,note3 ,images of the original pages are available through ,internet ,archive_/,american ,libraries4 ,see https3_/_/archive4org_/details_/fundamen talphilo#ja;balm ,transcriber's note3 ,text enclosed by underscores is in italics 7italics74 ,a carat character is used to denote superscription4 ,a single character following the carat is superscripted 7example3 #b;a74 ,multiple superscripted characters are enclosed by curly brackets 7example3 #a;ire74 ,,fundamental ,,philosophy4 by ,,rev4 ,,james ,,balmes4 ,translated from the ,spanish by ,henry ,f4 ,brownson1 ,m4,a4 ,in ,two ,volumes4 ,,vol4 ,i4 ,new ,york3 ,d4 ,j4 ,sadlier ,co41 #afd ,william ,street1 ,boston3--#abh ,federal ,street4 ,montreal3--,cor4 of ,notre ,dame and ,st4 ,francis ,xavier ,sts4 #ahef4 ,entered according to ,act of ,congress1 in the year #ahef1 ,by ,d4 ,j4 ,sadlier ,co41 ,in the ,clerk's ,office of the ,district ,court of the ,united ,states for the ,southern ,district of ,new ,york4 ,new ,york3 ,billin ,brother1 ,printers1 ,,xx ,north ,william ,st4 ,,contents ,,of ,,vol4 ,i4 ,,book ,,first4 ,,on ,,certainty4 ,,chapter ,,page ,i4 ,importance and ,utility of the ,question of ,certainty #c ,,ii4 ,true ,state of the ,question #g ,,iii4 ,certainty of the ,human ,race and ,philosophical ,certainty #ad ,,iv4 ,existence of ,transcendental ,science in the ,absolute ,intellectual ,order #bd ,v4 ,transcendental ,science in the ,human ,intellectual ,order cannot emanate from the ,senses #cb ,,vi4 ,transcendental ,science4--,insufficiency of ,real ,truths #cg ,,vii4 ,the ,philosophy of the ,me cannot produce ,transcendental ,science #da ,,viii4 ,universal ,identity #ef ,,ix4 ,universal ,identity1--,continued #fd ,x4 ,problem of ,representation3 ,monads of ,leibnitz #fg ,,xi4 ,problem of ,representation examined #ga ,,xii4 ,immediate ,intelligibility #gf ,,xiii4 ,representation of ,causality and ,ideality #hc ,,xiv4 ,impossibility of ,finding the first ,principle in the ,ideal ,order #hi ,,xv4 ,the ,indispensable ,condition of all ,human ,knowledge4--,means of perceiving ,truth #ib ,,xvi4 ,confusion of ,ideas in ,disputes on the ,fundamental ,principle #ajb ,,xvii4 ,thought and ,existence4--,descartes' ,principle #aje ,,xviii4 ,the ,principle of ,descartes1 continued4--,his ,method #aaa ,,xix4 ,value of the ,principle1 ,i ,think3--,its ,analysis #aah ,,xx4 ,true ,sense of the ,principle of ,contradiction4--,kant's ,opinion #abf ,,xxi4 ,does the ,principle of ,contradiction merit the ,title of ,fundamental2 and if so1 in what ,sense8 #adj ,,xxii4 ,the ,principle of ,evidence #adf ,,xxiii4 ,the ,criterion of ,consciousness #aea ,,xxiv4 ,the ,criterion of ,evidence #aeg ,,xxv4 ,the ,objective ,value of ,ideas #afc ,,xxvi4 ,can all ,cognitions be reduced to the ,perception of ,identity8 #aga ,,xxvii4 ,continuation of the same subject #agf ,,xxviii4 ,continuation of the same subject #ahc ,,xxix4 ,are there true ,synthetic ,judgments a priori in the ,sense of ,kant8 #ahh ,,xxx4 ,vico's ,criterion #bjj ,,xxxi4 ,continuation of the same subject #bab ,,xxxii4 ,the ,criterion on ,common ,sense #bai ,,xxxiii4 ,error of ,lamennais on ,common ,consent #bcj ,,xxxiv4 ,summary and ,conclusion #bec ,,book ,,second4 ,,on ,,sensation4 ,i4 ,sensation in ,itself #bdi ,,ii4 ,matter is incapable of ,sensation #bee ,,iii4 ,sleep and ,waking #bfc ,,iv4 ,relation of ,sensations to an ,external ,world #bfg ,v4 ,an ,idealist ,hypothesis #bgc ,,vi4 ,is the ,external and ,immediate ,cause of ,sensations a ,free ,cause8 #bgf ,,vii4 ,analysis of the ,objectiveness of ,sensations #bgi ,,viii4 ,sensation of ,extension #bhc ,,ix4 ,objectiveness of the ,sensation of ,extension #bhg ,x4 ,force of ,touch to make ,sensations ,objective #bic ,,xi4 ,inferiority of ,touch compared with other ,senses #bif ,,xii4 ,can ,sight alone give us the ,idea of a ,surface8 #cjb ,,xiii4 ,cheselden's ,blind ,man #caj ,,xiv4 ,can ,sight give us the ,idea of a ,solid8 #cae ,,xv4 ,sight and ,motion #cai ,,xvi4 ,possibility of other ,senses #cbd ,,xvii4 ,existence of ,new ,senses #cbh ,,xviii4 ,solution of ,lamennais' ,objection #ccc ,,book ,,third4 ,,extension ,,and ,,space4 ,i4 ,extension ,inseparable from the ,idea of ,body #cci ,,ii4 ,extension not ,perceptible as the ,direct and ,immediate ,object of ,sensations #cde ,,iii4 ,scientific ,fruitfulness of the ,idea of ,extension #cdh ,,iv4 ,reality of ,extension #ceg ,v4 ,geometrical ,exactness ,realized in ,nature #cfj ,,vi4 ,remarks on ,extension #cfe ,,vii4 ,space4--,nothing #cfi ,,viii4 ,descartes and ,leibnitz on ,space #cge ,,ix4 ,opinion of those who attribute to ,space a ,nature distinct from ,bodies #chj ,x4 ,opinion of those who hold ,space to be the ,immensity of ,god #chb ,,xi4 ,fenelon's ,opinion #chf ,,xii4 ,what ,space consists in #cia ,,xiii4 ,new ,difficulties #cif ,,xiv4 ,another ,important ,consequence #djj ,,xv4 ,illusion of ,fixed ,points in ,space #djc ,,xvi4 ,observations on ,kant's ,opinion #djg ,,xvii4 ,inability of ,kant's ,doctrine to solve the ,problem of the ,possibility of ,experience #dae ,,xviii4 ,the ,problem of ,sensible ,experience #dah ,,xix4 ,extension abstracted from ,phenomena #dba ,,xx4 ,are there ,absolute ,magnitudes8 #dbg ,,xxi4 ,pure ,intelligibility of the ,extended ,world #dcb ,,xxii4 ,infinite ,divisibility #dcf ,,xxiii4 ,unextended ,points #dci ,,xxiv4 ,a ,conjecture on the ,transcendental ,notion of ,extension #ddb ,,xxv4 ,harmony of the ,real1 ,phenomenal1 and ,ideal ,orders #ddf ,,xxvi4 ,character of the ,relations of the ,real ,order to the ,phenomenal #dej ,,xxvii4 ,whether every ,thing must be in some ,place #deb ,,xxviii4 ,contingency of ,corporeal ,relations #dei ,,xxix4 ,solution of two ,difficulties #dfb ,,xxx4 ,passive ,sensibility #dff ,,xxxi4 ,possibility of a greater ,sphere in active ,sensibility #dfi ,,xxxii4 ,possibility of the ,penetration of ,bodies #dhj ,,xxxiii4 ,a ,triumph of ,religion in the ,field of ,philosophy #dhc ,,xxxiv4 ,conclusion and ,summing up #dhi ,,notes ,,to ,,book ,,first #die ,,note ,,to ,,book ,,second #ead ,,notes ,,to ,,book ,,third #eag ,,introduction4 ,the following translation of the great work of the lamented ,james ,balmes on ,philosophy1 was undertaken at my suggestion and recommendation1 and thus far ,i hold myself responsible for it4 ,i have compared a considerable portion of it with the original1 and as far as ,i have compared it1 ,i have found it faithfully executed4 ,the translator appears to me to have rendered the author's thought with exactness and precision1 in a style not inferior to his own4 ,i have not added1 as was originally contemplated1 any ,notes to those of the author4 ,to have done so1 would have swelled the volumes to an unreasonable size1 and upon further consideration1 they did not seem to me to be necessary4 ,they would1 in fact1 have been an impertinence on my part1 and the reader will rather thank me for not having done it4 ,the work goes forth1 therefore1 as it came from the hands of its illustrious author1 with no addition or abbreviation1 or change1 except what was demanded by the difference between the ,spanish and ,english idioms4 ,james ,balmes1 in whose premature death in #ahdi1 the friends of religion and science have still to deplore a serious loss1 was one of the greatest writers and profoundest thinkers of ,spain1 and indeed of our times4 ,he is well and favorably known to the ,american public by his excellent work on ,european civilization1--a work which has been translated into the principal languages of ,europe4 ,in that work he proved himself a man of free and liberal thought1 of brilliant genius1 and varied and profound learning4 ,but his work on the bases of philosophy is his master-piece1 and1 taken as a whole1 the greatest work that has been published on that important subject in the nineteenth century4 ,yet it is rather as a criticism on the various erroneous systems of philosophy in modern times1 than as containing a system of philosophy itself1 that ,i have wished it translated and circulated in ,english4 ,as a refutation of ,bacon1 ,locke1 ,hume1 and ,condillac1 ,kant1 ,fichte1 ,schelling1 and ,spinoza1 it is a master-piece1 and leaves little to desire4 ,in determining the fundamental principles of philosophy1 and constructing a system in accordance with the real world1 the author is not always1 in my judgment1 successful1 and must yield to his ,italian contemporary1 the unhappy ,abbate ,gioberti4 ,when criticizing the errors of others1 the distinguished author reasons as an ontologist1 but when developing his own system1 he is almost a psychologist4 ,his ontology is usually sound1 indeed1 and his conclusions are for the most part just1 but not always logically obtained4 ,he recognizes no philosophical formula which embraces the whole subject-matter of philosophy1 and does not appear to be aware that the primum philosophicum is and must be a synthesis2 and hence he falls into what we may call1 not eclecticism1 but syncretism4 ,this is owing to the fact that his genius is critical rather than constructive1 and more apt to demolish than to build up4 ,what ,i regard as the chief error of the illustrious ,spaniard1 is his not recognizing that conceptions without intuitions are1 as ,kant justly maintains1 empty1 purely subjective1 the mind itself2 and hence1 while denying that we have intuition of the infinite1 contending that we have a real and objectively valid conception of it4 ,throughout his book the reader will find him maintaining that the human mind may1 by discursion1 attain to valid conceptions of a reality which transcends intuition4 ,this ,i regard as an error4 ,discursion is an act of reflection1 and though there is always less there can never be more in reflection than in intuition4 ,if we have no intuition of the infinite1 we have and can have no proper conception of it1 and what is taken to be a conception of it is simply the human mind itself1 and of no objective application or validity4 ,the excellent author is misled on this point1 by supposing that in intuition of the intelligible the mind is the actor and not simply the spectator1 and that an intuition of the infinite implies an infinite intuition4 ,in both cases he is mistaken4 ,in intuition we are simply spectators1 and the object affirms itself to us4 ,in intuition of the infinite1 it is not we who perceive and affirm the infinite1 by our own intellectual act1 but the infinite that reveals and affirms itself to our intellect4 ,in apprehending the infinite as thus revealed and affirmed1 we of course apprehend it in a finite1 not in an infinite manner4 ,that which is intuitively apprehended is infinite1 but the subjective apprehension is finite4 ,the limitation is on the part of the subject1 not on the part of the object4 ,the error arises from failing to distinguish sharply between intuition and reflection4 ,in intuition the principal and primary actor is the intelligible object4 ,in reflection it is the intellective subject2 in the intuitive order the object presents itself as it is1 with its own characteristics2 in the reflective order it is represented with the limitations and characteristics of the thinking subject4 ,as the subject is limited1 its conceptions are limited1 and represent the infinite not as infinite1 but as the not-finite2 and it is in the reflective order1 if we operate on our conceptions1 instead of our intuitions1 only by a discursive process that we can come to the conclusion that the not-finite is the infinite4 ,the author not distinguishing the two orders1 and taking conceptions which belong to the reflective order as if they belonged to the intuitive order1 supposes that we may have valid conceptions beyond the sphere of intuition4 ,but a little reflection should have taught him that1 if he had no intuition1 he could have no conception of the infinite4 ,following ,st4 ,thomas and all philosophers of the first order1 the author very properly maintains that it is by the divine intelligibility1 or the divine light1 that the human mind sees whatever it does see2 but he shrinks from saying that we have intuition of ,god himself4 ,so far as we are to understand intuition of ,god as intuition1 or open vision of him as he is in himself1 he is undoubtedly right4 ,but objects are intelligible only in the light of ,god1 and it is only by this light that we apprehend them4 ,do we ever apprehend objects by the light of ,god without apprehending the light which renders them apprehensible8 ,in apprehending the object1 we apprehend first of all the light which is the medium of its apprehension4 ,the light of ,god is ,god1 and if we have intuition of the light1 we must have intuition of him who is the true light that enlighteneth every man coming into this world4 ,we cannot see ,god as he is in himself1 not because he is not intelligible in himself1 but because of the excess of his light1 which dazzles and blinds our eyes through their weakness4 ,so1 very few of us can look steadily in the face of the sun without being dazzled1 yet not therefore is it to be said we cannot and do not see the sun4 ,the author does not seem to be aware that substance as distinguished from being or existence is an abstraction1 and therefore purely subjective1 and no object of intuition4 ,abstract from a thing all its properties or attributes1 and you have remaining simply zero4 ,the substance is properly the concrete thing itself1 and in the real order is distinguishable simply from its phenomena1 or accidents1--an abstract term1--not from its so-called attributes or properties4 ,hence1 the question1 so much disputed1 whether we perceive substances themselves1 is only the question1 whether we see things themselves or only their phenomena4 ,this question the ,scottish school of ,reid and ,sir ,william ,hamilton1 have settled forever1 and if it had not1 ,balmes has done it1 making the correction ,i have suggested1 in a manner that leaves nothing further to be said4 ,the author's proofs of the fact of creation are strong and well put1 but fail to be absolutely conclusive in consequence of his not recognizing intuition of the creative act4 ,they all presuppose this intuition1 and are conclusive1 because we in reality have it2 but by denying that we have it1 the author renders them formally inconclusive4 ,we have intuition of ,god1 real and necessary being1 we have also intuition of things or existences1 and therefore must have intuition of the creative act1 for things or existences are only the external terminus of the creative act itself4 ,hence it is that ,gioberti very properly makes the ideal formula1 or primum philosophicum1 the synthetic judgment1 ,ens creat existentias4 ,real and necessary ,being creates existences4 ,this formula or judgment in all its terms is given intuitively1 and simultaneously1 and it is because it is so given we are able at one blow to confound the skeptic1 the atheist1 and the pantheist4 ,the illustrious ,spaniard1 uses in all his argument this formula1 but he does so unconsciously1 in contradiction1 in fact1 to his express statements1 because he could not reason a moment1 form a single conclusion without it4 ,his argument in itself is good1 but his explication of it is sometimes in fault4 ,if the learned and excellent author had recognized the fact that we have intuition of the creative act of the first cause1 and the further fact that all second causes1 in their several spheres and degree1 imitate or copy the first1 he would have succeeded better in explaining their operation4 ,he does not seem to perceive clearly that the nexus which binds together cause and effect is the act of the cause1 which is in its own nature causative of the effect1 and by denying all intuition of this nexus1 he seems to leave us in the position where ,hume left us1 because it is impossible to attain by discursion to any objective reality of which we have no intuition4 ,these are all or nearly all the criticisms ,i am disposed to make upon the admirable work of ,balmes4 ,they are important1 no doubt1 but really detract much less from its value than it would seem4 ,it has1 in spite of these defects1 rare and positive merits4 ,the author has not indeed a synthetic genius1 but his powers of analysis are unsurpassed1 and as far as my philosophical reading goes1 unequalled4 ,he has not given us the last word of philosophy1 but he has given us precisely the work most needed in the present anarchical state of philosophical science4 ,not one of the errors to be detected in his work is peculiar to himself1 and the most that the most ill-natured critic can say against him is1 that1 while he retains and defends all the truth in the prevailing philosophy of the schools1 he has not escaped all its errors4 ,wherever he departs from scholastic tradition he follows truth1 and is defective only where that tradition is itself defective4 ,he has advanced far1 corrected innumerable errors1 poured a flood of light on a great variety of profound1 intricate1 and important problems1 without introducing a new or adding any thing to confirm an old error4 ,this is high praise1 but the philosophic reader will concede that it is well merited4 ,the work is well adapted to create a taste for solid studies4 ,it is written in a calm1 clear1 and dignified style1 sometimes rising to true eloquence4 ,the author threw his whole mind and soul into his work1 and shows himself everywhere animated by a pure and noble spirit1 free from all pride of opinion1 all love of theorizing1 and all dogmatism4 ,he evidently writes solely for the purpose of advancing the cause of truth and virtue1 religion and civilization1 and the effect of his writings on the heart is no less salutary than their effect on the mind4 ,i have wished the work to be translated and given to the ,english and ,american public1 not as a work free from all objections1 but as admirably adapted to the present state of the ,english and ,american mind1 as admirably fitted to correct the more dangerous errors now prevalent among us1 and to prepare the way for the elaboration of a positive philosophy worthy of the name4 ,we had nothing in ,english to compare with it1 and it is far better adapted to the ,english and ,american genius than the misty speculations we are importing1 and attempting to naturalize1 from ,germany4 ,it will lead no man into any error which he does not already entertain1 and few1 perhaps none1 can read it without positive benefit1 at least without getting rid of many errors4 ,with these remarks ,i commit these volumes to the public1 bespeaking for them a candid consideration4 ,the near relation in which ,i stand to the translator makes me anxious that his labors should be received with a kindly regard4 ,he who translates well a good book from a foreign language into his own1 does a service to his country next to that of writing a good book himself4 ,o4 ,a4 ,,brownson4 ,,august #g1 #ahef4 ,,book ,,first4 ,,on ,,certainty4 ,,fundamental ,,philosophy4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,,importance ,,and ,,utility ,,of ,,the ,,question ,,of ,,certainty4 #a4 ,we should begin the study of philosophy by examining the question of certainty2 before raising the edifice1 we must lay the foundation4 ,ever since there has been philosophy1 that is1 ever since men first reflected on themselves and the beings around them1 they have been engaged with those questions which have for their object the basis of human knowledge1 and this shows that on this subject serious difficulties are encountered4 ,inquirers1 however1 have not been discouraged by the sterility of philosophical labors2 and this shows that in the last term of the investigation an object of high importance is discovered4 ,philosophers have cavilled in the most extravagant manner upon the questions of certainty2 on few subjects has the history of the human mind presented such lamentable aberrations4 ,this consideration may excite suspicion that such investigations offer nothing solid to the mind1 and serve only to feed the vanity of the sophist4 ,but here1 as elsewhere1 we attribute no exaggerated importance to the opinions of philosophers1 and we are very far from believing that they ought to be regarded as the legitimate representatives of human reason4 ,it cannot1 however1 be denied that they are in the intellectual order the most active portion of the human race4 ,when the whole body of philosophers dispute1 humanity itself may be said to dispute4 ,every fact affecting the human race merits a thorough examination2 to undervalue it1 on account of the sophisms which envelop it1 is to fall into the worst of all sophisms4 ,there should be no contradiction between reason and common sense2 yet such a contradiction there would be1 if we should1 in the name of common sense1 contemn what occupies the reason of the most enlightened minds4 ,oftentimes it happens that what is grave and significant1 that which makes a thinking man meditate1 is the result neither of a disputation1 nor of the arguments therein adduced1 but the simple existence of the dispute itself4 ,in itself it is sometimes of little importance1 but by reason of what it indicates1 of great consequence4 #b4 ,all philosophical questions are in some manner involved in that of certainty4 ,when we have completely unfolded this1 we have examined under one aspect or another all that human reason can conceive of ,god1 man1 and the universe4 ,at first sight it may perhaps seem to be the simple foundation of the scientific structure2 but in this foundation1 if we carefully examine it1 we shall see the whole edifice represented3 it is a plane whereon is projected1 visibly and in fair perspective1 the whole body it is to support4 #c4 ,however limited may be the direct and immediate result of these investigations1 they are of incalculable advantage4 ,it is highly important to acquire science1 but not less important to know its limits4 ,near these limits there are shoals which the navigator ought to know4 ,it is by examining the question of certainty that we ascertain the limits of human science4 ,in descending to the depths to which these questions lead us1 the understanding grows dim1 and the heart is awed with a religious fear4 ,a moment ago we were contemplating the edifice of human knowledge1 and grew proud to see it with its colossal dimensions1 its beautiful forms1 its fine and bold construction2 we enter it1 and are led through deep caverns1 and1 as if by enchantment1 the foundation seems to be subtilized1 to evaporate1 and the superb edifice remains floating in the air4 #d4 ,it must be remarked that in entering on the examination of the question of certainty1 we do not conceal from ourselves its difficulties4 ,to conceal would not be to solve them2 on the contrary1 the first condition necessary to their complete solution1 is to see them with perfect clearness1 and to feel their full force4 ,it is no humiliation to the human understanding to seek those limits beyond which it cannot pass1 but it is to elevate and confirm it4 ,thus the intrepid naturalist1 when in search of some object he has penetrated to the bowels of the earth1 feels a mixture of terror and pride to be thus buried in subterranean caverns1 with just light enough to see immense masses barely suspended above his head and unfathomable abysses beneath his feet4 ,there is something sublime1 something attractive and captivating in the obscurity of the mysteries of science1 in uncertainty itself1 in the very assaults of doubt1 threatening to destroy in one instant the work accomplished by the human mind only in the space of long ages4 ,the greatest men have at all times enjoyed the contemplation of these mysteries4 ,the genius which spread its wings over the east1 over ,greece and ,rome1 over the schools of the ,middle ,ages1 is the same we now behold in modern ,europe4 ,plato1 ,aristotle1 ,st4 ,augustine1 ,abelard1 ,st4 ,anselm1 ,st4 ,thomas of ,aquin1 ,luis ,vives1 ,bacon1 ,descartes1 ,malebranche1 and ,leibnitz1 all1 each in his own way1 felt the sublime inspiration of philosophy4 ,whatever tends to raise man to lofty contemplation in the sanctuary of his soul1 contributes to his aggrandizement2 for it separates him from natural objects1 reminds him of his noble origin1 and proclaims to him his high destiny4 ,in a mechanical and sensual age1 when every thing seems opposed to the activity of the powers of the soul1 except when they administer to the wants of the body1 it is well to renew those great questions in which the mind roams free and untrammelled over unbounden realms of space4 ,only intellect can examine itself4 ,the stone falls1 but knows not that it falls2 the ray calcines and pulverizes1 ignorant of its power2 the flower knows not that its beauty is enchanting2 and the brute beast follows his instincts1 but asks not the reason of them4 ,man alone1 a fragile organization1 appearing for a moment on earth again to return to the dust1 harbors a spirit1 which first inspects the external world1 and then1 anxious to ascertain its own nature1 enters into itself as into a sanctuary1 and becomes its own oracle4 ,what am ,i8 ,what do ,i do8 ,what do ,i think8 ,what phenomena do ,i experience within myself8 ,why am ,i subject to them8 ,what is their cause1 their order of production1 their relations8 ,the mind asks itself these questions1--serious and difficult indeed1 but noble and sublime questions2 an unfailing proof that there is within us something superior to inert matter susceptible only of motion and a variety of forms1 that there is something1 which1 by an internal activity1 spontaneous and rooted in our very nature1 presents us an image of that infinite ,activity1 a single act of whose will created the world from nothing47#a7 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,true ,,state ,,of ,,the ,,question4 #e4 ,that we have certainty1 common sense assures us1 but what is its basis1 and how it is acquired1 are two difficult questions1 which it is for philosophy to answer4 ,three very different questions are involved in that of certainty2 and if confounded1 they contribute not a little to the creation of difficulties1 and the confusion of matters which1 even when they have their various aspects most accurately marked1 are sufficiently hard and complicated4 ,it will greatly conduce to the due determination of our ideas1 carefully to distinguish between the existence of certainty1 its basis1 and the mode in which it is acquired4 ,its existence is an indisputable fact2 its basis the object of philosophical researches1 and the mode of acquiring it frequently a concealed phenomenon not open to observation4 #f4 ,that bodies exist is a fact that no man of sane mind can doubt4 ,no questions raised upon this point can ever shake our firm conviction in the existence1 without us1 of what we call the corporeal world4 ,this conviction is a phenomenon of our existence4 ,explain it1 perhaps we cannot2 but we certainly cannot deny it2 we submit to it as to an inevitable necessity4 ,what is the basis of certainty8 ,here we have not a simple fact1 but a question solved by every philosopher in his own way4 ,descartes and ,malebranche recur to the veracity of ,god2 ,locke and ,condillac to the peculiar character and evolution of certain sensations4 ,how does man acquire this certainty8 ,he knows not3 he had it before reflecting on it2 he is astounded to hear it made a matter of dispute1 and he might never have suspected it could be asked1 why we are certain that what affects our senses exists4 ,it is of no use to ask him how he made so precious an acquisition2 he regards it as a fact scarcely distinct from his own existence4 ,he has no recollection of the order of sensations in his infancy2 he finds his mind now developed1 but is as ignorant of the laws of its development as he is of those which presided over the generation and growth of his body4 #g4 ,philosophy should begin by explaining1 not by disputing the fact of certainty4 ,if we are certain of nothing1 it is absolutely impossible for us to advance a single step in any science1 or to take any part whatever in the affairs of life4 ,a thorough-going skeptic would be insane1 and that too with insanity of the highest grade4 ,to such a one1 all communication with other men1 all succession of external actions1 all thoughts1 and even acts of the will would be impossible4 ,let us1 then1 admit the fact1 and not be so extravagant as to say that madness sits on the threshold of philosophy4 ,it is the part of philosophy to analyze1 not to destroy its object2 for by destroying its object it destroys itself4 ,every argument must have a resting-point1 which must be a fact4 ,whether it be internal or external1 idea or object1 the fact must exist3 we must begin by supposing something1 and this something we call a fact4 ,whoever begins by denying or doubting all facts1 is like the anatomist1 who1 before dissecting a corpse1 burns it1 and casts its ashes to the wind4 #h4 ,philosophy then1 it may be said1 commences not with an examination1 but with an affirmation4 ,granted1 and this is a truth whose admission closes the door on much sophistry1 and sheds a brilliant light over the whole theory of certainty4 ,philosophers are deceived when they imagine that they begin by doubting4 ,nothing is more false2 when they think1 they affirm1 if nothing else1 at least their own doubt3 whenever they reason1 they assert the connection of ideas1 that is1 the whole logical world4 ,fichte1 who certainly was not easily satisfied with anything1 begins to treat of the basis of human knowledge by making an affirmation1 and this he confesses with an ingenuousness that does him honor4 ,speaking of reflection1 the foundation of his philosophy1 he says3 ,the rules to which this reflection is subject1 are not proved to be valid1 but are tacitly presupposed to be known and admitted4 ,they are1 in their remotest origin1 derived from a principle1 the legitimacy of which can only be established on condition that they are valid4 ,this is a circle1 but an inevitable circle4 ,but supposing it to be inevitable1 and that we frankly confess it so to be1 it is1 in order to establish the highest principle1 allowable to trust all the laws of general logic4 ,we must start on the road of reflection with a proposition conceded by all the world without any contradiction4#a #a ,fichte1 ,grundlage der gesammten ,wissenschaftslehre4 ,theil4 i41 #a4 ,ed4 ,berlin1 #ahde1 p4 #ib4 #i4 ,certainty is to us a happy necessity2 nature imposes it1 and philosophers do not cast off nature4 ,pyrrho once came very near being hit by a stone1 but he very naturally took good care to get out of its way1 without stopping to examine whether it was a real stone1 or only the appearance of one4 ,the bystanders laughed at him for this1 and1 at the same time1 showed how inconsistent this act was with his doctrine2 but he gave this answer1 which1 under the circumstances1 was exceedingly profound3 ,it is hard entirely to throw off human nature4 #aj4 ,in sound philosophy1 then1 the question turns not upon the existence of certainty1 but upon its motives1 and the means of acquiring it4 ,it is an inheritance of which we cannot divest ourselves1 although we repudiate those very titles which guaranty its possession to us4 ,who is not certain that he thinks1 feels1 wills2 that he has a body1 and that there are around him others similar to his1 of which the corporeal universe consists8 ,prior to all systems1 humanity was in possession of this certainty1 so1 also1 is every individual1 although he may never during his whole life have once asked himself what the world is1 what bodies are1 or in what sensation1 thought1 and will consist4 ,not even if we examine the foundations of certainty and acknowledge the serious difficulties concerning them1 which arise from ratiocination1 is it possible to doubt everything4 ,there never was1 in all the rigor of the word1 a true skeptic4 #aa4 ,it is the same with certainty as with other objects of human knowledge4 ,the fact is presented to us in all its magnitude1 and with all clearness2 but we do not penetrate to its innermost nature4 ,our understanding is as well provided with means to acquire knowledge of phenomena in the spiritual as in the material order1 and it is sufficiently perspicacious to detect1 delineate1 and classify the laws to which they are subject2 but when it would ascend to the cognition of the very essence of things1 or would investigate the principles of the science which makes its boast1 it feels its strength fail1 and the ground whereon it stands1 tremble and sink beneath its feet4 ,happily1 man possesses certainty independently of philosophical systems1 not limited to phenomena of the soul1 but extending as far as is needed in order to direct his conduct1 both with regard to himself and to external objects4 ,before inquiring if there is certainty1 all men were certain that they thought1 willed1 felt1 that they had a body whose motions were governed by the will1 and that there existed an assemblage of various bodies1 called the universe4 ,since inquiries with regard to certainty were first instituted1 it has remained the same with all men1 even with those who disputed it2 not one of whom could ever go farther than ,pyrrho1 and succeed in casting off human nature4 #ab4 ,we cannot determine to what extent the force of mind of some philosophers1 engaged in combatting nature1 may have succeeded in creating doubt on many points1 but certain it is3 first1 that no one ever went so far as to doubt the internal phenomena whose presence he felt inwardly2 second1 that if indeed any one ever did persuade himself that no external object corresponded to these phenomena1 this must have been so strange an exception as to merit1 in the history of science1 and in the eyes of sound philosophy1 no more weight than the illusions of a maniac4 ,if ,berkely went so far as to deny the existence of bodies1 thus making the sophisms of reason triumph over the instincts of nature1 he is alone1 and in opposition to all mankind1 and richly merits to have this saying applied to him3 ,insanity is insanity still1 no matter how sublime it may be4 ,those very philosophers1 who carried their skepticism the farthest1 agreed upon the necessity of accommodating themselves in practice to the appearances of the senses1 and of reserving doubt for the world of speculation4 ,philosophers may dispute on every thing as much as they please1 but1 the dispute over1 they cease to be philosophers1 and are again men1 similar to other men1 and1 like them all1 enjoy the fruits of certainty4 ,this1 ,hume1 who denied with ,berkely the existence of bodies1 confesses3 ,i dine1 he says2 ,i play a game at backgammon2 ,i converse1 and am happy with my friends2 and when1 after three or four hours of amusement1 ,i would return to these speculations1 they appear so cold1 so strained1 and so ridiculous1 that ,i cannot find it in my heart to enter into them any farther4 ,here1 then1 ,i find myself absolutely and necessarily determined to live1 and talk1 and act1 like other people1 in the common affairs of life4#b #b ,treatise of ,human ,nature1 vol4 i41 p4 #dfg4 #ac4 ,we must1 in discussing certainty1 guard against the feverish desire of shaking the foundations of human reason4 ,we should1 in this class of questions1 seek a thorough knowledge of the principles of science1 and the laws which govern the development of our mind4 ,to labor to destroy them is to mistake the object of true philosophy3 we have only to make them a matter of observation1 just as we do those of the material world1 without any intention of disturbing the admirable order prevailing in the universe4 ,skeptics1 who1 in order to render their philosophy more solid1 begin by doubting every thing1 resemble the man1 who1 desirous of ascertaining1 and exactly determining the phenomena of life1 should bare his bosom1 and thrust the knife into his heart4 ,sobriety is as necessary to the health of the mind1 as to that of the body3 there is no wisdom without prudence1 no philosophy without judgment4 ,in the soul of man there is a divine light which directs him with admirable certainty4 ,if we do not persist in extinguishing it1 its splendor guides us1 and when we reach the term of science it shows it to us1 and makes us read in distinct characters the words1--enough1 you can go no farther4 ,these words are written by the ,author of all beings2 he it is that has given laws to the body as well as to the mind1 and he contains in his infinite essence the ultimate reason of all things4 #ad4 ,the certainty which is prior to all examination is not blind2 on the contrary1 it springs either from the clearness of the intellectual vision1 or from an instinct conformable to reason3 it is not opposed to reason1 but is its basis4 ,our mind1 in discursive reasoning1 knows truth by the connection of propositions1 or by the light which is reflected from one truth upon another4 ,in primitive certainty the vision is by direct light1 and does not need reflection4 ,when1 then1 we note the existence of certainty1 we do not speak of a blind fact1 nor do we seek to extinguish the light in its very source2 we would rather say1 that it is more brilliant there than in its radiations4 ,we see a body whose splendor illumines the world in which we live2 ought we1 if requested to explain its nature and its relations with other objects1 to begin by destroying these8 ,when naturalists would examine the nature of light1 and determine its laws1 they do not begin by removing the light itself1 and placing themselves in darkness4 #ae4 ,true1 this method of philosophizing is somewhat dogmatic1 but dogmatic as it is1 it has on its side1 as we have seen1 ,pyrrho1 ,hume1 and ,fichte4 ,it is not simply a method of philosophy1 it is the voluntary submission of our very nature to an inevitable necessity1 the combination of reason with instinct1 a simultaneous attention to different voices calling from the depths of our soul4 ,according to ,pascal1 nature confounds the ,pyrrhonians1 and reason the dogmatists4 ,this passes for a profound saying1 and is so under a certain aspect2 but it is notwithstanding somewhat inexact4 ,the confusion is not the same in both cases3 reason does not confound the dogmatist1 unless he separates it from nature2 but nature confounds the ,pyrrhonian1 either alone or joined with reason4 ,the true dogmatist founds his reason upon nature2 it knows itself1 confesses the impossibility of proving every thing1 and does not arbitrarily assume any principle that it needs unless nature itself furnishes it4 ,and thus it does not confound the dogmatist1 when guided by it he seeks a sure foundation for it4 ,nature1 when it confounds the ,pyrrhonian1 attests the triumph of the reason of dogmatists1 whose principal argument against ,pyrrhonians1 is the voice of nature itself4 ,pascal's thought would have been more exact if thus worded3 nature confounds the ,pyrrhonian and is necessary to the reason of dogmatists4 ,this is less antithetical1 but more true4 ,dogmatists do not deny nature2 reason without it is impotent2 to exercise its strength it needs a resting point4 ,with such1 ,archimedes offered to move the earth1 without this his immense lever could not stir a single atom47#b7 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,certainty ,,of ,,the ,,human ,,race1 ,,and ,,philosophical ,,certainty4 #af4 ,certainty does not originate in reflection2 it is the spontaneous product of man's nature1 and is annexed to the direct act of the intellectual and sensitive faculties4 ,it is a condition necessary to the exercise of both1 and without it life were a chaos2 we therefore possess it instinctively1 and without any reflection1 and we enjoy the fruit of this as of all those other benefits of the ,creator1 which are inseparably joined to our existence4 #ag4 ,it is1 then1 necessary to distinguish between the certainty of the human race and philosophical certainty1 although1 to speak frankly1 it is not easy to conceive what can be the value of any human certainty distinct from that of the human race4 ,if we set aside the efforts which the philosopher sometimes makes to discover the basis of human knowledge1 we shall readily find him confounded with the rest of mankind4 ,this cavil leaves no trace in his mind with respect to the certainty of all that the human race is certain of4 ,he then discovers that the doubt which he felt was not a real doubt1 although he may have deluded himself into a contrary belief4 ,his doubts were simple suppositions1 nothing more4 ,when his meditation is over1 and perhaps even while it lasts1 he finds that he is as certain as the most ignorant individual of his internal acts1 the existence of his own body1 of other bodies around him1 and of a thousand other things1 which constitute the amount of knowledge requisite to the wants of life4 ,question all1 from the infant of a few summers1 to the sage of many years and mature judgment1 on the certainty of their own existence1 their acts internal or external1 their friends and relatives1 the people among whom they dwell1 objects seen or heard of1 and you will not detect any hesitation in their answers1 or any kind of difference in the grades of their certainty4 ,if they have no knowledge of the philosophical questions touching these matters1 you may read in their countenances wonder and astonishment that any one should seriously investigate things so evident4 #ah4 ,impossible as it is for us to know in what manner the sensitive1 intellectual1 and moral powers of children are developed1 it is equally impossible to prove a a priori1 by analyzing the operations of his mind1 that reflex acts do not concur to the formation of certainty2 but it will not be difficult to find proofs of this in the exercise of these faculties when well developed4 ,if we observe attentively1 we shall see that the child's faculties habitually operate in a direct1 not a reflex manner2 which shows that the development is made directly1 not by reflection4 ,were the primitive development the work of reflexion1 the reflective power would be great in the child4 ,but this is not the case4 ,very few men are ever endowed with it1 and in the greater part of them it is very nearly null4 ,they who attain to it1 acquire it only by assiduous labor1 and not without great violence to himself1 can any one pass from direct to reflex cognition4 #ai4 ,no matter what you teach a child1 he perceives it indeed1 but call his attention to the perception itself1 and his understanding is at once obscured and confused4 ,let us make the experiment4 ,suppose we would teach a child the elements of geometry4 ,do you see this figure bounded by three lines8 ,it is called a triangle2 the lines are called sides1 and the points where they unite the vertices of the angles4--,i understand that4--,do you see this other figure bounded by four lines8 ,it is called quadrilateral1 and1 like the triangle1 has its sides and vertices of angles4--,very well4--,can a quadrilateral figure be a triangle1 or vice versa8--,it cannot4--,never8--,never4--,why not8--,one has three1 and the other four sides3 how then can they be the same thing8--,who knows8 ,it may seem so to you1 but----,see here6 ,this has three1 and this four sides2 and three and four are not the same thing4 ,torture his understanding as much as you please1 but you cannot drive him from his position3 and thus we see that his perception and his reason operate directly1 that is1 by direct application to the object4 ,of himself he does not direct his attention to his own internal acts1 does not think upon his own thoughts1 does not combine reflex ideas1 nor seek in them the certainty of his judgment4 #bj4 ,and here we detect a vital error in the art of thinking as it has hitherto been taught4 ,the young intellect is exercised in reflection1 the most difficult part of science1 which is as inconsiderate as it would be to commence his physical development by the most painful gymnastic exercises4 ,man's scientific development should be governed by his natural development1 which is direct not reflex4 #ba4 ,let us apply this remark to the exercise of the senses4 ,do you hear that music8 asks the child4--,what music8--,did you not hear it8 ,are you deaf8--,it seems to you that you hear it4--,but1 sir1 ,i hear it so distinctly6 ,how can it be possible8--,but how do you know8--,i hear it4 ,from his ,i hear it you cannot drive him3 he will not hesitate a moment1 nor will he appeal to any reflex act in order to avoid your importunities4 ,i hear it3 do not you hear it8 ,he asks nothing more1 and all your philosophy cannot equal the irresistible force of sensation which assures him that there is music1 and that whoever doubts it is either deaf or in jest4 #bb4 ,had the faculties of the child been developed by alternate direct and reflex acts2 had he1 when acquiring knowledge of things1 thought of something besides the things themselves2 evidently a continuation of such acts would have left some impression on his mind1 and urged to assign the motives of his certainty1 he would indicate those very means that he made use of in the gradual development of his faculties2 he would abstract the object1 retire into himself1 think upon his own thought in one way or another1 and thus encounter the difficulty4 ,nothing of this character takes place1 which proves that no such reflex acts have been performed1 that there have been only perceptions accompanied by internal consciousness and certainty of their existence2 but all in a confused1 instinctive manner1 without any thing like philosophical reflection4 #bc4 ,what has been said of the child1 may be proved true also of adults1 however clear and perfect their intellect4 ,if not initiated into questions of philosophy1 they will give very nearly the same answers to difficulties proposed on the same matters1 and even upon many others more exposed to doubt4 ,experience proves better than all ratiocination that no one acquires certainty by reflex acts4 #bd4 ,philosophers teach that the sources of certainty are the internal sense or consciousness of acts1 the external senses1 common sense1 reason1 and authority4 ,a few examples will show us that there is reflection in all these1 and how most men1 and even philosophers1 when they act like men and not like philosophers1 think4 #be4 ,suppose a clear-headed person1 one however who is ignorant of the questions of certainty1 has just seen some monument1 the ,escurial for instance1 which leaves a lively and lasting impression on his mind1 and while he recollects his gratification on seeing it1 try to make him doubt the existence of this recollection in his mind1 and its correspondence as well with the act of seeing as with the edifice itself1 and he will very certainly think you are in jest1 or will be astounded1 and will suspect you of being out of your senses4 ,he discovers no difference between things different as are the actual existence of his recollection1 its correspondence with the past act of seeing1 and the agreement of both with the edifice seen4 ,he knows in this case no more than a child of six years3 ,i recollect it1 ,i saw it1 it is as ,i recollect it4 ,this is all his science3 he neither reflects1 nor separates2 all is direct and simultaneous4 ,no matter what suppositions you make1 you can never get from the majority of men any better account of the phenomena of the internal sense1 than you got from the supposed individual's recollection of the ,escurial3 all that ,i know is that it is so4 ,there are here no reflex acts2 certainty attends the direct act1 and no philosophical considerations can add one iota to the security given by the very force of things1 and the instinct of nature4 #bf4 ,example of the testimony of the senses4 ,if we see any object1 no matter what1 at a proper distance and in sufficient light1 we judge of its size1 figure1 and color1 and we are very confident of the truth of our judgment1 although we may never1 in all our life1 have thought of a theory of sensation1 or of the relations of our organs1 either to each other or to external objects4 ,no reflex act accompanies the formation of our judgment2 all is done instinctively1 and without the intervention of philosophical considerations4 ,we see it1 and nothing else3 this is enough for certainty4 ,it is only after having handled books in which the question of certainty is agitated1 that we turn our attention to our own acts2 but this attention1 it is to be remarked1 lasts only so long as we are engaged in the scientific analysis2 when this is forgotten1 which it very soon is1 we return to our general routine1 and seldom recur to philosophy4 ,note well that we speak here of the certainty of the judgment formed in consequence of sensation only in so far as it is connected with the uses of life1 and not at all of its greater or less exactness with respect to the nature of things4 ,thus it matters little that we consider colors as inherent qualities of bodies1 although in reality they are not2 it is sufficient that the judgment formed does not in any sense change our relations to objects1 whatever may be the philosophical theory4 #bg4 ,example of common sense4 ,in the presence of a numerous assembly1 throw a quantity of printer's types at random upon the ground1 and tell the bystanders that their names will all be found printed4 ,they will all with one accord laugh at your folly4 ,but what is the reason of this8 ,have they all reflected upon the basis of their certainty8 ,assuredly they have not4 #bh4 ,example of reason4 ,we all reason1 and in many cases rightly4 ,without art or reflection of any kind1 we often distinguish the solid from the futile1 the sophistical from the conclusive4 ,this does not require us to regard the course of our understanding2 without scarcely noticing it we follow the right road2 and a man may1 in his life1 have formed a thousand rigorous and exact ratiocinations without ever having once attended to his method of reasoning4 ,even those most versed in the dialectic art1 repeatedly forget it2 they perhaps follow it very correctly in practice1 but they pay no express attention to any one of its rules4 #bi4 ,ideologists have written whole volumes on the operations of our understanding1 and the simple rustic performs these operations without thinking that he performs them4 ,how much has been written on abstraction1 generalization1 and universals6 ,yet this is all well regulated in the mind of every man1 ignorant as he may be of a science which examines it4 ,in his language you will find the universal and the particular expressed1 and every thing occupying its proper place in his discourse3 he encounters no difficulty in his direct acts4 ,but call his attention to these acts themselves1 to abstraction for example2 and what was in the direct act so clear and lucid1 becomes a chaos the moment it passes to the reflex order4 ,thus we see that reflection1 whose object is the act performed1 is of very little importance even in reasoning1 its most reflective medium4 #cj4 ,example of authority4 ,all civilized people know the existence of ,england1 but most of them know this only from having heard or read of it1 that is1 by authority4 ,their certainty of the existence of ,england evidently is not surpassed by that of objects of their own vision2 and yet how many of them have ever thought of analyzing the foundations of such a certainty8 ,yet is the certainty of those who have examined it greater than that of those who have not examined it8 ,in the present case1 as in an infinity of others analogous to it1 there is no intervention of reflex acts3 certainty is here formed instinctively1 and needs no medium invented by philosophers4 #ca4 ,these examples show that philosophers take a very different road to certainty from that taught by nature4 ,he who created all things out of nothing1 has provided them with all that is necessary to the exercise of their functions according to their respective positions in the universe2 and one of the first necessities of an intelligent being is the certainty of some truths4 ,what would become of us1 if before beginning to receive impressions1 and before the germination of primary ideas in our understanding1 we were obliged to perform the painful task of elaborating some system capable of saving us from uncertainty8 ,were it thus1 our intellect would perish at its very birth1 for no sooner would it open its eyes to the light than it would be involved in the chaos of its own cavils1 and it could never1 with its scattered forces1 succeed in dissipating the clouds which would arise on all sides1 and which would finally sink it in total darkness4 ,if the greatest philosophers1 the most clear and acute intellects1 the strongest and most vigorous geniuses have labored to so little purpose to establish solid principles1 such as might serve for the foundations of science1 what would have happened had not the ,creator succored us in this necessity1 and given certainty to the tender intellect1 just as he prepared for the preservation of the body the milk that nourishes and the air that vivifies it8 #cb4 ,if any part of science ought to be regarded as purely speculative1 it is undoubtedly the part which concerns certainty2 and this proposition1 paradoxical as it may seem at first sight1 is true1 and can be easily demonstrated4 #cc4 ,what does philosophy here propose to do8 ,to produce certainty8 ,but it exists independently of all philosophical systems1 and mankind were certain of many things before ever any one thought of such questions4 ,moreover1 since the question was first raised1 few1 compared with the whole human race1 have examined it2 so it is now1 and so it will be2 and all the theories invented on this point can have no effect upon the fact of certainty4 ,what has been said of its production may be said of the attempt to consolidate it4 ,when have the generality of men had1 or when will they have1 time and opportunity to examine these questions8 #cd4 ,philosophy could here have produced nothing but skepticism1 for the variety and opposition of systems were more calculated to create than to dissipate doubts4 ,happily nature is the most invincible opponent of skepticism2 the sage's dreams pass not from his library to the every day uses of the life of ordinary men1 or even of those who labor under or imagine them4 #ce4 ,philosophy here can propose to itself no more reasonable object than simply to examine the foundations of certainty1 with the sole view of more thoroughly knowing the human mind1 not of making any change in practice2 just as astronomers observe the course of the stars1 investigate and determine the laws to which they are subject1 without therefore presuming to be able to modify them4 #cf4 ,but even this supposition places philosophy in a very unsatisfactory position2 for if we recollect what we have already established1 we shall see that science observes a real and true phenomenon1 but gives it a gratuitous explanation1 by making an imaginary analysis of it4 ,experience has in fact shown our understanding to be guided by no one of the considerations made by philosophers2 its assent1 when it is accompanied by the greatest certainty1 is a spontaneous product of a natural instinct1 not of combinations2 it is a firm adhesion exacted by the evidence of the truth1 the power of the internal sense1 or the impulse of instinct2 not a conviction produced by a series of ratiocinations4 ,these combinations and ratiocinations therefore exist only in the mind of philosophers1 not in reality2 when1 therefore1 they attempt to designate the foundations of certainty1 we are told what could or should have been1 but not what is4 ,if philosophers would only be guided by their own systems1 and would not forget them nor set them aside as soon as1 or even before1 they have finished explaining them1 it might be said1 that even if no reason can be given for human certainty1 one can be given for philosophical certainty2 but since these same philosophers make no use of these scientific means save when developing them ex professo1 it follows that their pretended foundations are a mere theory1 having little or no connection with the reality4 #cg4 ,this demonstration of the vanity of philosophical systems relating to the foundation of certainty1 far from leading to skepticism1 has a directly contrary tendency2 for it makes us appreciate at their true value1 the emptiness of our cavils1 compares their impotence with the irresistible force of nature1 and thus destroys that foolish pride which would make us superior to the laws imposed upon our understanding by the ,creator himself2 it places us in the channel through which the torrent of humanity has for ages run2 and it disposes us to receive with sound philosophy what the laws of our nature force us to accept47#c7 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,existence ,,of ,,transcendental ,,science ,,in ,,the ,,absolute ,,intellectual ,,order4 #ch4 ,philosophers have sought a first principle of human knowledge2 each has assigned his own1 and now after so much discussion it is doubtful who is right1 or even if any one is right4 ,before inquiring what the first principle is1 they ought to have ascertained whether there be any such principle4 ,we cannot suppose this last question to be answered affirmatively2 for it is1 as we shall hereafter see1 susceptible of different solutions1 according to the aspect under which it is seen4 ,the first principle of knowledge may be understood in either of two senses2 as denoting one first truth from which all others flow1 or as expressing a truth which we must suppose if we would not have all other truths disappear4 ,in the former sense it is a spring from which the waters flow1 which fertilize the intellect2 in the second sense it is a point whereon to rest a great weight4 #ci4 ,is there any one truth from which all others flow8 ,there is in reality1 in the order of beings1 in the universal intellectual order2 but in the human intellectual order there is none4 #dj4 ,there is in the order of beings one truth1 the origin of all truths2 for truth is reality1 and there is one ,being1 author of all beings4 ,this being is a truth1--truth itself1--the plenitude of truth1--for he is being by essence1 the plenitude of being4 ,every school of philosophy has in some sense recognized this unity of origin4 ,the atheist talks of the force of nature2 the pantheist of an only substance1 of the absolute1 of the unconditioned2 both have abandoned the idea of ,god1 and now labour to replace it by something which may be made the origin of the existence of the universe1 and of the development of its phenomena4 #da4 ,there is in the universal intellectual order one truth from which all others flow2 it is1 that the unity of origin of all truths is not only found in realized truths1 that is1 in beings considered in themselves1 but likewise in the concatenation of ideas representing these beings4 ,and thus if our understanding could ascend to the knowledge of all truths1 and embrace them in their unity and in all the relations uniting them1 it would see them after arriving at a certain height1 notwithstanding their dispersion and divergence as now perceived by us1 converge to a centre1 in which they unite1 like rays of light in the luminous object from which they issued4 #db4 ,the most profound philosophical doctrines often appear in the treatises of theologians explaining the doctrines of the church4 ,thus ,st4 ,thomas1 in his questions on the understanding of angels1 and in other parts of his works1 has left us a very luminous and interesting theory4 ,according to him1 spirits understand by a number of ideas smaller in proportion to the superiority of their order2 and so the diminution goes on even to ,god1 who understands by means of a single idea which is his own essence4 ,and thus according to the holy doctor1 not only is there one being1 author of all beings1 but also one infinite idea which includes all ideas4 ,whoever fully possesses this idea will see every thing in it2 but since this full possession1 called comprehension in theology1 is solely a property of the infinite intelligence of ,god1 creatures1 when in the other life they shall have obtained the beatific vision1 will see more or fewer objects in ,god according to the greater or less perfection in which they possess it4 ,how wonderful6 ,the dogma of beatific vision well understood1 is also a truth which sheds much light upon philosophical theories4 ,malebranche's sublime dream about ideas was1 perhaps1 a reminiscence of his theological studies4 #dc4 ,the transcendental science which embraces and explains them all1 is a chimera to our mind so long as we inhabit this earth1 but it is a reality to other spirits of a higher order1 and it will also be so to us when1 freed from this mortal body1 we attain the regions of light4 #dd4 ,so far as we may conjecture from analogy1 we have proofs of the existence of this transcendental science1 which includes all sciences1 and is in its turn contained in one sole principle1 or rather1 in one only idea1 in one only intuition4 ,if we observe the scale of beings1 the grades of distinction between individual intelligences1 and the successive progress of science1 the image of this truth will be presented to us in a very striking manner4 ,one of the distinctive characteristics of our mind is its power of generalization1 of perceiving the common in the various1 of reducing the multiplex to unity2 and this power is proportional to its degree of intelligence4 #de4 ,the brute is limited to its sensations and the objects causing them4 ,it has no power of generalization or of classification2 nothing beyond the impression received or the instinct of satisfying its wants4 ,man1 however1 as soon as he opens the eyes of his understanding1 perceives unnumbered relations2 he applies what he has seen in one case to different cases2 he generalizes and infolds very many ideas in a single idea4 ,the child desires an object above his reach2 he immediately takes a chair or a stool1 and improvises a ladder4 ,a brute will watch the object of its appetite whole hours when placed beyond its reach1 without ever thinking of doing like the child1 and forming a ladder4 ,if every thing be so disposed as to enable it to climb1 it will climb1 but it is incapable of thinking that in similar circumstances it ought to act in like manner4 ,in the former case1 we see a being having the general idea of a means1 and its relation to the end1 of which it makes use when necessary3 in the latter we see another being having indeed before its eyes the end and the means1 but not perceiving their relation1 unable to go beyond the material individuality of objects4 ,in the former there is perception of unity2 in the latter there is no bond to join the variety of particular facts4 ,it is seen by this simple example that the child will reduce all the infinity of cases1 in which an object may be placed beyond his reach1 to this one case2 he possesses1 so to speak1 the formula of this little problem4 ,true1 he does not render himself an account of this formula1 that is1 does not reflect upon it2 but he has it in reality2 and if you give him an opportunity he will at once apply it1 which proves that he has it4 ,or speak to him of things placed too high for his reach1 and point rapidly from one to another of the objects before him2 he will at all times instantly apply the general idea of an auxiliary medium2 he will avail himself perhaps of his father's arm1 or that of a servant1 a chair1 if in the house1 a heap of stones1 if in the fields2 he discovers in all things the relation of the means to the end4 ,when he sees the end1 he immediately turns his attention to the means of attaining it3 the general idea seeks individualization in a particular case4 #df4 ,art is the collection of rules for doing any thing well2 and is the more perfect in proportion as each rule embraces a greater number of cases1 and consequently as the number of these rules is smaller4 ,doubtless1 buildings that were solid1 well proportioned1 and adapted to the purpose for which they were destined1 had been constructed before the rules of architecture were reduced to formulas2 but the great progress of intelligence in the construction of buildings consisted in ascertaining what there was common to all well-built houses1 in determining the cause of beauty and of solidity1 in themselves considered1 by passing from the individual to the universal1 that is1 by forming general ideas of beauty and solidity applicable to an indefinite number of particular cases1 by simplifying4 #dg4 ,the same may be said of all other liberal and mechanical arts3 the progress of intelligence in all of them consists in reducing multiplicity to unity1 and including the greatest possible number of applications in the least possible number of ideas4 ,this is why lovers of literature and the fine arts labor to discover an idea of beauty in general1 in order to attain a type applicable to all literary and artistic objects4 ,it is also obvious that those engaged in mechanical arts always endeavor to govern their proceedings by a few rules1 and he is held to be the most skilful who succeeds in combining the greatest variety of results with the greatest simplicity of means1 by making that1 which others connect with many ideas1 depend upon one idea alone4 ,when we see a machine produce wonderful effects by a very simple process1 we praise the artificer not less for the means than for the end3 this we say1 is grand1 and the simplicity with which it works is the most astonishing4 #dh4 ,let us apply this doctrine to the natural and exact sciences4 ,the merit of our actual system of numeration consists in including the expression of all numbers in a single idea1 making the value of each figure ten times that to the right1 and filling all intervals with zeros4 ,the expression of infinite numbers is reduced to the simplicity of a single rule based upon a single idea2 the relation of position with a tenfold value4 ,logarithms have enabled arithmetic to make a great advance by diminishing the number of its fundamental operations1 since1 with them it reduces multiplication and division to addition and subtraction4 ,algebra is only the generalization of arithmetical expressions and operations1 their simplification4 ,the application of algebra to geometry is the generalization of geometrical expressions2 formulas of lines1 figures1 bodies1 only the expression of their universal idea4 ,in this idea as in a type1 geometry preserves its first and generative idea1 and it requires only the simplest applications in order to form an exact calculation of all lines belonging to the same class1 which can possibly be met with in practice4 ,in the simple expression dz_/dx ,a1 called the differential coefficient1 is contained the whole idea of infinitesimal calculus4 ,it originated in geometrical considerations1 but so soon as its universality was conceived1 it poured a flood of light upon every branch of mathematical and natural science1 and led to the discovery of a new world1 whose confines are still unknown4 ,the prodigious fecundity of this calculus emanates from its simplicity1 its prompt generalization of both algebra and geometry1 and its uniting them in a single point which is the relation of the limits of the differentials of any function4 #di4 ,it is to this unity of idea that the human intellect in its ambition aspires1 and once obtained1 it proves the cause of great progress4 ,the glory of the greatest geniuses is that they discovered it3 the advance of science has consisted in profiting by it4 ,vieta explained and applied the principle of the general expression of arithmetical quantities2 ,descartes extended this to geometrical quantities4 ,newton established the principle of universal gravitation2 and he1 at the same time with ,leibnitz1 invented the infinitesimal calculus2 and the exact and natural sciences march1 by the light of a vast flambeau1 with gigantic strides along paths never before trodden4 ,and all this because intelligence has approached unity1 and become possessed of a generative idea1 involving infinite other ideas4 #ej4 ,it is worthy of remark1 that as we advance in science1 we meet numerous points of contact1 close relations1 which no one at first sight would have suspected4 ,ancient mathematicians discussed the conic sections1 but were far from imagining that the idea of the ellipse could be the basis of a system of astronomy3 the foci to them were simple points1 the curve a line1 and the relations of both the object of combinations at once profitless and without application4 ,ages pass away1 and these foci are the sun1 the curve the orbit of planets4 ,the lines on the geometrician's table represented a world6 ,the intimate connection of mathematical and natural science cannot be questioned2 and who shall say to what extent both are connected with ontological1 psychological1 theological1 and moral science8 ,the extended scale over which beings are distributed may at first sight seem to be an assemblage of unconnected objects1 but seen with the eyes of science1 it is perceived to be a delicately worked chain1 whose links present1 as we advance1 greater beauty and perfection4 ,we see the different realms of nature united by close relations3 the sciences1 of which they are the objects1 mutually borrow each other's light1 and enter on each other's territory4 ,the complication of objects among themselves involves this complication of science2 and the unity of the laws imposed upon different orders of beings makes all sciences approach1 and tend to form1 one only science4 ,if it were given us to see the identity of their origin1 the unity of the end and the simplicity of the means1 we should come into the possession of the true transcendental science1 the only science which involves all others1 or more correctly speaking1 the only idea in which every thing is represented as it is1 and every thing seen without any necessity of combination1 or effort of any kind1 just as a magnificent landscape1 its outlines1 form1 and colors are pictured on a perfectly clear mirror4 ,in the meantime1 we must rest satisfied with shadows of reality1 and must see in the instinctive tendency of our understanding to simplify1 to reduce every thing or make it approach as much as possible to unity1 the announcement1 the sign of this single science1 this intuition of the one infinite idea2 just as in the desire for happiness which agitates our heart1 the thirst after enjoyment which torments us we discover a proof that all is not ended here below1 and that our soul has been created for the possession of a good not to be attained in this mortal life4 #ea4 ,if we compare men with men1 and pay attention to the character of genius1 the most elevated point of human intelligence1 we shall see the truth of what has been said of the scale of human beings1 and the progress of science4 ,men of true genius are distinguished by the unity and extent of their conceptions4 ,if they treat a difficult and complicated question1 they simplify it1 consider it from a high point of view1 and determine one general idea which sheds light upon all the others4 ,if they have a difficulty to solve1 they show the root of the error1 and with a word dispel all the illusion of sophistry4 ,if they use synthesis1 they first establish the principle which is to serve as its basis1 and with one dash trace the road to be followed in order to reach the wished-for result4 ,if they make use of analysis1 they strike in its secret resort the point where decomposition is to commence1 they at once open the object1 and reveal to us its most obscure mysteries4 ,if there is question of a discovery1 while others are seeking here and there1 they strike the ground with their foot1 and exclaim1 the treasure is here4 ,they make no long arguments1 nor evasions2 their thoughts are few but pregnant2 their words are not many1 but in each of them is set a pearl of inestimable value4 #eb4 ,no doubt there is in the intellectual order a single truth from which all other truths emanate1 one idea which includes all other ideas4 ,this philosophy teaches1 and the efforts1 the natural and instinctive tendencies of every intelligence1 toiling after simplicity and unity1 show it3 such also is the dictate of common sense1 which considers that thought the highest and most noble which is the most comprehensive and the most simple47#d7 ,,chapter ,v4 ,,transcendental ,,science ,,in ,,the ,,human ,,intellectual ,,order ,,cannot ,,emanate ,,from ,,the ,,senses4 #ec4 ,in the human intellectual order1 such as it is in this life1 there is no one truth from which all others flow3 philosophers have sought one in vain2 they have found none1 for there was none to be found4 ,in fact1 where could it be found8 #ed4 ,would it emanate from the senses8 ,sensations are as various as the objects which produce them3 by them we acquire knowledge of individual and material things2 but no one truth1 source of all other truths1 can be found in any one of these1 or the sensations proceeding from them4 #ee4 ,if we observe our impressions received through sensation1 we shall perceive that they are all equal so far as the production of certainty is concerned4 ,we are just as certain of the sensation caused by any noise whatever1 as we are of that produced by an object which we see1 an odorous body which we smell1 a savory morsel which we taste1 or any thing which strongly affects our sense of touch4 ,there is no gradation in the certainty produced by these sensations3 they are all equal2 for if we speak of sensation itself1 we experience it in such a manner as to leave no uncertainty2 and if we speak of the relation of sensation with the existence of the object causing it1 we are just as certain that the sensation called sight corresponds to an external object seen1 as we are that an external object touched corresponds to the sensation called touch4 ,hence we infer that no one sensation is the origin of the certainty of other sensations2 in this they are all alike3 and most men have no other reason than their experience why they should be sure of this certainty4 ,we are aware that what happens to individuals from whose eyes cataracts have been removed1 shows that simple sensation does not suffice for the due appreciation of the object perceived1 and that one sense aids another3 but this does not prove any one of them to be preferable2 for as the blind man1 whose sight was suddenly restored1 did not form an exact judgment as to the size and distance of objects seen by sight only1 but required the assistance of touch2 so is it very probable that if a person of good eyesight had been deprived from his birth of the sense of touch1 he would not be able1 were this sense given him suddenly1 to form an exact judgment concerning objects touched1 until1 by the aid of sight1 he had become accustomed to combine the new and the old order of sensations1 and learnt by practice to determine the relations of sensation with its object1 or to know by sensation the properties of its object4 #ef4 ,this fact of the blind man is however contradicted by others which lead to a directly opposite result4 ,the youth1 upon whom the oculist1 ,jean ,janin1 performed the same operation1 and other persons blind from their birth1 whose eyesight ,luigi de' ,gregori partly restored1 did not1 like the blind man of ,cheselden1 deem these objects stuck to their eyes1 but that they saw them as things really external and separate4 ,rosmini thus relates it1#c although he gives the preference to the ,cheselden case1 which he says was repeated in ,italy by the professor ,giacomo di ,pavia with precisely the same results4 #c ,saggio sull' origine delle idee1 p4 #e1 c4 iv41 tr4 #aa1 p4 #bhe1 where he cites the theoretico-chemical observations on the cataracts of those born blind1 by ,luigi de' ,gregori1 professor of chemistry and opthalmia1 published at ,rome in #ahbf4 #eg4 ,it is not easy to ascertain how this combination of one sensation with another enables us to judge rightly of external objects2 chiefly because the development of our sensitive and intellectual faculties is completed before we can reflect upon it3 and thus we find ourselves certain of the existence and properties of things before we have thought of certainty1 and much less of the means of acquiring it4 #eh4 ,but even supposing us1 after occupying ourselves with sensations and their relations with objects1 to set aside the certainty which we already have1 and to act as if we sought it1 we can find no one sensation the basis of the certainty of the other sensations4 ,we should meet in that all the difficulties to be encountered in the others4 #ei4 ,one of the chief difficulties upon this point is to determine the relations of the sense of sight with that of touch1 and how far the one depends upon the other4 ,we propose hereafter to examine these questions at some length1 and we shall therefore now refrain from entering upon them1 as well because they are not of a character to be incidentally investigated1 as because whatever their solution1 it is not at all opposed to what we shall here establish4 #fj4 ,it would be of no advantage to us to know that the certainty of all sensations was1 philosophically speaking1 founded upon that of some one sensation4 ,every sensation is a contingent1 individual fact3 how then are we to draw from it light to guide us to necessary truths8 ,no matter under what aspect we consider sensation1 it is only an impression received through our organs4 ,we are sure of the impression because it is intimately present to our mind2 and its repetition aided by other sensations1 whether of the same or another sense1 makes us certain of its relations with the object producing it3 but every thing is done instinctively1 with little or no reflection2 and we are always condemned1 however much we reflect1 to reach a point beyond which we cannot pass1 for nature herself there stops us4 #fa4 ,far then from finding in any sensation a fundamental fact on which to found a philosophical certainty1 we discover a collection of particular and mutually distinct facts1 equal1 however1 so far as the production in us of that security which we call certainty is concerned4 ,it is of no use to decompose man1 and reduce him first to an inanimate machine1 then allow him one sense1 making him perceive different sensations1 afterwards grant him another sense1 making him combine the new and the old sensations1 and so on synthetically to the possession and exercise of them all4 ,these things may do to entertain one's curiosity1 to nourish philosophical pretensions1 or to give a show of probability to imaginary systems2 but they are in reality of little or no use2 the evolutions which the observer imagines do not resemble those of nature2 and the true philosopher ought to examine what really is1 not what is only in his conception4 ,condillac1 animating his statue by degrees1 and making the whole sum of human knowledge flow from one sensation1 is like those priests who got inside the statue of the idol1 and thence emitted their oracles4 ,it is not the statue which receives animation1 that speaks and thinks1 it is ,condillac from within it4 ,let us1 however1 grant to the sensist all he demands2 let us allow him to regulate as he pleases the mutual dependence of sensations2 for the instant we require him to make use only of pure sensations in his discussions1 he will be utterly disconcerted1 how much soever he may suppose them to be transformed4 ,but we reserve these questions to the place in which we shall examine the nature and origin of ideas4 #fb4 ,why are we sure that the agreeable sensation which we experience in our sense of smell proceeds from an object called a rose8 ,because we recollect having experienced the same sensation on a thousand other occasions2 because both sight and touch confirm the testimony of smell4 ,but how do we know that these sensations are something beside the impressions received in our soul8 ,why may we not believe them to come from some cause or other1 without relation to external causes8 ,is it because other men say the contrary8 ,are we certain that they exist8 ,how do they know what they tell us8 ,how do we know that we hear rightly8 ,there is the same difficulty with the other senses as with that of hearing1 and if we doubt the testimony of three senses1 why shall we not doubt that of four8 ,reasoning is here of no avail2 it would lead us to cavils which would require an impassible doubt1 and would tear from us a security1 of which1 notwithstanding all our efforts1 we cannot despoil ourselves4 ,moreover1 if we appeal to the principles of reason1 in order to prove the truth of sensation1 we leave the territory of sensations1 and do not place in them the primitive truth1 origin of all other truths1 nor accomplish what we undertook4 #fc4 ,hence it follows3 ,first1 that there is no one sensation which is the origin of the certainty of all others2 this we have only indicated here1 reserving the demonstration of it to our treatise on sensations4 ,secondly1 although such a sensation were to exist1 it could not serve as the basis of any thing in the intellectual order1 for with sensation alone it is impossible even to think4 ,thirdly1 that sensations1 so far from being able to serve as the basis of transcendental science1 cannot serve of themselves alone to establish any science2 because necessary truths cannot flow from them1 since they are contingent facts47#e7 ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,transcendental ,,science4--,,insufficiency ,,of ,,real ,,truths4 #fd4 ,we have thought proper briefly to refute ,condillac's system1 not on account of its intrinsic importance1 or because it was not before in sufficiently bad repute1 but in order to clear the field for higher and more strictly philosophical discussions4 ,we should not omit to guard philosophy against the prejudice cast upon it by a system as vain as it is profitless4 ,all that is most sublime in the science of the mind disappears with the statue-man and transformed sensations3 we vindicate the rights of human reason by showing that before entering upon more transcendental questions it is indispensable to discard ,condillac's system2 just as it is necessary before making a good road to clear away the brushwood which obstructs the passage4 #fe4 ,we come now to the proof that in the human intellectual order1 such as it is in this life1 there is no one truth the source of all truths2 because no one truth includes them all4 ,truths are of two kinds1 real and ideal4 ,we call facts1 or whatever exists1 real truths2 we call the necessary connection of ideas ideal truths4 ,a real truth may be expressed by the verb to be1 taken substantively1 or at least it supposes a proposition in which this verb has been taken in this sense3 an ideal truth is expressed by the same verb taken copulatively1 as signifying the necessary relation of a predicate with a subject1 abstracting it1 however1 from both4 ,we are1 that is1 we exist1 expresses a real truth1 a fact4 ,whoever thinks exists1 expresses an ideal truth1 for it does not affirm that there is any one who thinks or exists1 but that if there is any one who thinks1 he exists2 or1 in other words1 it affirms a necessary relation between thought and being4 ,to real truths corresponds the real world1 the world of existences2 to ideal truths the logical world1 that of possibility4 ,the verb to be1 is sometimes taken copulatively1 although the relation expressed by it be not necessary3 such is the case with all contingent propositions1 and when the predicate does not belong to the essence of the subject4 ,sometimes the necessity is conditional1 that is1 it supposes a fact2 and then there is no absolute necessity1 since the supposed fact is always contingent4 ,when we speak of ideal truths1 we refer to those that express an absolute necessary relation1 abstracting it from all order of existence2 and on the other hand1 we understand by real truths all those that suppose a proposition in which a fact has been established4 ,to this class belong the truths of natural science1 for they all suppose some fact which is the object of observation4 #ff4 ,no real finite truth can be the origin of all others4 ,truth of this kind is the expression of a particular contingent fact1 and consequently can neither include other real truths or the world of existences1 nor ideal truths which refer only to necessary relations in the world of possibility4 #fg4 ,were we to see intuitively infinite existence1 cause of all existences1 we should know a real truth1 origin of all others2 but as we know this infinite existence only by discursion and not by intuition1 it follows that we do not know the fact of that existence in which the reason of all other existences is contained4 ,neither is it possible for us1 after having by means of discursion reached this cognition1 to explain from this point of view the existence of the finite by the sole existence of the infinite2 for if we abstract the existence of the finite1 the discursion1 by which we attained to the cognition of the infinite1 disappears1 and then our whole scientific fabric tumbles to the ground4 ,demonstrate to a man by means of discursion the existence of ,god1 and require him1 setting aside the point of departure1 and depending upon the sole idea of the infinite1 to explain not only the possibility1 but also the reality of creation2 and he cannot do it4 ,if he only sets aside the finite all his reasoning fails1 and no effort can prevent its failing2 he is like an architect who1 after having built a superb cupola1 is required to support it although the foundations of the edifice are removed4 #fh4 ,take any real truth whatever1 the plainest and most certain fact1 and yet we can derive nothing from it if ideal truth comes not to fecundate it4 ,we exist1 we think1 we feel2 these are indubitable facts1 but science can deduce nothing from them2 they are particular contingent facts1 whose existence or non-existence neither affects other facts nor reaches the world of ideas4 ,these truths are of the purely sensible order1 have not of themselves any relation with the order of science1 nor can they be elevated to it if not combined with ideal truths4 ,descartes1 when he brought forward the fact of thought and existence1 driven as he was by his attempt to raise a scientific edifice1 passed unawares from the real to the ideal order4 ,i think1 he said2 and had he stopped here he would have reduced his philosophy to a simple intuition of consciousness2 but he wished to go farther1 he wished to reason1 and then of necessity availed himself of an ideal truth3 whoever thinks exists4 ,thus with a universal and necessary truth he fecundated his individual and contingent fact2 and as he needed some rule to guide him in his onward march1 he sought one in the admissibility of the evidence of ideas4 ,and thus also we see how this philosopher1 who so toiled in search of unity1 came all at once in contact with triplicity3 a fact1 an objective truth1 a criterion3 a fact in the consciousness of the subject2 an objective truth in the necessary relation of thought with existence2 a criterion in the admissibility of the evidence of ideas4 ,we may defy all the philosophers in the world to reason upon any fact whatever without the aid of ideal truth4 ,we shall find in all facts the same sterility as in the fact of consciousness4 ,this is no conjecture1 but a rigid demonstration4 ,only one existence contains the reason of all other existences2 if1 then1 we do not immediately and intuitively know it1 we cannot discover any one real truth1 origin of all others4 #fi4 ,even supposing there to be in the order of creation a fact of such a nature1 that the whole universe is only a simple development of it1 we should not therefore have found the real truth source of all science1 for it would not enable us to make any advance towards the world of possibility1 the ideal order1 infinitely superior to that of finite existences4 ,if we suppose the progress of natural science to lead to the discovery of a single1 simple law1 which presides over the development of all others1 and the application of which1 varied according to circumstances1 is a sufficient reason of all the phenomena now referred to many and very complicated laws2 this would1 without doubt1 be an immense progress in sciences the object of which is the visible world2 but what would it give us to know of the world of intelligences8 ,what of the world of possibility87#f7 ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,the ,,me ,,cannot ,,produce ,,transcendental ,,science4 #gj4 ,the testimony of consciousness is sure and irresistible1 but it has no connection with that of evidence4 ,the object of the one is a particular and contingent fact2 that of the other1 a necessary truth4 ,that ,i now think1 is to me absolutely certain2 but this thought of mine is not a necessary but a decidedly contingent truth2 for ,i might never have thought1 or even existed3 it is a purely individual fact1 is confined to me1 and its existence or non-existence in nowise affects universal truths4 ,consciousness is an anchor1 not a beacon3 it saves the understanding from shipwreck1 but does not light it on its way2 in the assaults of universal doubt1 consciousness is at hand to shield it from destruction2 but if asked to direct us1 it gives us only particular facts4 ,these facts have no scientific value1 except when made objective1 or rather1 when the mind1 reflecting upon them1 bathes them in the light of necessary truths4 ,we think1 we feel1 we are free2 these are facts2 but of themselves they are barren4 ,if we would fecundate them1 we must take them as a kind of material of universal truths4 ,thought becomes immovable1 it congeals1 if deprived of the impulse of these ideas2 sensation is common to us and the brutes2 and liberty1 without combination of motives presented by reason1 has no object1 no life4 #ga4 ,here we discover the cause of the obscurity and sterility of ,german philosophy since ,fichte4 ,kant fixed himself upon the subject1 without1 however1 destroying objectivity in the internal world2 and therefore his philosophy1 although containing many errors1 offers to the mind some luminous points3 but ,fichte went farther1 planted himself upon the me1 and made no use of objectivity1 save when it was necessary to the more solid establishment of a fact of consciousness2 and so he found only realms of darkness and contradiction4 ,men of gifted minds have labored in vain to make some ray of light emanate from a point condemned to obscurity4 ,the soul sees itself in its own acts2 and that it presents immediately to itself facts conducing to its own cognition is the only title it has1 more than other beings distinct from it1 to be conceived by itself4 ,what would it know were it not to perceive its own thought1 its will1 and the exercise of all its faculties8 ,how is it to discuss its own nature1 if not from data furnished by the testimony of its own acts8 ,the me then does not see itself intuitively2 is offered to itself only mediately1 by its acts2 that is1 so far as it is known1 it is in the same category as all other external beings1 which are all known by their effects upon us4 ,the me in itself considered1 is not a luminous point2 it supports the fabric of reason1 but is not the rule according to which it is to be constructed4 ,the true light is found in objectivity1 for it is properly the object of knowledge4 ,the me can neither be known nor thought1 save inasmuch as it makes itself its own object1 and consequently places itself on a level with other beings subject to intellectual activity1 which operates only by virtue of objective truths4 #gb4 ,intelligence cannot be conceived without at least internal objects2 but if the understanding do not conceive relations and consequently truths in them1 they will be sterile4 ,these truths will have no connection1 will be isolated facts1 if they involve no necessity2 and even those relations which refer to particular facts furnished by experience will not be susceptible of any combination if they do not1 at least conditionally1 involve some necessity4 ,the brilliancy of the light in the room where ,i now write is in itself a particular1 contingent fact1 and science1 as such1 cannot make it its object except by subjecting the movement of the light to geometrical laws1 that is1 to necessary truths4 ,science then may find a resting-point in the me itself as subject1 but no point of departure4 ,the individual is of no service to the universal1 nor the contingent to the necessary4 ,assuredly there would be no such thing as the individual ,a's science1 if the individual ,a himself did not exist2 but the science which stands in need of the individual subject is not science properly so called1 but the collection of individual acts by which the individual perceives science4 ,this collection of acts is not the science perceived1 which is something common to all intellects1 and does not need this or that individual3 the fund of truths constituting science does not spring from this collection of individual acts1 particular facts1 which are lost like minutest drops in the ocean of intelligence4 ,how then can science be based solely upon the subjective me8 ,how can the object be made to spring from this subject8 ,consciousness has no connection with science1 except in so far as it furnishes facts to which we may apply objective1 universal1 and necessary principles1 independent of all finite individuality1 constituting the patrimony of human reason1 but not requiring the existence of any man4 #gc4 ,no analysis of the facts of consciousness will produce the origin of the lights of science4 ,such an act would be either direct or reflex4 ,if direct1 its value is objective not subjective1 the act does not found science1 but the truth perceived1 not the subject but the object1 not the me1 but that which is seen by the me4 ,if reflex1 it supposes another previous act1 to wit1 the object of reflection1 which is primitive1 and not the act4 ,neither is the combination of the direct with the reflex act of any service to science1 except as connected with necessary and objective truths1 which are independent of the subject4 ,an act individually considered1 is an internal phenomenon1 which1 apart from objective truths1 teaches us nothing4 ,it has1 indeed1 a scientific value1 if considered under the general ideas of being1 cause1 effect1 principle or product of activity1 modification1 or its relations with its subject1 which is the substratum of other similar acts2 that is1 if it be considered as a particular case1 comprised in the general ideas as a contingent phenomenon1 to be appreciated by the help of necessary truths1 as an experimental fact to which a theory may be applied4 ,the reflex act is only a cognition of a cognition1 feeling1 or some other internal phenomenon2 and therefore all reflection upon consciousness presupposes a prior direct act4 ,the object of this direct act is not the me2 the fundamental principle of the cognition therefore is not the me1 as the object known1 but only as the necessary condition1 since there cannot be thought without a thinking subject4 #gd4 ,these considerations destroy the very foundations of the system of ,fichte1 and that of all who take the human me as their point of departure on the voyage of science4 ,the me1 in itself1 is not presented to us2 we know it only by its acts2 and herein it participates of a quality of other objects1 the essence of which is not immediately offered to us1 but only what emanates from it by the exercise of their activity upon us4 ,thus guided by objective and necessary truths1 which are the laws of our understanding1 the type of the relations of beings1 and consequently a sure standard of them1 we ascend by reasoning to the cognition of things themselves4 ,we know that our mind is simple1 because it thinks1 whereas the composite1 the multiplex cannot think4 ,it is thus we know the me4 ,we are conscious of its thinking activity1 and this is the material furnished by the fact1 but then comes the principle1 the objective truth to illumine the fact1 and show the repugnance between thought and composition1 and the necessary connection between simplicity and consciousness4 ,upon examination1 this reasoning will be found to apply not only to the me1 but to every thinking being2 and this is why we can extend our demonstration to all such beings3 the me1 therefore1 which applies this truth1 does not create1 it only knows it1 and knows itself to be a particular case comprised in the general rule4 #ge4 ,to pretend that truth has its source in the subjective me1 is to begin by supposing the me to be an absolute1 infinite being1 the origin of all truths1 and the reason of all beings2 which is equivalent to making philosophy commence by deifying the human understanding4 ,but as one individual has no more right to this deification than another1 to admit it is to establish a rational pantheism1 which1 as we shall hereafter see1 is nearly1 if not quite1 identical with absolute pantheism4 ,if we suppose individual reason to be only a phenomenon of the one absolute reason1 and consequently what we call spirits not to be true substances1 but modifications of a single spirit1 and each particular consciousness to be only a manifestation of the universal consciousness1 we can then conceive why the source of all truth is sought in the me1 and why we interrogate our own consciousness as a kind of oracle through which the universal consciousness speaks4 ,but the difficulty is that such a supposition is gratuitous1 and that they who thus seek the reason of all truths1 begin by establishing the most incomprehensible and absurd of propositions4 ,who will persuade us that our consciousness is only the modification of another8 ,who will make us believe that what we call the me is common to all men1 to all intelligent beings1 and that the only difference between them is the difference of the modifications of one absolute being8 ,why1 then1 is not this absolute being conscious of every consciousness which it comprises8 ,why does it not know that which it contains1 and by which it is modified8 ,why does it believe itself multiplex1 if indeed it be one8 ,where is the bond of this multiplicity8 ,if each particular consciousness were only a modification1 would it preserve its unity1 and a connected series of all that happens to it1 when this series1 this unity is wanting to the substance which it modifies8 #gf4 ,however this may be1 not even by supposing pantheism1 can the friends of subjective philosophy at all advance their pretensions4 ,with pantheism they legitimate1 so to speak1 their pretension1 but do not realize it4 ,they call themselves gods1 and as such1 have a reason for the source of truth being in them2 but as there is in their consciousness only one apparition of their divinity only one phase of the orb of light1 they can only see in it what it presents to them2 and their divinity finds itself subjected to certain laws which make it impossible for it to give the light demanded by philosophy4 #gg4 ,if we interrogate our consciousness upon necessary truths1 we shall perceive that1 far from pretending to found or to create them1 it both knows and confesses them to be independent of itself4 ,if1 thinking of this proposition3 ,it is impossible for a thing to be1 and not be at the same time2 we ask ourselves if the truth of this originates in our thought1 consciousness at once answers that it does not4 ,the proposition was true before our consciousness existed2 and should it now cease to exist1 the proposition would still be true2 true1 also1 when we do not think of it3 the soul is as an eye which contemplates the sun1 but is not1 therefore1 necessary to the existence of the sun4 #gh4 ,another consideration demonstrates the sterility of all philosophy which seeks in the me alone the sole and universal origin of human knowledge4 ,every cognition requires an object2 purely subjective cognition is inconceivable2 although we suppose the subject and object to be identified1 duality of relation1 real or conceived1 is still necessary2 that is1 the subject as known must stand in a certain opposition1--opposition at least conceived1--with itself as subject knowing4 ,now1 what is the object sought in the primitive act8 ,is it something not the subject8 ,then the philosophy of the subject falls into the current of other philosophies1 since in this something which is not the subject are objective truths4 ,is it the subject itself8 ,then we ask1 is it the subject in itself or in its acts2 if the subject in its acts1 then the philosophy is reduced to ideological analysis1 and has no special characteristic2 if the subject in itself1 we say it is not known intuitively1 and least of all can they who call it the absolute pretend to this cognition2 it is for them even more than for others a dark abyss4 ,in vain will you stoop over this abyss1 and shout for truth2 the dull rumbling which reaches your ears is only the echo of your own voice2 the profound cavern rolls back to you only your own words still more hollow and mysterious4 #gi4 ,eminent among the philosophers most given to empty cavils is the author of the ,doctrine of ,science1 ,fichte1 of whose system ,madame de ,stal ingenuously remarked1 that it very much resembled the awakening of ,pygmalion's statue from sleep1 which1 turning alternately to itself and to its pedestal said1 ,i am1 ,i am not4 ,fichte says1 in the beginning of his work entitled ,doctrine of ,science1 that he proposes to seek the most absolute principle1 the absolutely unconditioned principle of all human knowledge4 ,this his method is erroneous3 he begins by supposing what is unknown1 and does not even suspect that there may be a true multiplicity in the basis of human cognitions4 ,we believe that there may be1 and that there really is such a multiplicity1 that the sources of our knowledge are various1 and of different orders1 and that we cannot reduce them to unity without leaving man and ascending to ,god4 ,we repeat it1 this equivocation has become exceedingly general1 and its only result has been uselessly to fatigue inquiring minds or to drive them to extravagant systems4 ,few philosophers have toiled harder than ,fichte after this absolute principle2 and yet1 to speak plainly1 he accomplishes nothing2 he either repeats ,descartes' principle1 or amuses himself with a play upon words4 ,we feel pity at seeing him labor so earnestly to so little purpose4 ,we beg the reader to follow us with patience in our examination of the ,german philosopher's doctrine1 not with the hope of finding a thread to serve as a clue to the ,ddalus of philosophy1 but in order to judge1 with a knowledge of the cause1 doctrines which have made so much noise in the world4 ,if this principle1 says ,fichte1 is absolutely the first1 it can neither be defined nor demonstrated4 ,it must express the act1 which neither is nor can be presented among the empirical determinations of our consciousness1 but rather lies at the bottom of all consciousness1 and alone makes consciousness possible4#d #d ,wissenschaftslehre1 ,th4 #a1 #a4 ,without any antecedent1 or any reason1 without even taking the trouble to show on what he bases it1 ,fichte assures us that the first principle must express an act4 ,why may it not be an objective truth8 ,this1 at least1 would have deserved some attention1 for all preceding schools1 the ,cartesian included1 located the first principle among objective truths1 not among acts4 ,descartes himself needed an objective truth in order to establish the fact of thought and existence4 ,whoever thinks exists1 or1 in other words1 whoever does not exist cannot think4 #hj4 ,this last remark shows one of the radical vices affecting the doctrine of ,fichte and other ,germans1 who attribute an altogether unmerited importance to subjective philosophy4 ,they accuse others of too easily making the transition from the subject to the object1 but forget that they1 at the same time pass1 unauthorised by any reason or title1 from objective thought to the pure subject4 ,confining ourselves to the passage of ,fichte just cited1 what1 we ask1 will an act be which neither is nor can be presented among the empirical determinations of our consciousness8 ,the principle in question is not exempted from being known because it is absolute2 for if we do not know it1 we cannot assert that it is absolute2 and if it is not1 and cannot be presented among the empirical determinations of our consciousness1 it neither is nor can be known4 ,man knows not that which is not present in his consciousness4 ,the absolute principle upon which all consciousness rests1 and which makes it possible1 either does or does not belong to consciousness4 ,if the former1 it is liable to all the difficulties affecting the other acts of consciousness2 if the latter1 it cannot be the object of observation1 and therefore we can know nothing of it4 ,fichte confesses that in order to arrive at the primitive act1 and separate from it all that does not really belong to it1 we must suppose the rules of all reflection to be valid1 and start with some one of the many universally admitted propositions4 ,conceding us1 he says1 this proposition1 you must1 at the same time1 concede as act that which we desire to place as the principle of the whole ,doctrine of ,science2 and the result of the reflection must be that this act is conceded to us as the principle together with the proposition4 ,we take any fact of empirical consciousness1 and strip it one after another of all its empirical determinations1 until reduced to all its purity it contains that only which thought cannot absolutely exclude1 and from which nothing further can be taken4#e #e ,ibid4 ,these words show that the ,german philosopher proposed ascending to a perfectly pure and wholly indeterminate act of consciousness1 which1 however1 is impossible4 ,either he takes the act in a very broad sense1 and understands by it the substratum of all consciousness1 in which case he only expresses in other words the idea of substance2 or else he speaks of an act properly so called1 that is1 of some exercise of that activity1 that spontaneity which we feel within ourselves2 and in this sense the act of consciousness cannot be separated from all determination without destroying its individuality and existence4 ,man cannot think without thinking something1 desire without desiring something1 feel without feeling something1 or reflect upon internal acts without fixing his reflection upon something4 ,there is some determination in every act of consciousness3 an act perfectly pure1 abstracted from every thing1 and wholly indeterminate1 is impossible1 absolutely impossible2 subjectively1 because the act of consciousness1 although considered in the subject1 requires some determination2 objectively1 because such an act is inconceivable as individual1 and consequently as existing1 since it offers nothing determinate to the mind4 #ha4 ,fichte's indeterminate act is only the idea of act in general4 ,he imagined he had made a great discovery when he conceived nothing in the groundwork but the principle of act1 that is1 the idea of substance applied to that active being whose existence consciousness itself makes known to us4 ,if we may be allowed to say candidly what we think1 our opinion is1 that ,fichte1 with all his analytical investigations1 has not advanced philosophy one step towards the discovery of the first principle4 ,we see from what has already been said how easy it is to stop him by simply demanding an account of the suppositions made on the first page of his book4 ,still1 wishing1 as we do1 to oppose him with all fairness1 we will not take up his ideas without allowing him to explain them himself4 ,every one admits the proposition3 ,a is ,a2 just as that ,a ,a1 because such is the meaning of the logical copula2 and indeed without the least deliberation we perceive and affirm its complete certainty4 ,should any one ask a demonstration of it1 we should by no means give any1 but should maintain that the proposition is absolutely certain1 that is1 without any further foundation4 ,thus incontestibly proceeding with general consent1 we claim the right to suppose something absolutely4 ,we do not1 in affirming the preceding proposition to be certain in itself1 suppose that ,a is4 ,the proposition ,a is ,a1 is not equivalent to this3 ,a is1 or1 there is an ,a4 7,to be placed without a predicate has an entirely different meaning from to be with a predicate1 whereof more hereafter47 ,if we make ,a denote a space contained between two straight lines1 the proposition remains exact1 although the proposition1 ,a is1 be evidently false4 ,but1 we assert3 if ,a is1 ,a is thus4 ,the question is in no wise whether ,a is in general or not4 ,the question is not of the contents of the proposition1 but only of its form2 not whereof we know something1 but what we know of any object whatever4 ,consequently1 by the above assertion1 that the proposition is absolutely certain1 this is established1 that between the if and the thus there is a necessary connection2 and it is this necessary connection between both which is supposed absolutely and without other foundation4 ,i call this necessary connection provisionally ,x4 ,all this show of analysis amounts only to what every logical student knows1 that in every proposition the copula1 or the verb to be1 denotes not the existence of the subject1 but its relation to the predicate4 ,there was no need of so many words to tell us so simple a thing1 nor of such affected efforts of the understanding in treating of an identical proposition4 ,but let us arm ourselves with patience1 and continue to listen to the ,german philosopher3 ,but to return to ,a itself1 whether ,a is or not2 nothing is as yet affirmed thereon4 ,the question then occurs3 under what condition is ,a8 ,x at least is supposed in and by the me1 for it is the me which judges in the above proposition1 and indeed judges by ,x as by a law1 which consequently being given to the me1 and by it established absolutely and without other foundation1 must therefore be given to the me by the me itself4 #hb4 ,what does all this ,sanscrit mean8 ,we will translate it into ,english3 in identical or equivalent propositions there is a relation which the mind knows1 judges1 and according to which it decides upon the rest3 this relation is given to our mind2 identical propositions need no proof in order to obtain assent4 ,all this is very true1 very clear1 and very simple2 but1 when ,fichte adds that this relation must be given to the me by the me itself1 he asserts what he neither does nor can know4 ,who told him that objective truths come to us from ourselves8 ,is one of the principal philosophical questions1 such as is that of the origin of truth1 to be thus easily solved with a dash of the pen8 ,has he1 perchance1 defined his me1 or given us any idea of it8 ,either his words mean nothing1 or they mean this3 ,i judge of a relation2 this judgment is in me2 this relation1 as known and abstracted from real existence1 is in me2 all which may be reduced to ,descartes' more natural and simple expression3 ,i think1 therefore ,i exist4 #hc4 ,upon carefully examining ,fichte's words1 we clearly see that he made no more progress than the ,french philosopher4 ,he goes on3 ,whether and how ,a in general is supposed1 we know not2 but as ,x must mark a relation between an unknown supposition of ,a and an absolute supposition of ,a under the condition of this supposition1 in so far at least as that relation is supposed1 ,a exists in the me1 and is supposed by the me1 just as ,x4 ,x is possible only in relation to an ,a3 but ,x is really supposed in the me1 therefore ,a also must be supposed in the me in so far as ,x is referred to it4 ,what confusion and mystery in the expression of the commonest things6 ,how great ,descartes appears beside ,fichte6 ,each makes the fact of consciousness revealing existence the beginning of his philosophy4 ,the one expresses his thoughts clearly1 with simplicity and in a language which all the world does or may understand2 the other1 in order to seem an inventor1 and to show that he has no master1 envelops himself in a cloud of mystery1 with darkness all around1 whence in a hollow voice he pronounces his oracles4 ,descartes says3 ,i think1 ,i cannot doubt it1 it is a fact attested to me by my internal sense2 no one can think without existing2 therefore ,i exist4 ,this is clear1 simple1 and ingenuous2 it manifests a true philosopher1 one without affectation or pretension4 ,fichte says3 ,take any proposition whatever2 for example1 ,a is ,a3 and then goes on to explain how the verb to be in propositions does not express the absolute existence of the subject1 but its relation with the predicate2 the whole with a show of doctrine1 wearisome in its form1 and ridiculous in its sterility2 and this too when he only wants to inform us that ,a is in the me1 because the relation of the predicate with the subject1 that is1 ,x1 is possible only in a being1 since ,a denotes some being or other4 ,let us compare the two syllogisms4 ,descartes says3 ,no one can think without existing2 but ,i think2 therefore ,i exist4 ,fichte says literally what follows3 ,x is only possible in relation to an ,a2 but ,x is really supposed in the me2 therefore ,a must also be supposed in the me4 ,there is at bottom no difference at all1 and the only difference in form is that which exists between the language of a vain man and that of a sensible man4 ,at bottom the syllogisms are not different1 we repeat it4 ,descartes' major proposition is3 ,whatever thinks exists4 ,he does not prove it1 and admits that it cannot be proved4 ,fichte's major is3 ,x is possible only in relation to an ,a1 or1 in other words1 no relation of a predicate with a subject1 in so far as it is known1 is possible without a being which knows4 ,x must mark a relation between an unknown supposition of ,a and an absolute supposition of the same ,a1 at least in so far as that relation is supposed1 that is1 inasmuch as it is known4 ,and how does ,fichte prove a relative supposition to suppose an absolute supposition1 that is1 a subject in which it is supposed8 ,like ,descartes1 he does not prove it at all4 ,there is no relative ,a without an absolute ,a2 what does not exist cannot think4 ,this is clear and evident2 farther than this neither ,fichte nor ,descartes goes4 ,descartes' minor is3 ,i think2 this he does not prove1 but refers to consciousness beyond which he confesses that he cannot pass4 ,fichte's minor is this3 ,x is really asserted in the me2 which is equivalent to saying3 the relation of the predicate with the subject is really known by the me2 and as1 according to ,fichte himself1 the proposition may be selected at pleasure1 to say that the relation of the predicate with the subject is known by the me1 is the same as to say that any relation whatever is known by the me2 which in clearer terms may be expressed thus1 ,i think4 #hd4 ,here we would remark1 that the difference1 if any there be1 is altogether in favor of the ,french philosopher1 who understands by thought every internal phenomenon of which we are conscious4 ,in order to establish this fact1 he has no need of analyzing propositions1 and confusing the understanding upon those very points where it most requires clearness and precision4 ,fichte1 to arrive at the same point1 takes a roundabout way4 ,descartes points his finger to it1 and says3 this is it4 ,the one acts like a sophist1 the other like a true man of genius4 ,had the ,german philosopher confined his forms1 little calculated as they are to illustrate science1 to what we have thus far examined1 their greatest inconvenience would have been to weary both the author and his readers2 but unfortunately his mysterious me1 which makes its appearance at the very vestibule of science1 and which1 in the eyes of sound reason1 can only be what it was to ,descartes1--the human mind1 knowing its existence by its own thought1--goes on dilating in ,fichte's hands1 like a gigantic spectre1 which1 beginning in a single point1 ends by hiding its head in the heavens and its feet in the abyss4 ,this me1 absolute subject1 is then a being which exists because it supposed itself3 it is a being which creates its own self1 absorbs every thing1 is every thing1 and is revealed in the human mind as in one of the infinite phases of its infinite existence4 ,what we have thus far said1 suffices to show the tendencies of ,fichte's system4 ,we are here treating of certainty and its foundations2 this1 then1 is not the place to anticipate what we propose to say more at length upon this system when we come to explain the idea of substance and refute pantheism3 for this is one of the gravest errors of modern philosophy2 everywhere1 and under all aspects1 it must be combatted1 but to do this we must attack it in its roots4 ,this is why we have examined at such length ,fichte's fundamental reflection in his ,doctrine of ,science1 and stripped it of the importance which he claimed for it1 so as to make it the basis of a transcendental science2 for he flattered himself with being able to determine the absolutely unconditioned principle of all human knowledge47#g7 ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,,universal ,,identity4 #he4 ,in order to give unity to science1 some appeal to universal identity2 this1 however1 is not to discover unity1 but to take refuge in chaos4 ,universal identity is not only an absurdity1 but a groundless hypothesis4 ,excepting the unity of consciousness1 we find in ourselves nothing that is one2 but multiplicity of ideas1 perceptions1 judgments1 acts of the will1 impressions of various kinds2 and in relation to external objects1 we perceive multitude in the beings which surround us1 or as some pretend1 in their appearances4 ,where then are unity and identity1 for we can neither find them within nor without ourselves8 #hf4 ,if it be said that nothing is offered to us but phenomena1 and that we do not attain to the reality1 the absolute and identical unity hidden beneath them1 we can reply with this dilemma3 either our experience is confined to phenomena1 or it reaches the very nature of things3 if the former1 we cannot know what is concealed under the phenomena1 nor absolute and identical unity2 if the latter1 then nature is not one but multiplex1 for we everywhere encounter multiplicity4 #hg4 ,it is curious to observe how easily men1 the most skeptical in the simplest things1 suddenly become dogmatic at the very point where the greatest motives of doubt are presented4 ,with them the external world is either a pure appearance1 or a being having no resemblance to the conception formed of it by the human race3 the criterion of evidence1 that of consciousness1 and that of common sense have little power to command assent3 the crowd alone should be satisfied with such weak foundations2 the philosopher demands others far more solid4 ,but strange as it may seem1 the very philosopher who styled reality a deceitful appearance1 and saw obscurity in what the human race considered luminous1 so soon as he quitted the world of phenomena and arrived in the dominions of the absolute1 finds himself illumined by a mysterious splendor1 he requires no discussion1 but by a most pure intuition1 he sees the unconditioned1 the infinite1 the one in which every thing multiplex is involved1 the great reality1 the basis of all phenomena1 the great ,all which re-unites in its breast all existences1 re-assumes every thing1 and absorbs every thing into most perfect identity4 ,he fixes his philosophic eye upon this focus of light and life1 sees it roll out like the ocean of existence in vast billows1 and thus explains what is various by what is one1 the composite by the simple1 the finite by the infinite4 ,all these prodigies do not require him to leave himself2 he has only to go on destroying all that is empirical1 to ascend even to pure act by mysterious by-paths unknown to all except himself4 ,this me1 which may have believed itself an existence perishable and dependent on another superior existence1 is astounded at finding itself so great2 it discovers in itself the origin of all beings1 or1 more correctly speaking1 the only being1 of which all others are but phenomenal existences2 it is the universe itself become by a gradual development conscious of itself3 whatever is without itself1 and at first appears distinct1 is only itself1 a reflection of itself1 presented to its eyes1 and unfolded under a thousand different forms like a magnificent panorama4 ,let not the reader think we have imagined a system for the sake of combatting it2 the doctrine which we have here exposed1 is the doctrine of ,schelling4 #hh4 ,one cause of this error is the obscurity of the problem of knowing4 ,to know1 is an immanent action1 having1 at the same time1 relation to an external object1 excepting those cases in which the intelligent being becomes1 by a reflex act1 its own object4 ,in order to know a truth1 whatever it may be1 the mind does not quit itself2 it does not operate beyond itself2 its own consciousness tells it that it remains1 and that its activity is developed1 within itself4 ,this immanent action extends to objects the most distant in time and place1 and the most unlike in their nature4 ,how is the mind to come in contact with them8 ,how is it to ascertain whether their representation conforms to reality8 ,there can be no cognition without this representation2 without conformity1 there is no truth1 cognition is a pure illusion to which nothing corresponds1 and the human understanding is unceasingly the sport of vain appearances4 ,undeniably this problem is liable to very serious difficulties1 which perhaps the science of man1 while in this life1 cannot solve4 ,here arise all the ideological and psychological questions ever treated by the most eminent metaphysicians4 ,however1 as it is not our intention to anticipate what is to be hereafter considered1 we shall confine ourselves to the point of view indicated by our present question of certainty and its fundamental principle4 #hi4 ,consciousness attests the fact of representation2 without this there is no thought2 and the affirmation ,i think is1 if not the origin of all philosophy1 at least its indispensable condition4 #ij4 ,whence comes the representation8 ,how is a being placed in such communication with other beings1 and this not by a transient but by an immanent act8 ,how explain the conformity between the representation and the object8 ,does not this mystery indicate that there is unity1 identity1 at the bottom of all things1 that the being which knows1 is the very being known1 which appears to itself under a distinct form1 