds  of      
cognition something not belonging to    
,physic at all1 viz4 a  supernatural    
cause1--we speak in ,teleology1 indeed1 
of nature as if the  purposiveness      
therein were designed1 but in such a way
 that this design  is ascribed to       
nature1 i4e4 to matter4 ,now in this way
 there can be  no misunderstanding1     

because no design in the proper meaning 
of the  word can possibly be ascribed to
 inanimate matter2 we thus give notice  
that this word here only expresses a    
principle of the reflective not of  the 
determinant ,judgement1 and so is to    
introduce no particular ground  of      
causality2 but only adds for the use of 
the ,reason a different kind  of        
investigation from that according to    
mechanical laws1 in order to  supplement
 the inadequacy of the latter even for  
empirical research  into all particular 
laws of nature4 ,hence we speak quite   
correctly  in ,teleology1 so far as it  
is referred to ,physic1 of the wisdom1  
the  economy1 the forethought1 the      
beneficence of ,nature1 without either  
making an intelligent being of it1 for  
that would be preposterous2 or  even    
without presuming to place another      
intelligent ,being above it as  its     
,architect1 for that would be           
presumptuous4#aaa ,but there should  be 
only signified thereby a kind of        

causality of nature after the  analogy  
of our own in the technical use of      
,reason1 in order to have  before us the
 rule according to which certain        
products of nature must  be             
investigated4    ,but now why is it that
 ,teleology usually forms no proper part
 of  theoretical natural science1 but is
 regarded as a propaedeutic or          
transition to ,theology8 ,this is done  
in order to restrict the study  of      
nature1 mechanically considered1 to that
 which we can so subject  to observation
 or experiment that we are able to      
produce it ourselves  as nature does1 or
 at least by similar laws4 ,for we see  
into a thing  completely only so far as 
we can make it in accordance with our   
concepts and bring it to completion4    
,but organisation1 as an inner  purpose 
of nature1 infinitely surpasses all our 
faculty of presenting  the like by means
 of art4 ,and as concerns the external  
contrivances  of nature regarded as     
purposive 7wind1 rain1 etc471 ,physic1  

indeed1  considers their mechanism1 but 
it cannot at all present their reference
  to purposes1 so far as this is a      
condition necessarily belonging to      
cause2 for this necessity of connexion  
has to do altogether with the           
combination of our concepts and not with
 the constitution of things4            
,,second ,,division    ,,dialectic ,,of 
,,the ,,teleological ,,judgement        
#fi4 ,what is an antinomy of the        
,judgement8    ,the determinant         
,judgement has for itself no principles 
which are  the foundation of concepts of
 ,objects4 ,it has no autonomy1 for it  
subsumes only under given laws or       
concepts as principles4 ,hence it  is   
exposed to no danger of an antinomy of  
its own or to a conflict of  its        
principles4 ,so we saw that the         
transcendental ,judgement which         
contains the conditions of subsuming    
under categories was for itself  not    
nomothetic1 but that it only indicated  
the conditions of sensuous  intuition1  

under which reality 7application7 can be
 supplied to a given  concept1 as law of
 the ,understanding1 whereby the        
,judgement could never  fall into       
discord with itself 7at least as far as 
its principles are  concerned74    ,but 
the reflective ,judgement must subsume  
under a law1 which is not  yet given1   
and is therefore in fact only a         
principle of reflection  upon objects1  
for which we are objectively quite in   
want of a law or  of a concept of an    
,object that would be adequate as a     
principle for  the cases that occur4    
,since now no use of the cognitive      
faculties  can be permitted without     
principles1 the reflective ,judgement   
must  in such cases serve as a principle
 for itself4 ,this1 because it is  not  
objective and can supply no ground of   
cognition of the ,object  adequate for  
design1 must serve as a mere subjective 
principle1 for the  purposive employment
 of our cognitive faculties1 i4e4 for   
reflecting  upon a class of objects4    

,therefore in reference to such cases   
the  reflective ,judgement has its      
maxims--necessary maxims--on behalf of  
the cognition of natural laws in        
experience1 in order to attain by  their
 means to concepts1 even concepts of    
,reason2 since it has absolute  need of 
such in order to learn merely to cognise
 nature according to  its empirical     
laws4--,between these necessary maxims  
of the reflective  ,judgement there may 
be a conflict and consequently an       
antinomy1 upon  which a ,dialectic bases
 itself4 ,if each of two conflicting    
maxims has  its ground in the nature of 
the cognitive faculties1 this may be    
called  a natural ,dialectic1 and an    
unavoidable illusion which we must      
expose  and resolve in our ,critique1 to
 the end that it may not deceive us4    
#gj4 ,representation of this antinomy   
,so far as ,reason has to do with       
nature1 as the complex of objects  of   
external sense1 it can base itself      
partly upon laws which the              

,understanding itself prescribes a      
priori to nature1 partly upon  laws     
which it can extend indefinitely by     
means of the empirical  determinations  
occurring in experience4 ,to apply the  
former kind of  laws1 i4e4 the universal
 laws of material nature in general1 the
  ,judgement needs no special principle 
of reflection1 since it is there        
determinant because an objective        
principle is given to it through        
,understanding4 ,but as regards the     
particular laws that can only be made   
known to us through experience1 there   
can be under them such great            
manifoldness and diversity1 that the    
,judgement must serve as its own        
principle in order to investigate and   
search into the phenomena of  nature in 
accordance with a law4 ,such a guiding  
thread is needed1 if  we are only to    
hope for a connected empirical cognition
 according to  a thoroughgoing          
conformity of nature to law1 even its   
unity according  to empirical laws4 ,in 

this contingent unity of particular laws
 it may  very well happen that the      
,judgement in its reflection proceeds   
from  two maxims4 ,one of these is      
suggested to it a priori by the mere    
,understanding2 but the other is        
prompted by particular experiences1     
which bring the ,reason into play in    
order to form a judgement upon          
corporeal nature and its laws in        
accordance with a particular  principle4
 ,hence it comes about that these two   
kinds of maxims seem to  be incapable of
 existing together1 and consequently a  
,dialectic arises  which leads the      
,judgement into error in the principle  
of its reflection4    ,the first maxim  
of ,judgement is the proposition3 all   
production of  material things and their
 forms must be judged to be possible    
according  to merely mechanical laws4   
,the second maxim is the                
counter-proposition3 some products of   
material nature cannot be judged to be  
possible according to merely  mechanical

 laws4 7,to judge them requires quite a 
different law of  causality1 namely1    
that of final causes47    ,if these     
regulative principles of investigation  
be converted into  constitutive         
principles of the possibility of        
,objects1 they will run  thus3          
,proposition3 ,all production of        
material things is possible according   
to merely mechanical laws4              
,counter-proposition3 ,some production  
of material things is not  possible     
according to merely mechanical laws4    
,in this latter aspect1 as objective    
principles for the determinant          
,judgement1 they would contradict each  
other2 and consequently one of  the two 
propositions must necessarily be false4 
,we shall then1 it is  true1 have an    
antinomy1 but not of ,judgement2 there  
will be a conflict  in the legislation  
of ,reason4 ,reason1 however1 can prove 
neither the  one nor the other of these 
fundamental propositions1 because we can
  have a priori no determinant principle

 of the possibility of things  according
 to mere empirical laws of nature4      
,on the other hand1 as regards the      
first-mentioned maxims of a  reflective 
,judgement1 they involve no             
contradiction in fact4 ,for if  ,i say1 
,i must judge1 according to merely      
mechanical laws1 of the  possibility of 
all events in material nature1 and      
consequently of all  forms regarded as  
its products1 ,i do not therefore say3  
,they are  possible in this way alone   
7apart from any other kind of           
causality74  ,all that is implied is3 ,i
 must always reflect upon them according
  to the principle of the mere mechanism
 of nature1 and consequently            
investigate this as far as ,i can2      
because unless this lies at the  basis  
of investigation1 there can be no proper
 knowledge of nature at  all4 ,but this 
does not prevent us1 if occasion offers1
 from following  out the second maxim in
 the case of certain natural forms 7and 
even  by occasion of these in the whole 

of nature71 in order to reflect  upon   
them according to the principle of final
 causes1 which is quite  a different    
thing from explaining them according to 
the mechanism of  nature4 ,reflection in
 accordance with the first maxim is thus
 not  abrogated2 on the contrary1 we are
 told to follow it as far as we can4    
,nor is it said that these forms would  
not be possible in accordance  with the 
mechanism of nature4 ,it is only        
asserted that human ,reason  in         
following up this maxim and in this way 
could never find the least  ground for  
that which constitutes the specific     
character of a natural  purpose1        
although it would increase its knowledge
 of natural laws4  ,thus it is left     
undecided whether or not in the unknown 
inner ground  of nature1                
physico-mechanical and purposive        
combination may be united  in the same  
things in one principle4 ,we only say   
that our ,reason is  not in a position  
so to unite them2 and that therefore the

 ,judgement  7as reflective--from       
subjective grounds1 not as determinant1 
in  consequence of an objective         
principle of the possibility of things  
in  themselves7 is compelled to think a 
different principle from that of        
natural mechanism as the ground of the  
possibility of certain forms in  nature4
       #ga4 ,preliminary to the solution
 of the above antinomy    ,we can in no 
way prove the impossibility of the      
production of organised  natural        
products by the mere mechanism of       
nature1 because we cannot  see into the 
first inner ground of the infinite      
multiplicity of the  particular laws of 
nature1 which are contingent for us     
since they  are only empirically known2 
and so we cannot arrive at the inner    
all-sufficient principle of the         
possibility of a nature 7a principle    
which lies in the supersensible74       
,whether therefore the productive       
faculty of nature is sufficient for that
 which we judge to be formed  or        

combined in accordance with the ,idea of
 purposes1 as well as  for that which we
 believe to require merely a mechanical 
system  ,maschinenwesen of nature2 or   
whether there lies at the basis of      
things which we must necessarily judge  
as properly natural purposes1  a quite  
different kind of original causality1   
which cannot be  contained in material  
nature or in its intelligible substrate1
 viz4 an  architectonic                 
,understanding--this is a question to   
which our ,reason1  very narrowly       
limited in respect of the concept of    
causality if it  is to be specified a   
priori1 can give no answer              
whatever4--,but it  is just as certain  
and beyond doubt that1 in regard to our 
cognitive  faculties1 the mere mechanism
 of nature can furnish no ground of     
explanation of the production of        
organised beings4 ,for the reflective   
,judgement it is therefore a quite      
correct fundamental proposition1  that  
for that connexion of things according  

to final causes which is  so plain1     
there must be thought a causality       
distinct from that of  mechanism1 viz4  
that of an 7intelligent7 cause of the   
world acting in  accordance with        
purposes2 but for the determinant       
,judgement this  would be a hasty and   
unprovable proposition4 ,in the first   
case it is a  mere maxim of the         
,judgement1 wherein the concept of that 
causality is  a mere ,idea1 to which we 
by no means undertake to concede        
reality1 but  which we use as a guide to
 reflection1 which remains thereby      
always  open to all mechanical grounds  
of explanation and does not withdraw    
out of the world of ,sense4 ,in the     
second case the proposition would be  an
 objective principle prescribed by      
,reason1 to which the determinant       
,judgement must subject itself1 whereby 
however it withdraws beyond the  world  
of ,sense into the transcendent and     
perhaps is led into error4    ,all      
appearance of an antinomy between the   

maxims of the proper  physical          
7mechanical7 and the teleological       
7technical7 methods of  explanation     
rests therefore on this2 that we confuse
 a fundamental  proposition of the      
reflective with one of the determinant  
,judgement1  and the autonomy of the    
first 7which has mere subjective        
validity for  our use of ,reason in     
respect of particular empirical laws7   
with the  heteronomy of the second1     
which must regulate itself according to 
laws 7universal or particular7 given to 
it by the ,understanding4       #gb4 ,of
 the different systems which deal with  
the purposiveness of  nature    ,no one 
has ever doubted the correctness of the 
proposition that  judgement must be     
passed upon certain things of nature    
7organised  beings7 and their           
possibility in accordance with the      
concept of final  causes1 even if we    
only desire a guiding thread to learn   
how to  cognise their constitution      
through observation1 without aspiring to

 an  investigation into their first     
origin4 ,the question therefore can only
  be3 whether this fundamental          
proposition is merely subjectively      
valid1  i4e4 is a mere maxim of our     
,judgement2 or whether it is an         
objective  principle of nature1 in      
accordance with which1 apart from its   
mechanism  7according to the mere laws  
of motion71 quite a different kind of   
causality attaches to it1 viz4 that of  
final causes1 under which these  laws   
7of moving forces7 stand only as        
intermediate causes4    ,we could leave 
this question or problem quite undecided
 and unsolved  speculatively2 because if
 we content ourselves with speculation  
within the bounds of mere natural       
knowledge1 we have enough in these      
maxims for the study of nature and for  
the tracking out of its hidden  secrets1
 as far as human powers reach4 ,there is
 then indeed a certain  presentiment of 
our ,reason or a hint as it were given  
us by nature1  that1 by means of this   

concept of final causes1 we go beyond   
nature1  and could unite it to the      
highest point in the series of causes1  
if we  were to abandon or at least to   
lay aside for a time the investigation  
of nature 7although we may not have     
advanced far in it71 and seek           
thenceforth to find out whither this    
stranger in natural science1 viz4  the  
concept of natural purposes1 would lead 
us4    ,but here these undisputed maxims
 pass over into problems opening out  a 
wide field for difficulties4 ,does      
purposive connexion in nature  prove a  
particular kind of causality8 ,or is it 
not rather1 considered  in itself and in
 accordance with objective principles1  
similar to the  mechanism of nature1    
resting on one and the same ground8     
,only1 as  this ground in many natural  
products is often hidden too deep for   
our  investigation1 we make trial of a  
subjective principle1 that of art1  i4e4
 of causality according to ,ideas1 and  
we ascribe it to nature  by analogy4    

,this expedient succeeds in many cases1 
but seems in some  to mislead1 and in no
 case does it justify us in introducing 
into  natural science a particular kind 
of operation quite distinct from the    
causality according to the mere         
mechanical laws of nature4 ,we give  the
 name of ,technic to the procedure 7the 
causality7 of nature1 on  account of the
 appearance of purpose that we find in  
its products2 and  we shall divide this 
into designed 7technica intentionalis7  
and  undesigned 7technica naturalis74   
,the first is meant to signify  that the
 productive faculty of nature according 
to final causes must  be taken for a    
particular kind of causality2 the second
 that it is  at bottom quite similar to 
the mechanism of nature1 and that its   
contingent agreement with our artistic  
concepts and their rules should  be     
explained as a mere subjective condition
 of judging it1 and not1  falsely1 as a 
particular kind of natural production4  
,if we now speak of systems explanatory 

of nature in regard of final  causes1 it
 must be remarked that they all         
controvert each other  dogmatically1    
i4e4 as to objective principles of the  
possibility of  things1 whether there   
are causes which act designedly or      
whether they  are quite without design4 
,they do not dispute as to the          
subjective  maxims1 by which we merely  
judge of the causes of such purposive   
products4 ,in this latter case disparate
 principles could very well  be unified2
 but in the former1 contradictorily     
opposed laws annul each  other and      
cannot subsist together4    ,there are  
two sorts of systems as to the ,technic 
of nature1 i4e4  its productive power in
 accordance with the rule of purposes2  
viz4  ,idealism or ,realism of natural  
purposes4 ,the first maintains that  all
 purposiveness of nature is undesigned2 
the second that some 7in  organised     
beings7 is designed4 ,from this latter  
the hypothetical  consequence can be    
deduced that the ,technic of ,nature1 as

 concerns  all its other products in    
reference to the whole of nature1 is    
also  designed1 i4e4 is a purpose4      
7#a7 ,the ,idealism of purposiveness 7,i
 always understand here by  this1       
objective purposiveness7 is either that 
of the casuality or  the fatality of the
 determination of nature in the         
purposive form  of its products4 ,the   
former principle treats of the reference
 of  matter to the physical basis of its
 form1 viz4 the laws of motion2  the    
second1 its reference to the            
hyperphysical basis of itself and  of   
the whole of nature4 ,the system of     
casuality that is ascribed to  ,epicurus
 or ,democritus is1 taken literally1 so 
plainly absurd  that it need not detain 
us4 ,opposed to this is the system of   
fatality1  of which ,spinoza is taken as
 the author1 although it is much  older 
according to all appearance4 ,this1 as  
it appeals to something  supersensible  
to which our insight does not extend1 is
 not so easy to  controvert2 but that is

 because its concept of the original    
,being is  not possible to understand4  
,but so much is clear1 that on this     
theory  the purposive combination in the
 world must be taken as undesigned2  for
 although derived from an original      
,being1 it is not derived from  its     
,understanding or from any design on its
 part1 but rather from  the necessity of
 its nature and of the world-unity which
 emanates  therefrom4 ,consequently the 
,fatalism of purposiveness is at the    
same  time an ,idealism4    7#b7 ,the   
,realism of the purposiveness of nature 
is also either  physical or             
hyperphysical4 ,the former bases the    
purposes in nature1  by the analogy of a
 faculty acting with design1 on the life
 of matter  7either its own or the life 
of an inner principle in it1 a          
world-soul7  and is called ,hylozoism4  
,the latter derives them from the       
original  ground of the universe1 as    
from an intelligent ,being 7originally  
living71 who produces them with design1 

and is ,theism4#aab       #gc4 ,none of 
the above systems give what they pretend
    ,what do all these systems desire8  
,they desire to explain our             
teleological judgements about nature1   
and they go so to work therewith  that  
some deny their truth and1 consequently1
 explain them as an  ,idealism of       
,nature 7represented as ,art72 others   
recognise them as true1  and promise to 
establish the possibility of a nature in
 accordance with  the ,idea of final    
causes4    7#a7 ,the systems which      
defend the ,idealism of final causes in 
nature  grant1 it is true1 on the one   
hand to their principle a causality in  
accordance with the laws of motion      
7through which causality natural  things
 exist purposively72 but they deny to it
 intentionality1 i4e4  that it          
designedly determines itself to this its
 purposive production2  in other words1 
they deny that the cause is a purpose4  
,this is  ,epicurus's method of         
explanation1 according to which the     

distinction  between a ,technic of      
nature and mere mechanism is altogether 
denied4  ,blind chance is taken as the  
explanatory ground not only of the      
agreement of the developed products with
 our concepts of the purpose1  and      
consequently of nature's ,technic2 but  
also of the determination  of the causes
 of this production in accordance with  
the laws of motion1  and consequently of
 their mechanism4 ,thus nothing is      
explained1 not  even the illusion in our
 teleological judgements1 and           
consequently1 the  would-be ,idealism of
 these in no way established4    ,on the
 other hand1 ,spinoza wishes to dispense
 with all inquiries into  the ground of 
the possibility of purposes of nature1  
and to take away  all reality from this 
,idea4 ,he allows their validity in     
general not as  products but as         
accidents inhering in an original       
,being2 and to this  ,being1 as         
substrate of those natural things1 he   
ascribes not causality  in regard to    

them but mere subsistence4 ,on account  
of its unconditioned  necessity1 and    
also that of all natural things as      
accidents inhering  in it1 he secures1  
it is true1 to the forms of nature that 
unity of  ground which is requisite for 
all purposiveness2 but at the same time 
he tears away their contingence1 without
 which no unity of purpose  can be      
thought1 and with it all design1        
inasmuch as he takes away all           
intelligence from the original ground of
 natural things4    ,but ,spinozism does
 not furnish what it desires4 ,it       
desires to afford  an explanatory ground
 of the purposive connexion 7which it   
does not  deny7 of the things of nature1
 and it merely speaks of the unity of   
the  subject in which they all inhere4  
,but even if we concede to it that  the 
beings of the world exist in this way1  
such ontological unity is  not therefore
 a unity of purpose1 and does not make  
this in any way  comprehensible4 ,for   
this latter is a quite particular kind  

of unity  which does not follow from the
 connexion of things 7the beings of  the
 world7 in a subject 7the original      
,being71 but implies in itself          
reference to a cause which has          
,understanding2 and even if we unite    
all these things in a simple subject1   
this never exhibits a purposive         
reference4 ,for we do not think of them1
 first1 as the inner effects  of the    
substance1 as if it were a cause2 nor1  
secondly1 of this  cause as a cause     
producing effects by means of its       
,understanding4  ,without these formal  
conditions all unity is mere natural    
necessity2  and1 if it is ascribed as   
well to things which we represent as    
external to one another1 blind          
necessity4 ,but if we wish to give the  
name of purposiveness of nature to that 
which the schoolmen call the            
transcendental perfection of things 7in 
reference to their proper  being71      
according to which everything has in    
itself that which is  requisite to make 

it one thing and not another1 then we   
are only like  children playing with    
words instead of concepts4 ,for if all  
things  must be thought as purposes1    
then to be a thing is the same as to be 
a  purpose1 and there is at bottom      
nothing which specially deserves to be  
represented as a purpose4    ,we hence  
see at once that ,spinoza by his        
reducing our concepts of  the purposive 
in nature to our own consciousness of   
existing in an  all-embracing 7though   
simple7 ,being1 and by his seeking that 
form  merely in the unity of this       
,being1 must have intended to maintain  
not  the realism1 but the idealism of   
its purposiveness4 ,even this he was    
not able to accomplish1 because the mere
 representation of the unity of  the    
substrate cannot bring about the ,idea  
of a purposiveness1 even that  which is 
only undesigned4    7#b7 ,those who not 
only maintain the ,realism of natural   
purposes1 but  also set about explaining
 it1 believe that they can comprehend1  

at  least as regards its possibility1 a 
practical kind of causality1 viz4  that 
of causes working designedly2 otherwise 
they could not undertake  to supply this
 explanation4 ,for to authorise even the
 most daring of  hypotheses1 at least   
the possibility of what we assume as    
basis must  be certain1 and we must be  
able to assure objective reality to its 
concept4    ,but the possibility of     
living matter cannot even be thought2   
its  concept involves a contradiction   
because lifelessness1 inertia1          
constitutes the essential character of  
matter4 ,the possibility of  matter     
endowed with life1 and of collective    
nature regarded as an  animal1 can only 
be used in an inadequate way 7in the    
interests of  the hypothesis of         
purposiveness in the whole of nature71  
so far as it  is manifested by          
experience in the organisation of nature
 on a small  scale2 but in no way can we
 have insight into its possibility a    
priori4 ,there must then be a circle in 

the explanation1 if we wish to  derive  
the purposiveness of nature in organised
 beings from the life  of matter1 and   
yet only know this life in organised    
beings1 and can  form no concept of its 
possibility without experience of this  
kind4  ,hylozoism1 therefore1 does not  
furnish what it promises4    ,finally1  
,theism can just as little establish    
dogmatically the  possibility of natural
 purposes as a key to ,teleology2       
although it  certainly is superior to   
all other grounds of explanation in     
that1  through the ,understanding which 
it ascribes to the original ,being1 it  
rescues in the best way the             
purposiveness of nature from ,idealism1 
and  introduces a causality acting with 
design for its production4    ,but we   
must first prove satisfactorily to the  
determinant ,judgement the              
impossibility of the unity of purpose in
 matter resulting from its mere         
mechanism1 before we are justified in   
placing the ground of this beyond       

nature in a determinate way4 ,we can1   
however1 advance no further than  this4 
,in accordance with the constitution and
 limits of our cognitive  faculties     
7whilst we do not comprehend even the   
first inner ground  of this mechanism7  
we must in no wise seek in matter a     
principle of  determinate purposive     
references2 but no other way of judging 
of the  origination of its products as  
natural purposes remains to us than     
that by means of a supreme              
,understanding as cause of the world4   
,but  this is only a ground for the     
reflective1 not for the determinant     
,judgement1 and can justify absolutely  
no objective assertion4       #gd4 ,the 
reason that we cannot treat the concept 
of a ,technic of  nature dogmatically is
 the fact that a natural purpose is     
inexplicable    ,we deal with a concept 
dogmatically 7even though it should be  
empirically conditioned7 if we consider 
it as contained under another  concept  
of the ,object which constitutes a      

principle#aac of ,reason1  and determine
 it in conformity with this4 ,but we    
deal with it merely  critically1 if we  
consider it only in reference to our    
cognitive  faculties and consequently to
 the subjective conditions of thinking  
it1 without undertaking to decide       
anything about its ,object4 ,dogmatic   
procedure with a concept is then that   
which is conformable to law  for the    
determinant ,judgement1 critical        
procedure for the reflective            
,judgement4    ,now the concept of a    
thing as a natural purpose is a concept 
which  subsumes nature under a causality
 only thinkable through ,reason1  in    
order to judge in accordance with this  
principle about that  which is given of 
the ,object in experience4 ,but in order
 to use it  dogmatically for the        
determinant ,judgement1 we must be      
assured first  of the objective reality 
of this concept1 because otherwise we   
could  subsume no natural thing under   
it4 ,again1 the concept of a thing as  a

 natural purpose is1 no doubt1          
empirically conditioned1 i4e4 only      
possible under certain conditions given 
in experience1 though not to be         
abstracted therefrom2 but it is a       
concept only possible in accordance     
with a rational principle in the        
judgement about the object4 ,its        
objective reality1 therefore 7i4e4 that 
an object in conformity with  it is     
possible71 cannot be comprehended and   
dogmatically established as  such a     
principle2 and we do not know whether it
 is merely a sophistical  and           
objectively empty concept 7conceptus    
ratiocinans71 or a rational  concept1   
establishing a cognition and confirmed  
by ,reason 7conceptus                   
ratiocinatus74#aad ,therefore it cannot 
be dogmatically treated for  the        
determinant ,judgement1 i4e4 it is not  
only impossible to decide  whether or   
not things of nature considered as      
natural purposes require  for their     
production a causality of a quite       

peculiar kind 7that acting  on design72 
but the question cannot even be put1    
because the concept of  a natural       
purpose is simply not susceptible of    
proof through ,reason as  regards its   
objective reality4 ,that is1 it is not  
constitutive for the  determinant       
,judgement1 but merely regulative for   
the reflective4    ,that it is not      
susceptible of proof is clear because   
7as concept of  a natural product7 it   
embraces in itself natural necessity1   
and at  the same time 7as purpose7 a    
contingency of the form of the ,object  
7in  reference to the mere laws of      
nature7 in the very same thing4 ,hence1 
if there is to be no contradiction here 
it must contain a ground for  the       
possibility of the thing in nature1 and 
also a ground of the  possibility of    
this nature itself and of its reference 
to something  which1 not being          
empirically cognisable nature           
7supersensible71 is  therefore for us   
not cognisable at all4 ,this is         

requisite if it is  to be judged        
according to a different kind of        
causality from that  of natural         
mechanism when we wish to establish its 
possibility4 ,the  concept of a thing1  
then1 as a natural purpose1 is          
transcendent for  the determinant       
,judgement1 if we consider the ,object  
through ,reason  7although for the      
reflective ,judgement it certainly may  
be immanent in  respect of the objects  
of experience74 ,hence for determinant  
judgements  objective reality cannot be 
supplied to it2 and so it is            
intelligible  how all systems that one  
may project for the dogmatic treatment  
of  the concept of natural purposes and 
of nature itself considered  as a whole 
connected together by means of final    
causes1 can decide  nothing either by   
objective affirmation or by objective   
denial4 ,for if  things be subsumed     
under a concept that is merely          
problematical1 its  synthetical         
predicates 7e4g4 in the question whether

 the purpose of  nature which we        
conceive for the production of things is
 designed or  undesigned7 can furnish   
only problematical judgements of the    
,object1  whether affirmative or        
negative2 and we do not know whether we 
are  judging about something or about   
nothing4 ,the concept of a causality    
through purposes 7of art7 has at all    
events objective reality1 and  also the 
concept of a causality according to the 
mechanism of nature4  ,but the concept  
of a causality of nature according to   
the rule of  purposes1--still more of a 
,being such as cannot be given us in    
experience1 a ,being who is the original
 cause of nature1--though it  can be    
thought without contradiction1 yet is of
 no avail for dogmatic  determinations4 
,for1 since it cannot be derived from   
experience1  and also is not requisite  
for the possibility thereof1 its        
objective  reality can in no way be     
assured4 ,but even if this could be     
done1 how  can ,i number among the      

products of nature things which are     
definitely  accounted products of divine
 art1 when it is just the incapacity of 
nature to produce such things according 
to its own laws that made it  necessary 
to invoke a cause different from it8    
#ge4 ,the concept of an objective       
purposiveness of nature is a  critical  
principle of ,reason for the reflective 
,judgement    ,it is then one thing to  
say1 8the production of certain things  
of  nature or that of collective nature 
is only possible through a cause  which 
determines itself to action according to
 design02 and quite  another to say1 8,i
 can according to the peculiar          
constitution of my  cognitive faculties 
judge concerning the possibility of     
these things  and their production1 in  
no other fashion than by conceiving for 
this a  cause working according to      
design1 i4e4 a ,being which is          
productive  in a way analogous to the   
causality of an intelligence40 ,in the  
former  case ,i wish to establish       

something concerning the ,object1 and am
  bound to establish the objective      
reality of an assumed concept2 in  the  
latter1 ,reason only determines the use 
of my cognitive faculties1  conformably 
to their peculiarities and to the       
essential conditions  of their range and
 their limits4 ,thus the former         
principle is an  objective proposition  
for the determinant ,judgement1 the     
latter merely  a subjective proposition 
for the reflective ,judgement1 i4e4 a   
maxim  which ,reason prescribes to it4  
,we are in fact indispensably obliged to
 ascribe the concept of design  to      
nature if we wish to investigate it1    
though only in its organised  products1 
by continuous observation2 and this     
concept is therefore an  absolutely     
necessary maxim for the empirical use of
 our ,reason4 ,it  is plain that once   
such a guiding thread for the study of  
nature is  admitted and verified1 we    
must at least try the said maxim of     
,judgement  in nature as a whole2       

because thereby many of nature's laws   
might  discover themselves1 which       
otherwise1 on account of the limitation 
of our insight into its inner mechanism1
 would remain hidden4 ,but  though in   
regard to this latter employment that   
maxim of ,judgement is  certainly       
useful1 it is not indispensable1 for    
nature as a whole is not  given as      
organised 7in the narrow sense of the   
word above indicated74  ,on the other   
hand1 in regard to those natural        
products1 which must  be judged of as   
designed and not formed otherwise 7if we
 are to have  empirical knowledge of    
their inner constitution71 this maxim of
 the  reflective ,judgement is          
essentially necessary2 because the very 
thought  of them as organised beings is 
impossible without combining therewith  
the thought of their designed           
production4    ,now the concept of a    
thing whose existence or form we        
represent to  ourselves as possible     
under the condition of a purpose is     

inseparably  bound up with the concept  
of its contingency 7according to natural
  laws74 ,hence the natural things that 
we find possible only as purposes       
supply the best proof of the contingency
 of the world-whole2 to the  common     
,understanding and to the philosopher   
alike they are the only  valid ground of
 proof for its dependence on and origin 
from a ,being  existing outside the     
world--a ,being who must also be        
intelligent on  account of that         
purposive form4 ,teleology then finds   
the consummation  of its investigations 
only in ,theology4    ,but what now in  
the end does the most complete          
,teleology prove8 ,does  it prove that  
there is such an intelligent ,being8    
,no4 ,it only proves  that according to 
the constitution of our cognitive       
faculties and in  the consequent        
combination of experience with the      
highest principles of  ,reason1 we can  
form absolutely no concept of the       
possibility of such a  world as this    

save by thinking a designedly-working   
supreme cause  thereof4 ,objectively we 
cannot therefore lay down the           
proposition1  there is an intelligent   
original ,being2 but only subjectively1 
for the  use of our ,judgement in its   
reflection upon the purposes in nature1 
which can be thought according to no    
other principle than that of a          
designing causality of a highest cause4 
,if we wished to establish on           
teleological grounds the above          
proposition  dogmatically we should be  
beset with difficulties from which we   
could  not extricate ourselves4 ,for    
then the proposition must at bottom be  
reduced to the conclusion1 that the     
organised beings in the world  are no   
otherwise possible than by a            
designedly-working cause4 ,and we       
should unavoidably have to assert that1 
because we can follow up these  things  
in their causal combination only under  
the ,idea of purposes1 and  cognise them
 only according to their conformity to  

law1 we are thereby  justified in       
assuming this as a condition necessary  
for every thinking  and cognising       
being--a condition consequently         
attaching to the ,object  and not merely
 to our subject4 ,but such an assertion 
we do not succeed  in sustaining4 ,for1 
since we do not1 properly speaking1     
observe the  purposes in nature as      
designed1 but only in our reflection    
upon its  products think this concept as
 a guiding thread for our ,judgement1   
they are not given to us through the    
,object4 ,it is quite impossible for  us
 a priori to vindicate1 as capable of   
assumption1 such a concept  according to
 its objective reality4 ,it remains     
therefore a proposition  absolutely     
resting upon subjective conditions      
alone1 viz4 of the  ,judgement          
reflecting in conformity with our       
cognitive faculties4 ,if  we expressed  
this proposition dogmatically as        
objectively valid1 it  would be3 8,there
 is a ,god40 ,but for us men there is   

only permissible  the limited formula3  
8,we cannot otherwise think and make    
comprehensible  the purposiveness which 
must lie at the bottom of our cognition 
of  the internal possibility of many    
natural things1 than by representing  it
 and the world in general as a product  
of an intelligent cause1 a  ,god40#aae  
,now if this proposition1 based on an   
inevitably necessary maxim of our       
,judgement1 is completely satisfactory  
from every human point of view  for both
 the speculative and practical use of   
our ,reason1 ,i should like  to know    
what we lose by not being able to prove 
it as also valid for  higher beings1    
from objective grounds 7which           
unfortunately are beyond  our           
faculties74 ,it is indeed quite certain 
that we cannot adequately  cognise1 much
 less explain1 organised beings and     
their internal  possibility1 according  
to mere mechanical principles of nature2
 and we  can say boldly it is alike     
certain that it is absurd for men to    

make  any such attempt or to hope that  
another ,newton will arise in the       
future1 who shall make comprehensible by
 us the production of a blade  of grass 
according to natural laws which no      
design has ordered4#aaf  ,we must       
absolutely deny this insight to men4    
,but then how do we know  that in       
nature1 if we could penetrate to the    
principle by which it  specifies the    
universal laws known to us1 there cannot
 lie hidden 7in  its mere mechanism7 a  
sufficient ground of the possibility of 
organised  beings without supposing any 
design in their production8 would it    
not be judged by us presumptuous to say 
this8 ,probabilities here are  of no    
account when we have to do with         
judgements of pure ,reason4--,we  cannot
 therefore judge objectively1 either    
affirmatively or negatively1  concerning
 the proposition3 8,does a ,being acting
 according to design  lie at the basis  
of what we rightly call natural         
purposes1 as the cause  of the world    

