,,by ,,the ,,same ,,author4 ,,outlines ,,of ,,the ,,history ,,of ,,ethics ,,for ,,english ,,readers4 ,crown #hvo4 #cs4 #f;d4 ,,the ,,principles ,,of ,,political ,,economy4 ,third ,edition4 #hvo4 #ads4 net4 ,,the ,,elements ,,of ,,politics4 #hvo4 #ads4 net4 ,,philosophy3 ,,its ,,scope ,,and ,,relations4 #hvo4 #fs4 #f;d4 net4 ,,lectures ,,on ,,the ,,ethics ,,of ,,green1 ,,spencer1 ,,and ,,martineau4 #hvo4 #hs4 #f;d4 net4 ,,the ,,development ,,of ,,european ,,polity4 #hvo4 #ajs4 net4 ,,miscellaneous ,,essays ,,and ,,addresses4 #hvo4 #ajs4 net4 ,,lectures ,,on ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,kant ,,and ,,other ,,philosophical ,,lectures ,,and ,,essays4 #hvo4 #ajs4 net4 ,,henry ,,sidgwick3 ,a ,memoir4 ,by ,a4 ,s4 and ,e4 ,m4 ,s4 ,with ,portraits4 #hvo4 #abs4 #f;d4 net4 ,,macmillan ,,and ,,co41 ,,ltd41 ,,london4 ,,the ,,methods ,,of ,,ethics 1 1 2--,,plato4 ,,the ,,methods ,,of ,,ethics ,,by ,,henry ,,sidgwick ,,sometime ,,knightbridge ,,professor ,,of ,,moral ,,philosophy ,,in ,,the ,,university ,,of ,,cambridge ,,seventh ,,edition ,london ,,macmillan ,,and ,,co41 ,,limited ,,new ,,york3 ,,the ,,macmillan ,,company #aijg ,the ,right of ,translation is reserved4 ,first ,edition #ahgd4 ,second ,edition #ahgg4 ,third ,edition #ahhd4 ,fourth ,edition #ahij4 ,fifth ,edition #ahic4 ,sixth ,edition #aija4 ,seventh ,edition #aijg4 ,,preface ,,to ,,the ,,first ,,edition ,in offering to the public a new book upon a subject so trite as ,ethics1 it seems desirable to indicate clearly at the outset its plan and purpose4 ,its distinctive characteristics may be first given negatively4 ,it is not1 in the main1 metaphysical or psychological3 at the same time it is not dogmatic or directly practical3 it does not deal1 except by way of illustration1 with the history of ethical thought3 in a sense it might be said to be not even critical1 since it is only quite incidentally that it offers any criticism of the systems of individual moralists4 ,it claims to be an examination1 at once expository and critical1 of the different methods of obtaining reasoned convictions as to what ought to be done which are to be found--either explicit or implicit--in the moral consciousness of mankind generally3 and which1 from time to time1 have been developed1 either singly or in combination1 by individual thinkers1 and worked up into the systems now historical4 ,i have avoided the inquiry into the ,origin of the ,moral ,faculty--which has perhaps occupied a disproportionate amount of the attention of modern moralists--by the simple assumption 7which seems to be made implicitly in all ethical reasoning7 that there is something#a under any given circumstances which it is right or reasonable to do1 and that this may be known4 ,if it be admitted that we now have the faculty of knowing this1 it appears to me that the investigation of the historical antecedents of this cognition1 and of its relation to other elements of the mind1 no more properly belongs to ,ethics than the corresponding questions as to the cognition of ,space belong to ,geometry4#b ,i make1 however1 no further assumption as to the nature of the object of ethical knowledge3 and hence my treatise is not dogmatic3 all the different methods developed in it are expounded and criticised from a neutral position1 and as impartially as possible4 ,and thus1 though my treatment of the subject is1 in a sense1 more practical than that of many moralists1 since ,i am occupied from first to last in considering how conclusions are to be rationally reached in the familiar matter of our common daily life and actual practice2 still1 my immediate object--to invert ,aristotle's phrase--is not ,practice but ,knowledge4 ,i have thought that the predominance in the minds of moralists of a desire to edify has impeded the real progress of ethical science3 and that this would be benefited by an application to it of the same disinterested curiosity to which we chiefly owe the great discoveries of physics4 ,it is in this spirit that ,i have endeavoured to compose the present work3 and with this view ,i have desired to concentrate the reader's attention1 from first to last1 not on the practical results to which our methods lead1 but on the methods themselves4 ,i have wished to put aside temporarily the urgent need which we all feel of finding and adopting the true method of determining what we ought to do2 and to consider simply what conclusions will be rationally reached if we start with certain ethical premises1 and with what degree of certainty and precision4 ,i ought to mention that chapter iv4 of ,book i4 has been reprinted 7with considerable modifications7 from the ,contemporary ,review1 in which it originally appeared as an article on 8,pleasure and ,desire40 ,and ,i cannot conclude without a tribute of thanks to my friend ,mr4 ,venn1 to whose kindness in accepting the somewhat laborious task of reading and criticising my work1 both before and during its passage through the press1 ,i am indebted for several improvements in my exposition4 ,,preface ,,to ,,the ,,second ,,edition ,in preparing this work for the second edition1 ,i have found it desirable to make numerous alterations and additions4 ,indeed the extent which these have reached is so considerable1 that ,i have thought it well to publish them in a separate form1 for the use of purchasers of my first edition4 ,on one or two points ,i have to acknowledge a certain change of view2 which is partly at least due to criticism4 ,for instance1 in chap4 iv4 of ,book i4 7on 8,pleasure and ,desire071 which has been a good deal criticised by ,prof4 ,bain and others1 although ,i still retain my former opinion on the psychological question at issue1 ,i have been led to take a different view of the relation of this question to ,ethics2 and in fact #a of this chapter as it at present stands directly contradicts the corresponding passage in the former edition4 ,so again1 as regards the following chapter1 on #8,free-,will1' though ,i have not exactly found that the comments which it has called forth have removed my difficulties in dealing with this time-honoured problem1 ,i have become convinced that ,i ought not to have crudely obtruded these difficulties on the reader1 while professedly excluding the consideration of them from my subject4 ,in the present edition therefore ,i have carefully limited myself to explaining and justifying the view that ,i take of the practical aspect of the question4 ,i have further been led1 through study of the ,theory of ,evolution in its application to practice1 to attach somewhat more importance to this theory than ,i had previously done2 and also in several passages of ,books iii4 and iv4 to substitute #8well-being' for #8happiness1' in my exposition of that implicit reference to some further end and standard which reflection on the ,morality of ,common ,sense continually brings into view4 ,this latter change however 7as ,i explain in the concluding chapter of ,book iii47 is not ultimately found to have any practical effect4 ,i have also modified my view of #8objective rightness1' as the reader will see by comparing ,book i4 chap4 i4 #c with the corresponding passage in the former edition2 but here again the alteration has no material importance4 ,in my exposition of the ,utilitarian principle 7,book iv4 chap4 i47 ,i have shortened the cumbrous phrase #8greatest happiness of the greatest number' by omitting--as its author ultimately advised--the last four words4 ,and finally1 ,i have yielded as far as ,i could to the objections that have been strongly urged against the concluding chapter of the treatise4 ,the main discussion therein contained still seems to me indispensable to the completeness of the work2 but ,i have endeavoured to give the chapter a new aspect by altering its commencement1 and omitting most of the concluding paragraph4 ,the greater part1 however1 of the new matter in this edition is merely explanatory and supplementary4 ,i have endeavoured to give a fuller and clearer account of my views on any points on which ,i either have myself seen them to be ambiguously or inadequately expressed1 or have found by experience that they were liable to be misunderstood4 ,thus in ,book i4 chap4 ii4 ,i have tried to furnish a rather more instructive account than my first edition contained of the mutual relations of ,ethics and ,politics4 ,again1 even before the appearance of ,mr4 ,leslie ,stephen's interesting review in ,fraser 7,march #ahge71 ,i had seen the desirability of explaining further my general view of the #8,practical ,reason1' and of the fundamental notion signified by the terms #8right1' #8ought1' etc4 ,with this object ,i have entirely rewritten chap4 iii4 of ,book i41 and made considerable changes in chap4 i4 ,elsewhere1 as in chaps4 vi4 and ix4 of ,book i41 and chap4 vi4 of ,book ii41 ,i have altered chiefly in order to make my expositions more clear and symmetrical4 ,this is partly the case with the considerable changes that ,i have made in the first three chapters of ,book iii42 but ,i have also tried to obviate the objections brought by ,professor ,calderwood#c against the first of these chapters4 ,the main part of this ,book 7chaps4 iv4-xii47 has been but slightly altered2 but in chap4 xiii4 7on #8,philosophical ,intuitionism'71 which has been suggestively criticised by more than one writer1 ,i have thought it expedient to give a more direct statement of my own opinions2 instead of confining myself 7as ,i did in the first edition7 to comments on those of other moralists4 ,chap4 xiv4 again has been considerably modified2 chiefly in order to introduce into it the substance of certain portions of an article on #8,hedonism and ,ultimate ,good1' which ,i published in ,mind 7,no4 #e74 ,in ,book iv4 the changes 7besides those above mentioned7 have been inconsiderable2 and have been chiefly made in order to remove a misconception which ,i shall presently notice1 as to my general attitude towards the three ,methods which ,i am principally occupied in examining4 ,in revising my work1 ,i have endeavoured to profit as much as possible by all the criticisms on it that have been brought to my notice1 whether public or private4#d ,i have frequently deferred to objections1 even when they appeared to me unsound1 if ,i thought ,i could avoid controversy by alterations to which ,i was myself indifferent4 ,where ,i have been unable to make the changes required1 ,i have usually replied1 in the text or the notes1 to such criticisms as have appeared to me plausible1 or in any way instructive4 ,in so doing1 ,i have sometimes referred by name to opponents1 where ,i thought that1 from their recognised position as teachers of the subject1 this would give a distinct addition of interest to the discussion2 but ,i have been careful to omit such reference where experience has shown that it would be likely to cause offence4 ,the book is already more controversial than ,i could wish2 and ,i have therefore avoided encumbering it with any polemics of purely personal interest4 ,for this reason ,i have generally left unnoticed such criticisms as have been due to mere misapprehensions1 against which ,i thought ,i could effectually guard in the present edition4 ,there is1 however1 one fundamental misunderstanding1 on which it seems desirable to say a few words4 ,i find that more than one critic has overlooked or disregarded the account of the plan of my treatise1 given in the original preface and in #e of the introductory chapter3 and has consequently supposed me to be writing as an assailant of two of the methods which ,i chiefly examine1 and a defender of the third4 ,thus one of my reviewers seems to regard ,book iii4 7on ,intuitionism7 as containing mere hostile criticism from the outside3 another has constructed an article on the supposition that my principal object is the #8suppression of ,egoism'3 a third has gone to the length of a pamphlet under the impression 7apparently7 that the #8main argument' of my treatise is a demonstration of ,universalistic ,hedonism4 ,i am concerned to have caused so much misdirection of criticism3 and ,i have carefully altered in this edition the passages which ,i perceive to have contributed to it4 ,the morality that ,i examine in ,book iii4 is my own morality as much as it is any man's3 it is1 as ,i say1 the #8,morality of ,common ,sense1' which ,i only attempt to represent in so far as ,i share it2 ,i only place myself outside it either 7#a7 temporarily1 for the purpose of impartial criticism1 or 7#b7 in so far as ,i am forced beyond it by a practical consciousness of its incompleteness4 ,i have certainly criticised this morality unsparingly3 but ,i conceive myself to have exposed with equal unreserve the defects and difficulties of the hedonistic method 7cf4 especially chaps4 iii41 iv4 of ,book ii41 and chap4 v4 of ,book iv474 ,and as regards the two hedonistic principles1 ,i do not hold the reasonableness of aiming at happiness generally with any stronger conviction than ,i do that of aiming at one's own4 ,it was no part of my plan to call special attention to this 8,dualism of the ,practical ,reason0 as ,i have elsewhere called it3 but ,i am surprised at the extent to which my view has perplexed even those of my critics who have understood it4 ,i had imagined that they would readily trace it to the source from which ,i learnt it1 ,butler's well-known ,sermons4 ,i hold with ,butler that 8,reasonable ,self-love and ,conscience are the two chief or superior principles in the nature of man10 each of which we are under a 8manifest obligation0 to obey3 and ,i do not 7,i believe7 differ materially from ,butler in my view either of reasonable self-love1 or--theology apart--of its relation to conscience4 ,nor1 again1 do ,i differ from him in regarding conscience as essentially a function of the practical ,reason3 8moral precepts10 he says in the ,analogy 7,part ,,ii4 chap4 viii471 8are precepts the reason of which we see40 ,my difference only begins when ,i ask myself1 #8,what among the precepts of our common conscience do we really see to be ultimately reasonable8' a question which ,butler does not seem to have seriously put1 and to which1 at any rate1 he has given no satisfactory answer4 ,the answer that ,i found to it supplied the rational basis that ,i had long perceived to be wanting to the ,utilitarianism of ,bentham1 regarded as an ethical doctrine3 and thus enabled me to transcend the commonly received antithesis between ,intuitionists and ,utilitarians4 ,,footnotes3 #a ,i did not mean to exclude the supposition that two or more alternatives might under certain circumstances be equally right 7#ahhd74 #b ,this statement now appears to me to require a slight modification 7#ahhd74 #c ,cf4 ,mind1 ,no4 #b4 #d ,among unpublished criticisms ,i ought especially to mention the valuable suggestions that ,i have received from ,mr4 ,carveth ,read2 to whose assistance in revising the present edition many of my corrections are due4 ,,preface ,,to ,,the ,,third ,,edition ,in this third edition ,i have again made extensive alterations1 and introduced a considerable amount of new matter4 ,some of these changes and additions are due to modifications of my own ethical or psychological views2 but ,i do not think that any of these are of great importance in relation to the main subject of the treatise4 ,and by far the largest part of the new matter introduced has been written either 7#a7 to remove obscurities1 ambiguities1 and minor inconsistencies in the exposition of my views which the criticisms#e of others or my own reflection have enabled me to discover2 or 7#b7 to treat as fully as seemed desirable certain parts or aspects of the subject which ,i had either passed over altogether or discussed too slightly in my previous editions1 and on which it now appears to me important to explain my opinions1 either for the greater completeness of my treatise1--according to my own view of the subject1--or for its better adaptation to the present state of ethical thought in ,england4 ,the most important changes of the first kind have been made in chaps4 i4 and ix4 of ,book i41 chaps1 i4-iii4 of ,book ii41 and chaps4 i41 xiii41 and xiv4 of ,book iii43 under the second head ,i may mention the discussions of the relation of intellect to moral action in ,book i4 chap4 iii41 of volition in ,book i4 chap4 v41 of the causes of pleasure and pain in ,book ii4 chap4 vi41 of the notion of virtue in the morality of ,common ,sense in ,book iii4 chap4 ii41 and of evolutional ethics in ,book iv4 chap4 iv4 7chiefly74 ,i may add that all the important alterations and additions have been published in a separate form1 for the use of purchasers of my second edition4 ,,footnote3 #e ,i must here acknowledge the advantage that ,i have received from the remarks and questions of my pupils1 and from criticisms privately communicated to me by others2 among these latter ,i ought especially to mention an instructive examination of my fundamental doctrines by the ,rev4 ,hastings ,rashdall4 ,,preface ,,to ,,the ,,fourth ,,edition ,the chief alterations in this fourth edition are the following4 7#a7 ,i have expanded the discussion on ,free ,will in ,book i4 chap4 v4 #c1 to meet the criticisms of ,mr4 ,fowler1 in his ,principles of ,morals1 and ,dr4 ,martineau1 in his ,types of ,ethical ,theory4 7#b7 ,in consequence of the publication of the last-mentioned work1 ,i have rewritten part of chap4 xii4 of ,book iii41 which deals with the ,ethical view maintained by ,dr4 ,martineau4 7#c7 ,i have expanded the argument in ,book iii4 chap4 xiv41 to meet objections ably urged by ,mr4 ,rashdall in ,mind 7,april #ahhe74 7#d7 ,i have somewhat altered the concluding chapter1 in consequence of an important criticism by ,prof4 v4 ,gizycki 7,vierteljahrsschrift fr ,wissenschaftliche ,philosophie1 ,jahrg4 iv4 ,heft i47 which ,i had inadvertently overlooked in preparing the third edition4 ,several pages of new matter have thus been introduced3 for which--,i am glad to say--,i have made room by shortening what seemed prolix1 omitting what seemed superfluous1 and relegating digressions to notes1 in other parts of the work3 so that the bulk of the whole is not increased4 ,for the index which forms a new feature in the present edition ,i am indebted to the kindness of ,miss ,jones of ,girton ,college1 the author of ,elements of ,logic as a ,science of ,propositions4 ,,preface ,,to ,,the ,,fifth ,,edition ,such criticisms of my ,ethical opinions and reasonings as have come under my notice1 since the publication of the fourth edition of this treatise1 have chiefly related to my treatment of the question of ,free ,will in ,book i4 chap4 v41 or to the hedonistic view of ,ultimate ,good1 maintained in ,book iii4 chap4 iv4 ,i have accordingly rewritten certain parts of these two chapters1 in the hope of making my arguments more clear and convincing3 in each case a slight change in view will be apparent to a careful reader who compares the present with the preceding edition3 but in neither case does the change affect the main substance of the argument4 ,alterations1 in one or two cases not inconsiderable1 have been made in several other chapters1 especially ,book i4 chap4 ii41 and ,book iii4 chaps4 i4 and ii43 but they have chiefly aimed at removing defects of exposition1 and do not 7,i think7 in any case imply any material change of view4 ,my thanks are again due to ,miss ,jones1 of ,girton ,college1 for reading through the proofs of this edition and making most useful corrections and suggestions3 as well as for revising the index which she kindly made for the fourth edition4 ,,preface ,,to ,,the ,,sixth ,,edition ,the revision of ,the ,methods of ,ethics for this edition was begun by ,professor ,sidgwick and carried through by him up to p4 #bgf1 on which the last of his corrections on the copy were made4 ,the latter portion of his revision was done under the pressure of severe illness1 the increase of which prevented him from continuing it beyond the point mentioned2 and by the calamity of his death the rest of the book remains without the final touches which it might have received from his hand4 ,in accordance with his wish1 ,i have seen pp4 #bgg to #eji through the press unchanged--except for a few small alterations which he had indicated1 and the insertion on pp4 #deg-dei of the concluding passage of ,book iv4 chapter iii4#f ,such alterations as were made by ,professor ,sidgwick in this edition prior to p4 #bgf will be found chiefly in chapters i4-v4 and ix4 of ,book i41 and chapters iii4 and vi4 of ,book ii4 ,the ,appendix on 8,the ,kantian ,conception of ,free ,will10 promised in note #a on p4 #eh of this edition1 is substantially a reprint of a paper by ,professor ,sidgwick under that heading which appeared in ,mind1 vol4 xiii4 ,no4 #ea1 and accurately covers the ground indicated in the note4 ,there is one further matter of importance4 ,among the ,,ms4 material which ,professor ,sidgwick intended to be referred to1 in preparing this edition for the press1 there occurs1 as part of the ,,ms4 notes for a lecture1 a brief history of the development in his thought of the ethical view which he has set forth in the ,methods of ,ethics4 ,this1 though not in a finished condition1 is in essentials complete and coherent1 and since it cannot fail to have peculiar value and interest for students of the book1 it has been decided to insert it here4 ,such an arrangement seems to a certain extent in harmony with the author's own procedure in the ,preface to the ,second ,edition2 and in this way while future students of the ,methods will have access to an introductory account which both ethically and historically is of very exceptional interest1 no dislocation of the text will be involved4 ,in the account referred to ,professor ,sidgwick says3-- 8,my first adhesion to a definite ,ethical system was to the ,utilitarianism of ,mill3 ,i found in this relief from the apparently external and arbitrary pressure of moral rules which ,i had been educated to obey1 and which presented themselves to me as to some extent doubtful and confused2 and sometimes1 even when clear1 as merely dogmatic1 unreasoned1 incoherent4 ,my antagonism to this was intensified by the study of ,whewell's ,elements of ,morality which was prescribed for the study of undergraduates in ,trinity4 ,it was from that book that ,i derived the impression--which long remained uneffaced--that ,intuitional moralists were hopelessly loose 7as compared to mathematicians7 in their definitions and axioms4 ,the two elements of ,mill's view which ,i am accustomed to distinguish as ,psychological ,hedonism that each man does seek his own ,happiness and ,ethical ,hedonism that each man ought to seek the general ,happiness both attracted me1 and ,i did not at first perceive their incoherence4 ,psychological ,hedonism--the law of universal pleasure-seeking--attracted me by its frank naturalness4 ,ethical ,hedonism1 as expounded by ,mill1 was morally inspiring by its dictate of readiness for absolute self-sacrifice4 ,they appealed to different elements of my nature1 but they brought these into apparent harmony3 they both used the same words 8pleasure10 8happiness10 and the persuasiveness of ,mill's exposition veiled for a time the profound discrepancy between the natural end of action--private happiness1 and the end of duty--general happiness4 ,or if a doubt assailed me as to the coincidence of private and general happiness1 ,i was inclined to hold that it ought to be cast to the winds by a generous resolution4 ,but a sense grew upon me that this method of dealing with the conflict between ,interest and ,duty1 though perhaps proper for practice could not be final for philosophy4 ,for practical men who do not philosophise1 the maxim of subordinating self-interest1 as commonly conceived1 to 8altruistic0 impulses and sentiments which they feel to be higher and nobler is1 ,i doubt not1 a commendable maxim2 but it is surely the business of ,ethical ,philosophy to find and make explicit the rational ground of such action4 ,i therefore set myself to examine methodically the relation of ,interest and ,duty4 ,this involved a careful study of ,egoistic ,method1 to get the relation of ,interest and ,duty clear4 ,let us suppose that my own ,interest is paramount4 ,what really is my ,interest1 how far can acts conducive to it be known1 how far does the result correspond with ,duty 7or ,wellbeing of ,mankind78 ,this investigation led me to feel very strongly this opposition1 rather than that which ,mill and the earlier ,utilitarians felt between so-called ,intuitions or ,moral ,sense ,perceptions1 and ,hedonism1 whether ,epicurean or ,utilitarian4 ,hence the arrangement of my book--ii41 iii41 iv4 ,book ii4 ,egoism1 ,book iii4 ,intuitionism1 ,book iv4 ,utilitarianism4 ,the result was that ,i concluded that no complete solution of the conflict between my happiness and the general happiness was possible on the basis of mundane experience4 ,this conclusion ,i slowly and reluctantly accepted--cf4 ,book ii4 chap4 v41 and last chapter of treatise ,book ii4 chap4 v4 is on 8,happiness and ,duty10 and the concluding chapter is on 8,the ,mutual ,relations of the ,three ,methods04 ,this was most important to me4 ,in consequence of this perception1 moral choice of the general happiness or acquiescence in self-interest as ultimate1 became practically necessary4 ,but on what ground8 ,i put aside ,mill's phrases that such sacrifice was 8heroic03 that it was not 8well0 with me unless ,i was in a disposition to make it4 ,i put to him in my mind the dilemma3--,either it is for my own happiness or it is not4 ,if not1 why should ,i do it8--,it was no use to say that if ,i was a moral hero ,i should have formed a habit of willing actions beneficial to others which would remain in force1 even with my own pleasure in the other scale4 ,i knew that at any rate ,i was not the kind of moral hero who does this without reason2 from blind habit4 ,nor did ,i even wish to be that kind of hero3 for it seemed to me that that kind of hero1 however admirable1 was certainly not a philosopher4 ,i must somehow see that it was right for me to sacrifice my happiness for the good of the whole of which ,i am a part4 ,thus1 in spite of my early aversion to ,intuitional ,ethics1 derived from the study of ,whewell1 and in spite of my attitude of discipleship to ,mill1 ,i was forced to recognise the need of a fundamental ethical intuition4 ,the utilitarian method--which ,i had learnt from ,mill--could not1 it seemed to me1 be made coherent and harmonious without this fundamental intuition4 ,in this state of mind ,i read ,kant's ,ethics again3 ,i had before read it somewhat unintelligently1 under the influence of ,mill's view as to its 8grotesque failure40#g ,i now read it more receptively and was impressed with the truth and importance of its fundamental principle3--,act from a principle or maxim that you can will to be a universal law--cf4 ,book iii4 chap4 i4 #c of ,the ,methods of ,ethics4 ,it threw the 8golden rule0 of the gospel 78,do unto others as ye would that others should do unto you07 into a form that commended itself to my reason4 ,kant's resting of morality on ,freedom did not indeed commend itself to me1#h though ,i did not at first see1 what ,i now seem to see clearly1 that it involves the fundamental confusion of using 8freedom0 in two distinct senses--8freedom0 that is realised only when we do right1 when reason triumphs over inclination1 and 8freedom0 that is realised equally when we choose to do wrong1 and which is apparently implied in the notion of ill-desert4 ,what commended itself to me1 in short1 was ,kant's ethical principle rather than its metaphysical basis4 ,this ,i briefly explain in ,book iii4 chap4 i4 #c of ,the ,methods of ,ethics4 ,i shall go into it at more length when we come to ,kant4 ,that whatever is right for me must be right for all persons in similar circumstances--which was the form in which ,i accepted the ,kantian maxim--seemed to me certainly fundamental1 certainly true1 and not without practical importance4 ,but the fundamental principle seemed to me inadequate for the construction of a system of duties2 and the more ,i reflected on it the more inadequate it appeared4 ,on reflection it did not seem to me really to meet the difficulty which had led me from ,mill to ,kant3 it did not settle finally the subordination of ,self-interest to ,duty4 ,for the ,rational ,egoist--a man who had learnt from ,hobbes that ,self-preservation is the first law of ,nature and ,self-interest the only rational basis of social morality--and in fact1 its actual basis1 so far as it is effective--such a thinker might accept the ,kantian principle and remain an ,egoist4 ,he might say1 8,i quite admit that when the painful necessity comes for another man to choose between his own happiness and the general happiness1 he must as a reasonable being prefer his own1 i4e4 it is right for him to do this on my principle4 ,no doubt1 as ,i probably do not sympathise with him in particular any more than with other persons1 ,i as a disengaged spectator should like him to sacrifice himself to the general good3 but ,i do not expect him to do it1 any more than ,i should do it myself in his place40 ,it did not seem to me that this reasoning could be effectively confuted4 ,no doubt it was1 from the point of view of the universe1 reasonable to prefer the greater good to the lesser1 even though the lesser good was the private happiness of the agent4 ,still1 it seemed to me also undeniably reasonable for the individual to prefer his own4 ,the rationality of self-regard seemed to me as undeniable as the rationality of self-sacrifice4 ,i could not give up this conviction1 though neither of my masters1 neither ,kant nor ,mill1 seemed willing to admit it3 in different ways1 each in his own way1 they refused to admit it4 ,i was1 therefore1 if ,i may so say1 a disciple on the loose1 in search of a master--or1 if the term #8master' be too strong1 at any rate ,i sought for sympathy and support1 in the conviction which ,i had attained in spite of the opposite opinions of the thinkers from whom ,i had learnt most4 ,it was at this point then that the influence of ,butler came in4 ,for the stage at which ,i had thus arrived in search of an ethical creed1 at once led me to understand ,butler1 and to find the support and intellectual sympathy that ,i required in his view4 ,i say to understand him1 for hitherto ,i had misunderstood him1 as ,i believe most people then misunderstood1 and perhaps still misunderstand1 him4 ,he had been presented to me as an advocate of the authority of ,conscience2 and his argument1 put summarily1 seemed to be that because reflection on our impulses showed us ,conscience claiming authority therefore we ought to obey it4 ,well1 ,i had no doubt that my conscience claimed authority1 though it was a more utilitarian conscience than ,butler's3 for1 through all this search for principles ,i still adhered for practical purposes to the doctrine ,i had learnt from ,mill1 i4e4 ,i still held to the maxim of aiming at the general happiness as the supreme directive rule of conduct1 and ,i thought ,i could answer the objections that ,butler brought against this view 7in the 8,dissertation on ,virtue0 at the end of the ,analogy74 ,my difficulty was1 as ,i have said1 that this claim of conscience1 whether utilitarian or not1 had to be harmonised with the claim of ,rational ,self-love2 and that ,i vaguely supposed ,butler to avoid or override the latter claim4 ,but reading him at this stage with more care1 ,i found in him1 with pleasure and surprise1 a view very similar to that which had developed itself in my own mind in struggling to assimilate ,mill and ,kant4 ,i found he expressly admitted that 8interest1 my own happiness1 is a manifest obligation10 and that 8,reasonable ,self-love0 is 8one of the two chief or superior principles in the nature of man04 ,that is1 he recognised a 8,dualism of the ,governing ,faculty0--or as ,i prefer to say 8,dualism of the ,practical ,reason10 since the #8authority' on which ,butler laid stress must present itself to my mind as the authority of reason1 before ,i can admit it4 ,of this more presently3 what ,i now wish to make clear is that it was on this side--if ,i may so say--that ,i entered into ,butler's system and came under the influence of his powerful and cautious intellect4 ,but the effect of his influence carried me a further step away from ,mill3 for ,i was led by it to abandon the doctrine of ,psychological ,hedonism1 and to recognise the existence of #8disinterested' or #8extra-regarding' impulses to action1 impulses not directed towards the agent's pleasure cf4 chap4 iv4 of ,book i4 of ,the ,methods of ,ethics4 ,in fact as regards what ,i may call a ,psychological basis of ,ethics1 ,i found myself much more in agreement with ,butler than ,mill4 ,and this led me to reconsider my relation to ,intuitional ,ethics4 ,the strength and vehemence of ,butler's condemnation of pure ,utilitarianism1 in so cautious a writer1 naturally impressed me much4 ,and ,i had myself become1 as ,i had to admit to myself1 an ,intuitionist to a certain extent4 ,for the supreme rule of aiming at the general happiness1 as ,i had come to see1 must rest on a fundamental moral intuition1 if ,i was to recognise it as binding at all4 ,and in reading the writings of the earlier ,english ,intuitionists1 ,more and ,clarke1 ,i found the axiom ,i required for my ,utilitarianism ,that a rational agent is bound to aim at ,universal ,happiness1 in one form or another1 holding a prominent place 7cf4 ,history of ,ethics1 pp4 #agb1 #aha74 ,i had then1 theoretically as well as practically1 accepted this fundamental moral intuition2 and there was also the ,kantian principle1 which ,i recognised as irresistibly valid1 though not adequate to give complete guidance4--,i was then an 8intuitional0 moralist to this extent3 and if so1 why not further8 ,the orthodox moralists such as ,whewell 7then in vogue7 said that there was a whole intelligible system of intuitions3 but how were they to be learnt8 ,i could not accept ,butler's view as to the sufficiency of a plain man's conscience3 for it appeared to me that plain men agreed rather verbally than really4 ,in this state of mind ,i had to read ,aristotle again2 and a light seemed to dawn upon me as to the meaning and drift of his procedure--especially in ,books ii41 iii41 iv4 of the ,ethics--7cf4 ,history of ,ethics1 chap4 ii4 #i1 p4 #eh1 read to end of section74 ,what he gave us there was the ,common ,sense ,morality of ,greece1 reduced to consistency by careful comparison3 given not as something external to him but as what 8we0--he and others--think1 ascertained by reflection4 ,and was not this really the ,socratic induction1 elicited by interrogation8 ,might ,i not imitate this3 do the same for our morality here and now1 in the same manner of impartial reflection on current opinion8 ,indeed ought ,i not to do this before deciding on the question whether ,i had or had not a system of moral intuitions8 ,at any rate the result would be useful1 whatever conclusion ,i came to4 ,so this was the part of my book first written 7,book iii41 chaps4 i4-xi471 and a certain imitation of ,aristotle's manner was very marked in it at first1 and though ,i have tried to remove it where it seemed to me affected or pedantic1 it still remains to some extent4 ,but the result of the examination was to bring out with fresh force and vividness the difference between the maxims of ,common ,sense ,morality 7even the strongest and strictest1 e4g4 ,veracity and ,good ,faith7 and the intuitions which ,i had already attained1 i4e4 the ,kantian ,principle 7of which ,i now saw the only certain element in ,justice--8treat similar cases similarly0--to be a particular application71 and the ,fundamental ,principle of ,utilitarianism4 ,and this latter was in perfect harmony with the ,kantian ,principle4 ,i certainly could will it to be a universal law that men should act in such a way as to promote universal happiness2 in fact it was the only law that it was perfectly clear to me that ,i could thus decisively will1 from a universal point of view4 ,i was then a ,utilitarian again1 but on an ,intuitional basis4 ,but further1 the reflection on ,common ,sense ,morality which ,i had gone through1 had continually brought home to me its character as a system of rules tending to the promotion of general happiness 7cf4 ,methods of ,ethics pp4 #dgj1 #dga74 ,also the previous reflection on hedonistic method for ,book ii4 had shown me its weaknesses4 ,what was then to be done8 ,the conservative attitude to be observed towards ,common ,sense is given in chapter v4 of ,book iv43 8,adhere generally1 deviate and attempt reform only in exceptional cases in which1--notwithstanding the roughness of hedonistic method1--the argument against ,common ,sense is decisive40 ,in this state of mind ,i published my book3 ,i tried to say what ,i had found3 that the opposition between ,utilitarianism and ,intuitionism was due to a misunderstanding4 ,there was indeed a fundamental opposition between the individual's interest and either morality1 which ,i could not solve by any method ,i had yet found trustworthy1 without the assumption of the moral government of the world3 so far ,i agreed with both ,butler and ,kant4 ,but ,i could find no real opposition between ,intuitionism and ,utilitarianism4444 ,the ,utilitarianism of ,mill and ,bentham seemed to me to want a basis3 that basis could only be supplied by a fundamental intuition2 on the other hand the best examination ,i could make of the ,morality of ,common ,sense showed me no clear and self-evident principles except such as were perfectly consistent with ,utilitarianism4 ,still1 investigation of the ,utilitarian method led me to see defects in it3 the merely empirical examination of the consequences of actions is unsatisfactory2 and being thus conscious of the practical imperfection in many cases of the guidance of the ,utilitarian calculus1 ,i remained anxious to treat with respect1 and make use of1 the guidance afforded by ,common ,sense in these cases1 on the ground of the general presumption which evolution afforded that moral sentiments and opinions would point to conduct conducive to general happiness2 though ,i could not admit this presumption as a ground for overruling a strong probability of the opposite1 derived from utilitarian calculations40 ,it only remains to mention that the ,table of ,contents and the ,index have been revised in accordance with the changes in the text4 ,e4 ,e4 ,,constance ,,jones4 ,,girton ,,college1 ,,cambridge1 ,april #aija4 ,,footnotes3 #f ,cf4 note on p4 #deg1 and ,prefatory ,note to the ,seventh ,edition4 #g ,kant's ,fundamental ,principles 7,grundlegung zur ,metaphysik der ,sitten71 #a1 #b4 ,mill1 ,utilitarianism1 pp4 #e1 #f #gth edition 7large print71 #ahgi4 #h ,book i4 chap4 v4 of ,the ,methods of ,ethics4 ,,prefatory ,,note ,,to ,,the ,,seventh ,,edition ,this ,edition is a reprint of the ,sixth1 the only changes 7besides correction of a few clerical errors7 being an alteration of type in the passage which occurs on p4 #deg in the ,sixth ,edition and pp4 #deg-dei in this ,edition1 together with consequent changes 7#a7 in paging and indexing1 7#b7 in the reference to the passage in question in the reprinted ,preface to the ,sixth ,edition1 and 7#c7 in the insertion of the note on p4 #deg4 ,e4 ,e4 ,c4 ,j4 ,december #aijf4 ,,contents ,,book ,i ,,chapter ,i ,,introduction ,,pages #a4 ,ethics is a department of the ,theory or ,study of ,practice4 #a-b #b4 ,it is the study of what ought to be1 so far as this depends upon the voluntary action of individuals4 #b-d #c4 ,in deciding what they ought to do1 men naturally proceed on different principles1 and by different methods4 #d-f #d4 ,there are two prima facie rational ,ends1 ,excellence or ,perfection and ,happiness3 of which the latter at least may be sought for oneself or universally4 ,it is also commonly thought that certain ,rules are prescribed without reference to ulterior consequences4 ,the ,methods corresponding to these different principles reduce themselves in the main to three1 ,egoism1 ,intuitionism1 ,utilitarianism4 #f-aa #e4 ,these methods we are to examine separately1 abstracting them from ordinary thought1 where we find them in confused combination1 and developing them as precisely and consistently as possible4 #aa-ad ,,chapter ,,ii ,,ethics ,,and ,,politics #a4 ,in considering the relation between ,ethics and ,politics1 we have to distinguish between ,positive ,law and ,ideal ,law4 #ae-ah #b4 ,but at any rate the primary object of ,ethics is not to determine what ought to be done in an ideal society3 it therefore does not necessarily require as a preliminary the theoretical construction of such a society4 #ah-bb ,,chapter ,,iii ,,ethical ,,judgments #a4 ,by #8,reasonable' conduct--whether morally or prudentially reasonable--we mean that of which we judge that it #8ought' to be done4 ,such a judgment cannot be legitimately interpreted as a judgment concerning facts1 nor as referring exclusively to the means to ulterior ends3 in particular1 the term #8ought1' as used in moral judgments1 does not merely signify that the person judging feels a specific emotion3 #bc-bh #b4 nor does it merely signify that the conduct in question is prescribed under penalties3 #bh-ca #c4 ,the notion expressed by 8ought10 in its strictest ethical use is too elementary to admit of formal definition1 or of resolution into simpler notions2 it is assumed to be objectively valid2 and judgments in which it is used when they relate to the future conduct of the person judging1 are accompanied by a special kind of impulse to action4 #ca-ce #d4 ,this #8dictate of reason' is also exemplified by merely prudential judgments2 and by merely hypothetical imperatives4 #ce-ch ,,chapter ,,iv ,,pleasure ,,and ,,desire #a4 ,the psychological doctrine1 that the object of ,desire is always ,pleasure1 is liable to collide with the view of ,ethical judgments just given3 and in any case deserves careful examination4 #ci-db #b4 ,if by 8pleasure0 is meant 8agreeable feeling10 this doctrine is opposed to experience3 for throughout the whole scale of our desires1 from the highest to the lowest1 we can distinguish impulses directed towards other ends than our own feelings from the desire of pleasure3 #db-ea #c4 as is further shown by the occasional conflict between the two kinds of impulse4 #ea-eb #d4 ,nor can the doctrine derive any real support from consideration either of the #8unconscious' or the #8original' aim of human action4 #eb-ed ,note #ed-ef ,,chapter ,v ,,free ,,will #a4 ,the ,kantian identification of #8,free' and #8,rational' action is misleading from the ambiguity of the term #8freedom4' #eg-ei #b4 ,when1 by definition and analysis of voluntary action1 the issue in the ,free ,will ,controversy has been made clear1 it appears that the cumulative argument for ,determinism is almost overwhelming3 #ei-fe #c4 still it is impossible to me in acting not to regard myself as free to do what ,i judge to be reasonable4 ,however the solution of the metaphysical question of ,free ,will is not important--,theology apart--for systematic ,ethics generally3 #fe-gj #d4 it seems however to have a special relation to the notion of ,justice3 #ga-gb #e4 ,the practical unimportance of the question of ,free ,will becomes more clear if we scrutinize closely the range of volitional effects4#gb-gf ,,chapter ,,vi ,,ethical ,,principles ,,and ,,methods #a4 ,the ,methods indicated in chap4 i4 have a prima facie claim to proceed on reasonable principles3 other principles seem1 in so far as they can be made precise1 to reduce themselves to these3 #gg-hj #b4 especially the principle of 8living according to ,nature40 #hj-hc #c4 ,in short1 all varieties of ,method may conveniently be classed under three heads3 ,intuitionism and the two kinds of ,hedonism1 ,egoistic and ,universalistic4 ,the common confusion between the two latter is easily explained1 but must be carefully guarded against4 #hc-hg ,note #hg-hh ,,chapter ,,vii ,,egoism ,,and ,,self-,,love #a4 ,to get a clear idea of what is commonly known as ,egoism1 we must distinguish and exclude several possible meanings of the term3 #hi-ic #b4 and define its end as the greatest attainable surplus of pleasure over pain for the agent1--pleasures being valued in proportion to their pleasantness4 #ic-ie ,,chapter ,,viii ,,intuitionism #a4 ,i apply the term ,intuitional--in the narrower of two legitimate senses--to distinguish a method in which the rightness of some kinds of action is assumed to be known without consideration of ulterior consequences4 #if-ih #b4 ,the common antithesis between ,intuitive and ,inductive is inexact1 since this method does not necessarily proceed from the universal to the particular4 ,we may distinguish ,perceptional ,intuitionism1 according to which it is always the rightness of some particular action that is held to be immediately known3 #ih-ajj #c4 ,dogmatic ,intuitionism1 in which the general rules of ,common ,sense are accepted as axiomatic3 #ajj-aja #d4 ,philosophical ,intuitionism1 which attempts to find a deeper explanation for these current rules4 #aja-ajc ,note #ajc-ajd ,,chapter ,,ix ,,good #a4 ,another important variety of ,intuitionism is constituted by substituting for 8right0 the wider notion 8good40 #aje-ajf #b4 ,the common judgment that a thing is 8good0 does not on reflection appear to be equivalent to a judgment that it is directly or indirectly pleasant4 #ajf-aji #c4 8,good0 8desirable0 or 8reasonably desired03 as applied to conduct1 the term does not convey so definite a dictate as 8right10 and it is not confined to the strictly voluntary4 #aji-aac #d4 ,there are many other things commonly judged to be good3 but reflection shows that nothing is ultimately good except some mode of human existence4 #aac-aae ,,book ,,ii ,,egoism ,,chapter ,i ,,the ,,principle ,,and ,,method ,,of ,,egoism #a4 ,the ,principle of ,egoistic ,hedonism is the widely accepted proposition that the rational end of conduct for each individual is the ,maximum of his own ,happiness or ,pleasure4 #aai-aba #b4 ,there are several methods of seeking this end3 but we may take as primary that which proceeds by ,empirical-reflective comparison of pleasures4 #aba-abb ,,chapter ,,ii ,,empirical ,,hedonism #a4 ,in this method it is assumed that all pleasures sought and pains shunned are commensurable2 and can be arranged in a certain scale of preferableness3 #abc-abe #b4 pleasure being defined as 8feeling apprehended as desirable by the sentient individual at the time of feeling it40 #abe-acj ,note #acj ,,chapter ,,iii ,,empirical ,,hedonism 7continued7 #a4 ,to get a clearer view of this method1 let us consider objections tending to show its inherent impracticability3 as1 first1 that 8pleasure as feeling cannot be conceived10 and that a 8sum of pleasures is intrinsically unmeaning03 #aca-acd #b4 that transient pleasures cannot satisfy2 and that the predominance of self-love tends to defeat its own end3 #acd-ach #c4 that the habit of introspectively comparing pleasures is unfavourable to pleasure3 #ach-adj #d4 that any quantitative comparison of pleasures and pains is vague and uncertain1 even in the case of our own past experiences3 #adj-add #e4 that it also tends to be different at different times3 especially through variations in the present state of the person performing the comparison3 #add-adf #f4 that1 in fact1 the supposed definite commensurability of pleasures is an unverifiable assumption3 #adf-adg #g4 that there is a similar liability to error in appropriating the experience of others2 and in inferring future pleasures from past4 #adg-aej ,,chapter ,,iv ,,objective ,,hedonism ,,and ,,common ,,sense #a4 ,it may seem that the judgments of ,common ,sense respecting the ,sources of ,happiness offer a refuge from the uncertainties of ,empirical ,hedonism3 but there are several fundamental defects in this refuge2 #aea-aec #b4 and these judgments when closely examined are found to be perplexingly inconsistent4 #aec-aeh #c4 ,still we may derive from them a certain amount of practical guidance4 #aeh-afa ,,chapter ,v ,,happiness ,,and ,,duty #a4 ,it has been thought possible to prove on empirical grounds that one's greatest happiness is always attained by the performance of duty4 #afb-afc #b4 ,but no such complete coincidence seems to result from a consideration either of the ,legal ,sanctions of ,duty3 #afc-aff #c4 or of the ,social ,sanctions3 #aff-agj #d4 or of the ,internal ,sanctions3 even if we consider not merely isolated acts of duty1 but a virtuous life as a whole4 #agj-age ,,chapter ,,vi ,,deductive ,,hedonism #a4 ,hedonistic ,method must ultimately rest on facts of empirical observation3 but it might become largely deductive1 through scientific knowledge of the causes of pleasure and pain3 #agf-ahj #b4 but we have no practically available general theory of these causes1 either psychophysical1 #ahj-aij #c4 or biological4 #aij-aib #d4 ,nor can the principle of #8increasing life1' or that of #8aiming at self-development1' or that of #8giving free play to impulse1' be so defined as to afford us any practical guidance to the end of ,egoism1 without falling back on the empirical comparison of pleasures and pains4 #aib-aie ,,book ,,iii ,,intuitionism ,,chapter ,i ,,intuitionism #a4 ,the fundamental assumption of ,intuitionism is that we have the power of seeing clearly what actions are in themselves right and reasonable4 #aii-bja #b4 ,though many actions are commonly judged to be made better or worse through the presence of certain motives1 our common judgments of right and wrong relate1 strictly speaking1 to intentions4 ,one motive1 indeed1 the desire to do what is right as such1 has been thought an essential condition to right conduct3 but the ,intuitional method should be treated as not involving this assumption4 #bja-bjg #c4 ,it is certainly an essential condition that we should not believe the act to be wrong2 and this implies that we should not believe it to be wrong for any similar person in similar circumstances3 but this implication1 though it may supply a valuable practical rule1 cannot furnish a complete criterion of right conduct4 #bjg-baj #d4 ,the existence of apparent cognitions of right conduct1 intuitively obtained1 as distinct from their validity1 will scarcely be questioned2 and to establish their validity it is not needful to prove their #8originality4' #baj-bad #e4 ,both particular and universal intuitions are found in our common moral thought3 but it is for the latter that ultimate validity is ordinarily claimed by intuitional moralists4 ,we must try1 by reflecting on ,common ,sense1 how far we can state these ,moral ,axioms with clearness and precision4 #bad-baf ,,chapter ,,ii ,,virtue ,,and ,,duty #a4 ,duties are ,right acts1 for the adequate performance of which a moral motive is at least occasionally necessary4 ,virtuous conduct includes the performance of duties as well as praiseworthy acts that are thought to go beyond strict duty1 and that may even be beyond the power of some to perform4 #bag-bba #b4 ,virtues as commonly recognised1 are manifested primarily in volitions to produce particular right effects--which must at least be thought by the agent to be not wrong--3 but for the completeness of some virtues the presence of certain emotions seems necessary4 #bba-bbh #c4 ,it may be said that ,moral ,excellence1 like ,beauty1 eludes definition3 but if ,ethical ,science is to be constituted1 we must obtain definite ,moral ,axioms4 #bbh-bcj ,,chapter ,,iii ,,the ,,intellectual ,,virtues #a4 ,the common conception of ,wisdom assumes a harmony of the ends of different ethical methods3 all of which--and not one rather than another--the wise man is commonly thought to aim at and attain as far as circumstances admit4 #bca-bcc #b4 ,the ,will is to some extent involved in forming wise decisions3 but more clearly in acting on them--whatever we may call the ,virtue thus manifested4 #bcc-bcf #c4 ,of minor intellectual excellences1 some are not strictly ,virtues3 others are1 such as ,caution and ,decision1 being in part voluntary4 #bcf-bcg ,note #bcg ,,chapter ,,iv ,,benevolence #a4 ,the ,maxim of ,benevolence bids us to some extent cultivate affections1 and confer happiness #bch-bda #b4 on sentient1 chiefly human1 beings2 especially in certain circumstances and relations1 in which affections--which are hardly virtues--prompt to kind services4 ,rules for the distribution of ,kindness are needed1 #bda-bdf #c4 as claims may conflict2 but clearly binding rules cannot be obtained from ,common ,sense in a definite form2 #bdf-bdg #d4 nor clear principles from which rules may be deduced2 as is seen when we examine the duties to ,kinsmen1 as commonly conceived3 #bdg-bej #e4 and the wider duties of ,neighbourhood1 ,citizenship1 ,universal ,benevolence2 and the duties of cultivating ,reverence and ,loyalty3 #bej-bed #f4 and those springing from the ,conjugal relation3 #bed-bef #g4 and those of ,friendship3 #bef-bei #h4 and those of ,gratitude3 and those to which we are prompted by ,pity4 #bei-bfc ,note #bfc ,,chapter ,v ,,justice #a4 ,justice is especially difficult to define4 ,the ,just cannot be identified with the ,legal1 as laws may be unjust4 ,again1 the ,justice of laws does not consist merely in the absence of arbitrary inequality in framing or administering them4 #bfd-bfh #b4 ,one element of ,justice seems to consist in the fulfilment of 7#a7 contracts and definite understandings1 and 7#b7 expectations arising naturally out of the established order of ,society2 but the duty of fulfilling these latter is somewhat indefinite3 #bfh-bga #c4 and this social order may itself1 from another point of view1 be condemned as unjust2 that is1 as tried by the standard of ,ideal ,justice4 ,what then is this ,standard8 ,we seem to find various degrees and forms of it4 #bga-bgd #d4 ,one view of ,ideal ,law states ,freedom as its absolute ,end3 but the attempt to construct a system of law on this principle involves us in insuperable difficulties4 #bgd-bgh #e4 ,nor does the realisation of ,freedom satisfy our common conception of ,ideal ,justice4 ,the principle of this is rather #8that ,desert should be requited4' #bgh-bhc #f4 ,but the application of this principle is again very perplexing3 whether we try to determine ,good ,desert 7or the worth of services71 #bhc-bij #g4 or ,ill ,desert1 in order to realise ,criminal ,justice4 ,there remains too the difficulty of reconciling ,conservative and ,ideal ,justice4 #bij-bid ,,chapter ,,vi ,,laws ,,and ,,promises #a4 ,the duty of obeying ,laws1 though it may to a great extent be included under ,justice1 still requires a separate treatment4 ,we can1 however1 obtain no consensus for any precise definition of it4 #bie-big #b4 ,for we are neither agreed as to what kind of government is ideally legitimate1 #big-bii #c4 nor as to the criterion of a traditionally legitimate government1 #bii-cja #d4 nor as to the proper limits of governmental authority4 #cja-cjc #e4 ,the duty of fulfilling a promise in the sense in which it was understood by both promiser and promisee is thought to be peculiarly stringent and certain #cjc-cjd #f4 7it being admitted that its obligation is relative to the promisee1 and may be annulled by him1 and that it cannot override strict prior obligations74 #cjd-cje #g4 ,but ,common ,sense seems to doubt how far a promise is binding when it has been obtained by force or fraud3 #cje-cjf #h4 or when circumstances have materially altered since it was made--especially if it be a promise to the dead or absent1 from which no release can be obtained1 or if the performance of the promise will be harmful to the promisee1 or inflict a disproportionate sacrifice on the promiser4 #cjf-cjh #i4 ,other doubts arise when a promise has been misapprehended3 and in the peculiar case where a prescribed form of words has been used4 #cjh-caa ,,chapter ,,vii ,,classification ,,of ,,duties4 ,,truth #a4 ,i have not adopted the classification of duties into ,social and ,self-regarding3 as it seems inappropriate to the ,intuitional method1 of which the characteristic is1 that it lays down certain absolute and independent rules3 such as the rule of ,truth4 #cab-cae #b4 ,but ,common ,sense after all scarcely seems to prescribe truth-speaking under all circumstances3 nor to decide clearly whether the beliefs which we are bound to make true are those directly produced by our words or the immediate inferences from these4 #cae-cag #c4 ,it is said that the general allowance of ,unveracity would be suicidal1 as no one would believe the falsehood4 ,but this argument1 though forcible1 is not decisive2 for 7#a7 this result may be in special circumstances desirable1 or 7#b7 we may have reason to expect that it will not occur4 #cag-cai ,note #cai ,,chapter ,,viii ,,other ,,social ,,duties ,,and ,,virtues #a4 ,common opinion sometimes condemns sweepingly malevolent feelings and volitions3 but ,reflective ,common ,sense seems to admit some as legitimate1 determining the limits of this admission on utilitarian grounds4 #cbj-cbd #b4 ,other maxims of social duty seem clearly subordinate to those already discussed3 as is illustrated by an examination of ,liberality and other cognate notions4 #cbd-cbf ,,chapter ,,ix ,,self-,,regarding ,,virtues #a4 ,the general duty of seeking one's own happiness is commonly recognised under the notion of ,prudence4 #cbg-cbh #b4 ,this as specially applied to the control of bodily appetites is called ,temperance3 but under this notion a more rigid restraint is sometimes thought to be prescribed3 though as to the principle of this there seems no agreement4 #cbh-cbi #c4 ,nor is it easy to give a clear definition of the maxim of ,purity--but in fact common sense seems averse to attempt this4 ,we must note1 however1 that suicide is commonly judged to be absolutely wrong4 #cbi-cca ,,chapter ,x ,,courage1 ,,humility1 ,,etc4 #a4 ,the ,duty of ,courage is subordinate to those already discussed3 and in drawing the line between the ,excellence of ,courage and the ,fault of ,foolhardiness we seem forced to have recourse to considerations of expediency4 #ccb-ccd #b4 ,similarly the maxim of ,humility seems either clearly subordinate or not clearly determinate4 #ccd-ccf ,,chapter ,,xi ,,review ,,of ,,the ,,morality ,,of ,,common ,,sense #a4 ,we have now to examine the moral maxims that have been defined1 to ascertain whether they possess the characteristics of scientific intuitions4 #ccg-cch #b4 ,we require of an ,axiom that it should be 7#a7 stated in clear and precise terms1 7#b7 really self-evident1 7#c7 not conflicting with any other truth1 7#d7 supported by an adequate #8consensus of experts4' ,these characteristics are not found in the moral maxims of ,common ,sense4 #cch-cdc #c4 ,the maxims of ,wisdom and ,self-control are only self-evident in so far as they are tautological3 #cdc-cde #d4 nor can we state any clear1 absolute1 universally-admitted axioms for determining the duties of the ,affections3 #cde-cdi #e4 and as for the group of principles that were extracted from the common notion of ,justice1 we cannot define each singly in a satisfactory manner1 still less reconcile them3 #cdi-ceb #f4 and even the ,duty of ,good ,faith1 when we consider the numerous qualifications of it more or less doubtfully admitted by ,common ,sense1 seems more like a subordinate rule than an independent ,first ,principle4 ,still more is this the case with ,veracity3 #ceb-cee #g4 similarly with other virtues3 even the prohibition of ,suicide1 so far as rational1 seems to rest ultimately on utilitarian grounds4 #cee-ceg #h4 ,even ,purity when we force ourselves to examine it rigorously yields no clear independent principle4 #ceg-cei #i4 ,the common moral maxims are adequate for practical guidance1 but do not admit of being elevated into scientific axioms4 #cei-cfa ,,chapter ,,xii ,,motives ,,or ,,springs ,,of ,,action ,,as ,,subjects ,,of ,,moral ,,judgment #a4 ,it has been held by several moralists that the 8,universal ,conscience0 judges primarily not of ,rightness of acts1 but of ,rank of ,motives4 #cfb-cfe #b4 ,if1 however1 we include the ,moral ,sentiments among these motives1 this latter view involves all the difficulties and perplexities of the former1 yet it is paradoxical to omit these sentiments4 #cfe-cfg #c4 ,but even if we leave these out1 we still find very little agreement as to ,rank of ,motives3 and there is a special difficulty arising from complexity of motive4 ,nor does ,common ,sense seem to hold that a 8higher0 motive--below the highest--is always to be preferred to a 8lower40 #cfg-cgb ,,chapter ,,xiii ,,philosophical ,,intuitionism #a4 ,the ,philosopher1 as such1 attempts to penetrate beneath the surface of ,common ,sense to some deeper principles3 #cgc-cgd #b4 but has too often presented to the world1 as the result of his investigation1 tautological propositions and vicious circles4 #cgd-cgi #c4 ,still there are certain abstract moral principles of real importance1 intuitively known2 though they are not sufficient by themselves to give complete practical guidance4 ,thus we can exhibit a self-evident element in the commonly recognised principles of ,prudence1 ,justice1 and ,benevolence4 #cgi-chd #d4 ,this is confirmed by a reference to ,clarke's and ,kant's systems3 #chd-chf #e4 and also to ,utilitarianism3 which needs for its basis a self-evident principle of ,rational ,benevolence2 as is shown by a criticism of ,mill's 8proof40 #chf-chi ,note #chi-cij ,,chapter ,,xiv ,,ultimate ,,good #a4 ,the notion of ,virtue1 as commonly conceived1 cannot without a logical circle be identified with the notion of ,ultimate ,good3 #cia-cid #b4 nor is it in accordance with ,common ,sense to regard ,subjective ,rightness of ,will1 or other elements of ,perfection1 as constituting ,ultimate ,good4 #cid-cie #c4 ,what is ultimately good or desirable must be ,desirable ,consciousness4 #cie-cig #d4 i4e4 either simply ,happiness1 or certain objective relations of the ,conscious ,mind4 #cih-djj #e4 ,when these alternatives are fairly presented1 ,common ,sense seems disposed to choose the former3 especially as we can now explain its instinctive disinclination to admit ,pleasure as ultimate end3 while the other alternative leaves us without a criterion for determining the comparative value of different elements of #8,good4' #djj-djg ,,book ,,iv ,,utilitarianism ,,chapter ,i ,,the ,,meaning ,,of ,,utilitarianism #a4 ,the ethical theory called ,utilitarianism1 or ,universalistic ,hedonism1 is to be carefully distinguished from ,egoistic ,hedonism3 and also from any psychological theory as to the nature and origin of the ,moral ,sentiments4 #daa-dac #b4 ,the notion of #8,greatest ,happiness' has been determined in ,book ii4 chap4 i43 but the extent and manner of its application require to be further defined4 ,are we to include all ,sentient ,beings8 and is it ,total or ,average ,happiness that we seek to make a maximum8 ,we also require a supplementary ,principle for ,distribution of ,happiness3 the principle of ,equality is prima facie reasonable4 #dac-dag ,,chapter ,,ii ,,the ,,proof ,,of ,,utilitarianism ,common ,sense demands a ,proof of the first ,principle of this method1 more clearly than in the case of ,egoism and ,intuitionism4 ,such a proof1 addressed to the ,egoistic ,hedonist1 was in fact given in ,book iii4 chap4 xiii4 #c3 it exhibited the essence of the ,utilitarian ,principle as a clear and certain moral ,intuition4 ,but it is also important to examine its relation to other received maxims4 #dah-dbb ,,chapter ,,iii ,,the ,,relation ,,of ,,utilitarianism ,,to ,,the ,,morality ,,of ,,common ,,sense #a4 ,taking as our basis ,hume's exhibition of the ,virtues as ,felicific qualities of character1 we can trace a complex coincidence between ,utilitarianism and ,common ,sense4 ,it is not needful--nor does it even help the argument--to show this coincidence to be perfect and exact4 #dbc-dbf #b4 ,we may observe1 first1 that ,dispositions may often be admired 7as generally felicific7 when the special acts that have resulted from them are infelicific4 ,again1 the maxims of many virtues are found to contain an explicit or implicit reference to ,duty conceived as already determinate4 ,passing over these to examine the more definite among common notions of ,duty3 #dbf-dcj #c4 we observe1 first1 how the rules that prescribe the distribution of kindness in accordance with normal promptings of ,family ,affections1 ,friendship1 ,gratitude1 and ,pity have a firm ,utilitarian basis3 and how ,utilitarianism is naturally referred to for an explanation of the difficulties that arise in attempting to define these rules4 #dcj-dci #d4 ,a similar result is reached by an examination1 singly and together1 of the different elements into which we have analysed the common notion of ,justice3 #dci-ddh #e4 and in the case of other virtues4 #ddh-dej #f4 ,purity has been thought an exception3 but a careful examination of common opinions as to the regulation of sexual relations exhibits a peculiarly complex and delicate correspondence between moral sentiments and social utilities4 #dej-dec #g4 ,the hypothesis that the ,moral ,sense is #8unconsciously ,utilitarian' also accounts for the actual differences in different codes of ,duty and estimates of ,virtue1 either in the same age and country1 or when we compare different ages and countries4 ,it is not maintained that perception of rightness has always been consciously derived from perception of utility3 a view which the evidence of history fails to support4 #dec-deg ,on the ,utilitarian view1 the relation between ,ethics and ,politics is different for different parts of the legal code4 #deg-dei ,,chapter ,,iv ,,the ,,method ,,of ,,utilitarianism #a4 ,ought a ,utilitarian1 then1 to accept the ,morality of ,common ,sense provisionally as a body of ,utilitarian doctrine8 ,not quite2 for even accepting the theory that the ,moral ,sense is derived from ,sympathy1 we can discern several causes that must have operated to produce a divergence between ,common ,sense and a perfectly ,utilitarian code of morality4 #dfj-dfg #b4 ,at the same time it seems idle to try to construct such a code in any other way than by taking ,positive ,morality as our basis4 #dfg-dga #c4 ,if ,general ,happiness be the ultimate end1 it is not reasonable to adopt 8social health0 or 8efficiency0 as the practically ultimate criterion of morality4 #dga-dgd ,,chapter ,v ,,the ,,method ,,of ,,utilitarianism 7continued7 #a4 ,it is1 then1 a ,utilitarian's duty at once to support generally1 and to rectify in detail1 the morality of ,common ,sense3 and the method of pure empirical ,hedonism seems to be the only one that he can at present use in the reasonings that finally determine the nature and extent of this rectification4 #dge-dhj #b4 ,his innovations may be either negative and destructive1 or positive and supplementary4 ,there are certain important general reasons against an innovation of the former kind1 which may1 in any given case1 easily outweigh the special arguments in its favour4 #dhj-dhd #c4 ,generally1 a ,utilitarian in recommending1 by example or precept1 a deviation from an established rule of conduct1 desires his innovation to be generally imitated4 ,but in some cases he may neither expect nor desire such imitation2 though cases of this kind are rare and difficult to determine4 #dhe-dib #d4 ,there are no similar difficulties in the way of modifying the ,ideal of ,moral ,excellence--as distinguished from the dictates of ,moral ,duty--in order to render it more perfectly felicific4 #dib-die ,,concluding ,,chapter ,,the ,,mutual ,,relations ,,of ,,the ,,three ,,methods #a4 ,it is not difficult to combine the ,intuitional and ,utilitarian methods into one2 but can we reconcile ,egoistic and ,universalistic ,hedonism8 #dif-dih #b4 ,in so far as the latter coincides with ,common ,sense1 we have seen in ,book ii4 chap4 v4 that no complete reconciliation is possible1 on the basis of experience4 #dih-dii #c4 ,nor does a fuller consideration of ,sympathy1 as a specially ,utilitarian sanction1 lead us to modify this conclusion2 in spite of the importance that is undoubtedly to be attached to sympathetic pleasures4 #dii-ejc #d4 ,the ,religious ,sanction1 if we can show that it is actually attached to the ,utilitarian ,code1 is of course adequate3 #ejc-ejf #e4 but its existence cannot be demonstrated by ethical arguments alone4 ,still1 without this or some similar assumption1 a fundamental contradiction in ,ethics cannot be avoided4 #ejf-eji ,,appendix ,,on ,,kant',s ,,conception ,,of ,,free ,,will #eaa ,,index #eag ,,book ,i ,,chapter ,i ,,introduction #a4 ,the boundaries of the study called ,ethics are variously and often vaguely conceived3 but they will perhaps be sufficiently defined1 at the outset1 for the purposes of the present treatise1 if a #8,method of ,ethics' is explained to mean any rational procedure by which we determine what individual human beings #8ought'--or what it is #8right' for them--to do1 or to seek to realise by voluntary action4#i ,by using the word 8individual0 ,i provisionally distinguish the study of ,ethics from that of ,politics1#aj which seeks to determine the proper constitution and the right public conduct of governed societies3 both ,ethics and ,politics being1 in my view1 distinguished from positive sciences by having as their special and primary object to determine what ought to be1 and not to ascertain what merely is1 has been1 or will be4 ,the student of ,ethics seeks to attain systematic and precise general knowledge of what ought to be1 and in this sense his aims and methods may properly be termed #8scientific'3 but ,i have preferred to call ,ethics a study rather than a science1 because it is widely thought that a ,science must necessarily have some department of actual existence for its subject-matter4 ,and in fact the term #8,ethical ,science' might1 without violation of usage1 denote either the department of ,psychology that deals with voluntary action and its springs1 and with moral sentiments and judgments1 as actual phenomena of individual human minds2 or the department of ,sociology dealing with similar phenomena1 as manifested by normal members of the organised groups of human beings which we call societies4 ,we observe1 however1 that most persons do not pursue either of these studies merely from curiosity1 in order to ascertain what actually exists1 has existed1 or will exist in time4 ,they commonly wish not only to understand human action1 but also to regulate it2 in this view they apply the ideas #8good' and #8bad1' #8right' and #8wrong1' to the conduct or institutions which they describe2 and thus pass1 as ,i should say1 from the point of view of ,psychology or ,sociology to that of ,ethics or ,politics4 ,my definition of ,ethics is designed to mark clearly the fundamental importance of this transition4 ,it is true that the mutual implication of the two kinds of study--the positive and the practical--is1 on any theory1 very close and complete4 ,on any theory1 our view of what ought to be must be largely derived1 in details1 from our apprehension of what is2 the means of realising our ideal can only be thoroughly learnt by a careful study of actual phenomena2 and to any individual asking himself #8,what ought ,i to do or aim at8' it is important to examine the answers which his fellow-men have actually given to similar questions4 ,still it seems clear that an attempt to ascertain the general laws or uniformities by which the varieties of human conduct1 and of men's sentiments and judgments respecting conduct1 may be explained1 is essentially different from an attempt to determine which among these varieties of conduct is right and which of these divergent judgments valid4 ,it is1 then1 the systematic consideration of these latter questions which constitutes1 in my view1 the special and distinct aim of ,ethics and ,politics4 #b4 ,in the language of the preceding section ,i could not avoid taking account of two different forms in which the fundamental problem of ,ethics is stated2 the difference between which leads1 as we shall presently see1 to rather important consequences4 ,ethics is sometimes considered as an investigation of the true ,moral laws or rational precepts of ,conduct2 sometimes as an inquiry into the nature of the ,ultimate ,end of reasonable human action--the ,good or #8,true ,good' of man--and the method of attaining it4 ,both these views are familiar1 and will have to be carefully considered3 but the former seems most prominent in modern ethical thought1 and most easily applicable to modern ethical systems generally4 ,for the ,good investigated in ,ethics is limited to ,good in some degree attainable by human effort2 accordingly knowledge of the end is sought in order to ascertain what actions are the right means to its attainment4 ,thus however prominent the notion of an ,ultimate ,good--other than voluntary action of any kind--may be in an ethical system1 and whatever interpretation may be given to this notion1 we must still arrive finally1 if it is to be practically useful1 at some determination of precepts or directive rules of conduct4 ,on the other hand1 the conception of ,ethics as essentially an investigation of the #8,ultimate ,good' of ,man and the means of attaining it is not universally applicable1 without straining1 to the view of ,morality which we may conveniently distinguish as the ,intuitional view2 according to which conduct is held to be right when conformed to certain precepts or principles of ,duty1 intuitively known to be unconditionally binding4 ,in this view the conception of ,ultimate ,good is not necessarily of fundamental importance in the determination of ,right conduct except on the assumption that ,right conduct itself--or the character realised in and developed through ,right conduct--is the sole ,ultimate ,good for man4 ,but this assumption is not implied in the ,intuitional view of ,ethics3 nor would it1 ,i conceive1 accord with the moral common sense of modern ,christian communities4 ,for we commonly think that the complete notion of human ,good or ,well-being must include the attainment of ,happiness as well as the performance of ,duty2 even if we hold with ,butler that 8the happiness of the world is the concern of ,him who is the ,lord and the ,proprietor of it10 and that1 accordingly1 it is not right for men to make their performance of ,duty conditional on their knowledge of its conduciveness to their ,happiness4 ,for those who hold this1 what men ought to take as the practically ultimate end of their action and standard of ,right conduct1 may in some cases have no logical connexion with the conception of ,ultimate ,good for man3 so that1 in such cases1 however indispensable this latter conception may be to the completeness of an ethical system1 it would still not be important for the methodical determination of ,right conduct4 ,it is on account of the prevalence of the ,intuitional view just mentioned1 and the prominent place which it consequently occupies in my discussion1 that in defining ,ethics ,i have avoided the term #8,art of ,conduct' which some would regard as its more appropriate designation4 ,for the term #8,art'--when applied to the contents of a treatise--seems to signify systematic express knowledge 7as distinguished from the implicit knowledge or organised habit which we call skill7 of the right means to a given end4 ,now if we assume that the rightness of action depends on its conduciveness to some ulterior end1 then no doubt--when this end has been clearly ascertained--the process of determining the right rules of conduct for human beings in different relations and circumstances would naturally come under the notion of ,art4 ,but on the view that the practically ultimate end of moral action is often the ,rightness of the action itself--or the ,virtue realised in and confirmed by such action--and that this is known intuitively in each case or class of cases1 we can hardly regard the term #8,art' as properly applicable to the systematisation of such knowledge4 ,hence1 as ,i do not wish to start with any assumption incompatible with this latter view1 ,i prefer to consider ,ethics as the science or study of what is right or what ought to be1 so far as this depends upon the voluntary action of individuals4#aa #c4 ,if1 however1 this view of the scope of ,ethics is accepted1 the question arises why it is commonly taken to consist1 to a great extent1 of psychological discussion as to the #8nature of the moral faculty'2 especially as ,i have myself thought it right to include some discussion of this kind in the present treatise4 ,for it does not at first appear why this should belong to ,ethics1 any more than discussions about the mathematical faculty or the faculty of sense-perception belong to mathematics and physics respectively4 ,why do we not simply start with certain premises1 stating what ought to be done or sought1 without considering the faculty by which we apprehend their truth8 ,one answer is that the moralist has a practical aim3 we desire knowledge of right conduct in order to act on it4 ,now we cannot help believing what we see to be true1 but we can help doing what we see to be right or wise1 and in fact often do what we know to be wrong or unwise3 thus we are forced to notice the existence in us of irrational springs of action1 conflicting with our knowledge and preventing its practical realisation3 and the very imperfectness of the connexion between our practical judgment and our will impels us to seek for more precise knowledge as to the nature of that connexion4 ,but this is not all4 ,men never ask1 #8,why should ,i believe what ,i see to be true8' but they frequently ask1 #8,why should ,i do what ,i see to be right8' ,it is easy to reply that the question is futile1 since it could only be answered by a reference to some other recognised principle of right conduct1 and the question might just as well be asked as regards that again1 and so on4 ,but still we do ask the question widely and continually1 and therefore this demonstration of its futility is not completely satisfactory2 we require besides some explanation of its persistency4 ,one explanation that may be offered is that1 since we are moved to action not by moral judgment alone1 but also by desires and inclinations that operate independently of moral judgment1 the answer which we really want to the question #8,why should ,i do it8' is one which does not merely prove a certain action to be right1 but also stirs in us a predominant inclination to do the action4 ,that this explanation is true for some minds in some moods ,i would not deny4 ,still ,i think that when a man seriously asks #8why he should do' anything1 he commonly assumes in himself a determination to pursue whatever conduct may be shown by argument to be reasonable1 even though it be very different from that to which his non-rational inclinations may prompt4 ,and we are generally agreed that reasonable conduct in any case has to be determined on principles1 in applying which the agent's inclination--as it exists apart from such determination--is only one element among several that have to be considered1 and commonly not the most important element4 ,but when we ask what these principles are1 the diversity of answers which we find manifestly declared in the systems and fundamental formul of professed moralists seems to be really present in the common practical reasoning of men generally2 with this difference1 that whereas the philosopher seeks unity of principle1 and consistency of method at the risk of paradox1 the unphilosophic man is apt to hold different principles at once1 and to apply different methods in more or less confused combination4 ,if this be so1 we can offer another explanation of the persistent unsatisfied demand for an ultimate reason1 above noticed4 ,for if there are different views of the ultimate reasonableness of conduct1 implicit in the thought of ordinary men1 though not brought into clear relation to each other1--it is easy to see that any single answer to the question #8why' will not be completely satisfactory1 as it will be given only from one of these points of view1 and will always leave room to ask the question from some other4 ,i am myself convinced that this is the main explanation of the phenomenon3 and it is on this conviction that the plan of the present treatise is based4 ,we cannot1 of course1 regard as valid reasonings that lead to conflicting conclusions2 and ,i therefore assume as a fundamental postulate of ,ethics1 that so far as two methods conflict1 one or other of them must be modified or rejected4 ,but ,i think it fundamentally important to recognise1 at the outset of ,ethical inquiry1 that there is a diversity of methods applied in ordinary practical thought4 #d4 ,what then are these different methods8 what are the different practical principles which the common sense of mankind is prima facie prepared to accept as ultimate8 ,some care is needed in answering this question3 because we frequently prescribe that this or that #8ought' to be done or aimed at without any express reference to an ulterior end1 while yet such an end is tacitly presupposed4 ,it is obvious that such prescriptions are merely1 what ,kant calls them1 ,hypothetical ,imperatives2 they are not addressed to any one who has not first accepted the end4 ,for instance3 a teacher of any art assumes that his pupil wants to produce the product of the art1 or to produce it excellent in quality3 he tells him that he ought to hold the awl1 the hammer1 the brush differently4 ,a physician assumes that his patient wants health3 he tells him that he ought to rise early1 to live plainly1 to take hard exercise4 ,if the patient deliberately prefers ease and good living to health1 the physician's precepts fall to the ground3 they are no longer addressed to him4 ,so1 again1 a man of the world assumes that his hearers wish to get on in society1 when he lays down rules of dress1 manner1 conversation1 habits of life4 ,a similar view may be plausibly taken of many rules prescribing what are sometimes called 8duties to oneself03 it may be said that they are given on the assumption that a man regards his own ,happiness as an ultimate end3 that if any one should be so exceptional as to disregard it1 he does not come within their scope3 in short1 that the #8ought' in such formul is still implicitly relative to an optional end4 ,it does not1 however1 seem to me that this account of the matter is exhaustive4 ,we do not all look with simple indifference on a man who declines to take the right means to attain his own happiness1 on no other ground than that he does not care about happiness4 ,most men would regard such a refusal as irrational1 with a certain disapprobation2 they would thus implicitly assent to ,butler's statement#ab that 8interest1 one's own happiness1 is a manifest obligation40 ,in other words1 they would think that a man ought to care for his own happiness4 ,the word #8ought' thus used is no longer relative3 happiness now appears as an ultimate end1 the pursuit of which--at least within the limits imposed by other duties--appears to be prescribed by reason #8categorically1' as ,kant would say1 i4e4 without any tacit assumption of a still ulterior end4 ,and it has been widely held by even orthodox moralists that all morality rests ultimately on the basis of 8reasonable self-love02#ac i4e4 that its rules are ultimately binding on any individual only so far as it is his interest on the whole to observe them4 ,still1 common moral opinion certainly regards the duty or virtue of ,prudence as only a part--and not the most important part--of duty or virtue in general4 ,common moral opinion recognises and inculcates other fundamental rules--e4g4 those of ,justice1 ,good ,faith1 ,veracity--which1 in its ordinary judgments on particular cases1 it is inclined to treat as binding without qualification and without regard to ulterior consequences4 ,and1 in the ordinary form of the ,intuitional view of ,ethics1 the 8categorical0 prescription of such rules is maintained explicitly and definitely1 as a result of philosophical reflection3 and the realisation of ,virtue in act--at least in the case of the virtues just mentioned--is held to consist in strict and unswerving conformity to such rules4 ,on the other hand it is contended by many ,utilitarians that all the rules of conduct which men prescribe to one another as moral rules are really--though in part unconsciously--prescribed as means to the general happiness of mankind1 or of the whole aggregate of sentient beings2 and it is still more widely held by ,utilitarian thinkers that such rules1 however they may originate1 are only valid so far as their observance is conducive to the general happiness4 ,this contention ,i shall hereafter examine with due care4 ,here ,i wish only to point out that1 if the duty of aiming at the general happiness is thus taken to include all other duties1 as subordinate applications of it1 we seem to be again led to the notion of ,happiness as an ultimate end categorically prescribed1--only it is now ,general ,happiness and not the private happiness of any individual4 ,and this is the view that ,i myself take of the ,utilitarian principle4 ,at the same time1 it is not necessary1 in the methodical investigation of right conduct1 considered relatively to the end either of private or of general happiness1 to assume that the end itself is determined or prescribed by reason3 we only require to assume1 in reasoning to cogent practical conclusions1 that it is adopted as ultimate and paramount4 ,for if a man accepts any end as ultimate and paramount1 he accepts implicitly as his 8method of ethics0 whatever process of reasoning enables him to determine the actions most conducive to this end4#ad ,since1 however1 to every difference in the end accepted at least some difference in method will generally correspond3 if all the ends which men are found practically to adopt as ultimate 7subordinating everything else to the attainment of them under the influence of #8ruling passions'71 were taken as principles for which the student of ,ethics is called upon to construct rational methods1 his task would be very complex and extensive4 ,but if we confine ourselves to such ends as the common sense of mankind appears to accept as rational ultimate ends1 the task is reduced1 ,i think1 within manageable limits2 since this criterion will exclude at least many of the objects which men practically seem to regard as paramount4 ,thus many men sacrifice health1 fortune1 happiness1 to ,fame2 but no one1 so far as ,i know1 has deliberately maintained that ,fame is an object which it is reasonable for men to seek for its own sake4 ,it only commends itself to reflective minds either 7#a7 as a source of ,happiness to the person who gains it1 or 7#b7 a sign of his ,excellence1 moral or intellectual1 or 7#c7 because it attests the achievement by him of some important benefit to society1 and at the same time stimulates him and others to further achievement in the future3 and the conception of 8benefit0 would1 when examined in its turn1 lead us again to ,happiness or ,excellence of human nature1--since a man is commonly thought to benefit others either by making them happier or by making them wiser and more virtuous4 ,whether there are any ends besides these two1 which can be reasonably regarded as ultimate1 it will hereafter#ae be part of our business to investigate3 but we may perhaps say that prima facie the only two ends which have a strongly and widely supported claim to be regarded as rational ultimate ends are the two just mentioned1 ,happiness and ,perfection or ,excellence of human nature--meaning here by #8,excellence' not primarily superiority to others1 but a partial realisation of1 or approximation to1 an ideal type of human ,perfection4 ,and we must observe that the adoption of the former of these ends leads us to two prima facie distinct methods1 according as it is sought to be realised universally1 or by each individual for himself alone4 ,for though doubtless a man may often best promote his own happiness by labouring and abstaining for the sake of others1 it seems to be implied in our common notion of self-sacrifice that actions most conducive to the general happiness do not--in this world at least--always tend also to the greatest happiness of the agent4#af ,and among those who hold that 8happiness is our being's end and aim0 we seem to find a fundamental difference of opinion as to whose happiness it is that it is ultimately reasonable to aim at4 ,for to some it seems that 8the constantly proper end of action on the part of any individual at the moment of action is his real greatest happiness from that moment to the end of his life02#ag whereas others hold that the view of reason is essentially universal1 and that it cannot be reasonable to take as an ultimate and paramount end the happiness of any one individual rather than that of any other--at any rate if equally deserving and susceptible of it--so that general happiness must be the 8true standard of right and wrong1 in the field of morals0 no less than of politics4#ah ,it is1 of course1 possible to adopt an end intermediate between the two1 and to aim at the happiness of some limited portion of mankind1 such as one's family or nation or race3 but any such limitation seems arbitrary1 and probably few would maintain it to be reasonable per se1 except as the most practicable way of aiming at the general happiness1 or of indirectly securing one's own4 ,the case seems to be otherwise with ,excellence or ,perfection4#ai ,at first sight1 indeed1 the same alternatives present themselves3#bj it seems that the ,excellence aimed at may be taken either individually or universally2 and circumstances are conceivable in which a man is not unlikely to think that he could best promote the ,excellence of others by sacrificing his own4 ,but no moralist who takes ,excellence as an ultimate end has ever approved of such sacrifice1 at least so far as ,moral ,excellence is concerned2 no one has ever directed an individual to promote the virtue of others except in so far as this promotion is compatible with1 or rather involved in1 the complete realisation of ,virtue in himself4#ba ,so far1 then1 there seems to be no need of separating the method of determining right conduct which takes the ,excellence or ,perfection of the individual as the ultimate aim from that which aims at the ,excellence or ,perfection of the human community4 ,and since ,virtue is commonly conceived as the most valuable element of human ,excellence--and an element essentially preferable to any other element that can come into competition with it as an alternative for rational choice--any method which takes ,perfection or ,excellence of human nature as ultimate ,end will prima facie coincide to a great extent with that based on what ,i called the ,intuitional view3 and ,i have accordingly decided to treat it as a special form of this latter4#bb ,the two methods which take happiness as an ultimate end it will be convenient to distinguish as ,egoistic and ,universalistic ,hedonism3 and as it is the latter of these1 as taught by ,bentham and his successors1 that is more generally understood under the term #8,utilitarianism1' ,i shall always restrict that word to this signification4 ,for ,egoistic ,hedonism it is somewhat hard to find a single perfectly appropriate term4 ,i shall often call this simply ,egoism3 but it may sometimes be convenient to call it ,epicureanism3 for though this name more properly denotes a particular historical system1 it has come to be commonly used in the wider sense in which ,i wish to employ it4 #e4 ,the last sentence suggests one more explanation1 which1 for clearness' sake1 it seems desirable to make3 an explanation1 however1 rather of the plan and purpose of the present treatise than of the nature and boundaries of the subject of ,ethics as generally understood4 ,there are several recognised ways of treating this subject1 none of which ,i have thought it desirable to adopt4 ,we may start with existing systems1 and either study them historically1 tracing the changes in thought through the centuries1 or compare and classify them according to relations of resemblance1 or criticise their internal coherence4 ,or we may seek to add to the number of these systems3 and claim after so many unsuccessful efforts to have at last attained the one true theory of the subject1 by which all others may be tested4 ,the present book contains neither the exposition of a system nor a natural or critical history of systems4 ,i have attempted to define and unfold not one ,method of ,ethics1 but several3 at the same time these are not here studied historically1 as methods that have actually been used or proposed for the regulation of practice2 but rather as alternatives between which--so far as they cannot be reconciled--the human mind seems to me necessarily forced to choose1 when it attempts to frame a complete synthesis of practical maxims and to act in a perfectly consistent manner4 ,thus1 they might perhaps be called natural methods rationalised2 because men commonly seem to guide themselves by a mixture of different methods1 more or less disguised under ambiguities of language4 ,the impulses or principles from which the different methods take their rise1 the different claims of different ends to be rational1 are admitted1 to some extent1 by all minds3 and as along with these claims is felt the need of harmonising them--since it is1 as was said1 a postulate of the ,practical ,reason1 that two conflicting rules of action cannot both be reasonable--the result is ordinarily either a confused blending1 or a forced and premature reconciliation1 of different principles and methods4 ,nor have the systems framed by professed moralists been free from similar defects4 ,the writers have usually proceeded to synthesis without adequate analysis2 the practical demand for the former being more urgently felt than the theoretical need of the latter4 ,for here as in other points the development of the theory of ,ethics would seem to be somewhat impeded by the preponderance of practical considerations2 and perhaps a more complete detachment of the theoretical study of right conduct from its practical application is to be desired for the sake even of the latter itself3 since a treatment which is a compound between the scientific and the hortatory is apt to miss both the results that it would combine2 the mixture is bewildering to the brain and not stimulating to the heart4 ,so again1 ,i am inclined to think that here1 as in other sciences1 it would be an advantage to draw as distinct a line as possible between the known and the unknown2 as the clear indication of an unsolved problem is at any rate a step to its solution4 ,in ethical treatises1 however1 there has been a continual tendency to ignore and keep out of sight the difficulties of the subject2 either unconsciously1 from a latent conviction that the questions which the writer cannot answer satisfactorily must be questions which ought not to be asked2 or consciously1 that he may not shake the sway of morality over the minds of his readers4 ,this last well-meant precaution frequently defeats itself3 the difficulties thus concealed in exposition are liable to reappear in controversy3 and then they appear not carefully limited1 but magnified for polemical purposes4 ,thus we get on the one hand vague and hazy reconciliation1 on the other loose and random exaggeration of discrepancies2 and neither process is effective to dispel the original vagueness and ambiguity which lurks in the fundamental notions of our common practical reasonings4 ,to eliminate or reduce this indefiniteness and confusion is the sole immediate end that ,i have proposed to myself in the present work4 ,in order better to execute this task1 ,i have refrained from expressly attempting any such complete and final solution of the chief ethical difficulties and controversies as would convert this exposition of various methods into the development of a harmonious system4 ,at the same time ,i hope to afford aid towards the construction of such a system2 because it seems easier to judge of the mutual relations and conflicting claims of different modes of thought1 after an impartial and rigorous investigation of the conclusions to which they logically lead4 ,it is not uncommon to find in reflecting on practical principles1 that--however unhesitatingly they seem to command our assent at first sight1 and however familiar and apparently clear the notions of which they are composed--nevertheless when we have carefully examined the consequences of adopting them they wear a changed and somewhat dubious aspect4 ,the truth seems to be that most of the practical principles that have been seriously put forward are more or less satisfactory to the common sense of mankind1 so long as they have the field to themselves4 ,they all find a response in our nature3 their fundamental assumptions are all such as we are disposed to accept1 and such as we find to govern to a certain extent our habitual conduct4 ,when ,i am asked1 8,do you not consider it ultimately reasonable to seek pleasure and avoid pain for yourself80 8,have you not a moral sense80 8,do you not intuitively pronounce some actions to be right and others wrong80 8,do you not acknowledge the general happiness to be a paramount end80 ,i answer #8yes' to all these questions4 ,my difficulty begins when ,i have to choose between the different principles or inferences drawn from them4 ,we admit the necessity1 when they conflict1 of making this choice1 and that it is irrational to let sometimes one principle prevail and sometimes another2 but the necessity is a painful one4 ,we cannot but hope that all methods may ultimately coincide3 and at any rate1 before making our election we may reasonably wish to have the completest possible knowledge of each4 ,my object1 then1 in the present work1 is to expound as clearly and as fully as my limits will allow the different methods of ,ethics that ,i find implicit in our common moral reasoning2 to point out their mutual relations2 and where they seem to conflict1 to define the issue as much as possible4 ,in the course of this endeavour ,i am led to discuss the considerations which should1 in my opinion1 be decisive in determining the adoption of ethical first principles3 but it is not my primary aim to establish such principles2 nor1 again1 is it my primary aim to supply a set of practical directions for conduct4 ,i have wished to keep the reader's attention throughout directed to the processes rather than the results of ethical thought3 and have therefore never stated as my own any positive practical conclusions unless by way of illustration3 and have never ventured to decide dogmatically any controverted points1 except where the controversy seemed to arise from want of precision or clearness in the definition of principles1 or want of consistency in reasoning4 ,,footnotes3 #i ,the exact relation of the terms #8right' and #8what ought to be' is discussed in chap4 iii4 of this ,book4 ,i here assume that they may be used as convertible1 for most purposes4 #aj ,i use #8,politics' in what ,i take to be its most ordinary signification1 to denote the science or study of ,right or ,good ,legislation and ,government4 ,there is a wider possible sense of the term1 according to which it would include the greater part of ,ethics3 i4e4 if understood to be the ,theory of ,right ,social ,relations4 ,see chap4 ii4 #b4 #aa ,the relation of the notion of #8,good' to that of #8,right' or #8what ought to be' will be further considered in a subsequent chapter of this ,book 7ix47 #ab ,see the ,preface to ,butler's ,sermons on ,human ,nature4 #ac ,the phrase is ,butler's4 #ad ,see the last paragraph of chap4 iii4 of this ,book4 #ae ,see chap4 ix4 of this ,book1 and ,book iii4 chap4 xiv4 #af ,for a full discussion of this question1 see ,book ii4 chap4 v4 and the concluding chapter of the work4 #ag ,bentham1 ,memoirs 7vol4 x4 of ,bowring's edition71 p4 #efj4 #ah ,bentham again1 ,memoirs1 p4 #gi4 ,see note at the end of ,book i4 chap4 vi4 ,the ,utilitarians since ,bentham have sometimes adopted one1 sometimes the other1 of these two principles as paramount4 #ai ,i use the terms #8,excellence' and #8,perfection' to denote the same ultimate end regarded in somewhat different aspects3 meaning by either an ideal complex of mental qualities1 of which we admire and approve the manifestation in human life3 but using #8,perfection' to denote the ideal as such1 while #8,excellence' denotes such partial realisation of or approximation to the ideal as we actually find in human experience4 #bj ,it may be said that even more divergent views of the reasonable end are possible here than in the case of happiness3 for we are not necessarily limited 7as in that case7 to the consideration of sentient beings3 inanimate things also seem to have a perfection and excellence of their own and to be capable of being made better or worse in their kind2 and this perfection1 or one species of it1 appears to be the end of the ,fine ,arts4 ,but reflection ,i think shows that neither beauty nor any other quality of inanimate objects can be regarded as good or desirable in itself1 out of relation to the perfection or happiness of sentient beings4 ,cf4 post1 chap4 ix4 of this ,book4 #ba ,kant roundly denies that it can be my duty to take the ,perfection of others for my end3 but his argument is not1 ,i think1 valid4 ,cf4 post1 ,book iii4 chap4 iv4 #a4 #bb ,see ,book iii4 chap4 xiv41 where ,i explain my reasons for only giving a subordinate place to the conception of ,perfection as ,ultimate ,end4 ,,chapter ,,ii ,,the ,,relation ,,of ,,ethics ,,to ,,politics #a4 ,in the last chapter ,i have spoken of ,ethics and ,politics as being both ,practical ,studies1 including in the scope of their investigation somewhat that lies outside the sphere of positive sciences--viz4 the determination of ends to be sought1 or rules to be unconditionally obeyed4 ,before proceeding further1 it would seem desirable to determine in outline the mutual relations of these cognate studies1 regarded from the point of view of ,ethics4 ,as ,i have defined them1 ,ethics aims at determining what ought to be done by individuals1 while ,politics aims at determining what the government of a state or political society ought to do and how it ought to be constituted1--including under the latter head all questions as to the control over government that should be exercised by the governed4 ,at first sight it may seem that ,politics1 so conceived1 must be a branch of ,ethics4 ,for all the actions of government are actions of individuals1 alone or in combination1 and so are all the actions of those who1 obeying1 influencing1 or perhaps occasionally resisting government1 maintain and from time to time modify the constitution of their state3 and it would seem that if properly performed such actions must be determined on ethical principles or be capable of justification by such principles4 ,but this argument is not decisive2 for by similar reasoning ,ethics would have to comprehend all arts1 liberal and industrial4 ,e4g4 it is a main part of the moral duty of a sea-captain and his subordinates to navigate their ship properly2 but we do not take ,ethics to include a study of the rules of navigation4 ,it may be replied that every man is not a sailor1 but--at least in a country under popular government--every citizen has important political duties1 which he ought to perform according to knowledge1 so far as possible2 but1 similarly1 it is an important part of every adult's moral duty to take care of his health1 and it is proverbial that 8every man at forty is a fool or his own physician02 yet we do not consider ,ethics to include the art of medicine4 ,the specially important connexion between ,ethics and ,politics arises in a different way4 ,it is the business of government1 by laying down and enforcing laws1 to regulate the outward conduct of the governed1 not in one department only1 but in all their social relations1 so far as such conduct is a proper subject for coercive rules4 ,and not only ought this regulation to be in harmony with morality--for obviously people ought not to be compelled to do what they ought not to do--but further1 to an important extent the ,law of a man's state will properly determine the details of his moral duty1 even beyond the sphere of legal enforcement4 ,thus we commonly regard it as an individual's moral duty1 under the head of ,justice1 to 8give every man his own10 even when--through some accident--the other party has not the power of legally enforcing his right2 but still1 in considering what is the other's 8own10 we assume him generally to be guided by the law of his state2 if that were changed1 his moral duty would change with it4 ,similarly1 the mutual moral duties of husbands and wives1 and of children and parents1 will vary in detail with the variations in their legal relations4 ,but when we look closer at the relation thus constituted between ,ethics and ,politics1 we see that a distinction has to be taken between actual or ,positive ,law and ,ideal ,law or ,law as it ought to be4 ,it is for the latter that ,political ,theory lays down principles2 but it is ,positive1 not ,ideal1 ,law that primarily determines right conduct for an individual here and now1 in the manner just exemplified4 ,no doubt if ,positive and ,ideal ,law appear to me to diverge very widely--if 7e4g47 ,i am convinced by political theory that a fundamental change in the law of property is desirable--this conviction is likely to influence my view of my moral duty under the existing law2 but the extent of this influence is vague and uncertain4 ,suppose ,i am a slave-owner in a society in which slavery is established1 and become convinced that private property in human beings should be abolished by law3 it does not therefore follow that ,i shall regard it as my moral duty to set free my slaves at once4 ,i may think immediate general abolition of slavery not only hopeless1 but even inexpedient for the slaves themselves1 who require a gradual education for freedom3 so that it is better for the present to aim at legal changes that would cut off the worst evils of slavery1 and meanwhile to set an example of humane and considerate treatment of bondsmen4 ,similar reasonings might be applied to the abolition of private property in the instruments of production1 or in appointments to offices1 civil or ecclesiastical4 ,speaking generally1 the extent to which political ideals ought to influence moral duty would seem to depend partly on the apparent remoteness or nearness of the prospect of realising the ideal1 partly on its imperativeness1 or the expediency of immediate realisation3 and the force attached to both these considerations is likely to vary with the political method adopted2 so that it belongs to ,politics rather than ,ethics to determine them more precisely4 ,to sum up3 we have to distinguish clearly between two questions3 7#a7 how far the determination of right conduct for an individual here and now ought to be influenced by ,positive ,laws1 and other commands of ,government as actually established2 and 7#b7 how far it ought to be influenced by ,political ,theory1 as to the functions and structure of ,government as it ought to be4 ,as regards the former1 it clearly belongs to ,ethics to determine the grounds and limits of obedience to ,government2 and also the general conception of political duty1 so far as it goes beyond mere obedience--with due recognition of the large variations due to the varying political conditions of different states4 7,a 8good citizen0 in the ,united ,states will reasonably form a conception of his actual political duty widely divergent from that reasonably formed by a good citizen in ,russia4#bc7 ,and this will be the primary business of ,ethics so far as it deals with the political side of life4 ,the discussion of political ideals will only come within its purview in a more indefinite and indirect way1 so far as such ideals cannot but have some influence on the determination of political duty under existing conditions4 #b4 ,i have stated the ,relation of ,ethics to ,politics--regarded from an ethical point of view--that seems to me to accord with the definition of the former subject adopted in the preceding chapter4 ,some thinkers1 however1 take a view of ,ethical ,theory which involves a relation to ,political ,theory quite different from that just set forth2 regarding ,theoretical or 8,absolute0 ,ethics as properly an investigation not of what ought to be done here and now1 but of what ought to be the rules of behaviour in a society of ideally perfect human beings4 ,thus the subject-matter of our study would be doubly ideal3 as it would not only prescribe what ought to be done as distinct from what is1 but what ought to be done in a society that itself is not1 but only ought to be4 ,in this view the conclusions of ,theoretical or 8,absolute0 ,ethics would have as indirect and uncertain a relation to the practical problems of actual life as those of ,theoretical ,politics3--or even more so1 as in sober political theory it is commonly only the government and not the governed society that is conceived in an ideal condition4 ,still the two studies are not unlikely to blend in one theory of ideal social relations2--unless the ideal society is conceived as having no need of government1 so that ,politics1 in the ordinary sense1#bd vanishes altogether4 ,those who take this view#be adduce the analogy of ,geometry to show that ,ethics ought to deal with ideally perfect human relations1 just as ,geometry treats of ideally straight lines and perfect circles4 ,but the irregular lines which we meet with in experience have spatial relations which ,geometry does not ignore altogether2 it can and does ascertain them with a sufficient degree of accuracy for practical purposes3 though of course they are more complex than those of perfectly straight lines4 ,so in ,astronomy1 it would be more convenient for purposes of study if the stars moved in circles1 as was once believed3 but the fact that they move not in circles but in ellipses1 and even in imperfect and perturbed ellipses1 does not take them out of the sphere of scientific investigation3 by patience and industry we have learnt how to reduce to principles and calculate even these more complicated motions4 ,it may be useful for purposes of instruction to assume that the planets move in perfect ellipses3 but what we want1 as astronomers1 to know is the actual motion of the stars1 and its causes3 and similarly as moralists we naturally inquire what ought to be done in the actual world in which we live4 ,in neither case can we hope to represent in our general reasonings the full complexity of the actual considerations3 but we endeavour to approximate to it as closely as possible4 ,it is only so that we really grapple with the question to which mankind generally require an answer3 #8,what is a man's duty in his present condition8' ,for it is too paradoxical to say that the whole duty of man is summed up in the effort to attain an ideal state of social relations2 and unless we say this1 we must determine our duties to existing men in view of existing circumstances3 and this is what the student of ,ethics seeks to do in a systematic manner4 ,the inquiry into the morality of an ideal society can therefore be at best but a preliminary investigation1 after which the step from the ideal to the actual1 in accordance with reason1 remains to be taken4 ,we have to ask1 then1 how far such a preliminary construction seems desirable4 ,and in answering this we must distinguish the different methods of ,ethics4 ,for it is generally held by ,intuitionists that true morality prescribes absolutely what is in itself right1 under all social conditions2 at least as far as determinate duties are concerned3 as 7e4g47 that truth should always be spoken and promises kept1 and #8,justice be done1 though the sky should fall4' ,and so far as this is held it would seem that there can be no fundamental distinction drawn1 in the determination of duty1 between the actual state of society and an ideal state3 at any rate the general definition of 7e4g47 ,justice will be the same for both1 no less than its absolute stringency4 ,still even an extreme ,intuitionist would admit that the details of ,justice and other duties will vary with social institutions3 and it is a plausible suggestion1 that if we can clearly contemplate as a pattern the 8absolute0 ,justice of an ideal community1 we shall be better able to attain the merely 8relative0 ,justice that is alone possible under existing conditions4 ,how far this is so1 we shall be in a better position to judge when we have examined the definition of ,justice from an ,intuitional point of view4 ,the question takes a simpler form in the case of the method which proposes as an ultimate end1 and supreme standard1 ,universal ,happiness4#bf ,here we have merely to ask how far a systematic consideration of the social relations of an ideally happy group of human beings is likely to afford guidance in our efforts to promote human happiness here and now4 ,i shall not at present deny that this task might usefully be included in an exhaustive study of this method4 ,but it can easily be shown that it is involved in serious difficulties4 ,for as in ordinary deliberation we have to consider what is best under certain conditions of human life1 internal or external1 so we must do this in contemplating the ideal society4 ,we require to contemplate not so much the end supposed to be attained--which is simply the most pleasant consciousness conceivable1 lasting as long and as uninterruptedly as possible--but rather some method of realising it1 pursued by human beings2 and these1 again1 must be conceived as existing under conditions not too remote from our own1 so that we can at least endeavour to imitate them4 ,and for this we must know how far our present circumstances are modifiable2 a very difficult question1 as the constructions which have actually been made of such ideal societies show4 ,for example1 the ,republic of ,plato seems in many respects sufficiently divergent from the reality1 and yet he contemplates war as a permanent unalterable fact1 to be provided for in the ideal state1 and indeed such provision seems the predominant aim of his construction2 whereas the soberest modern ,utopia would certainly include the suppression of war4 ,indeed the ideal will often seem to diverge in diametrically opposite directions from the actual1 according to the line of imagined change which we happen to adopt1 in our visionary flight from present evils4 ,for example1 permanent marriage-unions now cause some unhappiness1 because conjugal affection is not always permanent2 but they are thought to be necessary1 partly to protect men and women from vagaries of passion pernicious to themselves1 but chiefly in order to the better rearing of children4 ,now it may seem to some that in an ideal state of society we could trust more to parental affections1 and require less to control the natural play of emotion between the sexes1 and that #8,free ,love' is therefore the ideal2 while others would maintain that permanence in conjugal affection is natural and normal1 and that any exceptions to this rule must be supposed to disappear as we approximate to the ideal4 ,again1 the happiness enjoyed in our actual society seems much diminished by the unequal distribution of the means of happiness1 and the division of mankind into rich and poor4 ,but we can conceive this evil removed in two quite different ways3 either by an increased disposition on the part of the rich to redistribute their share1 or by such social arrangements as would enable the poor to secure more for themselves4 ,in the one case the ideal involves a great extension and systematisation of the arbitrary and casual almsgiving that now goes on3 in the other case1 its extinction4 ,in short1 it seems that when we abandon the firm ground of actual society we have an illimitable cloudland surrounding us on all sides1 in which we may construct any variety of pattern states2 but no definite ideal to which the actual undeniably approximates1 as the straight lines and circles of the actual physical world approximate to those of scientific geometry4 ,it may be said1 however1 that we can reduce this variety by studying the past history of mankind1 as this will enable us to predict to some extent their future manner of existence4 ,but even so it does not appear that we shall gain much definite guidance for our present conduct4 ,for let us make the most favourable suppositions that we can1 and such as soar even above the confidence of the most dogmatic of scientific historians4 ,let us assume that the process of human history is a progress of mankind towards ever greater happiness4 ,let us assume further that we can not only fix certain limits within which the future social condition of mankind must lie1 but even determine in detail the mutual relations of the different elements of the future community1 so as to view in clear outline the rules of behaviour1 by observing which they will attain the maximum of happiness4 ,it still remains quite doubtful how far it would be desirable for us to imitate these rules in the circumstances in which we now live4 ,for this foreknown social order is ex hypothesi only presented as a more advanced stage in our social progress1 and not as a type or pattern which we ought to make a struggle to realise approximately at an earlier stage4 ,how far it should be taken as such a pattern1 is a question which would still have to be determined1 and in the consideration of it the effects of our actions on the existing generation would after all be the most important element4#bg ,,footnotes3 #bc ,it may be doubted whether the latter ought properly to be termed a 8good citizen10 and not rather a 8faithful subject of the ,czar of ,russia40 ,but this doubt only illustrates the divergence to which ,i am drawing attention4 #bd ,sometimes1 as before observed1 ,politics appears to be used in a wider sense1 to denote the theory of ideal social relations1 whether conceived to be established through governmental coercion or otherwise4 #be ,in writing this section ,i had primarily in view the doctrine set forth in ,mr4 ,spencer's ,social ,statics4 ,as ,mr4 ,spencer has restated his view and replied to my arguments in his ,data of ,ethics1 it is necessary for me to point out that the first paragraph of this section is not directed against such a view of #8,absolute' and #8,relative' ,ethics as is given in the later treatise--which seems to me to differ materially from the doctrine of ,social ,statics4 ,in ,social ,statics it is maintained not merely--as in the ,data of ,ethics--that ,absolute ,ethics which 8formulates normal conduct in an ideal society0 ought to 8take precedence of ,relative ,ethics02 but that ,absolute ,ethics is the only kind of ,ethics with which a philosophical moralist can possibly concern himself4 ,to quote ,mr4 ,spencer's words3--8,any proposed system of morals which recognises existing defects1 and countenances acts made needful by them1 stands self-condemned4444 ,moral law 444 requires as its postulate that human beings be perfect4 ,the philosophical moralist treats solely of the straight man 444 shows in what relationship he stands to other straight men 444 a problem in which a crooked man forms one of the elements1 is insoluble by him40 ,social ,statics 7chap4 i474 ,still more definitely is ,relative ,ethics excluded in the following passage of the concluding chapter of the same treatise 7the italics are mine73--8,it will very likely be urged that1 whereas the perfect moral code is confessedly beyond the fulfilment of imperfect men1 some other code is needful for our present guidance 444 to say that the imperfect man requires a moral code which recognises his imperfection and allows for it1 seems at first sight reasonable4 ,but it is not really so 444 a system of morals which shall recognise man's present imperfections and allow for them cannot be devised2 and would be useless if it could be devised40 #bf ,i omit1 for the present1 the consideration of the method which takes ,perfection as an ultimate end3 since1 as has been before observed1 it is hardly possible to discuss this satisfactorily1 in relation to the present question1 until it has been somewhat more clearly distinguished from the ordinary ,intuitional ,method4 #bg ,some further consideration of this question will be found in a subsequent chapter4 ,cf4 ,book iv4 chap4 iv4 #b4 ,,chapter ,,iii ,,ethical ,,judgments #a4 ,in the first chapter ,i spoke of actions that we judge to be right and what ought to be done as being 8reasonable10 or 8rational10 and similarly of ultimate ends as 8prescribed by ,reason03 and ,i contrasted the motive to action supplied by the recognition of such reasonableness with 8non-rational0 desires and inclinations4 ,this manner of speaking is employed by writers of different schools1 and seems in accordance with the common view and language on the subject4 ,for we commonly think that wrong conduct is essentially irrational1 and can be shown to be so by argument2 and though we do not conceive that it is by reason alone that men are influenced to act rightly1 we still hold that appeals to the reason are an essential part of all moral persuasion1 and that part which concerns the moralist or moral philosopher as distinct from the preacher or moral rhetorician4 ,on the other hand it is widely maintained that1 as ,hume says1 8,reason1 meaning the judgment of truth and falsehood1 can never of itself be any motive to the ,will02 and that the motive to action is in all cases some ,non-rational ,desire1 including under this term the impulses to action given by present pleasure and pain4 ,it seems desirable to examine with some care the grounds of this contention before we proceed any further4 ,let us begin by defining the issue raised as clearly as possible4 ,every one1 ,i suppose1 has had experience of what is meant by the conflict of non-rational or irrational desires with reason3 most of us 7e4g47 occasionally feel bodily appetite prompting us to indulgences which we judge to be imprudent1 and anger prompting us to acts which we disapprove as unjust or unkind4 ,it is when this conflict occurs that the desires are said to be irrational1 as impelling us to volitions opposed to our deliberate judgments2 sometimes we yield to such seductive impulses1 and sometimes not2 and it is perhaps when we do not yield that the impulsive force of such irrational desires is most definitely felt1 as we have to exert in resisting them a voluntary effort somewhat analogous to that involved in any muscular exertion4 ,often1 again1--since we are not always thinking either of our duty or of our interest1--desires of this kind take effect in voluntary actions without our having judged such actions to be either right or wrong1 either prudent or imprudent2 as 7e4g47 when an ordinary healthy man eats his dinner4 ,in such cases it seems most appropriate to call the desires 8non-rational0 rather than 8irrational40 ,neither term is intended to imply that the desires spoken of--or at least the more important of them--are not normally accompanied by intellectual processes4 ,it is true that some impulses to action seem to take effect1 as we say 8blindly0 or 8instinctively10 without any definite consciousness either of the end at which the action is aimed1 or of the means by which the end is to be attained3 but this1 ,i conceive1 is only the case with impulses that do not occupy consciousness for an appreciable time1 and ordinarily do not require any but very familiar and habitual actions for the attainment of their proximate ends4 ,in all other cases--that is1 in the case of the actions with which we are chiefly concerned in ethical discussion--the result aimed at1 and some part at least of the means by which it is to be realised1 are more or less distinctly represented in consciousness1 previous to the volition that initiates the movements tending to its realisation4 ,hence the resultant forces of what ,i call 8non-rational0 desires1 and the volitions to which they prompt1 are continually modified by intellectual processes in two distinct ways2 first by new perceptions or representations of means conducive to the desired ends1 and secondly by new presentations or representations of facts actually existing or in prospect--especially more or less probable consequences of contemplated actions--which rouse new impulses of desire and aversion4 ,the question1 then1 is whether the account just given of the influence of the intellect on desire and volition is not exhaustive2 and whether the experience which is commonly described as a 8conflict of desire with reason0 is not more properly conceived as merely a conflict among desires and aversions2 the sole function of reason being to bring before the mind ideas of actual or possible facts1 which modify in the manner above described the resultant force of our various impulses4 ,i hold that this is not the case2 that the ordinary moral or prudential judgments which1 in the case of all or most minds1 have some--though often an inadequate--influence on volition1 cannot legitimately be interpreted as judgments respecting the present or future existence of human feelings or any facts of the sensible world2 the fundamental notion represented by the word 8ought0 or 8right10#bh which such judgments contain expressly or by implication1 being essentially different from all notions representing facts of physical or psychical experience4 ,the question is one on which appeal must ultimately be made to the reflection of individuals on their practical judgments and reasonings3 and in making this appeal it seems most convenient to begin by showing the inadequacy of all attempts to explain the practical judgments or propositions in which this fundamental notion is introduced1 without recognising its unique character as above negatively defined4 ,there is an element of truth in such explanations1 in so far as they bring into view feelings which undoubtedly accompany moral or prudential judgments1 and which ordinarily have more or less effect in determining the will to actions judged to be right2 but so far as they profess to be interpretations of what such judgments mean1 they appear to me to fail altogether4 ,in considering this question it is important to take separately the two species of judgments which ,i have distinguished as 8moral0 and 8prudential40 ,both kinds might1 indeed1 be termed 8moral0 in a wider sense2 and1 as we saw1 it is a strongly supported opinion that all valid moral rules have ultimately a prudential basis4 ,but in ordinary thought we clearly distinguish cognitions or judgments of duty from cognitions or judgments as to what 8is right0 or 8ought to be done0 in view of the agent's private interest or happiness3 and the depth of the distinction will not1 ,i think1 be diminished by the closer examination of these judgments on which we are now to enter4 ,this very distinction1 however1 suggests an interpretation of the notion of rightness which denies its peculiar significance in moral judgments4 ,it is urged that 8rightness0 is properly an attribute of means1 not of ends3 so that the attribution of it merely implies that the act judged right is the fittest or only fit means to the realisation of some end understood if not expressly stated3 and similarly that the affirmation that anything #8ought to be done' is always made with at least tacit reference to some ulterior end4 ,and ,i grant that this is a legitimate interpretation1 in respect of a part of the use of either term in ordinary discourse4 ,but it seems clear 7#a7 that certain kinds of actions--under the names of ,justice1 ,veracity1 ,good ,faith1 etc4--are commonly held to be right unconditionally1 without regard to ulterior results3 and 7#b7 that we similarly regard as 8right0 the adoption of certain ends--such as the common good of society1 or general happiness4 ,in either of these cases the interpretation above suggested seems clearly inadmissible4#bi ,we have therefore to find a meaning for 8right0 or 8what ought to be0 other than the notion of fitness to some ulterior end4 ,here we are met by the suggestion that the judgments or propositions which we commonly call moral--in the narrower sense--really affirm no more than the existence of a specific emotion in the mind of the person who utters them2 that when ,i say #8,truth ought to be spoken' or #8,truthspeaking is right1' ,i mean no more than that the idea of truthspeaking excites in my mind a feeling of approbation or satisfaction4 ,and probably some degree of such emotion1 commonly distinguished as #8moral sentiment1' ordinarily accompanies moral judgments on real cases4 ,but it is absurd to say that a mere statement of my approbation of truth-speaking is properly given in the proposition #8,truth ought to be spoken'2 otherwise the fact of another man's disapprobation might equally be expressed by saying #8,truth ought not to be spoken'2 and thus we should have two coexistent facts stated in two mutually contradictory propositions4 ,this is so obvious1 that we must suppose that those who hold the view which ,i am combating do not really intend to deny it3 but rather to maintain that this subjective fact of my approbation is all that there is any ground for stating1 or perhaps that it is all that any reasonable person is prepared on reflection to affirm4 ,and no doubt there is a large class of statements1 in form objective1 which yet we are not commonly prepared to maintain as more than subjective if their validity is questioned4 ,if ,i say that #8the air is sweet1' or #8the food disagreeable1' it would not be exactly true to say that ,i mean no more than that ,i like the one or dislike the other3 but if my statement is challenged1 ,i shall probably content myself with affirming the existence of such feelings in my own mind4 ,but there appears to me to be a fundamental difference between this case and that of moral feelings4 ,the peculiar emotion of moral approbation is1 in my experience1 inseparably bound up with the conviction1 implicit or explicit1 that the conduct approved is #8really' right--i4e4 that it cannot1 without error1 be disapproved by any other mind4 ,if ,i give up this conviction because others do not share it1 or for any other reason1 ,i may no doubt still retain a sentiment prompting to the conduct in question1 or--what is perhaps more common--a sentiment of repugnance to the opposite conduct3 but this sentiment will no longer have the special quality of #8moral sentiment' strictly so called4 ,this difference between the two is often overlooked in ethical discussion3 but any experience of a change in moral opinion produced by argument