and that what we call realities are only phenomena of one and the same being1 always identical1 infinitely active1 which develops its strength in various ways1 and forms by its development what we call the universe8 ,no6 ,this neither is nor can be6 ,it is an absurdity which the most extravagant reason cannot accept3 it is a resource as desperate as it is impotent to explain a mystery1 if you will1 but one a thousand times less obscure than the system which pretends to clear it up4 #ia4 ,universal identity explains nothing1 but greatly confuses everything2 it does not dissipate the difficulty1 but strengthens it1 and renders it insolvable4 ,it certainly is no easy matter to explain how the mind obtains the representation of things distinct from itself2 but it is no easier to show how the mind can have the representation of itself4 ,if there is unity1 complete identity between the subject and the object1 how are the two presented to us as distinct things8 ,how can duality proceed from unity1 or diversity spring from identity8 ,it is a fact testified by experience1 not the experience of external objects1 but that of consciousness1 by that which is most hidden in our soul1 that there is in every cognition a subject and an object1 perception and the thing perceived1 and without this difference the act is not possible4 ,even when by an effort of reflection1 we take ourselves for our own object1 the duality appears2 if it does not exist1 we imagine it1 for without this fiction we cannot think4 #ib4 ,even in the most intimate and concentrated reflection1 duality1 upon careful examination1 is to be found1 not by fiction1 as it might seem at first sight1 but in reality4 ,when the understanding turns upon itself1 it does not see its own essence1 for it has no direct intuition of itself3 it sees its acts1 and these it takes for its object4 ,the reflex act is not the act reflected4 ,when ,i think that ,i think1 the first thought is distinct from the second1 and so distinct that one succeeds the other1 for the reflective thought can exist only subsequently to the thought reflected4 #ic4 ,this is confirmed by a profound analysis of reflection4 ,is reflection possible without an object reflected upon8 ,evidently not4 ,what is this object in the present case8 ,the thought itself3 then this thought must have preceded the reflection4 ,if it be supposed that they must not of necessity follow in different instants of time1 and that the dependence is saved1 notwithstanding the simultaneousness1 still the force of the argument is not lost2 we grant1 but do not concede1 that the simultaneousness is possible2 but the dependence at least is not possible without distinction4 ,dependence is a relation2 relation supposes opposition of extremes2 and this opposition draws with it distinction4 #id4 ,that these acts are distinct1 although simultaneous1 may be demonstrated in another manner4 ,one of them1 that reflected upon1 may exist without the reflex act4 ,we continually think1 without thinking that we think2 and the same may be proved true of every reflection whatever1 whether it is occupied with the act thought1 or it disappears and leaves only the direct act3 these acts are1 therefore1 not only distinct but separable2 therefore1 the duality of the subject and the object exists not only in the external world1 but also in that which is the most intimate and pure in our soul4 #ie4 ,it avails not to say that the object of reflection is not any determinate act1 but thought in general4 ,this is in many cases false2 for we not only think that we think1 but that we think a determinate thing4 ,moreover1 although the object of reflection is sometimes thought in general1 not even then does the duality disappear3 in that case the subjective act is an individual act1 existing in a determinate instant of time1 and its object is thought in general1 that is1 an idea representative of all thought1 an idea which involves a sort of confused recollection of all past acts1 or of what is called activity1 intellectual force4 ,the duality then exists more evidently1 if possible1 than when the object is a determinate thought4 ,in one instance at least two individual acts are compared2 but in this case an individual act is compared with an abstract idea1 a thing existing in one instant of time with an idea that either abstracts it1 or confusedly embraces all that has passed since the epoch when the consciousness of the reflecting being commenced4 #if4 ,these arguments have much greater weight when directed against those philosophers who place the essence of the mind not in the power of thinking but in thought itself2 who give to the me no other existence than what springs from its own knowledge1 affirming that it exists only because it supposes itself1 by knowing itself1 and only in so far as it supposes itself1 that is1 in so far as it knows itself4 ,with this system there is duality1 or rather plurality1 not only in the acts1 but even in the me itself2 because this me is an act1 and acts follow like a series of fluxions developed to infinity4 ,thus1 far from saving the unity and identity of subject and object1 plurality and multiplicity are established in the subject itself2 and the unity of consciousness itself1 in danger of being broken by the cavils of philosophers1 is forced to take refuge in the obscurity of invincible nature4 #ig4 ,we have thus incontestably proved that there is in us a duality of subject and object1 that without it knowledge is inconceivable1 and that representation itself is a contradiction unless in one sense or another we admit things really distinct in the recesses of intelligence4 ,we beg to observe that we have a sublime type of this distinction in the august mystery of the ,trinity1 the fundamental dogma of our holy religion1 covered1 indeed1 with an impenetrable veil1 but which sends forth light to illustrate the profoundest questions of philosophy4 ,this mystery is not explained by feeble man1 but is for him a sublime explanation4 ,thus ,plato availed himself of glimmerings from this focus as a treasure of immense value to philosophical theories2 thus the ,holy ,fathers and theologians1 in endeavoring to throw some light upon it by arguments of congruity1 have illustrated the most occult mysteries of human thought4 #ih4 ,the upholders of universal identity1 besides contradicting a primitive and fundamental fact of consciousness1 signally fail in their efforts to explain by it either the origin of intellectual representation or its conformity to its object4 ,evidently no man has an intuition of the nature of the individual me1 and still less of the absolute being which these philosophers suppose as the substratum of whatever exists or appears4 ,it is impossible for them to explain a priori1 without this intuition1 the representation of objects or their conformity to the representation4 ,the fact1 therefore1 on which they would base their whole philosophy1 either does not exist1 or is unknown to us3 in neither case can it serve as the foundation of a system4 ,were this fact to exist1 it could not be presented to our mind by any enunciation to which we could arrive by reasoning4 ,it must be seen rather than known2 either occupy the first place or none4 ,if we begin to reason without taking this fact for our basis1 we start from the apparent in order to attain to what truly is2 we make use of an illusion to arrive at reality4 ,thus it evidently follows from the system of our adversaries that philosophy must either start with the most powerful intuition1 or else it cannot advance a single step4 #ii4 ,the schools distinguish between the principle of being and the principle of knowledge1 principium essendi et principium cognoscendi2 but this distinction has no place in the system which we oppose2 being is there confounded with knowledge2 what exists1 exists because it is known1 and it exists only in so far as it is known4 ,to draw out the series of cognitions1 is to develop the series of existences4 ,they are not even two parallel movements2 they are but one movement2 the me is the universe1 and the universe is the me2 whatever exists is a development of the primitive fact1 is the fact itself which is displayed under different forms1 extending like an infinite ocean2 its position is unlimited space2 its duration eternity47#h7 ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,,universal ,,identity1--,,continued4 #ajj4 ,these systems1 as absurd as they are fatal1 although under distinct forms1 and by various means1 they tend to prepare the way for pantheism1 contain a profound truth which1 disfigured by vain cavils1 seems to be an abyss of darkness1 whereas it is in itself a ray of most brilliant light4 ,the human mind seeks that by reason to which it is impelled by an intellectual instinct2 how to reduce plurality to unity1 to re-unite1 as it were1 all the variety of existences in a point from which they all proceed1 and in which they are all absorbed4 ,the understanding knows that the conditioned must be included in the unconditioned1 the relative in the absolute1 the finite in the infinite1 the various in the one4 ,in this1 all religions1 all schools of philosophy agree4 ,the proclamation of this truth belongs to no one of them exclusively2 it is to be met with in all countries of the world1 in primitive times1 back even to the cradle of the human race4 ,beautiful1 sublime tradition6 ,preserved through all generations1 amid the ebb and flow of events1 it offers us the idea of the ,divinity presiding over the origin and destiny of the universe4 #aja4 ,yes6 ,the unity sought by philosophers is the ,divinity itself1--the ,divinity whose glory the firmament declares1 and whose august face of ineffable splendor appears to us in our inmost consciousness4 ,yes6 it is the ,divinity which enlightens and guides the true philosopher1 but blinds and confounds the proud sophist2 it is what the true philosopher calls ,,god1 and venerates and adores in the sanctuary of his soul1 but what the insensate philosopher1 with sacrilegious profanation1 calls the me4 ,considering its personality1 its consciousness1 its infinite intelligence1 and its most perfect liberty1 it is the foundation and the copestone of religion3 distinct from the world1 it produced the world from nothing1 and preserves and governs it1 and leads it by mysterious paths to the destiny assigned in its immutable decrees4 #ajb4 ,there is then unity in the world2 there is unity in philosophy4 ,in this all agree2 the difference is that some separate1 with the greatest care1 the finite from the infinite1 the thing created from the creative power1 unity from multiplicity1 and maintain the necessary communication between the free will of the omnipotent agent and finite existences1 between the wisdom of the sovereign intelligence and the fixed course of the universe3 while others1 affected with melancholy blindness1 confound the effect with the cause1 the finite with the infinite1 the various with the one1 and reproduce in the domain of philosophy the chaos of primeval times2 but all scattering and in frightful confusion1 without any hope of order or union3 the earth of these philosophers is void1 and darkness is upon the face of their deep2 the spirit of ,god has not moved over the waters to fecundate the chaos1 and produce oceans of life and light out of darkness and death4 ,the absurd systems invented by philosophical vanity explain nothing2 the system of religion1 which is that also of sound philosophy1 and of all mankind1 explains everything3 the intellectual1 as well as the corporeal world1 is a chaos to the human mind the instant it abandons the idea of ,god3 restore this and order reappears4 #ajc4 ,the two capital problems3 whence the intellectual representation1 and whence its conformity to objects1 have with us a most simple explanation4 ,our understanding1 although limited1 participates in the infinite light2 this light is not that which exists in ,god himself1 but a semblance communicated to a being created according to his image4 ,illumined by this light1 objects shine upon the eyes of our mind1 whether because they are in communication with it by means unknown to us1 or because the representation is given to us directly by ,god1 in the presence of objects4 ,the conformity of the representation to the thing represented1 results from the divine veracity4 ,an infinitely perfect ,god cannot take pleasure in deceiving his creatures4 ,such is the theory of ,descartes and ,malebranche1 eminent thinkers1 who took no step in the intellectual order1 without looking to the ,author of all light1 and who never wrote a page on which the name of ,god was not traced4 #ajd4 ,as will hereafter be seen1 ,malebranche admitted that man sees every thing in ,god1 even in this life2 but his system1 far from identifying the human me with the infinite being1 carefully distinguishes them1 not finding other means to sustain and enlighten the former than by approximating and uniting it to the second4 ,to read the great metaphysician's immortal work is enough to convince one that his system was not that of this pure1 primitive intuition1 which is an act required of all empiricism1 and which seems to rise within the limits of philosophy1 from that intuition of the simple fact1 the origin of all ideas and all facts1 in which one of the dogmas of our religion1 the beatific vision1 seems realized upon earth in the domain of philosophy4 ,these are senseless pretensions1 and as far from the mind as from the system of ,malebranche47#i7 ,,chapter ,x4 ,,problem ,,of ,,representation3 ,,monads ,,of ,,leibnitz4 #aje4 ,the pretension to find a real truth1 the fountain of all others1 is dangerous in the extreme1 however indifferent it may at first sight appear4 ,pantheism1 and the deification of the me1 two systems which coincide at bottom1 are a consequence not easy to be avoided if it be attempted to establish all human science upon one fact4 #ajf4 ,the real truth or fact1 which would serve as the basis of all science1 should be immediately perceived1 otherwise it would lack the character of origin and basis of other truths2 because the medium by which it should be perceived would itself have the better right to the title of first truth4 ,if this intermediate fact were the cause of the other1 evidently this latter would not be primitive2 and if the priority were given to the order of knowledge instead of the order of being1 we should still have the same difficulty as now to explain the transition from subject to object1 or the legitimacy of the medium by which we perceive the primitive fact4 ,since then1 the immediate presence1 the intimate union of the understanding with the thing known is necessary1 it is clear that as the me has this immediate presence only for itself and its own acts1 the fact sought for must be the me itself4 ,that which is immediately present to us is the facts of consciousness2 by them we place ourselves in communication with what is distinct from us4 ,in case then that we must find a primitive fact1 the origin of all others1 this fact must be the me4 ,if we deny this consequence1 we must deny the possibility of finding any fact which may be the source of transcendental science4 ,here we see how the apparently most innocent philosophical pretensions lead to fatal results4 #ajg4 ,there is here certainly very little chance for evasion1 but there is one so specious as to merit an examination4 ,the fact1 which is the scientific origin of all others1 is not necessarily their true origin4 ,by distinguishing between the principle of being and the principle of knowledge1 all difficulty seems to be avoided4 ,it is absurd and contrary to common sense1 that the me is the origin of all that exists2 but not that it is the representative principle of all that is or can be known4 ,representation is not synonymous with causality4 ,ideas represent but do not cause the objects represented4 ,why1 then1 is it not possible to admit a fact representative of all that the human understanding can know8 ,it is certain that the perception of this fact must be immediate1 that is1 it must be supposed intimately present to the understanding perceiving it2 for which reason1 it can be nothing else than the me3 this1 however1 is not to deify the me1 but only to concede to it a representative force1 which may have been given to it by a superior being4 ,it makes the me not an universal cause1 but a mirror which reflects the internal and external worlds4 ,this explanation reminds us of the famous system of monads advanced by ,leibnitz2 an ingenious system indeed1 the lofty flight of one of the mightiest geniuses that ever honored the human race4 ,the whole world formed of invisible beings1 all representative of the same universe1 whereof they are a part1 but by a representation adequate to their respective categories1 and in conformity to their corresponding point of view1 according to the place which they occupy1 unrolling themselves in an immense series1 which1 commencing with the lowest order1 goes on ascending to the very portal of infinity2 and at the uppermost point of existences is the monad1 which1 in itself contains the reason of all things1 which has produced them from nothing1 given to them their representative force1 and distributed them into their proper categories1 establishing among them a sort of parallelism of perception1 will1 action1 and motion1 in such a manner that1 without any one communicating any thing to another1 they all move on in most perfect conformity1 in ineffable harmony4 ,this is grand1 beautiful1 and wonderful2 a colossal hypothesis which the genius of ,leibnitz alone could ever have conceived4 #ajh4 ,having paid this tribute of admiration to the eminent author of the ,monadology1 we observe that its gigantic conception is only an hypothesis which all the talent of its inventor could never base upon a single fact capable of giving to it an appearance of probability4 ,omitting the very serious difficulties1 which this system1 doubtless against the will of its author1 opposes to the explanation of free will1 we shall confine ourselves to the examination of the bearings of this system upon the question now before us4 ,in the first place1 the representation of the monads1 being a mere hypothesis1 can serve to explain nothing1 unless philosophy is to be made the sport of ingenious combination4 ,the me is a monad1 that is1 an indivisible unity2 of this there can be no doubt4 ,the me is a monad representative of the universe3 this is an absolutely gratuitous assertion1 and until it is proved in some way or other1 we have the right to ignore it4 #aji4 ,now1 suppose the representative force1 as understood by ,leibnitz1 to exist in the me2 this hypothesis does not impugn what has been said against the primitive origin of transcendental science4 ,on close inspection1 the hypothesis of ,leibnitz will be found to explain the origin of ideas1 but not their connection4 ,make the soul a mirror1 in which1 by an effect of the creative will1 every thing is represented2 still it does not explain the order of these representations1 show how one of them springs from another1 or assign to them any other bond than the unity of consciousness4 ,this system then is quite out of the question3 we are not disputing on the manner in which representations exist in the soul1 nor on their origin2 but we are examining the opinion which pretends to found all science upon a single fact1 and to unfold all ideas as simple modifications of that fact4 ,this ,leibnitz never said1 nor can any thing be found in any of his works to indicate such a thought4 ,moreover1 the difference between this system of ,monadology and that of the ,german ,philosophers1 which we impugn1 is too palpable to escape any one4 ,i4 ,so far is ,leibnitz from advocating universal identity1 that he establishes an infinite plurality and multiplicity3 his monads are beings really different and distinct among themselves4 ,,ii4 ,the whole universe1 composed of monads1 proceeded1 according to ,leibnitz1 from one infinite monad2 and this procession was not by emanation1 but by creation4 ,,iii4 ,in the infinite monad1 in ,god1 ,leibnitz places the sufficient reason of every thing4 ,,iv4 ,knowledge has been freely given by ,god himself to the monads4 ,v4 ,this knowledge1 and the consciousness of it1 belong to the monads individually1 and ,leibnitz never even remotely took into consideration this foundation of all things1 which by its transformation ascends from nature to consciousness1 or descends from the region of consciousness and is converted into nature4 #aaj4 ,these differences so marked need no comments2 they show most evidently that the philosophers of modern ,germany cannot shield themselves under the name of ,leibnitz2 although1 in truth1 these philosophers have no failing of that kind3 far from seeking guides1 they all aspire to originality1 and this is one principal cause of their extravagance1 ,hegel1 ,schelling1 and ,fichte1 all pretend to be founders of a philosophy2 and ,kant was so governed by the same ambition1 that he made very important alterations in the second edition of his ,critic of ,pure ,reason1 lest he should be taken for a plagiarist from ,berkeley's idealism47#aj7 ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,,problem ,,of ,,representation ,,examined4 #aaa4 ,all our knowledge is by representation1 without which it would be inconceivable2 and yet what is representation in itself considered8 ,we cannot say3 it enlightens us as to other objects1 but not as to itself4 ,it is obvious that we do not attempt to conceal the very grave difficulties which the solution of this problem offers3 on the contrary1 we point them out with all clearness1 in order to avoid that vain presumption which is as fatal to science as to every thing else4 ,but let it not be supposed that we intend to banish this question from the arena of philosophy3 for many and serious as are its difficulties1 we are yet of opinion that they allow of sufficiently probable conjectures4 #aab4 ,the representative force may emanate from any one of these three sources3 identity1 causality1 or ideality4 ,we will explain ourselves4 ,a thing may represent itself2 and this we call representation of identity4 ,a cause may represent its effect2 and this is what we understand by representation of causality4 ,a being1 whether substance or accident1 may represent another distinct from itself1 which is not its effect2 and this we call representation of ideality4 ,we do not see how it is possible to assign any other source of representation3 holding1 therefore1 the division to be complete1 we will examine its three points2 and we beg to call the attention of the reader more especially to this matter1 because it is one of the most important in philosophy4 #aac4 ,that which represents must have some relation to the thing represented3 whether essential or accidental1 inherent or communicated1 this relation must exist4 ,two beings1 having absolutely no relation1 one of which nevertheless represents the other1 are a monstrosity4 ,there is nothing without a sufficient reason2 and there being no relation between the thing representing1 and that represented1 there is no sufficient reason of the representation4 ,it is here to be borne in mind that1 for the present1 we abstract the nature of this relation2 we do not assert it to be either real or ideal2 we only say that1 between the thing representing and that represented1 there must be some link1 whatever that link may be4 ,its mysteries1 its incomprehensibility1 do not destroy its existence4 ,philosophy perhaps may be unable to explain the enigma2 but it can demonstrate the existence of the link4 ,thus1 abstracting all experience1 it is possible to demonstrate a priori1 that there is a relation between the me and other beings1 by the mere fact of their representation existing in the me4 ,the incessant communication of intelligences with each other1 and with the universe1 proves that there is a point of union for them all4 ,representation1 alone1 is a convincing proof of this3 so many beings1 apparently dispersed and unconnected1 are intimately united in some centre1 so that the simple phenomenon of intelligence leads us to affirm the common link1 the unity in which plurality is joined4 ,this unity1 with pantheists1 is universal identity2 with us1 it is ,god4 #aad4 ,here observe that this relation between the thing representing and that represented1 is not necessarily direct or immediate2 it suffices that it be with a third object3 thus1 they who explain representation by identity1 and they who account for it by intermediate ideas1 must equally admit it2 for1 on the present matter1 there is no difference between those who hold these ideas to be produced by the action of objects upon our mind1 and those who make them proceed immediately from ,god4 #aae4 ,whatever represents any thing1 contains in some sense the thing represented2 for an object cannot be represented unless it is in some manner or other in the representation4 ,it may be the object itself1 or its image2 but this image cannot represent the object1 unless it is known to be its image4 ,every idea then involves the relation of objectivity2 otherwise it could not represent the object1 but only itself4 ,the act of intelligence is immanent1 but in such a manner1 that the intellect does not need to go out of itself to attain its object4 ,when we think of a star a million leagues distant1 our mind certainly does not go to the point where the star is2 but by means of the idea1 it destroys in an instant this immense distance1 and unites itself with the star4 ,what it perceives is not the idea1 but its object3 if this idea did not involve a relation to the object1 it would cease to be an idea to the mind1 and would represent nothing except itself4 #aaf4 ,there is then1 in every perception1 a connection of the being that perceives with the thing perceived4 ,when this perception is not immediate1 the medium must be such as to contain a necessary relation to the object2 it must conceal itself in order to offer to the eye of the mind only the thing represented4 ,from the instant that it presents itself1 and is seen1 or even noticed1 it ceases to be an idea and becomes an object4 ,the idea is a mirror1 which is most perfect when it creates the most perfect illusion4 ,it must necessarily present only the objects1 and project them at the proper distance1 without allowing the eye to see the crystalline plane which reflects them4 #aag4 ,this union of the thing representing1 with that represented1 of the intellect with its objects1 may1 in some instances1 be explained by identity4 ,in general1 no contradiction is discovered in any thing representing itself to the eye of the understanding1 if we suppose them to be united in some way or other4 ,in case then that the thing known is itself intelligent1 we see no difficulty in its being its own representation1 and consequently none in confounding ideality and reality in the same being4 ,if an idea can represent an object1 why may it not represent itself8 ,if an intelligent being can know an object through the medium of an idea1 why may it not know that object immediately8 ,the union of the thing known with the intellect is to us a mystery1 it is true2 but is the union effected by the medium of an idea less so8 ,to the idea may be objected all that can be brought against the thing itself2 and it is even more inexplicable how one thing represents another1 than how it represents itself4 ,the thing representing and that represented1 have between them a sort of relation of containing and contained4 ,it is easily conceived that the identical contains itself1 since identity expresses much more than to contain2 but it is not so easily conceived how the accident can contain the substance1 the transitory the permanent1 the ideal the real4 ,identity is then a true principle of representation4 #aah4 ,we would here make the following remarks necessary to avoid equivocations4 ,i4 ,we do not assert a necessary relation between identity and representation2 for this would make every being representative1 since every being is identical with itself4 ,we establish this proposition3 identity may be the origin of representation2 but we deny the two following3 identity is the necessary origin of representation2 representation is a sign of identity4 ,,ii4 ,we determine nothing as to the application of the relations between representation and identity1 so far as finite beings are concerned4 ,,iii4 ,we abstract the duality which results from supposing only subject and object1 and enter into no question on the nature of this duality4 #aai4 ,these ideas being fixed1 we may observe that we have an incontestable proof that there is no intrinsic repugnance between identity and representation in two dogmas of the ,catholic religion3 the beatific vision and the divine intelligence4 ,the dogma of the beatific vision teaches us that the human soul in the mansion of the blessed is intimately united to ,god1 and sees him face to face in his very essence4 ,no one ever said that this vision was made by the medium of an idea1 but theologians1 and among them ,st4 ,thomas1 expressly teach the contrary4 ,we have then identity united with representation1 that is1 the divine essence representing1 or rather presenting1 itself to the eyes of the human mind4 ,the dogma of divine intelligence teaches that ,god is infinitely intelligent4 ,god does not need to go out of himself1 nor employ distinct ideas in order to understand2 he sees himself in his essence4 ,here1 too1 identity is united with representation1 and the intelligent being identified with the thing understood47#aa7 ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,,immediate ,,intelligibility4 #abj4 ,neither active nor passive representation can be predicated of all things2 we mean to say1 that there are some beings which are not endowed with intellectual activity1 and cannot be even passively the object of the acts of the intellect4 ,as regards the power of active representation1 which is at bottom only the faculty of intelligence1 it is evident that many beings are destitute of it4 ,there may be greater difficulty with regard to passive representation1 or the fitness to be the immediate object of the intellect4 #aba4 ,an object cannot be known immediately1 that is1 without the mediation of an idea1 if it do not itself perform the functions of this idea1 and unite itself to the intellect which is to know it4 ,this alone takes from all material objects the character of being immediately intelligible3 so that if a mind be imagined having no idea of the corporeal universe1 it could know nothing of it1 although for all eternity in the midst of it4 ,hence it follows that matter neither is1 nor can be1 intelligent or intelligible3 the ideas which we have of it come from another source2 without them we might be united to matter1 and never know or even suspect its existence4 #abb4 ,an opportunity is here presented of explaining an exceedingly curious doctrine of ,st4 ,thomas4 ,this eminent metaphysician was of opinion that it required greater perfection to be immediately intelligible than to be intelligent2 so that the human mind1 although endowed with intelligence1 does not possess intelligibility4 ,in his ,summa ,theologica1#f the holy ,doctor asks if the soul knows itself by its essence1 and answers that it does not1 and thus defends his position3 #f ,p4 #a;a1 ,q4 #hg;a1 ,a4 #ao4 ,things are intelligible accordingly as they act1 and not as they have the power to act1 as is said in the ninth book of ,metaphysics 7tex4 #bj tr4 #c74 ,for any thing that comes under knowledge is being1 is the true1 in so far as it is in act1 and this is manifestly apparent in sensible things4 ,thus the sight does not perceive that which may be colored1 but that only which actually is colored4 ,and in the same manner as is manifest1 the intellect1 in so far as it knows material things1 knows that only which is in act4444 ,hence1 also1 in immaterial substances1 each one is intelligible by its essence1 accordingly as it is in act by its essence4 ,therefore1 the essence of ,god1 which is a pure and perfect act1 is absolutely and perfectly intelligible by itself2 thus ,god knows1 by his essence1 not only himself but also all other things4 ,but the essence of the angel belongs to the class of intelligible beings as an act1 but not as a pure and complete act1 wherefore his understanding is not completed by his essence4 ,for1 although the angel knows himself by his essence1 he cannot know all things by his essence1 but knows those distinct from himself only by their images4 ,but the human intellect in the class of intelligible beings is only a possible being4444 ,therefore1 considered in its essence1 it is an intelligent power2 hence of itself it has the faculty of understanding1 but not of being understood1 except inasmuch as it acts4 ,on this account the ,platonists placed the order of intelligible beings above the order of intellect2 because the intellect understands only by participation of the intelligible2 but according to them1 that which participates is beneath that of which it participates4 ,if1 then1 the human intellect places itself in act by the participation of separate intelligible forms1 as the ,platonists held1 it would know itself by this participation of incorporeal things4 ,but as it is natural to our intellect in the present life to look to material and sensible things1 it follows that our intellect knows itself only as it is placed in act by the species 7ideas7 abstracted from sensible things by the light of the intellect acting1 which is the act of the intelligible things themselves4444 ,therefore our intellect does not know itself by its essence but by its acts4 ,such is the doctrine of ,st4 ,thomas4 ,cardinal ,cajetan1 one of the most penetrating and subtile minds that ever existed1 has a commentary on this passage1 worthy of the text4 ,these are his words3 ,two things expressly follow1 from what is said in the text4 ,the first is1 that our intellect has of itself the faculty of understanding4 ,the second is1 that our intellect has not of itself the faculty of being understood4 ,hence the order of intellect is below the order of intelligible beings4 ,for if the perfection1 which our intellect has of itself1 is sufficient to understand1 but not to be understood1 it necessarily follows that greater perfection is required in a thing to be understood than to understand4 ,and because ,st4 ,thomas saw this consequence1 which at first sight does not seem true1 and might even be objected to him1 he excludes this apprehension1 by showing that this must be admitted to be true not only by the ,peripatetics1 from whose doctrine it results1 but also by the ,platonists4 ,but afterwards1 in answer to an objection brought by ,scotus1 called the ,subtle ,doctor1 he adds3 ,but because in order to understand an intellect and an intelligible object are required1 and the relation of the intellect to the intelligible1 is the relation of the perfectible to its perfection1 since the intellect in act consists in its being itself the intelligible thing1 as is evident from what has been said above2 it follows that immaterial beings are divided into two orders1 intellects1 and things intelligible4 ,and as the intelligible consists in perfective immateriality1 it follows that any thing is intelligible inasmuch as it is immaterially perfective4 ,that intelligibility requires immateriality is shown by this1 that no material thing is intelligible1 unless1 inasmuch as it is abstracted from matter4444 ,it has already been shown that any thing is intelligible by this1 that not only itself1 but others1 also1 are in the intelligible order1 either in act or in potentiality2 it is thus nothing more than to be perfected or perfectible by the intelligible4 #abc4 ,this theory may be more or less solid1 but it is in either case something more than ingenious2 it raises a new problem in philosophy of the highest importance3 to assign the conditions of intelligibility4 ,it has moreover the advantage of being in accordance with a fact attested by experience2 this fact is the difficulty experienced by the mind in knowing itself4 ,if it is immediately intelligible1 why does it not know itself8 ,what condition is wanting8 ,its intimate presence8 ,it has not only presence but identity4 ,perhaps the effort to know itself8 ,but the greater part of philosophy has no other end than this knowledge4 ,by denying immediate intelligibility to the soul1 we can explain why so great a difficulty is involved in ideological and psychological investigations1 by showing the reason of the obscurity experienced in passing from direct to reflex acts4 #abd4 ,the opinion of ,st4 ,thomas is not a mere conjecture3 we may1 in order to establish it in some manner upon fact1 assign a reason which seems to us greatly to strengthen it1 and which may be regarded as merely an extension of the one already given4 ,a thing to be intelligible must have two qualities3 immateriality1 and the activity necessary to operate upon the intelligent being4 ,this activity is indispensable1 for in the act of intelligence1 the intellect is in some sense passive4 ,when the idea is present1 the intellect cannot but know it3 when it is wanting1 it is impossible for the intellect to know it4 ,the idea1 therefore1 enables the intellect to act2 without it the intellect can do nothing4 ,consequently1 if we admit that any being can serve as idea to the intellect1 we must concede that being an activity to excite intellectual action2 and so far we make it superior to the intellect excited4 ,thus we explain why our intellect1 in this life at least1 does not know itself by itself4 ,experience shows that its activity needs to be excited4 ,left to itself it is like one asleep2 and this want of activity in our mind1 in the absence of exciting influences1 is one of the most constant of psychological facts4 ,this is not1 however1 to say that we have no spontaneity1 and that no action is possible without an external determining cause2 but only that this same spontaneous development would not exist1 if we had not previously been subjected to the influence of causes which brought out our activity4 ,we may learn things not taught us2 but we could learn nothing1 if teaching had not presided over the first development of our mind4 ,there are1 it is true1 many ideas in our mind1 which are not sensations1 and which cannot have emanated from them2 but it is equally true that a man1 deprived of all his senses1 could not think1 because his mind would want the exciting cause4 #abe4 ,we have dwelt thus long upon the explanation of the problem of intelligibility1 because we consider it of scarcely less importance than that of intelligence1 although we do not find it treated in philosophical works as it merits4 ,we will now reduce this doctrine to clear and simple propositions1 so that the reader may form a more complete conception of it2 and also1 in order to deduce some consequences which have been only slightly indicated in our exposition3 ,i4 ,a thing must be immaterial in order to be immediately intelligible4 ,,ii4 ,matter cannot be intelligible by itself4 ,,iii4 ,the relations of spirits to bodies1 or the representation of the latter in the former1 cannot be purely objective4 ,,iv4 ,some other class of relations must necessarily be admitted to explain the representative union of the world of intelligences with the corporeal world4 ,v4 ,immediate objective representation supposes activity in the object4 ,,vi4 ,the power of an object to represent itself to the eyes of an intelligence1 supposes in it a faculty of acting on that intelligence4 ,,vii4 ,this faculty necessarily produces an effect1 and consequently involves a kind of superiority of the object over the intelligence4 ,,viii4 ,an intelligent being is not necessarily immediately intelligible4 ,,ix4 ,immediate intelligibility seems to require greater perfection than intelligence4 ,x4 ,although not every intelligent being is intelligible1 yet every intelligible being is intelligent4 ,,xi4 ,god1 who is in every sense infinite activity1 is infinitely intelligent and infinitely intelligible by himself4 ,,xii4 ,god is intelligible by all created intellects1 provided it be his will to present himself immediately to them1 and strengthen and elevate them as may be necessary4 ,,xiii4 ,there is no repugnance in immediate intelligibility being communicated to some beings1 which are consequently intelligible by themselves4 ,,xiv4 ,our soul1 while united to our body1 is not immediately intelligible1 and we know it only by its acts4 ,,xv4 ,in this want of immediate intelligibility is found the reason of the difficulty of ideological and psychological studies1 and the obscurity which we experience in passing from direct to reflex knowledge4 ,,xvi4 ,therefore1 the philosophy of the me1 or that which seeks to explain the internal and external world by starting from the me1 is impossible2 it commences by denying one of the fundamental facts of psychology4 ,,xvii4 ,therefore1 the doctrine of universal identity is also absurd1 since it gives both intelligence and immediate intelligibility to matter1 which can have neither4 ,,xviii4 ,spiritualism1 therefore1 is a truth which springs as well from subjective as from objective philosophy1 from intelligence as from intelligibility4 ,,xix4 ,we must1 therefore1 go beyond ourselves1 and even rise above the universe to find the origin of either subjective or objective representation4 ,,xx4 ,therefore1 we must ascend to a primitive1 infinite activity1 which places intelligences in communication among themselves and with the corporeal world4 ,,xxi4 ,therefore1 purely ideological and psychological philosophy leads us to ,god4 ,,xxii4 ,therefore1 philosophy cannot commence by a single fact1 the origin of all other facts1 but must1 and does end with this supreme fact1 the infinite existence1 which is ,god47#ab7 ,,chapter ,,xiii4 ,,representation ,,of ,,causality ,,and ,,ideality4 #abf4 ,besides the representation of identity1 there is what ,i have called the representation of causality4 ,a being may represent itself1 a cause its effect4 ,productive activity is inconceivable1 if the principle of the productive act does not in some manner contain the thing produced4 ,therefore we say that ,god1 the universal cause of all that does or can exist1 contains in his essence all real and possible beings in a virtual or eminent manner4 ,a being can just as well present whatever it contains in itself1 as it can represent itself2 causality1 therefore1 under the conditions above explained1 may be an origin of representation4 #abg4 ,and here we would remark how profound a philosopher ,st4 ,thomas shows himself to be1 when he explains the manner in which ,god knows his creatures4 ,in his ,summa ,theologica1#g he asks if ,god knows things distinct from himself1 and answers in the affirmative2 not that he regards the divine essence as a mirror1 but that by recourse to a more profound consideration he seeks the origin of this knowledge in causality4 ,this is his doctrine in a few words3 ,it is manifest that ,god knows himself perfectly2 therefore he knows all his power1 and consequently all the things to which it extends4 ,another reason1 or rather enlargement of the same reason1 is1 that the being of the first cause is its intellect3 all effects pre-exist in ,god as in their cause2 they must1 therefore1 be in him in an intelligible manner1 since they are his intellect itself4 ,god then sees himself by his essence2 but he sees other things not in themselves1 but in his essence1 inasmuch as his essence contains the similitude of everything4 #g ,p4 #a;a1 ,q4 #ad;a1 ,a4 #eo4 ,the same doctrine is found in another place1#h where he asks if they who see the divine essence see all things in ,god4 #h ,q4 #ab;a1 ,a4 #ho4 #abh4 ,representation of ideality is that which neither proceeds from the identity of the thing representing with that represented1 nor from the relation of cause and effect4 ,our ideas are of this class1 for they are neither identical with their objects nor do they cause them4 ,it is impossible for us to know whether1 besides this representative force which we experience in our ideas1 there are finite substances capable of representing things distinct from1 and not caused by1 themselves4 ,leibnitz maintains that there are such substances2 but1 as we have seen1 his system of monads must be regarded as merely hypothetical4 ,it is better to say nothing than to make conjectures which lead to no result2 we shall therefore content ourselves with establishing the following propositions3 ,i4 ,if any being represent another which is not its effect1 it has not this representative force of itself1 but has received it from another4 ,,ii4 ,the communication of intelligences can only be explained by recurring to a first intelligence1 which1 being the cause of the others1 can give them the force to act upon one another1 and consequently to produce representation4 #abi4 ,causality may be a principle1 but is not a sufficient reason1 of representation4 ,in the first place1 a cause cannot represent its effect unless intelligible in itself4 ,thus1 although we attribute to matter an activity of its own1 we cannot concede it the power to represent its effects1 for want of the indispensable condition of immediate intelligibility4 #acj4 ,in order that effects may be intelligible in their cause1 it must of necessity possess the character of cause in its fulness1 by uniting all the conditions and determinations requisite to the production of the effect4 ,free causes do not represent their effects1 because these effects with relation to their causes are found only in the sphere of possibility4 ,the production may be realized1 but is not necessary2 and thus the possible1 but not the real1 is seen in the cause4 ,god knows future contingencies1 which depend upon the human will1 not precisely because he knows the activity of man1 but because he sees in himself1 without succession of time1 not only all that may1 but all that will happen2 since nothing can exist in the present or in the future without his will or permission4 ,he also knows future contingencies dependent solely on his own will1 because he knows from all eternity what he has resolved1 and his decrees are indefectible and immutable4 #aca4 ,even if we refer to the necessary order of nature1 and suppose one or more second causes to be known1 it is not possible to see in them all their effects with entire security1 unless the cause act in isolation1 or all the others are known together with it4 ,as experience shows us that all the parts of nature are in intimate and reciprocal communication1 we cannot suppose the above isolation1 and consequently the action of every second cause is subjected to the combinations of others1 which may either impede or modify its effect4 ,hence the difficulty of establishing general1 and at the same time1 perfectly safe laws in all that concerns nature4 #acb4 ,the preceding considerations1 it is to be observed1 demonstrate anew the impossibility of transcendental science based upon a fact from which all other facts proceed4 ,intellectual representation is not explained by substituting necessary emanation for free creation4 ,even supposing the variety of the universe to be purely phenomenal1 and at bottom only a being always one1 identical1 and absolute1 it cannot be denied that the phenomena are governed by certain laws1 and subject to various conditions4 ,either the human intellect can see the absolute in such a way as to discern by a simple intuition whatever is contained in it1 all that it is or can be1 under all possible forms2 or else it is condemned to follow the unfolding of the unconditioned1 the absolute1 and the permanent1 through its conditioned1 relative1 and variable forms4 ,the former1 which is a sort of ridiculous plagiarism from the dogma of beatific vision1 is1 in treating of the intellect in its present state1 so palpable an absurdity1 as to merit neither debate nor refutation4 ,the latter subjects the intellect to all the fatigue of investigation1 and destroys at one blow all the illusory promises of transcendental science4 #acc4 ,the understanding is1 in its acts1 subject to a law of succession1 or the idea of time4 ,the same thing obtains in nature1 whether it is so verified in reality1 or time is considered as a subjective condition which we transfer to objects2 be this doctrine of ,kant1 which we shall in due time examine1 as it may1 it is certain that succession1 at least for us1 exists1 and that we cannot ignore it4 ,in this hypothesis an infinite evolution can be known to us only in an infinite time4 ,thus1 by a metaphysical necessity1 we are unable to know not only the future evolution of the absolute1 but also the present and the past4 ,this evolution being absolutely necessary1 according to the doctrine to which we have reference1 an infinite succession must have preceded us2 thus the present organization of the universe must be regarded as one round of an unlimited ladder1 which in the past as in the future1 has no measure but eternity4 ,we can know the present state of the world solely by observation1 and then only to a very limited degree2 we must1 therefore1 of necessity1 deduce it from the idea of the absolute1 by following it in its infinite evolution4 ,were this not1 however1 in itself radically impossible1 it would1 nevertheless1 labor under the inconvenience of being too long a task to be accomplished in the life-time of any one man1 or even in that of all men who have ever lived1 taken collectively4 #acd4 ,but let us return to the representation of causality4 ,the ideal representation may be reduced to that of causality2 for since a spirit can have no idea of an object not produced by it1 unless communicated to it by another spirit1 the cause of the thing represented1 we infer that all purely ideal representations proceed either directly or indirectly1 mediately or immediately1 from the cause of the objects known4 ,and since1 on the other hand1 as we have already seen1 the first being knows things distinct from himself only1 as he is their cause2 we hold the representation of ideality to be reduced to that of causality1 thus in part verifying the principle of ,vico1 the profound ,neapolitan thinker3 the intellect only knows what it does4 #ace4 ,from this doctrine flow two consequences of which we must take note3 ,i4 ,there are only two primitive sources of intellectual representation3 identity and causality4 ,that of ideality is necessarily derived from that of causality4 ,,ii4 ,in the real order1 the principle of being is identical with the principle of knowledge4 ,that only which gives being can give knowledge4 ,the first cause can give knowledge only in so far as it gives being3 it represents because it causes4 #acf4 ,the representation of ideality1 although connected with that of causality1 is yet really distinct from it4 ,the explanation of its nature belongs indeed to the treatise on ideas2 but we cannot relinquish1 without an illustration1 a point so closely connected with the problem of intellectual representation4 ,some conceive ideas to be a sort of image or copy of the object2 but this is true only with respect to the representations of the imagination1 that is1 the purely corporeal2 and even here it is necessary to suppose the external world to be such as the senses present it1 which1 however1 under many aspects1 is not true4 ,to be convinced how illusory is the theory founded on the likeness of sensible things1 we have only to ask1 what the image of a relation is1 or1 how causality1 substance1 and being are portrayed4 ,in the perception of these ideas1 there is something more profound than any thing apparent in sensible things1 something of an entirely different order4 ,necessity has led us to compare the understanding to an eye which sees1 and the idea to an image present2 but this is only a comparison2 the reality is something more mysterious1 more secret1 more intimate3 there is an ineffable union between the perception and the idea3 man cannot explain it1 but he experiences it4 #acg4 ,our consciousness attests that there is in us unity of being1 that the soul is at all times identical with itself1 and that it remains constant notwithstanding the variety of ideas and of acts which pass over it1 like waves over the surface of a lake4 ,ideas are a mode of being of the mind3 but what is this mode8 ,in what does it consist8 ,does the production and reproduction of ideas proceed from a distinct cause which continually acts upon our soul1 and produces immediately those modes of being which we call representations1 or ideas8 ,or must we admit that there has been given to the mind an activity to produce these representations1 subject1 however1 to the determination of exciting causes8 ,these are questions which1 for the present1 we shall only indicate47#ac7 ,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,,impossibility ,,of ,,finding ,,the ,,first ,,principle ,,in ,,the ,,ideal ,,order4 #ach4 ,we shall in vain seek in the region of ideas for that which we could not find in that of facts1 for there is no ideal truth1 the origin of all other truths4 ,ideal truth only expresses the necessary relation of ideas1 abstracting the existence of the objects to which they relate3 hence it follows1 first of all1 that ideal truths are absolutely incapable of producing the knowledge of reality4 ,no ideal truth can lead to any result in the order of existences1 unless there be some fact to which it applies4 ,otherwise1 however fruitful it may be in the order of ideas1 it will be absolutely sterile in that of facts4 ,the fact without the ideal truth remains in its isolated individuality1 incapable of producing any thing more than cognition of itself3 but in return1 the ideal truth1 apart from the fact1 remains purely objective in the logical world1 and has no means of descending to that of existences4 #aci4 ,let us apply this doctrine to the most certain and most evident ideal principles1 to those which contain the most general ideas1 and which ought1 therefore1 to possess the fecundity in question1 if1 indeed1 it be anywhere to be encountered4 ,it is impossible for the same thing to be and not be at the same time4 ,this is the famous principle of contradiction1 which may undoubtedly claim to be regarded as one source of truth to the human understanding4 ,the ideas contained in it are the clearest and most simple conceivable2 in it is affirmed the repugnance of being to not-being1 and of not-being to being1 at the same time1 which is most evident4 ,but what advance can we make with this principle alone8 ,present it to the most penetrating mind1 to the most powerful genius2 leave them alone with it1 and there will result only a sterile1 although pure and most clear intuition4 ,since it does not affirm that any thing is or is not1 nothing can be inferred either for or against any existence3 it only offers to the mind this conditional relation3 that if any thing does exist1 it is repugnant for it not to exist at the same time that it exists1 or to exist at the same time that it does not exist4 ,but if the condition of existence or non-existence be not given1 yes and no in the real order are indifferent2 nothing is known concerning them1 however great the evidence in the ideal order4 ,to pass from the logical world to that of reality1 all that is required is a fact to serve as a bridge4 ,if this fact be offered to the understanding1 the two banks are joined1 and science commences4 ,i feel1 ,i think1 ,i exist3 these are facts of consciousness2 combine any one of them with the principle of contradiction1 and what before were sterile intuitions become prolific ratiocinations1 embracing at once the world of ideas1 and that of reality4 #adj4 ,even in the purely ideal order1 the principle of contradiction is sterile unless joined with particular truths of the same order4 ,in geometry1 for example1 it is often argued thus3 such a quantity is either greater or less than another1 or equal to it2 for otherwise it would be both greater and less1 equal and unequal1 at the same time1 which is absurd4 ,here the principle of contradiction is effectively applied1 not alone1 but together with a particular truth which makes such an application available4 ,thus1 in the above argument1 no use could be made of the principle of contradiction1 to prove equality or inequality were not the existence or non-existence of one of the two previously proved or supposed3 since this neither does nor can result from the principle of contradiction which includes1 not a particular idea1 but the most general ideas presented to the human mind4 #ada4 ,general truths1 of themselves1 even in the purely ideal order1 lead to nothing1 because of the indeterminateness of the ideas which they contain2 and1 on the other hand1 particular truths of themselves produce no result1 because they are limited to what they are1 making reasoning1 which cannot take one step without the aid of general ideas and propositions1 impossible4 ,light results from the union of one with the other2 separated they afford only an abstract and vague intuition1 or the contemplation of a particular truth1 which1 limited to a contracted sphere1 can give no knowledge of beings considered under a scientific aspect4 #adb4 ,we shall see when we come to treat of ideas1 that our mind has two very distinct classes of them2 the one supposes space1 and cannot abstract it1 such are all geometrical ideas3 the other does not relate to space1 and includes all non-geometrical ideas4 ,these two orders of ideas are separated by an impassable abyss1 if the two orders are not approximated by a simultaneous use of both4 ,the ideal order is not complete without this approximation2 and the real order of the universe is turned into a chaos1 or rather disappears1 if real and ideal truths are not combined1 in both the geometrical and non-geometrical orders4 ,from all geometrical ideas imaginable1 considered in all their ideal purity1 nothing would result for the ideal non-geometrical order1 for the world of material1 much less of immaterial realities2 and1 on the other hand1 from non-geometrical ideas alone we could not get so much as the idea of a right line4 ,this observation shows that there is for us in the ideal order no one truth1 the origin of all other truths2 for if we take the geometrical order1 we are limited to those combinations which do not go out of it2 if the non-geometrical order1 we lack the idea of space1 without which we lose even the possibility of conceiving the corporeal world47#ad7 ,,chapter ,,xv4 ,,the ,,indispensable ,,condition ,,of ,,all ,,human ,,knowledge4--,,means ,,of ,,perceiving ,,truth4 #adc4 ,we have not been able to discover1 either in the real or the ideal order1 a truth1 the origin of all other truths to our intellect while in this life4 ,therefore it stands proved that transcendental science properly so called is for us a chimera4 ,our cognitions must1 doubtless1 have some resting-point1 and this we shall now investigate4 ,for the better understanding of the subject now before us1 we will recall the true state of the question4 ,we do not seek a first principle1 which of itself alone illumines or produces all truths2 but we seek a truth which shall be the indispensable condition of all knowledge2 for this reason1 we do not call it an origin1 but a resting-point4 ,the edifice does not originate in the foundation1 but rests upon it4 ,we must consider the principle sought for as a foundation1 just as in the preceding chapters1 we treated of discovering a seed4 ,these two images seed and foundation1 perfectly express our ideas1 and exactly trace the limits of the two questions4 #add4 ,is there a resting-point of all science1 and of all knowledge1 scientific or not scientific8 ,if there is1 what is it8 ,are there many1 or only one8 ,evidently there must be a resting-point4 ,if asked the reason of an assent1 we must at last come to a fact or a proposition1 beyond which we cannot go2 for we cannot admit the process ad infinitum4 ,this is the point where we must of necessity stop1 and consequently the resting-point of certainty4 #ade4 ,starting with a given assent1 we may1 perhaps1 arrive at different principles1 independent one of the other1 all equally fundamental1 as regards our mind3 in this case there will be not only one1 but many resting-points4 ,we do not believe it possible to determine a priori1 whether there is unity or plurality for our intellect in this matter4 ,that human science must be reduced to a single principle is a proposition that has been asserted1 but never yet proved4 ,since the source of all truth1 as has been shown in the preceding chapters1 is not in man1 it is evident that the principles1 on which his knowledge is founded1 must be communicated4 ,who shall assure us that they are not many in number1 and of different orders8 ,nothing then in the present question can be resolved a priori1 and we must descend to ideological and psychological observations4 #adf4 ,our mind acquires truth1 or at least the appearance of truth2 that is to say1 that in one way or another1 it performs those acts which we call perception and sensation4 ,whether the reality does or does not correspond to the acts of our soul1 is at present of no consequence1 is not what we now seek3 we place the question on a ground accessible to the most skeptical2 for even they do not deny perception and sensation2 although they destroy reality1 they admit appearance4 #adg4 ,the means by which we perceive truth are of different orders2 and this is why truths perceived correspond equally to different orders1 parallel1 so to speak1 with the respective means of perception4 ,consciousness1 evidence1 and intellectual instinct or common sense1 are the three means2 to which correspond truths of consciousness1 necessary truths1 and common-sense truths4 ,these are distinct1 different1 and in many cases unconnected with each other2 and he1 who seeks to acquire complete and accurate ideas upon matters relating to the first principle of human knowledge1 must mark out their limits with great care4 #adh4 ,that means which we have called consciousness1 or the intimate sense of that which passes within us1 that which we experience1 is independent of all the others4 ,destroy evidence1 destroy intellectual instinct1 yet consciousness remains4 ,in order to feel1 and to be sure that we feel1 and what we feel1 we need only experience4 ,if we suppose the principle of contradiction to be doubtful1 still it will not shake our certainty that we suffer when we suffer1 that we rejoice when we rejoice1 that we think when we think4 ,the presence of the act1 or the impression at the bottom of our soul1 is intimate1 immediate to us1 and of irresistible efficacy to place us above all doubt4 ,sleeping or waking1 sane or insane1 the testimony of consciousness is the same2 there may be an error in the object1 but there can be none in the internal phenomenon4 ,the lunatic who believes that he counts numberless bags of dollars1 certainly does not count them1 and in this he is deceived2 yet he has in his mind the consciousness of what he does1 and in this he is infallible4 ,a man who dreams that he has fallen into the hands of robbers1 is deceived as to the external object1 but not as regards the act by which he believes it4 ,consciousness is independent of all extrinsic testimony2 its necessity is inevitable1 its force irresistible in producing certainty2 it is infallible in what concerns only itself2 if it exist it must give testimony of itself2 if it does not exist it cannot give it4 ,in it reality and appearance are confounded2 it cannot be apparent without being real2 the appearance alone is already a true consciousness4 #adi4 ,we include in the testimony of consciousness all that which we experience in our soul1 all that which affects what some call the human me1 ideas1 thoughts of every class1 acts of the will1 sentiments1 sensations2 in a word1 every thing of which we can say3 ,i experience it4 #aej4 ,manifestly the truths of consciousness are rather facts to be pointed out1 than combinations to be enunciated4 ,this is not to say that they cannot be enunciated1 but that in themselves they abstract all intellectual form1 are simple elements1 in ordering and comparing which the intellect may occupy itself1 but which of themselves give no light1 represent nothing1 but only present what they are2 that they are mere facts1 beyond which we cannot go4 #aea4 ,the habit of reflecting upon consciousness1 and of joining purely intellectual operations with facts of simple internal experience1 makes it difficult to conceive this isolation1 in which every thing purely subjective is by its nature found4 ,we endeavor to abstract reflection1 but we reflect upon our very effort to abstract it4 ,our intellect is a fire1 which1 extinguished on one side1 burns on the other2 the very effort to extinguish it ordinarily makes it burn brighter4 ,hence the difficulty of distinguishing the two characters of purely subjective and purely objective1 to mark the dividing line between evidence and consciousness1 between the known and the experienced4 ,nevertheless1 the separation of two such different elements may be made easy1 by considering that brutes are1 in their own way1 conscious of what they inwardly experience2 not supposing them to be mere machines1 we must allow them consciousness1 or the intimate presence of their sensations4 ,without this even sensation is inconceivable1 for that can have no sensation which does not perceive that it feels4 ,brutes reflect not on what passes within themselves2 they experience it1 but nothing more4 ,sensations succeed one another in their soul1 connected only by the unity of the being experiencing them2 but they do not take them for objects and consequently1 do not combine or transform them in any manner2 they leave them as they are1 simple facts4 ,from this we may derive some light for the conception of what the simple facts of consciousness are in us when abandoned to themselves1 perfectly isolated1 separated from purely intellectual operations1 and under no subjection to reflective activity1 which1 combining them in various ways1 and elevating them to the region of the purely ideal1 presents them to us in such a manner as to make us forget their primitive purity4 ,an effort is necessary in order clearly to perceive what the facts of consciousness are1 and what its testimony is2 for without this it is impossible to advance one step in the investigation of the first principle of human knowledge4 ,confusion on this point makes us fall into transcendental equivocations4 ,we shall hereafter have occasion to observe this1 and we have already encountered lamentable examples of such deviations in the errors of the philosophy of the me4 #aeb4 ,evidence is usually called an intellectual light4 ,this is a very happy metaphor1 and even exact2 but1 like all metaphors1 it has the defect of being of but little service to explain the mysteries of philosophy4 ,we also find intellectual light in many acts of consciousness4 ,there is also a sort of clear light in that intimate presence by which an operation or an impression is offered to the mind2 it shines upon the eye of the soul1 and makes it see what is before it4 ,if1 then1 we define evidence only by calling it the light of the intellect1 we confound it with consciousness1 or1 at least1 by the use of ambiguous language1 give others occasion of confounding them4 ,let us not be thought to blame those who have used the metaphor of light1 or to flatter ourselves with being able to define evidence with all exactness2 for who can express in words this phenomenon of our mind8 ,if we are to have any metaphor1 that of the intellectual light seems to be the most adequate4 ,for1 in truth1 when we fix our attention upon evidence1 in order to examine its nature and its effects on the mind1 it very naturally presents itself under the image of a light1 whose splendor illumines the objects1 and enables the mind to contemplate them3 but this1 we repeat1 is not enough4 ,we will1 then1 although we do not undertake exactly to define it1 point out a mark to distinguish it from every thing else4 #aec4 ,evidence is always accompanied by the necessity1 and consequently1 by the universality1 of the truths which it attests4 ,there is no evidence of the contingent1 except in so far as subjected to a necessary principle4 ,let us explain this doctrine by comparing examples taken respectively from consciousness and evidence4 ,that there is in me a being which thinks1 ,i know1 not by evidence1 but by consciousness4 ,that whatever thinks exists1 ,i know1 not by consciousness1 but by evidence4 ,in both cases the certainty is absolute1 irresistible2 but in the first it rests upon a particular1 contingent fact2 in the second upon a universal and necessary truth4 ,that ,i think is certain for me1 but not necessarily so for others2 the disappearance of my thought does not overturn the world of intelligences2 if my thought should now cease to exist1 truth in itself would suffer no change2 other intellects might and would continue to perceive truth2 and neither in the real nor in the ideal order would there be less concert and harmony4 ,i ask myself if ,i think1 and in the bottom of my soul ,i read that ,i do think3 ,i ask myself if this thought is necessary1 and not only does experience tell me that it is not1 but ,i can find no reason why it should be necessary4 ,even supposing that my thought ceases to exist1 ,i perceive that ,i continue to reason in due form4 ,thus ,i examine what would have happened if ,i had not existed1 or what may hereafter happen if ,i cease to exist2 and ,i assent to principles and draw conclusions without transgressing any law of the intellect4 ,the ideal world and the real world are presented to my eyes as a magnificent spectacle at which ,i indeed assist1 but from which ,i may withdraw without the representation undergoing any change1 except that ,i should leave vacant the imperceptible place which ,i now occupy4 ,but it is very different with the truths which are the object of evidence4 ,it is not necessary for me to think2 but it is so necessary for whatever thinks to exist1 that no efforts of mine could suffice to abstract this necessity for one moment4 ,if1 taking an absurd position1 ,i suppose the contrary1 and imagine for an instant the relation between thought and being to be cut short1 ,i break the chain which supports the order of the entire universe2 every thing is reversed1 thrown into confusion2 and ,i know not if what ,i see be chaos or nonentity4 ,what has taken place8 ,the intellect has only suffered a contradiction1 at the same time affirming and denying thought1 because it affirmed a thought to which it denied existence4 ,it has violated a universal and absolutely necessary law1 the violation of which throws every thing into chaos4 ,not the certainty of the soul's existence1 supported by the testimony of consciousness1 suffices to prevent the confusion3 the intellect by contradicting itself has denied itself2 from its insensate words1 not being1 but nonentity has resulted1 not light1 but darkness2 and this darkness cast over whatever exists or is possible turns back upon it and involves it in eternal night4 #aed4 ,we have here fixed and defined the conditions of consciousness and evidence4 ,the object of the former is the individual1 the contingent2 that of the latter the universal and the necessary4 ,only in ,god1 the source of all truth1 the universal and necessary principle of being and of knowledge1 is consciousness identified with evidence2 and it is not possible to abstract the testimony of his consciousness1 without annihilating everything4 ,what would remain in the world were ,i to disappear8 the creature asks itself1 and answers3 everything except myself4 ,were ,god to ask himself this question1 he would answer3 nothing4 #aee4 ,we have given the name of intellectual instinct to the impulse which in many cases produces certainty without the aid of the testimony either of consciousness or of evidence4 ,if you show a man a target1 then blindfold his eyes1 and turn him around at random several times1 and1 after this1 place a bow in his hands1 and assure him that the arrow will strike the precise centre of the target1 he will say that this is impossible2 and nothing can induce him to believe so great an absurdity4 ,and why not8 ,because of the testimony of consciousness8 ,no6 ,for the question is now of external objects4 ,neither does he depend on evidence2 for the objects of evidence are things necessary1 and it is not intrinsically impossible for the arrow to hit the mark assigned4 ,on what then rests his profound conviction that this is not possible8 ,if we suppose him to know nothing of theories1 of probabilities1 and combinations1 to have no knowledge of this science1 and never to have so much as thought of such things1 his certainty is just as great as it would be were he able to base it upon some sort of calculation4 ,all the bystanders1 whether rude or cultivated1 ignorant or learned1 need no reflection to be equally certain2 all will say1 or think1 this is impossible2 it cannot happen4 ,we again ask1 what is the foundation of so strong a conviction8 ,not springing from consciousness1 or from either mediate or immediate evidence1 it manifestly can have no other origin than that internal force which we call intellectual instinct1 and which may be called common sense1 or anything else1 so long as the fact itself is recognized4 ,it is a precious gift1 which the ,creator has given to us1 to make us reasonable even before we reason1 and to enable us rightly to govern our conduct when we lack time to examine motives of prudence4 #aef4 ,this intellectual instinct embraces many objects of different orders2 it is the guide and the shield of reason3 the guide1 because it precedes and shows the way2 the shield1 because it defends reason from her own cavils1 and because sophistry becomes dumb in its presence4 #aeg4 ,the testimony of human authority1 equally necessary to the individual and to society1 commands our assent1 by means of an intellectual instinct4 ,man believes man1 believes society1 even before thinking of the motives of his faith2 few examine them at all1 and yet this faith is universal4 ,we do not here inquire if intellectual instinct sometimes deceives1 or why1 or in what cases it deceives2 at present we only seek to establish its existence2 and with regard to the errors to which it leads1 we shall simply remark1 that in a weak being1 such as man1 the rule is continually changing1 and as it is not possible to find a man good1 without any admixture of evil1 so is it impossible to find truth without some admixture of error4 #aeh4 ,we make sensations objective only by virtue of an irresistible instinct4 ,nothing is more certain1 more evident to the eyes of philosophy1 than the subjectivity of all sensations2 that is1 sensations are immanent phenomena1 are within us1 and do not go out of us2 and yet nothing is more constant than the transition made by the whole human race from the subjective to the objective1 from the internal to the external1 from the phenomenon to the reality4 ,on what is this transition grounded8 ,if the most eminent philosophers experienced so much difficulty in finding the bridge1 which unites the two opposite banks2 if some of them1 wearied with investigation1 resolutely asserted that it was not possible to discover it1 will the commonalty of mankind discover it from their very childhood8 ,evidently1 motives of reasoning do not explain the transition2 appeal must be made to the instinct of nature4 ,there is then an instinct1 which by itself assures us of a truth demonstrated with difficulty by the most abstruse philosophy4 #aei4 ,here ,i shall notice the errors of those methods which isolate man's faculties1 and1 in order better to know the mind1 disfigure and mutilate it4 ,one of the most constant and fundamental facts of ideological and psychological science1 is the multiplicity of acts and faculties of the soul1 notwithstanding its simplicity attested by the unity of consciousness4 ,there is in man1 and in the universe1 an assemblage of laws1 the effects of which are simultaneously evolved with harmonious regularity2 to separate them1 is often equivalent to placing them in contradiction2 for1 no one of them being capable of producing its effect if isolated1 but requiring to be combined with the others1 they produce1 when made to operate alone1 instead of their regular effects1 the most hideous monstrosities4 ,if you retain in the world only the law of gravitation not combined with that of projection1 every thing will be precipitated towards one centre2 instead of that infinity of systems which adorn the firmament1 you will have only a rude and indigested mass4 ,if you destroy gravitation1 and preserve the force of projection1 all bodies will be decomposed into imperceptible atoms1 and be dispersed1 like most subtle ether1 through regions of immensity47#ae7 ,,chapter ,,xvi4 ,,confusion ,,of ,,ideas ,,in ,,disputes ,,on ,,the ,,fundamental ,,principle4 #afj4 ,there are1 in our opinion1 various principles1 which1 with regard to the human intellect1 may be called equally fundamental1 both because they serve as foundation in the common and scientific orders1 and because they do not rest upon any other1 since it is impossible to assign any one which enjoys this quality as an exclusive privilege4 ,in seeking the fundamental principle1 it is customary in the schools to observe that they do not endeavor to find a truth from which all others emanate1 but an axiom the destruction of which draws with it that of all other truths1 and the firmness of which sustains them1 at least indirectly1 in such manner that whoever denies them may be refuted by indirect demonstration1 or reduction ad absurdum2 that is1 admitting the above axiom1 it may follow that whoever denies the others will be convicted of being in opposition to one which he himself has acknowledged to be true4 #afa4 ,it has been much disputed whether this or that principle merit the preference4 ,we believe that there is here a confusion of ideas1 proceeding in great part from not sufficiently marking the limits of testimonies so distinct as those of consciousness1 of evidence1 and of common sense4 ,descartes' famous principle1 ,i think1 therefore ,i am2 that of contradiction1 it is impossible for a thing to be and not to be at the same time2 and what is called the principle of the ,cartesians1 whatever is contained in the clear and distinct idea of anything1 may be affirmed of it with all certainty2 are the three principles that have divided the schools4 ,in favor of each1 reasons the most powerful1 and even conclusive against the others1 considering the ground on which the question was placed1 have been brought forward4 ,if you are not certain that you think1 argues the partisan of ,descartes1 you cannot be certain even of the principle of contradiction1 or know the criterion of evidence to be valid2 for both1 it is necessary to think2 whoever affirms or denies anything1 thinks2 without thought1 neither affirmation nor negation is possible4 ,but let us admit thought3 we have already a foundation1 and one of such a nature that we find it in ourselves1 attested by consciousness1 irresistibly forcing upon us the certainty of its existence4 ,the foundation once laid1 we see how the edifice can be raised2 for this we need not go out of our own thought2 there is the luminous point to conduct us in the path to truth2 let us follow its splendor1 and having established an immovable point1 let us draw from it the mysterious thread to guide us in the labyrinth of science4 ,thus our principle is the first1 the basis of all others2 it has sufficient power to sustain itself1 sufficient also to impart firmness to others4 ,this language is certainly reasonable2 but it has this fault1 that the conviction which it is intended to produce1 is neutralized by the not less reasonable language of those who hold a directly contrary opinion4 ,one who maintains the principle of contradiction may reason thus3 if you do not admit it to be impossible for the same thing to be and not be at the same time1 it may be possible that you think and do not think at the same time2 your assertion1 then1 ,i think1 is of no weight1 for its opposite1 ,i do not think1 may1 at the same time1 be true4 ,in this case1 the conclusion of existence is invalid2 for1 even admitting the legitimacy of the consequence1 ,i think1 therefore ,i am1 as we know on the other hand that this other premise1 ,i do not think1 is possible1 the deduction cannot be made4 ,nor is the other principle3 whatever is contained in the clear and distinct idea of anything1 may he affirmed of it with all certainty1 of any more value without the principle of contradiction2 because if being and not-being are possible at the same time1 an idea may be clear and obscure1 distinct and confused2 a predicate may be contained and not contained in the subject2 we may be certain and uncertain1 affirm and deny2 therefore it is of no service4 ,he who argues thus seems quite reasonable2 but strangely enough1 the advocate of the third principle brings equally strong arguments against his two adversaries4 ,how is it known1 he asks1 that the principle of contradiction is true8 ,only because we see in the idea of being the impossibility of its being and not being at the same time1 and vice versa2 therefore1 we are sure of the principle of contradiction only from the application of the principle3 whatever is contained in the clear and distinct idea of anything1 may he affirmed of it with all certainty4 ,if nothing can be sustained without relying upon the principle of contradiction1--and this is based upon our principle1--ours is the foundation of them all4 #afb4 ,they are all three right1 and all three wrong4 ,they are right in asserting that the denial of their respective principles is the ruin of the others4 ,they are all wrong in pretending that the denial of the others is not the ruin of their own4 ,whence then the dispute8 ,from the confusion of ideas1 by which they compare principles of very different orders1 all indeed very true1 but not to be compared with each other for the same reason that we cannot compare the white and the warm1 and dispute whether a thing has more degrees of heat or whiteness4 ,comparison requires not only opposition in the extremes1 but also something in common2 if things are totally unlike1 comparison is impossible4 ,descartes' principle is the enunciation of a simple fact of consciousness2 that of contradiction is a truth known by evidence2 and that of the ,cartesians is an assertion that the criterion of evidence is valid1 and that it is a truth of reflection expressing the intellectual impulse by which we are borne to believe the truth of what we know by evidence4 ,the importance of this question requires a special examination of each of the three principles1 which we shall make in the next chapters47#af7 ,,chapter ,,xvii4 ,,thought ,,and ,,existence4--,,descartes' ,,principle4 #afc4 ,am ,i certain that ,i exist8 ,yes4 ,can ,i prove it8 ,no4 ,proof supposes reasoning2 there is no solid reasoning without a firm principle on which to rest it2 and there is no firm principle unless we suppose the existence of the reasoning being4 ,in effect1 if he who reasons is not certain of his own existence1 he cannot be certain of his own reasoning1 since there will be no reasoning if there be no one to reason4 ,therefore there are1 unless we suppose this1 no principles on which to rest2 there is nothing but illusion1 or rather there is neither any illusion1 for there can be none where there is no one illuded4 ,our existence cannot be demonstrated3 we have so clear and strong a consciousness of it that it leaves us no uncertainty2 but it is impossible to prove it by reasoning4 #afd4 ,it is a prejudice and a fatal error to believe ourselves able to prove everything by the use of reason2 the principles on which it is founded are prior to its use2 the existence of reason1 and that of the being that reasons1 are prior to both4 ,not only are not all things demonstrated1 but it may even be demonstrated that some things are indemonstrable4 ,demonstration is a ratiocination in which we infer from evident propositions1 a proposition evidently connected with them4 ,if the premises are of themselves evident1 they do not admit of demonstration2 if we suppose them in their turn demonstrable1 we shall have the same difficulty with respect to those on which the new demonstration is founded2 therefore we must either stop at an indemonstrable point1 or proceed to infinity1 which would be never to finish the demonstration4 #afe4 ,and it is to be remarked that indemonstrability does not belong solely to certain premises2 it is found1 in some measure1 in every argument by its very nature1 abstracting the propositions which compose it4 ,we know that the premises ,a and ,b are certain2 from them we infer the proposition ,c4 ,by what right8 ,because we see that ,c is connected with ,a and ,b4 ,but how do we know this8 ,if by immediate evidence1 by intuition1 here is something else that cannot be demonstrated1 the connection of the conclusion with the premises4 ,if by argument1 ratiocination1 establishing ourselves on the art of reasoning1 there are two considerations1 both tending to demonstrate indemonstrability4 ,i4 ,if the principles of the art are indemonstrable1 we have at once something indemonstrable2 if they are demonstrable1 we must make use of others which serve as their basis1 and at last either come to one which does not admit of demonstration1 or else proceed to infinity4 ,,ii4 ,how do we know the principles of reasoning to be applicable to this case8 ,by another act of reasoning8 ,then we shall encounter the same difficulty as in the other case4 ,is it because we see that it is so8 because it is immediately evident8 ,then here again we have an indemonstrable point4 ,these reflections will clearly show that to demand proof of everything is to demand what is impossible4 #aff4 ,a being which does not think has no consciousness of itself3 the stone exists1 but does not know that it exists1 neither would man himself in a similar case1 were all his intellectual and sensible faculties in complete inaction4 ,we easily conceive the difference of these two states by calling to mind what occurs1 when from waking we pass into a profound sleep1 and again when we awake from it4 ,the first starting-point of our cognitions is this intimate presence of our internal acts1 abstraction made of the questions which may be raised upon their nature4 ,if every thing existed as at present1 and there also existed1 besides the world which we see1 infinite other worlds1 not even then would any thing exist for us1 had we not those internal acts of which we are speaking4 ,we should be like an insensible body placed in the immensity of space1 which would suffer no mutation were every thing around it to disappear1 and would perceive no change even if it were itself to sink into the abyss of nothing4 ,on the other hand1 if we suppose every thing to be annihilated except this being within us which feels1 thinks1 and wills1 there still remains a point whereon to base the edifice of human cognitions3 this being1 though alone in immensity1 would render itself an account of its own acts to the extent of its ability1 and might go into numberless combinations having for their object the possible though not the real4 #afg4 ,the famous principle of ,descartes1 ,i think1 therefore ,i am1 has been often attacked1 and justly and conclusively so1 if this philosopher really understood his principle in the sense which the schools are accustomed to give it4 ,if ,descartes presented it as a true argument1 as an enthymema with an antecedent and a consequent1 the argument was clearly defective in its foundation4 ,for when he said1 ,i am going to prove my existence with this enthymema3 ,i think1 therefore ,i am3 this objection might have been made2 your enthymema is equivalent to a syllogism in this form3 whatever thinks1 exists2 but ,i think2 therefore1 ,i exist4 ,this syllogism1 in the supposition of a universal doubt1 excluding even the supposition of existence itself1 is inadmissable in its propositions and in their connection4 ,in the first place1 how do you know that whatever thinks exists8 ,because nothing can think without existing4 ,how do you know that8 ,because what does not exist1 does not act4 ,but how in its turn do you know this8 ,supposing every thing to be doubted1 nothing to be known1 these principles are not known2 otherwise we fall short of the supposition of universal doubt1 and consequently go out of the question4 ,if any one of these principles must be admitted without proof1 it is just as well to admit your own existence and save yourself the trouble of proving it with an enthymema4 ,in the second place1 how do you know that you think8 ,your argument may be retorted1 as dialecticians say1 in the following manner3 nothing can think without existing2 but your existence is doubtful1 for you are trying to prove it2 therefore you are not sure that you think4 #afh4 ,manifestly1 then1 ,descartes' principle1 taken as a true argument1 cannot be defended2 and it is so easy to see its defect1 that it seems impossible for so clear and penetrating an intellect to have overlooked it4 ,it is therefore probable that ,descartes understood his principle in a very different sense2 and we will now briefly show what meaning1 in our judgment1 the illustrious philosopher must have given to it4 ,supposing himself for a moment in universal doubt1 without accepting for certain anything that is known1 he concentrated himself on himself1 and in the depth of his soul sought a point whereon to base the edifice of human cognitions4 ,although we abstract all around us1 we clearly cannot abstract ourselves1 our mind1 which is present to its own eyes1 only the more lucidly1 the greater the abstraction in which we place ourselves with respect to eternal objects4 ,now in this concentration1 this collection of himself within himself1 this withdrawal from every thing for fear of error1 and asking himself if there be any thing certain1 if there be any foundation and starting-point in the career of knowledge2 first of all is presented to him the consciousness of thought1 the very presence of the acts of his mind4 ,if we mistake not1 this was ,descartes' thought3 ,i wish to doubt of every thing2 ,i refrain from affirming as from denying any thing2 ,i isolate myself from whatever surrounds me1 because ,i know not if it be any thing more than an illusion4 ,but in this very isolation1 ,i meet with the intimate sense of my internal acts1 with the presence of my mind2 ,i think1 therefore ,i am2 this ,i feel in a manner that leaves no room for doubt or uncertainty2 therefore1 ,i am2 that is to say1 this sense of my thought makes me know my existence4 #afi4 ,this explains why ,descartes did not present his principle as a mere enthymema1 as an ordinary argument1 but as determining a fact presented to him and first in the order of facts3 even if he inferred existence from thought1 it was not by deduction1 properly so called1 but as one fact contained in another1 or rather identified with it4 ,we say identified1 because it really is so in ,descartes' opinion2 and this confirms what we have already advanced1 that this philosopher did not offer an argument1 but laid down a fact4 ,according to him1 the essence of the soul consists in thought2 and as other schools of philosophy distinguish between substance and its acts1 considering the mind in the first class1 and thought in the second1 so ,descartes held that there was no distinction between mind and thought1 that they were the same thing1 that thought constituted the essence of the soul4 ,although one attribute1 he says1 suffices to make us know the substance1 there is1 nevertheless1 in every substance one attribute1 which constitutes its nature and its essence1 and on which all the others depend4 ,extension in length1 breadth1 and depth1 constitutes the essence of corporeal substance2 and thought constitutes the nature of the substance which thinks4#i ,from this it follows that ,descartes1 in laying down the principle1 ,i think1 therefore ,i exist1 only declared a fact attested by consciousness2 and so simple did he consider it1 and so unique1 that in evolving his system1 he identified thought with the soul1 and its essence with its existence4 ,he was conscious of thought1 and said3 this thought is my soul2 ,i am4 ,it is not now our purpose to weigh the value of this doctrine1 but only to explain in what it consists47#ag7 #i ,descartes4 ,principes de la ,philosophie1 #a;ire partie4 ,,chapter ,,xviii4 ,,the ,,principle ,,of ,,descartes1 ,,continued4--,,his ,,method4 #agj4 ,descartes did not always express himself with1 sufficient accuracy when announcing and explaining his principle2 and hence his words have been misinterpreted4 ,in the passage where he establishes consciousness of our own thought and existence as the foundation whereon all our cognitions must rest1 he uses terms from which it can be inferred that he not only means to declare a fact1 but that he also intends to afford a true argument4 ,nevertheless1 if we read his words attentively1 and compare them with one another1 it will be evident that such was not his idea1 although we should not sometimes be wrong in saying that he did not make sufficient account of the difference1 which we have just pointed out1 between an argument and the simple declaration of a fact2 and that1 when concentrating himself on himself1 he did not have a sufficiently clear reflex knowledge of the manner in which he rested upon his fundamental principle4 ,to convince ourselves of this1 let us examine his own words3 ,while we thus reject every thing of which we can have the least doubt1 and even feign that it is false1 we easily suppose that there is no ,god1 no heaven1 no earth2 that we have not a body3 but we cannot in like manner suppose that we are not whilst we doubt the truth of all these things2 for we experience so great repugnance to conceive that what thinks is not at the same time that it thinks1 that notwithstanding all the most extravagant suppositions1 we cannot help believing this conclusion1 ,i think1 therefore ,i am1 to be true1 and consequently the first and most certain to present itself to him who orders well his thoughts4#aj #aj ,descartes4 ,principes de la ,philosophie1 #a;ire partie1 ,n4 #g4 ,in this passage we detect a true syllogism3 whatever thinks1 exists2 but ,i think2 therefore ,i exist4 ,we have1 says ,descartes1 so great repugnance to conceive that what thinks is not at the same time that it thinks2 which is the same as to say1 whatever thinks1 exists2 and this1 in scholastic terms1 is to establish the major4 ,he then says3 notwithstanding all the most extravagant suppositions1 we cannot help believing this conclusion1 ,i think1 therefore ,i am1 to be true2 which is equivalent to proving the minor1 and the conclusion of the syllogism4 ,we know that ,descartes was somewhat taken up with the idea of proving at the same time that he was engaged in declaring4 ,this was the general tendency of his age1 and even the most ardent reformers with difficulty preserved themselves from the surrounding atmosphere4 ,we encounter this same spirit throughout his meditations1 admirably joined1 however1 with the spirit of observation4 ,but through these obscure or ambiguous explanations1 what thought do we discover at the bottom of ,descartes' system when we abstract his having1 or not having1 rendered himself an exact account of what he experienced8 ,this thought3 ,by an effort of my mind ,i can doubt the truth of everything2 but this effort has a limit in myself4 ,when ,i turn my attention upon myself1 upon the consciousness of my internal acts1 upon my existence1 doubt is at an end2 it cannot extend so far3 ,i find so great repugnance that the most extravagant suppositions cannot overcome it4 ,this his very words show3 besides declaring this fact1 he rises to a general and undoubtedly true proposition2 he draws a conclusion also very legitimate2 but neither of these was at all necessary to the present case2 neither seemed to explain well his opinion1 but either served to confuse it4 #aga4 ,descartes did nothing more in this point than what all philosophers do2 and strange as it may seem1 he did not differ from the chiefs of the metaphysical school diametrically opposed to his own1 that of ,locke and ,condillac4 ,that man1 in seeking to examine the origin of his cognitions1 and the principles on which his certainty is based1 encounters the fact of consciousness of his internal acts1 that this consciousness produces a firm certainty1 and that we can conceive nothing more certain1 is a fact on which all ideologists agree1 and which all establish1 although not in the same words4 ,the more we reflect on these matters1 the more we discover in them the realization of a principle confirmed by reason and experience1 that many truths are not new1 but only presented under a new form1 and that many systems are not new1 but only expressed in new formulas4 #agb4 ,even the universal doubt of ,descartes1 rightly understood1 is practised by every philosopher2 whence we see that the basis of his system1 opposed by many1 is in fact adopted by all4 ,in what does his method consist8 ,it may all be reduced to these two points3 ,i4 ,i wish to doubt of everything3 ,,ii4 ,when ,i wish to doubt of myself1 ,i cannot4 ,let us examine these points1 and we shall see that they are common to all philosophers with ,descartes4 ,why does ,descartes wish to doubt of everything8 ,because he proposes to examine the origin and certainty of his cognitions1 his whole knowledge2 and therefore he cannot help supposing nothing to be true4 ,if then he supposes anything1 he does not examine the origin and motives of the certainty of everything1 since he excepts that which he supposes to be true4 ,he must suppose nothing to be true1 that he knows nothing of anything2 otherwise he cannot say that he examines the foundation of everything4 ,either there is no such philosophical question1 although one is found in all books of philosophy1 or else ,descartes' method must of necessity be followed4 ,but in what does this doubt consist8 ,can it1 rationally speaking1 be a real and true doubt8 ,no6 that is absolutely impossible4 ,man does not1 because a philosopher1 destroy his nature2 and nature is invincibly opposed to this doubt taken in a strict sense4 #agc4 ,what then is this doubt8 ,nothing more than a supposition1 a fiction2 a supposition and fiction such as we make at every step in all science1 and which1 in reality1 is only non-attention to a conviction of our own4 ,use is made of this doubt in order to discover the first truth on which our understanding rests2 and this only requires a fictitious doubt3 there is no necessity of its being positive1 for it will evidently make no difference whether we really doubt of everything1 admit absolutely nothing1 or say3 ,i suppose that ,i have nothing for certain1 know nothing1 admit nothing4 ,an example will make this explanation more evident4 ,whoever knows the rudiments of geometry1 knows that in a triangle1 the greater angle is opposite to the greater side1 and he is absolutely certain of the truth of this theorem2 but if he propose to demonstrate it to another1 or repeat the demonstration to himself1 he abstracts the said certainty1 and proceeds as though he had it not1 in order to show that it is founded upon something4 ,in all our studies1 at every step1 we do the same4 ,such expressions as these are common3 ,this is so1 it is evident2 but let us suppose that it is not2 what will be the result8 ,this demonstration is conclusive1 but let us set it aside and suppose that we have it not2 how shall we demonstrate what we desire8 ,arguments ad absurdum1 so much in use in every science1 more especially in mathematics1 consist not only in abstracting what we know1 but in supposing something directly contrary4 ,if the line ,a1 says continually the geometrician1 is not equal to ,b1 it is either greater or less3 let us suppose it to be greater1 etc4 ,thus to investigate truth1 we frequently abstract what we know1 and even suppose the contrary4 ,apply this system to the investigation of the fundamental principle of our cognitions1 and ,descartes' universal doubt will follow1 in the only sense admissible at the tribunal of reason1 and possible to human nature4 ,it is probable that the illustrious philosopher understood it in the same sense1 although we must confess that his words are ambiguous4 ,we cannot conceive what object he could have had in understanding it differently1 supposing1 as we do1 that he had no other purpose than to pave the way for the investigation of truth4 ,by his manner of expressing himself1 he gave occasion to disputes1 which greater clearness would have prevented4 ,as he did not express himself with sufficient clearness1 so his adversaries did not press him with all the precision and energy possible4 ,to settle this whole matter1 it would have sufficed to ask him this question3 ,do you mean to say that1 in commencing our philosophical investigations1 there is a moment in which we really and actually doubt of every thing2 or do you deem it sufficient to abstract certainty1 and to suppose that we have it not1 as is frequently done in other studies8 #agd4 ,descartes was like all reformers who are ruled by one idea1 and express it so strongly as to seem to admit no other beside it4 ,in their language every thing is absolute1 exclusive4 ,they anticipate the combat which they must sustain1 perhaps already experience it1 and so they concentrate all their strength on the idea whose triumph they propose1 and lose sight of every thing else4 ,it cannot be inferred from this that they have no others which notably modify the principal2 but to oppose their adversaries1 who say1 ,this is absolutely false1 they assert that it is absolutely true4 ,history and experience furnish innumerable examples of such exaggerations4 ,the dominant idea of ,descartes was to demolish the philosophy which at that time reigned in the schools2 and he gave it so rude a shock as to make the world tremble4 ,see how he expressed his contempt for many called philosophers3 ,experience shows that they who make profession of being philosophers are often less wise and less reasonable than they who never applied themselves to this study4#aa #aa ,les ,principes de la ,philosophie4 ,preface1 p4 #ac4 #age4 ,the second part of ,descartes' method consists in taking thought for the point of departure1 and in declaring that in trying to doubt of every thing man finds a limit in the consciousness of his thought1 his existence4 ,this is evidently the phenomenon which remains in the mind of the observer after doubting of every thing else2 at least he cannot doubt that he doubts1 and consequently that he thinks2 for it must be remarked that this is an argument which has always been used against skeptics1 which is equivalent to ,descartes' method1 and establishes as an undeniable phenomenon a certainty superior to all sophisms1 the consciousness of one's self4 ,when ,descartes said1 ,i think1 he meant by this word every internal act1 every phenomenon immediately present to the soul2 he spoke not of thought taken in a purely intellectual sense1 but included in it all that of which we have immediate consciousness4 ,by the word thought1 he says1 ,i understand all that is done within us1 in such a manner that we perceive it immediately by ourselves3 this is why not only to understand1 to will1 to imagine1 but also to feel1 are here the same thing as to think4 ,for if ,i say that ,i see1 or that ,i walk1 and thence ,i infer that ,i am2 if ,i mean to speak of the action performed with my eyes or with my feet1 this conclusion is not so infallible that ,i have no reason to doubt it2 because it may be that ,i think ,i see1 or walk1 although ,i do not open my eyes or stir from my seat2 for this sometimes happens when ,i am asleep1 and the same might also happen even if ,i had no body2 but if ,i mean to speak only of the action of my thought or of the feeling1 that is to say1 the knowledge that ,i possess1 which makes it seem to me that ,i see1 or that ,i walk1 this same conclusion is so absolutely true that ,i cannot doubt it2 because it relates to the soul1 which alone has the faculty of feeling1 or of thinking1 in any other manner whatever4#ab #ab ,les ,principes de la ,philosophie4 #a;ire4 partie1 ,n4 #i4 #agf4 ,this passage shows very clearly ,descartes' ideas2 he destroyed every thing by doubt1 excepting one thing which defied all his efforts1 the consciousness of himself2 and this consciousness he took for the basis1 on which1 with full certainty1 he might build anew the edifice of science4 ,locke and ,condillac did nothing else2 they followed1 indeed1 a different path1 but their point of departure was at all times the same4 ,locke says3 ,first1 ,i shall inquire into the original of those ideas1 notions1 or whatever else you please to call them1 which a man observes1 and is conscious to himself he has in his mind2 and the ways whereby the understanding comes to be furnished by them4#ac ,since the mind1 in all its thoughts and reasonings1 hath no other immediate object but its own ideas1 which it alone does or can contemplate1 it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about them4#ad ,whether1 to speak metaphorically1 says ,condillac1 we ascend even to the heavens1 or descend into the abysses1 we do not go out of ourselves1 and it is always our own thought that we perceive4#ae #ac ,essay on the ,human ,understanding4 ,prologue4 #ad ,essay on the ,human ,understanding4 ,book iv41 ,chap4 ,i41 #a4 #ae ,essai sur l',origine des ,connaissances4 ,premire partie1 ,c4 #a41 #a4 #agg4 ,all ideological labors commence then by establishing the fact of consciousness of our ideas2 and it cannot be otherwise with respect to their certainty4 ,man1 although he overthrow and destroy every thing1 still encounters himself1 the one who overthrows and destroys every thing4 ,when he has gone so far as to doubt the existence of ,god1 the world1 his fellow-beings1 his own body1 he still1 in the midst of this immense solitude1 encounters himself4 ,the effort to conceal himself from his own eyes serves only to render him more visible3 he is a spirit to be killed by no blow1 and rays of light flow from every wound inflicted on him4 ,if he doubts that he feels1 he at least feels that he doubts2 if he doubts of this doubt1 he feels that he doubts of doubt itself2 thus1 in doubting of direct acts1 he enters into an interminable series of reflex acts1 necessarily linked one with the other1 and unrolled to the internal view like folds of a scarf which has no end47#ah7 ,,chapter ,,xix4 ,,value ,,of ,,the ,,principle1 ,i ,,think3 ,,its--,,analysis4 #agh4 ,we have already seen that ,descartes' principle1 considered as an enthymema1 cannot aspire to be fundamental4 ,in every argument there are premises and a consequence2 and to be conclusive1 the premises must be true1 and the consequence legitimate4 ,to say that an argument may be a fundamental principle1 is a manifest contradiction4 ,but if we take ,descartes' principle in the sense above explained1 that is1 not as an argument but as the declaration of a fact1 the contradiction ceases1 and it is a question1 worthy to be examined1 whether it merits the title of fundamental principle or not1 and in what sense4 ,we have already somewhat illustrated this matter1 but not yet sufficiently cleared it up2 we have made some preliminary remarks in order to show the state of the question1 but have not yet completely solved it4 #agi4 ,the proposition1 ,i think1 as we have remarked1 expresses something more than merely thought1 strictly so called3 it embraces acts of the will1 sentiments1 sensations1 acts1 and expressions of all kinds which are realized within us2 it includes all phenomena immediately present to our mind1 and attested by consciousness4 ,nothing that distinguishes between various acts and impressions can be a fundamental principle3 such a distinction supposes analysis1 and analysis requires reflection4 ,we do not reflect without rules and objects already known2 consequently1 to admit classifications in the first principle1 is to divest it of its character and to contradict ourselves4 #ahj4 ,we must not confound what is expressed by the proposition ,i think with the proposition itself4 ,the thing itself and the form are here very different3 the nature of the form may make us conceive ambiguous ideas of the thing itself3 the thing itself is a most simple fact2 the form is a logical combination1 and includes very heterogeneous elements4 ,this demands explanation4 ,the fact of consciousness1 in itself considered1 abstracts all relations2 it is nothing but itself1 leads to nothing but itself2 it is the presence of the act or impression1 or rather it is the act1 the impression itself1 which is present to the mind4 ,there is no combination of ideas1 no analysis of conceptions2 when it comes to this latter1 it leaves the territory of pure consciousness1 and enters the objective regions of intellectual activity4 ,but as language is to express the products of this activity1 and as it is cast1 so to say1 not in the mould of consciousness1 but in that of the intellect1 it is impossible for us to speak without some logical or ideal combination4 ,were we seeking an expression of pure consciousness1 unmixed with intellectual elements1 we should seek it not in language1 but in the natural sign of grief1 joy1 or some other passion2 in this alone is it expressed spontaneously and uncombined with foreign elements1 that something passes in our mind1 that we are conscious of something2 but the instant that we speak1 we express something more than pure consciousness3 the external world indicates the internal1 the product of intellectual activity1 its conception2 and this involves a subject and an object1 and therefore pertains to an order far superior to that of consciousness4 #aha4 ,to demonstrate the truth of what we have just said1 let us examine the expression1 ,i think4 ,this is a true proposition1 and it may1 without being in the least changed1 be presented under a strictly logical form1 ,i am thinking4 ,here we have a subject1 a predicate1 and a copula4 ,the subject is ,i2 that is to say1 we at once find the idea of a being1 the subject of acts and impressions1 the possessor of an activity expressed in the predicate4 ,this ,i is then presented to us as something far superior to the order of pure consciousness2 it is nothing less than the idea of substance4 ,we will analyze more at length what is contained under it4 ,we have1 in the first place1 the idea of unity3 the ,i has no meaning1 if it do not denote that something is one and identical1 notwithstanding the plurality and diversity realized in it4 ,the experimental unity of consciousness draws with it1 as a rigid consequence1 the unity of the being possessing it4 ,this being is the subject2 and in it are realized the variations without which it would be impossible to say ,i4 ,we hold then that in so simple an expression the ideas of unity and its relation to plurality1 of substance and its relations to accidents1 are contained2 that is1 the idea of the soul1 although expressive of a most simple unity1 is1 under the logical aspect1 composite1 and contains many things pertaining to the ideal order1 and not to be found in pure consciousness4 ,the idea of the soul1 strictly speaking1 although in a certain sense common to all men1 is in itself highly philosophical1 for it involves a combination of elements belonging to the intellectual order4 #ahb4 ,the predicate thinking is the expression of a general idea1 comprehending not only all thought1 but also all phenomena which immediately affect the mind4 ,these phenomena1 considered in what they have in common1 under the general idea of present to the mind1 are expressed in the word thinking4 ,the relation of the predicate with the subject1 or the agreement of thinking with the soul1 also expresses an analysis worthy of attention4 ,we at once detect a decomposition of the conception of the soul into two ideas2 that of the subject of various modifications1 and that of thinking4 ,otherwise the proposition has no meaning1 or rather its expression becomes impossible4 ,the idea of subject involves the ideas of unity and substance1 and that of thinking involves the idea of activity1 or of passivity1 so to speak1 accompanied by consciousness4 #ahc4 ,to render the proposition possible1 we must suppose the decomposition of the ideas to commence at some point1 that is1 either in the idea of the soul we find that of thinking1 or in that of thinking we find that of the soul4 ,fixing ourselves in the soul1 and abstracting thinking1 we meet with the idea of subject1 or of substance in general2 and there1 however much we cavil1 we shall never find the idea of thinking4 ,the soul in itself is not manifested to us2 we know it by thought2 in thought therefore we must fix the point of departure1 not in the soul2 wherefore in the above proposition1 what is primitively known is rather the predicate than the subject2 and of the two conceptions1 that of subject has rather the character of a thing contained1 than of a thing containing4 ,the soul by itself1 so to speak1 springs up with the presence of thought4 ,if the intellectual activity is concentrated in search of its first basis1 it finds it1 not in the pure subject1 but in its acts1 that is1 in its thoughts4 ,these last are then the first object of reflective intellectual activity1 its first element of combination1 its first datum for the solution of the problem4 ,fixing its sight on this element1 it discovers a unity in the midst of plurality1 a being that remains the same through the ebb and flow of the phenomena of consciousness2 and this identity is incontestably asserted by consciousness itself4 ,the idea of the soul then is taken from that of thought1 and consequently the subject springs from the predicate1 rather than the predicate from the subject4 #ahd4 ,the thought from which we derive the idea of the soul is not thought in general1 but thought realized1 existing in ourselves4 ,but this reality is sterile unless offered to the mind under a general idea2 for it is evident that the soul does not come from one single act1 since it is unity1 the subject of plurality4 ,to arrive at the idea of the soul we require unity of consciousness1 and this we know only as we have experienced it1 that is1 so far as we perceive the relation of the one to the multiple1 of a subject to its modifications4 ,such elaboration is necessary to the production of so simple an expression as ,i think2 and here we see how much reason there is to distinguish between the thing itself and the form1 and how inconsiderately they act who confound things so different4 ,thus1 from want of due analysis1 they take in philosophy immense strides from one order to another1 confound ideas and entangle matters4 #ahe4 ,to completely illustrate this matter1 we will examine the relations of existence to thought2 a very easy examination1 if we bear in mind the observation just made4 ,it is certain that we conceive existence before thought3 nothing can think without existing3 existence is an indispensable condition to thought3 to think and not to exist is a manifest contradiction4 ,but what is first offered to our mind is not existence1 but thought1 and this not in the abstract1 but determinate1 experimental1 or as the expression now is1 empyrical4 ,the idea of existence is general1 includes all beings1 and consciousness cannot commence with it4 ,at one time we obtain this idea by abstraction2 at another1 it is a form pre-existing in our mind1 not the first that occurs to us1 or to speak more exactly1 not the last point to be attained when we follow back the thread of our cognitions in order to discover their starting-point4 ,this consciousness1 when made objective1 and when the conception which it offers is analyzed1 presents to us the idea of existence as contained in itself4 ,hence we infer that the therefore ,i exist is not1 strictly speaking1 a consequence of the ,i think1 but the intuition of the idea of existence in that of thought4 ,there are here two propositions per se not1 as the scholastics say3 the one general1 the thinking is existing2 the other particular1 ,i thinking am existing4 ,the first belongs to the purely ideal order1 and is intrinsically evident1 independently of all particular consciousness2 the second participates of the two orders1 the real and the ideal2 the real1 in so far as it includes the particular fact of consciousness2 the ideal1 in so far as it includes a combination of the general idea of existence with the particular fact2 since thus only is the union of the predicate with the subject conceivable4 #ahf4 ,it will now be very easy to solve all the questions discussed in the schools4 ,first question4 ,does the principle ,i think depend on another8 ,we answer with a distinction4 ,if by this principle is meant the simple fact of consciousness1 it evidently does not4 ,for our understanding there is nothing prior to ourselves2 whatever we know so far forth as known by us1 supposes our consciousness2 if we suppress it1 we destroy every thing1 and although we attempt to destroy every thing1 it still remains indestructible1 since it depends on nothing1 presupposes nothing4 ,if by the principle ,i think is meant a proposition1 it can only have proceeded from reasoning or analysis1 and so cannot be the fundamental principle of our cognitions4 #ahg4 ,second question4 ,when the other principles are wanting1 is this one also wanting8 ,we must apply the same distinction here3 as a simple fact8 ,no6 as a proposition8 ,yes6 ,deny every thing1 even the principle of contradiction1 and consciousness still subsists2 but deny the principle of contradiction1 and every proposition is destroyed1 every combination becomes absurd3 analysis1 and the relation of the predicate with the subject1 are unmeaning words4 #ahh4 ,third question4 ,admitting the principle ,i think1 can he who denies the others be reduced at least indirectly to truth8 ,we again distinguish3 you speak of reducing him either by reasoning or by observation2 that is1 either you wish to convince him by arguments1 or else to turn his attention to himself1 as is done with a man distracted1 or one suffering mental derangement4 ,the second is possible1 but not the first4 ,whoever denies all principles1 that of contradiction included1 makes all argument impossible2 in vain then will you reason with him4 ,let us see4 ,you think1 one may say to him1 at least you so assert1 when you admit the principle ,i think4 ,true4 ,then you must also admit the principle of contradiction4 ,why so8 ,because otherwise you could think and not think at the same time4 ,very well4 ,but then you destroy your own thought4 ,how8 ,is it not true that you think8 ,certainly4 ,according to yourself it is possible that at the same time you do not think4 ,i agree with you4 ,therefore1 you destroy your thought2 for if you do not think1 the ,i think is destroyed1 and1 as all this is simultaneous1 you destroy your own thought4 ,not at all4 ,what ,i object to in your system is that you suppose true the very thing which ,i deny1 and so fall into the sophism named by logicians petitio principii4 ,by the very fact of my denying the principle of contradiction1 ,i deny that not-being destroys being1 and that being destroys not-being2 consequently1 ,i do not admit that the ,i do not think destroys the ,i think4 ,when you argue against me in this way1 you suppose the very point in question1 and attack me with principles which ,i do not admit4 ,in your system1 in which being destroys not-being1 and vice versa1 it is certain that to think1 and not think1 are incompatible2 but on my principles1 it is a very simple thing2 since1 according to them1 it is not impossible for the same thing to be and not be at the same time1 when ,i do not think1 ,i do not cease to think4 ,this is indeed absurd1 but not illogical2 deny the principle1 and the deduction is necessary4 ,and if it be said that in such a case he cannot reason1 as he just has reasoned1 he may reply that neither can his adversaries reason2 or1 if you choose1 he sees no difficulty in their both reasoning and not reasoning4 ,observation is the only means of bringing back one who has thus strayed away2 such a one has departed from reason1 and cannot be brought back to it by means of reason4 ,observations directed to him must be more of a call1 a sort of alarm to arouse reason1 not a combination to re-construct it3 he is as a man asleep1 or one in a swoon1 and we must call him1 and shake him1 in order to arouse him2 we must not dispute with him as with an adversary47#ai7 ,,chapter ,,xx4 ,,true ,,sense ,,of ,,the ,,principle ,,of ,,contradiction4--,,kant',s ,,opinion4 #ahi4 ,before examining the value of the principle of contradiction as a basis for our cognitions1 it will be well to fix its true and exact sense4 ,this renders necessary some considerations upon an opinion of ,kant1 advanced in his ,critic of ,pure ,reason1 when treating of the form in which the principle of contradiction has hitherto been enunciated in all schools of philosophy4 ,the ,german metaphysician grants1 that whatever may be the matter of our cognitions1 and in whatever manner they may relate to their object1 it is a general1 although a purely negative1 condition of all our judgments1 that they should not mutually contradict each other2 otherwise1 even without reference to their object1 they are nothing in themselves4 ,this doctrine established1 he observes that what is called the principle of contradiction is the following3 ,a predicate that is opposed to a subject does not belong to it2 and then goes on to say1 that this is a universal1 although purely negative criterion of all truth2 that it moreover belongs exclusively to logic1 since it is of use to pure cognitions as to cognitions in general1 without relation to their object1 and he declares that the contradiction makes them completely disappear4 ,but of this celebrated principle1 although stripped of all contents1 and purely formal1 he continues1 there is still a formula containing a synthesis1 which has inadvertently1 and quite unnecessarily1 been mixed up therein4 ,it is