,illustration3 ,immanuel ,kant          
99,,the ,,philosophy ,,of               
,,immanuel ,,kant99                     
,,by ,a4 ,d4 ,,lindsay1 ,m4,a4          
,,fellow ,,and ,,tutor ,,of ,,balliol   
,,college1 ,,oxford                     
,,london3 ,t4 ,c4  ,e4 ,c4 ,,jack1      
,,ltd4                  #ce             
,,paternoster ,,row1 ,e4,c41            
,,edinburgh                      ,,new  
,,york3 ,,dodge ,,publishing ,,co4      
99,,foreword99   ,there is a story that 
,schopenhauer used to begin his lectures
 on ,kant by saying3 ,let no one tell   
you what is contained in the ,critique  
of ,pure ,reason4  ,the writer of this  
little book hopes that no one will      
imagine that he has disregarded this    
warning4  ,there are no short-cuts to   
the understanding of a great            
philosopher1 and the only way to        
appreciate the greatness of a           
philosophic system is to study the      
philosopher's own writings4  ,all that  
the writer of a book like this can hope 

to do is to persuade others to undertake
 that study by interesting them in the  
problems with which it deals1 and by    
offering a few suggestions which may    
help to an understanding of it4  ,i have
 said nothing about the numerous other  
works which ,kant wrote4 ,for the three 
,critiques contain his system1 and the  
understanding of that is all-important4 
99,,contents99  ,,chap4  ,i4 ,,the      
,,idea ,,of ,,criticism  ,,ii4 ,,kant',s
 ,,statement ,,of ,,the ,,problem4      
,,synthetic ,a ,,priori ,,judgments     
,,iii4 ,,kant',s ,,idealism4  ,,time    
,,and ,,space  ,,iv4 ,,the ,,categories 
,,and ,,the ,,principles ,,of ,,pure    
,,understanding  ,v4 ,,the ,,antinomies 
,,and ,,criticism ,,of ,,the ,,proofs   
,,of ,,the ,,existence ,,of ,,god  ,,vi4
 ,,kant',s ,,moral ,,theory  ,,vii4     
,,the ,,critique ,,of ,,judgment        
,,bibliography                          
99,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,kant99      
99,,chapter ,i99                        
99,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,criticism99   ,it 

is a difficult matter1 says ,heine1 to  
write the life history of ,immanuel     
,kant1 for he had neither life nor      
history4  ,he lived a mechanically      
ordered1 abstract1 old bachelor kind of 
existence in a quiet1 retired alley in  
,koenigsberg1 an old town in the        
north-east corner of ,germany4  ,the    
times he lived in were stirring enough4 
,he was born in #agbd1 and died in      
#ahjd4  ,he lived through the ,seven    
,years' ,war that first made ,germany a 
nation1 he followed with sympathy the   
,united ,states ,war of ,independence1  
he saw the ,french ,revolution and the  
beginning of the career of ,napoleon4   
,yet in all his long life he never moved
 out of the province in which he was    
born1 and nothing was allowed to        
interrupt the steady course of his      
lecturing1 studying1 and writing4       
,getting up1 continues ,heine1 drinking 
coffee1 lecturing1 eating1 going for a  
walk1 everything had its fixed time2 and
 the neighbours knew that it must be    

exactly half-past four when ,immanuel   
,kant1 in his gray frock-coat1 with his 
,spanish cane in his hand1 stepped from 
his door and walked towards the little  
lime-tree avenue1 which is called after 
him the ,philosopher's ,walk4  ,strange 
contrast1 reflects ,heine1 between the  
man's outward life and his destructive1 
world-smashing thoughts4 ,as the        
political history of the eighteenth     
century came to an end when the ,french 
,revolution spilled over the borders of 
,france and drove ,napoleon up and down 
,europe1 breaking up the old political  
systems and inaugurating modern ,europe1
 so its opposing currents of thought    
were gathered together in the mind of a 
weak-chested1 half-invalid little man in
 ,koenigsberg1 and from their meeting a 
new era in philosophy began4  ,there are
 some philosophers to whom truth seems  
to come almost unsought1 as an immediate
 authoritative vision4  ,kant was not   
one of these4  ,his greatest work1 the  
,critique of ,pure ,reason1 was         

conceived when he was forty-eight1 and  
published in #agha1 when he was         
fifty-seven4  ,it was the outcome of    
half a lifetime's patient study and     
thought4  ,heine says of him3 ,he was   
the perfect type of the small           
shopkeeper4  ,nature had meant him to   
weigh coffee and sugar1 but fate willed 
that he should weigh other things and   
put a ,god on his scales1 and his       
weighing was exact4 ,the sneer is       
unjust1 but there is something in the   
simile2 for ,kant's philosophy was a    
kind of taking stock1 a survey of the   
great movement of thought from the time 
when the ,renaissance and the           
,reformation made thought free1 an      
attempt to estimate the achievements of 
the new sciences1 to deal with their    
conflicting claims and ideals and say   
what it all came to4  ,in ,kant modern  
science1 which began with ,descartes and
 ,galileo1 first became conscious of    
itself4  ,this taking stock ,kant called
 ,criticism4  ,his great books are all  

called ,critiques--the ,critique of     
,pure ,reason1 the ,critique of         
,practical ,reason1 the ,critique of    
,judgment4  ,he called his philosophy   
the ,critical ,philosophy or ,critical  
,idealism4  ,essential to an            
understanding of ,kant is an            
understanding of what he meant by       
criticism1 and why he opposes it to     
dogmatism and scepticism2 for the       
necessity and possibility of such a     
criticism was his great philosophical   
discovery4 ,we have called ,kant's work 
a survey of the achievements of the     
thought of his times1 but it was very   
much more than that1 and has a much more
 universal significance than could      
belong to any history of the thought of 
one epoch4  ,for these achievements of  
thought1 though great1 were conflicting 
and partial4 ,they contrasted with      
failure and barrenness in other         
directions1 and they seemed to be due to
 different methods4  ,this success of   
thought in one direction and its failure

 in another1 and this uncertainty about 
the true method of science1 were        
problems which at once presented        
themselves to an impartial observer1 and
 ,kant held that they could be answered 
only by taking stock of actual          
attainments1 and by criticism of the    
powers and range of human thought in    
general4  ,the problem that presented   
itself to him will be understood if we  
look for a moment at the history of     
thought in the seventeenth and          
eighteenth centuries4 ,one thing that   
,kant noted in it was the steady and    
sure progress of physics4  ,with the    
experiments of ,galileo and ,torricelli1
 he says in the preface to the second   
edition of the first ,critique1 a new   
light flashed on all students of nature4
  ,the continued success of physics     
meant the successful application of     
mathematics to the concrete world1 and  
along with it a remarkable development  
of mathematics itself4 ,this sudden     
success inspired men to feel that they  

had discovered a way of explaining the  
universe2 they contrasted the fertility 
of their new methods with the barrenness
 of scholastic speculation in morals and
 theology2 they felt confident that all 
that was wanted to the attainment of    
certain knowledge in all spheres of     
human interest was the extension of     
these methods4  ,if men would only set  
to work the right way1 they were sure   
that all difficulties would be overcome2
 and1 by reflection upon their own      
success1 they hoped to explain what the 
right way was4  ,unfortunately this was 
not easy1 for the advance from pure     
mathematics to physics1 from a study of 
the nature of pure mathematical         
conceptions to an inquiry into the laws 
of falling bodies1 implied a change     
whose nature was not clear to the men   
who had themselves made the advance4  ,a
 conflict arose between those who       
thought more of the fact that knowledge1
 to be certain1 must be capable of      
mathematical expression1 and those who  

thought more of the basis of experiment 
and observation on which the new        
sciences depended1 who remembered that  
these sciences began when ,galileo1     
instead of thinking in the abstract how 
bodies ought to fall1 dropped bodies of 
different weights from the top of the   
leaning tower of ,pisa and observed what
 actually happened4  ,descartes was the 
great representative of the first       
school4  ,he began by insisting on the  
difference between mathematical truth   
which could be1 as he said1 clearly and 
distinctly conceived1 and ordinary      
opinion about things which was full of  
guesswork and imagination4  ,scientific 
knowledge was possible1 he thought1 only
 by apprehending the real or primary    
qualities of things which were          
mathematical1 in contradistinction to   
their secondary qualities--their colour1
 smell1 c4--which were less real4       
,thence he came to think that the real  
world was mathematical in nature1 like a
 huge1 intricate geometrical figure4    

,the elements of mere fact1 in our      
present knowledge1 its dependence on    
observation and experiment1 he thought  
of as temporary defects which the       
progress of science would remove4 ,what 
we ordinarily call perception1 indeed1  
in the sense of awareness of things in  
time and space1 was described by        
,descartes' successors as confused      
thinking4  ,our knowledge of the world  
would1 it was hoped1 become a vast      
mathematical system1 all the detail and 
complexity of which would be rigorously 
deducible from a few central truths4    
,this general way of thinking was called
 ,rationalism4 ,kant ordinarily calls it
 ,dogmatism4  ,it was attacked by other 
scientists for its view of the nature of
 space and time4  ,no one who reflects  
at all can fail to distinguish a        
difference between the way in which we  
see the truth of a geometrical          
proposition--that1 e4g41 the three      
angles of a triangle are equal to two   
right angles--and the way in which we   

judge that such and such a figure drawn 
on a board is a triangle1 or make       
judgments about the way in which things 
are actually arranged in space or       
succeed in time4  ,judgments of the     
latter kind involve words like here and 
there1 now and then1 words which are all
 a kind of pointing4  ,it seems         
impossible from considering the nature  
of a triangle to deduce why any existing
 thing should be called triangular1 and 
all statements about the position of    
things in space and time seem to be     
derived not from a consideration of the 
general nature of space and time1 but   
from observation4  ,now the science     
which had made perhaps the most striking
 progress in the time we are speaking   
of1 physical astronomy1 involved any    
number of statements about the position 
of bodies in space4  ,the ,rationalist  
school admitted this1 but held that that
 was due to the fact that science was   
not sufficiently thought out4  ,in time1
 they hoped1 all statements about       

position in space would disappear4 ,to  
think of things in spatial order was to 
think confusedly4  ,newton1 on the other
 hand1 held that space could not be     
explained away1 that astronomy implied  
an absolute space in which things       
existed1 that the spatial relations of  
things could not be explained by the    
nature of the things themselves1 but    
only by a reference to absolute space in
 which they all were4 ,this meant that  
observation or perception was something 
of which you could not hope and should  
not wish to get rid1 and that an ideal  
of knowledge in which all applied       
mathematics should have been transmuted 
into pure mathematics was a vain one4   
,astronomy implied both mere observation
 and apprehension of necessary          
relations4  ,here was a science which   
seemed to employ both methods together4 
,galileo1 in fact could not have made   
his discovery without observation but   
men had observed bodies falling for ages
 without discovering the laws of motion4

  ,further1 the laws of motion1 once    
discovered1 made men in some degree     
independent of observation1 made them   
able to say of actual concrete things   
not only what had happened1 but what    
must happen4  ,such difficulties as     
these arose from reflection on the aims 
and methods of the mathematical         
sciences1 but there was much genuinely  
scientific inquiry in the seventeenth   
and eighteenth centuries1 which showed  
no signs of taking mathematical form2   
chemistry and biology1 for example1 were
 still almost entirely empirical4       
,furthermore1 thinkers were not         
concerned with science alone4  ,these   
centuries saw a great revival of        
interest in speculation on human        
affairs1 history1 politics1 morals and  
theology4  ,england1 which was the home 
of free discussion on questions of      
politics and morals1 and where1 more    
than in most other countries1 there was 
free discussion on theology1 became also
 the home of empiricism4  ,the empirical

 movement1 indeed1 drew much of its     
impetus from a reaction against ,hobbes1
 the only great ,english thinker who    
unhesitatingly applied the mechanical   
and deterministic assumptions of the new
 sciences to morals and politics1 and   
arrived by this uncompromising method at
 results so obviously repellent that no 
man of any sense could accept them1 and 
so consistently presented that they     
could not be refuted save by a          
refutation of the assumptions upon which
 they were founded4  ,such a refutation 
was1 in fact1 undertaken by ,locke1 the 
first great representative of the       
empirical school4  ,he was interested   
alike in the more obviously empirical   
sciences of chemistry and biology1 and  
in politics4  ,he was not a very        
consistent or systematic thinker1 but he
 had other gifts perhaps as valuable4   
,he was a man of great common sense and 
breadth of view1 and was able thereby to
 take a conspectus of the general       
situation in the various spheres of     

inquiry1 to notice the obvious          
differences in our knowledge of         
mathematics1 of chemical and biological 
fact1 and of theology1 and to see that  
these constituted a problem4  ,we find  
in him the first statement of the       
necessity of philosophical criticism4   
,it is contained in his account of the  
origin of the ,essay concerning ,human  
,understanding4  ,were it fit to trouble
 thee with the history of this ,essay1  
,i should tell thee that five or six    
friends1 meeting at my chamber1 and     
discoursing on a subject very remote    
from this 7they were discussing the     
principles of morality and revealed     
religion71 found themselves quickly at a
 stand1 by the difficulties that rose on
 every side4  ,after we had awhile      
puzzled ourselves1 without coming any   
nearer a resolution of those doubts     
which perplexed us1 it came into my     
thoughts that we took a wrong course2   
and that1 before we set ourselves upon  
inquiries of that nature1 it was        

necessary to examine our own abilities1 
and see what objects our understandings 
were1 or were not1 fitted to deal with4 
,we have here the same general starting 
point of inquiry as we shall afterwards 
find in ,kant4  ,there are certain1     
obstinate puzzles which we meet with in 
discussion which can only be solved by  
going back and inquiring into the nature
 of knowledge and the powers of our     
minds4 ,unfortunately1 as ,kant points  
out1 ,locke went the wrong way about his
 task4  ,he describes it as a plain     
historical inquiry4  ,he thought that he
 had only to look into his mind and see 
what was in it1 as he might open a door 
and look into a room4  ,the result is   
that he thinks of all knowledge as      
consisting simply in looking at what is 
present to the mind4  ,we can know1     
therefore1 whatever can be present to   
the mind1 and the limitations of        
knowledge are discovered by asking what 
can be so present to the mind4  ,the    
conclusions to which he comes as to     

different spheres of human inquiry are  
roughly these3 ,we can have knowledge of
 mathematics because there we are       
concerned only with ideas present to the
 mind1 and with noting their agreement  
and disagreement4  ,we can have no      
knowledge of such questions as the      
immortality of the soul1 or the nature  
of spirits1 for they are beyond our     
observation4  ,as regards existing      
things1 we can have knowledge of them1  
in so far as they are present to our    
minds1 and no further4  ,the meaning of 
present to the mind was never clearly   
analysed by ,locke2 but he meant1 for   
example1 that we can observe that an    
object which is yellow1 and which we    
call gold1 is also heavy1 and can be    
dissolved by ,aqua ,regia1 but we cannot
 say why that is so1 and we ought not1  
on ,locke's principles1 to have any     
ground for supposing that these         
qualities will go on co-existing4  ,the 
element of truth in ,locke's position is
 this4 ,when we are examining concrete  

things like pieces of gold or any       
chemical substance1 we find in them a   
number of varying qualities whose       
connection we cannot understand4  ,we do
 not know why a metal of a certain      
specific gravity should also be yellow2 
we can only note the fact4  ,hence in   
chemistry our method must be quite      
different from the method of            
mathematics4 ,in mathematics we start   
from the definition1 and we can         
understand the connection of the        
properties of a geometrical figure1 and 
see that they all follow necessarily    
from the definition4  ,but in sciences  
like chemistry a definition does not    
take us any further2 we can only find   
out the properties of a substance by    
observation and experiment4  ,locke     
explains this difference by saying that 
in the former case we are only concerned
 with agreement among our own ideas1 in 
the second place we are concerned       
somehow with things outside us4 ,this   
explanation will not stand4  ,it is not 

