,transcriber's ,note3 ,a catalog of publications was included at the end of the text4 ,where words occur in ,greek script1 7transliterations7 have been added4 99 99 99 99 99 ,shaw ,fellowship ,lectures1 #ahhd ,,on ,,the ,,ethics ,,of ,,naturalism ,,by ,w4 ,r4 ,,sorley1 ,m4,a4 ,,fellow ,,of ,,trinity ,,college1 ,,cambridge2 ,,and ,,examiner ,,in ,,philosophy ,,in ,,the ,,university ,,of ,,edinburgh ,,william ,,blackwood ,,and ,,sons ,,edinburgh ,,and ,,london ,,mdccclxxxv ,all ,rights reserved ,,prefatory ,,note4 ,the ,deed of ,foundation of the ,shaw ,fellowship provides that it shall be in the power of the ,senatus ,academicus of the ,university of ,edinburgh to require the holder of the ,shaw ,philosophical ,fellowship1 during the fourth or fifth year of his tenure of it1 to deliver in the ,university of ,edinburgh a course of ,lectures1 not exceeding four1 on any of the subjects for the encouragement of the study of which the ,fellowship has been founded4 ,the following pages consist of four lectures delivered in the ,university of ,edinburgh1 in accordance with this provision1 in the month of ,january #ahhd4 ,since their delivery1 the argument of the lectures has been revised1 and in some places enlarged4 ,i have also thought it better to modify their original form by dividing the discussion into chapters4 ,w4 ,r4 ,s4 ,,contents4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,,ethics ,,and ,,its ,,problems4 ,,page #a4 ,connection of ethics with theoretical philosophy1 #a 7a7 ,dependence of ethical on theoretical points of view1 #a 7b7 ,ethics necessary to complete philosophy1 #c #b4 ,the inquiry into the ethical end1 #e 7a7 ,fundamental1 #e 7b7 ,implies a new point of view1 #g 7c7 ,distinct from other ethical questions1 #i 77 ,from the inquiry into the methods of ethics1 #aj 77 ,from moral psychology and sociology1 #ac #c4 ,scope of the present inquiry1 #ad ,,part ,i4 ,,the ,,individualistic ,,theory4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,egoism4 ,definition of ,naturalism1 #bj ,psychological hedonism1 #ba #a4 ,its theory of action ambiguous1 #bb ,referring to-- 7a7 ,actual consequences of action1 #bc 7b7 ,or its expected consequences1 #bc 7c7 ,or its present characteristics1 #bd #b4 ,ethical inferences from this theory1 #be #c4 ,transition from psychological to ethical hedonism1 #ca #d4 ,possible objections considered1 #cg ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,the ,,transition ,,to ,,utilitarianism4 #a4 ,difference of the standpoints of individual and ,state1 #da #b4 ,connection between egoism and utilitarianism according to ,bentham1 #de 7a7 ,utilitarianism not a political duty1 #df 7b7 ,nor a moral duty1 #dg 7c7 ,nor insisted on as a religious duty1 #di 7d7 ,nor sufficiently motived in private ethics1 #ej #c4 ,exhaustive character of ,bentham's treatment from his point of view1 #ea 7a7 ,the religious sanction 7,paley71 #ec 7b7 ,limits of the political sanction1 #ed 7c7 ,uncertainty of the social sanction1 #ee 7d7 ,and of the internal sanction so far as a result of the social1 #ef #d4 ,mill's logical defence of utilitarianism1 #eg 7a7 ,distinction of kinds of pleasure1 #eh 7b7 ,ambiguities in his proof1 #fj #e4 ,actual transition to utilitarianism1 #fb 7a7 ,recognition of sympathy1 #fd 7b7 ,the idea of equality1 #fi #f4 ,the two sides of utilitarian theory without logical connection1 #gc #g4 ,summary of the ethical consequences of psychological hedonism1 #ge ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,moral ,,sentiment4 #a4 ,a uniform psychological theory not supplied by the opponents of ethical hedonism1 #gh #b4 ,the non-hedonistic theory of action1 #hd #c4 ,ethics made to depend on the moral sense1 #hi 7a7 ,as harmony of impulses1 #ij 7b7 ,as a separate sensitive faculty1 #ib 7c7 ,as an internal law1 #ajj #d4 ,the ethics of moral sentiment a mediating theory1 #aje ,,part ,,ii4 ,,the ,,theory ,,of ,,evolution4 ,,chapter ,v4 ,,the ,,theory ,,of ,,evolution ,,and ,,the ,,development ,,of ,,morality4 #a4 ,general characteristics of the theory of evolution1 #ajg ,an assertion of the unity of life1 #aji ,primarily historical1 but capable of ethical application1 #aaj #b4 ,the development of morality1 #aaf 7a7 ,historical psychology1 #aaf ,its difficulties1 #aag ,its result1 #abc 7b7 ,development of society1 #abd ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,evolution ,,and ,,ethical ,,theories4 ,bearing of the theory of evolution1 #abf #a4 ,on theories depending on moral sentiment or intuition1 #abg 7a7 ,ethical value of moral sentiments affected by their origin1 #acj 7b7 ,organic character of moral sentiments1 #acb ,resultant attitude of evolutionism to intuitionism1 #acc #b4 ,on egoism3 relation of egoism to altruism1 #acd 7a7 ,social nature of the individual1 #ace 7b7 ,limits to conciliation of egoism and altruism1 #ada 77 ,continued existence of competition1 #adb 77 ,different and conflicting degrees of altruism1 #adc 77 ,altruism of interest and altruism of motive1 #adc 77 ,weakness of altruistic feelings1 #adf 7c7 ,tendency of evolution opposed to egoism1 #adh ,evolution not the basis of psychological hedonism1 #adh ,nor of ethical hedonism1 #aej #c4 ,on utilitarianism1 #aeb ,modification of the utilitarian method1 #aec ,and of its principle1 #aee ,evolutionist objections to utilitarianism1 #aee 7a7 ,as prescribing an unprogressive ideal1 #aef 7b7 ,as a theory of consequences1 #afj 7c7 ,as related solely to sensibility1 #afa ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,,hedonism ,,and ,,evolutionism4 #a4 ,alliance of evolutionism and hedonism1 #afd 7a7 ,from interpreting greatest happiness by the laws of life1 #afd 7b7 ,from interpreting life by pleasure1 #afe #b4 ,evolutionist argument for concomitance of life and pleasure1 #afg #c4 ,objections to this argument1 #afh 7a7 ,that life cannot bring more pleasure than pain1 #afi 77 ,from the negative nature of pleasure1 #aga 77 ,from the facts of human life1 #agb 7b7 ,that the evolution of life does not uniformly tend to pleasure1 #agb 77 ,incompleteness of the evolutionist argument1 #agc 77 ,the pessimist doctrine that life tends to misery1 #age 7aa7 ,the hypothesis of the unconscious1 #agf 7bb7 ,the nature of volition1 #agg 7cc7 ,the facts of human progress1 #agi ,individual progress1 #agi ,social progress1 #aha #d4 ,the psychological analysis of pleasure and pain in relation to evolutionist ethics1 #ahf 7a7 ,the subjective nature of pleasure and pain1 #ahg 7b7 ,the conditions of pleasure and pain1 #aij 7c7 ,application of the theory of evolution1 #aig ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,,the ,,evolutionist ,,end4 ,necessity of inquiring into the ethical end suggested by the theory of evolution1 #bja #a4 ,adaptation to environment1 #bjc 7a7 ,as the end for present conduct1 #bjg ,opposed to progress1 #bjg ,does not fully represent evolution1 #bji 7b7 ,as describing the ultimate condition of life1 #baj ,resultant absolute code1 #baa 77 ,abstract principles of social relation1 #bab 77 ,personal end only defined as adaptation1 #bac 77 ,cannot be shown to lead to happiness1 #bac 7c7 ,insufficiency of adaptation as evolutionist end1 #bag #b4 ,end suggested by the tendency to variation1 #bba 7a7 ,prescribes self-development rather than self-preservation1 #bbb 7b7 ,standard for measuring development found in complexity of act and motive1 #bbg 77 ,antinomy between social and individual ends1 #bca 77 ,psychological defects1 #bcb #c4 ,development or increase of life as the end1 #bcf 7a7 ,subjective standard3 most persistent impulses1 #bdb ,cannot define life without an objective standard1 #bdd 7b7 ,objective standard3 defined in two ways1 #bdg 77 ,conformity to the type1 #bdh ,which can be reduced to-- 77 ,abundance and variety of vital power1 #bea ,that is1 to the subjective standard1 #bec ,summary as to the evolutionist end1 #bef 7a7 ,difficulty of reconciling individual and social ends1 #bef 7b7 ,hedonistic interpretation of evolution not possible1 #beg 7c7 ,no independent ethical ideal1 #bei ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,,on ,,the ,,basis ,,of ,,ethics4 #a4 ,principles involved in theory of evolution1 #bfc #b4 ,unsuccessful application of these principles to ethics1 #bfd 7a7 ,the principles being treated empirically1 #bfe 7b7 ,no logical transition having been effected from efficient to final cause1 #bfg #c4 ,difference between causality and teleology1 #bfi #d4 ,reference to self-consciousness implied in evolution1 #bgg 7a7 ,attempt to trace the genesis of self-consciousness1 #bgh 7b7 ,attempt to trace morality from reflex action1 #bhc #e4 ,the unity of self-consciousness1 #bhd 7a7 ,as making possible the transition from knowledge to morality1 #bhd 7b7 ,as determining the character of the ethical end1 #bhf 7c7 ,as showing that the realisation of the end must be progressive1 #bia ,,the ,,ethics ,,of ,,naturalism4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,,ethics ,,and ,,its ,,problems4 ,sidenote3 #a4 ,connection of ethics with theoretical philosophy4 ,sidenote3 7a7 ,dependence of ethical on theoretical points of view ,sidenote3 7a7 teleological1 ,sidenote3 7b7 jural1 ,sidenote3 7c7 empirical3 ,it is a common remark that a writer's ethical doctrine is throughout conditioned by his attitude to the problems of theoretical philosophy4 ,the main lines of dispute in questions of ethics may be regarded as prolongations of the controversies which arise in metaphysics and psychology4 ,the ,realism or ,idealism which marks a speculative system reappears in its ethics1 whilst differences in the psychological analysis of mental states1 or concerning the relation of pleasure to desire1 are grounds of distinction between schools of moralists4 ,and not only are the special controversies of ethics decided in different ways1 but the scope of the whole science is differently conceived1 as the speculative standpoint changes4 ,thus1 not for one school only1 but for a whole period in the history of reflection1 ethics was regarded as an inquiry into the highest human good4 ,opposed schools agreed in looking from this point of view1 however much they might differ from one another in defining the nature of that highest good4 ,at other times1 according to the prevailing view1 to investigate and systematise the rules of conduct has exhausted the scope of ethics--controversies being carried on as to the nature of those rules1 and their source in external authority or in the internal revelation of conscience4 ,again1 ethical inquiry has been apparently identified with the analysis and history of the moral affections and sentiments2 while a purely external point of view seems to be sometimes adopted1 and ethics held to be an investigation of the historical results of action1 and of the forms1 customary and institutional1 in which those results find permanent expression4 ,sidenote3 to be connected by philosophy4 ,these different ways of looking at the whole subject proceed from points of view whose effects are not confined to ethics1 but may be followed out in other lines of investigation4 ,they correspond to ideas which dominate different types of thought and form different philosophical standpoints4 ,the first starts from a teleological conception of human nature1 as an organism consciously striving towards its end4 ,the second assimilates ethics to a system of legal enactments1 and is connected with the jural conceptions of theology and law4 ,the two last are concerned to show that the subject-matter of ethics are facts which have to be treated by the ordinary inductive and historical methods4 ,these different points of view1 however1 are to be regarded as complementary rather than as conflicting1 although their complete synthesis must be worked out in the region of general philosophy1 and not on purely ethical ground4 ,philosophy has thus to deal with the notions which determine the scope and character of ethical thought2 and in this way it must necessarily pass from the purely speculative to the practical point of view4 ,if it is the business of philosophy to bring into rational order the material supplied by experience1 cosmical and anthropological1 it cannot be without bearing on the function of man as a source of action in the world4 ,the question1 ,what are the ends man is naturally fitted to attain8 or--if we prefer so to express it--,what are the ends he ought to pursue8 is not merely as natural as the question1 ,what can a man know of the world and of himself8 ,but the two questions are inseparably connected4 ,to know man is to know him not only as a thinking but also as an active being2 while to solve the problem of the ends of man implies knowledge both of his nature and of the sphere of his activity4 ,sidenote3 7b7 ,ethics necessary to complete philosophy4 ,much distrust is often expressed of metaphysics4 ,but it is not denied that the philosophy--whether metaphysical or not--in which our most comprehensive view of the world finds its reasoned expression1 cannot neglect that aspect of things in which man is related to his surroundings as a source of action4 ,recent ethical literature is itself a proof of this fact4 ,in its speculative developments1 both realistic and idealistic1 the philosophy of the present day has made the endeavour to connect its conceptions of the world of thought and nature with the ends contemplated as to be realised in the realm of action4 ,whatever difficulties may be involved in the transition from the is to the ought to be1 it is yet implied that the transition requires to be made1 not merely in order that human activity may be shown to be rational1 but that reason itself may be justified by leaving nothing outside its sphere4 ,we must make no attempt1 therefore1 to draw a line of absolute separation between the first two of the three questions in which1 as ,kant says1#a all the interests of our reason centre4 ,the ,what ought ,i to do8 of ethics is for ever falling back on the ,what can ,i know8 of metaphysics4 ,the question of practice must accordingly be treated throughout in connection with the question of knowledge4 ,if we use ,kant's distinction between speculative and practical reason1 we must always bear in mind that it is the same reason which is in one reference speculative1 in another practical4#b ,we are not at liberty to assume with ,butler#c that morality 444 must be somewhat plain and easy to be understood3 it must appeal to what we call common-sense4 ,nor may we presuppose1 as ,hutcheson did1#d that it is a subject about which a little reflection will discover the truth4 ,the question must be looked upon not so much as one of immediate practical as of scientific interest1 and reason is to be regarded as the only court of appeal4 ,sidenote3 #b4 ,the inquiry into the ethical end ,sidenote3 7a7 fundamental1 ,the form just quoted1 in which ,kant states the problem1 is not altogether free from ambiguity4 ,what ought ,i to do8 may be taken to signify1 ,what means should ,i adopt for the attainment of some end presupposed1 perhaps unconsciously1 as the end to be sought8 ,but it is evident1 not only that this is not what ,kant himself meant by the question1 but that1 as thus put1 it necessarily implies a further and deeper question4 ,not the discovery of the means1 but the determination of the end itself--the end which cannot be interpreted as a mere means to some further end--is the fundamental question of ethics4 ,it is only by misconception that this can be thought to be a trivial question4 ,to say1 as a recent scientific writer does1#e that happiness in one disguise or another is the end of human life is common ground for all the schools1 is either to ignore what the schools have taught1#f or else to use the word happiness merely as another name for the highest good4 ,but1 even were it still the case1 as it was in the time of ,aristotle1 that nearly all men were agreed as to the name of the highest good1 and that the common people and the cultured alike called it happiness1 the difference as to what they meant by the term would still remain4 ,to say that the ethical end is happiness is1 to use ,locke's terminology1 a trifling proposition2 for in so doing we merely give it a name#g--;and one which the controversies of philosophy have surrounded with confusion4 ,that the end is happiness in any definite sense1 for example1 as the greatest balance of pleasure over pain1 may be perfectly true1 but stands very much in need of proof4 ,that happiness is the highest ethical end can be assumed as true only when happiness is nothing more than an abbreviated expression for the highest ethical end4 ,sidenote3 7b7 implies a new point of view1 ,a difficulty of a more radical kind meets us1 at the very outset of our inquiry1 in the distinctively ethical notion expressed by the word ought4 ,various attempts have been made to surmount or circumvent this difficulty2 and some of these will come under consideration in the sequel4 ,the very notion of conscious activity contains the idea of bringing about something which does not yet exist4 ,it involves a purpose or end4 ,the notion ought1 it is true1 means more than this3 it implies an obligation to pursue a definite end or conform to definite rules1 regarded generally as coming from an authoritative source4 ,in this clear and full sense1 oughtness or duty is a comparatively recent notion1 foreign to the classical period of ,greek ethics4 ,the force and definiteness belonging to the modern conception of it are due to the juridical aspect which the ,stoic philosophy1 ,roman law1 and ,christian theology combined to impress upon morality4 ,but even the notion of purpose or end implies a preference of the end sought3 the state to be realised is looked upon as better or more to be desired than the existing state4 ,we may ask for the reason of this superior desirableness2 but the answer must soon fall back upon the assertion of something held to be desirable in itself4 ,the question which we are always asking1 and cannot help asking1 ,why is such and such an end to be pursued by me8 or ,why ought ,i to follow such and such a course of conduct8 must soon lead to the assertion of an ultimate end4 ,sidenote3 the transition to which requires investigation2 ,this end1 therefore1 must not be sought for some ulterior end1 nor desired as a means to satisfy any other desire4 ,but it is still necessary to inquire into the way in which the end1 held to be ultimate in a practical regard1 stands related to the constitution of man and his environment4 ,and the question to which ,i would draw attention1 as the fundamental problem of ethics1 is1 ,what is that which men have variously called happiness1 the highest good1 the ethical end8 or1 more precisely1 ,how can a transition be made from the notions of theoretical philosophy to the determination of that ethical end8 ,no assumption is made1 at starting1 as to the nature of this end1 or the manner of arriving at it4 ,it may be a transient state of feeling1 or a permanent type of character2 or it may by its very nature defy exact definition1--the idea itself being perfected as its realisation is progressively approached4 ,in any case it requires to be brought into connection with the ultimate conceptions of thought and existence4 ,this question of the ethical end or highest good is thus fundamental in ethical science1 and upon it all other questions in ethics finally depend4 ,but it is easy to see that it does not cover the whole field1 and that the other points of view already referred to have a legitimate application4 ,ethics has not only to determine the end1 but to apply it to practice1 and so to decide as to what is right or wrong in particular actions1 and virtuous or vicious in character4 ,and1 in addition to the two questions thus implied--the question as to the ethical end1 and that as to the application of it to practical affairs--there is another department of inquiry which has had a place assigned to it in most ethical systems1 and which has a right to be regarded as belonging to ethics4 ,we may investigate the place1 in the individual and the community respectively1 both of the sentiments and ideas and of the social institutions and customs through which morality is manifested2 and this inquiry covers the twofold ground of what may be called moral psychology and moral sociology4 ,sidenote3 7c7 distinct from other ethical questions3 ,of these three questions1 the first forms the subject of inquiry in the following pages4 ,it seems to me that a great part of the obscurity which surrounds ethical argument is due to confounding these different questions4 ,it is true that no one of them is without bearing on the others2 but it is none the less necessary1 in discussing any one of them1 to keep its distinctness from those others well in view4 ,in inquiring into the foundation on which the ethical end is based1 ,i do not intend to develop a code of rules for practical conduct or a theory of human virtue2 nor shall ,i attempt to trace the origin and nature of moral sentiments and ideas1 or of the social institutions and customs connected with morality4 ,if these subjects have to be introduced at all1 it will be only in so far as they may be thought to decide1 or tend to decide1 the question more immediately in view4 ,sidenote3 77 from inquiry into the methods of ethics4 ,sidenote3 ,limitation of this inquiry ,sidenote3 7aa7 from necessity of investigating all logical alternatives1 ,thus it forms no part of the present inquiry to follow out the application to conduct of different ethical ends1 or to exhibit the different practical systems to which different ends naturally lead4 ,it might seem indeed1 at first sight1 as if the development of their practical consequences might solve the question as to the nature of the ends themselves4 ,if we assume certain possible and prim facie reasonable ethical ends1 and then see what codes of morality they will yield1 surely 7it may be thought7 that one which affords the most consistent and harmonious code for the guidance of life will be the end to be sought in preference to all others4 ,but in order that the criticism of what ,professor ,sidgwick has called the methods of ethics may be able to answer the question as to the end or principle of ethics1 certain conditions must first be complied with4 ,in the first place1 it is necessary that the ends or principles whose applications to conduct are to be examined must not be uncritically accepted from the fluctuating morality of common-sense nor from the commonplaces of the schools1 but must be shown to be alternatives between which the human mind is necessarily forced to choose when it attempts to frame a complete synthesis of practical maxims1 and to act in a perfectly rational manner4#h ,sidenote3 7bb7 from more than one self-consistent code being possible1 ,but although this requisite is complied with1 it will still remain possible1 in the second place1 that two or more of the assumed principles may yield systems of practical rules perfectly self-consistent1 and yet inconsistent with one another4#i ,it would be very hard indeed to show that both the theory of ,egoistic ,hedonism1 and what is generally called ,utilitarianism1 do not succeed in doing so3 and thus the examination of methods is not of itself sufficient to settle the question of the end of conduct4 ,and since--to quote ,mr ,sidgwick#aj--;it is a fundamental postulate of ethics that either these methods must be reconciled and harmonised1 or all but one of them rejected1 it follows that the criticism of methods leads naturally up to an independent criticism of principles1 unless indeed it can be shown that one method only yields a consistent code of practical rules4 ,sidenote3 7cc7 from its assumption that the true end must give perfectly consistent rules4 ,even in this case1 however1 if it led to the adoption of the end in question1 it must be borne in mind that the postulate would be implied that the true ethical end must be able to yield a consistent and harmonious system of rules for practical life4 ,without altogether denying this postulate1 it yet seems to me that it stands in need of qualification4 ,for in different circumstances1 and at different stages of individual and social development1 the application of the same ethical end may naturally produce different and conflicting courses of conduct4 ,we must not start with any such assumption as that the rationality of the end consists in some sort of mathematical equality which ignores alike the different environment with which one age and another surround different generations1 and the different functions which one individual and another have to perform in the social whole4 ,we must leave open the possibility that what is right now may be wrong in another age2 we must remember that everybody may not count for one1 and that some people may count for more than one2 we must admit that we may have sometimes to do to others what we would not that others should do to us4 ,the only consistency we have a right to demand must leave room for such a variety of different conditions as to be1 by itself1 a very insecure guide4 ,from the difficulty of complying with the above conditions1 it seems practically impossible for the criticism of ethical methods to decide the question of the ethical end4 ,even if the application to conduct of every important end has been taken account of1 we are met with the difficulty that two or more mutually antagonistic though self-consistent practical codes may probably have been developed1 while we are not even justified in assuming that inability to yield a system which will fit the complex circumstances of life in a perfectly harmonious manner is sufficient ground for rejecting an end shown in some other way to be reasonable4 ,sidenote3 77 distinct from moral psychology and sociology4 ,the last department of ethics referred to--that which has to do with the origin and nature of moral sentiments and social customs--has a bearing on the question of the end of conduct in some respects more important than the investigation of ethical methods4 ,for1 whereas the latter expressly assumes certain ends as prim facie reasonable1 the former inquiry1 on the contrary1 is now frequently understood to be able1 without presupposing any ethical relations whatever1 to trace the way in which1 from primitive feelings and customs1 morality itself has been evolved4 ,the psychological side of ethical inquiry has always had an important place with ,english moralists4 ,at times1 indeed1 the question of the moral faculty has excited so much interest as to divert attention from the nature of morality itself4 ,moral truth has been supposed to be something known and indisputable1 the only question being how we came to know it4 ,but the psychology of ethics1 reinforced by the knowledge sociology gives of the development of morality1 rises now to larger issues4 ,it attempts to show the genesis of the moral from the non-moral1 to account thus for the origin of ethical ideas1 and even to determine what kinds of ends are to be striven after4 ,in this way1 a theory of the origin and growth of moral sentiments and institutions is made to render important help to more than one of the theories which will fall to be considered in the sequel4 ,sidenote3 #c4 ,present inquiry limited ,sidenote3 to theories depending on the human constitution1 ,the present ,essay has to inquire into the way in which we may determine what the end of human conduct is1--into the basis of ethics1 therefore4 ,but ,i do not propose to offer an exhaustive investigation of all the theories which have been or may be started in solution of the problem4 ,on the contrary1 ,i will begin by excluding from the inquiry all theories which seek the basis of ethics in something outside the constitution of man as a feeling and reasoning agent3#aa not because ,i contend that all such theories are prim facie unreasonable1 but because it is at any rate the more obvious course to seek to determine the function of an organism by studying its inner constitution1 than by having regard to something which is external to it1 and does not act upon and modify it as a necessary part of its environment4 ,it is only when this method has been tried and has failed that we should seek outside us for some guide as to the part we ought to play in the universe4 ,for this reason ,i shall not take into consideration the views of the basis of ethics which find it in positive law either divine or human1 except in so far as they are shown to follow from the nature of man4 ,it is not necessary for me to deny that the source of all moral obligation may be the will of ,god1 or the commands of the sovereign1 or the opinion of society1 and that the highest moral ideal may be obedience to such a rule4 ,but theories of this kind make ethics merely an application of positive theology1 or of legislation1 or of social sentiment1 and seem only to have an appropriate place when we have failed to find an independent basis for action4 ,the question which remains to be put may be expressed in these terms3 ,can we find in human nature 7taken either alone or in connection with its environment7 any indications of the end of human conduct1 or1 in other words1 of the principle on which human beings ought to act8 and if so1 in what direction do these indications point1 and what is their significance8 ,the answer to this question will thus necessarily depend on the view we take of the constitution of man and his relation to his environment4 ,and ,i purpose to bring this discussion within the necessary limits by considering the ethical consequences of one only of the two views into which philosophical opinion is divided4 ,sidenote3 and here to ethics of ,naturalism1 ,sidenote3 as distinguished from ,rational ethics4 ,sidenote3 ,naturalism either individualistic ,sidenote3 or historical4 ,now the fundamental principle of division in philosophical opinion lies in the place assigned to reason in human nature4#ab ,according to one theory1 man is essentially a sensitive subject1 though able to reason about his sensations--that is1 to associate1 compound1 and compare them4 ,he is supposed to be built up of sense-presentations associated with feelings of pleasure and pain4 ,recipient of external impressions which persist in idea and are accompanied by pleasure or pain on his part1 and thus followed by other ideas and impressions1 man's mental constitution is explained without attributing to reason any spontaneous or productive function4#ac ,the other view differs from this in attributing spontaneity to reason--making it1 in one way or another1 the source of forms of thought1 principles1 or ideas4 ,the former may be called the ,naturalistic1 the latter the ,rationalistic view of man3 from that follows a ,naturalistic or ,natural ethics1 from this a ,rationalistic or ,rational ethics4 ,into both these theories1 in a theoretical as well as in an ethical aspect1 the historical turn of thought which has characterised recent inquiry has introduced a profound modification4 ,on the basis of ,naturalism1 we may either look upon man as an individual distinct from other individuals1 as was done by ,epicurus and ,hobbes and the materialists of the eighteenth century1 or we may consider the race as itself an organism1 apart from which the individual is unintelligible1 and look upon human nature as having become what it now is through a long process of interaction between organism and environment1 in which social as well as psychical and physical facts have influenced the result4 ,this is the view to the elaboration of which ,comte and ,darwin and ,spencer have in different ways contributed4#ad ,what makes the historical method of importance philosophically1 is not the mere fact that it traces a sequence of events in time1 but the fact that1 by doing so1 it is able to look upon each link in the chain of events as necessarily connected with every other1 and thus to regard as a system--or1 rather1 as an organism--what previous empirical theories had left without any principle of unity4 ,sidenote3 ,rationalism either individualistic ,sidenote3 or universalistic4 ,a similar movement of thought has introduced a like modification into the ,rationalistic theory4 ,according to older doctrines1 the individual reason is mysteriously charged with certain priori principles which are to us laws of knowledge and of action2 whereas the form of ,rationalism which is now in the ascendant resembles the theory of natural evolution in this1 that as the latter finds the race more real than the individual1 and the individual to exist only in the race1 so the former looks upon the individual reason as but a finite manifestation of the universal reason1 and attempts to show the principles or constitutive elements of this universal reason or consciousness in their logical or necessary connection--leaving open to empirical investigation the way in which they have gradually disclosed themselves in the individual human subject1 and in the expression of the collective life of the race4 ,thus1 as ,natural ,ethics is divided into an individualistic and an historical view1 a similar distinction might be made in ,rational ,ethics1 though in this case it would be more difficult to follow out the distinction in detail2 and many ethical systems cannot be said to have kept consistently either to one side of it or to the other4 ,in the following discussion ,i shall investigate the ethical theory which is founded on the basis of ,naturalism--working out and criticising in somewhat greater detail that form of the theory which1 from the agreement it lays claim to with the results of modern science1 plays so important a part in contemporary philosophical thought4 ,,footnotes3 #a ,werke1 ed4 ,hartenstein 7#ahfg71 iii4 #ecb4 #b ,cf4 ,kant1 ,werke1 iv4 #bcg4 #c ,sermons1 v41 towards the end4 #d ,essay on the ,passions and ,affections1 p4 iv4 #e ,w4 ,h4 ,rolph1 ,biologische ,probleme1 zugleich als ,versuch zur ,entwicklung einer rationellen ,ethik1 #b;d ed41 p4 #ba4 #f ,not to mention ,kant1 the consistent opponent of every eudmonistic principle1 or the doctrines of a political idealist such as ,mazzini 7see ,life and ,writings 7#ahfg71 iv4 #bbc71 reference may be made to a writer like ,w4 ,k4 ,clifford1 who looks from the scientific point of view1 and yet holds that happiness is not to be desired for its own sake4--,lectures and ,essays 7#ahgi71 ii4 #aba1 #agc4 #g ,auch dieser ,begriff ,glckseligkeit ist an sich ein bloss formaler1 der jede beliebige materiale ,bestimmung zulsst4--,zeller1 ,ueber ,begriff und ,begrndung der sittlichen ,gesetze 7#ahhc71 p4 #bc4 #h ,methods of ,ethics1 book i4 chap4 i4 #e1 #c;d ed41 p4 #aa4 #i ,the rule1 ',let every one care for me1' is quite as simple1 and1 in a logical point of view1 defines conduct as consistently and reasonably as the rule1 ',love your neighbour as yourself4'--,leslie ,stephen1 ,science of ,ethics 7#ahhb71 p4 #gc4 #aj ,methods of ,ethics1 ,i4 i4 #c1 p4 #f4 #aa ,the difference between ,aristotle and ,kant in ethics is sometimes expressed 7see ,trendelenburg1 ,hist4 ,beitrge zur ,phil41 iii4 #aga ff47 as if it consisted in the fact that the former investigated human nature in order to find its 7telos71 whereas the latter sought the standard of action in a transcendental ground4 ,there is reason for this distinction in ,kant's manner of statement4 ,but both may be regarded as investigating human nature4 ,their difference rather consists in the different position and function assigned to reason in man4 ,it is because ,kant is for the moment looking upon reason as something distinct from human nature that he says that the ground of obligation is to be sought1 not in the nature of man or in the circumstances in the world in which he is placed1 but priori simply in the notions of pure reason 7,werke1 iv4 #bcg74 ,his metaphysical view of ethics1 however1 follows from the rational constitution of the human subject and his experience1 and does not depend on any source that really transcends the reason of man4 #ab ,opinion is also divided according to the place assigned to reason in the world1--this principle of division corresponding almost exactly with the former4 #ac ,thus it is the object of ,helvtius's first discours ,de l'esprit to prove that physical sensibility and memory are the only productive causes of our ideas4 #ad ,comte1 by connecting ethics with biology2 ,darwin and ,spencer1 by the doctrine of evolution4 ,,part ,i4 ,,the ,,individualistic ,,theory4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,egoism4 ,sidenote3 ,definition of ,naturalism4 ,it is difficult to give an exact definition or even description of what ,i have called the natural view of man4 ,perhaps it may be best defined1 negatively1 as the view which denies to reason any spontaneous or creative function in the human constitution4 ,for this definition1 if it still leaves the positive description wanting1 will at least make the classification into natural and rational exhaustive and mutually exclusive4 ,at the same time it is to be noted that1 on the theory of ,naturalism1 reason is not supposed to be excluded from all share in determining questions of conduct or the choice of ends4 ,it would1 indeed1 be impossible to have even the pretence of an ethical theory without a certain use of reason4 ,but its function1 in this case1 is limited to the merely formal one of bringing different presentations 7or objects7 and feelings into connection1 and comparing the different states of mind thus formed with one another1 not with a reason-given standard4 ,sidenote3 ,psychological hedonism4 ,since the function of reason is thus restricted1 and its competency to supply an end for1 or principle of1 action is denied1 we must seek this end either in the feelings of pleasure and pain which accompany both sensory and motor presentations1--perceptions1 that is to say1 and actions1--or in the more complex1 or apparently more complex1 emotions of the mind4 ,and the latter may either be themselves reducible to feelings of pleasure or pain accompanying presentations directly pleasurable or painful1 and thence transferred by association to other presentations1 or they may be regarded as somehow motives to action which may be or ought to be followed on their own account4 ,the ,individualistic ,theory1 therefore1 is not necessarily hedonistic4 ,it admits of a twofold view of the natural man3 one which looks upon him as in essence a pleasure-seeking1 pain-avoiding animal2 another which regards him as having a variety of impulses1 some of which are not directed to his own pleasure or avoidance of pain4 ,sidenote3 #a4 ,its theory of action ,sidenote3 ambiguous1 ,sidenote3 referring to ,the former view--psychological hedonism1 as it is called--claims to be an exhaustive analysis of the motives of human conduct1 perfectly general indeed1 but yet valid for every case of action4 ,it denies the possibility of a man acting from any other principle than desire of pleasure or aversion from pain4 ,the theory is1 that it is a psychological law that action is motived by pleasure and pain1 and that nothing else has motive-power over it4 ,if1 then1 one pleasure 7or avoidance of pain7 is chosen in preference to another1 it must be either by chance1--an alternative which has no ethical significance--no significance1 that is1 for the guidance of voluntary conduct1--or because the one course promises1 or seems to promise1 the attainment of a greater balance of pleasure than the other1 or is actually at the time more pleasant than that other4 ,thus the view that pleasure is the only motive of human action is really identical1 for ethical purposes1 with the theory loosely expressed in the law that action follows the greatest pleasure4#ae ,i say loosely expressed2 for the law as thus stated really admits of three quite different interpretations1 not always distinguished with the precision which such subjects require4 ,sidenote3 7a7 actual consequences of action1 ,sidenote3 or 7b7 its expected consequences1 ,sidenote3 or 7c7 its present characteristics4 7a7 ,in the first place1 the law might mean that action always follows the course which1 as a matter of fact1 will in the long-run bring the greatest balance of pleasure to the agent4 ,it is evident that there is no ground in psychology for maintaining this view4 ,yet it is a fair interpretation of the law of psychological hedonism1 as commonly stated2 and it is at least an admissible supposition that this meaning of the phrase has not been without effect upon the uses to which the law has been put by some of its upholders4 ,the second interpretation of the law--namely 7b71 that action is always in the direction which seems to the agent most likely to bring him the greatest balance of pleasure1 whether it actually brings it or not--is the sense in which it appears to have been most commonly taken when expressed with any degree of accuracy4 ,it is in this sense that--in language which ascribes greater consistency to men's conduct than it usually displays--interest is asserted by the author of the ',systme de la nature' to be the sole motive of human action4#af ,the same view is adopted by ,bentham2#ag and both ,james ,mill and ,john ,stuart ,mill identify desire with pleasure1 or an idea of pleasure1 in terms which are sufficiently sweeping1 if not very carefully weighed2#ah while the will is said to follow desire1 or only to pass out of its power when coming under the sway of habit4#ai ,still another meaning may1 however1 be given to the law of psychological hedonism1 according to which the doubtful reference to the manifold pleasures and pains1 contemplated as resulting from an action1 is got rid of1 and 7c7 the agent is asserted always to choose that action or forbearance which is actually most pleasant1 or least painful1 to him at the time--taking account1 of course1 of imaginative pleasures and pains1 as well as of those which are immediately connected with the senses4 ,it is in this interpretation of its law that psychological hedonism seems to be most capable of defence1 and in this sense it has been more than once stated and defended4#bj ,sidenote3 #b4 ,ethical inferences from this theory1 ,the ethics of the form of ,naturalism which is now under examination must be inferred from the law that human action follows the greatest pleasure1 in one or other of the above meanings which that law admits of4 ,the law is the datum or premiss from which we are to advance to an ethical conclusion4 ,the right is to be evolved from the pleasurable2 and the pleasurable1 consequently1 cannot be made to depend upon the right4 ,it is certainly true of the conduct of most men1 that our prospect of pleasure resulting from any course of conduct may largely depend on our conception of it as right or otherwise4#ba ,but this presupposes that there is a right independent of one's own pleasure1 and therefore does not apply to an ethics based on the simple theory of human nature put forward by psychological hedonism4 ,sidenote3 7a7 in its first meaning1 ,sidenote3 7b7in its second meaning3 ,sidenote3 private ethics and legislation1 ,sidenote3 7c7 in its third meaning4 ,it is scarcely necessary to discuss the first alternative 7a71 as no psychologist would seriously maintain it4 ,a society composed of men constituted in the way it supposes men to be constituted1 would be a collection of rational egoists1 omniscient in all that concerned the results of action1 and each adopting unerringly at every moment the course of conduct which would increase his own pleasure the most4 ,the conduct of any member of such a society could only be modified when--and would always be modified when--the modified conduct actually brought pleasurable results to the agent3 never so as to make him prefer the public good to his own4 ,the second alternative 7b7 admits of such modification taking place only when it seems to the individual that this modified action will produce a greater balance of pleasure or smaller balance of pain than any other course of action4 ,under this theory an individual might indeed prefer the public good or another man's good to his own1 but only through his being deceived as to the actual results of his course of action4 ,ethics as determining an end for conduct is put out of court2 though the statesman or the educator may modify the actions of others by providing appropriate motives4 ,if the two sovereign masters1 pain and pleasure1 determine what we shall do1 it is hardly necessary for them also to point out what we ought to do4#bb ,the end is already given in the nature of action1 though an enlightened understanding will teach men how the greatest balance of pleasure may be obtained4 ,we can only get at a rule prescribing an end by changing our point of view from the individual to the state4 ,it is best for the state that each individual should aim at the common happiness2 but1 when we talk of this as a moral duty for the individual1 all we can mean is that the state will punish a breach of it4 ,in the words of ,helvtius1#bc pain and pleasure are the bonds by which we can always unite personal interest to the interest of the nation4444 ,the sciences of morals and legislation can be only deductions from this simple principle4 ,according to ,bentham's psychology1 a man is necessitated by his mental and physical nature to pursue at every moment1 not the greatest happiness of the greatest number1 but what seems to him his own greatest happiness4 ,and what the legislator has to do is1 by judiciously imposed rewards and punishments1 especially the latter1 to make it for the greatest happiness of each to pursue the greatest happiness of all4#bd ,as distinguished from this art of legislation1 private ethics consists only of prudential rules prescribing the best means to an end predetermined by nature as the only possible end of human action3 it teaches how each man may dispose himself to pursue the course most conducive to his own happiness4#be ,the consequences to the theory of action of the third alternative 7c7 are similar3 it only states the law with more appearance of psychological accuracy4 ,if a man always follows that course of action which will give him at the time the greatest 7real and imaginative7 satisfaction1 it is impossible for us to infer from his nature an ethical law prescribing some other end1 without admitting a fundamental contradiction in human nature2 while to say that he ought to seek the end he always does and cannot help seeking1 is unnecessary and even unmeaning4 ,modification of character may of course be still brought about1 since the kinds of action in which an individual takes pleasure may be varied almost indefinitely4 ,but the motive made use of in this educative process must be personal pleasure2 and the end the legislator has in view in his work must be the same1#bf though it is often quietly assumed that for him personal pleasure has become identified with the wider interests of the community4 ,sidenote3 ,result of this ambiguity1 ,sidenote3 ethical hedonism4 ,the different significations of which it admits show that the psychological law that action follows the greatest pleasure is by no means so clear as it may at first sight appear4 ,probably it is the very ambiguity of the law that has made it appear to provide a basis for an ethical system4 ,when it is said that greatest pleasure is the moral end of action1 this greatest pleasure is looked upon as the greatest possible balance of pleasurable over painful states for the probable duration of life3 on the egoistic theory1 of the life of the individual2 on the utilitarian theory1 of the aggregate lives of all men or even of all sentient beings4 ,but when it is said that greatest pleasure is1 as a matter of fact1 always the motive of action1 it is obvious that greatest pleasure has changed its signification4 ,for if the same meaning were kept to1 not only would the psychological law as thus stated be openly at variance with facts1 but its validity would render the moral precept unnecessary4 ,it is even unmeaning to say that a man ought to do that which he always does and cannot help doing4#bg ,on the other hand1 if the double meaning of the phrase had been clearly stated1 we should at once have seen the hiatus in the proof of egoistic hedonism--the gap between the present 7or apparent7 pleasure for which one does act1 and the greatest pleasure of a lifetime for which one ought to act--as well as the additional difficulty of passing from egoism to utilitarianism4 ,if greatest apparent pleasure--or greatest present pleasure--is by an inexorable law of human nature always sought1 how can it be shown that we ought to sacrifice the apparent to the real--the present pleasure that is small to the greater future pleasure8 ,if the individual necessarily pursues his own pleasure1 how can we show that he ought to subordinate it to the pleasures of the greatest number8 ,sidenote3 #c4 ,transition from psychological to ethical hedonism4 ,right action will imply ,sidenote3 7a7 correct estimate of consequences of action1 ,sidenote3 7b7 and corresponding strength of feeling4 ,it is a matter of fact1 however1 that the psychologists who maintain that action follows the greatest pleasure--meaning by that1 greatest apparent or greatest present pleasure--have in their ethics made the transition to an enlightened ,egoism1 or even to ,utilitarianism4 ,the nature of the transition thus requires to be more clearly pointed out4 ,if the former interpretation of the law of psychological hedonism could be accepted1 and a man's motive for action were always what seemed to him likely to bring him the greatest pleasure on the whole1 ethics--what ,bentham calls private ethics--could be reduced 7as ,bentham finally reduces it7 to certain maxims of prudence4 ,to be fully acquainted with the sources of pleasure and pain1 and to estimate them correctly1 would imply possession of the highest 7egoistic7 morality4 ,if men could be made to think rightly as to what their greatest pleasure consisted in1 then right action on their part--that is to say1 the pursuit of their greatest pleasure--would 7according to ,bentham's psychology7 follow as a matter of course4 ,right conduct1 however1 is not so purely an affair of the intellect as this would make it4 ,indeed1 ,bentham's psychological assumption requires only to be plainly stated for its inconsistency with the facts of human action to become apparent4 ,the video meliora proboque1 deteriora sequor expresses too common an experience to be so easily explained away4 ,the impulses by which action is governed are not always in accordance with what the intellect decides to be best on a survey of the whole life and its varied chances4 ,in judging the consequences of action1 a future good is compared with a present1 regardless of the mere difference of time by which they are separated4 ,but the springs which move the will are often at variance with the decisions of the understanding2 and many men are unable to resist the strength of the impulse to act for the pleasure of the moment1 though they foresee that a greater future satisfaction would follow from present self-denial4 ,it would seem1 then1 that the facts of experience are sufficient to show that a man's conduct does not always follow the course which he thinks likely to bring him the greatest pleasure on the whole4 ,but the view that a man always acts for what is most pleasant--or least painful--at the time cannot be dismissed so easily4 ,it is not enough simply to point to the facts of human action in order to show that this hypothesis is inconsistent with them4 ,if we instanced the self-restraint in which so many pass their lives from day to day1 it might perhaps be answered that there is a persistent idea of duty1 or love of reputation1 or fear of social stigma1 the repression of which would be more painful than the restraint it puts upon other impulses4 ,even the martyr who deliberately parts with life itself for the sake of an ideal1 may be said to choose death as the least painful course open to him at the time4 ,it should be borne in mind1 however1 that ,professor ,bain1 the most thorough psychologist of ,bentham's school1 refuses to admit this line of defence for psychological hedonism1 and holds that1 in actions such as those referred to1 men are really carried out of the circle of their self-regarding desires4#bh ,but my present purpose is not to discuss the merits of any such psychological theory1 but rather to investigate its ethical consequences4 ,and for this purpose the question requires to be put1 how a passage is effected from psychological hedonism to an egoistic--and even to a utilitarian--theory of ethics4 ,sidenote3 ,the postulate that action can be rationalised ,sidenote3 involves these conditions1 ,if a man always acts for his greatest present pleasure1 real and imaginary1 it seems a far step to say that he ought to act--or in any way to expect that he will act--at each moment for the greatest sum of pleasure attainable in the probable duration of his life4 ,but on reflection1 this may turn out to follow if we postulate that conduct can be rationalised4 ,what is meant by this egoistic ought may be said to be simply that to the eye of reason the pleasure of any one moment cannot be regarded as more valuable than the equal pleasure of any other moment1 if it is equally certain2 and that therefore to act as if it were is to act unreasonably4 ,man fails in acting up to reason in this sense1 because his action is not motived by reason1 but directly by pleasure and pain2 and not by a mere estimate of pleasure and pain1 but by pleasure and pain themselves4 ,the psychological hedonist must maintain that the estimates of future pleasure and pain only become motives by being not merely recognised 7intellectually7 but felt 7emotionally7--that is1 by themselves becoming pleasurable or painful4 ,if the ,egoist calls any action irrational1 it cannot be because the motive which produced it was not the greatest pleasure in consciousness at the time4 ,it can only be on the ground that the greatest pleasure in consciousness at the time is likely to lead to a sacrifice of greater pleasure in the future2 and this must be due either to intellectual misapprehension or to the imagined fruition of future pleasure not being strong enough to outweigh the pleasure which comes from a present stimulus1 and to the imagined fruition of the more distant being weaker than that of the less distant pleasure4 ,it is owing to a defect of the imagination on a man's part that even with complete information he does not act up to his lights--irrational action being partly a consequence of insufficient acquaintance with the normal results of conduct1 partly due to defective imagination4 ,were a man's imagination of future pleasure and pain as strong as his experience of present pleasure and pain1 and did he correctly appreciate the results of his conduct1 then his action would1 of psychological necessity1 harmonise with the precepts of egoistic hedonism4 ,sidenote3 the latter of which ,sidenote3 is inconsistent with the nature of voluntary action4 ,egoistic hedonism may therefore1 in a certain sense1 be said to be a reasonable end of conduct on the theory of psychological hedonism2 it is the end which will be made his own by that ideally perfect man whose intellect can clearly see the issues of conduct1 and whose imagination of the future causes of sensibility is so vivid that the pleasure or pain got from anticipating them is as great as if they were present1 or only less lively in proportion as there is a risk of their not being realised4 ,conversely it would seem that only that man can act reasonably in whom imagination of pleasure 7or of pain7 is already of equal strength with the actual experience of it4 ,but1 if the pleasures of the imagination are as strong as those of sense or of reality1 the latter obviously become superfluous2 and it follows that the ideally perfect man is left without any motive to aim at the real thing1 since he can obtain as much pleasure by imagining it4 ,the cultured hedonist must1 it would seem1 be able to-- ,hold a fire in his hand ,by thinking on the frosty ,caucasus1 ,or cloy the hungry edge of appetite ,by bare imagination of a feast4 ,so far as feeling or motive to action goes1 no difference must exist for him between reality and imagination4 ,and thus1 although we may admit that1 on this psychological basis1 conduct when rationalised agrees with that prescribed by egoistic hedonism1 yet it can only be rationalised by a development of the strength of the imagination1 which would make the feeling which it brings with it as strong as that which accompanies a real object1 and hence take away the motive for the pursuit of the latter4 ,the discrepancy between representation and presentation which is necessary for the state of desire1#bi is no longer present4 ,hedonism vindicates its rationality only on conditions which imply the futility of action altogether4 ,it is not merely that the attainment of the hedonistic end in practical conduct implies a strength of imagination of which no one is capable1 but the conditions of acting both rationally and hedonistically1 are conditions which would paralyse all activity4 ,sidenote3 #d4 ,possible objections to preceding argument3 ,the foregoing argument may perhaps be objected to on two grounds4 ,on the one hand1 it may be said that it ignores the vast complexity of human motive1 and treats action as if it were a simple and abstract thing4 ,on the other hand1 we may be reminded of the fact that1 while all men act for pleasure1 the moral quality of their conduct does not depend on this fact1 but on the kind of things in which they take pleasure4 ,sidenote3 7a7 complexity of motive2 but it is psychological hedonism which ignores this4 ,so far as the first objection is concerned1 it seems to me that the fault belongs to the psychological theory of human action1 the ethical consequences of which are under investigation4 ,it is this theory which asserts that1 however interwoven the threads of impulse1 aversion1 and habit may be1 their most complex relations can be reduced to the formula1 greatest pleasure1 or least pain1 prevails4 ,it is not necessary1 indeed1 that every action should be the conscious pursuit of a pleasurable object already before the mind in idea4 ,but the theory1 if consistently carried out1 implies that the action which follows in the line of a previously formed habit1 does so because the discomfort or pain of breaking through the habit would be sufficient to counter-balance any satisfaction that might result4 ,the objection1 therefore1 of excessive simplicity or abstractness1 is one which cannot have greater force than when urged against the theory of psychological hedonism4 ,sidenote3 7b7 difference in kind of pleasurable objects2 ,sidenote3 but this involves a reference to something else than pleasure1 ,sidenote3 which psychological hedonism does not admit of4 ,further--and this is the second objection--the above analysis may be considered by some not to have taken sufficient account of the difference in the objects in which a human being can take pleasure1 and of the fact that the moral quality of men differs1 not according as they act for pleasure or not1 but according to the kind of actions and sufferances in which they find pleasure4 ,there can be no doubt of the importance of this distinction for questions of practical morals4 ,the man in whom selfishness takes the shape of benevolence1 as it did in ,bentham1 is infinitely better than the man in whom it retains the form of selfishness4 ,but the consideration is important just because it goes on the implied assumption that the hedonistic is not the chief aspect of conduct1 and that there is a difference between courses of action more fundamental than the pleasurable or painful feeling attendant on them4 ,if the principles on which the objection is founded were consistently adhered to and followed out1 they would make not pleasure1 but something else--that1 namely1 by which pleasures differ from one another in kind--the ethical standard4 ,but if1 in ultimate analysis1 it is the pleasure felt or expected that moves to action1 it would seem that there is no way in which the conclusion of the preceding argument can be avoided4 ,if pleasure is the motive1 it must be qu pleasure--that is to say1 either the greatest apparent pleasure1 or the greatest present pleasure1 is the motive4 ,if difference of quality be admitted1 we are introducing a determining factor other than pleasure4 ,certain kinds of pleasure may be better than others for the race or for the state4 ,but these differences must be reducible to terms of individual pleasure admitting of purely quantitative comparisons1 before they become motives to action4#cj ,from the point of view of the whole1 we may say that one action leads to a greater sum of pleasure than another4 ,but1 in judging the action of individuals1 all that we can say of it is1 that to one man one class of actions gives pleasure1 to another another3 each man is equally following the course of action which either 7a7 will bring1 or 7b7 seems to him likely to bring1 the greatest pleasure1 or 7c7 is actually most pleasant at the time4 ,from the nature of the individual we can evolve no end beyond egoistic hedonism4 ,and even this end can only be made his at each occurrence of action 7assuming the first alternative 7a7 to be incorrect7 by enlightening his intellect so that 7b7 will correspond with the actual greatest pleasure1 or by also enlivening his imagination of future pleasures and pains so that 7c7 will correspond with it2 and this1 as has been shown1 could only be effected under conditions which are inconsistent with the principles of human action4 ,,footnotes3 #ae ,meaning by greatest pleasure1 greatest balance of pleasure over pain1 and thus inclusive of the meaning least pain4 ,it is the expression in terms of feeling of the statement sometimes preferred1 that action follows the line of least resistance--a statement to which no exception can be taken1 nor any importance allowed1 till it be translated into definite psychological language4 #af ,ainsi lorsque nous disons que l'intrt est l'unique mobile des actions humaines1 nous voulons indiquer par l que chaque homme travaille sa manire son propre bonheur1 qu'il place dans quelqu'objet soit visible1 soit cach1 soit rel1 soit imaginaire1 et que tout le systme de sa conduite tend l'obtenir4--,systme de la nature 7#agha71 i4 #bfh4 #ag ,on the occasion of every act he exercises1 every human being is led to pursue that line of conduct which1 according to his view of the case taken by him at the moment1 will be in the highest degree contributory to his own greatest happiness4--,constitutional ,code1 book i4 #b2 ,works1 ix4 #e4 ,the continued existence of the species is1 ,bentham thinks1 a conclusive proof of this proposition4 #ah ,thus1 according to ,james ,mill1 the terms 'idea of pleasure' and 'desire' are but two names2 the thing named1 the state of consciousness is one and the same4 ,the word ,desire is commonly used to mark the idea of a pleasurable sensation when the future is associated with it4--,analysis of the ,phenomena of the ,human ,mind1 ,j4 ,s4 ,mill's edit41 ii4 #aib2 cf4 ,fragment on ,mackintosh 7#ahce71 p4 #chi f4 ,to the same effect ,j4 ,s4 ,mill says3 ,desiring a thing and finding it pleasant1 aversion to it and thinking of it as painful1 are phenomena entirely inseparable1 or rather two parts of the same phenomenon2 in strictness of language1 two different modes of naming the same psychological fact4--,utilitarianism1 #gth ed41 p4 #eh4 #ai ,will is the child of desire1 and passes out of the dominion of its parent only to come under that of habit4--,utilitarianism1 p4 #fj4 #bj ,thus ,jonathan ,edwards says3 ,when ,i say that the ,will is as the greatest apparent good1 or 7as ,i have explained it7 that volition has always for its object the thing which appears most agreeable1 it must be carefully observed1 to avoid confusion and needless objection1 that ,i speak of the direct and immediate object of the act of volition1 and not some object to which the act of will has only an indirect and remote respect4--,on the ,freedom of the ,will1 part i4 #b2 ,works1 i4 #acc4 ,the matter is put still more clearly by the late ,alfred ,barratt3 ,action does not always follow knowledge4 ,of course not3 but the doctrine ,hedonism does not require that it should2 for it says1 not that we follow what is our greatest possible pleasure1 or what we know or 'think' to be so1 but what at the moment of action is most desired4--,mind1 vol4 ii4 #agc2 cf4 ,physical ,ethics1 p4 #eb ff4 ,so ,mr ,stephen1 ,science of ,ethics1 p4 #dg3 ,it is more accurate to say that my conduct is determined by the pleasantest judgment1 than to say that it is determined by my judgment of what is pleasantest4 ,the negative side of the same view was expressed by ,locke in his doctrine that action is moved by the most pressing uneasiness 7,essay1 ,,ii4 xxi4 #bi1 #ca71 and distinguished by him from the former view 7b71 that the greater visible good is the motive 7,,ii4 xxi4 #ce1 #dd74 #ba ,sidgwick1 ,methods of ,ethics1 #c;d ed41 p4 #dj4 #bb ,bentham1 ,principles of ,morals and ,legislation1 chap4 i41 ,works1 i4 #a4 ,with this statement may be compared the assertion of ,helvtius3 ,il semble que1 dans l'univers moral comme dans l'univers physique1 ,dieu n'est mis qu'un seul principe dans tous ce qui a t4444 ,il semble qu'il ait dit pareillement l'homme3 444 ,je te mets sous la garde du plaisir et de la douleur3 l'un et l'autre veilleront tes penses1 tes actions2 engendreront tes passions1 exciteront tes aversions1 tes amitis1 tes tendresses1 tes fureurs2 allumeront tes dsirs1 tes craintes1 tes esprances1 te dvoileront des vrits2 te plongeront dans des erreurs2 et aprs t'avoir fait enfanter mille systmes absurdes et diffrens de morale et de lgislation1 te decouvriront un jour les principes simples1 au dveloppement desquels est attach l'ordre et le bonheur du monde moral4--,de l'esprit1 ,,iii4 ix1 uvres 7ed4 of #ahah71 i4 #bic4 #bc ,de l'homme1 concl4 gn41 uvres1 ii4 #fjh4 #bd ,cf4 ,systme de la nature1 i4 #abj3 ,la politique devrait tre l'art de rgler les passions des hommes et de les diriger vers le bien de la socit4 #be ,bentham1 op4 cit41 chap4 xix4 7xvii4 in the reprint of #ahgi71 #bj2 ,works1 i4 #adh4 #bf ,cf4 ,bentham1 ,works1 ix4 #e4 #bg ,sidgwick1 ,methods of ,ethics1 ,i4 iv4 #a1 #c;d ed41 p4 #da2 cf4 ,green1 ,prolegomena to ,ethics1 p4 #i3 ,to a being who is simply a result of natural forces1 an injunction to conform to their laws is unmeaning4 #bh ,cf4 ,the ,emotions and the ,will1 #c;d ed41 p4 #bic ff4 #bi ,cf4 ,sully1 ,outlines of ,psychology1 p4 #egg4 #cj ,cf4 ,j4 ,grote1 ',utilitarian ,philosophy1' p4 #bj1 note3 ,one kind of pleasure may be1 systematically1 to be preferred to another1 but it must be because the pleasures classified under it generally exceed those under the other in intensity1 or some other of the elements of value4 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,the ,,transition ,,to ,,utilitarianism4 ,sidenote3 #a4 ,different standpoints of individual and state ,it still remains possible1 of course1 to fix an ethical end in some other way than by studying individual human nature4 ,we may1 for instance1 looking from the point of view of the community1 fix its greatest happiness1 instead of his own1 as the individual's end4 ,but the difficulty then arises of persuading the individual--or1 indeed1 making it possible for him--to regard this impersonal goal as the end of his conduct4 ,for this purpose1 ,bentham seemed to look to the exercise of administrative control which1 by a system of rewards and punishments1 will make the greatest happiness of the individual coincide so far as possible with that of the community4#ca ,j4 ,s4 ,mill1 on the other hand1 with his eyes turned to the subjective springs of action1 saw in the gradual growth of sympathetic pleasures and pains the means by which an individual's desires would cease to conflict with those of his neighbours4 ,it is in some such way that the transition is made from ,egoism to ,utilitarianism4 ,the transition is made3 ,bentham and his school are an evidence of the fact4 ,but it is not therefore logical4 ,it is1 indeed1 important to notice that we only pass from the one theory to the other by changing our original individualistic point of view4 ,having already fixed an end for conduct regardless of the difference between the individual at the time of acting and at subsequent times1 we proceed to take the much longer step of ignoring the difference between the agent and other individuals4 ,the question is no longer1 ,what is good or desirable for the person who is acting8 but1 ,what is best on the whole for all those whom his action may affect--that is to say1 for the community8 ,sidenote3 cannot be logically connected ,sidenote3 through analogy of state to individual4 ,sidenote3 ,difference between one's own pleasure and the pleasure of others ,but while it is comparatively easy to see how this transition is effected as a matter of fact1 it is difficult to establish any logical connection between its different stages1 or to offer any considerations fitted to convince the individual that it is reasonable for him to seek the happiness of the community rather than his own4 ,only that conduct1 it may seem1 can be reasonable which directs and perfects the natural striving of each organism towards its own pleasure4 ,we may1 of course1 let our point of view shift from the individual to the social organism4 ,and in this case1 if the natural end of each human being is his own greatest pleasure1 the end of the community1 or organised body of pleasure-seekers1 will naturally be concluded to be the greatest aggregate pleasure of its members4 ,thus1 if we can hypostatise the community1 and treat it as an individual with magnified but human wants and satisfactions1 then1 for this leviathan1 the ethical end will correspond to what is called ,utilitarianism or ,universalistic ,hedonism4 ,but1 when we remember that the community is made up of units distinct from one another in feeling and action1 the difficulty arises of establishing it as the natural end1 or as a reasonable end1 for each of these units to strive after the greatest pleasure of all4 ,for it is evident that the pursuit of the greatest aggregate pleasure may often interfere with the attainment by the individual of his own greatest pleasure4 ,on the other hand1 the self-seeking action of the individual may no doubt lead to a loss of pleasure on the whole2 but then it is not his own pleasure that is lost1 only other people's4 ,to the outsider--as to the community--it may seem irrational that a small increase in the pleasure of one unit should be allowed at the expense of a loss of greater pleasure on the part of other units4 ,but it seems irrational only because the outsider naturally puts himself in the place of the community2 and neither takes account of the fact that to the individual agent there is a fundamental difference between his own pleasure and any one else's pleasure3 for him the former is1 and the latter is not1 pleasure at all4#cb ,sidenote3 overlooked in arguing from egoism to utilitarianism4 ,this fundamental difference seems to be overlooked when the attempt is made to argue logically from egoistic psychology 7or even from egoistic ethics7 to utilitarianism4 ,indeed1 the hiatus in logical proof is often only concealed by a confusion of standpoints2 and ,j4 ,s4 ,mill1 while emphasising the distinction between modern ,utilitarianism and the older ,epicureanism1 has even allowed his official proof of utilitarianism--such proof1 that is1 as he thinks the principle of ,utility to be susceptible of--to rest on the ambiguity between individual and social happiness4 ,sidenote3 #b4 ,connection between egoism and utilitarianism according to ,bentham3 ,sidenote3 7a7 ,utilitarianism not a political duty1 ,this ambiguity does not seem to have been consistently avoided even by ,bentham4 ,for the most part1 indeed1 nothing can exceed the clearness with which he recognises the twofold and possibly conflicting interests involved in almost every action4 ,there is the interest of the agent1 and the interest of others whom his action may affect4 ,and he also holds that1 in the case of divergence of interests1 the individual will act for his own4 ,the happiness of the individuals1 he says1#cc of whom a community is composed1--that is1 their pleasures1 and their security1--is the end1 and the sole end1 which the legislator ought to have in view--the sole standard in conformity to which each individual ought1 as far as depends upon the legislator1 to be made to fashion his conduct4 ,but whether it be this or anything else that is to be done1 there is nothing by which a man can ultimately be made to do it1 but either pain or pleasure--that is1 of course1 his own pain or pleasure4 ,here1 then1 ethical ,utilitarianism and psychological ,egoism are both plainly involved4 ,a man1 it is said1 can only pursue general happiness by its being identical with his own happiness4 ,and as it is evident1 and admitted1 that these two happinesses often diverge in the courses of action naturally leading to them1 a man can only be beneficent1 rather than selfish1 through some artificial arrangement which makes beneficence to be for his interest3#cd in plain language 7since rewards are only of exceptional applicability71 through his being punished for not being beneficent4#ce ,but1 as ,bentham clearly shows1 many cases of action cannot be safely touched by the legislator's art4 ,such cases unmeet for punishment include not only the actions which are beneficial or neutral in their results1 but also actions hurtful to the community1 though they may elude such vigilance as the state can contrive1 or their restraint by punishment inflicted by the state may constitute a greater evil than the offence4#cf ,probity may be exacted by the persons stated and certain who happen to be political superiors3 except in rare instances1 positive beneficence can not4 ,utilitarian conduct1 therefore1 is not a political duty1 because it is not fully enforced by definite punishment4 ,the art of legislation is indeed said to teach how a multitude of men1 composing a community1 may be disposed to pursue that course which upon the whole is the most conducive to the happiness of the whole community1 by means of motives to be applied by the legislator4#cg ,but the means here indicated are such as cannot fully compass the attainment of the end4 ,for the motives applied by the legislator either cannot reach a large part of the extra-regarding conduct of individuals1 or could only reach it by entailing greater evils than those they would be used to prevent4 ,sidenote3 7b7 nor a moral duty1 ,sidenote3 7c7 nor insisted on as a religious duty1 ,but if utilitarian conduct is not a political duty1 it may seem evident that it is at least a moral duty4 ,now a moral duty is said by ,bentham#ch to be created by a kind of motive which1 from the uncertainty of the persons to apply it1 and of the species and degree in which it will be applied1 has hardly yet got the name of punishment3 by various mortifications resulting from the ill-will of persons uncertain and variable1--the community in general2 that is1 such individuals of that community as he whose duty is in question shall happen to be connected with4 ,in plain language1 then1 moral duty simply means the ill-will of a man's neighbours which follows his conduct in so far as that conduct affects them disagreeably4 ,such ill-will on the part of a man's neighbours may result from success or from failure on his part1 from a breach of etiquette1 from refusal to sacrifice to the caprice of those neighbours the wider good of the society whom his conduct affects 7but to whom it may be unknown71 from deception or from telling the truth4 ,in a word1 the duty--that is1 the punishment--is entirely uncertain3 not only as regards the persons applying it1 its nature and its amount1 but also as regards the kind of actions to which it applies4 ,they will be actions unpleasant to the people who inflict the punishment1 but not necessarily hurtful to the common weal3 since the immediate effects of an action are easily recognised1 while its wider and more lasting consequences are neither so apparent nor appeal so surely to the interest of those who are cognisant of the action and immediately affected by it4 ,moral duty1 therefore1 as ,bentham defines it1 depending on1 or rather identical with1 the ill-will of one's neighbours1 is indefinite and limited in its nature1 and can command or sanction no such definite and wide-reaching rule for conduct as that a man should always act for the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people whom his action may affect4 ,utilitarian conduct1 therefore1 is neither a political duty nor a moral duty2 nor does ,bentham follow ,paley in insisting upon it as a religious duty created by punishment2 by punishment expected at the hands of a person certain--the ,supreme ,being4 ,and if he persists in asserting it to be a duty--but without meaning it to be understood that it is on any one of these three accounts that he looks upon it as such--all he then asserts is his own internal sentiment2 all he means then is that he feels himself pleased or displeased at the thoughts of the point of conduct in question1 but without being able to tell why4 ,in this case he should e'en say so2 and not seek to give an undue influence to his own single suffrage1 by delivering it in terms that purport to declare the voice either of ,god1 or of the law1 or of the people4#ci ,sidenote3 7d7 nor sufficiently motived in private ethics1 ,sidenote3 which can be reduced to prudence4 ,this plain piece of advice which ,bentham gives to ,blackstone is not often neglected by himself4 ,the motive1 he once said1 of his own exceptional devotion to the interests of the community was that it pleased him4 ,i am a selfish man1 he wrote1 as selfish as any man can be4 ,but in me1 somehow or other1 so it happens1 selfishness has taken the shape of benevolence4#dj ,but when the matter is thus brought back from the regions of political1 moral1 and religious duty1 to the individual ground of private ethics1 we have still to refer to ,bentham's own discussion of the question1 ,what motives 7independent of such as legislation and religion may chance to furnish7 can one man have to consult the happiness of another8#da ,bentham at once replies--and indeed the answer on his principles is obvious enough--that there is no motive which always continues adequate4 ,but yet there are1 he says1 no occasions in which a man has not some motives for consulting the happiness of other men4 ,such are the purely-social motive of sympathy or benevolence1 and the semi-social motives of love of amity and love of reputation4 ,a man is directly moved to promote the happiness of others through the sympathetic feelings which make the happiness of others in some degree pleasurable to himself2 and he is indirectly moved to promote their happiness through his desire of their friendship and good opinion4 ,so far1 therefore1 it is quite true that private ethics--or what ,bentham regards as such--concerns every member--that is1 the happiness and the actions of every member of any community that can be proposed4#db ,it certainly concerns their happiness1 but only in so far as this is a means to the happiness of the agent4 ,so that when ,bentham says that there is no case in which a private man ought not to direct his own conduct to the production of his own happiness and of that of his fellow-creatures1 he should rather say that a man will#dc only direct his conduct to the happiness of his fellow-creatures in so far as such action leads to his own happiness4 ,private ethics1 therefore1 has to do with the happiness of others only so far as this reacts on the happiness of self2 or1 as ,bentham ultimately defines it1 in terms to which no exception can be taken3 ,private ethics teaches how each man may dispose himself to pursue the course most conducive to his own happiness by means of such motives as offer of themselves4#dd 99 99 99 99 99 ,sidenote3 #c4 ,bentham's treatment exhaustive from his point of view4 ,under ,bentham's hands private ethics is thus reduced to prudence1 at the same time that the author has failed to show why the general happiness is to be aimed at by the individual as a religious or political or moral duty4 ,nor is this failure due to any lack of skill in following out the consequences which his premisses involved4 ,the arguments used against him have thus an equally valid application to all who adopt the same general line of thought4 ,for ,bentham appears to have seen as clearly as any of his disciples the difficulty of bringing the egoistic basis of his theory of human nature into harmony with the universal reference required by his ethics4 ,and the criticism already offered of the way in which ,bentham attempts to bring about this connection may be shown not to be restricted to his special way of putting the case4 ,it is necessary to remember that throughout this chapter we are looking from the individual's point of view1 and inquiring how far it is possible to work from it in the direction of utilitarianism4 ,now it is admitted that1 in pursuing his own happiness1 he is sometimes led1 and may be led on the whole1 to neglect the general happiness4 ,a sufficient reason for following the latter--or an obligation to do it--can therefore only come either from the supreme power or from one's fellow-men1 and from the latter either as organised in the ,state1 and expressing themselves by its constituted authorities1 or else by the vaguer method of social praise and blame4 ,bentham's classification of the possible sources or kinds of duty into religious1 political1 and moral or social1 is therefore a natural consequence of the individualistic system4 ,sidenote3 7a7 ,the religious sanction1 ,sidenote3 relied on by ,paley1 ,sidenote3 inverts the relation between ethics and theology4 ,the first of these possible sources of duty is indeed only mentioned by ,bentham1 and then passed by4 ,and yet it might seem that the religious sanction is a more efficient motive-power than the social1 while it applies to regions of conduct which legal enactment cannot reach4 ,without question1 the operation of such a motive is capable of bringing egoistic conduct into harmony with utilitarianism1 or with any other principle of action to which the sanction may be attached4 ,private happiness is our motive1 and the will of ,god our rule1 says ,paley2#de and in this case such conduct will be obligatory as the rule may arbitrarily determine2 while1 whatever it may be1 there will be a strong enough motive to follow it4 ,the whole fabric of a moral philosophy such as ,paley's1 therefore1 rests on two theological propositions--that ,god has ordained the general happiness as the rule of human conduct1 and that ,he will punish in another life those who disregard that rule4 ,the basis of morality is laid in a divine command enforced by a divine threat4 ,perhaps it will be generally agreed that ,bentham acted wisely in not laying stress on this application of the religious sanction4 ,even those least inclined to theological agnosticism would reject any such rough-and-ready solution of the problem which deals with the relation of morality to the divine nature4 ,paley's method of treatment1 they would say1 inverts the relation in which theism stands to morality4 ,the divine will cannot be thus arbitrarily connected with the moral law4 ,it can be conceived to approve and sanction such an object as the happiness of mankind only when ,god is first of all regarded as a moral being1 and the happiness of mankind as an object of moral action4 ,if any relation of consequence can be asserted between them1 the general happiness is to be regarded as a moral duty first1 and only afterwards as a religious duty4 ,sidenote3 7b7 ,limits of the political sanction4 ,when he comes to the political sanction1 ,bentham's treatment wants nothing in respect of fulness1 and even those who do not agree with his estimate of the infelicific character of many existing institutions and enactments will admit that even the best-intentioned legislator cannot make utilitarian conduct a political duty4 ,we must bear in mind here1 also1 the effect which individual desires and opinions have not only on social judgments1 but also on statute-law4 ,in arguing on the relation of the individual to the ,state1 we are too ready to forget that the ,state is represented by a legislator or body of legislators1 and that we can never assume that in their cases private interest has already become identified with the larger interests of the community4#df ,for were this the case1 the accusation of class-legislation or private interest would not be heard so often as it is4 ,sidenote3 7c7 ,uncertainty of the social sanction1 ,a modern disciple of ,bentham would thus be compelled1 just as ,bentham himself was1 to make utilitarianism neither a political nor religious but a moral duty1 enforced by and founded on the shifting and uncertain punishments or sanctions of society--what ,professor ,bain describes as the unofficial expressions of disapprobation and the exclusion from social good offices4#dg ,but as a logical proof of utilitarianism1 this means is1 if possible1 weaker than the preceding2 for social opinion1 though of somewhat wider applicability than legal enactment1 has probably been1 for the most part1 in even less exact correspondence than it with the general happiness4 ,the social sanction is strict on indifferent points of etiquette1 does not consult the general interests of mankind on points of honour1 and is lenient towards acts that the utilitarian moralist condemns4#dh ,sidenote3 7d7 and of the internal sanction so far as a result of the social4 ,professor ,bain1 however1 advances from the external disapprobation to an internal sanction--looking upon conscience as one of the powers which inflicts punishment1 and lies at the source of the feeling of obligation4 ,but if conscience is only an ideal resemblance of public authority1 growing up in the same individual mind1 and working to the same end1 it can1 as little as its archetype1 point to the maxim of utilitarianism4 ,according to ,professor ,bain1 it is through this sentiment--at first a mere imitation of external authority--that the individual becomes a law to himself1 on recognising the utilities that led to the imposition of the law4#di ,but on this theory1 in so far as conscience continues to point to the conduct impressed upon it by its external pattern1 it fails to correspond with the utilitarian maxim4 ,if1 on the other hand1 it is modified by the comprehensive and unselfish view of the effects of conduct which utilitarianism demands1 it must be at the expense of correcting its original edicts1 and so far discrediting its authoritative claims4 ,sidenote3 ,value of the social sanction ,sidenote3 apart from logical proof of utilitarianism4 ,the social sanction would be of much greater service if used to show how a solidarity is brought about between the interests and feelings of the individual and those of his neighbours1 from which the utilitarian maxim may be arrived at by a generalisation of his principle of conduct as modified by the social impulse4 ,but this would not constitute a logical justification of utilitarianism3 it would show how the principle has been arrived at1 but without giving a sufficient reason to the individual for adopting it4 ,and this is really the tendency of much recent discussion--of ,professor ,bain's theory of conscience as a reflex of the external order1 of ,george ,grote's analysis of the moral sentiment1 and of ,mill's doctrine of the progressive identification of the individual's feelings with those of his neighbours through the gradual increase of sympathetic pleasures and pains3 for it was to this source that ,mill looked for the practical solution of the antinomy between his psychological and ethical theories1 though he himself tried to pass from one position to the other by means of the highway in the air constructed by his own logic4 99 99 99 99 99 ,sidenote3 #d4 ,mill's logical defence of utilitarianism3 ,mill's attempt to pass by a logical method from psychological hedonism to utilitarianism is an instructive commentary on the difficulties which beset the transition4 ,his work may be described as a vindication of the utilitarian morality1 first1 from the charge of sensualism2 and secondly1 from that of selfishness4 ,and it is largely owing to his polemic that utilitarianism is no longer looked upon as either a sensual or a selfish theory4 ,it is not sensual1 unless1 indeed1 the pleasures of most men are of a sensual kind4 ,so far from being selfish1 it is almost stoical in the subordination of individual desires it enjoins4 ,but ,mill wished to do more than clear the character of utilitarian ethics4 ,he wished to show a logical reason for utilitarians pursuing elevated pleasures rather than base ones1 and to demonstrate the connection of his moral imperative with the principles which the school he belonged to laid down for human motives4 ,in both these respects his failure is conspicuous4 ,sidenote3 7a7 distinction of kinds of pleasure1 ,sidenote3 determined by authority1 ,sidenote3 either can be reduced to difference of quantity1 or leads to non-hedonistic standard2 ,in the former endeavour1 he went against ,bentham by attempting to draw a distinction in kind amongst pleasures--a distinction not reducible to quantitative measurement4 ,a higher degree of quality in the pleasure sought was to outweigh any difference in its amount or quantity4 ,with this modification1 utilitarianism is made to require a subordination of the lower or sensuous nature to the higher or intellectual nature4 ,pleasure1 indeed1 is still the end2 but the higher pleasure takes precedence over the lower1 irrespective of the amount of pleasant feeling that results4 ,pleasure is still the standard1 but not the ultimate standard2 for a further appeal has to be made to the criterion that distinguishes one pleasure from another1 not as merely greater or less1 but as higher or lower4 ,as is well known1 ,mill did not look either to the action or to the feeling itself for this criterion4 ,to have done so would have implied an acknowledgment that pleasure was no longer regarded as the ultimate standard4 ,he found the criterion of superiority simply in the opinion people of experience have about the relative desirability of various sorts of pleasure4 ,but such a criterion only pushes the final question of the standard one step farther back4 ,those people of experience to whom ,mill refers--who have tried both kinds of pleasure1 and prefer one of them#ej--;can they give no reason for1 no account of1 their preference8 ,if so1 to trust them is to appeal to blind authority1 and to relinquish anything like a science of ethics4 ,but1 if ,mill's authorities can reflect on their feelings1 as well as feel1 they can only tell us one or other of two things4 ,either the so-called higher pleasure is actually1 as pleasure1 so preferable to that called lower1 that the smallest amount of the one would be more pleasurable than the largest amount of the other2 or else the higher is called higher1 and is to be preferred to the lower--even although the latter may be greater as pleasure--because of a quality belonging to it over and above its character as pleasant feeling4 ,the former verdict would be in the first place paradoxical1 and1 in the second place1 would give up ,mill's case1 by reducing quality to a quantitative standard4 ,besides1 it would be no valid ground of preference for men in general2 since the pleasure of various actions and states differs according to the susceptibility of the subject4 ,according to the latter verdict1 the characteristic upon which the distinction of quality depends1 and not pleasure itself1 becomes the ethical standard4 ,sidenote3 7b7 ambiguities in his proof of utilitarianism4 ,in respect of his main contention1 that utilitarianism is a theory of beneficence1 and not of prudence or of selfishness1 ,mill emphasised even more strongly than ,bentham has done the distinction between the egoism which seeks its own things1 and the utilitarianism according to which everybody counts for one1 and nobody for more than one4 ,but when he attempted to connect this doctrine logically with the psychological postulates of his school1 he committed a double error4 ,in the first place1 he confused the purely psychological question of the motives that influence human conduct with the ethical question of the end to which conduct ought to be directed2 and1 in the second place1 he disregarded the difference of end there may be for society as a collective whole1 and for each member of the society individually4 ,there is in reality1 he says1#ea nothing desired except happiness2 and this psychological theory is too hastily identified with the ethical principle that happiness alone is desirable1 or what ought to be desired and pursued4 ,moreover1 no reason1 he says1 can be given why the general happiness is desirable1 except that each person1 so far as he believes it to be attainable1 desires his own happiness4 ,and this admission1 which seems as good as saying that no reason at all can be given why the individual should desire the general happiness1 is only held to be a sufficient reason for it1 through assuming that what is good for all as an aggregate is good for each member of the aggregate3 ,that each person's happiness is a good to that person1 and the general happiness1 therefore1 a good to the aggregate of all persons4#eb 99 99 99 99 99 ,sidenote3 ,imperfect coherence of ethical and theoretical philosophy4 ,it may appear strange to offer the preceding as the logical basis of an ethical principle which has had so wide and1 on the whole1 beneficial an influence as utilitarianism4 ,the explanation is to be found in the want of full coherence which often exists1 and is nowhere commoner than in ,english ethics1 between an author's practical view of life and the foundation of psychology or metaphysics with which it is connected4 ,it would certainly be wrong to imagine that ,bentham's self-denying labours rested on a confusion of standpoints1 or that ,mill's moral enthusiasm had no other support than a logical quibble4 ,to both of them1 and to many others1 utilitarianism was an ethical creed influencing their lives1 which was scarcely connected with the attempt to justify it logically4 ,such reasons in its favour as they adduced were rather after-thoughts for the defence of their creed than the foundations on which it was built4 ,sidenote3 #e4 ,actual transition to utilitarianism4 ,the formula of utilitarianism cannot be expressed as the conclusion of a syllogism or of an inductive inference4 ,it seems rather to have been arrived at by the production--or the recognition--of a sympathetic or altruistic sentiment1 which was made to yield a general principle for the guidance of conduct ,this process involves two steps1 which are consecutive and complementary1 although the positions they connect are not necessarily related4 ,the first step is to overcome the selfish principle of action in the individual2 the second to generalise it and obtain a principle for the non-selfish action that results4 ,mill seems to be the only recent writer who1 in making this transition1 adheres strictly to the psychological hedonism distinctive of his school4 ,he looks to the influence of education in increasing the feeling of unity between one man and his neighbours1 till individual action becomes merged in altruistic or social action4 ,the social state1 he says1 is at once so natural1 so necessary1 and so habitual to man1 that1 except in some unusual circumstances1 or by an effort of voluntary abstraction1 he never conceives himself otherwise than as a member of a body4#ec ,this is perfectly true1 but does not imply a sublation of selfishness4 ,a man never conceives himself otherwise than as a member of a body2 but it does not follow from this that he will subordinate his own interests to the interests of the other members when the two clash4 ,in cases of conflict the individual often tends to sacrifice the good of his neighbours to his own good2 and he may do so although he fully recognises the social consequences of action1 just because he still remains at the ethical standpoint which treats private good as superior to public4 ,it is true1 as ,mill contends1 that1 in an improving state of the human mind1 the influences are constantly on the increase1 which tend to generate in each individual a feeling of unity with all the rest2 which feeling1 if perfect1 would make him never think of1 or desire1 any beneficial condition for himself1 in the benefits of which they are not included4#ed ,but this is not sufficient to connect the two antagonistic poles of ,mill's system4 ,it starts with assuming the notion of an improving state of the human mind1 as determined according to an ethical standard not yet arrived at2 and it gives no valid account of the means by which the improvement is to be brought about4 ,it is prophetic of a time when the motives of human nature will have been so modified that the antagonism between self and others will be no longer felt2 but it offers no practical solution of the antinomy suited to present circumstances4 ,sidenote3 7a7 recognition of ,sympathy ,sidenote3 as disinterested1 by ,bain1 ,the basis of the ethical sentiment by which the desires and actions of a man are to be brought into harmony with those of his fellows is investigated in a more thorough manner by ,professor ,bain and by ,george ,grote4 ,but both of these writers stand on a somewhat different platform from the strict psychological hedonism which ,mill never relinquished4 ,thus ,grote enumerates as elementary tendencies of the mind1 which ethical sentiment presupposes1 and out of which it is compounded1 self-regarding tendencies1 sympathetic tendencies1 benevolent affections1 malevolent affections1 and 7though in a smaller degree7 love and hatred of those who cause pleasure and pain to others2#ee and this without interpreting sympathy1 in the way that ,mill does1 as having for its end the pleasures which come with the gratification of the sympathetic impulse1 or the removal of the pain caused by its restraint4 ,as ,professor ,bain argues1 this position of ,mill's is tenable only on the ground that the omission of a disinterested act that we are inclined to1 would give us so much pain that it is on the whole for our comfort that we should make the requisite sacrifice4 ,there is plausibility in this supposition4 ,but the doctrine breaks down when we try it upon extreme cases4444 ,all that people usually suffer from stifling a generous impulse is too slight and transient to be placed against any important sacrifice4#ef ,in recognising sympathy as a purely disinterested impulse1#eg ,mr ,bain breaks loose at an important point from the psychology of ,bentham4 ,he is indeed only kept from a complete break with it by the position he ascribes to sympathy as outside of the ordinary sphere of voluntary action4 ,above all things1 it would seem to be necessary that nothing should conflict with our character as rational beings1 which is to desire everything exactly according to its pleasure-value4#eh ,but sympathy obviously clashes with the regular outgoings of the will in favour of our pleasures2 so that it ought to be placed outside voluntary action1 and regarded simply as a remarkable and crowning instance of the ,fixed ,idea4#ei ,sidenote3 without being applied to determine the ethical end1 ,it is owing to its exclusion1 as a fixed idea1 from the sphere of voluntary conduct1 that sympathetic appropriation of the feelings of others has little or no place assigned it by ,professor ,bain1 when he goes on#fj to describe the way in which the moral opinions of men have actually originated4 ,they have1 he holds1 a twofold source--the one arising from the necessity for public security1 the other being of sentimental origin4 ,the former makes society ordain those acts and services required for its own preservation4 ,the latter leads to the confusion of this necessary element of morality with the sentimental likes and dislikes which may be characteristic of different people4 ,these are mixed up in one code with the imperative duties that hold society together2 and it is only when we disentangle this complication1 and refer each class of duties to their proper origin1 that we can obtain a clear insight into the foundations of morality4#fa ,morality1 therefore1 is that which is imposed by society for its own preservation and security1 and which is sanctioned by the punishments of society either in its public judicial acts1 or by the unofficial expressions of disapprobation and the exclusion from social good offices4#fb ,of this external law the moral sense or conscience is merely a subjective mirror or copy4 ,the duty of unselfishness is not connected with the disinterested impulse of sympathy1 but is traced to the external order of society1 which has found it necessary to restrain the self-seeking action of individuals--a restraint which has come to be transferred to the consciences of the members of the society4 ,mr ,bain's theory falls back in this way upon external authority1 just as ,bentham's did2 and1 for the same reasons1 they are neither of them able to prescribe the utilitarian principle of conduct4 ,but1 in his assertion of the disinterested nature of sympathy1 ,mr ,bain has introduced--though he has not himself utilised--a fruitful principle1 by means of which a basis of moral sentiment may be found by means of which it is possible to escape from ethical as well as psychological egoism4 ,sidenote3 and by ,grote4 ,this element of sympathy is most fully recognised in the instructive analysis of ethical sentiment by the late ,george ,grote4 ,at the same time1 ,grote does not1 like ,adam ,smith1 for instance1 attempt to evolve the material characteristics of approbation and disapprobation from this source4 ,the mere putting of one's self in the place of a spectator--or in that of the patient--instead of that of the agent1 is only a formal change1 which will modify our judgments or feelings without accounting for their actual content4 ,but a uniform formal element in all ethical sentiment is1 according to ,grote1 a man's constant habit of viewing and judging of circumstances around him1 both from the point of view of the agent and from that of the patient4#fc ,this twofold position is occupied by every individual4 ,he is an agent1 and in that position his own interests and feelings are separate from1 and often at variance with1 those of others4 ,but he is also a patient in respect of the actions of others1 and in that position his interests and his feelings are commonly in unison with those of the majority4 ,hence a man is led constantly to adopt ideally the point of view which is not actually his own at the time1 so that the idea of the judgment which others will form becomes constantly and indissolubly associated with the idea of action in the mind of every agent4 ,in every community1 certain actions are visited with the admiration1 esteem1 and protection of the society2 certain other actions with the opposite feelings and results3 so that there arises an association in my mind of a certain line of conduct on the part both of myself and of any other individual agent1 with a certain sentiment resulting from such conduct1 and excited by it1 in the minds of the general public around us4 ,it is a sentiment of regulated social reciprocity as between the agent and the society amongst which he lives4 ,and this sentiment1 when enforced by a sanction1 constitutes the complete form of ethical sentiment4 ,as a complete explanation of the moral sentiments and judgments of men1 this theory does not seem to be above criticism4 ,it requires not only an association between every personal action and the feelings--sympathetically imagined by the agent--with which the action will be regarded by others1 but it also implies that this association has become so inseparable that the feeling appears as an individual or personal one1 distinguished by the subject from other sentiments which he has on consciously imagining himself in the position of others4 ,but it is referred to here as illustrating what we find in ,mill1 and1 in a different way1 in ,professor ,bain1 that the first real step towards the utilitarian standard is to make the individual pass somehow or other to a standpoint outside his own nature4 ,in ,mill this is done mainly by the assertion of the social nature of man1 in ,grote by showing how a moral sentiment may be arrived at by the combined action of sympathy and association4 ,sidenote3 7b7 ,the idea of ,equality ,sidenote3 necessary to regulate sympathy2 ,the further influence required in the transition to utilitarianism is the idea of equality4 ,the best expression of utilitarian doctrine followed soon after the assertion of the equal rights of men which signalised the politics of the end of last century in the ,french and ,american revolutions4 ,bentham was permeated by the spirit of this movement1 however far he might be from accepting its abstractions about natural rights4 ,in his hands1 too1 utilitarianism was a political rather than an ethical doctrine4 ,everybody to count for one and nobody for more than one follows naturally from the phrase1 the greatest happiness of the greatest number4 ,without this assertion of the necessity of an equal distribution1 there is no safeguard against sympathy being restricted and partial in its operation4 ,indeed the feeling of sympathy in itself is naturally strongest towards those with whom one is in most frequent relation1 or connected by numerous associative ties2 and if left to itself1 it might therefore be expected to give rise to the extended selfishness of class or family interest1 only relieved by a spasmodic humanitarianism4 ,this tendency is corrected by the dogma of human equality1 which had been formulated as a juridical maxim in the ,roman ,jus ,gentium1 but afterwards passed into a political creed1 and found vent in the literature of the eighteenth century and in the public events which marked its close4 ,sidenote3 influence of the idea on ,bentham4 ,the change which this notion of human equality--passed through has been traced by ,sir ,henry ,maine4 ,where the ,roman jurisconsult had written 'quales sunt1' meaning exactly what he said1 the modern civilian wrote 'all men are equal' in the sense of 'all men ought to be equal4' ,the peculiar ,roman idea that natural law coexisted with civil law and gradually absorbed it1 had evidently been lost sight of1 or had become unintelligible1 and the words that had at most conveyed a theory concerning the origin1 composition1 and development of human institutions1 were beginning to express the sense of a great standing wrong suffered by mankind4#fd ,now ,bentham1 however far he may have been from trusting to the system of 'natural law1'#fe was certainly not beyond the influence of the idea of human equality which it carried in its train2 and1 from his own point of view1 he laboured to defend it4 ,in assimilating this idea1 utilitarianism has preserved one of the best results of the old law of nature1 without the ambiguity with which it had formerly been used1#ff if in a sense which admits of a somewhat narrow and abstract interpretation4 ,it is true that this does not give exactly the result which is usually described as utilitarianism4 ,i have spoken of the notion of equality as the regulator of sympathy--a canon in accordance with which the sympathetic impulse is to be guided4 ,sympathy impels us to relieve the pains and increase the pleasures of our fellow-men4 ,the principle of equality dictates that this sympathetic activity is to be directed to the happiness of all men equally4 ,every one whom our conduct may be made to affect is to count as a unit1 and a unit only4 ,the distribution is not to be according to kinship of blood or social ties1 though it is so much more in our power to promote the happiness of those closely connected with us1 that it may fairly occupy a larger share of our thought and energy than the happiness of other people does4 ,utilitarianism carries the application of the principle of equality still farther1 by looking upon self as a unit whose happiness is to be regarded as of exactly equal value with that of any one else4 ,with every individual reduced to the same ethical worth1 happiness is declared to be the end of moral action1 and equality of distribution the rule for deciding between the claims of competing individuals4 ,sidenote3 #f4 ,the two sides of utilitarian theory not logically connected4 ,it seems to me1 therefore1 that utilitarianism is a theory compounded out of two quite different elements4 ,on the one side the basis of the theory has been laid by ,bentham and ,mill in a naturalistic psychology which looks upon pleasure as the only object of desire4 ,to this there is superadded the idea of equality1 which is the distinctively ethical element in the theory4 ,but it is only by confusion that the idea of equality--which ,bentham expresses by the proposition that the happiness of one man is to count for no more than the happiness of another--can be supposed to be derived from the same theory of human nature as that which identifies pleasure and desire4 ,utilitarianism only becomes a practicable end for individual conduct when psychological hedonism has been given up4 ,it is futile to say that one ought to pursue the greatest happiness of the greatest number1 unless it is possible for the individual to act for something else than his own pleasure--that is1 for an end which is for him not pleasure at all4 ,in a word1 utilitarianism1 while maintaining that the only thing worth desiring is pleasure1 must at the same time admit that pleasure is not the only object that can be or is desired3 otherwise1 it can never advance from the egoistic to the universalistic form4 ,this view receives confirmation from the way in which utilitarianism is held by the most eminent of living moralists4 ,in the ',methods of ,ethics1' the tradition of ,bentham is expressly united with the doctrines of ,butler and ,clarke4 ,professor ,sidgwick agrees with ,bentham1 and the long line of moralists from ,epicurus downwards1 in maintaining the doctrine of ethical hedonism1 that pleasure is the only thing ultimately desirable2 but1 with ,butler1 he rejects the psychological hedonism1 according to which pleasure is the only object of desire4 ,so far from these two positions being inconsistent1 it is only through the second that the first can be held in its universalistic form4 ,the problem is1 however1 how to unite them4 ,in ,professor ,sidgwick's theory1 they are connected by the application of the ethical maxims of benevolence and equity1 which an exhaustive examination of ethical intuitions has left standing as axioms of the practical reason4 ,though utilitarianism1 therefore1 is still adhered to1 it is on an expressly ,rational ground1 not on the basis of ,naturalism4 99 99 99 99 99 ,sidenote3 #g4 ,summary of ethical consequences of psychological hedonism3 ,in this and the previous chapter1 ,i have looked at human nature from the point of view of psychological hedonism1 and have endeavoured to show what ethical principles that theory leads to1 or is consistent with4 ,the theory does not deny that there is a great diversity of capacities and interests in man4 ,but it holds that1 so far as concerns conduct1 they admit of being brought under one general law--that every action is subject to the rule of the two sovereign masters1 pleasure and pain4 ,it is evident1 therefore1 that if ethics is to be connected at all with psychology--if what ought to be done is in any degree what can be done--the end of conduct must be hedonistic4 ,the psychological fact cannot indeed be without more ado turned into a moral imperative4 ,yet this much may be admitted1 that if this interpretation of action leaves room for ethics at all1 the end prescribed can be nothing else than pleasure1 or the avoidance of pain4 ,sidenote3 7a7 no logical connection with utilitarianism2 ,the question1 therefore1 was how to determine the pleasure which is to be sought8 ,and ,i have tried to show1 in the chapter just concluded1 that utilitarianism does not admit of being logically arrived at from this point of view4 ,it may indeed1 under certain circumstances1#fg be the guide of political or social enactments2 but these can only be made to bear upon the conduct of individuals by the sanctions which the ,state or ,society has at its command4 ,the individual can have as his maxim of conduct an end which corresponds with utilitarianism in two events only3 when he is so constituted as to find his pleasure in the greatest aggregate pleasure of mankind1 or when the political and social sanctions are so complete and searching as to make his individual interest and the collective interest coincide4 ,the former event is unfortunately too rare to be taken into account in establishing a theory2 the latter would imply an interference with individual liberty so impracticable that it is not contemplated even in the most comprehensive of socialistic schemes4 ,sidenote3 7b7 admits of rational egoism ,sidenote3 only under impossible conditions4 ,hedonism in psychology1 therefore1 means egoism in ethics4 ,but even this theory1 as the previous chapter has shown1 has its own difficulties to meet4 ,the antagonism of individual and universal has not yet been got rid of4 ,the difficulty is no longer caused by the conflict between one man and his neighbours3 it is the difference between the feeling and action of a moment1 and the sum of feelings and actions which makes up a lifetime4 ,it is true that1 if we admit that pleasure is the only thing worth pursuing1 and that by pleasure a man means his own pleasure1 there is so far no reason for preferring the pleasure of one moment to that of another1 except as more certain or of greater amount or degree2#fh but this is to start with ascribing a value to pleasure1 and not with the simple fact that pleasure is desired4 ,if psychological hedonism is our starting-point--and we give to the theory the interpretation that has the greatest verisimilitude--it is the greatest present pleasure that rules4 ,and1 although the man of reflection will no doubt attempt to estimate the future pleasure at its true value in comparison with the pleasure actually present1 this can never have full effect upon his will4 ,it has been shown1 indeed1 that the realisation of egoistic hedonism is not merely unattainable from the point of view of psychological hedonism1 but that it would involve conditions inconsistent with the nature of desire4 ,,footnotes3 #ca ,professor ,bain distinguishes with greater clearness than his predecessors1 first1 legal duty1 or that the contravention of which is punished by the ministers of the state2 secondly1 moral duty1 enforced by the unofficial punishment of social disapprobation2 and thirdly1 the conduct which society leaves to individual choice1 without censuring either its commission or omission4 ,moral duty is further distinguished by him from the meritorious1 or conduct which society encourages by approval1 without censuring its omission4 #cb ,mr ,gurney's attempt 7,mind1 vii4 #cdi ff47 to rationalise the utilitarian ought depends upon the assumption that the individual feels a desire 7not only for his own1 but7 for other people's pleasure 7p4 #ceb74 ,from the point of view of the psychological hedonist1 however1 this desire is only secondary and derivative1 depending upon the fact that it increases the pleasure of the subject4 ,your pleasure1 the psychological hedonist would say1 is desired by me qu my pleasure4 ,if1 on the other hand1 it is admitted that the individual has other ends than his own pleasure1 there seems no ground in psychological fact for limiting these ends to something aimed at because pleasurable to others4 ,from this point of view the first step in the establishment of an ethical theory would be an attempt to find a principle of unity in the various ends actually aimed at by individuals1 and recognised by them as good4 ,this is made by ,professor ,sidgwick1 who1 while allowing that it is possible to hold that the objective relations of conscious minds which we call cognition of ,truth1 contemplation of ,beauty1 ,freedom of action1 c41 are good1 independently of the pleasures that we derive from them1 maintains that we can only justify to ourselves the importance that we attach to any of these objects by considering its conduciveness1 in one way or another1 to the happiness of conscious 7or sentient7 beings 7,methods of ,ethics1 iii4 xiv4 #c1 #c;d ed41 p4 #cih74 ,but ,mr ,sidgwick's ,utilitarianism depends on a ,rational view of human nature which is beyond the scope of the present discussion4 ,see below1 p4 #gd4 #cc ,principles of ,morals and ,legislation1 chap4 iii4 #a2 ,works1 i4 #ad4 #cd ,as ,paley put it1 with characteristic plainness of statement1 ,we can be obliged to nothing1 but what we ourselves are to gain or lose something by4--,moral and ,political ,philosophy1 book ii4 chap4 ii4 #ce ,cf4 ,bain1 ,emotions1 p4 #bfd3 ,i consider that the proper meaning or import of these terms ,morality1 ,duty1 ,obligation1 or ,right refers to the class of actions enforced by the sanction of punishment4 #cf ,bentham1 ,principles of ,morals and ,legislation1 chap4 xix4 7xvii471 #i ff2 ,works1 i4 #add ff4 #cg ,ibid41 #bj1 p4 #adh4 #ch ,fragment on ,government1 chap4 v42 ,works1 i4 #bic4 ,cf4 ,principles of ,morals and ,legislation1 ch4 iii4 #e1 p4 #ad1 where the ,moral ,sanction is said to proceed from such chance persons in the community as the person in question may happen in the course of his life to have concerns with4 #ci ,bentham1 ,fragment on ,government1 loc4 cit4 #dj ,works1 xi4 #ie2 cf4 ,j4 ,grote1 ,utilitarian ,philosophy1 p4 #acg4 #da ,principles of ,morals and ,legislation1 ch4 xix4 7xvii471 #g ff4 #db ,loc4 cit41 #h1 p4 #add4 #dc ,ought is inappropriate here according to ,bentham's principles1 since there is no question of punishment inflicted by a political or social or religious superior4 #dd ,loc4 cit41 #bj1 p4 #adh4 #de ,moral and ,political ,philosophy1 book ii4 chap4 iii4 #df ,this is clearly recognised by ,bentham3 ,the actual end as distinguished from the right and proper end of government is1 he says1 in every political community1 the greatest happiness of those1 whether one or many1 by whom the powers of government are exercised4--,constitutional ,code1 book i41 ,introd41 #b2 ,works1 ix4 #e4 #dg ,the ,emotions and the ,will1 p4 #bfd4 #dh ,cf4 ,bain1 ,the ,emotions and the ,will1 p4 #bhg4 ,professor ,bain says 7,emotions1 p4 #bgf n471 we ought to have a written code of public morality1 or of the duties imposed by society1 over and above what parliament imposes1 and this should not be a loosely written moral treatise1 but a strict enumeration of what society requires under pain of punishment by excommunication or otherwise1--the genuine offences that are not passed over4 ,this would certainly be very desirable1 were it not from the nature of the case impracticable4 ,popular judgment as to a man's conduct1--what society imposes1--is one of the things most difficult to predict3 it is under the influence of most heterogeneous causes1 personal1 industrial1 religious1 political1 c4 ,i do not think1 for instance1 that any one could safely undertake to describe exactly the kind of actions which will infallibly call forth the censure of ,british public opinion1 or that of the smaller and intersecting groups into which society is divided4 #di ,emotions1 p4 #bhh4 #ej ,i have spoken1 for simplicity's sake1 as if there were two kinds of pleasure easily distinguishable4 ,but the question is really much more complicated4 #ea ,utilitarianism1 p4 #eg4 #eb ,ibid41 p4 #ec4 #ec ,utilitarianism1 p4 #df4 ,but no statement of the sociality of man could be more explicit or satisfactory than that of ,butler1 ,sermons1 i4 #ed ,utilitarianism1 p4 #dh4 #ee ,fragments on ,ethical ,subjects 7#ahgf71 p4 #f4 #ef ,the ,emotions and the ,will1 #c;d ed41 p4 #bie4 #eg ,ibid41 p4 #aaa2 cf4 ,mind1 viii4 #ee3 ,the important exceptions to the law of ,pleasure and ,pain are 7#a7 ,fixed ,ideas1 7#b7 ,habits1 and 7#c7 ,disinterested action for others4 #eh ,emotions1 p4 #dch4 #ei ,emotions1 p4 #aba4 #fj ,ibid41 p4 #bga ff4 #fa ,ibid41 p4 #bgc4 #fb ,ibid41 p4 #bfd4 #fc ,fragments on ,ethical ,subjects1 p4 #h f4 #fd ,ancient ,law1 #hth ed41 p4 #ic4 #fe ,principles of ,morals and ,legislation1 chap4 ii4 #ad n4 #ff ,the ambiguity of the phrase is explained in an interesting way in ,sir ,h4 ,maine's account of the change from its juridical to a political or ethical meaning4 ,in some writers it seems to have a third and still different signification4 ,we must thus distinguish 7#a7 the juridical meaning1 originating in the ,roman law common to all nations1 which had arisen through the constant levelling or removal of irregularities which went on wherever the prtorian system was applied to the cases of foreign litigants1 modified subsequently by the ,greek conception of 7isots74 7#b7 ,the political meaning1 that all men ought to be equal1 arose from the preceding4 ,but its notion of ought seems often to depend on an idea of the constitution of nature according to which all men are actually born equal--not only in rights1 soon to be obscured by human convention1 but also in power or faculty1 afterwards unequally developed by education4 ,hence 7#c7 the natural meaning4 ,the doctrines of evolution and heredity have made this view seem as strange to us now as it would have done to the ,romans from whom it was illegitimately derived4 ,yet at one time it seems to have been assumed1 almost without question1 that there is but little difference in the natural endowments of different men4 ,this assumption lay at the basis of ,hobbes's political theory--,leviathan1 ,i4 xiii4 p4 #fj1--was stated in a more guarded form by ,locke--,on ,education1 #a2 ,works1 ed4 of #ahbd1 i4 #f1--;and adopted almost without qualification by ,helvtius1 who1 carrying out ,locke's metaphor of the soul as1 at birth1 a tabula rasa1 afterwards written over with the pen of experience1 says3 ,quintilien1 ,locke1 et moi1 disons3 ,l'ingalit des esprits est l'effet d'une cause connue1 et cette cause est la diffrence de l'ducation--the causes of the existing inequality being afterwards stated as twofold3 first1 the difference of environment1 which may be called chance2 and secondly1 the difference of strength in the desire for instruction4--,de l'homme1 ,,ii4 i41 ,,iii4 i41 ,,iv4 xxii42 uvres1 ii4 #ga1 #ia1 #bhj4 7,quintilian's statement1 however1 is even more guarded than ,locke's4 ,cf4 ,opera1 ed4 ,spalding1 i4 #dg47 #fg ,that is1 when 7#a7 the legislature accurately expresses the average feeling of all the members of the ,state2 or 7#b7 the legislators happen to be fully intelligent people in whom selfishness has taken the shape of benevolence4 #fh ,although1 as is well known1 propinquity was held by ,bentham to be an independent ground of distinction and preference4--,principles of ,morals and ,legislation1 chap4 iv1 sect4 #b4 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,moral ,,sentiment4 ,sidenote3 #a4 ,a uniform theory such as psychological hedonism ,psychological hedonism possesses the merit of offering a simple and uniform theory of mental action4 ,it may admit conflicting accounts of the kinds of action and sufferance which actually give men pleasure and pain1--a point on which1 for example1 ,hobbes and ,j4 ,s4 ,mill differ widely4 ,but it has one general formula for the relation of feeling to action1 which has been precise and clear enough to attract many psychologists4 ,the ethical consequences of the theory have1 indeed1 turned out--if the argument of the preceding chapters is valid--to be neither so obvious nor so satisfactory as its adherents have commonly supposed4 ,but it must nevertheless be admitted that1 if psychology shows pleasure to be1 as a matter of fact1 the constant end of action1 it will be useless--even if it is not impossible--for ethics to prescribe any other end4 ,sidenote3 not supplied by the opponents of ethical hedonism1 ,the opponents of ethical hedonism have thus uniformly insisted that the theory which makes pleasure the end and motive of all conscious activity is imperfect2 and this psychological question has been the battle-field of many of the controversies1 at any rate1 of ,english ethics4 ,psychological hedonism has not1 however1 been confronted by the ,english moralists with an opposed theory of equal simplicity1 nor can the controversy be said to have led to a thorough analysis of action4 ,the psychological investigation has1 in most cases1 been carried no farther than the ethical interests at stake seemed to require2 and the predominance of these interests has perhaps prevented the inquiry from being carried out with complete freedom from preconception on either side4 ,a uniform theory under which our various particular desires might be brought may1 indeed1 be said to have been suggested by ,butler4 ,he meets the hedonistic proposition that all desire is for personal pleasure1 by the doctrine that no particular desire has pleasure as its end1 since all pleasure presupposes a previous desire in the satisfaction of which it consists4#fi ,this theory1 which may have been derived from ,plato1#gj and was afterwards used by ,schopenhauer to prove the negative nature of pleasure and consequent worthlessness of life1 is1 however1 a generalisation which cannot be made to include the whole facts to be taken account of4#ga ,many pleasures occur independently of any precedent desire4 ,and what ,butler had to show--and was really concerned to show--was that desire was not exclusively directed to objects thus independently found to be pleasurable3 the contradictory1 that is to say1 and not the contrary1 of psychological hedonism4 ,sidenote3 in maintaining the reality of non-hedonistic activity4 ,for this purpose ,butler pointed to the whole class of affections which1 although they may also tend to private interest1 have an immediate reference to the good of others2 and1 in addition to these1 he contended for an original principle of benevolence towards others in human nature1 as well as of self-love or care for one's own interests and happiness4 ,this latter1 he held1 so far from being the sole principle of action1 implied the existence of a number of particular passions and affections1 directed immediately to external objects--the satisfaction of these desires giving pleasure1 though pleasure was not the end they aimed at4 ,voluntary action is thus not brought under any common rubric2 for1 at the same time that the calm principle of self-love is directed to the agent's greatest pleasure1 the object of hunger1 for example1 is said to be not pleasure but food1 that of benevolence not personal pleasure but the good of others4 ,sidenote3 ,non-hedonistic action generalised by ,herbart1 ,sidenote3 from the tendency of ideas to self-realisation4 ,the attempt to give unity to the non-hedonistic view of desire has come from a different quarter4 ,uninfluenced by the exigencies of ethical controversy1 which formed the entire motive of ,butler's investigation1 ,herbart and his school have worked out a theory of desire1 which has many points of comparison with that of ,butler4 ,however much they may differ from the ,english moralist--of whose existence they are mostly ignorant--they are at one with him in rejecting the maxim of psychological hedonism1 nihil appetimus nisi sub specie boni2 and their differences from him are largely due to their having gone further in their analysis of the facts1 and endeavoured to bring them under a general principle4 ,butler's view of the object of desire is distinguished from the ,herbartian chiefly in two respects4 ,in the first place1 he identifies that object with the external or real thing1 whereas ,herbart is careful to point out that it is a presentation or idea4 ,in the second place1 while ,butler is content to postulate an original tendency of our nature towards certain objects1 ,herbart attempts to get behind this tendency1 and explain the phenomena of striving from the interaction of presentations4 ,over and above the ordinary hypothesis of natural realism1 ,butler's theory implies a sort of pre-established harmony between our active tendencies and things outside the mind1 in virtue of which some of these things do1 and some do not1 attract our desires4 ,herbart1 on the other hand1 attempts nothing less than a complete genetic account of mental phenomena1 explaining the facts of presentation1 desire1 and feeling through the persistence of presentation in consciousness and their rise into clearer consciousness4#gb ,the phenomena of desire and feeling are both accounted for by this mechanism of impelling and inhibiting forces4#gc ,sidenote3 ,this tendency recognised in the doctrine of fixed ideas ,it would be beyond the scope of this ,essay to examine the above view of the active side of mental phenomena4 ,for present purposes it is enough to draw attention to the fact that the common deduction of the phenomena of desire and will from the feelings of pleasure and pain is not the only scientific theory of human action1 and that it is rejected on its merits by writers who have no hankering after what the psychological hedonist would call the mystical element of free-will4 ,it is of interest to note1 too1 that ,professor ,bain1 in whose works the traditions of psychological hedonism find their most careful expression1 has modified the doctrine so as to allow of desire of pleasure and avoidance of pain explaining less than had been formerly required of them4 ,outside the circle of hedonistically-determined motives1 he recognises the influence of the presentation or idea as a self-realising element in the individual consciousness1 apart from its pleasurable or painful characteristics4#gd ,those fixed ideas1 as ,mr ,bain calls them1 tend both to persist in the mind1 and to project themselves into action1 independently of pleasure and pain--or at least with a force which is out of proportion to the pleasure they bring4 ,as has been already seen1 it is by means of this doctrine that he explains the great fact of our nature denominated sympathy1 fellow-feeling1 pity1 compassion1 disinterestedness4#ge ,to the same category belongs much of the ambition and the aspirations of human beings4444 ,a certain notion--say of power1 wealth1 grandeur--has fixed itself in our mind and keeps a persistent hold there4 ,it is asserted1 indeed1 that the action of such fixed ideas perverts the regular operation of the will which would lead us to renounce whatever is hopeless or not worth the cost4 ,and1 certainly1 their admission among mental phenomena seems to imply the superposition of a new theory of action upon the old theory of psychological hedonism4 ,there is no disguising the importance of the modification thus introduced4 ,the name fixed idea is misleading if it be taken to imply that persistency and tendency to action are properties belonging to a certain class of ideas only4 ,mr ,bain's doctrine is founded on the hypothesis of the identity of the nervous centres which function in representation and in sensation1 and is therefore valid of all representations or ideas4 ,the characteristics of persistency1 and of tendency to action1 are therefore normal characteristics of presentations1 though they may belong in an unusual degree to some ideas from the relation these hold to the dominant cluster of ideas in the individual consciousness4 ,and if we thus attribute to all ideas without exception the tendency to self-realisation1 and recognise--as we must--the relation of mutual assistance or inhibition which ideas bear to one another