7and consequently as its author780 ,so  
much only is sure1  that if we are to   
judge according to what is permitted us 
to see by  our own proper nature 7the   
conditions and limitations of our       
,reason71  we can place at the basis of 
the possibility of these natural        
purposes  nothing else than an          
intelligent ,being4 ,this alone is in   
conformity  with the maxim of our       
reflective ,judgement and therefore with
 a ground  which1 though subjective1 is 
inseparably attached to the human race4 
#gf4 ,remark    ,this consideration1    
which very well deserves to be worked   
out in  detail in ,transcendental       
,philosophy1 can come in here only in   
passing1  by way of elucidation 7not as 
a proof of what is here proposed74      
,reason is a faculty of principles and  
proceeds in its extremest advance  to   
the unconditioned2 on the other hand1   
the ,understanding stands at  its       
service always only under a certain     
condition which must be given4  ,but    

without concepts of ,understanding1 to  
which objective reality  must be given1 
the ,reason cannot form any objective   
7synthetical7  judgement2 and contains  
in itself1 as theoretical ,reason1      
absolutely  no constitutive but merely  
regulative principles4 ,we soon see that
  where the ,understanding cannot       
follow1 the ,reason is transcendent1 and
  shows itself in ,ideas formerly       
established 7as regulative principles71 
but not in objectively valid concepts4  
,but the ,understanding which  cannot   
keep pace with ,reason but yet is       
requisite for the validity of  ,objects1
 limits the validity of these ,ideas to 
the subject1 although  extending it     
generally to all subjects of this kind4 
,that is1 the  ,understanding limits    
their validity to the condition1 that   
according  to the nature of our 7human7 
cognitive faculties1 or1 generally1     
according to the concept which we       
ourselves can make of the faculty  of a 
finite intelligent being1 nothing else  

can or must be thought2  though this is 
not to assert that the ground of such a 
judgement lies  in the ,object4 ,we     
shall adduce some examples which1 though
 they are  too important and difficult  
to impose them on the reader as proved  
propositions1 yet will give him material
 for thought and may serve to  elucidate
 what we are here specially concerned   
with4    ,it is indispensably necessary 
for the human ,understanding to         
distinguish between the possibility and 
the actuality of things4 ,the  ground   
for this lies in the subject and in the 
nature of our cognitive  faculties4     
,such a distinction 7between the        
possible and the actual7  would not be  
given were there not requisite for      
knowledge two quite  different elements1
 ,understanding for concepts and        
sensible intuition  for ,objects        
corresponding to them4 ,if our          
,understanding were intuitive  it would 
have no objects but those which are     
actual4 ,concepts 7which  merely extend 

to the possibility of an object7 and    
sensible intuitions  7which give us     
something without allowing us to cognise
 it thus as an  object7 would both      
disappear4 ,but now the whole of our    
distinction  between the merely possible
 and the actual rests on this1 that the 
former only signifies the positing of   
the representation of a thing  in       
respect of our concept1 and1 in general1
 in respect of the faculty  of thought2 
while the latter signifies the positing 
of the thing in  itself outside this    
concept4#aag ,the distinction1 then1 of 
possible  things from actual is one     
which has merely subjective validity for
 the  human ,understanding1 because we  
can always have a thing in our thoughts 
although it is really nothing1 or we can
 represent a thing as given  although we
 have no concept of it4 ,the            
propositions therefore--that  things can
 be possible without being actual1 and  
that consequently no  conclusion can be 
drawn as to actuality from mere         

possibility--are  quite valid for human 
,reason1 without thereby proving that   
this  distinction lies in things        
themselves4 ,that this does not follow1 
and  that consequently these            
propositions1 though valid of ,objects  
7in  so far as our cognitive faculty1 as
 sensuously conditioned1 busies  itself 
with ,objects of sense71 do not hold for
 things in general1  appears from the   
irrepressible demand of ,reason to      
assume something  7the original ground7 
necessarily existing as unconditioned1  
in which  possibility and actuality     
should no longer be distinguished1 and  
for which ,idea our ,understanding has  
absolutely no concept2 i4e4  it can find
 no way of representing such a thing and
 its manner of  existence4 ,for if the  
,understanding thinks such a thing      
7which it  may do at pleasure71 the     
thing is merely represented as possible4
 ,if  it is conscious of it as given in 
intuition1 then is it actual2 but       
nothing as to its possibility is thus   

thought4 ,hence the concept of  an      
absolutely necessary ,being is no doubt 
an indispensable ,idea of  ,reason1 but 
yet it is a problematical concept       
unattainable by the human               
,understanding4 ,it is indeed valid for 
the employment of our cognitive         
faculties in accordance with their      
peculiar constitution1 but not  valid of
 the ,object4 ,nor is it valid for every
 knowing being1 because  ,i cannot      
presuppose in every such being thought  
and intuition as two  distinct          
conditions of the exercise of its       
cognitive faculties1 and  consequently  
as conditions of the possibility and    
actuality of things4  ,an ,understanding
 into which this distinction did not    
enter1 might  say3 ,all ,objects that ,i
 know are1 i4e4 exist2 and the          
possibility  of some1 which yet do not  
exist 7i4e4 the contingency or the      
contrasted necessity of those which do  
exist71 might never come into  the      
representation of such a being at all4  

,but what makes it difficult  for our   
,understanding to treat its concepts    
here as ,reason does1 is  merely that   
for it1 as human ,understanding1 that is
 transcendent  7i4e4 impossible for the 
subjective conditions of its cognition7 
which ,reason makes into a principle    
appertaining to the ,object4--,here  the
 maxim always holds1 that all ,objects  
whose cognition surpasses  the faculty  
of the ,understanding are thought by us 
according to the  subjective conditions 
of the exercise of that faculty which   
necessarily  attach to our 7human7      
nature4 ,if judgements laid down in this
 way 7and  there is no other alternative
 in regard to transcendent concepts7    
cannot be constitutive principles       
determining the ,object as it is1 they  
will remain regulative principles       
adapted to the human point of view1     
immanent in their exercise and sure4    
,just as ,reason in the theoretical     
consideration of nature must assume  the
 ,idea of an unconditioned necessity of 

its original ground1 so also  it        
presupposes in the practical sphere its 
own 7in respect of nature7              
unconditioned causality1 or freedom1 in 
that it is conscious of its  own moral  
command4 ,here the objective necessity  
of the act1 as a duty1  is opposed to   
that necessity which it would have as an
 event1 if its  ground lay in nature and
 not in freedom 7i4e4 in the causality  
of  ,reason74 ,the morally absolutely   
necessary act is regarded as physically 
quite contingent1 since that which ought
 necessarily to happen often  does not  
happen4 ,it is clear then that it is    
owing to the subjective  constitution of
 our practical faculty that the moral   
laws must be  represented as commands1  
and the actions conforming to them as   
duties2  and that ,reason expresses this
 necessity not by an 8is0 7happens71    
but by an 8ought to be40 ,this would not
 be the case were ,reason  considered as
 in its causality independent of        
sensibility 7as the  subjective         

condition of its application to objects 
of nature71 and so  as cause in an      
intelligible world entirely in agreement
 with the moral  law4 ,for in such a    
world there would be no distinction     
between 8ought  to do0 and 8does10      
between a practical law of that which is
 possible  through us1 and the          
theoretical law of that which is actual 
through  us4 ,though1 therefore1 an     
intelligible world in which everything  
would  be actual merely because 7as     
something good7 it is possible1 together
  with freedom as its formal condition1 
is for us a transcendent concept1  not  
available as a constitutive principle to
 determine an ,object and  its objective
 reality2 yet1 because of the           
constitution of our 7in  part sensuous7 
nature and faculty it is1 so far as we  
can represent  it in accordance with the
 constitution of our ,reason1 for us and
 for  all rational beings that have a   
connexion with the world of sense1 a    
universal regulative principle4 ,this   

principle does not objectively          
determine the constitution of freedom1  
as a form of causality1 but it  makes   
the rule of actions according to that   
,idea a command for every  one1 with no 
less validity than if it did so         
determine it4    ,in the same way we may
 concede thus much as regards the case  
in hand4  ,between natural mechanism and
 the ,technic of nature1 i4e4 its       
purposive connexion1 we should find no  
distinction1 were it not that  our      
,understanding is of the kind that must 
proceed from the universal  to the      
particular4 ,the ,judgement then in     
respect of the particular can  cognise  
no purposiveness and1 consequently1 can 
form no determinant  judgements1 without
 having a universal law under which to  
subsume that  particular4 ,now the      
particular1 as such1 contains something 
contingent  in respect of the universal1
 while yet ,reason requires unity and   
conformity to law in the combination of 
particular laws of nature4  ,this       

conformity of the contingent to law is  
called purposiveness2 and  the          
derivation of particular laws from the  
universal1 as regards their  contingent 
element1 is impossible a priori through 
a determination  of the concept of the  
,object4 ,hence1 the concept of the     
purposiveness  of nature in its products
 is necessary for human ,judgement in   
respect  of nature1 but has not to do   
with the determination of ,objects4 ,it 
is1  therefore1 a subjective principle  
of ,reason for the ,judgement1 which  as
 regulative 7not constitutive7 is just  
as necessarily valid for our  human     
,judgement as if it were an objective   
principle4       #gg4 ,of the           
peculiarity of the human ,understanding1
 by means of which  the concept of a    
natural purpose is possible    ,we have 
brought forward in the ,remark          
peculiarities of our cognitive          
faculties 7even the higher ones7 which  
we are easily led to transfer as        
objective predicates to the things      

themselves4 ,but they concern ,ideas1   
no object adequate to which can be given
 in experience1 and they could  only    
serve as regulative principles in the   
pursuit of experience4 ,this  is the    
case with the concept of a natural      
purpose1 which concerns the  cause of   
the possibility of such a predicate1    
which cause can only lie  in the ,idea4 
,but the result corresponding to it     
7i4e4 the product7  is given in nature2 
and the concept of a causality of nature
 as of a  being acting according to     
purposes seems to make the ,idea of a   
natural  purpose into a constitutive    
principle1 which ,idea has thus         
something  different from all other     
,ideas4    ,this difference consists1   
however1 in the fact that the ,idea in  
question is not a rational principle for
 the ,understanding but  for the        
,judgement4 ,it is1 therefore1 merely   
the application of an  ,understanding in
 general to possible objects of         
experience1 in cases  where the         

judgement can only be reflective1 not   
determinant1 and where1  consequently1  
the object1 although given in           
experience1 cannot be  determinately    
judged in conformity with the ,idea 7not
 to say with  complete adequacy71 but   
can only be reflected on4    ,there     
emerges1 therefore1 a peculiarity of our
 7human7 ,understanding  in respect of  
the ,judgement in its reflection upon   
things of nature4  ,but if this be so1  
the ,idea of a possible ,understanding  
different  from the human must be       
fundamental here4 7,just so in the      
,critique  of ,pure ,reason we must have
 in our thoughts another possible kind  
of intuition1 if ours is to be regarded 
as a particular species  for which      
objects are only valid as phenomena47   
,and so we are able  to say3 ,certain   
natural products1 from the special      
constitution of  our ,understanding1    
must be considered by us1 in regard to  
their  possibility1 as if produced      
designedly and as purposes4 ,but we  do 

not1 therefore1 demand that there should
 be actually given a  particular cause  
which has the representation of a       
purpose as its  determining ground2 and 
we do not deny that an ,understanding1  
different  from 7i4e4 higher than7 the  
human1 might find the ground of the     
possibility of such products of nature  
in the mechanism of nature1  i4e4 in a  
causal combination for which an         
,understanding is not  explicitly       
assumed as cause4    ,we have now to do 
with the relation of our ,understanding 
to the  ,judgement2 viz4 we seek for a  
certain contingency in the constitution 
of our ,understanding1 to which we may  
point as a peculiarity  distinguishing  
it from other possible ,understandings4 
,this contingency is found1 naturally   
enough1 in the particular1  which the   
,judgement is to bring under the        
universal of the concepts  of           
,understanding4 ,for the universal of   
our 7human7 ,understanding does  not    
determine the particular1 and it is     

contingent in how many ways  different  
things which agree in a common          
characteristic may come before  our     
perception4 ,our ,understanding is a    
faculty of concepts1 i4e4 a  discursive 
,understanding1 for which it obviously  
must be contingent  of what kind and how
 very different the particular may be   
that can be  given to it in nature and  
brought under its concepts4 ,but now    
intuition  also belongs to knowledge1   
and a faculty of a complete spontaneity 
of intuition would be a cognitive       
faculty distinct from sensibility1  and 
quite independent of it1 in other words1
 an ,understanding in the  most general 
sense4 ,thus we can think an intuitive  
,understanding  negatively1 merely as   
not discursive#aah1 which does not      
proceed  from the universal to the      
particular1 and so to the individual    
7through  concepts74 ,for it that       
contingency of the accordance of nature 
in its  products according to particular
 laws with the ,understanding would  not

 be met with2 and it is this contingency
 that makes it so hard for  our         
,understanding to reduce the manifold of
 nature to the unity of  knowledge4     
,this reduction our ,understanding can  
only accomplish by  bringing natural    
characteristics into a very contingent  
correspondence  with our faculty of     
concepts1 of which an intuitive         
,understanding would  have no need4     
,our ,understanding has then this       
peculiarity as concerns the ,judgement1 
that in cognition by it the particular  
is not determined by the  universal and 
cannot therefore be derived from it2 but
 at the same  time this particular in   
the manifold of nature must accord with 
the  universal 7by means of concepts and
 laws7 so that it may be capable  of    
being subsumed under it4 ,this          
accordance under such circumstances     
must be very contingent and without     
definite principle as concerns the      
,judgement4    ,in order now to be able 
at least to think the possibility of    

such an  accordance of things of nature 
with our ,judgement 7which accordance   
we represent as contingent and          
consequently as only possible by means  
of a purpose directed thereto71 we must 
at the same time think of  another      
,understanding1 by reference to which   
and apart from any purpose  ascribed to 
it1 we may represent as necessary that  
accordance of  natural laws with our    
,judgement1 which for our ,understanding
 is only  thinkable through the medium  
of purposes4    ,in fact our            
,understanding has the property of      
proceeding in  its cognition1 e4g4 of   
the cause of a product1 from the        
analytical-universal 7concepts7 to the  
particular 7the given  empirical        
intuition74 ,thus as regards the        
manifold of the latter it  determines   
nothing1 but must await this            
determination by the ,judgement1  which 
subsumes the empirical intuition 7if the
 object is a natural  product7 under the
 concept4 ,we can however think an      

,understanding  which1 being1 not like  
ours1 discursive1 but intuitive1        
proceeds from  the synthetical-universal
 7the intuition of a whole as such7 to  
the  particular1 i4e4 from the whole to 
the parts4 ,the contingency  of the     
combination of the parts1 in order that 
a definite form of  the whole shall be  
possible1 is not implied by such an     
,understanding  and its representation  
of the whole4 ,our ,understanding       
requires this  because it must proceed  
from the parts as universally conceived 
grounds to different forms possible to  
be subsumed under them1 as              
consequences4 ,according to the         
constitution of our ,understanding a    
real whole of nature is regarded only as
 the effect of the concurrent  motive   
powers of the parts4 ,suppose then that 
we wish not to represent  the           
possibility of the whole as dependent on
 that of the parts 7after  the manner of
 our discursive ,understanding71 but    
according to the  standard of the       

intuitive 7original7 ,understanding to  
represent  the possibility of the parts 
7according to their constitution and    
combination7 as dependent on that of the
 whole4 ,in accordance with the  above  
peculiarity of our ,understanding it    
cannot happen that the whole  shall     
contain the ground of the possibility of
 the connexion of the  parts 7which     
would be a contradiction in discursive  
cognition71 but  only that the          
representation of a whole may contain   
the ground of the  possibility of its   
form and the connexion of the parts     
belonging to it4  ,now such a whole     
would be an effect 7product7 the        
representation of  which is regarded as 
the cause of its possibility2 but the   
product  of a cause whose determining   
ground is merely the representation of  
its effect is called a purpose4 ,hence  
it is merely a consequence of  the      
particular constitution of our          
,understanding1 that it represents      
products of nature as possible1         

according to a different kind of        
causality from that of the natural laws 
of matter1 namely1 that of  purposes and
 final causes4 ,hence also this         
principle has not to do  with the       
possibility of such things themselves   
7even when considered  as phenomena7    
according to the manner of their        
production1 but merely  with the        
judgement upon them which is possible to
 our ,understanding4  ,here we see at   
once why it is that in natural science  
we are not  long contented with an      
explanation of the products of nature by
 a  causality according to purposes4    
,for there we desire to judge of        
natural production merely in a manner   
conformable to our faculty of  judging1 
i4e4 to the reflective ,judgement1 and  
not in reference to  things themselves  
on behalf of the determinant ,judgement4
 ,it is here  not at all requisite to   
prove that such an intellectus          
archetypus is  possible1 but only that  
we are led to the ,idea of it1--which   

contains  no contradiction1--in contrast
 to our discursive ,understanding which 
has need of images 7intellectus ectypus7
 and to the contingency of  its         
constitution4    ,if we consider a      
material whole1 according to its form1  
as a product  of the parts with their   
powers and faculties of combining with  
one  another 7as well as of bringing in 
foreign materials71 we represent to     
ourselves a mechanical mode of producing
 it4 ,but in this way no concept        
emerges of a whole as purpose1 whose    
internal possibility presupposes        
throughout the ,idea of a whole on which
 depend the constitution and  mode of   
action of the parts1 as we must         
represent to ourselves an  organised    
body4 ,it does not follow indeed1 as has
 been shown1 that  the mechanical       
production of such a body is impossible2
 for to say so  would be to say that it 
would be impossible 7contradictory7 for 
any  ,understanding to represent to     
itself such a unity in the connexion of 

the manifold1 without the ,idea of the  
unity being at the same time its        
producing cause1 i4e4 without designed  
production4 ,this1 however1  would      
follow in fact if we were justified in  
regarding material beings  as things in 
themselves4 ,for then the unity that    
constitutes the  ground of the          
possibility of natural formations would 
be simply the  unity of space4 ,but     
space is no real ground of the products1
 but only  their formal condition1      
although it has this similarity to the  
real  ground which we seek that in it no
 part can be determined except in       
relation to the whole 7the              
representation of which therefore lies  
at  the ground of the possibility of the
 parts74 ,but now it is at least        
possible to consider the material world 
as mere phenomenon1 and to  think as its
 substrate something like a thing in    
itself 7which is  not phenomenon71 and  
to attach to this a corresponding       
intellectual  intuition 7even though it 

is not ours74 ,thus there would be1     
although  incognisable by us1 a         
supersensible real ground for nature1 to
 which  we ourselves belong4 ,in this we
 consider according to mechanical laws  
what is necessary in nature regarded as 
an object of ,sense2 but we  consider   
according to teleological laws the      
agreement and unity of its  particular  
laws and its forms--which in regard to  
mechanism we must  judge                
contingent--regarded as objects of      
,reason 7in fact the whole  of nature as
 a system74 ,thus we should judge nature
 according to two  different kinds of   
principles without the mechanical way of
 explanation  being shut out by the     
teleological1 as if they contradicted   
one another4    ,from this we are       
enabled to see what otherwise1 though we
 could easily  surmise it1 could with   
difficulty be maintained with certainty 
and  proved1 viz4 that the principle of 
a mechanical derivation of purposive    
natural products is consistent with the 

teleological1 but in no way  enables us 
to dispense with it4 ,in a thing that we
 must judge as a  natural purpose 7an   
organised being7 we can no doubt try all
 the known  and yet to be discovered    
laws of mechanical production1 and even 
hope  to make good progress therewith2  
but we can never get rid of the call    
for a quite different ground of         
production for the possibility of such  
a product1 viz4 causality by means of   
purposes4 ,absolutely no human  ,reason 
7in fact no finite ,reason like ours in 
quality1 however much it  may surpass it
 in degree7 can hope to understand the  
production of even  a blade of grass by 
mere mechanical causes4 ,as regards the 
possibility  of such an object1 the     
teleological connexion of causes and    
effects  is quite indispensable for the 
,judgement1 even for studying it by the 
clue of experience4 ,for external       
objects as phenomena an adequate  ground
 related to purposes cannot be met with2
 this1 although it lies  in nature1 must

 only be sought in the supersensible    
substrate of  nature1 from all possible 
insight into which we are cut off4      
,hence it  is absolutely impossible for 
us to produce from nature itself grounds
  of explanation for purposive          
combinations2 and it is necessary by the
  constitution of the human cognitive   
faculties to seek the supreme  ground of
 these purposive combinations in an     
original ,understanding as  the cause of
 the world4       #gh4 ,of the union of 
the principle of the universal mechanism
 of  matter with the teleological       
principle in the ,technic of nature     
,it is infinitely important for ,reason 
not to let slip the mechanism  of nature
 in its products1 and in their          
explanation not to pass it  by1 because 
without it no insight into the nature of
 things can be  attained4 ,suppose it   
admitted that a supreme ,architect      
immediately  created the forms of nature
 as they have been from the beginning1  
or  that ,he predetermined those which  

in the course of nature continually     
form themselves on the same model4 ,our 
knowledge of nature is not thus  in the 
least furthered1 because we cannot know 
the mode of action of  that ,being and  
the ,ideas which are to contain the     
principles of the  possibility of       
natural beings1 and we cannot by them   
explain nature  as from above downwards 
7a priori74 ,and if1 starting from the  
forms  of the objects of experience1    
from below upwards 7a posteriori71  we  
wish to explain the purposiveness1 which
 we believe is met with  in experience1 
by appealing to a cause working in      
accordance with  purposes1 then is our  
explanation quite tautological and we   
are only  mocking ,reason with words4   
,indeed when we lose ourselves with this
 way  of explanation in the             
transcendent1 whither natural knowledge 
cannot  follow1 ,reason is seduced into 
poetical extravagance1 which it is its  
peculiar destination to avoid4    ,on   
the other hand1 it is just as necessary 

a maxim of ,reason not  to pass by the  
principle of purposes in the products of
 nature4  ,for1 although it does not    
make their mode of origination any more 
comprehensible1 yet it is a heuristic   
principle for investigating the         
particular laws of nature2 supposing    
even that we wish to make no use  of it 
for explaining nature itself1--in which 
we still always speak  only of natural  
purposes1 although it apparently        
exhibits a designed  unity of           
purpose1--i4e4 without seeking beyond   
nature the ground of  the possibility of
 these particular laws4 ,but since we   
must come in  the end to this latter    
question1 it is just as necessary to    
think for  nature a particular kind of  
causality which does not present itself 
in  it1 as the mechanism of natural     
causes which does4 ,to the receptivity  
of several forms1 different from those  
of which matter is susceptible  by      
mechanism1 must be added a spontaneity  
of a cause 7which therefore  cannot be  

matter71 without which no ground can be 
assigned for those  forms4 ,no doubt    
,reason1 before it takes this step1 must
 proceed with  caution1 and not try to  
explain teleologically every ,technic of
 nature1  i4e4 every productive faculty 
of nature which displays in itself 7as  
in regular bodies7 purposiveness of     
figure to our mere apprehension2  but   
must always regard such as so far       
mechanically possible4 ,but on  that    
account to wish entirely to exclude the 
teleological principle1  and to follow  
simple mechanism only--in cases where1  
in the rational  investigation of the   
possibility of natural forms through    
their causes1  purposiveness shows      
itself quite undeniably as the reference
 to a  different kind of causality--to  
do this must make ,reason fantastic1 and
  send it wandering among chimeras of   
unthinkable natural faculties2 just  as 
a mere teleological mode of explanation 
which takes no account of  natural      
mechanism makes it visionary4    ,in the

 same natural thing both principles     
cannot be connected as  fundamental     
propositions of explanation 7deduction7 
of one by the  other1 i4e4 they do not  
unite for the determinant ,judgement as 
dogmatical and constitutive principles  
of insight into nature4 ,if ,i  choose1 
e4g4 to regard a maggot as the product  
of the mere mechanism  of nature 7of the
 new formation that it produces of      
itself1 when  its elements are set free 
by corruption71 ,i cannot derive the    
same  product from the same matter as   
from a causality that acts according  to
 purposes4 ,conversely1 if ,i regard the
 same product as a natural  purpose1 ,i 
cannot count on any mechanical mode of  
its production and  regard this as the  
constitutive principle of my judgement  
upon its  possibility1 and so unite both
 principles4 ,one method of explanation 
excludes the other2 even supposing that 
objectively both grounds of  the        
possibility of such a product rested on 
a single ground1 to which  we did not   

pay attention4 ,the principle which     
should render possible  the             
compatibility of both in judging of     
nature must be placed in  that which    
lies outside both 7and consequently     
outside the possible  empirical         
representation of nature71 but yet      
contains their ground1  i4e4 in the     
supersensible2 and each of the two      
methods of explanation  must be referred
 thereto4 ,now of this we can have no   
concept but the  indeterminate concept  
of a ground1 which makes the judging of 
nature  by empirical laws possible1 but 
which we cannot determine more nearly   
by any predicate4 ,hence the union of   
both principles cannot rest upon  a     
ground of explanation of the possibility
 of a product according to  given laws1 
for the determinant ,judgement1 but only
 upon a ground  of its exposition for   
the reflective ,judgement4--,to explain 
is to  derive from a principle1 which   
therefore we must clearly know and of   
which we can give an account4 ,no doubt 

the principle of the mechanism  of      
nature and that of its causality in one 
and the same natural product  must      
coalesce in a single higher principle1  
which is their common  source1 because  
otherwise they could not subsist side by
 side in the  observation of nature4    
,but if this principle1 objectively     
common to  the two1 which therefore     
warrants the association of the maxims  
of  natural investigation depending on  
both1 be such that1 though it  can be   
pointed to1 it cannot be determinately  
known nor clearly put  forward for use  
in cases which arise1 then from such a  
principle we  can draw no explanation1  
i4e4 no clear and determinate derivation
  of the possibility of a natural       
product in accordance with those  two   
heterogeneous principles4 ,but now the  
principle common to the  mechanical and 
teleological derivations is the         
supersensible1 which  we must place at  
the basis of nature1 regarded as        
phenomenon4 ,and of  this1 in a         

theoretical point of view1 we cannot    
form the smallest  positive determinate 
concept4 ,it cannot1 therefore1 in any  
way be  explained how1 according to it  
as principle1 nature 7in its particular 
laws7 constitutes for us one system1    
which can be cognised as possible       
either by the principle of physical     
development or by that of final  causes4
 ,if it happens that objects of nature  
present themselves which  cannot be     
thought by us1 as regards their         
possibility1 according to  the principle
 of mechanism 7which always has a claim 
on a natural  being71 without relying on
 teleological propositions1 we can only 
make  an hypothesis4 ,namely1 we suppose
 that we may hopefully investigate      
natural laws with reference to both     
7according as the possibility of  its   
product is cognisable by our            
,understanding by one or the other      
principle71 without stumbling at the    
apparent contradiction which comes  into
 view between the principles by which   

they are judged4 ,for at least  the     
possibility is assured that both may be 
united objectively in one  principle1   
since they concern phenomena that       
presuppose a supersensible  ground4     
,mechanism1 then1 and the teleological  
7designed7 ,technic of nature1  in      
respect of the same product and its     
possibility1 may stand under  a common  
supreme principle of nature in          
particular laws4 ,but since  this       
principle is transcendent we cannot1    
because of the limitation  of our       
,understanding1 unite both principles in
 the explanation of  the same production
 of nature even if the inner possibility
 of this  product is only intelligible  
verstndlich through a causality         
according to purposes 7as is the case   
with organised matter74 ,we  revert then
 to the above fundamental proposition of
 ,teleology4  ,according to the         
constitution of the human               
,understanding1 no other  than          
designedly-working causes can be assumed

 for the possibility of  organised      
beings in nature2 and the mere mechanism
 of nature cannot  be adequate to the   
explanation of these its products4 ,but 
we do not  attempt to decide anything by
 this fundamental proposition as to the 
possibility of such things themselves4  
,this is only a maxim of the reflective1
 not of the determinant  ,judgement2    
consequently only subjectively valid for
 us1 not objectively  for the           
possibility of things themselves of this
 kind 7in which both  kinds of          
production may well cohere in one and   
the same ground74  ,further1 without any
 concept1--besides the teleologically   
conceived  method of production1--of a  
simultaneously presented mechanism of   
nature1 no judgement can be passed on   
this kind of production as a  natural   
product4 ,hence the above maxim leads to
 the necessity of  an unification of    
both principles in judging of things as 
natural  purposes in themselves1 but    
does not lead us to substitute one for  

the other either altogether or in       
certain parts4 ,for in the place of     
what is thought 7at least by us7 as     
possible only by design we cannot  set  
mechanism1 and in the place of what is  
cognised as mechanically  necessary we  
cannot set contingency1 which would need
 a purpose as its  determining ground2  
but we can only subordinate the one     
7,mechanism7  to the other 7designed    
,technic71 which may quite well be the  
case  according to the transcendental   
principle of the purposiveness of       
nature4    ,for where purposes are      
thought as grounds of the possibility of
 certain  things1 we must assume also   
means1 whose law of working requires for
  itself nothing presupposing a         
purpose1--a mechanical law--and yet  can
 be a subordinate cause of designed     
effects4 ,thus--in the organic  products
 of nature1 and specially when prompted 
by their infinite  number1 we assume 7at
 least as a permissible hypothesis7     
design in  the combination of natural   

causes by particular laws as a universal
  principle of the reflective ,judgement
 for the whole of nature 7the           
world71--we can think a great and indeed
 universal combination of  mechanical   
with teleological laws in the           
productions of nature1 without          
interchanging the principles by which   
they are judged or putting one  in the  
place of the other4 ,for1 in a          
teleological judgement1 the  matter1    
even if the form that it assumes be     
judged possible only by  design1 can    
also1 conformably to the mechanical laws
 of its nature1  be subordinated as a   
means to the represented purpose4 ,but1 
since the  ground of this compatibility 
lies in that which is neither one nor   
the other 7neither mechanism nor        
purposive combination71 but is the      
supersensible substrate of nature of    
which we know nothing1 the two  ways of 
representing the possibility of such    
,objects are not to be  blended together
 by our 7human7 ,reason4 ,however1 we   

cannot judge of  their possibility      
otherwise than by judging them as       
ultimately resting  on a supreme        
,understanding by the connexion of final
 causes2 and thus  the teleological     
method of explanation is not eliminated4
    ,now it is quite indeterminate1 and 
for our ,understanding always           
indeterminable1 how much the mechanism  
of nature does as a means  towards each 
final design in nature4 ,however1 on    
account of the  above-mentioned         
intelligible principle of the           
possibility of a nature  in general1 it 
may be assumed that it is possible      
throughout according  to the two kinds  
of universally accordant laws 7the      
physical and  those of final causes71   
although we cannot see into the way how 
this  takes place4 ,hence we do not know
 how far the mechanical method of       
explanation which is possible for us may
 extend4 ,so much only is  certain that1
 so far as we can go in this direction1 
it must always  be inadequate for things

 that we once recognise as natural      
purposes2  and therefore we must1 by the
 constitution of our ,understanding1    
subordinate these grounds collectively  
to a teleological principle4    ,hereon 
is based a privilege1 and on account of 
the importance which the  study of      
nature by the principle of mechanism has
 for the theoretical  use of our        
,reason1 also an appeal4 ,we should     
explain all products  and occurrences in
 nature1 even the most purposive1 by    
mechanism as  far as is in our power    
7the limits of which we cannot specify  
in  this kind of investigation74 ,but at
 the same time we are not to lose  sight
 of the fact that those things which we 
cannot even state for  investigation    
except under the concept of a purpose of
 ,reason1 must1 in  conformity with the 
essential constitution of our ,reason1  
mechanical  causes notwithstanding1 be  
subordinated by us finally to causality 
in  accordance with purposes4           
,,methodology ,,of ,,the ,,teleological 

