,,three ,,dialogues ,,between ,,hylas   
,,and ,,philonous1   ,,in ,,opposition  
,,to ,,sceptics ,,and ,,atheists   by   
,george ,berkeley 7#afhe-agec7     ,,the
 ,,first ,,dialogue   ,,philonous4      
,good morrow1 ,hylas3 ,i did not expect 
to find you abroad so early4  ,,hylas4  
,it is indeed something unusual2 but my 
thoughts were so taken up with a subject
 ,i was discoursing of last night1 that 
finding ,i could not sleep1 ,i resolved 
to rise and take a turn in the garden4  
,,phil4  ,it happened well1 to let you  
see what innocent and agreeable         
pleasures you lose every morning4 ,can  
there be a pleasanter time of the day1  
or a more delightful season of the year8
 ,that purple sky1 those wild but sweet 
notes of birds1 the fragrant bloom upon 
the trees and flowers1 the gentle       
influence of the rising sun1 these and a
 thousand nameless beauties of nature   
inspire the soul with secret transports2
 its faculties too being at this time   
fresh and lively1 are fit for those     

meditations1 which the solitude of a    
garden and tranquillity of the morning  
naturally dispose us to4 ,but ,i am     
afraid ,i interrupt your thoughts3 for  
you seemed very intent on something4    
,,hyl4  ,it is true1 ,i was1 and shall  
be obliged to you if you will permit me 
to go on in the same vein2 not that ,i  
would by any means deprive myself of    
your company1 for my thoughts always    
flow more easily in conversation with a 
friend1 than when ,i am alone3 but my   
request is1 that you would suffer me to 
impart my reflexions to you4  ,,phil4   
,with all my heart1 it is what ,i should
 have requested myself if you had not   
prevented me4  ,,hyl4  ,i was           
considering the odd fate of those men   
who have in all ages1 through an        
affectation of being distinguished from 
the vulgar1 or some unaccountable turn  
of thought1 pretended either to believe 
nothing at all1 or to believe the most  
extravagant things in the world4 ,this  
however might be borne1 if their        

paradoxes and scepticism did not draw   
after them some consequences of general 
disadvantage to mankind4 ,but the       
mischief lieth here2 that when men of   
less leisure see them who are supposed  
to have spent their whole time in the   
pursuits of knowledge professing an     
entire ignorance of all things1 or      
advancing such notions as are repugnant 
to plain and commonly received          
principles1 they will be tempted to     
entertain suspicions concerning the most
 important truths1 which they had       
hitherto held sacred and unquestionable4
  ,,phil4  ,i entirely agree with you1  
as to the ill tendency of the affected  
doubts of some philosophers1 and        
fantastical conceits of others4 ,i am   
even so far gone of late in this way of 
thinking1 that ,i have quitted several  
of the sublime notions ,i had got in    
their schools for vulgar opinions4 ,and 
,i give it you on my word2 since this   
revolt from metaphysical notions to the 
plain dictates of nature and common     

sense1 ,i find my understanding         
strangely enlightened1 so that ,i can   
now easily comprehend a great many      
things which before were all mystery and
 riddle4  ,,hyl4  ,i am glad to find    
there was nothing in the accounts ,i    
heard of you4  ,,phil4  ,pray1 what were
 those8  ,,hyl4  ,you were represented1 
in last night's conversation1 as one who
 maintained the most extravagant opinion
 that ever entered into the mind of man1
 to wit1 that there is no such thing as 
,,material ,,substance in the world4    
,,phil4  ,that there is no such thing as
 what ,,philosophers ,,call ,,material  
,,substance1 ,i am seriously persuaded3 
but1 if ,i were made to see anything    
absurd or sceptical in this1 ,i should  
then have the same reason to renounce   
this that ,i imagine ,i have now to     
reject the contrary opinion4  ,,hyl4    
,what ,i can anything be more           
fantastical1 more repugnant to ,common  
,sense1 or a more manifest piece of     
,scepticism1 than to believe there is no

 such thing as ,,matter8  ,,phil4       
,softly1 good ,hylas4 ,what if it should
 prove that you1 who hold there is1 are1
 by virtue of that opinion1 a greater   
sceptic1 and maintain more paradoxes and
 repugnances to ,common ,sense1 than ,i 
who believe no such thing8  ,,hyl4  ,you
 may as soon persuade me1 the part is   
greater than the whole1 as that1 in     
order to avoid absurdity and            
,scepticism1 ,i should ever be obliged  
to give up my opinion in this point4    
,,phil4  ,well then1 are you content to 
admit that opinion for true1 which upon 
examination shall appear most agreeable 
to ,common ,sense1 and remote from      
,scepticism8  ,,hyl4  ,with all my      
heart4 ,since you are for raising       
disputes about the plainest things in   
nature1 ,i am content for once to hear  
what you have to say4  ,,phil4  ,pray1  
,hylas1 what do you mean by a ,,sceptic8
  ,,hyl4  ,i mean what all men mean--one
 that doubts of everything4  ,,phil4    
,he then who entertains no doubts       

concerning some particular point1 with  
regard to that point cannot be thought a
 sceptic4  ,,hyl4  ,i agree with you4   
,,phil4  ,whether doth doubting consist 
in embracing the affirmative or negative
 side of a question8  ,,hyl4  ,in       
neither2 for whoever understands        
,english cannot but know that ,,doubting
 signifies a suspense between both4     
,,phil4  ,he then that denies any point1
 can no more be said to doubt of it1    
than he who affirmeth it with the same  
degree of assurance4  ,,hyl4  ,true4    
,,phil4  ,and1 consequently1 for such   
his denial is no more to be esteemed a  
sceptic than the other4  ,,hyl4  ,i     
acknowledge it4  ,,phil4  ,how cometh it
 to pass then1 ,hylas1 that you         
pronounce me ,a ,,sceptic1 because ,i   
deny what you affirm1 to wit1 the       
existence of ,matter8 ,since1 for aught 
you can tell1 ,i am as peremptory in my 
denial1 as you in your affirmation4     
,,hyl4  ,hold1 ,philonous1 ,i have been 
a little out in my definition2 but every

 false step a man makes in discourse is 
not to be insisted on4 ,i said indeed   
that a ,,sceptic was one who doubted of 
everything2 but ,i should have added1 or
 who denies the reality and truth of    
things4  ,,phil4  ,what things8 ,do you 
mean the principles and theorems of     
sciences8 ,but these you know are       
universal intellectual notions1 and     
consequently independent of ,matter4    
,the denial therefore of this doth not  
imply the denying them4  ,,hyl4  ,i     
grant it4 ,but are there no other       
things8 ,what think you of distrusting  
the senses1 of denying the real         
existence of sensible things1 or        
pretending to know nothing of them4 ,is 
not this sufficient to denominate a man 
a ,,sceptic8  ,,phil4  ,shall we        
therefore examine which of us it is that
 denies the reality of sensible things1 
or professes the greatest ignorance of  
them2 since1 if ,i take you rightly1 he 
is to be esteemed the greatest          
,,sceptic8  ,,hyl4  ,that is what ,i    

desire4  ,,phil4  ,what mean you by     
,sensible ,things8  ,,hyl4  ,those      
things which are perceived by the       
senses4 ,can you imagine that ,i mean   
anything else8  ,,phil4  ,pardon me1    
,hylas1 if ,i am desirous clearly to    
apprehend your notions1 since this may  
much shorten our inquiry4 ,suffer me    
then to ask you this farther question4  
,are those things only perceived by the 
senses which are perceived immediately8 
,or1 may those things properly be said  
to be ,,sensible which are perceived    
mediately1 or not without the           
intervention of others8  ,,hyl4  ,i do  
not sufficiently understand you4        
,,phil4  ,in reading a book1 what ,i    
immediately perceive are the letters2   
but mediately1 or by means of these1 are
 suggested to my mind the notions of    
,god1 virtue1 truth1 c4 ,now1 that the  
letters are truly sensible things1 or   
perceived by sense1 there is no doubt3  
but ,i would know whether you take the  
things suggested by them to be so too4  

,,hyl4  ,no1 certainly3 it were absurd  
to think ,,god or ,,virtue sensible     
things2 though they may be signified and
 suggested to the mind by sensible      
marks1 with which they have an arbitrary
 connexion4  ,,phil4  ,it seems then1   
that by ,,sensible ,,things you mean    
those only which can be perceived       
,,immediately by sense8  ,,hyl4  ,right4
  ,,phil4  ,doth it not follow from     
this1 that though ,i see one part of the
 sky red1 and another blue1 and that my 
reason doth thence evidently conclude   
there must be some cause of that        
diversity of colours1 yet that cause    
cannot be said to be a sensible thing1  
or perceived by the sense of seeing8    
,,hyl4  ,it doth4  ,,phil4  ,in like    
manner1 though ,i hear variety of       
sounds1 yet ,i cannot be said to hear   
the causes of those sounds8  ,,hyl4     
,you cannot4  ,,phil4  ,and when by my  
touch ,i perceive a thing to be hot and 
heavy1 ,i cannot say1 with any truth or 
propriety1 that ,i feel the cause of its

 heat or weight8  ,,hyl4  ,to prevent   
any more questions of this kind1 ,i tell
 you once for all1 that by ,,sensible   
,,things ,i mean those only which are   
perceived by sense2 and that in truth   
the senses perceive nothing which they  
do not perceive ,,immediately3 for they 
make no inferences4 ,the deducing       
therefore of causes or occasions from   
effects and appearances1 which alone are
 perceived by sense1 entirely relates to
 reason4  ,,phil4  ,this point then is  
agreed between us--,that ,,sensible     
,,things ,,are ,,those ,,only ,,which   
,,are ,,immediately ,,perceived ,,by    
,,sense4 ,you will farther inform me1   
whether we immediately perceive by sight
 anything beside light1 and colours1 and
 figures2 or by hearing1 anything but   
sounds2 by the palate1 anything beside  
tastes2 by the smell1 beside odours2 or 
by the touch1 more than tangible        
qualities4  ,,hyl4  ,we do not4  ,,phil4
  ,it seems1 therefore1 that if you take
 away all sensible qualities1 there     

remains nothing sensible8  ,,hyl4  ,i   
grant it4  ,,phil4  ,sensible things    
therefore are nothing else but so many  
sensible qualities1 or combinations of  
sensible qualities8  ,,hyl4  ,nothing   
else4  ,,phil4  ,,heat then is a        
sensible thing8  ,,hyl4  ,certainly4    
,,phil4  ,doth the ,,reality of sensible
 things consist in being perceived8 or1 
is it something distinct from their     
being perceived1 and that bears no      
relation to the mind8  ,,hyl4  ,to      
,,exist is one thing1 and to be         
,,perceived is another4  ,,phil4  ,i    
speak with regard to sensible things    
only4 ,and of these ,i ask1 whether by  
their real existence you mean a         
subsistence exterior to the mind1 and   
distinct from their being perceived8    
,,hyl4  ,i mean a real absolute being1  
distinct from1 and without any relation 
to1 their being perceived4  ,,phil4     
,heat therefore1 if it be allowed a real
 being1 must exist without the mind8    
,,hyl4  ,it must4  ,,phil4  ,tell me1   

,hylas1 is this real existence equally  
compatible to all degrees of heat1 which
 we perceive2 or is there any reason why
 we should attribute it to some1 and    
deny it to others8 ,and if there be1    
pray let me know that reason4  ,,hyl4   
,whatever degree of heat we perceive by 
sense1 we may be sure the same exists in
 the object that occasions it4  ,,phil4 
,what6 the greatest as well as the      
least8  ,,hyl4  ,i tell you1 the reason 
is plainly the same in respect of both4 
,they are both perceived by sense2 nay1 
the greater degree of heat is more      
sensibly perceived2 and consequently1 if
 there is any difference1 we are more   
certain of its real existence than we   
can be of the reality of a lesser       
degree4  ,,phil4  ,but is not the most  
vehement and intense degree of heat a   
very great pain8  ,,hyl4  ,no one can   
deny it4  ,,phil4  ,and is any          
unperceiving thing capable of pain or   
pleasure8  ,,hyl4  ,no1 certainly4      
,,phil4  ,is your material substance a  

senseless being1 or a being endowed with
 sense and perception8  ,,hyl4  ,it is  
senseless without doubt4  ,,phil4  ,it  
cannot therefore be the subject of pain8
  ,,hyl4  ,by no means4  ,,phil4  ,nor  
consequently of the greatest heat       
perceived by sense1 since you           
acknowledge this to be no small pain8   
,,hyl4  ,i grant it4  ,,phil4  ,what    
shall we say then of your external      
object2 is it a material ,substance1 or 
no8  ,,hyl4  ,it is a material substance
 with the sensible qualities inhering in
 it4  ,,phil4  ,how then can a great    
heat exist in it1 since you own it      
cannot in a material substance8 ,i      
desire you would clear this point4      
,,hyl4  ,hold1 ,philonous1 ,i fear ,i   
was out in yielding intense heat to be a
 pain4 ,it should seem rather1 that pain
 is something distinct from heat1 and   
the consequence or effect of it4        
,,phil4  ,upon putting your hand near   
the fire1 do you perceive one simple    
uniform sensation1 or two distinct      

sensations8  ,,hyl4  ,but one simple    
sensation4  ,,phil4  ,is not the heat   
immediately perceived8  ,,hyl4  ,it is4 
,,phil4  ,and the pain8  ,,hyl4  ,true4 
,,phil4  ,seeing therefore they are both
 immediately perceived at the same time1
 and the fire affects you only with one 
simple or uncompounded idea1 it follows 
that this same simple idea is both the  
intense heat immediately perceived1 and 
the pain2 and1 consequently1 that the   
intense heat immediately perceived is   
nothing distinct from a particular sort 
of pain4  ,,hyl4  ,it seems so4  ,,phil4
  ,again1 try in your thoughts1 ,hylas1 
if you can conceive a vehement sensation
 to be without pain or pleasure4  ,,hyl4
  ,i cannot4  ,,phil4  ,or can you frame
 to yourself an idea of sensible pain or
 pleasure in general1 abstracted from   
every particular idea of heat1 cold1    
tastes1 smells8 c4  ,,hyl4  ,i do not   
find that ,i can4  ,,phil4  ,doth it not
 therefore follow1 that sensible pain is
 nothing distinct from those sensations 

or ideas1 in an intense degree8  ,,hyl4 
,it is undeniable2 and1 to speak the    
truth1 ,i begin to suspect a very great 
heat cannot exist but in a mind         
perceiving it4  ,,phil4  ,what6 are you 
then in that sceptical state of         
suspense1 between affirming and denying8
  ,,hyl4  ,i think ,i may be positive in
 the point4 ,a very violent and painful 
heat cannot exist without the mind4     
,,phil4  ,it hath not therefore         
according to you1 any ,,real being8     
,,hyl4  ,i own it4  ,,phil4  ,is it     
therefore certain1 that there is no body
 in nature really hot8  ,,hyl4  ,i have 
not denied there is any real heat in    
bodies4 ,i only say1 there is no such   
thing as an intense real heat4  ,,phil4 
,but1 did you not say before that all   
degrees of heat were equally real2 or1  
if there was any difference1 that the   
greater were more undoubtedly real than 
the lesser8  ,,hyl4  ,true3 but it was  
because ,i did not then consider the    
ground there is for distinguishing      

between them1 which ,i now plainly see4 
,and it is this3 because intense heat is
 nothing else but a particular kind of  
painful sensation2 and pain cannot exist
 but in a perceiving being2 it follows  
that no intense heat can really exist in
 an unperceiving corporeal substance4   
,but this is no reason why we should    
deny heat in an inferior degree to exist
 in such a substance4  ,,phil4  ,but how
 shall we be able to discern those      
degrees of heat which exist only in the 
mind from those which exist without it8 
,,hyl4  ,that is no difficult matter4   
,you know the least pain cannot exist   
unperceived2 whatever1 therefore1 degree
 of heat is a pain exists only in the   
mind4 ,but1 as for all other degrees of 
heat1 nothing obliges us to think the   
same of them4  ,,phil4  ,i think you    
granted before that no unperceiving     
being was capable of pleasure1 any more 
than of pain4  ,,hyl4  ,i did4  ,,phil4 
,and is not warmth1 or a more gentle    
degree of heat than what causes         

uneasiness1 a pleasure8  ,,hyl4  ,what  
then8  ,,phil4  ,consequently1 it cannot
 exist without the mind in an           
unperceiving substance1 or body4  ,,hyl4
  ,so it seems4  ,,phil4  ,since1       
therefore1 as well those degrees of heat
 that are not painful1 as those that    
are1 can exist only in a thinking       
substance2 may we not conclude that     
external bodies are absolutely incapable
 of any degree of heat whatsoever8      
,,hyl4  ,on second thoughts1 ,i do not  
think it so evident that warmth is a    
pleasure as that a great degree of heat 
is a pain4  ,,phil4  ,i do not pretend  
that warmth is as great a pleasure as   
heat is a pain4 ,but1 if you grant it to
 be even a small pleasure1 it serves to 
make good my conclusion4  ,,hyl4  ,i    
could rather call it an ,,indolence4 ,it
 seems to be nothing more than a        
privation of both pain and pleasure4    
,and that such a quality or state as    
this may agree to an unthinking         
substance1 ,i hope you will not deny4   

,,phil4  ,if you are resolved to        
maintain that warmth1 or a gentle degree
 of heat1 is no pleasure1 ,i know not   
how to convince you otherwise than by   
appealing to your own sense4 ,but what  
think you of cold8  ,,hyl4  ,the same   
that ,i do of heat4 ,an intense degree  
of cold is a pain2 for to feel a very   
great cold1 is to perceive a great      
uneasiness3 it cannot therefore exist   
without the mind2 but a lesser degree of
 cold may1 as well as a lesser degree of
 heat4  ,,phil4  ,those bodies1         
therefore1 upon whose application to our
 own1 we perceive a moderate degree of  
heat1 must be concluded to have a       
moderate degree of heat or warmth in    
them2 and those1 upon whose application 
we feel a like degree of cold1 must be  
thought to have cold in them4  ,,hyl4   
,they must4  ,,phil4  ,can any doctrine 
be true that necessarily leads a man    
into an absurdity8  ,,hyl4  ,without    
doubt it cannot4  ,,phil4  ,is it not an
 absurdity to think that the same thing 

should be at the same time both cold and
 warm8  ,,hyl4  ,it is4  ,,phil4        
,suppose now one of your hands hot1 and 
the other cold1 and that they are both  
at once put into the same vessel of     
water1 in an intermediate state2 will   
not the water seem cold to one hand1 and
 warm to the other8  ,,hyl4  ,it will4  
,,phil4  ,ought we not therefore1 by    
your principles1 to conclude it is      
really both cold and warm at the same   
time1 that is1 according to your own    
concession1 to believe an absurdity8    
,,hyl4  ,i confess it seems so4  ,,phil4
  ,consequently1 the principles         
themselves are false1 since you have    
granted that no true principle leads to 
an absurdity4  ,,hyl4  ,but1 after all1 
can anything be more absurd than to say1
 ,,there ,,is ,,no ,,heat ,,in ,,the    
,,fire8  ,,phil4  ,to make the point    
still clearer2 tell me whether1 in two  
cases exactly alike1 we ought not to    
make the same judgment8  ,,hyl4  ,we    
ought4  ,,phil4  ,when a pin pricks your

 finger1 doth it not rend and divide the
 fibres of your flesh8  ,,hyl4  ,it     
doth4  ,,phil4  ,and when a coal burns  
your finger1 doth it any more8  ,,hyl4  
,it doth not4  ,,phil4  ,since1         
therefore1 you neither judge the        
sensation itself occasioned by the pin1 
nor anything like it to be in the pin2  
you should not1 conformably to what you 
have now granted1 judge the sensation   
occasioned by the fire1 or anything like
 it1 to be in the fire4  ,,hyl4  ,well1 
since it must be so1 ,i am content to   
yield this point1 and acknowledge that  
heat and cold are only sensations       
existing in our minds4 ,but there still 
remain qualities enough to secure the   
reality of external things4  ,,phil4    
,but what will you say1 ,hylas1 if it   
shall appear that the case is the same  
with regard to all other sensible       
qualities1 and that they can no more be 
supposed to exist without the mind1 than
 heat and cold8  ,,hyl4  ,then indeed   
you will have done something to the     

purpose2 but that is what ,i despair of 
seeing proved4  ,,phil4  ,let us examine
 them in order4 ,what think you of      
,,tastes1 do they exist without the     
mind1 or no8  ,,hyl4  ,can any man in   
his senses doubt whether sugar is sweet1
 or wormwood bitter8  ,,phil4  ,inform  
me1 ,hylas4 ,is a sweet taste a         
particular kind of pleasure or pleasant 
sensation1 or is it not8  ,,hyl4  ,it   
is4  ,,phil4  ,and is not bitterness    
some kind of uneasiness or pain8  ,,hyl4
  ,i grant it4  ,,phil4  ,if therefore  
sugar and wormwood are unthinking       
corporeal substances existing without   
the mind1 how can sweetness and         
bitterness1 that is1 ,pleasure and pain1
 agree to them8  ,,hyl4  ,hold1         
,philonous1 ,i now see what it was      
delude time4 ,you asked whether heat and
 cold1 sweetness at were not particular 
sorts of pleasure and pain2 to which    
simply1 that they were4 ,whereas ,i     
should have thus distinguished3 those   
qualities1 as perceived by us1 are      

pleasures or pair existing in the       
external objects4 ,we must not therefore
 conclude absolutely1 that there is no  
heat in the fire1 or sweetness in the   
sugar1 but only that heat or sweetness1 
as perceived by us1 are not in the fire 
or sugar4 ,what say you to this8        
,,phil4  ,i say it is nothing to the    
purpose4 ,our discourse proceeded       
altogether concerning sensible things1  
which you defined to be1 ,,the ,,things 
,,we ,,immediately ,,perceive ,,by ,,our
 ,,senses4 ,whatever other qualities1   
therefore1 you speak of as distinct from
 these1 ,i know nothing of them1 neither
 do they at all belong to the point in  
dispute4 ,you may1 indeed1 pretend to   
have discovered certain qualities which 
you do not perceive1 and assert those   
insensible qualities exist in fire and  
sugar4 ,but what use can be made of this
 to your present purpose1 ,i am at a    
loss to conceive4 ,tell me then once    
more1 do you acknowledge that heat and  
cold1 sweetness and bitterness 7meaning 

those qualities which are perceived by  
the senses71 do not exist without the   
mind8  ,,hyl4  ,i see it is to no       
purpose to hold out1 so ,i give up the  
cause as to those mentioned qualities4  
,though ,i profess it sounds oddly1 to  
say that sugar is not sweet4  ,,phil4   
,but1 for your farther satisfaction1    
take this along with you3 that which at 
other times seems sweet1 shall1 to a    
distempered palate1 appear bitter4 ,and1
 nothing can be plainer than that divers
 persons perceive different tastes in   
the same food2 since that which one man 
delights in1 another abhors4 ,and how   
could this be1 if the taste was         
something really inherent in the food8  
,,hyl4  ,i acknowledge ,i know not how4 
,,phil4  ,in the next place1 ,,odours   
are to be considered4 ,and1 with regard 
to these1 ,i would fain know whether    
what hath been said of tastes doth not  
exactly agree to them8 ,are they not so 
many pleasing or displeasing sensations8
  ,,hyl4  ,they are4  ,,phil4  ,can you 

then conceive it possible that they     
should exist in an unperceiving thing8  
,,hyl4  ,i cannot4  ,,phil4  ,or1 can   
you imagine that filth and ordure affect
 those brute animals that feed on them  
out of choice1 with the same smells     
which we perceive in them8  ,,hyl4  ,by 
no means4  ,,phil4  ,may we not         
therefore conclude of smells1 as of the 
other forementioned qualities1 that they
 cannot exist in any but a perceiving   
substance or mind8  ,,hyl4  ,i think so4
  ,,phil4  ,then as to ,,sounds1 what   
must we think of them3 are they         
accidents really inherent in external   
bodies1 or not8  ,,hyl4  ,that they     
inhere not in the sonorous bodies is    
plain from hence3 because a bell struck 
in the exhausted receiver of an air-pump
 sends forth no sound4 ,the air1        
therefore1 must be thought the subject  
of sound4  ,,phil4  ,what reason is     
there for that1 ,hylas8  ,,hyl4         
,because1 when any motion is raised in  
the air1 we perceive a sound greater or 

lesser1 according to the air's motion2  
but without some motion in the air1 we  
never hear any sound at all4  ,,phil4   
,and granting that we never hear a sound
 but when some motion is produced in the
 air1 yet ,i do not see how you can     
infer from thence1 that the sound itself
 is in the air4  ,,hyl4  ,it is this    
very motion in the external air that    
produces in the mind the sensation of   
,,sound4 ,for1 striking on the drum of  
the ear1 it causeth a vibration1 which  
by the auditory nerves being            
communicated to the brain1 the soul is  
thereupon affected with the sensation   
called ,,sound4  ,,phil4  ,what6 is     
sound then a sensation8  ,,hyl4  ,i tell
 you1 as perceived by us1 it is a       
particular sensation in the mind4       
,,phil4  ,and can any sensation exist   
without the mind8  ,,hyl4  ,no1         
certainly4  ,,phil4  ,how then can      
sound1 being a sensation1 exist in the  
air1 if by the ,,air you mean a         
senseless substance existing without the

 mind8  ,,hyl4  ,you must distinguish1  
,philonous1 between sound as it is      
perceived by us1 and as it is in itself2
 or 7which is the same thing7 between   
the sound we immediately perceive1 and  
that which exists without us4 ,the      
former1 indeed1 is a particular kind of 
sensation1 but the latter is merely a   
vibrative or undulatory motion the air4 
,,phil4  ,i thought ,i had already      
obviated that distinction1 by answer ,i 
gave when you were applying it in a like
 case before4 ,but1 to say no more of   
that1 are you sure then that sound is   
really nothing but motion8  ,,hyl4  ,i  
am4  ,,phil4  ,whatever therefore agrees
 to real sound1 may with truth be       
attributed to motion8  ,,hyl4  ,it may4 
,,phil4  ,it is then good sense to speak
 of ,,motion as of a thing that is      
,,loud1 ,,sweet1 ,,acute1 or ,,grave4   
,,hyl4  ,i see you are resolved not to  
understand me4 ,is it not evident those 
accidents or modes belong only to       
sensible sound1 or ,,sound in the common