in virtue of their being presented to the same subject1 we have granted the material out of which1 in ,herbart's skilful ,mechanik des ,geistes1 the phenomena of feeling and desire are woven4 99 99 99 99 99 ,sidenote3 #b4 ,the non-hedonistic theory of action4 ,the view of individual human nature1 which holds that all its desires are not directed to personal pleasure1 thus claims consideration4 ,with its less restricted theory of action1 this doctrine may seem to offer a larger means of determining the appropriate end of human conduct4 ,in particular1 the suggestion naturally occurs that the ethical end will1 on this theory1 be something else than pleasure4#gf ,but there is1 nevertheless1 no contradiction in holding--as ,mr ,sidgwick does--that although other objects than pleasure are actually desired1 there is nothing else which can be held to be ultimately desirable1 or the tendency to which can be said to have moral worth4 ,sidenote3 ,difficulty of unifying the various impulses it implies1 ,the ethical barrenness of psychological hedonism has been seen to result from its narrow and inflexible view of human nature4 ,but theories such as those now to be considered have1 in an ethical regard1 to overcome a difficulty of another kind in the variety of impulses which they admit upon the stage4 ,the objects to which these impulses or desires relate have as yet received no further characterisation than that they are objects of desire4 ,and the difficulty of finding a principle by which some order of precedence or value amongst them may be determined is just1 in other words1 the difficulty of obtaining a moral standard4 ,sidenote3 so as to determine a standard for action4 ,the question does not ordinarily arise in the above form1 because the moral standard is commonly taken for granted1 and the various impulses1 affections1 and dispositions are made to derive their ethical rank from their relation to that standard4 ,but this method is obviously inappropriate when the standard is still to be ascertained1 its determination being the object of inquiry4 ,and it may seem that the constitution of man contains in itself a means of distinguishing the moral value of its various elements1 or of the actions to which they lead1 and thus furnishing a moral standard or end for conduct4 ,this purpose seems to have been to some extent1 though not quite clearly1 kept in view by the writers who1 in last century1 contended against the selfish theory which had been so crudely enunciated by ,hobbes4 ,they attempted to show that selfishness was not the only1 nor even the most prominent1 principle of action2 and1 from the system of diverse principles which they found implanted in human nature1 they endeavoured to work out a theory of conduct4 ,sidenote3 ,this attempted by the ,english moralists1 ,sidenote3 but along with a utilitarian criterion1 ,sidenote3 and with egoistic arguments4 ,especially amongst the later ,english moralists--,adam ,smith1 for instance--the question of the end or standard came almost to drop out of sight in the midst of the controversy regarding the nature of the moral sense or moral faculty--the way1 that is1 in which we become aware of the difference between right and wrong4 ,but in ,shaftesbury1 ,butler1 and ,hutcheson--the writers who formulated this doctrine of the moral sense--the attempt is made to connect a theory of the criterion of morality with the source of our knowledge of it4 ,shaftesbury and ,hutcheson both looked upon social welfare or the general happiness as the end of moral conduct1 and the criterion in accordance with which moral character is ascribed to actions2 at the same time that their main contention was for the immediateness of the sense by which we perceive these moral qualities4 ,and they sought to establish the connection of the two doctrines by means of the benevolent feelings--which they held to be original and independent of private interest--and their immediate approval by the reflex or moral sense of the individual man4 ,similar ideas appear in ,butler1 at the same time that he tended to make conscience or the moral sense the standard of morality1 as well as the source of our knowledge of it4 ,they1 as well as he1 however1 found it necessary to come back from the social or political to the individual point of view4 ,even if their conception of the good was not evolved from the nature of the individual man1 their philosophical standpoint required them to leave broader ground1 and show it to be the individual's natural goal4 ,and in doing this1 their constant tendency is to revert to egoistic arguments--demonstrating the complete harmony of virtue and interest1 or attempting to prove to the individual that his own happiness consists in the exercise of the social affections4 ,thus ,shaftesbury tries to show1 by an empirical collection of results1 that to have the natural 7or social7 affections too weak1 or the private affections too strong1 is a source of misery1#gg as well as the chief source of vice2 and that1 largely owing to the pleasure of virtuous action1 it is to the private interest and good of every one to work to the general good4#gh ,hutcheson1 again1 devotes a large portion of his most mature work to allay the suspicion that in following the impulse of our kind affections and the moral faculty we are counteracting our interests1 and abandoning what may be of more consequence to our happiness than either this self-approbation or the applauses of others2#gi while ,butler1 referring to virtuous conduct1 says1 in a well-known passage1 that when we sit down in a cool hour we can neither justify to ourselves this or any other pursuit1 till we are convinced that it will be for our happiness1 or at least not contrary to it4#hj ,opposed as the whole school were to the selfish theory of human action1 they never spoke of any sacrifice of private happiness as a thing to be looked for1 or in any way taken into account1 in conduct which is the result of calm deliberation4 ,it is difficult1 therefore1 to avoid the judgment passed upon them by ,schleiermacher1 that the ,english school of ,shaftesbury1 with all their talk about virtue1 are really given up to pleasure4#ha ,sidenote3 #c4 ,ethics may be made to depend on the moral sense4 ,at the same time1 their writings constantly suggest a theory of morals which is neither obliged to adopt off-hand a utilitarian criterion of virtue1 nor forced to fall back upon the egoistic sanctions of personal pleasure and pain4 ,their psychological theory points to an ethical doctrine in which pleasure is neither the sole end of action1 nor its sole motive4 ,they do not1 indeed1 make quite clear the transition from the psychological to the ethical point of view2 and critics are still fond of confronting ,butler with the objection he anticipated--,why ought ,i to obey my conscience8 ,the apparent petitio principii of ,butler's answer1 ,because it is the law of your nature1 is due to the way in which the teleological standpoint is introduced4 ,the purpose of which 7according to ,butler7 man is the vehicle or realising organism is spoken of as a law externally imposed1 and deriving its authority1 not from its own nature1 but from the nature of its origin4 ,sidenote3 ,different views of the nature of the moral sense4 ,there would seem to be one way only to surmount the difficulty arising from the variety of impulses of which the nature of man is made up1 and that is by consistently following out the teleological point of view4 ,but what1 the question is1 is the final or comprehensive end to which human nature points amidst this diversity of objects of striving8 ,the doctrine of the moral sense attempts to answer the question4 ,now this moral sense may either be regarded as not itself a separate faculty1 but simply an expression for the harmony of human tendencies2 or it may be looked upon as a separate and superior capacity1 which1 again1 may either be interpreted in terms of sense1 or of the understanding--the former interpretation leading to its identification with pleasure1 the latter to its being conceived as law4 99 99 99 99 99 ,sidenote3 7a7 ,the harmony of impulses4 ,shaftesbury's theory4 ,these different methods were attempted by the ,english moralists--the first1 however1 to a less extent than the others4 ,but it inspired much of ,shaftesbury's work1 though it cannot be said to have been consistently developed by him4 ,the conflict of impulses in man was too obvious a fact not to be apparent even in ,shaftesbury's roseate view of life4 ,he recognised1 indeed1 not only private or self-affections1 promoting the good of the individual1 and natural or social affections1 which led to the public good1 but also unnatural affections1 which tended to no good whatever4#hb ,the reference to consequences is thus made prominent at once4 ,the last class of affections is condemned outright because of its infelicific results2 while an attempt is made to prove from experience that the courses of conduct to which the two former lead coincide4 ,shaftesbury contended for a real organic union between the individual and society2 but1 when he came to establish its nature1 he made it consist in an asserted harmony of interests1 while the obligation to virtue was allowed to rest on its conduciveness to personal pleasure4 ,he sometimes spoke of virtue as identical with the harmonious development of the affections of the individual man2#hc but he expressly defined it as consisting in the individual having all his inclinations and affections 444 agreeing with the good of his kind or of that system in which he is included1 and of which he constitutes a part4#hd ,and the two views can only be connected by proving that the harmonious development of an individual's affections will lead to the good of the species3 the proof of this depending on a one-sided summation of consequences4 ,shaftesbury does1 indeed1 throw out the idea that both the self-affections and the natural or social affections become self-destructive when carried out so as to interfere with one another4 ,but this1 again1 has only the previous calculus of the results of conduct to support it4 ,he cannot show that the contradiction in the conception of a completely solitary being belongs also to the conception of a judiciously selfish being4 ,the latter being loses the pleasures of virtuous action2 but perhaps he may gain greater pleasures in their room4 ,he does not develop his whole nature2 but if that nature contains totally infelicific passions1 the development of the whole nature is not to be recommended4 ,thus ,shaftesbury is unable to reach a conception of man's nature as a harmony of impulses just on account of the external point of view which makes him treat it as an aggregate1 though he contends that it is an organism4 ,his ingenious and subtle account of the relations between the individual and society does not really go to the root of the matter1 because1 after all1 it remains a calculus of the results of action1 not an analysis of its nature4 ,and his view of the affections constituting the individual system leaves them wanting in the unity of organic connection4 ,an effort is made1 however1 to supply this defect by means of the reflex affections called the moral sense1 to which he ascribes an oversight over the other affections and their resultant actions4 ,in what way1 then1 must we regard the nature of this faculty and the important functions assigned to it8 99 99 99 99 99 ,sidenote3 7b7 ,a separate faculty4 ,hutcheson4 ,sidenote3 ,two questions regarding it3 ,it was left to ,shaftesbury's disciple1 ,francis ,hutcheson1 to elaborate with thoroughness this conception of the moral sense as a separate faculty4 ,hutcheson did not make any important addition to the ideas of ,shaftesbury and ,butler4 ,but he worked them out more systematically2 and in his last work1 the ',system of ,moral ,philosophy1' the protest against the egoism of ,hobbes has found expression in a complete theory of human nature1 in which the moral sense is supreme1 and the ends of conduct independent of self-interest4 ,hutcheson1 too1 keeps more closely than either of his immediate predecessors to the way of looking at human nature which is spoken of in this volume as naturalistic4 ,he rejects even more decidedly than ,shaftesbury--much more so than ,butler--any creative function of reason in determining the constitution and direction of the moral sense4#he ,the questions thus arise--7a7 ,what is the moral sense when not regarded as a rational determination of the ends of conduct8 and 7b7 ,to what determination of ends or other distinction between right and wrong in action does it lead8 ,on both these points there is a difference between his early ',inquiry into the ,original of our ,ideas of ,beauty and ,virtue' 7#agbe71 and the more mature ',system1' published in #agee1 eight years after his death4 ,sidenote3 77 ,nature of this faculty3 not reason2 ,sidenote3 at first defined as feeling of pleasure or pain1 ,hutcheson is in earnest with the rejection of reason as a creative force4 ,the moral sense is not1 he says1 a source of new ideas4 ,its objects are received in the ordinary ways by which1 through sensation and reflection1 we come by our knowledge4#hf ,but just as we have a sense of beauty in the forms of sensible objects1 so there is a moral sense given us from which1 in the contemplation of our actions1 we derive still nobler pleasures than those of physical sensation4 ,this moral sense is a determination of our minds to receive amiable or disagreeable ideas of actions4#hg ,so far1 therefore1 it seems to be simply a pleasure in the contemplation of certain actions which1 we say1 have an immediate goodness4 ,by a superior sense1 says ,hutcheson1 which ,i call a moral one1 we perceive pleasure in the contemplation of such actions in others1 and are determined to love the agent 7and much more do we perceive pleasure in being conscious of having done such actions ourselves7 without any view of further natural advantage from them4#hh ,the significance of this position is easily seen4 ,it is not only meant to give a criterion of moral action2 it is also a short cut to the conclusion that virtue is for our private interest4 ,the disquieting suspicion that morality may involve a sacrifice of individual happiness must be entirely removed1 if we have a moral sense and public affections1 whose gratifications are constituted by nature our most intense and durable pleasures4#hi ,the elaborate analysis of conduct and enumeration of the pleasures which various affections and actions bring in their train1 which ,hutcheson gave in his latest work1 were thus unnecessary as long as the position was maintained that the moral sense is emphatically a pleasure or pain1 and that the pleasures it gives are the most intense and durable we have4 ,there was only an apparent contradiction in this theory which placed the test of morality in a pleasure consequent upon moral action1 and yet held that such actions were not performed from interested motives4 ,in the spirit of ,butler's psychology1 ,hutcheson contends#ij that virtue is pleasant only because we have a natural and immediate tendency towards virtuous action2 our true motive is some determination of our nature to study the good of others2 and this1 although not always immediately pleasant in itself1 is yet succeeded by the calm satisfaction of the moral sense4 ,the real weakness of ,hutcheson's position is the fatal one that he cannot show that it corresponds with facts2 that the pleasures incidental to the moral sense outweigh all others4 ,indeed1 he defends his opinion in their favour only1 in a way which reminds one of ,mill's method in the ',utilitarianism1' by making every juror stand aside unless he has pledged himself to morality4#ia ,it is open to any one1 however1 to hold that the pleasures of benevolent action and the relish of the moral sense are not of sufficient hedonistic value to make up for the restraints they put upon conduct and the enjoyments they oblige one to forego4 ,even if this position be not correct1 it is merely a mistake in estimating doubtful quantities4 ,the man who chooses the smaller pleasure will be the loser by his mistake2 but we cannot say that the selfish man is to blame for not being benevolent1 because the pleasures of benevolence and the moral sense are greatest1 any more than we could blame the benevolent man for not being selfish1 if selfishness should turn out on the whole to leave a greater hedonistic balance at the individual's credit4 ,sidenote3 afterwards spoken of as a judgment1 ,sidenote3 but this judgment allowed to depend on feeling4 ,a more objective determination of the moral sense is afterwards given by ,hutcheson4 ,without professedly changing ground1 he ceases to speak of it as a mere feeling of pleasure1 and calls it a judgment of approbation or disapprobation4 ,it is1 he says1#ib a natural and immediate determination to approve certain affections and actions consequent upon them2 or a natural sense of immediate excellence in them1 not referred to any other quality perceivable by our other senses or by reasoning4 ,nor is this judgment of approbation consequent upon the feeling of pleasure the affection or action produces in us4 ,the action is not judged good because it gains to the agent the pleasure of self-approbation1 but it gains to him this pleasure because it was antecedently good1 or had that quality which1 by the constitution of this sense1 we must approve4#ic ,but1 in attempting to make clear the nature of this judgment1 ,hutcheson seems to return1 though not in so many words1 to his earlier position4 ,to seek a basis for the judgment in reason would have been to make the moral sense what ,kant afterwards made it1 simply practical reason4 ,this1 however1 would have been a metaphysic of ethics inconsistent with ,hutcheson's whole position4 ,he had always opposed the narrowly intellectual view of morality in ,clarke and ,wollaston1 and he had no conception of the function of reason which would admit of an interpretation of the judgment of approbation by an appeal to a rational determination1 depending upon an idea conceived as inherent in the human constitution1 and to be realised in action4 ,the judgment1 therefore1 is referred to a taste or relish#id for certain affections and actions1 and this he takes no pains to distinguish from pleasure4 ,the analogy he seeks to draw between the moral sense and our other powers does not really favour a distinction of it from pleasure4 ,to each of our powers1 he says1 we seem to have a corresponding taste or sense1 recommending the proper use of it to the agent1 and making him relish or value the like exercise of it by another4 ,this we see as to the powers of voice1 of imitation1 designing1 or machinery1 motion1 reasoning2 there is a sense discerning or recommending the proper exercise of them4#ie ,that is to say1 besides the sense of hearing1 which has to do with sounds1 there must needs be another sense which has to do with our way of hearing sounds2 besides the sense of sight1 which has to do with form and colour1 there must needs be another sense which has to do with our way of perceiving form and colour2 and so with every other activity1 especially those which proceed from our highest powers4 ,a doctrine such as this sets no limits to the manufacture of additional senses4 ,the whole view of human nature upon which it proceeds is one of meaningless complexity1 which serves the one good purpose only of showing how much ethics has suffered from a defective psychology4 ,the mental objects or presentations which are distinguished from one another by the difference of their characteristic qualities1 and which we therefore call colours1 or sounds1 or movements1 are accompanied by varying degrees of pleasurable or painful feeling2 and it is possible to hold that the moral sense is a name for such feelings following in the train of those complexes of presentations to which we give the name of actions1 or of those other recurring complexes we call affections4 ,this1 practically1 was the position with which ,hutcheson started in the ',inquiry4' ,benevolence pleased us and selfishness pained us2 just as the taste of sugar was pleasant1 and that of wormwood disagreeable4 ,perhaps ,hutcheson departed from this theory1 because he saw that if conduct was made a matter of taste1 there would be no sufficient reason for condemning selfishness any more than an unusual taste4 ,he therefore relinquished1 or seems to have relinquished1 the view of the moral sense as a feeling of pleasure or pain2 and under the influence1 no doubt1 of ,butler1 spoke of it as a judgment of approbation or disapprobation4 ,but he fell back on his original theory by making this judgment depend on a taste or relish1 which only lends itself to interpretation as a peculiar feeling of pleasure4 ,sidenote3 77 ,the objects of the moral sense3 first said to be actions2 ,sidenote3 afterwards to be affections2 ,the reflex nature of the moral sense is brought out more distinctly in the ',system' than in the ',inquiry4' ,in his earlier work1 ,hutcheson had spoken of it as directly related to actions4 ,but it was more consistent with his maturer thought to regard it as having to do with mental powers or affections in the first instance1 and with actions only indirectly or mediately4 ,the object of this sense1 he says1#if is not any external motion or action1 but the inward affections or dispositions2 and this is made by him to account for the discrepancy which the deliverances of the moral sense show in regard to actions4 ,it seems ever to approve and condemn uniformly the same immediate objects1 the same affections and dispositions2 though we reason very differently about the actions which evidence certain dispositions or their contraries4 ,this distinction is applied with unlimited confidence in its efficacy4 ,by means of it he would explain the most fundamental differences in the moral code of men and nations4 ,thus people unacquainted with the industrial improvements which give the character of permanence to property1 may see no harm in depriving men of their artificial acquisitions and stores beyond their present use1--that is to say1 no evil may appear in theft4#ig ,but it is more important in another respect2 for it enables the author to avoid the difficulty of finding any principle according to which the moral sense may be related to the empirical content of action4 ,as long as the moral sense was simply spoken of as a feeling of pleasure1 it could be conveniently regarded as the consequent of external actions4 ,but if it is an internal sense distinct from pleasure1 it is easier to relate it to what he calls our internal powers or affections than to action4 ,the moral sense1 then1 is to be the regulator of all our powers2 and by means of it ,hutcheson attempts to reduce human nature to a scale of morality4 ,sidenote3 but its grounds of preference ,sidenote3 mainly depend not on the nature of the affection1 but on its objects4 ,it is to be noted that1 in the classification he offers1#ih what are commonly called the virtues of candour1 veracity1 c41 are not accounted virtues at all1 but only immediately connected with virtuous affections3 these are identified with the kind or benevolent affections1 directed to the happiness of sentient beings4 ,within the latter there are two grounds of preference3 the deliberate affections are preferred to the passionate2 those which are more extensive in the range of their objects to the less extensive4 ,with regard to the former ground of preference1 the moral sense of the community has perhaps undergone some modification since ,hutcheson's time1 and looks upon enthusiasm with less suspicion than it formerly did4 ,the other ground of preference ascribed to the moral sense refers not so much to the affection itself--which is the direct or immediate object of the moral sense--as to the way in which the affection is applied1 the number of the objects to which it is directed4 ,the affection of benevolence is the same in nature whether its object be wide or restricted2 though difference in this respect profoundly influences the actions to which it leads4 ,the object approved or most approved by the moral sense is therefore1 according to ,hutcheson1 utilitarian conduct1 or rather1 as he would say1 the calm disposition leading thereto4#ii ,in this way he obtains a principle for determining the morality of actions2 but only through the arbitrary assertion that this principle is immediately approved by the moral sense4 ,the connection of the moral sense with an object such as universal benevolence could only be made out by showing a rational1 or at any rate an organic union between individual sentiment and social wellbeing2 and ,hutcheson1 like ,shaftesbury1 has no conception of attempting this in any other way than the traditional one of exhibiting the personal advantages of benevolent conduct1 and the disadvantages that accompany selfishness4 99 99 99 99 99 ,sidenote3 7c7 ,third view of the moral sense4 ,sidenote3 ,butler4 ,sidenote3 ,conscience an authoritative law1 ,both ,shaftesbury and ,hutcheson were often led astray by a tendency to interpret facts as they wished them to be1 rather than as they were4 ,their view of the consequences of action was coloured by their optimism4 ,butler1 too1 in spite of the difference in his general attitude to the value of human life1 was not altogether free from a similar error4 ,he thinks that ,shaftesbury has shown beyond all contradiction that virtue is naturally the interest of happiness1 and vice the misery of such a creature as man4#ajj ,but1 in view of particular exceptions1 or of any one not being convinced of this happy tendency of virtue1 he thinks it necessary to emphasise the natural authority of the principle of reflection4 ,conscience is1 he holds1 a part of our inward nature2 but it differs from the other parts of our nature inasmuch as it is not related immediately to an external object1 but to the actions dealing with such objects1 and to the dispositions leading to those actions4 ,it is a principle of reflex approbation or disapprobation1 which is said to have equal respect to both public and private good4 ,this tendency1 however1 would seem to be ascertained empirically4 ,the deliverances of conscience are immediate judgments as to the morality of actions and affections 7for ,butler speaks of it as referring to both equally72 and its reference to the ends which those actions or the exercise of these affections may ultimately tend to would1 therefore1 seem to be indirect4#aja ,butler was careful1 moreover1 not to speak of it as an sthetic or sensitive faculty1 but as a judgment4 ,it is not a feeling of pleasure1 but the revelation of law4 ,sidenote3 and the criterion of morality4 ,the approval of conscience is thus made the criterion of morality4 ,but a difficulty arises as to the way in which we are to regard the authority which conscience is said to carry along with it4 ,butler's utterances here commonly imply a teleological reference to an end implanted in human nature1 and to be discovered by observing that nature--the realisation of the end being obligatory1 because it is shown to be the purpose which the author of nature had in view in making man as he is4#ajb ,the authority of conscience thus seems to be derived from the divine purpose which it displays4 ,it carries within itself a claim to obedience2 but the justification of this claim depends on a theological basis4 ,and hence the question of the nature and origin of conscience is at once raised1 in order to determine the legitimacy of its claim to be1 rather than any other part of our constitution1 a divinely-implanted guide4 ,sidenote3 ,teleological and jural views not reconciled1 nor fully developed4 ,but more than one current of thought runs through ,butler's ethical treatise4 ,the theological reference is sometimes so used as to make the obligation to morality1 and even the nature of morality1 depend on the will of ,god3 though hardly according to ,paley's crude method of seeking in the external revelation of the divine command a means of uniting the divergent interests of the individual and of society4 ,in general1 ,butler's ruling idea is the idea of the system or unity of human nature1 for which he was largely indebted to ,shaftesbury's revival of the ,platonic conception4 ,conscience is regarded by him as the expression of this unity4 ,but its nature is never more deeply probed4 ,its deliverances are justified now by its supernatural mission1 and now by the more prosaic fact that it leads to our individual interest#ajc--;at any rate1 if we take in the future--while it could not be recommended as a guide if it did not4#ajd ,on one side1 therefore1 ,butler tends to a form of theological utilitarianism1 such as was common in his own day1 and was afterwards formulated by ,paley4#aje ,on the other hand1 his ethics more naturally allies itself with a different theory1 in which the moral law is conceived as having its source in practical reason1 and the naturalistic basis of ethics is definitely abandoned4 ,sidenote3 #d4 ,the ethics of moral sentiment a mediating theory2 ,sidenote3 explanation of its facts attempted by theory of evolution4 ,on the whole1 it would appear that the psychological ethics worked out by ,shaftesbury and his school occupies an insecure position between the view discussed in the two preceding chapters and that which ascribes to reason a function in the formation of objects of desire4 ,shaftesbury and his followers tried to strike out a middle course between the theory that ends of action may be determined by reason1 and that which looks upon all desires as being desires for objects as pleasurable4 ,they made the attempt to found a system of ethics on human nature1 and they held that that nature could not be accounted for by the simple psychological analysis of the ,epicurean school as then represented by ,hobbes4 ,on the other hand1 they did not see their way to adopt the rational ethics only known to them in the abstract form it had received at the hands of ,clarke and ,wollaston4 ,but their own theory of human nature requires a principle of harmony and co-ordination among the various impulses which they were unable to give a satisfactory account of4 ,it may seem1 however1 that the idea of the development of man with which we are now familiar1 may enable us to overcome the difficulties which formerly appeared insurmountable--showing the unity of human nature1 and the tendency of its activity4 ,the general course of evolution1 to which all life has been subject1 is thought to have brought about a harmony between individual and social feelings1 as well as between individual and social interests1 and thus to have removed the obstacles in the way of founding morality on the basis of ,naturalism4 ,it is1 therefore1 of importance to examine with care the ethical bearings of the theory of evolution4 ,,footnotes3 #fi ,the very idea of an interested pursuit necessarily presupposes particular passions or appetites2 since the very idea of interest or happiness consists in this1 that an appetite or affection enjoys its object4--,sermons1 ,pref42 cf4 ,serm4 xi4 #gj ,phil41 #ca ff42 cf4 ,gorg41 #die f42 ,rep41 ix4 #ehe4 #ga ,cf4 ,sidgwick1 ,methods of ,ethics1 ,i4 iv4 #b1 #c;d ed41 p4 #dd4 #gb ,herbart1 ,psychologie als ,wissenschaft1 #ajd1 ,werke1 vi4 #gd2 cf4 ,waitz1 ,lehrbuch der ,psychologie als ,naturwissenschaft1 #dj1 p4 #dah3 ,it is not difficult to recognise the basis of desire in the presentations brought forward by reproduction1 and1 at the same time1 held back by an inhibition4 #gc ,with ,herbart's doctrine may be compared ,mr ,h4 ,spencer's view of the genesis of feeling and voluntary action1 ,principles of ,psychology1 #b;d ed41 part iv4 chaps4 viii4 and ix4 #gd ,cf4 note to ,james ,mill's ,analysis1 ii4 #chc f4 #ge ,the ,senses and the ,intellect1 #c;d ed41 p4 #cdd2 cf4 ,mental and ,moral ,science1 pp4 #ij1 #ia4 #gf ,if there be any principles or affections in the mind of man distinct from self-love1 that the things those principles tend towards1 or the objects of those affections are1 each of them in themselves eligible to be pursued upon its own account1 and to be rested in as an end1 is implied in the very idea of such principle or affection4--,butler1 ,sermons1 ,pref4 #gg ,inquiry concerning ,virtue1 ,,ii4 i4 #c4 #gh ,ibid41 ,,ii4 ii41 conclusion4 #gi ,system of ,moral ,philosophy1 i4 #ii4 #hj ,sermons1 xi4 #ha ,kritik der bisherigen ,sittenlehre 7#ahjc71 p4 #ed4 #hb ,inquiry1 ,,ii4 i4 #c4 #hc ,inquiry1 ,,ii4 i4 #c2 ,,ii4 ii4 #b4 #hd ,ibid41 ,,ii4 i4 #a4 #he ,what is ,reason but that sagacity we have in prosecuting any end8 ,the ultimate end proposed by the common moralists is the happiness of the agent himself1 and this certainly he is determined to pursue from instinct4 ,now may not another instinct towards the public1 or the good of others1 be as proper a principle of virtue as the instinct toward private happiness8--,hutcheson1 ,inquiry1 p4 #aae4 #hf ,cf4 ,system1 i4 #ig2 ,inquiry1 p4 #abd4 #hg ,inquiry1 p4 #abd4 #hh ,ibid41 p4 #ajf4 #hi ,essay on the ,nature and ,conduct of the ,passions and ,affections1 with ,illustrations on the ,moral ,sense 7#agbh71 p4 xix4 #ij ,cf4 ,inquiry1 p4 #adj ff4 #ia ,introduction to ,moral ,philosophy1 translated from the ,latin1 #b;d ed41 #agec1 p4 #dc2 cf4 ,essay on the ,passions and ,affections1 c41 p4 #abh4 #ib ,system1 i4 #eh4 #ic ,system1 i4 #ec4 #id ,ibid41 i4 #ei4 #ie ,system1 i4 #ei4 #if ,system1 i4 #ig4 #ig ,system1 i4 #ic4 #ih ,system1 i4 #fh ff4 ,with this may be compared the elaborate classification of motives1 according to their moral quality1 in ,dr ,martineau's ',types of ,ethical ,theory1' ii4 #agf ff4 #ii ,system1 i4 #ej4 #ajj ,sermons1 ,pref4 #aja ,although it is not at all doubtful in the general1 what course of action this faculty or practical discerning power within us1 approves4444 ,it is 444 justice1 veracity1 and regard to the common good4--,dissertation on ,virtue4 #ajb ,sermons1 ii4 iii4 #ajc ,sermons1 iii4 v4 #ajd ,ibid41 xi4 #aje ,cf4 ,jodl1 ,geschichte der ,ethik1 i4 #aib4 ,,part ,,ii4 ,,the ,,theory ,,of ,,evolution4 ,,chapter ,v4 ,,the ,,theory ,,of ,,evolution ,,and ,,the ,,development ,,of ,,morality4 ,sidenote3 #a4 ,general characteristics of the theory of evolution3 ,to relinquish the individualistic theory of ethics does not necessarily imply a recourse to evolution4 ,it may still be possible to rest the foundation of ethics on the state1 without that view of the growth of the community and of its connection with the individual which the theory of evolution involves4 ,this1 as has already been pointed out1 was1 in part1 what ,bentham did2 while an attempt--in some respects more elaborate still--to deduce morality from society was made by ,hobbes4 ,the theory of ,bentham1 and of his successor ,professor ,bain1 is indeed partly individualistic1 partly social4#ajf ,in the former reference1 ethics becomes a theory of prudence2 in the latter1 a part of legislation4 ,with ,hobbes1 on the other hand1 the identification of individual and social interests is supposed to be brought about by the absolute necessity1 in order to personal security1 of a supreme political power1 into the hands of which all men have agreed to transfer their rights to all things4 ,but both ,hobbes and ,professor ,bain might have avoided obvious difficulties had they had the theory of evolution to assist them1 and had they thought themselves justified in making use of it4#ajg ,for want of it the former has to explain morality and its binding force by means of the fiction of an original contract2 while the latter has to account by the associations of a few years for the harmony of feeling between the individual and the whole1 and for the good of the community coming to be so faithfully reflected in the consciences of its members4 ,the theory of evolution1 by its doctrine of the hereditary transmission of acquired modifications1 gives a scientific basis for this existing solidarity between man and society4 ,the great consensus of opinion amongst those who are best qualified to judge--amongst those who alone are qualified to judge--may be regarded as having established the claim of the theory of evolution to give the most satisfactory account of all forms of natural life4 ,and it may seem only advancing the theory a step further1 or only developing one of its applications1 to make it yield a complete explanation of human nature1 mental as well as physical4 ,if ethics1 then1 is to be founded on a natural basis1 no theory would seem to be complete which leaves evolution out of account4 ,sidenote3 an assertion of the unity of life2 ,in general1 the theory of evolution is an assertion of the unity of life1 or1 in its widest form1 of the unity of existence4 ,progressive modifications and hereditary transmission of such modifications are1 it is contended1 sufficient to explain the different forms and species which life now manifests4 ,the assumption is specially discarded that there are fixed differences between kinds of living things making it impossible for them all to have developed from simple germs1 originally of like constitution1 which have1 in the course of time1 become more heterogeneous and complex1 and so given rise to the wealth of organic life4 ,but this general doctrine1 held 7wholly or in part7 in modern times by ,kant1 ,wolff1 and ,lamarck1 needed to be supplemented by a definite view of the way in which the progressive modifications took place2 and this required to be established as a really operative cause1 before evolution could receive scientific proof4 ,this more special element of the theory was ,darwin's contribution to the subject4 ,evolution1 he showed1--and herein consists his theoretical advance on ,lamarck1--has taken place by the natural selection of organisms1 so modified as to fit them for survival in the struggle for existence4 ,organisms in which advantageous modifications have been produced tend to survive1 and to transmit their modified structure to descendants1 while organisms in which such modifications have not been produced1 are less able to preserve their life and to hand it on to successors4 ,older types1 it is true1 remain1 but only in circumstances in which their continued existence does not seriously interfere with the organisms which1 in the struggle for life1 have developed a structure better suited to their environment3 when more perfect and less perfect forms cannot exist together1 only the better adapted survive4 ,sidenote3 in first instance1 historical2 ,sidenote3 but implies a teleological aspect1 which may have ethical consequences4 ,the theory of evolution is thus primarily the history of an order of sequent facts and relations4 ,it is an account of the origin or growth of things1 which attempts to explain their nature and constitution by showing how they have come to be what they are4 ,but1 in so doing1 it naturally reveals the method and tendency of this order4 ,and it is by means of this its teleological aspect that we see how it may be possible for it not merely to trace the development of historical facts1 such as the feelings and customs of men1 but at the same time to make a more real contribution to ethics by pointing out the course of action to which human nature is adapted4 ,it does not1 like the old teleology1 attempt to show that each thing has been formed with the design of subserving some particular purpose4 ,on the contrary1 it reverses this way of looking at things4 ,the fitness of an organism to fulfil any definite end comes to be regarded as the result not of a conscious design1 independent of the environment1 but of the modifications produced on the organism through the necessity laid upon it by its surroundings of adapting itself to them or else disappearing4 ,what the theory does show is1 that adaptation to environment is necessary for life1 and that organisms unable to adapt themselves pass away4 ,adaptation to environment will thus be implied in1 or be an essential means towards1 self-preservation and race-preservation1 self-development and race-development4 ,and should this preservation or development be looked upon as the end of conduct1 the adaptation to environment it implies may help to define and characterise the end4 ,again3 when an organism adapts itself to its environment1 it does so by some modification being produced in its structure corresponding to the modified function required by the conditions of life4 ,in this way1 one organism increases in complexity in a certain direction1 while another organism1 in different circumstances1 also develops a more complicated structure1 though one of a different kind4 ,thus organisms1 alike to begin with1 become heterogeneous in nature through exposure to different surroundings4 ,at the same time1 by constant interaction with their environments1 they become more definite and coherent in structure4 ,incipient modifications are developed and defined in different ways by different circumstances1 and the parts of a living being are brought into closer reciprocal relations1 and thus welded into a coherent organic whole4 ,this is what ,mr ,spencer means when he says that evolution implies a transition from an indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity3#ajh the whole process being interconnected in such a way that these different aspects of it--definiteness1 coherence1 heterogeneity--increase together and imply one another4 ,by this the inference would appear to be suggested that1 if conduct is to harmonise with the conditions of evolution1 this characteristic feature of it must be recognised in the ethical end4 ,sidenote3 ,distinction of its historical and ethical aspects4 ,in saying this1 ,i am perhaps anticipating results4 ,but it is well to show at the outset how the essentially historical inquiry carried out by the evolutionists may suggest conclusions which are ethical in their nature4 ,to some1 indeed1 it will appear superfluous to have spent even a sentence in suggesting a prim facie case for the ethical importance of evolution4 ,if there is one subject more than another1 it may be thought1 which has secured a place for itself in the scientific consciousness of the day1 it is the evolution-theory of ethics4 ,without question1 the phrase has been received into the scientific vocabulary2 but there is a good deal1 even in the official literature on the question1 to make one doubt whether it is always used with a distinct conception of its meaning4 ,when reference is made to the ethics of evolution1 no more is sometimes meant--though a great deal more should be meant--than an historical account of the growth of moral ideas and customs1 which may provide 7as ,mr ,stephen expresses it7 a new armoury wherewith to encounter certain plausible objections of the so-called ,intuitionists4 ,this1 however1 would only affect the ethical psychology of an opposed school4 ,the profounder question still remains1 ,what bearing has the theory of evolution1 or its historical psychology and sociology1 on the nature of the ethical end1 or on the standard for distinguishing right and wrong in conduct8 ,the answer to this question will be the reconstruction and deeper change which ,mr ,stephen holds to be necessary4#aji ,it is the ambiguity of the subject--or rather its twofold range--which has made the application of evolution to ethics look so obvious1 and made a discussion of the easier question frequently do duty for a solution of the more difficult4 ,the ethical writings of the evolutionists1 indeed1 often confuse the problems of history and theory in a way which presents the same difficulty to the critic as the works of the corresponding school in jurisprudence4 ,in both1 the writers seem disinclined fairly to put to themselves the question as to the kind of subjects to which so fruitful a method as that which has fallen into their hands is appropriate3 what its conditions are1 and whether it has any limits at all4 ,every one is now familiar with the evils of hypothetical history1 and with the iniquity of the proverbial philosophic offence of constructing facts out of one's inner consciousness4 ,the historical jurists deserve no little credit for the thoroughness with which this has been enforced by them2 perhaps1 too1 the same lesson may be learned from the facts of the development of morality4 ,but it may be questioned whether we are not at the present time more apt to confuse fact and theory in the opposite way3 whether the science of law is not sometimes lost sight of in the history of legal institutions1 and ethics in danger of being identified with the development of moral sentiments and customs4 ,we may naturally expect the theory of evolution to throw light on such questions as the growth of moral feelings and ideas1 and of the customs and institutions in which morality is expressed and embodied4 ,but to show the process morality has passed through in the individual mind and in society still leaves the question as to the end of conduct unanswered4 ,it is necessary1 therefore1 to keep clearly before us the distinction between the historical and the ethical problem1 if we would successfully attack the subject of the bearing of the theory of evolution on this fundamental question of ethics4 ,to the theory of evolution we are indebted for the opening up of a new field of investigation--the historical treatment of conduct4 ,but it is one thing to describe the way in which men have acted in the past3 to determine the end for their action now is quite a different problem2 and there is no reason why the distinction should be overlooked4 ,the interest which belongs to the history of morality is not solely nor mainly due to its bearing on questions beyond the historical sphere4 ,that its results will not be without relation--and that of an important kind--to questions of theory may well be expected4 ,but it can only tend to confusion if we treat the development of morality1 in the human mind and in society1 from a preconceived attitude--dogmatic or agnostic--towards the central problem of ethics4 99 99 99 99 99 ,sidenote3 #b4 ,the development of morality3 7a7 historical psychology4 ,the way in which the theory of evolution is applied to ethical psychology is easy enough to understand in principle1 though complex and obscure in many of its details4 ,we have only to postulate that mental as well as bodily traits admit of modification1 and that modifications once produced can be transmitted to descendants1#aaj and it at once follows that sentiments and ideas leading to actions which promote life will be encouraged and developed by natural selection4 ,thus parental and filial feelings1 once originated1 may have been developed through those families and tribes in which they were strongest1 presenting a more united1 and therefore stronger1 front against hostile influences4 ,the feelings of tribal sympathy and patriotism1 too1 may have had a similar history4 ,those races in which they were strongest would1 other things being equal1 obtain the mastery over and exterminate other races in which they were relatively weak4 ,the compactness of the community would even be promoted by that fear of the political and of the religious control in which the feeling of obligation is said to have had its root4 ,in general1 benevolence and sympathy amongst a people give it a solidarity from which it derives a stronger position1 so that in turn the benevolent and sympathetic feelings gain free scope to develop and expand4 ,sidenote3 ,its difficulties3 the origin of new feelings1 ,sidenote3 and of the moral consciousness2 ,but the working out of this theory is not without its own difficulties4 ,in the first place1 the factor in the theory of evolution which can be most clearly traced--the principle of natural selection--is not itself a source of change or of the production of new results4 ,it is only the means by which advantageous changes are preserved and disadvantageous changes passed by4 ,the initiative in these changes comes either from the unequal pressure of the environment or from some tendency to vary in the organism itself4 ,now1 if we suppose certain moral relations and the feelings corresponding to them to exist in a society1 and to tend to greater certainty and fulness of life on the part of those who possess them1 such relations and feelings will be favoured by the operation of natural selection1 and will gradually be assimilated into the tissue of the social organism4 ,but this does not account for the origin of morality generally nor of any particular moral relation2 it merely shows how1 having been somehow originated1 it has naturally come to persist4 ,there are thus really two points to be considered in tracing the development of moral ideas--the question of origin and the question of persistence4 ,the latter is accounted for by natural selection2 the former must be brought under the obscure laws of variation1 laws so obscure that variations in nature are frequently spoken of as if they took place by chance4 ,these two questions are involved at each stage in the progress of morality4 ,but it is at the initial stage that the question of origin is of greatest importance3 when the attempt is made to show how1 in the course of time1 and by the aid of purely physical and biological laws1 feelings and conduct1 from being merely natural and reflex1 have acquired a moral character--when1 in a word1 the moral is being evolved out of the non-moral4 ,a difficulty comes to the front here which scarcely arises when we are simply tracing the various phases through which the moral consciousness has passed1 and the various forms in which moral conduct and feelings have expressed and embodied themselves4 ,the latter subject is obviously within the scope of the theory of evolution1 if that theory applies to the processes of the human mind and society as well as to those of external nature4 ,and1 although each stage involves a modification to be accounted for not by natural selection1 but by the laws of variation1 yet the variation is within facts of the same order1 and creates no more difficulty than the successive modifications of living tissue which have been implied in the evolution of organic nature4 ,but the transition from the non-moral to the moral is a transition to a different order of facts or--perhaps we should rather say--to a different way of looking at facts1 and should not be assumed to be a process of the same kind and explicable by the same method of investigation as the passage from one fact to the similar fact which immediately follows it4 ,it may be compared1 perhaps1 to the transition from the sphere of inorganic matter to that of life4 ,at the same time1 it is frequently maintained that we unduly limit the application of the law of evolution if we deny its power to show how morality has developed out of customs and institutions whose origin can be traced to purely natural or non-moral causes4 ,and1 for present purposes1 it is sufficient to have pointed out that this does not necessarily follow from the admission that evolution applies to mental and social processes as well as to the facts of external nature4 ,it is not my object to criticise any doctrine of the development of morality2 but1 starting with the position taken up with regard to it by the theory of evolution1 to inquire what conclusions it may lead to as to the end of action4 ,sidenote3 the development of feelings apart from natural selection4 ,a further difficulty has to be met by the theory of the development of morality1 which is in a sense complementary of the initial difficulty encountered in differentiating the moral from the non-moral4 ,this further difficulty awaits it at a subsequent stage of development when the extension and refinement of moral feeling seem to have gone on in circumstances where there is no room for natural selection to work4 ,thus it has been admitted that the feeling of sympathy1 and the habitual exercise of mutual good offices among members of a community1 strengthen that society1 and make it fit to prevail in the struggle for existence over other similar societies1 the members of which are not so much at one amongst themselves in feeling and in act4 ,but as benevolence and sympathy widen1 and become less closely connected with a definite association of individuals1 such as the family or tribe1 and there ceases to be a particular body to the welfare of which these social feelings contribute1 the operation of the law of natural selection becomes less certain4 ,this law only tends to conserve and perfect the feelings in question1 in virtue of the fact that the associations to whose good they lead are successful in the struggle for life over other associations the members of which are not animated by like feelings4 ,the one association lives and expands1 while the others are unable to maintain themselves against the encroachments of their neighbours1 and thus fall to pieces4 ,the law of natural selection1 therefore1 comes into play only when there are competing organisms struggling against one another for the means of subsistence and development4 ,not only is it the case1 therefore1 that the sympathy which aids the weak who are unable to take care of themselves1 does not seem to be of the kind that would contribute to success in the struggle for existence2 but the more general and catholic our sympathies are1 the less will the law of evolution help to preserve and develop them--because the less will they tend to promote the welfare of one rival association rather than that of another4 ,thus the growth of really unrestricted sympathy with men as men cannot have been promoted in this way4 ,the enthusiasm of humanity which animated the early ,christians1 the self-renouncing brotherhood of ,buddha1 the 7philanthrpia7 attributed to men like ,xenocrates#aaa who had freed themselves from the aristocratic prejudices of ,athens1 the caritas generis humani of the ,stoics1--such feelings as these could not have been encouraged1 any more than they could have been produced1 by the operation of natural selection4 ,for1 however much they tend to elevate the human character1 and to promote human happiness1 they do not advance the welfare of one body of men to the exclusion of some other competitor in the struggle for existence4#aab ,but1 although the law of natural evolution cannot account1 by survival of the fittest1 for any progress made by universal benevolence1 yet it may explain the value ascribed to the feeling of benevolence1 when its object is the family or the community4 ,besides--as has already been pointed out--natural selection always implies an initiative got from elsewhere3 it does not itself produce modifications2 it only chooses out favourable ones and adds them together when produced4 ,it always implies an independent modification of the organism2 its part is to select the modifications best fitted to promote life4 ,hence the mere fact of benevolence being universalised is not in itself an anomaly on the theory of natural selection1 any more than is the fact of its being extended from the family to the tribe4 ,only1 the latter extension is one which it perpetuates1 the former is not4 ,no aspect of the theory of evolution seems able to account for an extension of the feeling of universal benevolence among different people or throughout different societies4 ,this feeling has neither tended to promote the welfare of the race animated by it to the exclusion of other competing races--for there are no competing races whom it could affect--nor can it be shown that it makes the individuals possessing it fitter to wage successful war against opposing forces1 than other individuals4#aac ,sidenote3 ,its result3 shows the social nature of the individual4 ,apart from such special difficulties1 however1 comparative psychology has shed a new light on the mental structure of the individual4 ,the facts it brings forward show that the nature of the individual man cannot be explained without taking into account the relations in which he stands to society by birth1 education1 and business4 ,he is1 from the first1 surrounded by1 and dependent upon1 other individuals1 and by a set of established usages and institutions which modify his life2 and he is connected with these in such a way that it is impossible to consider him as merely acted upon by them and influencing them in turn4 ,he has been produced by1 and has become a part of them4 ,his physical and mental structure bears the marks of the same influences as those by which his so-called environment has been formed4 ,he is cell in the tissue of which the body social is composed4 ,this was partly recognised1 it is true1 before the theory of evolution had been elaborated4 ,but the organic nature of the social union is confirmed by that theory1 and erected into a scientific view of human life4 ,sidenote3 7b7 ,development of society4 ,now the various sentiments which bring one man into mental union with others act with greatest facility when men are connected with one another by some definite mutual bond such as that which forms the family1 the clan1 or the nation4 ,the individual's feeling of sympathy with his neighbours both promotes this social union and depends upon it4 ,but it is characteristic of the theory of evolution to put the external aspect first--the social customs and institutions--and to evolve from them the corresponding sentiments and ideas4 ,not word or thought or power1 it holds1 is to be regarded as the origin of morality3 ,im ,anfang war die ,that4 ,the whole composed of these units bound together by reciprocity of feeling and function is termed the social organism2 and what has been called moral sociology shows the way in which the outward forms which express and embody morality have grown up and become part of it4 ,in this connection1 the theory of natural evolution traces the process by which1 from the rudimentary beginnings of society1 the members composing it have gradually become more coherent amongst one another1 related in definite ways instead of merely by chance1 and more differentiated in function4 ,certain rudimentary forms--such as the family 7in its rudest structure7--and the corresponding instincts are presupposed4 ,and from this basis the origin of institutions and customs1 political1 religious1 and industrial1 is traced4 ,in developing these various customs and institutions1 along with the corresponding sentiments1 the course of social evolution has had the effect of gradually bringing out and cultivating those feelings and tendencies in the individual which promote the welfare of the organism1 while other individual tendencies1 hostile to social welfare1 have been repressed4 ,not sympathy and benevolence only1 but honesty1 temperance1 justice1 and all the ordinary social and personal virtues1 may have their natural history traced in this way--by showing how they have contributed to the life of the individual1 or of the society1 or of both4#aad ,through the operation of purely natural laws1 the wicked are cut off from the earth1 while the perfect remain in it and leave their possessions to their children4 ,this is an obvious result of natural selection4 ,for those communities are always fittest to survive in which each member1 in feeling and in act1 is most at one with the whole4 ,the tendency of evolution seems to be to produce not merely an ideal but an actual identification of individual and social interests1 in which each man finds his own good in that of the state4 ,,footnotes3 #ajf ,the social basis of ethics is emphasised by ,professor ,bain in his ,practical ,essays 7#ahhd71 p4 #aee3 ',how is society to be held together8' is the first consideration2 and the sociologist--as constitution-builder1 administrator1 judge--is the person to grapple with the problem4 ,it is with him that law1 obligation1 right1 command1 obedience1 sanction1 have their origin and their explanation4 ,ethics is an important supplement to social or political law4 ,but it is still a department of law4 ,in any other view it is a maze1 a mystery1 a hopeless embroilment4 #ajg ,without denying that it is possible to apply the theory of evolution to mind1 ,professor ,bain holds that1 as a fact1 moral sentiment has not become organic and hereditary--that there are no moral instincts properly so called4--,the ,emotions and the ,will1 #c;d ed41 p4 #ef4 #ajh ,first ,principles1 #dth ed41 p4 #chj4 #aji ,science of ,ethics1 p4 vi4 #aaj ,it would seem that the transmission of mental qualities only takes place in the form of modified physical structure 7cf4 ,g4 ,h4 ,lewes1 ,problems of ,life and ,mind1 #ast series1 i4 #afd74 ,but1 if we regard it as established that every mental change has a structural modification corresponding to it1 the possibility of mental evolution and inheritance presents no new difficulty4 #aaa lian1 ,v4 ,h41 xiii4 #cj4 #aab ,if conscience has no other function than that assigned to it by ,clifford1 ,lectures and ,essay1 ii4 #afi1 the preservation of society in the struggle for existence1 then it can never reach universal benevolence or prescribe duties towards all mankind4 #aac ,a difficulty of another kind is suggested by ,professor ,bain1 who holds that the pleasure of malevolence is not only a real element in the human constitution1 but greater than would be naturally called forth by the conditions and course of development4 ,it is remarked by ,mr ,spencer1 he says1 that it was necessary for the progress of the race that destructive activity should not be painful1 but on the whole pleasurable4 ,in point of fact1 however1 the pleasure of destruction has gone much beyond what these words express1 and much beyond what is advantageous to the collective interest of animals and of human beings alike4 ,the positive delight in suffering has been at all stages too great4--,the ,emotions and the ,will1 p4 #ff4 ,so far from adopting this argument1 however1 ,i must confess myself still amongst the unconvinced regarding the pleasure of malevolence4 #aad ,this subject is carefully discussed in ,mr ,stephen's ',science of ,ethics4' ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,evolution ,,and ,,ethical ,,theories4 ,sidenote3 ,bearing of the theory of evolution on previous ethical theories4 ,before going on to inquire into the positive contributions to ethics which the theory of evolution has to offer1 it is necessary to consider the relation it bears to the preceding individualistic systems of morals4 ,it was by way of investigations in psychology and in the theory of society1 that it first began to influence ethical thought4 ,and1 at first sight1 it appeared to come as a natural ally of one of the opposed schools1 dreaded by the side it opposed1#aae welcomed with open arms by that favoured with its friendship4 ,but since the first shock of pained and pleased surprise1 there have been rumours of dissension in the allies' camp2 and the distribution of parties has now become a matter of difficulty4 ,the doctrine of evolution1 first seized upon for rebutting the arguments of the intuitional moralists1 has been found to transform rather than to destroy their system2 and the utilitarianism in whose interests the new controversial weapon was employed1 seems to have been subjected to a parallel process of transformation4 ,the bearing of evolution on egoism may appear to be even more fundamental4 ,for the inheritance by an individual of the qualities acquired by his ancestors may be thought to establish scientifically the theory of the unity of the race1 and1 in doing so1 to make the selfish system of conduct an anachronism4 ,sidenote3 #a4 ,on theories depending on moral sentiment or intuition4 ,it is not necessary to examine at any length the application of evolution to the theories which construct ethical principles on the basis of moral sentiment1 because these theories have been found either to resolve themselves into a subtle form of egoistic hedonism1 or else to rest their ethical system on a teleological conception1 which transcends the naturalistic view of man4 ,evolution has its own explanation to give of the seemingly intuitive character of moral ideas--showing how their immediate necessity for the individual of the present day may be reconciled with their empirical origin in the mental history of the race4 ,it attempts thus to supplant both egoism and intuitionism by the same doctrine of the organic union between individuals4 ,the phenomena of conscience and the moral sentiments had been brought forward to show that the origin of morality was independent of the experience of the pleasurable or painful results of action3 that certain actions and traits of character were immediately approved and pronounced to be right by the individual conscience1 and certain others as inexplicably but infallibly disapproved and pronounced to be wrong4 ,this phenomenon of moral approbation or disapprobation had indeed been thought by some--as has been already seen--to be only a special feeling of pleasure or pain4 ,even as such1 however1 it pointed to a peculiar harmony or sympathy between the feelings of the individual and the fortunes of society4 ,for the pleasure or pain of the individual was seen to be excited by actions and dispositions which might be shown to involve the common interests1 but were without relation to his own4 ,sidenote3 ,origin and history of moral sentiments and intuitions traced by evolution4 ,even on the empirical interpretation of them1 such facts of the individual mind were in need of explanation2 and the theory of evolution has taken in hand to show how the pre-established harmony grew up4 ,the results of this explanation are1 of course1 not put forward as explaining the facts away1 or depriving them of reality1 but as enabling us to see their true place and bearing in the economy of human nature4 ,in tracing the origin and history of the altruistic and moral sentiments of the individual1 the theory of evolution has this end in view4 ,it offers--so it is often said--terms of compromise between the intuitional and the empirical psychology of morals4 ,it will admit the