,a ,treatise ,concerning the ,principles
 of ,human ,knowledge   by  ,george     
,berkeley 7#afhe-agec7   ,,wherein ,,the
 ,,chief ,,causes ,,of ,,error ,,and    
,,difficulty ,,in ,,the ,,sciences1     
,,with ,,the ,,grounds ,,of             
,,scepticism1 ,,atheism1 ,,and          
,,irreligion1 ,,are ,,inquired ,,into4  
,,dedication      ,to the ,right        
,honourable   ,,thomas1 ,,earl ,,of     
,,pembroke1 ,c41   ,knight of the most  
,noble ,order of the ,garter and one of 
the ,lords of ,her ,majesty's most      
honourable privy council4  ,my ,lord1   
,you will perhaps wonder that an obscure
 person1 who has not the honour to be   
known to your lordship1 should presume  
to address you in this manner4 ,but that
 a man who has written something with a 
design to promote ,useful ,knowledge and
 ,religion in the world should make     
choice of your lordship for his patron1 
will not be thought strange by any one  
that is not altogether unacquainted with
 the present state of the church and    

learning1 and consequently ignorant how 
great an ornament and support you are to
 both4 ,yet1 nothing could have induced 
me to make you this present of my poor  
endeavours1 were ,i not encouraged by   
that candour and native goodness which  
is so bright a part in your lordship's  
character4 ,i might add1 my lord1 that  
the extraordinary favour and bounty you 
have been pleased to show towards our   
,society gave me hopes you would not be 
unwilling to countenance the studies of 
one of its members4 ,these              
considerations determined me to lay this
 treatise at your lordship's feet1 and  
the rather because ,i was ambitious to  
have it known that ,i am with the truest
 and most profound respect1 on account  
of that learning and virtue which the   
world so justly admires in your         
lordship1 ,,my ,,lord1 ,your lordship's 
most humble and most devoted servant1   
,,george ,,berkeley    99 99 99 99 99   
,,contents    ,,preface   ,,introduction
   ,,of ,,the ,,principles ,,of ,,human 

,,knowledge   99 99 99 99 99            
,,preface   ,what ,i here make public   
has1 after a long and scrupulous        
inquiry1 seemed to me evidently true and
 not unuseful to be known--particularly 
to those who are tainted with           
,scepticism1 or want a demonstration of 
the existence and immateriality of ,god1
 or the natural immortality of the soul4
 ,whether it be so or no ,i am content  
the reader should impartially examine2  
since ,i do not think myself any farther
 concerned for the success of what ,i   
have written than as it is agreeable to 
truth4 ,but1 to the end this may not    
suffer1 ,i make it my request that the  
reader suspend his judgment till he has 
once at least read the whole through    
with that degree of attention and       
thought which the subject-matter shall  
seem to deserve4 ,for1 as there are some
 passages that1 taken by themselves1 are
 very liable 7nor could it be remedied7 
to gross misinterpretation1 and to be   
charged with most absurd consequences1  

which1 nevertheless1 upon an entire     
perusal will appear not to follow from  
them2 so likewise1 though the whole     
should be read over1 yet1 if this be    
done transiently1 it is very probable my
 sense may be mistaken2 but to a        
thinking reader1 ,i flatter myself it   
will be throughout clear and obvious4   
,as for the characters of novelty and   
singularity which some of the following 
notions may seem to bear1 it is1 ,i     
hope1 needless to make any apology on   
that account4 ,he must surely be either 
very weak1 or very little acquainted    
with the sciences1 who shall reject a   
truth that is capable of demonstration1 
for no other reason but because it is   
newly known1 and contrary to the        
prejudices of mankind4 ,thus much ,i    
thought fit to premise1 in order to     
prevent1 if possible1 the hasty censures
 of a sort of men who are too apt to    
condemn an opinion before they rightly  
comprehend it4     ,,introduction   #a4 
,philosophy being nothing else but ,,the

 ,,study ,,of ,,wisdom ,,and ,,truth1 it
 may with reason be expected that those 
who have spent most time and pains in it
 should enjoy a greater calm and        
serenity of mind1 a greater clearness   
and evidence of knowledge1 and be less  
disturbed with doubts and difficulties  
than other men4 ,yet so it is1 we see   
the illiterate bulk of mankind that walk
 the high-road of plain common sense1   
and are governed by the dictates of     
nature1 for the most part easy and      
undisturbed4 ,to them nothing ,,that    
,,is ,,familiar appears unaccountable or
 difficult to comprehend4 ,they complain
 not of any want of evidence in their   
senses1 and are out of all danger of    
becoming ,,sceptics4 ,but no sooner do  
we depart from sense and instinct to    
follow the light of a superior          
principle1 to reason1 meditate1 and     
reflect on the nature of things1 but a  
thousand scruples spring up in our minds
 concerning those things which before we
 seemed fully to comprehend4 ,prejudices

 and errors of sense do from all parts  
discover themselves to our view2 and1   
endeavouring to correct these by reason1
 we are insensibly drawn into uncouth   
paradoxes1 difficulties1 and            
inconsistencies1 which multiply and grow
 upon us as we advance in speculation1  
till at length1 having wandered through 
many intricate mazes1 we find ourselves 
just where we were1 or1 which is worse1 
sit down in a forlorn ,scepticism4  #b4 
,the cause of this is thought to be the 
obscurity of things1 or the natural     
weakness and imperfection of our        
understandings4 ,it is said1 the        
faculties we have are few1 and those    
designed by nature for the ,,support and
 comfort of life1 and not to penetrate  
into the ,,inward ,,essence and         
constitution of things4 ,besides1 the   
mind of man being finite1 when it treats
 of things which partake of infinity1 it
 is not to be wondered at if it run into
 absurdities and contradictions1 out of 
which it is impossible it should ever   

extricate itself1 it being of the nature
 of infinite not to be comprehended by  
that which is finite4  #c4 ,but1        
perhaps1 we may be too partial to       
ourselves in placing the fault          
originally in our faculties1 and not    
rather in the wrong use we make of them4
 ,,it ,,is ,a ,,hard ,,thing ,,to       
,,suppose ,,that ,,right ,,deductions   
,,from ,,true ,,principles ,,should     
,,ever ,,end ,,in ,,consequences ,,which
 ,,cannot ,,be ,,maintained or made     
consistent4 ,we should believe that ,god
 has dealt more bountifully with the    
sons of men than to give them a strong  
desire for that knowledge which he had  
placed quite out of their reach4 ,this  
were not agreeable to the wonted        
indulgent methods of ,providence1 which1
 whatever appetites it may have         
implanted in the creatures1 doth usually
 furnish them with such means as1 if    
rightly made use of1 will not fail to   
satisfy them4 ,upon the whole1 ,i am    
inclined to think that the far greater  

part1 if not all1 of those difficulties 
which have hitherto amused philosophers1
 and blocked up the way to knowledge1   
are entirely owing to ourselves--that we
 have first raised a dust and then      
complain we cannot see4  #d4 ,my purpose
 therefore is1 to try if ,i can discover
 what those ,principles are which have  
introduced all that doubtfulness and    
uncertainty1 those absurdities and      
contradictions1 into the several sects  
of philosophy2 insomuch that the wisest 
men have thought our ignorance          
incurable1 conceiving it to arise from  
the natural dulness and limitation of   
our faculties4 ,and surely it is a work 
well deserving our pains to make a      
strict inquiry concerning the ,first    
,principles of ,human ,knowledge1 to    
sift and examine them on all sides1     
especially since there may be some      
grounds to suspect that those lets and  
difficulties1 which stay and embarrass  
the mind in its search after truth1 do  
not spring from any darkness and        

intricacy in the objects1 or natural    
defect in the understanding1 so much as 
from false ,principles which have been  
insisted on1 and might have been        
avoided4  #e4 ,how difficult and        
discouraging soever this attempt may    
seem1 when ,i consider how many great   
and extraordinary men have gone before  
me in the like designs1 yet ,i am not   
without some hopes--upon the            
consideration that the largest views are
 not always the clearest1 and that he   
who is short--sighted will be obliged to
 draw the object nearer1 and may1       
perhaps1 by a close and narrow survey1  
discern that which had escaped far      
better eyes4  #f4 ,a ,,chief ,,source   
,,of ,,error ,,in ,,all ,,parts ,,of    
,,knowledge4--,in order to prepare the  
mind of the reader for the easier       
conceiving what follows1 it is proper to
 premise somewhat1 by way of            
,introduction1 concerning the nature and
 abuse of ,language4 ,but the           
unravelling this matter leads me in some

 measure to anticipate my design1 by    
taking notice of what seems to have had 
a chief part in rendering speculation   
intricate and perplexed1 and to have    
occasioned innumerable errors and       
difficulties in almost all parts of     
knowledge4 ,and that is the opinion that
 the mind has a power of framing        
,,abstract ,,ideas or notions of things4
 ,he who is not a perfect stranger to   
the writings and disputes of            
philosophers must needs acknowledge that
 no small part of them are spent about  
abstract ideas4 ,these are in a more    
especial manner thought to be the object
 of those sciences which go by the name 
of ,,logic and ,,metaphysics1 and of all
 that which passes under the notion of  
the most abstracted and sublime         
learning1 in all which one shall scarce 
find any question handled in such a     
manner as does not suppose their        
existence in the mind1 and that it is   
well acquainted with them4  #g4 ,,proper
 ,,acceptation ,,of ,,abstraction4--,it 

is agreed on all hands that the         
qualities or modes of things do never   
,,really ,,exist ,,each ,,of ,,them     
,,apart ,,by ,,itself1 and separated    
from all others1 but are mixed1 as it   
were1 and blended together1 several in  
the same object4 ,but1 we are told1 the 
mind being able to consider each quality
 singly1 or abstracted from those other 
qualities with which it is united1 does 
by that means frame to itself abstract  
ideas4 ,for example1 there is perceived 
by sight an object extended1 coloured1  
and moved3 this mixed or compound idea  
the mind resolving into its simple1     
constituent parts1 and viewing each by  
itself1 exclusive of the rest1 does     
frame the abstract ideas of extension1  
colour1 and motion4 ,not that it is     
possible for colour or motion to exist  
without extension2 but only that the    
mind can frame to itself by             
,,abstraction the idea of colour        
exclusive of extension1 and of motion   
exclusive of both colour and extension4 

#h4 ,,of ,,generalizing ,note4--,again1 
the mind having observed that in the    
particular extensions perceived by sense
 there is something ,,common and alike  
,,in ,,all1 and some other things       
peculiar1 as this or that figure or     
magnitude1 which distinguish them one   
from another2 it considers apart or     
singles out by itself that which is     
common1 making thereof a most abstract  
idea of extension1 which is neither     
line1 surface1 nor solid1 nor has any   
figure or magnitude1 but is an idea     
entirely prescinded from all these4 ,so 
likewise the mind1 by leaving out of the
 particular colours perceived by sense  
that which distinguishes them one from  
another1 and retaining that only which  
is ,,common ,,to ,,all1 makes an idea of
 colour in abstract which is neither    
red1 nor blue1 nor white1 nor any other 
determinate colour4 ,and1 in like       
manner1 by considering motion           
abstractedly not only from the body     
moved1 but likewise from the figure it  

describes1 and all particular directions
 and velocities1 the abstract idea of   
motion is framed2 which equally         
corresponds to all particular motions   
whatsoever that may be perceived by     
sense4  ,note3 ,vide ,reid1 on the      
,intellectual ,powers of ,man1 ,essay   
,v1 chap iii4 sec4 #a1 edit4 #ahdc  #i4 
,,of ,,compounding4--,and as the mind   
frames to itself abstract ideas of      
qualities or ,,modes1 so does it1 by the
 same precision or mental separation1   
attain abstract ideas of the more       
compounded ,,beings which include       
several coexistent qualities4 ,for      
example1 the mind having observed that  
,peter1 ,james1 and ,john resemble each 
other in certain common agreements of   
shape and other qualities1 leaves out of
 the complex or compounded idea it has  
of ,peter1 ,james1 and any other        
particular man1 that which is peculiar  
to each1 retaining only what is common  
to all1 and so makes an abstract idea   
wherein all the particulars equally     

partake--abstracting entirely from and  
cutting off all those circumstances and 
differences which might determine it to 
any particular existence4 ,and after    
this manner it is said we come by the   
abstract idea of ,,man1 or1 if you      
please1 humanity1 or human nature2      
wherein it is true there is included    
colour1 because there is no man but has 
some colour1 but then it can be neither 
white1 nor black1 nor any particular    
colour1 because there is no one         
particular colour wherein all men       
partake4 ,so likewise there is included 
stature1 but then it is neither tall    
stature1 nor low stature1 nor yet middle
 stature1 but something abstracted from 
all these4 ,and so of the rest4         
,moreover1 their being a great variety  
of other creatures that partake in some 
parts1 but not all1 of the complex idea 
of ,,man1 the mind1 leaving out those   
parts which are peculiar to men1 and    
retaining those only which are common to
 all the living creatures1 frames the   

idea of ,,animal1 which abstracts not   
only from all particular men1 but also  
all birds1 beasts1 fishes1 and insects4 
,the constituent parts of the abstract  
idea of animal are body1 life1 sense1   
and spontaneous motion4 ,by ,,body is   
meant body without any particular shape 
or figure1 there being no one shape or  
figure common to all animals1 without   
covering1 either of hair1 or feathers1  
or scales1 c41 nor yet naked3 hair1     
feathers1 scales1 and nakedness being   
the distinguishing properties of        
particular animals1 and for that reason 
left out of the ,,abstract ,,idea4 ,upon
 the same account the spontaneous motion
 must be neither walking1 nor flying1   
nor creeping2 it is nevertheless a      
motion1 but what that motion is it is   
not easy to conceive,note44  ,note3     
,vide ,hobbes' ,tripos1 ch4 v4 sect4 #f4
  #aj4 ,,two ,,objections ,,to ,,the    
,,existence ,,of ,,abstract             
,,ideas4--,whether others have this     
wonderful faculty of ,,abstracting      

,,their ,,ideas1 they best can tell3 for
 myself1 ,i find indeed ,i have a       
faculty of imagining1 or representing to
 myself1 the ideas of those particular  
things ,i have perceived1 and of        
variously compounding and dividing them4
 ,i can imagine a man with two heads1 or
 the upper parts of a man joined to the 
body of a horse4 ,i can consider the    
hand1 the eye1 the nose1 each by itself 
abstracted or separated from the rest of
 the body4 ,but then whatever hand or   
eye ,i imagine1 it must have some       
particular shape and colour4 ,likewise  
the idea of man that ,i frame to myself 
must be either of a white1 or a black1  
or a tawny1 a straight1 or a crooked1 a 
tall1 or a low1 or a middle-sized man4  
,i cannot by any effort of thought      
conceive the abstract idea above        
described4 ,and it is equally impossible
 for me to form the abstract idea of    
motion distinct from the body moving1   
and which is neither swift nor slow1    
curvilinear nor rectilinear2 and the    

like may be said of all other abstract  
general ideas whatsoever4 ,to be plain1 
,i own myself able to abstract ,,in     
,,one ,,sense1 as when ,i consider some 
particular parts or qualities separated 
from others1 with which1 though they are
 united in some object1 yet it is       
possible they may really exist without  
them4 ,but ,i deny that ,i can abstract 
from one another1 or conceive           
separately1 those qualities which it is 
impossible should exist so separated2 or
 that ,i can frame a general notion1 by 
abstracting from particulars in the     
manner aforesaid--which last are the two
 proper acceptations of ,,abstraction4  
,and there are grounds to think most men
 will acknowledge themselves to be in my
 case4 ,the generality of men which are 
simple and illiterate never pretend to  
,,abstract ,,notions4 ,it is said they  
are difficult and not to be attained    
without pains and study2 we may         
therefore reasonably conclude that1 if  
such there be1 they are confined only to

 the learned4  #aa4 ,i proceed to       
examine what can be alleged in ,,defence
 ,,of ,,the ,,doctrine ,,of             
,,abstraction1 and try if ,i can        
discover what it is that inclines the   
men of speculation to embrace an opinion
 so remote from common sense as that    
seems to be4 ,there has been a late     
deservedly esteemed philosopher who1 no 
doubt1 has given it very much           
countenance1 by seeming to think the    
having abstract general ideas is what   
puts the widest difference in point of  
understanding betwixt man and beast4    
,the having of general ideas1 saith he1 
is that which puts a perfect distinction
 betwixt man and brutes1 and is an      
excellency which the faculties of brutes
 do by no means attain unto4 ,for1 it is
 evident we observe no foot-steps in    
them of making use of general signs for 
universal ideas2 from which we have     
reason to imagine that they have not the
 ,,faculty ,,of ,,abstracting1 or making
 general ideas1 since they have no use  

of words or any other general signs4    
,and a little after3 ,therefore1 ,i     
think1 we may suppose that it is in this
 that the species of brutes are         
discriminated from men1 and it is that  
proper difference wherein they are      
wholly separated1 and which at last     
widens to so wide a distance4 ,for1 if  
they have any ideas at all1 and are not 
bare machines 7as some would have them71
 we cannot deny them to have some       
reason4 ,it seems as evident to me that 
they do1 some of them1 in certain       
instances reason as that they have      
sense2 but it is only in particular     
ideas1 just as they receive them from   
their senses4 ,they are the best of them
 tied up within those narrow bounds1 and
 have not 7as ,i think7 the faculty to  
enlarge them by any kind of             
,,abstraction4 ,essay on ,human         
,understanding1 ,,ii4 xi4 #aj and #aa4  
,i readily agree with this learned      
author1 that the faculties of brutes can
 by no means attain to ,,abstraction4   

,but then if this be made the           
distinguishing property of that sort of 
animals1 ,i fear a great many of those  
that pass for men must be reckoned into 
their number4 ,the reason that is here  
assigned why we have no grounds to think
 brutes have abstract general ideas is1 
that we observe in them no use of words 
or any other general signs2 which is    
built on this supposition--that the     
making use of words implies the having  
general ideas4 ,from which it follows   
that men who use language are able to   
,,abstract or ,,generalize their ideas4 
,that this is the sense and arguing of  
the author will further appear by his   
answering the question he in another    
place puts3 ,since all things that exist
 are only particulars1 how come we by   
general terms8 ,his answer is3 ,words   
become general by being made the signs  
of general ideas4--,essay on ,human     
,understanding1 ,,iv4 iii4 #f4 ,but     
,note4 #a it seems that a word becomes  
general by being made the sign1 not of  

an ,,abstract general idea1 but of      
several particular ideas ,note4 #b1 any 
one of which it indifferently suggests  
to the mind4 ,for example1 when it is   
said the change of motion is            
proportional to the impressed force1 or 
that whatever has extension is          
divisible1 these propositions are to be 
understood of motion and extension in   
general2 and nevertheless it will not   
follow that they suggest to my thoughts 
an idea of motion without a body moved1 
or any determinate direction and        
velocity1 or that ,i must conceive an   
abstract general idea of extension1     
which is neither line1 surface1 nor     
solid1 neither great nor small1 black1  
white1 nor red1 nor of any other        
determinate colour4 ,it is only implied 
that whatever particular motion ,i      
consider1 whether it be swift or slow1  
perpendicular1 horizontal1 or oblique1  
or in whatever object1 the axiom        
concerning it holds equally true4 ,as   
does the other of every particular      

extension1 it matters not whether line1 
surface1 or solid1 whether of this or   
that magnitude or figure4  ,note #a3    
,,to ,,this ,i ,,cannot ,,assent1       
,,being ,,of ,,opinion1 edit of #agaj4  
,note #b3 ,of the same sort4  #ab4      
,,existence ,,of ,,general ,,ideas      
,,admitted4--,by observing how ideas    
become general we may the better judge  
how words are made so4 ,and here it is  
to be noted that ,i do not deny         
absolutely there are general ideas1 but 
only that there are any ,,abstract      
,,general ,,ideas2 for1 in the passages 
we have quoted wherein there is mention 
of general ideas1 it is always supposed 
that they are formed by ,,abstraction1  
after the manner set forth in sections  
#h and #i4 ,now1 if we will annex a     
meaning to our words1 and speak only of 
what we can conceive1 ,i believe we     
shall acknowledge that an idea which1   
considered in itself1 is particular1    
becomes general by being made to        
represent or stand for all other        

particular ideas of the ,,same ,,sort4  
,to make this plain by an example1      
suppose a geometrician is demonstrating 
the method of cutting a line in two     
equal parts4 ,he draws1 for instance1 a 
black line of an inch in length3 this1  
which in itself is a particular line1 is
 nevertheless with regard to its        
signification general1 since1 as it is  
there used1 it represents all particular
 lines whatsoever2 so that what is      
demonstrated of it is demonstrated of   
all lines1 or1 in other words1 of a line
 in general4 ,and1 as that particular   
line becomes general by being made a    
sign1 so the name ,,line1 which taken   
absolutely is ,,particular1 by being a  
sign is made ,,general4 ,and as the     
former owes its generality not to its   
being the sign of an abstract or general
 line1 but of ,,all ,,particular right  
lines that may possibly exist1 so the   
latter must be thought to derive its    
generality from the same cause1 namely1 
the ,,various ,,particular lines which  

it indifferently denotes4 ,note4  ,note3
 ,i look upon this 7doctrine7 to be one 
of the greatest and most valuable       
discoveries that have been made of late 
years in the republic of                
letters4--,treatise of ,human ,nature1  
book i1 part i1 sect4 #g4 ,also         
,stewart's ,philosophy of the ,mind1    
part i1 chapt4 iv4 sect4 iii4 p4 #ii4   
#ac4 ,,abstract ,,general ,,ideas       
,,necessary1 ,,according ,,to           
,,locke4--,to give the reader a yet     
clearer view of the nature of abstract  
ideas1 and the uses they are thought    
necessary to1 ,i shall add one more     
passage out of the ,essay on ,human     
,understanding1 7,,iv4 vii4 #i7 which is
 as follows3 ,,abstract ,,ideas are not 
so obvious or easy to children or the   
yet unexercised mind as particular ones4
 ,if they seem so to grown men it is    
only because by constant and familiar   
use they are made so4 ,for1 when we     
nicely reflect upon them1 we shall find 
that general ideas are fictions and     

contrivances of the mind1 that carry    
difficulty with them1 and do not so     
easily offer themselves as we are apt to
 imagine4 ,for example1 does it not     
require some pains and skill to form the
 general idea of a triangle 7which is   
yet none of the most abstract1          
comprehensive1 and difficult72 for it   
must be neither oblique nor rectangle1  
neither equilateral1 equicrural1 nor    
scalenon1 but ,,all ,,and ,,none of     
these at once8 ,in effect1 it is        
something imperfect that cannot exist1  
an idea wherein some parts of several   
different and ,,inconsistent ideas are  
put together4 ,it is true the mind in   
this imperfect state has need of such   
ideas1 and makes all the haste to them  
it can1 for the ,,conveniency ,,of      
,,communication ,,and ,,enlargement ,,of
 ,,knowledge1 to both which it is       
naturally very much inclined4 ,but yet  
one has reason to suspect such ideas are
 marks of our imperfection4 ,at least   
this is enough to show that the most    

abstract and general ideas are not those
 that the mind is first and most easily 
acquainted with1 nor such as its        
earliest knowledge is conversant        
about4--,if any man has the faculty of  
framing in his mind such an idea of a   
triangle as is here described1 it is in 
vain to pretend to dispute him out of   
it1 nor would ,i go about it4 ,all ,i   
desire is that the reader would fully   
and certainly inform himself whether he 
has such an idea or no4 ,and this1      
methinks1 can be no hard task for anyone
 to perform4 ,what more easy than for   
anyone to look a little into his own    
thoughts1 and there try whether he has1 
or can attain to have1 an idea that     
shall correspond with the description   
that is here given of the general idea  
of a triangle1 which is ,,neither       
,,oblique ,,nor ,,rectangle1            
,,equilateral1 ,,equicrural ,,nor       
,,scalenon1 ,,but ,,all ,,and ,,none    
,,of ,,these ,,at ,,once8  #ad4 ,,but   
,,they ,,are ,,not ,,necessary ,,for    

,,communication4--,much is here said of 
the difficulty that abstract ideas carry
 with them1 and the pains and skill     
requisite to the forming them4 ,and it  
is on all hands agreed that there is    
need of great toil and labour of the    
mind1 to emancipate our thoughts from   
particular objects1 and raise them to   
those sublime speculations that are     
conversant about abstract ideas4 ,from  
all which the natural consequence should
 seem to be1 that so ,,difficult a thing
 as the forming abstract ideas was not  
necessary for ,,communication1 which is 
so ,,easy and familiar to ,,all ,,sorts 
,,of ,,men4 ,but1 we are told1 if they  
seem obvious and easy to grown men1 ,,it
 ,,is ,,only ,,because ,,by ,,constant  
,,and ,,familiar ,,use ,,they ,,are     
,,made ,,so4 ,now1 ,i would fain know at
 what time it is men are employed in    
surmounting that difficulty1 and        
furnishing themselves with those        
necessary helps for discourse4 ,it      
cannot be when they are grown up1 for   

then it seems they are not conscious of 
any such painstaking2 it remains        
therefore to be the business of their   
childhood4 ,and surely the great and    
multiplied labour of framing abstract   
notions will be found a hard task for   
that tender age4 ,is it not a hard thing
 to imagine that a couple of children   
cannot prate together of their          
sugar-plums and rattles and the rest of 
their little trinkets1 till they have   
first tacked together numberless        
inconsistencies1 and so framed in their 
minds ,,abstract ,,general ,,ideas1 and 
annexed them to every common name they  
make use of8  #ae4 ,,nor ,,for ,,the    
,,enlargement ,,of ,,knowledge4--,nor do
 ,i think them a whit more needful for  
the ,,enlargement ,,of ,,knowledge than 
for ,,communication4 ,it is1 ,i know1 a 
point much insisted on1 that all        
knowledge and demonstration are about   
universal notions1 to which ,i fully    
agree3 but then it doth not appear to me
 that those notions are formed by       