,,judgement4#aai       #gi4 ,whether    
teleology must be treated as if it      
belonged to the  doctrine of nature     
,every science must have its definite   
position in the encyclopaedia of  all   
the sciences4 ,if it is a philosophical 
science its position must be  either in 
the theoretical or practical part4 ,if  
again it has its place  in the former of
 these1 it must be either in the        
doctrine of nature1 so  far as it       
concerns that which can be an object of 
experience 7in the  doctrine of bodies1 
the doctrine of the soul1 or the        
universal science  of the world71 or in 
the doctrine of ,god 7the original      
ground of the  world as the complex of  
all objects of experience74    ,now the 
question is1 what place is due to       
,teleology8 ,does it belong  to ,natural
 ,science 7properly so called7 or to    
,theology8 ,one of the  two it must be2 
for no science belongs to the transition
 from one to  the other1 because this   
transition only marks the articulation  

or  organisation of the system1 and not 
a place in it4    ,that it does not     
belong to ,theology as a part thereof1  
although it may  be made of the most    
important use therein1 is self-evident4 
,for it has  as its objects1 natural    
productions1 and their cause1 and       
although it  refers at the same time to 
the latter as to a ground lying outside 
of  and beyond nature 7a ,divine        
,author71 yet it does not do this for   
the  determinant but only for the       
reflective ,judgement in the            
consideration  of nature 7in order to   
guide our judgement on things in the    
world by  means of such an ,idea as a   
regulative principle1 in conformity with
 the  human ,understanding74    ,but it 
appears to belong just as little to     
,natural ,science1 which needs          
determinant and not merely reflective   
principles in order to supply  objective
 grounds for natural effects4 ,in fact1 
nothing is gained for  the theory of    
nature or the mechanical explanation of 

its phenomena  by means of its effective
 causes1 by considering them as         
connected  according to the relation of 
purposes4 ,the exhibition of the        
purposes  of nature in its products1 so 
far as they constitute a system         
according  to teleological concepts1    
properly belongs only to a description  
of  nature which is drawn up in         
accordance with a particular guiding    
thread4 ,here ,reason1 no doubt1        
accomplishes a noble work1 instructive  
and practically purposive in many points
 of view2 but it gives no  information  
as to the origin and the inner          
possibility of these  forms1 which is   
the special business of theoretical     
,natural ,science4  ,teleology1         
therefore1 as science1 belongs to no    
,doctrine1 but only to  ,criticism2 and 
to the criticism of a special cognitive 
faculty1 viz4  ,judgement4 ,but so far  
as it contains principles a priori1 it  
can and  must furnish the method by     
which nature must be judged according to

 the  principle of final causes4 ,hence 
its ,methodology has at least negative  
influence upon the procedure in         
theoretical ,natural ,science1 and also 
upon the relation which this can have in
 ,metaphysic to ,theology as its        
propaedeutic4       #hj4 ,of the        
necessary subordination of the          
mechanical to the  teleological         
principle in the explanation of a thing 
as a natural  purpose    ,the privilege 
of aiming at a merely mechanical method 
of explanation  of all natural products 
is in itself quite unlimited2 but the   
faculty  of attaining thereto is by the 
constitution of our ,understanding1 so  
far as it has to do with things as      
natural purposes1 not only very much    
limited but also clearly bounded4 ,for1 
according to a principle of the         
,judgement1 by this process alone       
nothing can be accomplished towards  an 
explanation of these things2 and        
consequently the judgement upon  such   
products must always be at the same time

 subordinated by us to a  teleological  
principle4    ,it is therefore rational1
 even meritorious1 to pursue natural    
mechanism1 in respect of the explanation
 of natural products1 so far  as can be 
done with probability2 and if we give up
 the attempt it is  not because it is   
impossible in itself to meet in this    
path with the  purposiveness of nature1 
but only because it is impossible for us
  as men4 ,for there would be required  
for that an intuition other than        
sensuous1 and a determinate knowledge of
 the intelligible substrate  of nature  
from which a ground could be assigned   
for the mechanism of  phenomena         
according to particular laws1 which     
quite surpasses our  faculties4         
,hence if the naturalist would not waste
 his labour he must in judging  of      
things1 the concept of any of which is  
indubitably established  as a natural   
purpose 7organised beings71 always lay  
down as basis an  original organisation1
 which uses that very mechanism in order

 to  produce fresh organised forms or to
 develop the existing ones into new     
shapes 7which1 however1 always result   
from that purpose and conformably  to   
it74    ,it is praiseworthy by the aid  
of comparative anatomy to go through the
  great creation of organised natures1  
in order to see whether there may  not  
be in it something similar to a system  
and also in accordance with  the        
principle of production4 ,for otherwise 
we should have to be content  with the  
mere principle of judgement 7which gives
 no insight into  their production7 and1
 discouraged1 to give up all claim to   
natural  insight in this field4 ,the    
agreement of so many genera of animals  
in a certain common schema1 which       
appears to be fundamental not only  in  
the structure of their bones but also in
 the disposition of their  remaining    
parts1--so that with an admirable       
simplicity of original  outline1 a great
 variety of species has been produced by
 the shortening  of one member and the  

lengthening of another1 the involution  
of this  part and the evolution of      
that1--allows a ray of hope1 however    
faint1  to penetrate into our minds1    
that here something may be accomplished 
by the aid of the principle of the      
mechanism of nature 7without  which     
there can be no natural science in      
general74 ,this analogy of  forms1 which
 with all their differences seem to have
 been produced  according to a common   
original type1 strengthens our          
suspicions of an  actual relationship   
between them in their production from a 
common  parent1 through the gradual     
approximation of one animal-genus to    
another--from those in which the        
principle of purposes seems to be  best 
authenticated1 i4e4 from man1 down to   
the polype1 and again from  this down to
 mosses and lichens1 and finally to the 
lowest stage of  nature noticeable by   
us1 viz4 to crude matter4 ,and so the   
whole ,technic  of nature1 which is so  
incomprehensible to us in organised     

beings that  we believe ourselves       
compelled to think a different principle
 for it1  seems to be derived from      
matter and its powers according to      
mechanical  laws 7like those by which it
 works in the formation of crystals74   
,here it is permissible for the         
archaeologist of nature to derive  from 
the surviving traces of its oldest      
revolutions1 according to all  its      
mechanism known or supposed by him1 that
 great family of creatures  7for so we  
must represent them if the said         
thoroughgoing relationship  is to have  
any ground74 ,he can suppose the bosom  
of mother earth1 as  she passed out of  
her chaotic state 7like a great animal71
 to have  given birth in the beginning  
to creatures of less purposive form1    
that  these again gave birth to others  
which formed themselves with greater    
adaptation to their place of birth and  
their relations to each other2  until   
this womb becoming torpid and ossified1 
limited its births to  definite species 

not further modifiable1 and the         
manifoldness remained  as it was at the 
end of the operation of that fruitful   
formative  power4--,only he must still  
in the end ascribe to this universal    
mother  an organisation purposive in    
respect of all these creatures2         
otherwise  it would not be possible to  
think the possibility of the purposive  
form  of the products of the animal and 
vegetable kingdoms4#abj ,he has then    
only pushed further back the ground of  
explanation and cannot pretend  to have 
made the development of those two       
kingdoms independent of the  condition  
of final causes4    ,even as concerns   
the variation to which certain          
individuals of  organised genera are    
accidentally subjected1 if we find that 
the  character so changed is hereditary 
and is taken up into the generative     
power1 then we cannot pertinently judge 
the variation to be anything  else than 
an occasional development of purposive  
capacities originally  present in the   

species with a view to the preservation 
of the race4  ,for in the complete inner
 purposiveness of an organised being1   
the  generation of its like is closely  
bound up with the condition of taking   
nothing up into the generative power    
which does not belong1 in such  a system
 of purposes1 to one of its undeveloped 
original capacities4  ,indeed1 if we    
depart from this principle1 we cannot   
know with certainty  whether several    
parts of the form which is now apparent 
in a species  have not a contingent and 
unpurposive origin2 and the principle of
  ,teleology1 to judge nothing in an    
organised being as unpurposive  which   
maintains it in its propagation1 would  
be very unreliable in its  application  
and would be valid solely for the       
original stock 7of which  we have no    
further knowledge74    ,hume#aba takes  
exception to those who find it requisite
 to  assume for all such natural        
purposes a teleological principle of    
judgement1 i4e4 an architectonic        

,understanding4 ,he says that it may    
fairly be asked3 how is such an         
,understanding possible8 ,how can the   
manifold faculties and properties that  
constitute the possibility  of an       
,understanding1 which has at the same   
time executive force1  be found so      
purposively together in one ,being8 ,but
 this objection  is without weight4 ,for
 the whole difficulty which surrounds   
the  question concerning the first      
production of a thing containing in     
itself purposes and only comprehensible 
by means of them1 rests on  the further 
question as to the unity of the ground  
of the combination  in this product of  
the various elements des                
,mannichfaltigen which  are external to 
one another4 ,for if this ground be     
placed in the  ,understanding of a      
producing cause as simple substance1 the
 question1  so far as it is             
teleological1 is sufficiently answered2 
but if the  cause be sought merely in   
matter as an aggregate of many          

substances  external to one another1 the
 unity of the principle is quite        
wanting for the internally purposive    
form of its formation1 and the          
autocracy of matter in productions which
 can only be conceived by our           
,understanding as purposes is a word    
without meaning4    ,hence it comes to  
pass that those who seek a supreme      
ground of  possibility for the          
objectively-purposive forms of matter1  
without  attributing to it              
,understanding1 either make the         
world-whole into  a single all-embracing
 substance 7,pantheism71 or 7which is   
only a  more determinate explanation of 
the former7 into a complex of many      
determinations inhering in a single     
simple substance 7,spinozism72  merely  
in order to satisfy that condition of   
all purposiveness--the  unity of ground4
 ,thus they do justice indeed to one    
condition of  the problem1 viz4 the     
unity in the purposive combination1 by  
means  of the mere ontological concept  

of a simple substance2 but they  adduce 
nothing for the other condition1 viz4   
the relation of this  substance to its  
result as purpose1 through which        
relation that  ontological ground is to 
be more closely determined in respect of
  the question at issue4 ,hence they    
answer the whole question in no  way4   
,it remains absolutely unanswerable 7for
 our ,reason7 if we do  not represent   
that original ground of things1 as      
simple substance2  its property which   
has reference to the specific           
constitution of the  forms of nature    
grounded thereon1 viz4 its purposive    
unity1 as the  property of an           
intelligent substance2 and the relation 
of these forms  to this intelligence 7on
 account of the contingency which we    
ascribe  to everything that we think    
possible only as a purpose7 as that of  
causality4       #ha4 ,of the           
association of mechanism with the       
teleological principle  in the          
explanation of a natural purpose as a   

natural product    ,according to the    
preceding paragraphs the mechanism of   
nature alone  does not enable us to     
think the possibility of an organised   
being2  but 7at least according to the  
constitution of our cognitive faculty7  
it must be originally subordinated to a 
cause working designedly4  ,but1 just as
 little is the mere teleological ground 
of such a being  sufficient for         
considering it and judging it as a      
product of nature1  if the mechanism of 
the latter be not associated with the   
former1  like the instrument of a cause 
working designedly1 to whose purposes   
nature is subordinated in its mechanical
 laws4 ,the possibility of such  a      
unification of two quite different kinds
 of causality1--of nature  in its       
universal conformity to law with an     
,idea which limits it to a  particular  
form1 for which it contains no ground in
 itself--is not  comprehended by our    
,reason4 ,it lies in the supersensible  
substrate  of nature1 of which we can   

determine nothing positively1 except    
that  it is the being in itself of which
 we merely know the phenomenon4  ,but   
the principle1 8all that we assume as   
belonging to this nature  7phenomenon7  
and as its product1 must be thought as  
connected  therewith according to       
mechanical laws10 has none the less     
force1  because without this kind of    
causality organised beings 7as purposes 
of  nature7 would not be natural        
products4    ,now if the teleological   
principle of the production of these    
beings  be assumed 7as is inevitable71  
we can place at the basis of the  cause 
of their internally purposive form      
either ,occasionalism or                
,pre-established ,harmony4 ,according to
 the former the ,supreme ,cause  of the 
world would1 conformably to its ,idea1  
furnish immediately the  organic        
formation on the occasion of every union
 of intermingling  materials4 ,according
 to the latter it would1 in the original
 products  of its wisdom1 only have     

supplied the capacity by means of which 
an organic being produces another of    
like kind1 and the species  perpetually 
maintains itself2 whilst the loss of    
individuals is  continually replaced by 
that nature which at the same time works
  towards their destruction4 ,if we     
assume the ,occasionalism of the        
production of organised beings1 all     
nature is quite lost1 and with  it all  
employment of ,reason in judging of the 
possibility of such  products2 hence we 
may suppose that no one will adopt this 
system1 who  has anything to do with    
philosophy4    ,the theory of           
,pre-established ,harmony may proceed in
 two different  ways4 ,it regards every 
organised being as generated by one of  
like  kind1 either as an educt or a     
product4 ,the system which regards      
generations as mere educts is called the
 theory of individual  preformation or  
the theory of evolution3 that which     
regards them  as products is entitled   
the system of epigenesis4 ,this latter  

may  also be entitled the system of     
generic preformation1 because the       
productive faculty of the generator and 
consequently the specific  form would be
 virtually performed according to the   
inner purposive  capacities which are   
part of its stock4 ,in correspondence   
with this the  opposite theory of       
individual preformations would be better
 entitled  the theory of involution4    
,the advocates of the theory of         
evolution1 who remove every  individual 
from the formative power of nature1 in  
order to make  it come immediately from 
the hand of the ,creator1 would1        
however1  not venture to regard this as 
happening according to the hypothesis   
of ,occasionalism4 ,for according to    
this the copulation is a mere           
formality1  propos of which a supreme   
intelligent ,cause of the  world has    
concluded to form a fruit immediately by
 his hand1 and only  to leave to the    
mother its development and nourishment4 
,they declare  themselves for           

preformation2 as if it were not all the 
same1 whether  a supernatural origin is 
assigned to these forms in the beginning
  or in the course of the world4 ,on the
 contrary1 a great number of            
supernatural arrangements would be      
spared by occasional creation1  which   
would be requisite1 in order that the   
embryo formed in the  beginning of the  
world might not be injured throughout   
the long period  of its development by  
the destructive powers of nature1 and   
might keep  itself unharmed2 and there  
would also be requisite an incalculably 
greater number of such preformed beings 
than would ever be developed1  and with 
them many creations would be made       
without need and without  purpose4 ,they
 would1 however1 be willing to leave at 
least something  to nature1 so as not to
 fall into a complete ,hyperphysic which
 can  dispense with all natural         
explanations4 ,it is true1 they hold so 
fast by their ,hyperphysic that they    
find even in abortions 7which  it is    

quite impossible to take for purposes of
 nature7 an admirable  purposiveness2   
though it be only directed to the fact  
that an anatomist  would take exception 
to it as a purposeless purposiveness1   
and would  feel a disheartened wonder   
thereat4 ,but the production of hybrids 
could absolutely not be accommodated    
with the system of preformation2  and to
 the seeds of the male creature1 to     
which they had attributed  nothing but  
the mechanical property of serving as   
the first means of  nourishment for the 
embryo1 they must attribute in addition 
a purposive  formative power1 which in  
the case of the product of two creatures
 of  the same genus they would concede  
to neither parent4    ,on the other     
hand1 even if we do not recognise the   
great superiority  which the theory of  
,epigenesis has over the former as      
regards the  empirical grounds of its   
proof1 still prior to proof ,reason     
views this  way of explanation with     
peculiar favour4 ,for in respect of the 

things  which we can only represent as  
possible originally according to the    
causality of purposes1 at least as      
concerns their propagation1 this  theory
 regards nature as self-producing1 not  
merely as self-evolving3  and so with   
the least expenditure of the            
supernatural leaves to nature  all that 
follows after the first beginning       
7though without determining  anything   
about this first beginning by which     
,physic generally is  thwarted1 however 
it may essay its explanation by a chain 
of causes74    ,as regards this theory  
of ,epigenesis1 no one has contributed  
more  either to its proof or to the     
establishment of the legitimate         
principles of its application1--partly  
by the limitation of a too  presumptuous
 employment of it1--than ,herr ,hofr4   
,blumenbach4#abb  ,in all physical      
explanations of these formations he     
starts from  organised matter4 ,that    
crude matter should have originally     
formed  itself according to mechanical  

laws1 that life should have sprung from 
the nature of what is lifeless1 that    
matter should have been able to  dispose
 itself into the form of a              
self-maintaining purposiveness--this  he
 rightly declares to be contradictory to
 ,reason4 ,but at the same  time he     
leaves to natural mechanism under this  
to us indispensable  principle of an    
original organisation1 an undeterminable
 but yet  unmistakeable element1 in     
reference to which the faculty of matter
 in  an organised body is called by him 
a formative impulse 7in contrast  to1   
and yet standing under the higher       
guidance and direction of1 that  merely 
mechanical formative power universally  
resident in matter74       #hb4 ,of the 
teleological system in the external     
relations of  organised beings    ,by   
external purposiveness ,i mean that by  
which one thing of nature  serves       
another as means to a purpose4 ,now     
things which have no internal           
purposiveness and which presuppose none 

for their possibility1 e4g4  earth1 air1
 water1 etc41 may at the same time be   
very purposive  externally1 i4e4 in     
relation to other beings4 ,but these    
latter  must be organised beings1 i4e4  
natural purposes1 for otherwise the     
former could not be judged as means to  
them4 ,thus water1 air1 and  earth      
cannot be regarded as means to the      
raising of mountains1 because  mountains
 contain nothing in themselves that     
requires a ground of their  possibility 
according to purposes1 in reference to  
which therefore  their cause can never  
be represented under the predicate of a 
means 7as  useful therefor74            
,external purposiveness is a quite      
different concept from that of  internal
 purposiveness1 which is bound up with  
the possibility of an  object           
irrespective of its actuality being     
itself a purpose4 ,we can ask  about an 
organised being the question3 ,what is  
it for8 ,but we cannot  easily ask this 
about things in which we recognise      

merely the working  of nature's         
mechanism4 ,for in the former1 as       
regards their internal  possibility1 we 
represent a causality according to      
purposes1 a creative  ,understanding1   
and we refer this active faculty to its 
determining  ground1 viz4 design4 ,there
 is only one external purposiveness     
which  is connected with the internal   
purposiveness of organisation1 and yet  
serves in the external relation of a    
means to a purpose1 without the         
question necessarily arising1 as to what
 end this being so organised  must have 
existed for4 ,this is the organisation  
of both sexes in their  mutual relation 
for the propagation of their kind2 since
 here we can  always ask1 as in the case
 of an individual1 why must such a pair 
exist8 ,the answer is3 ,this pair first 
constitutes an organising  whole1 though
 not an organised whole in a single     
body4    ,if we now ask1 wherefore      
anything is1 the answer is either3 ,its 
presence and its production have no     

reference at all to a cause working     
according to design1 and so we always   
refer its origin to the mechanism  of   
nature1 or3 ,there is somewhere a       
designed ground of its presence  7as a  
contingent natural being74 ,this thought
 we can hardly separate  from the       
concept of an organised thing2 for1     
since we must place at  the basis of its
 internal possibility a causality of    
final causes and  an ,idea lying at the 
ground of this1 we cannot think the     
existence  of this product except as a  
purpose4 ,for the represented effect1   
the  representation of which is at the  
same time the determining ground  of the
 intelligent cause working towards its  
production1 is called a  purpose4 ,in   
this case therefore we can either say3  
,the purpose of  the existence of such a
 natural being is in itself2 i4e4 it is 
not  merely a purpose but a final       
purpose1 or3 ,this is external to it in 
another natural being1 i4e4 it exists   
purposively not as a final  purpose1 but

 necessarily as a means4    ,but if we  
go through the whole of nature we find  
in it1 as nature1  no being which could 
make claim to the eminence of being the 
final  purpose of creation2 and we can  
even prove a priori that what might  be 
for nature an ultimate purpose1         
according to all the thinkable          
determinations and properties wherewith 
one could endow it1 could yet  as a     
natural thing never be a final purpose4 
,if we consider the vegetable kingdom we
 might at first sight1 on  account of   
the immeasurable fertility with which it
 spreads itself  almost on every soil1  
be led to take it for a mere product of 
that  mechanism which nature displays in
 the formations of the mineral  kingdom4
 ,but a more intimate knowledge of its  
indescribably wise  organisation does   
not permit us to hold to this thought1  
but prompts  the question3 ,what are    
these things created for8 ,if it is     
answered3  ,for the animal kingdom1     
which is thereby nourished and has thus 

been  able to spread over the earth in  
genera so various1 then the further     
question comes3 ,what are these         
plant-devouring animals for8 ,the answer
  would be something like this3 ,for    
beasts of prey1 which can only be       
nourished by that which has life4       
,finally we have the question3 ,what    
are these last1 as well as the          
first-mentioned natural kingdoms1 good  
for8 ,for man1 in reference to the      
manifold use which his ,understanding   
teaches him to make of all these        
creatures4 ,he is the ultimate purpose  
of creation here on earth1 because he is
 the only being upon it who  can form a 
concept of purposes1 and who can by his 
,reason make out of  an aggregate of    
purposively formed things a system of   
purposes4    ,we might also with the    
chevalier ,linnaeus#abc go the          
apparently  opposite way and say3 ,the  
herbivorous animals are there to        
moderate  the luxurious growth of the   
vegetable kingdom1 by which many of its 

species are choked4 ,the carnivora are  
to set bounds to the voracity of  the   
herbivora4 ,finally man1 by his pursuit 
of these and his diminution  of their   
numbers1 preserves a certain equilibrium
 between the producing  and the         
destructive powers of nature4 ,and so   
man1 although in a certain  reference he
 might be esteemed a purpose1 yet in    
another has only the  rank of a means4  
,if an objective purposiveness in the   
variety of the genera of creatures  and 
their external relations to one another1
 as purposively constructed  beings1 be 
made a principle1 then it is conformable
 to ,reason to  conceive in these       
relations a certain organisation and a  
system of all  natural kingdoms         
according to final causes4 ,only here   
experience seems  flatly to contradict  
the maxims of ,reason1 especially as    
concerns an  ultimate purpose of nature1
 which is indispensable for the         
possibility  of such a system and which 
we can put nowhere else but in man4 ,for

  regarding him as one of the many      
animal genera1 nature has not in the    
least excepted him from its destructive 
or its productive powers1 but  has      
subjected everything to a mechanism     
thereof without any purpose4    ,the    
first thing that must be designedly     
prepared in an arrangement  for a       
purposive complex of natural beings on  
the earth would be their  place of      
habitation1 the soil and the element on 
and in which they  are to thrive4 ,but a
 more exact knowledge of the            
constitution of  this basis of all      
organic production indicates no other   
causes than  those working quite        
undesignedly1 causes which rather       
destroy than  favour production1 order1 
and purposes4 ,land and sea not only    
contain  in themselves memorials of     
ancient mighty desolations which have   
confounded them and all creatures that  
are in them2 but their whole  structure1
 the strata of the one and the          
boundaries of the other1 have  quite the

 appearance of being the product of the 
wild and violent  forces of a nature    
working in a state of chaos4 ,although  
the figure1  the structure1 and the     
slope of the land might seem to be      
purposively  ordered for the reception  
of water from the air1 for the welling  
up of streams between strata of         
different kinds 7for many kinds of      
products71 and for the course of        
rivers--yet a closer investigation      
shows that they are merely the effects  
of volcanic eruptions or of  inundations
 of the ocean1 as regards not only the  
first production of  this figure1 but1  
above all1 its subsequent               
transformation1 as well as  the         
disappearance of its first organic      
productions4#abd ,now if the  place of  
habitation of all these creatures1 the  
soil 7of the land7  or the bosom 7of the
 sea71 indicates nothing but a quite    
undesigned  mechanism of its production1
 how and with what right can we demand  
and  maintain a different origin for    

these latter products8 ,the closest     
examination1 indeed 7in ,camper's#abe   
judgement71 of the remains  of the      
aforesaid devastations of nature seems  
to show that man was  not comprehended  
in these revolutions2 but yet he is so  
dependent on  the remaining creatures   
that1 if a universally directing        
mechanism of  nature be admitted in the 
case of the others1 he must also be     
regarded  as comprehended under it2 even
 though his ,understanding 7for the most
  part at least7 has been able to       
deliver him from these devastations4    
,but this argument seems to prove more  
than was intended by it4 ,it seems  to  
prove not merely that man cannot be the 
ultimate purpose of nature1  and that on
 the same grounds the aggregate of the  
organised things of  nature on the earth
 cannot be a system of purposes2 but    
also that the  natural products formerly
 held to be natural purposes have no    
other  origin than the mechanism of     
nature4    ,but in the solution given   

above of the ,antinomy of the principles
  of the mechanical and teleological    
methods of production of organic  beings
 of nature1 we have seen that they are  
merely principles of  the reflective    
,judgement in respect of nature as it   
produces forms  in accordance with      
particular laws 7for the systematic     
connexion of  which we have no key74    
,they do not determine the origin of    
these  beings in themselves2 but only   
say that we1 by the constitution of  our
 ,understanding and our ,reason1 cannot 
conceive it in this kind of  being      
except according to final causes4 ,the  
greatest possible effort1  even         
audacity1 in the attempt to explain them
 mechanically is not only  permitted1   
but we are invited to it by ,reason2    
notwithstanding that  we know from the  
subjective grounds of the particular    
species and  limitations of our         
,understanding 7not e4g4 because the    
mechanism  of production would          
contradict in itself an origin according

 to  purposes7 that we can never attain 
thereto4 ,finally1 the compatibility  of
 both ways of representing the          
possibility of nature may lie in  the   
supersensible principle of nature       
7external to us1 as well as in  us72    
whilst the method of representation     
according to final causes  may be only a
 subjective condition of the use of our 
,reason1 when it  not merely wishes to  
form a judgement upon objects as        
phenomena1 but  desires to refer these  
phenomena together with their principles
 to  their supersensible substrate1 in  
order to find certain laws of their     
unity possible1 which it cannot         
represent to itself except through      
purposes 7of which the ,reason also has 
such as are supersensible74       #hc4  
,of the ultimate purpose of nature as a 
teleological system    ,we have shown in
 the preceding that1 though not for the 
determinant but  for the reflective     
,judgement1 we have sufficient cause for
 judging man  to be1 not merely like all

 organised beings a natural purpose1 but
  also the ultimate purpose of nature   
here on earth2 in reference to  whom all
 other natural things constitute a      
system of purposes according  to        
fundamental propositions of ,reason4 ,if
 now that must be found in  man himself1
 which is to be furthered as a purpose  
by means of his  connexion with nature1 
this purpose must either be of a kind   
that  can be satisfied by nature in its 
beneficence2 or it is the aptitude  and 
skill for all kinds of purposes for     
which nature 7external and  internal7   
can be used by him4 ,the first purpose  
of nature would be  man's happiness1 the
 second his culture4    ,the concept of 
happiness is not one that man derives by
 abstraction  from his instincts and so 
deduces from his animal nature2 but it  
is a  mere ,idea of a state1 that he    
wishes to make adequate to the ,idea    
under merely empirical conditions 7which
 is impossible74 ,this ,idea he         
projects in such different ways on      

account of the complication of his      
,understanding with ,imagination and    
,sense1 and changes so often1 that      
nature1 even if it were entirely        
subjected to his elective will1 could   
receive absolutely no determinate1      
universal and fixed law1 so as to       
harmonise with this vacillating concept 
and thus with the purpose which  each   
man arbitrarily sets before himself4    
,and even if we reduce this  to the true
 natural wants as to which our race is  
thoroughly agreed1  or on the other     
hand1 raise ever so high man's skill to 
accomplish his  imagined purposes2 yet1 
even thus1 what man understands by      
happiness1  and what is in fact his     
proper1 ultimate1 natural purpose 7not  
purpose  of freedom71 would never be    
attained by him4 ,for it is not his     
nature  to rest and be contented with   
the possession and enjoyment of anything
  whatever4 ,on the other side1 too1    
there is something wanting4 ,nature  has
 not taken him for her special darling  

and favoured him with benefit  above all
 animals4 ,rather1 in her destructive   
operations1--plague1  hunger1 perils of 
waters1 frost1 assaults of other animals
 great and  small1 etc41--in these      
things has she spared him as little as  
any other  animal4 ,further1 the        
inconsistency of his own natural        
dispositions  drives him into           
self-devised torments1 and also reduces 
others of his  own race to misery1 by   
the oppression of lordship1 the         
barbarism of  war1 and so forth2 he1    
himself1 as far as in him lies1 works   
for the  destruction of his own race2 so
 that even with the most beneficent     
external nature1 its purpose1 if it were
 directed to the happiness  of our      
species1 would not be attained in an    
earthly system1 because  our nature is  
not susceptible of it4 ,man is then     
always only a link  in the chain of     
natural purposes2 a principle certainly 
in respect  of many purposes1 for which 
nature seems to have destined him in her

  disposition1 and towards which he sets
 himself1 but also a means for  the     
maintenance of purposiveness in the     
mechanism of the remaining  links4 ,as  
the only being on earth which has an    
,understanding and1  consequently1 a    
faculty of setting arbitrary purposes   
before itself1 he  is certainly entitled
 to be the lord of nature2 and if it be 
regarded  as a teleological system he   
is1 by his destination1 the ultimate    
purpose of nature4 ,but this is subject 
to the condition of his having  an      
,understanding and the ,will to give to 
it and to himself such a  reference to  
purposes1 as can be self-sufficient     
independently of  nature1 and1          
consequently1 can be a final purpose2   
which1 however1 must  not be sought in  
nature itself4    ,but in order to find 
out where in man we have to place that  
ultimate  purpose of nature1 we must    
seek out what nature can supply to      
prepare  him for what he must do himself
 in order to be a final purpose1 and  we

 must separate it from all those        
purposes whose possibility depends  upon
 things that one can expect only from   
nature4 ,of the latter  kind is earthly 
happiness1 by which is understood the   
complex of all  man's purposes possible 
through nature1 whether external nature 
or  man's nature2 i4e4 the matter of all
 his earthly purposes1 which1  if he    
makes it his whole purpose1 renders him 
incapable of positing  his own existence
 as a final purpose1 and being in       
harmony therewith4  ,there remains      
therefore of all his purposes in nature 
only the formal  subjective condition2  
viz4 the aptitude of setting purposes in
  general before himself1 and           
7independent of nature in his purposive 
determination7 of using nature1         
conformably to the maxims of his free   
purposes in general1 as a means4 ,this  
nature can do in regard to the  final   
purpose that lies outside it1 and it    
therefore may be regarded  as its       
ultimate purpose4 ,the production of the

 aptitude of a rational  being for      
arbitrary purposes in general           
7consequently in his freedom7  is       
culture4 ,therefore1 culture alone can  
be the ultimate purpose  which we have  
cause for ascribing to nature in respect
 to the human  race 7not man's earthly  
happiness or the fact that he is the    
chief  instrument of instituting order  
and harmony in irrational nature        
external to himself74    ,but all       
culture is not adequate to this ultimate
 purpose of nature4 ,the  culture of    
skill is indeed the chief subjective    
condition of aptitude  for furthering   
one's purposes in general2 but it is not
 adequate to  furthering the will#abf in
 the determination and choice of        
purposes1  which yet essentially belongs
 to the whole extent of an aptitude for 
purposes4 ,the latter condition of      
aptitude1 which we might call the       
culture of training 7discipline71 is    
negative1 and consists in the  freeing  
of the will from the despotism of       

desires4 ,by these1 tied as  we are to  
certain natural things1 we are rendered 
incapable even of  choosing1 while we   
allow those impulses to serve as        
fetters1 which  ,nature has given us as 
guiding threads that we should not      
neglect or  violate the destination of  
our animal nature--we being all the time
  free enough to strain or relax1 to    
extend or diminish them1 according  as  
the purposes of ,reason require4        
,skill cannot be developed in the human 
race except by means of  inequality     
among men2 for the great majority       
provide the necessities  of life1 as it 
were1 mechanically1 without requiring   
any art in  particular1 for the         
convenience and leisure of others who   
work at the  less necessary elements of 
culture1 science and art4 ,in an        
oppressed  condition they have hard work
 and little enjoyment1 although much of 
the culture of the higher classes       
gradually spreads to them4 ,yet with    
the progress of this culture 7the height

 of which is called luxury1  reached    
when the propensity to what can be done 
without begins to be  injurious to what 
is indispensable71 their calamities     
increase equally  in two directions1 on 
the one hand through violence from      
without1 on  the other hand through     
internal discontent2 but still this     
splendid  misery is bound up with the   
development of the natural capacities of
  the human race1 and the purpose of    
nature itself1 although not our         
purpose1 is thus attained4 ,the formal  
condition under which nature  can alone 
attain this its final design1 is that   
arrangement of men's  relations to one  
another1 by which lawful authority in a 
whole1  which we call a civil community1
 is opposed to the abuse of their       
conflicting freedoms2 only in this can  
the greatest development  of natural    
capacities take place4 ,for this also   
there would be  requisite1--if men were 
clever enough to find it out and wise   
enough  to submit themselves voluntarily

