,illustration3 ,aristotle               
99,,aristotle99                    ,,by 
,a4 ,e4 ,,taylor1 ,m4,a41 ,d4,,litt41   
,f4,b4,a4                               
,,london3 ,t4 ,c4  ,e4 ,c4 ,,jack       
#fg ,,long ,,acre1 ,w4,c41 ,,and        
,,edinburgh                      ,,new  
,,york3 ,,dodge ,,publishing ,,co4      
99,,contents99  ,,chap4  ,i4 ,,life     
,,and ,,works  ,,ii4 ,,the              
,,classification ,,of ,,the ,,sciences3 
,,scientific ,,method  ,,iii4 ,,first   
,,philosophy  ,,iv4 ,,physics  ,v4      
,,practical ,,philosophy  ,,bibliography
                                        
99,,aristotle99                         
99,,chapter ,i99                        
99,,life ,,and ,,works99   ,it has not  
commonly been the lot of philosophers1  
as it is of great poets1 that their     
names should become household words4 ,we
 should hardly call an ,englishman well 
read if he had not heard the name of    
,sophocles or ,moliere4  ,an educated   
man is expected to know at least who    

these great writers were1 and to        
understand an allusion to the ,antigone 
or ,le ,misanthrope4 ,but we call a man 
well read if his mind is stored with the
 verse of poets and the prose of        
historians1 even though he were ignorant
 of the name of ,descartes or ,kant4    
,yet there are a few philosophers whose 
influence on thought and language has   
been so extensive that no one who reads 
can be ignorant of their names1 and that
 every man who speaks the language of   
educated ,europeans is constantly using 
their vocabulary4 ,among this few       
,aristotle holds not the lowest place4  
,we have all heard of him1 as we have   
all heard of ,homer4  ,he has left his  
impress so firmly on theology that many 
of the formulae of the ,churches are    
unintelligible without acquaintance with
 his conception of the universe4  ,if we
 are interested in the growth of modern 
science we shall readily discover for   
ourselves that some knowledge of        
,aristotelianism is necessary for the   

understanding of ,bacon and ,galileo and
 the other great anti-,aristotelians who
 created the modern scientific view of  
,nature4  ,if we turn to the imaginative
 literature of the modern languages1    
,dante is a sealed book1 and many a     
passage of ,chaucer and ,shakespeare and
 ,milton is half unmeaning to us unless 
we are at home in the outlines of       
,aristotle's philosophy4  ,and if we    
turn to ordinary language1 we find that 
many of the familiar turns of modern    
speech cannot be fully understood       
without a knowledge of the doctrines    
they were first forged to express4  ,an 
,englishman who speaks of the golden    
mean or of liberal education1 or        
contrasts the matter of a work of       
literature with its form1 or the        
essential features of a situation or a  
scheme of policy with its accidents1 or 
theory with practice1 is using words    
which derive their significance from the
 part they play in the vocabulary of    
,aristotle4  ,the unambitious object of 

this little book is1 then1 to help the  
,english reader to a better             
understanding of such familiar language 
and a fuller comprehension of much that 
he will find in ,dante and ,shakespeare 
and ,bacon4  99,life of                 
,aristotle499--,the main facts of       
,aristotle's life may be briefly told4  
,he was born in #che-d ,b4,c4 at        
,stagirus1 a little city of the         
,chalcidic peninsula1 still called1     
almost by its ancient name1 ,chalcis1   
and died at the age of sixty-two at     
,chalcis in ,euboea4  ,thus he is a     
contemporary of ,demosthenes1 his       
manhood witnessed the struggle which    
ended in the establishment of the       
,macedonian monarchy as the dominant    
power in ,hellas1 and his later years   
the campaigns in which his pupil        
,alexander the ,great overthrew the     
,persian ,empire and carried ,greek     
civilisation to the banks of the ,jumna4
  ,in studying the constitutional       
theories of ,aristotle1 it is necessary 

to bear these facts in mind4 ,they help 
to explain certain limitations of       
outlook which might otherwise appear    
strange in so great a man4  ,it throws a
 great deal of light on the             
philosopher's intense conviction of the 
natural inferiority of the barbarian    
intellect and character to remember that
 he grew up in an outlying region where 
the barbarian was seen to disadvantage  
in the ordinary course of life4  ,hence 
the distinction between ,greek and      
barbarian came to mean for him much what
 the colour-line does to an ,american   
brought up in a ,southern ,state4  ,so1 
again1 when we are struck by his        
provincialism1 his apparent satisfaction
 with the ideal of a small              
self-contained city-state with a        
decently oligarchical government1 a good
 system of public education1 and no     
social problems1 but devoid alike of    
great traditions and far-reaching       
ambitions1 we must remember that the    
philosopher himself belonged to just    

such a tiny community without a past and
 without a future4 ,the ,chalcidic      
cities had been first founded1 as the   
name of the peninsula implies1 as       
colonies from the town of ,chalcis in   
,euboea2 ,corinth had also been         
prominent in establishing settlements in
 the same region4  ,at the height of    
,athenian ,imperial prosperity in the   
age of ,pericles the district had fallen
 politically under ,athenian control1   
but had been detached again from        
,athens1 in the last years of the       
,archidamian war1 by the genius of the  
great ,spartan soldier and diplomat     
,brasidas4 ,early in the fourth century 
the ,chalcidic cities had attempted to  
form themselves into an independent     
federation1 but the movement had been   
put down by ,sparta1 and the cities had 
fallen under the control of the rising  
,macedonian monarchy1 when ,aristotle   
was a baby4  ,a generation later1 a     
double intrigue of the cities with      
,philip of ,macedon and ,athens failed  

of its effect1 and the peninsula was    
finally incorporated with the           
,macedonian kingdom4  ,it is also       
important to note that the philosopher  
belonged by birth to a guild1 the       
,asclepiadae1 in which the medical      
profession was hereditary4  ,his father 
,nicomachus was court physician to      
,amyntas ,,ii41 the king for whose      
benefit the ,spartans had put down the  
,chalcidic league4 ,this early          
connection with medicine and with the   
,macedonian court explains largely both 
the predominantly biological cast of    
,aristotle's philosophical thought and  
the intense dislike of princes and      
courts to which he more than once gives 
expression4  ,at the age of eighteen1 in
 #cfg-f1 ,aristotle was sent to ,athens 
for higher education in philosophy and  
science1 and entered the famous         
,platonic ,academy1 where he remained as
 a member of the scientific group       
gathered round the master for twenty    
years1 until ,plato's death in #cdg-f4  

,for the three years immediately        
following ,aristotle was in ,asia ,minor
 with his friend and fellow-student     
,hermeias1 who had become by force of   
sheer capacity monarch of the city of   
,atarneus in the ,troad1 and was        
maintaining himself with much energy    
against the ,persian king4  ,pythias1   
the niece of ,hermeias1 became the      
philosopher's wife1 and it seems that   
the marriage was happy4 ,examination of 
,aristotle's contributions to marine    
biology has shown that his knowledge of 
the subject is specially good for the   
,aeolic coast and the shores of the     
adjacent islands4  ,this throws light on
 his occupations during his residence   
with ,hermeias1 and suggests that ,plato
 had discerned the bent of his          
distinguished pupil's mind1 and that his
 special share in the researches of the 
,academy had1 like that of ,speusippus1 
,plato's nephew and successor in the    
headship of the school1 been largely of 
a biological kind4  ,we also know that1 

presumably shortly after ,plato's death1
 ,aristotle had been one of the group of
 disciples who edited their teacher's   
unpublished lectures4 ,in #cdc ,hermeias
 was assassinated at the instigation of 
,persia2 ,aristotle honoured his memory 
by a hymn setting forth the godlikeness 
of virtue as illustrated by the life of 
his friend4 ,aristotle now removed to   
the ,macedonian court1 where he received
 the position of tutor to the ,crown    
,prince1 afterwards ,alexander the      
,great1 at this time 7#cdc ,b4,c47 a boy
 of thirteen4 ,the association of the   
great philosopher and the great king as 
tutor and pupil has naturally struck the
 imagination of later ages2 even in     
,plutarch's ,life of ,alexander we meet 
already with the full-blown legend of   
the influence of ,aristotle's           
philosophical speculations on           
,alexander4  ,it is1 however1 improbable
 that ,aristotle's influence counted for
 much in forming the character of       
,alexander4  ,aristotle's dislike of    

monarchies and their accessories is     
written large on many a page of his     
,ethics and ,politics2 the small        
self-contained city-state with no       
political ambitions for which he        
reserves his admiration would have      
seemed a mere relic of antiquity to     
,philip and ,alexander4  ,the only piece
 of contemporary evidence as to the     
relations between the master and the    
pupil is a sentence in a letter to the  
young ,alexander from the ,athenian     
publicist ,isocrates who maliciously    
congratulates the prince on his         
preference for rhetoric1 the art of     
efficient public speech1 and his        
indifference to logic-choppers4  ,how   
little sympathy ,aristotle can have had 
with his pupil's ambitions is shown by  
the fact that though his political      
theories must have been worked out      
during the very years in which          
,alexander was revolutionising          
,hellenism by the foundation of his     
world-empire1 they contain no allusion  

to so momentous a change in the social  
order4  ,for all that ,aristotle tells  
us1 ,alexander might never have existed1
 and the small city-state might have    
been the last word of ,hellenic         
political development4  ,hence it is    
probable that the selection of          
,aristotle1 who had not yet appeared    
before the world as an independent      
thinker1 to take part in the education  
of the ,crown ,prince was due less to   
personal reputation than to the         
connection of his family with the court1
 taken together with his own position as
 a pupil of ,plato1 whose intervention  
in the public affairs of ,sicily had    
caused the ,academy to be regarded as   
the special home of scientific interest 
in politics and jurisprudence4  ,it may 
be true that ,alexander found time in   
the midst of his conquests to supply his
 old tutor with zoological specimens2 it
 is as certain as such a thing can be   
that the ideals and characters of the   
two men were too different to allow of  

any intimate influence of either on the 
other4  ,when ,alexander was suddenly   
called to the ,macedonian throne by the 
murder of his father in #ccf ,b4,c41    
,aristotle's services were no longer    
needed2 he returned to ,athens and gave 
himself to purely scientific work4      
,just at this juncture the presidency of
 the ,academy was vacant by the death of
 ,speusippus1 ,aristotle's old associate
 in biological research4 ,possibly      
,aristotle thought himself injured when 
the school passed him over and elected  
,xenocrates of ,chalcedon as its new    
president4  ,at any rate1 though he     
appears never to have wholly severed his
 connection with the ,academy1 in #cce  
he opened a rival institution in the    
,lyceum1 or gymnasium attached to the   
temple of ,apollo ,lyceus1 to which he  
was followed by some of the most        
distinguished members of the ,academy4  
,from the fact that his instruction was 
given in the peripatos or covered       
portico of the gymnasium the school has 

derived its name of ,peripatetic4  ,for 
the next twelve years he was occupied in
 the organisation of the school as an   
abode for the prosecution of speculation
 and research in every department of    
inquiry1 and in the composition of      
numerous courses of lectures on         
scientific and philosophical questions4 
,the chief difference in general        
character between the new school and the
 ,academy is that while the scientific  
interests of the ,platonists centred in 
mathematics1 the main contributions of  
the ,lyceum to science lay in the       
departments of biology and history4     
,towards the end of ,alexander's life   
his attention was unfavourably directed 
on his old teacher4  ,a relative of     
,aristotle named ,callisthenes had      
attended ,alexander in his campaigns as 
historiographer1 and had provoked       
disfavour by his censure of the ,king's 
attempts to invest his                  
semi-constitutional position towards his
 ,hellenic subjects with the pomp of an 

,oriental despotism4  ,the historian's  
independence proved fatal4 ,he was      
accused of instigating an assassination 
plot among ,alexander's pages1 and      
hanged1 or1 as some said1 thrown into a 
prison where he died before trial4      
,alexander is reported to have held     
,aristotle responsible for his          
relative's treason1 and to have         
meditated revenge4  ,if this is so1 he  
was fortunately diverted from the       
commission of a crime by preoccupation  
with the invasion of ,india4  ,on the   
death of ,alexander in #cbc a brief but 
vigorous anti-,macedonian agitation     
broke out at ,athens4  ,aristotle1 from 
his ,macedonian connections1 naturally  
fell a victim1 in spite of his want of  
sympathy with the ideals of ,philip and 
,alexander4 ,like ,socrates1 he was     
indicted on the capital charge of       
impiety1 the pretext being that his poem
 on the death of ,hermeias1 written     
twenty years before1 was a virtual      
deification of his friend4  ,this was1  

however1 only a pretext2 the real       
offence was political1 and lay in his   
connection with the ,macedonian leader  
,antipater4  ,as condemnation was       
certain1 the philosopher anticipated it 
by withdrawing with his disciples to    
,chalcis1 the mother city of his native 
,stagirus4  ,here he died in the        
following year1 at the age of sixty-two 
or sixty-three4  ,the features of       
,aristotle1 familiar to us from busts   
and intaglios1 are handsome1 but        
indicate refinement and acuteness rather
 than originality1 an impression in     
keeping with what we should expect from 
a study of his writings4  ,the anecdotes
 related of him reveal a kindly1        
affectionate character1 and show little 
trace of the self-importance which      
appears in his work4 ,his will1 which   
has been preserved1 exhibits the same   
traits in its references to his happy   
family life and its solicitous care for 
the future of his children and servants4
  ,he was twice married1 first to       

,pythias1 and secondly to a certain     
,herpyllis1 by whom he left a son       
,nicomachus and a daughter4  ,the       
goodness of ,herpyllis to her husband is
 specially mentioned in the clauses of  
the will which make provision for her1  
while the warmth of the writer's        
feelings for ,pythias is shown by the   
direction that her remains are to be    
placed in the same tomb with his own4   
,the list of servants remembered and the
 bequests enumerated show the           
philosopher to have been in easier      
circumstances than ,plato4  99,the      
,works of ,aristotle994--,the so-called 
works of ,aristotle present us with a   
curious problem4  ,when we turn from    
,plato to his pupil we seem to have     
passed into a different atmosphere4     
,the ,discourses of ,socrates exhibit a 
prose style which is perhaps the most   
marvellous of all literary achievements4
  ,nowhere else do we meet with quite   
the same combination of eloquence1      
imaginative splendour1 incisive logic1  

and irresistible wit and humour4  ,the  
manner of ,aristotle is dry and formal4 
,his language bristles with             
technicalities1 makes little appeal to  
the emotions1 disdains graces of style1 
and frequently defies the simplest rules
 of composition4  ,our surprise is all  
the greater that we find later writers  
of antiquity1 such as ,cicero1          
commending ,aristotle for his copious   
and golden eloquence1 a characteristic  
which is conspicuously wanting in the   
,aristotelian writings we possess4  ,the
 explanation of the puzzle is1 however1 
simple4  ,plato and ,aristotle were at  
once what we should call professors and 
men of letters2 both wrote works for    
general circulation1 and both delivered 
courses of lectures to special students4
 ,but while ,plato's lectures have      
perished1 his books have come down to   
us4  ,aristotle's books have almost     
wholly been lost1 but we possess many of
 his lectures4 ,the works of ,aristotle 
praised by ,cicero for their eloquence  

were philosophical dialogues1 and formed
 the model for ,cicero's own            
compositions in this kind4  ,none of    
them have survived1 though some passages
 have been preserved in quotations by   
later writers4 ,that the works are      
actually the ,,mss4 of a lecturer       
posthumously edited by his pupils seems 
clear from external as well as from     
internal evidence4  ,in one instance we 
have the advantage of a double          
recension4 ,aristotle's ,ethics or      
,discourses on ,conduct have come down  
to us in two forms--the so-called       
,nicomachean ,ethics1 a redaction by the
 philosopher's son1 ,nicomachus1        
preserving all the characteristics of an
 oral course of lectures2 and a freer   
and more readable recast by a pupil1 the
 mathematician ,eudemus1 known as the   
,eudemian ,ethics4  ,in recent years we 
have also recovered from the sands of   
,egypt what appears to be our one       
specimen of a work of ,aristotle1       
intended to be read by the public at    

large1 the essay on the ,constitution of
 ,athens4  ,the style of this essay is  
easy1 flowing1 and popular1 and shows   
that ,aristotle could write well and    
gracefully when he thought fit4         
99,,chapter ,,ii99          99,,the     
,,classification ,,of ,,the ,,sciences3 
,,scientific ,,method99   ,philosophy1  
as understood by ,aristotle1 may be said
 to be the organised whole of           
disinterested knowledge1 that is1       
knowledge which we seek for the         
satisfaction which it carries with      
itself1 and not as a mere means to      
utilitarian ends4  ,the impulse which   
receives this satisfaction is curiosity 
or wonder1 which ,aristotle regards as  
innate in man1 though it does not get   
full play until civilisation has        
advanced far enough to make secure      
provision for the immediate material    
needs of life4  ,human curiosity was    
naturally directed first to the         
outstanding marvellous works of the     
physical world1 the planets1 the        

periodicity of their movements1 the     
return of the seasons1 winds1 thunder   
and lightning1 and the like4  ,hence the
 earliest ,greek speculation was        
concerned with problems of astronomy and
 meteorology4  ,then1 as reflection     
developed1 men speculated about         
geometrical figure1 and number1 the     
possibility of having assured knowledge 
at all1 the character of the common     
principles assumed in all branches of   
study or of the special principles      
assumed in some one branch1 and thus    
philosophy has finally become the       
disinterested study of every department 
of ,being or ,reality4  ,since          
,aristotle1 like ,hegel1 thought that   
his own doctrine was1 in essentials1 the
 last word of speculation1 the complete 
expression of the principles by which   
his predecessors had been unconsciously 
guided1 he believes himself in a        
position to make a final classification 
of the branches of science1 showing how 
they are related and how they are       

discriminated from one another4  ,this  
classification we have now to consider4 
99,classification of the                
,sciences994--,to begin with1 we have to
 discriminate ,philosophy from two      
rivals with which it might be confounded
 on a superficial view1 ,dialectic and  
,sophistry4 ,dialectic is the art of    
reasoning accurately from given         
premisses1 true or false4 ,this art has 
its proper uses1 and of one of these we 
shall have to speak4  ,but in itself it 
is indifferent to the truth of its      
premisses4 ,you may reason dialectically
 from premisses which you believe to be 
false1 for the express purpose of       
showing the absurd conclusions to which 
they lead4  ,or you may reason from     
premisses which you assume tentatively  
to see what conclusions you are         
committed to if you adopt them4  ,in    
either case your object is not directly 
to secure truth1 but only to secure     
consistency4  ,science or ,philosophy   
aims directly at truth1 and hence       

requires to start with true and certain 
premisses4 ,thus the distinction between
 ,science and ,dialectic is that        
,science reasons from true premisses1   
,dialectic only from probable or        
plausible premisses4  ,sophistry differs
 from ,science in virtue of its moral   
character4  ,it is the profession of    
making a living by the abuse of         
reasoning1 the trick of employing       
logical skill for the apparent          
demonstration of scientific or ethical  
falsehoods4  ,the sophist is one who    
earns a living from an apparent but     
unreal wisdom4  7,the emphasis thus     
falls on the notion of making an unreal 
wisdom into a trade4 ,the sophist's real
 concern is to get his fee47  ,science  
or ,philosophy is thus the disinterested
 employment of the understanding in the 
discovery of truth4  ,we may now        
distinguish the different branches of   
science as defined4 ,the first and most 
important division to be made is that   
between ,speculative or ,theoretical    

,science and ,practical ,science4  ,the 
broad distinction is that which we      
should now draw between the ,sciences   
and the ,arts 7i4e4 the industrial and  
technical1 not the fine arts74          
,speculative or ,theoretical ,philosophy
 differs from ,practical ,philosophy in 
its purpose1 and1 in consequence1 in its
 subject-matter1 and its formal logical 
character4  ,the purpose of the former  
is the disinterested contemplation of   
truths which are what they are          
independently of our own volition2 its  
end is to know and only to know4 ,the   
object of practical ,science is to know1
 but not only to know but also to turn  
our knowledge to account in devising    
ways of successful interference with the
 course of events4  7,the real          
importance of the distinction comes out 
in ,aristotle's treatment of the        
problems of moral and social science4   
,since we require knowledge of the moral
 and social nature of men not merely to 
satisfy an intellectual interest1 but as

 a basis for a sound system of education
 and government1 ,politics1 the theory  
of government1 and ,ethics1 the theory  
of goodness of conduct1 which for       
,aristotle is only a subordinate branch 
of ,politics1 belong to ,practical1 not 
to ,theoretical ,philosophy1 a view     
which is attended by important          
consequences47  ,it follows that there  
is a corresponding difference in the    
objects investigated by the two branches
 of ,philosophy4  ,speculative or       
,theoretical ,philosophy is concerned   
with that which cannot possibly be other
 than it is1 truths and relations       
independent of human volition for their 
subsistence1 and calling simply for     
recognition on our part4 ,practical     
,philosophy has to do with relations    
which human volition can modify1 things 
which may be other than they are1 the   
contingent4 7,thus e4g4 not only        
politics1 but medicine and economics    
will belong to ,practical ,science47    
,hence again arises a logical difference

 between the conclusions of ,theoretical
 and those of ,practical ,philosophy4   
,those of the former are universal      
truths deducible with logical necessity 
from self-evident principles4  ,those of
 the latter1 because they relate to what
 can be otherwise1 are never rigidly    
universal2 they are general rules which 
hold good in the majority of cases1 but 
are liable to occasional exceptions     
owing to the contingent character of the
 facts with which they deal4  ,it is a  
proof of a philosopher's lack of        
grounding in logic that he looks to the 
results of a practical science 7e4g4 to 
the detailed precepts of medicine or    
ethics7 for a higher degree of certainty
 and validity than the nature of the    
subject-matter allows4 ,thus for        
,aristotle the distinction between the  
necessary and the contingent is real and
 not merely apparent1 and probability is
 the guide in studies which have to do  
with the direction of life4             
,self-evident1 that is1 in a purely     

logical sense4 ,when you apprehend the  
principles in question1 you see at once 
that they are true1 and do not require  
to have them proved4 ,it is not meant   
that any and every man does1 in point of
 fact1 always apprehend the principles1 
or that they can be apprehended without 
preliminary mental discipline4   ,we    
proceed to the question how many        
subdivisions there are within           
theoretical ,philosophy itself4  ,plato 
had held that there are none4 ,all the  
sciences are deductions from a single   
set of ultimate principles which it is  
the business of that supreme science to 
which ,plato had given the name of      
,dialectic to establish4  ,this is not  
,aristotle's view4 ,according to him1   
theoretical ,philosophy falls into a    
number of distinct though not           
co-ordinate branches1 each with its own 
special subjects of investigation and   
its own special axiomatic principles4   
,of these branches there are three1     
,first ,philosophy1 ,mathematics1 and   

,physics4  ,first                       
,philosophy--afterwards to be known to  
the ,middle ,ages as                    
,metaphysics--treats1 to use            
,aristotle's own expression1 of ,being  
qua ,being4  ,this means that it is     
concerned with the universal            
characteristics which belong to the     
system of knowable reality as such1 and 
the principles of its organisation in   
their full universality4 ,first         
,philosophy alone investigates the      
character of those causative factors in 
the system which are without body or    
shape and exempt from all mutability4   
,since in ,aristotle's system ,god is   
the supreme ,cause of this kind1 ,first 
,philosophy culminates in the knowledge 
of ,god1 and is hence frequently called 
,theology4  ,it thus includes an element
 which would to-day be assigned to the  
theory of knowledge1 as well as one     
which we should ascribe to metaphysics1 
since it deals at once with the ultimate
 postulates of knowledge and the        

ultimate causes of the order of real    
existence4    ,the origin of this name  
seems to be that ,aristotle's lectures  
on ,first ,philosophy came to be studied
 as a continuation of his course on     
,physics4 ,hence the lectures got the   
name ,metaphysica because they came     
after 7meta7 those on ,physics4 ,finally
 the name was transferred 7as in the    
case of ,ethics7 from the lectures to   
the subject of which they treat4        
,mathematics is of narrower scope4      
,what it studies is no longer real being
 as such1 but only real being in so far 
as it exhibits number and geometrical   
form4  ,since ,aristotle holds the view 
that number and figure only exist as    
determinations of objects given in      
perception 7though by a convenient      
fiction the mathematician treats of them
 in abstraction from the perceived      
objects which they qualify71 he marks   
the difference between ,mathematics and 
,first ,philosophy by saying that       
whereas the objects of ,first           