,,abstraction in the manner             
,,premised--,,universality1 so far as ,i
 can comprehend1 not consisting in the  
absolute1 ,,positive nature or          
conception of anything1 but in the      
,,relation it bears to the particulars  
signified or represented by it2 by      
virtue whereof it is that things1 names1
 or notions1 being in their own nature  
,,particular1 are rendered ,,universal4 
,thus1 when ,i demonstrate any          
proposition concerning triangles1 it is 
to be supposed that ,i have in view the 
universal idea of a triangle2 which     
ought not to be understood as if ,i     
could frame an idea of a triangle which 
was neither equilateral1 nor scalenon1  
nor equicrural2 but only that the       
particular triangle ,i consider1 whether
 of this or that sort it matters not1   
doth equally stand for and represent all
 rectilinear triangles whatsoever1 and  
is in that sense ,,universal4 ,all which
 seems very plain and not to include any
 difficulty in it4  #af4                

,,objection4--,,answer4--,but here it   
will be demanded1 ,,how ,,we ,,can      
,,know ,,any ,,proposition ,,to ,,be    
,,true ,,of ,,all ,,particular          
,,triangles1 ,,except we have first seen
 it ,,demonstrated ,,of ,,the ,,abstract
 ,,idea ,,of ,a ,,triangle which equally
 agrees to all8 ,for1 because a property
 may be demonstrated to agree to some   
one particular triangle1 it will not    
thence follow that it equally belongs to
 any other triangle1 which in all       
respects is not the same with it4 ,for  
example1 having demonstrated that the   
three angles of an isosceles rectangular
 triangle are equal to two right ones1  
,i cannot therefore conclude this       
affection agrees to all other triangles 
which have neither a right angle nor two
 equal sides4 ,it seems therefore that1 
to be certain this proposition is       
universally true1 we must either make a 
particular demonstration for every      
particular triangle1 which is           
impossible1 or once for all demonstrate 

it of the ,,abstract ,,idea ,,of ,a     
,,triangle1 in which all the particulars
 do indifferently partake and by which  
they are all equally represented4 ,to   
which ,i answer1 that1 though the idea  
,i have in view whilst ,i make the      
demonstration be1 for instance1 that of 
an isosceles rectangular triangle whose 
sides are of a determinate length1 ,i   
may nevertheless be certain it extends  
to all other rectilinear triangles1 of  
what sort or bigness soever4 ,and that  
because neither the right angle1 nor the
 equality1 nor determinate length of the
 sides are at all concerned in the      
demonstration4 ,it is true the diagram  
,i have in view includes all these      
particulars1 but then there is not the  
least mention made of them in the proof 
of the proposition4 ,it is not said the 
three angles are equal to two right     
ones1 because one of them is a right    
angle1 or because the sides             
comprehending it are of the same length4
 ,which sufficiently shows that the     

right angle might have been oblique1 and
 the sides unequal1 and for all that the
 demonstration have held good4 ,and for 
this reason it is that ,i conclude that 
to be true of any obliquangular or      
scalenon which ,i had demonstrated of a 
particular right--angled equicrural     
triangle1 and not because ,i            
demonstrated the proposition of the     
abstract idea of a triangle ,and here it
 must be acknowledged that a man may    
consider a figure merely as triangular1 
without attending to the particular     
qualities of the angles1 or relations of
 the sides4 ,so far he may abstract2 but
 this will never prove that he can frame
 an abstract1 general1 inconsistent idea
 of a triangle4 ,in like manner we may  
consider ,peter so far forth as man1 or 
so far forth as animal without framing  
the fore-mentioned abstract idea1 either
 of man or of animal1 inasmuch as all   
that is perceived is not considered4    
#ag4 ,,advantage ,,of ,,investigating   
,,the ,,doctrine ,,of ,,abstract        

,,general ,,ideas4--,it were an endless 
as well as an useless thing to trace the
 ,,schoolmen1 those great masters of    
abstraction1 through all the manifold   
inextricable labyrinths of error and    
dispute which their doctrine of abstract
 natures and notions seems to have led  
them into4 ,what bickerings and         
controversies1 and what a learned dust  
have been raised about those matters1   
and what mighty advantage has been from 
thence derived to mankind1 are things at
 this day too clearly known to need     
being insisted on4 ,and it had been well
 if the ill effects of that doctrine    
were confined to those only who make the
 most avowed profession of it4 ,when men
 consider the great pains1 industry1 and
 parts that have for so many ages been  
laid out on the cultivation and         
advancement of the sciences1 and that   
notwithstanding all this the far greater
 part of them remains full of darkness  
and uncertainty1 and disputes that are  
like never to have an end1 and even     

those that are thought to be supported  
by the most clear and cogent            
demonstrations contain in them paradoxes
 which are perfectly irreconcilable to  
the understandings of men1 and that1    
taking all together1 a very small       
portion of them does supply any real    
benefit to mankind1 otherwise than by   
being an innocent diversion and         
amusement--,i say the consideration of  
all this is apt to throw them into a    
despondency and perfect contempt of all 
study4 ,but this may perhaps cease upon 
a view of the false principles that have
 obtained in the world1 amongst all     
which there is none1 methinks1 has a    
more wide and extended sway over the    
thoughts of speculative men than ,note4 
this of abstract general ideas4  ,note3 
,that we have been endeavouring to      
overthrow4--,edit #agaj4  #ah4 ,i come  
now to consider the ,,source ,,of ,,this
 ,,prevailing ,,notion1 and that seems  
to me to be ,,language4 ,and surely     
nothing of less extent than reason      

itself could have been the source of an 
opinion so universally received4 ,the   
truth of this appears as from other     
reasons so also from the plain          
confession of the ablest patrons of     
abstract ideas1 who acknowledge that    
they are made in order to naming2 from  
which it is a clear consequence that if 
there had been no such things as speech 
or universal signs there never had been 
any thought of abstraction4 ,see ,,iii4 
vi4 #ci1 and elsewhere of the ,essay on 
,human ,understanding4 ,let us examine  
the manner wherein words have           
contributed to the origin of that       
mistake4--,first ,vide sect4 xix4 then1 
it is thought that every name has1 or   
ought to have1 ,,one ,,only precise and 
settled signification1 which inclines   
men to think there are certain          
,,abstract1 ,,determinate ,,ideas that  
constitute the true and only immediate  
signification of each general name2 and 
that it is by the mediation of these    
abstract ideas that a general name comes

 to signify any particular thing4       
,whereas1 in truth1 there is no such    
thing as one precise and definite       
signification annexed to any general    
name1 they all signifying indifferently 
a great number of particular ideas4 ,all
 which doth evidently follow from what  
has been already said1 and will clearly 
appear to anyone by a little reflexion4 
,to this it will be ,,objected that     
every name that has a definition is     
thereby restrained to one certain       
signification4 ,for example1 a          
,,triangle is defined to be ,a ,,plain  
,,surface ,,comprehended ,,by ,,three   
,,right ,,lines1 by which that name is  
limited to denote one certain idea and  
no other4 ,to which ,i answer1 that in  
the definition it is not said whether   
the surface be great or small1 black or 
white1 nor whether the sides are long or
 short1 equal or unequal1 nor with what 
angles they are inclined to each other2 
in all which there may be great variety1
 and consequently there is ,,no ,,one   

,,settled ,,idea which limits the       
signification of the word ,,triangle4   
,it is one thing for to keep a name     
constantly to the same definition1 and  
another to make it stand everywhere for 
the same idea2 the one is necessary1 the
 other useless and impracticable4  #ai4 
,,secondly1 ,but1 to give a farther     
account how ,,words came to ,,produce   
,,the ,,doctrine ,,of ,,abstract        
,,ideas1 it must be observed that it is 
a received opinion that language has    
,,no ,,other ,,end but the communicating
 our ideas1 and that every significant  
name stands for an idea4 ,this being so1
 and it being withal certain that names 
which yet are not thought altogether    
insignificant do not always mark out    
,,particular conceivable ideas1 it is   
straightway concluded that ,,they       
,,stand ,,for ,,abstract ,,notions4     
,that there are many names in use       
amongst speculative men which do not    
always suggest to others determinate1   
particular ideas1 or in truth anything  

at all1 is what nobody will deny4 ,and a
 little attention will discover that it 
is not necessary 7even in the strictest 
reasonings7 significant names which     
stand for ideas should1 every time they 
are used1 excite in the understanding   
the ideas they are made to stand for--in
 reading and discoursing1 names being   
for the most part used as letters are in
 ,,algebra1 in which1 though a          
particular quantity be marked by each   
letter1 yet to proceed right it is not  
requisite that in every step each letter
 suggest to your thoughts that          
particular quantity it was appointed to 
stand for4,note4  ,note3 ,language has  
become the source or origin of abstract 
general ideas on account of a twofold   
error4--7#a47 ,that every word has only 
one signification4 7#b47 ,that the only 
end of language is the communication of 
our ideas--,ed4  #bj4 ,,some ,,of ,,the 
,,ends ,,of ,,language4--,besides1 the  
communicating of ideas marked by words  
is not the chief and only end of        

language1 as is commonly supposed4      
,there are other ends1 as the raising of
 some passion1 the exciting to or       
deterring from an action1 the putting   
the mind in some particular             
disposition--to which the former is in  
many cases barely subservient1 and      
sometimes entirely omitted1 when these  
can be obtained without it1 as ,i think 
does not unfrequently happen in the     
familiar use of language4 ,i entreat the
 reader to reflect with himself1 and see
 if it doth not often happen1 either in 
hearing or reading a discourse1 that the
 passions of fear1 love1 hatred1        
admiration1 disdain1 and the like1 arise
 immediately in his mind upon the       
perception of certain words1 without any
 ideas coming between4 ,at first1       
indeed1 the words might have occasioned 
ideas that were fitting to produce those
 emotions2 but1 if ,i mistake not1 it   
will be found that1 when language is    
once grown familiar1 the hearing of the 
sounds or sight of the characters is oft

 immediately attended with those        
passions which at first were wont to be 
produced by the intervention of ideas   
that are now quite omitted4 ,may we not1
 for example1 be affected with the      
promise of a ,,good ,,thing1 though we  
have not an idea of what it is8 ,or is  
not the being threatened with danger    
sufficient to excite a dread1 though we 
think not of any particular evil likely 
to befal us1 nor yet frame to ourselves 
an idea of danger in abstract8 ,if any  
one shall join ever so little reflexion 
of his own to what has been said1 ,i    
believe that it will evidently appear to
 him that general names are often used  
in the propriety of language without the
 speaker's designing them for marks of  
ideas in his own1 which he would have   
them raise in the mind of the hearer4   
,even proper names themselves do not    
seem always spoken with a design to     
bring into our view the ideas of those  
individuals that are supposed to be     
marked by them4 ,for example1 when a    

schoolman tells me ,aristotle has said  
it1 all ,i conceive he means by it is to
 dispose me to embrace his opinion with 
the deference and submission which      
custom has annexed to that name4 ,and   
this effect is often so instantly       
produced in the minds of those who are  
accustomed to resign their judgment to  
authority of that philosopher1 as it is 
impossible any idea either of his       
person1 writings1 or reputation should  
go before ,note44 ,innumerable examples 
of this kind may be given1 but why      
should ,i insist on those things which  
every one's experience will1 ,i doubt   
not1 plentifully suggest unto him8      
,note3 ,so close and immediate a        
connection may custom establish betwixt 
the very word ,,aristotle1 and the      
motions of assent and reverence in the  
minds of some men4--,edit #agaj4  #ba4  
,,caution ,,in ,,the ,,use ,,of         
,,language ,,necessary4--,we have1 ,i   
think1 shown the impossibility of       
,,abstract ,,ideas4 ,we have considered 

what has been said for them by their    
ablest patrons2 and endeavored to show  
they are of no use for those ends to    
which they are thought necessary4 ,and  
lastly1 we have traced them to the      
source from whence they flow1 which     
appears evidently to be language4--,it  
cannot be denied that words are of      
excellent use1 in that by their means   
all that stock of knowledge which has   
been purchased by the joint labours of  
inquisitive men in all ages and nations 
may be drawn into the view and made the 
possession of one single person4 ,but at
 the same time it must be owned that    
most parts of knowledge have been       
strangely perplexed and darkened by the 
abuse of words1 and general ways of     
speech wherein they are delivered4,note 
#a4 ,since therefore words are so apt to
 impose on the understanding,note #b41  
whatever ideas ,i consider1 ,i shall    
endeavour to take them bare and naked   
into my view1 keeping out of my thoughts
 so far as ,i am able1 those names which

 long and constant use has so strictly  
united with them2 from which ,i may     
expect to derive the following          
advantages3  ,note #a3 ,that it may     
almost be made a question1 whether      
language has contributed more to the    
hindrance or advancement of the         
sciences4--,edit #agaj4  ,note #b3 ,i am
 resolved in my inquiries to make as    
little use of them as possibly ,i       
can4--,edit #agaj4  #bb4 ,,first1 ,i    
shall be sure to get clear of all       
controversies ,,purely ,,verbal--the    
springing up of which weeds in almost   
all the sciences has been a main        
hindrance to the growth of true and     
sound knowledge4 ,,secondly1 this seems 
to be a sure way to extricate myself out
 of that fine and subtle net of         
,,abstract ,,ideas which has so         
miserably perplexed and entangled the   
minds of men2 and that with this        
peculiar circumstance1 that by how much 
the finer and more curious was the wit  
of any man1 by so much the deeper was he

 likely to be ensnared and faster held  
therein4 ,,thirdly1 so long as ,i       
confine my thoughts to my own ideas     
divested of words1 ,i do not see how ,i 
can easily be mistaken4 ,the objects ,i 
consider1 ,i clearly and adequately     
know4 ,i cannot be deceived in thinking 
,i have an idea which ,i have not4 ,it  
is not possible for me to imagine that  
any of my own ideas are alike or unlike 
that are not truly so4 ,to discern the  
agreements or disagreements there are   
between my ideas1 to see what ideas are 
included in any compound idea and what  
not1 there is nothing more requisite    
than an attentive perception of what    
passes in my own understanding4  #bc4   
,but the attainment of all ,,these      
,,advantages doth ,,presuppose ,,an     
,,entire ,,deliverance ,,from ,,the     
,,deception ,,of ,,words1 which ,i dare 
hardly promise myself2 so difficult a   
thing it is to dissolve an union so     
early begun1 and confirmed by so long a 
habit as that betwixt words and ideas4  

,which difficulty seems to have been    
very much increased by the doctrine of  
,,abstraction4 ,for1 so long as men     
thought abstract ideas were annexed to  
their words1 it doth not seem strange   
that they should use words for ideas--it
 being found an impracticable thing to  
lay aside the word1 and ,,retain ,,the  
,,abstract ,,idea ,,in ,,the ,,mind1    
,,which ,,in ,,itself ,,was ,,perfectly 
,,inconceivable4 ,this seems to me the  
principal cause why those men who have  
so emphatically recommended to others   
the laying aside all use of words in    
their meditations1 and contemplating    
their bare ideas1 have yet failed to    
perform it themselves4 ,of late many    
have been very sensible of the absurd   
opinions and insignificant disputes     
which grow out of the abuse of words4   
,and1 in order to remedy these evils1   
they advise well1 that we attend to the 
ideas signified1 and draw off our       
attention from the words which signify  
them4 ,but1 how good soever this advice 

may be they have given others1 it is    
plain they could not have a due regard  
to it themselves1 so long as they       
thought the only immediate use of words 
was to signify ideas1 and that the      
immediate signification of every general
 name was a ,,determinate ,,abstract    
,,idea4  #bd4 ,but1 ,,these ,,being     
,,known ,,to ,,be ,,mistakes1 ,a ,,man  
,,may with greater ease ,,prevent ,,his 
,,being ,,imposed ,,on ,,by ,,words4 ,he
 that knows he has no other than        
particular ideas1 will not puzzle       
himself in vain to find out and conceive
 the abstract idea annexed to any name4 
,and he that knows names do not always  
stand for ideas will spare himself the  
labour of looking for ideas where there 
are none to be had4 ,it were1 therefore1
 to be wished that everyone would use   
his utmost endeavours to obtain a clear 
view of the ideas he would consider1    
separating from them all that dress and 
incumbrance of words which so much      
contribute to blind the judgment and    

divide the attention4 ,in vain do we    
extend our view into the heavens and pry
 into the entrails of the earth1 in vain
 do we consult the writings of learned  
men and trace the dark footsteps of     
antiquity--we need only draw the curtain
 of words1 to hold the fairest tree of  
knowledge1 whose fruit is excellent1 and
 within the reach of our hand4  #be4    
,unless we take care ,,to ,,clear ,,the 
,,first ,,principles ,,of ,,knowledge   
,,from ,,the embarras and ,,delusion    
,,of ,,words1 we may make infinite      
reasonings upon them to no purpose2 we  
may draw consequences from consequences1
 and be never the wiser4 ,the farther we
 go1 we shall only lose ourselves the   
more irrecoverably1 and be the deeper   
entangled in difficulties and mistakes4 
,whoever therefore designs to read the  
following sheets1 ,i entreat him to make
 my words the occasion of his own       
thinking1 and endeavour to attain the   
same train of thoughts in reading that  
,i had in writing them4 ,by this means  

it will be easy for him to discover the 
truth or falsity of what ,i say4 ,he    
will be out of all danger of being      
deceived by my words1 and ,i do not see 
how he can be led into an error by      
considering his own naked1 undisguised  
ideas4     ,,of ,,the ,,principles ,,of 
,,human ,,knowledge   #a4 ,,objects ,,of
 ,,human ,,knowledge4--,it is evident to
 any one who takes a survey of the      
objects of human knowledge1 that they   
are either ,,ideas actually imprinted on
 the senses2 or else such as are        
perceived by attending to the passions  
and operations of the mind2 or lastly1  
ideas formed by help of memory and      
imagination--either compounding1        
dividing1 or barely representing those  
originally perceived in the aforesaid   
ways4 ,by sight ,i have the ideas of    
light and colours1 with their several   
degrees and variations4 ,by touch ,i    
perceive hard and soft1 heat and cold1  
motion and resistance1 and of all these 
more and less either as to quantity or  

degree4 ,smelling furnishes me with     
odours2 the palate with tastes2 and     
hearing conveys sounds to the mind in   
all their variety of tone and           
composition4 ,and as several of these   
are observed to accompany each other1   
they come to be marked by one name1 and 
so to be reputed as one thing4 ,thus1   
for example a certain colour1 taste1    
smell1 figure and consistence having    
been observed to go together1 are       
accounted one distinct thing1 signified 
by the name ,,apple4 ,other collections 
of ideas constitute a stone1 a tree1 a  
book1 and the like sensible             
things--which as they are pleasing or   
disagreeable excite the passions of     
love1 hatred1 joy1 grief1 and so forth4 
#b4 ,,mind--,,spirit--,,soul4--,but1    
besides all that endless variety of     
ideas or objects of knowledge1 there is 
likewise something which knows or       
perceives them1 and exercises divers    
operations1 as willing1 imagining1      
remembering1 about them4 ,this          

perceiving1 active being is what ,i call
 ,,mind1 ,,spirit1 ,,soul1 or ,,myself4 
,by which words ,i do not denote any one
 of my ideas1 but a thing entirely      
distinct from them1 ,,wherein ,,they    
,,exist1 or1 which is the same thing1   
whereby they are perceived--for the     
existence of an idea consists in being  
perceived4  #c4 ,,how ,,far ,,the       
,,assent ,,of ,,the ,,vulgar            
,,conceded4--,that neither our thoughts1
 nor passions1 nor ideas formed by the  
imagination1 exist ,,without the mind1  
is what ,,everybody ,,will ,,allow4 ,and
 it seems no less evident that the      
various sensations or ideas imprinted on
 the sense1 however blended or combined 
together 7that is1 whatever objects they
 compose71 cannot exist otherwise than  
,,in a mind perceiving them4 ,i think an
 intuitive knowledge may be obtained of 
this by any one that shall attend to    
,,what ,,is ,,meant ,,by ,,the ,,term   
,,exist1 when applied to sensible       
things4 ,the table ,i write on ,i say   

exists1 that is1 ,i see and feel it2 and
 if ,i were out of my study ,i should   
say it existed--meaning thereby that if 
,i was in my study ,i might perceive it1
 or that some other spirit actually does
 perceive it4,note4 ,there was an odour1
 that is1 it was smelt2 there was a     
sound1 that is1 it was heard2 a colour  
or figure1 and it was perceived by sight
 or touch4 ,this is all that ,i can     
understand by these and the like        
expressions4 ,for as to what is said of 
the absolute existence of unthinking    
things without any relation to their    
being perceived1 that seems perfectly   
unintelligible4 ,their ,,esse is        
,,percipi1 nor is it possible they      
should have any existence out of the    
minds or thinking things which perceive 
them4  ,note3 ,first argument in support
 of the author's theory4  #d4 ,,the     
,,vulgar ,,opinion ,,involves ,a        
,,contradiction4--,it is indeed an      
opinion ,,strangely prevailing amongst  
men1 that houses1 mountains1 rivers1 and

 in a word all sensible objects1 have an
 existence1 natural or real1 distinct   
from their being perceived by the       
understanding4 ,but1 with how great an  
assurance and acquiescence soever this  
principle may be entertained in the     
world1 yet whoever shall find in his    
heart to call it in question may1 if ,i 
mistake not1 perceive it to involve a   
manifest contradiction4 ,for1 what are  
the fore-mentioned objects but the      
things we perceive by sense8 and what do
 we ,,perceive ,,besides ,,our ,,own    
,,ideas ,,or ,,sensations8 and is it not
 plainly repugnant that any one of      
these1 or any combination of them1      
should exist unperceived8  #e4 ,,cause  
,,of ,,this ,,prevalent ,,error4--,if we
 thoroughly examine this tenet it will1 
perhaps1 be found at bottom to depend on
 the doctrine of ,,abstract ,,ideas4    
,for can there be a nicer strain of     
abstraction than to distinguish the     
existence of sensible objects from their
 being perceived1 so as to conceive them

 existing unperceived8 ,light and       
colours1 heat and cold1 extension and   
figures--in a word the things we see and
 feel--what are they but so many        
sensations1 notions1 ideas1 or          
impressions on the sense8 and is it     
possible to separate1 even in thought1  
any of these from perception8 ,for my   
part1 ,i might as easily divide a thing 
from itself4 ,i may1 indeed1 divide in  
my thoughts1 or conceive apart from each
 other1 those things which1 perhaps ,i  
never perceived by sense so divided4    
,thus1 ,i imagine the trunk of a human  
body without the limbs1 or conceive the 
smell of a rose without thinking on the 
rose itself4 ,so far1 ,i will not deny1 
,i can abstract--if that may properly be
 called ,,abstraction which extends only
 to the conceiving separately such      
objects as it is possible may really    
exist or be actually perceived asunder4 
,but my conceiving or imagining power   
does not extend beyond the possibility  
of real existence or perception4 ,hence1

 as it is impossible for me to see or   
feel anything without an actual         
sensation of that thing1 so is it       
impossible for me to conceive in my     
thoughts any sensible thing or object   
distinct from the sensation or          
perception of it4,note4  ,note3 ,in     
truth the object and the sensation are  
the same thing1 and cannot therefore be 
abstracted from each other--,edit #agaj4
  #f4 ,some truths there are so near and
 obvious to the mind that a man need    
only open his eyes to see them4 ,such ,i
 take this important one to be1 viz41   
that all the choir of heaven and        
furniture of the earth1 in a word all   
those bodies which compose the mighty   
frame of the world1 have not any        
subsistence without a mind1 that their  
,,being 7,,esse7 is to be perceived or  
known2 that consequently so long as they
 are not actually perceived by me1 or do
 not exist in my mind or that of any    
other ,,created ,,spirit1 they must     
either have no existence at all1 ,,or   

,,else ,,subsist ,,in ,,the ,,mind ,,of 
,,some ,,eternal ,,spirit--it being     
perfectly unintelligible1 and involving 
all the absurdity of abstraction1 to    
attribute to any single part of them an 
existence independent of a spirit       
,note44 ,to be convinced of which1 the  
reader need only reflect1 and try to    
separate in his own thoughts the being  
of a sensible thing from its being      
perceived4  ,note3 ,to make this appear 
with all the light and evidence of an   
axiom1 it seems sufficient if ,i can but
 awaken the reflection of the reader1   
that he may take an impartial view of   
his own meaning1 and in turn his        
thoughts upon the subject itself1 free  
and disengaged from all embarrass of    
words and prepossession in favour of    
received mistakes4--,edit #agaj  #g4    
,,second ,,argument4,note4--,from what  
has been said it follows there is ,,not 
,,any ,,other ,,substance ,,than        
,,spirit1 or that which perceives4 ,but1
 for the fuller proof of this point1 let

 it be considered the sensible qualities
 are colour1 figure1 motion1 smell1     
taste1 etc41 i4e4 the ideas perceived by
 sense4 ,now1 for an idea to exist in an
 unperceiving thing is a manifest       
contradiction1 for ,,to ,,have ,,an     
,,idea ,,is ,,all ,,one ,,as ,,to       
,,perceive2 that therefore wherein      
colour1 figure1 and the like qualities  
exist must perceive them2 hence it is   
clear there can be no ,,unthinking      
substance or ,,substratum of those      
ideas4  ,note3 ,vide sect4 iii4 and xxv4
  #h4 ,,objection4--,,answer4--,but1 say
 you1 though the ideas themselves do not
 exist without the mind1 yet there may  
be things ,,like them1 whereof they are 
copies or resemblances1 which things    
exist without the mind in an unthinking 
substance4 ,i ,,answer1 an idea can be  
like nothing but an idea2 a colour or   
figure can be like nothing but another  
colour or figure4 ,if we look but never 
so little into our thoughts1 we shall   
find it impossible for us to conceive a 

likeness except only between our ideas4 
,again1 ,i ask whether those supposed   
originals or external things1 of which  
our ideas are the pictures or           
representations1 be themselves          
perceivable or no8 ,if they are1 ,,then 
,,they ,,are ,,ideas and we have gained 
our point2 but if you say they are not1 
,i appeal to any one whether it be sense
 to assert a colour is like something   
which is invisible2 hard or soft1 like  
something which is intangible2 and so of
 the rest4  #i4 ,,the ,,philosophical   
,,notion ,,of ,,matter ,,involves ,a    
,,contradiction4--,some there are who   
make a ,,distinction betwixt ,,primary  
and ,,secondary qualities4 ,by the      
former they mean extension1 figure1     
motion1 rest1 solidity or               
impenetrability1 and number2 by the     
latter they denote all other sensible   
qualities1 as colours1 sounds1 tastes1  
and so forth4 ,the ideas we have of     
these they acknowledge not to be the    
resemblances of anything existing       

without the mind1 or unperceived1 but   
they will have our ideas of the primary 
qualities to be patterns or images of   
things which exist without the mind1 in 
an unthinking substance which they call 
,,matter4 ,by ,,matter1 therefore1 we   
are to understand an inert1 senseless   
substance1 in which extension1 figure1  
and motion ,,do ,,actually ,,subsist4   
,but it is evident from what we have    
already shown1 that extension1 figure1  
and motion are ,,only ,,ideas ,,existing
 ,,in ,,the ,,mind1 and that an idea can
 be like nothing but another idea1 and  
that consequently neither they nor their
 archetypes can exist in an             
,,unperceiving substance4 ,hence1 it is 
plain that the very notion of what is   
called ,,matter or ,,corporeal          
,,substance1 involves a contradiction in
 it4,note4  ,note3 ,insomuch that ,i    
should not think it necessary to spend  
more time in exposing its absurdity4    
,but because the tenet of the existence 
of matter seems to have taken so deep a 

root in the minds of philosophers1 and  
draws after it so many ill consequences1
 ,i choose rather to be thought prolix  
and tedious1 than omit anything that    
might conduce to the full discovery and 
extirpation of the prejudice4--,edit    
#agaj4  #aj4 ,,argumentum ,,ad          
,,hominem4--,they who assert that       
figure1 motion1 and the rest of the     
primary or original qualities do exist  
without the mind in unthinking          
substances1 do at the same time         
acknowledge that colours1 sounds1 heat  
cold1 and suchlike secondary qualities1 
do not--which they tell us are          
sensations existing ,,in ,,the ,,mind   
,,alone1 that depend on and are         
occasioned by the different size1       
texture1 and motion of the minute       
particles of matter4 ,this they take for
 an undoubted truth1 which they can     
demonstrate beyond all exception4 ,now1 
if it be certain that those original    
qualities ,,are ,,inseparably ,,united  
,,with ,,the ,,other ,,sensible         