this3 ,it is impossible for the same thing to be and not be at the same time4 ,not only has the apodictic certainty 7by the word impossible7 been unnecessarily added1 which certainty would have been of itself understood from the proposition2 but the proposition is affected by the condition of time1 and says1 as it were3 a thing ,a1 which is something ,b1 cannot at the same time be not ,b1 but it can very well be both 7,b as well as not ,b7 in succession4 ,for example3 a man who is young1 cannot at the same time be old2 but the same person may very well be young at one time1 at another not young1 that is1 old4 ,now1 the principle of contradiction1 as a mere logical principle1 must not at all restrict its meaning to the relations of time1 and consequently1 such a formula is quite opposed to its intention4 ,the misapprehension arises simply from this3 that we first separate the predicate of a thing from its conception1 and afterwards unite its opposite with this predicate1 which never gives a contradiction with the subject1 but only with its predicate1 which is synthetically joined with that subject1 and that only when the first and second predicates are asserted at the same time4 ,if ,i say a man who is unlearned is not learned1 the condition1 at the same time1 must be expressed2 for he who is unlearned at one time may very well be learned at another4 ,but if ,i say no unlearned man is learned1 the proposition is analytic1 since the sign 7the unlearnedness7 now constitutes the conception of the subject1 and then the negative proposition is evident immediately from the principle of contradiction1 without it being necessary for the condition1 at the same time1 to be added4 ,this is also the cause why ,i have so changed the formula of this principle1 that the nature of an analytic proposition might be clearly expressed4#af #af ,transcendental ,logic1 ,b4 ii41 ,c4 #b1 ,sect4 #a1 pp4 #adj-ada4 ,ed4 ,leipsic4 #ahbh4 #aij4 ,the reader will not easily comprehend the meaning of this passage1 not very clear of itself1 unless he knows what ,kant understands by analytic and synthetic propositions4 ,we will explain this4 ,in all affirmative judgments1 the relation of a predicate to a subject is possible in two manners3 either the predicate belongs to the subject as contained in it1 or is completely extraneous to it although joined with it4 ,in the former case1 the judgment is analytic2 in the latter1 it is synthetic4 ,analytic affirmative judgments are those in which the union of the predicate with the subject is conceived by identity3 those are called synthetic in which this union is conceived without identity4 ,kant illustrates his idea by the following examples3 ,when ,i say all bodies are extended1 ,i express an analytic judgment2 for ,i need not go out of the conception of body in order to find that of extension1 which ,i connect with it1 but ,i have only to analyze the conception of body1 that is1 to become conscious of the diversity which ,i always think in this conception1 in order to find the predicate4 ,it is1 therefore1 an analytic judgment4 ,but when ,i say1 all bodies are heavy1 the predicate heaviness is by no means included in my conception of the subject1 that is1 of body in general4 ,it is a conception added to the conception of body4 ,the addition in this way of the predicate to the subject gives a synthetic judgment4#ag #ag ,critic of ,pure ,reason4 ,introduction1 ,sect4 #d41 p4 #i4 ,it is easy to see the reason of the new nomenclature employed by the ,german philosopher4 ,he calls those judgments analytical1 in which it suffices to decompose the subject to find therein the predicate1 without the necessity of adding any thing not already thought1 at least obscurely1 in the very conception of the subject2 and he calls synthetic those in which it is necessary to add something to the conception of subject1 since the predicate is not found in this conception however much we decompose it4 #aia4 ,this division of judgment1 into analytic and synthetic1 is much used in modern philosophy1 above all among the ,germans2 certainly there are some who may imagine this to be a discovery made by the author of the ,critic of ,pure ,reason2 and the very novelty of the name may give occasion to equivocation4 ,yet1 in all the scholastic writers who lie forgotten1 and covered with dust1 in the recesses of libraries1 we find analytic and synthetic judgments1 though not under these names4 ,they said there were two kinds of judgments2 some1 in which the predicate was contained in the idea of subject1 and others1 in which it was not4 ,they called the propositions which expressed judgments of the former class1 per se not1 or known by themselves1 because1 the meaning of the terms being understood1 the predicate was seen to be contained in the idea1 or the conception of the subject4 ,they also called them first principles1 and the perception of them1 intelligence1 intellectus1 to distinguish them from reason1 which is conversant about the cognitions of mediate evidence1 or ratiocination4 ,see if the following texts of ,st4 ,thomas leave any thing to be desired in clearness or precision3 ,a proposition is known by itself1 per se not1 when the predicate is contained in the subject1 as2 man is an animal2 for animal is of the essence of man4 ,if1 then1 it is known to all1 what the subject and the predicate are1 that proposition will be known by itself to all1 as is seen in the first principles of demonstration1 which are certain1 common things1 not unknown to any one1 as being and not-being1 the whole1 the part1 and others similar4#ah #ah ,summa ,theologica4 ,p4 #a;a1 ,q4 #b;a1 ,a4 #ao1 in corp4 ,any proposition the predicate of which is of the essence of the subject1 is known by itself1 although such a proposition is not known by itself for any one who is ignorant of the definition of the subject4 ,thus this proposition1 man is rational1 is by its nature known by itself1 because whoever says man1 says rational4#ai #ai #a;a #b;dae1 ,q4 #id;a1 ,a4 #bo1 in corp4 #aib4 ,by these1 and many other examples1 which it would be easy to adduce1 it is seen that the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments was common in the schools centuries before ,kant flourished4 ,analytic judgments were all those formed by immediate evidence2 and synthetic1 those resulting from mediate evidence1 whether of the purely ideal order1 or in some sense depending on experience4 ,it was well known that there were conceptions of the subject1 in which the predicate was thought1 at least confusedly2 and thus union1 or identity1 was explained by saying that the propositions1 in which it was found1 were per se not ex terminis4 ,in analytic judgments1 the predicate is in the subject2 nothing is added1 according to ,kant1 it is only unfolded4 ,whoever says man says rational1 are the words of ,st4 ,thomas3 the idea is the same as that of the ,german philosopher4 #aic4 ,but let us see if it is necessary to change the formula by which the principle of contradiction has hitherto been expressed4 ,the first observation of ,kant refers to the word impossible1 which he considers unnecessarily added1 since the apodictic certainty1 which we wish to express1 should be contained in the proposition itself4 ,kant's formula of the principle is this3 a predicate which is opposed to a subject1 does not belong to it4 ,what is the meaning of the word impossible8 ,possible and impossible absolutely1 are said in relation to the terms4 ,possible1 because the predicate is not opposed to the subject2 impossible1 because the predicate is opposed to the subject2 says ,st4 ,thomas1#bj and with him agree all the schools4 ,therefore1 impossibility is the opposition of the predicate to the subject1 and to be repugnant is the same thing as to be impossible1 and ,kant uses the very language which he blames in others4 ,the common formula might be expressed in this manner3 there is opposition in the same thing being and not-being at the same time1 or1 being is opposed to not-being1 or1 being excludes not-being1 or1 every thing is equal to itself2 and ,kant expresses nothing more when he says3 a predicate which is opposed to a subject does not belong to it4 #bj ,p4 #a;a1 ,q4 #be;a1 ,a4 #c4 #aid4 ,as a universal criterion1 there is more exactness in the common formula than in that of ,kant4 ,the latter restricts the principle to the relation of predicate and subject1 and consequently to the purely ideal order1 making it of no value for the real1 unless by a sort of enlargement4 ,this enlargement1 although legitimate and easy1 is not needed in the common formula3 by saying being excludes not-being1 we embrace the ideal and the real1 and present to the mind the impossibility1 not only of contradictory judgments1 but also of contradictory things4 ,kant admits that the principle is the condition sine qua non of the truth of our cognitions1 so that we must take care not to place ourselves in contradiction with it1 under pain of annihilating all cognition4 ,let us put this to the proof4 ,give a man1 unacquainted with these matters1 although not ignorant of what is meant by predicate and subject1 these two formulas2 which will appear to him the best for all uses in the external as in the internal8 ,certainly not that of ,kant4 ,he sees in an instant1 in all its generality1 that a thing cannot both be and not be at the same time2 and he applies the principle to all uses as well in the real as in the ideal order4 ,treating of an external object1 he says1 this cannot both be and not be at the same time2 treating of contradictory judgments1 of ideas which exclude one another1 he says1 without any difficulty1 this cannot be1 because it is impossible for the same thing to be and not be at the same time4 ,but it is not so easily and so readily seen how transition is made from the ideal to the real order1 or how the purely logical ideas of predicate and subject can be used in the order of facts4 ,the common formula1 then1 besides being fully as exact as that of ,kant1 is more simple1 more intelligible1 and more easy of application4 ,are there any qualities more desirable than these in a universal criterion1 in the condition sine qua non of the truth of our cognitions8 #aie4 ,we have thus far supposed ,kant's formula really to express the principle of contradiction2 but this supposition is far from being exact4 ,undoubtedly there would be a contradiction1 were a predicate opposed to a subject1 and yet to belong to it2 and in this sense it may be said that the principle of contradiction is in some manner expressed in ,kant's formula4 ,but this is not enough2 for we should then be obliged to say that every axiom expresses the principle of contradiction1 since no axiom can be denied without a contradiction4 ,the formula of the principle must directly express reciprocal exclusion1 opposition between being and not-being2 this is what was intended1 and nothing else was ever meant by the principle of contradiction4 ,kant1 in his new formula1 does not directly express this exclusion3 what he expresses is1 that when the predicate is excluded from the idea of the subject1 it does not belong to it4 ,so far from expressing the principle of contradiction1 it is the famous principle of the ,cartesians3 whatever is contained in the clear and distinct idea of any thing may be affirmed of it with all certainty4 ,in substance the two formulas express the same thing1 and are only distinguished by these purely accidental differences3 first1 that ,kant's formula is the more concise2 second1 that it is negative1 and that of the ,cartesians affirmative4 #aif4 ,kant says3 whatever is excluded from the clear and distinct idea of any thing1 may be denied of it4 ,a predicate which is opposed to a subject is the same thing as that which is excluded from the idea of any thing2 does not belong to it is the same as may be denied of it4 ,and as1 on the other hand1 the principle of the ,cartesians must be understood in both senses1 the affirmative and the negative1 because when they say that whatever is contained in the clear and distinct idea of any thing may be affirmed of it1 they mean also that when any thing is excluded1 it may be denied2 it follows that ,kant says the same thing as the ,cartesians2 and thus1 in attempting to correct all the schools1 he has fallen into an equivocation not of a nature to acquire him any great credit for perspicacity4 ,it is clear that ,kant's formula implies this3 the predicate contained in the idea of a subject belongs to it4 ,this condition is equally the condition sine qua non of all analytic affirmative judgments2 for these disappear if that does not belong to the subject which is contained in its idea4 ,in this case there is not even an apparent difference between ,kant's formula and that of the ,cartesians2 the only difference is in terms2 the propositions are exactly the same4 ,hence we see that instead of affirming that the schools expressed themselves inaccurately in the clearest and most fundamental point of human knowledge1 we ought to proceed with great circumspection2 witness the originality of ,kant's formula4 #aig4 ,the author of the ,critic of ,pure ,reason was not more fortunate in censuring the condition1 at the same time1 which is generally added to the formula of the principle of contradiction4 ,since he took the liberty of believing that no philosopher before himself had expressed this formula in the proper manner1 we beg to say that he did not himself well understand what the others intended to express1 and we do not1 in saying this1 deem ourselves guilty of a philosophical profanation4 ,if ,kant is an oracle for certain persons1 all philosophers together and all mankind are also oracles to be heard and respected4 ,according to ,kant1 the principle of contradiction is the condition sine qua non of all human cognitions4 ,if1 then1 this condition is to serve as their object1 it must be so expressed as to be applicable to all cases4 ,our cognitions are not composed solely of necessary elements1 but admit1 to a great extent1 ideas connected with the contingent2 since1 as we have seen1 purely ideal truths lead to nothing positive1 unless brought down to the ground of reality4 ,contingent beings are subject to the condition of time1 and all cognitions relating to them must always depend on this condition4 ,their existence is limited to a determinate space of time2 and it is necessary to think and speak of it conformably to this determination4 ,even their essential properties are in some manner affected by the condition of time2 because if abstracted from it1 and considered in general1 they are not as they are when realized2 that is1 when they cease to be a pure abstraction1 and become something positive4 ,here1 then1 is the reason1 and a very profound and cogent reason1 why all the schools joined the idea of time to the formula of the principle of contradiction3 the reason1 we repeat1 is very profound1 and it is strange how it escaped the ,german philosopher's penetration4 #aih4 ,the importance of this subject requires still further explanation4 ,what is essential to the principle of contradiction1 is the exclusion of being by not-being1 and of not-being by being4 ,the formula must express this fact1 this truth1 which is presented by immediate evidence1 and is contemplated by the intellect in a most clear intuition1 admitting neither doubt nor obscurity of any kind4 ,the word being may be taken in two senses3 substantively1 inasmuch as it signifies existence2 and copulatively1 as it expresses the relation of predicate to subject4 ,peter is3 here the verb is signifies the existence of ,peter1 and is equivalent to this3 ,peter exists4 ,the equilateral triangle is equiangular3 here the verb is is taken copulatively1 since it is not affirmed that any equilateral triangle exists2 merely the relation of equality of angles to equality of sides is established absolutely1 abstraction made from the existence of either4 ,the principle of contradiction must extend to the cases in which being is copulative1 and to those in which it is substantive2 for when we say it is impossible for the same thing to be and not be1 we speak not only of the ideal order1 or of the relations between predicates and subjects1 but also of the real order4 ,were no reference made to this last1 we should hold the entire world of existences to be deprived of this indispensable condition of all cognitions4 ,moreover this condition is not only necessary to every cognition1 but also to every being in itself1 abstracting its being known1 or being intelligent4 ,what would a being be that could both be and not be8 ,what is the meaning of a contradiction realized8 ,the principle must extend to the word being1 not only as copulative1 but also as substantive4 ,all finite existences1 our own included1 are measured by a successive duration2 therefore1 if the formula of the principle of contradiction is to be applicable to whatever we know in the universe1 it must be accompanied by the condition of time4 ,all finite things1 which now exist1 at one time did not exist1 and it may again be true that they do not exist4 ,of no one can it be truly said that its non-existence is impossible2 this impossibility springs from existence in a given time1 and can only be asserted with respect to that time4 ,therefore1 the condition of time is absolutely necessary in the formula of the principle of contradiction1 if this formula is to serve for the existent1 that is1 for that which is the real object of our cognitions4 #aii4 ,let us now see what happens in the purely ideal order1 where the word being is taken copulatively4 ,propositions of the purely ideal order are of two classes2 in the first1 the subject is a generic idea1 which1 by the union of the specific difference1 becomes a determinate species2 in the second1 the subject is this determinate species1 or the generic idea joined with the difference4 ,the word angle expresses the generic idea comprehending all angles1 which1 united with the corresponding difference1 constitutes the species of acute1 obtuse1 or right angle4 ,at every step we modify the generic idea in various ways1 and as a succession1 in which are represented to us distinct conceptions1 all having for their basis the generic idea1 necessarily enters into it1 it follows that we consider this idea as a being which is successively transformed4 ,to express this succession1 which is purely intellectual1 we employ the idea of time2 and here is one of the reasons which justify the use of this condition even in the purely ideal order4 ,thus we say1 an angle cannot at the same time be both a right angle and a not-right angle2 for the idea of angle may be successively determined by the difference which constitutes it a right angle1 and a not-right angle2 but these determinations cannot co-exist even in our conception1 for which reason we do not assert the union of the difference with the genus to be absolutely impossible1 but limit the impossibility to the condition of simultaneousness4 ,in this proposition1 a right angle cannot be obtuse2 the subject is not the generic idea alone1 but is united with the difference expressed by the word right4 ,in the conception formed of these two ideas1 right and angle1 we see the impossibility of uniting the idea obtuse with them4 ,this is without any condition of time1 and here there is none expressed4 ,we frequently say1 an angle cannot be at the same time right and obtuse2 but we never say1 a right angle can never at the same time be obtuse1 but1 absolutely1 a right angle cannot be obtuse4 #bjj4 ,kant observes that the equivocation proceeds from commencing by separating the predicate of a thing from the conception of this thing1 and afterwards joining to this same predicate its opposite1 which never makes a contradiction to the subject1 but to the predicate1 which is synthetically united with it2 a contradiction which happens only when the first and second predicates are supposed at the same time4 ,this observation of ,kant is at bottom very true1 but it has its defects3 first1 it pretends to be original1 when it only says things already well known2 and secondly1 it is used to combat an equivocation existing only in the mind of the philosopher who wants to free others from it4 ,the two propositions analyzed in the last paragraph confirm what we have just said4 ,an angle cannot be both right and not right4 ,here the condition of time is necessary1 because the opposition is not between the predicate and the subject1 but between the two predicates4 ,the angle may be right or not right1 only at different times4 ,a right angle cannot be obtuse2 here the condition of time must not be expressed1 because the idea right entering into the conception of the subject1 entirely excludes the idea obtuse4 #bja4 ,if the principle of contradiction were to serve only for analytic judgments1 that is1 for those in which the predicate is contained in the idea of the subject1 the condition of time should never be expressed2 but as this principle is to guide us in all other judgments1 it follows that1 in the general formula1 we cannot abstract a condition absolutely indispensable in most cases4 ,in the present state of our understanding1 while we are in this life1 non-abstraction of time is the rule1 abstraction the exception2 and would you have a general formula conform to the exception and neglect the rule8 #bjb4 ,we cannot conceive what reason ,kant had to illustrate this subject with the examples above cited4 ,nothing can be more common and inopportune than what he adds in illustration of this matter by examples4 ,if ,i say a man who is unlearned is not learned1 the condition at the same time must be understood2 for he who is unlearned at one time1 may very well be learned at another4 ,this is not only very common and inopportune1 but it is exceedingly inexact4 ,if the proposition were3 a man cannot be ignorant and instructed2 then the condition at the same time should be added1 because not giving preference to either predicate over the other indicates the manner of the opposition1 which is of predicate to predicate1 and not of predicate to subject4 ,but in the example adduced by ,kant1 the man that is ignorant is not instructed4 ,the subject is not man alone1 but an ignorant man2 the predicate instructed devolves on man modified by the predicate ignorant1 and1 consequently1 the expression of time is not necessary1 nor is it used in ordinary language4 ,there is a great difference between these two propositions3 a man that is ignorant is not instructed2 and a man that is ignorant cannot be instructed4 ,the condition of time must not be expressed in the former1 for the reason already given2 it must be in the latter1 because speaking of the impossibility in an absolute manner1 we should deny the ignorant man even the power to be instructed4 #bjc4 ,kant's other example is the following3 ,but if ,i say no unlearned man is learned1 the proposition is analytical1 since the sign of unlearnedness now constitutes the conception of the subject1 and then the negative proposition is immediately evident from the principle of contradiction1 without it being necessary for the condition at the same time to be added4 ,we cannot see why ,kant makes so great difference between these two propositions3 a man who is unlearned is not learned1 and no unlearned man is learned2 in both1 the predicate relates not only to man1 but to an unlearned man2 and it is the same to say1 a man that is unlearned1 as1 an unlearned man4 ,if1 then1 the expression of time is not necessary in the one1 neither is it in the other4 ,if the idea of unlearned affects the subject1 the predicate is necessarily excluded1 because the ideas1 learned and unlearned1 are contradictory2 and we encounter the rule of logic1 that in necessary matters1 an indefinite is equivalent to a universal proposition4 ,the principle of contradiction must1 therefore1 be preserved as it is2 the condition of time must not be suppressed1 for this would render the formula1 in many cases1 inapplicable47#bj7 ,,chapter ,,xxi4 ,,does ,,the ,,principle ,,of ,,contradiction ,,merit ,,the ,,title ,,of ,,fundamental2 ,,and ,,if ,,so1 ,,in ,,what ,,sense8 #bjd4 ,having cleared up the true sense of the principle of contradiction1 let us now see whether it merits to be called fundamental1 whether it possesses all the characteristics requisite to such a dignity4 ,these characteristics are three in number3 first1 that it depend on no other principle2 secondly1 that its fall involve the ruin of all others2 thirdly1 that it may1 while it remains firm1 be conclusively urged against all who deny the others1 and be of avail to bring them back to the truth by a demonstration at least indirect4 99 99 99 99 99 #bje4 ,in order completely to solve all questions depending on the principle of contradiction1 we shall state a few propositions1 and accompany them with their proper demonstrations3 ,,first ,,proposition4 ,if the principle of contradiction be denied1 all certainty1 all truth1 and all knowledge are at an end4 ,demonstration4--,if a thing may be and not be at the same time1 we may be certain and not certain1 know and not know1 exist and not exist2 affirmation may be joined with negation1 contradictory things united1 distinct things identified1 and identical things distinguished3 the intellect is a chaos to the full extent of the word2 reason is overturned2 language is absurd2 subject and object clash in the midst of frightful darkness1 and all intellectual light is for ever extinguished4 ,all principles are involved in the universal wreck1 and consciousness itself would totter1 were it not1 when this absurd supposition is made1 upheld by the invincible hand of nature4 ,consciousness1 indeed1 in this absurd hypothesis1 does not perish1 for this is impossible1 but it sees itself carried away by this violent whirlwind1 which precipitates it and every thing else into chaotic darkness4 ,in vain does it strive to save its ideas2 they all vanish before the force of contradiction3 in vain does it generate new ideas to be substituted for those it loses2 these also disappear3 in vain does it seek new objects1 for they1 too1 disappear in like manner1 and it endures only to feel the radical impossibility of all thought1 and see contradiction lording it over the intellect1 and destroying1 with irresistible might1 whatever would germinate there4 ,,second ,,proposition4 #bjf4 ,it is not enough not to suppose the principle of contradiction false2 we must suppose it to be true1 if we would not have all certainty1 all knowledge1 all truth to perish4 ,demonstration4--,the reasons given for the first proposition avail also to prove this4 ,in the one case the principle of contradiction is supposed to be denied2 in the other1 it is neither supposed true nor false2 but this evidently is not enough1 for1 until the principle of contradiction is placed beyond all doubt1 we remain in darkness1 and must doubt of every thing4 ,we do not mean to say that it is impossible for us to have certainty of any thing1 if we do not think explicitly of this principle2 but that it must be so firmly established1 that we cannot raise the least doubt concerning it1 and that1 when we see any thing connected with it1 we must1 of necessity1 consider that thing as founded upon an immovable basis3 the least vacillation1 the least doubt of this principle utterly destroys it2 the possibility of an absurdity is itself an absurdity4 ,,third ,,proposition4 #bjg4 ,the certainty of the principle of contradiction rests upon no other principle4 ,demonstration4--,it is1 as we have seen1 necessary in every cognition to suppose the truth of the principle of contradiction2 therefore1 no one can avail to demonstrate it4 ,every argument1 made to demonstrate this1 necessarily involves a vicious circle2 the principle of contradiction is proved by another principle1 which1 in its turn1 supposes that of contradiction2 and so we shall have a superstructure resting upon a foundation1 which foundation rests upon the superstructure itself4 ,,fourth ,,proposition4 #bjh4 ,whoever denies the principle of contradiction can neither directly nor indirectly be refuted by any other4 ,demonstration4--,it would be amusing to hear the arguments directed against a man who admits both affirmation and negation to be at the same time possible2 although forced to admit the affirmative1 he will still hold the negative1 and vice versa4 ,it is impossible not only to argue1 but even to speak1 or to think on such a supposition4 ,,fifth ,,proposition4 #bji4 ,it is not exact to say1 as is generally said1 that by the principle of contradiction1 we may argue conclusively against whoever denies the others4 ,here take notice that we only say it is not exact1 for we believe it at bottom to be true1 although not free from inexactness4 ,to show this1 let us examine the weight of the demonstration ordinarily given4 ,the reasons1 arguments1 and replies may be presented most clearly and strongly in the form of a dialogue4 ,let us suppose some one to deny this axiom3 the whole is greater than its part4 ,if you deny this1 you admit that the same thing may both be and not be at the same time4 ,this is what you have to prove4 ,with you the whole is the whole and not the whole1 and the part the part and not the part4 ,why so8 ,first1 it is the whole by supposition4 ,admitted4 ,and at the same time it is not4 ,denied4 ,it is not the whole because it is not greater than its part4 ,an excellent way of arguing6 ,this is a petitio principii4 ,i commence by asserting that the whole is not greater than its part1 and you argue on the contrary supposition2 for you tell me the whole would not be the whole were it not greater than its part4 ,if ,i had conceded that the whole is greater than its part1 and then denied this property1 ,i should indeed fall into a contradiction1 making that a whole1 which1 according to my principles1 is not a whole2 but as ,i now deny that the whole must be greater than its part1 ,i must also deny that it ceases to be a whole by not being greater than its part4 #baj4 ,what will you reply to one reasoning thus4 ,certainly nothing in the form of an argument3 all that you can do is to call his attention to the absurdity of his position2 but this is to be done not by argument1 but by exactly determining the meaning of the words and analyzing the conceptions which they express4 ,this is all that can or should be done4 ,the contradiction exists2 this is certain2 but what is wanted is1 that he see that he has fallen into it2 and if the explanation of the terms1 and the analysis of the conceptions do not suffice1 nothing else will4 ,let us see how this may be done in the same example4 ,the whole is greater than its part4 ,what is the whole8 ,the collection of the parts1 the parts themselves united4 ,the idea of the parts then enters into the idea of the whole4 ,what is the meaning of greater8 ,one thing is said to be greater than another1 when1 besides containing an equal quantity1 it also contains something else4 ,seven is greater than five1 because1 besides the same five1 it contains also two4 ,the whole contains one part and also the other parts2 therefore1 the idea of greater than its part enters into the idea of whole4 ,thus it is that we must refute whoever denies this principle2 and this method1 better than that of argumentation1 may be said to explain the terms and analyze the conceptions1 for it clearly does nothing but define the former and decompose the latter4 ,,sixth ,,proposition4 #baa4 ,the principle of contradiction is known only by immediate evidence4 ,demonstration4--,two things are here to be proved3 that the knowledge is by evidence1 and that the evidence is immediate4 ,as regards the former we will remark that the principle of contradiction is not a simple fact of consciousness1 but a purely ideal truth4 ,every fact of consciousness involves reality1 and cannot be expressed without the assertion of some existence3 the principle of contradiction neither affirms nor denies any thing positive2 that is1 it does not say that any thing exists or does not exist2 it only expresses the opposition of being to not-being1 and of not-being to being1 abstraction made from our taking the word being copulatively or substantively4 #bab4 ,every fact of consciousness is not only something existent1 but something determinate2 it is not a thought in the abstract1 but is this or that thought4 ,the principle of contradiction contains nothing determinate2 it abstracts not only the existence1 but also the essence of things1 since it relates not only to existing things1 but also to things possible3 it distinguishes no species among them1 but embraces them all in their greatest generality4 ,when we say1 it is impossible for the same thing to be and not be1 the word thing does not at all restrict the meaning2 it expresses being in general1 in its greatest indeterminateness4 ,in the to be or not be1 the word be expresses not only existence1 but also every class of essences in their most complete indeterminateness4 ,thus the principle is equally applicable in these two propositions3 it is impossible for the moon to be and not be2 it is impossible for a circle to be and not be a circle2 although the first is in the real order1 and there the word be expresses existence1 and the second is in the ideal order1 and the word be expresses only the relation of predicate to subject4 #bac4 ,every fact of consciousness is individual2 the principle of contradiction is the most universal imaginable3 every fact of consciousness is contingent2 the principle of contradiction is absolutely necessary1 a necessity which is a mark of truths known by evidence4 #bad4 ,the principle of contradiction is a law of all intelligence2 it is of absolute necessity for the finite as for the infinite2 not even the infinite intelligence is beyond this necessity1 for infinite perfection cannot be an absurdity4 ,every fact of consciousness as purely individual1 relates only to the being that experiences it2 neither the order of intelligences1 nor that of truth suffers any mutation from my existence or non-existence4 #bae4 ,the principle of contradiction1 besides the marks of necessity and universality1 which distinguish truths of evidence1 possesses also that of being seen with that immediate1 intellectual clearness1 of which we have already treated4 ,in the idea of being we see most clearly the exclusion of not-being4 ,hence the proof of the second part of the proposition3 because there is immediate evidence of the relation of the predicate to the subject1 when the sole idea of the subject1 without the necessity of combination with other ideas1 enables us to perceive this relation3 this is so in the present case1 for not only no combination is needed1 but all combinations are impossible if the truth of this principle be not supposed47#ba7 ,,chapter ,,xxii4 ,,the ,,principle ,,of ,,evidence4 #baf4 ,among the principles which1 by their pretensions to the title of fundamental1 have most figured in the schools1 is one called the principle of the ,cartesians3 whatever is contained in the clear and distinct idea of any thing1 may be affirmed of it with all certainty4 ,we have already seen ,kant resuscitate this principle1 although in other words1 equivocally taking it as synonymous with that of contradiction4 ,upon close examination we shall easily perceive that the formula of the ,cartesians1 like that of ,kant1 only expresses the legitimacy of the criterion of evidence4 ,both may be simplified to this3 evidence is a criterion of truth2 or1 whatever is evident is true4 ,as we shall hereafter use this transformation to distinguish ideas which we consider very confused1 we will show the reason of the equality of the two expressions4 #bag4 ,to say that any thing is contained in the clear and distinct idea of another thing1 is the same as to say that there is evidence that a predicate belongs to a subject2 the words have1 and can have1 no other meaning4 ,to be contained in a clear and distinct idea1 is equivalent to seeing one thing in another by that intellectual light which we call evidence2 therefore1 this expression1 whatever is contained in the clear and distinct idea of any thing1 is exactly equivalent to this1 whatever is evident4 ,to say1 that any thing may be affirmed of another with all certainty1 is the same as to say1 this thing is true1 and we may be perfectly certain of it4 ,it is the truth that is affirmed1 and the truth only2 therefore1 this expression1 may be affirmed of it with all certainty1 is exactly equivalent to this1 it is true4 ,thus the expression of the ,cartesians may be transformed into this3 ,whatever is evident is true1 or its equivalent1 evidence is a sure criterion of truth4 #bah4 ,a predicate that is opposed to a subject does not belong to it1 is ,kant's formula4 ,the opposition here meant is that founded on ideas1 when the predicate is necessarily excluded by intrinsic opposition from the idea of the subject4 ,the expression1 then1 a predicate that is opposed to a subject1 is equivalent to this3 when the predicate is clearly seen excluded from the idea of the subject1 which last is in its turn equivalent to this3 the exclusion1 or the opposition between the subject and the predicate1 is evident4 ,does not belong to it1 means the same as1 it is true that it does not belong to it2 and since these formulas have two values1 one for affirmative1 another for negative cases1 if we say the predicate that is opposed to a subject does not belong to it1 we may with equal reason say1 the predicate contained in the idea of a subject belongs to it2 wherefore1 ,kant's formula exactly coincides with this3 whatever is evident is true4 #bai4 ,this transformation gives us greater simplicity and generality2 simplicity by the very expression1 and generality1 because affirmative as well as negative cases are included4 ,the words1 whatever is evident1 embrace affirmations as well as negations1 for the inclusion of a predicate in a subject may be just as evident as their mutual opposition4 ,thus1 we may see one thing contained in the idea of another1 just as we may see it excluded from that idea4 ,under all conceptions the formula1 whatever is evident is true1 is preferable2 and if we would express it not as a principle1 but as a rule to be applied1 it may be converted into this3 evidence is a sure criterion of truth4 #bbj4 ,this transformation must not be supposed to be the only object of the preceding analysis2 although in these matters clearness and precision should be carried to the highest possible point1 we should nevertheless have abstained from these considerations1 had we only proposed to make an innovation1 and one perhaps of little practical consequence2 the same thing is expressed in both formulas1 and he who does not understand the first will not understand the second4 ,our principal object was not1 however1 to make this innovation1 but to show into what a confusion of ideas those fall who inquire whether the principle involving the legitimacy of the criterion of evidence ought1 or ought not1 to be considered as fundamental1 and be preferred to the principle of contradiction1 as also to that of ,descartes4 #bba4 ,we begin by establishing a proposition which may seem a most strange paradox1 but is far from being so3 the principle of evidence is not evident4 ,demonstration4--,this principle in its simplest form is this3 the evident is true4 ,this proposition1 we say1 is not evident4 ,when is a proposition evident8 ,when we see the predicate in the idea of the subject2 and here this does not occur4 ,evident is the same thing as clearly seen1 as offered to the intellect in a most lucid manner4 ,true is the same as conformity of the idea with the object4 ,we now ask1 can you1 however much you analyze this idea1 seen with clearness1 ever find this other1 conformed to the object8 ,no4 ,this is an immense leap3 we pass from subjectiveness to objectiveness2 we affirm subjective to be the reflex of objective conditions2 we go from the idea to its object1 and this transition is the most transcendental1 difficult1 and obscure problem of philosophy4 ,let the reader now decide if we had not ground to assert that the proposition1 the principle of evidence is not evident1 was not a paradox4 #bbb4 ,what1 then1 shall we say of this proposition3 ,whatever is evident is true8 ,it is not an axiom1 for the predicate is not contained in the idea of the subject2 it is not a demonstrable proposition1 for all demonstration rests on evident principles1 and consists in deducing from them a consequence evidently connected with them2 this cannot take place unless we presuppose the legitimacy of evidence1 that is to say1 that which is the object of the demonstration4 ,at the commencement of the argument1 it might be asked1 how do you know the principle on which your argument is based8 ,how do you know it to be true8 ,by evidence4 ,but recollect you are proving that whatever is evident is true1 and1 therefore1 you beg the question4 ,the truth of the laws of logic1 to which every argument must conform1 is known only by evidence2 therefore if we do not suppose whatever is evident to be true1 we cannot argue at all4 #bbc4 ,we hold then that the principle of evidence can be based on no other principle1 and that1 consequently1 it has the first mark of the fundamental principle4 ,if it fails1 all other principles1--that of contradiction1 known like the others only by evidence1 included1--fail with it2 this is another mark of the fundamental principle4 ,let us see if it has the third1 by aid of which1 whoever denies the rest may be refuted4 ,rarely does any one deny the principle of contradiction1 and admit that of evidence2 yet1 making this extravagant supposition1 this principle alone would be of avail1 because the question would be reduced to this3 does he admit the principles to be evident8 ,if he does not1 his intellect is unlike that of other men2 if he does1 the argument brought against him is conclusive4 ,you admit that whatever is evident is true2 such or such a principle is evident for you1 therefore it is true4 ,the premises are evident of themselves2 the legitimacy of the consequence is also evident2 and he must consequently admit it1 since he admits the criterion of evidence to be a general rule4 #bbd4 ,whence then the singularity we have noticed in this principle8 ,it is neither evident1 nor demonstrable2 it is necessary to all others1 and whoever denies them is refuted by it4 ,whence1 then1 such a singularity8 ,it has a very simple cause2 it is1 that the principle of evidence expresses no objective truth1 and therefore is not demonstrable3 it is not a simple fact of consciousness1 for it expresses the relation of the subject to the object1 for which reason it cannot be limited to the purely subjective2 it is a proposition known by a reflex act1 and it expresses the primary law of all our objective cognitions4 ,these are founded on evidence2 this we experience3 but when the mind asks why we trust evidence1 we can make no other answer than that whatever is evident is true4 ,what is the foundation of this proposition8 ,ordinarily it has none2 we conform to it without ever thinking of it2 but if we take the pains to reflect1 we find three motives for assenting to it3 the first is an irresistible instinct of nature2 the second is the destruction of all our cognitions and the impossibility of thought1 if we do not admit the legitimacy of the criterion2 the third is the perceiving that1 admitting this criterion1 every thing is co-ordinated in the intellect1 that an ideal universe admirably harmonized1 takes the place of chaos1 and that we feel possessed of the means necessary to reason and to construct a scientific edifice in the real universe1 the knowledge of which we have from experience47#bb7 ,,chapter ,,xxiii4 ,,the ,,criterion ,,of ,,consciousness4 #bbe4 ,having established the worth of the principles of consciousness1 of evidence1 and of contradiction1 in relation to the dignity of fundamental1 we will now examine the intrinsic value of the different criteria4 ,and here the doctrine of the preceding chapters1 of which the following are the development and complement1 furnishes much light4 ,we will begin with consciousness1 or the internal sense4 ,the testimony of consciousness includes all phenomena1 either actively or passively1 realized in our soul4 ,it is by its nature purely subjective2 so that in itself considered1 apart from the intellectual instinct and the light of evidence1 it testifies nothing with respect to objects4 ,by it we know what we experience1 not what is2 we perceive the phenomenon1 not the reality2 what authorizes us to say3 such a thing appears to me2 but not1 such a thing is4 ,the transition from subject to object1 from the idea representing to the thing represented1 from the impression to the cause impressing1 belongs to other criteria3 consciousness is limited to the interior1 or rather1 to itself1 which is nothing but an act of our soul4 #bbf4 ,we must distinguish between direct and reflex consciousness3 the former accompanies every internal phenomenon2 the latter does not3 the former is natural2 the latter philosophical3 the former abstracts the act of reason2 the latter is one of these acts4 ,direct consciousness is the presence of the phenomenon to the mind1 whether that phenomenon be a sensation or an idea1 an act or an impression1 in the intellectual or the moral order4 ,this distinction shows that direct consciousness accompanies every exercise1 whether active or passive1 of the faculties of our soul4 ,it is a contradiction to say that these phenomena exist in the soul1 and are not present to it4 ,these phenomena are not modifications like those which occur in insensible things2 we here treat of living modifications1 so to speak1 in a living being2 in the idea of these modifications is contained their presence to the mind4 ,it is impossible for us to have a sensation without experiencing it2 for whoever says he has a sensation1 says that he experiences a sensation3 this experience is its presence2 an experienced sensation is a present sensation4 ,thought is by its essence1 a representation that can neither exist nor be conceived without presence2 the name itself shows this1 and the idea which we join with it confirms the meaning of the word4 ,when we speak of representation1 we understand that there is some real or imaginary object1 which mediately or immediately offers itself to the subject4 ,there is then presence in every representation1 and consequently in every thought4 ,if1 from what is passive1 like sensations and representations1 we pass to the active1 that is1 to the phenomena when the soul freely evolves its force in the intellectual or moral order1 in combining or willing1 this presence is1 if possible1 yet more evident4 ,the being that thus acts1 does not obey a natural impulse1 but motives which it proposes to itself1 and to which it may or may not attend4 ,to make intellectual combinations and to exercise acts of the will1 without either being present to the soul1 are contradictory assertions4 #bbg4 ,reflex consciousness1 called by the ,french aperception1 from the verb s'apercevoir1 and denoting perception of the perception1 is the act whereby the mind explicitly knows any phenomenon which is realized in it4 ,thus1 ,i hear a noise3 the simple sensation1 present to and affecting my mind1 constitutes what we have called direct consciousness2 but if besides hearing1 ,i also aperceive1 to use a ,gallicism1 that ,i hear2 then ,i not only hear1 but also think that ,i hear3 this we call reflex consciousness4 #bbh4 ,it is clear from this example1 that direct and reflex consciousness are not only distinct but separable4 ,i may hear without thinking that ,i hear2 and this is very often the case4 #bbi4 ,most men have little reflex consciousness1 and the greatest intellectual force operates directly4 ,this ideological fact is connected with moral truths of the utmost importance4 ,the human mind was not born to contemplate itself1 to think that it thinks3 its affections were not given as an object of reflection1 but as impulses which elevate it to what it is called to3 the principal object of its intelligence and love is1 in this life as in the other1 the infinite being4 ,the worship of itself is an aberration of pride2 its punishment is darkness4 #bcj4 ,all great scientific discoveries lie in the objective1 not in the subjective order4 ,the exact sciences1 natural as well as moral1 have emanated not from reflexion of the subject upon itself1 but from knowledge of objects and their relations4 ,even the metaphysical sciences1 in all that is most solid in them1 ontology1 cosmology1 and theology1 are purely objective3 ideology and psychology which consider the subject1 are full of the obscurity inherent in all that is subjective2 ideology scarcely does more than merely observe internal phenomena1--an observation1 we may remark1 generally very defective1 poorly made1 and bewildered with vain cavils2 and what has psychology itself1 truly demonstrated1 except the simplicity of the soul1 the necessary consequence of the unity of consciousness8 ,in all else it resembles ideology1 and to a certain point1 is confounded with it2 it observes phenomena1 and afterwards defines and classifies them better or worse1 but fails to explain their mysterious nature4 #bca4 ,consciousness is the foundation of the other criteria1 not as a proposition which serves as their basis1 but as a fact which is a necessary condition of them all4 #bcb4 ,consciousness tells us that we see the idea of one thing contained in the idea of another3 thus far there is nothing but appearance2 the formula1 to express its testimony would be3 it appears to me2 which denotes a purely subjective phenomenon4 ,but this phenomenon is accompanied by an intellectual instinct1 an irresistible impulse of nature1 which makes us assent to the truth of the relation1 not only so far as it is in us1 but as it is formed without us1 in the purely objective order1 whether in the sphere of reality or possibility4 ,thus it is explained how evidence is founded on consciousness1 not as identified with it1 but as resting upon it as a fact from which it cannot be abstracted1 and as also containing the intellectual instinct which makes us believe whatever is evident to be true4 #bcc4 ,sensation1 in itself considered1 is a fact of pure consciousness1 since it is immanent in us3 so far is it from being an act whereby the mind passes beyond itself1 translates itself to the object1 that it ought rather to be regarded as a passion than an action1 and this accords with the common mode of speaking1 which ascribes it to a passive rather than to an active faculty4 ,nevertheless on this mere fact of consciousness is in some sense founded what is called the testimony of the senses1 and consequently all knowledge of the external world1 its properties1 and relations4 ,in the sensation whereby we see the sun1 there are two things3 the sensation itself1 that is1 the representation which ,i experience in myself1 and which ,i call sight2 and the correspondence of this sensation to the external object which ,i call the sun4 ,evidently1 these are two very distinct things1 and yet we always unite them4 ,consciousness is certainly the first basis of the formation of judgment2 but alone it does not suffice1 for it only testifies that the sensation is1 not what it is4 ,how is the judgment completed8 ,by means of a natural instinct which makes us render sensations objective1 that is1 makes us believe in an external object corresponding to the internal phenomena4 ,thus the testimony of the senses is in some manner founded on consciousness2 it does not1 however1 proceed from consciousness alone1 but requires the natural instinct1 by means of which we form our judgments in perfect security4 #bcd4 ,we must here remark that evidence has nothing to do with the testimony of the senses1 even in their intellectual part1 wherein we judge that an external object corresponds to the sensation4 ,the idea of the existence or possibility of an external object does not enter into the idea of the sensation as purely subjective1 and without this indispensable condition there can be no evidence4 ,not only is this clear of itself1 but it is confirmed by daily experience4 ,we continually have the representation of the external subjectively considered1 as a pure phenomenon in our soul1 although no real object corresponds to it2 more or less clear when we are awake1 but most vivid1 even so as to produce a perfect illusion1 when we are asleep4 #bce4 ,with this exposition1 the value and extent of consciousness may be exactly determined3 this we shall see in the following propositions1 in all of which1 we would observe1 we treat only of direct consciousness4 ,,first ,,proposition4 ,the testimony of consciousness extends to all the phenomena that are realized in our soul1 regarded as an intellectual and sensitive being4 ,,second ,,proposition4 #bcf4 ,if there exist in our soul phenomena of a different order1 that is to say1 if it may in some sense be modified in non-representative faculties1 the testimony of consciousness does not extend to such phenomena4 ,we do not advance this proposition without a solid reason4 ,it is probable1 and even very probable1 that our soul has active faculties1 of the exercise of which it is not conscious2 otherwise how explain the mysteries of organic life8 ,the soul is united to the body1 and is for it the vital principle1 the separation from which causes death1 manifested in complete disorganization and decomposition4 ,this activity is exercised without consciousness1 either of the mode or of the fact of its existence4 ,it may be said that there is here a series of those confused perceptions of which ,leibnitz speaks in his ,monadologie2 or that these perceptions are so slight1 so wan1 as to leave no trace in the memory1 nor be an object of reflection3 but these are only conjectures4 ,it is hard to persuade one's self that the ftus in the mother's womb has any consciousness of the activity exercised for the development of its organization3 it is also hard to persuade one's self that even in adults there is any consciousness of that same activity producing circulation of the blood1 nutrition1 and other phenomena which constitute life4 ,if these phenomena are produced1 as they certainly are1 by the soul1 there is in it1 an exercise of activity of which it either has no consciousness1 or one so weak and confused that it is as if it were not4 ,,third ,,proposition4 #bcg4 ,the testimony of consciousness1 in itself considered1 is so limited to the purely internal1 that it is of itself worth nothing in the external order1 either for the criterion of evidence or that of the senses4 ,,fourth ,,proposition4 ,the testimony of consciousness is the foundation of the other criteria1 inasmuch as it is a fact which they all require1 and without which they are impossible4 ,,fifth ,,proposition4 #bch4 ,from the combination of consciousness with intellectual instinct arise all the other criteria47#bc7 ,,chapter ,,xxiv4 ,,the ,,criterion ,,of ,,evidence4 #bci4 ,there are two species of evidence1 mediate and immediate4 ,we call immediate evidence that which requires only understanding of the terms2 and mediate evidence that which requires reasoning4 ,that the whole is greater than its part is evident by immediate evidence2 that the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two sides1 is known by mediate evidence1 that is1 by demonstrative reasoning4 #bdj4 ,we have said that one of the distinctive characteristics of evidence is the necessity and universality of its object4 ,this is a characteristic as well of mediate as of immediate evidence4 ,besides this characteristic there is another1 called with more reason essential1 notwithstanding some doubt as to whether it extends to mediate evidence or not2 it is that the idea of the predicate is found contained in that of the subject4 ,this is the most complete essential notion of the criterion of immediate evidence1 by which it is distinguished from the criteria of consciousness and common sense4 ,we have said there is some doubt as to this characteristic extending to mediate evidence2 by this we mean that also in mediate evidence the idea of the predicate may be contained in that of the subject4 ,in this it is not our intention to ignore the difference between theorems and axioms1 but to call the reader's attention to a doctrine which we propose to develop1 while treating of mediate evidence4 ,in the present chapter we shall only treat of evidence in general1 or of immediate evidence alone4 #bda4 ,evidence involves relation1 for it implies comparison4 ,when the understanding does not compare1 it has no evidence1 but only a perception1 which is a pure fact of consciousness2 and this evidence does not refer to perception alone1 but always supposes or produces a judgment4 ,we find two things in every act where there is evidence3 the pure intuition of the idea1 and the decomposition of this idea into various conceptions accompanied with the perception of their mutual relations4 ,this we will explain by an example from geometry4 ,the triangle has three sides3 this is an evident proposition1 for in the very idea of triangle1 we find the three sides2 and in conceiving the triangle1 we in some sense conceive the three sides4 ,had we limited ourselves to the contemplation of the simple idea of triangle1 we should have had intuition of the idea1 but not evidence1 which begins only when we find1 in decomposing the conception of triangle1 and considering in it the idea of figure in general1 of side1 and of the number three1 these all contained in the primitive conception4 ,evidence consists in the clear conception of this4 ,so true is this that the very nature of things makes common language philosophical4 ,we do not say1 an idea is evident1 but a judgment is3 no one calls a term evident1 but a proposition only4 ,and why8 ,because the term simply expresses the idea without any relation1 or decomposition into its partial conceptions2 whereas the proposition expresses the judgment1 that is1 affirms or denies that one conception is contained in another1 which1 in the present matter1 supposes decomposition of the entire conception4 #bdb4 ,immediate evidence is the perception of identity between various conceptions1 separated by the analytical power of the intellect4 ,thus identity combined in a certain way with diversity is not a contradiction1 as it might at first sight seem1 but something very natural1 if we observe one of the most constant facts of our intellect1 the faculty of analyzing the most simple conceptions1 and of seeing relations between identical things4 ,what are all axioms8 ,what are all propositions per se not8 ,nothing but expressions1 in which it is affirmed that a predicate belongs to the essence of the subject1 or is contained in its idea4 ,the mere conception of the subject includes the predicate3 the term which denotes the first also denotes the second2 yet the intellect1 with a mysterious power of analysis1 distinguishes between identical things1 and then compares them in order to make them again identical4 ,whoever says triangle1 expresses a figure composed of three sides and three angles2 but the intellect may take this idea and consider in it the ideas of the number three1 side1 and angle1 and compare them with the primitive conception4 ,in this distinction there is no deception2 there is only the exercise of the faculty1 which regards the thing under different aspects1 in order to arrive at the intuition and affirmation of the identity of the very things it had before distinguished4 #bdc4 ,evidence is a sort of calculation of the intellect1 whereby it finds in the conception analyzed whatever was placed in the principle or was contained in it4 ,hence the necessity and universality of the object of evidence1 inasmuch as1 and in the manner1 in which it is expressed by the idea4 ,to this there are no exceptions4 ,either a predicate is or is not placed in a primitive principle3 if it is1 it is there1 according to the principle of contradiction4 ,either it was or was not excluded from the conception2 if the conception itself excludes or denies it1 this it does by virtue of the principle of contradiction4 ,thus the more fundamental of the two characteristics of evidence given above is1 that the idea of the predicate is contained in the idea of the subject4 ,hence the necessity and universality2 since1 in verifying this condition1 it is impossible for the predicate not to belong necessarily to all the subjects4 #bdd4 ,thus far we have encountered no difficulty1 because we have treated only of evidence subjectively considered1 that is1 as relating to pure conceptions2 but the intellect does not stop with the conception1 but extends to the object1 and says not only that it sees the thing1 but that the thing is as it sees it4 ,thus the principle of contradiction1 considered in the purely subjective order1 means that the conception of being is opposed to that of not-being1 which destroys it1 just as the conception of being destroys that of not-being2 it means1 that in endeavoring to conceive jointly these two things1 and to make them co-exist1 a sort of struggle of thoughts1 reciprocally annihilating each other1 takes place in the depths of our soul1--a struggle which the understanding is condemned to witness without hope of establishing peace between the combatants4 ,if we confine ourselves to this phenomenon1 no objection can be made4 ,we experience it1 and there is no further question about it2 but in announcing the principle1 we would announce something more than the incompatibility of the conceptions2 we would transfer this incompatibility to the things themselves1 and assert that not only our own conceptions1 but also all real and possible beings are subjected to this law4 ,whatever be the object of which we treat1 whatever the conditions under which we suppose it existent or possible1 we say that while it is1 it cannot not be2 and while it is not it cannot be4 ,we affirm1 then1 the law of contradiction1 not only for our own conceptions1 but also for things themselves2 the intellect applies to every thing the law which it finds necessary to itself4 ,by what right8 ,an incontestible right1 for it is the law of necessity4 ,with what reason8 ,with none1 for we are now at the foundation of reason2 this is the ne plus ultra of the human understanding2 philosophy can go no farther4 ,let us not1 however1 be thought to abandon the field to skeptics1 or to entrench ourselves in necessity1 contented with pointing out a fact of our nature4 ,the question is susceptible of different solutions1 which may not1 indeed1 go beyond the ne plus ultra of our mind1 but which yet leaves the cause of skepticism in great straits4 #bde4 ,to ask why the criterion of evidence is legitimate1 is to ask why this proposition is true3 whatever is evident is true2 it is to raise the question of the objectiveness of ideas4 ,the fundamental difference between dogmatists and skeptics1 is not that the latter deny the facts of consciousness1--the most refined skepticism has not come to this1 and both agree in recognizing the purely subjective appearance of phenomena2 but it is that dogmatists found science on consciousness1 and skeptics maintain that this is an illegitimate transition1 and that we must despair of science1 and confine ourselves to mere consciousness4 ,according to this doctrine1 ideas are empty forms of the understanding1 mean nothing1 and can lead to nothing2 although they entertain the understanding1 and offer to it an immense field for combinations1 the world they present to it is purely illusory1 and can serve for nothing in the real order4 ,in contemplating these entirely empty forms1 the intellect is the sport of fantastic visions1 from the union of which results the spectacle which seems now to belong to reality1 and now to possibility2 either it is a mere nonentity1 or something1 and if so1 it can never make us sure of the reality it possesses4 #bdf4 ,it is difficult to fight skepticism when it takes this ground3 situated beyond the domains of reason1 the decisions of reason cannot reach it4 ,it will appeal from them all1 for it begins by denying the competency of the judge4 ,but as these skeptics admit consciousness1 it is right that they should defend it against whoever attempts to deprive them of it4 ,we believe that if the objectiveness of ideas be denied1 not only all science1 but also all consciousness is annihilated2 and here skeptics are guilty of an inconsequence2 for1 while they deny the objectiveness of some ideas1 they admit that of others4 ,no consciousness1 properly so called1 can exist1 if this objectiveness be absolutely destroyed4 ,we beg the reader to follow us in a brief1 but severe analysis of the facts of consciousness1 in their relations with the objectiveness of ideas47#bd7 ,,chapter ,,xxv4 ,,the ,,objective ,,value ,,of ,,ideas4 #bdg4 ,the transition from subject to object1 from subjective appearance to objective reality1 is a problem which vexes fundamental philosophy4 ,consciousness will not permit us to doubt that certain things appear to us in such a manner2 but are they in reality what they appear to us8 ,how are we to know this8 ,what shall assure us of this conformity of the idea with the object8 ,the question does not relate solely to sensations2 it also extends to purely intellectual ideas1 even to those inundated with that internal light which we call evidence4 ,what ,i evidently see in the idea of a thing1 is as ,i see it1 philosophers have said1 and all mankind with them4 ,no one doubts what is presented to him as evidently true4 ,but how prove that evidence is a legitimate criterion of truth8 #bdh4 ,god is truthful1 says ,descartes1 and could not have deceived us2 ,he could not have taken pleasure in making us the victims of perpetual illusions4 ,all this is true4 ,but the skeptic will ask how we know that ,god is truthful1 or even that he exists4 ,if we found the veracity of ,god on the idea of an infinitely perfect being1 as ,descartes does1 there is still the same difficulty with respect to the correspondence of the idea with the object4 ,if we draw the demonstration of the veracity and existence of ,god from the ideas of necessary and contingent beings1 of effect and cause1 of order and intelligence1 we again meet the same obstacle1 and are still unable to pass from the idea to the object4 ,no matter how much we cavil1 we shall never get out of this circle1 we shall always return to the same point4 ,the mind cannot think out of itself2 what it knows1 it knows by means of its ideas2 if these deceive1 it has nothing left to set it right4 ,all rectification1 all proof must employ these ideas1 and these1 in their turn1 require new proof and rectification4 #bdi4 ,many books of philosophy exaggerate the illusions of the senses1 and the difficulty of assuring ourselves of the sensible reality1 when they solve this question3 ,i perceive it to be so2 but is it as ,i perceive8 ,these same books immediately afterwards speak of the order of ideas with security equal to their mistrust in the sensible order4 ,this does not seem very logical1 for phenomena relating to the senses1 may be examined by the light of reason1 and it may be seen how far they agree with it3 but what touch-stone have we for the phenomena of reason itself8 ,if there be difficulty in the sensible1 there is likewise in the intellectual1 and the more serious1 since it affects the very basis of all cognitions1 even those which relate to sensations4 ,if we doubt the existence of the external world which the senses present to us1 we may appeal to the connection of the sensations with causes not in us2 and so deduce by demonstration the relations of the appearances with the reality3 but this requires the ideas of cause and effect2 we must have some truth1 some general principles1 as for example1 that nothing can produce itself1 and others similar1 without which we cannot take one step4 #bej4 ,we do not believe any satisfactory reason can be given for the veracity of the criterion of evidence1 although it is impossible not to yield to it4 ,the connection1 therefore1 of evidence with reality1 and consequently1 the transition from the idea to the object1 are primitive facts of our nature1 a necessary law of our understanding1 the foundation of all that it contains1--a foundation which in its turn rests1 and can rest only on ,god1 the ,creator of our soul4 #bea4 ,we must observe the contradiction into which those philosophers fall who say3 ,i cannot doubt what is subjective1 what affects myself1 what ,i feel within myself2 but ,i have no right to go out of myself1 and affirm that what ,i think is in reality as ,i think4 ,do you know that you feel1 that you think1 that you have within you such or such an appearance8 ,can you prove it8 ,evidently you cannot4 ,you yield to a fact1 to an internal necessity which forces you to believe that you think1 that you feel1 or that such a thing appears to you2 but then there is equal necessity in the connection of the object with the idea1 an equal necessity forces you to believe that what appears to you to be in such or such a condition is as it appears4 ,neither case admits of demonstration2 in both there is an indeclinable necessity3 where1 then1 is philosophy1 when it is attempted to establish so great a difference between things which admit of none8 ,fichte says3 ,it is impossible to explain in a precise manner how a philosopher can get beyond the me3#ba and we may with equal reason say1 that we cannot conceive how he has been able to raise a system upon the me4 ,to what does he appeal8 ,to a fact of consciousness1 that is1 to a necessity4 ,and is not the assent to evidence1 the certainty to which the reality apparently corresponds1 also a necessity8 ,on what does ,fichte found his system of the me and the not-me8 ,we have only to read his works to see that he only founds it on considerations which suppose a value in certain ideas1 a truth in certain judgments4 ,otherwise it is impossible to speak or to think3 and this even he himself admits when1 in commencing his investigations on the principle of our cognitions1 he utters the words we have just quoted4 ,he then confesses that we cannot take one step without trusting all the laws of general logic1 which are not always demonstrated1 but are supposed tacitly admitted4 ,and what are these laws1 without objective truths8 ,what are they without the value of ideas1 without correspondence with objects8 ,fichte says rightly1 it is a circle2 but he can no more get out of it than other philosophers4 #ba ,wissenschaftslehre4 ,erster ,theil4 #c4 #beb4 ,to take from ideas their objective value1 to reduce them to mere subjective phenomena1 to resist that internal necessity which obliges us to admit the correspondence of the soul to objects1 is to destroy the very consciousness of the soul4 ,this must have been seen1 and this we think we can most evidently demonstrate4 #bec4 ,we have consciousness of ourselves4 ,we now abstract what we feel1 what we are2 but we know that we feel and that we are4 ,this experience is so clear1 so vivid1 that we cannot resist the truth of what it attests to us4 ,but this me is not only the me of the present instant1 it is also the me of yesterday1 and of all prior time of which we have consciousness4 ,we are the same that we were yesterday1 the being in which this succession is verified1 to which this variety of appearances is presented4 ,the consciousness of the me then includes the identity of a being at distinct times1 in various situations1 with different ideas1 and diverse affections1--the identity of a being which endures and is the same throughout the changes succeeding in it4 ,if this duration of identity be broken1 if ,i be not sure that ,i am the same me that ,i was previously1 the consciousness of the me is destroyed4 ,there would exist a series of unconnected facts1 isolated acts of consciousness1 but not that intimate consciousness ,i now experience4 ,this cannot be doubted2 every man feels it in himself2 it admits neither discussion nor proof in any one1 it requires them of no one4 ,the moment this consciousness of identity fails1 we are in our own eyes annihilated2 whatever we may be in reality1 for ourselves we are nothing4 ,what is the consciousness of a being1 formed from a series of acts of consciousness1 without connection or mutual relation8 ,it is a being revealed successively to itself1 yet not as itself1 but as a new being1 a being which is born and dies1 and dies and is born before its eyes1 without its knowing that what is born is what died1 or that what died is what was born3 it is a light which burns and is extinguished1 and again burns and is again extinguished1 without its knowing that it is the same light4 #bed4 ,this consciousness is completely destroyed by those who deny the connection between the idea and object4 ,demonstration4--,in the instant ,a1 ,i have no other subjective presence of my acts than the very act ,i am at that moment performing3 ,i cannot therefore be certain that ,i have had any previously1 if they be not represented in the present idea2 there is therefore a connection between this idea and its object4 ,attending then simply to the phenomena of consciousness1 to the mere consciousness of the subject1 we find that we do1 by an irresistible necessity1 attribute an objective value to ideas1 an objective truth to judgments4 #bee4 ,without this objective truth1 all certain recollection even of internal phenomena1 and by a legitimate consequence1 all reasoning1 judgment1 and thought1 are impossible4 ,recollection is of past acts4 ,when we recollect them1 they already are not2 for1 if they were1 we should not have recollection1 but present consciousness of them4 ,even when in the act of recollecting them we have other similar acts1 these are not the same1 for something of past time always enters into the idea of recollection4 ,therefore1 we can have no certainty of them1 but by their connection with the present act1 their correspondence with the idea presenting them to us4 #bef4 ,we have said that if1 in internal phenomena1 the certainty of the objective truth fail1 all reasoning is impossible4 ,in fact1 all reasoning supposes a succession of acts2 when one of them exists in the mind1 the other does not exist2 therefore1 continued minute recollections are required1 lest the chain be broken2 and thus1 without this chain1 there is no reasoning2 without recollection this chain is not2 without objective truth1 there is no certain recollection2 therefore1 without objective truth there is no reasoning4 #beg4 ,all judgments also seem impossible4 ,judgments are of two classes3 some require demonstration1 others do not4 ,those that require demonstration would be impossible1 for there can be no demonstration without reasoning1 and reasoning in this case is impossible4 ,as to those that do not need demonstration1 because they shine with immediate evidence2 all of them1 not relating to the present act of the soul1 in the very instant when the judgment is pronounced1 would be impossible4 ,therefore1 there could be no judgment but that of the present act1 that is1 the consciousness of the present without relation to the preceding4 ,but it is remarkable that even with respect to the acts of consciousness1 this judgment would be little less than impossible2 for when we form a judgment upon an act of consciousness1 this we do not by this act1 but by a reflex act4 ,this reflection requires succession1 and succession cannot be known with certainty if there be no objective truth4 ,it is even very doubtful if the judgments of immediate evidence would be possible4 ,they suppose1 as we explained in the preceding chapter1 relation of the partial conceptions into which the whole is decomposed2 and how can there be decomposition without succession8 ,if there is succession1 there is recollection2 if there is recollection1 there is no immediate presence of the thing recollected4 #beh4 ,such consequences are astounding1 but they are inevitable4 ,if we destroy objective truth1 all rational thought disappears4 ,such thought includes a certain continuity of acts corresponding to different instants2 if this continuity be broken1 the human thought ceases to be what it is1 ceases to exist as reason4 ,it is a series of acts which have no sort of connection1 and which lead to nothing4 ,in such a case1 all expression1 all words fail2 nothing has a fixed value2 every thing is ingulfed in obscurity4 ,thus it is in the intellectual and moral order as in the material2 and man has not even the comfort of possessing himself2 he vanishes from himself like an empty shadow4 #bei4 ,sensations may also exist as an unconnected series1 but there will be no certain recollection of them1 since the objective truth is wanting2 past sensations exist only as past1 and1 consequently1 as simple objects4 ,all intellectual reflection upon them will be impossible1 for reflection is not sensation2 sensation is an object of reflection1 not reflection itself4 ,thus1 the ignorant man has the same sensation as the philosopher1 but not the same reflection upon it4 ,a thousand times we have sensations without reflecting that we have them4 ,sensible is very different from intellectual consciousness2 the former is the simple presence of the sensation1 or the sensation itself2 the latter is the act of the intellect occupied with the sensation4 #bfj4 ,this distinction is also found in all purely intellectual acts3 the reflection upon the act is not the act itself4 ,one is the object of the other2 they are not identical1 and are often found separated4 ,if1 then1 there were no objective truth1 reflection would be impossible4 #bfa4 ,it is likewise difficult to comprehend how any act of the consciousness of the me1 even as present1 can be possible4 ,we have already seen the me disappear when the series of recollections is broken1 and without objective truth it is not even possible to conceive the me for one instant4 ,the me thinking knows the me thought only as object4 ,whether it perceive or know it1 to account to itself for itself1 it must reflect upon itself1 and take itself for its own object2 and there being no objective truth1 it is inconceivable how an object can have any value4 ,it follows from this1 that they who oppose objectiveness1 attack a fundamental law of our mind1 destroy thought1 even consciousness1 and every thing subjective which could serve as its basis4 #bfb4 ,in their arguments against objective certainty1 its opponents are accustomed to depend upon the errors into which it leads us4 ,the madman believes he sees objects1 which do not exist2 the lunatic believes firmly in his disconnected thoughts2 and why may not that which deceives us in one instance1 also deceive us in another1 and all cases8 ,can that be a certain criterion which sometimes fails8 ,why not stop with the purely subjective8 ,the madman1 the lunatic1 are deceived in the object1 not in the subject2 although what they think is not true1 it is still very true and certain that they think it4 ,this is a specious objection2 but it does not remove the difficulties under which the system1 in favor of which it is adduced1 labors2 and it may1 on the other hand1 be solved in so far as it tends to weaken objective truth4 ,the madman1 the lunatic1 have also recollections of things that never existed4 ,these recollections do not relate solely to external1 but likewise to their internal acts4 ,the madman who calls himself king1 acts in accordance with his thought1 with what he felt when crowned1 when dethroned2 and yet1 these intellectual phenomena never existed4 ,and1 however this may be1 he himself may have produced these recollections4 ,we hold1 then1 that the criterion with respect to memory is wrong in this case1 and can be of avail in no case4 ,therefore1 even1 although we had not shown that without objective truth there is no recollection even of the internal1 the arguments of our adversaries would have sufficed4 ,this objection1 if it prove any thing1 confirms all that we have advanced in demonstrating that without objectiveness there is no consciousness properly so called1 and this even our opponents do not admit4 #bfc4 ,moreover1 we at once see what weight an argument based on craziness should have at the tribunal of reason4 ,it all1 at the most1 only proves the weakness of our nature1 that in some unfortunate individuals the established order of humanity is reversed2 that the rule of truth1 as it exists in so weak a creature1 admits of some exceptions2 but these exceptions are known1 for their characters are marked4 ,the exception does not destroy1 it only confirms the rule47#be7 ,,chapter ,,xxvi4 ,,can ,,all ,,cognitions ,,be ,,reduced ,,to ,,the ,,perception ,,of ,,identity8 #bfd4 ,immediate evidence has for its objects those truths which the intellect sees with all clearness1 and to which it assents without the intervention of any medium1 as its name denotes4 ,these truths are enunciated in propositions called per se not1 first principles1 or axioms1 in which it is sufficient to know the meaning of the terms to see that the predicate is contained in the idea of the subject4 ,propositions of this class are few in all sciences2 the greater part of our cognitions are the fruit of reasoning which proceeds by mediate evidence4 ,in geometry the number of truths that do not require demonstration1 but only explanation1 is very limited4 ,the body of geometrical science1 with its present colossal dimensions1 has proceeded from reasoning3 even in the most comprehensive works the axioms occupy but a few pages2 the rest is composed of theorems1 propositions not of themselves evident1 but requiring demonstration4 ,the same is true of all other sciences4 #bfe4 ,since in axioms the intellect perceives the identity of the subject with the predicate1 intuitively seeing that the idea of the latter is contained in that of the former1 there arises a very grave philosophical question which may prove very difficult1 and cause strange controversies1 if care be not taken to place it upon its true ground4 ,is every human cognition reduced to the simple perception of identity8 and can its general formula be this3 ,a is ,a1 or3 a thing is itself8 ,some philosophers of note maintain the affirmative2 others the contrary4 ,we think there is a confusion of ideas not so much as to the question itself as to its state4 ,clear and exact ideas of what judgment is1 and of the relation affirmed or denied by it1 will greatly facilitate the accurate solution of the question4 #bff4 ,there is in every judgment perception of identity or non-identity1 accordingly as it is affirmative or negative4 ,the verb is does not express the union1 but the identity of the predicate with the subject2 and when accompanied with the negation not1 it simply expresses non-identity1 abstracting union or separation4 ,this is so true and so exact1 that in things really united an affirmative judgment is impossible1 because they have no identity4 ,we must1 then1 in such cases1 if we would be enabled to make an affirmation1 express the predicate in the concrete1 that is1 in some sense involving the idea of the subject itself in it2 for the same property affirmed in the concrete cannot be in the abstract1 but must rather be denied4 ,thus we may say1 man is rational2 but not1 man is rationality3 a body is extended2 but not1 a body is extension3 paper is white2 but not1 paper is whiteness4 ,why is this8 ,is it that rationality is not in man1 extension is not united to body1 nor whiteness to paper8 ,certainly not2 but if rationality be in man1 extension in body1 and whiteness in paper1 we have only not to perceive identity between the predicates and subjects1 to render affirmation impossible2 on the contrary1 despite the union1 we have negation3 thus we may say1 man is not rationality2 a body is not extension2 paper is not whiteness4 ,we have said that1 in order to save the expression of identity1 we used the concrete instead of the abstract term1 and involved in the former the idea of the subject4 ,it cannot be said that paper is whiteness1 but it may be said that paper is white2 for this last proposition means that paper is a white thing2 that is1 we make the general idea of a thing1 or the idea of a modifiable subject1 enter into the predicate while in the concrete2 and this subject is identical with the paper modified by whiteness4 #bfg4 ,thus it is easy to see1 that the expression1 union of the predicate with the subject1 is1 at the best1 inexact4 ,every affirmative proposition expresses the identity of the predicate with the subject4 ,use authorizes these modes of speaking1 which still produce some confusion when we endeavor perfectly to understand these matters4 ,and it must be observed1 that ordinary language here1 as often elsewhere1 is admirably exact and appropriate4 ,nobody says1 paper is whiteness1 but1 paper is white4 ,it is only when we would greatly heighten the degree1 to which a subject possesses a quality1 that we express it in the abstract1 and then we join with it the pronoun itself4 ,thus1 speaking hyperbolically1 we say a thing is beauty itself1 whiteness itself1 goodness itself4 #bfh4 ,even what in mathematics is called equality1 also means identity4 ,thus in this class of judgments1 besides what we have observed of general in them all1 to wit3 the identity saved by expressing the predicate in the concrete1 the very relation of equality denotes identity4 ,this needs explanation4 ,whoever says #f #c #i1 expresses the same as he who says #f #c are identical with #i4 ,clearly in the affirmation of equality1 no attention is paid to the form in which the quantities are expressed1 but to the quantities themselves alone2 otherwise we should be unable to affirm not only identity1 but also equality2 for it is evident that #f #c1 as to their form1 neither written1 spoken1 nor thought1 are identical with1 or equal to1 #i4 ,the equality is in the values expressed1 and these are not only equal but identical2 #f #c are the same as #i4 ,the whole is not distinguished from its united part2 #i is the whole1 #f #c its united parts4 ,the different manner of conceiving #f #c and #i does not exclude the identity4 ,the difference is in the intellectual form1 and occurs not only here but also in the perceptions of the simplest things2 there is nothing which we do not conceive under different aspects1 and whose conception we may not decompose in various ways2 but we do not therefore say that the thing ceases to be simple and identical with itself4 ,what we have said of an arithmetical equation may be extended to algebraical and geometrical equations4 ,if we have an equation whereof the first member is very simple1 as ,z1 and the second very complicated1 as the development of a series1 we cannot say that the first expression is equal to the second2 the equality is not in the expression but in the thing expressed1 in the value designated by the letters2 in this sense it is true1 in the former it is evidently false4 ,two circumferences having the same radius are equal4 ,here we seem to treat solely of equality1 since there are two distinct objects1 the two circumferences1 which may be traced on paper or represented in the imagination2 yet not even in this case is the distinction true1 it is only apparent1 for here1 as in algebraical and arithmetical equations1 there is distinction and even diversity in form with identity at bottom4 ,the principal argument1 on which the distinction is founded1 may be combatted by observing that the circumferences which may be traced or represented1 are only forms of the idea1 not the idea itself4 ,whether traced or represented they have a determinate size and a certain position on the planes seen or imagined2 in the idea1 and in the proposition containing it1 there is nothing of this2 we abstract all size1 all position1 and speak in a general and absolute sense4 ,true1 the representations may be infinite either externally or in the imagination2 but this1 so far from proving them identical1 shows their diversity1 since the idea is one and they are infinite2 the idea is constant1 they are variable2 the idea is independent of them1 they are dependent on the idea1 and have the character and denomination of circumferences1 inasmuch as they approach it by representing what it contains4 ,what1 then1 is expressed in the proposition3 two circumferences1 having the same radius1 are equal8 ,the fundamental idea is1 that the value of the circumference depends upon the radius1 and the proposition here enunciated is simply an application of this property to the case of the equality of radii4 ,the circumferences1 then1 conceived by us as distinct1 are only examples which we inwardly consider in order to render the truth of the application apparent2 but in what is purely intellectual1 we find only the decomposition of the idea of circumference1 or its relation to the radius applied to the case of equality4 ,then there are not two circumferences in the purely ideal order1 but one only1 whose properties we know under different conceptions1 and express in various ways4 ,if in all judgments there is affirmation of identity1 or non-identity1 and all our cognitions either begin or end in a judgment1 it would seem that they all ought to be reduced to a simple perception of identity4 ,the general formula of our cognitions will then be3 ,a is ,a1 or1 a thing is itself4 ,this result strikes one as an extravagant paradox1 and is so1 or not1 according to the sense in which it is understood2 but if rightly explained1 it may be admitted as a truth1 and a very simple one4 ,from what has been said in the preceding paragraphs1 the meaning of this opinion may be discerned3 but the importance of the present matter requires still further explanation4 ,,chapter ,,xxvii4 ,,continuation ,,of ,,the ,,same ,,subject4 #bfi4 ,it is even ridiculous to say that the cognitions of the sublimest philosophers may be reduced to this equation3 ,a is ,a4 ,this1 absolutely speaking1 is not only false1 but contrary to common sense2 but it is neither contrary to common sense nor false to say that all cognitions of mathematicians are perceptions of identity1 which1 presented under different conceptions1 undergoes infinite variations of form1 and so fecundates the intellect and constitutes science4 ,for the sake of greater clearness we will take an example1 and follow one idea through all its transformations4 #bgj4 ,the equation circle circle 7#a7 is very true1 but not very lucid1 since it serves no purpose1 because there is identity not only of ideas but likewise of conceptions and expression4 ,to have a true progress in science we must not only change the expression1 but also vary in some way the conception under which the identical thing is presented4 ,thus1 if we abbreviate the above equation in this form3 ,c circle 7#b71 we make no progress1 unless with respect to the purely material expression4 ,the only possible advantage of this is to assist the memory1 as instead of expressing the circle by a word1 we express it by its initial letter1 ,c4 ,why is this8 ,because the variety is in the expression1 not in the conception4 ,if1 instead of considering the identity in all its simplicity in both members of the equation1 we give the value of the circle with reference to the circumference1 we shall have ,c circumference #a_/b ,r 7#c71 that is1 the value of the circle is equal to the circumference multiplied by one-half the radius4 ,in the equation 7#c7 there is identity as in 7#a7 and 7#b71 because it is affirmed in it that the value expressed by ,c is the same as that expressed by circumference #a_/b ,r2 just as in the other two it is expressed that the value of the circle is the value of the circle4 ,but is this equation different from the other two8 ,it is very different4 ,what is the difference8 ,the first two simply express the identity conceived under the same point of view2 the circle expressed in the second member excites no idea not already excited by the first2 but in the last1 the second member expresses the same circle indeed1 but in its relations with the circumference and radius2 and1 consequently1 besides containing a sort of analysis of the circle1 it records the analysis previously made of the idea of the circumference in relation to the idea of radius4 ,the difference is not1 then1 solely in the material expression1 but in the variety of conceptions under which the same thing is presented4 ,calling the value of the relation of the circumference with the diameter ,n1 and the circle ,c1 the equation becomes3 ,c ,,nr#b 7#d74 ,here1 also1 there is identity of value2 but we discover a notable progress in the expression of the second member1 in which the value of the circle is given1 freed from its relations with the value of the circumference1 and dependent solely on a numerical value1 ,n1 and a right line1 which is the radius4 ,without losing the identity1 and only by a succession of perceptions of identity1 we have advanced in science1 and starting from so sterile a proposition as circle circle1 we have obtained another1 by means of which we may at once determine the value of any circle from its radius4 ,leaving elemental geometry1 and considering the circle as a curve referred to two axes1 with respect to which its points are determined1 we shall have ,z #b;,bx-x#b7e72 ,z expressing the value of the ordinate2 ,b the constant part of the axis of abscissas2 and x the abscissa corresponding to ,z4 ,we have here a still more notable progress of ideas3 in both members we now express the value1 not of the circle1 but of lines1 by which we may determine all points of the curve2 and we easily conceive that this curve1 which was contained in the figure whose properties we determined in elemental geometry1 may be conceived under such a form as belongs to a genus of curves1 whereof it constitutes a species by the particular relations of the quantities #bx and ,b2 thus modifying the expression by adding a new quantity1 combined in this or that manner1 we may obtain a curve of another species4 ,if1 therefore1 we would determine the value of the surface contained in this circle1 we may consider it1 not solely with respect to the radius1 but to the areas comprised between the various perpendiculars the extremities of which determine points of the curve and are called ordinates4 ,it results from this1 that the same value of the circle may be determined under various conceptions1 although this value is at all times identical2 the transition from one conception to another is the succession of the perceptions of identity presented under different forms4 ,let us now consider the value of the circle dependent on the radius3 this will give us ,c function x 7#f74 ,this equation enables us to conceive the circle under the general idea of a function of its radius1 or of x1 and consequently authorizes us to subject it to all the laws to which a function is subject1 and leads us to the properties of their differentials1 limits1 and relations4 ,by this equation we enter into infinitesimal calculus1 the expressions of which present identity under a form which records a series of conceptions of long and profound analysis4 ,thus1 expressing the differential of the circle by dc1 and its integral by ,s4 dc1 we shall have ,c ,s4 dc1 7#g71 an equation in which are expressed the same values as in circle circle1 but with this difference1 that the equation 7#g7 records immense analytical labors3 it results from a long succession of conceptions of integral calculus1 of differentials1 and limits of the differentials of the functions1 of the application of algebra to geometry1 and of a multitude of elementary geometrical notions1 algebraical rules and combinations1 and of whatever else was needed to arrive at this result4 ,therefore1 when we find the integral of the differential1 and obtain by integration the value of the circle1 it would clearly be most extravagant to affirm that the integral equation is nothing more than the equation circle circle2 but it is not so to say that at bottom there is identity1 and that the diversity of expression to which we have come1 is the result of a succession of perceptions of the same identity presented under different aspects4 ,supposing the conceptions1 through which it has been necessary to pass1 to be ,a1 ,b1 ,c1 ,d1 ,e1 ,m1 the law of their scientific connection may be thus expressed3 ,a ,b1 ,b ,c1 ,c ,d1 ,d ,e1 ,e ,m2 therefore ,a ,m4 #bga4 ,what we have just explained cannot be well understood unless we recall some characteristics of our intellect1 in which is found the reason of so great anomalies4 ,our intellect is so weak as to perceive things only successively3 only after much study does it see what is contained in the clearest ideas4 ,hence a necessity1 to which corresponds with admirable harmony a faculty that satisfies it3 the necessity is of conceiving under various1 and different1 as well as distinct1 forms1 even the simplest things3 the faculty is that of decomposing the conception into many parts1 and multiplying in the order of ideas what in that of reality is only one4 ,this faculty of decomposition would be useless were not the intellect1 in passing through the succession of conceptions1 to find means of connecting and retaining them3 otherwise it would continually lose the fruit of its labors2 it would slip from its hands as fast as it grasped it4 ,happily it has this means in signs either written1 spoken1 or thought2 those mysterious expressions which at times not only designate an idea1 but also are the compendium of the labors of a whole life1 and perhaps of a long series of ages4 ,when the sign is presented to us1 we do not see certainly and with full clearness all that it expresses1 nor why the expression is legitimate2 but we know confusedly the meaning therein contained2 we know that in case of necessity1 it is enough for us to follow the thread of the perceptions through which we have passed1 thus going back even to the simplest elements of science4 ,in making calculations1 the most eminent mathematician does not clearly see the meaning of the expressions he uses1 except as they relate to the object before him2 but he is certain that they do not deceive him1 that the rules by which he is guided are sure2 because he knows that at another time he established them by incontestible demonstrations4 ,the progress of a science may be compared to a series of posts on which the distances of a road are marked3 he who marked the numbers on the posts uses them without necessity of recalling the operations which led him to mark the quantity before him2 he is satisfied with knowing that the operations were well made1 and that he wrote the result correctly4 #bgb4 ,the proof of this necessity of decomposition1 besides being fully established by the above example1 is found in the elements of all instruction1 where1 under a form of demonstration1 it is necessary to explain propositions which express simply the definitions or axioms that have been before established4 ,for example3 we find in the elementary works on geometry this theorem3 all the diameters of a circle are equal2 and we must1 if we would have beginners understand it1 give a demonstrative form to that which neither is nor can be any thing more than an explanation1 and is almost a repetition of the idea of the circle4 ,when we describe a circle1 we fix a point around which we revolve a line called the radius2 since then the diameter is nothing more than the sum of two radii continued in the same right line1 the mere enunciation of the theorem would seem sufficient to show that it is evidently contained in the idea of the circle1 and is as a sort of repetition of the postulate1 on which the construction of the curve is founded3 still it is not so1 and it must be explained as if it were a proof2 we must show the diameter to be equal to two radii1 these radii to be equal1 and at times repeat that this is supposed in its construction3 in a word1 it is necessary to employ many conceptions to show a truth1 which ought to have been known by the simple intuition of one alone1 as is the case when the geometrical powers of the intellect have acquired a certain strength and robustness4 #bgc4 ,we may now appreciate at its just value1 the opinion of ,dugald ,stewart1 who1 in his ,elements of the ,philosophy of the ,human ,mind1 says3 ,it may be fairly questioned1 too1 whether it can1 with strict correctness1 be said of the simple arithmetical equation1 #b plus #b #d1 that it may be represented by the formula ,a ,a4 ,the one is a proposition asserting the equivalence of two different expressions2 to ascertain which equivalence may1 in numberless cases1 be an object of the highest importance4 ,the other is altogether unmeaning and nugatory1 and cannot1 by any possible supposition1 admit of the slightest application of a practical nature4 ,what opinion then shall we form of the proposition ,a ,a1 when considered as the representative of such a formula as the binomial theorem of ,sir ,isaac ,newton8 ,when applied to the equation #b plus #b #d1 7which in its extreme simplicity and familiarity is apt to be regarded in the light of an axiom37 the paradox does not appear to be so manifestly extravagant2 but1 in the other case1 it seems quite impossible to annex to it any meaning whatever4#bb ,this philosopher does not observe that the pretended extravagance arises from his wrong interpretation of his adversaries' opinion4 ,no one ever thought of denying the importance of the discoveries which prove different expressions equivalent3 no one doubts that ,newton's formula of the binomial is a great advance upon the formula ,a ,a3 but the question consists not in this1 but in seeing whether ,newton's formula of the binomial is any thing more than the expression of identical things2 and whether even the merit of the expression is or is not the fruit of a series of perceptions of identity4 ,were the question presented under ,dugald ,stewart's point of view1 it would be unworthy of discussion3 for philosophy should not dispute upon things that are ridiculous as well as absurd4 #bb ,part ,,ii41 ,chap4 ,,ii41 ,sect4 #c1 #b1 pages #dcf-g4 ,,chapter ,,xxviii4 ,,continuation ,,of ,,the ,,same ,,subject4 #bgd4 ,we will now explain how the doctrine of identity is applied in general to all reasoning1 whether upon mathematical objects or not3 with this view we will examine some of the dialectical forms in which the art of reasoning is taught4 ,every ,a is ,b2 ,m is ,a3 therefore ,m is ,b4 ,in the major of this syllogism we find the identity of every ,a with ,b2 and in the minor1 the identity of ,m with ,b4 ,in each of these propositions there is affirmation1 and1 consequently1 perception of identity4 ,let us now see what takes place in the connection which constitutes the force of the argument4 ,why do we say that ,m is ,b8 ,because ,m is ,a1 and every ,a is ,b4 ,m is one of the ,as1 expressed in the words every ,a2 therefore1 when we say1 ,m is ,a1 we say only what we had before said by every ,a4 ,what difference1 then1 is there8 ,there is this difference1 that in the expression every ,a1 no attention is paid to one of ,a's contents1 ,m1 of which we had nevertheless affirmed that it was ,b1 in affirming that every ,a is ,b4 ,if1 in the expression every ,a1 we have distinctly seen ,m1 the syllogism would not have been necessary1 because1 in saying every ,a is ,b1 we had already understood that ,m is ,b4 ,this observation is so true and exact1 that in treating of very clear relations we suppress the syllogism1 and replace it with the enthymema1 which is1 it is true1 an abbreviation of the syllogism2 but we must see in this abbreviation besides a saving of words1 a saving of conceptions1 for the intellect sees one intuitively in the other1 without necessity of decomposition4 ,he is a man1 therefore he is rational2 we omit the major1 and do not even think of it1 for we intuitively see1 in the idea of man1 and its application to an individual1 the idea of rational without any gradation of ideas or succession of conceptions4 ,let us suppose that we have to demonstrate that the perimeter of a polygon inscribed in a circle is less than the circumference1 and that we make the following syllogism3 ,the sum of all the right lines inscribed in their respective curves is less than the sum of those curves2 but the perimeter of the polygon is the sum of the right lines1 and the circumference is the sum of the arcs or curves2 therefore the inscribed perimeter is less than the circumference4 ,we now ask1 will any one who knows that the sum of the right lines is less than the sum of the curves1 fail to see with equal facility that the perimeter is less than the circumscribed circumference1 provided he understands the meaning of the words8 ,it is evident that he will not4 ,what necessity1 then1 of repeating the general principle8 ,is it to add any thing to the particular conception8 ,certainly not2 because nothing can be clearer than the following propositions3 the perimeter of the polygon is a sum of right lines2 the circumference is a sum of arcs or curves2 what the general principle does1 is to call attention to a phase of the particular conception1 so that what otherwise could not be seen in it may be seen on reflection4 ,the certainty of the conclusion does not depend on the general principle2 because1 from thinking on the relations of greater and less only with respect to the right lines of the perimeter and the arcs1 the sum of which forms the circumference1 any one would have inferred the same thing4 ,this example also tends to prove that the enthymema is not a mere abbreviation of words2 and it shows why we employ it in reasoning upon matters familiar to the understanding4 ,in any one of the conceptions we see all that is necessary for the consequence2 and1 therefore1 one premise suffices1 as in it the other is included rather than understood4 ,a beginner may say3 the arc is greater than the chord1 because the curve is greater than the right line2 but when familiarized with geometrical ideas1 he will simply say1 the arc is greater than the chord2 he will see the idea of the curve in that of the arc1 and the idea of the right line in that of the chord1 without need of decomposition4 ,if the arc is greater than its chord1 this is not because every curve is greater than the corresponding right line4 ,did the abstract idea of curve not exist1 and were this particular arc of a circle the only curve thought of2 did the abstract idea of right line not exist1 and were this particular chord the only right line thought of1 it would still1 as at present1 be true that the arc is greater than the chord4 #bge4 ,when treating of the necessary relations of things1 the general principles1 the middle terms1 and all the auxiliaries to reasoning furnished by logic1 are only inventions of art to make us reflect upon the conception of the thing1 and see in it what otherwise we should not see4 ,hence our judgments on necessary objects are in some sense analytical2 and ,kant equivocates1 when he says there are synthetic judgments not dependent on experience4 ,without experience we have only the conception of the thing4 ,we do not pretend that all propositions express such a relation between the subject and the predicate1 that the conception of the former will always give that of the latter2 but we do hold1 that the reason of this insufficiency is the incompleteness of the conception1 either in itself1 or in relation to our comprehension4 ,but if we suppose the conception complete in itself1 and a due capacity in our intellect to understand whatever it contains1 we shall find in the conception all that can be the object of science4 #bgf4 ,an example from mathematics will make this clearer4 ,large works on geometry are filled with explanations1 demonstrations1 and applications of the properties of the triangle4 ,the conceptions of right lines1 and the angles formed by them1 enter into the conception of the triangle4 ,we ask1 can all the explanations and demonstrations of the properties of triangles in general ever go beyond the ideas of right lines and angles8 ,no4 ,for the new elements introduced would be foreign to the triangle1 and would consequently change its nature4 ,necessary relations neither admit of more nor of less1 neither additions nor subtractions of any sort2 what is1 is1 and nothing more4 ,in passing from the triangle in general to its different species1 such as equilateral1 isosceles1 right angled1 scalene1 it is to be observed that the demonstration must rigorously attend to what is contained in the general conception1 modified by the determining properties of the species1 that is1 the equality of the three sides1 of two1 the inequality of all1 the supposition of a right angle1 and others4 #bgg4 ,what we are now explaining is clearly seen in the application of algebra to geometry4 ,a curve is expressed by a formula containing the conception of the curve1 or its essence4 ,the geometrician1 to demonstrate the properties of the curve1 does not need to go out of this formula2 it is a touch-stone in his hand1 and he finds in it all that he wants4 ,he inscribes triangles1 or other figures in the curve1 draws right lines from it to points without1 but never goes out of the conception expressed in the formula2 he decomposes it1 and finds in it what before he had not discovered4 ,in this equation z#b 7e#b_/;,e#b77b;,ex-x#b71 we find the expression of the relations which constitute the ellipse2 ,e expresses the greater semi-axis1 e the lesser1 z the ordinates1 and x the abscissas4 ,with this equation variously developed and transformed1 the properties of the curve are determined2 it shows1 with the help of constructions1 that the new property is contained in the conception1 and to find it1 we have only to analyze it4 ,if we suppose an intelligence capable of conceiving the essence of the curve1 by an immediate intuition of the law governing the inflection of points1 without the necessity of referring it to any line1 whether one axis instead of two suffices1 or in any other manner not even imaginable by us2 this intelligence will not need to follow all the evolutions which we have made in demonstrating the properties of the curve2 for it will perceive them to be clearly contained in the very conception of the curve4 ,this supposition is not arbitrary2 we see it realized every day1 though on a smaller scale4 ,an ordinary geometrician conceives a curve as also does ,pascal2 but while ,pascal at a glance sees the most recondite properties of the curve in this conception1 an ordinary geometrician sees only after long study its most common properties4 ,kant made no account of this doctrine1 and therefore could not solve the problem of pure synthetic judgments3 had he examined the subject more profoundly he would have seen that1 strictly speaking1 there are no such judgments2 and instead of wearing out his genius in attempting to solve an insolvable problem1 he would have abstained from raising it47#bf7 ,,chapter ,,xxix4 ,,are ,,there ,,true ,,synthetic ,,judgments ,a ,,priori ,,in ,,the ,,sense ,,of ,,kant8 #bgh4 ,the great importance attributed by the ,german philosopher to his imaginary discovery1 requires us to examine it at length4 ,this importance may be estimated from what he himself says3 ,if any of the ancients had only had the idea of proposing the present question1 it would have been a mighty barrier against all the systems of pure reason down to our days1 and would have saved many vain attempts which were blindly made without knowing what was treated of4#bc ,this passage is quite modest and naturally excites our curiosity to know what is the problem which needed only to be proposed in order to avoid all the aberrations of pure reason4 #bc ,critik der reinen ,vernunft4 ,einleitung4 ,here are his words3 ,all empirical judgments1 as such1 are synthetic4 ,for it would be absurd to ground an analytic judgment on experience1 since ,i am not obliged to go out of the conception itself in order to form the judgment1 and therefore can have no need of the testimony of experience4 ,that a body is extended1 is a proposition which stands firm a priori4 ,it is no empirical judgment2 for1 prior to experience1 ,i have all the conditions of forming it in the conception of body1 from which ,i deduce the predicate1 extension1 according to the principle of contradiction1 by which ,i at once become conscious of its necessity1 which ,i could not learn from experience4 ,but1 on the other hand1 ,i do not include1 in the primitive conception of body in general1 the predicate1 heaviness2 yet this conception of body in general indicates1 through experience of a part of it1 an object of experience1 to which ,i may add from experience other parts also belonging to it4 ,i can attain to the conception of body beforehand1 analytically1 through its characteristics extension1 impenetrability1 form1 etc41 all of which are included in the primary conception of body4 ,but ,i now extend my cognition1 and1 as ,i recur to experience1 from which ,i have obtained the conception of body in general1 ,i find along with these characteristics the conception of heaviness4 ,i therefore add this1 as a predicate1 to the conception of body4 ,the possibility of this synthesis therefore rests on experience2 for both conceptions1 although one does not contain the other1 yet belong as parts to a whole1 that is to say1 to experience1 which is itself a union of synthetic1 though contingent intuitions4 ,but in the case of synthetic judgments a priori we have not this assistance4 ,here we have not the advantage of returning and supporting ourselves on experience4 ,if ,i must go out of the conception ,a in order to find another conception ,b1 which is to be joined to it1 on what am ,i to rely8 and by what means does the synthesis become possible8#bd #bd ,ibid4 pp4 #i1 #aj4 #bgi4 ,the reason of this synthesis is found in the faculty of our mind of forming total conceptions1 in which the relation of the partial conceptions composing it is discovered2 and the legitimacy of the same synthesis is founded on the principles on which the criterion of evidence is based4 ,the synthesis of the schoolmen consists in the union of conceptions1 and does not refuse to admit as analytical the total conceptions1 from the decomposition of which results the knowledge of the relations of the partial conceptions4 ,if ,kant had stopped with the judgments of experience1 there would be no objection to his doctrine4 ,but extended to the purely intellectual order1 it is either inadmissible1 or at least expressed without much exactness4 #bfj4 ,kant says all mathematical judgments are analytic1 and that this truth which in his opinion is certainly incontestible and important on account of its consequences1 seems to have hitherto escaped the sagacity of the analysts of human reason1 causing very contrary opinions4 ,we think it is the sagacity of his ,aristarchus1 and not that of the analysts1 that is at fault4 ,one would certainly think at first sight that the proposition1 #g #e #ab1 is a purely analytic proposition1 which follows from the conception of a sum of seven and five1 according to the principle of contradiction4 ,but if we examine it more closely1 we find that the conception of the sum of seven and five contains nothing farther than the union of both numbers in one1 from which it cannot by any means be inferred what this other number is which contains them both4#be #be ,kant1 ubi supra1 #e4 ,were we to say that whoever hears seven plus five1 does not always think of twelve1 because he does not see clearly enough that one conception is the same as the other1 although it is under a different form1 it would be true4 ,but from this it does not follow that the conception is not purely analytic4 ,the mere explanation of both suffices to show their identity4 ,that this may be better understood1 we will invert the equation thus3 #ab #g #e4 ,it is evident that if any one does not know that #g #e #ab1 he will not know that #ab #g #e4 ,now1 in examining the conception #ab1 we certainly see #g #e contained in it4 ,therefore1 the conception of #ab is identical with the conception of #g #e2 and just as1 because he who hears #ab1 does not always think of #g #e1 we cannot thence infer that #ab does not contain #g #e2 so1 also1 we cannot1 because he who hears #g #e1 does not always think of #ab1 thence infer that the first conception does not contain the second4 ,the cause of the equivocation is1 that the two identical conceptions are presented to the intellect under different forms2 and until we have the form1 and look to what is under it1 we shall not discover the identity4 ,this is not1 strictly speaking1 reasoning but explanation4 ,what ,kant adds concerning the necessity of recurring1 in this case1 to an intuition1 with respect to one of the numbers1 adding five to seven on the fingers1 is exceedingly futile4 ,first1 in whatever way he adds the five1 there will never be anything but the five that is added1 and it will neither give more nor less than #g #e4 ,secondly1 the successive addition on the fingers is equivalent to saying #a #a #a #a #a #e4 ,this transforms the expression1 #g #e #ab1 into this other1 #g #a #a #a #a #a #ab2 but the conception1 #a #a #a #a #a1 has the same relation to #e1 as #g #e to #ab2 therefore1 if #g #e are not contained in #ab1 neither are #g #a #a #a #a #a contained in it4 ,it may be replied that ,kant does not speak of identity1 but of intuitions4 ,this intuition1 however1 is not the sensation1 but the idea2 and if the idea1 it is only the conception explained4 ,thirdly1 we know this method of intuition not to be even necessary for children4 ,fourthly1 this method is impossible in the case of large numbers4 #bha4 ,kant adds that this proposition1 a right line is the shortest distance between two points1 is not purely analytic1 because the idea of shortest distance is not contained in the idea of right line4 ,waiving the demonstrations which some authors give1 or pretend to give1 of this proposition1 we shall confine ourselves to ,kant's reasons4 ,he forgets that here the right line is not taken alone1 but compared with other lines4 ,the idea of right line alone neither does nor can contain the ideas of more or less2 for these ideas suppose a comparison4 ,but from the moment the right line and the curve are compared1 with respect to length1 the relation of superiority of the curve over the right line is seen4 ,the proposition is then the result of the comparison of two purely analytic conceptions with a third1 which is length4 #bhb4 ,if ,kant's reasoning were good1 even this judgment1 the whole is greater than its part1 would not be analytic2 for the idea of greater enters not into the conception of the whole until the whole is compared with its part4 ,thus1 the judgment1 four is greater than three1 would not be analytic1 because the idea of four until compared with three does not include the conception of greater4 ,the axiom3 things which are equal to the same thing are equal to each other1 would not be analytic1 because the conception1 equal to each other1 does not enter into the conception of things which are equal to the same thing1 until we reflect that the equality of the middle term implies the equality of the extremes4 ,the x1 of which ,kant speaks1 would be found in almost all judgments1 if we could not form total conceptions involving comparison of partial conceptions3 in this case we should have no analytic judgments except such as are wholly identical1 or directly contained in this formula1 ,a is ,a4 #bhc4 ,the comparison of two conceptions with a third1 does not take from the result the character of analytic judgment1 as a predicate cannot be seen in the idea of the subject1 without the aid of this comparison4 ,this comparison is often necessary1 because we only confusedly think of what is contained in the conception which we already have2 and sometimes it even happens that we do not think at all of it4 ,one often says a thing and then contradicts himself1 not observing that what he adds is opposed to what he had already said4 ,we often ask1 in conversation1 do you not see that you suppose the contrary of what you just said2 that the conditions you have just established imply the contrary of what you now assert8 #bhd4 ,a conception includes not only all that is expressly thought in it1 but all that can be thought4 ,if1 on decomposing it1 we find in it other things1 it cannot be said that we add them1 but that we find them4 ,it is not a synthesis1 but an analysis4 ,otherwise we must admit no analytic conceptions1 or only such as are purely identical4 ,except in this last case1 of which the general formula is1 ,a is ,a1 there is always in the predicate something not thought in the subject1 if not in substance at least in form4 ,the circle is a curve2 this undoubtedly is one of the simplest analytical propositions imaginable2 still the predicate expresses the general conception of curve1 which may be contained in the subject1 in a confused manner1 with relation to a particular species of curve4 ,following a gradation in geometrical propositions1 we may observe that there is nothing in one proposition not in the preceding1 except the greater or less difficulty of decomposing the conception1 so as to see in it what before we had not seen4 ,if we say1 the circle is a conic section1 evidently any one ignorant of the terms1 or who has not reflected on their true sense1 will not think of the attribute in the subject4 ,no addition is made to the conception of the circle2 only a property not before known is discovered1 and this discovery results from comparison with the cone4 ,is there any synthesis here8 ,no4 ,there is only an analysis of the two conceptions1 the circle and the cone1 compared4 ,as this error destroys the foundation of ,kant's doctrine on this point1 we will develop it and place it on a more solid foundation4 #bhe4 ,synthesis1 properly so called1 requires something to be added to the conception1 which in nowise belongs to it1 as the example brought by ,kant shows4 ,the conception1 extension1 is contained in the conception1 body2 but heaviness is an entirely foreign idea1 which we can unite to the conception1 body1 only because experience authorizes it4 ,only with this addition is there properly synthesis4 ,the union of ideas which results from the conception of the thing1 although comparison may be necessary in order to fecundate them1 does not make a synthesis4 ,the conceptions are not wholly absolute1 they contain relations1 and the