,,the      ,,problem ,,of ,,truth       
,,by ,h4 ,,wildon ,,carr      ,,honorary
 ,d4,,litt41 ,,durham          ,,london3
 ,t4 ,c4  ,e4 ,c4 ,,jack    #fg ,,long  
,,acre1 ,w4,c41 ,,and ,,edinburgh       
,,new ,,york3 ,,dodge ,,publishing ,,co4
          v    ,,preface    ,a problem  
of philosophy is completely different   
from a problem of  science4  ,in science
 we accept our subject-matter as it is  
presented in  unanalysed experience2 in 
philosophy we examine the first         
principles  and ultimate questions that 
concern conscious experience itself4    
,the  problem of truth is a problem of  
philosophy4  ,it is not a problem of    
merely historical interest1 but a       
present problem--a living  controversy1 
the issue of which is undecided4  ,its  
present interest may  be said to centre 
round the doctrine of pragmatism1 which 
some fifteen  years ago began to        
challenge the generally accepted        
principles of  philosophy4  ,in         
expounding this problem of truth1 my    

main purpose has  been to make clear to 
the reader the nature of a problem of   
philosophy  and to disclose the secret  
of its interest4  ,my book presumes no  
previous study of philosophy nor special
 knowledge of its problems4  ,the       
theories that ,i have shown in conflict 
on this question are1 each  of them1    
held by some of the leaders of          
philosophy4  ,in presenting  them1      
therefore1 ,i have tried to let the full
 dialectical force of the  argument     
appear4  ,i have indicated my own view1 
that the direction in  which the        
solution lies is in the new conception  
of life and the theory  of knowledge    
given to us in the philosophy of        
,bergson4  ,if ,i am right1  the        
solution is not1 like pragmatism1 a     
doctrine of the nature of  truth1 but a 
theory of knowledge in which vi the     
dilemma in regard to  truth does not    
arise4  ,but1 as always in philosophy1  
the solution of  one problem is the     
emergence of another4  ,there is no     

finality4    ,my grateful acknowledgment
 is due to my friend ,professor ,s4     
,alexander1  who kindly read my         
manuscript and assisted me with most    
valuable  suggestions1 and also to my   
friend ,dr4 ,t4 ,percy ,nunn for a      
similar  service4    ,h4 ,,wildon       
,,carr4          vii      ,,contents    
,,chap4      ,i4  ,,physics ,,and       
,,metaphysics    ,,ii4  ,,appearance    
,,and ,,reality    ,,iii4  ,,the        
,,logical ,,theories    ,,iv4  ,,the    
,,absolute    ,v4  ,,pragmatism    ,,vi4
  ,,utility    ,,vii4  ,,illusion       
,,viii4  ,,the ,,problem ,,of ,,error   
,,ix4  ,,conclusion    ,,bibliography   
,,index          #i    ,,the ,,problem  
,,of ,,truth          ,,chapter ,i      
,,physics ,,and ,,metaphysics    ,the   
progress of physical science leads to   
the continual discovery of  complexity  
in what is first apprehended as simple4 
,the atom of  hydrogen1 so long accepted
 as the ideal limit of simplicity1 is   
now  suspected to be not the lowest unit

 in the scale of elements1 and it is  no
 longer conceived1 as it used to be1 as 
structureless1 but as an  individual    
system1 comparable to a solar system1 of
 electrical  components preserving an   
equilibrium probably only temporary4    
,the same  tendency to discover         
complexity in what is first apprehended 
as simple  is evident in the study of   
philosophy4  ,the more our simple and   
ordinary notions are submitted to       
analysis1 the more are profound         
problems brought to consciousness4  ,it 
is impossible to think that we  do not  
know what such an ordinary1 simple      
notion as that of truth is2  yet the    
attempt to give a definition of its     
meaning brings quite  unexpected        
difficulties to light1 and the widest   
divergence at the  present time between 
rival principles of philosophical       
interpretation  is in regard to a theory
 of the nature of truth4  ,it is not a  
problem  that is pressed on us by any   
felt need1 nor is anyone who does not   

feel  its interest called upon to occupy
 himself with it4  ,we speak our        
language before we know its #aj grammar1
 and we reason just as well  whether we 
have learnt the science of logic or not4
    ,this science of ,logic1 or1 as it  
is sometimes called1 of ,formal ,logic1 
was1 until modern times1 regarded as a  
quite simple account of the  principles 
that govern the exercise of our         
reasoning faculty1 and of  the rules    
founded on those principles by following
 which truth was  attained and false    
opinion or error avoided4  ,it was      
called formal  because it was supposed  
to have no relation to the matter of the
  subject reasoned about1 but only to   
the form which the reasoning must  take4
  ,a complete account of this formal    
science1 as it was recognised  and      
accepted for many ages1 might easily    
have been set forth within the  limits  
of a small volume such as this4  ,but   
the development of modern  philosophy   
has wrought an extraordinary change4    

,anyone now who will  set himself the   
task of mastering all the problems that 
have been  raised round the question of 
the nature of logical process1 will find
  himself confronted with a vast library
 of special treatises1 and  involved in 
discussions that embrace the whole of   
philosophy4  ,the  special problem of   
truth that it is the object of this     
little volume to  explain is a quite    
modern question4  ,it has been raised   
within the  present generation of       
philosophical writers1 and is to-day1   
perhaps1  the chief controversy in which
 philosophers are engaged4  ,but        
although  it is only in the last few    
years that controversy has been aroused 
on  this question1 the problem is not   
new--it is indeed as old as  philosophy 
itself4  ,in the fifth century before   
,christ1 and in the  generation that    
immediately preceded ,socrates1 a famous
 philosopher1  ,protagoras 7#dha-daa    
,b4,c47 published a book with the title 
,the ,truth4  ,he had the misfortune1   

common at that time1 to offend the      
religious  ,athenians1 #aa for he spoke 
slightingly of the gods1 proposing to   
banish their existence or non-existence 
from writing and speech4  ,he  was      
convicted of atheism1 and his books were
 publicly burnt1 and he  himself1 then  
seventy years of age1 was either        
banished or at least was  obliged to    
flee from ,athens1 and on his way to    
,sicily he lost his life  in a          
shipwreck4  ,our knowledge of this book 
of ,protagoras is due to the            
preservation of its argument by ,plato  
in the dialogue ,thetetus4  ,protagoras1
 we are there told1 taught that man is  
the measure of all  things--of the      
existence of things that are1 and of the
 non-existence  of things that are not4 
,you have read him8 asks ,socrates1     
addressing ,thetetus4  ,oh yes1 again   
and again1 is ,thetetus' reply4  ,plato 
was entirely opposed to the doctrine    
that ,protagoras taught4  ,it  seemed to
 him to bring gods and men and tadpoles 

to one level as far as  truth was       
concerned2 for he drew the deduction    
that if man is the  measure of all      
things1 then to each man his own opinion
 is right4  ,plato opposed to it the    
theory that truth is the vision of a    
pure  objective reality4    ,this same  
problem that exercised the ancient world
 is now again a chief  centre of        
philosophical interest1 and the aim of  
this little book is  not to decide that 
question1 but to serve as a guide and   
introduction  to those who desire to    
know what the question is that divides  
philosophers to-day into the hostile    
camps of pragmatism and                 
intellectualism4    ,the subject is not 
likely to interest anyone who does not  
care for the  study of the exact        
definitions and abstract principles that
 lie at the  basis of science and       
philosophy4  ,there are many who are    
engaged in the  study of the physical   
and natural sciences1 and also many who 
devote  themselves to the social and    

political #ab sciences1 who hold in     
profound contempt the fine distinctions 
and intellectual subtleties  that seem  
to them the whole content of logic and  
metaphysic4  ,the  attitude of the      
scientific mind is not difficult to     
understand4  ,it has  recently been     
rather graphically expressed by a       
distinguished and  popular exponent of  
the principles of natural science4  ,one
 may regard  the utmost possibilities of
 the results of human knowledge as the  
contents of a bracket1 and place outside
 the bracket the factor x to  represent 
those unknown and unknowable            
possibilities which the  imagination of 
man is never wearied of suggesting4     
,this factor x is  the plaything of the 
metaphysician4#a  ,this mathematical    
symbol of  the bracket1 multiplied by x 
to represent the unknown and unknowable 
possibilities beyond it1 will serve me  
to indicate with some exactness  the    
problem with which ,i am going to deal4 
,the symbol is an expression  of the    

agnostic position4  ,the popular        
caricature of the metaphysician  and his
 plaything we may disregard as a pure   
fiction4  ,the unknowable  x of the     
agnostic is not the meta or beyond of   
physics which the  metaphysician vainly 
seeks to know4  ,the only beyond of     
physics is  consciousness or experience 
itself1 and this is the subject-matter  
of  metaphysics4  ,our present problem  
is that of the bracket1 not that of  the
 factor outside1 if there is any such   
factor1 nor yet the particular  nature  
of the contents within4  ,there are1 as 
we shall see1 three views  that are     
possible of the nature of the bracket4  
,in one view1 it is  merely the         
conception of the extent which knowledge
 has attained or can  attain2 it has no 
intimate relation to the knowledge1 but 
marks  externally its limit4  ,this is  
the view of the realist4  ,in another   
view1 the whole of knowledge is         
intimately related #ac to its           
particular parts2 the things we know are

 not a mere collection or  aggregate of 
independent facts that we have          
discovered2 the bracket  which contains 
our knowledge gives form to it1 and     
relates organically  the dependent parts
 to the whole in one comprehensive      
individual  system4  ,this is the view  
of the idealist4  ,there is yet another 
view3  human knowledge is relative to   
human activity and its needs2 the       
bracket is the ever-changing limit of   
that activity--within it is all  that is
 relevant to human purpose and          
personality without it is all  that is  
irrelevant4  ,this is the view of the   
pragmatist4    ,it is not only the      
scientific mind1 but also the ethical   
and religious  mind1 that is likely to  
be at least impatient1 if not           
contemptuous1 of  this inquiry4  ,the   
question ,what is truth8 will probably  
bring to  everyone's mind the words     
uttered by a ,roman ,procurator at the  
supreme  moment of a great              
world-tragedy4  ,pilate's question is   

usually  interpreted as the cynical jest
 of a judge indifferent to the          
significance of the great cause he was  
trying--the expression of the  belief   
that there is no revelation of spiritual
 truth of the highest  importance for   
our human nature1 or at least that there
 is no  infallible test by which it can 
be known4  ,it is not this problem of   
truth that we are now to discuss4       
,there are1 on the other hand1 many     
minds that can never rest satisfied     
while they have accepted only1 and not  
examined1 the assumptions of  science   
and the values of social and political  
and religious ideals4  ,their quest of  
first principles may appear to more     
practical natures a  harmless amusement 
or a useless waste of intellectual      
energy2 but they  are responding to a   
deep need of our human nature1 a need   
that1 it may  be1 is in its very nature 
insatiable--the need of intellectual    
satisfaction4  ,it is #ad the nature of 
this intellectual satisfaction  itself  

that is our problem of truth4    ,there 
are therefore two attitudes towards the 
problem of truth and  reality--that of  
the mind which brings a practical test  
to every  question1 and that of the mind
 restless to gain by insight or by      
speculation a clue to the mystery that  
enshrouds the meaning of  existence4    
,the first attitude seems peculiarly to 
characterise the man  of science1 who   
delights to think that the problem of   
reality is simple  and open to the      
meanest understanding4  ,between the    
plain man's view  and that of the man of
 high attainment in scientific research 
there is  for him only a difference of  
degree1 and science seems almost to     
require an apology if it does not       
directly enlarge our command over       
nature4  ,it would explain life and     
consciousness as the result of  chemical
 combination of material elements4      
,philosophy1 on the other  hand1 is the 
instinctive feeling that the secret of  
the universe is not  open and revealed  

to the plain man guided by common-sense 
experience  alone1 even if to this      
experience be added the highest         
attainments of  scientific research4    
,either there is far more in matter than
 is  contained in the three-dimensional 
space it occupies1 or else the  universe
 must owe its development to something  
beyond matter4  ,the  universe must seem
 a poor thing indeed to a man who can   
think that  physical science does or can
 lay bare its meaning4  ,it is the      
intense  desire to catch some glimpse of
 its meaning that leads the philosopher 
to strive to transcend the actual world 
by following the speculative  bent of   
the reasoning power that his            
intellectual nature makes possible4     
#a ,sir ,kay ,lankester4          #ae   
,,chapter ,,ii    ,,appearance ,,and    
,,reality    ,our conscious life is one 
unceasing change4  ,from the first      
awakening  of consciousness to the      
actual present1 no one moment has been  
the mere  repetition of another1 and the

 moments which as we look back seem to  
have made up our life are not separable 
elements of it but our own  divisions of
 a change that has been continuous4     
,and as it has been1 so  we know it will
 be until consciousness ceases with     
death4  ,consciousness and life are in  
this respect one and the same1 although 
when we speak of our consciousness we   
think chiefly of a passive  receptivity1
 and when we speak of our life we think 
of an activity4  ,consciousness as the  
unity of knowing and acting is a        
becoming4  ,the  past is not left       
behind1 it is with us in the form of    
memory2 the  future is not a            
predetermined order which only a natural
 disability  prevents us from knowing1  
it is yet uncreated2 conscious life is  
the  enduring present which grows with  
the past and makes the future4    ,this 
reality of consciousness is our         
continually changing experience4  ,but  
there is also another reality with which
 it seems to be in  necessary relation  

and also in complete contrast--this is  
the reality  of the material or physical
 universe4  ,the world of physical      
reality  seems to be composed of a      
matter that cannot change in a space    
that is  absolutely unchangeable4  ,this
 physical world seems made up of solid  
things1 formed out of matter4  ,change  
in physical science is only a           
rearrangement of matter or an alteration
 of position in space4    ,this physical
 reality is not1 as psychical reality   
is1 #af known to us  directly2 it is an 
interpretation of our sense experience4 
,immediate  experience has objects1     
generally called sense data4  ,these    
objects are  what we actually see in    
sensations of sight1 what we actually   
hear in  sensations of sound1 and so on2
 and they lead us to suppose or infer   
physical objects--that is1 objects that 
do not depend upon our  experience for  
their existence1 but whose existence is 
the cause of our  having the experience4
  ,the process by which we infer the    

nature of the  external world from our  
felt experience is logical4  ,it        
includes  perceiving1 conceiving1       
thinking or reasoning4  ,the object of  
the  logical process1 the aim or ideal  
to which it seeks to attain1 is  truth4 
,knowledge of reality is truth4         
,there are therefore two realities1 the 
reality of our felt experience  from    
which all thinking sets out1 and the    
reality which in thinking we  seek to   
know4  ,the one reality is immediate2 it
 is conscious experience  itself4  ,the 
other reality is that which we infer    
from the fact of  experience1 that by   
which we seek to explain our existence4 
,the one we  feel1 the other we think4  
,if the difference between immediate    
knowledge and mediate knowledge or      
inference lay in the feeling of         
certainty alone or in the nature of     
belief1 the distinction would not  be   
the difficult one that it is4  ,the     
theories of idealism and realism  show  
how widely philosophers are divided on  

the subject4  ,we are quite  as certain 
of some of the things that we can only  
infer as we are of  the things of which 
we are immediately aware4  ,we cannot   
doubt1 for  instance1 that there are    
other persons besides ourselves1 yet we 
can  have no distinct knowledge of any  
consciousness but one--our own4  ,our   
knowledge that there are other minds is 
an inference from our  observation of   
the behaviour of some of the things we  
#ag directly  experience1 and from the  
experience of our own consciousness4    
,and even  those things which seem in   
direct relation to us--the things we    
see1 or  hear1 or touch--are immediately
 present in only a very small1 perhaps  
an infinitesimal1 part of what we know  
and think of as their full  reality2 all
 but this small part is inferred4  ,from
 a momentary  sensation of sight1 or    
sound1 or touch we infer reality that   
far  exceeds anything actually given to 
us by the sensation4    ,thinking is    
questioning experience4  ,when our      

attention is suddenly  attracted by     
something--a flash of light1 or a sound1
 or a twinge of  pain--consciously or   
unconsciously we say to ourself1 ,what  
is that8  ,the that--a simple felt      
experience--contains a meaning1 brings a
  message1 and we ask what8  ,we        
distinguish the existence as an         
appearance1 and we seek to know the     
reality4  ,the quest of the reality     
which is made known to us by the        
appearance is the logical process of    
thought4  ,the end or purpose of this   
logical process is to replace the       
immediate reality of the felt experience
 with a mediated-reality--that  is1 a   
reality made known to us4  ,directly1   
therefore1 that we begin to  think1 the 
immediately present existence becomes an
 appearance1 and  throughout the        
development of our thought it is taken  
to be something  that requires          
explanation4  ,we seek to discover the  
reality which will  explain it4    ,it  
is in this distinction of appearance and

 reality that the problem of  truth     
arises4  ,it does not depend upon any   
particular theory of  knowledge4  ,the  
same fact is recognised by idealists and
 by realists4  ,idealism may deny that  
the knowledge of independent reality is 
possible2 realism may insist that it is 
implied in the very fact of             
consciousness itself--whichever is      
right1 the reality which thinking       
brings before the mind is quite #ah     
unlike and of a different order to  that
 which we immediately experience in     
feeling4  ,and even if we know  nothing 
of philosophy1 if we are ignorant of all
 theories of knowledge  and think of the
 nature of knowledge simply from the    
standpoint of the  natural man1 the fact
 is essentially the same--the true      
reality of  things is something         
concealed from outward view1 something  
to be found  out by science or by       
practical wisdom4  ,our knowledge of    
this reality  may be true1 in this case 
only is it knowledge2 or it may be      

false1 in  which case it is not         
knowledge but opinion or error4    ,the 
reality then1 the knowledge of which is 
truth1 is not the immediate  reality of 
feeling but the inferred reality of     
thought4  ,to have any  intelligible    
meaning1 the affirmation that knowledge 
is true supposes  that there already    
exists a distinction between knowledge  
and the  reality known1 between the     
being and the knowing of that which is  
known4  ,in immediate knowledge1 in     
actual conscious felt experience  there 
is no such distinction1 and therefore to
 affirm truth or error of  such         
knowledge is unmeaning4  ,i cannot have 
a toothache without knowing  that ,i    
have it4  ,in the actual felt toothache 
knowing and being are not  only         
inseparable--they are indistinguishable4
  ,if1 however1 ,i think of  my         
toothache as part of an independent     
order of reality1 my knowledge  of it   
may be true or false4  ,i am then       
thinking of it as the effect of  an     

exposed nerve1 or of an abscess or of an
 inflammation--as something1  that is to
 say1 that is conditioned independently 
of my consciousness  and that will cease
 to exist when the conditions are       
altered4  ,in the  same way1 when ,i    
behold a landscape1 the blue expanse of 
sky and  variegated colour of the land  
which ,i actually experience are not    
either true or false1 they are immediate
 experience in #ai which  knowing is    
being and being is knowing4  ,truth and 
error only apply to  the interpretation 
of that experience1 to the independent  
reality that  ,i infer from it4  ,we    
can1 then1 distinguish two kinds of     
knowledge  which we may call immediate  
and mediate1 or1 better still1          
acquaintance  and description4          
,accordingly1 when we say that something
 is1 or when  we say of anything that it
 if real1 we may mean either of two     
things4  ,we may mean that it is part of
 the changing existence that we actually
  feel and that we call consciousness or

 life1 or we may mean that it is  part  
of an independent order of things whose 
existence we think about  in order to   
explain1 not what our feeling is 7there 
can be no  explanation of this71 but how
 it comes to exist4  ,we know by        
description a vast number of things with
 which we never can be actually         
acquainted4  ,such1 indeed1 is the case 
with all the knowledge by which  we rule
 our lives and conceive the reality     
which environs us4  ,yet we  are        
absolutely dependent on the reality we  
know by acquaintance for all  our       
knowledge of these things4  ,not only is
 immediate sense experience  and the    
knowledge it gives us by acquaintance   
the only evidence we have  of the       
greater and wider reality1 but we are   
dependent on it for the  terms wherewith
 to describe it1 for the form in which  
to present it1  for the matter with     
which to compose it4  ,and this is the  
real ground  of the study of philosophy1
 the justification of its standpoint4   