true that mathematics is simply analysis
 of an arbitrary definition1 as ,locke  
seems to suggest4  ,it involves         
construction1 or1 as ,kant calls it1    
synthesis4  ,it is a process of         
discovering new truths4  ,secondly1 our 
statements about concrete objects are   
not statements of qualities we see      
co-existing at the moment4  ,they are   
statements about all gold or all men2 in
 other words1 they are universal1 and   
,locke found it impossible to explain   
the universality of such                
propositions--what we mean1 e4g4 when we
 talk about the nature of gold or of    
man1 not of this gold or this man that  
,i see before me4 ,lastly1 this         
distinction of mathematics and the      
empirical sciences by a distinction of  
spheres does not allow1 as we saw1 for a
 science like astronomy1 which builds on
 mathematics and yet applies to the     
concrete world4  ,these difficulties    
were seen more clearly by ,hume1 at once
 the greatest and the most              

thorough-going of empiricists4  ,he cut 
the knot in regard to mathematics by    
asserting that geometry1 just because it
 has clearly an application to the      
existing world1 had no more certainty   
than any other empirical inquiry1 while 
arithmetic and algebra1 he agreed1 were 
certain1 but confined their application 
to the sphere of our own ideas4 ,both   
positions are almost obviously          
inconsistent with the facts4  ,in       
considering the nature of our judgments 
about concrete existences he raised a   
more profound problem4  ,all such       
judgments1 as he said1 imply the        
principle of causation1 or of what is   
called1 in modern times1 the principle  
of the uniformity of nature4  ,that     
principle we take with us in our        
investigation of the existing world4    
,yet1 as ,hume saw1 we do not observe   
causes2 we only observe succession and  
change4  ,we seem1 therefore1 to put    
into the world we see a necessity and   
uniformity which the observed facts do  

not warrant4  ,how is this to be        
explained8  ,hume's answer is ingenious4
  ,the principle of causation cannot be 
rationally justified1 and the necessary 
connection we predicate of changes in   
the outside world is not in the things2 
it is only a feeling in ourselves1 and  
is the result of custom4  ,after seeing 
the same succession several times1 we   
come somehow to feel differently about  
it1 and that feeling of difference we   
express by saying that we have before us
 an instance not of simple succession1  
but of cause and effect4  ,this is not  
the place to discuss the difficulties of
 ,hume's position2 it is enough to      
notice how entirely passive it makes the
 mind1 and how alien such an explanation
 is from the spirit of inquiry and      
discovery4 ,if cause is simply the      
effect of custom on the mind1 then the  
facts either produce that effect or they
 do not4  ,in neither case is there     
anything to find out4 ,but the          
scientist1 in investigating causes1     

however strongly he may hold that he has
 to observe the facts1 knows also that  
he has a problem to solve1 that he has  
to discover the right way to go about   
it1 must adopt some principle in dealing
 with the facts4 ,pure passivity will   
help him little4  ,hume's account of    
causation1 then1 is really a denial of  
even empirical science1 and yet it      
helped to make clear an important truth2
 for1 although we do not get the        
principle of causation from experience1 
we have to go to experience to discover 
causal laws4  ,we do not discover       
causation by analysing a cause and      
seeing that it is such that1 from its   
nature1 it must produce a certain       
effect4  ,all knowledge of causation    
goes back to observed succession1 though
 all cases of observed and even repeated
 succession are not cases of causation4 
,hume1 therefore1 was right in saying   
that where there could be no observed   
succession there could be no knowledge  
of causation4  ,both the rationalistic  

and the empirical explanations of       
science had failed1 the one because it  
could find no room for observation of   
facts1 the other because it could find  
no room for principles governing that   
observation2 and we shall see that ,kant
 started with a consciousness of this   
double failure4  ,he saw that ,hume's   
criticism of causation raised problems  
for which the rationalist had no answer1
 and yet that the position reached by   
,hume was incompatible with the         
existence of science4  ,the same failure
 of both rationalism and empiricism had 
become evident in another sphere--that  
of morals and religion4  ,the relation  
of philosophy to science is always      
twofold4  ,philosophy is partly         
concerned with analysing and reflecting 
on the methods of the different         
sciences1 partly with seeking to adjust 
the rival and conflicting claims of the 
two great departments of man's          
life--science and religion4  ,it might  
seem1 at first sight1 as though in      

morals and religion rationalism were the
 only possible method to be approved by 
philosophy1 for1 inasmuch as morals are 
concerned with what ought to be1 not    
with what is1 they cannot depend on     
observation1 but must be deduced from   
some principle above experience2 nor are
 objects of religion1 ,god and the soul1
 objects of observation4 ,no man can by 
searching find out ,god4  ,it was       
natural1 therefore1 that both on the    
,continent and in ,england morality and 
religion began by being rationalistic4  
,descartes believed that his            
mathematical method could be applied    
with success to demonstrate the truths  
of religion1 while ,locke includes      
morality along with mathematics among   
the a priori and certain sciences4  ,but
 the history of eighteenth century      
controversy showed that1 in spite of    
rationalist methods1 neither morality   
nor religion could attain that certainty
 and general agreement which marked the 
mathematical sciences4 ,spinoza1        

applying the same method as ,descartes1 
but with more consistency1 arrived at a 
conception of ,god which most of his    
contemporaries regarded as horrid       
atheism1 and the general result of      
rational theology is well described by  
one of ,kant's correspondents when he   
says that the more proofs of the        
existence of ,god he learnt1 the more   
his doubts increased4  ,in ,england the 
attempts made to found morality upon    
rationalist principles produced systems 
too barren to withstand the attack of   
empiricism fortified by the growing     
interest in history and anthropology4   
,the ,deist movement1 an attempt to free
 religion from the incrustations of     
faith and deduce it from pure reason1   
showed that a religion founded on pure  
reason contained nothing worth          
believing4  ,in ,hume we have the final 
discrediting of reason in these spheres4
  ,he shows ingeniously that the good   
,berkeley's argument for the existence  
of ,god could be turned round to        

disprove the existence of the soul1 and 
he concluded that religion was a sphere 
with which reason had no concern4  ,in  
the sphere of morals the distinction    
between what ought to be and what is1   
the distinction on which rationalistic  
morals are based1 had been discredited  
by a reduction of all conduct to        
,utilitarianism1 a search for pleasure  
and a flight from pain mediated by      
sympathy4  ,the consequences are        
described by ,kant in his preface to the
 ,critique of ,pure ,reason3 ,at        
present1 after everything has been      
tried1 so they say1 and tried in vain1  
there reign in philosophy weariness and 
complete indifferentism1 the mother of  
chaos and night in all sciences1 though 
he hopefully continues1 but at the same 
time the source1 or at least the        
prelude1 of their near reform and of a  
new light1 after an ill-applied study   
has rendered them dark1 confused1 and   
useless4  ,the earlier of the modern    
thinkers--,descartes among the          

rationalists1 and ,bacon among the      
empiricists--are full of hope4  ,they   
have confidence in the human spirit4    
,but increased reflection seemed only to
 bring distrust with it4  ,the history  
of rationalism in theology showed that1 
in such matters1 reason could prove     
absolutely opposing positions4  ,most   
men were ready to accept ,hume's dictum 
that any one who follows his reason must
 be a fool and take refuge in an        
indifferentism which accepts whatever   
happens to be there4  ,the remedy for   
this state of affairs1 ,kant finds1 is  
the critical method2 for disbelief in   
reason is the reaction from             
overconfidence in it4  ,men had thought 
that reason could prove everything4     
,because these hopes had been           
frustrated1 they now thought that it    
could prove nothing4 ,philosophy1 he was
 convinced1 would oscillate between     
overweening confidence and unwarranted  
distrust in itself until it had         
criticised human reason and discovered  

what it could do and what it could not4 
,this is the task he set before himself4
  ,as the failure of eighteenth century 
philosophy1 which had led to distrust of
 all philosophy1 had been               
twofold--failure to give an intelligible
 explanation of the processes of        
scientific thought1 and failure to find 
any standard by which to mediate between
 the conflicting claims of science and  
religion--the task of the critical      
philosophy is twofold4  ,it attempts to 
explain and to justify the methods and  
assumptions of the sciences1 and to find
 some solution of the conflict between  
theories of the world which seem to be  
based upon these methods and the        
assumptions and claims of morality and  
religion4                               
99,,chapter ,,ii99                      
99,,kant',s ,,statement ,,of ,,the      
,,problem4  ,,synthetic                 
,a ,,priori ,,judgments99   ,in the     
preface to the second edition of the    
,critique of ,pure ,reason ,kant finds  

the necessity of criticism in the       
contrast between certain rational       
sciences and metaphysics4  ,mathematics 
and physics1 he observes1 are obviously 
certain sciences4  ,they are not        
empirical1 they make steady progress1   
the results they have reached are secure
 and unanimously accepted1 and have a   
certainty which no mere empirical       
investigation could attain4             
,metaphysics1 on the other hand1 though 
as ancient an inquiry1 seems incapable  
of any settled results4  ,its history is
 a record1 not of steady progress1 but  
of bewildering marches and              
countermarches4  ,the confident         
conclusions of one philosopher are as   
confidently denied by another1 and the  
endless indecisive conflict produces in 
the minds of most men the conviction    
that in philosophy one doctrine is as   
good as another1 and therefore none are 
worth very much4 ,in the sphere where   
reason might be expected to be most at  
home1 reason is impotent2 yet the       

achievements of reason in those other   
spheres of the a priori sciences should 
preserve us from any general scepticism 
of the powers of reason4  ,the task of  
criticism will be to examine the part   
played by reason in science1 and to ask 
how far its failure in metaphysics is   
due to mistakes in method1 and how far  
to the different nature of the objects  
of the a priori sciences and of         
metaphysics4 ,kant points out that it   
was some time before either mathematics 
or physics followed the secure path of a
 science4  ,the contrast between the    
haphazard and empirical observations of 
the ,babylonians or ,egyptians and the  
science of the ,greeks was due to the   
discovery of a new method4  ,the        
discovery by ,galileo and ,torricelli of
 modern physics came about by a similar 
revolution in method4  ,the ,critique1  
therefore1 is to be a treatise on       
method4  ,it will examine the method of 
reason in the sciences1 and ask what    
conclusions can be drawn as to the      

proper method of metaphysics4  ,in the  
,prolegomena1 a work in which he        
summarises the results of the first     
,critique1 ,kant describes the ,critique
 as an answer to three questions3 ,how  
is mathematics possible8  ,how is pure  
science of nature or physics possible8  
and1 ,how is metaphysics possible8      
,something of the nature of his answer  
to the third1 and for him the most      
important1 question1 may be gathered    
from the fact that he explains that the 
third question should not be put in the 
form1 ,how is metaphysics as a science  
possible8  ,that question can only be   
answered by saying that it is not       
possible4  ,but it is still allowable   
and necessary to ask1 ,how is           
metaphysics possible as a natural       
disposition of the mind8 ,for the main  
result of his inquiries into the place  
of reason in the sciences is to show    
that reason is successful in the        
sciences only because of the presence of
 certain conditions which are wanting in

 metaphysics4 ,at first sight we might  
think it natural that the objects of    
metaphysics which ,kant enumerates as   
,god1 ,freedom1 and ,immortality should 
be understood by reason1 and find it    
more difficult to explain how reason    
should apply to the world of ordinary   
experience4  ,the knowledge of everyday 
things is thought of as empirical1 a    
matter of observation2 while we are     
inclined to think that1 if there is     
rational knowledge1 it is knowledge of  
something else1 of the mere agreement or
 disagreement of ideas 7as ,hume        
thought71 or of the essences of things1 
known independently and apart from      
perception1 as ,plato thought4  ,kant   
argues that the combination of a priori 
reasoning and empirical observation1    
which earlier thinkers had found so     
puzzling in the exact sciences1 exhibits
 the only possible use of reason1 that  
reason1 divorced from and with no       
reference to the world of experience1 is
 barren1 and that consequently          

metaphysics1 if that be taken to mean a 
rational knowledge of objects which are 
outside of our experience1 does not     
exist4  ,we are left with metaphysics as
 a natural disposition2 for ,kant holds 
that the questions which metaphysics    
seeks to answer arise from the nature of
 reason and its relation to experience1 
though their answer is to be sought not 
in knowledge but in action4  ,this last 
point must be elucidated later4  ,in the
 meantime we must see how this inquiry  
into the nature of reason crystalises   
itself into a seemingly abstract and    
trivial question3 ,how are synthetic a  
priori judgments possible8  ,it is      
baffling at first to find an inquiry of 
the scope we have indicated suddenly    
take such a narrow form1 but a little   
consideration will show the importance  
of the question4  ,knowledge may be     
regarded as either analysis or          
synthesis1 as a puzzling out or         
unravelling of what we somehow know     
already1 or as a putting together of    

what had previously been known or       
observed separately4  ,the rationalist  
school1 whom we described in the last   
chapter1 were inclined to regard all    
knowledge as analytical4  ,they thought 
of progress in knowledge as an advance  
from obscure to clear apprehension1 and 
as a thinking out or making clear of    
something which had always been known   
somehow4 ,mathematics1 the typical form 
of knowledge for the rationalists1 had  
been thought of as the analysis of what 
was implied or given in the definitions4
  ,the conception of analytic a priori  
knowledge was thus familiar and simple4 
,on the other hand1 the empiricists had 
thought of knowledge as primarily       
synthesis--or1 as they called it1       
association--a connecting together of   
ideas in their nature separate4         
,knowledge of a thing was thought of as 
the observing together of several ideas4
 ,judgments about objects were regarded 
as judgments about the co-existence of  
separate ideas1 ideas which were not    

thought of as being bound by any logical
 necessity4 ,we do not understand why a 
substance with the specific gravity of  
gold should be yellow2 we only observe  
the co-existence of certain qualities4  
,the judgment1 then1 gold is yellow1 is 
synthetic2 it is an assertion of the    
co-existence of separate qualities4  ,it
 is also empirical2 it does not express 
a reasoned insight into the necessary   
connection of gold and yellow4  ,it     
seems rather a record of observation4   
,synthetic knowledge1 then1 was thought 
of as in its nature empirical and a     
posteriori4  ,hume1 who thought of all  
knowledge of the world in experience as 
synthetic1 denied to such knowledge any 
necessity or certainty4  ,hume1 however1
 had noticed that the principle of      
causation1 the judgment that every event
 has a cause1 is both a priori and      
synthetic4  ,it is not1 he held1 derived
 from experience2 rather it is a        
principle which guides our investigation
 of experience4  ,it is not got from    

analysis of the notion of causation1 nor
 is it simply concerned with the        
agreement or disagreement of our ideas4 
,it asserts the necessary connection of 
two perfectly separate existing things4 
,hume himself1 as we saw1 tried to      
explain away these uncomfortable facts4 
,he was too wedded to his belief that   
all knowledge was derived from passively
 received impressions to face them      
rightly4  ,kant1 coming to the problem  
with different prepossessions1 with the 
belief that most knowledge was analytic1
 was impressed with ,hume's proof that  
the principle of causation could not be 
derived from analysis4  ,the very basis 
of all science of nature1 then1         
contradicted the belief that knowledge  
was analytical4  ,kant was also1 with   
,hume1 convinced that the principle of  
causation was not derived from          
experience1 for he saw that experience  
assumed it4  ,at the same time1 he was  
not prepared1 like ,hume1 to explain it 
away4  ,further1 he saw that the problem