discovery of these relations does not give a synthesis1 but a more complete analysis4 ,if it be said that in this case there is something more than the primitive conception1 we answer that the same thing happens in all not purely identical4 ,we may also add that by the comparison a new total conception is formed resulting from the primitive conceptions2 and the properties of the relations are then seen1 not by synthesis1 but by the analysis of the total conception4 ,according to ,kant1 true synthesis requires the union of things so different from one another1 that the bond uniting them is a sort of mystery1 an x1 whose determination is a great philosophical problem4 ,if this x is found in the essential relation of the partial conceptions constituting the total conception1 the problem is resolved by a simple analysis1 or1 to speak more exactly1 it is shown that the problem did not exist1 because the x was a known quantity4 ,we know of no judgment more analytical than that in which we see the parts in the whole1 since the whole is only the parts united4 ,if we say1 one and one are two1 or1 two is equal to one plus one2 it cannot be denied that we have a total conception1 two1 in the decomposition of which1 we find one plus one4 ,if this be not an analytic conception1 that is to say1 if the predicate be not here contained in the idea of the subject1 it will be hard to tell what is4 ,but even here there are different conceptions1 one plus one2 unite them1 and they form the total conception4 ,the relation1 although most simple1 exists2 and whether it be more or less1 simple or complicated1 and1 consequently1 seen with more or less facility1 does not alter the character of the judgments1 or from synthetic convert them into analytic4 #bhf4 ,we will complete this explanation with an example from elementary geometry4 ,the surface of a rhomboid is equal to the surface of a rectangle having the same base and altitude4 ,first3 in the idea of the rhomboid1 we do not see the idea of its equality with the rectangle2 and this we cannot see1 because the relation does not exist when there is no other term to which it may relate4 ,the idea of the parallelogram does not contain that of the rectangle1 and consequently not that of equality4 ,second3 the relation results from the comparison of the rhomboid with the rectangle2 and1 consequently1 it must be found in a total conception containing them both4 ,it cannot1 therefore1 be said that we add any thing to the conception of the parallelogram which does not belong to it4 ,on the contrary1 we see this equality flow from the conception of the rhomboid and that of the rectangle1 as partial conceptions of the total conception1 formed by the combination of them both4 ,the analysis of this total conception opens to us the relation we are now in quest of2 for it must be observed that when the simple union of the conceptions compared does not suffice1 we make use of another including them1 and also something more2 and from the new conception1 duly analyzed1 we deduce the relation of the parts compared4 #bhg4 ,in the geometrical construction1 that serves for the demonstration of the above theorem1 which we have used as an example1 may be seen what we have just explained with regard to total conceptions containing other conceptions besides those compared4 ,if we place the rectangle and the rhomboid upon the same base1 we at once see that there is something common to both1 namely1 the triangle formed by the base1 a part of one side of the rhomboid1 and a part of one side of the rectangle4 ,neither synthesis nor analysis is here required1 because there is perfect coincidence1 and this in geometry is equivalent to perfect equality4 ,the difficulty is in the two remaining parts1 that is1 in the trapezoids to which the parallelograms are reduced by the subtraction of the common triangle4 ,the mere sight of the figures teaches nothing concerning the equivalence of the two surfaces2 we see only that the two sides of the rhomboidal surface go on extending1 but including a less distance in proportion as the angle becomes more oblique1 under these two conditions3 length of sides1 and diminution of distances between two limits1 of which one is infinity1 and the other the rectangle4 ,the relation of the equivalence of the surfaces may be demonstrated by prolonging the parallel opposite the base1 and thus forming a quadrilateral of which the trapezoids are parts2 to discover the equality of these trapezoids1 it is only necessary to decompose the quadrilateral1 attending to the equality of two triangles1 each respectively formed by one of the trapezoids and a common triangle4 ,is any thing here added to the conception of each trapezoid8 ,no4 ,we only compare them4 ,they could not be compared directly1 and therefore we included them in a total conception1 the mere analysis of which enabled us to discover the relation sought for4 ,the conception does not give this relation2 it only shows it2 for if the conception of the two figures compared were more perfect1 so that we might intuitively behold the relation existing between the increment of the sides and the decrement of their distance from each other1 we should see that there is here a constant law1 which supplies on one side what is lost on the other2 and consequently we should discover1 in the very conception of the rhomboid1 the fundamental reason of the equality1 that is1 the permanent value of the surface1 notwithstanding the greater or less obliquity of the angles2 thus obtaining what we deduced from the above comparison1 and generalize with reference to two constant lineal values1 base and altitude4 ,the same would happen with respect to the equivalence of all variable quantities differently expressed1 could we reduce their conceptions to such clear and simple formulas as those of apparent functions2 for example1 nx_/mx1 from which1 whatever the value of the variable1 there always results the same value of the expression1 which is constant1 to wit1 n_/m4 #bhh4 ,let not these investigations be imagined useless4 ,in this1 as in many other questions1 it happens that most important truths are the result of a philosophical problem which1 in appearance1 is merely speculative4 ,thus1 in the present case1 we observe ,kant explaining the principle of causality1 in an inexact1 and1 as we understand him1 in an altogether false sense2 but1 perhaps1 the origin of his equivocation lies in his considering the principle of causality as synthetic1 although a priori1 whereas it must be regarded as analytic1 as we shall show when treating of the idea of cause4 ,in consideration of the great importance of clear and distinct ideas on the present subject1 we will in a few words1 sum up the doctrine we have explained concerning mediate and immediate evidence4 ,there is immediate evidence when1 in the conception of the subject1 we see its agreement or disagreement with the predicate1 without requiring any other means than mere reflection on the meaning of the terms4 ,judgments of this class are with propriety called analytic1 because we have only to analyze the conception of the subject to find therein its agreement or disagreement with the predicate4 ,there is mediate evidence when1 in the conception of the subject1 we do not immediately see its agreement or disagreement with the predicate1 and therefore have to call in a middle term to make it manifest4 #bij4 ,here arises the question whether judgments of mediate evidence are analytic4 ,it is clear that if we mean by analytic only those in which we have solely to understand the meaning of the terms in order to see the agreement or disagreement of the predicate1 the judgments of mediate evidence cannot be called analytic2 but if by analytic judgment we mean a judgment in which it is only necessary to decompose the conception of the subject in order to find therein its agreement or disagreement with the predicate1 we must say that the judgments of mediate evidence are analytic1 and the means employed is only the formation of a total conception containing the partial conceptions1 the relation of which we seek to discover4 ,in the union of these partial conceptions there is a synthesis1 it is true2 but there is none in the discovery of their relation1 for this is done by analysis4 ,a judgment is not the less analytic because formed by the union of different conceptions2 for then no judgment would be analytic4 ,when we say1 man is rational1 the two conceptions of animal and rational enter into the conception of man1 but do not take from it its analytical character2 for this1 as its very name imports1 consists in the analysis of a conception1 being sufficient to show certain predicates in it1 without reference to the manner of this conception's formation1 whether two or more conceptions are united in it1 or not4 #bia4 ,this clearly shows in what mediate evidence consists4 ,the predicate is indeed contained in the idea of the subject2 but1 owing to the limitation of our intellect1 either these ideas are incomplete1 or we do not see them in all their extension1 or else we do not well distinguish what we in a confused manner perceive in them2 and hence1 to know the meaning of the terms does not enable us immediately to see that the predicate is contained in the idea of the subject4 ,moreover1 the objects1 even such as are purely ideal1 are presented to us separately2 and hence1 not knowing the sum of them all1 we pass successively from one to another1 discovering their mutual relations in proportion as we approach them4 #bib4 ,it may1 from what we have said1 be inferred that all judgments in the purely ideal order are analytic1 since every cognition of this order is obtained by the intuition of whatever is more or less complicated in the conception1 and there is no more synthesis than is necessary to bring the objects together1 by uniting their conceptions in one total conception1 which serves for the discovery of the relation of the partial conceptions4 #bic4 ,the x1 therefore1 of which ,kant speaks1 and the removal of which is one of the most important problems of philosophy1 is nothing more than the faculty possessed by the soul to unite the conceptions of different things in one total conception1 and to discover in it their mutual relations4 ,this faculty is no new discovery1 for the schools have all recognized it under one name or another4 ,no one ever denied to the intellect the faculty of comparing2 and comparison is the act whereby the intellect places two or more objects before its sight so as to perceive their mutual relations4 ,in this act the intellect forms a total conception1 of which the conceptions compared are a part4 ,thus we have seen that in geometry to verify the mutual relation of certain figures1 we construct a new figure which includes them all1 and is a sort of field whereon the comparison is made4 ,this exposition of analytic and synthetic judgments will suffice for the present2 as we proposed to treat of them here only in general1 and as related to certainty2 consequently we will not descend to their particular application to various ideas1 the analysis of which belongs to other parts of this work4 ,,chapter ,,xxx4 ,,vico',s ,,criterion4 #bid4 ,the doctrine of ,vico on the criterion of truth is connected with the matter of the preceding chapters on immediate and mediate evidence4 ,this philosopher thinks that the criterion consists in having made the truth which is known2 that our cognitions then only are completely certain1 and that they lose their certainty in proportion as the intellect loses its character of cause with respect to its objects4 ,god1 the cause of all1 knows every thing perfectly3 creatures1 whose causality is very limited1 are very limited in their cognitions2 and if in any thing they may be likened to the infinite1 it is in that ideal world which they construct for themselves1 and extend at pleasure1 stopped by no impassable limits4 ,let the author speak for himself4 ,the terms verum and factum1 the true and the made1 are used one for the other1 in the ,latin language1 or1 as the schoolmen say1 are convertible4 ,intelligere1 to understand1 is the same as to read with clearness and to know with evidence4 ,they used cogitare in the sense of the ,italian pensare e andar raccogliendo2 ratio with them meant a collection of numerical elements1 and also the gift by which man is distinguished from1 and made superior to1 the brute4 ,they defined man to be an animal participating of reason2 animal rationis particeps3 and consequently not absolutely possessed of it4 ,as words are the signs of ideas1 so also are ideas the signs and representations of things4 ,thus1 as to read1 legere1 is to unite the elements of writing1 which form the words2 so to understand1 intelligere1 is to unite all the elements which constitute the perfect idea of anything4 ,hence we infer that the doctrine of the ancient ,italians concerning truth was as follows3 ,truth is the same as fact2 and consequently ,god is the first truth1 because he is the first maker1 factor2 the infinite truth1 because he made all things2 the absolute truth1 because he represents all the elements of things1 both internal and external1 for he contains them4 ,to know is to unite the elements of things3 hence it follows that thought1 cogitatio1 is a property of the human mind2 and intelligence a property of the divine mind1 because ,god contains all the internal and all the external elements of things1 and therefore he unites them1 and he it is that disposes them2 whereas the human mind limited as it is1 and separated from all that is not itself1 may bring together extreme points1 but cannot unite them2 it may think of things1 but cannot understand them2 and this is why it is said to participate of reason1 but not to possess it4 ,let us explain these ideas by a comparison4 ,divine truth is a solid image of things1 a sort of plastic figure2 human truth is an image on a plane1 it has no depth1 but is a sort of painting4 ,divine truth is true1 because ,god knows in the same act by which he disposes and produces2 human truth is in relation to things which man in like manner disposes and creates4 ,science is the cognition of the mode in which the thing is made2 a cognition in which the mind makes its object1 since it recomposes its elements4 ,for ,god1 who understands every thing1 the object is a solid2 but it is a surface for man who understands only the exterior4 ,these points being settled1 in order that we may more easily make them harmonize with our religion1 let us observe that the ancient philosophers of ,italy identified truth and fact1 for they believed the world to be eternal4 ,thus the pagan philosophers adored a ,god who always operated ad extra1 a point rejected by our theology4 ,wherefore in our religion1 in which we profess that the world was created in time1 and out of nothing1 it is necessary to distinguish1 and identify created truth with what is made1 and uncreated truth with what is begotten1 genito4 ,thus the ,sacred ,scriptures1 with an elegance truly divine1 give the name of the ,word to the wisdom of ,god1 which contains in itself the ideas of all things and the elements of these ideas4 ,in the ,word1 truth is the comprehension of all the elements of this universe1 and it might produce infinite worlds4 ,from these elements1 known and contained in the divine omnipotence1 is formed the ,word real and absolute1 known by the ,father from all eternity and begotten by him also from all eternity4#bf #bf ,ancient ,wisdom of ,italy1 ,l4 #a1 ,c4 #a4 #bie4 ,from these principles ,vico deduces some very transcendental consequences1 among others1 the explanation of the reason why our sciences are divided into many branches1 and that of the different grades of certainty by which they are distinguished4 ,mathematics is the most certain1 because a kind of creation of the intellect1 which1 starting with the unity of a point1 constructs a world of forms and numbers by prolonging lines1 and multiplying unity even to infinity4 ,thus it knows what it produces itself1 and hence it is that the theorems commonly held to be objects of pure contemplation depend upon action just as the problems do4 ,mechanics is a less certain science than either geometry or arithemetic1 because it considers motions as realized by machines2 and physics is even less certain yet1 because it does not1 like mechanics1 consider the external motion of circumferences1 but the internal motion of their centres4 ,there is still less certainty in sciences of the moral order1 because these do not consider the motions of bodies arising from one certain and common origin1 which is nature1 but the motions of the soul1 often most profound1 often also capricious4 ,human science1 he says1 owes its origin to a defect of the human mind2 it is beyond all things in its extreme limitation1 contains nothing of what it seeks to know1 and is consequently unable to make the truth to which it aspires4 ,the most perfect sciences are those which have expiated the vice of their origin1 and are assimilated1 as a creation1 to divine science1 that is1 those in which the truth and the fact are mutually convertible4 ,from what proceeds1 we may infer that the criterion of truth1 and the rule to recognize it1 is to have made it3 consequently1 the clear and distinct idea of our mind which we have1 is not a criterion of the truth1 nor is it even a criterion of our mind2 because the soul does not1 by knowing itself1 make itself2 and not making itself1 it knows not in what way it knows itself4 ,since human science takes abstraction for its basis1 sciences are so much the more uncertain1 as they more nearly approach corporal matter4444 ,in a word1 the true and the good are convertible1 if what is known as true derives its being from the mind which knows it2 as human science imitates divine science1 wherein ,god1 by knowing the true1 begets it internally in eternity1 and makes it externally in time4 ,the communication of goodness to the objects of his thought is to ,god the criterion of the true3 vidit ,deus quod essent bona2 to men it is to have made the truth which they know4#bg #bg ,ibidem1 #a4 #bif4 ,vico's system undeniably shows him to have been a profound thinker1 and to have carefully meditated the problems of intelligence4 ,his line dividing the certainty of sciences is exceedingly interesting4 ,at first sight1 nothing is more specious than the difference marked between mathematical1 natural1 and moral sciences4 ,mathematics is absolutely certain1 because the work of the understanding1 it is as the understanding1 which constructed them1 sees them to be4 ,on the other hand1 the natural and moral sciences regard objects independent of reason1 having by themselves an existence of their own2 wherefore1 the understanding knows little of them1 and even in this little it is the more liable to err as it penetrates deeper into a sphere where it cannot construct4 ,we call this system specious1 because when examined1 it is found to be destitute of all solid foundation4 ,we recognize1 however1 a profound thought in its author2 for one he must have had to consider science under such a point of view4 #big4 ,the understanding knows only what it makes4 ,this proposition sums up ,vico's whole system2 and it must have some foundation1 or he cannot advance one step without begging his question4 ,why does the understanding know only what it makes8 ,why can the problem of representation have no possible solution out of causality8 ,we think we have shown another origin besides this in identity1 also in ideality duly connected with causality4 #bih4 ,to understand is not to cause4 ,there may be1 and there really is1 a productive intelligence2 but the act of understanding and that of causing1 in general1 offer distinct ideas4 ,intelligence supposes an activity2 otherwise that intimate life which distinguishes the intelligent being is inconceivable3 but this activity does not produce the objects known2 it operates in an immanent manner on these objects1 presupposed to be either mediately or immediately in union with the intellect4 #bii4 ,if the intellect be condemned to know nothing not made by itself1 it is difficult to conceive how the act of understanding can commence4 ,if we place ourselves in the initial moment1 we shall not know how to explain the development of this activity2 for1 if it can only know what it has made1 what is it to understand in the first moment before it has made any thing8 ,in the system before us1 the intellect has no object but what it has itself produced2 but to understand1 without an object understood1 is a contradiction1 so that not having in its initial moment yet produced any thing1 there can be nothing understood2 and1 consequently1 intelligence is inexplicable4 ,we cannot suppose its activity to be blindly exercised3 nothing is done blindly when there is question of representation1 and the productive activity essentially relates to things represented as represented4 ,so far as the problem of intelligence is concerned1 it makes no difference that these are produced externally1 with an existence distinct from the intellectual representation4 ,as ,vico himself explains1 human reason knows what it constructs in a purely ideal world2 and ,god knows the ,word which he begets1 although the ,word is not without the divine essence1 but is identified with it4 #cjj4 ,the ,neapolitan philosopher1 not satisfied with applying his system to human reason1 makes it applicable to all intelligences1 not excepting the divine2 although with a praiseworthy regard for religion1 he endeavors to reconcile his ideological doctrine with the dogmas of ,christianity4 ,truly1 the problems of intelligence cannot be completely solved without greatly cumulating them4 ,to trace the footsteps of human reason does not suffice to make us know the human understanding2 we must1 moreover1 propose the general problem of intelligence itself1 now limited1 like our own1 to faint glimmerings1 now dilating itself in a sea of light over the regions of infinity4 ,the sublime words1 with which ,st4 ,john commences his ,gospel1 besides the august truth taught by divine inspiration1 involve transcendental doctrines of an importance higher than can be found in the words of any man1 even if considered under a merely philosophical point of view4 ,when ,vico identifies truth with the made1 he is aware that he must1 according to a dogma of our religion1 distinguish between what is created and what is uncreated4 ,what is created is made2 what is uncreated1 begotten4 ,he admires the divine elegance of the ,holy ,scriptures in calling the wisdom of ,god1 in which the ideas of all things are contained1 and the elements of ideas themselves1 his ,word3 but when he would explain the conception of the ,word1 his expressions are very inexact2 he would have us understand1 so it would seem1 that the ,word only results from the elements known and contained in the divine omnipotence4 ,in this ,word1 he says1 the true is the comprehension of all the elements of this universe2 and it might form infinite worlds3 from these elements1 known and contained in the divine omnipotence1 is formed the ,word real and absolute1 known by the ,father from all eternity1 and by him begotten also from all eternity4#bh #bh ,ancient ,wisdom of ,italy1 ,l4 #a1 ,c4 #a4 ,if the author means that the ,word is conceived by the mere knowledge of what is contained in the divine omnipotence1 his assertion is false2 if he does not1 his mode of speaking is inexact4 ,st4 ,thomas asks whether any relation to creature be contained in the name of the ,word3 utrum in nomine ,verbi importetur respectus ad creaturam2 and he resolves the question with admirable laconism and solidity4 ,i reply that in the ,word relation to creature is contained4 ,for ,god1 by knowing himself1 knows every creature4 ,the ,word1 therefore1 conceived in the mind1 is representative of all actually understood by it4 ,wherefore there are in us different words according to the different things we understand4 ,but because ,god by one act understands both himself and all things1 his only ,word is expressive not only of the ,father1 but also of creatures4 ,and as the science of ,god is1 with respect to himself1 cognition1 but with respect to creatures1 cognition and cause2 so the ,word of ,god is expressive only of what is in ,god the ,father1 but both expressive and productive of creatures2 and this is why it is said in the ,thirty-second ,psalm3 ,he said1 and they were made2 because the productive reason of those things1 which the ,father makes1 is contained in the ,word4#bi #bi ,respondeo dicendum1 quod in ,verbo importatur respectus ad creaturam4 ,deus enim cognoscendo se1 cognoscit omnem creaturam4 ,verbum igitur in mente conceptum est representativum omnis ejus1 quod actu intelligitur4 ,unde in nobis sunt diversa verba1 secundum diversa1 qu intelligimus4 ,sed quia ,deus uno actu et se1 et omnia intelligit1 unicum verbum ejus est expressivum1 non solum ,patris sed etiam creaturarum4 ,et sicut ,dei scientia1 ,dei quidem est cognoscitiva tantum1 creaturarum autem cognoscitiva et factiva2 ita verbum ,dei1 ejus quod in ,deo ,patre est1 est expressivum tantum1 creaturarum vero est expressivum et operativum1 et propter hoc dicitur in ,psal4 #cb2 ,dixit1 et facta sunt1 quia importatur in ,verbo ratio factiva eorum qu ,deus facit4 ,summa ,theologi1 ,p4 #a;a1 ,qa1 #cd;a1 ,a #co4 ,we see by this passage1 that1 according to ,st4 ,thomas1 the ,word also expresses creatures1 and that it is conceived not only by the cognition of them1 but1 and this too1 primarily1 by the cognition of the divine essence4 ,elsewhere1 the ,holy ,doctor says3 ,the ,father1 by understanding himself1 the ,son1 and the ,holy ,ghost1 and all other things included in ,his science1 conceives the ,word1 in such a manner that the whole ,trinity is expressed in the ,word1 and also all creatures4#cj #cj ,pater enim intelligendo se1 et ,filium1 et ,spiritum ,sanctum1 et omnia alia qu ejus scientia continentur1 concipit ,verbum1 ut sic tota ,trinitas ,verbo dicatur1 et etiam omnis creatura4 ,p4 #a;a1 ,q4 #cd;a1 ,a4 #ao1 ad4 #cun4 #cja4 ,another doctrine of ,st4 ,thomas is also opposed to this system of ,vico1 according to whom1 the intellect knows what it makes1 and that only1 and because it makes it2 and the made being the sole criterion of the true1 the true and the made are convertible4 ,vico applies this doctrine to the divine intelligence1 only substituting begotten for made2 but this inverts the order of ideas1 since1 according to our mode of conceiving1 ,god does not understand because he begets1 but begets because he understands3 intelligence must be conceived before the ,word can be conceived4 ,in whoever understands1 says ,st4 ,thomas1 by the very fact of understanding1 something proceeds within him1 which is the conception of the thing understood coming from the intellective power1 and proceeding from its knowledge4#ca #ca ,quicunque autem intelligit1 ex hoc ipso quod intelligit1 procedit aliquid intra ipsum1 quod est conceptio rei intellect ex vi intellectiva proveniens et ex ejus notitia procedens4 ,quam quidem conceptionem vox significat1 et dicitur verbum cordis1 significatum verbo vocis4 ,p4 #a;a1 ,q4 #bg;a1 ,a4 #ao4 ,this doctrine of ,st4 ,thomas confirms the opinion1 expressed above1 concerning the impossibility of explaining the intellectual act solely by production4 ,to produce in the intellectual order1 it is evidently necessary to understand2 and consequently in the initial moment of every intelligence1 the productive act cannot be performed without intuition of the object4 ,st4 ,thomas speaks in this same sense of divine things1 as much as one can so speak2 he does not found the divine intelligence on the generation of the ,word1 but rather the generation of the ,word on the divine intelligence4 ,god1 according to ,st4 ,thomas1 begets the ,word because he understands1 but does not understand because he begets4 ,st4 ,thomas comprises in the ,word the expression of every thing contained in ,god2 for he presupposes the divine intelligence1 by which he makes it possible to speak or utter the ,word4 ,this1 then1 is the order of conceptions2 understanding1 object understood1 word proceeding from the act of understanding1 whereby the intelligent being expresses1 or says to itself1 the thing understood4 ,these ideas applied to ,god1 are3 ,god the ,father understanding2 divine essence and all that it contains understood2 ,word or ,son generated by this intellectual act1 expressive of all that is contained in the generative act4 #cjb4 ,we have no disposition to blame ,vico2 we have only endeavored to mark the inexactness of his words1 doing him1 at the same time1 the justice to believe that he understood things differently from what he explained them1 which1 indeed1 he has not succeeded in doing with due clearness4 ,let us now consider his system under less subtle points of view4 ,if the made be admitted as the only criterion of the true1 the understanding is obviously excluded from communication with all that it has not itself produced4 ,and not having made itself1 it cannot know itself4 ,the soul1 says ,vico1 knowing itself does not make itself1 and therefore knows not in what manner it knows4 ,thus abstracting the problem of intelligibility proposed in our twelfth chapter1 ,vico denies to our soul a criterion of itself1 for the sole reason that it is not its own cause4 ,identity1 therefore1 far from being an origin of representation1 as was proved in our eleventh chapter1 is incompatible with it2 nothing can know itself1 because nothing has made itself4 ,hence results a very grave error2 for it may be inferred that not even ,god can know himself1 since he is not his own cause4 ,it is not enough to say that he knows himself in the ,word1 since the ,word is impossible if intelligence be not supposed4 #cjc4 ,the whole world of reality1 distinct from that of intellectual being1 will forever remain unknown in ,vico's system1 which1 for this reason1 leads to the most rigid skepticism4 ,what does he admit8 ,the cognition by the mind of the mind's own work2 and in this are comprised the acts of consciousness and all the purely ideal objects which we create in it4 ,this1 also1 is admitted by the skeptics1 no one of whom would deny that we have consciousness1 and that there is an ideal world the work of this consciousness1 or at least attested by it4 ,if1 then1 we admit no criterion of truth but the made1 we open the door to skepticism1 and abandon the world of reality to fix ourselves in that of appearance4 ,nevertheless1 so strange are human opinions1 ,vico thought directly the contrary2 he believed that only with his system was it possible to refute skepticism4 ,it is curious to hear him say with perfect seriousness3 ,the only means of destroying skepticism is to take this for the criterion of truth1 that every one is certain of the truth which he makes4 ,but what is the foundation of so odd an opinion8 ,let us listen to the philosopher himself1 who says1 indeed1 many good things1 but does not show how they may tend to the overthrow of skepticism3 ,skeptics are always repeating that things seem to them1 but that they do not know what they really are4 ,they confess effects1 and consequently concede causes to them2 but they assert that they do not know these causes1 because they do not know the genus or form according to which things are made4 ,admit these propositions1 and retort them thus3 the comprehension of causes which contains all the genera and all the forms under which effects are produced1 and the appearances of which the skeptic confessedly sees1 although he denies that he knows their real essence1 is found in the first truth which comprises all1 and in which all1 even to the last1 are contained4 ,and since this truth comprises all truths1 it is infinite1 it excludes none1 and it has a superiority over every body1 which is only an effect4 ,this truth is consequently something spiritual2 in other words1 it is ,god1 the ,god of the ,christian4 ,by this we must measure human truth2 for human truth is that truth1 the elements of which we have co-ordinated within us1 and which1 by means of certain postulates1 we may extend and follow to infinity4 ,by co-ordinating these truths we know and make them at one and the same time2 and this is why1 in this case1 we have the genus and the form according to which we make4#cb #cb ,ibid4 #c4 ,we discover nothing in this refutation of skepticism calculated to destroy it4 ,even supposing all to admit the principle of causality1 which all do not admit1 what aid can he draw from this principle1 when he makes the work of that very understanding1 which must make use of it1 the only criterion8 ,if causality be the only criterion of truth1 the understanding is isolated1 and cannot1 in the order of effects1 take one step beyond what it has itself produced2 and1 in the order of causes1 it cannot ascend higher than itself2 for1 were it so to ascend1 it would know things not made by itself1 would know its own cause4 ,with this supposition the skeptics must triumph2 cognition is confined to the internal world1 to simple appearances2 and when one would go out of these1 he stumbles against the only criterion which opposes the cognition of all not made by the understanding itself4 ,we do then see reality1 but are separated from it by an impassable abyss4 ,the world in itself may be any thing we choose to suppose it2 but with respect to us1 it will be nothing4 ,this law applies to every intelligence1 so that vitality can only be known by the first cause4 ,these consequences1 inadmissible as they are1 if we would not throw ourselves unreservedly into the tide of skepticism1 are nevertheless inevitable in ,vico's system4 ,an original way truly of combatting skepticism1 thus to throw open its widest gates6 ,,chapter ,,xxxi4 ,,continuation ,,of ,,the ,,same ,,subject4 #cjd4 ,if the ,neapolitan philosopher's criterion be anywhere admissible1 it can only be in ideal truths2 for as these are absolutely cut off from existence1 we may well suppose them to be known even by an understanding which has not in reality produced them4 ,so far as known by the understanding they involve no reality1 and consequently no condition that exacts any productive force not referable to a purely ideal order4 ,in this order the human reason seems really to produce4 ,if we1 for example1 take geometry1 we shall readily perceive that1 even in its profoundest parts and in its greatest complications1 it is only a kind of intellectual construction1 wherein that only is to be found which reason has placed there4 ,reason it is which by force of perseverance has succeeded in uniting elements and so disposing them as to attain that wonderful result1 of which it may say with truth3 this is my work4 ,if we carefully observe the development of the science of geometry1 we shall perceive that the extended series of axioms1 theorems1 problems1 demonstrations and solutions1 begins with a few postulates1 and that it goes on with the aid of the same1 or others discovered by reason according to the demands of necessity or utility4 ,what is a line8 ,a series of points4 ,the line1 then1 is an intellectual construction1 and involves only the successive fluxions of a point4 ,what is a triangle8 ,an intellectual construction wherein the extremities of three lines are united4 ,what is a circle8 ,also an intellectual construction2 the space enclosed by a circumference formed by the extremity of a line revolved around a point4 ,what are all other curves8 ,lines described by the movement of a point governed by a certain law of inflexion4 ,what is a surface8 ,is not its idea generated by the motion of a line1 just as that of a solid is generated by the motion of a surface8 ,and what are all the objects of geometry but lines1 surfaces1 and solids of various kinds1 combined in various ways8 ,universal arithmetic1 whether arithmetic properly so called1 or algebra1 is a creation of the understanding4 ,number is a collection of units1 and it is the understanding that collects them4 ,two is only one and one1 and three only two and one2 and thus with all numerical values4 ,the ideas expressing these values consequently contain a creation of our mind1 are its work1 and include nothing not placed there by it4 ,we have already observed that algebra is a kind of language4 ,its rules are partly conventional1 and its most complicated formulas may be reduced to a conventional principle4 ,take one of the simplest3 a#j #a3 but why is it8 ,because a#j an-n2 why8 ,because there is a conventional usage to mark division by the remainder of the exponents2 and consequently an_/an1 which is evidently equal to one1 may be expressed an_/an an-n #a4 #cje4 ,these observations seem to prove ,vico's system to be really true1 so far as pure mathematics1 that is1 science of the purely ideal order1 is concerned4 ,possibly also the same may be said of it in relation to other science1 as for example1 metaphysics2 but we shall not follow it farther1 since it is not easy to find a ground free from conflicting opinions4 ,moreover1 having shown how far ,vico's system is admissible in mathematics1 we have thereby given a solution to difficulties to which it is subject in its other branches4 #cjf4 ,that in a purely ideal order the understanding constructs is undeniable1 and the schools agree in this4 ,there is no doubt that reason supposes1 combines1 compares1 deduces2 operations which are inconceivable without some kind of intellectual construction4 ,the understanding in this case knows what it makes1 because its work is present to it3 when it combines it knows that it combines2 when it compares or deduces1 it knows that it compares or deduces2 when it builds upon certain suppositions1 which it has itself established1 it knows in what they consist1 since it rests upon them4 #cjg4 ,the understanding knows what it makes2 but this is not all that it knows2 for it has truths which neither are nor can be its works1 since they are the basis of all its works1 as1 for example1 the principle of contradiction4 ,can the impossibility of a thing being and not being at the same time be said to be the work of our reason8 ,assuredly not4 ,reason itself is impossible if this principle be not supposed2 the understanding finds it in itself as an absolutely necessary law1 as a condition sine qua non of all its acts4 ,here1 then1 ,vico's criterion fails3 the understanding knows only the truth it makes3 and yet the understanding knows but does not make the truth of the principle of contradiction4 #cjh4 ,facts of consciousness are known by reason1 although they are not its production4 ,these facts are not only present to consciousness1 but are also objects of the combinations of reason3 here1 then1 ,vico's criterion again fails4 #cji4 ,although in those things that are a purely intellectual work1 the understanding knows what it makes1 it does not make whatever it chooses2 for then we should have to say that science is perfectly arbitrary3 instead of the geometrical results we now have1 we might have others as numerous as the individuals who deal in lines1 surfaces1 and solids4 ,this shows reason to be subject to certain laws1 its constructions to be connected with conditions which it cannot abstract4 ,one of these conditions is the principle of contradiction1 which would1 were it to fail1 annihilate all knowledge4 ,true1 by a series of intellectual constructions one may ascertain the size of a sphere2 but can two understandings obtain two different values of it8 ,they cannot1 for that would be an absurdity3 they may choose different ways1 or express their demonstrations and conclusions in different terms2 but the value is the same3 if there be any discrepancy1 it is because one or the other has fallen into an error4 #caj4 ,if we thoroughly examine this matter1 we shall perceive that the intellectual construction1 of which ,vico speaks1 is a fact generally admitted4 ,there are in this philosopher's system two new things1 the one good1 the other bad2 the good1 is to have indicated one reason of the certainty of mathematics2 the bad1 is to have exaggerated the value of his criterion4 ,we have said that his system expressed a fact generally recognized1 but exaggerated by him4 ,the understanding undoubtedly creates1 in some sense1 ideal sciences2 but in what sense8 ,solely by taking postulates1 and combining its data in various ways4 ,here ends its creative power1 for in these postulates and combinations it discovers truths not placed there by itself4 ,what is the triangle in the purely ideal order8 ,a creation of the understanding1 which disposes the lines in a triangular form1 and1 preserving this form1 modifies it in a thousand ways4 ,thus far there is only one postulate and different combinations of it3 but the properties of the triangle flow by absolute necessity from the conditions of the postulate3 the understanding1 however1 does not make these properties1 it discovers them4 ,the example of the triangle is applicable to all geometry4 ,the understanding takes a postulate2 this is its free work1 but it must not come in conflict with the principle of contradiction4 ,from this postulate flow absolutely necessary consequences1 independent of intellectual action1 and involving an absolute truth known by the understanding itself4 ,consequently it is false to say of them that it makes them4 ,suppose a man so to place a body1 that1 left to itself1 it will fall to the ground3 is it the man who gives it the force to fall8 ,certainly not1 but nature4 ,the man only supplies the condition necessary for the force of gravity to produce its effect3 when once the condition is performed1 the fall is inevitable4 ,here1 then1 is a simile which shows clearly and exactly what happens in the purely ideal order4 ,the understanding performs the conditions2 from them flow other truths1 not made1 but known1 by the understanding4 ,this truth is absolute1 is as the force of gravity in the order of ideas4 ,hence we see what is admissible1 and what inadmissible in ,vico's system4 ,the power of combination1 a generally recognized fact1 is admissible2 the exaggeration of this fact extended to all truths1 when it only comprises postulates in their various combinations1 is inadmissible4 ,the rules of algebra are conventional inasmuch as they relate to the expression1 for this might evidently have been different4 ,supposing1 however1 the expression1 the development of the rules1 is not conventional1 but necessary4 ,in the expression an_/an the number of times the quantity has entered as factor might clearly have been expressed in infinite ways2 but supposing the present to have been adopted1 the rule is not conventional1 but absolutely necessary2 since whatever the expression1 it is always certain that the division of a quantity by itself1 with distinct exponents1 gives for result the diminution of the number of times it has entered as factor3 this is denoted by the remainder of the exponents2 and consequently if the number of times be equal in the dividend and the divisor1 the result will be #j4 ,thus we see that even in algebra1 what the understanding has to do1 is to perform the conditions1 and express them as seems to it best3 but here its free work ends1 for necessary truths result from these conditions2 and these it does not make1 but only knows4 #caa4 ,vico's merit in this point consists in having expressed a very clear idea of the cause of the greater certainty of the purely ideal sciences4 ,in these the understanding itself performs the conditions upon which it has to build its edifice2 it chooses the ground1 forms the plan1 and raises the construction conformably to it4 ,in the real order this ground is already designated1 just as are the plan of the edifice and the materials for its construction4 ,in both cases it is subject to the general laws of reason1 but with this difference1 that in the purely ideal order1 it has to regard these laws and nothing else2 but in the real order1 it cannot abstract the objects considered in themselves1 and is condemned to submit to all the inconveniences they are of a nature to cause4 ,we will explain these ideas by an example4 ,if we would determine the relation of the sides of a triangle under certain conditions1 we have only to suppose the conditions and attend to them4 ,the ideal triangle is in our understanding a perfectly exact1 and also a fixed1 thing4 ,if we suppose it to be an isosceles triangle with the relation of the sides to the base as seven to five1 this ratio is absolute1 immutable1 so long as the supposition remains unchanged4 ,in all our operations upon these data1 we are liable to mistakes of calculation1 but no error can arise from inexactness of data4 ,the understanding knows1 indeed1 for what it knows is its own work4 ,if the triangle be not purely ideal1 but realized upon paper1 or on the ground1 the understanding vacillates because those conditions1 which1 in the purely ideal order1 it fixes with all exactness1 cannot be transferred in like manner to the real order2 and even were they transferred1 the understanding would have no means of appreciating them4 ,therefore1 ,vico says1 with great truth1 that our cognitions lose in certainty in the same proportion as they are removed from the ideal order and swallowed up in the reality of things4 #cab4 ,dugald ,stewart probably had in view this doctrine of ,vico when he explained the cause of the greater certainty of mathematical sciences4 ,it does not1 he says1 depend upon axioms1 but upon definitions2 that is1 he adopts1 with a slight modification1 the system of the ,neapolitan philosopher1 that the mathematical are the most certain1 because they are an intellectual construction founded upon certain conditions placed by the understanding and expressed by the definition4 ,this difference between the purely ideal and the real order did not escape the scholastics4 ,they were accustomed to say that there was no science of contingent and particular1 but only of necessary and universal things4 ,in the place of contingent substitute reality1 since all finite reality is contingent2 and instead of universal put ideal1 since the purely ideal is all universal2 and you will have the same doctrine enunciated in distinct words4 ,it is not easy to show exactly how far modern philosophers have availed themselves of the scholastic doctrine1 in so far as the distinction between pure and empirical cognitions is concerned2 but it is certain that some very clear passages upon these questions are to be found in the works of the scholastics4 ,it would not be strange if some moderns1 particularly ,germans1 whose laboriousness is proverbial1 especially in matters of erudition1 had read them47#bg7 ,,chapter ,,xxxii4 ,,the ,,criterion ,,of ,,common ,,sense4 #cac4 ,common sense is an exceedingly vague expression4 ,it should1 like all expressions which contain many and different ideas1 be considered under two aspects3 that of its etymological1 and that of its real value4 ,these two values are not always the same2 they are sometimes greatly discrepant2 but even in their discrepancy1 they usually preserve intimate relations4 ,we must not1 in order duly to appreciate the meaning of such expressions1 confine ourselves to their philosophical1 and contemn their vulgar meaning4 ,in the latter there is often a profound philosophy2 for1 in such cases1 the vulgar sense is a kind of precious sediment left by the flow of reason upon the word during many ages4 ,it thus happens that in measure1 as the vulgar sense is understood and analyzed1 the philosophical question is determined1 and the most intricate questions solved with the greatest facility4 #cad4 ,it is remarkable1 that besides the corporal senses there should be another1 called common sense4 ,sense3 ,this word excludes reflection1 all reasoning1 all combination2 nothing of this kind enters into the meaning of the word to sense4 ,when we sense1 the mind is rather passive than active2 it does nothing of itself2 it does not give1 it receives2 it suffers1 but does not perform1 an action4 ,this analysis leads us to a very important result1 and this is1 the separation from common sense of all that upon which the mind exercises its activity2 and the determination of one character of this criterion1 which is1 with respect to common sense2 the understanding has nothing to do but submit itself to a law perceived1 to an instinctive and unavoidable necessity4 #cae4 ,common3 ,this word excludes all individuality1 and shows the object of common sense to be general to all men4 ,the simple facts of consciousness are facts of sense1 but not of common sense2 the mind feels them when it abstracts objectiveness and generality2 what it experiences within itself is an experience exclusively its own1 and one which has no connection with others4 ,the word common shows the objects of this criterion to be common to all men1 and consequently referable to the objective order1 since the purely subjective1 as such1 is limited to the individual1 and in no wise affects what is general4 ,so exact is this observation1 that in ordinary language no internal phenomenon1 however extravagant1 is ever said to be opposed to common sense1 provided it be expressed simply with abstraction from its relation to the object4 ,if a man says3 ,i experience such or such a sensation1 ,i seem to see such or such a thing1 common sense is not against him2 but if he says1 such or such a thing is in such a manner1 and the assertion is extravagant1 it is against him1 for this is contrary to common sense4 #caf4 ,i believe the expression common sense to denote a law of our mind1 apparently differing according to the different cases to which it applies1 but in reality and apart from its modifications1 only one1 always the same1 consisting in a natural inclination of our mind to give its assent to some truths not attested by consciousness nor demonstrated by reason1 necessary to all men in order to satisfy the wants of sensitive1 intellectual1 and moral life4 ,if the fact be agreed on1 the name is of little moment3 whether common sense be or be not the most adequate to signify it1 is a philological1 not a philosophical1 question4 ,what we have to do1 is to inquire if this inclination of which we have spoken1 really exists1 under what forms it is presented1 to what cases it is applicable1 and how far1 and to what degree it may be considered a criterion of truth4 ,evidently this inclination cannot1 in the complication of the acts and faculties of our soul1 and in the multitude and diversity of the objects offered to it1 always be presented with the same character2 it must undergo various modifications capable of causing it to be considered as a distinct fact1 although in reality still the same1 transformed in a suitable manner4 ,the best means of avoiding a confusion of ideas1 will be to designate the various cases in which the exercise of this inclination occurs4 #cag4 ,we at once detect it in the case of truths immediately evident4 ,the understanding neither does nor can prove them1 and yet it must assent to them1 or perish like a flame that has nothing to feed upon4 ,the possession of one or more of these primitive truths is an indispensable condition to intellectual life2 without them intelligence is an absurdity4 ,here1 then1 we find all that is comprised in the definition of common sense3 the impossibility of proof2 an intellectual necessity1 which must be satisfied by assent2 and an irresistible and universal inclination to give this assent4 ,is there any objection to calling this inclination common sense8 ,for myself1 ,i shall not dispute upon words2 ,i mark the fact1 and this is all ,i need do in philosophy4 ,i grant that the inclination to assent is not1 in treating of immediate evidence1 usually called common sense1 and this not without a reason4 ,in order that the word sense may be properly applied to it1 the understanding ought to feel rather than know3 but in immediate evidence it knows rather than feels4 ,however this may be1 ,i repeat that the name is of no account2 yet1 it would not be difficult to find this criterion of truth called by grave authors common sense4 ,what ,i wish is to establish this law of our nature inclining us to give our assent to certain truths1 independently of consciousness and ratiocination4 #cah4 ,not immediate evidence alone has this irresistible inclination in its favor2 mediate evidence also has it4 ,our understanding necessarily assents1 not only to first principles1 but also to all propositions clearly connected with them4 ,the natural inclination to assent is not limited to the subjective value of ideas2 it also extends to their objective value4 ,we have already seen that this objectiveness is not directly demonstrable a priori1 and yet we stand in need of it4 ,if our understanding is not to be limited to a purely ideal and subjective world1 we must know not only that things seem to us1 as they do with mediate or immediate evidence1 but also that they really are such as they seem to be4 ,it is then necessary to assent to the objectiveness of ideas1 and we find within ourselves an irresistible and universal inclination to such an assent4 #cai4 ,what we have said of immediate and mediate evidence relatively to the objective value of ideas1 is true1 not only in the purely intellectual1 but also in the moral order4 ,the soul1 endowed as it is with free will1 needs rules for its direction3 if first intellectual principles are necessary in order to know1 moral principles are not less so in order to will and work4 ,what truth and error are to the understanding1 good and evil are to the will4 ,besides the life of the understanding1 there is a life of the will2 the one1 without principles on which to rest1 is annihilated2 the other1 as a moral being1 perishes1 or becomes an inconceivable absurdity1 if it have no rule1 the observation or violation of which constitutes its perfection or imperfection4 ,here is another necessity for the assent to certain moral truths1 and another reason of this irresistible and universal inclination to assent4 ,i would here remark1 that as it is not enough in the intellectual order to know1 but it is also necessary to act1 and one of the principles of action is perception by the senses2 so moral truths are not only known but felt4 ,when they are offered to the mind the understanding assents to them as unshaken1 and the heart embraces them with enthusiasm and love4 #cbj4 ,sensations considered as purely subjective do not meet the wants of sensitive life4 ,we must be sure that our sensations correspond to an external world1 real and true1 not phenomenal4 ,men do not ordinarily possess either the capacity or the time requisite to investigate the philosophical questions of the existence of bodies1 and to decide for or against ,berkeley and his followers4 ,what is necessary is perfect certainty that bodies do exist1 that sensations have an external object in reality4 ,all men have this certainty when they assent with an irresistible force to the objectiveness of ideas1 that is1 to the existence of bodies4 #cba4 ,faith in human authority furnishes us with another case of this wonderful instinct4 ,both the individual and society require faith3 without it society and family would be impossible2 the individual would be condemned to isolation1 and1 therefore1 to death4 ,the speech of man1 the human race itself1 would disappear were it not for faith4 ,this belief has distinct grades according to different circumstances1 but it always exists2 man is inclined1 by a natural instinct1 to believe his fellow man4 ,when many men speak1 and none raise their voices against them1 the force of this inclination increases in the same proportion as the number of witness1 until it becomes irresistible4 ,who doubts the existence of ,rome8 ,and yet1 the greater part of us only know it upon the authority of other men4 ,what foundation has faith in human authority8 ,most men are ignorant of the philosophical reasons which may be assigned2 but their faith is not therefore less lively than that of philosophers4 ,but why is this so8 ,because there is a necessity1 and at its side an instinct to be satisfied4 ,man must believe in man1 and he believes4 ,and here note well1 that the greater the necessity1 the greater the faith4 ,the very ignorant and imbecile believe all that is told them2 they make other men their guide1 and blindly follow them4 ,the tender child1 knowing nothing1 abandons itself to the absolute belief of the greatest marvels3 the word of those around is to it an invaluable criterion of truth4 #cbb4 ,besides the cases of first intellectual and moral principles1 the objectiveness of ideas and sensations1 the weight of human authority1 man must give his instantaneous assent to certain truths1 which1 although he might1 had he the time1 demonstrate1 he cannot now1 because so suddenly are they presented to him1 that they exact an immediate formation of judgment1 and1 sometimes1 also action4 ,in all these cases1 there is a natural inclination impelling us to assent4 ,hence it is that we instinctively judge it impossible1 or little less than impossible1 to cause a determinate effect1 by a fortuitous combination2 as1 for example1 to form a page of ,virgil by a chance mixture of types1 or to hit the bull's eye of a target without taking aim1 and other similar things4 ,in this there is assuredly a philosophical reason1 but one not known to common people4 ,there is evidence of this reason in the theory of probabilities3 it is a distinct application of the principle of causality1 and of the natural opposition of our understanding to supposing an effect without a cause1 and order where there is no ordering intelligence4 #cbc4 ,arguments of analogy1 are in human life necessary in infinite cases4 ,how do we know that the sun will rise to-morrow8 ,by the laws of nature4 ,how do we know that these will continue in force8 ,evidently1 we must finally recur to analogy4 ,the sun will rise to-morrow1 because it has risen to-day2 it rose yesterday1 and it has never failed to rise4 ,how do we know that spring will again bring flowers1 and autumn fruits8 ,because it has so happened in former years4 ,men ordinarily do not know the reasons which might be given for founding the argument from analogy on the constancy of the laws of nature1 and on the relation between certain physical causes and determinate effects2 but their assent is required and given4 #cbd4 ,in all the cases cited1 excepting1 perhaps1 that of immediate evidence1 the inclination to assent may be1 and really is1 called common sense4 ,the reason of this exception is1 that in this case1 although there is no demonstration1 the predicate is nevertheless most clearly seen contained in the idea of the subject2 but in the other cases there is neither demonstration nor this vision4 ,man assents by a natural impulse2 and if any thing is objected to his belief1 he does not call attention to his conception1 as in immediate evidence1 but is completely disconcerted1 and knows not what to answer2 he then applies to the objection1 not the name of error1 nor of absurdity1 but that of extravagance1 of something contrary to common sense4 ,suppose1 for example1 a little grain of sand to be mixed with a great heap1 and some one to come and say3 ,i will put my hand into the heap1 and instantly draw out the one grain hidden there4 ,what will you object to such a one8 ,what will the beholders reply8 ,nothing2 or1 looking at each other in perfect surprise1 they will exclaim3 ,what extravagance6 ,he has no common sense6 ,or suppose some one to say1 that all we see is nothing1 that there is no external world1 that we have no body1 or that all told us of the existence of a city called ,london is untrue4 ,whoever hears such madness1 knows not what to answer2 but he repels it by a natural impulse1 and the mind feels that this is nonsense without stopping to examine4 #cbe4 ,we shall now inquire whether common sense be a certain criterion of truth1 whether it be so in all1 or in what cases1 and what characters it must have in order to be an infallible criterion4 ,man cannot lay aside his nature3 when it speaks1 reason will not allow it to be ignored4 ,a natural inclination1 simply because it is natural1 is in the eyes of philosophy something highly respectable3 it is the province of reason and free will not to allow it to go astray4 ,what is natural to man is not always so perfectly fixed as it is in brutes1 where instinct is blind as it must be1 where there is neither reason nor free will4 ,the exercise of man's natural inclinations is subordinate to his reason and free will1 and1 consequently1 when these are called instincts1 the word has a very different meaning from what it has when applied to brutes4 ,what happens in the moral order is also verified in the intellectual4 ,we have not only our heart to watch1 but also our understanding2 both are subject to the law of perfectibility2 the objects which they offer to us are good and evil1 truth and error4 ,nature herself shows us which one we ought to choose1 but does not force our choice2 life and death are before us1 we may select the one we please4 #cbf4 ,there is in man1 independently of the action of free will1 a quality which oftentimes has the effect of turning his natural inclinations from their object2 it is weakness4 ,hence1 it is nothing extraordinary for these inclinations to be so distorted as to lead to error instead of truth1 and this renders it necessary to determine what characters common sense should have1 in order to be an absolutely infallible criterion4 #cbg4 ,we will point out the conditions1 such as we conceive them to be1 of true and never-erring common sense4 ,first ,condition4--,that the inclination be every way irresistible1 so that one cannot1 even by the aid of reflection1 resist or avoid it4 ,second ,condition4--,that every truth of common sense be absolutely certain to the whole human race4 ,this condition follows from the first4 ,third ,condition4--,that every truth of common sense stand the test of reason4 ,fourth ,condition4--,that every truth of common sense have for its object the satisfaction of some great necessity of sensitive1 intellectual1 or moral life4 #cbh4 ,when possessed of all these characters1 the criterion of common sense is absolutely infallible1 and may defy skeptics to assign a case wherein it has failed4 ,the higher the degree in which the conditions are satisfied1 the more certain will the criterion be4 ,we will explain this by a few examples4 ,there is no doubt that ordinary men make their sensations so far objective as to transfer what passes within themselves to the exterior1 without distinguishing between the subjective and the objective4 ,thus1 when they consider colors to be in things themselves1 they do not take the green1 for example1 to be the sensation of the green1 but a thing certain1 a quality1 or whatever else it may be called1 inherent in the object4 ,but in reality this certainly is not so4 ,the cause of the sensation is in the external object2 such a disposition of facts also as to produce through the medium of light the impression called green4 ,common sense here deceives2 for philosophical analysis convicts it of error4 ,but here common sense has not the requisite conditions4 ,in the first place1 it ought to stand the test of reason2 so soon as we reflect upon the case1 we discover an illusion as fair as innocent4 ,moreover1 it is not irresistible1 for our assent is withheld the instant we are convinced of the illusion4 ,neither is the assent universal1 for not all philosophers have it4 ,nor is it indispensable to the satisfaction of some great necessity of life4 ,it therefore has no one of the conditions just laid down4 ,what we have said of sight is applicable to the other senses4 ,what is the value of the testimony of common sense inasmuch as it leads us to make sensations objective8 ,we will answer this question4 ,a certainty that sensations correspond to external objects is necessary to the wants of life4 ,upon this all men without exception are agreed4 ,reflection cannot despoil us of our natural inclination2 and although reason1 when most it cavils1 may shake the foundations of this belief1 it never succeeds in convicting it of error4 ,even they who give the most weight to such cavils1 cannot prove that bodies do not exist3 they can only say that we do not know that they exist4 ,the natural inclination then possesses upon this point all the characteristics necessary to elevate it to the rank of an infallible criterion3 it is irresistible1 universal1 satisfies a great necessity of life1 and stands the test of reason4 ,as to qualities1 the direct objects of sensation1 it is not necessary for us that they exist in bodies themselves2 it is enough that these bodies have something which produces in us1 in some way or other1 a corresponding impression4 ,it is of little moment whether a green1 or orange color be1 or be not1 a quality of objects1 so long as they have some quality which produces in us the sensation of green1 or orange color1 as the case may be4 ,the ordinary wants of life are not at all affected by this question2 and man's relations with the sensible world would not be disturbed by the generalization of philosophical analysis4 ,there is1 perhaps1 a kind of disenchantment of nature1 since1 despoiled of sensations1 it is not nearly so beautiful2 but the enchantment still continues with most men2 and philosophy itself1 except in brief moments of reflection1 is subject to it2 and even in these moments it experiences an enchantment of a different kind1 as it considers how much of the beauty attributed to objects1 belong to man in his own right1 and that the simple exercise of a sensible being's harmonious faculties suffices to make the whole universe glow with splendor and glory47#bh7 ,,chapter ,,xxxiii4 ,,error ,,of ,,lamennais ,,on ,,common ,,consent4 #cbi4 ,the instinctive faith in human authority1 of which we have just treated1 is a fact attested by experience1 and one which no philosopher has presumed to call in doubt4 ,this faith1 duly directed by reason1 constitutes one criterion of truth4 ,the errors to which it may sometimes lead are inherent in human weakness1 and are amply compensated for by the advantages derived from it by society and individuals4 ,a celebrated writer undertook to include all criteria in that of human authority1 resolutely affirming common consent1 sensus communis1 to be to us the only seal of truth4#cc ,his system1 as strange as erroneous1 in which words as unlike as sensus and consensus are confounded1 is defended with that eloquent exaggeration characteristic of its eminent author2 but profound philosophy does not always accompany eloquence4 ,the sad fate of this genius1 as brilliant as erring1 shows the results of such a doctrine2 it opens an abyss which swallows up all truth1 and the author himself was the first to fall into it4 ,to appeal to the authority of others in all things1 and for all things1 is to despoil the individual of every criterion1 to annihilate them all1 not excepting the very one he attempts to establish4 ,it is inconceivable how such a system could have found favor with so gifted an intellect4 ,we feel1 when reading the eloquent pages of its development1 an undefinable pain to see such brilliant passages squandered on the repetition of all the common-places of skepticism1 ending in a most glaring paradox1 and the least philosophical system imaginable4 #cc ,lamennais1 ,essai sur l',indifference en ,matire de ,religion4 ,t4 #b1 ,c4 #ac4 ,lamennais calls common sense the only criterion2 nevertheless1 we have only to glance at the others to be convinced that this new criterion is sterile1 and could not produce them4 #ccj4 ,the testimony of consciousness1 in the first place1 cannot rest in any sense upon the authority of others4 ,formed as it is by a series of acts intimately present to our own mind1 and1 as without it1 it is not possible for us even to conceive individual thought1 it must evidently exist prior to the application of any criterion1 since no criterion is possible to him who does not think4 ,under a scientific aspect nothing can be weaker than his pretended refutation of ,descartes' principle4 ,when1 trying to rise from his methodical doubt1 ,descartes establishes this proposition1 ,i think1 therefore ,i am1 he passes an immense abyss1 and lays in the clouds the corner-stone of the edifice he is about to raise2 for1 strictly speaking1 we cannot say ,i think1 we cannot say ,i am1 we cannot say therefore1 or affirm anything as a consequence4#cd #cd ,ibid4 ,descartes' principle merited a more careful examination from whoever would invent a system4 ,to oppose to it that we cannot say therefore1 is to repeat the worn-out argument of the schools2 and to affirm that we cannot say ,i think1 is to contradict a fact of consciousness not denied even by skeptics4 ,in place of this1 we will explain at due length what is1 or at least1 what ought to be1 the sense of ,descartes' principle4 ,if1 according to ,lamennais1 we cannot say ,i think1 still less can we say that others think2 and as his system recognizes one only criterion1 common consent1 which absolutely needs the thought of others1 it follows that ,lamennais has laid his corner-stone higher in the clouds than he who founded philosophy upon a fact of consciousness4 #cca4 ,a criterion1 especially when it pretends to be the only one1 ought to have these two conditions3 to apply to all cases1 and not to suppose another4 ,now the criterion of common consent is precisely that which is farthest from possessing these conditions3 prior to it is the testimony of consciousness2 prior also to it is the testimony of the senses1 for we cannot know the consent of others if sight or hearing do not make us certain of it4 #ccb4 ,in many cases this criterion is impossible2 in many others it is exceedingly difficult if not wholly impossible4 ,to what point is common consent needed8 ,if the word common refers to the whole human race1 how are the suffrages of all mankind to be recognized8 ,if the consent need not be unanimous1 to what point does the contradiction1 or the simple non-assent of some1 destroy the legitimacy of the criterion8 #ccc4 ,lamennais' error consists in taking the effect for the cause1 and the cause for the effect4 ,we detect certain truths1 upon which all men are agreed1 and we say3 the guaranty that each one is right is the consent of all4 ,if we analyze this well1 we shall perceive that the reason of each individual's certainty is not the consent of others2 but on the contrary the reason why all agree is that each one for himself feels obliged to give his assent4 ,in this universal voting of the human race1 each one gives his own vote1 impelled in a certain sense by nature herself2 and as all experience the same impulse1 all vote alike4 ,lamennais says every one votes in the same way1 because all vote so2 but he does not observe that then the voting could never begin nor end4 ,this comparison is not an accidental satire1 but a strictly philosophical argument1 to which there can be no reply2 it suffices to show the system of ,lamennais to be unfounded and contradictory2 just as1 on the other hand1 it indicates the origin of the equivocation1 the taking the effect for the cause4 #ccd4 ,lamennais1 in order to prove his criterion to be the only one1 appeals to the testimony of consciousness4 ,in our opinion this testimony establishes directly the contrary4 ,who ever waited for the authority of others to be certain of the existence of bodies8 ,do we not see even brutes1 by force of a natural impulse1 making1 in their own way1 their sensations objective8 ,had we not in giving our assent to the words of men some other criterion than common consent1 we could never believe any one1 for the simple reason that it would be impossible to be certain of what others say or think without beginning by believing some one4 ,does the child refer to the authority of others before giving faith to what its mother recounts8 ,does it not rather obey the natural instinct communicated to it by the beneficent hand of the ,creator8 ,it does not believe because all believe2 but all children believe because each one of them believes3 their individual belief does not spring from a general belief1 but rather the general belief is formed from the assemblage of individual beliefs2 it is not natural because universal1 but universal because natural4 #cce4 ,lamennais' chief argument consists in this3 that in certain cases in order to make sure of the truth relatively to the other criteria1 we appeal to that of common consent1 and that folly itself is only the deviation from this consent4 ,if you tell a man that his eyes deceive him as to an object which he sees1 he instinctively turns to other men1 and asks them if they do not see it in the same way4 ,if all agree that he is wrong1 and he is satisfied they are in earnest1 he will experience a momentary vacillation of his faith in the testimony of sight2 he will approach the object1 will take a different position1 or adopt whatever other means may seem to him best suited to make sure that he is right4 ,if he still sees the object in the same way1 and the same persons and others who arrive persist in assuring him that the thing is not as he sees it1 he will distrust the testimony of sight1 and believe himself subject to some infirmity affecting his sight4 ,to this is the argument of ,lamennais reduced4 ,what results from it8 ,nothing to support the system of common consent4 ,true1 the other criteria are1 in exceptional circumstances1 liable to error2 in certain cases when a doubt arises an appeal is taken to the testimony of others3 but why8 ,simply1 in order to make sure that one has not labored under one of those derangements to which human misery is subject4 ,we know that what is natural is general2 and he who doubts inquires of others1 that he may ascertain if he has by some accident been out of his ordinary natural state4 ,who sees not the unreasonableness of raising an exceptional means to the rank of sole and general criterion8 ,who sees not the extravagance of asserting that we are assured of the testimony of the senses by the authority of other men1 solely because1 in extreme cases fearing some derangement of our organs1 we ask others if something appears to them as it does to us8 #ccf4 ,greater exaggeration we cannot have than that of ,lamennais1 when he affirms that the exact sciences are also founded on common consent2 that in this they enjoy no privilege1 and that the very term exact1 is one of those empty titles under which man seeks to conceal his weakness2 that geometry itself only exists by virtue of a tacit convention1 a convention which may be thus expressed3 we are obliged to hold such principles to be certain1 and we pronounce every one a rebel to common sense1 that is1 to the authority of the number1 who shall demand a demonstration of them4 ,this is an intolerable exaggeration4 ,the arguments which he adduces in his notes to prove the intrinsic uncertainty of mathematics are exceedingly feeble2 and some of them might make us suspect the author of the ,essai sur l',indifference to be a less profound philosopher than eloquent writer4 ,i am not ignorant of what has been advanced against the certainty of the exact sciences1 nor of the difficulties they present when called before the tribunal of metaphysics4 ,in the first volume of ,protestantism compared with ,catholicity1 ,i consecrated a chapter to what ,i call instinct of faith2 and this instinct1 ,i there maintained1 also exercises its influence upon the exact sciences4 ,these ,i do not place above moral sciences2 ,i esteem these latter the more2 but ,i must avoid an exaggeration that would destroy them all4 ,,chapter ,,xxxiv4 ,,summary ,,and ,,conclusion4 #ccg4 ,in concluding this book1 ,i wish to give a summary of my views on certainty1 wherein ,i shall show the connection between the doctrines exposed in the different chapters4 ,when philosophy meets a necessary fact its duty is to accept it4 ,such a fact is certainty4 ,to dispute its existence1 is to dispute the splendor of the sun at mid-day4 ,mankind are certain of many things2 philosophers1 skeptics not excluded1 are equally so4 ,absolute skepticism is impossible4 ,setting aside the question of certainty1 philosophy is free from extravagance1 and is established in the domain of reason2 it can there examine how we acquire certainty1 and upon what it is based4 ,the human race is endowed with certainty as a quality annexed to life1 a spontaneous result of the development of the soul's faculties4 ,certainty is natural2 consequently it precedes all philosophy1 and is independent of the opinions of men4 ,for the same reason the question of certainty1 although important to the knowledge of the laws to which our mind is subject1 is1 and always will be1 unproductive of practical results4 ,it is a dividing line fixed by reason lest at any time something should descend from the realm of abstraction prejudicial to society or individuals4 ,thus from its first investigations1 philosophy forms a kind of alliance with good sense2 they mutually promise never to be hostile to each other4 ,when we examine the foundations of certainty a question arises upon the first principle of human cognitions3 does it exist1 and what is it8 ,this question may have a double meaning4 ,it may either mean a primitive truth containing all others1 as the seed does plants and fruits2 or simply a resting-point4 ,the former gives rise to the question of transcendental science2 the latter is the cause of the disputes in the schools on the preference of different truths in relation to the dignity of first principle4 ,if truth exists1 there must be means of knowing it1 hence the question of the value of criteria4 ,there is in the order of being one truth1 the origin of all truths1 ,god1 who is also in the absolute intellectual order the origin of all truths4 ,in the human intellectual order there is no one truth1 the origin of all others2 neither is there in the real1 nor in the ideal order4 ,the philosophy of the me can be of no account in establishing transcendental science4 ,the doctrine of absolute identity is an absurdity2 besides1 it explains nothing4 ,the problem of representation is here proposed4 ,the representation may be of identity1 causality1 or ideality4 ,the last is founded on the preceding1 but is distinct from it4 ,besides the problem of representation we examined that of immediate intelligibility1 a difficult problem1 but one of the greatest importance to a perfect knowledge of the world of intelligences4 ,the disputes on the value of different principles1 as to which has the right to be called fundamental1 originate in a confusion of ideas4 ,we attempt to compare things of very diverse orders1 whereas this is impossible4 ,descartes' principle is the enunciation of a simple fact of consciousness2 that of contradiction1 an objective truth1 the indispensable condition of every cognition3 that of the ,cartesians is the expression of a law of our mind4 ,the three1 each in its own way and sphere1 are necessary2 no one of them is totally independent of the others2 the ruin of any one destroys our intelligence4 ,we have various criteria2 but they may all be reduced to three3 consciousness1 or internal sense1 evidence1 and intellectual instinct1 or common sense4 ,consciousness embraces all facts intimately present to our soul as purely subjective2 evidence extends to all objective truths1 upon which our reason is exercised2 intellectual instinct is the natural inclination to assent in cases which lie without the domain of consciousness and evidence4 ,the intellectual instinct obliges us to give an objective value to ideas2 in this case it mingles with the truths of evidence1 and is1 in ordinary language1 confounded with evidence4 ,when the intellectual instinct operates upon non-evident objects and inclines us to assent1 it is called common sense4 ,consciousness and the intellectual instinct constitute the other criteria4 ,the criterion of evidence includes two things3 the appearance of ideas1 which belongs to consciousness2 the objective value1 existing or possible1 which belongs to the intellectual instinct4 ,the testimony of the senses also has two parts3 sensation as purely subjective1 and this pertains to consciousness2 and the belief in the objectiveness of sensations1 and this pertains to the intellectual instinct4 ,the testimony of human authority is composed of that of the senses1 which place us in relation with our fellow-men1 and that of the intellectual instinct1 which induces us to believe them4 ,not everything is susceptible of proof2 but every criterion stands the test of reason4 ,the criterion of consciousness is a primitive fact of our nature2 in that of evidence we discover the indispensable condition of the existence of reason itself2 in that of the intellectual instinct by which we make our ideas objective1 is found a law of our nature likewise indispensable to the very existence of reason2 in that of common sense1 properly so called1 is the instinctive assent to truths1 which1 when examined1 are seen to be perfectly reasonable2 in that of the senses1 and in that of human authority1 we discover the same thing as in the other cases of common sense1 which is a means of satisfying the necessities of sensation1 intellectual1 and moral life4 ,the criteria do not conflict with1 but mutually aid and confirm each other4 ,neither is reason at war with nature1 nor nature with reason2 both are necessary to us2 both direct us with certainty1 although they are both liable to err1 since they belong to a limited and very feeble being4 #cch4 ,the philosophy which considers man only under a single aspect is incomplete1 and in danger of becoming false4 ,so far as certainty is concerned1 we must bear in mind this last observation3 to become excessively exclusive is to place one's self on the brink of error4 ,we may analyze if we will the sources of truth2 but we must not lose sight of their connection when examining them separately4 ,to begin by conceiving a system1 and then making everything conform to its demands1 is to place truth in the bed of ,procrustes4 ,unity is a great good2 but we must be satisfied with the measure imposed upon us by nature4 ,we must seek truth by human means1 and in proportion to our capacity4 ,the faculties of our soul are subject to certain laws1 which we cannot abstract4 ,one of the most constant laws of our being is the necessity of a simultaneous exercise of our faculties1 not only in order to become certain of truth1 but even to discover it4 ,man joins the greatest multiplicity with simplicity3 his soul is one1 is endowed with various faculties1 and united to a body of such variety and complication as to be called with much reason a little world4 ,his faculties are in intimate and mutual relation2 they exert a continuous influence upon each other4 ,to isolate them is to mutilate1 and sometimes to extinguish them4 ,this remark is important1 for it indicates the radical vice of all exclusive philosophy4 ,if a man have no sensations1 his understanding has no materials1 nor has it that stimulus1 without which it remains dormant4 ,when ,god united our soul and body1 it was that one might aid the other2 wherefore he established that admirable correspondence between the impressions of the body and the affections of the soul1 which1 therefore1 needs the body as a medium1 as an instrument1 whether the action of the body upon it be supposed to be a true action1 or only a simple occasion of causality of a higher order4 ,if a man1 having no sensations1 were to think1 he would only think as a pure spirit2 he would not be in relation with the external world1 nor would he be a man in the sense in which we use this word4 ,in such a case the body is superfluous1 and there is no reason why it should be united to the soul4 ,if we admit sensations1 and abstract reason1 man is converted into a brute4 ,he feels1 but does not think3 he experiences impressions1 but does not combine them1 for he is incapable of reflecting4 ,every thing succeeds in him as a series of necessary1 isolated phenomena1 which indicate nothing1 lead to nothing1 and are nothing but affections of a particular being who does not comprehend them1 nor render to himself an account of them4 ,it is even difficult to say of what kind are his relations with the external world4 ,arguing from appearances and analogy1 it is probable that brutes also make their sensations objective2 but ordinarily1 their objectiveness differs from ours4 ,let us take sleep for example4 ,if brutes sleep1 and they probably do sleep1 as certain appearances seem to indicate1 it would not be strange should they not distinguish as we do between waking and sleeping4 ,this supposes some reflection upon acts1 some comparison between the order and constancy of some1 and the disorder and inconstancy of others2 a reflection which man makes even in infancy1 and continues to make all his life without adverting to it4 ,when we awake from a deep sleep1 we sometimes remain for several moments in doubt if we are asleep or awake3 this doubt alone supposes a comparative reflection of the two states4 ,what do we do in order to resolve this doubt8 ,we examine the place where we are2 and the fact that we are abed1 in the silence and darkness of night1 indicates that the previous vision had no connection with our situation1 and therefore that we were asleep4 ,without this reflection1 the sensations of sleeping and waking would be connected1 and all confounded in one and the same class4 ,the instinct conceded to brutes1 but denied to men1 shows that reason was given to us in order to appreciate sensations4 ,there are1 then1 in man no criteria of truth absolutely isolated4 ,they are all in relation with each other1 they mutually affirm and complete each other2 for we must note that those truths1 of which all men are certain1 do in some sense rest upon all the criteria4 ,sensations instinctively lead us to believe in the existence of an external world2 and if this belief be submitted to the examination of reason1 it confirms the same truth1 resting upon the general ideas of cause and effect4 ,the pure understanding knows certain principles1 and assents to them as to necessary truths4 ,the senses1 if these principles be submitted to their experience1 confirm them as much as their own perfection1 or that of the instruments which they use1 permit4 ,all the radii of a circle are equal4 ,this is a necessary truth4 ,the senses perceive no perfect circle1 but they see that the more perfect the instrument is with which they construct it1 so much more nearly equal are the radii4 ,there is no change without a cause to produce it4 ,the senses cannot prove the proposition in all its universality1 for they are by nature limited to a determinate number of particular cases2 but1 so far as their experience goes1 they discover the order of such a dependence in the succession of phenomena4 ,the senses mutually aid each other4 ,the sensation of one sense is compared with those of the others1 when there arises a doubt as to its correspondence with its object4 ,we seem to hear the whistling of the wind2 but our hearing has more than once deceived us3 to make sure of the truth we look at trees or other objects4 ,we see a figure1 but there is not light sufficient to distinguish it from a shadow1 we approach and touch it4 ,the intellectual and moral faculties also exercise a salutary influence upon each other4 ,ideas rectify sentiments1 and sentiments ideas4 ,the value of the ideas of one order is verified by those of another order2 and the same with sentiments4 ,pity for one suffering punishment inspires the pardon of all criminals2 the indignation inspired at seeing the victims of crime1 induces to the application of punishment2 both sentiments involve something that is good2 but the one would engender impunity1 the other cruelty2 it is to temper them that the ideas of justice exist4 ,but this justice in its turn might pronounce excessively absolute sentences2 justice is one1 and the circumstances of peoples very different4 ,justice only considers the culpability1 and consequently pronounces such sentences4 ,a sentence may not be proper2 for here come in other moral ideas of a distinct order1 the amendment of the guilty joined with reparation made to the injured party2 ideas also of public convenience which are not repugnant to sound morals1 and which may direct their application4 ,complete truth1 like perfect good1 exists only with harmony4 ,this is a necessary law1 and to it man is subject4 ,since we do not intuitively see the infinite truth in which all truths are one1 and all good is one2 and as we are in relation with a world of finite1 and consequently multiple beings1 we need different powers to place us in contact1 so to speak1 with this variety of truths and finite goods2 but as they1 in their turn1 spring from one same principle1 and are directed to one same end1 they are submitted to harmony1 which is the unity of multiplicity4 #cci4 ,with these doctrines we believe philosophy without skepticism to be possible4 ,examination is not excluded2 on the contrary1 it is extended and completed4 ,this method has another advantage2 it does not make philosophy extravagant1 and philosophers exceptional4 ,philosophy cannot be so generalized as to become popular2 human nature is opposed to this2 but there is not on the other hand any necessity of condemning it to a misanthropic isolation by force of extravagant professions4 ,in such a case philosophy degenerates into philosophism4 ,exposition of facts1 conscientious examination1 clear language2 such we conceive sound philosophy to be4 ,this does not require it to cease to be profound1 unless by profoundness be meant darkness4 ,the rays of the sun light up the remotest depths of space4 #cdj4 ,i am aware that some philosophers of our age think otherwise1 that they deem it necessary1 when they examine the fundamental questions of philosophy1 to shake the foundations of the world2 and yet ,i have never been able to persuade myself that it was necessary to destroy in order to examine1 or that in order to become philosophers we ought to become madmen4 ,we may render the unreasonableness and extravagance of these masters of humanity sensible by an allegory1 although the simplicity of my language may somewhat mortify their philosophical profoundness4 ,the reader needs some solace and rest1 now that he has followed me through such abstruse treatises1 which all the power of the writer does not suffice to illustrate1 and still less to render attractive4 ,a noble1 rich1 and numerous family preserves in magnificent archives the records of its nobility1 alliances1 and possessions4 ,some of these documents are hardly legible1 either on account of the handwriting1 their great antiquity1 or the wear and tear of years4 ,there is also a suspicion that many of these documents are apocryphal2 although it is certain that many must be authentic1 since the nobility and other rights of the family1 so universally recognized1 must be founded on some of them1 and it is known that no other exists4 ,such is the state of things4 ,some curious person enters the archives1 and casting a glance upon the shelves1 recesses1 and drawers1 says3 ,this is all confusion2 to distinguish what is authentic from the apocryphal1 and put all in good order1 we must light a fire at the four corners of the archives1 and then examine the ashes4 ,what shall we think of such a proceeding8 ,this curious person is the philosopher who1 to distinguish the true and the false in our cognitions1 begins by denying all truth1 all certainty1 all reason4 ,we may be told that there is no question of denying1 but of doubting2 but whoever doubts all truth1 destroys it2 whoever doubts all certainty denies it2 whoever doubts all reason annihilates it4 ,prudence and common sense in small things are based upon the same principles as wisdom in great things4 ,let us go on with our allegory1 and see what common sense would indicate ought to be done in this case4 ,to take an inventory of whatever now exists1 without forgetting any thing1 however contemptible it may appear2 to make such temporary classifications as are deemed most proper to facilitate the examination1 reserving the final classification to the close2 to note carefully dates1 characters1 references1 and thus to distinguish priority and posteriority2 to see if there may be found some primitive documents1 referring to others anterior1 which certify the origin of the family2 to establish clear rules for the distinguishing that which is primitive from what is only secondary2 and not to insist on referring all documents to one alone1 exacting a unity which1 perhaps1 they have not2 for it may have happened that there were several primitive and mutually independent documents4 ,it would even be advisable in distinguishing the authentic from the apocryphal not to burn any thing1 for the apocryphal sometimes aids in the interpretation of what is authentic1 and it may be desirable to ascertain who were the falsifiers1 and what their motives4 ,moreover1 who knows but what he judges a document to be apocryphal1 which seems to him so to be solely because he does not understand it8 ,care1 then1 is to be taken to make a due separation1 and if the apocryphal is of no use in establishing titles1 or in defending them1 it may serve for the history of the archives1 which is no trifling reason for distinguishing the apocryphal from the authentic4 ,the human mind does not examine itself until well developed2 then1 at the first glance1 it sees in itself a connection of sensations1 ideas1 judgments1 and affections of a thousand kinds1 the whole interwoven in an inextricable manner4 ,to increase the complication1 it is not alone1 but in intimate relation with its like1 in mutual communication of sensations1 ideas1 and sentiments2 and all in their turn in contact with1 and under the influence of1 dissimilar beings of amazing variety1 the union of which forms the universe4 ,shall it begin by throwing it all down8 ,shall it reduce all to ashes1 and hope to rise like the phenix from the pyre8 ,shall it arbitrarily invent a fact1 a principle1 and say3 ,i must have a resting-point1 ,i will take this1 and upon it ,i will found science6 ,shall we1 before examining1 before analyzing1 say3 all this is one2 there is nothing if there be not absolute unity2 in it ,i place myself1 and all that ,i do not see from my point of view ,i reject8 ,no6 what we have to do1 is first to ascertain what is in our mind1 and then to examine1 classify it1 and give to it its true value2 not commence by mad and impotent efforts against nature1 but to lend an attentive ear to her inspirations4 ,there is no philosophy without a philosopher2 no reason without a rational being2 the existence of the subject is then a necessary supposition4 ,no reason is possible if the contradiction of being and not-being be possible2 all reason1 then1 supposes the principle of contradiction to be true4 ,when we examine reason it is reason that examines2 it needs rules1 light2 all examination1 then1 supposes this light1 the evidence and the legitimacy of its criterion4 ,man does not make himself1 he finds himself already made2 it is not he who imposes the conditions of his being2 he finds them already imposed4 ,these conditions are the laws of his being1 and why contend against them8 ,besides factitious prejudices1 says ,schelling1 man has others primordial1 placed in him not by education1 but by nature herself1 which in all men hold the place of principles of cognition1 and are a shoal to the free-thinker4 ,for my own part ,i do not seek to be more than all men2 if ,i cannot be a philosopher without ceasing to be a man1 ,i renounce philosophy and adhere to humanity4 ,,book ,,second4 ,,on ,,sensation4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,,sensation ,,in ,,itself4 #a4 ,sensation considered in itself is simply an internal affection2 but it is almost always accompanied by a judgment4 ,this judgment may be more or less explicit and more or less noticed by the subject of the sensation4 ,suppose ,i see two architectural ornaments at a proper distance1 and ,i discover no difference between them4 ,in this sensation there are two things to be considered4 ,i4 ,the internal affection which we call seeing4 ,on this point all doubt is impossible4 ,whether ,i am asleep or awake1 raving or in my sober senses1 whether the ornaments are alike or unlike1 whether1 in fine1 they exist or not1 there still exists in my soul the representation which ,i call seeing the ornaments4 ,,ii4 ,i also at the same time form a judgment that1 besides the internal affection which ,i experience1 the ornaments exist1 that they are in relief1 and that they are before my eyes4 ,in this judgment ,i may be deceived2 for ,i may be asleep or in a delirium2 it may be that the ornaments are behind me1 and that ,i only see their reflection in a mirror2 it may be that what ,i see is only a paper placed in such a manner behind a glass1 as to make upon the retina of my eyes the same impression as the ornaments would if they were really present2 or1 finally1 it may all be the work of a skilful painter who has given this illusory appearance to his canvas4 ,from this we see that1 admitting the existence of the internal fact of sensation1 it is possible3 ,i4 ,that there is no external object4 ,,ii4 ,that the objects exists1 but not in the position supposed4 ,,iii4 ,that the object is not the architectural ornaments4 ,,iv4 ,that both are plane surfaces2 or1 that one is in relief1 and the other a plane4 ,this brings us to the evident conclusion that mere sensation has no necessary relation to an external object2 for it not only can1 but it not unfrequently does1 exist without any such object4 ,this correspondence of the internal to the external belongs to the judgment which accompanies sensation1 not to sensation itself4 ,if brutes refer their sensations to objects1 as they probably do1 instinct must supply in them the want of judgment1 as in the child who has not acquired the use of the intellectual faculties4 ,sensation1 therefore1 in itself considered1 affirms nothing4 ,it is a mere affection of our being1 an effect produced in our soul1 and does not determine whether there is any action of an external object upon our senses1 nor whether the object is what it seems to be4 #b4 ,let us imagine an animal reduced to the one sense of touch1 and that not developed as in us1 but confined to a few rude impressions like those of heat and cold1 warmth and dryness2 and let us compare it with human sensibility4 ,what an immense distance between the two6 ,sensibility in such an animal borders on insensibility1 whilst in man it approaches intelligence1 the representations of his senses are so varied and so extended as to produce within him a whole world1 and they might produce infinite others4 ,man is at the highest round of the ladder1 so far as our observation goes1 but who can tell how much higher it may be possible to go8 #c4 ,however developed and perfected we suppose sensibility1 it falls far short of intelligence1 from which it must ever remain separated1 as from a faculty of a different order4 ,though we suppose the sensitive faculties capable of indefinite perfectibility1 they can never reach the sphere of intelligence1 properly so called4 ,this perfectibility would lie in a different order1 eternally distinct from that of intellectual beings4 ,if we suppose a color infinitely perfected1 it will never become a sound1 a sound a taste1 a taste a sound1 nor a sound a color2 because perfectibility is confined to its own order4 ,therefore1 however it may be perfected1 sensibility can never become intelligence4 ,this observation will serve to guard against one of the most fatal errors of our age1 which consists in regarding the universe as the result of a mysterious force1 which1 developing itself by a continual movement1 at once spontaneous and necessary1 goes on giving birth to beings and elevating species by a perpetual transformation4 ,thus the greater perfection of the vegetable organization would produce the animal faculties2 these being perfected would become sensitive1 and in measure as they progressed in the order of sensation they would approach the realm of intelligence1 and would finally attain it4 ,there is not a little analogy between this system and that which makes thought a transformed sensation2 it effaces the dividing line between intelligent and non-intelligent beings2 the sensations of an oyster may1 according to it1 be so perfected as to be converted into an intelligence superior to that of ,bossuet or of ,leibnitz2 and the development of the faculties of the man-statue would be an emblem of the development of the universe4 #d4 ,it may have been already remarked that we are now speaking of the sensitive faculty in itself considered1 abstracting from its relations to external objects2 and that we therefore comprehend in the word sensation1 all affections of the senses1 whether actually produced1 recollected1 or imagined2 that is1 all affections in all degrees from the first direct consciousness of them1 or when they are presented to the being which experiences them1 until they reach the limit where intelligence1 strictly so called1 commences4 ,it is impossible here to draw the dividing line between the sensible and the intelligible2 this requires profound and extensive studies upon sensations compared with ideas1 which does not belong to this place3 but it will be well to have pointed out the existence of this line1 in order to avoid confusion in a most subtle matter1 in which every error is attended with the most serious consequences4 #e4 ,in what does sensation consist8 ,what is its internal nature8 ,we only know that it is a modification of our being1 and that we cannot explain it4 ,no words suffice to convey an idea of a sensation to one who has never experienced it4 ,the man born blind may listen to all that philosophers have said and written on light and colors1 but can never imagine what light and colors are4 ,experience is the only teacher here2 and thus1 if we suppose a man's senses to be changed so that green appears to him purple1 and purple green1 notwithstanding his constant communication with other men1 he will never be freed from his error1 and he will never suspect that during his whole life he has made use of the words green and purple in a different sense from other men4 #f4 ,analogy and nature incline us to believe that brutes are not mere machines1 but that they also have sensations4 ,the vast scale over which irrational beings are distributed1 shows that the faculty of feeling is spread over the universe in different degrees1 and with a wonderful profusion4 ,our experience is confined to the globe in which we live2 but are the limits of sensitive life the same as those of our experience8 ,even on this globe our observation is confined to what the imperfection of our senses1 and the instruments which we use1 permit2 but how far is the chain of life prolonged8 ,where is its term8 ,is there not some participation of this mysterious faculty in those beings which we hold to be inanimate8 ,is the universe1 as ,leibnitz pretends1 composed of a collection of monads endowed with a certain perception8 ,this is indeed an unfounded hypothesis2 but since our means of observation are so limited1 we should be cautious how we assign boundaries to the realm of life4 #g4 ,we ordinarily speak of the faculty of sensation as of something belonging to a very inferior order2 so it is1 in fact1 if compared with intellectual faculties2 but this does not prevent it1 in itself considered1 from being a wonderful phenomenon1 of a nature to astonish and confound all who meditate upon it4 ,sensation6 ,with this word alone we pass an immense gap in the scale of beings4 ,what is the non-sensible compared with the sensible8 ,the insensible is1 but experiences not that it is2 there is nothing in it but itself3 the sensible experiences that it is2 and there is in it something besides itself1 all that it feels1 all that is represented in it4 ,the insensible1 although surrounded with beings1 is in complete isolation1--in solitude2 the sensible1 although alone1 may be in a world of infinitely varied representations4 #h4 ,the idea of the me is in some sense applicable to every sensitive being2 for sensation is inconceivable without a permanent being1 which experiences what is transitory2 that is1 without a being which is one in the midst of multiplicity4 ,every sensible being1 were it capable of reflection1 might1 in its own way1 say ,i2 for it is true of all of them that it is one same being that experiences the variety of sensations4 ,without this bond1 this unity1 there is no one sensible being1 but a succession of sensations as unconnected phenomena of the whole4 #i4 ,there is no sensation without direct consciousness2 for1 as this is nothing but the very presence of the phenomenon to the being experiencing it1 it would be contradictory to say that it feels without consciousness4 ,a sensation experienced1 is a sensation present2 a sensation not present1 that is1 not experienced1 is inconceivable1 is an absurdity4#ce #ce ,see ,bk4 ,,ii41 ,ch4 ,,xxiii41 #bbf4 #aj4 ,every sensation involves presence1 or direct consciousness1 but not representation4 ,i think this distinction important4 ,the sensations of smell1 taste1 and hearing1 are not representative2 they remain in themselves1 and in their object4 ,the being experiencing them might believe himself enclosed in himself1 in an absolute solitude1 with no relation to other beings2 but touch1 and1 above all1 sight1 are by their nature representative2 they involve relation to objects2 and they imply relation to other beings1 not as to mere causes of the internal affection1 but as the originals represented in the sensation4 ,the class of sensible beings endowed with the faculty of representation seems to be of an order very superior to the others2 these beings not only have consciousness1 but also a mysterious power whereby they see within themselves an entire world4 #aa4 ,what is the most perfect degree of sensitive life8 ,what the most imperfect8 ,these questions we cannot answer1 for we cannot judge of these things otherwise than by experience and analogy4 ,but viewing the immensity of the scale1 experience shows us we may infer that nature is far richer than we imagine4 ,let us not disturb its profound secrets1 but be content to suspect that they exist4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,matter ,,is ,,incapable ,,of ,,sensation4 #ab4 ,the phenomenon of sensibility reveals to us the existence of an order of beings distinct from matter4 ,however perfect we may suppose material organization1 it cannot rise to sensation2 matter is wholly incapable of sensation2 and the absurd system of materialism can neither explain the phenomena of intelligence1 nor even of sensation4 ,it is of little consequence to us that we do not know the intrinsical nature of sensitive being1 or of matter2 it is enough to know their essential properties1 in order to infer with certainty that they belong to distinct orders4 ,it is not true that the principal idea of the essence of things is necessary1 in order to demonstrate their absolute contradiction2 thousands of times we consider two geometrical figures whose essential property we do not know2 yet not1 therefore1 do we fail to see that they are different1 and that one cannot possibly be the other4 ,matter1 whatever opinion may be entertained of its essential property1 is necessarily a composite being2 matter without parts1 is not matter4 ,a composite being1 although called one1 inasmuch as its parts are united together1 and conspire to the same end1 is always a collection of many beings2 for the parts though united are still distinct ,if sensation could be predicated of a composite being1 the sensitive would not be a single being1 but a collection of beings2 but sensation essentially belongs to a being which is one1 and if divided is destroyed2 therefore1 no composite being1 however well organized1 is capable of sensation4 ,if we observe what takes place in us1 and reason from analogy1 to other sensitive beings1 we shall discover amid the variety of sensations a single being which perceives them2 it is one and the same being that hears1 sees1 touches1 smells1 and tastes2 that remembers sensations after they have disappeared2 that seeks them when agreeable1 and avoids them when unpleasant1 enjoys the former and suffers in the latter4 ,all this enters into the idea of sensitive being2 if brutes had not this common subject of all sensations2 were they not one in the midst of multiplicity1 identical in diversity1 and permanent under succession1 they would not be sensitive beings1 such as we conceive them to be2 they would have no sensation1 properly so called2 for there is no sensation1 in the sense in which we here understand it1 without a being affected by it1 a being which perceives it4 ,if we imagine a flow and ebb of sensations without any connection1 without a constant being to experience them1 the result will not be a sensitive being1 but a collection of phenomena1 each one of which by itself alone offers the same difficulty as all united1 the necessity of a being to experience it4 #ac4 ,let us take a being composed of two parts1 ,a and ,b1 and see if it can acquire1 for instance1 the sensation of sound4 ,if both parts perceive1 either both perceive the whole sound1 or each a portion of it4 ,if both perceive it entire1 one of them is superfluous1 for we are only seeking to explain the realization of the phenomenon1 which would thus be verified in one alone4 ,if each part hear the sound1 not entire1 but only a portion of it1 we shall have a divided sound2 and what is the division of a sound8 ,but even such an imaginary division does not serve to explain the phenomenon2 for the part of the sound perceived by ,a will not be perceived by ,b2 never1 therefore1 will there result a complete sensation4 ,shall we suppose ,a and ,b to be in relation1 and to mutually communicate their corresponding parts8 ,but then ,a perceives all its own part and also what ,b communicates to it3 of what use1 then1 is ,b1 if ,a perceives the whole8 ,why not place the whole primitive sensation in ,a8 ,we here see that such a communication is an absurd hypothesis1 since it would make a successive and mutual communication of the parts1 and a perception by each of its own part1 and also of that transmitted to it by the others1 indispensable to the formation of an entire sensation4 ,thus we should have not one sensation only1 but as many as there are parts2 not one sensitive being only1 but as many such beings as there are parts4 ,this hypothesis of communication of the parts paves the way for our system1 since it recognizes the necessity of unity to constitute sensation4 ,why do the parts mutually communicate what they have respectively perceived8 ,because an entire sensation could not otherwise be formed1 and so each part must receive what it has not of itself4 ,the object of this is1 that each one may perceive the whole2 the sensation1 therefore1 must be wholly in only one subject2 therefore1 at the very time that unity is denied1 it is acknowledged to be necessary4 #ad4 ,these parts1 ,a and ,b1 either are simple or they are not2 if they are simple1 why persist in advocating materialism1 when we must finally return to simple beings8 ,it is a manifest contradiction to say that sensation is an effect of organization1 and yet place it in a simple being1 for the simple cannot be organized2 there is no organization where there are no parts organized4 ,if we admit the simple being1 and place the sensation in it1 the organization will then be1 if you choose1 a medium1 a conduit1 an indispensable condition to the realization of the phenomenon2 then not it1 but the simple being will be the subject4 ,if these parts are not simple1 they are composed of others2 and of these we may argue the same as of the former2 for we must come to simple beings1 or else proceed to infinity4 ,if we admit such a process1 the sensible being will not be one1 but infinite2 the difficulties encountered with only two parts1 ,a and ,b1 will be multiplied even to infinity1 and so the sensible being will be not one but infinite1 and every sensation infinite4 #ae4 ,here we find a very serious difficulty4 ,if matter be incapable of perceiving1 the soul of brutes is not material2 if immaterial1 it is a spirit1 which cannot be admitted4 ,let us determine well the meaning of the words1 and this difficulty will vanish4 ,an immaterial being is not the same as a spirit2 every spirit is immaterial1 but not every thing immaterial is a spirit4 ,immaterial denotes negation of matter2 spirit implies more than this2 for we understand by it a simple being endowed with understanding and free-will4 ,the soul of brutes is then immaterial1 but not a spirit4 ,some one may say1 that what is not body is spirit1 that between these two classes of beings there is no medium4 ,but why8 ,whence such certainty8 ,if it be said that there is no medium between the material and the immaterial1 this is true2 for there is1 in truth1 no medium between yes and no2 every thing either is or is not2 but there enters into the idea of spirit much more than the simple negation of matter2 there is the idea of an active1 intelligent1 and free principle4 #af4 ,it may then be asked3 wherein consists the nature of the soul of brutes8 ,and we ask1 wherein consists the nature of the greater part of the things which we perceive8 ,do we know this nature in itself or in its acts8 ,do we see our own soul intuitively8 ,or do we1 perchance1 know it by the acts of which we are conscious8 ,if so1 we know in like manner the sensitive soul by its acts1 that is1 by perception of the senses2 we know that it is not matter1 for matter is incapable of sensation2 and the reasons which show us that our soul is a simple being1 an active principle endowed with understanding and free-will enable us to say that the soul of brutes is a simple being endowed with the faculty of feeling1 and with instincts and appetites of the sensible order4 ,we know not what this active principle in itself considered is1 but its acts show it to be a force superior to bodies1 one of the many activities which are the life of nature4 ,we encounter this living force in a portion of matter admirably organized2 the end of this organization is the harmonious exercise of the faculties of that living being which we call animal4 ,not to know what this force in itself is1 does not prevent us from affirming its existence1 for phenomena reveal it to us in an indisputable manner4 #ag4 ,what1 then1 will be the fate of these souls1 or living forces1 if the organization which gives them life be destroyed8 ,will they be reduced to non-existence1 since1 not being composed of parts1 they cannot be decomposed8 ,will they continue to exist until their turn shall come to preside over a new organization8 ,it will be well to separate these various questions1 and examine them apart4 ,if the soul of brutes be not composed of parts1 it cannot perish by disorganization2 what has no organizable parts is not organized1 and what is not organized cannot be disorganized4 ,hence we infer that the soul of brutes cannot perish by corruption1 properly so called2 for no being not composed of matter can4 ,we see not what difficulty can arise from this view2 but the question is only resolved in its negative part1 for thus far we know only that the soul of brutes cannot die1 or be corrupted by decomposition2 we must know what is done with it4 ,is it annihilated8 ,does it continue to exist8 ,and if so1 in what way8 ,these are different questions4 ,first of all we must observe1 that we have here only conjectures1 and these rather as to the possibility than as to the reality4 ,philosophy may indeed enable us to see what may be1 but not what is1 for we can know the reality only by experience1 which in the present case we cannot have4 ,when sound philosophy1 examining this point1 is asked what is1 its best reply is1 that it knows not2 if it is asked what may be1 it enters into an argumentation founded on general principles1 and more especially upon analogy4 #ah4 ,it is usually said that nothing is annihilated2 but this needs some explanation4 ,what is the meaning of annihilation8 ,to cease to be1 so that nothing1 which before was1 remains4 ,if a body be disorganized1 it ceases to be as an organized body2 but the matter remains1 and there is no annihilation4 ,is it true that nothing is annihilated8 ,some say we must distinguish between substances and accidents2 for1 as these latter are a kind of incomplete beings1 there is no reason why they should not cease to exist1 and nothing of them remain2 but in this disappearance there is no annihilation1 strictly so called2 thus we see things continually transformed1 and undergoing a succession of accidents which cease to exist whenever the thing ceases to be modified by them4 ,as to substances1 there would indeed be true annihilation should they cease to exist1 but this they do not1 because no substance is annihilated4 ,thus some think2 we know not how true this system may be1 for we know not upon what solid foundation it rests4 ,if a substance be destined to an end1 why may it not be annihilated when this end no longer exists8 ,a created being incessantly needs the conservatory action of the ,creator1 for which reason conservation is said to be a continued creation2 when1 then1 the end to which the created substance was destined ceases1 why may it not be annihilated8 ,we see nothing in its being annihilated repugnant to the wisdom or goodness of ,god4 ,the artificer abandons a tool no longer serviceable2 this1 in ,god1 would be equivalent to the withdrawal of his conservatory act1 and in the creature1 to the reduction to non-existence4 ,if it be not repugnant to the wisdom and goodness of ,god for an organized being to be disorganized1 or cease to exist as an organized being1 why may he not allow a substance which has accomplished the object for which it was created to cease to exist8 ,from this we infer that it would not be against sound philosophy to maintain that the souls of brutes are reduced to non-existence4 #ai4 ,but supposing there is no question of annihilation1 is there any reason against their continuing to exist8 ,if there be1 we know not what it is4 ,we know not of what use they would be2 but we may conjecture that absorbed anew into the bosom of nature they would not be useless4 ,neither do we know the use of many other beings1 and yet we cannot therefore deny their existence1 or doubt their utility4 ,who says that the vital principle residing in brutes can have no object if the organization which it animates be destroyed8 ,does the destruction of a plant involve1 perchance1 the extinction of all the vital principles residing in it8 ,do these principles1 by not operating upon the organized being just destroyed1 therefore cease to be of any use in the wonderful laboratory of nature8 ,who will say that a vital principle cannot be useful if it does not act upon an object within our observation8 ,who will assert that vital principles do not in the recesses of nature act in many and different ways1 and that the effects of their activity are not presented very differently according to circumstances1 yet always in conformity to laws established by infinite wisdom8 ,do not the magnificent profusion of radical materials1 the gems without number which we everywhere discover1 the immense amount of matter susceptible of transformation and assimilation by the living being1 the mysteries of generation in the animal and vegetable kingdoms1 all indicate to us that there are scattered over the universe an infinite number of vital principles1 which exercise their activity in very different ways1 and over a scale of astonishing extent8 ,who shall assure us that the same vital principle may not present very diverse phenomena1 according to the conditions which determine its action8 ,does not the same principle reside in the acorn1 as in the gnarled old oak that for ages has defied the fury of the tempest8 ,did experience not show it to be so1 who would ever have suspected the vital principle of a shapeless and filthy caterpillar to be the same as that of a beautiful butterfly8 ,it is not then contrary either to reason or to experience to suppose the soul of brutes1 the vital principle residing in them1 to continue after the organization of the body is destroyed1 and1 absorbed anew in the treasures of nature1 to be there preserved1 not as a useless thing1 but in the exercise of its faculties in different ways1 according to the conditions to which it is subjected47#bi7 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,sleep ,,and ,,waking4 #bj4 ,the fact of sensation is connected with many others1 and from this connection results a great part of our knowledge4 ,it has been said in a tone of great confidence1 that it was not possible to demonstrate by sensations the existence of bodies2 for as sensations are something purely internal1 they cannot enable us to infer the existence of any thing external1 and there is no reason for not regarding all our sensations as a collection of individual phenomena1 inclosed in our soul4 ,at first view it seems impossible to solve the difficulty2 nevertheless1 if we examine it thoroughly1 we shall see that too great importance has been attached to it4 #ba4 ,the first objection ordinarily made to the testimony of the senses1 is the difficulty of distinguishing with certainty between the state of sleep and that of waking4 ,we receive when asleep impressions similar to those we receive when awake3 how shall we know that the illusion is not perpetual8 ,lamennais1 with characteristic exaggeration1 says3 ,he who shall show that all life is not a sleep1 an indefinable chimera1 will do more than all philosophers have thus far been able to do4 ,there are here1 no doubt1 grave difficulties2 but we cannot persuade ourselves that they are insolvable4 ,first of all we shall examine if sleep and waking be different1 not only in the eyes of common sense1 but also in those of reason4 ,lamennais pretends that only at the tribunal of common consent can a satisfactory and definitive sentence be obtained3 we are convinced that very close reasoning can arrive at the same result to which consciousness1 common sense1 common consent1 or1 in other words1 the testimony of our own being and that of our fellow mortals1 conjointly