,it is  this fact--this ultimate        
undeniable fact--that all reality of    
whatever  kind and in whatever way      
known1 whether by thought or by feeling1
  whether it is perceived or conceived1 
remembered or imagined1 is in the  end  
composed of sense experience3 it is this
 fact from which all the  problems of   
philosophy arise4  ,it is this fact that
 our utilitarian men  of science find   
#bj themselves forced to recognise1     
however scornful  they may be of        
metaphysical methods and results4       
,the special problem of the nature of   
truth is concerned1 then1 with the      
reality that we have distinguished as   
known by description1 and  conceived by 
us as independent in its existence of   
the consciousness by  which we know it4 
,what is the nature of the seal by which
 we stamp  this knowledge true8         
,,chapter ,,iii    ,,the ,,logical      
,,theories    ,whoever cares to become  
acquainted with the difficulty of the   
problem  of truth must not be impatient 

of dialectical subtleties4  ,there is a 
well-known story in ,boswell's ,life of 
,dr4 ,johnson which relates how  the    
,doctor refuted ,berkeley's philosophy  
which affirmed the  non-existence of    
matter4  ,i observed1 says ,boswell1    
that though we  are satisfied his       
doctrine is not true1 it is impossible  
to refute it4  ,i shall never forget the
 alacrity with which ,johnson answered1 
striking  his foot with mighty force    
against a large stone1 till he rebounded
  from it--',i refute it thus4'  ,dr4   
,johnson is the representative of       
robust common sense4  ,it has very often
 turned out in metaphysical  disputes   
that the common-sense answer is the one 
that has been  justified in the end4    
,those who are impatient of metaphysics 
are1  therefore1 not without reasonable 
ground2 and indeed the strong belief    
that the common-sense view will be      
justified in the end1 however  powerful 
the sceptical doubt that seems to       
contradict it1 however  startling the   

paradox that seems to be involved in it1
 is a possession  of the human mind     
without which the ordinary #ba practical
 conduct of  life would be impossible4  
,when1 then1 we ask ourselves1 ,what is 
truth8  the answer seems to be simple   
and obvious4  ,truth1 we reply1 is a    
property of certain of our ideas2 it    
means their agreement1 as falsity  means
 their disagreement1 with reality4  ,if 
,i say of anything that it  is so1 then1
 if it is so1 what ,i say is true2 if it
 is not so1 then  what ,i say is false4 
,this simple definition of truth is one 
that is  universally accepted4  ,no one 
really can deny it1 for if he did he    
would have nothing to appeal to to      
justify his own theory or condemn       
another4  ,the problem of truth is only 
raised when we ask1 ,what does  the     
agreement of an idea with reality mean8 
,if the reader will ask  himself that   
question1 and carefully ponder it1 he   
will see that there  is some difficulty 
in the answer to the simple question1   

,what is truth8  ,the answer that will  
probably first of all suggest itself is 
that the  idea is a copy of the reality4
  ,and at once many experiences will    
seem  to confirm this view4  ,thus when 
we look at a landscape we know that  the
 lines of light which radiate from every
 point of it pass through  the lens of  
each of our eyes to be focussed on the  
retina1 forming  there a small picture  
which is the exact counterpart of the   
reality4  ,if we look into another      
person's eye we may see there a picture 
of the  whole field of his vision       
reflected from his lens4  ,it is true   
that  what we see is not what he sees1  
for that is on his retina1 but the      
analogy of this with a photographic     
camera1 where we see the picture on  the
 ground glass1 seems obvious and        
natural2 and so we think of  knowledge1 
so far as it depends on the sense of    
vision1 as consisting  in more or less  
vivid1 more or less faded1 copies of    
real things stored  up by the memory4   

,but a very little reflection will      
convince us that  the truth of our ideas
 cannot consist in the fact #bb that    
they are  copies of realities1 for      
clearly they are not copies in any      
possible  meaning of the term4  ,take1  
for example1 this very illustration of  
seeing a landscape3 what we see is not a
 picture or copy of the  landscape1 but 
the real landscape itself4  ,we feel    
quite sure of this1  and with regard to 
the other sensations1 those that come to
 us by  hearing1 taste1 smell1 touch1 it
 would seem highly absurd to suppose    
that the ideas these sensations produce 
in us are copies of real  things4  ,the 
pain of burning is not a copy of real   
fire1 and the truth  of the judgment1   
,fire burns1 does not consist in the    
fact that the  ideas denoted by the     
words fire1 burns1 faithfully copy      
certain  real things which are not      
ideas4  ,and the whole notion is seen to
 be  absurd if we consider that1 were it
 a fact that real things produce  copies

 of themselves in our mind1 we could    
never know it was so--all  that we      
should have any knowledge of would be   
the copies1 and whether  these were like
 or unlike the reality1 or indeed       
whether there was any  reality for them 
to be like would1 in the nature of the  
case1 be  unknowable1 and we could never
 ask the question4    ,if1 then1 our    
ideas are not copies of things1 and if  
there are things  as well as ideas about
 things1 it is quite clear that the     
ideas must  correspond to the things in 
some way that does not make them copies 
of  the things4  ,the most familiar     
instance of correspondence is the       
symbolism we use in mathematics4  ,are  
our ideas of this nature8  ,and is      
their truth their correspondence8  ,is a
 perfectly true idea one in  which there
 exists a point to point correspondence 
to the reality it  represents8  ,at once
 there will occur to the mind a great   
number of  instances where this seems to
 be the case4  ,a map of ,england is not

 a  copy of ,england such as1 for       
example1 a photograph might be if we    
were  to imagine it taken #bc from the  
moon4  ,the correctness or the truth  of
 a map consists in the correspondence   
between the reality and the  diagram1   
which is an arbitrary sign of it4       
,throughout the whole of our  ordinary  
life we find that we make use of symbols
 and signs that are  not themselves     
either parts of or copies of the things 
for which they  stand4  ,language itself
 is of this nature1 and there may be    
symbols of  symbols of symbols of real  
things4  ,written language is the       
arbitrary  visual sign of spoken        
language1 and spoken language is the    
arbitrary  sign1 it may be1 of an       
experienced thing or of an abstract     
idea4  ,is1  then1 this property of our 
ideas which we call truth the           
correspondence  of ideas with their     
objects1 and is falsity the absence of  
this  correspondence8  ,it cannot be so4
  ,to imagine that ideas can correspond 

with realities is to forget that ideas  
simply are the knowledge of  realities2 
it is to slip into the notion that we   
know two kinds of  different things1    
first realities and secondly ideas1 and 
that we can  compare together these two 
sorts of things4  ,but it is at once    
evident  that if we could know realities
 without ideas1 we should never need to 
have recourse to ideas4  ,it is simply  
ridiculous to suppose that the  relation
 between consciousness and reality which
 we call knowing is the  discovery of a 
correspondence between mental ideas and 
real things4  ,the two things that are  
related together in knowledge are not   
the idea  and its object1 but the mind  
and its object4  ,the idea of the object
 is  the knowledge of the object4       
,there may be correspondence between    
ideas1 but not between ideas and        
independent things1 for that supposes   
that the mind knows the ideas and also  
knows the things and observes  the      
correspondence between them4  ,and even 

if we suppose that ideas are  an        
independent kind of entity              
distinguishable and separable from      
another kind #bd of entity that forms   
the real world1 how could we  know that 
the two corresponded1 for the one would 
only be inferred from  the other8       
,there is1 however1 a form of the       
correspondence theory of truth that is  
presented in a way which avoids this    
difficulty4  ,truth1 it is said1 is     
concerned not with the nature of things 
themselves but with our  judgments about
 them4  ,judgment is not concerned with 
the terms that  enter into              
relation--these are immediately         
experienced and  ultimate--but with the 
relations in which they stand to one    
another4  ,thus1 when we say ,john is   
the father of ,james1 the truth of our  
judgment does not consist in the        
adequacy of our ideas of ,john and      
,james1 nor in the correspondence of our
 ideas with the realities1 but  is      
concerned only with the relation that is

 affirmed to exist between  them4  ,this
 relation is declared to be independent 
of or at least  external to the terms1  
and1 so far as it is expressed in a     
judgment1  truth consists in its actual 
correspondence with fact4  ,so if ,i say
  ,john is the father of ,james1 then1  
if ,john is the father of ,james1 the   
judgment is true1 the affirmation is a  
truth2 if he is not1 it is  false1 the  
affirmation is a falsehood4  ,this view 
has the merit of  simplicity1 and is    
sufficiently obvious almost to disarm   
criticism4  ,there is1 indeed1 little   
difficulty in accepting it if we are    
able to  take the view of the nature of 
the real universe which it assumes4     
,the  theory is best described as       
pluralistic realism4  ,it is the view   
that  the universe consists of or is    
composed of an aggregate of an infinite 
number of entities4  ,some of these have
 a place in the space and time  series1 
and these exist4  ,some1 on the other   
hand1 are possibilities  which have not 

and may never have any actual existence4
  ,entities that  have their place in   
the perceptual order of experience      
exist1 #be or  have existed1 or will    
exist2 but entities that are concepts1  
such as  goodness1 beauty1 truth1 or    
that are abstract symbols like numbers1 
geometrical figures1 pure forms1 do not 
exist1 but are none the less  just as   
real as the entities that do exist4     
,these entities are the  subject-matter 
of our judgments1 and knowing is        
discovering the  relations in which they
 stand to one another4  ,the whole      
significance  of this view lies in the  
doctrine that relations are external to 
the  entities that are related--they do 
not enter into and form part of the     
nature of the entities4  ,the difficulty
 of this view is just this  externality 
of the relation4  ,it seems difficult to
 conceive what  nature is left in any   
entity deprived of all its relations4   
,the  relation of father and son in the 
judgment1 ,john is the father of        

,james1 is so far part of the nature of 
the persons ,john and ,james1 that  if  
the judgment is false then to that      
extent ,john and ,james are not the     
actual persons ,john and ,james that    
they are thought to be4  ,and this is   
the case even in so purely external a   
relation as is expressed1 say1 in  the  
judgment1 ,edinburgh is ,east of        
,glasgow4  ,it is difficult to discuss  
any relation which can be said to be    
entirely indifferent to the nature  of  
its terms1 and it is doubtful if        
anything whatever would be left of  a   
term abstracted from all its relations4 
,these difficulties have led to the     
formulation of an altogether  different 
theory1 namely1 the theory that truth   
does not consist in  correspondence     
between ideas and their real            
counterparts1 but in the  consistence   
and internal harmony of the ideas       
themselves4  ,it is named  the coherence
 theory4  ,it will be recognised at once
 that there is very  much in common     

experience to support it4  ,it is by the
 test of  consistency and coherence that
 we invariably judge the truth of       
evidence4  #bf ,also it seems a very    
essential part of our intellectual      
nature to reject as untrue and false any
 statement or any idea that is          
self-contradictory or irreconcilable    
with the world of living  experience4   
,but then1 on the other hand1 we by no  
means allow that  that must be true     
which does not exhibit logical          
contradiction and  inconsistency4  ,it  
is a common enough experience that ideas
 prove false  though they have exhibited
 no inherent failure to harmonise with  
surrounding circumstances nor any       
self-contradiction4  ,the theory1       
therefore1 requires more than a cursory 
examination4    ,thinking is the        
activity of our mind which discovers the
 order1  arrangement1 and system in the 
reality that the senses reveal4         
,without  thought1 our felt experience  
would be a chaos and not a world4  ,the 

philosopher ,kant expressed this by     
saying that the understanding gives     
unity to the manifold of sense4  ,the   
understanding1 he said1 makes  nature4  
,it does this by giving form to the     
matter which comes to it by  the senses4
  ,the mind is not a tabula rasa upon   
which the external  world makes and     
leaves impressions1 it is a relating    
activity which  arranges the matter it  
receives in forms4  ,first of all there 
are space  and time1 which are forms in 
which we receive all perceptual         
experience1 and then there are          
categories that are conceptual frames or
  moulds by which we think of everything
 we experience as having definite       
relations and belonging to a real order 
of existence4  ,substance1  causality1  
quality1 and quantity are categories2   
they are universal  forms in which the  
mind arranges sense experience1 and     
which constitute  the laws of nature1   
the order of the world4  ,space and     
time1 and the  categories of the        

understanding ,kant declared to be      
transcendental--that is to say1 they are
 the elements necessary to  experience  
which are not #bg themselves derived    
from experience1 as1  for example1 that 
every event has a cause4  ,there are1 he
 declared1  synthetic a priori          
judgments--that is1 judgments about     
experience  which are not themselves    
derived from experience1 but1 on the    
contrary1  the conditions that make     
experience possible4  ,it is from this  
doctrine  of ,kant that the whole of    
modern idealism takes its rise4  ,kant1 
indeed1 held that there are             
things-in-themselves1 and to this extent
 he  was not himself an idealist1 but he
 also held that things-in-themselves    
are unknowable1 and this is essentially 
the idealist position4  ,clearly1 if we 
hold the view that things-in-themselves 
are unknowable1  truth cannot be a      
correspondence between our ideas and    
these  things-in-themselves4  ,truth    
must be some quality of the ideas       

themselves1 and this can only be their  
logical consistency4  ,consistency1     
because the ideas must be in agreement  
with one another2  and logical1 because 
this consistency belongs to the         
thinking1 and  logic is the science of  
thinking4  ,truth1 in effect1 is the    
ideal of  logical consistency4  ,we     
experience in thinking an activity      
striving to  attain the knowledge of    
reality1 and the belief1 the feeling of 
satisfaction that we experience when our
 thinking seems to attain the  knowledge
 of reality1 is the harmony1 the absence
 of contradiction1 the  coherence1 of   
our ideas themselves4  ,this is the     
coherence theory4  ,let  us see what it 
implies as to the ultimate nature of    
truth and reality4    ,in both the      
theories we have now examined1 truth is 
a logical character  of ideas4  ,in the 
correspondence theory there is indeed   
supposed a  non-logical reality1 but it 
is only in the ideas that there is the  
conformity or correspondence which      

constitutes their truth4  ,in the       
coherence theory1 reality is itself     
ideal1 and the #bh ultimate ground  of  
everything is logical4  ,this is the    
theory of truth that accords  with the  
idealist view1 and this view finds its  
most perfect expression  in the theory  
of the ,absolute4  ,the ,absolute is the
 idea of an object  that realises       
perfect logical consistency4  ,this     
object logic itself  creates2 if it be a
 necessary existence1 then knowledge of 
it cannot be  other than truth4  ,this  
view1 on account of the supreme position
 that  it assigns to the intellect1 and 
of the fundamental character with  which
 it invests the logical categories1 has 
been named by those who  oppose it      
,intellectualism4  ,it is important that
 it should be clearly  understood1 and  
the next chapter will be devoted to its 
exposition4          ,,chapter ,,iv     
,,the ,,absolute    ,a comparison of the
 two theories of truth examined in the  
last chapter  will show that1 whereas   

both rest on a logical quality in ideas1
 the  first depends on an external view 
taken by the mind of an independent     
non-mental reality1 whereas the second  
depends on the discovery of an  inner   
meaning in experience itself4  ,it is   
this inner meaning of  experience that  
we seek to know when asking any question
 concerning  reality4  ,it is the       
development of this view1 and what it   
implies as to  the ultimate nature of   
reality and truth1 that we are now to   
examine4    ,when we ask questions about
 reality1 we assume in the very inquiry 
that  reality is of a nature that       
experience reveals4  ,reality in its    
ultimate nature may be logical--that is 
to say1 of the nature of  reason1 or it 
may #bi be non-logical--that is to say1 
of the nature of  feeling or will2 but  
in either case it must be a nature of   
which  conscious experience can give us 
knowledge4  ,if indeed we hold the view 
which philosophers have often           
endeavoured to formulate1 that reality  

is  unknowable1 then there is no more to
 be said2 for1 whatever the picture  or 
the blank for a picture by which the    
mind tries to present this  unknowable  
reality1 there can be no question in    
relation to it of the  nature and       
meaning of truth4  ,an unknowable       
reality1 as we shall show  later on1 is 
to all intents and purposes non-existent
 reality4  ,on the  other hand1 if      
thinking leads to the knowledge of      
reality that we call  truth1 it is      
because being and knowing are ultimately
 one1 and this  unity can only be in    
conscious experience4  ,this is the     
axiom on which  the idealist argument is
 based4    ,the theory of the ,absolute 
is a logical argument of great          
dialectical  force4  ,it is not an      
exaggeration to say that it is the      
greatest  dialectical triumph of modern 
philosophy4  ,it is the most successful 
expression of idealism4  ,that this is  
not an extravagant estimate is  shown1  
,i think1 by the fact that1 widespread  

and determined as is the  opposition it 
has had to encounter1 criticism has been
 directed not so  much against its logic
 as against the basis of intellectualism
 on which  it rests4  ,the very boldness
 of its claim and brilliance of its     
triumph  lead to the suspicion that the 
intellect cannot be the sole determining
  factor of the ultimate nature of      
reality4    ,it will be easier to       
understand the theory of the ,absolute  
if we first  of all notice1 for the sake
 of afterwards comparing it1 another    
argument very famous in the history of  
philosophy--the argument to  prove the  
existence of ,god named after ,st4      
,anselm of ,canterbury4  #cj  ,it runs  
thus3 ,we have in ,god the idea of a    
perfect being2 the idea of a  perfect   
being includes the existence of that    
being1 for not to exist is  to fall     
short of perfection2 therefore ,god     
exists4  ,the theological  form of this 
argument need raise no prejudice against
 it4  ,it is of  very great intrinsic   

importance1 and if it is wrong it is not
 easy to  point out wherein the fallacy 
lies4  ,it may1 of course1 be denied    
that  we have or can have the idea of a 
perfect being--that is to say1 that  we 
can present that idea to the mind with a
 positive content or meaning  as        
distinct from a merely negative or      
limiting idea4  ,but this is            
practically to admit the driving force  
of the argument1 namely1 that  there may
 be an idea of whose content or meaning 
existence forms part4  ,with regard to  
everything else the idea of existing is 
not existence4  ,there is absolutely no 
difference between the idea of a hundred
 dollars  and the idea of a hundred     
dollars existing1 but there is the whole
  difference between thought and reality
 in the idea of the hundred  dollars    
existing and the existence of the       
hundred dollars4  ,their  actual        
existence in no way depends on the      
perfection or imperfection of  my idea1 
nor in the inclusion of their existence 

in my idea4  ,this is  sufficiently     
obvious in every case in which we are   
dealing with  perceptual reality1 and in
 which we can1 in the words of the      
philosopher ,hume1 produce the          
impression which gives rise to the idea4
  ,but there are some objects which by  
their very nature will not submit  to   
this test4  ,no man hath seen ,god at   
any time1 not because ,god is an  object
 existing under conditions and          
circumstances of place and time         
impossible for us to realise by reason  
of the limitations of our finite        
existence1 but because ,god is an object
 in a different sense from that  which  
has a place in the perceptual order1 and
 therefore it is affirmed  of ,god that 
the #ca idea involves existence4  ,god  
is not an object of  perception1 either 
actual or possible2 nor in the strict   
sense is ,god a  concept--that is to    
say1 a universal of which there may be  
particulars4  ,he is in a special sense 
the object of reason4  ,if we believe   

that  there is a ,god1 it is because our
 reason tells us that there must be4    
,god1 in philosophy1 is the idea of     
necessary existence1 and the  argument  
runs3 ,god must be1 therefore is4  ,if1 
then1 we exclude from  the idea of ,god 
every mythological and theological      
element--if we mean  not ,zeus nor      
,jehovah nor ,brahma1 but the first     
principle of  existence--then we may    
find in the ,st4 ,anselm argument the   
very ground  of theism4    ,i have      
explained this argument1 which is of the
 class called  ontological because it is
 concerned with the fundamental question
 of  being1 in order to give an instance
 of the kind of argument that has  given
 us the theory of the ,absolute4  ,i    
will now try to set that theory  before 
the reader1 asking only that he will put
 himself into the  position of a plain  
man with no special acquaintance with   
philosophy1  but reflective and anxious 
to interpret the meaning of his ordinary
  experience4    ,we have already seen  