,philosophy are separate from matter and
 devoid of motion1 those of             
,mathematics1 though incapable of       
motion1 have no separable existence but 
are inherent in matter4  ,physics is    
concerned with the study of objects     
which are both material and capable of  
motion4 ,thus the principle of the      
distinction is the presence or absence  
of initial restrictions of the range of 
the different branches of ,science4     
,first ,philosophy has the widest range1
 since its contemplation covers the     
whole ground of the real and knowable2  
,physics the narrowest1 because it is   
confined to a universe of discourse     
restricted by the double qualification  
that its members are all material and   
capable of displacement4  ,mathematics  
holds an intermediate position1 since in
 it1 one of these qualifications is     
removed1 but the other still remains1   
for the geometer's figures are          
boundaries and limits of sensible       
bodies1 and the arithmetician's numbers 

properties of collections of concrete   
objects4  ,it follows also that the     
initial axioms or postulates of         
,mathematics form a less simple system  
than those of ,first ,philosophy1 and   
those of ,physics than those of         
,mathematics4  ,mathematics requires as 
initial assumptions not only those which
 hold good for all thought1 but certain 
other special axioms which are only     
valid and significant for the realm of  
figure and number2 ,physics requires yet
 further axioms which are only          
applicable to what is in motion4  ,this 
is why1 though the three disciplines are
 treated as distinct1 they are not      
strictly co-ordinate1 and ,first        
,philosophy1 though first1 is only prima
 inter pares4  ,we thus get the         
following diagrammatic scheme of the    
classification of sciences3--           
,science                                
-----------------------                 
,theoretical               ,practical   
-----------------------                 

,first ,philosophy     ,mathe-          
,physics            or            matics
         ,theology   ,practical         
,philosophy is not subjected by         
,aristotle to any similar subdivision4  
,later students were accustomed to      
recognise a threefold division into     
,ethics 7the theory of individual       
conduct71 ,economics 7the theory of the 
management of the household71 ,politics 
7the theory of the management of the    
,state74  ,aristotle himself does not   
make these distinctions4 ,his general   
name for the theory of conduct is       
,politics1 the doctrine of individual   
conduct being for him inseparable from  
that of the right ordering of society4  
,though he composed a separate course of
 lectures on individual conduct 7the    
,ethics71 he takes care to open the     
course by stating that the science of   
which it treats is ,politics1 and offers
 an apology for dealing with the        
education of individual character apart 
from the more general doctrine of the   

organisation of society4  ,no special   
recognition is given in ,aristotle's own
 classification to the ,philosophy of   
,art4  ,modern students of ,aristotle   
have tried to fill in the omission by   
adding artistic creation to             
contemplation and practice as a third   
fundamental form of mental activity1 and
 thus making a threefold division of    
,philosophy into ,theoretical1          
,practical1 and ,productive4  ,the      
object of this is to find a place in the
 classification for ,aristotle's famous 
,poetics and his work on ,rhetoric1 the 
art of effective speech and writing4    
,but the admission of the third division
 of ,science has no warrant in the text 
of ,aristotle1 nor are the ,rhetoric and
 ,poetics1 properly speaking1 a         
contribution to ,philosophy4  ,they are 
intended as collections of practical    
rules for the composition of a pamphlet 
or a tragedy1 not as a critical         
examination of the canons of literary   
taste4  ,this was correctly seen by the 

dramatic theorists of the seventeenth   
century4 ,they exaggerated the value of 
,aristotle's directions and entirely    
misunderstood the meaning of some of    
them1 but they were right in their view 
that the ,poetics was meant to be a     
collection of rules by obeying which the
 craftsman might make sure of turning   
out a successful play4 ,so far as       
,aristotle has a ,philosophy of ,fine   
,art at all1 it forms part of his more  
general theory of education and must be 
looked for in the general discussion of 
the aims of education contained in his  
,politics4  99,the ,methods of          
,science994--,no place has been assigned
 in the scheme to what we call logic and
 ,aristotle called ,analytics1 the      
theory of scientific method1 or of proof
 and the estimation of evidence4  ,the  
reason is that since the fundamental    
character of proof is the same in all   
science1 ,aristotle looks upon logic as 
a study of the methods common to all    
science4  ,at a later date it became a  

hotly debated question whether logic    
should be regarded in this way as a     
study of the methods instrumental to    
proof in all sciences1 or as itself a   
special constituent division of         
philosophy4  ,the ,aristotelian view was
 concisely indicated by the name which  
became attached to the collection of    
,aristotle's logical works4  ,they were 
called the ,organon1 that is1 the       
instrument1 or the body of rules of     
method employed by ,science4  ,the      
thought implied is thus that logic      
furnishes the tools with which every    
science has to work in establishing its 
results4  ,our space will only permit of
 a brief statement as to the points in  
which the ,aristotelian formal logic    
appears to be really original1 and the  
main peculiarities of ,aristotle's      
theory of knowledge4  7a7 99,formal     
,logic994--,in compass the ,aristotelian
 logic corresponds roughly with the     
contents of modern elementary treatises 
on the same subject1 with the omission  

of the sections which deal with the     
so-called ,conditional ,syllogism4  ,the
 inclusion of arguments of this type in 
mediaeval and modern expositions of     
formal logic is principally due to the  
,stoics1 who preferred to throw their   
reasoning into these forms and subjected
 them to minute scrutiny4  ,in his      
treatment of the doctrine of ,terms1    
,aristotle avoids the mistake of        
treating the isolated name as though it 
had significance apart from the         
enunciations in which it occurs4  ,he is
 quite clear on the all-important point 
that the unit of thought is the         
proposition in which something is       
affirmed or denied1 the one thought-form
 which can be properly called true or   
false4  ,such an assertion he analyses  
into two factors1 that about which      
something is affirmed or denied 7the    
,subject71 and that which is affirmed or
 denied of it 7the ,predicate74         
,consequently his doctrine of the       
classification of ,terms is based on a  

classification of ,predicates1 or of    
,propositions according to the special  
kind of connection between the ,subject 
and ,predicate which they affirm or     
deny4  ,two such classifications1 which 
cannot be made to fit into one another1 
meet us in ,aristotle's logical         
writings1 the scheme of the ten         
,categories1 and that which was         
afterwards known in the ,middle ,ages as
 the list of ,predicaments or ,heads of 
,predicates1 or again as the ,five      
,words4  ,the list of ,categories       
reveals itself as an attempt to answer  
the question in how many different      
senses the words is a or are are        
employed when we assert that x is y or x
 is a y or xs are ys4  ,such a statement
 may tell us 7#a7 what x is1 as if ,i   
say x is a lion2 the predicate is then  
said to fall under the category of      
,substance2 7#b7 what x is like1 as when
 ,i say x is white1 or x is wise1--the  
category of ,quality2 7#c7 how much or  
how many x is1 as when ,i say x is tall 

or x is five feet long1--the category of
 ,quantity2 7#d7 how x is related to    
something else1 as when ,i say x is to  
the right of y1 x is the father of      
y1--the category of ,relation4  ,these  
are the four chief categories discussed 
by ,aristotle4  ,the remainder are 7#e7 
,place1 7#f7 ,time1 7#g7 and 7#h7       
,condition or ,state1 as when ,i say x  
is sitting down or x has his armour     
on1--7the only distinction between the  
two cases seems to be that 7#g7 denotes 
a more permanent state of x than 7#h772 
7#i7 ,action or ,activity1 as when ,i   
say x is cutting1 or generally x is     
doing something to y2 7#aj7 ,passivity1 
as when ,i say x is being cut1 or more  
generally1 so-and-so is being done to x4
 ,no attempt is made to show that this  
list of figures of predication is       
complete1 or to point out any principle 
which has been followed in its          
construction4  ,it also happens that    
much the same enumeration is            
incidentally made in one or two passages

 of ,plato4  ,hence it is not unlikely  
that the list was taken over by         
,aristotle as one which would be        
familiar to pupils who had read their   
,plato1 and therefore convenient for    
practical purposes4  ,the fivefold      
classification does depend on a         
principle pointed out by ,aristotle     
which guarantees its completeness1 and  
is therefore likely to have been thought
 out by him for himself1 and to be the  
genuine ,aristotelian scheme4  ,consider
 an ordinary universal affirmative      
proposition of the form all xs are ys4  
,now if this statement is true it may   
also be true that all ys are xs1 or it  
may not4  ,on the first supposition we  
have two possible cases1 7#a7 the       
predicate may state precisely what the  
subject defined is2 then y is the       
,definition of x1 as when ,i say that   
men are mortal animals1 capable of      
discourse4  ,here it is also true to say
 that mortal animals capable of         
discourse are men1 and ,aristotle       

regards the predicate mortal animal     
capable of discourse as expressing the  
inmost nature of man4  7#b7 ,the        
predicate may not express the inmost    
nature of the subject1 and yet may      
belong only to the class denoted by the 
subject and to every member of that     
class4  ,the predicate is then called a 
,proprium or property1 an exclusive     
attribute of the class in question4     
,thus it was held that all men are      
capable of laughter and all beings      
capable of laughter are men1 but that   
the capacity for laughter is no part of 
the inmost nature or real essence of    
humanity4  ,it is therefore reckoned as 
a ,proprium4  ,again in the case where  
it is true that all xs are ys1 but not  
true that all ys are xs1 y may be part  
of the definition of x or it may not4   
,if it is part of the definition of x it
 will be either 7#c7 a genus or wider   
class of which x forms a subdivision1 as
 when ,i say1 ,all men are animals1 or  
7#d7 a difference1 that is1 one of the  

distinctive marks by which the xs are   
distinguished from other sub-classes or 
species of the same genus1 as when ,i   
say1 ,all men are capable of discourse4 
,or finally 7#e7 y may be no part of the
 definition of x1 but a characteristic  
which belongs both to the xs and some   
things other than xs4  ,the predicate is
 then called an ,accident4  ,we have now
 exhausted all the possible cases1 and  
may say that the predicate of a         
universal affirmative proposition is    
always either a definition1 a proprium1 
a genus1 a difference1 or an accident4  
,this classification reached the ,middle
 ,ages not in the precise form in which 
it is given by ,aristotle1 but with     
modifications mainly due to the         
,neo-,platonic philosopher ,porphyry4   
,in its modified form it is regarded as 
a classification of terms generally4    
,definition disappears from the list1 as
 the definition is regarded as a complex
 made up of the genus1 or next highest  
class to which the class to be defined  

belongs1 and the differences which mark 
off this particular species or          
sub-class4  ,the species itself which   
figures as the subject-term in a        
definition is added1 and thus the ,five 
,words of mediaeval logic are enumerated
 as genus1 species1 difference1         
proprium1 accident4  ,the one point of  
philosophical interest about this       
doctrine appears alike in the scheme of 
the ,categories in the presence of a    
category of substance1 and in the list  
of ,predicaments in the sharp           
distinction drawn between definition and
 proprium4  ,from a logical point of    
view it does not appear why any         
proprium1 any character belonging to all
 the members of a class and to them     
alone1 should not be taken as defining  
the class4  ,why should it be assumed   
that there is only one predicate1 viz4  
man1 which precisely answers the        
question1 ,what is ,socrates8  ,why     
should it not be equally correct to     
answer1 a ,greek1 or a philosopher8     

,the explanation is that ,aristotle     
takes it for granted that not all the   
distinctions we can make between kinds  
of things are arbitrary and subjective4 
,nature herself has made certain hard   
and fast divisions between kinds which  
it is the business of our thought to    
recognise and follow4  ,thus according  
to ,aristotle there is a real gulf1 a   
genuine difference in kind1 between the 
horse and the ass1 and this is          
illustrated by the fact that the mule1  
the offspring of a horse and an ass1 is 
not capable of reproduction4 ,it is thus
 a sort of imperfect being1 a kind of   
monster existing contra naturam4  ,such 
differences as we find when we compare  
e4g4 ,egyptians with ,greeks do not     
amount to a difference in kind4  ,to say
 that ,socrates is a man tells me what  
,socrates is1 because the statement     
places ,socrates in the real kind to    
which he actually belongs2 to say that  
he is wise1 or old1 or a philosopher    
merely tells me some of his attributes4 

,it follows from this belief in real or 
natural kinds that the problem of       
definition acquires an enormous         
importance for science4  ,we1 who are   
accustomed to regard the whole business 
of classification as a matter of making 
a grouping of our materials such as is  
most pertinent to the special question  
we have in hand1 tend to look upon any  
predicate which belongs universally and 
exclusively to the members of a group1  
as a sufficient basis for a possible    
definition of the group4  ,hence we are 
prone to take the nominalist view of    
definition1 i4e4 to look upon a         
definition as no more than a declaration
 of the sense which we intend           
henceforward to put on a word or other  
symbol4  ,and consequently we readily   
admit that there may be as many         
definitions of a class as it has        
different propria4 ,but in a philosophy 
like that of ,aristotle1 in which it is 
held that a true classification must not
 only be formally satisfactory1 but must

 also conform to the actual lines of    
cleavage which ,nature has established  
between kind and kind1 the task of      
classificatory science becomes much more
 difficult4  ,science is called on to   
supply not merely a definition but the  
definition of the classes it considers1 
the definition which faithfully reflects
 the lines of cleavage in ,nature4      
,this is why the ,aristotelian view is  
that a true definition should always be 
per genus et differentias4  ,it should  
place a given class by mentioning the   
wider class next above it in the        
objective hierarchy1 and then           
enumerating the most deep-seated        
distinctions by which ,nature herself   
marks off this class from others        
belonging to the same wider class4      
,modern evolutionary thought may        
possibly bring us back to this          
,aristotelian standpoint4  ,modern      
evolutionary science differs from       
,aristotelianism on one point of the    
first importance4  ,it regards the      

difference between kinds1 not as a      
primary fact of ,nature1 but as produced
 by a long process of accumulation of   
slight differences4  ,but a world in    
which the process has progressed far    
enough will exhibit much the same       
character as the ,nature of ,aristotle4 
,as the intermediate links between      
species drop out because they are less  
thoroughly adapted to maintain          
themselves than the extremes between    
which they form links1 the world        
produced approximates more and more to a
 system of species between which there  
are unbridgeable chasms2 evolution tends
 more and more to the final             
establishment of real kinds1 marked by  
the fact that there is no permanent     
possibility of cross-breeding between   
them4  ,this makes it once more possible
 to distinguish between a nominal       
definition and a real definition4  ,from
 an evolutionary point of view1 a real  
definition would be one which specifies 
not merely enough characters to mark off

 the group defined from others1 but     
selects also for the purpose those      
characters which indicate the line of   
historical development by which the     
group has successively separated itself 
from other groups descended from the    
same ancestors4  ,we shall learn yet    
more of the significance of this        
conception of a real kind as we go on to
 make acquaintance with the outlines of 
,first ,philosophy4  ,over the rest of  
the formal logic of ,aristotle we must  
be content to pass more rapidly4 ,in    
connection with the doctrine of         
,propositions1 ,aristotle lays down the 
familiar distinction between the four   
types of proposition according to their 
quantity 7as universal or particular7   
and quality 7as affirmative or          
negative71 and treats of their contrary 
and contradictory opposition in a way   
which still forms the basis of the      
handling of the subject in elementary   
works on formal logic4  ,he also        
considers at great length a subject     

nowadays commonly excluded from the     
elementary books1 the modal distinction 
between the ,problematic proposition 7x 
may be y71 the ,assertory 7x is y71 and 
the ,necessary 7x must be y71 and the   
way in which all these forms may be     
contradicted4  ,for him1 modality is a  
formal distinction like quantity or     
quality1 because he believes that       
contingency and necessity are not merely
 relative to the state of our knowledge1
 but represent real and objective       
features of the order of ,nature4  ,in  
connection with the doctrine of         
,inference1 it is worth while to give   
his definition of ,syllogism or         
,inference 7literally computation7 in   
his own words4  ,syllogism is a         
discourse wherein certain things 7viz4  
the premisses7 being admitted1 something
 else1 different from what has been     
admitted1 follows of necessity because  
the admissions are what they are4  ,the 
last clause shows that ,aristotle is    
aware that the all-important thing in an

 inference is not that the conclusion   
should be novel but that it should be   
proved4  ,we may have known the         
conclusion as a fact before2 what the   
inference does for us is to connect it  
with the rest of our knowledge1 and thus
 to show why it is true4  ,he also      
formulates the axiom upon which         
syllogistic inference rests1 that if ,a 
is predicated universally of ,b and ,b  
of ,c1 ,a is necessarily predicated     
universally of ,c4  ,stated in the      
language of class-inclusion1 and adapted
 to include the case where ,b is denied 
of ,c this becomes the formula1 whatever
 is asserted universally1 whether       
positively or negatively1 of a class ,b 
is asserted in like manner of any class 
,c which is wholly contained in ,b1 the 
axiom de omni et nullo of mediaeval     
logic4  ,the syllogism of the first     
figure1 to which this principle         
immediately applies1 is accordingly     
regarded by ,aristotle as the natural   
and perfect form of inference4          

,syllogisms of the second and third     
figures can only be shown to fall under 
the dictum by a process of reduction or 
transformation into corresponding       
arguments in the first figure1 and are  
therefore called imperfect or           
incomplete1 because they do not exhibit 
the conclusive force of the reasoning   
with equal clearness1 and also because  
no universal affirmative conclusion can 
be proved in them1 and the aim of       
science is always to establish such     
affirmatives4  ,the list of moods of the
 three figures1 and the doctrine of the 
methods by which each mood of the       
imperfect figures can be replaced by an 
equivalent mood of the first is worked  
out substantially as in our current     
text-books4  ,the so-called fourth      
figure is not recognised1 its moods     
being regarded merely as unnatural and  
distorted statements of those of the    
first figure4  99,induction994--,of the 
use of induction in ,aristotle's        
philosophy we shall speak under the head

 of ,theory of ,knowledge4  ,formally it
 is called the way of proceeding from   
particular facts to universals1 and     
,aristotle insists that the conclusion  
is only proved if all the particulars   
have been examined4  ,thus he gives as  
an example the following argument1 x1 y1
 z are long-lived species of animals2 x1
 y1 z are the only species which have no
 gall2 ergo all animals which have no   
gall are long-lived4  ,this is the      
induction by simple enumeration         
denounced by ,francis ,bacon on the     
ground that it may always be discredited
 by the production of a single contrary 
instance1 e4g4 a single instance of an  
animal which has no gall and yet is not 
long-lived4  ,aristotle is quite aware  
that his induction does not establish   
its conclusion unless all the cases have
 been included in the examination4  ,in 
fact1 as his own example shows1 an      
induction which gives certainty does not
 start with particular facts at all4    
,it is a method of arguing that what has

 been proved true of each sub-class of a
 wider class will be true of the wider  
class as a whole4 ,the premisses are    
strictly universal throughout4  ,in     
general1 ,aristotle does not regard     
induction as proof at all4 ,historically
 induction is held by ,aristotle to have
 been first made prominent in philosophy
 by ,socrates1 who constantly employed  
the method in his attempts to establish 
universal results in moral science4     
,thus he gives1 as a characteristic     
argument for the famous ,socratic       
doctrine that knowledge is the one thing
 needful1 the induction1 he who         
understands the theory of navigation is 
the best navigator1 he who understands  
the theory of chariot-driving the best  
driver2 from these examples we see that 
universally he who understands the      
theory of a thing is the best           
practitioner1 where it is evident that  
all the relevant cases have not been    
examined1 and consequently that the     
reasoning does not amount to proof4     

,mill's so-called reasoning from        
particulars to particulars finds a place
 in ,aristotle's theory under the name  
of arguing from an example4  ,he gives  
as an illustration1 ,a war between      
,athens and ,thebes will be a bad thing1
 for we see that the war between ,thebes
 and ,phocis was so4  ,he is careful to 
point out that the whole force of the   
argument depends on the implied         
assumption of a universal proposition   
which covers both cases1 such as wars   
between neighbours are bad things4      
,hence he calls such appeals to example 
rhetorical reasoning1 because the       
politician is accustomed to leave his   
hearers to supply the relevant universal
 consideration for themselves4          
99,theory of ,knowledge994--,here1 as   
everywhere in ,aristotle's philosophy1  
we are confronted by an initial and     
insuperable difficulty4  ,aristotle is  
always anxious to insist on the         
difference between his own doctrines and
 those of ,plato1 and his bias in this  

direction regularly leads him to speak  
as though he held a thorough-going      
naturalistic and empirical theory with  
no transcendental moonshine about it4   
,yet his final conclusions on all points
 of importance are hardly               
distinguishable from those of ,plato    
except by the fact that1 as they are so 
much at variance with the naturalistic  
side of his philosophy1 they have the   
appearance of being sudden lapses into  
an alogical mysticism4  ,we shall find  
the presence of this fault more         
pronouncedly in his metaphysics1        
psychology1 and ethics than in his      
theory of knowledge1 but it is not      
absent from any part of his philosophy4 
,he is everywhere a ,platonist malgre   
lui1 and it is just the ,platonic       
element in his thought to which it owes 
its hold over men's minds4  ,plato's    
doctrine on the subject may be stated   
with enough accuracy for our purpose as 
follows4  ,there is a radical           
distinction between sense-perception and

 scientific knowledge4 ,a scientific    
truth is exact and definite1 it is also 
true once and for all1 and never becomes
 truer or falser with the lapse of time4
  ,this is the character of the         
propositions of the science which ,plato
 regarded as the type of what true      
science ought to be1 pure mathematics4  
,it is very different with the judgments
 which we try to base on our            
sense-perceptions of the visible and    
tangible world4  ,the colours1 tastes1  
shapes of sensible things seem different
 to different percipients1 and moreover 
they are constantly changing in         
incalculable ways4  ,we can never be    
certain that two lines which seem to our
 senses to be equal are really so2 it   
may be that the inequality is merely too
 slight to be perceptible to our senses4
  ,no figure which we can draw and see  
actually has the exact properties       
ascribed by the mathematician to a      
circle or a square4  ,hence ,plato      
concludes that if the word science be   

taken in its fullest sense1 there can be
 no science about the world which our   
senses reveal4  ,we can have only an    
approximate knowledge1 a knowledge which
 is after all1 at best1 probable        
opinion4  ,the objects of which the     
mathematician has certain1 exact1 and   
final knowledge cannot be anything which
 the senses reveal4 ,they are objects of
 thought1 and the function of visible   
models and diagrams in mathematics is   
not to present examples of them to us1  
but only to show us imperfect           
approximations to them and so to remind 
the soul of objects and relations       
between them which she has never        
cognised with the bodily senses4  ,thus 
mathematical straightness is never      
actually beheld1 but when we see lines  
of less and more approximate            
straightness we are put in mind of that 
absolute straightness to which          
sense-perception only approximates4  ,so
 in the moral sciences1 the various     
virtues are not presented in their      

perfection by the course of daily life4 
,we do not meet with men who are        
perfectly brave or just1 but the        
experience that one man is braver or    
juster than another calls into our mind 
the thought of the absolute standard of 
courage or justice implied in the       
conviction that one man comes nearer to 
it than another1 and it is these        
absolute standards which are the real   
objects of our attention when we try to 
define the terms by which we describe   
the moral life4  ,this is the           
epistemological side of the famous      
doctrine of the ,ideas4  ,the main      
points are two1 7#a7 that strict science
 deals throughout with objects and      
relations between objects which are of a
 purely intellectual or conceptual      
order1 no sense-data entering into their
 constitution2 7#b7 since the objects of
 science are of this character1 it      
follows that the ,idea or concept or    
universal is not arrived at by any      
process of abstracting from our         

experience of sensible things the       
features common to them all4  ,as the   
particular fact never actually exhibits 
the universal except approximately1 the 
universal cannot be simply disentangled 
from particulars by abstraction4  ,as   
,plato puts it1 it is apart from        
particulars1 or1 as we might reword his 
thought1 the pure concepts of science   
represent upper limits to which the     
comparative series which we can form out
 of sensible data continually           
approximate but do not reach them4  ,in 
his theory of knowledge ,aristotle      
begins by brushing aside the ,platonic  
view4  ,science requires no such ,ideas1
 transcending sense-experience1 as      
,plato had spoken of2 they are1 in fact1
 no more than poetic metaphors4  ,what  
is required for science is not that     
there should be a one over and above the
 many 7that is1 such pure concepts1     
unrealised in the world of actual       
perception1 as ,plato had spoken of71   
but only that it should be possible to  