conduce4 #bb4 ,man finds in himself a perfectly satisfactory certainty of the difference between sleep and waking3 we need no testimony of others to know that we are awake4 ,the difference between these states must not be solely sought in the clearness and vividness of sensations1 and the certainty which they generate4 ,undoubtedly images are sometimes presented to us in sleep with as much clearness as if we were awake1 and our certainty for the instant is complete4 ,who has not in sleep experienced great joy1 or terrible anguish8 ,sometimes1 but very rarely1 we have1 when we awake1 the reminiscence of having in the very act of sleep doubted if we were asleep2 but this seldom happens1 and it is in general true1 that even our dreams are not accompanied by this twilight of reflex reason which warns us of our state and of the illusion that we are under4 ,ordinarily1 while we dream1 we have no thought that we are asleep1 and we embrace a friend with the same effusion of tenderness1 or weep disconsolately over his tomb1 with the same affections as we should were all real4 #bc4 ,the difference is not in momentary uncertainty1 for we usually have1 on the contrary1 complete certainty4 ,whence1 then1 is this8 ,how does reason explain it8 ,how does philosophy come to the support of consciousness and common sense8 ,this is the matter we now purpose to examine4 ,if we abstract sensations having or not having relation to external objects1 and also the sufficiency of their testimony in any particular case1 and consider them solely as phenomena of our soul1 we shall find two orders of facts completely distinguished by marked characters1 sleep and waking4 ,in our soul these two orders are totally distinct2 even in the system of the idealist this distinction must be recognized4 ,if we reflect upon what we have experienced since first we had consciousness of what passes within us1 we shall observe in our being1 two classes of phenomena4 ,periodically and constantly we experience two series of sensations2 some more or less clear1 more or less vivid1 are confined simply to their object1 without the concurrence of many of our faculties1 and above all1 without reflection upon them2 others are always clear1 always vivid1 accompanied by acts of all our faculties1 our reflection upon them1 and their difference from those that went before1 is entirely subject to our free will in all that is relative2 we vary and modify them in a thousand different ways1 or suppress and reproduce them4 ,i see the paper upon which ,i write2 ,i reflect upon this sight2 ,i abandon and resume it at pleasure2 and if ,i choose1 ,i connect this sensation with others1 with a thousand thoughts or different caprices4 ,what takes place in this act1 always has happened to me1 and always will1 whenever that same series of phenomena is produced in me while awake4 ,but if ,i dream that ,i write1 although it happen not1 as it ordinarily does1 that ,i cannot hold my pen exactly right1 nor see clearly1 but only confusedly1 ,i neither feel the simultaneous exercise of all my faculties1 nor reflect upon my present state2 ,i do not have that full consciousness of what ,i am doing1 that clear and strong light which is scattered over all my waking actions and their objects4 ,when awake ,i think upon what ,i have done1 what ,i am doing1 what ,i shall do2 ,i recollect my dreams and call them illusions1 pronounce them unconnected and extravagant appearances1 and compare them with the order and connection of phenomena offered to me while awake4 ,nothing of this kind takes place in dreams2 ,i may1 perhaps1 have a clear1 lively sensation but it is independent of my will1 it is an isolated impression1 the use of only one faculty without the aid of the others1 without fixed and constant comparisons1 such as ,i make when awake2 and above all1 this phenomenon quickly vanishes1 and ,i either fall into a state of unconsciousness of my being1 or enter another state in which the same series of phenomena as before is reproduced2 they are clear1 lucid1 connected2 they stand the test of reason1 which compares them with each other1 and with anterior phenomena4 ,apart1 then1 from all idea of the external world1 and even of all being outside of ourselves1 we are certain of the distinction between the two orders of phenomena1 those of sleep and those of waking4 ,therefore1 they who attack the certainty of our cognitions because of the difficulty of distinguishing between these states1 make use of a very weak argument1 and rely upon a fact entirely false4 ,so far am ,i from believing it impossible to distinguish philosophically between sleep and waking1 that ,i deem the difference between these two states one of the clearest and most certain facts of our nature4 ,having established this truth1 and supposing no one to doubt that the sensations experienced in sleep are not produced by external objects1 and that1 consequently1 they cannot be a means of acquiring truth1 ,i pass to another more difficult and important question4 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,relation ,,of ,,sensations ,,to ,,an ,,external ,,world4 #bd4 ,have our sensations any relation to external objects1 or are they merely phenomena of our nature8 ,can we infer the existence of an external world from the existence of that internal world resulting from the union of the scenes presented by sensations8 ,this question is theoretical1 not practical1 and depends solely on the force of reasoning1 not on the voice of nature1--a voice stronger than all argument1 and irresistible4 ,to whatever result the philosophical examination of the relations of the ideal and the real worlds may lead1 we must submit to that necessity of our nature which makes us believe in the existence of such relations4 ,the great majority of mankind never have thought1 and probably never will think of making such an examination2 and yet they have no shadow of doubt that there exists a real world1 distinct from us1 but in incessant communication with us4 ,nature precedes philosophy4 ,we have no wish to show reason to be unable to vindicate the legitimacy of the inference whereby the real is deduced from the ideal1 the existence of the external world from that of the internal2 we would only point out a landmark to philosophy1 which1 if it does not illustrate it1 may at least inspire it with sobriety in investigating1 and with mistrust in its results4 ,indeed we cannot but see that that science must be erroneous which is opposed to a necessity1 and contradicts an evident fact3 it merits not to be called philosophy1 if it struggles with a law to which all humanity1 not even excepting the philosopher who presumes to protest against it1 is inevitably subject4 ,all that can be said against this law1 may be as specious as you please1 but it will only be a vain cavil1 a cavil which1 if unanswerable by our weak understanding1 nature herself will resist until we shall in another life see the depths of these secrets1 and how those links are joined whose points of contact reason cannot detect1 although nature feels their irresistible union at every moment of her existence4 #be4 ,that sensations are something more than mere phenomena of our soul1 that they are effects of a cause distinct from ourselves1 is seen by comparing them with each other4 ,we refer some to an external object2 others we do not3 these two orders of phenomena present very different characters4 ,i now have within me the representation of the country where ,i was born and spent my earliest years4 ,i see clearly a vast plain with its fields and prairies1 its little hills1 now forming only isolated hillocks1 now stretching in various directions1 sinking to the level of the plain1 or gradually rising until incorporated with the mountains1 the lofty chain of which surrounds all the plain1 and makes it a great amphitheatre1 with no outlet except on the south1 and here and there a chasm1 seemingly torn in the mighty wall reared by nature4 ,all this is very perfectly represented within me1 although more than a hundred leagues distant1 and this whenever1 and as long as ,i choose4 ,the same spectacle may1 perhaps1 be offered to me without the concurrence of my will1 but ,i am always free to distract myself from it2 ,i may drop the curtain upon this scene1 or raise it anew at my pleasure4 ,what happens in this case is confirmed by many others2 and thus ,i internally experience a series of phenomena representative of external objects1 but am under no necessity to submit to them1 for ,i can abandon or resume them by simple acts of my free will4 ,but1 at the same time1 ,i feel within myself another class of phenomena which are not dependent upon my will1 and which ,i cannot abandon and resume at pleasure2 they are subject to certain conditions which ,i cannot dispense with under pain of not attaining my purpose4 ,i now experience that a painting is represented to me2 or1 in ordinary language1 ,i see a painting before me4 ,let us suppose this to be a purely internal phenomenon1 and observe the conditions of its existence1 abstracting1 however1 all external reality1 that of my own body included1 and that1 also1 of the organs whereby the sensation is1 or seems to be1 transmitted to me4 ,now ,i experience the sensation2 now ,i do not4 ,what has intervened8 ,the sensation of a motion that has produced another sensation of sight1 and has destroyed the first2 or1 passing from ideal to real language1 ,i have placed my hand between my eyes and the object4 ,but why can ,i not during the last1 reproduce the first sensation8 ,we see clearly that if external objects do exist1 and my sensations are produced by them1 my sensations must be subject to the conditions which they impose upon them2 but if they are only internal phenomena1 there is no way of explaining them4 ,this is only the more incomprehensible as we do not find in the sensations1 which we consider as mere phenomena with no immediate relation to an external object1 a close dependence of some upon others1 but rather1 on the contrary1 great discordance4 #bf4 ,purely internal phenomena1 those which we regard as truly such1 are1 so far as their existence and their modifications are concerned1 greatly dependent upon the will4 ,i produce in my imagination1 whenever ,i please1 a scene representing the ,column of the ,place ,vendme at ,paris1 and ,i suppress it at my pleasure4 ,the same occurs with respect to all other objects which ,i recollect to have seen2 their presence within me depends upon my will4 ,it is true that sometimes objects which we do not wish are represented to us1 and that some effort is necessary to make them disappear4 ,if we see a dying person1 his countenance pale and damp with sweat1 his wandering eyes1 his clenched hands1 his distorted mouth and painful breathing1 interrupted with piteous groans1 remain long after stamped upon our imagination3 this sad spectacle will often recur to us in spite of ourselves2 but it is very certain that if we go into some complicated calculation1 or engage in the solution of some difficult problem1 we shall succeed in making it disappear4 ,we see by this1 that even in exceptional cases1 so long as we are of sane mind1 our will always exerts a great influence over purely internal phenomena4 ,it is otherwise with those which have immediate relation to external objects4 ,we cannot1 when in presence of the dying person1 avoid seeing and hearing him4 ,if these sensations be only a purely internal phenomenon1 this phenomenon is of a very different order from that of the other4 ,the one is wholly independent of our will1 not so the other4 ,purely internal phenomena have a very different mutual relation from that of external phenomena4 ,the will exerts a great influence upon the former1 but not upon the latter4 ,the former also are offered either by a mere act of the will1 or by themselves1 in isolation1 and need no connection with other preceding phenomena4 ,i write at ,madrid1 and all at once ,i find myself on the banks of the ,thames1 with its countless fleet of ships and steamers4 ,but this did not require me to pass through the series of phenomena which represent what are called ,france and ,spain4 ,i can represent the ,thames to myself immediately1 after a thousand sensations1 neither connected among themselves1 nor with it2 but if ,i would produce in myself the phenomenon called seeing1 ,i must pass through the whole series of phenomena consequent upon a voyage2 and this not in any way ,i may fancy1 but so as to feel really and truly all the accompanying pleasures and inconveniences2 ,i must make a true resolution to depart1 and arrive punctually at such an hour1 at the risk of missing the sensation called1 seeing the stage1 and another1 which ,i call1 seeing myself started2 in fine1 all the disagreeable sensations arising from such a mischance4 ,when ,i would represent this series of internal phenomena1 or1 in common language1 adventures of travel1 only internally1 ,i dispose all at my pleasure2 ,i stop1 or travel faster2 ,i take steps of a hundred leagues1 and pass immediately from one point to another1 and ,i experience none of those inconveniences which render the reality fatiguing4 ,i am in a world where ,i am master4 ,i command1 and the coach is ready1 the driver on his box1 the postilion in his saddle2 and ,i fly as borne on the wings of the wind4 ,beautiful landscapes1 barren lands1 gigantic mountains1 and plains whose boundaries join the heavens1 all pass before my eyes with wonderful rapidity4 ,tired of the land1 ,i embark upon the lofty deep2 ,i see the angry waves1 and hear1 amid their roaring and dashing against the ship1 the voice of the captain giving his orders4 ,i see the sailors work the ship2 ,i speak with the passengers1 and roam through the cabins2 and yet perceive no offensive smell1 and neither feel the qualms of sea-sickness1 nor observe them in others4 #bg4 ,if purely internal sensations1 especially when they proceed from external sensations1 be indeed mutually connected1 their connection is not such that it may not be modified in a thousand ways4 ,when we think of the ,obelisk of the ,place de la ,concorde1 its fountains and statues1 are very naturally presented to us2 so1 also1 are the ,palace of the ,tuileries1 and that of the ,chamber of ,deputies1 the ,madeleine1 and the ,champs-,elyses2 but we can1 by an act of the will1 change the scene2 and if we choose we may transfer the ,obelisk to the ,place du ,carrousel1 and admire the effect it produces there1 until1 satisfied with the operation1 we restore it to its granite base1 or think no more of it4 ,but with sight1 or the external phenomenon1 we should in vain strive to perform such manuvres2 everything keeps its place1 or1 at least1 seems to2 and the sensations are bound together with bands of iron4 ,one comes after the other1 and we cannot pass by any4 ,the mere observation1 then1 of what passes within us reveals the existence of two wholly distinct orders of phenomena3 in the one1 everything1 or almost everything1 depends upon our will2 in the other1 nothing4 ,in the one1 the phenomena have certain mutual relations1 very variable1 however1 and to a great extent subject to our fancy2 in the other1 they are dependent upon each other1 and are produced only under certain conditions4 ,we cannot see1 if we do not open the blinds so as to allow the light to enter4 ,here the phenomena of blinds and sight are necessarily connected2 but they are not always so2 for we may open them at night1 and yet not see2 and then we require another auxiliary phenomenon1 which is1 artificial light4 ,we cannot1 if we would1 change this law of dependence4 #bh4 ,what does all this show8 ,does it not show that the phenomena not dependent upon our will1 but subject both as to their existence and accidents to laws which we cannot change1 are produced by beings distinct from ourselves8 ,they are not ourselves1 for we often exist without them2 they are not caused by our will1 for they often occur without its concurrence1 often also against it2 they are not produced one by the other in the purely internal order1 for it very frequently happens that a phenomenon which has a thousand times followed another suddenly ceases1 however often the former be reproduced4 ,this leads us to examine an hypothesis which will greatly confirm the doctrine we have laid down4 ,,chapter ,v4 ,,an ,,idealist ,,hypothesis4 #bi4 ,the system of the ,idealists cannot stand without supposing the connection and dependence which we refer to external objects1 to exist only within us1 and the causality which we attribute to external objects1 to belong solely to our own acts4 ,i pull a rope in my chamber1 and a bell never fails to ring2 or in idealist language1 the sensation formed from that union of sensations into which enters what we call the rope and pulling it1 produces or involves that other1 which we call ringing a bell4 ,either from habit or some hidden law1 that relation of two phenomena will exist1 the never interrupted succession of which causes the illusion in us1 whereby we transfer to the real order1 what is purely imaginary4 ,this is the most irrational explanation possible1 and a few observations will show it to be futile4 ,today1 we pull the rope1 and strangely enough1 no bell rings3 but why not8 ,the causing phenomenon exists2 for undoubtedly there passes within us the act called pulling the rope1 and yet we pull and pull again1 and the bell does not ring4 ,who has changed the succession of phenomena8 ,why does not the phenomenon which a little while ago produced another1 not produce it now8 ,nothing new has happened within us1 we experience the first phenomenon just as clearly and vividly as before2 why1 then1 is not the second presented8 ,why is it that formerly we experienced the second whenever we wished1 by only exciting the first1 and now we cannot8 ,we make the act of our will just as efficaciously as before2 who1 then1 has rendered our will impotent8 ,hence we infer3 first1 that the second phenomenon does not depend upon the first1 considered only as a purely internal fact1 for this now exists precisely as it did before1 and yet produces not the same phenomenon2 secondly1 that it does not depend upon the act of our will2 for this is now as firm and strong as before1 and yet produces nothing4 ,we cannot1 however1 doubt that there is some connection between the two phenomena1 for we have innumerable times seen one follow the other1 and this cannot be explained by mere chance4 ,since then1 one does not cause the other in the internal order1 they must have some dependence in the external order2 in other words1 still keeping in view the case under examination1 although the cause which produced the first phenomenon continues to exist1 its connection with that which produced the other phenomenon must be interrupted2 and so it was1 in fact2 for when we pulled the rope no sound followed1 for the simple reason that the bell had been removed4 ,this is comprehensible1 if there be causes external to what we call sensations2 but if there be only simple internal phenomena1 no rational explanation can be given4 #cj4 ,and here it is to be observed1 that when we would explain the failure of succession of those phenomena which always have been united1 we may recur to many very different ones1 such as are internal phenomena1 which1 as such1 have neither relation nor resemblance1 and can only have some connection as corresponding to external objects4 ,we may1 when seeking the reason why the bell did not ring1 in order to explain the cause of the change in the regular order of appearances1 think of various causes1 which we now consider as mere appearances or internal phenomena2 we may have the following sensations3 the rope broken1 or caught1 the bell broken1 or removed1 or without a tongue4 ,we may attribute the failure of sound to any one of these sensations3 but nothing can possibly be more irrational than to attribute it to them1 if we regard them as mere internal facts2 for as sensations1 they nowhere appear4 ,we cannot discourse rationally if we do not make an external object correspond to each of these sensations1 of itself alone sufficing to interrupt the connection between pulling the rope and the vibration of the air which produces the sound4 #ca4 ,hence we conclude3 ,first1 that our sensations considered as purely internal phenomena1 are divided into two very different classes2 some depend upon our will1 others do not2 some have no mutual connection1 or are variable in their relations1 at the pleasure of him who experiences them2 others have a certain connection which we can neither change nor destroy4 ,secondly1 we conclude that the existence as well as the modifications of this last class1 proceeds from causes not ourselves1 independent of our will1 and outside of us4 ,that instinct1 therefore1 which impels us to refer these sensations to external objects1 is confirmed by reason3 therefore the testimony of the senses1 in so far as it assures us of the reality of objects1 is admissible at the tribunal of philosophy4 ,this demonstrates1 in a certain manner1 the existence of bodies2 for we find1 in philosophically examining the conception of body1 something in it distinct from our own being1 the presence of which causes us such and such sensations4 ,we know not the intimate essence of bodies2 but even if we did know it1 it would not aid our present purpose1 for we are not treating of the idea which a philosopher would in such a case form1 but of that formed by the generality of men4 ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,is ,,the ,,external ,,and ,,immediate ,,cause ,,of ,,sensations ,a ,,free ,,cause8 #cb4 ,a difficulty1 at first sight serious1 but in reality futile1 may be brought against the existence of bodies4 ,who knows1 it may be asked1 but what some cause1 not at all resembling the idea which we form of bodies1 produces in us all the phenomena that we experience8 ,god may1 if he pleases1 cause one or many sensations in us2 and who shall assure us that he does not8 ,who shall assure us that other beings may not do the same1 and so all our imaginations of a corporeal world be a pure illusion8 #cc4 ,the first and simplest solution that can be given is1 that ,god1 being infinitely true1 can neither deceive us himself1 nor allow other creatures to deceive us constantly and in a way that we cannot resist4 ,but this solution although well founded1 just1 and reasonable1 labors under the inconvenience of establishing the physical by recurring to the moral order2 and so it would never satisfy those who desire to see the truth of the testimony of the senses demonstrated by arguments drawn from the nature of things4 ,such arguments we think we can supply4 #cd4 ,our sensations do not proceed immediately from a free cause2 the being that produces them1 as well as that which experiences them1 is subject to fixed and necessary laws4 ,to be convinced of this1 we have only to reflect that we cannot1 if placed in certain conditions1 fail to experience a determinate sensation1 and that if these conditions be wanting1 we cannot experience it4 ,and this proves that we1 as well as the being which causes the impression in us1 are subject to a necessary order4 ,were it not thus1 we could not produce the sensation even by the means of certain conditions2 for as its cause would be subject to no law1 but only to its own free will1 it might a thousand times happen1 that our will would not agree with its will1 and so the desired impression would not be produced4 ,after experiencing a sensation of touch in which it seems that an opaque body covers our eyes1 we do not see1 and we cannot with all our efforts produce1 the sensation called seeing2 on the other hand1 if at a corresponding hour and place this sensation of contact ceases to exist1 we cannot possibly fail to experience the sensation of seeing different objects4 ,here1 therefore1 we are subject to a necessity2 the being1 also1 that causes the sensations in us1 is subject to a like necessity2 for if we perform the condition once or a thousand times of closing our eyes1 once or a thousand times the sensation will disappear2 or if we open them once or a thousand times in a light place1 so many times also the sensation will be produced2 the same1 if we retain everything in the same state1 and varied at our pleasure1 if we change our situation or the objects around us4 ,there does1 therefore1 exist without us1 subject to necessary laws1 a collection of beings which produce our sensations4 #ce4 ,it is remarkable not only that the influence they exert upon us does not flow from election or spontaneity in them1 but that they are not even presented as endowed with an activity of their own4 ,a painting hung upon the wall produces in us the same sensation as often as we look at it2 and1 saving the deterioration of time1 it will continue for ever to produce the same sensation4 ,it is1 moreover1 evident that these beings are subject to our action1 for we can1 by acting upon them differently1 make them produce different impressions4 ,we touch a ball1 and the continuation of the sensation of a hard1 polished1 spherical body1 assures us that it is one and the same being that produces it for a certain length of time2 and yet1 in this interval1 we may receive many and various sensations from the same object1 by presenting it to the light in different ways4 #cf4 ,the subjection of these beings to necessary laws is not necessarily with respect to sensations1 but is rather a mutual connection of their own4 ,the connection of impressions which we receive from them is an effect of the dependence of some of them upon others2 so that1 in order to produce a determinate impression1 we often employ an object which is1 in itself considered1 of no direct use1 but which brings another into action1 and so leads to what we desire4 ,to raise a curtain has no connection with a magnificent landscape2 and yet1 oftentimes1 we do nothing else when we wish to obtain a pleasant prospect4 ,the relation in question is not then of sensations1 but of their objects2 the connection of these is what induces us to make use of one of them in order to obtain another4 ,there is1 therefore1 outside of us a collection of beings subject to fixed laws1 as well with respect to our sensations as to themselves mutually2 therefore the external world exists1 and the internal world1 which represents it to us1 is not a pure illusion4 ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,,analysis ,,of ,,the ,,objectiveness ,,of ,,sensations4 #cg4 ,is the external world such as we believe it to be8 ,are the beings1 called bodies1 which cause our sensations in reality what we believe them8 ,may we not1 even after having demonstrated the existence of these beings1 and their necessary subjection to constant laws1 still doubt whether we have demonstrated the existence of bodies8 ,does it suffice for this to have proved the existence of external beings in relation among themselves and with us by means of laws fixed and independent of them as of ourselves8 #ch4 ,thoroughly to understand this question1 it will be well to simplify it1 and confine it to a single object4 ,i hold in my hand and see an orange4 ,i am certain1 from what has just been demonstrated1 that an external object exists in relation with other beings1 and with myself1 by necessary laws2 ,i am also certain that ,i may receive different impressions from it2 ,i see its color1 size1 and shape1 perceive its odor1 try its taste2 feel in my hand its size1 weight1 and form1 its concavities and convexities1 and also hear a little noise when ,i press it with my hand4 ,the idea of body is composite1 and such is that of the orange2 for it is that of something external1 extended1 colored1 odorous1 and savory4 ,whenever all these circumstances exist together1 whenever ,i receive from an object these same impressions1 ,i say that ,i see an orange4 #ci4 ,let us now examine how far the object corresponds to the sensations it causes in us4 ,what do we mean when we say a thing is savory8 ,simply1 that it produces an agreeable impression upon our palate2 and the same is true of smell4 ,therefore1 the two words1 odorous and savory1 express only the causality of these sensations resident in the external object4 ,we may say the same of color1 for1 although we commonly transfer the sensation to the object1 and openly contradict the philosophical theory of light and color1 this contradiction is less real than apparent2 for the judgment well examined is found to consist only in referring the impression to determinate objects2 so that when we for the first time hear professors of physics tell us that colors are not in the object1 we easily accustom ourselves to reconcile the philosophical theory with the impression of the sense2 especially since this theory does not render it less true that this or that impression comes to us from this or that object1 or its different parts4 #dj4 ,here1 it is not difficult to explain the phenomena of sensation or their correspondence with external objects2 for the correspondence is saved if these objects be really the cause 7or occasion7 of the sensations4 ,the question of extension is more difficult2 for this is as the basis of all other sensible properties2 and abstracting its constituting or not constituting the essence of bodies1 it is certain that we know no body without extension4 #da4 ,the following observation will render palpable the difference between extension and other sensible qualities4 ,he who has never thought of the relation of external objects to his sensations is indescribably confused2 he in some sense transfers color1 odor1 taste1 and even sound1 to objects themselves1 and considers confusedly these things to be qualities inherent in them4 ,thus the child and the uneducated man believe the color green to be really in the foliage1 odor in the rose1 sound in the bell1 taste in the fruit4 ,but this is readily seen to be a confused judgment1 of which they render no perfectly clear account to themselves2 a judgment which may be changed or even destroyed without changing or destroying the relations of our sensations with their objects4 ,even at a very tender age we easily accustom ourselves to refer color to light1 and even not to fix it definitively1 but to regard it as an impression produced upon our sense by the action of that mysterious agent4 ,it costs us no more to consider smell as a sensation produced by the action of the effluvia of bodies upon the organ of smell2 we also cease to consider sound as something inherent in the sonorous body1 and come to see in it only the impression caused upon the sense by the vibration of the air1 excited in its turn by the vibration of the sonorous body4 ,these philosophical considerations may1 at first sight1 seem to be in contradiction to our judgment1 but they do not change to us the external world2 they cause no inversion of our ideas of it2 they only make us fix our attention upon some relations which we had imperfectly defined1 and do not allow us to attribute to objects what in reality does not belong to them4 ,they make us limit the testimony of the senses to their appropriate sphere1 and in some manner rectify our judgments2 but the world continues the same that it was before1 excepting that we have discovered in the marvels of nature a closer relation with our own being1 and have perceived that our organization and our soul play a more important part in them than we had imagined4 #db4 ,if we destroy extension1 take this quality from external objects1 and regard it as only a mere sensation1 of which we only know that there is an external object which causes it1 the corporeal world at once disappears4 ,the whole system of the universe will be reduced to a collection of beings which cause us different impressions2 without the idea of extension we can neither form any idea of body1 nor know if all that we have thought of the world be aught else than a pure illusion4 ,i can easily resign my infantile belief that the color ,i see in my hand is in it1 or the noise made when ,i clap my hands is in them2 but ,i cannot1 do what ,i will1 lay aside the idea of extension2 ,i cannot imagine the distance from my wrist to the extremity of my fingers to be only a pure illusion1 that there only exists a being which causes it without my knowing whether in reality this distance exists4 ,i can easily separate from the fruit which ,i find savory the quality of savor2 and ,i may1 if ,i examine it philosophically1 admit1 without any inconvenience1 that it has nothing resembling taste1 but that it is only composed so to affect my palate as to produce an agreeable sensation4 ,but ,i cannot take from the fruit its extension2 in no wise can ,i regard it as something indivisible2 ,i cannot possibly regard the distance from one of its points to another as a mere sensation4 ,my efforts to consider the savory object as in itself indivisible are all in vain2 and if1 for a single instant1 ,i seem to have overcome the instinct of nature1 every thing is overturned4 ,by the same right that ,i make the fruit something indivisible1 ,i may make the whole universe so2 but an indivisible universe is to me no universe2 my intellect is confounded1 and all around me is annihilated4 ,i am in worse than chaos2 for chaos is at least something1 although the elements are in horrible confusion and frightful darkness2 but now ,i am worse off1 for the corporeal world1 such as ,i have conceived it to be1 returns to nothing4 ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,,sensation ,,of ,,extension4 #dc4 ,two of our senses perceive extension2 sight and touch4 ,sound1 taste1 and smell accompany extension1 but are something different from it4 ,the sight perceives nothing not extended2 extension is every way inseparable from this sensation4 ,we may be so enchanted by the sweet harmony of many instruments as to forget the extension of the instruments1 the air1 and our organs2 but we cannot1 in contemplating a painting even in the midst of our most ardent enthusiasm1 make its extension vanish4 ,if we withdraw from the ,transfiguration of ,raphael its extension1 the marvel disappears2 for even considered as a simple phenomenon of our soul1 continuity and distance enter of necessity into its very essence4 ,the same is true of touch1 although less generally so4 ,hardness and softness1 roughness and smoothness1 squareness and roundness1 all involve extension2 but it cannot be denied that there are some impressions of touch1 in which it is less clearly involved4 ,the acute pain of a puncture1 and others felt without any known external cause1 are not so clearly referred to extension1 but seem to have something of that simplicity which distinguishes the impressions of the other senses4 ,however this may be1 it is certain that the perception of extension belongs in a special manner to sight and touch4 #dd4 ,in order to form a clear idea of extension in its relations to sensation1 we will analyze it at some length4 ,and first of all1 it is to be remarked1 that extension involves multiplicity4 ,an extended being is of necessity a collection of beings1 more or less closely united by a bond which makes them all constitute one whole1 but does not prevent them from continuing many4 ,a splendid painting1 wherein the unity of the artist's thought dominates1 does not cease to be composed of many parts2 the moral chain which unites1 does not identify them2 it only connects1 co-ordinates them1 and makes them conspire to one end4 ,the firm adhesion of the molecules forming the diamond does not prevent these molecules from being distinct3 the material chain unites1 but does not identify them4 ,there is then no extension without multiplicity3 where there is extension1 there is1 rigorously speaking1 not one only being1 but many beings4 #de4 ,multiplicity does not constitute extension1 for it may exist without extension4 ,neither the multiplicity of sounds1 of tastes1 nor of odors1 constitutes extension4 ,we conceive in the material1 as in the moral and intellectual orders1 multiplicity of beings of different orders1 and yet this multiplicity involves no idea of extension4 ,even if we confine ourselves to the purely mathematical order1 we find multiplicity without extension1 in arithmetical and algebraic quantities4 ,therefore multiplicity1 although necessary1 does not alone suffice to constitute extension4 ,if we reflect upon the species of multiplicity required to constitute extension1 we shall observe that it must be accompanied by continuity4 ,sensations of touch as well as of sight involve continuity2 for it is impossible for us to see or to touch1 without receiving the impression of objects continuous1 immediately adjoining each other1 co-existing in their duration1 and at the same time presented as continuous one with another in space4 ,without this continuity1 multiplicity does not constitute extension4 ,if1 for example1 we take four or more points on the paper on which we now write1 and by an abstraction consider them as indivisible1 this multiplicity will not constitute extension3 we must unite them by lines at least imaginary2 and if continuity be wanting to the body in which we suppose them situated1 we shall find it necessary to recur to the continuity of space2 that is1 to regard this space as a collection of points whose continuation connects the first points4 ,no possible efforts can enable us to consider a collection of indivisible points1 neither continuous nor united by lines1 as extension2 this collection will be to us as that of beings having no connection with extension4 ,it is worthy of observation1 that if we assign them a determinate position in space1 this we do only by connecting them with other points1 by means of imaginary lines3 for we cannot otherwise conceive either distances or position in space4 ,if we attempt to abstract all this1 we either fall into intellectual nothingness1 we annihilate all idea of the object1 or we pass to another order of beings having no relation either to extension or space4 ,we quit matter and sensations1 and mount to the realm of spirits4 #df4 ,multiplicity and continuity are therefore necessary to constitute extension2 and we believe that these two conditions suffice2 for where they exist1 extension exists1 and with them alone1 we form the idea of extension4 ,the object of geometry is extension2 and only multiplicity and continuity constitute it4 ,lines1 surfaces1 solids1 such as are the object of geometry1 are only this continuity considered in its greatest abstraction4 ,empty space suffices1 or rather is requisite for geometry2 since1 it does not1 in making its applications to bodies1 find all the exactness of continuity in the abstract4 #dg4 ,if multiplicity and continuity constitute extension in space1 it really exists in the objects which cause our sensations4 ,basing ourselves upon the relation of phenomena among themselves and to their causes1 we have shown that external objects correspond to sensations3 thus it is that this relation also exists with respect to multiplicity and continuity2 these two properties are therefore found in nature4 ,the impressions that we receive by sight and touch1 are1 although we confine ourselves to a single object1 multiple1 and consequently correspond to many objects3 they are continuous1 and consequently correspond to continuous objects4 ,we will explain this reasoning4 ,looking at a painting1 ,i receive an impression coming from many different points2 and this impression1 it must be observed1 comes uninterruptedly from the whole surface presented4 ,if1 as we have shown1 the sight of one external point sufficed to convince me of its existence1 that of many will make me sure of the existence of many2 and the continuity of the impression will also make me certain of the continuity of the impressing points4 ,if ,i touch the object seen1 my touch will confirm that testimony of sight1 in what corresponds to it1 that is1 the multiplicity and continuity1 ,i experience the same continued succession of sensations2 and this shows me the existence and continuity of the objects causing them4 #dh4 ,in a few words1 extension supposes the co-existence of many objects1 in such a way1 however1 that they are one by continuation of others3 of both1 sensation makes us certain3 therefore the testimony of the senses suffices to make us certain that there are external objects1 and that they may produce various impressions4 ,these ideas contain every thing included in the idea of body3 therefore the testimony of the senses makes us certain of the existence of bodies4 ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,,objectiveness ,,of ,,the ,,sensation ,,of ,,extension4 #di4 ,having proved the testimony of the senses sufficient to assure us of the existence of bodies1 we now come to examine how far the ideas it makes us form are correct4 ,it is not enough to know that we may be sure of the existence of extension2 we must inquire if it in reality be such as the senses represent it2 and what we say of extension is applicable to the other properties of bodies4 ,in our opinion1 the only sensation that we transfer1 and cannot help transferring1 to the external1 is that of extension2 all others relate to objects only as effects to causes1 not as copies to originals4 ,sound1 taste1 and smell represent nothing resembling the objects causing them1 but extension does2 we attribute extension to objects1 and without it we cannot conceive them4 ,sound outside of me is not sound1 but only a simple vibration of the air1 produced by the vibration of a body4 ,taste outside of me is not taste1 but only a body applied to an organ of which it causes a mechanical or chemical modification4 ,the same is true of smell4 ,even in light and colors1 outside of me1 there is only a fluid which falls upon a surface1 and either directly or reflexly comes1 or may come1 to my eyes4 ,but extension outside of me1 independently of all relation with the senses1 is true extension1 is something whose existence and nature stand in no need of my senses4 ,when ,i perceive1 or imagine that ,i perceive it1 there is in it1 and in my impressions1 something besides the relation of an effect to its cause2 there is the representation1 the internal image of what exists externally4 #ej4 ,in order that the truth of what we have just advanced may be perfectly understood1 and strongly felt1 we would offer the reader a picture whence determinate sensations may be successively eliminated1 and made to mark the degree of elimination which it is possible to reach1 but not pass4 ,let us suppose all animals at once to lose the sense of taste1 or all bodies to be by nature destitute of the property of causing by their contact with an organ the sensation called taste4 ,the external world1 nevertheless1 continues to exist as before2 the same bodies that caused in us the sensations now lost1 continue to exist1 and may be applied to the very organ they before affected1 and cause in it sensations of touch1 as of soft or hard1 warm or cold4 ,either savory bodies1 or the organs of animals1 have undergone some change1 which has interrupted their previous relations2 a cause which before produced an effect is now seen to be impotent to produce it4 ,this may be owing to a modification of the bodies without changing their nature1 so far as we know it2 and it is also possible that they have not been changed1 but that this difference arises solely from an alteration of the organs4 ,but in any case1 the disappearance of this sensation has not made anything resembling it disappear from the universe2 if the change has been only in the organs1 external bodies remain untouched2 and if it has taken place in bodies1 it has made them lose a causing property of the sensation1 but not a property represented by the sensation4 ,we have taken all taste from food1 and the universe exists as before2 let us now take away all odors1 by changing odoriferous bodies1 or the organ of smell4 ,the same follows as in the case of taste4 ,odoriferous bodies will continue to exist1 and even transmit to our organ the effluvia that before produced the sensation of smell2 and the only novelty will be the non-existence of that sensation4 ,either the disposition to receive the necessary impression will be wanting in our organs1 or a causality will have disappeared from the universe1 but not a thing represented by the sensation4 ,gardens will not be despoiled of their beauty1 nor the fields of their luxuriant verdure2 the tree will still display its leafy bower1 and the fair fruit hang from its boughs1 and be shaken by the wind4 ,let us proceed in our destructive march1 and now suddenly make all animals deaf4 ,the musician becomes the actor of a silent pantomime2 the bell-rope is pulled1 and only the mute metal is struck2 conversation is reduced to oral gestures1 and the howlings of brutes are only the opening and closing of their mouths4 ,but the air vibrates as before2 its columns strike as before the drum of the ear2 nothing has been changed2 nothing has failed in the universe but one sensation4 ,the lightning ploughs the skies1 rivers follow their majestic course1 torrents dash onwards with the same rapidity1 and the proud cascade still leaps from its lofty rocks1 and displays its changing hues and foaming waves4 ,but let us now commit the greatest cruelty2 let us make all living creatures blind4 ,the sun still pours out his immense torrents of the fluid we call light2 it is reflected from surfaces1 and is refracted from the bodies it meets1 and passes to the retinas of eyes that formerly saw1 but are now converted into insensible membranes1 placed behind a crystal2 but every thing called color and sensation of light has disappeared4 ,yet the universe exists as before1 and the celestial bodies still follow their immense orbits4 ,as it is most difficult for us to abstract the sensation of light and colors from objects2 or1 in other words1 as we have a certain propensity to imagine that there really exist without us impressions which are only in us1 and to consider the sensation as a representation of the exterior2 so it costs us most to conceive all living creatures to be blind1 and nothing to remain of what sensations of this kind represented to us1 not even a fluid which reflects from certain surfaces1 and passes through some bodies1 not otherwise than as an invisible fluid4 ,wherefore1 in condescension to the difficulty which some experience in ceasing to externally realize what exists only within them1 we will frame our supposition differently2 for it will then be all that the demonstration requires1 and we may eliminate from objects whatever relates to any sensation excepting that of extension4 ,we will not then make all animals blind1 nor practise the cruelty of ,ulysses in the cave of ,polyphemus1 but spare in our inversion of the world that destructive instinct4 ,it matters little that men and animals are not blind1 provided they cannot see4 ,we will then leave those organs untouched1 but we will in return1 take all light from the universe2 quench like faint torches the sun and stars and all the celestial bodies1 extinguish their feeblest scintillations upon the earth1 the tall tapers which illumine the rich man's dwelling1 and the fire kindled in the peasant's cot1 the spark struck from the flint1 and the pale phosphorescences emitted from the graves of the dead4 ,every thing is involved in obscurity1 and it is as if that darkness which rested upon the face of the abyss before the ,creator said3 let there be light1 were restored4 ,we must bear in mind that we have not1 by plunging the world into such frightful obscurity1 changed any one of its laws4 ,the gigantic orbs describe as before with astonishing rapidity and admirable precision their immense orbits4 ,hence we infer that although we destroy smell1 taste1 sound1 light1 and colors1 the world still exists1 and we may without difficulty so conceive it to be4 ,we may even destroy the sensation of touch1 for it is easy to suppose that we perceive no impression by this sense4 ,we may substitute some sensations1 whose causes lie in bodies like those of heat and cold1 hardness and softness1 for others1 without therefore believing the universe no longer to exist4 #ea4 ,let us now make another abstraction1 and see what will happen4 ,let us destroy extension4 ,the world resists not this trial2 the stars vanish1 and the earth disappears beneath our feet1 distances no longer exist1 and motion is an absurdity3 our own body fades away and the whole universe is tumbled into nothingness1 or if it continues somehow to exist1 it is totally different from what we now imagine it to be4 ,and so indeed it is4 ,if we abstract extension1 if we do not externally realize that sensation1 or idea1 or whatever else it may be1 which we have of it1 if we do not consider it as the representation of what exists without us1 every thing is overthrown3 we know not what to think either of our sensations1 or their relation to the objects causing them2 things all go roundabout1 and one basis of our cognitions fails3 in vain we stretch out our arms to lay hold of some fixed point2 and we ask in our trouble1 if all that we perceive be only a pure illusion1 if ,berkeley's extravagances be true4 #eb4 ,it is worthy of remark that1 even if we make extension objective by transferring it to the external1 it is not altogether correct to say that it is represented by the sensation4 ,it is better to say that it is a receptacle of certain sensations1 a condition necessary to the functions of some of the senses1 but not their object4 ,extension abstracted from the sensations of sight and touch1 is1 as we have already said1 reduced to multiplicity and continuity4 ,the knowledge of it comes to us from the senses1 but it is different from what the senses represent it to us4 ,when we take color and light from the sensations1 received through the sense of sight1 we certainly still retain the idea of a thing extended1 but not of a visible thing1 nor of an object represented by the sensation4 ,in like manner1 if we despoil the sensations received through the sense of touch1 of those qualities which affect this sense1 the object that caused them is not annihilated1 neither is it represented by the impressions it transmits to us4 #ec4 ,these remarks show that we do not transfer our sensations to the exterior1 that they are a medium whereby our soul is informed1 but not images wherein it contemplates its objects4 ,all sensations indicate an external cause2 but some1 like those of sight and touch1 in an especial manner denote multiplicity and continuity1 or extension4 ,hence we also infer that the external world is not a pure illusion1 but that it really exists with its great masses1 its various motions1 its unlimited geometry3 but much of its beauty lies rather within ourselves than in it4 ,the ,creator of it has in an especial manner1 shown his infinite wisdom and omnipotent hand in sensible beings1 and above all in intelligences4 ,what would the universe be were there no one to feel and to understand8 ,the beauty1 the harmony1 the marvels of nature consist in the close relation1 the continuous communication of objects and sensible beings4 ,the rarest painting1 were there no one to perceive and admire its beauty1 would be only a collection of lineaments1 a hieroglyphic of unintelligible characters2 but so soon as it is seen by a feeling and knowing being1 it is animated1 is what it ought to be2 and in this wonderful communication the object gains in beauty all that it imparts of pleasure4 ,suppose a collection of instruments disposed by the proper mechanism to execute with admirable precision the highest conceptions of ,bellini or ,mozart3 to what is it all reduced if there be no sensitive being8 ,to vibrations in the air governed by some law1 to mere movements of a fluid1 subject to geometrical necessity4 ,introduce a man1 and the geometry is changed into celestial harmony1 then there is music1 enchantment4 ,the symmetry of the walks of a garden1 the elegance of its shrubbery1 the color and beauty of its flowers1 the fragrance of its odors1 are1 without a sensitive being1 only geometrical figures1 surfaces disposed according to some law1 volumes of such or such a kind1 columns of fluids springing from them and disappearing in space4 ,introduce man1 and the geometrical figures are adorned with a thousand beauties1 the flowers covered with gay colors1 and the columns of fluids changed into exquisite perfumes4 ,,chapter ,x4 ,,force ,,of ,,touch ,,to ,,make ,,sensations ,,objective4 #ed4 ,it has been said that touch is the surest1 and perhaps the only witness of the existence of bodies2 for without it1 all sensations would be nothing more than simple modifications of our being1 to which we could attribute no external object4 ,but this ,i do not believe to be true4 ,we receive by touch an impression1 just as we do by the other senses2 this impression is in all cases an affection of our being1 and not something external4 ,when1 from the continuance of these impressions1 their order1 and their independence of our will1 we judge them to proceed from objects without us1 our judgment is true not only of impressions of the sense of touch1 but also of those of the other senses4 #ee4 ,one of the reasons whereon it has been attempted to base the superiority of touch to attest the existence of bodies1 is that it gives us the idea or sensation of extension2 for if we suppose a man to be deprived of all his senses but that of touch1 and to pass his hand over the surface of a body1 he will experience that continuity of the sensation which involves extension4 ,this observation of those who maintain the supremacy of touch does not prove what they propose4 ,if we pass our sight over various objects1 or the different parts of one object1 we shall experience the sensation of continuity just as clearly as by touch4 ,we cannot conceive why the sensation of extension must be any clearer when the hand is passed along a balustrade than when it is seen by the eyes4 #ef4 ,the advocates of this opinion assert that we acquire by the touch of our body a double sensation1 which we do not by the other senses4 ,if we pass our hand over our forehead1 we feel with both our hand and our forehead1 and so verify a continuity of sensations1 all originating and terminating in ourselves4 ,thus we are conscious that both the sensations of our hand and our forehead belong to us4 ,but this reason1 by some deemed conclusive1 is nevertheless exceedingly futile2 it labors under the sophism called by dialecticians begging of the question1 for it supposes what was to be proved4 ,the man destitute of all senses but that of touch will1 indeed1 experience the two sensations and their continuity2 but what can he infer from them8 ,does he even know that he has either hand or forehead8 ,suppose him not to know1 how is he to acquire this knowledge8 ,both sensations belong to him1 and of this he is internally conscious2 but whence they came1 he knows not4 ,does the coincidence of the two sensations1 perchance1 prove something in favor of the existence of his forehead and hand1 objects of which we suppose him to have no idea8 ,if this coincidence proved what is pretended1 with still greater reason would it prove the combination of some senses with others to elevate us to the knowledge of the existence of bodies1 and consequently that this knowledge is not produced exclusively by touch4 ,whenever ,i have the sensation of the motion of placing my hand before my eyes1 ,i find that ,i lose sight of the objects before me1 and in their room is presented another always the same1 my hand4 ,if1 from this coincidence1 ,i infer the existence of external objects1 the supremacy of touch is destroyed1 for sight1 also1 acts a part in the formation of such a judgment4 ,i also observe that when ,i have the sensation of clapping my hands together1 ,i experience the sensation of hearing the noise of their contact2 if1 therefore1 coincidence is of any account1 hearing as well as touch comes in4 ,what ,i say concerning the clapping of my hands1 is applicable to what ,i experience when ,i pass a hand over any part of my body1 for instance my arm1 so as to produce some noise4 ,in this case there are two sensations coincident and continuous4 ,it will1 perhaps1 be replied1 that these examples refer to different senses1 and produce sensations of different kinds4 ,this1 however1 is of no consequence2 for1 if the being that perceives1 infers the existence of objects from the coincidence of various sensations1 the supremacy of touch is destroyed1 which is what we undertook to demonstrate4 #eg4 ,the sensation of the hand is not that of the forehead1 for the one is warmer or colder1 harder or softer than the other1 and so the sensation caused by the hand upon the forehead will not be the same as that produced upon the hand by the forehead4 ,it is to be observed1 that the less difference we suppose between the two sensations1 the less lively will be the perception of their duality1 and consequently the less marked the coincidence on which the judgment is founded4 ,thus by rigorously analyzing this matter we discover that the diversity of sensations contributes in an especial manner to form judgments of the existence of objects1 and therefore the combination of two senses will more conduce to this end than two sensations of one sense4 ,far1 then1 from its being necessary to consider touch as alone or superior upon this point1 it is only to be held as auxiliary to the other senses4 ,in truth1 it is almost beyond doubt that the sense of touch also requires the aid of the other senses1 and that the judgments resulting from it are similar to those coming from the other senses4 ,it is probable that only after repeated trials do we refer the sensation of touch to the object that causes it1 or even to the part affected4 ,the man who has had his arm amputated1 feels pain as if he still preserved it2 and this is because a repetition of acts has formed the habit of referring the cerebral impression to the point where the nerves transmitting it terminate4 ,there is1 therefore1 no necessary relation between the sense of touch and the object2 and this sense is1 like the others1 liable to illusions4 ,therefore1 it is not exact to say that the idea of body springs up under our hand1 if this be understood as excluding touch2 for the same is true of the other senses1 particularly of sight4 ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,,inferiority ,,of ,,touch ,,compared ,,with ,,other ,,senses4 #eh4 ,that superiority1 or rather that exclusive privilege1 conceded by ,condillac and other philosophers to touch1 not only has no foundation1 as we have just seen1 but seems to be in contradiction to the very nature of this sense4 ,in short1 it assigns the first place to the coarsest1 the most material of all the senses4 ,it cannot be known what ideas a man reduced to the one sense of touch would form of things2 but it seems to me that far from entering into clear and vivid communication with the external world1 and finding a sufficient foundation whereon to base his cognitions1 he would grope in the profoundest ignorance1 and labor under the most transcendental errors4 #ei4 ,if we compare touch with sight1 or even with hearing and smell1 we shall at once perceive a very important difference to its disadvantage4 ,touch transmits to us only impressions of objects immediately joining our body2 whereas1 the other three1 and especially sight1 place us in communication with far distant objects4 ,the fixed stars are separated from us by a distance such as almost to pass our imagination1 and yet we see them4 ,neither smell nor hearing1 it is true1 go so far2 but the former fails not to warn us of the existence of a garden at many paces from us2 and the latter gives us notice of a battle fought at many leagues distance1 of the electric spark which has cloven the clouds on the confines of the horizon1 or of the tempest roaring over the immensity of ocean4 #fj4 ,the limitation of touch to what is immediate to it involves a scarcity of the ideas originating in it alone1 and of necessity places it in a lower grade than the other three senses1 particularly sight4 ,let us in order to form clear ideas upon this point compare the range of sight with that of touch relatively to some object1 for example1 a building4 ,by means of sight we in a few instants obtain an idea of its front1 and other external parts2 and in a short time become acquainted with its internal divisions1 with the arrangement even of its ornaments and furniture4 ,can we accomplish all this by touch8 ,even if we suppose the most delicate sense of touch1 and the most tenacious memory of the impressions communicated1 long hours would be necessary to pass the hand over the front of the building1 and form some idea of it4 ,how will it be when we come to the whole exterior of the building8 the whole interior8 ,we see that it would be necessary to renounce such a task1 that the elaborate workmanship of a cornice1 a pedestal1 a peristyle1 the magnificence of a tower1 a cupola1 the boldness of an arch1 a vault1 which the eye seizes in an instant1 would require the poor being possessed of touch alone to go often on all fours1 climb over dangerous scaffoldings1 and expose himself to the danger of falling from fearful heights2 and yet he would never be able to acquire the millionth part of what the eyes so easily and so quickly perceive4 ,apply these observations to a city1 to vast countries1 to the universe1 and see what immense superiority sight has over touch4 #fa4 ,we do not indeed find so vast a superiority when we compare touch with the other senses2 nevertheless1 it does exist in a very high degree4 ,the first difference is the ability to act from a distance4 ,certainly1 touch also may in some manner perceive the presence or absence of the sun1 by means of the impressions of heat and cold2 and in like manner the presence or absence1 and the more or less close proximity of some bodies1 etc42 but not only are these impressions far from having the same variety and rapidity as those of hearing1 but they would not even give us any idea of distance1 if we had not already perceived it otherwise than by touch4 ,heat and cold1 dryness and moistness1 are what the impressions which some bodies1 though distant1 may make upon touch are reduced to2 and these impressions are clearly of a nature to be exposed to many serious errors4 #fb4 ,if we suppose a man1 having only the sense of touch1 to know the presence or absence of the sun above the horizon1 his only rule being the temperature of the atmosphere1 which depends upon a thousand causes having no connection with the orb of day1 it will happen that the natural or artificial change of it will lead him into error4 ,the dampness which we perceive around a lake is a sign of the nearness of the water2 but do we not a thousand times experience the feeling of dampness from causes operating on the atmosphere1 altogether independent of the waters of a lake8 ,it is certain that the concentration of all sensitive forces upon one sense1 the absence of all distraction1 and continual attention to only one kind of sensations1 might raise the delicacy of touch to a degree of perfection which we probably do not know2 just as the habit of connecting ideas with respect to only one order of sensations1 and of forming judgments concerning them1 produces a precision1 exactness1 and variety1 far superior to all that we can imagine4 ,but however far we might extend our conjectures upon this head1 it is certain that there is a limit in the nature of the organ and of its relations to bodies4 ,this organ must be limited to contiguous objects1 in order to receive well determined impressions2 and with respect to those that are distant1 and can act upon it1 they can do this by causing on it an impression such as the nature of both permits1 heat or cold1 dryness or dampness1 and if you will1 a certain pressure either greater or less4 ,so far as a great many other objects are concerned1 we cannot imagine any action4 ,however much the circle of this class of sensations be enlarged1 it must ever be very limited4 ,moreover1 we must observe1 that the perfectibility of touch by means of its isolation does not belong to it exclusively1 but extends likewise to the other senses2 for it is founded on the laws of organization1 and the generation of our ideas4 #fc4 ,to comprehend the superiority of hearing to touch in this matter1 we have only to consider the relation of distances1 the variety of objects1 the rapidity of the succession of sensations1 the simultaneousness so much greater in hearing than in touch1 and their relations to speech4 ,i4 ,relation of distances4 ,on this point1 hearing is clearly superior to touch1 for the latter generally requires contact1 the former does not1 but for the due appreciation of its object even requires a distance suited to the class of the sound4 ,of how many distant objects does hearing inform us of which touch can tell us nothing8 ,the gallop of the horse threatening to trample us under foot1 the roaring of the torrent which may carry us away in its course1 the thunder rumbling from afar1 and announcing the tempest1 the roar of cannon1 telling that a battle has begun1 the rattle of carriages in the streets1 drums and bells1 and clamor of voices which indicate the explosion of popular fury1 the noisy music that proclaims the joy caused by happy news1 the concert dedicated to the pleasures of the saloon1 the song that brings back melancholy recollections1 sentiments also of hope and love1 the groan that warns us of suffering1 the plaint that afflicts us with the idea of misery2 all this hearing tells us1 but touch can tell us nothing of any of these4 ,,ii4 ,variety of objects4 ,those distant objects which we know by touch1 are of necessity little varied2 and for the same reason the ideas resulting from it will be liable to a deplorable confusion and to great uncertainty4 ,hearing1 on the contrary1 informs us of infinite and exceedingly different objects1 and that1 too1 with perfect precision and exactness4 ,,iii4 ,rapidity of the succession of impressions4 ,it is evident that hearing has here an incalculable superiority over touch4 ,when touch perceives by juxtaposition1 it is under the necessity of successively going over the objects and even their different parts if it would receive varied impressions2 and this1 however small their number1 requires much time4 ,if the objects do not act by juxtaposition1 but by some medium1 the succession will require much more time1 and there will be much less variety4 ,compare this slowness to the rapidity with which hearing perceives a whole series of sounds in musical combinations1 the infinite inflexions of the voice1 the countless number of distinct articulations1 the infinity of noises of all kinds which we uninterruptedly perceive and classify1 and refer to their corresponding objects4 ,,iv4 ,the simultaneousness of sensations so vast in hearing1 is extremely limited in touch2 for in the latter it can only be in relation to a few objects2 but in the other it extends to many very different objects4 ,v4 ,but what most triumphantly indicates the superiority of hearing to touch1 is the facility it affords us of placing ourselves in communication1 by means of speech1 with the mind of our fellow-mortals1--a facility1 resulting from the rapidity of succession already remarked4 ,undoubtedly1 this communication of mind with mind1 may be established by touch1 if we express our words by characters sufficiently raised to be distinguished3 but what an immense difference between these impressions and those of hearing8 ,even if we suppose habit and a concentration of all the sensitive forces to have produced such a facility in passing the fingers over lines1 as far to surpass all that we see in the most dexterous players of musical instruments1 what comparison can there be instituted between this velocity and that of hearing8 ,how much time would be requisite only to go over tablets whereon is written a discourse which we hear in a few minutes8 ,moreover1 all men have means of hearing1 they need only make use of their organs4 ,but in order to converse by touch1 it is necessary to prepare tablets1 which can only serve for one object1 and cannot be at the same time used by two persons2 whereas by means of hearing1 one man alone may in brief time communicate an infinity of ideas to thousands of listeners4 ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,,can ,,sight ,,alone ,,give ,,us ,,the ,,idea ,,of ,a ,,surface8 #fd4 ,i have1 ,i believe1 made the inferiority of touch to sight and hearing palpable1 and have1 consequently1 shown the extravagance of endeavoring to make it the basis of all cognitions1 to found upon it the certainty of the judgments to which our other senses lead us1 and to make it a supreme judge to decide in the last appeal upon the doubts that may arise4 ,i hold it to be manifestly untrue that we cannot make the transition from the internal to the external world1 or from the existence of sensations to that of the objects causing them1 otherwise than by means of touch2 for not only have ,i combated the principal1 or rather the solitary reason upon which it is pretended to found this privilege1 but ,i have also demonstrated the mode of making this transition with respect to all the senses1 reasoning from the very nature and connection of internal phenomena4 ,i have likewise said and proved that the sensation of extension is the only one that is representative1 and that in all others there was only a relation of causality1 that is1 a connection of some sensation or an internal phenomenon with an external object1 without our transferring to this any thing resembling what we experienced in that4 #fe4 ,there are two senses which inform us with certainty of extension1 sight and touch4 ,we shall not now inquire if that be a true sensation which we have of extension1 or if it be an idea of a very different order1 resulting from the sensation4 ,i propose hereafter to examine this point1 but shall now confine myself to comparing sight with touch only as tending to give us the sensation of extension1 or1 if you will1 to furnish us with what is necessary to form an idea of it4 ,we cannot but see that extension lies within the domain of touch1 and that1 too1 whether it be considered only as a surface1 or also as a solid4 ,the same faculty cannot be denied to sight1 so far as surfaces are concerned2 for it is impossible to see if at least a plane be not presented to the eye4 ,a point without extension cannot be painted upon the retina1 but the instant an object is painted1 it has painted parts4 ,we can by no effort of our imagination1 conceive colors without extension2 for what is color without a surface over which it may extend8 #ff4 ,so hostile was ,condillac to the sense of sight that he was unwilling to allow it even the faculty of perceiving extension in surfaces2 but as he is of all philosophers the one who has most contributed to the propagation and establishment of this opinion1 we will examine his doctrine and its fundamental reasons4 ,we have only to read the chapters in which he explains it1 to see that he was not himself very confident of its truth1 but that he felt himself contradicted by both experience and reason4 ,in his ,trait des ,sensations1#cf where he examines the ideas of a man limited to the sense of sight1 he says that colors are distinguished by the sight because they seem to form a surface of which the eyes occupy a part1 and then asks3 ,will our statue1 judging itself to be at one time many colors1 perceive itself as a sort of colored surface8 ,we must bear in mind that1 according to ,condillac1 the statue confined to one sense will believe itself the sensation1 that is1 it will think that it is the odor1 the sound1 or the taste1 according as the sense of smell1 hearing1 or taste1 is the sense in exercise2 for which reason1 if a surface enter into the sensation of sight1 the statue ought to believe itself a colored surface4 ,i shall not examine the correctness of these observations1 but shall confine myself to the main point1 which is the relation of sight to a surface4 #cf ,p4 #a4 ,c4 xi4 #fg4 ,according to ,condillac1 the statue will never believe itself a colored surface1 that is1 although it may perceive the color1 it will not perceive the surface4 ,let the philosopher himself speak1 for his own words will suffice to condemn his opinion1 and to show the uncertainty with which he advanced it1 or else the obscurity under which it labors3 ,the idea of extension supposes the perception of many things1 some distinct from others4 ,this perception we cannot deny to the statue1 for it feels that it is repeated outside of itself as many times as there are colors modifying it4 ,when it is the red1 it feels itself outside of the green2 when the green1 it feels itself outside of the red1 and so with other colors4 ,some may imagine that1 conformably to these principles1 ,condillac goes on to establish that sight gives us the idea of extension1 since it makes us perceive things1 some outside of others1 in which1 according to him1 the idea of extension exactly consists4 ,but he does not2 far from following the true road1 he miserably loses his way2 he not only violates the principle he has just laid down1 but notably changes the state of the question4 ,he continues3 ,but in order to have a distinct and precise idea of magnitude1 it is necessary to see how the things perceived1 some outside of others1 are connected1 how they mutually terminate1 and how they are all enclosed in the limits which bound them4 ,this1 ,i repeat1 is to change the state of the question2 we are not now treating of a distinct and precise idea1 but simply of an idea4 ,how far the idea of extension given by sight is perfect1 is another question2 although it is manifest that if sight can give us an idea of extension1 it will come by continual exercise to render this idea more perfect4 #fh4 ,the statue1 in ,condillac's opinion1 could not perceive itself to be circumscribed by any limit1 because it could know nothing beyond itself2 but did he not just now tell us that the statue would believe itself different colors2 that some of these were outside of others2 and that when it would be one1 it would perceive itself outside of the others8 ,does this not imply not only one but many limits8 ,this difficulty did not altogether escape ,condillac2 for after having asked if the me of the statue1 when modified by a blue surface1 bordered with white1 would not believe itself a limited blue color1 he says3 ,at first sight we were inclined to believe that it would2 but the contrary opinion is much more probable4 ,but why8 ,the statue cannot perceive itself extended by this surface1 save inasmuch as each part modifies it in the same way2 each part should produce the sensation of blue color2 but if it is alike modified by a foot of this surface and by an inch1 it cannot perceive itself1 in this modification1 to be one magnitude rather than another4 ,therefore it does not perceive itself as magnitude2 therefore the sensation of color does not involve the idea of extension4 ,it is easy to see that ,condillac either supposes what is in debate1 or else says nothing to the point4 ,according to him1 the statue is alike modified by a foot of colored surface and by an inch4 ,if by this he means that the two modifications are identical under all aspects1 he supposes the very thing he ought to have proved2 for this is precisely the point in dispute1 whether surfaces differing in magnitude do1 or do not1 produce different sensations4 ,if he means1 as his words seem to indicate1 that the sensation as color1 and solely as color1 is the same in a foot of colored surface as in an inch1 he utters1 indeed1 an incontestable truth1 but one not at all to his purpose4 ,undoubtedly1 the sensation of blue1 as blue1 is the same in different magnitudes1 and no one ever thought of denying it4 ,but this is not the question3 it is whether1 the color remaining one and the same1 the sensation of sight is modified differently1 according to the variety of magnitude of the colored surface4 ,condillac denies it1 but in an uncertain and hesitating way4 ,we believe his negation to be so groundless that the direct contrary may be proved4 #fi4 ,i would ask ,condillac if he can have color without surface2 if an object without extension can be painted upon the retina2 if we can even conceive a color without extension4 ,no one of these is possible1 sight is therefore necessarily accompanied by extension4 #gj4 ,condillac places the idea of extension in some things being presented to us outside of others4 ,this1 as he him self confesses1 is verified in the sensation of color2 therefore the sight of what is colored must produce the idea of extension4 ,condillac's subterfuge here is an exceedingly weak one4 ,he pretends that it is necessary1 in order to have the idea of extension1 to have that of its limits4 ,but first of all1 we have shown from his own doctrine that these limits are perceived by the senses2 besides it is a very strange pretension to attribute to sight the faculty of giving us the idea of unlimited extension1 and to deny to it that of producing the idea of limitation2 as if there did not by the very fact of our seeing what is extended1 rise within us the idea of limitation1 if from no other cause1 from the very limitation of our organ2 or as if an unlimited were not more inconceivable than a limited sensation4 ,but suppose the limits not be perceived by the senses1 does unlimited extension therefore cease to be extension8 ,is it not rather extension of the highest order8 ,does the idea of space without end1 because unlimited1 cease to be an idea of extension8 #ga4 ,two colored circles1 one an inch1 and the other a yard in diameter1 are placed before our eyes2 will the effect produced upon the retina be the same in both1 abstraction made from all sensation of touch8 ,evidently not2 experience shows the contrary1 and the reason is founded on the laws of the reflection of light1 and on mathematical principles4 ,if the impressions are different1 the difference will be perceived2 therefore the difference of magnitude can be appreciated4 ,we will now suppose some one in spite of reason and experience to persist in maintaining that the sensation of the two circles will be the same in order to make the extravagance1 even the ridiculousness of this opinion palpable4 ,let us imagine the two circles to be of a red color1 and terminated by a blue line2 and now placing the less upon the greater circle so as to bring their centres together1 we ask1 will not the eye cast upon the figure see the less within the greater circle8 ,will not the blue line that terminates the circle of an inch in diameter be sure to be contained within the blue line that terminates the other circle of a yard in diameter8 ,but what else is the perception of extension than the perception of some parts beyond others8 ,is it not to perceive the difference of magnitude1 to perceive some greater than others1 and containing them8 ,evidently it is4 ,the sight therefore perceives magnitude2 therefore it perceives extension4 #gb4 ,we may still further confirm this truth4 ,experience teaches1 and did it not exist1 reason would still teach that there must be a limit to the field of sight1 according to our distance from the object4 ,thus1 when we fix our sight upon a wall of great extent we do not see it all1 but only a part4 ,now suppose an object of given magnitude to be within the range of sight1 but not so great as to cover the surface embraced by the eye4 ,according to ,condillac's system1 there can be no difference in the perception1 provided the color be the same2 whence1 it will follow1 that the sensation will be just the same1 whether the object occupy the whole1 or only an exceedingly minute part1 of the visual field4 ,it will likewise follow1 that1 if this visual field be1 for example1 a great white curtain a hundred yards square1 and the object a piece of blue cloth a yard square1 the sensation will be just the same whether the blue cloth be one inch or ninety yards square4 #gc4 ,these arguments1 which must have occurred at least confusedly to ,condillac1 made him hesitate in his expressions1 and even use contradictory language4 ,we may have already observed this in the passages cited1 but we shall see it yet more clearly in the following3--,we have no term to express with exactness the sentiment that the statue modified by many colors at one time has of itself2 but in fine1 it knows that it exists in many ways1 and perceives itself in a certain mode as a colored point beyond which are others1 in which it turns to find itself2 and under this point of view1 it may be said1 that it perceives itself extended4 ,he had before said1 that color did not seem extended to the statue1 until1 sight being instructed by touch1 the eye became accustomed to refer the one simple sensation to all the points of the surface3 and in the very next line1 as we have just seen1 he asserts the contrary2 the statue now perceives itself to be extended1 and the ideologist discovers no way of avoiding the contradiction1 but to warn us that the sentiment of extension will be vague because it wants limits4 ,this is a contradiction which we have already made evident4 ,but whence this want of limits8 ,if various figures of different colors1 green1 red1 etc41 be supposed to be upon a visual field of a hundred yards square of white surface1 the sight will1 as is evident1 perceive the limits of these figures2 where1 then1 did ,condillac discover that illimitation of which he talks8 #gd4 ,although it is very true that even if the sensation of color were to involve that of extension1 it would not therefore follow that it would produce it in us1 because we do not take from sensations all the ideas they contain1 but those only which we know4 ,this does not at all affect the present question4 ,we do not treat of what we can take from the sensation1 but of what is in it4 ,if ,condillac maintains that we may take the idea of extension from the sensation of touch1 by what right does he deny the same faculty with respect to sight1 supposing the idea of extension to be contained in both sensations8 ,if ,i mistake not1 this is a tacit confession of the falseness of his opinion4 ,the idea of extension is in the sensation of sight1 but we cannot take it thence4 ,why not8 ,because it is vague4 ,but then what is to prevent exercise1 involving comparison and reflection1 from rendering it distinct8 ,the difficulty consists in acquiring it in one way or another2 to perfect it is the work of time4 ,undoubtedly the first sensations of sight will not have that exactness which they have after much exercise2 but the same is true of the sense of touch4 ,this sense is perfected like the others2 it like them needs to be educated1 so to speak2 and those born blind1 who1 by force of concentration and labor1 come to possess it to an astonishing degree of delicacy1 offer us a manifest proof of this truth4 ,,chapter ,,xiii4 ,,cheselden',s ,,blind ,,man4 #ge4 ,cheselden's blind man1 of whom ,condillac spoke1 in confirmation of his opinions1 presents no phenomenon upon which they can rest4 ,this blind person was a youth of thirteen or fourteen years of age1 upon whom ,cheselden1 a distinguished ,london surgeon1 performed the operation of removing cataracts1 first from one eye1 then from the other4 ,he could before the operation tell day and night1 and in a very strong light distinguish1 white1 black1 and red4 ,this is an important circumstance1 and merits attention4 ,the phenomena the most remarkable1 and having the most relation to the question now before us1 were the following3 ,i4 ,when he began to see1 he believed that objects touched the external surface of his eye4 ,this would seem to show that sight alone cannot enable us to judge of distances2 but1 after close examination1 we shall clearly see that the argument is not conclusive4 ,no one will pretend that sight1 in the first moment of its exercise1 can communicate equally clear and distinct ideas to us1 as when experience has accustomed us to compare its different impressions4 ,this is the same with touch as with sight4 ,a blind person1 from his frequent custom of guiding himself1 in many of his movements by sensations of touch alone1 comes to know the position and distances of objects with wonderful precision4 ,if we suppose a man deprived of the sense of touch suddenly to acquire it1 neither will he at first judge with the same certainty the objects of this sense as after having exercised it4 ,experience teaches that the sense of touch is capable of a high degree of perfection4 ,we see it in blind persons at its highest point2 and probably the lowest point of its perfection1 in the first moments of its exercise1 would greatly resemble that of sight at the instant of being freed from the cataracts2 objects would be presented to it likewise in confusion2 and the subject experiencing them could not well appreciate their differences until practice had taught him how to distinguish and classify4 ,with respect to distance1 it is to be observed1 that this blind person of ,cheselden1 so far from having the habit of appreciating it1 had false ideas upon it4 ,as he was not totally blind1 the light1 which he perceived through the cataracts1 was sufficient to even enable him to distinguish between white1 black1 and red1 which seemed to him to touch his eye4 ,we may form some idea of this by observing what happens to us if we close our eyes in a very strong light4 ,hence he ought1 when he gained his sight1 to have imagined that the new sight was the same as the old1 and1 consequently1 that nothing had happened but a simple change of object4 ,a person totally blind would have better shown the power of sight to appreciate distances2 for he would have had no habit either favorable or unfavorable to their knowledge4 ,,ii4 ,it cost him much trouble to conceive that there were other objects beyond those he saw2 he could not distinguish limits2 every thing seemed to him immense4 ,although he knew by experience that his chamber was smaller than the whole house1 he could not conceive how he could see this4 ,from these facts ,condillac draws a confirmation of his system4 ,we are astonished that he should pretend to found an entire philosophy upon such data4 ,we submit the following considerations to the reader3 #gf4 ,the subject is here a youth of thirteen or fourteen years1 and consequently without any habit of observation4 ,he would naturally express very confusedly the impressions he received in so new and strange a situation4 ,the organ of sight must1 when exercised for the first time1 be exceedingly weak1 and consequently perform its sensitive functions only in a very imperfect way4 ,we ourselves repeatedly experience that we cannot1 if we suddenly pass from darkness to light1 especially if it be a very strong light1 distinguish objects1 but we see every thing in great confusion2 what then would happen to a poor child1 when at the age of thirteen years1 he for the first time opens his eyes to the light8 ,according to ,cheselden's own account1 objects were presented to him in such confusion that he could not distinguish them1 no matter what their size or shape4 ,this confirms what we have just said1 that the partial1 if not the sole cause of the confusion1 was that the organ did not produce impressions well1 because if these had been properly produced1 he would have been able to distinguish the limits of the different colors2 for1 in simple sensation1 to see is to distinguish4 ,we are also told that he could not recognize by sight the objects which he knew by touch4 ,but this only proves that not having been able to compare the two orders of sensations1 he could not know what corresponded in one to the impressions of the other4 ,by touch he would have known a spherical body2 but as he was still ignorant of the impression which a globe makes on the eye1 it is clear that if any one should show him a ball which he had handled a thousand times1 he would not even have suspected that the object seen was the same which he had touched4 ,this leads me to another observation which ,i consider very important4 #gg4 ,the child on whom these experiments were made was obliged to express his sensations in the visual order1 in a language which he did not understand4 ,for any one who is deprived of one of the senses must be absolutely ignorant of all the ideas which have their origin in that sensation4 ,hence it follows that he knows nothing of the language relating to that sense1 and the ideas which he joins to the words are entirely different from what those who possess that sense mean to express4 ,the blind man will speak of colors and the impressions produced by sight1 because he hears others speak of these things2 but for him the word to see does not mean to see1 light is not light1 nor color color1 as we understand them1 but they express different ideas which he has formed according to the circumstances1 in conformity with the explanations he has heard4 ,what importance then should we attach to what a child may say who1 besides the thoughtlessness natural to his age1 is placed in a situation new to him1 and required to express his ideas in a language which he does not know8 ,he is asked1 for example1 if he can distinguish a greater object from another which is smaller1 without considering that the words greater and smaller as he understood them1 inasmuch as they expressed abstract ideas1 or were referred to the sensations of touch1 were altogether new to him when applied to objects seen1 since he had no means of knowing what was meant when referred to a sensation which he experienced for the first time4 ,if within a circle1 a number of smaller circles of a different color were described1 he would see the smaller circles within the circumference of the greater2 but if asked if one appeared greater than the rest1 or if he could distinguish the limits which1 separated the smaller circles from each other1 he could not but give very absurd answers1 which the observers might perhaps take as the expression of curious phenomena4 ,they speak to him of figures1 lines1 extremities1 size1 position1 and distances in relation to sight1 and as he is ignorant of this language1 yet knows not that he is ignorant of it1 he must necessarily talk in a very strange manner4 ,a more attentive and profound observer would have perceived the same misunderstanding as when a deaf man disputes without hearing what was said4 ,these remarks are further confirmed by the contradiction in the account of ,cheselden4 ,the oculist tells us that the child could not distinguish the objects1 even those which differed most in form and size3 but that he found those most agreeable which were the most regular4 ,he must then have distinguished them2 for otherwise1 the sensation could not have been more or less pleasing4 ,and here in choosing an alternative in this contradiction1 we must hold that he distinguished the objects1 since there is a strong argument in its favor4 ,when two objects1 the one regular1 the other irregular1 were presented to him1 and he was questioned as to their resemblance and difference1 he must have answered so absurdly as to create the suspicion that he could not distinguish them4 ,the reason of this is1 that besides the confusion of sensations1 to which he was always more or less subject1 he was also ignorant of the language1 and although he distinguished the objects plainly1 still he could not understand what he was asked1 nor express what he felt4 ,but when examined as to the nature of the impression and whether it was pleasing or otherwise1 he found himself on a field common to all sensations1 the ideas of pleasure and displeasure were not new to him1 and he could say without confusion1 this pleases me2 that is displeasing to me4 ,to sum up what ,i have said1 ,i believe that the phenomena of ,cheselden's blind man1 only prove that sight1 like all the other senses1 needs a certain education1 that its first impressions are necessarily confused1 that the organ acquires the proper strength and precision only after long practice1 and finally1 that the judgments formed in consequence1 must be very incorrect until comparison1 joined with reflection1 has taught how to rectify inaccuracies4#cg #cg ,see ,book #a1 #ef4 ,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,,can ,,sight ,,give ,,us ,,the ,,idea ,,of ,a ,,solid8 #gh4 ,it has been asserted that sight can not give us the idea of size or of a solid1 but that this can be obtained only by the help of touch4 ,i believe the contrary may be proved with convincing certainty4 ,what is a solid8 ,it is the union of three dimensions4 ,if sight can give us the idea of surfaces which consist of two1 why not also of solids which consist of three dimensions8 ,this one reflection is enough to show that it has been denied without reason2 but ,i shall not stop with this1 but shall prove1 by the most rigorous observation1 and the analysis of its phenomena1 that sight can give us the idea of a solid4 #gi4 ,i willingly agree1 that if we suppose a man deprived of all the other senses1 to have his eyes immovably fixed on an immovable object1 he would never be able to distinguish between what is solid and what is merely perspective in the object2 or1 in other words1 that all the objects permanently painted on the retina will appear to be projected on a plane4 ,the reason of this is founded on the very laws of the organ of this sense1 and of the transmission of its impressions to the brain4 ,the soul refers the sensation to the extremity of the visual ray2 and since in the present instance it has been unable to make any comparisons1 it can have no motive for placing these extremities at unequal distances1 which constitutes the third dimension4 ,in order to understand this better1 let us suppose the object to be a cube placed so that three of its sides are seen4 ,it is evident that although the three surfaces are equal1 they will not appear so to the eye1 because their respective positions do not permit them to send their rays equally to it4 ,but as the soul has not had occasion to compare this sensation with any other1 it can not calculate the difference produced by the different positions and distances1 but must refer all the points to the same plane1 regarding the sides of the cube as unequal2 though1 in reality1 they are not so4 ,sight1 in this case1 presents the whole object on a perspective plane2 and as it could have no means of calculating the distance of the object from the eye1 it would probably believe it joined to the eye1 or1 more strictly speaking1 the sensation would represent only a simple phenomenon1 the relations and cause of which we could not explain4 #hj4 ,it is likewise probable1 that if1 while the eye remained fixed1 we could open and shut the lids1 we might form the idea that the object seen was outside of us2 so that by this motion alone1 we should obtain a point of comparison1 by the succession of the alternate disappearance and reproduction of the sensation of the object by the interposition or non-interposition of an obstacle4 ,then the idea of a greater or less distance would arise1 and as this would be in the direction perpendicular to the plane of the object1 we should already have the idea of a solid4 ,fortunately1 nature has been more beneficent to us1 and we are not obliged to limit ourselves to a supposition which thus curtails our means of acquiring ideas4 ,still it will not be useless to have examined the phenomenon on this supposition2 for1 from this examination1 we shall gain light to understand what ,i propose to demonstrate4 #ha4 ,in order that sight may originate the idea of a solid1 it requires motion4 ,this motion is an indispensable condition1 though it may be either in the object or in the eye itself4 ,let us suppose an immovable eye1 and see how by the motion of the objects1 the sensation of sight may present or produce the idea of a solid4 ,the only difficulty is to show how it can add to the two dimensions which constitute the plane1 the third which forms the solid4 ,let a fixed eye be directed to a point where there is a right rectangular parallelopipedon ,b1 so placed that its two bases are wholly concealed1 and let the right line drawn from the centre of the eye to the edge of the parallelopipedon divide the plane angle into two equal parts4 ,let us also suppose the sides of the parallelopipedon to be of different colors1--white1 green1 red1 and black4 ,in this case1 the eye sees the two planes as one1 and the edge appears as a right line separating the two parts of the same plane which differ only in color4 ,it is impossible for it to conceive the inclination of the two planes1 because as it refers the object to the extremity of the visual ray1 and has not been able to compare the varieties which result from difference of position and distance1 and from the manner in which the object receives the light1 it can only distinguish the different parts of the same plane4 ,it is well known that perspective can perfectly imitate a solid4 ,for1 if instead of the solid ,b1 we suppose two planes exactly representing the two sides seen1 the sensation will be the same1 the illusion complete4 ,therefore1 there are two distinct ways of producing the same sensation2 and consequently1 unless there has been a previous comparison1 there is no means of distinguishing them apart2 but the idea which would naturally result would be the most simple2 that is1 the idea of a plane4 #hb4 ,if we suppose the parallelopipedon ,b to revolve on a vertical axis1 it will present the four planes successively to the eye1 and they will appear greater or less according to their inclination to the visual ray1 the surface of the plane reaching its maximum when perpendicular to the ray1 and its minimum when parallel to it4 ,the succession and variety of the sensations will immediately produce the idea of motion2 for the same planes of the parallelopipedon are seen in different positions4 ,the uniform manner in which these planes succeed one another1 will also suggest the idea that the green which appears a few moments after the black1 is the same which was seen a few moments before2 and so of the other colors4 ,also1 as one is constantly hiding behind the other1 this naturally gives rise to the idea of extension in the direction1 or continuation of the visual ray2 and this is sufficient to produce the idea of size or of a solid4 ,when we see a plane we have the two dimensions which constitute a surface2 to form the idea of a solid1 we need only the idea of one dimension more2 this can not be found in the same plane1 but is produced by the motion of the parallelopipedon4 #hc4 ,this motion which we have supposed to be around a vertical axis1 we may equally suppose to take place around a horizontal axis4 ,we shall then see in succession the two opposite sides1 and the bases of the parallelopipedon with different appearances1 according to their various positions2 or1 in other words1 according to the angle formed by the planes and the visual ray4 ,these appearances will help more and more to form the idea of the third dimension1 which is not to be found in the primitive plane1 and consequently to supply what was wanted to constitute the idea of a solid4 #hd4 ,just as we have supposed the eye fixed and the object movable1 we may suppose the eye in motion and the object immovable4 ,the result is the same2 for1 it is evident that if the eye should move around the parallelopipedon1 now vertically1 and now horizontally1 it would experience the same sensations as when it was quiet1 and the parallelopipedon moved4 ,thus1 although we suppose the subject wholly deprived of the sense of touch1 so as to be unable to perceive its own motion1 it can still form the idea of solid by the impressions of sight alone4 ,true1 it could distinguish which moved1 the eye or the object1 but this does not interfere with the formation of the idea composed of the three dimensions4 ,,chapter ,,xv4 ,,sight ,,and ,,motion4 #he4 ,i said that the observer could not distinguish between his own motion and that of the object2 sight alone can not give us a true idea of motion4 ,thus in a boat1 although we are certain that we are moving1 the motion seems to us to be in the objects along the shore4 ,also if the motion of the object and that of the observer are simultaneous1 in the same direction1 and with the same velocity1 all appearance of motion is lost4 ,but if there are two objects1 one of which moves in the same direction as ourselves1 and the other in the opposite direction1 we perceive only the latter4 ,thus in a canal boat1 the horse which walks on the bank in the same direction which the boat follows1 seems to move without advancing4 ,of the two motions of the horse1 we perceive only the vertical1 the horizontal escapes us4 ,the reason of this is clear1 we can judge the object only by our impressions4 ,when the impression varies1 we have the idea of motion2 but not otherwise4 ,when the object or the eye is in motion1 there is a succession of impressions on the retina1 from which the idea of motion arises4 ,but if the motion of the eye accompanies the motion of the object1 one cancels the other1 the impression on the retina is constant1 and the object does not seem to move4 #hf4 ,in the same manner if the motion of the object and that of the eye are simultaneous1 but of unequal velocity1 we perceive only the difference2 that is to say1 if the motion of the eye be represented by #c and that of the object by #e1 the motion of the object will appear as #b1 or the difference between #e and #c4 ,if our motion is more rapid than the motion of the object1 although in the same direction1 the object will appear to move in the opposite direction1 as when we sail down a river faster than the current1 the water seems to flow backwards4 ,an immovable object at the same time seems to move in a direction opposite to our own with greater velocity than the current2 for1 here also1 of the two motions we perceive only the difference4 ,the motion of the boat1 which is equal to #e1 seems transferred to the fixed object1 which appears to move in the opposite direction with the velocity represented by #e2 and if we suppose the velocity of the current to be equal to #c1 it will have the appearance of moving backwards with a velocity of #e-c1 or #b4 #hg4 ,from these considerations it would seem to follow that although sight is sufficient to give us the idea of motion1 it is not sufficient to enable us to distinguish our own motion from that of the object1 but for this we have need of touch4 ,but this is not so2 for by sight alone1 we can distinguish the motion of the eye from that of the object1 and if in some cases this is impossible1 the same is true of touch4 ,we must observe that in the above examples touch is of much less use than sight in order to preserve us from illusions4 ,how by the aid of touch alone could we perceive the motion of a boat gliding smoothly down a river8 ,sometimes by the help of sight we observe this motion1 especially if we regard the objects along the bank which we pass2 but touch is essentially limited to what affects the body immediately1 and therefore cannot discover motion when the body is not affected by it4 ,it is also well to observe that we do not refer the motion perceived by touch to the objects around us until after we have acquired this habit by means of repeated comparisons4 ,when for the first time the hand is passed over an object1 we are unable to tell whether the hand moves over the body1 or the body under the hand4 ,the reason of this is that the sensation of motion is essentially a successive sensation1 and this succession exists equally whether the hand moves or the object4 ,let us suppose the hand to pass along an object of a varied surface1 we shall experience the variety of sensations corresponding to the surface2 suppose now that the hand remains motionless1 and the object passes under it with the same velocity1 pressure1 and friction1 the sensations will be the same as before4 ,every one must have observed that when leaning on a slippery object1 it is often difficult to tell whether it is the object which moves1 or ourselves4 ,therefore touch also confirms what we have advanced1 that the distinction between the motion of the member and that of the object does not arise from simple sensation4 #hh4 ,in this respect1 therefore1 touch does not help sight2 let us see if sight alone can enable us to distinguish between the motion of the eye and that of the object4 ,we have already observed that a single sensation with respect to one object only is insufficient1 but there is no difficulty in proving that this result may be obtained by the comparison of different sensations4 ,let us suppose the eye at a point ,a1 looking at an object ,b2 the object will appear at the extremity of the range of the sight as if projected on a plane4 ,to be more definite we will imagine the object ,b to be a column in the middle of a large hall1 and the point ,a a corner of the same hall4 ,the column will appear to the eye to be a part of the opposite wall4 ,if the eye changes its position1 the column will appear in another part of the wall2 so that if the eye should pass around the column1 it would appear successively on every part of the wall4 ,the same succession of phenomena would be observed if the eye should remain fixed and the column should move around it2 for it is evident that if the observer is placed in the centre of the room1 and the column moves around him1 the column will appear on all the parts of the opposite wall4 ,from this we infer that only one sensation of sight1 with only one object1 is not enough to determine whether the eye moves or the object4 ,but if instead of one object we suppose several moving simultaneously1 it is easy to see how the distinction of motions arises4 ,let us suppose that at the same time that the eye sees the column1 it also sees other objects1 such as chandeliers1 statues1 or other columns1 placed between the eye and the opposite wall4 ,if the eye moves every time the column changes its position on the opposite wall1 the other columns1 the chandeliers1 statues1 everything in the room seems to change its position2 whereas1 if the column moves and the eye remains fixed1 the column alone changes its position1 while everything else remains motionless4 ,therefore sight alone gives us two distinct orders of phenomena of motion3 ,i4 ,the first1 in which all the objects change their position4 ,,ii4 ,the second1 in which one object only changes its position4 ,these two orders of phenomena cannot remain unperceived2 for by the help of reflection excited and enlightened by the repetition of the phenomena1 we must come to the conclusion that when there is an entire and constant change of all the objects1 it is not they that move1 but the eye2 and that when only one or a part of the objects change their position1 the rest remaining fixed1 it is not the eye that moves1 but the objects which change their position4 ,when everything around us changes we infer that it is the eye that moves2 when one or two change their position we conclude that they move and not the eye4 ,this is not merely a supposition1 it is the reality4 ,the ideas derived from touch are essentially limited1 and it is therefore impossible that they should proceed from distant objects which cannot be touched4 #hi4 ,i believe ,i have demonstrated that the pretended superiority of touch is without foundation1 and that the opinion which makes this the basis of our knowledge of external objects1 the touch-stone of the certainty of the sensations transmitted by the other senses1 is an error4 ,without it we can acquire the certainty of the existence of bodies2 without it we can form the idea of surfaces and solids2 without it we discover motion1 and distinguish the motion of the object from that of the organ which receives the impression4 ,the theory of sensation here explained1 and the results which are deduced from the relations of the dependence or independence of the phenomena among themselves1 and with our will1 may all be applied to the sight as well as to the touch4 #ij4 ,summing up all we have said1 we have the following results3 ,i4 ,we distinguish sleep from waking1 even abstracting the objectiveness of the sensations4 ,,ii4 ,we distinguish two orders of phenomena of sensation2--the one internal1 the other external1 here also abstracting their objectiveness4 ,,iii4 ,the senses give us certainty of the existence of bodies4 ,,iv4 ,sensations have no type in the external object of what they represent1 except extension and motion4 ,v4 ,touch is not the basis or touch-stone of certainty4 ,,vi4 ,all that we know by means of the senses may be reduced to this2 that there are external beings1 that is to say1 beings placed outside of ourselves1 which are extended1 subject to necessary laws1 and which produce in us the effects which we call sensations4 ,,chapter ,,xvi4 ,,possibility ,,of ,,other ,,senses4 #ia4 ,lamennais writes3 ,who can say that a sixth sense would not disturb the harmony of the others by a contrary impression8 ,on what foundation could he deny it8 ,if we suppose other senses different from those which nature gave us1 might not our sensations and our ideas be different8 ,perhaps a slight modification in our organs would be sufficient to ruin our whole science4 ,perhaps there are beings so organized that their sensations are wholly opposed to ours1 and what is true for us is false for them1 and reciprocally4 ,for1 if we examine the matter closely1 what necessary connection is there between our sensations and the reality8 ,and if there were such a connection1 how could the senses make it known to us8#ch #ch ,essai sur l',indifference1 ,tome ,,ii41 ,part ,,iii41 ,ch4 ,i4 ,the questions which these words raise are of the highest importance and merit a serious examination4 #ib4 ,is there any intrinsical impossibility of an organization different from ours1 and an order of sensations different from those which we experience8 ,it seems not2 and if this impossibility exists1 it is unknown to man4 ,whatever opinion we adopt as to the manner in which external objects act upon the soul by means of the organs of the body1 there is no necessary relation1 nor even analogy1 between the object and the effect which it produces in us4 ,a body receives upon its surface rays of the fluid which we call light1 these rays are reflected upon the retina1 which is another surface in communication with the brain4 ,so far all is well1 and easily understood4 ,there is a fluid which moves1 goes from one surface to another1 and may cause this or that purely physical effect on the cerebral matter2 but what connection is there between this and the impression of a distinct order which we call seeing1 an impression which is neither the fluid nor the motion1 but an affection of which the living and thinking being1 the me is intimately conscious8 ,if1 instead of the luminous fluid and its mechanism1 we suppose another1 as1 for example1 the air which vibrates upon the tympanum1 what essential reason is there why this should not produce a sensation similar to that of sight8 ,it must be confessed that it is impossible to assign an essential reason4 ,to one who has no idea of our present organization1 both phenomena are equally incomprehensible4 #ic4 ,what has been said of sight and hearing may be applied to the other senses4 ,in all there is a bodily organ affected by a body2 we see the surfaces placed one before or under the other1 we see motions of one kind or another2 but how can we pass over the immense distance which separates these physical phenomena from the phenomenon of sensation8 ,for my part1 ,i see no way to do it2 this point is a barrier to the human intellect2 all appearances indicate that there is no connection between these two orders of phenomena except what the will of the ,creator has freely established2 if there is any necessary connection1 this necessity is a secret to man4 ,examine the textures which receive the impression of the objects1 the material substance which composes the nervous system which is the organ of sensations1 and say what relation you can find between the physical phenomena of this matter and the wonderful harmony of sensible phenomena4 #id4 ,still greater will be the difficulty if you consider that1 although protected from any injury1 the organs cease to produce sensations from the moment they are deprived of communication with the substance of the brain4 ,the phenomena of light are produced in the cavity of the skull amid the most profound darkness2 and all the wonderful magic of sensations by which the magnificent spectacle of the universe is presented to our mind1 which plunges the soul into raptures at the sound of music1 and which produces such varied and delightful sensations of taste and odors1 all arises in the brain1 a whitish1 rude1 and unformed substance1 from the appearance of which no one could imagine it destined to such noble functions4 #ie4 ,why is it that when the nerve ,a1 in communication with the brain is affected1 we experience the sensation which we call seeing1 or if the nerve ,b is affected1 the sensation which we call hearing1 and so of the other senses8 ,there may be a reason1 but1 at least1 we do not know it2 and it is probably no other than the free will of the ,creator4 ,here1 it is true1 philosophy confesses its weakness1 but1 at the same time1 it shows its power2 for it sees the immense distance which separates these phenomena1 between which there can be no point of communication but what is established by the ,almighty4 ,when there are second causes1 it is the merit of philosophy to discover them2 but when there are none1 its merit is in rising to the first cause4 ,a confession of its ignorance is sometimes a more sublime act of reason than the impotent effort of an unbounded pride4 ,if the perception of profound truths exalts the intellect1 is not the intellect exalted in perceiving its own ignorance1 which is sometimes a profound truth8 #if4 ,the existence of another sense is1 then1 possible2 at least1 we see no impossibility of it4 ,if the deaf man who has no idea of sound1 and the blind man who knows not what color is1 would be foolish to deny the possibility of those sensations of which they are deprived1 can we1 with any more show of reason1 assert the impossibility of an order of sensations different from what we possess8 ,if we examine the system of sensations by the light of reason1 we can discover no essential dependence between the sensations and their respective organs1 nor between the organs and the objects and circumstances by which they are affected4 ,why does the impression of the light upon my eyes cause in me a particular sensation1 which cannot result from the same impression on a different part of my body8 ,why may not the brain receive the same impression in various forms8 ,why must this fluid which we call light1 and no other1 produce the impression8 ,why may not this same sensation of seeing proceed equally from other affections of the brain8 ,a violent blow on the head produces the sensation of many luminous points1 whence the common expression of seeing stars by daylight4 ,we must confess that philosophy knows nothing of these secrets1 that as yet it has not been able to penetrate them1 and it can give no answer to these questions4 ,it sees an order of facts1 but no necessary connection between them1 or rather1 judging from its ideas of mind and body1 every thing induces it to believe that these phenomena in our life depend solely on the will of our ,creator4 #ig4 ,if an entirely new order of sensations is possible1 there may be beings with six or seven senses4 ,the imagination cannot conceive their nature2 but reason sees in them no impossibility4 ,,chapter ,,xvii4 ,,existence ,,of ,,new ,,senses4 #ih4 ,is it certain that we have only five ways of sensation8 ,i have some doubts on this point4 ,in order to present them with the greatest clearness1 and solve the questions which they raise1 it is well to settle the meaning of the terms4 ,what is sensation8 ,in the ordinary acceptation of the word1 it is the perception of the impression transmitted to us by one of the organs of the five senses4 ,thus understood it is clearly limited to the action of the organs1 but if considered as expressing a certain class of animal phenomena1 it is the experiencing of any affection produced by an impression of the organism4 ,even in common use the word sensation in its broadest signification is not restricted to the impressions of the five senses1 and although we make a great difference between sentiment and sensation2 still we are often forced to confound them1 and to use the word sensation to express things which have nothing whatever to do with the five senses4 ,thus we say3 ,the news made a great sensation2 ,i cannot resist the force of such strong sensations1 etc41 in which cases it is evident that there is no reference to seeing1 hearing1 smelling1 tasting1 or touching1 but to a different order of affections of the soul4 #ii4 ,i said we were forced to use the word in the broader meaning2 it is the truth which forces us4 ,for1 to the eyes of philosophy1 the phenomenon of sensation consists in the production in the soul of a particular affection determined by an impression on an organ2 and of whatever order this affection may be1 and whatever organ may be affected1 the animal phenomenon is substantially the same4 ,the difference is in the class of affections and of the organ which is their medium1 the essence of the phenomenon does not change4 ,and if by sensations we understand such distinct orders of affections as those of sight and of touch1 why may we not include other impressions caused by any other organ1 whatever that organ may be8 #ajj4 ,whatever use we may make of the word sensation1 it is certain that we experience many affections caused by organic impressions1 besides those of the five senses4 ,what are passions but affections of the soul1 springing from organic impressions8 ,does not the mere presence of an object often excite love1 anger1 pity1 joy1 grief1 and many other sentiments of the soul8 ,you may say there is an essential difference between the impressions of the senses and those of the passions1 that the former are independent of all previous idea and reflection1 which the latter more or less presuppose4 ,thus1 when an object is present to our open eyes1 we cannot but see it and always in the same manner2 and yet this object will excite in us at one time one passion1 at another time another1 and sometimes none2 and almost always with great difference in the degree of its intensity4 ,moreover it is not only the mere presence of the object which causes an affection1 but certain conditions are necessary1 for example2 the remembrance of a benefit or of an injury1 etc41 from which it is easy to see that there is an essential difference between the two classes of impressions4 #aja4 ,if we reflect well upon this objection we shall find that though it is specious and under many aspects true1 it contradicts nothing which ,i have asserted4 ,i did not deny that the new impressions were subject to very different conditions from those that govern the five senses2 but on the contrary ,i have all along supposed a difference not only in the class of impressions and the diversity of the organ1 but also in the manner in which the organ is affected1 and the circumstances in which the sensation is produced in the soul4 ,i only contended that the animal phenomenon was substantially the same1 that we find in it the three things which constitute its nature2 a corporeal object2 an organ affected by this object2 and an impression produced in the soul4 ,because this impression cannot exist without the aid of this or that idea1 this or that recollection1 it does not follow that the phenomenon does not exist1 or that it is not the same2 it is merely to impose a new condition1 and nothing more4 #ajb4 ,but there is no necessity of admitting that some previous idea or reflection is requisite in order that the sight of the object may produce certain impressions in the soul2--daily experience proves the contrary4 ,how is it that the presence of an object charms in an instant a tender and perhaps innocent heart8 ,whence then arises that sudden fascination which is preceded by no idea1 accompanied by no affection1 and is scarce voluntary8 ,not from the thought of gross enjoyments2 for perhaps he of whom ,i speak knows not their existence until he experiences this emotion2 he feels for the first time in his breast a trouble unknown before4 ,we must therefore recur to an organic affection similar to that which we find in the other senses4 ,certain conditions of age and temperament may be requisite1 one object may have been necessary1 among a thousand1 in particular circumstances1 of which the soul can give no account to itself though affected by them2 yet it is still true that there is an external object1 an affection of the organism1 and an impression in the soul1 all connected together by a mysterious1 but undeniable bond4 ,it is easy to discover a series of strong impressions in the phenomena relating to reproduction2 but although they presuppose the action of some one of the five senses1 they nevertheless belong to a different order4 ,no physiological studies are necessary to prove that these affections depend on the organization1 and that they are greatly influenced by age1 health1 temperament1 food1 climate1 and the seasons4 #ajc4 ,there is a difference between sentiments and sensations which1 though it does not change the fact physiologically and psychologically considered1 still greatly modifies it in its intellectual and moral relations4 ,the passions are commonly excited by an animate and sensible object1 whence it would seem that there is more communication between mind and mind1 between soul and soul1 than there is between one body and another4 ,the sad and mournful appearance not only of a man1 but even of an animal1 immediately excites in our breast the sentiment of compassion1 because it expresses the suffering of a living being4 ,this only proves that nature has mysterious ways by which it transmits to us the knowledge of hidden things2 but this transmission is made by the medium of a body which affects in some way our organic constitution4 ,there is here1 if you please1 a more admirable1 more penetrating1 and more spiritual a magic than that of the senses alone2 but the difference is in the degree1 not in the