that thinking is the questioning of     
experience1  and that the moment it     
begins it gives rise to a distinction   
between  appearance and reality4  ,it is
 the asking what8 of every that of  felt
 experience to which the mind attends4  
,the world in which we find  ourselves  
is extended all around us in space and  
full of things which  affect us in      
various ways3 some give us pleasure1    
others give us pain1  and we ourselves  
are things that affect other things as  
well as being  ourselves affected by    
them4  ,when we think about the things  
in the  world in order to discover what 
they really are1 we very soon find  that
 we are liable to illusion and error4   
#cb ,things turn out on  examination to 
be very different to what we first      
imagined them to be4  ,our ideas1 by    
which we try to understand the reality  
of things are just  so many attempts to 
correct and set right our illusions and 
errors4  ,and so the question arises1   
how far are our ideas about things      

truths  about reality8  ,it is very soon
 evident that there are some qualities  
of things that give rise to illusion and
 error much more readily than  others4  
,the spatial qualities of things1       
solidity1 shape1 size1 seem  to be real 
in a way that does not admit of doubt4  
,we seem able to  apply to these        
qualities a test that is definite and   
absolute4  ,on the  other hand1 there   
seem to be effects of these things in us
 such as  their colour1 taste1 odour1   
sound1 coldness1 or heat1 qualities that
  are incessantly changing and a        
fruitful source of illusion and error4  
,we therefore distinguish the spatial   
qualities as primary1 and consider  that
 they are the real things and different 
from their effects1 which  we call their
 secondary qualities4  ,and this is1    
perhaps1 our most  ordinary test of     
reality4  ,if1 for example1 we should   
think that  something we see is an      
unreal phantom1 or a ghost1 or some kind
 of  hallucination1 and on going up to  

it find that it does actually occupy    
space1 we correct our opinion and say   
the thing is real4  ,but the  spatial or
 primary qualities of a thing1 although 
they may seem more  permanent and more  
essential to the reality of the thing   
than the  secondary qualities1 are      
nevertheless only qualities4  ,they are 
not the  thing itself1 but ways in which
 it affects us4  ,it seems to us that   
these qualities must inhere in or belong
 to the thing1 and so we try to  form   
the idea of the real thing as a         
substance or substratum which has  the  
qualities4  ,this was a generally       
accepted notion until ,berkeley         
7#afhe-agfc7 showed how contradictory it
 is4  ,so #cc simple and  convincing was
 his criticism of the notion1 that never
 since has  material substance been put 
forward as an explanation of the reality
 of  the things we perceive4  ,all that 
he did was to show how impossible and   
contradictory it is to think that the   
reality of that which we perceive  is   

something in its nature imperceptible1  
for such must material  substance be    
apart from its sense qualities4  ,how   
can that which we  perceive be something
 imperceptible8  ,and if we reflect on  
it1 we shall  surely agree that it is   
so--by the thing we mean its qualities1 
and  apart from the qualities there is  
no thing4  ,we must try1 then1 in some  
other way to reach the reality4         
,what1 we shall now ask1 can it be that 
binds together these sense  qualities so
 that we speak of them as a thing8      
,there are two elements  that seem to   
enter into everything whatever that     
comes into our  experience1 and which it
 seems to us would remain if everything 
in the  universe were annihilated4      
,these are space and time4  ,are they   
reality8  ,here we are met with a new   
kind of difficulty4  ,it was  possible  
to dismiss material substance as a false
 idea1 an idea of  something whose      
existence is impossible2 but space and  
time are  certainly not false ideas4    

,the difficulty about them is that we   
cannot  make our thought of them        
consistent--they are ideas that contain 
a  self-contradiction1 or at least that 
lead to a self-contradiction when  we   
affirm them of reality4  ,with the ideas
 of space and time are  closely linked  
the ideas of change1 of movement1 of    
causation1 of  quality and quantity1 and
 all of these exhibit this same puzzling
  characteristic1 that they seem to make
 us affirm what we deny and deny  what  
we affirm4  ,i might fill this little   
book with illustrations of  the         
paradoxes that are involved in these    
ordinary working ideas4  ,everyone is   
familiar with the difficulty involved in
 the #cd idea of  time4  ,we must think 
there was a beginning1 and we cannot    
think that  there was any moment to     
which there was no before4  ,so also    
with space1  it is an infinite extension
 which we can only think of as a beyond 
to  every limit4  ,this receding limit  
of the infinitely extensible space      

involves the character of infinite      
divisibility1 for if there are an       
infinite number of points from which    
straight lines can be drawn  without    
intersecting one another to any fixed   
point there is therefore  no smallest   
space that cannot be further divided4   
,the contradictions  that follow from   
these demonstrable contents of the idea 
of space are  endless4  ,the relation of
 time to space is another source of     
contradictory ideas4  ,i shall perhaps1 
however1 best make the meaning  of this 
self-contradictory character of our     
ordinary ideas clear by  following out a
 definite illustration4  ,what is known 
as the antinomy  of motion is probably  
familiar to everyone from the well-known
 paradox  of the ,greek philosopher     
,zeno4  ,the flying arrow1 he said1 does
 not  move1 because if it did it would  
be in two places at one and the same    
time1 and that is impossible4  ,i will  
now put this same paradox of  movement  
in a form which1 so far as ,i know1 it  

has not been presented  before4  ,my    
illustration will involve the idea of   
causation as well as  that of movement4 
,if we suppose a space to be fully      
occupied1 we shall  agree that nothing  
within that space can move without      
thereby  displacing whatever occupies   
the position into which it moves4  ,that
 is  to say1 the movement of any        
occupant of one position must cause the 
displacement of the occupant of the new 
position into which he moves4  ,but on  
the other hand it is equally clear that 
the displacement of the  occupant of the
 new position is a prior condition of   
the possibility of  the movement of #ce 
the mover1 for nothing can move unless  
there is an  unoccupied place for it to 
move into1 and there is no unoccupied   
place  unless it has been vacated by its
 occupant before the movement begins4   
,we have therefore the clear            
contradiction that a thing can only move
  when something else which it causes to
 move has already moved4  ,now if  we   

reflect on it we shall see that this is 
exactly the position we  occupy in our  
three-dimensional space4  ,the space    
which surrounds us is  occupied1 and    
therefore we cannot move until a way is 
made clear for  us1 and nothing makes   
way for us unless we move4  ,we cannot  
move  through stone walls because we    
cannot displace solid matter1 but we can
  move through air and water because we 
are able to displace these4  ,the       
problem is the same4  ,my movement      
displaces the air1 but there is no      
movement until the air is displaced4    
,can we escape the contradiction  by    
supposing the displacement is the cause 
and the movement the effect4  ,are we1  
like people in a theatre queue1 only    
able to move from behind  forward as the
 place is vacated for us in front8  ,in 
that case we  should be driven to the   
incredible supposition that the original
 cause  or condition of our movement is 
the previous movement of something at   
the outskirts of our occupied space1    

that this somewhat moving into the  void
 made possible the movement of the      
occupant of the space next  adjoining1  
and so on until after a lapse of time   
which may be ages1  which may indeed be 
infinite1 the possibility of movement is
 opened to  us4  ,in fact we must       
believe that the effect of our          
movement--namely1  the displacement of  
the previous occupants from the         
positions we occupy  in moving--happened
 before it was caused4  ,now it is      
impossible for us  to believe either of 
the only two alternatives--either that  
we do not  really move but only #cf     
appear to do so1 or that the            
displacement our  movement causes really
 precedes the movement4  ,when we meet  
with a  direct self-contradiction in our
 thoughts about anything1 we can only   
suppose that that about which we are    
thinking is in its nature  nonsensical1 
or else that our ideas about it are     
wrong4    ,it may perhaps be thought    
that the whole difficulty arises simply 

because what we are trying to think     
consistently about is a reality  that is
 external to us4  ,space and time1      
movement1 cause and effect are  ideas   
that apply to a world outside and       
independent of the mind that  tries to  
think it4  ,may not this be the reason  
of our failure and the  whole           
explanation of the seeming              
contradiction8  ,if we turn our         
thoughts inward upon our own being and  
think of the self1 the ,i1 the  real    
subject of experience1 then surely where
 thought is at home and  its object is  
mental not physical1 we shall know      
reality4  ,it is not  so4  ,the same    
self-contradiction characterises our    
ideas when we try to  present the real  
object of inner perception as when we   
try to present  the real object of      
external perception4  ,not1 of course1  
that it is  possible to doubt the       
reality of our own existence1 but that  
we fail  altogether to express the      
meaning of the self we so surely know to

  exist in any idea which does not fall 
into self-contradiction4  ,as in  the   
case of the thing and its qualities1 we 
think that there is  something distinct 
from the qualities in which they inhere 
and yet find  ourselves unable to       
present to the mind any consistent idea 
of such  thing1 so we think that there  
must be some substance or basis of      
personal identity1 some real self which 
has the successive changing  conscious  
states1 which has the character which   
distinguishes our  actions as personal  
but which nevertheless is not itself    
these  things4  ,the self-contradiction 
#cg in the idea of self1 or ,i1 or      
subject1 is that it both cannot change  
and is always changing4  ,as            
unchanging1 we distinguish it from our  
body1 which is an external  object among
 other objects and is different from    
other objects only in  the more direct  
and intimate relation in which it stands
 to us4  ,the  body is always changing2 
never for two successive moments is it  

exactly  the same combination of        
chemical elements4  ,we distinguish also
 ourself  from that consciousness which 
is memory1 the awareness of past        
experience1 from present feelings1      
desires1 thoughts1 and                  
strivings--these1 we say1 belong to the 
self but are not it4  ,the self  must   
have qualities and dwell in the body1   
guiding1 directing1 and  controlling it1
 yet this self we never perceive1 nor   
can we conceive  it1 for our idea of it 
is of a reality that changes and is yet 
unchangeable4    ,there is1 however1 one
 idea--an idea to which we have already 
alluded--that seems to offer us an      
escape from the whole of this  logical  
difficulty1 the idea that reality is    
unknowable4  ,may not the               
contradictoriness of our ideas be due to
 this fact1 that our knowledge  is      
entirely of phenomena1 of appearances of
 things1 and not of things  as they are 
in themselves8  ,by a thing-in-itself we
 do not mean a  reality that dwells     

apart in a universe of its own1 out of  
any relation  whatever to our universe4 
,there may or may not be such realities1
 and  whether there are or not is purely
 irrelevant to any question of the      
nature of reality in our universe4  ,the
 thing-in-itself is the  unknowable     
reality of the thing we know4  ,we      
conceive it as existing in  complete    
abstraction from every aspect or        
relation of it that  constitutes        
knowledge of it in another4  ,the       
self-contradiction of such  an idea is  
not difficult to show1 quite apart from 
any consideration of  its utter futility
 as an #ch explanation4  ,the           
thing-in-itself either  is or else it is
 not the reality of phenomena4  ,if it  
is1 then1  inasmuch as the phenomena    
reveal it1 it is neither in-itself nor  
unknowable4  ,if1 on the other hand1 it 
is not1 if it is unrelated in  any way  
to phenomena1 then it is not only       
unknowable--it does not exist  to be    
known4  ,it is an idea without any      

content or meaning1 and  therefore      
indistinguishable from nothing4  ,it is 
simply saying of one  and the same thing
 that it must be and that there is      
nothing that it  can be4    ,while1     
then1 there is no actual thing that we  
experience1 whether it be  an object    
outside of us or an object within us1 of
 which we can say  this is not a        
phenomenon or appearance of reality but 
the actual  reality itself1 we cannot   
also say that we do not know reality1   
because  if we had no idea1 no          
criterion1 of reality we could never    
know that  anything was only an         
appearance4  ,it is this fact--the fact 
that we  undoubtedly possess1 in the    
very process of thinking itself1 a      
criterion of reality--that the idealist 
argument lays hold of as the  basis of  
its doctrine4  ,the mere fact seems1 at 
first sight1 barren and  unpromising    
enough1 but the idealist does not find  
it so4  ,possessed of  this principle1  
logic1 which has seemed till now purely 

destructive1  becomes in his hands      
creative1 and gives form and meaning to 
an object  of pure reason4    ,the      
criterion of reality is                 
self-consistency4  ,we cannot think that
  anything is ultimately real which has 
its ground of existence in  something   
else4  ,a real thing is that which can  
be explained without  reference to some 
other thing4  ,reality1 therefore1 is   
completely  self-contained existence1   
not merely dependent existence4         
,contradictions cannot be true4  ,if we 
have to affirm a contradiction of       
anything1 it must be due to an #ci      
appearance1 and the reality must        
reconcile the contradiction4  ,the idea 
of reality1 therefore1 is the  idea of  
perfect harmony4  ,knowing1 then1 what  
reality is1 can we say  that there is   
any actual object of thought that       
conforms to it8  ,and  have we in our   
limited experience anything that will   
guide us to the  attainment of this     
object8  ,the idealist is confident that

 we have4  ,some things seem to us to   
possess a far higher degree of reality  
than  others1 just because they conform 
in a greater degree to this ideal of    
harmonious existence4  ,it is when we   
compare the reality of physical  things 
with the reality of mental things that  
the contrast is most  striking1 and in  
it we have the clue to the nature of the
 higher  reality4  ,physical reality may
 seem1 and indeed in a certain sense is1
  the basis of existence1 but when we   
try to think out the meaning of         
physical reality1 it becomes            
increasingly abstract1 and we seem      
unable  to set any actual limit to      
prevent it dissipating into nothing4    
,in  physical science we never have     
before us an actual element1 either     
matter or energy1 in which we can       
recognise1 however far below the  limit 
of perceivability1 the ultimate stuff of
 which the universe is  composed4       
,science has simply to arrest the       
dissipation by boldly  assuming a matter

 that is the substance and foundation of
 reality and  an energy that is the     
ultimate cause of the evolution of the  
universe4  ,on the other hand1 when we  
consider mental existence1 the pursuit  
of  reality is in an exactly contrary   
direction4  ,there1 the more concrete1  
the more comprehensive1 the more        
individual a thing is1 the greater      
degree of reality it seems to have4  ,in
 the spiritual realm1 by which  we mean1
 not some supposed supra-mundane sphere1
 but the world of  values1 the world in 
which ideas have reality1 in which we   
live our  rational life1 reality is     
always sought in a #dj higher and higher
  individuality4  ,the principle of     
individuality is that the whole is  more
 real than the parts4  ,an individual   
human being1 for example1 is a  whole1  
an indivisible organic unity1 not merely
 an aggregation of  physiological organs
 with special functions1 nor are these a
 mere  collection of special cells1 nor 
these a mere concourse of chemical      

elements4  ,the ,state as a community is
 an individual organic unity with  a    
reality that is more than the mere total
 of the reality of individual  citizens 
who compose it4  ,it is this principle  
of individuality that is  the true      
criterion of reality4  ,it is this      
principle that1 while it  leads us to   
seek the unity in an individuality ever 
higher and more  complete than we have  
attained1 at the same time explains the 
discrepancy of our partial view1        
explains contradictions as the          
necessary result of the effort to       
understand the parts in independence  of
 the whole which gives to them their    
reality4  ,thus1 while on the one  hand 
the scientific search for reality is    
ever towards greater  simplicity and    
abstractness1 a simplicity whose ideal  
limit is zero1  the philosophical search
 for reality is ever towards greater    
concreteness1 towards full              
comprehensiveness1 and its ideal limit  
is  the whole universe as one perfect   

and completely harmonious individual4   
,this idea of full reality is the       
,absolute4  ,there are not two          
realities1 one material and the other   
spiritual2 the material and the         
spiritual are two directions in which we
 may seek the one reality1 but  there is
 only one pathway by which we shall find
 it4    ,the ,absolute is the whole     
universe not in its aspect of an        
aggregate of  infinitely diverse        
separate elements1 whether these are    
material or  spiritual1 but in its      
aspect of an individual whole and in its
 nature  as a whole4  ,this nature of   
the whole is to be individual--only in  
#da  the individual are contradictions  
reconciled4  ,is the ,absolute more     
than an idea8  ,does it actually exist8 
,clearly we cannot claim to know  it by 
direct experience1 by acquaintance2 it  
is not a that of which  we can ask what8
  ,it is the object of reason itself1   
therefore we  know that it must be4     
,also we know that it can be2 it is a   

possible  object in the logical meaning 
that it is not a self-contradictory     
idea1  like every other idea that we can
 have4  ,it is not self-contradictory1  
for it is itself the idea of that which 
is consistent4  ,therefore1  argues the 
idealist1 it is1 for that which must be1
 and can be1 surely  exists4  ,the      
reader will now understand why ,i       
introduced this account  of the         
,absolute with a description for        
comparison of the ,st4 ,anselm  proof of
 the existence of ,god4    ,there is one
 further question4  ,whether the        
,absolute does or does not  exist1 is   
it1 either in idea or reality1 of any   
use to us8  ,the reply  is that its     
value lies in this1 that it reveals to  
us the nature of  reality and the       
meaning of truth4  ,logic is the        
creative power of  thought which leads  
us to the discovery of higher and higher
 degrees of  reality4  ,the ,satyr1 in  
the fable1 drove his guest from his     
shelter  because the man blew into his  

hands to warm them1 and into his        
porridge  to cool it4  ,the ,satyr could
 not reconcile the contradiction that   
one  could with the same breath blow hot
 and cold4  ,nor would he reconcile  it 
ever1 so long as he sought truth as     
correspondence4  ,truth would  have     
shown the facts coherent by reconciling 
the contradiction in a  higher reality4 
#db    ,,chapter ,v    ,,pragmatism     
,the theory of the ,absolute is only one
 form of ,idealism1 but it  illustrates 
the nature and general direction of the 
development of  philosophy along the    
line of speculation that began with     
,kant4  ,there  have been1 of course1   
other directions4  ,in particular many  
attempts  have been made to make        
philosophy an adjunct of physical       
science1 but  the theory ,i have        
sketched is characteristic of the       
prevailing movement  in philosophy      
during the last period of the           
,nineteenth ,century1 and  until the    
movement known as ,pragmatism directed  

criticism upon it4  ,the  form the      
pragmatical criticism of the theory of  
the ,absolute took was  to direct       
attention to the logical or intellectual
 principle on which  it rests--in fact  
to raise the problem of the nature of   
truth4  ,pragmatism is a theory of the  
meaning of truth4  ,it is the denial of 
a  purely logical criterion of truth1   
and the insistence that truth is  always
 dependent on psychological conditions4 
,pragmatism therefore  rejects both the 
views that we have examined--the theory 
that truth is  a correspondence of the  
idea with its object1 and the theory    
that it is  the logical coherence and   
consistency of the idea itself4  ,it    
proposes  instead the theory that truth 
is always founded on a practical        
postulate1 and consists in the          
verification of that postulate2 the     
verification not being the discovery of 
something that was waiting to  be       
discovered1 but the discovery that the  
postulate that claims to be  true is    

useful1 in that it works4  ,truth is    
what works4    ,the ,absolute is reality
 and truth4  ,the idealist argument     
which we have  followed was an attempt  
to #dc determine the nature of reality1 
and  not an attempt to explain what we  
mean when we say that an idea agrees    
with its object4  ,what is true about   
reality8 was the starting point1  and   
not1 ,what is truth8 nor even1 ,what is 
true about truth8  ,the search  for     
reality failed to discover any object   
that agreed with its idea1  but at last 
there was found an idea that must agree 
with its object1 an  idea whose object  
cannot not be4  ,this idea1 the         
,absolute1 reveals the  nature of       
reality4  ,the pragmatist when he asks1 
,what is truth8 seems  to dig beneath   
the argument1 seems indeed even to reach
 the bedrock1  but it is only in        
appearance that this is so4  ,how1      
indeed1 could he  hope to be able to    
answer the question he has himself      
asked1 if there  is no way of           

distinguishing the true answer from the 
false8  ,we must  already know what     
truth is even to be able to ask what it 
is--a point  which many pragmatist      
writers appear to me to have overlooked4
    ,in challenging the idea of truth1  
the pragmatist raises the no less       
important question of the nature of     
error4  ,a theory of truth must not     
only show in what truth consists1 but   
must distinguish false from true  and   
show the nature of error4  ,the         
pragmatist claims for his theory  that  
it alone can give a consistent account  
of illusion and error4  ,now1 as we saw 
in our account of the idealist argument1
 it is the fact  of illusion and error  
that compels us to seek reality behind  
the  appearances that are the sense data
 of our conscious experience4  ,the     
whole force of the pragmatist movement  
in philosophy is directed to  proving   
that truth is a prior consideration to  
reality4  ,if we  understand the nature 
of truth1 we shall see reality in the   