predicate one term universally of many  
others4  ,this1 by itself1 means that   
the universal is looked on as a mere    
residue of the characteristics found in 
each member of a group1 got by          
abstraction1 i4e4 by leaving out of view
 the characteristics which are peculiar 
to some of the group and retaining only 
those which are common to all4  ,if     
,aristotle had held consistently to this
 point of view1 his theory of knowledge 
would have been a purely empirical one4 
,he would have had to say that1 since   
all the objects of knowledge are        
particular facts given in               
sense-perception1 the universal laws of 
science are a mere convenient way of    
describing the observed uniformities in 
the behaviour of sensible things4  ,but1
 since it is obvious that in pure       
mathematics we are not concerned with   
the actual relations between sensible   
data or the actual ways in which they   
behave1 but with so-called pure cases or
 ideals to which the perceived world    

only approximately conforms1 he would   
also have had to say that the           
propositions of mathematics are not     
strictly true4  ,in modern times        
consistent empiricists have said this1  
but it is not a position possible to one
 who had passed twenty years in         
association with the mathematicians of  
the ,academy1 and ,aristotle's theory   
only begins in naturalism to end in     
,platonism4  ,we may condense its most  
striking positions into the following   
statement4  ,by science we mean proved  
knowledge4  ,and proved knowledge is    
always mediated2 it is the knowledge of 
conclusions from premisses4  ,a truth   
that is scientifically known does not   
stand alone4  ,the proof is simply the  
pointing out of the connection between  
the truth we call the conclusion1 and   
other truths which we call the premisses
 of our demonstration4 ,science points  
out the reason why of things1 and this  
is what is meant by the ,aristotelian   
principle that to have science is to    

know things through their causes or     
reasons why4  ,in an ordered digest of  
scientific truths1 the proper           
arrangement is to begin with the        
simplest and most widely extended       
principles and to reason down1 through  
successive inferences1 to the most      
complex propositions1 the reason why of 
which can only be exhibited by long     
chains of deductions4  ,this is the     
order of logical dependence1 and is     
described by ,aristotle as reasoning    
from what is more knowable in its own   
nature1 the simple1 to what is usually  
more familiar to us1 because less       
removed from the infinite wealth of     
sense-perception1 the complex4  ,in     
discovery we have usually to reverse the
 process and argue from the familiar to 
us1 highly complex facts1 to the more   
knowable in its own nature1 the simpler 
principles implied in the facts4        
,this simple expression acquires a      
mysterious appearance in mediaeval      
philosophy from the standing            

mistranslation notiora naturae1 better  
known to nature4   ,it follows that     
,aristotle1 after all1 admits the       
disparateness of sense-perception and   
scientific knowledge4  ,sense-perception
 of itself never gives us scientific    
truth1 because it can only assure us    
that a fact is so2 it cannot explain the
 fact by showing its connection with the
 rest of the system of facts1 it does   
not give the reason for the fact4       
,knowledge of perception is always      
immediate1 and for that very reason is  
never scientific4 ,if we stood on the   
moon and saw the earth1 interposing     
between us and the sun1 we should still 
not have scientific knowledge about the 
eclipse1 because we should still have to
 ask for the reason why4  7,in fact1 we 
should not know the reason why without a
 theory of light including the          
proposition that light-waves are        
propagated in straight lines and several
 others47 ,similarly ,aristotle insists 
that ,induction does not yield          

scientific truth4  ,he who makes an     
induction points out something1 but does
 not demonstrate anything4  ,for        
instance1 if we know that each species  
of animal which is without a gall is    
long-lived1 we may make the induction   
that all animals without a gall are     
long-lived1 but in doing so we have got 
no nearer to seeing why or how the      
absence of a gall makes for longevity4  
,the question which we may raise in     
science may all be reduced to four      
heads1 7#a7 ,does this thing exist8 7#b7
 ,does this event occur8 7#c7 ,if the   
thing exists1 precisely what is it8 and 
7#d7 ,if the event occurs1 why does it  
occur8 and science has not completed its
 task unless it can advance from the    
solution of the first two questions to  
that of the latter two4 ,science is no  
mere catalogue of things and events1 it 
consists of inquiries into the real     
essences and characteristics of things  
and the laws of connection between      
events4  ,looking at scientific         

reasoning1 then1 from the point of view 
of its formal character1 we may say that
 all science consists in the search for 
middle terms of syllogisms1 by which to 
connect the truth which appears as a    
conclusion with the less complex truths 
which appear as the premisses from which
 it is drawn4  ,when we ask1 does such a
 thing exist8 or does such an event     
happen8 we are asking1 is there a middle
 term which can connect the thing or    
event in question with the rest of known
 reality8  ,since it is a rule of the   
syllogism that the middle term must be  
taken universally1 at least once in the 
premisses1 the search for middle terms  
may also be described as the search for 
universals1 and we may speak of science 
as knowledge of the universal           
interconnections between facts and      
events4  ,a science1 then1 may be       
analysed into three constituents4 ,these
 are3 7#a7 a determinate class of       
objects which form the subject-matter of
 its inquiries4  ,in an orderly         

exhibition of the contents of the       
science1 these appear1 as in ,euclid1 as
 the initial data about which the       
science reasons2 7#b7 a number of       
principles1 postulates1 and axioms1 from
 which our demonstrations must start4   
,some of these will be principles       
employed in all scientific reasoning4   
,others will be specific to the         
subject-matter with which a particular  
science is concerned2 7#c7 certain      
characteristics of the objects under    
study which can be shown by means of our
 axioms and postulates to follow from   
our initial definitions1 the accidentia 
per se of the objects defined4  ,it is  
these last which are expressed by the   
conclusions of scientific demonstration4
  ,we are said to know scientifically   
that ,b is true of ,a when we show that 
this follows1 in virtue of the          
principles of some science1 from the    
initial definition of ,a4  ,thus if we  
convinced ourselves that the sum of the 
angles of a plane triangle is equal to  

two right angles by measurement1 we     
could not be said to have scientific    
knowledge of the proposition4 ,but if we
 show that the same proposition follows 
from the definition of a plane triangle 
by repeated applications of admitted    
axioms or postulates of geometry1 our   
knowledge is genuinely scientific4  ,we 
now know that it is so1 and we see why  
it is so2 we see the connection of this 
truth with the simple initial truths of 
geometry4  ,this leads us to the        
consideration of the most characteristic
 point of ,aristotle's whole theory4    
,science is demonstrated knowledge1 that
 is1 it is the knowledge that certain   
truths follow from still simpler truths4
  ,hence the simplest of all the truths 
of any science cannot themselves be     
capable of being known by inference4    
,you cannot infer that the axioms of    
geometry are true because its           
conclusions are true1 since the truth of
 the conclusions is itself a consequence
 of the truth of the axioms4  ,nor yet  

must you ask for demonstration of the   
axioms as consequences of still simpler 
premisses1 because if all truths can be 
proved1 they ought to be proved1 and you
 would therefore require an infinity of 
successive demonstrations to prove      
anything whatever4  ,but under such     
conditions all knowledge of demonstrated
 truth would be impossible4  ,the first 
principles of any science must therefore
 be indemonstrable4 ,they must be known1
 as facts of sense-perception are known1
 immediately and not mediately4  ,how   
then do we come by our knowledge of     
them8  ,aristotle's answer to this      
question appears at first sight         
curiously contradictory4  ,he seems to  
say that these simplest truths are      
apprehended intuitively1 or on          
inspection1 as self-evident by          
,intelligence or ,mind4  ,on the other  
hand1 he also says that they are known  
to us as a result of induction from     
sense-experience4  ,thus he seems to be 
either a ,platonist or an empiricist1   

according as you choose to remember one 
set of his utterances or another1 and   
this apparent inconsistency has led to  
his authority being claimed in their    
favour by thinkers of the most widely   
different types4  ,but more careful     
study will show that the seeming        
confusion is due to the fact that he    
tries to combine in one statement his   
answers to two quite different          
questions1 7#a7 how we come to reflect  
on the axioms1 7#b7 what evidence there 
is for their truth4  ,to the first      
question he replies1 by induction from  
experience1 and so far he might seem to 
be a precursor of ,john ,stuart ,mill4  
,successive repetitions of the same     
sense-perceptions give rise to a single 
experience1 and it is by reflection on  
experience that we become aware of the  
most ultimate simple and universal      
principles4  ,we might illustrate his   
point by considering how the thought    
that two and two are four may be brought
 before a child's mind4  ,we might first

 take two apples1 and two other apples  
and set the child to count them4  ,by   
repeating the process with different    
apples we may teach the child to        
dissociate the result of the counting   
from the particular apples employed1 and
 to advance to the thought1 any two     
apples and any two other apples make    
four apples4 ,then we might substitute  
pears or cherries for the apples1 so as 
to suggest the thought1 two fruits and  
two fruits make four fruits4  ,and by   
similar methods we should in the end    
evoke the thought1 any two objects      
whatever and any other two objects      
whatever make four objects4 ,this       
exactly illustrates ,aristotle's        
conception of the function of induction1
 or comparison of instances1 in fixing  
attention on a universal principle of   
which one had not been conscious before 
the comparison was made4  ,now comes in 
the point where ,aristotle differs      
wholly from all empiricists1 later and  
earlier4  ,mill regards the instances   

produced in the induction as having a   
double function2 they not merely fix the
 attention on the principle1 they also  
are the evidence of its truth4 ,this    
gives rise to the greatest difficulty in
 his whole logical theory4 ,induction by
 imperfect enumeration is pronounced to 
be 7as it clearly is7 fallacious1 yet   
the principle of the uniformity of      
,nature which ,mill regards as the      
ultimate premiss of all science1 is     
itself supposed to be proved by this    
radically fallacious method4  ,aristotle
 avoids a similar inconsistency by      
holding that the sole function of the   
induction is to fix our attention on a  
principle which it does not prove4 ,he  
holds that ultimate principles neither  
permit of nor require proof4  ,when the 
induction has done its work in calling  
attention to the principle1 you have to 
see for yourself that the principle is  
true4  ,you see that it is true by      
immediate inspection just as in         
sense-perception you have to see that   

the colour before your eyes is red or   
blue4  ,this is why ,aristotle holds    
that the knowledge of the principles of 
science is not itself science           
7demonstrated knowledge71 but what he   
calls intelligence1 and we may call     
intellectual intuition4  ,thus his      
doctrine is sharply distinguished not   
only from empiricism 7the doctrine that 
universal principles are proved by      
particular facts71 but also from all    
theories of the ,hegelian type which    
regard the principles and the facts as  
somehow reciprocally proving each other1
 and from the doctrine of some eminent  
modern logicians who hold that          
self-evidence is not required in the    
ultimate principles of science1 as we   
are only concerned in logic with the    
question what consequences follow from  
our initial assumptions1 and not with   
the truth or falsehood of the           
assumptions themselves4  ,the result is 
that ,aristotle does little more than   
repeat the ,platonic view of the nature 

of science4  ,science consists of       
deductions from universal principles    
which sensible experience suggests1 but 
into which1 as they are apprehended by a
 purely intellectual inspection1 no     
sense-data enter as constituents4 ,the  
apparent rejection of transcendental    
moonshine has1 after all1 led to        
nothing4  ,the only difference between  
,plato and his scholar lies in the      
clearness of intellectual vision which  
,plato shows when he expressly maintains
 in plain words that the universals of  
exact science are not in our            
sense-perceptions and therefore to be   
extracted from them by a process of     
abstraction1 but are apart from or over 
them1 and form an ideal system of       
interconnected concepts which the       
experiences of sense merely imitate or  
make approximation to4  ,one more point 
remains to be considered to complete our
 outline of the ,aristotelian theory of 
knowledge4  ,the sciences have          
principles which are discerned to be    

true by immediate inspection4  ,but what
 if one man professes to see the        
self-evident truth of such an alleged   
principle1 while another is doubtful of 
its truth1 or even denies it8  ,there   
can be no question of silencing the     
objector by a demonstration1 since no   
genuine simple principle admits of      
demonstration4  ,all that can be done1  
e4g4 if a man doubts whether things     
equal to the same thing are equal to one
 another1 or whether the law of         
contradiction is true1 is to examine the
 consequences of a denial of the axiom  
and to show that they include some which
 are false1 or which your antagonist at 
least considers false4  ,in this way1 by
 showing the falsity of consequences    
which follow from the denial of a given 
principle1 you indirectly establish its 
truth4  ,now reasoning of this kind     
differs from science precisely in the   
point that you take as your major       
premiss1 not what you regard as true1   
but the opposite thesis of your         

antagonist1 which you regard as false4  
,your object is not to prove a true     
conclusion but to show your opponent    
that his premisses lead to false        
conclusions4  ,this is dialectical      
reasoning in ,aristotle's sense of the  
word1 i4e4 reasoning not from your own  
but from some one else's premisses4     
,hence the chief philosophical          
importance which ,aristotle ascribes to 
dialectic is that it provides a method  
of defending the undemonstrable axioms  
against objections4  ,dialectic of this 
kind became highly important in the     
mediaeval ,aristotelianism of the       
schoolmen1 with whom it became a regular
 method1 as may be seen e4g4 in the     
,summa of ,st4 ,thomas1 to begin their  
consideration of a doctrine by a        
preliminary rehearsal of all the        
arguments they could find or devise     
against the conclusion they meant to    
adopt4 ,thus the first division of any  
article in the ,summa ,theologiae of    
,thomas is regularly constituted by     

arguments based on the premisses of     
actual or possible antagonists1 and is  
strictly dialectical4  7,to be quite    
accurate ,aristotle should1 of course1  
have observed that this dialectical     
method of defending a principle becomes 
useless in the case of a logical axiom  
which is presupposed by all deduction4  
,for this reason ,aristotle falls into  
fallacy when he tries to defend the law 
of contradiction by dialectic4 ,it is   
true that if the law be denied1 then any
 and every predicate may be             
indifferently ascribed to any subject4  
,but until the law of contradiction has 
been admitted1 you have no right to     
regard it as absurd to ascribe all      
predicates indiscriminately to all      
subjects4 ,thus1 it is only assumed laws
 which are not ultimate laws of logic   
that admit of dialectical justification4
  ,if a truth is so ultimate that it has
 either to be recognised by direct      
inspection or not at all1 there can be  
no arguing at all with one who cannot or

 will not see it47                      
99,,chapter ,,iii99                     
99,,first ,,philosophy99   ,first       
,philosophy is defined by ,aristotle as 
a science which considers ,what ,is     
simply in its character of ,being1 and  
the properties which it has as such4    
,that there is1 or ought to be1 such a  
science is urged on the ground that     
every special science deals only with   
some restricted department of what is1  
and thus considers its subject-matter   
not universally in its character of     
being1 or being real1 but as determined 
by some more special condition4  ,thus1 
,first ,philosophy1 the science which   
attempts to discover the most ultimate  
reasons of1 or grounds for1 the         
character of things in general cannot be
 identified with any of the departmental
 sciences4  ,the same consideration     
explains why it is ,first ,philosophy   
which has to disentangle the principles 
of the various sciences1 and defend them
 by dialectic against those who impugn  

them4  ,it is no part of the duty of a  
geometer or a physicist to deal with    
objections to such universal principles 
of reasoning as the law of              
contradiction4  ,they may safely assume 
such principles2 if they are attacked1  
it is not by specifically geometrical or
 physical considerations that they can  
be defended4  ,even the principles of   
the special sciences have not to be     
examined and defended by the special    
sciences4  ,they are the starting-points
 of the sciences which employ them2     
these sciences are therefore justified  
in requiring that they shall be admitted
 as a condition of geometrical1 or      
physical1 or biological demonstrations4 
,if they are called in question1 the    
defence of them is the business of      
logic4  ,first ,philosophy1 then1 is the
 study of ,what ,is simply as such1 the 
universal principles of structure       
without which there could be no ordered 
system of knowable objects4  ,but the   
word is has more than one sense4  ,there

 are as many modes of being as there are
 types of predication4  ,substances1    
men1 horses1 and the like1 have their   
own specific mode of being--they are    
things2 qualities1 such as green or     
sweet1 have a different mode of         
being--they are not things1 but         
affections or attributes of things4     
,actions1 again1 such as building1      
killing1 are neither things nor yet     
affections of things2 their mode of     
being is that they are processes which  
produce or destroy things4  ,first      
,philosophy is concerned with the       
general character of all these modes of 
being1 but it is specially concerned    
with that mode of being which belongs to
 substances4  ,for this is the most     
primary of all modes of being4  ,we had 
to introduce a reference to it in our   
attempt to say what the mode of being of
 qualities and actions is1 and it would 
have been the same had our illustrations
 been drawn from any other categories4  
,hence the central and special problem  

of ,first ,philosophy is to analyse the 
notion of substance and to show the     
causes of the existence of substances4  
,next1 we have to note that the word    
substance itself has two senses4 ,when  
we spoke of substance as one of the     
categories we were using it in a        
secondary sense4  ,we meant by          
substances horse1 man1 and the rest of  
the real kinds which we find in ,nature1
 and try to reproduce in a scientific   
classification4  ,in this sense of the  
word substances are a special class of  
predicates1 as when we affirm of ,plato 
that he is a man1 or of ,bucephalus that
 he is a horse4  ,but in the primary    
sense a substance means an absolutely   
individual thing1 this man1 or this     
horse4  ,we may therefore define primary
 substances from the logician's point of
 view by saying that they can be only   
subjects of predication1 never          
predicates4 ,or again1 it is peculiar to
 substances1 that while remaining       
numerically one a substance admits of   

incompatible determinations1 as         
,socrates1 remaining one and the same   
,socrates1 is successively young and    
old4  ,this is not true of qualities1   
actions1 and the rest4  ,the same colour
 cannot be first white and then black2  
the same act cannot be first bad and    
then good4  ,thus we may say that       
individual substances are the fixed and 
permanent factors in the world of       
mutability1 the invariants of existence4
  ,processes go on in them1 they run the
 gamut of changes from birth to decay1  
processes take place among them1 they   
act on and are acted on by one another1 
they fluctuate in their qualities and   
their magnitude1 but so long as a       
substance exists it remains numerically 
one and the same throughout all these   
changes4  ,their existence is the first 
and most fundamental condition of the   
existence of the universe1 since they   
are the bearers of all qualities1 the   
terms of all relations1 and the agents  
and patients in all interaction4  ,the  

point to note is that ,aristotle begins 
his investigation into the structure of 
,what ,is and the causes by which it is 
produced by starting from the existence 
of individual things belonging to the   
physical order and perceived by the     
senses4 ,about any such thing we may ask
 two questions1 7#a7 into what          
constituent factors can it be logically 
analysed8 7#b7 and how has it come to   
exhibit the character which our analysis
 shows it to have8  ,the answer to these
 questions will appear from a           
consideration of two standing antitheses
 which run through ,aristotle's         
philosophy1 the contrast between ,matter
 and ,form1 and that between ,potential 
and ,actual1 followed by a              
recapitulation of his doctrine of the   
,four ,causes1 or four senses of the    
word ,cause4  99,matter and             
,form994--,consider any completely      
developed individual thing1 whether it  
is the product of human manufacture1 as 
a copper bowl1 or of natural            

reproduction1 as an oak-tree or a horse4
  ,we shall see at once that the bowl is
 like other articles made of the same   
metal1 candlesticks1 coal-vases1 in     
being made of the same stuff1 and unlike
 them in having the special shape or    
structure which renders it fit for being
 used as a bowl and not for holding a   
candle or containing coals4 ,so a       
botanist or a chemist will tell you that
 the constituent tissues of an oak or   
horse1 or the chemical elements out of  
which these tissues are built up are of 
the same kind as those of an ash or an  
ox1 but the oak differs from the ash or 
the horse from the ox in characteristic 
structure4 ,we see thus that in any     
individual thing we can distinguish two 
components1 the stuff of which it       
consists--which may be identical in kind
 with the stuff of which things of a    
very different kind consist--and the    
structural law of formation or          
arrangement which is peculiar to the    
special kind of thing under             

consideration4  ,in the actual          
individual thing these two are          
inseparably united2 they do not exist   
side by side1 as chemists say the atoms 
of hydrogen and oxygen do in a drop of  
water2 the law of organisation or       
structure is manifested in and through  
the copper1 or the various tissues of   
the living body4 ,aristotle expresses   
this by saying that you can distinguish 
two aspects in an individual1 its       
,matter1 7hyle1 materia7 and its ,form  
7eidos1 forma74  ,the individual is the 
matter as organised in accord with a    
determinate principle of structure1 the 
form4  ,of these terms1 the former1 hyle
 7materia1 matter7 means literally      
timber1 and more specifically ship's    
timbers1 and his selection of it to mean
 what is most exactly rendered by our   
own word stuff may perhaps be due to a  
reminiscence of an old ,pythagorean     
fancy which looked on the universe as a 
ship4  ,the word for form is the same as
 ,plato's1 and its philosophical uses   

are closely connected with its          
mathematical sense1 regular figure1 also
 a ,pythagorean technicality which still
 survives in certain stereotyped phrases
 in ,euclid4  ,aristotle extends the    
analysis into ,matter and ,form by      
analogy beyond the range of individual  
substances to everything in which we can
 distinguish a relatively indeterminate 
somewhat and a law or type of order and 
arrangement giving it determination4    
,thus if you consider the relatively    
fixed or formed character of a man in   
adult life1 we may look upon this       
character as produced out of the raw    
material of tendencies and dispositions1
 which have received a specific         
development along definite lines1       
according to the kind of training to    
which the mind has been subjected in the
 formative period of its growth4  ,we   
may therefore speak of native           
disposition as the matter or stuff of   
which character is made1 and the        
practical problem of education is to    

devise a system of training which shall 
impress on this matter precisely the    
form required if the grown man is to be 
a good citizen of a good state4  ,since 
a man's character itself is not a       
substance but a complex of habits or    
fixed ways of reacting upon suggestions 
coming from the world around him1 this  
is a good instance of the extension of  
the antithesis of ,matter and ,form     
beyond the category of substance4  ,we  
see then that ,matter in the            
,aristotelian sense must not be         
confounded with body2 the relatively    
undetermined factor which receives      
completer determination by the          
structural law or ,form is ,matter1     
whether it is corporeal or not4 ,this   
comes out with particular clearness in  
the metaphysical interpretation put on  
the logical process of definition by    
genus and difference4  ,when ,i define  
any real kind by specifying a higher and
 wider class of which it is a sub-kind1 
and adding the peculiar characteristics 

which distinguish the sub-kind under    
consideration from the other sub-kinds  
of the same genus1 the genus may be said
 to stand to the differences as ,matter1
 the relatively indeterminate1 to the   
,form which gives it its structure4  ,we
 further observe that ,matter and ,form 
are strictly correlative4  ,the matter  
is called so relatively to the form     
which gives it further determination4   
,when the words are used in their       
strictest sense1 with reference to an   
individual thing1 the ,form is taken to 
mean the last determination by which the
 thing acquires its complete character1 
and the ,matter is that which has yet to
 receive this last determination4 ,thus 
in the case of a copper globe1 the      
spherical figure is said to be its      
,form1 the copper its material4  ,in the
 case of the human body1 the ,matter is 
the various tissues1 muscles1 bones1    
skin1 c4 ,but each of these things which
 are counted as belonging to the ,matter
 of the globe or the human body has1    

according to ,aristotle1 a development  
behind it4 ,copper is not an element but
 a specific combination of elements1 and
 the same thing is even more true of the
 highly elaborate tissues of the living 
body4  ,thus what is ,matter relatively 
to the globe or living body is ,matter  
already determined by ,form if we       
consider it relatively to its own       
constituents4  ,the so-called elements  
of ,empedocles1 earth1 water1 air1 fire1
 are the matter of all chemical         
compounds1 the ,form of each compound   
being its specific law of composition2  
the immediate or proximate ,matter of   
the tissues of the animal body is1      
according to ,aristotle's biology1 the  
superfluous blood of the female parent1 
out of which the various tissues in the 
offspring are developed1 and the ,matter
 of this blood is in turn the various   
substances which are taken into the body
 of the parent as food and converted by 
assimilation into blood4  ,their        
,matter1 once more1 is the earth1 air1  

fire1 and water of which they are       
composed4 ,thus at every stage of a     
process of manufacture or growth a fresh
 ,form is superinduced on1 or developed 
within1 a ,matter which is already      
itself a combination of ,matter and     
,form relatively to the process by which
 it has itself been originated4 ,fully  
thought out1 such a view would lead to  
the conclusion that in the end the      
simple ultimate matter of all individual
 things is one and the same throughout  
the universe1 and has absolutely no     
definite structure at all4  ,the        
introduction of ,form or determinate    
structure of any kind would then have to
 be thought of as coming from an outside
 source1 since structureless ,matter    
cannot be supposed to give itself all   
sorts of specific determinations1 as has
 been demonstrated in our own times by  
the collapse of the ,synthetic          
,philosophy4  ,aristotle avoids the     
difficulty by holding that pure ,matter 
is a creation of our thought4 ,in actual