,,qualities1 and not1 even in thought1  
capable of being abstracted from them1  
it plainly follows that they exist only 
in the mind4 ,but ,i desire any one to  
reflect and try whether he can1 by any  
abstraction of thought1 conceive the    
extension and motion of a body without  
all other sensible qualities4 ,for my   
own part1 ,i see evidently that it is   
not in my power to frame an idea of a   
body extended and moving1 but ,i must   
withal give it some colour or other     
sensible quality which is ,,acknowledged
 to exist only in the mind4 ,in short1  
extension1 figure1 and motion1          
abstracted from all other qualities1 are
 inconceivable4 ,where therefore the    
other sensible qualities are1 there must
 these be also1 to wit1 in the mind and 
nowhere else4  #aa4 ,a ,,second         
,,argument ,,ad ,,hominem4--,again1     
,,great and ,,small1 ,,swift and ,,slow1
 ,,are ,,allowed ,,to ,,exist ,,nowhere 
,,without ,,the ,,mind1 being entirely  
,,relative1 and changing as the frame or

 position of the organs of sense varies4
 ,the extension therefore which exists  
without the mind is neither great nor   
small1 the motion neither swift nor     
slow1 that is1 they are nothing at all4 
,but1 say you1 they are extension in    
general1 and motion in general3 thus we 
see how much the tenet of extended      
movable substances existing without the 
mind depends on the strange doctrine of 
,,abstract ,,ideas4 ,and here ,i cannot 
but remark how nearly the vague and     
indeterminate description of ,matter or 
corporeal substance1 which the modern   
philosophers are run into by their own  
principles1 resembles that antiquated   
and so much ridiculed notion of         
,,materia ,,prima1 to be met with in    
,aristotle and his followers4 ,without  
extension solidity cannot be conceived2 
since therefore it has been shown that  
extension exists not in an unthinking   
substance1 the same must also be true of
 solidity4  #ab4 ,that ,,number is      
entirely ,,the ,,creature ,,of ,,the    

,,mind1 even though the other qualities 
be allowed to exist without1 will be    
evident to whoever considers that the   
same thing bears a different            
denomination of number as the mind views
 it with different respects4 ,thus1 the 
same extension is one1 or three1 or     
thirty-six1 according as the mind       
considers it with reference to a yard1 a
 foot1 or an inch4 ,number is so visibly
 relative1 and dependent on men's       
understanding1 that it is strange to    
think how any one should give it an     
absolute existence without the mind4 ,we
 say one book1 one page1 one line1 etc42
 all these are equally units1 though    
some contain several of the others4 ,and
 in each instance1 it is plain1 the unit
 relates to some particular combination 
of ideas arbitrarily put together by the
 mind4  #ac4 ,,unity ,i know some will  
have to be ,a ,,simple ,,or             
,,uncompounded ,,idea1 accompanying all 
other ideas into the mind4 ,that ,i have
 any such idea answering the word       

,,unity ,i do not find2 and if ,i had1  
methinks ,i could not miss finding it3  
on the contrary1 it should be the most  
familiar to my understanding1 since it  
is said to accompany all other ideas1   
and to be perceived by all the ways of  
sensation and reflexion4 ,to say no     
more1 it is an ,,abstract ,,idea4  #ad4 
,a ,,third ,,argument ,,ad              
,,hominem4--,i shall farther add1 that1 
after the same manner as modern         
philosophers prove certain sensible     
qualities to have no existence in       
,matter1 or without the mind1 the same  
thing may be likewise proved of all     
other sensible qualities whatsoever4    
,thus1 for instance1 it is said that    
heat and cold are affections only of the
 mind1 and not at all patterns of real  
beings1 existing in the corporeal       
substances which excite them1 for that  
the same body which appears cold to one 
hand seems warm to another4 ,now1 why   
may we not as well argue that figure and
 extension are not patterns or          

resemblances of qualities existing in   
,matter1 because to the same eye at     
different stations1 or eyes of a        
different texture at the same station1  
they appear various1 and cannot         
therefore be the images of anything     
,,settled ,,and ,,determinate ,,without 
,,the ,,mind8 ,again1 it is proved that 
,,sweetness is not really in the sapid  
thing1 because the thing remaining      
unaltered the sweetness is changed into 
bitter1 as in case of a fever or        
otherwise vitiated palate4 ,is it not as
 reasonable to say that ,,motion is not 
without the mind1 since if the          
succession of ideas in the mind become  
swifter1 the motion1 it is acknowledged1
 shall appear slower without any        
alteration in any external object8  #ae4
 ,,not ,,conclusive ,,as ,,to           
,,extension4--,in short1 let any one    
consider those arguments which are      
thought manifestly to prove that colours
 and taste exist only in the mind1 and  
he shall find they may with equal force 

be brought to prove the same thing of   
extension1 figure1 and motion4 ,though  
it must be confessed this method of     
arguing does not so much prove that     
there is no extension or colour in an   
outward object1 as that we do not know  
by ,,sense which is the ,,true extension
 or colour of the object4 ,but the      
arguments foregoing plainly show it to  
be impossible that any colour or        
extension at all1 or other sensible     
quality whatsoever1 should exist in an  
,,unthinking subject without the mind1  
or in truth1 that there should be any   
such thing as an outward object4  #af4  
,but let us examine a little the        
received opinion4--,it is said          
,,extension is a ,,mode or accident ,,of
 ,,matter1 and that ,matter is the      
,,substratum that supports it4 ,now ,i  
desire that you would explain to me what
 is meant by ,matter's ,,supporting     
extension4 ,say you1 ,i have no idea of 
,matter and therefore cannot explain it4
 ,i answer1 though you have no positive1

 yet1 if you have any meaning at all1   
you must at least have a relative idea  
of ,matter2 though you know not what it 
is1 yet you must be supposed to know    
what relation it bears to accidents1 and
 what is meant by its supporting them4  
,it is evident ,,support cannot here be 
taken in its usual or literal sense--as 
when we say that pillars support a      
building2 in what sense therefore must  
it be taken8 ,note4  ,note3 ,for my     
part1 ,i am not able to discover any    
sense at all that can be applicable to  
it4--,edit #agaj4  #ag4 ,,philosophical 
,,meaning ,,of ,,material ,,substance   
,,divisible ,,into ,,two ,,parts4--,if  
we inquire into what the most accurate  
philosophers declare themselves to mean 
by ,,material ,,substance1 we shall find
 them acknowledge they have no other    
meaning annexed to those sounds but the 
idea of ,,being ,,in ,,general1 together
 ,,with ,,the ,,relative ,,notion ,,of  
,,its ,,supporting ,,accidents4 ,the    
general idea of ,being appeareth to me  

the most abstract and incomprehensible  
of all other2 and as for its supporting 
accidents1 this1 as we have just now    
observed1 cannot be understood in the   
common sense of those words2 it must    
therefore be taken in some other sense1 
but what that is they do not explain4   
,so that when ,i consider the ,,two     
,,parts or branches which make the      
signification of the words ,,material   
,,substance1 ,i am convinced there is no
 distinct meaning annexed to them4 ,but 
why should we trouble ourselves any     
farther1 in discussing this material    
,,substratum or support of figure and   
motion1 and other sensible qualities8   
,does it not suppose they have an       
existence without the mind8 ,and is not 
this a direct repugnancy1 and altogether
 inconceivable8  #ah4 ,,the ,,existence 
,,of ,,external ,,bodies ,,wants        
,,proof4--,but1 though it were possible 
that solid1 figured1 movable substances 
may exist without the mind1             
corresponding to the ideas we have of   

bodies1 yet ,,how ,,is ,,it ,,possible  
,,for ,,us ,,to ,,know ,,this8 ,either  
we must know it by sense or by reason4  
,as for our senses1 by them we have the 
knowledge ,,only ,,of ,,our             
,,sensations1 ideas1 or those things    
that are immediately perceived by sense1
 call them what you will3 but they do   
not inform us that things exist without 
the mind1 or unperceived1 like to those 
which are perceived4 ,this the          
materialists themselves acknowledge4 ,it
 remains therefore that if we have any  
knowledge at all of external things1 it 
must be by ,,reason1 inferring their    
existence from what is immediately      
perceived by sense4 ,but what reason can
 induce us to believe the existence of  
bodies without the mind1 from what we   
perceive1 since the very patrons of     
,matter themselves do not pretend there 
is ,,any ,,necessary ,,connexion        
,,betwixt ,,them ,,and ,,our ,,ideas8 ,i
 say it is granted on all hands 7and    
what happens in dreams1 phrensies1 and  

the like1 puts it beyond dispute7 that  
,,it ,,is ,,possible ,,we ,,might ,,be  
,,affected ,,with ,,all ,,the ,,ideas   
,,we ,,have ,,now1 ,,though ,,there     
,,were ,,no ,,bodies ,,existing         
,,without ,,resembling ,,them4 ,hence1  
it is evident the supposition of        
external bodies is not necessary for the
 producing our ideas2 since it is       
granted they are produced sometimes1 and
 might possibly be produced always in   
the same order1 we see them in at       
present1 without their concurrence4     
#ai4  ,,the ,,existence ,,of ,,external 
,,bodies ,,affords ,,no ,,explication   
,,of ,,the ,,manner ,,in ,,which ,,our  
,,ideas ,,are ,,produced4--,but1 though 
we might possibly have all our          
sensations without them1 yet perhaps it 
may be thought ,,easier to conceive and 
explain the ,,manner of their           
production1 by supposing external bodies
 in their likeness rather than          
otherwise2 and so it might be at least  
probable there are such things as bodies

 that excite their ideas in our minds4  
,but neither can this be said2 for1     
though we give the materialists their   
external bodies1 they by their own      
confession are never the nearer knowing 
how our ideas are produced2 since they  
own themselves unable to comprehend in  
what manner ,,body ,,can ,,act ,,upon   
,,spirit1 or how it is possible it      
should imprint any idea in the mind4    
,hence it is evident the production of  
ideas or sensations in our minds can be 
no reason why we should suppose ,matter 
or corporeal substances1 ,,since ,,that 
,,is ,,acknowledged ,,to ,,remain       
,,equally ,,inexplicable ,,with ,,or    
,,without ,,this ,,supposition4 ,if     
therefore it were possible for bodies to
 exist without the mind1 yet to hold    
they do so1 must needs be a very        
precarious opinion2 since it is to      
suppose1 without any reason at all1 that
 ,god has created innumerable beings    
,,that ,,are ,,entirely ,,useless1 ,,and
 ,,serve ,,to ,,no ,,manner ,,of        

,,purpose4  #bj4 ,,dilemma4--,in short1 
if there were external bodies1 it is    
impossible we should ever come to know  
it2 and if there were not1 we might have
 the very same reasons to think there   
were that we have now4 ,suppose--what no
 one can deny possible--an intelligence 
without the help of external bodies1 to 
be affected with the same train of      
sensations or ideas that you are1       
imprinted in the same order and with    
like vividness in his mind4 ,i ask      
whether that intelligence has not all   
the reason to believe the existence of  
corporeal substances1 represented by his
 ideas1 and exciting them in his mind1  
that you can possibly have for believing
 the same thing8 ,of this there can be  
no question--which one consideration    
were enough to make any reasonable      
person suspect the strength of whatever 
arguments be may think himself to have1 
for the existence of bodies without the 
mind4  #ba4 ,were it necessary to add   
any ,,further ,,proof ,,against ,,the   

,,existence ,,of ,,matter after what has
 been said1 ,i could instance several of
 those errors and difficulties 7not to  
mention impieties7 which have sprung    
from that tenet4 ,it has occasioned     
numberless controversies and disputes in
 philosophy1 and not a few of far       
greater moment in religion4 ,but ,i     
shall not enter into the detail of them 
in this place1 as well because ,i think 
arguments ,a ,,posteriori are           
unnecessary for confirming what has     
been1 if ,i mistake not1 sufficiently   
demonstrated ,a ,,priori1 as because ,i 
shall hereafter find occasion to speak  
somewhat of them4  #bb4 ,i am afraid ,i 
have given cause to think ,i am         
needlessly prolix in handling this      
subject4 ,for1 to what purpose is it to 
dilate on that which may be demonstrated
 with the utmost evidence in a line or  
two1 to any one that is capable of the  
least reflexion8 ,it is but looking into
 your own thoughts1 and so trying       
whether you can conceive it possible for

 a sound1 or figure1 or motion1 or      
colour to exist without the mind or     
unperceived4 ,this easy trial may       
perhaps make you see that what you      
contend for is a downright              
contradiction4 ,insomuch that ,i am     
content to put the whole upon this      
issue3--,if you can but ,,conceive it   
possible for one extended movable       
substance1 or1 in general1 for any one  
idea1 or anything like an idea1 to exist
 otherwise than in a mind perceiving it1
 ,i shall readily give up the cause4    
,and1 as for all that ,,compages of     
external bodies you contend for1 ,i     
shall grant you its existence1 ,,though 
7#a47 ,,you ,,cannot ,,either ,,give    
,,me ,,any ,,reason ,,why ,,you         
,,believe ,,it ,,exists ,vide sect4     
lviii41 ,,or 7#b47 ,,assign ,,any ,,use 
,,to ,,it ,,when ,,it ,,is ,,supposed   
,,to ,,exist ,vide sect4 lx44 ,i say1   
the bare possibility of your opinions   
being true shall pass for an argument   
that it is so4 ,note3 i4e4 although your

 argument be deficient in the two       
requisites of an hypothesis4--,ed4  #bc4
 ,but1 say you1 surely there is nothing 
easier than for me to imagine trees1 for
 instance1 in a park1 or books existing 
in a closet1 and nobody by to perceive  
them4 ,i answer1 you may so1 there is no
 difficulty in it2 but what is all this1
 ,i beseech you1 more than framing in   
your mind certain ideas which you call  
,,books and ,,trees1 and the same time  
omitting to frame the idea of any one   
that may perceive them8 ,,but ,,do ,,not
 ,,you ,,yourself ,,perceive ,,or       
,,think ,,of ,,them ,,all ,,the ,,while8
 ,this therefore is nothing to the      
purpose2 it only shows you have the     
power of imagining or forming ideas in  
your mind3 but it does not show that you
 can conceive it possible the objects of
 your thought may exist without the     
mind4 ,to make out this1 ,,it ,,is      
,,necessary ,,that ,,you ,,conceive     
,,them ,,existing ,,unconceived ,,or    
,,unthought ,,of1 ,,which ,,is ,a       

,,manifest ,,repugnancy4 ,when we do our
 utmost to conceive the existence of    
external bodies1 we are all the while   
only contemplating our own ideas4 ,but  
the mind taking no notice of itself1 is 
deluded to think it can and does        
conceive bodies existing unthought of or
 without the mind1 though at the same   
time they are apprehended by or exist in
 itself4 ,a little attention will       
discover to any one the truth and       
evidence of what is here said1 and make 
it unnecessary to insist on any other   
proofs against the existence of material
 substance4  #bd4 ,,the ,,absolute      
,,existence ,,of ,,unthinking ,,things  
,,are ,,words ,,without ,a              
,,meaning4--,it is very obvious1 upon   
the least inquiry into our thoughts1 to 
know whether it is possible for us to   
understand what is meant by the         
,,absolute ,,existence ,,of ,,sensible  
,,objects ,,in ,,themselves1 ,,or       
,,without ,,the ,,mind4 ,to me it is    
evident those words mark out either a   

direct contradiction1 or else nothing at
 all4 ,and to convince others of this1  
,i know no readier or fairer way than to
 entreat they would calmly attend to    
their own thoughts2 and if by this      
attention the emptiness or repugnancy of
 those expressions does appear1 surely  
nothing more is requisite for the       
conviction4 ,it is on this therefore    
that ,i insist1 to wit1 that the        
,,absolute existence of unthinking      
things are words without a meaning1 or  
which include a contradiction4 ,this is 
what ,i repeat and inculcate1 and       
earnestly recommend to the attentive    
thoughts of the reader4  #be4 ,,third   
,,argument4,note3 ,vide sect4 iii4 and  
vii4--,,refutation ,,of ,,locke4--,all  
our ideas1 sensations1 notions1 or the  
things which we perceive1 by whatsoever 
names they may be distinguished1 are    
visibly inactive--there is nothing of   
power or agency included in them4 ,so   
that ,,one ,,idea or object of thought  
,,cannot ,,produce or make ,,any        

,,alteration ,,in ,,another4 ,to be     
satisfied of the truth of this1 there is
 nothing else requisite but a bare      
observation of our ideas4 ,for1 since   
they and every part of them exist only  
in the mind1 it follows that there is   
nothing in them but what is perceived3  
but whoever shall attend to his ideas1  
whether of sense or reflexion1 will not 
perceive in them any power or activity2 
there is1 therefore1 no such thing      
contained in them4 ,a little attention  
will discover to us that the very being 
of an idea implies passiveness and      
inertness in it1 insomuch that it is    
impossible for an idea to do anything1  
or1 strictly speaking1 to be the cause  
of anything3 neither can it be the      
resemblance or pattern of any active    
being1 as is evident from sect4 #h4     
,whence it plainly follows that         
extension1 figure1 and motion cannot be 
the cause of our sensations4 ,to say1   
therefore1 that these are the effects of
 powers resulting from the              

configuration1 number1 motion1 and size 
of corpuscles1 must certainly be false4 
,note3 ,vide sect4 cii4  #bf4 ,,cause   
,,of ,,ideas4--,we perceive a continual 
succession of ideas1 some are anew      
excited1 others are changed or totally  
disappear4 ,there is therefore some     
cause of these ideas1 whereon they      
depend1 and which produces and changes  
them4 ,that this cause cannot be any    
quality or idea or combination of ideas1
 is clear from the preceding section4   
,it must therefore be a substance2 but  
it has been shown that there is no      
corporeal or material substance3 it     
remains therefore that the ,,cause ,,of 
,,ideas is an incorporeal active        
substance or ,spirit4  #bg4 ,,no ,,idea 
,,of ,,spirit4--,a spirit is one simple1
 undivided1 active being--as it         
perceives ideas it is called the        
,,understanding1 and as it produces or  
otherwise operates about them it is     
called the ,,will4 ,hence there can be  
no idea formed of a soul or spirit2 for 

all ideas whatever1 being passive and   
inert 7vide sect4 #be71 they cannot     
represent unto us1 by way of image or   
,,likeness1 that which acts4 ,a little  
attention will make it plain to any one1
 that to have an idea which shall be    
like that active principle of motion and
 change of ideas is absolutely          
impossible4 ,such is the nature of      
,,spirit1 or that which acts1 that it   
cannot be of itself perceived1 ,,but    
,,only ,,by ,,the ,,effects ,,which ,,it
 ,,produceth4 ,if any man shall doubt of
 the truth of what is here delivered1   
let him but reflect and try if he can   
frame the idea of any power or active   
being1 and whether he has ideas of two  
principal powers1 marked by the names   
,,will and ,,understanding1 distinct    
from each other as well as from a third 
idea of ,substance or ,being in general1
 with a relative notion of its          
supporting or being the subject of the  
aforesaid powers--which is signified by 
the name ,,soul or ,,spirit4 ,this is   

what some hold2 but1 so far as ,i can   
see1 the words ,,will ,note3            
,understanding1 mind4--,edit #agaj41    
,,soul1 ,,spirit1 do not stand for      
different ideas1 or1 in truth1 for any  
idea at all1 but for something which is 
very different from ideas1 and which1   
being an agent1 cannot be like unto1 or 
represented by1 any idea whatsoever4    
,though it must be owned at the same    
time that we have some notion of soul1  
spirit1 and the operations of the mind3 
such as willing1 loving1                
hating--inasmuch as we know or          
understand the meaning of these words4  
#bh4 ,i find ,i can excite ideas in my  
mind at pleasure1 and vary and shift the
 scene as oft as ,i think fit4 ,it is no
 more than willing1 and straightway this
 or that idea arises in my fancy2 and by
 the same power it is obliterated and   
makes way for another4 ,this making and 
unmaking of ideas doth very properly    
denominate the mind active4 ,thus much  
is certain and grounded on experience2  

but when we think of unthinking agents  
or of exciting ideas exclusive of       
volition1 we only amuse ourselves with  
words4  #bi4 ,,ideas ,,of ,,sensation   
,,differ ,,from ,,those ,,of            
,,reflection ,,or ,,memory4--,but1      
whatever power ,i may have over ,,my    
,,own thoughts1 ,i find the ideas       
actually perceived by ,sense have not a 
like dependence on my will4 ,when in    
broad daylight ,i open my eyes1 it is   
not in my power to choose whether ,i    
shall see or no1 or to determine what   
particular objects shall present        
themselves to my view2 and so likewise  
as to the hearing and other senses2 the 
ideas imprinted on them are not         
creatures of my will4 ,there is         
,,therefore ,,some ,,other ,,will ,,or  
,,spirit that ,,produces ,,them4  #cj4  
,,laws ,,of ,,nature4--,the ideas of    
,sense are more strong1 lively1 and     
,,distinct than those of the            
imagination2 they have likewise a       
steadiness1 order1 and coherence1 and   

are not excited at random1 as those     
which are the effects of human wills    
often are1 but in a regular train or    
series1 the admirable connexion whereof 
sufficiently testifies the wisdom and   
benevolence of its ,author4 ,now ,,the  
,,set ,,rules ,,or ,,established        
,,methods ,,wherein ,,the ,,mind ,,we   
,,depend ,,on ,,excites ,,in ,,us ,,the 
,,ideas ,,of ,,sense1 ,,are ,,called    
,,the ,,laws ,,of ,,nature2 and these we
 learn by experience1 which teaches us  
that such and such ideas are attended   
with such and such other ideas1 in the  
ordinary course of things4  #ca4        
,,knowledge ,,of ,,them ,,necessary     
,,for ,,the ,,conduct ,,of ,,worldly    
,,affairs4--,this gives us a sort of    
foresight which enables us to regulate  
our actions for the benefit of life4    
,and without this we should be eternally
 at a loss2 we could not know how to act
 anything that might procure us the     
least pleasure1 or remove the least pain
 of sense4 ,that food nourishes1 sleep  

refreshes1 and fire warms us2 that to   
sow in the seed-time is the way to reap 
in the harvest2 and in general that to  
obtain such or such ends1 such or such  
means are conducive--all this we know1  
,,not ,,by ,,discovering ,,any          
,,necessary ,,connexion ,,between ,,our 
,,ideas1 but only by the observation of 
the settled laws of nature1 without     
which we should be all in uncertainty   
and confusion1 and a grown man no more  
know how to manage himself in the       
affairs of life than an infant just     
born4  #cb4 ,and yet ,,this consistent  
,,uniform ,,working1 which so evidently 
displays the goodness and wisdom of that
 ,governing ,spirit whose ,will         
constitutes the laws of nature1 is so   
far from leading our thoughts to ,him1  
that it rather ,,sends ,,them ,a        
,,wandering ,,after ,,second ,,causes4  
,for1 when we perceive certain ideas of 
,sense constantly followed by other     
ideas and ,,we ,,know ,,this ,,is ,,not 
,,of ,,our ,,own ,,doing1 we forthwith  

attribute power and agency to the ideas 
themselves1 and make one the cause of   
another1 than which nothing can be more 
absurd and unintelligible4 ,thus1 for   
example1 having observed that when we   
perceive by sight a certain round       
luminous figure we at the same time     
perceive by touch the idea or sensation 
called ,,heat1 we do from thence        
conclude the sun to be the cause of     
heat4 ,and in like manner perceiving the
 motion and collision of bodies to be   
attended with sound1 we are inclined to 
think the latter the effect of the      
former4  #cc4 ,,of ,,real ,,things ,,and
 ,,ideas ,,or ,,chimeras4--,the ideas   
imprinted on the ,senses by the ,author 
of nature are called ,,real ,,things2   
and those excited in the imagination    
being less regular1 vivid1 and constant1
 are more properly termed ,,ideas1 or   
,,images ,,of ,,things1 which they copy 
and represent4 ,but then our sensations1
 be they never so vivid and distinct1   
are nevertheless ,,ideas1 that is1 they 

exist in the mind1 or are perceived by  
it1 as truly as the ideas of its own    
framing4 ,the ideas of ,sense are       
allowed to have more reality in them1   
that is1 to be more 7#a7,,strong1       
7#b7,,orderly1 and 7#c7;,,coherent than 
the creatures of the mind2 but this is  
no argument that they exist without the 
mind4 ,they are also 7#d7,,less         
,,dependent ,,on ,,the ,,spirit ,note3  
,vide sect4 xxix4--,note41 or thinking  
substance which perceives them1 in that 
they are excited by the will of another 
and more powerful spirit2 yet still they
 are ,,ideas1 and certainly no ,,idea1  
whether faint or strong1 can exist      
otherwise than in a mind perceiving it4 
#cd4 ,,first ,,general                  
,,objection4--,,answer4--,before we     
proceed any farther it is necessary we  
spend some time in answering objections 
which may probably be made against the  
principles we have hitherto laid down4  
,in doing of which1 if ,i seem too      
prolix to those of quick apprehensions1 