 acceptation of the word1 but not to    
sound in the real and philosophic sense2
 which1 as ,i just now told you1 is     
nothing but a certain motion of the air8
  ,,phil4  ,it seems then there are two 
sorts of sound--the one vulgar1 or that 
which is heard1 the other philosophical 
and real8  ,,hyl4  ,even so4  ,,phil4   
,and the latter consists in motion8     
,,hyl4  ,i told you so before4  ,,phil4 
,tell me1 ,hylas1 to which of the       
senses1 think you1 the idea of motion   
belongs8 to the hearing8  ,,hyl4  ,no1  
certainly2 but to the sight and touch4  
,,phil4  ,it should follow then1 that1  
according to you1 real sounds may       
possibly be ,,seen ,,or ,,felt1 but     
never ,,heard4  ,,hyl4  ,look you1      
,philonous1 you may1 if you please1 make
 a jest of my opinion1 but that will not
 alter the truth of things4 ,i own1     
indeed1 the inferences you draw me into 
sound something oddly2 but common       
language1 you know1 is framed by1 and   
for the use of the vulgar3 we must not  

therefore wonder if expressions adapted 
to exact philosophic notions seem       
uncouth and out of the way4  ,,phil4    
,is it come to that8 ,i assure you1 ,i  
imagine myself to have gained no small  
point1 since you make so light of       
departing from common phrases and       
opinions2 it being a main part of our   
inquiry1 to examine whose notions are   
widest of the common road1 and most     
repugnant to the general sense of the   
world4 ,but1 can you think it no more   
than a philosophical paradox1 to say    
that ,,real ,,sounds ,,are ,,never      
,,heard1 and that the idea of them is   
obtained by some other sense8 ,and is   
there nothing in this contrary to nature
 and the truth of things8  ,,hyl4  ,to  
deal ingenuously1 ,i do not like it4    
,and1 after the concessions already     
made1 ,i had as well grant that sounds  
too have no real being without the mind4
  ,,phil4  ,and ,i hope you will make no
 difficulty to acknowledge the same of  
,,colours4  ,,hyl4  ,pardon me3 the case

 of colours is very different4 ,can     
anything be plainer than that we see    
them on the objects8  ,,phil4  ,the     
objects you speak of are1 ,i suppose1   
corporeal ,substances existing without  
the mind8  ,,hyl4  ,they are4  ,,phil4  
,and have true and real colours inhering
 in them8  ,,hyl4  ,each visible object 
hath that colour which we see in it4    
,,phil4  ,how6 is there anything visible
 but what we perceive by sight8  ,,hyl4 
,there is not4  ,,phil4  ,and1 do we    
perceive anything by sense which we do  
not perceive immediately8  ,,hyl4  ,how 
often must ,i be obliged to repeat the  
same thing8 ,i tell you1 we do not4     
,,phil4  ,have patience1 good ,hylas2   
and tell me once more1 whether there is 
anything immediately perceived by the   
senses1 except sensible qualities4 ,i   
know you asserted there was not2 but ,i 
would now be informed1 whether you still
 persist in the same opinion4  ,,hyl4   
,i do4  ,,phil4  ,pray1 is your         
corporeal substance either a sensible   

quality1 or made up of sensible         
qualities8  ,,hyl4  ,what a question    
that is6 who ever thought it was8       
,,phil4  ,my reason for asking was1     
because in saying1 ,,each ,,visible     
,,object ,,hath ,,that ,,colour ,,which 
,,we ,,see ,,in ,,it1 you make visible  
objects to be corporeal substances2     
which implies either that corporeal     
substances are sensible qualities1 or   
else that there is something besides    
sensible qualities perceived by sight3  
but1 as this point was formerly agreed  
between us1 and is still maintained by  
you1 it is a clear consequence1 that    
your ,,corporeal ,,substance is nothing 
distinct from ,,sensible ,,qualities4   
,,hyl4  ,you may draw as many absurd    
consequences as you please1 and         
endeavour to perplex the plainest       
things2 but you shall never persuade me 
out of my senses4 ,i clearly understand 
my own meaning4  ,,phil4  ,i wish you   
would make me understand it too4 ,but1  
since you are unwilling to have your    

notion of corporeal substance examined1 
,i shall urge that point no farther4    
,only be pleased to let me know1 whether
 the same colours which we see exist in 
external bodies1 or some other4  ,,hyl4 
,the very same4  ,,phil4  ,what6 are    
then the beautiful red and purple we see
 on yonder clouds really in them8 ,or do
 you imagine they have in themselves any
 other form than that of a dark mist or 
vapour8  ,,hyl4  ,i must own1           
,philonous1 those colours are not really
 in the clouds as they seem to be at    
this distance4 ,they are only apparent  
colours4  ,,phil4  ,,apparent call you  
them8 how shall we distinguish these    
apparent colours from real8  ,,hyl4     
,very easily4 ,those are to be thought  
apparent which1 appearing only at a     
distance1 vanish upon a nearer approach4
  ,,phil4  ,and those1 ,i suppose1 are  
to be thought real which are discovered 
by the most near and exact survey4      
,,hyl4  ,right4  ,,phil4  ,is the       
nearest and exactest survey made by the 

help of a microscope1 or by the naked   
eye8  ,,hyl4  ,by a microscope1         
doubtless4  ,,phil4  ,but a microscope  
often discovers colours in an object    
different from those perceived by the   
unassisted sight4 ,and1 in case we had  
microscopes magnifying to any assigned  
degree1 it is certain that no object    
whatsoever1 viewed through them1 would  
appear in the same colour which it      
exhibits to the naked eye4  ,,hyl4  ,and
 what will you conclude from all this8  
,you cannot argue that there are really 
and naturally no colours on objects3    
because by artificial managements they  
may be altered1 or made to vanish4      
,,phil4  ,i think it may evidently be   
concluded from your own concessions1    
that all the colours we see with our    
naked eyes are only apparent as those on
 the clouds1 since they vanish upon a   
more close and accurate inspection which
 is afforded us by a microscope4 ,then' 
as to what you say by way of prevention3
 ,i ask you whether the real and natural

 state of an object is better discovered
 by a very sharp and piercing sight1 or 
by one which is less sharp8  ,,hyl4  ,by
 the former without doubt4  ,,phil4  ,is
 it not plain from ,,dioptrics that     
microscopes make the sight more         
penetrating1 and represent objects as   
they would appear to the eye in case it 
were naturally endowed with a most      
exquisite sharpness8  ,,hyl4  ,it is4   
,,phil4  ,consequently the microscopical
 representation is to be thought that   
which best sets forth the real nature of
 the thing1 or what it is in itself4    
,the colours1 therefore1 by it perceived
 are more genuine and real than those   
perceived otherwise4  ,,hyl4  ,i confess
 there is something in what you say4    
,,phil4  ,besides1 it is not only       
possible but manifest1 that there       
actually are animals whose eyes are by  
nature framed to perceive those things  
which by reason of their minuteness     
escape our sight4 ,what think you of    
those inconceivably small animals       

perceived by glasses8 must we suppose   
they are all stark blind8 ,or1 in case  
they see1 can it be imagined their sight
 hath not the same use in preserving    
their bodies from injuries1 which       
appears in that of all other animals8   
,and if it hath1 is it not evident they 
must see particles less than their own  
bodies2 which will present them with a  
far different view in each object from  
that which strikes our senses8 ,even our
 own eyes do not always represent       
objects to us after the same manner4 ,in
 the jaundice every one knows that all  
things seem yellow4 ,is it not therefore
 highly probable those animals in whose 
eyes we discern a very different texture
 from that of ours1 and whose bodies    
abound with different humours1 do not   
see the same colours in every object    
that we do8 ,from all which1 should it  
not seem to follow that all colours are 
equally apparent1 and that none of those
 which we perceive are really inherent  
in any outward object8  ,,hyl4  ,it     

should4  ,,phil4  ,the point will be    
past all doubt1 if you consider that1 in
 case colours were real properties or   
affections inherent in external bodies1 
they could admit of no alteration       
without some change wrought in the very 
bodies themselves3 but1 is it not       
evident from what hath been said that1  
upon the use of microscopes1 upon a     
change happening in the burnouts of the 
eye1 or a variation of distance1 without
 any manner of real alteration in the   
thing itself1 the colours of any object 
are either changed1 or totally          
disappear8 ,nay1 all other circumstances
 remaining the same1 change but the     
situation of some objects1 and they     
shall present different colours to the  
eye4 ,the same thing happens upon       
viewing an object in various degrees of 
light4 ,and what is more known than that
 the same bodies appear differently     
coloured by candle-light from what they 
do in the open day8 ,add to these the   
experiment of a prism which1 separating 

the heterogeneous rays of light1 alters 
the colour of any object1 and will cause
 the whitest to appear of a deep blue or
 red to the naked eye4 ,and now tell me 
whether you are still of opinion that   
every body hath its true real colour    
inhering in it2 and1 if you think it    
hath1 ,i would fain know farther from   
you1 what certain distance and position 
of the object1 what peculiar texture and
 formation of the eye1 what degree or   
kind of light is necessary for          
ascertaining that true colour1 and      
distinguishing it from apparent ones4   
,,hyl4  ,i own myself entirely          
satisfied1 that they are all equally    
apparent1 and that there is no such     
thing as colour really inhering in      
external bodies1 but that it is         
altogether in the light4 ,and what      
confirms me in this opinion is1 that in 
proportion to the light colours are     
still more or less vivid2 and if there  
be no light1 then are there no colours  
perceived4 ,besides1 allowing there are 

colours on external objects1 yet1 how is
 it possible for us to perceive them8   
,for no external body affects the mind1 
unless it acts first on our organs of   
sense4 ,but the only action of bodies is
 motion2 and motion cannot be           
communicated otherwise than by impulse4 
,a distant object therefore cannot act  
on the eye2 nor consequently make itself
 or its properties perceivable to the   
soul4 ,whence it plainly follows that it
 is immediately some contiguous         
substance1 which1 operating on the eye1 
occasions a perception of colours3 and  
such is light4  ,,phil4  ,howl is light 
then a substance8  ,,hyl4 4 ,i tell you1
 ,philonous1 external light is nothing  
but a thin fluid substance1 whose minute
 particles being agitated with a brisk  
motion1 and in various manners reflected
 from the different surfaces of outward 
objects to the eyes1 communicate        
different motions to the optic nerves2  
which1 being propagated to the brain1   
cause therein various impressions2 and  

these are attended with the sensations  
of red1 blue1 yellow1 c4  ,,phil4  ,it  
seems then the light doth no more than  
shake the optic nerves4  ,,hyl4         
,nothing else4  ,,phil4  ,and consequent
 to each particular motion of the       
nerves1 the mind is affected with a     
sensation1 which is some particular     
colour4  ,,hyl4  ,right4  ,,phil4  ,and 
these sensations have no existence      
without the mind4  ,,hyl4  ,they have   
not4  ,,phil4  ,how then do you affirm  
that colours are in the light2 since by 
,,light you understand a corporeal      
substance external to the mind8  ,,hyl4 
,light and colours1 as immediately      
perceived by us1 ,i grant cannot exist  
without the mind4 ,but in themselves    
they are only the motions and           
configurations of certain insensible    
particles of matter4  ,,phil4  ,colours 
then1 in the vulgar sense1 or taken for 
the immediate objects of sight1 cannot  
agree to any but a perceiving substance4
  ,,hyl4  ,that is what ,i say4  ,,phil4

  ,well then1 since you give up the     
point as to those sensible qualities    
which are alone thought colours by all  
mankind beside1 you may hold what you   
please with regard to those invisible   
ones of the philosophers4 ,it is not my 
business to dispute about ,,them2 only  
,i would advise you to bethink yourself1
 whether1 considering the inquiry we are
 upon1 it be prudent for you to         
affirm--,,the ,,red ,,and ,,blue ,,which
 ,,we ,,see ,,are ,,not ,,real          
,,colours1 ,,but ,,certain ,,unknown    
,,motions ,,and ,,figures ,,which ,,no  
,,man ,,ever ,,did ,,or ,,can ,,see     
,,are ,,truly ,,so4 ,are not these      
shocking notions1 and are not they      
subject to as many ridiculous           
inferences1 as those you were obliged to
 renounce before in the case of sounds8 
,,hyl4  ,i frankly own1 ,philonous1 that
 it is in vain to longer4 ,colours1     
sounds1 tastes1 in a word all those     
termed ,,secondary ,,qualities1 have    
certainly no existence without the mind4

 ,but by this acknowledgment ,i must not
 be supposed to derogate1 the reality of
 ,matter1 or external objects2 seeing it
 is no more than several philosophers   
maintain1 who nevertheless are the      
farthest imaginable from denying        
,matter4 ,for the clearer understanding 
of this1 you must know sensible         
qualities are by philosophers divided   
into ,,primary and ,,secondary4 ,the    
former are ,extension1 ,figure1         
,solidity1 ,gravity1 ,motion1 and ,rest2
 and these they hold exist really in    
bodies4 ,the latter are those above     
enumerated2 or1 briefly1 ,,all          
,,sensible ,,qualities ,,beside ,,the   
,,primary2 which they assert are only so
 many sensations or ideas existing      
nowhere but in the mind4 ,but all this1 
,i doubt not1 you are apprised of4 ,for 
my part1 ,i have been a long time       
sensible there was such an opinion      
current among philosophers1 but was     
never thoroughly convinced of its truth 
until now4  ,,phil4  ,you are still then

 of opinion that ,,extension and        
,,figures are inherent in external      
unthinking substances8  ,,hyl4  ,i am4  
,,phil4  ,but what if the same arguments
 which are brought against ,secondary   
,qualities will hold good against these 
also8  ,,hyl4  ,why then ,i shall be    
obliged to think1 they too exist only in
 the mind4  ,,phil4  ,is it your opinion
 the very figure and extension which you
 perceive by sense exist in the outward 
object or material substance8 ,,hyl4    
,it is4  ,,phil4  ,have all other       
animals as good grounds to think the    
same of the figure and extension which  
they see and feel8  ,,hyl4  ,without    
doubt1 if they have any thought at all4 
,,phil4  ,answer me1 ,hylas4 ,think you 
the senses were bestowed upon all       
animals for their preservation and      
well-being in life8 or were they given  
to men alone for this end8  ,,hyl4  ,i  
make no question but they have the same 
use in all other animals4  ,,phil4  ,if 
so1 is it not necessary they should be  

enabled by them to perceive their own   
limbs1 and those bodies which are       
capable of harming them8  ,,hyl4        
,certainly4  ,,phil4  ,a mite therefore 
must be supposed to see his own foot1   
and things equal or even less than it1  
as bodies of some considerable          
dimension2 though at the same time they 
appear to you scarce discernible1 or at 
best as so many visible points8  ,,hyl4 
,i cannot deny it4  ,,phil4  ,and to    
creatures less than the mite they will  
seem yet larger8  ,,hyl4  ,they will4   
,,phil4  ,insomuch that what you can    
hardly discern will to another extremely
 minute animal appear as some huge      
mountain8  ,,hyl4  ,all this ,i grant4  
,,phil4  ,can one and the same thing be 
at the same time in itself of different 
dimensions8  ,,hyl4  ,that were absurd  
to imagine4  ,,phil4  ,but1 from what   
you have laid down it follows that both 
the extension by you perceived1 and that
 perceived by the mite itself1 as       
likewise all those perceived by lesser  

animals1 are each of them the true      
extension of the mite's foot2 that is to
 say1 by your own principles you are led
 into an absurdity4  ,,hyl4  ,there     
seems to be some difficulty in the      
point4  ,,phil4  ,again1 have you not   
acknowledged that no real inherent      
property of any object can be changed   
without some change in the thing itself8
  ,,hyl4  ,i have4  ,,phil4  ,but1 as we
 approach to or recede from an object1  
the visible extension varies1 being at  
one distance ten or a hundred times     
greater than another4 ,doth it not      
therefore follow from hence likewise    
that it is not really inherent in the   
object8  ,,hyl4  ,i own ,i am at a loss 
what to think4  ,,phil4  ,your judgment 
will soon be determined1 if you will    
venture to think as freely concerning   
this quality as you have done concerning
 the rest4 ,was it not admitted as a    
good argument1 that neither heat nor    
cold was in the water1 because it seemed
 warm to one hand and cold to the other8

  ,,hyl4  ,it was4  ,,phil4  ,is it not 
the very same reasoning to conclude1    
there is no extension or figure in an   
object1 because to one eye it shall seem
 little1 smooth1 and round1 when at the 
same time it appears to the other1      
great1 uneven1 and regular8  ,,hyl4     
,the very same4 ,but does this latter   
fact ever happen8  ,,phil4  ,you may at 
any time make the experiment1 by looking
 with one eye bare1 and with the other  
through a microscope4  ,,hyl4  ,i know  
not how to maintain it2 and yet ,i am   
loath to give up ,,extension1 ,i see so 
many odd consequences following upon    
such a concession4  ,,phil4  ,odd1 say  
you8 ,after the concessions already     
made1 ,i hope you will stick at nothing 
for its oddness4 ,but1 on the other     
hand1 should it not seem very odd1 if   
the general reasoning which includes all
 other sensible qualities did not also  
include extension8 ,if it be allowed    
that no idea1 nor anything like an idea1
 can exist in an unperceiving substance1

 then surely it follows that no figure1 
or mode of extension1 which we can      
either perceive1 or imagine1 or have any
 idea of1 can be really inherent in     
,matter2 not to mention the peculiar    
difficulty there must be in conceiving a
 material substance1 prior to and       
distinct from extension to be the       
,,substratum of extension4 ,be the      
sensible quality what it will--figure1  
or sound1 or colour1 it seems alike     
impossible it should subsist in that    
which doth not perceive it4  ,,hyl4  ,i 
give up the point for the present1      
reserving still a right to retract my   
opinion1 in case ,i shall hereafter     
discover any false step in my progress  
to it4  ,,phil4  ,that is a right you   
cannot be denied4 ,figures and extension
 being despatched1 we proceed next to   
,,motion4 ,can a real motion in any     
external body be at the same time very  
swift and very slow8  ,,hyl4  ,it       
cannot4  ,,phil4  ,is not the motion of 
a body swift in a reciprocal proportion 

to the time it takes up in describing   
any given space8 ,thus a body that      
describes a mile in an hour moves three 
times faster than it would in case it   
described only a mile in three hours4   
,,hyl4  ,i agree with you4  ,,phil4     
,and is not time measured by the        
succession of ideas in our minds8       
,,hyl4  ,it is4  ,,phil4  ,and is it not
 possible ideas should succeed one      
another twice as fast in your mind as   
they do in mine1 or in that of some     
spirit of another kind8  ,,hyl4  ,i own 
it4  ,,phil4  ,consequently the same    
body may to another seem to perform its 
motion over any space in half the time  
that it doth to you4 ,and the same      
reasoning will hold as to any other     
proportion3 that is to say1 according to
 your principles 7since the motions     
perceived are both really in the object7
 it is possible one and the same body   
shall be really moved the same way at   
once1 both very swift and very slow4    
,how is this consistent either with     

common sense1 or with what you just now 
granted8  ,,hyl4  ,i have nothing to say
 to it4  ,,phil4  ,then as for          
,,solidity2 either you do not mean any  
sensible quality by that word1 and so it
 is beside our inquiry3 or if you do1 it
 must be either hardness or resistance4 
,but both the one and the other are     
plainly relative to our senses3 it being
 evident that what seems hard to one    
animal may appear soft to another1 who  
hath greater force and firmness of      
limbs4 ,nor is it less plain that the   
resistance ,i feel is not in the body4  
,,hyl4  ,i own the very ,,sensation of  
resistance1 which is all you immediately
 perceive1 is not in the body2 but the  
,,cause of that sensation is4  ,,phil4  
,but the causes of our sensations are   
not things immediately perceived1 and   
therefore are not sensible4 ,this point 
,i thought had been already determined4 
,,hyl4  ,i own it was2 but you will     
pardon me if ,i seem a little           
embarrassed3 ,i know not how to quit my 

old notions4  ,,phil4  ,to help you out1
 do but consider that if ,,extension be 
once acknowledged to have no existence  
without the mind1 the same must         
necessarily be granted of motion1       
solidity1 and gravity2 since they all   
evidently suppose extension4 ,it is     
therefore superfluous to inquire        
particularly concerning each of them4   
,in denying extension1 you have denied  
them all to have any real existence4    
,,hyl4  ,i wonder1 ,philonous1 if what  
you say be true1 why those philosophers 
who deny the ,secondary ,qualities any  
real existence should yet attribute it  
to the ,primary4 ,if there is no        
difference between them1 how can this be
 accounted for8  ,,phil4  ,it is not my 
business to account for every opinion of
 the philosophers4 ,but1 among other    
reasons which may be assigned for this1 
it seems probable that pleasure and pain
 being rather annexed to the former than
 the latter may be one4 ,heat and cold1 
tastes and smells1 have something more  

vividly pleasing or disagreeable than   
the ideas of extension1 figure1 and     
motion affect us with4 ,and1 it being   
too visibly absurd to hold that pain or 
pleasure can be in an unperceiving      
substance1 men are more easily weaned   
from believing the external existence of
 the ,secondary than the ,primary       
,qualities4 ,you will be satisfied there
 is something in this1 if you recollect 
the difference you made between an      
intense and more moderate degree of     
heat2 allowing the one a real existence1
 while you denied it to the other4 ,but1
 after all1 there is no rational ground 
for that distinction2 for1 surely an    
indifferent sensation is as truly a     
,,sensation as one more pleasing or     
painful2 and consequently should not any
 more than they be supposed to exist in 
an unthinking subject4  ,,hyl4  ,it is  
just come into my head1 ,philonous1 that
 ,i have somewhere heard of a           
distinction between absolute and        
sensible extension4 ,now1 though it be  

acknowledged that ,,great and ,,small1  
consisting merely in the relation which 
other extended beings have to the parts 
of our own bodies1 do not really inhere 
in the substances themselves2 yet       
nothing obliges us to hold the same with
 regard to ,,absolute ,,extension1 which
 is something abstracted from ,,great   
and ,,small1 from this or that          
particular magnitude or figure4 ,so     
likewise as to motion2 ,,swift and      
,,slow are altogether relative to the   
succession of ideas in our own minds4   
,but1 it doth not follow1 because those 
modifications of motion exist not       
without the mind1 that therefore        
absolute motion abstracted from them    
doth not4  ,,phil4  ,pray what is it    
that distinguishes one motion1 or one   
part of extension1 from another8 ,is it 
not something sensible1 as some degree  
of swiftness or slowness1 some certain  
magnitude or figure peculiar to each8   
,,hyl4  ,i think so4  ,,phil4  ,these   
qualities1 therefore1 stripped of all   

sensible properties1 are without all    
specific and numerical differences1 as  
the schools call them4  ,,hyl4  ,they   
are4  ,,phil4  ,that is to say1 they are
 extension in general1 and motion in    
general4  ,,hyl4  ,let it be so4        
,,phil4  ,but it is a universally       
received maxim that ,,everything ,,which
 ,,exists ,,is ,,particular4 ,how then  
can motion in general1 or extension in  
general1 exist in any corporeal         
substance8  ,,hyl4  ,i will take time to
 solve your difficulty4  ,,phil4  ,but  
,i think the point may be speedily      
decided4 ,without doubt you can tell    
whether you are able to frame this or   
that idea4 ,now ,i am content to put our
 dispute on this issue4 ,if you can     
frame in your thoughts a distinct       
,,abstract ,,idea of motion or          
extension1 divested of all those        
sensible modes1 as swift and slow1 great
 and small1 round and square1 and the   
like1 which are acknowledged to exist   
only in the mind1 ,i will then yield the

 point you contend for4 ,but if you     
cannot1 it will be unreasonable on your 
side to insist any longer upon what you 
have no notion of4  ,,hyl4  ,to confess 
ingenuously1 ,i cannot4  ,,phil4  ,can  
you even separate the ideas of extension
 and motion from the ideas of all those 
qualities which they who make the       
distinction term ,,secondary8  ,,hyl4   
,what6 is it not an easy matter to      
consider extension and motion by        
themselves1 abstracted from all other   
sensible qualities8 ,pray how do the    
mathematicians treat of them8  ,,phil4  
,i acknowledge1 ,hylas1 it is not       
difficult to form general propositions  
and reasonings about those qualities1   
without mentioning any other2 and1 in   
this sense1 to consider or treat of them
 abstractedly4 ,but1 how doth it follow 
that1 because ,i can pronounce the word 
,,motion by itself1 ,i can form the idea
 of it in my mind exclusive of body8 or1
 because theorems may be made of        
extension and figures1 without any      

mention of ,,great or ,,small1 or any   
other sensible mode or quality1 that    
therefore it is possible such an        
abstract idea of extension1 without any 
particular size or figure1 or sensible  
quality1 should be distinctly formed1   
and apprehended by the mind8            
,mathematicians treat of quantity1      
without regarding what other sensible   
qualities it is attended with1 as being 
altogether indifferent to their         
demonstrations4 ,but1 when laying aside 
the words1 they contemplate the bare    
ideas1 ,i believe you will find1 they   
are not the pure abstracted ideas of    
extension4  ,,hyl4  ,but what say you to
 ,,pure ,,intellect8 ,may not abstracted
 ideas be framed by that faculty8       
,,phil4  ,since ,i cannot frame abstract
 ideas at all1 it is plain ,i cannot    
frame them by the help of ,,pure        
,,intellect2 whatsoever faculty you     
understand by those words4 ,besides1 not
 to inquire into the nature of pure     
intellect and its spiritual objects1 as 