 fact the crudest form in which matter  
is found is that of the elements4       
,since the transmutability of the       
elements is an indispensable tenet in   
,aristotle's ,physics1 we cannot avoid  
regarding earth1 water1 fire air as     
themselves determinations by specific   
,form of a still simpler ,matter1 though
 this prime ,matter all alone1 before a 
rag of ,form is on1 is never to be found
 existing in its simplicity4            
,hudibras1 ,pt4 #a1 ,canto #a1 #efj4    
,he had ,first ,matter seen undressed2  
,he took her naked all alone1 ,before   
one rag of ,form was on4   99,the       
,potential and the ,actual994--,so far  
we have been looking at the analysis of 
the individual thing1 as the current    
jargon puts it1 statically2 we have     
arrived at the antithesis of ,matter and
 ,form by contrasting an unfinished     
condition of anything with its finished 
condition4  ,but we may study the same  
contrast dynamically1 with special      
reference to the process of making or   

growth by which the relatively          
undetermined or unfinished becomes      
determined or finished4  ,the contrast  
of ,matter with ,form then passes into  
the contrast between ,potentiality and  
,actuality4  ,what this antithesis means
 we can best see from the case of the   
growth of a living organism4 ,consider  
the embryos of two animals1 or the seeds
 of two plants4  ,even a botanist or a  
physiologist may be unable to pronounce 
with certainty on the species to which  
the germ submitted to him belongs1 and  
chemical analysis may be equally at a   
loss4  ,even at a later stage of        
development1 the embryo of one          
vertebrate animal may be                
indistinguishable from that of another4 
,yet it is certain that one of two      
originally indistinguishable germs will 
grow into an oak and the other into an  
elm1 or one into a chimpanzee and the   
other into a man4 ,however              
indistinguishable1 they therefore may be
 said to have different latent          

tendencies or possibilities of          
development within them4  ,hence we may 
say of a given germ1 though this is not 
yet actually an oak1 it is potentially  
an oak1 meaning not merely that1 if     
uninterfered with1 it will in time be an
 oak1 but also that by no interference  
can it be made to grow into an elm or a 
beech4  ,so we may look upon all        
processes of production or development  
as processes by which what at first     
possessed only the tendency to grow     
along certain lines or to be worked up  
into a certain form1 has become actually
 endowed with the character to which it 
possessed the tendency4  ,the acorn     
becomes in process of time an actual    
oak1 the baby an actual man1 the copper 
is made into an actual vase1 right      
education brings out into active        
exercise the special capacities of the  
learner4  ,hence the distinction between
 ,matter and ,form may also be expressed
 by saying that the ,matter is the      
persistent underlying substratum in     

which the development of the ,form takes
 place1 or that the individual when     
finally determined by the ,form is the  
,actuality of which the undeveloped     
,matter was the ,potentiality4  ,the    
process of conception1 birth1 and growth
 to maturity in ,nature1 or of the      
production of a finished article by the 
arts whose business it is to imitate    
,nature1 may be said to be one of       
continuous advance towards the actual   
embodiment of a ,form1 or law of        
organisation1 in a ,matter having the   
latent potentiality of developing along 
those special lines4  ,when ,aristotle  
is speaking most strictly he            
distinguishes the process by which a    
,form is realised1 which he calls       
,energeia1 from the manifestation of the
 realised ,form1 calling the latter     
,entelechy 7literally finished or       
completed condition74 ,often1 however1  
he uses the word ,energeia more loosely 
for the actual manifestation of the     
,form itself1 and in this he is followed

 by the scholastic writers1 who render  
,energeia by actus or actus purus4  ,one
 presupposition of this process must be 
specially noted4 ,it is not an unending 
process of development of unrealised    
capacities1 but always has an ,end in   
the perfectly simple sense of a last    
stage4  ,we see this best in the case of
 growth4 ,the acorn grows into the      
sapling and the sapling into the oak1   
but there is nothing related to the oak 
as the oak is to the sapling4  ,the oak 
does not grow into something else4  ,the
 process of development from potential  
to actual in this special case comes to 
an end with the emergence of the mature 
oak4 ,in the organic world the end or   
last state is recognised by the fact    
that the organism can now exercise the  
power of reproducing its like4  ,this   
tendency of organic process to culminate
 in a last stage of complete maturity is
 the key to the treatment of the problem
 of the true end of life in ,aristotle's
 ,ethics4  99,the ,four ,causes994--,the

 conception of the world involved in    
these antitheses of ,form and ,matter1  
,potential and ,actual1 finds its       
fullest expression in ,aristotle's      
doctrine of the ,four ,causes or        
conditions of the production of things4 
,this doctrine is looked on by          
,aristotle as the final solution of the 
problem which had always been the       
central one for ,greek philosophy1 ,what
 are the causes of the world-order8     
,all the previous philosophies he       
regards as inadequate attempts to       
formulate the answer to this question   
which is only given completely by his   
own system4  ,hence the doctrine        
requires to be stated with some         
fullness4 ,we may best approach it by   
starting from the literal meaning of the
 ,greek terms aitia1 aition1 which      
,aristotle uses to convey the notion of 
cause4  ,aition is properly an adjective
 used substantially1 and means that on  
which the legal responsibility for a    
given state of affairs can be laid4     

,similarly aitia1 the substantive1 means
 the credit for good or bad1 the legal  
responsibility1 for an act4  ,now when  
we ask1 what is responsible for the fact
 that such and such a state of things   
now exists8 there are four partial      
answers which may be given1 and each of 
these corresponds to one of the causes4 
,a complete answer requires the         
enumeration of them all4  ,we may       
mention 7#a7 the matter or material     
cause of the thing1 7#b7 the law        
according to which it has grown or      
developed1 the form or formal cause1    
7#c7 the agent with whose initial       
impulse the development began--the      
starting-point of the process1 or1 as   
the later ,aristotelians call it1 the   
efficient cause1 7#d7 the completed     
result of the whole process1 which is   
present in the case of human manufacture
 as a preconceived idea determining the 
maker's whole method of handling his    
material1 and in organic development in 
,nature as implied in and determining   

the successive stages of growth--the end
 or final cause4  ,if any one of these  
had been different1 the resultant state 
of things would also have been          
different4  ,hence all four must be     
specified in completely accounting for  
it4  ,obvious illustrations can be given
 from artificial products of human      
skill1 but it seems clear that it was   
rather reflection on the biological     
process of reproduction and growth which
 originally suggested the analysis4     
,suppose we ask what was requisite in   
order that there should be now an oak on
 a given spot4  ,there must have been   
7#a7 a germ from which the oak has      
grown1 and this germ must have had the  
latent tendencies towards development   
which are characteristic of oaks4  ,this
 is the material cause of the oak4  7#b7
 ,this germ must have followed a        
definite law of growth2 it must have had
 a tendency to grow in the way          
characteristic of oaks and to develop   
the structure of an oak1 not that of a  

plane or an ash4  ,this is form or      
formal cause4 7#c7 ,also the germ of the
 oak did not come from nowhere2 it grew 
on a parent oak4 ,the parent oak and its
 acorn-bearing activity thus constitute 
the efficient cause of the present oak4 
7#d7 ,and there must be a final stage to
 which the whole process of growth is   
relative1 in which the germ or sapling  
is no longer becoming but is an adult   
oak bearing fresh acorns4  ,this is the 
end of the process4 ,one would not be   
going far wrong in saying that          
,aristotle's biological cast of thought 
leads him to conceive of this end in the
 case of reproduction as a sub-conscious
 purpose1 just as the workman's thought 
of the result to be attained by his     
action forms a conscious directing      
purpose in the case of manufacture4     
,both in ,nature and in art the form1   
the efficient cause1 and the end tend to
 coalesce4  ,thus in ,nature a man      
begets a man1 organic beings give birth 
to other organic beings of the same     

kind1 or1 in the technical language of  
the ,aristotelian theory of ,causation1 
the efficient cause produces1 as the end
 of its action1 a second being having   
the same form as itself1 though realised
 in different matter1 and numerically   
distinct from itself4  ,thus the        
efficient cause 7i4e4 the parent7 is a  
form realised in matter1 and the end is 
the same form realised in other matter4 
,so in products of art the true source  
of the process is the form the          
realisation of which is the end or final
 cause1 only with this difference1 that 
as efficient cause the form exists not  
in the material but by way of idea or   
representation in the mind of the       
craftsman4  ,a house does not produce   
another house1 but the house as existing
 in idea in the builder's mind sets him 
at work building1 and so produces a     
corresponding house in brick or stone4  
,thus the ultimate opposition is between
 the cause as matter1 a passive and     
inert substratum of change and          

development and the formal cause which1 
in the sense just explained1 is one with
 both the efficient or starting-point1  
and the end or goal of development4  ,it
 will1 of course1 be seen that          
individual bearers of forms are         
indispensable in the theory2 hence the  
notion of activity is essential to the  
causal relation4 ,it is a relation      
between things1 not between events4     
,aristotle has no sense of the word     
cause corresponding to ,mill's          
conception of a cause as an event which 
is the uniform precursor of another     
event4  ,two more remarks may be made in
 this connection4  7#a7 ,the prominence 
of the notion of end gives ,aristotle's 
philosophy a thorough-going ideological 
character4  ,god and ,nature1 he tells  
us1 do nothing aimlessly4  ,we should   
probably be mistaken if we took this to 
mean that ,god and ,nature act          
everywhere with conscious design4  ,the 
meaning is rather that every natural    
process has a last stage in which the   

form which was to begin with present in 
the agent or source of change is fully  
realised in the matter in which the     
agent has set up the process of change4 
,the normal thing is e4g4 for animals to
 reproduce their kind2 if the           
reproduction is imperfect or distorted1 
as in monstrous births1 this is an      
exception due to the occasional presence
 in matter of imperfections which hinder
 the course of development1 and must be 
regarded as contrary to the normal      
course of ,nature4  ,so hybrid          
reproduction is exceptional and against 
,nature1 and this is shown by the       
sterility of hybrids1 a sort of lesser  
monstrosity4  ,even females1 being      
arrested developments1 are a sort of    
still minor deviation from principle4   
7#b7 ,it may just be mentioned that     
,aristotle has a classification of      
efficient causes under the three heads  
of ,nature1 ,intelligence 7or ,man71 and
 ,chance4  ,the difference between      
,nature and ,man or ,intelligence as    

efficient causes has already been       
illustrated4 ,it is that in causation by
 ,nature1 such as sexual reproduction1  
or the assimilation of nutriment1 or the
 conversion of one element into another 
in which ,aristotle believed1 the form  
which is superinduced on the matter by  
the agent already exists in the agent   
itself as its form4 ,the oak springs    
from a parent oak1 the conversion of    
nutriment into organic tissue is due to 
the agency of already existing organic  
tissue4 ,in the case of human           
intelligence or art1 the form to be     
superinduced exists in the agent not as 
his characteristic form1 but by way of  
representation1 as a contemplated       
design4  ,the man who builds a house is 
not himself a house2 the form           
characteristic of a house is very       
different from that characteristic of a 
man1 but it is present in contemplation 
to the builder before it is embodied in 
the actual house4 ,a word may be added  
about the third sort of efficient       

causality1 causation by chance4  ,this  
is confined to cases which are          
exceptions from the general course of   
,nature1 remarkable coincidences4  ,it  
is what we may call simulated           
purposiveness4  ,when something in human
 affairs happens in a way which         
subserves the achievement of a result   
but was not really brought about by any 
intention to secure the result1 we speak
 of it as a remarkable coincidence4     
,thus it would be a coincidence if a man
 should be held to ransom by brigands   
and his best friend should1 without     
knowing anything of the matter1 turn up 
on the spot with the means of ransoming 
him4 ,the events could not have happened
 more opportunely if they had been      
planned1 and yet they were not planned  
but merely fell out so3 and since such a
 combination of circumstances simulating
 design is unusual1 it is not proper to 
say that the events happened in the     
course of ,nature4  ,we therefore say it
 happened by chance4  ,this doctrine of 

chance has its significance for         
mediaeval ,ethics4  ,in an age when the 
,protestant superstition that worldly   
success is proof of nearness to ,god had
 not yet been invented1 the want of     
correspondence between men's deserts and
 their prosperity was accounted for by  
the view that the distribution of       
worldly goods is1 as a rule1 the work of
 ,fortune or ,chance in the             
,aristotelian sense2 that is1 it is due 
to special coincidences which may look  
like deliberate design but are not      
really so4  7,see the elaborate         
exposition of this in ,dante1 ,inferno1 
vii4 #fg-ig47  99,motion994--,we have   
seen that causation1 natural or         
artificial1 requires the production in a
 certain matter of a certain form under 
the influence of a certain agent4  ,what
 is the character of the process set up 
by the agent in the matter and          
culminating in the appearance of the    
form8  ,aristotle answers that it is    
,motion 7kinesis74  ,the effect of the  

agent on the matter is to set up in it a
 motion which ends in its assuming a    
definite form4  ,the important point to 
be noted here is that ,aristotle regards
 this motion as falling wholly within   
the matter which is to assume the form4 
,it is not necessary that the agent     
should itself be in motion1 but only    
that it should induce motion in         
something else4 ,thus in all cases of   
intentional action the ultimate         
efficient cause is the idea of the      
result to be attained1 but this idea    
does not move about4  ,by its presence  
to the mind it sets something else 7the 
members of the body7 moving4  ,this     
conception of an efficient cause which1 
not moving itself1 by its mere presence 
induces movement in that to which it is 
present1 is of the highest importance in
 ,aristotle's theology4  ,of course it  
follows that since the motion by which  
the transition from potentiality to     
actuality is achieved falls wholly      
within the matter acted upon1 ,aristotle

 is not troubled with any of the        
questions as to the way in which motion 
can be transferred from one body to     
another which were so much agitated in  
the early days of the modern mechanical 
interpretation of natural processes4    
,aristotle's way of conceiving ,nature  
is thoroughly non-mechanical1 and       
approximates to what would now be called
 the ascription of vital or quasi-vital 
characteristics to the inorganic4  ,as1 
in the causality of art the mere        
presence of the form to be embodied in a
 given material to the mind of the      
craftsman brings about and directs the  
process of manufacture1 so in some      
analogous fashion the presence of an    
efficient cause in ,nature to that on   
which it works is thought of as itself  
constituting the efficiency of the      
cause4  ,as ,lotze phrases it1 things   
take note of one another's compresence  
in the universe1 or we might say the    
efficient cause and that on which it    
exercises its efficiency are en rapport4

  ,matter is sensitive to the presence  
of the efficient cause1 and in response 
to this sensitivity1 puts forth         
successive determinations1 expands its  
latent tendencies on definite lines4    
,the name motion has a wider sense for  
,aristotle than it has for ourselves4   
,he includes under the one common name  
all the processes by which things come  
to be what they are or cease to be what 
they have been4  ,thus he distinguishes 
the following varieties of motion3      
generation 7the coming of an individual 
thing into being71 with its opposite    
decay or corruption 7the passing of a   
thing out of being71 alteration 7change 
of quality in a thing71 augmentation and
 diminution 7change in the magnitude of 
a thing71 motion through space 7of which
 latter he recognises two sub-species1  
rectilinear transference and rotation in
 a circular orbit about an axis74  ,it  
is this last variety1 motion through    
space1 which is the most fundamental of 
all1 since its occurrence is involved in

 that of any of the other types of      
process mentioned1 though ,aristotle    
does not hold the thorough-going        
mechanical view that the other processes
 are only apparent1 and that1 as we     
should put it1 qualitative change is a  
mere disguise which mechanical motion   
wears for our senses4  99,the ,eternity 
of ,motion994--,certain very important  
consequences follow from the conception 
of efficient causation which we have    
been describing4  ,aristotle has no     
sympathy with the evolutionist views    
which had been favoured by some of his  
predecessors4  ,according to his theory 
of organic generation1 it takes a man to
 beget a man 2 where there is a baby1   
there must have been a father4          
,biological kinds representing real     
clefts in ,nature1 the process of the   
production of a young generation by an  
already adult generation must be thought
 of as without beginning and without    
end4  ,there can be no natural evolution
 of animals of one species from         

individuals of a different kind4  ,nor  
does it occur to ,aristotle to take into
 account the possibility of             
,creationism1 the sudden coming into    
being of a fully fledged first          
generation at a stroke4  ,this          
possibility is excluded by the doctrine 
that the matter of a thing must exist   
beforehand as an indispensable condition
 of the production of that thing4       
,every baby1 as we said1 must have had a
 father1 but that father must also have 
been a baby before he was a full-grown  
man4  ,hence the perpetuation of        
unchanging species must be without      
beginning and without end4 ,and it is   
implied that all the various processes1 
within and without the organism1 apart  
from which its life could not be kept   
up1 must be equally without beginning   
and without end4  ,the cosmos1 or       
orderly world of natural processes1 is  
strictly eternal2 motion is everlasting 
and continuous1 or unbroken4  ,even the 
great ,christian theologians who built  

upon ,aristotle could not absolutely    
break with him on this point4  ,st4     
,thomas1 though obliged to admit that   
the world was actually created a few    
thousand years before his own time1     
maintains that this can only be known to
 be true from revelation1               
philosophically it is equably tenable   
that the world should have been created 
from all eternity4  ,and it is the      
general doctrine of scholasticism that  
the expression creation only denotes the
 absolute dependence of the world on    
,god for its being4  ,when we say ,god  
created the world out of nothing1 we    
mean that ,he did not make it out of    
pre-existing matter1 that it depends for
 its being on ,him only2 the expression 
is purely negative in its import4       
99,god994--,with the doctrine of the    
eternity of the world and the processes 
which make up its life we come close to 
the culminating theory of ,aristotelian 
,first ,philosophy1 its doctrine of     
,god1 as the eternal1 unchanging source 

of all change1 movement1 and process4   
,all motion is a process within matter  
by which the forms latent in it are     
brought into actual manifestation4 ,and 
the process only takes place in the     
presence of an adequate efficient cause 
or source of motion4  ,hence the        
eternity of natural processes involves  
the existence of one or more eternal    
sources of motion4  ,for1 if we do not  
admit the existence of an unoriginated  
and ever-present source or sources of   
motion1 our only alternative is to hold 
that the world-process is due to a      
series of sources of motion existing    
successively4 ,but such a view would    
leave the unity and unbroken continuity 
of the world-process unaccounted for4   
,it would give us a succession of       
processes1 temporally contiguous1 not   
one unbroken process4  ,hence we argue  
from the continuity of motion to its    
dependence on a source or sources which 
are permanent and present throughout the
 whole everlasting world-process4  ,and 

when we come to the question whether    
there is only one such ultimate source  
of movement for the whole universe1 or  
several1 ,aristotle's answer is that the
 supreme ,unmoved ,mover is one4  ,one  
is enough for the purpose1 and the law  
of parcimony forbids us to assume the   
superfluous4  ,this then is the         
,aristotelian conception of ,god and    
,god's relation to the world4  ,god is  
the one supreme unchanging being to     
whose presence the world responds with  
the whole process of cosmic development1
 the ultimate educer of the series of   
forms latent in the matter of the world 
into actual manifestation4  ,standing1  
as ,he does1 outside the whole process  
which by ,his mere presence ,he         
initiates in ,nature1 ,he is not himself
 a composite of form and matter1 as the 
products of development are4 ,he is a   
pure individual form or actuality1 with 
no history of gradual development behind
 it4  ,thus ,he is a purely immaterial  
being1 indispensable to the world's     

existence but transcending it and       
standing outside it4  ,how ,his presence
 inspires the world to move ,aristotle  
tries to explain by the metaphor of     
appetition4  ,just as the good ,i desire
 and conceive1 without itself moving    
moves my appetition1 so ,god moves the  
universe by being its good4  ,this      
directly brings about a uniform unbroken
 rotation of the whole universe round   
its axis 7in fact1 the alternation of   
day and night74  ,and since this        
rotation is communicated from the       
outermost sphere of heaven to all the   
lesser spheres between it and the       
immovable centre1 the effects of ,god's 
presence are felt universally4  ,at the 
same time1 we must note that though ,god
 is the supreme ,mover of the ,universe1
 ,he is not regarded by ,aristotle as   
its ,creator1 even in the sense in which
 creation can be reconciled with the    
eternity of the world4  ,for the effect 
of ,god's presence is simply to lead to 
the development of form in an already   

existing matter4 ,without ,god there    
could be no form or order in things1 not
 even as much as is implied in the      
differentiation of matter into the four 
elements1 yet primary matter is no less 
than ,god a precondition of all that    
happens4  ,it is characteristic of      
,aristotle that his ,god is as far from 
discharging the functions of a          
,providence as ,he is from being a      
,creator4 ,his activity is not1 as      
,plato had made it1 that of the great   
,shepherd of the sheep4  ,as far as the 
world is concerned1 ,god's only function
 is to be there to move its appetition4 
,for the rest1 the unbroken activity of 
this life is directed wholly inward4    
,aristotle expressly calls it an        
activity of immobility4  ,more          
precisely1 he tells us1 it is activity  
of thought1 exercised unbrokenly and    
everlastingly upon the only object      
adequate to exercise ,god's             
contemplation1 ,himself4 ,his life is   
one of everlasting self-contemplation or

 thinking of thought itself4  ,like all 
unimpeded exercise of activity1 it is   
attended by pleasure1 and as the        
activity is continuous1 so the pleasure 
of it is continuous too4  ,at our best1 
when we give ourselves up to the pure   
contemplative activity of scientific    
thought or aesthetic appreciation1 we   
enter for a while into this divine life 
and share the happiness of ,god4  ,but  
that is a theme for our chapter on the  
,ethics4  ,it is a far cry from this    
conception of a ,god untroubled by care 
for a world to which ,he is only related
 as the object of its aspiration to the 
,god who cares even for the fall of the 
sparrow and of whom it is written1 ,sic 
,deus dilexit mundum1 but it was the    
standing task of the philosophical      
theologians of the ,middle ,ages to fuse
 the two conceptions4  ,plato's ,god1   
who1 if not quite the ,creator1 is the  
,father and ,fashioner of us all1 and   
keeps providential watch over the world 
,he has fashioned1 would have lent      

,himself better to their purposes1 but  
,plato was held by the mediaeval church 
to have denied the resurrection of the  
body4  ,the combination of ,aristotle's 
,theism with the ,theism of early       
,christianity was effected by           
exquisitely subtle logical devices1 but 
even in ,st4 ,thomas one cannot help    
seeing the seams4  ,nor can one help    
seeing in ,aristotle's own doctrine the 
usual want of coherence between an      
initial anti-,platonic bias and a final 
reversion to the very ,platonic         
positions ,aristotle is fond of         
impugning4  ,we are told at the outset  
that the ,platonic separate forms are   
empty names1 and that the real          
individual thing is always a composite  
of matter and a form which only exists  
in matter4  ,we find in the end that the
 source of the whole process by which   
matter becomes imbued with form is a    
being which is pure form and stands     
outside the whole development which its 
presence sets up4 ,and the issue of     

,aristotle's warning against poetic     
metaphors is the doctrine that ,god     
moves the world by being the object of  
the world's desire4                     
99,,chapter ,,iv99                      
99,,physics99   ,there is no part of    
,aristotle's system which has been more 
carefully thought out than his ,physics2
 at the same time it is almost wholly on
 account of his physical doctrines that 
his long ascendancy over thought is so  
much to be regretted4  ,aristotle's     
qualifications as a man of science have 
been much overrated4 ,in one department1
 that of descriptive natural history1 he
 shows himself a master of minute and   
careful observation who could obtain    
unqualified praise from so great a      
naturalist as ,darwin4 ,but in          
,astronomy and ,physics proper his      
inferiority in mathematical thinking and
 his dislike for mechanical ways of     
explaining facts put him at a great     
disadvantage1 as compared with ,plato   
and ,plato's ,pythagorean friends4      