,i hope it may be pardoned1 since all   
men do not equally apprehend things of  
this nature1 and ,i am willing to be    
understood by every one4  ,,first1 then1
 it will be objected that by the        
foregoing principles ,,all ,,that ,,is  
,,real ,,and ,,substantial ,,in ,,nature
 ,,is ,,banished ,,out ,,of ,,the       
,,world1 and instead thereof a          
chimerical scheme of ideas takes place4 
,all things that exist1 exist only in   
the mind1 that is1 they are purely      
notional4 ,what therefore becomes of the
 sun1 moon and stars8 ,what must we     
think of houses1 rivers1 mountains1     
trees1 stones2 nay1 even of our own     
bodies8 ,are all these but so many      
chimeras and illusions on the fancy8 ,to
 all which1 and whatever else of the    
same sort may be objected1 ,i ,,answer1 
that by the principles premised we are  
not deprived of any one thing in nature4
 ,whatever we see1 feel1 hear1 or       
anywise conceive or understand remains  
as secure as ever1 and is as real as    

ever4 ,there is a ,,rerum ,,natura1 and 
the distinction between realities and   
chimeras retains its full force4 ,this  
is evident from sect4 #bi1 #cj1 and #cc1
 where we have shown what is meant by   
,,real ,,things in opposition to        
,,chimeras or ideas of our own framing2 
but then they both equally exist in the 
mind1 and in that sense they are alike  
,,ideas4  #ce4 ,,the ,,existence ,,of   
,,matter1 ,,as ,,understood ,,by        
,,philosophers1 ,,denied4,vide sect4    
lxxxiv4--,i do not argue against the    
existence of any one thing that we can  
apprehend either by sense or reflexion4 
,that the things ,i see with my eyes and
 touch with my hands do exist1 really   
exist1 ,i make not the least question4  
,the only thing whose existence we deny 
,,is ,,that ,,which ,,philosophers      
,,call ,,matter or corporeal substance4 
,and in doing of this there is no damage
 done to the rest of mankind1 who1 ,i   
dare say1 will never miss it4 ,the      
,atheist indeed will want the colour of 

an empty name to support his impiety2   
and the ,philosophers may possibly find 
they have lost a great handle for       
trifling and disputation4  #cf4         
,,readily ,,explained4--,if any man     
thinks this detracts from the existence 
or reality of things1 he is very far    
from understanding what has been        
premised in the plainest terms ,i could 
think of4 ,take here an abstract of what
 has been said3--,there are spiritual   
substances1 minds1 or human souls1 which
 will or excite ideas in themselves at  
pleasure2 but these are faint1 weak1 and
 unsteady in respect of others they     
perceive by sense--which1 being         
impressed upon them according to certain
 rules or laws of nature1 speak         
themselves the effects of a mind more   
powerful and wise than human spirits4   
,these latter are said to have more     
,,reality in them than the former3--by  
which is meant that they are more       
affecting1 orderly1 and distinct1 and   
that they are not fictions of the mind  

perceiving them4 ,and in this sense the 
sun that ,i see by day is the real sun1 
and that which ,i imagine by night is   
the idea of the former4 ,in the sense   
here given of ,,reality it is evident   
that every vegetable1 star1 mineral1 and
 in general each part of the mundane    
system1 is as much a ,,real ,,being by  
our principles as by any other4 ,whether
 others mean anything by the term       
,,reality different from what ,i do1 ,i 
entreat them to look into their own     
thoughts and see4  #cg4 ,,the           
,,philosophic1 ,,not ,,the ,,vulgar     
,,substance1 ,,taken ,,away4--,i will be
 urged that thus much at least is true1 
to wit1 that we take away all corporeal 
substances4 ,to this my answer is1 that 
if the word ,,substance be taken in the 
vulgar sense--for a combination of      
sensible qualities1 such as extension1  
solidity1 weight1 and the like--this we 
cannot be accused of taking away3 but if
 it be taken in a philosophic sense--for
 the ,,support of accidents or          

,,qualities ,,without ,,the ,,mind--then
 indeed ,i acknowledge that we take it  
away1 if one may be said to take away   
that which never had any existence1 not 
even in the imagination4  #ch4 ,but1 say
 you1 it sounds very harsh to say we eat
 and drink ideas1 and are clothed with  
ideas4 ,i acknowledge it does so--the   
word ,,idea not being used in common    
discourse to signify the several        
combinations of sensible qualities which
 are called ,,things2 and it is certain 
that any expression which varies from   
the familiar use of language will seem  
harsh and ridiculous4 ,but this doth not
 concern the truth of the proposition1  
which in other words is no more than to 
say1 we are fed and clothed with those  
things which we perceive immediately by 
our senses4 ,the hardness or softness1  
the colour1 taste1 warmth1 figure1 or   
suchlike qualities1 which combined      
together constitute the several sorts of
 victuals and apparel1 have been shown  
to exist only in the mind that perceives

 them2 and this is all that is meant by 
calling them ,,ideas2 which word if it  
was as ordinarily used as ,,thing1 would
 sound no harsher nor more ridiculous   
than it4 ,i am not for disputing about  
the propriety1 but the truth of the     
expression4 ,if therefore you agree with
 me that we eat and drink and are clad  
with the immediate objects of sense1    
which cannot exist unperceived or       
without the mind1 ,i shall readily grant
 it is more proper or conformable to    
custom that they should be called things
 rather than ideas4  #ci4 ,,the ,,term  
,,idea ,,preferable ,,to ,,thing4--,if  
it be demanded why ,i make use of the   
word ,,idea1 and do not rather in       
compliance with custom call them        
,,things4 ,i answer1 ,i do it for two   
reasons3--first1 because the term       
,,thing in contra-distinction to ,,idea1
 is generally supposed to denote        
somewhat existing without the mind2     
secondly1 because ,,thing has a more    
comprehensive signification than ,,idea1

 including ,,spirit or thinking things  
as well as ,,ideas4 ,since therefore the
 objects of sense exist only in the     
mind1 and are withal thoughtless and    
inactive1 ,i chose to mark them by the  
word ,,idea1 which implies those        
properties4  #dj4 ,,the ,,evidence ,,of 
,,the ,,senses ,,not                    
,,discredited4--,but1 say what we can1  
some one perhaps may be apt to reply1 he
 will still believe his senses1 and     
never suffer any arguments1 how         
plausible soever1 to prevail over the   
certainty of them4 ,be it so2 assert the
 evidence of sense as high as you       
please1 we are willing to do the same4  
,that what ,i see1 hear1 and feel ,,doth
 ,,exist1 ,,that ,,is to say1 ,,is      
,,perceived ,,by ,,me1 ,i no more doubt 
than ,i do of my own being4 ,but ,i do  
not see how the testimony of sense can  
be alleged as a proof for the existence 
of anything which is not perceived by   
sense4 ,we are not for having any man   
turn ,,sceptic and disbelieve his       

senses2 on the contrary1 we give them   
all the stress and assurance imaginable2
 nor are there any principles more      
opposite to ,scepticism than those we   
have laid down ,note41 as shall be      
hereafter clearly shown4  ,note3 ,they  
extirpate the very root of scepticism1  
the fallacy of the senses4--,ed4  #da4  
,,second                                
,,objection4--,,answer4--,secondly1 it  
will be ,,objected that there is a great
 difference betwixt real fire for       
instance1 and the idea of fire1 betwixt 
dreaming or imagining oneself burnt1 and
 actually being so3 if you suspect it to
 be only the idea of fire which you see1
 do but put your hand into it and you   
will be convinced with a witness4 ,this 
and the like may be urged in opposition 
to our tenets4 ,to all which the        
,,answer is evident from what has been  
already said2 and ,i shall only add in  
this place1 that if real fire be very   
different from the idea of fire1 so also
 is the real pain that it occasions very

 different from the idea of the same    
pain1 and yet nobody will pretend that  
real pain either is1 or can possibly be1
 in an unperceiving thing1 or without   
the mind1 any more than its idea4  #db4 
,,third                                 
,,objection4--,,answer4--,thirdly1 it   
will be objected that we see things     
actually without or at distance from us1
 and which consequently do not exist in 
the mind2 it being absurd that those    
things which are seen at the distance of
 several miles should be as near to us  
as our own thoughts4 ,in answer to this1
 ,i desire it may be considered that in 
a ,,dream we do oft perceive things as  
existing at a great distance off1 and   
yet for all that1 those things are      
acknowledged to have their existence    
only in the mind4  #dc4 ,but1 for the   
fuller clearing of this point1 it may be
 worth while to consider how it is that 
we perceive distance and things placed  
at a distance by sight4 ,for1 that we   
should in truth see ,,external space1   

and bodies actually existing in it1 some
 nearer1 others farther off1 seems to   
carry with it some opposition to what   
has been said of their existing nowhere 
without the mind4 ,the consideration of 
this difficulty it was that gave birth  
to my ,essay towards a ,new ,theory of  
,vision1 which was published not long   
since1 wherein it is shown 7#a7 that    
,,distance or outness is ,,neither      
,,immediately of itself ,,perceived by  
sight1 nor yet apprehended or judged of 
by lines and angles1 or anything that   
has a necessary connexion with it2 but  
7#b7 that it is ,,only ,,suggested to   
our thoughts by certain visible ideas   
and sensations attending vision1 which  
in their own nature have no manner of   
similitude or relation either with      
distance or things placed at a distance2
 but1 by a connexion taught us ,,by     
,,experience1 they come to signify and  
suggest them to us1 after the same      
manner that ,,words of any language     
suggest the ideas they are made to stand

 for2 insomuch that a man ,,born blind  
and afterwards made to see1 would not1  
at first sight1 think the things he saw 
to be without his mind1 or at any       
distance from him4 ,see sect4 #da of the
 fore-mentioned treatise4  #dd4 ,the    
ideas of sight and touch make two       
species entirely distinct and           
heterogeneous4 ,,the ,,former ,,are     
,,marks ,,and ,,prognostics ,,of ,,the  
,,latter4 ,that the proper objects of   
sight neither exist without mind1 nor   
are the images of external things1 was  
shown even in that treatise4 ,though    
throughout the same the contrary be     
supposed true of tangible objects--not  
that to suppose that vulgar error was   
necessary for establishing the notion   
therein laid down1 but because it was   
beside my purpose to examine and refute 
it in a discourse concerning ,,vision4  
,so that in strict truth the ideas of   
sight1 when we apprehend by them        
distance and things placed at a         
distance1 do not suggest or mark out to 

us things ,,actually existing at a      
distance1 but only admonish us what     
ideas of touch will be imprinted in our 
minds at such and such distances of     
time1 and in consequence of such or such
 actions4 ,it is1 ,i say1 evident from  
what has been said in the foregoing     
parts of this ,treatise1 and in sect4   
#adg and elsewhere of the ,essay        
concerning ,vision1 that visible ideas  
are the ,language whereby the governing 
,spirit on whom we depend informs us    
what tangible ideas he is about to      
imprint upon us1 in case we excite this 
or that motion in our own bodies4 ,but  
for a fuller information in this point  
,i refer to the ,essay itself4  #de4    
,,fourth ,,objection1 ,,from ,,perpetual
 ,,annihilation ,,and                   
,,creation4--,,answer4--,fourthly1 it   
will be objected that from the foregoing
 principles it follows things are every 
moment annihilated and created anew4    
,the objects of sense exist only when   
they are perceived2 the trees therefore 

are in the garden1 or the chairs in the 
parlour1 no longer than while there is  
somebody by to perceive them4 ,upon     
,,shutting ,,my ,,eyes all the furniture
 in the room is reduced to nothing1 and 
barely upon opening them it is again    
created4 ,in ,,answer to all which1 ,i  
refer the reader to what has been said  
in sect4 #c1 #d1 c41 and desire he will 
consider whether he means anything by   
the actual existence of an idea distinct
 from its being perceived4 ,for my part1
 after the nicest inquiry ,i could make1
 ,i am not able to discover that        
anything else is meant by those words2  
and ,i once more entreat the reader to  
sound his own thoughts1 and not suffer  
himself to be imposed on by words4 ,if  
he can conceive it possible either for  
his ideas or their archetypes to exist  
without being perceived1 then ,i give up
 the cause2 but if he cannot1 he will   
acknowledge it is unreasonable for him  
to stand up in defence of he knows not  
what1 and pretend to charge on me as an 

absurdity the not assenting to those    
propositions which at bottom have no    
meaning in them4  #df4 ,,argumentum ,,ad
 ,,hominem4--,it will not be amiss to   
observe how far the received principles 
of philosophy are themselves chargeable 
with those pretended absurdities4 7#a7  
,it is thought strangely absurd that    
upon closing my eyelids all the visible 
objects around me should be reduced to  
nothing2 and yet is not this what       
philosophers commonly acknowledge1 when 
they agree on all hands that light and  
colours1 which alone are the proper and 
immediate objects of sight1 are mere    
sensations that exist no longer than    
they are perceived8 7#b7;,again1 it may 
to some perhaps seem very incredible    
that things should be every moment      
creating1 yet this very notion is       
commonly taught in the schools4 ,for the
 ,,schoolmen1 though they acknowledge   
the existence of ,matter1 and that the  
whole mundane fabric is framed out of   
it1 are nevertheless of opinion that it 

cannot subsist without the divine       
conservation1 which by them is expounded
 to be a continual creation4  #dg4 7#c7 
,further1 a little thought will discover
 to us that though we allow the         
existence of ,matter or corporeal       
substance1 yet it will unavoidably      
follow1 ,,from ,,the ,,principles       
,,which ,,are ,,now ,,generally         
,,admitted1 that the ,,particular       
bodies1 of what kind soever1 do none of 
them exist whilst they are not          
perceived4 ,for1 it is evident from     
sect4 ,,ii and the following sections1  
that the ,matter philosophers contend   
for is an incomprehensible somewhat1    
,,which ,,has ,,none ,,of ,,those       
,,particular ,,qualities ,,whereby ,,the
 ,,bodies ,,falling ,,under ,,our       
,,senses ,,are ,,distinguished ,,one    
,,from ,,another4 7#b7 ,but1 to make    
this more plain1 it must be remarked    
that the infinite divisibility of       
,matter is now universally allowed1 at  
least by the most approved and          

considerable philosophers1 who on the   
received principles demonstrate it      
beyond all exception4 ,hence1 it follows
 there is an infinite number of parts in
 each particle of ,matter which are not 
perceived by sense4 ,the reason         
therefore that any particular body seems
 to be of a finite magnitude1 or        
exhibits only a finite number of parts  
to sense1 is1 not because it contains no
 more1 since in itself it contains an   
infinite number of parts1 ,,but         
,,because ,,the ,,sense ,,is ,,not      
,,acute ,,enough ,,to ,,discern ,,them4 
,in proportion therefore as the sense is
 rendered more acute1 it perceives a    
greater number of parts in the object1  
that is1 the object appears greater1 and
 its figure varies1 those parts in its  
extremities which were before           
unperceivable appearing now to bound it 
in very different lines and angles from 
those perceived by an obtuser sense4    
,and at length1 after various changes of
 size and shape1 when the sense becomes 

infinitely acute the body shall seem    
infinite4 ,during all which there is no 
alteration in the body1 but only in the 
sense4 ,,each ,,body ,,therefore1       
,,considered ,,in ,,itself1 ,,is        
,,infinitely ,,extended1 ,,and          
,,consequently ,,void ,,of ,,all ,,shape
 ,,or ,,figure4 ,from which it follows  
that1 though we should grant the        
existence of ,matter to be never so     
certain1 yet it is withal as certain1   
the materialists themselves are by their
 own principles forced to acknowledge1  
that neither the particular bodies      
perceived by sense1 nor anything like   
them1 exists without the mind4 ,matter1 
,i say1 and each particle thereof1 is   
according to them infinite and          
shapeless1 ,,and ,,it ,,is ,,the ,,mind 
,,that ,,frames ,,all ,,that ,,variety  
,,of ,,bodies ,,which ,,compose ,,the   
,,visible ,,world1 ,,any ,,one ,,whereof
 ,,does ,,not ,,exist ,,longer ,,than   
,,it ,,is ,,perceived4  #dh4 ,if we     
consider it1 the objection proposed in  

sect4 #de will not be found reasonably  
charged on the principles we have       
premised1 so as in truth to make any    
objection at all against our notions4   
,for1 though we hold indeed the objects 
of sense to be nothing else but ideas   
which cannot exist unperceived2 yet we  
may not hence conclude they have no     
existence except only while they are    
perceived by ,,us1 since ,,there ,,may  
,,be ,,some ,,other ,,spirit ,,that     
,,perceives ,,them ,,though ,,we ,,do   
,,not4 ,wherever bodies are said to have
 no existence without the mind1 ,i would
 not be understood to mean this or that 
particular mind1 but ,,all ,,minds      
,,whatsoever4 ,it does not therefore    
follow from the foregoing principles    
that bodies are annihilated and created 
every moment1 or exist not at all during
 the intervals between our perception of
 them4  #di4 ,,fifth                    
,,objection4--,,answer4--,fifthly1 it   
may perhaps be ,,objected that if       
extension and figure exist only in the  

mind1 it follows that the mind is       
extended and figured2 since extension is
 a mode or attribute which 7to speak    
with the schools7 is predicated of the  
subject in which it exists4 ,i ,,answer1
 7#a7 ,those qualities are in the mind  
,,only ,,as ,,they ,,are ,,perceived    
,,by ,,it--that is1 not by way of ,,mode
 or ,,attribute1 but only by way of     
,,idea2 and it no more follows the soul 
or mind is extended1 because extension  
exists in it alone1 than it does that it
 is red or blue1 because those colours  
are ,,on ,,all ,,hands acknowledged to  
exist in it1 and nowhere else4 7#b7 ,as 
to what philosophers say of subject and 
mode1 that seems very groundless and    
unintelligible4 ,for instance1 in this  
proposition a die is hard1 extended1 and
 square1 they will have it that the word
 die denotes a subject or substance1    
distinct from the hardness1 extension1  
and figure which are predicated of it1  
and in which they exist4 ,this ,i cannot
 comprehend3 to me a die seems to be    

nothing distinct from those things which
 are termed its modes or accidents4     
,and1 to say a die is hard1 extended1   
and square is not to attribute those    
qualities to a subject distinct from and
 supporting them1 but only an           
explication of the meaning of the word  
,,die4  #ej4 ,,sixth ,,objection1 ,,from
 ,,natural                              
,,philosophy4--,,answer4--,sixthly1 you 
will say there have been a great many   
things explained by matter and motion2  
take away these and you destroy the     
whole corpuscular philosophy1 and       
undermine those mechanical principles   
which have been applied with so much    
success to account for the ,,phenomena4 
,in short1 whatever advances have been  
made1 either by ancient or modern       
philosophers1 in the study of nature do 
all proceed on the supposition that     
corporeal substance or ,matter doth     
really exist4 ,to this ,i ,,answer that 
there is not any one ,,phenomenon       
explained on that supposition which may 

not as well be explained without it1 as 
might easily be made appear by an       
,,induction ,,of ,,particulars4 ,to     
explain the ,,phenomena1 is all one as  
to show why1 upon such and such         
occasions1 we are affected with such and
 such ideas4 ,but 7#a7 how ,matter      
should operate on a ,spirit1 or produce 
any idea in it1 is what no philosopher  
will pretend to explain2 it is therefore
 evident there can be no use of ,matter 
in natural philosophy4 ,besides1 7#b7   
they who attempt to account for things  
do it not by ,,corporeal ,,substance1   
but by figure1 motion1 and other        
qualities1 which are in truth no more   
than mere ideas1 and1 therefore1 cannot 
be the cause of anything1 as has been   
already shown4 ,see sect4 #be4  #ea4    
,,seventh                               
,,objection4--,,answer4--,seventhly1 it 
will upon this be demanded whether it   
does not seem ,,absurd ,,to ,,take      
,,away ,,natural ,,causes1 ,,and        
,,ascribe ,,everything ,,to ,,the       

,,immediate ,,operation ,,of ,,spirits8 
,we must no longer say upon these       
principles that fire heats1 or water    
cools1 but that a ,spirit heats1 and so 
forth4 ,would not a man be deservedly   
laughed at1 who should talk after this  
manner8 ,i ,,answer1 he would so2 in    
such things we ought to ,,think ,,with  
,,the ,,learned1 ,,and ,,speak ,,with   
,,the ,,vulgar4 ,they who to            
demonstration are convinced of the truth
 of the ,copernican system do           
nevertheless say the sun rises1 the sun 
sets1 or comes to the meridian2 and if  
they affected a contrary style in common
 talk it would without doubt appear very
 ridiculous4 ,a little reflexion on what
 is here said will make it manifest that
 the common use of language would       
receive no manner of alteration or      
disturbance from the admission of our   
tenets4  #eb4 ,,in ,,the ,,ordinary     
,,affairs ,,of ,,life1 ,,any ,,phrases  
,,may ,,be ,,retained1 so long as they  
excite in us proper sentiments1 or      

dispositions to act in such a manner as 
is necessary for our ,,well-,,being1 how
 false soever they may be if taken in a 
strict and ,,speculative ,,sense4 ,nay1 
this is unavoidable1 since1 propriety   
being regulated by ,,custom1 language is
 suited to the ,,received opinions1     
which are not always the truest4 ,hence 
it is impossible1 even in the most      
rigid1 philosophic reasonings1 so far to
 alter the bent and genius of the tongue
 we speak1 as never to give a handle for
 cavillers to pretend difficulties and  
inconsistencies4 ,but1 a fair and       
ingenuous reader will collect the sense 
from the scope and tenor and connexion  
of a discourse1 making allowances for   
those inaccurate modes of speech which  
use has made inevitable4  #ec4 ,as to   
the ,,opinion ,,that ,,there ,,are ,,no 
,,corporeal ,,causes1 this has been     
heretofore maintained by some of the    
,schoolmen1 as it is of late by others  
among the modern philosophers1 who      
though they allow ,matter to exist1 yet 

will have ,god alone to be the immediate
 efficient cause of all things4 ,these  
men saw that amongst all the objects of 
sense there was none which had any power
 or activity included in it2 and that by
 consequence this was likewise true of  
whatever bodies they supposed to exist  
without the mind1 like unto the         
immediate objects of sense4 ,but then1  
that they should suppose an innumerable 
multitude of created beings1 which they 
acknowledge are not capable of producing
 any one effect in nature1 and which    
therefore are made to no manner of      
purpose1 since ,god might have done     
everything as well without them3 this ,i
 say1 though we should allow it         
possible1 must yet be a very            
unaccountable and extravagant           
supposition4  #ed4 ,,eighth             
,,objection4--,,twofold ,,answer4--,in  
the eighth place1 the universal         
concurrent assent of mankind may be     
thought by some an invincible argument  
in behalf of ,matter1 or the existence  

of external things4 ,must we suppose the
 whole world to be mistaken8 ,and if so1
 what cause can be assigned of so       
widespread and predominant an error8 ,i 
answer1 ,,first1 that1 upon a narrow    
inquiry1 it will not perhaps be found so
 many as is imagined do really believe  
the existence of ,matter or things      
without the mind4 ,strictly speaking1 to
 believe that which involves a          
contradiction1 or has no meaning in it1 
is impossible2 and whether the foregoing
 expressions are not of that sort1 ,i   
refer it to the impartial examination of
 the reader4 ,in one sense1 indeed1 men 
may be said to believe that ,matter     
exists1 that is1 they ,,act as if the   
immediate cause of their sensations1    
which affects them every moment1 and is 
so nearly present to them1 were some    
senseless unthinking being4 ,but1 that  
they should clearly apprehend any       
meaning marked by those words1 and form 
thereof a settled ,,speculative opinion1
 is what ,i am not able to conceive4    

,this is not the only instance wherein  
men impose upon themselves1 by imagining
 they believe those propositions which  
they have often heard1 though at bottom 
they have no meaning in them4  #ee4 ,but
 ,,secondly1 though we should grant a   
notion to be never so universally and   
steadfastly adhered to1 yet this is weak
 argument of its truth to whoever       
considers what a vast number of         
prejudices and false opinions are       
everywhere embraced with the utmost     
tenaciousness1 by the unreflecting      
7which are the far greater7 part of     
mankind4 ,there was a time when the     
antipodes and motion of the earth were  
looked upon as monstrous absurdities    
even by men of learning3 and if it be   
considered what a small proportion they 
bear to the rest of mankind1 we shall   
find that at this day those notions have
 gained but a very inconsiderable       
footing in the world4  #ef4 ,,ninth     
,,objection4--,,answer4--,but it is     
demanded that we assign ,a ,,cause ,,of 

,,this ,,prejudice1 and account for its 
obtaining in the world4 ,to this ,i     
,,answer1 that men knowing they         
perceived several ideas1 ,,whereof      
,,they ,,themselves ,,were ,,not ,,the  
,,authors--as not being excited from    
within nor depending on the operation of
 their wills--this made them maintain   
those ideas1 or objects of perception   
had an ,,existence ,,independent ,,of   
,,and ,,without ,,the ,,mind1 without   
ever dreaming that a contradiction was  
involved in those words4 ,but1          
philosophers having plainly seen that   
the immediate objects of perception do  
not exist without the mind1 ,,they ,,in 
,,some ,,degree ,,corrected the mistake 
of the vulgar2 but at the same time run 
into another which seems no less absurd1
 to wit1 that there are certain objects 
really existing without the mind1 or    
having a subsistence distinct from being
 perceived1 ,,of ,,which ,,our ,,ideas  
,,are ,,only ,,images or resemblances1  
imprinted by those objects on the mind4 