 to its constraint1--a cosmopolitan     
whole1 i4e4 a system of all states that 
are in danger of acting  injuriously    
upon each other4#abg ,failing this1 and 
with the obstacles  which ambition1 lust
 of dominion1 and avarice1 especially in
 those  who have the authority in their 
hands1 oppose even to the possibility   
of such a scheme1 there is1 inevitably1 
war 7by which sometimes  states         
subdivide and resolve themselves into   
smaller states1 sometimes  a state      
annexes other smaller states and strives
 to form a greater  whole74 ,though war 
is an undesigned enterprise of men      
7stirred up by  their unbridled         
passions71 yet is it perhaps#abh a      
deep-hidden  and designed enterprise of 
supreme wisdom for preparing1 if not for
  establishing1 conformity to law amid  
the freedom of states1 and with  this a 
unity of a morally grounded system of   
those states4 ,in spite of  the dreadful
 afflictions with which it visits the   
human race1 and the  perhaps greater    

afflictions with which the constant     
preparation for it  in time of peace    
oppresses them1 yet is it 7although the 
hope for a  restful state of popular    
happiness is ever further off7 a motive 
for  developing all talents serviceable 
for culture1 to the highest possible    
pitch4#abi    ,as concerns the          
discipline of the inclinations1--for    
which our  natural capacity in regard of
 our destination as an animal race is   
quite purposive1 but which render the   
development of humanity very            
difficult1--there is manifest in respect
 of this second requirement for  culture
 a purposive striving of nature to a    
cultivation which makes us  receptive of
 higher purposes than nature itself can 
supply4 ,we cannot  strive against the  
preponderance of evil1 which is poured  
out upon us  by the refinement of taste 
pushed to idealisation1 and even by the 
luxury of science as affording food for 
pride1 through the insatiable  number of
 inclinations thus aroused4 ,but yet we 

cannot mistake the  purpose of          
nature--ever aiming to win us away from 
the rudeness and  violence of those     
inclinations 7inclinations to enjoyment7
 which belong  rather to our animality1 
and for the most part are opposed to the
  cultivation of our higher destiny1 and
 to make way for the development  of our
 humanity4 ,the beautiful arts and the  
sciences which1 by their                
universally-communicable pleasure1 and  
by the polish and refinement  of        
society1 make man more civilised1 if not
 morally better1 win us in  large       
measure from the tyranny of             
sense-propensions1 and thus prepare  men
 for a lordship1 in which ,reason alone 
shall have authority2  whilst the evils 
with which we are visited1 partly by    
nature1 partly  by the intolerant       
selfishness of men1 summon1 strengthen1 
and harden  the powers of the soul not  
to submit to them1 and so make us feel  
an  aptitude for higher purposes1 which 
lies hidden in us4#acj       #hd4 ,of   

the final purpose of the existence of a 
world1 i4e4 of  creation itself    ,a   
final purpose is that purpose which     
needs no other as condition of  its     
possibility4    ,if the mere mechanism  
of nature be assumed as the ground of   
explanation  of its purposiveness1 we   
cannot ask3 what are things in the world
  there for8 ,for according to such an  
idealistic system it is only the        
physical possibility of things 7to think
 which as purposes would be  mere       
subtlety without any ,object7 that is   
under discussion2 whether we  refer this
 form of things to chance or to blind   
necessity1 in either  case the question 
would be vain4 ,if1 however1 we assume  
the purposive  combination in the world 
to be real and to be brought about by a 
particular kind of causality1 viz4 that 
of a designedly-working  cause1 we      
cannot stop at the question3 why have   
things of the world  7organised beings7 
this or that form8 why are they placed  
by nature  in this or that relation to  

one another8 ,but once an ,understanding
  is thought that must be regarded as   
the cause of the possibility of  such   
forms as are actually found in things1  
it must be also asked  on objective     
grounds3 ,who could have determined this
 productive  ,understanding to an       
operation of this kind8 ,this being is  
then the  final purpose in reference to 
which such things are there4    ,i have 
said above that the final purpose is not
 a purpose which nature  would be       
competent to bring about and to produce 
in conformity with  its ,idea1 because  
it is unconditioned4 ,for there is      
nothing in nature  7regarded as a       
sensible being7 for which the           
determining ground present  in itself   
would not be always conditioned2 and    
this holds not merely of  external      
7material7 nature1 but also of internal 
7thinking7 nature--it  being of course  
understood that ,i only am considering  
that in myself  which is nature4 ,but a 
thing that is to exist necessarily1 on  

account  of its objective constitution1 
as the final purpose of an intelligent  
cause1 must be of the kind that in the  
order of purposes it is  dependent on no
 further condition than merely its      
,idea4    ,now we have in the world only
 one kind of beings whose causality  is 
teleological1 i4e4 is directed to       
purposes and is at the same  time so    
constituted that the law according to   
which they have to  determine purposes  
for themselves is represented as        
unconditioned and  independent of       
natural conditions1 and yet as in itself
 necessary4 ,the  being of this kind is 
man1 but man considered as noumenon2 the
 only  natural being in which we can    
recognise1 on the side of its peculiar  
constitution1 a supersensible faculty   
7freedom7 and also the law of           
causality1 together with its ,object1   
which this faculty may propose to       
itself as highest purpose 7the highest  
good in the world74    ,now of man 7and 
so of every rational creature in the    

,world7 as a moral  being it can no     
longer be asked3 why 7quem in finem7 he 
exists8 ,his  existence involves the    
highest purpose to which1 as far as is  
in his  power1 he can subject the whole 
of nature2 contrary to which at least   
he cannot regard himself as subject to  
any influence of nature4--,if now       
things of the world1 as beings dependent
 in their existence1 need a  supreme    
cause acting according to purposes1 man 
is the final purpose of  creation2 since
 without him the chain of mutually      
subordinated purposes  would not be     
complete as regards its ground4 ,only in
 man1 and only in  him as subject of    
morality1 do we meet with unconditioned 
legislation  in respect of purposes1    
which therefore alone renders him       
capable of  being a final purpose1 to   
which the whole of nature is            
teleologically  subordinated4#aca       
#he4 ,of ,physico-theology              
,physico-theology is the endeavour of   
,reason to infer the ,supreme  ,cause of

 nature and its properties from the     
purposes of nature 7which  can only be  
empirically known74 ,moral theology     
7ethico-theology7  would be the         
endeavour to infer that ,cause and its  
properties from  the moral purpose of   
rational beings in nature 7which can be 
known a  priori74    ,the former        
naturally precedes the latter4 ,for if  
we wish to infer a  ,world ,cause       
teleologically from the things in the   
world1 purposes  of nature must first be
 given1 for which we afterwards have to 
seek  a final purpose1 and for this the 
principle of the causality of this      
,supreme ,cause4    ,many investigations
 of nature can and must be conducted    
according to  the teleological          
principle1 without our having cause to  
inquire into  the ground of the         
possibility of purposive working with   
which we meet  in various products of   
nature4 ,but if we wish to have a       
concept of this  we have absolutely no  
further insight into it than the maxim  

of the  reflective ,judgement affords3  
viz4 if only a single organic product of
  nature were given to us1 by the       
constitution of our cognitive faculty   
we could think no other ground for it   
than that of a cause of nature  itself  
7whether the whole of nature or only    
this bit of it7 which  contains the     
causality for it through ,understanding4
 ,this principle of  judging1 though it 
does not bring us any further in the    
explanation of  natural things and their
 origin1 yet discloses to us an outlook 
over  nature1 by which perhaps we may be
 able to determine more closely the     
concept1 otherwise so unfruitful1 of an 
,original ,being4    ,now ,i say that   
,physico-theology1 however far it may be
 pursued1 can  disclose to us nothing of
 a final purpose of creation2 for it    
does  not even extend to the question as
 to this4 ,it can1 it is true1 justify  
the concept of an intelligent ,world    
,cause1 as a subjective concept  7only  
available for the constitution of our   

cognitive faculty7 of  the possibility  
of things that we can make intelligible 
to ourselves  according to purposes2 but
 it cannot determine this concept       
further1  either in a theoretical or a  
practical point of view4 ,its endeavour 
does not come up to its design of being 
the basis of a ,theology1 but  it always
 remains only a physical ,teleology2    
because the purposive  reference therein
 is and must be always considered only  
as conditioned  in nature1 and it       
consequently cannot inquire into the    
purpose for  which nature itself exists 
7for which the ground must be sought    
outside  nature71--notwithstanding that 
it is upon the determinate ,idea of this
  that the determinate concept of that  
,supreme ,intelligent ,world ,cause1    
and the consequent possibility of a     
,theology1 depend4    ,what the things  
in the world are mutually useful for2   
what good the  manifold in a thing does 
for the thing2 how we have ground to    
assume  that nothing in the world is in 

vain1 but that everything in nature  is 
good for something1--the condition being
 granted that certain things  are to    
exist 7as purposes71 whence our ,reason 
has in its power for  the ,judgement no 
other principle of the possibility of   
the ,object1  which it inevitably judges
 teleologically1 than that of           
subordinating  the mechanism of nature  
to the ,architectonic of an intelligent 
,author  of the world--all this the     
teleological consideration of the world 
supplies us with excellently and to our 
extreme admiration4 ,but  because the   
data1 and so the principles1 for        
determining that concept  of an         
intelligent ,world ,cause 7as highest   
artist7 are merely empirical1  they do  
not enable us to infer any of its       
properties beyond those which           
experience reveals in its effects4 ,now 
experience1 since it can never  embrace 
collective nature as a system1 must     
often 7apparently7 happen  upon this    
concept 7and by mutually conflicting    

grounds of proof72 but  it can never1   
even if we had the power of surveying   
empirically the  whole system as far as 
it concerns mere nature1 raise us above 
nature  to the purpose of its existence1
 and so to the determinate concept of   
that supreme ,intelligence4    ,if we   
lessen the problem with the solution of 
which ,physico-theology  has to do1 its 
solution appears easy4 ,if we reduce the
 concept of a  ,deity to that of an     
intelligent being thought by us1 of     
which there  may be one or more1 which  
possesses many and very great           
properties1  but not all the properties 
which are requisite for the foundation  
of a  nature in harmony with the        
greatest possible purpose2 or if we do  
not  scruple in a theory to supply by   
arbitrary additions what is deficient   
in the grounds of proof1 and so1 where  
we have only ground for assuming  much  
perfection 7and what is 8much0 for us871
 consider ourselves  entitled to        
presuppose all possible perfection2 thus

 indeed physical  ,teleology may make   
weighty claims to the distinction of    
being the basis  of a ,theology4 ,but if
 we are desired to point out what impels
 and  moreover authorises us to add     
these supplements1 then we shall seek in
  vain for a ground of justification in 
the principles of the theoretical  use  
of ,reason1 which is ever desirous in   
the explanation of an ,object  of       
experience to ascribe to it no more     
properties than those for which         
empirical data of possibility are to be 
found4 ,on closer examination  we should
 see that properly speaking an ,idea of 
a ,supreme ,being1 which  rests on a    
quite different use of ,reason 7the     
practical use71 lies in  us             
fundamentally a priori1 impelling us to 
supplement1 by the concept  of a ,deity1
 the defective representation1 supplied 
by a physical  ,teleology1 of the       
original ground of the purposes in      
nature2 and we  should not falsely      
imagine that we had worked out this     

,idea1 and with  it a ,theology by means
 of the theoretical use of ,reason in   
the physical  cognition of the          
world--much less that we had proved its 
reality4    ,one cannot blame the       
ancients much1 if they thought of their 
gods as  differing much from each other 
both as regards their faculties and as  
regards their designs and volitions1 but
 yet thought of all of them1  the       
,supreme ,one not excepted1 as always   
limited after human fashion4  ,for if   
they considered the arrangement and the 
course of things in  nature1 they       
certainly found ground enough for       
assuming something  more than mechanism 
as its cause1 and for conjecturing      
behind the  machinery of this world     
designs of certain higher causes1 which 
they  could not think otherwise than    
superhuman4 ,but because they met with  
good and evil1 the purposive and the    
unpurposive1 mingled together 7at  least
 as far as our insight goes71 and could 
not permit themselves  to assume        

nevertheless that wise and benevolent   
purposes of which  they saw no proof lay
 hidden at bottom1 on behalf of the     
arbitrary  ,idea of a supremely perfect 
original ,author1 their judgement upon  
the supreme ,world ,cause could hardly  
have been other than it was1 so  long as
 they proceeded consistently according  
to maxims of the mere  theoretical use  
of ,reason4 ,others1 who wished to be   
theologians as  well as physicists1     
thought to find contentment for the     
,reason by  providing for the absolute  
unity of the principle of natural things
  which ,reason demands1 the ,idea of a 
,being of which as sole ,substance  the 
things would be all only inherent       
determinations4 ,this ,substance  would 
not be ,cause of the ,world by means of 
intelligence1 but in it all  the        
intelligences of the beings in the world
 would be comprised4 ,this  ,being      
consequently would produce nothing      
according to purposes2 but in  it all   
things1 on account of the unity of the  

subject of which they are  mere         
determinations1 must necessarily relate 
themselves purposively to  one another1 
though without purpose and design4 ,thus
 they introduced  the ,idealism of final
 causes1 by changing the unity 7so      
difficult to  explain7 of a number of   
purposively combined substances1 from   
being  the unity of causal dependence on
 one ,substance to be the unity of      
inherence in one4 ,this system--which in
 the sequel1 considered on the  side of 
the inherent world beings1 becomes      
,pantheism1 and 7later7 on  the side of 
the ,subject subsisting by itself as    
,original ,being1 becomes               
,spinozism1--does not so much resolve as
 explain away into nothing the  question
 of the first ground of the             
purposiveness of nature2 because  this  
latter concept1 bereft of all reality1  
must be taken for a mere                
misinterpretation of a universal        
ontological concept of a thing in       
general4    ,hence the concept of a     

,deity1 which would be adequate for our 
teleological judging of nature1 can     
never be derived from mere  theoretical 
principles of the use of ,reason 7on    
which ,physico-theology  alone is       
based74 ,for as one alternative we may  
explain all ,teleology  as a mere       
deception of the ,judgement in its      
judging of the causal  combination of   
things1 and fly to the sole principle of
 a mere  mechanism of nature1 which     
merely seems to us1 on account of the   
unity  of the ,substance of whose       
determinations nature is but the        
manifold1  to contain a universal       
reference to purposes4 ,or if1 instead  
of this  ,idealism of final causes1 we  
wish to remain attached to the principle
  of the ,realism of this particular    
kind of causality1 we may set  beneath  
natural purposes many intelligent       
original beings or only a  single one4  
,but so far as we have for the basis of 
this concept of  ,realism only empirical
 principles derived from the actual     

purposive  combination in the world1 we 
cannot on the one hand find any remedy  
for  the discordance that nature        
presents in many examples in respect of 
unity of purpose2 and on the other hand1
 as to the concept of a single          
intelligent ,cause1 so far as we are    
authorised by mere experience1 we  can  
never draw it therefrom in a manner     
sufficiently determined for any         
serviceable ,theology whatever 7whether 
theoretical or practical74    ,physical 
,teleology impels us1 it is true1 to    
seek a ,theology2 but it  cannot produce
 one1 however far we may investigate    
nature by means of  experience and1 in  
reference to the purposive combination  
apparent in  it1 call in ,ideas of      
,reason 7which must be theoretical for  
physical  problems74 ,what is the use1  
one might well complain1 of placing at  
the  basis of all these arrangements a  
great ,understanding incommensurable  by
 us1 and supposing it to govern the     
world according to design1 if  nature   

does not and cannot tell us anything of 
the final design8 ,for  without this we 
cannot refer all these natural purposes 
to any common  point1 nor can we form   
any teleological principle1 sufficient  
either  for cognising the purposes      
collected in a system1 or for forming a 
concept of the ,supreme ,understanding1 
as ,cause of such a nature1 that  could 
serve as a standard for our ,judgement  
reflecting teleologically  thereon4 ,i  
should thus have an artistic            
,understanding for scattered  purposes1 
but no ,wisdom for a final purpose1 in  
which final purpose  nevertheless must  
be contained the determining ground of  
the said  ,understanding4 ,but in the   
absence of a final purpose which pure   
,reason  alone can supply 7because all  
purposes in the world are empirically   
conditioned1 and can contain nothing    
absolutely good but only what is  good  
for this or that regarded as a          
contingent design71 and which alone     
would teach me what properties1 what    

degree1 and what relation of the        
,supreme ,cause to nature ,i have to    
think in order to judge of nature as  a 
teleological system2 how and with what  
right do ,i dare to extend at  pleasure 
my very limited concept of that original
 ,understanding 7which  ,i can base on  
my limited knowledge of the world71 of  
the ,might of that  original ,being in  
actualising its ,ideas1 and of its ,will
 to do so1 and  complete this into the  
,idea of an ,allwise1 ,infinite ,being8 
,if this is  to be done theoretically1  
it would presuppose omniscience in me1  
in  order to see into the purposes of   
nature in their whole connexion1 and  in
 addition the power of conceiving all   
possible plans1 in comparison  with     
which the present plan would be judged  
on sufficient grounds  as the best4 ,for
 without this complete knowledge of the 
effect ,i can  arrive at no determinate 
concept of the ,supreme ,cause1 which   
can only  be found in the concept of an 
,intelligence infinite in every respect1

  i4e4 the concept of a ,deity1 and so  
,i can supply no foundation for         
,theology4    ,hence1 with every        
possible extension of physical          
,teleology1 according  to the           
propositions above laid down we may say3
 ,by the constitution  and the          
principles of our cognitive faculty we  
can think of nature1 in  its purposive  
arrangements which have become known to 
us1 in no other  way than as the product
 of an ,understanding to which it is    
subject4  ,but the theoretical          
investigation of nature can never reveal
 to us  whether this ,understanding may 
not also1 with the whole of nature and  
its production1 have had a final design 
7which would not lie in the  nature of  
the sensible world74 ,on the contrary1  
with all our knowledge  of nature it    
remains undecided whether that ,supreme 
,cause is its  original ground according
 to a final purpose1 or not rather by   
means  of an ,understanding determined  
by the mere necessity of its nature to  

produce certain forms 7according to the 
analogy of what we call the             
art-instinct in animals72 without it    
being necessary to ascribe to  it even  
wisdom1 much less the highest wisdom    
combined with all other  properties     
requisite for the perfection of its     
product4    ,hence ,physico-theology is 
a misunderstood physical ,teleology1    
only  serviceable as a preparation      
7propaedeutic7 for ,theology2 and it is 
only adequate to this design by the aid 
of a foreign principle on which  it can 
rely1 and not in itself1 as its name    
would intimate4       #hf4 ,of          
,ethico-theology    ,the commonest      
,understanding1 if it thinks over the   
presence of things  in the world1 and   
the existence of the world itself1      
cannot forbear  from the judgement that 
all the various creatures1 no matter how
 great  the art displayed in their      
arrangement1 and how various their      
purposive  mutual connexion1--even the  
complex of their numerous systems 7which

  we incorrectly call worlds71--would be
 for nothing1 if there were not  also   
men 7rational beings in general74       
,without men the whole creation  would  
be a mere waste1 in vain1 and without   
final purpose4 ,but it is  not in       
reference to man's cognitive faculty    
7theoretical ,reason7 that  the being of
 everything else in the world gets its  
worth2 he is not  there merely that     
there may be some one to contemplate the
 world4  ,for if the contemplation of   
the world only afforded a representation
  of things without any final purpose1  
no worth could accrue to its  being from
 the mere fact that it is known2 we must
 presuppose for it  a final purpose1 in 
reference to which its contemplation    
itself has  worth4 ,again it is not in  
reference to the feeling of pleasure1 or
 to  the sum of pleasures1 that we think
 a final purpose of creation as  given2 
i4e4 we do not estimate that absolute   
worth by well-being or  by enjoyment    
7whether bodily or mental71 or in a     

word1 by happiness4  ,for the fact that 
man1 if he exists1 takes this for his   
final design1  gives us no concept as to
 why in general he should exist1 and as 
to  what worth he has in himself to make
 his existence pleasant4 ,he must1      
therefore1 be supposed to be the final  
purpose of creation1 in order  to have a
 rational ground for holding that nature
 must harmonise with  his happiness1 if 
it is considered as an absolute whole   
according  to principles of             
purposes4--,hence there remains only the
 faculty of  desire2 not1 however1 that 
which makes man dependent 7through      
sensuous  impulses7 upon nature1 nor    
that in respect of which the worth of   
his  being depends upon what he receives
 and enjoys4 ,but the worth which  he   
alone can give to himself1 and which    
consists in what he does1 how  and      
according to what principles he acts1   
and that not as a link in  nature's     
chain but in the freedom of his faculty 
of desire--i4e4 a  good will--is that   

whereby alone his being can have an     
absolute worth1  and in reference to    
which the being of the world can have a 
final  purpose4    ,the commonest       
judgement of healthy human ,reason      
completely accords  with this1 that it  
is only as a moral being that man can be
 a final  purpose of creation2 if we but
 direct men's attention to the question 
and incite them to investigate it4 ,what
 does it avail1 one will say1  that this
 man has so much talent1 that he is so  
active therewith1 and  that he exerts   
thereby a useful influence over the     
community1 thus  having a great worth   
both in relation to his own happy       
condition and  to the benefit of others1
 if he does not possess a good will8 ,he
 is a  contemptible ,object considered  
in respect of his inner self2 and if the
  creation is not to be without any     
final purpose at all1 he1 who as man    
belongs to it1 must1 in a world under   
moral laws1 inasmuch as he is a  bad    
man1 forfeit his subjective purpose     

7happiness74 ,this is the only          
condition under which his existence can 
accord with the final purpose4    ,if   
now we meet with purposive arrangements 
in the world and1 as ,reason  inevitably
 requires1 subordinate the purposes that
 are only conditioned  to an            
unconditioned1 supreme1 i4e4 final1     
purpose2 then we easily see  in the     
first place that we are thus concerned  
not with a purpose of  nature 7internal 
to itself71 so far as it exists1 but    
with the purpose  of its existence along
 with all its ordinances1 and1          
consequently1 with  the ultimate purpose
 of creation1 and specially with the    
supreme  condition under which can be   
posited a final purpose 7i4e4 the ground
  which determines a supreme            
,understanding to produce the beings of 
the  world74    ,since now it is only as
 a moral being that we recognise man as 
the  purpose of creation1 we have in the
 first place a ground 7at least1 the    
chief condition7 for regarding the world

 as a whole connected according  to     
purposes1 and as a system of final      
causes4 ,and1 more especially1  as      
regards the reference 7necessary for us 
by the constitution of our  ,reason7 of 
natural purposes to an intelligent      
,world ,cause1 we have one  principle   
enabling us to think the nature and     
properties of this ,first  ,cause as    
supreme ground in the kingdom of        
purposes1 and to determine  its concept4
 ,this physical ,teleology could not do2
 it could only lead  to indeterminate   
concepts thereof1 unserviceable alike in
 theoretical  and in practical use4     
,from the principle1 thus determined1 of
 the causality of the ,original  ,being 
we must not think ,him merely as        
,intelligence and as legislative  for   
nature1 but also as legislating         
supremely in a moral kingdom of         
purposes4 ,in reference to the highest  
good1 alone possible under  ,his        
sovereignty1 viz4 the existence of      
rational beings under moral  laws1 we   

shall think this ,original ,being as    
all-knowing3 thus our  inmost           
dispositions 7which constitute the      
proper moral worth of the  actions of   
rational beings of the world7 will not  
be hid from ,him4  ,we shall think ,him 
as all-mighty3 thus ,he will be able to 
make the  whole of nature accord with   
this highest purpose4 ,we shall think   
,him  as all-good1 and at the same time 
as just3 because these two  properties  
7which when united constitute ,wisdom7  
are the conditions  of the causality of 
a supreme ,cause of the world1 as       
highest good1  under moral laws4 ,so    
also all the other transcendental       
properties1  such as ,eternity1         
,omnipresence1 etc4 for goodness and    
justice are  moral properties#acb1 which
 are presupposed in reference to such a 
final purpose1 must be thought in       
,him4--,in this way moral ,teleology    
supplies the deficiency in physical     
,teleology1 and first establishes  a    
,theology2 because the latter1 if it did

 not borrow from the former  without    
being observed1 but were to proceed     
consistently1 could only  found a       
,demonology1 which is incapable of any  
definite concept4    ,but the principle 
of the reference of the world to a      
supreme ,cause1 as  ,deity1 on account  
of the moral purposive destination of   
certain beings  in it1 does not         
accomplish this by completing the       
physico-teleological  ground of proof   
and so taking this necessarily as its   
basis4 ,it is  sufficient in itself and 
directs attention to the purposes of    
nature and the investigation of that    
incomprehensible great art lying  hidden
 behind its forms1 in order to confirm  
incidentally by means of  natural       
purposes the ,ideas that pure practical 
,reason furnishes4 ,for  the concept of 
beings of the world under moral laws is 
a principle  7a priori7 according to    
which man must of necessity judge       
himself4  ,further1 if there is in      
general a ,world ,cause acting          

designedly and  directed towards a      
purpose1 this moral relation must be    
just as  necessarily the condition of   
the possibility of a creation1 as that  
in accordance with physical laws 7if1   
that is1 this intelligent ,cause  has   
also a final purpose74 ,this is regarded
 a priori by ,reason as a  necessary    
fundamental proposition for it in its   
teleological judging  of the existence  
of things4 ,it now only comes to this1  
whether we have  sufficient ground for  
,reason 7either speculative or          
practical7 to  ascribe to the supreme   
,cause1 acting in accordance with       
purposes1 a  final purpose4 ,for it may 
a priori be taken by us as certain that 
this1 by the subjective constitution of 
our ,reason and even of the  ,reason of 
other beings as far as we can think it1 
can be nothing else  than man under     
moral laws3 since otherwise the purposes
 of nature in  the physical order could 
not be known a priori1 especially as it 
can  in no way be seen that nature could

 not exist without such purposes4       
,remark    ,suppose the case of a man at
 the moment when his mind is disposed to
 a  moral sensation4 ,if surrounded by  
the beauties of nature1 he is in a      
state of restful1 serene enjoyment of   
his being1 he feels a want1 viz4  to be 
grateful for this to some being or      
other4 ,or if another time he  finds    
himself in the same state of mind when  
pressed by duties that he  can and will 
only adequately discharge by a voluntary
 sacrifice1 he  again feels in himself a
 want1 viz4 to have thus executed a     
command  and obeyed a ,supreme ,lord4   
,or1 again2 if he has in some heedless  
way  transgressed his duty1 but without 
becoming answerable to men1 his  severe 
self-reproach will speak to him with the
 voice of a judge to  whom he has to    
give account4 ,in a word1 he needs a    
moral ,intelligence1  in order to have a
 ,being for the purpose of his          
existence1 which may  be1 conformably to
 this purpose1 the cause of himself and 

of the  world4 ,it is vain to assign    
motives behind these feelings1 for they 
are immediately connected with the      
purest moral sentiment1 because         
gratitude1 obedience1 and humiliation   
7submission to deserved  chastisement7  
are mental dispositions that make for   
duty2 and the mind  which is inclined   
towards a widening of its moral         
sentiment here only  voluntarily        
conceives an object that is not in the  
world in order where  possible to render
 its duty before such an one4 ,it is    
therefore at  least possible and        
grounded too in our moral disposition to
 represent  a pure moral need of the    
existence of a ,being1 by which our     
morality  gains strength or even 7at    
least according to our representation7  
more  scope1 viz4 a new object for its  
exercise4 ,that is1 there is a need  to 
assume a morally-legislating ,being     
outside the world1 without any          
reference to theoretical proofs1 still  
less to self-interest1 from pure  moral 

grounds free from all foreign influence 
7and consequently only  subjective71 on 
the mere recommendation of a pure       
practical ,reason  legislating by itself
 alone4 ,and although such a mental     
disposition  might seldom occur or might
 not last long1 but be transient and    
without  permanent effect1 or might even
 pass away without any meditation on the
  object represented in such shadowy    
outline1 or without care to bring  it   
under clear concepts--there is yet here 
unmistakably the ground why  our moral  
capacity1 as a subjective principle1    
should not be contented  in its         
contemplation of the world with its     
purposiveness by means of  natural      
causes1 but should ascribe to it a      
supreme ,cause governing  nature        
according to moral principles4--,in     
addition1 we feel ourselves  constrained
 by the moral law to strive for a       
universal highest purpose  which yet we1
 in common with the rest of nature1 are 
incapable of  attaining2 and it is only 

so far as we strive for it that we can  
judge  ourselves to be in harmony with  
the final purpose of an intelligent     
,world ,cause 7if such there be74 ,thus 
is found a pure moral ground  of        
practical ,reason for assuming this     
,cause 7since it can be done  without   
contradiction71 in order that we may no 
more regard that effort  of ,reason as  
quite idle1 and so run the risk of      
abandoning it from  weariness4    ,with 
all this1 so much only is to be said1   
that though fear first  produces gods   
7demons71 it is ,reason by means of its 
moral  principles that can first produce
 the concept of ,god 7even when1 as     
commonly is the case1 one is unskilled  
in the ,teleology of nature1  or is very
 doubtful on account of the difficulty  
of adjusting by  a sufficiently         
established principle its mutually      
contradictory  phenomena74 ,also1 the   
inner moral purposive destination of    
man's  being supplies that in which     
natural knowledge is deficient1 by      

directing us to think1 for the final    
purpose of the being of all things  7for
 which no other principle than an       
ethical one is satisfactory to          
,reason71 the supreme ,cause as endowed 
with properties1 whereby it is  able to 
subject the whole of nature to that     
single design 7for which  nature is     
merely the instrument71--i4e4 to think  
it as a ,deity4       #hg4 ,of the moral
 proof of the ,being of ,god    ,there  
is a physical ,teleology1 which gives   
sufficient ground of  proof to our      
theoretical reflective ,judgement to    
assume the being of  an intelligent     
,world-,cause4 ,but we find also in     
ourselves and still  more in the concept
 of a rational being in general endowed 
with freedom  7of his causality7 a moral
 ,teleology4 ,however1 as the purposive 
reference1 together with its law1 is    
determined a priori in ourselves  and   
therefore can be cognised as necessary1 
this internal conformity  to law        
requires no intelligent cause external  

to us2 any more than we  need look to a 
highest ,understanding as the source of 
the purposiveness  7for every possible  
exercise of art7 that we find in the    
geometrical  properties of figures4 ,but
 this moral ,teleology concerns us as   
beings  of the world1 and therefore as  
beings bound up with other things in the
  world2 upon which latter1 whether as  
purposes or as objects in respect  of   
which we ourselves are final purpose1   
the same moral laws require  us to pass 
judgement4 ,this moral ,teleology1 then1
 has to do with the  reference of our   
own causality to purposes and even to a 
final purpose  that we must aim at in   
the world1 as well as with the          
reciprocal  reference of the world to   
that moral purpose1 and the external    
possibility of its accomplishment 7to   
which no physical ,teleology can  lead  
us74 ,hence the question necessarily    
arises1 whether it compels  our rational
 judgement to go beyond the world and   
seek an intelligent  supreme principle  

for that reference of nature to the     
moral in us2 in  order to represent     
nature as purposive even in reference to
 our inner  moral legislation and its   
possible accomplishment4 ,there is      
therefore  certainly a moral ,teleology1
 which is connected on the one hand with
  the nomothetic of freedom and on the  
other with that of nature2 just  as     
necessarily as civil legislation is     
connected with the question  where the  
executive authority is to be sought1 and
 in general in every  case with the     
question wherein ,reason is to furnish a
 principle  of the actuality of a       
certain regular order of things only    
possible  according to ,ideas4-- ,we    
shall first set forth the progress of   
,reason  from that moral ,teleology and 
its reference to physical1 to ,theology2
  and then make some observations upon  
the possibility and the validity  of    
this way of reasoning4    ,if we assume 
the being of certain things 7or even    
only certain forms of  things7 to be    

contingent and so to be possible only   
through something  else which is their  
cause1 we may seek for the unconditioned
 ground of  this causality of the       
supreme 7and so of the conditioned7     
either in  the physical or the          
teleological order 7either according to 
the nexus  effectivus or the nexus      
finalis74 ,that is1 we may either ask1  
what  is the supreme productive cause of
 these things2 or what is their  supreme
 7absolutely unconditioned7 purpose1    
i4e4 the final purpose of  that cause in
 its production of this or all its      
products generally8 ,in  the second case
 it is plainly presupposed that this    
cause is capable  of representing       
purposes to itself1 and consequently is 
an intelligent  ,being2 at least it must
 be thought as acting in accordance with
 the  laws of such a being4    ,if we   
follow the latter order1 it is a        
,,fundamental ,,proposition to  which   
even the commonest human ,reason is     
compelled to give immediate  assent1    

that if there is to be in general a     
final purpose furnished  a priori by    
,reason1 this can be no other than man  
7every rational  being of the world7    
under moral laws4#acc ,for 7and so every
 one  judges7 if the world consisted of 
mere lifeless1 or even in part of       
living but irrational1 beings1 its      
existence would have no worth  because  
in it there would be no being who would 
have the least concept  of what worth   
is4 ,again1 if there were intelligent   
beings1 whose  ,reason were only able to
 place the worth of the existence of    
things  in the relation of nature to    
themselves 7their well-being71 but not  
to furnish of itself an original worth  
7in freedom71 then there would          
certainly be 7relative7 purposes in the 
world1 but no 7absolute7 final  purpose1
 because the existence of such rational 
beings would be always  purposeless4    
,but the moral laws have this peculiar  
characteristic that  they prescribe to  
,reason something as a purpose without  