immediate and intuitive character in the individual of the sentiments which older empiricism had tried to make out to be composite1 growing up in each person out of the materials afforded by his environment1 and the experiences to which he was subjected4 ,the theory of evolution contends for an empiricism on a larger scale1 which will more closely connect the individual with the race1 and both with their environment4 ,sidenote3 ,bearing of this on their validity3 ,the question thus arises1 ,what bearing has this psychological or psychogonical theory on the ethical validity of moral intuitions and sentiments8 ,it certainly does not follow that they are of no moral value1 merely because their origin can be traced to simpler elements of experience4 ,they would lose ethical importance only if it were first of all shown that their validity depended on their not being derived from1 or compounded out of1 other elements4 ,as ,professor ,sidgwick says1 ,those who dispute the authority of moral or other intuitions on the ground of their derivation1 must be required to show1 not merely that they are the effects of certain causes1 but that these causes are of a kind that tend to produce invalid belief4#aaf ,but what the theory of evolution has to determine with regard to moral intuitions or sensibilities would seem to be not so much their ethical validity or invalidity1 as the range and manner of their ethical application4 ,it attempts to show that particular moral beliefs or feelings have been originated and formed by certain external customs belonging to the conditions of social or family life4 ,these customs have impressed themselves upon the mental structure1 and reappear in the individual in the shape of organic tendencies to certain actions1 or classes of actions1 and of aversion to other actions1 accompanied by a corresponding mental sentiment--or judgment--of approbation or disapprobation4 ,thus the individual comes instinctively to feel--or to judge1--,a ought to be done1 ,b ought not to be done4 ,now the evolutionist1 as ,i conceive1 does not proceed to infer that such judgments are invalid because he has shown how they originated--does not conclude 7to use ,mr ,sidgwick's words7 that all propositions of the form ',x is right' or 'good1' are untrustworthy2 but he does ask in what way the history of these judgments affects their application4#aag ,sidenote3 7a7 different social conditions from which they may have resulted1 7a7 ,he recognises1 in the first place1 that all such judgments are the natural result of a certain social condition1 and that there is1 therefore1 some probability that the same kind of social state could not continue to exist were those moral judgments habitually disregarded in conduct4 ,they have resulted from a certain state of society1 and have been assumed--after insufficient experience1 perhaps--to be required for the stability of that state1 so that every action opposed to these moral judgments will probably tend to weaken social bonds4 ,but the evolutionist's conclusions are not restricted to such generalities4 ,he may show that certain moral judgments or sentiments have had their origin from the habits of union between individuals1 and of respect for the rights of property1 which have obtained in every relatively permanent society1 and which may therefore be inferred to be probably necessary for the continued existence of any community2 that certain other sentiments or intuitions have descended to present individuals from customs which have not been so universal in the history of societies1 although the communities possessing them have shown greater power of vitality than those in which they were absent2 while others1 again1 may be traced to institutions which1 from their occasional and unprogressive character1 may be shown to be neither necessary nor beneficial4 ,sidenote3 and consequent difference in their value for conduct2 ,the evolutionist will therefore contend that different degrees of value for the regulation of conduct belong to different moral intuitions or classes of them4 ,if one class is habitually disregarded1 he may assert that historical evidence goes to show that society will fall to pieces1 and the life of man become1 in the expressive words of ,hobbes1 solitary1 poor1 nasty1 brutish1 and short4 ,the disregard of another class will probably lead to a more precarious existence1 or one less filled with the experiences which make up life2 while opposition to a third class1 so far from being hurtful or dangerous1 may remove unnecessary restrictions1 and aid the development both of the individual and of society4 ,sidenote3 7b7 their organic character4 7b7 ,there is a second point which will also be recognised by the evolutionist4 ,although these intuitions have been derived1 they are now organic1 and their disappearance from the human mind as instinctive tendencies towards or against action can only be slow and painful4 ,the process must involve a certain amount of loss3 at the same time1 it is not a process that can be easily avoided4 ,as soon as the reason of the instinctive tendency is inquired into1 it is weakened as instinct4 ,we pass from the action itself to the end it is fitted to subserve2 and1 if the instinctive action is not the most appropriate1 or has hurtful results1 we have already reached the stage in which the instinct is checked1 and begins to yield to action directed by a principle4 ,yet it dies out only gradually1 and1 so to speak1 after a struggle4 ,nor does it seem possible to assert with confidence1 as mitigating this struggle1 that the strongest impulses will always be those which are necessary or advantageous to the existence of society4 ,for it is a common experience that the moral intuitions which lead to conduct that has ceased to serve a purpose1 and the internal sanctions which follow disregard of them1 are often even more powerful than those which protect such virtues as justice or veracity4 ,sidenote3 ,resultant attitude of evolutionism to intuitionism4 ,from the preceding argument it follows that it cannot be held that moral intuitions are invalid because evolved4 ,the evolutionist will certainly go very far wrong1 as ,mr ,sidgwick points out1 if he maintains that a general demonstration of the derivedness or developedness of our moral faculty is an adequate ground for distrusting it4 ,instead of holding that1 if we succeed in tracing the origin of an intuition1 it is thereby discredited1 he will admit that the mere fact of our possessing any moral intuition shows that the habits of action from which it was derived have been permanent enough to leave their traces on the mental structure1 and that the conduct to which it leads1 like the custom from which it came1 will not destroy society1 but1 on the contrary1 will probably tend to its permanence4 ,the general attitude of the evolution-theory to moral intuitions is therefore1 after all1 very similar to that which ,mr ,sidgwick has reached as a result of his elaborate examination of the maxims of common-sense4 ,it is an attitude of trust modified by criticism4 ,in both an appeal is made from the axioms themselves3 in the one case1 to their historical genesis and the facts in which they originated2 in the other1 to the searching test of logical consistency1 and their capability of being applied to conduct4 ,but the theory of evolution1 if it succeeds in tracing the origin of our moral intuitions1 does seem to involve the abandonment of the old intuitional method which accepted them as rules of conduct from which no appeal could be taken4 99 99 99 99 99 ,sidenote3 #b4 ,bearing of the theory of evolution on egoism4 ,the theory of evolution transforms intuitionism by the way in which it connects the individual with the race4 ,its first effect upon egoism is similar4 ,the nature of the individual man as now exhibited is widely different from that which the older individualistic theory used to deal with4 ,the latter is typified by the marble statue to which ,condillac#aah compares the percipient subject1 as yet unaffected by sense-impressions4 ,the variety of mental life which is actually met with is accounted for by the different kinds of experiences different men pass through2 and the consequent difference in the sources of pleasure and pain accounts for the diverse lines of activity which human beings follow out4 ,but the theory of evolution shows that human nature is infinitely varied1 not only through the variety of circumstances1 but through the variety of inherited dispositions4 ,one individual is not merely connected with others through considerable similarity of experience built upon an equally characterless basis2 but he is organically related to all the members of the race1 not only bone of their bone and flesh of their flesh1 but mind of their mind4 ,he is connected with others by a thousand subtly interwoven threads of emotion which enter into his life1 and unite his desires and activities with the functions of the larger organism of which he is a member4 ,sidenote3 ,relation of egoism to altruism as affected by it3 7a7 nature of the individual social1 ,sidenote3 but not completely social4 ,the theory of evolution has thus an important contribution to make to the question of the relation between egoism and altruism4 ,it has remained for it to show historically how the individual is so connected with the community that the good1 or the pleasure1 of the one cannot be considered apart from that of the other4 ,from the non-evolutionist point of view it was always open to show how the individual depended on society1 how his wants could only be supplied by it1 and how the security and happiness of every one were bound up with those of his fellows4 ,the individualistic theory was thus able to give all sorts of egoistic reasons why people should indulge in what is now called altruistic conduct4 ,self was seen to be a poor centre for a man's actions1 and only chosen by the short-sighted person1 who thereby missed both the good to himself that followed from his neighbours' wellbeing1 and the peculiar pleasure of sympathy and benevolent action4 ,but the theory of evolution has shown how the two things have developed together in the race3 first1 the actual solidarity between the individual and the whole2 and secondly1 the subjective reflection of the same fact1 sympathy with the feelings of others4 ,when we ask1 therefore1 whether it is our own pleasure 7or good7 or that of others that we ought to aim at1 we are pointed to the gradual obliteration of the distinction between the interest and feelings of the individual and those of the whole4 ,were this completely accomplished1 there need be no more question about the matter4 ,if conduct with an egoistic motive or aim always resulted in altruistic equally with egoistic effects1 and if altruistic conduct had always egoistic equally with altruistic consequences1 it would even then be little more than vain subtlety to ask whether egoism or altruism was to be the real end of conduct4 ,but if1 in addition to the identity of interests1 there were also an identity of motive or feeling1#aai the question would be no longer in place at all4 ,for there would cease to be either a subjective distinction in motive between egoism and altruism1 or an objective distinction in the courses of conduct to which they led4 ,and it is just because this identification is manifestly incomplete--because neither the interests nor the desires of the individual harmonise with any degree of exactness with those of his fellows--that we must examine how far the conception of the social organism is a true expression for the connection of individuals4 ,sidenote3 ,difference between the individual and social organisms ,at most1 the theory of organic evolution can make out that there is a tendency towards the identification of the interests of the individual with those of society4 ,it cannot demonstrate a complete identification4 ,the community has indeed been called an organism1 and the individual spoken of as a cell in the tissue of which it is composed2 but we must avoid pressing this analogy to the point of breaking4 ,among so many points of similarity between society and an individual organism1 there is one essential distinction1--the social organism has no feelings and thoughts but those of its individual members--the conscious centre is in the unit1 not in the whole2 whereas1 when we regard the individual organism and its constituent members1 consciousness is seen to exist only in the whole1 not in each several unit4 ,the absence of a social sensorium#abj should1 therefore1 make us hesitate to identify the ends of individual with those of collective action4 ,every cell in the individual body has a life-history of its own1 besides partaking of the life of the organism2 and1 did it possess the reason which looks before and after1 it might probably adopt an egoistic attitude1 and object to the subordination of its private interests to the good of the whole4 ,in the same way1 the many individual lives which make up the social organism--since each of them possesses a separate consciousness--are apt to disregard the life of the larger whole whose members they are4 ,now what the theory of utilitarianism requires is1 that the happiness or pleasurable consciousness of the community or of the race1 not that of the individual1 be made the end2 and those who make egoism the end of ethics1 commonly maintain that the general happiness is the end of politics4#aba ,the individual is not indeed required to be entirely unselfish or altruistic in action4 ,he is not altogether forbidden to seek his own things1 nor enjoined to seek only the things of others2 and evolutionist utilitarianism1 indeed1 would tell him to seek his own happiness in the happiness of the community4 ,but the obvious remark must be borne in mind1 that society1 the social organism1 cannot experience happiness4 ,however it may resemble the individual organism in the manner of its growth1 the modes of its activity1 and even its relation to its component members1 yet it cannot feel pleasure or pain as an individual does4 ,the happiness of the community does not mean the happiness of the social organism1 but is only a concise formula for the aggregate happinesses of the individuals composing it4 ,sidenote3 in respect of feeling4 ,when it is said1 therefore--either as a political or an ethical theory--that the happiness of society is the end for conduct1 the end prescribed is altruistic rather than social4 ,its object is not an organism1 but an aggregate of individuals4 ,a certain organisation of society may lead to an increase in this aggregate happiness1 and so be necessary for the attainment of the end2 but if the end is happiness1 the social organism and its wellbeing are no longer the thing cared for1 but the greatest aggregate of pleasures on the part of its members4 ,sidenote3 ,theory of obligation simplified1 if universalistic end arrived at4 ,so long1 therefore1 as the end is pleasure1 it must have reference to individuals4 ,the utilitarian may try to persuade the agent to seek the pleasures of others as if they were his own--requiring him thus to seek his end out of himself1 and the circle of his own pleasures4 ,and1 while we continue to hold pleasure to be the end1 the evolution-theory can go no further than this4 ,it seemed to have made out an organic unity between different individuals1 through which it might be possible to effect a reconciliation between the rival ethical principles of egoism and altruism4 ,but the feeling of pleasure is just the point where individualism is strongest1 and in regard to which mankind1 instead of being an organism in which each part but subserves the purposes of the whole1 must rather be regarded as a collection of competing and co-operating units4 ,it is true that the social factor in the individual life is brought into scientific cognisance by the theory of evolution4 ,it shows the way in which his interests and feelings depend upon others4 ,and if1 through the influence of a political standpoint1 or of some intuition of reason1 a universalistic ethics has been already arrived at1 it can bring forward the organic union of individual and society as a means of enforcing the social end upon the individual agent4 ,in this way the theory of evolution makes a contribution to ethics at a critical point where the individualist theory failed4 ,for ethics must not rest content with pointing out an end for conduct or standard of morality1 without giving a reason to the individual why he should make this end his own--that is1 developing a doctrine of obligation4 ,in many current theories1 notably in the common forms of utilitarianism1 the two things are not necessarily connected1 since the standard is fixed from the point of view of the whole1 and obligation has reference to the individual4 ,the development of morality may appear to show how the two standpoints can be connected4 ,if it could be made out that the happiness of the community and of the individual are identical1 a standard of morality which made the aggregate happiness the end might be regarded as carrying its own obligation within itself3 politics and ethics would 7on the hedonistic theory7 be harmonised4 ,and1 in so far as evolution has brought the individual and society into closer reciprocal dependence1 it has lessened the practical difficulty of bringing about this conciliation1 or--to speak with the utilitarians--of making the standard of morality supply a doctrine of obligation4 ,at present1 however1 the course of human development is far from having reached the point at which actual harmony between the race and each member of it is established2 and it would therefore still be a subject for inquiry whether the theory of evolution could provide a basis for moral obligation1 even were the moral standard or the end for conduct satisfactorily established4 ,but1 in determining this latter question1 we find that the above psychological and sociological investigations have no longer the same degree of value as before4 ,in the theory of obligation1 every fact brought forward by evolution to show the harmony of individual and social welfare makes the way easier for establishing the reasonableness of the pursuit of social ends by the individual4 ,but from these facts of past development we have also to determine an end for present and future action4 ,and this question cannot be solved merely by showing how morality has developed1 though that development may form an important part of the evidence from which our conclusions are to be drawn4 ,sidenote3 7b7 ,limits to complete conciliation of egoism and altruism3 ,sidenote3 77 continued existence of competition2 ,the harmony of interests and the harmony of feelings required for the empirical reconciliation of egoism and altruism is a condition which needs only to be stated to show how far it is from being realised in present circumstances4 ,the constant struggle involved in the course of evolution throws doubt even on its ultimate attainment4 ,the rule has always been that the better-equipped organism asserts and maintains its supremacy only by vanquishing the organisms which are not so well equipped4 ,conflict and competition have been constant factors in development4 ,the present circumstances of the individual have been determined for him by the war of hostile interests between different communities1 and between different members of the same community2 and his mental inheritance has been largely formed by the emotions corresponding to this rivalry4 ,perhaps the necessity for conflict has diminished with the advance of evolution2 but it is still sufficiently great to make competition one of the chief formative influences in industrial and political life4 ,and the causes from which the struggle of interests arises are so constant--the multiplication of desires and of desiring individuals keeps so well in advance of the means of satisfying desires--that it is doubtful whether the course of evolution is fitted to bring about complete harmony between different individuals4 ,it would almost seem that the moving equilibrium in human conduct1 in which there is no clash of diverse interests1 cannot be expected to be brought about much before the time when the physical factors of the universe have reached the stage in which evolution ends4 ,sidenote3 77 different and conflicting degrees of altruism2 ,besides1 it does not do to speak as if the only alternative to egoism were a comprehensive altruism4 ,man is a member of a family1 a tribe1 a nation1 the race4 ,his altruism1 therefore1 may take the narrow form of family feeling1 or it may extend to tribal feeling1 or to patriotism1 or even rise to devotion to humanity4 ,and these do not merely supplement one another3 they are often conflicting principles of conduct4 ,action for the sake of the family may frequently be most unsocial2 the keen patriot ignores the rights of other peoples2 the citizen of the world is too often a stranger to the national spirit4 ,further1 when civilisation grows complex1 the same man is a member of many intersecting societies--a church1 a trade1 a party organisation#abb--;and has to balance the claims which each of these has upon him4 ,the sublation of egoism would still leave to be determined the different shares which these various social wholes have in a man's sympathies1 and their different claims upon his conduct4 ,sidenote3 77 the altruism of interest and the altruism of motive2 ,any theory of society will show how the good of the individual is not merely a part of the good of the whole1 but reacts in various ways upon the organism of which he is a member4 ,but1 in the case of any one individual1 the results of acts done for his own good 7or pleasure71 and the results of those done for the good 7or pleasure7 of the whole1 do not correspond with any exactness1 and often widely diverge4 ,if1 then1 the individual is consciously aiming at his own good 7or pleasure71 it is--if we look from the point of view of individualistic ethics--only an incidental and fortuitous result of the action when it promotes the common good4 ,when we recognise the social factor in the individual1 this judgment must be modified4 ,the evolution-theory shows how he has become so constituted that much that pleases him individually1 must of necessity benefit society at large4 ,but there are obvious limits to the harmony4 ,the pleasure or interest of the individual is often the reverse of advantageous to society4 ,it may be the case that in seeking his own private ends1 he is yet1 to use the words of ,adam ,smith1 led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention4#abc ,but1 if so1 the end is invisible as well as the hand that points to it4 ,and the good of society can be said to be the natural and uniform consequence of the individual's action1 only when he consciously makes it his end4 ,in a word1 the true altruism--or1 as we might call it1 using a word appropriated to another purpose--the true socialism is when the good of others or of society is pursued for its own sake2 and this is to be distinguished from the false or imperfect altruism1 in which the same outward result is aimed at1 because it is seen to be the most prudent way of promoting one's own good4 ,thus ,mr ,spencer's elaborate argument#abd to show that conduct of purely egoistic tendency1 equally with conduct of purely altruistic tendency1 is insufficient and self-destructive1 does not reach beyond the external results of action1 and leaves it possible for both end and motive to be still egoistic4 ,if morality is internal1#abe the discussion proves no ethical proposition at all4 ,the egoism of external prudence may indeed be transcended by recognising that the pleasures and pains of others are sources of sympathetic feeling in ourselves4 ,but a subjective or emotional egoism remains4 ,and if the fact that we receive pleasure from the pleasure of another man#abf is our reason for seeking his pleasure1 we shall cease to seek it when a means of greater pleasure offers4 ,in human life as at present constituted1 no secure principle of conduct can be based on the agreement of individual with social good2 for1 if they diverge1 as they often do1 there is no standard left for determining their competing claims4 ,sidenote3 77 altruistic feelings weak1 ,it will not do to divide all men1 as ,mr ,stephen seems to do1#abg into two classes1 typified by the reasonable and therefore sympathetic man who has struck a bargain with society to take common stock of pains and pleasures1 and the systematically selfish man who must be an idiot4 ,for most men belong to neither of those two classes3 their bargain with society has not been fully completed1 and can be withdrawn from temporarily when circumstances make withdrawal convenient1 though this process cannot be carried on indefinitely without greatly weakening the sympathetic feelings4 ,the majority of men are neither entirely sympathetic nor yet systematically selfish3 they are unsystematically sympathetic and unsystematically selfish4 ,such men have the sensibilities that give leverage to the moralist4#abh ,but it is futile to tell them to be more sympathetic1 or entirely sympathetic4 ,for sympathetic feelings cannot be produced at will3 they can only come with that slow modification of the character brought about by conduct4 ,shall we then say that a man should in all cases of conduct prefer the pleasure of the whole or of others to his own pleasure8 ,if a man were to do so1 then perhaps1 by consistent self-abnegation1 altruism might become pleasant1 and both the man himself and his descendants become more sympathetically constituted8 ,this perfection of altruistic sympathies is looked forward to by ,mr ,spencer as characteristic of a subsequent--the final--stage of evolution4 ,when that period comes1 men will compete with one another for the few remaining opportunities of self-sacrifice4#abi ,at present1 ,mr ,spencer argues1 pure altruism is suicidal4 ,the individual whose sympathetic nature is undeveloped may1 however1 go further1 and ask what right we have to say that the moral law is conformity to the conditions of social welfare1#acj rather than to those of individual welfare8 ,evolution1 it would seem1 does not suffice to prove this proposition1 which appears1 on the contrary1 to be a survival of the social or political way of looking at things inherited from the utilitarian theory4 ,but the point to be proved is why ,i ought to adopt this standpoint when considering what the end of my action is to be4 ,and this point stands in need of proof here as much as in utilitarianism1 and seems almost equally destitute of it4 ,sidenote3 and may be restrained by reflection4 ,feelings leading to altruistic conduct are undoubtedly possessed by the average man at his present stage of development4 ,yet the being who is able to reflect on the feelings possessed by him1 and compare the characteristics of different emotional states1 and the activities following from them1 has already before him the possibility of transcending them4 ,he is able to estimate their value in terms of simpler--or of other--feelings2 and the man who rigorously does so by the test of personal pleasure and pain manifests the spirit of the egoistic hedonist--a spirit which the theory of empirical evolution does not seem able to exorcise4 ,sidenote3 7c7 ,tendency of evolution to supplant egoism4 ,evolution not the basis of psychological hedonism1 ,at the same time the tendency of the evolution-theory is not to support but to supplant egoism4 ,neither the basis of psychological hedonism on which egoism is usually made to rest1 nor the independent arguments which have been urged for its ethical theory1 are drawn from the facts of development4 ,the theory of evolution may1 indeed1 be made to suggest that non-hedonistic action has arisen out of hedonistic3 ,that all affections are generated by association with experienced pleasure--only that the association is mainly ancestral in the case of 'affections' proper4 ,the dim remembrance of ancestral pleasures1 the force of ancestral habit1 produces that propension of which ,butler speaks1 disproportionate to 7distinct7 expectation and 7personal7 experience of pleasure4#aca ,but this view will be rejected by the pure egoist1#acb who must maintain that the pain of acting contrary to ancestral habit would in every case be greater than the expected pleasure foregone by following it4 ,according to the view suggested1 all deliberate volition would still be regarded as hedonistically determined1 though other motives than pleasure may affect action through having been inherited from cases of ancestral conduct in which they tended to personal pleasure4 ,even were it shown1 however1 that altruistic conduct has been developed out of egoistic1 the fact of its development would not alter its present characteristic4 ,if action now is not always moved by pleasure and pain alone1 it becomes a question of merely historical interest to trace its genesis to conduct to which our ancestors were hedonistically impelled4 ,the fact remains that the original simplicity of motive has been broken into1 and something else than personal pleasure admitted to have sway4 ,but it does not seem to have been made out that action in the early stages of human life was completely egoistic1 any more than that it is so now4 ,from first to last1 as ,mr ,spencer puts it1#acc self-sacrifice seems to have been involved in the preservation of each successive generation of individuals4 ,we inherit propensities to action which have been evolved from an initial stage in which there was no conscious distinction between egoism and altruism1 though both tendencies were present and were necessary for the continued existence of the species4 ,the feelings inherited by the egoistic hedonist are assessed by him at their pleasure-value4 ,but such feelings would never have been acquired by his ancestors1 had they tested each germinal emotion in the same way1 and so restrained self-sacrifice for offspring and fellow-men4 ,perhaps they did not clearly see or realise what their pleasure consisted in1 or accurately distinguish it from family or tribal welfare2 but1 through this deficiency of imagination1 the feelings were able to grow and perpetuate themselves1 which have tended to the preservation and consolidation of society4 ,sidenote3 nor of ethical hedonism4 ,nor can we gather from evolution any ethical argument leading to egoism as the principle or end for conduct2 and it is worthy of remark that the proof attempted by the late ,mr ,barratt is unaffected by his recognition of the theory of evolution as applied to mind1 depending on definitions and axioms which hold 7if at all7 for the individual man4 ,pleasure is defined by him as that state of consciousness which follows upon the unimpeded performance 7as such7 of its function by one or more of the parts of our organism2#acd and the good is forthwith identified with pleasure1 by its being shown that it is a state of consciousness1 and that it results from the due performance of function 7as such74#ace ,but the due#acf performance of function is itself a state or states of consciousness2 and in it1 not in any sequent or concomitant circumstances1 the good may consist4 ,the good1 we may say1 is not pleasure1 but the 7energeia7 of which pleasure is only the consequent or completion4 ,this is not a mere question of words4 ,for due performance of function cannot be measured by the resultant or accompanying feeling of pleasure3 the most perfect functioning1 just because it has become habitual1 has often the slightest accompaniment of pleasant feeling4 ,the way in which the argument is put in ',physical ,ethics' is thus well fitted to bring out the fundamental antithesis between ethical systems according as they place the good in the active element of function1 or in the passive element of pleasurable feeling which accompanies functioning4 ,the theory of evolution seems to have led many of the writers who have applied it to ethics to the other side of the antithesis than that adhered to by ,mr ,barratt4 ,they recognise ethical value as belonging to due performance of function1 rather than to the pleased states of consciousness which follow2 and in this way their theory leads them beyond hedonistic ethics4#acg ,sidenote3 #c4 ,bearing of the theory of evolution on utilitarianism ,it has been argued that the theory of evolution is1 in tendency1 hostile to the egoistic principle4 ,had egoism been consistently recognised and acted upon during the course of human development1 the features of social life which most promote co-operation and progress would never have become persistent4 ,but the same objection cannot be urged against universalistic hedonism4 ,it is true that this has not been the end consistently aimed at in the past4 ,those from whom our social instincts are inherited cannot be credited with having had either the general happiness or social evolution in view4 ,society and institutions furthering the common good were not the work of primitive utilitarians plotting for the greatest happiness of the greatest number4 ,they have come down to us from times when social organisation was forced upon men by the rude logic of facts which exterminated tribes in which the bond of union was weak2 and they have been gradually modified by the pressure of external circumstances and the growing influence of mental conceptions of what is best4 ,but the adoption of general happiness as the end of action would not have had the same effect on social evolution1 as the adoption of personal happiness as the end would have had4 ,it would have aided and not have hindered the growth of the feeling of unity among the members of a tribe or state1 as well as have led to the recognition of the individual as subordinate to the social organism4 ,it may thus seem quite natural to look to utilitarianism as giving the end for reflective action1 and yet to hold along with it what is loosely called the ethics of evolution4 ,sidenote3 has led to its modification ,sidenote3 in method1 ,but this first attitude of evolution to utilitarianism was not fitted to be permanent2 and the start#ach ,mr ,spencer got on being classed with anti-utilitarians must have been repeated in the experience of other moralists as they found themselves drifting from their ancient moorings4 ,mr ,spencer's difference from the utilitarians is not such as to lead him to reject or modify their principle4 ,he maintains1 as strongly as they do1 that the ultimately supreme end is happiness special and general4#aci ,but he disagrees with them in method1 holding that1 owing to the incommensurability of a man's different pleasures and pains1 and to the incommensurability of the pleasures and pains of one man with those of others1 coupled with the indeterminateness of the means required to reach so indeterminate an end1 happiness is not fitted to be the immediate aim of conduct4#adj ,but another method is open to us4 ,for since evolution has been1 and is still1 working towards the highest life1 it follows that conforming to those principles by which the highest life is achieved1 is furthering that end4#ada ,it is possible to deduce1 from the laws of life and the conditions of existence1 what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness1 and what kinds to produce unhappiness4#adb ,greatest pleasure1 that is to say1 is the end4 ,but it is so impossible to compare different kinds of pleasure1 different people's pleasure1 and different means for obtaining a maximum of it1 that it is not a practical end for aiming at4 ,no doubt is expressed that greatest happiness is the ultimate end2 although no good reason is given for holding that it is4 ,but it is an indeterminate end1 and needs to be interpreted by the course of evolution which is held to tend to it4 ,it is not too much to say1 therefore1 that ,mr ,spencer is only nominally a utilitarian4 ,his ethical principles are not arrived at by an estimate of the consequences of action1 but by deduction from the laws of that highest life which is now in process of evolution4 ,this alliance between evolutionism and hedonism will be examined in the following chapter4 ,at present it is necessary to consider the reasons which have led other evolutionists to look upon the new morality as superseding the utilitarian end4 ,sidenote3 and in principle4 ,sidenote3 7a7 ,ideal of utilitarianism objected to as unprogressive4 ,mr ,spencer's dissent from the doctrine of utility1 as commonly understood1 concerns1 he tells us1#adc not the object to be reached by men1 but the method of reaching it4 ,in other writers1 however1 the theory of evolution has not only supplanted the method of utilitarianism1 but also led to a modification of its principle4 ,the objections they have taken to it may perhaps be summed up by saying that they consider utilitarianism to look upon conduct from a mechanical1 instead of from an organic point of view4 ,it prescribed conduct to a man as if he were a machine with a certain kind and quantity of work to turn out4 ,his nature was looked upon by it as fixed1 and his social conditions as unvarying2 and the ideal set before him was therefore unprogressive--something that he was to do or to get1 not something that he was to become4 ,if consistently applied1 it has been recently argued1 utilitarianism seems irrevocably committed to a stereotyped and unprogressive ideal4#add ,according to ,mr ,stephen1 it considers society to be formed of an aggregate of similar human beings4 ,the character of each molecule is regarded as constant4 ,it can1 therefore1 give a test which is approximately accurate only1 which does not allow for the variation of character and of social relations4#ade ,to the same effect ,miss ,simcox maintains that it might pass muster in a theory of social statics1 but it breaks down altogether if we seek its help to construct a theory of social dynamics4#adf ,these writers do not seem to have made it quite clear1 however1 in what way utilitarianism assumes a stationary condition of human nature1 and so formulates conduct in a way unsuited to a progressive state4 ,to say simply that the greatest happiness of the greatest number is the end1 is not in itself inconsistent with a progressive state of human nature4 ,it is true that1 in all the enthusiasm for and belief in progress to be seen in a writer such as ,j4 ,s4 ,mill1 there is a constant goal always set to it in the possible maximum of pleasant feeling4 ,it would not have been inconsistent for him1 however1 to look upon human nature as capable of developing new susceptibilities for pleasure4 ,progress is made by increasing the amount of pleasure actually got4 ,and so far1 the ideal itself is certainly fixed1 while progress consists in its gradual realisation4 ,but there is no special virtue in having an ideal which is itself progressive4 ,a progressive ideal simply means an ideal which is incompletely comprehended1 and the comprehension of which proceeds gradually with its realisation4 ,at any time the definition of such an ideal can only be tentative3 with the actual assimilation of character to it1 the intellect comes to grasp its nature with increasing clearness4 ,i do not myself think that we can expect to have more than such a tentative and progressive comprehension of the moral ideal of humanity4 ,but we must not take objection to a theory because it gives at once a clear and definite view of the final end of conduct3 though we must not refrain from inquiring how the end is known4 ,sidenote3 ,force of the objection when attempt made to interpret greatest happiness1 ,sidenote3 by showing the way in which men can obtain happiness1 ,but the bearing of the objection to utilitarianism becomes apparent when we try to give some definite meaning to the end greatest happiness4 ,if we are content to receive it as simply a very general--or rather abstract--expression for our ideal1 nothing need be said1 except to put the question1 which has been already asked1 ,how we came by such an ideal8 ,the difficulty arises when we attempt to apply the ideal to practice4 ,with men of fixed character in an unchanging society1 our way might be comparatively clear4 ,but1 when both character and social relations vary1 and their variation extends to susceptibility to pleasure and pain1 and depends on the actions adopted to obtain the end1 utilitarianism may well appear to be without a principle by which to determine between different kinds of conduct4 ,to an objection similar to this1 but taken from the old point of view1 that we have no time before acting to sum up the pleasurable and painful consequences of our actions1 ,mill replied that there had been ample time--namely1 the whole past duration of the human species#adg--;in which to estimate the felicific results of conduct4 ,the variability of faculty and function makes this answer lack convincing power4 ,yet1 perhaps1 we are apt at present to disregard the real value of this collective experience of the race4 ,true1 human nature is not a constant2 yet certain of its qualities are persistent and constant enough not to leave us in doubt as to whether1 say1 murder and theft are beneficial or injurious to happiness4 ,there are at least certain actions1 and1 still more1 certain abstentions1 upon which human security--the basis of happiness--depends4 ,but it would seem that those secondary laws may be more properly regarded as conditions of life than means to pleasure4 ,sidenote3 and a maximum of it4 ,the difficulty1 however1 comes most clearly to the front when we attempt to define the maximum1 and that not for an individual or generation only1 but for the race4 ,it is not happiness merely1 but greatest happiness1 that is the utilitarian end4 ,is there any way1 then1 of determining how the maximum of happiness is to be obtained for generations whose characters1 though inherited from present individuals1 may be modified almost indefinitely8 ,the very existence and numbers of these future generations are problematic2 and ,mill1 as is well known1 spent much of his energy in trying to convince the present generation to restrict the numbers of the next4 ,even on the fundamental question as to whether happiness is to be obtained by the restriction of desires or by the satisfaction which leads to their recurrence and increase1 no principle can be extracted from utilitarian ethics4 ,the theory of evolution has shown how desires may be uprooted in the character of the race1 though they remain to the end in the present individuals2 but in each case utilitarianism would require us to sum up and estimate the relative advantages of renunciation and satisfaction1--a problem which the modifiability of human character seems to make impracticable4 ,thus1 even if certain rules of living may be ascertained1 and justified by the utilitarian principle1 it would seem that the end of greatest happiness for the race of man1 or the sentient creation generally1 must remain abstract4 ,there seems no principle through which it may be applied to conduct--no hope of an accurate estimate of results--when the variability of the individual and of social relations is taken into account4 ,sidenote3 7b7 ,objection to utilitarianism as a theory of consequences2 ,connected with this is the assertion that morality must have an inward1 not an external standard4 ,the evolutionists are inclined to condemn utilitarianism as a theory of consequences1 dealing solely with work produced4 ,according to ,mill1 utilitarian moralists have gone beyond almost all others in affirming that the motive has nothing to do with the morality of the action1 though much with the worth of the agent4#adh ,and this seems to be just what evolutionism objects to4 ,even the worth of the agent is1 according to utilitarianism1 only a tendency to perform the actions called moral3 a good or a bad disposition is said to be a bent of character from which useful or from which hurtful actions are likely to arise4#adi ,against this view ,mr ,stephen maintains that the attempt to secure an absolute and immutable moral law in its external shape must be illusory4 ,the moral law can be stated unconditionally when it is stated in the form ',be this1' but not when it is stated in the form ',do this4'#aej ,this1 however1 appears to express the matter in a way not free from difficulty4 ,the organic view of conduct will object not only to considering action apart from character1 but also to considering character apart from action4 ,we must treat conduct as a whole3 and1 in order to do so1 we must treat it as both arising out of and forming character2 and we must treat character not as mere potentiality1 but as it realises itself in conduct4 ,the weakness of the utilitarian theory is its method of treating actions merely in respect of their results3 the evolutionist must show how results are connected with motives1--how character and conduct are different aspects of a whole4 ,sidenote3 7c7 and as related solely to sensibility1 ,sidenote3 of which there is no common measure4 ,the difference of the evolutionist view from utilitarianism comes out at another point4 ,the latter places the standard and test of conduct in its effects on the sensibility4 ,the best is that which brings most pleasure4 ,utilitarians are now1 for the most part1 ready to admit that1 to be in earnest with their theory1 they must reject ,mill's attempt to distinguish qualities among pleasures4 ,if morality is to be defined by happiness1 we must1 of course1 allow all kinds of happiness to count1 and to count equally so far as they are actually equal4 ,we must reckon the pleasures of malevolence as well as those of benevolence4#aea ,of his own pleasures--of the relative amounts of pleasure he gets from various sources--each man is the final judge4 ,one man prefers push-pin to poetry1 another poetry to push-pin2 and neither has a right to call the other mistaken4 ,if we are to aim at the greatest maximum pleasure1 therefore1 we must not strive for what are commonly called high pleasures rather than low pleasures1 except as greater in intensity4 ,if we must have a standard1 the judgment of the 7phronimos7 for which ,mill contended must be superseded by the judgment of the average man4 ,if pleasure is the only end1 and satisfaction is simply another name for it1 then it is plainly incorrect to say that it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied2 better to be ,socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied4#aeb ,as has been urged from the evolutionist point of view1 there is no common measure of happiness to enable us to say that the more perfect being enjoys more of it than the less4#aec ,there seems one way only in which utilitarianism can bring its moral ideal into harmony with the upward tendency claimed for itself by evolutionist ethics--and that is1 by maintaining that the pleasures incident to what are regarded as the higher functions are the pleasures which excel others in respect of fecundity3 they are the source of future pleasures1 and are frequently inexclusive even in their present enjoyment4 ,the difficulty in making this assertion is just that these higher pleasures are but slightly appreciated by the majority of men1 and can hardly be said to be pleasures for them at all4 ,but here the theory of evolution1 whose adherents have been acting the part of the candid friend to utilitarianism1 must come to its aid1 and admit that human nature may be so modified in the future as to allow of the highest becoming also the greatest of pleasures4 ,the argument in the mouth of the utilitarian is perhaps a somewhat arbitrary one1 since it could be applied equally well to any class of pleasures4 ,the notion of higher1 as applied either to conduct or to pleasure1 has been accepted from current moral opinion4 ,but the theory of evolution has set itself to explain this notion1 and to develop a theory of morality in harmony with its own scientific positions1 and free from the defects which it has found in other systems4 ,how far it contributes to the determination of the ethical end will form the subject of investigation in the following chapters4 ,,footnotes3 #aae ,cf4 ,miss ,cobbe1 in ',darwinism in ,morals1 and other ,essays' 7#ahgb71 p4 #e4 #aaf ,methods of ,ethics1 ,,iii4 i4 #d1 #c;d ed41 p4 #baa4 #aag ,cf4 ,professor ,f4 ,pollock1 ,evolution and ,ethics--,mind1 i4 pp4 #cce ff4 ,apart from the bearing of a utilitarian test on inherited instincts1 to which ,mr ,pollock refers1 ,i have tried to show what meaning they will have for the evolutionist who judges them solely from the point of view of his theory4 #aah ,trait des sensations1 uvres 7#agih71 vol4 iii4 #aai ,it is to a condition of this sort that a phrase such as ,clifford's tribal self 7,lectures and ,essays1 ii4 #aaa7 would apply4 #abj ,cf4 ,spencer1 ,principles of ,sociology1 i4 #dgi4 #aba ,cf4 ,barratt1 ,ethics and ,politics--,mind1 ii4 #dec ff4 #abb ,cf4 ,stephen1 ,science of ,ethics1 p4 #aac4 #abc ,wealth of ,nations1 book iv4 ch4 ii4 #abd ,data of ,ethics1 chap4 xiii4 #abe ,stephen1 ,science of ,ethics1 p4 #aee2 cf4 ,spencer1 ,data of ,ethics1 p4 #abj4 #abf ,stephen1 ,science of ,ethics1 p4 #bbf4 #abg ,science of ,ethics1 p4 #bfc4 #abh ,cf4 ,ibid41 p4 #ddb4 #abi ,data of ,ethics1 p4 #bec #acj ,science of ,ethics1 p4 #cdi4 #aca ,f4 ,y4 ,edgeworth1 ,old and ,new ,methods of ,ethics 7#ahgg71 p4 #aa4 #acb ,cf4 ,a4 ,barratt1 ,mind1 iii4 #bhj4 #acc ,data of ,ethics1 chap4 xii4 #acd ,physical ,ethics1 p4 #ab4 #ace ,ibid41 p4 #ag4 #acf ,in the word due an idea of worth is involved4 ,probably ,mr ,barratt meant by due performance one which made the faculty correspond with its medium 7cf4 ,physical ,ethics1 p4 #i72 but this introduces a new standard of value4 #acg ,the transition involved in passing from pleasure to performance of function or life as the end of conduct1 may be illustrated by the following passage from ,mr ,pater's ',marius the ,epicurean' 7#ahhe1 i4 #afc73 ,really1 to the phase of reflection through which ,marius was then passing1 the charge of 'hedonism1' whatever its real weight might be1 was not properly applicable at all4 ,not pleasure1 but fulness of life1 and 'insight' as conducting to that fulness--energy1 choice and variety of experience--including noble pain and sorrow even--loves such as those in the exquisite old story of ,apuleius2 such sincere and strenuous forms of the moral life1 as ,seneca and ,epictetus--whatever form of human life1 in short1 was impassioned and ideal3 it was from this that the 'new ,cyrenaicism' of ,marius took its criterion of values4 ,it was a theory1 indeed1 which might rightly be regarded as in a great degree coincident with the main principle of the ,stoics themselves1 and a version of the precept ',whatsoever thy hand findeth to do1 do it with all thy might'--a doctrine so widely applicable among the nobler spirits of that time2 and as with that its mistaken tendency would lie in the direction of a kind of idolatry of mere life1 or natural gift or strength--l'idoltrie des talents4 #ach ,the note in question greatly startled me by implicitly classing me with anti-utilitarians4 ,i have never regarded myself as an anti-utilitarian4--,mr ,spencer's letter to ,j4 ,s4 ,mill1 printed in ,bain's ,mental and ,moral ,science1 p4 #gba4 #aci ,data of ,ethics1 p4 #agc2 cf4 p4 #cj4 #adj ,ibid41 pp4 #aed1 #aee4 #ada ,ibid41 p4 #aga4 #adb ,letter to ,j4 ,s4 ,mill1 in ,data of ,ethics1 p4 #eg4 #adc ,letter to ,j4 ,s4 ,mill1 in ,bain's ,mental and ,moral ,science1 p4 #gba4 #add ,j4 ,t4 ,punnet1 ,ethical ,alternatives--,mind1 x4 #ie4 #ade ,science of ,ethics1 p4 #cfc4 #adf ,natural ,law3 ,an ,essay in ,ethics 7#ahgg71 p4 #aja4 #adg ,utilitarianism1 p4 #cd4 #adh ,utilitarianism1 p4 #bf4 #adi ,ibid41 p4 #bg n4 #aej ,stephen1 ,science of ,ethics1 p4 #che4 #aea ,ibid41 p4 #cfa4 #aeb ,mill1 ,utilitarianism1 p4 #ad4 #aec ,simcox1 ,natural ,law1 p4 #aja4 ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,,hedonism ,,and ,,evolutionism4 ,sidenote3 #a4 ,alliance of evolutionism and hedonism effected in two ways3 ,the alliance between ,evolutionism and ,hedonism may be arrived at from either of the two points of view which are being brought into connection3 may be either an attempt to bring the hedonistic end into the definite region of law revealed by the evolution of life2 or may result from the endeavour to give clearness and persuasiveness to an ethical end which evolution itself seems to point to4 ,sidenote3 7a7 greatest happiness to be obtained by conforming to laws of life or of evolution2 ,the former point of view is represented in ,mr ,spencer's rejection of empirical utilitarianism1 and substitution for it of a practical end which is not enunciated in terms of pleasure4 ,happiness is still regarded by him as the supreme end2 but the tendency to it is not to be adopted as the end in practical morality4 ,there are certain conditions to social equilibrium which must be fulfilled before complete life--that is1 greatest happiness--can be obtained in any society4#aed ,thus the form of rational utilitarianism which he endeavours to establish does not take welfare for its immediate object of pursuit1 but conformity to certain principles which1 in the nature of things1 causally determine welfare4#aee ,having deduced from the laws of life and the conditions of existence what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness1 and what kinds to produce unhappiness1 we are to recognise these deductions as laws of conduct 444 irrespective of a direct estimation of happiness or misery4#aef ,the assumption is thus distinctly made that the tendency of life is to happiness1 and that the laws of its evolution yield practical principles by following out which the greatest happiness may be obtained1 without attempting the impossible task of estimating directly the felicific and infelicific results of conduct4 ,sidenote3 7b7 ethical end of evolution interpreted by pleasure4 ,starting with the evolutionist point of view1 but with an opposite estimate of the relative value for practice of the ends supplied by evolutionism and by hedonism1 a like identification of them might seem advisable4 ,the increase of life to which evolution tends may be regarded as not merely an account of the actual process of existence1 but as a principle of action for a conscious being4 ,in this way some such ethical imperative as ,be a self-conscious agent in the evolution of the universe#aeg may be formulated4 ,yet as the evolution of the universe is a somewhat large conception1 and its laws are not clear to every one1 it may seem necessary that the end should be explained by translation into better-known terms4 ,and this may be done if the conduct which promotes life most is1 at the same time1 the conduct which increases pleasure most4 ,in this way1 although the ultimate end is life1 or1 in vaster phrase1 the evolution of the universe1 the practical end is pleasure4 ,the moral value of conduct will depend on its tendency to increase the balance of pleasure over pain4 ,the ethics of evolution will be reduced to hedonism4 ,this way of determining the evolutionist end is put forward as a logical possibility rather than as representing the views of any party4 ,the contribution which the theory of evolution has to offer towards the determination of the ethical end1 has not yet received that definite expression which would justify our passing by any logical interpretation of it1 on the ground of its not being actually adopted by ethical writers4 ,yet it would seem that the above point of view is not altogether foreign to evolutionist morality4 ,the preservation or development of the individual--or of the race--which is put forward as an expression both for the actual course of evolution and the subjective impulse corresponding to it1 is often assumed to agree at each step with the desire for pleasure1 and1 when the stage of reflective consciousness is reached1 to be identical with the pursuit of a maximum of pleasure4#aeh ,in this way it is assumed that the preservation and development of life tend always to pleasure1 and that the end or tendency of evolution is being fulfilled when the greatest pleasure is wisely sought4 ,it is therefore necessary to inquire how far the correspondence between life and pleasure1 or between development and pleasure1 actually holds1 that we may see whether it is possible for the one to take the place of the other in determining the end for conduct4 99 99 99 99 99 ,sidenote3 #b4 ,evolutionist argument for concomitance of life and pleasure4 ,now it is argued1 from the point of view of evolution1 that1 taking for granted that pleasure motives action1 the organisms in which pleasurable acts coincided with life-preserving or health-promoting acts must have survived in the struggle for existence at the expense of those organisms whose pleasurable activity tended to their destruction or to the hindrance of their efficiency4#aei ,the assumption in this argument1 in addition to the constant postulate of natural selection1 is simply that pleasure is a chief motive of action2 the conclusion to which it leads is1 that there is a broad correspondence between life-preserving and pleasurable acts--that the preservation and development of life are pleasurable4 ,it is necessary to examine with care the validity of this important argument with reference to the attacks that may be made on it from the pessimist point of view2 and1 if its doctrine of the correspondence of life and pleasure is not entirely erroneous1 to inquire further whether this correspondence can be made to establish an end for conduct1 in accordance with the theory of evolution1 by measuring life in terms of pleasure4 ,sidenote3 #c4 ,objections to this argument3 ,what then is to be said of the supposed conflict between ,eudmonism ,hedonism and ,evolutionism which v4 ,hartmann#afj opposes to the optimist doctrine that evolution has tended to make life and pleasure coincide8 ,the problem of ,pessimism resolves itself into two questions which admit of being kept distinct3 7a7 ,the first is1 ,does life on the whole give1 or can it give1 a balance of pleasure8 ,this is the fundamental question of the value of life as put by those1 whether optimists or pessimists1 who assume that value means pleasure-value4 ,if it be answered in the negative1 the hedonistic ideal must be the reduction of the adverse balance to the zero-point of feeling striven after by ,eastern ascetics1 but1 to all appearance1 obtained only and most easily by death4#afa 7b7 ,the second question is1 ,does the evolution of life lead to an increase of pleasure and diminution of pain8 ,this is the question brought into prominence in recent discussions1 and of most importance for the present inquiry2 and upon an affirmative answer to it ,evolutionist ,hedonism is plainly dependent4 ,to both questions v4 ,hartmann gives an answer in the negative4 ,sidenote3 7a7 that life cannot bring more pleasure than pain2 7a7 ,if the pessimist view of life is correct1 ,mr ,spencer holds1#afb then the ending of an undesirable existence being the thing to be wished1 that which causes the ending of it must be applauded4 ,and this is so far true1 though not necessarily true in the way ,mr ,spencer thinks4 ,for this undesirable existence cannot1 perhaps1 be brought to a final conclusion merely by ending the individual life3 this would only leave room for other individuals to fill the vacant places4 ,annihilation is the end not directly for the individual1 but for the race4 ,not life itself1 according to ,schopenhauer1 but the will to live1 is to be killed in the individual man4 ,even this code of morals1 ,hartmann thinks1 is a remnant of the false1 pre-evolutionist individualism1 and would hinder the course of the universe1 by leaving the game to be played out by the remaining individuals whose wills were not strong enough to curb or kill themselves4 ,it is a mistake to think that the will to live which pulses through all existence can be annihilated by the phenomenal individual4 ,the individual's duty is not to seek for himself the painlessness of annihilation or passionless ,nirwna1 but to join in the ceaseless painful striving of nature1 and1 by contributing to the development of life1 to hasten its arrival once more at the goal of unconsciousness4 ,the self-destruction1 not of the individual will1 but of the cosmic or universal will1 is the final end of action4 ,apart from the metaphysical view of things with which this estimate of the value of life is connected1 and which may be regarded perhaps as its consequent rather than its cause1#afc the pessimist doctrine has a double foundation1 in psychology and in the facts of life4 ,sidenote3 77 from the negative nature of pleasure1 ,psychologically1 it seems to be best supported by ,schopenhauer's doctrine of will or desire as an incessant painful striving1 pleasure being merely the negative of this pain1 and always coming short of completely satisfying it4 ,but this position involves a double error in psychological analysis1 and is relinquished even by ,hartmann1 though he still regards pleasure as in all cases satisfaction of desire4 ,desire is itself merely a secondary or derived fact in human nature1 consequent on the inhibition of volitional energy4#afd ,the pleasures we call passive are independent of it2 and those which attend upon activity1 but are not themselves part of the end of action1 are also enjoyed without being striven after in order to satisfy a want4 ,further1 it is a mistake to look upon the pleasure of attainment as a mere negation of the pain of desire4 ,the painful element in desire comes from the inhibition of the attempted realisation of an ideal object4 ,in unsatisfied desires1 it is true1 the pain is in proportion to the strength of the restrained longing4 ,but1 if the inhibition is overcome1 the pain is not equal to the strength of the desire1 but only to the amount of opposition that has to be conquered in satisfying it4 ,hence1 not only are there other pleasures than those of satisfied desire1 but even the pleasure got from such satisfaction is something more than a mere recompense for the pain accompanying the desire4 ,sidenote3 77 from the facts of human life2 ,the support got by pessimism from the facts of human life is more difficult to estimate at its true value4 ,it is obvious that pleasure and pain are intermingled in almost every experience2 and the proportion in which they are mixed varies greatly in different circumstances and according to the susceptibilities of different persons4 ,if we ask a number of people whether life is on the whole pleasant to them1 not only do we receive a variety of answers which it is hard to sum up and average1 but the answers we get are apt to reflect the feeling of the moment rather than to represent an impartial estimate of the pleasure and pain of a lifetime4 ,thus experience seems unable to give us a trustworthy answer as to the average pleasure-value of life2 but1 if its verdict is correct1 that to some life is pleasant1 though to many painful1 this shows that a surplus of pain does not follow from the nature of life1 and thus destroys the position of thoroughgoing pessimism1 which looks upon this as the worst of all possible worlds4 ,sidenote3 7b7 that the evolution of life does not tend to pleasure4 7b7 ,it may still be maintained1 however--and this is the position which chiefly concerns us here--that the course of evolution does not tend to increase the pleasure in life at the expense of the pain in it1 and that1 therefore1 even although pleasure and evolution may both of them be possible ends of conduct1 they are ends which point in different directions and lead to different courses of action4 ,sidenote3 77 ,incompleteness of the evolutionist argument4 ,it is necessary for the evolutionist who holds that the development of life does not tend to increased pleasure1 to meet the argument already adduced#afe to show their correspondence4 ,nor does that argument seem to be altogether beyond criticism4 ,to compare progress or development with pleasure1 we ought to know exactly what is meant by both terms4 ,yet it is impossible to have a clear notion of progress without an idea of the end to which it tends1 and this has not yet been obtained4 ,it is largely on account of the difficulty of obtaining such an idea that some evolutionists seem to have been driven to measure progress in terms of pleasure1 just as1 owing to the difficulty of estimating and summing up pleasures1 some hedonists have been induced to measure them by the progress of evolution4 ,what we have now to see is whether the correspondence assumed between progress and pleasure actually exists4 ,and1 to avoid the tautology of saying that progress is increase of life1 we must judge of it simply by empirical observation of the nature of human activity and of the course of human affairs4 ,now the attempted identification of pleasurable and life-promoting activities rests on an incomplete account of the motives and results of action4 ,for1 in the first place1 even admitting that pleasure and avoidance of pain are the only motives to action1 the influence of natural selection has not prevented actions hurtful to life being sometimes accompanied by pleasant sensations4 ,its tendency to do so has been much more effective in the lower orders of animal life than in the higher4 ,the latter1 especially man1 possess the power of representing ideal states in the imagination1 and are thus able to avoid actions hurtful to life1 although these actions are pleasant at the time4 ,for the hurtful consequences of the action may be so vividly represented in idea as to outweigh the influence of the present pleasure which could be got from its enjoyment4#aff ,and further1 the analysis of volition involved in the argument seems to be insufficient4 ,for there are other springs of action to be taken account of than pleasure and its opposite4 ,habit1 imitation1 and interests of a more comprehensive kind than desire of pleasant feeling1 are all motives to action4 ,it is true that pleasure is always felt in the successful