,and this notion of the philosophers    
owes its origin to the same cause with  
the former1 namely1 their being         
conscious that they were not the authors
 of their own sensations1 which they    
evidently knew were imprinted from      
without1 and which therefore must have  
some cause distinct from the minds on   
which they are imprinted4  #eg4 ,,but   
,,why ,,they ,,should ,,suppose ,,the   
,,ideas ,,of ,,sense ,,to ,,be ,,excited
 ,,in ,,us ,,by ,,things ,,in ,,their   
,,likeness1 and not rather have recourse
 to ,,spirit which alone can act1 may be
 accounted for1 ,,first1 because they   
were not aware of the repugnancy there  
is1 7#a7 as well in supposing things    
like unto our ideas existing without1 as
 in 7#b7 attributing to them ,,power    
,,or ,,activity4 ,,secondly1 because the
 ,supreme ,spirit which excites those   
ideas in our minds1 is not marked out   
and limited to our view by any          
particular finite collection of sensible
 ideas1 as human agents are by their    

size1 complexion1 limbs1 and motions4   
,and thirdly1 because ,his operations   
are regular and uniform4 ,whenever the  
course of nature is interrupted by a    
miracle1 men are ready to own the       
presence of a superior agent4 ,but1 when
 we see things go on in the ordinary    
course they do not excite in us any     
reflexion2 their order and              
concatenation1 though it be an argument 
of the greatest wisdom1 power1 and      
goodness in their creator1 is yet so    
constant and familiar to us that we do  
not think them the immediate effects of 
a ,free ,spirit2 especially since       
inconsistency and mutability in acting1 
though it be an imperfection1 is looked 
on as a mark of freedom4  #eh4 ,,tenth  
,,objection4--,,answer4--,tenthly1 it   
will be objected that the notions we    
advance are inconsistent with several   
sound truths in philosophy and          
mathematics4 ,for example1 the motion of
 the earth is now universally admitted  
by astronomers as a truth grounded on   

the clearest and most convincing        
reasons4 ,but1 on the foregoing         
principles1 there can be no such thing4 
,for1 motion being only an idea1 it     
follows that if it be not perceived it  
exists not2 but the motion of the earth 
is not perceived by sense4 ,i answer1   
that tenet1 if rightly understood1 will 
be found to agree with the principles we
 have premised2 for1 the question       
whether the earth moves or no amounts in
 reality to no more than this1 to wit1  
whether we have reason to conclude1 from
 what has been observed by astronomers1 
that if we were placed in such and such 
circumstances1 and such or such a       
position and distance both from the     
earth and sun1 we should perceive the   
former to move among the choir of the   
planets1 and appearing in all respects  
like one of them2 and this1 by the      
established rules of nature which we    
have no reason to mistrust1 is          
reasonably collected from the phenomena4
  #ei4 ,we may1 from the experience we  

have had of the train and succession of 
ideas in our minds1 often make1 ,i will 
not say uncertain conjectures1 but sure 
and well--grounded predictions          
concerning the ideas we shall be        
affected with pursuant to a great train 
of actions1 and be enabled to pass a    
right judgment of what would have       
appeared to us1 in case we were placed  
in circumstances very different from    
those we are in at present4 ,herein     
consists the knowledge of nature1 which 
may preserve its use and certainty very 
consistently with what has been said4   
,it will be easy to apply this to       
whatever objections of the like sort may
 be drawn from the magnitude of the     
stars1 or any other discoveries in      
astronomy or nature4  #fj4 ,,eleventh   
,,objection4--,in the eleventh place1 it
 will be demanded to what purpose serves
 that curious organization of plants1   
and the animal mechanism in the parts of
 animals2 might not vegetables grow1 and
 shoot forth leaves of blossoms1 and    

animals perform all their motions as    
well without as with all that variety of
 internal parts so elegantly contrived  
and put together2 which1 being ideas1   
have nothing powerful or operative in   
them1 nor have any necessary connexion  
with the effects ascribed to them8 ,if  
it be a ,spirit that immediately        
produces every effect by a fiat or act  
of his will1 we must think all that is  
fine and artificial in the works1       
whether of man or nature1 to be made in 
vain4 ,by this doctrine1 though an      
artist has made the spring and wheels1  
and every movement of a watch1 and      
adjusted them in such a manner as he    
knew would produce the motions he       
designed1 yet he must think all this    
done to no purpose1 and that it is an   
,intelligence which directs the index1  
and points to the hour of the day4 ,if  
so1 why may not the ,intelligence do it1
 without his being at the pains of      
making the movements and putting them   
together8 ,why does not an empty case   

serve as well as another8 ,and how comes
 it to pass that whenever there is any  
fault in the going of a watch1 there is 
some corresponding disorder to be found 
in the movements1 which being mended by 
a skilful hand all is right again8 ,the 
like may be said of all the clockwork of
 nature1 great part whereof is so       
wonderfully fine and subtle as scarce to
 be discerned by the best microscope4   
,in short1 it will be asked1 how1 upon  
our principles1 any tolerable account   
can be given1 or any final cause        
assigned of an innumerable multitude of 
bodies and machines1 framed with the    
most exquisite art1 which in the common 
philosophy have very apposite uses      
assigned them1 and serve to explain     
abundance of phenomena8  #fa4           
,,answer4--,to all which ,i answer1     
first1 that though there were some      
difficulties relating to the            
administration of ,providence1 and the  
uses by it assigned to the several parts
 of nature1 which ,i could not solve by 

the foregoing principles1 yet this      
objection could be of small weight      
against the truth and certainty of those
 things which may be proved a priori1   
with the utmost evidence and rigor of   
demonstration4 ,secondly1 but neither   
are the received principles free from   
the like difficulties2 for1 it may still
 be demanded to what end ,god should    
take those roundabout methods of        
effecting things by instruments and     
machines1 which no one can deny might   
have been effected by the mere command  
of ,his will without all that apparatus2
 nay1 if we narrowly consider it1 we    
shall find the objection may be retorted
 with greater force on those who hold   
the existence of those machines without 
of mind2 for it has been made evident   
that solidity1 bulk1 figure1 motion1 and
 the like have no activity or efficacy  
in them1 so as to be capable of         
producing any one effect in nature4 ,see
 sect4 #be4 ,whoever therefore supposes 
them to exist 7allowing the supposition 

possible7 when they are not perceived   
does it manifestly to no purpose2 since 
the only use that is assigned to them1  
as they exist unperceived1 is that they 
produce those perceivable effects which 
in truth cannot be ascribed to anything 
but ,spirit4  #fb4 7,,fourthly47--,but1 
to come nigher the difficulty1 it must  
be observed that though the fabrication 
of all those parts and organs be not    
absolutely necessary to the producing   
any effect1 yet it is necessary to the  
producing of things in a constant       
regular way according to the laws of    
nature4 ,there are certain general laws 
that run through the whole chain of     
natural effects2 these are learned by   
the observation and study of nature1 and
 are by men applied as well to the      
framing artificial things for the use   
and ornament of life as to the          
explaining various phenomena--which     
explication consists only in showing the
 conformity any particular phenomenon   
has to the general laws of nature1 or1  

which is the same thing1 in discovering 
the uniformity there is in the          
production of natural effects2 as will  
be evident to whoever shall attend to   
the several instances wherein           
philosophers pretend to account for     
appearances4 ,that there is a great and 
conspicuous use in these regular        
constant methods of working observed by 
the ,supreme ,agent has been shown in   
sect4 #ca4 ,and it is no less visible   
that a particular size1 figure1 motion1 
and disposition of parts are necessary1 
though not absolutely to the producing  
any effect1 yet to the producing it     
according to the standing mechanical    
laws of nature4 ,thus1 for instance1 it 
cannot be denied that ,god1 or the      
,intelligence that sustains and rules   
the ordinary course of things1 might if 
,he were minded to produce a miracle1   
cause all the motions on the dial-plate 
of a watch1 though nobody had ever made 
the movements and put them in it3 but   
yet1 if ,he will act agreeably to the   

rules of mechanism1 by ,him for wise    
ends established and maintained in the  
creation1 it is necessary that those    
actions of the watchmaker1 whereby he   
makes the movements and rightly adjusts 
them1 precede the production of the     
aforesaid motions2 as also that any     
disorder in them be attended with the   
perception of some corresponding        
disorder in the movements1 which being  
once corrected all is right again4  #fc4
 ,it may indeed on some occasions be    
necessary that the ,author of nature    
display ,his overruling power in        
producing some appearance out of the    
ordinary series of things4 ,such        
exceptions from the general rules of    
nature are proper to surprise and awe   
men into an acknowledgement of the      
,divine ,being2 but then they are to be 
used but seldom1 otherwise there is a   
plain reason why they should fail of    
that effect4 ,besides1 ,god seems to    
choose the convincing our reason of ,his
 attributes by the works of nature1     

which discover so much harmony and      
contrivance in their make1 and are such 
plain indications of wisdom and         
beneficence in their ,author1 rather    
than to astonish us into a belief of    
,his ,being by anomalous and surprising 
events4  #fd4 ,to set this matter in a  
yet clearer light1 ,i shall observe that
 what has been objected in sect4 #fj    
amounts in reality to no more than      
this3--ideas are not anyhow and at      
random produced1 there being a certain  
order and connexion between them1 like  
to that of cause and effect2 there are  
also several combinations of them made  
in a very regular and artificial manner1
 which seem like so many instruments in 
the hand of nature that1 being hid as it
 were behind the scenes1 have a secret  
operation in producing those appearances
 which are seen on the theatre of the   
world1 being themselves discernible only
 to the curious eye of the philosopher4 
,but1 since one idea cannot be the cause
 of another1 to what purpose is that    

connexion8 ,and1 since those            
instruments1 being barely inefficacious 
perceptions in the mind1 are not        
subservient to the production of natural
 effects1 it is demanded why they are   
made2 or1 in other words1 what reason   
can be assigned why ,god should make us1
 upon a close inspection into ,his      
works1 behold so great variety of ideas 
so artfully laid together1 and so much  
according to rule2 it not being credible
 that ,he would be at the expense 7if   
one may so speak7 of all that art and   
regularity to no purpose4  #fe4 ,to all 
which my answer is1 first1 that the     
connexion of ideas does not imply the   
relation of cause and effect1 but only  
of a mark or sign with the thing        
signified4 ,the fire which ,i see is not
 the cause of the pain ,i suffer upon my
 approaching it1 but the mark that      
forewarns me of it4 ,in like manner the 
noise that ,i hear is not the effect of 
this or that motion or collision of the 
ambient bodies1 but the sign thereof4   

,secondly1 the reason why ideas are     
formed into machines1 that is1          
artificial and regular combinations1 is 
the same with that for combining letters
 into words4 ,that a few original ideas 
may be made to signify a great number of
 effects and actions1 it is necessary   
they be variously combined together4    
,and1 to the end their use be permanent 
and universal1 these combinations must  
be made by rule1 and with wise          
contrivance4 ,by this means abundance of
 information is conveyed unto us1       
concerning what we are to expect from   
such and such actions and what methods  
are proper to be taken for the exciting 
such and such ideas2 which in effect is 
all that ,i conceive to be distinctly   
meant when it is said that1 by          
discerning a figure1 texture1 and       
mechanism of the inward parts of bodies1
 whether natural or artificial1 we may  
attain to know the several uses and     
properties depending thereon1 or the    
nature of the thing4  #ff4 ,,proper     

,,employment ,,of ,,the ,,natural       
,,philosopher4--,hence1 it is evident   
that those things which1 under the      
notion of a cause co-operating or       
concurring to the production of effects1
 are altogether inexplicable1 and run us
 into great absurdities1 may be very    
naturally explained1 and have a proper  
and obvious use assigned to them1 when  
they are considered only as marks or    
signs for our information4 ,and it is   
the searching after and endeavouring to 
understand those signs instituted by the
 ,author of ,nature1 that ought to be   
the employment of the natural           
philosopher2 and not the pretending to  
explain things by corporeal causes1     
which doctrine seems to have too much   
estranged the minds of men from that    
active principle1 that supreme and wise 
,spirit in whom we live1 move1 and have 
our being4  #fg4 ,,twelfth              
,,objection4--,,answer4--,in the twelfth
 place1 it may perhaps be objected      
that--though it be clear from what has  

been said that there can be no such     
thing as an inert1 senseless1 extended1 
solid1 figured1 movable substance       
existing without the mind1 such as      
philosophers describe ,matter--yet1 if  
any man shall leave out of his idea of  
matter the positive ideas of extension1 
figure1 solidity and motion1 and say    
that he means only by that word an      
inert1 senseless substance1 that exists 
without the mind or unperceived1 which  
is the occasion of our ideas1 or at the 
presence whereof ,god is pleased to     
excite ideas in us3 it doth not appear  
but that ,matter taken in this sense may
 possibly exist4 ,in answer to which ,i 
say1 first1 that it seems no less absurd
 to suppose a substance without         
accidents1 than it is to suppose        
accidents without a substance4 ,but     
secondly1 though we should grant this   
unknown substance may possibly exist1   
yet where can it be supposed to be8     
,that it exists not in the mind is      
agreed2 and that it exists not in place 

is no less certain--since all place or  
extension exists only in the mind1 as   
has been already proved4 ,it remains    
therefore that it exists nowhere at all4
  #fh4 ,,matter ,,supports ,,nothing1   
,,an ,,argument ,,against ,,its         
,,existence4--,let us examine a little  
the description that is here given us of
 matter4 ,it neither acts1 nor          
perceives1 nor is perceived2 for this is
 all that is meant by saying it is an   
inert1 senseless1 unknown substance2    
which is a definition entirely made up  
of negatives1 excepting only the        
relative notion of its standing under or
 supporting4 ,but then it must be       
observed that it supports nothing at    
all1 and how nearly this comes to the   
description of a nonentity ,i desire may
 be considered4 ,but1 say you1 it is the
 unknown occasion1 at the presence of   
which ideas are excited in us by the    
will of ,god4 ,now1 ,i would fain know  
how anything can be present to us1 which
 is neither perceivable by sense nor    

reflexion1 nor capable of producing any 
idea in our minds1 nor is at all        
extended1 nor has any form1 nor exists  
in any place4 ,the words to be present1 
when thus applied1 must needs be taken  
in some abstract and strange meaning1   
and which ,i am not able to comprehend4 
#fi4 ,again1 let us examine what is     
meant by occasion4 ,so far as ,i can    
gather from the common use of language1 
that word signifies either the agent    
which produces any effect1 or else      
something that is observed to accompany 
or go before it in the ordinary course  
of things4 ,but when it is applied to   
,matter as above described1 it can be   
taken in neither of those senses2 for   
,matter is said to be passive and inert1
 and so cannot be an agent or efficient 
cause4 ,it is also unperceivable1 as    
being devoid of all sensible qualities1 
and so cannot be the occasion of our    
perceptions in the latter sense3 as when
 the burning my finger is said to be the
 occasion of the pain that attends it4  

,what therefore can be meant by calling 
matter an occasion8 ,the term is either 
used in no sense at all1 or else in some
 very distant from its received         
signification4  #gj4 ,you will ,perhaps 
say that ,matter1 though it be not      
perceived by us1 is nevertheless        
perceived by ,god1 to whom it is the    
occasion of exciting ideas in our minds4
 ,for1 say you1 since we observe our    
sensations to be imprinted in an orderly
 and constant manner1 it is but         
reasonable to suppose there are certain 
constant and regular occasions of their 
being produced4 ,that is to say1 that   
there are certain permanent and distinct
 parcels of ,matter1 corresponding to   
our ideas1 which1 though they do not    
excite them in our minds1 or anywise    
immediately affect us1 as being         
altogether passive and unperceivable to 
us1 they are nevertheless to ,god1 by   
whom they art perceived1 as it were so  
many occasions to remind ,him when and  
what ideas to imprint on our minds2 that

 so things may go on in a constant      
uniform manner4  #ga4 ,in answer to     
this1 ,i observe that1 as the notion of 
,matter is here stated1 the question is 
no longer concerning the existence of a 
thing distinct from ,spirit and idea1   
from perceiving and being perceived2 but
 whether there are not certain ideas of 
,i know not what sort1 in the mind of   
,god which are so many marks or notes   
that direct ,him how to produce         
sensations in our minds in a constant   
and regular method--much after the same 
manner as a musician is directed by the 
notes of music to produce that          
harmonious train and composition of     
sound which is called a tune1 though    
they who hear the music do not perceive 
the notes1 and may be entirely ignorant 
of them4 ,but1 this notion of ,matter   
seems too extravagant to deserve a      
confutation4 ,besides1 it is in effect  
no objection against what we have       
advanced1 viz4 that there is no         
senseless unperceived substance4  #gb4  

,,the ,,order ,,of ,,our ,,perceptions  
,,shows ,,the ,,goodness ,,of ,,god1    
,,but ,,affords ,,no ,,proof ,,of ,,the 
,,existence ,,of ,,matter4--,if we      
follow the light of reason1 we shall1   
from the constant uniform method of our 
sensations1 collect the goodness and    
wisdom of the ,spirit who excites them  
in our minds2 but this is all that ,i   
can see reasonably concluded from       
thence4 ,to me1 ,i say1 it is evident   
that the being of a spirit infinitely   
wise1 good1 and powerful is abundantly  
sufficient to explain all the           
appearances of nature4 ,but1 as for     
inert1 senseless ,matter1 nothing that  
,i perceive has any the least connexion 
with it1 or leads to the thoughts of it4
 ,and ,i would fain see any one explain 
any the meanest phenomenon in nature by 
it1 or show any manner of reason1 though
 in the lowest rank of probability1 that
 he can have for its existence1 or even 
make any tolerable sense or meaning of  
that supposition4 ,for1 as to its being 

an occasion1 we have1 ,i think1         
evidently shown that with regard to us  
it is no occasion4 ,it remains therefore
 that it must be1 if at all1 the        
occasion to ,god of exciting ideas in   
us2 and what this amounts to we have    
just now seen4  #gc4 ,it is worth while 
to reflect a little on the motives which
 induced men to suppose the existence of
 material substance2 that so having     
observed the gradual ceasing and        
expiration of those motives or reasons1 
we may proportionably withdraw the      
assent that was grounded on them4       
,first1 therefore1 it was thought that  
colour1 figure1 motion1 and the rest of 
the sensible qualities or accidents1 did
 really exist without the mind2 and for 
this reason it seemed needful to suppose
 some unthinking substratum or substance
 wherein they did exist1 since they     
could not be conceived to exist by      
themselves4 ,afterwards1 in process of  
time1 men being convinced that colours1 
sounds1 and the rest of the sensible1   

secondary qualities had no existence    
without the mind1 they stripped this    
substratum or material substance of     
those qualities1 leaving only the       
primary ones1 figure1 motion1 and       
suchlike1 which they still conceived to 
exist without the mind1 and consequently
 to stand in need of a material support4
 ,but1 it having been shown that none   
even of these can possibly exist        
otherwise than in a ,spirit or ,mind    
which perceives them it follows that we 
have no longer any reason to suppose the
 being of ,matter2 nay1 that it is      
utterly impossible there should be any  
such thing1 so long as that word is     
taken to denote an unthinking substratum
 of qualities or accidents wherein they 
exist without the mind4  #gd4 ,but      
though it be allowed by the materialists
 themselves that ,matter was thought of 
only for the sake of supporting         
accidents1 and1 the reason entirely     
ceasing1 one might expect the mind      
should naturally1 and without any       

reluctance at all1 quit the belief of   
what was solely grounded thereon2 yet   
the prejudice is riveted so deeply in   
our thoughts1 that we can scarce tell   
how to part with it1 and are therefore  
inclined1 since the thing itself is     
indefensible1 at least to retain the    
name1 which we apply to ,i know not what
 abstracted and indefinite notions of   
being1 or occasion1 though without any  
show of reason1 at least so far as ,i   
can see4 ,for1 what is there on our     
part1 or what do we perceive1 amongst   
all the ideas1 sensations1 notions which
 are imprinted on our minds1 either by  
sense or reflexion1 from whence may be  
inferred the existence of an inert1     
thoughtless1 unperceived occasion8 and1 
on the other hand1 on the part of an    
,all-sufficient ,spirit1 what can there 
be that should make us believe or even  
suspect ,he is directed by an inert     
occasion to excite ideas in our minds8  
#ge4 ,,absurdity ,,of ,,contending ,,for
 ,,the ,,existence ,,of ,,matter ,,as   

,,the ,,occasion ,,of ,,ideas4--,it is a
 very extraordinary instance of the     
force of prejudice1 and much to be      
lamented1 that the mind of man retains  
so great a fondness1 against all the    
evidence of reason1 for a stupid        
thoughtless somewhat1 by the            
interposition whereof it would as it    
were screen itself from the ,providence 
of ,god1 and remove it farther off from 
the affairs of the world4 ,but1 though  
we do the utmost we can to secure the   
belief of ,matter1 though1 when reason  
forsakes us1 we endeavour to support our
 opinion on the bare possibility of the 
thing1 and though we indulge ourselves  
in the full scope of an imagination not 
regulated by reason to make out that    
poor possibility1 yet the upshot of all 
is1 that there are certain unknown      
,ideas in the mind of ,god2 for this1 if
 anything1 is all that ,i conceive to be
 meant by occasion with regard to ,god4 
,and this at the bottom is no longer    
contending for the thing1 but for the   

name4  #gf4 ,whether therefore there are
 such ,ideas in the mind of ,god1 and   
whether they may be called by the name  
,matter1 ,i shall not dispute4 ,but1 if 
you stick to the notion of an unthinking
 substance or support of extension1     
motion1 and other sensible qualities1   
then to me it is most evidently         
impossible there should be any such     
thing1 since it is a plain repugnancy   
that those qualities should exist in or 
be supported by an unperceiving         
substance4  #gg4 ,,that ,a ,,substratum 
,,not ,,perceived1 ,,may ,,exist1       
,,unimportant4--,but1 say you1 though it
 be granted that there is no thoughtless
 support of extension and the other     
qualities or accidents which we         
perceive1 yet there may perhaps be some 
inert1 unperceiving substance or        
substratum of some other qualities1 as  
incomprehensible to us as colours are to
 a man born blind1 because we have not a
 sense adapted to them4 ,but1 if we had 
a new sense1 we should possibly no more 

doubt of their existence than a blind   
man made to see does of the existence of
 light and colours4 ,i answer1 first1 if
 what you mean by the word ,matter be   
only the unknown support of unknown     
qualities1 it is no matter whether there
 is such a thing or no1 since it no way 
concerns us2 and ,i do not see the      
advantage there is in disputing about   
what we know not what1 and we know not  
why4  #gh4 ,but1 secondly1 if we had a  
new sense it could only furnish us with 
new ideas or sensations2 and then we    
should have the same reason against     
their existing in an unperceiving       
substance that has been already offered 
with relation to figure1 motion1 colour 
and the like4 ,qualities1 as has been   
shown1 are nothing else but sensations  
or ideas1 which exist only in a mind    
perceiving them2 and this is true not   
only of the ideas we are acquainted with
 at present1 but likewise of all        
possible ideas whatsoever4  #gi4 ,but1  
you will insist1 what if ,i have no     

reason to believe the existence of      
,matter8 what if ,i cannot assign any   
use to it or explain anything by it1 or 
even conceive what is meant by that     
word8 yet still it is no contradiction  
to say that ,matter exists1 and that    
this ,matter is in general a substance1 
or occasion of ideas2 though indeed to  
go about to unfold the meaning or adhere
 to any particular explication of those 
words may be attended with great        
difficulties4 ,i answer1 when words are 
used without a meaning1 you may put them
 together as you please without danger  
of running into a contradiction4 ,you   
may say1 for example1 that twice two is 
equal to seven1 so long as you declare  
you do not take the words of that       
proposition in their usual acceptation  
but for marks of you know not what4     
,and1 by the same reason1 you may say   
there is an inert thoughtless substance 
without accidents which is the occasion 
of our ideas4 ,and we shall understand  
just as much by one proposition as the  

other4  #hj4 ,in the last place1 you    
will say1 what if we give up the cause  
of material ,substance1 and stand to it 
that ,matter is an unknown              
somewhat--neither substance nor         
accident1 spirit nor idea1 inert1       
thoughtless1 indivisible1 immovable1    
unextended1 existing in no place4 ,for1 
say you1 whatever may be urged against  
substance or occasion1 or any other     
positive or relative notion of ,matter1 
has no place at all1 so long as this    
negative definition of ,matter is       
adhered to4 ,i answer1 you may1 if so it
 shall seem good1 use the word ,matter  
in the same sense as other men use      
nothing1 and so make those terms        
convertible in your style4 ,for1 after  
all1 this is what appears to me to be   
the result of that definition1 the parts
 whereof when ,i consider with          
attention1 either collectively or       
separate from each other1 ,i do not find
 that there is any kind of effect or    
impression made on my mind different    

from what is excited by the term        
nothing4  #ha4 ,you will reply1 perhaps1
 that in the fore-said definition is    
included what doth sufficiently         
distinguish it from nothing--the        
positive abstract idea of quiddity1     
entity1 or existence4 ,i own1 indeed1   
that those who pretend to the faculty of
 framing abstract general ideas do talk 
as if they had such an idea1 which is1  
say they1 the most abstract and general 
notion of all2 that is1 to me1 the most 
incomprehensible of all others4 ,that   
there are a great variety of spirits of 
different orders and capacities1 whose  
faculties both in number and extent are 
far exceeding those the ,author of my   
being has bestowed on me1 ,i see no     
reason to deny4 ,and for me to pretend  
to determine by my own few1 stinted     
narrow inlets of perception1 what ideas 
the inexhaustible power of the ,supreme 
,spirit may imprint upon them were      
certainly the utmost folly and          
presumption--since there may be1 for    

aught that ,i know1 innumerable sorts of
 ideas or sensations1 as different from 
one another1 and from all that ,i have  
perceived1 as colours are from sounds4  
,but1 how ready soever ,i may be to     
acknowledge the scantiness of my        
comprehension with regard to the endless
 variety of spirits and ideas that may  
possibly exist1 yet for any one to      
pretend to a notion of ,entity or       
,existence1 abstracted from spirit and  
idea1 from perceived and being          
perceived1 is1 ,i suspect1 a downright  
repugnancy and trifling with words4--,it
 remains that we consider the objections
 which may possibly be made on the part 
of ,religion4  #hb4 ,,objections        
,,derived ,,from ,,the ,,scriptures     
,,answered4--,some there are who think  
that1 though the arguments for the real 
existence of bodies which are drawn from
 ,reason be allowed not to amount to    
demonstration1 yet the ,holy ,scriptures
 are so clear in the point as will      
sufficiently convince every good        