making4  ,reality can in fact be left to
 look after itself2 our business is with
  our conceptions alone1 which are      
either true or false4  ,the distinction 
of appearance and reality does #dd not  
explain illusion and error  because it  
does not distinguish between true and   
false appearance4  ,there is no         
principle in idealism by which the      
,absolute rejects the  false appearance 
and reconciles the true4    ,before ,i  
examine the pragmatist argument1 ,i     
ought first to explain the  meaning and 
origin of the word4  ,the term          
pragmatism1 that has in the  last few   
years entered so widely into all        
philosophical discussion1 was  used     
first by ,mr4 ,c4 ,s4 ,peirce1 an       
,american philosopher1 in a magazine    
article written as long ago as #ahgh1   
but it attracted no attention for       
nearly twenty years1 when it was        
recalled by ,william ,james in the      
criticism of the current philosophy in  
his ,will to ,believe1 a book  which    

marks the beginning of the new movement4
  ,pragmatism was first  put forward as 
the principle that the whole meaning of 
any conception  expresses itself in     
practical consequences4  ,the conception
 of the  practical effects of a         
conception is the whole conception of   
the  object4  ,the pragmatist maxim     
is--would you know what any idea or     
conception means1 then consider what    
practical consequences are  involved by 
its acceptance or rejection4  ,dr4      
,schiller1 the leading  exponent of the 
principle in ,england1 prefers to call  
the philosophy  ,humanism in order still
 more to emphasize the psychological and
  personal character of knowledge4  ,the
 name is suggested by the maxim of      
,protagoras1 ,man is the measure of all 
things4  ,the term  ,intellectualism is 
used by pragmatist writers to include   
all theories  of knowledge that do not  
agree with their own1 very much as the  
,greeks  called all who were not        
,greeks1 ,barbarians4  ,it must not be  

taken to  mean1 as its etymology would  
imply1 a philosophy like that of ,plato1
  which held that only universals1 the  
ideas1 are real1 or like that of        
,hegel1 who said that the actual is the 
rational and the rational is  the       
actual4  ,the #de pragmatists apply the 
term intellectualist to  all            
philosophers who recognise an objective 
character in the logical  ideal of      
truth1 whether or not they also         
recognise non-logical elements  in      
reality1 and whether or not these       
non-logical elements are physical1  such
 as matter and energy1 or purely        
psychical1 such as will1 desire1        
emotion1 pleasure1 and pain4            
,pragmatism is a criticism and a theory4
  ,if reality in its full meaning  is   
the ,absolute1 and if all seeming       
reality is only a degree of or          
approximation to this full reality1 if  
the knowledge of this reality  only is  
truth1 must it not seem to us that truth
 is useless knowledge8  ,useless1 not in

 the sense that it is without value to  
the mind that  cares to contemplate it1 
but useless in so far as the hard       
everyday  working world in which we have
 to spend our lives is concerned4  ,we  
who  have to win our existence in the   
struggle of life1 need truth4  ,we need 
truth in order to act4  ,truth that     
transcends our temporal needs1 truth    
that is eternal1 truth that reconciles  
illusion and error1 that accepts  them  
as a necessary condition of appearance  
in time1 is useless in  practice1       
however it may inspire the poet and     
philosopher4  ,truth to  serve us must  
reject error and not reconcile it1 must 
be a working  criterion and not only a  
rational one4  ,whatever truth is1 it is
 not  useless2 it is a necessity of     
life1 not a luxury of speculation4      
,pragmatism therefore rejects the       
logical criterion of truth because it   
is purely formal and therefore useless4 
,it demands for us a practical          
criterion1 one that will serve our      

continual needs4  ,whether our  working 
ideas--cause1 time1 space1 movement1    
things and their  qualities1 terms and  
their relations1 and the like--are      
consistent or  inconsistent in          
themselves1 they more or less work2 and 
in so far as  they work they are useful 
and serve us1 and because they work1 and
 just  in so far as they work1 they are 
true4  #df ,the pragmatist therefore    
declares that utility1 not logical      
consistency1 is the criterion of  truth4
  ,ideas are true in so far as they     
work4  ,the discovery that they  serve  
us is their verification4  ,if we       
discover ideas that will serve  us      
better1 the old ideas that were true    
become untrue1 and the new  ideas that  
we adopt become true because they are   
found to work4    ,this doctrine of the 
verification or making true of ideas    
leads to a  theory of the origin of the 
ideas themselves4  ,each idea has arisen
 or  been called forth by a human need4 
,it has been formed by human nature  to 

meet a need of human nature4  ,it is a  
practical postulate claiming  truth4    
,even the axioms that now seem to us    
self-evident--such1 for  example1 as the
 very law of contradiction itself1 from 
which1 as we  have seen1 the logical    
criterion of consistency is             
deduced--were in  their origin practical
 postulates1 called forth by a need1    
and1 because  found to work1 true4  ,the
 inconsistencies and contradictions in  
our  ideas do not condemn them as       
appearance1 and compel us to construct a
  reality in which they disappear or are
 reconciled1 but are evidence of  their 
origin in practical need and of their   
provisional character4  ,truth is not   
eternal1 it is changing4  ,new          
conditions are ever calling  forth new  
ideas1 and truths become untrue4  ,each 
new idea comes forward  with a claim to 
truth1 and its claim is tested by its   
practicability4  ,truth is not something
 we discover1 and which was there to be 
discovered4  ,we verify ideas4  ,to     

verify is not to find true but to  make 
true4    ,the pragmatist theory         
therefore is that truth is made4  ,in   
all other  theories truth is found4     
,but if we make truth we must make      
reality1  for it is clear that if       
reality is there already1 the agreement 
with it  of man-made truth would be     
nothing short of a miracle4  ,the       
pragmatist1  or at all events the       
pragmatist who is also a #dg humanist1  
finds no  difficulty in accepting this  
consequence of the theory1 although at  
the  same time insisting that the whole 
problem1 of being as well as of  knowing
 is concerned with truth4  ,we shall    
see1 however1 that it offers  a serious 
difficulty to the acceptance of the     
theory--a theory which in  very many    
respects agrees with ordinary practice  
and with scientific  method4  ,take1 for
 example1 scientific method4  ,is not   
all progress in  science made by        
suggesting a hypothesis1 and testing it 
by experiment  to see if it works8  ,do 

we not judge its claim to truth by the  
practical consequences involved in      
accepting or rejecting it8  ,is there   
any other verification8  ,this is the   
simple pragmatist test1--does the       
laboratory worker add to it or find it  
in any respect insufficient8  ,if  truth
 can be considered alone1 then we must  
admit that it is the  attribute of      
knowledge which is comprised under the  
term useful1 the  term being used in its
 most comprehensive meaning to include  
every kind  of practical consequence4   
,it is the question of reality that     
raises  the difficulty for the          
scientific worker4  ,we cannot believe1 
or  perhaps we should say1 the ordinary 
man and the scientific man would  find  
it very difficult to believe1 that      
reality changes correspondingly  with   
our success or failure in the           
verification of our hypothesis4  ,when  
the scientific worker verifies his      
hypothesis1 he feels not that  he has   
made something true which before was not

 true1 but that he has  discovered what 
always was true1 although until the     
discovery he did  not know it4  ,to this
 the pragmatist reply is1 that this very
 belief is  a practical consequence     
involved in the verification of the     
hypothesis1  involved in the discovery  
that it works4  ,what he denies is that 
truth  reveals1 or ever can reveal1 a   
reality entirely irrelevant to any human
  purpose4  ,it is also very important  
to add that in declaring that truth  is 
verification1 the #dh pragmatist does   
not set up a purely practical  or       
utilitarian standard4  ,the working of  
truth means theoretical as  well as     
practical working4  ,much of the current
 criticism of pragmatism  has failed to 
take notice of this intention or meaning
 of its  principle1 and hence the common
 misapprehension that the maxim truth   
is what works must mean that whatever a 
man believes is for him truth4    ,the  
pragmatist doctrine and attitude will   
perhaps be easier to  understand if we  

take it in regard to a particular       
instance of truth  and error in regard  
to fundamental notions4  ,in the last   
four or five  years a new principle has 
been formulated in ,physics1 named the  
,principle of ,relativity4  ,it         
revolutionises the current conceptions  
of  space and time4  ,it is so recent   
that probably some of my readers now    
hear of it for the first time1 and      
therefore before ,i refer to its        
formulation by mathematicians ,i will   
give a simple illustration to  explain  
what it is4  ,suppose that you are      
walking up and down the deck  of a      
steamer1 and let us suppose that the    
steamer is proceeding at the  speed of  
four miles an hour1 the space that you  
cover and the interval  of time that you
 occupy are exactly the same for you    
whether you are  moving up the deck in  
the direction the steamer is going or   
down the  deck in the direction which is
 the reverse of the steamer's movement4 
,but suppose some one on the shore could

 observe you moving while the  ship was 
invisible to him1 your movement would   
appear to him entirely  different to    
what it is to you4  ,when you were      
walking up the deck you  would seem to  
be going at twice the speed you would be
 going1 and when  you were going down   
the deck you would seem not to be moving
 at all4  ,the time measurement would   
also seem different to the observer on  
the  shore1 for while to you each moment
 would be measured by an equal #di      
space covered1 to him one moment you    
would be moving rapidly1 the next  at   
rest4  ,this is simple and easy to      
understand4  ,now suppose that both  you
 and the observer were each observing a 
natural phenomenon1 say a               
thunder-storm1 it would seem that each  
of you ought to observe it with  a      
difference--a difference strictly       
calculable from the system of  movement1
 the ship1 in which you were placed in  
relation to him4  ,the  propagation of  
the sound and of the light would have to

 undergo a  correction if each of you   
described your experience to the other4 
,if  you were moving in the direction of
 the light waves they would be  slower  
for you than for him1 and if against    
their direction they would  be faster   
for you than for him4  ,of course the   
immense velocity of the  light waves1   
about #bjj1jjj miles a second1 would    
make the difference in  a movement of   
four miles an hour so infinitesimal as  
to be altogether  inappreciable1 but it 
would not be nothing1 and you would feel
 quite  confident that if it could be   
measured the infinitesimal quantity     
would  appear in the result4  ,now      
suppose that we could measure it with   
absolute accuracy1 and that the result  
was the discovery that the  supposed    
difference did not exist at all--and of 
course1 we suppose  that there is no    
doubt whatever about the                
measurement--what1 then1  should we be  
obliged to think8  ,we should be forced 
to believe that as  the velocity of     

light was the same for the two          
observers1 one moving1  one at rest1    
therefore the space and the time must be
 different for  each4  ,now1 however    
strange it may seem1 such a measurement 
has been  made1 and with this surprising
 result4  ,in consequence there has been
  formulated a new principle in ,physics
 named the ,principle of  ,relativity4  
,i take this ,principle of ,relativity  
for my illustration  because it is based
 on reasoning that practically admits of
 no doubt1  and because #ej it requires 
us to form new conceptions of space and 
time which seem to alter fundamentally  
what we have hitherto considered  as the
 evident and unmistakable nature of     
those realities4  ,it has  always seemed
 that the distance separating two       
points1 and the interval  of time       
separating two events1 were each        
independent of the other and  each      
absolute4  ,however different the       
distance and the interval may  appear to
 observers in movement or to observers  

in different systems of  movement in    
relation to ourselves and to one        
another1 in themselves  they are the    
same distance and the same interval for 
all4  ,they are the  same for the man in
 the express train as for the man       
standing on the  station platform4  ,the
 ,principle of ,relativity requires us  
to think  that this is not so1 but that1
 contrary to all our settled notions1   
the  actual space and time vary--really 
undergo an alteration1 a contraction  or
 expansion--with each different system  
of movement of translation to  which the
 observer is bound4  ,events that for an
 observer belonging to  one system of   
movement happen in the same place1 for  
another observer  in a different system 
of movement happen in different places4 
,events  that for one observer happen   
simultaneously1 for other observers are 
separated by a time interval according  
to the movement of translation  of the  
system to which they belong4  ,so that  
space1 which ,newton  described as      

rigid1 and time which he described as   
flowing at a  constant rate1 and which  
for him was absolute1 are for the new   
theory  relative1 different for an      
observer in every different system of   
movement of translation4  ,or we may    
state it in the opposite way1 and  say  
that the ,principle of ,relativity shows
 us that the reason why  natural        
phenomena1 such as the rate of          
propagation of light1 undergo no        
alteration when we pass from one system 
of movement of translation to  another1 
as we #ea are constantly doing in the   
changing velocity of  the earth's       
movement round the sun1 is that space   
and time alter with  the velocity4  ,i  
cannot here give the argument or        
describe the  experiments which have    
given this result--,i am simply taking  
it as an  illustration4#a  ,it seems to 
me admirably suited to compare the      
pragmatist method and the pragmatist    
attitude with that of scientific        
realism and of absolute idealism4       

#a ,the ,principle of ,relativity is    
mainly the result of the recent         
mathematical work of ,h4 ,a4 ,lorentz1  
,einstein1 and the late ,professor      
,minkowski4  ,a very interesting and not
 excessively difficult1 account  of it  
is contained in ,dernires ,penses1 by   
the late ,henri ,poincar2  ,paris1      
,alcan4      ,here1 then1 is a question 
in which the truth of our accepted      
notions is  called in question1 and new 
notions claim to be true4  ,the sole    
question involved1 pragmatism insists1  
is the truth of conceptions1 not  the   
reality of things1 and there is but one 
way of testing the truth of             
conceptions--and that is by comparing   
the rival conceptions in respect  of the
 practical consequences that follow from
 them and adopting those  that will     
work4  ,if the old conceptions of space 
and time fail to  conform to a new need1
 then what was true before the need was 
revealed  is no longer true1 the new    
conception has become true4  ,by        

verifying  the new conception1 we make  
it true4  ,but1 objects the realist1 an 
idea  cannot become true2 what is now   
true always was true1 and what is no    
longer true never was true1 though we   
may have worked with the false  notion  
ignorant that it was false4  ,behind    
truth there is reality4  ,the  earth was
 spherical even when all mankind        
believed it flat and found  the belief  
work4  ,to this the pragmatist reply is 
that reality is only  our               
objectification of truth2 it possesses  
no meaning divorced from  human         
purposes4  ,had anyone announced that   
the earth was a sphere #eb  when it was 
generally held to be flat1 unless his   
announcement had some  relevance to a   
defect in the flat earth notion1 or a   
claim to revise  that notion1 his       
announcement would have been neither a  
truth nor a  falsehood in any           
intelligible meaning of the term--he    
would have been  making an irrelevant   
remark4  ,the notions of space and time 

that ,newton  held worked1 and were     
therefore true2 if a new need requires  
us to  replace them with other notions1 
and these other notions will work and   
are therefore true1 they have become    
true and ,newton's notions have  become 
false4  ,if it is still objected that   
the new notions were also  true for     
,newton1 although he was ignorant of    
them1 the need for them  not having     
arisen1 the only reply is that truth1 or
 reality1 in  complete detachment from  
human purposes1 cannot be either        
affirmed or  denied4    ,with this view 
the idealist will be in agreement2 his  
objection is of a  different kind4  ,he 
rejects1 as the pragmatist does1 the    
notion of a  reality independent of     
human nature that forces upon us the    
changes  that our conceptions undergo4  
,these changes1 he holds1 are the inner 
working of the conceptions themselves1  
the manifestation of our  intellectual  
nature1 ever striving for an ideal of   
logical consistency4  ,truth is this    

ideal4  ,we do not make it2 we move     
towards it4  ,if we  compare1 then1 the 
idealist and the pragmatist doctrine1 it
 will seem  that1 while for the idealist
 truth is growing with advancing        
knowledge  into an ever larger because  
more comprehensive system of reality1   
for  the pragmatist it is ever          
narrowing1 discarding failures as       
useless and  irrelevant to present      
purpose4  ,how indeed1 the idealist will
 ask1 if  practical consequences be the 
meaning of truth1 is it possible to     
understand that knowledge has advanced  
or can advance8  ,does not the  history 
of science prove a continual expansion1 
an increasing #ec  comprehension8  ,it  
is within the conception that the       
inconsistency is  revealed1 not in any  
mere outward use of the conceptions1 and
 the  intellectual effort is to         
reconcile the contradiction by relating 
the  conception to a more comprehensive 
whole4  ,how1 then1 does the idealist   
meet this case which we have specially  

instanced1 the demand for new  notions  
of space and time made by the ,principle
 of ,relativity8  ,he  denies that the  
new conceptions are called forth by     
human needs in the  narrow sense--that  
is to say1 in the sense that working    
hypotheses or  practical postulates are 
required4  ,the need is purely logical4 
,the  inconsistency revealed in the     
notions that have hitherto served us can
  only be reconciled by apprehending a  
higher unity4  ,if the older  notions of
 space and time are inadequate to the   
more comprehensive view  of the universe
 as a co-ordination of systems of       
movement1 then this  very negation of   
the older notions is the affirmation of 
the new1 and  from the negation by pure 
logic the content and meaning which are 
the  truth of the new notions are       
derived4  ,to this objection the        
pragmatist  reply is that if this be the
 meaning of the truth there is no way   
shown  by which it can be distinguished 
from error4  ,there is in fact for      

idealism no error1 no illusion1 no      
falsehood2 as real facts1 there are     
only degrees of truth4  ,but a theory of
 truth which ignores such  stubborn     
realities as illusion1 falsehood1 and   
error is1 from whatever  standpoint we  
view it1 useless4  ,on the other hand1  
pragmatism offers a  test by which we   
can discriminate between true and       
false--namely1 the  method of judging   
conceptions by their practical          
consequences4  ,can we  or can we not   
make our conceptions work8  ,that is the
 whole meaning of  asking1 ,are they    
true or false8  ,and now1 lest the      
reader is alarmed at  the prospect of   
having to revise his working ideas of   
space and #ed  time1 ,i will1 to        
reassure him1 quote the words with which
 ,henri  ,poincar concluded his account 
of the new conceptions1 and which       
admirably express and illustrate the    
pragmatist's attitude3 ,what is to  be  
our position in view of these new       
conceptions8  ,are we about to be       

forced to modify our conclusions8  ,no1 
indeed3 we had adopted a  convention    
because it seemed to us convenient1 and 
we declared that  nothing could compel  
us to abandon it4  ,to-day certain      
physicists wish  to adopt a new         
convention4  ,it is not because they are
 compelled to2  they judge this new     
convention to be more convenient--that  
is all2 and  those who are not of this  
opinion can legitimately keep the old   
and so  leave their old habits          
undisturbed4  ,i think1 between         
ourselves1 that  this is what they will 
do for a long time to come4    ,i have  
so far considered pragmatism rather as a
 criticism than as a  doctrine4  ,i will
 now try and characterise it on its     
positive side4  ,it  declares that there
 is no such thing as pure thought1 but  
that all  thinking is personal and      
purposive2 that all knowing is directed1
  controlled1 and qualified by          
psychological conditions such as        
interest1  attention1 desire1 emotion1  

and the like2 and that we cannot1 as    
formal  logic does1 abstract from any of
 these1 for logic itself is part of a   
psychical process4  ,truth therefore    
depends upon belief2 truths are  matters
 of belief1 and beliefs are rules of    
action4  ,it is this  doctrine that     
gives to pragmatism its paradoxical1    
some have even said  its grotesque1     
character4  ,it seems to say that the   
same proposition is  both true and      
false--true for the man who believes it1
 false for the  man who cannot4  ,it    
seems to say that we can make anything  
true by  believing it1 and we can       
believe anything so long as the         
consequences  of acting on it are not   
absolutely disastrous4  ,and the        
proposition1  ,all truths work1 seems to
 involve the conclusion that all that   
works is  true2 and the proposition1    
,the true is the useful1 seems to imply 
that  #ee whatever is useful is         
therefore true4  ,no small part of the  
pragmatist controversy has been directed

 to the attempt to show that  all and   
each of these corollaries are1 or arise 
from1 misconceptions of  the doctrine4  
,i think1 and ,i shall endeavour to     
show1 that there is a  serious defect in
 the pragmatist statement1 and that     
these  misconceptions are in a great    
part due to it4  ,nevertheless1 we must 
accept the pragmatist disavowal4  ,and  
there is no difficulty in doing  so1 for
 the meaning of the theory is           
sufficiently clear4  ,truth1  according 
to pragmatism1 is a value and not a     
fact4  ,truth is thus  connected with   
the conception of good4  ,in saying that
 truth is  useful1 we say that it is a  
means to an end1 a good4  ,it is not a  
moral  end1 but a cognitive end1 just as
 beauty is an esthetic end4  ,truth1    
beauty1 and goodness thus stand together
 as judgments of value or  worth4  ,it  
is only by recognising that truth is a  
value that we can  possess an actual    
criterion to distinguish it from error1 
for if truth  is a judgment of fact1 if 