any condition1  and consequently exactly
 as the concept of a final purpose      
requires4  ,the existence of a ,reason  
that can be for itself the supreme law  
in the  purposive reference1 in other   
words the existence of rational beings  
under moral laws1 can therefore alone be
 thought as the final purpose  of the   
being of a world4 ,if on the contrary   
this be not so1 there would  be either  
no purpose at all in the cause of its   
being1 or there would  be purposes1 but 
no final purpose4    ,the moral law as  
the formal rational condition of the use
 of our  freedom obliges us by itself   
alone1 without depending on any purpose 
as  material condition2 but it          
nevertheless determines for us1 and     
indeed  a priori1 a final purpose       
towards which it obliges us to strive2  
and this purpose is the highest good in 
the world possible through  freedom4    
,the subjective condition under which   
man 7and1 according to all our          
concepts1 every rational finite being7  

can set a final purpose before  himself 
under the above law is happiness4       
,consequently1 the highest  physical    
good possible in the world1 to be       
furthered as a final purpose  as far as 
in us lies1 is happiness1 under the     
objective condition of  the harmony of  
man with the law of morality as         
worthiness to be happy4    ,but it is   
impossible for us in accordance with all
 our rational  faculties to represent   
these two requirements of the final     
purpose  proposed to us by the moral    
law1 as connected by merely natural     
causes1 and yet as conformable to the   
,idea of that final purpose4 ,hence  the
 concept of the practical necessity of  
such a purpose through  the application 
of our powers does not harmonise with   
the theoretical  concept of the physical
 possibility of working it out1 if we   
connect  with our freedom no other      
causality 7as a means7 than that of     
nature4    ,consequently1 we must assume
 a moral ,world-,cause 7an ,author of   

the  world71 in order to set before     
ourselves a final purpose consistently  
with the moral law2 and in so far as the
 latter is necessary1 so far  7i4e4 in  
the same degree and on the same ground7 
the former also must  be necessarily    
assumed2 i4e4 we must admit that there  
is a ,god4#acd    ,this proof1 to which 
we can easily give the form of logical  
precision1  does not say3 it is as      
necessary to assume the ,being of ,god  
as to  recognise the validity of the    
moral law2 and consequently he who      
cannot convince himself of the first1   
can judge himself free from the         
obligations of the second4 ,no6 there   
must in such case only be given  up the 
aiming at the final purpose in the      
world1 to be brought about  by the      
pursuit of the second 7viz4 a happiness 
of rational beings  in harmony with the 
pursuit of moral laws1 regarded as the  
highest  good74 ,every rational being   
would yet have to cognise himself as    
straitly bound by the precepts of       

morality1 for its laws are formal  and  
command unconditionally without respect 
to purposes 7as the matter  of          
volition74 ,but the one requisite of the
 final purpose1 as practical  ,reason   
prescribes it to beings of the world1 is
 an irresistible purpose  imposed on    
them by their nature 7as finite beings71
 which ,reason wishes  to know as       
subject only to the moral law as        
inviolable condition1 or  even as       
universally set up in accordance with   
it4 ,thus ,reason takes for  final      
purpose the furthering of happiness in  
harmony with morality4 ,to  further this
 so far as is in our power 7i4e4 in     
respect of happiness7  is commanded us  
by the moral law2 be the issue of this  
endeavour what  it may4 ,the fulfilling 
of duty consists in the form of the     
earnest  will1 not in the intermediate  
causes of success4    ,suppose then that
 partly through the weakness of all the 
speculative  arguments so highly        
extolled1 and partly through many       

irregularities  in nature and the world 
of sense which come before him1 a man is
  persuaded of the proposition1 ,there  
is no ,god2 he would nevertheless be    
contemptible in his own eyes if on that 
account he were to imagine the  laws of 
duty as empty1 invalid and inobligatory1
 and wished to resolve  to transgress   
them boldly4 ,such an one1 even if he   
could be convinced  in the sequel of    
that which he had doubted at the first1 
would always  be contemptible while     
having such a disposition1 although he  
should  fulfil his duty as regards its  
external effect as punctiliously  as    
could be desired1 for he would be acting
 from fear or from the  aim at          
recompense1 without the sentiment of    
reverence for duty4 ,if1  conversely1 as
 a believer in ,god he performs his duty
 according  to his conscience1 uprightly
 and disinterestedly1 and nevertheless  
believes that he is free from all moral 
obligation so soon as he is  convinced  
that there is no ,god1 this could accord

 but badly with an  inner moral         
disposition4    ,we may then suppose the
 case of a righteous man e4g4           
,spinoza1#ace  who holds himself firmly 
persuaded that there is no ,god1 and    
also  7because in respect of the ,object
 of morality a similar consequence      
results7 no future life2 how is he to   
judge of his own inner purposive        
destination1 by means of the moral law1 
which he reveres in practice8  ,he      
desires no advantage to himself from    
following it1 either in this  or another
 world2 he wishes1 rather1              
disinterestedly to establish  the good  
to which that holy law directs all his  
powers4 ,but his  effort is bounded2 and
 from nature1 although he may expect    
here and  there a contingent accordance1
 he can never expect a regular harmony  
agreeing according to constant rules    
7such as his maxims are and must  be1   
internally71 with the purpose that he   
yet feels himself obliged  and impelled 
to accomplish4 ,deceit1 violence1 and   

envy will always  surround him1 although
 he himself be honest1 peaceable1 and   
kindly2 and  the righteous men with whom
 he meets will1 notwithstanding all     
their  worthiness of happiness1 be yet  
subjected by nature which regards not   
this1 to all the evils of want1 disease1
 and untimely death1 just like  the     
beasts of the earth4 ,so it will be     
until one wide grave engulfs  them      
together 7honest or not1 it makes no    
difference71 and throws  them back--who 
were able to believe themselves the     
final purpose of  creation--into the    
abyss of the purposeless chaos of matter
 from which  they were drawn4-- ,the    
purpose1 then1 which this               
well-intentioned  person had and ought  
to have before him in his pursuit of    
moral laws1  he must certainly give up  
as impossible4 ,or else1 if he wishes to
  remain dependent upon the call of his 
moral internal destination1  and not to 
weaken the respect with which the moral 
law immediately  inspires him1 by       

assuming the nothingness of the single1 
ideal1 final  purpose adequate to its   
high demand 7which cannot be brought    
about  without a violation of moral     
sentiment71 he must1 as he well         
can--since  there is at least no        
contradiction from a practical point of 
view in  forming a concept of the       
possibility of a morally prescribed     
final  purpose--assume the being of a   
moral author of the world1 that is1 a   
,god4       #hh4 ,limitation of the     
validity of the moral proof    ,pure    
,reason1 as a practical faculty1 i4e4 as
 the faculty of  determining the free   
use of our causality by ,ideas 7pure    
rational  concepts71 not only comprises 
in the moral law a regulative principle 
of our actions1 but supplies us at the  
same time with a subjective             
constitutive principle in the concept of
 an ,object which ,reason  alone can    
think1 and which is to be actualised by 
our actions in  the world according to  
that law4 ,the ,idea of a final purpose 

in the  employment of freedom according 
to moral laws has therefore subjective  
practical reality4 ,we are a priori     
determined by ,reason to promote  with  
all our powers the summum bonum         
,weltbeste which consists in  the       
combination of the greatest welfare of  
rational beings with the  highest       
condition of the good in itself1 i4e4 in
 universal happiness  conjoined with    
morality most accordant to law4 ,in this
 final purpose  the possibility of one  
part1 happiness1 is empirically         
conditioned1  i4e4 dependent on the     
constitution of nature 7which may or may
 not  agree with this purpose7 and is in
 a theoretical aspect problematical2    
whilst the other part1 morality1 in     
respect of which we are free from  the  
effects of nature1 stands fast a priori 
as to its possibility1  and is          
dogmatically certain4 ,it is then       
requisite for the objective  theoretical
 reality of the concept of the final    
purpose of rational  beings1 that we    

should not only have a priori           
presupposed a final  purpose for        
ourselves1 but also that the creation1  
i4e4 the world  itself1 should have as  
regards its existence a final purpose1  
which if  it could be proved a priori   
would add objectivity to the subjective 
reality of the final purpose of rational
 beings4 ,for if the creation  has on   
the whole a final purpose1 we cannot    
think it otherwise than as  harmonising 
with the moral purpose 7which alone     
makes the concept of a  purpose         
possible74 ,now we find without doubt   
purposes in the world1 and  physical    
,teleology exhibits them in such        
abundance1 that if we judge  in         
accordance with ,reason1 we have ground 
for assuming as a principle  in the     
investigation of nature that nothing in 
nature is without a  purpose2 but the   
final purpose of nature we seek there in
 vain4 ,this  can and must therefore1 as
 its ,idea only lies in ,reason1 be     
sought as  regards its objective        

possibility only in rational beings4    
,and the  practical ,reason of these    
latter not only supplies this final     
purpose2  it also determines this       
concept in respect of the conditions    
under  which alone a final purpose of   
creation can be thought by us4    ,the  
question is now1 whether the objective  
reality of the concept  of a final      
purpose of creation cannot be exhibited 
adequately to the  theoretical          
requirements of pure ,reason--if not    
apodictically for the  determinant      
,judgement yet adequately for the maxims
 of the theoretical  reflective         
,judgement8 ,this is the least one could
 expect from  theoretical philosophy1   
which undertakes to combine the moral   
purpose  with natural purposes by means 
of the ,idea of one single purpose2 but 
yet this little is far more than it can 
accomplish4    ,according to the        
principle of the theoretical reflective 
,judgement we  should say3 if we have   
ground for assuming for the purposive   

products  of nature a supreme ,cause of 
nature--whose causality in respect of   
the  actuality of creation is of a      
different kind from that required for   
the mechanism of nature1 i4e4 must be   
thought as the causality of  an         
,understanding--we have also sufficient 
ground for thinking in this  original   
,being not merely the purposes          
everywhere in nature but also  a final  
purpose4 ,this is not indeed a final    
purpose by which we can  explain the    
presence of such a ,being1 but one of   
which we may at least  convince         
ourselves 7as was the case in physical  
,teleology7 that we can  make the       
possibility of such a world conceivable1
 not merely according  to purposes1 but 
only through the fact that we ascribe to
 its existence  a final purpose4    ,but
 a final purpose is merely a concept of 
our practical ,reason1  and can be      
inferred from no data of experience for 
the theoretical  judging of nature1 nor 
can it be applied to the cognition of   

nature4  ,no use of this concept is     
possible except its use for practical   
,reason  according to moral laws2 and   
the final purpose of creation is that   
constitution of the world which         
harmonises with that which alone we  can
 put forward definitely according to    
laws1 viz4 the final purpose of  our    
pure practical ,reason1 in so far as it 
is to be practical4-- ,now  we have in  
the moral law1 which enjoins on us in a 
practical point of  view the application
 of our powers to the accomplishment of 
this final  purpose1 a ground for       
assuming its possibility and            
practicability1 and  consequently too   
7because without the concurrence of     
nature with a  condition not in our     
power1 its accomplishment would be      
impossible7 a  nature of things         
harmonious with it4 ,hence we have a    
moral ground for  thinking in a world   
also a final purpose of creation4    ,we
 have not yet advanced from moral       
,teleology to a ,theology1 i4e4 to  the 

being of a moral ,author of the world1  
but only to a final purpose  of creation
 which is determined in this way4 ,but  
in order to account  for this creation1 
i4e4 the existence of things1 in        
accordance with  a final purpose1 we    
must assume not only first an           
intelligent ,being  7for the possibility
 of things of nature which we are       
compelled to  judge of as purposes71 but
 also a moral ,being1 as author of the  
world1 i4e4 a ,god4 ,this second        
conclusion is of such a character  that 
we see it holds merely for the          
,judgement according to concepts  of    
practical ,reason1 and as such for the  
reflective and not the  determinant     
,judgement4 ,it is true that in us      
morally practical ,reason  is           
essentially different in its principles 
from technically practical  ,reason4    
,but we cannot assume that it must be so
 likewise in the supreme  ,world-,cause1
 regarded as ,intelligence1 and that a  
peculiar mode of  its causality is      

requisite for the final purpose1        
different from that  which is requisite 
merely for purposes of nature4 ,we      
cannot therefore  assume that in our    
final purpose we have not merely a moral
 ground  for admitting a final purpose  
of creation 7as an effect71 but also    
for admitting a moral ,being as the     
original ground of creation4 ,but  we   
may well say1 that1 according to the    
constitution of our rational  faculty1  
we cannot comprehend the possibility of 
such a purposiveness  in respect of the 
moral law1 and its ,object1 as there is 
in this  final purpose1 apart from an   
,author and ,governor of the world1 who 
is  at the same time its moral          
,lawgiver4    ,the actuality of a       
highest morally-legislating ,author is  
therefore  sufficiently established     
merely for the practical use of our     
,reason1  without determining anything  
theoretically as regards its being4 ,for
  ,reason requires1 in respect of the   
possibility of its purpose1 which  is   

given to us independently by its own    
legislation1 an ,idea through  which the
 inability to follow up this purpose1   
according to the mere  natural concepts 
of the world1 is removed 7sufficiently  
for the  reflective ,judgement74 ,thus  
this ,idea gains practical reality1     
although  all means of creating such for
 it in a theoretical point of view1 for 
the explanation of nature and           
determination of the supreme ,cause1    
are entirely wanting for speculative    
cognition4 ,for the theoretical         
reflective ,judgement physical          
,teleology sufficiently proves from the 
purposes of nature an intelligent       
,world-,cause2 for the practical        
,judgement moral ,teleology establishes 
it by the concept of a final  purpose1  
which it is forced to ascribe to        
creation in a practical  point of view4 
,the objective reality of the ,idea of  
,god1 as moral  ,author of the world1   
cannot1 it is true1 be established by   
physical  purposes alone4 ,but          

nevertheless1 if the cognition of these 
purposes  is combined with that of the  
moral purpose1 they are1 by virtue of   
the  maxim of pure ,reason which bids us
 seek unity of principles so far as  is 
possible1 of great importance for the   
practical reality of that  ,idea1 by    
bringing in the reality which it has for
 the ,judgement in a  theoretical point 
of view4    ,to prevent a               
misunderstanding which may easily arise1
 it is in the  highest degree needful to
 remark that1 in the first place1 we can
  think these properties of the highest 
,being only according to  analogy4 ,how 
indeed could we explore the nature of   
that1 to which  experience can show us  
nothing similar8 ,secondly1 in this way 
we only  think the supreme ,being2 we   
cannot thereby cognise ,him and ascribe 
anything theoretically to ,him4 ,it     
would be needful for the determinant    
,judgement in the speculative aspect of 
our ,reason1 to consider what  the      
supreme ,world-,cause is in ,himself4   

,but here we are only concerned  with   
the question what concept we can form of
 ,him1 according to the  constitution of
 our cognitive faculties2 and whether we
 have to assume  ,his existence in order
 merely to furnish practical reality to 
a  purpose1 which pure ,reason without  
any such presupposition enjoins upon  us
 a priori to bring about with all our   
powers1 i4e4 in order to  be able to    
think as possible a designed effect4    
,although that concept  may be          
transcendent for the speculative        
,reason1 and the properties  which we   
ascribe to the ,being thereby thought   
may1 objectively used1  conceal an      
anthropomorphism in themselves2 yet the 
design of its use  is not to determine  
the nature of that ,being which is      
unattainable by  us1 but to determine   
ourselves and our will accordingly4 ,we 
may call  a cause after the concept     
which we have of its effect 7though only
  in reference to this relation71       
without thereby meaning to determine    

internally its inner constitution1 by   
means of the properties which  can be   
made known to us solely by similar      
causes and must be given in  experience4
 ,for example1 amongst other properties 
we ascribe to the  soul a vis locomotiva
 because bodily movements actually arise
 whose  cause lies in the representation
 of them2 without therefore meaning  to 
ascribe to it the only mode of action   
that we know in moving  forces 7viz4 by 
attraction1 pressure1 impulse1 and      
consequently motion1  which always      
presuppose an extended being74 ,just so 
we must assume  something1 which        
contains the ground of the possibility  
and practical  reality1 i4e4 the        
practicability1 of a necessary moral    
final purpose2  but we can think of     
this1 in accordance with the character  
of the  effect expected of it1 as a wise
 ,being governing the world according   
to moral laws1 and1 conformably to the  
constitution of our cognitive           
faculties1 as a cause of things distinct

 from nature1 only in order  to express 
the relation of this ,being 7which      
transcends all our  cognitive faculties7
 to the ,objects of our practical       
,reason4 ,we do  not pretend thus to    
ascribe to it theoretically the only    
causality of  this kind known to us1    
viz4 an ,understanding and a ,will3 we  
do not  even pretend to distinguish     
objectively the causality thought in    
this  ,being1 as regards what is for us 
final purpose1 from the causality       
thought in it as regards nature 7and its
 purposive determinations in  general74 
,we can only assume this distinction as 
subjectively necessary  by the          
constitution of our cognitive faculties1
 and as valid for the  reflective1 not  
for the objectively determinant         
,judgement4 ,but if we  come to         
practice1 then such a regulative        
principle 7of prudence or  wisdom7      
commanding us to act conformably to that
 as purpose1 which  by the constitution 
of our cognitive faculties can only be  

thought  as possible in a certain way1  
is at the same constitutive1 i4e4       
practically determinant4 ,nevertheless1 
as a principle for judging  of the      
objective possibility of things1 it is  
no way theoretically  determinant 7i4e4 
it does not say that the only kind of   
possibility  which belongs to the       
,object is that which belongs to our    
thinking  faculty71 but is a mere       
regulative principle for the reflective 
,judgement4      ,remark    ,this moral 
proof is not one newly discovered1      
although perhaps its  basis is newly set
 forth2 since it has lain in man's      
rational faculty  from its earliest     
germ1 and is only continually developed 
with its  advancing cultivation4 ,so    
soon as men begin to reflect upon right 
and  wrong--at a time when1 quite       
indifferent as to the purposiveness of  
nature1 they avail themselves of it     
without thinking anything more of  it   
than that it is the accustomed course of
 nature--this judgement is  inevitable1 

viz4 that the issue cannot be the same1 
whether a man has  behaved candidly or  
falsely1 fairly or violently1 even      
though up to his  life's end1 as far as 
can be seen1 he has met with no         
happiness for  his virtues1 no          
punishment for his vices4 ,it is as if  
they perceived a  voice within saying   
that the issue must be different4 ,and  
so there  must lie hidden in them a     
representation1 however obscure1 of     
something  after which they feel        
themselves bound to strive2 with which  
such a  result would not agree1--with   
which1 if they looked upon the course of
  the world as the only order of things1
 they could not harmonise that  inner   
purposive determination of their minds4 
,now they might represent  in various   
rude fashions the way in which such an  
irregularity could  be adjusted 7an     
irregularity which must be far more     
revolting to the  human mind than the   
blind chance that we are sometimes      
willing to use  as a principle for      

judging of nature74 ,but they could     
never think  any other principle of the 
possibility of the unification of nature
  with its inner ethical laws1 than a   
supreme ,cause governing the world      
according to moral laws2 because a final
 purpose in them proposed as  duty1 and 
a nature without any final purpose      
beyond them in which that  purpose might
 be actualised1 would involve a         
contradiction4 ,as to the  inner#acf    
constitution of that ,world-,cause they 
could contrive much  nonsense4 ,but that
 moral relation in the government of the
 world would  remain always the same1   
which by the uncultivated ,reason1      
considered  as practical1 is universally
 comprehensible1 but with which the     
speculative ,reason can make far from   
the like advance4--,and in all          
probability attention would be directed 
first by this moral interest to  the    
beauty and the purposes in nature1 which
 would serve excellently  to strengthen 
this ,idea though they could not be the 

foundation of it4  ,still less could    
that moral interest be dispensed with1  
because it is  only in reference to the 
final purpose that the investigation of 
the  purposes of nature acquires that   
immediate interest which displays       
itself in such a great degree in the    
admiration of them without any          
reference to the advantage to be derived
 from them4       #hi4 ,of the use of   
the moral argument    ,the limitation of
 ,reason in respect of all our ,ideas of
 the  supersensible to the conditions of
 its practical employment has1 as  far  
as the ,idea of ,god is concerned1      
undeniable uses4 ,for it prevents       
,theology from rising into ,,theosophy  
7into transcendent concepts which       
confound ,reason71 or from sinking into 
,,demonology 7an anthropomorphic  way of
 representing the highest ,being74 ,and 
it also prevents ,religion  from turning
 into ,theurgy 7a fanatical belief that 
we can have a  feeling of other         
supersensible beings and can            

reciprocally influence  them71 or into  
,idolatry 7a superstitious belief that  
we can please  the ,supreme ,being by   
other means than by a moral             
sentiment74#acg    ,for if we permit the
 vanity or the presumption of sophistry 
to  determine the least thing           
theoretically 7in a way that extends our
  knowledge7 in respect of what lies    
beyond the world of sense1 or  if we    
allow any pretence to be made of insight
 into the being and  constitution of the
 nature of ,god1 of ,his ,understanding 
and ,will1 of  the laws of both and of  
,his properties which thus affect the   
world1  ,i should like to know where and
 at what point we will bound these      
assumptions of ,reason4 ,for wherever   
such insight can be derived1 there  may 
yet more be expected 7if we only strain 
our reflection1 as we have  a mind to   
do74 ,bounds must then be put to such   
claims according to a  certain          
principle1 and not merely because we    
find that all attempts  of the sort have

 hitherto failed1 for that proves       
nothing against the  possibility of a   
better result4 ,but here no principle is
 possible1  except either to assume that
 in respect of the supersensible        
absolutely  nothing can be theoretically
 determined 7except mere negations72  or
 else that our ,reason contains in      
itself a yet unused mine of  cognitions1
 reaching no one knows how far1 stored  
up for ourselves and  our               
posterity4--,but as concerns ,religion1 
i4e4 morals in reference  to ,god as    
legislator1 if the theoretical cognition
 of ,him is to come  first1 morals must 
be adjusted in accordance with          
,theology2 and not  only is an external 
arbitrary legislation of a ,supreme     
,being introduced  in place of an       
internal necessary legislation of       
,reason1 but also  whatever is defective
 in our insight into the nature of this 
,being  must extend to ethical precepts1
 and thus make ,religion immoral and    
perverted4    ,as regards the hope of a 

future life1 if instead of the final    
purpose  we have to accomplish in       
conformity with the precept of the moral
 law1  we ask of our theoretical faculty
 of cognition a clue for the judgement  
of ,reason upon our destination 7which  
clue is only considered as  necessary or
 worthy of acceptance in a practical    
reference71 then in  this aspect        
,psychology1 like ,theology1 gives no   
more than a negative  concept of our    
thinking being4 ,that is1 none of its   
actions or of the  phenomena of the     
internal sense can be explained         
materialistically2 and  hence of its    
separate nature and of the continuance  
or non-continuance  of its personality  
after death absolutely no ampliative    
determinant  judgement is possible on   
speculative grounds by means of our     
whole  theoretical cognitive faculty4   
,here then everything is handed over to 
the teleological judging of our         
existence in a practically necessary    
aspect1 and to the assumption of our    

continuance as a condition  requisite   
for the final purpose absolutely        
furnished by ,reason4 ,and so  this     
advantage 7which indeed at first glance 
seems to be a loss7 is  apparent2 that1 
as ,theology for us can never be        
,theosophy1 or rational  ,psychology    
become ,pneumatology--an ampliative     
science--so on the  other hand this     
latter is assured of never falling into 
,materialism4  ,psychology1 rather1 is a
 mere anthropology of the internal      
sense1  i4e4 is the knowledge of our    
thinking self in life2 and1 as          
theoretical cognition1 remains merely   
empirical4 ,on the other hand1  rational
 ,psychology1 as far as it is concerned 
with questions as to  our eternal       
existence1 is not a theoretical science 
at all1 but rests  on a single          
conclusion of moral ,teleology2 as also 
its whole use is  necessary merely on   
account of the latter1 i4e4 on account  
of our  practical destination4          
#ij4 ,of the kind of belief in a        

teleological proof of the ,being of     
,god    ,the first requisite for every  
proof1 whether it be derived from the   
immediate empirical presentation 7as in 
the proof from observation of  the      
object or from experiment7 of that which
 is to be proved1 or by  ,reason a      
priori from principles1 is this4 ,it    
should not persuade1  but convince1#ach 
or at least should tend to conviction4  
,i4e4 the  ground of proof or the       
conclusion should not be merely a       
subjective  7aesthetical7 determining   
ground of assent 7mere illusion71 but   
objectively valid and a logical ground  
of cognition2 for otherwise  the        
,understanding is ensnared1 but not     
convinced4 ,such an illusory  proof is  
that which1 perhaps with good intent but
 yet with wilful  concealment of its    
weaknesses1 is adduced in ,natural      
,theology4 ,in this  we bring in the    
great number of indications of the      
origin of natural  things according to  
the principle of purposes1 and take     

advantage  of the merely subjective     
basis of human ,reason1 viz4 its special
  propensity to think only one principle
 instead of several1 whenever  this can 
be done without contradiction2 and1 when
 in this principle  only one or more    
requisites for determining a concept are
 furnished1 to  add in our thought these
 additional features so as to complete  
the  concept of the thing by arbitrarily
 supplementing it4 ,for1 in truth1  when
 we meet with so many products in nature
 which are to us marks of  an           
intelligent cause1 why should we not    
think ,one cause rather than  many2 and 
in this ,one1 not merely great          
intelligence1 power1 etc41  but rather  
,omniscience1 and ,omnipotence--in a    
word1 think it as a  ,cause that        
contains the sufficient ground of such  
properties in all  possible things8     
,further1 why should we not ascribe to  
this unique1  all-powerful1 original    
,being not only intelligence for natural
 laws  and products1 but also1 as to a  

moral ,cause of the world1 supreme1     
ethical1 practical ,reason8 ,for by this
 completion of the concept a  sufficient
 principle is furnished both for insight
 into nature and  for moral wisdom2 and 
no objection grounded in any way can be 
made  against the possibility of such an
 ,idea4 ,if now at the same time  the   
moral motives of the mind are aroused1  
and a lively interest in  the latter is 
added by the force of eloquence 7of     
which they are  indeed very worthy71    
then there arises therefrom a persuasion
 of the  objective adequacy of the      
proof2 and also 7in most cases of its   
use7  a wholesome illusion which quite  
dispenses with all examination of  its  
logical strictness1 and even on the     
contrary regards this with  abhorrence  
and dislike as if an impious doubt lay  
at its basis4--,now  against this there 
is indeed nothing to say1 so long as we 
only have  regard to its popular        
usefulness4 ,but then the division of   
the proof  into the two dissimilar parts

 involved in the argument--belonging to 
physical and moral ,teleology           
respectively--cannot and must not be    
prevented4 ,for the blending of these   
makes it impossible to discern  where   
the proper force of the proof lies1 and 
in what part and how it  must be        
elaborated in order that its validity   
may be able to stand the  strictest     
examination 7even if we should be       
compelled to admit in one  part the     
weakness of our rational insight74 ,thus
 it is the duty of  the philosopher     
7supposing even that he counts as       
nothing the claims  of sincerity7 to    
expose the above illusion1 however      
wholesome it is1  which such a confusion
 can produce2 and to distinguish what   
merely  belongs to persuasion from that 
which leads to conviction 7for these    
are determinations of assent which      
differ not merely in degree but in      
kind71 in order to present plainly the  
state of the mind in this proof  in its 
whole clearness1 and to be able to      

subject it frankly to the  closest      
examination4    ,but a proof which is   
intended to convince1 can again be of   
two kinds2  either deciding what the    
object is in itself1 or what it is for  
us  7for men in general7 according to   
our necessary rational principles of    
judgement 7proof '  or ' 1 the last word
 being  taken in its universal          
signification of man in general74 ,in   
the first  case it is based on adequate 
principles for the determinant          
,judgement1  in the second for the      
reflective ,judgement4 ,in the latter   
case it  can never1 when resting on     
merely theoretical principles1 tend to  
conviction2 but if a practical principle
 of ,reason 7which is therefore         
universally and necessarily valid7 lies 
at its basis1 it may certainly  lay     
claim to conviction adequate in a pure  
practical point of view1  i4e4 to moral 
conviction4 ,but a proof tends to       
conviction1 though  without convincing1 
if it is merely#aci brought on the way  

thereto2  i4e4 if it contains in itself 
only objective grounds1 which although  
not attaining to certainty are yet of   
such a kind that they do not  serve     
merely for persuasion as subjective     
grounds of the judgement4#adj    ,all   
theoretical grounds of proof resolve    
themselves either into3 7#a7  ,proofs by
 logically strict ,syllogisms of        
,reason2 or where this is not  the case1
 7#b7 ,conclusions according to analogy2
 or where this also  has no place1 7#c7 
,probable opinion2 or finally1 which has
 the least  weight1 7#d7 ,assumption of 
a merely possible ground of explanation1
  i4e4 ,hypothesis4--,now ,i say that   
all grounds of proof in general1  which 
aim at theoretical conviction1 can bring
 about no belief of this  kind from the 
highest to the lowest degree1 if there  
is to be proved  the proposition of the 
existence of an original ,being1 as a   
,god1 in  the signification adequate to 
the whole content of this concept2 viz4 
a  moral ,author of the world1 by whom  

the final purpose of creation is  at the
 same time supplied4    7#a47 ,as to the
 logically accurate proof proceeding    
from universal  to particular1 we have  
sufficiently established in the         
,critique  the following3 ,since no     
intuition possible for us corresponds to
  the concept of a ,being that is to be 
sought beyond nature--whose  concept    
therefore1 so far as it is to be        
theoretically determined by  synthetical
 predicates1 remains always             
problematical for us--there  is         
absolutely no cognition of it to be had 
7by which the extent of  our theoretical
 knowledge is in the least enlarged74   
,the particular  concept of a           
supersensible ,being cannot be subsumed 
under the universal  principles of the  
nature of things1 in order to conclude  
from them to  it1 because those         
principles are valid simply for nature1 
as an object  of sense4    7#b47 ,we can
 indeed think one of two dissimilar     
things1 even in  the very point of their

 dissimilarity1 in accordance with the  
analogy#ada of the other2 but we cannot1
 from that wherein they are  dissimilar1
 conclude from the one to the other by  
analogy1 i4e4  transfer from the one to 
the other this sign of specific         
distinction4  ,thus ,i can1 according to
 the analogy of the law of the equality 
of  action and reaction in the mutual   
attraction and repulsion of bodies1     
also conceive of the association of the 
members of a commonwealth  according to 
rules of right2 but ,i cannot transfer  
to it those specific  determinations    
7material attraction or repulsion71 and 
ascribe them  to the citizens in order  
to constitute a system called a         
state4--,just  so we can indeed conceive
 of the causality of the original ,being
 in  respect of the things of the world1
 as natural purposes1 according to  the 
analogy of an ,understanding1 as ground 
of the forms of certain  products which 
we call works of art 7for this only     
takes place on  behalf of the           

theoretical or practical use that we    
have to make by our  cognitive faculty  
of this concept in respect of the       
natural things  in the world according  
to a certain principle74 ,but we can in 
no way  conclude according to analogy1  
because in the case of beings of the    
world ,understanding must be ascribed to
 the cause of an effect which  is judged
 artificial1 that in respect of nature  
the same causality  which we perceive in
 men attaches also to the ,being which  
is quite  distinct from nature4 ,for    
this concerns the very point of         
dissimilarity  which is thought between 
a cause sensibly conditioned in respect 
of its  effects and the supersensible   
original ,being itself in our concept of
  it1 and which therefore cannot be     
transferred from one to the other4--    
,in the very fact that ,i must conceive 
the divine causality only  according to 
the analogy of an ,understanding 7which 
faculty we know in  no other being than 
in sensibly-conditioned man7 lies the   

prohibition  to ascribe to it this      
,understanding in its peculiar          
signification4#adb    7#c47 ,opinion    
finds in a priori judgements no place   
whatever1 for  by them we either cognise
 something as quite certain or else     
cognise  nothing at all4 ,but if the    
given grounds of proof from which we    
start  7as here from the purposes in the
 world7 are empirical1 then we cannot   
even with their aid form any opinion as 
to anything beyond the world of  sense1 
nor can we concede to such venturesome  
judgements the smallest  claim to       
probability4 ,for probability is part of
 a certainty possible  in a certain     
series of grounds 7its grounds compare  
with the sufficient  ground as parts    
with a whole71 the insufficient ground  
of which must  be susceptible of        
completion4 ,but since1 as determining  
grounds of one  and the same judgement1 
they must be of the same kind1 for      
otherwise  they would not together      
constitute a whole 7such as certainty   

is71 one  part of them cannot lie within
 the bounds of possible experience and  
another outside all possible experience4
 ,consequently1 since merely  empirical 
grounds of proof lead to nothing        
supersensible1 and since  what is       
lacking in the series of them cannot in 
any way be completed1  we do not        
approach in the least nearer in our     
attempt to attain by  their means to the
 supersensible and to a cognition       
thereof4 ,thus in  any judgement about  
the latter by means of arguments derived
 from  experience1 probability has no   
place4    7#d47 ,if an hypothesis is to 
serve for the explanation of the        
possibility of a given phenomenon1 at   
least its possibility must  be          
completely certain4#adc ,it is          
sufficient that in an hypothesis  ,i    
disclaim any cognition of actuality     
7which is claimed in an  opinion given  
out as probable72 more than this ,i     
cannot give up4 ,the  possibility of    
that which ,i place at the basis of my  

explanation1  must at least be exposed  
to no doubt2 otherwise there would be no
 end  of empty chimeras4 ,but to assume 
the possibility of a supersensible      
,being determined according to certain  
concepts would be a completely          
groundless supposition4 ,for here none  
of the conditions requisite  for        
cognition1 as regards that in it which  
rests upon intuition1 is  given1 and so 
the sole criterion of possibility       
remaining is the mere  principle of     
,contradiction 7which can only prove the
 possibility of the  thought1 not of the
 object thought74    ,the result then is
 this4 ,for the existence ,dasein of the
 original  ,being1 as a ,godhead1 or of 
the soul as an immortal spirit1         
absolutely  no proof in a theoretical   
point of view is possible for the human 
,reason1 which can bring about even the 
least degree of belief4 ,the  ground of 
this is quite easy to comprehend4 ,for  
determining our  ,ideas of the          
supersensible we have no material       

whatever1 and we  must derive this      
latter from things in the world of      
sense1 which is  absolutely inadequate  
for such an ,object4 ,thus1 in the      
absence of all  determination of it1    
nothing remains but the concept of a    
non-sensible  something which contains  
the ultimate ground of the world of     
sense1 but  which does not furnish any  
knowledge 7any amplification of the     
concept7  of its inner constitution4    
#ia4 ,of the kind of belief produced by 
a practical faith    ,if we look merely 
to the way in which anything can be for 
us  7according to the subjective        
constitution of our representative      
powers7  an ,object of knowledge 7res   
cognoscibilis71 then our concepts will  
not cohere with ,objects1 but merely    
with our cognitive faculties and  the   
use which they can make of a given      
representation 7in a theoretical  or    
practical point of view74 ,thus the     
question whether anything is or  is not 
a cognisable being is not a question    

concerning the possibility  of things   
but of our knowledge of them4           
,cognisable things are of three kinds3  
things of opinion  7opinabile72 things  
of fact 7scibile72 and things of faith  
7mere credibile74    7#a47 ,objects of  
mere rational ,ideas1 which for         
theoretical knowledge  cannot be        
presented in any possible experience1   
are so far not  cognisable things1 and  
consequently in respect of them we can  
form  no opinion2 for to form an opinion
 a priori is absurd in itself  and the  
straight road to mere chimeras4 ,either 
then our proposition  is certain a      
priori or it contains nothing for       
belief4 ,therefore  things of opinion   
are always ,objects of an empirical     
cognition at  least possible in itself  
7objects of the world of sense72 but1   
which1  on account merely of the low    
degree of this faculty that we possess1 
is for us impossible4 ,thus the ether of
 the new physicists1#add  an elastic    
fluid pervading all other matter        