,,virtue1 ,,reason1 ,,god1 or the like1 
thus much seems manifest--that sensible 
things are only to be perceived by      
sense1 or represented by the            
imagination4 ,figures1 therefore1 and   
extension1 being originally perceived by
 sense1 do not belong to pure intellect3
 but1 for your farther satisfaction1 try
 if you can frame the idea of any       
figure1 abstracted from all             
particularities of size1 or even from   
other sensible qualities4  ,,hyl4  ,let 
me think a little--,i do not find that  
,i can4  ,,phil4  ,and can you think it 
possible that should really exist in    
nature which implies a repugnancy in its
 conception8  ,,hyl4  ,by no means4     
,,phil4  ,since therefore it is         
impossible even for the mind to disunite
 the ideas of extension and motion from 
all other sensible qualities1 doth it   
not follow1 that where the one exist    
there necessarily the other exist       
likewise8  ,,hyl4  ,it should seem so4  
,,phil4  ,consequently1 the very same   

arguments which you admitted as         
conclusive against the ,secondary       
,qualities are1 without any farther     
application of force1 against the       
,primary too4 ,besides1 if you will     
trust your senses1 is it not plain all  
sensible qualities coexist1 or to them  
appear as being in the same place8 ,do  
they ever represent a motion1 or figure1
 as being divested of all other visible 
and tangible qualities8  ,,hyl4  ,you   
need say no more on this head4 ,i am    
free to own1 if there be no secret error
 or oversight in our proceedings        
hitherto1 that all sensible qualities   
are alike to be denied existence without
 the mind4 ,but1 my fear is that ,i have
 been too liberal in my former          
concessions1 or overlooked some fallacy 
or other4 ,in short1 ,i did not take    
time to think4  ,,phil4  ,for that      
matter1 ,hylas1 you may take what time  
you please in reviewing the progress of 
our inquiry4 ,you are at liberty to     
recover any slips you might have made1  

or offer whatever you have omitted which
 makes for your first opinion4  ,,hyl4  
,one great oversight ,i take to be      
this--that ,i did not sufficiently      
distinguish the ,,object from the       
,,sensation4 ,now1 though this latter   
may not exist without the mind1 yet it  
will not thence follow that the former  
cannot4  ,,phil4  ,what object do you   
mean8 the object of the senses8  ,,hyl4 
,the same4  ,,phil4  ,it is then        
immediately perceived8  ,,hyl4  ,right4 
,,phil4  ,make me to understand the     
difference between what is immediately  
perceived and a sensation4  ,,hyl4  ,the
 sensation ,i take to be an act of the  
mind perceiving2 besides which1 there is
 something perceived2 and this ,i call  
the ,,object4 ,for example1 there is red
 and yellow on that tulip4 ,but then the
 act of perceiving those colours is in  
me only1 and not in the tulip4  ,,phil4 
,what tulip do you speak of8 ,is it that
 which you see8  ,,hyl4  ,the same4     
,,phil4  ,and what do you see beside    

colour1 figure1 and extension8  ,,hyl4  
,nothing4  ,,phil4  ,what you would say 
then is that the red and yellow are     
coexistent with the extension2 is it    
not8  ,,hyl4  ,that is not all2 ,i would
 say they have a real existence without 
the mind1 in some unthinking substance4 
,,phil4  ,that the colours are really in
 the tulip which ,i see is manifest4    
,neither can it be denied that this     
tulip may exist independent of your mind
 or mine2 but1 that any immediate object
 of the senses1--that is1 any idea1 or  
combination of ideas--should exist in an
 unthinking substance1 or exterior to   
,,all minds1 is in itself an evident    
contradiction4 ,nor can ,i imagine how  
this follows from what you said just    
now1 to wit1 that the red and yellow    
were on the tulip you ,,saw1 since you  
do not pretend to ,,see that unthinking 
substance4  ,,hyl4  ,you have an artful 
way1 ,philonous1 of diverting our       
inquiry from the subject4  ,,phil4  ,i  
see you have no mind to be pressed that 

way4 ,to return then to your distinction
 between ,,sensation and ,,object2 if ,i
 take you right1 you distinguish in     
every perception two things1 the one an 
action of the mind1 the other not4      
,,hyl4  ,true4  ,,phil4  ,and this      
action cannot exist in1 or belong to1   
any unthinking thing2 but1 whatever     
beside is implied in a perception may8  
,,hyl4  ,that is my meaning4  ,,phil4   
,so that if there was a perception      
without any act of the mind1 it were    
possible such a perception should exist 
in an unthinking substance8  ,,hyl4  ,i 
grant it4 ,but it is impossible there   
should be such a perception4  ,,phil4   
,when is the mind said to be active8    
,,hyl4  ,when it produces1 puts an end  
to1 or changes1 anything4  ,,phil4  ,can
 the mind produce1 discontinue1 or      
change anything1 but by an act of the   
will8  ,,hyl4  ,it cannot4  ,,phil4     
,the mind therefore is to be accounted  
,,active in its perceptions so far forth
 as ,,volition is included in them8     

,,hyl4  ,it is4  ,,phil4  ,in plucking  
this flower ,i am active2 because ,i do 
it by the motion of my hand1 which was  
consequent upon my volition2 so likewise
 in applying it to my nose4 ,but is     
either of these smelling8  ,,hyl4  ,,no4
  ,,phil4  ,i act too in drawing the air
 through my nose2 because my breathing  
so rather than otherwise is the effect  
of my volition4 ,but neither can this be
 called ,,smelling3 for1 if it were1 ,i 
should smell every time ,i breathed in  
that manner8  ,,hyl4  ,true4  ,,phil4   
,smelling then is somewhat consequent to
 all this8  ,,hyl4  ,it is4  ,,phil4    
,but ,i do not find my will concerned   
any farther4 ,whatever more there is--as
 that ,i perceive such a particular     
smell1 or any smell at all--this is     
independent of my will1 and therein ,i  
am altogether passive4 ,do you find it  
otherwise with you1 ,hylas8  ,,hyl4     
,no1 the very same4  ,,phil4  ,then1 as 
to seeing1 is it not in your power to   
open your eyes1 or keep them shut2 to   

turn them this or that way8  ,,hyl4     
,without doubt4  ,,phil4  ,but1 doth it 
in like manner depend on ,,your will    
that in looking on this flower you      
perceive ,,white rather than any other  
colour8 ,or1 directing your open eyes   
towards yonder part of the heaven1 can  
you avoid seeing the sun8 ,or is light  
or darkness the effect of your volition8
  ,,hyl4  ,no1 certainly4  ,,phil4  ,you
 are then in these respects altogether  
passive8  ,,hyl4 ,i am4  ,,phil4  ,tell 
me now1 whether ,,seeing consists in    
perceiving light and colours1 or in     
opening and turning the eyes8  ,,hyl4   
,without doubt1 in the former4  ,,phil4 
,since therefore you are in the very    
perception of light and colours         
altogether passive1 what is become of   
that action you were speaking of as an  
ingredient in every sensation8 ,and1    
doth it not follow from your own        
concessions1 that the perception of     
light and colours1 including no action  
in it1 may exist in an unperceiving     

substance8 ,and is not this a plain     
contradiction8  ,,hyl4  ,i know not what
 to think of it4  ,,phil4  ,besides1    
since you distinguish the ,,active and  
,,passive in every perception1 you must 
do it in that of pain4 ,but how is it   
possible that pain1 be it as little     
active as you please1 should exist in an
 unperceiving substance8 ,in short1 do  
but consider the point1 and then confess
 ingenuously1 whether light and colours1
 tastes1 sounds1 c4 are not all equally 
passions or sensations in the soul4 ,you
 may indeed call them ,,external        
,,objects1 and give them in words what  
subsistence you please4 ,but1 examine   
your own thoughts1 and then tell me     
whether it be not as ,i say8  ,,hyl4  ,i
 acknowledge1 ,philonous1 that1 upon a  
fair observation of what passes in my   
mind1 ,i can discover nothing else but  
that ,i am a thinking being1 affected   
with variety of sensations2 neither is  
it possible to conceive how a sensation 
should exist in an unperceiving         

substance4 ,but then1 on the other hand1
 when ,i look on sensible things in a   
different view1 considering them as so  
many modes and qualities1 ,i find it    
necessary to suppose a ,,material       
,,substratum1 without which they cannot 
be conceived to exist4  ,,phil4         
,,material ,,substratum call you it8    
,pray1 by which of your senses came you 
acquainted with that being8  ,,hyl4  ,it
 is not itself sensible2 its modes and  
qualities only being perceived by the   
senses4  ,,phil4  ,i presume then it was
 by reflexion and reason you obtained   
the idea of it8  ,,hyl4  ,i do not      
pretend to any proper positive ,,idea of
 it4 ,however1 ,i conclude it exists1   
because qualities cannot be conceived to
 exist without a support4  ,,phil4  ,it 
seems then you have only a relative     
,,notion of it1 or that you conceive it 
not otherwise than by conceiving the    
relation it bears to sensible qualities8
  ,,hyl4  ,right4  ,,phil4  ,be pleased 
therefore to let me know wherein that   

relation consists4  ,,hyl4  ,is it not  
sufficiently expressed in the term      
,,substratum1 or ,,substance8  ,,phil4  
,if so1 the word ,,substratum should    
import that it is spread under the      
sensible qualities or accidents8  ,,hyl4
  ,true4  ,,phil4  ,and consequently    
under extension8  ,,hyl4  ,i own it4    
,,phil4  ,it is therefore somewhat in   
its own nature entirely distinct from   
extension8  ,,hyl4  ,i tell you1        
extension is only a mode1 and ,matter is
 something that supports modes4 ,and is 
it not evident the thing supported is   
different from the thing supporting8    
,,phil4  ,so that something distinct    
from1 and exclusive of1 extension is    
supposed to be the ,,substratum of      
extension8  ,,hyl4  ,just so4  ,,phil4  
,answer me1 ,hylas4 ,can a thing be     
spread without extension8 or is not the 
idea of extension necessarily included  
in ,,spreading8  ,,hyl4  ,it is4        
,,phil4  ,whatsoever therefore you      
suppose spread under anything must have 

in itself an extension distinct from the
 extension of that thing under which it 
is spread8  ,,hyl4  ,it must4  ,,phil4  
,consequently1 every corporeal          
substance1 being the ,,substratum of    
extension1 must have in itself another  
extension1 by which it is qualified to  
be a ,,substratum3 and so on to         
infinity4 ,and ,i ask whether this be   
not absurd in itself1 and repugnant to  
what you granted just now1 to wit1 that 
the ,,substratum was something distinct 
from and exclusive of extension8  ,,hyl4
  ,aye but1 ,philonous1 you take me     
wrong4 ,i do not mean that ,matter is   
,,spread in a gross literal sense under 
extension4 ,the word ,,substratum is    
used only to express in general the same
 thing with ,,substance4  ,,phil4  ,well
 then1 let us examine the relation      
implied in the term ,,substance4 ,is it 
not that it stands under accidents8     
,,hyl4  ,the very same4  ,,phil4  ,but1 
that one thing may stand under or       
support another1 must it not be         

extended8  ,,hyl4  ,it must4  ,,phil4   
,is not therefore this supposition      
liable to the same absurdity with the   
former8  ,,hyl4  ,you still take things 
in a strict literal sense4 ,that is not 
fair1 ,philonous4  ,,phil4  ,i am not   
for imposing any sense on your words3   
you are at liberty to explain them as   
you please4 ,only1 ,i beseech you1 make 
me understand something by them4 ,you   
tell me ,matter supports or stands under
 accidents4 ,how6 is it as your legs    
support your body8  ,,hyl4  ,no2 that is
 the literal sense4  ,,phil4  ,pray let 
me know any sense1 literal or not       
literal1 that you understand it         
in4--,how long must ,i wait for an      
answer1 ,hylas8  ,,hyl4  ,i declare ,i  
know not what to say4 ,i once thought ,i
 understood well enough what was meant  
by ,matter's supporting accidents4 ,but 
now1 the more ,i think on it the less   
can ,i comprehend it3 in short ,i find  
that ,i know nothing of it4  ,,phil4    
,it seems then you have no idea at all1 

neither relative nor positive1 of       
,matter2 you know neither what it is in 
itself1 nor what relation it bears to   
accidents8  ,,hyl4  ,i acknowledge it4  
,,phil4  ,and yet you asserted that you 
could not conceive how qualities or     
accidents should really exist1 without  
conceiving at the same time a material  
support of them8  ,,hyl4  ,i did4       
,,phil4  ,that is to say1 when you      
conceive the real existence of          
qualities1 you do withal conceive       
,something which you cannot conceive8   
,,hyl4  ,it was wrong1 ,i own4 ,but     
still ,i fear there is some fallacy or  
other4 ,pray what think you of this8 ,it
 is just come into my head that the     
ground of all our mistake lies in your  
treating of each quality by itself4     
,now1 ,i grant that each quality cannot 
singly subsist without the mind4 ,colour
 cannot without extension1 neither can  
figure without some other sensible      
quality4 ,but1 as the several qualities 
united or blended together form entire  

sensible things1 nothing hinders why    
such things may not be supposed to exist
 without the mind4  ,,phil4  ,either1   
,hylas1 you are jesting1 or have a very 
bad memory4 ,though indeed we went      
through all the qualities by name one   
after another1 yet my arguments or      
rather your concessions1 nowhere tended 
to prove that the ,secondary ,qualities 
did not subsist each alone by itself2   
but1 that they were not ,,at ,,all      
without the mind4 ,indeed1 in treating  
of figure and motion we concluded they  
could not exist without the mind1       
because it was impossible even in       
thought to separate them from all       
secondary qualities1 so as to conceive  
them existing by themselves4 ,but then  
this was not the only argument made use 
of upon that occasion4 ,but 7to pass by 
all that hath been hitherto said1 and   
reckon it for nothing1 if you will have 
it so7 ,i am content to put the whole   
upon this issue4 ,if you can conceive it
 possible for any mixture or combination

 of qualities1 or any sensible object   
whatever1 to exist without the mind1    
then ,i will grant it actually to be so4
  ,,hyl4  ,if it comes to that the point
 will soon be decided4 ,what more easy  
than to conceive a tree or house        
existing by itself1 independent of1 and 
unperceived by1 any mind whatsoever8 ,i 
do at this present time conceive them   
existing after that manner4  ,,phil4    
,how say you1 ,hylas1 can you see a     
thing which is at the same time unseen8 
,,hyl4  ,no1 that were a contradiction4 
,,phil4  ,is it not as great a          
contradiction to talk of ,,conceiving a 
thing which is ,,unconceived8  ,,hyl4   
,it is4  ,,phil4  ,the tree or house    
therefore which you think of is         
conceived by you8  ,,hyl4  ,how should  
it be otherwise8  ,,phil4  ,and what is 
conceived is surely in the mind8  ,,hyl4
  ,without question1 that which is      
conceived is in the mind4  ,,phil4  ,how
 then came you to say1 you conceived a  
house or tree existing independent and  

out of all minds whatsoever8  ,,hyl4    
,that was ,i own an oversight2 but stay1
 let me consider what led me into       
it4--,it is a pleasant mistake enough4  
,as ,i was thinking of a tree in a      
solitary place1 where no one was present
 to see it1 methought that was to       
conceive a tree as existing unperceived 
or unthought of2 not considering that ,i
 myself conceived it all the while4 ,but
 now ,i plainly see that all ,i can do  
is to frame ideas in my own mind4 ,i may
 indeed conceive in my own thoughts the 
idea of a tree1 or a house1 or a        
mountain1 but that is all4 ,and this is 
far from proving that ,i can conceive   
them ,,existing ,,out ,,of ,,the ,,minds
 ,,of ,,all ,,spirits4  ,,phil4  ,you   
acknowledge then that you cannot        
possibly conceive how any one corporeal 
sensible thing should exist otherwise   
than in the mind8  ,,hyl4  ,i do4       
,,phil4  ,and yet you will earnestly    
contend for the truth of that which you 
cannot so much as conceive8  ,,hyl4  ,i 

profess ,i know not what to think2 but  
still there are some scruples remain    
with me4 ,is it not certain ,i ,,see    
,,things at a distance8 ,do we not      
perceive the stars and moon1 for        
example1 to be a great way off8 ,is not 
this1 ,i say1 manifest to the senses8   
,,phil4  ,do you not in a dream too     
perceive those or the like objects8     
,,hyl4  ,i do4  ,,phil4  ,and have they 
not then the same appearance of being   
distant8  ,,hyl4  ,they have4  ,,phil4  
,but you do not thence conclude the     
apparitions in a dream to be without the
 mind8  ,,hyl4  ,by no means4  ,,phil4  
,you ought not therefore to conclude    
that sensible objects are without the   
mind1 from their appearance1 or manner  
wherein they are perceived4  ,,hyl4  ,i 
acknowledge it4 ,but doth not my sense  
deceive me in those cases8  ,,phil4  ,by
 no means4 ,the idea or thing which you 
immediately perceive1 neither sense nor 
reason informs you that it actually     
exists without the mind4 ,by sense you  

only know that you are affected with    
such certain sensations of light and    
colours1 c4 ,and these you will not say 
are without the mind4  ,,hyl4  ,true3   
but1 beside all that1 do you not think  
the sight suggests something of         
,,outness ,,or ,,distance8  ,,phil4     
,upon approaching a distant object1 do  
the visible size and figure change      
perpetually1 or do they appear the same 
at all distances8  ,,hyl4  ,they are in 
a continual change4  ,,phil4  ,sight    
therefore doth not suggest1 or any way  
inform you1 that the visible object you 
immediately perceive exists at a        
distance1 or will be perceived when you 
advance farther onward2 there being a   
continued series of visible objects     
succeeding each other during the whole  
time of your approach4  ,,hyl4  ,it doth
 not2 but still ,i know1 upon seeing an 
object1 what object ,i shall perceive   
after having passed over a certain      
distance3 no matter whether it be       
exactly the same or no3 there is still  

something of distance suggested in the  
case4  ,,phil4  ,good ,hylas1 do but    
reflect a little on the point1 and then 
tell me whether there be any more in it 
than this3 from the ideas you actually  
perceive by sight1 you have by          
experience learned to collect what other
 ideas you will 7according to the       
standing order of nature7 be affected   
with1 after such a certain succession of
 time and motion4  ,,hyl4  ,upon the    
whole1 ,i take it to be nothing else4   
,,phil4  ,now1 is it not plain that if  
we suppose a man born blind was on a    
sudden made to see1 he could at first   
have no experience of what may be       
,,suggested by sight8  ,,hyl4  ,it is4  
,,phil4  ,he would not then1 according  
to you1 have any notion of distance     
annexed to the things he saw2 but would 
take them for a new set of sensations1  
existing only in his mind8  ,,hyl4  ,it 
is undeniable4  ,,phil4  ,but1 to make  
it still more plain3 is not ,,distance a
 line turned endwise to the eye8  ,,hyl4

  ,it is4  ,,phil4  ,and can a line so  
situated be perceived by sight8  ,,hyl4 
,it cannot4  ,,phil4  ,doth it not      
therefore follow that distance is not   
properly and immediately perceived by   
sight8  ,,hyl4  ,it should seem so4     
,,phil4  ,again1 is it your opinion that
 colours are at a distance8  ,,hyl4  ,it
 must be acknowledged they are only in  
the mind4  ,,phil4  ,but do not colours 
appear to the eye as coexisting in the  
same place with extension and figures8  
,,hyl4  ,they do4  ,,phil4  ,how can you
 then conclude from sight that figures  
exist without1 when you acknowledge     
colours do not2 the sensible appearance 
being the very same with regard to both8
  ,,hyl4  ,i know not what to answer4   
,,phil4  ,but1 allowing that distance   
was truly and immediately perceived by  
the mind1 yet it would not thence follow
 it existed out of the mind4 ,for1      
whatever is immediately perceived is an 
idea3 and can any idea exist out of the 
mind8  ,,hyl4  ,to suppose that were    

absurd3 but1 inform me1 ,philonous1 can 
we perceive or know nothing beside our  
ideas8  ,,phil4  ,as for the rational   
deducing of causes from effects1 that is
 beside our inquiry4 ,and1 by the senses
 you can best tell whether you perceive 
anything which is not immediately       
perceived4 ,and ,i ask you1 whether the 
things immediately perceived are other  
than your own sensations or ideas8 ,you 
have indeed more than once1 in the      
course of this conversation1 declared   
yourself on those points2 but you seem1 
by this last question1 to have departed 
from what you then thought4  ,,hyl4  ,to
 speak the truth1 ,philonous1 ,i think  
there are two kinds of objects3--the one
 perceived immediately1 which are       
likewise called ,,ideas2 the other are  
real things or external objects1        
perceived by the mediation of ideas1    
which are their images and              
representations4 ,now1 ,i own ideas do  
not exist without the mind2 but the     
latter sort of objects do4 ,i am sorry  

,i did not think of this distinction    
sooner2 it would probably have cut short
 your discourse4  ,,phil4  ,are those   
external objects perceived by sense or  
by some other faculty8  ,,hyl4  ,they   
are perceived by sense4  ,,phil4  ,howl 
,is there any thing perceived by sense  
which is not immediately perceived8     
,,hyl4  ,yes1 ,philonous1 in some sort  
there is4 ,for example1 when ,i look on 
a picture or statue of ,julius ,caesar1 
,i may be said after a manner to        
perceive him 7though not immediately7 by
 my senses4  ,,phil4  ,it seems then you
 will have our ideas1 which alone are   
immediately perceived1 to be pictures of
 external things3 and that these also   
are perceived by sense1 inasmuch as they
 have a conformity or resemblance to our
 ideas8  ,,hyl4  ,that is my meaning4   
,,phil4  ,and1 in the same way that     
,julius ,caesar1 in himself invisible1  
is nevertheless perceived by sight2 real
 things1 in themselves imperceptible1   
are perceived by sense4  ,,hyl4  ,in the

 very same4  ,,phil4  ,tell me1 ,hylas1 
when you behold the picture of ,julius  
,caesar1 do you see with your eyes any  
more than some colours and figures1 with
 a certain symmetry and composition of  
the whole8  ,,hyl4  ,nothing else4      
,,phil4  ,and would not a man who had   
never known anything of ,julius ,caesar 
see as much8  ,,hyl4  ,he would4        
,,phil4  ,consequently he hath his      
sight1 and the use of it1 in as perfect 
a degree as you8  ,,hyl4  ,i agree with 
you4  ,,phil4  ,whence comes it then    
that your thoughts are directed to the  
,roman emperor1 and his are not8 ,this  
cannot proceed from the sensations or   
ideas of sense by you then perceived2   
since you acknowledge you have no       
advantage over him in that respect4 ,it 
should seem therefore to proceed from   
reason and memory3 should it not8       
,,hyl4  ,it should4  ,,phil4            
,consequently1 it will not follow from  
that instance that anything is perceived
 by sense which is not1 immediately     

perceived4 ,though ,i grant we may1 in  
one acceptation1 be said to perceive    
sensible things mediately by sense3 that
 is1 when1 from a frequently perceived  
connexion1 the immediate perception of  
ideas by one sense ,,suggests to the    
mind others1 perhaps belonging to       
another sense1 which are wont to be     
connected with them4 ,for instance1 when
 ,i hear a coach drive along the        
streets1 immediately ,i perceive only   
the sound2 but1 from the experience ,i  
have had that such a sound is connected 
with a coach1 ,i am said to hear the    
coach4 ,it is nevertheless evident that1
 in truth and strictness1 nothing can be
 ,,heard ,,but ,,sound2 and the coach is
 not then properly perceived by sense1  
but suggested from experience4 ,so      
likewise when we are said to see a      
red-hot bar of iron2 the solidity and   
heat of the iron are not the objects of 
sight1 but suggested to the imagination 
by the colour and figure which are      
properly perceived by that sense4 ,in   

short1 those things alone are actually  
and strictly perceived by any sense1    
which would have been perceived in case 
that same sense had then been first     
conferred on us4 ,as for other things1  
it is plain they are only suggested to  
the mind by experience1 grounded on     
former perceptions4 ,but1 to return to  
your comparison of ,caesar's picture1 it
 is plain1 if you keep to that1 you must
 hold the real things1 or archetypes of 
our ideas1 are not perceived by sense1  
but by some internal faculty of the     
soul1 as reason or memory4 ,i would     
therefore fain know what arguments you  
can draw from reason for the existence  
of what you call ,,real ,,things ,,or   
,,material ,,objects4 ,or1 whether you  
remember to have seen them formerly as  
they are in themselves2 or1 if you have 
heard or read of any one that did4      
,,hyl4  ,i see1 ,philonous1 you are     
disposed to raillery2 but that will     
never convince me4  ,,phil4  ,my aim is 
only to learn from you the way to come  

at the knowledge of ,,material ,,beings4
 ,whatever we perceive is perceived     
immediately or mediately3 by sense1 or  
by reason and reflexion4 ,but1 as you   
have excluded sense1 pray shew me what  
reason you have to believe their        
existence2 or what ,,medium you can     
possibly make use of to prove it1 either
 to mine or your own understanding4     
,,hyl4  ,to deal ingenuously1           
,philonous1 now ,i consider the point1  
,i do not find ,i can give you any good 
reason for it4 ,but1 thus much seems    
pretty plain1 that it is at least       
possible such things may really exist4  
,and1 as long as there is no absurdity  
in supposing them1 ,i am resolved to    
believe as ,i did1 till you bring good  
reasons to the contrary4  ,,phil4       
,what6 ,is it come to this1 that you    
only ,,believe the existence of material
 objects1 and that your belief is       
founded barely on the possibility of its
 being true8 ,then you will have me     
bring reasons against it3 though another

 would think it reasonable the proof    
should lie on him who holds the         
affirmative4 ,and1 after all1 this very 
point which you are now resolved to     
maintain1 without any reason1 is in     
effect what you have more than once     
during this discourse seen good reason  
to give up4 ,but1 to pass over all this2
 if ,i understand you rightly1 you say  
our ideas do not exist without the mind1
 but that they are copies1 images1 or   
representations1 of certain originals   
that do8  ,,hyl4  ,you take me right4   
,,phil4  ,they are then like external   
things8  ,,hyl4  ,they are4  ,,phil4    
,have those things a stable and         
permanent nature1 independent of our    
senses2 or are they in a perpetual      
change1 upon our producing any motions  
in our bodies--suspending1 exerting1 or 
altering1 our faculties or organs of    
sense8  ,,hyl4  ,real things1 it is     
plain1 have a fixed and real nature1    
which remains the same notwithstanding  
any change in our senses1 or in the     

posture and motion of our bodies2 which 
indeed may affect the ideas in our      
minds1 but it were absurd to think they 
had the same effect on things existing  
without the mind4  ,,phil4  ,how then is
 it possible that things perpetually    
fleeting and variable as our ideas      
should be copies or images of anything  
fixed and constant8 ,or1 in other words1
 since all sensible qualities1 as size1 
figure1 colour1 c41 that is1 our ideas1 
are continually changing1 upon every    
alteration in the distance1 medium1 or  
instruments of sensation2 how can any   
determinate material objects be properly
 represented or painted forth by several
 distinct things1 each of which is so   
different from and unlike the rest8 ,or1
 if you say it resembles some one only  
of our ideas1 how shall we be able to   
distinguish the true copy from all the  
false ones8  ,,hyl4  ,i profess1        
,philonous1 ,i am at a loss4 ,i know not
 what to say to this4  ,,phil4  ,but    
neither is this all4 ,which are material

 objects in themselves--perceptible or  
imperceptible8  ,,hyl4  ,properly and   
immediately nothing can be perceived but
 ideas4 ,all material things1 therefore1
 are in themselves insensible1 and to be
 perceived only by our ideas4  ,,phil4  
,ideas then are sensible1 and their     
archetypes or originals insensible8     
,,hyl4  ,right4  ,,phil4  ,but how can  
that which is sensible be like that     
which is insensible8 ,can a real thing1 
in itself ,,invisible1 be like a        
,,colour2 or a real thing1 which is not 
,,audible1 be like a ,,sound8 ,in a     
word1 can anything be like a sensation  
or idea1 but another sensation or idea8 
,,hyl4  ,i must own1 ,i think not4      
,,phil4  ,is it possible there should be
 any doubt on the point8 ,do you not    
perfectly know your own ideas8  ,,hyl4  
,i know them perfectly2 since what ,i do
 not perceive or know can be no part of 
my idea4  ,,phil4  ,consider1 therefore1
 and examine them1 and then tell me if  
there be anything in them which can     