it asserts existence1 so also does      
error4    ,the pragmatist principle has 
an important bearing on religion4  ,it  
justifies the ,faith attitude4  ,it     
shows that the good aimed at by a  truth
 claim is only attainable by the        
exercise of the will to  believe4  ,thus
 it replaces the intellectual maxim1    
,believe in nothing  you can possibly   
doubt1 with the practical maxim1        
,resolve not to quench  any impulse to  
believe because doubts of the truth are 
possible4  ,belief may even be a        
condition of the success of the truth   
claim4          ,,chapter ,,vi          
,,utility    ,we have seen in the last  
chapter that pragmatism is both a       
criticism  and a theory4  ,it shows us  
that the #ef notion that truth is       
correspondence involves the conception  
of an impossible knowledge1  and the    
notion that truth is coherence or       
consistency involves the  conception of 
a useless knowledge4  ,the explanation  
pragmatism itself  offers is of the kind

 that is called in the technical        
language of  philosophy teleological4   
,this means that to explain or to give a
  meaning to truth all we can do is to  
point out the purpose on account  of    
which it exists4  ,this is not          
scientific explanation4  ,physical      
science explains a fact or an event by  
showing the conditions which  give rise 
to it or that determine its character4  
,pragmatism recognises  no conditions   
determining truth such as those which   
science embodies in  the conception of a
 natural law--that is1 the idea of a    
connection of  natural events with one  
another which is not dependent on human 
thoughts about them nor on human        
purposes in regard to them4  ,truth is  
in intimate association with human      
practical activity2 its meaning lies    
wholly in its utility4  ,we must        
therefore now examine somewhat closely  
this notion of utility4    ,there       
appears to me to be a serious defect in 
the pragmatist conception  and          

application of the principle of utility2
 it is based on a  conception altogether
 too narrow4  ,a theory that condemns   
any purely  logical process as resulting
 in useless knowledge can only justify  
itself by insisting on an application of
 the principle of utility that  will be 
found to exclude not merely the         
,absolute of philosophy but most  if not
 all of the results of pure mathematics 
and physics1 for these  sciences apply a
 method of pure logical deduction and   
induction  indistinguishable from that  
which pragmatism condemns4  ,the        
intellectual nature of man is an        
endowment which sharply distinguishes   
him from other forms of living          
creatures4  ,so supreme a position does 
our intellect assign to us1 so wide is  
the gap that separates #eg us  from     
other creatures little different from   
ourselves in respect of  perfection of  
material organisation and adaptation to 
environment1 that  it seems almost      
natural to suppose that our intellect is

 that for which  we exist1 and not      
merely a mode of controlling1 directing1
 and  advancing our life4  ,now it is   
possible to hold--and this is the view  
that ,i shall endeavour in what follows 
to develop--that the intellect  is      
subservient to life1 and that we can    
show the manner and method of  its      
working and the purpose it serves4  ,so 
far we may agree with the  pragmatist1  
but it is not the same thing to say that
 the intellect  serves a useful purpose 
and to say that truth1 the ideal of the 
intellect1 the end which it strives for1
 is itself only a utility4  ,were there 
no meaning in truth except that it is   
what works1 were there  no meaning      
independent of and altogether distinct  
from the practical  consequences of     
belief1 of what value to us would the   
intellect be8  ,if  the meaning the     
intellect assigns to truth is itself not
 true1 how can  the intellect serve us8 
,the very essence of its service is     
reduced to  nought2 for what else but   

the conception of an objective truth1 a 
logical reality independent of any and  
every psychological condition1  is the  
utility that the intellect puts us in   
possession of8  ,it is this  conception 
alone that constitutes it an effective  
mode of activity4  ,therefore1 if we    
hold with the pragmatist that the       
intellect is  subservient to life1 truth
 is indeed a utility1 but it is a       
utility  just because it has a meaning  
distinct from usefulness4  ,on the other
  hand1 to condemn any knowledge as     
useless is to deny utility to the       
intellect4    ,before ,i try to show    
that the logical method of the idealist 
philosophy1 which pragmatism condemns   
because it leads to useless  knowledge1 
is identical in every respect with the  
method employed in  pure mathematics and
 physics1 ,i will give for comparison   
two  illustrations #eh that seem to me  
instances of a narrow and of a wide  use
 of the concept of utility4    ,a short 
time ago an orang-utang escaped from its

 cage in the ,zoological  ,gardens under
 somewhat singular and very interesting 
circumstances4  ,the cage was secured   
with meshed wire of great strength1     
judged  sufficient to resist the direct 
impact of the most powerful of the      
carnivora2 but the ape1 by attention to 
the twisting of the plied wire1  had by 
constant trying succeeded in loosening  
and finally in unwinding  a large       
section4  ,it escaped from its          
enclosure1 and after doing  considerable
 damage in the corridor1 including the  
tearing out of a  window frame1 made its
 way into the grounds and took refuge in
 a tree1  twisting the branches into a  
platform said to be similar to the      
constructions it makes in its native    
forests4    ,in taking this action as an
 illustration1 ,i am not concerned with 
the  question of what may be the        
distinction between action that is      
intelligent and action that is          
instinctive4  ,if we take intelligence  
in  a wide and general meaning1 we may  

compare the intelligence shown by  this 
ape with the intelligence shown by man  
in the highest processes of  the mind4  
,psychologists would1 ,i think1 be      
unanimous in holding that  in the mind  
of the ape there was no conception of   
freedom1 no kind of  mental image of    
unrestricted life and of a distinct     
means of attaining  it1 no clearly      
purposed end1 the means of attaining    
which was what  prompted the undoing of 
the wire1 such as we should certainly   
suppose  in the case of a man in a      
similar situation4  ,it was the kind of 
intelligent action that psychologists   
denote by the description trial  and    
error4  ,it seems to me1 however1 that  
this exactly fulfils the  conditions    
that the pragmatist doctrine of the     
meaning of truth  require4  ,we see the 
intellect of the ape making true by     
finding out  what works4  #ei ,we can   
suppose an entire absence of the idea of
  objective truth to which reality must 
conform1 of truth unaffected by         

purpose4  ,here1 then1 we seem to have  
the pure type of truth in its  simplest 
conditions1 a practical activity using  
intelligence to  discover what works4   
,is the difference between this         
practical activity  and the higher      
mental activities as we employ them in  
the abstract  sciences one of degree of 
complexity only1 or is it different in  
kind8    ,let us consider now1 as an    
illustration of the method of the       
abstract  sciences1 the well-known case 
of the discovery of the planet ,neptune4
  ,this planet was discovered by        
calculation and deduction1 and was only 
seen when its position had been so      
accurately determined that the          
astronomers who searched for it knew    
exactly the point of the heavens  to    
which to direct their telescopes4  ,the 
calculation was one of  extraordinary   
intricacy1 and was made independently by
 two  mathematicians1 ,adams of         
,cambridge and ,leverrier of ,paris1    
between the  years #ahdc and #ahdf4     

,each communicated his result           
independently--,adams  to the astronomer
 ,challis1 the ,director of the         
,cambridge ,observatory1  and ,leverrier
 to ,dr4 ,galle of the ,berlin          
,observatory4  ,within six weeks  of one
 another and entirely unknown to one    
another1 in ,august and  ,september     
#ahdf1 each of these astronomers        
observed the planet where he  had been  
told to look for it4  ,this is one of   
the romances of modern  science4  ,it is
 not the discovery but the method that  
led to it which  may throw light on our 
problem of the nature of truth4    ,at  
first sight this seems exactly to accord
 with and even to illustrate  the       
pragmatist theory1 that truth is what   
works4  ,the investigation is  prompted 
by the discrepancies between the actual 
and the calculated  positions of        
,uranus1 the outermost planet1 as it was
 then supposed1 of  the system4  ,this  
revealed a need1 and this #fj need was  
met by the  practical postulate of the  

existence of another planet as yet      
unseen4  ,the hypothesis was found to   
work even before the actual observation 
put  the final seal of actuality on the 
discovery4  ,what else but the          
practical consequences of the truth     
claim in the form of the hypothesis  of 
an undiscovered planet were ever in     
question8  ,yes1 we reply1 but  the     
actual method adopted1 and the knowledge
 sought for by the method1  are         
precisely of the kind that pragmatism   
rejects as useless  knowledge4  ,why    
were not the observed movements of      
,uranus accepted as  what they were8    
,why was it felt that they must be other
 than they were  seen to be unless there
 was another planet8  ,the need lay in  
the idea  of system4  ,it was           
inconsistent with the system then       
believed complete1  and the need was to 
find the complete system in which it    
would  harmonise4  ,the truth that was  
sought for was a harmonious individual  
whole1 and the method employed precisely

 that which the ,absolutist  theory of  
reality employs4  ,there is observed a  
discrepancy1 an  inconsistency1 a       
contradiction within the whole conceived
 as a system4  ,this negation is treated
 as a defect1 is calculated and         
accurately  determined1 and is then     
positively affirmed of the reality4     
,now1 what  is distinctive in this      
method is that reality is conceived as a
  complete system4  ,if the felt defect 
in this system cannot be made good  by  
direct discovery1 its place is supplied 
by a fiction1 using the term  in its    
etymological meaning to express         
something made and not in its  derived  
meaning to express something found      
false4  ,this intellectual  process of  
construction is purely logical2 no      
psychological element in  the sense of  
the will to believe enters into it or   
colours it in any  way4    ,this is not 
an isolated instance1 it illustrates the
 method of science  in all theorising4  
,an even more #fa striking illustration 

than that  we have just given is the    
case of the hypothesis of the           
luminiferous  ther--a supposed          
existence1 a fiction1 that has served a 
useful1 even  an indispensable service  
in the history of modern physics4  ,to  
many  physicists1 even to ,lord ,kelvin1
 the hypothesis seemed so surely        
established that its nonexistence hardly
 seemed thinkable1 yet all the          
experiments designed to detect its      
presence have been uniformly  negative  
in result1 and it now seems not even    
necessary as a  hypothesis1 and likely  
to disappear4  ,the ther was not only   
not  discovered1 it was not even        
suspected to exist1 as in the case of   
the  unknown planet ,neptune--it was    
logically constructed4  ,it was required
  to support the theory of the          
undulatory nature of light and to fulfil
  the possibility of light propagation  
in space4  ,it was therefore a          
postulate1 called forth by a need--so   
far we may adopt the pragmatist         

account4  ,but what was the nature of   
the need1 and what was the method  by   
which the postulate was called forth8   
,it is in answering this  question that 
the pragmatist criterion fails4  ,the   
need was  intellectual in the purely    
logical meaning of the term1 and it was 
met  by a purely logical construction4  
,the need was a practical human need    
only in so far as the intellect working 
by logical process is a human  endowment
 but not in any personal sense such as  
is conveyed by the term  psychological4 
,willingness or unwillingness to        
believe1 desire1  aversion1 interest    
were all irrelevant4  ,given the        
intellect1 the  logical necessity was   
the only need that called forth by      
logical  process the truth-claiming     
hypothesis of the ther4  ,but even so1  
the  pragmatist will urge1 is its truth 
anything else but its usefulness as     
shown in the practical consequences of  
believing it8  ,was it not true  while  
it was useful1 and is it not only now   

false1 if it is false1 if  it is        
actually discovered not to be useful8   
#fb ,the reply is that no  mathematician
 or physicist would recognise the       
possibility of working  with a          
conception of truth that simply         
identified truth with utility1  and for 
this reason that he can only conceive   
reality as a system whose  truth is     
symbolised in an equation4  ,it is the  
system that determines  and             
characterises the postulate1 and not the
 postulate advanced at a  venture1 tried
 and verified1 that constitutes the     
system4  ,the  mathematician begins by  
placing symbols to represent the unknown
  factors in his equation1 and proceeds 
by means of his known factors to        
determine their value4  ,the ther is at 
first a pure fiction  constructed to    
supply an unknown existence recognised  
as a defect4  ,its  truth cannot mean   
that it works for it cannot but work1   
having been  constructed purely for that
 purpose4  ,its truth means that it     

corresponds to some actual existence at 
present unknown4  ,to prove its  truth  
the physicist does not appeal to its    
value as a hypothesis1 but  devises     
experiments by which1 if it does exist1 
its existence will be  demonstrated4    
,in this actual case the experiments    
have had a uniformly  negative result1  
and therefore the truth of the          
hypothesis is made  doubtful or denied4 
,the hypothesis continues to work as    
well as it  ever did1 and physicists    
will probably long continue to use it1  
but it  has failed to establish its     
truth claim4  ,the result is the modern 
,principle of ,relativity1 which1 as we 
have already said1 has produced a       
revolution in modern physics4  ,the     
abolition of the ther would have  been  
impossible if the physicist had been    
content with the utility of  his        
hypothesis and had not experimented to  
prove its truth4  ,the  relation between
 truth and utility is thus proved to be 
that it is  useful to know what is true4

    ,these two illustrations of         
scientific method--namely1 the discovery
 of  ,neptune and the negative discovery
 #fc that the ther is                   
non-existent--make it evident that      
verification is the intellectual        
process not of making true1 but of      
finding true4  ,we can1 indeed1         
distinguish quite clearly the two       
processes4  ,the first process1 that  of
 making true1 is the constructing of the
 fiction by which we complete  an       
incomplete system1 and the second is the
 testing of that fiction to  see if it  
corresponds to anything actually        
existing4  ,no kind of  intellectual    
activity will make an idea true1 and    
conversely we may say  that were truth  
only a utility1 then knowledge instead  
of being  systematic would be chaotic4  
,existence has its roots in reality1 not
  in knowledge4  ,reality does not      
depend on truth4  ,truth is the         
intellectual apprehension of reality4   
,if the pragmatist objects that in this 

argument ,i have throughout  supposed   
him to be urging the narrow meaning of  
utility1 namely1 that  it is usefulness 
in the strictly practical sense1 whereas
 he intends it  in the widest possible  
meaning--a meaning that includes        
theoretical  usefulness--then the       
trouble is a different one2 it is to    
know how and  where the pragmatist stops
 short of the coherence theory of truth1
 and  wherein his method differs from   
that of the idealist4    ,this brings me
 to the consideration of another theory 
in which the  concept of utility plays a
 large1 indeed a predominant part4      
,this is  the theory of the relation of 
knowledge to life that is given to us in
  the philosophy of ,bergson4  ,i have  
in one of the volumes of this series    
given an account of this philosophy2 ,i 
am here only dealing with its  relation 
to this special problem of the nature of
 truth4  ,it has been  claimed that this
 philosophy is only a form of           
pragmatism1 but it is  not a theory of  

truth1 and it has this essential        
difference from  pragmatism that it is  
the intellect and not truth that is a   
utility4  ,before we consider the       
question that it gives #fd rise to in   
regard to  truth1 let us first examine  
the theory of the intellect1 and the    
nature  of its utility4  ,the intellect 
is a mode of activity1 an endowment     
acquired in the course of evolution1 and
 which has been retained and  perfected 
because of its utility4  ,this does not 
mean that the  intellect directs us to  
what is useful and inhibits us from     
courses  fatal to life1 neither does it 
mean that it gives us any power to make 
true what is not already true1 it means 
that the power to acquire  knowledge is 
useful4  ,there is a contrast in our own
 existence between  our life and our    
intellect4    ,to understand the way in 
which the intellect serves the living   
creature  endowed with it1 we need only 
regard it from the standpoint of        
ordinary  experience4  ,we know in      

ourselves that our life is wider than   
our  intellect1 and that our intellect  
serves the activity of our life4  ,the  
common expressions we employ1 such as   
using our wits1 taking an  intelligent  
interest1 trying to think1 all imply a  
utility distinct  from the intellect4   
,so viewed1 our life appears as an      
active principle  within us1 maintaining
 our organism in its relations1 active  
and  passive1 and reactive to the       
reality outside and independent of it4  
,our intellect also seems both active   
and passive4  ,it receives the          
influences that stream in upon us from  
the reality around us1 it  apprehends   
and interprets them1 and works out the  
lines of our possible  action in regard 
to them4  ,the influences that flow in  
upon us from the  outside world are     
already selected before our intellect   
apprehends  them1 for they flow in by   
the avenues of our senses1 and the      
senses are  natural instruments of      
selection4  ,if we picture these        

influences as  vibrations1 then we may  
say that a certain group of vibrations  
of a  very rapid frequency are selected 
by the eye and give rise to vision1     
that another group of very much lower   
frequency are selected by the ear  and  
#fe give the sensation of sound1 and    
other groups are selected by  taste1    
smell1 and touch4  ,many groups are     
known indirectly by means of  artificial
 instruments1 and all the infinite      
series that unite these  groups of the  
actually experienced vibrations escape  
our apprehension  altogether--we have no
 means of selecting them4  ,but all     
these sense  data1 as we may call them1 
come to us without exertion or activity 
on  our part2 it is the intellect which 
gives them meaning1 which  interprets   
them1 which makes them the apprehension 
or awareness of  objects or things4     
,and the active part that the intellect 
plays is  also a process of selection4  
,this is evident if we reflect upon the 
universal form which our intellectual   

activity takes1 namely1  attention4  ,it
 is in the act of attention that we are 
conscious of  mental activity1 and      
attention is essentially selection--the 
selection  of an interest4  ,besides the
 natural selection that is effected by  
our  senses and the conscious selection 
that is manifest in attention1 there  is
 also a more or less arbitrary selection
 that our intellect performs  in marking
 out the lines of our practical interest
 and possible action4  ,in this work of 
selection the intellect makes the world 
conform to the  necessities of our      
action4    ,so far we have looked at our
 intellectual endowment from the        
standpoint  of ordinary common-sense    
experience4  ,let us now consider the   
philosophical theory based on this view1
 which explains the nature of  knowledge
 by showing its purpose4  ,the intellect
 not only selects1 but  in selecting    
transforms the reality4  ,it presents us
 with knowledge  that indeed corresponds
 with reality1 for it is essentially a  

view of  reality1 but also in selecting 
it marks out divisions1 and gives to    
reality a form that is determined by    
practical interest4  ,the same  reality 
is different to different individuals   
and to different species  according to  
their practical interests4  #ff ,the    
practical end which  the human intellect
 serves is to present us with a field   
for our life  activity4  ,this is the   
real world for us1 as we know it1 real  
objects  in a real space4  ,had we no   
other way of knowing but that of our    
intellect we should not know the life   
which is active within us as it  is     
really lived1 we should be as those who1
 standing outside1 watch a  movement1   
and not as those who are carried along  
in the movement and  experience it from 
within4  ,in life and intellect we have 
the  counterpart of reality and         
appearance4  ,life is not something that
  changes2 it is the change of which the
 something is the appearance4  ,life is 
the reality of which all things1 as we  

understand them1 are the  appearances1  
and on account of which they appear4    
,the solid things in  space and time are
 not in reality what they appear2 they  
are views of  the reality4  ,the        
intellect guided by our practical       
interest presents  reality under this   
form of solid spatial things4  ,clearly1
 then1 if  this view be true1 the whole 
world1 as it is presented to us and     
thought of by us1 is an illusion4  ,our 
science is not unreal1 but it is  a     
transformed reality4  ,the illusions may
 be useful1 may1 indeed1 be  necessary  
and indispensable1 but nevertheless it  
is illusion4    ,but here there arises a
 new difficulty in regard to truth4  ,if
 the  usefulness of the intellect       
consists in the active production of an 
illusion1 can we say that the intellect 
leads us to truth8  ,is it not  only if 
we can turn away from the intellect and 
obtain a  non-intellectual intuition    
that we can know truth8          #fg    
,,chapter ,,vii    ,,illusion    ,the   

doctrine that the world that appears is 
essentially unlike the  world that is is
 neither new nor peculiar to any        
particular theory of  philosophy4  ,it  
has received a new interest and a new   
interpretation  lately in the theory    
that we are now considering1 that the   
clue to the  appearance of the world to 
us is to be found in the conception of  
the  nature of the utility of the       
intellect and in the mode of its        
activity4  ,the idea that we are perhaps
 disqualified by our very nature itself 
from beholding reality and knowing truth
 is illustrated in the  well-known      
allegory in the ,republic of ,plato3    
,and now let me show in a figure how far
 our nature is enlightened or           
unenlightened4  ,behold6 human beings   
living in an underground den1  which has
 a mouth open towards the light and     
reaching all along the  den2 here they  
have been from their childhood1 and have
 their legs and  necks chained so that  
they cannot move and can only see before