 raised by the principle of causation   
was a wide one4 ,for other judgments1 he
 held1 are both synthetic and a priori1 
among them mathematical judgments4  ,as 
we shall see afterwards1 ,kant proved   
the impossibility of arriving at        
knowledge of ,god or the soul by mere   
analysis of concepts4  ,the judgments of
 metaphysics1 about ,god or the soul1   
are also synthetic4 ,but the validity of
 the judgments of metaphysics is under  
dispute4 ,if we examine the synthetic a 
priori judgments of mathematics and of  
science whose validity is certain1 we   
may then discover whether such judgments
 in metaphysics can or can not have     
similar certainty4  ,we may thus see    
that the problem of the possibility of  
synthetic a priori judgments is a       
restatement in logical terms of the     
problem of the relation between the a   
priori sciences and metaphysics4        
,something more must be said of the     
importance of synthetic a priori        
judgments in ,kant's account of         

knowledge4  ,their existence1 we have   
seen1 exposes the shortcomings of both  
rationalism1 which allowed only for     
analytic a priori judgments1 and        
empiricism1 which allowed only of       
synthetic a posteriori judgments4  ,both
 these theories tended to regard        
knowledge as an analysis or description 
of what was present to the mind1 and    
differed really only in their view of   
what was present4 ,for1 though the      
empiricist thought of empirical         
knowledge as synthesis1 the synthesis   
was not ascribed to the mind1 but to    
associating ideas2 the mind only        
observed1 and knowledge was merely the  
apprehension of objects by the senses4  
,we see what is before our eyes1 and    
notice the differences and similarities 
in what is before us4  ,the rationalist 
conceived of thought as simply          
apprehending the nature of the real1    
freed from the illusions of sense       
perception4  ,the mathematician has     
before his thought the nature of a      

triangle1 and sees intellectually what  
that nature implies4  ,we may try to    
mediate between the two by saying that  
while all knowing is observing1 some is 
observing of objects of thought and some
 of objects of sense1 the one being     
called understanding1 the other         
perception4  ,in most scientific        
judgments1 however1 we are not simply   
observing objects either of thought or  
of sense4  ,scientific judgments are    
more than descriptions of what is       
present to the mind or to the senses2   
they are essentially anticipations4     
,they go beyond what is immediately     
given4  ,this is shown by the fact that 
it is the characteristic of a scientific
 proposition that it can be verified4   
,if we understand it rightly1 we see    
that it implies that1 under             
such-and-such conditions1 such-and-such 
things will be experienced4  ,hence the 
importance of experiment to science4  ,a
 scientific proposition is1 of course1  
grounded on observation of perceived    

fact and understanding of universal     
connection1 but it is an assertion of   
something beyond that4  ,if1 then1 all  
scientific judgments are synthetic1 and 
if both rationalism and empiricism      
failed to account for the manner in     
which such judgments go beyond what is  
immediately given to the mind1 ought we 
not to say that the real problem for    
,kant is to show not merely how         
synthetic a priori judgments are        
possible1 but how any synthetic         
judgments are possible8  ,this seems at 
first sight plausible1 but the          
suggestion must be rejected2 for1 when  
,kant asks how a judgment is possible1  
he is not asking how we come to make it1
 but how we know that it is valid4      
,now1 if we consider any empirical      
judgment about the facts of nature1 we  
must recognise that ,locke and ,hume    
were right in denying certainty to such 
judgments4  ,in all general statements  
about concrete facts we to a certain    
extent go beyond our evidence4          

,empirical scientific statements are not
 theoretically certain4  ,they may1 of  
course1 be certain enough for all       
practical purposes4 ,they are reasonable
 expectations of what will happen1 but  
reasonable expectation is a very        
different thing from the certainty of   
mathematical insight4  ,now ,kant       
maintained that1 while such empirical   
judgments are not certain1 they all     
imply the certainty of a number of      
general principles on which they depend4
 ,these general principles are the      
synthetic a priori judgments with which 
he is especially concerned4  ,when we   
apply the principles of trigonometry to 
an engineering problem1 we know that our
 measurements are only approximate1 and 
that the result also will only be       
approximate2 but the possibility of     
arriving at such approximate results    
depends on the absolute truth of the    
trigonometrical principles1 and on the  
assumption that they express not simply 
the agreement or disagreement of ideas1 

but hold of the real4  ,when we apply   
the rules of arithmetic to counting     
objects1 there may be a certain         
arbitrariness in deciding on our unit4  
,there is no such arbitrariness in the  
rule4  ,all scientific judgments of     
causation are only approximately        
certain1 but they all imply the         
certainty of the principle of causation1
 and are based on the assumption that   
such a principle is of universal        
application4  ,this and the other       
principles assumed in our empirical     
judgments are1 then1 the synthetic      
judgments with which ,kant is concerned4
  ,now1 it is of the nature of our      
empirical knowledge that it is          
fragmentary and not uniform1 that we are
 concerned with an indefinite number of 
things whose connections we do not      
wholly understand1 and which we cannot  
therefore anticipate4  ,yet we assume   
that all these objects will obey the    
rules of arithmetic and geometry1 and   
will all be subject in their changes to 

the principle of causation4  ,on such   
assumptions all the sciences of applied 
mathematics depend4  ,how are they      
justifiable8  ,that is ,kant's question4
  ,kant1 when he considers mathematics1 
is concerned with the assumptions of    
applied mathematics1 of those sciences  
which1 though mathematical1 make        
statements about existing objects1 and  
in which the old distinction between    
understanding and perception which was  
based on the difference in the objects  
of these two faculties breaks down4     
,the sciences which ,kant is            
investigating imply that principles     
which are clearly not derived from mere 
observation are yet the basis on which  
we order and arrange what we observe4   
,now1 if we held that the objects of    
mathematics were independent entities   
quite separate from the things we       
perceive1 it would be impossible to     
explain how we might assume that the    
things we perceive would be subject to  
the rules of mathematics4  ,if1 on the  

other hand1 we held that in mathematics 
we were simply concerned with the       
various objects of the senses1 it would 
be impossible to explain how mathematics
 can have a generality and necessity    
which no statements can have which rest 
on observation of the various things we 
see4  ,the existence of applied         
mathematics implies firstly that        
understanding and perception are        
distinct1 and that neither of them can  
be reduced to the other1 for that would 
mean that we should have to give up     
either the element of observation and   
experiment or the element of necessity  
and a priority1 and secondly1 that      
understanding and perception are        
combined1 and must be combined for any  
advance in science4  ,now1 ,kant finds  
his answer to the problem he has raised 
by concentrating his attention on the   
fact that1 while understanding and      
perception are distinct1 they are both  
present in all knowledge4  ,his argument
 is that we are necessarily in a        

difficulty if we think of understanding 
and perception as having each its       
separate objects1 and then try to       
explain their combination4 ,if we begin 
with their combination1 we may see that 
the reference of principles of thought  
to objects of sense is not an accident1 
but that these principles of thought or 
of understanding1 as ,kant calls them1  
are only concerned with objects of      
sense1 and have no other meaning4  ,if  
we object1 ,but how can principles of   
thought be universal if they are        
concerned with the many and varying     
objects of sense8  ,kant's answer is    
that they are not concerned directly    
with these objects1 but with the        
conditions under which these objects can
 be understood4  ,they are therefore not
 statements about objects1 but          
statements of the conditions of possible
 experience4 ,if we find out that all   
perceiving and thinking imply certain   
conditions1 then we can affirm the      
validity of principles based upon these 

conditions1 so long as we do not try to 
apply the principles beyond our         
perceiving4  ,we may put the point in   
another way by asking by what right the 
mind can prescribe to or anticipate     
experience4  ,kant's answer is just in  
so far as we can determine the          
conditions under which alone objects can
 be known4  ,if that can be done1 we can
 say1 ,these principles will hold of    
objects in so far as they are known4    
,in the preface to the second edition of
 the ,critique of ,pure ,reason ,kant   
reverts to the discoveries of ,galileo  
and ,torricelli1 and points out that    
their success was due to their asking of
 nature the right question1 and the     
right question was that which reason    
could understand4 ,when ,galileo let    
balls of a particular weight1 which he  
had determined himself1 roll down an    
inclined plane1 or ,torricelli made the 
air carry a weight1 which he had        
previously determined to be equal to    
that of a definite volume of water1 a   

new light flashed on all students of    
nature4  ,they comprehended that reason 
has insight into that only which she    
herself produces on her own plan1 and   
that she must move forward with the     
principles of her judgments1 according  
to fixed law1 and compel nature to      
answer her questions1 but not let       
herself be led by nature1 as it were in 
leading-strings4 ,otherwise accidental  
observations1 made on no previously     
fixed plan1 will never converge towards 
a necessary law1 which is the only thing
 that reason seeks or requires4 ,reason1
 holding in one hand its principles1    
according to which alone concordant     
phenomena can be admitted as laws of    
nature1 and in the other the experiment 
which it has devised according to those 
principles1 must approach nature in     
order to be taught by it1 but not in the
 character of a pupil who agrees to     
everything the master likes1 but as an  
appointed judge1 who compels the        
witnesses to answer the questions which 

he himself proposes4  ,kant1 here1 is   
concerned with reason in its application
 to experience1 and he makes it clear   
that there is much in all such inquiries
 which cannot be anticipated a priori4  
,reason must approach nature in order to
 be taught by it4  ,the answer to the   
questions and experiments cannot be     
known beforehand4  ,the empirical       
element in science cannot be explained  
away4 ,reason dictates not the answer   
but the question1 and so far the form of
 the answer4  ,reason1 then1 it is      
suggested1 is concerned with the        
principles or conditions1 according to  
which we can understand things4 ,it is  
not a method of observing or analysing  
objects2 rather it states the methods   
and principles according to which       
objects must be observed if they are to 
be understood4  ,the principles are not 
statements about the nature of objects1 
but principles of the possibility of    
experience4  ,this new attitude to      
reason ,kant describes as the           

,copernican change in philosophy4  ,it  
constitutes ,kant's idealism4 ,its      
nature and importance we must examine in
 the next chapter4                      
99,,chapter ,,iii99                     
99,,kant',s ,,idealism4  ,,time ,,and   
,,space99   ,the great discovery which  
,kant considered he had made as to the  
nature of reason was that reason was not
 a method of observing objects as they  
really exist1 but was concerned directly
 only with our ways of understanding    
objects4  ,this discovery is the essence
 of ,kant's idealism1 and its main      
purport is expressed in the distinction 
,kant so often makes between things in  
themselves and phenomena4  ,this        
distinction is used as the key to the   
solution of all his difficulties4 ,but  
the doctrine it implies is very easy to 
misunderstand1 partly because idealism  
is generally used in a very different   
sense from that in which ,kant uses it1 
partly because ,kant's statement of the 
distinction between things in themselves

 and phenomena depended on a view of    
knowledge which he was very much        
concerned to refute1 but with which we  
are not now familiar4  ,if we are to    
understand ,kant's philosophy1 we must  
know what he means by idealism1 and     
wherein his idealism differs from that  
of his predecessors4  ,the word idealism
 is1 naturally1 contrasted with realism4
  ,it suggests an assertion that        
something is not real1 but only an idea4
  ,if we know it to be combined with a  
distinction between things in           
themselves1 and phenomena1 or           
appearances1 it seems to suggest that   
the objects of knowledge are somehow    
illusions1 or only appearances in the   
mind1 as contrasted with real things4   
,something like this had been held by   
,kant's predecessors4 ,for the          
fundamental principle of the idealism on
 which most of ,kant's predecessors had 
been agreed1 and which is sometimes     
called ,cartesian1 and sometimes        
subjective idealism1 is that the mind   

somehow knows itself and its own actions
 and states1 with more directness and   
certainty than it knows external        
objects4  ,the doctrine is commonly     
based upon a confused view of sense     
perception4  ,sense perception is       
obviously possible only through         
processes in the sensory organs1 and    
objects were thought of as producing    
impressions through the sensory organs  
in the brain1 and the mind as then      
becoming aware of them in the brain4    
,hence1 when ,locke says that the mind  
only knows its own ideas1 he tends to   
mean 7though the facts are sometimes too
 much for him and he is nobly           
inconsistent7 that the mind only knows  
objects inside the brain4  ,the main    
objection to this doctrine1 apart from  
the fact that it is based on a          
confusion1 is that it makes it quite    
inexplicable how the notion of an       
outside world ever arises4  ,for if we  
know1 and must eternally know1 only     
ideas inside our head1 why should we    

ever imagine that there an outside world
 exists4  ,yet if nothing outside us    
were observed--if we knew of no process 
which went on between outside objects   
and the brain1 the doctrine would have  
no basis on which to rest4  ,there      
cannot be any meaning in saying         
something is only an idea1 if we do not 
know what is real in the sense of its   
having an existence independent of our  
minds4  ,locke supposed that1 although  
we knew only ideas1 we could somehow    
refer from our ideas to an outside      
world4  ,for he thought that truth was  
concerned with the agreement of our     
ideas with reality4  ,this form of the  
doctrine1 the commonest1 is sometimes   
called ,representationism4  ,for it     
thinks of the mind as concerned with    
representations1 or pictures1 or images 
which it may compare with the real      
objects4  ,its futility is obvious      
enough4  ,we can only compare a picture 
with the thing it represents1 if we can 
know both4  ,if we can only know ideas1 

we can never know that they are only    
ideas1 and can never compare them with  
anything else4  ,this difficulty was    
seen by ,berkeley1 the most consistent  
of subjective idealists1 and led him to 
deny the existence of outside objects1  
and hold that existence or reality meant
 being perceived and nothing more4 ,but 
if we take ,berkeley's position1 it     
becomes very difficult to say what we   
mean by judgments being true4  ,if      
things only exist as we think of them1  
or perceive them1 or rather if they are 
only our thinking of or perceiving them1
 the question of the truth or falsity of
 our statements about them cannot arise4
  ,this idealism ,kant is careful to    
refute1 and he points out that there is 
no evidence for its fundamental         
proposition that we know our mind more  
directly than we know objects4  ,we are 
only conscious of ourselves in knowing  
something not ourselves4  ,we do not    
invent the notion of externality or     
outsideness in space from an experience 

in which it originally has no part4     
,externality is implied in our most     
simple experience4  ,we begin with      
consciousness of outside things1 and    
only become conscious of our own mental 
states or processes later4  ,but it is  
important to observe that1 the truth or 
falsity of subjective idealism has no   
bearing whatsoever on the question with 
which ,kant was concerned4 ,if ,i ask   
how ,i can lay down rules about what ,i 
have not yet experienced1 ,i am not in  
the least helped by being told that ,i  
only experience what is in my mind4 ,for
 the question will equally arise1 ,how  
do ,i know what is going to be in my    
mind8  ,the question idealism ordinarily
 discusses1 as to whether the objects of
 our awareness are in our mind or       
outside1 are in their nature mental and 
dependent on the mind or not1 is        
entirely and absolutely irrelevant to   
,kant's purposes4  ,but it is a fact1   
and one that has got to be explained    
that in judgment we go beyond what is   

present to our minds1 and that1 in so   
anticipating what we shall experience1  
we assume that certain principles hold  
of all that has been or may be present4 
,with that difficulty idealism1 as      
ordinarily understood1 has nothing to   
do4 ,representationism tried to give    
some account of this going beyond what  
is present to our minds by suggesting   
that truth is a reference from ideas to 
reality2 but1 as we saw1 if we know only
 ideas1 such a reference is impossible4 
,the doctrines opposed to               
representationism1 that only ideas      
exist1 or that we directly know real    
objects1 allow the existence of nothing 
contrasted with what we are apprehending
 to which a reference in judgment can be
 made4  ,no one who is satisfied with   
any of these positions can have seen    
,kant's problem4  ,if ,kant then1 is not
 a subjective idealist what does he mean
 by saying1 as he constantly does1 that 
we only know phenomena1 and why should  
that limitation of knowledge help him in