exist without the mind3 or if you can   
conceive anything like them existing    
without the mind4  ,,hyl4  ,upon        
inquiry1 ,i find it is impossible for me
 to conceive or understand how anything 
but an idea can be like an idea4 ,and it
 is most evident that ,,no ,,idea ,,can 
,,exist ,,without ,,the ,,mind4  ,,phil4
  ,you are therefore1 by your           
principles1 forced to deny the ,,reality
 of sensible things2 since you made it  
to consist in an absolute existence     
exterior to the mind4 ,that is to say1  
you are a downright sceptic4 ,so ,i have
 gained my point1 which was to shew your
 principles led to ,scepticism4  ,,hyl4 
,for the present ,i am1 if not entirely 
convinced1 at least silenced4  ,,phil4  
,i would fain know what more you would  
require in order to a perfect           
conviction4 ,have you not had the       
liberty of explaining yourself all      
manner of ways8 ,were any little slips  
in discourse laid hold and insisted on8 
,or were you not allowed to retract or  

reinforce anything you had offered1 as  
best served your purpose8 ,hath not     
everything you could say been heard and 
examined with all the fairness          
imaginable8 ,in a word have you not in  
every point been convinced out of your  
own mouth8 ,and1 if you can at present  
discover any flaw in any of your former 
concessions1 or think of any remaining  
subterfuge1 any new distinction1 colour1
 or comment whatsoever1 why do you not  
produce it8  ,,hyl4  ,a little patience1
 ,philonous4 ,i am at present so amazed 
to see myself ensnared1 and as it were  
imprisoned in the labyrinths you have   
drawn me into1 that on the sudden it    
cannot be expected ,i should find my way
 out4 ,you must give me time to look    
about me and recollect myself4  ,,phil4 
,hark2 is not this the college bell8    
,,hyl4  ,it rings for prayers4  ,,phil4 
,we will go in then1 if you please1 and 
meet here again tomorrow morning4 ,in   
the meantime1 you may employ your       
thoughts on this morning's discourse1   

and try if you can find any fallacy in  
it1 or invent any new means to extricate
 yourself4  ,,hyl4  ,agreed4     ,,the  
,,second ,,dialogue   ,,hyl4  ,i beg    
your pardon1 ,philonous1 for not meeting
 you sooner4 ,all this morning my head  
was so filled with our late conversation
 that ,i had not leisure to think of the
 time of the day1 or indeed of anything 
else4  ,,philonous4  ,i am glad you were
 so intent upon it1 in hopes if there   
were any mistakes in your concessions1  
or fallacies in my reasonings from them1
 you will now discover them to me4      
,,hyl4  ,i assure you ,i have done      
nothing ever since ,i saw you but search
 after mistakes and fallacies1 and1 with
 that view1 have minutely examined the  
whole series of yesterday's discourse3  
but all in vain1 for the notions it led 
me into1 upon review1 appear still more 
clear and evident2 and1 the more ,i     
consider them1 the more irresistibly do 
they force my assent4  ,,phil4  ,and is 
not this1 think you1 a sign that they   

are genuine1 that they proceed from     
nature1 and are conformable to right    
reason8 ,truth and beauty are in this   
alike1 that the strictest survey sets   
them both off to advantage2 while the   
false lustre of error and disguise      
cannot endure being reviewed1 or too    
nearly inspected4  ,,hyl4  ,i own there 
is a great deal in what you say4 ,nor   
can any one be more entirely satisfied  
of the truth of those odd consequences1 
so long as ,i have in view the          
reasonings that lead to them4 ,but1 when
 these are out of my thoughts1 there    
seems1 on the other hand1 something so  
satisfactory1 so natural and            
intelligible1 in the modern way of      
explaining things that1 ,i profess1 ,i  
know not how to reject it4  ,,phil4  ,i 
know not what way you mean4  ,,hyl4  ,i 
mean the way of accounting for our      
sensations or ideas4  ,,phil4  ,how is  
that8  ,,hyl4  ,it is supposed the soul 
makes her residence in some part of the 
brain1 from which the nerves take their 

rise1 and are thence extended to all    
parts of the body2 and that outward     
objects1 by the different impressions   
they make on the organs of sense1       
communicate certain vibrative motions to
 the nerves2 and these being filled with
 spirits propagate them to the brain or 
seat of the soul1 which1 according to   
the various impressions or traces       
thereby made in the brain1 is variously 
affected with ideas4  ,,phil4  ,and call
 you this an explication of the manner  
whereby we are affected with ideas8     
,,hyl4  ,why not1 ,philonous8 ,have you 
anything to object against it8  ,,phil4 
,i would first know whether ,i rightly  
understand your hypothesis4 ,you make   
certain traces in the brain to be the   
causes or occasions of our ideas4 ,pray 
tell me whether by the ,,brain you mean 
any sensible thing4  ,,hyl4  ,what else 
think you ,i could mean8  ,,phil4       
,sensible things are all immediately    
perceivable2 and those things which are 
immediately perceivable are ideas2 and  

these exist only in the mind4 ,thus much
 you have1 if ,i mistake not1 long since
 agreed to4  ,,hyl4  ,i do not deny it4 
,,phil4  ,the brain therefore you speak 
of1 being a sensible thing1 exists only 
in the mind4 ,now1 ,i would fain know   
whether you think it reasonable to      
suppose that one idea or thing existing 
in the mind occasions all other ideas4  
,and1 if you think so1 pray how do you  
account for the origin of that primary  
idea or brain itself8  ,,hyl4  ,i do not
 explain the origin of our ideas by that
 brain which is perceivable to          
sense--this being itself only a         
combination of sensible ideas--but by   
another which ,i imagine4  ,,phil4  ,but
 are not things imagined as truly ,,in  
,,the ,,mind as things perceived8       
,,hyl4  ,i must confess they are4       
,,phil4  ,it comes1 therefore1 to the   
same thing2 and you have been all this  
while accounting for ideas by certain   
motions or impressions of the brain2    
that is1 by some alterations in an idea1

 whether sensible or imaginable it      
matters not4  ,,hyl4  ,i begin to       
suspect my hypothesis4  ,,phil4         
,besides spirits1 all that we know or   
conceive are our own ideas4 ,when1      
therefore1 you say all ideas are        
occasioned by impressions in the brain1 
do you conceive this brain or no8 ,if   
you do1 then you talk of ideas imprinted
 in an idea causing that same idea1     
which is absurd4 ,if you do not conceive
 it1 you talk unintelligibly1 instead of
 forming a reasonable hypothesis4       
,,hyl4  ,i now clearly see it was a mere
 dream4 ,there is nothing in it4        
,,phil4  ,you need not be much concerned
 at it2 for after all1 this way of      
explaining things1 as you called it1    
could never have satisfied any          
reasonable man4 ,what connexion is there
 between a motion in the nerves1 and the
 sensations of sound or colour in the   
mind8 ,or how is it possible these      
should be the effect of that8  ,,hyl4   
,but ,i could never think it had so     

little in it as now it seems to have4   
,,phil4  ,well then1 are you at length  
satisfied that no sensible things have a
 real existence2 and that you are in    
truth an arrant sceptic8  ,,hyl4  ,it is
 too plain to be denied4  ,,phil4       
,look6 are not the fields covered with a
 delightful verdure8 ,is there not      
something in the woods and groves1 in   
the rivers and clear springs1 that      
soothes1 that delights1 that transports 
the soul8 ,at the prospect of the wide  
and deep ocean1 or some huge mountain   
whose top is lost in the clouds1 or of  
an old gloomy forest1 are not our minds 
filled with a pleasing horror8 ,even in 
rocks and deserts is there not an       
agreeable wildness8 ,how sincere a      
pleasure is it to behold the natural    
beauties of the earth6 ,to preserve and 
renew our relish for them1 is not the   
veil of night alternately drawn over her
 face1 and doth she not change her dress
 with the seasons8 ,how aptly are the   
elements disposed6 ,what variety and use

 in the meanest productions of nature6  
,what delicacy1 what beauty1 what       
contrivance1 in animal and vegetable    
bodies ,i ,how exquisitely are all      
things suited1 as well to their         
particular ends1 as to constitute       
opposite parts of the whole ,i ,and1    
while they mutually aid and support1 do 
they not also set off and illustrate    
each other8 ,raise now your thoughts    
from this ball of earth to all those    
glorious luminaries that adorn the high 
arch of heaven4 ,the motion and         
situation of the planets1 are they not  
admirable for use and order8 ,were those
 7miscalled ,,erratic7 globes once known
 to stray1 in their repeated journeys   
through the pathless void8 ,do they not 
measure areas round the sun ever        
proportioned to the times8 ,so fixed1 so
 immutable are the laws by which the    
unseen ,author of nature actuates the   
universe4 ,how vivid and radiant is the 
lustre of the fixed stars6 ,how         
magnificent and rich that negligent     

profusion with which they appear to be  
scattered throughout the whole azure    
vault6 ,yet1 if you take the telescope1 
it brings into your sight a new host of 
stars that escape the naked eye4 ,here  
they seem contiguous and minute1 but to 
a nearer view immense orbs of fight at  
various distances1 far sunk in the abyss
 of space4 ,now you must call           
imagination to your aid4 ,the feeble    
narrow sense cannot descry innumerable  
worlds revolving round the central      
fires2 and in those worlds the energy of
 an all-perfect ,mind displayed in      
endless forms4 ,but1 neither sense nor  
imagination are big enough to comprehend
 the boundless extent1 with all its     
glittering furniture4 ,though the       
labouring mind exert and strain each    
power to its utmost reach1 there still  
stands out ungrasped a surplusage       
immeasurable4 ,yet all the vast bodies  
that compose this mighty frame1 how     
distant and remote soever1 are by some  
secret mechanism1 some ,divine art and  

force1 linked in a mutual dependence and
 intercourse with each other2 even with 
this earth1 which was almost slipt from 
my thoughts and lost in the crowd of    
worlds4 ,is not the whole system        
immense1 beautiful1 glorious beyond     
expression and beyond thought6 ,what    
treatment1 then1 do those philosophers  
deserve1 who would deprive these noble  
and delightful scenes of all ,,reality8 
,how should those ,principles be        
entertained that lead us to think all   
the visible beauty of the creation a    
false imaginary glare8 ,to be plain1 can
 you expect this ,scepticism of yours   
will not be thought extravagantly absurd
 by all men of sense8  ,,hyl4  ,other   
men may think as they please2 but for   
your part you have nothing to reproach  
me with4 ,my comfort is1 you are as much
 a sceptic as ,i am4  ,,phil4  ,there1  
,hylas1 ,i must beg leave to differ from
 you4  ,,hyl4  ,what6 ,have you all     
along agreed to the premises1 and do you
 now deny the conclusion1 and leave me  

to maintain those paradoxes by myself   
which you led me into8 ,this surely is  
not fair4  ,,phil4  ,i deny that ,i     
agreed with you in those notions that   
led to ,scepticism4 ,you indeed said the
 ,,reality of sensible things consisted 
in ,,an ,,absolute ,,existence ,,out    
,,of ,,the ,,minds ,,of ,,spirits1 or   
distinct from their being perceived4    
,and pursuant to this notion of reality1
 ,,you are obliged to deny sensible     
things any real existence3 that is1     
according to your own definition1 you   
profess yourself a sceptic4 ,but ,i     
neither said nor thought the reality of 
sensible things was to be defined after 
that manner4 ,to me it is evident for   
the reasons you allow of1 that sensible 
things cannot exist otherwise than in a 
mind or spirit4 ,whence ,i conclude1 not
 that they have no real existence1 but  
that1 seeing they depend not on my      
thought1 and have all existence distinct
 from being perceived by me1 ,,there    
,,must ,,be ,,some ,,other ,,mind       

,,wherein ,,they ,,exist4 ,as sure1     
therefore1 as the sensible world really 
exists1 so sure is there an infinite    
omnipresent ,spirit who contains and    
supports it4  ,,hyl4  ,what6 ,this is no
 more than ,i and all ,christians hold2 
nay1 and all others too who believe     
there is a ,god1 and that ,he knows and 
comprehends all things4  ,,phil4  ,aye1 
but here lies the difference4 ,men      
commonly believe that all things are    
known or perceived by ,god1 because they
 believe the being of a ,god2 whereas   
,i1 on the other side1 immediately and  
necessarily conclude the being of a     
,god1 because all sensible things must  
be perceived by ,him4  ,,hyl4  ,but1 so 
long as we all believe the same thing1  
what matter is it how we come by that   
belief8  ,,phil4  ,but neither do we    
agree in the same opinion4 ,for         
philosophers1 though they acknowledge   
all corporeal beings to be perceived by 
,god1 yet they attribute to them an     
absolute subsistence distinct from their

 being perceived by any mind whatever2  
which ,i do not4 ,besides1 is there no  
difference between saying1 ,,there ,,is 
,a ,,god1 ,,therefore ,,he ,,perceives  
,,all ,,things2 and saying1 ,,sensible  
,,things ,,do ,,really ,,exist2 ,,and1  
,,if ,,they ,,really ,,exist1 ,,they    
,,are ,,necessarily ,,perceived ,,by    
,,an ,,infinite ,,mind3 ,,therefore     
,,there ,,is ,,an ,,infinite ,,mind ,,or
 ,,god8 ,this furnishes you with a      
direct and immediate demonstration1 from
 a most evident principle1 of the       
,,being ,,of ,a ,,god4 ,divines and     
philosophers had proved beyond all      
controversy1 from the beauty and        
usefulness of the several parts of the  
creation1 that it was the workmanship of
 ,god4 ,but that--setting aside all help
 of astronomy and natural philosophy1   
all contemplation of the contrivance1   
order1 and adjustment of things--an     
infinite ,mind should be necessarily    
inferred from the bare ,,existence ,,of 
,,the ,,sensible ,,world1 is an         

advantage to them only who have made    
this easy reflexion3 that the sensible  
world is that which we perceive by our  
several senses2 and that nothing is     
perceived by the senses beside ideas2   
and that no idea or archetype of an idea
 can exist otherwise than in a mind4    
,you may now1 without any laborious     
search into the sciences1 without any   
subtlety of reason1 or tedious length of
 discourse1 oppose and baffle the most  
strenuous advocate for ,atheism4 ,those 
miserable refuges1 whether in an eternal
 succession of unthinking causes and    
effects1 or in a fortuitous concourse of
 atoms2 those wild imaginations of      
,vanini1 ,hobbes1 and ,spinoza3 in a    
word1 the whole system of ,atheism1 is  
it not entirely overthrown1 by this     
single reflexion on the repugnancy      
included in supposing the whole1 or any 
part1 even the most rude and shapeless1 
of the visible world1 to exist without a
 mind8 ,let any one of those abettors of
 impiety but look into his own thoughts1

 and there try if he can conceive how so
 much as a rock1 a desert1 a chaos1 or  
confused jumble of atoms2 how anything  
at all1 either sensible or imaginable1  
can exist independent of a ,mind1 and he
 need go no farther to be convinced of  
his folly4 ,can anything be fairer than 
to put a dispute on such an issue1 and  
leave it to a man himself to see if he  
can conceive1 even in thought1 what he  
holds to be true in fact1 and from a    
notional to allow it a real existence8  
,,hyl4  ,it cannot be denied there is   
something highly serviceable to religion
 in what you advance4 ,but do you not   
think it looks very like a notion       
entertained by some eminent moderns1 of 
,,seeing ,,all ,,things ,,in ,,god8     
,,phil4  ,i would gladly know that      
opinion3 pray explain it to me4  ,,hyl4 
,they conceive that the soul1 being     
immaterial1 is incapable of being united
 with material things1 so as to perceive
 them in themselves2 but that she       
perceives them by her union with the    

substance of ,god1 which1 being         
spiritual1 is therefore purely          
intelligible1 or capable of being the   
immediate object of a spirit's thought4 
,besides the ,divine essence contains in
 it perfections correspondent to each   
created being2 and which are1 for that  
reason1 proper to exhibit or represent  
them to the mind4  ,,phil4  ,i do not   
understand how our ideas1 which are     
things altogether passive and inert1 can
 be the essence1 or any part 7or like   
any part7 of the essence or substance of
 ,god1 who is an impassive1 indivisible1
 pure1 active being4 ,many more         
difficulties and objections there are   
which occur at first view against this  
hypothesis2 but ,i shall only add that  
it is liable to all the absurdities of  
the common hypothesis1 in making a      
created world exist otherwise than in   
the mind of a ,spirit4 ,besides all     
which it hath this peculiar to itself2  
that it makes that material world serve 
to no purpose4 ,and1 if it pass for a   

good argument against other hypotheses  
in the sciences1 that they suppose      
,nature1 or the ,divine wisdom1 to make 
something in vain1 or do that by tedious
 roundabout methods which might have    
been performed in a much more easy and  
compendious way1 what shall we think of 
that hypothesis which supposes the whole
 world made in vain8  ,,hyl4  ,but what 
say you8 ,are not you too of opinion    
that we see all things in ,god8 ,if ,i  
mistake not1 what you advance comes near
 it4  ,,phil4  ,few men think2 yet all  
have opinions4 ,hence men's opinions are
 superficial and confused4 ,it is       
nothing strange that tenets which in    
themselves are ever so different1 should
 nevertheless be confounded with each   
other1 by those who do not consider them
 attentively4 ,i shall not therefore be 
surprised if some men imagine that ,i   
run into the enthusiasm of ,malebranche2
 though in truth ,i am very remote from 
it4 ,he builds on the most abstract     
general ideas1 which ,i entirely        

disclaim4 ,he asserts an absolute       
external world1 which ,i deny4 ,he      
maintains that we are deceived by our   
senses1 and1 know not the real natures  
or the true forms and figures of        
extended beings2 of all which ,i hold   
the direct contrary4 ,so that upon the  
whole there are no ,principles more     
fundamentally opposite than his and     
mine4 ,it must be owned that ,i entirely
 agree with what the holy ,scripture    
saith1 ,that in ,god we live and move   
and have our being4 ,but that we see    
things in ,his essence1 after the manner
 above set forth1 ,i am far from        
believing4 ,take here in brief my       
meaning3--,it is evident that the things
 ,i perceive are my own ideas1 and that 
no idea can exist unless it be in a     
mind3 nor is it less plain that these   
ideas or things by me perceived1 either 
themselves or their archetypes1 exist   
independently of my mind1 since ,i know 
myself not to be their author1 it being 
out of my power to determine at pleasure

 what particular ideas ,i shall be      
affected with upon opening my eyes or   
ears3 they must therefore exist in some 
other ,mind1 whose ,will it is they     
should be exhibited to me4 ,the things1 
,i say1 immediately perceived are ideas 
or sensations1 call them which you will4
 ,but how can any idea or sensation     
exist in1 or be produced by1 anything   
but a mind or spirit8 ,this indeed is   
inconceivable4 ,and to assert that which
 is inconceivable is to talk nonsense3  
is it not8  ,,hyl4  ,without doubt4     
,,phil4  ,but1 on the other hand1 it is 
very conceivable that they should exist 
in and be produced by a spirit2 since   
this is no more than ,i daily experience
 in myself1 inasmuch as ,i perceive     
numberless ideas2 and1 by an act of my  
will1 can form a great variety of them1 
and raise them up in my imagination3    
though1 it must be confessed1 these     
creatures of the fancy are not          
altogether so distinct1 so strong1      
vivid1 and permanent1 as those perceived

 by my senses--which latter are called  
,,red ,,things4 ,from all which ,i      
conclude1 ,,there ,,is ,a ,,mind ,,which
 ,,affects ,,me ,,every ,,moment ,,with 
,,all ,,the ,,sensible ,,impressions ,i 
,,perceive4 ,,and1 from the variety1    
order1 and manner of these1 ,i conclude 
,,the ,,author ,,of ,,them ,,to ,,be    
,,wise1 ,,powerful1 ,,and ,,good1       
,,beyond ,,comprehension4 ,,mark it     
well2 ,i do not say1 ,i see things by   
perceiving that which represents them in
 the intelligible ,substance of ,god4   
,this ,i do not understand2 but ,i say1 
the things by me perceived are known by 
the understanding1 and produced by the  
will of an infinite ,spirit4 ,and is not
 all this most plain and evident8 ,is   
there any more in it than what a little 
observation in our own minds1 and that  
which passeth in them1 not only enables 
us to conceive1 but also obliges us to  
acknowledge4  ,,hyl4  ,i think ,i       
understand you very clearly2 and own the
 proof you give of a ,deity seems no    

less evident than it is surprising4     
,but1 allowing that ,god is the supreme 
and universal ,cause of an things1 yet1 
may there not be still a ,third ,nature 
besides ,spirits and ,ideas8 ,may we not
 admit a subordinate and limited cause  
of our ideas8 ,in a word1 may there not 
for all that be ,,matter8  ,,phil4  ,how
 often must ,i inculcate the same thing8
 ,you allow the things immediately      
perceived by sense to exist nowhere     
without the mind2 but there is nothing  
perceived by sense which is not         
perceived immediately3 therefore there  
is nothing sensible that exists without 
the mind4 ,the ,matter1 therefore1 which
 you still insist on is something       
intelligible1 ,i suppose2 something that
 may be discovered by reason1 and not by
 sense4  ,,hyl4  ,you are in the right4 
,,phil4  ,pray let me know what         
reasoning your belief of ,matter is     
grounded on2 and what this ,matter is1  
in your present sense of it4  ,,hyl4  ,i
 find myself affected with various      

ideas1 whereof ,i know ,i am not the    
cause2 neither are they the cause of    
themselves1 or of one another1 or       
capable of subsisting by themselves1 as 
being altogether inactive1 fleeting1    
dependent beings4 ,they have therefore  
,,some cause distinct from me and them3 
of which ,i pretend to know no more than
 that it is ,,the ,,cause ,,of ,,my     
,,ideas4 ,and this thing1 whatever it   
be1 ,i call ,matter4  ,,phil4  ,tell me1
 ,hylas1 hath every one a liberty to    
change the current proper signification 
attached to a common name in any        
language8 ,for example1 suppose a       
traveller should tell you that in a     
certain country men pass unhurt through 
the fire2 and1 upon explaining himself1 
you found he meant by the word fire that
 which others call ,,water4 ,or1 if he  
should assert that there are trees that 
walk upon two legs1 meaning men by the  
term ,,trees4 ,would you think this     
reasonable8  ,,hyl4  ,no2 ,i should     
think it very absurd4 ,common custom is 

the standard of propriety in language4  
,and for any man to affect speaking     
improperly is to pervert the use of     
speech1 and can never serve to a better 
purpose than to protract and multiply   
disputes1 where there is no difference  
in opinion4  ,,phil4  ,and doth not     
,,matter1 in the common current         
acceptation of the word1 signify an     
extended1 solid1 moveable1 unthinking1  
inactive ,substance8  ,,hyl4  ,it doth4 
,,phil4  ,and1 hath it not been made    
evident that no ,,such substance can    
possibly exist8 ,and1 though it should  
be allowed to exist1 yet how can that   
which is ,,inactive be a ,,cause2 or    
that which is ,,unthinking be a ,,cause 
,,of ,,thought8 ,you may1 indeed1 if you
 please1 annex to the word ,,matter a   
contrary meaning to what is vulgarly    
received2 and tell me you understand by 
it1 an unextended1 thinking1 active     
being1 which is the cause of our ideas4 
,but what else is this than to play with
 words1 and run into that very fault you

 just now condemned with so much reason8
 ,i do by no means find fault with your 
reasoning1 in that you collect a cause  
from the ,,phenomena3 ,,but ,i deny that
 ,,the cause deducible by reason can    
properly be termed ,matter4  ,,hyl4     
,there is indeed something in what you  
say4 ,but ,i am afraid you do not       
thoroughly comprehend my meaning4 ,i    
would by no means be thought to deny    
that ,god1 or an infinite ,spirit1 is   
the ,supreme ,cause of all things4 ,all 
,i contend for is1 that1 subordinate to 
the ,supreme ,agent1 there is a cause of
 a limited and inferior nature1 which   
,,concurs in the production of our      
ideas1 not by any act of will1 or       
spiritual efficiency1 but by that kind  
of action which belongs to ,matter1 viz4
 ,,motion4  ,,phil4  ,i find you are at 
every turn relapsing into your old      
exploded conceit1 of a moveable1 and    
consequently an extended1 substance1    
existing without the mind4 ,what6 ,have 
you already forgotten you were          

convinced2 or are you willing ,i should 
repeat what has been said on that head8 
,in truth this is not fair dealing in   
you1 still to suppose the being of that 
which you have so often acknowledged to 
have no being4 ,but1 not to insist      
farther on what has been so largely     
handled1 ,i ask whether all your ideas  
are not perfectly passive and inert1    
including nothing of action in them4    
,,hyl4  ,they are4  ,,phil4  ,and are   
sensible qualities anything else but    
ideas8  ,,hyl4  ,how often have ,i      
acknowledged that they are not4  ,,phil4
  ,but is not ,,motion a sensible       
quality8  ,,hyl4  ,it is4  ,,phil4      
,consequently it is no action8  ,,hyl4  
,i agree with you4 ,and indeed it is    
very plain that when ,i stir my finger1 
it remains passive2 but my will which   
produced the motion is active4  ,,phil4 
,now1 ,i desire to know1 in the first   
place1 whether1 motion being allowed to 
be no action1 you can conceive any      
action besides volition3 and1 in the    

second place1 whether to say something  
and conceive nothing be not to talk     
nonsense3 and1 lastly1 whether1 having  
considered the premises1 you do not     
perceive that to suppose any efficient  
or active ,cause of our ideas1 other    
than ,,spirit1 is highly absurd and     
unreasonable8  ,,hyl4  ,i give up the   
point entirely4 ,but1 though ,matter may
 not be a cause1 yet what hinders its   
being an ,,instrument1 subservient to   
the supreme ,agent in the production of 
our ideas8  ,,phil4  ,an instrument say 
you2 pray what may be the figure1       
springs1 wheels1 and motions1 of that   
instrument8  ,,hyl4  ,those ,i pretend  
to determine nothing of1 both the       
substance and its qualities being       
entirely unknown to me4  ,,phil4  ,what8
 ,you are then of opinion it is made up 
of unknown parts1 that it hath unknown  
motions1 and an unknown shape8  ,,hyl4  
,i do not believe that it hath any      
figure or motion at all1 being already  
convinced1 that no sensible qualities   

can exist in an unperceiving substance4 
,,phil4  ,but what notion is it possible
 to frame of an instrument void of all  
sensible qualities1 even extension      
itself8  ,,hyl4  ,i do not pretend to   
have any notion of it4  ,,phil4  ,and   
what reason have you to think this      
unknown1 this inconceivable ,somewhat   
doth exist8 ,is it that you imagine ,god
 cannot act as well without it2 or that 
you find by experience the use of some  
such thing1 when you form ideas in your 
own mind8  ,,hyl4  ,you are always      
teasing me for reasons of my belief4    
,pray what reasons have you not to      
believe it8  ,,phil4  ,it is to me a    
sufficient reason not to believe the    
existence of anything1 if ,i see no     
reason for believing it4 ,but1 not to   
insist on reasons for believing1 you    
will not so much as let me know ,,what  
,,it ,,is you would have me believe2    
since you say you have no manner of     
notion of it4 ,after all1 let me entreat
 you to consider whether it be like a   