7mingled intimately with  it7 is a mere 
thing of opinion1 yet is such that1 if  
our external  senses were sharpened to  
the highest degree1 it could be         
perceived2  though it can never be      
presented in any observation or         
experiment4  ,to assume the existence of
 rational inhabitants of other planets  
is a thing of opinion2 for if we could  
come closer to them1 which is  in itself
 possible1 we should decide by          
experience whether they did  or did not 
exist2 but as we shall never come so    
near1 it remains in  the region of      
opinion4 ,but to hold the opinion that  
there are in the  material universe pure
 thinking spirits without bodies 7viz4  
if we  dismiss as unworthy of our notice
 certain phenomena which have been      
published as actual#ade7 is to be called
 poetic fiction4 ,this is no  thing of  
opinion1 but a mere ,idea which remains 
over1 when we remove  from a thinking   
being everything material1 and only     
leave thought  to it4 ,whether then the 

latter 7which we know only in man1 that 
is1  in combination with a body7 does   
survive1 we cannot decide4 ,such a      
thing is a sophistical being 7ens       
rationis ratiocinantis71 not a  rational
 being 7ens rationis ratiocinatae7#adf2 
of which latter it  is possible to show 
conclusively1 the objective reality of  
its concept2  at least for the practical
 use of ,reason1 because this which has 
its  peculiar and apodictically certain 
principles a priori1 demands            
7postulates7 it4    7#b47 ,objects for  
concepts1 whose objective reality can be
 proved  7whether through pure ,reason  
or through experience1 and1 in the first
  case1 from its theoretical or         
practical data1 in all cases by means of
  a corresponding intuition7 are things 
of fact 7res facti74#adg ,of  this kind 
are the mathematical properties of      
magnitudes 7in geometry71  because they 
are susceptible of a presentation a     
priori for the  theoretical use of      
,reason4 ,further1 things or their      

characteristics1  which can be exhibited
 in experience 7either our own or that  
of others  through the medium of        
testimony7 are likewise things of       
fact4--,and1  what is very remarkable1  
there is one rational ,idea 7susceptible
 in  itself of no presentation in       
intuition1 and consequently1 of no      
theoretical proof of its possibility7   
which also comes under things of  fact4 
,this is the ,idea of freedom1 whose    
reality1 regarded as that  of a         
particular kind of causality 7of which  
the concept1 theoretically  considered1 
would be transcendent71 may be exhibited
 by means of  practical laws of pure    
,reason1 and conformably to this1 in    
actual  actions1 and1 consequently1 in  
experience4--,this is the only one of   
all  the ,ideas of pure ,reason1 whose  
object is a thing of fact1 and to be    
reckoned under the scibilia4    7#c47   
,objects1 which in reference to the use 
of pure practical ,reason  that is in   
conformity with duty must be thought a  

priori 7whether  as consequences or as  
grounds71 but which are transcendent for
 its  theoretical use1 are mere things  
of faith4 ,of this kind is the  highest 
good in the world1 to be brought about  
by freedom4#adh  ,the concept of this   
cannot be established as regards its    
objective  reality in any experience    
possible for us and thus adequately for 
the theoretical use of ,reason2 but its 
use is commanded by practical  pure     
,reason in reference to the best        
possible working out of that            
purpose1#adi and it consequently must be
 assumed possible4 ,this  commanded     
effect1 together with the only          
conditions of its possibility  thinkable
 by us1 viz4 the ,being of ,god and the 
immortality of the  soul1 are things of 
faith 7res fidei71 and of all objects   
are the  only ones which can be so      
called4#aej ,for though what we learn by
  testimony from the experience of      
others must be believed by us1 yet  it  
is not therefore a thing of faith2 for  

it was the proper experience  of some   
one witness and so a thing of fact1 or  
is presupposed as  such4 ,again it must 
be possible by this path 7that of       
historical faith7  to arrive at         
knowledge2 and the ,objects of history  
and geography1  like everything in      
general which it is at least possible to
 know by  the constitution of our       
cognitive faculties1 belong not to      
things of  faith but to things of fact4 
,it is only objects of pure ,reason     
which  can be things of faith at all1   
though not as objects of the mere pure  
speculative ,reason3 for then they could
 not be reckoned with certainty  among  
things1 i4e4 ,objects of that cognition 
which is possible for  us4 ,they are    
,ideas1 i4e4 concepts of the objective  
reality of which  we cannot             
theoretically be certain4 ,on the other 
hand1 the highest  final purpose to be  
worked out by us1 by which alone we can 
become  worthy of being ourselves the   
final purpose of creation1 is an ,idea  

which has in a practical reference      
objective reality for us1 and is  also a
 thing4 ,but because we cannot furnish  
such reality to this  concept in a      
theoretical point of view1 it is a mere 
thing of faith  of the pure ,reason1    
along with ,god and ,immortality1 as the
 conditions  under which alone we1 in   
accordance with the constitution of our 
7human7 ,reason1 can conceive the       
possibility of that effect of the use   
of our freedom in conformity with law4  
,but belief in things of faith is  a    
belief in a pure practical point of     
view1 i4e4 a moral faith1 which  proves 
nothing for theoretical pure rational   
cognition1 but only for  that which is  
practical and directed to the fulfilment
 of its duties2  it in no way extends   
speculation or the practical rules of   
prudence in  accordance with the        
principle of self-love4 ,if the supreme 
principle  of all moral laws is a       
postulate1 so is also the possibility of
 its  highest ,object2 and consequently1

 too1 the condition under which we  can 
think this possibility is postulated    
along with it and by it4  ,thus the     
cognition of the latter is neither      
knowledge nor opinion of  the being and 
character of these conditions1 regarded 
as theoretical  cognition2 but is a mere
 assumption in a reference which is     
practical  and commanded for the moral  
use of our ,reason4    ,if we were able 
also plausibly to base upon the purposes
 of nature1  which physical ,teleology  
presents to us in such rich abundance1 a
  determinate concept of an intelligent 
,world-,cause1 then the existence       
,dasein of this ,being would not be a   
thing of faith4 ,for since this  would  
not be assumed on behalf of the         
performance of my duty1 but  only in    
reference to the explanation of nature1 
it would be merely  the opinion and     
hypothesis most conformable to our      
,reason4 ,now such  ,teleology leads in 
no way to a determinate concept of ,god2
 on the  contrary1 this can only be     

found in the concept of a moral ,author 
of  the ,world1 because this alone      
furnishes the final purpose to which  we
 can only reckon ourselves as attached  
if we behave conformably  to what the   
moral law prescribes as final purpose   
and consequently  obliges us to do4     
,hence it is only by its reference to   
the ,object of  our duty1 as the        
condition of the possibility of         
attaining the final  purpose of the     
same1 that the concept of ,god attains  
the privilege  of counting as a thing of
 faith1 in our belief2 but on the other 
hand1 this same concept cannot make its 
,object valid as a thing of  fact4 ,for1
 although the necessity of duty is very 
plain for practical  ,reason1 yet the   
attainment of its final purpose1 so far 
as it is not  altogether in our own     
power1 is only assumed on behalf of the 
practical  use of ,reason1 and therefore
 is not so practically necessary as duty
  itself4#aea    ,faith 7as habitus1 not
 as actus7 is the moral attitude of     

,reason  as to belief in that which is  
unattainable by theoretical cognition4  
,it is therefore the constant principle 
of the mind1 to assume as true1  on     
account of the obligation in reference  
to it1 that which it is  necessary to   
presuppose as condition of the          
possibility of the highest  moral final 
purpose#aeb2 although its possibility or
 impossibility  be alike impossible for 
us to see into4 ,faith 7absolutely so   
called7  is trust in the attainment of a
 design1 the promotion of which is a    
duty1 but the possibility of the        
fulfilment of which 7and consequently   
also that of the only conditions of it  
thinkable by us7 is not to be           
comprehended by us4 ,faith1 then1 that  
refers to particular objects1  which are
 not objects of possible knowledge or   
opinion 7in which latter  case it ought 
to be called1 especially in historical  
matters1 credulity  and not faith71 is  
quite moral4 ,it is a free belief1 not  
in that for  which dogmatical proofs for

 the theoretically determinant          
,judgement  are to be found1 or in that 
to which we hold ourselves bound1 but in
  that which we assume on behalf of a   
design in accordance with laws of       
freedom4 ,this1 however1 is not1 like   
opinion1 without any adequate  ground2  
but1 is grounded as in ,reason 7although
 only in respect of its  practical      
employment71 and adequately for its     
design4 ,for without  this1 the moral   
attitude of thought in its repudiation  
of the claim of  the theoretical ,reason
 for proofs 7of the possibility of the  
,objects  of morality7 has no           
permanence2 but wavers between practical
 commands  and theoretical doubts4 ,to  
be incredulous means to cling to maxims1
  and not to believe testimony in       
general2 but he is unbelieving1  who    
denies all validity to rational ,ideas1 
because there is wanting  a theoretical 
ground of their reality4#aed ,he judges 
therefore  dogmatically4 ,a dogmatical  
unbelief cannot subsist together with a 

moral maxim dominant in the mental      
attitude 7for ,reason cannot command    
one to follow a purpose1 which is       
cognised as nothing more than a         
chimera72 but a doubtful faith can4 ,to 
this the absence of conviction  by      
grounds of speculative ,reason is only a
 hindrance1 the influence of  which upon
 conduct a critical insight into the    
limits of this faculty  can remove1     
while it substitutes by way of          
compensation a paramount  practical     
belief4             99       99       99
       99       99    ,if1 in place of  
certain mistaken attempts1 we wish to   
introduce a  different principle into   
philosophy and to promote its influence1
 it  makes us highly contented to see   
how and why those attempts must have    
disappointed us4    ,god1 freedom1 and  
immortality1 are the problems at the    
solution  of which all the equipments of
 ,metaphysic aim1 as their ultimate and 
unique purpose4 ,now it was believed    
that the doctrine of freedom is  needed 

for practical philosophy only as its    
negative condition2 but  that on the    
other hand the doctrine of ,god and of  
the constitution of  the soul1 as       
belonging to theoretical philosophy1    
must be established  for themselves and 
separately1 in order afterwards to unite
 both  with that which the moral law    
7possible only under the condition of   
freedom7 commands1 and so to constitute 
a religion4 ,but we can easily  see that
 these attempts must fail4 ,for from    
mere ontological concepts  of things in 
general1 or of the existence of a       
necessary ,being1 it  is possible to    
form absolutely no determinate concept  
of an original  ,being by means of      
predicates which can be given in        
experience and can  therefore serve for 
cognition4 ,again a concept based on    
experience of  the physical             
purposiveness of nature could furnish no
 adequate proof  for morality1 or       
consequently for cognition of a ,deity4 
,just as little  could the cognition of 

the soul by means of experience 7which  
we only  apply in this life7 supply us  
with a concept of its spiritual immortal
  nature1 a concept which would be      
adequate for morality4 ,theology and    
,pneumatology1 regarded as problems of  
the sciences of a speculative  ,reason1 
can be established by no empirical data 
and predicates1  because the concept of 
them is transcendent for our whole      
cognitive  faculty4--,the determination 
of both concepts1 ,god and the soul 7in 
respect of its immortality7 alike1 can  
only take place by means of  predicates1
 which1 although they are only possible 
from a supersensible  ground1 must yet  
prove their reality in experience2 for  
thus alone can  they make possible a    
cognition of a quite supersensible      
,being4--,the  only concept of this kind
 to be met with in human ,reason is that
 of the  freedom of men under moral     
laws1 along with the final purpose which
  ,reason prescribes by these laws4 ,of 
these two the moral laws and the  final 

purpose the first are useful for        
ascribing to the ,author of  ,nature1   
the second for ascribing to man1 those  
properties which contain  the necessary 
condition of the possibility of both    
,god and the soul2  so that from this   
,idea a conclusion can be drawn as to   
the existence  and constitution of these
 beings which are otherwise quite hidden
 from  us4    ,thus the ground of the   
failure of the attempt to prove ,god and
  immortality by the merely theoretical 
path lies in this1 that no  cognition   
whatever is possible of the             
supersensible in this way 7of  natural  
concepts74 ,the ground of its success by
 the moral way 7of the  concept of      
freedom7 is as follows4 ,here the       
supersensible 7freedom71  which in this 
case is fundamental1 by a determinate   
law of causality  that springs from it1 
not only supplies material for cognition
 of other  supersensibles 7the moral    
final purpose and the conditions of its 
attainability71 but also establishes its

 reality in actions as a fact2  though  
at the same time it can furnish a valid 
ground of proof in no  other than a     
practical point of view 7the only one1  
however1 of which  ,religion has need74 
,it is thus very remarkable that of the 
three pure rational ,ideas1  ,god1      
freedom1 and immortality1 that of       
freedom is the only  concept of the     
supersensible which 7by means of the    
causality that is  thought in it7 proves
 its objective reality in nature by     
means of the  effects it can produce    
there2 and thus renders possible the    
connexion  of both the others with      
nature1 and of all three together with  
,religion4 ,we have therefore in us a   
principle capable of determining  the   
,idea of the supersensible within us1   
and thus also that of the  supersensible
 without us1 for knowledge1 although    
only in a practical  point of view2 a   
principle this of which mere speculative
 philosophy  7which could give a merely 
negative concept of freedom7 must       

despair4  ,consequently the concept of  
freedom 7as fundamental concept of all  
unconditioned practical laws7 can extend
 ,reason beyond those bounds1  within   
which every natural 7theoretical7       
concept must remain hopelessly  limited4
      ,general remark on ,teleology     
,if the question is1 what rank the moral
 argument1 which proves the  ,being of  
,god only as a thing of faith for the   
practical pure ,reason1  maintains among
 the other arguments in philosophy1 it  
is easy to set  aside the whole         
achievement of this last2 by which it   
appears that  there is no choice1 but   
that our theoretical faculty must give  
up all  its pretensions before an       
impartial criticism4    ,all belief must
 in the first place be grounded upon    
facts1 if it is  not to be completely   
groundless2 and therefore the only      
distinction  in proofs that there can be
 is that belief in the consequence      
derived  therefrom can either be        
grounded on this fact as knowledge for  

theoretical cognition1 or merely as     
faith for practical4 ,all facts  belong 
either to the natural concept which     
proves its reality in the  objects of   
sense1 given 7or which may possibly be  
given7 before all  natural concepts2 or 
to the concept of freedom1 which        
sufficiently  establishes its reality   
through the causality of ,reason in     
regard of  certain effects in the world 
of sense1 possible through it1 which it 
incontrovertibly postulates in the moral
 law4 ,the natural concept  7merely     
belonging to theoretical cognition7 is  
now either metaphysical  and thinkable  
completely a priori1 or physical1 i4e4  
thinkable  a posteriori and as necessary
 only through determinate experience4   
,the metaphysical natural concept 7which
 presupposes no determinate  experience7
 is therefore ontological4    ,the      
ontological proof of the being of ,god  
from the concept of an  original ,being 
is either that which from ontological   
predicates1  by which alone it can be   

thought as completely determined1 infers
  absolutely necessary being2 or that   
which1 from the absolute necessity  of  
the being somewhere of some thing1      
whatever it be1 infers the  predicates  
of the original ,being4 ,for there      
belongs to the concept of  an original  
,being1 inasmuch as it is not derived   
from anything1 the  unconditioned       
necessity of its presence1 and 7in order
 to represent  this7 its complete       
determination by its mere#aee concept4  
,it was  believed that both requirements
 were found in the concept of the       
ontological ,idea of a ,being the most  
real of all2 and thus two  metaphysical 
proofs originated4    ,the proof        
7properly called ontological7 resting   
upon a merely  metaphysical natural     
concept concludes from the concept of   
the  ,being the most real of all1 its   
absolutely necessary existence2  for 7it
 is said71 if it did not exist1 a       
reality would be wanting  to it1 viz4   
existence4--,the other 7which is also   

called the  metaphysico-cosmological    
proof7 concludes from the necessity of  
the  existence somewhere of a thing     
7which must be conceded1 for a being  is
 given to us in self-consciousness71 its
 complete determination as  that of a   
,being the most real of all2 for        
everything existing must be  completely 
determined1 but the absolutely necessary
 7i4e4 that which  we ought to cognise  
as such and consequently a priori7 must 
be  completely determined by means of   
its own concept4 ,but this is only  the 
case with the concept of a thing the    
most real of all4 ,it is not  needful to
 expose here the sophistry in both      
arguments1 which has been  already done 
elsewhere2#aef it is only needful to    
remark that neither  proof1 even if they
 could be defended by all manner of     
dialectical  subtlety1 could ever pass  
from the schools into the world1 or have
 the  slightest influence on the mere   
sound ,understanding4    ,the proof1    
which rests on a natural concept that   

can only be empirical  and yet is to    
lead us beyond the bounds of nature     
regarded as the  complex of the objects 
of sense1 can be no other than that     
derived from  the purposes of nature4   
,the concept of these cannot1 it is     
true1  be given a priori but only       
through experience2 but yet it promises 
such a concept of the original ground of
 nature as alone1 among all  those which
 we can conceive1 is suited to the      
supersensible1 viz4 that  of a highest  
,understanding as ,cause of the world4  
,this1 in fact1 it  completely performs 
in accordance with principles of the    
reflective  ,judgement1 i4e4 in         
accordance with the constitution of our 
7human7  faculty of cognition4--,but    
whether or not it is in a position to   
supply  from the same data this concept 
of a supreme1 i4e4 independent          
intelligent ,being1 in short of a ,god  
or ,author of a world under moral  laws1
 and consequently as sufficiently       
determined for the ,idea of a  final    

purpose of the being of the world--this 
is the question upon  which everything  
depends1 whether we desire a            
theoretically adequate  concept of the  
,original ,being on behalf of our whole 
knowledge of  nature1 or a practical    
concept for religion4    ,this argument 
derived from physical ,teleology is     
worthy of respect4 ,it  produces a      
similar effect in the way of conviction 
upon the common  ,understanding as upon 
the subtlest thinker2 and a             
,reimarus#aeg has  acquired immortal    
honour in his work 7not yet superseded71
 in which he  abundantly develops this  
ground of proof with his peculiar       
thoroughness  and lucidity4--,but how   
does this proof acquire such mighty     
influence  upon the mind8 ,how does a   
judgement by cold reason 7for we might  
refer to persuasion the emotion and     
elevation of reason produced by  the    
wonders of nature7 issue thus in a calm 
and unreserved assent8 ,it  is not the  
physical purposes1 which all indicate in

 the ,world ,cause  an unfathomable     
intelligence2 these are inadequate      
thereto1 because  they do not satisfy   
the need of the inquiring ,reason4 ,for1
 wherefore  7it asks7 are all those     
natural things that exhibit art8        
,wherefore is  man himself1 whom we must
 regard as the ultimate purpose of      
nature  thinkable by us8 ,wherefore is  
this collective ,nature here1 and what  
is the final purpose of such great and  
manifold art8 ,reason cannot  be        
contented with enjoyment or with        
contemplation1 observation1 and         
admiration 7which1 if it stops there1 is
 only enjoyment of a particular  kind7  
as the ultimate final purpose for the   
creation of the world and  of man       
himself2 for this presupposes a personal
 worth1 which man alone  can give       
himself1 as the condition under which   
alone he and his being  can be the final
 purpose4 ,failing this 7which alone is 
susceptible  of a definite concept71 the
 purposes of nature do not              

satisfactorily  answer our questions2   
especially because they cannot furnish  
any  determinate concept of the highest 
,being as an all-sufficient 7and        
therefore unique and so properly called 
highest7 being1 and of the  laws        
according to which an ,understanding is 
,cause of the world4    ,hence that the 
physico-teleological proof convinces1   
just as if it were  a theological proof1
 does not arise from our availing       
ourselves of the  ,ideas of purposes of 
nature as so many empirical grounds of  
proof of  a highest ,understanding4 ,but
 it mingles itself unnoticed with that  
moral ground of proof1 which dwells in  
every man and influences him  secretly1 
in the conclusion by which we ascribe to
 the ,being1 which  manifests itself    
with such incomprehensible art in the   
purposes of  nature1 a final purpose and
 consequently wisdom 7without however   
being  justified in doing so by the     
perception of the former72 and by which 
therefore we arbitrarily fill up the    

lacunas of the design argument4  ,in    
fact it is only the moral ground of     
proof which produces conviction1  and   
that only in a moral reference with     
which every man feels inwardly  his     
agreement4 ,but the physico-teleological
 proof has only the merit  of leading   
the mind1 in its consideration of the   
world1 by the way of  purposes and      
through them to an intelligent ,author  
of the world4 ,the  moral reference to  
purposes and the ,idea of a moral       
legislator and  ,author of the world1 as
 a theological concept1 seem to be      
developed of  themselves out of that    
ground of proof1 although they are in   
truth pure  additions4    ,henceforward 
we may allow the customary statement to 
stand4 ,for it  is generally difficult  
7if the distinction requires much       
reflection7  for ordinary sound         
,understanding to distinguish from one  
another as  heterogeneous the different 
principles which it confuses1 and from  
one of which alone it actually draws    

conclusions with correctness4 ,the      
moral ground of proof of the ,being of  
,god1 properly speaking1 does  not      
merely complete and render perfect the  
physico-teleological  proof2 but it is a
 special proof that supplies the        
conviction which  is wanting in the     
latter4 ,this latter in fact can do     
nothing more  than guide ,reason1 in its
 judgements upon the ground of nature   
and  that contingent but admirable order
 of nature only known to us by          
experience1 to the causality of a ,cause
 containing the ground of the  same in  
accordance with purposes 7which we by   
the constitution of our  cognitive      
faculties must think as an intelligent  
cause72 and thus by  arresting the      
attention of ,reason it makes it more   
susceptible of  the moral proof4 ,for   
what is requisite to the latter concept 
is so  essentially different from       
everything which natural concepts       
contain  and can teach1 that there is   
need of a particular ground of proof    

quite independent of the former1 in     
order to supply the concept of the      
original ,being adequately for ,theology
 and to infer its existence4--,the      
moral proof 7which it is true only      
proves the ,being of ,god in a          
practical though indispensable aspect of
 ,reason7 would preserve all  its force1
 if we found in the world no material1  
or only that which  is doubtful1 for    
physical ,teleology4 ,it is possible to 
conceive  rational beings surrounded by 
a nature which displayed no clear trace 
of organisation but only the effects of 
a mere mechanism of crude  matter2 on   
behalf of which and amid the            
changeability of some merely  contingent
 purposive forms and relations there    
would appear to be no  ground for       
inferring an intelligent ,author4 ,in   
such case there would  be no occasion   
for a physical ,teleology2 and yet      
,reason1 which here  gets no guidance   
from natural concepts1 would find in the
 concept of  freedom and in the moral   

,ideas founded thereon a practically    
sufficient  ground for postulating the  
concept of the original ,being in       
conformity  with these1 i4e4 as a       
,deity1 and for postulating nature 7even
 the  nature of our own being7 as a     
final purpose in accordance with freedom
  and its laws--and all this in         
reference to the indispensable command  
of  practical ,reason4--,however the    
fact that there is in the actual world  
for the rational beings in it abundant  
material for physical ,teleology  7even 
though this is not necessary7 serves as 
a desirable confirmation  of the moral  
argument1 as far as nature can exhibit  
anything analogous  to the 7moral7      
rational ,ideas4 ,for the concept of a  
supreme ,cause  possessing intelligence 
7though not reaching far enough for a   
,theology7  thus acquires sufficient    
reality for the reflective ,judgement1  
but it  is not required as the basis of 
the moral proof2 nor does this latter   
serve to complete as a proof the former1

 which does not by itself point  to     
morality at all1 by means of an argument
 developed according to  a single       
principle4 ,two such heterogeneous      
principles as nature and  freedom can   
only furnish two different kinds of     
proof2 and the attempt  to derive one   
from the other is found unavailing as   
regards that which  is to be proved4    
,if the physico-teleological ground of  
proof sufficed for the proof  which is  
sought1 it would be very satisfactory   
for the speculative  ,reason2 for it    
would furnish the hope of founding a    
,theosophy 7for  so we must call the    
theoretical cognition of the divine     
nature and  its existence which would   
suffice at once for the explanation of  
the  constitution of the world and for  
the determination of moral laws74  ,in  
the same way if ,psychology enabled us  
to arrive at a cognition  of the        
immortality of the soul it would make   
,pneumatology possible1  which would be 
just as welcome to the speculative      

,reason4 ,but neither1  agreeable as    
they would be to the arrogance of our   
curiosity1 would  satisfy the wish of   
,reason in respect of a theory which    
must be based  on a cognition of the    
nature of things4 ,whether the first1 as
 ,theology1  and the second1 as         
,anthropology1 when founded on the moral
 principle1  i4e4 the principle of      
freedom1 and consequently in accordance 
with  the practical use of ,reason do   
not better fulfil their objective  final
 design1 is another question which we   
need not here pursue4    ,the           
physico-teleological ground of proof    
does not reach to ,theology1  because it
 does not and cannot give any           
determinate concept1 sufficient  for    
this design1 of the original ,being2 but
 we must derive this from  quite another
 quarter1 or must supply its lacuna by  
an arbitrary  addition4 ,you infer1 from
 the great purposiveness of natural     
forms and  their relations1 a           
world-cause endowed with ,understanding2

 but what is  the degree of this        
,understanding8 ,without doubt you      
cannot assume that  it is the highest   
possible ,understanding2 because for    
that it would be  requisite that you    
should see that a greater ,understanding
 than that  of which you perceive proofs
 in the world1 is not thinkable2 and    
this  would be to ascribe ,omniscience  
to yourself4#aeh ,in the same way1  if  
you infer from the magnitude of the     
world the very great might of  its      
,author1 you must be content with this  
having only a comparative  significance 
for your faculty of comprehension2 for  
since you do not  know all that is      
possible1 so as to compare it with the  
magnitude of  the world as far as you   
know it1 you cannot infer the           
,almightiness  of its ,author from so   
small a standard1 and so on4 ,now you   
arrive in  this way at no definite      
concept of an original ,being available 
for a  ,theology2 for this can only be  
found in the concept of the totality of 

perfections compatible with             
intelligence1 and you cannot help       
yourself  to this by merely empirical   
data4 ,but without such a definite      
concept  you cannot infer a unique      
intelligent original ,being2 you can    
only  assume it 7with whatever          
motive74--,now it may certainly be      
conceded  that you should arbitrarily   
add 7for ,reason has nothing fundamental
 to  say to the contrary73 ,where so    
much perfection is found1 we may well   
assume that all perfection is united in 
a unique ,cause of the world1  because  
,reason succeeds better both            
theoretically and practically with  a   
principle thus definite4 ,but then you  
cannot regard this concept  of the      
original ,being as proved by you1 for   
you have only assumed it  on behalf of a
 better employment of ,reason4 ,hence   
all lamentation or  impotent anger on   
account of the alleged mischief of      
rendering doubtful  the coherency of    
your chain of reasoning1 is vain        

pretentiousness1  which would fain have 
us believe that the doubt here freely   
expressed  as to your argument is a     
doubting of sacred truth1 in order that 
under  this cover the shallowness of    
your argument may pass unnoticed4       
,moral ,teleology1 on the other hand1   
which is not less firmly based  than    
physical1--which1 indeed1 rather        
deserves the preference because  it     
rests a priori on principles inseparable
 from our ,reason--leads  to that which 
is requisite for the possibility of a   
,theology1 viz4 to  a determinate       
concept of the supreme ,cause1 as ,cause
 of the world  according to moral laws1 
and1 consequently1 to the concept of    
such a  cause as satisfies our moral    
final purpose4 ,for this are required1  
as  natural properties belonging to it1 
nothing less than ,omniscience1         
,omnipotence1 ,omnipresence1 and the    
like1 which must be thought as  bound up
 with the moral final purpose which is  
infinite and thus as  adequate to it4   

,hence moral ,teleology alone can       
furnish the concept of  a unique ,author
 of the world1 which is available for a 
,theology4    ,in this way ,theology    
leads immediately to ,religion1 i4e4 the
  recognition of our duties as divine   
commands#aei2 because it is only  the   
recognition of our duty and of the final
 purpose enjoined upon us  by ,reason   
which brings out with definiteness the  
concept of ,god4 ,this  concept1        
therefore1 is inseparable in its origin 
from obligation to  that ,being4 ,on the
 other hand1 even if the concept of the 
original  ,being could be also found    
determinately by the merely theoretical 
path  7viz4 the concept of it as mere   
,cause of nature71 it would afterwards  
be very difficult--perhaps impossible   
without arbitrary interpolation  of     
elements--to ascribe to this ,being by  
well-grounded proofs a  causality in    
accordance with moral laws2 and yet     
without this that  quasi-theological    
concept could furnish no foundation for 

religion4  ,even if a religion could be 
established by this theoretical path1 it
  would actually1 as regards sentiment  
7wherein its essence lies7 be  different
 from that in which the concept of ,god 
and the 7practical7  conviction of ,his 
,being originate from the fundamental   
,ideas of  morality4 ,for if we must    
suppose the ,omnipotence1 ,omniscience1 
etc41 of  an ,author of the world as    
concepts given to us from another       
quarter1  in order afterwards only to   
apply our concepts of duties to our     
relation to ,him1 then these latter     
concepts must bear very markedly  the   
appearance of compulsion and forced     
submission4 ,if1 instead of  this1 the  
respect for the moral law1 quite freely1
 in virtue of the  precept of our own   
,reason1 represents to us the final     
purpose of our  destination1 we admit   
among our moral views a ,cause          
harmonising with  this and with its     
accomplishment1 with the sincerest      
reverence1 which  is quite distinct from

 pathological fear2 and we willingly    
submit  ourselves thereto4#afj    ,if it
 be asked why it is incumbent upon us to
 have any ,theology at all1  it appears 
clear that it is not needed for the     
extension or correction  of our         
cognition of nature or in general for   
any theory1 but simply  in a subjective 
point of view for ,religion1 i4e4 the   
practical or  moral use of our ,reason4 
,if it is found that the only argument  
which  leads to a definite concept of   
the object of ,theology is itself moral1
  it is not only not strange1 but we    
miss nothing in respect of its  final   
purpose as regards the sufficiency of   
belief from this ground  of proof1      
provided that it be admitted that such  
an argument only  establishes the ,being
 of ,god sufficiently for our moral     
destination1  i4e4 in a practical point 
of view1 and that here speculation      
neither  shows its strength in any way1 
nor extends by means of it the sphere   
of its domain4 ,our surprise and the    

alleged contradiction between the       
possibility of a ,theology asserted here
 and that which the ,critique  of       
speculative ,reason said of the         
,categories--viz4 that they can only    
produce knowledge when applied to       
objects of sense1 but in no way when    
applied to the supersensible--vanish1 if
 we see that they are here  used for a  
cognition of ,god not in a theoretical  
point of view 7in  accordance with what 
,his own nature1 inscrutable to us1 may 
be7 but  simply in a practical4--,in    
order then at this opportunity to make  
an  end of the misinterpretation of that
 very necessary doctrine of the         
,critique1 which1 to the chagrin of the 
blind dogmatist1 refers ,reason  to its 
bounds1 ,i add here the following       
elucidation4    ,if ,i ascribe to a body
 motive force and thus think it by means
 of  the category of causality1 then ,i 
at the same time cognise it  by that    
category2 i4e4 ,i determine the concept 
of it1 as of an  ,object in general1 by 

means of what belongs to it by itself   
7as the  condition of the possibility of
 that relation7 as an object of sense4  
,if the motive force ascribed to it is  
repulsive1 then there belongs to  it    
7although ,i do not place near it any   
other body upon which it may  exert     
force7 a place in space1 and moreover   
extension1 i4e4 space  in itself1       
besides the filling up of this by means 
of the repulsive  forces of its parts4  
,in addition there is the law of this   
filling up  7that the ground of the     
repulsion of the parts must decrease in 
the  same proportion as the extension of
 the body increases1 and as the  space1 
which it fills with the same parts by   
means of this force1 is                 
augmented74--,on the contrary1 if ,i    
think a supersensible ,being as the     
first mover1 and thus by the category of
 causality as regards its  determination
 of the world 7motion of matter71 ,i    
must not think it as  existing in any   
place in space nor as extended2 ,i must 

not even think  it as existing in time  
or simultaneously with other beings4    
,hence ,i  have no determinations       
whatever1 which could make intelligible 
to me  the condition of the possibility 
of motion by means of this ,being as    
its ground4 ,consequently1 ,i do not in 
the very least cognise it by  means of  
the predicate of ,cause 7as first       
mover71 for itself2 but ,i  have only   
the representation of a something       
containing the ground  of the motions in
 the world2 and the relation of the     
latter to it  as their cause1 since it  
does not besides furnish me with        
anything  belonging to the constitution 
of the thing which is cause1 leaves its 
concept quite empty4 ,the reason of this
 is1 that by predicates which  only find
 their ,object in the world of sense ,i 
can indeed proceed  to the being of     
something which must contain their      
ground1 but not  to the determination of
 its concept as a supersensible being1  
which  excludes all these predicates4   