nature of the phenomena4 ,it is certain that living beings1 and those of the same species in particular1 are in a constant communication which mutually excites their affections1 and that these affections frequently suppose a mysterious correspondence with unknown agencies4 ,physical nature is full of fluids whose qualities are daily becoming known through scientific observation4 ,the phenomena of electricity and galvanism have revealed secrets of which we had no suspicion before4 ,who can tell by what means the functions of this vast and complicated system of animal life1 spread over the universe1 are performed8 ,it is probable that there are profound secrets in the correspondence and relation of organisms and in the way in which they influence one another yet to be discovered2 perhaps they will remain forever veiled to the eyes of mortality4 #ajd4 ,is it true that sensible beings can alone excite the passions8 or have not inanimate causes repeatedly affected our organs8 ,why are we sometimes joyful and sometimes sad1 at some times peaceful and at others irritable1 when we have had no communication with any living being8 ,it is clear that this depends on the affections of our organism1 and has no relation to the state of other sensible beings4 #aje4 ,therefore1 besides the impressions caused by the five senses1 there are others which proceed from purely corporeal and inanimate objects4 ,besides the phenomena of ordinary sensations1 there are others which differ from them only in the kind of impression and the organ affected2 and there is no more difference between these sensations and the former than there is between the impressions of one and those of another of the five senses4 ,therefore it is not correct to say that there are only five kinds of sensation4 ,,chapter ,,xviii4 ,,solution ,,of ,,lamennais' ,,objection4 #ajf4 ,from the preceding observations we shall now deduce an important consequence1--the solution of the difficulty presented by ,lamennais4 ,the existence of new senses would involve new sensations1 it is true2 but they would not disturb the harmony of those we already have4 ,we have shown that bodies affect our organs in a different manner1 and produce impressions different from those of the five senses2 but this does not disturb the agreement of our sensations1 nor change our ideas4 ,consequently1 the supposition of ,lamennais would not involve the disorder which he suspects4 #ajg4 ,sensations in themselves are mere affections of the soul1 and have no external object which corresponds to them except the existence and extension of bodies4 ,therefore a new order of sensations would only be a new order of affections1 which would in nowise alter our ideas4 ,from what we have hitherto said1 it is easy to see that the supposition of ,lamennais is already realized2 for there are sensations different from those of the five senses2 therefore this supposition does not contradict the nature and order of our ideas1 nor the certainty of our knowledge4 ,a musical instrument beautifully fashioned has charms for the ear1 the eye1 and the touch1 none of these impressions destroys the other2 if we suppose it placed in new relations with our organs1 so as to produce in the soul new impressions1 why is it impossible that they should accord8 ,does the melody of its sound cease because our soul experiences new affections whose nature has no connection with it8 ,certainly not4 ,why then fear the overthrow of our knowledge by the introduction of a new order of sensations8 ,why give such importance to a supposition1 the effects of which we can very well calculate1 and which1 if we examine the phenomena of our present sensations1 we find already realized8 #ajh4 ,it is true that we know of no other means of placing ourselves in contact with external objects than the five senses2 but it is equally true1 that this contact existing1 the impressions in the soul correspond mysteriously to the external objects2 so that1 while we observe the sensations by which the communication is established1 it is still impossible for us to explain them4 ,let us examine the magical effects of music4 ,they are of two orders2 the purely auditive1 and the intellectual or moral4 ,the first stop at the ear1 the second pass to the brain and to the heart2 and one may be admirably organized for the former1 yet unable to appreciate the latter4 ,two persons listen to a sonata1 both hear the material music1 but the intellectual and moral effects are not the same on both4 ,both perceive the least defect in the time or in the instrument1 both admire the art of the composer1 both are charmed2 but while the heart of one is unmoved1 the brain and the heart of the other are bounding with delight1 the power of his fancy is multiplied1 thoughts and images crowd upon his mind1 as though he had caught inspiration from the magic notes of the music4 ,his heart is transported with tenderness1 melancholy1 hatred1 love1 anger1 generosity1 and courage4 ,he is under a magical influence which1 moves him in spite of himself2 the vibrations of a chord have raised in his heart a mysterious tempest which the might of reason can hardly quiet4 #aji4 ,from this we must conclude1 that besides the ordinary relations between objects and the organs of the senses1 there are other relations still more intimate and more delicate between these objects and our organic system1 and that these latter are as certain as the former4 ,in them there is greater variety of individuals1 and the conditions necessary to produce determinate results are less known1 but there can be no doubt of their existence1 and this in the eyes of sound philosophy is sufficient to dissipate those absurd suppositions which would pretend to undermine the edifice of our knowledge4 #aaj4 ,thus1 then1 the objection is answered1 which says3 ,if we had another sense1 what would it tell us8 ,nothing which would destroy the certainty of our knowledge1 or the nature and order of our ideas4 ,the only new result would be one more added to the many ways in which objects now affect us4 ,the same thing would happen to us as to a man who after being deprived of the sense of smell1 should suddenly regain it3 he would have one sensation more2 the same thing would happen to us as to a man who experiences a new sentiment which he had not known before3 he has one affection more4 ,new impressions have their own rank1 neither interfering with1 nor changing those which previously existed4 ,,book ,,third4 ,,extension ,,and ,,space4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,,extension ,,inseparable ,,from ,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,body4 #a4 ,having seen that among the objects of our sensations1 extension alone has any external existence for us as any thing more than a principle of causality1 let us now try to understand what extension is4 ,the idea of extension seems to be inseparable from that of body2 at least1 ,i am unable to conceive a body without extension4 ,take away extension1 and the parts disappear1 and with them all that has relation with our senses2 there is no longer an object1 or1 if the object remains1 it is something altogether different from what is contained in the idea of body4 ,imagine an apple1 for instance1 from which you suddenly take away extension4 ,what will remain of it8 ,i am not now going to examine whether ,descartes is right when he says1 that the essence of body consists in extension2 all that ,i here assert is that a body cannot be conceived without extension4 ,i do not affirm the identity of two things1 but only the inseparability of two ideas in our mind4 ,it is not an opinion1 but a fact asserted by consciousness1 which is now under discussion4 ,abstracting extension1 ,i can conceive1 it is true1 a substance1 or1 to speak more generally1 a being2 but1 then1 there is no idea of body1 unless we confound this idea with1 that of substance or of being1 in general4 #b4 ,all our notions of bodies are obtained through the senses1 but without extension no sensation is possible2 for without it there can be no color1 no sound1 no touch1 no smell1 and no taste2 therefore1 without extension there remains only something of which we have no idea1 a vague notion which cannot enable us to distinguish one object from another1 a pure abstraction1 and nothing more4 #c4 ,to solve the difficulties which attend the separation of the two ideas of extension and of body1 it is necessary to determine the essence of body4 ,when we can distinguish the essence of a body from its extension1 the difficulty will be overcome1 but not until then4 #d4 ,in order to understand the reason of this inseparability1 it is necessary to remember what was said before1 that extension is the basis of all other sensations2 it is the substratum which is confounded with none1 depends on none of them in particular1 yet is an indispensable condition of them all4 ,i look at an apple1 and examine the mutual relations of the sensations which it produces4 ,it is evident that though ,i abstract the smell1 ,i do not thereby destroy any of the other sensations which it causes4 ,though it lose its odor1 it is still extended1 colored1 it has a taste1 and may produce a sound4 ,i may also1 in like manner1 abstract its taste1 its color1 and all that relates to the sight1 but ,i have still an object which is tangible1 and consequently extended1 figured1 and possessed of all its other properties which affect the touch4 ,if instead of abstracting what relates to the sight1 ,i abstract what belongs immediately to the touch1 ,i may do this without destroying the other sensations2 for ,i can still see the apple1 its extension1 form1 and color4 ,i may even go farther1 and strip the apple of all its sensible qualities1 of its taste1 smell1 color1 hardness1 and whatever the senses can perceive1 still there remains extension1 not indeed sensible1 but conceivable4 ,extension exists abstracted from its visibility1 since it exists for the blind man3 abstracted from its tangibility1 since it exists for the sight2 abstracted from odor1 taste1 and sound1 since it exists for those who are deprived of these sensations1 so long as they have sight or touch4 #e4 ,here a difficulty arises4 ,there seems to be a mistake in what we have said of the existence of extension abstracted from other sensations2 for1 although in making this abstraction we conceive ourselves to be deprived of these sensations1 still we retain the imagination of them2 thus1 when ,i strip the apple of all light and color1 it is still extended2 but that is because ,i still imagine a color1 or1 if ,i make a strong effort to destroy the color1 it appears to me like a black object1 on a ground of greater or less darkness1 distinct from the apple4 ,does not this prove that there is an illusion in such abstractions1 and that there is no complete abstraction1 since the reality which we abstract is succeeded by the imagination of the same qualities1 or of others which supply their place1 so as to make the extension perceptible8 ,this objection is specious1 and it would be difficult to give a satisfactory answer if the existence of men deprived of sight did not instantly dissipate it4 ,no such imagination is possible in the case of a blind man1 for him there is no color1 no shade1 no light1 no darkness1 nor anything which relates to sight1 and still he conceives extension4 #f4 ,but at least1 some one will answer1 it must be confessed that the idea of extension is necessarily dependent on the sensations of touch2 blind men also possess this sense1 and by it they acquire the idea of extension4 ,therefore the idea of extension is inseparable from the sensations of touch4 ,this argument is no better than the other2 for1 although we may acquire the idea of extension by the sense of touch1 and this sense is all that is required to produce it1 it is not true that this idea can only be acquired by touch4 ,i have already proved that sight is sufficient of itself alone to produce the idea of the three dimensions which constitute a solid or extension in its full complement4 ,but here ,i do not need the idea of a solid1 that of a surface is sufficient2 the extension of a surface is inseparable from sight4 ,there is no sight without color1 or light of some kind or other1 and this cannot even be imagined without a surface4 ,i have another argument4 ,geometricians1 doubtless1 conceive extension1 and yet they abstract all its relations to sight or touch2 therefore1 there is no necessary connection between them4 ,in any object submitted to the sight1 what quality relating to the touch is necessary in order to produce the idea of extension8 ,if we examine it closely1 we shall find that there is none4 ,let us take a liquid2 is its fluidity the necessary quality8 ,no2 for when congealed extension remains4 ,is it heat or cold8 ,no2 for without destroying its extension we may change its temperature as much as we please1 no alteration is perceptible4 ,whatever quality relative to touch we may take1 we shall find that it may be varied1 modified1 or entirely destroyed1 without visibly affecting the extension4 ,it often happens that we have a clear and definite idea of the extension of an object without knowing any thing of its qualities in relation to touch4 ,i see an object at a distance1 ,i distinguish its color and its form1 but ,i know not of what material it is1 whether it is of marble1 or wood1 or wax1 nor whether this material is hard or soft1 moist or dry1 warm or cold4 ,i do not even know if it is tangible1 as in the case of figures formed by vapors which are imperceptible to the touch4 #g4 ,without extension there can be neither sight1 nor touch1 nor any other sensation4 ,as to taste1 it is clear that it requires touch1 and cannot exist without it4 ,our assertion is less clear with regard to sound and smell2 for1 although we cannot separate these sensations from the idea of extension as they always involve this idea in one way or another1 we do not know how it would be with a man who was deprived of all the other senses1 and retained only those of smelling and hearing4 ,but without speculating on this hypothesis1 it is enough to know3 ,i4 ,that nothing which is not extended can act upon our organs1 unless by means wholly unknown to us1 and which would give no idea of what we understand by body4 ,,ii4 ,that even supposing the sensations of smelling and hearing to be possible without the idea of extension1 they would in that case be only simple phenomena of our being1 and would not place us in communication with the external world1 as we now perceive it2 because1 if we should not know that they proceeded from another cause1 we could have no more consciousness of them than that which we have of the me2 and if we should know it1 this cause would be represented to us only as an agent influencing us1 and not by any means as a being having any thing similar to what we understand by body4 ,,iii4 ,that in such a case we should have no idea of our own organization1 nor of the universe2 for it is clear that every thing being reduced to mere internal phenomena1 and their relation to the agents producing them1 and the idea of extension wanting1 neither the universe nor our own body would be to us what they now are4 ,what would the universe1--what would our body be without extension8 ,,iv4 ,that for the present we limit ourselves to the demonstration of the dependence which in the present system1 of things1 all sensations have in relation to extension2 and this demonstration holds good1 even though we suppose the man who possesses only the sense of smelling or that of hearing not to form any idea of extension1 and not to need it in order to experience its sensations4 ,v4 ,that even on this supposition1 the proposition before established1 that the idea of extension is independent of the other sensations1 still remains unassailed4 ,,vi4 ,that the truth which we are principally endeavoring to demonstrate1 that for us the idea of extension is inseparable from that of body1 also stands firm4 #h4 ,this inseparability is so certain1 that theologians explaining the august mystery of the ,eucharist1 distinguish in the extension of bodies the relations of the parts to each other1 and their relation to place1 in ordine ad se1 et in ordine ad locum2 and they say that the sacred body of our ,lord ,jesus ,christ is in this august ,sacrament1 by extension in ordine ad se1 though not by extension in ordine ad locum4 ,this proves that the theologians saw that it is not possible for man to lose all idea of extension1 without at the same time losing all idea of body2 and thus they invented this ingenious distinction1 of which ,i shall speak at greater length in another place4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,extension ,,not ,,perceptible ,,as ,,the ,,direct ,,and ,,immediate ,,object ,,of ,,sensations4 #i4 ,extension has the remarkable peculiarity of being perceived by different senses4 ,as regards sight and touch this is evident2 it is also true as far as concerns the other senses4 ,we perceive taste in different parts of the palate1 and we refer sound and smell to distinct points in space1 and this involves the idea of extension4 ,but what is more strange is1 that although extension is the indispensable basis of all sensations and therefore perceived by all the senses1 it is1 in itself1 and separated from every other quality1 imperceptible to them all4 ,the eye perceives only light1 and the ear sound1 the palate taste1 the smell odor1 and the object of touch is that which is warm or cold1 moist or dry1 solid or liquid1 etc4 ,none of these objects is extension1 none in particular is necessary for the perception of extension2 for we constantly find it separated from each of these qualities1 and yet it is still perceptible4 ,no one in particular is necessary for the perceptibility of extension1 but some one is indispensable2 for1 unless accompanied by some one of them1 it is imperceptible to the senses4 ,hence1 extension is a necessary condition of our sensations1 but is not itself perceived by the senses4 ,still it is not therefore unknown1 and this brings me to some other reflections which take us out of the phenomenal into the transcendental order1 and give rise to very serious and difficult questions1 which have hitherto been insolvable1 and it is to be feared must ever remain so4 #aj4 ,we have seen that extension in itself is not the direct object of sensation4 ,what1 then1 is it8 ,what is its nature8 ,there are two things which may be considered in the idea of extension3 that which it is in us1 and that which it represents to us2 or1 in other words1 its relation to the subject1 and its relation to the object4 ,the first being subject to immediate observation1 inasmuch as it exists within us1 is difficult but not impossible to explain4 ,the second is more difficult1 and almost impossible to explain1 because it is a very abstract and transcendental idea1 and also requires a series of arguments1 the thread of which may be broken without the one who reasons perceiving it4 #aa4 ,extension in us is not a sensation1 but an idea4 ,sometimes we imagine it under a sensible form1 confounding it with a determinate object2 at other times we picture it to ourselves as a vague obscurity in which bodies are placed2 but these are only fictions of the imagination4 ,a man born blind can have none of these internal representations1 and yet he forms a very good conception of extension4 ,we ourselves in thinking of extension abstract all these forms under which we imagine it4 ,two different sensations1 those of sight and touch1 produce the same idea of extension4 ,this is conclusive proof that extension is rather intelligible than sensible4 ,whatever may be the relation of extension to sensation1 we cannot deny that it is an idea if we reflect that it is the foundation of the whole science of geometry4 ,thus1 although we form various images of extension1 they are only the particular forms with which the mind clothes the idea1 if we may use the expression1 according to the circumstances of the case4 ,that which is fundamental and essential in the idea1 is of a different and higher order1 and has nothing in common with the applications which the mind makes in order to explain and apply it4 ,this idea includes dimensions1 but not determined or applied2 they are mere conceptions which represent nothing in particular4 #ab4 ,the idea of extension is a primitive fact of our mind4 ,it is not produced by sensations1 but precedes them1 if not in time1 at least in the order of being4 ,there is no ground for asserting that the idea of extension exists in the mind prior to the first impression of the senses1 but unless extension serves as their basis these impressions are inconceivable4 ,whether this idea is innate or developed1 or produced in the mind by the impressions1 there can be no doubt that it is distinct from them1 necessary to them1 and independent of any one of them in particular4 ,it may be that when these impressions are first received extension may not be known as a separate idea2 but it is certain that it is afterwards separated and stripped of the corporeal form1 and spiritualized1 and that this phenomenon may be occasioned but not caused by the sensation4 ,in sight1 abstracting extension1 there is color1 but we cannot discover in it any thing from which we can produce so fruitful an idea as that of extension4 ,even at first we see that the color itself is not perceptible without extension1 and so far from extension being produced by color1 it is on the contrary an indispensable condition without which color cannot be perceived4 ,colors as the objects of sensation are only individual phenomena1 which have no connection with one another nor with the general idea of extension4 ,what has been said of them will equally apply to all the impressions of touch4 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,scientific ,,fruitfulness ,,of ,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,extension4 #ac4 ,in order to understand the superiority of the idea of extension over mere sensations2 or rather1 in order to understand that there is a true idea of extension considered in itself1 and that there is no such idea of the direct and immediate objects of sensation1 ,i wish to call attention to the fact that among all the objects of the senses1 extension alone gives origin to a science4 ,this is a very important fact2--to explain it as it deserves1 ,i shall establish the following propositions3 ,,first ,,proposition4 ,extension is the basis of geometry4 ,,second ,,proposition4 ,not only is extension the basis of geometry1 but all that we know of the nature of bodies may be reduced to the manifestations1 applications1 and modifications of extension1 with the addition of the ideas of number and time4 ,,third ,,proposition4 ,whatever we know of sensations that deserves the name of science is included in the modifications of extension4 ,,fourth ,,proposition4 ,we can form no fixed idea of corporeal objects1 nor make any observation on the sensible world1 unless we are guided by the rule of extension4 ,these four propositions are nothing more than the enunciation of certain facts1 the mere exposition of which is a sufficient demonstration4 #ad4 ,extension is the basis of geometry4 ,this is evident1 since geometry treats only of dimensions1 and the idea of dimension is essential to extension4 ,when geometry treats of figures1 it is still extension which it is treating of2 for figures are only extension with certain limitations4 ,the quadrilateral contains two triangles4 ,to distinguish them1 it is only necessary to draw their limit1 which is the diagonal4 ,the idea of figure is merely the idea of limited extension1 and the figure is of this or that kind according to the nature of its limits4 ,consequently1 the idea of figure is nothing new superadded to extension2 but merely its application4 ,moreover1 limit or termination is not a positive idea2 it is a pure negation4 ,if ,i have extension and wish to form all the figures possible1 ,i need not conceive any thing new1 but only abstract what ,i have already2 ,i do not add1 but take away4 ,thus in the quadrilateral ,i obtain the conception of the triangle by abstracting one of the two equal parts into which it is divided by the diagonal4 ,in the same manner ,i deduce the quadrilateral from a pentagon by abstracting the triangle formed by a line drawn from one of its angles to either of the opposite angles4 ,these observations apply to all geometrical figures4 ,the idea of extension is like an immense ground on which we have only to draw limits in order to obtain whatever we want4 ,it does not follow from this that the understanding cannot proceed by addition or the synthetic method2 for1 just as the subtraction of one of the parts of the quadrilateral formed a triangle1 so also the addition of two triangles with an equal side will produce a quadrilateral4 ,and in the same way points produce lines1 lines surfaces1 and surfaces solids4 ,in all these cases the idea of figure is that of limited extension1 since the quantities which constitute it are merely extension with certain limitations4 #ae4 ,an observation here presents itself to my mind1 which ,i think must throw great light upon the question which we are now discussing4 ,if we compare the two methods by which the idea of figure is obtained2 the synthetic1 or that of composition or addition1 and the analytic1 or that of subtraction or limitation1 we shall find that the second is more natural than the other2 because that which the analytic method produces is permanent in the figure and essential to it1 whilst the synthetic only seems to constitute it1 and as soon as it is thus constituted the marks of its formation are obliterated4 ,an example will make this clearer4 ,in order to conceive a rectangle ,i have only to limit indefinite space by four lines in a rectangular position2 that is1 to affirm a part1 and deny the rest4 ,the lines are nothing in themselves1 and represent only the limit beyond which the space included in the rectangle cannot pass4 ,to abstract this limitation or denial of all that is not contained in the surface of the rectangle1 would be to destroy the rectangle4 ,therefore1 the denial in which this method consists is always permanent1 the manner of the production of the idea is inseparable from the idea itself4 ,but if1 on the other hand1 ,i proceed to form the rectangle by addition or by joining the hypotheneuse of two right-angle triangles1 the ideas of the two component parts are not necessary to the idea of the rectangle after its formation4 ,i can conceive the rectangle even abstracting the diagonal4 ,thus1 then1 it is demonstrated that the idea of extension is the only basis of geometry1 and that this idea is an immense field on which1 by means of limitation or abstraction1 we can obtain all the figures which form the object of geometry4 ,figures are only extension limited1 a positive extension accompanied by a negation1 and consequently whatever is positive in geometry is extension4 #af4 ,we cannot doubt that1 whatever we know of the nature of bodies1 may be reduced to certain modifications or properties of extension1 if we observe that the entire object of the natural sciences is the knowledge of the motion or of the different relations of things in space1 which is nothing more than the knowledge of the different kinds of extension4 ,statics is occupied in determining the laws of the equilibrium of bodies1 but in what way8 ,does it penetrate into the nature of the causes8 ,no2 it only determines the conditions to which the phenomenon is subject1 and the only ideas which enter into these conditions are the direction of the force1 that is to say1 a line in space1 and the velocity1 which is the relation of space to time4 ,the idea of time is the only idea which is here joined with that of extension4 ,in another place ,i shall prove that time1 separated from things1 is nothing1 and consequently1 although this idea is here joined to that of extension1 it does not interfere with the truth of what ,i have established4 ,in statics1 all that relates to other sensations is counted as nothing2 in order to solve the problems of the composition and decomposition of forces1 we abstract all color1 smell1 and other sensible qualities of bodies in motion4 ,what has been said of statics applies equally to dynamics1 hydrostatics1 hydraulics1 astronomy1 and to all sciences which regard motion4 #ag4 ,here an objection may be made4 ,that with the ideas of time and space1 we seem to combine another which is distinct from them1 and necessary1 in order to complete the idea of motion1 and this is the idea of a body moved4 ,it is not time1 nor is it space1 for space is not moved1 therefore it is distinct from them4 ,to this ,i reply1 first1 that ,i am speaking of extension1 and not of space alone1 which it is important to remember1 for what ,i shall afterwards say2 and secondly1 that science regards the thing moved as a point1 and this is sufficient for all its purposes4 ,thus in the systems of forces there is a point of application for each of the component forces1 and another for the resultant4 ,this point is not regarded as having any properties1 but is in relation to motion what the centre is in relation to a circle4 ,every thing is related to it1 yet it is nothing in itself1 except inasmuch as it occupies a definite position in space4 ,it may change according to the quantity and direction of the forces1 it may run over or describe a line in space with greater or less velocity1 and the line may be of this or that class1 and accompanied by various conditions4 ,if a body be impelled by two forces1 ,b and ,c1 acting upon a point ,a1 science considers in the body only the point through which the resultant of the forces ,b and ,c passes1 and abstracts all the other points of the body which1 being joined to the point ,a1 move with it4 #ah4 ,when ,i say that the natural sciences go no farther than the consideration of extension1 ,i only mean to exclude the other sensations1 but not ideas2 for it is clear that the ideas of time and number are combined with the idea of extension4 ,this is so true in mechanics1 in this sense at least1 that all its theorems and problems are reduced to geometrical expressions1 and even the idea of time is expressed by lines4 ,in every force there are three things to be considered3 the direction1 point of application1 and intensity4 ,the direction is represented by a line1 and the point of application by a point in space4 ,the intensity is represented only in the effect which it can produce1 and this is expressed by a line1 the length of which expresses the intensity of the force4 ,the effect of the intensity which is represented by a line includes the time also2 for the measure of a motion cannot be determined until we know its velocity1 which is merely the relation of space to time4 ,therefore1 although the idea of time is combined with that of extension1 the result is expressed by lines1 that is1 by extension4 #ai4 ,there is another circumstance still which shows the fruitfulness of the idea of extension4 ,it is that in the expression of the laws of nature1 it reaches cases which are beyond the idea of number4 ,if we suppose two equal rectangular forces1 ,,ab and ,,ac1 acting on the point ,a1 the resultant will be ,,ar4 ,now1 if we consider ,,ar to be the hypotheneuse of a right-angled triangle1 ,,ar#b ,,ab#b ,,ac#b1 extracting the square root ,,ar 7,,ab#b ,,ac#b74 ,if we suppose each of the component forces equal to #a1 ,,ar 7#ab #ab7 #b1 a value which can neither be expressed in whole numbers nor in fractions1 but which is represented by the hypotheneuse4 #bj4 ,in the physical sciences1 such words as force1 cause1 agent1 etc41 are frequently used1 but the ideas which these terms express are a part of science only inasmuch as they are represented by effects4 ,this is not because true philosophy confounds the cause with the effect1 but as physical science regards only the phenomenon in all that relates to the cause1 it limits itself to the abstract idea of causality1 which presents nothing determinate1 and consequently is not the object of its scientific labors4 ,the system of universal attraction has immortalized the name of ,newton1 and he begins by confessing his ignorance of the cause of the effect which he explains4 ,when we go beyond the phenomena and the calculations to which they give rise1 we enter the field of metaphysics4 #ba4 ,the natural sciences consider certain qualities of bodies which have no relation to extension1 as1 for example1 heat and light1 and this might seem to be a refutation of what we have said of extension4 ,still this objection disappears when we examine in what manner science takes note of these qualities1 and instead of overthrowing our thesis1 the result will strengthen1 extend1 and explain it4 ,heat is not measured by the sensation which it produces in us4 ,if we enter a room where the temperature is very high1 we experience a strong sensation of heat1 which gradually grows weaker1 while the temperature remains the same4 ,if we reach our hand to a friend we experience a sensation of heat or cold1 in proportion as his hand is warmer or colder than our own4 ,heat and cold are measured1 not in themselves1 nor in relation to our sensations1 but in the effect which they produce4 ,these effects are included in the modification of extension2 for the thermometer marks the temperature by a greater or less elevation of the mercury in a line4 ,its degrees are expressed by parts of a line1 on which they are marked4 ,i know that what is measured is distinct from extension2 but1 its measurement is only possible by relation to extension1 and by attending to effects which are modifications of extension4 ,thus1 the temperature at which water boils is #bab1 and this is discovered by the motion of the water1 and has relation to extension4 ,so1 also1 the rarefaction and condensation of bodies are modifications of extension1 since these states consist in the occupation of greater or less space1 or in the increase or diminution of their dimensions4 #bb4 ,all that science teaches us of light and colors relates to the different directions and combinations of the rays of light4 ,our observation goes no farther than sensation4 ,we know that we can combine the rays in different manners1 and direct them1 so as to modify our sensation1 but this is nothing more than the scientific knowledge of extension in the medium which we make use of1 and of the sensation experienced in consequence4 ,all beyond this is entirely unknown4 #bc4 ,we may say the same of all other sensations1 that of touch included4 ,what is that quality of bodies which we call hardness8 the resistance which we encounter when we touch them8 ,but abstracting sensation1 which only produces the consciousness of itself1 what do we find8 ,impenetrability4 ,and what do we understand by impenetrability8 ,the impossibility of two bodies occupying the same space at the same time4 ,here1 then1 we meet with extension4 ,if1 by hardness1 we mean the cohesion of molecules1 in what does cohesion consist8 ,in the juxtaposition of parts in such manner that they cannot1 without difficulty1 be separated4 ,but1 to be separated1 is to be made to occupy a place different from that which was before occupied4 ,here1 too1 we find the idea of extension4 ,of sound we know nothing scientifically1 except as relates to extension and motion4 ,the musical scale is expressed by a series of fractional numbers representing the vibrations of the air4 #bd4 ,these examples demonstrate the third of the above propositions1 that whatever we know of sensations that deserves the name of science1 is included in the modifications of extension4 #be4 ,it is the same with the fourth proposition1 that without the idea of extension1 we can have no fixed idea of any thing corporeal1 no fixed rule in relation to phenomena1 but are like blind men4 ,if1 for an instant1 we abstract the idea of extension1 it is impossible for us to take a step in advance4 ,the examples already adduced in order to demonstrate the second proposition1 render further explanation here unnecessary4 #bf4 ,although extension is essentially composed of parts1 there is in it something fixed1 unalterable1 and1 in some manner1 simple4 ,there may be more or less extension1 but not different kinds4 ,one right line may be longer or shorter than another1 but its length is not of a different species4 ,one surface may be larger than another1 a solid of a certain kind greater than another of the same kind1 but not in a different manner4 ,when ,i say that in the idea of extension objectively considered there is a certain sort of simplicity1 ,i do not mean that there is any thing entirely simple2 for ,i have just said that its object is essentially composite4 ,neither do ,i abstract its essential elements1 which are the three dimensions1 nor any idea which it involves1 as its limitability1 or capacity to be limited in various ways4 ,all ,i wish to show is that in all the different figures these fundamental notions are sufficient1 that they are never modified1 but always present the same thing to the mind4 ,let us compare a right line with a curve4 ,a right line is a direction which is always constant2 the curve a direction which is always varied4 ,a direction always varied is a collection of right directions infinitely small4 ,therefore1 the circumference of a circle is considered as a polygon of an infinite number of sides4 ,the curve is therefore formed by the variety of directions reduced to infinitesimal values4 ,this theory which explains the difference of the right line and the curve1 is evidently applicable to surfaces and solids4 ,let us compare a quadrilateral with a pentagon2 all that the second has which the first has not is one side more in perimeter1 and in area the space contained in the triangle formed by a line drawn from one of its angles to either of the opposite angles4 ,the lines are of the same kind1 the surfaces differ only in the ways in which they terminate4 ,but termination is the same as limitation4 ,therefore1 all that is essential to the idea of extension1 that is1 direction and limitability1 remain always the same and unchangeable4 ,this intrinsical constancy is indispensable to science4 ,that which is mutable1 may be the object of perception1 but not of scientific perception4 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,reality ,,of ,,extension4 #bg4 ,we now come to more difficult questions4 ,is extension any thing in itself1 abstracted from the idea of it8 ,if any thing1 what is it8 ,is it identified with bodies1 or is it confounded with space8 ,i have proved#ci that extension exists outside of ourselves1 that it is not an illusion of the senses2 and this solves the first question1 whether extension is any thing4 #ci ,book ,,ii4 ,ch4 ix4 ,whatever may be its nature or our ignorance on this point1 there is in reality something which corresponds to our idea of extension4 ,whoever denies this truth must be content to deny every thing except the consciousness of himself1 if indeed he does not experience doubts even of this too4 ,whatever idealists may assert1 there is not1 nor ever was a man who in his sound judgment seriously doubted the existence of an external world4 ,this conviction is for man a necessity against which it is vain to contend4 ,this external world is for us inseparable from that which is represented by the idea of extension4 ,it either does not exist1 or else it is extended4 ,if we could be persuaded that it is not extended1 it would not be difficult to convince us that it does not exist4 ,for my part1 ,i find it just as difficult to imagine the world without extension as without existence1 and if ,i could be made to believe its extension an illusion1 ,i should easily believe its existence also an illusion4 #bh4 ,it is to be observed that although we confess our ignorance of the internal nature of extension1 it is still necessary to admit that we know something of it2 its dimensions1 namely1 and what serves as the basis of geometry4 ,the difficulty is not in knowing what extension is geometrically considered1 but what it is in reality4 ,we know the geometrical essence1 but what we want to ascertain is1 whether this essence realized is something which is confounded with some other real thing1 or is only a quality which we know without knowing the being to which it belongs4 ,without this distinction we should deny the basis of geometry2 for1 it is evident that if we should not know the essence of extension in the aforesaid manner1 we could not be sure that we are not building in the air when we raise upon the idea of extension the whole science of geometry4 #bi4 ,thus then under this aspect1 we are certain that extension exists outside of us1 and that there are true dimensions4 ,this idea is a necessary consequence of the idea of the external world1 as we said before4 ,the dimensions in the external world must be subject to the same principles as those which we conceive1 or the very idea which we have formed of the external world is reversed4 ,i do not mean by this that a real circle may be a geometrical circle1 but only that what is true of the second must be true of the first also1 in proportion as it is constructed with greater or less exactness4 ,beyond what can be formed by the most perfect and exact instruments1 ,i can conceive1 without passing from the order of reality1 a circle or any other figure1 as near as ,i please to the geometrical idea4 ,the sharpest instrument can never mark an indivisible point1 nor draw a line without breadth2 but this surface1 on which the point is marked1 on the line drawn1 being infinitely divisible1 ,i can conceive a case in which the reality will come infinitely near to the geometrical idea4 #cj4 ,astronomy and all the physical sciences rest on the supposition that real extension is subject to the same principles as ideal extension2 and that experience comes closer to theory in proportion as the conditions of the second are more exactly fulfilled in the first4 ,the art of constructing mathematical instruments1 which has been brought in our day to a surprising perfection1 regards the ideal as the type of the real order2 and progress in the latter is the approximation to the models of the former4 ,theory directs the operations of practice1 and these in their turn confirm by the result the foresight of theory4 ,therefore1 extension exists not only in the ideal order1 but also in the real2 and it is something1 independently of our ideas2 and geometry1 that vast representation of a world of lines and figures1 has a real object in nature4 ,how far the real corresponds with the ideal1 we shall examine in the next chapter4 ,,chapter ,v4 ,,geometrical ,,exactness ,,realized ,,in ,,nature4 #ca4 ,the disagreement which we discover between the phenomena and the geometrical theory makes us apt to think that reality is rough and coarse1 and that purity and exactness are found only in our ideas4 ,this is a mistaken opinion caused by want of reflection4 ,the reality is as geometrical as our ideas2 the phenomenon realizes the idea in all its purity and vigor4 ,be not startled by this seeming paradox2 for it will soon appear to you a very true1 reasonable1 and well-grounded proposition4 ,we shall first prove that the ideas which are the elements of geometry have their objects in the real world1 and that these objects are subject to precisely the same conditions as the ideas4 ,this proved1 it clearly follows that geometry in all its strictness exists as well in the real as in the ideal order4 #cb4 ,let us begin with a point4 ,in the ideal order1 a point is an invisible thing1 it is the limit of a line and its generating element1 and it occupies a determinate position in space4 ,it is the limit of a line2 for when we take away its length1 we have a point remaining which we are forced to regard as the limit of the line unless we destroy it entirely so as to have nothing left4 ,the more the line is shortened the nearer it approaches to a point1 yet can never be identified with it until its length is wholly suppressed4 ,the point is the generating element of the line2 for we form the idea of lineal dimension by considering a point in motion4 ,the occupation of a determinate position in space is another indispensable condition of the idea of a point1 if we wish to use it in geometrical figures4 ,the centre of a circle is a point in itself indivisible1 it fills no space2 but in order that it be of any use as centre1 we must be able to refer all the radii to it1 and this is impossible unless it occupy a determinate position equidistant from all points of the circumference4 ,as a general rule1 geometry acts upon dimensions1 and these dimensions require points in which they commence1 points through which they pass1 and points in which they end1 and by which distances1 inclinations1 and all that relates to the position of lines and planes1 are measured4 ,nothing of all this can be conceived unless the point1 although not extended1 occupies a determinate position in space4 #cc4 ,does there exist in nature anything which corresponds to the geometrical point1 and unites all its conditions with as great exactness as science in its purest idealism can desire8 ,i believe there does4 ,philosophers have adopted different opinions as to the divisibility of matter4 ,some maintain that there are unextended points in which the division ends1 and that all composite bodies are formed of these4 ,others assert that it is not possible to arrive at simple elements1 but the division may continue ad infinitum continually approaching the limit of composition1 but never reaching it4 ,the first of these opinions is equivalent to the admission of geometrical points realized in nature2 the second1 though apparently less favorable to this realization1 must come to it at last4 ,unextended molecules are the realization of the geometrical point1 in all its exactness4 ,they are the limit of dimension1 because division ends with them4 ,they are the generative elements of dimension1 because they form extension4 ,they occupy a determinate position in space1 because bodies with all their conditions and determinations in space are formed of them4 ,therefore1 from this opinion1 held by eminent philosophers like ,leibnitz and ,boscowich1 it follows that the geometrical point exists in nature in all the purity and exactness of the scientific order4 ,the opinion which denies the existence of unextended points1 admits1 as it necessarily must admit1 infinite divisibility4 ,extension has parts1 and therefore is divisible2 these parts1 in their turn1 are either extended or not extended2 if unextended1 the supposition fails1 and the opinion of unextended points is admitted2 if extended1 they are divisible1 and we must either come at last to unextended points1 or continue the division ad infinitum4 ,i remarked above that1 although less favorable to the real existence of geometrical points1 this opinion as well as the other does acknowledge their realization4 ,the parts into which the composite is divided are not created by the division1 but exist before the division1 and without them the division would be impossible4 ,they do not exist because they may be divided1 but they may be divided because they exist4 ,this opinion therefore1 does not expressly admit the existence of unextended points1 but it admits the possibility of eternally coming nearer to them1 and this not only in the ideal1 but also in the real order2 because the divisibility is not affirmed of the ideas1 but of the matter itself4 ,although our experience of division is limited1 divisibility itself is unlimited4 ,a being endowed with greater powers than we possess1 might carry the division further than we are able to do4 ,our ability to divide is limited1 but ,god1 by his infinite power1 can push the division ad infinitum1 and ,his infinite intelligence sees in an instant all the parts into which the composite may be divided4 ,omitting the difficulties which attend an opinion which seems to suppose the existence of what it denies1 ,i will ask if geometry can require more rigorous exactness than is found in the points to which infinite power can come1 if we suppose it to exercise its eternal action in dividing the composite2 or1 in other words1 can there be any more strictly geometrical points than those seen by an infinite intelligence in an infinitely divisible being8 ,this not only satisfies our imagination and our ideas of exactness1 but goes even beyond4 ,experience teaches us that to imagine an unextended point is not impossible2 and to think it in the purely intellectual order1 is only to conceive the possibility of this infinite divisibility1 and to be suddenly placed at the last limit1--a limit which must still be far distant from that to which1 not abstraction1 but the sight of infinite intelligence can reach4 ,if the geometrical point exists1 the geometrical line also exists2 for it is only a series of unextended points2 or1 if we are unwilling to acknowledge these1 a series of extremes to which division infinitely continued at last arrives4 ,a series of geometrical lines forms a surface2 and a union of surfaces forms a solid1 the ideal order agreeing with reality in its formation as in its nature4 #cd4 ,this theory of the realization of geometry extends equally to all the natural sciences4 ,it is an error to say1 for example1 that the reality does not correspond to the theories of mechanics4 ,it should rather be said that it is not the reality that is at fault1 but the means of experimenting2 the blame should not be imputed to the reality1 but rather to the limitation of our experience4 ,the centre of gravity in a body1 is the point where all the forces of gravitation in the body unite4 ,mechanics supposes this point to be indivisible1 and in accordance with this supposition1 establishes and demonstrates its theorems1 and solves its problems4 ,here stops the mechanician1 and the machinist begins1 who can never discover the strict centre of gravity supposed in the theory4 ,experience disagrees with the principles1 and we ought to correct the former by adhering to that which is determined by the latter4 ,is this because the centre of gravity does not exist in nature with all the exactness which science supposes8 ,no2 the centre exists1 but the means of finding it are wanting4 ,nature goes as far as science2 neither remains behind2 but our means of experience are unable to keep up with them4 ,the mechanician determines the indivisible point in which the centre of gravity is situated1 supposing the surface without thickness1 lines without breadth1 and the length divided at a determinate point of space1 which has no extension4 ,nature entirely fulfills these conditions4 ,the point exists1 and the reality should not be blamed for the limitation of our experience4 ,the point exists in either of the hypotheses mentioned above4 ,the first1 which favors unextended points1 admits the existence of the centre of gravity in all its scientific purity4 ,the other is not so decided1 but it says to us3 ,do you see this molecule1 this little globe of infinitesimal diameter1 the smallness of which the imagination cannot represent8 ,make it still smaller1 by dividing it for all eternity1 in decreasing geometrical progression1 and you will always be coming nearer the centre of gravity without ever reaching it4 ,nature will never fail2 the limit will ever retire from you2 but you will know you are approaching it4 ,within this molecule is what you seek4 ,continue to advance1 you will never reach it1--but what you want is there4 ,in this case ,i do not see that the reality falls short of scientific exactness2 no mechanical theory imagined or conceived can go farther4 #ce4 ,these reflections place beyond all doubt that geometry with all its exactness1 and theories in all their rigor1 exist in nature4 ,if we could follow it in our experience1 we should find the real conformed to the ideal order1 and we should discover that when experience is opposed to theory1 it is not the latter which is wrong1 but the limitation of our means makes us lay aside the conditions imposed by the theory4 ,the machinist who constructs a system of indented wheels finds himself obliged to correct the rules of theory1 on account of friction1 and other circumstances1 proceeding from the material which he employs4 ,if he could see with a glance the bosom of nature1 he would discover in the friction itself a new system of infinitesimal gearing which would confirm with wonderful exactness those very rules which a rude experience represents to him as opposed to reality4 #cf4 ,if the universe is admirable in its masses of gigantic immensity1 it is not less so in its smallest parts4 ,we are placed between two infinities4 ,man in his weakness1 unable to reach either one or the other1 must content himself with feeling them1 hoping that a new existence in another world will clear up the secrets which are now veiled in impenetrable darkness4 ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,remarks ,,on ,,extension4 #cg4 ,if extension is something as we have proved2 what is it8 ,we find extension in bodies and also in space because in both we find that which constitutes its essence1 which is dimension4 ,is the extension of bodies the same as the extension of space8 ,i see and hold in my hand a pen3 it is certainly extended4 ,it moves1 and its extension moves with it4 ,the space in which its motion is executed remains immovable4 ,at the instant ,a the extension of the pen occupies the point ,a2 at the moment ,b the same extension of the pen occupies the part ,b of space which is distinct from the part ,a2 therefore neither the part ,a of space nor the part ,b is identified with the extension of the body4 ,this seems to have all the force of a demonstration2 but to make it more clear and more general1 ,i will put it into the form of a syllogism4 ,things which are separated or may be separated are distinct2 but the extension of bodies may be separated from any part of space2 therefore the extension of bodies and the extension of space are distinct4 ,i said that this reasoning seems to have all the force of a demonstration1 but it is nevertheless subject to serious difficulties4 ,these difficulties cannot be understood without a profound analysis of the idea of space1 and therefore ,i shall reserve my opinion until this has been treated of in the following chapters4 #ch4 ,is the extension of a body the body itself8 ,i cannot conceive a body without extension1 but this does not prove that extension is the same thing as the body4 ,my soul has acquired a knowledge of the body by means of the senses4 ,these senses have awakened in me the idea of extension2 but they have told me nothing of the intrinsic nature of the body perceived4 ,in those beings which we call bodies we find the power of producing in us impressions very distinct from that of extension4 ,from two bodies of equal extension we receive very different impressions1 therefore there is in them something besides extension4 ,if extension was their only quality1 this being equal1 the effect would be the same2 but experience teaches us that it is not so4 ,moreover we conceive extension in pure space where there is no body4 ,the idea of body implies the idea of mobility1 while space is immovable4 ,it implies the power of producing impressions2 the extension of space has not of itself this power4 ,therefore the simple idea of extension does not include even in our cognitions the whole idea of a body4 ,we do not know in what the essence of body consists2 but we know that in the idea which we have of it there is something more than extension4 #ci4 ,when it is said that a body is inconceivable without extension it is not meant that extension is the constitutive notion of the essence of body4 ,this essence is unknown to us1 and therefore we cannot know what does or does not belong to it4 ,the true meaning of this inseparability of the two ideas of extension and body is this3 ,as we have no knowledge a priori of bodies1 but whatever we know of them1 their existence included1 we derive through the senses1 all that we think or imagine concerning them must presuppose that which is the basis of our sensations4 ,this basis1 as we have already seen1 is extension2 without it there is no sensation1 and consequently without it a body ceases to exist for us1 or is reduced to a being which we cannot distinguish from others4 ,i will explain my ideas4 ,if ,i strip bodies of extension and leave them only the nature of a being which causes the impressions which ,i receive2 this being is the same1 so far as ,i am concerned1 as a spirit which should produce the same impressions4 ,i see this paper1 and it causes in me the impression of a white surface4 ,there is no doubt that ,god could produce in my mind the same sensation without the existence of any body4 ,then supposing that ,i knew that no external extended object corresponded to my sensation1 which was caused by a being acting upon me1 it is evident that there would be two distinct things in my mind4 ,first1 the phenomenon of sensation1 which under all hypotheses is the same2 and secondly1 the idea of the being which produced it1 which is only the idea of a being distinct from myself1 acting upon me1 which in relation to the external world1 would involve two ideas2 those of distinction and causality4 ,i now take from the paper extension1 and what remains8 ,the same as before4 #a4 ,an internal phenomenon1 made known by consciousness4 #b4 ,the idea of a being the cause of this phenomenon4 ,i do not know whether this must always be a body2 but ,i know that the idea of a body1 as ,i understand it1 includes something more than this4 ,i know that being is not in relation to myself distinguishable from other beings1 and that if there is any thing in its nature to distinguish it from them1 it is something unknown to me4#dj #dj ,see ,ch4 ,i4 #dj4 ,this is the sense in which ,i say that we cannot separate the idea of extension from the body4 ,but from this it must not be inferred that the things themselves are identified2 perhaps1 even1 a more profound knowledge of matter would show us that instead of being identical1 they are entirely distinct4 ,we have seen that it is so with their ideas1 and this is a sign that it is so in reality4 #da4 ,we have few ideas as clear as that of extension geometrically considered2 every attempt to explain it is useless2 we know it more perfectly by mere intuition than whole volumes could make it known to us4 ,it is so clear an idea1 that on it is founded a whole science1 the most extensive and evident which we possess1 that of geometry4 ,therefore there is reason to believe that we know the true essence of extension1 since we know its necessary properties1 and even base a whole science on this knowledge4 ,yet we do not discover in this idea1 either impenetrability or any of the properties of bodies2 but rather on the contrary1 we find a capacity indifferent to them all4 ,we conceive extension penetrable as easily as impenetrable1 empty or full1 white or green1 with properties by which it can be placed in relation with our organs1 as easily as without them4 ,we can conceive extension in a body acting on another body1 or in pure space2 in the sun which enlightens and warms the world1 or in the vague dimensions of an empty immensity4 ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,,space4--,,nothing4 #db4 ,it may have been remarked in the preceding chapters that the idea of extension is always united with that of space1 and when we endeavor to determine the real nature of the former1 we encounter the questions which relate to the latter4 ,it is not possible to explain one1 while the other remains in obscurity4 ,it is for this reason that ,i have concluded to examine carefully the questions concerning space under its ideal as well as under its real aspect2 since only in this manner is it possible to determine clearly the nature of extension4 #dc4 ,space is one of those profound mysteries which the natural order presents to man's weak understanding4 ,the deeper he examines it the more obscure he finds it2 the mind is buried in the darkness which we imagine to exist beyond the bounds of the finite1 in the abyss of immensity4 ,we know not if what we behold is an illusion or a reality4 ,for a moment we seem to have found the truth1 and then we discover that we have stretched our arms to embrace a shadow4 ,we form arguments which in any other matter would be conclusive1 but are not so here1 because they are in direct contradiction to others equally conclusive4 ,we seem to have reached the limit which the ,creator has put to our investigations2 and in endeavoring to pass beyond it1 our strength fails1 for we find ourselves out of the element which is natural to our life4 ,when certain philosophers pass rapidly over the questions relating to space1 and flatter themselves with explaining them in a few words1 we can assure them that either they have not meditated much upon the difficulty which these questions involve1 or else they have not understood them4 ,it was not so that ,descartes1 ,malebranche1 ,newton1 or ,leibnitz proceeded4 ,to descend this bottomless abyss is not to lose time in useless discussion2 even though we should not find what we seek1 we obtain a most precious result1 for we reach the limits assigned to our intellect4 ,it is well to know what may be known and what cannot2 for from this knowledge philosophy draws high and valuable considerations4 ,moreover1 though we have small hope of success1 we cannot pass over without examining an idea that is so closely connected with all our knowledge of corporeal objects1 that is to say1 extension4 ,there must be a motive of investigation since all philosophers have investigated it1 and who can say that after long ages of efforts the truth is not perhaps reserved as the reward of constancy8 #dd4 ,what then is space8 ,is it something real or only an idea8 ,if an idea is there any object in the external world which corresponds to it8 ,is it a pure illusion8 ,and is the word space without meaning8 ,if we do not know what space is1 let us at least fix the meaning of the word1 and thus determine in some measure the state of the question4 ,by space we understand the extension in which we imagine bodies to be placed1 or the capacity to contain them to which we attribute none of their qualities except extension4 ,let us suppose a glass to be hermetically sealed1 and the interior to remain empty by the annihilation of what it contained2 this cavity or capacity which in our way of understanding it may be occupied by a body is a part of space4 ,let us imagine the world to be an immense receptacle in which all bodies are contained2 let us suddenly make it empty and we have a cavity equal in space to the universe4 ,if we imagine beyond the limits of the world a capacity to contain other bodies1 we have an unlimited or imaginary space4 ,space appears to us at first sight1 if not infinite1 at least indefinite4 ,for in whatever part we conceive a body to be placed1 we also conceive the possibility of its moving1 describing any class of lines1 or taking any kind of direction and departing indefinitely from its first position4 ,therefore we imagine no limit to this capacity1 to these dimensions4 ,therefore space appears to us as indefinite4 #de4 ,is space a pure nothing8 ,some philosophers maintain that abstracted from the surface of bodies1 and considered as a mere interval1 it is a pure nothing4 ,at the same time they admit that it is only owing to space that two bodies are really distant from each other1 and add that if we suppose the whole world1 with the exception of one body only1 to be reduced to nothing1 this body could move and change its place4 ,i am confident that this opinion involves irreconcilable contradictions4 ,to say extension-nothing is a contradiction in terms1 and the opinion of these philosophers is reduced to this expression4 #df4 ,if every thing in a room be reduced to nothing1 it seems impossible for the walls to remain distant from each other2 for the idea of distance implies a medium between the two objects2 and nothing1 being nothing1 cannot be the medium required4 ,if the interval is nothing1 there is no distance4 ,to attribute properties to nothing1 is to destroy all ideas1--to affirm that a thing may be and not be at the same time1--and consequently to overthrow the foundation of human knowledge4 #dg4 ,to say that if the contents were annihilated1 a negative space would remain1 is only to play with words without touching the difficulty to be solved4 ,this negative space is either something or nothing2 if it is something1 the opinion we are opposing is false2 if it is nothing1 the difficulty remains the same4 #dh4 ,but1 it may be said1 although nothing remains between the surfaces1 they still retain the capacity of containing something4 ,to this ,i reply1 that this capacity is not in the surfaces themselves1 but in their distance from each other2 for if it were in the surfaces1 they would still preserve it1 no matter how they may be placed1 which is absurd4 ,we have not therefore advanced a single step4 ,we must explain what this capacity1 or this distance1 is2 and this is still untouched4 #di4 ,perhaps it may be said that annihilating all that is contained between the surfaces1 does not destroy the volume which they form1 and the idea of this volume implies the idea of capacity4 ,but ,i reply1 that the idea of volume involves that of distance1 and there is no distance if this distance is a pure nothing4 #ej4 ,in our efforts to surmount these difficulties1 another seemingly specious solution offers1 but if we examine it we shall find it as weak as the others4 ,distance1 it might be said1 is a mere negation of contact1 but negation is a pure nothing2 therefore this nothing is what we seek4 ,i say this solution is as weak as the others2 for1 if distance is only the negation of contact1 all distances must be equal1 because negation cannot be greater or less4 ,the negation of contact is the same whether the surfaces are a million leagues or only the millionth part of an inch distant from each other4 ,this negation1 therefore1 explains nothing1 and the difficulty still remains4 #ea4 ,not only is the idea of distance not explained by the idea of contact1 but on the contrary1 the idea of contact can only be explained by the idea of distance4 ,contiguity is explained by immediate union of two surfaces2 we say that they touch each other because there is nothing between them1 or there is no distance4 ,the idea of contact does not involve the qualities which relate to the senses1 nor the action which one body may exercise upon another which touches it1 as impulse or compression4 ,contiguity is a negative1 and purely geometrical1 idea1 and implies only the negation of distance4 ,contiguity cannot be greater or less2 it is all that it can be when there is a true negation of distance4 ,two objects may be more or less distant1 but they cannot touch more or less1 with respect to the same parts4 ,there may be contact of more points1 but not more contact of the same points4 #eb4 ,if we attribute distance and capacity to space1 the argument in favor of its reality becomes still stronger4 ,let us suppose an empty sphere two feet in diameter4 ,within there is only space2 if space is nothing there is nothing in it4 ,is motion possible in this empty sphere8 ,it does not seem that there can be any doubt of this4 ,there is a movable body1 an extension greater than the extension of the body1 and a distance to be passed over4 ,we may add to this1 that if motion were not possible1 it would not be possible to make the sphere empty1 or after making it empty1 to fill it4 ,neither emptying nor filling the sphere can be done without motion of bodies in the interior of the sphere1 and motion of a body in another body is only possible in space1 because bodies are impenetrable1 and also because1 when the sphere is filled after it is empty1 the body which enters does not meet another body2 and when the sphere is made empty1 the body which passes out1 moves over the space which it abandons1 and in which nothing remains after it has passed out4 ,therefore1 supposing the sphere empty1 there may be motion in it4 ,but if the space contained in the sphere is a pure nothing1 the motion also is nothing1 and consequently does not exist4 ,motion can neither exist nor be perceived without a distance passed over4 ,if1 therefore1 the distance is nothing1 there is no motion4 ,if we say that the body has passed over half of the diameter1 or one foot1 what does this mean8 ,if the space is nothing1 it can mean nothing4 ,i see no reply which can be made to these arguments1 which are all based on the axiom1 that nothing has no properties4 #ec4 ,however great may be the difficulties opposed to the reality of space1 they are not so great as those which are brought against the opinion1 which1 while granting extension to space1 still regards it as a pure nothing4 ,the former1 as we shall soon see1 are produced by certain inaccuracies in our way of conceiving things1 rather than by arguments founded on the nature of things2 whilst those objections which we have brought against the opinion denying the reality of space1 are founded on the ideas which are the basis of all our knowledge1 and on this evident proposition3 nothing has no properties4 ,if this proposition is not admitted as an established axiom1 the principle of contradiction falls1 and all human knowledge is destroyed4 ,for1 it would be a plain contradiction1 if nothing could have any properties or parts2 if any thing could be affirmed of nothing1 or could be moved in nothing2 if a science like geometry could be founded upon nothing2 or if all the calculations which are made on nature are referred to nothing4 ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,,descartes ,,and ,,leibnitz ,,on ,,space4 #ed4 ,if space is something1 what is it8 ,here is the difficulty4 ,to overthrow the opinion of our adversaries was easy1 but to maintain our position is more difficult4 ,can we say that space is only the extension of bodies2 that conceived in the abstract it gives us the idea of what we call pure space2 and that the different points and positions are mere modifications of extension8 ,it is easy to see that if space is the extension of bodies1 where there is no body there can be no space1 and consequently vacuum is impossible4 ,this consequence is unavoidable4 ,this has been the opinion of celebrated philosophers like ,descartes and ,leibnitz2 but ,i cannot understand why they both gave the universe an indefinite extension4 ,it is true that by this means they avoid the difficulty of the space which we imagine beyond the limits of the universe2 since1 if the universe is not limited1 there can be nothing beyond its limits1 and therefore1 whatever we can imagine1 must be within the universe4 ,but our object is not to avoid difficulties1 but to solve them2 and it argues nothing for the soundness of our opinion that it escapes difficulties4 #ee4 ,according to ,descartes1 the essence of body is in extension1 and as we necessarily conceive extension in space1 it follows that space1 body1 and extension1 are three essentially identical things4 ,vacuum1 as it is generally conceived1 that is1 an extension without a body1 is then a contradiction2 for it is a body1 because it is extension1 and it is not a body1 because we suppose that there is no body4 ,descartes accepts all the consequences of this doctrine4 ,he does not admit the supposition that if ,god should annihilate all the matter contained in a vessel1 this vessel could still retain its form4 ,we shall observe1 he says1 in opposition to this serious error1 that there is no necessary connection between the vessel and the body which fills it2 but such is the invincible necessity of the relation between the concave figure of the vessel and the extension contained in this concavity1 that it is not more difficult to imagine a mountain without a valley1 than to conceive this concavity without the extension contained in it1 or this extension without a thing extended4 ,nothing1 as we have often said1 cannot be extended4 ,therefore1 if any one should ask1 what would happen if ,god should destroy the matter contained in a vessel1 without replacing it1 we must say that the sides of the vessel would come so closely together as to touch each other4 ,two bodies must touch each other1 when there is nothing between them4 ,it would be a contradiction to assert that these two bodies were separated2 that is to say1 that there was a distance between them1 if this distance were nothing1 or did not exist4 ,distance is a property of extension1 and cannot exist without extension4#da #da ,descartes1 ,principes de la ,philosophie4 ,p4 #b1 #ah4 #ef4 ,if ,descartes had gone no farther than to maintain that space1 because it contains real distances1 cannot be a mere nothing1 his reasoning would seem conclusive4 ,but when he adds that space is body1 because space is extension1 and extension constitutes the essence of body1 he asserts what he does not prove4 ,because we cannot imagine or conceive a body without extension1 it only follows that extension is a property of bodies without which we cannot conceive them1--not that it is their essence4 ,to be able to say this1 it would be necessary for us to have the idea of body as we have that of extension1 in order that we might see if they are identical4 ,but all that we know of bodies is derived through the senses2 we are not able to penetrate into their more intimate nature4 ,whence arises the inseparability of the ideas of body and extension8 ,it arises from the idea which we have of bodies being a confused idea1 since we conceive it to be a substance in certain relations to ourselves1 and causing in us the impressions which we call sensations4 ,but since the basis of sensations is extension1 as we have demonstrated in a former chapter1 this is the only medium by which we are placed in relation with bodies4 ,when we suppress this basis1 by abstracting it1 we retain nothing of body beyond a general idea of being or substance without any thing to characterize it1 or to distinguish it from others4 ,we find all this in the order of our ideas1 but we cannot infer from this that bodies have no other reality than extension4 #eg4 ,the same reasoning destroys the opinion of indefinite or infinite extension4 ,descartes1 explaining his doctrine on the idea of extension1 says3 ,we shall also know that this world1 or the extended matter which composes the universe1 is without limits2 for1 no matter how far off we place these limits1 we can imagine spaces indefinitely extended beyond them2 and we not only imagine these spaces1 but we conceive them as really existing such as we imagine them1 and containing an indefinitely extended body1 as the idea of extension which we conceive in every space is the true idea which we ought to form of a body4#db #db ,descartes1 ,ibid41 ,,ii1 p4 #ba4 ,in this passage1 besides the error in relation to the essence of bodies1 there is a gratuitous transition from a purely ideal or rather1 imaginary order1 to the real order4 ,it is certain that wherever ,i may imagine the limits of the universe1 if ,i consider them as an immense arch surrounding it1 ,i still imagine new immensities of space beyond this arch2 but to conclude that the reality is as ,i imagine it1 does not seem conformed to the rules of good logic4 ,if it is as clear as ,descartes supposes1 if it is not only an imagination1 but a conception founded on clear and distinct ideas1 how happens it that so many philosophers see in all this only a play of the imagination8 #eh4 ,leibnitz thinks that space is a relation1 an order1 not only between things existing1 but also between possible things as if they existed4#dc ,he also believes vacuum impossible1 but not for the reason which ,descartes gives4 ,these are his words3 #dc ,leibnitz1 ,nouveaux ,essais4 ,l4 ,,ii41 ,c4 ,,xiii41 #ag4 ,philalethes4--,those who take matter and extension for the same thing1 pretend that the sides of a hollow empty body would touch each other4 ,but the space which is between the two bodies is enough to prevent their mutual contact4 ,theophilus4--,i am of your opinion2 for1 although ,i do not admit a vacuum1 ,i distinguish matter from extension1 and concede that although there were a vacuum in a sphere1 the opposite poles would not on that account unite4 ,but ,i do not believe this is a case which the divine perfection would permit4#dd #dd ,leibnitz1 ,ibid41 #ba4 #ei4 ,leibnitz seems to me to commit what logicians call petitio principii1 or1 begging the question4 ,he says that in the case supposed1 the sides would not touch each other1 because the space between them would prevent it2 but this is what he had to prove1--the real existence of this space4 ,this reality is what ,descartes denies4 #fj4 ,if we compare the opinions of ,descartes and ,leibnitz1 we shall see that both agree in denying to space a reality distinct from bodies1 but basing their denial on very different reasons4 ,descartes places the essence of body in extension2 where there is extension there is body2 where there is space there is extension2 consequently1 there neither is nor can be a vacuum4 ,leibnitz does not believe an empty capacity intrinsically absurd1 and that he does not admit it is solely because1 in his conception1 it is repugnant to the divine perfection4 ,the two illustrious philosophers started from very different principles1 but arrived at the same conclusion4 ,descartes rests upon metaphysical reasons1 founded on the essence of things4 ,leibnitz bases his opinion on the absolute essence of things only in its relations with the divine perfection4 ,empty capacity is a contradiction in the opinion of ,leibnitz1 only inasmuch as it is opposed to optimism4 #fa4 ,it is very remarkable that three so distinguished philosophers as ,aristotle1 ,descartes1 and ,leibnitz1 should agree in denying the existence of this capacity which is called space1 considered as a being distinct from bodies1 and with the possibility of existing by itself4 ,the difference of their opinions only proves that at the bottom of the question there is a difficulty more serious than some ideologists believe1 who explain the idea of space and its generation with the same ease as though they were treating of the simplest matters4 ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,,opinion ,,of ,,those ,,who ,,attribute ,,to ,,space ,a ,,nature ,,distinct ,,from ,,bodies4 #fb4 ,the preceding considerations seem to me to establish beyond any question1 that space and nothing are contradictory terms4 ,if space is a capacity with dimensions that can be really measured1 it has real properties1 and therefore is distinct from a pure nothing4 ,we have the idea of space1 on it is based a certain and evident science1 that of geometry2 this idea is also necessary for the conception of motion4 ,a pure nothing cannot be the object which corresponds to this idea4 ,is space something distinct from the extension of bodies8 ,it is objected to the opinion which maintains this1 that space must be either body or spirit1 and if not body it must be spirit1 which is absurd1 since that which is essentially composed of parts1 as space is1 cannot be a spirit1 which is a simple being4 ,there are strong arguments against the opinion which attributes to space a nature distinct from bodies1 but ,i do not attach much weight to the above objection2 for it is only necessary to deny the disjunctive proposition and the whole argument falls to the ground4 ,how can it be proved that there is no medium between body and spirit8 ,we know the essence of neither body nor spirit1 and shall we arrogate to ourselves the right to assert that there is nothing in the universe which is not comprised under one of two extremes1 the nature of which we know not4 #fc4 ,it may be replied1 that there is no medium between the simple and the composite1 any more than between yes and no2 and therefore there is no medium between body which is composite1 and spirit which is simple4 ,i concede that there is no medium between the simple and the composite1 and that whatever exists is one or the other2 but ,i deny that whatever is composite is body1 and whatever is simple is spirit4 ,these two propositions3 every composite is a body1 and3 every body is composite1 are not identical4 ,there may1 therefore1 be composites that are not bodies4 ,composition1 or the possession of parts1 is a property of bodies1 but does not constitute their essence1 or1 at least1 we do not know that it does4 ,if it were so1 we should be obliged to embrace the opinion of ,descartes1 that extension constitutes the essence of bodies4 ,how do we know that there may not be things which have parts1 and yet are not bodies8 #fd4 ,even the state of the question makes us suppose space to be a substance1 that is1 a being subsisting by itself without requiring another being in which to exist4 ,the difficulty once overcome on this supposition1 it is solved in its most essential and inaccessible point1 and therefore in all others4 ,if we suppose space to be distinct from bodies1 and at the same time a true reality1 we must consider it as a substance1 as it exists in itself without any other being in which it inheres4 #fe4 ,i said that a simple being is not necessarily a spirit4 ,to explain this1 ,i need only observe1 that to say every spirit is simple1 is not the same as to say every simple being is a spirit4 ,simplicity is a necessary attribute of a spirit1 but does not constitute its essence4 ,the idea of simplicity expresses only the negation of parts1 and the essence of spirit cannot consist in a negation4 #ff4 ,the argument of those who object to this opinion which attributes to space a nature distinct from bodies1 making it an extended substance1 that it must also be infinite1 is equally inconclusive4 ,for even on this hypothesis1 there is no reason why a limit may not be assigned to space4 ,what is there beyond this limit8 ,nothing4 ,we may1 it is true1 conceive a vague extension1 but imagination is not reality4 ,we also imagine an epoch prior to the ,creation2 if1 then1 imagination were an argument in favor of the infinity of the world1 it would also be an argument for its eternity4 ,the arguments with which ,i have fought against the opinion that space is a pure nothing1 are not founded on our imaginations1 but on the impossibility of nothing being extended1 or having any properties4 ,this is the principal argument which ,i have used against those who1 while they hold space to be a pure nothing1 maintain the possibility of the conception or existence of the properties which they attribute to space4 ,,chapter ,x4 ,,opinion ,,of ,,those ,,who ,,hold ,,space ,,to ,,be ,,the ,,immensity ,,of ,,god4 #fg4 ,overwhelmed by these difficulties1 and unable to reconcile the reality which space offers us with nothing1 or to conceive in any thing created the immobility1 infinity1 and perpetuity which we imagine in space1 some philosophers have put forth the opinion that space is the immensity of ,god4 ,at first sight this seems an extravagant absurdity1 but if we wish fairly to prove the falsity of this opinion1 we must do justice not only to the right intention of those who have defended it1 and the sound explanations which they brought to their assistance1 but also to the reasons which forced them to this extremity1 and which1 though certainly not weighty or solid1 are far from being so contemptible as one may imagine4 #fh4 ,the argument in favor of this opinion may be put in the following form4 ,space is something4 ,before ,god created the world space existed4 ,it is not possible to conceive bodies as existing without space in which they are extended4 ,before they exist1 we conceive this capacity in which they may be placed1 as already existing4 ,therefore1 space is eternal4 ,there is no motion without space2 and in the first instant of the creation bodies could move and be moved4 ,though we suppose only one body in the world1 it could be moved2 and this motion could be infinitely continued4 ,therefore space is infinite4 ,annihilate now this body also1 and the extension in which it moved will remain2 in it new bodies1 new worlds may be created4 ,therefore space is indestructible4 ,but an eternal1 infinite1 and indestructible being cannot be created4 ,therefore1 space is uncreated4 ,therefore it is ,god himself4 ,but it must be ,god inasmuch as we conceive him in relation to extension2 and1 therefore1 space is the immensity of ,god4 ,immensity is the attribute by which ,god is in every part2 it is an attribute which relates to extension4 ,space is1 therefore1 the immensity of ,god4 ,only by adopting this theory can we reasonably admit that space is eternal1 infinite1 and indestructible4 #fi4 ,the objection to this opinion is that it destroys the simplicity of ,god4 ,if space is a property of ,god1 it is ,god2 for1 whatever is in ,god1 is ,god4 ,therefore1 as space is essentially extended1 ,god too must be extended4 ,clarke saw the force of this argument2 he was made to feel it by the arguments of his adversary1 ,leibnitz2 but he answers it very weakly4 ,he says that space has parts1 but they are not separable4 ,but1 however this may be1 it is certain that space has parts4 ,true1 in the idea of space we distinguish parts without separating them2 but we really conceive them in it1 and we cannot conceive space without them4 ,besides1 if we should admit this theory1 what would become of the proofs of the immateriality of the soul8 ,if the infinite wisdom is extended1 why may not the human soul with much more reason be so8 ,carried away by his favorite idea1 ,clarke went so far as to write what we should not have expected from such a man1 that3 ,in questions of this nature1 when we speak of parts1 we mean parts that are separable1 composite1 and disunited like those of matter1 which for this reason is always a compound and never a simple substance4 ,matter is not one substance1 but a composition of substances4 ,this is why1 in my opinion1 matter is incapable of thinking4 ,this incapacity does not proceed from extension1 but from the parts being distinct substances1 disunited1 and independent of each other4#de ,this explanation tends to destroy the simplicity of thinking beings2 for by simplicity has always been understood the absolute wanting of all parts and not the absence of this or that kind of parts4 ,inseparability does not destroy the existence of parts2 it merely asserts the force of cohesion4 #de ,fragment of a ,letter4--7,i do not know what letter the author here refers to1 but the same opinion in almost the same words may be found in ,clarke's fourth and fifth letters to ,leibnitz1 ,tr47 #gj4 ,it is also to be feared that this doctrine opens the door to pantheism4 ,it was even objected to ,clarke that it made ,god the soul of the world1 and although he defended himself from this charge1 there still remains an objection which was not proposed to him1 and which is a very serious one4 ,if we say that ,god is space1 or that space is a property of ,god1 what hinders our saying that ,god is the world1 or that the world is a property of ,god8 ,the world is extended2 but so is space4 ,if ,god and space are not contradictory ideas in the same being1 why are ,god and the universe contradictory8 ,clarke says that bodies are composed of different substances1 that they are not one substance2 but it is certain that all we know of bodies is that they are extended1 and that they cause certain impressions in us4 ,since1 then1 extension is not repugnant to ,god1 and much less so the causality of impressions1 there can be no reason against saying that what ,clarke calls distinct substances1 are only the parts1 or1 if he prefers it1 the properties of the infinite substance4 ,newton went so far as to say that space was the sensorium of ,god1 and even ,clarke maintained against ,leibnitz that ,newton's expression might bear a sound interpretation1 as it was intended only as a comparison4 ,but ,leibnitz insists so strongly on this charge that it is plain that he had very great objections to this word4 #ga4 ,whatever tends to confound ,god with nature1 or to place him in constant communication with it1 otherwise than by pure acts of intellect and will1 places us on a very slippery declivity1 where we can hardly help being precipitated to the bottom1 and at this bottom is pantheism1 which is but a phasis of atheism47#cj7 ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,,fenelon',s ,,opinion4 #gb4 ,clarke's opinion is very similar to that of ,fenelon1 who in his ,treatise on the existence and attributes of ,god1 explains immensity in a very surprising manner4 ,he says3 ,after considering the eternity and immutability of ,god1 which are the same thing1 ,i ought to examine his immensity4 ,since he is by himself1 he is sovereignly1 and since he is sovereignly1 he has all being in himself4 ,since he has all being in himself1 he has without doubt extension2 extension is a manner of being1 of which ,i have an idea4 ,i have already seen that my ideas upon the essence of things1 are real degrees of being1 which actually exist in ,god1 and are possible out of him1 because he can produce them4 ,therefore1 extension is in him2 he can produce it outside of himself1 only because it is contained in the fulness of his being4 ,to a certain extent the words of ,fenelon may be explained in a sense which most theologians would not reject4 ,they distinguish two classes of perfections2 those which involve no imperfection2 such as wisdom1 holiness1 and justice2 and those which involve imperfection1 as1 for example1 all which belong to bodies1 extension1 form1 etc4 ,the former1 which are also called perfections simpliciter1 are in ,god formaliter2 that is to say1 just as they are1 because their nature involves no kind of imperfection1 and1 therefore1 in ,god1 they do not diminish nor tarnish his infinite perfection4 ,those of the second class1 which are called perfections secundum quid1 are in ,god not formaliter2 for the imperfection which they involve is repugnant to his infinite perfection1 but virtualiter or eminenter2 that is to say1 that all the perfection1 all the being which they contain is in ,god1 who is infinite perfection1 infinite being2 and ,god can produce them exteriorly by his creative omnipotence4 ,but inasmuch as they pre-exist in an infinite being1 they are freed from all limitation and imperfection1 and identified with the infinite essence1 and have a mode of being far superior to what they are in reality4 ,this is expressed by the term eminenter4 ,among these perfections secundum quid1 extension has always been numbered4 #gc4 ,if the illustrious ,archbishop of ,cambrai had held to this sense1 we should have nothing to say in relation to his doctrine1 but the words which follow seem to show that he inclined to the opinion of those who maintain that space is the immensity of ,god4 ,whence1 then1 he adds1 is it that ,i do not call him extended and corporeal8 ,it is because there is an extreme difference1 as ,i have already remarked1 between attributing to ,god all that is positive in extension1 and attributing to him extension with a limit or negation4 ,he that places extension without limits changes extension into immensity2 he who places extension with limits1 makes a corporeal nature4 ,from these words it might be believed that ,fenelon did not distinguish the two modes of being of extension as theologians do2 but he gives to ,god all that is positive in extension1 though he gives it to him without limit4 ,from this it would seem to follow that ,god is really extended1 although his extension is infinite4 ,with all the respect due to the illustrious shade of one of the greatest ornaments of the ,catholic ,church1 and one of the greatest men of modern times1 ,i must say that such an opinion does not seem to me to be sustainable4 ,a ,god really extended though with an infinite extension is not ,god4 ,that which is extended is essentially composite2 ,god is essentially simple4 ,therefore1 ,god and extension are contradictory4 #gd4 ,but let us hear the illustrious prelate continue the explanation and defence of his opinion4 ,he says3 ,from the moment that you place no limit to extension1 you take from it figure1 divisibility1 motion1 and impenetrability2--figure1 because this is only a mode of limiting by surfaces2--divisibility1 because1 as we have seen1 that which is infinite cannot be diminished1 therefore1 it cannot be divided1 and consequently1 it is not composite and divisible2--motion1 because1 if you suppose a whole1 which has no parts nor limits1 it cannot move beyond its place1 because there can be no place beyond the true infinite2 neither can it change the arrangement and situation of its parts1 because it has no parts of which it is composed2--impenetrability1 in fine1 because impenetrability can only be conceived by conceiving two limited bodies1 one of which is not the other1 and cannot occupy the same space as the other4 ,there are no two such bodies in infinite and indivisible extension2 therefore there is no impenetrability in this extension4 ,these principles established1 it follows that all that is positive in extension is in ,god1 although ,god has no figure1 is not movable1 divisible1 or impenetrable1 and consequently is not palpable1 nor measurable4 ,from this passage it is very evident that ,fenelon was far from imagining a composite ,god1 a ,god with parts4 ,he expressly denies it more than once in these few lines4 ,not less was to be looked for from his deep penetration and the purity of his doctrines2 but1 although this saves the rectitude of his intention1 it does not satisfy philosophical exactness4 ,for my part1 ,i honestly confess that if extension is to be taken in its true sense1 ,i cannot conceive how taking away its limits destroys its parts4 ,on the contrary1 ,i should rather say that an infinite extension would have infinite parts4 ,if it is infinite it will have no figure2 because figure involves a limit2 but if it be true extension1 it is a sort of immense field on which all imaginable figures may be traced4 ,it will have no essential figure of its own1 but it will be the recipient of all figures1 the inexhaustible sea from which they all arise4 ,that which is traced in it1 will be in it2 the points which terminate the figures must be in it4 ,is not this to have parts1 composition8 ,infinite extension could have no figure1 not because it has no parts1 or is simple1 but because it has infinite parts1 because its composition is infinite4 ,i agree that an infinite extension would not be divisible1 if by dividing1 is meant separating2 because in that immense fulness everything would be in its position with infinite firmness4 ,so also we imagine space1 the place of all motion1 with its parts immovable1 the field of all separation1 with its parts inseparable2 but we are treating of division1 not of separation4 ,if there is true extension1 it is divisible2 we conceive space with its parts inseparable1 but still divisible2 for we measure them1 count them1 and it is by relation to them that we form an idea of the size1 distance1 and motion of bodies4 #gd4 ,such clear and conclusive reflections could not fail to present themselves to the mind of the illustrious philosopher2 but he seems to have preferred inconsequence or obscurity of language to the fatal corollaries of his first proposition4 ,he said plainly and without any restriction1 that all that is positive in extension1 except the limit1 is in ,god4 ,he had asserted that extension with limits is corporeal1 and that to change extension into immensity it was only necessary to take away its limits4 ,he consequently attributed to ,god a true1 although infinite1 extension1 and then wishing to explain and strengthen his doctrine he tells us that this extension has no parts4 ,what is extension without parts8 ,who can conceive it8 ,does not extension necessarily imply an order of things of which some are outside of others4 ,it has been always so understood4 ,to speak of an extension without parts is to speak of an extension improperly so called4 ,when speaking of such extension it is not enough to say it has no limits1 it should be added that it is of an entirely different nature1 that the word extension is used in another sense4 ,fenelon seemed to know this1 when1 notwithstanding the obscurity of his former expressions1 elevated on the wings of his religion and his genius1 he says3 ,god is in no place1 as in no time2 for his absolute and infinite being has no relation to place or time1 which are but limits and restrictions of being4 ,to ask if he is beyond the universe1 if he exceeds its extremities in length1 breadth1 and depth1 is as absurd a question as to ask if he was before the world1 and if he will still be when the world is no more4 ,as there is neither past nor future in ,god1 so there is neither hither nor thither4 ,as his absolute permanence excludes all measure of succession1 so also his immensity excludes all measure of extension4 ,he has not been1 he will not be1 but he is4 ,in the same manner1 to speak properly1 he is not here1 he is not there1 he is not beyond such a limit1 but he is1 absolutely4 ,all expressions which place him in relation to any term1 or fix him in a certain place1 are improper and unbecoming4 ,where then is he8 ,he is4 ,he is in such a manner that we must not ask where4 ,that which only half is1 or with limits1 is a certain thing in such a way that it is nothing else4 ,but ,god is not any particular and restricted thing4 ,he is all2 he is being2 or better and more simply1 he is4 ,for the fewer words we use1 the more we say4 ,he is4 ,beware of adding any thing to this4 #gf4 ,while reading these magnificent words1 ,i am carried away by the elevation and grandeur of his ideas of ,god and of his immensity1 and ,i forget the objections to the first proposition1 which1 if not false or inexact1 is not1 to say the least1 expressed with all the clearness that could be desired4 ,still1 ,i do not hesitate to maintain that his opinion coincides with ,clarke's2 although the illustrious writer1 ,christian1 and poet1 seem to merit a pardon for the philosopher4 ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,,what ,,space ,,consists ,,in4 #gg4 ,descartes' opinion wholly confounds space and bodies1 making the essence of bodies consist in extension1 and asserting that wherever there is space1 there is body4 ,this opinion we have seen to be void of all reasonable foundation4 ,perhaps he would come nearer the truth who should say1 that in reality space is nothing more than the extension of bodies1 without reference to the question whether extension does or does not constitute the essence of bodies1 and denying its infinity4 #gh4 ,let us examine this last opinion4 ,analyzing the origin of the idea of space1 we find that it is merely the idea of extension taken in the abstract4 ,if ,i hold before my eyes an orange1 ,i may1 by means of abstractions1 arrive at the idea of a pure extension1 equal to that of the orange4 ,in order to do this1 ,i begin by abstracting its color1 taste1 smell1 and all its qualities which affect the senses4 ,i then have left only an extended being1 and if ,i take from it its mobility1 it is reduced to a part of space equal to the size of the orange4 ,it is plain that the same abstraction is possible in relation to the universe1 and the result will be the idea of all the space which the universe occupies4 #gi4 ,here ,i shall answer an objection which might be made to this explanation of the idea of space1 and thereby take advantage of this opportunity to throw some light upon the origin of the idea of infinite1 or imaginary space4 ,the difficulty is this4 ,if we form the idea of space by the mere abstraction of the qualities which accompany extension1 we can only conceive a space equal to the size of the body from which we have abstracted all its sensible qualities4 ,the abstraction made upon an orange can only give a space equal to the size of the orange1 and that made upon the universe can only give a space equal to what we conceive in the universe4 ,consequently1 we can never1 by this means1 obtain the idea of a space without limits which always presents itself to our mind when we think of space considered in itself4 ,the solution of this difficulty is in the truth that abstraction rises from the particular to the general4 ,from the idea of gold1 by abstracting those properties which constitute gold1 and attending only to those which it possesses as metal1 ,i arrive at the much more general idea of metal1 which belongs not only to gold1 but to all other metals4 ,by this abstraction ,i pass the limit which separates gold from other metals1 and form an idea which extends to all1 neither specifying1 nor excluding any4 ,if from the idea of metal ,i abstract all that constitutes metal1 and attend only to what constitutes mineral1 ,i pass another limit1 and arrive at a still more general idea4 ,thus passing successively the idea of inorganic1 of body1 and of substance1 until ,i come to the idea of being1 ,i thus form the most general idea possible1 and which includes every thing4#df #df ,i take no notice in this place of the different manner in which the idea of being is applicable to ,god and to creatures4 ,thus passing over the limits which distinguish and1 as it were1 separate objects1 abstraction rises to the most general4 ,if we apply this doctrine to the abstractions made upon bodies1 we shall discover the reason of the illimitability of the idea of space4 ,when after the abstractions made upon the orange1 ,i have left only the idea of its extension1 the abstraction has not reached the highest point possible2 for my conception is not that of extension in itself1 but only of the extension of the orange2 ,i conceive its extension1 not extension itself4 ,but if ,i abstract all that makes this extension the extension of the orange1 and attend only to extension in itself1 then the idea of figure disappears1 the extension expands indefinitely1 it is impossible for me to assign any term to it1 for any limit would make it a determinate1 a particular extension1 not extension in itself4 ,then the frontiers of the universe1 so to speak1 disappear2 for however great the universe may be1 it is limited1 and can give only a particular extension1 not extension itself4 ,this is the manner in which the idea of imaginary space seems to be formed4 #hj4 ,an observation of the phenomena of the imagination will confirm what we have explained by the mere order of intelligence4 ,when ,i imagine the extension of an orange1 ,i imagine it with a limit1 with this or that color1 and with these or those qualities2 since it is not possible for me to imagine a figure without lines which terminate it4 ,this limit in the imagination is distinct both from the extension which it encloses1 and from the extension which it excludes4 ,if it were not so distinguished1 we could not imagine it as limit1 and it would not answer its object1 which is to enable us to distinguish that which it encloses4 ,therefore1 the abstraction is not complete4 ,in the imagination there is always something determinate1 which is the limit or the lines which constitute the limit4 ,destroy these limits1 and the imagination expands1 until it becomes lost in a sort of dark1 unbounded abyss1 such as we imagine beyond the universe4 ,a very simple example will make this explanation clearer4 ,our imagination may be compared to a black board on which a figure is marked with chalk4 ,when we see the white line on the board which forms the figure1 we see the figure also2 but if we rub out the line1 there remains only the uniform figure of the board4 ,if we suppose the lines which terminate the black board to be indefinitely withdrawn1 we shall look in vain for a figure2 we see only a black surface indefinitely extended4 ,there is a sufficient parity between this and the manner in which the imagination pictures to itself an endless space4 #ha4 ,the idea of an abstract extension which is limited1 is a contradiction4 ,limit takes from extension generality2 and generality destroys the limit4 ,there can1 therefore1 be no abstract idea of limited extension2 but when we form an idea of extension in the abstract1 we conceive it as unlimited1 and the imagination attempting to follow the understanding1 pictures to itself an indefinite space4 #hb4 ,summing up this doctrine1 and deducing its inevitable consequences1 we may say3 ,i4 ,that space is nothing else than the extension of bodies4 ,,ii4 ,that the idea of space is the idea of extension4 ,,iii4 ,that the different parts conceived in space are the ideas of particular extensions1 from which we have not taken their limits4 ,,iv4 ,that the idea of infinite space is the idea of extension in general1 abstracted from all limit4 ,v4 ,that indefinite space arises necessarily from the imagination1 which destroys the limit in attempting to follow the generalizing march of the understanding4 ,,vi4 ,that where there is no body there is no space4 ,,vii4 ,that what is called distance is only the interposition of a body4 ,,viii4 ,that if every intermediate body be taken away1 distance ceases2 there is then contiguity1 and1 consequently1 absolute contact4 ,,ix4 ,that if there were only two bodies in existence1 it would be metaphysically impossible for them to be distant from each other4 ,x4 ,that all vacuum1 of whatever kind1 or however obtained1 is absolutely impossible4 #hc4 ,these are the consequences which follow from the principle explained in this chapter4 ,if the reader ask me what ,i think of them and of the principle on which they are based1 ,i frankly confess that1 although the principle seems true and the conclusions legitimate1 still the strangeness of some of them1 and yet more so with regard to others which ,i shall point out as we come to them1 makes me suspect that there is some error concealed in the principle1 or else the reasoning which deduces these consequences contains some defect which is not easy to discover4 ,i do not put forth a settled opinion1 so much as a series of conjectures1 with the arguments in their favor4 ,the reader may see by this what sense ,i attach to the word demonstration1 when in the sequel he sees it often employed in treating of the deduction of certain consequences which are exceedingly strange1 although1 in my opinion1 deserving a careful attention4 ,i say this not only to explain what is passing in my own mind1 but also to warn the reader against too great confidence on these points1 whatever may be the opinion which he adopts4 ,before commencing these investigations on space1 ,i remarked that the arguments on both sides seemed equally conclusive2 which shows that the human reason has reached its bounds1 and makes us suspect that this investigation is beyond the sphere to which the mind is restricted by a primary condition of its nature4 ,however this may be1 let us continue to conjecture2 and although we cannot pass beyond certain limits1 let us exercise the understanding by examining them in their full extent4 ,thus1 if we were placed on a very elevated ground with deep precipices on all sides1 we should take pleasure in walking around the circumference1 and gazing upon the immense depth under our feet4 ,i shall now proceed to deduce other results1 and to solve as far as possible the difficulties which arise1 making some applications1 the immense importance of which produces uncertainty and causes fear4 ,,chapter ,,xiii4 ,,new ,,difficulties4 #hd4 ,if space is the extension of bodies1 it follows that extension has no recipient1 that is to say1 no place in which it can be situated4 ,this seems to be in direct contradiction to our most common ideas2 for when we conceive any thing to be extended1 we conceive the necessity of a place equal to it in which it can be contained and situated4 ,this difficulty1 which seems so serious at first1 immediately vanishes if we deny that every extended thing needs a place in which it may be situated4 ,what is this place8 ,it is an extension in which the thing may be contained4 ,does this extension also require another extension in which it may be placed1 or does it not8 ,if it does1 then the same question may be asked of this new place in which the other place is contained1 and so on ad infinitum4 ,this is evidently impossible1 and therefore we must admit that it is false that all extension requires another extension in which it may be placed4 ,just as the extension of space does not require another extension1 so the extension of bodies does not require space4 ,there is no disparity between the two cases4 ,therefore the necessity of a place for every extension is merely imaginary1 and is opposed to reason4 ,extension1 therefore1 may exist in itself1 and there is no reason why the extension of bodies may not also exist in this manner4 #he4 ,what in this case would be the meaning of changing place8 ,it would simply mean that bodies change their respective position4 ,this is the explanation of motion4 ,suppose three bodies1 ,a1 ,b1 and ,c1 to be situated in space4 ,their respective distances are the bodies which are interposed between them4 ,the change which a new position causes1 is motion4 #hf4 ,therefore1 if there were only one body there could be no motion4 ,for motion is necessarily the passing over a distance1 and1 there is no distance when there is only one body4 ,this seems at first absurd1 because it is opposed to our way of thinking and imagining2 but if we carefully examine this way of thinking and imagining1 we shall see that the phenomena of our mind are in accordance with this theory4 ,motion has no meaning for us1 we do not feel or perceive it1 when we cannot refer it to the position of different bodies among themselves4 ,if we sail down a river1 shut up in the cabin of the vessel which bears us on1 we really move1 though we have no perception of this motion4 ,we know that we move when watching the objects on the shore1 we see that they are continually changing4 ,even then1 the motion seems to be in the objects around us1 not in ourselves1 and the phenomena would be absolutely the same with respect to us1 if1 instead of the objects being at rest1 and the vessel in motion1 the vessel should be at rest and the objects in motion1 supposing the motion of the objects to be properly combined4#dg #dg ,see ,book ,,ii41 ,chap4 xv4 ,therefore1 take away the agitation1 which is all that informs us of our own motion1 and we are unable to distinguish whether the motion is in us or in the objects2 and we are naturally more inclined to refer the motion to them than to ourselves4 ,when the vessel that carries us leaves the port1 we know very well that it is not the port which moves1 and yet the illusion is complete1 the port seems to retire from us4 ,hence motion for us is only the change of the respective position of bodies4 ,if we had not experienced this change1 we should have no idea of motion4 ,thus no one denies that the phenomena of diurnal motion are the same1 whether the heavens revolve around us from east to west1 or the earth turns on its axis from west to east4 ,therefore1 the motion of only one body is a pure illusion2 and there is no proof of the argument founded on it which is brought to oppose our doctrine of space4 ,hence1 also1 the whole universe considered as only one body1 is immovable1 motion takes place only in its interior4 #hg4 ,but one of the strangest results of this theory is the a priori demonstration that the universe can only be terminated in a certain manner1 to the exclusion of a multitude of figures which are essentially repugnant to it4 ,according to the doctrine which we have put forth1 if we suppose only one body to exist1 it cannot have any part of its surface so disposed that the shortest line from any one point to another shall pass outside of the body4 ,for1 as we suppose only one body1 outside of it is pure nothing2 and can1 therefore1 contain no distances which can be measured by lines4 ,this excludes a multitude of irregular figures1 and thus we find geometrical regularity growing out of a metaphysical idea4 ,hence if only one body were in existence1 it would be impossible for it to have any angles entering into it4 ,for1 its figure requires that the point ,a1 the vertex of the angle1 should be at the distance ,a ,d from the point ,d1 the vertex of another angle4 ,this distance cannot exist1 for there is no distance where there is no body4 ,therefore1 the distance would exist and not exist at the same time1 which is contradictory4 ,it would also be an absurdity1 because the capacities marked by the angles would not be filled4 ,the observation of nature confirms the former result1 inasmuch as its tendency is always to terminate every thing with curved lines and surfaces4 ,the orbits of the stars are curves1 and the stars themselves terminate in curve surfaces4 ,the great irregularities which are observed in their surfaces might seem to destroy this conclusion1 but it must be remembered the limit of the figure is not in these irregularities1 but in the atmosphere which surrounds them1 and which1 being a fluid1 can have no irregularities of surface4 #hh4 ,another consequence1 as strange as the former1 is1 that we are obliged to admit the existence of a perfect geometrical surface1 and this a priori4 ,if1 where there is no body1 distance is metaphysically impossible1 this must be just as true in small as in great things1 and even in infinitesimals4 ,this is also a reason of the impossibility of vacuum4 ,it is evident that a surface is not perfect when some of its points go farther out than others1 so that the less they go out from the surface the more perfect it becomes4 ,as there are no such points in the last surface of the universe1 this surface is the realization of geometrical perfection4 ,we have demonstrated that it is impossible for the surface to have any angles entering into it2 it is equally impossible for it to have any1 even the least1 prominence4 ,the difference is only in greater or less1 which does not affect the metaphysical impossibility4 ,it is1 therefore1 demonstrated that in the ultimate surface of the universe there is no irregularity1 but that its surface is geometrically perfect4 ,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,,another ,,important ,,consequence4 #hi4 ,i now proceed to deduce the last consequence of the principle explained above4 ,it is of the greatest importance1 and seems to deserve the careful attention of all those who unite their metaphysical and physical studies4 ,the existence of universal gravitation may be demonstrated a priori4 ,universal gravitation is a law of nature by which some bodies are directed to others4 ,we abstract here the manner4 ,this direction is metaphysically necessary1 if we suppose that there is no distance where there is no body4 ,for1 if this be so1 two bodies cannot exist separated4 ,the law of contiguity is a metaphysical necessity1 and therefore the incessant approaching of some bodies to others is a continual obedience to this necessity4 ,the velocity with which they approach must be in the ratio of the velocity with which the medium departs4 ,the limit of the velocity of this motion is the relation of space with an indivisible instant1 such as we might suppose if ,god should suddenly annihilate the intervening body4 ,as the solid masses which revolve above our heads would in this case be submerged in a fluid1 supposing this fluid to be of such nature as easily to change its place1 it follows that the stars must be subject to the law of approximation1 because the medium which separates them is continually retiring in various directions4 ,if we suppose this fluid to be immovable1 the metaphysical necessity of this approximation ceases4 #ij4 ,this theory seems to lead to the explanation of the mechanism of the universe1 by simple geometrical laws1 and destroys what some have called occult properties1 and others forces4 ,although it is easy to explain by metaphysical and geometrical ideas1 the fact of gravitation1 or the mere tendency of bodies mutually to approach1 it is still very difficult to determine by this order of ideas the conditions which govern gravitation4 #ia4 ,if the motion of approximation depended only on the intervening body1 inequality of these bodies would produce unequal motions4 ,it is impossible to calculate the degree of this inequality in bodies which are not subject to our observation4 #ib4 ,besides this difficulty there is another still greater1 which is1 that bodies which move in a medium have no fixed direction1 but vary their motions with the variations of the medium4 ,if the gravitation of the body ,a towards the body ,b1 depends only on the motion of the retiring medium1 the gravitation will not be in the right line ,,ab1 but will follow the undulations described by the medium4 ,this is contrary to experience4 #ic4 ,from these considerations1 it follows that even though the gravitation naturally arises from the position of the bodies1 still this necessity would not produce the order which exists1 if its results were not subject to certain laws4 ,and1 therefore1 the phenomena of nature1 although founded on a necessity1 would still1 admitting the existence and position of bodies1 be contingent in all that relates to the application of this necessity4 #id4 ,going still deeper into this matter1 we find that the tendency to approximation1 although necessary1 is not sufficient either to produce motion or to preserve it4 ,whenever one body moves1 it is always necessary that another should follow it1 in order to preserve the contiguity2 but1 there being no vacuum1 there is no reason why any body should move1 and consequently1 no cause of motion4 ,therefore1 geometrical ideas are not sufficient to explain the origin of motion1 but we must look for its cause elsewhere4 ,contiguity being a metaphysical necessity1 if the body ,a moves in any direction1 the contiguous bodies ,b and ,c must also move2 but if the contiguity already existed1 there is no reason why the body ,a should begin to move1 nor1 consequently1 why the bodies ,b and ,c should follow its motion4 ,at any instant whatever1 if we suppose motion1 we must suppose contiguity2 for the state of the question supposes this condition always present1 as being metaphysically necessary4 ,there is then no reason why the motion should at any time be prolonged2 for the bodies being at every instant contiguous there is no reason for its continuation4 ,the motion of the body ,a draws with it the body ,b2 ,b draws ,c1 and so on4 ,now1 if the motion of the body ,b has no other origin than its contiguity to ,a1 the motion of ,c has no other origin than its contiguity to ,b4 ,the cause of the motion is only not to interrupt the contiguity2 this contiguity always existing as is absolutely necessary1 there is no reason why the motion should begin1 or after it has begun1 why it should continue4 #ie4 ,the laws of nature cannot then be explained by geometrical and metaphysical ideas1 although we suppose approximation to be an intrinsical necessity of bodies4 ,under any supposition it is necessary to seek out of matter a superior cause which impresses1 regulates1 and continues motion4 ,,chapter ,,xv4 ,,illusion ,,of ,,fixed ,,points ,,in ,,space4 #if4 ,since space is only the extension of bodies1 and there is no space where there are no bodies1 it follows that the extension which we conceive distinct from bodies1 with fixed points and dimensions1 immovable in itself1 and the receptacle of all that is movable1 is a pure illusion1 and there is nothing in reality corresponding to it4 ,in order to explain this doctrine and at the same time to solve certain objections which may be made1 it will not be out of place to analyze the idea which we form of fixedness in relation to space4 ,because there are certain immovable points in the world in relation to which we conceive directions1 we form the idea that these points are fixed1 and in relation to them and because of them we imagine fixedness1 immobility1 as one of the properties which distinguish this ideal receptacle which we call space4 ,the four cardinal points1 ,east1 ,west1 ,north1 and ,south1 have had a great influence in producing this idea4 ,still it is easy to show that there is no such thing and that it is a pure illusion4 #ig4 ,we shall first destroy the fixedness of ,east and ,west4 ,supposing the earth to have a diurnal motion of rotation on its axis1 as astronomers now hold1 the points of ,east and ,west1 so far from being fixed1 are continually changing their position4 ,thus1 supposing an observer at the point ,a of the earth1 ,east to him will be the point ,b1 and ,west the point ,c4 ,if the earth revolves on its axis1 the ,east and ,west of the observer will be successively at the points ,m1 ,n1 ,p1 ,q1 etc4 of the heavenly arch4 ,although we suppose this arch fixed1 ,east and ,west have no fixed meaning4 ,if we deny the rotation of the earth1 the appearances will be the same as though this rotation existed2 and the most that we can say is that this fixedness is an appearance4 ,besides1 if we suppose the earth to be at rest1 and the heavens to move round it1 it is still more impossible to determine the fixed points of ,east and ,west2 for1 in this case1 the points in the heavens to which we refer them are in continual motion4 ,we repeat that all this is a mere appearance4 ,if a man who knows not that the earth is spherical1 but imagines it to be a plane surface1 walks from ,west to ,east1 he will believe that these two points are immovable1 although they are continually changing4 ,he would still imagine that he was going farther from the place where he started1 although1 after passing over the whole circumference of the earth1 he would find himself where he was at first4 #ih4 ,north and ,south seem to present greater difficulty1 by reason of their fixedness in relation to us2 still it is easy to show that this is not absolute1 but only apparent4 ,let ,n and ,s represent the north and south poles4 ,if we imagine the earth and the heavens to turn at the same time from south to north1 it is evident that the fixedness of the points ,n and ,s would not exist1 and yet the observer ,a would believe that every thing was immovable1 because the appearances would be absolutely the same4 ,to an observer travelling from the equator toward either pole1 the pole would rise over the horizon1 while to another who remains in the same place1 the pole would be at rest4 ,even in relation to the