performance of an action1 and it is also true that the inhibition of will is always painful2 but it is none the less incorrect to look either upon the pleasure that follows from the action1 or the pain that would be the result of its inhibition as1 in ordinary cases1 the motive4 ,it is motives of a different kind than pleasure1 such as imitation#afg and the influence of ideal ends1 which most often lead to progress4 ,and the progress that is due to such motives cannot be measured by its effect in increasing pleasure1 nor assumed to make pleasure and life correspond4 ,other activities less advantageous in nature in all respects but this1 might1 so far as the reasoning goes1 lead to equal or to more pleasurable consequences4 ,at the best1 therefore1 the above argument only proves a general tendency towards the coincidence of pleasurable actions with actions which promote life2 it does not show that the increase of life can be accurately measured by pleasure4 ,the process of natural selection might kill off all organisms whose desires led them normally to action hurtful to life4 ,but sufficient evidence has not been brought forward to show that it is fitted to produce an exact proportion between progress and pleasure4 ,sidenote3 77 ,the pessimist doctrine that life tends to misery3 ,sidenote3 7aa7 the hypothesis of the unconscious2 ,hartmann1 however1 attempts to strike a more fundamental blow than this at the presupposition involved in the argument for evolutionist hedonism4 ,for he contends that1 throughout all life1 the great pulse of progress is neither1 on the one hand1 desire for pleasure1 nor1 on the other1 the more complex and varied motives just referred to1 but that it is the incessant striving towards fulness of life by a universal unconscious will1 which is manifested in all things1 and which is for ever pressing onwards towards conscious realisation1 regardless of the increase of pain which the course of evolution implies4 ,but this hypothesis of unconscious will is not a justifiable metaphysical principle got at by the analysis of experience1 and necessary for its explanation1 though lying beyond it4 ,it is a metempirical1 or rather mythical1 cause interpolated into the processes of experience4 ,hence the antagonism in which it stands to psychological fact3 its disregard of the effect of pleasure as a powerful motive in volition2 and its neglect of the obvious truth that function so reacts upon organ that all actions have simply by continuance a tendency to be performed with greater ease1 and therefore to yield in their performance increase of pleasure4 ,the smoothness and precision with which it works may1 indeed1 lead to a function being performed unconsciously1 and thus without either pain or pleasure4 ,but the normal exercise of conscious activity is uniformly pleasurable4#afh ,sidenote3 7bb7 the nature of volition2 ,while giving up ,schopenhauer's doctrine of the merely negative character of pleasure1 ,hartmann yet contends that eternal limits are set by the very nature of volition1 which make it impossible to have a world with more pleasure in it than pain4 ,but his arguments#afi come very far short of proving his case4 ,for1 in the first place1 to say that the stimulation and wearying of the nerves imply the necessity of a cessation of pleasure as well as of pain1 is to confuse complete states of consciousness with the subjective feeling which accompanies each state4 ,it is not true that one ever becomes weary of pleasure3 to talk as if there were one class of nerves for pleasure1 and another for pain1 is absurd4 ,but every mental state1 however pleasurable to start with1 tends to become monotonous1 wearisome1 or painful4 ,pleasure thus requires a change from one mental state to another3 to say that it requires a change from pleasure to something else is a contradiction in terms4 ,it is the objects or activity that require to be varied1 not the feeling of pleasure4 ,again1 in the second place1 it is true that pleasure is to be regarded as indirect in so far as it is entirely due to the cessation of a pain1 and not to instantaneous satisfaction of will4 ,but it does not do to regard the pleasure as altogether indirect when1 although the cessation of a pain is necessary for its production1 it is itself something more than this cessation4 ,the inhibition of will often prevents the realisation of an object which is very much more than a recompense in pleasurable quality for the pain of the restraint2 and although the pleasure only arises from the removal of this painful state of inhibition1 there is a direct and positive gain over and above the gratification of having pain removed4 ,in the third place1 ,hartmann argues that the satisfaction of will is often unconscious1 whereas pain is eo ipso conscious4 ,but1 even admitting the reality of unconscious will or desire1 which this argument involves1 it does not follow that pleasure and pain are differently affected in regard to it4 ,if pain is eo ipso conscious1 so also is pleasure2 if the satisfaction of unconscious desire gives no pleasure1 neither does the absence of such satisfaction give pain4#agj ,it is true1 as ,hartmann adds in the fourth place1 that desire is often long and the joy of satisfaction fleeting2 but this refers not so much to mental pleasures as to those connected with physical appetite4 ,of them it is true that ,these violent delights have violent ends1 ,and in their triumph die4 ,but in the higher pleasures with more permanent objects of pursuit1 although the desire may be long-continued1 the pleasure does not disappear in the moment of gratification4 ,it would seem1 therefore1 that the pessimist psychology1 in treating pleasure in a different way from pain1 mistakes the true nature of both as simply polar extremes#aga of feeling1 and prevents the argument being faced which has been brought forward to show the increasing correspondence of pleasure and life4 99 99 99 99 99 ,sidenote3 7cc7 the facts of human progress3 ,the failure of the psychological argument makes the whole burden of the proof of pessimism rest upon the argument from historical facts4 ,and the attempt has been definitely made to show1 from observation of the course of human affairs1 that the progress of the world tends to misery4 ,it is necessary1 therefore1 to ask whether it can be established that the facts included under the vague term human progress have a normal tendency either to increase pleasure or to act in the opposite way4 ,now progress is a characteristic both of the individual and of society2 but pleasure only belongs to the former1 so that an answer to the question whether individual progress tends to increase the surplus of pleasure over pain1 still leaves unsettled the question as to the effect of social progress4 ,sidenote3 individual progress2 ,it seems evident that both the physical and mental development of the individual imply greater adaptability to1 and correspondence with1 the external world1 and that1 on account of this development1 there is less unpleasant friction between outer and inner relations1 and means are at hand for obtaining objects of desire with less exertion than formerly4 ,but1 at the same time1 the increase of knowledge and of skill always implies not merely the means of satisfying old wants1 but the creation of new ones3 we see more of the evil in the world than our forefathers did1 and there are more avenues by which it can approach us1 if we have also more effective means for avoiding what we dislike4 ,and1 although knowledge brings with it not only the pleasure of gratified curiosity1 but that recognition of a universal order which frees the mind from the evils bred by a belief in the fickleness of nature1 yet this all-pervading sense of law has so regulated our beliefs and methods of research that science itself may seem to have lost the peculiar freshness of interest that belonged to its earlier stages2 while the feelings called forth by a vision of the divine presence in the world1 find but a poor substitute in the sublime region of cosmic emotion4 ,further1 the widening of the sympathetic feelings and their consequent activities1 and the refinement of the whole sensitive nature by which it responds more quickly and accurately to emotional stimuli1 have made the present generation more susceptible to both pain and pleasure than its predecessors4 ,but ,hartmann's argument that the duller nervous system of the savage races 7,naturvlker7 makes them happier than the civilised 7,culturvlker71#agb leaves out of sight the new sources of pleasure as well as pain that are opened up to a refined sensibility4 ,according to ,hartmann1 the sthetic sensibilities may be a source of painless pleasure3 yet even their cultivation cannot be said to be matter of pure gain to their possessors2 for the pain of discord is to be set against--in his opinion1 it outweighs--the pleasure of harmony4 ,on the whole1 then1 it would appear that the evolution of the individual leads to greater possibilities both of pleasure and of pain4 ,the refinement of the intellectual and emotional nature opens up wider ranges of both kinds of feeling2 and we are driven to look mainly to the improvement of the social environment for the means of increasing pleasure and diminishing pain4 ,sidenote3 social progress3 ,sidenote3 industrial1 ,but to estimate the hedonistic value of social progress is a still more difficult task than the preceding4 ,for the march of affairs has often little regard to its effect on the happiness of the greater number of people concerned4 ,industrially1 it may be thought that the increase in the amount of wealth produced affords a vastly greater means of comfort and luxury4 ,yet1 it is doubtful whether this increase has always been sufficient to keep pace with the growth of population2 and it is certain that every society whose territory is limited1 must1 when its numbers have increased beyond a certain point1 begin to experience the diminishing returns which nature yields for the labour expended upon it4 ,indeed1 the tendency to an excess in the rate of increase of population over that of means of subsistence is one of the chief causes which make it so difficult to assert that civilisation tends to greater happiness4 ,but1 even although the average quantity of wealth be greater now than before1 it must be remembered that wealth is measured by its amount1 whereas happiness depends on the equality with which that amount is distributed4#agc ,yet the present industrial rgime tends to the accumulation of immense wealth in a few hands1 rather than to its proportionate increase throughout the community4 ,the industrial progress which increases the wealth of the rich1 has little to recommend it if it leaves the labouring poor at a starvation-wage4 ,and what if ,trade sow cities ,like shells along the shore1 ,and thatch with towns the prairie broad ,with railways ironed o'er1-- if the population can be divided into plutocrats and proletariate8 ,moreover1 the very nature of economic production seems to imply an opposition between social progress and individual wellbeing4 ,for the former1 in demanding the greatest possible amount of produce1 requires an excessive and increasing specialisation of labour4 ,each worker must perform that operation only to which he has been specially trained1 or which he can do best4 ,and in this way industrialism tends to occupy the greater part of the waking hours of an increasing proportion of human lives in the repetition of a short series of mechanical movements which call out a bare minimum of the faculties of the worker1 dwarf his nature1 and reduce his life to a mere succession of the same monotonous sensation4#agd ,in spite1 therefore1 of immense improvements in the general conditions of wellbeing1 it is still difficult to say that the happiness of the average human life has been much increased by the march of industrial progress4 ,sidenote3 and political4 ,a more hopeful view may1 perhaps1 be taken of the effect of political progress4 ,the increase of popular government gratifies the desire for power1 and1 in some cases1 even tends to a more efficient management of affairs4 ,still more important in its effect on happiness is the greater security for life and property which the gradual consolidation of political control has brought about4 ,it would seem1 too1 that the harsher features of the struggle by which this advance takes place have been modified2 and that the war of politics has abated in fury more than the war of trade4 ,on the whole1 therefore1 the tendency of modern political rule appears to be towards an almost unmixed gain in respect of happiness1--by the security it affords for life and property1 by its wide distribution of political power1 and by the room it gives for individual freedom4 ,yet the last of these results--in the laissez-faire system of industrialism to which it has led1 and which1 in spite of many modifications1 is still in the ascendant--has effects of a more doubtful character4 ,this mere reference to one or two of the leading features of progress would not be sufficient to support a thesis either as to its beneficial or baneful tendency4 ,but evidence enough has been led to show that the effects on pleasure of individual and social development are of a mixed kind1--that culture and civilisation have neither the tendency to misery which ,hartmann follows ,rousseau in attributing to them1#age nor1 on the other hand1 that steady correspondence with increasing pleasure which would be required to establish the position of evolutionist hedonism4 ,sidenote3 ,necessity of choosing between evolutionism and hedonism4 ,it follows1 therefore1 that1 without adopting a pessimist view1 we must still make our choice between evolutionism and hedonism4 ,the course of evolution--so far as experience helps us to understand it--cannot be measured by increase of pleasure4 ,nothing is said here to show that it is not perfectly consistent to hold that the moral feelings and ideas1 the customs to which they have given rise1 and the institutions in which they are embodied1 have been produced by the ordinary laws of evolution1 and yet to maintain that the moral end for reflective beings is the hedonistic or utilitarian end4 ,it may be possible1 that is to say1 to be an evolutionist in psychology and sociology1 at the same time that one is a hedonist in ethics4 ,but it is not allowable to adopt pleasure as the end1 and yet speak of it as determined by evolution4 ,evolution can determine no such end until it be shown that the progress it connotes implies a proportionate increase of pleasure4 ,such is the conclusion to which we are led by a consideration of the bearings of evolution upon the increase of pleasure and pain4 ,but this argument requires to be supplemented by the more satisfactory method of an independent analysis of pleasure in relation to the development of human nature2 and from this analysis we may hope to discover how far the theory of evolution is consistent with the ethics of hedonism4 99 99 99 99 99 ,sidenote3 #d4 ,the psychological analysis of pleasure and pain in relation to the ethics of evolution4 ,the relative and transient nature of pleasure has been urged as an objection against any form of hedonism by many philosophers since the time of ,plato4 ,and the argument has of late years been brought forward in a way which shows that the calculus of pleasures and pains which ,bentham's ethics implies is much less certain and easy than its author supposed4 ,this has been made clear both by the subtle analysis carried out by the late ,professor ,green1 and by ,professor ,sidgwick's examination of the difficulties which beset the hedonistic calculus4 ,it does not appear1 however1 to have been made out that the nature of pleasure proves hedonism to be impossible as the end of conduct4 ,but it may1 perhaps1 appear that the case is altered when we consider the matter in the light of the evolutionist form of hedonism now under examination1 and estimate from this point of view the ethical bearings of the psychological analysis of feeling4 ,sidenote3 7a7 ,the purely subjective nature of pleasure2 ,sidenote3 its connection with objective states of mind1 ,sidenote3 through which it may be made the end of conduct4 ,the difficulty of defining pleasure or pain is not the same as the difficulty or impossibility of defining any elementary sensation4 ,for the latter is connected in definite ways with other similar sensations1 can be compared and associated with them1 and by such association go to make up an object or thing4 ,but pleasure and pain are neither objects nor parts of objects3 they cannot be distinguished from or associated with the impressions of the senses so as to constitute an object4 ,they can only be spoken of as an affection of the percipient and active subject1 different in kind both from the objects it knows and the acts it performs3 each can only be defined as the opposite of the other4 ,pleasure and pain are not real phenomena with a distinguishable existence of their own1 like sensations1 conceptions1 or actions2 they have no trace of objectivity whatever1 but are1 as ,hamilton puts it1#agf subjectively subjective3 pleasure is not a fact1 nor is pain a fact1 but one fact is pleasurable1 another painful4#agg ,pleasure1 therefore1 is a mere feeling of the subject1 concomitant with the sensory or motor presentations which1 by reason of their presence to consciousness1 we call objects or actions4 ,it is not something by itself which we can choose rather than something else1 as we may select a peach instead of an apple4 ,it can only be made the end of conduct in an indirect way4 ,we must aim not at pleasure per se1 but at objects which we have reason to believe will be accompanied by pleasurable feeling4 ,pleasure and pain1 as it has been urged1#agh are not quantities that can be added and subtracted4 ,it is not the pleasurable or painful feeling1 but the perceptional or cognitive elements in the mental state of which it is an element1 that admit of plurality and measurement4 ,but we may foresee that one mental state will be accompanied by pleasurable1 another by painful feeling1 and1 on that account1 we may choose the former4 ,in a great number of cases we are further able to make a quantitative estimate1 and to say that the pleasurable feeling accompanying one object or action is more intense than that accompanying another1 and thus to choose one object rather than another1 not merely because one is pleasurable while the other is painful1 but 7in cases where both are pleasurable7 because it is supposed that the one will yield more intense or more prolonged pleasure than the other4 ,if this be true1 the purely subjective nature of pleasure does not make it impossible for it to be taken as the practical end of conduct for the individual--however inexact and tentative many of its estimates must be--though it will shortly appear that its nature unfits it to be the end on the theory of evolution4 ,the difficulty arises when we attempt to interpret1 by means of pleasure1 the increase and development of life to which the course of evolution tends1 and which is sometimes put forward as the end which the evolution-theory prescribes for conduct4 ,and the difficulty also meets us when we seek to explain the conception of a maximum of pleasures as the end1 by means of the conception of evolution4 ,as long as we are content to look upon human nature as consisting of constant sources of activity and enjoyment1 and having fixed susceptibilities for pleasure and pain1 it is easy to adopt the increase of pleasure and diminution of pain as our aim4 ,but the case is altered when we take into consideration the fact that man's actions and sensibilities are subject to indefinite modification4 ,pleasure1 as we have seen1 is a feeling of the subject dependent upon the objects1 sensory and motor1 present at any time to consciousness4 ,these objects alone can be our end2 but we may aim at certain of them rather than others1 simply on account of their pleasurable accompaniment4 ,it may happen1 however1 that an object or action at one time pleasurable becomes painful at another time1 and that what is now painful ceases to be so and becomes pleasurable4 ,in this case our course of action1 if motived by pleasure1 would have to be entirely changed1 our practical ethics revised and reversed4 ,and1 although no sudden alteration such as this ever takes place1 the theory of evolution shows that a gradual modification of the kind is going on4 ,sidenote3 7b7 ,the conditions of pleasure and pain3 ,the conditions of pleasure and pain1 physiological and psychological1 are matter of dispute2 and the dispute is complicated by the confusion of the physiological with the psychological problem4 ,it will be evident1 however1--if only we keep different things clear of each other1--that both kinds of explanation are possible1 and that they are distinct from one another4 ,the question of the nervous antecedents and concomitants of feeling is one thing1 and quite distinct from the question which now arises of the mental antecedents or concomitants of feeling4 ,and here the theories which have attempted a generalisation of the phenomena are1 in the light of recent inquiry1 mainly two3 the theory that pleasure follows1 or is the sense of1 increase of life1 and that which holds it to be the concomitant of unimpeded conscious functioning or of medium activities4 ,sidenote3 77 ,pleasure not definable as the sense of increased vitality2 ,the former theory#agi might be put forward as indicating how it is possible to institute a connection between pleasure and evolution4 ,but it has been already shown that neither the actual facts of life1 nor the tendencies to action1 can be so interpreted as to make their nature and development correspond1 with any degree of exactness1 with pleasure and its increase4#ahj ,nor is it possible to make out that every pain corresponds to a loss of vitality1 every pleasure heightens it4 ,on the contrary1 the assertion that pleasure-giving actions and life-preserving actions coincide1 is due to a hasty generalisation which cannot include all the facts4 ,that it holds throughout a considerable extent is true4 ,pleasure is1 at any rate1 a usual accompaniment of the normal processes of the development of life2 and pain reaches its climax in death4 ,but yet there is a broad margin of experience for which the generalisation is incorrect4 ,there are numerous cases of painful and pleasurable sensations which cannot be shown to be1 respectively1 destructive of1 and beneficial to1 vitality4 ,as ,mr ,bain1 who always keeps the facts in view1 admits1 with regard to the feelings connected with the five senses1 we cannot contend that the degree of augmented vital energy corresponds always with the degree of the pleasure4#aha ,the same discrepancy may be observed in more complex experiences4 ,the effort after a fuller life1 whether physical or mental1 even when its ultimate success is not doubtful1 may bring more pain than pleasure2 while the life which never strains its powers towards the limits of endurance1 may experience almost uninterrupted pleasure3 but such pleasure is the sure herald of the process of degeneration4 ,sidenote3 77 may be held to depend on medium or normal functioning4 ,the theory that pleasure follows increased vitality1 and pain decreased vitality1 is supplemented or opposed in modern psychology by the theory that feeling depends on function3 that pleasure is the concomitant of medium activities1#ahb or of conscious functioning1 which is unimpeded and not overstrained#ahc--pain accompanying the opposite condition4 ,the objection urged against this view1 that it leaves the so-called passive pleasures out of account1 seems to be made without sufficient consideration of what is meant by attributing passivity to pleasure4 ,all that such an expression can denote1 would appear to be that1 in the pleasurable experience referred to1 no exercise of the muscles is implied1 not that such an experience can take place without any conscious activity on the part of the subject4 ,at the same time1 the theory that pleasure in all cases depends upon function1 must be admitted to be obliged to call in the aid of hypothesis in order to explain all the facts4 ,if the generalisation required by the theory can be made out1 it must be by emphasising the fact that feeling is never properly regarded as purely passive1 but implies subjective reaction2 and by supposing that the variation of feeling between pleasure and pain depends on a difference in the character of this subjective reaction4 ,at the same time1 the complete accuracy of this generalisation is not of vital importance here1 as it is mainly with the feeling which manifestly results from activity or functioning that we are concerned4 ,sidenote3 ,modification of pleasurable characteristics of objects ,whether pleasure depends upon increase of vital energy1 or upon unimpeded or medium functioning1 it must be subject to modification along with the conditions under which life may continue and increase1 or the modes of activity which may be carried on without opposition and in moderation4 ,this constant modification of the objects in which one takes pleasure1 or which give one pain1 is1 indeed1 a fact which must be admitted by any theory of feeling4 ,a state of mind may be at first pleasurable2 but1 if it be long-continued1 the pleasure will give way to the pain of monotony4 ,the same is true of a painful state of mind3 its continuance does not prolong the same intensity of painful consciousness1 but the sensibility becomes dulled and the pain diminishes4 ,the transition is still more striking in the case of motor activities4 ,in learning to walk1 or to ride1 or to play any instrument1 the first experiences are those of painful effort4 ,gradually1 however1 the co-ordinations of movement required entail less and less pain1 till the feeling passes over into its opposite1 and we have a pleasurable sense of successful effort and well-adapted functioning4 ,but1 just as pain gave way to pleasure1 so pleasure itself subsides1 the action becomes merely reflex and passes out of consciousness altogether1 unless it be so long continued as to produce fatigue--that is1 pain4 ,habit1 as ,dumont remarks1#ahd intensifies perceptions1 but weakens pleasure and pain4 ,sidenote3 suggests that feeling depends on objective intensity4 ,these are psychological facts--not mere theories--which hold true even of the individual experience4 ,but they have led psychologists to the theory1 supported by a vast amount of direct experiment1 that there is no object or action which can be said to be absolutely and in itself either pleasant or painful4#ahe ,the feeling of pleasure or pain accompanying the object is a function of its intensity in relation to the subject4 ,this proposition cannot1 indeed1 be fully demonstrated regarding each simple sensation3 to the emotions into which intricate relations of perceptions enter1 it does not apply1 till their complexity has been reduced4 ,some sensations and perceptions are certainly felt as painful in any intensity in which they are distinctly present to consciousness4 ,but1 although this is a real difficulty1 it does not seem insuperable4 ,the instances which ,mill cites#ahf to throw doubt on the generalisation that quality of feeling depends on intensity are unfortunately chosen for his purpose4 ,for--to take his example--the taste of rhubarb is to many not painful but pleasant2 and1 indeed1 every case of acquired taste shows that pleasure and pain can be modified through habit and custom1 and suggests that1 even in the case of those sensations which are painful in any form we have been able to experience them1 there is a degree of intensity below which they would1 if experienced1 be pleasant4 ,experiment has proved of the majority even of sensible qualities1 and analogy leads us to conclude of all1 that there is a degree in which each may be pleasant1 and a degree in which each may be painful1 and1 between them1 a--real or imaginary--zero-point of feeling1 where there is neither pleasure nor pain4 ,this must1 it is true1 be received as a hypothesis only2 but it is a hypothesis which is suggested by a wide range of facts1 and which is able to include even those facts with which it is seemingly inconsistent1 by supposing that could their intensity be indefinitely diminished without their passing out of consciousness1 these sensations would reach a point after which they would be felt as pleasant and not as painful4 ,further1 experiment shows that this dividing-point which separates the two poles of feeling is not always placed at the same degree of intensity1 that it differs not only for every object1 but for each individual subject as well1 and that it undergoes modification in the course of the subject's development4#ahg ,what is true of sense-perception is still more evident regarding those experiences in which the activity of the subject is more obviously involved4 ,as any function may1 if carried beyond a certain degree of intensity1 be painful1 so any function consistent with life may be a source of pleasure4 99 99 99 99 99 ,sidenote3 7c7 ,application of the theory of evolution3 ,sidenote3 any conduct consistent with conditions of life will come to be pleasurable2 ,from the preceding discussion two things may be inferred3 first1 the dependence of pleasure and pain on the subject-activity1 whether the activity be that of perception or of what is specifically called action2 and secondly1 the modification of pleasure and pain1 and transition from one to the other1 along with the modification of that subject-activity4 ,to the application of both these conclusions there may be limits2 but their general accuracy does not seem doubtful4 ,what the doctrine of evolution adds to this is its proof of the indefinite modifiability of human function4 ,it is an essential principle of life1 ,mr ,spencer wrote1#ahh before he had arrived at his general theory of evolution1 that a faculty to which circumstances do not allow full exercise diminishes2 and that a faculty on which circumstances make excessive demands increases2 and to this we must now add1 that1 supposing it consistent with maintenance of life1 there is no kind of activity which will not become a source of pleasure if continued2 and that therefore pleasure will eventually accompany every mode of action demanded by social conditions4#ahi ,it is1 he holds1 a biological truth1 that everywhere faculties adjust themselves to the conditions of existence in such wise that the activities those conditions require become pleasurable4#aij ,the vast periods of time over which evolution stretches are scarcely needed to show how pleasure may be made to follow from almost any course of action consistent with the continuance of life4 ,the change of habits which often takes place in the history of a nation1 and even in the life of an individual1 makes this sufficiently obvious4 ,but1 if we still think of making attainment of pleasure the end of conduct1 the doctrine of evolution must give us pause4 ,it has been already argued that1 given certain sources of1 and susceptibilities for1 pleasure1 the course of evolution has not been such as to produce an exact coincidence between them and the actions which further life4 ,but it would seem that1 given habits of acting which are consistent with the conditions of life1 and which are systematically carried out1 these will not fail to grow pleasant as the organism becomes adapted to them4 ,at the best1 it is difficult enough to say1 even for the individual1 whether one imagined object or course of action will exceed another in pleasurable feeling or not4 ,but1 when we remember that function and feeling may be modified indefinitely1 it is impossible to say what course of conduct will produce the greatest amount of pleasure for the race4 ,taking in all its effects1 we cannot say that one way of seeking pleasure is better--that is1 will bring more pleasure--than another4 ,bearing in mind the modifications which evolution produces1 it seems impossible to guide the active tendencies of mankind towards the goal of greatest pleasure1 except by saying that the greatest pleasure will be got from the greatest amount of successful1 or of unrestrained1 or of medium activity4 ,sidenote3 maximum pleasure only definable in terms of life4 ,if1 then1 we have been seeking to define the evolutionist end by interpreting it in terms of pleasure1 it appears that we have only succeeded in making the round of a circle3 pleasure as the end is seen to be only definable as life or activity1 although it was adopted as the end in order that by its help we might discover what life or activity meant as the end for conduct4 ,we may1 perhaps1 still be able to hold to a form of hedonism1 if we turn our attention from the race to a small portion of present mankind4 ,in spite of the modifiability of function and its parasite feeling1 we may still be able to say that such and such a course of action is likely to bring most pleasure to the individual or even to the family4 ,but we cannot extend such a means of interpreting the ethics of evolution to the race1 where the possibility of modification is indefinitely great1 and the pain incurred in initiating a change counts for little in comparison with its subsequent results4 ,if we continue to look from the evolutionist point of view1 the question1 ,what conduct will on the whole bring most pleasure8 can only be answered by saying that it is the conduct which will most promote life--an answer which might have been more satisfactory had it not been to give meaning to this end promotion of life that it was interpreted in terms of greatest pleasure4 ,the evolution-theory of ethics is thus seen to oscillate from the theory which looks upon the summum bonum as pleasure1 to that which finds it in activity4 ,it contains elements which make it impossible for it to adhere to the former alternative4 ,the comprehensiveness of its view of life makes it unable to adopt pleasure as the end1 since pleasure changes with every modification of function4 ,and it has now to be seen whether the empirical method of interpretation to which it adheres will allow of its notion of life or activity affording a satisfactory end for conduct4 ,,footnotes3 #aed ,data of ,ethics1 p4 #aga4 #aee ,data of ,ethics1 p4 #afb4 #aef ,ibid41 p4 #eg4 #aeg ,cf4 ,a4 ,barratt1 in ,mind1 ii4 #agb n4 #aeh ,as illustrating this ,i may refer to ,g4 v4 ,giycki1 ,philosophische ,consequenzen der ,lamarck-,darwin'schen ,entwicklungstheorie 7#ahgf71 p4 #bg3 ,wir haben oben die ,erhaltung und ,frderung des ,lebens des ,individuums und der ,gattung als das eine ,ziel der ,einrichtung des geistigen ,organismus gekennzeichnet4 ,p4 #eh3 ,auf das ,streben nach in sich befriedigtem psychischen ,leben that is to say1 pleasure sind alle animalen ,organismen angelegt4 ,in his popular essay1 ',grundzge der ,moral' 7#ahhc71 ,dr ,giycki's principle and method are utilitarian4 ,with the above may be compared ,guyau1 ,esquisse d'une morale sans obligation ni sanction 7#ahhe71 p4 #ae3 ,l'action sort naturellement du fonctionnement de la vie1 en grande partie inconscient2 elle entre aussitt dans le domaine de la conscience et de la jouissance1 mais elle n'en vient pas4 ,la tendance de l'tre persvrer dans l'tre est le fond de tout dsir sans constituer elle-mme un dsir dtermin4 #aei ,spencer1 ,data of ,ethics1 p4 #hb f2 ,principles of ,psychology1 #abe1 #c;d ed41 i4 #bhj2 ,stephen1 ,science of ,ethics1 p4 #hc4 ,the simplicity of this argument will be appreciated if we consider the difficulty ,comte experienced in trying to reach a similar conclusion4 ,see ,positive ,philosophy1 ,miss ,martineau's translation1 ii4 #hg ff4 #afj ,cf4 ,phnomenologie des sittlichen ,bewusstseins1 pp4 #gja1 #gjh4 #afa ,cf4 ,sidgwick1 ,methods of ,ethics1 #c;d ed41 p4 #abg4 #afb ,data of ,ethics1 p4 #bf4 #afc ,cf4 ,vaihinger1 ,hartmann1 ,dhring und ,lange 7#ahgf71 p4 #abd4 #afd ,cf4 ,sully1 ,pessimism1 p4 #baf4 #afe ,see above1 p4 #afg f4 #aff ,cf4 ,fiske1 ,outlines of ,cosmic ,philosophy 7#ahgd71 ii4 #ccb f4 #afg ,imitation1 according to ,kant 7,grundlegung zur ,met4 d4 ,sitten1 ,werke1 iv4 #beg71 has no place at all in morals2 and this is true if the naked law of duty--or respect for it--is the sole ethical motive4 ,but if morality consists in the attainment of an ideal which is being gradually realised in man1 moral value will not be denied to the motive which leads the individual to fashion his own nature after that in which morality has attained more complete realisation4 #afh ,see the concluding pages of this chapter4 #afi ,philosophie des ,unbewussten1 #fth ed41 p4 #ffj ff4 #agj ,cf4 ,sully1 ,pessimism1 p4 #bbf n4 #aga ,cf4 ,j4 ,ward1 ,journal of ,speculative ,philosophy1 xvi4 7#ahhb71 #cgg4 #agb ,phil4 d4 ,unbewussten1 p4 #gdg4 #agc ,bentham1 ,theory of ,legislation 7by ,dumont1 #ahgf71 p4 #ajc ff4 ,wundt1 ,physiologische ,psychologie1 #b;d ed41 p4 #dfi1 finds in this an instance of ,weber's law4 ,thus1 the man with #ajj receives the same pleasure on receipt of #a1 as the possessor of #ajjj does on receiving #aj4 ,as ,wundt remarks1 however1 this is only true within certain limits4 ,sixpence may give more pleasure to a beggar who is never far from the starvation-point1 than the clearing of a million to ,baron ,rothschild4 ,further than this1 the law only states an abstract truth4 ,for the susceptibility to pleasure is not only very different in different individuals1 but this difference depends on many other circumstances than the amount of wealth already in possession1--such as original emotional susceptibility1 c4 #agd ,cf4 ,comte1 ,positive ,philosophy1 ii4 #add4 #age ,phn4 d4 s4 ,b41 p4 #fdj4 #agf ,lectures on ,metaphysics1 ii4 #dcb4 #agg ,l4 ,dumont1 ,thorie scientifique de la sensibilit1 #b;d ed41 p4 #hc2 cf4 ,f4 ,bouillier1 ,du plaisir et de la douleur1 #b;d ed41 p4 #bi ff4 ,reference may also be made to the leading psychological text-book4 ,das ,gefhl1 says ,volkmann 7,lehrbuch der ,psychologie1 #abg1 #c;d ed41 ii4 #cjj71 ist nmlich keine eigene ,vorstellung neben den anderen 7es gibt keine eigenen ',gefhlsvorstellungen'71 ja berhaupt gar keine ,vorstellung4 ,professor ,bain's view is different1 but does not altogether prevent him from acknowledging the subjectivity of feeling3 ,without intellectual images clearly recollected1 we do not remember feelings2 the reproduction of feeling is an intellectual fact1 and the groundwork is intellectual imagery4--,emotions1 p4 #fc4 #agh ,cf4 ,green1 ,introduction to ,hume1 ii4 #g4 #agi ,cf4 ,spinoza1 ,ethica1 iii4 #aa1 schol42 ,hobbes1 ,leviathan1 i4 #f1 p4 #be2 ,bain1 ,the ,senses and the ,intellect1 p4 #bhc4 ,professor ,bain's statement is carefully guarded3 ,a very considerable number of the facts may be brought under the following principle--namely1 that states of pleasure are connected with an increase1 and states of pain with an abatement1 of some1 or all1 of the vital functions4 #ahj ,as ,mr ,spencer allows1 ,psychology1 #abf1 i4 #bhd3 ,in the case of mankind1 then1 there has arisen1 and must long continue1 a deep and involved derangement of the natural connections between pleasures and beneficial actions1 and between pains and detrimental actions4 #aha ,the ,senses and the ,intellect1 p4 #bhf4 ,the ,law of ,conservation is incomplete1 ,mr ,bain holds1 and must be supplemented by the ,law of ,stimulation 7p4 #bid74 #ahb ,spencer1 ,psychology1 #abc1 i4 #bgg3 ,generally speaking1 then1 pleasures are the concomitants of medium activities1 where the activities are of kinds liable to be in excess or in defect2 and where they are of kinds not liable to be excessive1 pleasure increases as the activity increases1 except where the activity is either constant or involuntary4 #ahc ,hamilton1 ,lectures1 ii4 #ddj3 ,pleasure is the reflex of the spontaneous and unimpeded exertion of a power of whose energies we are conscious4 ,pain1 a reflex of the overstrained or repressed exertion of such a power4 ,cf4 ,aristotle1 ,eth4 ,n41 vii4 #ab1 p4 #aaec a #ad1 x4 #d1 p4 #aagd b #bj4 #ahd ,thorie scientifique1 p4 #gh4 #ahe ,cf4 ,wundt1 ,physiol4 ,psych41 p4 #dgj2 ,fechner1 ,vorschule der ,aesthetik1 ii4 #bdc f4 #ahf ,exam4 of ,hamilton's ,philosophy1 #eth ed41 p4 #eei4 #ahg ,see ,fechner1 loc4 cit4 #ahh ,social ,statics1 p4 #gi4 #ahi ,data of ,ethics1 p4 #ahf4 #aij ,mind1 vi4 #he4 ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,,the ,,evolutionist ,,end4 ,sidenote3 ,want of harmony between evolutionism and hedonism4 ,in showing the important bearing which evolution has on the causes of pleasure1 the argument of the preceding chapter has also made clear that the ends of evolutionism and of hedonism cannot be made to explain one another4 ,the theory which starts with a maximum of pleasure as the ultimate end1 but points to the course of evolution as showing how that end is to be realised1 is confronted by the fact that the development of life does not always tend to increased pleasure1 and that the laws of its development cannot therefore be safely adopted as maxims for the attainment of pleasure4 ,the same objection may be taken to the method of interpreting the evolutionist end by means of the pleasurable results of conduct4 ,the two do not correspond with that exactness which would admit of one doing duty for the other as a practical guide4 ,and a further difficulty has been shown to stand in the way of this method4 ,for1 on coming to analyse pleasure1 we find that it may1 by habituation1 arise from any--or almost any--course of conduct which the conditions of existence admit of4 ,the evolutionist1 therefore1 can have no surer idea of greatest pleasure--even although this may not be a very sure one--than that it will follow in the train of the greatest or most varied activity which harmonises with the laws of life4 ,sidenote3 ,necessity of investigating independent evolutionist end4 ,we must therefore forsake the method of eclecticism1 and inquire whether the theory of evolution can make any independent contribution towards determining an end for conduct4 ,we are frequently told that it prescribes as the end preservation1 or development1 or the health of the society4 ,but to obtain a clear meaning for such notions1 we must see what definite content the theory of evolution can give them1--without considering1 at present1 the grounds for transforming them into ethical precepts4 ,now1 it may be thought--and the suggestion deserves careful examination--that we may find in the characteristics of evolution itself#aia an indication of the end which organisms produced by and subject to evolution are naturally fitted to attain4 ,these characteristics must therefore be passed under review1 that their ethical bearings may be seen4 99 99 99 99 99 ,sidenote3 #a4 ,adaptation to environment3 necessary for life2 #a4 ,the first condition of development1 and even of life1 is correspondence between an organism and its environment4 ,the waste implied in the processes which constitute the life of an organised body has to be supplied by nutriment got from surrounding objects4 ,it requires food1 air1 light1 and heat in due proportions in order that its various organs may do their work4 ,when these circumstances change1 either it adapts itself to the new conditions or death ensues4 ,thus we find that every animal is limited to a certain range of climate2 every plant to certain zones of latitude and elevation1#aib--though nothing differs more among different species than the extent of an organism's adaptability to varying conditions4 ,a definite organism and a medium suitable to it are called by ,comte the two fundamental correlative conditions of life2 according to ,mr ,spencer they constitute life4 ,conformity is absolutely necessary between the vital functions of any organism and the conditions in which it is placed4 ,in this conformity there are varying degrees1 and the completeness of the life will be proportionate to the completeness of the correspondence4#aic ,even when life is not altogether extinguished1 it is impeded by imperfect adaptation4 ,where external circumstances make the attainment of nourishment difficult and precarious1 life is shortened in extent1 and1 within its limits1 more occupied with simply maintaining its necessary functions--less full1 varied1 and active4 ,the same holds good whether the external circumstances are natural or social1--applies equally to those whose energies are exhausted in the production of a bare livelihood from a niggard soil and unpropitious climate1 and to those who1 under changed conditions1 feel the hardship of adapting themselves to a new social medium4 ,sidenote3 spoken of as the ethical end2 ,sidenote3 defines the notion of self-preservation4 ,shall we say1 then1 that the end of human conduct is adaptation to environment8 ,this seems to be the position taken up by some evolutionists4 ,in the language of von ,baer1#aid the end of ends is always that the organic body be adapted to the conditions of the earth1 its elements and means of nutriment2 and ,mr ,spencer holds that all evil results from the non-adaptation of constitution to condition4#aie ,the hedonism which ,mr ,spencer definitely accepts as his ethical principle prevents him1 indeed1 from fully adopting the theory of human action which von ,baer seems to regard as the result of the doctrine of evolution4 ,yet complete adaptation of constitution to condition is held by him to be characteristic of that perfect form of life to which evolution tends1 and the laws of which are to be our guides in our present imperfect social condition4 ,in working out his theory of ethics1 he describes acts as good or bad according as they are well or ill adjusted to ends1 identifying the good with the conduct furthering self-preservation1 and the bad with the conduct tending to self-destruction4#aif ,the notion of self-preservation thus introduced is naturally suggested as the end subserved by the activity of an organism being adjusted to surrounding conditions4 ,self-preservation1 therefore1 rather than adaptation to environment1 will be regarded as the end1 with which adaptation will be connected as the essential means4 ,this notion of self-preservation has played a remarkable part in ethical and psychological discussion since the time of the ,stoics4 ,it withdraws attention from the relative and transient feeling of pleasure to the permanence of the living being4 ,thus1 with the ,stoics1 the notion of self-preservation was accompanied by an ethics hostile to indulgence in pleasure2 while1 on the other hand1 in ,spinoza and in ,hobbes1 pleasure was recognised as the natural consequence of self-preserving acts--the former defining it as a transition from less to greater perfection1 the latter as the sense of what helps the vital functions4 ,the theory of evolution has1 of course1 not only its distinctive contribution to make to the connection between self-preservation and pleasure--a subject already referred to1--but also shows how an increasing harmony has been produced between acts which tend to self-preservation and those which tend to social-preservation4 ,with ,mr ,spencer these two points are united4 ,his doctrine that the conduct which furthers race-maintenance evolves hand-in-hand with the conduct which furthers self-maintenance#aig is preliminary to the establishment of the proposition that the highest life is one in which egoistic and altruistic acts harmonise with one another and with external conditions3 the life called moral is one in which this moving equilibrium reaches completeness or approaches most nearly to completeness4#aih ,sidenote3 ,self-preservation and social-preservation4 ,as has been already pointed out1#aii it is not the case1 in the present state of human life1 that egoistic and altruistic tendencies1 even when properly understood1 always lead to the same course of conduct2 and even the theory of evolution does not do away with the necessity for a compromise between them4 ,but1 even had the theory of evolution overcome the opposition between the individual and social standpoints1 much would still remain to be done for the purpose of constructing a system of ethics1 or determining the ethical end4 ,it seems better1 therefore1 to pass over at present the conflict of competing interests4 ,according to ,pascal1 the entire succession of men1 the whole course of ages1 is to be regarded as one man always living and always learning4 ,and this is a suggestion which the theory of evolution only states more definitely1 though it cannot completely vindicate it4 ,on this supposition1 self-preservation is social-preservation1 and the possibly divergent interests of the individual and the whole are left out of account4 ,the end for the race then is1 according to the theory most explicitly stated by von ,baer1 a state of moving equilibrium3 and to this state of affairs we are at least1 ,mr ,spencer holds1 indubitably tending4 ,in the final stage of human development1 man will be perfectly adapted to the conditions of his environment1 so that1 to each change without1 there will be an answering organic change4 ,the ideal which seems to be held up to us is that of a time in which there will be no more irksome fretting in the machinery of life1 and circumstances will never be unpropitious1 because the organism will never be wanting in correspondence with them4 ,sidenote3 7a7 ,as the end for present conduct3 opposed to progress2 ,if this adaptation be adopted as the practical end for conduct under present conditions1 and not merely as describing a far-off ideal to which we are supposed to be tending1 man may continue to manifest a law of progress1 but its initiation will be from external conditions4 ,if adaptation to environment is consistently made the end1 activity will have to be restricted to suiting one's powers to an external order of nature1 and desire will have to be curbed when it does not bring the means of satisfaction along with it4 ,bene latere will again be an equivalent for bene vivere1 and happiness will have to be sought in withdrawal from the distractions of political life1 and in the restriction of desire4 ,it is strange to see the theory which is supposed to be based upon and to account for progress1 returning in this way to an ideal similar to that in which the post-,aristotelian schools took refuge amid the decline of political and intellectual life in ,greece4 ,the end which ,stoic and ,epicurean alike sought in complete emancipation from the conditions of the external world1#bjj is now1 in more scientific phrase1 made to consist in complete harmony with these conditions4 ,but1 in their practical results1 the two theories would seem scarcely to differ4 ,it is not astonishing1 therefore1 if this gospel of renunciation finds little favour among practical men in our day4 ,it is seen that1 if a man has not wants1 he will make no efforts1 and that1 if he make no efforts1 his condition can never be bettered4 ,thus social reformers have often found that the classes they have tried to elevate did not feel the evil of their lot as their benefactors saw it1 and they have had to create wants before attempting to satisfy them4#bja ,and the practical tendency finds its counterpart in speculative opinion1 so that1 whereas ,epicurus placed happiness in freedom from wants1 modern hedonism usually considers a man the happier the more wants he has and is able to supply4#bjb ,sidenote3 does not fully represent the theory of evolution4 ,this practical tendency brings out the truth that it is not only by the subordination of self to circumstances1 and the restriction of desire to present means of satisfaction1 that the required harmony between outer and inner relations can be brought about4 ,the other alternative is open3 circumstances may be subordinated to self4 ,for this latter alternative the theory of evolution seems really to leave room as much as for the former4 ,it is excluded only when a one-sided emphasis is laid on the necessity of adaptation to environment4 ,for evolution implies a gradually increasing heterogeneity of structure as the prelude to perfect agreement with circumstances3 the limit of heterogeneity towards which every aggregate progresses is the formation of as many specialisations and combinations of parts as there are specialised and combined forces to be met4#bjc ,the end of evolution is a correspondence between inner and outer which is not produced by the easy method of both being very simple1 but which is consistent with1 and indeed requires1 the complexity and heterogeneity produced in both by constant interaction4#bjd ,the greater this complexity1 the more filled with sensation1 emotion1 and thought life is1 the greater is what ,mr ,spencer calls its breadth4 ,but1 if adaptation is still regarded as expressing the end1 then1 the more perfect this adaptation is1 the less room seems left for progress1 and the end of human conduct is placed in a state of moving equilibrium in which action takes place without a jar and without disturbing the play of external conditions4#bje 99 99 99 99 99 ,sidenote3 7b7 ,as describing the ultimate condition of life1 ,this end of adaptation is looked upon by ,mr ,spencer not as representing the conduct prescribed by morality in present circumstances1 but as describing the ultimate condition of human life4 ,as such1 it is the foundation of his ,absolute ,ethics--that final permanent code which alone admits of being definitely formulated1 and so constituting ethics as a science in contrast with empirical ethics4#bjf ,the philosophical moralist1 he tells us1 treats solely of the straight man4 ,he determines the properties of the straight man2 describes how the straight man comports himself2 shows in what relationship he stands to other straight men2 shows how a community of straight men is constituted4 ,any deviation from strict rectitude he is obliged wholly to ignore4 ,it cannot be admitted into his premisses without vitiating all his conclusions4 ,a problem in which a crooked man forms one of the elements is insoluble by him4#bjg ,sidenote3 complete correspondence with environment4 ,sidenote3 ,resultant absolute code of ethics ,sidenote3 77 lays down abstract principles for relation of individual to society2 ,sidenote3 77 farther only defines end of conduct as adaptation2 ,how1 then1 are we to conceive the nature or conduct of the straight man8 ,to begin with1 it is made clear that his dealings are only with straight men2 for there are no crooked men in the ideal community4 ,the coexistence of a perfect man and an imperfect society is impossible2 and could the two coexist the resulting conduct would not furnish the ethical standard sought4#bjh ,the ultimate man is one in whom this process of adaptation to the social state has gone so far as to produce a correspondence between all the promptings of his nature and all the requirements of his life as carried on in society4 ,if so1 it is a necessary implication that there exists an ideal code of conduct formulating the behaviour of the completely-adapted man in the completely-evolved society4 ,this is the code of ,absolute ,ethics1 whose injunctions alone are absolutely right1 and which1 as a system of ideal conduct1 is to serve as a standard for our guidance in solving1 as well as we can1 the problems of real conduct4#bji ,at the outset1 we were required to interpret the more developed by the less developed2 #baj the conclusion sets forth that the less developed is to be guided by the more developed1 the real by the ideal4 ,now1 ethics includes all conduct which furthers or hinders1 in either direct or indirect ways1 the welfare of self or others4#baa ,thus ,absolute ,ethics1 like ,relative ,ethics1 has two divisions1 personal and social4 ,as to the latter1 ,mr ,spencer formulates certain principles of justice1 negative beneficence1 and positive beneficence1#bab which describe the harmonious co-operation of ideal men in the ideal state4 ,these principles may perhaps be capable of a modified application to the present state of society1 in which there is a conflict of interests3 although ,mr ,spencer's representation of them--which is still1 however1 incomplete--suggests the belief that they are not so much guides which the ideal gives to the real1 as suggestions for the construction of a ,utopia gathered from the requirements of present social life4 ,but1 supposing the harmonious co-operation of individuals to be thus provided for1 what is the personal end8 and what1 it might be added1 is the social end1 if society has any further function than regulating the relation of its units to one another8 ,absolute ethics does not seem to be able to give much guidance here4 ,a code of perfect personal conduct1 we are told1 can never be made definite4#bac ,there are various types of activities1 all of which may belong to lives complete after their kinds4 ,but yet perfection of individual life does imply certain modes of action which are approximately alike in all cases1 and which1 therefore1 become part of the subject-matter of ethics4 ,we cannot lay down precise rules for private conduct1 but only general requirements4 ,and these are3 to maintain the balance between waste and nutrition1 to observe a relation between activity and rest1 to marry and have children4#bad ,this is how the straight man comports himself4 ,apart1 therefore1 from the suggestion thrown out that a man's function may be the realisation of a type of activity complete after its kind--a suggestion to be considered in the sequel--all that we can say of the completely-adapted man would seem to be that he will be adapted to his circumstances4 ,sidenote3 77 cannot be shown to lead to happiness4 ,we have a right to demur if the pleasures of the final condition of equilibrium be held up to our imagination as a reason for aiming at it4 ,that it is the establishment of the greatest perfection and most complete happiness1#bae seems an unwarrantable assumption4 ,yet it is through this assumption that an apparent harmony between ,mr ,spencer's hedonistic ethics and his view of the tendency of evolution is brought about4 ,it is not at all certain that the result of perfectly adapted function is great increase of pleasure4 ,it is true that all the pains of disharmony between inner desire or feeling and outer circumstances would1 in such a case1 disappear2 but with them also there would be lost the varied pleasures of pursuit and successful struggle4 ,it cannot even be assumed that other pleasures would continue as intense as before4 ,for1 as acts are performed more easily1 and thus with less conscious volition1 they gradually pass into the background of consciousness1 or out of consciousness altogether2 and the pleasure accompanying them fades gradually away as they cease to occupy the attention4 ,where action is perfectly automatic1 feeling does not exist4#baf ,the so-called passive pleasures might still remain4 ,but the fact of effort being no longer necessary for the adjustment of inner to outer relations might have the effect of making the moving equilibrium still called life automatic in every detail4 ,indeed1 if the suggestions of the ',first ,principles' are to be carried out1 it would seem that the moving equilibrium is a transitional state on the way to complete equilibrium1#bag which is another name for death4#bah ,so far1 therefore1 from heightened pleasure being the result of completely perfect adjustment of inner to outer relations1 this adjustment would seem to reach its natural goal in unconsciousness--a conclusion which may commend itself to those of ,mr ,spencer's disciples who take a less optimist view of life than their master4 ,it seems evident1 therefore1 that to take adaptation to environment1 or self-preservation as interpreted by adaptation1 as the end of conduct1 is to adopt an end which cannot be shown to be desirable on the ground of yielding a maximum of happiness or pleasure4 ,and it is almost with a feeling of relief that one finds ,mr ,spencer's confidence in the tendency of evolution so far shaken as to admit of his saying that however near to completeness the adaptation of human nature to the conditions of existence at large1 physical and social1 may become1 it can never reach completeness4#bai ,adaptation to environment must1 at any rate1 be kept quite distinct from any theory of ethics which takes pleasure as the end of life2 and it cannot consistently determine any result as of ethical value on account of its pleasurable consequences4 ,the goal it sets before us1 and in which human progress ends1 is conformity with an external order4 ,the modification of these external conditions by human effort is to be justified ethically by the opportunity it gives for bringing about a fuller agreement between the individual or race and its environment4 ,the result is a stationary state of human conduct1 corresponding with1 or a part of1 that general equilibration to which1 according to ,mr ,spencer1 all evolution tends4 ,but this theory1 which places the goal of conduct in what seems to be the actual tendency of evolution1 gains no real support from this apparent harmony of ethics with general philosophy4 ,it may be granted that the evidence of physical laws goes to show that the evolution of the solar1 or even stellar1 system is towards a condition in which the moving equilibrium will at last pass into a form in which there is no further sensible motion1 and the concentration of matter is complete4 ,but to infer from this that the theory which places the end of conduct in a similar equilibrium shows the harmony of morality with the tendency of existence in general1 would really involve a confusion of the two different meanings of end4 ,the end or termination of all things may be equilibrium1 motionlessness1 or dissolution1 but this is no reason why the end or aim of conduct should be a similar equilibrium4 ,indeed1 to say that we ought to promote the end of evolution1 and that this end is annihilation1 is inconsistent with the postulate always implied by the ethics of evolution--the postulate that conduct should promote evolution because life is desirable1#bbj and increase of life comes with the progress of evolution4 ,nor is it of any assistance to reply to this by saying that the dissolution in which evolution ends may be only the prelude to another process of evolution in which life will gradually progress till it again reaches equilibrium4 ,for1 in the first place1 this is only a problematical suggestion--is not1 to speak in ,mr ,spencer's language1 demonstrable priori by deduction from the persistence of force1 as the tendency of present evolution to equilibrium is held to be2 and secondly1 the new process1 if it were to come about1 would have to begin again the slow ascent from the lowest rung of the ladder of existence3 so that1 in aiding evolution towards the goal of equilibrium1 we should be only guiding it to the old starting-point which has now1 after many a painful struggle1 been left far behind4 99 99 99 99 99 ,sidenote3 7c7 ,insufficiency of adaptation as evolutionist end3 ,sidenote3 tendency to variation in all organisms1 ,but further1 it would seem that the theory of evolution itself is not fairly represented by a view which emphasises the fact of adaptation to environment to the exclusion of that of variation4 ,the latter is as necessary to progressive development as the former4 ,adaptation to environment might seem to be most nearly complete when organism and environment were both so simple as to be hardly separate4 ,the polype1 which is scarcely different from the sea-water it inhabits1 might seem by correspondence with its medium to be near the maximum of adaptation1 though at the very beginning of life4 ,it may be solely because the environment is subject to numerous changes that the organism of simple structure cannot maintain life4 ,but it is only through its own inherent power of variation that progress in organic life is possible4 ,perfect correspondence with the environment was not reached by simple organisms1 not only on account of the want of uniformity in their surroundings1 but also because there is in every organism a tendency to variation through which the modifications are produced which natural selection takes hold of4 ,did organisms not tend to vary in function and structure1 no progressive modification would be possible4 ,those fittest to live would be selected once for all1 and all but those adapted to the environment weeded out4 ,it is not necessary for our present purpose to have any definite theory of the obscure laws by which this variability is governed4#bba ,it is enough that natural selection requires the striking out of new modifications as well as the transmission of those already produced4#bbb ,it may be the fact that variation is1 in the last resort1 due to changes in surrounding circumstances1 to the unequal incidence of external forces upon a finite aggregate4#bbc ,but1 with living bodies as now constituted1 it has1 at any rate as proximate cause1 a twofold source4 ,it may be due to the direct effect of external forces1 or it may be caused by the energy stored up in the organism in growth4#bbd ,sidenote3 consciously directed in man4 ,in man the outgo of this force is conscious2 and1 by means of his conscious or intelligent volition1 governed by interests of various kinds1 he can anticipate and modify the action of natural selection4 ,the law that the fittest organism survives may perhaps work in man as in the lower animals1 if only we give a wide enough meaning to fittest1 so as to admit even of the weak being made fit through the sympathy and help of the strong4 ,natural selection becomes dependent upon variations of a kind different from those in the merely animal world1 so that its practical effect may be in some cases apparently reversed4 ,we thus see how it is that even ,darwin holds that in moralised societies natural selection apparently effects but little1#bbe at the same time that we may not be inclined to deny the truth of ,schffle's contention#bbf that1 although circumstances differ1 the law of action remains the