may afford an illustration of it4 ,suppose 7e4g47 that any one habitually influenced by the sentiment of ,veracity is convinced that under certain peculiar circumstances in which he finds himself1 speaking truth is not right but wrong4 ,he will probably still feel a repugnance against violating the rule of truthspeaking3 but it will be a feeling quite different in kind and degree from that which prompted him to veracity as a department of virtuous action4 ,we might perhaps call the one a #8moral' and the other a #8quasi-moral' sentiment4 ,the argument just given holds equally against the view that approbation or disapprobation is not the mere liking or aversion of an individual for certain kinds of conduct1 but this complicated by a sympathetic representation of similar likings or aversions felt by other human beings4 ,no doubt such sympathy is a normal concomitant of moral emotion1 and when the former is absent there is much greater difficulty in maintaining the latter3 this1 however1 is partly because our moral beliefs commonly agree with those of other members of our society1 and on this agreement depends to an important extent our confidence in the truth of these beliefs4#cj ,but if1 as in the case just supposed1 we are really led by argument to a new moral belief1 opposed not only to our own habitual sentiment but also to that of the society in which we live1 we have a crucial experiment proving the existence in us of moral sentiments as ,i have defined them1 colliding with the represented sympathies of our fellow-men no less than with our own mere likings and aversions4 ,and even if we imagine the sympathies opposed to our convictions extended until they include those of the whole human race1 against whom we imagine ourselves to stand as ,athanasius contra mundum2 still1 so long as our conviction of duty is firm1 the emotion which we call moral stands out in imagination quite distinct from the complex sympathy opposed to it1 however much we extend1 complicate and intensify the latter4 #b4 ,so far1 then1 from being prepared to admit that the proposition #8,x ought to be done' merely expresses the existence of a certain sentiment in myself or others1 ,i find it strictly impossible so to regard my own moral judgments without eliminating from the concomitant sentiment the peculiar quality signified by the term #8moral4' ,there is1 however1 another interpretation of #8ought1' in which the likings and aversions that men in general feel for certain kinds of conduct are considered not as sympathetically represented in the emotion of the person judging1 and thus constituting the moral element in it1 but as causes of pain to the person of whom #8ought' or #8duty' is predicated4 ,on this view1 when we say that a man #8ought' to do anything1 or that it is his #8duty' to do it1 we mean that he is bound under penalties to do it2 the particular penalty considered being the pain that will accrue to him directly or indirectly from the dislike of his fellow-creatures4 ,i think that this interpretation expresses a part of the meaning with which the words #8ought' and #8duty' are used in ordinary thought and discourse4 ,for we commonly use the term #8moral obligation' as equivalent to #8duty' and expressing what is implied in the verb #8ought1' thus suggesting an analogy between this notion and that of legal obligation2 and in the case of positive law we cannot refuse to recognise the connexion of #8obligation' and #8punishment'3 a law cannot be properly said to be actually established in a society if it is habitually violated with impunity4 ,but a more careful reflection on the relation of ,law to ,morality1 as ordinarily conceived1 seems to show that this interpretation of #8ought'--though it cannot be excluded--must be distinguished from the special ethical use of the term4 ,for the ideal distinction taken in common thought between legal and merely moral rules seems to lie in just this connexion of the former but not the latter with punishment3 we think that there are some things which a man ought to be compelled to do1 or forbear1 and others which he ought to do or forbear without compulsion1 and that the former alone fall properly within the sphere of law4 ,no doubt we also think that in many cases where the compulsion of law is undesirable1 the fear of moral censure and its consequences supplies a normally useful constraint on the will of any individual4 ,but it is evident that what we mean when we say that a man is 8morally though not legally bound0 to do a thing is not merely that he 8will be punished by public opinion if he does not02 for we often join these two statements1 clearly distinguishing their import3 and further 7since public opinion is known to be eminently fallible7 there are many things which we judge men #8ought' to do1 while perfectly aware that they will incur no serious social penalties for omitting them4 ,in such cases1 indeed1 it would be commonly said that social disapprobation #8ought' to follow on immoral conduct2 and in this very assertion it is clear that the term #8ought' cannot mean that social penalties are to be feared by those who do not disapprove4 ,again1 all or most men in whom the moral consciousness is strongly developed find themselves from time to time in conflict with the commonly received morality of the society to which they belong3 and thus--as was before said--have a crucial experience proving that duty does not mean to them what other men will disapprove of them for not doing4 ,at the same time ,i admit1 as indeed ,i have already suggested in #c of chap4 i41 that we not unfrequently pass judgments resembling moral judgments in form1 and not distinguished from them in ordinary thought1 in cases where the obligation affirmed is found1 on reflection1 to depend on the existence of current opinions and sentiments as such4 ,the members of modern civilised societies are under the sway of a code of ,public ,opinion1 enforced by social penalties1 which no reflective person obeying it identifies with the moral code1 or regards as unconditionally binding3 indeed the code is manifestly fluctuating and variable1 different at the same time in different classes1 professions1 social circles1 of the same political community4 ,such a code always supports to a considerable extent the commonly received code of morality3 and most reflective persons think it generally reasonable to conform to the dictates of public opinion--to the code of ,honour1 we may say1 in graver matters1 or the rules of ,politeness or ,good ,breeding in lighter matters--wherever these dictates do not positively conflict with morality2 such conformity being maintained either on grounds of private interest1 or because it is thought conducive to general happiness or wellbeing to keep as much as possible in harmony with one's fellow-men4 ,hence in the ordinary thought of unreflective persons the duties imposed by social opinion are often undistinguished from moral duties3 and indeed this indistinctness is almost inherent in the common meaning of many terms4 ,for instance1 if we say that a man has been #8dishonoured' by a cowardly act1 it is not quite clear whether we mean that he has incurred contempt1 or that he has deserved it1 or both3 as becomes evident when we take a case in which the ,code of ,honour comes into conflict with ,morality4 ,if 7e4g47 a man were to incur social ostracism anywhere for refusing a duel on religious grounds1 some would say that he was #8dishonoured1' though he had acted rightly1 others that there could be no real dishonour in a virtuous act4 ,a similar ambiguity seems to lurk in the common notion of #8improper' or #8incorrect' behaviour4 ,still in all such cases the ambiguity becomes evident on reflection3 and when discovered1 merely serves to illustrate further the distinction between the notion of #8right conduct1' #8duty1' what we #8ought' or are under #8moral obligation' to do--when these terms are used in a strictly ethical sense--and conduct that is merely conformed to the standard of current opinion4 ,there is1 however1 another way of interpreting #8ought' as connoting penalties1 which is somewhat less easy to meet by a crucial psychological experiment4 ,the moral imperative may be taken to be a law of ,god1 to the breach of which ,divine penalties are annexed2 and these1 no doubt1 in a ,christian society1 are commonly conceived to be adequate and universally applicable4 ,still1 it can hardly be said that this belief is shared by all the persons whose conduct is influenced by independent moral convictions1 occasionally unsupported either by the law or the public opinion of their community4 ,and even in the case of many of those who believe fully in the moral government of the world1 the judgment 8,i ought to do this0 cannot be identified with the judgment 8,god will punish me if ,i do not02 since the conviction that the former proposition is true is distinctly recognised as an important part of the grounds for believing the latter4 ,again1 when ,christians speak--as they commonly do--of the #8justice' 7or other moral attributes7 of ,god1 as exhibited in punishing sinners and rewarding the righteous1 they obviously imply not merely that ,god will thus punish and reward1 but that it is #8right'#ca for ,him to do so3 which1 of course1 cannot be taken to mean that ,he is #8bound under penalties4' #c4 ,it seems then that the notion of #8ought' or #8moral obligation' as used in our common moral judgments1 does not merely import 7#a7 that there exists in the mind of the person judging a specific emotion 7whether complicated or not by sympathetic representation of similar emotions in other minds72 nor 7#b7 that certain rules of conduct are supported by penalties which will follow on their violation 7whether such penalties result from the general liking or aversion felt for the conduct prescribed or forbidden1 or from some other source74 ,what then1 it may be asked1 does it import8 ,what definition can we give of #8ought1' #8right1' and other terms expressing the same fundamental notion8 ,to this ,i should answer that the notion which these terms have in common is too elementary to admit of any formal definition4 ,in so saying1 ,i do not mean to imply that it belongs to the 8original constitution of the mind02 i4e4 that its presence in consciousness is not the result of a process of development4 ,i do not doubt that the whole fabric of human thought--including the conceptions that present themselves as most simple and elementary--has been developed1 through a gradual process of psychical change1 out of some lower life in which thought1 properly speaking1 had no place4 ,but it is not therefore to be inferred1 as regards this or any other notion1 that it has not really the simplicity which it appears to have when we now reflect upon it4 ,it is sometimes assumed that if we can show how thoughts have grown up--if we can point to the psychical antecedents of which they are the natural consequents--we may conclude that the thoughts in question are really compounds containing their antecedents as latent elements4 ,but ,i know no justification for this transference of the conceptions of chemistry to psychology2#cb ,i know no reason for considering psychical antecedents as really constitutive of their psychical consequents1 in spite of the apparent dissimilarity between the two4 ,in default of such reasons1 a psychologist must accept as elementary what introspection carefully performed declares to be so2 and1 using this criterion1 ,i find that the notion we have been examining1 as it now exists in our thought1 cannot be resolved into any more simple notions3 it can only be made clearer by determining as precisely as possible its relation to other notions with which it is connected in ordinary thought1 especially to those with which it is liable to be confounded4 ,in performing this process it is important to note and distinguish two different implications with which the word 8ought0 is used2 in the narrowest ethical sense what we judge #8ought to be' done1 is always thought capable of being brought about by the volition of any individual to whom the judgment applies4 ,i cannot conceive that ,i #8ought' to do anything which at the same time ,i judge that ,i cannot do4 ,in a wider sense1 however1--which cannot conveniently be discarded--,i sometimes judge that ,i #8ought' to know what a wiser man would know1 or feel as a better man would feel1 in my place1 though ,i may know that ,i could not directly produce in myself such knowledge or feeling by any effort of will4 ,in this case the word merely implies an ideal or pattern which ,i #8ought'--in the stricter sense--to seek to imitate as far as possible4 ,and this wider sense seems to be that in which the word is normally used in the precepts of ,art generally1 and in political judgments3 when ,i judge that the laws and constitution of my country #8ought to be' other than they are1 ,i do not of course imply that my own or any other individual's single volition can directly bring about the change4#cc ,in either case1 however1 ,i imply that what ought to be is a possible object of knowledge3 i4e4 that what ,i judge ought to be must1 unless ,i am in error1 be similarly judged by all rational beings who judge truly of the matter4 ,in referring such judgments to the #8,reason1' ,i do not mean here to prejudge the question whether valid moral judgments are normally attained by a process of reasoning from universal principles or axioms1 or by direct intuition of the particular duties of individuals4 ,it is not uncommonly held that the moral faculty deals primarily with individual cases as they arise1 applying directly to each case the general notion of duty1 and deciding intuitively what ought to be done by this person in these particular circumstances4 ,and ,i admit that on this view the apprehension of moral truth is more analogous to ,sense-perception than to ,rational ,intuition 7as commonly understood73#cd and hence the term ,moral ,sense might seem more appropriate4 ,but the term ,sense suggests a capacity for feelings which may vary from ,a to ,b without either being in error1 rather than a faculty of cognition3#ce and it appears to me fundamentally important to avoid this suggestion4 ,i have therefore thought it better to use the term ,reason with the explanation above given1 to denote the faculty of moral cognition3#cf adding1 as a further justification of this use1 that even when a moral judgment relates primarily to some particular action we commonly regard it as applicable to any other action belonging to a certain definable class3 so that the moral truth apprehended is implicitly conceived to be intrinsically universal1 though particular in our first apprehension of it4 ,further1 when ,i speak of the cognition or judgment that #8,x ought to be done'--in the stricter ethical sense of the term ought#cg--;as a #8dictate' or #8precept' of reason to the persons to whom it relates1 ,i imply that in rational beings as such this cognition gives an impulse or motive to action3 though in human beings1 of course1 this is only one motive among others which are liable to conflict with it1 and is not always--perhaps not usually--a predominant motive4 ,in fact1 this possible conflict of motives seems to be connoted by the term #8dictate' or #8imperative1' which describes the relation of ,reason to mere inclinations or non-rational impulses by comparing it to the relation between the will of a superior and the wills of his subordinates4 ,this conflict seems also to be implied in the terms #8ought1' #8duty1' #8moral obligation1' as used in ordinary moral discourse3 and hence these terms cannot be applied to the actions of rational beings to whom we cannot attribute impulses conflicting with reason4 ,we may1 however1 say of such beings that their actions are #8reasonable1' or 7in an absolute sense7 #8right4' #d4 ,i am aware that some persons will be disposed to answer all the preceding argument by a simple denial that they can find in their consciousness any such unconditional or categorical imperative as ,i have been trying to exhibit4 ,if this is really the final result of self-examination in any case1 there is no more to be said4 ,i1 at least1 do not know how to impart the notion of moral obligation to any one who is entirely devoid of it4 ,i think1 however1 that many of those who give this denial only mean to deny that they have any consciousness of moral obligation to actions without reference to their consequences2 and would not really deny that they recognise some universal end or ends--whether it be the general happiness1 or well-being otherwise understood--as that at which it is ultimately reasonable to aim1 subordinating to its attainment the gratification of any personal desires that may conflict with this aim4 ,but in this view1 as ,i have before said1 the unconditional imperative plainly comes in as regards the end1 which is--explicitly or implicitly--recognised as an end at which all men #8ought' to aim2 and it can hardly be denied that the recognition of an end as ultimately reasonable involves the recognition of an obligation to do such acts as most conduce to the end4 ,the obligation is not indeed 8unconditional10 but it does not depend on the existence of any non-rational desires or aversions4 ,and nothing that has been said in the preceding section is intended as an argument in favour of ,intuitionism1 as against ,utilitarianism or any other method that treats moral rules as relative to ,general ,good or ,well-being4 ,for instance1 nothing that ,i have said is inconsistent with the view that ,truthspeaking is only valuable as a means to the preservation of society3 only if it be admitted that it is valuable on this ground ,i should say that it is implied that the preservation of society--or some further end to which this preservation1 again1 is a means--must be valuable per se1 and therefore something at which a rational being1 as such1 ought to aim4 ,if it be granted that we need not look beyond the preservation of society1 the primary #8dictate of reason' in this case would be #8that society ought to be preserved'3 but reason would also dictate that truth ought to be spoken1 so far as truthspeaking is recognised as the indispensable or fittest means to this end3 and the notion 8ought0 as used in either dictate is that which ,i have been trying to make clear4 ,so again1 even those who hold that moral rules are only obligatory because it is the individual's interest to conform to them--thus regarding them as a particular species of prudential rules--do not thereby get rid of the #8dictate of reason1' so far as they recognise private interest or happiness as an end at which it is ultimately reasonable to aim4 ,the conflict of ,practical ,reason with irrational desire remains an indubitable fact of our conscious experience1 even if practical reason is interpreted to mean merely self-regarding ,prudence4 ,it is1 indeed1 maintained by ,kant and others that it cannot properly be said to be a man's duty to promote his own happiness2 since 8what every one inevitably wills cannot be brought under the notion of duty40 ,but even granting#ch it to be in some sense true that a man's volition is always directed to the attainment of his own happiness1 it does not follow that a man always does what he believes will be conducive to his own greatest happiness4 ,as ,butler urges1 it is a matter of common experience that men indulge appetite or passion even when1 in their own view1 the indulgence is as clearly opposed to what they conceive to be their interest as it is to what they conceive to be their duty4 ,thus the notion #8ought'--as expressing the relation of rational judgment to non-rational impulses--will find a place in the practical rules of any egoistic system1 no less than in the rules of ordinary morality1 understood as prescribing duty without reference to the agent's interest4 ,here1 however1 it may be held that ,egoism does not properly regard the agent's own greatest happiness as what he 8ought0 to aim at3 but only as the ultimate end for the realisation of which he has1 on the whole1 a predominant desire2 which may be temporarily overcome by particular passions and appetites1 but ordinarily regains its predominance when these transient impulses have spent their force4 ,i quite recognise that this is a view widely taken of egoistic action1 and ,i propose to consider it in a subsequent chapter4#ci ,but even if we discard the belief1 that any end of action is unconditionally or 8categorically0 prescribed by reason1 the notion #8ought' as above explained is not thereby eliminated from our practical reasonings3 it still remains in the 8hypothetical imperative0 which prescribes the fittest means to any end that we may have determined to aim at4 ,when 7e4g47 a physician says1 8,if you wish to be healthy you ought to rise early10 this is not the same thing as saying 8early rising is an indispensable condition of the attainment of health40 ,this latter proposition expresses the relation of physiological facts on which the former is founded2 but it is not merely this relation of facts that the word #8ought' imports3 it also implies the unreasonableness of adopting an end and refusing to adopt the means indispensable to its attainment4 ,it may perhaps be argued that this is not only unreasonable but impossible3 since adoption of an end means the preponderance of a desire for it1 and if aversion to the indispensable means causes them not to be adopted although recognised as indispensable1 the desire for the end is not preponderant and it ceases to be adopted4 ,but this view is due1 in my opinion1 to a defective psychological analysis4 ,according to my observation of consciousness1 the adoption of an end as paramount--either absolutely or within certain limits--is quite a distinct psychical phenomenon from desire3 it is a kind of volition1 though it is1 of course1 specifically different from a volition initiating a particular immediate action4 ,as a species intermediate between the two1 we may place resolutions to act in a certain way at some future time3 we continually make such resolutions1 and sometimes when the time comes for carrying them out1 we do in fact act otherwise under the influence of passion or mere habit1 without consciously cancelling our previous resolve4 ,this inconsistency of will our practical reason condemns as irrational1 even apart from any judgment of approbation or disapprobation on either volition considered by itself4 ,there is a similar inconsistency between the adoption of an end and a general refusal to take whatever means we may see to be indispensable to its attainment3 and if1 when the time comes1 we do not take such means while yet we do not consciously retract our adoption of the end1 it can hardly be denied that we #8ought' in consistency to act otherwise than we do4 ,and such a contradiction as ,i have described1 between a general resolution and a particular volition1 is surely a matter of common experience4 ,,footnotes3 #bh ,the difference between the significations of the two words is discussed later4 #bi ,as1 for instance1 when ,bentham explains 7,principles of ,morals and ,legislation1 chap4 i4 i4 note7 that his fundamental principle 8states the greatest happiness of all those whose interest is in question as being the right and proper end of human action10 we cannot understand him really to mean by the word 8right0 8conducive to the general happiness10 though his language in other passages of the same chapter 7 ix4 and x47 would seem to imply this2 for the proposition that it is conducive to general happiness to take general happiness as an end of action1 though not exactly a tautology1 can hardly serve as the fundamental principle of a moral system4 #cj ,see ,book iii4 chap4 xi4 #a4 #ca #8,ought' is here inapplicable1 for a reason presently explained4 #cb ,in ,chemistry we regard the antecedents 7elements7 as still existing in and constituting the consequent 7compound7 because the latter is exactly similar to the former in weight1 and because we can generally cause this compound to disappear and obtain the elements in its place4 ,but we find nothing at all like this in the growth of mental phenomena3 the psychical consequent is in no respect exactly similar to its antecedents1 nor can it be resolved into them4 ,i should explain that ,i am not here arguing the question whether the validity of moral judgments is affected by a discovery of their psychical antecedents4 ,this question ,i reserve for subsequent discussion4 ,see ,book iii4 chap4 i4 #d4 #cc ,i do not even imply that any combination of individuals could completely realise the state of political relations which ,i conceive #8ought to' exist4 ,my conception would be futile if it had no relation to practice3 but it may merely delineate a pattern to which no more than an approximation is practically possible4 #cd ,we do not commonly say that particular physical facts are apprehended by the ,reason3 we consider this faculty to be conversant in its discursive operation with the relation of judgments or propositions3 and the intuitive reason 7which is here rather in question7 we restrict to the apprehension of universal truths1 such as the axioms of ,logic and ,mathematics4 #ce ,by cognition ,i always mean what some would rather call 8apparent cognition0--that is1 ,i do not mean to affirm the validity of the cognition1 but only its existence as a psychical fact1 and its claim to be valid4 #cf ,a further justification for this extended use of the term ,reason will be suggested in a subsequent chapter of this ,book 7chap4 viii4 #c74 #cg ,this is the sense in which the term will always be used in the present treatise1 except where the context makes it quite clear that only the wider meaning--that of the political #8ought'--is applicable4 #ch ,as will be seen from the next chapter1 ,i do not grant this4 #ci ,chap4 ix4 of this ,book4 ,,chapter ,,iv ,,pleasure ,,and ,,desire #a4 ,in the preceding chapter ,i have left undetermined the emotional characteristics of the impulse that prompts us to obey the dictates of ,reason4 ,i have done so because these seem to be very different in different minds1 and even to vary much and rapidly in the same mind1 without any corresponding variation in the volitional direction of the impulse4 ,for instance1 in the mind of a rational ,egoist the ruling impulse is generally what ,butler and ,hutcheson call a 8calm0 or 8cool0 self-love3 whereas in the man who takes universal happiness as the end and standard of right conduct1 the desire to do what is judged to be reasonable as such is commonly blended in varying degrees with sympathy and philanthropic enthusiasm4 ,again1 if one conceives the dictating ,reason--whatever its dictates may be--as external to oneself1 the cognition of rightness is accompanied by a sentiment of ,reverence for ,authority2 which may by some be conceived impersonally1 but is more commonly regarded as the authority of a supreme ,person1 so that the sentiment blends with the affections normally excited by persons in different relations1 and becomes ,religious4 ,this conception of ,reason as an external authority1 against which the self-will rebels1 is often irresistibly forced on the reflective mind3 at other times1 however1 the identity of ,reason and ,self presents itself as an immediate conviction1 and then ,reverence for ,authority passes over into ,self-respect2 and the opposite and even more powerful sentiment of ,freedom is called in1 if we consider the rational ,self as liable to be enslaved by the usurping force of sensual impulses4 ,quite different again are the emotions of ,aspiration or ,admiration aroused by the conception of ,virtue as an ideal of ,moral ,beauty4#dj ,other phases of emotion might be mentioned1 all having with these the common characteristic that they are inseparable from an apparent cognition--implicit or explicit1 direct or indirect--of rightness in the conduct to which they prompt4 ,there are1 no doubt1 important differences in the moral value and efficacy of these different emotions1 to which ,i shall hereafter call attention2 but their primary practical effect does not appear to vary so long as the cognition of rightness remains unchanged4 ,it is then with these cognitions that ,ethics1 in my view1 is primarily concerned3 its object is to free them from doubt and error1 and systematise them as far as possible4 ,there is1 however1 one view of the feelings which prompt to voluntary action1 which is sometimes thought to cut short all controversy as to the principles on which such action ought to be regulated4 ,i mean the view that volition is always determined by pleasures or pains actual or prospective4 ,this doctrine--which ,i may distinguish as ,psychological ,hedonism--is often connected and not seldom confounded with the method of ,ethics which ,i have called ,egoistic ,hedonism2 and no doubt it seems at first sight a natural inference that if one end of action--my own pleasure or absence of pain--is definitely determined for me by unvarying psychological laws1 a different end cannot be prescribed for me by ,reason4 ,reflection1 however1 shows that this inference involves the unwarranted assumption that a man's pleasure and pain are determined independently of his moral judgments3 whereas it is manifestly possible that our prospect of pleasure resulting from any course of conduct may largely depend on our conception of it as right or otherwise3 and in fact the psychological theory above mentioned would require us to suppose that this is normally the case with conscientious persons1 who habitually act in accordance with their moral convictions4 ,the connexion of the expectation of pleasure from an act with the judgment that it is right may be different in different cases3 we commonly conceive a truly moral man as one who finds pleasure in doing what he judges to be right because he so judges it3 but1 even where moral sensibility is weak1 expectation of pleasure from an act may be a necessary consequent of a judgment that it is right1 through a belief in the moral government of the world somehow harmonising ,virtue and ,self-interest4 ,i therefore conclude that there is no necessary connexion between the psychological proposition that pleasure or absence of pain to myself is always the actual ultimate end of my action1 and the ethical proposition that my own greatest happiness or pleasure is for me the right ultimate end4 ,it may1 however1 be replied that if the former proposition be accepted in the same quantitatively precise form as the latter--if it is admitted that ,i must by a law of my nature always aim at the greatest possible pleasure 7or least pain7 to myself--then at least ,i cannot conceive any aim conflicting with this to be prescribed by ,reason4 ,and this seems to me undeniable4 ,if1 as ,bentham#da affirms1 8on the occasion of every act he exercises1 every human being is0 inevitably 8led to pursue that line of conduct which1 according to his view of the case1 taken by him at the moment1 will be in the highest degree contributory to his own greatest happiness10#db then1 to any one who knows this1 it must become inconceivable that ,reason dictates to him to pursue any other line of conduct4 ,but at the same time1 as it seems to me1 the proposition that he #8ought' to pursue that line of conduct becomes no less clearly incapable of being affirmed with any significance4 ,for a psychological law invariably realised in my conduct does not admit of being conceived as #8a precept' or #8dictate' of reason3 this latter must be a rule from which ,i am conscious that it is possible to deviate4 ,i do not1 however1 think that the proposition quoted from ,bentham would be affirmed without qualification by any of the writers who now maintain psychological ,hedonism4 ,they would admit1 with ,j4 ,s4 ,mill1#dc that men often1 not from merely intellectual deficiencies1 but from 8infirmity of character1 make their election for the nearer good1 though they know it to be less valuable3 and this no less when the choice is between two bodily pleasures 444 they pursue sensual indulgences to the injury of health1 though perfectly aware that health is the greater good40#dd ,this being so1 ,egoistic ,hedonism becomes a possible ethical ideal to which psychological ,hedonism seems to point4 ,if it can be shown that the ultimate aim of each of us in acting is always solely some pleasure 7or absence of pain7 to himself1 the demonstration certainly suggests that each ought to seek his own greatest pleasure4#de ,as has been said1 no cogent inference is possible from the psychological generalisation to the ethical principle3 but the mind has a natural tendency to pass from the one position to the other3 if the actual ultimate springs of our volition are always our own pleasures and pains1 it seems prima facie reasonable to be moved by them in proportion to their pleasantness and painfulness1 and therefore to choose the greatest pleasure or least pain on the whole4 ,further1 this psychological doctrine seems to conflict with an ethical view widely held by persons whose moral consciousness is highly developed3 viz4 that an act1 to be in the highest sense virtuous1 must not be done solely for the sake of the attendant pleasure1 even if that be the pleasure of the moral sense2 so that if ,i do an act from the sole desire of obtaining the glow of moral self-approbation which ,i believe will attend its performance1 the act will not be truly virtuous4 ,it seems therefore important to subject psychological ,hedonism1 even in its more indefinite form1 to a careful examination4 #b4 ,it will be well to begin by defining more precisely the question at issue4 ,first1 ,i will concede that pleasure is a kind of feeling which stimulates the will to actions tending to sustain or produce it1--to sustain it1 if actually present1 and to produce it1 if it be only represented in idea--2 and similarly pain is a kind of feeling which stimulates to actions tending to remove or avert it4#df ,it seems convenient to call the felt volitional stimulus in the two cases respectively ,desire#dg and ,aversion2 though it should be observed that the former term is ordinarily restricted to the impulse felt when pleasure is not actually present1 but only represented in idea4 ,the question at issue1 then1 is not whether pleasure1 present or represented1 is normally accompanied by an impulse to prolong the actual or realise the represented feeling1 and pain correspondingly by aversion3 but whether there are no desires and aversions which have not pleasures and pains for their objects--no conscious impulses to produce or avert results other than the agent's own feelings4 ,in the treatise to which ,i have referred1 ,mill explains that 8desiring a thing1 and finding it pleasant1 are1 in the strictness of language1 two modes of naming the same psychological fact40 ,if this be the case1 it is hard to see how the proposition we are discussing requires to be determined by 8practised self-consciousness and self-observation02 as the denial of it would involve a contradiction in terms4 ,the truth is that an ambiguity in the word ,pleasure has tended to confuse the discussion of this question4#dh ,when we speak of a man doing something 8at his pleasure10 or 8as he pleases10 we usually signify the mere fact of voluntary choice3 not necessarily that the result aimed at is some prospective feeling of the chooser4 ,now1 if by 8pleasant0 we merely mean that which influences choice1 exercises a certain attractive force on the will1 it is an assertion incontrovertible because tautological1 to say that we desire what is pleasant--or even that we desire a thing in proportion as it appears pleasant4 ,but if we take 8pleasure0 to denote the kind of feelings1 above defined1 it becomes a really debateable question whether the end to which our desires are always consciously directed is the attainment by ourselves of such feelings4 ,and this is what we must understand ,mill to consider 8so obvious1 that it will hardly be disputed40 ,it is rather curious to find that one of the best-known of ,english moralists regards the exact opposite of what ,mill thinks so obvious1 as being not merely a universal fact of our conscious experience1 but even a necessary truth4 ,butler1 as is well known1 distinguishes self-love1 or the impulse towards our own pleasure1 from 8particular movements towards particular external objects--honour1 power1 the harm or good of another02 the actions proceeding from which are 8no otherwise interested than as every action of every creature must from the nature of the case be2 for no one can act but from a desire1 or choice1 or preference of his own40 ,such particular passions or appetites are1 he goes on to say1 8necessarily presupposed by the very idea of an interested pursuit2 since the very idea of interest or happiness consists in this1 that an appetite or affection enjoys its object40 ,we could not pursue pleasure at all1 unless we had desires for something else than pleasure2 for pleasure consists in the satisfaction of just these 8disinterested0 impulses4 ,butler has certainly over-stated his case1#di so far as my own experience goes2 for many pleasures1--especially those of sight1 hearing and smell1 together with many emotional pleasures1--occur to me without any perceptible relation to previous desires1 and it seems quite conceivable that our primary desires might be entirely directed towards such pleasures as these4 ,but as a matter of fact1 it appears to me that throughout the whole scale of my impulses1 sensual1 emotional1 and intellectual alike1 ,i can distinguish desires of which the object is something other than my own pleasure4 ,i will begin by taking an illustration of this from the impulses commonly placed lowest in the scale4 ,the appetite of hunger1 so far as ,i can observe1 is a direct impulse to the eating of food4 ,such eating is no doubt commonly attended with an agreeable feeling of more or less intensity2 but it cannot1 ,i think1 be strictly said that this agreeable feeling is the object of hunger1 and that it is the representation of this pleasure which stimulates the will of the hungry man as such4 ,of course1 hunger is frequently and naturally accompanied with anticipation of the pleasure of eating3 but careful introspection seems to show that the two are by no means inseparable4 ,and even when they occur together the pleasure seems properly the object not of the primary appetite1 but of a secondary desire which can be distinguished from the former2 since the gourmand1 in whom this secondary desire is strong1 is often prompted by it to actions designed to stimulate hunger1 and often1 again1 is led to control the primary impulse1 in order to prolong and vary the process of satisfying it4 ,indeed it is so obvious that hunger is something different from the desire for anticipated pleasure1 that some writers have regarded its volitional stimulus 7and that of desire generally7 as a case of aversion from present pain4 ,this1 however1 seems to me a distinct mistake in psychological classification4 ,no doubt desire is a state of consciousness so far similar to pain1 that in both we feel a stimulus prompting us to pass from the present state into a different one4 ,but aversion from pain is an impulse to get out of the present state and pass into some other state which is only negatively represented as different from the present3 whereas in desire as such1 the primary impulse is towards the realisation of some positive future result4 ,it is true that when a strong desire is1 for any reason1 baulked of its effect in causing action1 it is generally painful in some degree3 and so a secondary aversion to the state of desire is generated1 which blends itself with the desire and may easily be confounded with it4 ,but here1 again1 we may distinguish the two impulses by observing the different kinds of conduct to which they occasionally prompt3 for the aversion to the pain of ungratified desire1 though it may act as an additional stimulus towards the gratification of the desire1 may also 7and often does7 prompt us to get rid of the pain by suppressing the desire4 ,the question whether all desire has in some degree the quality of pain1 is one of psychological rather than ethical interest2#ej so long as it is admitted that it is often not painful in any degree comparable to its intensity as desire1 so that its volitional impulse cannot be explained as a case of aversion to its own painfulness4 ,at the same time1 so far as my experience goes1 ,i have no hesitation in answering the question in the negative4 ,consider again the case of hunger2 ,i certainly do not find hunger as an element of my normal life at all a painful feeling3 it only becomes painful when ,i am in ill health1 or when the satisfaction of the appetite is abnormally delayed4 ,and1 generally speaking1 any desire that is not felt to be thwarted in its primary impulse to actions tending to its satisfaction1 is not only not itself a painful feeling--even when this attainment is still remote--but is often an element of a state of consciousness which as a whole is highly pleasurable4 ,indeed1 the pleasures afforded by the consciousness of eager activity1 in which desire is an essential element1 constitute a considerable item in the total enjoyment of life4 ,it is almost a commonplace to say that such pleasures1 which we may call generally the pleasures of ,pursuit1 are more important than the pleasures of ,attainment3 and in many cases it is the prospect of the former rather than of the latter that induces us to engage in a pursuit4 ,in such cases it is peculiarly easy to distinguish the desire to attain the object pursued1 from a desire of the pleasure of attainment3 since the attainment only becomes pleasant in prospect because the pursuit itself stimulates a desire for what is pursued4 ,take1 for example1 the case of any game which involves--as most games do--a contest for victory4 ,no ordinary player before entering on such a contest1 has any desire for victory in it3 indeed he often finds it difficult to imagine himself deriving gratification from such victory1 before he has actually engaged in the competition4 ,what he deliberately1 before the game begins1 desires is not victory1 but the pleasant excitement of the struggle for it2 only for the full development of this pleasure a transient desire to win the game is generally indispensable4 ,this desire1 which does not exist at first1 is stimulated to considerable intensity by the competition itself3 and in proportion as it is thus stimulated both the mere contest becomes more pleasurable1 and the victory1 which was originally indifferent1 comes to afford a keen enjoyment4 ,the same phenomenon is exhibited in the case of more important kinds of pursuit4 ,thus it often happens that a man1 feeling his life languid and devoid of interests1 begins to occupy himself in the prosecution of some scientific or socially useful work1 for the sake not of the end but of the occupation4 ,at first1 very likely1 the occupation is irksome3 but soon1 as he foresaw1 a desire to attain the end at which he aims is stimulated1 partly by sympathy with other workers1 partly by his sustained exercise of voluntary effort directed towards it2 so that his pursuit1 becoming eager1 becomes also a source of pleasure4 ,here1 again1 it is no doubt true that in proportion as his desire for the end grows strong1 the attainment of it becomes pleasant in prospect3 but it would be a palpable mistake to say that this prospective pleasure is the object of the desire that causes it4#ea ,when we compare these pleasures with those previously discussed1 another important observation suggests itself4 ,in the former case1 though we could distinguish appetite1 as it appears in consciousness1 from the desire of the pleasure attending the satisfaction of appetite1 there appeared to be no incompatibility between the two4 ,the fact that a glutton is dominated by the desire of the pleasures of eating in no way impedes the development in him of the appetite which is a necessary condition of these pleasures4 ,but when we turn to the pleasures of pursuit1 we seem to perceive this incompatibility to a certain extent3 a certain subordination of self-regard seems to be necessary in order to obtain full enjoyment4 ,a man who maintains throughout an epicurean mood1 keeping his main conscious aim perpetually fixed on his own pleasure1 does not catch the full spirit of the chase2 his eagerness never gets just the sharpness of edge which imparts to the pleasure its highest zest4 ,here comes into view what we may call the fundamental paradox of ,hedonism1 that the impulse towards pleasure1 if too predominant1 defeats its own aim4 ,this effect is not visible1 or at any rate is scarcely visible1 in the case of passive sensual pleasures4 ,but of our active enjoyments generally1 whether the activities on which they attend are classed as #8bodily' or as #8intellectual' 7as well as of many emotional pleasures71 it may certainly be said that we cannot attain them1 at least in their highest degree1 so long as we keep our main conscious aim concentrated upon them4 ,it is not only that the exercise of our faculties is insufficiently stimulated by the mere desire of the pleasure attending it1 and requires the presence of other more objective1 #8extra-regarding1' impulses1 in order to be fully developed3 we may go further and say that these other impulses must be temporarily predominant and absorbing1 if the exercise and its attendant gratification are to attain their full scope4 ,many middle-aged ,englishmen would maintain the view that business is more agreeable than amusement2 but they would hardly find it so if they transacted the business with a perpetual conscious aim at the attendant pleasure4 ,similarly1 the pleasures of thought and study can only be enjoyed in the highest degree by those who have an ardour of curiosity which carries the mind temporarily away from self and its sensations4 ,in all kinds of ,art1 again1 the exercise of the creative faculty is attended by intense and exquisite pleasures3 but it would seem that in order to get them1 one must forget them3 the genuine artist at work seems to have a predominant and temporarily absorbing desire for the realisation of his ideal of beauty4 ,the important case of the benevolent affections is at first sight somewhat more doubtful4 ,on the one hand it is of course true1 that when those whom we love are pleased or pained1 we ourselves feel sympathetic pleasure and pain3 and further1 that the flow of love or kindly feeling is itself highly pleasurable4 ,so that it is at least plausible to interpret benevolent actions as aiming ultimately at the attainment of one or both of these two kinds of pleasures1 or at the averting of sympathetic pain from the agent4 ,but we may observe1 first1 that the impulse to beneficent action produced in us by sympathy is often so much out of proportion to any actual consciousness of sympathetic pleasure and pain in ourselves1 that it would be paradoxical to regard this latter as its object4 ,often indeed we cannot but feel that a tale of actual suffering arouses in us an excitement on the whole more pleasurable than painful1 like the excitement of witnessing a tragedy2 and yet at the same time stirs in us an impulse to relieve it1 even when the process of relieving is painful and laborious and involves various sacrifices of our own pleasures4 ,again1 we may often free ourselves from sympathetic pain most easily by merely turning our thoughts from the external suffering that causes it3 and we sometimes feel an egoistic impulse to do this1 which we can then distinguish clearly from the properly sympathetic impulse prompting us to relieve the original suffering4 ,and finally1 the much-commended pleasures of benevolence seem to require1 in order to be felt in any considerable degree1 the pre-existence of a desire to do good to others for their sake and not for our own4 ,as ,hutcheson explains1 we may cultivate benevolent affection for the sake of the pleasures attending it 7just as the glutton cultivates appetite71 but we cannot produce it at will1 however strong may be our desire of these pleasures3 and when it exists1 even though it may owe its origin to a purely egoistic impulse1 it is still essentially a desire to do good to others for their sake and not for our own4 ,it cannot perhaps be said that the self-abandonment and self-forgetfulness1 which seemed an essential condition of the full development of the other elevated impulses before noticed1 characterise benevolent affection normally and permanently2 as love1 when a powerful emotion1 seems naturally to involve a desire for reciprocated love1 strong in proportion to the intensity of the emotion2 and thus the consciousness of self and of one's own pleasures and pains seems often heightened by the very intensity of the affection that binds one to others4 ,still we may at least say that this self-suppression and absorption of consciousness in the thought of other human beings and their happiness is a common incident of all strong affections3 and it is said that persons who love intensely sometimes feel a sense of antagonism between the egoistic and altruistic elements of their desire1 and an impulse to suppress the former1 which occasionally exhibits itself in acts of fantastic and extravagant self-sacrifice4 ,if then reflection on our moral consciousness seems to show that 8the pleasure of virtue is one which can only be obtained on the express condition of its not being the object sought10#eb we need not distrust this result of observation on account of the abnormal nature of the phenomenon4 ,we have merely another illustration of a psychological law1 which1 as we have seen1 is exemplified throughout the whole range of our desires4 ,in the promptings of ,sense no less than in those of ,intellect or ,reason we find the phenomenon of strictly disinterested impulse3 base and trivial external ends may excite desires of this kind1 as well as the sublime and ideal3 and there are pleasures of the merely animal life which can only be obtained on condition of not being directly sought1 no less than the satisfactions of a good conscience4 #c4 ,so far ,i have been concerned to insist on the felt incompatibility of #8self-regarding' and #8extra-regarding' impulses only as a means of proving their essential distinctness4 ,i do not wish to overstate this incompatibility3 ,i believe that most commonly it is very transient1 and often only momentary1 and that our greatest happiness--if that be our deliberate aim--is generally attained by means of a sort of alternating rhythm of the two kinds of impulse in consciousness4 ,a man's conscious desire is1 ,i think1 more often than not chiefly extra-regarding2 but where there is strong desire in any direction1 there is commonly keen susceptibility to the corresponding pleasures2 and the most devoted enthusiast is sustained in his work by the recurrent consciousness of such pleasures4 ,but it is important to point out that the familiar and obvious instances of conflict between self-love and some extra-regarding impulse are not paradoxes and illusions to be explained away1 but phenomena which the analysis of our consciousness in its normal state1 when there is no such conflict1 would lead us to expect4 ,if we are continually acting from impulses whose immediate objects are something other than our own happiness1 it is quite natural that we should occasionally yield to such impulses when they prompt us to an uncompensated sacrifice of pleasure4 ,thus a man of weak self-control1 after fasting too long1 may easily indulge his appetite for food to an extent which he knows to be unwholesome3 and that not because the pleasure of eating appears to him1 even in the moment of indulgence1 at all worthy of consideration in comparison with the injury to health2 but merely because he feels an impulse to eat food1 which prevails over his prudential judgment4 ,thus1 again1 men have sacrificed all the enjoyments of life1 and even life itself1 to obtain posthumous fame3 not from any illusory belief that they would be somehow capable of deriving pleasure from it1 but from a direct desire of the future admiration of others1 and a preference of it to their own pleasure4 ,and so1 again1 when the sacrifice is made for some ideal end1 as ,truth1 or ,freedom1 or ,religion3 it may be a real sacrifice of the individual's happiness1 and not merely the preference of one highly refined pleasure 7or of the absence of one special pain7 to all the other elements of happiness4 ,no doubt this preference is possible2 a man may feel that the high and severe delight of serving his ideal is a 8pearl of great price0 outweighing in value all other pleasures4 ,but he may also feel that the sacrifice will not repay him1 and yet determine that it shall be made4 ,to sum up3 our conscious active impulses are so far from being always directed towards the attainment of pleasure or avoidance of pain for ourselves1 that we can find everywhere in consciousness extra-regarding impulses1 directed towards something that is not pleasure1 nor relief from pain2 and1 indeed1 a most important part of our pleasure depends upon the existence of such impulses3 while on the other hand they are in many cases so far incompatible with the desire of our own pleasure that the two kinds of impulse do not easily coexist in the same moment of consciousness2 and more occasionally 7but by no means rarely7 the two come into irreconcilable conflict1 and prompt to opposite courses of action4 ,and this incompatibility 7though it is important to notice it in other instances7 is no doubt specially prominent in the case of the impulse towards the end which most markedly competes in ethical controversy with pleasure3 the love of virtue for its own sake1 or desire to do what is right as such4 #d4 ,the psychological observations on which my argument is based will not perhaps be directly controverted1 at least to such an extent as to involve my main conclusion3 but there are two lines of reasoning by which it has been attempted to weaken the force of this conclusion without directly denying it4 ,in the first place1 it is urged that ,pleasure1 though not the only conscious aim of human action1 is yet always the result to which it is unconsciously directed4 ,the proposition would be difficult to disprove2 since no one denies that pleasure in some degree normally accompanies the attainment of a desired end3 and when once we go beyond the testimony of consciousness there seems to be no clear method of determining which among the consequences of any action is the end at which it is aimed4 ,for the same reason1 however1 the proposition is at any rate equally difficult to prove4 ,but ,i should go further1 and maintain that if we seriously set ourselves to consider human action on its unconscious side1 we can only conceive it as a combination of movements of the parts of a material organism3 and that if we try to ascertain what the #8end' in any case of such movements is1 it is reasonable to conclude that it is some material result1 some organic condition conducive to the preservation either of the individual organism or of the race to which it belongs4 ,in fact1 the doctrine that pleasure 7or the absence of pain7 is the end of all human action can neither be supported by the results of introspection1 nor by the results of external observation and inference3 it rather seems to be reached by an arbitrary and illegitimate combination of the two4 ,but again1 it is sometimes said that whatever be the case with our present adult consciousness1 our original impulses were all directed towards pleasure#ec or from pain1 and that any impulses otherwise directed are derived from these by 8association of ideas40 ,i can find no evidence that even tends to prove this3 so far as we can observe the consciousness of children1 the two elements1 extra-regarding impulse and desire for pleasure1 seem to coexist in the same manner as they do in mature life4 ,in so far as there is any difference1 it seems to be in the opposite direction2 as the actions of children1 being more instinctive and less reflective1 are more prompted by extra-regarding impulse1 and less by conscious aim at pleasure4 ,no doubt the two kinds of impulse1 as we trace back the development of consciousness1 gradually become indistinguishable3 but this obviously does not justify us in identifying with either of the two the more indefinite impulse out of which both have been developed4 ,but even supposing it were found that our earliest appetites were all merely appetites for pleasure1 it would have little bearing on the present question4 ,what ,i am concerned to maintain is that men do not now normally desire pleasure alone1 but to an important extent other things also3 some in particular having impulses towards virtue1 which may and do conflict with their conscious desire for their own pleasure4 ,to say in answer to this that all men once desired pleasure is1 from an ethical point of view1 irrelevant3 except on the assumption that there is an original type of man's appetitive nature1 to which1 as such1 it is right or best for him to conform4 ,but probably no ,hedonist would expressly maintain this2 though such an assumption1 no doubt1 is frequently made by writers of the ,intuitional school4 ,,note4--,some psychologists regard ,desire as essentially painful4 ,this view seems to me erroneous1 according to the ordinary use of the term3 and though it does not necessarily involve the confusion--against which ,i am chiefly concerned to guard in the present chapter--between the volitional stimulus of desire itself and the volitional stimulus of aversion to desire as painful1 it has some tendency to cause this confusion4 ,it may therefore be worth while to point out that the difference of opinion between myself and the psychologists in question--of whom ,i select ,dr4 ,bain as a leading example--depends largely1 though not entirely1 on a difference of definition4 ,in chap4 viii4 of the second division of his book on ,the ,emotions and the ,will1 ,dr4 ,bain defines ,desire as 8that phase of volition where there is a motive and not ability to act on it10 and gives the following illustration3-- 8,the inmate of a small gloomy chamber conceives to himself the pleasure of light and of an expanded prospect3 the unsatisfying ideal urges the appropriate action for gaining the reality2 he gets up and walks out4 ,suppose now that the same ideal delight comes into the mind of a prisoner4 ,unable to fulfil the prompting1 he remains under the solicitation of the motive3 and his state is denominated craving1 longing1 appetite1 desire4 ,if all motive impulses could be at once followed up1 desire would have no place 444 there is a bar in the way of acting which leads to the state of conflict and renders desire a more or less painful state of mind40 ,now ,i agree that ,desire is most frequently painful in some degree when the person desiring is inhibited from acting for the attainment of the desired object4 ,i do not indeed think that even under these circumstances it is always painful1 especially when it is accompanied with hope4 ,take the simple case of hunger4 ,ordinarily1 when ,i am looking forward to dinner with a good appetite1 ,i do not find hunger painful--unless ,i have fasted unusually long--although custom and a regard for my digestion prevent me from satisfying the appetite till the soup is served4 ,still ,i admit that when action tending to fruition is excluded1 desire is very liable to be painful4 ,but it is surely contrary to usage to restrict the term ,desire to this case4 ,suppose ,dr4 ,bain's prisoner becomes possessed of a file1 and sees his way to getting out of prison by a long process1 which will involve1 among other operations1 the filing of certain bars4 ,it would surely seem absurd to say that his desire finally ceases when the operation of filing begins4 ,no doubt the concentration of attention on the complex activities necessary for the attainment of freedom is likely to cause the prisoner to be so absorbed by other ideas and feelings that the desire of freedom may temporarily cease to be present in his consciousness4 ,but as the stimulus on which his whole activity ultimately depends is certainly derived from the unrealised idea of freedom1 this idea1 with the concomitant feeling of desire1 will normally recur at brief intervals during the process4 ,similarly in other cases1 while it is quite true that men often work for a desired end without consciously feeling desire for the end1 it would be absurd to say that they never feel desire while so working3 at any rate this restricted use of the term has never1 ,i think1 been adopted by ethical writers in treating of ,desire4 ,and in some passages ,dr4 ,bain himself seems to adopt a wider meaning4 ,he says1 for instance1 in the chapter from which ,i have quoted1 that 8we have a form of desire 444 when we are working for distant ends40 ,if1 then1 it be allowed that the feeling of ,desire is at any rate sometimes an element of consciousness coexisting with a process of activity directed to the attainment of the desired object1 or intervening in the brief pauses of such a process1 ,i venture to think that when the feeling is observed under these conditions1 it will not be found in accordance with the common experience of mankind to describe it as essentially painful4 ,take1 as a simple instance1 the case of a game involving bodily exercise and a contest of skill4 ,probably many persons who take part in such exercises for sanitary or social purposes begin without any perceptible desire to win the game3 and probably as long as they remain thus indifferent the exercise is rather tedious4 ,usually1 however1 a conscious desire to win the game is excited1 as a consequence of actions directed towards this end3 and--in my experience at least--in proportion as the feeling grows strong1 the whole process becomes more pleasurable4 ,if this be admitted to be a normal experience1 it must surely be also admitted that ,desire in this case is a feeling in which introspection does not enable us to detect the slightest quality of pain4 ,it would be easy to give an indefinite number of similar instances of energetic activity carried on for an end--whether in sport or in the serious business of life--where a keen desire for the attainment of the end in view is indispensable to a real enjoyment of the labour required to attain1 and where at the same time we cannot detect any painfulness in the desire1 however much we try to separate it in introspective analysis from its concomitant feeling4 ,the error that ,i am trying to remove seems to me partly due to overlooking these cases1 and contemplating exclusively cases in which ,desire is for some reason or other prevented from having its normal effect in stimulating activity directed to the attainment of the desired object4 ,partly1 however1 it seems to be due to the resemblance between ,desire and ,pain1 to which ,i have drawn attention in the text of this chapter1 i4e4 the unrestfulness which is undoubtedly a characteristic of the state of desire1 and--ordinarily--of pain4 ,for the characteristic of 8unrestfulness0 requires some care to distinguish it from 8uneasiness10 in the sense in which this latter term signifies some degree of painfulness4 ,the mistake is connected with the equally erroneous view--which ,hobbes controverts in his usual forcible style--that 8the ,felicity of this life consisteth in the repose of a mind satisfied02 and it has also some affinity with the widespread view--which has left its mark on more than one ,european language--that labour1 strenuous activity1 is essentially painful4 ,on both these points1 it ought to be said1 there is doubtless considerable divergence between the experiences of different individuals3 but at any rate among ,englishmen ,i conceive that a person who finds desire always painful--in the sense in which1 as ,i have tried to show1 the word is commonly used both by moralists and in ordinary discourse--is as exceptional a being as one who finds labour always painful4 ,,footnotes3 #dj ,the relation of the sthetic to the moral ideal of conduct will be discussed in a subsequent chapter 7ix47 of this ,book4 #da ,i here1 as in chap4 i41 adopt the exact hedonistic interpretation of #8happiness' which ,bentham has made current4 ,this seems to me the most suitable use of the term2 but ,i afterwards 7,book i4 chap4 vii4 #a7 take note of other uses4 #db ,constitutional ,code1 ,introduction1 #b4 #dc ,utilitarianism1 chap4 ii4 p4 #ad4 #dd ,mr4 ,leslie ,stephen1 who holds 7,science of ,ethics1 p4 #ej7 that 8pain and pleasure are the sole determining causes of action10 at the same time thinks that it 8will be admitted on all hands0 that 8we are not always determined by a calculation of pleasure to come40 #de ,or1 more precisely1 #8greatest surplus of pleasure over pain4' #df ,the qualifications and limitations which this proposition requires1 before it can be accepted as strictly true1 do not seem to me important for the purpose of the present argument4 ,see ,book ii4 chap4 ii4 #b4 #dg ,in the present treatise #8,desire' is primarily regarded as a felt impulse or stimulus to actions tending to the realisation of what is desired4 ,there are1 however1 states of feeling1 sometimes intense1 to which the term #8desire' is by usage applicable1 in which this impulsive quality seems to be absent or at least latent2 because the realisation of the desired result is recognised as hopeless1 and has long been so recognised4 ,in such cases the #8desire' 7so-called7 remains in consciousness only as a sense of want of a recognised good1 a feeling no more or otherwise impulsive than the regretful memory of past joy4 ,that is1 desire in this condition may develop a secondary impulse to voluntary day-dreaming1 by which a bitter-sweet imaginary satisfaction of the want is attained2 or1 so far as it is painful1 it may impel to action or thought which will bring about its own extinction3 but its primary impulse to acts tending to realise the desired result is no longer perceptible4 ,with this state of mind --8the desire of the moth for the star1 ,of the night for the morrow0-- ,i am not concerned in the present discussion4 ,i notice it chiefly because some writers 7e4g4 ,dr4 ,bain7 seem to contemplate as the sole or typical case of desire1 8where there is a motive and no ability to act upon it02 thus expressly excluding that condition of desire 7as ,i use the term7 which seems to me of primary importance from an ethical point of view1 i4e4 where action tending to bring about the desired result is conceived as at once possible4 #dh ,the confusion occurs in the most singular form in ,hobbes1 who actually identifies ,pleasure and ,appetite--8this motion in which consisteth pleasure1 is a solicitation to draw near to the thing that pleaseth40 #di ,the same argument is put in a more guarded1 and1 ,i think1 unexceptionable form by ,hutcheson4 ,it is perhaps more remarkable that ,hume1 too1 shares ,butler's view which he expresses almost in the language of the famous sermons4 8,there are10 he says1 8bodily wants or appetites1 acknowledged by every one1 which necessarily precede all sensual enjoyment1 and carry us directly to seek possession of the object4 ,thus hunger and thirst have eating and drinking for their end3 and from the gratification of these primary appetites arises a pleasure1 which may become the object of another species of inclination that is secondary and interested40 ,hence ,hume finds that 8the hypothesis which allows of a disinterested benevolence1 distinct from self-love10 is 8conformable to the analogy of nature40 ,see ,enquiry concerning the ,principles of ,morals 7,appendix ,,ii474 #ej ,some further discussion of it will be found in the note at the end of the chapter4 #ea ,professor ,j4 ,s4 ,mackenzie1 in his ,manual of ,ethics 7#crd edition1 ,book i4 chap4 ii4 note71 arguing for the universal painfulness of desire1 urges that the so-called 8pleasures of pursuit0 are really pleasures of 8progressive attainment02 what causes pleasure being the series of partial attainments that precede the final attainment4 ,there seems to me much truth in this view1 as regards some forms of pursuit2 but in other cases ,i can find nothing deserving the name in the course of the pursuit3 the prominent element of the pleasure seems to be clearly the reflex of eager and hopeful1 perhaps consciously skilful1 activity4 ,e4g4 this is often the case in the pursuit of truth1 scientific or historical4 ,i have spent most pleasant hours in hunting for evidence in favour of a conjecture that had occurred to me as a possible solution of a difficult historical question1 without any 8progressive attainment0 at all1 as ,i found no evidence of any importance3 but the pleasure had none the less been real1 at any rate in the earlier part of the pursuit4 ,or take the common experience of deer-stalking1 or the struggle for victory in an evenly balanced game of chess1 or a prolonged race in which no competitor gains on the others till near the end4 ,i find nothing like 8progressive attainment0 in these cases4 ,but even granting ,mr4 ,mackenzie's view to be more widely applicable than ,i think it1 the question it deals with seems to me in the main irrelevant to the issue that ,i am now discussing3 since it remains true that the presence of antecedent desire is an essential condition of the pleasures of attainment--whether 8progressive0 or 8catastrophic0--and that the desire is not itself perceptibly painful4 #eb ,lecky1 ,hist4 of ,european ,morals1 ,introduction4 #ec ,i must ask the reader to distinguish carefully the question discussed in this chapter1 which relates to the objects of desires and aversions1 from the different question whether the causes of these impulses are always to be found in antecedent experiences of pleasure and pain4 ,the bearing of this latter question on ,ethics1 though not unimportant1 is manifestly more indirect than that of the question here dealt with3 and it will be convenient to postpone it till a later stage of the discussion4 ,cf4 post1 ,book ii4 chap4 vi4 #b1 and ,book iv4 chap4 iv4 #a4 ,,chapter ,v ,,free ,,will #a4 ,in the preceding chapters ,i have treated first of rational1 and secondly of disinterested action1 without introducing the vexed question of the ,freedom of the ,will4 ,the difficulties connected with this question have been proved by long dialectical experience to be so great1 that ,i am anxious to confine them within as strict limits as ,i can1 and keep as much of my subject as possible free from their perturbing influence4 ,and it appears to me that we have no psychological warrant for identifying ,disinterested with either 8,free0 or 8,rational0 action2 while to identify ,rational and ,free action is at least misleading1 and tends to obscure the real issue raised in the ,free ,will controversy4 ,in the last chapter ,i have tried to show that action strictly disinterested1 that is1 disregardful of foreseen balance of pleasure to ourselves1 is found in the most instinctive as well as in the most deliberate and self-conscious region of our volitional experience4 ,and rational action1 as ,i conceive it1 remains rational1 however completely the rationality of any individual's conduct may be determined by causes antecedent or external to his own volition3 so that the conception of acting rationally1 as explained in the last chapter but one1 is not bound up with the notion of acting #8freely1' as maintained by ,libertarians generally against ,determinists4 ,i say 8,libertarians generally10 because in the statements made by disciples of ,kant as to the connexion of ,freedom and ,rationality1 there appears to me to be a confusion between two meanings of the term ,freedom1 which require to be carefully distinguished in any discussion of ,free ,will4 ,when a disciple of ,kant#ed says that a man 8is a free agent in so far as he acts under the guidance of reason10 the statement easily wins assent from ordinary readers2 since1 as ,whewell says1 we ordinarily 8consider our ,reason as being ourselves rather than our desires and affections4 ,we speak of ,desire1 ,love1 ,anger1 as mastering us1 or of ourselves as controlling them4 ,if we decide to prefer some remote and abstract good to immediate pleasures1 or to conform to a rule which brings us present pain 7which decision implies exercise of ,reason71 we more particularly consider such acts as our own acts40#ee ,i do not1 therefore1 object on the score of usage to this application of the term 8free0 to denote voluntary actions in which the seductive solicitations of appetite or passion are successfully resisted3 and ,i am sensible of the gain in effectiveness of moral persuasion which is obtained by thus enlisting the powerful sentiment of ,liberty on the side of ,reason and ,morality4 ,but it is clear that if we say that a man is a 8free0 agent in so far as he acts rationally1 we cannot also say--in the same sense--that it is by his own 8free0 choice that he acts irrationally1 when he does so act2 and it is this latter proposition which ,libertarians generally have been concerned to maintain4 ,they have thought it of fundamental importance to show the #8,freedom' of the moral agent1 on account of the connexion that they have held to exist between ,freedom and ,moral ,responsibility3 and it is obvious that the ,freedom thus connected with ,responsibility is not the ,freedom that is only manifested or realised in rational action1 but the ,freedom to choose between right and wrong which is manifested or realised equally in either choice4 ,now it is implied in the ,christian consciousness of 8wilful sin0 that men do deliberately and knowingly choose to act irrationally4 ,they do not merely prefer self-interest to duty 7for here is rather a conflict of claims to rationality than clear irrationality72 but 7e4g47 sensual indulgence to health1 revenge to reputation1 etc41 though they know that such preference is opposed to their true interests no less than to their duty4#ef ,hence it does not really correspond to our experience as a whole to represent the conflict between ,reason and passion as a conflict between #8ourselves' on the one hand and a force of nature on the other4 ,we may say1 if we like1 that when we yield to passion1 we become #8the slaves of our desires and appetites'3 but we must at the same time admit that our slavery is self-chosen4 ,can we say1 then1 of the wilful wrongdoer that his wrong choice was #8free1' in the sense that he might have chosen rightly1 not merely if the antecedents of his volition1 external and internal1 had been different1 but supposing these antecedents unchanged8 ,this1 ,i conceive1 is the substantial issue raised in the ,free ,will controversy2 which ,i now propose briefly to consider3 since it is widely believed to be of great ,ethical importance4 #b4 ,we may conveniently begin by defining more exactly the notion of ,voluntary action1 to which1 according to all methods of ,ethics alike1 the predicates #8right' and #8what ought to be done'--in the strictest ethical sense--are exclusively applicable4 ,in the first place1 ,voluntary action is distinguished as #8conscious' from actions or movements of the human organism which are #8unconscious' or #8mechanical4' ,the person whose organism performs such movements only becomes aware of them1 if at all1 after they have been performed2 accordingly they are not imputed to him as a person1 or judged to be morally wrong or imprudent2 though they may sometimes be judged to be good or bad in respect of their consequences1 with the implication that they ought to be encouraged or checked as far as this can be done indirectly by conscious effort4 ,so again1 in the case of conscious actions1 the agent is not regarded as morally culpable1 except in an indirect way1 for entirely unforeseen effects of his voluntary actions4 ,no doubt when a man's action has caused some unforeseen harm1 the popular moral judgment often blames him for carelessness2 but it would be generally admitted by reflective persons that in such cases strictly moral blame only attaches to the agent in an indirect way1 in so far as his carelessness is the result of some wilful neglect of duty4 ,thus the proper immediate objects of moral approval or disapproval would seem to be always the results of a man's volitions so far as they were intended--i4e4 represented in thought as certain or probable#eg consequences of his volitions3--or1 more strictly1 the volitions themselves in which such results were so intended1 since we do not consider that a man is relieved from moral blame because his wrong intention remains unrealised through external causes4 ,this view seems at first sight to differ from the common opinion that the morality of acts depends on their #8motives'2 if by motives are understood the desires that we feel for some of the foreseen consequences of our acts4 ,but ,i do not think that those who hold this opinion would deny that we are blameworthy for any prohibited result which we foresaw in willing1 whether it was the object of desire or not4 ,no doubt it is commonly held that acts1 similar as regards their foreseen results1 may be #8better' or #8worse'#eh through the presence of certain desires or aversions4 ,still so far as these feelings are not altogether under the control of the will1 the judgment of #8right' and #8wrong'--in the strictest sense of these terms--seems to be not properly applicable to the feelings themselves1 but rather to the exertion or omission of voluntary effort to check bad motives and encourage good ones1 or to the conscious adoption of an object of desire as an end to be aimed at--which is a species of volition4 ,we may conclude then that judgments of right and wrong relate properly to volitions accompanied with intention--whether the intended consequences be external1 or some effects produced on the agent's own feelings or character4 ,this excludes from the scope of such judgments those conscious actions which are not intentional1 strictly speaking2 as when sudden strong feelings of pleasure and pain cause movements which we are aware of making1 but which are not preceded by any representation in idea either of the movements themselves or of their effects4 ,for such actions1 sometimes distinguished as #8instinctive1' we are only held to be responsible indirectly so far as any bad consequences of them might have been prevented by voluntary efforts to form habits of more complete self-control4 ,we have to observe further that our common moral judgments recognise an important distinction between impulsive and deliberate wrongdoing1 condemning the latter more strongly than the former4 ,the line between the two cannot be sharply drawn3 but we may define #8impulsive' actions as those where the connexion between the feeling that prompts and the action prompted is so simple and immediate that1 though intention is distinctly present1 the consciousness of personal choice of the intended result is evanescent4 ,in deliberate volitions there is always a conscious selection of the result as one of two or more practical alternatives4 ,in the case1 then1 of such volitions as are pre-eminently the objects of moral condemnation and approbation1 the psychical fact #8volition' seems to include--besides intention1 or representation of the results of action--also the consciousness of self as choosing1 resolving1 determining these results4 ,and the question which ,i understand to be at issue in the ,free ,will controversy may be stated thus3 ,is the self to which ,i refer my deliberate volitions a self of strictly determinate moral qualities1 a definite character partly inherited1 partly formed by my past actions and feelings1 and by any physical influences that it may have unconsciously received2 so that my voluntary action1 for good or for evil1 is at any moment completely caused by the determinate qualities of this character1 together with my circumstances1 or the external influences acting on me at the moment--including under this latter term my present bodily conditions8--or is there always a possibility of my choosing to act in the manner that ,i now judge to be reasonable and right1 whatever my previous actions and experiences may have been8 ,in the above questions a materialist would substitute #8brain and nervous system' for #8character1' and thereby obtain a clearer notion2 but ,i have avoided using terms which suggest materialistic assumptions1 because ,determinism by no means involves ,materialism4 ,for the present purpose the difference is unimportant4 ,the substantial dispute relates to the completeness of the causal dependence of any volition upon the state of things at the preceding instant1 whether we specify these as #8character and circumstances1' or #8brain and environing forces4'#ei ,on the ,determinist side there is a cumulative argument of great force4 ,the belief that events are determinately related to the state of things immediately preceding them is now held by all competent thinkers in respect of all kinds of occurrences except human volitions4 ,it has steadily grown both intensively and extensively1 both in clearness and certainty of conviction and in universality of application1 as the human mind has developed and human experience has been systematised and enlarged4 ,step by step in successive departments of fact conflicting modes of thought have receded and faded1 until at length they have vanished everywhere1 except from this mysterious citadel of ,will4 ,everywhere else the belief is so firmly established that some declare its opposite to be inconceivable3 others even maintain that it always was so4 ,every scientific procedure assumes it3 each success of science confirms it4 ,and not only are we finding ever new proof that events are cognisably determined1 but also that the different modes of determination of different kinds of events are fundamentally identical and mutually dependent3 and naturally1 with the increasing conviction of the essential unity of the cognisable universe1 increases the indisposition to allow the exceptional character claimed by ,libertarians for the department of human action4 ,again1 when we fix our attention on human action1 we observe that the portion of it which is originated unconsciously is admittedly determined by physical causes3 and we find that no clear line can be drawn between acts of this kind and those which are conscious and voluntary4 ,not only are many acts of the former class entirely similar to those of the latter1 except in being unconscious3 but we remark further that actions which we habitually perform continually pass from the conscious class into the--wholly or partly--unconscious3 and the further we investigate1 the more the conclusion is forced upon us1 that there is no kind of action originated by conscious volition which cannot also1 under certain circumstances1 be originated unconsciously4 ,again1 when we look closely at our conscious acts1 we find that in respect of such of them as ,i have characterised as #8impulsive'--acts done suddenly under the stimulus of a momentary sensation or emotion--our consciousness can hardly be said to suggest that they are not completely determined by the strength of the stimulus and the state of our previously determined temperament and character at the time of its operation3 and here again1 as was before observed1 it is difficult to draw a line clearly separating these actions from those in which the apparent consciousness of #8free choice' becomes distinct4 ,further1 we always explain#fj the voluntary action of all men except ourselves on the principle of causation by character and circumstances4 ,indeed otherwise social life would be impossible3 for the life of man in society involves daily a mass of minute forecasts of the actions of other men1 founded on experience of mankind generally1 or of particular classes of men1 or of individuals2 who are thus necessarily regarded as things having determinate properties1 causes whose effects are calculable4 ,we infer generally the future actions of those whom we know from their past actions2 and if our forecast turns out in any case to be erroneous1 we do not attribute the discrepancy to the disturbing influence of ,free ,will1 but to our incomplete acquaintance with their character and motives4 ,and passing from individuals to communities1 whether we believe in a 8social science0 or not1 we all admit and take part in discussions of social phenomena in which the same principle is assumed3 and however we may differ as to particular theories1 we never doubt the validity of the assumption3 and if we find anything inexplicable in history1 past or present1 it never occurs to us to attribute it to an extensive exercise of free will in a particular direction4 ,nay1 even as regards our own actions1 however #8free' we feel ourselves at any moment1 however unconstrained by present motives and circumstances and unfettered by the result of what we have previously been and felt1 our volitional choice may appear3 still1 when it is once well past1 and we survey it in the series of our actions1 its relations of causation and resemblance to other parts of our life appear1 and we naturally explain it as an effect of our nature1 education1 and circumstances4 ,nay we even apply the same conceptions to our future action1 and the more1 in proportion as our moral sentiments are developed3 for with our sense of duty generally increases our sense of the duty of moral culture1 and our desire of self-improvement3 and the possibility of moral self-culture depends on the assumption that by a present volition we can determine to some extent our actions in the more or less remote future4 ,no doubt we habitually take at the same time the opposite1 ,libertarian1 view as to our future3 we believe1 for example1 that we are perfectly able to resist henceforward temptations to which we have continually yielded in the past4 ,but it should be observed that this belief is 7as moralists of all schools admit and even urge7 at any rate to a great extent illusory and misleading4 ,though ,libertarians contend that it is possible for us at any moment to act in a manner opposed to our acquired tendencies and previous customs1--still1 they and ,determinists alike teach that it is much less easy than men commonly imagine to break the subtle unfelt trammels of habit4 #c4 ,against the formidable array of cumulative evidence offered for ,determinism there is to be set the immediate affirmation of consciousness in the moment of deliberate action4 ,certainly when ,i have a distinct consciousness of choosing between alternatives of conduct1 one of which ,i conceive as right or reasonable1 ,i find it impossible not to think that ,i can now choose to do what ,i so conceive1--supposing that there is no obstacle to my doing it other than the condition of my desires and voluntary habits1--however strong may be my inclination to act unreasonably1 and however uniformly ,i may have yielded to such inclinations in the past4#fa ,i recognise that each concession to vicious desire makes the difficulty of resisting it greater when the desire recurs3 but the difficulty always seems to remain separated from impossibility by an impassable gulf4 ,i do not deny that the experience of mankind includes cases in which certain impulses--such as aversion to death or extreme pain1 or morbid appetite for alcohol or opium--have reached a point of intensity at which they have been felt as irresistibly overmastering voluntary choice4 ,i think we commonly judge that when this point is reached the individual ceases to be morally responsible for the act done under such overmastering impulse3 but at any rate the moral problem thus presented is very exceptional2 in ordinary cases of yielding to temptation this consciousness of the irresistibility of impulse does not come in4 ,ordinarily1 however strong may be the rush of appetite or anger that comes over me1 it does not present itself as irresistible2 and1 if ,i deliberate at such a moment1 ,i cannot regard the mere force of the impulse as a reason for doing what ,i otherwise judge to be unreasonable4 ,i can suppose that my conviction of free choice may be illusory3 that if ,i knew my own nature ,i might see it to be predetermined that1 being so constituted and in such circumstances1 ,i should act on the occasion in question contrary to my rational judgment4 ,but ,i cannot conceive myself seeing this1 without at the same time conceiving my whole conception of what ,i now call 8my0 action fundamentally altered3 ,i cannot conceive that if ,i contemplated the actions of my organism in this light ,i should refer them to my 8self0--i4e4 to the mind so contemplating--in the sense in which ,i now refer them4 ,in this conflict of arguments1 it is not surprising that the theoretical question as to the ,freedom of the ,will is still differently decided by thinkers of repute2 and ,i do not myself wish at present to pronounce any decision on it4 ,but ,i think it possible and useful to show that the ethical importance of deciding it one way or another is liable to be exaggerated2 and that any one who will consider the matter soberly and carefully will find this importance to be of a strictly limited kind4 ,it is chiefly on the ,libertarian side that ,i find a tendency to the exaggeration of which ,i have just spoken4 ,some ,libertarian writers maintain that the conception of the ,freedom of the ,will1 alien as it may be to positive science1 is yet quite indispensable to ,ethics and ,jurisprudence2 since in judging that ,i 8ought0 to do anything ,i imply that ,i 8can0 do it1 and similarly in praising or blaming the actions of others ,i imply that they 8could0 have acted otherwise4 ,if a man's actions are mere links in a chain of causation which1 as we trace it back1 ultimately carries us to events anterior to his personal existence1 he cannot1 it is said1 really have either merit or demerit2 and if he has not merit or demerit1 it is repugnant to the common moral sense of mankind to reward or punish--even to praise or blame--him4 ,in considering this argument1 it will be convenient--for clearness of discussion--to assume in the first instance that there is no doubt or conflict in our view of what it is right to do1 except such as may be caused by the present question4 ,it will also be convenient to separate the discussion of the importance of ,free ,will in relation to moral action generally from the special question of its importance in relation to punishing and rewarding2 since1 in the latter species of action1 what chiefly claims attention is not the present ,freedom of the agent1 but the past ,freedom of the person now acted on4 ,as regards action generally1 the ,determinist allows that a man is only morally bound to do what is 8in his power02 but he explains 8in his power0 to mean that the result in question will be produced if the man choose to produce it4 ,and this is1 ,i think1 the sense in which the proposition 8what ,i ought to do ,i can do0 is commonly accepted3 it means 8can do if ,i choose10 not 8can choose to do40 ,still the question remains 8,can ,i choose to do what in ordinary thought ,i judge to be right to do80 ,here my own view is that--within the limits above explained--,i inevitably conceive that ,i can choose2 however1 ,i can suppose myself to regard this conception as illusory1 and to judge1 inferring the future from the past1 that ,i certainly shall not choose1 and accordingly that such choice is not really possible to me4 ,this being supposed1 it seems to me undeniable that this judgment will exclude or weaken the operation of the moral motive in the case of the act contemplated3 ,i either shall not judge it reasonable to choose to do what ,i should otherwise so judge1 or if ,i do pass the judgment1 ,i shall also judge the conception of duty applied in it to be illusory1 no less than the conception of ,freedom4 ,so far ,i concede the ,libertarian contention as to the demoralising effect of ,determinism1 if held with a real force of conviction4 ,but ,i think the cases are rare in which it is even on ,determinist principles legitimate to conclude it to be certain--and not merely highly probable--that ,i shall deliberately choose to do what ,i judge to be unwise4#fb ,ordinarily the legitimate inference from a man's past experience1 and from his general knowledge of human nature1 would not go beyond a very strong probability that he would choose to do wrong3 and a mere probability--however strong--that ,i shall not will to do right cannot be regarded by me in deliberation as a reason for not willing3#fc while it certainly supplies a rational ground for willing strongly--just as a strong probability of any other evil supplies a rational ground for special exertions to avoid it4 ,indeed1 ,i do not see why a ,libertarian should not--equally with a ,determinist--accept as valid1 and find it instructive to contemplate1 the considerations that render it probable that he will not choose to do right in any particular circumstances4 ,in all ordinary cases1 therefore1 it does not seem to me relevant to ethical deliberation to determine the metaphysical validity of my consciousness of freedom to choose whatever ,i may conclude to be reasonable1 unless the affirmation or negation of the ,freedom of the ,will somehow modifies my view of what it would be reasonable to choose to do if ,i could so choose4 ,i do not think that any such modification of view can be maintained1 as regards the ultimate ends of rational action which1 in chap4 i41 ,i took as being commonly accepted4 ,if ,happiness1 whether private or general1 be taken as the ultimate end of action on a ,libertarian view1 the adoption of a ,determinist view affords no ground for rejecting it3 and if ,excellence is in itself admirable and desirable1 it surely remains equally so whether any individual's approximation to it is entirely determined by inherited nature and external influences or not3--except so far as the notion of ,excellence includes that of ,free ,will4 ,now ,free ,will is obviously not included in our common ideal of physical and intellectual perfection3 and it seems to me also not to be included in the common notions of the excellences of character which we call virtues3 the manifestations of courage1 temperance1 and justice do not become less admirable because we can trace their antecedents in a happy balance of inherited dispositions developed by a careful education4#fd ,can1 then1 the affirmation or negation of ,free ,will affect our view of the fittest means for the attainment of either end8 ,in considering this we have to distinguish between the case of a connexion between means and end believed to exist on empirical or other scientific grounds1 and the case where the belief in such connexion is an inference from the belief in a moral government of the world4 ,according to the received view of the moral government of the world1 the performance of ,duty is the best means of attaining the agent's happiness largely through its expected consequences in another world1 in which virtue will be rewarded and vice punished by ,god3 if1 then1 the belief in the moral government of the world and a future life for men is held to depend on the assumption of ,free ,will1 this latter becomes obviously of fundamental ethical importance3 not1 indeed1 in determining a man's ,duty1 but in reconciling it with his ,interest4 ,this1 ,i think1 is the main element of truth in the view that the denial of ,free ,will removes motives to the performance of ,duty3 and ,i admit the validity of the contention1 so far as 7#a7 the course of action conducive to an individual's ,interest would be thought to diverge from his ,duty1 apart from theological considerations1 and 7#b7 in the theological reasoning that removes this divergence ,free ,will is an indispensable assumption4 ,the former point will be examined in a subsequent chapter2#fe the latter it hardly falls within the scope of this treatise to discuss4#ff ,if we confine our attention to such connexion between means and ends as is scientifically cognisable1 it does not appear that an act now deliberated on can be less or more a means to any ulterior end1 because it is predetermined4 ,it may1 however1 be urged that in considering how we ought to act in any case1 we have to take into account the probable future actions of others1 and also of ourselves2 and that with regard to these it is necessary to decide the question of ,free ,will1 in order that we may know whether the future is capable of being predicted from the past4 ,but here1 again1 it seems to me that no definite practical consequences would logically follow from this decision4 ,for however far we may go in admitting ,free ,will as a cause1 the actual operation of which may falsify the most scientific forecasts of human action1 still since it is ex hypothesi an absolutely unknown cause1 our recognition of it cannot lead us to modify any such forecasts3 at most1 it can only affect our reliance on them4 ,we may illustrate this by an imaginary extreme case4 ,suppose we were somehow convinced that all the planets were endowed with ,free ,will1 and that they only maintained their periodic motions by the continual exercise of free choice1 in resistance to strong centrifugal or centripetal inclinations4 ,our general confidence in the future of the solar system might reasonably be impaired1 though it is not easy to say how much2#fg but the details of our astronomical calculations would be clearly unaffected3 the free wills could in no way be taken as an element in the reckoning4 ,and the case would be similar1 ,i suppose1 in the forecast of human conduct1 if psychology and sociology should ever become exact sciences4 ,at present1 however1 they are so far from being such that this additional element of uncertainty can hardly have even any emotional effect4 ,to sum up3 we may say that1 in so far as we reason to any definite conclusions as to what the future actions of ourselves or others will be1 we must consider them as determined by unvarying laws3 if they are not completely so determined our reasoning is pro tanto liable to error3 but no other is open to us4 ,while on the other hand1 when we are endeavouring to ascertain 7on any principles7 what choice it is reasonable to make between two alternatives of present conduct1 ,determinist conceptions are as irrelevant as they are in the former case inevitable4 ,and from neither point of view does it seem practically important1 for the general regulation of conduct1 to decide the metaphysical question at issue in the ,free-will ,controversy3 unless--passing from ,ethics into ,theology--we rest the reconciliation of ,duty and ,interest on a theological argument that requires the assumption of ,free ,will4 #d4 ,so far ,i have been arguing that the adoption of ,determinism will not--except in certain exceptional circumstances or on certain theological assumptions--reasonably modify a man's view of what it is right for him to do or his reasons for doing it4 ,it may1 however1 be said that--granting the reasons for right action to remain unaltered--still the motives that prompt to it will be weakened2 since a man will not feel remorse for his actions1 if he regards them as necessary results of causes anterior to his personal existence4 ,i admit that so far as the sentiment of remorse implies self-blame irremovably fixed on the self blamed1 it must tend to vanish from the mind of a convinced ,determinist4 ,still ,i do not see why the imagination of a ,determinist should not be as vivid1 his sympathy as keen1 his love of goodness as strong as a ,libertarian's3 and ,i therefore see no reason why dislike for his own shortcomings and for the mischievous qualities of his character which have caused bad actions in the past should not be as effective a spring of moral improvement as the sentiment of remorse would be4 ,for it appears to me that men in general take at least as much pains to cure defects in their circumstances1 organic defects1 and defects of intellect--which cause them no remorse--as they do to cure moral defects2 so far as they consider the former to be no less mischievous and no less removable than the latter4 ,this leads me to the consideration of the effect of ,determinist doctrines on the allotment of punishment and reward4 ,for it must be admitted1 ,i think1 that the common retributive view of punishment1 and the ordinary notions of 8merit10 8demerit10 and 8responsibility10 also involve the assumption of ,free ,will3 if the wrong act1 and the bad qualities of character manifested in it1 are conceived as the necessary effects of causes antecedent or external to the existence of the agent1 the moral responsibility--in the ordinary sense--for the mischief caused by them can no longer rest on him4 ,at the same time1 the ,determinist can give to the terms 8ill-desert0 and 8responsibility0 a signification which is not only clear and definite1 but1 from an utilitarian point of view1 the only suitable meaning4 ,in this view1 if ,i affirm that ,a is responsible for a harmful act1 ,i mean that it is right to punish him for it2 primarily1 in order that the fear of punishment may prevent him and others from committing similar acts in future4 ,the difference between these two views of punishment is theoretically very wide4 ,i shall1 however1 when ,i come to examine in detail the current conception of ,justice1#fh endeavour to show that this admission can hardly have any practical effect2 since it is practically impossible to be guided1 either in remunerating services or in punishing mischievous acts1 by any other considerations than those which the ,determinist interpretation of desert would include4 ,for instance1 the treatment of legal punishment as deterrent and reformatory rather than retributive seems to be forced upon us by the practical exigences of social order and wellbeing--quite apart from any ,determinist philosophy4#fi ,moreover1 as ,i shall hereafter show1 if the retributive view of ,punishment be strictly taken--abstracting completely from the preventive view--it brings our conception of ,justice into conflict with ,benevolence1 as punishment presents itself as a purely useless evil4 ,similarly1 as regards the sentiments which prompt to the expression of moral praise and blame--,i admit that in the mind of a convinced ,determinist1 the desire to encourage good and prevent bad conduct must take the place of a desire to requite the one or the other3 but again ,i see no reason why the ,determinist species of moral sentiments should not be as effective in promoting virtue and social wellbeing as the ,libertarian species4 #e4 ,it is1 however1 of obvious practical importance to ascertain how far the power of the will 7whether metaphysically free or not7 actually extends3 for this defines the range within which ethical judgments are in the strictest sense applicable4 ,this inquiry is quite independent of the question of metaphysical freedom2 we might state it in ,determinist terms as an inquiry into the range of effects which it would be possible to cause by human volition1 provided that adequate motives are not wanting4 ,these effects seem to be mainly of three kinds3 first1 changes in the external world consequent upon muscular contractions2 secondly1 changes in the train of ideas and feelings that constitutes our conscious life2 and thirdly1 changes in the tendencies to act hereafter in certain ways under certain circumstances4 ,i4 ,the most obvious and prominent part of the sphere of volitional causation is constituted by such events as can be produced by muscular contractions4 ,as regards these1 it is sometimes said that it is properly the muscular contraction that we will1 and not the more remote effects2 for these require the concurrence of other causes1 and therefore we can never be absolutely certain that they will follow4 ,but no more is it certain1 strictly speaking1 that the muscular contraction will follow1 since our limb may be paralysed1 etc4 ,the immediate consequent of the volition is some molecular change in the motor nerves4 ,since1 however1 we are not conscious in willing of our motor nerves and their changes1--nor indeed commonly of the muscular contractions that follow them1--it seems a misuse of terms to describe either as the normal #8object' of the mind in willing3 since it is almost always some more remote effect which we consciously will and intend4 ,still of almost all effects of our will on the external world some contraction of our muscles is an indispensable antecedent2 and when that is over our part in the causation is completed4 ,,ii4 ,we can control to some extent our thoughts and feelings4 ,it would seem1 indeed1 that an important part of what we commonly call #8control of feeling' comes under the head just discussed4 ,our control over our muscles enables us to keep down the expression of the feeling and to resist its promptings to action3 and as the giving free vent to a feeling tends1 generally speaking1 to sustain and prolong it1 this muscular control amounts to a certain power over the emotion4 ,but there is not the same connexion between our muscular system and our thoughts3 and yet experience shows that most men 7though some1 no doubt1 much more than others7 can voluntarily determine the direction of their thoughts1 and pursue at will a given line of meditation4 ,in such cases1 what is effected by the effort of will seems to be the concentration of our consciousness on a part of its content1 so that this part grows more vivid and clear1 while the rest tends to become obscure and ultimately to vanish4 ,frequently this voluntary exertion is only needed to initiate a train of ideas1 which is afterwards continued without effort3 as in recalling a series of past events or going through a familiar train of reasoning4 ,by such concentration we can free ourselves of many thoughts and feelings upon which we do not wish to dwell3 but our power to do this is very limited1 and if the feeling be strong and its cause persistent1 it requires a very unusual effort of will to banish it thus4 ,,iii4 ,the effect of volition1 however1 to which ,i especially wish to direct the reader's attention is the alteration in men's tendencies to future action which must be assumed to be a consequence of general resolutions as to future conduct1 so far as they are effective4 ,even a resolution to do a particular act--if it is worth while to make it1 as experience shows it to be--must be supposed to produce a change of this kind in the person who makes it3 it must somehow modify his present tendencies to act in a certain way on a foreseen future occasion4 ,but it is in making general resolutions for future conduct that it is of most practical importance for us to know what is within the power of the will4 ,let us take an example4 ,a man has been in the habit of drinking too much brandy nightly3 one morning he resolves that he will do so no more4 ,in making this resolve he acts under the belief that by a present volition he can so far alter his habitual tendency to indulgence in brandy1 that some hours hence he will resist the full force of his habitual craving for the stimulant4 ,now whether this belief is well or ill founded is a different question from that usually discussed between ,determinists and ,libertarians3 at the same time the two questions are liable to be confused4 ,it is sometimes vaguely thought that a belief in ,free ,will requires us to maintain that at any moment we can alter our habits to any extent by a sufficiently strong exertion4 ,and no doubt most commonly when we make such efforts1 we believe at the moment that they will be completely effectual3 we will to do something hours or days hence with the same confidence with which we will to do something immediately4 ,but on reflection1 no one1 ,i think1 will maintain that in such cases the future act appears to be in his power in the same sense as a choice of alternatives that takes effect immediately4 ,not only does continual experience show us that such resolutions as to the future have a limited and too frequently an inadequate effect3 but the common belief is really inconsistent with the very doctrine of ,free ,will that is thought to justify it3 for if by a present volition ,i can fully determine an action that is to take place some hours hence1 when the time comes to do that act ,i shall find myself no longer free4 ,we must therefore accept the conclusion that each such resolve has only a limited effect3 and that we cannot know when making it how far this effect will exhibit itself in the performance of the act resolved upon4 ,at the same time it can hardly be denied that such resolves sometimes succeed in breaking old habits3 and even when they fail to do this1 they often substitute a painful struggle for smooth and easy indulgence4 ,hence it is reasonable to suppose that they always produce some effect in this direction2 whether they operate by causing new motives to present themselves on the side of reason1 when the time of inner conflict arrives2 or whether they directly weaken the impulsive force of habit in the same manner as an actual breach of custom does1 though in an inferior degree4#gj ,if this account of the range of volition be accepted1 it will1 ,i trust1 dispel any lingering doubts which the argument of the preceding section1 as to the practical unimportance of the ,free ,will controversy1 may have left in the reader's mind4 ,for it may have been vaguely thought that while on the ,determinist theory it would be wrong1 in certain cases1 to perform a single act of virtue if we had no ground for believing that we should hereafter duly follow it up2 on the assumption of ,freedom we should boldly do always what would be best if consistently followed up1 being conscious that such consistency is in our power4 ,but the supposed difference vanishes1 if it be admitted that by any effort of resolution at the present moment we can only produce a certain limited effect upon our tendencies to action at some future time1 and that immediate consciousness cannot tell us that this effect will be adequate to the occasion1 nor indeed how great it will really prove to be4 ,for the most extreme ,libertarian must then allow that before pledging ourselves to any future course of action we ought to estimate carefully1 from our experience of ourselves and general knowledge of human nature1 what the probability is of our keeping present resolutions in the circumstances in which we are likely to be placed4 ,it is no doubt morally most important that we should not tranquilly acquiesce in any weakness or want of self-control3 but the fact remains that such weakness is not curable by a single volition3 and whatever we can do towards curing it by any effort of will at any moment1 is as clearly enjoined by reason on the ,determinist theory as it is on the ,libertarian4 ,on neither theory is it reasonable that we should deceive ourselves as to the extent of our weakness1 or ignore it in the forecast of our conduct1 or suppose it more easily remediable than it really is4 ,,footnotes3 #ed ,i have thought it expedient to exclude the ,kantian conception of ,free ,will from the scope of the discussion in this chapter1 partly on account of the confusion mentioned in the text2 partly because it depends on the conception of a causality not subject to time-conditions1 which appears to me altogether untenable1 while it does not fall within the plan of the present treatise to discuss it4 ,but considering the widespread influence of ,kantian theory on current ethical thought1 ,i have thought it desirable to give a brief discussion of his conception of ,free ,will in an ,appendix 7,i474 #ee ,elements of ,morality1 ,book i4 chap4 ii4 ,at the same time1 it is also true--as ,i afterwards say--that we sometimes identify ourselves with passion or appetite in conscious conflict with reason3 and then the rule of reason is apt to appear an external constraint1 and obedience to it a servitude1 if not a slavery4 #ef ,the difficulty which ,socrates and the ,socratic schools had in conceiving a man to choose deliberately what he knows to be bad for him--a difficulty which drives ,aristotle into real ,determinism in his account of purposed action1 even while he is expressly maintaining the 8voluntariness0 and 8responsibility0 of vice--seems to be much reduced for the modern mind by the distinction between moral and prudential judgments1 and the prima facie conflict between #8interest' and #8duty4' ,being thus familiar with the conception of deliberate choice consciously opposed either to interest or to duty1 we can without much difficulty conceive of such choice in conscious opposition to both4 ,see chap4 ix4 #c1 of this ,book4 #eg ,it is most convenient to regard 8intention0 as including not only such results of volition as the agent desired to realise1 but also any that1 without desiring1 he foresaw as certain or probable4 ,the question how far we are responsible for all the foreseen consequences of our acts1 or1 in the case of acts prescribed by definite moral rules1 only for their results within a certain range1 will be considered when we come to examine the ,intuitional ,method4 #eh ,in a subsequent chapter 7chap4 ix4 of this ,book7 ,i shall examine more fully the relation of the antithesis #8right' and #8wrong' to the vaguer and wider antithesis #8good' and #8bad1' in our practical reasonings4 #ei ,it is not uncommon for ,determinists to conceive of each volition as connected by uniform laws with our past state of consciousness4 ,but any uniformities we might trace among a man's past consciousnesses1 even if we knew them all1 would yet give us very imperfect guidance as to his future action3 as there would be left out of account-- 7#a7 ,all inborn tendencies and susceptibilities1 as yet latent or incompletely exhibited2 7#b7 ,all past physical influences1 of which the effects had not been perfectly represented in consciousness4 #fj ,i do not mean that this is the only view that we take of the conduct of others3 ,i hold 7as will presently appear7 that in judging of their conduct morally1 we ordinarily apply the conception of ,free ,will4 ,but we do not ordinarily regard it as one kind of causation1 limiting and counteracting the other kind4 #fa ,it is not the possibility of merely indeterminate choice1 of an 8arbitrary freak of unmotived willing10 with which we are concerned from an ethical point of view1 but the possibility of choosing between rational and irrational motives4 #fb ,i think that in most cases when a man yields to temptation1 judging that it is 8no use trying to resist10 he judges in semi-conscious self-sophistication1 due to the influence of appetite or passion disturbing the process of reasoning4 ,i do not doubt that this self-sophistication is likely to take a ,determinist form in the mind of one who has adopted ,determinism as a speculative opinion3 but ,i see no reason for thinking that a ,libertarian is not in equal danger of self-sophistication1 though in his case it will take a different form4 ,e4g4 where a ,determinist would reason 8,i certainly shall take my usual glass of brandy to-night1 so there is no use resolving not to take it10 the ,libertarian's reasoning would be 8,i mean to leave off that brandy1 but it will be just as easy to leave it off to-morrow as to-day2 ,i will therefore have one more glass1 and leave it off to-morrow40 #fc ,there is1 however1 a special case in which this probability may be indirectly a reason for not resolving to do what would otherwise be best2 i4e4 where this resolution would only be right if followed by subsequent resolutions4 ,the problem thus presented is considered later1 pp4 #ge1 #gf4 #fd ,i should admit1 indeed1 that the ordinary notion of merit becomes inapplicable 7see pp4 #ga1 #gb74 ,but ,i do not see that ,perfection becomes less an ,end to be aimed at1 because we cease to regard its attainment as meritorious4 ,the inapplicability of the notion of #8merit' to ,divine action has never been felt to detract from the ,perfection of the ,divine ,nature4 #fe ,see ,book ii4 chap4 v4 and the concluding chapter of the treatise4 #ff ,i ought1 however1 to point out that an important section of theologians who have held the belief in the moral government of the world in its intensest form have been ,determinists4 #fg ,in order to determine this we should require first to settle another disputed question1 as to the general reasonableness of our expectation that the future will resemble the past4 #fh ,see ,book iii4 chap4 v4 #fi ,thus we find it necessary to punish negligence1 when its effects were very grave1 even when we cannot trace it to wilful disregard of duty2 and to punish rebellion and assassination none the less although we know that they were prompted by a sincere desire to serve ,god or to benefit mankind4 #gj ,it should be observed that the same kind of change is sometimes brought about1 without volition1 by a powerful emotional shock1 due to extraneous causes3 and hence it might be inferred that in all cases it is a powerful impression of an emotional kind that produces the effect2 and that the will is only concerned in concentrating our attention on the benefits to be gained or evils to be avoided by the change of habit1 and so intensifying the impression of these4 ,but though this kind of voluntary contemplation is a useful auxiliary to good resolutions1 it does not seem to be this effort of will that constitutes the resolution3 we can clearly distinguish the two4 ,hence this third effect of volition cannot be resolved into the second1 but must be stated separately4 ,,chapter ,,vi ,,ethical ,,principles ,,and ,,methods #a4 ,the results of the three preceding chapters may be briefly stated as follows3-- ,the aim of ,ethics is to systematise and free from error the apparent cognitions that most men have of the rightness or reasonableness of conduct1 whether the conduct be considered as right in itself1 or as the means to some end commonly conceived as ultimately reasonable4#ga ,these cognitions are normally accompanied by emotions of various kinds1 known as 8moral sentiments03 but an ethical judgment cannot be explained as affirming merely the existence of such a sentiment3 indeed it is an essential characteristic of a moral feeling that it is bound up with an apparent cognition of something more than mere feeling4 ,such cognitions1 again1 ,i have called #8dictates1' or #8imperatives'2 because1 in so far as they relate to conduct on which any one is deliberating1 they are accompanied by a certain impulse to do the acts recognised as right1 which is liable to conflict with other impulses4 ,provided this impulse is effective in producing right volition1 it is not of primary importance for ethical purposes to determine the exact characteristics of the emotional states that precede such volitions4 ,and this remains true even if the force actually operating on his will is mere desire for the pleasures that he foresees will attend right conduct1 or aversion to the pains that will result from doing wrong3 though we observe that in this case his action does not correspond to our common notion of strictly virtuous conduct2 and though there seems to be no ground for regarding such desires and aversions as the sole1 or even the normal1 motives of human volitions4 ,nor1 again1 is it generally important to determine whether we are always1 metaphysically speaking1 #8free' to do what we clearly see to be right4 ,what ,i #8ought' to do1 in the strictest use of the word #8ought1' is always #8in my power1' in the sense that there is no obstacle to my doing it except absence of adequate motive2 and it is ordinarily impossible for me1 in deliberation1 to regard such absence of motive as a reason for not doing what ,i otherwise judge to be reasonable4 ,what then do we commonly regard as valid ultimate reasons for acting or abstaining8 ,this1 as was said1 is the starting-point for the discussions of the present treatise3 which is not primarily concerned with proving or disproving the validity of any such reasons1 but rather with the critical exposition of the different #8methods'--or rational procedures for determining right conduct in any particular case--which are logically connected with the different ultimate reasons widely accepted4 ,in the first chapter we found that such reasons were supplied by the notions of ,happiness and ,excellence or ,perfection 7including ,virtue or ,moral ,perfection as a prominent element71 regarded as ultimate ends1 and ,duty as prescribed by unconditional rules4 ,this threefold difference in the conception of the ultimate reason for conduct corresponds to what seem the most fundamental distinctions that we apply to human existence2 the distinction between the conscious being and the stream of conscious experience1 and the distinction 7within this latter7 of ,action and ,feeling4 ,for ,perfection is put forward as the ideal goal of the development of a human being1 considered as a permanent entity2 while by ,duty1 we mean the kind of ,action that we think ought to be done2 and similarly by ,happiness or ,pleasure we mean an ultimately desired or desirable kind of ,feeling4 ,it may seem1 however1 that these notions by no means exhaust the list of reasons which are widely accepted as ultimate grounds of action4 ,many religious persons think that the highest reason for doing anything is that it is ,god's ,will3 while to others #8,self-realisation' or #8,self-development1' and to others1 again1 #8,life according to nature' appear the really ultimate ends4 ,and it is not hard to understand why conceptions such as these are regarded as supplying deeper and more completely satisfying answers to the fundamental question of ,ethics1 than those before named3 since they do not merely represent #8what ought to be1' as such2 they represent it in an apparently simple relation to what actually is4 ,god1 ,nature1 ,self1 are the fundamental facts of existence2 the knowledge of what will accomplish ,god's ,will1 what is1 #8according to ,nature1' what will realise the true ,self in each of us1 would seem to solve the deepest problems of ,metaphysics as well as of ,ethics4 ,but just because these notions combine the ideal with the actual1 their proper sphere belongs not to ,ethics as ,i define it1 but to ,philosophy--the central and supreme study which is concerned with the relations of all objects of knowledge4 ,the introduction of these notions into ,ethics is liable to bring with it a fundamental confusion between 8what is0 and 8what ought to be10 destructive of all clearness in ethical reasoning3 and if this confusion is avoided1 the strictly ethical import of such notions1 when made explicit1 appears always to lead us to one or other of the methods previously distinguished4 ,there is least danger of confusion in the case of the theological conception of #8,god's ,will'2 since here the connexion between #8what is' and #8what ought to be' is perfectly clear and explicit4 ,the content of ,god's ,will we conceive as presently existing1 in idea3 its actualisation is the end to be aimed at4 ,there is indeed a difficulty in understanding how ,god's ,will can fail to be realised1 whether we do right or wrong3 or how1 if it cannot fail to be realised in either case1 its realisation can give the ultimate motive for doing right4 ,but this difficulty it belongs to ,theology rather than ,ethics to solve4 ,the practical question is1 assuming that ,god wills in a special sense what we ought to do1 how we are to ascertain this in any particular case4 ,this must be either by ,revelation or by ,reason1 or by both combined4 ,if an external ,revelation is proposed as the standard1 we are obviously carried beyond the range of our study2 on the other hand1 when we try to ascertain by reason the ,divine ,will1 the conception seems to present itself as a common form under which a religious mind is disposed to regard whatever method of determining conduct it apprehends to be rational2 since we cannot know any act to be in accordance with the ,divine ,will1 which we do not also1 by the same exercise of thought1 know to be dictated by reason4 ,thus1 commonly1 it is either assumed that ,god desires the ,happiness of men1 in which case our efforts should be concentrated on its production3 or that ,he desires their ,perfection1 and that that should be our end3 or that whatever ,his end may be 7into which perhaps we have no right to inquire7 ,his ,laws are immediately cognisable1 being in fact the first principles of ,intuitional ,morality4 ,or perhaps it is explained that ,god's ,will is to be learnt by examining our own constitution or that of the world we are in3 so that #8,conformity to ,god's ,will' seems to resolve itself into #8,self-realisation1' or #8,life according to nature4' ,in any case1 this conception1 however important it may be in supplying new motives for doing what we believe to be right1 does not--apart from ,revelation--suggest any special criterion of rightness4 #b4 ,let us pass to consider the notions #8,nature1' #8,natural1' #8,conformity to ,nature4' ,i assume--in order to obtain a principle distinct from #8,self-realisation1'#gb--that the #8,nature' to which we are to conform is not each one's own individual nature1 but human nature generally1 considered either apart from or in relation to its environment3 that we are to find the standard of right conduct in a certain type of human existence which we can somehow abstract from observation of actual human life4 ,now in a certain sense every rational man must1 of course1 8conform to nature02 that is1 in aiming at any ends1 he must adapt his efforts to the particular conditions of his existence1 physical and psychical4 ,but if he is to go beyond this1 and conform to #8,nature' in the adoption of an ultimate end or paramount standard of right conduct1 it must be on the basis--if not of strictly ,theological assumptions1 at any rate--of the more or less definite recognition of ,design exhibited in the empirically known world4 ,if we find no design in nature1 if the complex processes of the world known to us through experience are conceived as an aimless though orderly drift of change1 the knowledge of these processes and their laws may indeed limit the aims of rational beings1 but ,i cannot conceive how it can determine the ends of their action1 or be a source of unconditional rules of duty4 ,and in fact those who use #8natural' as an ethical notion do commonly suppose that by contemplating the actual play of human impulses1 or the physical constitution of man1 or his social relations1 we may find principles for determining positively and completely the kind of life he was designed to live4 ,i think1 however1 that every attempt thus to derive #8what ought to be' from #8what is' palpably fails1 the moment it is freed from fundamental confusions of thought4 ,for instance1 suppose we seek practical guidance in the conception of human nature regarded as a system of impulses and dispositions1 we must obviously give a special precision to the meaning of 8natural02 since in a sense1 as ,butler observes1 any impulse is natural1 but it is manifestly idle to bid us follow ,nature in this sense3 for the question of duty is never raised except when we are conscious of a conflict of impulses1 and wish to know which to follow4 ,nor does it help us to say that the supremacy of ,reason is ,natural1 as we have started by assuming that what ,reason prescribes is conformity to ,nature1 and thus our line of thought would become circular3 the ,nature that we are to follow must be distinguished from our ,practical ,reason1 if it is to become a guide to it4 ,how then are we to distinguish #8natural impulses'--in the sense in which they are to guide rational choice--from the unnatural8 ,those who have occupied themselves with this distinction seem generally to have interpreted the ,natural to mean either the common as opposed to the rare and exceptional1 or the original as opposed to what is later in development2 or1 negatively1 what is not the effect of human volition4 ,but ,i have never seen any ground for assuming broadly that ,nature abhors the exceptional1 or prefers the earlier in time to the later2 and when we take a retrospective view of the history of the human race1 we find that some impulses which all admire1 such as the love of knowledge and enthusiastic philanthropy1 are both rarer and later in their appearance than others which all judge to be lower4 ,again1 it is obviously unwarrantable to eschew as unnatural and opposed to the ,divine design all such impulses as have been produced in us by the institutions of society1 or our use of human arrangements and contrivances1 or that result in any way from the deliberate action of our fellow-men3 for this were arbitrarily to exclude society and human action from the scope of ,nature's purposes4 ,and besides it is clear that many impulses so generated appear to be either moral or auxiliary to morality and in other ways beneficial3 and though others no doubt are pernicious and misleading1 it seems that we can only distinguish these latter from the former by taking note of their effects1 and not by any precision that reflection can give to the notion of #8natural4' ,if1 again1 we fall back upon a more physical view of our nature and endeavour to ascertain for what end our corporeal frame was constructed1 we find that such contemplation determines very little4 ,we can infer from our nutritive system that we are intended to take food1 and similarly that we are to exercise our various muscles in some way or other1 and our brain and organs of sense4 ,but this carries us a very trifling way1 for the practical question almost always is1 not whether we are to use our organs or leave them unused1 but to what extent or in what manner we are to use them3 and it does not appear that a definite answer to this question can ever be elicited1 by a logical process of inference1 from observations of the human organism1 and the actual physical life of men4 ,if1 finally1 we consider man in his social relations--as father1 son1 neighbour1 citizen--and endeavour to determine the 8natural0 rights and obligations that attach to such relations1 we find that the conception #8natural' presents a problem and not a solution4 ,to an unreflective mind what is customary in social relations usually appears natural2 but no reflective person is prepared to lay down 8conformity to custom0 as a fundamental moral principle3 the problem1 then1 is to find in the rights and obligations established by custom in a particular society at a particular time an element that has a binding force beyond what mere custom can give4 ,and this problem can only be solved by reference to the ultimate good of social existence--whether conceived as happiness or as perfection--or by appealing to some intuitively known principle of social duty1 other than the principle of aiming at the