 any of his difficulties8  ,he means1 in
 the first place1 that all knowledge    
depends upon perception4  ,the first    
paragraph of the first part of the      
,critique of ,pure ,reason makes that   
clear4 ,whatever the process and the    
means may be by which knowledge reaches 
its objects1 there is one that reaches  
them directly and forms the ultimate    
material of all thought1 viz4           
perception4  ,this is possible only when
 the object is given1 and the object can
 be given only 7to human beings1 at     
least7 through a certain affection of   
the mind4  ,now1 although we perceive an
 objective reality1 sense perception    
obviously gives a very imperfect        
knowledge of objects4  ,we see only some
 sides and aspects of things1 and not   
others4  ,what we see depends on changes
 in our position4  ,further1 we know    
that what we see is only a small part of
 the nature of anything4 ,we think of   
reality as an interconnected system1 but
 we only perceive a very small part of  

it1 and what we perceive depends upon   
the particular time and the particular  
part of space in which we live4  ,in our
 experience we are never really content 
simply with what we perceive2 we        
perceive much too little for that4 ,we  
are always inferring from what we see to
 something beyond it4 ,what is that     
something beyond1 which1 as we have     
seen1 is implied in all judgment8  ,we  
might hold that it was the things as    
they really are as distinguished from   
things as they appear1 or phenomena1 and
 that1 when we turned from perception to
 thought1 we turned from illusion to    
reality4  ,kant denied this4 ,he held   
that1 if you examine a scientific       
judgment about anything you perceive1   
such as that yellow thing is gold1 you  
will find that1 if you know what the    
judgment means1 you will be able to say3
 ,then1 under such-and-such             
conditions--if you weigh it1 for        
example--you will have such-and-such a  
perception4  ,the appeal is not from    

what you perceive to what you think1 but
 from what you perceive now to what you 
will perceive under such-and-such       
conditions4  ,such a reference indeed1  
implies thought and what is ordinarily  
called a concept2 but our knowledge of  
concepts used in science always means   
that1 if we know what is meant e4g4 by  
calling anything gold1 we know how it   
will behave under such-and-such         
conditions4  ,the concept1 in ,kant's   
words1 is a function of unity in our    
representations4  ,the task of thought1 
then1 is not to turn the mind away from 
what we perceive1 but to help us to     
transcend some of the limitations of our
 perceptions1 or1 to speak more         
accurately1 to set somewhat further back
 the limits of our perception2 for      
thought never entirely transcends these 
limits4  ,our knowledge is always       
conditioned by the fact that we are     
finite minds living in a particular     
place and at a particular time2 but     
thought can extend the range of our     

perception in space and in time4  ,the  
limitations of our perception have1 for 
,kant1 a double aspect1 which determines
 his division of the first part of the  
,critique into two parts--the           
,a,esthetic and the ,analytic4  ,in the 
first place1 our direct knowledge of    
space at any one time is always         
knowledge only of a part of space2 our  
direct knowledge of time1 whether in    
present consciousness or in memory of   
our own experience1 is knowledge of only
 a part of time2 and the things in the  
space we directly perceive1 or in the   
time we experience1 are what they are by
 their relation to space outside the    
space we see1 and time beyond the time  
we experience1 and that limited space   
and time we treat1 therefore1 as parts  
of one all-embracing space and one      
all-embracing time1 and in the          
conception of an indefinitely extended  
space and time we can think of the space
 in which all things exist1 and the time
 in which all things occur1 of which we 

only see and experience a small part4   
,the science of astronomy obviously     
talks of space and time far beyond      
anything we could ever perceive1 but we 
go beyond such direct perception in such
 simple expressions as forty miles from 
here or three days hence4  ,and1 when   
,kant says that space and time are only 
phenomenal1 he does not mean that they  
are mental1 but that we only know them  
through perception1 and that we get at  
absolute space and time not by going    
from what we perceive to what we think1 
but by thinking of what we perceive     
indefinitely extended4  ,all definite   
statements about space must come back in
 the end to so far from here1 all about 
time to so long from now1 and the fact  
that all our knowledge of space and time
 is got by adding to or extending in    
thought the space and time we directly  
perceive does1 according to ,kant1 solve
 some obstinate puzzles about the nature
 of space and time4  ,in the second     
place1 if we consider our knowledge of  

objects1 we realise that1 as we said1 at
 any one moment we only perceive them in
 part or from one position4 ,what we    
directly perceive of them is fragmentary
 and discontinuous1 one aspect seen now1
 and another aspect seen at another     
time4  ,but we do not think of the      
things as existing in that discontinuous
 way2 we think of them as having a      
nature of their own4 ,that does not     
contradict1 but is something very much  
more than1 what we perceive1 and our    
knowledge of any object is got by       
piecing together the aspects we directly
 perceive2 but that piecing together1 or
 synthesis1 is not haphazard4  ,it is   
governed by rules--rules partly derived 
from the nature of the particular thing 
we are concerned with1 and partly more  
general rules1 which come from the      
relation of this work of piecing        
together to the framework of space and  
time by help of which it is done4       
,kant's conception of knowledge1 then1  
is something like this4  ,each of us is 

in direct contact with reality1 but we  
perceive directly only a small part of  
it1 and1 as our consciousness moves on  
in time1 and as we change our position  
in space1 we are directly conscious of  
different small portions of reality4  ,a
 part of the whole is illumined by      
direct perception1 but the whole        
stretches beyond that indefinitely in   
space and time4  ,in the part we        
directly perceive there is a temporal   
order and a spatial order4  ,things are 
given to us arranged in space and       
ordered in time1 and these arrangements 
or orders in the space and time that is 
directly given to us in perception have 
certain rules1 and we think of these    
principles of arrangement as extending  
indefinitely beyond the space and time  
given to us in perception4 ,when we make
 judgments about reality beyond our     
perception1 we think of things as so    
arranged in the space and time beyond   
our perception as we should see them    
arranged were the range of our          

perception sufficiently wide4 ,further1 
it is most important to remember that we
 do not remain in one place and at one  
time and make guesses of what may happen
 in the darkness beyond4  ,though our   
perception at any one moment is limited1
 we can connect what we see at one time 
with what we see at another4  ,we can1  
by means of language and writing1 use   
the perception of others to fill out our
 experience1 until gradually our        
scientific judgments1 our knowledge of  
what we should perceive under all sorts 
of possible experience1 seems to bulk   
much more largely than could our        
individual perceptions4 ,but we are     
still1 ,kant would say1 getting at our  
knowledge of what is beyond by piecing  
together what we and other people have  
perceived1 and the whole is always much 
more than that4  ,what1 then1 is meant  
by the contention that we can know      
things in themselves which ,kant is     
earnest to refute8  ,it might mean that 
we do in perception attain to a complete

 knowledge1 but that would be obviously 
untrue4  ,as ,kant understood the claim1
 it meant rather something like this3   
,in thought we are obviously not limited
 by our perception4  ,we are always     
assuming certain principles1 such as the
 laws of space or the principle of      
causation1 to hold of all reality1 both 
what we do and what we do not directly  
perceive4  ,may we not say1 then1 that  
these principles hold of all reality1   
and argue from that fact to what the    
nature of the whole must be8  ,if       
everything that we know is caused1 e4g41
 may we not apply the principle of      
causation to all reality and say that it
 must have a cause8  ,when we come to   
consider the ,dialectic1 the second main
 division of the first ,critique1 we    
shall notice ,kant's detailed analysis  
of these arguments1 and how he points   
out that you can in this way get        
contradictory results4 ,in the meantime 
it must be observed that in these       
arguments we start from principles      

applied to what we perceive and         
expressing connections between the      
different things we perceive1 and then  
apply them beyond everything we do or   
could perceive4  ,that means that we    
imagine that we can take these          
principles out of relation not only to  
this or that detail of perception1 but  
out of relation to any perception at    
all1 and thus apprehend reality by      
thought independently of perception4    
,kant's answer is that thought cannot   
directly apprehend the nature of the    
whole1 and these universal principles1  
such as the principle of causation1 are 
only principles by which we connect one 
perception with another to amend the    
discontinuous and fragmentary nature of 
our perception2 they are rules for the  
synthesis of what we perceive4  ,by so  
synthesising our perceptions we come to 
a less imperfect knowledge of the whole1
 but apart from perceptions the         
principles have no meaning at all4      
,kant's idealism1 i4e4 his insistence   

that we know only phenomena1 not things 
in themselves1 is relevant to his       
problem1 because it implies the denial  
of the view that thought has objects    
apprehended independently of perception1
 and because it insists that we can only
 know directly what we perceive1 or     
things as they appear to us1 that in our
 process from perception to knowledge we
 start with what is present to our      
perception and end with what is or with 
what might be present to our perception1
 and that this process is possible by   
reason of our continued consciousness in
 time4  ,the process1 ,kant holds1 is   
governed by certain principles4  ,these 
depend upon the part played by space and
 time in all our perception1 and the    
manner in which we employ space and time
 in piecing together our discontinuous  
perceptions4  ,now1 obviously it is     
quite possible to hold this position    
without having thought out what is      
implied in being present to the mind in 
perception4 ,this is what ,kant did4    

,he describes perception in different   
and inconsistent ways4  ,the reason for 
this inconsistency is that ,kant is not 
concerned with the nature of perception1
 but with the relation of what is       
immediately perceived to what is not but
 may be immediately perceived1 and he   
therefore never worked out any          
consistent account of perception4  ,he  
sometimes talks of perception reaching  
objects directly1 and refutes the view  
that we perceive only what is in our    
mind4  7,this1 indeed1 is implied in his
 distinction of space and time as forms 
of external and internal sense          
respectively47  ,but usually he takes   
the ordinary idealist view that we do   
not perceive things1 but affections     
produced in us by things4  ,owing to    
this inconsistency ,kant constantly     
seems to be stating very much more than 
he has any right to4  ,this is          
especially true in all that he says     
about knowledge being confined to       
phenomena and not extending to things in

 themselves4  ,when he talks of our     
knowing only phenomena1 he sometimes    
seems to mean that we know objects1     
things in themselves1 only in part1 in  
so far as they appear to us4  ,that     
would make the distinction between the  
phenomenon and the thing in itself a    
distinction between the same thing      
imperfectly and perfectly understood4   
,he sometimes1 and this is his more     
usual view1 seems to mean that we are   
aware of appearances1 entities separate 
and distinguishable from the objects    
which produce them in our minds4  ,but  
if we work out in any of ,kant's        
arguments the point of his appeal to the
 fact that knowledge is only of         
phenomena1 we shall find that in every  
case the difference between a subjective
 idealist and a realist view of         
perception1 of what being present to the
 mind means1 is irrelevant1 and that his
 argument holds on either theory4  ,we  
must now turn to ,kant's account of     
space and time which is given in the    

,a,esthetic1 the first part of the      
,critique4  ,he begins by showing the   
impossibility of the two views of the   
nature of space and time which then held
 the field1 the views of ,newton and    
,leibniz4 ,newton had thought of space  
and time as realities1 things in        
themselves existing along with other    
things4 ,but obviously we cannot think  
of space as a separate thing existing by
 itself2 for space without things would 
have no determination or possibility of 
determination1 and would be to us just  
nothing1 whereas1 as it is1 it is       
something to us4  ,the same holds of    
time4  ,the ,newtonian doctrine1 ,kant  
says1 forces us to assume two eternal1  
infinite1 and self-subsisting           
non-realities1 which are there1 without 
any reality in them1 only that they may 
comprehend all reality4  ,just because  
things are in space and time1 space and 
time are not themselves things4  ,but if
 this makes us say that space and time  
are only relations between or qualities 

of things1 we find ourselves in         
difficulties as obvious4  ,we do not    
come to apprehend space and time by     
comparing things and seeing that they   
have a common quality of being spatial  
or temporal1 as we come to apprehend    
redness1 e4g41 by seeing red things4    
,the perception of space and time is    
implied in each and every perception of 
things4  ,we cannot1 therefore1 derive  
them from our study of things2 we must  
begin with them4  ,further1 ,kant       
notices1 as against ,leibniz1 that space
 and time are not ordinary concepts     
because they have no instances4         
,different men are instances of man1 but
 different spaces or times are only     
parts or determinations of the one space
 and the one time4  ,as against the     
view1 then1 that would make space and   
time only relations1 derived from our   
comparison of things which are not      
temporal or spatial1 ,kant insists that 
space and time are a priori4  ,we cannot
 see things without seeing them outside 

one another--i4e4 in space--or          
experience succession or change without 
experiencing it in time4  ,space and    
time1 then1 have a certain independence 
of things in space and time4 ,the       
qualitative differences of things in    
space or events in time do not affect   
the nature of space and time1 and we can
 and do study and discuss spatial and   
temporal relations quite independently  
of such differences4  ,space and time1  
then1 can be abstracted from things in  
space and time4 ,yet1 on the other hand1
 we cannot think that space and time    
exist independently of things4  ,they do
 not exist in abstraction2 for1 though  
the specific differences of things in   
space and time are irrelevant to the    
nature of space and time1 if there were 
no things1 or if there were no          
differences1 there could be no space and
 time as we know them4 ,the empirical   
perception1 says ,kant1 is not          
compounded of phenomena and space1 of   
the sensation and the empty perception4 

,space and time1 therefore1 ,kant says1 
are not things in themselves4  ,what1   
then1 are they8  ,kant's answer is that 
they are forms of our perception4       
,space is the form of external          
perception1 and time is the form of     
internal perception1 and ,kant holds    
that by this answer we can understand   
both how our knowledge of space and time
 may be a priori1 how spatial and       
temporal distinctions may be abstracted 
from the differences of things1 and how 
we may avoid the difficulties consequent
 on regarding time and space as         
independent things4  ,what1 then1 does  
,kant mean by form8  ,he seems to mean  
two things1 which he does not clearly   
distinguish4 ,the first meaning is best 
described in his own words3 ,in the     
phenomenon ,i call what corresponds to  
the sensation the matter of the         
phenomenon1 and that which causes that  
the manifold of the phenomenon is       
perceived as arranged in specific       
relations ,i call the form of the       

phenomenon4  ,we are here face to face  
with the ultimate difference of form and
 matter1 or order and that which is     
ordered4  ,when ,kant calls time and    
space the form of our perception he is  
simply calling attention to the fact    
that in all that we perceive we find    
this distinction4  ,it is something     
found1 given1 not made by us4 ,by the   
word form ,kant does not mean anything  
specially subjective as contrasted with 
matter or content1 for he carefully     
distinguishes between space and time1   
and such qualities as colour1 which get 
their nature in part1 he thinks1 from   
the specific nature of the sense organ4 
,compared with such qualities space and 
time are objective4  ,the phrase forms  
of our perception1 then1 does not really
 explain anything about space and time2 
it only emphasises the fact that the    
distinction between space and time and  
objects in them is found in what we     
perceive1 and that there is no meaning  
in discussing either side of the        

distinction as though it were quite     
independent of what we perceive4  ,but  
form has also another meaning which     
justifies ,kant in calling space and    
time only forms of our perception1 and  
hence subjective4  ,for1 while these    
forms are found in what we perceive1 the
 distinctive part which they play in our
 knowledge is due to the fact that we   
use space and time as a framework by    
which to connect our scattered          
experiences4 ,we come to think of the   
space and time we perceive as parts of  
an absolute space and an absolute time4 
,we perceive parts of space and time1   
but absolute space and absolute time we 
do not perceive4  ,they are the form we 
perceive imagined indefinitely extended4
  ,we order the particular parts of     
space and time which we do perceive in  
reference to absolute space and time4   
,yet absolute space and time are only   
known through the finite parts of space 
and time which we actually experience4  
,hence absolute space and time are not  

perceived realities or perceived orders1
 but ways in which we organise and      
arrange what we perceive4 ,now1 the     
qualities of space and time which are   
hard to think of as the qualities of a  
thing that exists1 i4e4 their infinite  
divisibility and infinite extension1 are
 qualities of absolute space and time4  
,when we say that space is infinitely   
divisible1 we do not mean that any      
existing thing is made up of an infinite
 number of parts4  ,the divisibility of 
space and the divisibility of matter are
 quite different4  ,an inch as a spatial
 determination is infinitely divisible1 
but the divisibility of the actual stuff
 which any inch may measure is a matter 
of empirical investigation1 and ought to
 admit of a definite answer4  ,that     
means that1 while we use determinations 
of space which we consider infinitely   
divisible and infinitely extensible to  
measure things in space1 we do not      
consider that these determinations1     
fractions1 or multiples of inches or    