,thus his authority was for centuries   
one of the chief influences which       
prevented the development of ,astronomy 
on right lines4  ,plato had himself both
 taught the mobility of the earth and   
denied correctly that the earth is at   
the centre of the universe1 and the     
,copernican hypothesis in ,astronomy    
probably originated in the ,academy4    
,aristotle1 however1 insists on the     
central position of the earth1 and      
violently attacks ,plato for believing  
in its motion4 ,it is equally serious   
that he insists on treating the         
so-called four elements as ultimately   
unanalysable forms of matter1 though    
,plato had not only observed that so far
 from being the ,,abc 7stoicheia or     
elementa1 literally1 letters of the     
alphabet7 of ,nature they do not deserve
 to be called even syllables1 but had   
also definitely put forward the view    
that it is the geometrical structure of 
the corpuscles of body upon which       
sensible qualities depend4  ,it is on   

this doctrine1 of course1 that all      
mathematical physics rests4 ,aristotle  
reverts to the older theory that the    
differences between one element and     
another are qualitative differences of a
 sensible kind4 ,even in the biological 
sciences ,aristotle shows an unfortunate
 proneness to disregard established fact
 when it conflicts with the theories for
 which he has a personal liking4  ,thus1
 though the importance of the brain as  
the central organ of the sensori-motor  
system had been discovered in the late  
sixth or early fifth century by the     
physician ,alemacon of ,crotona1 and    
taught by the great ,hippocrates in the 
fifth and by ,plato in the fourth       
century1 ,aristotle's prejudices in     
favour of the doctrines of a different  
school of biologists led him to revert  
to the view that it is the heart which  
is the centre of what we now call the   
nervous system4  ,it is mainly on       
account of these reactionary scientific 
views that he was attacked in the early 

seventeenth century by writers like our 
own ,francis ,bacon1 who found in       
veneration for ,aristotle one of the    
chief hindrances to the free development
 of natural science4  ,the same         
complaints had been made long before by 
critics belonging to the ,platonic      
,academy4  ,it is a ,platonist of the   
time of ,marcus ,aurelius who sums up a 
vigorous attack on the ,aristotelian    
astronomy by the remark that ,aristotle 
never understood that the true task of  
the physicist is not to prescribe laws  
to ,nature1 but to learn from           
observation of the facts what the laws  
followed by ,nature are4  ,in           
determining the scope of ,physics1 we   
have to begin by considering what is the
 special characteristic of things       
produced by ,nature as contrasted with  
those produced by art4  ,the obvious    
distinction1 intimated by the very      
etymology of the word ,nature 7physis1  
connected with phyesthai1 to grow1 to be
 born1 as natura is with nasci71 is that

 what is by ,nature is born and grows1  
whereas what is as a result of artifice 
is made4  ,the natural may thus be said 
to consist of living bodies and of their
 constituent parts4  ,hence inorganic   
matter also is included in ,nature1 on  
the ground that living tissue can be    
analysed back into compounds of the     
elements4  ,now things which are alive  
and grow are distinguished from things  
which are made by a source of motion and
 quiescence within themselves2 all of   
them exhibit motions1 changes of        
quality1 processes of growth and decline
 which are initiated from within4       
,hence ,nature may be defined as the    
totality of things which have a source  
of motion internal to themselves and of 
the constituent parts of such things4   
,nature then comprises all beings       
capable of spontaneous change4 ,whatever
 either does not change at all1 or only 
changes in consequence of external      
influences1 is excluded from ,nature4   
,thus the fundamental fact everywhere   

present in ,nature is change1 process1  
motion4  ,since motion in the literal   
sense of change of position is involved 
as a condition of every such process1   
and such motion requires space through  
which to move and time to move in1 the  
doctrine of space and time will also    
form part of ,physics4  ,hence a great  
part of ,aristotle's special lectures on
 ,physics is occupied with discussion of
 the nature of space and time1 and of   
the continuity which we must ascribe to 
them if the continuous motion on which  
the unbroken life of the universe       
depends is to be real ,aristotle knows  
nothing of the modern questions whether 
space and time are real or only         
phenomenal1 whether they are objective  
or subjective4  ,just as he simply      
assumes that bodies are things that     
really exist1 whether we happen to      
perceive them or not1 so he assumes that
 the space and time in which they move  
are real features of a world that does  
not depend for its existence on our     

perceiving it4  ,his treatment of space 
is singularly naif4  ,he conceives it as
 a sort of vessel1 into which you can   
pour different liquids4 ,just as the    
same pot may hold first wine and then   
water1 so1 if you can say1 there was    
water here1 but now there is air here1  
this implies the existence of a         
receptacle which once held the water1   
but now holds the air4  ,hence a jug or 
pot may be called a place that can be   
carried about1 and space or place may be
 called an immovable vessel4  ,hence the
 place of a thing may be defined as the 
boundary1 or inner surface1 of the body 
which immediately surrounds the thing4  
,it follows from this that there can be 
no empty space4  ,in the last resort1   
absolute space is the actual surface of 
the outermost heaven which contains     
everything else in itself but is not    
contained in any remoter body4  ,thus   
all things whatever are in this heaven4 
,but it is not itself in anything else4 
,in accord with the standing ,greek     

identification of determinate character 
with limitation1 ,aristotle holds that  
this outermost heaven must be at a      
limited distance from us4  ,actual space
 is thus finite in the sense that the   
volume of the universe could be         
expressed as a finite number of cubic   
miles or yards1 though1 since it must be
 continuous1 it is infinitely divisible4
  ,however often you subdivide a length1
 an area1 or a volume1 you will always  
be dividing it into lesser lengths1 c41 
which can once more be divided4  ,you   
will never by division come to points1  
i4e4 mere positions without magnitude of
 divisibility4  ,the treatment of time  
is more thoughtful4  ,time is           
inseparably connected with movement or  
change4  ,we only perceive that time has
 elapsed when we perceive that change   
has occurred4 ,but time is not the same 
as change4 ,for change is of different  
and incommensurate kinds1 change of     
place1 change of colour1 c42 but to take
 up time is common to all these forms of

 process4  ,and time is not the same as 
motion4  ,for there are different rates 
of speed1 but the very fact that we can 
compare these different velocities      
implies that there are not different    
velocities of time4  ,time then is that 
in terms of which we measure motion1 the
 number of motion in respect of before  
and after1 i4e4 it is that by which we  
estimate the duration of processes4     
,thus e4g4 when we speak of two minutes1
 two days1 two months as required for a 
certain process to be completed1 we are 
counting something4  ,this something is 
time4 ,it does not seem to occur to     
,aristotle that this definition implies 
that there are indivisible bits of time1
 though he quite correctly states the   
incompatible proposition that time is   
made up of successive nows1 i4e4 moments
 which have no duration at all1 and can 
no more be counted than the points on a 
straight line4  ,he recognises of course
 that the continuity of motion implies  
that of time as well as of space4       

,since1 however1 continuity in his      
language means the same thing as        
indefinite divisibility1 it ought not to
 be possible for him to regard time as  
made up of nows2 time1 like linear      
extension1 ought for him to be a length 
of something4  99,the ,continuous       
,motion and the ,spheres499--,the       
continuous world-process depends upon a 
continuous movement set up in the       
universe as a whole by the presence of  
an everlasting and unchangeable ,first  
,mover1 ,god4 ,from the self-sameness of
 ,god1 it follows that this most        
universal of movements must be          
absolutely uniform4  ,of what precise   
kind can such a movement be8  ,as the   
source of the movement is one1 and the  
object moved is also one--viz4 the      
compass of the heaven1 the movement of  
the primum mobile or first moved--the   
object immediately stimulated to motion 
by ,god's presence to it1 must be       
mechanically simple4  ,now ,aristotle1  
mistakenly1 held that there are two     

forms of movement which are simple and  
unanalysable1 motion of translation     
along a straight line1 and motion of    
rotation round an axis4  ,he is at pains
 to argue that rectilinear motion1 which
 we easily discover to be that          
characteristic of bodies near the       
earth's surface when left to themselves1
 cannot be the kind of movement which   
belongs to the heaven as a whole4  ,for 
continuous rectilinear movement in the  
same direction could not go on for ever 
on his assumption that there is no space
 outside the heaven1 which is itself at 
a finite distance from us4  ,and motion 
to and fro would not be unbroken1 since 
,aristotle argues that every time a     
moving body reached the end of its path1
 and the sense of its movement was      
reversed1 it would be for two           
consecutive moments in the same place1  
and therefore at rest4  ,reversal of    
sense would imply a discontinuity4      
,hence he decides that the primary      
unbroken movement must be the rotation  

of the first moved--that is1 the heaven 
containing the fixed stars--round its   
axis4  ,this is the only movement which 
could go on for ever at a uniform rate  
and in the same sense4  ,starting with  
the conviction that the earth is at rest
 in the centre of the universe1 he      
inevitably accounts for the alternation 
of day and night as the effect of such a
 revolution of the whole universe round 
an axis passing through the centre of   
the earth4  ,the universe is thus       
thought of as bounded by a spherical    
surface1 on the concave side of which   
are the fixed stars1 which are therefore
 one and all at the same distance from  
us4  ,this sphere1 under the immediate  
influence of ,god1 revolves on its axis 
once in twenty-four hours1 and this     
period of revolution is absolutely      
uniform4  ,next the apparently irregular
 paths of the planets known to          
,aristotle 7i4e4 the moon1 ,mercury1    
,venus1 the sun1 ,mars1 ,jupiter1       
,saturn7 are resolved into combinations 

of similar uniform rotations1 each      
planet having as many spheres assigned  
to it as are requisite for the analysis 
of its apparent path into perfectly     
circular elementary motions4            
,altogether ,aristotle holds that       
fifty-four such rotating spheres are    
required over and above the first moved 
itself1 whose rotation is1 of course1   
communicated to all the lesser spheres  
included within it4  ,as in the case of 
the first moved1 the uniform unceasing  
rotation of each sphere is explained by 
the influence on it of an unchanging    
immaterial form1 which is to its own    
sphere what ,god is to the universe as a
 whole4  ,in the ,aristotelianism of the
 mediaeval church these pure forms or   
intelligences which originate the       
movements of the various planetary      
spheres are naturally identified with   
angels4  ,it is e4g4 to the angelic     
intelligences which move the heaven of  
,venus1 which comes third in order      
counting outward from the earth1 that   

,dante addresses his famous ,canzone1   
,voi ch' intendendo il terzo del movete4
  ,the mediaeval astronomy1 however1    
differs in two important respects from  
that of ,aristotle himself4  7#a7 ,the  
number of spheres is different4         
,increasing knowledge of the complexity 
of the paths of the planets showed that 
if their paths are to be analysed into  
combinations of circular motions1       
fifty-four such rotations must be an    
altogether inadequate number4           
,aristotle's method of analysis of the  
heavenly movements was therefore        
combined with either or both of two     
others originated by pure astronomers   
who sat loose to metaphysics4  ,one of  
these methods was to account for a      
planet's path by the introduction of    
epicycles4  ,the planet was thought of  
not as fixed at a given point on its    
principal sphere1 but as situated on the
 circumference of a lesser sphere which 
has its centre at a fixed point of the  
principal sphere and rotates around an  

axis passing through this centre4  ,if  
need were1 this type of hypothesis could
 be further complicated by imagining any
 number of such epicycles within        
epicycles4  ,the other method was the   
employment of eccentrics1 i4e4 circular 
movements which are described not about 
the common centre of the earth and the  
universe1 but about some point in its   
neighbourhood4  ,by combinations of     
epicycles and eccentrics the mediaeval  
astronomers contrived to reduce the     
number of principal spheres to one for  
each planet1 the arrangement we find in 
,dante4  7#b7 ,also real or supposed    
astronomical perturbations unknown to   
,aristotle led some mediaeval theorists 
to follow the scheme devised by         
,alphonso the ,wise of ,castille1 in    
which further spheres are inserted      
between that of ,saturn1 the outermost  
planet1 and the first moved4  ,in       
,dante1 we have1 excluding the empyrean 
or immovable heaven where ,god and the  
blessed are1 nine spheres1 one for each 

of the planets1 one for the fixed stars1
 and one for the first moved1 which is  
now distinguished from the heaven of the
 stars4  ,in ,milton1 who adopts the    
,alphonsine scheme1 we have further a   
sphere called the second movable or     
crystalline introduced between the      
heaven of the fixed stars and the first 
moved1 to account for the imaginary     
phenomenon of trepidation4  ,in reading 
,dante1 ,shakespeare1 and ,milton1 we   
have always to remember that none of    
these reproduces the ,aristotelian      
doctrine of the spheres accurately2     
their astronomy is an amalgam of        
,aristotle1 ,ptolemy1 and ,hipparchus4  
,paradise ,lost1 iii4 #dha4  ,they pass 
the planets seven1 and pass the fixed1  
,and that crystalline sphere whose      
balance weighs ,the trepidation talked1 
and that first moved4   ,so far1 the    
doctrine of the fifty-five spheres might
 be no more than a legitimate           
mathematical fiction1 a convenient      
device for analysing the complicated    

apparent movements of the heavenly      
bodies into circular components4  ,this 
was originally the part played by       
spheres in ancient astronomical theory1 
and it is worth while to be quite clear 
about the fact1 as there is a mistaken  
impression widely current to-day that   
,aristotle's astronomy is typical of    
,greek views in general4  ,the truth is 
that it is peculiar to himself4  ,the   
origin of the theory was ,academic4     
,plato proposed to the ,academy as a    
subject of inquiry1 to devise such a    
mathematical analysis of astronomical   
motions as will best save the           
appearances1 i4e4 will most simply      
account for the apparent paths of the   
planets4  ,the analysis of these paths  
into resultants of several rotations was
 offered as a solution by the astronomer
 ,eudoxus of ,cnidus4  ,so far1 the     
spheres1 then1 were a mere mathematical 
hypothesis4  ,what ,aristotle did1 and  
it is perhaps the most retrograde step  
ever taken in the history of a science1 

was to convert the mathematical         
hypothesis into physical fact4  ,the    
spheres become with him real bodies1 and
 as none of the bodies we are familiar  
with exhibit any tendency to rotate in  
circles when left to themselves1        
,aristotle was forced to introduce into 
,physics the disastrous theory1 which it
 was a great part of ,galileo's         
life-work to destroy1 that the stuff of 
which the spheres are made is a fifth   
body1 different from the elements of    
which the bodies among which we live are
 made4  ,hence he makes an absolute     
distinction between two kinds of matter1
 celestial matter1 the fifth body1 and  
terrestrial or elementary matter4  ,the 
fundamental difference is that          
terrestrial or elementary matter1 left  
to itself1 follows a rectilinear path1  
celestial matter rotates1 but it is     
further inferred from the supposed      
absolute uniformity of the celestial    
movements that celestial matter is      
simple1 uncompounded1 incapable of      

change1 and consequently that no new    
state of things can ever arise in the   
heavens4  ,the spheres and planets have 
always been and will always be exactly  
as they are at the present moment4      
,mutability is confined to the region of
 terrestrial or elementary matter1 which
 only extends as far as the orbit of the
 moon1 the lowest of the celestial      
bodies1 because it is only terrestrial  
things which are1 as we should say1     
chemical compounds4  ,this is the       
doctrine which ,galileo has in mind when
 he dwells on such newly-discovered     
astronomical facts as the existence of  
sun-spots and variable stars1 and the   
signs of irregularity presented by the  
moon's surface4  ,the distinction is    
peculiar to ,aristotle4  ,no one before 
him had ever thought of supposing the   
heavenly bodies to be made of any       
materials other than those of which     
bodies terrestrial are made4  ,in the   
,academic attack on ,aristotle's science
 of which we have already spoken the two

 points singled out for reprobation are 
7#a7 his rejection of the principle that
 all moving bodies1 left to themselves1 
follow a rectilinear path1 and 7#b7 his 
denial that the heavenly bodies are made
 of the same elements as everything     
else4  7,it may just be mentioned in    
passing that our word quintessence gets 
its sense from the supposed special     
nobility of the incorruptible fifth     
body47  99,terrestrial ,bodies994--,as  
we have seen already1 ,aristotle was out
 of sympathy with the tendency to regard
 the sensible differences between bodies
 as consequences of more ultimate       
differences in the geometrical structure
 of their particles4  ,hence his whole  
attitude towards the problems of that   
branch of natural science which we call 
physics is quite unlike any view to     
which we are accustomed4  ,he reverts   
from the mathematical lines of thought  
current in ,plato's ,academy to the type
 of view more natural to the plain man1 
and1 like the earliest sixth-century men

 of science1 regards the qualitative    
differences which our senses apprehend  
as fundamental4  ,among these1          
particular stress is laid on the        
difference in sensible temperature 7the 
hot--the cold71 in saturation 7the      
dry--the moist71 and in density 7the    
dense--the rare74  ,if we consider the  
first two of these oppositions1 we can  
make four binary combinations of the    
elementary opposite characters1 viz4 hot
 and dry1 hot and moist1 cold and moist1
 cold and dry4  ,these combinations are 
regarded as corresponding respectively  
to the sensible characteristics of the  
four bodies which ,empedocles1 the      
father of ,greek chemistry1 had treated 
as the ultimate components of           
everything4 ,fire is hot and dry1 air   
hot and moist1 water moist and cold1    
earth cold and dry4  ,this reflection   
shows us why ,aristotle held that the   
most rudimentary form in which matter   
ever actually exists is that of one of  
these elements4  ,each of them has one  

quality in common with another1 and it  
is in virtue of this that a portion of  
one element can be assimilated by and   
transmuted into another1 a process which
 seems to the untutored eye to be       
constantly recurring in ,nature4 ,we    
also observe that the order in which the
 elements appear1 when so arranged as to
 form a series in which each term has   
one quality in common with each of its  
neighbours1 is also that of their       
increasing density4  ,this would help to
 make the conception of their           
transmutability all the more natural1 as
 it suggests that the process may be    
effected by steady condensation4 ,we    
must remember carefully that for        
,aristotle1 who denies the possibility  
of a vacuum1 as for the mediaeval       
alchemists1 condensation does not mean a
 mere diminution of the distances       
between corpuscles which remain         
unchanged in character1 but is a process
 of real qualitative change in the body 
which undergoes it4  ,incidentally we   

may remark that all changes of quality  
are regarded by ,aristotle as stages in 
a continuous movement from one extreme  
of a scale to another4  ,for example1   
colours1 with him as with ,goethe1 form 
a series of which the opposites white   
and black are the end-points4  ,every   
other colour is a combination of white  
and black according to a definite       
proportion4  ,the ,aristotelian doctrine
 of weight was one of the chief         
obstacles which seventeenth-century     
science had to contend with in          
establishing correct notions in         
dynamics4  ,it is a curious feature of  
,greek science before ,aristotle that1  
though the facts connected with gravity 
were well known1 no one introduced the  
notion of weight to account for them4   
,the difference between heavy bodies and
 light bodies had been previously       
treated as secondary for science4       
,plato's treatment of the matter is     
typical of the best fourth-century      
science4  ,we must not try to explain   

why the heavier bodies tend to move     
towards the earth's surface by saying   
that they have a downward motion2 their 
motion is not downward but towards the  
centre 7the earth1 though not fixed at  
the centre of the universe1 being nearer
 to it than the rest of the solar and   
sidereal system74  ,plato then explains 
the tendency in virtue of which the     
heavier bodies move towards the centre  
as an attraction of like for like4  ,the
 universal tendency is for smaller      
masses of earth1 water1 air1 fire to be 
attracted towards the great aggregations
 of the same materials4  ,this is far   
from being a satisfactory theory in the 
light of facts which were not yet known 
to ,plato1 but it is on the right lines4
 ,it starts from the conception of the  
facts of gravity as due to an attractive
 force of some kind1 and it has the     
great merit of bringing the sinking of  
stones and the rising of vapours under  
the same explanation4  ,aristotle1      
though retaining the central idea that a

 body tends to move towards the region  
where the great cosmic mass of the same 
kind is congregated1 introduced the     
entirely incompatible notion of an      
absolute distinction of up and down4    
,he identified the centre of the        
universe with that of the earth1 and    
looked on motion to this centre as      
downward4  ,this led him to make a      
distinction between heavy bodies1 which 
naturally tend to move down1 and light  
bodies1 which tend to move up away from 
the centre4  ,the doctrine works out    
thus4  ,the heaviest elements tend to be
 massed together nearest the centre1 the
 lightest to be furthest from it4 ,each 
element thus has its proper place1 that 
of water being immediately above earth1 
that of air next1 and that of fire      
furthest from the centre1 and nearest to
 the regions occupied by celestial      
matter4  7,readers of ,dante will       
recollect the ascent from the ,earthly  
,paradise through the sphere of fire    
with which the ,paradiso opens47  ,in   

its own proper region no body is heavy  
or light2 as we should say any fluid    
loses its weight when immersed in       
itself4  ,when a portion of an element  
is out of its own region and surrounded 
by the great cosmic aggregate of another
 element1 either of two cases may occur4
  ,the body which is out of its element 
may be below its proper place1 in which 
case it is light and tends to move      
perpendicularly upwards to its place1 or
 it may be above its proper place1 and  
then it is heavy and tends to move      
perpendicularly down until it reaches   
its place4  ,it was this supposed real  
distinction between motion up and motion
 down which made it so hard for the     
contemporaries of ,galileo to understand
 that an inflated bladder rises for the 
same reason that a stone sinks4         
99,biology994--,of ,aristotle's biology 
reasons of space forbid us to say much  
here4  ,but a remark or two may be made 
about his theory of reproduction1 since 
it is constantly referred to in much    

modern literature and has also played   
its part in theology4 ,an interesting   
point is the distinction between perfect
 and imperfect animals4 ,perfect animals
 are those which can only be reproduced 
sexually4 ,aristotle held1 however1 that
 there are some creatures1 even among   
vertebrates1 which may be produced by   
the vivifying effect of solar heat on   
decomposing matter1 without any parents 
at all4  ,thus malobservation of the    
facts of putrefaction led to the belief 
that flies and worms are engendered by  
heat from decaying bodies1 and it was   
even thought that frogs and mice are    
produced in the same way from           
river-slime4  ,in this process1 the     
so-called aequivocal generation1 solar  
heat was conceived as the operative     
efficient cause which leads to the      
realisation of an organic form in the   
decaying matter4  ,in sexual            
reproduction ,aristotle regards the male
 parent as the agent or efficient cause 
which contributes the element of form   

and organisation to the offspring4  ,the
 female parent supplies only the raw    
material of the new creature1 but she   
supplies the whole of this4  ,no        
material is supplied by the male parent 
to the body of the offspring1 a theory  
which ,st4 ,thomas found useful in      
defending the dogma of the ,virgin      
,birth4  99,psychology994--,since the   
mind grows and develops1 it comes under 
the class of things which have a source 
of motion internal to themselves1 and   
psychology is therefore1 for ,aristotle1
 a branch of ,physics4  ,to understand  
his treatment of psychological questions
 we need bear two things in mind4 7#a7  
,psyche or soul means in ,greek more    
than consciousness does to us4          
,consciousness is a relatively late and 
highly developed manifestation of the   
principle which the ,greeks call soul4  
,that principle shows itself not merely 
in consciousness but in the whole       
process of nutrition and growth and the 
adaptation of motor response to an      

external situation4 ,thus consciousness 
is a more secondary feature of the soul 
in ,greek philosophy than in most modern
 thought1 which has never ceased to be  
affected by ,descartes' selection of    
thought as the special characteristic of
 psychical life4  ,in common language   
the word psyche is constantly used where
 we should say life rather than soul1   
and in ,greek philosophy a work on the  
,psyche means what we should call one on
 the principle of life4  7#b7 ,it is a  
consequence of this way of thinking of  
the soul that the process of bodily and 
mental development is regarded by       
,aristotle as one single continuous     
process4  ,the growth of a man's        
intellect and character by which he     
becomes a thinker and a citizen is a    
continuation of the process by which his
 body is conceived and born and passes  
into physical manhood4  ,this comes out 
in the words of the definition of the   
soul4  ,the soul is the first entelechy 
7or actual realisation7 of a natural    

organic body4  ,what this means is that 
the soul stands to the living body as   
all form realised in matter does to the 
matter of which it is the form1 or that 
the soul is the form of the body4  ,what
 the organic body is to the embryo out  
of which it has grown1 that soul is to  
the body itself4  ,as the embryo grows  
into the actual living body1 so the     
living body grows into a body exhibiting
 the actual directing presence of mind4 
,aristotle illustrates the relation by  
the remark that if the whole body was   
one vast eye1 seeing would be its soul4 
,as the eye is a tool for seeing with1  
but a living tool which is part of      
ourselves1 so the body is a like tool or
 instrument for living with4 ,hence we  
may say of the soul that it is the end  
of the body1 the activity to which the  
body is instrumental1 as seeing is the  
end to which the eye is instrumental4   
,but we must note that the soul is      
called only the first or initial        
entelechy of the body4  ,the reason is  