,christian that bodies do really exist1 
and are something more than mere ideas2 
there being in ,holy ,writ innumerable  
facts related which evidently suppose   
the reality of timber and stone1        
mountains and rivers1 and cities1 and   
human bodies4 ,to which ,i answer that  
no sort of writings whatever1 sacred or 
profane1 which use those and the like   
words in the vulgar acceptation1 or so  
as to have a meaning in them1 are in    
danger of having their truth called in  
question by our doctrine4 ,that all     
those things do really exist1 that there
 are bodies1 even corporeal substances1 
when taken in the vulgar sense1 has been
 shown to be agreeable to our           
principles2 and the difference betwixt  
things and ideas1 realities and         
chimeras1 has been distinctly explained4
 ,see sect4 #bi1 #cj1 #cc1 #cf1 c4 ,and 
,i do not think that either what        
philosophers call ,matter1 or the       
existence of objects without the mind1  
is anywhere mentioned in ,scripture4    

#hc4 ,,no ,,objection ,,as ,,to         
,,language ,,tenable4--,again1 whether  
there can be or be not external things1 
it is agreed on all hands that the      
proper use of words is the marking our  
conceptions1 or things only as they are 
known and perceived by us2 whence it    
plainly follows that in the tenets we   
have laid down there is nothing         
inconsistent with the right use and     
significancy of language1 and that      
discourse1 of what kind soever1 so far  
as it is intelligible1 remains          
undisturbed4 ,but all this seems so     
manifest1 from what has been largely set
 forth in the premises1 that it is      
needless to insist any farther on it4   
#hd4 ,but1 secondly it will be urged    
that miracles do1 at least1 lose much of
 their stress and import by our         
principles4 ,what must we think of      
,moses' rod8 was it not really turned   
into a serpent2 or was there only a     
change of ideas in the minds of the     
spectators8 ,and1 can it be supposed    

that our ,saviour did no more at the    
marriage-feast in ,cana than impose on  
the sight1 and smell1 and taste of the  
guests1 so as to create in them the     
appearance or idea only of wine8 ,the   
same may be said of all other miracles2 
which1 in consequence of the foregoing  
principles1 must be looked upon only as 
so many cheats1 or illusions of fancy4  
,to this ,i reply1 that the rod was     
changed into a real serpent1 and the    
water into real wine4 ,that this does   
not in the least contradict what ,i have
 elsewhere said will be evident from    
sect4 #cd and #ce4 ,but this business of
 real and imaginary has been already so 
plainly and fully explained1 and so     
often referred to1 and the difficulties 
about it are so easily answered from    
what has gone before1 that it were an   
affront to the reader's understanding to
 resume the explication of it in its    
place4 ,i shall only observe that if at 
table all who were present should see1  
and smell1 and taste1 and drink wine1   

and find the effects of it1 with me     
there could be no doubt of its reality2 
so that at bottom the scruple concerning
 real miracles has no place at all on   
ours1 but only on the received          
principles1 and consequently makes      
rather for than against what has been   
said4  #he4 ,,consequences ,,of ,,the   
,,preceding ,,tenets4--,having done with
 the ,objections1 which ,i endeavoured  
to propose in the clearest light1 and   
gave them all the force and weight ,i   
could1 we proceed in the next place to  
take a view of our tenets in their      
,consequences4 ,some of these appear at 
first sight--as that several difficult  
and obscure questions1 on which         
abundance of speculation has been thrown
 away1 are entirely banished from       
philosophy4 ,whether corporeal substance
 can think1 whether ,matter be          
infinitely divisible1 and how it        
operates on spirit--these and like      
inquiries have given infinite amusement 
to philosophers in all ages2 but        

depending on the existence of ,matter1  
they have no longer any place on our    
principles4 ,many other advantages there
 are1 as well with regard to religion as
 the sciences1 which it is easy for any 
one to deduce from what has been        
premised2 but this will appear more     
plainly in the sequel4  #hf4 ,,the      
,,removal ,,of ,,matter ,,gives         
,,certainty ,,to ,,knowledge4--,from the
 principles we have laid down it follows
 human knowledge may naturally be       
reduced to two heads--that of ideas and 
that of spirits4 ,of each of these ,i   
shall treat in order4  ,and first as to 
ideas or unthinking things4 ,our        
knowledge of these has been very much   
obscured and confounded1 and we have    
been led into very dangerous errors1 by 
supposing a twofold existence of the    
objects of sense--the one intelligible  
or in the mind1 the other real and      
without the mind2 whereby unthinking    
things are thought to have a natural    
subsistence of their own distinct from  

being perceived by spirits4 ,this1      
which1 if ,i mistake not1 has been shown
 to be a most groundless and absurd     
notion1 is the very root of ,scepticism2
 for1 so long as men thought that real  
things subsisted without the mind1 and  
that their knowledge was only so far    
forth real as it was conformable to real
 things1 it follows they could not be   
certain they had any real knowledge at  
all4 ,for how can it be known that the  
things which are perceived are          
conformable to those which are not      
perceived1 or exist without the mind8   
#hg4 ,colour1 figure1 motion1 extension1
 and the like1 considered only as so    
many sensations in the mind1 are        
perfectly known1 there being nothing in 
them which is not perceived4 ,but1 if   
they are looked on as notes or images1  
referred to things or archetypes        
existing without the mind1 then are we  
involved all in scepticism4 ,we see only
 the appearances1 and not the real      
qualities of things4 ,what may be the   

extension1 figure1 or motion of anything
 really and absolutely1 or in itself1 it
 is impossible for us to know1 but only 
the proportion or relation they bear to 
our senses4 ,things remaining the same1 
our ideas vary1 and which of them1 or   
even whether any of them at all1        
represent the true quality really       
existing in the thing1 it is out of our 
reach to determine4 ,so that1 for aught 
we know1 all we see1 hear1 and feel may 
be only phantom and vain chimera1 and   
not at all agree with the real things   
existing in rerum natura4 ,all this     
scepticism follows from our supposing a 
difference between things and ideas1 and
 that the former have a subsistence     
without the mind or unperceived4 ,it    
were easy to dilate on this subject1 and
 show how the arguments urged by        
sceptics in all ages depend on the      
supposition of external objects4  #hh4  
,,if ,,there ,,be ,,external ,,matter1  
,,neither ,,the ,,nature ,,nor          
,,existence ,,of ,,things ,,can ,,be    

,,known4--,so long as we attribute a    
real existence to unthinking things1    
distinct from their being perceived1 it 
is not only impossible for us to know   
with evidence the nature of any real    
unthinking being1 but even that it      
exists4 ,hence it is that we see        
philosophers distrust their senses1 and 
doubt of the existence of heaven and    
earth1 of everything they see or feel1  
even of their own bodies4 ,and1 after   
all their labour and struggle of        
thought1 they are forced to own we      
cannot attain to any self-evident or    
demonstrative knowledge of the existence
 of sensible things4 ,but1 all this     
doubtfulness1 which so bewilders and    
confounds the mind and makes philosophy 
ridiculous in the eyes of the world1    
vanishes if we annex a meaning to our   
words1 and not amuse ourselves with the 
terms absolute1 external1 exist1 and    
such-like1 signifying we know not what4 
,i can as well doubt of my own being as 
of the being of those things which ,i   

actually perceive by sense2 it being a  
manifest contradiction that any sensible
 object should be immediately perceived 
by sight or touch1 and at the same time 
have no existence in nature1 since the  
very existence of an unthinking being   
consists in being perceived4  #hi4 ,,of 
,,thing ,,or ,,being4--,nothing seems of
 more importance towards erecting a firm
 system of sound and real knowledge1    
which may be proof against the assaults 
of ,scepticism1 than to lay the         
beginning in a distinct explication of  
what is meant by thing1 reality1        
existence2 for in vain shall we dispute 
concerning the real existence of things1
 or pretend to any knowledge thereof1 so
 long as we have not fixed the meaning  
of those words4 ,thing or ,being is the 
most general name of all2 it comprehends
 under it two kinds entirely distinct   
and heterogeneous1 and which have       
nothing common but the name4 viz4       
spirits and ideas4 ,the former are      
active1 indivisible substances3 the     

latter are inert1 fleeting1 dependent   
beings1 which subsist not by themselves1
 but are supported by1 or exist in minds
 or spiritual substances4 ,we comprehend
 our own existence by inward feeling or 
reflexion1 and that of other spirits by 
reason4 ,we may be said to have some    
knowledge or notion of our own minds1 of
 spirits and active beings1 whereof in a
 strict sense we have not ideas4 ,in    
like manner1 we know and have a notion  
of relations between things or          
ideas--which relations are distinct from
 the ideas or things related1 inasmuch  
as the latter may be perceived by us    
without our perceiving the former4 ,to  
me it seems that ideas1 spirits1 and    
relations are all in their respective   
kinds the object of human knowledge and 
subject of discourse2 and that the term 
idea would be improperly extended to    
signify everything we know or have any  
notion of4  #ij4 ,,external ,,things    
,,either ,,imprinted ,,by ,,or          
,,perceived ,,by ,,some ,,other         

,,mind4--,ideas imprinted on the senses 
are real things1 or do really exist2    
this we do not deny1 but we deny they   
can subsist without the minds which     
perceive them1 or that they are         
resemblances of any archetypes existing 
without the mind2 since the very being  
of a sensation or idea consists in being
 perceived1 and an idea can be like     
nothing but an idea4 ,again1 the things 
perceived by sense may be termed        
external1 with regard to their          
origin--in that they are not generated  
from within by the mind itself1 but     
imprinted by a ,spirit distinct from    
that which perceives them4 ,sensible    
objects may likewise be said to be      
without the mind in another sense1      
namely when they exist in some other    
mind2 thus1 when ,i shut my eyes1 the   
things ,i saw may still exist1 but it   
must be in another mind4  #ia4          
,,sensible ,,qualities ,,real4--,it were
 a mistake to think that what is here   
said derogates in the least from the    

reality of things4 ,it is acknowledged1 
on the received principles1 that        
extension1 motion1 and in a word all    
sensible qualities have need of a       
support1 as not being able to subsist by
 themselves4 ,but the objects perceived 
by sense are allowed to be nothing but  
combinations of those qualities1 and    
consequently cannot subsist by          
themselves4 ,thus far it is agreed on   
all hand4 ,so that in denying the things
 perceived by sense an existence        
independent of a substance of support   
wherein they may exist1 we detract      
nothing from the received opinion of    
their reality1 and are guilty of no     
innovation in that respect4 ,all the    
difference is that1 according to us1 the
 unthinking beings perceived by sense   
have no existence distinct from being   
perceived1 and cannot therefore exist in
 any other substance than those         
unextended indivisible substances or    
spirits which act and think and perceive
 them2 whereas philosophers vulgarly    

hold that the sensible qualities do     
exist in an inert1 extended1            
unperceiving substance which they call  
,matter1 to which they attribute a      
natural subsistence1 exterior to all    
thinking beings1 or distinct from being 
perceived by any mind whatsoever1 even  
the eternal mind of the ,creator1       
wherein they suppose only ideas of the  
corporeal substances created by him2 if 
indeed they allow them to be at all     
created4  #ib4 ,,objections ,,of        
,,atheists ,,overturned4--,for1 as we   
have shown the doctrine of ,matter or   
corporeal substance to have been the    
main pillar and support of ,scepticism1 
so likewise upon the same foundation    
have been raised all the impious schemes
 of ,atheism and ,irreligion4 ,nay1 so  
great a difficulty has it been thought  
to conceive ,matter produced out of     
nothing1 that the most celebrated among 
the ancient philosophers1 even of those 
who maintained the being of a ,god1 have
 thought ,matter to be uncreated and    

co-eternal with ,him4 ,how great a      
friend material substance has been to   
,atheists in all ages were needless to  
relate4 ,all their monstrous systems    
have so visible and necessary a         
dependence on it that1 when this        
corner-stone is once removed1 the whole 
fabric cannot choose but fall to the    
ground1 insomuch that it is no longer   
worth while to bestow a particular      
consideration on the absurdities of     
every wretched sect of ,atheists4  #ic4 
,,and ,,of ,,fatalists ,,also4--,that   
impious and profane persons should      
readily fall in with those systems which
 favour their inclinations1 by deriding 
immaterial substance1 and supposing the 
soul to be divisible and subject to     
corruption as the body2 which exclude   
all freedom1 intelligence1 and design   
from the formation of things1 and       
instead thereof make a self--existent1  
stupid1 unthinking substance the root   
and origin of all beings2 that they     
should hearken to those who deny a      

,providence1 or inspection of a         
,superior ,mind over the affairs of the 
world1 attributing the whole series of  
events either to blind chance or fatal  
necessity arising from the impulse of   
one body or another--all this is very   
natural4 ,and1 on the other hand1 when  
men of better principles observe the    
enemies of religion lay so great a      
stress on unthinking ,matter1 and all of
 them use so much industry and artifice 
to reduce everything to it1 methinks    
they should rejoice to see them deprived
 of their grand support1 and driven from
 that only fortress1 without which your 
,epicureans1 ,hobbists1 and the like1   
have not even the shadow of a pretence1 
but become the most cheap and easy      
triumph in the world4  #id4 ,,of        
,,idolators4--,the existence of ,matter1
 or bodies unperceived1 has not only    
been the main support of ,atheists and  
,fatalists1 but on the same principle   
doth ,idolatry likewise in all its      
various forms depend4 ,did men but      

consider that the sun1 moon1 and stars1 
and every other object of the senses are
 only so many sensations in their minds1
 which have no other existence but      
barely being perceived1 doubtless they  
would never fall down and worship their 
own ideas1 but rather address their     
homage to that ,,eternal ,,invisible    
,,mind which produces and sustains all  
things4  #ie4 ,,and ,,socinians4--,the  
same absurd principle1 by mingling      
itself with the articles of our faith1  
has occasioned no small difficulties to 
,christians4 ,for example1 about the    
,resurrection1 how many scruples and    
objections have been raised by          
,socinians and others8 ,but do not the  
most plausible of them depend on the    
supposition that a body is denominated  
the same1 with regard not to the form or
 that which is perceived by sense1 but  
the material substance1 which remains   
the same under several forms8 ,take away
 this material substance1 about the     
identity whereof all the dispute is1 and

 mean by body what every plain ordinary 
person means by that word1 to wit1 that 
which is immediately seen and felt1     
which is only a combination of sensible 
qualities or ideas1 and then their most 
unanswerable objections come to nothing4
  #if4 ,,summary ,,of ,,the             
,,consequences ,,of ,,expelling         
,,matter4--,matter being once expelled  
out of nature drags with it so many     
sceptical and impious notions1 such an  
incredible number of disputes and       
puzzling questions1 which have been     
thorns in the sides of divines as well  
as philosophers1 and made so much       
fruitless work for mankind1 that if the 
arguments we have produced against it   
are not found equal to demonstration 7as
 to me they evidently seem71 yet ,i am  
sure all friends to knowledge1 peace1   
and religion have reason to wish they   
were4  #ig4 ,beside the external        
existence of the objects of perception1 
another great source of errors and      
difficulties with regard to ideal       

knowledge is the doctrine of abstract   
ideas1 such as it has been set forth in 
the ,introduction4 ,the plainest things 
in the world1 those we are most         
intimately acquainted with and perfectly
 know1 when they are considered in an   
abstract way1 appear strangely difficult
 and incomprehensible4 ,time1 place1 and
 motion1 taken in particular or         
concrete1 are what everybody knows1 but1
 having passed through the hands of a   
metaphysician1 they become too abstract 
and fine to be apprehended by men of    
ordinary sense4 ,bid your servant meet  
you at such a time in such a place1 and 
he shall never stay to deliberate on the
 meaning of those words2 in conceiving  
that particular time and place1 or the  
motion by which he is to get thither1 he
 finds not the least difficulty4 ,but if
 time be taken exclusive of all those   
particular actions and ideas that       
diversify the day1 merely for the       
continuation of existence or duration in
 abstract1 then it will perhaps gravel  

even a philosopher to comprehend it4    
#ih4 ,,dilemma4--,for my own part1      
whenever ,i attempt to frame a simple   
idea of time1 abstracted from the       
succession of ideas in my mind1 which   
flows uniformly and is participated by  
all beings1 ,i am lost and embrangled in
 inextricable difficulties4 ,i have no  
notion of it at all1 only ,i hear others
 say it is infinitely divisible1 and    
speak of it in such a manner as leads me
 to entertain odd thoughts of my        
existence2 since that doctrine lays one 
under an absolute necessity of thinking1
 either that he passes away innumerable 
ages without a thought1 or else that he 
is annihilated every moment of his life1
 both which seem equally absurd4 ,time  
therefore being nothing1 abstracted from
 the sucession of ideas in our minds1 it
 follows that the duration of any finite
 spirit must be estimated by the number 
of ideas or actions succeeding each     
other in that same spirit or mind4      
,hence1 it is a plain consequence that  

the soul always thinks2 and in truth    
whoever shall go about to divide in his 
thoughts1 or abstract the existence of a
 spirit from its cogitation1 will1 ,i   
believe1 find it no easy task4  #ii4 ,so
 likewise when we attempt to abstract   
extension and motion from all other     
qualities1 and consider them by         
themselves1 we presently lose sight of  
them1 and run into great extravagances4 
,all which depend on a twofold          
abstraction2 first1 it is supposed that 
extension1 for example1 may be          
abstracted from all other sensible      
qualities2 and secondly1 that the entity
 of extension may be abstracted from its
 being perceived4 ,but1 whoever shall   
reflect1 and take care to understand    
what he says1 will1 if ,i mistake not1  
acknowledge that all sensible qualities 
are alike sensations and alike real2    
that where the extension is1 there is   
the colour1 too1 i4e41 in his mind1 and 
that their archetypes can exist only in 
some other mind2 and that the objects of

 sense are nothing but those sensations 
combined1 blended1 or 7if one may so    
speak7 concreted together2 none of all  
which can be supposed to exist          
unperceived4  #ajj4 ,what it is for a   
man to be happy1 or an object good1     
every one may think he knows4 ,but to   
frame an abstract idea of happiness1    
prescinded from all particular pleasure1
 or of goodness from everything that is 
good1 this is what few can pretend to4  
,so likewise a man may be just and      
virtuous without having precise ideas of
 justice and virtue4 ,the opinion that  
those and the like words stand for      
general notions1 abstracted from all    
particular persons and actions1 seems to
 have rendered morality very difficult1 
and the study thereof of small use to   
mankind4 ,and in effect the doctrine of 
abstraction has not a little contributed
 towards spoiling the most useful parts 
of knowledge4  #aja4 ,,of ,,natural     
,,philosophy ,,and ,,mathematics4--,the 
two great provinces of speculative      

science conversant about ideas received 
from sense1 are ,natural ,philosophy and
 ,mathematics2 with regard to each of   
these ,i shall make some observations4  
,and first ,i shall say somewhat of     
,natural ,philosophy4 ,on this subject  
it is that the sceptics triumph4 ,all   
that stock of arguments they produce to 
depreciate our faculties and make       
mankind appear ignorant and low1 are    
drawn principally from this head1       
namely1 that we are under an invincible 
blindness as to the true and real nature
 of things4 ,this they exaggerate1 and  
love to enlarge on4 ,we are miserably   
bantered1 say they1 by our senses1 and  
amused only with the outside and show of
 things4 ,the real essence1 the internal
 qualities and constitution of every the
 meanest object1 is hid from our view2  
something there is in every drop of     
water1 every grain of sand1 which it is 
beyond the power of human understanding 
to fathom or comprehend4 ,but1 it is    
evident from what has been shown that   

all this complaint is groundless1 and   
that we are influenced by false         
principles to that degree as to mistrust
 our senses1 and think we know nothing  
of those things which we perfectly      
comprehend4  #ajb4 ,one great inducement
 to our pronouncing ourselves ignorant  
of the nature of things is the current  
opinion that everything includes within 
itself the cause of its properties2 or  
that there is in each object an inward  
essence which is the source whence its  
discernible qualities flow1 and whereon 
they depend4 ,some have pretended to    
account for appearances by occult       
qualities1 but of late they are mostly  
resolved into mechanical causes1 to wit1
 the figure1 motion1 weight1 and        
suchlike qualities1 of insensible       
particles2 whereas1 in truth1 there is  
no other agent or efficient cause than  
spirit1 it being evident that motion1 as
 well as all other ideas1 is perfectly  
inert4 ,see sect4 #be4 ,hence1 to       
endeavour to explain the production of  

colours or sounds1 by figure1 motion1   
magnitude1 and the like1 must needs be  
labour in vain4 ,and accordingly we see 
the attempts of that kind are not at all
 satisfactory4 ,which may be said in    
general of those instances wherein one  
idea or quality is assigned for the     
cause of another4 ,i need not say how   
many hypotheses and speculations are    
left out1 and how much the study of     
nature is abridged by this doctrine4    
#ajc4 ,,attraction ,,signifies ,,the    
,,effect1 ,,not ,,the ,,manner ,,or     
,,cause4--,the great mechanical         
principle now in vogue is attraction4   
,that a stone falls to the earth1 or the
 sea swells towards the moon1 may to    
some appear sufficiently explained      
thereby4 ,but how are we enlightened by 
being told this is done by attraction8  
,is it that that word signifies the     
manner of the tendency1 and that it is  
by the mutual drawing of bodies instead 
of their being impelled or protruded    
towards each other8 ,but1 nothing is    

determined of the manner or action1 and 
it may as truly 7for aught we know7 be  
termed impulse1 or protrusion1 as       
attraction4 ,again1 the parts of steel  
we see cohere firmly together1 and this 
also is accounted for by attraction2    
but1 in this as in the other instances1 
,i do not perceive that anything is     
signified besides the effect itself2 for
 as to the manner of the action whereby 
it is produced1 or the cause which      
produces it1 these are not so much as   
aimed at4  #ajd4 ,indeed1 if we take a  
view of the several phenomena1 and      
compare them together1 we may observe   
some likeness and conformity between    
them4 ,for example1 in the falling of a 
stone to the ground1 in the rising of   
the sea towards the moon1 in cohesion1  
crystallization1 etc1 there is something
 alike1 namely1 an union or mutual      
approach of bodies4 ,so that any one of 
these or the like phenomena may not seem
 strange or surprising to a man who has 
nicely observed and compared the effects

 of nature4 ,for that only is thought so
 which is uncommon1 or a thing by       
itself1 and out of the ordinary course  
of our observation4 ,that bodies should 
tend towards the centre of the earth is 
not thought strange1 because it is what 
we perceive every moment of our lives4  
,but1 that they should have a like      
gravitation towards the centre of the   
moon may seem odd and unaccountable to  
most men1 because it is discerned only  
in the tides4 ,but a philosopher1 whose 
thoughts take in a larger compass of    
nature1 having observed a certain       
similitude of appearances1 as well in   
the heavens as the earth1 that argue    
innumerable bodies to have a mutual     
tendency towards each other1 which he   
denotes by the general name attraction1 
whatever can be reduced to that he      
thinks justly accounted for4 ,thus he   
explains the tides by the attraction of 
the terraqueous globe towards the moon1 
which to him does not appear odd or     
anomalous1 but only a particular example

 of a general rule or law of nature4    
#aje4 ,if therefore we consider the     
difference there is betwixt natural     
philosophers and other men1 with regard 
to their knowledge of the phenomena1 we 
shall find it consists not in an exacter
 knowledge of the efficient cause that  
produces them--for that can be no other 
than the will of a spirit--but only in a
 greater largeness of comprehension1    
whereby analogies1 harmonies1 and       
agreements are discovered in the works  
of nature1 and the particular effects   
explained1 that is1 reduced to general  
rules1 see sect4 #fb1 which rules1      
grounded on the analogy and uniformness 
observed in the production of natural   
effects1 are most agreeable and sought  
after by the mind2 for that they extend 
our prospect beyond what is present and 
near to us1 and enable us to make very  
probable conjectures touching things    
that may have happened at very great    
distances of time and place1 as well as 
to predict things to come2 which sort of

 endeavour towards omniscience is much  
affected by the mind4  #ajf4 ,,caution  
,,as ,,to ,,the ,,use ,,of              
,,analogies4--,but we should proceed    
warily in such things1 for we are apt to
 lay too great stress on analogies1 and1
 to the prejudice of truth1 humour that 
eagerness of the mind whereby it is     
carried to extend its knowledge into    
general theorems4 ,for example1 in the  
business of gravitation or mutual       
attraction1 because it appears in many  
instances1 some are straightway for     
pronouncing it universal2 and that to   
attract and be attracted by every other 
body is an essential quality inherent in
 all bodies whatsoever4 ,whereas it is  
evident the fixed stars have no such    
tendency towards each other2 and1 so far
 is that gravitation from being         
essential to bodies that in some        
instances a quite contrary principle    
seems to show itself2 as in the         
perpendicular growth of plants1 and the 
elasticity of the air4 ,there is nothing

 necessary or essential in the case1 but
 it depends entirely on the will of the 
,governing ,spirit1 who causes certain  
bodies to cleave together or tend       
towards each other according to various 
laws1 whilst ,he keeps others at a fixed
 distance2 and to some ,he gives a quite
 contrary tendency to fly asunder just  
as ,he sees convenient4  #ajg4 ,after   
what has been premised1 ,i think we may 
lay down the following conclusions4     
,first1 it is plain philosophers amuse  
themselves in vain1 when they inquire   
for any natural efficient cause1        
distinct from a mind or spirit4         
,secondly1 considering the whole        
creation is the workmanship of a wise   
and good ,agent1 it should seem to      
become philosophers to employ their     
thoughts 7contrary to what some hold7   
about the final causes of things2 and ,i
 confess ,i see no reason why pointing  
out the various ends to which natural   
things are adapted1 and for which they  
were originally with unspeakable wisdom 

contrived1 should not be thought one    
good way of accounting for them1 and    
altogether worthy a philosopher4        
,thirdly1 from what has been premised no
 reason can be drawn why the history of 
nature should not still be studied1 and 
observations and experiments made1      
which1 that they are of use to mankind1 
and enable us to draw any general       
conclusions1 is not the result of any   
immutable habitudes or relations between
 things themselves1 but only of ,god's  
goodness and kindness to men in the     
administration of the world4 ,see sect4 
#cj and #ca ,fourthly1 by a diligent    
observation of the phenomena within our 
view1 we may discover the general laws  
of nature1 and from them deduce the     
other phenomena2 ,i do not say          
demonstrate1 for all deductions of that 
kind depend on a supposition that the   
,author of nature always operates       
uniformly1 and in a constant observance 
of those rules we take for principles3  
which we cannot evidently know4  #ajh4  