same4 ,schffle points out how1 as we rise in the scale of life1 especially as it is manifested in human society1 the organisation becomes more delicate1 and other than merely natural facts have to be taken account of1 so that the fittest to live in the new social and intellectual environment is no longer the man of greatest physical strength and skill4 ,the theory of natural selection as applied to the ordinary spheres of plant and animal life1 may perhaps1 for some purposes1 neglect consideration of the fact that it presupposes a tendency to variation in the organisms whose growth it describes4 ,but1 when the variation in the behaviour of the organism becomes conscious and designed1 there is thereby produced a preliminary indication or determination of the lines on which natural selection is to work4 ,and1 before the theory of evolution can give a full account of the ethical in man1 it must distinguish consciously-determined from merely natural action1 and give an analysis of what is implied in the former4 ,we must bear in mind that it may be the case that the ground and possibility of progress and of the efficiency of ideal ends in human conduct--which adaptation to environment has been unable logically to explain or leave room for--are to be found in this differentiating fact of conscious activity4 ,but we must first of all see whether1 from the empirical characteristics of variation1 we can extract an ethical end or any guide for conduct4 99 99 99 99 99 ,sidenote3 #b4 ,end suggested by this tendency to variation ,sidenote3 7a7 prescribes self-development rather than self-preservation1 #b4 ,the lower animals1 says a writer on biology1 are just as well organised for the purposes of their life as the higher are for theirs4 ,the tape-worm is relatively quite as perfect as the man1 and distinguished from him by many superior capabilities4#bbg ,it is incorrect to look upon the evolution of animal life as working upon one line1 so that the different kinds of living beings can be arranged1 as it were1 in an order of merit1 in which the organisation of the higher animal plainly excels that of the lower4 ,the conditions of life are manifold and various enough to permit of the existence of many species equally perfect in relation to their environments4 ,the fact that we are still able to speak of one species or one animal as higher than another1 is not owing to the one being better adapted to its environment than the other1 but is supposed rather to be due to the higher forms having their organs more distinctly specialised for different functions4#bbh ,even ,mr ,spencer1 for whom equilibrium is the goal of life1 implicitly admits that adaptation alone is not the end of human action1 by his doctrine that the degree of evolution may be measured by the complexity of the adjustments it effects between organism and environment4 ,the end1 therefore1 it may be said1 is no longer the mere self-preservation found in adaptation to environment1 but the self-development which implies temporary disharmony between organism and surroundings4 ,for self-preservation and self-development1 though frequently spoken of as identical1 are really distinct and often opposed notions--the former denoting a tendency to persist in one's present state of being1 while the latter implies more or less change4 ,it may be held1 however1 that for an organism such as man to persist in his state of being1 implies modification of his faculties1 and that this modification involves development4 ,for any organism to exist apart from change is1 of course1 impossible4 ,life is only known to us as a series of changes4 ,but that change does not necessarily mean development or change to a higher condition4 ,degradation is as well known a fact as development2 and between the two1 there is room for a state of existence of which it is difficult to say whether it improves or deteriorates4 ,and whatever may be intended by the phrase1 self-preservation points to a state of this kind rather than to an improving condition4 ,the notion of self-development has therefore a richer content than that of self-preservation2 but just on this account it cannot be explained by a reference to the nature of things as they are4 ,sidenote3 thus taking account of variability ,it is true that self-development can only go on by a continuous process of adjustment2 but it is also necessary for it that this tendency to adaptation should be continually hindered from becoming complete or lapsing into equilibrium4 ,it is here that the function of variation comes in4 ,on the one side there is this tendency to vary after a fashion often without any apparent regard to external conditions2 on the other side1 there is the action of the external conditions selecting and favouring those variations which bring the organism into closer correspondence with them4 ,the wide range over which the theory of natural selection applies is due to the fact that the environment is never uniform and never constant1 so that modifications on the part of the organism have a chance of suiting its varied and changing character4 ,its changes1 moreover1 are often the result not so much of any absolute alteration in external circumstances1 as of a new relation between them and living beings having been brought about4 ,for the enormous reproductive faculty of most organisms makes them multiply so rapidly as to press ever more and more closely against the limit of subsistence1 and thus to produce competition for the means of living4 ,hence the fresh lines of development originated by each organism have to be tested by their correspondence with a constantly changing medium4 ,the altered circumstances give the modifications which organisms are for ever striking out an opportunity of perpetuating themselves4 ,sidenote3 which complicates the tendency to correspondence with environment1 ,by each new variation the existing relation between organism and environment is disturbed4 ,the variation may1 however1 prove its utility at once by a more exact correspondence than before with the requirements of external conditions4 ,but1 in what are called the higher grades of life1 variations from the type are sometimes not immediately useful1 although they may ultimately become most advantageous4#bbi ,were it not for the remarkable power of persistence possessed by the higher animals1 the modified organism would be unable to hold its own4 ,the great majority of such eccentric or extraordinary variations do1 as a matter of fact1 soon disappear1 because unable to prove their utility4 ,but others of them1 either by the power they give the organism to mould circumstances to itself1 or by their appropriateness to the greater complexity which comes with the increased number of living organisms1 and the more delicate readjustment it requires1 prove themselves to be fitter to live than if no variation had taken place and the preceding state of relative equilibrium had been maintained4 ,the higher adjustment of life to its surroundings1 which marks each stage of advancing evolution1 had its beginning in the rupture of the original simpler harmony that previously existed4 ,sidenote3 especially in human conduct4 ,if we compare human conduct with that of animals lower in the organic scale1 it becomes evident that there is a broad difference between the two in this1 that actions in the former are purposed1 performed with a definite end in view2 whereas1 in the latter1 they seem to be the blind result of impulse1 and there are slight1 if any1 traces of purpose4 ,in activity of the latter kind1 natural selection works in the ordinary way by choosing for survival the animals which behave so as best to suit their environment4 ,but actions done with a view to an end may anticipate the verdict of this natural law4 ,the agent may see that conduct of a particular kind would conduce to the promotion of life1 while conduct of a different kind would render him less fit to live2 and1 as a consequence1 the former action may be chosen4 ,in this way development may be anticipated1 and the present order of affairs may be disturbed1 more or less forcibly1 in order to bring about a foreseen better state of things4 ,we are thus able to see more clearly how it is that the theory of evolution may be thought to give rise to two different ethical ends4 ,the first of these is the theory already criticised1 adaptation to environment1 which corresponds to the notion of self-preservation4 ,but this end1 as we have seen1 only takes one side of the theory of evolution into consideration--neglects the tendency to variation which evolution postulates1 and which1 in the higher organisms1 becomes purposed4 ,the other end which seems to be suggested by the theory of evolution takes account of this tendency to variation1 and may be said to correspond to the notion of self-development2 but this end it is harder to define4 ,adaptation we can easily understand by a reference to the environment to which life is to be adapted4 ,this involves a knowledge of the conditions of the environment1 but nothing more4 ,development can be measured by no such standard4 ,on the one hand it implies an independent1 or relatively independent1 tendency to variation4 ,on the other hand1 however1 it is necessary that the disharmony with environment1 in which this tendency to variation may begin1 should not be excessive and should not be permanent2 for without a certain amount of adaptation to environment no organism can live4 ,the extent of initial disharmony which is possible1 or is useful1 varies according to the versatility of the faculties of each individual organism1 and to its place in the scale of being2 but throughout all existence it is true that want of adaptation beyond a certain varying degree is fatal3 a mode of action entirely alien to the prevailing modes of action1 cannot be successfully persisted in--must eventuate in death of self1 or posterity1 or both4#bcj ,sidenote3 7b7 ,standard for measuring development ,by what standard1 then1 can we measure development8 ,we have already seen1 from the formula1 as it is called1 or definition1 of evolution1 that it implies an advance to a state of increased coherence1 definiteness1 and heterogeneity1 by the double process of differentiation of parts1 and integration of these parts into a whole by the formation of definite relations to one another4 ,the notions of coherence amongst parts and of increased definiteness of function and structure are easily understood4 ,but the heterogeneity postulated is a more complex notion1--has1 in the first place1 a double reference1 is at the same time a differentiation of the parts from each other and a differentiation of the consolidated whole from the environment2#bca and secondly1 is manifested in living beings in increased complexity of every kind--of structure1 form1 chemical composition1 specific gravity1 temperature1 and self-mobility4#bcb ,can we then apply this at once to ethics1 and say that the most developed--that is1 the most moral--conduct is that which is most definite1 coherent1 and heterogeneous8 ,this doctrine has at least the merit of not leaving out of sight so fundamental a characteristic of evolution as the tendency to variation2 and1 without being consistently held to1 it is the burden of much of ,mr ,spencer's ',data of ,ethics1' where it is illustrated and defended with great ingenuity4 ,sidenote3 found in degree of complexity of act and motive4 ,that moral conduct is distinguished by definiteness and coherence--that it works towards a determinate end1 and that its various actions are in agreement with one another and parts of a whole--may be admitted4 ,but this is at most a merely formal description of what is meant by morality in conduct4 ,to say that conduct must be a coherent whole1 and must seek a determinate end by appropriate means1 leaves unsettled the question as to what this end should be1 or what means are best fitted to attain it4 ,but1 when we go on to say that as conduct is more varied in act1#bcc more heterogeneous in motive1#bcd it is higher in the moral scale1 we seem to have got hold of something which may be a guide for determining the ethical end4 ,the mark of what is higher in evolution1 and consequently in morality1 will be greater heterogeneity or complexity4#bce ,sidenote3 ,difficulties of the theory3 ,this conclusion follows from an attempt not merely to treat moral phenomena as phenomena of evolution1 but also to find the ultimate interpretations of ethics only in those fundamental truths which are common to all the sciences1 physical1 biological1 psychological1 sociological4#bcf ,now the fundamental truths which these sciences have in common are those only which are most abstract4 ,but as we pass from mere relations between matter and motion to life1 and from life to self-consciousness1 we have something different from these fundamental truths with the addition of certain others not fundamental3 we find that things are not merely more complex2 but are changed in aspect and nature4 ,even though it be true that the new phenomena may still admit of analysis into the old simpler terms1 and that life1 mind1 and society may be interpreted as redistributions of matter and motion1#bcg it must yet at least be admitted that the change passed through is one similar to those which ,mill compared to chemical composition3 the new compound differs fundamentally in mode of action from the elements out of which it was formed4 ,now1 in saying that the most complex adjustments of acts to ends are the highest kinds of conduct1 and that we should be guided by the more complex in preference to simpler motives1 this obvious difficulty is passed over4 ,it is true that ,mr ,spencer1 in chapters rich in suggestion1 and filled with skilfully chosen illustrations1 has passed in review the various aspects of conduct according as we look at it from the point of view of the physical environment1 of life1 of mind1 or of society4 ,but when these different aspects are brought together and compared1 it becomes clear that the attempt to judge conduct by reference to the fundamental truth that evolution implies an advance towards greater complexity1 must necessarily end in failure4#bch ,sidenote3 77 antinomy produced by it between the social and individual ends2 ,in the first place1 there is a notable discrepancy between the biological and the sociological aspect4 ,for the complete development of the individual life implies that every function should be fulfilled1 and that its fulfilment should interfere with the performance of no other function4 ,the performance of every function is1 in a sense1 a moral obligation4 ,the ideally moral man 444 is one in whom the functions of all kinds are duly fulfilled1--that is to say1 discharged in degrees duly adjusted to the conditions of existence4#bci ,a fully evolved life is marked by multiplicity and complexity of function4 ,and1 if from the individual we pass to the social organism1 we find that the same truth holds4 ,the state1 or organised body of individuals1 has many functions to perform2 but it can only perform them in the most efficient way through the functions of its individual members being specialised4 ,from the social point of view1 therefore1 the greatest possible division of labour is a mark of the most evolved and perfect community4 ,and this division of labour implies that each individual1 instead of performing every function of which he is capable1 should be made to restrict himself to that at which he is best1 so that the community may be the gainer from the time and exertion that are saved1 and the skill that is produced1 by the most economic expenditure of individual talent4 ,thus social perfection appears to imply a condition of things inconsistent with that development of one's whole nature which1 from the biological point of view1 has just been defined as a characteristic of the ideally moral man4 ,it seems1 indeed1 inevitable that any such abstract preliminary notion of development as that which would test it by increase of complexity must fail in such a case as this where there is no question between the competing claims of two phenomena on the same level1 but where harmony is wanted between the different aspects the same phenomena present when looked at from the point of view of the individual and from the point of view of the whole4 ,sidenote3 77 its psychological aspect ,sidenote3 confounds complexity of structure with indirectness of origin1 ,there is still greater difficulty in applying this criterion1 when we come to the psychological aspect of morality--the aspect most prominent in modern philosophy from the revival of independent ethical speculation till the time of ,kant4 ,according to ,mr ,spencer1 the acts characterised by the more complex motives and the more involved thoughts1 have all along been of higher authority for guidance4#bdj ,but the later or more advanced in mental evolution is not always more complex in structure2 for it is a characteristic of mental development that the processes by which a result has been arrived at gradually disappear on account of the diminished attention they receive1 so that there remains what is1 so far as psychical structure is concerned1 a simple mental state4 ,complexity of structure and indirectness of origin are thus really two different characteristics of states of mind1 which frequently go together1 but frequently part company4#bda ,when ,mr ,spencer1 accordingly1 goes on to say#bdb that for the better preservation of life the primitive simple presentative feelings must be controlled by the later-evolved compound and representative feelings1 he is really passing to a different standard without giving up the former4 ,the sympathy with injured ,zulus or ,afghans which would be approved by ,mr ,spencer#bdc may be a more indirect1 representative1 or re-representative feeling1 than the sentiments which led to ,british invasion1 and1 as such1 may be more to be commended4 ,but it would be rash to say that sympathy with the ,british interests supposed to be at stake--interests of commerce1 and of the balance of political power1 as well as those arising from the subtle effect of national prestige--is less complex than the feeling of sympathy with a people dispossessed of its territory4 ,the latter feeling may be more indirect or representative1 as implying an imaginative appropriation of the circumstances of another community2 but1 so far as structure is concerned1 it is composed of far fewer and simpler component elements than the feeling for ,british interests4 ,sidenote3 neither of which can serve as an ethical standard4 ,nor1 on the other hand1 can we allow ourselves to take refuge in the conclusion that1 if the more complex emotion cannot be held to be better morally1 then that which is later in evolution may at least be regarded as of higher authority than the earlier evolved feeling4 ,according to ,mr ,spencer1 the man who obtains by fraud the money to support his family is to be condemned1 because1 although we admit the claim his family have upon him1 we regard as of superior authority the feelings which respond to men's proprietary claims--feelings which are re-representative in a higher degree and refer to more remote diffused consequences4#bdd ,but were this the ground of distinction1 we ought also to regard the feelings prompting a man to distribute his fortune in any foolish enterprise as of superior authority to those which prompt him to support his family1 if only the former are re-representative in a higher degree1 and their consequences more remote and diffused4 ,many of the greatest evils which infect social life and warp the moral feelings of men1 are evils which are only possible as the result of a highly advanced civilisation and a refined and delicate organisation of the mind4 ,the factitious sentiments raised by a subtle casuistry with the effect of confusing the ordinary distinctions of right and wrong are1 in almost all cases1 more indirect and re-representative than the feelings in harmony with the moral consciousness of the community which they set aside in the individual conscience4 ,so obvious1 indeed1 are objections of this kind--objections1 that is to say1 taken from the impossibility of so applying the criterion as to construct a workable system of morals--that ,mr ,spencer virtually relinquishes his own theory1 talking of it as true only on the average1#bde and even allowing that it is in some cases suicidal4#bdf ,as it cannot be held that the more complex in evolution is of greater authority than the less complex1 nor that the later in evolution has such authority over the earlier1 we must admit that the so-called fundamental characteristics of evolution1 which find a place in its definition or formula1 are unable to determine its value in an ethical regard4 ,the richness of life1 physical1 intellectual1 and social1 has indeed been produced only as the result of a long course of development1 and by the assimilation of many various elements into a complex organisation2 but its value cannot be measured either by the test of mechanical complexity1 or by the length of time it has taken to evolve4 ,we must therefore seek some other method of giving a meaning to evolution in the region of moral values2 and we find ,mr ,spencer himself really falling back in his discussion on the more general answer to our question1 that the end of evolution is life3 evolution becomes the highest possible when the conduct simultaneously achieves the greatest totality of life in self1 offspring1 and fellow-men4#bdg ,since it appears1 then1 that the characteristic of complexity or variety is as unsatisfactory a criterion of morality1 as the notion of adaptation to environment was found to be1 we must ask for some further interpretation of the notion of development or increase of life when regarded as the end of conduct4 99 99 99 99 99 ,sidenote3 #c4 ,further attempt to define development or increase of life as the end4 ,sidenote3 ,biological definition of life insufficient4 #c4 ,the ethics of evolution--in whatever form we have as yet found it--has always proceeded on the assumption that life is desirable1 and that it has a value which makes its pursuit and promotion a reasonable moral end4 ,how this fundamental ethical assumption#bdh is to be justified1 ,i do not at present inquire4 ,but the question must now be faced--,what is meant by life when we say that its increase or development is the moral end1 and speak of its greatest totality in a way that implies that it admits of quantitative measurement8 ,the biological definition of life is itself matter of dispute4 ,but1 even were such a definition as that proposed by ,mr ,spencer agreed to1 it would be insufficient to provide a standard for human conduct4 ,the very generality which may make it fit to stand as a definition1 or at least abstract description1 of life1 renders it at the same time incapable of serving as a criterion by which the various modes of the manifestation of life may be judged4 ,one point1 however1 generally emphasised by the theory of evolution1 may be admitted4 ,the life which human conduct ought to increase is not merely that of one individual man1 but the whole life of the community--self1 offspring1 and fellow-men--with which the individual life is bound up4 ,evolution has shown how the growth of the individual has been so dependent upon that of the whole body of society that it is impossible to separate their interests4 ,at the same time1 no complete identity has been brought about1 and it remains one of the greatest difficulties of any empirical theory to harmonise their competing claims4 ,for argument's sake1 however1 and to admit of the quality of the end being investigated apart from considerations as to the method of distribution1 the question may be discussed as if natural selection had produced complete solidarity between the life of the individual and that of the race4 ,what criterion have we1 then1 of the development of human nature or life8 ,the answer at once suggests itself that the higher evolution of life can be accurately measured by the amount of pleasure got by living beings4 ,but this view has been examined in the preceding chapter1 and found to be unsupported by sufficient evidence2 so that we are driven to seek for some non-hedonistic criterion that will give meaning to the phrase development or increase of life1 when prescribed as the ethical end4 ,sidenote3 ,health as the end either used to interpret pleasure1 ,nor is the matter made any clearer by saying that the health of society is the end we ought to promote4#bdi ,this has been put forward as an interpretation of the hedonistic principle1 which brings that principle into accord with the theory of evolution4 ,as such1 however1 it seems open to fatal objections4 ,given as an explanation of pleasure1 it falls back upon the notion of life2 for health can only be defined as that which conduces to continued and energetic life4 ,further than this1 there is a special difficulty in adopting health as the proximate end where pleasure is the ultimate end4 ,even if we could assert that health always leads to pleasure1 it is not evident that it is better known1 or more easily made the end1 than pleasure4 ,for of present pleasure we have a standard in our own consciousness from which there is no appeal4 ,and1 although the value of a series of pleasures is much harder to estimate1 there is also no slight difficulty in saying what will promote the efficiency or health of an organism4 ,besides1 the question arises whether health really corresponds with pleasure2 and this is1 in another form1 the question which has been already answered in the negative1--whether life can be measured by pleasure4 ,sidenote3 or falls back on the notion of life4 ,on the other hand1 if health is to be taken not as an explanation of or means to pleasure1 but as a substitute for the notion of life1 then we hardly get beyond our original terms4 ,health must be interpreted simply as that which leads to strong and continued life3 so that the only information to be got from the new term is that the life we are to promote must be vigorous and long2 and this was already implied in saying that it is the increase or development of life that is the end4 ,it will not do to identify the notion with the mere balance of physiological functions which1 in common language1 appropriates to itself the term health4 ,we must include the health of the soul as well as the health of the body1 and the health of society as well as the health of the soul4 ,the balance of mental and social1 as well as of physiological1 functions1 is implied in the complex life of whose evolution we form a part4 ,to say that we are to promote this balance of various functions1 is to say nothing more than that we are to promote the life into which physical and mental and social factors enter4 ,the attempt to arrive at an end for conduct1 by consideration of the characteristics of evolution1 has been made without success4 ,it has been found1 too1 that development or increase of life does not admit of translation into the language of hedonism3 and the question thus arises1 how we are to define this end1 which we are unable to interpret in terms of pleasure4 ,sidenote3 ,ways of determining increase of life or natural good1 ,what meaning can be given to the notion increase of life as the end of conduct1 without interpreting life in terms of pleasure8 ,can we1 the question may be put1 reach a natural good as distinct from sensible good or pleasure8 ,we must discard at the outset any such rational view of nature as gave colour to the ,stoic doctrine by identifying nature with the universal reason4 ,and we must equally avoid the doctrine that reason regulative of conduct is manifested in the constitution of man either in a distinct faculty1 such as conscience1 or in the due regulation of the various impulses4 ,trendelenburg's teleological conception of human nature1 for instance1 implies a rational element which could not be got from the causal sequence traced by evolution4#bej ,for he determines the essence of man by reference to the inner end of his constitution1 and postulates an organic unity of impulses which1 in the form of conscience1 protests against self-seeking action on the part of any single impulse4 ,but no other hierarchy of motives can be admitted here than that produced by the natural law of evolution2 and this law can only show how one impulse1 or class of impulses1 has become more authoritative1 by showing how it has become stronger or more persistent3 the other methods of evolving this authority on the basis of naturalism1 do so by means of the pleasurable or painful consequences of motives and actions4 ,sidenote3 either subjective or objective4 ,there are two ways in which1 on most or all ethical theories1 the attempt may be made to distinguish good from bad conduct4 ,we may either look to a subjective motive or impulse as giving the means of distinction1 or we may test conduct by its conformity with an objective standard4 ,if we like to make use of the terms self-preservation and self-development1 then these may refer either to the subjective impulse which urges man to preserve or develop his life1 or to some objective standard for estimating actions according as they actually tend to prolong life or enrich it4 ,both these possibilities are open to the theory of evolution4 ,although the subjective impulse is1 of course1 a property of the individual1 it may be the result of the whole course of social development1 and thus take in others as well as self in the range of its application4 ,it is therefore necessary to examine both methods of determination with some care1 especially as we are in no little danger of reaching an illusory appearance of conclusiveness by allowing the subjective standard to rest on the objective1 and the objective1 in turn1 on the subjective4 ,sidenote3 7a7 ,subjective standard3 most persistent impulses2 ,to begin with the subjective side4 ,it may be thought that we can point to some impulse1 tendency1 motive1 or class of motives in the individual mind by following which the evolution of life will be promoted1 and that we are thus able to solve the question of practical ethics1 though our conception of what the evolution of life connotes may still be in want of exact definition4 ,as already pointed out1 such an impulse 7unless it depends on an objective standard7 must carry its own authority with it by its strength or persistency4 ,the case would1 of course1 be perfectly simple1 if we could assert that the carrying out of all impulses in one's nature was to be approved as tending to the development of life4 ,could this assertion be made1 there might be no difficulty in ethics1 or rather1 there might be no ethics at all1 because there would be no difficulty in conduct4 ,it is obvious1 however1 that the development of one natural tendency often conflicts with that of another in the same individual1 as well as with the tendencies of other individuals4 ,the course of evolution has no doubt tended to modify1 though it has not rooted out1 the impulses which are most prejudicial to individual and social welfare4 ,but the increase of wants as well as satisfactions which it has brought about in human nature1 makes it doubtful whether it has on the whole tended to diminish the conflict of motives4 ,sidenote3 implies distinction between permanent and transient self2 ,again1 when it is said that a man should be himself1 or that this is his strongest tendency1#bea there is an implicit reference to a distinction between a permanent and a transient1 or a better and a worse self1 and it seems to be imagined that this distinction can be reduced to difference in degrees of strength4 ,but evolution has not enabled us to obviate ,butler's objection to taking the strongest tendency--meaning by this the tendency which is at any time strongest--as representing nature4 ,for it is an undeniable fact that the tendency which for a time is the strongest--it may even be that which is strongest throughout an individual life--frequently leads to a diminution of vital power on the part of the agent1 as well as to interference with the free exercise of the vital powers of others4 ,some advantage is gained1 perhaps1 by substituting for strongest the nearly equivalent phrase most persistent tendency4 ,all those impulses which have in the past served to promote life have been chosen out and stored up as a sort of permanent basis for the human fabric2 whereas other impulses1 not so advantageous in their effects1 have a less permanent influence1 though they are not less real4 ,the more regular or persistent class of impulses may1 therefore1 7the idea is7 be taken as representing the course of the evolution by which they have been produced4 ,sidenote3 but includes non-moral impulses in the former1 ,to a large extent this distinction of two classes of impulses is justified4 ,there seems no doubt that the social1 and what are usually termed moral1 feelings have a tendency to return into consciousness after any temporary depression or exclusion1 which is not shared by some of the feelings with which they most commonly conflict4 ,other impulses1 not usually classed as moral1 no doubt share this characteristic of persistency or recurrence4 ,the wish for another man's property1 says ,darwin1 is as persistent a desire as any that can be named4 ,the selfish feelings have obviously this persistent character4 ,but an evolutionist may perhaps maintain that it is one of the defects of ordinary moral opinion that it depreciates the necessity and value for life of the selfish feelings1 just because they are so strong as to stand in need of no encouragement4 ,and it is not necessary that the evolutionist morality should agree at all points with ordinary moral opinion or moral intuition4 ,it recognises1 or ought to recognise the agency of immoral as well as moral forces1 admitting that it is by the action of both of these that man as he is at present has been produced1 although the principle of the survival of the fittest has tended1 though by no means uniformly1 towards the elimination of the immoral factor4 ,we may admit1 therefore1 that there is a pressure on the will of the average individual towards certain kinds of conduct rather than others1 or1 put more precisely1 that while all acts are performed in consequence of pressure on the will1 the pressure towards certain kinds of acts is a permanent force which1 although overcome for the time1 always tends to reassert itself1 while the tendency towards other acts inconsistent with these is more intermittent and variable1 and does not reassert itself in the same way4 ,but this subjective experience is so limited in accuracy and extent as to be an unfit test of morality4 ,sidenote3 is restricted to previous habits of acting1 ,sidenote3 and cannot define nature of morality4 ,in the first place1 selfish conduct is as necessary for the preservation and development of man as altruistic conduct1 and must therefore have given rise to an equally great and persistent pressure on the will3 so that the subjective criterion of persistency leaves untouched what is often regarded as the most difficult question of morals1 the balance of social and individual claims4 ,in the second place1 this subjective tendency is only a recurrence of antecedent advantageous characteristics1 and does not lead us beyond the status quo1 so that1 if any progress is to be made in the future1 it will be only possible through the pressure of new external conditions3 no function is left for any ethical ideal which points beyond past and present habits of action4 ,in the third place1 subjective tendency only enables us to say generally that some acts or tendencies are more persistent than others1 without giving any further description of what sort of acts these are4 ,were these tendencies or impulses a perfect guide to conduct1 this defect would be of little practical consequence4 ,it would prevent our having a definite ethical theory only in circumstances in which no ethical theory would be likely to be asked for4 ,but the line between the more and less persistent motives is a narrow and shifting one4 ,the impulses which are the residua of advantageous ancestral actions are counteracted by other impulses1 residua of actions which would not be counted as moral1 though we inherit tendencies to them because they formed a real part of our ancestral activity4 ,we therefore stand in need of some characteristic by which to distinguish the one class of tendencies from the other4 ,and as the only subjective characteristic is that of strength or persistency1 and this has been found insufficient1 an objective standard is shown to be necessary4 ,sidenote3 ,thus subjective standard acknowledged to depend on ,the impossibility of the subjective test doing duty alone without support from some objective criterion1 is practically acknowledged by the writer who has discussed this part of the subject with greater penetration than any other investigator on the same lines4 ,the average man1 it is said1 feels the pressure upon his own individual will of all the unknown natural sequence of motive which caused his ancestors to do on the whole more often the right thing than the wrong#beb--or1 as we must read it without objective assumption1 to do on the whole more often one class of acts than another4 ,the right must be defined simply as that to which this special feeling in the subject is directed1 and it therefore becomes necessary to discover what descriptions of acts inspire this feeling4#bec ,thus1 with greater facility than would be permitted to a critic1 we are made to pass from the subjective to the objective method of determination4 ,sidenote3 7b7 ,objective standard3 ,the question1 ,what is right8 is thus relinquished for the question1 ,what is good8 ,good is said to be of three kinds--natural1 sensible1 and moral4 ,but as by sensible good is meant pleasure1#bed and pleasure is not the end1 and as by moral good is meant the pursuit of natural good under difficulties1#bee it follows that natural good is the end we seek4 ,we have thus to determine1 as exactly as may be1 this objective standard called natural good4 ,it is interpreted in two ways1 which1 however1 may be not necessarily inconsistent3 77 the perfection of the type as it is1 and 77 the absolute abundance and variety of vital power4#bef ,sidenote3 77 ,conformity to the type4 ,sidenote3 ,the type defined as what best serves its purpose ,this phrase1 the perfection of the type as it is1 is somewhat misleading4 ,when the perfection of the type is said to be the end1 we naturally regard the type as something that needs to be brought to perfection1 and ex hypothesi is not perfect at present1 or as it is4 ,but if the perfection of the type as it is is the standard1 this implies1 unless the standard itself is faulty1 that the type is already perfect1 and1 therefore1 that the perfection spoken of is the characteristic of a thing which conforms to the type1 and not something to which the type has to conform4 ,this interpretation is confirmed by the fact that imperfection is defined as only departure from the class type4#beg ,plainly1 then1 the objective standard meant is conformity to the type4 ,what1 then1 is the type8 ,concerning things made by art the answer is easy4 ,the type1 as ,mr ,stephen puts it1 represents the maximum of efficiency1#beh or1 as we may say1 is that which most fully realises the purpose for which the thing was formed4 ,the best bow is that which shoots truest and farthest with a relatively small expenditure of strength by the archer2 that which best realises the purpose of a bow is the typical bow4 ,a similar explanation of types may be given regarding animals modified by artificial selection4 ,the typical pointer or hunter can be defined from this teleological point of view2 and1 as long as people lived in the belief that all things were made for man1 it was natural to fix the type of each class by reference to the human purpose it could best subserve4 ,so also1 as long as people think that1 whether all things were made for man or not1 all things may be made use of by him1 there will be a tendency towards the same anthropomorphic interpretation of types4 ,if1 then1 the typical products of art1 and1 to a large extent1 the typical products of nature1 are those which best serve human purposes1 or best correspond with human ideals1 how shall we define the typical man himself--the type which it is our perfection to conform to8 ,every reasoning agent1 it may perhaps be allowed1#bei represents a certain type2 but the type can no longer be defined merely as maximum of efficiency1 for it is the end or purpose of this efficiency which now requires determination4 ,in defining the typical man1 we must have no idea of final cause or purpose which is not rooted in the nature of his organism4 ,how1 then1 shall we now determine the type in conformity to which perfection consists8#bfj ,sidenote3 or as the normal1 ,sidenote3 or as what has strongest vitality or aids development1 that is1 ,the first answer to this seems to be1 that the type is what is normal1--what we have learned to regard as the normal development of objects belonging to the class4#bfa ,but the normal may have either of two meanings--it may1 in the first place1 mean the usual or customary4 ,this1 however1 would make the typical man mean the ordinary or average man2 and the ideal of conformity to the type would be reduced to doing the customary thing1 and not trying to be better than one's neighbours4 ,but it is evident that this stationary morality does not represent properly what is fundamental in the theory of evolution3 whatever other duties men may acknowledge1 they do not look upon it as a duty to preserve the species in statu quo4#bfb ,if natural science teaches one thing more clearly than another1 it is that the type1 like the individual1 is not permanent1 but the subject of gradual modifications4 ,if the type is what is normal1 we must mean by normal something else than customary4 ,but the only other meaning of the word seems to imply a reference to a rule--either a rule imposed from without1 or an inner constitution or order4 ,if the former alternative is adopted1 then we may use another definition of ,mr ,stephen's1 and say that the typical organism is 444 that organism which is best fitted for all the conditions of life1 or1 in other words1 which has the strongest vitality2#bfc and thus have to fall back either on the notion of adaptation to environment1 or on that of strongest vitality--the notion we are seeking to interpret4 ,if the other meaning1 which the reference to a rule may convey1 be adopted1 then we are met by the fact that the inner order or constitution which is to be our guide1 can 7from our present empirical point of view7 mean nothing different from the line of development4 ,and as we have already seen that it is unsatisfactory to interpret this as equivalent to adaptation to environment1 or to increase of definiteness1 coherence1 and heterogeneity1 this principle of conformity to the type is reduced to the general principle which we have been attempting to define more exactly--increase of life4 ,sidenote3 77 ,abundance and variety of vital power1 ,sidenote3 which falls back on the subjective standard4 ,thus the first determination of natural good as perfection of the type is seen to reduce itself to the second1 absolute abundance and variety of vital power4 ,for the additional statement1 which makes the highest excellence consist in conformity to the type as it is going to be1 but as1 except in a few chosen specimens1 it is not yet discernible to be1#bfd is unsatisfactory4 ,for to those few chosen specimens the end would seem to be simply to remain as they are--a conclusion which is hardly consistent for a writer who regards morality as a continual progress towards a higher life1 a process of climbing4#bfe ,and1 for the generality of men1 there must be some standard for determining what is going to be1 and for certifying that the few chosen specimens have realised this state in its perfect form4 ,thus conformity to the type as it is going to be1 equally with perfection of conformity to the type as it is1 seems to be but another way of saying abundance and variety of vital power1 or1 more fully stated1 the possession of abundant faculties1 active and passive1 fully developed1 and in regular and equal exercise4#bff ,the question thus comes to be how we are to determine this abundance of faculties4 ,we cannot do so by reference to such characteristics as increase in the number and complexity of these faculties2 for a criterion of this kind1 as we have seen1 is of no assistance in deciding the most fundamental ethical questions4 ,to say that these faculties must be regular and equal in their exercise1 is to give a merely formal canon4 ,for how the equality and regularity are to be brought about1--which faculties are to be supreme and which subordinate--what meaning equality can have in view of the admitted diversity in a man's nature1--are questions left altogether undetermined4 ,and to describe the ideal or perfect universe as one in which there is no conflict or collision1#bfg is to give a description which is negative as well as merely formal4 ,we are thus obliged to fall back on a subjective criterion1 and say that the abundant life which it is the end of conduct to promote is a man's strongest tendencies1 or the greatest number of these4 ,natural good is determined by preferring out of all the rudimentary possibilities existing in nature1 the combination that harmonises the greatest number of the strongest tendencies4#bfh ,we set out1 be it remembered1 to obtain a characterisation of those acts to which the most persistent tendencies of human nature lead us2 and the conclusion we have arrived at is1 that they are the acts which harmonise the greatest number of the strongest tendencies4 ,the objective standard is thus reduced to the subjective standard1 which it was brought in to explain and support4 ,sidenote3 ,strongest tendencies the result of past activities1 ,now these strongest tendencies1 in the harmonious play of which natural good or perfection is said to consist1 are themselves the result of the courses of conduct which have been most vigorous and successful in ancestral organisms1 and they may therefore1 perhaps1 be taken as a survival and index of the antecedent state of human nature4 ,the realisation--or1 rather1 continuation--of human nature as it has been and is1 seems thus to be the ideal which empirical evolution is able to set before conduct1--with this formal modification1 that1 while the various impulses are1 so far as possible1 to have free play given them1 they should be developed in a harmonious manner4 ,it seems doubtful how far this tendency towards harmony is properly suggested by1 or consistent with1 evolution1 which has implied a ceaseless struggle of opposing forces4 ,at any rate1 evolution does not seem competent to give any principle of relative subordination between the various impulses1 such as might add reality to the formal principle of harmony4 ,but what it is essential to lay stress on here is1 that the only end which empirical evolution seems able to establish is conformity to human nature as it is--the tendencies in it which are strongest and most persistent4 ,sidenote3 and thus give no ideal for progress4 ,we thus see that the attempt to explain on empirical grounds what is meant by positing life1 or increase and variety of life1 as the end of action1 is practically reduced to making the most persistent impulses of human nature the guide of conduct4 ,but these impulses1 it has been shown1 are only the survival or remnant of past stages in the course of development1 not anticipations of future stages3 so that evolution is in this way incapable of giving an ideal of progress as the end for conduct1 and the last word it seems able to give us as a guide for action is that we should tread in the places where the footprints of ancestral conduct have left the deepest impress4 ,the ideal of such a system is summed up in the new ,beatitude1 ,blessed is he that continueth where he is4 ,it is probably just because the empirical aspect of evolution seems so little able to yield an end for human conduct corresponding to the actual course of evolution--which has been progress--that no thorough attempt has been made to develop a system of morals from the principle just reached4 ,it is true that systems have been worked out by moralists who have taken human nature as their standard1 and that ,trendelenburg1 at any rate1 expressly includes historical development in his conception of man4 ,but both ,trendelenburg and a moralist like ,butler 7who has as yet no conception of the gradual modifications of human character and tendencies produced by evolution7 have a view of human nature essentially distinct from that which has been called the naturalistic view4#bfi ,for both assume a definite rational organisation of impulses similar to that taught in ,plato's analogy between the individual man and a political constitution1 so that the whole nature1 or human nature as a whole1 cannot be identified with the impulses which strength at any time makes most persistent1 but depends upon the rational allotment of function and measure to each4 99 99 99 99 99 ,sidenote3 ,summary4 ,sidenote3 ,difficulty of reconciling individual and social ends4 ,in summing up the argument of the preceding chapters1 it is necessary to refer again to the discussion carried on in chapter vi4 on the relation between egoism and altruism as affected by the theory of evolution4 ,this discussion was not inserted in order to throw an additional obstacle in the way of obtaining an ethical end from the empirical theory of evolution4 ,it is an integral part of an attempt to estimate the ethical value of the evolution-theory4 ,the antinomy between the individual and social standpoints cannot be solved by a theory of morality which does not recognise that the individual1 in his rational nature1 is not opposed to other individuals1 but in reality one with them4 ,the theory of evolution certainly seems to go a long way towards establishing the unity of the individual with the race1 and in substituting an organic connection between them1 in place of the almost contingent reciprocal relations spoken of in earlier empirical theories4 ,but when we come to inquire into this unity of organic connection1 attempting still to keep to the purely empirical point of view1 we find that the old difficulties return1 that it must be recognised that the connection is empirically incomplete1 and that it gives way at the very places where a firm basis for the theory of morals is required4 ,it was in this way that1 quite apart from this opposition between the individual and the whole1 the empirical character of the theory prevented our getting from it any clear and consistent notion of the ethical end it leads to4 ,sidenote3 ,hedonistic interpretation of evolution not possible4 ,it appeared at first that the ethics of evolution1 when interpreted empirically1 might be easily reconciled with the older theory of hedonism1 by identifying life with pleasure--holding that the highest or most evolved life is that which contains most pleasure1 and that increase of pleasure is therefore the end of conduct4 ,in this way the end of evolutionism would be reduced to the end of utilitarianism4 ,some utilitarians1 on the other hand1 sought to get rid of the difficulties of their calculus1 by the assumption that the greatest pleasure would be found by following the direction of evolution4 ,but1 around both points of view1 and the correspondence they assumed to exist between pleasure and evolution1 special difficulties were seen to gather4 ,any hedonistic theory might be met by the assertion that life is essentially a painful experience1 and pleasure unattainable2 and although the grounds on which this assertion was made seemed to be distinctly erroneous1 and hedonism did not appear to be an impossible theory of conduct1 yet a similar objection told with greater force against the combination of evolutionism and hedonism4 ,for it holds the double position that the end is to promote life1 and that life is to be promoted by adding to pleasure2 or else1 that the end is pleasure1 but that pleasure is to be got by following evolution4 ,it postulates1 therefore1 that the progress of life tends1 and tends even in a proportionate degree1 to the increase of pleasure4 ,yet we could obtain no proof that this progress does1 as a matter of fact1 increase pleasure in any regular way4 ,on the contrary1 the facts of experience seemed to show that life and pleasure do not advance proportionately1 nor even always concomitantly4 ,but a still more important and fundamental objection to the hedonistic form of evolutionism was deduced from the nature of pleasure itself2 for it can be modified indefinitely1 and always follows in the wake of function4 ,thus the sole intelligible account we can give of what conduct will bring the greatest pleasure is1 that it is the conduct which calls forth the greatest amount of successful energising1 that which employs the greatest number and the strongest of the human faculties4 ,hence1 instead of being able to measure life by pleasure1 we were driven to interpret pleasure in terms of life4 ,sidenote3 ,no independent ethical ideal afforded by the theory of evolution4 ,and perhaps at first sight it seemed that the theory of evolution could lead us beyond the pleasure-basis of older ,naturalism4 ,but1 when the matter was examined more closely1 without departing from the empirical point of view1 it was found that the notions put forward were unsatisfactory1 that they did not represent the progressive nature of the course of evolution1 and that their apparent force fell away before logical analysis4 ,it became evident1 in the first place1 that no appropriate end of human conduct could be derived from the nature of evolution in general4 ,it is true that adaptation to environment is necessary for life2 but to put forward such adaptation as the end for action1 is to set up a practical goal which corresponds but ill with the facts from which it professes to be taken1 making the theory which is supposed to account for progress establish no end by pursuit of which progress becomes possible for human action4 ,further than this1 it neglects a factor in evolution as necessary to it as is adaptation to environment--the element1 namely1 of variation4 ,a theory which took the latter as well as the former of these factors into account seemed1 in the next place1 to be given by those general characteristics which are said to mark all progress--increase of definiteness1 coherence1 and heterogeneity4 ,but from these1 again1 it was found impossible to elicit a coherent and consistent rule for determining right and wrong in conduct1 or a definite end for action3 they were too abstract and mechanical to suit the living organism of human conduct2 and we were thus driven back on the more general statement that life or the increase of life is the end after which we should strive4 ,in inquiring into the meaning which could be given to this end1 without interpreting it as pleasure1 it was found1 after tracing it through various forms of expression1 that it reduced itself to making a man's strongest and most persistent impulses both standard and end4 ,and this proved to be not only an uncertain and shifting guide for conduct1 but an imperfect representation of what was to be expected from a progressive1 because evolutionist1 ethics4 ,for these persistent impulses could only be regarded as the survival of past activities1 and consequently1 contained no ideal beyond that of continuing in the old paths1 and re-treading an already well-beaten course4 ,just as from the external end of adaptation to environment1 so from this internal or subjective principle1 no ideal for progress1 nor any definite end of action1 could be obtained4 ,it would appear1 therefore1 that the theory of evolution--however great its achievements in the realm of natural science--is almost resultless in ethics4 ,it only remains now to inquire whether this want of competency to determine practical ends may not be due to the superficiality of the ordinary empirical interpretation of evolution1 which has hitherto been adhered to4 ,,footnotes3 #aia ,taking evolution in its widest sense1 since the theory of evolution does not imply some intrinsic proclivity in every species towards a higher form4--,spencer1 ,first ,principles1 ,app4 p4 #egd2 ,principles of ,sociology1 i4 #ajf4 #aib ,spencer1 ,principles of ,biology1 i4 #gc4 #aic ,ibid41 i4 #hb4 #aid ,reden 7#ahgf71 ii4 #ccb4 #aie ,social ,statics 7#ahej71 p4 #gg4 #aif ,data of ,ethics1 p4 #be4 #aig ,data of ,ethics1 p4 #af4 #aih ,ibid41 p4 #ga4 #aii ,see above1 chap4 vi4 p4 #acg ff4 #bjj ,zeller1 ,phil4 d4 ,griechen1 #c;d ed41 ,,iii4 i4 #ded1 #dgj4 #bja ,lassalle's tirade against the verdammte ,bedrfnisslosigkeit of the ,german workman is a case in point4 #bjb ,lange1 ,gesch4 d4 ,materialismus1 #b;d ed41 ii4 #deh4 #bjc ,spencer1 ,first ,principles1 p4 #dij4 #bjd ,an aspect of ,mr ,spencer's ethical theory which will be considered in the sequel3 p4 #bbh ff4 #bje ,cf4 ,a4 ,barratt1 ,physical ,ethics1 p4 #bid1 where morality is placed in reasonable obedience to the physical laws of nature4 #bjf ,data of ,ethics1 p4 #adh4 #bjg ,social ,statics1 quoted in ,data of ,ethics1 p4 #bga4 #bjh ,data of ,ethics1 p4 #bgi4 #bji ,ibid41 p4 #bge4 #baj ,data of ,ethics1 p4 #g4 #baa ,ibid41 p4 #bha4 #bab ,these are examined by ,mr ,f4 ,w4 ,maitland1 in an incisive criticism of ,mr ,h4 ,spencer's ,theory of ,society1 ,mind1 viii4 #ced ff41 #ejf ff4 #bac ,data of ,ethics1 p4 #bhb4 #bad ,ibid41 p4 #bhc4 #bae ,first ,principles1 p4 #eag4 #baf ,spencer1 ,psychology1 #bab1 i4 #dgh4 #bag ,first ,principles1 p4 #dhi4 #bah ,a complete equilibrium of the aggregate is without life1 and a moving equilibrium of the aggregate is living4--,principles of ,sociology1 i4 #ajf4 #bai ,data of ,ethics1 p4 #bed4 #bbj ,spencer1 ,data of ,ethics1 p4 #bf4 #bba ,darwin1 ,origin of ,species 7#ahei71 pp4 #dc1 #aca1 #dff4 #bbb ,spencer1 ,biology1 i4 #beg4 #bbc ,first ,principles1 p4 #djd f4 #bbd ,cf4 ,clifford1 ,lectures and ,essays1 i4 #aja4 #bbe ,descent of ,man1 #b;d ed41 p4 #acg1 cf4 pp4 #aih1 #fah2 cf4 ,a4 ,r4 ,wallace1 ,contributions 7#ahgj71 p4 #ccj4 #bbf ,vierteljahrsschrift f4 wiss4 ,phil41 i4 7#ahgg71 #edc ff4 #bbg ,rolph1 ,biol4 ,probl41 p4 #cc4 #bbh ,darwin1 ,origin of ,species1 p4 #ccf4 #bbi ,thus ,darwin1 ,descent of ,man1 p4 #ea1 speaking of the advantage to man it must have been to become a biped1 says3 ,the hands and arms could hardly have become perfect enough to have manufactured weapons1 or to have hurled stones and spears with a true aim1 as long as they were habitually used for locomotion and for supporting the whole weight of the body2 or1 as before remarked1 as long as they were especially fitted for climbing trees4 ,the hands had to lose their dexterity for the latter purposes before they could acquire the more delicate adjustments necessary for skill in the former4 ,the transition was of course a gradual one2 but the initial variations required would seem to have been at first unfavourable to man's chances in the struggle for existence1 though it was through them that he rose to his place at the summit of the organic scale4 #bcj ,spencer1 ,data of ,ethics1 p4 #bhj4 #bca ,spencer1 ,biology1 i4 #adi4 #bcb ibid41 i4 #add4 #bcc ,spencer1 ,data of ,ethics1 p4 #ga3 ,briefly1 then1 if the conduct is the best possible on every occasion1 it follows that as the occasions are endlessly varied the acts will be endlessly varied to suit--the heterogeneity in the combination of motions will be extreme4 #bcd ,spencer1 ,data of ,ethics1 p4 #ajf3 ,the acts characterised by the more complex motives and the more involved thoughts1 have all along been of higher authority for guidance4 #bce ,cf4 ,clifford1 ,lectures and ,essays1 i4 #id f41 where a similar definition is given in answer to the question1 ,what is the meaning of better8 #bcf ,spencer1 ,data of ,ethics1 p4 #fc4 #bcg ,cf4 ,spencer1 ,first ,principles1 p4 #eff4 #bch ,so far as the following criticism may appear to apply to ,mr ,spencer1 and not merely to a possible way of defining moral conduct1 it is necessary to bear in mind the words of his preface to the ',data of ,ethics'3 ,with a view to clearness1 ,i have treated separately some correlative aspects of conduct1 drawing conclusions either of which becomes untrue if divorced from the other4 #bci ,spencer1 ,data of ,ethics1 p4 #ge f4 #bdj ,data of ,ethics1 p4 #ajf4 #bda ,although ,mr ,spencer holds that representativeness varies as definiteness1 and measures complexity1 including that complexity implied by increasing heterogeneity4--,principles of ,psychology1 ii4 #eaf f4 #bdb ,data of ,ethics1 p4 #aac4 #bdc ,cf4 ,principles of ,sociology1 ii4 #gbe4 #bdd ,data of ,ethics1 p4 #abc4 #bde ,data of ,ethics1 pp4 #ajg1 #abi4 #bdf ,ibid41 p4 #aaj4 #bdg ,data of ,ethics1 p4 #be2 cf4 ,lange1 ,ges4 d4 ,mat41 ii4 #bdg4 ,lange's statement is noteworthy3 ,die menschliche ,vernunft kennt kein anderes ,ideal1 als die mglichste ,erhaltung und ,vervollkommnung des ,lebens1 welches einmal begonnen hat1 verbunden mit der ,einschrnkung von ,geburt und ,tod4 #bdh ,the endeavour to further evolution1 especially that of the human race1 is put forward as a new duty by ,mr ,f4 ,galton1 ,inquiries into ,human ,faculty and its ,development 7#ahhc71 p4 #ccg4 #bdi ,darwin1 ,descent of ,man1 p4 #aba2 ,stephen1 ,science of ,ethics1 p4 #cff4 ,earlier than either of these writers1 ,dr ,hutchison ,stirling suggested ,health as a practical principle to be set against the anarchy of individualism4 ,but with him1 it is not an empirical generalisation of the tendency of evolution4 ,it is as the outward sign of freedom1 the realisation of the universal will1 that health may be set at once as sign and as goal of the harmonious operation of the whole system--as sign and as goal of a realisation of life4--,secret of ,hegel1 ii4 #eed4 #bej ,naturrecht auf dem ,grunde der ,ethik1 #b;d ed41 #ahfh4 #bea ,cf4 ,e4 ,simcox1 ,natural ,law1 p4 #ig4 #beb ,simcox1 ,natural ,law1 p4 #hf4 #bec ,ibid41 p4 #hg4 #bed ,ibid41 p4 #ij4 #bee ,ibid41 p4 #ii4 #bef ,simcox1 ,natural ,law1 p4 #ajd4 #beg ,ibid41 p4 #hg4 #beh ,science of ,ethics1 p4 #gf4 #bei ,science of ,ethics1 p4 #gd4 #bfj ,even were we to succeed in getting a satisfactory view of the type1 we should still have to leave room for the individuality of each person1 which is such that his function must differ in a manner corresponding to his peculiar nature and surroundings 7cf4 ,lotze1 ,grundzge der praktischen ,phil41 p4 #ac f47 #bfa ,simcox1 ,natural ,law1 p4 #hh4 #bfb ,ibid41 p4 #ajj4 #bfc ,science of ,ethics1 p4 #abj4 #bfd ,simcox1 ,natural ,law1 p4 #ajd4 #bfe ,ibid41 p4 #ajc4 #bff ,ibid41 p4 #hi2 cf4 ,j4 ,t4 ,punnet1 ,mind1 x4 #ia3 ,what the progress-principle makes its aim and end is not complexity1 but the highest and choicest fruits of complexity--the harmonious unfolding of all the latent capacities of man4 #bfg ,of real tendencies--,natural ,law1 p4 #ih4 ,but what tendencies are not real8 #bfh ,natural ,law1 p4 #ih4 #bfi ,cf4 ,trendelenburg1 ,naturrecht1 p4 #de3 ,von der philosophischen ,seite kann es kein anderes ,princip der ,ethik geben als das menschliche ,wesen an sich1 d4 h41 das menschliche ,wesen in der ,tiefe seiner ,idee und im ,reichthum seiner historischen ,entwickelung4 ,beides gehrt zusammen4 ,denn das nur ,historische wrde blind und das nur ,ideale leer4 ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,,on ,,the ,,basis ,,of ,,ethics4 ,the peculiarity of the conclusion we have reached is1 that the theory which is used to explain the nature of progress1 seems unable to give any canon or end for conduct which points out the way for progressive advance4 ,the view of human nature became unsatisfactory just at the critical point--when we attempted to get at a knowledge of its end or final cause1 which would give unity and purpose to action4 ,to say that the end is increase of life or function appeared a merely formal notion unless we defined life as pleasure1 while pleasure itself was found to be unintelligible except as performance of function4 ,this uncertainty seems to indicate a certain superficiality in the ordinary empirical way of looking at evolution4#bgj ,sidenote3 #a4 ,principles involved in the theory of evolution4 ,the principles involved in the theory of evolution are1 in brief1 as follows4 ,in the first place1 it shows that there is a tendency1 brought about by natural selection1 for organisms to harmonise with or become adapted to their environment--a tendency1 that is to say1 towards unity of organism and environment1 and1 in so far as external conditions are uniform1 towards a general unity of life4 ,in the second place1 the theory implies variation in organisms1 produced either by the unequal incidence of external forces1 or by the spontaneous action of the organism1 or by both causes combined4 ,the mere increase in the number of living organisms leads to a modification of the conditions of life by which new variations are encouraged4 ,and this tendency to variation in organisms--not merely the diversity of external environment--is perpetually complicating the conditions which the former tendency1 that towards unity1 helps to bring into harmony4 ,it thus happens that there is1 in the third place1 a continual process of readjustment and oscillation between the tendency towards unity and that towards variety1 which1 through opposition and conciliation1 produces continuity in nature4 ,each newly formed unity between organism and environment is broken by a new variation of the organism or of the environment1 which further complicates the problem to be solved by the unifying process1 and gives scope for a more intricate and more comprehensive readjustment4 ,unity1 ,variety1 and ,continuity are thus the three principles implied in the theory of