centimetres1 have anything to do with   
the constitution of the thing they      
measure4  ,it was not put together in   
fractions of inches4 ,thus we must      
distinguish between space as the form of
 what we perceive1 the                  
next-each-otherness of things1 and the  
use we make of that form to construct by
 means of measurement order in all      
different perception4 ,the first is     
obviously the form only of what we      
perceive1 and gives rise to no          
transcendental questions4  ,but the     
second1 infinite space1 though it seems 
to transcend our perception1 has still  
only meaning in reference to perception1
 is only a way of ordering our          
perceptions4  ,the same holds good of   
time4  ,we can see now what ,kant means 
by saying that time and space are       
empirically real and transcendentally   
ideal4  ,kant does not maintain that    
space and time are illusions4  ,they are
 a constant element of what is given us 
in perception4  ,it is only when we try 

and go beyond our perceptions1 and take 
space and time as things existing       
independently of what we perceive1 thus 
trying to transcend the limits of       
possible perception1 that we fall into  
illusion4  ,space and time have meaning 
only as elements in what we perceive1 or
 in connecting what we perceive now with
 what we may perceive4                  
99,,chapter ,,iv99         99,,the      
,,categories ,,and ,,the ,,principles   
,,of ,,pure ,,understanding99   ,kant   
makes the distinction between perception
 and understanding depend upon the      
distinction between the receptivity and 
the spontaneity of the mind4  ,in the   
,a,esthetic he has been concerned with  
time and space as elements in what seems
 to be given to the mind4  ,before we   
begin to ask the questions of science1  
before we analyse1 describe1 or         
classify1 before we have to think1 we   
perceive4  ,time and space are not got  
at by thinking or generalisation4  ,for 
before we can say anything about any    

part of our experience1 it is given us  
in a certain spatial and temporal order4
  ,if we open our eyes at any moment1 we
 are1 without any conscious effort of   
thought on our part1 confronted with an 
elaborate content4  ,it seems simple to 
distinguish this receptive attitude of  
the mind in perception from its activity
 in thinking4  ,the distinction is not  
really so simple as it appears4 ,for we 
all know that what we perceive depends1 
at least to some extent1 on the mind's  
activity4  ,we are familiar with the    
reflection that men see what they want  
to see or what they are looking for4    
,this is clearly shown in the case of   
hearing by the difference in what we    
hear when we are listening to a language
 we understand and when we are listening
 to an unfamiliar language1 or in the   
common experience when1 after failing to
 hear what someone has said1 we think   
what it must have been1 and then seem to
 recall the sound1 not as we heard it1  
but as we should have heard it if we had

 heard it rightly4  ,anyone who reflects
 on the process of fast reading will    
realise that we do not perceive or      
notice all the letters on a page2 we    
fill in from our imagination1 as we     
discover when we read words that are not
 on the page4  ,it is a very hard thing1
 giving up all interpretation and       
inference1 to describe faithfully just  
what is there to see4  ,passive         
perception1 then1 does not exist1 and   
our thought affects our perception4     
,yet1 at the same time1 the distinction 
between thought and perception1 although
 not simple1 is real4  ,for although our
 previous thought affects our perception
 and we see things already classified1  
see books1 and tables1 and chairs1 not  
merely coloured surfaces1 yet we can    
distinguish between simple immediate    
perception and the process of thought   
which begins when we ask1 ,what is that8
 i4e4 when we begin to make judgments4  
,the characteristic of thought1         
according to ,kant1 is synthesis1 or    

putting together1 and all synthesis is  
the work of the mind4  ,when we begin to
 describe and classify the contents of  
our perception1 we pick out separate    
qualities from the continuous whole we  
perceive1 and group them together4      
,this grouping is1 of course1 determined
 by the likenesses and differences which
 we perceive everywhere1 but we do not1 
in judging1 confine ourselves to        
noticing likeness and difference4  ,for 
any content of our perception has some  
point of resemblance1 and some of       
difference with any other4  ,we are     
concerned with likenesses that go with  
or are the signs of other likenesses4   
,on the basis of perceived likeness we  
erect the notion of things and qualities
 of a certain kind4 ,in doing this we go
 beyond what we see1 and unite and      
arrange the contents of our perception  
through concepts4  ,that is what we are 
doing when we say that is a so-and-so4  
,for example1 if ,i say that rock is    
like a dog1 ,i am simply expressing a   

likeness ,i perceive4  ,i do not imply  
that the rock is therefore alive or will
 bark2 ,i am not going beyond how the   
rock looks2 but if ,i say that object is
 a dog1 ,i assert that all that is      
implied in being a dog will hold of that
 object1 i4e4 that it will have a       
certain appearance and behaviour1 which 
is known4  ,i can anticipate1 therefore1
 how it will behave1 look1 and sound    
under certain circumstances4 ,all these 
phenomena1 the appearance1 the barking1 
and running1 though ,i may perceive them
 at different times and places1 are     
grouped together in the judgment1 ,that 
is a dog4  ,this is what ,kant means by 
saying1 ,concepts depend on functions4  
,by function ,i mean the unity of the   
act of arranging different              
representations under one common        
representation4  ,concepts1 therefore1  
always refer to perception1 and it is by
 means of concepts that we are enabled  
to introduce such order into what we    
perceive1 that we can anticipate from   

what we perceive what we shall perceive4
 ,perceptions without concepts are      
blind4  ,without concepts what we       
perceive would not lead us in any way   
beyond what is immediately given4       
,thoughts without contents are empty4   
,concepts are nothing1 and have no      
meaning apart from the contents of      
perception which they unify4  ,most of  
these concepts are what is called       
empirical4 ,we get at them by observing 
likenesses and differences in what we   
perceive1 and observing which are       
significant and important1 and which are
 what we call accidental4 ,science1 in  
its discovery of laws1 is only carrying 
further this process which is implied in
 all simple judgments4 ,by observing    
likenesses and differences1 their       
uniformities and variations1 and        
discovering those which are a key to the
 rest1 we improve our concepts1 and     
thereby have more knowledge of what we  
call natural laws1 and can more and more
 anticipate experience4  ,with these    

empirical concepts and their development
 ,kant is not concerned4  ,but there are
 certain concepts of which ,hume had    
observed that they are not obtained in  
the ordinary way from an examination of 
the contents of experience4  ,the two   
with which he chiefly concerned himself 
were substance and cause4  ,these       
concepts seems to play an especially    
important part in the ordering and      
arranging of the concepts of experience4
  ,for the work of science1 in moving   
from a simple observation of likenesses 
and differences to a knowledge of       
empirical laws1 depends upon certain    
assumptions or principles1 like the     
principle of causation or the principle 
of the conservation of energy4  ,these  
principles imply concepts not derived1  
like the others1 from generalisation    
from experience2 they are the synthetic 
a priori judgments which1 as we have    
seen1 constituted a special problem for 
,kant4  ,kant is first concerned to ask 
where these a priori concepts come from1

 and how many of them there are4 ,this  
inquiry he calls the metaphysical       
deduction of the categories4  ,having   
answered that question1 he then goes on 
to ask by what right we assume these    
principles in our dealing with          
experience4  ,this1 the most important  
and difficult section of the ,critique1 
he calls the transcendental deduction of
 the categories4  ,most concepts1 as we 
saw1 are empirical4  ,we take certain   
likenesses and differences we observe as
 the mark of a real unity in the things4
  ,the different natures of different   
things we do not fully know1 but we     
distinguish them by the different       
uniformities we observe1 and in order to
 explain our experience we assume the   
unity underlying these perceived        
likenesses4  ,iron1 dog1 fire1 are names
 for the natures of things which we see 
manifested in our experience4  ,the     
concept1 then1 is got from what we      
perceive1 though it stands for something
 more than we perceive4 ,how1 then1 can 

there be any concepts which are not got 
from the empirical differences of things
 we perceive8  ,let us take such a      
concept as substance1 and see whether we
 can discover where it comes from4      
,locke had been puzzled by discovering  
that he could not1 in any object1 find  
anything which was its substantiality4  
,calling anything a substance is not    
like saying that it is hard1 or green1  
or heavy2 we are not concerned with     
specific differences in things1 but we  
are not therefore saying what is        
meaningless4 ,there is something1 namely
 substance1 which we can distinguish    
from the hardness1 or colour1 or weight 
that we perceive4  ,that something we do
 not perceive2 we assume it whenever we 
talk of a thing being hard1 and green1  
and heavy4  ,a thing's substantiality is
 just the unity of its perceivable      
qualities4 ,but such a unity is implied 
in the concept of any object4           
,substance1 then1 is a name for one of  
the general principles implied in our   

assuming that what we perceive are real 
objects4  ,kant generalises the result  
of this inquiry into particular concepts
 of this kind4  ,he holds that a priori 
concepts or categories 7i4e4 the        
concepts which we do not get from       
empirical differences of things7 stand  
for principles implied in thinking of   
things as objects or in judging4 ,if we 
want1 therefore1 to find out the number 
of the categories1 we must ask how many 
different kinds of unity are implied in 
judgment1 or what are the conditions of 
judging any object4  ,kant does not here
 help1 but rather misleads us in this   
inquiry4  ,for he unfortunately thought 
that the different kinds of judgment    
could be discovered without further ado 
by taking the list given in formal      
logic4  ,he therefore first makes a list
 of categories1 based on the logical    
forms of judgment1 and then tries to    
show the connection between these       
categories and the principles which     
were1 as he had discovered1 assumed in  

the mathematical sciences4  ,the actual 
movement of his thought is1 ,i think1   
different4  ,he asks if there are any   
general conditions implied in all       
judgment4  ,his answer is that all      
judgments1 all statements1 that is1     
which claim to be true1 imply           
determination of time and space4  ,from 
that determination certain principles   
can be deduced4  ,if time and space are 
implied in all judging1 then these      
principles will equally be implied1 and 
will hold of all things which can be    
objects for us4  ,it will be easier to  
understand ,kant's arguments if we      
invert the order of the ,critique and   
begin with examining the nature of the  
principles of the understanding or of   
one of them4  ,the categories which are 
of importance in ,kant's argument are   
quantity1 quality1 substance1 causation1
 and reciprocity1 and necessity1        
possibility1 and actuality4 ,the last   
three are less important than the       
others1 and we shall not deal with them4

  ,to the first five of these categories
 correspond the following principles3   
7#a7 ,quantity4  ,all phenomena are1    
with reference to their perception1     
extensive quantities4  7#b7 ,quality4   
,in all phenomena the real1 which is the
 object of a sensation1 has intensive   
quantity1 that is1 a degree4  ,the last 
three are classed under a general       
heading of ,analogies of ,experience1   
whose principle is3 ,experience is      
possible only through the representation
 of a necessary connection of           
perceptions4  ,they are  7#c7 ,the      
principle of the permanence of          
substance4  ,in all changes of phenomena
 the substance is permanent1 and its    
quantum is neither increased nor        
diminished in nature4  7#d7 ,principle  
of the succession of time1 according to 
the ,law of ,causality4  ,all changes   
take place according to the law of      
connection between cause and effect4    
7#e7 ,principle of co-existence1        
according to the law of reciprocity or  

community4  ,all substances1 so far as  
they can be perceived as co-existent in 
space1 are always affecting each other  
reciprocally4  ,these principles1 ,kant 
points out1 are assumed in the sciences 
of applied mathematics4  ,the           
application of geometry to the world we 
experience assumes that all phenomena   
are extensive quantities2 physics       
assumes that quantitative expression can
 be given to the qualities of objects   
other than their size1 their weight1    
e4g41 and all scientific determination  
of change assumes the three principles  
which ,kant calls analogies of          
experience3 the permanence or           
conservation of amount in changes1 the  
necessary connection of things in time1 
and the reciprocal interdependence of   
things which exist at the same time4    
,these principles are not proved by     
science2 their validity is assumed in   
all scientific investigation4 ,on what1 
then1 does it rest8  ,we shall follow   
,kant's argument more easily if we take 

his account of one of these             
principles--the principle of causation4 
,for what is said of that will hold1    
with necessary changes1 of the others1  
and1 as we have noticed1 it was ,hume's 
criticism of causation which first led  
,kant to formulate the critical problem4
  ,hume had pointed out that we had     
never such insight into causal          
connection as to be able1 from mere     
inspection of a cause1 to foretell the  
effect without any reference to         
experience4  ,he declared1 on the       
contrary1 that there was no difference  
between observed succession and         
causation so far as concerned the       
objects observed4  ,in each case we see 
first one thing and then another4 ,the  
difference1 then1 between mere          
succession and causal connection can    
only be in us1 in the way we come to    
feel about certain successions we       
observe4  ,in technical language1 the   
necessity of causation is subjective4   
,how does ,kant answer this position8   

,he begins1 as is usual with him1 by    
taking the problem a little further     
back4  ,causation is a connection we    
predicate between what we see at one    
time1 and what we see at another4 ,now  
if we take into account only the fact   
that we see one thing at one time and   
another thing at another1 there is no   
difference between what we see when we  
successively see two things which we    
judge to co-exist1 and when we see two  
things one of which we judge to have    
succeeded the other in time4  ,hume1    
therefore1 proved too much4  ,his       
argument would show that we have no     
grounds for distinguishing between      
apprehension of succession and          
succession in apprehending1 but such a  
distinction is the basis of our         
apprehension and understanding of change
 or movement4  ,if1 then1 we examine how
 we distinguish between apprehension of 
succession and succession in            
apprehending1 we may see on what the    
principle of causation is based4  ,an   

instance will help to make this point   
clear4 ,suppose that ,i am sitting in a 
room1 and look first at the door and    
then turn round and look at the window4 
,there are two successive acts of       
apprehending2 the content of the first  
is the door1 of the second1 the window1 
but the succession1 ,i say1 is in my    
apprehending4  ,the door and the window 
have co-existed all the time4 ,suppose1 
again1 that ,i look out of the window   
and see a cab in front of the house     
opposite1 come back into the room1 and  
then look out again and see the cab in  
front of a house further down4  ,here1  
again1 are two successive acts of       
apprehending1 the content of the first  
houses with cab in front of one house1  
of the second houses with cab in front  
of another4  ,this time ,i say the      
houses have gone on co-existing1 but the
 cab has moved4  ,the difference in what
 ,i see this time is due not to me1 but 
to the cab4  ,the succession is in the  
thing apprehended4  ,if we just think of

 the contents apprehended1 we have first
 ,a1 then ,b1 and say ,a and ,b co-exist
 in the first instance1 and have ,,cd   
and ,,ce1 and say ,d and ,e have been   
successive in the other4  ,why in the   
second case do we not say when we look  
out of the window the second time3 ,here
 is another row of houses1 which1 though
 they look exactly the same as the ones 
,i saw last time1 have got the cab in a 
different place8  ,that is the land of  
thing one does say in a dream4 ,why     
would it be inadmissible in waking life8
  ,let us first ask how we ever come to 
make the distinction between change in  
the content of our perception1 which is 
due to change in us1 and change in the  
things we perceive4  ,look out of a     
window into a busy street4  ,as we look 
certain things remain the same1 the     
houses opposite1 the lamp-posts1 and so 
on1 but other things change4  ,the      
permanence of part of the contents      
guarantees us that the change we        
perceive is not due to us3 if it were1  

these would change also4  ,therefore it 
must be in certain of the things4       
,change is perceived against a          
background that is permanent and does   
not change4  ,but any such particular   
perception is1 of course1 very limited4 
,we do not see all the world at once1   
and we only come to know a larger extent
 of reality by means of memory1 which   
enables us to put together what we see  
at one time with what we see at another4
 ,we have got to try and understand how 
it is that we make this distinction1    
which is clear to us in small isolated  
bits of experience1 hold of all         
experience4  ,now if reality did not    
change1 and we were conscious of our own
 movements1 we could go from one point  
to another of reality and back again1   
and could be aware that the changes in  
our perception were all due1 not to     
change in reality1 but to us--were our  
history4  ,we should know that the      
different things we saw were co-existing
 all the time1 and we should1 in        

describing them1 try to describe them1  
as in a map1 as we should perceive them 
if we saw them all at once4  ,the       
succession would be subjective1 the     
co-existence objective4  ,if we         
perceived nothing but change1 we should 
be incapable of distinguishing between  
our changes and the change outside us1  
for all succession in our experiencing  
would be experience of what was         
successive1 and there could be no       
distinction between psychology and      
science4  ,our experience of reality is 
not like either of these suppositions1  
but like both of them combined4  ,some  
succession of our experiencing is       
experience of the co-existing1 some     
experience of succession4  ,reality     
stretches out beyond us in space1 some  
of it changing and some of it permanent2
 we cannot tell simply from the         
difference in what we perceive whether  
the difference comes from change in us  
or change in the thing4  ,we can tell   
that only on the assumption that we are 

having fragmentary views of a whole that
 is continuous4  ,the only continuity we
 know is the continuity of our own      
experience made possible by memory1 and 
we try to interpret that experience in  
the light of the larger continuity of   
the world which our experience breaks   
up4  ,as we go from one place to        
another1 notice now this thing1 now     
that1 we can test interpretations made  
on this assumption4  ,wrong             
interpretations are those which make our
 experience inconsistent4  ,if we       
thought that what happened at one time  
had no relation with what happened at   
another1 that anything might happen any 
time1 our experience and our own life   
would be the merest jumble4  ,our       
experience attains consistency only as  
we learn more and more to disentangle   
the differences in experience which come
 from our changes1 from the changes and 
the variety which are part of the whole 
connected system of reality1 of which we
 see now one fragment1 then another4    