,,three ,,analogies4--,those men who    
frame general rules from the phenomena  
and afterwards derive the phenomena from
 those rules1 seem to consider signs    
rather than causes4 ,a man may well     
understand natural signs without knowing
 their analogy1 or being able to say by 
what rule a thing is so or so4 ,and1 as 
it is very possible to write improperly1
 through too strict an observance of    
general grammar rules2 so1 in arguing   
from general laws of nature1 it is not  
impossible we may extend the analogy too
 far1 and by that means run into        
mistakes4  #aji4 ,as in reading other   
books a wise man will choose to fix his 
thoughts on the sense and apply it to   
use1 rather than lay them out in        
grammatical remarks on the language2 so1
 in perusing the volume of nature1 it   
seems beneath the dignity of the mind to
 affect an exactness in reducing each   
particular phenomenon to general rules1 
or showing how it follows from them4 ,we
 should propose to ourselves nobler     

views1 namely1 to recreate and exalt the
 mind with a prospect of the beauty1    
order4 extent1 and variety of natural   
things3 hence1 by proper inferences1 to 
enlarge our notions of the grandeur1    
wisdom1 and beneficence of the ,creator2
 and lastly1 to make the several parts  
of the creation1 so far as in us lies1  
subservient to the ends they were       
designed for1 ,god's glory1 and the     
sustentation and comfort of ourselves   
and fellow-creatures4  #aaj4 ,the best  
key for the aforesaid analogy or natural
 ,science will be easily acknowledged to
 be a certain celebrated ,treatise of   
,mechanics4 ,in the entrance of which   
justly admired treatise1 ,time1 ,space1 
and ,motion are distinguished into      
absolute and relative1 true and         
apparent1 mathematical and vulgar2 which
 distinction1 as it is at large         
explained by the author1 does suppose   
these quantities to have an existence   
without the mind2 and that they are     
ordinarily conceived with relation to   

sensible things1 to which nevertheless  
in their own nature they bear no        
relation at all4  #aaa4 ,as for ,time1  
as it is there taken in an absolute or  
abstracted sense1 for the duration or   
perseverance of the existence of things1
 ,i have nothing more to add concerning 
it after what has been already said on  
that subject4 ,sect4 #ig and #ih4 ,for  
the rest1 this celebrated author holds  
there is an absolute ,space1 which1     
being unperceivable to sense1 remains in
 itself similar and immovable2 and      
relative space to be the measure        
thereof1 which1 being movable and       
defined by its situation in respect of  
sensible bodies1 is vulgarly taken for  
immovable space4 ,place he defines to be
 that part of space which is occupied by
 any body2 and according as the space is
 absolute or relative so also is the    
place4 ,absolute ,motion is said to be  
the translation of a body from absolute 
place to absolute place1 as relative    
motion is from one relative place to    

another4 ,and1 because the parts of     
absolute space do not fall under our    
senses1 instead of them we are obliged  
to use their sensible measures1 and so  
define both place and motion with       
respect to bodies which we regard as    
immovable4 ,but1 it is said in          
philosophical matters we must abstract  
from our senses1 since it may be that   
none of those bodies which seem to be   
quiescent are truly so1 and the same    
thing which is moved relatively may be  
really at rest2 as likewise one and the 
same body may be in relative rest and   
motion1 or even moved with contrary     
relative motions at the same time1      
according as its place is variously     
defined4 ,all which ambiguity is to be  
found in the apparent motions1 but not  
at all in the true or absolute1 which   
should therefore be alone regarded in   
philosophy4 ,and the true as we are told
 are distinguished from apparent or     
relative motions by the following       
properties4--,first1 in true or absolute

 motion all parts which preserve the    
same position with respect of the whole1
 partake of the motions of the whole4   
,secondly1 the place being moved1 that  
which is placed therein is also moved2  
so that a body moving in a place which  
is in motion doth participate the motion
 of its place4 ,thirdly1 true motion is 
never generated or changed otherwise    
than by force impressed on the body     
itself4 ,fourthly1 true motion is always
 changed by force impressed on the body 
moved4 ,fifthly1 in circular motion     
barely relative there is no centrifugal 
force1 which1 nevertheless1 in that     
which is true or absolute1 is           
proportional to the quantity of motion4 
#aab4 ,,motion1 ,,whether ,,real ,,or   
,,apparent1 ,,relative4--,but1          
notwithstanding what has been said1 ,i  
must confess it does not appear to me   
that there can be any motion other than 
relative2 so that to conceive motion    
there must be at least conceived two    
bodies1 whereof the distance or position

 in regard to each other is varied4     
,hence1 if there was one only body in   
being it could not possibly be moved4   
,this seems evident1 in that the idea ,i
 have of motion doth necessarily include
 relation4  #aac4 ,,apparent ,,motion   
,,denied4--,but1 though in every motion 
it be necessary to conceive more bodies 
than one1 yet it may be that one only is
 moved1 namely1 that on which the force 
causing the change in the distance or   
situation of the bodies1 is impressed4  
,for1 however some may define relative  
motion1 so as to term that body moved   
which changes its distance from some    
other body1 whether the force or action 
causing that change were impressed on it
 or no1 yet as relative motion is that  
which is perceived by sense1 and        
regarded in the ordinary affairs of     
life1 it should seem that every man of  
common sense knows what it is as well as
 the best philosopher4 ,now1 ,i ask any 
one whether1 in his sense of motion as  
he walks along the streets1 the stones  

he passes over may be said to move1     
because they change distance with his   
feet8 ,to me it appears that though     
motion includes a relation of one thing 
to another1 yet it is not necessary that
 each term of the relation be           
denominated from it4 ,as a man may think
 of somewhat which does not think1 so a 
body may be moved to or from another    
body which is not therefore itself in   
motion4  #aad4 ,as the place happens to 
be variously defined1 the motion which  
is related to it varies4 ,a man in a    
ship may be said to be quiescent with   
relation to the sides of the vessel1 and
 yet move with relation to the land4 ,or
 he may move eastward in respect of the 
one1 and westward in respect of the     
other4 ,in the common affairs of life   
men never go beyond the earth to define 
the place of any body2 and what is      
quiescent in respect of that is         
accounted absolutely to be so4 ,but     
philosophers1 who have a greater extent 
of thought1 and juster notions of the   

system of things1 discover even the     
earth itself to be moved4 ,in order     
therefore to fix their notions they seem
 to conceive the corporeal world as     
finite1 and the utmost unmoved walls or 
shell thereof to be the place whereby   
they estimate true motions4 ,if we sound
 our own conceptions1 ,i believe we may 
find all the absolute motion we can     
frame an idea of to be at bottom no     
other than relative motion thus defined4
 ,for1 as has been already observed1    
absolute motion1 exclusive of all       
external relation1 is incomprehensible2 
and to this kind of relative motion all 
the above-mentioned properties1 causes1 
and effects ascribed to absolute motion 
will1 if ,i mistake not1 be found to    
agree4 ,as to what is said of the       
centrifugal force1 that it does not at  
all belong to circular relative motion1 
,i do not see how this follows from the 
experiment which is brought to prove it4
 ,see ,philosophiae ,naturalis          
,principia ,mathematica1 in ,schol4     

,def4 ,,viii4 ,for the water in the     
vessel at that time wherein it is said  
to have the greatest relative circular  
motion1 has1 ,i think1 no motion at all2
 as is plain from the foregoing section4
  #aae4 ,for1 to denominate a body moved
 it is requisite1 first1 that it change 
its distance or situation with regard to
 some other body2 and secondly1 that the
 force occasioning that change be       
applied to it4 ,if either of these be   
wanting1 ,i do not think that1 agreeably
 to the sense of mankind1 or the        
propriety of language1 a body can be    
said to be in motion4 ,i grant indeed   
that it is possible for us to think a   
body which we see change its distance   
from some other to be moved1 though it  
have no force applied to it 7in which   
sense there may be apparent motion71 but
 then it is because the force causing   
the change of distance is imagined by us
 to be applied or impressed on that body
 thought to move2 which indeed shows we 
are capable of mistaking a thing to be  

in motion which is not1 and that is all4
  #aaf4 ,,any ,,idea ,,of ,,pure ,,space
 ,,relative4--,from what has been said  
it follows that the philosophic         
consideration of motion does not imply  
the being of an absolute ,space1        
distinct from that which is perceived by
 sense and related bodies2 which that it
 cannot exist without the mind is clear 
upon the same principles that           
demonstrate the like of all other       
objects of sense4 ,and perhaps1 if we   
inquire narrowly1 we shall find we      
cannot even frame an idea of pure ,space
 exclusive of all body4 ,this ,i must   
confess seems impossible1 as being a    
most abstract idea4 ,when ,i excite a   
motion in some part of my body1 if it be
 free or without resistance1 ,i say     
there is ,space2 but if ,i find a       
resistance1 then ,i say there is ,body2 
and in proportion as the resistance to  
motion is lesser or greater1 ,i say the 
space is more or less pure4 ,so that    
when ,i speak of pure or empty space1 it

 is not to be supposed that the word    
space stands for an idea distinct from  
or conceivable without body and         
motion--though indeed we are apt to     
think every noun substantive stands for 
a distinct idea that may be separated   
from all others2 which has occasioned   
infinite mistakes4 ,when1 therefore1    
supposing all the world to be           
annihilated besides my own body1 ,i say 
there still remains pure ,space1 thereby
 nothing else is meant but only that ,i 
conceive it possible for the limbs of my
 body to be moved on all sides without  
the least resistance1 but if that1 too1 
were annihilated then there could be no 
motion1 and consequently no ,space4     
,some1 perhaps1 may think the sense of  
seeing doth furnish them with the idea  
of pure space2 but it is plain from what
 we have elsewhere shown1 that the ideas
 of space and distance are not obtained 
by that sense4 ,see the ,essay          
concerning ,vision4  #aag4 ,what is here
 laid down seems to put an end to all   

those disputes and difficulties that    
have sprung up amongst the learned      
concerning the nature of pure ,space4   
,but the chief advantage arising from it
 is that we are freed from that         
dangerous dilemma1 to which several who 
have employed their thoughts on that    
subject imagine themselves reduced1 to  
wit1 of thinking either that ,real      
,space is ,god1 or else that there is   
something beside ,god which is eternal1 
uncreated1 infinite1 indivisible1       
immutable4 ,both which may justly be    
thought pernicious and absurd notions4  
,it is certain that not a few divines1  
as well as philosophers of great note1  
have1 from the difficulty they found in 
conceiving either limits or annihilation
 of space1 concluded it must be divine4 
,and some of late have set themselves   
particularly to show the incommunicable 
attributes of ,god agree to it4 ,which  
doctrine1 how unworthy soever it may    
seem of the ,divine ,nature1 yet ,i do  
not see how we can get clear of it1 so  

long as we adhere to the received       
opinions4  #aah4 ,,the ,,errors         
,,arising ,,from ,,the ,,doctrines ,,of 
,,abstraction ,,and ,,external          
,,material ,,existences1 ,,influence    
,,mathematical ,,reasonings4--,hitherto 
of ,natural ,philosophy3 we come now to 
make some inquiry concerning that other 
great branch of speculative knowledge1  
to wit1 ,mathematics4 ,these1 how       
celebrated soever they may be for their 
clearness and certainty of              
demonstration1 which is hardly anywhere 
else to be found1 cannot nevertheless be
 supposed altogether free from mistakes1
 if in their principles there lurks some
 secret error which is common to the    
professors of those sciences with the   
rest of mankind4 ,mathematicians1 though
 they deduce their theorems from a great
 height of evidence1 yet their first    
principles are limited by the           
consideration of quantity3 and they do  
not ascend into any inquiry concerning  
those transcendental maxims which       

influence all the particular sciences1  
each part whereof1 ,mathematics not     
excepted1 does consequently participate 
of the errors involved in them4 ,that   
the principles laid down by             
mathematicians are true1 and their way  
of deduction from those principles clear
 and incontestible1 we do not deny2 but1
 we hold there may be certain erroneous 
maxims of greater extent than the object
 of ,mathematics1 and for that reason   
not expressly mentioned1 though tacitly 
supposed throughout the whole progress  
of that science2 and that the ill       
effects of those secret unexamined      
errors are diffused through all the     
branches thereof4 ,to be plain1 we      
suspect the mathematicians are as well  
as other men concerned in the errors    
arising from the doctrine of abstract   
general ideas1 and the existence of     
objects without the mind4  #aai4        
,arithmetic has been thought to have for
 its object abstract ideas of ,number2  
of which to understand the properties   

and mutual habitudes1 is supposed no    
mean part of speculative knowledge4 ,the
 opinion of the pure and intellectual   
nature of numbers in abstract has made  
them in esteem with those philosophers  
who seem to have affected an uncommon   
fineness and elevation of thought4 ,it  
has set a price on the most trifling    
numerical speculations which in practice
 are of no use1 but serve only for      
amusement2 and has therefore so far     
infected the minds of some1 that they   
have dreamed of mighty mysteries        
involved in numbers1 and attempted the  
explication of natural things by them4  
,but1 if we inquire into our own        
thoughts1 and consider what has been    
premised1 we may perhaps entertain a low
 opinion of those high flights and      
abstractions1 and look on all inquiries1
 about numbers only as so many          
difficiles nugae1 so far as they are not
 subservient to practice1 and promote   
the benefit of life4  #abj4 ,unity in   
abstract we have before considered in   

sect4 #ac1 from which and what has been 
said in the ,introduction1 it plainly   
follows there is not any such idea4     
,but1 number being defined a collection 
of units1 we may conclude that1 if there
 be no such thing as unity or unit in   
abstract1 there are no ideas of number  
in abstract denoted by the numeral names
 and figures4 ,the theories therefore in
 ,arithmetic1 if they are abstracted    
from the names and figures1 as likewise 
from all use and practice1 as well as   
from the particular things numbered1 can
 be supposed to have nothing at all for 
their object2 hence we may see how      
entirely the science of numbers is      
subordinate to practice1 and how jejune 
and trifling it becomes when considered 
as a matter of mere speculation4  #aba4 
,however1 since there may be some who1  
deluded by the specious show of         
discovering abstracted verities1 waste  
their time in arithmetical theorems and 
problems which have not any use1 it will
 not be amiss if we more fully consider 

and expose the vanity of that pretence2 
and this will plainly appear by taking a
 view of ,arithmetic in its infancy1 and
 observing what it was that originally  
put men on the study of that science1   
and to what scope they directed it4 ,it 
is natural to think that at first1 men1 
for ease of memory and help of          
computation1 made use of counters1 or in
 writing of single strokes1 points1 or  
the like1 each whereof was made to      
signify an unit1 i4e41 some one thing of
 whatever kind they had occasion to     
reckon4 ,afterwards they found out the  
more compendious ways of making one     
character stand in place of several     
strokes or points4 ,and1 lastly1 the    
notation of the ,arabians or ,indians   
came into use1 wherein1 by the          
repetition of a few characters or       
figures1 and varying the signification  
of each figure according to the place it
 obtains1 all numbers may be most aptly 
expressed2 which seems to have been done
 in imitation of language1 so that an   

exact analogy is observed betwixt the   
notation by figures and names1 the nine 
simple figures answering the nine first 
numeral names and places in the former1 
corresponding to denominations in the   
latter4 ,and agreeably to those         
conditions of the simple and local value
 of figures1 were contrived methods of  
finding1 from the given figures or marks
 of the parts1 what figures and how     
placed are proper to denote the whole1  
or vice versa4 ,and having found the    
sought figures1 the same rule or analogy
 being observed throughout1 it is easy  
to read them into words2 and so the     
number becomes perfectly known4 ,for    
then the number of any particular things
 is said to be known1 when we know the  
name of figures 7with their due         
arrangement7 that according to the      
standing analogy belong to them4 ,for1  
these signs being known1 we can by the  
operations of arithmetic know the signs 
of any part of the particular sums      
signified by them2 and1 thus computing  

in signs 7because of the connexion      
established betwixt them and the        
distinct multitudes of things whereof   
one is taken for an unit71 we may be    
able rightly to sum up1 divide1 and     
proportion the things themselves that we
 intend to number4  #abb4 ,in           
,arithmetic1 therefore1 we regard not   
the things1 but the signs1 which        
nevertheless are not regarded for their 
own sake1 but because they direct us how
 to act with relation to things1 and    
dispose rightly of them4 ,now1 agreeably
 to what we have before observed of     
words in general 7sect4 #ai1 ,introd47  
it happens here likewise that abstract  
ideas are thought to be signified by    
numeral names or characters1 while they 
do not suggest ideas of particular      
things to our minds4 ,i shall not at    
present enter into a more particular    
dissertation on this subject1 but only  
observe that it is evident from what has
 been said1 those things which pass for 
abstract truths and theorems concerning 

numbers1 are in reality conversant about
 no object distinct from particular     
numeral things1 except only names and   
characters1 which originally came to be 
considered on no other account but their
 being signs1 or capable to represent   
aptly whatever particular things men had
 need to compute4 ,whence it follows    
that to study them for their own sake   
would be just as wise1 and to as good   
purpose as if a man1 neglecting the true
 use or original intention and          
subserviency of language1 should spend  
his time in impertinent criticisms upon 
words1 or reasonings and controversies  
purely verbal4  #abc4 ,from numbers we  
proceed to speak of ,extension1 which1  
considered as relative1 is the object of
 ,geometry4 ,the infinite divisibility  
of finite extension1 though it is not   
expressly laid down either as an axiom  
or theorem in the elements of that      
science1 yet is throughout the same     
everywhere supposed and thought to have 
so inseparable and essential a connexion

 with the principles and demonstrations 
in ,geometry1 that mathematicians never 
admit it into doubt1 or make the least  
question of it4 ,and1 as this notion is 
the source from whence do spring all    
those amusing geometrical paradoxes     
which have such a direct repugnancy to  
the plain common sense of mankind1 and  
are admitted with so much reluctance    
into a mind not yet debauched by        
learning2 so it is the principal        
occasion of all that nice and extreme   
subtilty which renders the study of     
,mathematics so difficult and tedious4  
,hence1 if we can make it appear that no
 finite extension contains innumerable  
parts1 or is infinitely divisible1 it   
follows that we shall at once clear the 
science of ,geometry from a great number
 of difficulties and contradictions     
which have ever been esteemed a reproach
 to human reason1 and withal make the   
attainment thereof a business of much   
less time and pains than it hitherto has
 been4  #abd4 ,every particular finite  

extension which may possibly be the     
object of our thought is an idea        
existing only in the mind1 and          
consequently each part thereof must be  
perceived4 ,if1 therefore1 ,i cannot    
perceive innumerable parts in any finite
 extension that ,i consider1 it is      
certain they are not contained in it2   
but1 it is evident that ,i cannot       
distinguish innumerable parts in any    
particular line1 surface1 or solid1     
which ,i either perceive by sense1 or   
figure to myself in my mind3 wherefore  
,i conclude they are not contained in   
it4 ,nothing can be plainer to me than  
that the extensions ,i have in view are 
no other than my own ideas2 and it is no
 less plain that ,i cannot resolve any  
one of my ideas into an infinite number 
of other ideas1 that is1 that they are  
not infinitely divisible4 ,if by finite 
extension be meant something distinct   
from a finite idea1 ,i declare ,i do not
 know what that is1 and so cannot affirm
 or deny anything of it4 ,but if the    

terms extension1 parts1 c41 are taken in
 any sense conceivable1 that is1 for    
ideas1 then to say a finite quantity or 
extension consists of parts infinite in 
number is so manifest a contradiction1  
that every one at first sight           
acknowledges it to be so2 and it is     
impossible it should ever gain the      
assent of any reasonable creature who is
 not brought to it by gentle and slow   
degrees1 as a converted ,gentile to the 
belief of transubstantiation4 ,ancient  
and rooted prejudices do often pass into
 principles2 and those propositions     
which once obtain the force and credit  
of a principle1 are not only themselves1
 but likewise whatever is deducible from
 them1 thought privileged from all      
examination4 ,and there is no absurdity 
so gross1 which1 by this means1 the mind
 of man may not be prepared to swallow4 
#abe4 ,he whose understanding is        
possessed with the doctrine of abstract 
general ideas may be persuaded that     
7whatever be thought of the ideas of    

sense7 extension in abstract is         
infinitely divisible4 ,and one who      
thinks the objects of sense exist       
without the mind will perhaps in virtue 
thereof be brought to admit that a line 
but an inch long may contain innumerable
 parts--really existing1 though too     
small to be discerned4 ,these errors are
 grafted as well in the minds of        
geometricians as of other men1 and have 
a like influence on their reasonings2   
and it were no difficult thing to show  
how the arguments from ,geometry made   
use of to support the infinite          
divisibility of extension are bottomed  
on them4 ,at present we shall only      
observe in general whence it is the     
mathematicians are all so fond and      
tenacious of that doctrine4  #abf4 ,it  
has been observed in another place that 
the theorems and demonstrations in      
,geometry are conversant about universal
 ideas 7sect4 #ae1 ,introd472 where it  
is explained in what sense this ought to
 be understood1 to wit1 the particular  

lines and figures included in the       
diagram are supposed to stand for       
innumerable others of different sizes2  
or1 in other words1 the geometer        
considers them abstracting from their   
magnitude--which does not imply that he 
forms an abstract idea1 but only that he
 cares not what the particular magnitude
 is1 whether great or small1 but looks  
on that as a thing different to the     
demonstration4 ,hence it follows that a 
line in the scheme but an inch long must
 be spoken of as though it contained ten
 thousand parts1 since it is regarded   
not in itself1 but as it is universal2  
and it is universal only in its         
signification1 whereby it represents    
innumerable lines greater than itself1  
in which may be distinguished ten       
thousand parts or more1 though there may
 not be above an inch in it4 ,after this
 manner1 the properties of the lines    
signified are 7by a very usual figure7  
transferred to the sign1 and thence1    
through mistake1 though to appertain to 

it considered in its own nature4  #abg4 
,because there is no number of parts so 
great but it is possible there may be a 
line containing more1 the inch-line is  
said to contain parts more than any     
assignable number2 which is true1 not of
 the inch taken absolutely1 but only for
 the things signified by it4 ,but men1  
not retaining that distinction in their 
thoughts1 slide into a belief that the  
small particular line described on paper
 contains in itself parts innumerable4  
,there is no such thing as the          
ten--thousandth part of an inch2 but    
there is of a mile or diameter of the   
earth1 which may be signified by that   
inch4 ,when therefore ,i delineate a    
triangle on paper1 and take one side not
 above an inch1 for example1 in length  
to be the radius1 this ,i consider as   
divided into #aj1jjj or #ajj1jjj parts  
or more2 for1 though the ten-thousandth 
part of that line considered in itself  
is nothing at all1 and consequently may 
be neglected without an error or        

inconveniency1 yet these described      
lines1 being only marks standing for    
greater quantities1 whereof it may be   
the ten--thousandth part is very        
considerable1 it follows that1 to       
prevent notable errors in practice1 the 
radius must be taken of #aj1jjj parts or
 more4  #abh4 ,,lines ,,which ,,are     
,,infinitely ,,divisible4--,from what   
has been said the reason is plain why1  
to the end any theorem become universal 
in its use1 it is necessary we speak of 
the lines described on paper as though  
they contained parts which really they  
do not4 ,in doing of which1 if we       
examine the matter thoroughly1 we shall 
perhaps discover that we cannot conceive
 an inch itself as consisting of1 or    
being divisible into1 a thousand parts1 
but only some other line which is far   
greater than an inch1 and represented by
 it2 and that when we say a line is     
infinitely divisible1 we must mean a    
line which is infinitely great4 ,what we
 have here observed seems to be the     

chief cause why1 to suppose the infinite
 divisibility of finite extension has   
been thought necessary in geometry4     
#abi4 ,the several absurdities and      
contradictions which flowed from this   
false principle might1 one would think1 
have been esteemed so many              
demonstrations against it4 ,but1 by ,i  
know not what logic1 it is held that    
proofs a posteriori are not to be       
admitted against propositions relating  
to infinity1 as though it were not      
impossible even for an infinite mind to 
reconcile contradictions2 or as if      
anything absurd and repugnant could have
 a necessary connexion with truth or    
flow from it4 ,but1 whoever considers   
the weakness of this pretence will think
 it was contrived on purpose to humour  
the laziness of the mind which had      
rather acquiesce in an indolent         
scepticism than be at the pains to go   
through with a severe examination of    
those principles it has ever embraced   
for true4  #acj4 ,of late the           

speculations about ,infinities have run 
so high1 and grown to such strange      
notions1 as have occasioned no small    
scruples and disputes among the         
geometers of the present age4 ,some     
there are of great note who1 not content
 with holding that finite lines may be  
divided into an infinite number of      
parts1 do yet farther maintain that each
 of those infinitesimals is itself      
subdivisible into an infinity of other  
parts or infinitesimals of a second     
order1 and so on ad infinitum4 ,these1  
,i say1 assert there are infinitesimals 
of infinitesimals of infinitesimals1 c41
 without ever coming to an end2 so that 
according to them an inch does not      
barely contain an infinite number of    
parts1 but an infinity of an infinity of
 an infinity ad infinitum of parts4     
,others there be who hold all orders of 
infinitesimals below the first to be    
nothing at all2 thinking it with good   
reason absurd to imagine there is any   
positive quantity or part of extension  

which1 though multiplied infinitely1 can
 never equal the smallest given         
extension4 ,and yet on the other hand it
 seems no less absurd to think the      
square1 cube or other power of a        
positive real root1 should itself be    
nothing at all2 which they who hold     
infinitesimals of the first order1      
denying all of the subsequent orders1   
are obliged to maintain4  #aca4         
,,objection ,,of                        
,,mathematicians4--,,answer4--,have we  
not therefore reason to conclude they   
are both in the wrong1 and that there is
 in effect no such thing as parts       
infinitely small1 or an infinite number 
of parts contained in any finite        
quantity8 ,but you will say that if this
 doctrine obtains it will follow the    
very foundations of ,geometry are       
destroyed1 and those great men who have 
raised that science to so astonishing a 
height1 have been all the while building
 a castle in the air4 ,to this it may be
 replied that whatever is useful in     

geometry1 and promotes the benefit of   
human life1 does still remain firm and  
unshaken on our principles2 that science
 considered as practical will rather    
receive advantage than any prejudice    
from what has been said4 ,but to set    
this in a due light may be the proper   
business of another place4 ,for the     
rest1 though it should follow that some 
of the more intricate and subtle parts  
of ,speculative ,mathematics may be     
pared off without any prejudice to      
truth1 yet ,i do not see what damage    
will be thence derived to mankind4 ,on  
the contrary1 ,i think it were highly to
 be wished that men of great abilities  
and obstinate application would draw off
 their thoughts from those amusements1  
and employ them in the study of such    
things as lie nearer the concerns of    
life1 or have a more direct influence on
 the manners4  #acb4 ,,second           
,,objection ,,of                        
,,mathematicians4--,,answer4--,if it be 
said that several theorems undoubtedly  

true are discovered by methods in which 
infinitesimals are made use of1 which   
could never have been if their existence
 included a contradiction in it2 ,i     
answer that upon a thorough examination 
it will not be found that in any        
instance it is necessary to make use of 
or conceive infinitesimal parts of      
finite lines1 or even quantities less   
than the minimum sensible2 nay1 it will 
be evident this is never done1 it being 
impossible4  #acc4 ,,if ,,the ,,doctrine
 ,,were ,,only ,,an ,,hypothesis ,,it   
,,should ,,be ,,respected ,,for ,,its   
,,consequences4--,by what we have       
premised1 it is plain that very numerous
 and important errors have taken their  
rise from those false ,principles which 
were impugned in the foregoing parts of 
this treatise2 and the opposites of     
those erroneous tenets at the same time 
appear to be most fruitful ,principles1 
from whence do flow innumerable         
consequences highly advantageous to true
 philosophy1 as well as to religion4    