 them1  being prevented by the chains   
from turning round their heads4  ,above 
and behind them a fire is blazing at a  
distance1 and between the fire  and the 
prisoners there is a raised way2 and you
 will see1 if you look1  a low wall     
built along the way1 like the screen    
which marionette  players have in front 
of them1 over which they show the       
puppets4  ,and  men are passing along   
the wall carrying all sorts of vessels1 
and  statues1 and figures of animals    
made of wood and stone and various      
materials1 which appear over the        
wall4444    ,they are strange prisoners1
 like ourselves1 and they see only their
  own shadows or the shadows of one     
another which the fire throws on the    
opposite wall of the cave4  ,and so also
 of the objects carried and of  the     
passers-by2 to the prisoners the truth  
would be literally nothing  but the     
shadows of the images4    #fh    ,and   
now look again1 and see what will       
naturally follow if the  prisoners are  

released and disabused of their error4  
,at first1 when  any of them1 is        
liberated and compelled suddenly to     
stand up and turn  his neck round and   
walk and look towards the light1 he will
 suffer  sharp pains2 the glare will    
distress him1 and he will be unable to  
see  the realities of which in his      
former state he had seen the shadows4   
,and then conceive someone saying to him
 that what he saw before was an         
illusion1 but that now1 when he is      
approaching nearer to being1 and his    
eye is turned towards more real         
existence1 he has a clearer vision1 and 
what will be his reply8  ,will he not   
fancy that the shadows which he         
formerly saw are truer than the objects 
which are now shown to him8444    ,and  
suppose that he is forced into the      
presence of the sun himself1 is  he not 
likely to be pained and irritated8      
,when he approaches the light  his eyes 
will be dazzled1 and he will not be able
 to see anything at  all of what are now

 called realities4    ,the thought that 
,plato has expressed in this wonderful  
allegory has  entered deeply into all   
philosophy4  ,what we first take for    
reality is  merely a shadow world4  ,but
 in ,plato's view it is the intellect   
which  gives us the means of escape1 the
 power to turn from the illusion to     
behold the reality4  ,it is not until   
now that philosophy has sought the  clue
 to the illusion in the nature of the   
intellect itself4  ,the very  instrument
 of truth is unfitted to reveal to us   
the reality as it is1  because its      
nature and purpose is to transform      
reality1 to make reality  appear in a   
form which1 though of paramount         
importance to us as active  beings1 is  
essentially an illusion4  ,the          
intellectual bent of our mind  leads us 
away from1 and not towards a vision of  
reality in its purity4  ,the more our   
intellect progresses1 and the more and  
more clearly we  #fi see into a greater 
and ever greater number of things1 the  

farther  are we from1 and not the nearer
 to a grasp of reality as it is4  ,to   
obtain this vision of reality we have to
 turn away from the intellect  and find 
ourselves again in that wider life out  
of which the intellect  is formed4      
,life1 as it lives1 is an intuition that
 is nonintellectual4    ,human          
intelligence1 writes ,bergson1 is not at
 all what ,plato taught  in the allegory
 of the cave4  ,its function is not to  
look at passing  shadows1 nor yet to    
turn itself round and contemplate the   
glaring sun4  ,it has something else to 
do4  ,harnessed1 like yoked oxen1 to a  
heavy  task1 we feel the play of our    
muscles and joints1 the weight of the   
plough1 and the resistance of the soil4 
,to act and to know that we are  acting1
 to come into touch with reality and    
even to live it1 but only  in the       
measure in which it concerns the work   
that is being accomplished  and the     
furrow that is being ploughed1 such is  
the function of human  intelligence4    

,the illusion to which our intellectual 
nature subjects us is the  necessity we 
are under to regard the things of the   
universe as more  ultimate1 as more     
fundamental than the movement which     
actuates the  universe4  ,it seems to us
 impossible that there could exist      
movement or  change1 unless there       
already existed things to be moved or   
changed1  things whose nature is not    
altered1 but only their form and their  
external relations1 when they are moved 
or changed4  ,this necessity of  thought
 seems to have received authoritative   
recognition in all  attempts1 religious 
and scientific1 to conceive origins4    
,thus we read  in the ,book of ,genesis3
      ,in the beginning ,god created the
 heaven and the earth4  ,and the earth  
was without form1 and void2 and darkness
 was upon the face of the deep4  ,and   
the ,spirit of ,god moved upon the face 
of the waters4      #gj ,the matter of  
the universe1 it is felt1 must be in    
existence  before the movement which    

vivifies it4  ,the dead inert stuff must
 be  created before it can receive the  
breath of life4  ,and if ,god the       
creator is conceived as living before   
the matter which ,he has created1  it is
 as an external principle1 the relation 
of which to the creation  is by most    
religious minds thought to transcend the
 power of the finite  understanding to  
conceive4    ,the same fundamental      
conception of the primacy of matter over
 movement  is evident in the scientific 
theories of the nature and origin of    
life4  ,life appears to science as a    
form of energy that requires things1    
matter occupying space1 to support it4  
,according to one view1 life is  the    
result of a certain combination or      
synthesis of chemical or  physical      
elements1 previously existing           
separately--a combination of  very great
 complexity1 and one that may possibly  
have occurred once  only in the long    
process of nature1 but which            
nevertheless might be1  and some think  

probably1 or even certainly1 will be    
brought about by a  chemist working in  
his laboratory4  ,this is the           
mechanistic or  materialist view4  ,on  
the other hand1 there is the theory of  
vitalism4  ,life1 it is contended1      
cannot be due to such a synthesis of    
material  elements as the mechanistic   
view supposes1 because it is of the     
nature  of an entelechy--that is1 an    
individual existence which functions1 as
  a whole1 in every minutest part of the
 organism it vitalises4  ,life  has     
supervened upon1 and not arisen out of  
the material organism which  it guides  
and controls not by relating independent
 parts1 but by making  every part       
subserve the activity and unity of the  
whole4  ,but the  vitalist theory1 as   
well as the mechanistic theory1         
conceives the  movement and change which
 is life as dependent on the previous   
existence of a matter or stuff which is 
moved or changed4  ,the  philosophical  
#ga conception differs1 therefore1 from 

both these  theories4  ,it is that life 
is an original movement1 and that this  
movement is the whole reality of which  
things1 inert matter1 even  spatial     
extension1 are appearances4  ,true      
duration is change1 not the  permanence 
of something amidst change4  ,there are 
no unchanging things4  ,everything      
changes4  ,reality is the flux2 things  
are views of the flux1  arrests or      
contractions of the flowing that the    
intellect makes4  ,the  appearance of   
the world to us is our intellectual     
grasp of a reality  that flows4  ,this  
original movement is the life of the    
universe4  ,briefly stated1 the argument
 on which the theory is based is that it
 is  logically impossible to explain    
change by changelessness1 movement by   
immobility4  ,real change cannot be a   
succession of states themselves  fixed  
and changeless2 real movement cannot be 
the immobile positions in  which some   
thing is successively at rest4  ,on the 
other hand1 if  movement is original1   

the interruption of movement1 in        
whatever way  effected1 will appear as  
things4  ,the experience which confirms 
this  argument is the insight that      
everyone may obtain of the reality of   
his  own life as continuous movement1   
unceasing change1 wherein all that      
exists exists together in a present     
activity4  ,to develop this argument    
would exceed the limits of this book1   
and would be outside its purpose4  ,it  
is essential1 however1 that such a      
theory should be understood1 for        
clearly it is possible to hold not only 
that we are subject to  illusion1 but   
that illusion is of the very nature of  
intellectual  apprehension4  ,if1 then1 
the understanding works illusion for the
 sake  of action1 is it thereby         
disqualified as an instrument for the   
attainment of truth8    ,we are brought1
 then1 to the critical point of our     
inquiry4  ,if  illusion is the essential
 condition of human activity1 if the    
intellect1 the very instrument of truth1

 #gb is itself affected1 what  is to    
save us from universal scepticism8  ,if 
the salt have lost his  savour1         
wherewith shall it be salted8  ,the     
intellect with its frames  and moulds   
shapes living change and movement into  
fixed immobile  states2 the process of  
knowing alters profoundly the reality   
known4  ,must we not conclude that      
knowledge1 however useful1 is not true8 
,and  to what shall we turn for truth8  
,there is1 indeed1 if this be so1 a     
deeper irony in the question1 ,what is  
truth8 than even ,pilate could  have    
imagined4  ,we have absolutely no       
practical concern with truth--we  must  
leave it to the mystic1 to the          
unpractical1 the contemplative man  who 
has turned aside from the stern task of 
busy life4    ,it is not so4  ,the      
problem that seems so fundamental admits
 a quite  simple solution4  ,illusion is
 not error1 nor is it falsehood2 it is  
the  appearance of reality4  ,it is the 
reality that appears1 and when we  grasp

 the principle of utility we understand 
the shape that the  appearance must     
assume4  ,this shape may seem to us a   
distortion1 but in  recognising         
appearance we are in touch with reality1
 and practical  interest is the key that
 opens to us the interpretation of      
intellectual  experience4  ,and it is   
not only by the intellect that we       
interpret the  nature of reality1 for   
besides logic there is life1 and in life
 we  directly perceive the reality that 
in logic we think about4    ,the        
intellect1 then1 does not make truth1   
neither does it make reality2  it makes 
reality take the form of spatial things1
 and it makes things  seem to be the    
ground of reality4  ,were our nature not
 intellectual1 if  all consciousness was
 intuitive1 the world would not then    
appear as  things--there would be no    
things4  ,but1 notwithstanding that our 
world  is an illusion1 it is not the    
less on that account a true world1 and  
our science is true knowledge1 in the   

objective meaning of truth1 for  #gc    
once an illusion is interpreted1 it     
becomes an integral part of  the        
conception of reality4  ,it would be    
easy to find abundant  illustration of  
this fact within science itself4  ,thus 
in the familiar  case of the straight   
stick which appears bent when partly    
immersed in  water1 as soon as the      
illusion is understood as due to the    
different  refraction of light in media 
of different density1 air and water1 it 
ceases to be an illusion4  ,we then     
recognise that if a partly immersed     
stick did not appear bent1 it would     
really be bent4  ,again1 the  illusion  
that clings to us most persistently     
throughout our experience  is that which
 is connected with movement and rest4   
,the system of  movement in which we are
 ourselves carried along appears to us  
stationary1 while that which is outside 
it seems alone to move4  ,in  very      
simple cases1 such as viewing the       
landscape from a  railway-carriage      

window1 habit has long caused the       
illusion to cease1  but we all remember 
the child's feeling that the trees and  
fields were  flying past us4  ,the      
earth's motion never becomes to us a    
real  experience of movement1 we accept 
the fact and never doubt the  scientific
 evidence on which it rests1 yet we     
always speak and think of  sunrise and  
sunset2 and this is not merely due to   
the accident that our  language was     
fixed before the nature of the celestial
 movement was  known1 but to a natural  
illusion which it is far more convenient
 to  retain than to abandon4    ,the    
fact of illusion is not the tenet of any
 particular philosophy1 nor  even of    
philosophy itself2 it is a recognised   
factor in common life and  in physical  
science1 but in instancing the theory of
 ,bergson's  philosophy ,i am choosing  
an extreme case4  ,berkeley held that   
illusion  is practically universal2     
,kant taught that the apparent          
objectivity of  phenomena is the form   

that the understanding imposes on       
things2 but  ,bergson teaches #gd not   
only that all material reality is       
illusion1  but also that this very      
illusion is the work of the intellect1  
that the  intellect is formed for this  
purpose1 intellect and matter being     
correlative1 evolving pari passu4  ,to  
such a doctrine there is of  necessity a
 positive side1 for it is impossible    
that it can rest on  universal          
scepticism--scepticism both of knowledge
 and of the  instrument of knowledge4   
,if the intellectual view of reality as 
solid  matter in absolute space is      
illusion1 it must be possible to        
apprehend  the reality from which the   
judgment that it is illusion is derived4
  ,if  the intellect distorts1 there    
must be an intuition which is pure1 and 
the relation between these will be the  
relation between reality and            
appearance4  ,neither1 then1 is reality 
truth1 nor appearance error4  ,there is 
a truth of appearance1 a truth that is a

 value in itself1 a  truth that is more 
than the mere negation that appearance  
is not  reality4  ,the appearance is our
 hold upon the reality1 our actual      
contact with it1 the mode and direction 
of our action upon it4  ,what1  then1 is
 error8  ,it cannot consist in the fact 
that we know appearance  only1 not      
reality1 for we can only know reality by
 its appearance4  ,it  cannot be an     
appearance behind which there is no     
reality1 for non-being  cannot appear4  
,it cannot be nothing at all or pure    
non-being1 for to  think of absolute    
nothing is not to think4  ,in error     
there is some  object of thought which  
is denied real being4  ,what this is is 
the  problem of error4                  
,,chapter ,,viii    ,,the ,,problem ,,of
 ,,error    ,in the ,thetetus of ,plato1
 ,socrates has been discussing with     
,thetetus what knowledge is1 and when at
 last agreement seems to be  reached in 
the definition that #ge knowledge is    
true opinion1 a new  difficulty occurs  

to ,socrates3    ,there is a point which
 often troubles me and is a great       
perplexity to  me both in regard to     
myself and to others4  ,i cannot make   
out the  nature or origin of the mental 
experience to which ,i refer4  ,how     
there  can be false opinion--that       
difficulty still troubles the eye of my 
mind4  ,do we not speak of false        
opinion1 and say that one man holds a   
false and another a true opinion1 as    
though there were some natural          
distinction between them8  ,all things  
and everything are either known  or not 
known4  ,he who knows1 cannot but know2 
and he who does not know1  cannot       
know4444  ,where1 then1 is false        
opinion8  ,for if all things are  either
 known or unknown1 there can be no      
opinion which is not  comprehended under
 this alternative1 and so false opinion 
is excluded4    ,this difficulty may    
appear at first sight purely verbal1 and
 we shall  perhaps be inclined to see   
the answer to it in the double use that 

we  make of the word knowledge4  ,we use
 the word in two senses1 in one of      
which it includes all and everything    
that is or can be present to the  mind  
in thinking1 and in another and narrower
 sense the word knowledge  means truth4 
,it was in the narrow sense of the word 
that whatever is  not true is not       
knowledge that ,socrates interpreted the
 meaning of the  ,delphic oracle that   
had declared him the wisest of men4     
,his wisdom  must be1 he said1 that     
whereas other men seemed to be wise and 
to know  something1 he knew that he knew
 nothing4  ,all men have opinion1 but   
opinion is not knowledge1 though easily 
and generally mistaken for it4  ,his    
perplexity was to understand what       
actually this false opinion could  be   
which passed for knowledge4  ,it could  
not be nothing at all1 for  then it     
would simply mean ignorance2 but in     
false opinion #gf some  object is       
present to the mind4  ,everything that  
the mind thinks of has  being4  ,a thing

 may have being that does not exist if  
by existence is  meant the particular   
existence of an event in time1 for most 
of the  things we think about are       
timeless--they are ideas1 such as       
whiteness1  goodness1 numbers and the   
properties of numbers1 faith1 love1 and 
such-like4  ,all such ideas are called  
universals1 because their reality  does 
not mean that they exist at one         
particular moment and no other1  but    
they are real1 they have being4  ,how1  
then1 can there be anything             
intermediate between being and not      
being1 anything that is and also is     
not1 for this is what false opinion or  
error seems to be8    ,there is1 then1 a
 problem of error1 and it is quite      
distinct from the  problem of truth4    
,the problem of truth is to know by what
 criterion we  can test the agreement of
 our ideas with reality2 the problem of 
error  is to know how there can be false
 opinion4  ,there is false opinion1 of  
this no one needs to be convinced2 but  

where its place is in the  fundamental  
scheme of the mental process1 in what   
precisely it  consists1 whether it is   
purely a negation or whether it has a   
positive  nature of its own1 this is the
 problem we have now to consider4       
,there is an important distinction in   
logic between what is  contradictory and
 what is contrary4  ,of two             
contradictory propositions  one must be 
true1 the other must be false2 but of   
two contrary  propositions one must be  
false1 but both may be false4  ,of      
contradictory propositions one is always
 a pure negation1 one declares  the     
non-existence of what the other affirms 
the existence2 but of  contrary         
propositions each has a positive        
content1 and both may be  false4  ,a    
true proposition may be based on a false
 opinion1 and it is  very important to  
have a clear idea of what we intend by  
false opinion4  ,we do not mean by false
 opinion such plainly false #gg         
propositions as  that two and two are   

five or that there may be no corners in 
a  square--such propositions are false1 
because they contradict  propositions   
that are self-evident4  ,if anyone      
should seriously affirm  them1 we should
 not1 ,i think1 say that such a one had 
a false opinion1  but that he failed1   
perhaps through some illusion1 to       
understand the  meaning of the terms he 
was using4  ,an example of what would   
now1 ,i  suppose1 be unquestionably     
regarded by everyone as error is that   
whole  body of opinion that found       
expression in the theory and practice of
  witchcraft4  ,this was once almost    
universally accepted1 and though        
probably at no period nor in any country
 was there not some one who  doubted or 
disbelieved1 still the reasons of such  
doubt or disbelief  would probably be   
very different from those reasons which 
lead us to  reject it to-day4  ,for     
witchcraft was grounded on a general    
belief that  spiritual agencies1        
beneficent and malign1 were the cause of

 material  well-being or evil4  ,this   
conception has now given place to the   
mechanistic or naturalistic theory on   
which our modern physical science  is   
based4  ,we interpret all physical      
occurrences as caused by material       
agency4  ,but this belief1 quite as much
 as the belief in spiritual  agencies1  
is opinion1 not knowledge1 and it may be
 false4  ,it is  conceivable that future
 generations will reject our scientific 
notions1  self-evident though they seem 
to us1 as completely as we reject the   
notions of the dark ages4  ,it is even  
conceivable that the whole of our       
modern science may come to appear to    
mankind as not even an  approximation to
 knowledge4  ,error1 like illusion1 may 
be universal4  ,no one whose opinion    
counts as a rational belief now holds   
that  sickness may be caused by the     
malign influence of the evil eye1 and   
that this influence may be neutralised  
by making the sign of the cross2  some1 
but very few1 believe that a #gh sick   

man may be healed by the  prayers and   
anointing of righteous men2 many believe
 that material  disease1 however        
malignant1 may be expelled from the body
 by faith2  while the majority of       
rational men1 whatever independent      
religious  views they hold1 regard      
sickness and disease as material in the 
ordinary sense1 and expect them to yield
 to drugs and treatment4  ,now1  of     
these various opinions some must be     
false1 while all may be false4  ,let us 
add some illustrations from philosophy4 
,some philosophers hold1  in common with
 general opinion1 that sense experience 
is caused by  physical objects2 others  
hold that there are no physical objects1
 but  that consciousness is the one and 
only reality2 and there are others  who 
think that the reality that gives rise  
to our sense experience is  neither     
physical in the sense of a material     
thing1 nor mental in the  sense of      
consciousness or thought1 but is        
movement or change--change  that        

requires no support and is absolute4    
,all these are opinions1 and  may be    
false1 and our belief that any one of   
them is true does not  depend on        
immediate experience1 but on reasons4   
,the best that can be  said in favour of
 any belief is that there is no reason  
for supposing  it false1 and the worst  
that can be said against any belief is  
that  there is no reason for supposing  
it true4  ,our problem1 then1 is to     
know what constitutes the nature of     
error in any one of these examples  if  
it is1 as each one may be1 false8       
,the instances we have given are all of 
them propositions or judgments1  or else
 conceptions formed out of propositions 
or judgments1 the  purpose of which is  
to interpret experience4  ,the actual   
experience  itself1 in so far as it     
consists of the actual presence of the  
object  to the mind aware of it1 is1 as 
we have seen1 neither truth nor error2  
it simply is what it is4  ,it is the    
conceptions by which we interpret  this 