happiness or perfection of society4 ,nor1 again1 does it help us to adopt the more modern view of ,nature1 which regards the organic world as exhibiting1 not an aggregate of fixed types1 but a continuous and gradual process of changing life4 ,for granting that this #8evolution'--as the name implies--is not merely a process from old to new1 but a progress from less to more of certain definite characteristics2 it is surely absurd to maintain that we ought therefore to take these characteristics as ,ultimate ,good1 and make it our whole endeavour to accelerate the arrival of an inevitable future4 ,that whatever is to be will be better than what is1 we all hope2 but there seems to be no more reason for summarily identifying #8what ought to be' with #8what certainly will be1' than for finding it in #8what commonly is1' or #8what originally was4' ,on the whole1 it appears to me that no definition that has ever been offered of the ,natural exhibits this notion as really capable of furnishing an independent ethical first principle4 ,and no one maintains that #8natural' like #8beautiful' is a notion that though indefinable is yet clear1 being derived from a simple unanalysable impression4 ,hence ,i see no way of extracting from it a definite practical criterion of the rightness of actions4 #c4 ,the discussion in the preceding section will have shown that not all the different views that are taken of the ultimate reason for doing what is concluded to be right lead to practically different methods of arriving at this conclusion4 ,indeed we find that almost any method may be connected with almost any ultimate reason by means of some--often plausible--assumption4 ,hence arises difficulty in the classification and comparison of ethical systems2 since they often appear to have different affinities according as we consider ,method or ,ultimate ,reason4 ,in my treatment of the subject1 difference of ,method is taken as the paramount consideration3 and it is on this account that ,i have treated the view in which ,perfection is taken to be the ,ultimate ,end as a variety of the ,intuitionism which determines right conduct by reference to axioms of duty intuitively known2 while ,i have made as marked a separation as possible between ,epicureanism or ,egoistic ,hedonism1 and the ,universalistic or ,benthamite#gc ,hedonism to which ,i propose to restrict the term ,utilitarianism4 ,i am aware that these two latter methods are commonly treated as closely connected3 and it is not difficult to find reasons for this4 ,in the first place1 they agree in prescribing actions as means to an end distinct from1 and lying outside the actions2 so that they both lay down rules which are not absolute but relative1 and only valid if they conduce to the end4 ,again1 the ultimate end is according to both methods the same in quality1 i4e4 pleasure2 or1 more strictly1 the maximum of pleasure attainable1 pains being subtracted4 ,besides1 it is of course to a great extent true that the conduct recommended by the one principle coincides with that inculcated by the other4 ,though it would seem to be only in an ideal polity that #8self-interest well understood' leads to the perfect discharge of all social duties1 still1 in a tolerably well-ordered community it prompts to the fulfilment of most of them1 unless under very exceptional circumstances4 ,and1 on the other hand1 a ,universalistic ,hedonist may reasonably hold that his own happiness is that portion of the universal happiness which it is most in his power to promote1 and which therefore is most especially entrusted to his charge4 ,and the practical blending of the two systems is sure to go beyond their theoretical coincidence4 ,it is much easier for a man to move in a sort of diagonal between ,egoistic and ,universalistic ,hedonism1 than to be practically a consistent adherent of either4 ,few men are so completely selfish1 whatever their theory of morals may be1 as not occasionally to promote the happiness of others from natural sympathetic impulse unsupported by ,epicurean calculation4 ,and probably still fewer are so resolutely unselfish as never to find 8all men's good0 in their own with rather too ready conviction4 ,further1 from ,bentham's psychological doctrine1 that every human being always does aim at his own greatest apparent happiness1 it seems to follow that it is useless to point out to a man the conduct that would conduce to the general happiness1 unless you convince him at the same time that it would conduce to his own4 ,hence on this view1 egoistic and universalistic considerations must necessarily be combined in any practical treatment of morality3 and this being so1 it was perhaps to be expected that ,bentham#gd or his disciples would go further1 and attempt to base on the ,egoism which they accept as inevitable the ,universalistic ,hedonism which they approve and inculcate4 ,and accordingly we find that ,j4 ,s4 ,mill does try to establish a logical connexion between the psychological and ethical principles which he holds in common with ,bentham1 and to convince his readers that because each man naturally seeks his own happiness1 therefore he ought to seek the happiness of other people4#ge ,nevertheless1 it seems to me undeniable that the practical affinity between ,utilitarianism and ,intuitionism is really much greater than that between the two forms of ,hedonism4 ,my grounds for holding this will be given at length in subsequent chapters4 ,here ,i will only observe that many moralists who have maintained as practically valid the judgments of right and wrong which the ,common ,sense of mankind seems intuitively to enunciate1 have yet regarded ,general ,happiness as an end to which the rules of morality are the best means1 and have held that a knowledge of these rules was implanted by ,nature or revealed by ,god for the attainment of this end4 ,such a belief implies that1 though ,i am bound to take1 as my ultimate standard in acting1 conformity to a rule which is for me absolute1 still the natural or ,divine reason for the rule laid down is ,utilitarian4 ,on this view1 the method of ,utilitarianism is certainly rejected3 the connexion between right action and happiness is not ascertained by a process of reasoning4 ,but we can hardly say that the ,utilitarian principle is altogether rejected3 rather the limitations of the human reason are supposed to prevent it from apprehending adequately the real connexion between the true principle and the right rules of conduct4 ,this connexion1 however1 has always been to a large extent recognised by all reflective persons4 ,indeed1 so clear is it that in most cases the observance of the commonly received moral rules tends to render human life tranquil and happy1 that even moralists 7as ,whewell7 who are most strongly opposed to ,utilitarianism have1 in attempting to exhibit the 8necessity0 of moral rules1 been led to dwell on utilitarian considerations4 ,and during the first period of ethical controversy in modern ,england1 after the audacious enunciation of ,egoism by ,hobbes had roused in real earnest the search for a philosophical basis of morality1 ,utilitarianism appears in friendly alliance with ,intuitionism4 ,it was not to supersede but to support the morality of ,common ,sense1 against the dangerous innovations of ,hobbes1 that ,cumberland declared 8the common good#gf of all ,rationals0 to be the end to which moral rules were the means4 ,we find him quoted with approval by ,clarke1 who is commonly taken to represent ,intuitionism in an extreme form4 ,nor does ,shaftesbury1 in introducing the theory of a 8moral sense10 seem to have dreamt that it could ever impel us to actions not clearly conducive to the ,good#gf of the ,whole3 and his disciple ,hutcheson expressly identified its promptings with those of ,benevolence4 ,butler1 ,i think1 was our first influential writer who dwelt on the discrepancies between ,virtue as commonly understood and 8conduct likeliest to produce an overbalance of happiness40#gg ,when ,hume presented ,utilitarianism as a mode of explaining current morality1 it was seen or suspected to have a partially destructive tendency4 ,but it was not till the time of ,paley and ,bentham that it was offered as a method for determining conduct1 which was to overrule all traditional precepts and supersede all existing moral sentiments4 ,and even this final antagonism relates rather to theory and method than to practical results3 practical conflict1 in ordinary human minds1 is mainly between ,self-interest and ,social ,duty however determined4 ,indeed1 from a practical point of view the principle of aiming at the 8greatest happiness of the greatest number0 is prima facie more definitely opposed to ,egoism than the ,common-,sense morality is4 ,for this latter seems to leave a man free to pursue his own happiness under certain definite limits and conditions3 whereas ,utilitarianism seems to require a more comprehensive and unceasing subordination of self-interest to the common good4 ,and thus1 as ,mill remarks1 ,utilitarianism is sometimes attacked from two precisely opposite sides3 from a confusion with ,egoistic ,hedonism it is called base and grovelling2 while at the same time it is more plausibly charged with setting up too high a standard of unselfishness and making exaggerated demands on human nature4 ,a good deal remains to be said1 in order to make the principle and method of ,utilitarianism perfectly clear and explicit3 but it seems best to defer this till we come to the investigation of its details4 ,it will be convenient to take this as the final stage of our examination of methods4 ,for on the one hand it is simpler that the discussion of ,egoistic should precede that of ,universalistic ,hedonism2 and on the other1 it seems desirable that we should obtain in as exact a form as possible the enunciations of ,intuitive ,morality1 before we compare these with the results of the more doubtful and difficult calculations of utilitarian consequences4 ,in the remaining chapters of this ,book ,i shall endeavour to remove certain ambiguities as to the general nature and relations of the other two methods1 as designated respectively by the terms ,egoism and ,intuitionism1 before proceeding to the fuller examination of them in ,books ii4 and iii4 ,,note4--,i have called the ethical doctrine that takes universal happiness as the ultimate end and standard of right conduct by the name of ,bentham1 because the thinkers who have chiefly taught this doctrine in ,england during the present century have referred it to ,bentham as their master4 ,and it certainly seems to me clear--though ,mr4 ,bain 7cf4 ,mind1 ,january #ahhc1 p4 #dh7 appears to doubt it--that ,bentham adopted this doctrine explicitly1 in its most comprehensive scope1 at the earliest stage in the formation of his opinions2 nor do ,i think that he ever consciously abandoned or qualified it4 ,we find him writing in his common-place book1 in #aggc-d 7cf4 ,works1 ,bowring's edition1 vol4 x4 p4 #gj71 that ,helvetius had 8established a standard of rectitude for actions02--the standard being that 8a sort of action is a right one1 when the tendency of it is to augment the mass of happiness in the community40 ,and we find him writing fifty years later 7cf4 ,works1 vol4 x4 p4 #gi7 the following account of his earliest view1 in a passage which contains no hint of later dissent from it3--8,by an early pamphlet of ,priestley's 444 light was added to the warmth4 ,in the phrase #8the greatest happiness of the greatest number1' ,i then saw delineated1 for the first time1 a plain as well as a true standard for whatever is right or wrong 444 in human conduct1 whether in the field of morals or of politics40 ,at the same time ,i must admit that in other passages ,bentham seems no less explicitly to adopt ,egoistic ,hedonism as the method of #8private ,ethics1' as distinct from legislation3 and in his posthumous #8,deontology' the two principles appear to be reconciled by the doctrine1 that it is always the individual's true interest1 even from a purely mundane point of view1 to act in the manner most conducive to the general happiness4 ,this latter proposition--which ,i regard as erroneous--is not1 indeed1 definitely put forward in any of the treatises published by ,bentham in his lifetime1 or completely prepared by him for publication3 but it may be inferred from his common-place book that he held it 7see his ,works1 vol4 x4 pp4 #efj1 #efa74 ,,footnotes3 #ga ,as ,i have before said1 the applicability of a method for determining right conduct relatively to an ultimate end--whether ,happiness or ,perfection--does not necessarily depend on the acceptance of the end as prescribed by reason3 it only requires that it should be in some way adopted as ultimate and paramount4 ,i have1 however1 confined my attention in this treatise to ends which are widely accepted as reasonable3 and ,i shall afterwards endeavour to exhibit the self-evident practical axioms which appear to me to be implied in this acceptance4 ,cf4 post1 ,book iii4 chap4 xiii4 #gb ,the notion of #8,self-realisation' will be more conveniently examined in the following chapter3 where ,i shall distinguish different interpretations of the term #8,egoism1' which ,i have taken to denote one of the three principal species of ethical method4 #gc ,see ,note at the end of the chapter4 #gd ,see ,note at the end of the chapter4 #ge ,we shall have occasion to consider ,mill's argument on this point in a subsequent chapter4 ,cf4 post1 ,book iii4 chap4 xiii4 #gf ,it should be observed that neither ,cumberland nor ,shaftesbury uses the term 8,good0 7substantive7 in a purely and exclusively hedonistic sense4 ,but ,shaftesbury uses it mainly in this sense3 and ,cumberland's 8,good0 includes ,happiness as well as ,perfection4 #gg ,see ,dissertation ,,ii4 ,of the ,nature of ,virtue appended to the ,analogy4 ,it may be interesting to notice a gradual change in ,butler's view on this important point4 ,in the first of his ,sermons on ,human ,nature1 published some years before the ,analogy1 he does not notice1 any more than ,shaftesbury and ,hutcheson1 any possible want of harmony between ,conscience and ,benevolence4 ,a note to ,sermon ,,xii41 however1 seems to indicate a stage of transition between the view of the first ,sermon and the view of the ,dissertation4 ,,chapter ,,vii ,,egoism ,,and ,,self-,,love #a4 ,in the preceding chapters ,i have used the term 8,egoism10 as it is most commonly used1 to denote a system which prescribes actions as means to the end of the individual's happiness or pleasure4 ,the ruling motive in such a system is commonly said to be 8self-love40 ,but both terms admit of other interpretations1 which it will be well to distinguish and set aside before proceeding further4 ,for example1 the term 8egoistic0 is ordinarily and not improperly applied to the basis on which ,hobbes attempted to construct morality2 and on which alone1 as he held1 the social order could firmly rest1 and escape the storms and convulsions with which it seemed to be menaced from the vagaries of the unenlightened conscience4 ,but it is not strictly the end of ,egoism as ,i have defined it--greatest attainable pleasure for the individual--but rather 8self-preservation10 which determines the first of those precepts of rational egoism which ,hobbes calls 8,laws of ,nature10 viz41 8,seek peace and ensue it40 ,and in the development of his system we often find that it is ,preservation rather than ,pleasure1 or perhaps a compromise between the two1#gh that is taken as the ultimate end and standard of right conduct4 ,again1 in ,spinoza's view the principle of rational action is necessarily egoistic1 and is 7as with ,hobbes7 the impulse of self-preservation4 ,the individual mind1 says ,spinoza1 like everything else1 strives so far as it is able to continue in its state of being3 indeed this effort is its very essence4 ,it is true that the object of this impulse cannot be separated from pleasure or joy2 because pleasure or joy is 8a passion in which the soul passes to higher perfection40 ,still it is not at ,pleasure that the impulse primarily aims1 but at the mind's ,perfection or ,reality3 as we should now say1 at ,self-realisation or ,self-development4 ,of this1 according to ,spinoza1 the highest form consists in a clear comprehension of all things in their necessary order as modifications of the one ,divine ,being1 and that willing acceptance of all which springs from this comprehension4 ,in this state the mind is purely active1 without any admixture of passion or passivity3 and thus its essential nature is realised or actualised to the greatest possible degree4 ,we perceive that this is the notion of ,self-realisation as defined not only by but for a philosopher3 and that it would mean something quite different in the case of a man of action--such1 for example1 as the reflective dramatist of ,germany introduces exclaiming3 ,ich kann mich nicht ,wie so ein ,wortheld1 so ein ,tugend-,schwtzer ,an meinem ,willen wrmen1 und ,gedanken 444 ,wenn ich nicht wirke mehr1 bin ich vernichtet4#gi ,the artist1 again1 often contemplates his production of the beautiful as a realisation of self3 and moralists of a certain turn of mind1 in all ages1 have similarly regarded the sacrifice of inclination to duty as the highest form of ,self-development2 and held that true self-love prompts us always to obey the commands issued by the governing principle--,reason or ,conscience--within us1 as in such obedience1 however painful1 we shall be realising our truest self4 ,we see1 in short1 that the term ,egoism1 so far as it merely implies that reference is made to self in laying down first principles of conduct1 does not really indicate in any way the substance of such principles4 ,for all our impulses1 high and low1 sensual and moral alike1 are so far similarly related to self1 that--except when two or more impulses come into conscious conflict--we tend to identify ourselves with each as it arises4 ,thus self-consciousness may be prominent in yielding to any impulse3 and egoism1 in so far as it merely implies such prominence1 is a common form applicable to all principles of action4 ,it may be said1 however1 that we do not1 properly speaking1 #8develop' or #8realise' self by yielding to the impulse which happens to be predominant in us2 but by exercising1 each in its due place and proper degree1 all the different faculties1 capacities1 and propensities1 of which our nature is made up4 ,but here there is an important ambiguity4 ,what do we mean by #8due proportion and proper degree'8 ,these terms may imply an ideal1 into conformity with which the individual mind has to be trained1 by restraining some of its natural impulses and strengthening others1 and developing its higher faculties rather than its lower3 or they may merely refer to the original combination and proportion of tendencies in the character with which each is born2 to this1 it may be meant1 we ought to adapt as far as possible the circumstances in which we place ourselves and the functions which we choose to exercise1 in order that we may 8be ourselves10 8live our own life10 etc4 ,according to the former interpretation rational ,self-development is merely another term for the pursuit of ,perfection for oneself3 while in the latter sense it hardly appears that ,self-development 7when clearly distinguished7 is really put forward as an absolute end1 but rather as a means to happiness2 for supposing a man to have inherited propensities clearly tending to his own unhappiness1 no one would recommend him to develop these as fully as possible1 instead of modifying or subduing them in some way4 ,whether actually the best way of seeking happiness is to give free play to one's nature1 we will hereafter consider in the course of our examination of ,hedonism4 ,on the whole1 then1 ,i conclude that the notion of ,self-realisation is to be avoided in a treatise on ethical method1 on account of its indefiniteness3 and for a similar reason we must discard a common account of ,egoism which describes its ultimate end as the #8good' of the individual2 for the term #8good' may cover all possible views of the ultimate end of rational conduct4 ,indeed it may be said that ,egoism in this sense was assumed in the whole ethical controversy of ancient ,greece2 that is1 it was assumed on all sides that a rational individual#hj would make the pursuit of his own good his supreme aim3 the controverted question was whether this ,good was rightly conceived as ,pleasure or ,virtue1 or any tertium quid4 ,nor is the ambiguity removed if we follow ,aristotle in confining our attention to the ,good attainable in human life1 and call this ,well-being 774 ,for we may still argue with the ,stoics1 that virtuous or excellent activities and not pleasures are the elements of which true human ,well-being is composed4 ,indeed ,aristotle himself adopts this view1 so far as to determine the details of ,well-being accordingly3 though he does not1 with the ,stoics1 regard the pursuit of ,virtue and that of ,pleasure as competing alternatives1 holding rather that the 8best pleasure0 is an inseparable concomitant of the most excellent action4 ,even the ,english term ,happiness is not free from a similar ambiguity4#ha ,it seems1 indeed1 to be commonly used in ,bentham's way as convertible with ,pleasure1--or rather as denoting that of which the constituents are pleasures2--and it is in this sense that ,i think it most convenient to use it4 ,sometimes1 however1 in ordinary discourse1 the term is rather employed to denote a particular kind of agreeable consciousness1 which is distinguished from and even contrasted with definite specific pleasures--such as the gratifications of sensual appetite or other keen and vehement desires--as being at once calmer and more indefinite3 we may characterise it as the feeling which accompanies the normal activity of a 8healthy mind in a healthy body10 and of which specific pleasures seem to be rather stimulants than elements4 ,sometimes1 again--though1 ,i think1 with a more manifest divergence from common usage--8happiness0 or 8true happiness0 is understood in a definitely non-hedonistic sense1 as denoting results other than agreeable feelings of any kind4#hb #b4 ,to be clear1 then1 we must particularise as the object of ,self-love1 and ,end of the method which ,i have distinguished as ,egoistic ,hedonism1 ,pleasure1 taken in its widest sense1 as including every species of 8delight10 8enjoyment10 or 8satisfaction02 except so far as any particular species may be excluded by its incompatibility with some greater pleasures1 or as necessarily involving concomitant or subsequent pains4 ,it is thus that ,self-love seems to be understood by ,butler#hc and other ,english moralists after him2 as a desire of one's own pleasure generally1 and of the greatest amount of it obtainable1 from whatever source it may be obtained4 ,in fact1 it is upon this generality and comprehensiveness that the #8authority' and #8reasonableness' attributed to ,self-love in ,butler's system are founded4 ,for satisfaction or pleasure of some kind results from gratifying any impulse2 thus when antagonistic impulses compete for the determination of the ,will1 we are prompted by the desire for pleasure in general to compare the pleasures which we foresee will respectively attend the gratification of either impulse1 and when we have ascertained which set of pleasures is the greatest1 ,self-love or the desire for pleasure in general reinforces the corresponding impulse4 ,it is thus called into play whenever impulses conflict1 and is therefore naturally regulative and directive 7as ,butler argues7 of other springs of action4 ,on this view1 so far as ,self-love operates1 we merely consider the amount of pleasure or satisfaction3 to use ,bentham's illustration1 8quantity of pleasure being equal1 push-pin is as good as poetry40 ,this position1 however1 seems to many offensively paradoxical2 and ,j4 ,s4 ,mill#hd in his development of ,bentham's doctrine thought it desirable to abandon it and to take into account differences in quality among pleasures as well as differences in degree4 ,now here we may observe1 first1 that it is quite consistent with the view quoted as ,bentham's to describe some kinds of pleasure as inferior in quality to others1 if by #8a pleasure' we mean 7as is often meant7 a whole state of consciousness which is only partly pleasurable2 and still more if we take into view subsequent states4 ,for many pleasures are not free from pain even while enjoyed2 and many more have painful consequences4 ,such pleasures are1 in ,bentham's phrase1 8impure03 and as the pain has to be set off as a drawback in valuing the pleasure1 it is in accordance with strictly quantitative measurement of pleasure to call them inferior in kind4 ,and again1 we must be careful not to confound intensity of pleasure with intensity of sensation3 as a pleasant feeling may be strong and absorbing1 and yet not so pleasant as another that is more subtle and delicate4 ,with these explanations1 it seems to me that in order to work out consistently the method that takes pleasure as the sole ultimate end of rational conduct1 ,bentham's proposition must be accepted1 and all qualitative comparison of pleasures must really resolve itself into quantitative4 ,for all pleasures are understood to be so called because they have a common property of pleasantness1 and may therefore be compared in respect of this common property4 ,if1 then1 what we are seeking is pleasure as such1 and pleasure alone1 we must evidently always prefer the more pleasant pleasure to the less pleasant3 no other choice seems reasonable1 unless we are aiming at something besides pleasure4 ,and often when we say that one kind of pleasure is better than another--as 7e4g47 that the pleasures of reciprocated affection are superior in quality to the pleasures of gratified appetite--we mean that they are more pleasant4 ,no doubt we may mean something else3 we may mean1 for instance1 that they are nobler and more elevated1 although less pleasant4 ,but then we are clearly introducing a non-hedonistic ground of preference3 and if this is done1 the method adopted is a perplexing mixture of ,intuitionism and ,hedonism4 ,to sum up3 ,egoism1 if we merely understand by it a method that aims at ,self-realisation1 seems to be a form into which almost any ethical system may be thrown1 without modifying its essential characteristics4 ,and even when further defined ,egoistic ,hedonism1 it is still imperfectly distinguishable from ,intuitionism if quality of pleasures is admitted as a consideration distinct from and overruling quantity4 ,there remains then ,pure or ,quantitative ,egoistic ,hedonism1 which1 as a method essentially distinct from all others and widely maintained to be rational1 seems to deserve a detailed examination4 ,according to this the rational agent regards quantity of consequent pleasure and pain to himself as alone important in choosing between alternatives of action2 and seeks always the greatest attainable surplus of pleasure over pain--which1 without violation of usage1 we may designate as his #8greatest happiness4' ,it seems to be this view and attitude of mind which is most commonly intended by the vaguer terms #8egoism1' #8egoistic'3 and therefore ,i shall allow myself to use these terms in this more precise signification4 ,,footnotes3 #gh ,thus the end for which an individual is supposed to renounce the unlimited rights of the ,state of ,nature is said 7,leviathan1 chap4 xiv47 to be 8nothing else but the security of a man's person in this life1 and the means of preserving life so as not to be weary of it40 #gi ,schiller's ,wallenstein4 #hj ,i shall afterwards try to explain how it comes about that1 in modern thought1 the proposition #8,my own ,good is my only reasonable ultimate end' is not a mere tautology1 even though we define #8,good' as that at which it is ultimately reasonable to aim4 ,cf4 post1 chap4 ix4 and ,book iii4 chaps4 xiii4 xiv4 #ha ,aristotle's selection of to denote what he elsewhere calls 8,human0 or 8,practicable0 good1 and the fact that1 after all1 we have no better rendering for than 8,happiness0 or 8,felicity10 has caused no little misunderstanding of his system4 ,thus when ,stewart 7,philosophy of the ,active and ,moral ,powers1 ,book ii4 chap4 ii47 says that 8by many of the best of the ancient moralists 444 the whole of ethics was reduced to this question 444 ,what is most conducive on the whole to our happiness80 the remark1 if not exactly false1 is certain to mislead his readers2 since by ,stewart1 as by most ,english writers1 8,happiness0 is definitely conceived as consisting of 8,pleasures0 or 8,enjoyments40 #hb ,thus ,green 7,prolegomena to ,ethics1 ,book iii4 chap4 iv4 #bbh7 says1 8,it is the realisation of those objects in which we are mainly interested1 not the succession of enjoyments which we shall experience in realising them1 that forms the definite content of our idea of true happiness1 so far as it has such content at all40 ,cf4 also #bch4 ,it is more remarkable to find ,j4 ,s4 ,mill 7,utilitarianism1 chap4 iv47 declaring that 8money0--no less than 8power0 or 8fame0--comes by association of ideas to be 8a part of happiness10 an 8ingredient in the individual's conception of happiness40 ,but this seems to be a mere looseness of phraseology1 venial in a treatise aiming at a popular style2 since ,mill has expressly said that 8by happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain10 and he cannot mean that money is either the one or the other4 ,in fact he uses in the same passage--as an alternative phrase for 8parts of happiness0--the phrases 8sources of happiness0 and 8sources of pleasure03 and his real meaning is more precisely expressed by these latter terms4 ,that is1 the distinction which he is really concerned to emphasise is that between the state of mind in which money is valued solely as a means of buying other things1 and the state of mind--such as the miser's--in which the mere consciousness of possessing it gives pleasure1 apart from any idea of spending it4 #hc ,see ,sermon ,,xi4 8444 the cool principle of self-love or general desire of our own happiness40 #hd ,utilitarianism1 chap4 ii4 ,,chapter ,,viii ,,intuitionism #a4 ,i have used the term #8,intuitional' to denote the view of ethics which regards as the practically ultimate end of moral actions their conformity to certain rules or dictates#he of ,duty unconditionally prescribed4 ,there is1 however1 considerable ambiguity as to the exact antithesis implied by the terms #8intuition1' #8intuitive1' and their congeners1 as currently used in ethical discussion1 which we must now endeavour to remove4 ,writers who maintain that we have #8intuitive knowledge' of the rightness of actions usually mean that this rightness is ascertained by simply 8looking at0 the actions themselves1 without considering their ulterior consequences4 ,this view1 indeed1 can hardly be extended to the whole range of duty2 since no morality ever existed which did not consider ulterior consequences to some extent4 ,prudence or ,forethought has commonly been reckoned a virtue3 and all modern lists of ,virtues have included ,rational ,benevolence1 which aims at the happiness of other human beings generally1 and therefore necessarily takes into consideration even remote effects of actions4 ,it must be observed1 too1 that it is difficult to draw the line between an act and its consequences3 as the effects consequent on each of our volitions form a continuous series of indefinite extension1 and we seem to be conscious of causing all these effects1 so far as at the moment of volition we foresee them to be probable4 ,however1 we find that in the common notions of different kinds of actions1 a line is actually drawn between the results included in the notion and regarded as forming part of the act1 and those considered as its consequences4 ,for example1 in speaking truth to a jury1 ,i may possibly foresee that my words1 operating along with other statements and indications1 will unavoidably lead them to a wrong conclusion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused1 as certainly as ,i foresee that they will produce a right impression as to the particular matter of fact to which ,i am testifying3 still1 we should commonly consider the latter foresight or intention to determine the nature of the act as an act of veracity1 while the former merely relates to a consequence4 ,we must understand then that the disregard of consequences1 which the ,intuitional view is here taken to imply1 only relates to certain determinate classes of action 7such as ,truth-speaking7 where common usage of terms adequately defines what events are to be included in the general notions of the acts1 and what regarded as their consequences4 ,but again3 we have to observe that men may and do judge remote as well as immediate results to be in themselves good1 and such as we ought to seek to realise1 without considering them in relation to the feelings of sentient beings4 ,i have already assumed this to be the view of those who adopt the general ,perfection1 as distinct from the ,happiness1 of human society as their ultimate end2 and it would seem to be the view of many who concentrate their efforts on some more particular results1 other than morality1 such as the promotion of ,art or ,knowledge4 ,such a view1 if expressly distinguished from ,hedonism1 might properly be classed as ,intuitional1 but in a sense wider than that defined in the preceding paragraph3 i4e4 it would be meant that the results in question are judged to be good immediately1 and not by inference from experience of the pleasures which they produce4 ,we have1 therefore1 to admit a wider use of #8,intuition1' as equivalent to #8immediate judgment as to what ought to be done or aimed at4' ,it should1 however1 be observed that the current contrast between #8intuitive' or #8a priori' and #8inductive' or #8a posteriori' morality commonly involves a certain confusion of thought4 ,for what the #8inductive' moralist professes to know by induction1 is commonly not the same thing as what the #8intuitive' moralist professes to know by intuition4 ,in the former case it is the conduciveness to pleasure of certain kinds of action that is methodically ascertained3 in the latter case1 their rightness3 there is therefore no proper opposition4 ,if ,hedonism claims to give authoritative guidance1 this can only be in virtue of the principle that pleasure is the only reasonable ultimate end of human action3 and this principle cannot be known by induction from experience4 ,experience can at most tell us that all men always do seek pleasure as their ultimate end 7that it does not support this conclusion ,i have already tried to show73 it cannot tell us that any one ought so to seek it4 ,if this latter proposition is legitimately affirmed in respect either of private or of general happiness1 it must either be immediately known to be true1--and therefore1 we may say1 a moral intuition--or be inferred ultimately from premises which include at least one such moral intuition2 hence either species of ,hedonism1 regarded from the point of view primarily#hf taken in this treatise1 might be legitimately said to be in a certain sense #8intuitional4' ,it seems1 however1 to be the prevailing opinion of ordinary moral persons1 and of most of the writers who have maintained the existence of moral intuitions1 that certain kinds of actions are unconditionally prescribed without regard to ulterior consequences3 and ,i have accordingly treated this doctrine as a distinguishing characteristic of the ,intuitional method1 during the main#hg part of the detailed examination of that method which ,i attempt in ,book iii4 #b4 ,further2 the common antithesis between #8intuitive' and #8inductive' morality is misleading in another way3 since a moralist may hold the rightness of actions to be cognisable apart from the pleasure produced by them1 while yet his method may be properly called ,inductive4 ,for he may hold that1 just as the generalisations of physical science rest on particular observations1 so in ethics general truths can only be reached by induction from judgments or perceptions relating to the rightness or wrongness of particular acts4 ,for example1 when ,socrates is said by ,aristotle to have applied inductive reasoning to ethical questions1 it is this kind of induction which is meant4#hh ,he discovered1 as we are told1 the latent ignorance of himself and other men3 that is1 that they used general terms confidently1 without being able1 when called upon1 to explain the meaning of those terms4 ,his plan for remedying this ignorance was to work towards the true definition of each term1 by examining and comparing different instances of its application4 ,thus the definition of ,justice would be sought by comparing different actions commonly judged to be just1 and framing a general proposition that would harmonise with all these particular judgments4 ,so again1 in the popular view of ,conscience it seems to be often implied that particular judgments are the most trustworthy4 #8,conscience' is the accepted popular term for the faculty of moral judgment1 as applied to the acts and motives of the person judging2 and we most commonly think of the dictates of conscience as relating to particular actions4 ,thus when a man is bidden1 in any particular case1 to #8trust to his conscience1' it commonly seems to be meant that he should exercise a faculty of judging morally this particular case without reference to general rules1 and even in opposition to conclusions obtained by systematic deduction from such rules4 ,and it is on this view of ,conscience that the contempt often expressed for #8,casuistry' may be most easily justified3 for if the particular case can be satisfactorily settled by conscience without reference to general rules1 #8,casuistry1' which consists in the application of general rules to particular cases1 is at best superfluous4 ,but then1 on this view1 we shall have no practical need of any such general rules1 or of scientific ,ethics at all4 ,we may of course form general propositions by induction from these particular conscientious judgments1 and arrange them systematically3 but any interest which such a system may have will be purely speculative4 ,and this accounts1 perhaps1 for the indifference or hostility to systematic morality shown by some conscientious persons4 ,for they feel that they can at any rate do without it3 and they fear that the cultivation of it may place the mind in a wrong attitude in relation to practice1 and prove rather unfavourable than otherwise to the proper development of the practically important faculty manifested or exercised in particular moral judgments4 ,the view above described may be called1 in a sense1 #8ultra-intuitional1' since1 in its most extreme form1 it recognises simple immediate intuitions alone and discards as superfluous all modes of reasoning to moral conclusions3 and we may find in it one phase or variety of the ,intuitional method1--if we may extend the term #8method' to include a procedure that is completed in a single judgment4 #c4 ,but though probably all moral agents have experience of such particular intuitions1 and though they constitute a great part of the moral phenomena of most minds1 comparatively few are so thoroughly satisfied with them1 as not to feel a need of some further moral knowledge even from a strictly practical point of view4 ,for these particular intuitions do not1 to reflective persons1 present themselves as quite indubitable and irrefragable3 nor do they always find when they have put an ethical question to themselves with all sincerity1 that they are conscious of clear immediate insight in respect of it4 ,again1 when a man compares the utterances of his conscience at different times1 he often finds it difficult to make them altogether consistent3 the same conduct will wear a different moral aspect at one time from that which it wore at another1 although our knowledge of its circumstances and conditions is not materially changed4 ,further1 we become aware that the moral perceptions of different minds1 to all appearance equally competent to judge1 frequently conflict3 one condemns what another approves4 ,in this way serious doubts are aroused as to the validity of each man's particular moral judgments3 and we are led to endeavour to set these doubts at rest by appealing to general rules1 more firmly established on a basis of common consent4 ,and in fact1 though the view of conscience above discussed is one which much popular language seems to suggest1 it is not that which ,christian and other moralists have usually given4 ,they have rather represented the process of conscience as analogous to one of jural reasoning1 such as is conducted in a ,court of ,law4 ,here we have always a system of universal rules given1 and any particular action has to be brought under one of these rules before it can be pronounced lawful or unlawful4 ,now the rules of positive law are usually not discoverable by the individual's reason3 this may teach him that law ought to be obeyed1 but what law is must1 in the main1 be communicated to him from some external authority4 ,and this is not unfrequently the case with the conscientious reasoning of ordinary persons when any dispute or difficulty forces them to reason3 they have a genuine impulse to conform to the right rules of conduct1 but they are not conscious1 in difficult or doubtful cases1 of seeing for themselves what these are3 they have to inquire of their priest1 or their sacred books1 or perhaps the common opinion of the society to which they belong4 ,in so far as this is the case we cannot strictly call their method ,intuitional4 ,they follow rules generally received1 not intuitively apprehended4 ,other persons1 however 7or perhaps all to some extent71 do seem to see for themselves the truth#hi and bindingness of all or most of these current rules4 ,they may still put forward #8common consent' as an argument for the validity of these rules3 but only as supporting the individual's intuition1 not as a substitute for it or as superseding it4 ,here then we have a second ,intuitional ,method3 of which the fundamental assumption is that we can discern certain general rules with really clear and finally valid intuition4 ,it is held that such general rules are implicit in the moral reasoning of ordinary men1 who apprehend them adequately for most practical purposes1 and are able to enunciate them roughly2 but that to state them with proper precision requires a special habit of contemplating clearly and steadily abstract moral notions4 ,it is held that the moralist's function then is to perform this process of abstract contemplation1 to arrange the results as systematically as possible1 and by proper definitions and explanations to remove vagueness and prevent conflict4 ,it is such a system as this which seems to be generally intended when ,intuitive or a priori morality is mentioned1 and which will chiefly occupy us in ,book iii4 #d4 ,by philosophic minds1 however1 the #8,morality of ,common ,sense' 7as ,i have ventured to call it71 even when made as precise and orderly as possible1 is often found unsatisfactory as a system1 although they have no disposition to question its general authority4 ,it is found difficult to accept as scientific first principles the moral generalities that we obtain by reflection on the ordinary thought of mankind1 even though we share this thought4 ,even granting that these rules can be so defined as perfectly to fit together and cover the whole field of human conduct1 without coming into conflict and without leaving any practical questions unanswered1--still the resulting code seems an accidental aggregate of precepts1 which stands in need of some rational synthesis4 ,in short1 without being disposed to deny that conduct commonly judged to be right is so1 we may yet require some deeper explanation why it is so4 ,from this demand springs a third species or phase of ,intuitionism1 which1 while accepting the morality of common sense as in the main sound1 still attempts to find for it a philosophic basis which it does not itself offer3 to get one or more principles more absolutely and undeniably true and evident1 from which the current rules might be deduced1 either just as they are commonly received or with slight modifications and rectifications4#ij ,the three phases of ,intuitionism just described may be treated as three stages in the formal development of ,intuitive ,morality3 we may term them respectively ,perceptional1 ,dogmatic1 and ,philosophical4 ,the last-mentioned ,i have only defined in the vaguest way3 in fact1 as yet ,i have presented it only as a problem1 of which it is impossible to foresee how many solutions may be attempted3 but it does not seem desirable to investigate it further at present1 as it will be more satisfactorily studied after examining in detail the ,morality of ,common ,sense4 ,it must not be thought that these three phases are sharply distinguished in the moral reasoning of ordinary men3 but then no more is ,intuitionism of any sort sharply distinguished from either species of ,hedonism4 ,a loose combination or confusion of methods is the most common type of actual moral reasoning4 ,probably most moral men believe that their moral sense or instinct in any case will guide them fairly right1 but also that there are general rules for determining right action in different departments of conduct3 and that for these again it is possible to find a philosophical explanation1 by which they may be deduced from a smaller number of fundamental principles4 ,still for systematic direction of conduct1 we require to know on what judgments we are to rely as ultimately valid4 ,so far ,i have been mainly concerned with differences in intuitional method due to difference of generality in the intuitive beliefs recognised as ultimately valid4 ,there is1 however1 another class of differences arising from a variation of view as to the precise quality immediately apprehended in the moral intuition4 ,these are peculiarly subtle and difficult to fix in clear and precise language1 and ,i therefore reserve them for a separate chapter4 ,,note4--,intuitional moralists have not always taken sufficient care in expounding their system to make clear whether they regard as ultimately valid1 moral judgments on single acts1 or general rules prescribing particular kinds of acts1 or more universal and fundamental principles4 ,for example1 ,dugald ,stewart uses the term 8perception0 to denote the immediate operation of the moral faculty2 at the same time1 in describing what is thus perceived1 he always seems to have in view general rules4 ,still we can tolerably well distinguish among ,english ethical writers those who have confined themselves mainly to the definition and arrangement of the ,morality of ,common ,sense1 from those who have aimed at a more philosophical treatment of the content of moral intuition4 ,and we find that the distinction corresponds in the main to a difference of periods3 and that--what perhaps we should hardly have expected--the more philosophical school is the earlier4 ,the explanation of this may be partly found by referring to the doctrines in antagonism to which1 in the respective periods1 the ,intuitional method asserted and developed itself4 ,in the first period all orthodox moralists were occupied in refuting ,hobbism4 ,but this system1 though based on ,materialism and ,egoism1 was yet intended as ethically constructive4 ,accepting in the main the commonly received rules of social morality1 it explained them as the conditions of peaceful existence which enlightened self-interest directed each individual to obey2 provided only the social order to which they belonged was not merely ideal1 but made actual by a strong government4 ,now no doubt this view renders the theoretical basis of duty seriously unstable2 still1 assuming a decently good government1 ,hobbism may claim to at once explain and establish1 instead of undermining1 the morality of ,common ,sense4 ,and therefore1 though some of ,hobbes' antagonists 7as ,cudworth7 contented themselves with simply reaffirming the absoluteness of morality1 the more thoughtful felt that system must be met by system and explanation by explanation1 and that they must penetrate beyond the dogmas of common sense to some more irrefragable certainty4 ,and so1 while ,cumberland found this deeper basis in the notion of 8the common good of all ,rationals0 as an ultimate end1 ,clarke sought to exhibit the more fundamental of the received rules as axioms of perfect self-evidence1 necessarily forced upon the mind in contemplating human beings and their relations4 ,clarke's results1 however1 were not found satisfactory3 and by degrees the attempt to exhibit morality as a body of scientific truth fell into discredit1 and the disposition to dwell on the emotional side of the moral consciousness became prevalent4 ,but when ethical discussion thus passed over into psychological analysis and classification1 the conception of the objectivity of duty1 on which the authority of moral sentiment depends1 fell gradually out of view3 for example1 we find ,hutcheson asking why the moral sense should not vary in different human beings1 as the palate does1 without dreaming that there is any peril to morality in admitting such variations as legitimate4 ,when1 however1 the new doctrine was endorsed by the dreaded name of ,hume1 its dangerous nature1 and the need of bringing again into prominence the cognitive element of moral consciousness1 were clearly seen3 and this work was undertaken as a part of the general philosophic protest of the ,scottish ,school against the ,empiricism that had culminated in ,hume4 ,but this school claimed as its characteristic merit that it met ,empiricism on its own ground1 and showed among the facts of psychological experience which the ,empiricist professed to observe1 the assumptions which he repudiated4 ,and thus in ,ethics it was led rather to expound and reaffirm the morality of ,common ,sense1 than to offer any profounder principles which could not be so easily supported by an appeal to common experience4 ,,footnotes3 #he ,i use the term 8dictates0 to include the view afterwards mentioned 7 #b7 in which the ultimately valid moral imperatives are conceived as relating to particular acts4 #hf ,i have explained in the concluding paragraph of chap4 iii4 that a different view of hedonistic systems is admissible4 #hg ,the wider of the two meanings of #8,intuition' here distinguished is required in treating of ,philosophical ,intuitionism4 ,see ,book iii4 chap4 xiii4 #hh ,it must1 however1 be remembered that ,aristotle regarded the general proposition obtained by induction as really more certain 7and in a higher sense knowledge7 than the particulars through which the mind is led up to it4 #hi ,strictly speaking1 the attributes of truth and falsehood only belong formally to ,rules when they are changed from the imperative mood 78,do ,x07 into the indicative 78,x ought to be done074 #ij ,it should be observed that such principles will not necessarily be 8intuitional0 in the narrower sense that excludes consequences2 but only in the wider sense as being self-evident principles relating to #8what ought to be4' ,,chapter ,,ix ,,good #a4 ,we have hitherto spoken of the quality of conduct discerned by our moral faculty as #8rightness1' which is the term commonly used by ,english moralists4 ,we have regarded this term1 and its equivalents in ordinary use1 as implying the existence of a dictate or imperative of reason1 which prescribes certain actions either unconditionally1 or with reference to some ulterior end4 ,it is1 however1 possible to take a view of virtuous action in which1 though the validity of moral intuitions is not disputed1 this notion of rule or dictate is at any rate only latent or implicit1 the moral ideal being presented as attractive rather than imperative4 ,such a view seems to be taken when the action to which we are morally prompted1 or the quality of character manifested in it1 is judged to be #8good' in itself 7and not merely as a means to some ulterior ,good74 ,this1 as was before noticed1 was the fundamental ethical conception in the ,greek schools of ,moral ,philosophy generally2 including even the ,stoics1 though their system1 from the prominence that it gives to the conception of ,natural ,law1 forms a transitional link between ancient and modern ethics4 ,and this historical illustration may serve to exhibit one important result of substituting the idea of #8goodness' for that of #8rightness' of conduct1 which at first sight might be thought a merely verbal change4 ,for the chief characteristics of ancient ethical controversy as distinguished from modern may be traced to the employment of a generic notion instead of a specific one in expressing the common moral judgments on actions4 ,virtue or ,right action is commonly regarded as only a species of the ,good3 and so1 on this view of the moral intuition1 the first question that offers itself1 when we endeavour to systematise conduct1 is how to determine the relation of this species of good to the rest of the genus4 ,it was on this question that the ,greek thinkers argued1 from first to last4 ,their speculations can scarcely be understood by us unless with a certain effort we throw the quasi-jural notions of modern ethics aside1 and ask 7as they did7 not 8,what is ,duty and what is its ground80 but 8,which of the objects that men think good is truly ,good or the ,highest ,good80 or1 in the more specialised form of the question which the moral intuition introduces1 8,what is the relation of the kind of ,good we call ,virtue1 the qualities of conduct and character which men commend and admire1 to other good things80 ,this1 then1 is the first difference to be noticed between the two forms of the intuitive judgment4 ,in the recognition of conduct as #8right' is involved an authoritative prescription to do it3 but when we have judged conduct to be good1 it is not yet clear that we ought to prefer this kind of good to all other good things3 some standard for estimating the relative values of different #8goods' has still to be sought4 ,i propose1 then1 to examine the import of the notion #8,good' in the whole range of its application2--premising that1 as it is for the constituents of ,ultimate ,good that we require a standard of comparison1 we are not directly concerned with anything that is clearly only good as a means to the attainment of some ulterior end4 ,if1 indeed1 we had only this latter case to consider1 it would be plausible to interpret #8good' without reference to human desire or choice1 as meaning merely #8fit' or #8adapted' for the production of certain effects--a good horse for riding1 a good gun for shooting1 etc4 ,but as we apply the notion also to ultimate ends1 we must seek a meaning for it which will cover both applications4 #b4 ,there is1 however1 a simple interpretation of the term--which is widely maintained to be the true one--according to which everything which we judge to be good is implicitly conceived as a means to the end of pleasure1 even when we do not make in our judgment any explicit reference to this or any other ulterior end4 ,on this view1 any comparison of things in respect of their #8goodness' would seem to be really a comparison of them as sources of pleasure2 so that any attempt to systematise our intuitions of goodness1 whether in conduct and character or in other things1 must reasonably lead us straight to ,hedonism4 ,and no doubt1 if we consider the application of the term1 outside the sphere of character and conduct1 to things that are not definitely regarded as means to the attainment of some ulterior object of desire1 we find a close correspondence between our apprehension of pleasure derived from an object1 and our recognition that the object is in itself #8good4' ,the good things of life are things which give pleasure1 whether sensual or emotional3 as good dinners1 wines1 poems1 pictures1 music3 and this gives a prima facie support to the interpretation of #8good' as equivalent to #8pleasant4' ,i think1 however1 that if we reflect on the application of the term to the cases most analogous to that of conduct--i4e4 to what we may call #8objects of taste'--we shall find that this interpretation of it has not clearly the support of common sense4 ,in the first place1 allowing that the judgment that any object is good of its kind is closely connected with the apprehension of pleasure derived from it1 we must observe that it is generally to a specific kind of pleasure that the affirmation of goodness corresponds2 and that if the object happens to give us pleasure of a different kind1 we do not therefore call it good--at least without qualification4 ,for instance1 we should not call a wine good solely because it was very wholesome2 nor a poem on account of its moral lessons4 ,and hence when we come to consider the meaning of the term #8good' as applied to conduct1 there is no reason1 so far1 to suppose that it has any reference or correspondence to all the pleasures that may result from the conduct4 ,rather the perception of goodness or virtue in actions would seem to be analogous to the perception of beauty#ia in material things3 which is normally accompanied with a specific pleasure which we call #8sthetic1' but has often no discoverable relation to the general usefulness or agreeableness of the thing discerned to be beautiful3 indeed1 we often recognise this kind of excellence in things hurtful and dangerous4 ,but further3 as regards sthetic pleasures1 and the sources of such pleasures that we commonly judge to be good1 it is the received opinion that some persons have more and others less #8good taste'3 and it is only the judgment of persons of good taste that we recognise as valid in respect of the real goodness of the things enjoyed4 ,we think that of his own pleasure each individual is the final judge1 and there is no appeal from his decision1--at least so far as he is comparing pleasures within his actual experience2 but the affirmation of goodness in any object involves the assumption of a universally valid standard1 which1 as we believe1 the judgment of persons to whom we attribute good taste approximately represents4 ,and it seems clear that the term #8good' as applied to #8taste' does not mean #8pleasant'2 it merely imports the conformity of the sthetic judgment so characterised to the supposed ideal1 deviation from which implies error and defect4 ,nor does it appear to be always the person of best taste who derives the greatest enjoyment from any kind of good and pleasant things4 ,we are familiar with the fact that connoisseurs of wines1 pictures1 etc41 often retain their intellectual faculty of appraising the merits of the objects which they criticise1 and deciding on their respective places in the scale of excellence1 even when their susceptibilities to pleasure from these objects are comparatively blunted and exhausted4 ,and more generally we see that freshness and fulness of feeling by no means go along with taste and judgment3 and that a person who possesses the former may derive more pleasure from inferior objects than another may from the best4 ,to sum up3 the general admission that things which are called #8good' are productive of pleasure1 and that the former quality is inseparable in thought from the latter1 does not involve the inference that the common estimates of the goodness of conduct may be fairly taken as estimates of the amount of pleasure resulting from it4 ,for 7#a7 analogy would lead us to conclude that the attribution of goodness1 in the case of conduct as of objects of taste generally1 may correspond not to all the pleasure that is caused by the conduct1 but to a specific pleasure1 in this case the contemplative satisfaction which the conduct causes to a disinterested spectator3 and 7#b7 it may not excite even this specific pleasure generally in proportion to its goodness1 but only 7at most7 in persons of good moral taste3 and even in their case we can distinguish the intellectual apprehension of goodness--which involves the conception of an ideal objective standard--from the pleasurable emotion which commonly accompanies it2 and may suppose the latter element of consciousness diminished almost indefinitely4 ,finally1 when we pass from the adjective to the substantive #8good1' it is at once evident that this latter cannot be understood as equivalent to #8pleasure' or #8happiness' by any persons who affirm--as a significant proposition and not as a mere tautology--that the ,pleasure or ,happiness of human beings is their ,good or ,ultimate ,good4 ,such affirmation1 which would1 ,i think1 be ordinarily made by ,hedonists1 obviously implies that the meaning of the two terms is different1 however closely their denotation may coincide4 ,and it does not seem that any fundamental difference of meaning is implied by the grammatical variation from adjective to substantive4 #c4 ,what then can we state as the general meaning of the term #8good'8 ,shall we say--with ,hobbes1 and many since ,hobbes--that #8whatsoever is the object of any man's ,desire1 that it is which he for his part calleth ,good1 and the object of his aversion1 ,evil'8 ,to simplify the discussion1 we will consider only what a man desires for itself--not as a means to an ulterior result1--and for himself--not benevolently for others3 his own ,good#ib and ultimate ,good4 ,we have first to meet the obvious objection that a man often desires what he knows is on the whole bad for him3 the pleasure of drinking champagne which is sure to disagree with him1 the gratification of revenge when he knows that his true interest lies in reconciliation4 ,the answer is that in such cases the desired result is accompanied or followed by other effects which when they come excite aversion stronger than the desire for the desired effect3 but that these bad effects1 though fore-seen are not fore-felt3 the representation of them does not adequately modify the predominant direction of desire as a present fact4 ,but1 granting this1 and fixing attention solely on the result desired1 apart from its concomitants and consequences--it would still seem that what is desired at any time is1 as such1 merely apparent ,good1 which may not be found good when fruition comes1 or at any rate not so good as it appeared4 ,it may turn out a #8,dead ,sea apple1' mere dust and ashes in the eating3 more often1 fruition will partly correspond to expectation1 but may still fall short of it in a marked degree4 ,and sometimes--even while yielding to the desire--we are aware of the illusoriness of this expectation of #8good' which the desire carries with it4 ,i conclude1 therefore1 that if we are to conceive of the elements of ultimate ,good as capable of quantitative comparison--as we do when we speak of preferring a #8greater' good to a #8lesser1'--we cannot identify the object of desire with #8good' simply1 or #8true good1' but only with #8apparent good4' ,but further3 a prudent man is accustomed to suppress1 with more or less success1 desires for what he regards as out of his power to attain by voluntary action--as fine weather1 perfect health1 great wealth or fame1 etc42 but any success he may have in diminishing the actual intensity of such desires has no effect in leading him to judge the objects desired less #8good4' ,it would seem then1 that if we interpret the notion #8good' in relation to #8desire1' we must identify it not with the actually desired1 but rather with the desirable3--meaning by #8desirable' not necessarily #8what ought to be desired' but what would be desired1 with strength proportioned to the degree of desirability1 if it were judged attainable by voluntary action1 supposing the desirer to possess a perfect forecast1 emotional as well as intellectual1 of the state of attainment or fruition4 ,it still remains possible that the choice of any particular good1 thus defined as an object of pursuit1 may be on the whole bad1 on account of its concomitants and consequences2 even though the particular result when attained is not found other than it was imagined in the condition of previous desire4 ,if1 therefore1 in seeking a definition of #8ultimate ,good' we mean #8good on the whole1' we have--following the line of thought of the preceding paragraph--to express its relation to ,desire differently4 ,in the first place we have to limit our view to desire which becomes practical in volition2 as ,i may still regard as desirable results which ,i judge it on the whole imprudent to aim at4 ,but1 even with this limitation1 the relation of my #8good on the whole' to my desire is very complicated4 ,for it is not even sufficient to say that my ,good on the whole is what ,i should actually desire and seek if all the consequences of seeking it could be foreknown and adequately realised by me in imagination at the time of making my choice4 ,no doubt an equal regard for all the moments of our conscious experience--so far1 at least1 as the mere difference of their position in time is concerned--is an essential characteristic of rational conduct4 ,but the mere fact1 that a man does not afterwards feel for the consequences of an action aversion strong enough to cause him to regret it1 cannot be accepted as a complete proof that he has acted for his #8good on the whole4' ,indeed1 we commonly reckon it among the worst consequences of some kinds of conduct that they alter men's tendencies to desire1 and make them desire their lesser good more than their greater3 and we think it all the worse for a man--even in this world--if he is never roused out of such a condition and lives till death the life of a contented pig1 when he might have been something better4 ,to avoid this objection1 it would have to be said that a man's future good on the whole is what he would now desire and seek on the whole if all the consequences of all the different lines of conduct open to him were accurately foreseen and adequately realised in imagination at the present point of time4 ,this hypothetical composition of impulsive forces involves so elaborate and complex a conception1 that it is somewhat paradoxical to say that this is what we commonly mean when we talk of a man's #8good on the whole4' ,still1 ,i cannot deny that this hypothetical object of a resultant desire supplies an intelligible and admissible interpretation of the terms #8good' 7substantive7 and #8desirable1' as giving philosophical precision to the vaguer meaning with which they are used in ordinary discourse3 and it would seem that a calm comprehensive desire for #8good' conceived somewhat in this way1 though more vaguely1 is normally produced by intellectual comparison and experience in a reflective mind4 ,the notion of #8,good' thus attained has an ideal element3 it is something that is not always actually desired and aimed at by human beings3 but the ideal element is entirely interpretable in terms of fact1 actual or hypothetical1 and does not introduce any judgment of value1 fundamentally distinct from judgments relating to existence2--still less any #8dictate of ,reason4'#ic ,it seems to me1 however1 more in accordance with common sense to recognise--as ,butler does--that the calm desire for my #8good on the whole' is authoritative2 and therefore carries with it implicitly a rational dictate to aim at this end1 if in any case a conflicting desire urges the will in an opposite direction4 ,still we may keep the notion of #8dictate' or #8imperative' merely implicit and latent1--as it seems to be in ordinary judgments as to #8my good' and its opposite--by interpreting #8ultimate good on the whole for me' to mean what ,i should practically desire if my desires were in harmony with reason1 assuming my own existence alone to be considered4 ,on this view1 8ultimate good on the whole10 unqualified by reference to a particular subject1 must be taken to mean what as a rational being ,i should desire and seek to realise1 assuming myself to have an equal concern for all existence4 ,when conduct is judged to be #8good' or #8desirable' in itself1 independently of its consequences1 it is1 ,i conceive1 this latter point of view that is taken4 ,such a judgment differs1 as ,i have said1 from the judgment that conduct is #8right1' in so far as it does not involve a definite precept to perform it2 since it still leaves it an open question whether this particular kind of good is the greatest good that we can under the circumstances obtain4 ,it differs further1 as we may now observe1 in so far as good or excellent actions are not implied to be in our power in the same strict sense as #8right' actions--any more than any other good things3 and in fact there are many excellences of behaviour which we cannot attain by any effort of will1 at least directly and at the moment3 hence we often feel that the recognition of goodness in the conduct of others does not carry with it a clear precept to do likewise1 but rather the vague desire ,that stirs an imitative will4 ,in so far as this is the case ,goodness of ,conduct becomes an ulterior end1 the attainment of which lies outside and beyond the range of immediate volition4 #d4 ,it remains to consider by what standard the value of conduct or character1#id thus intuitively judged to be good in itself1 is to be co-ordinated and compared with that of other good things4 ,i shall not now attempt to establish such a standard2 but a little reflection may enable us to limit considerably the range of comparison for which it is required4 ,for ,i think that if we consider carefully such permanent results as are commonly judged to be good1 other than qualities of human beings1 we can find nothing that1 on reflection1 appears to possess this quality of goodness out of relation to human existence1 or at least to some consciousness or feeling4#ie ,for example1 we commonly judge some inanimate objects1 scenes1 etc4 to be good as possessing beauty1 and others bad from ugliness3 still no one would consider it rational to aim at the production of beauty in external nature1 apart from any possible contemplation of it by human beings4 ,in fact when beauty is maintained to be objective1 it is not commonly meant that it exists as beauty out of relation to any mind whatsoever3 but only that there is some standard of beauty valid for all minds4 ,it may1 however1 be said that beauty and other results commonly judged to be good1 though we do not conceive them to exist out of relation to human beings 7or at least minds of some kind71 are yet so far separable as ends from the human beings on whom their existence depends1 that their realisation may conceivably come into competition with the perfection or happiness of these beings4 ,thus1 though beautiful things cannot be thought worth producing except as possible objects of contemplation1 still a man may devote himself to their production without any consideration of the persons who are to contemplate them4 ,similarly knowledge is a good which cannot exist except in minds2 and yet one may be more interested in the development of knowledge than in its possession by any particular minds2 and may take the former as an ultimate end without regarding the latter4 ,still1 as soon as the alternatives are clearly apprehended1 it will1 ,i think1 be generally held that beauty1 knowledge1 and other ideal goods1 as well as all external material things1 are only reasonably to be sought by men in so far as they conduce either 7#a7 to ,happiness or 7#b7 to the ,perfection or ,excellence of human existence4 ,i say 8human10 for though most utilitarians consider the pleasure 7and freedom from pain7 of the inferior animals to be included in the ,happiness which they take as the right and proper end of conduct1 no one seems to contend that we ought to aim at perfecting brutes1 except as a means to our ends1 or at least as objects of scientific or sthetic contemplation for us4 ,nor1 again1 can we include1 as a practical end1 the existence of beings above the human4 ,we certainly apply the idea of ,good to the ,divine ,existence1 just as we do to ,his work1 and indeed in a pre-eminent manner3 and when it is said that 8we should do all things to the glory of ,god10 it may seem to be implied that the existence of ,god is made better by our glorifying ,him4 ,still this inference when explicitly drawn appears somewhat impious2 and theologians generally recoil from it1 and refrain from using the notion of a possible addition to the ,goodness of the ,divine ,existence as a ground of human duty4 ,nor can the influence of our actions on other extra-human intelligences besides the ,divine be at present made matter of scientific discussion4 ,i shall therefore confidently lay down1 that if there be any ,good other than ,happiness to be sought by man1 as an ultimate practical end1 it can only be the ,goodness1 ,perfection1 or ,excellence of ,human ,existence4 ,how far this notion includes more than ,virtue1 what its precise relation to ,pleasure is1 and to what method we shall be logically led if we accept it as fundamental1 are questions which we shall more conveniently discuss after the detailed examination of these two other notions1 ,pleasure and ,virtue1 in which we shall be engaged in the two following ,books4 ,,footnotes3 #ia ,it is1 however1 necessary to distinguish between the ideas of ,moral ,goodness and ,beauty as applied to human actions3 although there is much affinity between them1 and they have frequently been identified1 especially by the ,greek thinkers4 ,no doubt both the ideas themselves and the corresponding pleasurable emotions1 arising on the contemplation of conduct1 are often indistinguishable3 a noble action affects us like a scene1 a picture1 or a strain of music3 and the delineation of human virtue is an important part of the means which the artist has at his disposal for producing his peculiar effects4 ,still1 on looking closer1 we see not only that there is much good conduct which is not beautiful1 or at least does not sensibly impress us as such2 but even that certain kinds of crime and wickedness have a splendour and sublimity of their own4 ,for example1 such a career as ,csar ,borgia's1 as ,renan says1 is 8beau comme une tempte1 comme un abme40 ,it is true1 ,i think1 that in all such cases the beauty depends upon the exhibition in the criminal's conduct of striking gifts and excellences mingled with the wickedness3 but it does not seem that we can abstract the latter without impairing the sthetic effect4 ,and hence ,i conceive1 we have to distinguish the sense of beauty in conduct from the sense of moral goodness4 #ib ,it would seem that1 according to the common view of #8good1' there are occasions in which an individual's sacrifice of his own good on the whole1 according to the most rational conception of it that he can form1 would apparently realise greater good for others4 ,whether1 indeed1 such a sacrifice is ever really required1 and whether1 if so1 it is truly reasonable for the individual to sacrifice his own good on the whole1 are among the profoundest questions of ethics3 and ,i shall carefully consider them in subsequent chapters 7especially ,book iii4 chap4 xiv474 ,i here only desire to avoid any prejudgment of these questions in my definition of #8my own good4' #ic ,as before said 7chap4 iii4 #d71 so far as my #8good on the whole' is adopted as an end of action1 the notion of #8ought'--implying a dictate or imperative of ,reason--becomes applicable to the necessary or fittest means to the attainment of the adopted end4 #id ,character is only known to us through its manifestation in conduct2 and ,i conceive that in our common recognition of ,virtue as having value in itself1 we do not ordinarily distinguish character from conduct3 we do not raise the question whether character is to be valued for the sake of the conduct in which it is manifested1 or conduct for the sake of the character that it exhibits and develops4 ,how this question should be answered when it is raised will be more conveniently considered at a later stage of the discussion4 ,see ,book iii4 chap4 ii4 #b1 and chap4 xiv4 #a4 #ie ,no doubt there is a point of view1 sometimes adopted with great earnestness1 from which the whole universe and not merely a certain condition of rational or sentient beings is contemplated as #8very good'3 just as the ,creator in ,genesis is described as contemplating it4 ,but such a view can scarcely be developed into a method of ,ethics4 ,for practical purposes1 we require to conceive some parts of the universe as at least less good than they might be4 ,and we do not seem to have any ground for drawing such a distinction between different portions of the non-sentient universe1 considered in themselves and out of relation to conscious or sentient beings4 ,,book ,,ii ,,egoistic ,,hedonism ,,chapter ,i ,,the ,,principle ,,and ,,method ,,of ,,egoism #a4 ,the object of the present ,book is to examine the method of determining reasonable conduct which has been already defined in outline under the name of ,egoism3 taking this term as equivalent to ,egoistic ,hedonism1 and as implying the adoption of his own greatest happiness as the ultimate end of each individual's actions4 ,it may be doubted whether this ought to be included among received 8methods of ,ethics02 since there are strong grounds for holding that a system of morality1 satisfactory to the moral consciousness of mankind in general1 cannot be constructed on the basis of simple ,egoism4 ,in subsequent chapters#if ,i shall carefully discuss these reasons3 at present it seems sufficient to point to the wide acceptance of the principle that it is reasonable for a man to act in the manner most conducive to his own happiness4 ,we find it expressly admitted by leading representatives both of ,intuitionism and of that ,universalistic ,hedonism to which ,i propose to restrict the name of ,utilitarianism4 ,i have already noticed that ,bentham1 although he puts forward the greatest happiness of the greatest number as the 8true standard of right and wrong10 yet regards it as 8right and proper0 that each individual should aim at his own greatest happiness4 ,and ,butler is equally prepared to grant 8that our ideas of happiness and misery are of all our ideas the nearest and most important to us 444 that1 though virtue or moral rectitude does indeed consist in affection to and pursuit of what is right and good as such2 yet1 when we sit down in a cool hour1 we can neither justify to ourselves this or any other pursuit till we are convinced that it will be for our happiness1 or at least not contrary to it40#ig ,and even ,clarke#ih--notwithstanding the emphatic terms in which he has maintained that 8,virtue truly deserves to be chosen for its own sake and ,vice to be avoided0--yet admits that it is 8not truly reasonable that men by adhering to ,virtue should part with their lives1 if thereby they eternally deprived themselves of all possibility of receiving any advantage from that adherence40 ,and1 generally1 in the ages of ,christian faith1 it has been obvious and natural to hold that the realisation of virtue is essentially an enlightened and far-seeing pursuit of ,happiness for the agent4 ,nor has this doctrine been held only by persons of a cold and calculating turn of mind3 we find it urged with emphasis by so chivalrous and high-minded a preacher as ,bishop ,berkeley4 ,no doubt this is only one side or element of the ,christian view3 the opposite doctrine1 that an action done from motives of self-interest is not properly virtuous1 has continually asserted itself as either openly conflicting or in some manner reconciled with the former4 ,still the former1 though less refined and elevated1 seems to have been the commoner view4 ,indeed1 it is hardly going too far to say that common sense assumes that #8interested' actions1 tending to promote the agent's happiness1 are prima facie reasonable3 and that the onus probandi lies with those who maintain that disinterested conduct1 as such1 is reasonable4 ,but1 as has been before said1 in the common notions of #8interest1' #8happiness1' etc41 there is a certain amount of vagueness and ambiguity3 so that in order to fit these terms for the purposes of scientific discussion1 we must1 while retaining the main part of their signification1 endeavour to make it more precise4 ,in my judgment this result is attained if by #8greatest possible ,happiness' we understand the greatest attainable surplus of pleasure over pain2 the two terms being used1 with equally comprehensive meanings1 to include respectively all kinds of agreeable and disagreeable feelings4 ,further1 if this quantitative definition of the end be accepted1 consistency requires that pleasures should be sought in proportion to their pleasantness2 and therefore the less pleasant consciousness must not be preferred to the more pleasant1 on the ground of any other qualities that it may possess4 ,the distinctions of quality that ,mill and others urge may still be admitted as grounds of preference1 but only in so far as they can be resolved into distinctions of quantity4 ,this is the type to which the practical reasoning that is commonly called #8,egoistic' tends to conform1 when we rigorously exclude all ambiguities and inconsistencies3 and it is only in this more precise form that it seems worth while to subject such reasoning to a detailed examination4 ,we must therefore understand by an ,egoist a man who when two or more courses of action are open to him1 ascertains as accurately as he can the amounts of pleasure and pain that are likely to result from each1 and chooses the one which he thinks will yield him the greatest surplus of pleasure over pain4 #b4 ,it must1 however1 be pointed out that the adoption of the fundamental principle of ,egoism1 as just explained1 by no means necessarily implies the ordinary empirical method of seeking one's own pleasure or happiness4 ,a man may aim at the greatest happiness within his reach1 and yet not attempt to ascertain empirically what amount of pleasure and pain is likely to attend any given course of action2 believing that he has some surer1 deductive method for determining the conduct which will make him most happy in the long-run4 ,he may believe this on grounds of ,positive ,religion1 because ,god has promised happiness as a reward for obedience to certain definite commands3 or on grounds of ,natural ,religion1 because ,god being just and benevolent must have so ordered the world that ,happiness will in the long-run be distributed in proportion to ,virtue4 ,it is 7e4g47 by a combination of both these arguments that ,paley connects the ,universalistic ,hedonism that he adopts as a method for determining duties1 with the ,egoism which seems to him self-evident as a fundamental principle of rational conduct4 ,or again1 a man may connect virtue with happiness by a process of a priori reasoning1 purely ethical2 as ,aristotle seems to do by the assumption that the #8best' activity will be always attended by the greatest pleasure as its inseparable concomitant2 #8best' being determined by a reference to moral intuition1 or to the common moral opinions of men generally1 or of well-bred and well-educated men4 ,or the deduction by which ,maximum ,pleasure is inferred to be the result of a particular kind of action may be psychological or physiological3 we may have some general theory as to the connexion of pleasure with some other physical or psychical fact1 according to which we can deduce the amount of pleasure that will attend any particular kind of behaviour3 as 7e4g47 it is widely held that a perfectly healthy and harmonious exercise of our different bodily and mental functions is the course of life most conducive to pleasure in the long-run4 ,in this latter case1 though accepting unreservedly the ,hedonistic principle1 we shall not be called upon to estimate and compare particular pleasures1 but rather to define the notions of #8perfect health' and #8harmony of functions' and consider how these ends may be attained4 ,still those who advocate such deductive methods commonly appeal to ordinary experience1 at least as supplying confirmation or verification2 and admit that the pleasantness and painfulness of pleasures and pains are only directly known to the individual who experiences them4 ,it would seem1 therefore1 that--at any rate--the obvious method of ,egoistic ,hedonism is that which we may call ,empirical-reflective3 and it is this ,i conceive that is commonly used in egoistic deliberation4 ,it will be well1 therefore1 to examine this method in the first instance2 to ascertain clearly the assumptions which it involves1 and estimate the exactness of its results4 ,,footnotes3 #if ,see chap4 iii4 #b1 and chap4 v4 of this ,book4 #ig ,butler1 ,serm4 xi4 #ih ,boyle ,lectures 7#agje74 ,prop4 i4 p4 #aaf4 ,,chapter ,,ii ,,empirical ,,hedonism #a4 ,the first and most fundamental assumption1 involved not only in the empirical method of ,egoistic ,hedonism1 but in the very conception of #8,greatest ,happiness' as an end of action1 is the commensurability of ,pleasures and ,pains4 ,by this ,i mean that we must assume the pleasures sought and the pains shunned to have determinate quantitative relations to each other2 for otherwise they cannot be conceived as possible elements of a total which we are to seek to make as great as possible4 ,it is not absolutely necessary to exclude the supposition that there are some kinds of pleasure so much more pleasant than others1 that the smallest conceivable amount of the former would outweigh the greatest conceivable amount of the latter2 since1 if this were ascertained to be the case1 the only result would be that any hedonistic calculation involving pleasures of the former class might be simplified by treating those of the latter class as practically non-existent4#ii ,i think1 however1 that in all ordinary prudential reasoning1 at any rate1 the assumption is implicitly made that all the pleasures and pains that man can experience bear a finite ratio to each other in respect of pleasantness and its opposite4 ,so far as this ratio can be made definite the ,intensity of a pleasure 7or pain7 can be balanced against its ,duration3#ajj for if we conceive one pleasure 7or pain71 finite in duration1 to be intensively greater than another in some definite ratio1 it seems to be implied in this conception that the latter if continuously increased in extent--without change in its intensity--would at a certain point just balance the former in amount4 ,if pleasures1 then1 can be arranged in a scale1 as greater or less in some finite degree2 we are led to the assumption of a hedonistic zero1 or perfectly neutral feeling1 as a point from which the positive quantity of pleasures may be measured4 ,and this latter assumption emerges still more clearly when we consider the comparison and balancing of pleasures with pains1 which ,hedonism necessarily involves4 ,for pain must be reckoned as the negative quantity of pleasure1 to be balanced against and subtracted from the positive in estimating happiness on the whole2 we must therefore conceive1 as at least ideally possible1 a point of transition in consciousness at which we pass from the positive to the negative4 ,it is not absolutely necessary to assume that this strictly indifferent or neutral feeling ever actually occurs4 ,still experience seems to show that a state at any rate very nearly approximating to it is even common3 and we certainly experience continual transitions from pleasure to pain and vice versa1 and thus 7unless we conceive all such transitions to be abrupt7 we must exist at least momentarily in this neutral state4 ,in what ,i have just said1 ,i have by implication denied the paradox of ,epicurus#aja that the state of painlessness is equivalent to the highest possible pleasure2 so that if we can obtain absolute freedom from pain1 the goal of ,hedonism is reached1 after which we may vary1 but cannot increase1 our pleasure4 ,this doctrine is opposed to common sense and common experience4 ,but it would1 ,i think1 be equally erroneous1 on the other hand1 to regard this neutral feeling--hedonistic zero1 as ,i have called it--as the normal condition of our consciousness1 out of which we occasionally sink into pain1 and occasionally rise into pleasure4 ,nature has not been so niggardly to man as this3 so long as health is retained1 and pain and irksome toil banished1 the mere performance of the ordinary habitual functions of life is1 according to my experience1 a frequent source of moderate pleasures1 alternating rapidly with states nearly or quite indifferent4 ,thus we may venture to say that the #8apathy' which so large a proportion of ,greek moralists in the post-,aristotelian period regarded as the ideal state of existence1 was not really conceived by them as 8without one pleasure and without one pain02 but rather as a state of placid intellectual contemplation1 which in philosophic minds might easily reach a high degree of pleasure4 #b4 ,we have yet to give to the notions of pleasure and pain the precision required for quantitative comparison4 ,in dealing with this point1 and in the rest of the hedonistic discussion1 it will be convenient for the most part to speak of pleasure only1 assuming that pain may be regarded as the negative quantity of pleasure1 and that accordingly any statements made with respect to pleasure may be at once applied1 by obvious changes of phrase1 to pain4 ,the equivalent phrase for ,pleasure1 according to ,mr4 ,spencer1#ajb is 8a feeling which we seek to bring into consciousness and retain there02 and similarly1 ,mr4 ,bain says that 8pleasure and pain1 in the actual or real experience1 are to be held as identical with motive power40 ,but--granting that pleasures normally excite desire--it still does not seem to me that ,i judge pleasures to be greater and less exactly in proportion as they stimulate the will to actions tending to sustain them4 ,of course neither ,mr4 ,bain nor ,mr4 ,spencer must be understood to lay down that all pleasures when actually felt actually stimulate to exertion of some kind2 since this is obviously not true of the pleasures of repose1 a warm bath1 etc4 ,the stimulus must in such cases be understood to be latent and potential2 only becoming actual when action is required to prevent the cessation or diminution of the pleasure4 ,thus a man enjoying rest after fatigue is vaguely conscious of a strong clinging to his actual condition1 and of a latent readiness to resist any impulse to change it4 ,further1 the stimulus of moderate pleasures and pains may become unfelt through habitual repression4 ,for instance1 in a habitually temperate man the stimulus to prolong the pleasure of eating or drinking usually ceases before the pleasure ceases3 it is only occasionally that he feels the need of controlling an impulse to eat or drink up to the point of satiety4 ,so again1 a protracted pain of moderate intensity and free from alarm--such as a dull prolonged toothache--seems sometimes to lose its felt stimulus to action without losing its character as pain4 ,here again the stimulus may be properly conceived as latent3 since if asked whether we should like to get rid of even a mild toothache1 we should certainly answer yes4 ,but even if we confine our attention to cases where the stimulus is palpable and strong1 ,mr4 ,bain's identification of 8pleasure and pain0 with motive power does not appear to me to accord exactly with our common empirical judgments4 ,he himself contrasts the 8disproportionate strain of active powers in one direction10 to which 8any sudden and great delight may give rise10 with the 8proper frame of mind under delight10 which is 8to inspire no endeavours except what the charm of the moment justifies40#ajc ,and he elsewhere explains that 8our pleasurable emotions are all liable to detain the mind unduly10 through the 8atmosphere of excitement0 with which they are surrounded1 carrying the mind 8beyond the estimate of pleasure and pain1 to the state named #8passion1'0 in which a man is not 8moved solely by the strict value of the pleasure10 but also by 8the engrossing power of the excitement40#ajd ,it is true that in such cases ,mr4 ,bain seems to hold that these 8disturbances and anomalies of the will scarcely begin to tell in the actual feeling10#aje but it seems to me clear that exciting pleasures are liable to exercise1 even when actually felt1 a volitional stimulus out of proportion to their intensity as pleasures2 and ,mr4 ,bain himself seems to recognise this in a passage where he says that 8acute pleasures and pains stimulate the will perhaps more strongly than an equivalent stimulation of the massive kind40#ajf ,i also find that some feelings which stimulate strongly to their own removal are either not painful at all or only slightly painful3--e4g4 ordinarily the sensation of being tickled4 ,if this be so1 it is obviously inexact to define pleasure1 for purposes of measurement1 as the kind of feeling that we seek to retain in consciousness4 ,shall we then say that there is a measurable quality of feeling expressed by the word 8pleasure10 which is independent of its relation to volition1 and strictly undefinable from its simplicity8--like the quality of feeling expressed by 8sweet10 of which also we are conscious in varying degrees of intensity4 ,this seems to be the view of some writers3 but1 for my own part1 when ,i reflect on the notion of pleasure1--using the term in the comprehensive sense which ,i have adopted1 to include the most refined and subtle intellectual and emotional gratifications1 no less than the coarser and more definite sensual enjoyments1--the only common quality that ,i can find in the feelings so designated seems to be that relation to desire and volition expressed by the general term 8desirable10 in the sense previously explained4 ,i propose therefore to define ,pleasure--when we are considering its 8strict value0 for purposes of quantitative comparison--as a feeling which1 when experienced by intelligent beings1 is at least implicitly apprehended as desirable or--in cases of comparison--preferable4 ,here1 however1 a new question comes into view4 ,when ,i stated in the preceding chapter1 as a fundamental assumption of ,hedonism1 that it is reasonable to prefer pleasures in proportion to their intensity1 and not to allow this ground of preference to be outweighed by any merely qualitative difference1 ,i implied that the preference of pleasures on grounds of quality as opposed to quantity--as #8higher' or #8nobler'--is actually possible3 and indeed such non-hedonistic preference is commonly thought to be of frequent occurrence4 ,but if we take the definition of pleasure just given--that it is the kind of feeling which we apprehend to be desirable or preferable--it seems to be a contradiction in terms to say that the less pleasant feeling can ever be thought preferable to the more pleasant4 ,this contradiction may be avoided as follows4 ,it will be generally admitted that the pleasantness of a feeling is only directly cognisable by the individual who feels it at the time of feeling it4 ,thus1 though 7as ,i shall presently argue71 in so far as any estimate of pleasantness involves comparison with feelings only represented in idea1 it is liable to be erroneous through imperfections in the representation--still1 no one is in a position to controvert the preference of the sentient individual1 so far as the quality of the present feeling alone is concerned4 ,when1 however1 we judge of the preferable quality 7as #8elevation' or #8refinement'7 of a state of consciousness as distinct from its pleasantness1#ajg we seem to appeal to some common standard which others can apply as well as the sentient individual4 ,hence ,i should conclude that when one kind of pleasure is judged to be qualitatively superior to another1 although less pleasant1 it is not really the feeling itself that is preferred1 but something in the mental or physical conditions or relations under which it arises1 regarded as cognisable objects of our common thought4 ,for certainly if ,i in thought distinguish any feeling from all its conditions and concomitants--and also from all its effects on the subsequent feelings of the same individual or of others--and contemplate it merely as the transient feeling of a single subject2 it seems to me impossible to find in it any other preferable quality than that which we call its pleasantness1 the degree of which is only cognisable directly by the sentient individual4 ,it should be observed that if this definition of pleasure be accepted1 and if1 as before proposed1 #8,ultimate ,good' be taken as equivalent to #8what is ultimately desirable1' the fundamental proposition of ethical ,hedonism has chiefly a negative significance2 for the statement that #8,pleasure is the ,ultimate ,good' will only mean that nothing is ultimately desirable except desirable feeling1 apprehended as desirable by the sentient individual at the time of feeling it4 ,this being so1 it may be urged against the definition that it could not be accepted by a moralist of stoical turn1 who while recognising pleasure as a fact refused to recognise it as in any degree ultimately desirable4 ,but ,i think such a moralist ought to admit an implied judgment that a feeling is per se desirable to be inseparably connected with its recognition as pleasure2 while holding that sound philosophy shows the illusoriness of such judgments4 ,this1 in fact1 seems to have been substantially the view of the ,stoic school4 ,however this may be1 ,i conceive that the preference which pure ,hedonism regards as ultimately rational1 should be defined as the preference of feeling valued merely as feeling1 according to the estimate implicitly or explicitly made by the sentient individual at the time of feeling it2 without any regard to the conditions and relations under which it arises4 ,accordingly we may state as the fundamental assumption of what ,i have called ,quantitative ,hedonism1--implied in the adoption of 8greatest surplus of pleasure over pain0 as the ultimate end1--that all pleasures and pains1 estimated merely as feelings1 have for the sentient individual cognisable degrees of desirability1 positive or negative2 observing further1 that the empirical method of ,hedonism can only be applied so far as we assume that these degrees of desirability are definitely given in experience4 ,there is one more assumption of a fundamental kind1 which is not perhaps involved in the acceptance of the ,hedonistic calculus considered as purely theoretical1 but is certainly implied if it be put forward as a practical method for determining right conduct3 the assumption1 namely1 that we can by foresight and calculation increase our pleasures and decrease our pains4 ,it may perhaps be thought pedantic to state it formally3 and in fact no one will deny that the conditions upon which our pleasures and pains depend are to some extent cognisable by us and within our own control4 ,but1 as we shall see1 it has been maintained that the practice of ,hedonistic observation and calculation has an inevitable tendency to decrease our pleasures generally1 or the most important of them3 so that it becomes a question whether we can gain our greatest happiness by seeking it1 or at any rate by trying to seek it with scientific exactness4 ,,note4--,it is sometimes thought to be a necessary assumption of ,hedonists that a surplus of pleasure over pain is actually attainable by human beings3 a proposition which an extreme pessimist would deny4 ,but the conclusion that life is always on the whole painful would not prove it to be unreasonable for a man to aim ultimately at minimising pain1 if this is still admitted to be possible2 though it would1 no doubt1 render immediate suicide1 by some painless process1 the only reasonable course for a perfect egoist--unless he looked forward to another life4 ,,footnotes3 #ii ,we find it sometimes asserted by persons of enthusiastic and passionate temperament1 that there are feelings so exquisitely delightful1 that one moment of their rapture is preferable to an eternity of agreeable consciousness of an inferior kind4 ,these assertions1 however1 are perhaps consciously hyperbolical1 and not intended to be taken as scientific statements3 but in the case of pain1 it has been deliberately maintained by a thoughtful and subtle writer1 with a view to important practical conclusions1 that 8torture0 so extreme as to be 8incommensurable with moderate pain0 is an actual fact of experience4 7,see 8,a ,chapter in the ,ethics of ,pain10 by the late ,edmund ,gurney1 in a volume of essays entitled ,tertium ,quid47 ,this doctrine1 however1 does not correspond to my own experience2 nor does it appear to me to be supported by the common sense of mankind3--at least ,i do not find1 in the practical forethought of persons noted for caution1 any recognition of the danger of agony such that1 in order to avoid the smallest extra risk of it1 the greatest conceivable amount of moderate pain should reasonably be incurred4 #ajj ,bentham gives four qualities of any pleasure or pain 7taken singly7 as important for purposes of ,hedonistic calculation3 7#a7 ,intensity1 7#b7 ,duration1 7#c7 ,certainty1 7#d7 ,proximity4 ,if we assume 7as above argued7 that ,intensity must be commensurable with ,duration1 the influence of the other qualities on the comparative value of pleasures and pains is not difficult to determine3 for we are accustomed to estimate the value of chances numerically1 and by this method we can tell exactly 7in so far as the degree of uncertainty can be exactly determined7 how much the doubtfulness of a pleasure detracts from its value3 and proximity is a property which it is reasonable to disregard except in so far as it diminishes uncertainty4 ,for my feelings a year hence should be just as important to me as my feelings next minute1 if only ,i could make an equally sure forecast of them4 ,indeed this equal and impartial concern for all parts of one's conscious life is perhaps the most prominent element in the common notion of the rational--as opposed to the merely impulsive--pursuit of pleasure4 #aja ,cf4 ,cic4 de ,fin4 ,book i4 chap4 xi4 #ch4 #ajb ,principles of ,psychology1 ,part ii4 chap4 ix4 #abe4 #ajc ,the ,emotions and the ,will1 #crd ,edition1 p4 #cib4 #ajd ,mental and ,moral ,science1 ,book iv4 chap4 iv4 #d4 #aje ,ibid4 ,book iv4 chap4 v4 #d4 #ajf ,ibid4 ,book iii4 chap4 i4 #h4 #ajg ,it was before observed that by saying that one pleasure is superior in quality to another we may mean that it is preferable when considered merely as pleasant3 in which case difference in kind resolves itself into difference in degree4 ,,chapter ,,iii ,,empirical ,,hedonism--,continued #a4 ,let1 then1 pleasure be defined as feeling which the sentient individual at the time of feeling it implicitly or explicitly apprehends to be desirable2--desirable1 that is1 when considered merely as feeling1 and not in respect of its objective conditions or consequences1 or of any facts that come directly within the cognisance and judgment of others besides the sentient individual4 ,and let it be provisionally assumed that feelings generally can be compared from this point of view1 with sufficient definiteness for practical purposes1 and empirically known to be more or less pleasant in some definite degree4 ,then the empirical-reflective method of ,egoistic ,hedonism will be1 to represent beforehand the different series of feelings that our knowledge of physical and psychical causes leads us to expect from the different lines of conduct that lie open to us2 judge which series1 as thus represented1 appears on the whole preferable1 taking all probabilities into account2 and adopt the corresponding line of conduct4 ,it may be objected that the calculation is too complex for practice2 since any complete forecast of the future would involve a vast number of contingencies of varying degrees of probability1 and to calculate the ,hedonistic value of each of these chances of feeling would be interminable4 ,still we may perhaps reduce the calculation within manageable limits1 without serious loss of accuracy1 by discarding all manifestly imprudent conduct1 and neglecting the less probable and less important contingencies2 as we do in some of the arts that have more definite ends1 such as strategy and medicine4 ,for if the general in ordering a march1 or the physician in recommending a change of abode1 took into consideration all the circumstances that were at all relevant to the end sought1 their calculations would become impracticable2 accordingly they confine themselves to the most important2 and we may deal similarly with the ,hedonistic art of life4 ,there are1 however1 objections urged against the ,hedonistic method which go much deeper2 and by some writers are pressed to the extreme of rejecting the method altogether4 ,a careful examination of these objections seems to be the most convenient way of obtaining a clear view1 both of the method itself and of the results that may reasonably be expected from it4 ,i should1 however1 point out that we are now only concerned with what may be called intrinsic objections to ,egoistic ,hedonism2 arguments1 that is1 against the possibility of obtaining by it the results at which it aims4 ,we are not now to consider whether it is reasonable for an individual to take his own happiness as his ultimate end2 or how far the rules of action deduced from the adoption of this end1 and from the actual conditions of the individual's existence1 will coincide with current opinions as to what is right4 ,these questions1 according to the plan of my work1 are postponed for future consideration3#ajh our sole concern at present is with objections tending to show the intrinsic impracticability of ,hedonism as a rational method4 ,we are met1 in the first place1 by an objection which1 if valid at all1 must be admitted to be decisive4 ,it has been affirmed#aji by ,green that 8pleasure as feeling1 in distinction from its conditions that are not feelings1 cannot be conceived40 ,if so1 ,rational ,hedonism would certainly be impossible3 but the proposition seems equally opposed to common sense1 and to the universal assumption of empirical psychologists2 who1 in investigating elaborately and systematically the conditions1 mental and physical1 of pleasure and pain1 necessarily assume that these feelings can be distinguished in thought from their 8conditions which are not feelings40 ,i also find that the writer himself from whom ,i have quoted1 in a later treatise1#aaj conducts long arguments respecting pleasure which are only intelligible if the distinction between pleasure and its conditions is thoroughly grasped and steadily contemplated4 ,indeed he carries a distinction of this kind to an extreme point of subtlety2 as he requires us to distinguish the 8self-satisfaction sought in all desire that amounts to will0 from the 8pleasure0 that 8there is in all self-satisfaction if attained03 whereas other moralists regard self-satisfaction as a species of pleasure4#aaa ,to maintain that we can distinguish pleasure from self-satisfaction1 and cannot distinguish it from its conditions1 seems to me too violent a paradox to need refutation4 ,it is possible that ,green may only mean that pleasure cannot be thought to exist apart from conditions which are not feelings1 and that it necessarily varies with any variation in its conditions4 ,the statement thus interpreted ,i do not deny3 but it is quite irrelevant to the question whether pleasure can be estimated separately from its conditions1 or whether pleasures received under different conditions can be quantitatively compared4 ,i cannot have the pleasure of witnessing a tragedy or the pleasure of witnessing a farce1 without having along with either a complex of innumerable thoughts and images1 very diverse in quality in the two cases3 but this does not prevent me from deciding confidently whether the tragedy or the farce will afford me most pleasure on the whole4 ,i pass to another objection made by the same writer to the ,hedonistic conception of the supreme end of action as 8the greatest possible sum of pleasures40 7,it should be 8the greatest possible surplus of pleasure over pain03 but the difference is unimportant for the present argument47 ,the phrase1 he says1 is 8intrinsically unmeaning03 but his justification for this statement appears to be different in different treatises4 ,at first he boldly affirmed that 8pleasant feelings are not quantities that can be added10#aab apparently because 8each is over before the other begins40 ,the latter statement1 however1 is equally true of the parts of time3 but it would be obviously absurd to say that hours1 days1 years are 8not quantities that can be added40 ,possibly this consideration occurred to ,green before writing the ,prolegomena to ,ethics3 at any rate in the latter treatise he admits that states 8of pleasant feeling0 can be added together in 8thought10 only denying that they can be added 8in enjoyment or imagination of enjoyment40#aac ,but this concedes all that is required for the ,hedonistic valuation of future feelings2 no ,hedonist ever supposed that the happiness he aims at making as great as possible was something to be enjoyed all at once1 or ever wanted to imagine it as so enjoyed4 ,and unless the transiency of pleasure diminishes its pleasantness--a point which ,i will presently consider--,i cannot see that the possibility of realising the ,hedonistic end is at all affected by the necessity of realising it in successive parts4 ,green1 in another passage1#aad appears to lay down that 8an end0 which is 8to serve the purpose of a criterion0 must 8enable us to distinguish actions that bring men nearer to it from those which do not40 ,this1 however1 would only be the case if by an 8end0 is necessarily meant a goal or consummation1 which1 after gradually drawing nearer to it1 we reach all at once3 but this is not1 ,i conceive1 the sense in which the word is ordinarily understood by ethical writers3 and certainly all that ,i mean by it is an object of rational aim--whether attained in successive parts or not--which is not sought as a means to the attainment of any ulterior object1 but for itself4 ,and so long as any one's prospective balance of pleasure over pain admits of being made greater or less by immediate action in one way or another1#aae there seems no reason why #8,maximum ,happiness' should not provide as serviceable a criterion of conduct as any #8chief good' capable of being possessed all at once1 or in some way independent of the condition of time4 #b4 ,if1 however1 it be maintained1 that the consciousness of the transiency of pleasure either makes it less pleasant at the time or causes a subsequent pain1 and that the deliberate and systematic pursuit of pleasure tends to intensify this consciousness2 the proposition1 if borne out by experience1 would certainly constitute a relevant objection to the method of ,egoistic ,hedonism4 ,and this view would seem to be in the mind of the writer above quoted 7though it is nowhere clearly put forward73 since he affirms that it is 8impossible that self-satisfaction should be found in any succession of pleasures02#aaf as self-satisfaction being 8satisfaction for a self that abides and contemplates itself as abiding0 must be at least relatively permanent3#aag and it is1 ,i suppose1 implied that the disappointment of the ,hedonist1 who fails to find self-satisfaction where he seeks for it1 is attended with pain or loss of pleasure4#aah ,if this be so1 and if the self-satisfaction thus missed can be obtained by the resolute adoption of some other principle of action1 it would certainly seem that the systematic pursuit of pleasure is in some danger of defeating itself3 it is therefore important to consider carefully how far this is really the case4 ,so far as my own experience goes1 it does not appear to me that the mere transiency of pleasures is a serious source of discontent1 so long as one has a fair prospect of having as valuable pleasures in the future as in the past--or even so long as the life before one has any substantial amount of pleasure to offer4 ,but ,i do not doubt that an important element of happiness1 for all or most men1 is derived from the consciousness of possessing 8relatively permanent0 sources of pleasure--whether external1 as wealth1 social position1 family1 friends2 or internal1 as knowledge1 culture1 strong and lively interest in the wellbeing of fairly prosperous persons or institutions4 ,this1 however1 does not1 in my opinion1 constitute an objection to ,hedonism3 it rather seems obvious1 from the hedonistic point of view1 that 8as soon as intelligence discovers that there are fixed objects1 permanent sources of pleasure1 and large groups of enduring interests1 which yield a variety of recurring enjoyments1 the rational will1 preferring the greater to the less1 will unfailingly devote its energies to the pursuit of these40#aai ,it may be replied that if these permanent sources of pleasure are consciously sought merely as a means to the hedonistic end1 they will not afford the happiness for which they are sought4 ,with this ,i to some extent agree2 but ,i think that if the normal complexity of our impulses be duly taken into account1 this statement will be found not to militate against the adoption of ,hedonism1 but merely to signalise a danger against which the ,hedonist has to guard4 ,in a previous chapter#abj ,i have1 after ,butler1 laid stress on the difference between impulses that are1 strictly speaking1 directed towards pleasure1 and #8extra-regarding' impulses which do not aim at pleasure1--though much1 perhaps most1 of our pleasure consists in the gratification of these latter1 and therefore depends upon their existence4 ,i there argued that in many cases the two kinds of impulse are so far incompatible that they do not easily coexist in the same moment of consciousness4 ,i added1 however1 that in the ordinary condition of our activity the incompatibility is only momentary1 and does not prevent a real harmony from being attained by a sort of alternating rhythm of the two impulses in consciousness4 ,still it seems undeniable that this harmony is liable to be disturbed2 and that while on the one hand individuals may and do sacrifice their greatest apparent happiness to the gratification of some imperious particular desire1 so1 on the other hand1 self-love is liable to engross the mind to a degree incompatible with a healthy and vigorous outflow of those #8disinterested' impulses towards particular objects1 the pre-existence of which is necessary to the attainment1 in any high degree1 of the happiness at which self-love aims4 ,i should not1 however1 infer from this that the pursuit of pleasure is necessarily self-defeating and futile2 but merely that the principle of ,egoistic ,hedonism1 when applied with a due knowledge of the laws of human nature1 is practically self-limiting2 i4e4 that a rational method of attaining the end at which it aims requires that we should to some extent put it out of sight and not directly aim at it4 ,i have before spoken of this conclusion as the #8,fundamental ,paradox of ,egoistic ,hedonism'2 but though it presents itself as a paradox1 there does not seem to be any difficulty in its practical realisation1 when once the danger indicated is clearly seen4 ,for it is an experience only too common among men1 in whatever pursuit they may be engaged1 that they let the original object and goal of their efforts pass out of view1 and come to regard the means to this end as ends in themselves3 so that they at last even sacrifice the original end to the attainment of what is only secondarily and derivatively desirable4 ,and if it be thus easy and common to forget the end in the means overmuch1 there seems no reason why it should be difficult to do it to the extent that ,rational ,egoism prescribes3 and1 in fact1 it seems to be continually done by ordinary persons in the case of amusements and pastimes of all kinds4 ,it is true that1 as our desires cannot ordinarily be produced by an effort of will--though they can to some extent be repressed by it--if we started with no impulse except the desire of pleasure1 it might seem difficult to execute the practical paradox of attaining pleasure by aiming at something else4 ,yet even in this hypothetical case the difficulty is less than it appears4 ,for the reaction of our activities upon our emotional nature is such that we may commonly bring ourselves to take an interest in any end by concentrating our efforts upon its attainment4 ,so that1 even supposing a man to begin with absolute indifference to everything except his own pleasure1 it does not follow that if he were convinced that the possession of other desires and impulses were necessary to the attainment of the greatest possible pleasure1 he could not succeed in producing these4 ,but this supposition is never actually realised4 ,every man1 when he commences the task of systematising his conduct1 whether on egoistic principles or any other1 is conscious of a number of different impulses and tendencies within him1 other than the mere desire for pleasure1 which urge his will in particular directions1 to the attainment of particular results3 so that he has only to place himself under certain external influences1 and these desires and impulses will begin to operate without any effort of will4 ,it is sometimes thought1 however1 that there is an important class of refined and elevated impulses with which the supremacy of self-love is in a peculiar way incompatible1 such as the love of virtue1 or personal affection1 or the religious impulse to love and obey ,god4 ,but at any rate in the common view of these impulses1 this difficulty does not seem to be recognised4 ,none of the school of moralists that followed ,shaftesbury in contending that it is a man's true interest to foster in himself strictly disinterested social affections1 has noted any inherent incompatibility between the existence of these affections and the supremacy of rational self-love4 ,and similarly ,christian preachers who have commended the religious life as really the happiest1 have not thought genuine religion irreconcilable with the conviction that each man's own happiness is his most near and intimate concern4 ,other persons1 however1 seem to carry the religious consciousness and the feeling of human affection to a higher stage of refinement1 at which a stricter disinterestedness is exacted4 ,they maintain that the essence of either feeling1 in its best form1 is absolute self-renunciation and self-sacrifice4 ,and certainly these seem incompatible with self-love1 however cautiously self-limiting4 ,a man cannot both wish to secure his own happiness and be willing to lose it4 ,and yet how if willingness to lose it is the true means of securing it8 ,can self-love not merely reduce indirectly its prominence in consciousness1 but directly and unreservedly annihilate itself8 ,this emotional feat does not seem to me possible3 and therefore ,i must admit that a man who embraces the principle of ,rational ,egoism cuts himself off from the special pleasure that attends this absolute sacrifice and abnegation of self4 ,but however exquisite this may be1 the pitch of emotional exaltation and refinement necessary to attain it is comparatively so rare1 that it is scarcely included in men's common estimate of happiness4 ,i do not therefore think that an important objection to ,rational ,egoism can be based upon its incompatibility with this particular consciousness3 nor that the common experience of mankind really sustains the view that the desire of one's own happiness1 if accepted as supreme and regulative1 inevitably defeats its own aim through the consequent diminution and desiccation of the impulses and emotional capacities necessary to the attainment of happiness in a high degree2 though it certainly shows a serious and subtle danger in this direction4 #c4 ,there is1 however1 another way in which the habit of mind necessarily resulting from the continual practice of hedonistic comparison is sometimes thought to be unfavourable to the attainment of the hedonistic end3 from a supposed incompatibility between the habit of reflectively observing and examining pleasure1 and the capacity for experiencing pleasure in normal fulness and intensity4 ,and it certainly seems important to consider what effect the continual attention to our pleasures1 in order to observe their different degrees1 is likely to have on these feelings themselves4 ,the inquiry at first sight seems to lead to irreconcilable contradiction in our view of pleasure4 ,for if pleasure only exists as it is felt1 the more conscious we are of it1 the more pleasure we have3 and it would seem that the more our attention is directed towards it1 the more fully we shall be conscious of it4 ,on the other hand ,hamilton's statement that 8knowledge and feeling0 7cognition and pleasure or pain7 are always 8in a certain inverse proportion to each other10 corresponds prima facie to our common experience3 for the purely cognitive element of consciousness seems to be neither pleasurable nor painful1 so that the more our consciousness is occupied with cognition1 the less room there seems to be for feeling4 ,this view1 however1 rests on the assumption that the total intensity of our consciousness is a constant quantity2 so that when one element of it positively increases1 the rest must positively--as well as relatively--diminish4 ,and it does not appear to me that experience gives us any valid ground for making this general assumption3 it rather seems that at certain times in our life intellect and feeling are simultaneously feeble2 so that the same mental excitement may intensify both simultaneously4 ,still it seems to be a fact that any very powerful feeling1 reaching to the full intensity of which our consciousness is normally capable1 is commonly diminished by a contemporaneous stroke of cognitive effort3 hence it is a general difficulty in the way of exact observation of our emotions that the object cognised seems to shrink and dwindle in proportion as the cognitive regard grows keen and eager4 ,how then are we to reconcile this with the proposition first laid down1 that pleasure only exists as we are conscious of it8 ,the answer seems to be that the mere consciousness of a present feeling--apart from any distinct representative elements--cannot diminish the feeling of which it is an indispensable and inseparable condition3 but in introspective cognition we go beyond the present feeling1 comparing and classifying it with remembered or imagined feelings2 and the effort of representing and comparing these other feelings tends to decrease the mere presentative consciousness of the actual pleasure4 ,i conclude1 then1 that there is a real danger of diminishing pleasure by the attempt to observe and estimate it4 ,but the danger seems only to arise in the case of very intense pleasures1 and only if the attempt is made at the moment of actual enjoyment2 and since the most delightful periods of life have frequently recurring intervals of nearly neutral feeling1 in which the pleasures immediately past may be compared and estimated without any such detriment1 ,i do not regard the objection founded on this danger as particularly important4 #d4 ,more serious1 in my opinion1 are the objections urged against the possibility of performing1 with definite and trustworthy results1 the comprehensive and methodical comparison of pleasures and pains which the adoption of the ,hedonistic standard involves4 ,i cannot indeed doubt that men habitually compare pleasures and pains in respect of their intensity3 that 7e4g47 when we pass from one state of consciousness to another1 or when in any way we are led to recall a state long past1 we often unhesitatingly declare the present state to be more or less pleasant than the past3 or that we declare some pleasant experiences to have been #8worth1' and others #8not worth1' the trouble it took to obtain them1 or the pain that followed them4 ,but1 granting this1 it may still be maintained 7#a7 that this comparison as ordinarily made is both occasional and very rough1 and that it can never be extended as systematic ,hedonism requires1 nor applied1 with any accuracy1 to all possible states however differing in quality2 and 7#b7 that as commonly practised it is liable to illusion1 of which we can never measure the precise amount1 while we are continually forced to recognise its existence4 ,this illusion was even urged by ,plato as a ground for distrusting the apparent affirmation of consciousness in respect of present pleasure4 ,plato thought that the apparent intensity of the coarser bodily pleasures was illusory2 because these states of consciousness1 being preceded by pain1 were really only states of relief from pain1 and so properly neutral1 neither pleasant nor painful--examples of what ,i have called the hedonistic zero--only appearing pleasant from contrast with the preceding pain4 ,to this1 however1 it has been answered1 that in estimating pleasure there is no conceivable appeal from the immediate decision of consciousness3 that here the ,phenomenal is the ,real--there is no other real that we can distinguish from it4 ,and this seems to me true1 in so far as we are concerned only with the present state4 ,but then--apart from the difficulty just noticed of observing a pleasure while it is felt without thereby diminishing it--it is obvious that in any estimate of its intensity we are necessarily comparing it with some other state4 ,and this latter must generally be a representation1 not an actual feeling3 for though we can sometimes experience two or perhaps more pleasures at once1 we are rarely in such cases able to compare them satisfactorily3 for either the causes of the two mutually interfere1 so that neither reaches its normal degree of intensity2 or1 more often1 the two blend into one state of pleasant consciousness the elements of which we cannot estimate separately4 ,but if it is therefore inevitable that one term at least in our comparison should be an imagined pleasure1 we see that there is a possibility of error in any such comparison2 for the imagined feeling may not adequately represent the pleasantness of the corresponding actual feeling4 ,and in the egoistic comparison1 the validity of which we are now discussing1 the objects primarily to be compared are all represented elements of consciousness3 for we are desiring to choose between two or more possible courses of conduct1 and therefore to forecast future feelings4 ,let us then examine more closely the manner in which this comparison is ordinarily performed1 that we may see what positive grounds we have for mistrusting it4 ,in estimating for practical purposes the value of different pleasures open to us1 we commonly trust most to our prospective imagination3 we project ourselves into the future1 and imagine what such and such a pleasure will amount to under hypothetical conditions4 ,this imagination1 so far as it involves conscious inference1 seems to be chiefly determined by our own experience of past pleasures1 which are usually recalled generically1 or in large aggregates1 though sometimes particular instances of important single pleasures occur to us as definitely remembered3 but partly1 too1 we are influenced by the experience of others sympathetically appropriated3 and here again we sometimes definitely refer to particular experiences which have been communicated to us by individuals1 and sometimes to the traditional generalisations which are thought to represent the common experience of mankind4 ,now it does not seem that such a process as this is likely to be free from error3 and1 indeed1 no one pretends that it is4 ,in fact there is scarcely any point upon which moralisers have dwelt with more emphasis than this1 that man's forecast of pleasure is continually erroneous4 ,each of us frequently recognises his own mistakes3 and each still more often attributes to others errors unseen by themselves1 arising either from misinterpretation of their own experience1 or from ignorance or neglect of that of others4 ,how then are these errors to be eliminated8 ,the obvious answer is that we must substitute for the instinctive1 largely implicit1 inference just described a more scientific process of reasoning3 by deducing the probable degree of our future pleasure or pain in any given circumstances from inductive generalisations based on a sufficient number of careful observations of our own and others' experience4 ,we have then to ask1 first1 how far can each of us estimate accurately his own past experience of pleasures and pains8 secondly1 how far can this knowledge of the past enable him to forecast1 with any certainty1 the greatest happiness within his reach in the future8 thirdly1 how far can he appropriate1 for the purposes of such forecasts1 the past experience of others8 ,as regards the first of these questions1 it must be remembered that it is not sufficient to know generally that we derive pleasures and pains from such and such sources2 we require to know approximately the positive or negative degree of each feeling2 unless we can form some quantitative estimate of them1 it is futile to try to attain our greatest possible happiness--at least by an empirical method4 ,we have therefore to compare quantitatively each pleasure as it occurs1 or as recalled in imagination1 with other imagined pleasures3 and the question is1 how far such comparisons can be regarded as trustworthy4 ,now for my own part1 when ,i reflect on my pleasures and pains1 and endeavour to compare them in respect of intensity1 it is only to a very limited extent that ,i can obtain clear and definite results from such comparisons1 even taking each separately in its simplest form3--whether the comparison is made at the moment of experiencing one of the pleasures1 or between two states of consciousness recalled in imagination4 ,this is true even when ,i compare feelings of the same kind3 and the vagueness and uncertainty increases1 in proportion as the feelings differ in kind4 ,let us begin with sensual gratifications1 which are thought to be especially definite and palpable4 ,suppose ,i am enjoying a good dinner3 if ,i ask myself whether one kind of dish or wine gives me more pleasure than another1 sometimes ,i can decide1 but very often not4 ,so if ,i reflect upon two modes of bodily exercise that ,i may have taken3 if one has been in a marked degree agreeable or tedious1 ,i take note of it naturally2 but it is not natural to me to go further than this in judging of their pleasurableness or painfulness1 and the attempt to do so does not seem to lead to any clear affirmation4 ,and similarly of intellectual exercises and states of consciousness predominantly emotional3 even when the causes and quality of the feelings compared are similar1 it is only when the differences in pleasantness are great1 