that the mere presence of the soul does 
not guarantee the full living of the    
life to which our body is but the       
instrument4  ,if we are to live in the  
fullest sense of the word1 we must not  
merely have a soul2 we have it even in  
sleep1 in ignorance1 in folly4  ,the    
soul itself needs further to be educated
 and trained in intelligence and        
character1 and to exercise its          
intelligence and character efficiently  
on the problems of thought and life4    
,the mere presence of soul is only a    
first step in the progress towards      
fullness of life4  ,this is why         
,aristotle calls the soul the first     
entelechy of the living body4  ,the full
 and final entelechy is the life of     
intelligence and character actively     
functioning4  ,from this conception of  
the soul's relation to the body we see  
that ,aristotle's doctrine of body and  
mind does not readily fall into line    
with any of the typical theories of our 
time4  ,he neither thinks of the soul as

 a thing acting on the body and acted on
 by it1 nor yet as a series of states of
 mind concomitant with certain states of
 body4 ,from his point of view to ask   
whether soul and body interact1 or      
whether they exhibit parallelism1 would 
be much the same thing as to ask whether
 life interacts with the body1 or       
whether there is a parallelism between  
vital processes and bodily processes4   
,we must not ask at all how the body and
 soul are united4  ,they are one thing1 
as the matter and the form of a copper  
globe are one4  ,thus they are in actual
 fact inseparable4 ,the soul is the soul
 of its body and the body the body of   
its soul4 ,we can only distinguish them 
by logical analysis1 as we can          
distinguish the copper from the         
sphericity in the copper globe4         
99,grades of ,psychical ,life994--,if we
 consider the order of development1 we  
find that some vital activities make    
their appearance earlier than others1   
and that it is a universal law that the 

more highly developed activities always 
have the less highly developed as their 
basis and precondition1 though the less 
highly developed may exist apart from   
the more highly developed4  ,so we may  
arrange vital activities in general in  
an ontogenetic order1 the order in which
 they make their appearance in the      
individual's development4  ,aristotle   
reckons three such stages1 the          
nutritive1 the sensitive1 and the       
intelligent4  ,the lowest form in which 
life shows itself at all1 the level of  
minimum distinction between the living  
and the lifeless1 is the power to take  
in nutriment1 assimilate it1 and grow4  
,in vegetables the development is       
arrested at this point4 ,with the       
animals we reach the next highest level1
 that of sensitive life4  ,for all      
animals have at least the sense of      
touch4 ,thus they all show              
sense-perception1 and it is a           
consequence of this that they exhibit   
appetition1 the simplest form of        

conation1 and the rudiments of feeling  
and temper4  ,for what has sensations   
can also feel pleasure and pain1 and    
what can feel pleasure and pain can     
desire1 since desire is only appetition 
of what is pleasant4  ,thus in the      
animals we have the beginnings of       
cognition1 conation1 and affective and  
emotional life in general4  ,and        
,aristotle adds that locomotion makes   
its appearance at this level2 animals do
 not1 like plants1 have to trust to     
their supply of nutriment coming to     
them2 they can go to it4  ,the third    
level1 that of intelligence1 i4e4 the   
power to compare1 calculate1 and        
reflect1 and to order one's life by     
conscious rule1 is exhibited by man4    
,what distinguishes life at this level  
from mere sensitive life is1 on the     
intellectual side1 the ability to       
cognise universal truths1 on the        
conative1 the power to live by rule     
instead of being swayed by momentary    
appetition4  ,the former gives us the   

possibility of science1 the latter of   
moral excellence4    ,cf4 ,dante's      
,fatti non foste a viver como bruti1    
,ma per seguir virtute e conosoenza4    
99,sensation994--,life manifests itself 
at the animal level on the cognitive    
side as sense-perception1 on the        
conative as appetition or desire1 on the
 affective as feeling of pleasure or    
pain1 and in such simple emotional moods
 as temper1 resentment1 longing4        
,aristotle gives sensation a logical    
priority over the conative and emotional
 expression of animal life4  ,to        
experience appetition or anger or desire
 you must have an object which you crave
 for or desire or are angry with1 and it
 is only when you have reached the level
 of presentations through the senses    
that you can be said to have an object4 
,appetition or temper is as real a fact 
as perception1 but you cannot crave for 
or feel angry with a thing you do not   
apprehend4  ,aristotle's definition of  
sense perception is that it is a        

capacity for discerning or              
distinguishing between the sensible     
qualities of things4  ,his conception of
 the process by which the discernment or
 distinguishing is effected is not      
altogether happy4 ,in sense-perception  
the soul takes into itself the form of  
the thing perceived without its matter1 
as sealing-wax receives the shape of an 
iron seal-ring without the iron4  ,to   
understand this1 we have to remember    
that for ,aristotle the sensible        
qualities of the external world1 colour1
 tones1 tastes1 and the rest1 are not   
effects of mechanical stimulation of our
 sense-organs1 but real qualities of    
bodies4  ,the hardness of iron1 the     
redness of a piece of red wax are all   
primarily in the iron or the wax4  ,they
 are forms1 or determinations by        
definite law1 of the matter of the iron 
or the wax4  ,this will become clearer  
if we consider a definite example1 the  
red colour of the wax4  ,in the wax the 
red colour is a definite combination of 

the colour-opposites white and black    
according to a fixed ratio4 ,now        
,aristotle's view of the process of     
sense-perception is that when ,i become 
aware of the red colour the same        
proportion of white to black which makes
 the wax red is reproduced in my organ  
of vision2 my eye1 while ,i am seeing   
the red1 assimilated to the wax1 is     
itself for the time actually reddened4  
,but it does not become wax because the 
red thing ,i am looking at is a piece of
 red wax4  ,the eye remains a thing     
composed of living tissues4  ,this is   
what is meant by saying that in seeing  
the colours of things the eye receives  
forms without the matter of the things  
in which those forms are exhibited4     
,thus the process of sense-perception is
 one in which the organ of sense is     
temporarily assimilated to the thing    
apprehended in respect of the particular
 quality cognised by that organ1 but in 
respect of no other4 ,according to      
,aristotle this process of assimilation 

always requires the presence of a       
medium4  ,if an object is in immediate  
contact with the eye we cannot see its  
colour2 if it is too near the ear1 we do
 not discern the note it gives out4     
,even in the case of touch and taste    
there is no immediate contact between   
the object perceived and the true organ 
of perception4  ,for in touch the flesh 
is not the organ of apprehension but an 
integument surrounding it and capable of
 acting as an intermediary between it   
and things4 ,thus perception is always  
accomplished by a motion set up in the  
medium by the external object1 and by   
the medium in our sense-organs4         
,aristotle thus contrives to bring      
correct apprehension by sense of the    
qualities of things under the formula of
 the right mean or right proportion1    
which is better known from the use made 
of it in the philosopher's theory of    
conduct4 ,the colour of a surface1 the  
pitch of the note given out by a        
vibrating string1 c41 depend on1 and    

vary with1 certain forms or ratios in   
the surface or the vibrating string2 our
 correct apprehension of the qualities  
depends on the reproduction of the same 
ratios in our sense-organs1 the         
establishment of the right proportion in
 us4  ,that this right proportion may be
 reproduced in our own sense-organs it  
is necessary 7#a7 that the medium should
 have none of the sensible qualities for
 the apprehension whereof it serves as  
medium1 e4g4 the medium in              
colour-perception must be colourless4   
,if it had a colour of its own1 the     
motion set up by the coloured bodies we 
apprehend would not be transmitted      
undistorted to our organs2 we should see
 everything through a coloured haze4 ,it
 is necessary for the same reason 7#b7  
that the percipient organ itself1 when  
in a state of quiescence1 should possess
 none of the qualities which can be     
induced in it by stimulation4 ,the      
upshot of the whole theory is that the  
sense-organ is potentially what the     

sense-quality it apprehends is actually4
 ,actual perceiving is just that special
 transition from the potential to the   
actual which results in making the organ
 for the time being actually of the same
 quality as the object4  99,the ,common 
,sensibles and the ,common              
,sense-organ994--,every sense has a     
range of qualities connected with it as 
its special objects4  ,colours can only 
be perceived by the eye1 sounds by the  
ear1 and so forth4  ,but there are      
certain characters of perceived things  
which we appear to apprehend by more    
than one sense4  ,thus we seem to       
perceive size and shape either by touch 
or by sight1 and number by hearing as   
well1 since we can count e4g4 the       
strokes of an unseen bell4 ,hence       
,aristotle distinguishes between the    
special sensible qualities such as      
colour and pitch1 and what he calls the 
common sensibles1 the character of      
things which can be perceived by more   
than one organ4  ,these are enumerated  

as size1 form or shape1 number1 motion  
7and its opposite rest71 being4 7,the   
addition of this last is1 of course1    
meant to account for our conviction that
 any perceived colour1 taste1 or other  
quality is a reality and not a          
delusion47  ,the list corresponds very  
closely with one given by ,plato of the 
things which the mind perceives by      
herself without the help of any organ1  
i4e4 of the leading determinations of   
sensible things which are due not to    
sense but to understanding4  ,it was an 
unfortunate innovation to regard the    
discernment of number or movement1 which
 obviously demand intellectual processes
 such as counting and comparison1 as    
performed immediately by sense1 and to  
assign the apprehension of number1      
movement1 figure to a central organ4    
,this organ he finds in the heart4  ,the
 theory is that when the special organs 
of the senses are stimulated1 they in   
turn communicate movements to the blood 
and animal spirits 7i4e4 the vapours    

supposed to be produced from the blood  
by animal heat74  ,these movements are  
propagated inwards to the heart1 where  
they all meet4  ,this is supposed to    
account for the important fact that1    
though our sensations are so many and   
diverse1 we are conscious of our own    
unity as the subjects apprehending all  
this variety4  ,the unity of the        
perceiving subject is thus made to      
depend on the unity of the ultimate     
organ of sensation1 the heart4 ,further1
 when once a type of motion has been set
 up in any sense-organ at the periphery 
of the body it will be propagated inward
 to the common sensorium in the heart4  
,the motions set up by stimulation1 e4g4
 of the eye and of the skin1 are partly 
different1 partly the same 7viz4 in so  
far as they are determined by the       
number1 shape1 size1 movement of the    
external stimuli74  ,hence in the heart 
itself the stimulation on which         
perception of number or size depends is 
one and the same whether it has been    

transmitted from the eye or from the    
skin6  ,awareness of lapse of time is   
also regarded as a function of the      
common sense-organ1 since it is the     
common sensory which perceives motion1  
and lapse of time is apprehended only in
 the apprehension of motion4 ,thus1 in  
respect of the inclusion of geometrical 
form and lapse of time among the common 
sensibles1 there is a certain           
resemblance between ,aristotle's        
doctrine and ,kant's theory that        
recognition of spatial and temporal     
order is a function not of understanding
 but of pure sense4 ,it is further held 
that to be aware that one is perceiving 
7self-consciousness7 and to discriminate
 between the different classes of       
special sense-perception must also be   
functions of the common sense-organ4    
,thus ,aristotle makes the mistake of   
treating the most fundamental acts of   
intelligent reflection as precisely on a
 par1 from the point of view of the     
theory of knowledge1 with awareness of  

colour or sound4  ,a more legitimate    
function assigned to the common         
sensorium in the heart is that fantasy1 
the formation of mental imagery1 depends
 on its activity4  ,the simplest kind of
 image1 the pure memory-image left      
behind after the object directly        
arousing perception has ceased to       
stimulate1 is due to the persistence of 
the movements set up in the heart after 
the sensory process in the peripheral   
organ is over4  ,since ,aristotle denies
 the possibility of thinking without the
 aid of memory-images1 this function of 
the common sensorium is the             
indispensable basis of mental recall1   
anticipation1 and thought4 ,neither     
experience1 i4e4 a general conviction   
which results from the frequent         
repetition of similar perceptions1 nor  
thought can arise in any animal in which
 sense-stimulation does not leave such  
traces behind it4  ,similarly free      
imagery1 the existence of trains of     
imagination not tied down to the        

reproduction of an actual order of      
sensations1 is accounted for by the     
consideration that chance coincidence   
may lead to the stimulation of the heart
 in the same way in which it might have 
been stimulated by actual               
sensation-processes4  ,sleeping and     
waking and the experiences of dream-life
 are likewise due to changes in the     
functioning of the common sense-organ1  
brought about partly by fatigue in the  
superficial sense-organs1 partly by     
qualitative changes in the blood and    
animal spirits caused by the processes  
of nutrition and digestion4 ,probably   
,aristotle's best scientific work in    
psychology is contained in the series of
 small essays in which this theory of   
memory and its imagery is worked out4   
7,aristotle's language about the common 
sensibles is1 of course1 the source of  
our expression common sense1 which1     
however1 has an entirely different      
meaning4  ,the shifting of sense has    
apparently been effected through        

,cicero's employment of the phrase      
sensus communis to mean tactful         
sympathy1 the feeling of fellowship with
 our kind on which the ,stoic           
philosophers laid so much stress47      
99,thought994--,though thinking is      
impossible except by the use of imagery1
 to think is not merely to possess      
trains of imagery1 or even to be aware  
of possessing them4  ,thinking means    
understanding the meaning of such mental
 imagery and arriving through the       
understanding at knowledge of the       
structure of the real world4  ,how this 
process of interpreting mental imagery  
and reaching valid truth is achieved    
with greater and greater success until  
it culminates in the apprehension of the
 supreme principles of philosophy we    
have seen in dealing with the           
,aristotelian theory of knowledge4      
,from the point of view of the physicist
 who is concerned with thinking simply  
as a type of natural process1 the       
relation of understanding to the mental 

imagery just described is analogous to  
that of sensation to sensible qualities4
  ,the objects which thinking apprehends
 are the universal types of relation by 
which the world of things is pervaded4  
,the process of thinking is one in which
 this system of universal relations is  
reproduced by way of idea in the mind of
 the thinker4  ,the understanding thus  
stands to its objects as matter to form4
  ,the process of getting actually to   
understand the world is one in which our
 thought or understanding steadily      
receives completer determination and    
form from its contemplation of reality4 
,in this sense1 the process is one in   
which the understanding may be said to  
be passive in knowledge4  ,it is passive
 because it is the subject which1 at    
every fresh stage in the progress to    
knowledge1 is being quite literally     
informed by the action of the real world
 through the sensation and imagery4     
,hence ,aristotle says that1 in order   
that the understanding may be correctly 

informed by its contact with its        
objects1 it must1 before the process    
begins1 have no determinate character of
 its own4  ,it must be simply a capacity
 for apprehending the types of          
interconnection4 ,what is called the    
intelligence--,i mean that with which   
the soul thinks and understands--is not 
an actual thing until it thinks4  7,this
 is meant to exclude any doctrine which 
credits the understanding with either   
furniture of its own such as innate     
ideas1 or a specific structure of its   
own4  ,if the results of our thinking   
arose partly from the structure of the  
world of objects and partly from        
inherent laws of the structure of mind1 
our thought at its best would not       
reproduce the universal forms or types  
of interconnection as they really are1  
but would distort them1 as the shapes of
 things are distorted when we see them  
through a lens of high refractive       
index47  ,thus1 though ,aristotle       
differs from the modern empiricists in  

holding that universals realty exist in 
things1 and are the links of connection 
between them1 he agrees with the        
empiricist that knowledge is not the    
resultant of a combination of facts on  
the one side and fundamental laws of the
 mind's working on the other4  ,at the  
outset the understanding has no         
structure2 it develops a structure for  
itself in the same process1 and to the  
same degree1 in which it apprehends the 
facts4  ,hence the understanding only is
 real in the actual process of          
understanding its objects1 and again in 
a sense the understanding and the things
 it understands are one4  ,only we must 
qualify this last statement by saying   
that it is only potentially that the    
understanding is the forms which it     
apprehends4  ,aristotle does not mean by
 this that such things as horses and    
oxen are thoughts or ideas4  ,by the    
things with which understanding is said 
to be one he means the forms which we   
apprehend when we actually understand   

the world or any part of it1 the truths 
of science4  ,his point then is that the
 actual thinking of these truths and the
 truths themselves do not exist apart   
from one another4  ,science does not    
mean certain things written down in a   
book2 it means a mind engaged in        
thinking and knowing things1 and of the 
mind itself1 considered out of its      
relation to the actual life of thinking 
the truths of science1 we can say no    
more than that it is a name for the fact
 that we are capable of achieving such  
thought4  99,the ,active                
,intelligence994--,so far ,aristotle's  
account of thought has been plain       
sailing4  ,thought has been considered  
as the final and highest development of 
the vital functions of the organism1 and
 hence as something inseparable from the
 lower functions of nutrition and       
sensitive life4 ,the existence of a     
thought which is not a function of a    
living body1 and which is not passive1  
has been absolutely excluded4 ,but at   

this point we are suddenly met by the   
most startling of all the               
inconsistencies between the naturalistic
 and the spiritualist strains in        
,aristotle's philosophy4  ,in a few     
broken lines he tells us that there is  
another sense of the word thought in    
which thought actually creates the      
truths it understands1 just as light may
 be said to make the colours which we   
see by its aid4  ,and this intelligence1
 he adds1 is separable from matter1 and 
impassive and unmixed1 being in its     
essential nature an activity4444  ,it   
has no intermission in its thinking4    
,it is only in separation from matter   
that it is fully itself1 and it alone is
 immortal and everlasting 444 while the 
passive intelligence is perishable and  
does not think at all1 apart from this4 
,the meaning of this is not made clear  
by ,aristotle himself1 and the          
interpretation was disputed even among  
the philosopher's personal disciples4   
,one important attempt to clear up the  

difficulty is that made by ,alexander of
 ,aphrodisias1 the greatest of the      
commentators on ,aristotle1 in the      
second century ,a4,d4  ,alexander said1 
as ,aristotle has not done1 that the    
active intelligence is numerically the  
same in all men1 and is identical with  
,god4 ,thus1 all that is specifically   
human in each of us is the passive      
intelligence or capacity for being      
enlightened by ,god's activity upon us4 
,the advantage of the view is1 that it  
removes the active intelligence         
altogether from the purview of          
psychology1 which then becomes a purely 
naturalistic science4  ,the great       
,arabian ,aristotelian1 ,averroes 7,ibn 
,roschd7 of ,cordova1 in the twelfth    
century1 went still further in the      
direction of naturalism4  ,since the    
active and passive intelligence can only
 be separated by a logical abstraction1 
he inferred that men1 speaking strictly1
 do not think at all2 there is only one 
and the same individual intelligence in 

the universe1 and all that we call our  
thinking is really not ours but ,god's4 
,the great ,christian scholastics of the
 following century in general read      
,aristotle through the eyes of          
,averroes1 the ,commentator1 as ,st4    
,thomas calls him1 ,averrois che il gran
 commento feo1 as ,dante says4 ,but     
their theology compelled them to disavow
 his doctrine of the active             
intelligence1 against which they could  
also bring1 as ,st4 ,thomas does1 the   
telling argument that ,aristotle could  
never have meant to say that there      
really is no such thing as human        
intelligence4  ,hence arose a third     
interpretation1 the ,thomist1 according 
to which the active intelligence is     
neither ,god nor the same for all men1  
but is the highest and most rational    
part of the individual human soul1 which
 has no bodily organ4                   
99,,chapter ,v99                        
99,,practical ,,philosophy99   ,hitherto
 we have been concerned with the        

speculative branches of knowledge1 we   
have now to turn to practice4 ,practice1
 too1 is an activity of thought1 but an 
activity which is never satisfied by the
 process of thinking itself4  ,in       
practice our thinking is always directed
 towards the production of some result  
other than true thought itself4 ,as in  
engineering it is not enough to find a  
solution of the problem how to build a  
bridge over a given river capable of    
sustaining a given strain1 so in        
directing our thought on the problems of
 human conduct and the organisation of  
society we aim at something more than   
the understanding of human life4  ,in   
the one case what we aim at is the      
construction of the bridge2 in the other
 it is the production of goodness in    
ourselves and our fellow-men1 and the   
establishment of right social relations 
in the state4  ,aristotle is careful to 
insist on this point throughout his     
whole treatment of moral and social     
problems4  ,the principal object of his 

lectures on conduct is not to tell his  
hearers what goodness is1 but to make   
them good1 and similarly it is quite    
plain that ,politics was intended as a  
text-book for legislators4  ,in close   
connection with this practical object   
stands his theory of the kind of truth  
which must be looked for in ethics and  
politics4  ,he warns us against         
expecting precepts which have the exact 
and universal rigidity of the truths of 
speculative science4  ,practical science
 has to do with the affairs of men's    
lives1 matters which are highly complex 
and variable1 in a word1 with what may  
be otherwise4  ,hence we must be content
 if we can lay down precepts which hold 
good in the main1 just as in medicine we
 do not expect to find directions which 
will effect a cure in all cases1 but are
 content with general directions which  
require to be adapted to special cases  
by the experience and judgment of the   
practitioner4  ,the object of practical 
science then is to formulate rules which

 will guide us in obtaining our various 
ends4  ,now when we consider these ends 
we see at once that some are subordinate
 to others4 ,the manufacture of         
small-arms may be the end at which their
 maker aims1 but it is to the military  
man a mere means to his end1 which is   
the effective use of them4 ,successful  
use of arms is again the end of the     
professional soldier1 but it is a mere  
means among others to the statesman4    
,further1 it is the military men who use
 the arms from whom the manufacturer has
 to take his directions as to the kind  
of arms that are wanted1 and again it is
 the statesman to whom the professional 
soldiers have to look for directions as 
to when and with what general objects in
 view they shall fight4  ,so the art    
which uses the things produced by       
another art is the superior and         
directing art2 the art which makes the  
things1 the inferior and subordinate    
art4  ,hence the supreme practical art  
is politics1 since it is the art which  

uses the products turned out by all     
other arts as means to its ends4  ,it is
 the business of politics1 the art of   
the statesman1 to prescribe to the      
practitioners of all other arts and     
professions the lines on which and the  
conditions under which they shall       
exercise their vocation with a view to  
securing the supreme practical end1 the 
well-being of the community4  ,among the
 other professions and arts which make  
the materials the statesman employs1 the
 profession of the educator stands      
foremost4  ,the statesman is bound to   
demand certain qualities of mind and    
character in the individual citizens4   
,the production of these mental and     
moral qualities must therefore be the   
work of the educator4  ,it thus becomes 
an important branch of politics to      
specify the kind of mental and moral    
qualities which a statesman should      
require the educator to produce in his  
pupils4  ,it is this branch of politics 
which ,aristotle discusses in his       