experience that are #gi true or false4  
,and our problem is that  the meaning or
 content of a conception1 that which is 
present to the  mind when we make a     
judgment1 is precisely the same whether 
the  conception is true or false1 there 
is no distinctive mark or feature by    
which we can know that in the one case  
the object of thought is a real  or     
actual fact1 in the other an opinion to 
which no reality  corresponds4  ,and1   
further1 it seems exceedingly difficult 
to  understand in what way a non-reality
 can be present to the mind at all4     
,let us now examine some attempts to    
solve this problem1 and first of  all   
let us take the pragmatist solution4    
,pragmatism claims that it has  no      
difficulty in explaining error1 because1
 as we have already seen1 it            
acknowledges no other test or criterion 
of truth except a pragmatic  one4       
,every proposition or judgment that we  
make must1 in order to have  any meaning
 whatever1 be relevant to some human    

purpose2 every such  proposition is a   
truth-claim2 and every truth-claim is   
tested by its  workability4             
,consequently1 error is simply the      
failure of a  proposition to establish  
its claim by the practical test of      
working4  ,propositions marked by such  
failure are errors4  ,as there is no    
truth  independent of time1 place1 and  
circumstance1 no irrelevant truth1 no   
truth independent of the conditions     
under which its claim is put  forward1  
there is no truth that may not become   
error4  ,no judgment1  according to     
pragmatism1 is an error pure and        
simple--that is to say1  it cannot come 
into existence as error1 for it comes   
claiming truth1  and maintaining that   
claim until challenged2 it becomes an   
error in  retrospect only1 and always in
 relation to another judgment which     
corrects it4  ,error does not           
characterise a class of judgments2 it is
  something that happens to a judgment1 
it is a judgment whose  truth-claim is  

rejected in reference to another        
judgment #hj which  succeeds4  ,the     
essential thing in the pragmatist       
doctrine of error is  that in claiming  
to be true a judgment is not challenging
 comparison  with some independent      
reality1 nor is it claiming to belong to
 a  timeless order of existence--to be  
eternal2 it is claiming to fulfil  the  
particular purpose for which it has been
 called forth1 whether that  purpose be 
practical or theoretical4    ,let us now
 consider the explanation of error      
offered by the idealist  philosophy4    
,in this view only the whole truth is   
wholly true2 the  ,absolute1 as a       
perfect1 concrete1 individual system1 is
 the ideal1 and  all that falls short of
 it can only possess a degree of        
truth--a degree  which is greater or    
less according as it approximates to the
 ideal4  ,the degrees of truth are not  
quantitative1 not a mixture of truth and
  error1 but a nearer or more distant   
approach to the ideal4  ,there can  be  

no absolute error1 because if truth is  
the whole1 error1 if it  exists at all1 
must in some way be included in truth4  
,clearly error  cannot as such be truth1
 and therefore it must follow that1 in  
the  whole1 error loses its character of
 error1 and finds reconciliation of  its
 contradiction to truth4  ,error1 then1 
if it is something1 and not a  pure     
negation1 is partial or incomplete      
truth2 the perplexity and  contradiction
 that it gives rise to are incidental to
 our partial view4  ,knowledge1 it must 
seem to us1 can exist only for          
omniscience4  ,unless  we know          
everything1 we know nothing4    ,these  
two doctrines are in a sense the exact  
antithesis of one another4  ,they agree 
together in this1 that in each the      
explanation of error  follows as a      
consequence of the conception of the    
nature of truth4  ,the  pragmatist      
theory implies that there is no truth in
 any real sense1 but  only more or less 
successful error4  ,the idealist theory 

implies that  there is no real error1   
but only a variety in the degree of     
truth4    #ha    ,most people1 however1 
are convinced that truth and error are  
not  related to one another1 nor to the 
circumstances that call forth belief  or
 disbelief4  ,let us now examine a      
theory that recognises this4  ,there    
are false judgments1 and they need      
explanation2 error has a nature of  its 
own4  ,if a judgment is false1 it is    
absolutely and unalterably  false2 if it
 is true1 it is unconditionally true and
 with no reserve4  ,no logical process1 
no psychological disposition1 can make  
what is  false true4  ,error must lie in
 the nature of knowledge1 and to        
discover  that nature we must understand
 the theory of knowledge and determine  
the exact nature of the mental act in   
knowing4  ,the first essential is  to   
distinguish the kind of knowledge to    
which truth and error can  apply4  ,we  
pointed out in the second chapter that  
all knowledge rests  ultimately on      

immediate experience4  ,in immediate    
experience the  relation between the    
mental act of knowing and the object    
that is known  is so simple that any    
question as to truth or error in regard 
to it is  unmeaning4  ,to question the  
truth of immediate experience is to     
question its existence2 it is to ask if 
it is what it is1 and this is  plainly  
unmeaning4  ,but thinking1 we said1 is  
questioning experience in  order to know
 its content or meaning1 and in         
thinking1 the simplicity  of the        
relation which unites the mind to its   
object in immediate  experience is left 
behind1 and a logical process of very   
great  complexity takes its place4  ,it 
is in this complexity that the          
possibility of error lies4    ,let us   
look at it a little more closely4       
,knowing is a relation which  unites two
 things1 one the mind that knows1 the   
other the thing known4  ,in every act of
 knowing1 something is present to the   
mind2 if knowing  is simply awareness of

 this actually present something1 we    
call it  immediate experience1 we are   
acquainted with the object4  ,but our   
knowledge is not only of objects #hb    
immediately present to the mind  and    
with which we are therefore acquainted4 
,knowledge embraces the  past and future
 and the distant realms of space4       
,indeed were knowledge  only of what is 
actually present to the mind1 it is     
difficult to  imagine that we could1 in 
the ordinary meaning of the word1 know  
anything at all4  ,i may be thinking1   
for example1 of an absent friend2  all  
that is present to my mind is1 it may   
be1 a memory image1 a faint  recall of  
his appearance on some one occasion1 or 
perhaps a  recollection of the tone of  
his voice1 or it may be the black marks 
on  white paper which ,i recognise as   
his handwriting4  ,this image is        
present to my mind1 but the image is not
 the object1 my friend1 about  whom ,i  
think and make endless judgments1 true  
and false4  ,so also1 if  what is       

present to the mind is affecting me     
through the external  senses1 if it is a
 sense impression1 it is clear that what
 is actually  present is not the whole  
object of which ,i am aware1 but only a 
very  small part of it1 or1 it may be1  
no part of it at all1 but something1 a  
sound1 or an odour1 that represents it4 
,the immediate data of  consciousness   
are named by some philosophers sense    
data1 by others1  presentations1 by     
others images1 and there is much        
controversy as to  their nature and     
existence1 but with this controversy we 
are not here  concerned--we are seeking 
to make clear an obvious distinction1   
namely1  the distinction between        
knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge 
by  description4    ,what kind of       
knowledge is it that we acquire by      
description8  ,knowledge  about things  
with which we are not first acquainted4 
,the most  important knowledge that we  
possess or acquire is knowledge of      
objects  which we know only by the      

knowledge we have about them--objects   
that we  know about without knowing     
them4  ,they are not direct impressions 
on  our senses1 #hc nor are they ideas  
known in actual experience4  ,we  make  
judgments about them1 and the subjects  
about which we make these  judgments are
 really composed of these judgments that
 we make about  them4  ,to go back to   
our illustrations1 we may know a great  
deal about  the evil eye1 a malignant   
influence1 disease1 faith1 healing1     
causality1 physical objects1 without any
 acquaintance with them1  without even  
knowing that they exist4  ,such         
knowledge is descriptive1  and the      
objects are descriptions4  ,knowledge by
 description is never  quite simple1 and
 is often very complex1 for1 besides the
 relation of  the mental act to the     
object known1 there are the terms and   
relations  which are the elements in the
 judgment and the relations of the      
judgments themselves4  ,if we analyse a 
judgment1 every word in which it  is    

expressed1 whether it is a noun or a    
verb or a preposition or a  conjunction1
 conveys a distinct meaning1 indicates a
 term or a  relation1 each of which can 
be made a distinct object to the mind1  
and  all of which are combined in the   
single meaning the judgment expresses4  
,it is in this complexity that the      
possibility of error lies1 and the      
possibility increases as the complexity 
increases4  ,all the terms and  the     
relations which a judgment contains     
depend on the knowledge we have  by     
acquaintance--that is to say1 we are    
ultimately dependent on our  actual     
experience for all knowledge whatever1  
whether it is  acquaintance or          
description1 for we can only describe in
 terms with  which we are acquainted2   
but in the judgment these elements are  
combined into new objects1 or a certain 
relation is declared to exist  between  
objects1 and it is this combination of  
the elements of the  judgment that      
involves its truth or falsehood4    ,if 

this view of the nature of the mental   
act of knowing is accepted1 we  are able
 to understand how false opinion #hd is 
consistent with the  fact that all      
knowledge is truth4  ,we escape both the
 alternatives that  seemed to ,socrates 
the only possible ones4  ,when a man has
 a false  opinion1 does he think that   
which he knows to be some other thing   
which  he knows1 and knowing both is he 
at the same time ignorant of both8  ,or 
does he think of something which he does
 not know as some other thing  which he 
does not know8   ,no1 neither2 in error 
he thinks that  something that he knows 
is in a relation that he knows to some  
other  thing that he knows1 when in fact
 that relation is not relating the two  
things4  ,the false proposition is not  
one in which the constituent  terms and 
relations are unknown or non-existent1  
but one in which a  combination of these
 terms and relations is thought to exist
 when in  fact it does not exist2 and   
the true proposition is that in which   

the  combination thought to exist does  
exist4  ,we can1 therefore1 if this     
account be true1 at least know what     
false opinion or error can be1  whether 
or not we have any means of deciding in 
regard to any  particular opinion that  
it is false4    ,there is one other     
theory1 the last we shall notice4  ,it  
is in one  respect the most important of
 all1 namely1 that it is the most direct
  attempt to grapple with the problem of
 error4  ,it is founded on a  theory of 
knowledge which we owe mainly to the    
profound and acute work  of a ,german   
philosopher 7,meinong71 and which at the
 present time is  being keenly          
discussed4  ,it is an attempt to        
determine more exactly  than has yet    
been done the fundamental scheme of the 
mental life and  development4  ,the     
brief account that ,i am now offering1  
,i owe to a  paper by ,prof4 ,g4 ,f4    
,stout on ,some ,fundamental ,points in 
the ,theory of  ,knowledge4  ,we have   
seen that the problem of error is the   

difficulty  there is in conceiving how  
there can be any real thing1 any real   
#he  object of thought1 intermediate    
between being and not-being4  ,error    
seems to exist and yet to have a nature 
which is a negation of  existence1 and  
it seems therefore to be a downright    
contradiction when  we affirm that error
 or false opinion can be--that there is 
a real  object of thought when we judge 
falsely4  ,this theory meets the        
difficulty directly by distinguishing in
 the mental act of knowing a  process   
that is neither perceiving nor thinking 
of things1 and that  involves neither   
believing nor disbelieving on the one   
hand nor  desiring or willing on the    
other3 this is the process of supposing4
  ,corresponding to this mental act of  
supposing1 there is a distinct kind  of 
object intended or meant by the mind--an
 object that is neither a  sense datum  
nor an idea1 nor a judgment1 but a      
supposition4  ,also and  again          
corresponding to this mental act of     

supposing and its intended  object the  
supposition1 there is a mode of being   
which is neither  existence nor         
non-existence1 but is named subsistence4
  ,a supposition1  it is said1 does not 
exist--it subsists4  ,this thesis1 it   
will easily  be understood1 is based on 
an analysis1 and deals with arguments   
that  touch the most fundamental        
problems of theory of knowledge4        
,moreover1  its presentment is          
excessively technical1 and only those   
highly trained  in the habit of         
psychological introspection and skilled 
in  philosophical analysis are really   
competent to discuss it4  ,it is not    
possible to offer here anything but a   
simple outline of the part of the       
theory that concerns the present        
problem4  ,the actual experience of     
knowing is a relation between two       
things1 one of which is a mental  act1  
the act of perceiving or thinking or    
having ideas1 and the other  is an      
object1 that which is perceived or      

thought of4  ,the act is a  particular  
mental existence1 it is the act of a    
psychical individual4  ,the object is   
not included within the actual          
experience which is the  knowing of it1 
it is #hf that which is meant or        
intended by the  experience4  ,the act1 
then1 is the mental process of meaning  
or  intending1 the object the thing     
meant or intended4  ,the mental act     
differs according to the kind of object 
intended4  ,the act of  perceiving is   
the direction of the mind towards sense 
data and ideas2  the act of judging is  
the direction of the mind towards       
judgments or  propositions about things1
 propositions that affirm or deny       
relations  between things2 the act of   
supposing is different from both        
these--it  is the direction of the mind 
towards suppositions4  ,suppositions    
differ  from ideas in this1 that they   
may be either positive or negative1     
whereas ideas are never negative4  ,this
 may seem to contradict  experience4    

,can we not1 for example1 have an idea  
of not-red just as  well as an idea of  
red8  ,no1 the two ideas can easily be  
seen to be one  and the same2 in each   
case it is red we are actually          
acquainted with1  and the difference is 
in affirming or denying existence to the
 one  idea4  ,the difference is in our  
judgment1 which may be affirmative or   
negative4  ,a supposition is like a     
judgment in this respect2 it may be     
either affirmative or negative1 but it  
differs from a judgment in  another     
respect1 that while a judgment always   
conveys a conviction1  always expresses 
belief or disbelief1 a supposition does 
not--it is  neither believed nor        
disbelieved4    ,before ,i show the     
application of this analysis of         
knowledge to the  problem of error1 let 
me try and clear up its obscurity1 for  
undoubtedly it is difficult to          
comprehend4  ,its difficulty lies in    
this1 that though all the ideas with    
which it deals are quite                

familiar--suppositions1 real and unreal 
possibilities1 fulfilled and            
non-fulfilled beliefs--yet it seems to  
run counter to all our notions  of the  
extreme simplicity of the appeal to     
reality4  ,it seems strange  and        
paradoxical to our ordinary habit #hg of
 thinking to affirm that  there are real
 things and real relations between      
things which though  real yet do not    
exist1 and also that non-existent       
realities are not  things that once were
 real but now are nought--they are      
things that  subsist4  ,yet this is no  
new doctrine4  ,the most familiar case  
of such  realities is that of numbers4  
,the ,greeks discovered that numbers do 
not exist--that is to say1 that their   
reality is of another kind to  that     
which we denote by existence4  ,numbers 
are realities1 otherwise  there would be
 no science of mathematics4  ,pythagoras
 7about #edj-ejj  ,b4,c47 taught that   
numbers are the reality from which all  
else is  derived4  ,and there are many  

other things of the mind that seem      
indeed  to be more real than the things 
of sense4  ,it is this very problem of  
error that brings into relief this most 
important doctrine4    ,now let us apply
 this theory of the supposition to the  
problem of  error1 and we shall then see
 how there can be an object present to  
the  mind when we judge falsely1 and    
also that the object is the same        
whether we judge truly or falsely4      
,suppositions are real  possibilities2  
they are alternatives that may be       
fulfilled or that may  never be         
fulfilled4  ,these real possibilities1  
or these possible  alternatives1 are    
objects of thought2 they do not belong  
to the mental  act of thinking2 they are
 not in the mind1 but realities present 
to the  mind4  ,in mere supposing they  
are present as alternatives2 in judging1
  we affirm of them or deny of them the 
relation to general reality that  they  
are fulfilled4  ,judgments therefore are
 true or false accordingly  as the      

fulfilment they affirm does or does not 
agree with reality4  ,in  this way1     
then1 we may answer the perplexing      
question1 ,how can there be  an object  
of thought in a false judgment8  ,the   
answer is1 that the  objects of thought 
about which we make judgments are       
suppositions1 and  our judgments #hh    
concern their fulfilment1 and their     
fulfilment is a  relation external to   
them--it is their agreement or          
disagreement with  reality4             
,,chapter ,,ix    ,,conclusion    ,i    
will now briefly sum up the argument of 
this book4  ,the problem of  truth is to
 discover the nature of the agreement   
between the things of  the mind1 our    
ideas1 and the reality of which ideas   
are the knowledge4  ,we call the        
agreement truth4  ,what is it8  ,we have
 seen that there are  three different   
answers1 namely--7#a7 ,that it is a     
correspondence  between the idea and the
 reality2 7#b7 ,that it is the coherence
 of the  idea in a consistent and       

harmonious whole2 and 7#c7 ,that it is a
 value  that we ourselves give to our   
ideas4    ,the theory that truth is     
correspondence we found to offer this   
difficulty4  ,to say of an idea that it 
corresponds with reality  supposes a    
knowledge of reality in addition to and 
distinct from the  knowledge that is the
 idea1 and yet the knowledge of reality 
is the  idea of it4  ,and if it be said 
that not the idea but the judgment is   
what corresponds with reality in truth1 
this equally supposes a  knowledge of   
reality that is not a judgment4  ,if1 as
 the common sense  of mankind requires  
us to believe1 the reality that is known
 by us  exists in entire independence of
 our relation of knowing to it1 how can 
we state this fact without falling into 
contradiction in the very  statement of 
it8  ,this is the difficulty of a       
realist theory of  knowledge4    ,we    
next examined the theory that truth is  
coherence1 and this seemed to  present  
to us an unattainable ideal4  #hi ,only 

the whole truth is  wholly true4  ,we   
followed the idealist argument on which 
it is based1  and this seemed to lead us
 inevitably1 in the doctrine of the     
,absolute1  to the paradox that unless  
we know everything we know nothing4     
,in pragmatism we met a new principle1  
the proposal to regard truth as a       
value4  ,truth1 it is said1 is something
 that happens to ideas2 they  become    
true1 or are made true4  ,there is no   
criterion1 no absolute  standard1       
independent of ideas to which they must 
conform if they are  judged to be true4 
,the value of an idea is its practical  
usefulness as  tested by its            
workability4  ,truth is what works4     
,this led us to  criticise the concept  
of utility4  ,we found that it is       
impossible to  identify utility with    
truth even if we include theoretical    
utility in  its widest meaning1 because 
over and above the usefulness and       
workability of an idea there always     
remains the question of its  relation to

 reality4  ,but we recognised in the    
principle of truth-value  an important  
advance towards a theory of knowledge4  
,the solution of the problem of truth1  
it became clear1 must be sought  in a   
theory of knowledge4  ,have we1 in the  
new theory of life and  knowledge of    
,bergson's philosophy1 an answer to the 
question1 ,what is  truth8  ,yes1 but   
not in the form of a direct solution of 
the dilemma  which confronts us in every
 theory that accepts the independence of
  knowledge and reality--rather in a    
theory of knowledge in which the        
dilemma does not and cannot arise4      
,the theory of ,bergson is that in the  
intuition of life we know reality  as it
 is1 our knowledge is one with our      
knowing2 and in the intellect  we       
possess a mode of knowing which is      
equally immediate but the  essential    
quality of which is that it externalises
 or spatialises  reality4  ,we          
understand this mode of knowing in #ij  
recognising the  purpose it serves1 its 

practical advantage to us4  ,the theory1
  therefore1 resembles pragmatism in    
bringing the concept of utility to  the 
aid of its theory of knowledge4  ,but1  
we insisted1 the resemblance  is outward
 only1 for the essential tenet of       
pragmatism1 that truth  itself is a     
value1 is fatal to the theory4  ,it     
would mean1 in fact1  that not the mode 
of knowing1 that is the intellect1 but  
the actual  knowledge itself1 is a      
practical endowment4  ,but the problem  
of truth  arises in a new form1 for the 
practical utility of the intellect      
consists in the illusion which it       
produces in us4  ,it makes the flowing  
reality appear as fixed states4  ,how1  
then1 can universal illusion be         
consistent with the possession of truth8
  ,to answer this question we  examined 
the nature of illusion and its          
distinction from error4    ,in the last 
chapter we have dealt with the problem  
of error4  ,the fact  of error presented
 a difficulty distinct from the         

question1 ,what is  truth8 for it       
implied a real object of thought1 of    
which it seemed  equally contradictory  
to say that it exists and that it does  
not exist4  ,in the solutions that have 
been proposed we saw how the problem is 
forcing philosophers to examine again   
the fundamental processes of the  mind  
and the nature of the universe they     
reveal4          #ia    ,,bibliography  
,the ,thetetus of ,plato is an          
exposition of the problem of truth and  
error as it presented itself in ancient 
philosophy4  ,the quotation ,i  have    
made from it1 and also the quotations   
from the ,republic1 are  from ,jowett's 
translation4    ,the most clear         
exposition of what ,i have called the   
realistic doctrine  is ,the ,problems of
 ,philosophy1 by the ,hon4 ,bertrand    
,russell1 in the  ,home ,university     
,library 7,williams and ,norgate74  ,i  
have adopted ,mr4  ,russell's terms1    
acquaintance and description2 the       
distinction they  denote seems to me of 

fundamental importance1 and ,mr4        
,russell's  doctrine on this point a    
permanent addition to philosophy4  ,mr4 
,russell's theory1 that in the judgment 
what is present to the mind is a        
relation which is external to the terms 
of the judgment1 and that  agreement or 
disagreement between this relation and  
reality makes the  truth or falsehood of
 the judgment1 can only be appreciated  
if studied  in connection with his      
general scheme4    ,the classical work  
on what ,i have called the modern       
idealist doctrine  7,i have avoided the 
word intellectualist7 is ,mr4 ,f4 ,h4   
,bradley's  ,appearance and ,reality4   
,i have attempted to give the main lines
 of  the theory in my chapter on ,the   
,absolute4  ,although it is a book for  
advanced students1 it is not a closed   
volume even to the uninstructed4  ,the  
brilliant dialectical skill of the #ib  
author is acknowledged and  may be      
enjoyed by those who reject or may fail 
to understand his  conclusion4  ,mr4    