,by the category of causality1 then1  if
 ,i determine it by the concept of a    
first mover1 ,i do not in the  very     
least cognise what ,god is4 ,perhaps1   
however1 ,i shall have better  success  
if ,i start from the order of the world1
 not merely to think  its causality as  
that of a supreme ,understanding1 but to
 cognise  it by means of this           
determination of the said concept2      
because here  the troublesome condition 
of space and of extension               
disappears4--,at  all events the great  
purposiveness in the world compels us to
 think  a supreme cause of it1 and to   
think its causality as that of an       
,understanding2 but we are not therefore
 entitled to ascribe this to  it4 7,e4g4
 we think of the eternity of ,god as    
presence in all time1  because we can   
form no other concept of mere being as a
 quantum1 i4e4  as duration2 or we think
 of the divine ,omnipresence as presence
 in  all places in order to make        
comprehensible to ourselves ,his        

immediate  presence in things which are 
external to one another2 without daring 
to ascribe to ,god any of these         
determinations1 as something cognised   
in ,him47 ,if ,i determine the causality
 of a man1 in respect of certain        
products which are only explicable by   
designed purposiveness1 by  thinking it 
as that of ,understanding1 ,i need not  
stop here1 but ,i can  ascribe to him   
this predicate as a well-known property 
and cognise him  accordingly4 ,for ,i   
know that intuitions are given to the   
senses of men  and are brought by the   
,understanding under a concept and thus 
under a  rule2 that this concept only   
contains the common characteristic 7with
  omission of the particular ones7 and  
is thus discursive2 and that the  rules 
for bringing given representations under
 a consciousness in  general are given  
by ,understanding before those          
intuitions1 etc4 ,i  therefore ascribe  
this property to man as a property by   
means of which  ,i cognise him4         

,however1 if ,i wish to think a         
supersensible ,being  7,god7 as an      
intelligence1 this is not only          
permissible in a certain  aspect of my  
employment of ,reason--it is            
unavoidable2 but to ascribe  to ,him    
,understanding and to flatter ourselves 
that we can cognise  ,him by means of it
 as a property of ,his1 is in no way    
permissible4  ,for ,i must omit all     
those conditions under which alone ,i   
know an  ,understanding1 and thus the   
predicate which only serves for         
determining  man cannot be applied at   
all to a supersensible ,object2 and     
therefore  by a causality thus          
determined1 ,i cannot cognise what ,god 
is4 ,and so it  is with all ,categories1
 which can have no significance for     
cognition in  a theoretical aspect1 if  
they are not applied to objects of      
possible  experience4--,however1        
according to the analogy of an          
,understanding ,i  can in a certain     
other aspect think a supersensible      

being1 without at  the same time meaning
 thereby to cognise it theoretically2   
viz4 if this  determination of its      
causality concerns an effect in the     
world1 which  contains a design morally 
necessary but unattainable by a sensible
  being4 ,for then a cognition of ,god  
and of ,his ,being 7,theology7 is       
possible by means of properties and     
determinations of ,his causality  merely
 thought in ,him according to analogy1  
which has all requisite  reality in a   
practical reference though only in      
respect of this  7as moral74--,an       
,ethical ,theology is therefore         
possible2 for though  morality can      
subsist without theology as regards its 
rule1 it cannot  do so as regards the   
final design which this proposes1 unless
 ,reason  in respect of it is to be     
renounced4 ,but a ,theological ,ethic   
7of pure  ,reason7 is impossible2 for   
laws which ,reason itself does not give 
and  whose observance it does not bring 
about as a pure practical faculty1  can 

not be moral4 ,in the same way a        
,theological ,physic would be a         
nonentity1 for it would propose no laws 
of nature but ordinances of a  ,highest 
,will2 while on the other hand a        
physical 7properly speaking a           
physico-teleological7 ,theology can     
serve at least as a propaedeutic  to    
,theology proper1 by giving occasion for
 the ,idea of a final purpose  which    
nature cannot present by the observation
 of natural purposes of  which it offers
 abundant material4 ,it thus makes felt 
the need of a  ,theology which shall    
determine the concept of ,god adequately
 for the  highest practical use of      
,reason1 but it cannot develop this and 
base it  satisfactorily on its proofs4  
,,the ,,end      ,printed by ,r4  ,r4   
,,clark1 ,,limited1 ,edinburgh4         
,,works ,,on ,,philosophy      ,by      
,,immanuel ,,kant      ,,kant',s        
,,critical ,,philosophy ,,for ,,english 
,,readers4 ,by ,j4 ,p4 ,,mahaffy1       
,d4,d41 and ,the ,right ,rev4 ,j4 ,h4   

,,bernard1 ,d4,d4 ,two vols4 ,crown     
#hvo4        ,vol4 ,i4 ,,the ,,kritik   
,,of ,,the ,,pure ,,reason ,,explained  
,,and ,,defended4 #gs4        #f;d4     
,vol4 ,,ii4 ,,prolegomena4 ,translated1 
with ,notes and ,appendices4 #fs4       
,,critique ,,of ,,pure ,,reason4        
,translated by ,f4 ,,max ,m,,ller4      
,second ,edition1      ,revised4 ,extra 
,crown #hvo4 #aes4 net4      ,,critique 
,,of ,,pure ,,reason4 ,translated by ,f4
 ,,max ,m,,ller4 ,vol4 #a4              
,containing ,translator's ,preface2     
,historical ,introduction by ,,ludwig   
,,noir2 and ,additions made by ,,kant in
 the ,second ,edition of the            
,critique4 #hvo4 #afs4      ,by         
,professor ,,henri ,,bergson            
,,creative ,,evolution4 ,translated by  
,,arthur ,,mitchell1 ,ph4,d4 #hvo4 #ajs4
      net4      ,,laughter3 ,an ,essay  
on the ,meaning of the ,comic4          
,authorised      ,translation from the  
,sixth ,edition by ,,cloudesley         
,,brereton1 ,l4 s ,l4      7,paris71    

,m4,a4 7,cantab472 and ,,fred           
,,rothwell1 ,b4,a4 7,london74 ,extra    
,crown #hvo4 #cs4 #f;d4 net4      ,,an  
,,introduction ,,to ,,metaphysics4      
,translated by ,t4 ,e4 ,,hulme4 ,crown  
#hvo4      #bs4 net4      ,a ,,critical 
,,exposition ,,of ,,bergson',s          
,,philosophy4 ,by ,j4 ,mc,k,e,l,l,a,r   
,,stewart1 ,b4,a41 ,d4,phil4 #hvo4 #es4 
net4      ,by ,,benedetto ,,croce       
,,philosophy ,,of ,,the ,,practical4    
,economic and ,ethic4 ,translated by    
,,douglas ,,ainslie1 ,b4,a4 #hvo4 #abs4 
net4      ,,sthetic ,,as ,,science ,,of 
,,expression ,,and ,,general            
,,linguistic4 ,translated      by       
,,douglas ,,ainslie1 ,b4,a4 #hvo4 #ajs4 
net4      ,,encyclop,,dia ,,of ,,the    
,,philosophical ,,sciences4 ,edited by  
,,wilhelm      ,,windelband and ,,arnold
 ,,ruge4 ,english ,edition under the    
,editorship of      ,sir ,,henry        
,,jones4 #hvo4        ,vol4 ,i4 ,,logic4
 ,by ,,arnold ,,ruge1 ,,wilhelm         
,,windelband1 ,,josiah ,,royce1         

,,louis ,,couturat1 ,,benedetto ,,croce1
 ,,federigo ,,enriques1 and ,,nicolaj   
,,losskij4 #gs4 #f;d4 net4    ,,london3 
,,macmillan ,,and ,,co41 ,,ltd4         
,,works ,,on ,,philosophy      ,,the    
,,schools ,,of ,,philosophy    ,a       
,,history ,,of ,,the ,,evolution ,,of   
,,philosophical ,,thought    ,,by       
,,various ,,writers    ,,edited ,,by    
,,sir ,,henry ,,jones    ,,professor    
,,of ,,moral ,,philosophy ,,in ,,the    
,,university ,,of ,,glasgow      ,,the  
,,evolution ,,of ,,educational ,,theory4
 ,by ,professor ,,john ,,adams1 ,m4,a41 
,b4,sc41 ,,ll4,d4 #hvo4 #ajs4 net4      
,,the ,,history ,,of ,,greek            
,,philosophy4 ,by ,professor ,,john     
,,burnet1 ,,ll4,d4 ,vol4      ,i4 ,from 
,thales to ,plato4                      
,in the ,press4      ,,the ,,history    
,,of ,,modern ,,philosophy ,,from       
,,hobbes ,,to ,,reid4 ,by ,professor    
,g4 ,f4 ,,stout4                        
,in preparation4      ,other volumes to 
follow4           99       99       99  

99       99      ,,the ,,principle ,,of 
,,individuality ,,and ,,value4 ,the     
,gifford ,lectures for      #aiaa4 ,by  
,,bernard ,,bosanquet1 ,,ll4,d41        
,d4,c4,l4 #hvo4 #ajs4 net4      ,,the   
,,value ,,and ,,destiny ,,of ,,the      
,,individual4 ,the ,gifford ,lectures   
for      #aiab ,by ,,bernard            
,,bosanquet1 ,,ll4,d41 ,d4,c4,l4 #hvo4  
#ajs4 net4      ,,the ,,crowning ,,phase
 ,,of ,,the ,,critical ,,philosophy4 ,a 
,study in ,kant's      ,critique of     
,judgment4 ,by ,r4 ,a4 ,c4 ,,macmillan1 
,m4,a41 ,d4,phil4 #hvo4      #ajs4 net4 
,,the ,,history ,,and ,,theory ,,of     
,,vitalism4 ,by ,prof4 ,,hans ,,driesch1
 ,ph4,d4      ,translated by ,c4 ,k4    
,,ogden1 ,b4,a4 ,revised throughout and 
in part      rewritten by the ,author   
for the ,english ,edition4 ,crown #hvo4 
,in the ,press4      ,,the ,,problem    
,,of ,,individuality4 ,lectures4 ,by    
,prof4 ,,hans ,,driesch1 ,ph4,d4        
#hvo4                                   
,in the ,press4      ,,the ,,foundations

 ,,of ,,character4 ,being a ,study of   
the ,emotions and      ,sentiments4 ,by 
,,alexander ,f4 ,,shand1 ,m4,a4 #hvo4   
,in the ,press4      ,,the ,,theory ,,of
 ,,relativity4 ,by ,l4 ,,silberstein1   
,ph4,d4 #hvo4                           
,in the ,press4      ,,modern           
,,philosophers4 ,lectures4 ,by ,,harald 
,h,,ffding4 ,translated by      ,,alfred
 ,c4 ,,mason1 ,m4,a4 ,crown #hvo4       
,in the ,press4      ,,london3          
,,macmillan ,,and ,,co41 ,,ltd4         
,,footnotes3      #a ,dr4 ,caird        
7,critical ,philosophy of ,kant1 vol4   
ii4 p4 #djf7 has  given an instructive  
account of the gradual development in   
,kant's mind  of the main idea of the   
,critique of ,judgement4    #b ,natural 
,theology and ,modern ,thought1 p4 #aeh4
    #c ,i reproduce here in part a paper
 read before the ,victoria ,institute   
in ,april #ahib4    #d ,critique of     
,pure ,reason4 ,dialectic1 ,bk4 ii4     
chap4 i4 near the end4    #e ,cf4 ,kuno 
,fischer1 ,a ,critique of ,kant1 p4     

#adb4    #f ,quoted by ,caird1 ,critical
 ,philosophy of ,kant1 vol4 ii4 p4 #ejg1
  who reiterates this criticism all     
through his account of ,kant's          
teaching4    #g ,natural ,theology and  
,modern ,thought1 p4 #bda4    #h        
,reading1 with ,windelband1 in sicheren 
alleinigen ,besitz4    #i ,if we have   
cause for supposing that concepts which 
we use as  empirical principles stand in
 relationship with the pure cognitive   
faculty a priori1 it is profitable1     
because of this reference1  to seek for 
them a transcendental definition2 i4e4 a
 definition  through pure categories1 so
 far as these by themselves adequately  
furnish the distinction of the concept  
in question from others4 ,we  here      
follow the example of the mathematician 
who leaves undetermined  the empirical  
data of his problem1 and only brings    
their relation in  their pure synthesis 
under the concepts of pure ,arithmetic1 
and thus  generalises the solution4     
,objection has been brought against a   

similar  procedure of mine 7cf4 the     
,preface to the ,critique of ,practical 
,reason1  ,abbott's ,translation1 p4    
#id71 and my definition of the faculty  
of desire has been found fault with1    
viz4 that it is the being's  faculty of 
becoming by means of its representations
 the cause of the  actuality of the     
objects of these representations2 for   
the desires  might be mere cravings1 and
 by means of these alone every one is   
convinced the ,object cannot be         
produced4--,but this proves nothing more
  than that there are desires in man1 by
 which he is in contradiction  with     
himself4 ,for here he strives for the   
production of the ,object  by means of  
the representation alone1 from which he 
can expect no  result1 because he is    
conscious that his mechanical powers 7if
 ,i may  so call those which are not    
psychological7 which must be determined 
by that representation to bring about   
the ,object 7mediately7 are  either not 
competent1 or even tend towards what is 

impossible2 e4g4  to reverse the past   
7,o mihi praeteritos 444 etc471 or to   
annihilate  in the impatience of        
expectation the interval before the     
wished for  moment4--,although in such  
fantastic desires we are conscious of   
the  inadequacy 7or even the            
unsuitability7 of our representations   
for  being causes of their objects1 yet 
their reference as causes1 and          
consequently the representation of their
 causality1 is contained in  every wish2
 and this is specially evident if the   
wish is an affection  or longing4 ,for  
these longings by their dilatation and  
contraction  of the heart and consequent
 exhaustion of its powers1 prove that   
these  powers are continually kept on   
the stretch by representations1 but that
  they perpetually let the mind1 having 
regard to the impossibility of  the     
desire1 fall back in exhaustion4 ,even  
prayers for the aversion  of great and  
7as far as one can see7 unavoidable     
evils1 and many  superstitious means for

 attaining in a natural way impossible  
purposes1  point to the causal reference
 of representations to their ,objects2 a
  reference which cannot at all be      
checked by the consciousness of the     
inadequacy of the effort to produce the 
effect4--,as to why there should  be in 
our nature this propensity to desires   
which are consciously vain1  that is an 
anthropologico-teleological problem4 ,it
 seems that if we  were not determined  
to the application of our powers before 
we were  assured of the adequacy of our 
faculties to produce an ,object1 these  
powers would remain in great part       
unused4 ,for we commonly learn to  know 
our powers only by first making trial of
 them4 ,this deception in  the case of  
vain wishes is then only the consequence
 of a benevolent  ordinance in our      
nature4 ,this note was added by ,kant in
 the ,second  ,edition4    #aj ,one of  
the various pretended contradictions in 
this whole  distinction of the causality
 of nature from that of freedom is      

this4 ,it is objected that if ,i speak  
of obstacles which nature  opposes to   
causality according to 7moral7 laws of  
freedom or of the  assistance it        
affords1 ,i am admitting an influence of
 the former  upon the latter4 ,but if we
 try to understand what has been said1  
this  misinterpretation is very easy to 
avoid4 ,the opposition or assistance  is
 not between nature and freedom1 but    
between the former as phenomenon  and   
the effects of the latter as phenomena  
in the world of sense4  ,the causality  
of freedom itself 7of pure and practical
 ,reason7 is  the causality of a natural
 cause subordinated to freedom 7i4e4  of
 the subject considered as man and      
therefore as phenomenon74 ,the          
intelligible1 which is thought under    
freedom1 contains the ground of  the    
determination of this natural cause in a
 way not explicable  any further 7just  
as that intelligible does which         
constitutes the  supersensible substrate
 of nature74    #aa ,it has been thought

 a doubtful point that my divisions in  
pure  ,philosophy should always be      
threefold4 ,but that lies in the nature 
of  the thing4 ,if there is to be an a  
priori division it must be either       
analytical1 according to the law of     
contradiction1 which is always  twofold 
7quodlibet ens est aut ,a aut non ,a72  
or it is synthetical4  ,and if in this  
latter case it is to be derived from a  
priori concepts  7not as in ,mathematic 
from the intuition corresponding to the 
concept71  the division must necessarily
 be trichotomy4 ,for according to what  
is requisite for synthetical unity in   
general there must be 7#a7 a  condition1
 7#b7 a conditioned1 and 7#c7 the       
concept which arises from the  union of 
the conditioned with its condition4     
#ab ,the definition of taste which is   
laid down here is that it is the        
faculty of judging of the beautiful4    
,but the analysis of judgements of      
taste must show what is required in     
order to call an object beautiful4  ,the

 moments1 to which this ,judgement has  
regard in its reflection1 ,i  have      
sought in accordance with the guidance  
of the logical functions of  judgement  
7for in a judgement of taste a reference
 to the ,understanding  is always       
involved74 ,i have considered the moment
 of quality first1  because the         
aesthetical judgement upon the beautiful
 first pays  attention to it4    #ac ,a 
judgement upon an object of satisfaction
 may be quite  disinterested1 but yet   
very interesting1 i4e4 not based upon an
  interest1 but bringing an interest    
with it2 of this kind are all pure      
moral judgements4 ,judgements of taste1 
however1 do not in themselves  establish
 any interest4 ,only in society is it   
interesting to have  taste3 the reason  
of this will be shown in the sequel4    
#ad ,second ,edition4    #ae ,an        
obligation to enjoyment is a manifest   
absurdity4 ,thus the  obligation to all 
actions which have merely enjoyment for 
their aim can  only be a pretended one2 

however spiritually it may be conceived 
7or  decked out71 even if it is a       
mystical1 or so-called heavenly1        
enjoyment4    #af ,second ,edition4     
#ag ,second ,edition4    #ah ,ueberweg  
points out 7,hist4 of ,phil41 ii4 #ebh1 
,eng4 ,trans47  that ,mendelssohn had   
already called attention to the         
disinterestedness  of our satisfaction  
in the ,beautiful4 8,it appears10 says  
,mendelssohn1  8to be a particular mark 
of the beautiful1 that it is            
contemplated  with quiet satisfaction1  
that it pleases1 even though it be not  
in our  possession1 and even though we  
be never so far removed from the desire 
to put it to our use40 ,but1 of course1 
as ,ueberweg remarks1 ,kant's           
conception of disinterestedness extends 
far beyond the absence of a  desire to  
possess the object4    #ai ,reading     
besondere with ,windelband2 ,hartenstein
 reads  bestimmte4    #bj ,i4e4 ,the    
,critique of ,pure ,reason1 ,analytic1  
bk4 ii4 c4 i4    #ba ,second ,edition4  

,spencer expresses much more concisely  
what ,kant  has in his mind here4       
8,pleasure 444 is a feeling which we    
seek to  bring into consciousness and   
retain there2 pain is 444 a feeling     
which  we seek to get out of            
consciousness and to keep out40         
,principles of  ,psychology1  #abe4     
#bb ,the editions of ,hartenstein and   
,kirchmann omit ohne before  zweck1     
which makes havoc of the sentence4 ,it  
is correctly printed by  ,rosenkranz and
 ,windelband4    #bc ,first ,edition4   
#bd ,cf4 ,metaphysic of ,morals1        
,introd4 ,i4 8,the pleasure which  is   
necessarily bound up with the desire 7of
 the object whose  representation       
affects feeling7 may be called practical
 pleasure1  whether it be cause or      
effect of the desire4 ,on the contrary1 
the  pleasure which is not necessarily  
bound up with the desire of the  object1
 and which1 therefore1 is at bottom not 
a pleasure in the  existence of the     
,object of the representation1 but      

clings to the  representation only1 may 
be called mere contemplative pleasure or
  passive satisfaction4 ,the feeling of 
the latter kind of pleasure we  call    
taste40    #be ,second ,edition4    #bf 
,first ,edition has gleiche2 ,second    
,edition has solche4    #bg ,first and  
,second ,editions have sehr zweifle2 but
 this was  corrected to nicht zweifle in
 the ,third ,edition of #agii4    #bh   
,belebt machen2 ,first ,edition had     
beliebt4    #bi ,second ,edition4    #cj
 ,kant probably alludes here to         
,baumgarten 7#agad-agfb71 who was the   
first writer to give the name of        
,aesthetics to the ,philosophy of       
,taste4  ,he defined beauty as          
8perfection apprehended through the     
senses40 ,kant  is said to have used as 
a text-book at lectures a work by       
,meier1 a  pupil of ,baumgarten's1 on   
this subject4    #ca ,cf4 ,preface to   
the ,metaphysical ,elements of ,ethics1 
v43 8,the  word perfection is liable to 
many misconceptions4 ,it is sometimes   

understood as a concept belonging to    
,transcendental ,philosophy2 viz4  the  
concept of the totality of the manifold1
 which1 taken together1  constitutes a  
,thing2 sometimes1 again1 it is         
understood as belonging to  ,teleology1 
so that it signifies the agreement of   
the characteristics  of a thing with a  
purpose4 ,perfection in the former sense
 might be  called quantitative          
7material71 in the latter qualitative   
7formal7  perfection40    #cb ,the words
 even if 444 general were added in the  
,second ,edition4    #cc ,second        
,edition4    #cd ,models of taste as    
regards the arts of speech must be      
composed  in a dead and learned         
language4 ,the first1 in order that they
 may not  suffer that change which      
inevitably comes over living languages1 
in  which noble expressions become flat1
 common ones antiquated1 and newly      
created ones have only a short currency4
 ,the second1 because learned  languages
 have a grammar which is subject to no  

wanton change of  fashion1 but the rules
 of which are preserved unchanged4      
#ce ,this distinction between an ,idea  
and an ,ideal1 as also  the further     
contrast between ,ideals of the ,reason 
and ,ideals of the  ,imagination1 had   
already been given by ,kant in the      
,critique of ,pure  ,reason1 ,dialectic1
 bk4 ii4 c4 iii4  #a4    #cf ,polycletus
 of ,argos flourished about #dcj ,b4,c4 
,his statue of the  ,spearbearer        
7,doryphorus71 afterwards became known  
as the ,canon2  because in it the artist
 was supposed to have embodied a perfect
  representation of the ideal of the    
human figure4    #cg ,this was a        
celebrated statue executed by ,myron1 a 
,greek sculptor1  contemporary with     
,polycletus4 ,it is frequently mentioned
 in the ,greek  ,anthology4    #ch ,it  
will be found that a perfectly regular  
countenance1 such  as a painter might   
wish to have for a model1 ordinarily    
tells us  nothing2 because it contains  
nothing characteristic1 and therefore   

rather expresses the ,idea of the race  
than the specific traits of  a person4  
,the exaggeration of a characteristic of
 this kind1 i4e4  such as does violence 
to the normal ,idea 7the purposiveness  
of the  race7 is called caricature4     
,experience also shows that these quite 
regular countenances commonly indicate  
internally only a mediocre man2         
presumably 7if it may be assumed that   
external nature expresses the           
proportions of internal7 because1 if no 
mental disposition exceeds that         
proportion which is requisite in order  
to constitute a man free from  faults1  
nothing can be expected of what is      
called genius1 in which  nature seems to
 depart from the ordinary relations of  
the mental powers  on behalf of some    
special one4    #ci ,it might be        
objected to this explanation that there 
are things1 in  which we see a purposive
 form without cognising any definite    
purpose  in them1 like the stone        
implements often got from old sepulchral

  tumuli with a hole in them as if for a
 handle4 ,these1 although they  plainly 
indicate by their shape a purposiveness 
of which we do not  know the purpose1   
are nevertheless not described as       
beautiful4 ,but if  we regard a thing as
 a work of art1 that is enough to make  
us admit  that its shape has reference  
to some design and definite purpose4    
,and  hence there is no immediate       
satisfaction in the contemplation of it4
  ,on the other hand a flower1 e4g4 a   
tulip1 is regarded as beautiful2        
because in perceiving it we find a      
certain purposiveness which1 in our     
judgement1 is referred to no purpose at 
all4    #dj ,cp4 p4 #agj1 infra4    #da 
,see ,the ,history of ,sumatra1 by ,w4  
,marsden 7,london1 #aghc71 p4  #aac4    
#db ,cf4  #db1 infra4    #dc ,second    
,edition4    #dd ,second ,edition4      
#de ,lettres sur l'gypte1 par ,m4       
,savary1 ,amsterdam1 #aghg4    #df      
,second ,edition4    #dg ,with this     
should be compared the similar          

discussion in the  ,critique of ,pure   
,reason1 ,dialectic1 bk4 ii4 c4 ii4  #a1
 ,on the  ,system of ,cosmological      
,ideas4    #dh ,second ,edition4    #di 
,cf4  #hc1 infra4    #ej ,in the        
,philosophical ,theory of ,religion1 pt4
 i4 sub fin4  7,abbott's ,translation1  
p4 #cfj71 ,kant1 as here1 divides 8all  
religions  into two                     
classes--favour-seeking religion 7mere  
worship7 and moral  religion1 that is1  
the religion of a good life20 and he    
concludes  that 8amongst all the public 
religions that have ever existed the    
,christian alone is moral40    #ea      
,voyages dans les ,alpes1 par ,h4 ,b4 de
 ,saussure2 vol4 i4 was  published at   
,neuchatel in #aggi2 vol4 ii4 at ,geneva
 in #aghf4    #eb ,second ,edition4     
#ec ,als ,vermgen der ,independenz der  
absoluten ,totalitt1 a curious  phrase4 
#ed ,second ,edition4    #ee ,affections
 are specifically different from        
passions4 ,the  former are related      
merely to feeling2 the latter belong to 

the faculty  of desire1 and are         
inclinations which render difficult or  
impossible  all determination of the    
elective will by principles4 ,the former
 are  stormy and unpremeditated2 the    
latter are steady and deliberate2 thus  
indignation in the form of wrath is an  
affection1 but in the form of  hatred   
7revenge7 is a passion4 ,the latter can 
never and in no reference  be called    
sublime2 because while in an affection  
the freedom of the  mind is hindered1 in
 a passion it is abolished4 ,cf4        
,preface to the  ,metaphysical ,elements
 of ,ethics1  xvi41 where this          
distinction is  more fully drawn out4   
,affection is described as hasty2 and   
passion is  defined as the sensible     
appetite grown into a permanent         
inclination4    #ef ,in the ,preface to 
the ,metaphysical ,elements of ,ethics1 
xvii41  ,kant gives the term moral      
apathy to that freedom from the sway of 
the  affections1 which is distinguished 
from indifference to them4    #eg       