,particularly ,matter1 or the absolute  
existence of corporeal objects1 has been
 shown to be that wherein the most      
avowed and pernicious enemies of all    
knowledge1 whether human or divine1 have
 ever placed their chief strength and   
confidence4 ,and surely1 if by          
distinguishing the real existence of    
unthinking things from their being      
perceived1 and allowing them a          
subsistance of their own out of the     
minds of spirits1 no one thing is       
explained in nature1 but on the contrary
 a great many inexplicable difficulties 
arise2 if the supposition of ,matter is 
barely precarious1 as not being grounded
 on so much as one single reason2 if its
 consequences cannot endure the light of
 examination and free inquiry1 but      
screen themselves under the dark and    
general pretence of infinites being     
incomprehensible2 if withal the removal 
of this ,matter be not attended with the
 least evil consequence2 if it be not   
even missed in the world1 but everything

 as well1 nay much easier conceived     
without it2 if1 lastly1 both ,sceptics  
and ,atheists are for ever silenced upon
 supposing only spirits and ideas1 and  
this scheme of things is perfectly      
agreeable both to ,reason and ,religion3
 methinks we may expect it should be    
admitted and firmly embraced1 though it 
were proposed only as an hypothesis1 and
 the existence of ,matter had been      
allowed possible1 which yet ,i think we 
have evidently demonstrated that it is  
not4  #acd4 ,true it is that1 in        
consequence of the foregoing principles1
 several disputes and speculations which
 are esteemed no mean parts of learning1
 are rejected as useless4 ,but1 how     
great a prejudice soever against our    
notions this may give to those who have 
already been deeply engaged1 and make   
large advances in studies of that       
nature1 yet by others we hope it will   
not be thought any just ground of       
dislike to the principles and tenets    
herein laid down1 that they abridge the 

labour of study1 and make human sciences
 far more clear1 compendious and        
attainable than they were before4  #ace4
 ,having despatched what we intended to 
say concerning the knowledge of ,,ideas1
 the method we proposed leads us in the 
next place to treat of ,,spirits--with  
regard to which1 perhaps1 human         
knowledge is not so deficient as is     
vulgarly imagined4 ,the great reason    
that is assigned for our being thought  
ignorant of the nature of spirits is our
 not having an idea of it4 ,but1 surely 
it ought not to be looked on as a defect
 in a human understanding that it does  
not perceive the idea of spirit1 if it  
is manifestly impossible there should be
 any such idea4 ,and this if ,i mistake 
not has been demonstrated in section    
#bg2 to which ,i shall here add that a  
spirit has been shown to be the only    
substance or support wherein unthinking 
beings or ideas can exist2 but that this
 substance which supports or perceives  
ideas should itself be an idea or like  

an idea is evidently absurd4  #acf4     
,,objection4--,,answer4--,it will       
perhaps be said that we want a sense 7as
 some have imagined7 proper to know     
substances withal1 which1 if we had1 we 
might know our own soul as we do a      
triangle4 ,to this ,i answer1 that1 in  
case we had a new sense bestowed upon   
us1 we could only receive thereby some  
new sensations or ideas of sense4 ,but  
,i believe nobody will say that what he 
means by the terms soul and substance is
 only some particular sort of idea or   
sensation4 ,we may therefore infer that1
 all things duly considered1 it is not  
more reasonable to think our faculties  
defective1 in that they do not furnish  
us with an idea of spirit or active     
thinking substance1 than it would be if 
we should blame them for not being able 
to comprehend a round square4  #acg4    
,from the opinion that spirits are to be
 known after the manner of an idea or   
sensation have risen many absurd and    
heterodox tenets1 and much scepticism   

about the nature of the soul4 ,it is    
even probable that this opinion may have
 produced a doubt in some whether they  
had any soul at all distinct from their 
body since upon inquiry they could not  
find they had an idea of it4 ,that an   
idea which is inactive1 and the         
existence whereof consists in being     
perceived1 should be the image or       
likeness of an agent subsisting by      
itself1 seems to need no other          
refutation than barely attending to what
 is meant by those words4 ,but1 perhaps 
you will say that though an idea cannot 
resemble a spirit in its thinking1      
acting1 or subsisting by itself1 yet it 
may in some other respects2 and it is   
not necessary that an idea or image be  
in all respects like the original4      
#ach4 ,i answer1 if it does not in those
 mentioned1 it is impossible it should  
represent it in any other thing4 ,do but
 leave out the power of willing1        
thinking1 and perceiving ideas1 and     
there remains nothing else wherein the  

idea can be like a spirit4 ,for1 by the 
word spirit we mean only that which     
thinks1 wills1 and perceives2 this1 and 
this alone1 constitutes the             
signification of the term4 ,if therefore
 it is impossible that any degree of    
those powers should be represented in an
 idea1 it is evident there can be no    
idea of a spirit4  #aci4 ,but it will be
 objected that1 if there is no idea     
signified by the terms soul1 spirit1 and
 substance1 they are wholly             
insignificant1 or have no meaning in    
them4 ,i answer1 those words do mean or 
signify a real thing1 which is neither  
an idea nor like an idea1 but that which
 perceives ideas1 and wills1 and reasons
 about them4 ,what ,i am myself1 that   
which ,i denote by the term ,i1 is the  
same with what is meant by soul or      
spiritual substance4 ,if it be said that
 this is only quarreling at a word1 and 
that1 since the immediately             
significations of other names are by    
common consent called ideas1 no reason  

can be assigned why that which is       
signified by the name spirit or soul may
 not partake in the same appellation4 ,i
 answer1 all the unthinking objects of  
the mind agree in that they are entirely
 passive1 and their existence consists  
only in being perceived2 whereas a soul 
or spirit is an active being1 whose     
existence consists1 not in being        
perceived1 but in perceiving ideas and  
thinking4 ,it is therefore necessary1 in
 order to prevent equivocation and      
confounding natures perfectly           
disagreeing and unlike1 that we         
distinguish between spirit and idea4    
,see sect4 #bg4  #adj4 ,,our ,,idea ,,of
 ,,spirit4--,in a large sense1 indeed1  
we may be said to have an idea or rather
 a notion of spirit2 that is1 we        
understand the meaning of the word1     
otherwise we could not affirm or deny   
anything of it4 ,moreover1 as we        
conceive the ideas that are in the minds
 of other spirits by means of our own1  
which we suppose to be resemblances of  

them2 so we know other spirits by means 
of our own soul--which in that sense is 
the image or idea of them2 it having a  
like respect to other spirits that      
blueness or heat by me perceived has to 
those ideas perceived by another4  #ada4
 ,,the ,,natural ,,immortality ,,of     
,,the ,,soul ,,is ,a ,,necessary        
,,consequence ,,of ,,the ,,foregoing    
,,doctrine4--,it must not be supposed   
that they who assert the natural        
immortality of the soul are of opinion  
that it is absolutely incapable of      
annihilation even by the infinite power 
of the ,creator who first gave it being1
 but only that it is not liable to be   
broken or dissolved by the ordinary laws
 of nature or motion4 ,they indeed who  
hold the soul of man to be only a thin  
vital flame1 or system of animal        
spirits1 make it perishing and          
corruptible as the body2 since there is 
nothing more easily dissipated than such
 a being1 which it is naturally         
impossible should survive the ruin of   

the tabernacle wherein it is enclosed4  
,and this notion has been greedily      
embraced and cherished by the worst part
 of mankind1 as the most effectual      
antidote against all impressions of     
virtue and religion4 ,but it has been   
made evident that bodies1 of what frame 
or texture soever1 are barely passive   
ideas in the mind1 which is more distant
 and heterogeneous from them than light 
is from darkness4 ,we have shown that   
the soul is indivisible1 incorporeal1   
unextended1 and it is consequently      
incorruptible4 ,nothing can be plainer  
than that the motions1 changes1 decays1 
and dissolutions which we hourly see    
befall natural bodies 7and which is what
 we mean by the course of nature7 cannot
 possibly affect an active1 simple1     
uncompounded substance2 such a being    
therefore is indissoluble by the force  
of nature2 that is to say1 the soul of  
man is naturally immortal4  #adb4 ,after
 what has been said1 it is1 ,i suppose1 
plain that our souls are not to be known

 in the same manner as senseless1       
inactive objects1 or by way of idea4    
,spirits and ideas are things so wholly 
different1 that when we say they exist1 
they are known1 or the like1 these words
 must not be thought to signify anything
 common to both natures4 ,there is      
nothing alike or common in them3 and to 
expect that by any multiplication or    
enlargement of our faculties we may be  
enabled to know a spirit as we do a     
triangle1 seems as absurd as if we      
should hope to see a sound4 ,this is    
inculcated because ,i imagine it may be 
of moment towards clearing several      
important questions1 and preventing some
 very dangerous errors concerning the   
nature of the soul4 ,we may not1 ,i     
think1 strictly be said to have an idea 
of an active being1 or of an action1    
although we may be said to have a notion
 of them4 ,i have some knowledge or     
notion of my mind1 and its acts about   
ideas1 inasmuch as ,i know or understand
 what is meant by these words4 ,what ,i 

know1 that ,i have some notion of4 ,i   
will not say that the terms idea and    
notion may not be used convertibly1 if  
the world will have it so2 but yet it   
conduceth to clearness and propriety    
that we distinguish things very         
different by different names4 ,it is    
also to be remarked that1 all relations 
including an act of the mind1 we cannot 
so properly be said to have an idea1 but
 rather a notion of the relations and   
habitudes between things4 ,but if1 in   
the modern way1 the word idea is        
extended to spirits1 and relations1 and 
acts1 this is1 after all1 an affair of  
verbal concern4  #adc4 ,it will not be  
amiss to add1 that the doctrine of      
abstract ideas has had no small share in
 rendering those sciences intricate and 
obscure which are particularly          
conversant about spiritual things4 ,men 
have imagined they could frame abstract 
notions of the powers and acts of the   
mind1 and consider them prescinded as   
well from the mind or spirit itself1 as 

from their respective objects and       
effects4 ,hence a great number of dark  
and ambiguous terms1 presumed to stand  
for abstract notions1 have been         
introduced into metaphysics and         
morality1 and from these have grown     
infinite distractions and disputes      
amongst the learned4  #add4 ,but1       
nothing seems more to have contributed  
towards engaging men in controversies   
and mistakes with regard to the nature  
and operations of the mind1 than the    
being used to speak of those things in  
terms borrowed from sensible ideas4 ,for
 example1 the will is termed the motion 
of the soul2 this infuses a belief that 
the mind of man is as a ball in motion1 
impelled and determined by the objects  
of sense1 as necessarily as that is by  
the stroke of a racket4 ,hence arise    
endless scruples and errors of dangerous
 consequence in morality4 ,all which1 ,i
 doubt not1 may be cleared1 and truth   
appear plain1 uniform1 and consistent1  
could but philosophers be prevailed on  

to retire into themselves1 and          
attentively consider their own meaning4 
#ade4 ,,knowledge ,,of ,,spirits ,,not  
,,immediate4--,from what has been said1 
it is plain that we cannot know the     
existence of other spirits otherwise    
than by their operations1 or the ideas  
by them excited in us4 ,i perceive      
several motions1 changes1 and           
combinations of ideas1 that inform me   
there are certain particular agents1    
like myself1 which accompany them and   
concur in their production4 ,hence1 the 
knowledge ,i have of other spirits is   
not immediate1 as is the knowledge of my
 ideas2 but depending on the            
intervention of ideas1 by me referred to
 agents or spirits distinct from myself1
 as effects or concomitant signs4  #adf4
 ,but1 though there be some things which
 convince us human agents are concerned 
in producing them2 yet it is evident to 
every one that those things which are   
called the ,works of ,nature1 that is1  
the far greater part of the ideas or    

sensations perceived by us1 are not     
produced by1 or dependent on1 the wills 
of men4 ,there is therefore some other  
,spirit that causes them2 since it is   
repugnant that they should subsist by   
themselves4 ,see sect4 #bi4 ,but1 if we 
attentively consider the constant       
regularity1 order1 and concatenation of 
natural things1 the surprising          
magnificence1 beauty1 and perfection of 
the larger1 and the exquisite           
contrivance of the smaller parts of     
creation1 together with the exact       
harmony and correspondence of the whole1
 but above all the never-enough-admired 
laws of pain and pleasure1 and the      
instincts or natural inclinations1      
appetites1 and passions of animals2 ,i  
say if we consider all these things1 and
 at the same time attend to the meaning 
and import of the attributes ,one1      
,eternal1 ,infinitely ,wise1 ,good1 and 
,perfect1 we shall clearly perceive that
 they belong to the aforesaid ,spirit1  
who works all in all1 and by whom all   

things consist4  #adg4 ,,the ,,existence
 ,,of ,,god ,,more ,,evident ,,than     
,,that ,,of ,,man4--,hence1 it is       
evident that ,god is known as certainly 
and immediately as any other mind or    
spirit whatsoever distinct from         
ourselves4 ,we may even assert that the 
existence of ,god is far more evidently 
perceived than the existence of men2    
because the effects of nature are       
infinitely more numerous and            
considerable than those ascribed to     
human agents4 ,there is not any one mark
 that denotes a man1 or effect produced 
by him1 which does not more strongly    
evince the being of that ,spirit who is 
the ,author of ,nature4 ,for1 it is     
evident that in affecting other persons 
the will of man has no other object than
 barely the motion of the limbs of his  
body2 but that such a motion should be  
attended by1 or excite any idea in the  
mind of another1 depends wholly on the  
will of the ,creator4 ,he alone it is   
who1 upholding all things by the word of

 ,his power1 maintains that intercourse 
between spirits whereby they are able to
 perceive the existence of each other4  
,and yet this pure and clear light which
 enlightens every one is itself         
invisible4  #adh4 ,it seems to be a     
general pretence of the unthinking herd 
that they cannot see ,god4 ,could we but
 see ,him1 say they1 as we see a man1 we
 should believe that ,he is1 and        
believing obey ,his commands4 ,but alas1
 we need only open our eyes to see the  
,sovereign ,lord of all things1 with a  
more full and clear view than we do any 
one of our fellow--creatures4 ,not that 
,i imagine we see ,god 7as some will    
have it7 by a direct and immediate view2
 or see corporeal things1 not by        
themselves1 but by seeing that which    
represents them in the essence of ,god1 
which doctrine is1 ,i must confess1 to  
me incomprehensible4 ,but ,i shall      
explain my meaning2--,a human spirit or 
person is not perceived by sense1 as not
 being an idea2 when therefore we see   

the colour1 size1 figure1 and motions of
 a man1 we perceive only certain        
sensations or ideas excited in our own  
minds2 and these being exhibited to our 
view in sundry distinct collections1    
serve to mark out unto us the existence 
of finite and created spirits like      
ourselves4 ,hence it is plain we do not 
see a man--if by man is meant that which
 lives1 moves1 perceives1 and thinks as 
we do--but only such a certain          
collection of ideas as directs us to    
think there is a distinct principle of  
thought and motion1 like to ourselves1  
accompanying and represented by it4 ,and
 after the same manner we see ,god2 all 
the difference is that1 whereas some one
 finite and narrow assemblage of ideas  
denotes a particular human mind1        
whithersoever we direct our view1 we do 
at all times and in all places perceive 
manifest tokens of the ,divinity3       
everything we see1 hear1 feel1 or       
anywise perceive by sense1 being a sign 
or effect of the power of ,god2 as is   

our perception of those very motions    
which are produced by men4  #adi4 ,it is
 therefore plain that nothing can be    
more evident to any one that is capable 
of the least reflexion than the         
existence of ,god1 or a ,spirit who is  
intimately present to our minds1        
producing in them all that variety of   
ideas or sensations which continually   
affect us1 on whom we have an absolute  
and entire dependence1 in short in whom 
we live1 and move1 and have our being4  
,that the discovery of this great truth1
 which lies so near and obvious to the  
mind1 should be attained to by the      
reason of so very few1 is a sad instance
 of the stupidity and inattention of    
men1 who1 though they are surrounded    
with such clear manifestations of the   
,deity1 are yet so little affected by   
them that they seem1 as it were1 blinded
 with excess of light4  #aej4           
,,objection ,,on ,,behalf ,,of          
,,nature4--,,answer4--,but you will say1
 has ,nature no share in the production 

of natural things1 and must they be all 
ascribed to the immediate and sole      
operation of ,god8 ,i answer1 if by     
,nature is meant only the visible series
 of effects or sensations imprinted on  
our minds1 according to certain fixed   
and general laws1 then it is plain that 
,nature1 taken in this sense1 cannot    
produce anything at all4 ,but1 if by    
,nature is meant some being distinct    
from ,god1 as well as from the laws of  
nature1 and things perceived by sense1  
,i must confess that word is to me an   
empty sound without any intelligible    
meaning annexed to it4 ,nature1 in this 
acceptation1 is a vain chimera1         
introduced by those heathens who had not
 just notions of the omnipresence and   
infinite perfection of ,god4 ,but1 it is
 more unaccountable that it should be   
received among ,christians1 professing  
belief in the ,holy ,scriptures1 which  
constantly ascribe those effects to the 
immediate hand of ,god that heathen     
philosophers are wont to impute to      

,nature4 ,the ,lord ,he causeth the     
vapours to ascend2 ,he maketh lightnings
 with rain2 ,he bringeth forth the wind 
out of his treasures4 ,jerem4 #aj4 #ac4 
,he turneth the shadow of death into the
 morning1 and maketh the day dark with  
night4 ,amos1 #e4 #h4 ,he visiteth the  
earth1 and maketh it soft with showers3 
,he blesseth the springing thereof1 and 
crowneth the year with ,his goodness2 so
 that the pastures are clothed with     
flocks1 and the valleys are covered over
 with corn4 ,see ,psalm #fe4 ,but1      
notwithstanding that this is the        
constant language of ,scripture1 yet we 
have ,i know not what aversion from     
believing that ,god concerns ,himself so
 nearly in our affairs4 ,fain would we  
suppose ,him at a great distance off1   
and substitute some blind unthinking    
deputy in ,his stead1 though 7if we may 
believe ,saint ,paul7 ,he be not far    
from every one of us4  #aea4 ,,objection
 ,,to ,,the ,,hand ,,of ,,god ,,being   
,,the ,,immediate ,,cause1              

,,threefold4--,,answer4--,it will1 ,i   
doubt not1 be objected that the slow and
 gradual methods observed in the        
production of natural things do not seem
 to have for their cause the immediate  
hand of an ,almighty ,agent4 ,besides1  
monsters1 untimely births1 fruits       
blasted in the blossom1 rains falling in
 desert places1 miseries incident to    
human life1 and the like1 are so many   
arguments that the whole frame of nature
 is not immediately actuated and        
superintended by a ,spirit of infinite  
wisdom and goodness4 ,but the answer to 
this objection is in a good measure     
plain from sect4 #fb2 it being visible  
that the aforesaid methods of nature are
 absolutely necessary1 in order to      
working by the most simple and general  
rules1 and after a steady and consistent
 manner2 which argues both the wisdom   
and goodness of ,god4 ,such is the      
artificial contrivance of this mighty   
machine of nature that1 whilst its      
motions and various phenomena strike on 

our senses1 the hand which actuates the 
whole is itself unperceivable to men of 
flesh and blood4 ,verily 7saith the     
prophet7 thou art a ,god that hidest    
thyself4 ,isaiah1 #de4 #ae4 ,but1 though
 the ,lord conceal ,himself from the    
eyes of the sensual and lazy1 who will  
not be at the least expense of thought1 
yet to an unbiased and attentive mind   
nothing can be more plainly legible than
 the intimate presence of an ,all-wise  
,spirit1 who fashions1 regulates and    
sustains the whole system of beings4 ,it
 is clear1 from what we have elsewhere  
observed1 that the operating according  
to general and stated laws is so        
necessary for our guidance in the       
affairs of life1 and letting us into the
 secret of nature1 that without it all  
reach and compass of thought1 all human 
sagacity and design1 could serve to no  
manner of purpose2 it were even         
impossible there should be any such     
faculties or powers in the mind4 ,see   
sect4 #ca4 ,which one consideration     

abundantly outbalances whatever         
particular inconveniences may thence    
arise4  #aeb4 ,we should further        
consider that the very blemishes and    
defects of nature are not without their 
use1 in that they make an agreeable sort
 of variety1 and augment the beauty of  
the rest of the creation1 as shades in a
 picture serve to set off the brighter  
and more enlightened parts4 ,we would   
likewise do well to examine whether our 
taxing the waste of seeds and embryos1  
and accidental destruction of plants and
 animals1 before they come to full      
maturity1 as an imprudence in the       
,author of nature1 be not the effect of 
prejudice contracted by our familiarity 
with impotent and saving mortals4 ,in   
man indeed a thrifty management of those
 things which he cannot procure without 
much pains and industry may be esteemed 
wisdom4 ,but1 we must not imagine that  
the inexplicably fine machine of an     
animal or vegetable costs the great     
,creator any more pains or trouble in   

its production than a pebble does2      
nothing being more evident than that an 
,omnipotent ,spirit can indifferently   
produce everything by a mere fiat or act
 of ,his will4 ,hence1 it is plain that 
the splendid profusion of natural things
 should not be interpreted weakness or  
prodigality in the agent who produces   
them1 but rather be looked on as an     
argument of the riches of ,his power4   
#aec4 ,as for the mixture of pain or    
uneasiness which is in the world1       
pursuant to the general laws of nature1 
and the actions of finite1 imperfect    
spirits1 this1 in the state we are in at
 present1 is indispensably necessary to 
our well-being4 ,but our prospects are  
too narrow4 ,we take1 for instance1 the 
idea of some one particular pain into   
our thoughts1 and account it evil2      
whereas1 if we enlarge our view1 so as  
to comprehend the various ends1         
connexions1 and dependencies of things1 
on what occasions and in what           
proportions we are affected with pain   

and pleasure1 the nature of human       
freedom1 and the design with which we   
are put into the world2 we shall be     
forced to acknowledge that those        
particular things which1 considered in  
themselves1 appear to be evil1 have the 
nature of good1 when considered as      
linked with the whole system of beings4 
#aed4 ,,atheism ,,and ,,manicheism      
,,would ,,have ,,few ,,supporters ,,if  
,,mankind ,,were ,,in ,,general         
,,attentive4--,from what has been said1 
it will be manifest to any considering  
person1 that it is merely for want of   
attention and comprehensiveness of mind 
that there are any favourers of ,atheism
 or the ,manichean ,heresy to be found4 
,little and unreflecting souls may      
indeed burlesque the works of           
,providence1 the beauty and order       
whereof they have not capacity1 or will 
not be at the pains1 to comprehend2 but 
those who are masters of any justness   
and extent of thought1 and are withal   
used to reflect1 can never sufficiently 

admire the divine traces of ,wisdom and 
,goodness that shine throughout the     
,economy of ,nature4 ,but what truth is 
there which shineth so strongly on the  
mind that by an aversion of thought1 a  
wilful shutting of the eyes1 we may not 
escape seeing it8 ,is it therefore to be
 wondered at1 if the generality of men1 
who are ever intent on business or      
pleasure1 and little used to fix or open
 the eye of their mind1 should not have 
all that conviction and evidence of the 
,being of ,god which might be expected  
in reasonable creatures8  #aee4 ,we     
should rather wonder that men can be    
found so stupid as to neglect1 than that
 neglecting they should be unconvinced  
of such an evident and momentous truth4 
,and yet it is to be feared that too    
many of parts and leisure1 who live in  
,christian countries1 are1 merely       
through a supine and dreadful           
negligence1 sunk into ,atheism4 ,since  
it is downright impossible that a soul  
pierced and enlightened with a thorough 

sense of the omnipresence1 holiness1 and
 justice of that ,almighty ,spirit      
should persist in a remorseless         
violation of ,his laws4 ,we ought1      
therefore1 earnestly to meditate and    
dwell on those important points2 that so
 we may attain conviction without all   
scruple that the eyes of the ,lord are  
in every place beholding the evil and   
the good2 that ,he is with us and       
keepeth us in all places whither we go1 
and giveth us bread to eat and raiment  
to put on2 that ,he is present and      
conscious to our innermost thoughts2 and
 that we have a most absolute and       
immediate dependence on ,him4 ,a clear  
view of which great truths cannot choose
 but fill our hearts with an awful      
circumspection and holy fear1 which is  
the strongest incentive to ,virtue1 and 
the best guard against ,vice4  #aef4    
,for1 after all1 what deserves the first
 place in our studies is the            
consideration of ,,god and our ,,duty2  
which to promote1 as it was the main    

drift and design of my labours1 so shall
 ,i esteem them altogether useless and  
ineffectual if1 by what ,i have said1 ,i
 cannot inspire my readers with a pious 
sense of the ,presence of ,god2 and1    
having shown the falseness or vanity of 
those barren speculations which make the
 chief employment of learned men1 the   
better dispose them to reverence and    
embrace the salutary truths of the      
,gospel1 which to know and to practice  
is the highest perfection of human      
nature4