philosopher1 or even like a man of      
common sense1 to pretend to believe you 
know not what and you know not why4     
,,hyl4  ,hold1 ,philonous4 ,when ,i tell
 you ,matter is an ,,instrument1 ,i do  
not mean altogether nothing4 ,it is true
 ,i know not the particular kind of     
instrument2 but1 however1 ,i have some  
notion of ,,instrument ,,in ,,general1  
which ,i apply to it4  ,,phil4  ,but    
what if it should prove that there is   
something1 even in the most general     
notion of ,,instrument1 as taken in a   
distinct sense from ,,cause1 which makes
 the use of it inconsistent with the    
,divine attributes8  ,,hyl4  ,make that 
appear and ,i shall give up the point4  
,,phil4  ,what mean you by the general  
nature or notion of ,,instrument8       
,,hyl4  ,that which is common to all    
particular instruments composeth the    
general notion4  ,,phil4  ,is it not    
common to all instruments1 that they are
 applied to the doing those things only 
which cannot be performed by the mere   

act of our wills8 ,thus1 for instance1  
,i never use an instrument to move my   
finger1 because it is done by a         
volition4 ,but ,i should use one if ,i  
were to remove part of a rock1 or tear  
up a tree by the roots4 ,are you of the 
same mind8 ,or1 can you shew any example
 where an instrument is made use of in  
producing an effect ,,immediately       
depending on the will of the agent8     
,,hyl4  ,i own ,i cannot4  ,,phil4  ,how
 therefore can you suppose that an      
,all-perfect ,spirit1 on whose ,will all
 things have an absolute and immediate  
dependence1 should need an instrument in
 his operations1 or1 not needing it1    
make use of it8 ,thus it seems to me    
that you are obliged to own the use of a
 lifeless inactive instrument to be     
incompatible with the infinite          
perfection of ,god2 that is1 by your own
 confession1 to give up the point4      
,,hyl4  ,it doth not readily occur what 
,i can answer you4  ,,phil4  ,but1      
methinks you should be ready to own the 

truth1 when it has been fairly proved to
 you4 ,we indeed1 who are beings of     
finite powers1 are forced to make use of
 instruments4 ,and the use of an        
instrument sheweth the agent to be      
limited by rules of another's           
prescription1 and that he cannot obtain 
his end but in such a way1 and by such  
conditions4 ,whence it seems a clear    
consequence1 that the supreme unlimited 
agent useth no tool or instrument at    
all4 ,the will of an ,omnipotent ,spirit
 is no sooner exerted than executed1    
without the application of means2 which1
 if they are employed by inferior       
agents1 it is not upon account of any   
real efficacy that is in them1 or       
necessary aptitude to produce any       
effect1 but merely in compliance with   
the laws of nature1 or those conditions 
prescribed to them by the ,first ,cause1
 who is ,himself above all limitation or
 prescription whatsoever4  ,,hyl4  ,i   
will no longer maintain that ,matter is 
an instrument4 ,however1 ,i would not be

 understood to give up its existence    
neither2 since1 notwithstanding what    
hath been said1 it may still be an      
,,occasion4  ,,phil4  ,how many shapes  
is your ,matter to take8 ,or1 how often 
must it be proved not to exist1 before  
you are content to part with it8 ,but1  
to say no more of this 7though by all   
the laws of disputation ,i may justly   
blame you for so frequently changing the
 signification of the principal         
term7--,i would fain know what you mean 
by affirming that matter is an occasion1
 having already denied it to be a cause4
 ,and1 when you have shewn in what sense
 you understand ,,occasion1 pray1 in the
 next place1 be pleased to shew me what 
reason induceth you to believe there is 
such an occasion of our ideas8  ,,hyl4  
,as to the first point3 by ,,occasion ,i
 mean an inactive unthinking being1 at  
the presence whereof ,god excites ideas 
in our minds4  ,,phil4  ,and what may be
 the nature of that inactive unthinking 
being8  ,,hyl4  ,i know nothing of its  

nature4  ,,phil4  ,proceed then to the  
second point1 and assign some reason why
 we should allow an existence to this   
inactive1 unthinking1 unknown thing4    
,,hyl4  ,when we see ideas produced in  
our minds1 after an orderly and constant
 manner1 it is natural to think they    
have some fixed and regular occasions1  
at the presence of which they are       
excited4  ,,phil4  ,you acknowledge then
 ,god alone to be the cause of our      
ideas1 and that ,he causes them at the  
presence of those occasions4  ,,hyl4    
,that is my opinion4  ,,phil4  ,those   
things which you say are present to     
,god1 without doubt ,he perceives4      
,,hyl4  ,certainly2 otherwise they could
 not be to ,him an occasion of acting4  
,,phil4  ,not to insist now on your     
making sense of this hypothesis1 or     
answering all the puzzling questions and
 difficulties it is liable to3 ,i only  
ask whether the order and regularity    
observable in the series of our ideas1  
or the course of nature1 be not         

sufficiently accounted for by the wisdom
 and power of ,god2 and whether it doth 
not derogate from those attributes1 to  
suppose ,he is influenced1 directed1 or 
put in mind1 when and what ,he is to    
act1 by an unthinking substance8 ,and1  
lastly1 whether1 in case ,i granted all 
you contend for1 it would make anything 
to your purpose2 it not being easy to   
conceive how the external or absolute   
existence of an unthinking substance1   
distinct from its being perceived1 can  
be inferred from my allowing that there 
are certain things perceived by the mind
 of ,god1 which are to ,him the occasion
 of producing ideas in us8  ,,hyl4  ,i  
am perfectly at a loss what to think1   
this notion of ,,occasion seeming now   
altogether as groundless as the rest4   
,,phil4  ,do you not at length perceive 
that in all these different acceptations
 of ,,matter1 you have been only        
supposing you know not what1 for no     
manner of reason1 and to no kind of use8
  ,,hyl4  ,i freely own myself less fond

 of my notions since they have been so  
accurately examined4 ,but still1        
methinks1 ,i have some confused         
perception that there is such a thing as
 ,,matter4  ,,phil4  ,either you        
perceive the being of ,matter           
immediately or mediately4 ,if           
immediately1 pray inform me by which of 
the senses you perceive it4 ,if         
mediately1 let me know by what reasoning
 it is inferred from those things which 
you perceive immediately4 ,so much for  
the perception4 ,then for the ,matter   
itself1 ,i ask whether it is object1    
,,substratum1 cause1 instrument1 or     
occasion8 ,you have already pleaded for 
each of these1 shifting your notions1   
and making ,matter to appear sometimes  
in one shape1 then in another4 ,and what
 you have offered hath been disapproved 
and rejected by yourself4 ,if you have  
anything new to advance ,i would gladly 
bear it4  ,,hyl4  ,i think ,i have      
already offered all ,i had to say on    
those heads4 ,i am at a loss what more  

to urge4  ,,phil4  ,and yet you are     
loath to part with your old prejudice4  
,but1 to make you quit it more easily1  
,i desire that1 beside what has been    
hitherto suggested1 you will farther    
consider whether1 upon supposition that 
,matter exists1 you can possibly        
conceive how you should be affected by  
it4 ,or1 supposing it did not exist1    
whether it be not evident you might for 
all that be affected with the same ideas
 you now are1 and consequently have the 
very same reasons to believe its        
existence that you now can have4  ,,hyl4
  ,i acknowledge it is possible we might
 perceive all things just as we do now1 
though there was no ,matter in the      
world2 neither can ,i conceive1 if there
 be ,matter1 how it should produce' any 
idea in our minds4 ,and1 ,i do farther  
grant you have entirely satisfied me    
that it is impossible there should be   
such a thing as matter in any of the    
foregoing acceptations4 ,but still ,i   
cannot help supposing that there is     

,,matter in some sense or other4 ,,what 
,,that ,,is ,i do not indeed pretend to 
determine4  ,,phil4  ,i do not expect   
you should define exactly the nature of 
that unknown being4 ,only be pleased to 
tell me whether it is a ,substance2 and 
if so1 whether you can suppose a        
,substance without accidents2 or1 in    
case you suppose it to have accidents or
 qualities1 ,i desire you will let me   
know what those qualities are1 at least 
what is meant by ,matter's supporting   
them8  ,,hyl4  ,we have already argued  
on those points4 ,i have no more to say 
to them4 ,but1 to prevent any farther   
questions1 let me tell you ,i at present
 understand by ,,matter neither         
substance nor accident1 thinking nor    
extended being1 neither cause1          
instrument1 nor occasion1 but ,something
 entirely unknown1 distinct from all    
these4  ,,phil4  ,it seems then you     
include in your present notion of       
,matter nothing but the general abstract
 idea of ,,entity4  ,,hyl4  ,nothing    

else2 save only that ,i super-add to    
this general idea the negation of all   
those particular things1 qualities1 or  
ideas1 that ,i perceive1 imagine1 or in 
anywise apprehend4  ,,phil4  ,pray where
 do you suppose this unknown ,matter to 
exist8  ,,hyl4  ,oh ,philonous6 now you 
think you have entangled me2 for1 if ,i 
say it exists in place1 then you will   
infer that it exists in the mind1 since 
it is agreed that place or extension    
exists only in the mind4 ,but ,i am not 
ashamed to own my ignorance4 ,i know not
 where it exists2 only ,i am sure it    
exists not in place4 ,there is a        
negative answer for you4 ,and you must  
expect no other to all the questions you
 put for the future about ,matter4      
,,phil4  ,since you will not tell me    
where it exists1 be pleased to inform me
 after what manner you suppose it to    
exist1 or what you mean by its          
,,existence8  ,,hyl4  ,it neither thinks
 nor acts1 neither perceives nor is     
perceived4  ,,phil4  ,but what is there 

positive in your abstracted notion of   
its existence8  ,,hyl4  ,upon a nice    
observation1 ,i do not find ,i have any 
positive notion or meaning at all4 ,i   
tell you again1 ,i am not ashamed to own
 my ignorance4 ,i know not what is meant
 by its ,,existence1 or how it exists4  
,,phil4  ,continue1 good ,hylas1 to act 
the same ingenuous part1 and tell me    
sincerely whether you can frame a       
distinct idea of ,entity in general1    
prescinded from and exclusive of all    
thinking and corporeal beings1 all      
particular things whatsoever4  ,,hyl4   
,hold1 let me think a little--,i        
profess1 ,philonous1 ,i do not find that
 ,i can4 ,at first glance1 methought ,i 
had some dilute and airy notion of ,pure
 ,entity in abstract2 but1 upon closer  
attention1 it hath quite vanished out of
 sight4 ,the more ,i think on it1 the   
more am ,i confirmed in my prudent      
resolution of giving none but negative  
answers1 and not pretending to the least
 degree of any positive knowledge or    

conception of ,matter1 its ,,where1 its 
,,how1 its ,,entity1 or anything        
belonging to it4  ,,phil4  ,when1       
therefore1 you speak of the existence of
 ,matter1 you have not any notion in    
your mind8  ,,hyl4  ,none at all4       
,,phil4  ,pray tell me if the case      
stands not thus--,at first1 from a      
belief of material substance1 you would 
have it that the immediate objects      
existed without the mind2 then that they
 are archetypes2 then causes2 next      
instruments2 then occasions3 lastly     
,,something ,,in ,,general1 which being 
interpreted proves ,,nothing4 ,so       
,matter comes to nothing4 ,what think   
you1 ,hylas1 is not this a fair summary 
of your whole proceeding8  ,,hyl4  ,be  
that as it will1 yet ,i still insist    
upon it1 that our not being able to     
conceive a thing is no argument against 
its existence4  ,,phil4  ,that from a   
cause1 effect1 operation1 sign1 or other
 circumstance1 there may reasonably be  
inferred the existence of a thing not   

immediately perceived2 and that it were 
absurd for any man to argue against the 
existence of that thing1 from his having
 no direct and positive notion of it1 ,i
 freely own4 ,but1 where there is       
nothing of all this2 where neither      
reason nor revelation induces us to     
believe the existence of a thing2 where 
we have not even a relative notion of   
it2 where an abstraction is made from   
perceiving and being perceived1 from    
,spirit and idea3 lastly1 where there is
 not so much as the most inadequate or  
faint idea pretended to--,i will not    
indeed thence conclude against the      
reality of any notion1 or existence of  
anything2 but my inference shall be1    
that you mean nothing at all2 that you  
employ words to no manner of purpose1   
without any design or signification     
whatsoever4 ,and ,i leave it to you to  
consider how mere jargon should be      
treated4  ,,hyl4  ,to deal frankly with 
you1 ,philonous1 your arguments seem in 
themselves unanswerable2 but they have  

not so great an effect on me as to      
produce that entire conviction1 that    
hearty acquiescence1 which attends      
demonstration4 ,i find myself relapsing 
into an obscure surmise of ,i know not  
what1 ,,matter4  ,,phil4  ,but1 are you 
not sensible1 ,hylas1 that two things   
must concur to take away all scruple1   
and work a plenary assent in the mind8  
,let a visible object be set in never so
 clear a light1 yet1 if there is any    
imperfection in the sight1 or if the eye
 is not directed towards it1 it will not
 be distinctly seen4 ,and though a      
demonstration be never so well grounded 
and fairly proposed1 yet1 if there is   
withal a stain of prejudice1 or a wrong 
bias on the understanding1 can it be    
expected on a sudden to perceive        
clearly1 and adhere firmly to the truth8
 ,no2 there is need of time and pains3  
the attention must be awakened and      
detained by a frequent repetition of the
 same thing placed oft in the same1 oft 
in different lights4 ,i have said it    

already1 and find ,i must still repeat  
and inculcate1 that it is an            
unaccountable licence you take1 in      
pretending to maintain you know not     
what1 for you know not what reason1 to  
you know not what purpose4 ,can this be 
paralleled in any art or science1 any   
sect or profession of men8 ,or is there 
anything so barefacedly groundless and  
unreasonable to be met with even in the 
lowest of common conversation8 ,but1    
perhaps you will still say1 ,matter may 
exist2 though at the same time you      
neither know ,,what ,,is ,,meant by     
,,matter1 or by its ,,existence4 ,this  
indeed is surprising1 and the more so   
because it is altogether voluntary and  
of your own head1 you not being led to  
it by any one reason2 for ,i challenge  
you to shew me that thing in nature     
which needs ,matter to explain or       
account for it4  ,,hyl4  ,,the ,,reality
 of things cannot be maintained without 
supposing the existence of ,matter4 ,and
 is not this1 think you1 a good reason  

why ,i should be earnest in its defence8
  ,,phil4  ,the reality of things6 ,what
 things8 sensible or intelligible8      
,,hyl4  ,sensible things4  ,,phil4  ,my 
glove for example8  ,,hyl4  ,that1 or   
any other thing perceived by the senses4
  ,,phil4  ,but to fix on some          
particular thing4 ,is it not a          
sufficient evidence to me of the        
existence of this ,,glove1 that ,i see  
it1 and feel it1 and wear it8 ,or1 if   
this will not do1 how is it possible ,i 
should be assured of the reality of this
 thing1 which ,i actually see in this   
place1 by supposing that some unknown   
thing1 which ,i never did or can see1   
exists after an unknown manner1 in an   
unknown place1 or in no place at all8   
,how can the supposed reality of that   
which is intangible be a proof that     
anything tangible really exists8 ,or1 of
 that which is invisible1 that any      
visible thing1 or1 in general of        
anything which is imperceptible1 that a 
perceptible exists8 ,do but explain this

 and ,i shall think nothing too hard for
 you4  ,,hyl4  ,upon the whole1 ,i am   
content to own the existence of matter  
is highly improbable2 but the direct and
 absolute impossibility of it does not  
appear to me4  ,,phil4  ,but granting   
,matter to be possible1 yet1 upon that  
account merely1 it can have no more     
claim to existence than a golden        
mountain1 or a centaur4  ,,hyl4  ,i     
acknowledge it2 but still you do not    
deny it is possible2 and that which is  
possible1 for aught you know1 may       
actually exist4  ,,phil4  ,i deny it to 
be possible2 and have1 if ,i mistake    
not1 evidently proved1 from your own    
concessions1 that it is not4 ,in the    
common sense of the word ,,matter1 is   
there any more implied than an extended1
 solid1 figured1 moveable substance1    
existing without the mind8 ,and have not
 you acknowledged1 over and over1 that  
you have seen evident reason for denying
 the possibility of such a substance8   
,,hyl4  ,true1 but that is only one     

sense of the term ,,matter4  ,,phil4    
,but is it not the only proper genuine  
received sense8 ,and1 if ,matter1 in    
such a sense1 be proved impossible1 may 
it not be thought with good grounds     
absolutely impossible8 ,else how could  
anything be proved impossible8 ,or1     
indeed1 how could there be any proof at 
all one way or other1 to a man who takes
 the liberty to unsettle and change the 
common signification of words8  ,,hyl4  
,i thought philosophers might be allowed
 to speak more accurately than the      
vulgar1 and were not always confined to 
the common acceptation of a term4       
,,phil4  ,but this now mentioned is the 
common received sense among philosophers
 themselves4 ,but1 not to insist on     
that1 have you not been allowed to take 
,matter in what sense you pleased8 ,and 
have you not used this privilege in the 
utmost extent2 sometimes entirely       
changing1 at others leaving out1 or     
putting into the definition of it       
whatever1 for the present1 best served  

your design1 contrary to all the known  
rules of reason and logic8 ,and hath not
 this shifting1 unfair method of yours  
spun out our dispute to an unnecessary  
length2 ,matter having been particularly
 examined1 and by your own confession   
refuted in each of those senses8 ,and   
can any more be required to prove the   
absolute impossibility of a thing1 than 
the proving it impossible in every      
particular sense that either you or any 
one else understands it in8  ,,hyl4     
,but ,i am not so thoroughly satisfied  
that you have proved the impossibility  
of ,matter1 in the last most obscure    
abstracted and indefinite sense4        
,,phil4 4 ,when is a thing shewn to be  
impossible8  ,,hyl4  ,when a repugnancy 
is demonstrated between the ideas       
comprehended in its definition4  ,,phil4
  ,but where there are no ideas1 there  
no repugnancy can be demonstrated       
between ideas8  ,,hyl4  ,i agree with   
you4  ,,phil4  ,now1 in that which you  
call the obscure indefinite sense of the

 word ,,matter1 it is plain1 by your own
 confession1 there was included no idea 
at all1 no sense except an unknown      
sense2 which is the same thing as none4 
,you are not1 therefore1 to expect ,i   
should prove a repugnancy between ideas1
 where there are no ideas2 or the       
impossibility of ,matter taken in an    
,,unknown sense1 that is1 no sense at   
all4 ,my business was only to shew you  
meant ,,nothing2 and this you were      
brought to own4 ,so that1 in all your   
various senses1 you have been shewed    
either to mean nothing at all1 or1 if   
anything1 an absurdity4 ,and if this be 
not sufficient to prove the             
impossibility of a thing1 ,i desire you 
will let me know what is4  ,,hyl4  ,i   
acknowledge you have proved that ,matter
 is impossible2 nor do ,i see what more 
can be said in defence of it4 ,but1 at  
the same time that ,i give up this1 ,i  
suspect all my other notions4 ,for      
surely none could be more seemingly     
evident than this once was3 and yet it  

now seems as false and absurd as ever it
 did true before4 ,but ,i think we have 
discussed the point sufficiently for the
 present4 ,the remaining part of the day
 ,i would willingly spend in running    
over in my thoughts the several heads of
 this morning's conversation1 and       
tomorrow shall be glad to meet you here 
again about the same time4  ,,phil4  ,i 
will not fail to attend you4     ,,the  
,,third ,,dialogue   ,,philonous4  ,tell
 me1 ,hylas1 what are the fruits of     
yesterday's meditation8 ,has it         
confirmed you in the same mind you were 
in at parting8 or have you since seen   
cause to change your opinion8  ,,hylas4 
,truly my opinion is that all our       
opinions are alike vain and uncertain4  
,what we approve to-day1 we condemn     
to-morrow4 ,we keep a stir about        
knowledge1 and spend our lives in the   
pursuit of it1 when1 alas ,i we know    
nothing all the while3 nor do ,i think  
it possible for us ever to know anything
 in this life4 ,our faculties are too   

narrow and too few4 ,nature certainly   
never intended us for speculation4      
,,phil4  ,what6 ,say you we can know    
nothing1 ,hylas8  ,,hyl4  ,there is not 
that single thing in the world whereof  
we can know the real nature1 or what it 
is in itself4  ,,phil4  ,will you tell  
me ,i do not really know what fire or   
water is8  ,,hyl4  ,you may indeed know 
that fire appears hot1 and water fluid2 
but this is no more than knowing what   
sensations are produced in your own     
mind1 upon the application of fire and  
water to your organs of sense4 ,their   
internal constitution1 their true and   
real nature1 you are utterly in the dark
 as to ,,that4  ,,phil4  ,do ,i not know
 this to be a real stone that ,i stand  
on1 and that which ,i see before my eyes
 to be a real tree8  ,,hyl4  ,,know8    
,no1 it is impossible you or any man    
alive should know it4 ,all you know is1 
that you have such a certain idea or    
appearance in your own mind4 ,but what  
is this to the real tree or stone8 ,i   

tell you that colour1 figure1 and       
hardness1 which you perceive1 are not   
the real natures of those things1 or in 
the least like them4 ,the same may be   
said of all other real things1 or       
corporeal substances1 which compose the 
world4 ,they have none of them anything 
of themselves1 like those sensible      
qualities by us perceived4 ,we should   
not therefore pretend to affirm or know 
anything of them1 as they are in their  
own nature4  ,,phil4  ,but surely1      
,hylas1 ,i can distinguish gold1 for    
example1 from iron3 and how could this  
be1 if ,i knew not what either truly    
was8  ,,hyl4  ,believe me1 ,philonous1  
you can only distinguish between your   
own ideas4 ,that yellowness1 that       
weight1 and other sensible qualities1   
think you they are really in the gold8  
,they are only relative to the senses1  
and have no absolute existence in       
nature4 ,and in pretending to           
distinguish the species of real things1 
by the appearances in your mind1 you may

 perhaps act as wisely as he that should
 conclude two men were of a different   
species1 because their clothes were not 
of the same colour4  ,,phil4  ,it seems1
 then1 we are altogether put off with   
the appearances of things1 and those    
false ones too4 ,the very meat ,i eat1  
and the cloth ,i wear1 have nothing in  
them like what ,i see and feel4  ,,hyl4 
,even so4  ,,phil4  ,but is it not      
strange the whole world should be thus  
imposed on1 and so foolish as to believe
 their senses8 ,and yet ,i know not how 
it is1 but men eat1 and drink1 and      
sleep1 and perform all the offices of   
life1 as comfortably and conveniently as
 if they really knew the things they are
 conversant about4  ,,hyl4  ,they do so3
 but you know ordinary practice does not
 require a nicety of speculative        
knowledge4 ,hence the vulgar retain     
their mistakes1 and for all that make a 
shift to bustle through the affairs of  
life4 ,but philosophers know better     
things4  ,,phil4  ,you mean1 they ,,know

 that they ,,know ,,nothing4  ,,hyl4    
,that is the very top and perfection of 
human knowledge4  ,,phil4  ,but are you 
all this while in earnest1 ,hylas2 and  
are you seriously persuaded that you    
know nothing real in the world8 ,suppose
 you are going to write1 would you not  
call for pen1 ink1 and paper1 like      
another man2 and do you not know what it
 is you call for8  ,,hyl4  ,how often   
must ,i tell you1 that ,i know not the  
real nature of any one thing in the     
universe8 ,i may indeed upon occasion   
make use of pen1 ink1 and paper4 ,but   
what any one of them is in its own true 
nature1 ,i declare positively ,i know   
not4 ,and the same is true with regard  
to every other corporeal thing4 ,and1   
what is more1 we are not only ignorant  
of the true and real nature of things1  
but even of their existence4 ,it cannot 
be denied that we perceive such certain 
appearances or ideas2 but it cannot be  
concluded from thence that bodies really
 exist4 ,nay1 now ,i think on it1 ,i    

must1 agreeably to my former            
concessions1 farther declare that it is 
impossible any ,,real corporeal thing   
should exist in nature4  ,,phil4  ,you  
amaze me4 ,was ever anything more wild  
and extravagant than the notions you now
 maintain3 and is it not evident you are
 led into all these extravagances by the
 belief of ,,material ,,substance8 ,this
 makes you dream of those unknown       
natures in everything4 ,it is this      
occasions your distinguishing between   
the reality and sensible appearances of 
things4 ,it is to this you are indebted 
for being ignorant of what everybody    
else knows perfectly well4 ,nor is this 
all3 you are not only ignorant of the   
true nature of everything1 but you know 
not whether anything really exists1 or  
whether there are any true natures at   
all2 forasmuch as you attribute to your 
material beings an absolute or external 
existence1 wherein you suppose their    
reality consists4 ,and1 as you are      
forced in the end to acknowledge such an

 existence means either a direct        
repugnancy1 or nothing at all1 it       
follows that you are obliged to pull    
down your own hypothesis of material    
,substance1 and positively to deny the  
real existence of any part of the       
universe4 ,and so you are plunged into  
the deepest and most deplorable         
scepticism that ever man was4 ,tell me1 
,hylas1 is it not as ,i say8  ,,hyl4  ,i
 agree with you4 ,,material ,,substance 
was no more than an hypothesis2 and a   
false and groundless one too4 ,i will no
 longer spend my breath in defence of   
it4 ,but whatever hypothesis you        
advance1 or whatsoever scheme of things 
you introduce in its stead1 ,i doubt not
 it will appear every whit as false3 let
 me but be allowed to question you upon 
it4 ,that is1 suffer me to serve you in 
your own kind1 and ,i warrant it shall  
conduct you through as many perplexities
 and contradictions1 to the very same   
state of scepticism that ,i myself am in
 at present4  ,,phil4  ,i assure you1   