that hedonistic comparison seems to yield any definite result4 ,but when ,i try to arrange in a scale pleasures differing in kind2 to compare 7e4g47 labour with rest1 excitement with tranquillity1 intellectual exercise with emotional effusion1 the pleasure of scientific apprehension with that of beneficent action1 the delight of social expansion with the delight of sthetic reception2 my judgment wavers and fluctuates far more1 and in the majority of cases ,i cannot give any confident decision4 ,and if this is the case with what ,bentham calls #8pure'--i4e4 painless--pleasures1 it is still more true of those even commoner states of consciousness1 where a certain amount of pain or discomfort is mixed with pleasure1 although the latter preponderates4 ,if it is hard to say which of two different states of contentment was the greater pleasure1 it seems still harder to compare a state of placid satisfaction with one of eager but hopeful suspense1 or with triumphant conquest of painful obstacles4 ,and perhaps it is still more difficult to compare pure pleasures with pure pains1 and to say how much of the one kind of feeling we consider to be exactly balanced by a given amount of the other when they do not occur simultaneously3 while an estimate of simultaneous feelings is1 as we have seen1 generally unsatisfactory from the mutual interference of their respective causes4 #e4 ,but again1 if these judgments are not clear and definite1 still less are they consistent4 ,i do not now mean that one man's estimate of the value of any kind of pleasures differs from another's3 for we have assumed each sentient individual to be the final judge of the pleasantness and painfulness of his own feelings1 and therefore this kind of discrepancy does not affect the validity of the judgments1 and creates no difficulty until any one tries to appropriate the experience of others4 ,but ,i mean that each individual's judgment of the comparative value of his own pleasures is apt to be different at different times1 though it relates to the same past experiences2 and that this variation is a legitimate ground for distrusting the validity of any particular comparison4 ,the causes of this variation seem to be partly due to the nature of the represented feeling1 and partly to the general state of the mind at the time of making the representation4 ,to begin with the former3 we find that different kinds of past pleasures and pains do not equally admit of being revived in imagination4 ,thus1 generally speaking1 our more emotional and more representative pains are more easily revived than the more sensational and presentative3 for example1 it is at this moment much more easy for me to imagine the discomfort of expectancy which preceded a past sea-sickness than the pain of the actual nausea3 although ,i infer--from the recollection of judgments passed at the time--that the former pain was trifling compared with the latter4 ,to this cause it seems due that past hardships1 toils1 and anxieties often appear pleasurable when we look back upon them1 after some interval2 for the excitement1 the heightened sense of life that accompanied the painful struggle1 would have been pleasurable if taken by itself2 and it is this that we recall rather than the pain4 ,in estimating pleasures the other cause of variation is more conspicuous2 we are conscious of changes occasional or periodic in our estimate of them1 depending upon changes in our mental or bodily condition4 ,e4g4 it is a matter of common remark with respect to the gratifications of appetite that we cannot estimate them adequately in the state of satiety1 and that we are apt to exaggerate them in the state of desire4 7,i do not deny that intensity of antecedent desire intensifies the pleasure of fruition2 so that this pleasure not only appears1 as ,plato thought1 but actually is greater owing to the strength of the desire that has preceded4 ,still it is a matter of common experience that pleasures which have been intensely desired are often found to disappoint expectation47 ,there seem to be no special states of aversion1 determined by bodily causes1 and related to certain pains as our appetites to their correspondent pleasures2 but most persons are liable to be thrown by the prospect of certain pains into the state of passionate aversion which we call fear1 and to be thereby led to estimate such pains as worse than they would be judged to be in a calmer mood4 ,further1 when feeling any kind of pain or uneasiness we seem liable to underrate pain of a very dissimilar kind3 thus in danger we value repose1 overlooking its ennui1 while the tedium of security makes us imagine the mingled excitement of past danger as almost purely pleasurable4 ,and again when we are absorbed in any particular pleasant activity1 the pleasures attending dissimilar activities are apt to be contemned3 they appear coarse or thin1 as the case may be3 and this constitutes a fundamental objection to noting the exact degree of a pleasure at the time of experiencing it4 ,the eager desire1 which often seems an indispensable element of the whole state of pleasurable activity1 generally involves a similar bias3 indeed any strong excitement1 in which our thought is concentrated on a single result or group of results--whether it be the excitement of aversion1 fear1 hope1 or suspense--tends to make us inappreciative of alien pleasures and pains alike4 ,and1 speaking more generally1 we cannot imagine as very intense a pleasure of a kind that at the time of imagining it we are incapable of experiencing3 as 7e4g47 the pleasures of intellectual or bodily exercise at the close of a wearying day2 or any emotional pleasure when our susceptibility to the special emotion is temporarily exhausted4 ,on the other hand1 it is not easy to guard against error1 as philosophers have often thought1 by making our estimate in a cool and passionless state4 ,for there are many pleasures which require precedent desire1 and even enthusiasm and highly wrought excitement1 in order to be experienced in their full intensity2 and it is not likely that we should appreciate these adequately in a state of perfect tranquillity4 #f4 ,these considerations make clearer the extent of the assumptions of ,empirical ,quantitative ,hedonism1 stated in the preceding chapter3 viz4 7#a7 that our pleasures and pains have each a definite degree1 and 7#b7 that this degree is empirically cognisable4 ,firstly1 if pleasure only exists as it is felt1 the belief that every pleasure and pain has a definite intensive quantity or degree must remain an a priori assumption1 incapable of positive empirical verification4 ,for the pleasure can only have the degree as compared with other feelings1 of the same or some different kind2 but1 generally speaking1 since this comparison can only be made in imagination1 it can only yield the hypothetical result that if certain feelings could be felt together1 precisely as they have been felt separately1 one would be found more desirable than the other in some definite ratio4 ,if1 then1 we are asked what ground we have for regarding this imaginary result as a valid representation of reality1 we cannot say more than that the belief in its general validity is irresistibly suggested in reflection on experience1 and remains at any rate uncontradicted by experience4 ,but secondly1 granting that each of our pleasures and pains has really a definite degree of pleasantness or painfulness1 the question still remains whether we have any means of accurately measuring these degrees4 ,is there any reason to suppose that the mind is ever in such a state as to be a perfectly neutral and colourless medium for imagining all kinds of pleasures8 ,experience certainly shows us the frequent occurrence of moods in which we have an apparent bias for or against a particular kind of feeling4 ,is it not probable that there is always some bias of this kind8 that we are always more in tune for some pleasures1 more sensitive to some pains1 than we are to others8 ,it must1 ,i think1 be admitted that the exact cognition of the place of each kind of feeling in a scale of desirability1 measured positively and negatively from a zero of perfect indifference1 is at best an ideal to which we can never tell how closely we approximate4 ,still in the variations of our judgment and the disappointment of our expectations we have experience of errors of which we can trace the causes and allow for them1 at least roughly2 correcting in thought the defects of imagination4 ,and since what we require for practical guidance is to estimate not individual past experiences1 but the value of a kind of pleasure or pain1 as obtained under certain circumstances or conditions2 we can to some extent diminish the chance of error in this estimate by making a number of observations and imaginative comparisons1 at different times and in different moods4 ,in so far as these agree we may legitimately feel an increased confidence in the result3 and in so far as they differ1 we can at least reduce our possible error by striking an average of the different estimates4 ,it will be evident1 however1 that such a method as this cannot be expected to yield more than a rough approximation to the supposed truth4 #g4 ,we must conclude then that our estimate of the hedonistic value of any past pleasure or pain1 is liable to an amount of error which we cannot calculate exactly2 because the represented pleasantness of different feelings fluctuates and varies indefinitely with changes in the actual condition of the representing mind4 ,we have now to observe that1 for similar reasons1 even supposing we could adequately allow for1 and so exclude1 this source of error in our comparison of past pleasures1 it is liable to intrude again in arguing from the past to the future4 ,for our capacity for particular pleasures may be about to change1 or may have actually changed since the experiences that form the data of our calculation4 ,we may have reached the point of satiety in respect of some of our past pleasures1 or otherwise lost our susceptibility to them1 owing to latent changes in our constitution3 or we may have increased our susceptibility to pains inevitably connected with them3 or altered conditions of life may have generated in us new desires and aversions1 and given relative importance to new sources of happiness4 ,or any or all of these changes may be expected to occur1 before the completion of the course of conduct upon which we are now deciding4 ,the most careful estimate of a girl's pleasures 7supposing a girl gifted with the abnormal habit of reflection that would be necessary7 would not much profit a young woman3 and the hedonistic calculations of youth require modification as we advance in years4 ,it may be said1 however1 that no one1 in making such a forecast1 can or does rely entirely on his own experience3 when endeavouring to estimate the probable effect upon his happiness of new circumstances and influences1 untried rules of conduct and fashions of life1 he always argues partly from the experience of others4 ,this is1 ,i think1 generally true3 but by including inferences from other men's experience we inevitably introduce a new possibility of error2 for such inference proceeds on the assumption of a similarity of nature among human beings1 which is never exactly true1 while we can never exactly know how much it falls short of the truth2 though we have sufficient evidence of the striking differences between the feelings produced in different men by similar causes1 to convince us that the assumption would in many cases be wholly misleading4 ,on this ground ,plato's reason for claiming that the life of the ,philosopher has more pleasure than that of the ,sensualist is palpably inadequate4 ,the philosopher1 he argues1 has tried both kinds of pleasure1 sensual as well as intellectual1 and prefers the delights of philosophic life2 the sensualist ought therefore to trust his decision and follow his example4 ,but who can tell that the philosopher's constitution is not such as to render the enjoyments of the senses1 in his case1 comparatively feeble8 while on the other hand the sensualist's mind may not be able to attain more than a thin shadow of the philosopher's delight4 ,and so1 generally speaking1 if we are to be guided by another's experience1 we require to be convinced not only that he is generally accurate in observing1 analysing1 and comparing his sensations1 but also that his relative susceptibility to the different kinds of pleasure and pain in question coincides with our own4 ,if he is unpractised in introspective observation1 it is possible that he may mistake even the external conditions of his own happiness2 and so the communication of his experience may be altogether misleading4 ,but however accurately he has analysed and determined the causes of his feelings1 that similar causes would produce similar effects in us must always be uncertain4 ,and the uncertainty is increased indefinitely if our adviser has to recall in memory out of a distant past some of the pleasures or pains to be compared4 ,thus in the ever-renewed controversy between ,age and ,youth1 wisdom is not after all so clearly on the side of maturer counsels as it seems to be at first sight4 ,when a youth is warned by his senior to abstain from some pleasure1 on the ground of prudence1 because it is not worth the possible pleasures that must be sacrificed for it and the future pains that it will entail2 it is difficult for him to know how far the elder man can recall--even if he could once feel--the full rapture of the delight that he is asking the younger to renounce4 ,and further1 this source of error besets us in a more extended and more subtle manner than has yet been noticed4 ,for our sympathetic apprehension of alien experiences of pleasure and pain has been so continually exercised1 in so many ways1 during the whole of our life1 both by actual observation and oral communication with other human beings1 and through books and other modes of symbolic suggestion2 that it is impossible to say how far it has unconsciously blended with our own experience1 so as to colour and modify it when represented in memory4 ,thus we may easily overlook the discrepancy between our own experience and that of others1 in respect of the importance of certain sources of pleasure and pain1 if no sudden and striking disappointment of expectations forces it on our notice4 ,only with considerable care and attention can sympathetic persons separate their own real likes and dislikes from those of their associates3 and we can never tell whether this separation has been completely effected4 ,but again3 the practical inference from the past to the future is further complicated by the fact that we can alter ourselves4 ,for it may be that our past experience has been greatly affected by our being not properly attuned to certain pleasures1 as 7e4g47 those of art1 or study1 or muscular exercise1 or society1 or beneficent action2 or not duly hardened against certain sources of pain1 such as toil1 or anxiety1 or abstinence from luxuries3 and there may be within our power some process of training or hardening ourselves which may profoundly modify our susceptibilities4 ,and this consideration is especially important1--and at the same time especially difficult to deal with1--when we attempt to appropriate the experience of another4 ,for we may find that he estimates highly pleasures which we not only have never experienced at all1 but cannot possibly experience without a considerable alteration of our nature4 ,for example1 the pleasures of the religious life1 the raptures of prayer and praise and the devotion of the soul to ,god1 are commonly thought to require ,conversion or complete change of nature before they can be experienced4 ,and in the same way the sacrifice of sensual inclination to duty is disagreeable to the non-moral man when he at first attempts it1 but affords to the truly virtuous man a deep and strong delight4 ,and similarly almost all the more refined intellectual and emotional pleasures require training and culture in order to be enjoyed2 and since this training does not always succeed in producing any considerable degree of susceptibility1 it may always be a matter of doubt for one from whom it would require the sacrifice of other pleasures1 whether such sacrifice is worth making4 ,the foregoing considerations must1 ,i think1 seriously reduce our confidence in what ,i have called the ,empirical-reflective method of ,egoistic ,hedonism4 ,i do not conclude that we should reject it altogether3 ,i am conscious that1 in spite of all the difficulties that ,i have urged1 ,i continue to make comparisons between pleasures and pains with practical reliance on their results4 ,but ,i conclude that it would be at least highly desirable1 with a view to the systematic direction of conduct1 to control and supplement the results of such comparisons by the assistance of some other method3 if we can find any on which we see reason to rely4 ,,footnotes3 #ajh ,see chap4 v4 of this ,book1 chap4 xiv4 of ,book iii41 and the concluding chapter of the treatise4 #aji ,see ,green's ,introduction to vol4 ii4 of ,hume's ,treatise on ,human ,nature1 #g4 ,the statement is substantially repeated in the same writer's ,prolegomena to ,ethics4 #aaj ,prolegomena to ,ethics1 #aeh4 #aaa ,e4g4 ,butler1 ,sermon xi4 says1 8,every man hath a desire for his own happiness 444 the object desired is our own happiness1 enjoyment1 satisfaction40 #aab ,introduction to ,hume1 l4c4 #aac ,prolegomena to ,ethics1 #bba4 #aad ,ibid4 #cei4 #aae ,this ,green in several passages seems expressly to admit e4g4 7 #ccb7 he says that certain measures 8needed in order to supply conditions favourable to good character1 tend also to make life more pleasant on the whole03 and1 elsewhere1 that 8it is easy to show that an overbalance of pain would result to those capable of being affected by it0 from the neglect of certain duties4 #aaf ,prolegomena to ,ethics1 #agf4 #aag ,op4 cit4 #bcb4 #aah ,i cannot state this positively1 because--as ,i have said--,green expressly distinguishes self-satisfaction from pleasure1 and does not expressly affirm that its absence is attended by pain4 #aai ,sully1 ,pessimism1 chap4 xi4 p4 #bhb4 #abj ,book i4 chap4 iv4 ,,chapter ,,iv ,,objective ,,hedonism ,,and ,,common ,,sense #a4 ,before we examine those methods of seeking one's own happiness which are more remote from the empirical1 it will be well to consider how far we may reasonably avoid the difficulties and uncertainties of the method of reflective comparison1 by relying on the current opinions and accepted estimates of the value of different objects commonly sought as sources of pleasure4 ,it certainly seems more natural to men1 at least in the main plan and ordering of their lives1 to seek and consciously estimate the objective conditions and sources of happiness1 rather than happiness itself2 and it may plausibly be said that by relying on such estimates of objects we avoid the difficulties that beset the introspective method of comparing feelings3 and that the common opinions as to the value of different sources of pleasure express the net result of the combined experience of mankind from generation to generation3 in which the divergences due to the limitations of each individual's experience1 and to the differently tinged moods in which different estimates have been taken1 have balanced and neutralised each other and so disappeared4 ,i do not wish to undervalue the guidance of common sense in our pursuit of happiness4 ,i think1 however1 that when we consider these common opinions as premises for the deductions of systematic egoism1 they must be admitted to be open to the following grave objections4 ,in the first place1 ,common ,sense gives us only1 at the best1 an estimate true for an average or typical human being3 and1 as we have already seen1 it is probable that any particular individual will be more or less divergent from this type4 ,in any case1 therefore1 each person will have to correct the estimate of common opinion by the results of his own experience in order to obtain from it trustworthy guidance for his own conduct3 and this process of correction1 it would seem1 must be involved in all the difficulties from which we are trying to escape4 ,but1 secondly1 the experience of the mass of mankind is confined within limits too narrow for its results to be of much avail in the present inquiry4 ,the majority of human beings spend most of their time in labouring to avert starvation and severe bodily discomfort3 and the brief leisure that remains to them1 after supplying the bodily needs of food1 sleep1 etc41 is spent in ways determined rather by impulse1 routine1 and habit1 than by a deliberate estimate of probable pleasure4 ,it would seem1 then1 that the common sense to which we have here to refer can only be that of a minority of comparatively rich and leisured persons4 ,but again1 we cannot tell that the mass of mankind1 or any section of the mass1 is not generally and normally under the influence of some of the causes of mal-observation previously noticed4 ,we avoid the 8idols of the cave0 by trusting ,common ,sense1 but what is to guard us against the 8idols of the tribe08 ,moreover1 the common estimate of different sources of happiness seems to involve all the confusion of ideas and points of view1 which in defining the empirical method of ,hedonism we have taken some pains to eliminate4 ,in the first place it does not distinguish between objects of natural desire and sources of experienced pleasure4 ,now we have seen 7,book i4 chap4 iv47 that these two are not exactly coincident--indeed we find numerous examples of men who continue not only to feel but to indulge desires1 the gratification of which they know by ample experience to be attended with more pain than pleasure4 ,and therefore the current estimate of the desirability of objects of pursuit cannot be taken to express simply men's experience of pleasure and pain3 for men are apt to think desirable what they strongly desire1 whether or not they have found it conducive to happiness on the whole3 and so the common opinion will tend to represent a compromise between the average force of desires and the average experience of the consequences of gratifying them4 ,we must allow again for the intermingling of moral with purely hedonistic preferences in the estimate of common sense4 ,for even when men definitely expect greater happiness from the course of conduct which they choose than from any other1 it is often because they think it the right1 or more excellent1 or more noble course2 making1 more or less unconsciously1 the assumption 7which we shall presently have to consider7 that the morally best action will prove to be also the most conducive to the agent's happiness4 ,and a similar assumption seems to be made--without adequate warrant--as regards merely sthetic preferences4 ,again1 the introduction of the moral and sthetic points of view suggests the following doubt3--,are we to be guided by the preferences which men avow1 or by those which their actions would lead us to infer8 ,on the one hand1 we cannot doubt that men often1 from weakness of character1 fail to seek what they sincerely believe will give them most pleasure in the long-run3 on the other hand1 as a genuine preference for virtuous or refined pleasure is a mark of genuine virtue or refined taste1 men who do not really feel such preference are unconsciously or consciously influenced by a desire to gain credit for it1 and their express estimate of pleasures is thus modified and coloured4 #b4 ,but1 even if we had no doubt on general grounds that ,common ,sense would prove our best guide in the pursuit of happiness1 we should still be perplexed by finding its utterances on this topic very deficient in clearness and consistency4 ,i do not merely mean that they are different in different ages and countries--that we might explain as due to variations in the general conditions of human life--3 but that serious conflicts and ambiguities are found if we consider only the current common sense of our own age and country4 ,we can make a list of sources of happiness apparently recommended by an overwhelming consensus of current opinion3 as health1 wealth1 friendship and family affections1 fame and social position1 power1 interesting and congenial occupation and amusement1--including the gratification1 in some form1 of the love of knowledge1 and of those refined1 partly sensual1 partly emotional1 susceptibilities which we call sthetic4#aba ,but if we inquire into the relative value of these objects of common pursuit1 we seem to get no clear answer from ,common ,sense--unless1 perhaps1 it would be generally agreed that health ought to be paramount to all other secondary ends3 though even on this point we could not infer general agreement from observation of the actual conduct of mankind4 ,nay1 even as regards the positive estimate of these sources of happiness1 we find on closer examination that the supposed consensus is much less clear than it seemed at first4 ,not only are there numerous and important bodies of dissidents from the current opinions3 but the very same majority1 the same ,common ,sense of ,mankind that maintains these opinions1 is found in a singular and unexpected manner to welcome and approve the paradoxes of these dissidents4 ,men show a really startling readiness to admit that the estimates of happiness which guide them in their ordinary habits and pursuits are erroneous and illusory2 and that from time to time the veil is1 as it were1 lifted1 and the error and illusion made manifest4 ,for1 first1 men seem to attach great value to the ample gratification of bodily appetites and needs3 the wealthier part of mankind spend a considerable amount of money and forethought upon the means of satisfying these in a luxurious manner3 and though they do not often deliberately sacrifice health to this gratification--common sense condemns that as irrational--still one may say that they are habitually courageous in pressing forward to the very verge of this imprudence4 ,and yet the same people are fond of saying that 8hunger is the best sauce10 and that 8temperance and labour will make plain food more delightful than the most exquisite products of the culinary art40 ,and they often argue with perfect sincerity that the rich have really no advantage1 or scarcely any advantage1 over the comparatively poor1 in respect of these pleasures2 for habit soon renders the more luxurious provision for the satisfaction of their acquired needs no more pleasant to the rich than the appeasing of his more primitive appetites is to the poor man4 ,and the same argument is often extended to all the material comforts that wealth can purchase4 ,it is often contended that habit at once renders us indifferent to these while they are enjoyed1 and yet unable to dispense with them without annoyance3 so that the pleasures of the merely animal life are no greater to the rich than to the poor1 but only more insecure4 ,and from this there is but a short step to the conclusion1 that wealth1 in the pursuit of which most men agree in concentrating their efforts1 and on the attainment of which all congratulate each other1--wealth1 for which so many risk their health1 shorten their lives1 reduce their enjoyments of domestic life1 and sacrifice the more refined pleasures of curiosity and art1--is really a very doubtful gain1 in the majority of cases2 because the cares and anxieties which it entails balance1 for most men1 the slight advantage of the luxuries which it purchases4#abb ,and similarly1 although social rank and status is1 in ,england1 an object of passionate pursuit1 yet it is continually said1 with general approval1 that it is of no intrinsic value as a means of happiness2 that though the process of ascending from a lower grade to a higher is perhaps generally agreeable1 and the process of descending from a higher to a lower certainly painful1 yet permanent existence on the loftier level is no more pleasant than on the humbler2 that happiness is to be found as easily in a cottage as in a palace 7if not1 indeed1 more easily in the cottage73 and so forth4 ,still more trite are the commonplaces as to the emptiness and vanity of the satisfaction to be derived from ,fame and ,reputation4 ,the case of posthumous fame1 indeed1 is a striking instance of the general proposition before laid down1 that the commonly accepted ends of action are determined partly by the average force of desires that are not directed towards pleasure1 nor conformed to experiences of pleasure4 ,for posthumous fame seems to rank pretty high among the objects that common opinion regards as good or desirable for the individual3 and the pursuit of it is not ordinarily stigmatised as contrary to prudence1 even if it leads a man to sacrifice other important sources of happiness to a result of which he never expects to be actually conscious4 ,yet the slightest reflection shows such a pursuit to be prima facie irrational1#abc from an egoistic point of view2 and every moraliser has found this an obvious and popular topic4 ,the actual consciousness of present fame is no doubt very delightful to most persons3 still the moraliser does not find it difficult to maintain that even this is attended with such counterbalancing disadvantages as render its hedonistic value very doubtful4 ,again1 the current estimate of the desirability of ,power is tolerably high1 and perhaps the more closely and analytically we examine the actual motives of men1 the more widespread and predominant its pursuit will appear3 for many men seem to seek wealth1 knowledge1 even reputation1 as a means to the attainment of power1 rather than for their own sakes or with a view to other pleasures4 ,and yet men assent willingly when they are told that the pursuit of power1 as of fame1 is prompted by a vain ambition1 never satisfied1 but only rendered more uneasy by such success as is possible for it3 that the anxieties which attend not only the pursuit but the possession of power1 and the jealousies and dangers inseparable from the latter1 far outweigh its pleasures4 ,society of some sort no one can deny to be necessary to human happiness3 but still the kind and degree of social intercourse which is actually sought by the more wealthy and leisured portion of the community1 with no little expenditure of time1 trouble1 and means1 is often declared to yield a most thin and meagre result of pleasure4 ,we find1 no doubt1 great agreement among modern moralisers as to the importance of the exercise of the domestic affections as a means of happiness3 and this certainly seems to have a prominent place in the plan of life of the majority of mankind4 ,and yet it may fairly be doubted whether men in general do value domestic life very highly1 apart from the gratification of sexual passion4 ,certainly whenever any part of civilised society is in such a state that men can freely indulge this passion and at the same time avoid the burden of a family1 without any serious fear of social disapprobation1 celibacy tends to become common3 it has even become so common as to excite the grave anxiety of legislators4 ,and though such conduct has always been disapproved by common sense1 it seems to be rather condemned as anti-social than as imprudent4 ,thus our examination shows great instability and uncertainty in the most decisive judgments of common sense2 since1 as ,i have said1 bodily comfort and luxury1 wealth1 fame1 power1 society are the objects which common opinion seems most clearly and confidently to recommend as sources of pleasure4 ,for though the pleasures derived from ,art and the contemplation of the beautiful in ,nature1 and those of curiosity and the exercise of the intellect generally1 are highly praised1 it is difficult to formulate a 8common opinion0 in respect of them1 since the high estimates often set upon them seem to express the real experience of only small minorities4 ,and though these have persuaded the mass of mankind1 or that portion of it which is possessed of leisure1 to let ,culture be regarded as an important source of happiness2 they can scarcely be said to have produced any generally accepted opinion as to its importance in comparison with the other sources before mentioned1 the pleasures of which are more genuinely appreciated by the majority2 still less as to the relative value of different elements of this culture4 ,but even supposing the consensus1 in respect of sources of happiness1 were far more complete and clear than impartial reflection seems to show1 its value would still be considerably impaired by the dissent of important minorities1 which we have not yet noticed4 ,for example1 many religious persons regard all mundane pleasures as mean and trifling2 so full of vanity and emptiness that the eager pursuit of them is only possible through ever-renewed illusion1 leading to ever-repeated disappointment4 ,and this view is shared by not a few reflective persons who have no religious bias3 as is evident from the numerous adherents that ,pessimism has won in recent times4 ,indeed a somewhat similar judgment1 on the value of the ordinary objects of human pursuit1 has been passed by many philosophers who have not been pessimists3 and when we consider that it is the philosopher's especial business to reflect with care and precision on the facts of consciousness1 we shall hesitate1 in any dispute between philosophers and the mass of mankind1 to let our conclusion be determined by merely counting heads4 ,on the other hand1 as has been already observed1 the philosopher's susceptibilities and capacities of feeling do not fairly represent those of humanity in general3 and hence if he ventures to erect the results of his individual experience into a universal standard1 he is likely to overrate some pleasures and underrate others4 ,perhaps the most convincing illustrations of this are furnished by thinkers not of the idealist or transcendental type1 but professed ,hedonists1 such as ,epicurus and ,hobbes4 ,we cannot accept as fair expressions of the ordinary experience of the human race either ,epicurus's identification of painlessness with the highest degree of pleasure1 or ,hobbes's asseveration that the gratifications of curiosity 8far exceed in intensity all carnal delights40 ,thus we seem to be in this dilemma3 the mass of mankind1 to whose common opinion we are naturally referred for catholically authoritative beliefs respecting the conditions of happiness1 are deficient in the faculty or the habit of observing and recording their experience3 and usually1 in proportion as a man is1 by nature and practice1 a better observer1 the phenomena that he has to observe are more and more divergent from the ordinary type4 #c4 ,on the whole1 it must1 ,i think1 be admitted that the ,hedonistic method cannot be freed from inexactness and uncertainty by appealing to the judgments of common sense respecting the sources of happiness4 ,at the same time ,i would not exaggerate the difficulty of combining these into a tolerably coherent body of probable doctrine1 not useless for practical guidance4 ,for first1 it must be observed1 that it is only occasionally and to a limited extent that these commonly commended sources of happiness come into competition with one another and are presented as alternatives4 ,for example1 the pursuit of wealth often leads also to power 7besides the power that lies in wealth7 and to reputation3 and again1 these objects of desire can usually be best attained--as far as it is in our power to attain them at all--by employment which in itself gives the pleasure that normally attends energetic exercise of one's best faculties3 and this congenial employment is not incompatible with adequate exercise of the affections1 social and domestic2 nor with cultivated amusement 7which must always be carefully limited in amount if it is to be really amusing74 ,and no one doubts that to carry either employment or amusement to a degree that injures health involves generally a sacrifice of happiness1 no less than over-indulgence in sensual gratifications4 ,and as for the philosophical or quasi-philosophical paradoxes as to the illusoriness of sensual enjoyments1 wealth1 power1 fame1 etc41 we may explain the widespread acceptance which these find by admitting a certain general tendency to exaggeration in the common estimates of such objects of desire1 which from time to time causes a reaction and an equally excessive temporary depreciation of them4 ,as we saw 7chap4 iii47 it is natural for men to value too highly the absent pleasures for which they hope and long3 power and fame1 for example1 are certainly attended with anxieties and disgusts which are not foreseen when they are represented in longing imagination3 yet it may still be true that they bring to most men a clear balance of happiness on the whole4 ,it seems clear1 again1 that luxury adds less to the ordinary enjoyment of life than most men struggling with penury suppose3 there are special delights attending the hard-earned meal1 and the rarely-recurring amusement1 which must be weighed against the profuser pleasures that the rich can command3 so that we may fairly conclude that increase of happiness is very far from keeping pace with increase of wealth4 ,on the other hand1 when we take into account all the pleasures of ,culture1 ,power1 ,fame1 and ,beneficence1 and still more the security that wealth gives against the pains of privation and the anxieties of penury--for the owner himself and those whom he loves--we can hardly doubt that increase of wealth brings on the average some increase of happiness3 at least until a man reaches an income beyond that of the great majority in any actual community4 ,thus on the whole it would seem to be a reasonable conclusion that1 while it is extravagant to affirm that happiness is 8equally distributed through all ranks and callings10 it is yet more equally distributed than the aspect of men's external circumstances would lead us to infer3 especially considering the importance of the pleasures that attend the exercise of the affections4 ,again1 common sense is quite prepared to recognise that there are persons of peculiar temperament to whom the ordinary pleasures of life are really quite trifling in comparison with more refined enjoyments3 and also that men generally are liable to fall1 for certain periods1 under the sway of absorbing impulses1 which take them out of the range within which the judgments of common sense are even broadly and generally valid4 ,no one 7e4g47 expects a lover to care much for anything except the enjoyments of love2 nor considers that an enthusiast sacrifices happiness in making everything give way to his hobby4 ,in fact we may say that common sense scarcely claims to provide more than rather indefinite general rules1 which no prudent man should neglect without giving himself a reason for doing so4 ,such reasons may either be drawn from one's knowledge of some peculiarities in one's nature1 or from the experience of others whom one has ground for believing to be more like oneself than the average of mankind are4 ,still1 as we saw1 there is considerable risk of error in thus appropriating the special experience of other individuals3 and1 in short1 it does not appear that by any process of this kind1--either by appealing to the common opinion of the many1 or to that of cultivated persons1 or to that of those whom we judge most to resemble ourselves1--we can hope to solve with precision or certainty the problems of egoistic conduct4 ,the question then remains1 whether any general theory can be attained of the causes of pleasure and pain so certain and practically applicable that we may by its aid rise above the ambiguities and inconsistencies of common or sectarian opinion1 no less than the shortcomings of the empirical-reflective method1 and establish the ,hedonistic art of life on a thoroughly scientific basis4 ,to the consideration of this question ,i shall proceed in the last chapter of this book3 but before entering upon it1 ,i wish to examine carefully a common belief as to the means of attaining happiness which--though it hardly claims to rest upon a scientific basis--is yet generally conceived by those who hold it to have a higher degree of certainty than most of the current opinions that we have been examining4 ,this is the belief that a man will attain the greatest happiness open to him by the performance of his ,duty as commonly recognised and prescribed--except so far as he may deviate from this standard in obedience to a truer conception of the conduct by which universal good is to be realised or promoted4#abd ,the special importance of this opinion to a writer on ,morals renders it desirable to reserve our discussion of it for a separate chapter4 ,,footnotes3 #aba ,the consideration of the importance of ,morality as a source of happiness is reserved for the next chapter4 #abb ,it is striking to find the author of the ,wealth of ,nations1 the founder of a long line of plutologists who are commonly believed to exalt the material means of happiness above all other1 declaring that 8wealth and greatness are mere trinkets of frivolous utility10 and that 8in ease of body and peace of mind1 all the different ranks of life are nearly upon a level1 and the beggar who suns himself by the side of the highway possesses that security which kings are fighting for40 ,adam ,smith1 ,moral ,sentiments1 ,part iv4 chap4 i4 #abc ,no doubt such a pursuit may be justified to self-love by dwelling on the pleasures of hope and anticipation which attend it4 ,but this is obviously an after-thought4 ,it is not for the sake of these originally that posthumous fame is sought by him whom it spurs 8,to scorn delights and live laborious days40 #abd ,in the following chapter ,i have not entered into any particular consideration of the case in which the individual's conscience is definitely in conflict with the general moral consciousness of his age and country3 because1 though it is commonly held to be a man's duty always to obey the dictates of his own conscience1 even at the risk of error1 it can hardly be said to be a current opinion that he will always attain the greatest happiness open to him by conforming to the dictates of his conscience even when it conflicts with received morality4 ,,chapter ,v ,,happiness ,,and ,,duty #a4 ,the belief in the connexion of ,happiness with ,duty is one to which we find a general tendency among civilised men1 at least after a certain stage in civilisation has been reached4 ,but it is doubtful whether it would be affirmed1 among ourselves1 as a generalisation from experience1 and not rather as a matter of direct ,divine ,revelation1 or an inevitable inference from the belief that the world is governed by a perfectly ,good and ,omnipotent ,being4 ,to examine thoroughly the validity of the latter belief is one of the most important tasks that human reason can attempt3 but involving as it does an exhaustive inquiry into the evidences of ,natural and ,revealed ,religion1 it could hardly be included within the scope of the present treatise4#abe ,here1 then1 ,i shall only consider the coincidence of ,duty and ,happiness in so far as it is maintained by arguments drawn from experience and supposed to be realised in our present earthly life4 ,perhaps1 as so restricted1 the coincidence can hardly be said to be 8currently believed03 indeed it may be suggested that the opposite belief is implied in the general admission of the necessity of rewards and punishments in a future state1 in order to exhibit and realise completely the moral government of the world4 ,but reflection will show that this implication is not necessary2 for it is possible to hold that even here virtue is always rewarded and vice punished1 so far as to make the virtuous course of action always the most prudent2 while yet the rewards and punishments are not sufficient to satisfy our sense of justice4 ,admitting that the virtuous man is often placed on earth in circumstances so adverse that his life is not as happy as that of many less virtuous2 it is still possible to maintain that by virtue he will gain the maximum of happiness that can be gained under these circumstances1 all appearances to the contrary notwithstanding4 ,and this view has certainly been held by moralists of reputation on grounds drawn from actual experience of human life2 and seems often to be confidently put forward on similar grounds by popular preachers and moralisers4 ,it appears therefore desirable to subject this opinion to a careful and impartial examination4 ,in conducting this examination1 at the present stage of our inquiry1 we shall have to use the received notions of ,duty without further definition or analysis3 but it is commonly assumed by those whose view we are to examine that these conceptions--as they are found in the moral consciousness of ordinary well-meaning persons--are at least approximately valid and trustworthy2 and the preceding chapters will have fully shown that the generalisations of ,hedonism must be established1 if at all1 by large considerations and decisive preponderances1 and that it would be idle in considering a question of this kind to take account of slight differences1 and to pretend to weigh in our mental scales comparatively small portions of happiness4#abf #b4 ,accepting1 then1 the common division#abg of duties into self-regarding and social1 it may be conceded that as far as the first are concerned the view that we are examining is not likely to provoke any controversy3 for by #8duties towards oneself' are commonly meant acts that tend directly or indirectly to promote one's happiness4 ,we may therefore confine our attention to the social department of ,duty1 and consider whether by observing the moral rules that prescribe certain modes of behaviour towards others we shall always tend to secure the greatest balance of happiness to ourselves4 ,here it will be convenient to adopt with some modification the terminology of ,bentham2 and to regard the pleasures consequent on conformity to moral rules1 and the pains consequent on their violation1 as the #8sanctions' of these rules4 ,these #8sanctions' we may classify as ,external and ,internal4 ,the former class will include both #8,legal ,sanctions1' or penalties inflicted by the authority1 direct or indirect1 of the sovereign2 and #8,social ,sanctions1' which are either the pleasures that may be expected from the approval and goodwill of our fellow-men generally1 and the services that they will be prompted to render both by this goodwill and by their appreciation of the usefulness of good conduct1 or the annoyance and losses that are to be feared from their distrust and dislike4 ,the internal sanctions of duty--so far as it diverges from the conduct which self-interest apart from morality would dictate--will lie in the pleasurable emotion attending virtuous action1 or in the absence of remorse1 or will result more indirectly from some effect on the mental constitution of the agent produced by the maintenance of virtuous dispositions and habits4 ,this classification is important for our present purpose1 chiefly because the systems of rules to which these different sanctions are respectively attached may be mutually conflicting4 ,the ,positive ,morality of any community undergoes development1 and is thus subject to changes which affect the consciences of the few before they are accepted by the many2 so that the rules at any time sustained by the strongest social sanctions may not only fall short of1 but even clash with1 the intuitions of those members of the community who have most moral insight4 ,for similar reasons ,law and ,positive ,morality may be at variance1 in details4 ,for though a law could not long exist1 which it was universally thought wrong to obey2 there may easily be laws commanding conduct that is considered immoral by some more or less enlightened fraction of the community1 especially by some sect or party that has a public opinion of its own3 and any individual may be so much more closely connected with this fraction than with the rest of the community1 that the social sanction may in his case practically operate against the legal4 ,this conflict of sanctions is of great importance in considering whether these sanctions1 as at present capable of being foreseen1 are sufficient in all cases to determine a rational egoist to the performance of social duty3 for the more stress we lay on either the legal or the social sanctions of moral conduct1 the greater difficulty we shall have in proving the coincidence of duty and self-interest in the exceptional cases in which we find these sanctions arrayed against what we conceive to be duty4 ,but even if we put these cases out of sight1 it still seems clear that the external sanctions of morality alone are not always sufficient to render immoral conduct also imprudent4 ,we must indeed admit that in an even tolerably well-ordered society--i4e4 in an ordinary civilised community in its normal condition--all serious open violation of law is contrary to prudence1 unless it is an incident in a successful process of violent revolution3 and further1 that violent revolutions would very rarely--perhaps never--be made by a combination of persons1 all perfectly under the control of enlightened self-love2 on account of the general and widespread destruction of security and of other means of happiness which such disturbances inevitably involve4 ,still1 so long as actual human beings are not all rational egoists1 such times of disorder will be liable to occur3 and we cannot say that under existing circumstances it is a clear universal precept of ,rational ,self-love that a man should 8seek peace and ensue it02 since the disturbance of political order may offer to a cool and skilful person1 who has the art of fishing in troubled waters1 opportunities of gaining wealth1 fame1 and power1 far beyond what he could hope for in peaceful times4 ,in short1 though we may admit that a society composed entirely of rational egoists would1 when once organised1 tend to remain in a stable and orderly condition1 it does not follow that any individual rational egoist will always be on the side of order in any existing community4#abh ,but at any rate1 in the most orderly societies with which we are acquainted1 the administration of law and justice is never in so perfect a state as to render secret crimes always acts of folly1 on the score of the legal penalties attached to them4 ,for however much these may outweigh the advantages of crime1 cases must inevitably occur in which the risk of discovery is so small1 that on a sober calculation the almost certain gain will more than compensate for the slight chance of the penalty4 ,and finally1 in no community is the law actually in so perfect a state that there are not certain kinds of flagrantly anti-social conduct which slip through its meshes and escape legal penalties altogether1 or incur only such legal penalties as are outweighed by the profit of law-breaking4 #c4 ,let us proceed1 then1 to consider how far the social sanction in such cases supplies the defects of the legal4 ,no doubt the hope of praise and liking and services from one's fellow-men1 and the fear of forfeiting these and incurring instead aversion1 refusal of aid1 and social exclusion1 are considerations often important enough to determine the rational egoist to law-observance1 even in default of adequate legal penalties4 ,still these sanctions are liable to fail just where the legal penalties are defective2 social no less than legal penalties are evaded by secret crimes2 and in cases of criminal revolutionary violence1 the efficacy of the social sanction is apt to be seriously impaired by the party spirit enlisted on the side of the criminal4 ,for it has to be observed that the force of the social sanction diminishes very rapidly1 in proportion to the number of dissidents from the common opinion that awards it4 ,disapprobation that is at once intense and quite universal would be so severe a penalty as perhaps to outweigh any imaginable advantages2 since it seems impossible for a human being to live happily1 whatever other goods he may enjoy1 without the kindly regards of some of his fellows3 and so1 in contemplating the conventional portrait of the tyrant1 who is represented as necessarily suspicious of those nearest him1 even of the members of his own family1 we feel prepared to admit that such a life must involve the extreme of unhappiness4 ,but when we turn to contemplate the actual tyrannical usurpers1 wicked statesmen1 successful leaders of unwarranted rebellion1 and1 speaking generally1 the great criminals whose position raises them out of the reach of legal penalties1 it does not appear that the moral odium under which they lie must necessarily count for much in an egoistic calculation of the gain and loss resulting from their conduct4 ,for this disesteem is only expressed by a portion of the community3 and its utterance is often drowned in the loud-voiced applause of the multitude whose admiration is largely independent of moral considerations4 ,nor are there wanting philosophers and historians whose judgment manifests a similar independence4 ,it seems1 then1 impossible to affirm that the external sanctions of men's legal duties will always be sufficient to identify duty with interest4 ,and a corresponding assertion would be still more unwarranted in respect of moral duties not included within the sphere of ,law4 ,in saying this1 ,i am fully sensible of the force of what may be called the ,principle of ,reciprocity1 by which certain utilitarians have endeavoured to prove the coincidence of any individual's interest with his social duties4 ,virtues 7they say7 are qualities either useful or directly agreeable to others3 thus they either increase the market value of the virtuous man's services1 and cause others to purchase them at a higher rate and to allot to him more dignified and interesting functions2 or they dispose men to please him1 both out of gratitude and in order to enjoy the pleasures of his society in return3 and again--since man is an imitative animal--the exhibition of these qualities is naturally rewarded by a reciprocal manifestation of them on the part of others1 through the mere influence of example4 ,i do not doubt that the prospect of these advantages is an adequate motive for cultivating many virtues and avoiding much vice4 ,thus on such grounds a rational egoist will generally be strict and punctual in the fulfilment of all his engagements1 and truthful in his assertions1 in order to win the confidence of other men2 and he will be zealous and industrious in his work1 in order to obtain gradually more important and therefore more honourable and lucrative employment2 and he will control such of his passions and appetites as are likely to interfere with his efficiency2 and will not exhibit violent anger or use unnecessary harshness even towards servants and subordinates2 and towards his equals and superiors in rank he will be generally polite and complaisant and good-humoured1 and prompt to show them all such kindness as costs but little in proportion to the pleasure it gives4 ,still1 reflection seems to show that the conduct recommended by this line of reasoning does not really coincide with moral duty4 ,for1 first1 what one requires for social success is that one should appear1 rather than be1 useful to others3 and hence this motive will not restrain one from doing secret harm to others1 or even from acting openly in a way that is really harmful1 though not perceived to be so4 ,and again1 a man is not useful to others by his virtue only1 but sometimes rather by his vice2 or more often by a certain admixture of unscrupulousness with his good and useful qualities4 ,and further1 morality prescribes the performance of duties equally towards all1 and that we should abstain as far as possible from harming any3 but on the principle of ,reciprocity we should exhibit our useful qualities chiefly towards the rich and powerful1 and abstain from injuring those who can retaliate2 while we may reasonably omit our duties to the poor and feeble1 if we find a material advantage in so doing1 unless they are able to excite the sympathy of persons who can harm us4 ,moreover1 some vices 7as for example1 many kinds of sensuality and extravagant luxury7 do not inflict any immediate or obvious injury on any individual1 though they tend in the long-run to impair the general happiness3 hence few persons find themselves strongly moved to check or punish this kind of mischief4 ,doubtless in the last-mentioned cases the mere disrepute inevitably attaching to open immorality is an important consideration4 ,but ,i do not think that this will be seriously maintained to be sufficient always to turn the scales of prudence against vice--at least by any one who has duly analysed the turbid and fluctuating streams of social opinion upon which the good or ill repute of individuals mainly depends1 and considered the conflicting and divergent elements that they contain4 ,many moralists have noticed the discrepancy in modern ,europe between the ,law of ,honour 7or the more important rules maintained by the social sanction of polite persons7 and the morality professed in society at large4 ,this is1 however1 by no means the only instance of a special code1 divergent in certain points from the moral rules generally accepted in the community where it exists4 ,most religious sects and parties1 and probably the majority of trades and professions1 exhibit this phenomenon in some degree4 ,i do not mean merely that special rules of behaviour are imposed upon members of each profession1 corresponding to their special social functions and relations3 ,i mean that a peculiar moral opinion is apt to grow up1 conflicting to a certain extent with the opinion of the general public4 ,the most striking part of this divergence consists generally in the approval or excusal of practices disapproved by the current morality3 as 7e4g47 licence among soldiers1 bribery among politicians in certain ages and countries1 unveracity of various degrees among priests and advocates1 fraud in different forms among tradesmen4 ,in such cases there are generally strong natural inducements to disobey the stricter rule 7in fact it would seem to be to the continual pressure of these inducements that the relaxation of the rule has been due73 while at the same time the social sanction is weakened to such an extent that it is sometimes hard to say whether it outweighs a similar force on the other side4 ,for a man who1 under these circumstances1 conforms to the stricter rule1 if he does not actually meet with contempt and aversion from those of his calling1 is at least liable to be called eccentric and fantastic3 and this is still more the case if by such conformity he foregoes advantages not only to himself but to his relatives or friends or party4 ,very often this professional or sectarian excusal of immorality of which we are speaking is not so clear and explicit as to amount to the establishment of a rule1 conflicting with the generally received rule3 but is still sufficient to weaken indefinitely the social sanction in favour of the latter4 ,and1 apart from these special divergences1 we may say generally that in most civilised societies there are two different degrees of positive morality1 both maintained in some sort by common consent2 a stricter code being publicly taught and avowed1 while a laxer set of rules is privately admitted as the only code which can be supported by social sanctions of any great force4 ,by refusing to conform to the stricter code a man is often not liable to incur exclusion from social intercourse1 or any material hindrance to professional advancement1 or even serious dislike on the part of any of the persons whose society he will most naturally seek2 and under such circumstances the mere loss of a certain amount of reputation is not likely to be felt as a very grave evil1 except by persons peculiarly sensitive to the pleasures and pains of reputation4 ,and there would seem to be many men whose happiness does not depend on the approbation or disapprobation of the moralist--and of mankind in general in so far as they support the moralist--to such an extent as to make it prudent for them to purchase this praise by any great sacrifice of other goods4 #d4 ,we must conclude1 then1 that if the conduct prescribed to the individual by the avowedly accepted morality of the community of which he is a member1 can be shown to coincide with that to which ,rational ,self-love would prompt1 it must be1 in many cases1 solely or chiefly on the score of the internal sanctions4 ,in considering the force of these sanctions1 ,i shall eliminate those pleasures and pains which lie in the anticipation of rewards and punishments in a future life3 for as we are now supposing the calculations of ,rational ,egoism to be performed without taking into account any feelings that are beyond the range of experience1 it will be more consistent to exclude also the pleasurable or painful anticipations of such feelings4 ,let us1 then1 contemplate by itself the satisfaction that attends the performance of duty as such 7without taking into consideration any ulterior consequences71 and the pain that follows on its violation4 ,after the discussions of the two preceding chapters ,i shall not of course attempt to weigh exactly these pleasures and pains against others2 but ,i see no empirical grounds for believing that such feelings are always sufficiently intense to turn the balance of prospective happiness in favour of morality4 ,this will hardly be denied if the question is raised in respect of isolated acts of duty4 ,let us take an extreme case1 which is yet quite within the limits of experience4 ,the call of duty has often impelled a soldier or other public servant1 or the adherent of a persecuted religion1 to face certain and painful death1 under circumstances where it might be avoided with little or no loss even of reputation4 ,to prove such conduct always reasonable from an egoistic point of view1 we have to assume that1 in all cases where such a duty could exist and be recognised1 the mere pain#abi that would follow on evasion of duty would be so great as to render the whole remainder of life hedonistically worthless4 ,surely such an assumption would be paradoxical and extravagant4 ,nothing that we know of the majority of persons in any society would lead us to conclude that their moral feelings taken alone form so preponderant an element of their happiness4 ,and a similar conclusion seems irresistible even in more ordinary cases1 where a man is called on to give up1 for virtue's sake1 not life1 but a considerable share of the ordinary sources of human happiness4 ,can we say that all1 or even most1 men are so constituted that the satisfactions of a good conscience are certain to repay them for such sacrifices1 or that the pain and loss involved in them would certainly be outweighed by the remorse that would follow the refusal to make them8#acj ,perhaps1 however1 so much as this has scarcely ever been expressly maintained4 ,what ,plato in his ,republic and other writers on the same side have rather tried to prove1 is not that at any particular moment duty will be1 to every one on whom it may devolve1 productive of more happiness than any other course of conduct2 but rather that it is every one's interest on the whole to choose the life of the virtuous man4 ,but even this it is very difficult even to render probable3 as will appear1 ,i think1 if we examine the lines of reasoning by which it is commonly supported4 ,to begin with ,plato's argument4 ,he represents the soul of the virtuous man as a well-ordered polity of impulses1 in which every passion and appetite is duly obedient to the rightful sovereignty of reason1 and operates only within the limits laid down by the latter4 ,he then contrasts the tranquil peace of such a mind with the disorder of one where a succession of baser impulses1 or some ruling passion1 lords it over reason3 and asks which is the happiest1 even apart from external rewards and punishments4 ,but we may grant all that ,plato claims1 and yet be no further advanced towards the solution of the question before us4 ,for here the issue does not lie between ,reason and ,passion1 but rather--in ,butler's language--between ,rational ,self-love and ,conscience4 ,we are supposing the ,egoist to have all his impulses under control1 and are only asking how this control is to be exercised4 ,now we have seen that the regulation and organisation of life best calculated to attain the end of self-interest appears prima facie divergent at certain points from that to which men in general are prompted by a sense of duty4 ,in order to maintain ,plato's position it has to be shown that this appearance is false2 and that a system of self-government1 which under certain circumstances leads us to pain1 loss1 and death1 is still that which self-interest requires4 ,it can scarcely be said that our nature is such that only this anti-egoistic kind of regulation is possible2 that the choice lies between this and none at all4 ,it is easy to imagine a rational egoist1 strictly controlling each of his passions and impulses--including his social sentiments--within such limits that its indulgence should not involve the sacrifice of some greater gratification3 and experience seems to show us many examples of persons who at least approximate as closely to this type as any one else does to the ideal of the orthodox moralist4 ,hence if the regulation of ,conscience be demonstrably the best means to the individual's happiness1 it must be because the order kept by ,self-love involves a sacrifice of pleasure on the whole1 as compared with the order kept by ,conscience4 ,and if this is the case1 it would seem that it can only be on account of the special emotional pleasure attending the satisfaction of the moral sentiments1 or special pain or loss of happiness consequent on their repression and violation4 ,before1 however1 we proceed further1 a fundamental difficulty must be removed which has probably some time since suggested itself to the reader4 ,if a man thinks it reasonable to seek his own interest1 it is clear that he cannot himself disapprove of any conduct that comes under this principle or approve of the opposite4 ,and hence it may appear that the pleasures and pains of conscience cannot enter into the calculation whether a certain course of conduct is or is not in accordance with ,rational ,egoism1 because they cannot attach themselves in the egoist's mind to any modes of action which have not been already decided1 on other grounds1 to be reasonable or the reverse4 ,and this is to a certain extent true2 but we must here recur to the distinction 7indicated in ,book i4 chap4 iii4 #a7 between the general impulse to do what we believe to be reasonable1 and special sentiments of liking or aversion for special kinds of conduct1 independent of their reasonableness4 ,in the moral sentiments as they exist in ordinary men1 these two kinds of feeling are indistinguishably blended2 because it is commonly believed that the rules of conduct to which the common moral sentiments are attached are in some way or other reasonable4 ,we can1 however1 conceive the two separated3 and in fact1 as was before said1 we have experience of such separation whenever a man is led by a process of thought to adopt a different view of morality from that in which he has been trained2 for in such a case there will always remain in his mind some quasi-moral likings and aversions1 no longer sustained by his deliberate judgment of right and wrong4 ,and thus there is every reason to believe that most men1 however firmly they might adopt the principles of ,egoistic ,hedonism1 would still feel sentiments prompting to the performance of social duty1 as commonly recognised in their society1 independently of any conclusion that the actions prompted by such sentiments were reasonable and right4 ,for such sentiments would always be powerfully supported by the sympathy of others1 and their expressions of praise and blame1 liking and aversion3 and since it is agreed that the conduct commonly recognised as virtuous is generally coincident with that which enlightened self-love would dictate1 a rational egoist's habits of conduct will be such as naturally to foster these 7for him7 #8quasi-moral' feelings4 ,the question therefore arises--not whether the egoist should cherish and indulge these sentiments up to a certain point1 which all would admit--but whether he can consistently encourage them to grow to such a pitch that they will always prevail over the strongest opposing considerations2 or1 to put it otherwise1 whether prudence requires him to give them the rein and let them carry him whither they will4 ,we have already seen ground for believing that ,rational ,self-love will best attain its end by limiting its conscious operation and allowing free play to disinterested impulses3 can we accept the further paradox that it is reasonable for it to abdicate altogether its supremacy over some of these impulses8 ,on a careful consideration of the matter1 it will appear1 ,i think1 that this abdication of self-love is not really a possible occurrence in the mind of a sane person1 who still regards his own interest as the reasonable ultimate end of his actions4 ,such a man may1 no doubt1 resolve that he will devote himself unreservedly to the practice of virtue1 without any particular consideration of what appears to him to be his interest3 he may perform a series of acts in accordance with this resolution1 and these may gradually form in him strong habitual tendencies to acts of a similar kind4 ,but it does not seem that these habits of virtue can ever become so strong as to gain irresistible control over a sane and reasonable will4 ,when the occasion comes on which virtue demands from such a man an extreme sacrifice--the imprudence of which must force itself upon his notice1 however little he may be in the habit of weighing his own pleasures and pains--he must always be able to deliberate afresh1 and to act 7as far as the control of his will extends7 without reference to his past actions4 ,it may1 however1 be said that1 though an egoist retaining his belief in rational egoism cannot thus abandon his will to the sway of moral enthusiasm1 still1 supposing it possible for him to change his conviction and prefer duty to interest1--or supposing we compare him with another man who makes this choice1--we shall find that a gain in happiness on the whole results from this preference4 ,it may be held that the pleasurable emotions attendant upon such virtuous or quasi-virtuous habits as are compatible with adhesion to egoistic principles are so inferior to the raptures that attend the unreserved and passionate surrender of the soul to virtue1 that it is really a man's interest--even with a view to the present life only--to obtain1 if he can1 the convictions that render this surrender possible2 although under certain circumstances it must necessarily lead him to act in a manner which1 considered by itself1 would be undoubtedly imprudent4 ,this is certainly a tenable proposition1 and ,i am quite disposed to think it true of persons with specially refined moral sensibilities4 ,but--though from the imperfections of the hedonistic calculus the proposition cannot in any case be conclusively disproved--it seems1 as ,i have said1 to be opposed to the broad results of experience1 so far as the great majority of mankind are concerned4 ,observation would lead me to suppose that most men are so constituted as to feel far more keenly pleasures 7and pains7 arising from some other source than the conscience2 either from the gratifications of sense1 or from the possession of power and fame1 or from strong human affections1 or from the pursuit of science1 art1 etc42 so that in many cases perhaps not even early training could have succeeded in giving to the moral feelings the requisite predominance3 and certainly where this training has been wanting1 it seems highly improbable that a mere change of ethical conviction could develop their moral susceptibilities so far as to make it clearly their earthly interest to resolve on facing all sacrifices for the fulfilment of duty4 ,to sum up3 although the performance of duties towards others and the exercise of social virtue seem to be generally the best means to the attainment of the individual's happiness1 and it is easy to exhibit this coincidence between ,virtue and ,happiness rhetorically and popularly2 still1 when we carefully analyse and estimate the consequences of ,virtue to the virtuous agent1 it appears improbable that this coincidence is complete and universal4 ,we may conceive the coincidence becoming perfect in a ,utopia where men were as much in accord on moral as they are now on mathematical questions1 where ,law was in perfect harmony with ,moral ,opinion1 and all offences were discovered and duly punished3 or we may conceive the same result attained by intensifying the moral sentiments of all members of the community1 without any external changes 7which indeed would then be unnecessary74 ,but just in proportion as existing societies and existing men fall short of this ideal1 rules of conduct based on the principles of ,egoistic ,hedonism seem liable to diverge from those which most men are accustomed to recognise as prescribed by ,duty and ,virtue4 ,,footnotes3 #abe ,such discussion of the question as seemed desirable in a work like this will be found in the concluding chapter of the treatise4 #abf ,for a similar reason ,i shall here treat the notions of #8,duty' and #8,virtuous action' as practically coincident2 reserving for future discussion the divergences between the two which reflection on the common usage of the terms appears to indicate4 ,see ,book iii4 chap4 ii4 #abg ,whatever modifications of this division may afterwards appear to be necessary 7cf4 ,book iii4 chap4 ii4 #a1 and chap4 vii4 #a7 will not1 ,i think1 tend to invalidate the conclusions of the present chapter4 #abh ,i do not here consider the case of revolutionists aiming sincerely at the general wellbeing2 since the morality of such revolutions will generally be so dubious1 that these cases cannot furnish any clear argument on either side of the question here discussed4 #abi ,under the notion of #8moral pain' 7or pleasure7 ,i intend to include1 in this argument1 all pain 7or pleasure7 that is due to sympathy with the feelings of others4 ,it is not convenient to enter1 at this stage of the discussion1 into a full discussion of the relation of ,sympathy to ,moral ,sensibility2 but ,i may say that it seems to me certain1 on the one hand1 that these two emotional susceptibilities are actually distinct in most minds1 whatever they may have been originally2 and on the other hand that sympathetic and strictly moral feelings are almost inextricably blended in the ordinary moral consciousness3 so that1 for the purposes of the present argument it is not of fundamental importance to draw a distinction between them4 ,i have1 however1 thought it desirable to undertake a further examination of sympathy--as the internal sanction on which ,utilitarians specially lay stress--in the concluding chapter of this treatise3 to which1 accordingly1 the reader may refer4 #acj ,a striking confirmation of this is furnished by those ,christian writers of the last century who treat the moral unbeliever as a fool who sacrifices his happiness both here and hereafter4 ,these men were1 for the most part1 earnestly engaged in the practice of virtue1 and yet this practice had not made them love virtue so much as to prefer it1 even under ordinary circumstances1 to the sensual and other enjoyments that it excludes4 ,it seems then absurd to suppose that1 in the case of persons who have not developed and strengthened by habit their virtuous impulses1 the pain that might afterwards result from resisting the call of duty would always be sufficient to neutralise all other sources of pleasure4 ,,chapter ,,vi ,,deductive ,,hedonism #a4 ,in the preceding chapter we have seen reason to conclude that1 while obedience to recognised rules of duty tends1 under ordinary circumstances1 to promote the happiness of the agent1 there are yet no adequate empirical grounds for regarding the performance of duty as a universal or infallible means to the attainment of this end4 ,even1 however1 if it were otherwise1 even if it were demonstrably reasonable for the egoist to choose duty at all costs under all circumstances1 the systematic endeavour to realise this principle would not--according to common notions of morality--solve or supersede the problem of determining the right method for seeking happiness4 ,for the received moral code allows within limits the pursuit of our own happiness1 and even seems to regard it as morally prescribed2#aca and still more emphatically inculcates the promotion of the happiness of other individuals1 with whom we are in various ways specially connected3 so that1 under either head1 the questions that we have before considered as to the determination and measurement of the elements of happiness would still require some kind of answer4 ,it remains to ask how far a scientific investigation of the causes of pleasure and pain can assist us in dealing with this practical problem4 ,now it is obvious that for deciding which of two courses of action is preferable on hedonistic grounds1 we require not only to measure pains and pleasures of different kinds1 but also to ascertain how they may be produced or averted4 ,in most important prudential decisions1 complex chains of consequences are foreseen as intervening between the volition we are immediately to initiate and the feelings which constitute the ultimate end of our efforts2 and the degree of accuracy with which we forecast each link of these chains obviously depends upon our knowledge1 implicit or explicit1 of the relations of cause and effect among various natural phenomena4 ,but if we suppose the different elements and immediate sources of happiness to have been duly ascertained and valued1 the investigation of the conditions of production of each hardly belongs to a general treatise on the method of ethics2 but rather to some one or other of the special arts subordinate to the general art of conduct4 ,of these subordinate arts some have a more or less scientific basis1 while others are in a merely empirical stage2 thus if we have decided how far health is to be sought1 it belongs to the systematic art of hygiene1 based on physiological science1 to furnish a detailed plan of seeking it2 so far1 on the other hand1 as we aim at power or wealth or domestic happiness1 such instruction as the experience of others can give will be chiefly obtained in an unsystematic form1 either from advice relative to our own special circumstances1 or from accounts of success and failure in analogous situations4 ,in either case the exposition of such special arts does not appear to come within the scope of the present treatise2 nor could it help us in dealing with the difficulties of measuring pleasures and pains which we have considered in the previous chapters4 ,it may1 however1 be thought that a knowledge of the causes of pleasure and pain may carry us beyond the determination of the means of gaining particular kinds of pleasure and avoiding particular kinds of pain2 and enable us to substitute some deductive method of evaluing the elements of happiness for the empirical-reflective method of which we have seen the defects4#acb ,a hedonistic method1 indeed1 that would dispense altogether with direct estimates of the pleasurable and painful consequences of actions is almost as inconceivable as a method of astronomy that would dispense with observations of the stars4 ,it is1 however1 conceivable that by induction from cases in which empirical measurement is easy we may obtain generalisations that will give us more trustworthy guidance than such measurement can do in complicated cases2 we may be able to ascertain some general psychical or physical concomitant or antecedent of pleasure and pain1 more easy to recognise1 foresee1 measure1 and produce or avert in such cases1 than pleasure and pain themselves4 ,i am willing to hope that this refuge from the difficulties of ,empirical ,hedonism may some time or other be open to us3 but ,i cannot perceive that it is at present available4 ,there is at present1 so far as ,i can judge1 no satisfactorily established general theory of the causes of pleasure and pain2 and such theories as have gained a certain degree of acceptance1 as partially true or probable1 are manifestly not adapted for the practical application that we here require4 ,the chief difficulty of finding a universally applicable theory of the causes of pleasures and pains is easily explained4 ,pleasures and pains may be assumed to have universally--like other psychical facts--certain cerebral nerve-processes1 specifically unknown1 as their inseparable concomitants3 accordingly1 we may seek their causes either in antecedent physical or antecedent psychical facts4 ,but in one important class of cases the chief cognisable antecedents are obviously of the former kind1 while in another important class they are obviously of the latter kind3 the difficulty is to establish any theory equally applicable to both classes1 or to bring the results of the two lines of inquiry under a single generalisation without palpably unsupported hypotheses4 ,in the case of pleasures and pains--especially pains--connected with sensation the most important cognisable antecedents are clearly physical4 ,i do not deny that1 when the pain is foreseen1 the attitude of mind in which it is met may materially influence its magnitude3 indeed1 in the hypnotic condition of the brain1 the feeling of pain may be apparently altogether prevented by an antecedent belief that it will not be felt4 ,still in the main1 under ordinary conditions1 the pains of sensation--probably the intensest in the experience of most persons--invade and interrupt our psychical life from without2 and it would be idle to look for the chief causes of their intensity or quality among antecedent psychical facts4 ,this is not equally true of the most prominent pleasures of sense3 since antecedent desire1 if not an absolutely indispensable condition of such pleasures1 seems at any rate necessary to their attaining a high degree of intensity4 ,still the chief causes of these desires themselves are clearly physical states and processes--not merely neural--in the organism of the sentient individual3 and this is also true of a more indefinite kind of pleasure1 which is an important element of ordinary human happiness1--the 8well-feeling0 that accompanies and is a sign of physical well-being4 ,on the other hand1 when we investigate the causes of the pleasures and pains that belong to intellectual exercises or the play of personal affections1--or of the pleasures 7and to some extent pains7 that belong to the contemplation of beauty 7or its opposite7 in art or nature1--no physiological theory can carry us far1 owing to our ignorance of the neural processes that accompany or antecede these feelings4 ,this is my general conclusion3 the grounds for which ,i propose to illustrate and explain further in the present chapter4 ,it would1 however1 seem to be quite beyond my limits to attempt anything like an exhaustive discussion of either psychological or physiological theories of the causes of pleasure and pain4 ,i shall confine myself to certain leading generalisations1 which seem to have a special interest for students of ethics2 either because ethical motives have had a share in causing their acceptance2 or because--though inadequately grounded as general theories--they appear to have a partial and limited value for practical guidance4 #b4 ,let us begin by considering a theory1 primarily psychological1 which has at least the merit of antiquity--as it is admittedly derived from ,aristotle1#acc--;and is1 in some form or other1 still current4#acd ,it is that expressed by ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton#ace in the following propositions3 8,pleasure is the reflex of the spontaneous and unimpeded exertion of a power of whose energy we are conscious3 pain1 a reflex of the overstrained or repressed exertion of such a power40 ,the phrases suggest active as ordinarily distinguished from passive states2 but ,hamilton explains that 8energy0 and similar terms 8are to be understood to denote indifferently all the processes of our higher and lower life of which we are conscious10--on the ground that consciousness itself implies more than a mere passivity of the subject4 ,i think1 however1 that the theory is evidently framed primarily to suit the pleasures and pains that belong to the intellectual life as such1 and is only applied by a somewhat violent straining to an important class among the pleasures and pains that belong to man's animal life4 ,for ,hamilton explains his terms 7a7 8spontaneous0 and 7b7 8unimpeded0 to imply respectively 7a7 absence of 8forcible repression0 or 8forcible stimulation0 of the power exercised1 and 7b7 absence of checks or hindrances on the part of the object about which it is conversant4 ,but these terms seem to have no clear psychical import in application to organic sensations of the kind ordinarily called passive4 ,e4g4 the feelings and vague representations of bodily processes which constitute the consciousness of a toothache are as free from conscious repression or stimulation as those which constitute the consciousness that accompanies a warm bath3--except so far as the mere presence of pain implies constraint1 since we experience it unwillingly1 and the mere presence of pleasure implies the opposite3 but in this sense constraint and its opposite are characteristics of the effects to be explained1 and cannot therefore be regarded as their causes4 ,indeed1 the ethical interest and value of the theory appears to me to lie in its very one-sidedness4 ,it tends to correct a vulgar error in the estimate of pleasure1 by directing attention strongly to the importance of a class of pleasures which ordinary pleasure-seeking probably undervalues1--the pleasures that specially belong to a life filled with strenuous activity1 whether purely intellectual1 or practical and partly physical4#acf ,in the same way it effectively dispels the popular inadvertence of regarding labour as normally painful because some labour is so1 and because the pleasures connected with relief from toil--the pleasures of repose and play--are in the experience of most persons more striking than the pleasures of strenuous activity4 ,at the same time1 even if we limit the theory to the pleasures and pains immediately connected with voluntary activity--intellectual or physical--it seems to me devoid not only of definite guidance1 but also of adequate theoretical precision4 ,for it seems to imply that the exercise of our powers is always made less pleasant by the presence of impediments2 but this is obviously not true either of mainly intellectual or mainly physical activities4 ,some obstacles undeniably increase pleasure by drawing out force and skill to overcome them1 as is clearly shown in the case of games and sports3 and even if we understand pain-causing impediments to be only such hindrances as repress and diminish action1 ,i do not find that the theory is supported by experience1 except so far as the repression causes the specific discomfort of unsatisfied desire4 ,e4g4 ,i find entertainment rather than discomfort in trying to make out objects in a dim light1 or the meaning of a speech in a strange language1 provided that failure does not interfere with the attainment of any end to which ,i attach importance4 ,it is a fundamental defect in ,hamilton's theory1 even in its more limited application1 that it ignores the teleological character of normal human activity4 ,this defect is avoided in a modification of the theory that a recent writer has adopted4 8,the antithesis10 says ,mr4 ,stout1#acg 8between pleasure and pain is coincident with the antithesis between free and impeded progress towards an end4 ,unimpeded progress is pleasant in proportion to the intensity and complexity of mental excitement4 ,an activity which is 444 thwarted and retarded 444 is painful in proportion to its intensity and complexity and to the degree of the hindrance40 ,mr4 ,stout admits the difficulty of applying this principle of explanation to the pleasures and pains of sense3#ach and--unlike ,hamilton--he expressly recognises that 8a struggle with difficulties which is not too prolonged or too intense may enhance the pleasure of success out of all proportion to its own painfulness40 ,but this qualification seems to render the propositions first laid down unimportant from our present practical point of view1 whatever may be their theoretical value4 ,i think1 too1 that the importance of antecedent desire1 as a condition of the pleasures and pains attendant on voluntary activities1 should be more expressly recognised4 ,when desire is strong1 hopeful effort to overcome difficulties in the way of fruition tends to be proportionally pleasurable--apart from actual success--while disappointment or the fear of disappointment similarly tends to be painful3 but when desire is not strong1 the shock of thwarted activity and unfulfilled expectation may be rather agreeable than otherwise4 ,thus1 suppose ,i take a walk for pleasure1 intending to reach a neighbouring village1 and find an unexpected flood crossing my road2 if ,i have no strong motive for arriving at the village1 the surprise and consequent change in the plan of my walk will probably be on the whole a pleasurable incident4 ,the importance of eager desire as a condition of pleasure is noteworthy from an ethical point of view3 as it gives the psychological basis for the familiar precept to repress--with a view to private happiness--desires for ends that are either unattainable or incompatible with the course of life which prudence marks out2 and for the somewhat less trite maxim of encouraging and developing desires that prompt in the same direction as rational choice4 ,suppose now we drop the dubious term 8unimpeded0--retaining ,hamilton's idea of 8overstrained or repressed exertion0 as the condition of pain--and at the same time passing to a physical point of view1 mean by 8activity0 the activity of an organ4 ,we thus reach what is substantially ,mr4 ,spencer's doctrine1 that pains are the psychical concomitants of excessive or deficient actions of organs1 while pleasures are the concomitants of medium activities4#aci ,in considering this theory it will be convenient to take pains and pleasures separately3 as it is obviously based primarily on experiences of pain rather than of pleasure1--especially of the pains of sense to which ,hamilton's theory seemed palpably inapplicable4 ,instances are abundant in which pain is obviously caused by excessive stimulation of nerves4 ,thus when we gradually increase the intensity of sensible heat1 pressure1 muscular effort1 we encounter pain at a certain point of the increase2 8deafening0 sounds are highly disagreeable2 and to confront a tropical sun with unprotected eyeballs would soon become torture4 ,some pains1 again1 as ,spencer points out1 arise from the excessive actions of organs whose normal actions yield no feelings3 as when the digestive apparatus is overtaxed4 ,still in none of these cases does it seem clear that pain supervenes through a mere intensification in degree of the action of the organ in question2 and not rather through some change in the kind of action--some inchoate disintegration or disorganisation4 ,and this latter cause--rather than mere quantity of stimulation--is strongly suggested by a consideration of the pains due to wounds and diseases1 and even of the transient digestive discomforts which arise from an improper kind rather than an improper quantity of food4 ,and a similar explanation seems to me most probable in the case of pains which1 according to ,mr4 ,spencer1 arise from 8deficient0 action4 ,he speaks of these as 8discomforts or cravings02 but1 as ,i have before pointed out1#adj bodily appetites and other desires may be strongly-felt impulses to action without being appreciably painful3 and1 in my experience1 when they become decidedly painful1 some disturbance tending to derangement may be presumed either in the organ primarily concerned or in the organism as a whole4 ,thus hunger1 in my experience1 may be extremely keen without being appreciably painful3 and when ,i find it painful1 experience leads me to expect a temporarily reduced power of assimilation1 indicating some disorganisation in the digestive apparatus4#ada ,in any case1 empirical evidence supports 8excessive action0 of an organ as a cause of pain far more clearly than 8deficient action40 ,indeed a consideration of this evidence has led some psychologists to adopt the generalisation#adb that there is no quality of sensation absolutely pleasant or unpleasant1 but that every kind of sensation as it grows in intensity begins at a certain point to be pleasurable1 and continues such up to a certain further point at which it passes rapidly through indifference into pain4 ,my own experience1 however1 fails to support this generalisation4 ,i agree with ,gurney#adc that 8of many tastes and odours the faintest possible suggestion is disagreeable02 while other feelings resulting from stimulation of sense-organs appear to remain highly pleasurable at the highest degree of stimulation which the actual conditions of physical life appear to allow4 ,however this may be1 whether we conceive the nervous action of which pain is an immediate consequent or concomitant as merely excessive in quantity1 or in some way discordant or disorganised in quality1 it is obvious that neither explanation can furnish us with any important practical guidance3 since we have no general means of ascertaining1 independently of our experience of pain itself1 what nervous actions are excessive or disorganised3 and the cases where we have such means do not present any practical problems which the theory enables us to solve4 ,no one doubts that wounds and diseases are to be avoided under all ordinary circumstances3 and in the exceptional circumstances in which we may be moved to choose them as the least of several evils1 the exactest knowledge of their precise operation in causing pain is not likely to assist our choice4 ,it may be said1 however1--turning from pain to pleasure1--that the generalisation which we have been considering at any rate gives us a psychophysical basis for the ancient maxim of 8avoiding excess0 in the pursuit of pleasure4 ,but we have to observe that the practical need of this maxim is largely due to the qualifications which the psychophysical generalisation requires to make it true4 ,thus it is especially needed in the important cases in which over-stimulation is followed by pain not at once but after an interval of varying length4 ,e4g4 alcoholic drinking1 to many1 remains pleasurable at the time up to the point of excess at which the brain can no longer perform its functions3 it is 8next morning0 that the pain comes1 or perhaps--in the case of 8well-seasoned0 topers--not till after many years of habitual excess4 ,it should be noted also that it is not always the organ of which the exercise gives pleasure that also1 through over-exercise1 causes the pain of excess4 ,thus when we are tempted to eat too much1 the seductive pleasure is mainly due to the nerves of taste which are not overtaxed2 the pains come from the organs of digestion1 whose faint1 vague pleasures alone would hardly tempt the voluptuary to excess4 ,in the case of dangerous mental excitements the penalty on excess is usually still more indirect4 ,on the whole1 granting that pleasure like virtue resides somewhere in the mean1 it must be admitted that this proposition gives no practical directions for attaining it4 ,for first1 granting that both excessive and deficient activities of organs cause pain1 the question still remains--as ,spencer himself says--,what determines in any case the lower and the higher limits within which action is pleasurable8 ,spencer's answer to this question ,i will consider presently4 ,but there is a question no less obvious to which he does not expressly advert1 viz4 why among the normal activities of our physical organs1 that have counterparts in consciousness1 some only are pleasurable in any appreciable degree1 while many if not most are nearly or quite indifferent4 ,it seems undeniable 7e4g47 that while tastes and smells are mostly either agreeable or disagreeable1 most sensations of touch and many of sight and sound are not appreciably#add either2 and that1 in the daily routine of healthy life1 eating and drinking are ordinarily pleasant1 while dressing and undressing1 walking and muscular movements generally are practically indifferent4 ,it does not seem that an adequate explanation can be found in the operation of habit4#ade ,it is no doubt true that actions through frequent uniform repetition tend to become automatic and lose their conscious counterparts1 and hedonic indifference certainly seems in some cases to be a stage through which such actions pass on the way to unconsciousness4 ,thus even a business walk in a strange town is normally pleasant through the novelty of the sights3 but a similar walk in the town where one lives is ordinarily indifferent1 or nearly so2 while if one's attention is strongly absorbed by the business1 it may be performed to a great extent unconsciously4 ,on the other hand1 the operations of habit often have the opposite effect of making activities pleasant which were at first indifferent or even disagreeable3 as in the case of acquired tastes1 physical or intellectual4 ,indeed such experiences have long been--,i think1 quite legitimately--used by moralists as an encouragement to irksome duties1 on the ground that their irksomeness will be transient1 through the operation of habit1 while the gain of their performance will be permanent4 ,mr4 ,spencer1 indeed1 regards such experiences as so important that he ventures to base on them the prediction that 8pleasure will eventually accompany every mode of action demanded by social conditions40 ,this1 however1 seems unduly optimistic1 in view not only of the first-mentioned tendency of habit to hedonic indifference1 but also of a third tendency to render actions1 at first indifferent or even pleasant1 gradually more irksome4 ,thus our intellect gradually wearies of monotonous activities1 and the ennui may sometimes become intense3 so again the relish of a kind of diet at first agreeable may turn through monotony into disgust4 ,some quite different explanation must therefore be sought for the varying degrees in which pleasure accompanies normal activities4 ,can we find this in a suggestion of ,mr4 ,spencer's1 developed by ,mr4 ,grant ,allen1#adf that the pleasurableness of normal organic activities depends on their intermittence1 and that 8the amount of pleasure is probably 444 in the inverse ratio of the natural frequency of excitation0 of the nerve-fibres involved8 ,this theory certainly finds some support in the fact that the sensual pleasures generally recognised as greatest are those attending the activities of organs which are normally left unexercised for considerable intervals4 ,still1 there are many facts that it does not explain--e4g4 the great differences in the pleasures obtainable at any given time by different stimulations of the same sense2 the phenomenon expressed in the proverbial phrase 8,l'apptit vient en mangeant02 and the fact that the exercise of the visual organs after apparently dreamless sleep does not give appreciably keener pleasure than it does at ordinary times4 ,it would seem that we must seek for some special cause of the pleasurable effect of intermittence in certain cases4 ,and this cannot be merely the greater intensity of the nervous action that takes place when long-unexercised and well-nourished nerve-centres are stimulated3 for why1 if that were the explanation1 should the normal consciousness of full nervous activity1 gradually attained--as when we are in full swing of energetic unwearied work of a routine kind--be often nearly or quite indifferent8 ,among the various competing hypotheses offered at this point of our inquiry--no one of which1 ,i believe1 has attained anything like general acceptance as covering the whole ground--,i select for discussion one that has special ethical interest4 ,according to this hypothesis1#adg the organic process accompanied by pleasure is to be conceived as a 8restoration of equilibrium0 after 8disturbance03 so that the absence of appreciable pleasure in the case of certain normal activities is explained by the absence of antecedent disturbance4 ,this view is obviously applicable to certain classes of pleasures which1 though by no means rare are incidental in a normal life3--the pleasure of relief after physical pain1 or after the strain of great anxiety1 and the pleasure of repose after unusual exertions1 intellectual or muscular4 ,but when we attempt to apply it to sensational pleasures generally1 the indefiniteness of the notion of 8equilibrium10 as applied to the processes of a living organism1 becomes manifest4 ,for our physical life consists of a series of changes1 for the most part periodically recurrent with slight modification after short intervals3 and it is difficult to see why we should attach the idea of 8disturbance0 or 8restoration of equilibrium0 to any one among these normal processes rather than any other3--e4g4 it is difficult to see why the condition of having expended energy should be regarded as a departure from equilibrium any more than the condition of having just taken in nutriment4 ,in fact1 to render the hypothesis we are considering at all applicable to normal pleasures of sense1 we have to pass from the physiological to the psychological point of view1 and take note of the psychical state of desire1 as a consciously unrestful condition1 of which the essence is a felt impulse to pass out of this state towards the attainment of the desired object4 ,our hypothesis1 then1 may take this unrestful consciousness as a sign of what1 from a physiological point of view1 is 8disturbance of equilibrium10 and similarly1 the satisfaction of desire may be taken to be1 physiologically1 a restoration of equilibrium4 ,on this assumption1 the theory becomes undeniably applicable to those gratifications of sensual appetite which form the most prominent element of the pleasures of sense1 as popularly conceived4 ,now we have already noted that by a wide-spread confusion of thought1 desire has often been regarded as a species of pain4 ,accordingly1 the theory that we are considering was originally prompted by the ethical motive of depreciating the vulgarly overvalued pleasures of satisfied bodily appetite1 by laying stress on their inseparable connexion with antecedent pain4 ,the depreciation1 however1 fails so far as the appetite which is a necessary antecedent condition of the pleasure is--though an unrestful state--not appreciably painful4#adh ,in any case1 admitting the physical counterpart of conscious desire to be a #8disturbance of equilibrium1' or an effect and sign of such disturbance1 the theory seems open to obvious objections1 if it is extended to cover the whole range of the pleasures of sense4 ,for conscious desire is certainly not a necessary condition of experiencing the simple pleasures of the special senses3 normally no sense of want has preceded the experience of pleasant sights1 sounds1 odours1 flavours1 or of the more important pleasures1 more complex in their psychical conditions1 which we call sthetic4 ,no doubt in special cases antecedent privation may produce a conscious want of these latter pleasures which may increase their intensity when they are at length attained3 or even without any felt privation1 the prospect of enjoying such pleasures may produce a keen desire for the enjoyment1 which may be regarded as a 8disturbance of equilibrium0 no less plausibly than a bodily appetite4 ,but it would be quite unwarrantable therefore to suppose a similar disturbance1 though unfelt1 in the ordinary cases where pleasures of this kind are experienced without any antecedent consciousness of desire or want4 ,i have perhaps said enough to support my general conclusion that psychophysical speculation as to the causes of pleasure and pain does not at present afford a basis for a deductive method of practical ,hedonism4 ,but1 before passing from this topic1 ,i may remark that the difficulties in the way of any such theory seem especially great in the case of the complex pleasures which we distinguish as 8sthetic40 ,all would agree that sthetic gratification1 when at all high1 depends on a subtle harmony of different elements in a complex state of consciousness2 and that the pleasure resulting from such harmonious combination is indefinitely greater than the sum of the simpler pleasures which the uncombined elements would yield4 ,but even those who estimate most highly the success that has so far been attained in discovering the conditions of this harmony1 in the case of any particular art1 would admit that mere conformity to the conditions thus ascertained cannot secure the production of sthetic pleasure in any considerable degree4 ,however subtly we state in general terms the objective relations of elements in a delightful work of art1 on which its delight seems to depend1 we must always feel that it would be possible to produce out of similar elements a work corresponding to our general description which would give no delight at all2 the touch that gives delight depends upon an instinct for which no deductive reasoning can supply a substitute4 ,this is true1 even without taking into account the wide divergences that we actually find in the sthetic sensibilities of individuals3 still less1 therefore1 is it needful to argue that1 from the point of view of an individual seeking his own greatest happiness1 none but a mainly inductive and empirical method of estimating sthetic pleasures can be made available4 #c4 ,i now pass to consider a theory which may be distinguished from those discussed in the preceding section as being biological rather than psychophysical3 since it directs attention not to the actual present characteristics of the organic states or changes of which pleasures and pains are the concomitants or immediate consequents1 but to their relations to the life of the organism as a whole4 ,i mean the theory that 8pains are the correlatives of actions injurious to the organism1 while pleasures are the correlatives of acts conducive to its welfare40 ,mr4 ,spencer1 from whom the above propositions are quoted1#adi subsequently explains 8injurious0 and 8conducive to welfare0 to mean respectively 8tending to decrease or loss of life10 and 8tending to continuance or increase of life03 but in his deduction by which the above conclusion is summarily established1 8injurious0 and 8beneficial0 are used as equivalent simply to 8destructive0 and 8preservative0 of organic life3 and it will be more convenient to take the terms first in this simpler signification4 ,mr4 ,spencer's argument is as follows3-- 8,if we substitute for the word ,pleasure the equivalent phrase--a feeling which we seek to bring into consciousness and retain there2 and if we substitute for the word ,pain the equivalent phrase--a feeling which we seek to get out of consciousness and to keep out2 we see at once that1 if the states of consciousness which a creature endeavours to maintain are the correlatives of injurious actions1 and if the states of consciousness which it endeavours to expel are the correlatives of beneficial actions1 it must quickly disappear through persistence in the injurious and avoidance of the beneficial4 ,in other words1 those races of beings only can have survived in which1 on the average1 agreeable or desired feelings went along with activities conducive to the maintenance of life1 while disagreeable and habitually-avoided feelings went along with activities directly or indirectly destructive of life2 and there must ever have been1 other things equal1 the most numerous and long-continued survivals among races in which these adjustments of feelings to actions were the best1 tending ever to bring about perfect adjustment40 ,now ,i am not concerned to deny the value of this summary deduction for certain purposes4 ,but it can easily be shown to be inadequate to afford a basis for a deductive method of seeking maximum happiness for the individual1 by substituting ,preservation for ,pleasure as the end directly aimed at4 ,in the first place1 ,mr4 ,spencer only affirms the conclusion to be true1 as he rather vaguely says1 8on the average03 and it is obvious that though the tendency to find injurious acts pleasant or preservative acts painful must be a disadvantage to any species of animal in the struggle for existence1 it may--if existing only to a limited extent--be outweighed by other advantages1 so that the organism in which it exists may survive in spite of it4 ,this1 ,i say1 is obvious a priori3 and common experience1 as ,mr4 ,spencer admits1 shows 8in many conspicuous ways0 that this has been actually the case with civilised man during the whole period of history that we know3 owing to the changes caused by the course of civilisation1 8there has arisen and must long continue a deep and involved derangement of the natural connexions between pleasures and beneficial actions and between pains and detrimental actions40 ,this seems to be in itself a sufficient objection to founding a deductive method of ,hedonism on ,mr4 ,spencer's general conclusion4 ,it is1 indeed1 notorious that civilised men take pleasure in various forms of unhealthy conduct and find conformity to the rules of health irksome2 and it is also important to note that they may be1 and actually are1 susceptible of keen pleasure from acts and processes that have no material tendency to preserve life4 ,nor is there any difficulty in explaining this on the 8evolution hypothesis02 since we cannot argue a priori from this hypothesis that the development of the nervous system in human beings may not bring with it intense susceptibilities to pleasure from non-preservative processes1 if only the preservation of the individuals in whom such susceptibilities are developed is otherwise adequately provided for4 ,now this latter supposition is obviously realised in the case of persons of leisure in civilised society2 whose needs of food1 clothing1 shelter1 etc41 are abundantly supplied through the complex social habit which we call the institution of private property3 and ,i know no empirical ground for supposing that a cultivated man tends1 in consequence of the keen and varied pleasure which he seeks and enjoys1 to live longer than a man who goes through a comparatively dull round of monotonous routine activity1 interspersed by slightly pleasurable intervals of repose and play4 #d4 ,if1 however1 the individual is not likely to obtain a maximum of ,pleasure by aiming merely at ,preservation1 it remains to consider whether 8quantity of life0 will serve any better4 ,now it is of course true that so far as nervous action is attended by consciousness pleasurable in quality1 the more there is of it1 the happier we shall be4 ,but even if we assume that the more intense and full life is 8on the average0 the happier1 it by no means follows that we shall gain maximum pleasure by aiming merely at intensity of consciousness3 for we experience intense pains even more indubitably than intense pleasures1 and in those 8full tides of soul10 in which we seem to be most alive1 painful consciousness may be mixed in almost any proportion4 ,and further we often experience excitement nearly or quite neutral in quality 7i4e4 not distinctly pleasurable or painful71 which reaches a great pitch of intensity1 as in the case of laborious struggles with difficulties1 and perplexing conflicts of which the issue is doubtful4 ,it may1 however1 be replied that 8quantity of life0 must be taken to imply not merely intensity of consciousness1 but multiplicity and variety--a harmonious and many-sided development of human nature4 ,and experience certainly seems to support the view that men lose happiness by allowing some of their faculties or capacities to be withered and dwarfed for want of exercise1 and thus not leaving themselves sufficient variety of feelings or activities3 especially as regards the bodily organs1 it will be agreed that the due exercise of most1 if not all1 is indispensable to the health of the organism2 and further1 that the health maintained by this balance of functions is a more important source of the individual's happiness than the unhealthy over-exercise of any one organ can be4 ,still1 it would appear that the harmony of functions necessary to health is a very elastic one1 and admits of a very wide margin of variation1 as far as the organs under voluntary control are concerned4 ,a man 7e4g47 who exercises his brain alone will probably be ill in consequence3 but he may exercise his brain much and his legs little1 or vice versa1 without any morbid results4 ,and1 in the same way1 we cannot lay down the proposition1 that a varied and many-sided life is the happiest1 with as much precision as would be necessary if it were to be accepted as a basis for deductive ,hedonism4 ,for it seems to be also largely true1 on the other side1 that the more we come to exercise any faculty with sustained and prolonged concentration1 the more pleasure we derive from such exercise1 up to the point at which it becomes wearisome1 or turns into a semi-mechanical routine which renders consciousness dull and languid4 ,it is1 no doubt1 important for our happiness that we should keep within this limit3 but we cannot fix it precisely in any particular case without special experience3 especially as there seems always to be a certain amount of weariness and tedium which must be resisted and overcome1 if we would bring our faculties into full play1 and obtain the full enjoyment of our labour4 ,and similarly in respect of passive emotional consciousness3 if too much sameness of feeling results in languor1 too much variety inevitably involves shallowness4 ,the point where concentration ought to stop1 and where dissipation begins1 varies from man to man1 and must1 it would seem1 be decided by the specific experience of individuals4 ,there is1 however1 another and simpler way in which the maxim of #8giving free development to one's nature' may be understood3 i4e4 in the sense of yielding to spontaneous impulses1 instead of endeavouring to govern these by elaborate forecasts of consequences3 a scientific justification for this course being found in the theory that spontaneous or instinctive impulses really represent the effects of previous experiences of pleasure and pain on the organism in which they appear1 or its ancestors4 ,on this ground1 it has been maintained that in complicated problems of conduct1 experience will 8enable the constitution to estimate the respective amounts of pleasure and pain consequent upon each alternative10 where it is 8impossible for the intellect0 to do this3 and 8will further cause the organism instinctively to shun that course which produces on the whole most suffering40#aej ,that there is an important element of truth in this contention ,i would not deny4 ,but any broad conclusion that non-rational inclination is a better guide than reason to the individual's happiness would be quite unwarranted by anything that we know or can plausibly conjecture respecting biological evolution4 ,for--overlooking the effect of natural selection to foster impulses tending to the preservation of the race rather than the pleasure of the individual1 and granting that every sentient organism tends to adapt itself to its environment1 in such a manner as to acquire instincts of some value in guiding it to pleasure and away from pain--it by no means follows that in the human organism one particular kind of adaptation1 that which proceeds by unconscious modification of instinct1 is to be preferred to that other kind of adaptation which is brought about by conscious comparison and inference4 ,it rather seems clear1 that this proposition can only be justified by a comparison of the consequences of yielding to instinctive impulses with the consequences of controlling them by calculations of resulting pleasure and pain4 ,but it will hardly be maintained that in the majority of clear instances where non-rational impulse conflicts with rational forecast1 a subsequent calculation of consequences appears to justify the former2 the assertion would be in too flagrant conflict with the common sense and common experience of mankind4 ,hence1 however true it may be that in certain cases instinct is on the whole a safer guide than prudential calculation1 it would still seem that we can only ascertain these cases by careful reflection on experience3 we cannot determine the limits to which prudential calculation may prudently be carried1 except by this very calculation itself4 ,we seem1 then1 forced to conclude that there is no scientific short-cut to the ascertainment of the right means to the individual's happiness3 every attempt to find a #8high priori road' to this goal brings us back inevitably to the empirical method4 ,for instead of a clear principle universally valid1 we only get at best a vague and general rule1 based on considerations which it is important not to overlook1 but the relative value of which we can only estimate by careful observation and comparison of individual experience4 ,whatever uncertainty besets these processes must necessarily extend to all our reasonings about happiness4 ,i have no wish to exaggerate these uncertainties1 feeling that we must all continue to seek happiness for ourselves and for others1 in whatever obscurity we may have to grope after it3 but there is nothing gained by underrating them1 and it is idle to argue as if they did not exist4 ,,footnotes3 #aca 8,it should seem that a due concern about our own interest or happiness1 and a reasonable endeavour to secure and promote it1 444 is virtue1 and the contrary behaviour faulty and blamable40 ,butler 7in the ,dissertation ,of the ,nature of ,virtue appended to the ,analogy74 #acb ,this view is suggested by ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer's statement--in a letter to ,j4 ,s4 ,mill1 published in ,mr4 ,bain's ,mental and ,moral ,science2 and partially reprinted in ,mr4 ,spencer's ,data of ,ethics1 chap4 iv4 #ba--that 8it is the business of moral science to deduce1 from the laws of life and the conditions of existence1 what kinds of actions necessarily tend to produce happiness1 and what kinds to produce unhappiness10 and that when it has done this1 8its deductions are to be recognised as laws of conduct2 and are to be conformed to irrespective of a direct estimate of happiness or misery40 ,i ought1 however1 to say that ,mr4 ,spencer has made it clear in his latest treatise that the only cogent deductions of this kind which he conceives to be possible relate to the behaviour not of men here and now1 but of ideal men living in an ideal society1 and living under conditions so unlike those of actual humanity that all their actions produce 8pleasure unalloyed with pain anywhere0 7,data of ,ethics1 #aja74 ,the laws of conduct in this ,utopia constitute1 in ,mr4 ,spencer's view1 the subject-matter of 8,absolute ,ethics02 which he distinguishes from the 8,relative ,ethics0 that concerns itself with the conduct of the imperfect men who live under the present imperfect social conditions1 and of which the method is1 as he admits1 to a great extent 8necessarily empirical0 7,data of ,ethics1 #ajh74 ,how far such a system as ,mr4 ,spencer calls ,absolute ,ethics can be rationally constructed1 and how far its construction would be practically useful1 ,i shall consider in a later part of this treatise 7,book iv4 chap4 iv471 when ,i come to deal with the method of ,universalistic ,hedonism3 at present ,i am only concerned with the question how far any deductive ,ethics is capable of furnishing practical guidance to an individual seeking his own greatest happiness here and now4 #acc ,aristotle's theory is1 briefly1 that every normal sense-perception or rational activity has its correspondent pleasure1 and that the most perfect is the most pleasant3 the most perfect in the case of any faculty being the exercise of the faculty in good condition on the best object4 ,the pleasure follows the activity immediately1 giving it a kind of finish1 8like the bloom of youth40 ,pleasures vary in kind1 as the activities that constitute life vary3 the best pleasures are those of the philosophic life4 #acd ,see ,bouillier1 ,du plaisir et de la douleur1 chap4 iii42 ,l4 ,dumont1 ,thorie scientifique de la sensibilit1 chap4 iii42 as well as ,stout1 ,analytic ,psychology1 chap4 xii4--to which ,i refer later4 #ace ,lectures on ,metaphysics1 vol4 ii4 ,lect4 xlii4 #acf ,in ,aristotle's exposition of this theory--which with him is only a theory of pleasure--the ethical motive of exhibiting the philosophic life as preferable to that of the sensualist1 in respect of the pleasures it affords1 is quite unmistakable4 #acg ,analytic ,psychology1 chap4 xii4 #b4 #ach ,the physiological theory which ,mr4 ,stout puts forward1 as at once correspondent and supplementary to his psychological generalisation1 will be noticed later4 #aci ,psychology1 chap4 ix4 #abh4 #adj ,book i4 chap4 iv4 #ada ,it may be added that in the case of emotional pains and pleasures1 the notion of quantitative difference between the cerebral nerve-processes1 antecedent respectively to the one and the other1 seems altogether unwarrantable3 the pains of shame1 disappointed ambition1 wounded love1 do not appear to be distinguishable from the pleasures of fame1 success1 reciprocated affection1 by any difference of intensity in the impressions or ideas accompanied by the pleasures and pains respectively4 #adb ,see ,wundt1 ,grundzge der physiologischen ,psychologie1 chap4 x4 #adc ,power of ,sound1 chap4 i4 #b4 #add ,i say 8appreciably0 because the controverted psychological question whether there are any strictly neutral or indifferent modifications of consciousness seems to me unimportant from a practical point of view4 ,see ,sully1 ,human ,mind1 chap4 xiii4 #b4 #ade ,see ,stout1 ,analytic ,psychology1 l4c4 #adf ,physiological sthetics1 chap4 ii4 #adg ,see ,stout1 ,analytic ,psychology1 chap4 xii4 #d4 #adh ,see ,book i4 chap4 iv4 ,note4 #adi ,principles of ,psychology1 #abe1 and ,data of ,ethics1 #cc4 #aej ,the quotations are from ,mr4 ,spencer's ,social ,statics1 chap4 iv43 but ,i should explain that in the passage quoted ,mr4 ,spencer is not writing from the point of view of ,egoistic ,hedonism4 ,,book ,,iii ,,intuitionism ,,chapter ,i ,,intuitionism #a4 ,the effort to examine1 closely but quite neutrally1 the system of ,egoistic ,hedonism1 with which we have been engaged in the last ,book1 may not improbably have produced on the reader's mind a certain aversion to the principle and method examined1 even though 7like myself7 he may find it difficult not to admit the #8authority' of self-love1 or the #8rationality' of seeking one's own individual happiness4 ,in considering #8enlightened self-interest' as supplying a prima facie tenable principle for the systematisation of conduct1 ,i have given no expression to this sentiment of aversion1 being anxious to ascertain with scientific impartiality the results to which this principle logically leads4 ,when1 however1 we seem to find on careful examination of ,egoism 7as worked out on a strictly empirical basis7 that the common precepts of duty1 which we are trained to regard as sacred1 must be to the egoist rules to which it is only generally speaking and for the most part reasonable to conform1 but which under special circumstances must be decisively ignored and broken1--the offence which ,egoism in the abstract gives to our sympathetic and social nature adds force to the recoil from it caused by the perception of its occasional practical conflict with common notions of duty4 ,but further1 we are accustomed to expect from ,morality clear and decisive precepts or counsels3 and such rules as can be laid down for seeking the individual's greatest happiness cannot but appear wanting in these qualities4 ,a dubious guidance to an ignoble end appears to be all that the calculus of ,egoistic ,hedonism has to offer4 ,and it is by appealing to the superior certainty with which the dictates of ,conscience or the ,moral ,faculty are issued1 that ,butler maintains the practical supremacy of ,conscience over ,self-love1 in spite of his admission 7in the passage before quoted#aea7 of theoretical priority in the claims of the latter4#aeb ,a man knows certainly1 he says1 what he ought to do3 but he does not certainly know what will lead to his happiness4 ,in saying this1 ,butler appears to me fairly to represent the common moral sense of ordinary mankind1 in our own age no less than in his4 ,the moral judgments that men habitually pass on one another in ordinary discourse imply for the most part that duty is usually not a difficult thing for an ordinary man to know1 though various seductive impulses may make it difficult for him to do it4 ,and in such maxims as that duty should be performed #8advienne que pourra1' that truth should be spoken without regard to consequences1 that justice should be done #8though the sky should fall1' it is implied that we have the power of seeing clearly that certain kinds of actions are right and reasonable in themselves1 apart from their consequences2--or rather with a merely partial consideration of consequences1 from which other consequences admitted to be possibly good or bad are definitely excluded4#aec ,and such a power is claimed for the human mind by most of the writers who have maintained the existence of moral intuitions2 ,i have therefore thought myself justified in treating this claim as characteristic of the method which ,i distinguish as ,intuitional4 ,at the same time1 as ,i have before observed1 there is a wider sense in which the term #8intuitional' might be legitimately applied to either ,egoistic or ,universalistic ,hedonism2 so far as either system lays down as a first principle--which if known at all must be intuitively known--that happiness is the only rational ultimate end of action4 ,to this meaning ,i shall recur in the concluding chapters 7xiii4 and xiv47 of this ,book2 in which ,i shall discuss more fully the intuitive character of these hedonistic principles4 ,but since the adoption of this wider meaning would not lead us to a distinct ethical method1 ,i have thought it best1 in the detailed discussion of ,intuitionism which occupies the first eleven chapters of this ,book1 to confine myself as far as possible to ,moral ,intuition understood in the narrower sense above defined4 #b4 ,here1 perhaps1 it may be said that in thus defining ,intuitionism ,i have omitted its most fundamental characteristic2 that the ,intuitionist properly speaking--in contrast with the ,utilitarian--does not judge actions by an external standard at all2 that true morality1 in his view1 is not concerned with outward actions as such1 but with the state of mind in which acts are done--in short with 8intentions0 and 8motives40#aed ,i think1 however1 that this objection is partly due to a misunderstanding4 ,moralists of all schools1 ,i conceive1 would agree that the moral judgments which we pass on actions relate primarily to intentional actions regarded as intentional4 ,in other words1 what we judge to be #8wrong'--in the strictest ethical sense--is not any part of the actual effects1 as such1 of the muscular movements immediately caused by the agent's volition1 but the effects which he foresaw in willing the act2 or1 more strictly1 his volition or choice of realising the effects as foreseen4#aee ,when ,i speak therefore of acts1 ,i must be understood to mean--unless the contrary is stated--acts presumed to be intentional and judged as such3 on this point ,i do not think that any dispute need arise4 ,the case of motives is different and requires careful discussion4 ,in the first place the distinction between 8motive0 and 8intention0 in ordinary language is not very precise3 since we apply the term 8motive0 to foreseen consequences of an act1 so far as they are conceived to be objects of desire to the agent1 or to the desire of such consequences3 and when we speak of the intention of an act we usually1 no doubt1 have desired consequences in view4 ,i think1 however1 that for purposes of exact moral or jural discussion1 it is best to include under the term #8intention' all the consequences of an act that are foreseen as certain or probable2 since it will be admitted that we cannot evade responsibility for any foreseen bad consequences of our acts by the plea that we felt no desire for them1 either for their own sake or as means to ulterior ends3#aef such undesired accompaniments of the desired results of our volitions are clearly chosen or willed by us4 ,hence the intention of an act may be judged to be wrong1 while the motive is recognised as good2 as when a man commits perjury to save a parent's or a benefactor's life4 ,such judgments are1 in fact1 continually passed in common moral discourse4 ,it may1 however1 be said that an act cannot be right1 even when the intention is such as duty would prescribe1 if it be done from a bad motive3 that--to take a case suggested by ,bentham--a man who prosecutes from malice a person whom he believes to be guilty1 does not really act rightly2 for1 though it may be his duty to prosecute1 he ought not to do it from malice4 ,it is doubtless true that it is our duty to get rid of bad motives if we can2 so that a man's intention cannot be wholly right1 unless it includes the repression1 so far as possible1 of a motive known to be bad4 ,but no one1 ,i think1 will contend that we can always suppress entirely a strong emotion2 and such suppression will be especially difficult if we are to do the act to which the wrong impulse prompts2 while yet1 if that act be clearly a duty which no one else can so properly perform1 it would be absurd to say that we ought to omit it because we cannot altogether exclude an objectionable motive4 ,it is sometimes said that1 though we may not be able in doing our duty to exclude a bad motive altogether from our minds1 it is still possible to refuse to act from it4 ,but ,i think that this is only possible so far as the details of action to which a right motive would prompt differ to some extent from those to which a wrong motive would prompt4 ,no doubt this is often the case3--thus1 in ,bentham's example1 a malevolent prosecutor may be prompted to take unfair advantage