same position on the earth the altitude of the pole changes1 by the variation of the angle formed by the plane of the ecliptic with the plane of the equator1 which variation is according to some calculations #h in a century1 according to others #j4eba in a year1 or #eb4a in a century4 #ii4 ,it follows from these reflections that the position of bodies is not absolute1 but relative2 that one body might exist alone1 but then it would have no position1 as this is entirely a relative idea1 and there is no relation in this case1 because there is no point of comparison2 and that absolutely speaking there is no such thing as above or below2 for although we imagine these to be fixed points1 this imagination is only a comparison which we make between two points3 below being that point toward which we gravitate1 and above the opposite4 ,thus in the antipodes above is what we call below1 and below what we call above4 #ajj4 ,direction is impossible without points to which it can be referred4 ,therefore1 without the existence of bodies1 directions are purely ideal1 and if only one body existed1 it could have no directions out of its own extension4 #aja4 ,here arises a difficulty apparently serious1 but in reality of little weight4 ,if only one body existed1 could ,god give it motion8 ,to deny it seems to limit the omnipotence of ,god2 and to concede it is to destroy all that has been said against space distinct from bodies4 ,this objection derives its seeming importance from a confusion of ideas1 which is caused by not understanding the true state of the question4 ,is this motion intrinsically impossible1 or is it not8 ,if it is impossible1 there is no reason why we should be afraid to say that ,god cannot produce it3 for omnipotence does not extend to things which are contradictory4 ,if the possibility of this motion is admitted1 then we must return to the questions on the nature of space1 and examine whether the reasons on which this impossibility is founded are1 or are not1 valid4 ,the questions relating to omnipotence are out of place here1 and this difficulty can be solved without them4 ,if the impossibility of the motion is demonstrated1 it is no limitation of the omnipotence of ,god to say that he cannot produce it1 no more than it is when we say that he cannot make a triangle a circle4 ,if the impossibility is not demonstrated1 then the question of omnipotence does not come in at all4 #ajb4 ,neither does the argument founded on the existence of vacuum destroy the doctrine which we have established4 ,natural philosophers generally admit vacuum1 and suppose it necessary for the explanation of motion1 condensation1 rarefaction1 and other phenomena of nature4 ,but to this ,i reply as follows3 ,i4 ,the opinions of ,descartes and ,leibnitz are of weight in what relates to nature1 whether experimental or transcendental1 and neither of them admitted a vacuum4 ,,ii4 ,no observation can prove its existence1 because disseminated vacuum would occupy such small spaces that no instrument could reach them1 and also because observation can only be made on those objects which affect our senses1 and we know not but what there may be bodies which1 on account of their excessive tenuity1 are not perceptible by the senses4 ,,iii4 ,we can determine nothing certain concerning the internal modifications of matter in motion1 condensation1 and rarefaction1 until we know the elements of which it is composed4 ,,iv4 ,it is not strange that we are unable to comprehend the phenomena which seem incompatible with the denial of matter3 for we can neither understand infinite divisibility1 nor how extension can be composed of unextended points4 ,v4 ,the existence of vacuum is a metaphysical question which does not belong to the regions of experience1 and is not affected by the system of the sciences of observation4 #ajc4 ,by making the idea of space consist in abstract or generalized extension we reconcile all that is necessary1 absolute1 and infinite in it with its objective reality4 ,this reality is the extension of bodies1 while necessity and infinity are not found in the bodies themselves1 but in the abstract idea4 ,objects themselves are confined to the sphere of reality1 and are1 therefore1 limited and contingent4 ,the objectiveness of the abstract idea includes both the existent and the possible1 and has1 therefore1 no limits1 and is not subject to any contingency4 ,,chapter ,,xvi4 ,,observations ,,on ,,kant',s ,,opinion4 #ajd4 ,we have already shown that extension considered in us1 is something more than a mere sensation1 that it is a true idea1 the basis of some sensations1 and at the same time a pure idea4 ,as far as it relates to sensations1 it is the foundation of our sensitive faculties2 and in so far as it is an idea1 it is the root of geometry4 ,this is an important distinction1 and we shall find it useful to enable us rightly to appreciate the value of ,kant's opinion of space4 #aje4 ,all our sensations are1 either more or less1 connected with extension2 although if we consider sensation a priori by itself1 and independently of all habit1 it would seem as though only the sensations of sight and touch were necessarily connected with an extended object4 ,it does not seem to me that the loss of these two senses would necessarily involve the privation of the impressions of hearing or smelling1 or1 perhaps1 even of taste2 for although it is true that the sensations of touch1 such as hardness or softness1 etc41 are always united with the sensations of the palate2 it is equally certain that those sensations are wholly distinct from the sensation of taste1 and we have no reason for asserting that they cannot be separated from it4 #ajf4 ,extension1 considered in us or in its intuition1 may be regarded as a necessary condition of our sensitive faculties4 ,kant saw this1 but he exaggerated it when he denied the objective reality of space1 asserting that space is only a subjective condition a priori without which we cannot receive impressions1 the form of phenomena1 that is1 of appearances1 but nothing in reality4 ,i have already said that space1 as distinguished from bodies1 is nothing1 but the object of the idea of space is the extension of bodies2 or1 rather1 this extension is the foundation from which we deduce the general idea of space1 and is contained in this idea4 #ajg4 ,to say1 as ,kant does1 that space is the form under which the phenomena are presented to us1 and that it is a necessary subjective condition of their perception1 is equivalent to saying that the phenomena which are presented as extended1 require that the mind should be capable of perceiving extension4 ,this is very true1 but it throws no light on the nature of the idea of space1 either in itself or in its object4 ,space1 says ,kant1 is no empirical conception which is derived from external experience4 ,for in order that certain sensations may be referred to something out of me1 that is1 to something in another part of space than that in which ,i am1 and in order that ,i may conceive them as outside of and near one another1 and1 consequently1 not only as separated1 but also as occupying separate places1 the conception of space must be placed as the foundation4 ,therefore1 the conception of space cannot be obtained by experience from the relations of the external phenomenon1 but this external experience itself is possible only by this conception4#dh #dh ,kant1 ,transc4 sth4 ,i4 ,absch4 #b1 #a4 ,there is a great confusion of ideas here4 ,what are the conditions which are necessary to the phenomenon of the sensation of the extended8 ,we are not here treating of the appreciation of dimensions1 but merely of extension as represented or conceived4 ,i do not see how this phenomenon requires any thing a priori1 except the sensitive faculty which1 in fact1 exists a priori1 that is to say1 is a primitive fact of our soul in its relations to the organization of the body which is united to it1 and of the other bodies which surround it4 ,under certain conditions of our organization1 and of the bodies which affect it1 the soul receives the impressions of sight or touch1 and with them the impression of extension4 ,this extension is not presented to the mind in the abstract1 or as separated from the other sensation which accompany it1 but as united with them4 ,the mind does not reflect1 then1 upon the position of the objects1 but it has an intuition of the arrangement of the parts4 ,so long as the fact is confined to mere sensation1 it is common to the learned and the unlearned1 to the old and the young1 and even to all animals4 ,this requires nothing a priori except the sensitive faculty1 which simply means that a being1 in order to perceive1 must have the faculty of perceiving1 and should hardly deserve to be announced as a discovery of philosophy4 #aji4 ,there is no such discovery in ,kant's doctrine of space1 for on the one side he asserts a well known fact1 that the intuition of space is a necessary subjective condition1 without which it is impossible for us to perceive things1 one outside of another2 and on the other side he falls into idealism1 inasmuch as he denies this extension all reality1 and regards things and their position in space as pure phenomena1 or mere appearances4 ,the fact which he asserts is true at bottom2 for it is1 in fact1 impossible to perceive things as distinct among themselves1 and as outside of us1 without the intuition of space2 but1 at the same time1 it is not accurately expressed1 for the intuition of space is this perception itself2 and1 consequently1 he ought to have said that they are identical1 not that one is an indispensable condition of the other4 #aaj4 ,prior to the impressions1 there is no such intuition1 and if we regard it as a pure intuition and separated from intellectual conception1 we can only conceive it as accompanied by some representation of one of the five senses4 ,let us imagine a pure space without any of these representations1 without even that mysterious vagueness which we imagine in the most distant regions of the universe4 ,the imagination finds no object2 the intuition ceases2 there remains only the purely intellectual conceptions which we form of extension1 the ideas of an order of possible beings1 and the assertion or denial of this order1 according to our opinion of the reality or non-reality of space4 #aaa4 ,it is evident that a series of pure sensations cannot produce a general idea4 ,science requires some other foundation4 ,the phenomena leave traces of the sensible object in the memory1 and are so connected with each other1 that the representation of one cannot be repeated without exciting the representation of the other1 but they produce no general result which could serve as the basis of geometry4 ,a dog sees a man stoop1 and make a certain motion1 and is immediately struck with a stone1 which causes in him a sensation of pain2 when the dog sees another man perform the motion1 he runs away2 because the sensations of the motions are connected in his memory with the sensation of pain1 and his natural instinct of avoiding pain inspires him to fly4 #aab4 ,when these sensations are produced in an intelligent being1 they excite other internal phenomena1 distinct from the mere sensitive intuition4 ,whether general ideas already exist in our mind1 or are formed by the aid of sensation1 it is certain that they are developed in the presence of sensation4 ,thus1 in the present case we not only have the sensitive intuition of extension1 but we also perceive something which is common to all extended objects4 ,extension ceases to be a particular object1 and becomes a general form applicable to all extended things4 ,there is then a perception of extension in itself1 although there is no intuition of the extended2 we then begin to reflect upon the idea and analyze it1 and deduce from it those principles1 which are the fruitful germs from the infinite development of which is produced the tree of science called geometry4 #aac4 ,this transition from the sensation to the idea1 from the contingent to the necessary1 from the particular fact to the general science1 presents important considerations on the origin and nature of ideas1 and the high character of the human mind4 ,kant seems to have confounded the imagination of space with the idea of space1 and notwithstanding his attempts at analysis1 he is not so profound as he thinks1 when he considers space as the receptacle of phenomena4 ,this a very common idea1 and all that ,kant has done is to destroy its objectiveness1 making space a purely subjective condition4 ,according to this philosopher1 the world is the sum of the appearances which are presented to our mind2 and just as we imagine in the external world an unlimited receptacle which contains every thing1 but is distinct from what it contains1 so he has placed space within us as a preliminary condition1 as a form of the phenomena1 as a capacity in which we may distribute and classify them4 #aad4 ,in this he confounds1 ,i say1 the vague imagination with the idea4 ,the limit between the two is strongly marked4 ,when we see an object we have the sensation and intuition of extension4 ,the space perceived or sensed is1 in this case1 the extension itself perceived4 ,we imagine a multitude of extended objects1 and a capacity which contains them all4 ,we imagine this capacity as the immensity of the ethereal regions1 a boundless abyss1 a dark region beyond the limits of creation4 ,so far there is no idea1 there is only an imagination arising from the fact that when we begin to see bodies we do not see the air which surrounds them1 and the transparency of the air permits us to see distant objects1 and thus from our infancy we are accustomed to imagine an empty capacity in which all bodies are placed1 but which is distinct from them4 ,but this is not the idea of space2 it is only an imagination of it1 a sort of rude1 sensible idea1 probably common to man and the beasts4 ,the true idea1 and the only one deserving the name1 is that which our mind possesses when it conceives extension in itself1 without any mixture of sensation1 and which is1 as it were1 the seed of the whole science of geometry4 #aae4 ,it should be observed that the word representation as applied to purely intellectual ideas must be taken in a purely metaphorical sense1 unless we eliminate from its meaning all that relates to the sensible order4 ,we know objects by ideas1 but they are not represented to us4 ,representation1 properly speaking1 occurs only in the imagination which necessarily relates to sensible things4 ,if ,i demonstrate the properties of a triangle1 it is clear that ,i must know the triangle1 that ,i must have an idea of it2 but this idea is not the natural representation which is presented to me like a figure in a painting4 ,all the world1 even irrational animals have this representation1 yet we cannot say that brutes have the idea of a triangle4 ,this representation has no degrees of perfection1 but is equally perfect in all4 ,any one who imagines three lines with an area enclosed1 possesses the representation of a triangle with as much perfection as ,archimedes2 but the same cannot be said of the idea of a triangle1 which is evidently susceptible of various degrees of perfection4 #aaf4 ,the representation of a triangle is always limited to a certain size and figure4 ,when we imagine a triangle1 it is always with such or such extension and with greater or smaller angles4 ,the imagination representing an obtuse angled triangle sees something very different from an acute or right angled triangle4 ,but the idea of the triangle in itself is not subject to any particular size or figure2 it extends to all triangular figures of every size4 ,the general idea of triangle abstracts necessarily all species of triangles1 whilst the representation of a triangle is necessarily the representation of a triangle of a determinate species4 ,therefore the representation and the idea are very different1 even in relation to sensible objects4 #aag4 ,it is the same with space4 ,its representation is not its idea4 ,the representation is always presented to us as something determinate1 with a clearness like that of the air illuminated by the sun1 or a blackness like the darkness of night4 ,there is nothing of this sort in the idea1 or when we reason upon extension and distances4 ,the idea of space is one2 its representations are many4 ,the idea is common to the blind man and to him who sees4 ,for both it is equally the basis of geometry1 but the representation is very different in these two4 ,the latter represents space as a confused reproduction of the sensations of sight2 the blind man can only represent it as a confused repetition of the sensations of touch4 ,the representation of space is only indefinite1 and even this progressively4 ,the imagination runs over one space after another1 but it cannot at once represent a space without limits2 it can no more do this than the sight can take in an endless object4 ,the imagination is a sort of interior sight1 it reaches a certain point1 but there it finds a limit4 ,it can1 it is true1 pass beyond this limit1 and expand still farther1 but only successively1 and always with the condition of encountering a new limit4 ,space is not represented as infinite1 but as indefinite1 that is to say1 that after a given limit there is always more space1 but we can never advance so far as to imagine an infinite totality4 ,it is the contrary with the idea2 we conceive instantaneously what is meant by infinite space1 we dispute on its possibility or impossibility1 we distinguish it perfectly from indefinite space1 we ask if it has in reality limits or not1 calling it in the first case finite1 in the latter infinite4 ,we see in the word indefinite the impossibility of finding limits1 but at the same time we distinguish between the existence of these limits1 and finding them4 ,all this shows that the idea is very different from the representation4 ,to regard space as a mere condition of sensibility is to confound the two aspects under which extension should be considered1 as the basis of sensations1 and as idea2 as the field of all sensible representations1 and as the origin of geometry4 ,i have often insisted on this distinction1 and shall never weary of repeating it2 because it is the line which divides the sensible from the purely intellectual order1 and sensations from ideas4 ,,chapter ,,xvii4 ,,inability ,,of ,,kant',s ,,doctrine ,,to ,,solve ,,the ,,problem ,,of ,,the ,,possibility ,,of ,,experience4 #aah4 ,i think that ,kant's ,transcendental sthetics1 or theory of sensibility1 is not sufficiently transcendental4 ,it is too much confined to the empirical part1 and does not rise to the height which we should expect from the title4 ,the problem of the possibility of experience which ,kant proposed to solve1 either is not at all touched by his doctrine1 or else it is solved in a strictly idealist sense4 ,it leaves the problem untouched1 if we consider only what relates to observation2 for he only repeats what we already knew in establishing the fact of the exteriority of things2 it solves the problem in a strictly idealist sense1 inasmuch as these things are only considered as phenomena or appearances4 #aai4 ,a purely subjective space either does not explain the problems of the external world1 or it denies them in denying all reality4 ,what progress has philosophy made by affirming that space is a purely subjective condition8 ,before ,kant1 did we1 perchance1 not know that we had perception of external phenomena8 ,the difficulty was not in the existence of this perception attested by consciousness2 but in its value to prove the existence of an external world1 in relation with it4 ,the difficulty was in the objective1 not the subjective part of the perception4 #abj4 ,to say that the perception is nothing more than a condition of the subject1 is to cut the knot instead of untying it4 ,it does not explain the manner of the possibility of experience1 but denies this possibility4 ,what is experience if there is only the subject8 ,there will be the phenomenon or appearance of objectiveness1 but nature is then only a mere appearance1 and there is nothing in reality which corresponds to our experimental perceptions4 ,we then have experience reduced to the perception of appearances2 and as even this purely phenomenal experience is only possible by virtue of a purely subjective condition1 the intuition of space2 all experience remains purely subjective1 and we find ourselves holding the system of ,fichte1 admitting the me as the primitive fact1 the development of which constitutes the universe4 ,thus the system of ,fichte follows from ,kant's doctrine2 the former has only carried out the principles of his master4 #aba4 ,in order to make the connection between the two doctrines still clearer1 we shall make some further reflections on ,kant's system4 ,if space is something purely subjective1 a condition of the sensibility and of the possibility of experience1 it follows that the mind instead of receiving any thing from the object1 creates whatever is in the object1 or rather1 whatever we consider as in it4 ,things in themselves are not extended2 extension is only a form with which the mind clothes them4 ,in the same manner1 they are not colored1 sonorous1 tasteful1 or odorous1 except inasmuch as we transfer to them that which is in ourselves alone4 ,every thing being reduced to mere appearances1 there is in the external world not even the principle of causality of subjective extension2 the mind gives it to objects1 does not receive it from them4 ,these objects are pure phenomena2 and1 consequently1 the soul only sees what it contains in itself1 it knows no other world than that which is its own creation4 ,thus1 we see the real world spring from the me2 or1 rather1 the real world is only the ideal creation of the mind4 ,on this supposition1 the laws of nature are only the laws of our own mind1 and instead of seeking for the types of our ideas in nature1 we ought to regard our ideas as the generative principle of all that exists1 or seems to exist2 and the laws of the universe are merely the subjective condition of the me applied to phenomena4 #abb4 ,some of the disciples of ,kant show no fear of his idealist tendencies2 in fact they accept them without any hesitation1 as may be seen by the comparisons which they use in explaining his doctrine4 ,if a seal be applied to a piece of soft wax1 it will leave its impression on the wax2 if we suppose the seal to be capable of perception1 it would see its mark on the wax1 and attribute to the object what it had itself given it4 ,if a vase full of water were capable of perception1 it would attribute to the water the form1 which in reality is only the form of the vase itself1 and is communicated from it to the water4 ,in a similar manner the mind constructs the external world1 giving to it its impression and form1 and then believing it has received from the external world what it has itself communicated to it4 #abc4 ,still we must confess that ,kant1 in the second edition of his ,critic of ,pure ,reason1 rejects these conclusions1 and expressly combats idealism4 ,there is no necessity of examining how far the second edition contradicts the first3 it is sufficient for me to inform the reader that this contradiction exists1 and that in the first edition there are expressions which so plainly lead to idealism1 that it is impossible not to be surprised on finding the same author in the second edition of his work strongly opposing the idealist system4 ,i have pointed out the consequences of the doctrine2 if the author understood it in a different sense from that which his words expressed1 this is merely a personal1 not a philosophical question47#ca7 ,,chapter ,,xviii4 ,,the ,,problem ,,of ,,sensible ,,experience4 #abd4 ,the great problem of philosophy does not consist in the explanation of the possibility of experience2 but in establishing the reason of the consciousness of experience1 as experience4 ,experience in itself is a fact of our soul attested by consciousness1 but to know that this fact is a fact of experience1 is something very different from mere experience2 for1 by knowing this1 we pass from the subjective to the objective1 referring to the external world what we experience within us4 ,we refer objects to different points of space1 and regard them as outside of1 and distinct from1 each other3 to say that the instinct by which we so regard them is a condition of the subject and of sensible experience is to establish a sterile fact4 ,the difficulty is in knowing why we have this instinct2 why the representation of an extension is in our soul2 and why this subjective extension in a simple being should be presented to our perception as the image of something external and really extended4 #abe4 ,transcendental esthetics may determine the following problems3 ,i4 ,to explain what is the subjective representation of extension1 abstracted from all that is objective4 ,,ii4 ,why this representation is found in our soul4 ,,iii4 ,why a simple being contains in itself the representation of multiplicity1 and an unextended being the representation of extension4 ,,iv4 ,why and how we pass from ideal to real extension4 ,v4 ,to determine how far we may apply to extension what is true of the other sensations1 which are considered as phenomena of our soul1 having no external object like them1 and no other correspondence with the external world than the relation of effects to their cause4 #abf4 ,what is the subjective representation of extension1 abstracted from all that is objective8 ,it is a fact of our soul2 no further explanation is possible2 he that has it1 knows what it is2 he that has it not1 does not1 except intelligences of a higher order1 which know what this representation is1 without experiencing it as we do4 #abg4 ,i do not pretend that it is possible to explain why the representation of extension is found in our soul2 we might as well ask why we are intelligent and sensible beings4 ,the only reason a priori which we can give1 is that ,god has so created us4 ,this representation may be found in us1 and it is so found1 for we experience it2 but this internal experience is the limit of philosophy2 immediate observation can go no farther back4 ,reason raises us to the knowledge of a cause which created us1 but not to a phenomenon which is the source of the phenomena of experience4 #abh4 ,why a simple being contains in itself the representation of multiplicity1 and an unextended being the representation of extension1 is the problem of intelligence1 which1 because it is intelligence1 is one and simple1 and capable of perceiving multiplicity and composition4 #abi4 ,we pass from ideal to real extension by a natural and irresistible impulse1 which is confirmed by the assent of reason4 ,this has been demonstrated in the first book1 and also in the second when treating of the objectiveness of sensations4 #acj4 ,of the five problems the last remains4 ,we must determine how far we may apply to extension what is true of the other sensations1 which are considered as phenomena of our soul1 having no external object like them1 and no other correspondence with the external world than the relation of effects to their cause4 #aca4 ,the solution of this problem settles the question for or against the idealists4 ,if we may apply to extension what is true of the other sensations1 idealism triumphs1 and the real world1 if it exists1 is a being which has no resemblance to the world which we think4 ,i have proved in treating of sensations#di that extension is something real1 and independent of our sensations1 and ,i have shown#ej that it represents multiplicity and continuity4 ,this is sufficient to overthrow idealism1 and also to explain1 to a certain extent1 what extension consists in2 but as the idea of space1 which is closely connected with extension1 had not then been examined1 it was not possible for us to rise above the order of phenomena and regard extension under a transcendental aspect1 examining it in itself1 abstracted from all its relations with the world of appearances4 ,this is what ,i propose to do in the following chapters4 #di ,bk4 ,,ii41 ,chs4 ,,vii41 ,,viii41 and ,,ix41 and ,bk4 ,,iii41 ,ch4 ,,iv4 #ej ,bk4 ,,ii41 ,ch4 ,,viii41 and ,bk4 ,,iii41 ,ch4 ,,vi4 #acb4 ,we come now to a more cragged path2 we have to distinguish the reality from appearance2 our understanding1 which is always accompanied by sensible representations1 must now depart from them1 and place itself in opposition to a condition to which it is naturally subjected in the exercise of its functions4 ,,chapter ,,xix4 ,,extension ,,abstracted ,,from ,,phenomena4 #acc4 ,that which is extended is not one being only2 it is a collection of beings4 ,extension necessarily contains parts1 some outside of1 and consequently distinct from1 others4 ,their union is not identity2 for1 the very fact that they are united1 supposes them distinct1 since any thing is not united with itself4 ,it would seem from this that extension in itself and distinguished from the things extended1 is nothing2 to imagine extension as a being whose real nature can be investigated is to resign one's self to be the sport of one's fancy4 ,extension is not identified in particular with any one of the beings which compose it1 but it is the result of their union4 ,this is equally true whether we consider extension composed of unextended points1 or of points that are extended but infinitely divisible4 ,if we suppose the points unextended1 it is evident that they are not extension1 because extended and unextended are contradictory4 ,neither are these points identified with extension1 if we suppose them extended2 for extension implies a whole1 and a whole cannot be identified with any of its parts4 ,if a line be four feet long1 there cannot be identity between the whole line and one of its parts a foot long4 ,we may suppose these parts1 instead of a foot1 to be only an inch in length1 and we may divide them ad infinitum1 but we shall never find any of these parts equal to any of its subdivisions4 ,therefore1 extension is not identical with any of the particular beings which compose it4 #acd4 ,the idea of multiplicity being involved in the idea of extension1 it would seem that extension ought to be considered1 not as a being in itself1 but as the result of a union of many beings4 ,this result is what we call continuity4 ,we have already seen#ea that multiplicity is not sufficient to constitute extension4 ,it enters into the idea of number1 and yet number does not represent any thing extended4 ,we also conceive a union of acts1 faculties1 activities1 substances1 and beings of various classes1 without conceiving extension1 and yet multiplicity is a part of all these conceptions4 #ea ,bk4 ,,ii4 ,chap4 ,,viii4 #ace4 ,therefore continuity is necessary1 in order to complete the idea of extension4 ,what1 then1 is continuity8 ,it is the position of parts outside of1 but joined to other parts4 ,but what is the meaning of the terms1 outside of1 and joined to8 ,inside and outside1 joined and separated1 imply extension1 they presuppose that which is to be explained2 the thing to be defined enters into the definition in the same sense in which it is to be defined4 ,exactly2 for1 to explain the continuity of extension is the same as to show the meaning of the terms inside and outside1 joined and separated4 #acf4 ,we must not forget this observation1 unless we wish to accept the explanations which are found in almost all the books on the subject4 ,to define extension by the words inside and outside1 is not to add any thing1 under a philosophic aspect2 it is merely to express the same thing in different words4 ,without doubt this language would be the simplest1 if all we wanted was to establish the phenomenon only1 but philosophy will not be satisfied with it4 ,it is a practical1 not a speculative1 explanation4 ,the same may be said of the definition of extension by space or places4 ,what is extension8--the occupation of place3--but1 what is a place8--a portion of space terminated by certain surfaces3--what is space8--the extension in which bodies are placed1 or the capacity to receive them4 ,but even admitting the existence of space as something absolute1 what is the capacity of bodies to fill space8 ,who does not see that this is to define a thing by itself1 a vicious circle8 ,the extension of space is explained by the capacity of receiving2 the extension of bodies by the capacity of filling4 ,the idea of extension remains untouched2 it is not defined1 it is merely expressed in different words1 but which mean the same thing4 ,to suppose the existence of space as something absolute1 does not help the question1 and is1 besides1 an entirely gratuitous supposition4 ,to take the extension of space as a term by relation to which we may explain the extension of bodies1 is to suppose that to be found which we are looking for4 ,we run into the same error if we try to explain the words inside and outside1 by referring them to distinct points in space1 we should define a thing by itself2 for1 we have the same difficulty with respect to space to determine the meaning of inside and outside1 joined and separated1 and contiguous and distant4 ,if we presuppose the extension of space as something absolute1 and try to explain other extensions by relation to this1 we only make the illusion more complete4 ,we have to explain extension in itself1 the extension of space must be explained as well as the rest2 to presuppose it is to assume the question already solved1 not to solve it4 #acg4 ,extension in relation to its dimensions seems to be independent of the thing extended in the same place4 ,an extension may remain absolutely fixed with the same dimensions1 notwithstanding the change of place of the thing extended4 ,if we suppose a series of objects to pass over a fixed visual field1 the things extended vary incessantly1 but the extension remains the same4 ,if we suppose a very large object to pass before a window1 it changes continually2 for the part which we see at the instant ,a is not the part which we see at the instant ,b1 but the extension has not varied in its dimensions4 ,this regards surfaces only1 but the same doctrine may be applied to solids4 ,a space may be successively filled with a variety of objects1 but its capacity remains the same4 ,there is no identity between the object and the extension which contains it2 for any number of objects of the same size may occupy the same place2 neither is the air1 or any surrounding object1 identified with the extension2 for these1 too1 may change without affecting the extension in which the object is contained4 #ach4 ,though the dimensions remain fixed while the objects vary1 it does not follow that extension is purely subjective1 even though we suppose that the objects which vary cannot be distinguished4 ,if the contrary were maintained1 the change of the dimensions would prove them to be objective2 and the argument might be retorted against our adversaries4 ,that the dimensions are fixed shows that different objects may produce similar impressions2 and therefore we can form an idea of a determinate dimension or figure1 without reference to the particular object to which it does1 or may correspond4 ,no one will deny that we have the representation of dimensions1 without necessarily referring them to any thing in particular2 but what we wish to determine is1 whether these dimensions exist in reality1 and what is their nature1 independently of their relations to us4 #aci4 ,if we admit that continuity has no external object either in pure space or in bodies1 what becomes of the corporeal world8 ,it is indeed to a collection of beings which in one way or another1 and in a certain order1 act upon our being4 ,the difficulties against the realization of phenomenal continuity are not destroyed by appealing to the necessities of the corporeal organization of sensible beings4 ,if any one should ask how external beings can act upon us1 and affect our organs1 if they have not in them the continuity with which they are presented to us2 such a one would show that he does not understand the state of the question4 ,for it is evident that if we should take from the external world all real continuity1 leaving only the phenomenal1 we should at the same time take it from our own organization1 which is but a part of the universe4 ,there is here a mutual relation and sort of parallelism of phenomena and realities which mutually complete and explain each other4 ,if the universe is a collection of beings acting upon us in a certain order1 our organization is another collection of beings1 receiving their influence in the same order4 ,either both are inexplicable1 or else the explanation of one involves the explanation of the other4 ,if that order is fixed and constant1 and its correspondence remains the same1 nothing is changed1 no matter what hypothesis is assumed in order to explain the phenomenon4 #adj4 ,the object of our searches here1 is the reality subject to the condition of explaining the phenomenon1 and not contradicting the order of our ideas4 ,it might be objected to those who take from the external world the phenomenal or apparent qualities of continuity1 that they destroy geometry1 which is based on the idea of phenomenal continuity4 ,but this objection cannot stand2 for it supposes the idea of geometry to be phenomenal1 whereas it is transcendental4 ,we have already shown that the idea of extension is not a sensation1 but a pure idea1 and that the imaginary representations by which it is made sensible are not the idea1 but only the forms with which the idea is clothed4 #ada4 ,all phenomenal extension is presented to us with a certain magnitude2 geometry abstracts all magnitude4 ,its theorems and problems relate to figures in general abstracted absolutely from their size1 and when the size is taken into consideration it is only in so far as relative4 ,of two triangles of equal bases that which has greater altitude has the greater surface4 ,here the word greater relates to size1 it is true2 but to a relative1 not to any absolute size2 the question is not of the magnitudes themselves1 but of their relation4 ,consequently1 the theorem is equally true whether the triangles are immense1 or infinitely small4 ,therefore1 geometry abstracts absolutely all magnitudes considered as phenomena1 and makes use of them only in order to assist the intellectual perception by the sensible representation4 #adb4 ,this is an important truth1 and ,i shall explain it further when combating ,condillac's system in the treatise on ideas1 where ,i shall show that even the ideas which we have of bodies neither are1 nor can be1 a transformed sensation4 ,according to these principles1 geometry is a science which makes its pure ideas sensible by a phenomenal representation4 ,this representation is necessary so long as geometry is a human science1 and man is subject to phenomena2 but geometry in itself and in all its purity has no need of such representations4 #adc4 ,in order that this doctrine may seem less strange1 and may be more readily accepted1 ,i will ask1 whether pure spirits possess the science of geometry8 ,we must answer in the affirmative2 for1 otherwise we should be forced to conclude that ,god1 the author of the universe and greatest of geometricians1 does not know geometry4 ,does ,god1 then1 have these representations1 by the aid of which we imagine extension8 ,no2 these representations are a sort of continuation of sensibility which ,god has not2 they are the exercise of the internal sense1 which is not found in ,god4 ,st4 ,thomas calls them phantasmata1 and says they are not found in ,god1 or in pure spirits1 nor even in the soul separated from the body4 ,therefore1 the science of geometry is possible1 and does really exist without sensible representations1 and1 consequently1 we may distinguish two extensions1 the one phenomenal1 and the other real1 without thereby destroying either the phenomenon or the reality1 so long as we admit the correspondence between them2 so long as we do not break the thread which unites our being with those around us2 so long as the conditions of our being harmonize with those of the external world47#cb7 ,,chapter ,,xx4 ,,are ,,there ,,absolute ,,magnitudes8 #add4 ,the preceding doctrine will seem much more probable if we reflect that all purely intellectual perceptions of extension may be reduced to the knowledge of order and relation4 ,there is nothing absolute in the eyes of science1 not even of mathematical science4 ,the absolute1 in relation to extension1 is an ignorant fancy which the observation of the phenomena is sufficient to dissipate4 ,in the order of appearances there are no absolute magnitudes2 all are relations4 ,we can not even form an idea of a magnitude1 unless with reference to another which serves for a measure4 ,the absolute is found only in number1 and never in extension2 a magnitude is absolute1 not in itself1 but only by being numbered4 ,a surface two feet square1 presents two distinct ideas2 the number of its parts1 and the kind of parts4 ,the number is a fixed idea1 but the kind is purely relative4 ,i will try to make this clearer4 #ade4 ,when ,i speak of a surface four feet square1 the number four is a simple1 fixed1 and unchangeable idea2 but ,i can explain a square foot only by relations4 ,if ,i am asked what is a square foot1 ,i can answer only by comparison with a square rod or a square inch2 but if ,i am again asked what is a square rod or a square inch1 ,i am again forced to recur to other measures which are greater or smaller2 ,i can nowhere find a fixed magnitude4 #adf4 ,if there were some fixed measure it might be some dimension of the body1 my hand1 or foot1 or arm4 ,but who does not see that the dimensions of my body are not a universal measure1 and that the hands1 or feet1 or arms1 of all men are not equal8 ,and even in the same individual they are subject to a thousand changes more or less perceptible4 ,shall we take for our fixed measure the radius of the earth1 or of a heavenly body8 ,but one has no claim to preference before the other4 ,every one knows that astronomers take sometimes the radius of the earth1 and sometimes the radius of its orbit as the unity of measure4 ,if we suppose these radii to be greater or smaller1 can we not equally in either case take them as the measure8 ,they are preferred because they do not change4 ,but even astronomers regard these magnitudes as purely relative1 and at one time consider them infinitely large1 at another infinitely small1 according to the point of view from which they look at them4 ,the radius of the earth's orbit is considered infinite in comparison with a small inequality on the earth's surface1 and infinitely small when compared with the distance of the fixed stars4 ,we can form no idea of these measures except by comparison with those in constant use4 ,what idea should we have of the magnitude of the radius of the earth if we did not know how many million measures it is equal to8 ,what idea should we have in turn of these measures if we had nothing constant to which we could refer them8 #adg4 ,there is something absolute in magnitudes1 it may be objected2 for a foot is a certain length which we both see and touch1 and cannot be greater or smaller2 the surface of a square yard is in like manner something definite which we see and which we touch2 and the same may be applied to solids4 ,there is no necessity of going farther to find that which is so clearly presented to us in sensible intuition4 ,this objection supposes that there is something fixed and constant in intuition2 this is false4 ,i appeal to experience4 ,it is probable that men see the same magnitudes very differently according to the disposition of their eyes4 ,no one is ignorant that this happens when the objects are at a distance2 for1 then1 one sees clearly what another cannot even distinguish2 to one it is a surface1 while to another it is not even so much as a point4 ,we all know what a great variety there is in the size of objects when looked at through differently graduated glasses4 ,from all this we conclude that there is nothing fixed in phenomenal magnitude2 but that every thing is subject to continual changes4 ,when we look through a microscope objects which were before invisible1 take large dimensions2 and as the microscope may be infinitely perfected1 it is not absurd to suppose that there are animals to whom what is invisible to us appears larger than the whole earth4 ,the construction of the eye may also be considered in an inverse sense1 and as infinite perfection is also possible in this case1 it is possible that magnitudes which to us are immense may be invisible to other beings4 ,to this eye of colossal vision the terrestrial globe would perhaps be an imperceptible atom4 ,this is no more than what happens by the interposition of distance2 immense masses in the firmament seem to us to be only small specks of light4 #adh4 ,it must now be very evident that there is nothing absolute in magnitudes of sight2 but that all is relative1 and that objects appear to us greater or less1 according to habit1 the construction of our organs1 and other circumstances4 ,the variety of appearances is in accordance with philosophy2 since no necessary relation can be discovered between the size of the organ and the object4 ,what connection is there between a narrow surface like the retina of our eye and the immense surfaces which are painted on it8 #adi4 ,from sight we may pass to touch1 but we find no reason of the fixity of phenomenal magnitude4 ,the sense of touch gives us the ideas of magnitudes by relation to the time it takes to pass over them1 and to the velocity of our motion4 ,the ideas of time and velocity are also relative2 they refer to the space passed over4 ,when we measure velocity we say that it is the space divided by the time2 in measuring time we say that it is the space divided by the velocity2 and we measure space by multiplying the velocity by the time4 ,all these ideas are correlative1 and are measured by each other1 and by their mutual relations4 ,this shows that these ideas have nothing absolute2 their whole character is that of a relation which is incomplete1 or rather does not exist1 if one of the terms is wanting4 #aej4 ,we shall find it equally impossible to determine these measures by the impressions which the motion causes in us4 ,if for example we propose to measure the degree of velocity1 by the agitation which we feel in our body1 we shall find that the measure varies with the agitation1 but this agitation depends on the degree of force exerted1 and still more on the strength of the subject4 ,thus a little child is obliged to run till he is almost out of breath1 to keep up with his father who is walking fast4 ,the impossibility of any fixed measure by means of impressions will be still more apparent if we compare the motion of a horse with the motion of a microscopic animal4 ,the distance which a horse would pass over almost without any sensible motion1 would require the microscopic animal to display its whole activity1 and run perhaps a whole day4 ,the horse would scarce believe he had changed his place1 whereas the poor animalcule would at night be overcome by fatigue like one who has travelled a long journey4 ,compare now the motion of the horse with the motion of those fabulous giants who piled up mountains to scale the heavens2 a single step of one of those giants would be a long distance for the horse to travel4 #aea4 ,art seems to be in accordance with science on this point4 ,in art1 size is nothing1 the only thing which is regarded is the proportion or relation4 ,a skilful miniature represents a person as clearly as a painting the size of life4 ,the same principle is applied to all the objects embraced by art1 the artistic thought never refers directly to the size2 proportion1 the relative is all that is attended to2 the absolute counts for nothing4 ,we see the system of relations transferred to the order of appearances1 inasmuch as they affect the faculties susceptible of pleasure2 reason is thus admirably harmonized with sentiment1 in the same manner as we have found intellect harmonized with the senses4 ,,chapter ,,xxi4 ,,pure ,,intelligibility ,,of ,,the ,,extended ,,world4 #aeb4 ,objects in themselves do not change their nature1 by the variety of appearances which they produce in us4 ,a polygon turning with rapidity has the appearance of a circle2 the stars appear like small points2 and considering the various classes of objects1 we may observe that there is a great variety of appearances depending on circumstances4 ,the nature of a being does not consist in what it appears1 but in what it is4 ,suppose there were no sensitive being in the world1 the present order of sensibility would disappear2 for without sensitive beings there would be no representations4 ,what would the world be in that case8 ,this is a great problem of metaphysics4 #aec4 ,a pure spirit1--the existence of which we must always suppose2 for1 though all finite beings were annihilated1 there would still remain the infinite being which is ,god1--a pure spirit would know the extended world just as it is in itself1 and would not have the sensible representations either external or internal1 which we have4 ,this is certain1 unless we mean to attribute imagination and sensibility to pure spirits1 and even to ,god himself4 ,on this supposition ,i ask1 what would a pure spirit know of the external world8 or1 to speak more properly1 since the existence of such a spirit is certain and its intelligence infinite1 what does this spirit know of the external world8 #aed4 ,that which this spirit knows of the world is the world1 because he cannot be deceived4 ,but this spirit does not know the world under any sensible form4 ,therefore the world may be known without any of the forms of sensibility1 and consequently may be the object of a pure intelligence4 ,there is no difficulty on this point in what regards sensations4 ,it is only necessary that we should say that the pure spirit knows perfectly the principle of causality which resides in the object1 and produces the impressions which we experience4 ,there is no need of attributing to the intelligent spirit any sensation of the thing understood4 ,this question is more difficult when we come to explain what relates to extension4 ,for1 if we say that the spirit only knows the principle of causality of the subjective representation of the extended1 it follows that there is no true extension in the objects1 because the spirit sees all that there is1 and if the spirit does not see it1 it is because it is not4 ,we fall into ,berkeley's idealism2 an external world without extension is not the world of common sense1 but the world of the idealists4 ,if1 on the other hand1 we say that this pure spirit does know extension1 we seem to attribute to the spirit sensible representation2 because the extension represented seems to involve sensible representation4 ,what is an extension with lines1 surfaces1 and figures8 ,and these objects1 as we understand them1 are sensible2 if1 however1 they be taken in another sense1 the extension of the world will be of another nature1 it will be something of which we have no idea2 and here again we fall into idealism4 #aee4 ,to solve this difficulty1 which is really a serious one1 it is necessary to recollect the distinction on which ,i insisted so earnestly between extension as sensation and extension as idea4 ,the former can become subjective only in a sensible being2 the second may be1 and is1 subjective in a purely intellectual being4 ,extension as sensation is something subjective1 it is an appearance2 its object exists in reality1 but without including in its essence any thing more than is necessary in order to produce the sensation4 ,extension as idea is also subjective2 but it has a real object which corresponds to it1 and satisfies all the conditions of the idea4 #aef4 ,does not this theory seem to establish two geometries8 ,we must distinguish4 ,the scientific and the pure ideal geometry will remain the same1 save the difference of the intelligences which possess it4 ,but notwithstanding this difference1 what is true in one is true in the other4 ,empirical geometry as the representative part of geometry will be different3 we have the idea only of our own4 #aeg4 ,in fact we observe two parts in geometry even in ourselves2 the one purely scientific1 the other of sensible representation4 ,the former includes the connection of ideas2 the latter the images and particular cases by means of which we make the ideas sensible3 the first is the ground2 the second is the form4 ,but although the two are different1 we cannot separate them entirely3 we cannot have the geometrical idea without the sensible representation1 we understand it only per conversionem ad phantasmata1 as say the scholastics4 ,thus the two orders of geometry1 the sensible and the intellectual1 though different1 are always joined in us2 whether because the pure geometrical idea arises from the sensible1 or is excited by it1 or because this is perhaps a necessary primitive condition imposed on our mind by its union with the body4 #aeh4 ,this shows how the pure geometry may be separated from the sensible1 and how it may exist in pure intellectual beings1 without any of the forms which represent the geometrical idea in sensible beings4 #aei4 ,but what becomes of extension in itself and stripped of all sensible form8 ,when we speak of extension stripped of all sensible form1 we do not mean to deprive it of its capacity to be perceived by the senses1 we merely abstract the relations of this capacity to sensible beings4 ,extension is then reduced1 not to an imaginary space1 nor to an eternal and infinite being1 but to an order of beings1 to the sum of their constant relations subject to necessary laws4 ,what then are these relations8 ,i know not4 ,but ,i know that they exist and that these necessary laws exist4 ,that they exist in reality ,i know by experience1 which gives testimony of their existence2 that they are possible1 ,i know on the authority of my ideas1 the connection of which forces my assent to their intrinsical evidence4 #afj4 ,that this evidence touches but one aspect of the object1 is true2 that there are many things in the object which we do not know1 is likewise true2 but this only proves that our science is incomplete1 not that it is illusory or false4 #afa4 ,it is difficult for us to conceive the pure intelligibility of the sensible world1 both because our ideas are always accompanied by representations of the imagination1 and because we try to explain it by simple addition and subtraction of parts1 as though all the problems of the universe could be reduced to expressions of lines1 surfaces1 and solids4 ,geometry plays an important part in all that regards the appreciation of the phenomena of nature2 but when we want to penetrate to the essence of things1 we must lay aside geometry and take up metaphysics4 ,there is no more seductive philosophy than that which reduces the world to motions and figures1 but at the same time there is none more superficial4 ,a slight reflection on the reality of things shows the insufficiency of such a system4 ,for1 though the imagination be satisfied with it1 the understanding is not1 and it takes a noble revenge on its unfaithful companion1 when1 forcing the imagination to fix itself upon objects1 the understanding sinks it in an ocean of darkness and contradiction4 ,those who laugh at the forms1 the acts1 the forces1 and other such expressions used with more or less exactness in different schools1 ought to reflect that even in the physical world there is something more than is perceived by the senses2 and that even sensible phenomena cannot be explained by mere sensible representations4 ,physical science is not complete until it calls to its aid metaphysics4 ,the best proof of this will be found in the next chapter1 where we shall see the imagination entangled in its own representations4 ,,chapter ,,xxii4 ,,infinite ,,divisibility4 #afb4 ,the divisibility of matter is a question that torments philosophers4 ,matter is divisible because it is extended1 and there is no extension without parts4 ,these parts are extended or are not3 if they are1 they are again divisible2 if they are not1 they are simple1 and in the division of matter we must come to unextended points4 ,this last consequence can be avoided only by recourse to the infinite divisibility of matter1 and even this is a means of escaping the difficulty rather than a true solution4 ,i intimated elsewhere#eb that infinite divisibility seems to suppose the very thing which it denies4 ,division does not make the parts1 it supposes them2 that which is simple cannot be divided2 therefore1 the parts which may be divided pre-exist in the infinitely divisible composition4 #eb ,chap4 v4 ,let us imagine ,god to exert his infinite power in dividing1 will he exhaust divisibility8 ,if you say no1 you seem to place limits to his omnipotence2 if you say yes1 we shall have arrived at simple points1 as otherwise the divisibility would not be exhausted4 ,even supposing that ,god does not make this division1 his infinite intelligence certainly sees all the parts into which the composite is divisible2 these parts must be simple1 or else the infinite intelligence would not see the limit of divisibility4 ,if you answer that this limit does not exist1 and therefore cannot be seen1 ,i reply that we must then admit an infinite number of parts in each portion of matter2 there would1 in this case1 be no limit of divisibility1 because the number of parts would be inexhaustible2 but this infinite number would be seen by the infinite intelligence1 as it is1 and all these parts would be known as they are4 ,the difficulty still remains2 these parts are simple or composite2 if simple1 the opinion which we are opposing does1 at least1 admit unextended points2 if composite1 the same argument may be repeated2 they are again divisible4 ,we shall then have a new infinite number in each one of the parts of the first infinite number2 but as this series of infinities must be always known to the infinite intelligence1 we must come to simple points1 or else say that the infinite intelligence does not know all that there is in matter4 ,it does not mend the matter to say that the parts are not actual but only possible4 ,in the first place1 possible parts are existing parts1 because1 if the parts are not real1 there must be real simplicity1 and consequently1 indivisibility4 ,secondly1 if they are possible1 they may be made to exist by the intervention of an infinite power2 and then what are these parts8 they are either extended or unextended1 and the matter returns to where it was before4 #afc4 ,some say that a mathematical quantity1 or a body mathematically considered1 is infinitely divisible1 but that natural bodies are not1 because their natural form requires a determinate quantity4 ,this is the explanation which was given in the schools2 but it is very clear that there is no ground for affirming that these natural bodies require a certain quantity1 beyond which division is impossible4 ,this cannot be proved either a priori nor a posteriori3 not a priori1 because we do not know the essence of bodies1 and cannot say that there is a point where the natural form requires the limit of divisibility2 neither can it be proved a posteriori1 because the means of observation at our disposal are so coarse1 that it is impossible for us to reach the last limit of division and discover a part which cannot be divided4 ,besides1 when we reach this quantity beyond which division cannot go1 we have a true quantity1 by the supposition2 if it is quantity it is extended2 if it is extended it has parts2 if it has parts it is divisible4 ,therefore there is no reason for saying that there is any natural form which limits division4 #afd4 ,the distinction between a natural and a mathematical body is not admissible in what relates to division4 ,this is a result of the nature of extension1 which is real in natural bodies1 and ideal in mathematical4 ,that the parts in natural bodies are not actual but possible1 may be understood in two ways2 it may mean that they are not actually separated2 or1 that they are not distinct4 ,that they are not separated has no bearing on the question2 for division may be conceived without separating the parts4 ,but1 if they are not distinct1 the division is impossible2 for it cannot even be conceived where the things are not distinct4 #afe4 ,this distinction seems to have originated in the attempt to avoid the necessity of admitting infinite divisibility in natural bodies4 ,but the difficulty still remaining with regard to mathematical bodies1 the philosophical mystery still subsists4 ,it consists in this1 that no limit can be assigned to division so long as there is any thing extended2 and1 on the other hand1 if1 in order to assign this limit1 we come to simple points1 then it is impossible to reconstitute extension4 ,the difficulty arises from the very nature of extended things1 whether realized or only conceived2 the real order escapes none of the difficulties of the ideal4 ,if ideal extension cannot be constituted out of unextended points1 neither can real extension2 if ideal extension has no limit to its divisibility until we come to simple points1 the same is also true of real extension2 for in both it is a result of the essence of extension1 and inseparable from it4 ,,chapter ,,xxiii4 ,,unextended ,,points4 #aff4 ,there are two strong arguments against the existence of unextended points3 the first is1 that we must suppose them infinite in number1 for otherwise it does not seem possible to arrive at the simple1 starting from the extended3 the second is1 that even supposing them infinite in number they are incapable of producing extension4 ,these arguments are so powerful as to excuse all the aberrations of the contrary opinion1 which1 however strange they may seem1 are not more strange than the simple forming extension1 and the smallest portion of matter containing an infinite number of parts4 #afg4 ,it does not seem possible to arrive at unextended points unless by an infinite division4 ,the unextended is zero in the order of extension1 and in order to arrive at zero by a decreasing geometrical progression it must be continued ad infinitum4 ,mathematical calculation presents a sensible image of this4 ,when two parts are united they must have a side where they touch1 and another where they are not in contact4 ,if we separate the interior side from the exterior we have two new sides1 one which touches and another which does not4 ,continuing the division the same thing happens again2 we must1 therefore1 pass through an infinite series in order to arrive at the unextended1 which is equivalent to saying that we shall never arrive there4 ,to continue the division ad infinitum we must suppose infinite parts1 and consequently the existence of an actual infinite number4 ,from the moment that we suppose this infinite number to exist it seems to become finite1 since we already see a limit to the division1 and also other numbers greater than it4 ,let us suppose that this infinite number of parts is found in a cubic inch2 there are numbers which are greater than this which we suppose infinite2 a cubic foot1 for example1 will contain #a1gbh times the infinite number of parts contained in the cubic inch4 ,thus the opinion of unextended points seeking to avoid infinite division1 runs into it2 just as its adversaries trying to escape from unextended points are forced to acknowledge their existence4 ,the imagination loses itself and the understanding is confused4 #afh4 ,the other objection is not less unanswerable4 ,suppose we have arrived at unextended points1 how shall we reconstitute extension8 ,the unextended has no dimensions2 therefore1 no matter how many unextended points we may take1 we can never form extension with them4 ,let us imagine two points to be united1 as neither of them alone occupies any place1 neither will they both together4 ,we cannot say that they penetrate each other2 for penetration cannot exist without extension4 ,we must admit that these parts being zero in the order of extension1 their sum can never give extension1 no matter how many of them we may add together4 #afi4 ,it is certain that a sum of zeros can give only zero for the result1 but mathematicians admit that there are certain expressions equal to zero1 which multiplied by an infinite quantity will give a finite quantity for the product4 #j #j #j #j ,n #j #j2 but if we take #j_/,m #j1 and multiply it by the expression ,m_/#j #j1 we shall have 7#j_/,m7 7,m_/#j7 7#j ,m7_/7,m #j7 #j_/j which is equal to any finite quantity1 which we may express by ,a4 ,this is shown by the principles of elementary algebra only2 if we pass to the transcendental we have dz_/dx o_/o ,b2 ,b expressing the differential coefficient which may be equal to a finite value4 ,can these mathematical doctrines serve to explain the generation of the extended from unextended points8 ,i think not4 ,it is evident that1 multiplication being only addition shortened1 if an infinite addition of zeros can give only zero2 multiplication can give no other result1 although the other factor be infinite4 ,why then do mathematical results say the contrary8 ,this contradiction is not true1 but only apparent4 ,in the multiplication of the infinitesimal by the infinite we may obtain a finite quantity for product1 because the infinitesimal is not regarded as a true zero1 but as a quantity less than all imaginable quantities1 but still it is something4 ,if this condition were wanting1 all the operations would be absurd1 because they would turn upon a pure nothing4 ,shall we therefore say that the equation1 dz_/dx o_/o1 is only approximate8 ,no2 for it expresses the relation of the limit of the decrement1 which is equal to ,b only when the differentials are equal to zero4 ,but as geometricians only consider the limit in itself1 they pass over all the intervals of the decrement1 and place themselves at once at the point of true exactness4 ,why then operate on these quantities8 ,because the operations are a sort of algebraic language1 and mark the course that has been followed in the calculations1 and recall the connection of the limit with the quantity to which it refers4 #agj4 ,unity which is not number produces number2 why then cannot points without extension produce extension8 ,there is a great disparity between the two cases4 ,the unextended1 as such1 involves only the negative idea of extension2 but in unity1 although number is denied1 this negation does not constitute its nature4 ,no one ever defined unity to be the negation of number1 yet we always define the unextended to be that which has no extension4 ,unity is any being taken in general1 without considering its divisibility2 number is a collection of unities2 therefore the idea of number involves the idea of unity1 of an undivided being1 number being nothing more than the repetition of this unity4 ,it belongs to the essence of all number that it can be resolved into unity2 it contains unity in a determinate manner4 ,but the extended can not be resolved into the unextended1 unless by proceeding ad infinitum1 or else by some process of decomposition which we know nothing of4 ,,chapter ,,xxiv4 ,a ,,conjecture ,,on ,,the ,,transcendental ,,notion ,,of ,,extension4 #aga4 ,the arguments for or against unextended points1 for or against the infinite divisibility of matter seem equally conclusive4 ,the understanding is afraid that it has met with contradictory demonstrations2 it thinks it discovers absurdities in infinite divisibility1 and absurdities in limiting it2 absurdities in denying unextended points1 and absurdities in admitting them4 ,it is invincible attacking an opinion1 but its strength is turned into weakness as soon as it attempts to establish or defend any thing of its own4 ,yet reason can never contradict itself2 two contradictory demonstrations would be the contradiction of reason1 and would produce its ruin2 the contradiction can1 therefore1 only be apparent4 ,but who shall flatter himself that he can untie the knot8 ,excessive confidence on this point is a sure proof that one has not understood the true state of the question1 and such vanity would be punished by the conviction of ignorance4 ,with all these reserves ,i now proceed to make a few observations on this mysterious subject4 #agb4 ,i am inclined to believe that in all investigations on the first elements of matter1 there is an error which renders any result impossible4 ,you wish to know whether extension may be produced from unextended points1 and the method which you employ consists in imagining them already approached1 and then trying to see if any part of space can be filled by them4 ,this seems to me like trying to make a denial correspond to an affirmation4 ,the unextended point represents nothing determinate to us except the denial of extension2 when1 therefore1 we ask if this point joined with others like it can occupy space1 we ask if the unextended can be extended4 ,our imagination makes us presuppose extension in the very act in which we wish to examine its primitive generation4 ,space1 such as we conceive it1 is a true extension2 and1 as has been shown1 is the idea of extension in general2 to imagine1 therefore1 that the unextended can fill space1 is to change non-extension into extension4 ,it is true that this is precisely what is required1 and in this consists the whole difficulty2 but the error is in attempting to solve it by a juxtaposition which makes these points both unextended and extended1 an evident contradiction4 #agc4 ,in order to know how extension is generated1 it would be necessary to free ourselves from all sensible representations1 and from all ideas which are in the least degree affected by the phenomenon1 and to contemplate it with an eye as simple1 a look as penetrating1 as that of a pure spirit4 ,it would be necessary to take from all geometrical ideas all phenomenal forms1 all representations of the imagination1 and present them to the imagination purified from all mixture with the sensible order4 ,it would be necessary to know how far extension1 real continuity1 agrees with the phenomenal4 ,it would1 in fine1 be necessary to eliminate from the object perceived1 all that relates to the subject which perceives it4 #agd4 ,in extension1 as we have already seen1 there are two things to be considered2 multiplicity1 and continuity4 ,as to the first1 there is no objection to supposing that it may be the result of unextended points1 since number results from various units whether they are simple or composite4 ,but the difficulty is with regard to continuity1 which sensible intuition clearly presents to us as the basis of the representations of the imagination1 but the nature of which is a puzzle to the understanding4 ,it may perhaps be said that continuity1 abstracted from the sensible representation1 and considered only in the transcendental order1 is1 in its reality and as it appears to a pure spirit1 nothing more than the constant relation of many beings1 which are of a nature to produce in a sensitive being the phenomenon of representation1 and to be perceived in the intuition which we call the representation of space4 ,according to this hypothesis extension in the external world is real1 not only as a principle of causality of our impressions1 but also as an object subject to the necessary relations which we conceive4 #age4 ,but1 then1 it will be asked1 is the external world such as we imagine it8 ,to this we must answer1 in accordance with what we have said when treating of sensations1 that it is necessary to take from sensations all that is subjective1 and which by an innocent illustration we look upon as objective2 we may then say that extension really exists outside of us and independent of our sensations2 considered in itself1 it exists free from all sensible representation1 and in the same manner in which a pure spirit may perceive it4 #agf4 ,we see no objection which can reasonably be made to this theory which affirms the reality of the corporeal world1 at the same time that it settles the difficulties of idealism4 ,to give my opinion in a few words1 ,i say3 ,that extension in itself1 exists such as ,god knows it1 and in the cognition of ,god there is no mixture of any of the sensible representations which always accompany man's perception4 ,that which is positive in extension is multiplicity1 together with a certain constant order2 continuity is nothing more than this constant order1 in so far as sensibly represented in us1 it is a purely subjective phenomenon which does not at all affect the reality4 #agg4 ,we may even assign a reason why sensible intuition has been given to us4 ,our soul is united to an organized body1--that is to say1 a collection of beings bound together by constant relation to each other and to the other bodies of the universe4 ,in order that the harmony might not be interrupted1 and that the soul which presides over this organization might rightly exercise its functions1 there was need of a continued representation of this collection of the relations of our own and other bodies4 ,this representation must be simultaneous and independent of intellectual combinations2 for otherwise the animal faculties could not be exercised with the promptness and perseverance which the satisfaction of the necessities of life demands4 ,therefore it is that all sensible beings1 even those which have not reason1 have been endowed with this intuition of extension or space3 which is like an unlimited field on which the different parts of the universe are represented4 ,,chapter ,,xxv4 ,,harmony ,,of ,,the ,,real1 ,,phenomenal1 ,,and ,,ideal ,,orders4 #agh4 ,we may consider two natures in the external world1 the one real1 the other phenomenal2 the first is particular and absolute1 the second is relative to the being which perceives the phenomenon2 by the first the world is1 by the second it appears4 ,a pure intellectual being knows the world as it is2 a sensitive being experiences it as it appears4 ,we can discover this duality in ourselves2 in so far as we are sensitive beings1 we experience the phenomenon1 but in so far as intelligent1 although we do not know the reality1 we attempt to reach it by reasoning and conjecture4 #agi4 ,the external world in its real nature1 abstracted from the phenomenal1 is not an illusion4 ,its existence is known to us not by phenomena only1 but by principles of pure intelligence which are superior to all that is individual and contingent4 ,these principles1 based on the data of experience1--that is1 on sensations the existence of which we know from consciousness1 assure us that the objectiveness of sensations1 or the reality of the external world1 is a truth4 #ahj4 ,this distinction between the essential and the accidental1 and between the absolute and the relative1 was admitted in the schools4 ,extension was considered not as the essence1 but as an accident of bodies2 the relations of bodies to our senses are not founded immediately on their essence1 but on their accidents4 ,matter and substantial form united constitute the essence of bodies2 the matter receiving the form1 and the form actuating the matter4 ,neither the matter nor the substantial form can be immediately perceived by the senses1 because this perception requires the determination of figure and other accidents distinct from the essence of body4 ,therefore the scholastics distinguished sensible objects into three classes2 particular1 common1 and accidental1 proprium1 commune1 et per accidens4 ,the particular is that which appears immediately to the senses1 and is only perceived by one of them1 as color1 sound1 taste1 and smell4 ,the common is that which is perceived by more than one sense1 as figure1 which is the object of sight and of touch4 ,the accidental is that which is not directly perceived by any of the senses1 but is hidden under sensible qualities1 by means of which it is discovered1 as are substances4 ,the sensible per accidens is connected with sensible qualities2 but they do not present it to the understanding as an image presents the original1 but as a sign the signified4 ,hence they did not consider the sensible per accidens as proceeding from the species and reducing the sensitive faculty to act3 it was intelligible rather than sensible4 #aha4 ,in the corporeal universe considered in its essence1 there is no necessity of supposing any thing resembling the sensible representation1 but we must suppose the object to correspond to the idea2 for otherwise we should have to admit that geometrical truths may be contradicted by experience4 #ahb4 ,although extension is an order of beings of which we cannot form a perfect conception1 because we cannot purify our ideas from all sensible form1 still this order must correspond to our ideas1 and even to our sensible representations1 so far as is necessary to prove the truth of the ideas4 ,it is evident that although the phenomenal order is distinct from the real1 it depends on it1 and is connected with it by constant laws4 ,if we suppose that there is no parallel between the reality and the phenomenon1 and that the reality has not all the conditions necessary to satisfy the demands of the phenomenon1 there can be no reason why the phenomena should be subject to constant laws1 and why experience should not suffer continual confusion4 ,without a fixed and constant correspondence between the reality and the appearance1 the world becomes a chaos to us1 and all regular and constant experience becomes impossible4 #ahc4 ,let us examine this at greater length4 ,one of the elementary propositions of geometry says3 ,when two straight lines intersect each other1 the opposite or vertical angles1 which they form1 are equal4 ,in order to demonstrate this1 ,i must have the internal intuition of two lines intersecting each other4 ,but the geometrical proposition is not confined to any particular intuition1 but embraces all that can be imagined1 without any limit to their number1 or any determination as to the measure of the angles1 the length of the lines1 or their position in space4 ,here the pure idea extends to an infinity of cases1 whereas the sensible intuition represents them only one at a time1 and isolated if represented successively4 ,the understanding is not limited to the affirmation of this relation between the ideas1 but applies it to the reality1 and says3 ,whenever the conditions of this ideal order are realized1 that which ,i see in my ideas is true in reality1 and the relation expressed will be more or less exact in proportion to the exactness of the realization of the conditions2 the more delicate the real lines are1 that is1 the more they approach the condition of right lines1 the nearer will the relation of the two angles approach to perfect equality4 ,this conviction is founded on the principle of contradiction1 which would be false if the proposition were not true2 and it is confirmed by experience1 so far as it touches the conditions of the ideal order4 #ahd4 ,what is there in reality which corresponds to this proposition8 ,an existing or real line is an order of beings2 two lines which intersect each other are two orders of beings with a determinate relation2 the angle is the result of this relation1 or1 rather1 it is the relation itself2 the equality of the opposite angle is the correspondence of these relations in the ratio of equality by the continuation of the same order in another sense4 ,these relations between the orders and the beings1 and the correspondence of these orders to each other1 is what corresponds in reality to the pure geometrical idea1 or to the idea separated from all sensible representation4 ,since the relations of the idea have their corresponding objects in the relations of the reality1 geometry exists not only in the ideal order1 but also in the real4 ,since the phenomenon or sensible representation is subject to the same conditions as the idea1 because the order of phenomena presents certain relations of the same nature as the relations of the idea and the fact2 the idea1 the phenomenon1 and the reality agree1 and it is explained why the intellectual order is confirmed by experience1 and experience receives with confidence the direction it gives4 #ahe4 ,this harmony must have a cause2 we must look for a principle which is the sufficient reason of this wonderful agreement between things so distinct4 ,here new problems arise which overwhelm the understanding1 but at the same time expand and invigorate it by the grandeur of the spectacle presented to its view1 and the immensity of the field opened to its investigations4 ,,chapter ,,xxvi4 ,,character ,,of ,,the ,,relations ,,of ,,the ,,real ,,order ,,to ,,the ,,phenomenal4 #ahf4 ,is the agreement of the idea1 the phenomenon1 and the reality necessary1 is it founded on the essence of things1 or has it been freely established by the will of the ,creator8 ,if the world had no other reality than that expressed by the sensible representation1 if the appearances were an exact copy of the essence of things1 we should have to say that this agreement is unalterable1 that things are what they appear1 and that if we suppose them to exist1 it is absolutely necessary that they should be just what they appear2 for nothing can be in contradiction with its constitutive notion4 ,that which now is extended1 would be necessarily extended1 and could not but be extended in the same manner in which it appears to us1 and under the same conditions2 the relation of bodies to each other would be necessarily subject to the same phenomenal laws1 and all which does not come under this order would be a contradiction1 and beyond the limit of omnipotence4 #ahg4 ,bodies are presented to us in the sensible intuition with a determinate magnitude1 and in a certain fixed relation which we calculate by comparison with an immovable extension1 such as we imagine space4 ,by magnitude1 bodies occupy a certain space1 determinate1 though changeable by motion2 by the relation of magnitudes they occupy a greater or smaller place1 and mutually exclude each other2 this exclusion is called impenetrability4 ,the question to be examined here is1 whether the determination of magnitudes1 and their relation in respect to the occupation of place1 are things absolutely necessary1 so that their alteration involves a contradiction1 or not4 ,i answer that they are not4 #ahh4 ,relation to place considered as a portion of pure space1 means nothing2 for ,i have already shown that this space is only an abstraction of our understanding1 and that in itself it has no reality1--it is nothing4 ,therefore the relation to it must be nothing also1 because the relation is destroyed if one of the terms is nothing4 ,therefore1 the relations of bodies to place can only be the relations of bodies to one another4 #ahi4 ,this is the principal thing to be noticed in this question4 ,the understanding gets confused when it begins by supposing space an absolute nature with necessary relation to all bodies4 ,we must remember the doctrine of the chapters1#ec where we explained how the idea of space is generated in us1 what object corresponds to this idea in reality1 and how2 and we shall easily perceive that the absolute and essential relations which we think we discover between bodies and a vacant and real capacity1 are illusions of our imagination1 in consequence of our not sufficiently purifying the ideal order by separating from it all sensible impressions4 ,we cannot understand so much as the meaning of these questions1 if we do not make an attempt at this separation as far as is possible to our nature4 ,if this is done1 then the questions proposed in the following chapters will appear very philosophical1 and their solution will seem probable1 if not true2 but they must seem absurd1 if we confound the pure intellectual order with the sensible4 ,we cannot admit the idealism which destroys the real world2 but the empiricism which annihilates the ideal order1 is equally objectionable4 ,if we cannot rise above the sensible representations1 let us renounce philosophy1 give up thinking1 and confine ourselves to sensation4 #ec ,,xii41 ,,xiii41 ,,xiv41 and ,,xv4 ,,chapter ,,xxvii4 ,,whether ,,every ,,thing ,,must ,,be ,,in ,,some ,,place4 #aij4 ,is it necessary that whatever exists should be in some place8 ,this question may seem strange1 but it is profoundly philosophical4 ,to be is not the same as to be in a place4 ,to be1 whether taken substantively as signifying to exist1 or copulatively1 as expressing the relation of the predicate to the subject1 does not involve the idea of being in a place4 ,the relation of an object to place is not necessary to it2 for it is not contained in the notion of object4 ,it is something added to the object1 whether it is given to the object with more or less foundation by ourselves1 or the object has it in reality by communication from some other4 ,the imagination can represent nothing which does not occupy a place1 but the understanding may conceive things that are not situated in any place4 ,when we reflect on the essence of objects1 what position does our mind give them8 ,the intellectual act is always accompanied by sensible representations1 which sometimes assist it1 and sometimes embarrass and confuse it2 but in either case the act of the understanding is always distinct from these representations4 #aia4 ,there is no reason for saying that every thing must occupy a place4 ,the imagination cannot see how any thing can exist otherwise1 but the understanding finds no absurdity in it1 and it is in accordance with the principles of philosophy4 ,if place considered in itself is only a part of space terminated by a surface1 and space abstracted from bodies is nothing1 the relation to place or to points in space must be nothing4 ,we must have bodies in order to have a term of the relation2 therefore1 if we suppose a being which has no relation to bodies1 it is not necessary that it should be in any place4 #aib4 ,the relation of a being to bodies may be of three kinds3 that of commensuration1 as is the relation of lines1 surfaces1 and solids to each other2 that of generation1 as we conceive the line generated by the point2 and that of action in general1 as we conceive the relation of pure spirits to matter4 ,the first cannot exist if the object has no dimensions2 for then it cannot be measured2 the second can exist only in unextended or infinitesimal points1 from which extension is generated2 therefore these two relations can only exist between bodies1 or their generative elements4 ,therefore1 nothing which is not a body or an element of body1 can occupy place under either of these aspects4 ,as to the third relation1 that of action of a cause upon a body1 it may be found in all agents capable of acting upon matter2 but it is evident that the position which results from this1 is something very different from that which we conceive in bodies or their elements2 it is something of a wholly distinct order1 and belongs rather to the pure idea of causality than to the intuition of space4 #aic4 ,we can conceive a being which is not a body1 nor an element of body1 and which does not exercise any action on bodies2 in this case1 this being has none of the three relations of which we have spoken1 consequently it is not in any place1 and to say that it is here1 or that it is there1 that it is near or distant1 would be using words without meaning4 #aid4 ,viewed from the point of this doctrine1 the following questions are easy to answer3 ,where must a pure spirit be which has no relation of causality nor influence of any kind upon the corporeal world8 ,nowhere4 ,the answer will not seem strange to one who understands that the question is absurd4 ,in the case supposed1 there is no where1 for this involves a relation and there are no relations here4 ,where would the pure spirits be if the world did not exist8 ,nowhere1 unless we have a mind to say they would be in themselves4 ,but1 the word to be does not mean the position of which we are speaking here1 but only the existence of the spirit1 or its identity with itself4 ,where was ,god before the world was created8 ,he was1 but he was not in any place2 for he has no parts4 #aie4 ,i wish here to expose an error of ,kant4 ,this philosopher believed that space was conceived by us as a condition of all existence in general1 and on this he founded one of his arguments that space was a purely subjective form4 ,in the second edition of his ,critic of pure ,reason1 explaining the subjectiveness of space1 he seems to hold1 that we do not even conceive things in the pure intellectual order1 without referring them to space4 ,he observes that in natural theology1 when treating of things which cannot be the object of intuition either for us or for themselves1 we are very careful not to attribute to this intuition or manner of perception time and space1 which are the conditions of human intuition4 ,but1 he adds1 by what right do we proceed thus1 when time and space have already been established as the forms of things in themselves1 and conditions of their existence a priori1 subsisting still after all else has been annihilated by thought8 ,as conditions of all existence in general1 they must be the conditions of the existence of ,god4 ,if we do not make space and time the objective forms of all things1 it only remains for us to make them the subjective forms of our mode of intuition1 as well internal as external4 ,kant is right in saying that space and time ought not to be considered as real forms1 not susceptible of annihilation1 and therefore necessary and eternal2 but ,i do not see the necessity of the disjunctive by which he asserts that if we do not make space and time the objective forms of all things1 we must make them the subjective forms1 and that1 otherwise1 we should make space and time conditions of the existence of ,god4 #aif4 ,we regard space as an actual condition of things1 which occupy place1 but not of all things4 ,we conceive existence in pure spirits without the necessity of any relation to place1 and1 consequently1 independent of all position in space4 ,on this point1 as on all relating to the pure intellectual order1 we find in the theologians doctrines which are highly important1 and deserve to be consulted by all who wish to go deeply into philosophical questions4 ,the author of the ,critic of ,pure ,reason would have found there some observations which would have cleared up the difficulties which embarrassed him4 ,he would have found how incorrect it is to say that space is a condition of the existence of all things1 in the beautiful as well as profound theory by which many of the scholastics explain the presence of ,god in the corporeal world1 and the presence of the angels in different places1 their motion from one point to another without passing through the intermediate points1 and the manner in which the soul is wholly in the whole body and in every part of the body4 ,in these works1 unfortunately so little consulted1 the ,german philosopher would have learned that the presence of a spirit in a place is something different from the presence of a body1 and has no relation to the intuition of space1 whether regarded as the basis of sensible representations or as a geometrical idea4 #aig4 ,st4 ,thomas#ed asks if ,god is in all things1 and answers that he is4 ,in proving this assertion he does not consider the necessity of every thing being in some place1 but on the contrary seems rather to forget the idea of space1 and regards only causality4 #ed ,sum4 ,theol4 ,p4 ,i41 ,q4 viii41 ,art4 #a4 ,as ,god1 he says1 is being itself by his essence1 created being must be his effect1 as to burn is the effect of fire4 ,but ,god causes this effect in things not only when they begin to be1 but as long as they are preserved in being2 thus the light is caused in the air by the sun as long as air remains illuminated4 ,as long therefore as things retain their being1 ,god is necessarily present to them1 according to the manner in which they have their being4 ,but being is that which is most internal1 and most closely inherent in every thing because it is the form of all that is in it1 ,god therefore is in all things internally4 ,to be situated in space is to be contained in it2 so1 at least1 we conceive whatever we consider situated in space4 ,st4 ,thomas rejects this meaning as applied to spiritual beings1 and says1 that although corporeal beings are contained in things1 spiritual beings on the contrary contain the things in which they are4 ,in the second article he asks whether ,god is in all places 7ubique72 and1 he says1 that as ,god is in all things1 giving them being and the power of acting1 so he is in all places giving them being and capacity 7virtutem locativam74 ,he states as an objection that incorporeal things are not in any place1 and answers in the following philosophical words3 ,incorporeal things are not in place by the contact of measurable quantity1 like bodies2 but by the contact of activity 7virtutis74 ,then explaining how the indivisible can be in different places1 he says3 ,the indivisible is of two kinds2 first1 it is the limit of the continued1 as a point in permanent things1 and a moment in successive things4 ,the indivisible in permanent things1 cannot be in different parts of place or in different places1 because it has a determinate position2 and in the same manner the indivisible in action or in motion cannot be in different parts of time1 because it has a determinate order in action or motion4 ,but there is another indivisible which is beyond all kind of continuation1 and in this sense incorporeal substances1 as ,god1 the angels1 and the soul1 are called indivisible4 ,the indivisible in this manner1 is not applied to the continued as any thing which belongs to it1 but only as reaching it by its activity2 therefore as its activity may extend to one or many1 to the small or to the great1 it may be in one place or in many places1 in a small place or in a great place4 ,what can be clearer1 relatively to the intuition of space1 than that when any thing is in a place it cannot be out of that place8 ,but the holy ,doctor1 rising above sensible representations1 boldly maintains that ,god may be whole in the whole1 and in every part of the whole1 as the soul is whole in every part of the body4 ,and why8 ,because what is called totality in corporeal things relates to quantity1 but the totality of incorporeal things relates to essence1 and cannot be measured by quantity1 and is not confined to any place4 ,in the ,treatise on the ,angels1#ee he says that the expression to be in place is used equivocally 7quivoce71#ef when applied to angels and bodies4 ,bodies are in place by the contact of measurable quantity1 but angels by virtual quantity1 that is to say1 by the action which they may exercise upon a body4 ,we cannot1 therefore1 say that an angel has a position in the continued 7quod habeat situm in continuo74 ,in the ,treatise on the ,soul#eg he maintains that the soul is whole in every part of the body4 ,he distinguishes the totality of essence from the totality of quantity1 and makes use of an argument similar to that which he used with respect to the angels4 ,the more we reflect on this doctrine the more profound it appears2 those who have made light of it1 have shown that they never penetrated beyond the surface in all that concerns the relations of spiritual to corporeal things4 ,it is generally dangerous to laugh at opinions held by great men2 for if they are not certain1 they have1 at least1 powerful arguments in their favor4 ,nothing is more contrary to sensible representations than the possibility of any thing being in different places at the same time1 but we shall find nothing more in conformity with the principles of sound philosophy than this possibility1 after we have profoundly analyzed the relations of extension with unextended things1 and discovered the difference between the position of quantity and the position of causality4 #ee ,sum4 ,theol4 ,q4 ,,lii41 ,art4 ,i4 #ef ,dialecticians understand by an equivocal term one which in different things has an entirely different meaning4 ,they give as an example the term ,,lion which is applied equivocally to an animal1 or a constellation4 quivoca sunt quorum nomen commune est1 et ratio per nomen significata1 simpliciter diversa1 is the scholastic definition4 #eg ,sum4 ,theol4 ,q4 lxxvi41 ,art4 #h4 #aih4 ,from these doctrines it may be concluded1 that to be in space is not a general condition of all existences1 even according to the manner of existences2 for we can conceive existences without relation to any place4 ,many have confounded imagination with understanding on this point1 and believed that what is impossible for the former is equally so for the latter4 ,it is certain that we can imagine nothing without referring it to points of space1 and even in purely intellectual objects there is always a sensible representation1 but the understanding regards these representations as false and does not conform to them4 ,as imagination is a sort of continuation of sensibility1 or an internal sense1 and the basis of sensations is extension2 it is impossible for us to exercise this internal sense1 without the presence of space1 which1 as we have shown1 is only the idea of extension in general4 ,position in space is consequently a general condition of all things1 as perceived by the senses1 but not as perceived by the intellect4 ,,chapter ,,xxviii4 ,,contingency ,,of ,,corporeal ,,relations4 #aii4 ,position in place is the relation of a body to other bodies4 ,is this relation necessary8 ,i distinguish3 conditionally1 yes2 essentially1 no4 ,god has established this relation1 and therefore it is necessary2 but ,god might have ordered it otherwise1 and can even now change it1 without varying the essence of things4 ,if we admit1 as we must1 a correspondence between the subjective and the objective1 or between the appearance and the reality1 we cannot deny that the relations of bodies are constant1 and this constancy must proceed from some necessity4 ,but that the existing order is subject to fixed laws1 does not prove that these laws have their root in the essence of things1 in such a manner that1 supposing the existence of objects1 their relations could not have been very different from what they actually are4 #bjj4 ,in order to assert that the existing order of the universe is intrinsically necessary1 we must know the essence of things2 but this is not possible for us1 because objects are not immediately present to our understanding1 and we see them only under one aspect1 that which places them in relation with our sensitive faculties4 ,the best proof of our ignorance of the essence of bodies is the great division of opinion on this subject4 ,some maintain that the essence of bodies is extension or dimensions2 and others that extension is merely an accident1 not only distinct1 but even separable from corporeal substance4 ,the great obscurity in which the investigation of the constitutive elements of bodies is involved1 proves that their essence is unknown to us1 and that we know nothing of them except their relation to our sensibility4 #bja4 ,it is not necessary that the aspect under which being is presented to us should contain its whole nature4 ,to say that bodies contain nothing besides what we perceive in them1 is to make our faculties the type of things in themselves1 a ridiculous pretension in a being which finds its activity limited at every step and is almost always passive in its relations to bodies1 and which1 in order to exercise its faculties externally1 is forced to submit to the laws of the external world1 or else to encounter obstacles which are absolutely insurmountable4 ,if we are ignorant of the essence of bodies we can have no certain knowledge of what is intrinsically necessary in them2 with the exception of composition1 which even the sensible order presents to us1 and which we cannot take from bodies without seeming to run into a contradiction4 ,simplicity and composition in the same object are incompatible and contradictory4 #bjb4 ,hence1 in all that pertains to the relations of bodies we must abstain from judging absolutely1 and speak only conditionally4 ,we may say3 ,this happens now2 this must happen according to the order now established2 but we cannot say3 ,this happens1 and it is absolutely necessary that it should happen4 ,the transition from the first proposition to the second1 implies the knowledge of what no man can know1 that the aspect under which the external world is presented to us is the image of its essence4 #bjc4 ,one of the greatest errors of ,descartes was1 that he did not make sufficient account of this difference3 he placed the essence of bodies in dimensions1 which is to confound the real world with the phenomenal1 and to take one aspect of things for their nature4 ,it is true that whatever affects us has extension1 and that extension is the basis of the relations of our sensibility with the external world2 but it does not follow that the essence of this world is nothing more than what is presented to us in its dimensions4 ,we might as well say that the essence of man is the lines which mark his form4 #bjd4 ,the different aspects under which the external world is presented to our senses1 ought to prevent us from confounding what is absolute in it with what is relative4 ,a man deprived of one sense would not reason well if he should conclude that the world has no other aspects than those which he perceives4 ,what do we know of the manner in which objects are presented to pure spirits1 or of the many other phases which they might offer to our sensibility8 ,let us then leave nature its secrets2 and let us not limit omnipotence by saying1 that the order of the world is so intrinsically necessary that its present relations cannot be changed without contradiction4 ,when we examine the possibility of a new order of relations between the beings which we call bodies1 let us not settle the question too quickly1 taking for our only type of the possible the vain impotence of our faculties4 ,what should we think of a blind man who should laugh at those who see1 if he heard them speak of the relations of objects as seen8 ,yet we present the same spectacle to a pure spirit when we talk of the impossibility of an order different from what our senses perceive4 #bje4 ,the principles of physical science are in great part conditional2 for they are true only on the supposition of the reality of the data furnished by experience4 ,if position and relation to place are not essential to bodies1 distance and motion are conditional facts true only under certain suppositions4 ,all the natural sciences1 as we have seen1 are reduced to the calculation of extension and motion2 they do not reach the essence of things1 but are limited to one aspect1 that presented by experience4 ,in these sciences there is consequently nothing strictly absolute2 in this respect1 they are far below metaphysics1 which knows things that are absolutely necessary4 ,a further explanation of this doctrine is required1 and will be given in the following chapters4 ,,chapter ,,xxix4 ,,solution ,,of ,,two ,,difficulties4 #bjf4 ,must not the theory which supposes the relations of bodies to be variable1 put an end to all the natural sciences8 ,can there be science without a necessary object8 and can there be a necessity which is compatible with variability8 ,the natural sciences have two parts3 one physical1 and the other geometrical4 ,the first supposes the data furnished by experience2 the second forms its calculations relative to these data4 ,change the relations of external beings1 and the data will be different1 you will have a new experience producing a new physical science3 the calculation will be the same1 only new results will be obtained from the new data4 ,the difficulty thus disappears4 ,all the physical sciences are based on observation1 all their combinations are made from data furnished by experience2 therefore the physical sciences are not wholly absolute1 but they have a part which is conditional4 ,the theory of universal gravitation is developed as a body of geometrical science1 but it starts from the data furnished by experience4 ,destroy these data and from a body of physical science it becomes a body of pure geometry4 ,in mechanics1 the problems of the composition and decomposition of forces have a physical signification1 inasmuch as they presuppose the data of experience2 suppress these data and there remains only a composition of lines which mean nothing when we call them forces4 ,therefore mechanics is only a system of geometrical applications4 #bjg4 ,here another difficulty arises which is apparently more serious than the other4 ,if the relations of bodies are not essential1 but are subject to variation2 if our calculations upon them are not founded upon data which are intrinsically necessary1 it seems that geometry is destroyed1 or limited in such a way to the ideal order1 that it cannot be sure that on descending to the field of experience it will not find that false which it regarded as true1 and that true which it reputed false4 ,for example1 the distances of bodies are calculated by considerations of geometry3 if the relation of distance is variable1 and a body may be in many places at the same time1 geometry turns out false4 ,such a supposition is no more than the application of the foregoing theory2 for1 if the relations are variable1 this variation may affect distance1 which is only a relation4 ,i said this difficulty was more serious than the other1 because it leaves the field of experience1 and attacks the order of our ideas1 an order which we must hold to be indestructible1 unless we wish to give up our reason4 ,what would become of our reason if geometry were contradicted by the reality8 what would become of an order of ideas in contradiction to facts8 ,still ,i repeat that the force of this difficulty is only apparent1 and if analyzed will be found of no more weight than the objection which we have already answered4 ,a body which is a hundred yards distant from another1 cannot be only one yard distant2 geometry would be opposed to it4 ,but if the relations of bodies are variable this proposition can mean nothing with respect to the reality4 ,therefore geometry is false4 ,i admit the consequence2 but the principle on which it is based involves a supposition contrary to my theory4 ,if you alter or destroy the relations of bodies1 you destroy distance1 which is a relation1 consequently you cannot have a distance of one hundred yards1 nor of one yard1 nor any distance at all1 and if there is no distance there is no contradiction4 ,if1 then1 you ask how great is the distance between them1 your question is absurd2 for it supposes a distance1 whereas there is no distance at all4 #bjh4 ,this solution rests on a fundamental principle which we ought never to lose sight of4 ,geometrical truth is true in reality when the conditions of geometry exist in reality2 if these conditions do not exist1 there is no real geometry4 ,there is nothing strange in this3 in fact1 the same occurs in the purely ideal order2 even there1 geometry rests on certain postulates1 without which it is impossible4 ,two triangles with the same base and altitude are equivalent to each other4 ,this is a true proposition1 but only on the supposition that there are those orders of points which are called lines1 and that the lines form angles1 and are united at three points4 ,if these relations are not presupposed1 the geometrical theorem has no meaning4 #bji4 ,geometry in itself1 or in the purely ideal order1 is founded on the principle of contradiction4 ,the truth of this principle being absolutely necessary1 that of geometry is equally so4 ,but the principle of contradiction1 like all purely ideal principles1 abstracts existence1 and is applied to nothing in practice1 unless we suppose some fact to support it4 ,yes and no at the same time are impossible2 but the principle determines nothing for or against either of the extremes4 ,it only affirms that one excludes the other2 if we suppose yes1 it excludes no1 and if we suppose no1 it excludes yes2 that is to say1 it always needs a condition1 a datum which only experience can furnish4 ,it is the same with geometry4 ,all its theorems and problems refer to the ideal field within us1 where there are certain conditions which lead to certain results1 by virtue of the principle of contradiction3 whenever the conditions exist1 the results are true2 but if the former fail the latter are false4 ,ideal sciences consider the connection of conclusions with principles in the order of possibility1 but take no note of facts4 ,if the connection is admitted the science is true4 ,,chapter ,,xxx4 ,,passive ,,sensibility4 #baj4 ,active sensibility1 or the faculty of perceiving by the senses1 has been a subject of great dispute among philosophers4 ,passive sensibility1 or the capacity of an object to be perceived1 is a question of not less interest4 ,can every thing which exists be perceived by the senses8 ,before answering this question1 let us remember that to be perceived by the senses may be understood in two ways3 ,first1 it may mean1 to cause an impression in a sensitive being2 and secondly1 to be the immediate object of sensible intuition4 ,the first is true of every being capable of producing the impression2 the second is true only of those beings which unite the conditions which the intuition supposes4 #baa4 ,to produce an impression is simply to cause2 and causality is not repugnant to simple beings4 ,there is1 therefore1 no absurdity in supposing that pure spirits can produce sensible impressions3 were it otherwise ,god could not act upon our soul1 causing an impression in it1 without the mediation of bodies4 ,this causality cannot be called passive sensibility2 the being which has it is not perceived by the senses4 ,the relation of the sensation to the being which produces it would be only that of an effect to its cause4 #bab4 ,to be the immediate object of sensible intuition1 is to be presented to this intuition as an original to the copy4 ,under this view1 only the extended can be perceived by the senses2 that is to say1 multiplicity combined with continuity is an absolutely necessary condition of our sensitive faculties in relation to external objects4 #bac4 ,in this manner1 it is a manifest contradiction to say that the simple can be sensible4 ,instinct and reason force us to suppose a real object of sensible intuition4 ,this intuition is referred to the object as to something essentially composite1 belonging to the order which we call continuity4 ,if we make this object simple1 it ceases to be sensible2 and we both affirm and deny its sensible objectiveness4 ,it is a contradiction to suppose a faculty in act1 and at the same time to deprive it of the conditions to which its action is necessarily subject4 #bad4 ,it may be said1 that there is no necessity of transferring to the object the conditions of the subject1 and therefore a simple object may be presented to the senses4 ,but this is to elude the question at issue4 ,for1 either the sensible intuition is referred to the object1 or it is not2 if it is1 the object cannot be simple2 if it is not1 we fall into idealism1 which we have so often combated in the course of this work4 #bae4 ,if you answer1 that our soul1 which is simple1 has the representation of the composite1 ,i reply1 that the objective representation is not the same thing as the subjective perception of the composite2 nor the presentation of the object as multiple the same thing as the perception of the multiple4 ,our soul perceives the multiple1 and for this reason must itself be one1 or it could not perceive that which is multiple4 ,so much for the subjective2 as to the objective1 we must remark1 that our sensible representations do not always proceed from real objects2 but they always refer to objects which are at least possible2 that is to say1 the intuition is never entirely void2 and when it has no object in reality1 it finds one in possibility4 #baf4 ,the external world1 as involving multiplicity1 or a collection of many beings1 and as susceptible of this order which we call continuity1 may be the object of sensible intuition1 as we experience in reality4 ,but this passive sensibility is not intrinsically necessary to it3 ,i mean that ,god could so have disposed the collection of beings constituting the universe as not to be sensible4 ,this is based on the variability of the relations of bodies2 for1 it is evident that if these relations did not exist1 or were not subject to the conditions required by sensible representation1 this representation would be impossible1 and the world not sensible4 #bag4 ,experience confirms this conclusion which is obtained from transcendental philosophy4 ,we find a slight alteration continually changing sensible bodies into insensible1 and making sensible those that were insensible4 ,the condensation of the air makes it visible2 and its rarefaction invisible4 ,a liquid body is tangible1 but it ceases to be so when converted into vapor4 ,the same variety which is caused by the alteration of the object may also proceed from a modification of the organ4 ,a proof of this is found in what happens to the sight when aided by certain instruments4 ,if1 then1 these transitions from sensible to insensible are now possible1 without infringement of the fundamental laws of the relations of bodies1 why could there not be a radical change in these relations which should make bodies wholly insensible8 #bah4 ,by the variation of the relations of the beings which compose the corporeal universe1 the sensible might become insensible2 and1 on the other hand1 there are many insensible beings which by a different arrangement might be made sensible4 ,to a certain extent we have something besides idle conjectures on this matter3 facts speak2 in proportion as the field of experience is expanded1 new phenomena are discovered2 thus magnetic attraction1 electricity1 and galvanism1 have been added to experimental science4 ,in these phenomena there are agents at work which are not perceptible to the senses2 why may they not be disposed in such way as to be perceived like other bodies8 ,where is the limit of these agents8 ,we know not2 but reasoning from analogy we may believe that there are many others whose existence is not known to us4 ,the perfection of a sensitive organ by means of instruments1 is an arrangement by which we vary the ordinary system of the relations of our body to those around us4 ,this perfectibility is indefinite1 and the farther we advance1 the greater do we find its extension4 ,it is therefore probable1 that in the universe there are many beings which are imperceptible to our senses1 but which a modification of our organs1 or a change of some of the laws of nature would render sensible4 ,what a vast field of bold conjectures and sublime meditations6 ,,chapter ,,xxxi4 ,,possibility ,,of ,a ,,greater ,,sphere ,,in ,,active ,,sensibility4 #bai4 ,having treated of passive sensibility in the order of possibles1 a similar question naturally arises with respect to the active sensibility of beings subject to different conditions from those of our soul while united to the body4 ,i speak only of possibility1 for1 limited to what experience teaches us1 we know not what may be in the sphere of beings with which we have no communication4 ,whatever we know of them is by divine revelation2 and the object of revelation is not to teach us philosophy1 but virtue4 #bbj4 ,to examine how far active sensibility is possible in an order different from that of our experience1 not only raises curious and interesting questions1 but it also gives an opportunity to explain by new reflections1 the nature of this phenomenon in its relations to bodily organization4 ,there is a special reason why we should seek to investigate this question4 ,it consists in the interest inspired by every thing which relates to a state of existence into which we must soon enter4 ,short are the moments allotted to man to dwell in this world4 ,we all hasten with astonishing rapidity to the final instant when the fragile organization which envelops our mortal spirit shall dissolve1 and crumble into dust1--when the being which feels1 thinks1 and wills within us1 shall pass to a new state1 and be separated from the bodily organization4 ,what will then be its faculties8 ,this is a question which we cannot be indifferent to2 for it concerns us1 and the state of our future existence4 #bba4 ,if we are asked whether a pure spirit is capable of sensible perception1 we must answer negatively2 because we are treating of active sensibility1 which is not possible without the mediation of a body4 ,i believe that some explanation of the question may be given4 ,but we must first of all determine the meaning of the words4 ,sometimes we understand by a pure spirit1 one which is not united to a body2 but1 more strictly speaking1 the term is confined to a spirit which neither is united to a body1 nor destined to this union4 ,thus the human soul is a spirit1 but not a pure spirit2 for it is either actually united to a body or is destined to this union4 ,it might appear at first sight that as we are limiting ourselves to the sphere of possibility1 there is no difference between the two acceptations of the term2 for1 if it is not essentially repugnant to the soul when separated from the body1 to have sensible intuition1 it will not be so to other spirits4 ,the parity is not certain2 still1 for the present1 when speaking of pure spirits in general1 ,i shall include souls separated from bodies4 #bbb4 ,what do we understand by sensing8 ,this word may mean two things4 ,it may mean the receiving of an impression by means of bodily organs2 or it may mean simply the experiencing of the impression1 independently of the bodily organ4 ,for example3 ,i see an object4 ,here is the affection called seeing1 and the mechanism by which the object transmits light to the retina1 and a certain impression to the brain4 ,these are two very different things2 the first is a fact of my mind2 the second a modification of my body4 #bbc4 ,if by sensing is meant the receiving of the impression of a bodily organ1 it is clear that a spirit which has no body cannot sense2 but if by it is meant only the subjective affection abstracted from the medium by which it is produced or communicated1 then the question is different1 and the existence or non-existence of bodies cannot affect its answer either affirmatively or negatively4 #bbd4 ,the question then becomes this3 ,can a pure spirit have the various affections and representations which we call sensible8 ,simplicity is not opposed to the sensitive faculty4 ,our soul senses1 and still it is simple4 ,the body aids it in the exercise of the sensitive faculties2 but this aid is instrumental1 not1 however1 in such a manner that the soul senses by the body1 as an action is performed by means of the instrument4 ,that which senses is the soul itself1 and the instrumental action of the body consists in providing certain conditions from which sensation follows1 by a physical or occasional influx4 ,therefore1 the simplicity of a pure spirit is no argument against the sensitive faculties4 ,such an argument would prove too much2 consequently1 it proves nothing4 #bbe4 ,hence there would be no intrinsical repugnance in ,god communicating to a pure spirit sensitive faculties2 whether representative like those which place us in relation with the corporeal world1 or purely subjective1 like those of pleasure or pain4 #bbf4 ,although in the present order these functions depend on certain conditions to which bodies are subject1 considered in themselves1 inasmuch as they are a modification of the soul1 they have no essential relation to the corporeal world4 ,it would therefore seem contrary to the principles of sound philosophy to say1 that the soul separated from the body could not experience affections similar to those it has in this life4 ,if this is not repugnant to the soul in its separate existence1 why should it be so to other spirits8 ,the sensitive faculties are a sort of inferior order of perception4 ,we see them in beings united to bodies1 but they are not exercised immediately by a bodily organ4 ,so far from contradicting simplicity1 they require it2 and therefore we have seen#eh that matter is incapable of sensation4 ,many grave philosophers are of opinion that the causality of bodies with respect to sensations1 is only occasional4 ,this opinion is founded on the difficulty of explaining how a composite being can produce affections of any kind in a simple being4 ,instead of a repugnance between simplicity and the sensitive faculties1 there is1 on the contrary1 a necessary connection4 ,no composite being can be sensitive4 #eh ,b4 ,,ii41 ,ch4 ,,ii4 #bbg4 ,perhaps it may now be thought that there is no longer any doubt of the possibility of sensation independently of the bodily organs2 and that to hold the contrary1 it would be necessary to maintain that ,god can not produce immediately that which he produces by means of second causes4 ,the observations which we have made may seem to have exhausted the matter1 but if we reflect on it1 we shall find that we have scarce entered on it4 ,it must not be forgotten that we are examining the possibility of sensitive faculties1 in relation to one attribute only1 that of simplicity4 ,this greatly limits the question1 as it leaves it to be solved under one aspect only4 ,simplicity is a negative property4 ,when we say that any thing is simple1 we deny that it has parts1 but we affirm none of its properties2 we say what it is not1 not what it is4 ,therefore1 in maintaining that sensitive faculties are not repugnant to a pure spirit1 we ought to restrict the proposition2 we should express our meaning more exactly1 if instead of saying sensitive faculties are not repugnant to a pure spirit1 we should say1 sensitive faculties are not repugnant to the simplicity of a pure spirit4 #bbh4 ,this last observation seems to me to present the question in its true point of view4 ,any other expression of it seems only to confuse ideas and raise problems which we have not sufficient data to solve4 ,in fact1 how do we know but what the repugnance which does not exist between sensibility and simplicity1 may exist between sensibility and some attribute which we know nothing about8 ,this argument is not valid for the human soul1 because we already know that