evolution4#bga ,sidenote3 #b4 ,unsuccessful application of these principles to ethics2 ,it is from these principles that the attempt has been made to show the ethical bearing of evolution4 ,the first of them1 ,unity1 is represented in the theory that would make adaptation to environment the end of conduct2 and the second is represented ethically in the doctrine suggested by ,mr ,spencer1 that the degree of morality depends on the degree of complexity in act and motive4 ,but both of these views are obviously one-sided1 even from the point of view of empirical evolution4 ,taken together1 the principles on which they depend make up that law of continuous and progressive advance which may be regarded as expressing the essential characteristic of the theory4 ,and from this more general and accurate expression of it1 we might have expected to have been able to elicit the contribution which evolution has to make to the determination of the ethical end4 ,but after examining the various forms which it may take1 we have been unable to obtain from it a principle of action4 ,sidenote3 7a7 the principles being treated as derived from experience1 ,in inquiring into the reason which has made the theory of evolution seemingly so barren in its ethical consequences1 the first point which requires attention is that the characteristics of ,unity1 ,variety1 and ,continuity are treated by it not as principles involved in development1 but as theories inferred from1 or superinduced upon1 the facts of development4 ,we are led by facts to suppose certain hypothetical laws--namely1 that organisms tend to harmony with their environment1 but that there are certain causes promoting variation1 and1 consequently1 that the history of all life is that of a continuous process towards more comprehensive uniformities1 passing always into more intricate variations4 ,additional facts are compared with these hypothetical causes1 and1 by their ability to explain such facts1 the hypotheses are raised to the position of laws of nature1 and are confidently applied to account for new phenomena of the same kind4 ,but when we pass beyond facts lying immediately on the plane of those from which our laws have been gathered1 it is to follow an insufficient analogy if we interpret them by theories only shown to belong to the former order4 ,and this becomes still more obvious when the change is not merely to a different order of facts1 but to a different way of looking at facts1 as is the case in the transition from the point of view of knowledge to that of action4 ,sidenote3 not as depending on a principle implied in experience2 ,but there is another way in which the principles of ,unity1 ,variety1 and ,continuity may be regarded4 ,instead of being simply generalisations gathered from experience and depending upon it1 they may be founded on a principle which is itself the basis of the possibility of experience4 ,of course1 no one would think of denying that it is to the accumulated mass of experienced facts that these laws owe their prominence in modern scientific opinion1 and their acceptance by the judgment of the best scientists4 ,but the process by which a man has been led to lay hold of such principles is one thing2 their logical position in relation to experience quite another4 ,our definite recognition of the laws may very well be the result of experience1 at the same time that the principle of ,continuity is presupposed in our having experience at all4 ,as long as we kept to the ground from which we started1 and did not attempt to get beyond the categories of causality and reciprocity1 our progress might seem to be easy enough4 ,although their logical relations may be misconceived1 the laws are1 of course1 actually there1 in experience3 their application to the successive phenomena of nature remains the same1 and may be duly apprehended4 ,the extension of facts into laws is explained by the scientific imagination1 and we do not stay to inquire into the conditions on which the scientific imagination works and has applicability to experience4 ,but1 when we try to pass from efficient cause to the notion of purpose or of morality1 we find ourselves driven back on the fundamental constitution of knowledge1 and see that it is only through the unifying and relating action of a self-conscious subject that knowledge is possible or things exist for us at all4 ,and this is the reason why we are able to say that the ,unity or ,continuity of nature is a principle or law of experience4#bgb ,were that principle not involved in knowledge1 there would be no world of nature for us at all4 ,the empirical interpretation of evolution1 which has been hitherto adopted1 has made the negative side of this truth sufficiently evident3 it has shown that we cannot1 on empirical ground1 reach the end or purpose of human nature4 ,the question thus arises1 whether what may be called the metaphysical or transcendental interpretation of evolution can show the reason of this defect and suggest a remedy4 ,sidenote3 7b7 no logical transition being effected from efficient to final cause4 ,the insufficiency of the empirical way of looking at things is seen most clearly when we attempt to make the transition just referred to1 and determine an end for conduct4 ,it seems often to be thought that1 in pointing out the tendency of affairs1 we are1 at the same time1 prescribing the end towards which human endeavour ought to be directed4 ,now1 it is very difficult to say how far an empirical method enables us to anticipate tendencies of this kind at all4 ,even from the historical point of view the conditioning circumstances are so complicated that it is by no means easy to predict the result of their combination4 ,it is argued1 however1 by ,schffle1#bgc that we are at least able to see as far as the next stage in the series of historical progress1 and this is thought to lead to the conclusion that we should make this next stage of development our end3 further than it we cannot see1 and therefore need not provide4 ,if1 then1 we have no ultimate end for conduct1 at least we need never be without a proximate end--and one which is always changing with the course of events4 ,instead1 therefore1 of saying that we should take no thought for the morrow1 the contention would seem to be that we should live for the morrow but take no thought for the day after4 ,but here the altered point of view is scarcely concealed4 ,from the discussion of efficient causes we proceed all at once to decide upon ends or final causes4 ,we have shown 7let it be granted7 that1 taking account of the present position and mode of action of the forces we are able to examine1 they will modify the present state of affairs in a certain known manner4 ,to-day we are in state ,a2 to-morrow we shall be in1 or well on the way towards1 state ,ab2 therefore1 runs the conclusion1 implied or expressed1 we ought to make ,ab our end4 ,but this is more than a fallacy due to the confusion of the two meanings of end4 ,the conclusion to which it leads is inconsistent with1 or at least shows the one-sidedness of1 the premisses from which it was drawn4 ,for1 if ,ab is really the next term in the series of historical progress1 our making it our end can neither help nor hinder its realisation4 ,if1 on the other hand1 there is really a meaning in our making the world-end our own1 then we cannot bring that end1 the realisation of which is conceived as still in the future1 under the category of efficient causality1 and say with confidence that it is the next stage in the course of events4 ,sidenote3 #c4 ,difference between causality and teleology4 ,the idea does not work itself out in the same way as an efficient cause works in the processes of nature4 ,we might indeed speak--perhaps with some intelligible meaning--of the tendency of evolution becoming conscious in man1 and then working towards its own realisation as a fixed idea4 ,so far as the simpler representations are concerned1 this mode of action has been clearly illustrated in ,mr ,bain's writings2 and the characteristic is not limited to the less complex kinds of mental objects4 ,the idea is1 in its own nature1 a force tending both to exist in consciousness and to realise itself through the motor energies4#bgd ,consciousness of an end is a motive to action4 ,thus the notion of final cause includes that of efficient cause2 but the two are not convertible4 ,the idea of an end1 being conceived by reason1 cannot be described simply as a tendency become conscious4 ,it has passed into the region in which various conceptions are1 or may be1 competing against one another1 and the resultant is decided on upon grounds which may be called subjective since they proceed from conscious determination4 ,however the laws of this conscious determination may be expressed1 they are not to be identified with the natural sequence of events as it may be conceived to exist independently of the individual consciousness4 ,what seems the tendency of things may be altered or modified upon some ground of preference by the conscious subject4 ,in passing therefore to the working out of a rational or mental idea--such as is implied in the conception of an end--we can no longer fully represent our notions by means of the determined temporal succession called causality4 ,sidenote3 ,these notions unconnected by empiricism1 ,thus the empirical standpoint leaves the case incomplete4 ,a man might quite reasonably ask why he should adopt as maxims of conduct the laws seen to operate in nature4 ,the end1 in this way1 is not made to follow from the natural function of man4 ,it is simply a mode in which the events of the world occur2 and we must1 therefore1 give a reason why it should be adopted as his end by the individual agent4 ,to him there may be no sufficient grounds of inducement to become a self-conscious agent in the evolution of the universe4 ,from the purely evolutionist point of view1 no definite attempt has been made to solve the difficulty4 ,it seems really to go no deeper than ,dr ,johnson's reply to ,boswell1 when the latter plagued him to give a reason for action3 ',sir1' said he1 in an animated tone1 'it is driving on the system of life4'#bge ,when any further answer is attempted now to the question1 it appears to be on hedonistic grounds4 ,sidenote3 even with the assistance of hedonism4 ,but it is not certain that the next stage of development will bring more pleasure along with it than the present4 ,enough has already been said of the difficulties and uncertainties which surround any attempt to interpret evolution as tending constantly to increased pleasure4 ,it may be thought1 however1 that1 if neither optimism nor pessimism is the conclusion to which we are led1 the modified doctrine of what is called ,meliorism may be accepted4 ,and this theory--which holds that the world is improving1 that the balance of good over evil1 or that of pleasure over pain1 is on the increase--might seem to form a convenient support to the present doctrine4 ,for it may appear to follow from it that1 if the next stage in the world-process--that towards which evolution is tending--is known1 then we should make it our end to accelerate this stage1 as it will be one which brings with it a better state of affairs than the present4 ,but not even the most enthusiastic meliorist has tried to show anything more than that his doctrine holds true in general1 and that1 although progress has many receding waves1 the tide of human happiness is rising4 ,but we cannot tell how great these receding waves may be2 nor may we say that our action can have no power to check them4 ,it follows1 therefore1 that1 in judging of any special and temporary movement of events 7and it is not pretended that our anticipatory knowledge of the future can extend far71 we cannot assume that the second stage will be better than the first1 or that voluntary modification of it--if that be possible--might not improve both the immediate result and its later consequences4 ,it becomes necessary1 therefore1 to compare the value of the two by the directly pleasurable effects they may be expected to have1 so that we are driven back to test the course of evolution by reference to some other principle4 ,the further we go in examining an empirical theory1 the clearer does it become that it can make no nearer approach to the discovery of an ethical end1 than to point out what courses of action are likely to be the pleasantest1 or what tendencies to action the strongest3 while this can only be done within certain limits4 ,the doctrine of evolution itself1 when added to empirical morality1 only widens our view of the old landscape--does not enable us to pass from is to ought1 or from efficient to final cause1 any more than the telescope can point beyond the sphere of spatial quantity4 ,sidenote3 ,new point of view introduced by teleology ,we are endeavouring to get at the idea or end of human nature in an impossible way when we attempt to reach it on purely empirical lines1 and think that1 if we work long enough on them1 we are sure to come to it4 ,in the same way it was formerly thought by physiologists that1 if we thoroughly examined the brain with microscope and scalpel1 we should come upon the seat of the soul at last1 while psychologists were fain to believe that1 in addition to all our presentations of objects1 we had also a presentation of the subject or thinking being4 ,the mistake of both was in imagining that the soul was a thing amongst other things1 or a presentation amongst other presentations1 instead of the subject and condition of there being either things or thoughts at all4 ,of a similar character is the attempt to get at an end or final cause without leaving the point of view of efficient causality4 ,were it successful1 it would reduce final cause to mechanism4 ,to look upon man or upon nature as manifesting an end implies an idea or notion of the object as a whole1 over and above the mutual determination of its various parts1 and thus necessitates the contemplation of it as though an understanding contained the ground of the unity of the multiplicity of its empirical laws4#bgf ,it is the attempt to get at an external purpose for objects of experience that has made teleology be looked upon askance by men of science4 ,a conception of this kind went far to vitiate physics in the middle ages1 till it was1 with justice1 strictly excluded from the scientific interpretation of nature by the leaders of modern philosophy4#bgg ,but teleology does not stand or fall with this external form of it1 which takes its illustrations from the products of the factory1 not from the manifestations of life1#bgh and which is really only mechanism misunderstood4 ,sidenote3 necessary in considering life1 ,the conception of an end is forced upon us in considering life1 because then it is necessary to take account of the being as organised1 and therefore as a whole4 ,in the investigation of nature1 on the other hand1 things may be apprehended without relation to the conception of the whole2 and teleology1 therefore1 seems to be unnecessary4 ,the notion of purpose1 it is often said1 is essential to biology1 but out of place in physical science4 ,but when we look on the world as a whole1 the notion of end or purpose is introduced1 and the functions of its various parts conceived from a new point of view4 ,and the end of an organism can only be partially understood1 when that organism is conceived as a whole apart from its environment4 ,it is only a partial manifestation or example of the more perfect reality in which things are to be regarded as not merely conditioned and conditioning1 but as revelations of purpose4 ,but1 although the notion of purpose cannot be dispensed with in considering organic nature1 the teleological notions we form of living things are imperfect and abstract4 ,thus the organism is often1 more or less explicitly1 judged by its utility for some human purpose4 ,in these cases the end is clearly an external and dependent one4 ,and1 when the adaptation of its parts is spoken of in relation to its type or perfect form1 a conception is involved over and above what can be inferred from the nature of the organism in itself4 ,the notion of the end depends upon a rational ideal1 which passes beyond the causal interrelation of parts to the conception of the organism as a whole1 whose function is necessarily related to its environment4 ,sidenote3 and life directly known only as self-conscious4 ,our knowledge of the ends of the lower animals is really much more imperfect than our knowledge of the human end4 ,for the only life we really know is self-conscious life1 and that we are unable to attribute to them4 ,we know their life only by conjecture1 our knowledge of it being but an abstraction from our own consciousness4 ,the ethical1 as ,trendelenburg puts it1#bgi is the higher stage of the process1 a lower stage of which is the organic4 ,the purpose1 which is conceived as blind or unconscious in nature1 becomes conscious and voluntary in man4 ,but our notion of the former is simply an abstraction from the free and conscious purpose which characterises our own activity4 ,the conception of life is only known to us as--is only--an element or moment in our own self-consciousness4 ,and life which is not self-conscious can only be judged in relation to the self-consciousness which contains in itself the explanation both of life and of nature4 ,the germ of truth in the old mechanical teleology may perhaps be seen in this way4 ,for it had right on its side in so far as it referred everything to the self-consciousness manifested in man2 it was mistaken only in so far as it made things relative to his needs and desires4 ,the teleological anthropomorphism which judges all things according to their correspondence with human purposes1 must be transcended1 equally with the speculative anthropomorphism which frames the unseen world in the likeness of the phenomena of our present experience4 ,but to attempt to escape from what is sometimes called anthropomorphism--the reference of the nature and purpose of things to self-consciousness1 as expressive of the ultimate reality--is to attempt to escape from thought itself1 and makes one's thinking from the beginning void and contradictory4 ,sidenote3 #d4 ,reference to self-consciousness implied in evolution1 ,now this reference to self has been omitted in our consideration of empirical evolution4 ,we have taken the purely objective ground of science1 and we have admitted what science has told us of how all sorts of things came to be1--how man appeared on the earth1 gradually adapted himself to his surroundings and modified them--how sentiments expanded1 customs grew1 and one institution developed out of another4 ,but science shows us all this only as an external process of events in space and time--a process in which the preceding determines each succeeding state1 and all parts are united together4 ,it does not show us the process from the inside4 ,and1 in the end1 it can do no more than point towards1 without reaching1 the comprehensive idea of a whole1 by reference to which idea all the members of the whole are determined1 in such a way that it is insufficient to look upon one as causing another1 and with the others making up the aggregate2 since each member only exists for the sake of the whole1 and the idea of the whole precedes the parts which constitute it4#bhj ,the teleological conception thus necessarily leads us beyond the ordinary categories of science1 by which all things are conceived as connected causally in space and time4 ,but the scientific theories that we have been discussing do not recognise this altered point of view2 and1 without giving any justification for the change of standpoint1 lay down the moral law that we ought to aim at the realisation of something which can only be described as a mental conception or idea4 ,here a double change in point of view is involved4 ,we are no longer considering a process going on outside us1 in which the reference to self may be fairly ignored1 but we put ourselves in relation to this external order3 and we do so1 not merely as cognitive1 but as active--as the potential source of actions which we say ought to be performed by us4 ,sidenote3 7a7 made clear in the attempt to trace the genesis of self-consciousness4 ,the assumption involved in the former change is that made by comparative or evolutionist psychology1 when it attempts to play the part of a theory of knowledge4 ,the development of impressions and ideas is made to pass upwards to more complicated stages1 till it reaches the point at which the individual1 conceived as determined by external forces and reacting upon them1 becomes conscious of itself as a subject of knowledge and source of action4 ,this transition from the category of causality to self-consciousness is1 in some systems--that of ,mr ,spencer1 for example--either concealed or held to with no firm grasp4 ,throughout his objective treatment of psychology1 it would seem that ,mr ,spencer is evolving mind or self-consciousness out of the process in which simple relations of matter and motion form the lowest stage1 and reflex action is that which approaches most nearly to having mental characteristics4 ,and1 from this objective point of view1 he speaks of his philosophy as an interpretation of the detailed phenomena of life1 mind1 and society1 in terms of matter1 motion1 and force4#bha ,but when he discusses the subjective side1 he admits that it is entirely unique and sui generis1#bhb and adopts what is known as the two aspects theory--the theory that mind cannot be accounted for as derived from matter1 any more than matter can be accounted for as derived from mind1 but that they are both phases of one ultimate and unknown reality4#bhc ,this admission involves a practical acknowledgment that it is impossible to arrive at consciousness or at subjectivity by a process of natural development4 ,we must1 it affirms1 postulate two aspects or phases of existence1 or two lines of development1 connected probably in their ultimate reality1 but1 as known to us1 distinct from one another1 and without mutual influence4 ,sidenote3 ,reference to self-consciousness1 ,the doctrine that a reference to self-consciousness is implied in experience1 may perhaps be made clearer by considering a criticism to which it has recently been subjected by an able psychological writer4 ,professor ,w4 ,james writes as follows3-- ,the doctrine of the post-,kantians1 that all knowledge is also self-knowledge1 seems to flow from this confusion between the psychologist's standpoint and the standpoint of the feeling upon which he is supposed to be making his report4 ,empirically1 of course1 an awareness of self accompanies most of our thinking4 ,but that it should be needed to make that thinking 'objective' is quite another matter4 ',green-after-red-and-other-than-it' is an absolutely complete object of thought1 ideally considered1 and needs no added element4 ,the fallacy seems to arise from some such reflection as this1 that since the feeling is what it feels itself to be1 so it must feel itself to be what it is--namely1 related to each of its objects4 ,that the last is covers much more ground than the first1 the philosopher here does not notice4 ,the first is signifies only the feeling's inward quality2 the last is covers all possible facts about the feeling1--relational facts1 which can only be known from outside points of view1 like that of the philosopher himself4#bhd ,sidenote3 though not itself a part of experience1 ,sidenote3 logically implied by experience4 ,now it seems to me that the real confusion here is between the point of view of experience1 and the point of view of reflection on experience1 and that it is not the post-,kantians who confuse the two points of view4 ,the post-,kantians--by whom ,professor ,james means ,t4 ,h4 ,green and the writers commonly associated with him--habitually occupy the latter standpoint4 ,they do not hold that all knowledge is also self-knowledge1 in the sense that an awareness of self accompanies most or all of our thinking4 ,when we have this empirical awareness of self1 our object is the more or less distinct contents of perception1 c41 which make up the empirical ego4 ,but this knowledge of the empirical ego1 equally with knowledge of external nature1 implies logically the action of self-consciousness4 ,when we reflect upon experience1 one constant element is seen to be implied in it--the reference to a subject of knowledge and feeling4 ,certainly post-,kantians do not imagine--as ,professor ,james seems himself to imagine and to think they do--that a feeling feels itself1 or an object knows itself4 ,green-after-red-and-other-than-it is for them1 as for him1 if not an absolutely complete object of thought1 yet relatively complete4 ,it may be apprehended alone as a part of experience4 ,but reflection on experience shows that it1 like any other object of thought1 depends upon a knowing subject4 ,the post-,kantians do not assert that knowing an object involves for the individual knower actual consciousness of what his knowledge implies1 any more than they would say that the plain man is already a metaphysician4 ,but they hold that reflection on experience shows that self-reference1 or reference to a subject1 is a logical condition of there being experience at all4 ,so far from confusing the two standpoints1 they require carefully to emphasise their difference1 lest the actual content of a state of consciousness in the individual man be held to be equivalent to the grounds or conditions of that state of consciousness4 ,the reason why there is even an apparent plausibility in the attempt to get at a natural development of self-consciousness1 is that the reference to self is1 from the outset1 implicitly1 but logically1 assumed in tracing the sequence of events which forms the subject-matter of the theory of evolution1 while the course of development does nothing more than render its implication explicit4 ,self-consciousness is not something that exists apart from the world of known and knowable objects1 any more than it is itself a special department of this world of objects distinguishable from1 and determined by1 its surroundings4 ,it is1 on the contrary1 the supreme condition of the world of objects having any existence whatever4 ,it is only through objects being brought into relation with the identical and permanent subject of knowledge1 that there is unity in nature1 or1 in other words1 that there is a known world of nature or experience at all4 ,the evolution of mind or self-consciousness out of experience is1 therefore1 not merely to be rejected as a problem too intricate for psychological analysis4 ,it is a mistake to think that it is a possible problem at all2 for it attempts to make experience account for and originate the principles on which its own possibility depends4 ,sidenote3 7b7 made clear in the attempt to trace morality from reflex action4 ,but it is the second change in point of view which needs special emphasis here--the change from the point of view of science to that of morality4 ,taken in its bare form1 this is perhaps little more than a confusion of thought4 ,the fact of things being of a certain constitution1 and of their progress tending in a certain direction1 cannot of itself supply a law for the exercise of our activity4 ,but the view is associated with a theory of the nature of human action which seeks to bring it into the strict line of natural development4 ,just as empirical psychology attempted to treat self-consciousness as a stage in the evolution of experience or knowledge1 so the empirical theory of morality1 aided by the doctrine of evolution1 tries to show how the action which is called moral has been developed out of purely physical or reflex action4 ,but this theory of the development of moral action is really open to the same objection as that which was urged against the theory which evolves self-consciousness from the unconscious4 ,the objection to the latter was1 that experience1 itself constituted by consciousness1 is made to produce the condition of its own possibility2 and a similar confusion is involved in attempting to develop moral action out of merely physical or reflex action4 ,the only case of true psychical or conscious action is that in which there is a conscious determination of end and means2 and action of this kind implies the same relation to self-consciousness as that by which knowledge is constituted4 ,the relation is1 however1 manifested in a different way3 it is not an apprehension of the manifold of impression into the unity of consciousness1 but the externalisation of self-consciousness in realising a conceived end or idea4 ,now1 in so far as physical and psychical facts are phenomena of experience--and they have no other existence1 at least none that can have any intelligible meaning given to it--they presuppose self-consciousness2 for it is only in relation to it that experience is possible4 ,that is to say1 their existence logically implies a reference to a subject whose active externalising manifestation is the determination of means and end which constitutes moral 7as distinguished from merely natural7 action4 ,so far1 therefore1 from our being able to trace the development of moral action from the simpler phenomena of natural action1 we find that these1 in their most rudimentary form1 by virtue of their being phenomena of experience1 imply and receive their reality from the self-consciousness which is the differentiating quality both of knowledge and of moral action4 ,sidenote3 #e4 ,the unity of self-consciousness3 ,sidenote3 7a7 as making possible the transition from knowledge to morality2 ,from this it follows that1 although1 empirically1 the change from the point of view of science to that of morality is a transition to a different order of facts1 yet the passage may be possible transcendentally through self-consciousness4 ,for in self-consciousness we reach the element of identity between knowledge and action4 ,it is1 therefore1 of importance to understand the nature of this self-conscious activity in relation to knowledge and to action4 ,if the fundamental characteristic of knowledge is the bringing into relation to consciousness1 then all conscious action has this characteristic2 for it determines self towards some particular line of activity--that is to say1 towards an object or end which is thereby related to consciousness4 ,action therefore1 we may say1 is knowledge4 ,and in the same way1 on the other hand1 since the relating to consciousness which constitutes knowledge can only be regarded as originated by the subject1 it follows1 conversely1 that knowledge is action4#bhe ,we act1 says ,spinoza1 only in so far as we know or understand4 ,action is but one aspect or manifestation of that which1 in another aspect or manifestation1 is knowledge4 ,but the aspect of self-consciousness we call knowledge and that we call action are different from one another4 ,in the former the relating to consciousness in the definite forms of thought and perception is the prominent thing4 ,in the latter it is the realising energy of the self-conscious subject4 ,the ordinary distinction between knowledge and action is therefore correct1 if not pushed to the extent of making an absolute separation between them3 in the former we idealise the real1 in the latter we realise the ideal4 ,but they are at one in this1 that both involve self-conscious activity4 ,sidenote3 7b7 as determining the character of the ethical end1 ,the self-consciousness which in one relation is knowledge1 in another action1 is thus the fundamental fact of human nature2 and on it1 therefore1 the ethical end must be based1 if that end can be disclosed by the nature of man1 and is to express what is most fundamental in his nature4 ,now1 as knowledge finds its completion when all things are connected with one another and the subject in a definite system of relations1 the end of completed self-conscious activity cannot be different4 ,in their final perfection1 as in their fundamental nature1 the two are at one4 ,as ,kant puts it1#bhf the speculative and the practical reason are reconciled in the notion of end4 ,however virtue may differ from knowledge in the processes of ordinary experience1 the distinction only belongs to their finite realisation4 ,an intuitive understanding1 or understanding which1 in knowing1 creates the objects of knowledge1 is the highest conception of reason4 ,yet the very notion of a finite self implies that neither such knowledge nor such activity belongs to it4 ,in knowledge and action1 as properties of the ultimate self-consciousness1 human beings only participate4 ,it is only by means of the laborious methods of observation and inference that they approach the intuition of all things as a unity in which perfect knowledge consists2 and1 in the same way1 it is only by the gradual volitional adaptation of means to end that they are able1 in some measure1 to contribute to the realisation of self-consciousness in the world4 ,sidenote3 as self-realisation1 ,an end can only be made our own when conceived as necessary for realising or completing our idea of self4 ,conscious volition only follows a conceived want1 or recognition that the self as imagined--the ideal self--is not realised in the actual self4 ,the action is towards a fuller working out of the idea of self2 and the end may therefore1 in all cases of conscious action1 be said to be self-realisation1 though the nature of this end differs according to each man's conception of self4 ,this may be expressed1 as ,green expresses it1 by saying that self-satisfaction is the form of every object willed2 but 444 it is on the specific difference of the objects willed under the general form of self-satisfaction that the quality of the will must depend4#bhg ,it appears to me1 however1 that this statement requires to be guarded by an explanation4 ,the self-satisfaction sought must not be looked upon as a feeling1--for if it is1 it can only be interpreted psychologically as pleasure--but as simply conscious self-realisation4 ,and this self-realisation is the objective consciousness of an attained end1 which is accompanied by1 but is not the same as1 the feeling of pleasure4 ,self-realisation is the end1 not the pleasurable feeling which follows it2 self-satisfaction1 not the pleasure of self-satisfaction4 ,in this way1 the common experience that the objects with which we seek to satisfy ourselves do not turn out capable of satisfying us1#bhh might be expressed by saying that the method adopted for the realisation of self is often found in its result to lead to incomplete1 or even to illusory1 self-realisation4 ,the question thus arises1 ,what is the true self that is to be realised1 and what is meant by the realisation of it8 ,the will that wills itself is as bare a notion in ethics1 as the thought that thinks itself is in metaphysics4 ,the good will1 which ,kant rightly held to be the only ultimate good1 never altogether escaped this formality in ,kant's own treatment of it4 ,his idea of humanity as a realm of ends was limited by his formal conception of the function of reason1 though it suggests the way by which the mere tautology of will may be transcended4 ,it is of the essence of a finite will that its end is different from the realisation of the end4 ,but the rationality of the will implies that it must aim at nothing less than the harmonious articulation of its whole activity in the unity of self-consciousness4 ,sidenote3 but as transcending egoism2 ,it has been argued above that both knowledge and morality are expressions of self-conscious activity3 in it these different manifestations find an element of fundamental identity4 ,but it may be maintained1 further1 that this unity of self-consciousness is not merely the unity of the different states of an individual1 but that it is an element which transcends the difference by which concrete individuals are distinguished from one another4 ,if this view can be carried out1 it seems to lead us to attribute to other men something more than a similar consciousness#bhi to our own1 and to make us look on all self-conscious beings as sharing in1 or manifesting1 in various imperfect ways1 one identical self-consciousness4 ,from this point of view1 self-realisation would be established as no mere individual end4 ,the first law of morality would be not the natural impulse for each to take care of himself in the struggle for life1 but1 on the contrary1 the sublation of that distinction between the particular ego and other individuals which would admit of the one using the others as mere means to his own advancement4 ,his true end is the same as theirs3 the realisation of the self-consciousness in which both partake--its realisation1 that is to say1 not in one individual only1 but wherever it is manifested4#bij ,this is the rationale of what the empirical theory of evolution tries to establish by pointing to the growing harmony in feeling and interest between the individual and society4 ,what evolution really shows is the gradual manifestation in actual volition of the identity of nature in all men4#bia ,i do not say that this fundamental identity of nature does away with all conflict between self-realisation in one's self and in others2 but it does much1 if it establishes the principle that the realisation of one's own nature involves the realisation of that of others4 ,as ,schffle says1 the moral law is the direction of the will to the genuinely human as humanity2 and this is a transcendental element embedded in the hearts of all men--though in its basis only1 for it is developed and ripened in the course of history4#bib ,and the more fully self-consciousness is realised1 the clearer does it become that its complete realisation implies that kingdom of ends spoken of by ,kant1 in which all self-conscious beings are at once subjects and sovereign4 ,sidenote3 7c7 as showing that the realisation of the end must be progressive4 ,further1 self-realisation in both its aspects--as individual and as social--is necessarily progressive4 ,it is only at the highest stage of its development that nature becomes the organ of intelligence and morality4#bic ,and1 just as knowledge expresses itself through the forms of space and time1 and1 therefore1 by gradual colligations of facts1 so the conscious determination of activity is manifested in the world in an order of consecutive acts1 and is therefore subject1 in its manifestation1 to the laws of temporal succession4 ,it is the part of a system of metaphysics--at any rate1 it does not belong to the present inquiry--to show how reason manifests itself in space and time1 and how1 through the rationality of this manifestation1 everything in space is and acts only in relation to its environment1 and through it1 to the rest of the world1 and how each event in time is the result of preceding events1 and determines those which follow it4 ,what it thus shows the necessity of is the process of evolution2 and it is because this process is determined by reason that the world is the object of knowledge and the sphere of moral action4 ,evolution is thus not the foundation of morality1 but the manifestation of the principle on which it depends4 ,morality cannot be explained by means of its own development1 without reference to the self-consciousness which makes that development possible4 ,however valuable may be the information we get from experience as to the gradual evolution of conduct1 its nature and end can only be explained by a principle that transcends experience4 ,,the ,,end4 ,,printed ,,by ,,william ,,blackwood ,,and ,,sons4 ,,footnotes3 #bgj ,the empirical interpretation of evolution is that adopted by the majority of evolutionists1 but is not essential to the truth of the theory4 ,a protest against it is entered by ,mr ,wallace1 though in the somewhat crude form of postulating supernatural interference for the production of certain classes of phenomena 7cf4 ,contributions to the ,theory of ,natural ,selection1 p4 #cei71 at the same time that his conception of nature does not seem to differ otherwise from that of ,hckel4 #bga ,the reference in the above to ,kant1 ,werke1 iii4 #dch ff41 is obvious2 but it is nevertheless a true account of the principles involved in the theory of evolution4 #bgb ,cf4 ,stirling1 ,secret of ,hegel1 ii4 #fae3 ,one grand system1 unity of type1 all this must be postulated from the very constitution of human reason2 but from the very constitution of experience as well1 it can never be realised in experience4 #bgc ,bau und ,leben des socialen ,krpers1 ii4 #fh4 #bgd ,cf4 ,fouille1 ,critique des systmes de morale contemporains1 p4 #ac ff4 #bge ,boswell's ,life of ,johnson1 chap4 liv4 #bgf ,kant1 ,werke1 v4 #ahg 7,kr4 d4 ,urt41 ,einl4 iv47 #bgg ,descartes1 ,princ4 phil41 iii4 #c1 i4 #bh2 ,bacon1 ,de augm41 iii4 #e1 ,novum organum1 ii4 #b4 #bgh ,cf4 ,kant1 ,werke1 v4 #chg 7,kr4 d4 ,urt41 #fe74 #bgi ,historische ,beitrge zur ,philosophie1 iii4 #afe4 #bhj ,cf4 ,hegel1 ,wissenschaft der ,logik1 iii4 #bbh4 #bha ,first ,principles1 #aid1 p4 #eef4 #bhb ,principles of ,psychology1 #ef1 i4 #adj4 #bhc ,ibid41 #bgb1 #bgc1 i4 #fbd ff4 #bhd ,mind1 ix4 #ba4 #bhe ,from action in this its ultimate meaning as equivalent to origination by the subject1 it is necessary to distinguish action as a phenomenon in the external world4 ,the latter is one of the modes in which the relation of objects is known to us1 the former a characteristic of knowing4 ,the active nature of knowledge is worked out in an interesting way in ,professor ,s4 ,s4 ,laurie's ',metaphysica nova et vetusta1' by ,scotus ,novanticus 7#ahhd74 #bhf ,werke1 iii4 #ech2 cf4 ,adamson1 ,philosophy of ,kant1 p4 #ach4 #bhg ,prolegomena to ,ethics1 p4 #afa4 #bhh ,prolegomena to ,ethics1 p4 #afe4 #bhi ,sidgwick1 ,green's ,ethics1 ,mind1 ix4 #ahj4 #bij ,this is implied in ,hegel's well-known imperative1 ,be a person and respect others as persons4--,phil4 d4 ,rechts1 p4 #gc4 #bia ,thus ,hffding maintains that the highest ethical idea is the idea of the human race as a realm of personalities4--,grundlage der humanen ,ethik 7aus dem dnischen71 p4 #gd4 #bib ,bau und ,leben des socialen ,krpers1 i4 #agc4 #bic ,cf4 ,h4 ,siebeck1 ,philosophische ,monatshefte1 xx4 #cdj4 99 99 99 99 99 ,,catalogue ,,of ,,messrs ,,blackwood ,,sons' ,,publications4 ,,philosophical ,,classics ,,for ,,english ,,readers4 ,,edited ,,by ,,william ,,knight1 ,,ll4,d41 ,professor of ,moral ,philosophy in the ,university of ,st ,andrews4 ,in crown #hvo ,volumes1 with ,portraits1 price #cs4 #f;d4 ,now ready-- ,,descartes1 by ,professor ,mahaffy1 ,dublin4--,,butler1 by ,rev4 ,w4 ,lucas ,collins1 ,m4,a4--,,berkeley1 by ,professor ,campbell ,fraser1 ,edinburgh4--,,fichte1 by ,professor ,adamson1 ,owens ,college1 ,manchester4--,,kant1 by ,professor ,wallace1 ,oxford4--,,hamilton1 by ,professor ,veitch1 ,glasgow4--,,hegel1 by ,professor ,edward ,caird1 ,glasgow4--,,leibniz1 by ,j4 ,theodore ,merz4--,,vico1 by ,professor ,flint1 ,edinburgh4--,,hobbes1 by ,professor ,croom ,robertson1 ,london4--,,hume1 by the ,editor4--,,spinoza1 by the ,very ,rev4 ,principal ,caird1 ,glasgow4--,,bacon3 ,part ,i4 ,the ,life1 by ,professor ,nichol1 ,glasgow4--,,bacon3 ,part ,,ii4 ,philosophy1 by the same ,author4--,,locke1 by ,professor ,campbell ,fraser1 ,edinburgh4 ,in preparation4 ,,mill1 by the ,right ,hon4 ,a4 ,j4 ,balfour4 99 99 99 99 99 ,,foreign ,,classics ,,for ,,english ,,readers4 ,,edited ,,by ,,mrs ,,oliphant4 ,in crown #hvo1 #bs4 #f;d4 ,contents of the ,series4 ,,dante1 by the ,editor4--,,voltaire1 by ,general ,sir ,e4 ,b4 ,hamley1 ,k4,c4,b4--,,pascal1 by ,principal ,tulloch4--,,petrarch1 by ,henry ,reeve1 ,c4,b4--,,goethe1 by ,a4 ,hayward1 ,q4,c4--,,moli,,re1 by the ,editor and ,f4 ,tarver1 ,m4,a4--,,montaigne1 by ,rev4 ,w4 ,l4 ,collins1 ,m4,a4--,,rabelais1 by ,walter ,besant1 ,m4,a4--,,calderon1 by ,e4 ,j4 ,hasell4--,,saint ,,simon1 by ,clifton ,w4 ,collins1 ,m4,a4--,,cervantes1 by the ,editor4--,,corneille ,,and ,,racine1 by ,henry ,m4 ,trollope4--,,madame ,,de ,s,,vign1 by ,miss ,thackeray4--,,la ,,fontaine1 ,,and ,,other ,,french ,,fabulists1 by ,rev4 ,w4 ,lucas ,collins1 ,m4,a4--,,schiller1 by ,james ,sime1 ,m4,a41 ,author of ',lessing1 his ,life and ,writings4'--,,tasso1 by ,e4 ,j4 ,hasell4--,,rousseau1 by ,henry ,grey ,graham4--,,alfred ,,de ,,musset1 by ,c4 ,f4 ,oliphant4 ,in preparation4 ,,leopardi4 ,by the ,editor4 99 99 99 99 99 ,,now ,,complete4 ,,ancient ,,classics ,,for ,,english ,,readers4 ,,edited ,,by ,,the ,,rev4 ,w4 ,,lucas ,,collins1 ,m4,a4 ,complete in #bh ,vols4 crown #hvo1 cloth1 price #bs4 #f;d4 each4 ,and may also be had in #ad ,volumes1 strongly and neatly bound1 with calf or vellum back1 #c1 #ajs4 ,contents of the ,series4 ,,homer3 ,,the ,,iliad1 by the ,editor4--,,homer3 ,,the ,,odyssey1 by the ,editor4--,,herodotus1 by ,george ,c4 ,swayne1 ,m4,a4--,,xenophon1 by ,sir ,alexander ,grant1 ,bart41 ,,ll4,d4--,,euripides1 by ,w4 ,b4 ,donne4--,,aristophanes1 by the ,editor4--,,plato1 by ,clifton ,w4 ,collins1 ,m4,a4--,,lucian1 by the ,editor4--,,schylus1 by the ,right ,rev4 the ,bishop of ,colombo4--,,sophocles1 by ,clifton ,w4 ,collins1 ,m4,a4--,,hesiod ,,and ,,theognis1 by the ,rev4 ,j4 ,davies1 ,m4,a4--,,greek ,,anthology1 by ,lord ,neaves4--,,virgil1 by the ,editor4--,,horace1 by ,sir ,theodore ,martin1 ,k4,c4,b4--,,juvenal1 by ,edward ,walford1 ,m4,a4--,,plautus ,,and ,,terence1 by the ,editor4--,,the ,,commentaries ,,of ,c,,sar1 by ,anthony ,trollope4--,,tacitus1 by ,w4 ,b4 ,donne4--,,cicero1 by the ,editor4--,,pliny',s ,,letters1 by the ,rev4 ,alfred ,church1 ,m4,a41 and the ,rev4 ,w4 ,j4 ,brodribb1 ,m4,a4--,,livy1 by the ,editor4--,,ovid1 by the ,rev4 ,a4 ,church1 ,m4,a4--,,catullus1 ,,tibullus1 ,,and ,,propertius1 by the ,rev4 ,jas4 ,davies1 ,m4,a4--,,demosthenes1 by the ,rev4 ,w4 ,j4 ,brodribb1 ,m4,a4--,,aristotle1 by ,sir ,alexander ,grant1 ,bart41 ,,ll4,d4--,,thucydides1 by the ,editor4--,,lucretius1 by ,w4 ,h4 ,mallock1 ,m4,a4--,,pindar1 by the ,rev4 ,f4 ,d4 ,morice1 ,m4,a4 ,saturday ,review4--,it is difficult to estimate too highly the value of such a series as this in giving ',english readers' an insight1 exact as far as it goes1 into those olden times which are so remote1 and yet to many of us so close4 99 99 99 99 99 ,,catalogue ,,of ,,messrs ,,blackwood ,,sons' ,,publications4 ,,alison4 ,history of ,europe4 ,by ,sir ,,archibald ,,alison1 ,bart41 ,d4,c4,l4 #a4 ,from the ,commencement of the ,french ,revolution to the ,battle of ,waterloo4 ,,library ,,edition1 #ad vols41 with ,portraits4 ,demy #hvo1 #aj1 #ajs4 ,,another ,,edition1 in #bj vols4 crown #hvo1 #f4 ,,people',s ,,edition1 #ac vols4 crown #hvo1 #b1 #aas4 #b4 ,continuation to the ,accession of ,louis ,napoleon4 ,,library ,,edition1 #h vols4 #hvo1 #f1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,,people',s ,,edition1 #h vols4 crown #hvo1 #cds4 #c4 ,epitome of ,alison's ,history of ,europe4 ,twenty-ninth ,thousand1 #gs4 #f;d4 #d4 ,atlas to ,alison's ,history of ,europe4 ,by ,a4 ,keith ,johnston4 ,,library ,,edition1 demy #dto1 #c1 #cs4 ,,people',s ,,edition1 #cas4 #f;d4 ---- ,life of ,john ,duke of ,marlborough4 ,with some ,account of his ,contemporaries1 and of the ,war of the ,succession4 ,third ,edition1 #b vols4 #hvo4 ,portraits and ,maps1 #cjs4 ---- ,essays3 ,historical1 ,political1 and ,miscellaneous4 #c vols4 demy #hvo1 #des4 ,,acta ,,sanctorum ,,hiberni2 ,ex ,codice ,salmanticensi4 ,nunc primum integre edita opera ,,caroli ,,de ,,smedt et ,,josephi ,,de ,,backer1 e ,soc4 ,jesu1 ,hagiographorum ,bollandianorum2 ,auctore et ,sumptus ,largiente ,,joanne ,,patricio ,,marchione ,,bothae4 ,in ,one handsome #dto ,volume1 bound in half roxburghe1 #b1 #bs42 in paper wrapper1 #cas4 #f;d4 ,,aird4 ,poetical ,works of ,thomas ,aird4 ,fifth ,edition1 with ,memoir of the ,author by the ,rev4 ,,jardine ,,wallace1 and ,portrait4 ,crown #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,,allardyce4 ,the ,city of ,sunshine4 ,by ,,alexander ,,allardyce4 ,three vols4 post #hvo1 #a1 #es4 #f;d4 ---- ,memoir of the ,honourable ,george ,keith ,elphinstone1 ,k4,b41 ,viscount ,keith of ,stonehaven1 ,marischal1 ,admiral of the ,red4 #hvo1 with ,portrait1 ,illustrations1 and ,maps1 #bas4 ,,almond4 ,sermons by a ,lay ,head-master4 ,by ,,hely ,,hutchinson ,,almond1 ,m4,a4 ,oxon41 ,head-master of ,loretto ,school4 ,crown #hvo1 #es4 ,,ancient ,,classics ,,for ,,english ,,readers4 ,edited by ,rev4 ,w4 ,,lucas ,,collins1 ,m4,a4 ,price #bs4 #f;d4 each4 ,for list of ,vols41 see page #b4 ,,aytoun4 ,lays of the ,scottish ,cavaliers1 and other ,poems4 ,by ,w4 ,,edmondstoune ,,aytoun1 ,d4,c4,l41 ,professor of ,rhetoric and ,belles-,lettres in the ,university of ,edinburgh4 ,new ,edition4 ,fcap4 #hvo1 #cs4 #f;d4 ,another ,edition1 being the ,thirtieth4 ,fcap4 #hvo1 cloth extra1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,cheap ,edition4 ,fcap4 #hvo4 ,illustrated ,cover4 ,price #as4 ,cloth1 #gs4 #c;d4 ---- ,an ,illustrated ,edition of the ,lays of the ,scottish ,cavaliers4 ,from designs by ,sir ,,noel ,,paton4 ,small #dto1 in gilt cloth1 #bas4 ---- ,bothwell3 a ,poem4 ,third ,edition4 ,fcap4 #gs4 #f;d4 ---- ,poems and ,ballads of ,goethe4 ,translated by ,professor ,,aytoun and ,sir ,,theodore ,,martin1 ,k4,c4,b4 ,third ,edition4 ,fcap41 #fs4 ---- ,bon ,gaultier's ,book of ,ballads4 ,by the ,,same4 ,fifteenth ,edition4 ,with ,illustrations by ,doyle1 ,leech1 and ,crowquill4 ,fcap4 #hvo1 #es4 ---- ,the ,ballads of ,scotland4 ,edited by ,professor ,,aytoun4 ,fourth ,edition4 #b vols4 fcap4 #hvo1 #abs4 ---- ,memoir of ,william ,e4 ,aytoun1 ,d4,c4,l4 ,by ,sir ,,theodore ,,martin1 ,k4,c4,b4 ,with ,portrait4 ,post #hvo1 #abs4 ,,bach4 ,on ,musical ,education and ,vocal ,culture4 ,by ,,albert ,b4 ,,bach4 ,fourth ,edition4 #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ---- ,the ,principles of ,singing4 ,a ,practical ,guide for ,vocalists and ,teachers4 ,with ,course of ,vocal ,exercises4 ,crown #hvo1 #fs4 ---- ,the ,art of ,singing4 ,with ,musical ,exercises for ,young ,people4 ,crown #hvo1 #cs4 ---- ,the ,art ,ballad3 ,loewe and ,schubert4 ,with ,music ,illustrations4 ,with a ,portrait of ,,loewe4 ,third ,edition4 ,small #dto1 #es4 ,,ballads ,,and ,,poems4 ,by ,,members ,,of ,,the ,,glasgow ,,ballad ,,club4 ,crown #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,,bannatyne4 ,handbook of ,republican ,institutions in the ,united ,states of ,america4 ,based upon ,federal and ,state ,laws1 and other reliable sources of information4 ,by ,,dugald ,j4 ,,bannatyne1 ,scotch ,solicitor1 ,new ,york2 ,member of the ,faculty of ,procurators1 ,glasgow4 ,cr4 #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,,bellairs4 ,the ,transvaal ,war1 #ahhj-ha4 ,edited by ,lady ,,bellairs4 ,with a ,frontispiece and ,map4 #hvo1 #aes4 ---- ,gossips with ,girls and ,maidens1 ,betrothed and ,free4 ,new ,edition4 ,crown #hvo1 #cs4 #f;d4 ,cloth1 extra gilt edges1 #es4 ,,besant4 ,the ,revolt of ,man4 ,by ,,walter ,,besant1 ,m4,a4 ,ninth ,edition4 ,crown #hvo1 #cs4 #f;d4 ---- ,readings in ,rabelais4 ,crown #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,,beveridge4 ,culross and ,tulliallan2 or ,perthshire on ,forth4 ,its ,history and ,antiquities4 ,with ,elucidations of ,scottish ,life and ,character from the ,burgh and ,kirk-,session ,records of that ,district4 ,by ,,david ,,beveridge4 #b vols4 #hvo1 with ,illustrations1 #dbs4 ---- ,between the ,ochils and the ,forth2 or1 ,from ,stirling ,bridge to ,aberdour4 ,crown #hvo1 #fs4 ,,black4 ,heligoland and the ,islands of the ,north ,sea4 ,by ,,william ,,george ,,black4 ,crown #hvo1 #ds4 ,,blackie4 ,lays and ,legends of ,ancient ,greece4 ,by ,,john ,,stuart ,,blackie1 ,emeritus ,professor of ,greek in the ,university of ,edinburgh4 ,second ,edition4 ,fcap4 #hvo1 #es4 ---- ,the ,wisdom of ,goethe4 ,fcap4 #hvo4 ,cloth1 extra gilt1 #fs4 ---- ,scottish ,song3 ,its ,wealth1 ,wisdom1 and ,social ,significance4 ,crown #hvo4 ,with ,music4 #gs4 #f;d4 ---- ,a ,song of ,heroes4 ,crown #hvo1 #fs4 ,,blackwood',s ,,magazine1 from ,commencement in #ahag to ,november #ahia4 ,nos4 #a to #iac1 forming #adh ,volumes4 ---- ,index to ,blackwood's ,magazine4 ,vols4 #a to #ej4 #hvo1 #aes4 ,,blackwood4 ,tales from ,blackwood4 ,price ,one ,shilling each1 in ,paper ,cover4 ,sold separately at all ,railway ,bookstalls4 ,they may also be had bound in cloth1 #ahs41 and in half calf1 richly gilt1 #cjs4 ,or #ab volumes in #f1 roxburghe1 #bas41 and half red morocco1 #bhs4 ---- ,tales from ,blackwood4 ,new ,series4 ,complete in ,twenty-four ,shilling ,parts4 ,handsomely bound in #ab vols41 cloth1 #cjs4 ,in leather back1 roxburghe style1 #cgs4 #f;d4 ,in half calf1 gilt1 #ebs4 #f;d4 ,in half morocco1 #ees4 ---- ,tales from ,blackwood4 ,third ,series4 ,complete in #f vols4 ,handsomely bound in cloth1 #aes42 or in #ab vols4 #ahs4 ,the #f vols4 bound in roxburghe1 #bas4 ,half calf1 #bes4 ,half morocco1 #bhs4 ,also in #ab parts1 price #as4 each4 ---- ,travel1 ,adventure1 and ,sport4 ,from ',blackwood's ,magazine4' ,uniform with ',tales from ,blackwood4' ,in ,twelve ,parts1 each price #as4 ,or handsomely bound in #f vols41 #aes4 ,half calf1 #bes4 ,,blackwood4 ,new ,uniform ,series of ,three-and-,sixpenny ,novels 7,copyright74 ,crown #hvo1 cloth4 ,now ready3-- ,,beggar ,,my ,,neighbour4 ,by ,e4 ,d4 ,gerard4 ,,the ,,waters ,,of ,,hercules4 ,by the ,same4 ,,sons ,,and ,,daughters4 ,by ,mrs ,oliphant4 ,,fair ,,to ,,see4 ,by ,l4 ,w4 ,m4 ,lockhart4 ,,the ,,revolt ,,of ,,man4 ,by ,walter ,besant4 ,,mine ,,is ,,thine4 ,by ,l4 ,w4 ,m4 ,lockhart4 ,,altiora ,,peto4 ,by ,laurence ,oliphant4 ,,doubles ,,and ,,quits4 ,by ,l4 ,w4 ,m4 ,lockhart4 ,,lady ,,baby4 ,by ,d4 ,gerard4 ,,hurrish4 ,by the ,hon4 ,emily ,lawless4 ,,the ,,blacksmith ,,of ,,voe4 ,by ,paul ,cushing4 ,,the ,,dilemma4 ,by the ,author of ',the ,battle of ,dorking4' ,,my ,,trivial ,,life ,,and ,,misfortune4 ,by ,a ,plain ,woman4 ,,piccadilly4 ,by ,laurence ,oliphant4 ,with ,illustrations4 ,others in preparation4 ---- ,standard ,novels4 ,uniform in size and legibly ,printed4 ,each ,novel complete in one volume4 ,,florin ,,series1 ,illustrated ,boards4 ,or in ,new ,cloth ,binding1 #bs4 #f;d4 ,,tom ,,cringle',s ,,log4 ,by ,michael ,scott4 ,,the ,,cruise ,,of ,,the ,,midge4 ,by the ,same4 ,,cyril ,,thornton4 ,by ,captain ,hamilton4 ,,annals ,,of ,,the ,,parish4 ,by ,john ,galt4 ,,the ,,provost1 c4 ,by ,john ,galt4 ,,sir ,,andrew ,,wylie4 ,by ,john ,galt4 ,,the ,,entail4 ,by ,john ,galt4 ,,miss ,,molly4 ,by ,beatrice ,may ,butt4 ,,reginald ,,dalton4 ,by ,j4 ,g4 ,lockhart4 ,,pen ,,owen4 ,by ,dean ,hook4 ,,adam ,,blair4 ,by ,j4 ,g4 ,lockhart4 ,,lady ,,lee',s ,,widowhood4 ,by ,general ,sir ,e4 ,b4 ,hamley4 ,,salem ,,chapel4 ,by ,mrs ,oliphant4 ,,the ,,perpetual ,,curate4 ,by ,mrs ,oliphant4 ,,miss ,,marjoribanks4 ,by ,mrs ,oliphant4 ,,john3 ,a ,love ,story4 ,by ,mrs ,oliphant4 ,,shilling ,,series1 ,illustrated ,cover4 ,or in ,new ,cloth ,binding1 #as4 #f;d4 ,,the ,,rector1 and ,,the ,,doctor',s ,,family4 ,by ,mrs ,oliphant4 ,,the ,,life ,,of ,,mansie ,,wauch4 ,by ,d4 ,m4 ,moir4 ,,peninsular ,,scenes ,,and ,,sketches4 ,by ,f4 ,hardman4 ,,sir ,,frizzle ,,pumpkin1 ,,nights ,,at ,,mess1 c4 ,,the ,,subaltern4 ,,life ,,in ,,the ,,far ,,west4 ,by ,g4 ,f4 ,ruxton4 ,,valerius3 ,a ,roman ,story4 ,by ,j4 ,g4 ,lockhart4 ,,blackmore4 ,the ,maid of ,sker4 ,by ,r4 ,d4 ,,blackmore1 ,author of ',lorna ,doone1' c4 ,new ,edition4 ,crown #hvo1 #fs4 ,,blair4 ,history of the ,catholic ,church of ,scotland4 ,from the ,introduction of ,christianity to the ,present ,day4 ,by ,,alphons ,,bellesheim1 ,d4,d41 ,canon of ,aix-la-,chapelle4 ,translated1 with ,notes and ,additions1 by ,d4 ,,oswald ,,hunter ,,blair1 ,o4,s4,b41 ,monk of ,fort ,augustus4 ,complete in #d vols4 demy #hvo1 with ,maps4 ,price #abs4 #f;d4 each4 ,,boscobel ,,tracts4 ,relating to the ,escape of ,charles the ,second after the ,battle of ,worcester1 and his subsequent ,adventures4 ,edited by ,j4 ,,hughes1 ,esq41 ,a4,m4 ,a ,new ,edition1 with additional ,notes and ,illustrations1 including ,communications from the ,rev4 ,r4 ,h4 ,,barham1 ,author of the ',ingoldsby ,legends4' #hvo1 with ,engravings1 #afs4 ,,brougham4 ,memoirs of the ,life and ,times of ,henry ,lord ,brougham4 ,written by ,,himself4 #c vols4 #hvo1 #b1 #hs4 ,the ,volumes are sold separately1 price #afs4 each4 ,,brown4 ,the ,forester3 ,a ,practical ,treatise on the ,planting1 ,rearing1 and ,general ,management of ,forest-trees4 ,by ,,james ,,brown1 ,,ll4,d41 ,inspector of and ,reporter on ,woods and ,forests4 ,fifth ,edition1 revised and enlarged4 ,royal #hvo1 with ,engravings1 #cfs4 ,,brown4 ,the ,ethics of ,george ,eliot's ,works4 ,by ,,john ,,crombie ,,brown4 ,fourth ,edition4 ,crown #hvo1 #bs4 #f;d4 ,,brown4 ,a ,manual of ,botany1 ,anatomical and ,physiological4 ,for the ,use of ,students4 ,by ,,robert ,,brown1 ,m4,a41 ,ph4,d4 ,crown #hvo1 with numerous ,illustrations1 #abs4 #f;d4 ,,bruce4 ,in ,clover and ,heather4 ,poems by ,,wallace ,,bruce4 ,new and ,enlarged ,edition4 ,crown #hvo1 #ds4 #f;d4 ,a limited number of ,copies of the ,first ,edition1 on large hand-made paper1 #abs4 #f;d4 ,,brydall4 ,art in ,scotland2 its ,origin and ,progress4 ,by ,,robert ,,brydall1 ,master of ,st ,george's ,art ,school of ,glasgow4 #hvo1 #abs4 #f;d4 ,,buchan4 ,introductory ,text-,book of ,meteorology4 ,by ,,alexander ,,buchan1 ,m4,a41 ,f4,r4,s4,e41 ,secretary of the ,scottish ,meteorological ,society1 c4 ,crown #hvo1 with #h ,coloured ,charts and ,engravings1 #ds4 #f;d4 ,,buchanan4 ,the ,shire ,highlands 7,east ,central ,africa74 ,by ,,john ,,buchanan1 ,planter at ,zomba4 ,crown #hvo1 #es4 ,,burbidge4 ,domestic ,floriculture1 ,window ,gardening1 and ,floral ,decorations4 ,being practical directions for the ,propagation1 ,culture1 and ,arrangement of ,plants and ,flowers as ,domestic ,ornaments4 ,by ,f4 ,w4 ,,burbidge4 ,second ,edition4 ,crown #hvo1 with numerous ,illustrations1 #gs4 #f;d4 ---- ,cultivated ,plants3 ,their ,propagation and ,improvement4 ,including ,natural and ,artificial ,hybridisation1 ,raising from ,seed1 ,cuttings1 and ,layers1 ,grafting and ,budding1 as applied to the ,families and ,genera in ,cultivation4 ,crown #hvo1 with numerous ,illustrations1 #abs4 #f;d4 ,,burton4 ,the ,history of ,scotland3 ,from ,agricola's ,invasion to the ,extinction of the last ,jacobite ,insurrection4 ,by ,,john ,,hill ,,burton1 ,d4,c4,l41 ,historiographer-,royal for ,scotland4 ,new and ,enlarged ,edition1 #h vols41 and ,index4 ,crown #hvo1 #c1 #cs4 ---- ,history of the ,british ,empire during the ,reign of ,queen ,anne4 ,in #c vols4 #hvo1 #cfs4 ---- ,the ,scot ,abroad4 ,third ,edition4 ,crown #hvo1 #ajs4 #f;d4 ---- ,the ,book-,hunter4 ,new ,edition4 ,with ,portrait4 ,crown #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,,bute4 ,the ,roman ,breviary3 ,reformed by ,order of the ,holy cumenical ,council of ,trent2 ,published by ,order of ,pope ,st ,pius ,v42 and ,revised by ,clement ,,viii4 and ,urban ,,viii42 together with the ,offices since granted4 ,translated out of ,latin into ,english by ,,john1 ,marquess of ,bute1 ,k4,t4 ,in #b vols41 crown #hvo1 cloth boards1 edges uncut4 #b1 #bs4 ---- ,the ,altus of ,st ,columba4 ,with a ,prose ,paraphrase and ,notes4 ,in paper cover1 #bs4 #f;d4 ,,butler4 ,pompeii3 ,descriptive and ,picturesque4 ,by ,w4 ,,butler4 ,post #hvo1 #es4 ,,butt4 ,miss ,molly4 ,by ,,beatrice ,,may ,,butt4 ,cheap ,edition1 #bs4 ---- ,eugenie4 ,crown #hvo1 #fs4 #f;d4 ---- ,elizabeth1 and ,other ,sketches4 ,crown #hvo1 #fs4 ---- ,novels4 ,new and ,uniform ,edition4 ,crown #hvo1 each #bs4 #f;d4 ,delicia4 ,now ready4 ,,caird4 ,sermons4 ,by ,,john ,,caird1 ,d4,d41 ,principal of the ,university of ,glasgow4 ,sixteenth ,thousand4 ,fcap4 #hvo1 #es4 ---- ,religion in ,common ,life4 ,a ,sermon preached in ,crathie ,church1 ,october #ad1 #ahee1 before ,her ,majesty the ,queen and ,prince ,albert4 ,published by ,her ,majesty's ,command4 ,cheap ,edition1 #c;d4 ,,campbell4 ,critical ,studies in ,st ,luke's ,gospel3 ,its ,demonology and ,ebionitism4 ,by ,,colin ,,campbell1 ,b4,d41 ,minister of the ,parish of ,dundee1 formerly ,scholar and ,fellow of ,glasgow ,university4 ,author of the ',three ,first ,gospels in ,greek1 arranged in parallel columns4' ,post #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,,campbell4 ,sermons ,preached before the ,queen at ,balmoral4 ,by the ,rey4 ,a4 ,a4 ,,campbell1 ,minister of ,crathie4 ,published by ,command of ,her ,majesty4 ,crown #hvo1 #ds4 #f;d4 ,,campbell4 ,records of ,argyll4 ,legends1 ,traditions1 and ,recollections of ,argyllshire ,highlanders1 collected chiefly from the ,gaelic4 ,with ,notes on the ,antiquity of the ,dress1 ,clan ,colours or ,tartans of the ,highlanders4 ,by ,,lord ,,archibald ,,campbell4 ,illustrated with ,nineteen full-page ,etchings4 #dto1 printed on hand-made paper1 #c1 #cs4 ,,canton4 ,a ,lost ,epic1 and other ,poems4 ,by ,,william ,,canton4 ,crown #hvo1 #es4 ,,carrick4 ,koumiss2 or1 ,fermented ,mare's ,milk3 and its ,uses in the ,treatment and ,cure of ,pulmonary ,consumption1 and other ,wasting ,diseases4 ,with an ,appendix on the best ,methods of ,fermenting ,cow's ,milk4 ,by ,,george ,l4 ,,carrick1 ,m4,d41 ,l4,r4,c4,s4,e4 and ,l4,r4,c4,p4,e41 ,physician to the ,british ,embassy1 ,st ,petersburg1 c4 ,crown #hvo1 #ajs4 #f;d4 ,,carstairs4 ,british ,work in ,india4 ,by ,r4 ,,carstairs4 ,cr4 #hvo1 #fs4 ,,cauvin4 ,a ,treasury of the ,english and ,german ,languages4 ,compiled from the best ,authors and ,lexicographers in both ,languages4 ,by ,,joseph ,,cauvin1 ,,ll4,d4 and ,ph4,d41 of the ,university of ,gttingen1 c4 ,crown #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,,cave-,,brown4 ,lambeth ,palace and its ,associations4 ,by ,j4 ,,cave-,,brown1 ,m4,a41 ,vicar of ,detling1 ,kent1 and for many years ,curate of ,lambeth ,parish ,church4 ,with an ,introduction by the ,archbishop of ,canterbury4 ,second ,edition1 containing an additional ,chapter on ,medieval ,life in the ,old ,palaces4 #hvo1 with ,illustrations1 #bas4 ,,charteris4 ,canonicity2 or1 ,early ,testimonies to the ,existence and ,use of the ,books of the ,new ,testament4 ,based on ,kirchhoffer's ',quellensammlung4' ,edited by ,a4 ,h4 ,,charteris1 ,d4,d41 ,professor of ,biblical ,criticism in the ,university of ,edinburgh4 #hvo1 #ahs4 ,,christison4 ,life of ,sir ,robert ,christison1 ,bart41 ,m4,d41 ,d4,c4,l4 ,oxon41 ,professor of ,medical ,jurisprudence in the ,university of ,edinburgh4 ,edited by his ,,sons4 ,in two vols4 #hvo4 ,vol4 ,i4--,autobiography4 #afs4 ,vol4 ,,ii4--,memoirs4 #afs4 ,,church ,,service ,,society4 ,a ,book of ,common ,order3 ,being ,forms of ,worship issued by the ,church ,service ,society4 ,sixth ,edition4 ,crown1 #hvo1 #fs4 ,also in #b vols1 crown #hvo1 #fs4 #f;d4 ,,cleland4 ,too ,apt a ,pupil4 ,by ,,robert ,,cleland4 ,author of ',barbara ,allan1 the ,provost's ,daughter4' ,crown #hvo1 #fs4 ,,clouston4 ,popular ,tales and ,fictions3 their ,migrations and ,transformations4 ,by ,w4 ,a4 ,,clouston1 ,editor of ',arabian ,poetry for ,english ,readers1' c4 #b vols4 post #hvo1 roxburghe binding1 #bes4 ,,cobban4 ,master of his ,fate4 ,by ,j4 ,,maclaren ,,cobban1 ,author of ',the ,cure of ,souls1' ',tinted ,vapours1' c4 ,new and ,cheaper ,edition4 ,crown #hvo1 paper cover1 #as4 ,cloth1 bevelled boards1 #cs4 #f;d4 ,,cochran4 ,a ,handy ,text-,book of ,military ,law4 ,compiled chiefly to assist ,officers preparing for ,examination2 also for all ,officers of the ,regular and ,auxiliary ,forces4 ,comprising also a ,synopsis of part of the ,army ,act4 ,by ,major ,f4 ,,cochran1 ,hampshire ,regiment ,garrison ,instructor1 ,north ,british ,district4 ,crown #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,,colquhoun4 ,the ,moor and the ,loch4 ,containing ,minute ,instructions in all ,highland ,sports1 with ,wanderings over ,crag and ,corrie1 ,flood and ,fell4 ,by ,,john ,,colquhoun4 ,seventh ,edition4 ,with ,illustrations4 #hvo1 #bas4 ,,cotterill4 ,suggested ,reforms in ,public ,schools4 ,by ,c4 ,c4 ,,cotterill1 ,m4,a4 ,crown #hvo1 #cs4 #f;d4 ,,cranstoun4 ,the ,elegies of ,albius ,tibullus4 ,translated into ,english ,verse1 with ,life of the ,poet1 and ,illustrative ,notes4 ,by ,,james ,,cranstoun1 ,,ll4,d41 ,author of a ,translation of ',catullus4' ,crown #hvo1 #fs4 #f;d4 ---- ,the ,elegies of ,sextus ,propertius4 ,translated into ,english ,verse1 with ,life of the ,poet1 and ,illustrative ,notes4 ,crown #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,,crawford4 ,saracinesca4 ,by ,f4 ,,marion ,,crawford1 ,author of ',mr ,isaacs1' ',dr ,claudius1' ',zoroaster1' c4 c4 ,fifth ,ed4 ,crown #hvo1 #fs4 ,,crawford4 ,the ,doctrine of ,holy ,scripture respecting the ,atonement4 ,by the late ,,thomas ,j4 ,,crawford1 ,d4,d41 ,professor of ,divinity in the ,university of ,edinburgh4 ,fifth ,edition4 #hvo1 #abs4 ---- ,the ,fatherhood of ,god1 ,considered in its ,general and ,special ,aspects4 ,third ,edition1 ,revised and ,enlarged4 #hvo1 #is4 ---- ,the ,preaching of the ,cross1 and other ,sermons4 #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ---- ,the ,mysteries of ,christianity4 ,crown #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,,crawford4 ,an ,atonement of ,east ,london1 and other ,poems4 ,by ,,howard ,,crawford1 ,m4,a4 ,crown #hvo1 #es4 ,,cushing4 ,the ,blacksmith of ,voe4 ,by ,,paul ,,cushing1 ,author of ',the ,bull i' th' ,thorn4' ,cheap ,edition4 ,crown #hvo1 #cs4 #f;d4 ---- ,cut with his own ,diamond4 ,a ,novel4 #c vols4 cr4 #hvo1 #bes4 #f;d4 ,,davies4 ,norfolk ,broads and ,rivers2 or1 ,the ,waterways1 ,lagoons1 and ,decoys of ,east ,anglia4 ,by ,g4 ,,christopher ,,davies4 ,illustrated with ,seven full-page ,plates4 ,new and ,cheaper ,edition4 ,crown #hvo1 #fs4 ---- ,our ,home in ,aveyron4 ,sketches of ,peasant ,life in ,aveyron and the ,lot4 ,by ,g4 ,,christopher ,,davies and ,mrs ,,broughall4 ,illustrated with full-page ,illustrations4 #hvo1 #aes4 ,cheap ,edition1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,,dayne4 ,in the ,name of the ,tzar4 ,a ,novel4 ,by ,j4 ,,belford ,,dayne4 ,crown #hvo1 #fs4 ---- ,tribute to ,satan4 ,a ,novel4 ,crown #hvo1 #bs4 #f;d4 ,,de ,,la ,,warr4 ,an ,eastern ,cruise in the ',edeline4' ,by the ,countess ,,de ,,la ,,warr4 ,in ,illustrated ,cover4 #bs4 ,,descartes4 ,the ,method1 ,meditations1 and ,principles of ,philosophy of ,descartes4 ,translated from the ,original ,french and ,latin4 ,with a ,new ,introductory ,essay1 ,historical and ,critical1 on the ,cartesian ,philosophy4 ,by ,professor ,,veitch1 ,,ll4,d41 ,glasgow ,university4 ,ninth ,edition4 #fs4 #f;d4 ,,dickson4 ,gleanings from ,japan4 ,by ,w4 ,g4 ,,dickson1 ,author of ',japan3 ,being a ,sketch of its ,history1 ,government1 and ,officers of the ,empire4' ,with ,illustrations4 #hvo1 #afs4 ,,dogs1 ,,our ,,domesticated3 ,their ,treatment in reference to ,food1 ,diseases1 ,habits1 ,punishment1 ,accomplishments4 ,by ',,magenta4' ,crown #hvo1 #bs4 #f;d4 ,,domestic ,,experiment1 ,a4 ,by the ,author of ',ideala3 ,a ,study from ,life4' ,crown #hvo1 #fs4 ,,dr ,,hermione4 ,by the ,author of ',lady ,bluebeard1' ',zit and ,xoe4' ,crown #hvo1 #fs4 ,,du ,,cane4 ,the ,odyssey of ,homer1 ,books ,i4-,,xii4 ,translated into ,english ,verse4 ,by ,sir ,,charles ,,du ,,cane1 ,k4,c4,m4,g4 #hvo1 #ajs4 #f;d4 ,,dudgeon4 ,history of the ,edinburgh or ,queen's ,regiment ,light ,infantry ,militia1 now #crd ,battalion ,the ,royal ,scots2 with an ,account of the ,origin and ,progress of the ,militia1 and a ,brief ,sketch of the old ,royal ,scots4 ,by ,major ,r4 ,c4 ,,dudgeon1 ,adjutant #crd ,battalion ,the ,royal ,scots4 ,post #hvo1 with ,illustrations1 #ajs4 #f;d4 ,,duncan4 ,manual of the ,general ,acts of ,parliament relating to the ,salmon ,fisheries of ,scotland from #ahbh to #ahhb4 ,by ,j4 ,,barker ,,duncan4 ,crown #hvo1 #es4 ,,dunsmore4 ,manual of the ,law of ,scotland as to the ,relations between ,agricultural ,tenants and their ,landlords1 ,servants1 ,merchants1 and ,bowers4 ,by ,w4 ,,dunsmore4 #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,,dupr4 ,thoughts on ,art1 and ,autobiographical ,memoirs of ,giovanni ,dupr4 ,translated from the ,italian by ,e4 ,m4 ,,peruzzi1 with the permission of the ,author4 ,new ,edition4 ,with an ,introduction by ,w4 ,w4 ,,story4 ,crown #hvo1 #ajs4 #f;d4 ,,eliot4 ,george ,eliot's ,life1 ,related in her ,letters and ,journals4 ,arranged and ,edited by her husband1 ,j4 ,w4 ,,cross4 ,with ,portrait and other ,illustrations4 ,third ,edition4 #c vols4 post #hvo1 #dbs4 ---- ,george ,eliot's ,life4 7,cabinet ,edition47 ,with ,portrait and other ,illustrations4 #c vols4 crown #hvo1 #aes4 ---- ,george ,eliot's ,life4 ,with ,portrait and other ,illustrations4 ,new ,edition1 in one volume4 ,crown #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ---- ,works of ,george ,eliot 7,cabinet ,edition74 ,handsomely printed in a new type1 #ba volumes1 crown #hvo1 price1 #e1 #es4 ,the ,volumes are also sold separately1 price #es4 each1 viz43-- ,romola4 #b vols4--,silas ,marner1 ,the ,lifted ,veil1 ,brother ,jacob4 #a vol4--,adam ,bede4 #b vols4--,scenes of ,clerical ,life4 #b vols4--,the ,mill on the ,floss4 #b vols4--,felix ,holt4 #b vols4--,middlemarch4 #c vols4--,daniel ,deronda4 #c vols4--,the ,spanish ,gypsy4 #a vol4--,jubal1 and other ,poems1 ,old and ,new4 #a vol4--,theophrastus ,such4 #a vol4--,essays4 #a vol4 ---- ,novels by ,,george ,,eliot4 ,cheap ,edition4 ,adam ,bede4 ,illustrated4 #cs4 #f;d41 cloth4--,the ,mill on the ,floss4 ,illustrated4 #cs4 #f;d41 cloth4--,scenes of ,clerical ,life4 ,illustrated4 #cs41 cloth4--,silas ,marner3 the ,weaver of ,raveloe4 ,illustrated4 #bs4 #f;d41 cloth4--,felix ,holt1 the ,radical4 ,illustrated4 #cs4 #f;d41 cloth4--,romola4 ,with ,vignette4 #cs4 #f;d41 cloth4 ---- ,middlemarch4 ,crown #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ---- ,daniel ,deronda4 ,crown #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ---- ,essays4 ,new ,edition4 ,crown #hvo1 #es4 ---- ,impressions of ,theophrastus ,such4 ,new ,ed4 ,cr4 #hvo1 #es4 ---- ,the ,spanish ,gypsy4 ,new ,edition4 ,crown #hvo1 #es4 ---- ,the ,legend of ,jubal1 and other ,poems1 ,old and ,new4 ,new ,edition4 ,crown #hvo1 #es4 ---- ,wise1 ,witty1 and ,tender ,sayings1 in ,prose and ,verse4 ,selected from the ,works of ,,george ,,eliot4 ,eighth ,edition4 ,fcap4 #hvo #fs4 ---- ,the ,george ,eliot ,birthday ,book4 ,printed on fine paper1 with red border1 and handsomely bound in cloth1 gilt4 ,fcap4 #hvo1 cloth1 #cs4 #f;d4 ,and in ,french morocco or ,russia1 #es4 ,,essays ,,on ,,social ,,subjects4 ,originally published in the ',saturday ,review4' ,new ,ed4 ,first ,second ,series4 #b vols4 cr4 #hvo1 #fs4 each4 ,,ewald4 ,the ,crown and its ,advisers2 or1 ,queen1 ,ministers1 ,lords and ,commons4 ,by ,,alexander ,,charles ,,ewald1 ,f4,s4,a4 ,crown #hvo1 #es4 ,,faiths ,,of ,,the ,,world1 ,the4 ,a ,concise ,history of the ,great ,religious ,systems of the ,world4 ,by various ,authors4 ,crown #hvo1 #es4 ,,farrer4 ,a ,tour in ,greece in #ahhj4 ,by ,,richard ,,ridley ,,farrer4 ,with ,twenty-seven full-page ,illustrations by ,,lord ,,windsor4 ,royal #hvo1 with a ,map1 #bas4 ,,ferrier4 ,philosophical ,works of the late ,james ,f4 ,ferrier1 ,b4,a4 ,oxon41 ,professor of ,moral ,philosophy and ,political ,economy1 ,st ,andrews4 ,new ,edition4 ,edited by ,sir ,,alex4 ,,grant1 ,bart41 ,d4,c4,l41 and ,professor ,,lushington4 #c vols4 crown #hvo1 #cds4 #f;d4 ---- ,institutes of ,metaphysic4 ,third ,edition4 #ajs4 #f;d4 ---- ,lectures on the ,early ,greek ,philosophy4 #c;d ,ed4 #ajs4 #f;d4 ---- ,philosophical ,remains1 including the ,lectures on ,early ,greek ,philosophy4 #b vols41 #bds4 ,,fitzroy4 ,dogma and the ,church of ,england4 ,by ,a4 ,i4 ,,fitzroy4 ,post #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,,flint4 ,the ,philosophy of ,history in ,europe4 ,by ,,robert ,,flint1 ,d4,d41 ,,ll4,d41 ,professor of ,divinity1 ,university of ,edinburgh4 #b vols4 #hvo4 ,new ,edition in preparation4 ---- ,theism4 ,being the ,baird ,lecture for #ahgf4 ,seventh ,edition4 ,crown #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ---- ,anti-,theistic ,theories4 ,being the ,baird ,lecture for #ahgg4 ,fourth ,edition4 ,crown #hvo1 #ajs4 #f;d4 ---- ,agnosticism4 ,being the ,croall ,lectures for #ahhg-hh4 ,in the press4 ,,forbes4 ,insulinde3 ,experiences of a ,naturalist's ,wife in the ,eastern ,archipelago4 ,by ,mrs ,h4 ,o4 ,,forbes4 ,crown #hvo1 with a ,map4 #ds4 #f;d4 ,,foreign ,,classics ,,for ,,english ,,readers4 ,edited by ,mrs ,,oliphant4 ,price #bs4 #f;d4 ,for ,list of ,volumes published1 see page #b4 ,,foster4 ,the ,fallen ,city1 and ,other ,poems4 ,by ,,will ,,foster4 ,in #a vol4 ,crown #hvo4 ,immediately4 ,,fullarton4 ,merlin3 ,a ,dramatic ,poem4 ,by ,,ralph ,,macleod ,,fullarton4 ,crown #hvo1 #es4 ,,galt4 ,novels by ,,john ,,galt4 ,fcap4 #hvo1 boards1 #bs42 cloth1 #bs4 #f;d4 ,annals of the ,parish4--,the ,provost4--,sir ,andrew ,wylie4--,the ,entail4 ,,general ,,assembly ,,of ,,the ,,church ,,of ,,scotland4 ---- ,prayers for ,social and ,family ,worship4 ,prepared by a ,special ,committee of the ,general ,assembly of the ,church of ,scotland4 ,entirely ,new ,edition1 ,revised and ,enlarged4 ,fcap4 #hvo red edges1 #bs4 ---- ,prayers for ,family ,worship4 ,a ,selection from the complete book4 ,fcap4 #hvo1 red edges1 price #as4 ---- ,scottish ,hymnal1 with ,appendix ,incorporated4 ,published for ,use in ,churches by ,authority of the ,general ,assembly4 #a4 ,large type1 cloth1 red edges1 #bs4 #f;d42 ,french morocco1 #ds4 #b4 ,bourgeois type1 limp cloth1 #as42 ,french morocco1 #bs4 #c4 ,nonpareil type1 cloth1 red edges1 #f;d42 ,french morocco1 #as4 #d;d4 #d4 ,paper covers1 #c;d4 #e4 ,sunday-,school ,edition1 paper covers1 #a;d4 ,no4 #a1 bound with the ,psalms and ,paraphrases1 ,french morocco1 #hs4 ,no4 #b1 bound with the ,psalms and ,paraphrases1 cloth1 #bs42 ,french morocco1 #cs4 ,,gerard4 ,reata3 ,what's in a ,name4 ,by ,e4 ,d4 ,,gerard4 ,new ,edition4 ,crown #hvo1 #fs4 ---- ,beggar my ,neighbour4 ,cheap ,edition4 ,crown #hvo1 #cs4 #f;d4 ---- ,the ,waters of ,hercules4 ,cheap ,edition4 ,crown #hvo1 #cs4 #f;d4 ,,gerard4 ,the ,land beyond the ,forest4 ,facts1 ,figures1 and ,fancies from ,transylvania4 ,by ,e4 ,,gerard4 ,in ,two ,volumes4 ,with ,maps and ,illustrations4 #bes4 ---- ,bis3 ,some ,tales ,retold4 ,crown #hvo1 #fs4 ---- ,a ,secret ,mission4 #b vols4 crown #hvo1 #ags4 ,,gerard4 ,lady ,baby4 ,by ,,dorothea ,,gerard1 ,author of ',orthodox4' ,cheap ,edition4 ,crown #hvo1 #cs4 #f;d4 ---- ,recha4 ,second ,edition4 ,crown #hvo1 #fs4 ,,gerard4 ,stonyhurst ,latin ,grammar4 ,by ,rev4 ,,john ,,gerard4 ,fcap4 #hvo1 #cs4 ,,gill4 ,free ,trade3 an ,inquiry into the ,nature of its ,operation4 ,by ,,richard ,,gill4 ,crown #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ---- ,free ,trade under ,protection4 ,crown #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,,goethe',s ,,faust4 ,translated into ,english ,verse by ,sir ,,theodore ,,martin1 ,k4,c4,b4 ,part ,i4 ,second ,edition1 post #hvo1 #fs4 ,ninth ,edition1 fcap41 #cs4 #f;d4 ,part ,,ii4 ,second ,edition1 revised4 ,fcap4 #hvo1 #fs4 ,,goethe4 ,poems and ,ballads of ,goethe4 ,translated by ,professor ,,aytoun and ,sir ,,theodore ,,martin1 ,k4,c4,b4 ,third ,edition1 fcap4 #hvo1 #fs4 ,,goodall4 ,juxta ,crucem4 ,studies of the ,love that is over us4 ,by the late ,rev4 ,,charles ,,goodall1 ,b4,d41 ,minister of ,barr4 ,with a ,memoir by ,rev4 ,dr ,strong1 ,glasgow1 and ,portrait4 ,crown #hvo1 #fs4 ,,gordon ,,cumming4 ,two ,happy ,years in ,ceylon4 ,by ,c4 ,f4 ,,gordon ,,cumming4 ,with #ae full-page ,illustrations and a ,map4 #b vols4 #hvo1 #cjs4 ---- ,at ,home in ,fiji4 ,fourth ,edition1 post #hvo4 ,with ,illustrations and ,map4 #gs4 #f;d4 ---- ,a ,lady's ,cruise in a ,french ,man-of-,war4 ,new and ,cheaper ,edition4 #hvo4 ,with ,illustrations and ,map4 #abs4 #f;d4 ---- ,fire-,fountains4 ,the ,kingdom of ,hawaii3 ,its ,volcanoes1 and the ,history of its ,missions4 ,with ,map and ,illustrations4 #b vols4 #hvo1 #bes4 ---- ,wanderings in ,china4 ,new and ,cheaper ,edition4 #hvo1 with ,illustrations1 #ajs4 ---- ,granite ,crags3 ,the ,y-semit ,region of ,california4 ,illustrated with #h ,engravings4 ,new and ,cheaper ,edition4 #hvo1 #hs4 #f;d4 ,,graham4 ,the ,life and ,work of ,syed ,ahmed ,khan1 ,c4,s4,i4 ,by ,lieut4-,colonel ,g4 ,f4 ,i4 ,,graham1 ,b4,s4,c4 #hvo1 #ads4 ,,graham4 ,manual of the ,elections 7,scot47 7,corrupt and ,illegal ,practices7 ,act1 #ahij4 ,with ,analysis1 ,relative ,act of ,sederunt1 ,appendix containing the ,corrupt ,practices ,acts of #ahhc and #ahhe1 and ,copious ,index4 ,by ,j4 ,,edward ,,graham1 ,advocate4 #hvo1 #ds4 #f;d4 ,,grant4 ,bush-,life in ,queensland4 ,by ,a4 ,c4 ,,grant4 ,new ,edition4 ,crown #hvo1 #fs4 ,,griffiths4 ,locked ,up4 ,by ,major ,,arthur ,,griffiths1 ,author of ',the ,wrong ,road1' ',chronicles of ,newgate1' c4 ,with ,illustrations by ,c4 ,j4 ,,staniland1 ,r4,i4 ,crown #hvo1 #bs4 #f;d4 ,,guthrie-,,smith4 ,crispus3 ,a ,drama4 ,by ,h4 ,,guthrie-,,smith4 ,in one volume4 ,fcap4 #dto1 #es4 ,,haines4 ,unless6 ,a ,romance4 ,by ,,randolph ,,haines4 ,crown #hvo1 #fs4 ,,haldane4 ,subtropical ,cultivations and ,climates4 ,a ,handy ,book for ,planters1 ,colonists1 and ,settlers4 ,by ,r4 ,c4 ,,haldane4 ,post #hvo1 #is4 ,,hallett4 ,a ,thousand ,miles on an ,elephant in the ,shan ,states4 ,by ,,holt ,s4 ,,hallett1 ,m4 ,inst4 ,c4,e41 ,f4,r4,g4,s41 ,m4,r4,a4,s41 ,hon4 ,member ,manchester and ,tyneside ,geographical ,societies4 #hvo1 with ,maps and numerous ,illustrations1 #bas4 ,,hamerton4 ,wenderholme3 ,a ,story of ,lancashire and ,yorkshire ,life4 ,by ,,philip ,,gilbert ,,hamerton1 ,author of ',a ,painter's ,camp4' ,a ,new ,edition4 ,crown #hvo4 #fs4 ,,hamilton4 ,lectures on ,metaphysics4 ,by ,sir ,,william ,,hamilton1 ,bart41 ,professor of ,logic and ,metaphysics in the ,university of ,edinburgh4 ,edited by the ,rev4 ,h4 ,l4 ,,mansel1 ,b4,d41 ,,ll4,d41 ,dean of ,st ,paul's2 and ,,john ,,veitch1 ,m4,a41 ,,ll4,d41 ,professor of ,logic and ,rhetoric1 ,glasgow4 ,seventh ,edition4 #b vols4 #hvo1 #bds4 ---- ,lectures on ,logic4 ,edited by the ,,same4 ,third ,edition4 #b vols41 #bds4 ---- ,discussions on ,philosophy and ,literature1 ,education and ,university ,reform4 ,third ,edition1 #hvo1 #bas4 ---- ,memoir of ,sir ,william ,hamilton1 ,bart41 ,professor of ,logic and ,metaphysics in the ,university of ,edinburgh4 ,by ,professor ,,veitch1 of the ,university of ,glasgow4 #hvo1 with ,portrait1 #ahs4 ---- ,sir ,william ,hamilton3 ,the ,man and his ,philosophy4 ,two ,lectures delivered before the ,edinburgh ,philosophical ,institution1 ,january and ,february #ahhc4 ,by the ,,same4 ,crown #hvo1 #bs4 ,,hamley4 ,the ,operations of ,war ,explained and ,illustrated4 ,by ,general ,sir ,,edward ,,bruce ,,hamley1 ,k4,c4,b41 ,k4,c4,m4,g41 ,m4,p4 ,fifth ,edition1 revised throughout4 #dto1 with numerous ,illustrations1 #cjs4 ---- ,national ,defence2 ,articles and ,speeches4 ,post #hvo1 #fs4 ---- ,shakespeare's ,funeral1 and other ,papers4 ,post #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ---- ,thomas ,carlyle3 ,an ,essay4 ,second ,ed4 ,cr4 #hvo1 #bs4 #f;d4 ---- ,on ,outposts4 ,second ,edition4 #hvo1 #bs4 ---- ,wellington's ,career2 ,a ,military and ,political ,summary4 ,crown #hvo1 #bs4 ---- ,lady ,lee's ,widowhood4 ,crown #hvo1 #bs4 #f;d4 ---- ,our ,poor ,relations4 ,a ,philozoic ,essay4 ,with ,illustrations1 chiefly by ,ernest ,griset4 ,crown #hvo1 cloth gilt1 #cs4 #f;d4 ,,hamley4 ,guilty1 or ,not ,guilty8 ,a ,tale4 ,by ,major-,general ,w4 ,g4 ,,hamley1 late of the ,royal ,engineers4 ,new ,edition4 ,crown #hvo1 #cs4 #f;d4 ,,harrison4 ,the ,scot in ,ulster4 ,the ,story of the ,scottish ,settlement in ,ulster4 ,by ,,john ,,harrison1 ,author of ',oure ,tounis ,colledge4' ,crown #hvo1 #bs4 #f;d4 ,,hasell4 ,bible ,partings4 ,by ,e4 ,j4 ,,hasell4 ,crown #hvo1 #fs4 ---- ,short ,family ,prayers4 ,cloth1 #as4 ,,hay4 ,the ,works of the ,right ,rev4 ,dr ,george ,hay1 ,bishop of ,edinburgh4 ,edited under the ,supervision of the ,right ,rev4 ,bishop ,,strain4 ,with ,memoir and ,portrait of the ,author4 #e vols4 crown #hvo1 bound in extra cloth1 #a1 #as4 ,the following ,volumes may be had separately--viz43 ,the ,devout ,christian ,instructed in the ,law of ,christ from the ,written ,word4 #b vols41 #hs4--,the ,pious ,christian ,instructed in the ,nature and ,practice of the ,principal ,exercises of ,piety4 #a vol4 #cs4 ,,heatley4 ,the ,horse-,owner's ,safeguard4 ,a ,handy ,medical ,guide for every ,man who owns a ,horse4 ,by ,g4 ,s4 ,,heatley1 ,m4,r4,c4,v4,s4 ,crown #hvo1 #es4 ---- ,the ,stock-,owner's ,guide4 ,a ,handy ,medical ,treatise for every ,man who owns an ,ox or a ,cow4 ,crown #hvo1 #ds4 #f;d4 ,,hedderwick4 ,lays of ,middle ,age2 and other ,poems4 ,by ,,james ,,hedderwick1 ,,ll4,d4 ,price #cs4 #f;d4 ---- ,backward ,glances2 or1 ,some ,personal ,recollections4 ,with a ,portrait4 ,post #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,,hemans4 ,the ,poetical ,works of ,mrs ,hemans4 ,copyright ,editions4--,royal #hvo1 #es4--,the ,same1 with ,engravings1 cloth1 gilt edges1 #gs4 #f;d4--,six ,vols4 in ,three1 fcap41 #abs4 #f;d4 ,,select ,,poems ,,of ,,mrs ,,hemans4 ,fcap41 cloth1 gilt edges1 #cs4 ,,herkless4 ,cardinal ,beaton3 ,priest and ,politician4 ,by ,,john ,,herkless1 ,minister of ,taunadice4 ,with a ,portrait4 ,post #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,,home ,,prayers4 ,by ,ministers of the ,church of ,scotland and ,members of the ,church ,service ,society4 ,second ,edition4 ,fcap4 #hvo1 #cs4 ,,homer4 ,the ,odyssey4 ,translated into ,english ,verse in the ,spenserian ,stanza4 ,by ,,philip ,,stanhope ,,worsley4 ,third ,edition1 #b vols4 fcap41 #abs4 ---- ,the ,iliad4 ,translated by ,p4 ,s4 ,,worsley and ,professor ,,conington4 #b vols4 crown #hvo1 #bas4 ,,hutchinson4 ,hints on the ,game of ,golf4 ,by ,,horace ,g4 ,,hutchinson4 ,sixth ,edition1 ,enlarged4 ,fcap4 #hvo1 cloth1 #as4 ,,iddesleigh4 ,lectures and ,essays4 ,by the late ,,earl ,,of ,,iddesleigh1 ,g4,c4,b41 ,d4,c4,l41 c4 #hvo1 #afs4 ---- ,life1 ,letters1 and ,diaries of ,sir ,stafford ,northcote1 ,first ,earl of ,iddesleigh4 ,by ,,andrew ,,lang4 ,with ,three ,portraits and a ,view of ,pynes4 ,third ,edition4 #b vols ,post #hvo1 #cas4 #f;d4 ,,popular ,,edition4 ,in one volume4 ,with two ,engravings4 ,post #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,,index ,,geographicus3 ,being a ,list1 alphabetically arranged1 of the ,principal ,places on the ,globe1 with the ,countries and ,subdivisions of the ,countries in which they are situated1 and their ,latitudes and ,longitudes4 ,imperial #hvo1 pp4 #fgf1 #bas4 ,,jean ,,jambon4 ,our ,trip to ,blunderland2 or1 ,grand ,excursion to ,blundertown and ,back4 ,by ,,jean ,,jambon4 ,with ,sixty ,illustrations designed by ,,charles ,,doyle1 engraved by ,,dalziel4 ,fourth ,thousand4 ,cloth1 gilt edges1 #fs4 #f;d4 ,cheap ,edition1 cloth1 #cs4 #f;d4 ,boards1 #bs4 #f;d4 ,,jennings4 ,mr ,gladstone3 ,a ,study4 ,by ,,louis ,j4 ,,jennings1 ,m4,p41 ,author of ',republican ,government in the ,united ,states1' ',the ,croker ,memoirs1' c4 ,popular ,edition4 ,crown #hvo1 #as4 ,,jerningham4 ,reminiscences of an ,attach4 ,by ,,hubert ,e4 ,h4 ,,jerningham4 ,second ,edition4 ,crown #hvo1 #es4 ---- ,diane de ,breteuille4 ,a ,love ,story4 ,crown #hvo1 #bs4 #f;d4 ,,johnston4 ,the ,chemistry of ,common ,life4 ,by ,professor ,j4 ,f4 ,w4 ,,johnston4 ,new ,edition1 ,revised1 and brought down to date4 ,by ,,arthur ,,herbert ,,church1 ,m4,a4 ,oxon42 ,author of ',food3 its ,sources1 ,constituents1 and ,uses1' c4 ,with ,maps and #ajb ,engravings4 ,cr4 #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ---- ,elements of ,agricultural ,chemistry and ,geology4 ,revised1 and brought down to date4 ,by ,sir ,,charles ,a4 ,,cameron1 ,m4,d41 ,f4,r4,c4,s4,i41 c4 ,sixteenth ,edition4 ,fcap4 #hvo1 #fs4 #f;d4 ---- ,catechism of ,agricultural ,chemistry and ,geology4 ,new ,edition1 revised and enlarged1 by ,sir ,c4 ,a4 ,,cameron4 ,eighty-sixth ,thousand1 with numerous ,illustrations1 #as4 ,,johnston4 ,patrick ,hamilton3 a ,tragedy of the ,reformation in ,scotland1 #aebh4 ,by ,t4 ,p4 ,,johnston4 ,crown #hvo1 with ,two ,etchings4 #es4 ,,ker4 ,short ,studies on ,st ,paul's ,letter to the ,philippians4 ,by ,rev4 ,,william ,,lee ,,ker1 ,minister of ,kilwinning4 ,crown #hvo1 #es4 ,,king4 ,the ,metamorphoses of ,ovid4 ,translated in ,english ,blank ,verse4 ,by ,,henry ,,king1 ,m4,a41 ,fellow of ,wadham ,college1 ,oxford1 and of the ,inner ,temple1 ,barrister-at-,law4 ,crown #hvo1 #ajs4 #f;d4 ,,kinglake4 ,history of the ,invasion of the ,crimea4 ,by ,a4 ,w4 ,,kinglake4 ,cabinet ,edition1 revised4 ,with an ,index to the ,complete ,work4 ,illustrated with ,maps and ,plans4 ,complete in #i ,vols41 crown #hvo1 at #fs4 each4 ---- ,history of the ,invasion of the ,crimea4 ,demy #hvo4 ,vol4 ,,vi4 ,winter ,troubles4 ,with a ,map1 #afs4 ,vols4 ,,vii4 and ,,viii4 ,from the ,morrow of ,inkerman to the ,death of ,lord ,raglan4 ,with an ,index to the ,whole ,work4 ,with ,maps and ,plans4 #bhs4 ---- ,eothen4 ,a ,new ,edition1 uniform with the ,cabinet ,edition of the ',history of the ,invasion of the ,crimea1' price #fs4 ,,kneipp4 ,my ,water-,cure4 ,as ,tested through more than ,thirty ,years1 and ,described for the ,healing of ,diseases and the ,preservation of ,health4 ,by ,,sebastian ,,kneipp1 ,parish ,priest of ,wrishofen 7,bavaria74 ,with a ,portrait and other ,illustrations4 ,only ,authorised ,english ,translation4 ,translated from the ,thirtieth ,german ,edition by ,a4 de ,f4 ,crown #hvo1 #es4 ,,knollys4 ,the ,elements of ,field-,artillery4 ,designed for the ,use of ,infantry and ,cavalry ,officers4 ,by ,,henry ,,knollys1 ,captain ,royal ,artillery2 ,author of ',from ,sedan to ,saarbrck1' ,editor of ',incidents in the ,sepoy ,war1' c4 ,with ,engravings4 ,crown #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,,lamington4 ,in the ,days of the ,dandies4 ,by the late ,lord ,,lamington4 ,crown #hvo4 ,illustrated cover1 #as42 cloth1 #as4 #f;d4 ,,lawless4 ,hurrish3 a ,study4 ,by the ,hon4 ,,emily ,,lawless1 ,author of ',a ,chelsea ,householder1' c4 ,fourth ,edition1 crown #hvo1 #cs4 #f;d4 ,,lawson4 ,spain of ,to-day3 ,a ,descriptive1 ,industrial1 and ,financial ,survey of the ,peninsula1 with a full account of the ,rio ,tinto ,mines4 ,by ,w4 ,r4 ,,lawson4 ,crown #hvo1 #cs4 #f;d4 ,,lees4 ,a ,handbook of ,sheriff ,court ,styles4 ,by ,j4 ,m4 ,,lees1 ,m4,a41 ,,ll4,b41 ,advocate1 ,sheriff-,substitute of ,lanarkshire1 ,new ,ed41 #hvo1 #bas4 ---- ,a ,handbook of the ,sheriff and ,justice of ,peace ,small ,debt ,courts4 #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,,lightfoot4 ,studies in ,philosophy4 ,by the ,rev4 ,j4 ,,lightfoot1 ,m4,a41 ,d4,sc41 ,vicar of ,cross ,stone1 ,todmorden4 ,crown #hvo1 #ds4 #f;d4 ,,lockhart4 ,novels by ,,laurence ,w4 ,m4 ,,lockhart4 ,see ,blackwoods' ,new ,series of ,three-and-,sixpenny ,novels on page #e4 ,,lorimer4 ,the ,institutes of ,law3 ,a ,treatise of the ,principles of ,jurisprudence as determined by ,nature4 ,by the late ,,james ,,lorimer1 ,professor of ,public ,law and of the ,law of ,nature and ,nations in the ,university of ,edinburgh4 ,new ,edition1 revised and much enlarged4 #hvo1 #ahs4 ---- ,the ,institutes of the ,law of ,nations4 ,a ,treatise of the ,jural ,relation of ,separate ,political ,communities4 ,in #b vols4 #hvo4 ,volume ,i41 price #afs4 ,volume ,,ii41 price #bjs4 ,,love4 ,scottish ,church ,music4 ,its ,composers and ,sources4 ,with ,musical ,illustrations4 ,by ,,james ,,love4 ,in #a vol4 post #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,m',,combie4 ,cattle and ,cattle-,breeders4 ,by ,,william ,m',,combie1 ,tillyfour4 ,new ,edition1 enlarged1 with ,memoir of the ,author4 ,by ,,james ,,macdonald1 of the ',farming ,world4' ,crown #hvo1 #cs4 #f;d4 ,,macrae4 ,a ,handbook of ,deer-,stalking4 ,by ,,alexander ,,macrae1 late ,forester to ,lord ,henry ,bentinck4 ,with ,introduction by ,,horatio ,,ross1 ,esq4 ,fcap4 #hvo1 with two ,photographs from ,life4 #cs4 #f;d4 ,m',,crie4 ,works of the ,rev4 ,thomas ,m',crie1 ,d4,d4 ,uniform ,edition4 ,four vols4 crown #hvo1 #bds4 ---- ,life of ,john ,knox4 ,containing ,illustrations of the ,history of the ,reformation in ,scotland4 ,crown #hvo1 #fs4 ,another ,edition1 #cs4 #f;d4 ---- ,life of ,andrew ,melville4 ,containing ,illustrations of the ,ecclesiastical and ,literary ,history of ,scotland in the ,sixteenth and ,seventeenth ,centuries4 ,crown #hvo1 #fs4 ---- ,history of the ,progress and ,suppression of the ,reformation in ,italy in the ,sixteenth ,century4 ,crown #hvo1 #ds4 ---- ,history of the ,progress and ,suppression of the ,reformation in ,spain in the ,sixteenth ,century4 ,crown #hvo1 #cs4 #f;d4 ---- ,lectures on the ,book of ,esther4 ,fcap4 #hvo1 #es4 ,,macdonald4 ,a ,manual of the ,criminal ,law 7,scotland7 ,procedure ,act1 #ahhg4 ,by ,,norman ,,doran ,,macdonald4 ,revised by the ,,lord ,,justice-,,clerk4 #hvo1 cloth1 #ajs4 #f;d4 ,,macgregor4 ,life and ,opinions of ,major-,general ,sir ,charles ,mac,gregor1 ,k4,c4,b41 ,c4,s4,i41 ,c4,i4,e41 ,quartermaster-,general of ,india4 ,from his ,letters and ,diaries4 ,edited by ,,lady ,,macgregor4 ,with ,portraits and ,maps to illustrate ,campaigns in which he was engaged4 #b vols4 #hvo1 #ces4 ,m',,intosh4 ,the ,book of the ,garden4 ,by ,,charles ,m',,intosh1 formerly ,curator of the ,royal ,gardens of his ,majesty the ,king of the ,belgians1 and lately of those of his ,grace the ,duke of ,buccleuch1 ,k4,g41 at ,dalkeith ,palace4 #b vols4 royal #hvo1 with #acej ,engravings4 #d1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,vol4 ,i4 ,on the ,formation of ,gardens and ,construction of ,garden ,edifices4 #b1 #aj,s4 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,practical ,gardening4 #a1 #ags4 #f;d4 ,,macintyre4 ,hindu-,koh3 ,wanderings and ,wild ,sports on and beyond the ,himalayas4 ,by ,major-,general ,,donald ,,macintyre1 ,v4,c41 late ,prince of ,wales' ,own ,goorkhas1 ,f4,r4,g4,s4 ,dedicated to ,h4,r4,h4 ,the ,prince of ,wales4 ,new and ,cheaper ,edition1 revised1 with numerous ,illustrations1 post #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,,mackay4 ,a ,sketch of the ,history of ,fife and ,kinross4 ,a ,study of ,scottish ,history and ,character4 ,by 4 ,j4 ,g4 ,,mackay1 ,sheriff of these ,counties4 ,crown #hvo1 #fs4 ,,mackay4 ,a ,manual of ,modern ,geography2 ,mathematical1 ,physical1 and ,political4 ,by the ,rev4 ,,alexander ,,mackay1 ,,ll4,d41 ,f4,r4,g4,s4 #aath ,thousand1 revised to the present time4 ,crown #hvo1 pp4 #fhh4 #gs4 #f;d4 ---- ,elements of ,modern ,geography4 #ec;d ,thousand1 revised to the present time4 ,crown #hvo1 pp4 #cjj1 #cs4 ---- ,the ,intermediate ,geography4 ,intended as an ,intermediate ,book between the ,author's ',outlines of ,geography' and ',elements of ,geography4' ,fifteenth ,edition1 revised4 ,crown #hvo1 pp4 #bch1 #bs4 ---- ,outlines of ,modern ,geography4 #ahhth ,thousand1 revised to the present time4 #ahmo1 pp4 #aah1 #as4 ---- ,first ,steps in ,geography4 #ajeth ,thousand4 #ahmo1 pp4 #ef4 ,sewed1 #d;d42 cloth1 #f;d4 ---- ,elements of ,physiography and ,physical ,geography4 ,with ,express ,reference to the ,instructions issued by the ,science and ,art ,department4 #cjth ,thousand1 revised4 ,crown #hvo1 #as4 #f;d4 ---- ,facts and ,dates2 or1 the ,leading ,events in ,sacred and ,profane ,history1 and the ,principal ,facts in the various ,physical ,sciences4 ,for ,schools and ,private ,reference4 ,new ,edition4 ,crown #hvo1 #cs4 #f;d4 ,,mackay4 ,an ,old ,scots ,brigade4 ,being the ,history of ,mackay's ,regiment1 now incorporated with the ,royal ,scots4 ,with an ,appendix containing many ,original ,documents connected with the ,history of the ,regiment4 ,by ,,john ,,mackay 7late7 ,,of ,,herriesdale4 ,crown #hvo1 #es4 ,,mackenzie4 ,studies in ,roman ,law4 ,with ,comparative ,views of the ,laws of ,france1 ,england1 and ,scotland4 ,by ,,lord ,,mackenzie1 one of the ,judges of the ,court of ,session in ,scotland4 ,sixth ,edition1 ,edited by ,,john ,,kirkpatrick4 ,esq41 ,m4,a41 ,,ll4,b41 ,advocate1 ,professor of ,history in the ,university of ,edinburgh4 #hvo1 #abs4 ,m',,kerlie4 ,galloway3 ,ancient and ,modern4 ,an ,account of the ,historic ,celtic ,district4 ,by ,p4 ,h4 ,m',,kerlie1 ,f4,s4,a4 ,scot41 ,f4,r4,g4,s41 c4 ,author of ',lands and their ,owners in ,galloway4' ,crown #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,m',,pherson4 ,summer ,sundays in a ,strathmore ,parish4 ,by ,j4 ,,gordon ,m',,pherson1 ,ph4,d41 ,f4,r4,s4,e41 ,minister of ,ruthven4 ,crown #hvo1 #es4 ---- ,golf and ,golfers4 ,past and ,present4 ,with an ,introduction by the ,right ,hon4 ,a4 ,j4 ,,balfour1 and a ,portrait of the ,author4 ,fcap4 #hvo1 #as4 #f;d4 ,,main4 ,three ,hundred ,english ,sonnets4 ,chosen and ,edited by ,,david ,m4 ,,main4 ,fcap4 #hvo1 #fs4 ,,mair4 ,a ,digest of ,laws and ,decisions1 ,ecclesiastical and ,civil1 relating to the ,constitution1 ,practice1 and ,affairs of the ,church of ,scotland4 ,with ,notes and ,forms of ,procedure4 ,by the ,rev4 ,,william ,,mair1 ,d4,d4 ,minister of the ,parish of ,earlston4 ,crown #hvo4 ,with ,supplements1 #hs4 ,,marmorne4 ,the ,story is told by ,,adolphus ,,segrave1 the youngest of three ,brothers4 ,third ,edition4 ,crown #hvo1 #fs4 ,,marshall4 ,french ,home ,life4 ,by ,,frederick ,,marshall1 ,author of ',claire ,brandon4' ,second ,edition4 #es4 ---- ,it ,happened ,yesterday4 ,a ,novel4 ,crown #hvo1 #fs4 ,,marshman4 ,history of ,india4 ,from the ,earliest ,period to the ,close of the ,india ,company's ,government2 with an ,epitome of ,subsequent ,events4 ,by ,,john ,,clark ,,marshman1 ,c4,s4,i4 ,abridged from the ,author's larger work4 ,second ,edition1 revised4 ,crown #hvo1 with ,map1 #fs4 #f;d4 ,,martin4 ,goethe's ,faust4 ,part ,i4 ,translated by ,sir ,,theodore ,,martin1 ,k4,c4,b4 ,second ,ed41 crown #hvo1 #fs4 ,ninth ,ed41 fcap4 #hvo1 #cs4 #f;d4 ---- ,goethe's ,faust4 ,part ,,ii4 ,translated into ,english ,verse4 ,second ,edition1 revised4 ,fcap4 #hvo1 #fs4 ---- ,the ,works of ,horace4 ,translated into ,english ,verse1 with ,life and ,notes4 #b vols4 ,new ,edition1 crown #hvo1 #bas4 ---- ,poems and ,ballads of ,heinrich ,heine4 ,done into ,english ,verse4 ,second ,edition4 ,printed on papier verg1 crown #hvo1 #hs4 ---- ,the ,song of the ,bell1 and other ,translations from ,schiller1 ,goethe1 ,uhland1 and ,others4 ,crown #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ---- ,catullus4 ,with ,life and ,notes4 ,second ,ed41 post #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ---- ,aladdin3 ,a ,dramatic ,poem4 ,by ,,adam ,,oehlenschlaeger4 ,fcap4 #hvo1 #es4 ---- ,correggio3 ,a ,tragedy4 ,by ,,oehlenschlaeger4 ,with ,notes4 ,fcap4 #hvo1 #cs4 ---- ,king ,rene's ,daughter3 ,a ,danish ,lyrical ,drama4 ,by ,,henrik ,,hertz4 ,second ,edition1 fcap41 #bs4 #f;d4 ,,martin4 ,on some of ,shakespeare's ,female ,characters4 ,in a ,series of ,letters4 ,by ,,helena ,,faucit1 ,,lady ,,martin4 ,dedicated by permission to ,her ,most ,gracious ,majesty the ,queen4 ,new ,edition1 enlarged4 #hvo1 with ,portrait by ,lane1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,,matheson4 ,can the ,old ,faith ,live with the ,new8 or the ,problem of ,evolution and ,revelation4 ,by the ,rev4 ,,george ,,matheson1 ,d4,d4 ,third ,edition4 ,crown #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ---- ,the ,psalmist and the ,scientist2 or1 ,modern ,value of the ,religious ,sentiment4 ,new and ,cheaper ,edition4 ,crown #hvo1 #es4 ---- ,spiritual ,development of ,st4 ,paul4 ,crown #hvo1 #es4 ---- ,sacred ,songs4 ,new and ,cheaper ,edition4 ,cr4 #hvo1 #bs4 #f;d4 ,,maurice4 ,the ,balance of ,military ,power in ,europe4 ,an ,examination of the ,war ,resources of ,great ,britain and the ,continental ,states4 ,by ,colonel ,,maurice1 ,r4 ,a41 ,professor of ,military ,art and ,history at the ,royal ,staff ,college4 ,crown #hvo1 with a ,map4 #fs4 ,,meredyth4 ,the ,brief for the ,government1 #ahhf-ib4 ,a ,handbook for ,conservative and ,unionist ,writers1 ,speakers1 c4 ,second ,edition4 ,by ,w4 ,h4 ,,meredyth4 ,crown #hvo1 #bs4 #f;d4 ,,michel4 ,a ,critical ,inquiry into the ,scottish ,language4 ,with the view of ,illustrating the ,rise and ,progress of ,civilisation in ,scotland4 ,by ,,francisque-,,michel1 ,f4,s4,a4 ,lond4 and ,scot41 ,correspondant de l',institut de ,france1 c4 #dto1 printed on hand-made paper1 and bound in ,roxburghe1 #ffs4 ,,michie4 ,the ,larch3 ,being a ,practical ,treatise on its ,culture and ,general ,management4 ,by ,,christopher ,y4 ,,michie1 ,forester1 ,cullen ,house4 ,crown #hvo1 with ,illustrations4 ,new and ,cheaper ,edition1 enlarged1 #es4 ---- ,the ,practice of ,forestry4 ,cr4 #hvo1 with ,illustrations4 #fs4 ,,middleton4 ,the ,story of ,alastair ,bhan ,comyn2 or1 ,the ,tragedy of ,dunphail4 ,a ,tale of ,tradition and ,romance4 ,by the ,lady ,,middleton4 ,square #hvo #ajs4 ,cheaper ,edition1 #es4 ,,miller4 ,landscape ,geology4 ,a ,plea for the ,study of ,geology by ,landscape ,painters4 ,by ,,hugh ,,miller1 of ,h4,m4 ,geological ,survey4 ,cr4 #hvo1 #cs4 ,,milne4 ,the ,problem of the ,churchless and ,poor in our ,large ,towns4 ,with special reference to the ,home ,mission ,work of the ,church of ,scotland4 ,by the ,rev4 ,,robt4 ,,milne1 ,m4,a41 ,d4,d41 ,ardler4 ,new and ,cheaper ,edition4 ,crown #hvo1 #as4 ,,milne-,,home4 ,mamma's ,black ,nurse ,stories4 ,west ,indian ,folk-lore4 ,by ,,mary ,,pamela ,,milne-,,home4 ,with six full-page tinted ,illustrations4 ,small #dto1 #es4 ,,minto4 ,a ,manual of ,english ,prose ,literature1 ,biographical and ,critical3 designed mainly to show ,characteristics of ,style4 ,by ,w4 ,,minto1 ,m4,a41 ,professor of ,logic in the ,university of ,aberdeen4 ,third ,edition1 revised4 ,crown #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ---- ,characteristics of ,english ,poets1 from ,chaucer to ,shirley4 ,new ,edition1 revised4 ,crown #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,,moir4 ,life of ,mansie ,wauch1 ,tailor in ,dalkeith4 ,by ,d4 ,m4 ,,moir4 ,with #h ,illustrations on ,steel1 by the late ,,george ,,cruikshank4 ,crown #hvo1 #cs4 #f;d4 ,another ,edition1 fcap4 #hvo1 #as4 #f;d4 ,,momerie4 ,defects of ,modern ,christianity1 and other ,sermons4 ,by ,,alfred ,,williams ,,momerie1 ,m4,a41 ,d4,sc41 ,,ll4 ,d4 #dth ,edition4 ,cr4 #hvo1 #es4 ---- ,the ,basis of ,religion4 ,being an ,examination of ,natural ,religion4 ,third ,edition4 ,crown #hvo1 #bs4 #f;d4 ---- ,the ,origin of ,evil1 and other ,sermons4 ,seventh ,edition1 enlarged4 ,crown #hvo1 #es4 ---- ,personality4 ,the ,beginning and ,end of ,metaphysics1 and a ,necessary ,assumption in all ,positive ,philosophy4 ,fourth ,ed4 ,cr4 #hvo1 #cs4 ---- ,agnosticism4 ,third ,edition1 ,revised4 ,crown #hvo1 #es4 ---- ,preaching and ,hearing2 and other ,sermons4 ,third ,edition1 ,enlarged4 ,crown #hvo1 #es4 ---- ,belief in ,god4 ,third ,edition4 ,crown #hvo1 #cs4 ---- ,inspiration2 and other ,sermons4 ,second ,ed4 ,cr4 #hvo1 #es4 ---- ,church and ,creed4 ,second ,edition4 ,crown #hvo1 #ds4 #f;d4 ,,montague4 ,campaigning in ,south ,africa4 ,reminiscences of an ,officer in #ahgi4 ,by ,captain ,w4 ,e4 ,,montague1 #idth ,regiment1 ,author of ',claude ,meadowleigh1' c4 #hvo1 #ajs4 #f;d4 ,,montalembert4 ,memoir of ,count de ,montalembert4 ,a ,chapter of ,recent ,french ,history4 ,by ,mrs ,,oliphant1 ,author of the ',life of ,edward ,irving1' c4 #b vols4 crown #hvo1 #a1 #ds4 ,,morison4 ,sordello4 ,an ,outline ,analysis of ,mr ,browning's ,poem4 ,by ,,jeanie ,,morison1 ,author of ',the ,purpose of the ,ages1' ',ane ,booke of ,ballades1' c4 ,crown #hvo1 #cs4 ---- ,selections from ,poems4 ,crown #hvo1 #ds4 #f;d4 ---- ,there as ,here4 ,crown #hvo1 #cs4 ,a limited impression on hand-made paper1 bound in vellum1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,,munro4 ,on ,valuation of ,property4 ,by ,,william ,,munro1 ,m4,a41 ,her ,majesty's ,assessor of ,railways and ,canals for ,scotland4 ,second ,edition4 ,revised and enlarged4 #hvo1 #cs4 #f;d4 ,,murdoch4 ,manual of the ,law of ,insolvency and ,bankruptcy3 ,comprehending a ,summary of the ,law of ,insolvency1 ,notour ,bankruptcy1 ,composition-contracts1 ,trust-deeds1 ,cessios1 and ,sequestrations2 and the ,winding-up of ,joint-,stock ,companies in ,scotland2 with ,annotations on the various ,insolvency and ,bankruptcy ,statutes2 and with ,forms of ,procedure applicable to these ,subjects4 ,by ,,james ,,murdoch1 ,member of the ,faculty of ,procurators in ,glasgow4 ,fifth ,edition1 ,revised and ,enlarged1 #hvo1 #a1 #ajs4 ,,my ,,trivial ,,life ,,and ,,misfortune3 ,a ,gossip with no ,plot in ,particular4 ,by ,a ,,plain ,,woman4 ,cheap ,ed41 crown #hvo1 #cs1 #f;d4 ,by the ,,same ,,author4 ,,poor ,,nellie4 ,new ,edition4 ,crown #hvo1 #fs4 ,,napier4 ,the ,construction of the ,wonderful ,canon of ,logarithms 7,mirifici ,logarithmorum ,canonis ,constructio74 ,by ,,john ,,napier of ,merchiston4 ,translated for the first time1 with ,notes1 and a ,catalogue of ,napier's ,works1 by ,,william ,,rae ,,macdonald4 ,small #dto1 #aes4 ,a few large paper copies may be had1 printed on ,whatman paper1 price #cjs4 ,,neaves4 ,songs and ,verses1 ,social and ,scientific4 ,by an ,old ,contributor to ',maga4' ,by the ,hon4 ,lord ,,neaves4 ,fifth ,ed41 fcap4 #hvo1 #ds4 ---- ,the ,greek ,anthology4 ,being ,vol4 ,,xx4 of ',ancient ,classics for ,english ,readers4' ,crown #hvo1 #bs4 #f;d4 ,,nicholson4 ,a ,manual of ,zoology1 for the ,use of ,students4 ,with a ,general ,introduction on the ,principles of ,zoology4 ,by ,,henry ,,alleyne ,,nicholson1 ,m4,d41 ,d4,sc41 ,f4,l4,s41 ,f4,g4,s41 ,regius ,professor of ,natural ,history in the ,university of ,aberdeen4 ,seventh ,edition1 rewritten and enlarged4 ,post #hvo1 pp4 #ief1 with #eee ,engravings on ,wood1 #ahs4 ---- ,text-,book of ,zoology1 for the ,use of ,schools4 ,fourth ,edition1 enlarged4 ,crown #hvo1 with #ahh ,engravings on ,wood1 #gs4 #f;d4 ---- ,introductory ,text-,book of ,zoology1 for the ,use of ,junior ,classes4 ,sixth ,edition1 revised and enlarged1 with #aff ,engravings1 #cs4 ---- ,outlines of ,natural ,history1 for ,beginners2 being ,descriptions of a ,progressive ,series of ,zoological ,types4 ,third ,edition1 with ,engravings1 #as4 #f;d4 ---- ,a ,manual of ,palontology1 for the ,use of ,students4 ,with a ,general ,introduction on the ,principles of ,palontology4 ,by ,professor ,h4 ,,alleyne ,,nicholson and ,,richard ,,lydekker1 ,b4,a4 ,third ,edition4 ,rewritten and greatly enlarged4 #b vols4 #hvo1 with ,engravings1 #c1 #cs4 ---- ,the ,ancient ,life-,history of the ,earth4 ,an ,outline of the ,principles and ,leading ,facts of ,palontological ,science4 ,crown #hvo1 with #bgf ,engravings1 #ajs4 #f;d4 ---- ,on the ,tabulate ,corals of the ,palozoic ,period1 with ,critical ,descriptions of ,illustrative ,species4 ,illustrated with #ae ,lithograph ,plates and numerous ,engravings4 ,super-royal #hvo1 #bas4 ---- ,synopsis of the ,classification of the ,animal ,kingdom4 #hvo1 with #ajf ,illustrations1 #fs4 ---- ,on the ,structure and ,affinities of the ,genus ,monticulipora and its ,sub-,genera1 with ,critical ,descriptions of ,illustrative ,species4 ,illustrated with numerous ,engravings on wood and lithographed ,plates4 ,super-royal #hvo1 #ahs4 ,,nicholson4 ,communion with ,heaven1 and other ,sermons4 ,by the late ,,maxwell ,,nicholson1 ,d4,d41 ,minister of ,st ,stephen's1 ,edinburgh4 ,crown #hvo1 #es4 #f;d4 ---- ,rest in ,jesus4 ,sixth ,edition4 ,fcap4 #hvo1 #ds4 #f;d4 ,,nicholson4 ,a ,treatise on ,money1 and ,essays on ,present ,monetary ,problems4 ,by ,,joseph ,,shield ,,nicholson1 ,m4,a41 ,d4,sc41 ,professor of ,commercial and ,political ,economy and ,mercantile ,law in the ,university of ,edinburgh4 #hvo1 #ajs4 #f;d4 ---- ,thoth4 ,a ,romance4 ,third ,edition4 ,crown #hvo1 #ds4 #f;d4 ---- ,a ,dreamer of ,dreams4 ,a ,modern ,romance4 ,second ,edition4 ,crown #hvo1 #fs4 ,,nicolson ,,and ,,mure4 ,a ,handbook to the ,local ,government 7,scotland7 ,act1 #ahhi4 ,with ,introduction1 ,explanatory ,notes1 and ,index4 ,by ,j4 ,,badenach ,,nicolson1 ,advocate1 ,counsel to the ,scotch ,education ,department1 and ,w4 ,j4 ,,mure1 ,advocate1 ,legal ,secretary to the ,lord ,advocate for ,scotland4 ,ninth ,reprint4 #hvo1 #es4 ,,oliphant4 ,masollam3 a ,problem of the ,period4 ,a ,novel4 ,by ,,laurence ,,oliphant4 #c vols4 post #hvo1 #bes4 #f;d4 ---- ,scientific ,religion2 or1 ,higher ,possibilities of ,life and ,practice through the ,operation of ,natural ,forces4 ,second ,edition4 #hvo1 #afs4 ---- ,altiora ,peto4 ,by ,,laurence ,,oliphant4 ,cheap ,edition4 ,crown #hvo1 boards1 #bs4 #f;d42 cloth1 #cs4 #f;d4 ,illustrated ,edition4 ,crown #hvo1 cloth1 #fs4 ---- ,piccadilly3 ,a ,fragment of ,contemporary ,biography4 ,with ,illustrations by ,richard ,doyle4 ,new ,edition1 #cs4 #f;d4 ,cheap ,edition1 boards1 #bs4 #f;d4 ---- ,traits and ,travesties2 ,social and ,political4 ,post #hvo1 #ajs4 #f;d4 ---- ,the ,land of ,gilead4 ,with ,excursions in the ,lebanon4 ,with ,illustrations and ,maps4 ,demy #hvo1 #bas4 ---- ,haifa3 ,life in ,modern ,palestine4 #b;d ,edition4 #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ---- ,episodes in a ,life of ,adventure2 or1 ,moss from a ,rolling ,stone4 ,fifth ,edition4 ,post #hvo1 #fs4 ---- ,memoir of the ,life of ,laurence ,oliphant1 and of ,alice ,oliphant1 his ,wife4 ,by ,mrs ,m4 ,o4 ,w4 ,,oliphant4 ,seventh ,edition4 ,in #b vols4 post #hvo1 with ,portraits4 #bas4 ,,oliphant4 ,katie ,stewart4 ,by ,mrs ,,oliphant4 #bs4 #f;d4 ---- ,the ,duke's ,daughter1 and ,the ,fugitives4 ,a ,novel4 #c vols4 crown #hvo1 #bes4 #f;d4 ---- ,two ,stories of the ,seen and the ,unseen4 ,the ,open ,door--,old ,lady ,mary4 ,paper ,covers1 #as4 ---- ,sons and ,daughters4 ,crown #hvo1 #cs4 #f;d4 ,,oliphant4 ,notes of a ,pilgrimage to ,jerusalem and the ,holy ,land4 ,by ,f4 ,r4 ,,oliphant4 ,crown #hvo1 #cs4 #f;d4 ,,on ,,surrey ,,hills4 ,by ,a ,,son ,,of ,,the ,,marshes4 ,cr4 #hvo1 #fs4 ,,osborn4 ,narratives of ,voyage and ,adventure4 ,by ,admiral ,,sherard ,,osborn1 ,c4,b4 #c vols4 crown #hvo1 #abs4 ,,ossian4 ,the ,poems of ,ossian in the ,original ,gaelic4 ,with a ,literal ,translation into ,english1 and a ,dissertation on the ,authenticity of the ,poems4 ,by the ,rev4 ,,archibald ,,clerk4 #b vols4 imperial #hvo1 #a4 #aas4 #f;d4 ,,oswald4 ,by ,fell and ,fjord2 or1 ,scenes and ,studies in ,iceland4 ,by ,e4 ,j4 ,,oswald4 ,post #hvo1 with ,illustrations4 #gs4 #f;d4 ,,owen4 ,annals of a ,fishing ,village4 ,drawn from the ,notes of ,a ,son of the ,marshes4 ,edited by ,j4 ,a4 ,,owen4 ,crown #hvo1 with ,illustrations1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,,page4 ,introductory ,text-,book of ,geology4 ,by ,,david ,,page1 ,,ll4,d41 ,professor of ,geology in the ,durham ,university of ,physical ,science ,newcastle1 and ,professor ,,lapworth of ,mason ,science ,college1 ,birmingham4 ,with ,engravings and ,glossarial ,index4 ,twelfth ,edition4 ,revised and ,enlarged4 #cs4 #f;d4 ---- ,advanced ,text-,book of ,geology1 ,descriptive and ,industrial4 ,with ,engravings1 and ,glossary of ,scientific ,terms4 ,sixth ,edition1 revised and enlarged1 #gs4 #f;d4 ---- ,introductory ,text-,book of ,physical ,geography4 ,with ,sketch-,maps and ,illustrations4 ,edited by ,,charles ,,lapworth1 ,,ll4,d41 ,f4,g4,s41 c41 ,professor of ,geology and ,mineralogy in the ,mason ,science ,college1 ,birmingham1 #abth ,edition4 #bs4 #f;d4 ---- ,advanced ,text-,book of ,physical ,geography4 ,third ,edition1 ,revised and ,enlarged by ,prof4 ,,lapworth4 ,with ,engravings4 #es4 ,,paton4 ,spindrift4 ,by ,sir ,j4 ,,noel ,,paton4 ,fcap41 cloth1 #es4 ---- ,poems by a ,painter4 ,fcap41 cloth1 #es4 ,,paton4 ,body and ,soul4 ,a ,romance in ,transcendental ,pathology4 ,by ,,frederick ,,noel ,,paton4 ,third ,edition4 ,crown #hvo1 #as4 ,,patterson4 ,essays in ,history and ,art4 ,by ,r4 ,,hogarth ,,patterson4 #hvo1 #abs4 ---- ,the ,new ,golden ,age1 and ,influence of the ,precious ,metals upon the ,world4 #b vols4 #hvo1 #cas4 #f;d4 ,,paul4 ,history of the ,royal ,company of ,archers1 the ,queen's ,body-,guard for ,scotland4 ,by ,,james ,,balfour ,,paul1 ,advocate of the ,scottish ,bar4 ,crown #dto1 with ,portraits and other ,illustrations4 #b1 #bs4 ,,peile4 ,lawn ,tennis as a ,game of ,skill4 ,with latest revised ,laws as played by the ,best ,clubs4 ,by ,captain ,s4 ,c4 ,f4 ,,peile1 ,b4,s4,c4 ,cheaper ,edition1 fcap4 cloth1 #as4 ,,pettigrew4 ,the ,handy ,book of ,bees1 and their ,profitable ,management4 ,by ,a4 ,,pettigrew4 ,fifth ,edition1 ,enlarged1 with ,engravings4 ,crown #hvo1 #cs4 #f;d4 ,,philosophical ,,classics ,,for ,,english ,,readers4 ,edited by ,,william ,,knight1 ,,ll4,d41 ,professor of ,moral ,philosophy1 ,university of ,st ,andrews4 ,in crown #hvo volumes1 with portraits1 price #cs4 #f;d4 ,for list of ,volumes published1 see page #b4 ,,philip4 ,the ,function of ,labour in the ,production of ,wealth4 ,by ,,alexander ,,philip1 ,,ll4,b41 ,edinburgh4 ,crown #hvo1 #cs4 #f;d4 ,,pollok4 ,the ,course of ,time3 ,a ,poem4 ,by ,,robert ,,pollok1 ,a4,m4 ,small fcap4 #hvo1 cloth gilt1 #bs4 #f;d4 ,cottage ,edition1 #cbmo1 #h;d4 ,the ,same1 cloth1 gilt edges1 #as4 #f;d4 ,another ,edition1 with ,illustrations by ,birket ,foster and others1 fcap41 cloth1 #cs4 #f;d41 or with edges gilt1 #ds4 ,,port ,,royal ,,logic4 ,translated from the ,french2 with ,introduction1 ,notes1 and ,appendix4 ,by ,,thomas ,,spencer ,,baynes1 ,,ll4 ,d41 ,professor in the ,university of ,st ,andrews4 ,tenth ,edition1 #abmo1 #ds4 ,,potts ,,and ,,darnell4 ,aditus ,faciliores3 ,an easy ,latin ,construing ,book1 with ,complete ,vocabulary4 ,by the late ,a4 ,w4 ,,potts1 ,m4,a41 ,,ll4,d41 and the ,rev4 ,c4 ,,darnell1 ,m4,a41 ,head-,master of ,cargilfield ,preparatory ,school1 ,edinburgh4 ,tenth ,edition1 fcap4 #hvo1 #cs4 #f;d4 ---- ,aditus ,faciliores ,graeci4 ,an easy ,greek ,construing ,book1 with ,complete ,vocabulary4 ,fourth ,edition1 fcap4 #hvo1 #cs4 ,,potts4 ,school ,sermons4 ,by the late ,,alexander ,,wm4 ,,potts1 ,,ll4,d41 ,first ,head-,master of ,fettes ,college4 ,with a ,memoir and ,portrait4 ,crown #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,,pringle4 ,the ,live-,stock of the ,farm4 ,by ,,robert ,o4 ,,pringle4 ,third ,edition4 ,revised and ,edited by ,,james ,,macdonald4 ,cr4 #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,,public ,,general ,,statutes ,,affecting ,,scotland from #agjg to #ahdg1 with ,chronological ,table and ,index4 #c vols4 large #hvo1 #c1 #cs4 ,,public ,,general ,,statutes ,,affecting ,,scotland1 ,,collection ,,of4 ,published ,annually with ,general ,index4 ,,radical ,,cure ,,for ,,ireland1 ,the4 ,a ,letter to the ,people of ,england and ,scotland concerning a new ,plantation4 ,with #b ,maps4 #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,,ramsay4 ,rough ,recollections of ,military ,service and ,society4 ,by ,lieut4-,col4 ,,balcarres ,d4 ,,wardlaw ,,ramsay4 ,two vols4 post #hvo1 #bas4 ,,ramsay4 ,scotland and ,scotsmen in the ,eighteenth ,century4 ,edited from the ,,mss4 of ,,john ,,ramsay1 ,esq4 of ,ochtertyre1 by ,,alexander ,,allardyce1 ,author of ',memoir of ,admiral ,lord ,keith1 ,k4,b41' c4 #b vols4 #hvo1 #cas4 #f;d4 ,,rankin4 ,a ,handbook of the ,church of ,scotland4 ,by ,,james ,,rankin1 ,d4,d41 ,minister of ,muthill2 ,author of ',character ,studies in the ,old ,testament1' c4 ,an entirely ,new and much ,enlarged ,edition4 ,crown #hvo1 with #b ,maps1 #gs4 #f;d4 ---- ,the ,creed in ,scotland4 ,an ,exposition of the ,apostles' ,creed4 ,with ,extracts from ,archbishop ,hamilton's ,catechism of #aeeb1 ,john ,calvin's ,catechism of #aeef1 and a ,catena of ,ancient ,latin and other ,hymns4 ,post #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ---- ,first ,communion ,lessons4 ,twenty-third ,edition4 ,paper ,cover1 #b;d4 ,,records ,,of ,,the ,,tercentenary ,,festival ,,of ,,the ,,university ,,of ,,edinburgh4 ,celebrated in ,april #ahhd4 ,published under the ,sanction of the ,senatus ,academicus4 ,large #dto1 #b1 #abs4 #f;d4 ,,robertson4 ,early ,religion of ,israel4 ,being the ,baird ,lecture for #ahhh-hi4 ,by ,,james ,,robertson1 ,d4,d41 ,professor of ,oriental ,languages in the ,university of ,glasgow4 ,in one ,vol4 crown #hvo4 ,immediately4 ,,robertson4 ,orellana1 and other ,poems4 ,by ,j4 ,,logie ,,robertson1 ,m4,a4 ,fcap4 #hvo4 ,printed on hand-made paper4 #fs4 ,,robertson4 ,our ,holiday ,among the ,hills4 ,by ,,james and ,,janet ,,logie ,,robertson4 ,fcap4 #hvo1 #cs4 #f;d4 ,,roscoe4 ,rambles with a ,fishing-rod4 ,by ,e4 ,s4 ,,roscoe4 ,crown #hvo1 #ds4 #f;d4 ,,ross4 ,old ,scottish ,regimental ,colours4 ,by ,,andrew ,,ross1 ,s4,s4,c41 ,hon4 ,secretary ,old ,scottish ,regimental ,colours ,committee4 ,dedicated by ,special ,permission to ,her ,majesty the ,queen4 ,folio4 #b1 #abs4 #f;d4 ,,russell4 ,the ,haigs of ,bemersyde4 ,a ,family ,history4 ,by ,,john ,,russell4 ,large #hvo1 with ,illustrations4 #bas4 ,,russell4 ,fragments from ,many ,tables4 ,being the ,recollections of some ,wise and ,witty ,men and ,women4 ,by ,,geo4 ,,russell4 ,cr4 #hvo1 #ds4 #f;d4 ,,rutland4 ,notes of an ,irish ,tour in #ahdf4 ,by the ,,duke ,,of ,,rutland1 ,g4,c4,b4 7,lord ,,john ,,manners74 ,new ,edition4 ,crown #hvo1 #bs4 #f;d4 ---- ,correspondence between the ,right ,honble4 ,william ,pitt and ,charles ,duke of ,rutland1 ,lord ,lieutenant of ,ireland1 #agha-aghg4 ,with ,introductory ,note by ,john ,duke of ,rutland4 #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,,rutland4 ,gems of ,german ,poetry4 ,translated by the ,,duchess ,,of ,,rutland 7,lady ,,john ,,manners74 ,new ,edition in preparation4 ---- ,impressions of ,bad-,homburg4 ,comprising a ,short ,account of the ,women's ,associations of ,germany under the ,red ,cross4 ,crown #hvo1 #as4 #f;d4 ---- ,some ,personal ,recollections of the ,later ,years of the ,earl of ,beaconsfield1 ,k4,g4 ,sixth ,edition1 #f;d4 ---- ,employment of ,women in the ,public ,service4 #f;d4 ---- ,some of the ,advantages of ,easily ,accessible ,reading and ,recreation ,rooms1 and ,free ,libraries4 ,with ,remarks on ,starting and ,maintaining ,them4 ,second ,edition1 crown #hvo1 #as4 ---- ,a ,sequel to ,rich ,men's ,dwellings1 and other ,occasional ,papers4 ,crown #hvo1 #bs4 #f;d4 ---- ,encouraging ,experiences of ,reading and ,recreation ,rooms1 ,aims of ,guilds1 ,nottingham ,social ,guild1 ,existing ,institutions1 c41 c4 ,crown #hvo1 #as4 ,,schiller4 ,wallenstein4 ,a ,dramatic ,poem4 ,by ,,frederick ,,von ,,schiller4 ,translated by ,c4 ,g4 ,a4 ,,lockhart4 ,fcap4 #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,,scotch ,,loch ,,fishing4 ,by ,black ,palmer4 ,crown #hvo1 interleaved with blank pages1 #ds4 ,,scougal4 ,prisons and their ,inmates2 or1 ,scenes from a ,silent ,world4 ,by ,,francis ,,scougal4 ,crown #hvo1 boards1 #bs4 ,,sellar4 ,manual of the ,education ,acts for ,scotland4 ,by the late ,,alexander ,,craig ,,sellar1 ,m4,p4 ,eighth ,edition4 ,revised and in great part rewritten by ,j4 ,,edward ,,graham1 ,b4,a4 ,oxon41 ,advocate4 ,with ,rules for the conduct of ,elections1 with ,notes and ,cases4 ,with a ,supplement1 being the ,acts of #ahhi in so far as affecting the ,education ,acts4 #hvo1 #abs4 #f;d4 ,,supplement ,,to ,,sellar',s ,,manual ,,of ,,the ,,education ,,acts4 #hvo1 #bs4 ,,seth4 ,scottish ,philosophy4 ,a ,comparison of the ,scottish and ,german ,answers to ,hume4 ,balfour ,philosophical ,lectures1 ,university of ,edinburgh4 ,by ,,andrew ,,seth1 ,m4,a41 ,professor of ,logic and ,metaphysics in ,edinburgh ,university4 ,second ,edition4 ,crown #hvo1 #es4 ---- ,hegelianism and ,personality4 ,balfour ,philosophical ,lectures4 ,second ,series4 ,crown #hvo1 #es4 ,,seth4 ,freedom as ,ethical ,postulate4 ,by ,,james ,,seth1 ,m4,a41 ,george ,munro ,professor of ,philosophy1 ,dalhousie ,college1 ,halifax1 ,canada4 #hvo1 #as4 ,,shadwell4 ,the ,life of ,colin ,campbell1 ,lord ,clyde4 ,illustrated by ,extracts from his ,diary and ,correspondence4 ,by ,lieutenant-,general ,,shadwell1 ,c4,b4 #b vols4 #hvo4 ,with ,portrait1 ,maps1 and ,plans4 #cfs4 ,,shand4 ,half a ,century2 or1 ,changes in ,men and ,manners4 ,by ,,alex4 ,,innes ,,shand1 ,author of ',against ,time1' c4 ,second ,edition1 #hvo1 #abs4 #f;d4 ---- ,letters from the ,west of ,ireland4 ,reprinted from the ',times4' ,crown #hvo1 #es4 ---- ,kilcarra4 ,a ,novel4 #c vols4 crown #hvo1 #bes4 #f;d4 ,,sharpe4 ,letters from and to ,charles ,kirkpatrick ,sharpe4 ,edited by ,,alexander ,,allardyce1 ,author of ',memoir of ,admiral ,lord ,keith1 ,k4,b41' c4 ,with a ,memoir by the ,rev4 ,w4 ,k4 ,r4 ,,bedford4 ,in two vols4 #hvo4 ,illustrated with ,etchings and other ,engravings4 #b1 #abs4 #f;d4 ,,sim4 ,margaret ,sim's ,cookery4 ,with an ,introduction by ,l4 ,b4 ,,walford1 ,author of ',mr ,smith3 ,a ,part of ,his ,life1' c4 ,crown #hvo1 #es4 ,,skelton4 ,maitland of ,lethington2 and the ,scotland of ,mary ,stuart4 ,a ,history4 ,by ,,john ,,skelton1 ,c4,b41 ,,ll4,d41 ,author of ',the ,essays of ,shirley4' ,demy #hvo #b vols41 #bhs4 ---- ,the ,handbook of ,public ,health4 ,a ,complete ,edition of the ,public ,health and other ,sanitary ,acts relating to ,scotland4 ,annotated1 and with the ,rules1 ,instructions1 and ,decisions of the ,board of ,supervision brought up to date with relative forms4 #hvo1 with ,supplement1 #hs4 #f;d4 ---- ,supplement to ,skelton's ,handbook4 ,the ,administration of the ,public ,health ,act in ,counties4 #hvo1 cloth1 #as4 #f;d4 ---- ,the ,local ,government 7,scotland7 ,act in ,relation to ,public ,health4 ,a ,handy ,guide for ,county and ,district ,councillors1 ,medical ,officers1 ,sanitary ,inspectors1 and ,members of ,parochial ,boards4 ,second ,edition4 ,with a new ,preface on appointment of ,sanitary ,officers4 ,crown #hvo1 #bs4 ,,smith4 ,for ,god and ,humanity4 ,a ,romance of ,mount ,carmel4 ,by ,,haskett ,,smith1 ,author of ',the ,divine ,epiphany1' c4 #c vols4 post #hvo1 #bes4 #f;d4 ,,smith4 ,thorndale2 or1 ,the ,conflict of ,opinions4 ,by ,,william ,,smith1 ,author of ',a ,discourse on ,ethics1' c4 ,new ,edition4 ,cr4 #hvo1 #ajs4 #f;d4 ---- ,gravenhurst2 or1 ,thoughts on ,good and ,evil4 ,second ,edition1 with ,memoir of the ,author4 ,crown #hvo1 #hs4 ---- ,the ,story of ,william and ,lucy ,smith4 ,edited by ,,george ,,merriam4 ,large post #hvo1 #abs4 #f;d4 ,,smith4 ,memoir of the ,families of ,m',combie and ,thoms1 originally ,m',intosh and ,m',thomas4 ,compiled from ,history and ,tradition4 ,by ,,william ,m',,combie ,,smith4 ,with ,illustrations4 #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,,smith4 ,greek ,testament ,lessons for ,colleges1 ,schools1 and ,private ,students1 consisting chiefly of the ,sermon on the ,mount and the ,parables of our ,lord4 ,with ,notes and ,essays4 ,by the ,rev4 ,j4 ,,hunter ,,smith1 ,m4,a41 ,king ,edward's ,school1 ,birmingham4 ,crown #hvo1 #fs4 ,,smith4 ,writings by the ,way4 ,by ,,john ,,campbell ,,smith1 ,m4,a41 ,sheriff-,substitute4 ,crown #hvo1 #is4 ,,smith4 ,the ,secretary for ,scotland4 ,being a ,statement of the ,powers and ,duties of the new ,scottish ,office4 ,with a ,short ,historical ,introduction and numerous references to important ,administrative ,documents4 ,by ,w4 ,c4 ,,smith1 ,,ll4,b41 ,advocate4 #hvo1 #fs4 ,,sorley4 ,the ,ethics of ,naturalism4 ,being the ,shaw ,fellowship ,lectures1 #ahhd4 ,by ,w4 ,r4 ,,sorley1 ,m4,a41 ,fellow of ,trinity ,college1 ,cambridge1 ,professor of ,logic and ,philosophy in ,university ,college of ,south ,wales4 ,crown #hvo1 #fs4 ,,speedy4 ,sport in the ,highlands and ,lowlands of ,scotland with ,rod and ,gun4 ,by ,,tom ,,speedy4 ,second ,edition1 ,revised and ,enlarged4 ,with ,illustrations by ,lieut4-,gen4 ,hope ,crealocke1 ,c4,b41 ,c4,m4,g41 and others4 #hvo1 #aes4 ,,sprott4 ,the ,worship and ,offices of the ,church of ,scotland4 ,by ,,george ,w4 ,,sprott1 ,d4,d41 ,minister of ,north ,berwick4 ,crown #hvo1 #fs4 ,,stafford4 ,how ,i ,spent my ,twentieth ,year4 ,being a ,record of a ,tour ,round the ,world1 #ahhf-hg4 ,by the ,,marchioness ,,of ,,stafford4 ,with ,illustrations4 ,third ,edition1 crown #hvo1 #hs4 #f;d4 ,,starforth4 ,villa ,residences and ,farm ,architecture3 ,a ,series of ,designs4 ,by ,,john ,,starforth1 ,architect4 #ajb ,engravings4 ,second ,edition1 medium #dto1 #b1 #ags4 #f;d4 ,,statistical ,,account ,,of ,,scotland4 ,complete1 with ,index1 #ae vols4 #hvo1 #af1 #afs4 ,each ,county sold separately1 with ,title1 ,index1 and ,map1 neatly bound in cloth4 ,,stephens' ,,book ,,of ,,the ,,farm2 detailing the ,labours of the ,farmer1 ,farm-,steward1 ,ploughman1 ,shepherd1 ,hedger1 ,farm-,labourer1 ,field-,worker1 and ,cattleman4 ,illustrated with numerous ,portraits of ,animals and ,engravings of ,implements1 and ,plans of ,farm ,buildings4 ,fourth ,edition4 ,revised1 and in great part rewritten by ,,james ,,macdonald1 of the ',farming ,world1' c41 c4 ,assisted by many of the leading agricultural authorities of the day4 ,complete in ,six ,divisional ,volumes1 bound in cloth1 each #ajs4 #f;d41 or handsomely bound1 in #c volumes1 with leather back and gilt top1 #c1 #cs4 ,,stephens4 ,the ,book of ,farm ,implements and ,machines4 ,by ,j4 ,,slight and ,r4 ,,scott ,,burn1 ,engineers4 ,edited by ,,henry ,,stephens4 ,large #hvo1 #b1 #bs4 ,,stevenson4 ,british ,fungi4 7,hymenomycetes47 ,by ,rev4 ,,john ,,stevenson1 ,author of ',mycologia ,scotia1' ,hon4 ,sec4 ,cryptogamic ,society of ,scotland4 #b vols4 post #hvo1 with ,illustrations1 price #abs4 #f;d4 each4 ,vol4 ,i4 ,,agaricus--,,bolbitius4 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,,cortinarius--,,dacrymyces4 ,,stewart4 ,advice to ,purchasers of ,horses4 ,by ,,john ,,stewart1 ,v4,s4 ,new ,edition4 #bs4 #f;d4 ---- ,stable ,economy4 ,a ,treatise on the ,management of ,horses in relation to ,stabling1 ,grooming1 ,feeding1 ,watering1 and ,working4 ,seventh ,edition1 fcap4 #hvo1 #fs4 #f;d4 ,,stewart4 ,a ,hebrew ,grammar1 with the ,pronunciation1 ,syllabic ,division and ,tone of the ,words1 and ,quantity of the ,vowels4 ,by ,rev4 ,,duncan ,,stewart1 ,d4,d4 ,fourth ,edition4 #hvo1 #cs4 #f;d4 ,,stewart4 ,boethius3 ,an ,essay4 ,by ,,hugh ,,fraser ,,stewart1 ,m4,a41 ,trinity ,college1 ,cambridge4 ,crown #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,,stoddart4 ,angling ,songs4 ,by ,,thomas ,,tod ,,stoddart4 ,new ,edition1 with a ,memoir by ,,anna ,m4 ,,stoddart4 ,crown #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,,stormonth4 ,etymological and ,pronouncing ,dictionary of the ,english ,language4 ,including a very ,copious ,selection of ,scientific ,terms ,for ,use in ,schools and ,colleges1 and as a ,book of ,general ,reference4 ,by the ,rev4 ,,james ,,stormonth4 ,the ,pronunciation carefully ,revised by the ,rev4 ,p4 ,h4 ,,phelp1 ,m4,a4 ,cantab4 ,tenth ,edition1 ,revised throughout4 ,crown #hvo1 pp4 #hjj4 #gs4 #f;d4 ---- ,dictionary of the ,english ,language1 ,pronouncing1 ,etymological1 and ,explanatory4 ,revised by the ,rev4 ,p4 ,h4 ,,phelp4 ,library ,edition4 ,imperial #hvo1 handsomely bound in half morocco1 #cas4 #f;d4 ---- ,the ,school ,etymological ,dictionary and ,word-,book4 ,fourth ,edition4 ,fcap4 #hvo1 pp4 #bed4 #bs4 ,,story4 ,nero2 ,a ,historical ,play4 ,by ,w4 ,w4 ,,story1 ,author of ',roba di ,roma4' ,fcap4 #hvo1 #fs4 ---- ,vallombrosa4 ,post #hvo1 #es4 ---- ,poems4 #b4 vols4 fcap41 #gs4 #f;d4 ---- ,fiammetta4 ,a ,summer ,idyl4 ,crown #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ---- ,conversations in a ,studio4 #b vols4 crown #hvo1 #abs4 #f;d4 ---- ,excursions in ,art and ,letters4 ,crown #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,,strickland4 ,life of ,agnes ,strickland4 ,by her ,,sister4 ,post #hvo1 with ,portrait engraved on ,steel1 #abs4 #f;d4 ,,sturgis4 ,john-a-,dreams4 ,a ,tale4 ,by ,,julian ,,sturgis4 ,new ,edition1 crown #hvo1 #cs4 #f;d4 ---- ,little ,comedies1 ,old and ,new4 ,crown #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,,sutherland4 ,handbook of ,hardy ,herbaceous and ,alpine ,flowers1 for general ,garden ,decoration4 ,containing ,descriptions of upwards of #ajjj ,species of ,ornamental ,hardy ,perennial and ,alpine ,plants2 along with ,concise and ,plain ,instructions for their ,propagation and ,culture4 ,by ,,william ,,sutherland1 ,landscape ,gardener2 formerly ,manager of the ,herbaceous ,department at ,kew4 ,crown #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,,taylor4 ,the ,story of ,my ,life4 ,by the late ,colonel ,,meadows ,,taylor1 ,author of ',the ,confessions of a ,thug1' c4 c4 ,edited by his ,daughter4 ,new and cheaper ,edition1 being the ,fourth4 ,crown #hvo1 #fs4 ,,tholuck4 ,hours of ,christian ,devotion4 ,translated from the ,german of ,a4 ,tholuck1 ,d4,d41 ,professor of ,theology in the ,university of ,halle4 ,by the ,rev4 ,,robert ,,menzies1 ,d4,d4 ,with a ,preface written for this ,translation by the ,author4 ,second ,edition1 crown #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,,thomson4 ,handy ,book of the ,flower-,garden3 being ,practical ,directions for the ,propagation1 ,culture1 and ,arrangement of ,plants in ,flower-,gardens all the year round4 ,with ,engraved ,plans4 ,by ,,david ,,thomson1 ,gardener to his ,grace the ,duke of ,buccleuch1 ,k4,t41 at ,drumlanrig4 ,fourth and ,cheaper ,edition1 crown #hvo1 #es4 ---- ,the ,handy ,book of ,fruit-,culture under ,glass3 being a series of ,elaborate ,practical ,treatises on the ,cultivation and ,forcing of ,pines1 ,vines1 ,peaches1 ,figs1 ,melons1 ,strawberries1 and ,cucumbers4 ,with ,engravings of ,hothouses1 c4 ,second ,ed4 ,cr4 #hvo1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,,thomson4 ,a ,practical ,treatise on the ,cultivation of the ,grape ,vine4 ,by ,,william ,,thomson1 ,tweed ,vineyards4 ,tenth ,edition1 #hvo1 #es4 ,,thomson4 ,cookery for the ,sick and ,convalescent4 ,with ,directions for the ,preparation of ,poultices1 ,fomentations1 c4 ,by ,,barbara ,,thomson4 ,fcap4 #hvo1 #as4 #f;d4 ,,thornton4 ,opposites4 ,a ,series of ,essays on the ,unpopular ,sides of ,popular ,questions4 ,by ,,lewis ,,thornton4 #hvo1 #abs4 #f;d4 ,,tom ,,cringle',s ,,log4 ,a ,new ,edition1 with ,illustrations4 ,crown #hvo1 cloth gilt1 #es4 ,cheap ,edition1 #bs4 ,,transactions ,,of ,,the ,,highland ,,and ,,agricultural ,,society ,,of ,,scotland4 ,published annually1 price #es4 ,,tulloch4 ,rational ,theology and ,christian ,philosophy in ,england in the ,seventeenth ,century4 ,by ,,john ,,tulloch1 ,d4,d41 ,principal of ,st ,mary's ,college in the ,university of ,st ,andrews2 and one of her ,majesty's ,chaplains in ,ordinary in ,scotland4 ,second ,edition4 #b vols4 #hvo1 #afs4 ---- ,modern ,theories in ,philosophy and ,religion4 #hvo1 #aes4 ---- ,luther1 and other ,leaders of the ,reformation4 ,third ,edition1 enlarged4 ,crown #hvo1 #cs4 #f;d4 ---- ,memoir of ,principal ,tulloch1 ,d4,d41 ,,ll4,d4 ,by ,mrs ,,oliphant1 ,author of ',life of ,edward ,irving4' ,third and ,cheaper ,edition4 #hvo1 with ,portrait4 #gs4 #f;d4 ,,tweedie4 ,the ,arabian ,horse3 his ,country and ,people4 ,with ,portraits of ,typical or ,famous ,arabians1 and numerous other ,illustrations2 also a ,map of the ,country of the ,arabian ,horse1 and a descriptive ,glossary of ,arabic words and proper names4 ,by ,colonel ,w4 ,,tweedie1 ,c4,s4,i41 ,bengal ,staff ,corps1 ,h4,b4,m4's late ,consul-,general1 ,baghdad4 ,in the press4 ,,veitch4 ,institutes of ,logic4 ,by ,,john ,,veitch1 ,,ll4,d41 ,professor of ,logic and ,rhetoric in the ,university of ,glasgow4 ,post #hvo1 #abs4 #f;d4 ---- ,the ,feeling for ,nature in ,scottish ,poetry4 ,from the ,earliest ,times to the ,present ,day4 #b vols4 fcap4 #hvo1 in roxburghe binding4 #aes4 ---- ,merlin and ,other ,poems4 ,fcap4 #hvo1 #ds4 #f;d4 ---- ,knowing and ,being4 ,essays in ,philosophy4 ,first ,series4 ,crown #hvo1 #es4 ,,virgil4 ,the neid of ,virgil4 ,translated in ,english ,blank ,verse by ,g4 ,k4 ,,rickards1 ,m4,a41 and ,lord ,,ravensworth4 #b vols4 fcap4 #hvo1 #ajs4 ,,walford4 ,four ,biographies from ',blackwood'3 ,jane ,taylor1 ,hannah ,more1 ,elizabeth ,fry1 ,mary ,somerville4 ,by ,l4 ,b4 ,,walford4 ,crown #hvo1 #es4 ,,warren',s 7,,samuel7 ,,works3-- ,diary of a ,late ,physician4 ,cloth1 #bs4 #f;d42 boards1 #bs4 ,ten ,thousand ,a-,year4 ,cloth1 #cs4 #f;d42 boards1 #bs4 #f;d4 ,now and ,then4 ,the ,lily and the ,bee4 ,intellectual and ,moral ,development of the ,present ,age4 #ds4 #f;d4 ,essays3 ,critical1 ,imaginative1 and ,juridical4 #es4 ,,warren4 ,the ,five ,books of the ,psalms4 ,with ,marginal ,notes4 ,by ,rev4 ,,samuel ,l4 ,,warren1 ,rector of ,esher1 ,surrey2 late ,fellow1 ,dean1 and ,divinity ,lecturer1 ,wadham ,college1 ,oxford4 ,crown #hvo1 #es4 ,,webster4 ,the ,angler and the ,loop-,rod4 ,by ,,david ,,webster4 ,crown #hvo1 with ,illustrations1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,,wellington4 ,wellington ,prize ,essays on the ,system of ,field ,manuvres best adapted for enabling our ,troops to meet a ,continental ,army4 ,edited by ,general ,sir ,,edward ,,bruce ,,hamley1 ,k4,c4,b41 ,k4,c4,m4,g4 #hvo1 #abs4 #f;d4 ,,wenley4 ,socrates and ,christ3 ,a ,study in the ,philosophy of ,religion4 ,by ,r4 ,m4 ,,wenley1 ,m4,a41 ,lecturer on ,mental and ,moral ,philosophy in ,queen ,margaret ,college1 ,glasgow2 ,examiner in ,philosophy in the ,university of ,glasgow4 ,crown #hvo1 #fs4 ,,werner4 ,a ,visit to ,stanley's ,rear-,guard at ,major ,barttelot's ,camp on the ,aruhwimi4 ,with an ,account of ,river-,life on the ,congo4 ,by ,j4 ,r4 ,,werner1 ,f4,r4,g4,s41 ,engineer1 late in the ,service of the ,etat ,independant du ,congo4 ,with ,maps1 ,portraits1 and other ,illustrations4 #hvo4 #afs4 ,,westminster ,,assembly4 ,minutes of the ,westminster ,assembly1 while engaged in preparing their ,directory for ,church ,government1 ,confession of ,faith1 and ,catechisms 7,november #afdd to ,march #afdi74 ,edited by the ,rev4 ,professor ,,alex4 ,t4 ,,mitchell1 of ,st ,andrews1 and the ,rev4 ,,john ,,struthers1 ,,ll4,d4 ,with a ,historical and ,critical ,introduction by ,professor ,mitchell4 #hvo1 #aes4 ,,white4 ,the ,eighteen ,christian ,centuries4 ,by the ,rev4 ,,james ,,white4 ,seventh ,edition1 post #hvo1 with ,index1 #fs4 ---- ,history of ,france1 from the ,earliest ,times4 ,sixth ,thousand1 post #hvo1 with ,index1 #fs4 ,,white4 ,archological ,sketches in ,scotland--,kintyre and ,knapdale4 ,by ,colonel ,t4 ,p4 ,,white1 ,r4,e41 of the ,ordnance ,survey4 ,with numerous ,illustrations4 #b vols4 folio1 #d1 #ds4 ,vol4 ,i41 ,kintyre1 sold separately1 #b1 #bs4 ---- ,the ,ordnance ,survey of the ,united ,kingdom4 ,a ,popular ,account4 ,crown #hvo1 #es4 ,,wicks4 ,golden ,lives4 ,the ,story of a ,woman's ,courage4 ,by ,,frederick ,,wicks4 ,cheap ,edition1 with #abj ,illustrations4 ,illustrated ,boards4 #hvo1 #bs4 #f;d4 ,,williamson4 ,poems of ,nature and ,life4 ,by ,,david ,r4 ,,williamson1 ,minister of ,kirkmaiden4 ,fcap4 #hvo1 #cs4 ,,wills ,,and ,,greene4 ,drawing-room ,dramas for ,children4 ,by ,w4 ,g4 ,,wills and the ,hon4 ,mrs ,,greene4 ,crown #hvo1 #fs4 ,,wilson4 ,works of ,professor ,wilson4 ,edited by his ,son-in-,law1 ,professor ,,ferrier4 #ab vols4 crown #hvo1 #b1 #hs4 ---- ,christopher in his ,sporting-,jacket4 #b vols41 #hs4 ---- ,isle of ,palms1 ,city of the ,plague1 and other ,poems4 #ds4 ---- ,lights and ,shadows of ,scottish ,life1 and other ,tales4 #ds4 ---- ,essays1 ,critical and ,imaginative4 #d vols41 #afs4 ---- ,the ,noctes ,ambrosian4 #d vols41 #afs4 ---- ,homer and his ,translators1 and the ,greek ,drama4 ,crown #hvo1 #ds4 ,,wingate4 ,lily ,neil4 ,a ,poem4 ,by ,,david ,,wingate4 ,crown #hvo1 #ds4 #f;d4 ,,wordsworth4 ,the ,historical ,plays of ,shakspeare4 ,with ,introductions and ,notes4 ,by ,,charles ,,wordsworth1 ,d4,c4,l41 ,bishop of ,s4 ,andrews4 #c vols4 post #hvo1 cloth1 each price #gs4 #f;d41 or handsomely bound in half-calf1 each price #is4 #i;d4 ,,worsley4 ,poems and ,translations4 ,by ,,philip ,,stanhope ,,worsley1 ,m4,a4 ,edited by ,,edward ,,worsley4 ,second ,edition1 enlarged4 ,fcap4 #hvo1 #fs4 ,,yate4 ,england and ,russia ,face to ,face in ,asia4 ,a ,record of ,travel with the ,afghan ,boundary ,commission4 ,by ,captain ,a4 ,c4 ,,yate1 ,bombay ,staff ,corps4 #hvo1 with ,maps and ,illustrations1 #bas4 ,,yate4 ,northern ,afghanistan2 or1 ,letters from the ,afghan ,boundary ,commission4 ,by ,major ,c4 ,e4 ,,yate1 ,c4,s4,i41 ,c4,m4,g4 ,bombay ,staff ,corps1 ,f4,r4,g4,s4 #hvo1 with ,maps4 #ahs4 ,,young4 ,a ,story of ,active ,service in ,foreign ,lands4 ,compiled from letters sent home from ,south ,africa1 ,india1 and ,china1 #ahef-ahhb4 ,by ,surgeon-,general ,a4 ,,graham ,,young1 ,author of ',crimean ,cracks4' ,crown #hvo1 ,illustrated1 #gs4 #f;d4 ,,yule4 ,fortification3 for the ,use of ,officers in the ,army1 and ,readers of ,military ,history4 ,by ,col4 ,,yule1 ,bengal ,engineers4 #hvo1 with numerous ,illustrations1 #ajs4 #f;d4