,reading weiche with ,rosenkranz and    
,windelband2 ,hartenstein and           
,kirchmann have weise1 which yields no  
sense4    #eh ,cf4 p4 #abi1 supra4      
#ei ,kirchmann has positiv2 but this is 
probably a mere misprint4    #fj ,l4c4  
vol4 ii4 p4 #aha4    #fa ,see ,burke1   
,on the ,sublime and ,beautiful1 ,part  
,,iv41 ,sect4  vii4 8,if the pain and   
terror are so modified as not to be     
actually  noxious2 if the pain is not   
carried to violence1 and the terror is  
not conversant about the present        
destruction of the person1 as these     
emotions clear the parts1 whether fine  
or gross1 of a dangerous and            
troublesome incumbrance1 they are       
capable of producing delight2 not       
pleasure1 but a sort of delightful      
horror1 a sort of tranquillity  tinged  
with terror2 which1 as it belongs to    
self-preservation1 is one  of the       
strongest of all the passions40 ,kant   
quotes from the ,german  version        
published at ,riga in #aggc4 ,this was a

 free translation made  from ,burke's   
fifth edition4    #fb ,see ,burke1 l4c41
 ,part ,,iv41 ,sect4 xix4 8,beauty acts 
by relaxing  the solids of the whole    
system4 ,there are all the appearances  
of such  a relaxation2 and a relaxation 
somewhat below the natural tone seems   
to me to be the cause of all positive   
pleasure4 ,who is a stranger to  that   
manner of expression so common in all   
times and in all countries1  of being   
softened1 relaxed1 enervated1 dissolved1
 melted away by  pleasure80    #fc      
,reading ,gebot2 ,kirchmann has ,gesetz4
    #fd ,second ,edition4    #fe ,second
 ,edition4    #ff ,cf4 ,critique of     
,pure ,reason1 ,methodology1 c4 #a1  #a4
 8,the  construction of a concept is the
 a priori presentation of the           
corresponding intuition40    #fg        
,charles ,batteux 7#agac-aghj71 author  
of ,les ,beaux ,arts reduits   un mme   
principe4    #fh ,essay ,,xviii1 ,the   
,sceptic4 8,critics can reason and      
dispute  more plausibly than cooks or   

perfumers4 ,we may observe1 however1    
that  this uniformity among human kind1 
hinders not1 but that there is a        
considerable diversity in the sentiments
 of beauty and worth1 and that          
education1 custom1 prejudice1 caprice1  
and humour1 frequently vary  our taste  
of this kind4444 ,beauty and worth are  
merely of a relative  nature1 and       
consist in an agreeable sentiment1      
produced by an object in  a particular  
mind1 according to the peculiar         
structure and constitution  of that     
mind40    #fi ,for the distinction1 an  
important one in ,kant1 between         
judgements  of experience and judgements
 of perception1 see his ,prolegomena1   
#ah4 ,cf4 ,kant's ,critical ,philosophy 
for ,english ,readers1 vol4 i4 p4  #aaf4
    #gj ,first ,edition has 8limited40  
#ga ,in order to be justified in        
claiming universal assent for an        
aesthetical judgement that rests merely 
on subjective grounds1 it  is sufficient
 to assume1 7#a7 that the subjective    

conditions of the  ,judgement1 as       
regards the relation of the cognitive   
powers thus put  into activity to a     
cognition in general1 are the same in   
all men4 ,this  must be true1 because   
otherwise men would not be able to      
communicate  their representations or   
even their knowledge4 7#b7 ,the         
judgement must  merely have reference to
 this relation 7consequently to the     
formal  condition of the ,judgement7 and
 be pure1 i4e4 not mingled either  with 
concepts of the ,object or with         
sensations1 as determining grounds4  ,if
 there has been any mistake as regards  
this latter condition1 then  there is   
only an inaccurate application of the   
privilege1 which a law  gives us1 to a  
particular case2 but that does not      
destroy the privilege  itself in        
general4    #gb ,kant lays down these   
three maxims in his ,introduction to    
,logic1   vii41 as 8general rules and   
conditions of the avoidance of error40  
#gc ,we soon see that although          

enlightenment is easy in thesi1 yet  in 
hypothesi it is difficult and slow of   
accomplishment4 ,for not to  be passive 
as regards ,reason1 but to be always    
self-legislative1 is  indeed quite easy 
for the man who wishes only to be in    
accordance with  his essential purpose1 
and does not desire to know what is     
beyond his  ,understanding4 ,but since  
we can hardly avoid seeking this1 and   
there  are never wanting others who     
promise with much confidence that they  
are able to satisfy our curiosity1 it   
must be very hard to maintain in  or    
restore to the mind 7especially the mind
 of the public7 that bare  negative     
which properly constitutes              
enlightenment4    #gd ,we may designate 
,taste as sensus communis aestheticus1  
common  ,understanding as sensus        
communis logicus4    #ge ,peter ,camper 
7#agbb-aghi71 a celebrated naturalist   
and comparative  anatomist2 for some    
years professor at ,groningen4    #gf   
,in my country a common man1 if you     

propose to him such a problem  as that  
of ,columbus with his egg1 says1 that is
 not art1 it is only  science4 ,i4e4 if 
we know how1 we can do it2 and he says  
the same  of all the pretended arts of  
jugglers4 ,on the other hand1 he will   
not  refuse to apply the term art to the
 performance of a rope-dancer4    #gg   
,kant was accustomed to say that the    
talk at a dinner table  should always   
pass through these three                
stages--narrative1 discussion1  and     
jest2 and punctilious in this1 as in all
 else1 he is said to have  directed the 
conversation at his own table           
accordingly 7,wallace's  ,kant1 p4 #ci74
    #gh ,second ,edition4    #gi ,cf4   
,aristotle's ,poetics1 c4 iv4 p4 #addh  
b3      1                 4 ,cf4 also   
,rhetoric1  ,i4 #aa1 p4 #acga b2 and    
,burke on the ,sublime and ,beautiful1  
,part ,i4   #af4 ,boileau 7,l'art       
potique1 chant #c71 makes a similar     
observation3        8,il n'est point de 
serpent ni de monstre odieux      ,qui1 

par l'art imit1 ne puisse plaire aux    
yeux4      ,d'un pinceau dlicat         
l'artifice agrable      ,du plus affreux
 objet fait un objet aimable40      #hj 
,second ,edition4    #ha ,cf4 p4 #aii1  
infra4    #hb ,in ,english we would     
rather say 8without soul02 but ,i prefer
 to  translate ,geist consistently by   
spirit1 to avoid the confusion of  it   
with ,seele4    #hc ,these lines occur  
in one of ,frederick the ,great's       
,french poems3  ptre au marchal ,keith  
,,xviii41 8sur les vaines terreurs de la
 mort et  les frayeurs d'une autre vie40
 ,kant here translates them into        
,german4    #hd ,withof1 whose 8,moral  
,poems0 appeared in #agee4 ,this        
reference was  supplied by ,h4 ,krebs in
 ,notes and ,queries #eth ,january      
#ahie4    #he ,perhaps nothing more     
sublime was ever said and no sublimer   
thought  ever expressed than the famous 
inscription on the ,temple of ,isis     
7,mother ,nature73 8,i am all that is   
and that was and that shall be1  and no 

mortal hath lifted my veil40 ,segner    
availed himself of this  ,idea in a     
suggestive vignette prefixed to his     
,natural ,philosophy1 in  order to      
inspire beforehand the pupil whom he was
 about to lead into  that temple with a 
holy awe1 which should dispose his mind 
to serious  attention4 ,j4 ,a4 de       
,segner 7#agjd-aggg7 was ,professor of  
,natural  ,philosophy at ,gttingen1 and 
the author of several scientific works  
of  repute4    #hf ,second ,edition4    
#hg ,the three former faculties are     
united in the first instance by  means  
of the fourth4 ,hume gives us to        
understand in his ,history of  ,england 
that although the ,english are inferior 
in their productions  to no people in   
the world as regards the evidences they 
display of the  three former properties1
 separately considered1 yet they must be
 put  after their neighbours the ,french
 as regards that which unites these     
properties4 ,in his ,observations on the
 ,beautiful and ,sublime1  iv4  sub     

init41 ,kant remarks that the ,english  
have the keener sense of the  sublime1  
the ,french of the beautiful4    #hh    
,the reader is not to judge this scheme 
for a possible division of  the         
beautiful arts as a deliberate theory4  
,it is only one of various  attempts    
which we may and ought to devise4    #hi
 ,second ,edition4    #ij ,i4e4 the case
 of ,plastic art1 with its subdivisions 
of  ,architecture and ,sculpture1 as is 
explained in the next paragraph4    #ia 
,that landscape gardening may be        
regarded as a species of the  art of    
painting1 although it presents its forms
 corporeally1 seems  strange4 ,but since
 it actually takes its forms from nature
 7trees1  shrubs1 grasses1 and flowers  
from forest and field--at least in the  
first instance71 and so far is not an   
art like ,plastic2 and since it  also   
has no concept of the object and its    
purpose 7as in ,architecture7           
conditioning its arrangements1 but      
involves merely the free play of the    

,imagination in contemplation1 it so far
 agrees with mere aesthetical  painting 
which has no definite theme 7which      
arranges sky1 land1 and  water1 so as to
 entertain us by means of light and     
shade only74--,in  general the reader is
 only to judge of this as an attempt to 
combine  the beautiful arts under one   
principle1 viz4 that of the expression  
of aesthetical ,ideas 7according to the 
analogy of speech71 and not to  regard  
it as a definitive analysis of them4    
#ib ,i must admit that a beautiful poem 
has always given me a pure              
gratification2 whilst the reading of the
 best discourse1 whether of a  ,roman   
orator or of a modern parliamentary     
speaker or of a preacher1 has  always   
been mingled with an unpleasant feeling 
of disapprobation of  a treacherous art1
 which means to move men in important   
matters like  machines to a judgement   
that must lose all weight for them on   
quiet  reflection4 ,readiness and       
accuracy in speaking 7which taken       

together  constitute ,rhetoric7 belong  
to beautiful art2 but the art of the    
orator  7ars oratoria71 the art of      
availing oneself of the weaknesses of   
men  for one's own designs 7whether     
these be well meant or even actually    
good does not matter7 is worthy of no   
respect4 ,again1 this art only  reached 
its highest point1 both at ,athens and  
at ,rome1 at a time when  the state was 
hastening to its ruin and true patriotic
 sentiment had  disappeared4 ,the man   
who along with a clear insight into     
things has in  his power a wealth of    
pure speech1 and who with a fruitful    
,imagination  capable of presenting his 
,ideas unites a lively sympathy with    
what is  truly good1 is the vir bonus   
discendi peritus1 the orator without    
art but of great impressiveness1 as     
,cicero has it2 though he may not       
always remain true to this ideal4    #ic
 ,from this to the end of the paragraph1
 and the next note1 were  added in the  
,second ,edition4    #id ,those who     

recommend the singing of spiritual songs
 at family  prayers do not consider that
 they inflict a great hardship upon  the
 public by such noisy 7and therefore in 
general pharisaical7  devotions2 for    
they force the neighbours either to sing
 with them  or to abandon their         
meditations4 ,kant suffered himself from
 such  annoyances1 which may account for
 the asperity of this note4 ,at one     
period he was disturbed by the          
devotional exercises of the prisoners in
  the adjoining jail4 ,in a letter to   
the burgomaster 8he suggested the       
advantage of closing the windows during 
these hymn-singings1 and added  that the
 warders of the prison might probably be
 directed to accept  less sonorous and  
neighbour-annoying chants as evidence of
 the penitent  spirit of their captives0
 7,wallace's ,kant1 p4 #db74    #ie ,cf4
 8,parturiunt montes1 nascitur ridiculus
 mus40    #if ,the ,first ,edition adds 
8as in the case of a man who gets the   
news  of a great commercial success40   

#ig ,the jest may have been taken from  
,steele's play1 8,the ,funeral or       
,grief  la mode10 where it occurs       
verbatim4 ,this play was published  in  
#agjb4    #ih ,henriade1 ,chant #g1 sub 
init4        8,du ,dieu qui nous cra la 
clmence infinie1      ,pour adoucir les 
maux de cette courte vie1      ,a plac  
parmi nous deux tres bienfaisants1      
,de la terre  jamais aimables habitants1
      ,soutiens dans les travaux1 trsors
 dans l'indigence3      ,l'un est le    
doux sommeil1 et l'autre est            
l'esprance40      #ii ,we may describe  
as a rationalising judgement 7judicium  
ratiocinans7 one which proclaims itself 
as universal1 for as such it  can serve 
as the major premise of a syllogism4 ,on
 the other hand1 we  can only speak of a
 judgement as rational 7judicium        
ratiocinatum7  which is thought as the  
conclusion of a syllogism1 and          
consequently as  grounded a priori4     
#ajj ,cf4 p4 #bda1 infra4    #aja       
,second ,edition4    #ajb ,antiparos is 

a small island in the ,cyclades1        
remarkable for a  splendid stalactite   
cavern near the southern coast4    #ajc 
,the intuitive in cognition must be     
opposed to the discursive  7not to the  
symbolical74 ,the former is either      
schematical1 by  demonstration2 or      
symbolical as a representation in       
accordance with  a mere analogy4    #ajd
 ,i read ,geselligkeit with ,rosenkranz 
and ,windelband2  ,hartenstein and      
,kirchmann have ,glckseligkeit4    #aje 
,as in pure mathematics we can never    
talk of the existence1 but  only of the 
possibility of things1 viz4 of an       
intuition corresponding  to a concept1  
and so never of cause and effect1 it    
follows that all  purposiveness observed
 there must be considered merely as     
formal and  never as a natural purpose4 
#ajf ,the allusion is to ,vitruvius de  
,architectura1 ,bk4 vi4  ,praef4        
8,aristippus philosophus ,socraticus1   
naufragio cum eiectus ad  ,rhodiensium  
litus animadvertisset geometrica        

schemata descripta1  exclamavisse ad    
comites ita dicitur1 ,bene speremus1    
hominum enim  vestigia video40    #ajg  
,second ,edition4    #ajh ,we can       
conversely throw light upon a certain   
combination1 much  more often met with  
in ,idea than in actuality1 by means of 
an analogy  to the so-called immediate  
natural purposes4 ,in a recent complete 
transformation of a great people into a 
state the word organisation  for the    
regulation of magistracies1 etc41 and   
even of the whole  body politic1 has    
often been fitly used4 ,for in such a   
whole every  member should surely be    
purpose as well as means1 and1 whilst   
all  work together towards the          
possibility of the whole1 each should be
  determined as regards place and       
function by means of the ,idea of the   
whole4 ,kant probably alludes here to   
the organisation of the ,united  ,states
 of ,america4    #aji ,these words are  
inserted by ,rosenkranz and ,windelband1
 but  omitted by ,hartenstein and       

,kirchmann4    #aaj ,in the aesthetical 
part  #eh1 p4 #bdg it was said3 ,we     
view beautiful nature with favour1      
whilst we have a quite free             
7disinterested7 satisfaction in its     
form4 ,for in this mere judgement of    
taste no consideration is given to the  
purpose for which these natural         
beauties exist2 whether to excite       
pleasure in us1 or as purposes  without 
any reference to us at all4 ,but in a   
teleological judgement we  pay attention
 to this reference1 and here we can     
regard it as a favour  of nature that it
 has been willing to minister to our    
culture by the  exhibition of so many   
beautiful figures4    #aaa ,the ,german 
word vermessen is a good word and full  
of meaning4  ,a judgement in which we   
forget to consider the extent of our    
powers  7our ,understanding7 may        
sometimes sound very humble1 and yet    
make great  pretensions1 and so be very 
presumptuous4 ,of this kind are most of 
those by which we pretend to extol the  

divine wisdom by ascribing to  it       
designs in the works of creation and    
preservation which are really  meant to 
do honour to the private wisdom of the  
reasoner4    #aab ,we thus see that in  
most speculative things of pure ,reason1
 as  regards dogmatic assertions1 the   
philosophical schools have commonly     
tried all possible solutions of a given 
question4 ,to explain the  purposiveness
 of nature men have tried either        
lifeless matter or  a lifeless ,god1 or 
again1 living matter or a living ,god4  
,it  only remains for us1 if the need   
should arise1 to abandon all these      
objective assertions and to examine     
critically our judgement merely  in     
reference to our cognitive faculties1 in
 order to supply to their  principle a  
validity which1 if not dogmatic1 shall  
at least be that of  a maxim sufficient 
for the sure employment of ,reason4     
#aac ,that is1 the wider concept serves 
as a universal1 under which  the        
particular may be brought2 cognition    

from principles1 in ,kant's  phrase1 is 
the process of knowing the particular in
 the universal by  means of concepts4   
#aad ,this distinction will be familiar 
to the student of the  ,critique of     
,pure ,reason4 ,see ,dialectic1 bk4 i41 
,of the ,concepts of  ,pure ,reason4    
#aae ,second ,edition4    #aaf ,this    
principle1 that for our intellect1 the  
conception of an  organised body is     
impossible except by the aid of the     
,idea of design1  is frequently insisted
 on by ,kant4 ,professor ,wallace points
 out  7,kant1 p4 #aaj7 that as far back 
as #agee1 in his ,general ,physiogony   
and ,theory of the ,heavens1 ,kant      
classed the origin of animals and       
plants with the secrets of ,providence  
and the mystical number #fff 8as  one of
 the topics on which ingenuity and      
thought are occasionally  wasted40      
#aag ,second ,edition4    #aah ,second  
,edition4    #aai ,this is marked as an 
,appendix in the ,second ,edition4      
#abj ,we may call a hypothesis of this  

kind a daring venture of reason1  and   
there may be few even of the most acute 
naturalists through whose  head it has  
not sometimes passed4 ,for it is not    
absurd1 like that  generatio aequivoca  
by which is understood the production of
 an  organised being through the        
mechanics of crude unorganised matter4  
,it would always remain generatio       
univoca in the most universal  sense of 
the word1 for it only considers one     
organic being as derived  from another  
organic being1 although from one which  
is specifically  different2 e4g4 certain
 water-animals transform themselves     
gradually  into marsh-animals and from  
these1 after some generations1 into     
land-animals4 ,a priori1 in the         
judgement of ,reason alone1 there is no 
contradiction here4 ,only experience    
gives no example of it2 according  to   
experience all generation that we know  
is generatio homonyma4  ,this is not    
merely univoca in contrast to the       
generation out of  unorganised material1

 but in the organisation the product is 
of like  kind to that which produced it2
 and generation heteronyma1 so far as   
our empirical knowledge of nature       
extends1 is nowhere found4    #aba ,it  
is probable that ,kant alludes here to  
,hume's ,essay ,on a  ,providence and a 
,future ,state1  xi of the ,inquiry4    
,hume argues that  though the inference 
from an effect to an intelligent cause  
may be  valid in the case of human      
contrivance1 it is not legitimate to    
rise by  a like argument to ,supreme    
,intelligence4 8,in human nature there  
is a  certain experienced coherence of  
designs and inclinations2 so that when  
from any fact we have discovered one    
intention of any man1 it may often  be  
reasonable from experience to infer     
another1 and draw a long chain  of      
conclusions concerning his past or      
future conduct4 ,but this method  of    
reasoning can never have place with     
regard to a being so remote and         
incomprehensible1 who bears much less   

analogy to any other being in the       
universe than the sun to a waxen taper1 
and who discovers himself only  by some 
faint traces or outlines1 beyond which  
we have no authority to  ascribe to him 
any attribute or perfection40    #abb   
,j4 ,f4 ,blumenbach 7#ageb-ahdj71 a     
,german naturalist and professor  at    
,gttingen2 the author of ,institutiones 
,physiologicae 7#aghg7 and  other works4
 ,an interesting account of him is given
 in ,lever's novel  ,adventures of      
,arthur ,o',leary1 ch4 xix4    #abc     
,carl von ,linn 7#agjg-aggh71 ,knight of
 the ,polar ,star1 the  celebrated      
,swedish botanist4    #abd ,if the once 
adopted name ,natural history is to     
continue for the  description of nature1
 we may in contrast with art1 give the  
title of  ,archaeology of nature to that
 which the former literally indicates1  
viz4 a representation of the old        
condition of the earth1 about  which1   
although we cannot hope for certainty1  
we have good ground for  conjecture4 ,as

 sculptured stones1 etc41 belong to the 
province of art1  so petrefactions      
belong to the archaeology of nature4    
,and since work  is actually being done 
in this science 7under the name of the  
,theory  of the ,earth71 constantly1    
although of course slowly1 this name is 
not  given to a merely imaginary        
investigation of nature1 but to one to  
which nature itself leads and invites   
us4    #abe ,see p4 #ahd above4    #abf 
,first ,edition has freedom4    #abg    
,these views are set forth by ,kant more
 fully in the essay ,zum  ewigen        
,frieden 7#agie74    #abh ,second       
,edition4    #abi ,cf4 ,the             
,philosophical ,theory of ,religion1    
,part i41 ,on the bad  principle in     
,human ,nature1 ,,iii41 where ,kant     
remarks that although war  8is not so   
incurably bad as the deadness of a      
universal monarchy 444  yet1 as an      
ancient observed1 it makes more bad men 
than it takes away40    #acj ,the value 
of life for us1 if it is estimated by   

that which we  enjoy 7by the natural    
purpose of the sum of all inclinations1 
i4e4  happiness71 is easy to decide4 ,it
 sinks below zero2 for who would be     
willing to enter upon life anew under   
the same conditions8 who would do  so   
even according to a new1 self-chosen    
plan 7yet in conformity with  the course
 of nature71 if it were merely directed 
to enjoyment8 ,we  have shown above what
 value life has in virtue of what it    
contains in  itself1 when lived in      
accordance with the purpose that nature 
has along  with us1 and which consists  
in what we do 7not merely what we       
enjoy71  in which1 however1 we are      
always but means towards an undetermined
  final purpose4 ,there remains then    
nothing but the value which we          
ourselves give our life1 through what we
 can not only do1 but do  purposively in
 such independence of nature that the   
existence of nature  itself can only be 
a purpose under this condition4    #aca 
,it would be possible that the happiness

 of rational beings in  the world should
 be a purpose of nature1 and then also  
this would be  its ultimate purpose4 ,at
 least we cannot see a priori why nature
  should not be so ordered1 because by  
means of its mechanism this  effect     
would be certainly possible1 at least so
 far as we see4 ,but  morality1 with a  
causality according to purposes         
subordinated thereto1  is absolutely    
impossible by means of natural causes2  
for the principle  by which it          
determines to action is supersensible1  
and is therefore  the only possible     
principle in the order of purposes that 
in respect  of nature is absolutely     
unconditioned4 ,its subject consequently
 alone  is qualified to be the final    
purpose of creation to which the whole  
of nature is subordinated4--,happiness1 
on the contrary1 as has been  shown in  
the preceding paragraphs by the         
testimony of experience1 is  not even a 
purpose of nature in respect of man in  
preference to  other creatures2 much    

less a final purpose of creation4 ,men  
may of  course make it their ultimate   
subjective purpose4 ,but if ,i ask1 in  
reference to the final purpose of       
creation1 why must men exist8 then  we  
are speaking of an objective supreme    
purpose1 such as the highest  ,reason   
would require for creation4 ,if we      
answer3 ,these beings exist  to afford  
objects for the benevolence of that     
,supreme ,cause2 then we  contradict the
 condition to which the ,reason of man  
subjects even his  inmost wish for      
happiness 7viz4 the harmony with his own
 internal moral  legislation74 ,this    
proves that happiness can only be a     
conditioned  purpose1 and that it is    
only as a moral being that man can be   
the final  purpose of creation2 but that
 as concerns his state happiness is only
  connected with it as a consequence1   
according to the measure of his  harmony
 with that purpose regarded as the      
purpose of his being4    #acb ,second   
,edition4    #acc ,i say deliberately   

under moral laws4 ,it is not man in     
accordance  with moral laws1 i4e4 a     
being who behaves himself in conformity 
with them1 who is the final purpose of  
creation4 ,for by using the  latter     
expression we should be asserting more  
than we know2 viz4 that  it is in the   
power of an ,author of the world to     
cause man always to  behave himself in  
accordance with moral laws4 ,but this   
presupposes a  concept of freedom and of
 nature 7of which latter we can only    
think an  external author71 which would 
imply an insight into the supersensible 
substrate of nature and its identity    
with that which causality through       
freedom makes possible in the world4    
,and this far surpasses the  insight of 
our ,reason4 ,only of man under moral   
laws can we say1  without transgressing 
the limits of our insight3 his being    
constitutes  the final purpose of the   
world4 ,this harmonises completely with 
the  judgement of human ,reason         
reflecting morally upon the course of   

the  world4 ,we believe that we perceive
 in the case of the wicked the traces   
of a wise purposive reference1 if we    
only see that the wanton criminal  does 
not die before he has undergone the     
deserved punishment of his  misdeeds4   
,according to our concepts of free      
causality1 our good or bad  behaviour   
depends on ourselves2 we regard it the  
highest wisdom in the  government of the
 world to ordain for the first1         
opportunity1 and for  both1 their       
consequence1 in accordance with moral   
laws4 ,in the latter  properly consists 
the glory of ,god1 which is hence not   
unsuitably  described by theologians as 
the ultimate purpose of creation4-- ,it 
is further to be remarked that when we  
use the word creation1 we  understand   
nothing more than we have said here1    
viz4 the cause of the  being of the     
world or of the things in it            
7substances74 ,this is  what the concept
 properly belonging to this word        
involves 7actuatio  substantiae est     

creatio72 and consequently there is not 
implied in it  the supposition of a     
freely working1 and therefore           
intelligent1 cause  7whose being we     
first of all want to prove74    #acd    
,note added in ,second ,edition4 ,this  
moral argument does not  supply any     
objectively-valid proof of the ,being of
 ,god2 it does  not prove to the sceptic
 that there is a ,god1 but proves that  
if he  wishes to think in a way         
consonant with morality1 he must admit  
the  assumption of this proposition     
under the maxims of his practical       
,reason4-- ,we should therefore not say3
 it is necessary for morals             
,sittlichkeit1 to assume the happiness  
of all rational beings of the  world in 
proportion to their morality ,moralitt2 
but rather1 this  is necessitated by    
morality4 ,accordingly1 this is a       
subjective  argument sufficient for     
moral beings4    #ace ,second ,edition4 
#acf ,second ,edition4    #acg ,in a    
practical sense that religion is always 

idolatry which  conceives the ,supreme  
,being with properties1 according to    
which  something else besides morality  
can be a fit condition for that which   
man can do being in accordance with ,his
 ,will4 ,for however pure and  free from
 sensible images the concept that we    
have formed may be in a  theoretical    
point of view1 yet it will be in a      
practical point of view  still          
represented as an idol1 i4e4 in regard  
to the character of  ,his ,will1        
anthropomorphically4    #ach ,cf4       
,introd4 to ,logic1 ix4 p4 #fc1         
8,conviction is opposed to  ,persuasion1
 which is a belief from inadequate      
reasons1 of which we do  not know       
whether they are only subjective or are 
also objective40    #aci ,second        
,edition4    #adj ,i4e4 ,urtheils4      
,first ,edition had ,urtheilens1 the    
judging  subject4    #ada ,analogy 7in a
 qualitative signification7 is the      
identity of  the relation between       
reasons and consequences 7causes and    

effects71 so  far as it is to be found1 
notwithstanding the specific difference 
of  the things or those properties in   
them which contain the reason for  like 
consequences 7i4e4 considered apart from
 this relation74 ,thus we  conceive of  
the artificial constructions of beasts  
by comparing them  with those of men2 by
 comparing the ground of those effects  
brought  about by the former1 which we  
do not know1 with the ground of similar 
effects brought about by men 7reason71  
which we do know2 i4e4 we  regard the   
ground of the former as an analogon of  
reason4 ,we then try  at the same time  
to show that the ground of the artisan  
faculty of  beasts1 which we call       
instinct1 specifically different as it  
is in fact  from reason1 has yet a      
similar relation to its effect 7the     
buildings of  the beaver as compared    
with those of men74--,but then ,i cannot
 therefore  conclude that because man   
uses reason for his building1 the beaver
  must have the like1 and call this a   

conclusion according to analogy4  ,but  
from the similarity of the mode of      
operation of beasts 7of which  we cannot
 immediately perceive the ground7 to    
that of men 7of which we  are           
immediately conscious71 we can quite    
rightly conclude according  to analogy1 
that beasts too act in accordance with  
representations  7not as ,descartes has 
it1 that they are machines71 and that   
despite  their specific distinction they
 are yet 7as living beings7 of the same 
genus as man4 ,the principle of our     
right so to conclude consists in  the   
sameness of the ground for reckoning    
beasts in respect of the said           
determination in the same genus with    
men1 regarded as men1 so far as we  can 
externally compare them with one another
 in accordance with their  actions4     
,there is par ratio4 ,just so ,i can    
conceive1 according to the  analogy of  
an ,understanding1 the causality of the 
supreme ,world-,cause1  by comparing its
 purposive products in the world with   

the artificial  works of men2 but ,i    
cannot conclude according to analogy to 
those  properties in it which are in    
man1 because here the principle of the  
possibility of such a method of         
reasoning entirely fails1 viz4 the      
paritas rationis for counting the       
,supreme ,being in one and the same     
genus with man 7in respect of the       
causality of both74 ,the causality  of  
the beings of the world1 which is always
 sensibly conditioned 7as  is causality 
through ,understanding7 cannot be       
transferred to a ,being  which has in   
common with them no generic concept save
 that of ,thing in  general4    #adb ,we
 thus miss nothing in the representation
 of the relations of  this ,being to the
 world1 as far as the consequences1     
theoretical or  practical1 of this      
concept are concerned4 ,to wish to      
investigate what  it is in itself1 is a 
curiosity as purposeless as it is vain4 
#adc ,cf4 ,introd4 to ,logic1 p4 #gf1   
where the conditions of a  legitimate   

hypothesis are laid down4 ,see also     
,critique of ,pure  ,reason1            
,methodology1 c4 i4  #c4    #add ,this  
illustration is also given in the ,logic
 7p4 #eg72  where the three modi of     
belief1 ,opinion1 ,faith1 and           
,knowledge1  are distinguished from each
 other4 ,cf4 ,critique of ,pure ,reason1
  ,methodology1 c4 ii4  #c4    #ade ,the
 speculations of ,swedenborg seem to    
have always had a strange  fascination  
for ,kant4 ,he says of two reported     
cases of ,swedenborg's  clairvoyance    
that he knows not how to disprove them  
7,rosenkranz vii4  #e72 but in his      
,anthropology  #ce1 #cg1 he attacks     
,swedenborgianism  as folly4 ,so in an  
early essay1 ,dreams of a ,visionary    
explained  by ,dreams of ,metaphysics1  
he avows his scepticism as to the value 
of the information which 8psychical     
research0 can supply about the          
spirit-world1 though he is careful not  
to commit himself to any  dogmatic      
statement on the subject of ghosts4 ,in 

the ,critique of ,pure  ,reason 7when   
discussing the ,postulates of ,empirical
 ,thought7 he  gives1 as an instance of 
a concept inconsistent with the canons  
of  possibility1 8a power of being in a 
community of thought with other  men1   
however distant from us40    #adf ,cf4  
supra1 p4 #bbi4    #adg ,i here extend1 
correctly as it seems to me1 the concept
 of a  thing of fact beyond the usual   
signification of this word4 ,for it is  
not needful1 not even feasible1 to limit
 this expression merely to  actual      
experience1 if we are talking of the    
relation of things to  our cognitive    
faculties2 for an experience merely     
possible is quite  sufficient in order  
that we may speak of them merely as     
objects of a  definite kind of          
cognition4    #adh ,cf4 introduction to 
,logic1 p4 #ei note4    #adi ,second    
,edition4    #aej ,things of faith are  
not therefore articles of faith2 if we  
understand by the latter things of faith
 to the confession of which  7internal  

or external7 we can be bound4 ,natural  
theology contains  nothing like this4   
,for since they1 as things of faith     
7like things of  fact7 cannot be based  
on theoretical proofs1 they are accepted
 by  a belief which is free and which   
only as such is compatible with the     
morality of the subject4    #aea ,the   
final purpose which the moral law       
enjoins upon us to further1  is not the 
ground of duty2 since this lies in the  
moral law1 which1  as formal practical  
principle1 leads categorically1         
independently  of the ,objects of the   
faculty of desire 7the material of the  
will7  and consequently of any purpose  
whatever4 ,this formal characteristic   
of my actions 7their subordination under
 the principle of universal  validity71 
wherein alone consists their inner moral
 worth1 is quite  in our power2 and ,i  
can quite well abstract from the        
possibility or  the unattainableness of 
purposes which ,i am obliged to promote 
in  conformity with that law 7because in

 them consists only the external  worth 
of my actions7 as something which is    
never completely in my  power1 in order 
only to look to that which is of my     
doing4 ,but then  the design of         
promoting the final purpose of all      
rational beings  7happiness so far as it
 is possible for it to be accordant with
 duty7  is even yet prescribed by the   
law of duty4 ,the speculative ,reason1  
however1 does not see at all the        
attainableness of this 7neither on  the 
side of our own physical faculty nor on 
that of the co-operation  of nature74   
,it must rather1 so far as we can judge 
in a rational way1  hold the derivation1
 by the aid of such causes1 of such a   
consequence  of our good conduct from   
mere nature 7internal and external7     
without  ,god and immortality1 to be an 
ungrounded and vain1 though well-meant1 
expectation2 and if it could have       
complete certainty of this judgement1   
it would regard the moral law itself as 
the mere deception of our  ,reason in a 

practical aspect4 ,but since the        
speculative ,reason fully  convinces    
itself that the latter can never take   
place1 but that on the  other hand those
 ,ideas whose object lies outside nature
 can be thought  without contradiction1 
it must for its own practical law and   
the  problem prescribed thereby1 and    
therefore in a moral aspect1 recognise  
those ,ideas as real in order not to    
come into contradiction with itself4    
#aeb ,it is a trust in the promise of   
the moral law2 not however such  as is  
contained in it1 but such as ,i put into
 it and that on morally  adequate       
grounds4#aec ,for a final purpose cannot
 be commanded by any  law of ,reason    
without this latter at the same time    
promising1 however  uncertainly1 its    
attainableness2 and thus justifying our 
belief in  the special conditions under 
which alone our ,reason can think it as 
attainable4 ,the word fides expresses   
this2 and it can only appear  doubtful1 
how this expression and this particular 

,idea came into moral  philosophy1 since
 it first was introduced with           
,christianity1 and the  adoption of it  
perhaps might seem to be only a         
flattering imitation  of ,christian     
terminology4 ,but this is not the only  
case in which this  wonderful religion  
with its great simplicity of statement  
has enriched  philosophy with far more  
definite and purer concepts of morality1
 than  it had been able to furnish      
before2 but which1 once they are there1 
are  freely assented to by ,reason and  
are assumed as concepts to which  it    
could well have come of itself and which
 it could and should have  introduced4  
#aec ,second ,edition4    #aed ,cf4     
,introd4 to ,logic1 ix4 p4 #fj1 8,that  
man is morally  unbelieving who does not
 accept that which though impossible to 
know is morally necessary to suppose40  
#aee ,first ,edition4    #aef ,in the   
,critique of ,pure ,reason1 ,dialectic1 
bk4 ,,ii4 c4 iii4   #d1 #e4    #aeg ,h4 
,s4 ,reimarus 7#afid-agfh71 the author  

of the famous  ,wolfenbttel ,fragments1 
published after the death of ,reimarus  
by  ,lessing4 ,the book alluded to by   
,kant is probably the ,abhandlungen von 
den vornehmsten ,wahrheiten der         
natrlichen ,religion 7#aged71 which had 
great popularity in its day4    #aeh    
,these arguments are advanced by ,hume1 
,inquiry1  vii4 ,cf4 also  ,pure        
,reason1 ,dialectic1 bk4 ,,ii4 c4 iii4  
#f1 and ,practical ,reason1  ,dialectic1
 c4 ii4  vii4    #aei ,cf4 ,practical   
,reason1 ,dialectic1 c4 ii4  v4    #afj 
,the admiration for beauty1 and also the
 emotion aroused by the  manifold       
purposes of nature1 which a reflective  
mind is able to feel  even prior to a   
clear representation of a rational      
,author of the world1  have something in
 themselves like religious feeling4     
,they seem in the  first place by a     
method of judging analogous to moral to 
produce an  effect upon the moral       
feeling 7gratitude to1 and veneration   
for1 the  unknown cause72 and thus by   

exciting moral ,ideas to produce an     
effect  upon the mind1 when they inspire
 that admiration which is bound up with 
far more interest than mere theoretical 
observation can bring about4            
,transcriber's ,notes      ,punctuation1
 hyphenation1 and spelling were made    
consistent when a  predominant          
preference was found in this book2      
otherwise they were not  changed4       
,simple typographical errors were       
corrected4    ,ambiguous hyphens at the 
ends of lines were retained4    ,text   
has three occcurrences of 8casuality01  
which have been retained1  but which may
 be misprints for 8causality04    ,these
 are transliterations of the ,greek text
 for use on devices that  cannot display
 such text3      ,page xvii3 kosmos4    
,page xxii3 kalo4      ,page xxiv3      
sphrosyn4      ,page xxxiii3 nous4      
,page #cig3 kat' altheian 7or7 kat'     
anthrpon4      ,footnote #gi 7originally
 on page #aie73 ha gar auta lyprs       
hormen1      toutn tas eikonas tas      

malista kribmenas chairomen therountes  
hoion thrin te morphas tn atimotatn kai 
nekrn4