of his enemy1 or cause him needless pain by studied insults2 and it is obviously possible for him--and his duty--to resist such promptings4 ,but so far as precisely the same action is prompted by two different motives1 both present in my consciousness1 ,i am not conscious of any power to cause this action to be determined by one of the two motives to the exclusion of the other4 ,in other words1 while a man can resolve to aim at any end which he conceives as a possible result of his voluntary action1 he cannot simultaneously resolve not to aim at any other end which he believes will be promoted by the same action2 and if that other end be an object of desire to him1 he cannot1 while aiming at it1 refuse to act from this desire4#aeg ,on the whole1 then1 ,i conclude 7#a7 that while many actions are commonly judged to be made better or worse by the presence or absence of certain motives1 our judgments of right and wrong strictly speaking relate to intentions1 as distinguished from motives2#aeh and 7#b7 that while intentions affecting the agent's own feelings and character are morally prescribed no less than intentions to produce certain external effects1 still1 the latter form the primary--though not the sole--content of the main prescriptions of duty1 as commonly affirmed and understood3 but the extent to which this is the case1 will become more clear as we proceed4 ,it has indeed been maintained by moralists of influence that the moral value of our conduct depends upon the degree to which we are actuated by the one motive which they regard as truly moral3 viz4 the desire or free choice#aei of doing what is right as such1 realising duty or virtue for duty or virtue's sake3#afj and that a perfectly good act must be done entirely from this motive4 ,i think1 however1 that it is difficult to combine this view--which ,i may conveniently distinguish as ,stoical--with the belief1 which modern orthodox moralists have usually been concerned to maintain1 that it is always a man's true interest to act virtuously4 ,i do not mean that a man who holds this belief must necessarily be an egoist3 but it seems to me impossible for him to exclude from his motives a regard for his own interest1 while yet believing that it will be promoted by the act which he is willing4 ,if1 therefore1 we hold that this self-regard impairs the moral value of an act otherwise virtuous1 and at the same time hold that virtue is always conducive to the virtuous agent's interest1 we seem driven to the conclusion that knowledge of the true relation between virtue and happiness is an insuperable obstacle to the attainment of moral perfection4 ,i cannot accept this paradox3 and in subsequent chapters ,i shall try to show that the ,stoical view of moral goodness is not on the whole sustained by a comprehensive survey and comparison of common moral judgments3 since in some cases acts appear to have the quality of virtue even more strikingly when performed from some motive other than the love of virtue as such4 ,for the present ,i wish rather to point out that the doctrine above stated is diametrically opposed to the view that the universal or normal motives of human action are either particular desires of pleasure or aversions to pain for the agent himself1 or the more general regard to his happiness on the whole which ,i term ,self-love2 that it also excludes the less extreme doctrine that duties may be to some extent properly done from such self-regarding motives2 and that one or other of these positions has frequently been held by writers who have expressly adopted an ,intuitional method of ,ethics4 ,for instance1 we find ,locke laying down1 without reserve or qualification1 that 8good and evil are nothing but pleasure and pain1 or that which occasions or procures pleasure or pain to us30#afa so that 8it would be utterly in vain to suppose a rule set to the free actions of man1 without annexing it to some reward or punishment to determine his will40 ,on the other hand1 he expresses1 with no less emphasis1 the conviction that 8from self-evident propositions1 by necessary consequences1 as incontestable as those in mathematics1 the measures of right and wrong might be made out10#afb so that 8morality might be placed among the sciences capable of demonstration40 ,the combination of these two doctrines gives us the view that moral rules are essentially laws of ,god1 which men are impelled to obey1 solely or mainly1 from fear or hope of divine punishments or rewards2 and some such view as this seems to be widely accepted1 by plain men without very refined moral sensibilities4 ,as an example1 again1 of thinkers who1 while recognising in human nature a disinterested regard for duty or virtue as such1 still consider that self-love is a proper and legitimate motive to right conduct1 we may refer to ,butler and his disciples4 ,butler regards 8reasonable self-love0 as not merely a normal motive to human action1 but as being--no less than conscience--a 8chief or superior principle in the nature of man02 so that an action 8becomes unsuitable0 to this nature1 if the principle of self-love be violated4 ,accordingly the aim of his teaching is not to induce men to choose duty rather than interest1 but to convince them that there is no inconsistency between the two2 that self-love and conscience lead 8to one and the same course of life40 ,this intermediate doctrine appears to me to be more in harmony with the common sense of mankind on the whole than either of the extreme views before contrasted4 ,but ,i do not conceive that any one of the three positions is inconsistent with fundamental assumptions of the ,intuitional method4 ,even those who hold that human beings cannot reasonably be expected to conform to moral rules disinterestedly1 or from any other motive than that supplied by the sanctions divinely attached to them1 still commonly conceive ,god as supreme ,reason1 whose laws must be essentially reasonable3 and so far as such laws are held to be cognisable by the #8light of nature'--so that morality1 as ,locke says1 may be placed among demonstrative sciences--the method of determining them will be none the less intuitional because it is combined with the belief that ,god will reward their observance and punish their violation4 ,on the other hand those who hold that regard for duty as duty is an indispensable condition of acting rightly1 would generally admit that acting rightly is not adequately defined as acting from a pure desire to act rightly2 that though1 in a certain sense1 a man who sincerely desires and intends to act rightly does all he can1 and completely fulfils duty1 still such a man may have a wrong judgment as to the particulars of his duty1 and therefore1 in another sense1 may act wrongly4 ,if this be admitted1 it is evident that1 even on the view that the desire or resolution to fulfil duty as such is essential to right action1 a distinction between two kinds of rightness is required2 which we may express by saying that an act is--on this view--8formally0#afc right1 if the agent in willing is moved by pure desire to fulfil duty or chooses duty for duty's sake2 8materially0 right1 if he intends the right particular effects4 ,this distinction being taken1 it becomes plain that there is no reason why the same principles and method for determining material rightness1 or rightness of particular effects1 should not be adopted by thinkers who differ most widely on the question of formal rightness2 and it is1 obviously1 with material rightness that the work of the systematic moralist is mainly concerned4 #c4 ,the term #8formal rightness1' as above used1 implying a desire or choice of the act as right1 implies also a belief that it is so4 ,but the latter condition may exist without the former3 ,i cannot perform an act from pure love of duty without believing it to be right3 but ,i can believe it to be right and yet do it from some other motive4 ,and there seems to be more agreement among moralists who adopt the ,intuitional ,method as to the moral indispensability of such a belief1 than we have found with respect to the question of motive3 at least1 it would1 ,i conceive1 be universally held that no act can be absolutely right1 whatever its external aspect and relations1 which is believed by the agent to be wrong4#afd ,such an act we may call 8subjectively0 wrong1 even though 8objectively0 right4 ,it may still be asked whether it is better in any particular case that a man should do what he mistakenly believes to be his duty1 or what really is his duty in the particular circumstances--considered apart from his mistaken belief--and would be completely right if he could only think so4 ,the question is rather subtle and perplexing to ,common ,sense3 it is therefore worth while to point out that it can have only a limited and subordinate practical application4 ,for no one1 in considering what he ought himself to do in any particular case1 can distinguish what he believes to be right from what really is so3 the necessity for a practical choice between #8subjective' and #8objective' rightness can only present itself in respect of the conduct of another person whom it is in our power to influence4 ,if another is about to do what we think wrong while he thinks it right1 and we cannot alter his belief but can bring other motives to bear on him that may overbalance his sense of duty1 it becomes necessary to decide whether we ought thus to tempt him to realise what we believe to be objectively right against his own convictions4 ,i think that the moral sense of mankind would pronounce against such temptation1--thus regarding the ,subjective rightness of an action as more important than the ,objective1--unless the evil of the act prompted by a mistaken sense of duty appeared to be very grave4#afe ,but however essential it may be that a moral agent should do what he believes to be right1 this condition of right conduct is too simple to admit of systematic development3 it is1 therefore1 clear that the details of our investigation must relate mainly to #8objective' rightness4 ,there is1 however1 one practical rule of some value1 to be obtained by merely reflecting on the general notion of rightness1#aff as commonly conceived4 ,in a previous chapter#afg ,i endeavoured to make this notion clearer by saying that #8what ,i judge to be right must1 unless ,i am in error1 be judged to be so by all rational beings who judge truly of the matter4' ,this statement does not imply that what is judged to be right for one man must necessarily be judged so for another3 #8objective' rightness may vary from ,a to ,b no less than the #8objective' facts of their nature and circumstances vary4 ,there seems1 however1 to be this difference between our conceptions of ethical and physical objectivity respectively3 that we commonly refuse to admit in the case of the former--what experience compels us to admit as regards the latter--variations for which we can discover no rational explanation4 ,in the variety of coexistent physical facts we find an accidental or arbitrary element in which we have to acquiesce1 as we cannot conceive it to be excluded by any extension of our knowledge of physical causation4 ,if we ask1 for example1 why any portion of space empirically known to us contains more matter than any similar adjacent portion1 physical science can only answer by stating 7along with certain laws of change7 some antecedent position of the parts of matter which needs explanation no less than the present2 and however far back we carry our ascertainment of such antecedent positions1 the one with which we leave off seems as arbitrary as that with which we started4 ,but within the range of our cognitions of right and wrong1 it will be generally agreed that we cannot admit a similar unexplained variation4 ,we cannot judge an action to be right for ,a and wrong for ,b1 unless we can find in the natures or circumstances of the two some difference which we can regard as a reasonable ground for difference in their duties4 ,if therefore ,i judge any action to be right for myself1 ,i implicitly judge it to be right for any other person whose nature and circumstances do not differ from my own in some important respects4 ,now by making this latter judgment explicit1 we may protect ourselves against the danger which besets the conscience1 of being warped and perverted by strong desire1 so that we too easily think that we ought to do what we very much wish to do4 ,for if we ask ourselves whether we believe that any similar person in similar circumstances ought to perform the contemplated action1 the question will often disperse the false appearance of rightness which our strong inclination has given to it4 ,we see that we should not think it right for another1 and therefore that it cannot be right for us4 ,indeed this test of the rightness of our volitions is so generally effective1 that ,kant seems to have held that all particular rules of duty can be deduced from the one fundamental rule 8,act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a universal law of nature40#afh ,but this appears to me an error analogous to that of supposing that ,formal ,logic supplies a complete criterion of truth4 ,i should agree that a volition which does not stand this test#afi is to be condemned2 but ,i hold that a volition which does stand it may after all be wrong4 ,for ,i conceive that all 7or almost all7 persons who act conscientiously could sincerely will the maxims on which they act to be universally adopted3 while at the same time we continually find such persons in thoroughly conscientious disagreement as to what each ought to do in a given set of circumstances4 ,under these circumstances1 to say that all such persons act rightly--in the objective sense--because their maxims all conform to ,kant's fundamental rule1 would obliterate altogether the distinction between subjective and objective rightness2 it would amount to affirming that whatever any one thinks right is so1 unless he is in error as to the facts of the case to which his judgment applies4 ,but such an affirmation is in flagrant conflict with common sense2 and would render the construction of a scientific code of morality futile3 as the very object of such a code is to supply a standard for rectifying men's divergent opinions4 ,we may conclude then that the moral judgments which the present method attempts to systematise are primarily and for the most part intuitions of the rightness or goodness 7or the reverse7 of particular kinds of external effects of human volition1 presumed to be intended by the agent1 but considered independently of the agent's own view as to the rightness or wrongness of his intention2 though the quality of motives1 as distinct from intentions1 has also to be taken into account4 #d4 ,but the question may be raised1 whether it is legitimate to take for granted 7as ,i have hitherto been doing7 the existence of such intuitions8 ,and1 no doubt1 there are persons who deliberately deny that reflection enables them to discover any such phenomenon in their conscious experience as the judgment or apparent perception that an act is in itself right or good1 in any other sense than that of being the right or fit means to the attainment of some ulterior end4 ,i think1 however1 that such denials are commonly recognised as paradoxical1 and opposed to the common experience of civilised men3--at any rate if the psychological question1 as to the existence of such moral judgments or apparent perceptions of moral qualities1 is carefully distinguished from the ethical question as to their validity1 and from what we may call the #8psychogonical' question as to their origin4 ,the first and second of these questions are sometimes confounded1 owing to an ambiguity in the use of the term 8intuition02 which has sometimes been understood to imply that the judgment or apparent perception so designated is true4 ,i wish therefore to say expressly1 that by calling any affirmation as to the rightness or wrongness of actions 8intuitive10 ,i do not mean to prejudge the question as to its ultimate validity1 when philosophically considered3 ,i only mean that its truth is apparently known immediately1 and not as the result of reasoning4 ,i admit the possibility that any such 8intuition0 may turn out to have an element of error1 which subsequent reflection and comparison may enable us to correct2 just as many apparent perceptions through the organ of vision are found to be partially illusory and misleading3 indeed the sequel will show that ,i hold this to be to an important extent the case with moral intuitions commonly so called4 ,the question as to the validity of moral intuitions being thus separated from the simple question #8whether they actually exist1' it becomes obvious that the latter can only be decided for each person by direct introspection or reflection4 ,it must not therefore be supposed that its decision is a simple matter1 introspection being always infallible3 on the contrary1 experience leads me to regard men as often liable to confound with moral intuitions other states or acts of mind essentially different from them1--blind impulses to certain kinds of action or vague sentiments of preference for them1 or conclusions from rapid and half-unconscious processes of reasoning1 or current opinions to which familiarity has given an illusory air of self-evidence4 ,but any errors of this kind1 due to careless or superficial reflection1 can only be cured by more careful reflection4 ,this may indeed be much aided by communication with other minds2 it may also be aided1 in a subordinate way1 by an inquiry into the antecedents of the apparent intuition1 which may suggest to the reflective mind sources of error to which a superficial view of it is liable4 ,still the question whether a certain judgment presents itself to the reflective mind as intuitively known cannot be decided by any inquiry into its antecedents or causes4#agj ,it is1 however1 still possible to hold that an inquiry into the ,origin of moral intuitions must be decisive in determining their ,validity4 ,and in fact it has been often assumed1 both by ,intuitionists and their opponents1 that if our moral faculty can be shown to be #8derived' or #8developed' out of other pre-existent elements of mind or consciousness1 a reason is thereby given for distrusting it2 while if1 on the other hand1 it can be shown to have existed in the human mind from its origin1 its trustworthiness is thereby established4 ,either assumption appears to me devoid of foundation4 ,on the one hand1 ,i can see no ground for supposing that a faculty thus derived1 is1 as such1 more liable to error than if its existence in the individual possessing it had been differently caused3#aga to put it otherwise1 ,i cannot see how the mere ascertainment that certain apparently self-evident judgments have been caused in known and determinate ways1 can be in itself a valid ground for distrusting this class of apparent cognitions4 ,i cannot even admit that those who affirm the truth of such judgments are bound to show in their causes a tendency to make them true3 indeed the acceptance of any such onus probandi would seem to me to render the attainment of philosophical certitude impossible4 ,for the premises of the required demonstration must consist of caused beliefs1 which as having been caused will equally stand in need of being proved true1 and so on ad infinitum3 unless it be held that we can find among the premises of our reasonings certain apparently self-evident judgments which have had no antecedent causes1 and that these are therefore to be accepted as valid without proof4 ,but such an assertion would be an extravagant paradox3 and1 if it be admitted that all beliefs are equally in the position of being effects of antecedent causes1 it seems evident that this characteristic alone cannot serve to invalidate any of them4 ,i hold1 therefore1 that the onus probandi must be thrown the other way3 those who dispute the validity of moral or other intuitions on the ground of their derivation must be required to show1 not merely that they are the effects of certain causes1 but that these causes are of a kind that tend to produce invalid beliefs4 ,now it is not1 ,i conceive1 possible to prove by any theory of the derivation of the moral faculty that the fundamental ethical conceptions #8right' or #8what ought to be done1' #8good' or #8what it is reasonable to desire and seek1' are invalid1 and that consequently all propositions of the form #8,x is right' or #8good' are untrustworthy3 for such ethical propositions1 relating as they do to matter fundamentally different from that with which physical science or psychology deals1 cannot be inconsistent with any physical or psychological conclusions4 ,they can only be shown to involve error by being shown to contradict each other3 and such a demonstration cannot lead us cogently to the sweeping conclusion that all are false4 ,it may1 however1 be possible to prove that some ethical beliefs have been caused in such a way as to make it probable that they are wholly or partially erroneous3 and it will hereafter be important to consider how far any ,ethical intuitions1 which we find ourselves disposed to accept as valid1 are open to attack on such psychogonical grounds4 ,at present ,i am only concerned to maintain that no general demonstration of the derivedness or developedness of our moral faculty can supply an adequate reason for distrusting it4 ,on the other hand1 if we have been once led to distrust our moral faculty on other grounds--as 7e4g47 from the want of clearness and consistency in the moral judgments of the same individual1 and the discrepancies between the judgments of different individuals--it seems to me equally clear that our confidence in such judgments cannot properly be re-established by a demonstration of their #8originality4' ,i see no reason to believe that the #8original' element of our moral cognition can be ascertained2 but if it could1 ,i see no reason to hold that it would be especially free from error4 #e4 ,how then can we hope to eliminate error from our moral intuitions8 ,one answer to this question was briefly suggested in a previous chapter where the different phases of the ,intuitional ,method were discussed4 ,it was there said that in order to settle the doubts arising from the uncertainties and discrepancies that are found when we compare our judgments on particular cases1 reflective persons naturally appeal to general rules or formul3 and it is to such general formul that ,intuitional ,moralists commonly attribute ultimate certainty and validity4 ,and certainly there are obvious sources of error in our judgments respecting concrete duty which seem to be absent when we consider the abstract notions of different kinds of conduct2 since in any concrete case the complexity of circumstances necessarily increases the difficulty of judging1 and our personal interests or habitual sympathies are liable to disturb the clearness of our moral discernment4 ,further1 we must observe that most of us feel the need of such formul not only to correct1 but also to supplement1 our intuitions respecting particular concrete duties4 ,only exceptionally confident persons find that they always seem to see clearly what ought to be done in any case that comes before them4 ,most of us1 however unhesitatingly we may affirm rightness and wrongness in ordinary matters of conduct1 yet not unfrequently meet with cases where our unreasoned judgment fails us2 and where we could no more decide the moral issue raised without appealing to some general formula1 than we could decide a disputed legal claim without reference to the positive law that deals with the matter4 ,and such formul are not difficult to find3 it only requires a little reflection and observation of men's moral discourse to make a collection of such general rules1 as to the validity of which there would be apparent agreement at least among moral persons of our own age and civilisation1 and which would cover with approximate completeness the whole of human conduct4 ,such a collection1 regarded as a code imposed on an individual by the public opinion of the community to which he belongs1 we have called the ,positive ,morality of the community3 but when regarded as a body of moral truth1 warranted to be such by the consensus of mankind1--or at least of that portion of mankind which combines adequate intellectual enlightenment with a serious concern for morality--it is more significantly termed the morality of ,common ,sense4 ,when1 however1 we try to apply these currently accepted principles1 we find that the notions composing them are often deficient in clearness and precision4 ,for instance1 we should all agree in recognising ,justice and ,veracity as important virtues2 and we shall probably all accept the general maxims1 that #8we ought to give every man his own' and that #8we ought to speak the truth'3 but when we ask 7#a7 whether primogeniture is just1 or the disendowment of corporations1 or the determination of the value of services by competition1 or 7#b7 whether and how far false statements may be allowed in speeches of advocates1 or in religious ceremonials1 or when made to enemies or robbers1 or in defence of lawful secrets1 we do not find that these or any other current maxims enable us to give clear and unhesitating decisions4 ,and yet such particular questions are1 after all1 those to which we naturally expect answers from the moralist4 ,for we study ,ethics1 as ,aristotle says1 for the sake of ,practice3 and in practice we are concerned with particulars4 ,hence it seems that if the formul of ,intuitive ,morality are really to serve as scientific axioms1 and to be available in clear and cogent demonstrations1 they must first be raised--by an effort of reflection which ordinary persons will not make--to a higher degree of precision than attaches to them in the common thought and discourse of mankind in general4 ,we have1 in fact1 to take up the attempt that ,socrates initiated1 and endeavour to define satisfactorily the general notions of duty and virtue which we all in common use for awarding approbation or disapprobation to conduct4 ,this is the task upon which we shall be engaged in the nine chapters that follow4 ,i must beg the reader to bear in mind that throughout these chapters ,i am not trying to prove or disprove ,intuitionism1 but merely by reflection on the common morality which ,i and my reader share1 and to which appeal is so often made in moral disputes1 to obtain as explicit1 exact1 and coherent a statement as possible of its fundamental rules4 ,,footnotes3 #aea ,see p4 #aai4 #aeb ,it may seem1 he admits1 that 8since interest1 one's own happiness1 is a manifest obligation10 in any case in which virtuous action appears to be not conducive to the agent's interest1 he would be 8under two contrary obligations1 i4e4 under none at all4 ,but10 he urges1 8the obligation on the side of interest really does not remain4 ,for the natural authority of the principle of reflection or conscience is an obligation 444 the most certain and known3 whereas the contrary obligation can at the utmost appear no more than probable3 since no man can be certain in any circumstances that vice is his interest in the present world1 much less can he be certain against another3 and thus the certain obligation would entirely supersede and destroy the uncertain one40--7,preface to ,butler's ,sermons47 #aec ,i have before observed 7,book i4 chap4 viii4 #a7 that in the common notion of an act we include a certain portion of the whole series of changes partly caused by the volition which initiated the so-called act4 #aed ,some would add 8character0 and 8disposition40 ,but since characters and disposition not only cannot be known directly but can only be definitely conceived by reference to the volitions and feelings in which they are manifested1 it does not seem to me possible to regard them as the primary objects of intuitive moral judgments4 ,see chap4 ii4 #b of this ,book4 #aee ,no doubt we hold a man responsible for unintended bad consequences of his acts or omissions1 when they are such as he might with ordinary care have foreseen2 still1 as ,i have before said 7p4 #fj71 we admit on reflection that moral blame only attaches to such careless acts or omissions indirectly1 in so far as the carelessness is the result of some previous wilful neglect of duty4 #aef ,i think that common usage1 when carefully considered1 will be found to admit this definition4 ,suppose a nihilist blows up a railway train containing an emperor and other persons3 it will no doubt be held correct to say simply that his intention was to kill the emperor2 but it would be thought absurd to say that he #8did not intend' to kill the other persons1 though he may have had no desire to kill them and may have regarded their death as a lamentable incident in the execution of his revolutionary plans4 #aeg ,a further source of confusion between 8intention0 and 8motive0 arises from the different points of view from which either may be judged4 ,thus an act may be one of a series which the agent purposes to do for the attainment of a certain end3 and our moral judgment of it may be very different1 according as we judge the intention of the particular act1 or the general intention of the series regarded as a whole4 ,either point of view is legitimate1 and both are often required2 for we commonly recognise that1 of the series of acts which a man does to attain 7e4g47 any end of ambition1 some may be right or allowable1 while others are wrong2 while the general intention to attain the end by wrong means1 if necessary1 as well as right-- 8,get place and wealth1 if possible with grace2 ,if not1 by any means get wealth and place0-- is clearly a wrong intention4 ,so again1 in judging a motive to be good or bad1 we may either consider it simply in itself1 or in connexion with other balancing and controlling motives--either actually present along with it1 or absent when they ought to be present4 ,thus in the above case we do not commonly think the desire for wealth or rank bad in itself2 but we think it bad as the sole motive of a statesman's public career4 ,it is easy to see that one or other of these different distinctions is apt to blend with and confuse the simple distinction between intention and motive4 #aeh ,the view that moral judgments relate primarily or most properly to motives will be more fully discussed in chap4 xii4 of this ,book4 #aei ,i use these alternative terms in order to avoid the ,free ,will ,controversy4 #afj ,many religious persons would probably say that the motive of obedience or love to ,god was the highest4 ,but those who take this view would generally say that obedience and love are due to ,god as a ,moral ,being1 possessing the attributes of ,infinite ,wisdom and ,goodness1 and not otherwise3 and if so1 these religious motives would seem to be substantially identical with regard for duty and love of virtue1 though modified and complicated by the addition of emotions belonging to relations between persons4 #afa ,locke's ,essay1 ,,ii4 c4 #bh1 #e1 #f4 #afb ,ibid4 ,,iv4 c4 #c1 #ah4 #afc ,i do not myself usually employ the antithesis of ,form and ,matter in philosophical exposition1 as it appears to me open to the charge of obscurity and ambiguity4 ,in the present case we may interpret 8formal rightness0 as denoting at once a universal and essential1 and a subjective or internal condition of the rightness of actions4 #afd ,it is not1 ,i conceive1 commonly held to be indispensable1 in order to constitute an act completely right1 that a belief that it is right should be actually present in the agent's mind3 it might be completely right1 although the agent never actually raised the question of its rightness or wrongness4 ,see p4 #bbe4 #afe ,the decision would1 ,i think1 usually be reached by weighing bad consequences to the agent's character against bad consequences of a different kind4 ,in extreme cases the latter consideration would certainly prevail in the view of common sense4 ,thus we should generally approve a statesman who crushed a dangerous rebellion by working on the fear or cupidity of a leading rebel who was rebelling on conscientious grounds4 ,cf4 post1 ,book iv4 chap4 iii4 #c4 #aff ,the antithesis of #8subjective' and #8objective' cannot be applied to the condition of right conduct considered in this paragraph3 for this formal condition is at once subjective and objective2 being1 as ,i argue1 involved in our common notion of right conduct1 it is1 therefore1 necessarily judged by us to be of really universal application3 and1 though it does not secure complete objective rightness1 it is an important protection against objective wrongness4 #afg ,cf4 ,book i4 chap4 iii4 #c4 #afh ,see the ,grundlegung zur ,metaphysik der ,sitten 7pp4 #bfi-bgc1 ,hartenstein2 ,abbott's transl4 #ahgi pp4 #ed-fa74 ,here ,kant first says1 8,there is therefore but one categorical imperative1 namely1 this3 ,act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law4 ,now1 if all imperatives of duty can be deduced from this one imperative as from their principle 444 we shall at least be able to show what we understand by duty and what this notion means40 ,he then demonstrates the application of the principle to four cases1 selected as representative of 8the many actual duties02 and continues3 8if now we attend to ourselves on occasion of any transgression of duty1 we shall find that we in fact do not will that our maxim should be a universal law1 for that is impossible for us0 4443 then1 summing up the conclusion of this part of his argument1 he says1 8we have exhibited clearly and definitely for every practical application the content of the categorical imperative which must contain the principle of all duty1 if there is such a thing at all40 #afi ,i do not mean that ,i am prepared to accept ,kant's fundamental maxim1 in the precise form in which he has stated it3 but the qualifications which it seems to me to require will be more conveniently explained later4 #agj ,see ,book i4 chap4 iii4 p4 #cb4 #aga ,i cannot doubt that every one of our cognitive faculties1--in short the human mind as a whole1--has been derived and developed1 through a gradual process of physical change1 out of some lower life in which cognition1 properly speaking1 had no place4 ,on this view1 the distinction between #8original' and #8derived' reduces itself to that between #8prior' and #8posterior' in development3 and the fact that the moral faculty appears somewhat later in the process of evolution than other faculties can hardly be regarded as an argument against the validity of moral intuition2 especially since this process is commonly conceived to be homogeneous throughout4 ,indeed such a line of reasoning would be suicidal2 as the cognition that the moral faculty is developed is certainly later in development than moral cognition1 and would therefore1 by this reasoning1 be less trustworthy4 ,,chapter ,,ii ,,virtue ,,and ,,duty #a4 ,before1 however1 we attempt to define particular virtues or departments of duty1 it will be well to examine further the notions of ,duty and ,virtue in general1 and the relations between the two1 as we find them implicitly conceived by the common sense of mankind1 which we are endeavouring to express4 ,hitherto ,i have taken ,duty to be broadly convertible with ,right conduct3 ,i have noticed1 however1 that the former term--like 8ought0 and 8moral obligation0--implies at least the potential presence of motives prompting to wrong conduct2 and is therefore not applicable to beings to whom no such conflict of motives can be attributed4 ,thus ,god is not conceived as performing duties1 though ,he is conceived as realising ,justice and other kinds of ,rightness in action4 ,for a similar reason1 we do not commonly apply the term #8duty' to right actions--however necessary and important--when we are so strongly impelled to them by non-moral inclinations that no moral impulse is conceived to be necessary for their performance4 ,thus we do not say generally that it is a duty to eat and drink enough3 though we do often say this to invalids who have lost their appetite4 ,we should therefore perhaps keep most close to usage if we defined ,duties as #8those ,right actions or abstinences1 for the adequate accomplishment of which a moral impulse is conceived to be at least occasionally necessary4' ,but as this line of distinction is vague1 and continually varying1 ,i shall not think it necessary to draw attention to it in the detailed discussion of duties3 it seems sufficient to point out that we shall be chiefly concerned with such right conduct as comes within the definition just suggested4 ,it may be said1 however1 that there is another implication in the term 8duty0 which ,i have so far overlooked1 but which its derivation--and that of the equivalent term #8obligation'--plainly indicates3 viz4 that it is 8due0 or owed to some one4 ,but ,i think that here the derivation does not govern the established usage3 rather1 it is commonly recognised that duties owed to persons1 or 8relative0 duties1 are only one species1 and that some duties--as 7e4g47 ,truth-speaking--have no such relativity4 ,no doubt it is possible to view any duty as relative to the person or persons immediately affected by its performance2 but it is not usual to do this where the immediate effects are harmful--as where truth-speaking causes a physically injurious shock to the person addressed--3 and though it may still be conceived to be ultimately good for society1 and so 8due0 to the community or to humanity at large1 that truth should even in this case be spoken1 this conception hardly belongs to the intuitional view that #8truth should be spoken regardless of consequences4' ,again1 it may be thought by religious persons that the performance of duties is owed not to the human or other living beings affected by them1 but to ,god as the author of the moral law4 ,and ,i certainly would not deny that our common conception of duty involves an implied relation of an individual will to a universal will conceived as perfectly rational3 but ,i am not prepared to affirm that this implication is necessary1 and an adequate discussion of the difficulties involved in it would lead to metaphysical controversies which ,i am desirous of avoiding4 ,i propose1 therefore1 in this exposition of the ,intuitional method1 to abstract from this relation of ,duty generally to a ,divine ,will3 and1 for reasons partly similar1 to leave out of consideration the particular 8duties to ,god0 which ,intuitionists have often distinguished and classified4 ,our view of the general rules of 8duty to man0 7or to other animals7--so far as such rules are held to be cognisable by moral intuition--will1 ,i conceive1 remain the same1 whether or not we regard such rules as imposed by a ,supreme ,rational ,will3 since in any case they will be such as we hold it rational for all men to obey1 and therefore such as a ,supreme ,reason would impose4 ,i shall not therefore treat the term 8,duty0 as implying necessarily a relation either to a universal ,imponent or to the individuals primarily affected by the performance of duties3 but shall use it as equivalent generally to ,right conduct1 while practically concentrating attention on acts and abstinences for which a moral impulse is thought to be more or less required4 ,the notion of ,virtue presents more complexity and difficulty1 and requires to be discussed from different points of view4 ,we may begin by noticing that there seem to be some particular virtues 7such as ,generosity7 which may be realised in acts objectively--though not subjectively--wrong1 from want of insight into their consequences3 and even some 7such as ,courage7 which may be exhibited in wrong acts that are known by the agent to be such4 ,but though the contemplation of such acts excites in us a quasi-moral admiration1 in the latter case we certainly should not call them virtuous1 and it is doubtful whether we should do so in the former case1 if we were using the term strictly4 ,it will therefore involve no material deviation from usage1 if we limit the term 8,virtue0 to qualities exhibited in right conduct3#agb accordingly ,i propose to adopt this limitation in subsequent discussions4 ,how far1 then1 are we to regard the spheres of ,duty and ,virtue 7thus defined7 as co-extensive8 ,to a great extent they undoubtedly are so1 in the common application of the terms1 but not altogether3 since in its common use each term seems to include something excluded from the other4 ,we should scarcely say that it was virtuous--under ordinary circumstances--to pay one's debts1 or give one's children a decent education1 or keep one's aged parents from starving2 these being duties which most men perform1 and only bad men neglect4 ,on the other hand1 there are acts of high and noble virtue which we commonly regard as going beyond the strict duty of the agent2 since1 while we praise their performance1 we do not condemn their non-performance4 ,here1 however1 a difficulty seems to arise2 for we should not deny that it is1 in some sense1 a man's strict duty to do whatever action he judges most excellent1 so far as it is in his power4 ,but can we say that it is as much in a man's power to realise ,virtue as it is to fulfil ,duty8#agc ,to some extent1 no doubt1 we should say this3 no quality of conduct is ever called a virtue unless it is thought to be to some extent immediately attainable at will by all ordinary persons1 when circumstances give opportunity for its manifestation4 ,in fact the line between virtues and other excellences of behaviour is commonly drawn by this characteristic of voluntariness2--an excellence which we think no effort of will could at once enable us to exhibit in any appreciable degree is called a gift1 grace1 or talent1 but not properly a virtue4 ,writers like ,hume1#agd who obliterate this line1 diverge manifestly from common sense4 ,still ,i regard it as manifestly paradoxical to maintain that it is in the power of any one at any time to realise virtue in the highest form or degree2 7e4g47 no one would affirm that any ordinary man can at will exhibit the highest degree of courage in the sense in which courage is a virtue--when occasion arises4 ,it would seem1 therefore1 that we can distinguish a margin of virtuous conduct1 which may be beyond the strict duty of any individual as being beyond his power4 ,can we then1 excluding this margin1 say that virtuous conduct1 so far as it is in a man's power1 coincides completely with his duty8 ,certainly we should agree that a truly moral man cannot say to himself1 8,this is the best thing on the whole for me to do1 but yet it is not my duty to do it though it is in my power03 this would certainly seem to common sense an immoral paradox4#age ,and yet there seem to be acts and abstinences which we praise as virtuous1 without imposing them as duties upon all who are able to do them2 as for a rich man to live very plainly and devote his income to works of public beneficence4 ,perhaps we may harmonise these inconsistent views by distinguishing between the questions #8what a man ought to do or forbear' and #8what other men ought to blame him for not doing or forbearing'3 and recognising that the standard normally applied in dealing with the latter question is laxer than would be right in dealing with the former4 ,but how is this double standard to be explained8 ,we may partly explain it by the different degrees of our knowledge in the two cases3 there are many acts and forbearances of which we cannot lay down definitely that they ought to be done or forborne1 unless we have the complete knowledge of circumstances which a man commonly possesses only in his own case1 and not in that of other men4 ,thus ,i may easily assure myself that ,i ought to subscribe to a given hospital3 but ,i cannot judge whether my neighbour ought to subscribe1 as ,i do not know the details of his income and the claims which he is bound to satisfy4 ,i do not1 however1 think that this explanation is always applicable3 ,i think that there are not a few cases in which we refrain from blaming others for the omission of acts which we do not doubt that we in their place should have thought it our duty to perform4 ,in such cases the line seems drawn by a more or less conscious consideration of what men ordinarily do1 and by a social instinct as to the practical effects of expressed moral approbation and disapprobation3 we think that moral progress will on the whole be best promoted by our praising acts that are above the level of ordinary practice1 and confining our censure--at least if precise and particular--to acts that fall clearly below this standard4 ,but a standard so determined must be inevitably vague1 and tending to vary as the average level of morality varies in any community1 or section of a community3 indeed it is the aim of preachers and teachers of morality to raise it continually4 ,hence it is not convenient to use it in drawing a theoretical line between ,virtue and ,duty3 and ,i have therefore thought it best to employ the terms so that virtuous conduct may include the performance of duty as well as whatever good actions may be commonly thought to go beyond duty2 though recognising that ,virtue in its ordinary use is most conspicuously manifested in the latter4 #b4 ,so far ,i have been considering the term #8,virtuous' as applied to conduct4 ,but both this general term1 and the names connoting particular virtues--8just10 8liberal10 8brave10 etc4--are applied to persons as well as to their acts3 and the question may be raised which application is most appropriate or primary4 ,here reflection1 ,i think1 shows that these attributes are not thought by us to belong to acts considered apart from their agents3 so that ,virtue seems to be primarily a quality of the soul or mind1 conceived as permanent in comparison with the transient acts and feelings in which it is manifested4 ,as so conceived it is widely held to be a possession worth aiming at for its own sake2 to be1 in fact1 a part of that ,perfection of man which is by some regarded as the sole ,ultimate ,good4 ,this view ,i shall consider in a subsequent chapter4#agf ,meanwhile it may be observed that ,virtues1 like other habits and dispositions1 though regarded as comparatively permanent attributes of the mind1 are yet attributes of which we can only form definite notions by conceiving the particular transient phenomena in which they are manifested4 ,if then we ask in what phenomena ,virtuous character is manifested1 the obvious answer is that it is manifested in voluntary actions1 so far as intentional2 or1 more briefly1 in volitions4 ,and many1 perhaps most1 moralists would give this as a complete answer4 ,if they are not prepared to affirm with ,kant that a good will is the only absolute and unconditional ,good1 they will at any rate agree with ,butler that 8the object of the moral faculty is actions1 comprehending under that name active or practical principles3 those principles from which men would act if occasions and circumstances gave them power40 ,and if it be urged that more than this is included 7e4g47 in the ,christian conception of the ,virtue of ,charity1 the 8love of our neighbour10 they will explain with ,kant that by this love we must not understand the emotion of affection1 but merely the resolution to benefit1 which alone has 8true moral worth40 ,i do not1 however1 think that the complete exclusion of an emotional element from the conception of ,virtue would be really in harmony with the common sense of mankind4 ,i think that in our common moral judgments certain kinds of virtuous actions are held to be at any rate adorned and made better by the presence of certain emotions in the virtuous agent3 though no doubt the element of volition is the more important and indispensable4 ,thus the ,virtue of ,chastity or ,purity1 in its highest form1 seems to include more than a mere settled resolution to abstain from unlawful lust2 it includes some sentiment of repugnance to impurity4 ,again1 we recognise that benefits which spring from affection and are lovingly bestowed are more acceptable to the recipients than those conferred without affection1 in the taste of which there is admittedly something harsh and dry3 hence1 in a certain way1 the affection1 if practical and steady1 seems a higher excellence than the mere beneficent disposition of the will1 as resulting in more excellent acts4 ,in the case of ,gratitude even the rigidity of ,kant#agg seems to relax1 and to admit an element of emotion as indispensable to the virtue3 and there are various other notions1 such as ,loyalty and ,patriotism1 which it is difficult--without paradox--either to exclude from a list of virtues or to introduce stripped bare of all emotional elements4 ,a consideration of the cases last mentioned will lead us to conclude that1 in the view of ,common ,sense1 the question 7raised in the preceding chapter71 whether an act is virtuous in proportion as it was done from regard for duty or virtue1 must be answered in the negative3 for the degree in which an act deserves praise as courageous1 loyal1 or patriotic does not seem to be reduced by its being shown that the predominant motive to the act was natural affection and not love of virtue as such4 ,indeed in some cases ,i think it clear that we commonly attribute virtue to conduct where regard for duty or virtue is not consciously present at all3 as in the case of a heroic act of courage--let us say1 in saving a fellow-creature from death--under an impulse of spontaneous sympathy4 ,so again1 when we praise a man as 8genuinely humble0 we certainly do not imply that he is conscious of fulfilling a duty--still less that he is conscious of exhibiting a virtue--by being humble4 ,it further appears to me that in the case of many important virtues we do not commonly consider the ultimate spring of action--whether it be some emotional impulse or the rational choice of duty as duty--in attributing a particular virtue to particular persons3 what we regard as indispensable is merely a settled resolve to will a certain kind of external effects4 ,thus we call a man veracious if his speech exhibits1 in a noteworthy degree1 a settled endeavour to produce in the minds of others impressions exactly correspondent to the facts1 whatever his motive may be for so doing3 whether he is moved1 solely or mainly1 by a regard for virtue1 or a sense of the degradation of falsehood1 or a conviction that truth-speaking is in the long run the best policy1 or a sympathetic aversion to the inconveniences which misleading statements cause to other people4 ,i do not mean that we regard these motives as of equal moral value3 but that the presence or absence of any one or other of them is not implied in our attribution of the virtue of veracity4 ,similarly we attribute ,justice1 if a man has a settled habit of weighing diverse claims and fulfilling them in the ratio of their importance2 ,good ,faith if he has a settled habit of strictly keeping express or tacit engagements3 and so forth4 ,even where we clearly take motives into account1 in judging of the degree of virtue it is often rather the force of seductive motives resisted than the particular nature of the prevailing springs of action which we consider4 ,thus we certainly think virtue has been manifested in a higher degree in just or veracious conduct1 when the agent had strong temptations to be unjust or unveracious2 and in the same way there are certain dispositions or habits tending to good conduct which are called virtues when there are powerful seductive motives operating and not otherwise2 e4g4 when we attribute the virtue of temperance to a man who eats and drinks a proper amount1 it is because we also attribute to him appetites prompting to excess4 ,at the same time ,i admit that ,common ,sense seems liable to some perplexity as to the relation of virtue to the moral effort required for resisting unvirtuous impulses4 ,on the one hand a general assent would be given to the proposition that virtue is especially drawn out and exhibited in a successful conflict with natural inclination3 and perhaps even to the more extreme statement that there is no virtue#agh in doing what one likes4 ,on the other hand we should surely agree with ,aristotle that ,virtue is imperfect so long as the agent cannot do the virtuous action without a conflict of impulses2 since it is from a wrong bent of natural impulse that we find it hard to do what is best1 and it seems absurd to say that the more we cure ourselves of this wrong bent1 the less virtuous we grow4 ,perhaps we may solve the difficulty by recognising that our common idea of ,virtue includes two distinct elements1 the one being the most perfect ideal of moral excellence that we are able to conceive for human beings1 while the other is manifested in the effort of imperfect men to attain this ideal4 ,thus in proportion as a man comes to like any particular kind of good conduct and to do it without moral effort1 we shall not say that his conduct becomes less virtuous but rather more in conformity with a true moral ideal2 while at the same time we shall recognise that in this department of his life he has less room to exhibit that other kind of virtue which is manifested in resistance to seductive impulses1 and in the energetic striving of the will to get nearer to ideal perfection4 ,so far ,i have been considering the manifestation of virtue in emotions and volitions1 and have not expressly adverted to the intellectual conditions of virtuous acts3 though in speaking of such acts it is of course implied that the volition is accompanied with an intellectual representation of the particular effects willed4 ,it is not1 however1 implied that in willing such effects we must necessarily think of them as right or good3 and ,i do not myself think that1 in the view of common sense1 this is an indispensable condition of the virtuousness of an act2 for it seems that some kinds of virtuous acts may be done so entirely without deliberation that no moral judgment was passed on them by the agent4 ,this might be the case1 for instance1 with an act of heroic courage1 prompted by an impulse of sympathy with a fellow-creature in sudden peril4 ,but it is1 ,i conceive1 clearly necessary that such an act should not be even vaguely thought to be bad4 ,as ,i have already said1 it is more doubtful how far an act which is conceived by the agent to be good1 but which is really bad1 is ever judged by common sense to be virtuous#agi3 but if we agree to restrict the term to acts which we regard as right1 it is again obvious that the realisation of virtue may not be in the power of any given person at any given time1 through lack of the requisite intellectual conditions4#ahj ,to sum up the results of a rather complicated discussion3 ,i consider ,virtue as a quality manifested in the performance of duty 7or good acts going beyond strict duty73 it is indeed primarily attributed to the mind or character of the agent2 but it is only known to us through its manifestations in feelings and acts4 ,accordingly1 in endeavouring to make precise our conceptions of the particular virtues1 we have to examine the states of consciousness in which they are manifested4 ,examining these1 we find that the element of volition is primarily important1 and in some cases almost of sole importance1 but yet that the element of emotion cannot be altogether discarded without palpable divergence from common sense4 ,again1 concentrating our attention on the volitional element1 we find that in most cases what we regard as manifestations of virtue are the volitions to produce certain particular effects2 the general determination to do right as right1 duty for duty's sake1 is indeed thought to be of fundamental importance as a generally necessary spring of virtuous action2 but it is not thought to be an indispensable condition of the existence of virtue in any particular case4 ,similarly in considering the emotional element1 though an ardent love of virtue or aversion to vice generally is a valuable stimulus to virtuous conduct1 it is not a universally necessary condition of it3 and in the case of some acts the presence of other emotions--such as kind affection--makes the acts better than if they were done from a purely moral motive4 ,such emotions1 however1 cannot be commanded at will3 and this is also true of the knowledge of what ought to be done in any particular case1--which1 if we restrict the term #8virtuous' to right acts1 is obviously required to render conduct perfectly virtuous4 ,for these and other reasons ,i consider that though ,virtue is distinguished by us from other excellences by the characteristic of voluntariness--it must be to some extent capable of being realised at will when occasion arises--this voluntariness attaches to it only in a certain degree2 and that1 though a man can always do his ,duty if he knows it1 he cannot always realise virtue in the highest degree4 ,it should1 however1 be observed that even when it is beyond our power to realise virtue immediately at will1 we recognise a duty of cultivating it and seeking to develop it3 and this duty of cultivation extends to all virtuous habits or dispositions in which we are found to be deficient1 so far as we can thus increase our tendency to do the corresponding acts in future2 however completely such acts may on each occasion be within the control of the will4 ,it is true that for acts of this latter kind1 so far as they are perfectly deliberate1 we do not seem to need any special virtuous habits2 if only we have knowledge of what is right and best to be done1 together with a sufficiently strong wish to do it4#aha ,but1 in order to fulfil our duties thoroughly1 we are obliged to act during part of our lives suddenly and without deliberation3 on such occasions there is no room for moral reasoning1 and sometimes not even for explicit moral judgment2 so that in order to act virtuously1 we require such particular habits and dispositions as are denoted by the names of the special virtues3 and it is a duty to foster and develop these in whatever way experience shows this to be possible4 ,the complicated relation of virtue to duty1 as above determined1 must be borne in mind throughout the discussion of the particular virtues1 to which ,i shall proceed in the following chapters4 ,but1 as we have seen1 the main part of the manifestation of virtue in conduct consists in voluntary actions1 which it is within the power of any individual to do--so far as they are recognised by him as right1--and which therefore come within our definition of ,duty1 as above laid down2 it will not therefore be necessary1 during the greater part of the ensuing discussion1 to distinguish between principles of virtuous conduct and principles of duty2 since the definitions of the two will coincide4 #c4 ,here1 however1 a remark is necessary1 which to some extent qualifies what was said in the preceding chapter1 where ,i characterised the common notions of particular virtues--justice1 etc4--as too vague to furnish exact determinations of the actions enjoined under them4 ,i there assumed that rules of duty ought to admit of precise definition in a universal form3 and this assumption naturally belongs to the ordinary or jural view of ,ethics as concerned with a moral code3 since we should agree that if obligations are imposed on any one he ought at least to know what they are1 and that a law indefinitely drawn must be a bad law4 ,but so far as we contemplate virtue as something that goes beyond strict duty and is not always capable of being realised at will1 this assumption is not so clearly appropriate3 since from this point of view we naturally compare excellence of conduct with beauty in the products of the ,fine ,arts4 ,of such products we commonly say1 that though rules and definite prescriptions may do much1 they can never do all2 that the highest excellence is always due to an instinct or tact that cannot be reduced to definite formul4 ,we can describe the beautiful products when they are produced1 and to some extent classify their beauties1 giving names to each2 but we cannot prescribe any certain method for producing each kind of beauty4 ,so1 it may be said1 stands the case with virtues3 and hence the attempt to state an explicit maxim1 by applying which we may be sure of producing virtuous acts of any kind1 must fail3 we can only give a general account of the virtue--a description1 not a definition--and leave it to trained insight to find in any particular circumstances the act that will best realise it4 ,on this view1 which ,i may distinguish as sthetic ,intuitionism1 ,i shall have something to say hereafter4#ahb ,but ,i conceive that our primary business is to examine the larger claims of those ,rational or ,jural ,intuitionists1 who maintain that ,ethics admits of exact and scientific treatment1 having for its first principles the general rules of which we have spoken1 or the most fundamental of them3 and who thus hold out to us a hope of getting rid of the fluctuations and discrepancies of opinion1 in which we acquiesce in sthetic discussions1 but which tend to endanger seriously the authority of ethical beliefs4 ,and we cannot1 ,i think1 decide on the validity of such claims without examining in detail the propositions which have been put forward as ethical axioms1 and seeing how far they prove to be clear and explicit1 or how far others may be suggested presenting these qualities4 ,for it would not be maintained1 at least by the more judicious thinkers of this school1 that such axioms are always to be found with proper exactness of form by mere observation of the common moral reasonings of men2 but rather that they are at least implied in these reasonings1 and that when made explicit their truth is self-evident1 and must be accepted at once by an intelligent and unbiassed mind4 ,just as some mathematical axioms are not and cannot be known to the multitude1 as their certainty cannot be seen except by minds carefully prepared1--but yet1 when their terms are properly understood1 the perception of their absolute truth is immediate and irresistible4 ,similarly1 if we are not able to claim for a proposed moral axiom1 in its precise form1 an explicit and actual assent of 8orbis terrarum10 it may still be a truth which men before vaguely apprehended1 and which they will now unhesitatingly admit4 ,in this inquiry it is not of great importance in what order we take the virtues4 ,we are not to examine the system of any particular moralist1 but the ,morality 7as it was called7 of ,common ,sense2 and the discussion of the general notions of ,duty and ,virtue1 in which we have been engaged in the present chapter1 will have shown incidentally the great difficulty of eliciting from ,common ,sense any clear principle of classification of the particular duties and virtues4 ,hence ,i have thought it best to reserve what ,i have to say on the subject of classification till a later period of the discussion2 and in the first place to take the matter to be investigated quite empirically1 as we find it in the common thought expressed in the common language of mankind4 ,the systems of moralists commonly attempt to give some definite arrangement to this crude material3 but in so far as they are systematic they generally seem forced to transcend ,common ,sense1 and define what it has left doubtful2 as ,i shall hereafter try to show4 ,for the present1 then1 it seems best1 in this empirical investigation1 to take the virtues rather in the order of their importance2 and1 as there are some that seem to have a special comprehensiveness of range1 and to include under them1 in a manner1 all or most of the others1 it will be convenient to begin with these4 ,of these ,wisdom is perhaps the most obvious3 in the next chapter1 therefore1 ,i propose to examine our common conceptions of ,wisdom1 and certain other cognate or connected virtues or excellences4 ,,footnotes3 #agb ,it is more convenient1 for the purpose of expounding the morality of common sense1 to understand by ,virtue a quality exhibited in right conduct2 for then we can use the common notions of the particular virtues as heads for the classification of the most important kinds or aspects of right conduct as generally recognised4 ,and ,i think that this employment of the term is as much in accordance with ordinary usage as any other equally precise use would be4 #agc ,in ,book i4 chap4 v4 #c ,i have explained the sense in which ,determinists no less than ,libertarians hold that it is in a man's power to do his duty4 #agd ,cf4 ,inquiry concerning the ,principles of ,morals1 ,appendix iv4 #age ,if the phrase in the text were used by a moral person1 with a sincere and predominant desire to do his duty1 it must1 ,i conceive1 be used in one of two senses3 either 7#a7 half-ironically1 in recognition of a customary standard of virtuous conduct which the speaker is not prepared expressly to dispute1 but which he does not really adopt as valid--as when we say that it would be virtuous to read a new book1 hear a sermon1 pay a visit1 etc42 or 7#b7 it might be used loosely to mean that such and such conduct would be best if the speaker were differently constituted4 #agf ,chap4 xiv4 of this ,book4 #agg ,cf4 ,met4 ,anf4 d4 ,tugendlehre1 #cc3 8diese ,tugend1 welche mit ,innigkeit der wohlwollenden ,gesinnung zugleich ,zrtlichkeit des ,wohlwollens verbindet40 #agh ,or no 8merit03--but so far as this latter notion is precisely applied1 it will be more appropriately considered in ch4 v4 of this ,book 7on ,justice74 #agi ,i have before said that decidedly wrong acts are frequently considered to exhibit in a high degree the tendencies which1 when exhibited in right acts1 we call particular virtues--generosity1 courage1 patriotism1 etc43 and this is especially true of acts bad through ignorance4 #ahj ,this1 ,i think1 is a conclusion which common sense on the whole accepts3 though ,i note a considerable reluctance to accept it2 which1 however1 is not shown in the attribution of virtue to persons who do clearly wrong acts1 but rather in an effort to explain their ignorance as caused by some previous wilful wrongdoing4 ,we try to persuade ourselves that if 7e4g47 ,torquemada did not know that it was wrong to torture heretics1 he might have known if he had not wilfully neglected means of enlightenment3 but there are many cases in which this kind of explanation is unsupported by facts1 and ,i see no ground for accepting it as generally true4 #aha ,hence the ,socratic doctrine that #8all virtue is knowledge'2 on the assumption that a rational being must necessarily wish for what is good4 #ahb ,see chap4 xiv4 #a of this ,book4 ,,chapter ,,iii ,,wisdom ,,and ,,self-,,control #a4 ,wisdom was always placed by the ,greek philosophers first in the list of virtues1 and regarded as in a manner comprehending all the others3 in fact in the post-,aristotelian schools the notion of the ,sage or ideally ,wise man 77 was regularly employed to exhibit in a concrete form the rules of life laid down by each system4 ,in common ,greek usage1 however1 the term just mentioned would signify excellence in purely speculative science1 no less than practical wisdom#ahc3 and the ,english term ,wisdom has1 to some extent1 the same ambiguity4 ,it is1 however1 chiefly used in reference to practice3 and even when applied to the region of pure speculation suggests especially such intellectual gifts and habits as lead to sound practical conclusions3 namely1 comprehensiveness of view1 the habit of attending impartially to a number of diverse considerations difficult to estimate exactly1 and good judgment as to the relative importance of each4 ,at any rate1 it is only ,practical ,wisdom which we commonly class among ,virtues1 as distinguished from purely intellectual excellences4 ,how then shall we define ,practical ,wisdom8 ,the most obvious part of its meaning is a tendency to discern1 in the conduct of life generally1 the best means to the attainment of any ends that the natural play of human motives may lead us to seek3 as contrasted with technical skill1 or the faculty of selecting the best means to given ends in a certain limited and special department of human action4 ,such skill in the special arts is partly communicable by means of definite rules1 and partly a matter of tact or instinct1 depending somewhat on natural gifts and predispositions1 but to a great extent acquired by exercise and imitation2 and similarly practical ,wisdom1 if understood to be ,skill in the ,art of ,life1 would involve a certain amount of scientific knowledge1 the portions of different sciences bearing directly on human action1 together with empirical rules relating to the same subject-matter2 and also the tact or trained instinct just mentioned1 which would even be more prominent here1 on account of the extreme complexity of the subject-matter4 ,but it does not appear from this analysis why this skill should be regarded as a virtue3 and reflection will show that we do not ordinarily mean by wisdom merely the faculty of finding the best means to any ends3 for we should not call the most accomplished swindler wise2 whereas we should not hesitate to attribute to him cleverness1 ingenuity1 and other purely intellectual excellences4 ,so again we apply the term 8worldly-wise0 to a man who skilfully chooses the best means to the end of ambition2 but we should not call such a man #8wise' without qualification4 ,wisdom1 in short1 appears to me to imply right judgment in respect of ends as well as means4 ,here1 however1 a subtle question arises4 ,for the assumption on which this treatise proceeds is that there are several ultimate ends of action1 which all claim to be rational ends1 such as every man ought to adopt4 ,hence1 if ,wisdom implies right judgment as to ends1 it is clear that a person who regards some one end as the sole right or rational ultimate end will not consider a man wise who adopts any other ultimate end4 ,can we say then that in the common use of the word ,wisdom any one ultimate end is distinctly implied to the exclusion of others8 ,it may be suggested1 perhaps1 that in the moral view of ,common ,sense which we are now trying to make clear1 since ,wisdom itself is prescribed or commended as a quality of conduct intuitively discerned to be right or good1 the ultimate end which the wise man prefers must be just this attainment of rightness or goodness in conduct generally2 rather than pleasure for himself or others1 or any other ulterior end4 ,i think1 however1 that in the case of this notion it is impossible to carry out that analysis of ordinary practical reasoning into several distinct methods1 each admitting and needing separate development1 upon which the plan of this treatise is founded4 ,for1 as we saw1 it is characteristic of ,common ,sense to assume coincidence or harmony among these different competing methods4 ,and hence1 while as regards most particular virtues and duties1 the exercise of moral judgment in ordinary men is prima facie independent of hedonistic calculations1 and occasionally in apparent conflict with their results1--so that the reconciliation of the different procedures presents itself as a problem to be solved--in the comprehensive notion of ,wisdom the antagonism is latent4 ,common ,sense seems to mean by a ,wise man1 a man who attains at once all the different rational ends2 who by conduct in perfect conformity with the true moral code attains the greatest happiness possible both for himself and for mankind 7or that portion of mankind to which his efforts are necessarily restricted74 ,but if we find this harmony unattainable1--if1 for example1 ,rational ,egoism seems to lead to conduct opposed to the true interests of mankind in general1 and we ask whether we are to call ,wise the man who seeks1 or him who sacrifices1 his private interests1--,common ,sense gives no clear reply4 #b4 ,let us now return to the question whether ,wisdom1 as exhibited in right judgment as to ends1 is in any degree attainable at will1 and so1 according to our definition1 a ,virtue4 ,at first sight1 the perception of the right end may seem not to be voluntary any more than the cognition of any other kind of truth2 and though in most cases the attainment of truth requires voluntary effort1 still we do not generally think it possible for any man1 by this alone1 to attain even approximately the right solution of a difficult intellectual problem4 ,it is often said1 however1 that the cognition of ,moral truth depends largely upon the #8heart1' that is1 upon a certain condition of our desires and other emotions3 and it would seem to be on this view that ,wisdom is regarded as a ,virtue2 and we may admit it as such1 according to the definition before given1 so far as this condition of feeling is attainable at will4 ,still1 on closer scrutiny1 there hardly seems to be agreement as to the right emotional conditions of the cognition of ends3 as some would say that prayer or ardent aspiration produced the most favourable state1 while others would urge that emotional excitement is likely to perturb the judgment1 and would say that we need for right apprehension rather tranquillity of feeling3 and some would contend that a complete suppression of selfish impulses was the essential condition1 while others would regard this as chimerical and impossible1 or1 if possible1 a plain misdirection of effort4 ,on these points we cannot decide in the name of ,common ,sense3 but it would be generally agreed that there are certain violent passions and sensual appetites which are known to be liable to pervert moral apprehensions1 and that these are to some extent under the control of the ,will2 so that a man who exercises moral effort to resist their influence1 when he wishes to decide on ends of action1 may be said to be so far voluntarily wise4 ,and this applies to some extent even to that other function of ,wisdom1 first discussed1 which consists in the selection of the best means to the attainment of given ends4 ,for experience seems to show that our insight in practical matters is liable to be perverted by desire and fear1 and that this perversion may be prevented by an effort of self-control3 so that unwisdom1 even here1 is at least not altogether involuntary4 ,thus in a dispute which may lead to a quarrel1 ,i may be entirely unable to show foresight and skill in maintaining my right in such a manner as to avoid needless exasperation1 and so far may be unable to conduct the dispute wisely3 but it is always in my power1 before taking each important step1 to reduce the influence of anger or wounded amour propre on my decisions1 and ,i may avoid much unwisdom in this way4 ,and it is to be observed that volition has a more important part to play in developing or protecting our insight into the right conduct of life1 than it has in respect of the technical skill to which we compared ,practical ,wisdom2 in proportion as the reasonings in which ,practical ,wisdom is exhibited are less clear and exact1 and the conclusions inevitably more uncertain4 ,for desire and fear could hardly make one go wrong in an arithmetical calculation2 but in estimating a balance of complicated practical probabilities it is more difficult to resist the influence of strong inclination3 and it would seem to be a more or less definite consciousness of the continual need of such resistance1 which leads us to regard ,wisdom as a ,virtue4 ,we may say then that ,practical ,wisdom1 so far as it is a virtue1 involves a habit of resistance to desires and fears which is commonly distinguished as ,self-control4 ,but suppose a man has determined with full insight the course of conduct that it is reasonable for him to adopt under any given circumstances1 the question still remains whether he will certainly adopt it4 ,now ,i hardly think that ,common ,sense considers the choice1 as distinct from the cognition1 of right ends to belong to ,wisdom2 and yet we should scarcely call a man wise who deliberately chose to do what he knew to be contrary to reason4 ,the truth seems to be that the notion of such a choice1 though the modern mind admits it as possible1#ahd is somewhat unfamiliar in comparison with either 7#a7 impulsive irrationality1 or 7#b7 mistaken choice of bad for good4 ,in the last case1 if the mistake is entirely involuntary1 the choice has1 of course1 no subjective wrongness3 often1 however1 the mistaken conclusion is caused by a perverting influence of desire or fear of which the agent is obscurely conscious1 and which might be resisted and dispelled by an effort of will4 ,as so caused1 the mistake falls under the head of culpable unwisdom1 due to want of self-control similar in kind--though not in degree--to that which is exhibited in the rarer phenomenon of a man deliberately choosing to do what he knows to be bad for him4 ,the case of impulsive wrongdoing is somewhat different4 ,it is clear that a resolution made after deliberation1 in accordance with our view of what is right1 should not be abandoned or modified except deliberately--at least if time for fresh deliberation be allowed--3 and the self-control required to resist impulses prompting to such abandonment or modification--which we may perhaps call ,firmness1--is an indispensable auxiliary to ,wisdom4 ,but the gusts of impulse that the varying occasions of life arouse sometimes take effect so rapidly that the resolution to which they run counter is not actually recalled at the time3 and in this case the self-control or firmness required to prevent unreasonable action seems to be not attainable at will1 when it is most wanted4 ,we can1 however1 cultivate this important habit by graving our resolves deeper in the moments of deliberation that continually intervene among the moments of impulsive action4 #c4 ,in examining the functions of ,wisdom1 other subordinate excellences come into view1 which are partly included in our ideal conception of ,wisdom1 and partly auxiliary or supplementary4 ,some of these1 however1 no one would exactly call virtues3 such as ,sagacity in selecting the really important points amid a crowd of others1 ,acuteness in seeing aids or obstacles that lie somewhat hidden4 ,ingenuity in devising subtle or complicated means to our ends1 and other cognate qualities more or less vaguely defined and named4 ,we cannot be acute1 or ingenious1 or sagacious when we please1 though we may become more so by practice4 ,the same may be said of ,caution1 so far as ,caution implies taking into due account material circumstances unfavourable to our wishes and aims3 for by no effort of will can we certainly see what circumstances are material2 we can only look steadily and comprehensively4 ,the term #8,caution1' however1 may also be legitimately applied to a species of ,self-control which we shall properly regard as a ,virtue3 viz4 the tendency to deliberate whenever and so long as deliberation is judged to be required1 even though powerful impulses urge us to immediate action4#ahe ,and1 in antithesis to ,caution1 we may notice as another minor virtue the quality called ,decision1 so far as we mean by ,decision the habit of resisting an irrational impulse to which men are liable1 of continuing to some extent in the deliberative attitude when they know that deliberation is no longer expedient1 and that they ought to be acting4 #8,decision1' however1 is often applied 7like #8,caution'7 to denote solely or chiefly a merely intellectual excellence2 viz4 the tendency to judge rightly as to the time for closing deliberation4 ,i conclude then that so far as such qualities as those which ,i have distinguished as ,caution1 and ,decision1 are recognised as ,virtues and not merely as intellectual excellences1 it is because they are1 in fact1 species of ,self-control2 i4e4 because they involve voluntary adoption of and adhesion to rational judgments as to conduct1 in spite of certain irrational motives prompting in an opposite direction4 ,now it may seem at first sight that if we suppose perfect correctness of judgment combined with perfect self-control1 the result will be a perfect performance of duty in all departments2 and the realisation of perfect ,virtue1 except so far as this involves the presence of certain special emotions not to be commanded at will4#ahf ,and no doubt a perfectly wise and self-controlled man cannot be conceived as breaking or neglecting any moral rule4 ,but it is important to observe that even sincere and single-minded efforts to realise what we see to be right may vary in intensity2 and that therefore the tendency to manifest a high degree of intensity in such efforts is properly praised as ,energy1 if the quality be purely volitional2 or under some such name as ,zeal or ,moral ,ardour1 if the volitional energy be referred to intensity of emotion1 and yet not connected with any emotion more special than the general love of what is ,right or ,good4 ,,note4--,it is to be observed that in the discussions of this chapter the question at issue between ,intuitional and ,utilitarian ,ethics is not yet reached4 ,for1 granting that we can elicit by reflection clear rules of duty under the heads of ,wisdom1 ,caution and ,decision1 the rules are obviously not independent2 they presuppose an intellectual judgment otherwise obtained1 or capable of being obtained1 as to what is right or expedient to do4 ,,footnotes3 #ahc ,indeed ,aristotle1 who stood alone among the schools sprung from ,socrates in distinguishing sharply #8theoretic' from #8practical' wisdom1 restricts the term to the former1 and uses another word 77 to denote the latter4 #ahd ,i have already adverted to the difference between ancient and modern thought in this respect4 ,cf4 ante1 ,book i4 chap4 v4 #a1 p4 #ei1 note4 #ahe ,it may be observed that there is another meaning again in which the term #8,caution' is sometimes used4 ,since of the various means which we may use to gain any end1 some are more and some less certain2 and some are dangerous--that is1 involve a chance of consequences either antagonistic to our pursuit1 or on different grounds to be avoided--while others are free from such danger2 #8,caution' is often used to denote the temper of mind which inclines to the more certain and less dangerous means4 ,in this sense1 in so far as the chance in each case of winning the end1 and the value of the end as compared with other ends1 and as weighed against the detriment which its pursuit may entail1 can be precisely estimated1 the limits of the duty of ,caution may obviously be determined without difficulty4 #ahf ,see p4 #bbc1 and #b of the next chapter4 ,,chapter ,,iv ,,benevolence #a4 ,we have seen that the virtue of ,practical ,wisdom comprehends all others1 so far as virtuous conduct in each department necessarily results from a clear knowledge and choice of the true ultimate end or ends of action1 and of the best means to the attainment of such end or ends4#ahg ,from this point of view1 we may consider the names of the special virtues as denoting special departments of this knowledge2 which it is now our business to examine more closely4 ,when1 however1 we contemplate these1 we discern that there are other virtues1 which1 in different ways1 may be regarded as no less comprehensive than ,wisdom4 ,especially in modern times1 since the revival of independent ethical speculation1 there have always been thinkers who have maintained1 in some form1 the view that ,benevolence is a supreme and architectonic virtue1 comprehending and summing up all the others1 and fitted to regulate them and determine their proper limits and mutual relations4#ahh ,this widely supported claim to supremacy seems an adequate reason for giving to ,benevolence the first place after ,wisdom1 in our examination of the commonly received maxims of ,duty and ,virtue4 ,the general maxim of ,benevolence would be commonly said to be1 8that we ought to love all our fellow-men10 or 8all our fellow-creatures03 but1 as we have already seen1 there is some doubt among moralists as to the precise meaning of the term 8love10 in this connexion3 since1 according to ,kant and others1 what is morally prescribed as the ,duty of ,benevolence is not strictly the affection of love or kindness1 so far as this contains an emotional element1 but only the determination of the will to seek the good or happiness of others4 ,and ,i agree that it cannot be a strict duty to feel an emotion1 so far as it is not directly within the power of the ,will to produce it at any given time4 ,still 7as ,i have said7 it seems to me that this emotional element is included in our common notion of ,charity or ,philanthropy1 regarded as a ,virtue3 and ,i think it paradoxical#ahi to deny that it raises the mere beneficent disposition of the will to a higher degree of excellence1 and renders its effects better4 ,if this be so1 it will be a duty to cultivate the affection so far as it is possible to do so3 and indeed this would seem 7no less than the permanent disposition to do good7 to be a normal effect of repeated beneficent resolves and actions3 since1 as has often been observed1 a benefit tends to excite love in the agent towards the recipient of the benefit1 no less than in the recipient towards the agent4 ,it must be admitted1 however1 that this effect is less certain than the production of the benevolent disposition2 and that some men are naturally so unattractive to others that the latter can feel no affection1 though they may entertain benevolent dispositions1 towards the former4 ,at any rate1 it would seem to be a duty generally1 and till we find the effort fruitless1 to cultivate kind affections towards those whom we ought to benefit2 not only by doing kind actions1 but by placing ourselves under any natural influences which experience shows to have a tendency to produce affection4 ,but we have still to ascertain more particularly the nature of the actions in which this affection or disposition of will is shown4 ,they are described popularly as #8doing good4' ,now we have before#aij noticed that the notion #8good1' in ordinary thought1 includes1 undistinguished and therefore unharmonised1 the different conceptions that men form of the ultimate end of rational action4 ,it follows that there is a corresponding ambiguity in the phrase #8doing good'3 since1 though many would unhesitatingly take it to mean the promotion of ,happiness1 there are others who1 holding that ,perfection and not ,happiness is the true ultimate ,good1 consistently maintain that the real way to #8do good' to people is to increase their virtue or aid their progress towards ,perfection4 ,there are1 however1 even among anti-,epicurean moralists1 some--such as ,kant--who take an opposite view1 and argue that my neighbour's ,virtue or ,perfection cannot be an end to me1 because it depends upon the free exercise of his own volition1 which ,i cannot help or hinder4 ,but on the same grounds it might equally well be argued that ,i cannot cultivate ,virtue in myself1 but only practise it from moment to moment3 whereas even ,kant does not deny that we can cultivate virtuous dispositions in ourselves1 and that in other ways than by the performance of virtuous acts3 and ,common ,sense always assumes this to be possible and prescribes it as a duty4 ,and surely it is equally undeniable that we can cultivate virtue in others3 and indeed such cultivation is clearly the object not only of education1 but of a large part of social action1 especially of our expression of praise and blame4 ,and if ,virtue is an ultimate end for ourselves1 to be sought for its own sake1 benevolence must lead us to do what is possible to obtain it for our neighbour4 ,and indeed we see that in the case of intense individual affection1 the friend or lover generally longs that the beloved should be excellent and admirable as well as happy3 perhaps1 however1 this is because love involves preference1 and the lover desires that the beloved should be really worthy of preference as well as actually preferred by him1 as otherwise there is a conflict between ,love and ,reason4 ,on the whole then1 ,i do not find1 in the common view of what ,benevolence bids us promote for others1 any clear selection indicated between the different and possibly conflicting elements of ,good as commonly conceived4 ,but we may say1 ,i think1 that the promotion of ,happiness is practically the chief part of what ,common ,sense considers to be prescribed as the external duty of ,benevolence3 and for clearness' sake we will confine our attention to this in the remainder of the discussion4#aia ,it should be observed that by happiness we are not to understand simply the gratification of the actual desires of others1 for men too often desire what would tend to their unhappiness in the long run3 but the greatest possible amount of pleasure or satisfaction for them on the whole--in short1 such happiness as was taken to be the rational end for each individual in the system of ,egoistic ,hedonism4 ,it is this that ,rational ,benevolence bids us provide for others2 and if one who loves is led from affectionate sympathy with the longings of the beloved to gratify those longings believing that the gratification will be attended with an overplus of painful consequences1 we commonly say that such affection is weak and foolish4 #b4 ,it remains to ask towards whom this disposition or affection is to be maintained1 and to what extent4 ,and1 firstly1 it is not quite clear whether we owe benevolence to men alone1 or to other animals also4 ,that is1 there is a general agreement that we ought to treat all animals with kindness1 so far as to avoid causing them unnecessary pain2 but it is questioned whether this is directly due to sentient beings as such1 or merely prescribed as a means of cultivating kindly dispositions towards men4 ,intuitional moralists of repute have maintained this latter view3 ,i think1 however1 that ,common ,sense is disposed to regard this as a hard-hearted paradox1 and to hold with ,bentham that the pain of animals is per se to be avoided4 ,passing to consider how our benevolence ought to be distributed among our fellow-men1 we may conveniently make clear the ,intuitional view by contrasting it with that of ,utilitarianism4 ,for ,utilitarianism is sometimes said to resolve all virtue into universal and impartial ,benevolence3 it does not1 however1 prescribe that we should love all men equally1 but that we should aim at ,happiness generally as our ultimate end1 and so consider the happiness of any one individual as equally important with the equal happiness of any other1 as an element of this total2 and should distribute our kindness so as to make this total as great as possible1 in whatever way this result may be attained4 ,practically of course the distribution of any individual's services will1 even on this view1 be unequal3 as each man will obviously promote the general happiness best by rendering services to a limited number1 and to some more than others3 but the inequality1 on the ,utilitarian theory1 is secondary and derivative4 ,common ,sense1 however1 seems rather to regard it as immediately certain without any such deduction that we owe special dues of kindness to those who stand in special relations to us4 ,the question then is1 on what principles1 when any case of doubt or apparent conflict of duties arises1 we are to determine the nature and extent of the special claims to affection and kind services which arise out of these particular relations of human beings4 ,are problems of this kind to be solved by considering which course of conduct is on the whole most conducive to the general happiness1 or can we find independent and self-evident principles sufficiently clear and precise to furnish practical guidance in such cases8 ,the different answers given to this fundamental question will obviously constitute the main difference between the ,intuitional and ,utilitarian methods2 so far as the #8good' which the benevolent man desires and seeks to confer on others is understood to be ,happiness4 ,when1 however1 we come to investigate this question we are met with a difficulty in the arrangement of the subject1 which1 like most difficulties of classification1 deserves attentive consideration1 as it depends upon important characteristics of the matter that has to be arranged4 ,in a narrower sense of the term1 ,benevolence is not unfrequently distinguished from--and even contrasted with--,justice2 we may of course exercise both towards the same persons1 but we commonly assume that the special function of ,benevolence begins where ,justice ends2 and it is rather with this special function that we are concerned in considering claims to affection1 and to kind services normally prompted by affection4 ,at the same time1 if we consider these services as strictly due to persons in certain relations1 the moral notion under which these duties are presented to us is not easily distinguishable from that of ,justice2 while yet these duties can hardly be withdrawn from the sphere of ,benevolence in the narrowest sense4 ,it is sometimes given as a distinction between ,justice and ,benevolence1 that the services which ,justice prescribes can be claimed as a right by their recipient1 while ,benevolence is essentially unconstrained3 but we certainly think 7e4g47 that parents have a right to filial affection and to the services that naturally spring from it4 ,it is further said that the duties of ,affection are essentially indefinite1 while those we classify under the head of ,justice are precisely defined3 and no doubt this is partly true4 ,we not only find it hard to say exactly how much a son owes his parents1 but we are even reluctant#aib to investigate this3 we do not think that he ought to ask for a precise measure of his duty1 in order that he may do just so much and no more2 while a great part of ,justice consists in the observance of stated agreements and precise rules4 ,at the same time it is difficult to maintain this distinction as a ground of classification2 for the duties of ,affection are admittedly liable to come into competition with each other1 and with other duties2 and when this apparent conflict of duties occurs1 we manifestly need as precise a definition as possible of the conflicting obligations1 in order to make a reasonable choice among the alternatives of conduct presented to us4 ,accordingly in the following chapter 7 #b7 ,i shall show how this competition of claims renders our common notion of ,justice applicable to these no less than to other duties3 meanwhile1 it seems proper to treat here separately of all duties that arise out of relations where affection normally exists1 and where it ought to be cultivated1 and where its absence is deplored if not blamed4 ,for all are agreed that there are such duties1 the non-performance of which is a ground for censure1 beyond the obligations imposed by law1 or arising out of specific contract1 which will come under a different head4 ,beyond these duties1 again1 there seems to be a region of performance where the services rendered cannot properly be claimed as of debt1 and blame is not felt to be due for non-performance3 and with regard to this region1 too1--which clearly belongs to ,benevolence as contrasted with ,justice--there is some difficulty in stating the view of ,common ,sense morality4 ,there are two questions to be considered4 ,we have to ask1 firstly1 whether services rendered from affection1 over and above what strict ,duty is thought to require1 are to be deemed ,virtuous2 and secondly1 whether the affection itself is to be considered worthy of admiration as a moral excellence1 and therefore a mental condition that we should strive to attain4 ,i think that ,common ,sense clearly regards as virtuous the disposition to render substantial positive services to men at large1 and promote their well-being1--whether such a disposition springs out of natural kindliness of feeling towards human beings generally1 or whether it is merely the result of moral effort and resolve--provided it is accompanied by an adequate degree of intellectual enlightenment4#aic ,and the same may be said of the less comprehensive affection that impels men to promote the well-being of the community of which they are members2 and again of the affection that normally tends to accompany the recognition of rightful rule or leadership in others4 ,in some ages and countries ,patriotism and ,loyalty have been regarded as almost supreme among the virtues2 and even now ,common ,sense gives them a high place4 ,but when we pass to more restricted1 and1 ordinarily more intense1 affections1 such as those which we feel for relations and friends1 it becomes more difficult to determine whether they are to be considered as moral excellences and cultivated as such4 ,first1 to avoid confusion1 we must remark that ,love is not merely a desire to do good to the object beloved1 although it always involves such a desire4 ,it is primarily a pleasurable emotion1 which seems to depend upon a certain sense of union with another person1 and it includes1 besides the benevolent impulse1 a desire of the society of the beloved3 and this element may predominate over the former1 and even conflict with it1 so that the true interests of the beloved may be sacrificed4 ,in this case we call the affection selfish1 and do not praise it at all1 but rather blame4 ,if now we ask whether intense ,love for an individual1 considered merely as a benevolent impulse1 is in itself a moral excellence1 it is difficult to extract a very definite answer from ,common ,sense3 but ,i think it inclines on the whole to the negative4 ,we are no doubt generally inclined to admire any kind of conspicuously #8altruistic' conduct and any form of intense love1 however restricted in its scope2 yet it hardly seems that the susceptibility to such individualised benevolent emotions is exactly regarded as an essential element of moral ,perfection1 which we ought to strive after and cultivate like other moral excellences2 we seem1 in fact1 to doubt whether such effort is desirable in this case1 at least beyond the point up to which such affection is thought to be required for the performance of recognised duties4 ,again1 we think it natural and desirable that--as generally speaking each person feels strong affection for only a few individuals1--in his efforts to promote directly the well-being of others he should1 to a great extent1 follow the promptings of such restricted affection3 but we are hardly prepared to recommend that he should render services to special individuals beyond what he is bound to render1 and such as are the natural expression of an eager and overflowing affection1 without having any such affection to express3 although1 as was before said1 in certain intimate relations we do not approve of the limits of duty being too exactly measured4 ,on the whole1 then1 ,i conclude that--while we praise and admire enthusiastic ,benevolence and ,patriotism1 and are touched and charmed by the spontaneous lavish outflow of ,gratitude1 ,friendship1 and the domestic affections--still what chiefly concerns us as moralists1 under the present head1 is the ascertainment of the right rules of distribution of services and kind acts1 in so far as we consider the rendering of these to be morally obligatory4 ,for provided a man fulfils these duties 7and observes the other recognised rules of morality7 ,common ,sense is not prepared to say how far it is right or good that he should sacrifice any other noble and worthy aim--such as the cultivation of knowledge or any of the fine arts--to the claims of philanthropy or personal affection3 there seem to be no generally accepted 8intuitional0 principles for determining such a choice of alternatives4#aid #c4 ,what then are the duties that we owe to our fellow-men--so far as they do not seem to come under the head of ,justice more properly than ,benevolence8 ,perhaps the mere enumeration of them is not difficult4 ,we should all agree that each of us is bound to show kindness to his parents and spouse and children1 and to other kinsmen in a less degree3 and to those who have rendered services to him1 and any others whom he may have admitted to his intimacy and called friends3 and to neighbours and to fellow-countrymen more than others3 and perhaps we may say to those of our own race more than to black or yellow men1 and generally to human beings in proportion to their affinity to ourselves4 ,and to our country as a corporate whole we believe ourselves to owe the greatest sacrifices when occasion calls 7but in a lower stage of civilisation this debt is thought to be due rather to one's king or chief73 and a similar obligation seems to be recognised1 though less definitely and in a less degree1 as regards minor corporations of which we are members4 ,and to all men with whom we may be brought into relation we are held to owe slight services1 and such as may be rendered without inconvenience3 but those who are in distress or urgent need have a claim on us for special kindness4 ,these are generally recognised claims3 but we find considerable difficulty and divergence1 when we attempt to determine more precisely their extent and relative obligation3 and the divergence becomes indefinitely greater when we compare the customs and common opinions now existing among ourselves in respect of such claims1 with those of other ages and countries4 ,for example1 in earlier ages of society a peculiar sacredness was attached to the tie of hospitality1 and claims arising out of it were considered peculiarly stringent3 but this has changed as hospitality in the progress of civilisation has become a luxury rather than a necessary1 and we do not think that we owe much to a man because we have asked him to dinner4 ,or again we may take an instance where the alteration is perhaps actually going on--the claims of kindred in respect of bequest4 ,we should now commonly think that a man ought usually to leave his property to his children3 but that if he has no children we think he may do what he likes with it1 unless any of his brothers or sisters are in poverty1 in which case compassion seems to blend with and invigorate the evanescent claim of consanguinity4 ,but in an age not long past a childless man was held to be morally bound to leave his money to his collateral relatives3 and thus we are naturally led to conjecture that in the not distant future1 any similar obligation to children--unless they are in want or unless their education is not completed--may have vanished out of men's minds4 ,a similar change might be traced in the commonly recognised duty of children to parents4 ,it may however be urged that this variation of custom is no obstacle to the definition of duty1 because we may lay down that the customs of any society ought to be obeyed so long as they are established1 just as the laws ought1 although both customs and laws may be changed from time to time4 ,and no doubt it is generally expedient to conform to established customs3 still1 on reflection1 we see that it cannot be laid down as an absolute duty4 ,for the cases of ,custom and ,law are not similar3 as in every progressive community there is a regular and settled mode of abrogating laws that are found bad3 but customs cannot be thus formally abolished1 and we only get rid of them through the refusal of private individuals to obey them2 and therefore it must be sometimes right to do this1 if some customs are vexatious and pernicious1 as we frequently judge those of antique and alien communities to be4 ,and if we say that customs should generally be obeyed1 but that they may be disobeyed when they reach a certain degree of inexpediency1 our method seems to resolve itself into ,utilitarianism3 for we cannot reasonably rest the general obligation upon one principle1 and determine its limits and exceptions by another4 ,if the duties above enumerated can be referred to independent and self-evident principles1 the limits of each must be implicitly given in the intuition that reveals the principle4 #d4 ,in order then to ascertain how far we possess such principles1 let us examine in more detail what ,common ,sense seems to affirm in respect of these duties4 ,they seem to range themselves under four heads4 ,there are 7#a7 duties arising out of comparatively permanent relationships not voluntarily chosen1 such as ,kindred and in most cases ,citizenship and ,neighbourhood3 7#b7 those of similar relationships voluntarily contracted1 such as ,friendship3 7#c7 those that spring from special services received1 or ,duties of ,gratitude3 and 7#d7 those that seem due to special need1 or ,duties of ,pity4 ,this classification is1 ,i think1 convenient for discussion3 but ,i cannot profess that it clearly and completely avoids cross divisions2 since1 for example1 the principle of ,gratitude is often appealed to as supplying the rationale for the duties owed by children to parents4 ,here1 however1 we come upon a material disagreement and difficulty in determining the maxim of this species of duty4 ,it would be agreed that children owe to their parents respect and kindness generally1 and assistance in case of infirmity or any special need3 but it seems doubtful how far this is held by ,common ,sense to be due on account of the relationship alone1 or on account of services rendered during infancy1 and how far it is due to cruel or neglectful parents4 ,most perhaps would say1 here and in other cases1 that mere nearness of blood constituted a certain claim3 but they would find it hard to agree upon its exact force4#aie ,but1 apart from this1 there seems great difference of opinion as to what is due from children to parents who have performed their duty2 as1 for example1 how far obedience is due from a child who is no longer in its parents' guardianship or dependent on them for support3--whether 7e4g47 a son or a daughter is bound not to oppose a parent's wishes in marrying or choosing a profession4 ,practically we find that parental control is greater in the case of persons who can enrich their children by testament3 still we can hardly take this into consideration in determining the ideal of filial duty3 for to this1 whatever it may be1 the child is thought to be absolutely bound1 and not as a quidproquo in anticipation of future benefits3 and many would hold that a parent had no moral right to disinherit a child1 except as a penalty for a transgression of duty4 ,and this leads to what we may conveniently examine next1 the duty of parents to children4 ,this too we might partly classify under a different head1 viz4 that of duties arising out of special needs3 for no doubt children are naturally objects of compassion1 on account of their helplessness1 to others besides their parents4 ,but on the latter they have a claim of a different kind1 springing from the universally recognised duty of not causing pain or any harm to other human beings1 directly or indirectly1 except in the way of deserved punishment3 for the parent1 being the cause of the child's existing in a helpless condition1 would be indirectly the cause of the suffering and death that would result to it if neglected4 ,still this does not seem an adequate explanation of parental duty1 as recognised by ,common ,sense4 ,for we commonly blame a parent who leaves his children entirely to the care of others1 even if he makes ample provision for their being nourished and trained up to the time at which they can support themselves by their own labour4 ,we think that he owes them affection 7as far as this can be said to be a duty7 and the tender and watchful care that naturally springs from affection3 and1 if he can afford it1 somewhat more than the necessary minimum of food1 clothing1 and education4 ,still it does not seem clear how far beyond this he is bound to go4 ,it is easy to say broadly that he ought to promote his children's happiness by all means in his power3 and no doubt it is natural for a good parent to find his own best happiness in his children's1 and we are disposed to blame any one who markedly prefers his own interest to theirs3 still it seems unreasonable that he should purchase a small increase of their happiness by a great sacrifice of his own3 and moreover there are other worthy and noble ends which may 7and do7 come into competition with this4 ,to take instances of actual occurrence3 one parent is led to give up some important and valuable work1 which perhaps no one else can or will do1 in order to leave his children a little more wealth3 another brings them to the verge of starvation in order to perfect an invention or prosecute scientific researches4 ,we seem to condemn either extreme3 yet what clear and accepted principle can be stated for determining the true mean8 ,again1 as we have seen1 some think that a parent has no right to bequeath his inheritance away from his children1 unless they have been undutiful3 and in some states this is even forbidden by law4 ,others1 however1 hold that children as such have no claims to their parents' wealth3 but only if there is a tacit understanding that they will succeed to it1 or1 at any rate1 if they have been reared in such habits of life and social relations as will render it difficult and painful for them to live without inherited wealth4 ,it would be tedious to go in detail through all the degrees of consanguinity1 as it is clear that our conception of the mutual duties of kinsmen becomes vaguer as the kinship becomes more remote4 ,among children of the same parents1 brought up together1 affection of more or less strength grows up so naturally and commonly1 that we regard those who feel no affection for their brothers and sisters with a certain aversion and moral contempt1 as somewhat inhuman3 and we think that in any case the services and kind acts which naturally spring from affection ought to be rendered to some extent2 but the extent seems quite undefined4 ,and even towards remoter kinsmen we think that a certain flow of kindly feeling will attend the representation of consanguinity in men of good dispositions4 ,some indeed still think that cousins have a moral right to a man's inheritance in default of nearer heirs1 and to assistance in any need2 but it seems equally common to hold that they can at most claim to be selected ceteris paribus as the recipients of bounty1 and that an unpromising cousin should not be preferred to a promising stranger4 #e4 ,i have placed ,neighbourhood along with ,kindred among the relations out of which a certain claim for mutual services is thought to spring4 ,however1 no one perhaps would say that mere local juxtaposition is in itself a ground of duties3 it seems rather that neighbours naturally feel more sympathy with one another than with strangers1 as the tie of common humanity is strengthened even by such conjunction and mutual association as mere neighbourhood 7without co-operation or friendship7 may involve1 and a man in whom this effect is not produced is thought more or less inhuman4 ,and so in large towns where this mutual sympathy does not so naturally grow up 7for all the townsmen are in a sense neighbours1 and one cannot easily sympathise with each individual in a multitude71 the tie of neighbourhood is felt to be relaxed1 and neighbour only claims from neighbour1 as the nearest man1 what one man may claim from another4 ,for there are some services1 slight in ordinary times but greater in the case of exceptional need1 which any man is thought to have a right to ask from any other3 so that a comparatively trifling circumstance may easily give a special direction to this general claim1 and make it seem reasonable that the service should be asked from one person rather than another4 ,thus any degree of kinship seems to have this effect 7since the representation of this tends to produce a feeling of union and consequent sympathy71 and so even the fact of belonging to the same province1 as creating a slight probability of community of origin2 and again similarities of various kinds1 as one sympathises more easily with one's like1 and so persons naturally seek aid in distress from those of the same age1 or sex1 or rank1 or profession4 ,the duty of neighbourhood seems therefore only a particular application of the duty of general benevolence or humanity4 ,and the claim of fellow-countrymen is of the same kind3 that is1 if they are taken as individuals2 for one's relation to one's country as a whole is thought to be of a different kind1 and to involve much more stringent obligations4 ,still the duties of ,patriotism are difficult to formulate4 ,for the mere obedience to the laws of a country which morality requires from all its inhabitants seems to come under another head3 and aliens are equally bound to this4 ,and in the case of most social functions which men undertake1 patriotism is at least not a prominent nor indispensable motive3 for they undertake them primarily for the sake of payment2 and having undertaken them1 are bound by ,justice and ,good ,faith to perform them adequately4 ,however1 if any of the functions of ,government are unpaid1 we consider that men exhibit patriotism in performing them3 for though it is plausible to say that they get their payment in social distinction1 still on reflection this view does not appear to be quite appropriate2 since social distinction is intended to express feelings of honour and respect1 and we cannot properly render these as part of a bargain1 but only as a tribute paid to virtue or excellence of some kind4 ,but how far any individual is bound to undertake such functions is not quite clear3 and the question seems generally decided by considerations of expediency1--except in so far as duties of this kind devolve1 legally or constitutionally1 upon all the citizens in a free country1 as is ordinarily the case to some extent4 ,among these the duty of fighting the national enemies is prominent in many countries3 and even where this function has become a salaried and voluntarily adopted profession1 it is often felt to be in a special sense the #8service of one's country1' and we think it at least desirable and best that it should be performed with feelings of patriotism3 as we find it somewhat degrading and repulsive that a man should slaughter his fellow-men for hire4 ,and in great crises of national existence the affection of ,patriotism is naturally intensified3 and even in ordinary times we praise a man who renders services to his country over and above the common duties of citizenship4 ,but whether a citizen is at any time morally bound to more than certain legally or constitutionally determined duties1 does not seem to be clear3 nor1 again1 is there general agreement on the question whether by voluntary expatriation#aif he can rightfully relieve himself of all moral obligations to the community in which he was born4 ,nor1 finally1 does there seem to be any consensus as to what each man owes to his fellow-men1 as such4 ,the ,utilitarian doctrine1 as we have seen1 is that each man ought to consider the happiness of any other as theoretically of equal importance with his own1 and only of less importance practically1 in so far as he is better able to realise the latter4 ,and it seems to me difficult to say decidedly that this is not the principle of general ,benevolence1 as recognised by the common sense of mankind4 ,but it must be admitted that there is also current a lower and narrower estimate of the services that we are held to be strictly bound to render to our fellow-men generally4 ,this lower view seems to recognise 7#a7--;as was before noticed--a negative duty to abstain from causing pain or harm to any of our fellow-men1 except in the way of deserved punishment2 to which we may add1 as an immediate corollary1 the duty of making reparation for any harm that we may have done them3#aig and 7#b7 a positive duty to render1 when occasion offers1 such services as require either no sacrifice on our part1 or at least one very much less in importance than the service rendered4 ,further1 a general obligation of being #8useful to society' by some kind of systematic work is vaguely recognised2 rich persons who are manifest drones incur some degree of censure from the majority of thoughtful persons4 ,beyond this somewhat indefinite limit of ,duty extends the ,virtue of ,benevolence without limit3 for excess is not thought to be possible in doing good to others1 nor in the disposition to do it1 unless it leads us to neglect definite duties4 ,under the notion of ,benevolence as just defined1 the minor rules of ,gentleness1 ,politeness1 ,courtesy1 etc4 may be brought1 in so far as they prescribe the expression of general goodwill and abstinence from anything that may cause pain to others in conversation and social demeanour4 ,there is1 however1 an important part of ,politeness which it may be well to notice and discuss separately2 the duty1 namely1 of showing marks of ,reverence to those to whom they are properly due4 ,reverence we may define as the feeling which accompanies the recognition of ,superiority or ,worth in others4 ,it does not seem to be necessarily in itself benevolent1 though often accompanied by some degree of love4 ,but its ethical characteristics seem analogous to those of benevolent affection1 in so far as1 while it is not a feeling directly under the control of the will1 we yet expect it under certain circumstances and morally dislike its absence1 and perhaps commonly consider the expression of it to be sometimes a duty1 even when the feeling itself is absent4 ,still1 as to this latter duty of expressing reverence1 there seems to be great divergence of opinion4 ,for the feeling seems to be naturally excited by all kinds of superiority1--not merely moral and intellectual excellences1 but also superiorities of rank and position3 and indeed in the common behaviour of men it is to the latter that it is more regularly and formally rendered4 ,and yet1 again1 it is commonly said that ,reverence is more properly due to the former1 as being more real and intrinsic superiorities3 and many think that to show any reverence to men of rank and position rather than to others is servile and degrading3 and some even dislike the marks of respect which in most countries are exacted by official superiors from their subordinates1 saying that obedience legally defined is all that is properly owed in this relation4 ,a more serious difficulty of a somewhat similar kind arises when we consider how far it is a duty to cultivate the affection of ,loyalty3 meaning by this term--which is used in various senses--the affection that is normally felt by a well-disposed servant or official subordinate towards a good master or official superior4 ,on the one hand it is widely thought that the duties of obedience which belong to these relations will be better performed if affection enters into the motive1 no less than the duties of the family relations3 but in the former case it seems to be a tenable view that the habits of orderliness and good faith--ungrudging obedience to law and ungrudging fulfilment of contract--will ordinarily suffice1 without personal affection2 and1 on the other hand1 a disposition to obey superiors1 beyond the limits of their legal or contractual rights to issue commands1 may easily be mischievous in its effects1 if the superiors are ill-disposed4 ,in the case of a wise and good superior it is1 indeed1 clearly advantageous that inferiors should be disposed to obey beyond these limits2 but it is not therefore clear that this disposition is one which it should be made a duty to cultivate beyond the degree in which it results spontaneously from a sense of the superior's goodness and wisdom4 ,nor do ,i think that any decided enunciation of duty on this point can be extracted from ,common ,sense4 #f4 ,we have next to consider the duties of ,affection that arise out of relationships voluntarily assumed4 ,of these the most important is the ,conjugal ,relation4 ,and here we may begin by asking whether it be the duty of human beings generally to enter into this relation4 ,it is no doubt normal to do so1 and most persons are prompted to it by strong desires3 but in so far as it can be said to be prescribed by ,common ,sense1 it does not seem an independent duty1 but derivative from and subordinate to the general maxims of ,prudence and ,benevolence4#aih ,and in all modern civilised societies1 law and custom leave the conjugal union perfectly optional3 but the conditions under which it may be formed1 and to a certain extent the mutual rights and duties arising out of it1 are carefully laid down by law2 and it is widely thought that this department of law more than others ought to be governed by independent moral principles1 and to protect1 as it were1 by an outer barrier1 the kind of relation which morality prescribes4 ,if we ask what these principles are1 ,common ,sense--in modern ,european communities--seems to answer that the marriage union ought to be 7#a7 exclusively monogamic1 7#b7 at least designed to be permanent1 and 7#c7 not within certain degrees of consanguinity4 ,i do not1 however1 think that any of these propositions can on reflection be maintained to be self-evident4 ,even against incest we seem to have rather an intense sentiment than a clear intuition2 and it is generally recognised that the prohibition of all but monogamic unions can only be rationally maintained on utilitarian grounds4#aii ,as regards the permanence of the marriage-contract all would no doubt agree that fidelity is admirable in all affections1 and especially in so close and intimate a relation as the conjugal3 but we cannot tell a priori how far it is possible to prevent decay of love in all cases3 and it is certainly not self-evident that the conjugal relation ought to be maintained when love has ceased2 nor that if the parties have separated by mutual consent they ought to be prohibited from forming fresh unions4 ,in so far as we are convinced of the rightness of this regulation1 it is always1 ,i think1 from a consideration of the generally mischievous consequences that would ensue if it were relaxed4 ,further1 in considering the evils on the opposite side we are led to see that there is no little difference of opinion among moral persons as to the kind of feeling which is morally indispensable to this relation4 ,for some would say that marriage without intense and exclusive affection is degrading even though sanctioned by law3 while others would consider this a mere matter of taste1 or at least of prudence1 provided there was no mutual deception3 and between these two views we might insert several different shades of opinion4 ,nor1 again1 is there agreement as to the external duties arising out of the relationship4 ,for all would lay down conjugal fidelity1 and mutual assistance 7according to the customary division of labour between men and women--unless this should be modified by mutual agreement74 ,but beyond this we find divergence3 for some state that 8the marriage contract binds each party1 whenever individual gratification is concerned1 to prefer the happiness of the other party to its own#bjj03 while others would say that this degree of unselfishness is certainly admirable1 but as a mere matter of duty it is enough if each considers the other's happiness equally with his 7or her7 own4 ,and as to the powers and liberties that ought to be allowed to the wife1 and the obedience due from her to the husband--,i need scarcely at the present time 7#ahgd7 waste space in proving that there is no consensus of moral opinion4 #g4 ,the conjugal relation is1 in its origin1 of free choice1 but when it has once been formed1 the duties of affection that arise out of it are commonly thought to be analogous to those arising out of relations of consanguinity4 ,it therefore holds an intermediate position between these latter1 and ordinary friendships1 partnerships1 and associations1 which men are equally free to make and to dissolve4 ,now most associations that men form are for certain definite ends1 determined by express contract or tacit understanding3 accordingly the duty arising out of them is merely that of fidelity to such contract or understanding1 which will be considered later under the heads of ,justice and ,good ,faith4 ,but this does not seem to be the case with what in a strict sense of the term are called ,friendships#bja3 for although ,friendship frequently arises among persons associated for other ends1 yet the relation is always conceived to have its end in itself1 and to be formed primarily for the development of mutual affection between the friends1 and the pleasure which attends this4 ,still1 it is thought that when such an affection has once been formed it creates mutual duties which did not previously exist3 we have therefore to inquire how far this is the case1 and on what principles these can be determined4 ,now here a new kind of difficulty has to be added to those which we have already found in attempting to formulate ,common ,sense4 ,for we find some who say that1 as it is essential to ,friendship that the mutual kindly feeling1 and the services springing from it1 should be spontaneous and unforced1 neither the one nor the other should be imposed as a duty2 and1 in short1 that this department of life should be fenced from the intrusion of moral precepts1 and left to the free play of natural instinct4 ,and this doctrine all would perhaps admit to a certain extent3 as1 indeed1 we have accepted it with regard to all the deeper flow and finer expression of feeling even in the domestic relations3 for it seemed pedantic and futile to prescribe rules for this1 or even 7though we naturally admire and praise any not ungraceful exhibition of intense and genuine affection7 to delineate an ideal of excellence for all to aim at4 ,still1 there seemed to be an important sphere of strict duty--however hard to define--in the relations of children to parents1 etc41 and even in the case of friendship it seems contrary to common sense to recognise no such sphere2 as it not unfrequently occurs to us to judge that one friend has behaved wrongly to another1 and to speak as if there were a clearly cognisable code of behaviour in such relations4 ,perhaps1 however1 we may say that all clear cases of wrong conduct towards friends come under the general formula of breach of understanding4 ,friends not unfrequently make definite promises of service1 but we need not consider these1 as their violation is prohibited by a different and clearer moral rule4 ,but further1 as all love is understood to include#bjb a desire for the happiness of its object1 the profession of friendship seems to bind one to seek this happiness to an extent proportionate to such profession4 ,now common benevolence 7cf4 ante1 #e7 prescribes at least that we should render to other men such services as we can render without any sacrifice1 or with a sacrifice so trifling as to be quite out of proportion to the service rendered4 ,and since the profession of friendship--though the term is used to include affections of various degree--must imply a greater interest in one's friend's happiness than in that of men in general1 it must announce a willingness to make more or less considerable sacrifices for him1 if occasion offers4 ,if then we decline to make such sacrifices1 we do wrong by failing to fulfil natural and legitimate expectations4 ,so far there seems no source of difficulty except the indefiniteness inevitably arising from the wide range of meanings covered by the term ,friendship4 ,but further questions arise in consequence of the changes of feeling to which human nature is liable3 first1 whether it is our duty to resist such changes as much as we can2 and secondly1 whether if this effort fails1 and love diminishes or departs1 we ought still to maintain a disposition to render services corresponding to our past affection4 ,and on these points there does not seem to be agreement among moral and refined persons4 ,for1 on the one hand1 it is natural to us to admire fidelity in friendship and stability of affections1 and we commonly regard these as most important excellences of character3 and so it seems strange if we are not to aim at these as at all other excellences1 as none more naturally stir us to imitation4 ,and hence many would be prepared to lay down that we ought not to withdraw affection once given1 unless the friend behaves ill3 while some would say that even in this case we ought not to break the friendship unless the crime is very great4 ,yet1 on the other hand1 we feel that such affection as is produced by deliberate effort of will is but a poor substitute for that which springs spontaneously1 and most refined persons would reject such a boon3 while1 again1 to conceal the change of feeling seems insincere and hypocritical4 ,but as for services1 a refined person would not accept such from a former friend who no longer loves him3 unless in extreme need1 when any kind of tie is1 as it were1 invigorated by the already strong claim which common humanity gives each man upon all others4 ,perhaps1 therefore1 there cannot be a duty to offer such services in any case1 when the need is not extreme4 ,though this inference is not quite clear3 for in relations of affection we often praise one party for offering what we rather blame the other for accepting4 ,but it seems that delicate questions of this kind are more naturally referred to canons of good taste and refined feeling than of morality proper3 or at least only included in the scope of morality in so far as we have a general duty to cultivate good taste and refinement of feeling1 like other excellences4 ,on the whole1 then1 we may say that the chief difficulties in determining the moral obligations of friendship arise 7#a7 from the indefiniteness of the tacit understanding implied in the relation1 and 7#b7 from the disagreement which we find as to the extent to which ,fidelity is a positive duty4 ,it may be observed that the latter difficulty is especially prominent in respect of those intimacies between persons of different sex which precede and prepare the way for marriage4 #h4 ,i pass now to the third head1 ,gratitude4 ,it has been already observed that the obligation of children to parents is sometimes based upon this3 and in other affectionate relationships it commonly blends with and much strengthens the claims that are thought to arise out of the relations themselves2 though none of the duties that we have discussed seem referable entirely to gratitude4 ,but where gratitude is due1 the obligation is especially clear and simple4 ,indeed the duty of requiting benefits seems to be recognised wherever morality extends2 and ,intuitionists have justly pointed to this recognition as an instance of a truly universal intuition4 ,still1 though the general force of the obligation is not open to doubt 7except of the sweeping and abstract kind with which we have not here to deal71 its nature and extent are by no means equally clear4 ,in the first place1 it may be asked whether we are only bound to repay services1 or whether we owe the special affection called ,gratitude2 