,ethics4 ,he never contemplates a study 
of the individual's good apart from     
politics1 the study of the good of the  
society4 ,what then is the good or the  
best kind of life for an individual     
member of society8  ,aristotle answers  
that as far as the mere name is         
concerned1 there is a general agreement 
to call the best life1 ,eudaimonia1     
,happiness4  ,but the real problem is   
one of fact4  ,what kind of life        
deserves to be called happiness8 ,plato 
had laid it down that the happy life    
must satisfy three conditions4  ,it must
 be desirable for its own sake1 it must 
be sufficient of itself to satisfy us1  
and it must be the life a wise man would
 prefer to any other4  ,the question is1
 ,what general formula can we find which
 will define the life which satisfies   
these conditions8  ,to find the answer  
we have to consider what ,plato and     
,aristotle call the work or function of 
man4  ,by the work of anything we mean  
what can only be done by it1 or by it   

better than by anything else4  ,thus the
 work of the eye is to see4  ,you cannot
 see with any other organ1 and when the 
eye does this work of seeing well you   
say it is a good eye4  ,so we may say of
 any living being that its work is to   
live1 and that it is a good being when  
it does this work of living efficiently4
 ,to do its own work efficiently is the 
excellence or virtue of the thing4  ,the
 excellence or virtue of a man will thus
 be to live efficiently1 but since life 
can be manifested at different levels1  
if we would know what man's work is we  
must ask whether there is not some form 
of life which can only be lived by man4 
,now the life which consists in merely  
feeding and growing belongs to all      
organisms and can be lived with equal   
vigour by them all4 ,there is1 however1 
a kind of life which can only be lived  
by man1 the life which consists in      
conscious direction of one's actions by 
a rule4 ,it is the work of man to live  
this kind of life1 and his happiness    

consists in living it efficiently and   
well4  ,so we may give as the definition
 of human well-being that it is an      
active life in accord with excellence1  
or if there are more forms of excellence
 than one1 in accord with the best and  
completest of them2 and we must add in a
 complete life to show that mere promise
 not crowned by performance does not    
suffice to entitle man's life to be     
called happy4  ,we can see that this    
definition satisfies ,plato's three     
conditions4  ,a vigorous and active     
living in a way which calls into play   
the specifically human capacities of man
 is desirable for its own sake1 and     
preferable to any other life which could
 be proposed to us4  ,it too is the only
 life which can permanently satisfy men1
 but we must add that if such a life is 
to be lived adequately certain          
advantages of fortune must be           
presupposed4 ,we cannot fully live a    
life of this kind if we are prevented   
from exercising our capacities by lack  

of means or health or friends and       
associates1 and even the calamities     
which arise in the course of events may 
be so crushing as to hinder a man1 for a
 time1 from putting forth his full      
powers4  ,these external good things are
 not constituents of happiness1 but     
merely necessary conditions of that     
exercise of our own capacities which is 
the happy life4  ,in our definition of  
the happy life we said that it was one  
of activity in accord with goodness or  
excellence1 and we left it an open      
question whether there are more kinds of
 such goodness than one4  ,on           
consideration we see that two kinds of  
goodness or excellence are required in  
living the happy life4 ,the happy life  
for man is a life of conscious following
 of a rule4  ,to live it well1 then1 you
 need to know what the right rule to    
follow is1 and you need also to follow  
it4  ,there are persons who deliberately
 follow a wrong rule of life--the       
wicked4 ,there are others who know what 

the right rule is but fail to follow it 
because their tempers and appetites are 
unruly--the morally weak4  ,to live the 
happy life1 then1 two sorts of goodness 
are required4  ,you must have a good    
judgment as to what the right rule is   
7or if you cannot find it out for       
yourself1 you must at least be able to  
recognise it when it is laid down by    
some one else1 the teacher or lawgiver71
 and you must have your appetites1      
feelings1 and emotions generally so     
trained that they obey the rule4  ,hence
 excellence1 goodness1 or virtue is     
divided into goodness of intellect and  
goodness of character 7moral goodness71 
the word character being used for the   
complex of tempers1 feelings1 and the   
affective side of human nature          
generally4  ,in education goodness of   
character has to be produced by training
 and discipline before goodness of      
intellect can be imparted4  ,the young  
generally have to be trained to obey the
 right rule before they can see for     

themselves that it is the right rule1   
and if a man's tempers and passions are 
not first schooled into actual obedience
 to the rule he will in most cases never
 see that it is the right rule at all4  
,hence ,aristotle next goes on to       
discuss the general character of the    
kind of goodness he calls goodness of   
character1 the right state of the       
feelings and passions4  ,the first step 
towards understanding what goodness of  
character is is to consider the way in  
which it is actually produced4  ,we are 
not born with this goodness of tempers  
and feelings ready made1 nor yet do we  
obtain it by theoretical instruction2 it
 is a result of a training and          
discipline of the feelings and impulses4
  ,the possibility of such a training is
 due to the fact that feelings and      
impulses are rational capacities1 and a 
rational capacity can be developed into 
either of two contrasted activities     
according to the training it receives4  
,you cannot train stones to fall        

upwards1 but you can train a hot temper 
to display itself either in the form of 
righteous resentment of wrong-doing or  
in that of violent defiance of all      
authority4  ,our natural emotions and   
impulses are in themselves neither good 
nor bad2 they are the raw material out  
of which training makes good or bad     
character according to the direction it 
gives to them4  ,the effect of training 
is to convert the indeterminate tendency
 into a fixed habit4  ,we may say1 then1
 that moral goodness is a fixed state of
 the soul produced by habituation4  ,by 
being trained in habits of endurance1   
self-mastery1 and fair dealing1 we      
acquire the kind of character to which  
it is pleasing to act bravely1          
continently1 and fairly1 and            
disagreeable to act unfairly1           
profligately1 or like a coward4 ,when   
habituation has brought about this      
result the moral excellences in question
 have become part of our inmost self and
 we are in full possession of goodness  

of character4  ,in a word1 it is by     
repeated doing of right acts that we    
acquire the right kind of character4    
,but what general characteristics       
distinguish right acts and right habits 
from wrong ones8  ,aristotle is guided  
in answering the question by an analogy 
which is really at the bottom of all    
,greek thinking on morality4 ,the       
thought is that goodness is in the soul 
what health and fitness are in the body1
 and that the preceptor is for the soul 
what the physician or the trainer is for
 the body4  ,now it was a well-known    
medical theory1 favoured by both ,plato 
and ,aristotle1 that health in the body 
means a condition of balance or         
equilibration among the elements of     
which it is composed4  ,when the hot and
 the cold1 the moist and the dry in the 
composition of the human frame exactly  
balance one another1 the body is in     
perfect health4  ,hence the object of   
the regimen of the physician or the     
trainer is to produce and maintain a    

proper balance or proportion between the
 ingredients of the body4  ,any course  
which disturbs this balance is injurious
 to health and strength4 ,you damage    
your health if you take too much food or
 exercise1 and also if you take too     
little4 ,the same thing is true of      
health in the soul4  ,our soul's health 
may be injured by allowing too much or  
too little play to any of our natural   
impulses or feelings4  ,we may lay it   
down1 then1 that the kind of training   
which gives rise to a good habit is     
training in the avoidance of the        
opposite errors of the too much and the 
too little4  ,and since the effect of   
training is to produce habits which     
issue in the spontaneous performance of 
the same kind of acts by which the      
habits were acquired1 we may say not    
merely that goodness of character is    
produced by acts which exhibit a proper 
balance or mean1 but that it is a       
settled habit of acting so as to exhibit
 the same balance or proportion4 ,hence 

the formal definition of goodness of    
character is that it is a settled       
condition of the soul which wills or    
chooses the mean relatively to          
ourselves1 this mean being determined by
 a rule or whatever we like to call that
 by which the wise man determines it4   
,there are several points in this       
definition of the mean upon which moral 
virtue depends of which we must take    
note unless we are to misunderstand     
,aristotle seriously4  ,to begin with1  
the definition expressly says that moral
 goodness is a state of will or choice4 
,thus it is not enough that one should  
follow the rule of the mean outwardly in
 one's actions2 one's personal will must
 be regulated by it4  ,goodness of      
character is inward2 it is not merely   
outward4  ,next we must not suppose that
 ,aristotle means that the just enough  
is the same for all our feelings1 that  
every impulse has a moral right to the  
same authority in shaping our conduct as
 any other4  ,how much or how little is 

the just enough in connection with a    
given spring of action is one of the    
things which the wise man's rule has to 
determine1 just as the wise physician's 
rule may determine that a very little   
quantity is the just enough in the case 
of some articles of diet or curative    
drugs1 while in the case of others the  
just enough may be a considerable       
amount4  ,also the right mean is not the
 same for every one4  ,what we have to  
attain is the mean relatively to        
ourselves1 and this will be different   
for persons of different constitutions  
and in different conditions4  ,it is    
this relativity of the just enough to   
the individual's personality and        
circumstances which makes it impossible 
to lay down precise rules of conduct    
applicable alike to everybody1 and      
renders the practical attainment of     
goodness so hard4  ,it is my duty to    
spend some part of my income in buying  
books on philosophy1 but no general rule
 will tell me what percentage of my     

income is the right amount for me to    
spend in this way4  ,that depends on a  
host of considerations1 such as the     
excess of my income above my necessary  
expenses and the like4  ,or again1 the  
just enough may vary with the same man  
according to the circumstances of the   
particular case4 ,no rule of thumb      
application of a formula will decide    
such problems4 ,hence ,aristotle insists
 that the right mean in the individual  
case has always to be determined by     
immediate insight4  ,this is precisely  
why goodness of intellect needs to be   
added to goodness of character4  ,his   
meaning is well brought out by an       
illustration which ,i borrow from       
,professor ,burnet4 ,on a given occasion
 there will be a temperature which is   
just right for my morning bath4  ,if the
 bath is hotter than this1 it will be   
too hot2 if it is colder1 it will be too
 cold4  ,but as this just right         
temperature varies with the condition of
 my body1 it cannot be ascertained by   

simply using a thermometer4 ,if ,i am in
 good general health ,i shall1 however1 
know by the feel of the water when the  
temperature is right4  ,so if ,i am in  
good moral health ,i shall know1 without
 appealing to a formal code of maxims1  
what is the right degree1 e4g4 of       
indignation to show in a given case1 how
 it should be shown and towards whom4   
,thus we see why ,aristotle demands     
goodness of character as a preliminary  
condition of goodness of intellect or   
judgment in moral matters4  ,finally1 if
 we ask by what rule the mean is        
determined1 the answer will be that the 
rule is the judgment of the legislator  
who determines what is the right mean by
 his knowledge of the conditions on     
which the well-being of the community   
depends4  ,he then embodies his insight 
in the laws which he makes and the      
regulations he imposes on the educators 
of youth4  ,the final aim of education  
in goodness is to make our immediate    
judgment as to what is right coincide   

with the spirit of a wise legislation4  
,the introduction of the reference to   
will or choice into the definition of   
goodness of character leads ,aristotle  
to consider the relation of will to     
conduct4  ,his main object is to escape 
the paradoxical doctrine which          
superficial students might derive from  
the works of ,plato1 that wrong-doing is
 always well-meaning ignorance4         
,aristotle's point is that it is the    
condition of will revealed by men's acts
 which is the real object of our        
approval or blame4  ,this is because in 
voluntary action the man himself is the 
efficient cause of his act4  ,hence the 
law recognises only two grounds on which
 a man may plead1 that he is not        
answerable for what he does4  7#a7      
,actual physical compulsion by force    
majeure4  7#b7 ,ignorance1 not due to   
the man's own previous negligence1 of   
some circumstances material to the      
issue4  ,when either of these pleas can 
be made with truth the man does not     

really contribute by his choice to the  
resulting act1 and therefore is not     
really its cause4 ,but a plea of        
ignorance of the general laws of        
morality does not excuse4  ,i cannot    
escape responsibility for a murder by   
pleading that ,i did not know that      
murder is wrong4  ,such a plea does not 
exempt me from having been the cause of 
the murder2 it only shows that my moral 
principles are depraved4  ,more         
precisely will is a process which has   
both an intellectual and an appetitive  
element4  ,the appetitive element is our
 wish for some result4 ,the intellectual
 factor is the calculation of the steps 
by which that result may be obtained4   
,when we wish for the result we begin to
 consider how it might be brought about1
 and we continue our analysis until we  
find that the chain of conditions       
requisite may be started by the         
performance of some act now in our power
 to do4  ,will may thus be defined as   
the deliberate appetition of something  

within our power1 and the very          
definition shows that our choice is an  
efficient cause of the acts we choose to
 do4  ,this is why we rightly regard men
 as responsible or answerable for their 
acts of choice1 good and bad alike4     
,from the analysis of goodness of       
character1 we proceed to that of        
goodness of intellect4  ,the important  
point is to decide which of all the     
forms of goodness of intellect is that  
which must be combined with goodness of 
character to make a man fit to be a     
citizen of the state4 ,it must be a kind
 of intellectual excellence which makes 
a man see what the right rule by which  
the mean is determined is4  ,now when we
 come to consider the different         
excellences of intellect we find that   
they all fall under one of two heads1   
theoretical or speculative wisdom and   
practical wisdom4  ,theoretical wisdom  
is contained in the sciences which give 
us universal truths about the fixed and 
unalterable relations of the things in  

the universe1 or1 as we should say1     
which teach us the laws of ,nature4     
,its method is syllogism1 the function  
of which is to make us see how the more 
complex truths are implied in simpler   
principles4  ,practical wisdom is       
intelligence as employed in controlling 
and directing human life to the         
production of the happy life for a      
community1 and it is this form of       
intellectual excellence which we require
 of the statesman4  ,it is required of  
him not only that he should know in     
general what things are good for man1   
but also that he should be able to judge
 correctly that in given circumstances  
such and such an act is the one which   
will secure the good4  ,he must not only
 know the right rule itself1 which      
corresponds to the major premiss of     
syllogism in theoretical science1 but he
 must understand the character of       
particular acts so as to see that they  
fall under the right rule4  ,thus the   
method of practical wisdom will be      

analogous to that of theoretical wisdom4
  ,in both cases what we have to do is  
to see that certain special facts are   
cases of a general law or rule4  ,hence 
,aristotle calls the method of practical
 wisdom the practical syllogism or      
syllogism of action1 since its          
peculiarity is that what issues from the
 putting together of the premisses is   
not an assertion but the performance of 
an act4  ,in the syllogism of action1   
the conclusion1 that is to say1 the     
performance of a given act1 just as in  
the syllogism of theory1 is connected   
with the rule given in the major premiss
 by a statement of fact2 thus e4g4 the  
performance of a specific act such as   
the writing of this book is connected   
with the general rule what helps to     
spread knowledge ought to be done by the
 conviction that the writing of this    
book helps to spread knowledge4  ,our   
perception of such a fact is like a     
sense-perception in its directness and  
immediacy4  ,we see therefore that the  

kind of intellectual excellence which   
the statesman must possess embraces at  
once a right conception of the general  
character of the life which is best for 
man1 because it calls into play his     
specific capacities as a human being1   
and also a sound judgment in virtue of  
which he sees correctly that particular 
acts are expressions of this good for   
man4 ,this1 then1 is what we mean by    
practical wisdom4  ,so far1 then1 it    
would seem that the best life for man is
 just the life of co-operation in the   
life of the state1 which man1 being the 
only political animal or animal capable 
of life in a state1 has as his peculiar 
work1 and as if the end of all moral    
education should be to make us good and 
efficient citizens4 ,but in the ,ethics1
 as elsewhere1 the end of ,aristotle's  
argument has a way of forgetting the    
beginning4 ,we find that there is after 
all a still higher life open to man than
 that of public affairs4  ,affairs and  
business of all kinds are only          

undertaken as means to getting leisure1 
just as civilised men go to war1 not for
 the love of war itself1 but to secure  
peace4 ,the highest aim of life1 then1  
is not the carrying on of political     
business for its own sake1 but the      
worthy and noble employment of leisure1 
the periods in which we are our own     
masters4 ,it has the advantage that it  
depends more purely on ourselves and our
 own internal resources than any other  
life of which we know1 for it needs very
 little equipment with external goods as
 compared with any form of the life of  
action4  ,it calls into play the very   
highest of our own capacities as        
intelligent beings1 and for that very   
reason the active living of it is       
attended with the purest of all         
pleasures4  ,in it1 moreover1 we enter  
at intervals and for a little while1 so 
far as the conditions of our mundane    
existence allow1 into the life which    
,god enjoys through an unbroken         
eternity4  ,thus we reach the curious   

paradox that while the life of          
contemplation is said to be that of our 
truest self1 it is also maintained that 
this highest and happiest life is one   
which we live1 not in respect of being  
human1 but in respect of having a divine
 something in us4 ,when we ask what this
 life of contemplation includes1 we see 
from references in the ,politics that it
 includes the genuinely aesthetic       
appreciation of good literature and     
music and pictorial and plastic art1 but
 there can be no doubt that what bulks  
most largely in ,aristotle's mind is the
 active pursuit of science for its own  
sake1 particularly of such studies as   
,first ,philosophy and ,physics1 which  
deal with the fundamental structure of  
the universe4 ,aristotle thus definitely
 ends by placing the life of the scholar
 and the student on the very summit of  
felicity4  ,it is from this doctrine    
that mediaeval ,christianity derives its
 opposition between the vita            
contemplativa and vita activa and its   

preference for the former1 though in the
 mediaeval mind the contemplative life  
has come to mean generally a kind of    
brooding over theological speculations  
and of absorption in mystical ecstasy   
very foreign to the spirit of           
,aristotle4  ,the types by which the    
contrast of the two lives is            
illustrated1 ,rachael and ,leah1 ,mary  
and ,martha1 are familiar to all readers
 of ,christian literature4  ,the ,theory
 of the ,state4--,man is by nature a    
political animal1 a being who can only  
develop his capacities by sharing in the
 life of a community4  ,hence ,aristotle
 definitely rejects the view that the   
state or society is a mere creature of  
convention or agreement1 an institution 
made by compact between individuals for 
certain special ends1 not growing       
naturally out of the universal demands  
and aspirations of humanity4  ,mankind1 
he urges1 have never existed at all as  
isolated individuals4  ,some rudimentary
 form of social organisation is to be   

found wherever men are to be found4     
,the actual stages in the development of
 social organisation have been          
three--the family1 the village          
community1 the city state4  ,in the very
 rudest forms of social life known to   
us1 the patriarchal family1 not the     
individual1 is the social unit4  ,men   
lived at first in separate families     
under the control of the head of the    
family4  ,now a family is made up in its
 simplest form of at least three        
persons1 a man1 his wife1 and a servant 
or slave to do the hard work1 though    
very poor men often have to replace the 
servant by an ox as the drudge of all   
work4  ,children when they come swell   
the number1 and thus we see the         
beginnings of complex social relations  
of subordination in the family itself4  
,it involves three such distinct        
relations1 that of husband and wife1    
that of parent and child1 that of master
 and man4  ,the family passes into the  
village community1 partly by the        

tendency of several families of common  
descent to remain together under the    
direction of the oldest male member of  
the group1 partly by the association of 
a number of distinct families for       
purposes of mutual help and protection  
against common dangers4  ,neither of    
these forms of association1 however1    
makes adequate provision for the most   
permanent needs of human nature4        
,complete security for a permanent      
supply of material necessaries and      
adequate protection only come when a    
number of such scattered communities    
pool their resources1 and surround      
themselves with a city wall4 ,the city  
state1 which has come into being in this
 way1 proves adequate to provide from   
its own internal resources for all the  
spiritual as well as the material needs 
of its members4  ,hence the independent 
city state does not grow as civilisation
 advances into any higher form of       
organisation1 as the family and village 
grew into it4  ,it is the end1 the last 

word of social progress4 ,it is amazing 
to us that this piece of cheap          
conservatism should have been uttered at
 the very time when the system of       
independent city states had visibly     
broken down1 and a former pupil of      
,aristotle himself was founding a       
gigantic empire to take their place as  
the vehicle of civilisation4  ,the end  
for which the state exists is not merely
 its own self-perpetuation4  ,as we have
 seen1 ,aristotle assigns a higher value
 to the life of the student than to the 
life of practical affairs4  ,since it is
 only in the civilised state that the   
student can pursue his vocation1 the    
ultimate reason for which the state     
exists is to educate its citizens in    
such a way as shall fit them to make the
 noble use of leisure4  ,in the end the 
state itself is a means to the spiritual
 cultivation of its individual members4 
,this implies that the chosen few1 who  
have a vocation to make full use of the 
opportunities provided for leading this 

life of noble leisure1 are the real end 
for the sake of which society exists4   
,the other citizens who have no         
qualification for any life higher than  
that of business and affairs are making 
the most of themselves in devoting their
 lives to the conduct and maintenance of
 the organisation whose full advantages 
they are unequal to share in4  ,it is   
from this point of view also that       
,aristotle treats the social problem of 
the existence of a class whose whole    
life is spent in doing the hard work of 
society1 and thus setting the citizen   
body free to make the best use it can of
 leisure4  ,in the conditions of life in
 the ,greek world this class consisted  
mainly of slaves1 and thus the problem  
,aristotle has to face is the moral     
justifiability of slavery4  ,we must    
remember that he knew slavery only in   
its comparatively humane ,hellenic form4
 ,the slaves of whom he speaks were     
household servants and assistants in    
small businesses4  ,he had not before   

his eyes the system of enormous         
industries carried on by huge gangs of  
slaves under conditions of revolting    
degradation which disgraced the later   
,roman ,republic and the early ,roman   
,empire1 or the ,southern ,states of    
,north ,america4  ,his problems are in  
all essentials much the same as those   
which concern us to-day in connection   
with the social position of the classes 
who do the hard bodily work of the      
community4  ,much consideration is given
 in the ,politics to the classification 
of the different types of constitution  
possible for the city-state4  ,the      
current view was that there are three   
main types distinguished by the number  
of persons who form the sovereign       
political authority1 monarchy1 in which 
sovereign power belongs to a single     
person2 oligarchy1 in which it is in the
 hands of a select few2 democracy1 in   
which it is enjoyed by the whole body of
 the citizens4  ,aristotle observes1    
correctly1 that the really fundamental  

distinction between a ,greek oligarchy  
and a ,greek democracy was that the     
former was government by the propertied 
classes1 the latter government by the   
masses4  ,hence the watchword of        
democracy was always that all political 
rights should belong equally to all     
citizens1 that of oligarchy that a man's
 political status should be graded      
according to his stake in the country4  
,both ideals are1 according to him1     
equally mistaken1 since the real end of 
government1 which both overlook1 is the 
promotion of the good life4  ,in a state
 which recognises this ideal1 an        
aristocracy or government by the best1  
only the best men will possess the full 
rights of citizenship1 whether they are 
many or few4  ,there might even be a    
monarch at the head of such a state1 if 
it happened to contain some one man of  
outstanding intellectual and moral      
worth4  ,such a state should be the very
 opposite of a great imperial power4    
,it should1 that its cultivation may be 

the more intensive1 be as small as is   
compatible with complete independence of
 outside communities for its material   
and spiritual sustenance1 and its       
territory should only be large enough to
 provide its members with the permanent 
possibility of ample leisure1 so long as
 they are content with plain and frugal 
living4  ,though it ought not1 for      
military and other reasons1 to be cut   
off from communication with the sea1 the
 great military and commercial high road
 of the ,greek world1 it ought not to be
 near enough to the coast to run any    
risk of imperilling its moral           
cultivation by becoming a great         
emporium1 like the ,athens of ,pericles4
 ,in the organisation of the society    
care should be taken to exclude the     
agricultural and industrial population  
from full citizenship1 which carries    
with it the right to appoint and to be  
appointed as administrative magistrates4
  ,this is because these classes1 having
 no opportunity for the worthy          

employment of leisure1 cannot be trusted
 to administer the state for the high   
ends which it is its true function to   
further4  ,thus ,aristotle's political  
ideal is that of a small but leisured   
and highly cultivated aristocracy1      
without large fortunes or any remarkable
 differences in material wealth1 free   
from the spirit of adventure and        
enterprise1 pursuing the arts and       
sciences quietly while its material     
needs are supplied by the labour of a   
class excluded from citizenship1 kindly 
treated but without prospects4  ,weimar1
 in the days when ,thackeray knew it as 
a lad1 would apparently reproduce the   
ideal better than any other modern state
 one can think of4  ,the object of the  
,politics is1 however1 not merely to    
discuss the ideal state but to give     
practical advice to men who might be    
looking forward to actual political     
life1 and would therefore largely have  
to be content with making the best of   
existing institutions4  ,in the absence 

of the ideal aristocracy1 ,aristotle's  
preference is for what he calls ,polity 
or constitutional government1 a sort of 
compromise between oligarchy and        
democracy4 ,of course a practical       
statesman may have to work with a       
theoretically undesirable constitution1 
such as an oligarchy or an unqualified  
democracy4  ,but it is only in an ideal 
constitution that the education which   
makes its subject a good man1 in the    
philosopher's sense of the word1 will   
also make him a good citizen4  ,if the  
constitution is bad1 then the education 
best fitted to make a man loyal to it   
may have to be very different from that 
which you would choose to make him a    
good man4 ,the discussion of the kind of
 education desirable for the best kind  
of state1 in which to be a loyal citizen
 and to be a good man are the same      
thing1 is perhaps the most permanently  
valuable part of the ,politics4  ,though
 ,aristotle's writings on practical     
philosophy have been more read in modern

 times than any other part of his works1
 they are far from being his best and   
most thorough performances4  ,in no     
department of his thought is he quite so
 slavishly dependent on his master      
,plato as in the theory of the good for 
man and the character of moral          
excellence4  ,no ,aristotelian work is  
quite so commonplace in its handling of 
a vast subject as the ,politics4 ,in    
truth his interest in these social      
questions is not of the deepest4  ,he   
is1 in accordance with his view of the  
superiority of theoretical science1     
entirely devoid of the spirit of the    
social reformer4  ,what he really cares 
about is theology and physics1 and the  
fact that the objects of the educational
 regulations of the ,politics are all   
designed to encourage the study of these
 theoretical sciences1 makes this       
section of the ,politics still one of   
the most valuable expositions of the    
aims and requirements of a liberal      
education4  ,all education must be under