,hylas1 ,i do not pretend to frame any  
hypothesis at all4 ,i am of a vulgar    
cast1 simple enough to believe my       
senses1 and leave things as ,i find     
them4 ,to be plain1 it is my opinion    
that the real things are those very     
things ,i see1 and feel1 and perceive by
 my senses4 ,these ,i know2 and1 finding
 they answer all the necessities and    
purposes of life1 have no reason to be  
solicitous about any other unknown      
beings4 ,a piece of sensible bread1 for 
instance1 would stay my stomach better  
than ten thousand times as much of that 
insensible1 unintelligible1 real bread  
you speak of4 ,it is likewise my opinion
 that colours and other sensible        
qualities are on the objects4 ,i cannot 
for my life help thinking that snow is  
white1 and fire hot4 ,you indeed1 who by
 ,,snow and fire mean certain external1 
unperceived1 unperceiving substances1   
are in the right to deny whiteness or   
heat to be affections inherent in       
,,them4 ,but ,i1 who understand by those

 words the things ,i see and feel1 am   
obliged to think like other folks4 ,and1
 as ,i am no sceptic with regard to the 
nature of things1 so neither am ,i as to
 their existence4 ,that a thing should  
be really perceived by my senses1 and at
 the same time not really exist1 is to  
me a plain contradiction2 since ,i      
cannot prescind or abstract1 even in    
thought1 the existence of a sensible    
thing from its being perceived4 ,wood1  
stones1 fire1 water1 flesh1 iron1 and   
the like things1 which ,i name and      
discourse of1 are things that ,i know4  
,and ,i should not have known them but  
that ,i perceived them by my senses2 and
 things perceived by the senses are     
immediately perceived2 and things       
immediately perceived are ideas2 and    
ideas cannot exist without the mind2    
their existence therefore consists in   
being perceived2 when1 therefore1 they  
are actually perceived there can be no  
doubt of their existence4 ,away then    
with all that scepticism1 all those     

ridiculous philosophical doubts4 ,what a
 jest is it for a philosopher to        
question the existence of sensible      
things1 till he hath it proved to him   
from the veracity of ,god2 or to pretend
 our knowledge in this point falls short
 of intuition or demonstration6 ,i might
 as well doubt of my own being1 as of   
the being of those things ,i actually   
see and feel4  ,,hyl4  ,not so fast1    
,philonous3 you say you cannot conceive 
how sensible things should exist without
 the mind4 ,do you not8  ,,phil4  ,i do4
  ,,hyl4  ,supposing you were           
annihilated1 cannot you conceive it     
possible that things perceivable by     
sense may still exist8  ,,phil4  ,i can2
 but then it must be in another mind4   
,when ,i deny sensible things an        
existence out of the mind1 ,i do not    
mean my mind in particular1 but all     
minds4 ,now1 it is plain they have an   
existence exterior to my mind2 since ,i 
find them by experience to be           
independent of it4 ,there is therefore  

some other ,mind wherein they exist1    
during the intervals between the times  
of my perceiving them3 as likewise they 
did before my birth1 and would do after 
my supposed annihilation4 ,and1 as the  
same is true with regard to all other   
finite created spirits1 it necessarily  
follows there is an ,,omnipresent       
,,eternal ,,mind1 which knows and       
comprehends all things1 and exhibits    
them to our view in such a manner1 and  
according to such rules1 as ,he ,himself
 hath ordained1 and are by us termed the
 ,,laws ,,of ,,nature4  ,,hyl4  ,answer 
me1 ,philonous4 ,are all our ideas      
perfectly inert beings8 ,or have they   
any agency included in them8  ,,phil4   
,they are altogether passive and inert4 
,,hyl4  ,and is not ,god an agent1 a    
being purely active8  ,,phil4  ,i       
acknowledge it4  ,,hyl4  ,no idea       
therefore can be like unto1 or represent
 the nature of ,god8  ,,phil4  ,it      
cannot4  ,,hyl4  ,since therefore you   
have no ,,idea of the mind of ,god1 how 

can you conceive it possible that things
 should exist in ,his mind8 ,or1 if you 
can conceive the mind of ,god1 without  
having an idea of it1 why may not ,i be 
allowed to conceive the existence of    
,matter1 notwithstanding ,i have no idea
 of it8  ,,phil4  ,as to your first     
question3 ,i own ,i have properly no    
,,idea1 either of ,god or any other     
spirit2 for these being active1 cannot  
be represented by things perfectly      
inert1 as our ideas are4 ,i do          
nevertheless know that ,i1 who am a     
spirit or thinking substance1 exist as  
certainly as ,i know my ideas exist4    
,farther1 ,i know what ,i mean by the   
terms ,i ,,and ,,myself2 and ,i know    
this immediately or intuitively1 though 
,i do not perceive it as ,i perceive a  
triangle1 a colour1 or a sound4 ,the    
,mind1 ,spirit1 or ,soul is that        
indivisible unextended thing which      
thinks1 acts1 and perceives4 ,i say     
,,indivisible1 because unextended2 and  
,,unextended1 because extended1 figured1

 moveable things are ideas2 and that    
which perceives ideas1 which thinks and 
wills1 is plainly itself no idea1 nor   
like an idea4 ,ideas are things         
inactive1 and perceived4 ,and ,spirits a
 sort of beings altogether different    
from them4 ,i do not therefore say my   
soul is an idea1 or like an idea4       
,however1 taking the word ,,idea in a   
large sense1 my soul may be said to     
furnish me with an idea1 that is1 an    
image or likeness of ,god--though indeed
 extremely inadequate4 ,for1 all the    
notion ,i have of ,god is obtained by   
reflecting on my own soul1 heightening  
its powers1 and removing its            
imperfections4 ,i have1 therefore1      
though not an inactive idea1 yet in     
,,myself some sort of an active thinking
 image of the ,deity4 ,and1 though ,i   
perceive ,him not by sense1 yet ,i have 
a notion of ,him1 or know ,him by       
reflexion and reasoning4 ,my own mind   
and my own ideas ,i have an immediate   
knowledge of2 and1 by the help of these1

 do mediately apprehend the possibility 
of the existence of other spirits and   
ideas4 ,farther1 from my own being1 and 
from the dependency ,i find in myself   
and my ideas1 ,i do1 by an act of       
reason1 necessarily infer the existence 
of a ,god1 and of all created things in 
the mind of ,god4 ,so much for your     
first question4 ,for the second3 ,i     
suppose by this time you can answer it  
yourself4 ,for you neither perceive     
,matter objectively1 as you do an       
inactive being or idea2 nor know it1 as 
you do yourself1 by a reflex act1       
neither do you mediately apprehend it by
 similitude of the one or the other2 nor
 yet collect it by reasoning from that  
which you know immediately4 ,all which  
makes the case of ,,matter widely       
different from that of the ,,deity4     
,,hyl4  ,you say your own soul supplies 
you with some sort of an idea or image  
of ,god4 ,but1 at the same time1 you    
acknowledge you have1 properly speaking1
 no ,,idea of your own soul4 ,you even  

affirm that spirits are a sort of beings
 altogether different from ideas4       
,consequently that no idea can be like a
 spirit4 ,we have therefore no idea of  
any spirit4 ,you admit nevertheless that
 there is spiritual ,substance1 although
 you have no idea of it2 while you deny 
there can be such a thing as material   
,substance1 because you have no notion  
or idea of it4 ,is this fair dealing8   
,to act consistently1 you must either   
admit ,matter or reject ,spirit4 ,what  
say you to this8  ,,phil4  ,i say1 in   
the first place1 that ,i do not deny the
 existence of material substance1 merely
 because ,i have no notion of it' but   
because the notion of it is             
inconsistent2 or1 in other words1       
because it is repugnant that there      
should be a notion of it4 ,many things1 
for aught ,i know1 may exist1 whereof   
neither ,i nor any other man hath or can
 have any idea or notion whatsoever4    
,but then those things must be possible1
 that is1 nothing inconsistent must be  

included in their definition4 ,i say1   
secondly1 that1 although we believe     
things to exist which we do not         
perceive1 yet we may not believe that   
any particular thing exists1 without    
some reason for such belief3 but ,i have
 no reason for believing the existence  
of ,matter4 ,i have no immediate        
intuition thereof3 neither can ,i       
immediately from my sensations1 ideas1  
notions1 actions1 or passions1 infer an 
unthinking1 unperceiving1 inactive      
,substance--either by probable          
deduction1 or necessary consequence4    
,whereas the being of my ,self1 that is1
 my own soul1 mind1 or thinking         
principle1 ,i evidently know by         
reflexion4 ,you will forgive me if ,i   
repeat the same things in answer to the 
same objections4 ,in the very notion or 
definition of ,,material ,,substance1   
there is included a manifest repugnance 
and inconsistency4 ,but this cannot be  
said of the notion of ,spirit4 ,that    
ideas should exist in what doth not     

perceive1 or be produced by what doth   
not act1 is repugnant4 ,but1 it is no   
repugnancy to say that a perceiving     
thing should be the subject of ideas1 or
 an active thing the cause of them4 ,it 
is granted we have neither an immediate 
evidence nor a demonstrative knowledge  
of the existence of other finite        
spirits2 but it will not thence follow  
that such spirits are on a foot with    
material substances3 if to suppose the  
one be inconsistent1 and it be not      
inconsistent to suppose the other2 if   
the one can be inferred by no argument1 
and there is a probability for the      
other2 if we see signs and effects      
indicating distinct finite agents like  
ourselves1 and see no sign or symptom   
whatever that leads to a rational belief
 of ,matter4 ,i say1 lastly1 that ,i    
have a notion of ,spirit1 though ,i have
 not1 strictly speaking1 an idea of it4 
,i do not perceive it as an idea1 or by 
means of an idea1 but know it by        
reflexion4  ,,hyl4  ,notwithstanding all

 you have said1 to me it seems that1    
according to your own way of thinking1  
and in consequence of your own          
principles1 it should follow that ,,you 
are only a system of floating ideas1    
without any substance to support them4  
,words are not to be used without a     
meaning4 ,and1 as there is no more      
meaning in ,,spiritual ,,substance than 
in ,,material ,,substance1 the one is to
 be exploded as well as the other4      
,,phil4  ,how often must ,i repeat1 that
 ,i know or am conscious of my own      
being2 and that ,i ,,myself am not my   
ideas1 but somewhat else1 a thinking1   
active principle that perceives1 knows1 
wills1 and operates about ideas4 ,i know
 that ,i1 one and the same self1        
perceive both colours and sounds3 that a
 colour cannot perceive a sound1 nor a  
sound a colour3 that ,i am therefore one
 individual principle1 distinct from    
colour and sound2 and1 for the same     
reason1 from aft other sensible things  
and inert ideas4 ,but1 ,i am not in like

 manner conscious either of the         
existence or essence of ,matter4 ,on the
 contrary1 ,i know that nothing         
inconsistent can exist1 and that the    
existence of ,matter implies an         
inconsistency4 ,farther1 ,i know what ,i
 mean when ,i affirm that there is a    
spiritual substance or support of ideas1
 that is1 that a spirit knows and       
perceives ideas4 ,but1 ,i do not know   
what is meant when it is said that an   
unperceiving substance hath inherent in 
it and supports either ideas or the     
archetypes of ideas4 ,there is therefore
 upon the whole no parity of case       
between ,spirit and ,matter4  ,,hyl4  ,i
 own myself satisfied in this point4    
,but1 do you in earnest think the real  
existence of sensible things consists in
 their being actually perceived8 ,if so2
 how comes it that all mankind          
distinguish between them8 ,ask the first
 man you meet1 and he shall tell you1   
,,to ,,be ,,perceived is one thing1 and 
,,to ,,exist is another4  ,,phil4  ,i am

 content1 ,hylas1 to appeal to the      
common sense of the world for the truth 
of my notion4 ,ask the gardener why he  
thinks yonder cherry-tree exists in the 
garden1 and he shall tell you1 because  
he sees and feels it2 in a word1 because
 he perceives it by his senses4 ,ask him
 why he thinks an orange-tree not to be 
there1 and he shall tell you1 because he
 does not perceive it4 ,what he         
perceives by sense1 that he terms a     
real1 being1 and saith it ,,is ,,or     
,,exists2 but1 that which is not        
perceivable1 the same1 he saith1 hath no
 being4  ,,hyl4  ,yes1 ,philonous1 ,i   
grant the existence of a sensible thing 
consists in being perceivable1 but not  
in being actually perceived4  ,,phil4   
,and what is perceivable but an idea8   
,and can an idea exist without being    
actually perceived8 ,these are points   
long since agreed between us4  ,,hyl4   
,but1 be your opinion never so true1 yet
 surely you will not deny it is         
shocking1 and contrary to the common    

sense of men4 ,ask the fellow whether   
yonder tree hath an existence out of his
 mind3 what answer think you he would   
make8  ,,phil4  ,the same that ,i should
 myself1 to wit1 that it doth exist out 
of his mind4 ,but then to a ,christian  
it cannot surely be shocking to say1 the
 real tree1 existing without his mind1  
is truly known and comprehended by 7that
 is ,,exists ,,in7 the infinite mind of 
,god4 ,probably he may not at first     
glance be aware of the direct and       
immediate proof there is of this2       
inasmuch as the very being of a tree1 or
 any other sensible thing1 implies a    
mind wherein it is4 ,but the point      
itself he cannot deny4 ,the question    
between the ,materialists and me is not1
 whether things have a ,,real existence 
out of the mind of this or that person1 
but whether they have an ,,absolute     
existence1 distinct from being perceived
 by ,god1 and exterior to all minds4    
,this indeed some heathens and          
philosophers have affirmed1 but whoever 

entertains notions of the ,deity        
suitable to the ,holy ,scriptures will  
be of another opinion4  ,,hyl4  ,but1   
according to your notions1 what         
difference is there between real things1
 and chimeras formed by the imagination1
 or the visions of a dream--since they  
are all equally in the mind8  ,,phil4   
,the ideas formed by the imagination are
 faint and indistinct2 they have1       
besides1 an entire dependence on the    
will4 ,but the ideas perceived by sense1
 that is1 real things1 are more vivid   
and clear2 and1 being imprinted on the  
mind by a spirit distinct from us1 have 
not the like dependence on our will4    
,there is therefore no danger of        
confounding these with the foregoing3   
and there is as little of confounding   
them with the visions of a dream1 which 
are dim1 irregular1 and confused4 ,and1 
though they should happen to be never so
 lively and natural1 yet1 by their not  
being connected1 and of a piece with the
 preceding and subsequent transactions  

of our lives1 they might easily be      
distinguished from realities4 ,in short1
 by whatever method you distinguish     
,,things ,,from ,,chimeras on your      
scheme1 the same1 it is evident1 will   
hold also upon mine4 ,for1 it must be1  
,i presume1 by some perceived           
difference2 and ,i am not for depriving 
you of any one thing that you perceive4 
,,hyl4  ,but still1 ,philonous1 you     
hold1 there is nothing in the world but 
spirits and ideas4 ,and this1 you must  
needs acknowledge1 sounds very oddly4   
,,phil4  ,i own the word ,,idea1 not    
being commonly used for ,,thing1 sounds 
something out of the way4 ,my reason for
 using it was1 because a necessary      
relation to the mind is understood to be
 implied by that term2 and it is now    
commonly used by philosophers to denote 
the immediate objects of the            
understanding4 ,but1 however oddly the  
proposition may sound in words1 yet it  
includes nothing so very strange or     
shocking in its sense2 which in effect  

amounts to no more than this1 to wit1   
that there are only things perceiving1  
and things perceived2 or that every     
unthinking being is necessarily1 and    
from the very nature of its existence1  
perceived by some mind2 if not by a     
finite created mind1 yet certainly by   
the infinite mind of ,god1 in whom we   
five1 and move1 and have our being4 ,is 
this as strange as to say1 the sensible 
qualities are not on the objects3 or    
that we cannot be sure of the existence 
of things1 or know any thing of their   
real natures--though we both see and    
feel them1 and perceive them by all our 
senses8  ,,hyl4  ,and1 in consequence of
 this1 must we not think there are no   
such things as physical or corporeal    
causes2 but that a ,spirit is the       
immediate cause of all the phenomena in 
nature8 ,can there be anything more     
extravagant than this8  ,,phil4  ,yes1  
it is infinitely more extravagant to    
say--a thing which is inert operates on 
the mind1 and which is unperceiving is  

the cause of our perceptions1 without   
any regard either to consistency1 or the
 old known axiom1 ,,nothing ,,can ,,give
 ,,to ,,another ,,that ,,which ,,it     
,,hath ,,not ,,itself4 ,besides1 that   
which to you1 ,i know not for what      
reason1 seems so extravagant is no more 
than the ,holy ,scriptures assert in a  
hundred places4 ,in them ,god is        
represented as the sole and immediate   
,author of all those effects which some 
heathens and philosophers are wont to   
ascribe to ,nature1 ,matter1 ,fate1 or  
the like unthinking principle4 ,this is 
so much the constant language of        
,scripture that it were needless to     
confirm it by citations4  ,,hyl4  ,you  
are not aware1 ,philonous1 that in      
making ,god the immediate ,author of all
 the motions in nature1 you make ,him   
the ,author of murder1 sacrilege1       
adultery1 and the like heinous sins4    
,,phil4  ,in answer to that1 ,i observe1
 first1 that the imputation of guilt is 
the same1 whether a person commits an   

action with or without an instrument4   
,in case therefore you suppose ,god to  
act by the mediation of an instrument or
 occasion1 called ,,matter1 you as truly
 make ,him the author of sin as ,i1 who 
think ,him the immediate agent in all   
those operations vulgarly ascribed to   
,nature4 ,i farther observe that sin or 
moral turpitude doth not consist in the 
outward physical action or motion1 but  
in the internal deviation of the will   
from the laws of reason and religion4   
,this is plain1 in that the killing an  
enemy in a battle1 or putting a criminal
 legally to death1 is not thought       
sinful2 though the outward act be the   
very same with that in the case of      
murder4 ,since1 therefore1 sin doth not 
consist in the physical action1 the     
making ,god an immediate cause of all   
such actions is not making ,him the     
,author of sin4 ,lastly1 ,i have nowhere
 said that ,god is the only agent who   
produces all the motions in bodies4 ,it 
is true ,i have denied there are any    

other agents besides spirits2 but this  
is very consistent with allowing to     
thinking rational beings1 in the        
production of motions1 the use of       
limited powers1 ultimately indeed       
derived from ,god1 but immediately under
 the direction of their own wills1 which
 is sufficient to entitle them to all   
the guilt of their actions4  ,,hyl4     
,but the denying ,matter1 ,philonous1 or
 corporeal ,substance2 there is the     
point4 ,you can never persuade me that  
this is not repugnant to the universal  
sense of mankind4 ,were our dispute to  
be determined by most voices1 ,i am     
confident you would give up the point1  
without gathering the votes4  ,,phil4   
,i wish both our opinions were fairly   
stated and submitted to the judgment of 
men who had plain common sense1 without 
the prejudices of a learned education4  
,let me be represented as one who trusts
 his senses1 who thinks he knows the    
things he sees and feels1 and entertains
 no doubts of their existence2 and you  

fairly set forth with all your doubts1  
your paradoxes1 and your scepticism     
about you1 and ,i shall willingly       
acquiesce in the determination of any   
indifferent person4 ,that there is no   
substance wherein ideas can exist beside
 spirit is to me evident4 ,and that the 
objects immediately perceived are ideas1
 is on all hands agreed4 ,and that      
sensible qualities are objects          
immediately perceived no one can deny4  
,it is therefore evident there can be no
 ,,substratum of those qualities but    
spirit2 in which they exist1 not by way 
of mode or property1 but as a thing     
perceived in that which perceives it4 ,i
 deny therefore that there is ,,any     
,,unthinking-,,substratum of the objects
 of sense1 and ,,in ,,that ,,acceptation
 that there is any material substance4  
,but if by ,,material ,,substance is    
meant only ,,sensible ,,body1 ,,that    
which is seen and felt 7and the         
unphilosophical part of the world1 ,i   
dare say1 mean no more7--then ,i am more

 certain of matter's existence than you 
or any other philosopher pretend to be4 
,if there be anything which makes the   
generality of mankind averse from the   
notions ,i espouse1 it is a             
misapprehension that ,i deny the reality
 of sensible things4 ,but1 as it is you 
who are guilty of that1 and not ,i1 it  
follows that in truth their aversion is 
against your notions and not mine4 ,i do
 therefore assert that ,i am as certain 
as of my own being1 that there are      
bodies or corporeal substances 7meaning 
the things ,i perceive by my senses72   
and that1 granting this1 the bulk of    
mankind will take no thought about1 nor 
think themselves at all concerned in the
 fate of those unknown natures1 and     
philosophical quiddities1 which some men
 are so fond of4  ,,hyl4  ,what say you 
to this8 ,since1 according to you1 men  
judge of the reality of things by their 
senses1 how can a man be mistaken in    
thinking the moon a plain lucid surface1
 about a foot in diameter2 or a square  

tower1 seen at a distance1 round2 or an 
oar1 with one end in the water1 crooked8
  ,,phil4  ,he is not mistaken with     
regard to the ideas he actually         
perceives1 but in the inference he makes
 from his present perceptions4 ,thus1 in
 the case of the oar1 what he           
immediately perceives by sight is       
certainly crooked2 and so far he is in  
the right4 ,but if he thence conclude   
that upon taking the oar out of the     
water he shall perceive the same        
crookedness2 or that it would affect his
 touch as crooked things are wont to do3
 in that he is mistaken4 ,in like       
manner1 if he shall conclude from what  
he perceives in one station1 that1 in   
case he advances towards the moon or    
tower1 he should still be affected with 
the like ideas1 he is mistaken4 ,but his
 mistake lies not in what he perceives  
immediately1 and at present1 7it being a
 manifest contradiction to suppose he   
should err in respect of that7 but in   
the wrong judgment he makes concerning  

the ideas he apprehends to be connected 
with those immediately perceived3 or1   
concerning the ideas that1 from what he 
perceives at present1 he imagines would 
be perceived in other circumstances4    
,the case is the same with regard to the
 ,copernican system4 ,we do not here    
perceive any motion of the earth3 but it
 were erroneous thence to conclude1     
that1 in case we were placed at as great
 a distance from that as we are now from
 the other planets1 we should not then  
perceive its motion4  ,,hyl4  ,i        
understand you2 and must needs own you  
say things plausible enough4 ,but1 give 
me leave to put you in mind of one      
thing4 ,pray1 ,philonous1 were you not  
formerly as positive that ,matter       
existed1 as you are now that it does    
not8  ,,phil4  ,i was4 ,but here lies   
the difference4 ,before1 my positiveness
 was founded1 without examination1 upon 
prejudice2 but now1 after inquiry1 upon 
evidence4  ,,hyl4  ,after all1 it seems 
our dispute is rather about words than  

things4 ,we agree in the thing1 but     
differ in the name4 ,that we are        
affected with ideas ,,from ,,without is 
evident2 and it is no less evident that 
there must be 7,i will not say          
archetypes1 but7 ,powers without the    
mind1 corresponding to those ideas4     
,and1 as these ,powers cannot subsist by
 themselves1 there is some subject of   
them necessarily to be admitted2 which  
,i call ,,matter1 and you call ,,spirit4
 ,this is all the difference4  ,,phil4  
,pray1 ,hylas1 is that powerful ,being1 
or subject of powers1 extended8  ,,hyl4 
,it hath not extension2 but it hath the 
power to raise in you the idea of       
extension4  ,,phil4  ,it is therefore   
itself unextended8  ,,hyl4  ,i grant it4
  ,,phil4  ,is it not also active8      
,,hyl4  ,without doubt4 ,otherwise1 how 
could we attribute powers to it8        
,,phil4  ,now let me ask you two        
questions3 ,,first1 ,whether it be      
agreeable to the usage either of        
philosophers or others to give the name 

,,matter to an unextended active being8 
,and1 ,,secondly1 ,whether it be not    
ridiculously absurd to misapply names   
contrary to the common use of language8 
,,hyl4  ,well then1 let it not be called
 ,matter1 since you will have it so1 but
 some ,,third ,,nature distinct from    
,matter and ,spirit4 ,for what reason is
 there why you should call it ,spirit8  
,does not the notion of spirit imply    
that it is thinking1 as well as active  
and unextended8  ,,phil4  ,my reason is 
this3 because ,i have a mind to have    
some notion of meaning in what ,i say3  
but ,i have no notion of any action     
distinct from volition1 neither can ,i  
conceive volition to be anywhere but in 
a spirit3 therefore1 when ,i speak of an
 active being1 ,i am obliged to mean a  
,spirit4 ,beside1 what can be plainer   
than that a thing which hath no ideas in
 itself cannot impart them to me2 and1  
if it hath ideas1 surely it must be a   
,spirit4 ,to make you comprehend the    
point still more clearly if it be       

possible1 ,i assert as well as you that1
 since we are affected from without1 we 
must allow ,powers to be without1 in a  
,being distinct from ourselves4 ,so far 
we are agreed4 ,but then we differ as to
 the kind of this powerful ,being4 ,i   
will have it to be ,spirit1 you ,matter1
 or ,i know not what 7,i may add too1   
you know not what7 ,third ,nature4      
,thus1 ,i prove it to be ,spirit4 ,from 
the effects ,i see produced1 ,i conclude
 there are actions2 and1 because        
actions1 volitions2 and1 because there  
are volitions1 there must be a ,,will4  
,again1 the things ,i perceive must have
 an existence1 they or their archetypes1
 out of ,,my mind3 but1 being ideas1    
neither they nor their archetypes can   
exist otherwise than in an              
understanding2 there is therefore an    
,,understanding4 ,but will and          
understanding constitute in the         
strictest sense a mind or spirit4 ,the  
powerful cause1 therefore1 of my ideas  
is in strict propriety of speech a      