,the distinction between succession in  
our apprehending and apprehension of    
succession1 which is the basis of all   
experience of change1 implies the       
recognition of change as not arbitrary  
but part of a connected system of       
reality4  ,as ,kant puts it in his      
formulation of the principle of the     
analogies of experience1 ,experience is 
only possible by means of the           
representation of a necessary connection
 of perceptions4  ,but if our perception
 of reality is fragmentary1 how can we  
think of reality as other than          
fragmentary1 how can we fill up the     
gaps8  ,only by thinking of the whole as
 a connected system in space and time4  
,for it is the nature of space and time 
that they can be thought of             
independently of the specific nature of 
the things in space and time1 and that  
the space and time we perceive in any   
one experience must be thought of as    
parts of an all-embracing space and an  
all-embracing time4 ,we cannot follow   

the whole history of a change from ,a to
 ,b1 we can only say that1 if our       
experience is to have any consistency1  
we must think that the fact that we     
first saw ,a and then saw ,b implies in 
this case that the change from ,a to ,b 
is part of the continuous system of     
change in time1 that it is determined in
 time4  ,but to think of an event as    
determined in time is not to think of it
 as determined by time1 for time in     
itself could not produce one thing more 
than another4  ,it is to think of it as 
determined by the nature of what        
precedes it in time4  ,we therefore     
conclude that like causes have like     
effects2 for1 if anything could cause   
anything1 we should never know that     
change in what we observed was due to   
change in us--in the position of our    
bodies1 e4g4--and the experience of     
objective change would be impossible4   
,the principle does not tell us of      
itself what causes what4  ,that can only
 be discovered by empirical             

investigation4  ,that is necessary      
because we do not1 as we seem to have   
assumed above1 simply see one thing     
becoming another4  ,we see parts of all 
kinds of changes4 ,hence succession may 
be objective but not causal4 ,science   
has1 by observation and experiment1 to  
disentangle and isolate different       
changes1 but it could not do this       
without assuming the principle of       
causality4  ,causation1 then1 and the   
other assumptions of the physical       
sciences1 are shown by ,kant to be      
grounds of the possibility of           
experience4  ,we cannot deny them       
without denying elementary distinctions 
in our experience1 without which life   
would be a chaos1 and which are assumed 
and justified every moment4  ,while     
,kant thus demonstrates the validity of 
such principles1 he is also insistent on
 the limitations of their application4  
,they are principles which give         
consistency to experience1 but must not 
be applied save in reference to what we 

experience4  ,they apply1 in his words1 
only to phenomena4  ,the purport of this
 limitation can1 again1 be most easily  
seen by examining the principle of      
causality4  ,by means of that principle 
we connect one event with another1 but  
the reality is not two different but    
connected events1 but a continuous      
process4  ,the continuous process       
escapes us1 because our perception of it
 is fragmentary and discontinuous4      
,inasmuch as a judgment of causal       
connection asserts that the events we   
separately notice are connected1 it is  
true1 but it is false if taken to imply 
that reality consists of a series of    
discontinuous events or stages which are
 yet connected4  ,such an assumption    
would mean1 in ,kant's words1 that      
causation is applied not to phenomena   
7things as they appear to us71 but to   
things in themselves 7things considered 
apart from the manner in which they     
appear to us74  ,if we realise its      
falsehood1 we can1 he thinks1 evade the 

contradictions which he examines in the 
,dialectic4                             
99,,chapter ,v99               99,,the  
,,antinomies ,,and ,,criticism ,,of     
,,the ,,proofs ,,of                     
,,the ,,existence ,,of ,,god99   ,so far
 we have been considering the positive  
side of ,kant's argument1 his attempt to
 confirm the validity of the principles 
of science4  ,we must now notice the    
negative side1 his attempt to limit the 
application of these principles1 and his
 denial of the possibility of knowledge 
in certain spheres4  ,we saw that ,kant 
in his ,prolegomena summed up the       
argument of the three chief divisions of
 the ,critique as an answer to the      
questions3 ,how is mathematics possible8
  ,how is pure science of nature        
possible8 and1 ,how is metaphysics      
possible8  ,he qualified the last       
question by adding as a natural         
disposition of the mind4  ,the argument 
of the ,dialectic is that metaphysics1  
in the sense of inquiry into objects    

which transcend the bounds of           
experience1 is not possible as a        
science1 but that metaphysical questions
 arise naturally from the nature of     
human reason4  ,they cannot be answered4
  ,all we can do is to see why we cannot
 answer them4  ,kant thought of         
knowledge as a process of extending the 
bounds of perception1 of piecing        
together the fragmentary glimpses we get
 of the world1 stretching them out in   
spatial and temporal determinations that
 go beyond what we have actually        
experienced1 connecting and linking up  
the events which we perceive            
discontinuously4  ,as science extends1  
the range of our knowledge widens1 but  
the process of extension never reaches  
its completion4  ,there are always more 
facts to be discovered and explained4   
,science1 therefore1 can never rest     
content with its achievements1 but must 
always demand that the investigation of 
conditions should be pushed further back
 and on4  ,from this sense of the       

incompleteness of all actual knowledge1 
and of all there is that might be but is
 not known1 arises what ,kant calls an  
ideal of reason1 a demand that1 in all  
investigation into the conditioned1 we  
should go on till we come to the        
totality of conditions4  ,this ideal he 
holds to be serviceable and necessary4  
,it has1 however1 a natural tendency to 
pass from an ideal to an idea1 and in so
 doing it gives rise to the             
contradictions with which the ,dialectic
 is concerned4  ,if all our             
investigation is governed by the thought
 that it must go on until it reaches    
completion1 we naturally speculate on   
the fulfilment of that ideal1 and try to
 form an idea of that totality of       
conditions1 of how we should think the  
world if we knew it in its completeness4
  ,herein we hypostatize the ideal or   
make it an idea1 and we fall into       
contradiction2 for we cannot really know
 the whole without knowing all its      
parts4  ,if we give up the slow and     

never-completed process of knowing one  
part after another1 and try to jump to  
the idea of the whole1 we reach quite   
contrary results1 as we apply to the    
conception of the whole one or other of 
two assumptions implied in our          
investigation of the parts4  ,kant      
sharply distinguishes between the       
principles of the pure understanding and
 the ideas of reason4  ,the former are  
implied in all our knowledge1 and the   
fact that experience is not chaotic     
confirms them at every moment4  ,the    
second are ideals which guide knowledge1
 but are never realised4  ,he calls them
 ideas of reason1 because it is the     
special task of reason to lay down rules
 for the proper and complete working of 
the understanding4  ,this task1 he      
thinks1 is exemplified in the logical   
nature of the syllogism which brings    
into unity the judgments of the         
understanding4  ,as he used the forms of
 judgment as a guiding thread to        
discover a complete list of categories  

of the understanding1 so he uses the    
forms of syllogism to discover a        
complete list of the ideas of reason4   
,in both cases ,kant's reference to     
logical forms is far-fetched4  ,actually
 the list in the ,dialectic seems to be 
influenced by a number of considerations
 not always consistent4  ,there are     
three main divisions of the ,dialectic4 
7,the first ,kant calls the paralogisms 
of rational psychology47  ,all knowing  
and experience imply the unity of the   
self which knows4  ,in actual experience
 that unity is qualified by the nature  
of what it unites1 but we may try to    
think of it apart from and independent  
of this4 ,this leads to an attempt to   
know the self by asking what must be its
 nature if it has the unity implied in  
knowing1 and to argue that the soul is a
 substance and simple1 not affected by  
the changes in the matter which it knows
 and therefore immortal4  ,the second   
division arises from the fact that in   
knowledge we are concerned with         

series--a series of addings together and
 a series of divisions1 as of parts of  
space and time2 a series of things      
arising one from the other1 as in       
causation2 and a series of things in    
dependence one upon the other4  ,the    
ideas of reason come from the thought of
 these series completed1 and produce    
what ,kant calls antinomies4  ,for if we
 start with the thought that what we are
 trying to apprehend must be a whole1 we
 get one series of results2 if with the 
thought that we can only apprehend the  
whole by going from condition to        
condition indefinitely1 we get another4 
,kant distinguishes four antinomies1    
each with thesis and antithesis4  ,the  
thesis of the first is1 ,the world has a
 beginning in time1 and is limited also 
in regard to space2 the antithesis1 ,the
 world has no beginning and no limits in
 space1 but is infinite1 in respect both
 to time and space4  ,the thesis of the 
second is1 ,every compound substance in 
the world consists of simple parts1 and 

nothing exists anywhere but the simple  
or what is composed of it2 the          
antithesis is the contrary of this4     
,the thesis of the third is1 ,causality1
 according to the laws of nature1 is not
 the only causality from which all the  
phenomena of the world can be deduced4  
,in order to account for these phenomena
 it is necessary also to admit another  
causality1 that of freedom2 the         
antithesis1 ,there is no freedom1 but   
everything in the world takes place     
entirely according to the laws of       
nature4  ,the thesis of the fourth is1  
,there exists an absolutely necessary   
,being belonging to the world1 either as
 a part or as a cause of it2 the        
antithesis is a denial of this4  ,the   
problems of the third division of the   
,dialectic arises from an attempt to    
think of a whole which shall include    
both the known world and the mind that  
knows4 ,this attempt1 which ,kant calls 
the ideal of pure reason1 leads to      
proofs of the existence of ,god4  ,as   

the ,dialectic proceeds1 it becomes     
clear that ,kant has another list to    
hand4  ,he enumerates1 as the three     
great objects of metaphysical inquiry1  
,god1 ,freedom1 and immortality1 and in 
his discussion of the ideas of reason he
 treats them principally as attempts to 
give definite and dogmatic answers to   
the problems suggested by these three   
topics4  ,immortality is the subject of 
what ,kant calls the paralogisms of     
rational psychology4  ,he argues that   
all attempts to prove the immortality of
 the soul by a priori arguments involve 
an argument of this kind3 they begin by 
noting that death is always dissolution 
of some kind1 that1 therefore1 what is  
not made up of parts and cannot be      
dissolved1 cannot die4  ,then they urge 
that the soul is not made up of parts1  
and therefore cannot die4  ,the fallacy 
in this argument is that it treats the  
unity of the self as though it were an  
object of knowledge4  ,we can show that 
knowledge is only possible if the self  

has a unity other than that of a spatial
 whole1 but we cannot therefore argue   
that it must be exactly like a spatial  
whole1 in the sense that death in it can
 only be brought about by dissolution1  
but unlike a spatial whole in that in it
 there is nothing to be dissolved4  ,the
 real nature of the unity of the self1  
,kant argues1 cannot be known4  ,all we 
can do is to reject a priori arguments  
either for or against its immortality4  
,freedom is treated in the third        
antinomy of pure reason1 and to that    
,kant devotes most attention1 but others
 of the antinomies are concerned with   
the difficulties arising from the       
application of spatial and temporal     
determinations to reality as a whole1   
and to the category of necessity4  ,kant
 makes a distinction between the first  
two and the second two antinomies4  ,it 
is the first two that express the       
inadequacy of temporal or spatial       
determination to reality as a whole4    
,all such determination implies         

measurement1 and measurement is always a
 relation of part to part4  ,the        
antitheses of both antinomies express   
the inadequacy of any number to the     
expression of the nature of the whole1  
the thesis the inadequacy of regarding  
reality as an aggregate or addition of  
any kind4  ,each is strong in what it   
denies1 and ,kant's solution is that    
both thesis and antithesis are false1   
because you cannot apply spatial or     
temporal determination to the world as a
 whole4  ,in contrast the solution of   
the other antinomies is that both thesis
 and antithesis are true1 and that is   
possible because they are concerned with
 different things4  ,the third antinomy 
arises from the difficulty of applying  
the category of causation to the world  
as a whole4  ,the assumption underlying 
the thesis is not1 as is sometimes      
asserted1 merely that the notion of     
infinity in itself implies a            
contradiction1 but that a determinate   
result must have a determinate cause4   