 public control1 and education must be  
universal and compulsory4  ,public      
control is necessary1 not merely to     
avoid educational anarchy1 but because  
it is a matter of importance to the     
community that its future citizens      
should be trained in the way which will 
make them most loyal to the constitution
 and the ends it is designed to         
subserve4  ,even in one of the bad types
 of state1 where the life which the     
constitution tends to foster is not the 
highest1 the legislator's business is to
 see that education is directed towards 
fostering the spirit of the             
constitution4  ,there is to be an       
atmosphere which impregnates the whole  
of the teaching1 and it is to be an     
atmosphere of public spirit4  ,the only 
advantage which ,aristotle sees in      
private education is that it allows of  
more modification of programme to meet  
the special needs of the individual     
pupil than a rigid state education which
 is to be the same for all4  ,the actual

 regulations which ,aristotle lays down 
are not very different from those of    
,plato4 ,both philosophers hold that    
primary education1 in the early years of
 life1 should aim partly at promoting   
bodily health and growth by a proper    
system of physical exercises1 partly at 
influencing character and giving a      
refined and elevated tone to the mind by
 the study of letters1 art1 and music4  
,both agree that this should be followed
 in the later teens by two or three     
years of specially rigorous systematic  
military training combined with a taste 
of actual service in the less exhausting
 and less dangerous parts of a soldier's
 duty4  ,it is only after this1 at about
 the age at which young men now take a  
university course1 that ,plato and      
,aristotle would have the serious       
scientific training of the intellect    
begun4  ,the ,politics leaves the       
subject just at the point where the     
young men are ready to undergo their    
special military training4  ,thus we do 

not know with certainty what scientific 
curriculum ,aristotle would have        
recommended1 though we may safely guess 
that it would have contained            
comparatively little pure mathematics1  
but a great deal of astronomy1          
cosmology1 and biology4  ,with respect  
to the primary education ,aristotle has 
a good deal to say4  ,as forcing is     
always injurious1 it should not be begun
 too soon4 ,for the first five years a  
child's life should be given up to      
healthy play4  ,great care must be taken
 that children are not allowed to be too
 much with servants1 from whom they may 
imbibe low tastes1 and that they are    
protected against any familiarity with  
indecency4  ,from five to seven a child 
may begin to make a first easy          
acquaintance with the life of the school
 by looking on at the lessons of its    
elders4  ,the real work of school       
education is to begin at seven and not  
before4  ,we next have to consider what 
should be the staple subjects of an     

education meant not for those who are to
 follow some particular calling1 but for
 all the full citizens of a state4      
,aristotle's view is that some useful   
subjects must1 of course1 be taught4    
,reading and writing1 for instance1 are 
useful for the discharge of the business
 of life1 though their commercial       
utility is not the highest value which  
they have for us4  ,but care must be    
taken that only those useful studies    
which are also liberal should be taught2
 illiberal or mechanical subjects must  
not have any place in the curriculum4   
,a liberal education means1 as the name 
shows1 one which will tend to make its  
recipient a free man1 and not a slave in
 body and soul4  ,the mechanical crafts 
were felt by ,aristotle to be illiberal 
because they leave a man no leisure to  
make the best of body and mind2 practice
 of them sets a stamp on the body and   
narrows the mind's outlook4  ,in        
principle then1 no study should form a  
subject of the universal curriculum if  

its only value is that it prepares a man
 for a profession followed as a means of
 making a living4 ,general education1   
all-round training which aims at the    
development of body and mind for its own
 sake1 must be kept free from the       
intrusion of everything which has a     
merely commercial value and tends to    
contract the mental vision4  ,it is the 
same principle which we rightly employ  
ourselves when we maintain that a       
university education ought not to       
include specialisation on merely        
technical or professional studies4 ,the 
useful subjects which have at the same  
time a higher value as contributing to  
the formation of taste and character and
 serving to elevate and refine the mind 
include1 besides reading and writing1   
which render great literature accessible
 to us1 bodily culture 7the true object 
of which is not merely to make the body 
strong and hardy1 but to develop the    
moral qualities of grace and courage71  
music1 and drawing4 ,aristotle holds    

that the real reason for making children
 learn music is 7#a7 that the artistic  
appreciation of really great music is   
one of the ways in which leisure may be 
worthily employed1 and to appreciate    
music rightly we must have some personal
 training in musical execution2 7#b7    
that all art1 and music in particular1  
has a direct influence on character4    
,plato and ,aristotle1 though they      
differ on certain points of detail1 are 
agreed that the influence of music on   
character1 for good or bad1 is enormous4
  ,music1 they say1 is the most         
imitative of all the arts4  ,the various
 rhythms1 times1 and scales imitate     
different tempers and emotional moods1  
and it is a fundamental law of our      
nature that we grow like what we take   
pleasure in seeing or having imitated or
 represented for us4 ,hence if we are   
early accustomed to take pleasure in the
 imitation of the manly1 resolute1 and  
orderly1 these qualities will in time   
become part of our own nature4  ,this is

 why right musical education is so      
important that ,plato declared that the 
revolutionary spirit always makes its   
first appearance in innovations on      
established musical form4  ,there is1   
however1 one important difference       
between the two philosophers which must 
be noted1 because it concerns           
,aristotle's chief contribution to the  
philosophy of fine art4  ,plato had in  
the ,republic proposed to expel florid1 
languishing1 or unduly exciting forms of
 music not only from the schoolroom1 but
 from life altogether1 on the ground of 
their unwholesome tendency to foster an 
unstable and morbid character in those  
who enjoy them4  ,for the same reason he
 had proposed the entire suppression of 
tragic drama4  ,aristotle has a theory  
which is directly aimed against this    
overstrained ,puritanism4 ,he holds that
 the exciting and sensational art which 
would be very bad as daily food may be  
very useful as an occasional medicine   
for the soul4  ,he would retain even the

 most sensational forms of music on     
account of what he calls their purgative
 value4  ,in the same spirit he asserts 
that the function of tragedy1 with its  
sensational representations of the      
calamities of its heroes1 is by the     
vehicle of fear and pity to purge our   
minds of those and similar emotions4    
,the explanation of the theory is to be 
sought in the literal sense of the      
medical term purgative4  ,according to  
the medical view which we have already  
found influencing his ethical doctrine1 
health consists in the maintenance of an
 equality between the various           
ingredients of the body4  ,every now and
 again it happens that there arise      
superfluous accretions of some one      
ingredient1 which are not carried away  
in the normal routine of bodily life4   
,these give rise to serious derangement 
of function and may permanently injure  
the working of the organism1 unless they
 are removed in time by a medicine which
 acts as a purge1 and clears the body of

 a superfluous accumulation4  ,the same 
thing also happens in the life of the   
soul4  ,so long as we are in good       
spiritual health our various feelings   
and emotional moods will be readily     
discharged in action1 in the course of  
our daily life4 ,but there is always the
 possibility of an excessive            
accumulation of emotional moods for     
which the routine of daily life does not
 provide an adequate discharge in       
action4  ,unless this tendency is       
checked we may contract dangerously     
morbid habits of soul4  ,thus we need   
some medicine for the soul against this 
danger1 which may be to it what a       
purgative is to the body4  ,now it was a
 well-known fact1 observed in connection
 with some of the more extravagant      
religious cults1 that persons suffering 
from an excess of religious frenzy might
 be cured homoeopathically1 so to say1  
by artificially arousing the very       
emotion in question by the use of       
exciting music4  ,aristotle extends the 

principle by suggesting that in the     
artificial excitement aroused by        
violently stimulating music or in the   
transports of sympathetic apprehension  
and pity with which we follow the       
disasters of the stage-hero1 we have a  
safe and ready means of ridding         
ourselves of morbid emotional strain    
which might otherwise have worked havoc 
with the efficient conduct of real life4
  ,the great value of this defence of   
the occasional employment of sensation  
as a medicine for the soul is obvious4  
,unhappily it would seem to have so     
dominated ,aristotle's thought on the   
functions of dramatic art as to blind   
him to what we are accustomed to think  
the nobler functions of tragedy4  ,no   
book has had a more curious fate than   
the little manual for intending         
composers of tragedies which is all that
 remains to us of ,aristotle's lectures 
on ,poetry4  ,this is not the place to  
tell the story of the way in which the  
great classical ,french playwrights1 who

 hopelessly misunderstood the meaning of
 ,aristotle's chief special directions1 
but quite correctly divined that his    
lectures were meant to be an actual     
,vade ,mecum for the dramatist1         
deliberately constructed their          
masterpieces in absolute submission to  
regulations for which they had no better
 reasons than that they had once been   
given magisterially by an ancient ,greek
 philosopher4  ,but it may be worth     
while to remark that the worth of       
,aristotle's account of tragedy as      
art-criticism has probably been vastly  
overrated4  ,from first to last the     
standpoint he assumes1 in his verdicts  
on the great tragic poets1 is that of   
the gallery4  ,what he insists on all   
through1 probably because he has the    
purgative effect of the play always in  
his mind1 is a well-woven plot with     
plenty of melodramatic surprise in the  
incidents and a thoroughly sensational  
culmination in a sense of unrelieved    
catastrophe over which the spectator can

 have a good cry1 and so get well purged
 of his superfluous emotion4  ,it is    
clear from his repeated allusions that  
the play he admired above all others was
 the ,king ,oedipus of ,sophocles1 but  
it is equally clear that he admired it  
not for the profound insight into human 
life and destiny or the deep sense of   
the mystery of things which some modern 
critics have found in it1 but because   
its plot is the best and most startling 
detective story ever devised1 and its   
finale a triumph of melodramatic horror4
                                        
99,,bibliography99   ,the ,english      
reader who wishes for further           
information about ,aristotle and his    
philosophy may be referred to any or all
 of the following works3--  ,e4         
,zeller4--,aristotle and the ,earlier   
,peripatetics4  ,english translation in 
#b vols4 by ,b4 ,f4 ,c4 ,costelloe and  
,j4 ,h4 ,muirhead4 ,london4 ,longmans   
,co4  99,e4 ,wallace4--,outlines of the 
,philosophy of ,aristotle4  ,cambridge  

,university ,press4  ,g4                
,grote4--,aristotle4  ,london4  ,john   
,murray4  99,w4 ,d4 ,ross4--,the ,works 
of ,aristotle translated into ,english1 
vol4 viii41 ,metaphysics4  ,oxford4     
,clarendon ,press4  99,a4 ,e4           
,taylor4--,aristotle on his             
,predecessor4  7,metaphysics1 ,bk4 ,i41 
translated with notes1 c47 ,chicago4    
,open ,court ,publishing ,co4  ,g4 ,d4  
,hicks4--,aristotle de ,anima 7,greek   
text1 ,english translation1             
,commentary74  ,cambridge ,university   
,press4  99,d4 ,p4 ,chase4--,the ,ethics
 of ,aristotle4  ,walter ,scott ,co4    
99,j4 ,burnet4--,aristotle on           
,education4  7,english translation of   
,ethics1 ,bks4 ,i4-,,iii4 #e1 ,x4 #f to 
end2 ,politics1 ,,viii4 #ag1 ,,viii47   
,cambridge ,university ,press4  99,b4   
,jowett4--,the ,politics of ,aristotle4 
,oxford4  ,clarendon ,press4  99,i4     
,bywater4--,aristotle on the ,art of    
,poetry4  7,greek ,text1 ,english       
,translation1 ,commentary47  ,oxford4   

,clarendon ,press4  ,j4 ,i4 ,beare and  
,w4 ,d4 ,ross4--,the ,works of          
,aristotle translated into ,english1    
,pt4 ,i4  7,parvu ,naturalia1 the minor 
psychological works47 ,oxford4          
,clarendon ,press4  ,j4 ,i4             
,beare4--,greek ,theories of ,elementary
 ,cognition from ,alemacon to           
,aristotle4  ,oxford4  ,clarendon       
,press4  ,the works marked by an        
asterisk will probably be found most    
useful for the beginner4  ,no works in  
foreign languages and no editions not   
accompanied by an ,english translation  
have been mentioned4  ,there is at      
present no satisfactory complete        
translation of ,aristotle into ,english4
  ,one1 of which two volumes have been  
mentioned above1 is in course of        
production at the ,clarendon ,press1    
,oxford1 under the editorship of ,j4 ,a4
 ,smith and ,w4 ,d4 ,ross4              
,printed by ,,ballantyne1 ,,hanson  ,co4
                            ,edinburgh  
,london                99      99       

99      99      99      99      99      
99                ,we have nothing but  
the highest praise for these            
little books1 and no one who examines   
them will have         anything         
else4--,westminster ,gazette1 #bbnd     
,june #aiab4                            
99,,the ,,people',s ,,books99           
99,,the ,,first ,,ninety ,,volumes99    
,the volumes issued are marked with an  
asterisk                                
99,,science99  #a4 ,the ,foundations of 
,science 4 4 4 ,by ,w4 ,c4 ,d4 ,whetham1
 ,m4,a41 ,f4,r4,s4 #b4 ,embryology--,the
 ,beginnings of ,life 4 4 4 ,by ,prof4  
,gerald ,leighton1 ,m4,d4 #c4 ,biology 4
 4 4 ,by ,prof4 ,w4 ,d4 ,henderson1     
,m4,a4 #d4 ,zoology3 ,the ,study of     
,animal ,life 4 4 4 ,by ,prof4 ,e4 ,w4  
,mac,bride1 ,m4,a41 ,f4,r4,s4 #e4       
,botany2 ,the ,modern ,study of ,plants 
4 4 4 ,by ,m4 ,c4 ,stopes1 ,d4,sc41     
,ph4,d41 ,f4,l4,s4 #g4 ,the ,structure  
of the ,earth 4 4 4 ,by ,prof4 ,t4 ,g4  
,bonney1 ,f4,r4,s4 #h4 ,evolution 4 4 4 

,by ,e4 ,s4 ,goodrich1 ,m4,a41 ,f4,r4,s4
 #aj4 ,heredity 4 4 4 ,by ,j4 ,a4 ,s4   
,watson1 ,b4,sc4 #aa4 ,inorganic        
,chemistry 4 4 4 ,by ,prof4 ,e4 ,c4 ,c4 
,baly1 ,f4,r4,s4 #ab4 ,organic          
,chemistry 4 4 4 ,by ,prof4 ,j4 ,b4     
,cohen1 ,b4,sc41 ,f4,r4,s4 #ac4 ,the    
,principles of ,electricity 4 4 4 ,by   
,norman ,k4 ,campbell1 ,m4,a4 #ad4      
,radiation 4 4 4 ,by ,p4 ,phillips1     
,d4,sc4 #ae4 ,the ,science of the ,stars
 4 4 4 ,by ,e4 ,w4 ,maunder1            
,f4,r4,a4,s4 #af4 ,the ,science of      
,light 4 4 4 ,by ,p4 ,phillips1 ,d4,sc4 
#ag4 ,weather ,science 4 4 4 ,by ,r4 ,g4
 ,k4 ,lempfert1 ,m4,a4 #ah4 ,hypnotism  
and ,self-,education 4 4 4 ,by ,a4 ,m4  
,hutchison1 ,m4,d4 #ai4 ,the ,baby3 ,a  
,mother's ,book 4 4 4 ,by a ,university 
,woman4 #bj4 ,youth and ,sex--,dangers  
and ,safeguards for ,boys and ,girls 4 4
 4 ,by ,mary ,scharlieb1 ,m4,d41 ,m4,s41
 and ,f4 ,arthur ,sibly1 ,m4,a41        
,,ll4,d4 #ba4 ,marriage and ,motherhood 
4 4 4 ,by ,h4 ,s4 ,davidson1 ,m4,b41    

,f4,r4,c4,s4,e4 #bb4 ,lord ,kelvin 4 4 4
 ,by ,a4 ,russell1 ,m4,a41 ,d4,sc41     
,m4,i4,e4,e4 #bc4 ,huxley 4 4 4 ,by     
,professor ,g4 ,leighton1 ,m4,d4 #bd4   
,sir ,william ,huggins and              
,spectroscopic ,astronomy 4 4 4 ,by ,e4 
,w4 ,maunder1 ,f4,r4,a4,s41 of the      
,royal ,observatory1 ,greenwich4 #fb4   
,practical ,astronomy 4 4 4 ,by ,h4     
,macpherson1 ,jr41 ,f4,r4,a4,s4 #fc4    
,aviation 4 4 4 ,by ,sydney ,f4 ,walker1
 ,r4,n4 #fd4 ,navigation 4 4 4 ,by      
,william ,hall1 ,r4,n41 ,b4,a4 #fe4     
,pond ,life 4 4 4 ,by ,e4 ,c4 ,ash1     
,m4,r4,a4,c4 #ff4 ,dietetics 4 4 4 ,by  
,alex4 ,bryce1 ,m4,d41 ,d4,p4,h4        
99,,philosophy ,,and ,,religion99  #be4 
,the ,meaning of ,philosophy 4 4 4 ,by  
,prof4 ,a4 ,e4 ,taylor1 ,m4,a41         
,f4,b4,a4 #bf4 ,henri ,bergson 4 4 4 ,by
 ,h4 ,wildon ,carr1 ,litt4,d4 #bg4      
,psychology 4 4 4 ,by ,h4 ,j4 ,watt1    
,m4,a41 ,ph4,d41 ,d4,phil4 #bh4 ,ethics 
4 4 4 ,by ,canon ,rashdall1 ,d4,litt41  
,f4,b4,a4 #bi4 ,kant's ,philosophy 4 4 4

 ,by ,a4 ,d4 ,lindsay1 ,m4,a4 #cj4 ,the 
,teaching of ,plato 4 4 4 ,by ,a4 ,d4   
,lindsay1 ,m4,a4 #fg4 ,aristotle 4 4 4  
,by ,prof4 ,a4 ,e4 ,taylor1 ,m4,a41     
,f4,b4,a4 #fh4 ,friedrich ,nietzsche 4 4
 4 ,by ,m4 ,a4 ,muegge4 #fi4 ,eucken3 ,a
 ,philosophy of ,life 4 4 4 ,by ,a4 ,j4 
,jones1 ,m4,a41 ,b4,sc41 ,ph4,d4 #gj4   
,the ,experimental ,psychology of       
,beauty 4 4 4 ,by ,c4 ,w4 ,valentine1   
,b4,a41 ,d4,phil4 #ga4 ,the ,problem of 
,truth 4 4 4 ,by ,h4 ,wildon ,carr1     
,litt4,d4 #ca4 ,buddhism 4 4 4 ,by      
,prof4 ,t4 ,w4 ,rhys ,davids1 ,m4,a41   
,f4,b4,a4 #cb4 ,roman ,catholicism 4 4 4
 ,by ,h4 ,b4 ,coxon4  ,preface1 ,mgr4   
,r4 ,h4 ,benson4 #cc4 ,the ,oxford      
,movement 4 4 4 ,by ,wilfrid ,ward4 #cd4
 ,the ,bible and ,criticism 4 4 4 ,by   
,w4 ,h4 ,bennett1 ,d4,d41 ,litt4,p41 and
 ,w4 ,f4 ,adeney1 ,d4,d4 #ce4 ,cardinal 
,newman 4 4 4 ,by ,wilfrid ,meynell4    
#gb4 ,the ,church of ,england 4 4 4 ,by 
,rev4 ,canon ,masterman4 #gc4           
,anglo-,catholicism 4 4 4 ,by ,a4 ,e4   

,manning ,foster4 #gd4 ,the ,free       
,churches 4 4 4 ,by ,rev4 ,edward       
,shillito1 ,m4,a4 #ge4 ,judaism 4 4 4   
,by ,ephraim ,levine1 ,m4,a4 #gf4       
,theosophy 4 4 4 ,by ,annie ,besant4    
99,,history99  #cf4 ,the ,growth of     
,freedom 4 4 4 ,by ,h4 ,w4 ,nevinson4   
#cg4 ,bismarck and the ,origin of the   
,german ,empire 4 4 4 ,by ,professor ,f4
 ,m4 ,powicke4 #ch4 ,oliver ,cromwell 4 
4 4 ,by ,hilda ,johnstone1 ,m4,a4 #ci4  
,mary ,queen of ,scots 4 4 4 ,by ,e4    
,o',neill1 ,m4,a4 #dj4 ,cecil ,john     
,rhodes1 #ahec-aijb 4 4 4 ,by ,ian ,d4  
,colvin4 #da4 ,julius ,caesar 4 4 4 ,by 
,hilary ,hardinge4 #db4 ,england in the 
,making 4 4 4 ,by ,prof4 ,f4 ,j4 ,c4    
,hearnshaw1 ,m4,a41 ,,ll4,d4 #dc4       
,england in the ,middle ,ages 4 4 4 ,by 
,e4 ,o',neill1 ,m4,a4 #dd4 ,the         
,monarchy and the ,people 4 4 4 ,by ,w4 
,t4 ,waugh1 ,m4,a4 #de4 ,the ,industrial
 ,revolution 4 4 4 ,by ,arthur ,jones1  
,m4,a4 #df4 ,empire and ,democracy 4 4 4
 ,by ,g4 ,s4 ,veitch1 ,m4,a41 ,litt4,d4 

#fa4 ,home ,rule 4 4 4 ,by ,l4 ,g4      
,redmond ,howard4  ,preface by ,robert  
,harcourt1 ,m4,p4 #gg4 ,nelson 4 4 4 ,by
 ,h4 ,w4 ,wilson4 #gh4 ,wellington and  
,waterloo 4 4 4 ,by ,major ,g4 ,w4      
,redway4                                
99,,social ,,and ,,economic99  #dg4     
,women's ,suffrage 4 4 4 ,by ,m4 ,g4    
,fawcett1 ,,ll4,d4 #dh4 ,the ,working of
 the ,british ,system of ,government    
to-day 4 4 4 ,by ,prof4 ,ramsay ,muir1  
,m4,a4 #di4 ,an ,introduction to        
,economic ,science 4 4 4 ,by ,prof ,h4  
,o4 ,meredith4 ,m4,a4 #ej4 ,socialism 4 
4 4 ,by ,b4 ,b4 ,kirkman1 ,b4,a4 #gi4   
,mediaeval ,socialism 4 4 4 ,by ,bede   
,jarrett1 ,o4,p41 ,m4,a4 #hj4           
,syndicalism 4 4 4 ,by ,j4 ,h4 ,harley1 
,m4,a4 #ha4 ,labour and ,wages 4 4 4 ,by
 ,h4 ,m4 ,hallsworth1 ,m4,a41 ,b4,sc4   
#hb4 ,co-operation 4 4 4 ,by ,joseph    
,clayton4 #hc4 ,insurance as a ,means of
 ,investment 4 4 4 ,by ,w4 ,a4          
,robertson1 ,f4,f4,a4                   
99,,letters99  #ea4 ,shakespeare 4 4 4  

,by ,prof4 ,c4 ,h4 ,herford1 ,litt4,d4  
#eb4 ,wordsworth 4 4 4 ,by ,rosaline    
,masson4 #ec4 ,pure ,gold--,a ,choice of
 ,lyrics and ,sonnets 4 4 4 by ,h4 ,c4  
,o',neill #ed4 ,francis ,bacon 4 4 4 ,by
 ,prof4 ,a4 ,r4 ,skemp1 ,m4,a4 #ee4 ,the
 ,brontes 4 4 4 ,by ,flora ,masson4 #ef4
 ,carlyle 4 4 4 ,by ,l4 ,mac,lean ,watt4
 #eg4 ,dante 4 4 4 ,by ,a4 ,g4 ,ferrers 
,howell4 #eh4 ,ruskin 4 4 4 ,by ,a4     
,blyth ,webster1 ,m4,a4 #ei4 ,common    
,faults in ,writing ,english 4 4 4 ,by  
,prof4 ,a4 ,r4 ,skemp1 ,m4,a4 #fj4 ,a   
,dictionary of ,synonyms 4 4 4 ,by      
,austin ,k4 ,gray1 ,b4,a4 #hd4 ,history 
of ,english ,literature 4 4 4 ,by ,a4   
,compton-,rickett4 #he4 ,a ,history of  
,english ,literature 4 4 4 ,by ,a4      
,compton-,rickett1 ,,ll4,d4 #hf4        
,browning 4 4 4 ,by ,prof4 ,a4 ,r4      
,skemp1 ,m4,a4 #hg4 ,charles ,lamb 4 4 4
 ,by ,flora ,masson4 #hh4 ,goethe 4 4 4 
,by ,prof4 ,c4 ,h4 ,herford1 ,litt4,d4  
#ij4 ,rousseau 4 4 4 ,by ,f4 ,b4        
,kirkman1 ,b4,a4 #ia4 ,ibsen 4 4 4 ,by  

,hilary ,hardinge4                      
,,london ,,and ,,edinburgh3 ,t4 ,c4  ,e4
 ,c4 ,,jack                      ,,new  
,,york3 ,,dodge ,,publishing ,,co4