which seems generally to combine kindly feeling and eagerness to requite with some sort of emotional recognition of superiority1 as the giver of benefits is in a position of superiority to the receiver4 ,on the one hand we seem to think that1 in so far as any affection can possibly be a duty1 kindly feeling towards benefactors must be such3 and yet to persons of a certain temperament this feeling is often peculiarly hard to attain1 owing to their dislike of the position of inferiority2 and this again we consider a right feeling to a certain extent1 and call it #8independence' or #8proper pride'2 but this feeling and the effusion of gratitude do not easily mix1 and the moralist finds it difficult to recommend a proper combination of the two4 ,perhaps it makes a great difference whether the service be lovingly done3 as in this case it seems inhuman that there should be no response of affection3 whereas if the benefit be coldly given1 the mere recognition of the obligation and settled disposition to repay it seem to suffice4 ,and #8independence' alone would prompt a man to repay the benefit in order to escape from the burden of obligation4 ,but it seems doubtful whether in any case we are morally satisfied with this as the sole motive4 ,it is partly this impatience of obligation which makes a man desirous of giving as requital more than he has received2 for otherwise his benefactor has still the superiority of having taken the initiative4 ,but also the worthier motive of affection urges us in the same direction3 and here1 as in other affectionate services1 we do not like too exact a measure of duty2 a certain excess falling short of extravagance seems to be what we admire and praise4 ,in so far1 however1 as conflict of claims makes it needful to be exact1 we think perhaps that an equal return is what the duty of gratitude requires1 or rather willingness to make such a return1 if it be required1 and if it is in our power to make it without neglecting prior claims4 ,for we do not think it obligatory to requite services in all cases1 even if it be in our power to do so1 if the benefactor appear to be sufficiently supplied with the means of happiness3 but if he either demand it or obviously stand in need of it1 we think it ungrateful not to make an equal return4 ,but when we try to define this notion of #8equal return1' obscurity and divergence begin4 ,for 7apart from the difficulty of comparing different kinds of services where we cannot make repayment in kind7 ,equality has two distinct meanings1 according as we consider the effort made by the benefactor1 or the service rendered to the benefited4 ,now perhaps if either of these be great1 the gratitude is naturally strong3 for the apprehension of great earnestness in another to serve us tends to draw from us a proportionate response of affection3 and any great pleasure or relief from pain naturally produces a corresponding emotion of thankfulness to the man who has voluntarily caused this1 even though his effort may have been slight4 ,and hence it has been suggested1 that in proportioning the dues of gratitude we ought to take whichever of the two considerations will give the highest estimate4 ,but this does not seem in accordance with ,common ,sense3 for the benefit may be altogether unacceptable1 and it is hard to bind us to repay in full every well-meant blundering effort to serve us2 though we feel vaguely that some return should be made even for this4 ,and though it is more plausible to say that we ought to requite an accepted service without weighing the amount of our benefactor's sacrifice1 still when we take extreme cases the rule seems not to be valid3 e4g4 if a poor man sees a rich one drowning and pulls him out of the water1 we do not think that the latter is bound to give as a reward what he would have been willing to give for his life4 ,still1 we should think him niggardly if he only gave his preserver half-a-crown3 which might1 however1 be profuse repayment for the cost of the exertion4 ,something between the two seems to suit our moral taste3 but ,i find no clear accepted principle upon which the amount can be decided4 ,the last claim to be considered is that of ,special ,need4 ,this has been substantially stated already1 in investigating the obligation of ,general ,benevolence or ,common ,humanity4 ,for it was said that we owe to all men such services as we can render by a sacrifice or effort small in comparison with the service3 and hence1 in proportion as the needs of other men present themselves as urgent1 we recognise the duty of relieving them out of our superfluity4 ,but ,i have thought it right to notice the duty separately1 because we are commonly prompted to fulfil it by the specific emotion of ,pity or ,compassion4 ,here1 again1 there seems a doubt how far it is good to foster and encourage this emotion--as distinct from the practical habit of rendering prompt aid and succour in distress1 whenever such succour is judged to be right4 ,on the one hand1 the emotional impulse tends to make the action of relieving need not only easier to the agent1 but more graceful and pleasing3 on the other hand1 it is generally recognised that mistaken pity is more likely to lead us astray than--e4g4--mistaken gratitude3 as it is more liable to interfere dangerously with the infliction of penalties required for the maintenance of social order1 or with the operation of motives to industry and thrift1 necessary for economic well-being4 ,and when--to guard against the last-mentioned danger--we try to define the external duty of relieving want1 we find ourselves face to face with what is no mere problem of the closet1 but a serious practical perplexity to most moral persons at the present day4 ,for many ask whether it is not our duty to refrain from all superfluous indulgences1 until we have removed the misery and want that exist around us1 as far as they are removable by money4 ,and in answering this question ,common ,sense seems to be inevitably led to a consideration of the economic consequences of attempting--either by taxation and public expenditure1 or by the voluntary gifts of private persons--to provide a sufficient income for all needy members of the community2 and is thus gradually brought to substitute for the ,intuitional method of dealing with problems of this kind a different procedure1 having at least much affinity with the ,utilitarian method4#bjc ,in conclusion1 then1 we must admit that while we find a number of broad and more or less indefinite rules unhesitatingly laid down by ,common ,sense in this department of duty1 it is difficult or impossible to extract from them1 so far as they are commonly accepted1 any clear and precise principles for determining the extent of the duty in any case4 ,and yet1 as we saw1 such particular principles of distribution of the services to which good-will prompts seem to be required for the perfection of practice no less than for theoretical completeness2 in so far as the duties which we have been considering are liable to come into apparent conflict with each other and with other prescriptions of the moral code4 ,in reply it may perhaps be contended that if we are seeking exactness in the determination of duty1 we have begun by examining the wrong notion3 that1 in short1 we ought to have examined ,justice rather than ,benevolence4 ,it may be admitted that we cannot find as much exactness as we sometimes practically need1 by merely considering the common conceptions of the duties to which men are prompted by natural affections2 but it may still be maintained that we shall at any rate find such exactness adequately provided for under the head of ,justice4 ,this contention ,i will proceed to examine in the next chapter4 ,,note4--,it should be borne in mind throughout the discussion carried on in this and the next six chapters that what we are primarily endeavouring to ascertain is not true morality but the morality of ,common ,sense3 so that if any moral proposition is admitted to be paradoxical1 the admission excludes it1--not as being necessarily false1 but as being not what ,common ,sense holds4 ,,footnotes3 #ahg ,the qualifications which this proposition requires have been already noticed1 and will be further illustrated as we proceed4 #ahh ,the phase of this view most current at present would seem to be ,utilitarianism1 the principles and method of which will be more fully discussed hereafter3 but in some form or degree it has been held by many whose affinities are rather with the ,intuitional school4 #ahi ,see note at end of chapter4 #aij ,cf4 ,book i4 chaps4 vii4 ix4 #aia ,a further reason for so doing will appear in the sequel2 when we come to survey the general relation of ,virtue to ,happiness1 as the result of that detailed examination of the particular virtues which forms the main subject of the present book4 ,cf4 post1 chap4 xiv4 of this ,book4 #aib ,this reluctance1 however1 seems largely due to the fact that this precise measure of duty is most frequently demanded when the issue lies between ,duty and ,self-interest4 #aic ,it must be admitted that the more the benevolent impulse is combined with the habit of considering the complex consequences of different courses of action that may be presented as alternatives1 and comparing the amounts of happiness to others respectively resulting from them1 the more good1 ceteris paribus1 is likely to be caused by it on the whole4 ,and so far as there seems to be a certain natural incompatibility between this habit of calculation and comparison and the spontaneous fervour of kindly impulse1 ,common ,sense is somewhat puzzled which to prefer2 and takes refuge in an ideal that transcends this incompatibility and includes the two4 #aid ,this question will be further discussed in the concluding chapter of this ,book 7chap4 xiv474 #aie ,it may be said that a child owes gratitude to the authors of its existence4 ,but life alone1 apart from any provision for making life happy1 seems a boon of doubtful value1 and one that scarcely excites gratitude when it was not conferred from any regard for the recipient4 #aif ,in #ahfh it was affirmed1 in an ,act passed by the ,congress of the ,united ,states1 that 8the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all people40 ,i do not know how far this would be taken to imply that a man has a moral right to leave his country whenever he finds it convenient--provided no claims except those of ,patriotism retain him there4 ,but if it was intended to imply this1 ,i think the statement would not be accepted in ,europe without important limitations3 though ,i cannot state any generally accepted principle from which such limitations could be clearly deduced4 #aig ,how far we are bound to make reparation when the harm is involuntary1 and such as could not have been prevented by ordinary care on our part1 is not clear3 but it will be convenient to defer the consideration of this till the next chapter 7 #e73 as the whole of this department of duty is more commonly placed under the head of ,justice4 #aih ,i raise this question1 because if the rule of #8living according to ,nature' were really adopted as a first principle1 in any ordinary meaning of the term #8nature1' it would certainly seem to be the duty of all normal human beings to enter into conjugal relations3 but just this instance seems to show that the principle is not accepted by ,common ,sense4 ,see ,book i4 chap4 vi4 #b4 #aii ,the moral necessity of prohibiting polygamy is sometimes put forward as an immediate inference from the equality of the numbers of the two sexes4 ,this argument1 however1 seems to require the assumption that all men and women ought to marry3 but this scarcely any one will expressly affirm3 and actually considerable numbers remain unmarried1 and there is no reason to believe that in countries where polygamy is allowed1 paucity of supply has ever made it practically difficult for any man to find a mate4 #bjj ,cf4 ,wayland1 ,elements of ,moral ,science1 ,book ii4 part ii4 class #b1 #b4 #bja ,i use the term here to imply a mutual affection more intense than the kindly feeling which a moral man desires to find towards all persons with whom he is brought into continual social relations1 through business or otherwise4 #bjb ,it was before observed that this is only one--and not always the most prominent--element of the whole emotional state which we call love4 #bjc ,see ,book iv4 chap4 iii4 #c4 ,,chapter ,v ,,justice #a4 ,we have seen that in delineating the outline of duty1 as intuitively recognised1 we have to attempt to give to common terms a definite and precise meaning4 ,this process of definition always requires some reflection and care1 and is sometimes one of considerable difficulty4 ,but there is no case where the difficulty is greater1 or the result more disputed1 than when we try to define ,justice4 ,before making the attempt1 it may be as well to remind the reader what it is that we have to do4 ,we have not to inquire into the derivation of the notion of ,justice1 as we are not now studying the history of our ethical thought1 but its actual condition4 ,nor can we profess to furnish a definition which will correspond to every part of the common usage of the term2 for many persons are undoubtedly vague and loose in their application of current moral notions4 ,but it is an assumption of the ,intuitional method#bjd that the term #8justice' denotes a quality which it is ultimately desirable to realise in the conduct and social relations of men2 and that a definition may be given of this which will be accepted by all competent judges as presenting1 in a clear and explicit form1 what they have always meant by the term1 though perhaps implicitly and vaguely4 ,in seeking such a definition we may1 so to speak1 clip the ragged edge of common usage1 but we must not make excision of any considerable portion4#bje ,perhaps the first point that strikes us when we reflect upon our notion of ,justice is its connexion with ,law4 ,there is no doubt that just conduct is to a great extent determined by ,law1 and in certain applications the two terms seem interchangeable4 ,thus we speak indifferently of #8,law ,courts' and #8,courts of ,justice1' and when a private citizen demands ,justice1 or his just rights1 he commonly means to demand that ,law should be carried into effect4 ,still reflection shows that we do not mean by ,justice merely conformity to ,law4 ,for1 first1 we do not always call the violators of law unjust1 but only of some ,laws3 not1 for example1 duellists or gamblers4 ,and secondly1 we often judge that ,law as it exists does not completely realise ,justice2 our notion of ,justice furnishes a standard with which we compare actual laws1 and pronounce them just or unjust4 ,and1 thirdly1 there is a part of just conduct which lies outside the sphere even of ,law as it ought to be2 for example1 we think that a father may be just or unjust to his children in matters where the law leaves 7and ought to leave7 him free4 ,we must then distinguish ,justice from what has been called the virtue or duty of ,order1 or ,law-observance3 and perhaps1 if we examine the points of divergence just mentioned1 we shall be led to the true definition of ,justice4 ,let us therefore first ask1 ,of what kind of laws is the observance generally thought to be a realisation of ,justice8 ,in most cases they might be described as laws which define and secure the interests of assignable individuals4 ,but this description is not complete1 as ,justice is admittedly concerned in the apportionment of adequate punishment to each offender2 though we should not say that a man had an interest in the adequacy of his punishment4 ,let us say1 then1 that the laws in which ,justice is or ought to be realised1 are laws which distribute and allot to individuals either objects of desire1 liberties and privileges1 or burdens and restraints1 or even pains as such4 ,these latter1 however1 are only allotted by law to persons who have broken other laws4 ,and as all law is enforced by penalties1 we see how the administration of law generally may be viewed as the administration of ,justice1 in accordance with this definition3 not because all laws are primarily and in their first intention distributive1 but because the execution of law generally involves the due allotment of pains and losses and restraints to the persons who violate it4 ,or1 more precisely1 we should say that this legal distribution ought to realise ,justice1 for we have seen that it may fail to do so4 ,we have next to ask1 therefore1 ,what conditions must laws fulfil in order that they may be just in their distributive effects8 ,here1 however1 it may seem that we are transgressing the limit which divides ,ethics from ,politics3 for ,ethics is primarily concerned with the rules which ought to govern the private conduct of individuals2 and it is commonly thought that private persons ought to obey even laws that they regard as unjust1 if established by lawful authority4 ,still1 this is doubted in the case of laws that seem extremely unjust3 as 7e4g47 the ,fugitive ,slave law in the ,united ,states before the rebellion4 ,at any rate it seems desirable that we should here digress somewhat into political discussion2 partly in order to elucidate the notion of ,justice1 which seems to be essentially the same in both regions1 and partly because it is of great practical importance to individuals1 in regulating private conduct beyond the range of ,law-observance1 to know whether the laws and established order of the society in which they live are just or unjust4 ,now perhaps the most obvious and commonly recognised characteristic of just laws is that they are ,equal3 and in some departments of legislation1 at least1 the common notion of ,justice seems to be exhaustively expressed by that of ,equality4 ,it is commonly thought1 for example1 that a system of taxation would be perfectly just if it imposed exactly equal burdens upon all3#bjf and though this notion of #8equal burden' is itself somewhat difficult to define with the precision required for practical application1 still we may say that ,justice here is thought to resolve itself into a kind of equality4 ,however1 we cannot affirm generally that all laws ought to affect all persons equally1 for this would leave no place for any laws allotting special privileges and burdens to special classes of the community2 but we do not think all such laws necessarily unjust3 e4g4 we think it not unjust that only persons appointed in a certain way should share in legislation1 and that men should be forced to fight for their country but not women4 ,hence some have said that the only sense in which justice requires a law to be equal is that its execution must affect equally all the individuals belonging to any of the classes specified in the law4 ,and no doubt this rule excludes a very real kind of injustice3 it is of the highest importance that judges and administrators should never be persuaded by money or otherwise to show #8respect of persons4' ,so much equality1 however1 is involved in the very notion of a law1 if it be couched in general terms3 and it is plain that laws may be equally executed and yet unjust3 for example1 we should consider a law unjust which compelled only red-haired men to serve in the army1 even though it were applied with the strictest impartiality to all red-haired men4 ,we must therefore conclude1 that1 in laying down the law no less than in carrying it out1 all inequality#bjg affecting the interests of individuals which appears arbitrary1 and for which no sufficient reason can be given1 is held to be unjust4 ,but we have still to ask1 what kind of reasons for inequality ,justice admits and from what general principle 7or principles7 all such reasons are to be deduced8 #b4 ,perhaps we shall find it easier to answer this question1 if we examine the notion of ,justice as applied to that part of private conduct which lies beyond the sphere of law4 ,here1 again1 we may observe that the notion of ,justice always involves allotment of something considered as advantageous or disadvantageous3 whether it be money or other material means of happiness2 or praise1 or affection1 or other immaterial good1 or some merited pain or loss4 ,hence ,i should answer the question raised in the preceding chapter 7 #c71 as to the classification of the duties there discussed under the heads of ,justice and ,benevolence respectively1 by saying that the fulfilment of any duty of the affections1 considered by itself1 does not exemplify ,justice3 but that when we come to compare the obligations arising out of different affectionate relations1 and to consider the right allotment of love and kind services1 the notion of ,justice becomes applicable4 ,in order to arrange this allotment properly we have to inquire what is ,just4 ,what then do we mean by a just man in matters where law-observance does not enter8 ,it is natural to reply that we mean an impartial man1 one who seeks with equal care to satisfy all claims which he recognises as valid and does not let himself be unduly influenced by personal preferences4 ,and this seems an adequate account of the virtue of justice so far as we consider it merely subjectively1 and independently of the intellectual insight required for the realisation of objective justice in action3 if we neglect to give due consideration to any claim which we regard as reasonable1 our action cannot be just in intention4 ,this definition suffices to exclude wilful injustice3 but it is obvious that it does not give us a sufficient criterion of just acts1 any more than the absence of arbitrary inequality was found to be a sufficient criterion of just laws4#bjh ,we want to know what are reasonable claims4 ,well1 of these the most important--apart from the claims discussed in the preceding chapter--seems to be that resulting from contract4 ,this is to a certain extent enforced by law3 but it is clear to us that a just man will keep engagements generally1 even when there may be no legal penalty attached to their violation4 ,the exact definition of this duty1 and its commonly admitted qualifications1 will be discussed in the next chapter3 but of its general bindingness ,common ,sense has no doubt4 ,further1 we include under the idea of binding engagements not merely verbal promises1 but also what are called #8implied contracts' or #8tacit understandings4' ,but this latter term is a difficult one to keep precise3 and1 in fact1 is often used to include not only the case where ,a has in some way positively implied a pledge to ,b1 but also the case where ,b has certain expectations of which ,a is aware4 ,here1 however1 the obligation is not so clear3 for it would hardly be said that a man is bound to dispel all erroneous expectations that he may know to be formed respecting his conduct1 at the risk of being required to fulfil them4 ,still1 if the expectation was such as most persons would form under the circumstances1 there seems to be some sort of moral obligation to fulfil it1 if it does not conflict with other duties1 though the obligation seems less definite and stringent than that arising out of contract4 ,indeed ,i think we may say that ,justice is generally1 though somewhat vaguely1 held to prescribe the fulfilment of all such expectations 7of services1 etc47 as arise naturally and normally out of the relations1 voluntary or involuntary1 in which we stand towards other human beings4 ,but the discussions in the preceding chapter have shown the difficulty of defining even those duties of this kind which1 in an indefinite form1 seemed certain and indisputable3 while others are only defined by customs which to reflection appear arbitrary4 ,and though while these customs persist1 the expectations springing from them are in a certain sense natural1 so that a just man seems to be under a kind of obligation to fulfil them1 this obligation cannot be regarded as clear or complete1 for two reasons that were given in the last chapter2 first1 because customs are continually varying1 and as long as any one is in a state of variation1 growing or decaying1 the validity of the customary claim is obviously doubtful2 and secondly1 because it does not seem right that an irrational and inexpedient custom should last for ever1 and yet it can only be abolished by being 8more honoured in the breach than in the observance40 ,this line of reflection therefore has landed us in a real perplexity respecting the department of duty which we are at present examining4 ,justice is something that we conceive to be intrinsically capable of perfectly definite determination3 a scrupulously just man1 we think1 must be very exact and precise in his conduct4 ,but when we consider that part of ,justice which consists in satisfying such natural and customary claims as arise independently of contract1 it seems impossible to estimate these claims with any exactness4 ,the attempt to map out the region of ,justice reveals to us a sort of margin or dim borderland1 tenanted by expectations which are not quite claims and with regard to which we do not feel sure whether ,justice does or does not require us to satisfy them4 ,for the ordinary actions of men proceed on the expectation that the future will resemble the past3 hence it seems natural to expect that any particular man will do as others do in similar circumstances1 and1 still more1 that he will continue to do whatever he has hitherto been in the habit of doing2 accordingly his fellow-men are inclined to think themselves wronged by his suddenly omitting any customary or habitual act1 if the omission causes them loss or inconvenience4#bji ,on the other hand1 if a man has given no pledge to maintain a custom or habit1 it seems hard that he should be bound by the unwarranted expectations of others4 ,in this perplexity1 common sense often appears to decide differently cases similar in all respects1 except in the quantity of disappointment caused by the change4 ,for instance1 if a poor man were to leave one tradesman and deal with another because the first had turned ,quaker1 we should hardly call it an act of injustice1 however unreasonable we might think it3 but if a rich country gentleman were to act similarly towards a poor neighbour1 many persons would say that it was unjust persecution4 ,the difficulty just pointed out extends equally to the duties of kindness--even to the specially stringent and sacred duties of the domestic affections and gratitude--discussed in the previous chapter4 ,we cannot get any new principle for settling any conflict that may present itself among such duties1 by asking #8what ,justice requires of us'3 the application of the notion of ,justice only leads us to view the problem in a new aspect as a question of the right distribution of kind services--it does not help us to solve it4 ,had we clear and precise intuitive principles for determining the claims 7e4g47 of parents on children1 children on parents1 benefactors on the recipients of their benefits1 we might say exactly at what point or to what extent the satisfaction of one of these claims ought in justice to be postponed to the satisfaction of another1 or to any worthy aim of a different kind3 but ,i know no method of determining a problem of this kind which is not either implicitly utilitarian1 or arbitrarily dogmatic1 and unsupported by ,common ,sense4 #c4 ,if now we turn again to the political question1 from which we diverged1 we see that we have obtained from the preceding discussion one of the criteria of the justice of laws which we were seeking--viz4 that they must avoid running counter to natural and normal expectations--3 but we see at the same time that the criterion cannot be made definite in its application to private conduct1 and it is easy to show that there is the same indefiniteness and consequent difficulty in applying it to legislation4 ,for ,law itself is a main source of natural expectations2 and1 since in ordinary times the alterations in law are very small in proportion to the amount unaltered1 there is always a natural expectation that the existing laws will be maintained3 and although this is1 of course1 an indefinite and uncertain expectation in a society like ours1 where laws are continually being altered by lawful authority1 it is sufficient for people in general to rely upon in arranging their concerns1 investing their money1 choosing their place of abode1 their trade and profession1 etc4 ,hence when such expectations are disappointed by a change in the law1 the disappointed persons complain of injustice1 and it is to some extent admitted that justice requires that they should be compensated for the loss thus incurred4 ,but such expectations are of all degrees of definiteness and importance1 and generally extend more widely as they decrease in value1 like the ripples made by throwing a stone into a pond1 so that it is practically impossible to compensate them all3 at the same time1 ,i know no intuitive principle by which we could separate valid claims from invalid1 and distinguish injustice from simple hardship4#baj ,but even if this difficulty were overcome further reflection must1 ,i think1 show that the criterion above given is incomplete or imperfectly stated3 otherwise it would appear that no old law could be unjust1 since laws that have existed for a long time must create corresponding expectations4 ,but this is contrary to ,common ,sense3 as we are continually becoming convinced that old laws are unjust 7e4g4 laws establishing slavery73 indeed1 this continually recurring conviction seems to be one of the great sources of change in the laws of a progressive society4 ,perhaps we may say that there are natural expectations which grow up from other elements of the social order1 independent of and so possibly conflicting with laws3 and that we call rules unjust which go counter to these4 ,thus e4g4 primogeniture appears to many unjust1 because all the landowner's children are brought up in equally luxurious habits1 and share equally the paternal care and expenditure1 and so the inequality of inheritance seems paradoxical and harsh4 ,still1 we cannot explain every case in this way3 for example1 the conviction that slavery is unjust can hardly be traced to anything in the established order of the slave-holding society1 but seems to arise in a different way4 ,the truth is1 this notion of #8natural expectations' is worse than indefinite3 the ambiguity of the term conceals a fundamental conflict of ideas1 which appears more profound and far-reaching in its consequences the more we examine it4 ,for the word #8natural1' as used in this connexion1 covers and conceals the whole chasm between the actual and the ideal--what is and what ought to be4 ,as we before noticed1#baa the term seems1 as ordinarily used1 to contain the distinct ideas of 7#a7 the common as opposed to the exceptional1 and 7#b7 the original or primitive as contrasted with the result of later conventions and institutions4 ,but it is also used to signify1 in more or less indefinite combination with one or other of these meanings1 #8what would exist in an ideal state of society4' ,and it is easy to see how these different meanings have been blended and confounded4 ,for since by #8,nature' men have really meant ,god1 or ,god viewed in a particular aspect--,god1 we may say1 as known to us in experience--when they have come to conceive a better state of things than that which actually exists1 they have not only regarded this ideal state as really exhibiting the ,divine purposes more than the actual1 and as being so far more #8natural'3 but they have gone further1 and supposed more or less definitely that this ideal state of things must be what ,god originally created1 and that the defects recognisable in what now exists must be due to the deteriorating action of men4 ,but if we dismiss this latter view1 as unsupported by historical evidence1 we recognise more plainly the contrast and conflict between the other two meanings of #8natural1' and the corresponding discrepancy between the two elements of the common notion of ,justice4 ,for1 from one point of view1 we are disposed to think that the customary distribution of rights1 goods1 and privileges1 as well as burdens and pains1 is natural and just1 and that this ought to be maintained by law1 as it usually is3 while1 from another point of view1 we seem to recognise an ideal system of rules of distribution which ought to exist1 but perhaps have never yet existed1 and we consider laws to be just in proportion as they conform to this ideal4 ,it is the reconciliation between these two views which is the chief problem of political ,justice4#bab ,on what principles1 then1 is the ideal to be determined8 ,this is1 in fact1 the question which has been chiefly in view from the outset of the chapter2 but we could not satisfactorily discuss it until we had distinguished the two elements of ,justice1 as commonly conceived--one conservative of law and custom1 and the other tending to reform them4 ,it is on this latter that we shall now concentrate our attention4 ,when1 however1 we examine this ideal1 as it seems to show itself in the minds of different men in different ages and countries1 we observe various forms of it1 which it is important to distinguish4 ,in the first place1 it must be noticed that an ideal constitution of society may be conceived and sought with many other ends in view besides the right distribution of good and evil among the individuals that compose it3 as 7e4g47 with a view to conquest and success in war1 or to the development of industry and commerce1 or to the highest possible cultivation of the arts and sciences4 ,but any such political ideal as this is beyond the range of our present consideration1 as it is not constructed on the basis of our common notion of ,justice4 ,our present question is1 ,are there any clear principles from which we may work out an ideally just distribution of rights and privileges1 burdens and pains1 among human beings as such8 ,there is a wide-spread view1 that in order to make society just certain ,natural ,rights should be conceded to all members of the community1 and that positive law should at least embody and protect these1 whatever other regulations it may contain3 but it is difficult to find in ,common ,sense any definite agreement in the enumeration of these ,natural ,rights1 still less any clear principles from which they can be systematically deduced4 #d4 ,there is1 however1 one mode of systematising these ,rights and bringing them under one principle1 which has been maintained by influential thinkers2 and which1 though now perhaps somewhat antiquated1 is still sufficiently current to deserve careful examination4 ,it has been held that ,freedom from interference is really the whole of what human beings1 originally and apart from contracts1 can be strictly said to owe to each other3 at any rate1 that the protection of this ,freedom 7including the enforcement of ,free ,contract7 is the sole proper aim of ,law1 i4e4 of those rules of mutual behaviour which are maintained by penalties inflicted under the authority of ,government4 ,all natural ,rights1 on this view1 may be summed up in the ,right to ,freedom2 so that the complete and universal establishment of this ,right would be the complete realisation of ,justice1--the ,equality at which ,justice is thought to aim being interpreted as ,equality of ,freedom4 ,now when ,i contemplate this as an abstract formula1 though ,i cannot say that it is self-evident to me as the true fundamental principle of ,ideal ,law1 ,i admit that it commends itself much to my mind2 and ,i might perhaps persuade myself that it is owing to the defect of my faculty of moral 7or jural7 intuition that ,i fail to see its self-evidence4 ,but when ,i endeavour to bring it into closer relation to the actual circumstances of human society1 it soon comes to wear a different aspect4 ,in the first place1 it seems obviously needful to limit the extent of its application4 ,for it involves the negative principle that no one should be coerced for his own good alone2 but no one would gravely argue that this ought to be applied to the case of children1 or of idiots1 or insane persons4 ,but if so1 can we know a priori that it ought to be applied to all sane adults8 since the above-mentioned exceptions are commonly justified on the ground that children1 etc41 will manifestly be better off if they are forced to do and abstain as others think best for them2 and it is1 at least1 not intuitively certain that the same argument does not apply to the majority of mankind in the present state of their intellectual progress4 ,indeed1 it is often conceded by the advocates of this principle that it does not hold even in respect of adults in a low state of civilisation4 ,but if so1 what criterion can be given for its application1 except that it must be applied wherever human beings are sufficiently intelligent to provide for themselves better than others would provide for them8 and thus the principle would present itself not as absolute1 but merely a subordinate application of the wider principle of aiming at the general happiness or well-being of mankind4 ,but1 again1 the term ,freedom is ambiguous4 ,if we interpret it strictly1 as meaning ,freedom of ,action alone1 the principle seems to allow any amount of mutual annoyance except constraint4 ,but obviously no one would be satisfied with such ,freedom as this4 ,if1 however1 we include in the idea absence of pain and annoyance inflicted by others1 it becomes at once evident that we cannot prohibit all such annoyances without restraining freedom of action to a degree that would be intolerable2 since there is scarcely any gratification of a man's natural impulses which may not cause some annoyance to others4 ,hence in distinguishing the mutual annoyances that ought to be allowed from those that must be prohibited we seem forced to balance the evils of constraint against pain and loss of a different kind3 while if we admit the ,utilitarian criterion so far1 it is difficult to maintain that annoyance to individuals is never to be permitted in order to attain any positive good result1 but only to prevent more serious annoyance4 ,thirdly1 in order to render a social construction possible on this basis1 we must assume that the right to ,freedom includes the right to limit one's freedom by contract2 and that such contracts1 if they are really voluntary and not obtained by fraud or force1 and if they do not violate the freedom of others1 are to be enforced by legal penalties4 ,but ,i cannot see that enforcement of ,contracts is strictly included in the notion of realising ,freedom2 for a man seems to be most completely free when no one of his volitions is allowed to have any effect in causing the external coercion of any other4 ,if1 again1 this right of limiting ,freedom is itself unlimited1 a man might thus freely contract himself out of freedom into slavery1 so that the principle of freedom would turn out suicidal2 and yet to deduce from this principle a limited right of limiting freedom by contract seems clearly impossible4#bac ,but if it be difficult to define freedom as an ideal to be realised in the merely personal relations of human beings1 the difficulty is increased when we consider the relation of men to the material means of life and happiness4 ,for it is commonly thought that the individual's right to ,freedom includes the right of appropriating material things4 ,but1 if ,freedom be understood strictly1 ,i do not see that it implies more than his right to non-interference while actually using such things as can only be used by one person at once3 the right to prevent others from using at any future time anything that an individual has once seized seems an interference with the free action of others beyond what is needed to secure the freedom1 strictly speaking1 of the appropriator4 ,it may perhaps be said that a man1 in appropriating a particular thing1 does not interfere with the freedom of others1 because the rest of the world is still open to them4 ,but others may want just what he has appropriated3 and they may not be able to find anything so good at all1 or at least without much labour and search2 for many of the instruments and materials of comfortable living are limited in quantity4 ,this argument applies especially to property in land3 and it is to be observed that1 in this case1 there is a further difficulty in determining how much a man is to be allowed to appropriate by #8first occupation4' ,if it be said that a man is to be understood to occupy what he is able to use1 the answer is obvious that the use of land by any individual may vary almost indefinitely in extent1 while diminishing proportionally in intensity4 ,for instance1 it would surely be a paradoxical deduction from the principle of ,freedom to maintain that an individual had a right to exclude others from pasturing sheep on any part of the land over which his hunting expeditions could extend4#bad ,but if so can it be clear that a shepherd has such a right against one who wishes to till the land1 or that one who is using the surface has a right to exclude a would-be miner8 ,i do not see how the deduction is to be made out4 ,again1 it may be disputed whether the right of ,property1 as thus derived1 is to include the right of controlling the disposal of one's possessions after death4 ,for this to most persons seems naturally bound up with ownership3 yet it is paradoxical to say that we interfere with a man's freedom of action by anything that we may do after his death to what he owned during his life3 and jurists have often treated this right as purely conventional and not therefore included in #8natural law4' ,other difficulties might be raised3 but we need not pursue them1 for if ,freedom be taken simply to mean that one man's actions are to be as little as possible restrained by others1 it is obviously more fully realised without appropriation4 ,and if it be said that it includes1 beside this1 facility and security in the gratification of desires1 and that it is ,freedom in this sense that we think should be equally distributed1 and that this cannot be realised without appropriation2 then it may be replied1 that in a society where nearly all material things are already appropriated1 this kind of ,freedom is not and cannot be equally distributed4 ,a man born into such a society1 without inheritance1 is not only far less free than those who possess property1 but he is less free than if there had been no appropriation4 ,it may be said#bae that1 having freedom of contract1 he will give his services in exchange for the means of satisfying his wants2 and that this exchange must necessarily give him more than he could have got if he had been placed in the world by himself2 that1 in fact1 any human society always renders the part of the earth that it inhabits more capable of affording gratification of desires to each and all of its later-born members than it would otherwise be4 ,but however true this may be as a general rule1 it is obviously not so in all cases3 as men are sometimes unable to sell their services at all1 and often can only obtain in exchange for them an insufficient subsistence4 ,and1 even granting it to be true1 it does not prove that society1 by appropriation1 has not interfered with the natural freedom of its poorer members3 but only that it compensates them for such interference1 and that the compensation is adequate3 and it must be evident that if compensation in the form of material commodities can be justly given for an encroachment on ,freedom1 the realisation of ,freedom cannot be the one ultimate end of distributive ,justice4 #e4 ,it seems1 then1 that though ,freedom is an object of keen and general desire1 and an important source of happiness1 both in itself and indirectly from the satisfaction of natural impulses which it allows1 the attempt to make it the fundamental notion of theoretical ,jurisprudence is attended with insuperable difficulties3 and that even the ,natural ,rights which it claims to cover cannot be brought under it except in a very forced and arbitrary manner4#baf ,but further1 even if this were otherwise1 an equal distribution of ,freedom does not seem to exhaust our notion of ,justice4 ,ideal ,justice1 as we commonly conceive it1 seems to demand that not only ,freedom but all other benefits and burdens should be distributed1 if not equally1 at any rate justly1--,justice in distribution being regarded as not identical with ,equality1 but merely exclusive of arbitrary inequality4 ,how1 then1 shall we find the principle of this highest and most comprehensive ideal8 ,we shall be led to it1 ,i think1 by referring again to one of the grounds of obligation to render services1 which was noticed in the last chapter3 the claim of ,gratitude4 ,it there appeared that we have not only a natural impulse to requite benefits1 but also a conviction that such requital is a duty1 and its omission blameworthy1 to some extent at least2 though we find it difficult to define the extent4 ,now it seems that when we1 so to say1 universalise this impulse and conviction1 we get the element in the common view of ,justice1 which we are now trying to define4 ,for if we take the proposition #8that good done to any individual ought to be requited by him1' and leave out the relation to the individual in either term of the proposition1 we seem to have an equally strong conviction of the truth of the more general statement #8that good deeds ought to be requited4'#bag ,and if we take into consideration all the different kinds and degrees of services1 upon the mutual exchange of which society is based1 we get the proposition #8that men ought to be rewarded in proportion to their deserts4' ,and this would be commonly held to be the true and simple principle of distribution in any case where there are no claims arising from ,contract or ,custom to modify its operation4 ,for example1 it would be admitted that--if there has been no previous arrangement--the profits of any work or enterprise should be divided among those who have contributed to its success in proportion to the worth of their services4 ,and it may be observed1 that some thinkers maintain the proposition discussed in the previous section--that ,law ought to aim at securing the greatest possible ,freedom for each individual--not as absolute and axiomatic1 but as derivative from the principle that ,desert ought to be requited2 on the ground that the best way of providing for the requital of ,desert is to leave men as free as possible to exert themselves for the satisfaction of their own desires1 and so to win each his own requital4 ,and this seems to be really the principle upon which the ,right of ,property is rested1 when it is justified by the proposition that #8every one has an exclusive right to the produce of his labour4' ,for on reflection it is seen that no labour really #8produces' any material thing1 but only adds to its value3 and we do not think that a man can acquire a right to a material thing belonging to another1 by spending his labour on it--even if he does so in the bona fide belief that it is his own property--but only to adequate compensation for his labour2 this1 therefore1 is what the proposition just quoted must mean4 ,the principle is1 indeed1 sometimes stretched to explain the original right of property in materials1 as being in a sense #8produced' 7i4e4 found7 by their first discoverer2#bah but here again1 reflection shows that ,common ,sense does not grant this 7as a moral right7 absolutely1 but only in so far as it appears to be not more than adequate compensation for the discoverer's trouble4 ,for example1 we should not consider that the first finder of a large uninhabited region had a moral right to appropriate the whole of it4 ,hence this justification of the right of property refers us ultimately to the principle #8that every man ought to receive adequate requital for his labour4' ,so1 again1 when we speak of the world as justly governed by ,god1 we seem to mean that1 if we could know the whole of human existence1 we should find that happiness is distributed among men according to their deserts4 ,and ,divine ,justice is thought to be a pattern which ,human ,justice is to imitate as far as the conditions of human society allow4 ,this kind of ,justice1 as has been said1 seems like ,gratitude universalised3 and the same principle applied to punishment may similarly be regarded as ,resentment universalised2 though the parallel is incomplete1 if we are considering the present state of our moral conceptions4 ,history shows us a time in which it was thought not only as natural1 but as clearly right and incumbent on a man1 to requite injuries as to repay benefits3 but as moral reflection developed in ,europe this notion was repudiated1 so that ,plato taught that it could never be right really to harm any one1 however he may have harmed us4 ,and this is the accepted doctrine in ,christian societies1 as regards requital by individuals of personal wrongs4 ,but in its universalised form the old conviction still lingers in the popular view of ,criminal ,justice3 it seems still to be widely held that ,justice requires pain to be inflicted on a man who has done wrong1 even if no benefit result either to him or to others from the pain4 ,personally1 ,i am so far from holding this view that ,i have an instinctive and strong moral aversion to it3 and ,i hesitate to attribute it to ,common ,sense1 since ,i think that it is gradually passing away from the moral consciousness of educated persons in the most advanced communities3 but ,i think it is still perhaps the more ordinary view4 ,this1 then1 is one element of what ,aristotle calls ,corrective ,justice1 which is embodied in criminal law4 ,it must not be confounded with the principle of ,reparation1 on which legal awards of damages are based4 ,we have already noticed this as a simple deduction from the maxim of general ,benevolence1 which forbids us to do harm to our fellow-creatures3 for if we have harmed them1 we can yet approximately obey the maxim by giving compensation for the harm4 ,though here the question arises whether we are bound to make reparation for harm that has been quite blamelessly caused3 and it is not easy to answer it decisively4#bai ,on the whole1 ,i think we should condemn a man who did not offer some reparation for any serious injury caused by him to another--even if quite involuntarily caused1 and without negligence3 but perhaps we regard this rather as a duty of ,benevolence--arising out of the general sympathy that each ought to have for others1 intensified by this special occasion--than as a duty of strict ,justice4 ,if1 however1 we limit the requirement of ,reparation1 under the head of strict ,justice1 to cases in which the mischief repaired is due to acts or omissions in some degree culpable1 a difficulty arises from the divergence between the moral view of culpability1 and that which social security requires4 ,of this ,i will speak presently4#bbj ,in any case there is now#bba no danger of confusion or collision between the principle of ,reparative and that of ,retributive ,justice1 as the one is manifestly concerned with the claims of the injured party1 and the other with the deserts of the wrongdoer3 though in the actual administration of ,law the obligation of paying compensation for wrong may sometimes be treated as a sufficient punishment for the wrongdoer4 ,when1 however1 we turn again to the other branch of ,retributive ,justice1 which is concerned with the reward of services1 we find another notion1 which ,i will call ,fitness1 often blended indistinguishably#bbb with the notion of ,desert1 and so needing to be carefully separated from it2 and when the distinction has been made1 we see that the two are liable to come into collision4 ,i do not feel sure that the principle of #8distribution according to ,fitness' is found1 strictly speaking1 in the analysis of the ordinary notion of ,justice3 but it certainly enters into our common conception of the ideal or perfectly rational order of society1 as regards the distribution both of instruments and functions1 and 7to some extent at least7 of other sources of happiness4 ,we certainly think it reasonable that instruments should be given to those who can use them best1 and functions allotted to those who are most competent to perform them3 but these may not be those who have rendered most services in the past4 ,and again1 we think it reasonable that particular material means of enjoyment should fall to the lot of those who are susceptible of the respective kinds of pleasure2 as no one would think of allotting pictures to a blind man1 or rare wines to one who had no taste3 hence we should probably think it fitting that artists should have larger shares than mechanics in the social distribution of wealth1 though they may be by no means more deserving4 ,thus the notions of ,desert and ,fitness appear at least occasionally conflicting2 but perhaps1 as ,i have suggested1 ,fitness should rather be regarded as a utilitarian principle of distribution1 inevitably limiting the realisation of what is abstractly just1 than as a part of the interpretation of ,justice proper3 and it is with the latter that we are at present concerned4 ,at any rate it is the ,requital of ,desert that constitutes the chief element of ,ideal ,justice1 in so far as this imports something more than mere ,equality and ,impartiality4 ,let us then examine more closely wherein ,desert consists2 and we will begin with ,good ,desert or ,merit1 as being of the most fundamental and permanent importance2 for we may hope that crime and its punishment will decrease and gradually disappear as the world improves1 but the right or best distribution of the means of wellbeing is an object that we must always be striving to realise4 #f4 ,and first1 the question which we had to consider in defining ,gratitude again recurs3 whether1 namely1 we are to apportion the reward to the effort made1 or to the results attained4 ,for it may be said that the actual utility of any service must depend much upon favourable circumstances and fortunate accidents1 not due to any desert of the agent3 or again1 may be due to powers and skills which were connate1 or have been developed by favourable conditions of life1 or by good education1 and why should we reward him for these8 7for the last-mentioned we ought rather to reward those who have educated him74 ,and certainly it is only in so far as moral excellences are exhibited in human achievements that they are commonly thought to be such as ,god will reward4 ,but by drawing this line we do not yet get rid of the difficulty4 ,for it may still be said that good actions are due entirely1 or to a great extent1 to good dispositions and habits1 and that these are partly inherited and partly due to the care of parents and teachers2 so that in rewarding these we are rewarding the results of natural and accidental advantages1 and it is unreasonable to distinguish these from others1 such as skill and knowledge1 and to say that it is even ideally just to reward the one and not the other4 ,shall we say1 then1 that the reward should be proportionate to the amount of voluntary effort for a good end8 ,but ,determinists will say that even this is ultimately the effect of causes extraneous to the man's self4 ,on the ,determinist view1 then1 it would seem to be ideally just 7if anything is so7 that all men should enjoy equal amounts of happiness3 for there seems to be no justice in making ,a happier than ,b1 merely because circumstances beyond his own control have first made him better4 ,but why should we not1 instead of #8all men1' say #8all sentient beings'8 for why should men have more happiness than any other animal8 ,but thus the pursuit of ideal justice seems to conduct us to such a precipice of paradox that ,common ,sense is likely to abandon it4 ,at any rate the ordinary idea of ,desert has thus altogether vanished4#bbc ,and thus we seem to be led to the conclusion which ,i anticipated in ,book i4 chap4 v43 that in this one department of our moral consciousness the idea of ,free ,will seems involved in a peculiar way in the moral ideas of ,common ,sense1 since if it is eliminated the important notions of ,desert or ,merit and ,justice require material modification4#bbd ,at the same time1 the difference between ,determinist and ,libertarian ,justice can hardly have any practical effect4 ,for in any case it does not seem possible to separate in practice that part of a man's achievement which is due strictly to his free choice from that part which is due to the original gift of nature and to favouring circumstances3#bbe so that we must necessarily leave to providence the realisation of what we conceive as the theoretical ideal of ,justice1 and content ourselves with trying to reward voluntary actions in proportion to the worth of the services intentionally rendered by them4 ,if1 then1 we take as the principle of ideal justice1 so far as this can be practically aimed at in human society1 the requital of voluntary services in proportion to their worth1 it remains to consider on what principle or principles the comparative worth of different services is to be rationally estimated4 ,there is no doubt that we commonly assume such an estimate to be possible2 for we continually speak of the #8fair' or #8proper' price of any kind of services as something generally known1 and condemn the demand for more than this as extortionate4 ,it may be said that the notion of ,fairness or ,equity which we ordinarily apply in such judgments is to be distinguished from that of ,justice2 ,equity being in fact often contrasted with strict ,justice1 and conceived as capable of coming into collision with it4 ,and this is partly true3 but ,i think the wider and no less usual sense of the term ,justice1 in which it includes ,equity or ,fairness1 is the only one that can be conveniently adopted in an ethical treatise3 for in any case where ,equity comes into conflict with strict justice1 its dictates are held to be in a higher sense just1 and what ought to be ultimately carried into effect in the case considered--though not1 perhaps1 by the administrators of law4 ,i treat ,equity1 therefore1 as a species of ,justice2 though noting that the former term is more ordinarily used in cases where the definiteness attainable is recognised as somewhat less than in ordinary cases of rightful claims arising out of law or contract4 ,on what principle1 then1 can we determine the 8fair0 or 8equitable0 price of services8 ,when we examine the common judgments of practical persons in which this judgment occurs1 we find1 ,i think1 that the #8fair' in such cases is ascertained by a reference to analogy and custom1 and that any service is considered to be #8fairly worth' what is usually given for services of the kind4 ,hence this element of the notion of ,justice may seem1 after all1 to resolve itself into that discussed in #b3 and in some states of society it certainly appears that the payment to be given for services is as completely fixed by usage as any other customary duty1 so that it would be a clear disappointment of normal expectation to deviate from this usage4 ,but probably no one in a modern civilised community would maintain in its full breadth this identification of the ,just with the ,usual price of services3 and so far as the judgments of practical persons may seem to imply this1 ,i think it must be admitted that they are superficial or merely inadvertent1 and ignore the established mode of determining the market prices of commodities by free competition of producers and traders4 ,for where such competition operates the market value rises and falls1 and is different at different places and times2 so that no properly instructed person can expect any fixity in it1 or complain of injustice merely on account of the variations in it4 ,can we then say that #8market value' 7as determined by free competition7 corresponds to our notion of what is ideally just8 ,this is a question of much interest1 because this is obviously the mode of determining the remuneration of services that would be universal in a society constructed on the principle previously discussed1 of securing the greatest possible ,freedom to all members of the community4 ,it should be observed that this1 which we may call the ,individualistic ,ideal1 is the type to which modern civilised communities have1 until lately1 been tending to approximate3 and it is therefore very important to know whether it is one which completely satisfies the demands of morality2 and whether ,freedom1 if not an absolute end or ,first ,principle of abstract ,justice1 is still to be sought as the best means to the realisation of a just social order by the general requital of ,desert4 ,at first sight it seems plausible to urge that the #8market value' represents the estimate set upon anything by mankind generally1 and therefore gives us exactly that #8common sense' judgment respecting value which we are now trying to find4 ,but on examination it seems likely that the majority of men are not properly qualified to decide on the value of many important kinds of services1 from imperfect knowledge of their nature and effects2 so that1 as far as these are concerned1 the true judgment will not be represented in the market-place4 ,even in the case of things which a man is generally able to estimate1 it may be manifest in a particular case that he is ignorant of the real utility of what he exchanges2 and in this case the #8free' contract hardly seems to be fair3 though if the ignorance was not caused by the other party to the exchange1 ,common ,sense is hardly prepared to condemn the latter as unjust for taking advantage of it4 ,for instance1 if a man has discovered by a legitimate use of geological knowledge and skill that there is probably a valuable mine on land owned by a stranger1 reasonable persons would not blame him for concealing his discovery until he had bought the mine at its market value3 yet it could not be said that the seller got what it was really worth4 ,in fact ,common ,sense is rather perplexed on this point3 and the rationale of the conclusion at which it arrives1 must1 ,i conceive1 be sought in economic considerations1 which take us quite beyond the analysis of the common notion of ,justice4#bbf ,again1 there are social services recognised as highly important which generally speaking have no price in any market1 on account of the indirectness and uncertainty of their practical utility3 as1 for instance1 scientific discoveries4 ,the extent to which any given discovery will aid industrial invention is so uncertain1 that even if the secret of it could be conveniently kept1 it would not usually be profitable to buy it4 ,but even if we confine our attention to products and services generally marketable1 and to bargains thoroughly understood on both sides1 there are still serious difficulties in the way of identifying the notions of #8free' and #8fair' exchange4 ,thus1 where an individual1 or combination of individuals1 has the monopoly of a certain kind of services1 the market-price of the aggregate of such services can under certain conditions be increased by diminishing their total amount2 but it would seem absurd to say that the social ,desert of those rendering the services is thereby increased1 and a plain man has grave doubts whether the price thus attained is fair4 ,still less is it thought fair to take advantage of the transient monopoly produced by emergency3 thus1 if ,i saw ,crsus drowning and no one near1 it would not be held fair in me to refuse to save him except at the price of half his wealth4 ,but if so1 can it be fair for any class of persons to gain competitively by the unfavourable economic situation of another class with which they deal8 ,and if we admit that it would be unfair1 where are we to draw the line8 ,for any increase of the numbers of a class renders its situation for bargaining less favourable3 since the market price of different services depends partly upon the ease or difficulty of procuring them--as ,political ,economists say1 #8on the relation between the supply of services and the demand for them'--and it does not seem that any individual's social ,desert can properly be lessened merely by the increased number or willingness of others rendering the same services4 ,nor1 indeed1 does it seem that it can be decreased by his own willingness1 for it is strange to reward a man less because he is zealous and eager in the performance of his function2 yet in bargaining the less willing always has the advantage4 ,and1 finally1 it hardly appears that the social worth of a man's service is necessarily increased by the fact that his service is rendered to those who can pay lavishly2 but his reward is certainly likely to be greater from this cause4 ,such considerations as these have led some political thinkers to hold that ,justice requires a mode of distributing payment for services1 entirely different from that at present effected by free competition3 and that all labourers ought to be paid according to the intrinsic value of their labour as estimated by enlightened and competent judges4 ,if the ,socialistic ,ideal--as we may perhaps call it--could be realised without counter-balancing evils1 it would certainly seem to give a nearer approximation to what we conceive as ,divine ,justice than the present state of society affords4 ,but this supposes that we have found the rational method of determining value3 which1 however1 is still to seek4 ,shall we say that these judges are to take the value of a service as proportionate to the amount of happiness produced by it8 ,if so1 the calculation is1 of course1 exposed to all the difficulties of the hedonistic method discussed in ,book ii43 but supposing these can be overcome1 it is still hard to say how we are to compare the value of different services that must necessarily be combined to produce happy life4 ,for example1 how shall we compare the respective values of necessaries and luxuries8 for we may be more sensible of the enjoyment derived from the latter1 but we could not have this at all without the former4 ,and1 again1 when different kinds of labour co-operate in the same production1 how are we to estimate their relative values8 for even if all mere unskilled labour may be brought to a common standard1 this seems almost impossible in the case of different kinds of skill4 ,for how shall we compare the labour of design with that of achievement8 or the supervision of the whole with the execution of details8 or the labour of actually producing with that of educating producers8 or the service of the savant who discovers a new principle1 with that of the inventor who applies it8 ,i do not see how these questions1 or the difficulties noticed in the preceding paragraph1 can be met by any analysis of our common notion of ,justice4 ,to deal with such points at all satisfactorily we have1 ,i conceive1 to adopt quite a different line of reasoning3 we have to ask1 not what services of a certain kind are intrinsically worth1 but what reward can procure them and whether the rest of society gain by the services more than the equivalent reward4 ,we have1 in short1 to give up as impracticable the construction of an ideally just social order1#bbg in which all services are rewarded in exact proportion to their intrinsic value4 ,and1 for similar reasons1 we seem forced to conclude1 more generally1 that it is impossible to obtain clear premises for a reasoned method of determining exactly different amounts of ,good ,desert4 ,indeed1 perhaps1 ,common ,sense scarcely holds such a method to be possible3 for though it considers ,ideal ,justice to consist in rewarding ,desert1 it regards as ,utopian any general attempt to realise this ideal in the social distribution of the means of happiness4 ,in the actual state of society it is only within a very limited range that any endeavour is made to reward ,good ,desert4 ,parents attempt this to some extent in dealing with their children1 and the ,state in rewarding remarkable public services rendered by statesmen1 soldiers1 etc43 but reflection on these cases will show how very rough and imperfect are the standards used in deciding the amount due4 ,and ordinarily the only kind of ,justice which we try to realise is that which consists in the fulfilment of contracts and definite expectations2 leaving the general fairness of ,distribution by ,bargaining to take care of itself4 #g4 ,when we pass to consider the case of ,criminal ,justice1 we find1 in the first place1 difficulties corresponding to those which we have already noticed4 ,we find1 to begin1 a similar implication and partial confusion of the ideas of ,law and ,justice4 ,for1 as was said1 by #8bringing a man to ,justice' we commonly mean #8inflicting legal punishment' on him3 and we think it right that neither more nor less than the penalty prescribed by law should be executed1 even though we may regard the legal scale of punishment as unjust4 ,at the same time1 we have no such perplexity in respect of changes in the law as occurs in the case of ,civil ,justice2 for we do not think that a man can acquire1 by custom1 prescriptive rights to over-lenient punishment1 as he is thought to do to an unequal distribution of liberties and privileges4 ,if now we investigate the ideal of ,criminal ,justice1 as intuitively determined1 we certainly find that in so far as punishment is not regarded as merely preventive1#bbh it is commonly thought that it ought to be proportioned to the gravity of crime4#bbi ,still1 when we endeavour to make the method of apportionment perfectly rational and precise1 the difficulties seem at least as great as in the case of ,good ,desert4 ,for1 first1 the assumption of ,free ,will seems necessarily to come in here also2 since if a man's bad deeds are entirely caused by nature and circumstances1 it certainly appears1 as ,robert ,owen urged1 that he does not properly deserve to be punished for them2 ,justice would rather seem to require us to try to alter the conditions under which he acts4 ,and we actually do punish deliberate offences more than impulsive1 perhaps as implying a more free choice of evil4 ,again1 we think that offences committed by persons who have had no moral training1 or a perverted training1 are really less criminal2 at the same time it is commonly agreed that men can hardly remit punishment on this account4 ,again the gravity--from a moral point of view--of a crime seems to be at least much reduced1 if the motive be laudable1 as when a man kills a villain whose crimes elude legal punishment1 or heads a hopeless rebellion for the good of his country3 still it would be paradoxical to affirm that we ought to reduce punishment proportionally3 ,common ,sense would hold that--whatever ,god may do--men must1 generally speaking1 inflict severe punishment for any gravely mischievous act forbidden by law which has been intentionally done1 even though it may have been prompted by a good motive4 ,but even if we neglect the motive1 and take the intention only into account1 it is not easy to state clear principles for determining the gravity of crimes4 ,for sometimes1 as in the case of the patriotic rebel1 the intention of the criminal is to do what is right and good3 and in many cases1 though he knows that he is doing wrong1 he does not intend to cause any actual harm to any sentient being2 as when a thief takes what he thinks will not be missed4 ,again1 we do not commonly think that a crime is rendered less grave by being kept perfectly secret2 and yet a great part of the harm done by a crime is the #8secondary evil' 7as ,bentham calls it7 of the alarm and insecurity which it causes2 and this part is cut off by complete secrecy4 ,it may be replied that this latter difficulty is not a practical one2 because we are not called upon to punish a crime until it has been discovered1 and then the secondary evil has been caused1 and is all the greater because of the previous secrecy4 ,but it remains true that it was not designed for discovery2 and therefore that this part of the evil caused by the crime was not intended by the criminal4 ,and if we say that the heinousness of the crime depends on the loss of happiness that would generally be caused by such acts if they were allowed to go unpunished1 and that we must suppose the criminal to be aware of this2 we seem to be endeavouring to force a utilitarian theory into an intuitional form by means of a legal fiction4 ,we have hitherto spoken of intentional wrong-doing3 but positive law awards punishment also for harm that is due to rashness or negligence2 and the justification of this involves us in further difficulties4 ,some jurists seem to regard rashness and negligence as positive states of mind1 in which the agent consciously refuses the attention or reflection which he knows he ought to give2 and no doubt this sort of wilful recklessness does sometimes occur1 and seems as properly punishable as if the resulting harm had been positively intended4 ,but the law as actually administered does not require evidence that this was the agent's state of mind 7which indeed in most cases it would be impossible to give73 but is content with proof that the harm might have been prevented by such care as an average man would have shown under the circumstances4 ,and most commonly by #8carelessness' we simply mean a purely negative psychological fact1 i4e4 that the agent did not perform certain processes of observation or reflection2 it is therefore at the time strictly involuntary1 and so scarcely seems to involve ill-desert4 ,it may be said perhaps that though the present carelessness is not blameworthy1 the past neglect to cultivate habits of care is so4 ,but in many individual instances we cannot reasonably infer even this past neglect2 and in such cases the utilitarian theory of punishment1 which regards it as a means of preventing similar harmful acts in the future1 seems alone applicable4 ,similar difficulties arise1 as was before hinted 7p4 #bhb71 in determining the limits within which ,reparation is due2 that is1 on the view that it is not incumbent on us to make compensation for all harm caused by our muscular actions1 but only for harm which--if not intentional--was due to our rashness or negligence4 ,the results of this examination of ,justice may be summed up as follows4 ,the prominent element in ,justice as ordinarily conceived is a kind of ,equality3 that is1 ,impartiality in the observance or enforcement of certain general rules allotting good or evil to individuals4 ,but when we have clearly distinguished this element1 we see that the definition of the virtue required for practical guidance is left obviously incomplete4 ,inquiring further for the right general principles of distribution1 we find that our common notion of ,justice includes--besides the principle of ,reparation for injury--two quite distinct and divergent elements4 ,the one1 which we may call ,conservative ,justice1 is realised 7#a7 in the observance of ,law and ,contracts and definite understandings1 and in the enforcement of such penalties for the violation of these as have been legally determined and announced2 and 7#b7 in the fulfilment of natural and normal expectations4 ,this latter obligation1 however1 is of a somewhat indefinite kind4 ,but the other element1 which we have called ,ideal ,justice1 is still more difficult to define2 for there seem to be two quite distinct conceptions of it1 embodied respectively in what we have called the ,individualistic and the ,socialistic ,ideals of a political community4 ,the first of these takes the realisation of ,freedom as the ultimate end and standard of right social relations3 but on examining it closer we find that the notion of ,freedom will not give a practicable basis for social construction without certain arbitrary#bcj definitions and limitations3 and even if we admit these1 still a society in which ,freedom is realised as far as is feasible does not completely suit our sense of ,justice4 ,prima facie1 this is more satisfied by the ,socialistic ,ideal of ,distribution1 founded on the principle of requiting ,desert3 but when we try to make this principle precise1 we find ourselves again involved in grave difficulties2 and similar perplexities beset the working out of rules of ,criminal ,justice on the same principle4 ,,footnotes3 #bjd ,how far an independent principle of ,justice is required for the ,utilitarian method will be hereafter considered4 7,book iv4 chap4 i47 #bje ,aristotle1 in expounding the virtue of 1 which corresponds to our ,justice1 notices that the word has two meanings2 in the wider of which it includes in a manner all ,virtue1 or at any rate the social side or aspect of ,virtue generally4 ,the word #8,justice' does not appear to be used in ,english in this comprehensive manner 7except occasionally in religious writings1 from the influence of the ,greek word as used in the ,new ,testament73 although the verb 8to justify0 seems to have this width of meaning2 for when ,i say that one is 8justified0 in doing so and so1 ,i mean no more than that such conduct is right for him4 ,in the present discussion1 at any rate1 ,i have confined myself to the more precise signification of the term4 #bjf ,i ought to say that1 in my view1 this only applies to taxes in the narrower sense in which they are distinguished from payments for services received by individuals from ,government4 ,in the case of these latter1 ,i conceive that ,justice is rather held to lie in duly proportioning payment to amount of service received4 ,some persons have held that all payments made to ,government ought to be determined on this principle3 and this view seems to me to be consistent with the individualistic ideal of political order1 which ,i shall presently examine3 but1 as ,i have elsewhere tried to show 7,princ4 of ,pol4 ,econ4 ,book iii4 chap4 viii471 there is an important department of ,governmental expenditure to which this principle is not applicable4 #bjg ,it may be well to notice a case in which the very equality of application1 which is1 as has been said1 implied in the mere idea of a law couched in general terms1 is felt to be unjust4 ,this is the case where the words of a statute1 either from being carelessly drawn1 or on account of the inevitable defects of even the most precise terminology1 include 7or exclude7 persons and circumstances which are clearly not included in 7or excluded from7 the real intent and purpose of the law4 ,in this case a particular decision1 strictly in accordance with a law which generally considered is just1 may cause extreme injustice3 and so the difference between actual ,law and ,justice is sharply brought out4 ,still we cannot in this way obtain principles for judging generally of the justice of laws4 #bjh ,it should be observed that we cannot even say1 in treating of the private conduct of individuals1 that all arbitrary inequality is recognised as unjust3 it would not be commonly thought unjust in a rich bachelor with no near relatives to leave the bulk of his property in providing pensions exclusively for indigent red-haired men1 however unreasonable and capricious the choice might appear4 #bji ,it may be observed that sometimes claims generated in this way have legal validity2 as when a right of way is established without express permission of the landowner1 merely by his continued indulgence4 #baj ,this is the case even1 as ,i say1 when laws are altered lawfully3 still more after any exceptional crisis at which there has occurred a rupture of political order3 for then the legal claims arising out of the new order which is thus rooted in disorder conflict with those previously established in a manner which admits of no theoretical solution3 it can only be settled by a rough practical compromise4 ,see next chapter1 #c4 #baa ,book i4 chap4 vi4 #b4 #bab ,it is characteristic of an unprogressive society that in it these two points of view are indistinguishable2 the ,jural ,ideal absolutely coincides with the ,customary1 and social perfection is imagined to consist in the perfect observance of a traditional system of rules4 #bac ,this question1 how far the conception of ,freedom involves unlimited right to limit ,freedom by free contract1 will meet us again in the next chapter1 when we consider the general duty of obedience to ,law4 #bad ,it has often been urged as a justification for expropriating savages from the land of new colonies that tribes of hunters have really no moral right to property in the soil over which they hunt4 #bae ,this is the argument used by optimistic political economists such as ,bastiat4 #baf ,the further consideration of ,political ,freedom1 with which we shall be occupied in the next chapter1 will afford additional illustrations of the difficulties involved in the notion4 #bag ,if the view given in the text be sound1 it illustrates very strikingly the difference between natural instincts and moral intuitions4 ,for the impulse to requite a service is1 on its emotional side1 quite different from that which prompts us to claim the fruits of our labour1 or 8a fair day's wages for a fair day's work40 ,still1 our apprehension of the duty of ,gratitude seems capable of being subsumed under the more general intuition #8that desert ought to be requited4' #bah ,it certainly requires a considerable strain to bring the #8right of ,first ,discovery' under the notion of #8right to the produce of one's labour4' ,hence ,locke and others have found it necessary to suppose1 as the ultimate justification of the former right1 #8a tacit consent' of mankind in general that all things previously unappropriated shall belong to the first appropriator4 ,but this must be admitted to be a rather desperate device of ethico-political construction3 on account of the fatal facility with which it may be used to justify almost any arbitrariness in positive law4 #bai ,the reader will find an interesting illustration of the perplexity of ,common ,sense on this point in ,mr4 ,o4 ,w4 ,holmes1 ,junior's1 book on ,the ,common ,law1 chap4 iii41 where the author gives a penetrating discussion of the struggle1 in the development of the doctrine of torts in ,english ,law1 between two opposing views3 7#a7 that 8the risk of a man's conduct is thrown upon him as the result of some moral short-coming10 and 7#b7 that 8a man acts at his peril always1 and wholly irrespective of the state of his consciousness upon the matter40 ,the former is the view that has in the main prevailed in ,english ,law2 and this seems to me certainly in harmony with the ,common ,sense of mankind1 so far as legal liability is concerned2 but ,i do not think that the case is equally clear as regards moral obligation4 #bbj ,cf4 post1 pp4 #bib-c4 ,it may be added that there is often a further difficulty in ascertaining the amount of compensation due3 for this frequently involves a comparison of things essentially disparate1 and there are some kinds of harm which it seems impossible to compensate4 #bba ,in the earlier stage of moral development1 referred to in the preceding paragraph1 retribution inflicted on the wrongdoer was regarded as the normal mode of reparation to the person injured4 ,but this view is contrary to the moral ,common ,sense of ,christian ,societies4 #bbb ,i think the term 8merit0 often blends the two notions1 as when we speak of 8promotion by merit40 ,by moralists1 however1 8merit0 is generally used as exactly equivalent to what ,i have called 8desert40 #bbc ,the only tenable ,determinist interpretation of ,desert is1 in my opinion1 the ,utilitarian3 according to which1 when a man is said to deserve reward for any services to society1 the meaning is that it is expedient to reward him1 in order that he and others may be induced to render similar services by the expectation of similar rewards4 ,cf4 post1 ,book iv4 chap4 iii4 #d4 #bbd ,perhaps we may partly attribute to the difficulties above discussed1 that the notion of ,desert has sometimes dropped out of the ideal of ,utopian reconstructors of society1 and #8,equality of ,happiness' has seemed to be the only end4 ,justice1 it has been thought1 prescribes simply that each should have an equal share of happiness1 as far as happiness depends on the action of others4 ,but there seems to be much difficulty in working this out3 for 7apart from the considerations of ,fitness above mentioned7 equal happiness is not to be attained by equal distribution of objects of desire4 ,for some require more and some less to be equally happy4 ,hence1 it seems1 we must take differences of needs into consideration4 ,but if merely mental needs are included 7as seems reasonable7 we should have to give less to cheerful1 contented1 self-sacrificing people than to those who are naturally moody and exigeant1 as the former can be made happy with less4 ,and this is too paradoxical to recommend itself to ,common ,sense4 #bbe ,no doubt1 it would be possible to remove1 to some extent1 the inequalities that are attributable to circumstances1 by bringing the best education within the reach of all classes1 so that all children might have an equal opportunity of being selected and trained for any functions for which they seemed to be fit3 and this seems to be prescribed by ideal justice1 in so far as it removes or mitigates arbitrary inequality4 ,accordingly in those ideal reconstructions of society1 in which we may expect to find men's notions of abstract justice exhibited1 such an institution as this has generally found a place4 ,still1 there will be much natural inequality which we cannot remove or even estimate4 #bbf ,cf4 post1 ,book iv4 chap4 iii4 #d4 #bbg ,it is not perhaps necessary that ,i should here enlarge on the practical obstacles in the way of any attempt to realise such an ideal system4 #bbh ,i have already expressed my opinion that this ,utilitarian view of punishment is gradually tending to prevail2 but ,i do not think that it has yet prevailed4 #bbi ,of course those who hold that the essence of ,justice consists in securing external ,freedom among the members of a community1 and that punishment is only justified as a means to this end1 naturally think that in awarding punishment we ought to consider merely its efficacy as such means4 ,but this can scarcely be put forward as an interpretation of the common notion of ,just ,punishment4 #bcj ,by #8arbitrary' ,i mean such definitions and limitations as destroy the self-evidence of the principle2 and1 when closely examined1 lead us to regard it as subordinate4 ,,chapter ,,vi ,,laws ,,and ,,promises #a4 ,in the discussion of ,justice the moral obligations of obedience to ,law and observance of ,contract have been included1 and have1 indeed1 appeared to be the most definite part of the complex system of private duties commonly included under that term4 ,at the same time1 as we have seen1 there are some laws1 the violation of which does not interfere with the rights of others1 and therefore has not the characteristics of an act of ,injustice4 ,while again1 the duty of ,fidelity to promises is also commonly conceived as independent of any injury that might be done to the promisee by breaking it3 for 7e4g47 men ordinarily judge that promises to the dead1 though they are beyond the reach of injury1 ought to be kept3 indeed1 some would regard them as even more sacred than promises made to the living4 ,it seems therefore desirable to examine the propositions #8that ,law ought to be obeyed' and #8that promises ought to be kept1' considered as independent principles4 ,to begin with the former3 how are we to ascertain what the ,law is which1 as is commonly thought1 we are morally bound to obey1 as such8 ,it is plain that we cannot here distinguish ,legal from other rules by considering the sanctions actually attached to them1 as we had occasion to do in a previous chapter4#bca ,for commands issued by rebels and usurpers are held to have as such no general bindingness1 though they may be enforced by judicial penalties2 it would be generally agreed that so far as it is our duty to obey such commands this is solely in order to avoid the greater evils which might result to ourselves and others from our disobedience2 and that the extent of such a duty must be determined by considerations of expediency4 ,nor1 again1 can we say that all commands even of a legitimate sovereign are to be regarded as ,laws in the sense in which the term must be taken in the proposition that #8laws ought to be obeyed'3 since we all recognise that a rightful sovereign may command his subjects to do what is wrong1 and that it is then their duty to disobey him4 ,it seems therefore that for our present purpose we must define ,laws to be ,rules of ,conduct laid down by a ,rightful ,authority1 commanding within the limits of its authority4 ,there are therefore two questions to be settled1 if the proposition that laws ought to be obeyed is to furnish practical guidance3 7#a7 how we are to distinguish the ,rightful ,lawmaker--whether individual or body1 and 7#b7 how we are to ascertain the limits of this lawmaker's authority4 ,the questions should be distinguished2 but1 as we shall see1 they can only be partially separated4 ,beginning with the first question1 we may assume that the authority to make laws resides in some living man or men4 ,no doubt in some societies1 at some stages of their development1 the whole or a part of the code of laws habitually observed1 or at least recognised as binding1 has been believed to be of divine or semi-divine institution2 or perhaps from mere antiquity to possess a sanctity superior to that of any living authority1 so as to be not legitimately alterable4 ,but we hardly find this view in the ,common ,sense of civilised ,europe1 upon which we are now reflecting3 at any rate in our societies there is not thought to be any portion of the definite prescriptions of positive law which1 in virtue of its origin1 is beyond the reach of alteration by any living authority4 ,where then is this authority to be found8 ,in the answers commonly given to this question1 the conflict between the ,ideal and the ,traditional or ,customary1 which has perplexed us in seeking the definition of ,justice1 meets us again in an even more complicated form4 ,for not only do some say that obedience is always due to the traditionally legitimate authority in any country1 while others maintain that an authority constituted in accordance with certain abstract principles is essentially legitimate1 and that a nation has a right to claim that such an authority shall be established1 even at the risk of civil strife and bloodshed3 but often1 too1 the authority actually established is not even traditionally legitimate4 ,so that we have to distinguish three claims to authority1 each of which may come into conflict with either of the other two3 7#a7 that of the ,government held to be ideally or abstractly right1 and such as ought to be established3 7#b7 that of the ,government de jure1 according to the constitutional traditions in any given country3 and 7#c7 that of the de facto ,government4 #b4 ,let us begin by considering the ,ideal4 ,here ,i do not propose to consider all views as to the right constitution of supreme authority which speculative thinkers have put forward2 but only such as have a prima facie claim to express the ,common ,sense of mankind on the subject4 ,of these the most important1 and the most widely urged and admitted1 is the principle that the ,sovereign in any community can only be rightly constituted by the ,consent of the ,subjects4 ,this1 as was noticed in the preceding chapter1 is involved in the adoption of ,freedom as the ultimate end of political order3 if no one originally owes anything to another except non-interference1 he clearly ought only to be placed in the relation of ,subject to ,sovereign by his own consent4 ,and thus1 in order to reconcile the original right of ,freedom with the actual duty of ,law-observance1 some supposition of a social compact appears necessary2 by means of which ,obedience to ,law becomes merely a special application of the duty of keeping compacts4 ,in what way1 then1 are the terms of this fundamental compact to be known8 ,no one now maintains the old view that the transition from the #8natural' to the #8political' state actually took place by means of an 8original contract10 which conferred indelible legitimacy on some particular form of social organisation4 ,shall we say1 then1 that a man by remaining a member of a community enters into a #8tacit undertaking' to obey the laws and other commands imposed by the authority generally recognised as lawful in that community8 ,in this way however the ,ideal lapses into the ,customary3 and the most unlimited despotism1 if established and traditional1 might claim to rest on free consent as well as any other form of government3 so that the principle of abstract ,freedom would lead to the justification of the most unqualified concrete tyranny and servitude2 and thus our theory would end by riveting men's chains under pretence of exalting their freedom4 ,if to avoid this result1 we suppose that certain #8,natural ,rights' are inalienable--or tacitly reserved in the tacit compact--and that laws are not strictly legitimate which deprive a man of these1 we are again met by the difficulty of deducing these inalienable rights from any clear and generally accepted principles4 ,for instance1 as we have seen1 a widely accepted opinion is that all such rights may be summed up in the notion of ,freedom2 but we have also seen that this principle is ambiguous1 and especially that the right of private property as commonly recognised cannot be clearly deduced from it2 and if so it would certainly be most paradoxical to maintain that no government can legitimately claim obedience for any commands except such as carry out the principle of protecting from interference the ,freedom of the individuals governed4 ,it has been thought that we can avoid this difficulty by constituting the supreme organ of government so that any law laid down by it will always be a law to which every person called on to obey it will have consented personally or by his representatives3 and that a government so constituted1 in which--to adopt ,rousseau's phrase--every one 8obeys himself alone10 will completely reconcile freedom and order4 ,but how is this result to be attained8 ,rousseau held that it could be attained by pure direct democracy1 each individual subordinating his private will to the 8general will0 of the sovereign people of which all are equally members4 ,but this 8general will0 must be practically the will of the majority3 and it is paradoxical to affirm that the freedom and natural rights of a dissentient minority are effectively protected by establishing the condition that the oppressors must exceed the oppressed in number4 ,again1 if the principle be absolute it ought to apply to all human beings alike3 and if to avoid this absurdity we exclude children1 an arbitrary line has to be drawn3 and the exclusion of women1 which even those who regard the suffrage as a natural right are often disposed to maintain1 seems altogether indefensible4 ,and to suppose--as some have done--that the ideal of 8obeying oneself alone0 can be even approximately realised by ,representative ,democracy1 is even more patently absurd4 ,for a ,representative assembly is normally chosen only by a part of the nation1 and each law is approved only by a part of the assembly3 and it would be ridiculous to say that a man has assented to a law passed by a mere majority of an assembly against one member of which he has voted4 ,but1 again1 to lay down absolutely that the laws of any community ought to express the will of the majority of its members seems incompatible with the view so vigorously maintained by ,socrates and his most famous disciples1 that laws ought to be made by people who understand law-making4 ,for though the majority of a representative assembly in a particular country at a particular time may be more fit to make laws for their country than any set of experts otherwise selected1 it is certainly not self-evident that this will be universally the case4 ,yet surely the ,socratic proposition 7which is merely a special application of the principle noticed in the latter part of the preceding chapter1 #8that function should be allotted to the fittest'7 has as much claim to be considered a primary intuition as the one that we have been discussing4 ,indeed1 the secular controversy between ,aristocracy and ,democracy seems ultimately reducible to a conflict between those two principles3 a conflict of which it is impossible to find a solution1 so long as the argument remains in the a priori region4 #c4 ,however1 to discuss this exhaustively would carry us too far beyond the range of ,ethics proper3 but we may perhaps conclude that it is impossible to elicit from ,common ,sense any clear and certain intuitions as to the principles on which an ideal constitution should be constructed4 ,and there is an equal want of agreement as to the intrinsic lawfulness of introducing such a constitution in violation of the traditional and established order in any community4 ,for some think that a nation has a natural right to a government approximately conformed to the ideal1 and that this right may be maintained by force in the last resort4 ,others1 however1 hold that1 though the ideal polity may rightly be put forward and commended1 and every means used to promote its realisation which the established government in any country permits1--still1 rebellion can never be justifiable for this purpose alone4 ,while others1--perhaps the majority1--would decide the question on grounds of expediency1 balancing the advantages of improvement against the evils of disorder4 ,but further1 as we saw1 it is not so easy to say what the established government is4 ,for sometimes an authority declared by law to be illegitimate issues ordinances and controls the administration of justice4 ,the question then arises1 how far obedience is due to such an authority4 ,all are agreed that usurpation ought to be resisted2 but as to the right behaviour towards an established government which has sprung from a successful usurpation1 there is a great difference of opinion4 ,some think that it should be regarded as legitimate1 as soon as it is firmly established3 others that it ought to be obeyed at once1 but under protest1 with the purpose of renewing the conflict on a favourable opportunity3 others think that this latter is the right attitude at first1 but that a usurping government1 when firmly established1 loses its illegitimacy gradually1 and that it becomes1 after a while1 as criminal to rebel against it as it was originally to establish it4 ,and this last seems1 on the whole1 the view of ,common ,sense2 but the point at which the metamorphosis is thought to take place can hardly be determined otherwise than by considerations of expediency4 ,but again1 it is only in the case of an absolute government1 where customary obedience is unconditionally due to one or more persons1 that the fundamental difficulties of ascertaining the legitimacy of authority are of the simple kind just discussed4 ,in a constitutionally governed state numerous other moral disagreements arise4 ,for1 in such a state1 while it is of course held that the sovereign is morally bound to conform to the constitution1#bcb it is still disputed whether the subjects' obligation to obedience is properly conceived as conditional upon this conformity3 and whether they have the moral right 7#a7 to refuse obedience to an unconstitutional command2 and 7#b7 even to inflict on the sovereign the penalty of rebellion for violating the constitution4 ,again1 in determining what the constitutional obligations really are we find much perplexity and disagreement1 not merely as to the exact ascertainment of the relevant historical facts but as to the principles on which these facts ought to be treated4 ,for the various limitations of sovereign authority comprised in the constitution have often been originally concessions extorted by fear from a sovereign previously absolute2 and it is doubted how far such concessions are morally binding on the sovereign from whom they were wrested1 and still more how far they are binding on succeeding sovereigns4 ,or1 vice vers1 a people may have allowed liberties once exercised to fall into disuse2 and it is doubted whether it retains the right of reclaiming them4 ,and1 generally1 when a constitutional rule has to be elicited from a comparison of precedents1 it is open to dispute whether a particular act of either party should be regarded as a constitutive precedent or as an illegitimate encroachment4 ,and hence we find that1 in constitutional countries1 men's view of what their constitution traditionally is has often been greatly influenced by their view of what it ideally ought to be3 in fact1 the two questions have rarely been kept quite distinct4 #d4 ,but even in cases where we can ascertain clearly to what authority obedience is properly due1 further difficulties are liable to arise when we attempt to define the limits of such obedience4 ,for in modern society1 as we have seen1 all admit that any authority ought to be disobeyed which commands immoral acts2 but this is one of those tautological propositions1 so common in popular morality1 which convey no real information2 the question is1 what acts there are which do not cease to be immoral when they have been commanded by a rightful authority4 ,there seems to be no clear principle upon which these can be determined4 ,it has sometimes been said that the ,law cannot override definite duties2 but the obligation of fidelity to contract is peculiarly definite1 and yet we do not consider it right to fulfil a contract of which a law1 passed subsequently to the making of the contract1 has forbidden the execution4 ,and1 in fact1 we do not find any practical agreement on this question1 among persons who would not consciously accept the utilitarian method of deciding it by a balance of conflicting expediences4 ,for some would say that the duties of the domestic relations must yield to the duty of law-observance1 and that 7e4g47 a son ought not to aid a parent actively or passively in escaping the punishment of crime3 while others would consider this rule too inhuman to be laid down1 and others would draw the line between assistance and connivance4 ,and similarly1 when a rightly constituted government commands acts unjust and oppressive to others2 ,common ,sense recoils from saying either that all such commands ought to be obeyed or that all ought to be disobeyed2 but--apart from utilitarian considerations--,i can find no clear accepted principle for distinguishing those unjust commands of a legitimate government which ought to be obeyed from those which ought not to be obeyed4 ,again1 some jurists hold that we are not strictly bound to obey laws1 when they command what is not otherwise a duty1 or forbid what is not otherwise a sin2 on the ground that in the case of duties prescribed only by positive laws1 the alternatives of obeying or submitting to the penalty are morally open to us4#bcc ,others1 however1 think this principle too lax2 and certainly if a widespread preference of penalty to obedience were shown in the case of any particular law1 the legislation in question would be thought to have failed4 ,nor1 on the other hand1 does there seem to be any agreement as to whether one is bound to submit to unjust penalties4 ,since1 then1 on all these points there is found to be so much difference of opinion1 it seems idle to maintain that there is any clear and precise axiom or first principle of ,order1 intuitively seen to be true by the common reason and conscience of mankind4 ,there is1 no doubt1 a vague general habit of obedience to laws as such 7even if bad laws71 which may fairly claim the universal consensus of civilised society3 but when we try to state any explicit principle corresponding to this general habit1 the consensus seems to abandon us1 and we are inevitably drawn into controversies which seem to admit of no solution except that offered by the utilitarian method4#bcd #e4 ,we have next to treat of ,good ,faith1 or ,fidelity to ,promises2 which it is natural to consider in this place1 because1 as has been seen1 the ,duty of ,law-observance has by some thinkers been based upon a prior duty of fulfilling a contract4 ,the ,social ,contract however1 as above examined1 seems at best merely a convenient fiction1 a logical artifice1 by which the mutual jural relations of the members of a civilised community may be neatly expressed3 and in stating the ethical principles of ,common ,sense1 such a fiction would seem to be out of place4 ,it must1 however1 be allowed that there has frequently been a close historical connection between the ,duty of ,law-observance and the duty of ,good ,faith4 ,in the first place1 a considerable amount of ,constitutional ,law at least1 in certain ages and countries1 has been established or confirmed by compacts expressly made between different sections of the community2 who agree that for the future government shall be carried on according to certain rules4 ,the duty of observing these rules thus presents itself as a ,duty of ,fidelity to compact4 ,yet more is this the case1 when the question is one of imposing not a law1 but a law-giver2 whose authority is strengthened by the exaction of an oath of allegiance from his subjects generally or a representative portion of them4 ,still1 even in such cases1 it can only be by a palpable fiction that the mass of the citizens can be regarded as bound by an engagement which only a few of them have actually taken4 ,we may begin our examination of the duty of ,keeping ,promises by noticing that some moralists have classified or even identified it with ,veracity4 ,from one point of view there certainly seems to be an analogy between the two2 as we fulfil the obligations of ,veracity and ,good ,faith alike by effecting a correspondence between words and facts--in the one case by making fact correspond with statement1 and in the other by making statement correspond with fact4 ,but the analogy is obviously superficial and imperfect2 for we are not bound to make our actions correspond with our assertions generally1 but only with our promises4 ,if ,i merely assert my intention of abstaining from alcohol for a year1 and then after a week take some1 ,i am 7at worst7 ridiculed as inconsistent3 but if ,i have pledged myself to abstain1 ,i am blamed as untrustworthy4 ,thus the essential element of the ,duty of ,good ,faith seems to be not conformity to my own statement1 but to expectations that ,i have intentionally raised in others4 ,on this view1 however1 the question arises whether1 when a promise has been understood in a sense not intended by the promiser1 he is bound to satisfy expectations which he did not voluntarily create4 ,it is1 ,i think1 clear to ,common ,sense that he is so bound in some cases1 if the expectation was natural and such as most men would form under the circumstances3 but this would seem to be one of the more or less indefinite duties of ,justice1 and not properly of ,good ,faith1 as there has not been1 strictly speaking1 any promise at all4 ,the normal effect of language is to convey the speaker's meaning to the person addressed 7here the promiser's to the promisee71 and we always suppose this to have taken place when we speak of a promise4 ,if through any accident this normal effect is missed1 we may say that there is no promise1 or not a perfect promise4 ,the moral obligation1 then1 of a promise is perfectly constituted when it is understood by both parties in the same sense4 ,and by the term #8promise' we include not words only1 but all signs and even tacit understandings not expressly signified in any way1 if such clearly form a part of the engagement4 ,the promiser is bound to perform what both he and the promisee understood to be undertaken4 #f4 ,is1 then1 this obligation intuitively seen to be independent and certain8 ,it is often said to be so3 and perhaps we may say that it seems so to unreflective common sense4 ,but reflection seems at least to disclose a considerable number of qualifications of the principle2 some clear and precise1 while others are more or less indefinite4 ,in the first place1 thoughtful persons would commonly admit that the obligation of a promise is relative to the promisee1 and may be annulled by him4 ,and therefore if the promisee be dead1 or otherwise inaccessible and incapable of granting release1 there is constituted an exceptional case1 of which the solution presents some difficulty4#bce ,secondly1 a promise to do an immoral act is held not to be binding1 because the prior obligation not to do the act is paramount2 just as in law a contract to do what a man is not legally free to do1 is invalid3 otherwise one could evade any moral obligation by promising not to fulfil it1 which is clearly absurd4#bcf ,and the same principle is of course applicable to immoral omissions or forbearances to act3 here however1 a certain difficulty arises from the necessity of distinguishing between different kinds or degrees of obligatoriness in duties2 since it is clear that a promise may sometimes make it obligatory to abstain from doing what it would otherwise have been a duty to do4 ,thus it becomes my duty not to give money to a meritorious hospital if ,i have promised all ,i can spare to an undeserving friend2 though apart from the promise it might have been my duty to prefer the hospital to the friend4 ,we have1 however1 already seen the difficulty of defining the limits of strict duty in many cases3 thus 7e4g47 it might be doubted how far the promise of aid to a friend ought to override the duty of giving one's children a good education4 ,the extent1 therefore1 to which the obligation of a promise overrides prior obligations becomes practically somewhat obscure4 #g4 ,further qualifications of the duty of fidelity to promises1 the consideration of which is involved in more difficulty and dispute1 are suggested when we examine more closely the conditions under which promises are made1 and the consequences of executing them4 ,in the first place1 it is much disputed how far promises obtained by #8fraud or force' are binding4 ,as regards fraud1 if the promise was understood to be conditional on the truth of a statement which is found to be false1 it is of course not binding1 according to the principle ,i originally laid down4 ,but a promise may be made in consequence of such a fraudulent statement1 and yet made quite unconditionally4 ,even so1 if it were clearly understood that it would not have been made but for the false statement1#bcg probably most persons would regard it as not binding4 ,but the false statement may be only one consideration among others1 and it may be of any degree of weight2 and it seems doubtful whether we should feel justified in breaking a promise1 because a single fraudulent statement had been a part of the inducement to make it3 still more if there has been no explicit assertion1 but only a suggestion of what is false3 or no falsehood at all1 stated or suggested1 but only a concealment of material circumstances4 ,we may observe that certain kinds of concealment are treated as legitimate by our law3 in most contracts of sale1 for example1 the law adopts the principle of #8caveat emptor1' and does not refuse to enforce the contract because the seller did not disclose defects in the article sold1 unless by some words or acts he produced the belief that it was free from such defects4 ,still1 this does not settle the moral question how far a promise is binding if any material concealment is shown to have been used to obtain it4 ,we have also to consider the case in which an erroneous impression has not been wilfully produced1 but was either shared by the promisee or produced in some way unintentionally4 ,perhaps in this last case most would say that the bindingness of the promise is not affected1 unless it was expressly conditional4 ,but on all these points ,common ,sense seems doubtful3 and somewhat similar difficulties present themselves when we endeavour to define the obligation of promises partly obtained by some degree of illegal violence and intimidation4 #h4 ,but1 secondly1 even if a promise has been made quite freely and fairly1 circumstances may alter so much before the time comes to fulfil it1 that the effects of keeping it may be quite other than those which were foreseen when it was made4 ,in such a case probably all would agree that the promisee ought to release the promiser4 ,but if he declines to do this1 it seems difficult to decide how far the latter is bound4 ,some would say that he is in all cases3 while others would consider that a considerable alteration of circumstances removed the obligation--perhaps adding that all engagements must be understood to be taken subject to a general understanding that they are only binding if material circumstances remain substantially the same4 ,but such a principle very much impairs the theoretical definiteness of the duty4 ,this difficulty assumes a new aspect when we consider the case already noticed1 of promises made to those who are now dead or temporarily out of the reach of communications4 ,for then there is no means of obtaining release from the promise1 while at the same time its performance may be really opposed to the wishes--or what would have been the wishes--of both parties4 ,the difficulty is sometimes concealed by saying that it is our duty to carry out the #8intention' of the promise4 ,for as so used the word ,intention is1 in common parlance1 ambiguous3 it may either mean the signification which the promisee attached to the terms employed1 as distinct from any other signification which the common usage of words might admit3 or it may include ulterior consequences of the performance of the promise1 which he had in view in exacting it4 ,now we do not commonly think that the promiser is concerned with the latter4 ,he certainly has not pledged himself to aim generally at the end which the promisee has in view1 but only so far as some particular means are concerned3 and if he considers these means not conducive to the end1 he is not thereby absolved from his promise1 under ordinary circumstances4 ,but in the case supposed1 when circumstances have materially changed1 and the promise does not admit of revision1 probably most persons would say that we ought to take into consideration the ulterior wishes of the promisee1 and carry out what we sincerely think would have been his intention4 ,but the obligation thus becomes very vague3 since it is difficult to tell from a man's wishes under one set of circumstances what he would have desired under circumstances varying from these in a complex manner3 and practically this view of the obligation of a promise generally leads to great divergence of opinion4 ,hence it is not surprising that some hold that even in such a case the obligation ought to be interpreted strictly3 while others go to the other extreme1 and maintain that it ceases altogether4 ,but again1 it was said that a promise cannot abrogate a prior obligation2 and1 as a particular application of this rule1 it would be generally agreed that no promise can make it right to inflict harm on any one4 ,on further consideration1 however1 it appears doubtful how far the persons between whom the promise passed are included in the scope of this restriction4 ,for1 first1 it does not seem to be commonly held that a man is as strictly bound not to injure himself as he is to avoid harming others2 and so it is scarcely thought that a promise is not binding because it was a foolish one1 and will entail an amount of pain or burden on the promiser out of proportion to the good done to the promisee4 ,still1 if we take an extreme case1 where the sacrifice is very disproportionate to the gain1 many conscientious persons would think that the promise ought rather to be broken than kept4 ,and1 secondly1 a different question arises when we consider the possibility of injuring the promisee by fulfilling the promise4 ,for when it is said to be wrong to do harm to any one1 we do not commonly mean only what he thinks harm1 but what really is so1 though he may think it a benefit2 for it seems clearly a crime for me to give any one what ,i know to be poison1 even though he may be stubbornly convinced that it is wholesome food4 ,but now suppose that ,i have promised ,a to do something1 which1 before ,i fulfil the promise1 ,i see reason to regard as likely to injure him4 ,the circumstances may be precisely the same1 and only my view of them have changed4 ,if ,a takes a different view and calls on me to fulfil the promise1 is it right to obey him8 ,surely no one would say this in an extreme case1 such as that of the poison4 ,but if the rule does not hold for an extreme case1 where can we draw the line8 at what point ought ,i to give up my judgment to ,a1 unless my own conviction is weakened8 ,common ,sense seems to give no clear answer4 #i4 ,i have laid down that a promise is binding in so far as it is understood on both sides similarly3 and such an understanding is ordinarily attained with sufficient clearness1 as far as the apprehension of express words or signs is concerned4 ,still1 even here obscurity and misapprehension sometimes occur2 and in the case of the tacit understandings with which promises are often complicated1 a lack of definite agreement is not improbable4 ,it becomes1 therefore1 of practical importance to decide the question previously raised3 ,what duty rests on the promiser of satisfying expectations which he did not intend to create8 ,i called this a duty not so much of ,good ,faith as of ,justice1 which prescribes the fulfilment of normal expectations4 ,how then shall we determine what these are8 ,the method by which we commonly ascertain them seems to be the following4 ,we form the conception of an average or normal man1 and consider what expectations he would form under the circumstances1 inferring this from the beliefs and expectations which men generally entertain under similar circumstances4 ,we refer1 therefore1 to the customary use of language1 and customary tacit understandings current among persons in the particular relations in which promiser and promisee stand4 ,such customary interpretations and understandings are of course not obligatory upon persons entering into an engagement3 but they constitute a standard which we think we may presume to be known to all men1 and to be accepted by them1 except in so for as it is explicitly rejected4 ,if one of the parties to an engagement has deviated from this common standard without giving express notice1 we think it right that he should suffer any loss that may result from the misunderstanding4 ,this criterion then is generally applicable3 but if custom is ambiguous or shifting it cannot be applied2 and then the just claims of the parties become a problem1 the solution of which is very difficult1 if not strictly indeterminate4 ,so far we have supposed that the promiser can choose his own words1 and that if the promisee finds them ambiguous he can get them modified1 or 7what comes to the same thing7 explained1 by the promiser4 ,but we have now to observe that in the case of promises made to the community1 as a condition of obtaining some office or emolument1 a certain unalterable form of words has to be used if the promise is made at all4 ,here the difficulties of moral interpretation are much increased4 ,it may be said1 indeed1 that the promise ought to be interpreted in the sense in which its terms are understood by the community3 and1 no doubt1 if their usage is quite uniform and unambiguous1 this rule of interpretation is sufficiently obvious and simple4 ,but since words are often used in different ways by different members of the same society1 and especially with different degrees of strictness and laxity1 it often happens that a promise to the community cannot strictly be said to be understood in any one sense3 the question therefore arises1 whether the promiser is bound to keep it in the sense in which it will be most commonly interpreted1 or whether he may select any of its possible meanings4 ,and if the formula is one of some antiquity1 it is further questioned1 whether it ought to be interpreted in the sense which its words would now generally bear1 or in that which they bore when it was drawn up2 or1 if they were then ambiguous1 in the sense which appears to have been attached to them by the government that imposed the promise4 ,on all these points it is difficult to elicit any clear view from ,common ,sense4 ,and the difficulty is increased by the fact that there are usually strong inducements to make these formal engagements1 which cause even tolerably conscientious persons to take them in a strained and unnatural sense4 ,when this has been done continually by many persons1 a new general understanding grows up as to the meaning of the engagements3 sometimes they come to be regarded as #8mere forms1' or1 if they do not reach this point of degradation1 they are at least understood in a sense differing indefinitely from their original one4 ,the question then arises1 how far this process of gradual illegitimate relaxation or perversion can modify the moral obligation of the promise for a thoroughly conscientious person4 ,it seems clear that when the process is complete1 we are right in adopting the new understanding as far as ,good ,faith is concerned1 even if it palpably conflicts with the natural meaning of language2 although it is always desirable in such cases that the form of the promise should be changed to correspond with the changed substance4 ,but when1 as is ordinarily the case1 the process is incomplete1 since a portion of the community understands the engagement in the original strict sense1 the obligation becomes difficult to determine1 and the judgments of conscientious persons respecting it become divergent and perplexed4 ,to sum up the results of the discussion3 it appears that a clear consensus can only be claimed for the principle that a promise1 express or tacit1 is binding1 if a number of conditions are fulfilled3 viz4 if the promiser has a clear belief as to the sense in which it was understood by the promisee1 and if the latter is still in a position to grant release from it1 but unwilling to do so1 if it was not obtained by force or fraud1 if it does not conflict with definite prior obligations1 if we do not believe that its fulfilment will be harmful to the promisee1 or will inflict a disproportionate sacrifice on the promiser1 and if circumstances have not materially changed since it was made4 ,if any of these conditions fails1 the consensus seems to become evanescent1 and the common moral perceptions of thoughtful persons fall into obscurity and disagreement4 ,,footnotes3 #bca ,cf4 ante1 ,book ii4 chap4 v4 #b4 #bcb ,it is perhaps hardly necessary that ,i should here notice the ,hobbist doctrine1 revived in a modified form by ,austin1 that 8the power of the sovereign is incapable of legal limitation40 ,for no one now maintains pure ,hobbism3 and ,austin is as far as possible from meaning that there cannot be an express or tacit understanding between ,sovereign and ,subjects1 the violation of which by the former may make it morally right for the latter to rebel4 ,in fact1 as used by him1 ,hobbes' doctrine reduces itself to the rather unimportant proposition that a sovereign will not be punished for unconstitutional conduct through the agency of his own law-courts1 so long as he remains sovereign4 ,i may take this opportunity of observing that ,austin's definition of ,law is manifestly unsuited for our present purpose3 since a law1 in his view1 is not a command that ought to be obeyed1 but a command for the violation of which we may expect a particular kind of punishment4 #bcc ,cf4 ,blackstone1 ,introduction1 #b4 8,in relation to those laws which enjoin only positive duties1 and forbid only such things as are not mala in se1 but mala prohibita merely1 without any intermixture of moral guilt1 annexing a penalty to non-compliance1 here ,i apprehend conscience is no further concerned1 than by directing a submission to the penalty in case of our breach of those laws 444 the alternative is offered to every man1 #8either abstain from this or submit to such a penalty4'0 #bcd ,into the ethical difficulties peculiar to ,international ,law1 ,i have not thought it worth while to enter4 #bce ,vows to ,god constitute another exception3 and it is thought by many that if these are binding1 there must be some way in which ,god can be understood to grant release from them4 ,but this it is beyond my province to discuss4 #bcf ,the case is somewhat different when the act has become immoral after the promise was made3 still1 here also1 the prior duty of abstaining from it would be universally held to prevail4 #bcg ,what is here said of a #8statement' may be extended to any mode of producing a false impression4 ,,chapter ,,vii ,,the ,,classification ,,of ,,duties--,,veracity #a4 ,it may easily seem that when we have discussed ,benevolence1 ,justice1 and the observance of ,law and ,contract1 we have included in our view the whole sphere of social duty1 and that whatever other maxims we find accepted by ,common ,sense must be subordinate to the principles which we have been trying to define4 ,for whatever we owe definitely to our fellow-men1 besides the observance of special contracts1 and of positive laws1 seems--at least by a slight extension of common usage--to be naturally included under ,justice3 while the more indefinite obligations which we recognise seem to correspond to the goodwill which we think ought to exist among all members of the human family1 together with the stronger affections appropriate to special relations and circumstances4 ,and hence it may be thought that the best way of treating the subject would have been to divide ,duty generally into ,social and ,self-regarding1 and again to subdivide the former branch into the heads which ,i have discussed one by one2 afterwards adding such minor details of duty as have obtained special names and distinct recognition4 ,and this is perhaps the proper place to explain why ,i did not adopt this course4 ,the division of duties into ,social and ,self-regarding1 though obvious1 and acceptable enough as a rough prima facie classification1 does not on closer examination seem exactly appropriate to the ,intuitional ,method4 ,for these titles naturally suggest that the happiness or well-being1 of the agent or of others1 is always the end and final determinant of right action3 whereas the ,intuitional doctrine is1 that at least certain kinds of conduct are prescribed absolutely1 without reference to their ulterior consequences4 ,and if a more general meaning be given to the terms1 and by ,social duties we understand those which consist in the production of certain effects upon others1 while in the ,self-regarding we aim at producing certain effects upon ourselves1 the division is still an unsuitable one4 ,for these consequences are not clearly recognised in the enunciation of common rules of morality3 and in many cases we produce marked effects both on ourselves and on others1 and it is not easy to say which 7in the view of ,common ,sense7 are most important3 and again1 this principle of division would sometimes make it necessary to cut in two the class of duties prescribed under some common notion2 as the same rule may govern both our social and our solitary conduct4 ,take1 for example1 the acts morally prescribed under the head of ,courage4 ,it seems clear that the prominence given to this ,virtue in historic systems of morality has been due to the great social importance that must always attach to it1 so long as communities of men are continually called upon to fight for their existence and well-being3 but still the quality of bravery is the same essentially1 whether it be exhibited for selfish or social ends4 ,it is no doubt true that when we examine with a view to definition the kinds of conduct commended or prescribed in any list of ,virtues commonly recognised1 we find1 to a great extent1 that the maxims we obtain are clearly not absolute and independent3 that the quality denoted by our term is admittedly only praiseworthy in so far as it promotes individual or general welfare1 and becomes blameworthy--though remaining in other respects the same--when it operates adversely to these ends4 ,we have already noticed this result in one or two instances1 and it will be illustrated at length in the following chapters4 ,but though this is the case to a great extent1 it is1 for our present purpose1 of special importance to note the--real or apparent--exceptions to the rule2 because they are specially characteristic of the method that we call ,intuitionism4 ,one of the most important of these exceptions is ,veracity3 and the affinity in certain respects of this duty--in spite of fundamental differences--to the duty of ,good ,faith or ,fidelity to ,promises renders it convenient to examine the two in immediate succession4 ,under either head a certain correspondence between words and facts is prescribed3 and hence the questions that arise when we try to make the maxims precise are somewhat similar in both cases4 ,for example1 just as the duty of ,good ,faith did not lie in conforming our acts to the admissible meaning of certain words1#bch but to the meaning which we knew to be put on them by the promisee2 so the duty of ,truthspeaking is not to utter words which might1 according to common usage1 produce in other minds beliefs corresponding to our own1 but words which we believe will have this effect on the persons whom we address4 ,and this is usually a very simple matter1 as the natural effect of language is to convey our beliefs to other men1 and we commonly know quite well whether we are doing this or not4 ,a certain difficulty arises1 as in the case of promises1 from the use of set forms imposed either by law or by custom2 to which most of the discussion of the similar difficulty in the preceding chapter applies with obvious modifications4 ,in the case of formul imposed by law--such 7e4g47 as declarations of religious belief--it is doubtful whether we may understand the terms in any sense which they commonly bear1 or are to take them in the sense intended by the ,legislature that imposed them2 and again1 a difficulty is created by the gradual degradation or perversion of their meaning1 which results from the strong inducements offered for their general acceptance2 for thus they are continually strained and stretched until a new general understanding seems gradually to grow up as to the meaning of certain phrases2 and it is continually disputed whether we may veraciously use the phrases in this new signification4 ,a similar process continually alters the meaning of conventional expressions current in polite society4 ,when a man declares that he #8has great pleasure in accepting' a vexatious invitation1 or is #8the