,,spirit4  ,,hyl4  ,and now ,i warrant  
you think you have made the point very  
clear1 little suspecting that what you  
advance leads directly to a             
contradiction4 ,is it not an absurdity  
to imagine any imperfection in ,god8    
,,phil4  ,without a doubt4  ,,hyl4  ,to 
suffer pain is an imperfection8  ,,phil4
  ,it is4  ,,hyl4  ,are we not sometimes
 affected with pain and uneasiness by   
some other ,being8  ,,phil4  ,we are4   
,,hyl4  ,and have you not said that     
,being is a ,spirit1 and is not that    
,spirit ,god8  ,,phil4  ,i grant it4    
,,hyl4  ,but you have asserted that     
whatever ideas we perceive from without 
are in the mind which affects us4 ,the  
ideas1 therefore1 of pain and uneasiness
 are in ,god2 or1 in other words1 ,god  
suffers pain3 that is to say1 there is  
an imperfection in the ,divine nature3  
which1 you acknowledged1 was absurd4 ,so
 you are caught in a plain              
contradiction4  ,,phil4  ,that ,god     
knows or understands all things1 and    

that ,he knows1 among other things1 what
 pain is1 even every sort of painful    
sensation1 and what it is for ,his      
creatures to suffer pain1 ,i make no    
question4 ,but1 that ,god1 though ,he   
knows and sometimes causes painful      
sensations in us1 can ,himself suffer   
pain1 ,i positively deny4 ,we1 who are  
limited and dependent spirits1 are      
liable to impressions of sense1 the     
effects of an external ,agent1 which1   
being produced against our wills1 are   
sometimes painful and uneasy4 ,but ,god1
 whom no external being can affect1 who 
perceives nothing by sense as we do2    
whose will is absolute and independent1 
causing all things1 and liable to be    
thwarted or resisted by nothing3 it is  
evident1 such a ,being as this can      
suffer nothing1 nor be affected with any
 painful sensation1 or indeed any       
sensation at all4 ,we are chained to a  
body3 that is to say1 our perceptions   
are connected with corporeal motions4   
,by the law of our nature1 we are       

affected upon every alteration in the   
nervous parts of our sensible body2     
which sensible body1 rightly considered1
 is nothing but a complexion of such    
qualities or ideas as have no existence 
distinct from being perceived by a mind4
 ,so that this connexion of sensations  
with corporeal motions means no more    
than a correspondence in the order of   
nature1 between two sets of ideas1 or   
things immediately perceivable4 ,but    
,god is a ,pure ,spirit1 disengaged from
 all such sympathy1 or natural ties4 ,no
 corporeal motions are attended with the
 sensations of pain or pleasure in ,his 
mind4 ,to know everything knowable1 is  
certainly a perfection2 but to endure1  
or suffer1 or feel anything by sense1 is
 an imperfection4 ,the former1 ,i say1  
agrees to ,god1 but not the latter4 ,god
 knows1 or hath ideas2 but ,his ideas   
are not conveyed to ,him by sense1 as   
ours are4 ,your not distinguishing1     
where there is so manifest a difference1
 makes you fancy you see an absurdity   

where there is none4  ,,hyl4  ,but1 all 
this while you have not considered that 
the quantity of ,matter has been        
demonstrated to be proportioned to the  
gravity of bodies4 ,and what can        
withstand demonstration8  ,,phil4  ,let 
me see how you demonstrate that point4  
,,hyl4  ,i lay it down for a principle1 
that the moments or quantities of motion
 in bodies are in a direct compounded   
reason of the velocities and quantities 
of ,matter contained in them4 ,hence1   
where the velocities are equal1 it      
follows the moments are directly as the 
quantity of ,matter in each4 ,but it is 
found by experience that all bodies     
7bating the small inequalities1 arising 
from the resistance of the air7 descend 
with an equal velocity2 the motion      
therefore of descending bodies1 and     
consequently their gravity1 which is the
 cause or principle of that motion1 is  
proportional to the quantity of ,matter2
 which was to be demonstrated4  ,,phil4 
,you lay it down as a self-evident      

principle that the quantity of motion in
 any body is proportional to the        
velocity and ,,matter taken together2   
and this is made use of to prove a      
proposition from whence the existence of
 ,,matter is inferred4 ,pray is not this
 arguing in a circle8  ,,hyl4  ,in the  
premise ,i only mean that the motion is 
proportional to the velocity1 jointly   
with the extension and solidity4        
,,phil4  ,but1 allowing this to be true1
 yet it will not thence follow that     
gravity is proportional to ,,matter1 in 
your philosophic sense of the word2     
except you take it for granted that     
unknown ,,substratum1 or whatever else  
you call it1 is proportional to those   
sensible qualities2 which to suppose is 
plainly begging the question4 ,that     
there is magnitude and solidity1 or     
resistance1 perceived by sense1 ,i      
readily grant2 as likewise1 that gravity
 may be proportional to those qualities 
,i will not dispute4 ,but that either   
these qualities as perceived by us1 or  

the powers producing them1 do exist in a
 ,,material ,,substratum2 this is what  
,i deny1 and you indeed affirm1 but1    
notwithstanding your demonstration1 have
 not yet proved4  ,,hyl4  ,i shall      
insist no longer on that point4 ,do you 
think1 however1 you shall persuade me   
that the natural philosophers have been 
dreaming all this while8 ,pray what     
becomes of all their hypotheses and     
explications of the phenomena1 which    
suppose the existence of ,matter8       
,,phil4  ,what mean you1 ,hylas1 by the 
,,phenomena8  ,,hyl4  ,i mean the       
appearances which ,i perceive by my     
senses4  ,,phil4  ,and the appearances  
perceived by sense1 are they not ideas8 
,,hyl4  ,i have told you so a hundred   
times4  ,,phil4  ,therefore1 to explain 
the phenomena1 is1 to shew how we come  
to be affected with ideas1 in that      
manner and order wherein they are       
imprinted on our senses4 ,is it not8    
,,hyl4  ,it is4  ,,phil4  ,now1 if you  
can prove that any philosopher has      

explained the production of any one idea
 in our minds by the help of ,,matter1  
,i shall for ever acquiesce1 and look on
 all that hath been said against it as  
nothing2 but1 if you cannot1 it is vain 
to urge the explication of phenomena4   
,that a ,being endowed with knowledge   
and will should produce or exhibit ideas
 is easily understood4 ,but that a      
,being which is utterly destitute of    
these faculties should be able to       
produce ideas1 or in any sort to affect 
an intelligence1 this ,i can never      
understand4 ,this ,i say1 though we had 
some positive conception of ,matter1    
though we knew its qualities1 and could 
comprehend its existence1 would yet be  
so far from explaining things1 that it  
is itself the most inexplicable thing in
 the world4 ,and yet1 for all this1 it  
will not follow that philosophers have  
been doing nothing2 for1 by observing   
and reasoning upon the connexion of     
ideas1 they discover the laws and       
methods of nature1 which is a part of   

knowledge both useful and entertaining4 
,,hyl4  ,after all1 can it be supposed  
,god would deceive all mankind8 ,do you 
imagine ,he would have induced the whole
 world to believe the being of ,matter1 
if there was no such thing8  ,,phil4    
,that every epidemical opinion1 arising 
from prejudice1 or passion1 or          
thoughtlessness1 may be imputed to ,god1
 as the ,author of it1 ,i believe you   
will not affirm4 ,whatsoever opinion we 
father on ,him1 it must be either       
because ,he has discovered it to us by  
supernatural revelation2 or because it  
is so evident to our natural faculties1 
which were framed and given us by ,god1 
that it is impossible we should withhold
 our assent from it4 ,but where is the  
revelation8 or where is the evidence    
that extorts the belief of ,matter8     
,nay1 how does it appear1 that ,matter1 
,,taken ,,for ,,something ,,distinct    
,,from ,,what ,,we ,,perceive ,,by ,,our
 ,,senses1 is thought to exist by all   
mankind2 or indeed1 by any except a few 

philosophers1 who do not know what they 
would be at8 ,your question supposes    
these points are clear2 and1 when you   
have cleared them1 ,i shall think myself
 obliged to give you another answer4 ,in
 the meantime1 let it suffice that ,i   
tell you1 ,i do not suppose ,god has    
deceived mankind at all4  ,,hyl4  ,but  
the novelty1 ,philonous1 the novelty6   
,there lies the danger4 ,new notions    
should always be discountenanced2 they  
unsettle men's minds1 and nobody knows  
where they will end4  ,,phil4  ,why the 
rejecting a notion that has no          
foundation1 either in sense1 or in      
reason1 or in ,divine authority1 should 
be thought to unsettle the belief of    
such opinions as are grounded on all or 
any of these1 ,i cannot imagine4 ,that  
innovations in government and religion  
are dangerous1 and ought to be          
discountenanced1 ,i freely own4 ,but is 
there the like reason why they should be
 discouraged in philosophy8 ,the making 
anything known which was unknown before 

is an innovation in knowledge3 and1 if  
all such innovations had been forbidden1
 men would have made a notable progress 
in the arts and sciences4 ,but it is    
none of my business to plead for        
novelties and paradoxes4 ,that the      
qualities we perceive are not on the    
objects3 that we must not believe our   
senses3 that we know nothing of the real
 nature of things1 and can never be     
assured even of their existence3 that   
real colours and sounds are nothing but 
certain unknown figures and motions3    
that motions are in themselves neither  
swift nor slow3 that there are in bodies
 absolute extensions1 without any       
particular magnitude or figure3 that a  
thing stupid1 thoughtless1 and inactive1
 operates on a spirit3 that the least   
particle of a body contains innumerable 
extended parts3--these are the          
novelties1 these are the strange notions
 which shock the genuine uncorrupted    
judgment of all mankind2 and being once 
admitted1 embarrass the mind with       

endless doubts and difficulties4 ,and it
 is against these and the like          
innovations ,i endeavour to vindicate   
,common ,sense4 ,it is true1 in doing   
this1 ,i may perhaps be obliged to use  
some ,,ambages1 and ways of speech not  
common4 ,but1 if my notions are once    
thoroughly understood1 that which is    
most singular in them will1 in effect1  
be found to amount to no more than      
this4--that it is absolutely impossible1
 and a plain contradiction1 to suppose  
any unthinking ,being should exist      
without being perceived by a ,mind4     
,and1 if this notion be singular1 it is 
a shame it should be so1 at this time of
 day1 and in a ,christian country4      
,,hyl4  ,as for the difficulties other  
opinions may be liable to1 those are out
 of the question4 ,it is your business  
to defend your own opinion4 ,can        
anything be plainer than that you are   
for changing all things into ideas8     
,you1 ,i say1 who are not ashamed to    
charge me ,,with ,,scepticism4 ,this is 

so plain1 there is no denying it4       
,,phil4  ,you mistake me4 ,i am not for 
changing things into ideas1 but rather  
ideas into things2 since those immediate
 objects of perception1 which1 according
 to you1 are only appearances of things1
 ,i take to be the real things          
themselves4  ,,hyl4  ,things6 ,you may  
pretend what you please2 but it is      
certain you leave us nothing but the    
empty forms of things1 the outside only 
which strikes the senses4  ,,phil4      
,what you call the empty forms and      
outside of things seem to me the very   
things themselves4 ,nor are they empty  
or incomplete1 otherwise than upon your 
supposition--that ,matter is an         
essential part of all corporeal things4 
,we both1 therefore1 agree in this1 that
 we perceive only sensible forms3 but   
herein we differ--you will have them to 
be empty appearances1 ,i1 real beings4  
,in short1 you do not trust your senses1
 ,i do4  ,,hyl4  ,you say you believe   
your senses2 and seem to applaud        

yourself that in this you agree with the
 vulgar4 ,according to you1 therefore1  
the true nature of a thing is discovered
 by the senses4 ,if so1 whence comes    
that disagreement8 ,why is not the same 
figure1 and other sensible qualities1   
perceived all manner of ways8 and why   
should we use a microscope the better to
 discover the true nature of a body1 if 
it were discoverable to the naked eye8  
,,phil4  ,strictly speaking1 ,hylas1 we 
do not see the same object that we feel2
 neither is the same object perceived by
 the microscope which was by the naked  
eye4 ,but1 in case every variation was  
thought sufficient to constitute a new  
kind of individual1 the endless number  
of confusion of names would render      
language impracticable4 ,therefore1 to  
avoid this1 as well as other            
inconveniences which are obvious upon a 
little thought1 men combine together    
several ideas1 apprehended by divers    
senses1 or by the same sense at         
different times1 or in different        

circumstances1 but observed1 however1 to
 have some connexion in nature1 either  
with respect to co-existence or         
succession2 all which they refer to one 
name1 and consider as one thing4 ,hence 
it follows that when ,i examine1 by my  
other senses1 a thing ,i have seen1 it  
is not in order to understand better the
 same object which ,i had perceived by  
sight1 the object of one sense not being
 perceived by the other senses4 ,and1   
when ,i look through a microscope1 it is
 not that ,i may perceive more clearly  
what ,i perceived already with my bare  
eyes2 the object perceived by the glass 
being quite different from the former4  
,but1 in both cases1 my aim is only to  
know what ideas are connected together2 
and the more a man knows of the         
connexion of ideas1 the more he is said 
to know of the nature of things4 ,what1 
therefore1 if our ideas are variable2   
what if our senses are not in all       
circumstances affected with the same    
appearances4 ,it will not thence follow 

they are not to be trusted2 or that they
 are inconsistent either with themselves
 or anything else3 except it be with    
your preconceived notion of 7,i know not
 what7 one single1 unchanged1           
unperceivable1 real ,nature1 marked by  
each name4 ,which prejudice seems to    
have taken its rise from not rightly    
understanding the common language of    
men1 speaking of several distinct ideas 
as united into one thing by the mind4   
,and1 indeed1 there is cause to suspect 
several erroneous conceits of the       
philosophers are owing to the same      
original3 while they began to build     
their schemes not so much on notions as 
on words1 which were framed by the      
vulgar1 merely for conveniency and      
dispatch in the common actions of life1 
without any regard to speculation4      
,,hyl4  ,methinks ,i apprehend your     
meaning4  ,,phil4  ,it is your opinion  
the ideas we perceive by our senses are 
not real things1 but images or copies of
 them4 ,our knowledge1 therefore1 is no 

farther real than as our ideas are the  
true ,,representations ,,of ,,those     
,,originals4 ,but1 as these supposed    
originals are in themselves unknown1 it 
is impossible to know how far our ideas 
resemble them2 or whether they resemble 
them at all4 ,we cannot1 therefore1 be  
sure we have any real knowledge4        
,farther1 as our ideas are perpetually  
varied1 without any change in the       
supposed real things1 it necessarily    
follows they cannot all be true copies  
of them3 or1 if some are and others are 
not1 it is impossible to distinguish the
 former from the latter4 ,and this      
plunges us yet deeper in uncertainty4   
,again1 when we consider the point1 we  
cannot conceive how any idea1 or        
anything like an idea1 should have an   
absolute existence out of a mind3 nor   
consequently1 according to you1 how     
there should be any real thing in       
nature4 ,the result of all which is that
 we are thrown into the most hopeless   
and abandoned scepticism4 ,now1 give me 

leave to ask you1 ,first1 ,whether your 
referring ideas to certain absolutely   
existing unperceived substances1 as     
their originals1 be not the source of   
all this scepticism8 ,secondly1 whether 
you are informed1 either by sense or    
reason1 of the existence of those       
unknown originals8 ,and1 in case you are
 not1 whether it be not absurd to       
suppose them8 ,thirdly1 ,whether1 upon  
inquiry1 you find there is anything     
distinctly conceived or meant by the    
,,absolute ,,or ,,external ,,existence  
,,of ,,unperceiving ,,substances8       
,lastly1 ,whether1 the premises         
considered1 it be not the wisest way to 
follow nature1 trust your senses1 and1  
laying aside all anxious thought about  
unknown natures or substances1 admit    
with the vulgar those for real things   
which are perceived by the senses8      
,,hyl4  ,for the present1 ,i have no    
inclination to the answering part4 ,i   
would much rather see how you can get   
over what follows4 ,pray are not the    

objects perceived by the ,,senses of    
one1 likewise perceivable to others     
present8 ,if there were a hundred more  
here1 they would all see the garden1 the
 trees1 and flowers1 as ,i see them4    
,but they are not in the same manner    
affected with the ideas ,i frame in my  
,,imagination4 ,does not this make a    
difference between the former sort of   
objects and the latter8  ,,phil4  ,i    
grant it does4 ,nor have ,i ever denied 
a difference between the objects of     
sense and those of imagination4 ,but    
what would you infer from thence8 ,you  
cannot say that sensible objects exist  
unperceived1 because they are perceived 
by many4  ,,hyl4  ,i own ,i can make    
nothing of that objection3 but it hath  
led me into another4 ,is it not your    
opinion that by our senses we perceive  
only the ideas existing in our minds8   
,,phil4  ,it is4  ,,hyl4  ,but the      
,,same idea which is in my mind cannot  
be in yours1 or in any other mind4 ,doth
 it not therefore follow1 from your     

principles1 that no two can see the same
 thing8 ,and is not this highly1 absurd8
  ,,phil4  ,if the term ,,same be taken 
in the vulgar acceptation1 it is certain
 7and not at all repugnant to the       
principles ,i maintain7 that different  
persons may perceive the same thing2 or 
the same thing or idea exist in         
different minds4 ,words are of arbitrary
 imposition2 and1 since men are used to 
apply the word ,,same where no          
distinction or variety is perceived1 and
 ,i do not pretend to alter their       
perceptions1 it follows that1 as men    
have said before1 ,,several ,,saw ,,the 
,,same ,,thing1 so they may1 upon like  
occasions1 still continue to use the    
same phrase1 without any deviation      
either from propriety of language1 or   
the truth of things4 ,but1 if the term  
,,same be used in the acceptation of    
philosophers1 who pretend to an         
abstracted notion of identity1 then1    
according to their sundry definitions of
 this notion 7for it is not yet agreed  

wherein that philosophic identity       
consists71 it may or may not be possible
 for divers persons to perceive the same
 thing4 ,but whether philosophers shall 
think fit to ,,call a thing the ,,same  
or no1 is1 ,i conceive1 of small        
importance4 ,let us suppose several men 
together1 all endued with the same      
faculties1 and consequently affected in 
like sort by their senses1 and who had  
yet never known the use of language2    
they would1 without question1 agree in  
their perceptions4 ,though perhaps1 when
 they came to the use of speech1 some   
regarding the uniformness of what was   
perceived1 might call it the ,,same     
thing3 others1 especially regarding the 
diversity of persons who perceived1     
might choose the denomination of        
,,different things4 ,but who sees not   
that all the dispute is about a word8 to
 wit1 whether what is perceived by      
different persons may yet have the term 
,,same applied to it8 ,or1 suppose a    
house1 whose walls or outward shell     

remaining unaltered1 the chambers are   
all pulled down1 and new ones built in  
their place2 and that you should call   
this the ,,same1 and ,i should say it   
was not the ,,same house4--would we not1
 for all this1 perfectly agree in our   
thoughts of the house1 considered in    
itself8 ,and would not all the          
difference consist in a sound8 ,if you  
should say1 ,we differed in our notions2
 for that you super-added to your idea  
of the house the simple abstracted idea 
of identity1 whereas ,i did not2 ,i     
would tell you1 ,i know not what you    
mean by ,,the ,,abstracted ,,idea ,,of  
,,identity2 and should desire you to    
look into your own thoughts1 and be sure
 you understood yourself4--,why so      
silent1 ,hylas8 ,are you not yet        
satisfied men may dispute about identity
 and diversity1 without any real        
difference in their thoughts and        
opinions1 abstracted from names8 ,take  
this farther reflexion with you3 that   
whether ,matter be allowed to exist or  

no1 the case is exactly the same as to  
the point in hand4 ,for the             
,materialists themselves acknowledge    
what we immediately perceive by our     
senses to be our own ideas4 ,your       
difficulty1 therefore1 that no two see  
the same thing1 makes equally against   
the ,materialists and me4  ,,hyl4  ,ay1 
,philonous1 but they suppose an external
 archetype1 to which referring their    
several ideas they may truly be said to 
perceive the same thing4  ,,phil4  ,and 
7not to mention your having discarded   
those archetypes7 so may you suppose an 
external archetype on my                
principles2--,,external1 ,i ,,mean1 ,,to
 ,,your ,,own ,,mind3 though indeed it  
must be' supposed to exist in that ,mind
 which comprehends all things2 but then1
 this serves all the ends of ,,identity1
 as well as if it existed out of a mind4
 ,and ,i am sure you yourself will not  
say it is less intelligible4  ,,hyl4    
,you have indeed clearly satisfied      
me--either that there is no difficulty  

at bottom in this point2 or1 if there   
be1 that it makes equally against both  
opinions4  ,,phil4  ,but that which     
makes equally against two contradictory 
opinions can be a proof against neither4
  ,,hyl4  ,i acknowledge it4 ,but1 after
 all1 ,philonous1 when ,i consider the  
substance of what you advance against   
,,scepticism1 it amounts to no more than
 this3 ,we are sure that we really see1 
hear1 feel2 in a word1 that we are      
affected with sensible impressions4     
,,phil4  ,and how are ,,we concerned any
 farther8 ,i see this cherry1 ,i feel   
it1 ,i taste it3 and ,i am sure         
,,nothing cannot be seen1 or felt1 or   
tasted3 it is therefore real4 ,take away
 the sensations of softness1 moisture1  
redness1 tartness1 and you take away the
 cherry1 since it is not a being        
distinct from sensations4 ,a cherry1 ,i 
say1 is nothing but a congeries of      
sensible impressions1 or ideas perceived
 by various senses3 which ideas are     
united into one thing 7or have one name 

given them7 by the mind1 because they   
are observed to attend each other4      
,thus1 when the palate is affected with 
such a particular taste1 the sight is   
affected with a red colour1 the touch   
with roundness1 softness1 c4 ,hence1    
when ,i see1 and feel1 and taste1 in    
such sundry certain manners1 ,i am sure 
the cherry exists1 or is real2 its      
reality being in my opinion nothing     
abstracted from those sensations4 ,but  
if by the word ,,cherry1 you mean an    
unknown nature1 distinct from all those 
sensible qualities1 and by its          
,,existence something distinct from its 
being perceived2 then1 indeed1 ,i own1  
neither you nor ,i1 nor any one else1   
can be sure it exists4  ,,hyl4  ,but1   
what would you say1 ,philonous1 if ,i   
should bring the very same reasons      
against the existence of sensible things
 ,,in ,a ,,mind1 which you have offered 
against their existing ,,in ,a          
,,material ,,substratum8  ,,phil4  ,when
 ,i see your reasons1 you shall hear    

what ,i have to say to them4  ,,hyl4    
,is the mind extended or unextended8    
,,phil4  ,unextended1 without doubt4    
,,hyl4  ,do you say the things you      
perceive are in your mind8  ,,phil4     
,they are4  ,,hyl4  ,again1 have ,i not 
heard you speak of sensible impressions8
  ,,phil4  ,i believe you may4  ,,hyl4  
,explain to me now1 ,o ,philonous6 how  
it is possible there should be room for 
all those trees and houses to exist in  
your mind4 ,can extended things be      
contained in that which is unextended8  
,or1 are we to imagine impressions made 
on a thing void of all solidity8 ,you   
cannot say objects are in your mind1 as 
books in your study3 or that things are 
imprinted on it1 as the figure of a seal
 upon wax4 ,in what sense1 therefore1   
are we to understand those expressions8 
,explain me this if you can3 and ,i     
shall then be able to answer all those  
queries you formerly put to me about my 
,,substratum4  ,,phil4  ,look you1      
,hylas1 when ,i speak of objects as     

existing in the mind1 or imprinted on   
the senses1 ,i would not be understood  
in the gross literal sense2 as when     
bodies are said to exist in a place1 or 
a seal to make an impression upon wax4  
,my meaning is only that the mind       
comprehends or perceives them2 and that 
it is affected from without1 or by some 
being distinct from itself4 ,this is my 
explication of your difficulty2 and how 
it can serve to make your tenet of an   
unperceiving material ,,substratum      
intelligible1 ,i would fain know4       
,,hyl4  ,nay1 if that be all1 ,i confess
 ,i do not see what use can be made of  
it4 ,but are you not guilty of some     
abuse of language in this8  ,,phil4     
,none at all4 ,it is no more than common
 custom1 which you know is the rule of  
language1 hath authorised3 nothing being
 more usual1 than for philosophers to   
speak of the immediate objects of the   
understanding as things existing in the 
mind4 ',nor is there anything in this   
but what is conformable to the general  

analogy of language2 most part of the   
mental operations being signified by    
words borrowed from sensible things2 as 
is plain in the terms ,,comprehend1     
reflect1 ,,discourse1 ,c41 which1 being 
applied to the mind1 must not be taken  
in their gross1 original sense4  ,,hyl4 
,you have1 ,i own1 satisfied me in this 
point4 ,but there still remains one     
great difficulty1 which ,i know not how 
you will get over4 ,and1 indeed1 it is  
of such importance that if you could    
solve all others1 without being able to 
find a solution for this1 you must never
 expect to make me a proselyte to your  
principles4  ,,phil4  ,let me know this 
mighty difficulty4  ,,hyl4  ,the        
,scripture account of the creation is   
what appears to me utterly              
irreconcilable with your notions4 ,moses
 tells us of a creation3 a creation of  
what8 of ideas8 ,no1 certainly1 but of  
things1 of real things1 solid corporeal 
substances4 ,bring your principles to   
agree with this1 and ,i shall perhaps   

agree with you4  ,,phil4  ,moses        
mentions the sun1 moon1 and stars1 earth
 and sea1 plants and animals4 ,that all 
these do really exist1 and were in the  
beginning created by ,god1 ,i make no   
question4 ,if by ,,ideas you mean       
fictions and fancies of the mind1 then  
these are no ideas4 ,if by ,,ideas you  
mean immediate objects of the           
understanding1 or sensible things1 which
 cannot exist unperceived1 or out of a  
mind1 then these things are ideas4 ,but 
whether you do or do not call them      
,,ideas1 it matters little4 ,the        
difference is only about a name4 ,and1  
whether that name be retained or        
rejected1 the sense1 the truth1 and     
reality of things continues the same4   
,in common talk1 the objects of our     
senses are not termed ,,ideas1 but      
,,things4 ,call them so still3 provided 
you do not attribute to them any        
absolute external existence1 and ,i     
shall never quarrel with you for a word4
 ,the creation1 therefore1 ,i allow to  

have been a creation of things1 of      
,,real things4 ,neither is this in the  
least inconsistent with my principles1  
as is evident from what ,i have now     
said2 and would have been evident to you
 without this1 if you had not forgotten 
what had been so often said before4 ,but
 as for solid corporeal substances1 ,i  
desire you to show where ,moses makes   
any mention of them2 and1 if they should
 be mentioned by him1 or any other      
inspired writer1 it would still be      
incumbent on you to shew those words    
were not taken in the vulgar            
acceptation1 for things falling under   
our senses1 but in the philosophic      
acceptation1 for ,matter1 or ,,an       
,,unknown ,,quiddity1 ,,with ,,an       
,,absolute ,,existence4 ,when you have  
proved these points1 then 7and not till 
then7 may you bring the authority of    
,moses into our dispute4  ,,hyl4  ,it is
 in vain to dispute about a point so    
clear4 ,i am content to refer it to your
 own conscience4 ,are you not satisfied 

there is some peculiar repugnancy       
between the ,mosaic account of the      
creation and your notions8  ,,phil4  ,if
 all possible sense which can be put on 
the first chapter of ,genesis may be    
conceived as consistently with my       
principles as any other1 then it has no 
peculiar repugnancy with them4 ,but     
there is no sense you may not as well   
conceive1 believing as ,i do4 ,since1   
besides spirits1 all you conceive are   
ideas2 and the existence of these ,i do 
not deny4 ,neither do you pretend they  
exist without the mind4  ,,hyl4  ,pray  
let me see any sense you can understand 
it in4  ,,phil4  ,why1 ,i imagine that  
if ,i had been present at the creation1 
,i should have seen things produced into
 being--that is become perceptible--in  
the order prescribed by the sacred      
historian4 ,i ever before believed the  
,mosaic account of the creation1 and now
 find no alteration in my manner of     
believing it4 ,when things are said to  
begin or end their existence1 we do not 

mean this with regard to ,god1 but ,his 
creatures4 ,all objects are eternally   
known by ,god1 or1 which is the same    
thing1 have an eternal existence in ,his
 mind3 but when things1 before          
imperceptible to creatures1 are1 by a   
decree of ,god1 perceptible to them1    
then are they said to begin a relative  
existence1 with respect to created      
minds4 ,upon reading therefore the      
,mosaic account of the creation1 ,i     
understand that the several parts of the
 world became gradually perceivable to  
finite spirits1 endowed with proper     
faculties2 so that1 whoever such were   
present1 they were in truth perceived by
 them4 ,this is the literal obvious     
sense suggested to me by the words of   
the ,holy ,scripture3 in which is       
included no mention1 or no thought1     
either of ,,substratum1 ,,instrument1   
,,occasion1 or ,,absolute ,,existence4  
,and1 upon inquiry1 ,i doubt not it will
 be found that most plain honest men1   
who believe the creation1 never think of

 those things any more than ,i4 ,what   
metaphysical sense you may understand it
 in1 you only can tell4  ,,hyl4  ,but1  
,philonous1 you do not seem to be aware 
that you allow created things1 in the   
beginning1 only a relative1 and         
consequently hypothetical being3 that is
 to say1 upon supposition there were    
,,men to perceive them2 without which   
they have no actuality of absolute      
existence1 wherein creation might       
terminate4 ,is it not1 therefore1       
according to you1 plainly impossible the
 creation of any inanimate creatures    
should precede that of man8 ,and is not 
this directly contrary to the ,mosaic   
account8  ,,phil4  ,in answer to that1  
,i say1 first1 created beings might     
begin to exist in the mind of other     
created intelligences1 beside men4 ,you 
will not therefore be able to prove any 
contradiction between ,moses and my     
notions1 unless you first shew there was
 no other order of finite created       
spirits in being1 before man4 ,i say    

farther1 in case we conceive the        
creation1 as we should at this time1 a  
parcel of plants or vegetables of all   
sorts produced1 by an invisible ,power1 
in a desert where nobody was            
present--that this way of explaining or 
conceiving it is consistent with my     
principles1 since they deprive you of   
nothing1 either sensible or imaginable2 
that it exactly suits with the common1  
natural1 and undebauched notions of     
mankind2 that it manifests the          
dependence of all things on ,god2 and   
consequently hath all the good effect or
 influence1 which it is possible that   
important article of our faith should   
have in making men humble1 thankful1 and
 resigned to their great ,creator4 ,i   
say1 moreover1 that1 in this naked      
conception of things1 divested of words1
 there will not be found any notion of  
what you call the ,,actuality ,,of      
,,absolute ,,existence4 ,you may indeed 
raise a dust with those terms1 and so   
lengthen our dispute to no purpose4 ,but