,if we think of what actually exists now
 as having been caused by what has      
preceded it1 we must think of that which
 has had a determinate result being     
itself determinate4 ,it is the familiar 
argument for a first cause4 ,in         
causation we seem to be relating one    
event to another event1 and are really  
only putting the question of origination
 further back4  ,yet1 if we say that    
therefore we must suppose an absolute   
origination of change1 a beginning of   
the series1 we have to answer the       
question1 ,how is it possible to think  
of the originating number of the series8
  ,for to think that something can arise
 from nothing is to contradict the      
principle of causation4  ,kant's        
solution to this difficulty is          
important1 for it had great influence   
upon his ethical theory4  ,the category 
of causation applies only to phenomena4 
,if we think of things as phenomena we  
must recognise that they are subject to 
the principle of causation2 if we think 

of them as things in themselves1 the    
category of causation does not apply to 
them1 and their action may be free4     
,the same action may therefore on its   
phenomenal side be determined1 and on   
its nominal side1 as the action of a    
thing in itself1 be free4 ,this may seem
 to be solving one contradiction by     
propounding another1 till we remember   
that in causation we do not explain the 
relation of cause to effect4  ,the      
relation we discover is between one     
instance of cause and effect and        
another4  ,like causes have like        
effects4 ,the principle applies1 then1  
in so far as things are like one        
another4  ,it applies to changes which  
are aggregates or complexes of simpler  
changes which are like other changes4   
,if and in so far as there are things   
which are more than aggregates of their 
elements1 and are therefore unique1     
there are things to whose changes no    
laws of cause and effect are adequate4  
,the point may be illustrated by the way

 we think about character4 ,if we think 
of a man's character as his             
characteristics1 his being this or that 
kind of person1 we must think of his    
action as so far determined1 but that   
does not prevent us from thinking of his
 individuality as something more than   
any sum or combination of               
characteristics1 as something           
essentially alive1 which escapes all    
attempts to bind it by rules4  ,it is   
the difference in ,kant's words between 
man regarded from the point of view of  
anthropology1 and man regarded as a     
responsible moral being4  ,we shall see 
in the next chapter that this           
distinction is the basis of ,kant's     
moral theory4 ,here it must be noted    
that he does not claim that his solution
 of the third antinomy proves the fact  
of freedom4  ,that1 he held1 no merely  
intellectual argument could prove4  ,it 
only defends the possibility of freedom4
  ,the third division of the ,dialectic 
is an examination of the proofs of the  

existence of ,god4  ,when we study      
,kant's account of them1 we find we are 
concerned not1 as elsewhere in the      
,dialectic1 with a conflict springing   
from the nature of reason itself1 but   
with the relation of thought and        
conduct4  ,kant distinguishes three     
proofs of the existence of ,god--the    
ontological1 the cosmological1 and the  
physico-theological--but he maintains   
that the last two really rest upon and  
imply the first4  ,the first1 the       
ontological proof1 is the argument that 
the very conception of a perfect being  
implies existence4  ,it is the only     
proof of moral importance1 inasmuch as  
it attempts to argue a priori that a    
being of perfect morality must exist4   
,kant's answer to it is that1 to argue  
that we could not conceive a perfect    
being unless we conceived that being's  
existence1 is to suppose that to        
conceive of a thing1 and to conceive of 
the same thing existing1 is to conceive 
of different things4 ,existence1 he     

says1 adds nothing to the concept of an 
object4 ,kant's objection to the        
ontological proof has been criticised4  
,but the proof either assumes that ,god 
is a being independent of and separate  
from the rest of reality1 and then1 as  
,kant says1 we may conceive ,god as     
existing1 but our conception not being  
necessitated1 carries no necessity with 
it4  7,if ,i conceive a hundred dollars 
to be in my pocket1 he says1 ,i conceive
 them to be there2 but that does not    
mean the dollars are there47  ,or if we 
say that reality must be thought of as  
existing1 the answer is1 ,yes1 but must 
reality necessarily be thought of as    
morally perfect8  ,it is this last      
assumption which alone makes the        
ontological proof worth proving2 for    
arguments about the existence or        
non-existence of ,god are mere quarrels 
about words1 except in so far as they   
are concerned with moral issues4  ,but  
moral issues cannot be solved by a      
consideration of purely intellectual    

assumptions4  ,the nature of the other  
two proofs of ,god's existence makes    
this clear4 ,the second1 the            
cosmological1 is the argument that if   
anything exists1 something must         
necessarily exist4 ,kant's answer is    
that this is sound so far as it goes1   
but it does not prove that what         
necessarily exists is a morally perfect 
being4  ,the third1 the                 
physico-theological argument1 is the    
familiar argument from design4  ,kant   
treats this argument with much greater  
respect than the other two1 but insists 
that we must see how far it will carry  
us4  ,if we are going to infer the      
nature of ,god from the nature of the   
world as we see it1 we must do so       
honestly4  ,but though we see design in 
the world1 we do not see perfection1 and
 on the basis of this argument we cannot
 ignore the imperfection and want of    
harmony which is as patent as the       
harmony and design4  ,kant's analysis of
 these proofs seems negative4  ,its real

 purport is to insist that religion     
cannot be dissociated from moral        
experience1 that the knowledge of ,god1 
which is the concern of religion1 is not
 got by intellectual speculation1 but in
 the moral life4  ,when he said that he 
had limited reason to make room for     
faith1 he did not mean that men could   
not prove the existence of ,god1 but    
might believe in it if they pleased4    
,he meant that ,god is implied and known
 above all in moral action4  ,his       
criticism of these classical proofs is  
thus the beginning of that revivified   
philosophy of religion whose chief      
representatives have been               
,schleiermacher and ,ritschl4           
99,,chapter ,,vi99                      
99,,kant',s ,,moral ,,theory99   ,kant's
 moral theory is an integral part of his
 philosophical system4  ,if the         
,critique of ,pure ,reason argues the   
impotence of reason in the sphere of    
speculation1 the ,critique of ,practical
 ,reason affirms its sovereignty in the 

sphere of practice4  ,the second        
,critique is thus the complement of the 
first4  ,kant's treatment of moral      
problems being largely the consequence  
of the conclusions of the first         
,critique1 his moral theory is thus     
mainly metaphysical4  ,the title of one 
of his works on moral theory1           
,fundamental ,principles of the         
,metaphysic of ,morals1 bears this out4 
,there were1 no doubt1 other influences 
which had their effect on his conception
 of morality4  ,he tells us himself that
 he was inspired by the teaching of     
,rousseau on the dignity and worth of   
man4 ,he was undoubtedly repelled into a
 reaction against the sentimental school
 of ,shaftesbury1 which in its ,german  
adherents insisted on the agreeable and 
gentlemanly nature of virtue with an    
almost sickly sentiment4 ,this reaction 
accounts for the extreme emphasis laid  
by ,kant on the divorce between duty and
 any kind of inclination4  ,but his     
doctrine as a whole can only be         

understood in the light of the          
conclusions of the first ,critique4     
,kant's conception of freedom or        
autonomy of the will is the key to his  
moral theory4  ,on the hypothesis of    
freedom of the will1 he says1 morality  
together with its principle follows from
 it by mere analysis of the conception4 
,we saw in the last chapter that ,kant  
regarded human action1 when looked at   
from an anthropological point of view1  
as phenomenal1 and therefore subject to 
the law of cause and effect4  ,if we    
think of man as a creature of           
inclination1 with likes and dislikes1 we
 seem1 in considering men's differences 
from one another in this respect1 to be 
dealing with matters of fact over which 
men have no control4  ,we are born and  
grow up with different natures1 with the
 result that one man likes one thing1   
another another2 one man's temptations  
do not tempt another1 what one man finds
 easy another finds difficult4  ,we seem
 here to be in a world where causation  

rules4  ,if men act differently1 it is  
because their external environment1     
acting upon their different natures1    
calls out different responses4  ,so far1
 then1 says ,kant1 as men act according 
to inclination1 do things because they  
like doing them1 or avoid them because  
they dislike them1 their actions are    
what he calls heteronomous1 governed by 
laws over which they have no control4   
,we assume1 whenever we are trying to   
explain human actions1 that they are the
 result of the interaction of character 
and environment1 and are not to be      
praised or blamed but understood4  ,tout
 comprendre est tout pardonner4  ,but   
when we consider our moral judgments we 
seem to be in a different world1 for    
there are some actions which we think we
 or others ought to have done or ought  
not to have done1 and this obligation   
has nothing to do with our likes and    
dislikes4  ,if we look back upon a past 
action of our own1 we may see why we did
 it1 understand how the temptation to it

 appealed with peculiar strength to     
something in our nature1 yet            
nevertheless we may say that we ought   
not to have done it1 and with that      
judgment goes the conviction that we    
need not have done it4  ,the conception 
of what ought to be is on a different   
plane from the conception of what is1   
and assumes a different kind of         
causality4  ,it assumes that1 when we   
are done with our analysis of character1
 of a man's likes and dislikes and the  
effect of circumstances upon them1 we   
can still assume that it is in his power
 to do what he ought and to abstain from
 doing what he ought not4  ,we praise   
the first and blame the second1 whether 
in ourselves or others1 just because we 
assume1 over and above inclination and  
disinclination1 a possibility of acting 
or not acting as duty demands4  ,thus   
,kant analyses the assumption of moral  
judgment4 ,but it is still no more than 
an assumption1 and he has to ask how it 
can be reconciled with the seemingly    

contradictory principle of causation4   
,the analysis of the third antinomy in  
the first ,critique1 as we saw1 prepared
 the way by maintaining that the same   
action might be phenomenally determined1
 and free as the action of a thing in   
itself1 were there another form of      
causality--free causality or            
self-determination4  ,for the existence 
of such another form of causality the   
first ,critique offered no evidence4    
,kant's concern is to show that morality
 assumes it2 for the claim of duty is   
that a man should not act as a creature 
of inclination1 of likes and dislikes4  
,duty claims to cut across all such     
empirical considerations4  ,the motive  
to do what duty demands must come from  
elsewhere4  ,it may then be found to be 
a claim that man should act not as a    
part of the physical world1 but as a    
moral being4  ,for man1 as well as an   
observer and understander of other men1 
is also a moral agent4  ,as such he     
stands in quite different relations to  

other men4  ,he treats them and himself 
as moral agents1 responsible for their  
actions4 ,as a member of the world of   
moral relations he acknowledges a system
 of rights and duties1 he holds himself 
responsible to other men as they are    
responsible to him1 and all this has    
nothing to do with what a man wants or  
does not want to do1 with how easy or   
how difficult he may find it to perform 
what duty demands4  ,in this he is      
assuming in himself and other men a     
power of determining the will in        
accordance with the moral law4 ,that1   
just because it takes no account of     
likes and dislikes1 cannot be derived   
from these or from considerations of    
circumstances or environment4  ,it must 
be deducible from the nature of man as a
 moral being4  ,in obeying the moral    
law1 then1 man will be obeying a law    
that comes from himself4  ,his will will
 be self-legislative4  ,this power of   
acting in accordance with a law that    
comes from the nature of man as a       

rational1 responsible being1 and not as 
a member of the world of causes and     
effects1 is moral freedom2 it is the    
assumption of all moral judgment and    
action4  ,it cannot1 ,kant holds1 be    
explained4  ,for all explanation is the 
work of the understanding1 and that can 
explain only phenomena4  ,it is enough  
that the first ,critique has shown that 
phenomenal causality is not inconsistent
 with the possibility of another        
causality4  ,in the moral sphere we act 
and judge as if we were free4 ,the moral
 law and duty make claims upon us on the
 same assumption4 ,moral freedom1 then1 
is the ground of the possibility of     
moral experience4  ,kant's account of   
duty is determined by the sharp         
separation which he makes of man as     
moral agent and man regarded from the   
point of view of anthropology4  ,the    
commands of duty must be derived solely 
from the nature of man as a moral agent4
  ,if they were the consequence of man's
 empirical nature or his surroundings1  

they would have no claim to override his
 promptings of inclination or pleasure4 
,he describes these commands as         
categorical1 and the principle of       
morality as a categorical imperative4   
,the meaning of this phrase lies in its 
opposition to hypothetical4  ,many      
commands and principles are1 ,kant says1
 hypothetical4  ,they assume that men   
desire certain ends1 happiness or health
 or success1 and the actions they advise
 are advised as means to such ends4     
,the law of morality is quite different 
from such prudential maxims4  ,it does  
not say1 ,if you want to be happy or to 
save your soul1 then act thus and thus4 
,its commands are absolute1 for they    
appeal to man simply as a rational      
being4 ,they must therefore be derived  
solely from a consideration of man's    
rationality4  ,it is difficult at first 
sight to see how any commands can be    
deduced from a consideration so         
abstract4  ,how1 we might say1 can man's
 rationality be known and recognised    

except in the content of what he does   
and thinks8  ,kant seeks to derive his  
imperative from the contrast between    
acting as a moral agent and following   
inclination4  ,man regards himself as a 
moral agent1 morally responsible for his
 conduct1 and he regards others as      
morally responsible1 whatever his or    
their particular nature or character may
 be4  ,that means that he must act as he
 thinks any one else would be bound to  
act1 and from this ,kant deduces his    
formulation of the categorical          
imperative3 ,act only according to that 
maxim which you can at the same time    
will to be a universal law4  ,another   
formula indicates more clearly the      
relation of duty to a society of moral  
agents responsible to one another3 ,act 
so that you treat humanity1 in your     
person and in the person of every one   
else1 always as an end as well as a     
means1 never merely as a means4  ,it is 
only by following such imperatives that 
we can rise above the promptings of     

circumstance1 for only thus is the will 
self-legislative4  ,in obeying such an  
imperative our will is self-determined1 
for it is following a principle that is 
derived from man's nature as independent
 and transcendent of the world of       
phenomena4  ,hence in moral action we   
are in contact with the reality of      
things more truly than in any           
understanding of phenomena4  ,the moral 
law has a dignity which no natural      
inclinations or likings can have1 and   
the good-will1 the will which follows   
such a law1 has a similar worth and     
dignity4  ,there is nothing in the      
world--nay1 even beyond the             
world--nothing conceivable1 which can be
 regarded as good without qualification1
 saving alone a good will4  ,such in    
outline is ,kant's account of morality4 
,a discussion of some of the            
difficulties which a consideration of it
 suggests may help to make its purport  
more clear4  ,kant holds that the       
principles of right action can be       

deduced directly from the imperative he 
has formulated1 and need take therefore 
no account of historical circumstance4  
,now1 it is easy to show that1 when we  
do an action which we know to be wrong1 
we are making an exception in our own   
favour4  ,we cannot universalise the    
maxim of our own conduct4  ,when we do  
what we know to be wrong1 we recognise  
what is right4  ,we say1 ,this is how   
any one ought to act in these           
circumstances1 but ,i am not going to do
 it4  ,we must learn to look upon       
ourselves as we should look upon and    
judge any other moral agent4  ,if1 when 
taxed with wrongdoing1 we reply1 ,i     
wanted to do it1 or ,that is the kind of
 person ,i am1 or ,that is the way ,i am
 made1 we are abandoning the moral      
position1 and the answer is1 ,whether   
you wanted it or not1 you ought not to  
have done it1 or1 ,well1 you ought to   
become different4  ,but this does not   
help us when1 looking at actions from a 
moral standpoint1 it is difficult to say

 what ought to be done4  ,kant tries to 
show that wrong action1 if              
universalised1 is always contradictory4 
,he takes the instance of telling a lie4
  ,if that were universal no one would  
believe any one else1 and there would be
 no point in telling a lie4  ,lying is  
essentially parasitical4  ,but this does
 not help us in the familiar problem in 
casuistry1 whether it is allowable to   
tell a lie to save life4  ,for here we  
have a conflict between two maxims1 both
 of which can be universalised4  ,we    
cannot regard such a situation as simply
 involving a question of telling the    
truth or of saving life4  ,we must      
consider the circumstances of the case4 
,this is even more evident if we apply  
,kant's rule to the question of whether 
celibacy is ever justified4  ,if        
celibacy were universal1 there would    
soon be nobody to be celibate1 but it   
does not therefore follow that some     
people under certain circumstances ought
 not to be celibate4 ,the question      

cannot be answered without reference to 
circumstances4  ,the moral of this is   
that the categorical imperative does not
 enable us to act without individual    
moral judgment in individual cases4     
,further1 in one of the instances which 
,kant gives he admits that there are    
certain ways of action which might be   
universalised1 but which he nevertheless
 holds to be wrong4  ,he instances the  
duty of being industrious4  ,a society  
could quite well be imagined in which   
every one was lazy1 but he says1 ,it    
cannot be willed4  ,the ultimate appeal 
here is to what the moral reason wills4 
,that means that we must admit that the 
moral reason or moral judgment has a    
content not derivable simply from the   
conception of the moral law2 that there 
are certain kinds of life1 certain kinds
 of action1 which we judge to be good1  
and others which we judge to be bad4    
,but1 if this is so1 we must give up the
 sharp separation ,kant makes between   
the moral law and nature1 and allow that

 things in nature can have a moral      
value4 ,it may still be true that they  
only have moral value through their     
relation to a good will1 and have no    
moral significance apart from such a    
relation4  ,the difficulties created by 
,kant's sharp separation of the moral   
and the phenomenal worlds are equally   
apparent in his discussion of motives4  
,he conceives the individual as         
phenomenal1 to be determined solely by  
pleasure and pain4  ,the power of the   
moral law is manifest1 therefore1 when  
its commands run counter to inclination1
 and the motive of respect for the moral
 law conquers inclination4  ,it is true 
to say that a man's likes and dislikes  
in themselves are not to the point when 
we are asking what he ought to do1 but  
,kant sometimes speaks as though there  
could be no moral value in an action    
which did not go against inclination4   
,this is perilously near that morbid    
theory of conscience which assumes that 
the fact that an action would be very   