obedient servant' of one whom he regards as an inferior1 he uses phrases which were probably once deceptive4 ,if they are so no longer1 ,common ,sense condemns as over-scrupulous the refusal to use them where it is customary to do so4 ,but ,common ,sense seems doubtful and perplexed where the process of degradation is incomplete1 and there are still persons who may be deceived3 as in the use of the reply that one is #8not at home' to an inconvenient visitor from the country4 ,however1 apart from the use of conventional phrases1 the rule #8to speak the truth' is not generally difficult of application in conduct4 ,and many moralists have regarded this1 from its simplicity and definiteness1 as a quite unexceptionable instance of an ethical axiom4 ,i think1 however1 that patient reflection will show that this view is not really confirmed by the ,common ,sense of mankind4 #b4 ,in the first place1 it does not seem clearly agreed whether ,veracity is an absolute and independent duty1 or a special application of some higher principle4 ,we find 7e4g47 that ,kant regards it as a duty owed to oneself to speak the truth1 because #8a lie is an abandonment or1 as it were1 annihilation of the dignity of man4' ,and this seems to be the view in which lying is prohibited by the code of honour1 except that it is not thought 7by men of honour as such7 that the dignity of man is impaired by any lying3 but only that lying for selfish ends1 especially under the influence of fear1 is mean and base4 ,in fact there seems to be circumstances under which the code of honour prescribes lying4 ,here1 however1 it may be said to be plainly divergent from the morality of ,common ,sense4 ,still1 the latter does not seem to decide clearly whether truth-speaking is absolutely a duty1 needing no further justification3 or whether it is merely a general right of each man to have truth spoken to him by his fellows1 which right however may be forfeited or suspended under certain circumstances4 ,just as each man is thought to have a natural right to personal security generally1 but not if he is himself attempting to injure others in life and property3 so if we may even kill in defence of ourselves and others1 it seems strange if we may not lie1 if lying will defend us better against a palpable invasion of our rights3 and ,common ,sense does not seem to prohibit this decisively4 ,and again1 just as the orderly and systematic slaughter which we call war is thought perfectly right under certain circumstances1 though painful and revolting3 so in the word-contests of the law-courts1 the lawyer is commonly held to be justified in untruthfulness within strict rules and limits3 for an advocate is thought to be over-scrupulous who refuses to say what he knows to be false1 if he is instructed to say it4#bci ,again1 where deception is designed to benefit the person deceived1 ,common ,sense seems to concede that it may sometimes be right3 for example1 most persons would not hesitate to speak falsely to an invalid1 if this seemed the only way of concealing facts that might produce a dangerous shock3 nor do ,i perceive that any one shrinks from telling fictions to children1 on matters upon which it is thought well that they should not know the truth4 ,but if the lawfulness of benevolent deception in any case be admitted1 ,i do not see how we can decide when and how far it is admissible1 except by considerations of expediency2 that is1 by weighing the gain of any particular deception against the imperilment of mutual confidence involved in all violation of truth4 ,the much argued question of religious deception 7#8pious fraud'7 naturally suggests itself here4 ,it seems clear1 however1 that ,common ,sense now pronounces against the broad rule1 that falsehoods may rightly be told in the interests of religion4 ,but there is a subtler form in which the same principle is still maintained by moral persons4 ,it is sometimes said that the most important truths of religion cannot be conveyed into the minds of ordinary men1 except by being enclosed1 as it were1 in a shell of fiction2 so that by relating such fictions as if they were facts1 we are really performing an act of substantial veracity4#bdj ,reflecting upon this argument1 we see that it is not after all so clear wherein ,veracity consists4 ,for from the beliefs immediately communicated by any set of affirmations inferences are naturally drawn1 and we may clearly foresee that they will be drawn4 ,and though commonly we intend that both the beliefs immediately communicated and the inferences drawn from them should be true1 and a person who always aims at this is praised as candid and sincere3 still we find relaxation of the rule prescribing this intention claimed in two different ways by at least respectable sections of opinion4 ,for first1 as was just now observed1 it is sometimes held that if a conclusion is true and important1 and cannot be satisfactorily communicated otherwise1 we may lead the mind of the hearer to it by means of fictitious premises4 ,but the exact reverse of this is perhaps a commoner view3 viz4 that it is only an absolute duty to make our actual affirmations true3 for it is said that though the ideal condition of human converse involves perfect sincerity and candour1 and we ought to rejoice in exhibiting these virtues where we can1 still in our actual world concealment is frequently necessary to the well-being of society1 and may be legitimately effected by any means short of actual falsehood4 ,thus it is not uncommonly said that in defence of a secret we may not indeed lie1#bda i4e4 produce directly beliefs contrary to fact2 but we may 8turn a question aside10 i4e4 produce indirectly1 by natural inference from our answer1 a negatively false belief2 or 8throw the inquirer on a wrong scent10 i4e4 produce similarly a positively false belief4 ,these two methods of concealment are known respectively as suppressio veri and suggestio falsi1 and many think them legitimate under certain circumstances3 while others say that if deception is to be practised at all1 it is mere formalism to object to any one mode of effecting it more than another4 ,on the whole1 then1 reflection seems to show that the rule of ,veracity1 as commonly accepted1 cannot be elevated into a definite moral axiom3 for there is no real agreement as to how far we are bound to impart true beliefs to others3 and while it is contrary to ,common ,sense to exact absolute candour under all circumstances1 we yet find no self-evident secondary principle1 clearly defining when it is not to be exacted4 #c4 ,there is1 however1 one method of exhibiting a priori the absolute duty of ,truth1 which we must not overlook2 as1 if it be valid1 it would seem that the exceptions and qualifications above mentioned have been only admitted by ,common ,sense from inadvertence and shallowness of thought4 ,it is said that if it were once generally understood that lies were justifiable under certain circumstances1 it would immediately become quite useless to tell the lies1 because no one would believe them2 and that the moralist cannot lay down a rule which1 if generally accepted1 would be suicidal4 ,to this there seem to be three answers4 ,in the first place it is not necessarily an evil that men's confidence in each other's assertions should1 under certain peculiar circumstances1 be impaired or destroyed3 it may even be the very result which we should most desire to produce3 e4g4 it is obviously a most effective protection for legitimate secrets that it should be universally understood and expected that those who ask questions which they have no right to ask will have lies told them3 nor1 again1 should we be restrained from pronouncing it lawful to meet deceit with deceit1 merely by the fear of impairing the security which rogues now derive from the veracity of honest men4 ,no doubt the ultimate result of general unveracity under the circumstances would be a state of things in which such falsehoods would no longer be told3 but unless this ultimate result is undesirable1 the prospect of it does not constitute a reason why the falsehoods should not be told so long as they are useful4 ,but1 secondly1 since the beliefs of men in general are not formed purely on rational grounds1 experience shows that unveracity may long remain partially effective under circumstances where it is generally understood to be legitimate4 ,we see this in the case of the law-courts4 ,for though jurymen are perfectly aware that it is considered the duty of an advocate to state as plausibly as possible whatever he has been instructed to say on behalf of any criminal he may defend1 still a skilful pleader may often produce an impression that he sincerely believes his client to be innocent3 and it remains a question of casuistry how far this kind of hypocrisy is justifiable4 ,but1 finally1 it cannot be assumed as certain that it is never right to act upon a maxim of which the universal application would be an undoubted evil4 ,this assumption may seem to be involved in what was previously admitted as an ethical axiom1 that what is right for me must be right for #8all persons under similar conditions4'#bdb ,but reflection will show that there is a special case within the range of the axiom in which its application is necessarily self-limiting1 and excludes the practical universality which the axiom appears to suggest3 i4e4 where the agent's conditions include 7#a7 the knowledge that his maxim is not universally accepted1 and 7#b7 a reasoned conviction that his act will not tend to make it so1 to any important extent4 ,for in this case the axiom will practically only mean that it will be right for all persons to do as the agent does1 if they are sincerely convinced that the act will not be widely imitated2 and this conviction must vanish if it is widely imitated4 ,it can hardly be said that these conditions are impossible3 and if they are possible1 the axiom that we are discussing can only serve1 in its present application1 to direct our attention to an important danger of unveracity1 which constitutes a strong--but not formally conclusive--utilitarian ground for speaking the truth4#bdc ,,note4--,mr4 ,stephen 7,science of ,ethics1 chap4 v4 #cc7 explains the exceptions to the rule of truth-speaking as follows3-- 8,the rule1 #8,lie not1' is the external rule1 and corresponds approximately to the internal rule1 #8,be trustworthy4' ,cases occur where the rules diverge1 and in such cases it is the internal rule which is morally approved4 ,truthfulness is the rule because in the vast majority of cases we trust a man in so far as he speaks the truth2 in the exceptional cases1 the mutual confidence would be violated when the truth1 not when the lie1 is spoken40 ,this explanation seems to me for several reasons inadequate4 7#a7 ,if we may sometimes lie to defend the life or secrets of others1 it is paradoxical to say that we may not do so to defend our own2 but a falsehood in self-defence obviously cannot be justified as an application of the maxim 8be trustworthy40 7#b7 ,even when the falsehood is in legitimate defence of others against attacks1 we cannot say that the speaker manifests 8trustworthiness0 without qualification2 for the deceived assailant trusts his veracity1 otherwise he would not be deceived3 the question therefore is under what circumstances the confidence of ,a that ,i shall speak the truth may legitimately be disappointed in order not to disappoint the confidence of ,b that ,i shall defend his life and honour4 ,this question ,mr4 ,stephen's explanation does not in any way aid us to answer4 ,the general question raised by ,mr4 ,stephen1 as to the value of 8internal rules10 expressed in the form 8,be this10 in contrast to external rules1 expressed in the form 8,do this10 will be dealt with in a subsequent chapter 7xiv4 #a74 ,,footnotes3 #bch ,the case where set forms are used being the exceptio probans regulam4 #bci ,it can hardly be said that the advocate merely reports the false affirmations of others3 since the whole force of his pleading depends upon his adopting them and working them up into a view of the case which1 for the time at least1 he appears to hold4 #bdj ,e4g4 certain religious persons hold--or held in #ahgc--that it is right solemnly to affirm a belief that ,god created the world in #f days and rested on the #gth1 meaning that #a 3 #f is the divinely ordered proportion between rest and labour4 #bda ,cf4 ,whewell1 ,elements of ,morality1 ,book ii4 chap4 xv4 #bii4 #bdb ,cf4 chap4 i4 #c of this ,book4 #bdc ,see ,book iv4 chap4 v4 #c for a further discussion of this axiom4 ,,chapter ,,viii ,,other ,,social ,,duties ,,and ,,virtues #a4 ,when we proceed to inquire how far the minor social duties and virtues recognised by ,common ,sense appear on examination to be anything more than special applications of the ,benevolence--general or particular--discussed in chap4 iv41 the department of duty which most prominently claims our attention1 is that which deals with the existence1 and determines the legitimacy1 of feelings antithetical to the benevolent4 ,for it seems that malevolent affections are as natural to man as the benevolent3 not indeed in the same sense--for man tends to have normally some kindly feeling for any fellow-man1 when there is no special cause operating to make him love or hate1 7though this tendency is obscured in the lower stages of social development by the habitual hostility between strange tribes and races72 but still such special causes of malevolent feeling continually occur1 and1 in the main1 exemplify a psychological law analogous to that by which the growth of benevolent feelings is explained4 ,for just as we are apt to love those who are the cause of pleasure to us whether by voluntary benefits or otherwise3 so by strict analogy we naturally dislike those who have done us harm1 either consciously from malevolence or mere selfishness1 or even unconsciously1 as when another man is an obstacle to our attainment of a much-desired end4 ,thus we naturally feel ill-will to a rival who deprives us of an object of competition3 and so in persons in whom the desire of superiority is strong1 a certain dislike of any one who is more successful or prosperous than themselves is easily aroused3 and this envy1 however repulsive to our moral sense1 seems as natural as any other malevolent emotion4 ,and it is to be observed that each of the elements into which we can analyse malevolent affection finds its exact counterpart in the analysis of the benevolent3 as the former includes a dislike of the presence of its object and a desire to inflict pain on it1 and also a capacity of deriving pleasure from the pain thus inflicted4#bdd ,if now we ask how far indulgence of malevolent emotions is right and proper1 the answer of ,common ,sense is not easy to formulate4 ,for some would say broadly that they ought to be repressed altogether or as far as possible4 ,and no doubt we blame all envy 7though sometimes to exclude it altogether requires a magnanimity which we praise73 and we regard as virtues or natural excellences the good-humour which prevents one from feeling even pain to a material extent--not to say resentment--from trifling annoyances inflicted by others1 the meekness which does not resent even graver injuries1 the mildness and gentleness which refrain from retaliating them1 and the placability which accords forgiveness rapidly and easily4 ,we are even accustomed to praise the mercy which spares even deserved punishment3 because though we never exactly disapprove of the infliction of deserved punishment1 and hold it to be generally a duty of government--and in certain cases of private persons--to inflict it1 we do not think that this duty admits of no exceptions2 we think that in exceptional cases considerations not strictly relevant to the question of justice may be properly regarded as reasons for remitting punishment1 and we admire the sympathetic nature that eagerly avails itself of these legitimate occasions for remission4 ,on the other hand ,common ,sense admits instinctive resentment for wrong to be legitimate and proper3 and even a more sustained and deliberate malevolence is commonly approved as virtuous indignation4 ,the problem1 then1 is how to reconcile these diverse approvals4 ,even as regards external duty1 there is some difficulty2 since1 though it is clear to common sense that in a well-ordered society punishment of adults ought generally to be inflicted by government1 and that a private individual wronged ought not to 8take the law into his own hands10--still there are in all societies injuries to individuals which the law does not punish at all or not adequately1 and for which effective requital is often possible without transgressing the limits of legality2 and there seems to be no clear agreement as to the right manner of dealing with these4 ,for the ,christian code is widely thought to prescribe a complete and absolute forgiveness of such offences1 and many ,christians have endeavoured to carry out this rule by dismissing the offences as far as possible from their minds1 or at least allowing the memory of them to have no effect on their outward conduct4 ,few1 however1 would deny that1 so far as a wrong done to me gives ground for expecting future mischief from the offender to myself or to others1 ,i am bound as a rational being to take due precautions against this future mischief2 and probably most would admit that such precautions for the future1 in the case we are considering1 may include the infliction of punishment for the past1 where impunity would give a dangerous temptation to a repetition of the unpunished offence4 ,if we ask1 therefore1 how far forgiveness is practically possible1 the answer seems admittedly to depend on two considerations3 7#a7 how far the punishment to which resentment prompts is really required in the interests of society1 and 7#b7 how far1 if so1 it will be adequately inflicted if the person wronged refrains from inflicting it4 ,but1 obviously1 so far as we allow the question to be settled by these considerations we are introducing a method difficult to distinguish from the ,utilitarian4 ,and we seem led to a similar result in discussing the legitimacy of malevolent feeling4 ,here again we find much disagreement among thoughtful persons3 for many would say that though the emotion of anger is legitimate1 it ought to be directed always against wrong acts as such1 and not against the agent3 for even where the anger may legitimately prompt us to punish him1 it ought never to overcome our kindly feeling towards him4 ,and certainly if this state of mind is possible1 it seems the simplest reconciliation of the general maxim of ,benevolence with the admitted duty of inflicting punishment4 ,on the other hand1 it is urged1 with some reason1 that to retain a genuine kindly feeling towards a man1 while we are gratifying a strong impulse of aversion to his acts by inflicting pain on him1 requires a subtle complexity of emotion too far out of the reach of ordinary men to be prescribed as a duty3 and that we must allow as right and proper a temporary suspension of benevolence towards wrong-doers until they have been punished4 ,some1 again1 make a distinction between ,instinctive and ,deliberate ,resentment3 saying that the former is legitimate in so far as it is required for the self-defence of individuals and the repression of mutual violence1 but that deliberate resentment is not similarly needed1 for if we act deliberately we can act from a better motive4 ,others1 however1 think that a deliberate and sustained desire to punish wrong-doers is required in the interests of society1 since the mere desire to realise ,justice will not practically be strong enough to repress offences3 and that it is as serious a mistake to attempt to substitute the desire of ,justice for natural resentment as it would be to substitute prudence for natural appetite in eating and drinking1 or mere dutifulness for filial affection4#bde ,again1 a distinction may be taken between the impulse to inflict pain and the desire of the antipathetic pleasure which the agent will reap from this infliction2 so that1 while we approve the former under certain circumstances1 we may still regard the latter as altogether inadmissible4 ,it would seem1 however1 that a man under the influence of a strong passion of resentment can hardly exclude from his mind altogether an anticipation of the pleasure that he will feel when the passion is gratified2 and if so1 he can hardly exclude altogether the desire of this gratification4 ,if1 therefore1 it is important for the well-being of society that men should derive hearty satisfaction from the punishment of a nefarious criminal1 it is perhaps going too far to prohibit absolutely the desire of this satisfaction2 though we may say that a man ought not to cherish this desire1 and gloat over the anticipated pleasure4 ,on the whole we may perhaps sum up by saying that a superficial view of the matter naturally leads us to condemn sweepingly all malevolent feelings and the acts to which they prompt1 as contrary to the general duty of benevolence3 but that the common sense of reflective persons recognises the necessity of relaxing this rule in the interests of society3 only it is not clear as to the limits or principles of this relaxation1 though inclined to let it be determined by considerations of expediency4 #b4 ,the remaining virtues that are clearly and exclusively social1 will be easily seen to have no independent maxims2 the conduct in which they are respectively realised being merely the fulfilment1 under special conditions1 of the rules already discussed4 ,we need not1 then1 enter upon an exhaustive examination of these minor virtues--for it is not our object to frame a complete glossary of ethical terms--3 but for illustration's sake it may be well to discuss one or two of them2 and ,i will select for examination ,liberality with its cognate notions1 partly on account of the prominence that it has had in the earlier ages of thought1 and partly because of a certain complexity in the feelings with which it is usually regarded4 ,considered as a ,virtue1 ,liberality seems to be merely ,benevolence1 as exhibited in the particular service of giving money1 beyond the limits of strict duty as commonly recognised3--for in so far as it can be called a duty to be liberal1 it is because in the performance of the more or less indefinite duties enumerated in chap4 iv4 we do not like exactness to be sought2 a certain excess is needful if the duty is to be well done4 ,and perhaps in the case of the poor this graceful excess is excluded by prudence3 for though a poor man might make a great sacrifice in a small gift we should call this generous but scarcely liberal2 ,liberality appears to require an external abundance in the gift even more than a self-sacrificing disposition4 ,it seems therefore to be possible only to the rich3 and1 as ,i have hinted1 in the admiration commonly accorded to it there seems to be mingled an element rather sthetic than moral4 ,for we are all apt to admire power1 and we recognise the latent power of wealth gracefully exhibited in a certain degree of careless profusion when the object is to give happiness to others4 ,indeed the vulgar admire the same carelessness as manifested even in selfish luxury4 ,the sphere of ,liberality1 then1 lies generally in the fulfilment of the indefinite duties of ,benevolence4 ,but there is a certain borderground between ,justice and ,benevolence where it is especially shown2 namely1 in the full satisfaction of all customary expectations1 even when indefinite and uncertain2 as 7e4g47 in the remuneration of services1 in so far as this is governed by custom2 and even where it is left entirely to free contract1 and therefore naturally determined by haggling and bargaining 7as market value generally71 it is characteristic of a liberal man to avoid this haggling and to give somewhat higher remuneration than the other party might be induced to take1 and similarly to take for his own services a somewhat lower payment than he might persuade the other to give4 ,and again1 since laws and promises and especially tacit understandings are sometimes doubtful and ambiguous1 a liberal man will in such cases unhesitatingly adopt the interpretation which is least in his own favour1 and pay the most that he can by any fairminded person be thought to owe1 and exact the least that reasonably can be thought to be due to himself3 that is1 if the margin be1 relatively to his resources1 not considerable4#bdf ,and of a man who does the opposite of all this we predicate ,meanness2 this being the vice antithetical to ,liberality4 ,here again there seems no place for this particular vice if the amount at stake be considerable2 for then we think it not mean to exact one's own rights to the full1 and worse than mean to refuse another what he ought to have2 in fact in such cases we think that any indefiniteness as to rights should be practically removed by the decision of a judge or arbitrator4 ,the vice of meanness then is1 we may say1 bounded on the side of vice by injustice3 the mean man is blamed not for violation of ,justice1 but1 because he chooses a trifling gain to himself rather than the avoidance of disappointment to others4 ,and here1 again1 it should be observed1 an element not strictly moral is included in the common disapprobation of meanness4 ,for1 as we have seen1 a certain carelessness of money is admired as a sign of power and superiority3 and the opposite habit is a symbol of inferiority4 ,the mean man then is apt to be despised as having the bad taste to show this symbol needlessly1 preferring a little gain to the respect of his fellow-men4 ,meanness1 however1 has a wider sphere than ,liberality1 and refers not merely to the taking or refusing of money1 but to taking advantages generally3 in this wider sense the opposite virtue is ,generosity4 ,in so far as the sphere of ,generosity coincides with that of ,liberality1 the former seems partly to transcend the latter1 partly to refer more to feelings than to outward acts1 and to imply a completer triumph of unselfish over selfish impulses4 ,in the wider sense it is strikingly exhibited in conflict and competition of all kinds4 ,here it is sometimes called ,chivalry4 ,reflection shows us that the essence of this beautiful virtue is the realisation of ,benevolence under circumstances which make it peculiarly difficult and therefore peculiarly admirable4 ,for ,generosity or ,chivalry towards adversaries or competitors seems to consist in showing as much kindness and regard for their well-being as is compatible with the ends and conditions of conflict3 one prominent form of this being the endeavour to realise ideal justice in these conditions1 not merely by observing all the rules and tacit understandings under which the conflict is conducted1 but by resigning even accidental advantages4 ,such resignation1 however1 is not considered a strict duty3 nor is there any agreement as to how far it is right and virtuous2 for what some would praise and approve1 others would regard as quixotic and extravagant4 ,to sum up1 we may say that the terms ,liberality and ,generosity1 so far as they are strictly ethical1 denote the virtue of ,benevolence 7perhaps including ,justice to some extent7 as exhibited in special ways and under special conditions4 ,and the examination of the other minor social virtues would evidently lead to similar general results3 though it might not always be easy to agree on their definitions4 ,,footnotes3 #bdd ,it is to be observed that men derive pleasure from the pains and losses of others1 in various ways1 without the specific emotion which ,i distinguish as malevolent affection3 either 7#a7 from the sense of power exercised--which explains much of the wanton cruelty of schoolboys1 despots1 etc4--or 7#b7 from a sense of their own superiority or security in contrast with the failures and struggles of others1 or 7#c7 even merely from the excitement sympathetically caused by the manifestation or representation of any strong feeling in others2 a real tragedy is interesting in the same way as a fictitious one4 ,but these facts1 though psychologically interesting1 present no important ethical problems2 since no one doubts that pain ought not to be inflicted from such motives as these4 #bde ,butler 7,sermon ,,viii41 ,upon ,resentment7 recognises that deliberate resentment 8has in fact a good influence upon the affairs of the world02 though 8it were much to be wished that men would act from a better principle40 #bdf ,if the amount at stake is such as to constitute a real sacrifice1 the conduct seems to be more than liberal1 and 7unless blamed as extravagant7 is rather praised as generous or highminded4 ,,chapter ,,ix ,,self-,,regarding ,,virtues #a4 ,i conceive that according to the morality of ,common ,sense1 an ultimate harmony between 7#a7 ,self-interest and 7#b7 ,virtue is assumed or postulated2 so that the performance of duty and cultivation of ,virtue generally may be regarded as a 8duty to self10 as being always conducive to the agent's true interest and well-being4 ,but further1 ,common ,sense 7in modern ,europe7 recognises a strict duty of preserving one's own life1 even when the prospect life offers is one in which pain preponderates over pleasure2 it is1 indeed1 held to be right and praiseworthy to encounter certain death in the performance of strict duty1 or for the preservation of the life of another1 or for any very important gain to society2 but not merely in order to avoid pain to the agent4 ,at the same time1 within the limits fixed by this and other duties1 ,common ,sense considers1 ,i think1#bdg that it is a duty to seek our own happiness1 except in so far as we can promote the welfare of others by sacrificing it4 ,this 8due concern about our own interest or happiness0 may be called the ,duty of ,prudence4 ,it should1 however1 be observed that--since it is less evident that men do not adequately desire their own greatest good1 than that their efforts are not sufficiently well directed to its attainment--in conceiving ,prudence as a ,virtue or ,excellence1 attention is often fixed almost exclusively on its intellectual side4 ,thus regarded1 ,prudence may be said to be merely ,wisdom made more definite by the acceptance of ,self-interest as its sole ultimate end3 the habit of calculating carefully the best means to the attainment of our own interest1 and resisting all irrational impulses which may tend to perturb our calculations or prevent us from acting on them4 #b4 ,there are1 however1 current notions of particular virtues1 which might be called ,self-regarding2 but yet with respect to which it is not quite clear whether they are merely particular applications of ,prudence1 or whether they have independent maxims4 ,of these ,temperance1 one of the four cardinal virtues anciently recognised1 seems the most prominent4 ,in its ordinary use1 ,temperance is the habit of controlling the principal appetites 7or desires which have an immediate corporeal cause74 ,the habit of moderating and controlling our desires generally is recognised by ,common ,sense as useful and desirable1 but with less distinctness and emphasis4 ,all are agreed that our appetites need control3 but in order to establish a maxim of ,temperance1 we have to determine within what limits1 on what principle1 and to what end they ought to be controlled4 ,now in the case of the appetites for food1 drink1 sleep1 stimulants1 etc41 no one doubts that bodily health and vigour is the end naturally subserved by their gratification1 and that the latter ought to be checked whenever it tends to defeat this end 7including in the notion of health the most perfect condition of the mental faculties1 so far as this appears to depend upon the general state of the body74 ,and1 further1 the indulgence of a bodily appetite is manifestly imprudent1 if it involves the loss of any greater gratification of whatever kind3 and otherwise wrong if it interferes with the performance of duties2 though it is perhaps doubtful how far this latter indulgence would commonly be condemned as #8intemperance4' ,some1 however1 deduce from the obvious truth1 that the maintenance of bodily health is the chief natural end of the appetites1 a more rigid rule of restraint1 and one that goes beyond prudence4 ,they say that this end ought to fix not only the negative but the positive limit of indulgence2 that the pleasure derived from the gratification of appetite should never be sought per se 7even when it does not impair health1 or interfere with duty1 or with a greater pleasure of a different kind72 but only in so far as such gratification is positively conducive to health4 ,when we consider to what a marked divergence from the usual habits of the moral rich this principle would lead1 we might be disposed to say that it is clearly at variance with ,common ,sense3 but it often meets with verbal assent4 ,there is1 again1 a third and intermediate view which accepts the principle that the gratification of appetite is not to be sought for its own sake1 but admits other ends as legitimate besides the mere maintenance of health and strength3--e4g4 8cheerfulness1 and the cultivation of the social affections40#bdh ,some such principle seems to be more or less consciously held by many persons3 hence we find that solitary indulgence in the pleasures of the table is very frequently regarded with something like moral aversion3 and that the banquets which are given and enjoyed by moral persons1 are vaguely supposed to have for their end not the common indulgence of sensual appetites1 but the promotion of conviviality and conversational entertainment4 ,for it is generally believed that the enjoyment in common of a luxurious meal develops social emotions1 and also stimulates the faculties of wit and humour and lively colloquy in general2 and feasts which are obviously not contrived with a view to such convivial and colloquial gratifications seem to be condemned by refined persons4 ,still it would be going too far to state1 as a maxim supported by ,common ,sense in respect of sensual pleasures generally1 that they are never to be sought except they positively promote those of a higher kind4 #c4 ,in the last section we have spoken chiefly of the appetites for food and drink4 ,it is1 however1 in the case of the appetite of sex that the regulation morally prescribed most clearly and definitely transcends that of mere prudence3 which is indicated by the special notion of ,purity or ,chastity4#bdi ,at first sight it may perhaps appear that the regulation of the sexual appetite prescribed by the received moral code merely confines its indulgence within the limits of the union sanctioned by law3 only that here1 as the natural impulse is peculiarly powerful and easily excited1 it is especially necessary to prohibit any acts1 internal as well as external1 that tend even indirectly to the transgression of these limits4 ,and this is to a great extent true3 still on reflection it will appear1 ,i think1 that our common notion of purity implies a standard independent of law2 for1 first1 conformity to this does not necessarily secure purity3 and secondly1 all illegitimate sexual intercourse is not thought to be impure1#bej and it is only by inadvertence that the two notions are sometimes confounded4 ,but it is not very clear what this standard is4 ,for when we interrogate the moral consciousness of mankind1 we seem to find two views1 a stricter and a laxer1 analogous to the two interpretations of ,temperance last noticed4 ,it is agreed that the sexual appetite ought never to be indulged for the sake of the sensual gratification merely1 but as a means to some higher end3 but some say that the propagation of the species is the only legitimate1 as it is obviously the primary natural1 end3 while others regard the development of mutual affection in a union designed to be permanent as an end perfectly admissible and right4 ,i need not point out that the practical difference between the two views is considerable2 so that this question is one which it is necessary to raise and decide4 ,but it may be observed that any attempt to lay down minute and detailed rules on this subject seems to be condemned by ,common ,sense as tending to defeat the end of purity2 as such minuteness of moral legislation invites men in general to exercise their thoughts on this subject to an extent which is practically dangerous4#bea ,i ought to point out that the ,virtue of ,purity is certainly not merely self-regarding1 and is therefore properly out of place in this chapter3 but the convenience of discussing it along with ,temperance has led me to take it out of its natural order4 ,some1 however1 would go further1 and say that it ought to be treated as a distinctly social virtue3 for the propagation and rearing of children is one of the most important of social interests3 and they would maintain that ,purity merely connotes a sentiment protective of these important functions1 supporting the rules which we consider necessary to secure their proper performance4 ,but it seems clear that1 though ,common ,sense undoubtedly recognises this tendency of the sentiment of ,purity to maintain the best possible provision for the continuance of the human race1 it still does not regard that as the fundamental point in the definition of this rule of duty1 and the sole criterion in deciding whether acts do or do not violate the rule4 ,there seem to be no similar special questions with respect to most other desires4 ,we recognise1 no doubt1 a general duty of self-control3 but this is merely as a means to the end of acting rationally 7whatever our interpretation of rational action may be72 it only prescribes that we should yield to no impulse which prompts us to act in antagonism to ends or rules deliberately accepted4 ,further1 there is a certain tendency among moral persons to the ascetic opinion that the gratification of merely sensual impulse is in itself somewhat objectionable3 but this view does not seem to be taken by ,common ,sense in particular cases2--we do not 7e4g47 commonly condemn the most intense enjoyment of muscular exercise1 or warmth1 or bathing4 ,the only other case1 besides that of the appetites above discussed1 in which the ,common ,sense of our age and country seems to regard as right or admirable the repression of natural impulses1 beyond what ,prudence and ,benevolence would dictate1 is that of the promptings of pain and fear4 ,an important instance of this is to be found in the before-mentioned rule prohibiting suicide absolutely1 even in face of the strongest probability that the rest of a man's life will be both miserable and burdensome to others4 ,but in other cases also praise is apparently bestowed on endurance of pain and danger1 beyond what is conducive to happiness2 as we shall have occasion to observe in the next chapter4 ,,footnotes3 #bdg ,kant argues 7,met4 ,anfangsgr4 d4 ,tugendlehre1 ,th4 ,i41 iv47 that as every one 8inevitably wills0 means to promote his own happiness this cannot be regarded as a duty4 ,but1 as ,i have before urged 7,book i4 chap4 iv4 #a71 a man does not 8inevitably will0 to do what he believes will be most conducive to his own greatest happiness4 ,the view in the text is that of ,butler 7,dissertation ,of the nature of ,virtue72 who admits that 8nature has not given us so sensible a disapprobation of imprudence and folly as of falsehood1 injustice1 and cruelty02 but points out that such sensible disapprobation is for various reasons less needed in the former case4 #bdh ,see ,whewell's ,elements of ,morality1 ,book ii4 chap4 x4 #bdi ,the notion of ,chastity is nearly equivalent to that of ,purity1 only somewhat more external and superficial4 #bej ,in so far as mere illegitimacy of union is conceived to be directly and specially prohibited1 and not merely from considerations of ,prudence and ,benevolence1 it is regarded as a violation of ,order rather than of ,purity4 #bea ,it was partly owing to the serious oversight of not perceiving that ,purity itself forbids too minute a system of rules for the observance of purity that the medival ,casuistry fell into disrepute4 ,,chapter ,x ,,courage1 ,,humility1 ,,etc4 #a4 ,besides the ,virtue of ,purity1 which we found it convenient to discuss in the last chapter1 there remain one or two prominent excellences of character which do not seem to be commonly admired and inculcated with any distinct reference either to private or to general happiness2 and which1 though in most cases obviously conducive to one or other of these ends1 sometimes seem to influence conduct in a direction at variance with them4 ,for example1 ,courage is a quality which excites general admiration1 whether it is shown in self-defence1 or in aiding others1 or even when we do not see any benefit resulting from the particular exhibition of it4 ,again1 in ,christian societies1 ,humility 7if believed sincere7 often obtains unqualified praise1 in spite of the loss that may evidently result from a man's underrating his own abilities4 ,it will be well1 therefore1 to examine how far in either case we can elicit a clear and independent maxim defining the conduct commended under each of these notions4 ,to begin with ,courage4 ,we generally denote by this term a disposition to face danger of any kind without shrinking4 ,we sometimes also call those who bear pain unflinchingly courageous3 but this quality of character we more commonly distinguish as ,fortitude4 ,now it seems plain that if we seek for a definition of strict duty1 as commonly recognised1 under the head either of ,courage or of ,fortitude1 we can find none that does not involve a reference to other maxims and ends4 ,for no one would say that it is our duty to face danger or to bear avoidable pain generally1 but only if it meets us in the course of duty4#beb ,and even this needs further qualification3 for as regards such duties as those 7e4g47 of general ,benevolence1 it would be commonly allowed that the agent's pain and danger are to be taken into account in practically determining their extent3 it would be held that we are not bound to endure any pain except for the prevention of manifestly greater pain to another1 or the attainment of a more important amount of positive good3 nor to run any risk1 unless the chance of additional benefit to be gained for another outweighs the cost and chance of loss to ourselves if we fail4 ,indeed it is doubtful whether the common estimate of the duty of ,benevolence could be said to amount quite to this4#bec ,when1 however1 we consider ,courage as an ,excellence rather than a duty1 it seems to hold a more independent position in our moral estimation4 ,and this view corresponds more completely than the other to the common application of the notion2 as there are many acts of courage1 which are not altogether within the control of the ,will1 and therefore cannot be regarded as strict duties4 ,for 7#a7 danger is frequently sudden and needs to be met without deliberation1 so that our manner of meeting it can only be semi-voluntary4 ,and 7#b7 though naturally timid persons can perhaps with effort control fear as they can anger or appetite1 if time be allowed for deliberation1 and can prevent it from taking effect in dereliction of duty3 still this result is not all that is required for the performance of such courageous acts as need more than ordinary energy--for the energy of the timid virtuous man is liable to be exhausted in the effort to control his fear3 e4g4 in battle he can perhaps stand still to be killed as well as the courageous man1 but not charge with the same impetuosity or strike with the same vigour and precision4#bed ,so far then as ,courage is not completely voluntary1 we have to consider whether it is a desirable quality rather than whether we are strictly bound to exhibit it4 ,and here there seems no doubt that we commonly find it morally admirable without reference to any end served by it1 and when the dangers which call it forth might be avoided without any dereliction of duty4 ,at the same time we call a man foolhardy who runs unnecessarily into danger beyond a certain degree4 ,where then is the limit to be fixed8 ,on utilitarian principles we should endeavour to strike as exact a balance as possible between the amount of danger incurred in any case and the probable benefit of cultivating and developing by practice a habit so frequently necessary for the due performance of important duties4 ,this will obviously give a different result for different states of society and different callings and professions2 as most people need this instinctive courage less in civilised societies than in semi-barbarous ones1 and civilians less than soldiers4 ,perhaps the instinctive admiration of mankind for acts of daring does not altogether observe this limit3 but we may say1 ,i think1 that in so far as it attempts to justify itself on reflection1 it is commonly in some such way as this2 and ,common ,sense does not seem to point to any limit depending on a different principle4 #b4 ,as the ,virtue of ,courage is prominent in ,pagan ethics1 and in the ,code of ,honour which may be regarded as a sort of survival of the pagan view of morality1 so ,humility especially belongs to the ideal set before mankind by ,christianity4 ,the common account1 however1 of this virtue is somewhat paradoxical4 ,for it is generally said that ,humility prescribes a low opinion of our own merits3 but if our merits are comparatively high1 it seems strange to direct us to have a low opinion of them4 ,it may be replied1 that though our merits may be high when compared with those of ordinary men1 there are always some to be found superior1 and we can compare ourselves with these1 and in the extreme case with ideal excellence1 of which all fall far short2 and that we ought to make this kind of comparison and not the other kind1 and contemplate our faults--of which we shall assuredly find a sufficiency--and not our merits4 ,but surely in the most important deliberations which human life offers1 in determining what kind of work we shall undertake and to what social functions we shall aspire1 it is often necessary that we should compare our qualifications carefully with those of average men1 if we are to decide rightly4 ,and it would seem just as irrational to underrate ourselves as to overrate2 and though most men are more prone to the latter mistake1 there are certainly some rather inclined to the former4 ,i think that if we reflect carefully on the common judgments in which the notion of ,humility is used1 we shall find that the quality commonly praised under this name 7which is not always used eulogistically71 is not properly regulative of the opinions we form of ourselves--for here as in other opinions we ought to aim at nothing but ,truth--but tends to the repression of two different seductive emotions1 one entirely self-regarding1 the other relating to others and partly taking effect in social behaviour4 ,partly1 the ,virtue of ,humility is manifested in repressing the emotion of self-admiration1 which springs naturally from the contemplation of our own merits1 and as it is highly agreeable1 prompts to such contemplation4 ,this admiring self-complacency is generally condemned3 but not1 ,i think1 by an intuition that claims to be ultimate1 as it is commonly justified by the reason that such self-admiration1 even if well-grounded1 tends to check our progress towards higher virtue4 ,the mere fact of our feeling this admiration is thought to be evidence that we have not sufficiently compared ourselves with our ideal1 or that our ideal is not sufficiently high3 and it is thought to be indispensable to moral progress that we should have a high ideal and should continually contemplate it4 ,at the same time1 we obviously need some care in the application of this maxim4 ,for all admit that self-respect is an important auxiliary to right conduct3 and moralists continually point to the satisfactions of a good conscience as part of the natural reward which ,providence has attached to virtue3 yet it is difficult to separate the glow of self-approbation which attends the performance of a virtuous action from the complacent self-consciousness which ,humility seems to exclude4 ,perhaps we may say that the feeling of self-approbation itself is natural and a legitimate pleasure1 but that if prolonged and fostered it is liable to impede moral progress3 and that what ,humility prescribes is such repression of self-satisfaction as will tend on the whole to promote this end4 ,on this view the maxim of ,humility is clearly a dependent one3 the end to which it is subordinate is progress in ,virtue generally4 ,as for such pride and self-satisfaction as are based not on our own conduct and its results1 but on external and accidental advantages1 these are condemned as involving a false and absurd view as to the nature of real merit4 ,but we not only take pleasure in our own respect and admiration1 but still more1 generally speaking1 in the respect and admiration of others4 ,the desire for this1 again1 is held to be to some extent legitimate1 and even a valuable aid to morality3 but as it is a dangerously seductive impulse1 and frequently acts in opposition to duty1 it is felt to stand in special need of self-control4 ,humility1 however1 does not so much consist in controlling this desire1 as in repressing the claim for its satisfaction which we are naturally disposed to make upon others4 ,we are inclined to demand from others #8tokens of respect1' some external symbol of their recognition of our elevated place in the scale of human beings2 and to complain if our demands are not granted4 ,such claims and demands ,humility bids us repress4 ,it is thought to be our duty not to exact1 in many cases1 even the expression of reverence which others are strictly bound to pay4 ,and yet here1 again1 there is a limit1 in the view of ,common ,sense1 at which this quality of behaviour passes over into a fault3 for the omission of marks of respect#bee is sometimes an insult which impulses commonly regarded as legitimate and even virtuous 7sense of ,dignity1 ,self-respect1 ,proper ,pride1 etc47 prompt us to repel4 ,i do not1 however1 think it possible to claim a consensus for any formula for determining this limit4 ,,footnotes3 #beb ,in the case of pain which cannot be avoided we consider that ,fortitude will suppress outcries and lamentations3 though in so far as these relieve the sufferer without annoying others1 the duty seems doubtful4 #bec ,cf4 ante1 chap4 iv4 #e of this ,book4 #bed ,the above remarks apply in a less degree to the 8moral courage0 by which men face the pains and dangers of social disapproval in the performance of what they believe to be duty3 for the adequate accomplishment of such acts depends less on qualities not within the control of the will at any given time4 #bee ,i do not refer to customary marks of respect for officials1 the omission of which would be a breach of established order2 since the special political reason for requiring these obviously takes the question beyond the sphere of application of the ,virtue of ,humility4 ,,chapter ,,xi ,,review ,,of ,,the ,,morality ,,of ,,common ,,sense #a4 ,we have now concluded such detailed examination of the morality of ,common ,sense as1 on the plan laid down in chap4 i4 of this ,book1 it seemed desirable to undertake4 ,we have not discussed all the terms of our common moral vocabulary3 but ,i believe that we have omitted none that are important either in themselves or relatively to our present inquiry4 ,for of those that remain we may fairly say1 that they manifestly will not furnish independent maxims3 for reflection will show that the conduct designated by them is either prescribed merely as a means to the performance of duties already discussed2 or is really identical with the whole or part of some of these1 viewed in some special aspect1 or perhaps specialised by the addition of some peculiar circumstance or condition4 ,let us now pause and survey briefly the process in which we have been engaged1 and the results which we have elicited4 ,we started with admitting the point upon the proof of which moralists have often concentrated their efforts1 the existence of apparently independent moral intuitions4 ,it seemed undeniable that men judge some acts to be right and wrong in themselves1 without consideration of their tendency to produce happiness to the agent or to others3 and indeed without taking their consequences into account at all1 except in so far as these are included in the common notion of the act4 ,we saw1 however1 that in so far as these judgments are passed in particular cases1 they seem to involve 7at least for the more reflective part of mankind7 a reference of the case to some general rule of duty3 and that in the frequent cases of doubt or conflict of judgments as to the rightness of any action1 appeal is commonly made to such rules or maxims1 as the ultimately valid principles of moral cognition4 ,in order1 therefore1 to throw the ,morality of ,common ,sense into a scientific form1 it seemed necessary to obtain as exact a statement as possible of these generally recognised principles4 ,i did not think that ,i could dispense myself from this task by any summary general argument1 based on the unscientific character of common morality4 ,there is no doubt that the moral opinions of ordinary men are in many points loose1 shifting1 and mutually contradictory1 but it does not follow that we may not obtain from this fluid mass of opinion1 a deposit of clear and precise principles commanding universal acceptance4 ,the question1 whether we can do this or not1 seemed to me one which should not be decided a priori without a fair trial3 and it is partly in order to prepare materials for this trial that the survey in the preceding eight chapters has been conducted4 ,i have endeavoured to ascertain impartially1 by mere reflection on our common moral discourse1 what are the general principles or maxims1 according to which different kinds of conduct are judged to be right and reasonable in different departments of life4 ,i wish it to be particularly observed1 that ,i have in no case introduced my own views1 in so far as ,i am conscious of their being at all peculiar to myself3 my sole object has been to make explicit the implied premises of our common moral reasoning4 ,i now wish to subject the results of this survey to a final examination1 in order to decide whether these general formul possess the characteristics by which self-evident truths are distinguished from mere opinions4 #b4 ,there seem to be four conditions1 the complete fulfilment of which would establish a significant proposition1 apparently self-evident1 in the highest degree of certainty attainable3 and which must be approximately realised by the premises of our reasoning in any inquiry1 if that reasoning is to lead us cogently to trustworthy conclusions4 ,i4 ,the terms of the proposition must be clear and precise4 ,the rival originators of modern ,methodology1 ,descartes and ,bacon1 vie with each other in the stress that they lay on this point3 and the latter's warning against the 8notiones male terminat0 of ordinary thought is peculiarly needed in ethical discussion4 ,in fact my chief business in the preceding survey has been to free the common terms of ,ethics1 as far as possible1 from objection on this score4 ,,ii4 ,the self-evidence of the proposition must be ascertained by careful reflection4 ,it is needful to insist on this1 because most persons are liable to confound intuitions1 on the one hand with mere impressions or impulses1 which to careful observation do not present themselves as claiming to be dictates of ,reason2 and on the other hand1 with mere opinions1 to which the familiarity that comes from frequent hearing and repetition often gives a false appearance of self-evidence which attentive reflection disperses4 ,in such cases the ,cartesian method of testing the ultimate premises of our reasonings1 by asking ourselves if we clearly and distinctly apprehend them to be true1 may be of real use2 though it does not1 as ,descartes supposed1 afford a complete protection against error4 ,a rigorous demand for self-evidence in our premises is a valuable protection against the misleading influence of our own irrational impulses on our judgments3 while at the same time it not only distinguishes as inadequate the mere external support of authority and tradition1 but also excludes the more subtle and latent effect of these in fashioning our minds to a facile and unquestioning admission of common but unwarranted assumptions4 ,and we may observe that the application of this test is especially needed in ,ethics4 ,for1 on the one hand1 it cannot be denied that any strong sentiment1 however purely subjective1 is apt to transform itself into the semblance of an intuition2 and it requires careful contemplation to detect the illusion4 ,whatever we desire we are apt to pronounce desirable3 and we are strongly tempted to approve of whatever conduct gives us keen pleasure4#bef ,and on the other hand1 among the rules of conduct to which we customarily conform1 there are many which reflection shows to be really derived from some external authority3 so that even if their obligation be unquestionable1 they cannot be intuitively ascertained4 ,this is of course the case with the ,positive ,law of the community to which we belong4 ,there is no doubt that we ought1--at least generally speaking1--to obey this3 but what it is we cannot of course ascertain by any process of abstract reflection1 but only by consulting ,reports and ,statutes4 ,here1 however1 the sources of knowledge are so definite and conspicuous1 that we are in no danger of confounding the knowledge gained from studying them with the results of abstract contemplation4 ,the case is somewhat different with the traditional and customary rules of behaviour which exist in every society1 supplementing the regulative operation of ,law proper3 here it is much more difficult to distinguish the rules which a moral man is called upon to define for himself1 by the application of intuitively known principles1 from those as to which some authority external to the individual is recognised as the final arbiter4#beg ,we may illustrate this by referring to two systems of rules which we have before#beh compared with ,morality2 the ,law of ,honour1 and the ,law of ,fashion or ,etiquette4 ,i noticed that there is an ambiguity in the common terms #8honourable' and #8dishonourable'2 which are no doubt sometimes used1 like ethical terms1 as implying an absolute standard4 ,still1 when we speak of the ,code of ,honour we seem to mean rules of which the exact nature is to be finally determined by an appeal to the general opinion of well-bred persons3 we admit that a man is in a sense #8dishonoured' when this opinion condemns him1 even though we may think his conduct unobjectionable or even intrinsically admirable4#bei ,similarly1 when we consider from the point of view of reason the rules of ,fashion or ,etiquette1 some may seem useful and commendable1 some indifferent and arbitrary1 some perhaps absurd and burdensome3 but nevertheless we recognise that the final authority on matters of ,etiquette is the custom of polite society2 which feels itself under no obligation of reducing its rules to rational principles4 ,yet it must be observed that each individual in any society commonly finds in himself a knowledge not obviously incomplete of the rules of ,honour and ,etiquette1 and an impulse to conform to them without requiring any further reason for doing so4 ,each often seems to see at a glance what is honourable and polite just as clearly as he sees what is right3 and it requires some consideration to discover that in the former cases custom and opinion are generally the final authority from which there is no appeal4 ,and even in the case of rules regarded as distinctly moral1 we can generally find an element that seems to us as clearly conventional as the codes just mentioned1 when we contemplate the morality of other men1 even in our own age and country4 ,hence we may reasonably suspect a similar element in our own moral code3 and must admit the great importance of testing rigorously any rule which we find that we have a habitual impulse to obey2 to see whether it really expresses or can be referred to a clear intuition of rightness4 ,,iii4 ,the propositions accepted as self-evident must be mutually consistent4 ,here1 again1 it is obvious that any collision between two intuitions is a proof that there is error in one or the other1 or in both4 ,still1 we frequently find ethical writers treating this point very lightly4 ,they appear to regard a conflict of ultimate rules as a difficulty that may be ignored or put aside for future solution1 without any slur being thrown on the scientific character of the conflicting formul4 ,whereas such a collision is absolute proof that at least one of the formul needs qualification3 and suggests a doubt whether the correctly qualified proposition will present itself with the same self-evidence as the simpler but inadequate one2 and whether we have not mistaken for an ultimate and independent axiom one that is really derivative and subordinate4 ,,iv4 ,since it is implied in the very notion of ,truth that it is essentially the same for all minds1 the denial by another of a proposition that ,i have affirmed has a tendency to impair my confidence in its validity4 ,and in fact #8universal' or #8general' consent has often been held to constitute by itself a sufficient evidence of the truth of the most important beliefs2 and is practically the only evidence upon which the greater part of mankind can rely4 ,a proposition accepted as true upon this ground alone has1 of course1 neither self-evidence nor demonstrative evidence for the mind that so accepts it2 still1 the secure acceptance that we commonly give to the generalisations of the empirical sciences rests--even in the case of experts--largely on the belief that other experts have seen for themselves the evidence for these generalisations1 and do not materially disagree as to its adequacy4 ,and it will be easily seen that the absence of such disagreement must remain an indispensable negative condition of the certainty of our beliefs4 ,for if ,i find any of my judgments1 intuitive or inferential1 in direct conflict with a judgment of some other mind1 there must be error somewhere3 and if ,i have no more reason to suspect error in the other mind than in my own1 reflective comparison between the two judgments necessarily reduces me temporarily to a state of neutrality4 ,and though the total result in my mind is not exactly suspense of judgment1 but an alternation and conflict between positive affirmation by one act of thought and the neutrality that is the result of another1 it is obviously something very different from scientific certitude4 ,now if the account given of the ,morality of ,common ,sense in the preceding chapters be in the main correct1 it seems clear that1 generally speaking1 its maxims do not fulfil the conditions just laid down4 ,so long as they are left in the state of somewhat vague generalities1 as we meet them in ordinary discourse1 we are disposed to yield them unquestioning assent1 and it may be fairly claimed that the assent is approximately universal--in the sense that any expression of dissent is eccentric and paradoxical4 ,but as soon as we attempt to give them the definiteness which science requires1 we find that we cannot do this without abandoning the universality of acceptance4 ,we find1 in some cases1 that alternatives present themselves1 between which it is necessary that we should decide2 but between which we cannot pretend that ,common ,sense does decide1 and which often seem equally or nearly equally plausible4 ,in other cases the moral notion seems to resist all efforts to obtain from it a definite rule3 in others it is found to comprehend elements which we have no means of reducing to a common standard1 except by the application of the ,utilitarian--or some similar--method4 ,even where we seem able to educe from ,common ,sense a more or less clear reply to the questions raised in the process of definition1 the principle that results is qualified in so complicated a way that its self-evidence becomes dubious or vanishes altogether4 ,and thus in each case what at first seemed like an intuition turns out to be either the mere expression of a vague impulse1 needing regulation and limitation which it cannot itself supply1 but which must be drawn from some other source3 or a current opinion1 the reasonableness of which has still to be shown by a reference to some other principle4 ,in order that this result may be adequately exhibited1 ,i must ask the reader to travel with me again through the series of principles elicited from ,common ,sense in the previous chapters1 and to examine them from a somewhat different point of view4 ,before1 our primary aim was to ascertain impartially what the deliverances of ,common ,sense actually are3 we have now to ask how far these enunciations can claim to be classed as ,intuitive ,truths4 ,the reader should observe that throughout this examination a double appeal is made2 on the one hand to his individual moral consciousness1 and1 on the other hand1 to the ,common ,sense of mankind1 as expressed generally by the body of persons on whose moral judgment he is prepared to rely4 ,i ask him 7#a7 whether he can state a clear1 precise1 self-evident first principle1 according to which he is prepared to judge conduct under each head3 and 7#b7 if so1 whether this principle is really that commonly applied in practice1 by those whom he takes to represent ,common ,sense4#bfj #c4 ,if we begin by considering the duty of acting wisely1 discussed in chap4 iii41 we may seem perhaps to have before us an axiom of undoubted self-evidence4 ,for acting wisely appeared to mean taking the right means to the best ends2 i4e4 taking the means which ,reason indicates to the ends which ,reason prescribes4 ,and it is evident that it must be right to act reasonably4 ,equally undeniable is the immediate inference from1 or negative aspect of1 this principle2 that it is wrong to act in opposition to rational judgment4 ,this1 taken in connexion with the empirical fact of impulses in our minds conflicting with ,reason1 gives--as another self-evident principle--the maxim of ,temperance or ,self-control in its widest interpretation2 i4e4 #8,that reason should never give way to ,appetite or ,passion4'#bfa ,and these principles have sometimes been enounced with no little solemnity as answering the fundamental question of ,ethics and supplying the basis or summary of a doctrine of ,practice4 ,but this statement of principles turns out to be one of those stages1 so provokingly frequent in the course of ethical reflection1 which1 as far as practical guidance is concerned1 are really brief circuits1 leading us back to the point from which we started4 ,or rather1 to prevent misapprehension1 it should be observed that the maxims just given may be understood in two senses3 in one sense they are certainly self-evident1 but they are also insignificant3 in another sense they include more or less distinctly a direction to an important practical duty1 but as so understood they lose their self-evidence4 ,for if the rules of ,wisdom and ,self-control mean 7#a7 that we ought always to do what we see to be reasonable1 and 7#b7 that we are not to yield to any impulse urging us in an opposite direction2 they simply affirm that it is our duty 7#a7 generally1 and 7#b7 under special temptations1 to do what we judge to be our duty2#bfb and convey no information as to the method and principles by which duty is to be determined4 ,but if these rules are further understood 7as they sometimes are understood7 to prescribe the cultivation of a habit of acting rationally2 that is1 of referring each act to definitely conceived principles and ends1 instead of allowing it to be determined by instinctive impulses2 then ,i cannot see that the affirmation of this as an universal and absolute rule of duty is self-evidently true4 ,for when ,reason is considered not in the present as actually commanding1 but as an ,end of which a fuller realisation has to be sought in the future2 the point of view from which its sovereignty has to be judged is entirely changed4 ,the question is no longer whether the dictates of ,reason ought always to be obeyed1 but whether the dictation of ,reason is always a ,good2 whether any degree of predominance of ,reason over mere ,impulse must necessarily tend to the perfection of the conscious self of which both are elements4 ,and it is surely not self-evident that this predominance cannot be carried too far2 and that ,reason is not rather self-limiting1 in the knowledge that rational ends are sometimes better attained by those who do not directly aim at them as rational4 ,certainly ,common ,sense is inclined to hold that in many matters instinct is a better spring of action than reason3 thus it is commonly said that a healthy appetite is a better guide to diet than a doctor's prescription3 and1 again1 that marriage is better undertaken as a consequence of falling in love than in execution of a tranquil and deliberate design3 and we before observed 7chap4 iv47 that there is a certain excellence in services springing from spontaneous affection which does not attach to similar acts done from pure sense of duty4 ,and in the same way experience seems to show that many acts requiring promptitude and vigour are likely to be more energetic and effective1 and that many acts requiring tact and delicacy are likely to be more graceful and pleasant to others1 if they are done not in conscious obedience to the dictates of ,reason but from other motives4 ,it is not necessary here to decide how far this view is true3 it suffices to say that we do not know intuitively that it is not true to some extent2 we do not know that there may not be--to use ,plato's analogy--over-government in the individual soul no less than in the state4 ,the residuum1 then1 of clear intuition which we have so far obtained1 is the insignificant proposition that it is our duty to do what we judge to be our duty4 #d4 ,let us pass now to what ,i have called the duties of the ,affections1 the rules that prescribe either love itself in some degree1 or the services that naturally spring from it in those relations where it is expected and desired4 ,here1 in the first place1 the question how far we are bound to render these services when we do not feel the affection is answered differently in many cases by different persons1 and no determination of the limit seems self-evident4 ,and similarly if we ask whether affection itself is a duty2 for on the one hand it is at least only partially within the control of the will1 and in so far as it can be produced by voluntary effort1 there is thought to be something unsatisfactory and unattractive in the result2 and on the other hand1 in certain relations it seems to be commonly regarded as a duty4 ,on those points the doctrine of ,common ,sense is rather a rough compromise between conflicting lines of thought than capable of being deduced from a clear and universally accepted principle4 ,and if we confine ourselves to the special relations where ,common ,sense admits no doubt as to the broad moral obligation of at least rendering such services as affection naturally prompts1 still the recognised rules of external duty in these relations are1 in the first place1 wanting in definiteness and precision3 and secondly1 they do not1 when rigorously examined1 appear to be1 or to be referable to1 independent intuitions so far as the particularity of the duties is concerned4 ,let us take1 for example1 the duty of parents to children4 ,we have no doubt about this duty as a part of the present order of society1 by which the due growth and training of the rising generation is distributed among the adults4 ,but when we reflect on this arrangement itself1 we cannot see intuitively that it is the best possible4 ,it may be plausibly maintained that children would be better trained1 physically and mentally1 if they were brought up under the supervision of physicians and philosophers1 in large institutions maintained out of the general taxes4 ,we cannot decide a priori which of these alternatives is preferable2 we have to refer to psychological and sociological generalisations1 obtained by empirical study of human nature in actual societies4 ,if1 however1 we consider the duty of parents by itself1 out of connexion with this social order1 it is certainly not self-evident that we owe more to our own children than to others whose happiness equally depends on our exertions4 ,to get the question clear1 let us suppose that ,i am thrown with my family upon a desert island1 where ,i find an abandoned orphan4 ,is it evident that ,i am less bound to provide this child1 as far as lies in my power1 with the means of subsistence1 than ,i am to provide for my own children8 ,according to some1 my special duty to the latter would arise from the fact that ,i have brought them into being3 but1 if so1 it would seem that on this principle ,i have a right to diminish their happiness1 provided ,i do not turn it into a negative quantity2 since1 as without me they would not have existed at all1 they can1 as my children1 have no claim upon me for more than an existence on the whole above zero in respect of happiness4 ,we might even deduce a parental right 7so far as this special claim is concerned7 to extinguish children painlessly at any point of their existence1 if only their life up to that point has been on the whole worth having2 for how can persons who would have had no life at all but for me fairly complain that they are not allowed more than a certain quantity8#bfc ,i do not mean to assert that these doctrines are even implicitly held by ,common ,sense3 but merely to show that here1 as elsewhere1 the pursuit of an irrefragable intuition may lead us unaware into a nest of paradoxes4 ,it seems1 then1 that we cannot1 after all1 say that the special duty of parents to children1 considered by itself1 possesses clear self-evidence3 and it was easy to show 7cf4 chap4 iv47 that as recognised by ,common ,sense its limits are indeterminate4 ,the rule prescribing the duty of children to parents need not detain us2 for to ,common ,sense it certainly seems doubtful whether this is not merely a particular case of gratitude2 and we certainly have no clear intuition of what is due to parents who do not deserve gratitude4 ,again1 the moral relation of husband and wife seems to depend chiefly upon contract and definite understanding4 ,it is1 no doubt1 usually thought that ,morality1 as well as law prescribes certain conditions for all connubial contracts3 and in our own age and country it is held that they should be 7#a7 monogamic and 7#b7 permanent4 ,but it seems clear that neither of these opinions would be maintained to be a primary intuition4 ,whether these or any other legal regulations of the union of the sexes can be deduced from some intuitive principle of ,purity1 we will presently consider3 but as for such conjugal duties as are not prescribed by ,law1 probably no one at the present day would maintain that there is any such general agreement as to what these are1 as would support the theory that they may be known a priori4#bfd ,if1 then1 in these domestic relations--where the duties of affection are commonly recognised as so imperative and important--we can find no really independent and self-evident principles for determining them1 ,i need not perhaps spend time in showing that the same is the case in respect of the less intimate ties 7of kindred1 neighbourhood1 etc47 that bind us to other human beings4 ,indeed1 this was made sufficiently manifest in our previous discussion of those other duties4 ,no doubt there are certain obligations towards human beings generally which are1 speaking broadly1 unquestionable3 as1 for example1 the negative duty of abstaining from causing pain to others against their will1 except by way of deserved punishment 7whether this is to be placed under the head of ,justice or ,benevolence72 and of making reparation for any pain which we may have caused4 ,still1 when we consider the extent of these duties and try to define their limits1--when we ask how far we may legitimately cause pain to other men 7or other sentient beings7 in order to obtain happiness for ourselves or third persons1 or even to confer a greater good on the sufferer himself1 if the pain be inflicted against his will1--we do not seem able to obtain any clear and generally accepted principle for deciding this point1 unless the ,utilitarian formula be admitted as such4 ,again1 as regards ,reparation1 there is1 as we have seen1 a fundamental doubt how far this is due for harm that has been involuntarily caused4 ,similarly1 all admit that we have a general duty of rendering services to our fellow-men and especially to those who are in special need1 and that we are bound to make sacrifices for them1 when the benefit that we thereby confer very decidedly outweighs the loss to ourselves2 but when we ask how far we are bound to give up our own happiness in order to promote that of our fellows1 while it can hardly be said that ,common ,sense distinctly accepts the ,utilitarian principle1 it yet does not definitely affirm any other4 ,and even the common principle of ,gratitude1 though its stringency is immediately and universally felt1 seems yet essentially indeterminate3 owing to the unsolved question whether the requital of a benefit ought to be proportionate to what it cost the benefactor1 or to what it is worth to the recipient4 #e4 ,when we pass to consider that element of ,justice which presented itself as ,gratitude universalised1 the same difficulty recurs in a more complicated form4 ,for here1 too1 we have to ask whether the ,requital of ,good ,desert ought to be proportioned to the benefit rendered1 or to the effort made to render it4 ,and if we scrutinise closely the common moral notion of ,retributive ,justice1 it appears1 strictly taken1 to imply the metaphysical doctrine of ,free ,will2 since1 according to this conception1 the reasonableness of rewarding merit is considered solely in relation to the past1 without regard to the future bad consequences to be expected from leaving merit without encouragement3 and if every excellence in any one's actions or productions seems referable ultimately to causes other than himself1 the individual's claim to requital1 from this point of view1 appears to vanish4 ,on the other hand it is obviously paradoxical in estimating ,desert to omit the moral excellences due to hereditary transmission and education3 or even intellectual excellences1 since good intention without foresight is commonly held to constitute a very imperfect merit4 ,even if we cut through this speculative difficulty by leaving the ultimate reward of real ,desert to ,divine ,justice1 we still seem unable to find any clear principles for framing a scale of merit4 ,and much the same may be said1 mutatis mutandis1 of the scale of ,demerit which ,criminal ,justice seems to require4 ,and even if these difficulties were overcome1 we should still be only at the commencement of the perplexities in which the practical determination of ,justice on self-evident principles is involved4 ,for the examination of the contents of this notion1 which we conducted in chap4 v41 furnished us not with a single definite principle1 but with a whole swarm of principles1 which are unfortunately liable to come into conflict with each other2 and of which even those that when singly contemplated have the air of being self-evident truths1 do not certainly carry with them any intuitively ascertainable definition of their mutual boundaries and relations4 ,thus1 for example1 in constructing an ideally perfect distribution of the means of happiness1 it seems necessary to take into account the notion 7as ,i called it7 of ,fitness1 which1 though often confounded with ,desert1 seems essentially distinct from it4 ,for the social #8distribuend' includes not merely the means of obtaining pleasurable passive feelings1 but also functions and instruments1 which are important sources of happiness1 but which it is obviously reasonable to give to those who can perform and use them4 ,and even as regards the material means of comfort and luxury--wealth1 in short--we do not find that the same amount produces the same result of happiness in every case3 and it seems reasonable that the means of refined and varied pleasure should be allotted to those who have the corresponding capacities for enjoyment4#bfe ,and yet these may not be the most deserving1 so that this principle may clearly conflict with that of requiting ,desert4 ,and either principle1 as we saw1 is liable to come into collision with the widely-accepted doctrine that the proper ultimate end of ,law is to secure the greatest possible ,freedom of action to all members of the community3 and that all that any individual1 strictly speaking1 owes to any other is non-interference1 except so far as he has further bound himself by free contract4 ,but further1 when we come to examine this principle in its turn1 we find that1 in order to be capable at all of affording a practical basis for social construction1 it needs limitations and qualifications which make it look less like an independent principle than a 8middle axiom0 of ,utilitarianism2 and that it cannot without a palpable strain be made to cover the most important rights which ,positive ,law secures4 ,for example1 the justification of permanent appropriation is surely rather that it supplies the only adequate motive for labour than that it1 strictly speaking1 realises ,freedom3 nor can the questions that arise in determining the limits of the right of property--such as whether it includes the right of bequest--be settled by any deductions from this supposed fundamental principle4 ,nor again1 can even the enforcement of contracts be fairly said to be a realisation of ,freedom2 for a man seems1 strictly speaking1 freer when no one of his volitions is allowed to cause an external control of any other4 ,and if we disregard this as a paradoxical subtlety1 we are met on the opposite side by the perplexity that if abstract ,freedom is consistent with any engagement of future services1 it must on the same grounds be consistent with such as are perpetual and unqualified1 and so even with actual slavery4 ,and this question becomes especially important when we consider that the duty of obeying positive laws has by many been reconciled with the abstract right of ,freedom1 by supposing a #8tacit compact' or understanding between each individual and the rest of his community4 ,this ,compact1 however1 seems on examination too clearly fictitious to be put forward as a basis of moral duty3 as is further evident from the indefinitely various qualifications and reservations with which the #8understanding' has by different thinkers been supposed to be #8understood4' ,hence many who maintain the #8,birthright of ,freedom' consider that the only abstractedly justifiable social order is one in which no laws are imposed without the express consent of those who are to obey them4 ,but we found it impossible really to construct society upon this basis3 and such ,representative ,governments as have actually been established only appear to realise this idea by means of sweeping limitations and transparent fictions4 ,it was manifest1 too1 that the maximum of what may be called ,constitutional ,freedom--i4e4 the most perfect conformity between the action of a government and the wishes of the majority of its subjects--need by no means result in the realisation of the maximum of ,civil ,freedom in the society so governed4 ,but even if we could delineate to our satisfaction an ideal social order1 including an ideal form of government1 we have still to reconcile the duty of realising this with the conformity due to the actual order of society4 ,for we have a strong conviction that positive laws ought1 generally speaking1 to be obeyed3 and1 again1 our notion of ,justice seemed to include a general duty of satisfying the expectations generated by custom and precedent4 ,yet if the actual order of society deviates very much from what we think ought to exist1 the duty of conforming to it seems to become obscure and doubtful4 ,and apart from this we cannot say that ,common ,sense regards it as an axiom that ,laws ought to be obeyed4 ,indeed1 all are agreed that they ought to be disobeyed when they command what is wrong3 though we do not seem able to elicit any clear general view as to what remains wrong after it has been commanded by the sovereign4 ,and1 again1 the positive laws that ought to be obeyed as such must be the commands issued by a 7morally7 rightful authority3 and though these will ordinarily coincide with the commands legally enforced1 we cannot say that this is always the case2 for the courts may be temporarily subservient to a usurper2 or1 again1 the sovereign hitherto habitually obeyed may be one against whom it has become right to rebel 7since it is generally admitted that this is sometimes right74 ,we require1 then1 principles for determining when usurpation becomes legitimate and when rebellion is justifiable3 and we do not seem able to elicit these from ,common ,sense--except so far as it may be fairly said that on this whole subject ,common ,sense inclines more to the ,utilitarian method than it does in matters of private morality4 ,still less can we state the general duty of satisfying #8natural expectations'--i4e4 such expectations as an average man would form under given circumstances--in the form of a clear and precise moral axiom4 ,no doubt a just man will generally satisfy customary claims3 but it can hardly be maintained that the mere existence of a custom renders it clearly obligatory that any one should conform to it who has not already promised to do so2 especially since bad customs can only be abolished by individuals venturing to disregard them4 #f4 ,we have still to examine 7whether as a branch of ,justice or under a separate head7 the duty of fulfilling express promises and distinct understandings4 ,the peculiar confidence which moralists have generally felt in this principle is strikingly illustrated by those endeavours to extend its scope which we have just had occasion to notice3 and it certainly seems to surpass in simplicity1 certainty1 and definiteness the moral rules that we have hitherto discussed4 ,here1 then1 if anywhere1 we seem likely to find one of those ethical axioms of which we are in search4 ,now we saw that the notion of a ,promise requires several qualifications not commonly noticed to make it precise3 but this alone is no reason why it may not be fitly used in framing a maxim1 which when enunciated and understood will properly claim universal acceptance as self-evident4 ,for similarly the uninstructed majority of mankind could not define a circle as a figure bounded by a line of which every point is equidistant from the centre3 but nevertheless1 when the definition is explained to them1 they will accept it as expressing the perfect type of that notion of roundness which they have long had in their minds4 ,and the same potential universality of acceptance may1 ,i think1 be fairly claimed for the propositions that the promise which the ,common ,sense of mankind recognises as binding must be understood by promiser and promisee in the same sense at the time of promising1 and that it is relative to the promisee and capable of being annulled by him1 and that it cannot override determinate#bff prior obligations4 ,but the case is different with the other qualifications which we had to discuss4 ,when once the question of introducing these has been raised1 we see that ,common ,sense is clearly divided as to the answer4 ,if we ask 7e4g47 how far our promise is binding if it was made in consequence of false statements1 on which1 however1 it was not understood to be conditional2 or if important circumstances were concealed1 or we were in any way led to believe that the consequences of keeping the promise would be different from what they turn out to be2 or if the promise was given under compulsion2 or if circumstances have materially altered since it was given1 and we find that the results of fulfilling it will be different from what we foresaw when we promised2 or even if it be only our knowledge of consequences which has altered1 and we now see that fulfilment will entail on us a sacrifice out of proportion to the benefit received by the promisee2 or perhaps see that it will even be injurious to him though he may not think so2--different conscientious persons would answer these and other#bfg questions 7both generally and in particular cases7 in different ways3 and though we could perhaps obtain a decided majority for some of these qualifications and against others1 there would not in any case be a clear consensus either way4 ,and1 moreover1 the mere discussion of these points seems to make it plain that the confidence with which the 8unsophisticated conscience0 asserts unreservedly 8that promises ought to be kept10 is due to inadvertence2 and that when the qualifications to which we referred are fairly considered1 this confidence inevitably changes into hesitation and perplexity4 ,it should be added1 that some of these qualifications themselves suggest a reference to the more comprehensive principle of ,utilitarianism1 as one to which this particular rule is naturally subordinate4 ,again1 reflection upon the place of this duty in a classified system of moral obligations tends to confirm our distrust of the ordinary enunciations of ,common ,sense in respect of it4 ,for1 as was seen1 ,fidelity to promises is very commonly ranked with ,veracity2 as though the mere fact of my having said that ,i would do a thing were the ground of my duty to do it4 ,but on reflection we perceive that the obligation must be regarded as contingent on the reliance that another has placed on my assertion3 that1 in fact1 the breach of duty is constituted by the disappointment of expectations voluntarily raised4 ,and when we see this we become less disposed to maintain the absoluteness of the duty3 it seems now to depend upon the amount of harm done by disappointing expectations2 and we shrink from saying that the promise ought to be kept1 if the keeping it would involve an amount of harm that seems decidedly to outweigh this4 ,the case of ,veracity we may dismiss somewhat more briefly1 as here it was still more easy to show that the common enunciation of the unqualified duty of ,truth-speaking is made without full consideration1 and cannot approve itself to the reflective mind as an absolute first principle4 ,for1 in the first place1 we found no clear agreement as to the fundamental nature of the obligation2 or as to its exact scope1 i4e4 whether it is our actual affirmation as understood by the recipient which we are bound to make correspondent to fact 7as far as we can71 or whatever inferences we foresee that he is likely to draw from this1 or both4 ,to realise perfect ,candour and ,sincerity1 we must aim at both3 and we no doubt admire the exhibition of these virtues3 but few will maintain that they ought to be exhibited under all circumstances4 ,and1 secondly1 it seems to be admitted by ,common ,sense1 though vaguely and reluctantly1 that the principle1 however defined1 is not of universal application2 at any rate it is not thought to be clearly wrong that untruths should be told to children1 or madmen1 or invalids1 or by advocates1 or to enemies or robbers1 or even to persons who ask questions which they have no right to ask 7if a mere refusal to answer would practically reveal an important secret74 ,and when we consider the limitations generally admitted1 it seems still more plain than in the last case1 that they are very commonly determined by utilitarian reasonings1 implicit or explicit4 #g4 ,if1 then1 the prescriptions of ,justice1 ,good ,faith1 and ,veracity1 as laid down by ,common ,sense1 appear so little capable of being converted into first principles of scientific ,ethics1 it seems scarcely necessary to inquire whether such axioms can be extracted from the minor maxims of social behaviour1 such as the maxim of ,liberality or the rules restraining the ,malevolent ,affections3 or1 again1 from such virtues as ,courage and ,humility1 which we found it difficult to class as either social or self-regarding4 ,indeed1 it was made plain in chap4 viii4 that as regards the proper regulation of resentment1 ,common ,sense can only be saved from inconsistency or hopeless vagueness by adopting the #8interest of society' as the ultimate standard3 and in the same way we cannot definitely distinguish ,courage from ,foolhardiness except by a reference to the probable tendency of the daring act to promote the wellbeing of the agent or of others1 or to some definite rule of duty prescribed under some other notion4 ,it is true that among what are commonly called 8duties to self0 we find the duty of self-preservation prescribed with apparent absoluteness1--at least so far as the sacrifice of one's life is not imperatively required for the preservation of the lives of others1 or for the attainment of some result conceived to be very important to society4 ,i think1 however1 that when confronted with the question of preserving a life which we can foresee will be both miserable and burdensome to others--e4g4 the life of a man stricken with a fatal disease which precludes the possibility of work of any kind1 during the weeks or months of agony that remain to him1--though ,common ,sense would still deny the legitimacy of suicide1 even under these conditions1 it would also admit the necessity of finding reasons for the denial4 ,this admission would imply that the universal wrongness of suicide is at any rate not self-evident4 ,and the reasons that would be found--so far as they did not ultimately depend upon premises drawn from ,revelational ,theology--would1 ,i think1 turn out to be utilitarian1 in a broad sense of the term3 it would be urged that if any exceptions to the rule prohibiting suicide were allowed1 dangerous encouragement would be given to the suicidal impulse in other cases in which suicide would really be a weak and cowardly dereliction of social duty3 it would also probably be urged that the toleration of suicide would facilitate secret murders4 ,in short1 the independent axiom of which we are in search seems to disappear on close examination in this case no less than in others4 ,so again1 reflection seems to show that the duties of ,temperance1 ,self-control1 and other cognate virtues1 are only clear and definite in so far as they are conceived as subordinate either to ,prudence 7as is ordinarily the case71 or to ,benevolence or some definite rule of social duty1 or at least to some end--such as #8furtherance of moral progress'#bfh--of which the conception involves the notion of duty supposed to be already determinate4 ,certainly the authority of ,common ,sense cannot be fairly claimed for any restriction even of the bodily appetites for food and drink1 that is not thus subordinated4 ,in the case1 however1 of the sexual appetite1 a special regulation seems to be prescribed on some independent principle under the notion of ,purity or ,chastity4 ,in chap4 ix4 of this ,book1 where we examined this notion1 it appeared that ,common ,sense is not only not explicit1 but actually averse to explicitness1 on this subject4 ,as my aim in the preceding chapters was to give1 above all things1 a faithful exposition of the morality of ,common ,sense1 ,i allowed my inquiry to be checked by this 7as it seemed7 clearly recognisable sentiment4 ,but when it becomes our primary object to test the intuitive evidence of the moral principles commonly accepted1 it seems necessary to override this aversion3 for we can hardly ascertain whether rational conviction is attainable as to the acts allowed and forbidden under this notion and its opposite1 without subjecting it to the same close scrutiny that we have endeavoured to give to the other leading notions of ,ethics4 ,here the briefest account of such a scrutiny will be sufficient4 ,i am aware that in giving even this ,i cannot but cause a certain offence to minds trained in good moral habits3 but ,i trust ,i may claim the same indulgence as is commonly granted to the physiologist1 who also has to direct the student's attention to objects which a healthy mind is naturally disinclined to contemplate4 #h4 ,what1 then1 is the conduct which ,purity forbids 7for the principle is more easily discussed in its negative aspect78 ,as the normal and obvious end of sexual intercourse is the propagation of the species1 some have thought that all indulgence of appetite1 except as a means to this end1 should be prohibited4 ,but this doctrine would lead to a restriction of conjugal intercourse far too severe for ,common ,sense4 ,shall we say1 then1 that ,purity forbids such indulgence except under the conditions of conjugal union defined by ,law8 ,but this answer1 again1 further reflection shows to be unsatisfactory4 ,for1 first1 we should not1 on consideration1 call a conjugal union impure1 merely because the parties had wilfully omitted to fulfil legal conditions1 and had made a contract which the law declined to enforce4 ,we might condemn their conduct1 but we should not apply to it this notion4 ,and1 secondly1 we feel that positive law may be unfavourable to ,purity1 and that in fact ,purity1 like ,justice1 is something which the law ought to maintain1 but does not always4 ,we have to ask1 then1 what kind of sexual relations we are to call essentially impure1 whether countenanced or not by ,law and ,custom8 ,there appear to be no distinct principles1 having any claim to self-evidence1 upon which the question can be answered so as to command general assent4 ,it would be difficult even to state such a principle for determining the degree of consanguinity between husband and wife which constitutes a union incestuous2 although the aversion with which such unions are commonly regarded is a peculiarly intense moral sentiment2 and the difficulty becomes indefinitely greater when we consider the rationale of prohibited degrees of affinity4 ,again1 probably few would stigmatise a legal polygynous connexion as impure1 however they might disapprove of the law and of the state of society in which such a law was established3 but if legal ,polygyny is not impure1 is ,polyandry1 when legal and customary--as is not unfrequently the case among the lower races of man--to be so characterised8 and if not1 on what rational principle can the notion be applied to institutions and conduct8 ,again1 where divorce by mutual consent1 with subsequent marriage1 is legalised1 we do not call this an offence against ,purity3 and yet if the principle of free change be once admitted1 it seems paradoxical to distinguish purity from impurity merely by less rapidity of transition2#bfi and to condemn as impure even #8,free ,love1' in so far as it is earnestly advocated as a means to a completer harmony of sentiment between men and women1 and not to mere sensual license4 ,shall we1 then1 fall back upon the presence of mutual affection 7as distinguished from mere appetite7 as constituting the essence of pure sexual relations8 ,but this1 again1 while too lax from one point of view1 seems from another too severe for ,common ,sense3 as we do not condemn marriages without affection as impure1 although we disapprove of them as productive of unhappiness4 ,such marriages1 indeed1 are sometimes stigmatised as 8legalised prostitution10 but the phrase is felt to be extravagant and paradoxical2 and it is even doubtful whether we do disapprove of them under all circumstances2 as 7e4g47 in the case of royal alliances4 ,again1 how shall we judge of such institutions as those of ,plato's ,commonwealth1 establishing community of women and children1 but at the same time regulating sexual indulgence with the strictest reference to social ends8 ,our habitual standards seem inapplicable to such novel circumstances4 ,the truth seems to be1 that reflection on the current sexual morality discovers to us two distinct grounds for it3 first and chiefly1 the maintenance of a certain social order1 believed to be most conducive to the prosperous continuance of the human race3 and1 secondly1 the protection of habits of feeling in individuals believed to be generally most important to their perfection or their happiness4 ,we commonly conceive that both these ends are to be attained by the same regulations3 and in an ideal state of society this would perhaps be the case3 but in actual life there is frequently a partial separation and incompatibility between them4 ,but further1 if the repression of sexual license is prescribed merely as a means to these ends1 it does not seem that we can affirm as self-evident that it is always a necessary means in either case3 on the contrary1 it seems clear that such an affirmation would be unreliable apart from empirical confirmation4 ,we cannot reasonably be sure1 without induction from sociological observations1 that a certain amount of sexual license will be incompatible with the maintenance of population in sufficient numbers and good condition4 ,and if we consider the matter in its relation to the individual's perfection1 it is certainly clear that he misses the highest and best development of his emotional nature1 if his sexual relations are of a merely sensual kind3 but we can hardly know a priori that this lower kind of relation interferes with the development of the higher 7nor indeed does experience seem to show that this is universally the case74 ,and this latter line of argument has a further difficulty4 ,for the common opinion that we have to justify does not merely condemn the lower kind of development in comparison with the higher1 but in comparison with none at all4 ,since we do not positively blame a man for remaining celibate 7though we perhaps despise him somewhat unless the celibacy is adopted as a means to a noble end73 it is difficult to show why we should condemn--in its bearing on the individual's emotional perfection solely--the imperfect development afforded by merely sensual relations4 #i4 ,much more might be said to exhibit the perplexities in which the attempt to define the rule of ,purity or ,chastity involves us4 ,but ,i do not desire to extend the discussion beyond what is necessary for the completion of my argument4 ,it seems to me that the conclusion announced in #b of this chapter has now been sufficiently justified4 ,we have examined the moral notions that present themselves with a prima facie claim to furnish independent and self-evident rules of morality3 and we have in each case found that from such regulation of conduct as the ,common ,sense of mankind really supports1 no proposition can be elicited which1 when fairly contemplated1 even appears to have the characteristic of a scientific axiom4 ,it is therefore scarcely needful to proceed to a systematic examination of the manner in which ,common ,sense provides for the co-ordination of these principles4 ,in fact1 this question seems to have been already discussed as far as is profitable3 for the attempt to define each principle singly has inevitably led us to consider their mutual relations3 and it was in the cases where two moral principles came into collision that we most clearly saw the vagueness and inconsistency with which the boundaries of each are determined by ,common ,sense4 ,for example1 the distinction between perfectly stringent moral obligations1 and such laxer duties as may be modified by a man's own act1 is often taken3 and it is one which1 as we saw1 is certainly required in formulating the ,common-,sense view of the effect of a promise in creating new obligations3 but it is one which we cannot apply with any practical precision1 because of the high degree of indeterminateness which we find in the common notions of duties to which the highest degree of stringency is yet commonly attributed4 ,it only remains to guard my argument from being understood in a more sweeping sense than it has been intended or is properly able to bear4 ,nothing that ,i have said even tends to show that we have not distinct moral impulses1 claiming authority over all others1 and prescribing or forbidding kinds of conduct as to which there is a rough general agreement1 at least among educated persons of the same age and country4 ,it is only maintained that the objects of these impulses do not admit of being scientifically determined by any reflective analysis of common sense4 ,the notions of ,benevolence1 ,justice1 ,good ,faith1 ,veracity1 ,purity1 etc41 are not necessarily emptied of significance for us1 because we have found it impossible to define them with precision4 ,the main part of the conduct prescribed under each notion is sufficiently clear3 and the general rule prescribing it does not necessarily lose its force because there is in each case a margin of conduct involved in obscurity and perplexity1 or because the rule does not on examination appear to be absolute and independent4 ,in short1 the ,morality of ,common ,sense may still be perfectly adequate to give practical guidance to common people in common circumstances3 but the attempt to elevate it into a system of ,intuitional ,ethics brings its inevitable imperfections into prominence without helping us to remove them4#bgj ,,footnotes3 #bef ,hence the practical importance of the ,formal test of ,rightness1 on which ,kant insists3 cf4 ante1 chap4 i4 #c of this ,book4 #beg ,the final arbiter1 that is1 on the question what the rule is3 of course the moral obligation to conform to any rule laid down by an external authority must rest on some principle which the individual's reason has to apply4 #beh ,cf4 ,book i4 chap4 iii4 #b4 #bei ,cf4 ,book i4 chap4 iii4 #b4 #bfj ,it has been fairly urged that ,i leave the determinations of ,common ,sense very loose and indefinite3 and if ,i were endeavouring to bring out a more positive result from this examination1 ,i ought certainly to have discussed further how we are to ascertain the #8experts' on whose #8consensus' we are to rely1 in this or any other subject4 ,but my scientific conclusions are to so great an extent negative1 that ,i thought it hardly necessary to enter upon this discussion4 ,i have been careful not to exaggerate the doubtfulness and inconsistency of ,common ,sense3 should it turn out to be more doubtful and inconsistent than ,i have represented it1 my argument will only be strengthened4 #bfa ,in chap4 ix4 ,temperance was regarded as subordinate to1 or a special application of1 ,prudence or ,self-love moralised3 because this seemed to be on the whole the view of ,common ,sense1 which in the preceding chapters ,i have been endeavouring to follow as closely as possible1 both in stating the principles educed and in the order of their exposition4 #bfb ,the admission that these maxims are self-evident must be taken subject to the distinction before established between 8subjective0 and 8objective0 rightness4 ,it is a necessary condition of my acting rightly that ,i should not do what ,i judge to be wrong3 but if my judgment is mistaken1 my action in accordance with it will not be 8objectively0 right4 #bfc ,it may be noticed that a view very similar to this has often been maintained in considering what ,god is in justice bound to do for human beings in consequence of the quasi-parental relation in which ,he stands to them4 #bfd ,it is not irrelevant to notice the remarkable divergence of suggestions for the better regulation of marriage1 to which reflective minds seem to be led when they are once set loose from the trammels of tradition and custom2 as exhibited in the speculations of philosophers in all ages--especially of those 7as e4g4 ,plato7 to whom we cannot attribute any sensual or licentious bias4 #bfe ,for example1 many seem to hold that wealth is1 roughly speaking1 rightly distributed when cultivated persons have abundance and the uncultivated a bare subsistence1 since the former are far more capable of deriving happiness from wealth than the latter4 #bff ,i refer later 7p4 #cfj7 to the difficulty before noticed in respect of such prior obligations as are not strictly determinate4 #bfg ,i have omitted as less important the special questions connected with promises to the dead or to the absent1 or where a form of words is prescribed4 #bfh ,it was this conception that seemed to give the true standard of ,humility1 considered as a purely internal duty4 #bfi ,it should be observed that ,i am not asking for an exact quantitative decision1 but whether we can really think that the decision depends upon considerations of this kind4 #bgj ,it should be observed that the more positive treatment of ,common-sense ,morality1 in its relation to ,utilitarianism1 to which we shall proceed in chap4 iii4 of the following ,book1 is intended as an indispensable supplement of the negative criticism which has just been completed4 ,,chapter ,,xii ,,motives ,,or ,,springs ,,of ,,action ,,considered ,,as ,,subjects ,,of ,,moral ,,judgment #a4 ,in the first chapter of this third ,book ,i was careful to point out that motives1 as well as intentions1 form part of the subject-matter of our common moral judgments3 and indeed in our notion of #8conscientiousness' the habit of reflecting on motives1 and judging them to be good or bad1 is a prominent element4 ,it is necessary1 therefore1 in order to complete our examination of the ,intuitional ,method1 to consider this comparison of motives1 and ascertain how far it can be made systematic1 and pursued to conclusions of scientific value4 ,and this seems a convenient place for treating of this part of the subject3 since it has been maintained by an important school of ,english moralists that ,desires and ,affections rather than ,acts are the proper subjects of the ethical judgment3 and it is natural to fall back upon this view when systematic reflection on the morality of ,common ,sense has shown us the difficulty of obtaining a precise and satisfactory determination of rightness and wrongness in external conduct4 ,to avoid confusion1 it should be observed that the term #8motive' is commonly used in two ways4 ,it is sometimes applied to those among the foreseen consequences of any act which the agent desired in willing3 and sometimes to the desire1 or conscious impulse itself4 ,the two meanings are in a manner correspondent1 as1 where impulses are different1 there must always be some sort of difference in their respective objects4 ,but for our present purpose it is more convenient to take the latter meaning3 as it is our own impulsive nature that we have practically to deal with1 in the way of controlling1 resisting1 indulging the different impulses2 and therefore it is the ethical value of these that we are primarily concerned to estimate3 and we often find that two impulses1 which would be placed very far apart in any psychological list1 are directed towards an end materially identical1 though regarded from a different point of view in each case4 ,as 7e4g47 both appetite and ,rational self-love may impel a man to seek a particular sensual gratification2 though in the latter case it is regarded under the general notion of pleasure1 and as forming part of a sum called ,happiness4 ,in this chapter1 then1 ,i shall use the term ,motive to denote the desires of particular results1 believed to be attainable as consequences of our voluntary acts1 by which desires we are stimulated to will those acts4#bga ,the first point to notice in considering the ethical result of a comprehensive comparison of motives is1 that the issue in any internal conflict is not usually thought to be between positively good and bad1 but between better and less good1 more or less estimable or elevated motives4 ,the only kind of motive which 7if any7 we commonly judge to be intrinsically bad1 apart from the circumstances under which it operates1 is malevolent affection2 that is1 the desire1 however aroused1 to inflict pain or harm on some other sentient being4 ,and reflection shows 7as we saw in chap4 viii4 of this ,book7 that ,common ,sense does not pronounce even this kind of impulse absolutely bad3 since we commonly recognise the existence of #8legitimate resentment' and #8righteous indignation'2 and though moralists try to distinguish between anger directed #8against the act' and #8against the agent1' and between the impulse to inflict pain and the desire of the antipathetic pleasure that the agent will reap from this infliction1 it may be fairly doubted whether it is within the capacity of ordinary human nature to maintain these distinctions in practice4 ,at any rate there is no other motive except deliberate malevolence which ,common ,sense condemns as absolutely bad4 ,the other motives that are commonly spoken of in #8dyslogistic' terms seem to be most properly called 7in ,bentham's language7 #8,seductive' rather than bad4 ,that is1 they prompt to forbidden conduct with conspicuous force and frequency3 but when we consider them carefully we find that there are certain limits1 however narrow1 within which their operation is legitimate4 ,the question1 then1 is how far the intuitive knowledge that our common judgments seem to imply of the relative goodness of different kinds of motives is found on reflection to satisfy the conditions laid down in the preceding chapter4 ,i have before#bgb argued that it is incorrect to regard this comparison of motives as the normal form of our common moral judgments1 nor do ,i see any ground for holding it to be the original form4 ,i think that in the normal development of man's moral consciousness1 both in the individual and in the race1 moral judgments are first passed on outward acts1 and that motives do not come to be definitely considered till later2 just as external perception of physical objects precedes introspection4 ,at the same time1 in my view1 it does not therefore follow that the comparison of motives is not the final and most perfect form of the moral judgment4 ,it might approve itself as such by the systematic clearness and mutual consistency of the results to which it led1 when pursued by different thinkers independently3 and by its freedom from the puzzles and difficulties to which other developments of the ,intuitional ,method seem to be exposed4 ,it appears1 however1 on examination that1 on the one hand1 many 7if not all7 of the difficulties which have emerged in the preceding discussion of the commonly received principles of conduct are reproduced in a different form when we try to arrange ,motives in order of excellence3 and on the other hand1 such a construction presents difficulties peculiar to itself1 and the attempt to solve these exhibits greater and more fundamental differences among ,intuitive moralists1 as regards ,rank of ,motive1 than we found to exist as regards ,rightness of outward acts4 #b4 ,in the first place1 it has to be decided whether we are to include in our list of motives the ,moral ,sentiments1 or impulses towards particular kinds of virtuous conduct as such1 e4g4 ,candour1 ,veracity1 ,fortitude4 ,it seems unwarrantable to exclude them1 as such sentiments are observable as distinct and independent impulses in most well-trained minds1 and we sometimes recognise their existence in considerable intensity1 as when we speak of a man being #8enthusiastically brave1' or #8intensely veracious1' or as #8having a passion for justice4' ,at the same time their admission places us in the following dilemma4 ,either the objects of these impulses are represented by the very notions that we have been examining--in which case1 after we have decided that any impulse is better than its rival1 all the perplexities set forth in the previous chapters will recur1 before we can act on our decision2 for what avails it to recognise the superiority of the impulse to do justice1 if we do not know what it is just to do8--or if in any case the object which a moral sentiment prompts us to realise is conceived more simply1 without the qualifications which a complete reflection on ,common ,sense forced us to recognise2 then1 as the previous investigation shows1 we shall certainly not find agreement as to the relation between this and other impulses4 ,for example1 a dispute1 whether the impulse to speak the truth ought or ought not to be followed1 will inevitably arise when ,veracity seems opposed either to the general good1 or to the interests of some particular person2 that is1 when it conflicts with #8particular' or #8universal' benevolence4 ,hutcheson expressly places these latter impulses in a higher rank than 8candour1 veracity1 fortitude02 reserving the highest moral approbation for 8the most extensive benevolence0 or 8calm1 stable1 universal goodwill to all40#bgc ,but this view1 which coincides practically with ,utilitarianism1 would certainly be disputed by most ,intuitional moralists4 ,again1 some of these moralists 7as ,kant7 regard all actions as bad--or not good--which are not done from pure regard for duty or choice of ,right as ,right3 while ,hutcheson1 who represents the opposite pole of ,intuitional ,ethics1 equally distinguishes the love of ,virtue as a separate impulse2 but treats it as at once co-ordinate in rank and coincident in its effects with universal ,benevolence4 ,so1 again1 moralists diverge widely in estimating the ethical value of ,self-love4 ,for ,butler seems to regard it as one of two superior and naturally authoritative impulses1 the other being ,conscience3 nay1 in a passage before quoted1 he even concedes that it would be reasonable for ,conscience to yield to it1 if the two could possibly conflict4 ,other moralists 7and ,butler elsewhere7#bgd appear to place ,self-love among virtuous impulses under the name of ,prudence3 though among these they often rank it rather low1 and would have it yield in case of conflict1 to nobler virtues4 ,others1 again1 exclude it from ,virtue altogether3 e4g4 ,kant1 in one of his treatises1#bge says that the end of ,self-love1 one's own happiness1 cannot be an end for the ,moral ,reason2 that the force of the reasonable will1 in which ,virtue consists1 is always exhibited in resistance to natural egoistic impulses4 ,dr4 ,martineau1 whose system is framed on the basis that ,i am now examining1 attempts to avoid some of the difficulties just pointed out by refusing to admit the existence of any virtuous impulses except the 8preference for the superior of the competing springs of action in each case0 of a conflict of motives4 8,i cannot admit10 he says1 8either the loves of ,virtues--of candour1 veracity1 fortitude--or the virtues themselves1 as so many additional impulses over and above those from the conflict of which they are formed4 ,i do not confess my fault in order to be candid 444 unless ,i am a prig1 ,i never think of candour1 as predicable1 or going to be predicable1 of me at all40#bgf ,i am not1 however1 sure whether ,dr4 ,martineau really means to deny the existence of persons who act from a conscious desire to realise an ideal of ,candour or ,fortitude1 or whether he merely means to express disapproval of such persons3 in the former sense his statement seems to me a psychological paradox1 in conflict with ordinary experience3 in the latter sense it seems an ethical paradox1 affording a striking example of that diversity of judgments as to the rank of motives1 to which ,i am now drawing attention4 #c4 ,but even if we put out of sight the ,moral sentiments and ,self-love1 it is still scarcely possible to frame a scale of motives arranged in order of merit1 for which we could claim anything like a clear consent1 even of cultivated and thoughtful persons4 ,on one or two points1 indeed1 we seem to be generally agreed2 e4g4 that the bodily appetites are inferior to the benevolent affections and the intellectual desires2 and perhaps that impulses tending primarily to the well-being of the individual are lower in rank than those which we class as extra-regarding or disinterested4 ,but beyond a few vague statements of this kind1 it is very difficult to proceed4 ,for example1 when we compare personal affections with the love of knowledge or of beauty1 or the passion for the ideal in any form1 much doubt and divergence of opinion become manifest4 ,indeed1 we should hardly agree on the relative rank of the benevolent affections taken by themselves2 for some would prefer the more intense1 though narrower1 while others would place the calmer and wider feelings in the highest rank4 ,or again1 since ,love1 as we saw1#bgg is a complex emotion1 and commonly includes1 besides the desire of the good or happiness of the beloved1 a desire for union or intimacy of some kind2 some would consider an affection more elevated in proportion as the former element predominated1 while others would regard the latter as at least equally essential to the highest kind of affection4 ,again1 we may notice the love of ,fame as an important and widely operative motive1 which would be ranked very differently by different persons3 for some would place the former 8spur that the clear spirit doth raise0 among the most elevated impulses after the moral sentiments2 while others think it degrading to depend for one's happiness on the breath of popular favour4 ,further1 the more we contemplate the actual promptings that precede any volition1 the more we seem to find complexity of motive the rule rather than the exception1 at least in the case of educated persons3 and from this composition of impulses there results a fundamental perplexity as to the principles on which our decision is to be made1 even supposing that we have a clear view of the relative worth of the elementary impulses4 ,for the compound will generally contain nobler and baser elements1 and we can hardly get rid of the latter2 since--as ,i have before said--though we may frequently suppress and expel a motive by firmly resisting it1 it does not seem possible to exclude it if we do the act to which it prompts4 ,suppose1 then1 that we are impelled in one direction by a combination of high and low motives1 and in another by an impulse that ranks between the two in the scale1 how shall we decide which course to follow8 ,such a case is by no means uncommon3 e4g4 an injured man may be moved by an impulse of pity to spare his injurer1 while a regard for justice and a desire of revenge combined impel him to inflict punishment4 ,or1 again1 a ,jew of liberal views might be restrained from eating pork by a desire not to shock the feelings of his friends1 and might be moved to eat it by the desire to vindicate true religious liberty combined with a liking for pork4 ,how are we to deal with such a case as this8 ,for it will hardly be suggested that we should estimate the relative proportions of the different motives and decide accordingly2--qualitative analysis of our motives is to some extent possible to us1 but the quantitative analysis that this would require is not in our power4 ,but even apart from this difficulty arising from complexity of motives1 ,i think it impossible to assign a definite and constant ethical value to each different kind of motive1 without reference to the particular circumstances under which it has arisen1 the extent of indulgence that it demands1 and the consequences to which this indulgence would lead in any particular case4 ,i may conveniently illustrate this by reference to the table1 drawn up by ,dr4 ,martineau1#bgh of springs of action arranged in order of merit4 ,,lowest4 #a4 ,secondary ,passions3--,censoriousness1 ,vindictiveness1 ,suspiciousness4 #b4 ,secondary ,organic ,propensions3--,love of ,ease and ,sensual ,pleasure4 #c4 ,primary ,organic ,propensions3--,appetites4 #d4 ,primary ,animal ,propension3--,spontaneous ,activity 7unselective74 #e4 ,love of ,gain 7reflective derivative from ,appetite74 #f4 ,secondary ,affections 7sentimental indulgence of sympathetic feelings74 #g4 ,primary ,passions3--,antipathy1 ,fear1 ,resentment4 #h4 ,causal energy3--,love of ,power1 or ,ambition2 ,love of ,liberty4 #i4 ,secondary ,sentiments3--,love of ,culture4 #aj4 ,primary ,sentiments of ,wonder and ,admiration4 #aa4 ,primary ,affections1 ,parental and ,social2 with 7approximately7 ,generosity and ,gratitude4 #ab4 ,primary ,affection of ,compassion4 #ac4 ,primary ,sentiment of ,reverence4 ,,highest4 ,this scale seems to me open to much criticism1 both from a psychological and from an ethical point of view3#bgi but1 granting that it corresponds broadly to the judgments that men commonly pass as to the different elevation of different motives1 it seems to me in the highest degree paradoxical to lay down that each class of motives is always to be preferred to the class below it1 without regard to circumstances and consequences4 ,so far as it is true that 8the conscience says to every one1 #8,do not eat till you are hungry and stop when you are hungry no more1'0 it is not1 ,i venture to think1 because a 8regulative right is clearly vested in primary instinctive needs1 relatively to their secondaries10 but because experience has shown that to seek the gratification of the palate apart from the satisfaction of hunger is generally dangerous to physical well-being2 and it is in view of this danger that the conscience operates4 ,if we condemn 8a ship captain10 who1 8caught in a fog off a lee shore1 neglects1 through indolence and love of ease1 to slacken speed and take cautious soundings and open his steam-whistle10 it is not because we intuitively discern ,fear to be a higher motive than ,love of ,ease1 but because the consequences disregarded are judged to be indefinitely more important than the gratification obtained3 if we took a case in which fear was not similarly sustained by prudence1 our judgment would certainly be different4 ,the view of ,common ,sense appears rather to be that most natural impulses have their proper spheres1 within which they should be normally operative1 and therefore the question whether in any case a higher motive should yield to a lower one cannot be answered decisively in the general way in which ,dr4 ,martineau answers it3 the answer must depend on the particular conditions and circumstances of the conflict4 ,we recognise it as possible that a motive which we commonly rank as higher may wrongly intrude into the proper sphere of one which we rank as lower1 just as the lower is liable to encroach on the higher2 only since there is very much less danger of the former intrusion1 it naturally falls into the background in ethical discussions and exhortations that have a practical aim4 ,the matter is complicated by the further consideration that as the character of a moral agent becomes better1 the motives that we rank as 8higher0 tend to be developed1 so that their normal sphere of operation is enlarged at the expense of the lower4 ,hence there are two distinct aims in moral regulation and culture1 so far as they relate to motives3 7#a7 to keep the 8lower0 motive within the limits within which its operation is considered to be legitimate and good on the whole1 so long as we cannot substitute for it the equally effective operation of a higher motive2 and at the same time 7#b7 to effect this substitution of 8higher0 for 8lower0 gradually1 as far as can be done without danger1--up to a limit which we cannot definitely fix1 but which we certainly conceive1 for the most part1 as falling short of complete exclusion of the lower motive4 ,i may illustrate by reference to the passion of resentment of which ,i before spoke4 ,the view of reflective common sense is1 ,i think1 that the malevolent impulse so designated1 as long as it is strictly limited to resentment against wrong and operates in aid of justice1 has a legitimate sphere of action in the social life of human beings as actually constituted3 that1 indeed1 its suppression would be gravely mischievous1 unless we could at the same time intensify the ordinary man's regard for justice or for social well-being so that the total strength of motives prompting to the punishment of crime should not be diminished4 ,it is1 no doubt1 8to be wished10 as ,butler says1 that men would repress wrong from these higher motives rather than from passionate resentment2 but we cannot hope to effect this change in human beings generally except by a slow and gradual process of elevation of character3 therefore supposing a conflict between 8,compassion10 which is highest but one in ,dr4 ,martineau's scale1 and 8,resentment10 which he places about the middle1 it is by no means to be laid down as a general rule that compassion ought to prevail4 ,we ought rather--with ,butler--to regard resentment as a salutary 8balance to the weakness of pity10 which would be liable to prevent the execution of justice if resentment were excluded4 ,or we might similarly take the impulse which comes lowest 7among those not condemned altogether7 in ,dr4 ,martineau's scale--the 8,love of ,ease and ,sensual ,pleasure40 ,no doubt this impulse1 or group of impulses1 is continually leading men to shirk or scamp their strict duty1 or to fall in some less definite way below their own ideal of conduct2 hence the attitude habitually maintained towards it by preachers and practical moralists is that of repression4 ,still1 common sense surely recognises that there are cases in which even this impulse ought to prevail over impulses ranked above it in ,dr4 ,martineau's scale2 we often find men prompted--say by 8love of gain0--to shorten unduly their hours of recreation2 and in the case of a conflict of motives under such circumstances we should judge it best that victory should remain on the side of the 8love of ease and pleasure10 and that the encroachment of 8love of gain0 should be repelled4 ,i do not1 however1 think that in either of these instances the conflict of motives would remain such as ,i have just described3 ,i think that though the struggle might begin as a duel between resentment and compassion1 or between love of ease and love of gain1 it would not be fought out in the lists so drawn2 since higher motives would inevitably be called in as the conflict went on1 regard for justice and social well-being on the side of resentment1 regard for health and ultimate efficiency for work on the side of love of ease2 and it would be the intervention of these higher motives that would decide the struggle1 so far as it was decided rightly and as we should approve4 ,this certainly is what would happen in my own case1 if the supposed conflict were at all serious and its decision deliberate2 and this constitutes my final reason for holding that such a scale as ,dr4 ,martineau has drawn up1 of motives arranged according to their moral rank1 can never have more than a very subordinate ethical importance4 ,i admit that it may serve to indicate in a rough and general way the kinds of desires which it is