 ,i entreat you calmly to look into your
 own thoughts1 and then tell me if they 
are not a useless and unintelligible    
jargon4  ,,hyl4  ,i own ,i have no very 
clear notion annexed to them4 ,but what 
say you to this8 ,do you not make the   
existence of sensible things consist in 
their being in a mind8 ,and were not all
 things eternally in the mind of ,god8  
,did they not therefore exist from all  
eternity1 according to you8 ,and how    
could that which was eternal be created 
in time8 ,can anything be clearer or    
better connected than this8  ,,phil4    
,and are not you too of opinion1 that   
,god knew all things from eternity8     
,,hyl4  ,i am4  ,,phil4  ,consequently  
they always had a being in the ,divine  
intellect4  ,,hyl4  ,this ,i            
acknowledge4  ,,phil4  ,by your own     
confession1 therefore1 nothing is new1  
or begins to be1 in respect of the mind 
of ,god4 ,so we are agreed in that      
point4  ,,hyl4  ,what shall we make then
 of the creation8  ,,phil4  ,may we not 

understand it to have been entirely in  
respect of finite spirits2 so that      
things1 with regard to us1 may properly 
be said to begin their existence1 or be 
created1 when ,god decreed they should  
become perceptible to intelligent       
creatures1 in that order and manner     
which ,he then established1 and we now  
call the laws of nature8 ,you may call  
this a ,,relative1 or ,,hypothetical    
,,existence if you please4 ,but1 so long
 as it supplies us with the most        
natural1 obvious1 and literal sense of  
the ,mosaic history of the creation2 so 
long as it answers all the religious    
ends of that great article2 in a word1  
so long as you can assign no other sense
 or meaning in its stead2 why should we 
reject this8 ,is it to comply with a    
ridiculous sceptical humour of making   
everything nonsense and unintelligible8 
,i am sure you cannot say it is for the 
glory of ,god4 ,for1 allowing it to be a
 thing possible and conceivable that the
 corporeal world should have an absolute

 existence extrinsical to the mind of   
,god1 as well as to the minds of all    
created spirits2 yet how could this set 
forth either the immensity or           
omniscience of the ,deity1 or the       
necessary and immediate dependence of   
all things on ,him8 ,nay1 would it not  
rather seem to derogate from those      
attributes8  ,,hyl4  ,well1 but as to   
this decree of ,god's1 for making things
 perceptible1 what say you1 ,philonous8 
,is it not plain1 ,god did either       
execute that decree from all eternity1  
or at some certain time began to will   
what ,he had not actually willed before1
 but only designed to will8 ,if the     
former1 then there could be no creation1
 or beginning of existence1 in finite   
things4 ,if the latter1 then we must    
acknowledge something new to befall the 
,deity2 which implies a sort of change3 
and all change argues imperfection4     
,,phil4  ,pray consider what you are    
doing4 ,is it not evident this objection
 concludes equally against a creation in

 any sense2 nay1 against every other act
 of the ,deity1 discoverable by the     
light of nature8 ,none of which can ,,we
 conceive1 otherwise than as performed  
in time1 and having a beginning4 ,god is
 a ,being of transcendent and unlimited 
perfections3 ,his nature1 therefore1 is 
incomprehensible to finite spirits4 ,it 
is not1 therefore1 to be expected1 that 
any man1 whether ,materialist or        
,immaterialist1 should have exactly just
 notions of the ,deity1 ,his attributes1
 and ways of operation4 ,if then you    
would infer anything against me1 your   
difficulty must not be drawn from the   
inadequateness of our conceptions of the
 ,divine nature1 which is unavoidable on
 any scheme2 but from the denial of     
,matter1 of which there is not one word1
 directly or indirectly1 in what you    
have now objected4  ,,hyl4  ,i must     
acknowledge the difficulties you are    
concerned to clear are such only as     
arise from the non-existence of ,matter1
 and are peculiar to that notion4 ,so   

far you are in the right4 ,but ,i cannot
 by any means bring myself to think     
there is no such peculiar repugnancy    
between the creation and your opinion2  
though indeed where to fix it1 ,i do not
 distinctly know4  ,,phil4  ,what would 
you have8 ,do ,i not acknowledge a      
twofold state of things--the one ectypal
 or natural1 the other archetypal and   
eternal8 ,the former was created in     
time2 the latter existed from           
everlasting in the mind of ,god4 ,is not
 this agreeable to the common notions of
 divines8 or1 is any more than this     
necessary in order to conceive the      
creation8 ,but you suspect some peculiar
 repugnancy1 though you know not where  
it lies4 ,to take away all possibility  
of scruple in the case1 do but consider 
this one point4 ,either you are not able
 to conceive the ,creation on any       
hypothesis whatsoever2 and1 if so1 there
 is no ground for dislike or complaint  
against any particular opinion on that  
score3 or you are able to conceive it2  

and1 if so1 why not on my ,principles1  
since thereby nothing conceivable is    
taken away8 ,you have all along been    
allowed the full scope of sense1        
imagination1 and reason4 ,whatever1     
therefore1 you could before apprehend1  
either immediately or mediately by your 
senses1 or by ratiocination from your   
senses2 whatever you could perceive1    
imagine1 or understand1 remains still   
with you4 ,if1 therefore1 the notion you
 have of the creation by other          
,principles be intelligible1 you have it
 still upon mine2 if it be not          
intelligible1 ,i conceive it to be no   
notion at all2 and so there is no loss  
of it4 ,and indeed it seems to me very  
plain that the supposition of ,matter1  
that is a thing perfectly unknown and   
inconceivable1 cannot serve to make us  
conceive anything4 ,and1 ,i hope it need
 not be proved to you that if the       
existence of ,matter doth not make the  
creation conceivable1 the creation's    
being without it inconceivable can be no

 objection against its non-existence4   
,,hyl4  ,i confess1 ,philonous1 you have
 almost satisfied me in this point of   
the creation4  ,,phil4  ,i would fain   
know why you are not quite satisfied4   
,you tell me indeed of a repugnancy     
between the ,mosaic history and         
,immaterialism3 but you know not where  
it lies4 ,is this reasonable1 ,hylas8   
,can you expect ,i should solve a       
difficulty without knowing what it is8  
,but1 to pass by all that1 would not a  
man think you were assured there is no  
repugnancy between the received notions 
of ,materialists and the inspired       
writings8  ,,hyl4  ,and so ,i am4       
,,phil4  ,ought the historical part of  
,scripture to be understood in a plain  
obvious sense1 or in a sense which is   
metaphysical and out of the way8  ,,hyl4
  ,in the plain sense1 doubtless4       
,,phil4  ,when ,moses speaks of herbs1  
earth1 water1 c4 as having been created 
by ,god2 think you not the sensible     
things commonly signified by those words

 are suggested to every unphilosophical 
reader8  ,,hyl4  ,i cannot help thinking
 so4  ,,phil4  ,and are not all ideas1  
or things perceived by sense1 to be     
denied a real existence by the doctrine 
of the ,materialist8  ,,hyl4  ,this ,i  
have already acknowledged4  ,,phil4     
,the creation1 therefore1 according to  
them1 was not the creation of things    
sensible1 which have only a relative    
being1 but of certain unknown natures1  
which have an absolute being1 wherein   
creation might terminate8  ,,hyl4       
,true4  ,,phil4  ,is it not therefore   
evident the assertors of ,matter destroy
 the plain obvious sense of ,moses1 with
 which their notions are utterly        
inconsistent2 and instead of it obtrude 
on us ,i know not what2 something       
equally unintelligible to themselves and
 me8  ,,hyl4  ,i cannot contradict you4 
,,phil4  ,moses tells us of a creation4 
,a creation of what8 of unknown         
quiddities1 of occasions1 or            
,,substratum8 ,no1 certainly2 but of    

things obvious to the senses4 ,you must 
first reconcile this with your notions1 
if you expect ,i should be reconciled to
 them4  ,,hyl4  ,i see you can assault  
me with my own weapons4  ,,phil4  ,then 
as to ,,absolute ,,existence2 was there 
ever known a more jejune notion than    
that8 ,something it is so abstracted and
 unintelligible that you have frankly   
owned you could not conceive it1 much   
less explain anything by it4 ,but       
allowing ,matter to exist1 and the      
notion of absolute existence to be clear
 as light2 yet1 was this ever known to  
make the creation more credible8 ,nay1  
hath it not furnished the atheists and  
infidels of all ages with the most      
plausible arguments against a creation8 
,that a corporeal substance1 which hath 
an absolute existence without the minds 
of spirits1 should be produced out of   
nothing1 by the mere will of a ,spirit1 
hath been looked upon as a thing so     
contrary to all reason1 so impossible   
and absurd6 that not only the most      

celebrated among the ancients1 but even 
divers modern and ,christian            
philosophers have thought ,matter       
co-eternal with the ,deity4 ,lay these  
things together1 and then judge you     
whether ,materialism disposes men to    
believe the creation of things4  ,,hyl4 
,i own1 ,philonous1 ,i think it does    
not4 ,this of the ,,creation is the last
 objection ,i can think of2 and ,i must 
needs own it hath been sufficiently     
answered as well as the rest4 ,nothing  
now remains to be overcome but a sort of
 unaccountable backwardness that ,i find
 in myself towards your notions4        
,,phil4  ,when a man is swayed1 he knows
 not why1 to one side of the question1  
can this1 think you1 be anything else   
but the effect of prejudice1 which never
 fails to attend old and rooted notions8
 ,and indeed in this respect ,i cannot  
deny the belief of ,matter to have very 
much the advantage over the contrary    
opinion1 with men of a learned          
education4  ,,hyl4  ,i confess it seems 

to be as you say4  ,,phil4  ,as a       
balance1 therefore1 to this weight of   
prejudice1 let us throw into the scale  
the great advantages that arise from the
 belief of ,immaterialism1 both in      
regard to religion and human learning4  
,the being of a ,god1 and               
incorruptibility of the soul1 those     
great articles of religion1 are they not
 proved with the clearest and most      
immediate evidence8 ,when ,i say the    
being of a ,god1 ,i do not mean an      
obscure general ,cause of things1       
whereof we have no conception1 but ,god1
 in the strict and proper sense of the  
word4 ,a ,being whose spirituality1     
omnipresence1 providence1 omniscience1  
infinite power and goodness1 are as     
conspicuous as the existence of sensible
 things1 of which 7notwithstanding the  
fallacious pretences and affected       
scruples of ,sceptics7 there is no more 
reason to doubt than of our own         
being4--,then1 with relation to human   
sciences4 ,in ,natural ,philosophy1 what

 intricacies1 what obscurities1 what    
contradictions hath the belief of       
,matter led men into6 ,to say nothing of
 the numberless disputes about its      
extent1 continuity1 homogeneity1        
gravity1 divisibility1 c4--do they not  
pretend to explain all things by bodies 
operating on bodies1 according to the   
laws of motion8 and yet1 are they able  
to comprehend how one body should move  
another8 ,nay1 admitting there was no   
difficulty in reconciling the notion of 
an inert being with a cause1 or in      
conceiving how an accident might pass   
from one body to another2 yet1 by all   
their strained thoughts and extravagant 
suppositions1 have they been able to    
reach the ,,mechanical production of any
 one animal or vegetable body8 ,can they
 account1 by the laws of motion1 for    
sounds1 tastes1 smells1 or colours2 or  
for the regular course of things8 ,have 
they accounted1 by physical principles1 
for the aptitude and contrivance even of
 the most inconsiderable parts of the   

universe8 ,but1 laying aside ,matter and
 corporeal1 causes1 and admitting only  
the efficiency of an ,all-perfect ,mind1
 are not all the effects of nature easy 
and intelligible8 ,if the ,,phenomena   
are nothing else but ,,ideas2 ,god is a 
,,spirit1 but ,matter an unintelligent1 
unperceiving being4 ,if they demonstrate
 an unlimited power in their cause2 ,god
 is active and omnipotent1 but ,matter  
an inert mass4 ,if the order1           
regularity1 and usefulness of them can  
never be sufficiently admired2 ,god is  
infinitely wise and provident1 but      
,matter destitute of all contrivance and
 design4 ,these surely are great        
advantages in ,,physics4 ,not to mention
 that the apprehension of a distant     
,deity naturally disposes men to a      
negligence in their moral actions2 which
 they would be more cautious of1 in case
 they thought ,him immediately present1 
and acting on their minds1 without the  
interposition of ,matter1 or unthinking 
second causes4--,then in ,,metaphysics3 

what difficulties concerning entity in  
abstract1 substantial forms1 hylarchic  
principles1 plastic natures1 substance  
and accident1 principle of              
individuation1 possibility of ,matter's 
thinking1 origin of ideas1 the manner   
how two independent substances so widely
 different as ,,spirit ,,and ,,matter1  
should mutually operate on each other8  
what difficulties1 ,i say1 and endless  
disquisitions1 concerning these and     
innumerable other the like points1 do we
 escape1 by supposing only ,spirits and 
ideas8--,even the ,,mathematics         
themselves1 if we take away the absolute
 existence of extended things1 become   
much more clear and easy2 the most      
shocking paradoxes and intricate        
speculations in those sciences depending
 on the infinite divisibility of finite 
extension2 which depends on that        
supposition--,but what need is there to 
insist on the particular sciences8 ,is  
not that opposition to all science      
whatsoever1 that frenzy of the ancient  

and modern ,sceptics1 built on the same 
foundation8 ,or can you produce so much 
as one argument against the reality of  
corporeal things1 or in behalf of that  
avowed utter ignorance of their natures1
 which doth not suppose their reality to
 consist in an external absolute        
existence8 ,upon this supposition1      
indeed1 the objections from the change  
of colours in a pigeon's neck1 or the   
appearance of the broken oar in the     
water1 must be allowed to have weight4  
,but these and the like objections      
vanish1 if we do not maintain the being 
of absolute external originals1 but     
place the reality of things in ideas1   
fleeting indeed1 and                    
changeable2--however1 not changed at    
random1 but according to the fixed order
 of nature4 ,for1 herein consists that  
constancy and truth of things which     
secures all the concerns of life1 and   
distinguishes that which is real from   
the ,,irregular ,,visions of the fancy4 
,,hyl4  ,i agree to all you have now    

said1 and must own that nothing can     
incline me to embrace your opinion more 
than the advantages ,i see it is        
attended with4 ,i am by nature lazy2 and
 this would be a mighty abridgment in   
knowledge4 ,what doubts1 what           
hypotheses1 what labyrinths of          
amusement1 what fields of disputation1  
what an ocean of false learning1 may be 
avoided by that single notion of        
,,immaterialism6  ,,phil4  ,after all1  
is there anything farther remaining to  
be done8 ,you may remember you promised 
to embrace that opinion which upon      
examination should appear most agreeable
 to ,common ,sense and remote from      
,scepticism4 ,this1 by your own         
confession1 is that which denies        
,matter1 or the ,,absolute existence of 
corporeal things4 ,nor is this all2 the 
same notion has been proved several     
ways1 viewed in different lights1       
pursued in its consequences1 and all    
objections against it cleared4 ,can     
there be a greater evidence of its      

truth8 or is it possible it should have 
all the marks of a true opinion and yet 
be false8  ,,hyl4  ,i own myself        
entirely satisfied for the present in   
all respects4 ,but1 what security can ,i
 have that ,i shall still continue the  
same full assent to your opinion1 and   
that no unthought-of objection or       
difficulty will occur hereafter8        
,,phil4  ,pray1 ,hylas1 do you in other 
cases1 when a point is once evidently   
proved1 withhold your consent on account
 of objections or difficulties it may be
 liable to8 ,are the difficulties that  
attend the doctrine of incommensurable  
quantities1 of the angle of contact1 of 
the asymptotes to curves1 or the like1  
sufficient to make you hold out against 
mathematical demonstration8 ,or will you
 disbelieve the ,providence of ,god1    
because there may be some particular    
things which you know not how to        
reconcile with it8 ,if there are        
difficulties ,,attending                
,,immaterialism1 there are at the same  

time direct and evident proofs of it4   
,but for the existence of ,matter there 
is not one proof1 and far more numerous 
and insurmountable objections lie       
against it4 ,but where are those mighty 
difficulties you insist on8 ,alas6 you  
know not where or what they are2        
something which may possibly occur      
hereafter4 ,if this be a sufficient     
pretence for withholding your full      
assent1 you should never yield it to any
 proposition1 how free soever from      
exceptions1 how clearly and solidly     
soever demonstrated4  ,,hyl4  ,you have 
satisfied me1 ,philonous4  ,,phil4      
,but1 to arm you against all future     
objections1 do but consider3 ,that which
 bears equally hard on two contradictory
 opinions can be proof against neither4 
,whenever1 therefore1 any difficulty    
occurs1 try if you can find a solution  
for it on the hypothesis of the         
,,materialists4 ,be not deceived by     
words2 but sound your own thoughts4 ,and
 in case you cannot conceive it easier  

by the help of ,,materialism1 it is     
plain it can be no objection against    
,,immaterialism4 ,had you proceeded all 
along by this rule1 you would probably  
have spared yourself abundance of       
trouble in objecting2 since of all your 
difficulties ,i challenge you to shew   
one that is explained by ,matter3 nay1  
which is not more unintelligible with   
than without that supposition2 and      
consequently makes rather ,,against than
 ,,for it4 ,you should consider1 in each
 particular1 whether the difficulty     
arises from the ,,non-,,existence ,,of  
,,matter4 ,if it doth not1 you might as 
well argue from the infinite            
divisibility of extension against the   
,divine prescience1 as from such a      
difficulty against ,,immaterialism4 ,and
 yet1 upon recollection1 ,i believe you 
will find this to have been often1 if   
not always1 the case4 ,you should       
likewise take heed not to argue on a    
,,petitio ,,principii4 ,one is apt to   
say--,the unknown substances ought to be

 esteemed real things1 rather than the  
ideas in our minds3 and who can tell but
 the unthinking external substance may  
concur1 as a cause or instrument1 in the
 productions of our ideas8 ,but is not  
this proceeding on a supposition that   
there are such external substances8 ,and
 to suppose this1 is it not begging the 
question8 ,but1 above all things1 you   
should beware of imposing on yourself by
 that vulgar sophism which is called    
,,ignoratio ,,elenchi4 ,you talked often
 as if you thought ,i maintained the    
non-existence of ,sensible ,things4     
,whereas in truth no one can be more    
thoroughly assured of their existence   
than ,i am4 ,and it is you who doubt2 ,i
 should have said1 positively deny it4  
,everything that is seen1 felt1 heard1  
or any way perceived by the senses1 is1 
on the principles ,i embrace1 a real    
being2 but not on yours4 ,remember1 the 
,matter you contend for is an ,unknown  
,somewhat 7if indeed it may be termed   
,,somewhat71 which is quite stripped of 

all sensible qualities1 and can neither 
be perceived by sense1 nor apprehended  
by the mind4 ,remember ,i say1 that it  
is not any object which is hard or soft1
 hot or cold1 blue or white1 round or   
square1 c4 ,for all these things ,i     
affirm do exist4 ,though indeed ,i deny 
they have an existence distinct from    
being perceived2 or that they exist out 
of all minds whatsoever4 ,think on these
 points2 let them be attentively        
considered and still kept in view4      
,otherwise you will not comprehend the  
state of the question2 without which    
your objections will always be wide of  
the mark1 and1 instead of mine1 may     
possibly be directed 7as more than once 
they have been7 against your own        
notions4  ,,hyl4  ,i must needs own1    
,philonous1 nothing seems to have kept  
me from agreeing with you more than this
 same ,,mistaking ,,the ,,question4 ,in 
denying ,matter1 at first glimpse ,i am 
tempted to imagine you deny the things  
we see and feel3 but1 upon reflexion1   

find there is no ground for it4 ,what   
think you1 therefore1 of retaining the  
name ,,matter1 and applying it to       
,,sensible ,,things8 ,this may be done  
without any change in your sentiments3  
and1 believe me1 it would be a means of 
reconciling them to some persons who may
 be more shocked at an innovation in    
words than in opinion4  ,,phil4  ,with  
all my heart3 retain the word ,,matter1 
and apply it to the objects of sense1 if
 you please2 provided you do not        
attribute to them any subsistence       
distinct from their being perceived4 ,i 
shall never quarrel with you for an     
expression4 ,,matter1 or ,,material     
,,substance1 are terms introduced by    
philosophers2 and1 as used by them1     
imply a sort of independency1 or a      
subsistence distinct from being         
perceived by a mind3 but are never used 
by common people2 or1 if ever1 it is to 
signify the immediate objects of sense4 
,one would think1 therefore1 so long as 
the names of all particular things1 with

 the ,,terms ,,sensible1 ,,substance1   
,,body1 ,,stuff1 and the like1 are      
retained1 the word ,,matter should be   
never missed in common talk4 ,and in    
philosophical discourses it seems the   
best way to leave it quite out3 since   
there is not1 perhaps1 any one thing    
that hath more favoured and strengthened
 the depraved bent of the mind towards  
,atheism than the use of that general   
confused term4  ,,hyl4  ,well but1      
,philonous1 since ,i am content to give 
up the notion of an unthinking substance
 exterior to the mind1 ,i think you     
ought not to deny me the privilege of   
using the word ,,matter as ,i please1   
and annexing it to a collection of      
sensible qualities subsisting only in   
the mind4 ,i freely own there is no     
other substance1 in a strict sense1 than
 ,,spirit4 ,but ,i have been so long    
accustomed to the term ,,matter that ,i 
know not how to part with it3 to say1   
there is no ,,matter in the world1 is   
still shocking to me4 ,whereas to       

say--,there is no ,,matter1 if by that  
term be meant an unthinking substance   
existing without the mind2 but if by    
,,matter is meant some sensible thing1  
whose existence consists in being       
perceived1 then there is                
,,matter3--,,this distinction gives it  
quite another turn2 and men will come   
into your notions with small difficulty1
 when they are proposed in that manner4 
,for1 after all1 the controversy about  
,,matter in the strict acceptation of   
it1 lies altogether between you and the 
philosophers3 whose principles1 ,i      
acknowledge1 are not near so natural1 or
 so agreeable to the common sense of    
mankind1 and ,holy ,scripture1 as yours4
 ,there is nothing we either desire or  
shun but as it makes1 or is apprehended 
to make1 some part of our happiness or  
misery4 ,but what hath happiness or     
misery1 joy or grief1 pleasure or pain1 
to do with ,absolute ,existence2 or with
 unknown entities1 ,,abstracted ,,from  
,,all ,,relation ,,to ,,us8 ,it is      

evident1 things regard us only as they  
are pleasing or displeasing3 and they   
can please or displease only so far     
forth as they are perceived4 ,farther1  
therefore1 we are not concerned2 and    
thus far you leave things as you found  
them4 ,yet still there is something new 
in this doctrine4 ,it is plain1 ,i do   
not now think with the ,philosophers2   
nor yet altogether with the vulgar4 ,i  
would know how the case stands in that  
respect2 precisely1 what you have added 
to1 or altered in my former notions4    
,,phil4  ,i do not pretend to be a      
setter-up of new notions4 ,my endeavours
 tend only to unite1 and place in a     
clearer light1 that truth which was     
before shared between the vulgar and the
 philosophers3--the former being of     
opinion1 that ,,those ,,things ,,they   
,,immediately ,,perceive ,,are ,,the    
,,real ,,things2 and the latter1 that   
,,the ,,things ,,immediately ,,perceived
 ,,are ,,ideas1 ,,which ,,exist ,,only  
,,in ,,the ,,mind4 ,which two notions   

put together1 do1 in effect1 constitute 
the substance of what ,i advance4       
,,hyl4  ,i have been a long time        
distrusting my senses3 methought ,i saw 
things by a dim light and through false 
glasses4 ,now the glasses are removed   
and a new light breaks in upon my       
understanding4 ,i am clearly convinced  
that ,i see things in their native      
forms1 and am no longer in pain about   
their ,,unknown ,,natures ,,or          
,,absolute ,,existence4 ,this is the    
state ,i find myself in at present2     
though1 indeed1 the course that brought 
me to it ,i do not yet thoroughly       
comprehend4 ,you set out upon the same  
principles that ,academics1 ,cartesians1
 and the like sects usually do2 and for 
a long time it looked as if you were    
advancing their philosophical           
,scepticism3 but1 in the end1 your      
conclusions are directly opposite to    
theirs4  ,,phil4  ,you see1 ,hylas1 the 
water of yonder fountain1 how it is     
forced upwards1 in a round column1 to a 

certain height2 at which it breaks1 and 
falls back into the basin from whence it
 rose3 its ascent1 as well as descent1  
proceeding from the same uniform law or 
principle of ,,gravitation4 just so1 the
 same ,principles which1 at first view1 
lead to ,scepticism1 pursued to a       
certain point1 bring men back to ,common
 ,sense4