disagreeable to the agent is itself     
proof that the proposal to perform it is
 the voice of conscience4 ,here again we
 have to say that the fact that         
inclinations viewed merely as           
inclinations have no moral value1 does  
not show that1 relatively to the good   
will1 one may not be better than        
another4  ,there is nothing to be proud 
of in the fact that we dislike doing our
 duty4  ,this sharp separation between  
the world of morality and science was   
somewhat tempered in ,kant's third      
,critique1 which we shall examine in the
 next chapter4                          
99,,chapter ,,vii99           99,,the   
,,critique ,,of ,,judgment--,,aesthetics
 ,,and ,,teleology99   ,the ,critique of
 ,judgment is at once the most          
interesting and the most difficult of   
,kant's three ,critiques4  ,it seems to 
cover a much wider ground than either of
 the two earlier ,critiques4  ,it       
concerns itself with the relation of    
empirical investigation to the a priori 

principles of understanding discussed in
 the first ,critique1 with an attempt to
 bridge the gulf between the world of   
freedom and the world of nature as      
described in the second ,critique1 with 
a discussion of the principles of       
aesthetics and of the conflict between  
the rival claims of the principles of   
mechanism and teleology1 a conflict     
which1 since the discoveries of ,darwin 
and the increasing interest taken in    
biology1 is becoming every day more     
important4  ,on all these points ,kant  
has much of importance to say4  ,modern 
theories of aesthetic are mainly based  
on an acceptance of the distinctions    
which he first laid down clearly4  ,much
 modern philosophy of a type which is   
little in sympathy with the doctrines of
 the first ,critique--,pragmatism1 for  
example--is an elaboration of his       
account of the regulative principles    
which guide empirical investigation1    
while speculation on the rival methods  
of biology has hardly advanced beyond   

the solution suggested by ,kant4 ,yet   
the very suggestiveness of this book    
makes it hard to understand4  ,it is    
difficult to see the connection which   
,kant supposed to exist between these   
very various problems4  ,the form of the
 book1 like the form of the first       
,critique1 is marked by subdivisions    
suggested by formal logic1 which seem to
 have little or no connection with the  
subjects discussed under them1 so that  
the whole is a curious combination of   
formal system and discursive content4   
,kant himself regarded this ,critique as
 the triumphant vindication of his whole
 system1 in that it brought together and
 reconciled subjects which he had       
previously distinguished too sharply4   
,many later writers have thought rather 
that in it the inconsistencies which    
they believe to exist in ,kant's thought
 come to a head4  ,we have not space    
here to vindicate the ,critique of      
,judgment as the crowning phase of the  
critical philosophy1 as a recent writer 

has called it1 or to examine singly     
,kant's treatment of the various        
subjects of interest with which it is   
concerned4  ,it is important1 however1  
to follow the connection which ,kant    
supposed to exist between these         
different subjects4  ,if we can         
understand that1 we shall gain          
considerable insight into ,kant's system
 as a whole4  ,kant names the book the  
,critique of ,judgment1 or1 more        
exactly1 the ,critique of the ,faculty  
of ,judgment4 ,judgment is distinguished
 from understanding1 whose principles   
are more peculiarly the subject of the  
first ,critique4  ,the understanding1   
according to ,kant1 is the faculty of   
rules4  ,judgment is shown in the       
application of rules to individual      
instances4  ,it is the element of       
individuality and spontaneity in all    
thinking1 for which no rules can be     
discovered4  ,judgment cannot be taught1
 different men possess it in different  
degrees2 it is akin to genius4  ,when1  

then1 ,kant turns to examine the faculty
 of judgment1 he is asking whether the  
mind1 in dealing with individuals in all
 their variety and difference1 and in   
attempting to understand them1 is guided
 by any general rules or principles4    
,the import of this question becomes    
clear in his relation of it to the      
familiar question of causation4  ,the   
principle of causation1 as we have seen1
 is1 according to ,kant1 an a priori    
principle of the understanding1 and is  
assumed in all experience2 but it does  
not of itself enable us to determine in 
any particular case what causes what4   
,that is the task of empirical          
investigation1 and needs1 as we know1   
the imagination and insight of the      
individual investigator2 in ,kantian    
language1 it is the work of the faculty 
of judgment4  ,besides the a priori     
principle of causation1 therefore1 we   
have an indefinite number of empirical  
causal laws4  ,kant asks whether the    
scientist in investigating such laws1   

and more particularly in considering    
their relation to one another1 is guided
 by any principles4 ,he finds that the  
scientist assumes that this indefinite  
variety is capable of being reduced to  
some kind of unity1 assumes that there  
is continuity in nature1 that knowledge 
will not remain an aggregate of         
disconnected rules4  ,chemistry1 for    
example1 has discovered that the        
overwhelming variety of natural changes 
can be reduced to the action and        
interaction of a small number of        
elements4  ,the chemist proposes to go  
on and see whether the different        
elements may not themselves be seen to  
be forms of one substance4  ,these      
assumptions are1 according to ,kant1    
quite different from the principles of  
the understanding4  ,for the latter are 
grounds of the possibility of           
experience4 ,we cannot deny them without
 making experience unmeaning4  ,this    
cannot be said of the former4  ,it      
obviously cannot be essential to        

experience that the multiplicity of the 
laws of nature should be reducible to   
unity1 for such unity has never been    
discovered4 ,experience has been quite  
possible without it4  ,this distinction 
between two kinds of principles ,kant   
expresses by calling those with which we
 are now concerned regulative4  ,the    
purpose they serve is the regulation and
 improvement of knowledge4  ,they do    
not1 like the principles of the         
understanding1 prescribe to nature4  ,we
 assume in them that nature is1 in      
,kant's words1 purposive to the         
understanding--that is1 we first think  
out what order of nature would be       
intelligible1 and then look to see      
whether we cannot discover in nature    
such an order4  ,this assumption does   
not prove that there is any such order1 
but in science we act as if it were     
there to be found out4  ,this suggestion
 of ,kant's has been elaborated in many 
modern writers on philosophy1 who have  
pointed out how much scientific method  

is governed by the notion of the most   
easily intelligible theory1 and they    
have argued that science assumes1 for   
the convenience of method1 principles   
which it never completely proves4 ,these
 principles are called sometimes        
methodological assumptions1 sometimes   
postulates4  ,the difference between    
such modern writers and ,kant is that   
the former think that all a priori      
principles are of this nature1 and that 
the principle of causation1 for example1
 is itself only a postulate4  ,the      
faculty of judgment1 then1 according to 
,kant1 assumes for regulative purposes  
that nature is purposive to our         
understanding4  ,what does this last    
phrase mean8  ,we are often concerned to
 know the relation of things to our     
purposes4  ,it has been pointed out that
 very many of our empirical concepts    
represent rather our practical interest 
in things than our desire to understand 
them as they are4  ,kant's phrase       
implies that1 apart from any such       

relation to particular purposes1 there  
is a more general purpose of mere       
intelligibility1 which some objects     
obviously serve more than others4  ,here
 we pass to the consideration of art1   
for in our judgments of beauty ,kant    
holds that we similarly disregard the   
relation of the beautiful object to any 
particular purpose1 and seem to be      
concerned with general purposiveness4   
,the judgment of beauty is1 for ,kant1  
the supreme act of the faculty of       
judgment4  ,it is reflection on an      
individual for its own sake1 without    
attempting to fit it to our desires or  
see it as an instance of our concepts or
 rules4  ,kant therefore proceeds to    
examine our judgments of beauty1 which  
show how reflection on individual       
objects may display general rules1 and  
then proceeds1 in the last part of the  
,critique1 to discuss the part played by
 the concept of purposiveness in our    
understanding of nature4  ,it would seem
 at first sight that ,kant is not       

interested in art for its own sake1 but 
for the light which it throws upon the  
nature of our intellectual faculties4   
,nevertheless he is careful to insist on
 the distinction between artistic and   
scientific judgments4  ,the judgment of 
beauty1 he insists1 is free1 is not     
determined by a concept4  ,we are not   
concerned1 in such judgments1 with      
asking what an object is4  ,in so far   
as1 in our appreciation of beauty1 we   
bring in such considerations we are     
wrong4  ,he therefore rules out any     
theory that beauty is concerned with    
faithful representation4  ,beauty       
consists in the form of an object1 and  
in nothing else4  ,the judgment of      
beauty1 besides being free1 is also     
disinterested4  ,the relation of the    
beautiful object to our purposes is     
irrelevant to its beauty4  ,the judgment
 of beauty cannot1 therefore1 be        
determined by rules of any kind4  ,it is
 always individual and immediate1 and   
the immediate feeling of beauty counts  

for more than any rules or canons of    
taste4  ,kant therefore vindicates art  
as independent of either science or     
morality4  ,yet1 once we realise its    
independence1 the nature of art throws  
light upon both science and morality2   
for the judgment of beauty1 although    
free and not determined by concepts1    
claims universal validity4  ,we might   
put ,kant's point in another way by     
saying that art is significant1 and yet 
is not significant of anything in       
particular4  ,its meaning cannot be     
reduced to scientific statement nor     
abstracted from its form1 and yet art   
has meaning4  ,kant finds the           
explanation of the fact that the        
judgment of beauty is free1 and yet     
claims universal validity1 in the       
suggestion that a beautiful object is   
one the contemplation of which arouses  
and enlivens the two faculties of the   
intelligence1 the imagination and the   
understanding1 in their proper          
proportion or harmony4  ,all knowledge  

needs imagination1 the power of seeing  
resemblances and differences in objects1
 and understanding which by concepts    
gives unity and rules to the            
imagination4  ,in science the           
imagination is subordinate to the       
understanding1 for the aim of science is
 definiteness and precision4  ,in art   
the imagination is free1 and yet art is 
not the mere seeing of resemblances and 
differences2 it also has its unity4  ,it
 aims at the best proportion of variety 
and unity4  ,this is independent of the 
varying natures of individual persons1  
and therefore the judgment of beauty can
 claim to be universally valid4         
,beautiful objects1 then1 are purposive 
to the understanding1 inasmuch as their 
form stimulates in the most harmonious  
degree the two faculties of             
intelligence1 and in art we find proof  
that there is a principle of general    
intelligibility1 which may guide the    
work of the scientist4  ,the purpose of 
the scientist is quite different from   

that of the artist1 but if he is to     
reduce his facts to order and           
intelligibility he must be guided by a  
principle which is seen in its pure form
 in the artist4  ,in the second place1  
an understanding of the nature of art   
has significance for moral theory1      
because the judgment of beauty is       
disinterested1 and shows that pleasure  
may be independent of desire4  ,in      
aesthetic pleasure we are not merely    
determined by our inclinations1 for art 
is of all human activities free and     
creative4 ,we enjoy art not because it  
serves any of our individual desires and
 purposes1 it is enjoyed by something in
 us that is universal4  ,art1 then1     
contradicts the position which ,kant    
assumes in the second ,critique1 that we
 cannot follow pleasure without being   
slaves of our phenomenal nature4  ,it is
 a disinterested enjoyment1 and is      
witness to the possibility of           
disinterested pleasure in the good4     
,further1 ,kant held that in one kind of

 aesthetic enjoyment1 appreciation of   
the sublime1 the contrast between our   
weakness and the vast extent and        
overwhelming powers of nature1 calls    
forth in us a conviction accompanied by 
pleasure of the yet greater might of the
 moral law within us4  ,art therefore   
may become the symbol of morality1 and  
the third ,critique does much to soften 
the rigour of the teaching of the       
second4  ,in the last part of the       
,critique of ,judgment ,kant applies his
 doctrine of regulative principles to   
the understanding of nature4  ,the      
faculty of judgment1 as we saw1 is      
concerned with the attempt to give unity
 to the detail of the natural world4    
,in this work it has two regulative     
principles1 mechanism and teleology4    
,reality cannot be formed according to  
both these principles2 for mechanism    
assumes that reality can be regarded as 
a pattern or complex of recurring or    
interchangeable parts whose changes are 
necessitated1 teleology that the world  

cannot be explained without supposing   
purpose to be an operating agency in    
change4 ,mechanism seeks to explain     
things as the necessary result of their 
original condition1 teleology in the    
light of their highest development4 ,the
 two principles have therefore been held
 to be inconsistent4  ,the scientist1   
jealous for the validity of his         
discovery of mechanism1 combats the very
 notion of purposive agency4  ,the      
theologian thinks that to admit         
mechanism anywhere is to give up his    
whole position4  ,kant's solution of    
this antinomy is that both mechanism and
 teleology are only regulative          
principles4  ,they tell us nothing of   
the ultimate nature of reality1 except  
that we can explain much of it by       
regarding it as if it were a machine1   
and much by regarding it as if it were  
the field of purposive agency4  ,reality
 must be consistent with both these     
facts1 but more we cannot say4 ,the     
moral is that we should continue to     

treat them as regulative principles1 and
 push each principle of explanation as  
far as it will go4  ,kant is here1 as   
usual1 the enemy alike of scientific and
 of theological dogmatism4  ,he will not
 allow any limit to be set to the work  
of scientific investigation1 and yet    
will not allow a principle of scientific
 method to be converted from an         
explanation of perceived facts into a   
theory of the universe4  ,besides       
mediating between the conflicting claims
 of mechanism and teleology1 ,kant also 
modifies the notion of teleology4  ,when
 we think of reality as purposive1 we do
 not necessarily think of it as having a
 definite purpose1 as being subordinate1
 for example1 to the well-being of man4 
,the principle of purposiveness arises  
properly1 he holds1 from the            
contemplation of living things1 from the
 perception of the difference between an
 organism and a machine4  ,an organism  
is purposive in the sense in which a    
work of art is4  ,in applying the       

principle we are trying to understand   
reality as though the relation of all   
the different things in it were like the
 relation of the parts of an organism or
 a picture4 ,but this principle1 like   
the principle of mechanism1 does not    
carry us further than the facts we have 
examined1 for an organism or a work of  
art can only be understood by study of  
the individual relations of all its     
parts4  ,we can never know the universe 
as an organism1 for we can never know   
all its parts4  ,we can understand and  
put together more and more of them1 but 
we never come to the end4  ,the third   
,critique1 then1 enforces the lesson of 
the first1 that knowledge is the work of
 individual finite minds1 trying to     
understand elements in a whole that     
transcends the limits of their          
experience1 pushing back the spatial and
 temporal limits which confine each     
individual1 but never removing them     
altogether4  ,the critical philosophy   
teaches the impossibility of absolute   

knowledge1 but it does so not by        
suggesting general scepticism of all    
knowledge1 but by enforcing the validity
 of scientific knowledge within its own 
limits4                                 
99,,bibliography99                      
99,,translations99   ,there are two     
accessible translations of the ,critique
 of ,pure ,reason--,meiklejohn 7,bell   
,co47 and ,max ,mueller 7,macmillan74   
,kant's ethical writings have been      
translated by ,abbott 7,longmans74      
,there is a translation of the ,critique
 of ,pure ,reason by ,bernard           
7,macmillan71 and of the first part of  
it1 the ,critique of ,a,esthetic        
,judgment1 by ,meredith 7,clarendon     
,press74  ,this last book has           
introductory essays and notes4  ,the    
student beginning the study of ,kant    
will find ,watson's ,selections from    
,kant 7,mac,lehose  ,sons7 useful if he 
cannot read the ,critiques in full4     
99,,commentaries99   ,the most useful   
small books on ,kant are ,adamson1 ,the 

,philosophy of ,kant 7,blackwood71 and  
,watson1 ,the ,philosophy of ,kant      
,explained 7,mac,lehose74  ,the best and
 most thorough work on ,kant in ,english
 is ,caird1 ,the ,critical ,philosophy  
of ,kant1 #b vols4  7,mac,lehose74      
,,printed ,,in ,,great ,,britain