,harold ,h4 ,joachim's ,the ,nature of  
,truth 7,oxford1  ,clarendon ,press7 is 
a most able and scholarly argument for  
the  coherence theory of truth4    ,the 
principal expositions of ,pragmatism are
 the works of ,william ,james  and of   
,dr4 ,f4 ,c4 ,s4 ,schiller4  ,william   
,james' ,the ,will to ,believe was  the 
first distinct formulation of the       
principle4  ,pragmatism1 a ,new  ,name  
for some ,old ,ways of ,thinking1 is the
 fullest and most systematic  statement 
of the doctrine4  ,the ,meaning of      
,truth is a defence of the  doctrine    
against the criticism that had been     
meted out to it  unsparingly4  ,all     
three books are published by ,longmans4 
,dr4 ,f4 ,c4 ,s4 ,schiller is           
uncompromising in his advocacy of a     
complete  return to the doctrine taught 
in the ancient world by ,protagoras4    
,he  has defended that philosopher      
against the arguments of ,plato in a    
polemical pamphlet entitled ,plato or   
,protagoras8 7,oxford1 ,blackwell74  ,an

 ,essay on ,axioms as ,postulates in    
,personal ,idealism 7,macmillan   ,co471
 and two volumes of collected essays on 
,humanism 7,macmillan   ,co471 set forth
 the doctrine1 which he prefers to call 
,humanism1 with  great force1 abundant  
illustration1 and the relief of no small
 amount  of humour4    ,for an account  
of the theories of ,bergson1 ,i may     
mention my own little  book in this     
series1 ,henri ,bergson3 ,the           
,philosophy of ,change4  ,m4  ,bergson's
 books are ,time and ,freewill1 ,matter 
and ,memory1 and  ,creative ,evolution4 
,to these has been recently added ,an   
,introduction to ,metaphysics           
7,macmillan1 #aiab74  ,it is the        
republication in ,english of an article 
written in #aijc1 which has been  for a 
long time out of print4  ,it is a short 
and clear statement of the  doctrine of 
,intuition4    #ic    ,the important    
studies of ,professor ,g4 ,f4 ,stout are
 not easily  accessible to the general  
reader1 as they consist in contributions

 to  philosophical journals and         
proceedings of learned societies4  ,the 
essay  referred to in the last chapter1 
,some ,fundamental ,points in the       
,theory  of ,knowledge1 is in the ,st4  
,andrews ,quincentenary ,publications1  
#aiaa  7,maclehose74  ,i may mention    
also his essay on ,error in ,personal   
,idealism1 noticed above1 and ,the      
,object of ,thought and ,real ,being1   
in ,proceedings of the ,aristotelian    
,society1 #aiaa4          #id    ,,index
    ,,ndx    ,bergson1 ,mons4 ,henri1   
#fc1 #fi1 #gc1 #hi    ,berkeley1 #bj1   
#cb1 #gc      ,coherence ,theory1 #be1  
#bg    ,correspondence ,theory1 #bd1 #bg
      ,discovery of ,planet ,neptune1   
#ei      ,faith-attitude of ,pragmatism1
 #ee    ,formal ,logic1 #aj      ,hegel1
 #dd    ,hume1 #cj                      
,intellectualism1 #dd      ,james1      
,william1 #dd      ,kant1 #bf1 #bg1 #db1
 #gc      ,meinong1 #hd      ,pierce1   
,c4 ,s41 #dd    ,plato1 #aa1 #dd1 #fg1  
#fh1 #gd    ,pluralistic ,realism1 #bd  

,poincar1 ,henri1 #ed    ,pragmatist    
,theory of ,truth1 #ee    ,primary      
,qualities1 #cb    ,protagoras1 ,his    
book ,the ,truth1 #aj1 #aa2 ,his maxim1 
#dd    ,pythagoras1 #hg                 
,relativity1 ,principle of1 #dh1 #ec1   
#fb    ,republic of ,plato1 #fg      ,s4
 ,anselm's ,argument1 #bi1 #ca1 #da     
,schiller1 ,dr4 ,f4 ,c4 ,s41 #dd        
,self1 ,the ,idea of1 #cf    ,socrates1 
#aa1 #gd    ,space and ,time1 #cc1 #cd1 
#cf    ,stout1 ,prof4 ,g4 ,f41 #hd      
,thetetus of ,plato1 #aa1 #gd           
,unknowable1 ,the1 #bi1 #cg      ,zeno1 
#cd  ,,endx          ,printed by        
,,ballantyne1 ,,hanson  ,co4            
,edinburgh  ,london                99   
99      99      99      99              
,,the ,,people',s ,,books    ,,the      
,,first ,,hundred ,,volumes    7,spring 
#aiac7        ,,science      #a4 ,the   
,foundations of ,science 4 4 4 ,by ,w4  
,c4 ,d4 ,whetham1 ,m4,a41 ,f4,r4,s4     
#b4 ,embryology--,the ,beginnings of    
,life 4 4 4 ,by ,prof4 ,gerald          

,leighton1 ,m4,d4    #c4 ,biology 4 4 4 
,by ,prof4 ,w4 ,d4 ,henderson1 ,m4,a4   
#d4 ,zoology3 ,the ,study of ,animal    
,life 4 4 4 ,by ,prof4 ,e4 ,w4          
,mac,bride1               ,m4,a41       
,f4,r4,s4    #e4 ,botany2 ,the ,modern  
,study of ,plants 4 4 4 ,by ,m4 ,c4     
,stopes1 ,d4,sc41               ,ph4,d41
 ,f4,l4,s4    #g4 ,the ,structure of the
 ,earth 4 4 4 ,by ,prof4 ,t4 ,g4        
,bonney1 ,f4,r4,s4    #h4 ,evolution 4 4
 4 ,by ,e4 ,s4 ,goodrich1 ,m4,a41       
,f4,r4,s4    #aj4 ,heredity 4 4 4 ,by   
,j4 ,a4 ,s4 ,watson1 ,b4,sc4    #aa4    
,inorganic ,chemistry 4 4 4 ,by ,prof4  
,e4 ,c4 ,c4 ,baly1 ,f4,r4,s4    #ab4    
,organic ,chemistry 4 4 4 ,by ,prof4 ,j4
 ,b4 ,cohen1 ,b4,sc41 ,f4,r4,s4    #ac4 
,the ,principles of ,electricity 4 4 4  
,by ,norman ,k4 ,campbell1 ,m4,a4       
#ad4 ,radiation 4 4 4 ,by ,p4 ,phillips1
 ,d4,sc4    #ae4 ,the ,science of the   
,stars 4 4 4 ,by ,e4 ,w4 ,maunder1      
,f4,r4,a4,s4    #af4 ,the ,science of   
,light 4 4 4 ,by ,p4 ,phillips1 ,d4,sc4 

#ag4 ,weather ,science 4 4 4 ,by ,r4 ,g4
 ,k4 ,lempfert1 ,m4,a4    #ah4          
,hypnotism and ,self-,education 4 4 4   
,by ,a4 ,m4 ,hutchison1 ,m4,d4    #ai4  
,the ,baby3 ,a ,mother's ,book 4 4 4 ,by
 a ,university ,woman4    #bj4 ,youth   
and ,sex--,dangers and ,safeguards for  
,boys and ,girls 4 4 4               ,by
 ,mary ,scharlieb1 ,m4,d41 ,m4,s41 and  
,f4 ,arthur ,sibly1 ,m4,a41 ,,ll4,d4    
#ba4 ,marriage and ,motherhood 4 4 4 ,by
 ,h4 ,s4 ,davidson1 ,m4,b41             
,f4,r4,c4,s4,e4    #bb4 ,lord ,kelvin 4 
4 4 ,by ,a4 ,russell1 ,m4,a41 ,d4,sc41  
,m4,i4,e4,e4    #bc4 ,huxley 4 4 4 ,by  
,professor ,g4 ,leighton1 ,m4,d4    #bd4
 ,sir ,william ,huggins and             
,spectroscopic ,astronomy 4 4 4         
,by ,e4 ,w4 ,maunder1 ,f4,r4,a4,s41 of  
the ,royal ,observatory1 ,greenwich4    
#fb4 ,practical ,astronomy 4 4 4 ,by ,h4
 ,macpherson1 ,jr41 ,f4,r4,a4,s4    #fc4
 ,aviation 4 4 4 ,by ,sydney ,f4        
,walker1 ,r4,n4    #fd4 ,navigation 4 4 
4 ,by ,william ,hall1 ,r4,n41 ,b4,a4    

#fe4 ,pond ,life 4 4 4 ,by ,e4 ,c4 ,ash1
 ,m4,r4,a4,c4    #ff4 ,dietetics 4 4 4  
,by ,alex4 ,bryce1 ,m4,d41 ,d4,p4,h4    
#id4 ,the ,nature of ,mathematics 4 4 4 
,by ,p4 ,e4 ,b4 ,jourdain1 ,m4,a4       
#ie4 ,applications of ,electricity 4 4 4
 ,by ,alex4 ,ogilvie1 ,b4,sc4    #if4   
,gardening 4 4 4 ,by ,a4 ,cecil         
,bartlett4    #ig4 ,the ,care of the    
,teeth 4 4 4 ,by ,j4 ,a4 ,young1        
,l4,d4,s4    #ih4 ,atlas of the ,world 4
 4 4 ,by ,t4 ,bartholomew1 ,f4,r4,g4,s4 
#aaj4  ,british ,birds 4 4 4 ,by ,f4 ,b 
,kirkman1 ,b4,a4        ,,philosophy    
,,and ,,religion      #be4 ,the ,meaning
 of ,philosophy 4 4 4 ,by ,prof4 ,a4 ,e4
 ,taylor1 ,m4,a41 ,f4,b4,a4    #bf4     
,henri ,bergson 4 4 4 ,by ,h4 ,wildon   
,carr1 ,litt4,d4    #bg4 ,psychology 4 4
 4 ,by ,h4 ,j4 ,watt1 ,m4,a41 ,ph4,d41  
,d4,phil4    #bh4 ,ethics 4 4 4 ,by     
,canon ,rashdall1 ,d4,litt41 ,f4,b4,a4  
#bi4 ,kant's ,philosophy 4 4 4 ,by ,a4  
,d4 ,lindsay1 ,m4,a41 of                
,balliol ,college1 ,oxford4    #cj4 ,the

 ,teaching of ,plato 4 4 4 ,by ,a4 ,d4  
,lindsay1 ,m4,a4    #fg4 ,aristotle 4 4 
4 ,by ,prof4 ,a4 ,e4 ,taylor1 ,m4,a41   
,f4,b4,a4    #fh4 ,friedrich ,nietzsche 
4 4 4 ,by ,m4 ,a4 ,mgge4    #fi4        
,eucken3 ,a ,philosophy of ,life 4 4 4  
,by ,a4 ,j4 ,jones1 ,m4,a41 ,b4,sc41    
,ph4,d4    #gj4 ,the ,experimental      
,psychology of ,beauty 4 4 4 ,by ,c4 ,w4
 ,valentine1               ,b4,a41      
,d4,phil4    #ga4 ,the ,problem of      
,truth 4 4 4 ,by ,h4 ,wildon ,carr1     
,litt4,d4    #ii4 ,george ,berkeley3    
,the ,philosophy of ,idealism 4 4 4 ,by 
,c4 ,w4 ,valentine1 ,b4,a4    #ca4      
,buddhism 4 4 4 ,by ,prof4 ,t4 ,w4 ,rhys
 ,davids1 ,f4,b4,a4    #cb4 ,roman      
,catholicism 4 4 4 ,by ,h4 ,b4 ,coxon4  
,preface1 ,mgr4 ,r4 ,h4 ,benson4    #cc4
 ,the ,oxford ,movement 4 4 4 ,by       
,wilfrid ,ward4    #cd4 ,the ,bible and 
,criticism 4 4 4 ,by ,w4 ,h4 ,bennett1  
,d4,d41 ,litt4,p41               and ,w4
 ,f4 ,adeney1 ,d4,d4    #ce4 ,cardinal  
,newman 4 4 4 ,by ,wilfrid ,meynell4    

#gb4 ,the ,church of ,england 4 4 4 ,by 
,rev4 ,canon ,masterman4    #gc4        
,anglo-,catholicism 4 4 4 ,by ,a4 ,e4   
,manning ,foster4    #gd4 ,the ,free    
,churches 4 4 4 ,by ,rev4 ,edward       
,shillito1 ,m4,a4    #ge4 ,judaism 4 4 4
 ,by ,ephraim ,levine1 ,m4,a4    #gf4   
,theosophy 4 4 4 ,by ,annie ,besant4    
,,history      #cf4 ,the ,growth of     
,freedom 4 4 4 ,by ,h4 ,w4 ,nevinson4   
#cg4 ,bismarck and the ,origin of the   
,german ,empire 4 4 4               ,by 
,professor ,f4 ,m4 ,powicke4    #ch4    
,oliver ,cromwell 4 4 4 ,by ,hilda      
,johnstone1 ,m4,a4    #ci4 ,mary ,queen 
of ,scots 4 4 4 ,by ,e4 ,o',neill1      
,m4,a4    #dj4 ,cecil ,john ,rhodes1    
#ahec-aijb 4 4 4 ,by ,ian ,d4 ,colvin4  
#da4 ,julius ,csar 4 4 4 ,by ,hilary    
,hardinge4    #db4 ,england in the      
,making 4 4 4 ,by ,prof4 ,f4 ,j4 ,c4    
,hearnshaw1 ,m4,a41 ,,ll4,d4    #dc4    
,england in the ,middle ,ages 4 4 4 ,by 
,e4 ,o',neill1 ,m4,a4    #dd4 ,the      
,monarchy and the ,people 4 4 4 ,by ,w4 

,t4 ,waugh1 ,m4,a4    #de4 ,the         
,industrial ,revolution 4 4 4 ,by       
,arthur ,jones1 ,m4,a4    #df4 ,empire  
and ,democracy 4 4 4 ,by ,g4 ,s4        
,veitch1 ,m4,a41 ,litt4,d4    #fa4 ,home
 ,rule 4 4 4 ,by ,l4 ,g4 ,redmond       
,howard4               ,preface by      
,robert ,harcourt1 ,m4,p4    #gg4       
,nelson 4 4 4 ,by ,h4 ,w4 ,wilson4      
#gh4 ,wellington and ,waterloo 4 4 4 ,by
 ,major ,g4 ,w4 ,redway4    #ajj4 ,a    
,history of ,greece 4 4 4 ,by ,e4       
,fearenside1 ,b4,a4    #aja4  ,luther   
and the ,reformation 4 4 4 ,by ,leonard 
,d4 ,agate1 ,m4,a4    #ajb4 ,the        
,discovery of the ,new ,world 4 4 4 ,by 
,f4 ,b4 ,kirkman1 ,b4,a4    #ajc4       
,turkey and the ,eastern ,question 4 4 4
 ,by ,john ,macdonald1 ,m4,a4    #ajd4  
,architecture 4 4 4 ,by ,mrs4 ,arthur   
,bell4        ,,social ,,and ,,economic 
#dg4 ,women's ,suffrage 4 4 4 ,by ,m4   
,g4 ,fawcett1 ,,ll4,d4    #dh4 ,the     
,working of the ,british ,system        
of ,government to-day 4 4 4 ,by ,prof4  

,ramsay ,muir1 ,m4,a4    #di4 ,an       
,introduction to ,economic ,science 4 4 
4 ,by ,prof4 ,h4 ,o4 ,meredith1 ,m4,a4  
#ej4 ,socialism 4 4 4 ,by ,f4 ,b4       
,kirkman1 ,b4,a4    #gi4 ,medival       
,socialism 4 4 4 ,by ,bede ,jarrett1    
,o4,p41 ,m4,a4    #hj4 ,syndicalism 4 4 
4 ,by ,j4 ,h4 ,harley1 ,m4,a4    #ha4   
,labour and ,wages 4 4 4 ,by ,h4 ,m4    
,hallsworth1 ,m4,a41 ,b4,sc4    #hb4    
,co-operation 4 4 4 ,by ,joseph         
,clayton4    #hc4 ,insurance as a ,means
 of ,investment 4 4 4 ,by ,w4 ,a4       
,robertson1 ,f4,f4,a4    #ib4 ,the      
,training of the ,child 4 4 4 ,by ,g4   
,spiller4    #aje4  ,trade ,unions 4 4 4
 ,by ,joseph ,clayton4    #ajf4         
,everyday ,law 4 4 4 ,by ,j4 ,j4 ,adams4
        ,,letters      #ea4 ,shakespeare
 4 4 4 ,by ,prof4 ,c4 ,h4 ,herford1     
,litt4,d4    #eb4 ,wordsworth 4 4 4 ,by 
,rosaline ,masson4    #ec4 ,pure        
,gold--,a ,choice of ,lyrics and        
,sonnets 4 4 4 by ,h4 ,c4 ,o',neill     
#ed4 ,francis ,bacon 4 4 4 ,by ,prof4   

,a4 ,r4 ,skemp1 ,m4,a4    #ee4 ,the     
,bronts 4 4 4 ,by ,flora ,masson4       
#ef4 ,carlyle 4 4 4 ,by ,l4 ,mac,lean   
,watt4    #eg4 ,dante 4 4 4 ,by ,a4 ,g4 
,ferrers ,howell4    #fj4 ,a ,dictionary
 of ,synonyms 4 4 4 ,by ,austin ,k4     
,gray1 ,b4,a4    #hc4 ,insurance as a   
,means of ,investment 4 4 4 ,by ,w4 ,a4 
,robertson1 ,f4,f4,a4    #hd4 ,classical
 ,dictionary 4 4 4 ,by ,a4 ,e4          
,stirling4    #he4 ,a ,history of       
,english ,literature 4 4 4 ,by ,a4      
,compton-,rickett1 ,,ll4,d4    #hf4     
,browning 4 4 4 ,by ,prof4 ,a4 ,r4      
,skemp1 ,m4,a4    #hg4 ,charles ,lamb 4 
4 4 ,by ,flora ,masson4    #hh4 ,goethe 
4 4 4 ,by ,prof4 ,c4 ,h4 ,herford1      
,litt4,d4    #hi4 ,balzac 4 4 4 ,by     
,frank ,harris4    #ij4 ,rousseau 4 4 4 
,by ,h4 ,sacher    #ia4 ,ibsen 4 4 4 ,by
 ,hilary ,hardinge4    #ic4 ,tennyson 4 
4 4 ,by ,aaron ,watson4    #ajg4 ,r4 ,l4
 ,stevenson 4 4 4 ,by ,rosaline ,masson4
    #ajh4 ,shelley 4 4 4 ,by ,sydney    
,waterlow1 ,m4,a4    #aji4 ,william     

,morris 4 4 4 ,by ,a4 ,blyth ,webster1  
,m4,a4        ,,london ,,and            
,,edinburgh3 ,t4 ,c4  ,e4 ,c4 ,,jack    
,,new ,,york3 ,,dodge ,,publishing ,,co4