the soul is capable of sensing2 but it is valid for other spirits1 whose essence is unknown to us1 and the character of whose perceptive faculties experience has not discovered to us4 #bbi4 ,one of the distinctive marks of sensitive perception is the reference to individual objects1 not in what concerns their essence1 but inasmuch as they are arranged in a certain order1 the variations of which do not affect their internal nature4 ,extension itself1 which both instinct and reflection teach us to regard as objective1 is rather a result of the relations of the beings which form the composite extended object1 than those beings themselves4 ,the sensitive faculties are the lowest grade in the order of perception4 ,their sole function is to make known to their possessor a certain arrangement of external objects1 but they teach him nothing concerning the nature of those objects4 ,pure spirits are a grade higher in the scale of perceptive beings1 and one of the characteristics of intelligence is1 that it penetrates to the inward nature of things4 ,therefore it might easily happen that the sensible faculties are repugnant to intelligences of a higher order than ours1 not by reason of their simplicity1 but on account of the different manner of their perception4 #bcj4 ,reasoning by analogy from what takes place within ourselves1 we are confirmed in this opinion4 ,sensible representations are often powerful auxiliaries to purely intellectual perception2 but they just as often embarrass and confuse it4 ,in meditating on very abstract matters sensible representations are a hinderance to the understanding1 from which we should be glad to free ourselves4 ,every one has experienced this to be so4 ,they are like shadows which come between the eye of the intellect and the object3 the necessity of continually removing them delays and weakens our perception4 ,thus1 we propose1 for example1 to think of causality4 ,no sensible representation should find place in this idea in the abstract1 yet in spite of all our efforts the representation haunts us4 ,at one time it is the word causality1 written or spoken2 at another1 the image of a man doing something1 or of any other agent4 ,the sensible representation is always in our way1 and we cannot free ourselves from its presence4 ,the understanding is forced to repeat continually to itself1 ,this is not the idea of causality2 it is only an image1 a comparison1 an expression2 in order to defend itself against illusions1 which would make it confound the particular with the universal1 the contingent with the necessary1 the phenomenal with the real4 #bca4 ,we must conclude from this that a repugnance of sensitive faculties to the nature of a pure spirit1 might proceed from the character of its intelligence1 which by reason of its perfection rejects the duality of perception which exists in us4 ,the object of the understanding is the essence of the thing understood1 quidditas1 as the scholastics called it4 ,sensible representations tell us nothing of this essence4 ,they offer only one aspect of things1 and even this is limited to the perception of extension2 for as regards the other sensations1 they are a subjective fact which instinct and reason teach us to attribute to external causes1 rather than a perception of the real disposition of things4 #bcb4 ,this suggests another observation which supports the conjecture that the elevation of intelligence above a certain degree makes it incompatible with sensitive faculties4 ,sensations would tell us nothing even of this aspect and disposition of things if they did not have extension for their basis4 ,to what should we reduce the corporeal world if we supposed it unextended8 ,since extension1 as we have shown1#ei although the basis of some sensations1 is not the direct and immediate object of sensation2 that which in the sensitive faculties makes us perceive something of the reality of objects1 is not strictly sensible4 ,therefore1 if it is the character of intellectual perception to know the reality of the object1 the more elevated an intelligence is the farther it will be from sensation1 and there may be a subject in which intellectual faculties are incompatible with sensitive faculties4 #ei ,ch4 ,,ii4 #bcc4 ,we shall better understand the force of this observation by casting a glance at the scale of beings1 and noting the difference in them in proportion to their perfection4 ,the isolation of a being is a mark of its imperfection4 ,the lowest idea of an object is that which we form when we conceive it absolutely limited to existence1 completely inert1 without either internal or external activity4 ,a stone has existence and a determinate form2 it is what it was made1 and nothing more2 it preserves the form which was given to it1 but it has no activity to communicate with other beings1 no consciousness of what it is2 in all its relations it is passive2 it receives but cannot give4 #bcd4 ,in proportion as beings rise in the scale of perfection1 this isolation ceases2 active properties are combined with the passive2 such we conceive to be the corporeal agents1 which1 although they do not reach the category of living beings1 take an active part in the production of phenomena in the laboratory of nature4 ,in these beings we find besides what they are1 what they can do2 their relations with other beings are many and varied2 their existence is not confined to the circle of their own existence2 but it expands and is communicated in some way to others4 #bce4 ,in organized beings we find a more expansive nature4 ,their life is a continual expansion4 ,the living being extends in a measure beyond the limits of its own existence2 for it bears within it the germs of its reproduction4 ,its existence is not for itself alone1 but for others also4 ,it is only an imperceptible link in the great chain of nature2 but the vibrations of this link are felt in the remotest confines of the universe4 #bcf4 ,life is still more extended when it becomes sensation4 ,the sensitive being contains in himself1 as it were1 the universe4 ,by the consciousness of its affections1 it places itself in new relations with all that acts upon it4 ,perception is immanent1 that is to say1 it remains in the subject1 but with the subjective is combined the objective1 by which the universe is reflected on a point4 ,being does not then exist in itself alone1 it becomes in some manner other things4 ,there is a profound truth in the expression of the scholastics3 ,that which knows is the thing known4 ,there is a certain order in sensations2 they are more perfect in proportion as they are less subjective2 the most noble are those which place us in communication with objects considered in themselves1--those which are not limited to the experience of what the objects cause in us1 but include the knowledge of what the objects are4 #bcg4 ,extension is the basis of the objectiveness of sensations1 but it is not the direct and immediate object of sensation4 ,although extension teaches us something of the reality of beings as regards a certain arrangement of them among themselves1 it is not so much the object of a sensitive faculty as of intelligence4 ,here sensation ceases and science commences4 ,science is not satisfied with what the objects appear4 ,it penetrates to the reality2 the understanding does not stop with the subjective1 but passes to the objective1 and when it cannot reach the reality1 it wanders in the regions of possibility4 #bch4 ,thus we see that the perfection of beings is in proportion to their expansion4 ,accordingly as they are more perfect1 they go farther out of their own sphere1 and exercise a more extended activity4 ,hence the highest degree of perception is the least subjective2 the lowest is sensation1 which is limited to the experience of the sentient subject4 ,intelligence which is the highest degree1 abstracts experience1 and gives its whole attention to reality1 its proper object4 #bci4 ,if we could know the intimate nature of pure spirits1 perhaps we should find that the sensitive faculties are altogether incompatible with the elevation of their intelligence1 and that the analogy founded on the nature of our perceptions has no value when applied to a more perfect order of intelligence4 ,however this may be1 we must admit that the question would have been solved in a very incomplete way1 if we had limited it to the single aspect of simplicity4 ,these observations on the nature of intelligence ought to make us very cautious in affirming to be possible1 what we should perhaps see to be impossible1 if our knowledge of the nature of things were greater4 #bdj4 ,so far we have spoken only of the intrinsical possibility2 what shall we say of the reality8 ,this is a question of fact which can only be solved on data which our experience is unable to furnish1 as we are not in immediate communication either with souls separated from bodies1 or with pure spirits4 #bda4 ,if we wish to look for an argument to prove that pure spirits and souls after they are separated from bodies1 have no sensitive faculties1 we shall find it in the consideration of the end to which these faculties are destined1 better than by attempting to discover the essence of things4 ,the body1 to which the soul is united in this life1 is an organization subject to the general laws of the corporeal universe4 ,in order that the soul may rightly exercise its functions1 it must be in constant communication with its own body and the bodies around it2 it must have sensible intuition of the relations of bodies2 it must be notified by pain of any disorder which occurs in its body1 and guided by the sentiment of pleasure as by an instinct which1 directed and moderated by reason1 may point out to it what is profitable or necessary4 ,when the soul is no longer united to the body1 there is no reason why it should have these affections1 as it does not require to be directed in its acts4 ,as this applies equally to pure spirits1 we may form a conjecture as to the cause of the difference which there must be between the state of our soul in this life1 and that of spiritual beings which are not united to bodies4 ,this argument1 deduced from the final cause1 is not to be considered as a proof2 at best it is only a conjecture3 for we do not know how far the soul in its separate existence1 or pure spirits1 may be in relation with bodies2 and consequently1 we do not know whether these sensible affections would be useful or necessary for ends of which we have no conception4 ,and even supposing that neither the soul nor pure spirits have any relations with bodies1 we are far from sure that sensible affections would be useless to them4 ,on the contrary1 so far as we can form an opinion on the subject1 it seems that to take from the soul its imagination and sensation1 would be to deprive it of two of its most beautiful faculties2 for they not only assist the understanding1 but are often a strong motive of its acts4 #bdb4 ,it is difficult for us to form an idea of pleasure or pain1 without sensible affections4 ,in the purely intellectual will1 we conceive only willing and not willing1 acts of a most simple relation1 which do not have for us the same meaning as a pleasant or unpleasant affection4 ,we often wish a thing in which we experience pain2 and as often find pleasure in what we do not wish4 ,therefore to wish and not to wish do not imply pleasure and displeasure1 but are independent of these affections and may exist in opposition to them4 #bdc4 ,it might be said that the cause of this discord is in the disagreement of the sensitive with the intellectual faculties4 ,this is true1 but it proves nothing against what ,i have been saying4 ,the purely intellectual will1 in opposition with the sensible affections1 does not involve pleasure or exclude pain4 ,the will triumphs1 it is true1 but it does so by virtue of its freedom4 ,its triumph is like that of a master obliged to exact obedience by severe punishment1 who experiences pain at the very time when he is obtaining the execution of his commands4 ,who can tell1 then1 whether the will1 after this life1 will be accompanied by affections similar to those which it now has1 but purified from the grossness of the body which weighs down the soul8 ,i see no intrinsical impossibility in it4 ,if questions of philosophy could be solved by sentiment1 ,i should not hesitate to express my opinion that this fair and noble union of faculties which we call the heart1 does not go down to the grave1 but flies with the soul to the regions of immortality4 #bdd4 ,as to the imagination1--that mysterious faculty which not only gives life to the real world1 but possesses an inexhaustible activity in creating new worlds of its own1 displaying before the eyes of the soul rich and splendid panoramas2 why should it desert the soul on its separation from the body8 ,why may not the harmony of nature be perceived in a similar manner hereafter8 ,let us not advance opinions on secrets of which we are ignorant1 but1 at the same time1 let us beware of setting bounds to the omnipotence of ,god4 ,sound philosophy should not multiply opinions beyond measure2 but neither should it circumscribe within the limits of human reason the sphere of possibility4 ,,chapter ,,xxxii4 ,,possibility ,,of ,,the ,,penetration ,,of ,,bodies4 #bde4 ,the more we meditate on the corporeal world1 the more we discover the contingency of many of its relations1 and the consequent necessity of recourse to a higher cause which has established them4 ,even those properties which seem most absolute cease to appear so when submitted to the examination of reason4 ,what more necessary than impenetrability8 ,yet from the moment it is carefully analyzed1 it becomes reduced to a fact of experience not founded on the nature of things1 which consequently may exist or cease to exist without any contradiction4 #bdf4 ,impenetrability is that property of bodies by which two or more cannot be in the same place at the same time4 ,for those who do not make pure space a reality independent of bodies this definition has no meaning2 for if place like pure space is nothing1 to speak of the same place abstracted from bodies1 is to speak of nothing4 ,in that case1 impenetrability can only be a certain relation either of bodies or of ideas4 #bdg4 ,above all1 we must distinguish the real order from the purely ideal4 ,we may consider two kinds of impenetrability2 physical impenetrability1 and geometrical impenetrability4 ,the physical is that which we see in nature2 the geometrical that which is found in our ideas4 ,two balls of metal cannot be in the same place3 this is physical impenetrability4 ,the ideas of the two balls present two extensions which mutually exclude each other in the sensible representation3 this is geometrical impenetrability4 ,if we imagine two balls which perfectly coincide1 they are no longer two1 but only one2 and if we imagine one ball to occupy a part of the other1 we have a new figure1 or1 rather1 one is considered as a portion of the other1 and is consequently contained in the idea of the other1 as a small ball inside of a larger ball4 ,on either supposition the balls are regarded as penetrating each other in whole or in part2 but by penetration is here meant only that there are certain parts in one1 considered as pure space1 which the other1 also considered as pure space1 occupies4 ,geometrical impenetrability exists only when the two objects are supposed to be separated1 and only inasmuch as they are separated2 in which case impenetrability is absolutely necessary1 because penetration would be to confound what is by the supposition separated1 and would imply separation and non-separation1 which are contradictory4 ,therefore1 geometrical impenetrability is no argument in favor of physical impenetrability2 for the former exists only in case it is presupposed or required under pain of contradiction4 ,the same would occur in reality2 for if we suppose two bodies separated1 they cannot be in the same place whilst they are separated1 without a manifest contradiction4 ,on this point1 therefore1 the ideal teaches us nothing as to the real4 #bdh4 ,can penetration exist in reality8 ,can one ball of metal1 for example1 enter another ball of metal1 as we make one geometrical ball enter another8 ,we are not treating of the regular order of things which is repugnant to such suppositions1 but of the essence of things4 ,on this supposition1 ,i maintain that there is no contradiction in making bodies penetrable1 and that an analysis of this matter proves that the impenetrability of bodies is not essential4 ,we have seen that the idea of place as pure space is an abstraction4 ,it is therefore an entirely imaginary supposition on which we give to every body a certain extension to fill a certain place1 necessarily1 and in such a manner that it is impossible for it to admit another body into the same place at the same time4 ,the position of bodies in general is the sum of their relations2 the particular extension of each body is only the sum of the relations of its parts among themselves1 until we come by an infinite division to unextended or infinitesimal points4 ,the sum of the relations of indivisible or infinitesimal beings constitutes what we call extension and space1 and all that is contained in the vast field of sensible representation4 ,who can assure us that these relations are not variable8 ,is our experience1 perhaps1 the limit of the nature of things8 ,evidently not4 ,the universe was not planned after our experience1 but our experience is obtained from the universe4 ,to say that it contains1 and can contain only what our experience sees in it1 is to make the me the type of the universe2 to affirm that its laws are derived from us1 that they are emanations from our being4 ,foolish pride of an imperceptible atom1 which appears for an instant on the great theatre of nature1 and goes out like a spark of fire2 foolish pride for a spirit which1 despite its great idea of its own importance1 feels that it is unable to withdraw itself from these laws and phenomena1 which it pretends to consider as its own creation6 ,,chapter ,,xxxiii4 ,a ,,triumph ,,of ,,religion ,,in ,,the ,,field ,,of ,,philosophy4 #bdi4 ,there are two things in extended objects3 multiplicity and continuity4 ,the first is absolutely necessary to extension2 it supposes distinct parts1 and that which is distinct cannot be identical without evident contradiction4 ,the continuity represented in the sensible impression is not essential to extension1 because it is only the result of a union of relations inseparable in the present order of sensibility1 but not absolutely necessary in the order of reality4 ,transcendental philosophy rising above sensible representations1 and leaving phenomena to enter on the contemplation of beings in themselves1 nowhere discovers the necessity of these relations1 and is obliged to consider them as simple facts which might cease to be without any contradiction4 ,in this manner the correspondence of the phenomenon with the reality is saved1 and the internal world harmonized with the external1 but the subjective conditions of the former are not all transferred to the latter in such a way as to make what is necessary for our representations1 absolutely necessary in itself4 #bej4 ,arrived at this point of transcendental philosophy1 the mind beholds new worlds unfolded to its view4 ,we rejoice to say that this discovers to us a new proof of the divinity of the ,catholic religion1 and teaches us to distrust that proud philosophy which finds a contradiction in every thing which it cannot understand4 #bea4 ,there is a mystery which the ,church celebrates with august ceremonies1 and the ,christian adores with faith and with love4 ,the unbeliever sees the holy ,tabernacle1 and exclaims1 in the pride of his ignorance3 ,here is a monument of superstition2 here man adores an absurdity4 ,as the present is a work of philosophy1 not of theology1 ,i might pass over without answering the objections of infidelity1 but the occasion seems so well suited for the solution of some difficulties brought by light and superficial thinkers1 that ,i am unwilling to pass them in silence4 ,the nature of the work requires me to be brief in this discussion1 though the subject is too important to be entirely omitted2 the more so1 as ,catholic writers on philosophy have given their explanations on these points in what they considered the most seasonable place1 and most frequently when treating of extension4 #beb4 ,that the mystery of the ,eucharist is a supernatural fact incomprehensible to man1 and inexplicable by human words1 is confessed by ,catholics and acknowledged by the ,church4 ,we cannot1 therefore1 give a philosophical reason to explain this secret2 no one was ever so vain as to attempt it4 ,we can only examine whether the mystery is absurd and intrinsically contradictory2 for if it were1 it would not be a truth but an error1 because divine omnipotence does not extend to what is absurd4 ,the question is1 whether the fact1 although beyond the laws of nature1 is intrinsically possible2 for then it belongs to the field of criticism4 ,if the incredulous man admits ,god1 he must admit his omnipotence2 the discussion must then be1 not whether ,god can perform this miracle1 but whether he has performed it4 #bec4 ,the objections brought against the ,eucharist may be reduced to the following3 a body exists without the conditions to which other bodies are subject2 it produces none of the sensible impressions which we receive from other bodies2 and is in many places at the same time4 ,to answer these objections1 let us first determine our ideas4 #bed4 ,the doctrines explained in the theory of sensations in this volume1 show how false it is to say that the ,eucharist is impossible4 ,under the sacred species is a body which does not affect our senses2 here is a miracle1 but not an impossible thing4 ,i have shown that there is no necessary relation between bodies and our sensibility4 ,the connection which now exists cannot be explained by any intrinsical property of spirits and bodies2 we must1 therefore1 recur to a higher cause which freely established these relations4 ,the same cause can suspend them4 ,from this point of view the question becomes this3 ,can the power of ,god make a body which shall not produce the phenomena of sensibility1 and suspend the laws which he was free to establish8 ,thus presented1 the question cannot bear two answers4 ,it must be answered in the affirmative1 or the omnipotence of ,god is denied4 #bee4 ,those who attempt to show the impossibility of our dogma1 must prove the following propositions3 ,i4 ,passive sensibility is so essential to bodies that they cannot lose it without destroying the principle of contradiction4 ,,ii4 ,the relations of our organs to objects are intrinsically immutable4 ,,iii4 ,the transmission of the impressions of the organ to the sensitive faculties of the soul is equally essential1 and can fail under no supposition4 ,if they do not prove the truth of these three propositions1 all the objections founded on the phenomena of sensibility fall to the ground4 ,if one only is not proved1 all the objections are solved2 for it is evident that the phenomena of sensibility may be altered by three causes3 ,i4 ,by the absence of the dispositions necessary to the body1 that it may be the object of sensibility4 ,,ii4 ,by the interruption of the ordinary relations between our organs and the body4 ,,iii4 ,by the failure of the transmission of the impressions of the organ to the sensitive faculties4 ,consequently1 if one of the first propositions is false1 the doubter is reduced to silence4 #bef4 ,whoever should attempt to prove these three propositions1 not only would fail1 but the attempt would prove his ignorance of the phenomena of sensibility1 and that his philosophy on this point is the notions of the vulgar4 ,it is not necessary to be a philosopher1 it is sufficient to have acquired a very slight knowledge of philosophy to see that such an attempt would suppose a complete ignorance of the history of philosophy4 ,at any rate1 ,i need not insist on this point2 for ,i have treated these questions at length in the last two books of this volume4 #beg4 ,the solution there given ought to suffice to answer satisfactorily the objection founded on the particular state of a body without the conditions of extension which we find in others4 ,from the moment that we suppose the correspondence of a body with our senses to be suspended1 as these are the only means by which we are informed of what passes in the external world1 it is impossible for us to affirm that there is any absurdity in that of which we have no experience4 ,we perceive extension only by sensation1 therefore we can say nothing in relation to the extension of an object of which we have no sensation4 ,but although this answer should cut short all objections1 ,i shall not confine myself to this alone4 #beh4 ,what is extension8 ,in reality it is the sum of the relations of the beings which compose the extended object4 ,these relations1 as ,i have proved1 are not intrinsically necessary3 therefore ,god can alter them4 ,thus this question comes to the same point as the preceding3 can the power of ,god suspend1 alter1 or entirely take away relations which are not intrinsically necessary8 ,evidently it can4 ,the difficulty then is not as to what could have been1 but as to what is4 ,again we find ourselves out of the field of philosophy in that of facts1 or the examination of the motives of credibility4 #bei4 ,the other objection founded on the impossibility of body being in several places at the same time1 though in appearance more difficult1 amounts to the same as the former4 ,to be in a place1 as we now understand it1 is to have a particular extension1 with the ordinary form and relations with respect to the extension of other bodies4 ,if we suppose a body with extension subject to other conditions1 without the ordinary relation to the extension of other bodies1 we destroy the supposition on which we base the impossibility of a body being at the same time in several places4 ,therefore1 as we have proved that the omnipotence of ,god can alter and even take away these relations1 there is no contradiction in admitting the destruction of the results which proceed from these relations4 #bfj4 ,this is why the distinction of the scholastics between two classes of extension3 in ordine ad se1 et in ordine ad locum1 or quantitative and sacramental extension1 though to the eyes of a superficial philosophy it might appear to be an empty subtlety1 invented for the purpose of avoiding the difficulty1 is nevertheless a profound observation1 confirmed by the analysis of the reality and the phenomenon in the sensible order4 ,i do not mean by this to say that when this distinction was made in the schools1 they understood perfectly all the truth and philosophical nicety which it involves2 nor that the distinction was always accompanied by the critical analysis which belongs to it4 ,at present ,i abstract the merit of the men and regard only the thing4 ,the less philosophical intelligence we suppose in those who used the distinction1 the more admirable appears that religion which inspires its defenders with fruitful thoughts which the ages to come might unfold4 ,the philosophical schools disputed warmly on extension1 on accidents1 and on the sensitive faculties3 the ,catholic dogma taught a truth which was contrary to all appearances1 it stimulated them to examine more profoundly the distance of the phenomenon from the reality1 the difference between the contingent and the necessary2 the mystery which the ,church taught introduced into philosophy questions which without it would probably never have occurred to man's understanding4 #bfa4 ,bacon expressed a profound truth when he said that a little philosophy carried its possessor from religion1 and a great deal of philosophy leads him to it4 ,a careful study of the objections brought against ,christianity1 lays bare a truth confirmed by the history of eighteen centuries2 the most weighty objections against ,catholicity1 instead of proving any thing against it1 involve a proof which confirms it4 ,the secret for discovering this proof1 is to go to the bottom of the objection1 and examine it under all its aspects4 ,original sin is a mystery1 but it explains the whole world2 the ,incarnation is a mystery1 but it explains the traditions of the human race2 faith is full of mysteries1 but it satisfies one of the greatest necessities of reason2 the history of the creation is a mystery1 but this mystery clears up chaos1 throws light on the world1 and is the key to the history of mankind2 all ,christianity is a collection of mysteries1 but these mysteries are connected by a secret union with all that is profound1 grand1 sublime1 or beautiful in heaven or earth2 they are connected with the individual1 with the family1 with society1 with ,god1 with the understanding1 with the heart1 with languages1 sciences1 and art4 ,the investigator who rejects religion and even seeks means to oppose it1 finds it at the entrance as at the outlet of the mysterious ways of life2 at the cradle of the infant as in the shadow of the tomb2 in time as in eternity2 explaining every thing by a word2 listening unmoved to the wanderings of ignorance and the sarcasms of unbelief1 patiently awaiting till the course of ages shall acknowledge its truth1 which existed before all ages4 ,,chapter ,,xxxiv4 ,,conclusion ,,and ,,summing ,,up4 #bfb4 ,before passing to another subject1 let us fix our attention for a few moments on the nature and origin of the idea of extension4 ,we shall thus collect the fruit of the preceding investigations1 and prepare the way for those which follow4 ,the scientific fruitfulness of this idea to our mind proves how distant sensible impressions are from intellectual perception4 ,we cannot know whether this idea existed in our mind before the sensible impression2 if it did exist we were not conscious of it1 and in this respect it is affirming a gratuitous proposition to say that it is an innate idea4 ,what we can safely say1 is1 that there are two distinct orders of internal phenomena1 that sensation could not have produced the idea1 that this idea is immeasurably superior to the external impression1 or even the internal sensitive intuition1 and that if it did not already exist in the mind1 it was not produced by sensation as an effect is produced by its cause4 #bfc4 ,here we make an important transition from the order of sensations1 to the order of ideas1 and discover in our mind a new class of facts4 ,it matters little whether these facts exist before the impression1 or result from its presence4 ,in the first case1 we see in the mind a deposit of germs which need only the warmth of life in order to be developed2 in the second1 we find in the mind a fertility which produces these germs4 ,in either case we find a being of a privileged nature1 a sublime being which by a single leap rises above the region of matter1 and awakened by the external impression1 arises to a new life which this world cannot contain4 #bfd4 ,in this sense there are innate ideas2 ideas which sensation could not have produced4 ,in this sense all general and necessary ideas are innate2 for sensation could not produce them4 ,sensation is never any thing more than a phenomenon1 a particular and contingent fact1 and consequently incapable of producing general ideas1 or the ideas of the necessary relations of being4 ,sight1 or the imaginary representation of a triangle1 is a contingent phenomenon which tells us nothing of the necessary relations of the sides and angles to each other4 ,in order to perceive these relations1 this necessity1 something else is required4 ,this something else1 call it innate ideas1 force1 fecundity1 or activity of the mind1 or any thing you please1 exists1 and could not have been produced by sensation1 but belongs to a higher order distinct from sensible phenomena4 #bfe4 ,after such long investigations of the phenomena of sensation1 we at last find an idea2 it is the idea of extension1 the foundation of all the mathematical sciences and of their application to the laws of nature4 ,the human mind1 in all its relations with the material world1 seems to have one great idea1 that of extension1 which1 modified in infinite ways1 is the origin of all the sciences which relate to matter4 ,the whole material world rests on this idea1 and all knowledge of material objects proceeds from it4 ,it is a pure idea in its necessary relations and in its necessary branches4 ,it is a light given to the lord of creation that he may know and admire the prodigies of nature4 #bff4 ,we find the same wonderful simplicity amidst so complicated a multiplicity in another order of ideas4 ,hence we infer that the whole edifice of the sciences and all human knowledge are founded on a small number of ideas1 perhaps on two alone4 ,these ideas are not sensible representations1 they are the objects of pure intuitions2 they cannot be decomposed1 but they may be applied to an infinite variety of things2 they are not explained by words1 as a union including various conceptions2 by them a mind acts on another mind1 not to teach it any thing1 but to make it concentrate its activity in order to note what it contains within itself1 and learn1 in a certain measure1 what it already knows4 ,try to explain extension1 the idea by which we perceive this order which we cannot express in words1 but on which we found sensible experience and geometrical science1 and you can find no expression4 ,will you define it to be parts outside of parts8 ,but what are parts1 and what does outside mean1 if you have not the idea of extension8 ,take any extended thing1 make your mind concentrate itself and exercise its activity in generalization4 ,is this triangle a quadrilateral8 ,no4 ,are they both extended8 ,yes4 ,is this surface a solid8 ,no4 ,are they both extended8 ,yes4 ,are all triangles different from quadrilaterals8 ,yes4 ,have all surfaces and solids extension8 ,yes4 ,how do you pass from one fact to all the facts of the same kind1 from the contingent to the necessary8 ,have you explained what extension is8 ,no4 ,have you shown what there is common to all these different things8 ,no4 ,all that you have done then is to arouse the activity of your mind1 and to make it direct its attention to the general idea of extension1 and the mind applies this idea to various things which are different1 yet have something in common1 it applies the different modifications of this idea to various things which have something in common1 and finds them different4 ,you have not taught the truths of geometry to the mind1 but have awakened them in it1 whether they already existed in it1 or the mind had the faculty of producing them4 #bfg4 ,let us now collect the result of the investigations we have made4 ,i do not give an equal value to all the propositions which follow4 ,i have explained my opinion of each in its proper place1 but ,i consider it well to sum them all up here in order to assist the understanding and help the memory4 ,i4 ,there is immediate certainty of our relations with beings distinct from us4 ,,ii4 ,there is certainty of the existence of an external world4 ,,iii4 ,the external world in relation to us1 is only an extended being which affects us1 and is subject to constant laws which we may determine4 ,,iv4 ,we have the idea of extension4 ,v4 ,the idea of extension is excited by sensations1 but it is not confounded with them4 ,,vi4 ,the idea of extension is the basis of all our cognitions of bodies4 ,,vii4 ,the idea of extension should not be confounded with the imaginary representation of extension4 ,,viii4 ,an extended space which is nothing real1 is an absurdity4 ,,ix4 ,space is nothing real distinguished from the extension of bodies4 ,x4 ,where there are no bodies1 there are no distances4 ,,xi4 ,motion is the change of the positions of bodies among themselves4 ,,xii4 ,there is not and cannot be vacuum of any kind4 ,,xiii4 ,the idea of space is the idea of extension in the abstract4 ,,xiv4 ,the imagination of an unlimited space is only an attempt of the imagination to follow the understanding in the abstraction of extension4 ,it also arises from our habit of seeing through transparent mediums1 and moving in fluids whose resistance is not perceptible4 ,,xv4 ,as all that we know of bodies is1 that they are extended and affect us1 whatever has these two conditions is to us a body4 ,,xvi4 ,but as we do not know the essence of bodies1 we do not know whether a body can exist without extension4 ,,xvii4 ,neither do we know what modifications the extension of one body may be subject to1 with respect to others4 ,,xviii4 ,the elements of which bodies are composed are unknown to us4 ,,xix4 ,the approximation of some bodies to others1 and the gravitation which results from it1 seem to be the necessary effect of their present relations4 ,,xx4 ,the necessity of approximation does not suffice to explain the laws of motion1 or their beginning1 or their continuation4 ,,xxi4 ,the idea of space is not an absolutely necessary condition of sensation4 ,,xxii4 ,the idea of extension has a real objectiveness4 ,,xxiii4 ,the transition from the subjective to the objective in relation to extension is a primitive fact of our nature4 ,,xxiv4 ,therefore bodily phenomena have a real existence outside of us4 ,,xxv4 ,therefore a real certainty1 scientific as well as phenomenal1 arises from the testimony of the senses4 ,,xxvi4 ,reason justifies the instinct of nature when it examines the relation of subjectiveness with objectiveness in sensations4 ,,xxvii4 ,geometry considers extension in the abstract2 but with the certainty that when the principle exists in the real order1 the consequences cannot fail to be produced1 and that the consequences will be more or less exact in proportion as the principle is more or less exactly realized4 ,,xxviii4 ,notwithstanding our certainty of the existence of the external world we do not know its essence4 ,,xxix4 ,we do not know what this world is when seen by a pure spirit4 ,,xxx4 ,sensible intuition1 to which our geometry relates1 does not constitute the essence of scientific knowledge1 and may be separated from it4 ,,xxxi4 ,a change in the relations of corporeal beings among themselves1 and with our sensitive faculties1 is not intrinsically impossible4 ,,notes ,,to ,,book ,,first4 ,,on ,,chapter ,i4 7#a7 ,we must distinguish between certainty and truth3 there are intimate relations between them1 yet they are very different things4 ,truth is the conformity of the intellect with the object4 ,certainty is a firm assent to a real or apparent truth4 ,certainty is not truth1 but it must at least have the illusion of truth4 ,we may be certain of what is false1 but not unless we believe it to be true4 ,there is no truth so long as there is no judgment2 for without judgment there is only perception1 but no comparison of the idea with the thing2 and without comparison there can be neither conformity nor discrepancy4 ,if we conceive a mountain a thousand miles high1 we conceive a thing that does not exist2 but we do not err so long as we do not assert the existence of the mountain4 ,if we affirm it1 there is opposition between our judgment and the reality3 this constitutes error4 ,the object of the intellect is truth2 therefore1 we at least require the illusion of truth in order to be certain3 our intellect is weak2 hence its certainty is liable to error4 ,the first is a law of the intellect1 the second a proof of its frailty4 ,philosophy1 or1 rather1 man1 cannot rest content with appearances1 but demands reality2 if any one be convinced that he has only the appearance1 or if he even doubt of it1 he loses his certainty1 for it admits appearances only on condition of their being disguised4 ,,on ,,chapter ,,ii4 7#b7 ,even ,pyrrho did not doubt of every thing as some pretend2 he admitted sensations so far as passive1 and resigned himself to the consequences of these impressions1 and yielded to the necessity of conforming in practice to what they indicated4 ,no one ever yet denied appearances3 it is reality that is disputed2 some hold that man must be content with saying it appears2 others that he can go so far as to say it is4 ,it is useful to preserve this distinction1 as it prevents confusion of ideas in the history of philosophy1 and conduces to render clear the question of certainty4 ,thus of the three questions3 is there certainty8 on what is it founded8 how is it acquired8 the first is resolved alike by all the schools1 so far as it relates to a fact of our soul3 by only admitting appearances1 they admit the certainty of them4 ,,on ,,chapter ,,iii4 7#c7 ,in order to form clear ideas of the development of the understanding1 and the other faculties of our soul1 the reader may refer to what we advanced in our work1 entitled ,the ,criterion1 and particularly to the chapters ,i41 ,,ii41 ,,iii41 ,,xii41 ,,xiii41 ,,xiv41 ,,xviii41 and ,,xxii4 ,,on ,,chapter ,,iv4 7#d7 ,we subjoin the passages from ,st4 ,thomas on the unity and multiplicity of ideas1 to which we referred in the text4 ,we believe the friends of solid and profound metaphysics will read them with great pleasure4 ,in omnibus enim substantiis intellectualibus1 invenitur virtus intellectiva per influentiam divini luminis4 ,quod quidem in primo principio est unum et simplex1 et quanto magis creatur intellectuales distant a primo principio1 tanto magis dividitur illud lumen1 et diversificatur1 sicut accidit in lineis a centro egredientibus4 ,et inde est quod ,deus per suam essentiam omnia intelligit3 superiores autem intellectualium substantiarum1 etsi per plures formas intelligant1 tamen intelligunt per pauciores et magis universales et virtuosiores ad comprehensionem rerum propter efficaciam virtutis intellectiv1 qu est in eis4 ,in inferioribus autem sunt form plures et minus universales1 et minus efficaces ad comprehensionem rerum1 in quantum deficiunt a virtute intellectiva superiorum4 ,si ergo inferiores substanti haberent formas in illa universalitate1 in qua habent superiores1 quia non sunt tant efficaci in intelligendo1 non acciperent per eas perfectam cognitionem de rebus1 sed in quadam communitate1 et confusione1 quod aliqualiter apparet in hominibus4 ,nam qui sunt debilioris intellectus1 per universales conceptiones magis intelligentium1 non accipiunt perfectam cognitionem1 nisi eis singula in speciali explicentur4 7,p4 #an1 ,q4 #hib1 ,a4 #a47 ,intellectus quanto est altior et perspicacior tanto ex uno potest plura cognoscere4 ,et quia intellectus divinus est altissimus1 per unam simplicem essentiam suam omnia cognoscit2 nec est ibi aliqua pluralitas formarum idealium1 nisi secundum diversos respectus divin essenti ad res cognitas2 sed in intellectu creato multiplicatur secundum rem quod est unum secundum rem in mente divina1 ut non possit omnia per unum cognoscere2 ita tamen quod quanto intellectus creatus est altior1 tanto pauciores habet formas ad plura cognoscenda efficaces4 ,et hoc est quod ,dio4 dicit1 #ab1 c4 hier4 quod superiores ordines habent scientiam magis universalem in inferioribus4 ,et in lib4 de causis dicitur1 quod intelligenti superiores habent formas magis universales2 hoc tamen observato1 quod in infimis angelis sunt form adhuc universales in tantum1 quod per unam formam possunt cognoscere omnia individua unius speciei3 ita quod illa species sit propria1 uniuscujusque particularium secundum diversos respectus ejus ad particularia1 sicut essentia divina efficitur propria similitudo singulorum secundum diversos respectus2 sed intellectus humanus qui est ultimus in ordine substantiarum intellectualium habet formas in tantum particulatas quod non potest per unam speciem nisi unum quid cognoscere4 ,et ideo similitudo speciei existens in intellectu humano non sufficit ad cognoscenda plura singularia2 et propter hoc intellectui adjuncti sunt sensus quibus singularia accipiat4 7,quodlib4 #g1 ,a4 #c47 ,respondeo dicendum1 quod ex hoc sunt in rebus aliqua superiora1 quod sunt uni primo1 quod est ,deus1 propinquiora et similiora4 ,in ,deo autem tota plenitudo intellectualis cognitionis continetur in uno1 scilicet in essentia divina1 per quam ,deus omnia cognoscit4 ,qu quidem intelligibilis plentitudo1 in intelligibilibus creaturis inferiori modo et minus simpliciter invenitur4 ,unde oportet1 quod ea qu ,deus cognoscit per unam1 inferiores intellectus cognoscant per multa2 et tanto amplius per plura1 quanto amplius intellectus inferior fuit4 ,sic igitur quanto angelus fuerit superior1 tanto per pauciores species universitatem intelligibilium apprehendere poterit1 et ideo oportet quod ejus form sint universaliores1 quasi ad plura se extendentes unaquque eorum4 ,et de hoc1 exemplum aliqualiter in nobis perspici potest3 sunt enim quidam1 qui veritatem intelligibilem capere non possunt2 nisi eis particulatim per singula explicatur4 ,et hoc quidem ex debilitate intellectus eorum contingit4 ,alii vero qui sunt fortioris intellectus1 ex paucis multo capere possunt4 7,p4#a;a1 ,q4 #ee;a ,a4 #c47 ,,on ,,chapter ,v4 7#e7 ,here is the idea of ,condillac's man-statue explained by himself3 ,to gain this object we imagined a statue internally organized like ourselves1 and animated with a mind deprived of every sort of ideas4 ,we also supposed its exterior composed wholly of marble1 to allow it the use of none of its senses1 and we reserved to ourselves the liberty to open them at our pleasure to the different impressions of which they are susceptible4 ,we thought we ought to commence with smell1 because of all the senses this is the one which least contributes to cognitions of the mind4 ,next we had to examine the others1 and after having considered them apart and together1 we saw the statue become an animal able to attend to its own preservation4 ,the principle that determines the development of its faculties is simple2 even sensations contain it2 for1 all being of necessity either agreeable or the contrary1 the statue is interested in enjoying some and shunning others4 ,the reader will now be convinced that this interest suffices to give occasion to the gradations of the will and the understanding4 ,judgments1 reflection1 desires1 passions1 are only sensations variously transformed4 ,this is why it seemed to us useless to suppose the soul to have received immediately from nature all the sensations with which it is endowed4 ,nature has given us organs which show us by pleasure or pain what we ought to seek or to avoid2 but here she stops1 and leaves to experience the task of leading us to contract habits1 and finish the work she has commenced4 ,this object is new1 and shows all the simplicity of the ways of the ,author of nature4 ,is it not a thing worthy of our admiration thus to see1 from man's sensibility to pleasure or pain1 spring up in him ideas1 desires1 habits1 and talents of various kinds8--,traite des ,sensations4 ,dessein de l'ouvrage4 ,what we admire in ,condillac is not his system1 but his candor2 and we wonder yet more that1 for a time1 he should have had numerous followers of his so poor and superficial system4 ,the author proposes the difficulty1 that as there is in our soul nothing but transformed sensations1 it is strange that brutes1 which also have sensations1 should not be endowed with the same faculties as man4 ,can the reader imagine what profound reason the ,french philosopher assigned8 ,we doubt it very much4 ,it is a curious thought3 the organ of touch is less perfect in brutes1 and consequently it cannot be to them an occasional cause of all the operations which we observe in ourselves4 ,he did well to adopt the motto3 nec tamen quasi ,pythius ,apollo6 ,,on ,,chapter ,,vi4 7#f7 ,the works of the scholastics are worth reading on these points4 ,treating of the object of science1 they are at once exact and profound4 ,it is not easy to think of any thing concerning the classification of truths not explained or indicated by them4 ,,on ,,chapter ,,vii4 7#g7 ,let us not be thought to judge too severely of the forms adopted by the ,german philosophers4 ,it is well known how ,madame de ,stal speaks of them2 but happily we can cite in our favor a more competent judge4 ,schelling1 one of the chiefs of ,german philosophy1 says3 ,the ,germans have so long philosophized among themselves1 as to gradually depart more and more1 in their thoughts and their words1 from what is universally intelligible2 and the degree of departure therefrom has almost come at last to be the measure of philosophical ability4 ,examples are not wanting to us4 ,as families which separate from general society1 and live wholly among themselves1 among other repulsive singularities1 come to use expressions intelligible only to themselves1 so is it with the ,germans in philosophy2 and after vain efforts to spread the ,kantian philosophy out of ,germany1 they renounced the attempt to make themselves intelligible to other nations2 they became accustomed to regard themselves as the chosen people of philosophy1 forgetting that the primary end of philosophy1--an end often neglected1 but not the less to be sought for on that account1--is to gain universal consent1 by making themselves universally intelligible4 ,this is not to say that we must judge works of thought like exercises in style2 but all philosophy not intelligible to all civilized nations1 and accessible in every language1 cannot1 for this reason alone1 be the universal and true philosophy4--,schelling's ,judgment of ,v4 ,cousin1 and the state of ,french and ,german ,philosophy in general4 #ahcd4 p4 #d4 ,schelling flatters himself that ,german philosophy is about to take a better course with respect to clearness1 and adds3 ,the philosophical writer who1 for tens of years past1 was unable to depart from the terms and forms of the school1 without loss of his scientific reputation1 may hereafter emancipate himself from this restraint4 ,he will seek depth of thought2 and an absolute incapacity to express himself with clearness1 will no longer be regarded as the mark of talent and philosophical inspiration4 ,we have nothing to add to this passage2 we would only remind its author that3 mutato nomine1 de te fabula narratur4 ,,on ,,chapter ,,viii4 7#h7 ,the perusal of ,schelling's work on ,ideal ,transcendentalism leaves no doubt as to his view of this identity1 which at bottom neither is nor can be any thing else than pantheism2 yet1 for the sake of truth1 we will allow that ,schelling seems to have modified his doctrine1 or to have feared its consequences1 if we are to consider the indications found in his discourse at the opening of his course of philosophy1 at ,berlin1 the #acth of ,november1 #ahda4 ,we there find the following passage1 worthy of the attention of all thinking men3 ,the difficulties and obstacles of all kinds1 against which philosophy contends are visible1 and in vain would we attempt to dissemble them4 ,never was there a more powerful reaction against philosophy on the part of real and active life than at this present epoch2 and this proves philosophy to have penetrated even to the vital questions of society1 those concerning which no one can rest indifferent4 ,so long as a philosophy is only in the first stages of formation1 taking the first steps in its march1 no one cares for it1 except philosophers themselves2 other men await the last word of philosophy1 since it is important to the general public only in its results4 ,we confess that we ought not to take as the practical result of a solid and profoundly meditated philosophy whatever it may please any body to designate as such3 were it so1 the world would be subjected to doctrines the most repugnant to sound morality1 even such as sap its foundation4 ,no6 ,no one judges of philosophy by the practical conclusions drawn by ignorance or presumption4 ,moreover1 lest deception on this point be possible1 the public should reject a philosophy which has such results1 without examining or even judging it in its principles2 it should say that it cannot understand the depth of these questions1 or the artificial and intricate march of the arguments2 but without pausing here it should promptly decide that a philosophy leading to such conclusions cannot be true in its principles4 ,what the ,roman moralist said of the useful3 nihil utile nisi quod honestum1 is equally applicable to the investigation of truth3 no philosophy that respects itself will allow that it leads to irreligion4 ,yet actual philosophy is in such a state1 that1 however much it promises a religious result1 no one admits it2 for deductions drawn from it convert the dogmas of the ,christian religion into a vain phantasmagory4 ,as to this1 some of its most faithful disciples are openly agreed2 be the suspicion well founded or not1 its existence suffices1 and this opinion is established4 ,but active life in the last result is always right2 and so philosophy is exposed to great risks4 ,they who war on one philosophy are not far from condemning all philosophy2 they say in their heart1 there is no longer philosophy in the world4 ,i myself am not exempt from these condemnations1 since it is pretended that it is ,i1 who first gave impulse to this philosophy which is at present so badly judged of1 because of its religious results4 ,how shall ,i defend myself8 ,certainly ,i would never attack a philosophy for its last results2 but ,i would judge it in its first principles1 as every philosophical mind should4 ,it is moreover well enough known that ,i have shown myself little satisfied with the philosophy of which ,i speak4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the moral and spiritual worlds are so divided that any point of union for an instant should be a motive of satisfaction4 ,besides to destroy1 is a very sad thing when there is nothing wherewith to replace the thing destroyed4 ',do it better yourself1' we say to one who can do nothing but criticize4 99 99 99 99 99 ,i therefore consecrate myself entirely to the mission with which ,i am charged2 for you ,i will live2 for you ,i will labor without ceasing while there remains in me the breath of life1 and while ,he permits me1 without whose permission not a hair can fall from our head1 and yet less a deeply felt word proceed from our mouth4 ,he1 without whose inspiration not one lucid idea can shine on our mind1 nor one thought of truth and liberty illumine our soul4 ,this passage shows the embarrassment of the ,german philosopher's position1 and the irreligious consequences attached to his doctrines4 ,it is consoling to see him pay some homage to truth2 but it is afflicting to see him still pretend to save its inconsequence4 ,,on ,,chapter ,,ix4 7#i7 ,in these latter days there have not been wanting some to count the illustrious ,malebranche among the partisans of pantheism4 ,we cannot conceive how ,m4 ,cousin could say2 ,malebranche est avec ,spinoza le plus grand disciple de ,descartes4 ,comme lui il a tir des principes de leur commun matre les consquences que ces principes renfermaient4 ,malebranche est la lettre ,spinoza chrtien4 7,fragments ,philosophiques4 ,t4 #bme4 p4 #afg4 ,ed4 #c;ieme47 ,we repeat that we cannot conceive how any one1 who had read ever so little of the great metaphysician's works1 should assert such a paradox4 ,the slightest glance at his writings suffices to show in them the most lofty spiritualism united with profound respect for the dogmas of our most holy religion4 ,when we treat of the various philosophical systems of the origin of ideas and the problem of the universe1 we shall have other occasions to vindicate the wise and pious author of the ,investigation de la ,verit4 ,yet we were unwilling to pass by the present occasion without doing him the justice to defend him from imputations1 which he would1 were he living1 repel as intolerable calumnies4 ,who would have thought when he wrote those works1 on every page of which we find1 ,god1 the mind1 the ,christian religion1 eternal truth1 and original sin1 with frequent texts from the sacred ,scriptures and ,st4 ,augustine1 that he would ever be ranked with ,spinoza1 with the absurd epithet of ,christian ,spinoza8 ,such is at times the sad lot of great men1 thus to be held as chiefs of sects they abhorred4 ,malebranche styled ,spinoza1 l'impie de nos jours1 and ,m4 ,cousin dares call ,malebranche the ,christian ,spinoza4 ,,on ,,chapter ,x4 7#aj7 ,we are not ignorant of the difficulties to which ,leibnitz's systems are subject2 but it is necessary to show that in this great man's mind the erroneous doctrines of modern ,germans had no place4 ,et c'est ainsi1 he says1 in his ,monadologie 7,no4 #ch71 que la dernire raison des choses doit tre dans une substance necessaire1 dans laquelle le dtail des changmens ne soit qu'eminemment1 comme dans la source1 et c'est ce que nous appelons ,dieu4 ,or cette substance tant une raison suffisante de tout ce dtail1 lequel est aussi li partout1 il n'y a qu'un ,dieu1 et ce ,dieu suffit4 ,on peut juger aussi que cette substance suprme qui est unique1 universelle1 et necessaire1 n'ayant rien hors d'elle qui en soit indpendant1 et tant une suite simple de l'tre possible1 doit tre incapable de limites et contenir tout autant de realit qu'il est possible4 ,d'o il s'ensuit1 que ,dieu est absolument parfait1 la perfection n'tant autre chose1 que la grandeur de la realit positive prise prcisment en mettant part les limites ou bornes dans les choses qui en ont4 ,et l1 o il n'y a point de bornes1 c'est--dire1 en ,dieu1 la perfection est absolument infinie4 ,il s'ensuit aussi que les cratures ont leur perfections de l'influence de ,dieu1 mais qu'elles ont leurs imperfections de leur nature propre1 incapable d'tre sans bornes4 ,car c'est en cela qu'elles sont distingues de ,dieu4 ,il est vrai aussi1 qu'en ,dieu est non seulement la source des existences1 mais encore celle des essences1 en tant que relles1 ou de ce qu'il y a de rel dans la possibilit4 ,in his dissertation on the ,platonic philosophy he combats the pantheistic tendencies of ,valentine ,weigel1 in these words3 ,valentinum ,weigelium1 qui non tantum vitam beatam peculiari libero per ,deificationem explicat1 sed et passim mortem et quietem hujusmodi commendat1 vellem cum aliis ,quietistis suspicionem similis sententi non dedisse4 99 99 99 ,spinoza aliter eodem tendebat2 ei una substantia est1 ,deus2 creatur ejus modificationes1 et figur in cera continue per motum nascentes et pereuntes4 ,ita ipsi1 perinde ut ,almerico1 anima non superest1 nisi per suum esse ideale in ,deo ut ibi ab terno fuit4 ,sed nihil in ,platone animadverto1 unde colligam1 animos propriam sibi substantiam non servare2 quod etiam sane philosophanti extra controversiam est1 neque intelligi contraria potest sententia1 nisi ,deum et animam corporea fingas1 neque enim aliter ex ,deo animas1 tanquam particulas divellas2 sed talis de ,deo atque anima notio1 aliunde absurda est4 7,leibnitz4 ,epist4 ad ,hanschium de ,philos4 ,platon47 ,so far was ,leibnitz from deeming the tendency to pantheism an elevated philosophy1 that1 as we have just seen1 he considered it the result of a rude imagination4 ,it is very remarkable that under an historical as under a metaphysical aspect ,leibnitz agrees with ,st4 ,thomas2 both express the same ideas in very similar words4 ,the holy doctor asks if the soul is made from the substance of ,god1 and there takes occasion to examine the origin of the error1 and says3 ,respondeo dicendum1 quod dicere animam esse de substantia ,dei1 manifestam improbabilitatem continet4 ,ut enim ex dictis patet1 anima humana est quandoque intelligens in potentia1 et scientiam quodammodo a rebus acquirit1 et habet diversas potentias2 qu omnia aliena sunt a ,dei natura1 qui est actus purus1 et nihil ab alio accipiens1 et nullam in se diversitatem habens1 ut supra probatum est4 ,sed hic error principium habuisse videtur ex duabus positionibus antiquorum4 ,primi enim1 qui naturas rerum considerare inceperunt1 imaginationem transcendere non valentes1 nihil prter corpora esse posuerunt4 ,et ideo ,deum dicebant esse quoddam corpus1 quod aliorum corporum judicabant esse principium4 ,et quia animam ponebant esse de natura illius corporis1 quod dicebant esse principium1 ut dicitur in primo de anima1 per consequens sequebatur quod anima esset de substantia ,dei4 ,juxta quam positionem etiam ,manichi1 ,deum esse quamdam lucem corpoream existimantes1 quandam partem illius lucis animam esse posuerunt corpori alligatam4 ,secundo vero processum fuit ad hoc quod aliqui aliquid incorporeum esse apprehenderunt2 non tamen a corpore separatum1 sed corporis formam4 ,unde et ,varro dixit quod ,deus est anima1 mundum intuitu1 vel motu et ratione gubernans3 ut ,augu4 narrat #g de ,civit4 ,dei4 ,sic igitur illius totalis anim partem1 aliqui posuerunt animam hominis3 sicut homo est pars totius mundi2 non valentes intellectu pertingere ad distinguendos spiritualium substantiarum gradus1 nisi secundum distinctiones corporum4 ,hc autem sunt omnia impossibilia1 ut supra probatum est1 unde manifeste falsum est animam esse de substantia ,dei4 7,p4 #a;a1 ,q4 #ij;a1 ,a4 #ao47 ,,on ,,chapter ,,xi4 7#aa7 ,we often find the intellect identified by the scholastics with the thing known1 even when they treat of created intellects2 but this identity is limited to the purely ideal order1 and denotes only the intimate union of the idea and the intellect4 ,it is well known what importance they attached to matters and forms2 and this distinction is also applied to the phenomena of intelligence4 ,although the idea was considered as a thing distinct from the intellect1 yet1 as the intellect is perfected by it1 and placed in relation with the thing represented1 they said that the intellect was the same as the thing known4 ,we must thus explain passages in ,st4 ,thomas and other scholastics1 since1 although their expressions1 if considered in isolation1 would be inexact1 they are not so1 if regard be had to the meaning which they attributed to them1 and which clearly follows from their fundamental principles4 ,thus ,st4 ,thomas 7,quodlibet4 #g ,a4 #b71 to prove that the created intellect cannot know many things at the same time1 says3 ,sed quod intellectus simul intelligat plura intelligibilia1 primo et principaliter1 est impossibile4 ,cujus ratio est quia intellectus secundum actum est omnino1 id est1 perfecte res intellecta3 ut dicitur in #c de anima4 ,quod quidem intelligendum est non quod essentia intellectus fiat res intellecta vel species ejus2 sed quia complete informatur per speciem rei intellect1 dum eam actu intelligit4 ,unde intellectum simul plura intelligere primo1 idem est ac si res una simul esset plura4 ,in rebus enim materiabilus videmus quod una res numero non potest esse simul plura in actu1 sed plura in potentia4 99 99 99 99 99 ,unde patet quod sicut una res materialis non potest esse simul plura actu1 ita unus intellectus non potest simul plura intelligere primo4 ,et hoc est quod ,alga1 dicit1 quod sicut unum corpus non potest simul figurari pluribus figuris2 ita unus intellectus non potest simul plura intelligere4 ,nec potest dici quod intellectus informatur perfecte simul pluribus speciebus intelligibilibus1 sicut unum corpus simul informatur figura et colore2 quia figura et color non sunt form unius generis1 nec in eodem ordine accipiuntur quia non ordinantur ad perficiendum in esse unius rationis2 sed omnes form intelligibiles in quantum hujusmodi1 sunt unius generis1 et in eodem ordine se habent ad intellectum1 in quantum perficiunt intellectum in hoc quod est esse intellectum in actu4 ,unde plures species intelligibiles se habent sicut figur plures1 vel plures colores1 qui simul in actu in eodem esse non possunt secundum idem4 ,by the first passage1 we see that the meaning of identity of the intellect with the thing known1 is the same as explained in the beginning of this note2 to wit1 the intimate union of the idea of intelligible species with the intellect1 as the form with its matter1--a form which perfects the intellect1 makes it pass from potentiality to actuality1 and places it in relation with the thing represented4 ,,on ,,chapter ,,xii4 7#ab7 ,the doctrine of immediate intelligibility is susceptible of still further illustration2 but as this cannot be clearly done without examining at length the nature of ideas1 which does not pertain to our present treatise1 we shall reserve it for its proper place4 ,,on ,,chapter ,,xiii4 7#ac7 ,enough1 perhaps1 was not said in the text to enable all readers to form clear and complete ideas of the representation of causality2 but this doctrine1 as regards the first intelligence1 is closely allied to the questions on the foundation of the possibility even of non-existent things1--questions which we cannot here investigate without reversing the order of subjects4 ,,on ,,chapter ,,xiv4 7#ad7 ,the distinction of geometrical and non-geometrical orders of ideas is of the utmost importance in ideology4 ,we have given this distinction in order that the examination of a truth fundamental among purely ideal truths might not remain incomplete4 ,but its explanation and foundation will be given in our treatise on the of space and extension4 ,,on ,,chapter ,,xv4 7#ae7 ,the word instinct1 when applied to the intellect1 is clearly taken in a different sense than it is when applied to irrational animals4 ,it has here no ignoble meaning2 and this is in accordance with the use made of it when divine things are spoken of4 ,one meaning given it by the dictionary is1 impulse1 or movement of the ,holy ,ghost1 in speaking of supernatural inspirations4 ,the ,latin1 instinctus1 means inspiration4 ,thus3 ,sacro mens instincta furore4 ,,on ,,chapter ,,xvi4 7#af7 ,the confusion of ideas upon this point originates in that tendency to unity of which we spoke in our ,fourth ,chapter4 ,we first suppose there must be one only principle1 and we ask what it is2 whereas1 before inquiring what it is1 we should ascertain if there be one only1 as is supposed4 ,we have already seen that ,fichte's system rested on the same supposition4 ,thus the cause of innocent disputes in the schools may lead to more transcendental errors4 ,,on ,,chapter ,,xvii4 7#ag7 ,we have1 we think1 faithfully interpreted the thought of ,descartes1 but lest there should be some doubt as to this1 we subjoin a notable passage from his answer to the objections collected by ,pre ,mersenne from various philosophers and theologians1 against the ,second1 ,third1 ,fourth1 ,fifth1 and ,sixth ,meditations4 ,when we know that we are something that thinks1 this first notion is taken from no syllogisms2 and when any one says3 ,i think1 therefore ,i am1 or exist1 he does not infer his existence from thought1 as by the force of a syllogism1 but as a thing known by itself2 he sees it by a simple inspection of the mind2 for if he deduced it from a syllogism1 he would have to know beforehand this major2 whatever thinks1 is1 or exists4 ,on the contrary1 this proposition is manifested to him by his own sentiment that he cannot think without existing4 ,it is a property characteristic of our mind to form general propositions from the knowledge of particular propositions4 ,descartes does not always explain himself with this clearness2 the objections of his adversaries made him examine his doctrine more thoroughly1 and this contributed to clear up his ideas4 ,,on ,,chapter ,,xviii4 7#ah7 ,to form an accurate estimate of ,descartes' views1 let us listen to his own explanation of his system4 ,as the senses sometimes deceive us1 ,i wished to suppose that nothing of what they make us imagine appeared2 as there are men who are deceived1 and make paralogisms even when reasoning upon the simplest matters of geometry1 ,i judged myself as liable to err as they are1 and ,i rejected as false all those reasons ,i had before held to be demonstrations2 and also considering that even the thoughts which we have while awake may come to us while asleep1 although no one of them may be true1 ,i resolved to feign that all things which had entered my mind contained no more truth than illusory dreams4 ,but ,i immediately observed that1 while ,i wished to think that every thing was false1 it was necessary for me1 who thought this1 to be something2 and1 noting that this truth3 ,i think1 therefore ,i am1 was so firm and secure1 that the most extravagant suppositions could not shake it1 ,i judged that ,i might1 without scruple1 receive it as the first truth of philosophy4--,discours sur la ,mthode4 ,p4 #d;ieme4 ,we said that the doubt of ,descartes was a supposition1 a fiction1 and these are the very terms he himself uses4 ,in his reply to the objections of ,pre ,mersenne1 we find the following confirmatory extract3 ,i have read with great satisfaction your observations upon my treatise on philosophy1 for they show your good-will towards me1 your piety towards ,god1 and your zeal for the advance of his glory4 ,i cannot but rejoice that you have judged my arguments worthy of your criticism1 but also that you say nothing not easily answerable4 ,in the first place1 you remind me that ,i have rejected the ideas of phantasms of bodies1 not truly1 but only by a mere fiction1 in order to conclude that ,i am something that thinks1 fearing1 perhaps1 that ,i should believe it followed from this that ,i am only something that thinks2 but ,i have already shown1 in my ,second ,meditation1 that ,i agreed with this1 and ,i said3 ',but these things1 which ,i suppose not to be1 because ,i do not know them1 may not really be any thing different from me who know them2 of this ,i can say nothing1 ,i have at present nothing to do with it4' 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 ,we here see that ,descartes did not deny his doubt to be a mere fiction2 he even says that he does nothing but apply a method1 the necessity of which all philosophers admit4 ,i pray you1 he continues1 to remember that with respect to matters of the will1 ,i have always made a broad distinction between the contemplation of truth and the uses of life2 as regards the latter1 ,i am so far from thinking that we must follow only things very clearly known1 that ,i believe we must not always consider even what is most probable1 but that we must1 among things wholly unknown or uncertain1 sometimes choose one1 and hold firmly to it1 so long as we see no reason for not doing so1 just as if we had chosen it from evident and certain motives1 as ,i have already explained in the ,discours sur la ,mthode2 but when we treat only of the contemplation of truth1 who ever doubted that it was necessary to suspend the judgment upon things that are obscure or not distinctly known8 ,in what1 then1 consists ,descartes' merit8 ,in having applied a rule known to all1 and employed by few1 and in so doing at the very time that prejudices in favor of the ,aristotelian doctrine were the strongest4 ,descartes plainly says so2 his method of doubting is not new1 only the application of it was wanting2 for1 as regards its fundamental principle1 who ever doubted that it was necessary to suspend the judgment upon things that are obscure or not distinctly known8 ,understanding ,descartes' method in this sense1 that is1 taking the doubt as a supposition1 a mere fiction1 it is not opposed to sound religious and moral principles4 ,the profound philosopher does not seem to disdain to set his readers at rest upon this point2 he ingenuously shows1 in commencing his investigations1 that his religious belief was safe4 ,finally1 as before undertaking to rebuild the house wherein one lives1 it is not enough to demolish the old one1 and provide materials and workmen1 or to exercise one's self in architecture1 and to carefully trace the design of the new house2 but it is also necessary to have another house in which to live1 while the new one is building2 so that my actions might not be unresolved1 like my judgments1 and that ,i might1 in the meantime1 live as happily as possible1 ,i made a provision for myself2 it consists of three or four maxims4 ,the first is1 to observe the laws and customs of my country1 and constantly to preserve the religion in which1 by the grace of ,god1 ,i have been instructed from my infancy4 99 99 99 99 99 99 ,after having assured myself of these maxims1 and laid them aside with the truths of faith which have always been first in my belief1 ,i judged that ,i might freely reject the rest of my opinions4--,discours sur la ,mthode1 ,p4 #c;ieme4 ,,on ,,chapter ,,xix4 7#ai7 ,with respect to the distinction between the testimony of consciousness and that of evidence1 as in the analysis of the proposition3 ,i think1 therefore ,i am2 there can be no doubt that ,descartes did not express himself with sufficient precision and exactness4 ,see1 for example1 this extract3 ,after this1 ,i considered in general what is necessary for a proposition to be true and certain2 for1 although ,i had not yet met such a one1 ,i nevertheless thought ,i ought to know in what this certainty consisted2 and observing that in the proposition1 ,i think1 therefore ,i am1 there is nothing to assure me of its truth1 except the clear perception that in order to think ,i must be1 ,i judged that ,i could take it to be a general rule that things clearly and distinctly conceived are all true2 only there is some difficulty in ascertaining what things we do distinctly conceive4--,discours sur la ,mthode4 ,partie #dme4 ,,on ,,chapter ,,xx4 7#bj7 ,the apodictical certainty of which ,kant speaks in the passage cited1 is the result of the intrinsic evidence of ideas1 or1 in other words1 it is what the schoolmen called metaphysical certainty4 ,,on ,,chapter ,,xxi4 7#ba7 ,besides the questions on the principle of contradiction as the only foundation of certainty1 there are others as to its scientific utility and importance4 ,we shall1 when we come to treat of the idea of being in general1 examine these points at length2 wherefore we will now pass them by4 ,,on ,,chapter ,,xxii4 7#bb7 ,we see by a passage from the fourth part of the ,discourse on ,method1 by ,descartes1 cited in note xv41 that besides the principle1 ,i think1 therefore ,i am1 he admitted the principle of the legitimacy of evidence2 for1 asking what is necessary in order that a proposition may be true and certain1 he says1 that having remarked that if he was certain of the truth of this proposition 7,i think1 therefore ,i am71 he was so only because he saw it to be so2 he believed that he could take it to be a general rule that things known clearly and distinctly are all true4 ,this shows two principles1 closely connected1 although very unlike1 to enter into ,descartes' system4 ,the first is the fact of consciousness of thought2 the second is the general rule of the legitimacy of the criterion of evidence4 ,it is also to be remarked that there is here some confusion of ideas1 which we have already pointed out4 ,it is not exact to say that the principle1 ,i think1 therefore ,i am1 is evident3 the evidence relates to the consequence2 but there is1 properly speaking1 no evidence of the act of thought1 excepting consciousness4 ,evidence is a criterion1 but not the only one4 ,,on ,,chapter ,,xxiii4 7#bc7 ,what we have said of the second proposition of this chapter is independent of the mode in which the soul and body exercise their mutual influence4 ,these questions belong elsewhere4 ,this influence is1 in every system1 a fact attested by experience2 and this is all that is needed for what we propose to establish here4 ,,on ,,chapter ,,xxiv4 7#bd7 ,for the better understanding of what we have said in this chapter on evidence1 it will be well to consider what will be advanced in chapters ,,xxvi4 to ,,xxxi41 inclusive4 ,,on ,,chapter ,,xxv4 7#be7 ,what has been said in this chapter shows the truth of what we said in the twenty-fourth chapter1 upon the connection of the different criteria1 and the necessity of not confining one's self to an exclusive philosophy4 ,consciousness serves as the basis of the other criteria1 as an indispensable fact2 but if we deny the others1 we also deny consciousness4 ,,on ,,chapters ,,xxvi41 ,,xxvii41 ,,and ,,xxviii4 7#bf7 ,dugald ,stewart in his ,elements of the ,philosophy of the ,human ,mind1 7,p4 ,,ii41 ,c4 ,,ii41 ,section #c1 #b17 cites a passage from a dissertation printed at ,berlin in #agfd1 which does not appear so unreasonable as he pretends4 ,we subjoin it1 because the ,german philosopher's opinion seems to us the same that we gave in the text4 ,omnes mathematicorum propositiones sunt identic et representantur hac formula1 ,a,a4 ,sunt veritates identic1 sub varia forma express1 imo ipsum quod dicitur contradictionis principium vario modo enuntiatum et involutum2 si quidem omnes hujus generis propositiones revera in eo continentur4 ,secundum nostram autem intelligendi facultatem ea est propositionum differentia1 quod qudam longa ratiociniorum serie1 alia autem breviore via1 ad primum omnium principiorum reducantur1 et in illud resolvantur4 ,sic4 v4 g4 propositio #bbd statim huc cedit3 #aaaaaaaa2 id est1 idem est idem2 et1 proprie loquendo1 hoc modo enuntiari debet1--si contingat adesse vel existere quatuor entia1 tum existunt quatuor entia2 nam de existentia non agunt geometr1 sed ea hypothetice tantum subintelligitur4 ,inde summa oritur certitudo ratiocinia perspicienti2 observat nempe idearum identitatem2 et hc est evidentia assensum immediate cogens1 quam mathematicam aut geometricam vocamus4 ,mathesi tamen sua natura priva non est et propria2 oritur etenim ex identitatis perceptione1 qu locum habere potest1 etiamsi ide non reprsentent extensum4 ,,on ,,chapters ,,xxx ,,and ,,xxxi4 7#bg7 ,we have shown that ,dugald ,stewart had perhaps in view ,vico's doctrine2 but without wishing to bring against him the charge he brought against his master1 ,reid1 that of resuscitating the doctrines of the ,jesuit ,buffier1 we would1 in order that the reader may judge with full knowledge of the cause1 subjoin a remarkable extract from the ,scotch philosopher1 which will show coincidence between some of his doctrines and those of the ,neapolitan4 ,had ,stewart read ,vico1 we are inclined to believe that he would not have complained of the confusion with which various ancient and modern authors have explained this doctrine4 ,the peculiarity of that species of evidence which is called demonstrative1 and which so remarkably distinguishes our mathematical conclusions from those to which we are led in other branches of science1 is a fact which must have arrested the attention of every person who possesses the slightest acquaintance with the elements of geometry4 ,and yet1 ,i am doubtful if a satisfactory account has hitherto been given of the circumstance in which it arises4 ,mr4 ,locke tells us1 that 'what constitutes a demonstration is intuitive evidence of every step2' and ,i readily grant1 that if in a single step such evidence should fail1 the other parts of the demonstration would be of no value4 ,it does not1 however1 seem to me that it is on this consideration that the demonstrative evidence of the conclusion depends1 not even when we add to it another which is much insisted on by ,dr4 ,reid1--that 'in demonstrative evidence our first principles must be intuitively certain4' ,the inaccuracy of this remark ,i formerly pointed out when treating of the evidence of axioms2 on which occasion ,i also observed1 that the first principles of our reasonings in mathematics are not axioms1 but definitions4 ,it is in this last circumstance 7,i mean the peculiarity of reasoning from definitions7 that the true theory of mathematical demonstration is to be found2 and ,i shall accordingly endeavor to explain it at considerable length1 and to state some of the more important consequences to which it leads4 ,that ,i may not1 however1 have the appearance of claiming1 in behalf of the following discussion1 an undue share of originality1 it is necessary for me to remark that the leading idea which it contains has been repeatedly started1 and even to a certain length prosecuted1 by different writers1 ancient as well as modern2 but that1 in all of them1 it has been so blended with collateral considerations1 although foreign to the point in question1 as to divert the attention both of writer and reader1 from that single principle on which the solution of the problem hinges4 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 ,it was already remarked1 in the first chapter of this part1 that whereas1 in all other sciences1 the propositions which we attempt to establish1 express facts real or supposed1--in mathematics1 the propositions which we demonstrate only assert a connection between certain suppositions and certain consequences4 ,our reasonings1 therefore1 in mathematics1 are directed to an object essentially different from what we have in view1 in any other employment of our intellectual faculties2--not to ascertain truths with respect to actual existences1 but to trace the logical filiation of consequences which follow from an assumed hypothesis4 ,if1 from this hypothesis1 we reason with correctness1 nothing1 it is manifest1 can be wanting to complete the evidence of the result2 as this result only asserts a necessary connection between the supposition and the conclusion4 ,in the other sciences1 admitting that every ambiguity of language were removed1 and that every step of our deductions were rigorously accurate1 our conclusions would still be attended with more or less of uncertainty1 being ultimately founded on principles which may1 or may not1 correspond exactly with the fact4 7,elements of the ,philosophy of the ,human ,mind4 ,p4 ,,ii41 ,c4 ,,ii41 ,s4 #c1 #a47 ,this is exactly ,vico's doctrine of the cause of the difference in the degrees of evidence and certainty2 although he makes a general system1 in order to explain the problem of intelligence1 what the ,scotchman only assigns as a fact to show the reason of mathematical evidence4 ,pre ,buffier 7,trait4 des prem4 ,vrits1 ,p4 ,i41 ,c4 ,,ii47 explains the same thing with great clearness4 ,we have said that1 considering the indefatigable laboriousness which distinguishes the ,germans1 it would not be strange if they had read the scholastics4 ,in confirmation of this1 we notice that ,leibnitz urgently recommends the reading of them1 and the more modern ,germans are not likely to forget the advice of so able an author4 ,among various passages of ,leibnitz1 we select the following extract1 because it seems to us rather curious3 ,truth is more spread than one would believe2 but it is often colored1 also often covered over1 and even weakened1 mutilated1 and corrupted by additions which spoil it1 or render it less useful4 ,by observing the traces of truth in the ancients1 or1 to speak more generally1 in all who have preceded us1 we dig gold from dirt1 and draw the diamond from its mine1 light from darkness1 and this would really be perennis qudam ,philosophia4 ,it may even be said that some progress would be observable in knowledge4 ,the ,orientals have great and beautiful ideas of the ,divinity2 the ,greeks added reasoning and a form of science2 the ,fathers of the ,church rejected whatever was bad in ,greek philosophy2 but the scholastics labored to usefully employ whatever was acceptable in ,pagan philosophy4 ,i have frequently said3 aurum latere in stercore illo scholastico barbariei1 and ,i wish we could find some one versed in the ,irish and ,spanish philosophy1 to cull from it what is good2 ,i am sure he would find his labor repaid by many and beautiful truths4 ,there was once a ,swiss who mathematized scholastically2 his works are but little known2 although1 from what ,i have seen of them1 ,i should judge them to be profound and worthy of consideration4 7,lettre #c;ieme ,m4 ,remond de ,montmort47 ,thus speaks ,leibnitz1 one of the most eminent men of modern times1 and of whom ,fontenelle said3 ,he led the van in all the sciences4 ,see1 then1 if he was wrong in recommending the study of those authors to all desirous of acquiring a profound knowledge of philosophy4 ,this study1 setting aside its intrinsic utility1 is of great advantage in judging1 with knowledge of the cause1 a school1 which1 whatever its worth1 occupies a page in the history of the human mind4 ,,on ,,chapter ,,xxxii4 7#bh7,the author to whom ,i allude 7#cag7 is ,fenelon1 who1 under the name of common sense1 includes also the criterion of evidence1 as may be seen by this extract3 ,what is common sense8 ,does it not consist in the first notions which all men have of the same things8 ,this common sense1 which always and everywhere is the same1 which precedes all examination1 and even holds it in ridicule on certain questions1 in which one laughs instead of examining2 which renders man unable to doubt1 no matter how great his efforts may be2 this sense which belongs to all men1 which only waits to be consulted in order to discover itself and show us the evidence or the absurdity of the question1 is not this what ,i call my ideas8 ,here1 then1 are these general ideas or notions which ,i cannot contradict or examine1 but according to which ,i examine and judge every thing1 so that1 instead of replying1 ,i laugh when any thing is proposed clearly in opposition to what these immutable ideas represent4--,existence de ,dieu1 ,p4 ,,ii41 v4 #cc4 ,there is no doubt that ,fenelon speaks of evidence in this extract1 since1 besides using this very term1 he refers to immutable ideas2 by common sense he understands the general ideas by which we judge of all things1 or in other words1 the ideas from which evidence proceeds4 ,,note ,,to ,,book ,,second4 ,,on ,,chapter ,,ii4 7#bi7 ,the immateriality of the souls of brutes is not a discovery of modern philosophy1 the scholastics maintained it1 and carried their ideas on this subject so far as to assert that no vital principle can be a body4 ,in this sense they taught that even the principle of life1 or the soul of plants1 was something superior to the body4 ,st4 ,thomas 7,p4 ,i41 ,q4 ,,lxxv41 ,a4 ,i47 asks1 in general1 if the soul is a body3 ,utrum anima sit corpus1 and answers as follows3 ,respondeo dicendum1 quod ad inquirendum de natura anim1 oportet prsupponere1 quod anima dicitur esse primum principium vit1 in iis qu apud nos vivunt4 ,animata enim viventia dicimus1 res vero inanimatas vita carentes2 vita autem maxime manifestatur duplici opere1 scilicet cognitionis1 et motus4 ,horum autem principium antiqui philosophi imaginationem transcendere non valentes1 aliquod corpus ponebant1 sola corpora res esse dicentes1 et quod non est corpus1 nihil esse1 et secundum hoc1 animam aliquod corpus esse dicebant4 ,hujus autem opinionis falsitas1 licet multipliciter ostendi possit1 tamen uno utemur1 quo etiam communius et certius patet animam corpus non esse4 ,manifestum est enim1 quod non quodcumque vitalis operationis principium est anima2 sic enim oculus esset anima1 cum sit quoddam principium visionis1 et idem esset dicendum de aliis anim instrumentis3 sed primum principium vit dicimus esse animam4 ,quamvis autem aliquod corpus possit esse quoddam principium vit1 sicut cor est principium vit in animali2 tamen non potest esse primum principium vit aliquod corpus4 ,manifestum est enim1 quod esse principium vit1 vel vivens1 non convenit corpori ex hoc quod est corpus1 alioquin omne corpus esset vivens1 aut principium vit1 convenit igitur alicui corpori quod sit vivens1 vel etiam principium vit1 per hoc quod est tale corpus4 ,quod autem est actu tale1 habet hoc ab aliquo principio1 quod dicitur actus ejus4 ,anima igitur qu est primum principium vit1 non est corpus1 sed corporis actus1 sicut calor qui est principium calefactionis1 non est corpus1 sed quidam corporis actus4 ,notwithstanding this doctrine1 it might still be doubted whether matter does not enter as a component element in the soul1 although the soul itself is not corporeal1 and1 therefore1 the holy doctor 7,ib41 ,a4 #e7 asks if the soul is composed of matter and form2 and here he is speaking of the soul in general as the principle of life1 and not of the intellectual soul alone4 ,he answers in the negative1 as follows3 ,respondeo dicendum1 quod anima non habet materiam1 et hoc potest considerari dupliciter4 ,primo quidem1 ex ratione anim in communi1 est enim de ratione anim1 quod sit forma alicujus corporis4 ,aut igitur est forma secundum se totam1 aut secundum aliquam partem sui4 ,si secundum se totam1 impossibile est quod pars ejus sit materia1 si dicatur materia aliquid ejus in potentia tantum1 quia forma1 in quantum forma1 est actus4 ,id autem quod est in potentia tantum1 non potest esse pars actus1 cum potentia repugnet actui1 utpote contra actum divisa4 ,si autem sit forma secundum aliquam partem sui1 illam partem dicemus esse animam1 et illam materiam cujus primo est actus1 dicemus esse primum animatum4 ,secundo specialiter ex ratione human anim1 in quantum est intellectiva4 ,although these passages are clear enough1 there is another where it is expressly asserted that the souls of perfect animals are absolutely indivisible1 so that division can be predicated of them neither per se nor per accidens4 ,he asks1 7,q4 ,,lxxvi41 art4 #h17 if the soul in general is in any part of the body2 and he answers1 yes3 distinguishing between essential and quantitative totality3 ,sed forma1 qu requirit diversitatem in partibus1 sicut est anima1 et prcipue animalium perfectorum1 non equaliter se habet ad totum et ad partes2 unde non dividitur per accidens1 scilicet per divisionem quantitatis4 ,sic ergo totalitas quantitativa1 non potest attribui anim1 nec per se1 nec per accidens4 ,sed totalitas secunda1 qu attenditur secundum rationis et essenti perfectionem1 proprie et per se1 convenit formis4 ,it seems1 however1 that this doctrine of ,st4 ,thomas met with opposition1 from some persons who could not conceive how the soul of brutes could be inextensive1 as they regarded this as the exclusive property of the intellectual soul4 ,cardinal ,gaetano1 in his comments on ,st4 ,thomas1 undertakes his defence4 ,he shows that he understood the doctrine of ,st4 ,thomas concerning the indivisibility of the souls of brutes1 in its strictest sense4 ,he gives the objection in the following words3 ,dubium secundo est circa candem totalitatem quoniam ,s4 ,thomas a communi opinione discordare videtur hoc in loco1 eo quod ponat prter animam intellectivam1 aliquam aliam formam in materia inextensam1 scilicet animam sensitivam animalium perfectorum1 cum tamen vix possit sustineri1 quod anima intellectiva de foris veniens1 informet secundum esse1 et sit inextensa4 ,instead of more or less plausible interpretations of the text in order to solve the objection1 the learned commentator boldly maintains the indivisibility of the souls of brutes1 and treats almost with contempt those who think differently3 ,ad secundum dubium dicitur1 quod doctrina hic tradita1 est quidem contra modernorum communem phantasiam1 sed non contra philosophicas rationes1 parum est autem de horum aucthoritate curandum4 ,cum autem dicitur1 quod sine ratione hoc est dictum1 respondetur quod ratio insinuata est a posteriori1 quia scilicet diversam totaliter habet habitudinem ad totum et partem ipsa forma ex propria ratione4 ,si enim habet totaliter diversam habitudinem ad totum et ad partes1 hoc provenit ex indivisibilitate form4 ,quia si divideretur forma ad divisionem totius1 jam pars form proportionaretur parti corporis1 et cum pars quantitativa form sit tota essentia form1 ergo ipsa forma secundum rationem su essenti non habet totaliter diversam habitudinem ad totum et ad partes3 sed utrumque1 scilicet tam totum quam partem respicit1 ut proportionatum perfectible4 ,et confirmari potest ista ratio1 quia forma extensa ex vi solius divisionis1 non desinit esse secundum illam partem quam habet in parte decisa3 imo qu quodammodo erat per modum potenti1 perficitur1 et fit actu seorsum1 ut patet in formis naturalibus1 ergo a destructione consequentis1 si ex sola divisione pars decisa non potest retinere eandem speciem1 ergo non erat extensa et divisibilis ad divisionem subjecti4 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 ,non est ergo sine ratione dictum1 quod anim aliqu prter intellectivam sunt tant perfectionis quod sunt inextens1 tam per se quam per accidens3 quamquam potenti omnes earum sint extens per accidens3 qualitates enim1 sunt corporis partibus accommodat4 ,,notes ,,to ,,book ,,third4 ,,on ,,chapter ,x4 7#cj7 ,leibnitz and ,clarke had a very interesting dispute on space1 from which ,i shall extract a few passages4 ,leibnitz wrote a letter to the ,princess of ,wales1 in which he repeated the expression of ,newton1 that space was the organ which ,god uses in his sensations of things4 ,leibnitz argued against this opinion1 that if ,god1 in order to perceive things1 needs any medium1 they do not depend entirely on him1 and are not produced by him4 ,clarke ,answered3 ,m4 le chevalier ,newton ne dit pas que l'espace est l'organe dont ,dieu se sert pour apercevoir les choses2 il ne dit pas non plus que ,dieu ait besoin d'aucun moyen pour les apercevoir4 ,au contraire1 il dit que ,dieu1 tant prsent partout1 aperoit les choses par sa prsence immdiate1 dans tout l'espace o elles sont1 sans l'intervention ou le secours d'aucun organe ou d'aucun moyen4 ,pour rendre cela plus intelligible1 il l'claircit par une comparaison4 ,il dit que comme l'me1 tant immdiatement prsente aux images qui se forment dans le cerveau par le moyen des organes des sens1 voit ces images comme si elles taient les choses mmes qu'elles reprsentent2 de mme ,dieu voit tout par sa prsence immdiate1 tant actuellement prsent aux choses mmes1 toutes les choses qui sont dans l'univers1 comme l'me est prsente toutes les images qui se forment dans le cerveau4 ,m4 ,newton considre le cerveau et les organes des sens comme le moyen par lequel ces images sont formes1 et non comme le moyen par lequel l'me voit ou aperoit ces images lorsqu'elles sont ainsi formes4 ,et dans l'univers il ne considre pas les choses comme si elles taient des images formes par un certain moyen ou par des organes1 mais comme des choses relles que ,dieu lui-mme a formes et qu'il voit dans tous les lieux o elles sont sans l'intervention d'aucun moyen4 ,c'est tout ce que ,m4 ,newton a voulu dire par la comparaison dont il s'est servi lorsqu'il suppose que l'espace infini est1 pour ainsi dire1 le sensorium de l',etre qui est prsent partout4 ,leibnitz ,replied3 ,il se trouve expressment dans l'appendice de l',optique de ,m4 ,newton que l'espace est le sensorium de ,dieu4 ,or le mot sensorium a toujours signifi l'organe de la sensation4 ,permis lui et ses amis de s'expliquer maintenant tout autrement1 je ne m'y oppose pas4 ,on suppose que la prsence de l'me suffit pour qu'elle s'aperoive de se qui se passe dans le cerveau2 mais c'est justement ce que le ,p4 ,malebranche et toute l'cole cartsienne nient et ont raison de nier4 ,il faut toute autre chose que la seule prsence pour qu'une chose reprsente ce qui se passe dans l'autre4 ,il faut pour cela quelque communication explicable1 quelque manire d'influence4 ,l'espace1 selon ,m4 ,newton1 est intimement prsent au corps qu'il contient1 et qui est commensur avec lui2 s'ensuit-il pour cela que l'espace s'aperoive de ce qui se passe dans le corps1 et qu'il s'en souvienne aprs que le corps en sera sorti8 ,outre que l'me tant indivisible1 sa prsence immdiate1 qu'on pourrait s'imaginer dans le corps1 ne serait que dans un point4 ,comment donc s'apercevrait-elle de ce qui se fait hors de ce point8 ,je prtends d'tre le premier qui ait montr comment l'me s'aperoit de ce qui se passe dans le corps4 ,la raison pourquoi ,dieu s'aperoit de tout n'est pas sa simple prsence1 mais encore son opration2 c'est parce qu'il conserve les choses par une action qui produit continuellement ce qu'il y a de bont et de perfection en elles4 ,mais les mes n'ayant point d'influence immdiate sur les corps1 ni les corps sur les mes1 leur correspondance mutuelle ne saurait tre explique par la prsence4 ,clarke ,answered3 ,le mot de sensorium ne signifie pas proprement l'organe1 mais le lieu de la sensation4 ,l'il1 l'oreille1 etc41 sont des organes1 mais ce ne sont pas des sensoria4 ,d'ailleurs ,m4 le chevalier ,newton ne dit pas que l'espace est un sensorium1 mais qu'il est 7par voie de comparaison7 pour ainsi dire le sensorium1 etc4 ,on n'a jamais suppos que la prsence de l'me suffit pour la perception2 on a dit seulement que cette prsence est ncessaire afin que l'me aperoive4 ,si l'me n'tait pas prsente aux images des choses qui sont aperues1 elle ne pourrait pas les apercevoir2 mais sa prsence ne suffit pas1 moins qu'elle ne soit aussi une substance vivante4 ,les substances inanimes1 quoique prsentes1 n'aperoivent rien2 et une substance vivante n'est capable de perception que dans le lieu o elle est prsente2 soit aux choses mmes1 comme ,dieu est prsent tout l'univers2 soit aux images des choses1 comme l'me leur est prsente dans son sensorium4 ,il est impossible qu'une chose agisse ou que quelque sujet agisse sur elle dans un lieu o elle n'est pas prsente1 comme il est impossible qu'elle soit dans un lieu o elle n'est pas4 ,quoique l'me soit indivisible1 il ne s'ensuit pas qu'elle n'est prsente que dans un seul point4 ,l'espace fini ou infini es absolument indivisible1 mme par la pense2 car on ne peut s'imaginer que ses parties se sparent l'une de l'autre sans s'imaginer qu'elles sortent1 pour ainsi dire1 hors d'elle-mmes2 et cependant l'espace n'est pas un simple point4 ,dieu n'aperoit pas les choses par sa simple prsence1 ni parce qu'il agit sur elles1 mais parce qu'il est non-seulement partout1 mais encore un tre vivant et intelligent4 ,on doit dire la mme chose de l'me1 dans sa petite sphre1 ce n'est point par sa simple prsence1 mais parce qu'elle est une substance vivante1 qu'elle aperoit les images auxquelles elle est prsente1 et qu'elle ne saurait apercevoir sans leur tre prsente4 ,reply of ,leibnitz4 ,ces messieurs soutiennent donc que l'espace est un tre rel absolu2 mais cela les mne de grandes difficults1 car il parat que cet tre doit tre ternel et infini4 ,c'est pourquoi il y en a qui out cru que c'tait ,dieu lui-mme1 ou bien son attribut1 son immensit4 ,mais comme il a des parties1 ce n'est pas une chose qui puisse convenir ,dieu4 ,pour moi1 j'ai marqu plus d'une fois que je tenais l'espace pour quelque chose de purement relatif1 comme le temps1 pour un ordre des coexistences1 comme le temps est un ordre de successions4 ,car l'espace marque1 en terms de possibilit1 un ordre des choses qui existent en mme temps1 en tant qu'elles existent ensemble1 sans entrer dans leurs manires d'exister4 ,et lorsqu'on voit plusieurs choses ensemble1 on s'aperoit de cet ordre des choses entre elles4 ,pour rfuter l'imagination de ceux qui prennent l'espace pour une substance1 ou du moins pour quelque tre absolu1 j'ai plusieurs dmonstrations2 mais je ne veux me servir prsent que de celle dont on me fournit ici l'occasion4 ,je dis donc que si l'espace tait un tre absolu1 il arriverait quelque chose dont il serait impossible qu'il y et une raison suffisante1 ce qui est contre notre axiome4 ,voici comment je le prouve4 ,l'espace est quelque chose d'uniforme absolument2 et sans les choses y places1 un point de l'espace ne diffre absolument en rien d'un autre point de l'espace4 ,or il suit de cela 7suppos que l'espace soit quelque chose en lui-mme outre l'ordre des corps entre eux7 qu'il est impossible qu'il y ait une raison pourquoi ,dieu1 gardant les mmes situations des corps entre eux1 ait plac les corps dans l'espace ainsi et non autrement2 et pourquoi tout n'a pas t pris rebours 7par exemple71 par un change de l'orient et de l'occident4 ,mais si l'espace n'est autre chose que cet ordre ou rapport1 et n'est rien du tout sans les corps1 que la possibilit1 d'en mettre1 ces deux tats1 l'un tel qu'il est1 l'autre suppos rebours1 ne diffreraient point entre eux4 ,leur diffrence ne se trouve donc que dans notre supposition chimrique de la ralit de l'espace en lui-mme4 ,mais dans la vrit1 l'un serait justement la mme chose que l'autre1 comme ils sont absolument indiscernables2 et par consquent il n'y a pas lieu de demander la raison de la prfrence de l'un l'autre4 ,il en est de mme du temps4 ,suppos que quelqu'un demande pourquoi ,dieu n'a pas tout cr un an plus tt1 et que ce mme personnage veuille infrer de l que ,dieu a fait quelque chose dont il n'est pas possible qu'il y ait une raison pourquoi il a fait ainsi plutt qu'autrement3 on lui rpondrait que son illation serait vraie1 si le temps tait quelque chose1 hors des choses temporelles2 car il serait impossible qu'il y et des raisons pourquoi les choses eussent t appliques plutt de tels instants qu' d'autres1 leur succession demeurant la mme4 ,mais cela mme prouve que les instants hors des choses ne sont rien1 et qu'ils ne consistent que dans leur ordre successif2 lequel demeurant le mme1 l'un des deux tats1 comme celui de l'anticipation imagine1 ne diffrait en rien1 et ne saurait tre discern de l'autre qui est maintenant4444 ,il sera difficile de nous faire accroire que1 dans l'usage ordinaire1 sensorium ne signifie pas l'organe de la sensation4444 ,la simple prsence d'une substance mme anime ne suffit pas pour la perception2 un aveugle et mme un distrait ne voit point4 ,il faut expliquer comment l'me s'aperoit de ce qui est hors d'elle4 ,dieu n'est pas prsent aux choses par situation1 mais par essence2 sa prsence se manifeste par son opration immdiate4 ,la prsence de l'me est toute d'une autre nature4 ,dire qu'elle est diffuse par le corps1 c'est la rendre tendue et divisible2 dire qu'elle est tout entire en chaque partie de quelque corps1 c'est la rendre divisible d'elle-mme4 ,l'attacher un point1 la rpandre par plusieurs points1 tout cela ne sont qu'expressions abusives1 ,idola ,tribus4 ,clarke's ,answer3 ,il est indubitable que rien n'existe sans qu'il y ait une raison suffisante de son existence1 et que rien n'existe d'une certaine manire plutt que d'une autre1 sans qu'il y ait aussi une raison suffisante de cette manire d'exister4 ,mais l'gard des choses qui sont indiffrentes en elles-mmes1 la simple volont est une raison suffisante pour leur donner l'existence1 ou pour les faire exister d'une certaine manire2 et cette volont n'a pas besoin d'tre dtermine per une cause trangre4444 ,l'espace n'est pas une substance1 un tre ternel et infini1 mais une proprit ou une suite de l'existence d'un tre infini et ternel4 ,l'espace infini est l'immensit mais l'immensit n'est pas ,dieu2#fj donc l'espace infini n'est pas ,dieu4 ,ce que l'on dit ici de l'espace n'est point une difficult4 ,l'espace infini est absolument et essentiellement indivisible1 et c'est une contradiction dans les termes que de supposer qu'il soit divis2 car il faudrait qu'il y et un espace entre les parties que l'on suppose diviss2 ce qui est supposer que l'espace est divis et non divis en mme temps4#fa 444 #fj ,in this proposition ,clarke is either inexact and obscure1 or else he falls into a serious error4 ,the immensity of ,god is ,god himself4 ,every attribute of ,god is ,god4 #fa ,here ,clarke confounds divisibility with separability4 ,see chapters ,x4 and ,,xi4 of this book4 ,il ne s'agit pas de savoir ce que ,goclenius#fb entend par le mot de sensorium1 mais en quel sens ,m4 le chevalier ,newton s'est servi de ce mot dans son livre4 ,si ,goclenius croit que l'il1 l'oreille1 ou quelque autre organe des sens est le sensorium1 il se trompe4 ,mais quand un auteur emploie un terme d'art et qu'il dclare en quel sens il s'en sert1 quoi bon rechercher de quelle manire d'autres crivains ont entendu ce mme terme8 ,scapula traduit le mot dont il s'agit ici1 domicilium1 c'est--dire le lieu ou l'me rside4 #fb ,goclenius is the author of a philosophical dictionary quoted by ,leibnitz4 ,reply of ,leibnitz3 ,si l'espace infini est l'immensit1 l'espace fini sera l'oppos de l'immensit1 c'est--dire la mensurabilit ou l'tendue borne4 ,or l'tendue doit tre l'affection d'un tendu4 ,mais si cet espace est vide1 il sera un attribut sans sujet1 une tendue d'aucun tendu4 ,c'est pourquoi1 en faisant de l'espace une proprit1 l'on tombe dans mon sentiment1 qui le fait un ordre des choses et non pas quelque chose d'absolu4 ,si l'espace est une ralit absolue1 bien loin d'tre une proprit ou accidentalit oppose la substance1 il sera plus subsistant que les substances4 ,dieu ne le saurait dtruire1 ni mme changer en rien4 ,il est non-seulement immense dans le tout1 mais encore immuable et ternel en chaque partie4 ,il y aura une infinit de choses ternelles hors de ,dieu4 ,dire que l'espace infini est sans parties1 c'est dire que les espaces finis ne le composent point1 et que l'espace infini pourrait subsister quand tous les espaces finis seraient rduits rien4 ,ce serait comme si l'on disait1 dans la supposition cartsienne1 d'un univers tendu sans bornes1 que cet univers pourrait subsister quand tous les corps qui le composent seraient rduits rien 444 ,je serais bien aise de voir le passage d'un philosophe qui prenne sensorium autrement que ,goclenius4 ,si ,scapula dit que sensorium est la place o l'entendement rside1 il entendra l'organe de la sensation interne2 ainsi il ne s'loignera point de ,goclenius4 ,sensorium a toujours t l'organe de la sensation4 ,la glande pinale serait1 selon ,descartes1 le sensorium dans le sens qu'on rapporte de ,scapula4 ,il n'y a gure d'expression moins convenable sur se sujet que celle qui donne ,dieu un sensorium3 il semble qu'elle le fait l'me du monde4 ,et on aurait bien de la peine donner l'usage que ,m4 ,newton fait de ce mot un sens qui le puisse justifier4 ,clarke's ,answer3 ,on revient encore ici l'usage du mot de sensorium1 quoique ,m4 ,newton se soit servi d'un correctif lorsqu'il a employ ce mot4 ,il n'est pas ncessaire de rien ajouter ce que j'ai dit sur cela 444 ,l'espace destitu de corps est une proprit d'une substance immatrielle2 l'espace n'est pas born par les corps1 mais il existe galement dans les corps et hors des corps4 ,l'espace n'est pas renferm entre les corps2 mais les corps tant dans l'espace immense sont eux-mmes borns par leurs propres dimensions4 ,l'espace vide n'est pas un attribut sans sujet2 car par cet espace nous n'entendons pas un espace o il n'y a rien1 mais un espace sans corps4 ,dieu est certainement prsent dans tout l'espace vide1 et peut-tre qu'il y a aussi dans cet espace plusieurs autres substances qui ne sont pas matrielles1 et qui par consquent ne peuvent tre tangibles ni aperues par aucun de nos sens4 ,l'espace n'est pas une substance1 mais un attribut2 et si c'est un attribut d'un tre ncessaire1 il doit 7comme tous les autres attributs d'un tre ncessaire7 exister plus ncessairement que les substances mmes1 qui ne sont pas ncessaires4 ,l'espace est immense1 immuable et ternel2 et l'on doit dire la mme chose de la dure4 ,mais il ne s'ensuit pas de l qu'il n'y ait rien d'ternel hors de ,dieu1 car l'espace et la dure ne sont pas hors de ,dieu1 ce sont des suites immdiates et ncessaires de son existence1 sans lesquelles il ne serait point ternel et prsent partout4 ,les infinis ne sont composs de finis que comme les finis sont composs d'infinitsimes2 j'ai fait voir ci-dessus en quel sens on peut dire que l'espace a des parties ou qu'il n'en a pas4 ,les parties dans le sens que l'on donne ce mot1 lorsqu'on l'applique au corps1 sont sparables1 composes1 dsunies1 indpendantes les unes des autres et capables de mouvement4 ,mais quoique l'imagination puisse en quelque manire concevoir des parties dans l'espace infini1 cependant1 comme ces parties1 improprement ainsi dites1 sont essentiellement immobiles et insparables les unes des autres1 il s'ensuit que cet espace est essentiellement simple et absolument indivisible4#fc #fc ,here ,clarke falls again into the confusion we have spoken of1 and making divisibility the same thing as separability1 he asserts contradictory propositions4 ,reply of ,leibnitz3 ,comme j'avais object que l'espace pris pour quelque chose de rel et d'absolu1 sans les corps1 serait une chose ternelle1 impassible1 indpendante de ,dieu1 on a tch d'luder cette difficult en disant que l'espace est une proprit de ,dieu4 ,j'ai oppos cela1 dans mon crit prcdent1 que la proprit de ,dieu est l'immensit2 mais que l'espace1 qui est souvent commensur avec les corps1 et l'immensit de ,dieu1 n'est pas la mme chose4 ,j'ai encore object que1 si l'espace est une proprit1 et si l'espace infini est l'immensit de ,dieu1 l'espace fini sera l'tendue ou la mensurabilit de quelque chose finie4 ,ainsi l'espace occup par un corps sera l'tendue de ce corps1 chose absurde1 puisqu'un corps peut changer d'espace1 mais qu'il ne peut point quitter son tendue4 ,j'ai encore demand3 si l'espace est une proprit1 de quelle chose sera donc la proprit1 un espace vuide born1 tel qu'on s'imagine dans le rcipient puis air8 ,il ne parat point raisonnable de dire que cet espace vuide1 rond ou quarr1 soit une proprit de ,dieu4 ,sera-ce donc peut-tre la proprit de quelques substances immatrielles1 tendues1 imaginaires1 qu'on se figure 7se semble7 dans les espaces imaginaires8 ,si l'espace est la proprit ou l'affection de la substance qui est dans l'espace1 le mme espace sera tantt l'affection d'un corps1 tantt d'un autre corps1 tantt d'une substance immatrielle1 tantt1 peut-tre1 de ,dieu1 quand il est vuide de toute autre substance matrielle ou immatrielle4 ,mais voil une trange proprit ou affection1 qui passe de sujet en sujet4 ,les sujets quitteront ainsi leurs accidents comme un habit1 afin que d'autres sujets s'en puissent revtir4 ,aprs cela comment distinguera-t-on les accidents et les substances8 ,que si les espaces borns qui y sont1 et si l'espace infini est la proprit de ,dieu1 il faut 7chose trange7 que la proprit de ,dieu soit compose des affections des cratures2 car tous les espaces finis1 pris ensemble1 composent l'espace infini4 ,que si l'on nie que l'espace born soit une affection des choses bornes1 il ne sera pas raisonnable non plus que l'espace infini soit l'affection ou la proprit d'une chose infinie4 ,j'avais insinu toutes ces difficults dans mon crit prcdent1 mais il ne parat point qu'on ait tch d'y satisfaire4 ,j'ai encore d'autres raisons contre l'trange imagination que l'espace est une proprit de ,dieu4 ,si cela est1 l'espace entre dans l'essence de ,dieu4 ,or l'espace a des parties2 donc il y aurait des parties dans l'essence de ,dieu1 spectatum admissi4 ,de plus des espaces sont tantt vuides1 tantt remplis2 donc il y aura dans l'essence de ,dieu des parties tantt vuides1 tantt remplies1 et par consquent sujettes un changement perptuel4 ,les corps remplissant l'espace rempliraient une partie de l'essence de ,dieu1 et y seraient commensurs2 et1 dans la supposition du vuide1 une partie de l'essence sera dans le rcipient4 ,ce dieu parties ressemblera fort au dieu stocien1 qui tait l'univers entier1 considr comme un animal divin4 ,si l'espace infini est l'immensit de ,dieu1 le temps infini sera l'ternit de ,dieu2 il faudra donc dire que ce qui est dans l'espace est dans l'immensit de ,dieu1 et par consquent dans son essence2 et que ce qui est dans le temps est dans l'ternit de ,dieu4 ,phrases tranges1 et qui font bien connatre qu'on abuse des termes4 ,en voici encore une autre instance4 ,l'immensit de ,dieu fait que ,dieu est dans tous les espaces4 ,mais si ,dieu est dans l'espace1 comment peut-on dire que l'espace est en ,dieu1 ou qu'il est sa proprit8 ,on a bien ou dire que la proprit soit dans le sujet2 mais on n'a jamais ou dire que le sujet soit dans la proprit4 ,de mme1 ,dieu existe en chaque temps1 comment donc le temps est-il dans ,dieu1 et comment peut-il tre une proprit de ,dieu8 ,ce sont des alloglossies perptuelles4444 ,comme j'avais object que l'espace a des parties1 on cherche un autre chappatoire en s'loignant du sens reu des termes1 et soutenant que l'espace n'a point de parties2 parce que ses parties ne sont point sparables et ne sauraient tre loignes les unes des autres par discerption4 ,mais il suffit que l'espace ait des parties1 soit que ces parties soient sparables ou non2 et on les peut assigner dans l'espace1 soit par les corps qui y sont1 soit par les lignes ou surfaces qu'on peut mener4444 ,on s'excuse de n'avoir point dit que l'espace est le sensorium de ,dieu1 mais seulement comme son sensorium4 ,il semble que l'un est aussi peu convenable et aussi peu intelligible que l'autre4444 ,si ,dieu sent ce qui ce passe dans le monde1 par le moyen d'un sensorium1 il semble que les choses agissent sur lui1 et qu'ainsi il est comme on conoit l'me du monde4 ,on m'impute de rpter les objections1 sans prendre connaissance des rponses2 mais je ne vois point qu'on ait satisfait cette difficult2 on ferait mieux de renoncer tout fait ce sensorium prtendu4 ,for the rest of this interesting discussion1 ,i refer the reader to the works of ,leibnitz4 ,these extracts may serve to show what importance eminent philosophers attributed to the questions on space4 ,,on ,,chapter ,,xvii4 7#ca7 ,in order that the reader may form a perfect conception of ,kant's opinion of space1 and judge for himself whether there is or not the contradiction which we have intimated1 ,i extract a few passages from his works4 ,the transcendental conception of phenomena#fd in space is a critical observation that1 in general nothing perceived in space is any thing in itself2 that space is1 moreover1 a form of things1 and would belong to them if considered in themselves2 but that objects in themselves are wholly unknown to us1 and those things which we call external objects1 are only the pure representations of our sensibility1 whose form is space1 and whose true correlative1 that is to say1 the thing in itself1 is for this reason wholly unknown1 and will always remain so2 for experience can tell us nothing of it4 #fd ,kant defines phenomenon1 the indeterminate object of an empirical intuition4 ,he calls empirical intuition1 that which relates to an object by means of sensation4 ,he understands by sensation1 the effect of an object on the representative faculty1 in so far as we are affected by it4--,transcend4 sthet4 ,i4 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 ,it is altogether certain1 and not merely possible or probable1 that space and time1 as the necessary conditions of all experience1 both internal and external1 are purely subjective conditions of all our intuitions4 ,it is therefore equally certain that all objects in relation with space and time1 are only simple phenomena and not things in themselves1 if considered according to the manner in which they are given us4 ,much may be said a priori of the form of objects1 but nothing of the thing in itself1 which serves as the ground of these phenomena4--,transc4 sth4 ,i4 ,this doctrine of ,kant's brought upon him the charge of idealism1 and drew from the ,german philosopher explanations which some look upon as a manifest contradiction4 ,here is how ,kant defends himself from idealism3 ,when ,i say that in space and time the intuitions of external objects1 and of the mind1 represent these two things as they affect our senses1 ,i do not mean to say that objects are a pure appearance2 for in the phenomenon1 the objects1 and even the properties which we attribute to them1 are always considered as something really given2 but that as this quality of being given depends only on the manner of perception of the subject in its relation with the object given1 this object as phenomenon1 is different from what it is as object in itself4 ,i do not say that bodies merely seem to be external1 or that my soul merely seems to have been given me in consciousness4 ,when ,i assert that the qualities of space and time 7in conformity to which ,i place the body and the soul as the condition of their existence7 exist only in my mode of intuition1 and not in the objects themselves1 ,i should do wrong to convert into a mere appearance what ,i must take for a phenomenon2 but this does not occur1 if my principle of the ideality of all our sensible intuitions is admitted4 ,on the contrary1 if an objective reality is given to all these forms of sensible representations1 every thing is inevitably converted into a pure appearance2 for1 if space and time are considered as qualities which1 as to their possibility1 must be found in the things themselves1 and we reflect on the absurdities which follow1 since two infinite things1 which can neither be substances1 nor any thing inherent in a substance1 but which are still something existent1 and even the necessary condition of the existence of all things would still subsist1 though all the rest were annihilated1 we cannot blame ,berkeley for reducing bodies to a mere appearance4--,ibid4 #b;d ,edition4 ,in the ,transcendental ,logic there is also a reputation of idealism4 ,there ,kant establishes this theorem3 ,the mere consciousness of my own existence1 empirically determined1 proves the existence of objects outside of me in space4 ,it is not possible for me to give here the doctrines of ,kant's ,transcendental ,logic2 it is enough to have given his remarks on the reality of objects2 others call them retractations or contradictions1 and give various causes for them1 which1 however1 do not belong to the field of philosophy4 ,,on ,,chapter ,,xix4 7#cb7 ,the scholastics always carefully separated the sensible order from the intelligible4 ,kant was not the first to discover the limits which divide the intelligible from the sensible1 things in themselves as objects of the understanding1 noumena1 as he calls them1 from things as represented in sensible intuition1 phenomena4 ,the scholastics were so far from regarding sensible representations as sufficient for intelligence1 that they denied that they were intelligible4 ,the intellect might know sensible things1 but it was necessary for it to abstract them from material conditions4 ,on account of its limitation1 it required the intuition of objects in sensible representation1 conversio ad phantasmata2 but these intuitions were not the intellectual act1 they were only its necessary conditions4 ,hence proceeded the theory of the intellectus agens1 which some have laughed at1 because they did not understand it4 ,this hypothesis has strong reasons in its favor1 whatever may be its intrinsic value1 if1 setting aside the form in which it is expressed1 we attend only to its ideological profoundness4 ,in reading some passages in ,kant's ,transcendental ,logic on phenomena and noumena1 on the necessity of sensible intuition in pure conceptions1 and the distinction of the intuition from the conception1 and on the sensible and intelligible worlds corresponding to the sensitive and intellective faculties1 we might suppose that the ,german philosopher had read the scholastics4 ,true1 he departed from their doctrines1 but what of that8 ,the authors from whom we learn the most1 are not always those whose opinions we follow4 ,in the treatise on ideas1 ,i shall have occasion to explain my opinion on this point2 for the present ,i shall only make a few extracts from ,st4 ,thomas1 the most illustrious representative of the scholastic philosophy4 ,the reader will find that he clearly explains our necessity of sensible representations1 7phantasmata17 and the line which divides these representations from the purely intellectual order4 7,pars #a1 ,q4 ,,lxxix41 art4 #c47 ,sed quia ,aristoteles non posuit formas rerum naturalium subsistere sine materia1 form autem in materia existentes non sunt intelligibiles actu2 sequebatur1 quod natur1 seu form rerum sensibilium1 quas intelligimus1 non essent intelligibiles actu4 ,nihil autem reducitur de potentia in actum1 nisi per aliquod ens actu3 sicut sensus fit in actu per sensibile in actu4 ,oportet igitur ponere aliquam virtutem ex parte intellectus1 qu faceret intelligibilia in actu per abstractionem specierum a conditionibus materialibus4 ,et hc est necessitas ponendi intellectum agentem4 7,p4 #a1 ,q4 ,,lxxix41 art4 #d74 ,ad cujus evidentiam considerandum est1 quod supra animam intellectivam humanam1 necesse est ponere aliquem superiorem intellectum1 a quo anima virtutem intelligendi obtineat4 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 ,nihil autem est perfectius in inferioribus rebus anima humana4 ,unde oportet dicere1 quod in ipsa sit aliqua virtus derivata a superiori intellectu1 per quam possit phantasmata illustrare4 ,et hoc experimento cognoscimus1 dum percipimus nos abstrahere formas universales a conditionibus particularibus1 quod est facere actu intelligibilia4 7,p4 #a4 ,q41 ,,lxxxiv41 art4 #a47 ,hoc autem necessarium non est3 quia etiam in ipsis sensibilibus videmus1 quod forma alio modo est in uno sensibilium1 quam in altero2 puta cum in uno est albedo intensior1 in alio remissior1 ut cum in uno est albedo cum dulcedine1 in alio sine dulcedine4 ,et per hunc etiam modum1 forma sensibilis alio modo est in re1 qu est extra animam1 et alio modo in sensu1 qui suspicit formas sensibilium absque materia1 sicut colorem auri sine auro4 ,et similiter intellectus species corporum1 qu sunt materiales et mobiles1 recipit immaterialiter1 et immobiliter1 secundum modum suum1 nam receptum est in recipiente per modum recipientis4 ,dicendum est ergo1 quod anima per intellectum cognoscit corpora1 cognitione immateriali1 universali et necessaria4 7,p4 ,i1 ,q4 ,,lxxxiv41 art4 #f47 ,et ideo ad causandam intellectualem operationem secundum ,aristotelem non sufficit sola impressio sensibilium corporum1 sed requiritur aliquid nobilius1 quia agens est honorabilius patiente1 ut ipse dicit4 ,non autem quod intellectualis operatio causetur ex sola impressione aliquarum rerum superiorum1 ut ,plato posuit1 sed illud superius1 et nobilius agens1 quod vocat intellectum agentem1 de quo jam supra diximus quod facit phantasmata a sensibus accepta intelligibilia in actu1 per modum abstractionis cuiusdam4 ,secundum hoc ergo1 ex parte phantasmatum intellectualis operatio a sensu causatur4 ,sed quia phantasmata non sufficiunt immutare intellectum possibilem1 sed oportet quod fiant intelligibilia actu per intellectum agentem1 non potest dici quod sensibilis cognitio sit totalis1 et perfecta causa intellectualis cognitionis1 sed magis quodammodo est materia caus4 ,,end ,,of ,,vol4 ,i4 99 99 99 99 99 ,transcriber's note3 ,obvious typographical errors have been silently corrected4 ,hyphenation has been standardised4 ,variations in spelling1 punctuation and accents are as in the original4 ,repetition of the titles of ,books #b and #c has been removed4 ,footnotes1 identified thus #a1 are placed at the end of paragraph4 ,references to the ,notes on ,chapters are identified thus 7#a7 at the end of the chapter as in the original4 ,page #dcc1 para #aed1 ,there is no need of attributing to the inligent spirit4444 ,inligent corrected to intelligent4 ,page #dhf1 ,,ii4 ,the relations of our organs to objects are intrinsically immutable4 ,the to has been added4