ordinarily best to encourage and indulge1 in comparison with other kinds which are ordinarily likely to compete and collide with them2 and we might thus settle summarily some of the comparatively trifling conflicts of motive which the varying and complex play of needs1 habits1 interests1 and their accompanying emotions1 continually stirs in our daily life4 ,but if a serious question of conduct is raised1 ,i cannot conceive myself deciding it morally by any comparison of motives below the highest3 it seems to me that the question must inevitably be carried up for decision into the court of whatever motive we regard as supremely regulative3 so that the comparison ultimately decisive would be not between the lower motives primarily conflicting1 but between the effects of the different lines of conduct to which these lower motives respectively prompt1 considered in relation to whatever we regard as the ultimate end or ends of reasonable action4 ,and this1 ,i conceive1 will be the course naturally taken by the moral reflection not only of utilitarians1 but of all who follow ,butler in regarding our passions and propensions as forming naturally a 8system or constitution10 in which the ends of lower impulses are subordinate as means to the ends of certain governing motives1 or are comprehended as parts in these larger ends4 ,,footnotes3 #bga ,in ,green's ,prolegomena to ,ethics1 ,book ii4 chaps4 i4 and ii4 a peculiar view is taken of 8motives1 of that kind by which it is the characteristic of moral or human action1 to be determined40 ,such motives1 it is maintained1 must be distinguished from desires in the sense of 8mere solicitations of which a man is conscious02 they are 8constituted by the reaction of the man's self upon these1 and its identification of itself with one of them40 ,in fact the 8direction of the self-conscious self to the realisation of an object0 which ,i should call an act of will1 is the phenomenon to which ,green would restrict the term 8desire in that sense in which desire is the principle and notion of an imputable human action40 ,the use of terms here suggested appears to me inconvenient1 and the psychological analysis implied in it to a great extent erroneous4 ,i admit that in certain simple cases of choice1 where the alternatives suggested are each prompted by a single definite desire1 there is no psychological inaccuracy in saying that in willing the act to which he is stimulated by any such desire the agent 8identifies himself with the desire40 ,but in more complex cases the phrase appears to me incorrect1 as obliterating important distinctions between the two kinds of psychical phenomena which are usually and conveniently distinguished as 8desires0 and volitions4 ,in the first place1 as ,i have before pointed out 7chap4 i4 #b of this ,book71 it often happens that certain foreseen consequences of volition1 which as foreseen are undoubtedly willed and--in a sense--chosen by the agents1 are not objects of desire to him at all1 but even possibly of aversion--aversion1 of course1 overcome by his desire of other consequences of the same act4 ,in the second place1 it is specially important1 from an ethical point of view1 to notice that1 among the various desires or aversions aroused in us by the complex foreseen consequences of a contemplated act1 there are often impulses with which we do not identify ourselves1 but which we even try to suppress as far as possible3 though as it is not possible to suppress them completely--especially if we do the act to which they prompt--we cannot say that they do not operate as motives4 #bgb ,cf4 ante1 chap4 i4 #b of this ,book4 #bgc ,hutcheson1 ,system of ,moral ,philosophy1 ,book i4 chap4 iv4 #aj4 #bgd ,see the ,dissertation ,of the ,nature of ,virtue appended to the ,analogy4 #bge ,the ,metaphysische ,anfangsgrnde der ,tugendlehre3 but it ought to be observed that the ethical view briefly expounded in the ,kritik der reinen ,vernunft appears to have much more affinity with ,butler's4 #bgf ,types of ,ethical ,theory1 ,vol4 ii4 p4 #bhd1 #bnd edition4 #bgg ,cf4 ante1 chap4 iv4 #b of this ,book4 #bgh ,types of ,ethical ,theory1 vol4 ii4 p4 #bff4 ,dr4 ,martineau explains that the chief composite springs are inserted in their approximate place1 subject to the variations of which their composition renders them susceptible4 #bgi ,thus we might ask why the class of 8passions0 is so strangely restricted1 why conjugal affection is omitted1 whether wonder can properly be regarded as a definite motive1 whether 8censoriousness0 is properly ranked with 8vindictiveness0 as one of the 8lowest passions10 etc4 ,,chapter ,,xiii ,,philosophical ,,intuitionism #a4 ,is there1 then1 no possibility of attaining1 by a more profound and discriminating examination of our common moral thought1 to real ethical axioms--intuitive propositions of real clearness and certainty8 ,this question leads us to the examination of that third phase of the intuitive method1 which was called ,philosophical ,intuitionism4#bhj ,for we conceive it as the aim of a philosopher1 as such1 to do somewhat more than define and formulate the common moral opinions of mankind4 ,his function is to tell men what they ought to think1 rather than what they do think3 he is expected to transcend ,common ,sense in his premises1 and is allowed a certain divergence from ,common ,sense in his conclusions4 ,it is true that the limits of this deviation are firmly1 though indefinitely1 fixed3 the truth of a philosopher's premises will always be tested by the acceptability of his conclusions3 if in any important point he be found in flagrant conflict with common opinion1 his method is likely to be declared invalid4 ,still1 though he is expected to establish and concatenate at least the main part of the commonly accepted moral rules1 he is not necessarily bound to take them as the basis on which his own system is constructed4 ,rather1 we should expect that the history of ,moral ,philosophy--so far at least as those whom we may call orthodox thinkers are concerned--would be a history of attempts to enunciate1 in full breadth and clearness1 those primary intuitions of ,reason1 by the scientific application of which the common moral thought of mankind may be at once systematised and corrected4 ,and this is to some extent the case4 ,but ,moral ,philosophy1 or philosophy as applied to ,morality1 has had other tasks to occupy it1 even more profoundly difficult than that of penetrating to the fundamental principles of ,duty4 ,in modern times especially1 it has admitted the necessity of demonstrating the harmony of ,duty with ,interest2 that is1 with the ,happiness or ,welfare of the agent on whom the duty in each case is imposed4 ,it has also undertaken to determine the relation of ,right or ,good generally to the world of actual existence3 a task which could hardly be satisfactorily accomplished without an adequate explanation of the existence of ,evil4 ,it has further been distracted by questions which1 in my view1 are of psychological rather than ethical importance1 as to the #8innateness' of our notions of ,duty1 and the origin of the faculty that furnishes them4 ,with their attention concentrated on these difficult subjects1 each of which has been mixed up in various ways with the discussion of fundamental moral intuitions1 philosophers have too easily been led to satisfy themselves with ethical formul which implicitly accept the morality of ,common ,sense en bloc1 ignoring its defects2 and merely express a certain view of the relation of this morality to the individual mind or to the universe of actual existence4 ,perhaps also they have been hampered by the fear 7not1 as we have seen1 unfounded7 of losing the support given by #8general assent' if they set before themselves and their readers too rigid a standard of scientific precision4 ,still1 in spite of all these drawbacks1 we find that philosophers have provided us with a considerable number of comprehensive moral propositions1 put forward as certain and self-evident1 and such as at first sight may seem well adapted to serve as the first principles of scientific morality4 #b4 ,but here a word of caution seems required1 which has been somewhat anticipated in earlier chapters1 but on which it is particularly needful to lay stress at this point of our discussion3 against a certain class of sham-axioms1 which are very apt to offer themselves to the mind that is earnestly seeking for a philosophical synthesis of practical rules1 and to delude the unwary with a tempting aspect of clear self-evidence4 ,these are principles which appear certain and self-evident because they are substantially tautological3 because1 when examined1 they are found to affirm no more than that it is right to do that which is--in a certain department of life1 under certain circumstances and conditions--right to be done4 ,one important lesson which the history of moral philosophy teaches is that1 in this region1 even powerful intellects are liable to acquiesce in tautologies of this kind2 sometimes expanded into circular reasonings1 sometimes hidden in the recesses of an obscure notion1 often lying so near the surface that1 when once they have been exposed1 it is hard to understand how they could ever have presented themselves as important4 ,let us turn1 for illustration's sake1 to the time-honoured ,cardinal ,virtues4 ,if we are told that the dictates of ,wisdom and ,temperance may be summed up in clear and certain principles1 and that these are respectively1 7#a7 ,it is right to act rationally1 7#b7 ,it is right that the ,lower parts of our nature should be governed by the ,higher1 we do not at first feel that we are not obtaining valuable information4 ,but when we find 7cf4 ante1 chap4 xi4 #c7 that 8acting rationally0 is merely another phrase for 8doing what we see to be right10 and1 again1 that the 8higher part0 of our nature to which the rest are to submit is explained to be ,reason1 so that 8acting temperately0 is only 8acting rationally0 under the condition of special non-rational impulses needing to be resisted1 the tautology of our 8principles0 is obvious4 ,similarly when we are asked to accept as the principle of ,justice 8that we ought to give every man his own10 the definition seems plausible--until it appears that we cannot define 8his own0 except as equivalent to 8that which it is right he should have40 ,the definitions quoted may be found in modern writers3 but it seems worthy of remark that throughout the ethical speculation of ,greece1#bha such universal affirmations as are presented to us concerning ,virtue or ,good conduct seem almost always to be propositions which can only be defended from the charge of tautology1 if they are understood as definitions of the problem to be solved1 and not as attempts at its solution4 ,for example1 ,plato and ,aristotle appear to offer as constructive moralists the scientific knowledge on ethical matters of which ,socrates proclaimed the absence2 knowledge1 that is1 of the ,good and ,bad in human life4 ,and they seem to be agreed that such ,good as can be realised in the concrete life of men and communities is chiefly ,virtue1--or 7as ,aristotle more precisely puts it7 the exercise of ,virtue3 so that the practical part of ethical science must consist mainly in the knowledge of ,virtue4 ,if1 however1 we ask how we are to ascertain the kind of conduct which is properly to be called ,virtuous1 it does not seem that ,plato can tell us more of each virtue in turn than that it consists in 7#a7 the knowledge of what is ,good in certain circumstances and relations1 and 7#b7 such a harmony of the different elements of man's appetitive nature1 that their resultant impulse may be always in accordance with this knowledge4 ,but it is just this knowledge 7or at least its principles and method7 that we are expecting him to give us3 and to explain to us instead the different exigencies under which we need it1 in no way satisfies our expectation4 ,nor1 again1 does ,aristotle bring us much nearer such knowledge by telling us that the ,good in conduct is to be found somewhere between different kinds of ,bad4 ,this at best only indicates the whereabouts of ,virtue3 it does not give us a method for finding it4 ,on the ,stoic system1#bhb as constructed by ,zeno and ,chrysippus1 it is perhaps unfair to pronounce decisively1 from the accounts given of it by adversaries like ,plutarch1 and such semi-intelligent expositors as ,cicero1 ,diogenes ,laertius1 and ,stobus4 ,but1 as far as we can judge of it1 we must pronounce the exposition of its general principles a complicated enchainment of circular reasonings1 by which the inquirer is continually deluded with an apparent approach to practical conclusions1 and continually led back to the point from which he set out4 ,the most characteristic formula of ,stoicism seems to have been that declaring #8,life according to ,nature' to be the ultimate end of action4 ,the spring of the motion that sustained this life was in the vegetable creation a mere unfelt impulse3 in animals it was impulse accompanied with sensation3 in man it was the direction of ,reason1 which in him was naturally supreme over all merely blind irrational impulses4 ,what then does ,reason direct8 #8,to live according to ,nature' is one answer3 and thus we get the circular exposition of ethical doctrine in its simplest form4 ,sometimes1 however1 we are told that it is #8,life according to ,virtue'3 which leads us into the circle already noticed in the ,platonic-,aristotelian philosophy2 as ,virtue1 by the ,stoics also1 is only defined as knowledge of ,good and ,bad in different circumstances and relations4 ,indeed1 this latter circle is given by the ,stoics more neatly and perfectly3 for with ,plato and ,aristotle ,virtue was not the sole1 but only the chief content of the notion ,good1 in its application to human life3 but in the view of ,stoicism the two notions are absolutely coincident4 ,the result1 then1 is that ,virtue is knowledge of what is good and ought to be sought or chosen1 and of what is bad and ought to be shunned or rejected3 while at the same time there is nothing good or properly choice-worthy1 nothing bad or truly formidable1 except ,virtue and ,vice respectively4 ,but if ,virtue is thus declared to be a science that has no object except itself1 the notion is inevitably emptied of all practical content4 ,in order1 therefore1 to avoid this result and to reconcile their system with common sense1 the ,stoics explained that there were other things in human life which were in a manner preferable1 though not strictly good1 including in this class the primary objects of men's normal impulses4 ,on what principle then are we to select these objects when our impulses are conflicting or ambiguous8 ,if we can get an answer to this question1 we shall at length have come to something practical4 ,but here again the ,stoic could find no other general answer except either that we were to choose what was ,reasonable1 or that we were to act in accordance with ,nature3 each of which answers obviously brings us back into the original circle at a different point4#bhc ,in ,butler's use of the ,stoic formula1 this circular reasoning seems to be avoided3 but it is so only so long as the intrinsic reasonableness of right conduct is ignored or suppressed4 ,butler assumes with his opponents that it is reasonable to live according to ,nature1 and argues that ,conscience or the faculty that imposes moral rules is naturally supreme in man4 ,it is therefore reasonable to obey ,conscience4 ,but are the rules that ,conscience lays down merely known to us as the dictates of arbitrary authority1 and not as in themselves reasonable8 ,this would give a surely dangerous absoluteness of authority to the possibly unenlightened conscience of any individual3 and ,butler is much too cautious to do this3 in fact1 in more than one passage of the ,analogy#bhd he expressly adopts the doctrine of ,clarke1 that the true rules of morality are essentially reasonable4 ,but if ,conscience is1 after all1 ,reason applied to ,practice1 then ,butler's argument seems to bend itself into the old circle3 #8it is reasonable to live according to ,nature1 and it is natural to live according to ,reason4' ,in the next chapter ,i shall have to call attention to another logical circle into which we are liable to slide1 if we refer to the ,good or ,perfection1 whether of the agent or of others1 in giving an account of any special virtue2 if we allow ourselves1 in explaining ,good or ,perfection1 to use the general notion of virtue 7which is commonly regarded as an important element of either74 ,meanwhile ,i have already given1 perhaps1 more than sufficient illustration of one of the most important dangers that beset the students of ,ethics4 ,in the laudable attempt to escape from the doubtfulness1 disputableness1 and apparent arbitrariness of current moral opinions1 he is liable to take refuge in principles that are incontrovertible but tautological and insignificant4 #c4 ,can we then1 between this ,scylla and ,charybdis of ethical inquiry1 avoiding on the one hand doctrines that merely bring us back to common opinion with all its imperfections1 and on the other hand doctrines that lead us round in a circle1 find any way of obtaining self-evident moral principles of real significance8 ,it would be disheartening to have to regard as altogether illusory the strong instinct of ,common ,sense that points to the existence of such principles1 and the deliberate convictions of the long line of moralists who have enunciated them4 ,at the same time1 the more we extend our knowledge of man and his environment1 the more we realise the vast variety of human natures and circumstances that have existed in different ages and countries1 the less disposed we are to believe that there is any definite code of absolute rules1 applicable to all human beings without exception4 ,and we shall find1 ,i think1 that the truth lies between these two conclusions4 ,there are certain absolute practical principles1 the truth of which1 when they are explicitly stated1 is manifest2 but they are of too abstract a nature1 and too universal in their scope1 to enable us to ascertain by immediate application of them what we ought to do in any particular case2 particular duties have still to be determined by some other method4 ,one such principle was given in chap4 i4 #c of this ,book2 where ,i pointed out that whatever action any of us judges to be right for himself1 he implicitly judges to be right for all similar persons in similar circumstances4 ,or1 as we may otherwise put it1 #8if a kind of conduct that is right 7or wrong7 for me is not right 7or wrong7 for some one else1 it must be on the ground of some difference between the two cases1 other than the fact that ,i and he are different persons4' ,a corresponding proposition may be stated with equal truth in respect of what ought to be done to--not by--different individuals4 ,these principles have been most widely recognised1 not in their most abstract and universal form1 but in their special application to the situation of two 7or more7 individuals similarly related to each other3 as so applied1 they appear in what is popularly known as the ,golden ,rule1 #8,do to others as you would have them do to you4' ,this formula is obviously unprecise in statement2 for one might wish for another's co-operation in sin1 and be willing to reciprocate it4 ,nor is it even true to say that we ought to do to others only what we think it right for them to do to us2 for no one will deny that there may be differences in the circumstances--and even in the natures--of two individuals1 ,a and ,b1 which would make it wrong for ,a to treat ,b in the way in which it is right for ,b to treat ,a4 ,in short the self-evident principle strictly stated must take some such negative form as this2 #8it cannot be right for ,a to treat ,b in a manner in which it would be wrong for ,b to treat ,a1 merely on the ground that they are two different individuals1 and without there being any difference between the natures or circumstances of the two which can be stated as a reasonable ground for difference of treatment4' ,such a principle manifestly does not give complete guidance--indeed its effect1 strictly speaking1 is merely to throw a definite onus probandi on the man who applies to another a treatment of which he would complain if applied to himself2 but ,common ,sense has amply recognised the practical importance of the maxim3 and its truth1 so far as it goes1 appears to me self-evident4 ,a somewhat different application of the same fundamental principle that individuals in similar conditions should be treated similarly finds its sphere in the ordinary administration of ,law1 or 7as we say7 of #8,justice4' ,accordingly in #a of chap4 v4 of this ,book ,i drew attention to #8impartiality in the application of general rules1' as an important element in the common notion of ,justice2 indeed1 there ultimately appeared to be no other element which could be intuitively known with perfect clearness and certainty4 ,here again it must be plain that this precept of impartiality is insufficient for the complete determination of just conduct1 as it does not help us to decide what kind of rules should be thus impartially applied2 though all admit the importance of excluding from government1 and human conduct generally1 all conscious partiality and #8respect of persons4' ,the principle just discussed1 which seems to be more or less clearly implied in the common notion of #8fairness' or #8equity1' is obtained by considering the similarity of the individuals that make up a ,logical ,whole or ,genus4 ,there are others1 no less important1 which emerge in the consideration of the similar parts of a ,mathematical or ,quantitative ,whole4 ,such a ,whole is presented in the common notion of the ,good--or1 as is sometimes said1 #8good on the whole'--of any individual human being4 ,the proposition #8that one ought to aim at one's own good' is sometimes given as the maxim of ,rational ,self-love or ,prudence3 but as so stated it does not clearly avoid tautology2 since we may define #8good' as #8what one ought to aim at4' ,if1 however1 we say #8one's good on the whole1' the addition suggests a principle which1 when explicitly stated1 is1 at any rate1 not tautological4 ,i have already referred to this principle#bhe as that #8of impartial concern for all parts of our conscious life'3--we might express it concisely by saying #8that ,hereafter as such is to be regarded neither less nor more than ,now4' ,it is not1 of course1 meant that the good of the present may not reasonably be preferred to that of the future on account of its greater certainty3 or again1 that a week ten years hence may not be more important to us than a week now1 through an increase in our means or capacities of happiness4 ,all that the principle affirms is that the mere difference of priority and posteriority in time is not a reasonable ground for having more regard to the consciousness of one moment that to that of another4 ,the form in which it practically presents itself to most men is #8that a smaller present good is not to be preferred to a greater future good' 7allowing for difference of certainty73 since ,prudence is generally exercised in restraining a present desire 7the object or satisfaction of which we commonly regard as pro tanto #8a good'71 on account of the remoter consequences of gratifying it4 ,the commonest view of the principle would no doubt be that the present pleasure or happiness is reasonably to be foregone with the view of obtaining greater pleasure or happiness hereafter3 but the principle need not be restricted to a hedonistic application2 it is equally applicable to any other interpretation of #8one's own good1' in which good is conceived as a mathematical whole1 of which the integrant parts are realised in different parts or moments of a lifetime4 ,and therefore it is perhaps better to distinguish it here from the principle #8that ,pleasure is the sole ,ultimate ,good1' which does not seem to have any logical connexion with it4 ,so far we have only been considering the #8,good on the ,whole' of a single individual3 but just as this notion is constructed by comparison and integration of the different #8goods' that succeed one another in the series of our conscious states1 so we have formed the notion of ,universal ,good by comparison and integration of the goods of all individual human--or sentient--existences4 ,and here again1 just as in the former case1 by considering the relation of the integrant parts to the whole and to each other1 ,i obtain the self-evident principle that the good of any one individual is of no more importance1 from the point of view 7if ,i may say so7 of the ,universe1 than the good of any other2 unless1 that is1 there are special grounds for believing that more good is likely to be realised in the one case than in the other4 ,and it is evident to me that as a rational being ,i am bound to aim at good generally1--so far as it is attainable by my efforts1--not merely at a particular part of it4 ,from these two rational intuitions we may deduce1 as a necessary inference1 the maxim of ,benevolence in an abstract form3 viz4 that each one is morally bound to regard the good of any other individual as much as his own1 except in so far as he judges it to be less1 when impartially viewed1 or less certainly knowable or attainable by him4 ,i before observed that the duty of ,benevolence as recognised by common sense seems to fall somewhat short of this4 ,but ,i think it may be fairly urged in explanation of this that practically each man1 even with a view to universal ,good1 ought chiefly to concern himself with promoting the good of a limited number of human beings1 and that generally in proportion to the closeness of their connexion with him4 ,i think that a #8plain man1' in a modern civilised society1 if his conscience were fairly brought to consider the hypothetical question1 whether it would be morally right for him to seek his own happiness on any occasion if it involved a certain sacrifice of the greater happiness of some other human being1--without any counterbalancing gain to any one else1--would answer unhesitatingly in the negative4 ,i have tried to show how in the principles of ,justice1 ,prudence1 and ,rational ,benevolence as commonly recognised there is at least a self-evident element1 immediately cognisable by abstract intuition2 depending in each case on the relation which individuals and their particular ends bear as parts to their wholes1 and to other parts of these wholes4 ,i regard the apprehension1 with more or less distinctness1 of these abstract truths1 as the permanent basis of the common conviction that the fundamental precepts of morality are essentially reasonable4 ,no doubt these principles are often placed side by side with other precepts to which custom and general consent have given a merely illusory air of self-evidence3 but the distinction between the two kinds of maxims appears to me to become manifest by merely reflecting upon them4 ,i know by direct reflection that the propositions1 #8,i ought to speak the truth1' #8,i ought to keep my promises'--however true they may be--are not self-evident to me2 they present themselves as propositions requiring rational justification of some kind4 ,on the other hand1 the propositions1 #8,i ought not to prefer a present lesser good to a future greater good1' and #8,i ought not to prefer my own lesser good to the greater good of another1'#bhf do present themselves as self-evident2 as much 7e4g47 as the mathematical axiom that #8if equals be added to equals the wholes are equal4' ,it is on account of the fundamental and manifest importance1 in my view1 of the distinction above drawn between 7#a7 the moral maxims which reflection shows not to possess ultimate validity1 and 7#b7 the moral maxims which are or involve genuine ethical axioms1 that ,i refrained at the outset of this investigation from entering at length into the psychogonical question as to the origin of apparent moral intuitions4 ,for no psychogonical theory has ever been put forward professing to discredit the propositions that ,i regard as really axiomatic1 by showing that the causes which produced them were such as had a tendency to make them false3 while as regards the former class of maxims1 a psychogonical proof that they are untrustworthy when taken as absolutely and without qualification true is in my view1 superfluous3 since direct reflection shows me they have no claim to be so taken4 ,on the other hand1 so far as psychogonical theory represents moral rules as1 speaking broadly and generally1 means to the ends of individual and social good or well-being1 it obviously tends to give a general support to the conclusions to which the preceding discussion has brought us by a different method3 since it leads us to regard other moral rules as subordinate to the principles of ,prudence and ,benevolence4#bhg #d4 ,i should1 however1 rely less confidently on the conclusions set forth in the preceding section1 if they did not appear to me to be in substantial agreement--in spite of superficial differences--with the doctrines of those moralists who have been most in earnest in seeking among commonly received moral rules for genuine intuitions of the ,practical ,reason4 ,i have already pointed out#bhh that in the history of ,english ,ethics the earlier intuitional school show1 in this respect1 a turn of thought on the whole more philosophical than that which the reaction against ,hume rendered prevalent4 ,among the writers of this school there is no one who shows more earnestness in the effort to penetrate to really self-evident principles than ,clarke4#bhi ,accordingly1 ,i find that ,clarke lays down1 in respect of our behaviour towards our fellow-men1 two fundamental 8rules of righteousness03#bij the first of which he terms ,equity1 and the second ,love or ,benevolence4 ,the ,rule of ,equity he states thus3 8,whatever ,i judge reasonable or unreasonable that another should do for me3 that by the same judgment ,i declare reasonable or unreasonable that ,i should in the like case do for him0#bia--which is of course1 the #8,golden ,rule' precisely stated4 ,the obligation to 8,universal ,love or ,benevolence0 he exhibits as follows3-- 8,if there be a natural and necessary difference between ,good and ,evil3 and that which is ,good is fit and reasonable1 and that which is ,evil is unreasonable1 to be done3 and that which is the ,greatest ,good is always the most fit and reasonable to be chosen3 then 444 every rational creature ought in its sphere and station1 according to its respective powers and faculties1 to do all the ,good it can to its fellow-creatures3 to which end1 universal ,love and ,benevolence is plainly the most certain1 direct1 and effectual means40#bib ,here the mere statement that a rational agent is bound to aim at universal good is open to the charge of tautology1 since ,clarke defines #8,good' as 'that which is fit and reasonable to be done4' ,but ,clarke obviously holds that each individual #8rational creature' is capable of receiving good in a greater or less degree1 such good being an integrant part of universal good4 ,this indeed is implied in the common notion1 which he uses1 of #8doing ,good to one's fellow-creatures1' or1 as he otherwise expresses it1 #8promoting their welfare and happiness4' ,and thus his principle is implicitly what was stated above1 that the good or welfare of any one individual must as such be an object of rational aim to any other reasonable individual no less than his own similar good or welfare4 7,it should be observed1 however1 that the proposition that ,universal ,benevolence is the right means to the attainment of universal good1 is not quite self-evident2 since the end may not always be best attained by directly aiming at it4 ,thus ,rational ,benevolence1 like ,rational ,self-,love1 may be self-limiting2 may direct its own partial suppression in favour of other impulses47 ,among later moralists1 ,kant is especially noted for his rigour in separating the purely rational element of the moral code3 and his ethical view also appears to me to coincide to a considerable extent1 if not completely1 with that set forth in the preceding section4 ,i have already noticed that his fundamental principle of duty is the #8formal' rule of 8acting on a maxim that one can will to be law universal02 which1 duly restricted1#bic is an immediate practical corollary from the principle that ,i first noticed in the preceding section4 ,and we find that when he comes to consider the ends at which virtuous action is aimed1 the only really ultimate end which he lays down is the object of ,rational ,benevolence as commonly conceived--the happiness of other men4#bid ,he regards it as evident a priori that each man as a rational agent is bound to aim at the happiness of other men3 indeed1 in his view1 it can only be stated as a duty for me to seek my own happiness so far as ,i consider it as a part of the happiness of mankind in general4 ,i disagree with the negative side of this statement1 as ,i hold with ,butler that 8one's own happiness is a manifest obligation0 independently of one's relation to other men2 but1 regarded on its positive side1 ,kant's conclusion appears to agree to a great extent with the view of the duty of ,rational ,benevolence that ,i have given3--though ,i am not altogether able to assent to the arguments by which ,kant arrives at his conclusion4#bie #e4 ,i must now point out--if it has not long been apparent to the reader--that the self-evident principles laid down in #c do not specially belong to ,intuitionism in the restricted sense which1 for clear distinction of methods1 ,i gave to this term at the outset of our investigation4 ,the axiom of ,prudence1 as ,i have given it1 is a self-evident principle1 implied in ,rational ,egoism as commonly accepted4#bif ,again1 the axiom of ,justice or ,equity as above stated--#8that similar cases ought to be treated similarly'--belongs in all its applications to ,utilitarianism as much as to any system commonly called ,intuitional3 while the axiom of ,rational ,benevolence is1 in my view1 required as a rational basis for the ,utilitarian system4 ,accordingly1 ,i find that ,i arrive1 in my search for really clear and certain ethical intuitions1 at the fundamental principle of ,utilitarianism4 ,i must1 however1 admit that the thinkers who in recent times have taught this latter system1 have not1 for the most part1 expressly tried to exhibit the truth of their first principle by means of any such procedure as that above given4 ,still1 when ,i examine the 8proof0 of the 8principle of ,utility0 presented by the most persuasive and probably the most influential among ,english expositors of ,utilitarianism1--,j4 ,s4 ,mill1--,i find the need of some such procedure to complete the argument very plain and palpable4 ,mill begins by explaining#big that though 8questions of ultimate ends are not amenable0 to 8proof in the ordinary and popular meaning of the term10 there is a 8larger meaning of the word proof0 in which they are amenable to it4 8,the subject10 he says1 is 8within the cognisance of the rational faculty4444 ,considerations may be presented capable of determining the intellect to0 accept 8the ,utilitarian formula40 ,he subsequently makes clear that by 8acceptance of the ,utilitarian formula0 he means the acceptance1 not of the agent's own greatest happiness1 but of 8the greatest amount of happiness altogether0 as the ultimate 8end of human action0 and 8standard of morality03 to promote which is1 in the ,utilitarian view1 the supreme 8directive rule of human conduct40 ,then when he comes to give the 8proof0--in the larger sense before explained--of this rule or formula1 he offers the following argument4 8,the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable1 is that people do actually desire it4444 ,no reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable1 except that each person1 so far as he believes it to be attainable1 desires his own happiness4 ,this1 however1 being a fact1 we have not only all the proof which the case admits of1 but all which it is possible to require1 that happiness is a good3 that each person's happiness is a good to that person1 and the general happiness1 therefore1 a good to the aggregate of persons40#bih ,he then goes on to argue that pleasure1 and pleasure alone1 is what all men actually do desire4 ,now1 as we have seen1 it is as a 8standard of right and wrong10 or 8directive rule of conduct10 that the utilitarian principle is put forward by ,mill3 hence1 in giving as a statement of this principle that 8the general happiness is desirable10 he must be understood to mean 7and his whole treatise shows that he does mean7 that it is what each individual ought to desire1 or at least--in the stricter sense of #8ought'--to aim at realising in action4#bii ,but this proposition is not established by ,mill's reasoning1 even if we grant that what is actually desired may be legitimately inferred to be in this sense desirable4 ,for an aggregate of actual desires1 each directed towards a different part of the general happiness1 does not constitute an actual desire for the general happiness1 existing in any individual2 and ,mill would certainly not contend that a desire which does not exist in any individual can possibly exist in an aggregate of individuals4 ,there being therefore no actual desire--so far as this reasoning goes--for the general happiness1 the proposition that the general happiness is desirable cannot be in this way established3 so that there is a gap in the expressed argument1 which can1 ,i think1 only be filled by some such proposition as that which ,i have above tried to exhibit as the intuition of ,rational ,benevolence4 ,utilitarianism is thus presented as the final form into which ,intuitionism tends to pass1 when the demand for really self-evident first principles is rigorously pressed4 ,in order1 however1 to make this transition logically complete1 we require to interpret #8,universal ,good' as #8,universal ,happiness4' ,and this interpretation cannot1 in my view1 be justified by arguing1 as ,mill does1 from the psychological fact that ,happiness is the sole object of men's actual desires1 to the ethical conclusion that it alone is desirable or good2 because in ,book i4 chap4 iv4 of this treatise ,i have attempted to show that ,happiness or ,pleasure is not the only object that each for himself actually desires4 ,the identification of ,ultimate ,good with ,happiness is properly to be reached1 ,i think1 by a more indirect mode of reasoning2 which ,i will endeavour to explain in the next ,chapter4 ,,note4--,the great influence at present exercised by ,kant's teaching makes it worth while to state briefly the arguments by which he attempts to establish the duty of promoting the happiness of others1 and the reasons why ,i am unable to regard these arguments as cogent4 ,in some passages he attempts to exhibit this duty as an immediate deduction from his fundamental formula--8act from a maxim that thou canst will to be universal law0--when considered in combination with the desire for the kind services of others which 7as he assumes7 the exigencies of life must arouse in every man4 ,the maxim1 he says1 8that each should be left to take care of himself without either aid or interference10 is one that we might indeed conceive existing as a universal law3 but it would be impossible for us to will it to be such4 8,a will that resolved this would be inconsistent with itself1 for many cases may arise in which the individual thus willing needs the benevolence and sympathy of others0 7,grundlegung1 p4 #ej ,rosenkrantz74 ,similarly elsewhere 7,metaph4 ,anfangsgr4 d4 ,tugendlehre1 ,einleit4 #h and #cj7 he explains at more length that the ,self-love which necessarily exists in every one involves the desire of being loved by others and receiving aid from them in case of need4 ,we thus necessarily constitute ourselves an end for others1 and claim that they shall contribute to our happiness3 and so1 according to ,kant's fundamental principle1 we must recognise the duty of making their happiness our end4 ,now ,i cannot regard this reasoning as strictly cogent4 ,in the first place1 that every man in need wishes for the aid of others is an empirical proposition which ,kant cannot know a priori4 ,we can certainly conceive a man in whom the spirit of independence and the distaste for incurring obligations would be so strong that he would choose to endure any privations rather than receive aid from others4 ,but even granting that every one1 in the actual moment of distress1 must necessarily wish for the assistance of others2 still a strong man1 after balancing the chances of life1 may easily think that he and such as he have more to gain1 on the whole1 by the general adoption of the egoistic maxim2 benevolence being likely to bring them more trouble than profit4 ,in other passages1 however1 ,kant reaches the same conclusion by an apparently different line of argument4 ,he lays down that1 as all action of rational beings is done for some end1 there must be some absolute end1 corresponding to the absolute rule before given1 that imposes on our maxims the form of universal law4 ,this absolute end1 prescribed by ,reason necessarily and a priori for all rational beings as such1 can be nothing but ,reason itself1 or the ,universe of ,rationals2 for what the rule inculcates is1 in fact1 that we should act as rational units in a universe of rational beings 7and therefore on principles conceived and embraced as universally applicable74 ,or again1 we may reach the same result negatively4 ,for all particular ends at which men aim are constituted such by the existence of impulses directed towards some particular objects4 ,now we cannot tell a priori that any one of these special impulses forms part of the constitution of all men3 and therefore we cannot state it as an absolute dictate of ,reason that we should aim at any such special object4 ,if1 then1 we thus exclude all particular empirical ends1 there remains only the principle that 8all ,rational beings as such are ends to each03 or1 as ,kant sometimes puts it1 that 8humanity exists as an end in itself40 ,now1 says ,kant1 so long as ,i confine myself to mere non-interference with others1 ,i do not positively make ,humanity my end2 my aims remain selfish1 though restricted by this condition of non-interference with others4 ,my action1 therefore1 is not truly virtuous2 for ,virtue is exhibited and consists in the effort to realise the end of ,reason in opposition to mere selfish impulses4 ,therefore 8the ends of the subject1 which is itself an end1 must of necessity be my ends1 if the representation of ,humanity as an end in itself is to have its full weight with me0 7,grundlegung1 p4 #ei71 and my action is to be truly rational and virtuous4 ,here1 again1 ,i cannot accept the form of ,kant's argument4 ,the conception of 8humanity as an end in itself0 is perplexing3 because by an ,end we commonly mean something to be realised1 whereas 8humanity0 is1 as ,kant says1 8a self-subsistent end03 moreover1 there seems to be a sort of paralogism in the deduction of the principle of ,benevolence by means of this conception4 ,for the humanity which ,kant maintains to be an end in itself is ,man 7or the aggregate of men7 in so far as rational4 ,but the subjective ends of other men1 which ,benevolence directs us to take as our own ends1 would seem1 according to ,kant's own view1 to depend upon and correspond to their non-rational impulses--their empirical desires and aversions4 ,it is hard to see why1 if man as a rational being is an absolute end to other rational beings1 they must therefore adopt his subjective aims as determined by his non-rational impulses4 ,,footnotes3 #bhj ,cf4 ante1 ,book i4 chap4 viii4 #d4 #bha ,i am fully sensible of the peculiar interest and value of the ethical thought of ancient ,greece4 ,indeed through a large part of the present work the influence of ,plato and ,aristotle on my treatment of this subject has been greater than that of any modern writer4 ,but ,i am here only considering the value of the general principles for determining what ought to be done1 which the ancient systems profess to supply4 #bhb ,the following remarks apply less to later ,stoicism--especially the ,roman ,stoicism which we know at first hand in the writings of ,seneca and ,marcus ,aurelius2 in which the relation of the individual man to ,humanity generally is more prominent than it is in the earlier form of the system4 #bhc ,it should be observed that in determining the particulars of external duty the ,stoics to some extent used the notion #8nature' in a different way3 they tried to derive guidance from the complex adaptation of means to ends exhibited in the organic world4 ,but since in their view the whole course of the ,universe was both perfect and completely predetermined1 it was impossible for them to obtain from any observation of actual existence a clear and consistent principle for preferring and rejecting alternatives of conduct3 and in fact their most characteristic practical precepts show a curious conflict between the tendency to accept what was customary as #8natural1' and the tendency to reject what seemed arbitrary as unreasonable4 #bhd ,cf4 ,analogy1 ,part ii4 chap4 i4 and chap4 viii4 #bhe ,cf4 ante1 note to p4 #abd4 #bhf ,to avoid misapprehension ,i should state that in these propositions the consideration of the different degrees of certainty of ,present and ,future ,good1 ,own and ,others' ,good respectively1 is supposed to have been fully taken into account before the future or alien ,good is judged to be greater4 #bhg ,it may1 however1 be thought that in exhibiting this aspect of the morality of ,common ,sense1 psychogonical theory leads us to define in a particular way the general notion of #8good' or #8well-being1' regarded as a result which morality has a demonstrable natural tendency to produce4 ,this point will be considered subsequently 7chap4 xiv4 #a of this ,book3 and ,book iv4 chap4 iv474 #bhh ,cf4 ante1 ,book i4 chap4 viii4 ,note1 pp4 #ajc1 #ajd4 #bhi ,in drawing attention to ,clarke's system1 ,i ought perhaps to remark that his anxiety to exhibit the parallelism between ethical and mathematical truth 7on which ,locke before him had insisted7 renders his general terminology inappropriate1 and occasionally leads him into downright extravagances4 ,e4g4 it is patently absurd to say that 8a man who wilfully acts contrary to ,justice wills things to be what they are not and cannot be03 nor are 8,relations and ,proportions0 or 8fitnesses and unfitnesses of things0 very suitable designations for the matter of moral intuition4 ,but for the present purpose there is no reason to dwell on these defects4 #bij ,clarke's statement of the 8,rule of ,righteousness with respect to ourselves0 ,i pass over1 because it is1 as he states it1 a derivative and subordinate rule4 ,it is that we should preserve our being1 be temperate1 industrious1 etc41 with a view to the performance of ,duty3 which of course supposes ,duty 7i4e4 the ultimate and absolute rules of ,duty7 already determined4 ,i may observe that the reasonableness of ,prudence or ,self-love is only recognised by ,clarke indirectly2 in a passage which ,i quoted before 7p4 #abj74 #bia ,boyle ,lectures 7#agje71 etc41 pp4 #hf1 #hg4 #bib l4c4 p4 #ib4 #bic ,i think that ,kant1 in applying this axiom1 does not take due account of certain restrictive considerations4 ,cf4 chap4 vii4 #c of this ,book1 and also ,book iv4 chap4 v4 #c4 #bid ,kant no doubt gives the agent's own ,perfection as another absolute end2 but when we come to examine his notion of perfection1 we find that it is not really determinate without the statement of other ends of reason1 for the accomplishment of which we are to perfect ourselves4 ,see ,met4 ,anfangsgr4 d4 ,tugendlehre1 ,i4 ,theil1 v4 8,the perfection that belongs to men generally 444 can be nothing else than the cultivation of one's power1 and also of one's will1 to satisfy the requirements of duty in general40 #bie ,see note at the end of the chapter4 #bif ,on the relation of ,rational ,egoism to ,rational ,benevolence--which ,i regard as the profoundest problem of ,ethics--my final view is given in the last chapter of this treatise4 #big ,utilitarianism1 chap4 i4 pp4 #f1 #g1 and chap4 ii4 pp4 #af1 #ag4 #bih l4c4 chap4 iv4 pp4 #eb1 #ec4 #bii ,it has been suggested that ,i have overlooked a confusion in ,mill's mind between two possible meanings of the term #8desirable1' 7#a7 what can be desired and 7#b7 what ought to be desired4 ,i intended to show by the two first sentences of this paragraph that ,i was aware of this confusion1 but thought it unnecessary for my present purpose to discuss it4 ,,chapter ,,xiv ,,ultimate ,,good #a4 ,at the outset of this treatise#cjj ,i noticed that there are two forms in which the object of ethical inquiry is considered2 it is sometimes regarded as a ,rule or ,rules of ,conduct1 #8the ,right1' sometimes as an end or ends1 #8the ,good4' ,i pointed out that in the moral consciousness of modern ,europe the two notions are prima facie distinct2 since while it is commonly thought that the obligation to obey moral rules is absolute1 it is not commonly held that the whole ,good of man lies in such obedience2 this view1 we may say1 is--vaguely and respectfully but unmistakably--repudiated as a ,stoical paradox4 ,the ultimate ,good or ,wellbeing of man is rather regarded as an ulterior result1 the connexion of which with his ,right ,conduct is indeed commonly held to be certain1 but is frequently conceived as supernatural1 and so beyond the range of independent ethical speculation4 ,but now1 if the conclusions of the preceding chapters are to be trusted1 it would seem that the practical determination of ,right ,conduct depends on the determination of ,ultimate ,good4 ,for we have seen 7a7 that most of the commonly received maxims of ,duty--even of those which at first sight appear absolute and independent--are found when closely examined to contain an implicit subordination to the more general principles of ,prudence and ,benevolence3 and 7b7 that no principles except these1 and the formal principle of ,justice or ,equity can be admitted as at once intuitively clear and certain2 while1 again1 these principles themselves1 so far as they are self-evident1 may be stated as precepts to seek 7#a7 one's own good on the whole1 repressing all seductive impulses prompting to undue preference of particular goods1 and 7#b7 others' good no less than one's own1 repressing any undue preference for one individual over another4 ,thus we are brought round again to the old question with which ethical speculation in ,europe began1 #8,what is the ,ultimate ,good for man8'--though not in the egoistic form in which the old question was raised4 ,when1 however1 we examine the controversies to which this question originally led1 we see that the investigation which has brought us round to it has tended definitely to exclude one of the answers which early moral reflection was disposed to give to it4 ,for to say that #8,general ,good' consists solely in general ,virtue1--if we mean by ,virtue conformity to such prescriptions and prohibitions as make up the main part of the morality of ,common ,sense--would obviously involve us in a logical circle2 since we have seen that the exact determination of these prescriptions and prohibitions must depend on the definition of this ,general ,good4 ,nor1 ,i conceive1 can this argument be evaded by adopting the view of what ,i have called #8sthetic ,intuitionism' and regarding ,virtues as excellences of conduct clearly discernible by trained insight1 although their nature does not admit of being stated in definite formul4 ,for our notions of special virtues do not really become more independent by becoming more indefinite3 they still contain1 though perhaps more latently1 the same reference to #8,good' or #8,wellbeing' as an ultimate standard4 ,this appears clearly when we consider any virtue in relation to the cognate vice--or at least non-virtue--into which it tends to pass over when pushed to an extreme1 or exhibited under inappropriate conditions4 ,for example1 ,common ,sense may seem to regard ,liberality1 ,frugality1 ,courage1 ,placability1 as intrinsically desirable3 but when we consider their relation respectively to ,profusion1 ,meanness1 ,foolhardiness1 ,weakness1 we find that ,common ,sense draws the line in each case not by immediate intuition1 but by reference either to some definite maxim of duty1 or to the general notion of #8,good' or ,wellbeing3 and similarly when we ask at what point ,candour1 ,generosity1 ,humility cease to be virtues by becoming #8excessive4' ,other qualities commonly admired1 such as ,energy1 ,zeal1 ,self-control1 ,thoughtfulness1 are obviously regarded as virtues only when they are directed to good ends4 ,in short1 the only so-called ,virtues which can be thought to be essentially and always such1 and incapable of excess1 are such qualities as ,wisdom1 ,universal ,benevolence1 and 7in a sense7 ,justice2 of which the notions manifestly involve this notion of ,good1 supposed already determinate4 ,wisdom is insight into ,good and the means to ,good2 ,benevolence is exhibited in the purposive actions called 8doing ,good03 ,justice 7when regarded as essentially and always a ,virtue7 lies in distributing ,good 7or evil7 impartially according to right rules4 ,if then we are asked what is this ,good which it is excellent to know1 to bestow on others1 to distribute impartially1 it would be obviously absurd to reply that it is just this knowledge1 these beneficent purposes1 this impartial distribution4 ,nor1 again1 can ,i perceive that this difficulty is in any way met by regarding ,virtue as a quality of 8character0 rather than of 8conduct10 and expressing the moral law in the form1 8,be this10 instead of the form 8,do this40#cja ,from a practical point of view1 indeed1 ,i fully recognise the importance of urging that men should aim at an ideal of character1 and consider action in its effects on character4 ,but ,i cannot infer from this that character and its elements--faculties1 habits1 or dispositions of any kind--are the constituents of ,ultimate ,good4 ,it seems to me that the opposite is implied in the very conception of a faculty or disposition2 it can only be defined as a tendency to act or feel in a certain way under certain conditions2 and such a tendency appears to me clearly not valuable in itself but for the acts and feelings in which it takes effect1 or for the ulterior consequences of these1--which consequences1 again1 cannot be regarded as ,ultimate ,good1 so long as they are merely conceived as modifications of faculties1 dispositions1 etc4 ,when1 therefore1 ,i say that effects on character are important1 it is a summary way of saying that by the laws of our mental constitution the present act or feeling is a cause tending to modify importantly our acts and feelings in the indefinite future3 the comparatively permanent result supposed to be produced in the mind or soul1 being a tendency that will show itself in an indefinite number of particular acts and feelings1 may easily be more important1 in relation to the ultimate end1 than a single act or the transient feeling of a single moment3 but its comparative permanence appears to me no ground for regarding it as itself a constituent of ultimate good4 #b4 ,so far1 however1 ,i have been speaking only of particular virtues1 as exhibited in conduct judged to be objectively right3 and it may be argued that this is too external a view of the ,virtue that claims to constitute ,ultimate ,good4 ,it may be said that the difficulty that ,i have been urging vanishes if we penetrate beyond the particular virtues to the root and essence of virtue in general1--the determination of the will to do whatever is judged to be right and to aim at realising whatever is judged to be best--2 since this subjective rightness or goodness of will1 being independent of knowledge of what is objectively right or good1 is independent of that presupposition of ,good as already known and determined1 which we have seen to be implied in the common conceptions of virtue as manifested in outward acts4 ,i admit that if subjective rightness or goodness of ,will is affirmed to be the ,ultimate ,good1 the affirmation does not exactly involve the logical difficulty that ,i have been urging4 ,none the less is it fundamentally opposed to ,common ,sense2 since the very notion of subjective rightness or goodness of will implies an objective standard1 which it directs us to seek1 but does not profess to supply4 ,it would be a palpable and violent paradox to set before the right-seeking mind no end except this right-seeking itself1 and to affirm this to be the sole ,ultimate ,good1 denying that any effects of right volition can be in themselves good1 except the subjective rightness of future volitions1 whether of self or of others4 ,it is true that no rule can be recognised1 by any reasonable individual1 as more authoritative than the rule of doing what he judges to be right2 for1 in deliberating with a view to my own immediate action1 ,i cannot distinguish between doing what is objectively right1 and realising my own subjective conception of rightness4 ,but we are continually forced to make the distinction as regards the actions of others and to judge that conduct may be objectively wrong though subjectively right3 and we continually judge conduct to be objectively wrong because it tends to cause pain and loss of happiness to others1--apart from any effect on the subjective rightness of their volitions4 ,it is as so judging that we commonly recognise the mischief and danger of fanaticism3--meaning by a fanatic a man who resolutely and unswervingly carries out his own conception of rightness1 when it is a plainly mistaken conception4 ,the same result may be reached even without supposing so palpable a divorce between subjective and objective rightness of volition as is implied in the notion of fanaticism4 ,as ,i have already pointed out1#cjb though the #8dictates of ,reason' are always to be obeyed1 it does not follow that #8the dictation of ,reason'--the predominance of consciously moral over non-moral motives--is to be promoted without limits2 and indeed ,common ,sense appears to hold that some things are likely to be better done1 if they are done from other motives than conscious obedience to practical ,reason or ,conscience4 ,it thus becomes a practical question how far the dictation of ,reason1 the predominance of moral choice and moral effort in human life1 is a result to be aimed at3 and the admission of this question implies that conscious rightness of volition is not the sole ultimate good4 ,on the whole1 then1 we may conclude that neither 7#a7 subjective rightness or goodness of volition1 as distinct from objective1 nor 7#b7 virtuous character1 except as manifested or realised in virtuous conduct1 can be regarded as constituting ,ultimate ,good3 while1 again1 we are precluded from identifying ,ultimate ,good with virtuous conduct1 because our conceptions of virtuous conduct1 under the different heads or aspects denoted by the names of the particular virtues1 have been found to presuppose the prior determination of the notion of ,good--that ,good which virtuous conduct is conceived as producing or promoting or rightly distributing4 ,and what has been said of ,virtue1 seems to me still more manifestly true of the other talents1 gifts1 and graces which make up the common notion of human excellence or ,perfection4 ,however immediately the excellent quality of such gifts and skills may be recognised and admired1 reflection shows that they are only valuable on account of the good or desirable conscious life in which they are or will be actualised1 or which will be somehow promoted by their exercise4 #c4 ,shall we then say that ,ultimate ,good is ,good or ,desirable conscious or sentient ,life--of which ,virtuous action is one element1 but not the sole constituent8 ,this seems in harmony with ,common ,sense2 and the fact that particular virtues and talents and gifts are largely valued as means to ulterior good does not necessarily prevent us from regarding their exercise as also an element of ,ultimate ,good3 just as the fact that physical action1 nutrition1 and repose1 duly proportioned and combined1 are means to the maintenance of our animal life1 does not prevent us from regarding them as indispensable elements of such life4 ,still it seems difficult to conceive any kind of activity or process as both means and end1 from precisely the same point of view and in respect of precisely the same quality3 and in both the cases above mentioned it is1 ,i think1 easy to distinguish the aspect in which the activities or processes in question are to be regarded as means from that in which they are to be regarded as in themselves good or desirable4 ,let us examine this first in the case of the physical processes4 ,it is in their purely physical aspect1 as complex processes of corporeal change1 that they are means to the maintenance of life3 but so long as we confine our attention to their corporeal aspect1--regarding them merely as complex movements of certain particles of organised matter--it seems impossible to attribute to these movements1 considered in themselves1 either goodness or badness4 ,i cannot conceive it to be an ultimate end of rational action to secure that these complex movements should be of one kind rather than another1 or that they should be continued for a longer rather than a shorter period4 ,in short1 if a certain quality of human ,life is that which is ultimately desirable1 it must belong to human ,life regarded on its psychical side1 or1 briefly1 ,consciousness4 ,but again3 it is not all life regarded on its psychical side which we can judge to be ultimately desirable3 since psychical life as known to us includes pain as well as pleasure1 and so far as it is painful it is not desirable4 ,i cannot therefore accept a view of the wellbeing or welfare of human beings--as of other living things--which is suggested by current zoological conceptions and apparently maintained with more or less definiteness by influential writers2 according to which1 when we attribute goodness or badness to the manner of existence of any living organism1 we should be understood to attribute to it a tendency either 7#a7 to self-preservation1 or 7#b7 to the preservation of the community or race to which it belongs--so that what 8,wellbeing0 adds to mere 8,being0 is just promise of future being4 ,it appears to me that this doctrine needs only to be distinctly contemplated in order to be rejected4 ,if all life were as little desirable as some portions of it have been1 in my own experience and in that 7,i believe7 of all or most men1 ,i should judge all tendency to the preservation of it to be unmitigatedly bad4 ,actually1 no doubt1 as we generally hold that human life1 even as now lived1 has on the average1 a balance of happiness1 we regard what is preservative of life as generally good1 and what is destructive of life as bad3 and ,i quite admit that a most fundamentally important part of the function of morality consists in maintaining such habits and sentiments as are necessary to the continued existence1 in full numbers1 of a society of human beings under their actual conditions of life4 ,but this is not because the mere existence of human organisms1 even if prolonged to eternity1 appears to me in any way desirable2 it is only assumed to be so because it is supposed to be accompanied by ,consciousness on the whole desirable2 it is therefore this ,desirable ,consciousness which we must regard as ultimate ,good4 ,in the same way1 so far as we judge virtuous activity to be a part of ,ultimate ,good1 it is1 ,i conceive1 because the consciousness attending it is judged to be in itself desirable for the virtuous agent2 though at the same time this consideration does not adequately represent the importance of ,virtue to human wellbeing1 since we have to consider its value as a means as well as its value as an end4 ,we may make the distinction clearer by considering whether ,virtuous life would remain on the whole good for the virtuous agent1 if we suppose it combined with extreme pain4 ,the affirmative answer to this question was strongly supported in ,greek philosophical discussion3 but it is a paradox from which a modern thinker would recoil3 he would hardly venture to assert that the portion of life spent by a martyr in tortures was in itself desirable1--though it might be his duty to suffer the pain with a view to the good of others1 and even his interest to suffer it with a view to his own ultimate happiness4 #d4 ,if then ,ultimate ,good can only be conceived as ,desirable ,consciousness--including the ,consciousness of ,virtue as a part but only as a part--are we to identify this notion with ,happiness or ,pleasure1 and say with the ,utilitarians that ,general ,good is general happiness8 ,many would at this point of the discussion regard this conclusion as inevitable3 to say that all other things called good are only means to the end of making conscious life better or more desirable1 seems to them the same as saying that they are means to the end of happiness4 ,but very important distinctions remain to be considered4 ,according to the view taken in a previous chapter1#cjc in affirming ,ultimate ,good to be ,happiness or ,pleasure1 we imply 7#a7 that nothing is desirable except desirable feelings1 and 7#b7 that the desirability of each feeling is only directly cognisable by the sentient individual at the time of feeling it1 and that therefore this particular judgment of the sentient individual must be taken as final#cjd on the question how far each element of feeling has the quality of ,ultimate ,good4 ,now no one1 ,i conceive1 would estimate in any other way the desirability of feeling considered merely as feeling3 but it may be urged that our conscious experience includes besides ,feelings1 ,cognitions and ,volitions1 and that the desirability of these must be taken into account1 and is not to be estimated by the standard above stated4 ,i think1 however1 that when we reflect on a cognition as a transient fact of an individual's psychical experience1--distinguishing it on the one hand from the feeling that normally accompanies it1 and on the other hand from that relation of the knowing mind to the object known which is implied in the term 8true0 or 8valid cognition0#cje--;it is seen to be an element of consciousness quite neutral in respect of desirability3 and the same may be said of ,volitions1 when we abstract from their concomitant feelings1 and their relation to an objective norm or ideal1 as well as from all their consequences4 ,it is no doubt true that in ordinary thought certain states of consciousness--such as ,cognition of ,truth1 ,contemplation of ,beauty1 ,volition to realise ,freedom or ,virtue--are sometimes judged to be preferable on other grounds than their pleasantness3 but the general explanation of this seems to be 7as was suggested in ,book ii4 chap4 ii4 #b7 that what in such cases we really prefer is not the present consciousness itself1 but either effects on future consciousness more or less distinctly foreseen1 or else something in the objective relations of the conscious being1 not strictly included in his present consciousness4 ,the second of these alternatives may perhaps be made clearer by some illustrations4 ,a man may prefer the mental state of apprehending truth to the state of half-reliance on generally accredited fictions1#cjf while recognising that the former state may be more painful than the latter1 and independently of any effect which he expects either state to have upon his subsequent consciousness4 ,here1 on my view1 the real object of preference is not the consciousness of knowing truth1 considered merely as consciousness1--the element of pleasure or satisfaction in this being more than outweighed by the concomitant pain1--but the relation between the mind and something else1 which1 as the very notion of #8truth' implies1 is whatever it is independently of our cognition of it1 and which ,i therefore call objective4 ,this may become more clear if we imagine ourselves learning afterwards that what we took for truth is not really such3 for in this case we should certainly feel that our preference had been mistaken2 whereas if our choice had really been between two elements of transient consciousness1 its reasonableness could not be affected by any subsequent discovery4 ,similarly1 a man may prefer freedom and penury to a life of luxurious servitude1 not because the pleasant consciousness of being free outweighs in prospect all the comforts and securities that the other life would afford1 but because he has a predominant aversion to that relation between his will and the will of another which we call slavery3 or1 again1 a philosopher may choose what he conceives as #8inner freedom'--the consistent self-determination of the will--rather than the gratifications of appetite2 though recognising that the latter are more desirable1 considered merely as transient feelings4 ,in either case1 he will be led to regard his preference as mistaken1 if he be afterwards persuaded that his conception of ,freedom or self-determination was illusory2 that we are all slaves of circumstances1 destiny1 etc4 ,so again1 the preference of conformity to ,virtue1 or contemplation of ,beauty1 to a state of consciousness recognised as more pleasant seems to depend on a belief that one's conception of ,virtue or ,beauty corresponds to an ideal to some extent objective and valid for all minds4 ,apart from any consideration of future consequences1 we should generally agree that a man who sacrificed happiness to an erroneous conception of ,virtue or ,beauty made a mistaken choice4 ,still1 it may be said that this is merely a question of definition3 that we may take #8conscious life' in a wide sense1 so as to include the objective relations of the conscious being implied in our notions of ,virtue1 ,truth1 ,beauty1 ,freedom2 and that from this point of view we may regard cognition of ,truth1 contemplation of ,beauty1 ,free or ,virtuous action1 as in some measure preferable alternatives to ,pleasure or ,happiness--even though we admit that ,happiness must be included as a part of ,ultimate ,good4 ,in this case the principle of ,rational ,benevolence1 which was stated in the last chapter as an indubitable intuition of the practical ,reason1 would not direct us to the pursuit of universal happiness alone1 but of these 8ideal goods0 as well1 as ends ultimately desirable for mankind generally4 #e4 ,i think1 however1 that this view ought not to commend itself to the sober judgment of reflective persons4 ,in order to show this1 ,i must ask the reader to use the same twofold procedure that ,i before requested him to employ in considering the absolute and independent validity of common moral precepts4 ,i appeal firstly to his intuitive judgment after due consideration of the question when fairly placed before it3 and secondly to a comprehensive comparison of the ordinary judgments of mankind4 ,as regards the first argument1 to me at least it seems clear after reflection that these objective relations of the conscious subject1 when distinguished from the consciousness accompanying and resulting from them1 are not ultimately and intrinsically desirable2 any more than material or other objects are1 when considered apart from any relation to conscious existence4 ,admitting that we have actual experience of such preferences as have just been described1 of which the ultimate object is something that is not merely consciousness3 it still seems to me that when 7to use ,butler's phrase7 we 8sit down in a cool hour10 we can only justify to ourselves the importance that we attach to any of these objects by considering its conduciveness1 in one way or another1 to the happiness of sentient beings4 ,the second argument1 that refers to the common sense of mankind1 obviously cannot be made completely cogent2 since1 as above stated1 several cultivated persons do habitually judge that knowledge1 art1 etc4--not to speak of ,virtue--are ends independently of the pleasure derived from them4 ,but we may urge not only that all these elements of 8ideal good0 are productive of pleasure in various ways2 but also that they seem to obtain the commendation of ,common ,sense1 roughly speaking1 in proportion to the degree of this productiveness4 ,this seems obviously true of ,beauty2 and will hardly be denied in respect of any kind of social ideal3 it is paradoxical to maintain that any degree of ,freedom1 or any form of social order1 would still be commonly regarded as desirable even if we were certain that it had no tendency to promote the general happiness4 ,the case of ,knowledge is rather more complex2 but certainly ,common ,sense is most impressed with the value of knowledge1 when its #8fruitfulness' has been demonstrated4 ,it is1 however1 aware that experience has frequently shown how knowledge1 long fruitless1 may become unexpectedly fruitful1 and how light may be shed on one part of the field of knowledge from another apparently remote3 and even if any particular branch of scientific pursuit could be shown to be devoid of even this indirect utility1 it would still deserve some respect on utilitarian grounds2 both as furnishing to the inquirer the refined and innocent pleasures of curiosity1 and because the intellectual disposition which it exhibits and sustains is likely on the whole to produce fruitful knowledge4 ,still in cases approximating to this last1 ,common ,sense is somewhat disposed to complain of the misdirection of valuable effort2 so that the meed of honour commonly paid to ,science seems to be graduated1 though perhaps unconsciously1 by a tolerably exact utilitarian scale4 ,certainly the moment the legitimacy of any branch of scientific inquiry is seriously disputed1 as in the recent case of vivisection1 the controversy on both sides is generally conducted on an avowedly utilitarian basis4 ,the case of ,virtue requires special consideration3 since the encouragement in each other of virtuous impulses and dispositions is a main aim of men's ordinary moral discourse2 so that even to raise the question whether this encouragement can go too far has a paradoxical air4 ,still1 our experience includes rare and exceptional cases in which the concentration of effort on the cultivation of virtue has seemed to have effects adverse to general happiness1 through being intensified to the point of moral fanaticism1 and so involving a neglect of other conditions of happiness4 ,if1 then1 we admit as actual or possible such #8infelicific' effects of the cultivation of ,virtue1 ,i think we shall also generally admit that1 in the case supposed1 conduciveness to general happiness should be the criterion for deciding how far the cultivation of ,virtue should be carried4 ,at the same time it must be allowed that we find in ,common ,sense an aversion to admit ,happiness 7when explained to mean a sum of pleasures7 to be the sole ultimate end and standard of right conduct4 ,but this1 ,i think1 can be fully accounted for by the following considerations4 ,i4 ,the term ,pleasure is not commonly used so as to include clearly all kinds of consciousness which we desire to retain or reproduce3 in ordinary usage it suggests too prominently the coarser and commoner kinds of such feelings2 and it is difficult even for those who are trying to use it scientifically to free their minds altogether from the associations of ordinary usage1 and to mean by ,pleasure only ,desirable ,consciousness or ,feeling of whatever kind4 ,again1 our knowledge of human life continually suggests to us instances of pleasures which will inevitably involve as concomitant or consequent either a greater amount of pain or a loss of more important pleasures3 and we naturally shrink from including even hypothetically in our conception of ultimate good these--in ,bentham's phrase--8impure0 pleasures2 especially since we have1 in many cases1 moral or sthetic instincts warning us against such pleasures4 ,,ii4 ,we have seen#cjg that many important pleasures can only be felt on condition of our experiencing desires for other things than pleasure4 ,thus the very acceptance of ,pleasure as the ultimate end of conduct involves the practical rule that it is not always to be made the conscious end4 ,hence1 even if we are considering merely the good of one human being taken alone1 excluding from our view all effects of his conduct on others1 still the reluctance of ,common ,sense to regard pleasure as the sole thing ultimately desirable may be justified by the consideration that human beings tend to be less happy if they are exclusively occupied with the desire of personal happiness4 ,e4g4 7as was before shown7 we shall miss the valuable pleasures which attend the exercise of the benevolent affections if we do not experience genuinely disinterested impulses to procure happiness for others 7which are1 in fact1 implied in the notion of #8benevolent affections'74 ,,iii4 ,but again1 ,i hold1 as was expounded in the preceding chapter1 that disinterested benevolence is not only thus generally in harmony with rational ,self-love1 but also in another sense and independently rational3 that is1 ,reason shows me that if my happiness is desirable and a good1 the equal happiness of any other person must be equally desirable4 ,now1 when ,happiness is spoken of as the sole ultimate good of man1 the idea most commonly suggested is that each individual is to seek his own happiness at the expense 7if necessary7 or1 at any rate1 to the neglect of that of others3 and this offends both our sympathetic and our rational regard for others' happiness4 ,it is1 in fact1 rather the end of ,egoistic than of ,universalistic ,hedonism1 to which ,common ,sense feels an aversion4 ,and certainly one's individual happiness is1 in many respects1 an unsatisfactory mark for one's supreme aim1 apart from any direct collision into which the exclusive pursuit of it may bring us with rational or sympathetic ,benevolence4 ,it does not possess the characteristics which1 as ,aristotle says1 we 8divine0 to belong to ,ultimate ,good3 being 7so far1 at least1 as it can be empirically foreseen7 so narrow and limited1 of such necessarily brief duration1 and so shifting and insecure while it lasts4 ,but ,universal ,happiness1 desirable consciousness or feeling for the innumerable multitude of sentient beings1 present and to come1 seems an ,end that satisfies our imagination by its vastness1 and sustains our resolution by its comparative security4 ,it may1 however1 be said that if we require the individual to sacrifice his own happiness to the greater happiness of others on the ground that it is reasonable to do so1 we really assign to the individual a different ultimate end from that which we lay down as the ultimate ,good of the universe of sentient beings3 since we direct him to take1 as ultimate1 ,happiness for the ,universe1 but ,conformity to ,reason for himself4 ,i admit the substantial truth of this statement1 though ,i should avoid the language as tending to obscure the distinction before explained between 8obeying the dictates0 and 8promoting the dictation0 of reason4 ,but granting the alleged difference1 ,i do not see that it constitutes an argument against the view here maintained1 since the individual is essentially and fundamentally different from the larger whole--the universe of sentient beings--of which he is conscious of being a part2 just because he has a known relation to similar parts of the same whole1 while the whole itself has no such relation4 ,i accordingly see no inconsistency in holding that while it would be reasonable for the aggregate of sentient beings1 if it could act collectively1 to aim at its own happiness only as an ultimate end--and would be reasonable for any individual to do the same1 if he were the only sentient being in the universe--it may yet be actually reasonable for an individual to sacrifice his own ,good or happiness for the greater happiness of others4#cjh ,at the same time ,i admit that1 in the earlier age of ethical thought which ,greek philosophy represents1 men sometimes judged an act to be #8good' for the agent1 even while recognising that its consequences would be on the whole painful to him1--as 7e4g47 a heroic exchange of a life full of happiness for a painful death at the call of duty4 ,i attribute this partly to a confusion of thought between what it is reasonable for an individual to desire1 when he considers his own existence alone1 and what he must recognise as reasonably to be desired1 when he takes the point of view of a larger whole3 partly1 again1 to a faith deeply rooted in the moral consciousness of mankind1 that there cannot be really and ultimately any conflict between the two kinds of reasonableness4#cji ,but when #8,reasonable ,self-love' has been clearly distinguished from ,conscience1 as it is by ,butler and his followers1 we find it is naturally understood to mean desire for one's own ,happiness3 so that in fact the interpretation of #8one's own good1' which was almost peculiar in ancient thought to the ,cyrenaic and ,epicurean heresies1 is adopted by some of the most orthodox of modern moralists4 ,indeed it often does not seem to have occurred to these latter that this notion can have any other interpretation4#caj ,if1 then1 when any one hypothetically concentrates his attention on himself1 ,good is naturally and almost inevitably conceived to be ,pleasure1 we may reasonably conclude that the ,good of any number of similar beings1 whatever their mutual relations may be1 cannot be essentially different in quality4 ,,iv4 ,but lastly1 from the universal point of view no less than from that of the individual1 it seems true that ,happiness is likely to be better attained if the extent to which we set ourselves consciously to aim at it be carefully restricted4 ,and this not only because action is likely to be more effective if our effort is temporarily concentrated on the realisation of more limited ends--though this is no doubt an important reason3--but also because the fullest development of happy life for each individual seems to require that he should have other external objects of interest besides the happiness of other conscious beings4 ,and thus we may conclude that the pursuit of the ideal objects before mentioned1 ,virtue1 ,truth1 ,freedom1 ,beauty1 etc41 for their own sakes1 is indirectly and secondarily1 though not primarily and absolutely1 rational2 on account not only of the happiness that will result from their attainment1 but also of that which springs from their disinterested pursuit4 ,while yet if we ask for a final criterion of the comparative value of the different objects of men's enthusiastic pursuit1 and of the limits within which each may legitimately engross the attention of mankind1 we shall none the less conceive it to depend upon the degree in which they respectively conduce to ,happiness4 ,if1 however1 this view be rejected1 it remains to consider whether we can frame any other coherent account of ,ultimate ,good4 ,if we are not to systematise human activities by taking ,universal ,happiness as their common end1 on what other principles are we to systematise them8 ,it should be observed that these principles must not only enable us to compare among themselves the values of the different non-hedonistic ends which we have been considering1 but must also provide a common standard for comparing these values with that of ,happiness2 unless we are prepared to adopt the paradoxical position of rejecting happiness as absolutely valueless4 ,for we have a practical need of determining not only whether we should pursue ,truth rather than ,beauty1 or ,freedom or some ideal constitution of society rather than either1 or perhaps desert all of these for the life of worship and religious contemplation2 but also how far we should follow any of these lines of endeavour1 when we foresee among its consequences the pains of human or other sentient beings1 or even the loss of pleasures that might otherwise have been enjoyed by them4#caa ,i have failed to find--and am unable to construct--any systematic answer to this question that appears to me deserving of serious consideration3 and hence ,i am finally led to the conclusion 7which at the close of the last chapter seemed to be premature7 that the ,intuitional method rigorously applied yields as its final result the doctrine of pure ,universalistic ,hedonism1#cab--which it is convenient to denote by the single word1 ,utilitarianism4 ,,footnotes3 #cjj ,see ,book i4 chap4 i4 #b4 #cja ,cf4 ,stephen1 ,science of ,ethics1 chap4 iv4 #af4 #cjb ,chap4 xi4 #c2 see also chap4 xii4 #c4 #cjc ,book ii4 chap4 ii4 #cjd ,final1 that is1 so far as the quality of the present feeling is concerned4 ,i have pointed out that so far as any estimate of the desirability or pleasantness of a feeling involves comparison with feelings only represented in idea1 it is liable to be erroneous through imperfections in the representation4 #cje ,the term 8cognition0 without qualification more often implies what is signified by 8true0 or 8valid03 but for the present purpose it is necessary to eliminate this implication4 #cjf ,cf4 ,lecky1 ,history of ,european ,morals1 pp4 #eb seqq4 #cjg ,book i4 chap4 iv42 cf4 ,book ii4 chap4 iii4 #cjh ,i ought at the same time to say that ,i hold it no less reasonable for an individual to take his own happiness as his ultimate end4 ,this 8,dualism of the ,practical ,reason0 will be further discussed in the concluding chapter of the treatise4 #cji ,we may illustrate this double explanation by a reference to some of ,plato's ,dialogues1 such as the ,gorgias1 where the ethical argument has a singularly mixed effect on the mind4 ,partly1 it seems to us more or less dexterous sophistry1 playing on a confusion of thought latent in the common notion of good3 partly a noble and stirring expression of a profound moral faith4 #caj ,cf4 ,stewart1 ,philosophy of the ,active and ,moral ,powers1 ,book ii4 chap4 i4 #caa ,the controversy on vivisection1 to which ,i referred just now1 affords a good illustration of the need that ,i am pointing out4 ,i do not observe that any one in this controversy has ventured on the paradox that the pain of sentient beings is not per se to be avoided4 #cab ,i have before noticed 7,book ii4 chap4 iii4 p4 #acd7 the metaphysical objection taken by certain writers to the view that ,happiness is ,ultimate ,good2 on the ground that ,happiness 7 sum of pleasures7 can only be realised in successive parts1 whereas a 8,chief ,good0 must be 8something of which some being can be conceived in possession0--something1 that is1 which he can have all at once4 ,on considering this objection it seemed to me that1 in so far as it is even plausible1 its plausibility depends on the exact form of the notion #8a ,chief ,good' 7or #8,summum ,bonum'71 which is perhaps inappropriate as applied to ,happiness4 ,i have therefore in this chapter used the notion of #8,ultimate ,good'3 as ,i can see no shadow of reason for affirming that that which is ,good or ,desirable per se1 and not as a means to some further end1 must necessarily be capable of being possessed all at once4 ,i can understand that a man may aspire after a ,good of this latter kind3 but so long as ,time is a necessary form of human existence1 it can hardly be surprising that human good should be subject to the condition of being realised in successive parts4 ,,book ,,iv ,,utilitarianism ,,chapter ,i ,,the ,,meaning ,,of ,,utilitarianism #a4 ,the term ,utilitarianism is1 at the present day1 in common use1 and is supposed to designate a doctrine or method with which we are all familiar4 ,but on closer examination1 it appears to be applied to several distinct theories1 having no necessary connexion with one another1 and not even referring to the same subject-matter4 ,it will be well1 therefore1 to define1 as carefully as possible1 the doctrine that is to be denoted by the term in the present ,book3 at the same time distinguishing this from other doctrines to which usage would allow the name to be applied1 and indicating1 so far as seems necessary1 its relation to these4 ,by ,utilitarianism is here meant the ethical theory1 that the conduct which1 under any given circumstances1 is objectively right1 is that which will produce the greatest amount of happiness on the whole2 that is1 taking into account all whose happiness is affected by the conduct4 ,it would tend to clearness if we might call this principle1 and the method based upon it1 by some such name as 8,universalistic ,hedonism03 and ,i have therefore sometimes ventured to use this term1 in spite of its cumbrousness4 ,the first doctrine from which it seems necessary to distinguish this1 is the ,egoistic ,hedonism expounded and discussed in ,book ii4 of this treatise4 ,the difference1 however1 between the propositions 7#a7 that each ought to seek his own happiness1 and 7#b7 that each ought to seek the happiness of all1 is so obvious and glaring1 that instead of dwelling upon it we seem rather called upon to explain how the two ever came to be confounded1 or in any way included under one notion4 ,this question and the general relation between the two doctrines were briefly discussed in a former chapter4#cac ,among other points it was there noticed that the confusion between these two ethical theories was partly assisted by the confusion with both of the psychological theory that in voluntary actions every agent does1 universally or normally1 seek his own individual happiness or pleasure4 ,now there seems to be no necessary connexion between this latter proposition and any ethical theory3 but in so far as there is a natural tendency to pass from psychological to ethical ,hedonism1 the transition must be--at least primarily--to the ,egoistic phase of the latter4 ,for clearly1 from the fact that every one actually does seek his own happiness we cannot conclude1 as an immediate and obvious inference1 that he ought to seek the happiness of other people4#cad ,nor1 again1 is ,utilitarianism1 as an ethical doctrine1 necessarily connected with the psychological theory that the moral sentiments are derived1 by 8association of ideas0 or otherwise1 from experiences of the non-moral pleasures and pains resulting to the agent or to others from different kinds of conduct4 ,an ,intuitionist might accept this theory1 so far as it is capable of scientific proof1 and still hold that these moral sentiments1 being found in our present consciousness as independent impulses1 ought to possess the authority that they seem to claim over the more primary desires and aversions from which they have sprung3 and an ,egoist on the other hand might fully admit the altruistic element of the derivation1 and still hold that these and all other impulses 7including even ,universal ,benevolence7 are properly under the rule of ,rational ,self-love3 and that it is really only reasonable to gratify them in so far as we may expect to find our private happiness in such gratification4 ,in short1 what is often called the 8utilitarian0 theory of the origin of the moral sentiments cannot by itself provide a proof of the ethical doctrine to which ,i in this treatise restrict the term ,utilitarianism4 ,i shall1 however1 hereafter try to show that this psychological theory has an important though subordinate place in the establishment of ,ethical ,utilitarianism4#cae ,finally1 the doctrine that ,universal ,happiness is the ultimate standard must not be understood to imply that ,universal ,benevolence is the only right or always best motive of action4 ,for1 as we have before observed1 it is not necessary that the end which gives the criterion of rightness should always be the end at which we consciously aim3 and if experience shows that the general happiness will be more satisfactorily attained if men frequently act from other motives than pure universal philanthropy1 it is obvious that these other motives are reasonably to be preferred on ,utilitarian principles4 #b4 ,let us now examine the principle itself somewhat closer4 ,i have already attempted 7,book ii4 chap4 i47 to render the notion of ,greatest ,happiness as clear and definite as possible2 and the results there obtained are of course as applicable to the discussion of ,universalistic as to that of ,egoistic ,hedonism4 ,we shall understand1 then1 that by ,greatest ,happiness is meant the greatest possible surplus of pleasure over pain1 the pain being conceived as balanced against an equal amount of pleasure1 so that the two contrasted amounts annihilate each other for purposes of ethical calculation4 ,and of course1 here as before1 the assumption is involved that all pleasures included in our calculation are capable of being compared quantitatively with one another and with all pains2 that every such feeling has a certain intensive quantity1 positive or negative 7or1 perhaps1 zero71 in respect of its desirableness1 and that this quantity may be to some extent known3 so that each may be at least roughly weighed in ideal scales against any other4 ,this assumption is involved in the very notion of ,maximum ,happiness2 as the attempt to make #8as great as possible' a sum of elements not quantitatively commensurable would be a mathematical absurdity4 ,therefore whatever weight is to be attached to the objections brought against this assumption 7which was discussed in chap4 iii4 of ,book ii47 must of course tell against the present method4 ,we have next to consider who the 8all0 are1 whose happiness is to be taken into account4 ,are we to extend our concern to all the beings capable of pleasure and pain whose feelings are affected by our conduct8 or are we to confine our view to human happiness8 ,the former view is the one adopted by ,bentham and ,mill1 and 7,i believe7 by the ,utilitarian school generally3 and is obviously most in accordance with the universality that is characteristic of their principle4 ,it is the ,good ,universal1 interpreted and defined as #8happiness' or #8pleasure1' at which a ,utilitarian considers it his duty to aim3 and it seems arbitrary and unreasonable to exclude from the end1 as so conceived1 any pleasure of any sentient being4 ,it may be said that by giving this extension to the notion1 we considerably increase the scientific difficulties of the hedonistic comparison1 which have already been pointed out 7,book ii4 chap4 iii473 for if it be difficult to compare the pleasures and pains of other men accurately with our own1 a comparison of either with the pleasures and pains of brutes is obviously still more obscure4 ,still1 the difficulty is at least not greater for ,utilitarians than it is for any other moralists who recoil from the paradox of disregarding altogether the pleasures and pains of brutes4 ,but even if we limit our attention to human beings1 the extent of the subjects of happiness is not yet quite determinate4 ,in the first place1 it may be asked1 ,how far we are to consider the interests of posterity when they seem to conflict with those of existing human beings8 ,it seems1 however1 clear that the time at which a man exists cannot affect the value of his happiness from a universal point of view2 and that the interests of posterity must concern a ,utilitarian as much as those of his contemporaries1 except in so far as the effect of his actions on posterity--and even the existence of human beings to be affected--must necessarily be more uncertain4 ,but a further question arises when we consider that we can to some extent influence the number of future human 7or sentient7 beings4 ,we have to ask how1 on ,utilitarian principles1 this influence is to be exercised4 ,here ,i shall assume that1 for human beings generally1 life on the average yields a positive balance of pleasure over pain4 ,this has been denied by thoughtful persons3 but the denial seems to me clearly opposed to the common experience of mankind1 as expressed in their commonly accepted principles of action4 ,the great majority of men1 in the great majority of conditions under which human life is lived1 certainly act as if death were one of the worst of evils1 for themselves and for those whom they love3 and the administration of criminal justice proceeds on a similar assumption4#caf ,assuming1 then1 that the average happiness of human beings is a positive quantity1 it seems clear that1 supposing the average happiness enjoyed remains undiminished1 ,utilitarianism directs us to make the number enjoying it as great as possible4 ,but if we foresee as possible that an increase in numbers will be accompanied by a decrease in average happiness or vice versa1 a point arises which has not only never been formally noticed1 but which seems to have been substantially overlooked by many ,utilitarians4 ,for if we take ,utilitarianism to prescribe1 as the ultimate end of action1 happiness on the whole1 and not any individual's happiness1 unless considered as an element of the whole1 it would follow that1 if the additional population enjoy on the whole positive happiness1 we ought to weigh the amount of happiness gained by the extra number against the amount lost by the remainder4 ,so that1 strictly conceived1 the point up to which1 on ,utilitarian principles1 population ought to be encouraged to increase1 is not that at which average happiness is the greatest possible1--as appears to be often assumed by political economists of the school of ,malthus--but that at which the product formed by multiplying the number of persons living into the amount of average happiness reaches its maximum4 ,it may be well here to make a remark which has a wide application in ,utilitarian discussion4 ,the conclusion just given wears a certain air of absurdity to the view of ,common ,sense2 because its show of exactness is grotesquely incongruous with our consciousness of the inevitable inexactness of all such calculations in actual practice4 ,but1 that our practical ,utilitarian reasonings must necessarily be rough1 is no reason for not making them as accurate as the case admits2 and we shall be more likely to succeed in this if we keep before our mind as distinctly as possible the strict type of the calculation that we should have to make1 if all the relevant considerations could be estimated with mathematical precision4 ,there is one more point that remains to be noticed4 ,it is evident that there may be many different ways of distributing the same quantum of happiness among the same number of persons2 in order1 therefore1 that the ,utilitarian criterion of right conduct may be as complete as possible1 we ought to know which of these ways is to be preferred4 ,this question is often ignored in expositions of ,utilitarianism4 ,it has perhaps seemed somewhat idle1 as suggesting a purely abstract and theoretical perplexity1 that could have no practical exemplification2 and no doubt1 if all the consequences of actions were capable of being estimated and summed up with mathematical precision1 we should probably never find the excess of pleasure over pain exactly equal in the case of two competing alternatives of conduct4 ,but the very indefiniteness of all hedonistic calculations1 which was sufficiently shown in ,book ii41 renders it by no means unlikely that there may be no cognisable difference between the quantities of happiness involved in two sets of consequences respectively2 the more rough our estimates necessarily are1 the less likely we shall be to come to any clear decision between two apparently balanced alternatives4 ,in all such cases1 therefore1 it becomes practically important to ask whether any mode of distributing a given quantum of happiness is better than any other4 ,now the ,utilitarian formula seems to supply no answer to this question3 at least we have to supplement the principle of seeking the greatest happiness on the whole by some principle of ,just or ,right distribution of this happiness4 ,the principle which most ,utilitarians have either tacitly or expressly adopted is that of pure equality--as given in ,bentham's formula1 8everybody to count for one1 and nobody for more than one40 ,and this principle seems the only one which does not need a special justification2 for1 as we saw1 it must be reasonable to treat any one man in the same way as any other1 if there be no reason apparent for treating him differently4#cag ,,footnotes3 #cac ,book i4 chap4 vi4 ,it may be worth while to notice1 that in ,mill's well-known treatise on ,utilitarianism this confusion1 though expressly deprecated1 is to some extent encouraged by the author's treatment of the subject4 #cad ,i have already criticised 7,book iii4 chap4 xiii47 the mode in which ,mill attempts to exhibit this inference4 #cae ,cf4 post1 chap4 iv4 #caf ,those who held the opposite opinion appear generally to assume that the appetites and desires which are the mainspring of ordinary human action are in themselves painful3 a view entirely contrary to my own experience1 and1 ,i believe1 to the common experience of mankind4 ,see chap4 iv4 #b of ,book i4 ,so far as their argument is not a development of this psychological error1 any plausibility it has seems to me to be obtained by dwelling onesidedly on the annoyances and disappointments undoubtedly incident to normal human life1 and on the exceptional sufferings of small minorities of the human race1 or perhaps of most men during small portions of their lives4 ,the reader who wishes to see the paradoxical results of pessimistic utilitarianism seriously worked out by a thoughtful and suggestive writer1 may refer to ,professor ,macmillan's book on the ,promotion of ,general ,happiness 7,swan ,sonnenschein and ,co4 #ahij74 ,the author considers that 8the philosophical world is pretty equally divided between optimists and pessimists10 and his own judgment on the question at issue between the two schools appears to be held in suspense4 #cag ,it should be observed that the question here is as to the distribution of ,happiness1 not the means of happiness4 ,if more happiness on the whole is produced by giving the same means of happiness to ,b rather than to ,a1 it is an obvious and incontrovertible deduction from the ,utilitarian principle that it ought to be given to ,b1 whatever inequality in the distribution of the means of happiness this may involve4 ,,chapter ,,ii ,,the ,,proof ,,of ,,utilitarianism ,in ,book ii41 where we discussed the method of ,egoistic ,hedonism1 we did not take occasion to examine any proof of its first principle3 and in the case of ,universalistic ,hedonism also1 what primarily concerns us is not how its principle is to be proved to those who do not accept it1 but what consequences are logically involved in its acceptance4 ,at the same time it is important to observe that the principle of aiming at universal happiness is more generally felt to require some proof1 or at least 7as ,mill puts it7 some 8considerations determining the mind to accept it10 than the principle of aiming at one's own happiness4 ,from the point of view1 indeed1 of abstract philosophy1 ,i do not see why the ,egoistic principle should pass unchallenged any more than the ,universalistic4 ,i do not see why the axiom of ,prudence should not be questioned1 when it conflicts with present inclination1 on a ground similar to that on which ,egoists refuse to admit the axiom of ,rational ,benevolence4 ,if the ,utilitarian has to answer the question1 #8,why should ,i sacrifice my own happiness for the greater happiness of another8' it must surely be admissible to ask the ,egoist1 #8,why should ,i sacrifice a present pleasure for a greater one in the future8 ,why should ,i concern myself about my own future feelings any more than about the feelings of other persons8' ,it undoubtedly seems to ,common ,sense paradoxical to ask for a reason why one should seek one's own happiness on the whole2 but ,i do not see how the demand can be repudiated as absurd by those who adopt the views of the extreme empirical school of psychologists1 although those views are commonly supposed to have a close affinity with ,egoistic ,hedonism4 ,grant that the ,ego is merely a system of coherent phenomena1 that the permanent identical #8,i' is not a fact but a fiction1 as ,hume and his followers maintain2 why1 then1 should one part of the series of feelings into which the ,ego is resolved be concerned with another part of the same series1 any more than with any other series8 ,however1 ,i will not press this question now2 since ,i admit that ,common ,sense does not think it worth while to supply the individual with reasons for seeking his own interest4#cah ,reasons for doing his duty--according to the commonly accepted standard of duty--are not held to be equally superfluous3 indeed we find that utilitarian reasons are continually given for one or other of the commonly received rules of morality4 ,still the fact that certain rules are commonly received as binding1 though it does not establish their self-evidence1 renders it generally unnecessary to prove their authority to the ,common ,sense that receives them3 while for the same reason a ,utilitarian who claims to supersede them by a higher principle is naturally challenged1 by ,intuitionists no less than by ,egoists1 to demonstrate the legitimacy of his claim4 ,to this challenge some ,utilitarians would reply by saying that it is impossible to 8prove0 a first principle2 and this is of course true1 if by proof we mean a process which exhibits the principle in question as an inference from premises upon which it remains dependent for its certainty2 for these premises1 and not the inference drawn from them1 would then be the real first principles4 ,nay1 if ,utilitarianism is to be proved to a man who already holds some other moral principles1--whether he be an ,intuitional moralist1 who regards as final the principles of ,truth1 ,justice1 ,obedience to authority1 ,purity1 etc41 or an ,egoist who regards his own interest as the ultimately reasonable end of his conduct1--it would seem that the process must be one which establishes a conclusion actually superior in validity to the premises from which it starts4 ,for the ,utilitarian prescriptions of duty are prima facie in conflict1 at certain points and under certain circumstances1 both with rules which the ,intuitionist regards as self-evident1 and with the dictates of ,rational ,egoism2 so that ,utilitarianism1 if accepted at all1 must be accepted as overruling ,intuitionism and ,egoism4 ,at the same time1 if the other principles are not throughout taken as valid1 the so-called proof does not seem to be addressed to the ,intuitionist or ,egoist at all4 ,how shall we deal with this dilemma8 ,how is such a process--clearly different from ordinary proof--possible or conceivable8 ,yet there certainly seems to be a general demand for it4 ,perhaps we may say that what is needed is a line of argument which on the one hand allows the validity1 to a certain extent1 of the maxims already accepted1 and on the other hand shows them to be not absolutely valid1 but needing to be controlled and completed by some more comprehensive principle4 ,such a line of argument1 addressed to ,egoism1 was given in chap4 xiii4 of the foregoing book4 ,it should be observed that the applicability of this argument depends on the manner in which the ,egoistic first principle is formulated4 ,if the ,egoist strictly confines himself to stating his conviction that he ought to take his own happiness or pleasure as his ultimate end1 there seems no opening for any line of reasoning to lead him to ,universalistic ,hedonism as a first principle2#cai it cannot be proved that the difference between his own happiness and another's happiness is not for him all-important4 ,in this case all that the ,utilitarian can do is to effect as far as possible a reconciliation between the two principles1 by expounding to the ,egoist the sanctions of rules deduced from the ,universalistic principle1--i4e4 by pointing out the pleasures and pains that may be expected to accrue to the ,egoist himself from the observation and violation respectively of such rules4 ,it is obvious that such an exposition has no tendency to make him accept the greatest happiness of the greatest number as his ultimate end2 but only as a means to the end of his own happiness4 ,it is therefore totally different from a proof 7as above explained7 of ,universalistic ,hedonism4 ,when1 however1 the ,egoist puts forward1 implicitly or explicitly1 the proposition that his happiness or pleasure is ,good1 not only for him but from the point of view of the ,universe1--as 7e4g47 by saying that #8nature designed him to seek his own happiness1'--it then becomes relevant to point out to him that his happiness cannot be a more important part of ,good1 taken universally1 than the equal happiness of any other person4 ,and thus1 starting with his own principle1 he may be brought to accept ,universal happiness or pleasure as that which is absolutely and without qualification ,good or ,desirable3 as an end1 therefore1 to which the action of a reasonable agent as such ought to be directed4 ,this1 it will be remembered1 is the reasoning#cbj that ,i used in chap4 xiii4 of the preceding book in exhibiting the principle of ,rational ,benevolence as one of the few ,intuitions which stand the test of rigorous criticism4 ,it should be observed1 however1 that as addressed to the ,intuitionist1 this reasoning only shows the ,utilitarian first principle to be one moral axiom3 it does not prove that it is sole or supreme4 ,the premises with which the ,intuitionist starts commonly include other formul held as independent and self-evident4 ,utilitarianism has therefore to exhibit itself in the twofold relation above described1 at once negative and positive1 to these formul4 ,the ,utilitarian must1 in the first place1 endeavour to show to the ,intuitionist that the principles of ,truth1 ,justice1#b etc4 have only a dependent and subordinate validity3 arguing either that the principle is really only affirmed by ,common ,sense as a general rule admitting of exceptions and qualifications1 as in the case of ,truth1 and that we require some further principle for systematising these exceptions and qualifications2 or that the fundamental notion is vague and needs further determination1 as in the case of ,justice2#cba and further1 that the different rules are liable to conflict with each other1 and that we require some higher principle to decide the issue thus raised2 and again1 that the rules are differently formulated by different persons1 and that these differences admit of no ,intuitional solution1 while they show the vagueness and ambiguity of the common moral notions to which the ,intuitionist appeals4 ,this part of the argument ,i have perhaps sufficiently developed in the preceding book4 ,it remains to supplement this line of reasoning by developing the positive relation that exists between ,utilitarianism and the ,morality of ,common ,sense3 by showing how ,utilitarianism sustains the general validity of the current moral judgments1 and thus supplements the defects which reflection finds in the intuitive recognition of their stringency2 and at the same time affords a principle of synthesis1 and a method for binding the unconnected and occasionally conflicting principles of common moral reasoning into a complete and harmonious system4 ,if systematic reflection upon the morality of ,common ,sense thus exhibits the ,utilitarian principle as that to which ,common ,sense naturally appeals for that further development of its system which this same reflection shows to be necessary1 the proof of ,utilitarianism seems as complete as it can be made4 ,and since1 further--apart from the question of proof--it is important in considering the method of ,utilitarianism to determine exactly its relation to the commonly received rules of morality1 it will be proper to examine this relation at some length in the following chapter4 ,,footnotes3 #cah ,the relation of ,egoistic to ,universalistic ,hedonism is further examined in the concluding chapter4 #cai ,it is to be observed that he may be led to it in other ways than that of argument3 i4e4 by appeals to his sympathies1 or to his moral or quasi-moral sentiments4 #cbj ,i ought to remind the reader that the argument in chap4 xiii4 only leads to the first principle of ,utilitarianism1 if it be admitted that ,happiness is the only thing ultimately and intrinsically ,good or ,desirable4 ,i afterwards in chap4 xiv4 endeavoured to bring ,common ,sense to this admission4 #cba ,that is1 so far as we mean by ,justice anything more than the simple negation of arbitrary inequality4 ,,chapter ,,iii ,,relation ,,of ,,utilitarianism ,,to ,,the ,,morality ,,of ,,common ,,sense #a4 ,it has been before observed 7,book i4 chap4 vi47 that the two sides of the double relation in which ,utilitarianism stands to the ,morality of ,common ,sense have been respectively prominent at two different periods in the history of ,english ethical thought4 ,since ,bentham we have been chiefly familiar with the negative or aggressive aspect of the ,utilitarian doctrine4 ,but when ,cumberland1 replying to ,hobbes1 put forward the general tendency of the received moral rules to promote the 8common ,good#cbb of all ,rationals0 his aim was simply ,conservative3 it never occurs to him to consider whether these rules as commonly formulated are in any way imperfect1 and whether there are any discrepancies between such common moral opinions and the conclusions of ,rational ,benevolence4 ,so in ,shaftesbury's system the 8,moral0 or 8,reflex ,sense0 is supposed to be always pleased with that 8balance0 of the affections which tends to the good or happiness of the whole1 and displeased with the opposite4 ,in ,hume's treatise this coincidence is drawn out more in detail1 and with a more definite assertion that the perception of utility#cbc 7or the reverse7 is in each case the source of the moral likings 7or aversions7 which are excited in us by different qualities of human character and conduct4 ,and we may observe that the most penetrating among ,hume's contemporary critics1 ,adam ,smith1 admits unreservedly the objective coincidence of ,rightness or ,approvedness and ,utility3 though he maintains1 in opposition to ,hume1 that 8it is not the view of this utility or hurtfulness1 which is either the first or the principal source of our approbation or disapprobation40 ,after stating ,hume's theory that 8no qualities of the mind are approved of as virtuous1 but such as are useful or agreeable either to the person himself or to others1 and no qualities are disapproved of as vicious but such as have a contrary tendency02 he remarks that 8,nature seems indeed to have so happily adjusted our sentiments of approbation and disapprobation to the conveniency both of the individual and of the society1 that after the strictest examination it will be found1 ,i believe1 that this is universally the case40 ,and no one can read ,hume's ,inquiry into the ,first ,principles of ,morals without being convinced of this at least1 that if a list were drawn up of the qualities of character and conduct that are directly or indirectly productive of pleasure to ourselves or to others1 it would include all that are commonly known as virtues4 ,whatever be the origin of our notion of moral goodness or excellence1 there is no doubt that 8,utility0 is a general characteristic of the dispositions to which we apply it3 and that1 so far1 the ,morality of ,common ,sense may be truly represented as at least unconsciously ,utilitarian4 ,but it may still be objected1 that this coincidence is merely general and qualitative1 and that it breaks down when we attempt to draw it out in detail1 with the quantitative precision which ,bentham introduced into the discussion4 ,and no doubt there is a great difference between the assertion that virtue is always productive of happiness1 and the assertion that the right action is under all circumstances that which will produce the greatest possible happiness on the whole4 ,but it must be borne in mind that ,utilitarianism is not concerned to prove the absolute coincidence in results of the ,intuitional and ,utilitarian methods4 ,indeed1 if it could succeed in proving as much as this1 its success would be almost fatal to its practical claims2 as the adoption of the ,utilitarian principle would then become a matter of complete indifference4 ,utilitarians are rather called upon to show a natural transition from the ,morality of ,common ,sense to ,utilitarianism1 somewhat like the transition in special branches of practice from trained instinct and empirical rules to the technical method that embodies and applies the conclusions of science3 so that ,utilitarianism may be presented as the scientifically complete and systematically reflective form of that regulation of conduct1 which through the whole course of human history has always tended substantially in the same direction4 ,for this purpose it is not necessary to prove that existing moral rules are more conducive to the general happiness than any others3 but only to point out in each case some manifest felicific tendency which they possess4 ,hume's dissertation1 however1 incidentally exhibits much more than a simple and general harmony between the moral sentiments with which we commonly regard actions and their foreseen pleasurable and painful consequences4 ,and1 in fact1 the ,utilitarian argument cannot be fairly judged unless we take fully into account the cumulative force which it derives from the complex character of the coincidence between ,utilitarianism and ,common ,sense4 ,it may be shown1 ,i think1 that the ,utilitarian estimate of consequences not only supports broadly the current moral rules1 but also sustains their generally received limitations and qualifications3 that1 again1 it explains anomalies in the ,morality of ,common ,sense1 which from any other point of view must seem unsatisfactory to the reflective intellect2 and moreover1 where the current formula is not sufficiently precise for the guidance of conduct1 while at the same time difficulties and perplexities arise in the attempt to give it additional precision1 the ,utilitarian method solves these difficulties and perplexities in general accordance with the vague instincts of ,common ,sense1 and is naturally appealed to for such solution in ordinary moral discussions4 ,it may be shown further1 that it not only supports the generally received view of the relative importance of different duties1 but is also naturally called in as arbiter1 where rules commonly regarded as co-ordinate come into conflict3 that1 again1 when the same rule is interpreted somewhat differently by different persons1 each naturally supports his view by urging its ,utility1 however strongly he may maintain the rule to be self-evident and known a priori3 that where we meet with marked diversity of moral opinion on any point1 in the same age and country1 we commonly find manifest and impressive utilitarian reasons on both sides3 and that finally the remarkable discrepancies found in comparing the moral codes of different ages and countries are for the most part strikingly correlated to differences in the effects of actions on happiness1 or in men's foresight of1 or concern for1 such effects4 ,most of these points are noticed by ,hume1 though in a somewhat casual and fragmentary way3 and many of them have been incidentally illustrated in the course of the examination of ,common ,sense ,morality1 with which we were occupied in the preceding ,book4 ,but considering the importance of the present question1 it may be well to exhibit in systematic detail the cumulative argument which has just been summed up1 even at the risk of repeating to some extent the results previously given4 #b4 ,we may begin by replying to an objection which is frequently urged against ,utilitarianism4 ,how1 it is asked1 if the true ground of the moral goodness or badness of actions lies in their utility or the reverse1 can we explain the broad distinction drawn by ,common ,sense between the moral and other parts of our nature8 ,why is the excellence of ,virtue so strongly felt to be different in kind1 not merely from the excellence of a machine1 or a fertile field1 but also from the physical beauties and aptitudes1 the intellectual gifts and talents of human beings4 ,i should answer that--as was argued in an earlier chapter 7,book iii4 chap4 ii47--qualities that are1 in the strictest sense of the term1 ,virtuous1 are always such as we conceive capable of being immediately realised by voluntary effort1 at least to some extent2 so that the prominent obstacle to virtuous action is absence of adequate motive4 ,hence we expect that the judgments of moral goodness or badness1 passed either by the agent himself or by others1 will--by the fresh motive which they supply on the side of virtue--have an immediate practical effect in causing actions to be at least externally virtuous3 and the habitual consciousness of this will account for almost any degree of difference between moral sentiments and the pleasure and pain that we derive from the contemplation of either extra-human or non-voluntary utilities and inutilities4 ,to this1 however1 it is replied1 that among the tendencies to strictly voluntary actions there are many not commonly regarded as virtuous1 which are yet not only useful but on the whole more useful than many virtues4 8,the selfish instinct that leads men to accumulate confers ultimately more advantage on the world than the generous instinct that leads men to give4444 ,it is scarcely doubtful that a modest1 diffident1 and retiring nature1 distrustful of its own abilities1 and shrinking with humility from conflict1 produces on the whole less benefit to the world than the self-assertion of an audacious and arrogant nature1 which is impelled to every struggle1 and develops every capacity4 ,gratitude has no doubt done much to soften and sweeten the intercourse of life1 but the corresponding feeling of revenge was for centuries the one bulwark against social anarchy1 and is even now one of the chief restraints to crime4 ,on the great theatre of public life1 especially in periods of great convulsions where passions are fiercely roused1 it is neither the man of delicate scrupulosity and sincere impartiality1 nor yet the single-minded religious enthusiast1 incapable of dissimulation or procrastination1 who confers most benefit on the world4 ,it is much rather the astute statesman1 earnest about his ends1 but unscrupulous about his means1 equally free from the trammels of conscience and from the blindness of zeal1 who governs because he partly yields to the passions and the prejudices of his time4 ,but 444 it has scarcely yet been contended that the delicate conscience which in these cases impairs utility constitutes vice40#cbd ,these objections are forcibly urged2 but they appear to me not very difficult to answer1 it being always borne in mind that the present argument does not aim at proving an exact coincidence between ,utilitarian inferences and the intuitions of ,common ,sense1 but rather seeks to represent the latter as inchoately and imperfectly ,utilitarian4 ,in the first place1 we must carefully distinguish between the recognition of goodness in dispositions1 and the recognition of rightness in conduct4 ,an act that a ,utilitarian must condemn as likely to do more harm than good may yet show a disposition or tendency that will on the whole produce more good than harm4 ,this is eminently the case with scrupulously conscientious acts4 ,however true it may be that unenlightened conscientiousness has impelled men to fanatical cruelty1 mistaken asceticism1 and other infelicific conduct1 ,i suppose no ,intuitionist would maintain that carefulness in conforming to accepted moral rules has not1 on the whole1 a tendency to promote happiness4 ,it may be observed1 however1 that when we perceive the effects of a disposition generally felicific to be in any particular case adverse to happiness1 we often apply to it1 as so operating1 some term of condemnation3 thus we speak1 in the case above noticed1 of #8over-scrupulousness' or #8fanaticism4' ,but in so far as we perceive that the same disposition would generally produce good results1 it is not inconsistent still to regard it1 abstracting from the particular case1 as a good element of character4 ,secondly1 although1 in the view of a ,utilitarian1 only the useful is praiseworthy1 he is not bound to maintain that it is necessarily worthy of praise in proportion as it is useful4 ,from a ,utilitarian point of view1 as has been before said1 we must mean by calling a quality #8deserving of praise1' that it is expedient to praise it1 with a view to its future production3 accordingly1 in distributing our praise of human qualities1 on utilitarian principles1 we have to consider primarily not the usefulness of the quality1 but the usefulness of the praise3 and it is obviously not expedient to encourage by praise qualities which are likely to be found in excess rather than in defect4 ,hence 7e4g47 however necessary self-love or resentment may be to society1 it is quite in harmony with ,utilitarianism that they should not be recognised as virtues by ,common ,sense1 in so far as it is reasonably thought that they will always be found operating with at least sufficient intensity4 ,we find1 however1 that when self-love comes into conflict with impulses seen to be on the whole pernicious1 it is praised as ,prudence3 and that when a man seems clearly deficient in resentment1 he is censured for tameness3 though as malevolent impulses are much more obviously productive of pain than pleasure1 it is not unnatural that their occasional utility should be somewhat overlooked4 ,the case of ,humility and ,diffidence may be treated in a somewhat similar way4 ,as we saw#cbe it is only inadvertently that ,common ,sense praises the tendency to underrate one's own powers3 on reflection it is generally admitted that it cannot be good to be in error on this or any other point4 ,but the desires of ,superiority and ,esteem are so strong in most men1 that arrogance and self-assertion are both much commoner than the opposite defects1 and at the same time are faults peculiarly disagreeable to others3 so that humility gives us an agreeable surprise1 and hence ,common ,sense is easily led to overlook the more latent and remote bad consequences of undue self-distrust4 ,we may observe further that the perplexity which we seemed to find in the ,morality of ,common ,sense1 as to the relation of moral excellence to moral effort1 is satisfactorily explained and removed when we adopt a ,utilitarian point of view3 for on the one hand it is easy to see how certain acts--such as kind services--are likely to be more felicific when performed without effort1 and from other motives than regard for duty3 while on the other hand a person who in doing similar acts achieves a triumph of duty over strong seductive inclinations1 exhibits thereby a character which we recognise as felicific in a more general way1 as tending to a general performance of duty in all departments4 ,so again1 there is a simple and obvious utilitarian solution of another difficulty which ,i noticed1 as to the choice between ,subjective and ,objective rightness in the exceptional case in which alone the two can be presented as alternatives1--i4e4 when we are considering whether we shall influence another to act contrary to his conviction as to what is right4 ,a utilitarian would decide the question by weighing the felicific consequences of the particular right act against the infelicific results to be apprehended hereafter from the moral deterioration of the person whose conscientious convictions were overborne by other motives3 unless the former effects were very important he would reasonably regard the danger to character as the greater3 but if the other's mistaken sense of duty threatened to cause a grave disaster1 he would not hesitate to overbear it by any motives which it was in his power to apply4 ,and in practice ,i think that the ,common ,sense of mankind would come to similar conclusions by more vague and semi-conscious reasoning of the same kind4 ,in order1 however1 to form a precise estimate of the extent to which ,utilitarianism agrees or disagrees with ,common ,sense1 it seems best to examine the more definite judgments of right and wrong in conduct1 under the particular heads represented by our common notions of virtues and duties4 ,i may begin by pointing out once more that so far as any adequately precise definitions of these notions are found to involve1 implicitly or explicitly1 the notion of #8good' or of #8right' supposed already determinate1 they can afford no ground for opposing a ,utilitarian interpretation of these fundamental conceptions4 ,for example1 we saw this to be the case with the chief of the intellectual excellences discussed in ,book iii4 chap4 iii4 ,wisdom1 as commonly conceived1 is not exactly the faculty of choosing the right means to the end of universal happiness2 rather1 as we saw1 its notion involves an uncritical synthesis of the different ends and principles that are distinguished and separately examined in the present treatise4 ,but if its import is not distinctly ,utilitarian1 it is certainly not anything else as distinct from ,utilitarian3 if we can only define it as the faculty or habit of choosing the right or best means to the right or best end1 for that very reason our definition leaves it quite open to us to give the notions #8good' and #8right' a ,utilitarian import4 #c4 ,let us then examine first the group of virtues and duties discussed in ,book iii4 chap4 iv41 under the head of ,benevolence4 ,as regards the general conception of the duty1 there is1 ,i think1 no divergence that we need consider between the ,intuitional and ,utilitarian systems4 ,for though ,benevolence would perhaps be more commonly defined as a disposition to promote the ,good of one's fellow-creatures1 rather than their ,happiness 7as definitely understood by ,utilitarians72 still1 as the chief element in the common notion of good 7besides happiness7 is moral good or ,virtue1#cbf if we can show that the other virtues are--speaking broadly--all qualities conducive to the happiness of the agent himself or of others1 it is evident that ,benevolence1 whether it prompts us to promote the virtue of others or their happiness1 will aim directly or indirectly at the ,utilitarian end4#cbg ,nor1 further1 does the comprehensive range which ,utilitarians give to ,benevolence1 in stating as their ultimate end the greatest happiness of all sentient beings1 seem to be really opposed to ,common ,sense2 for in so far as certain ,intuitional moralists restrict the scope of the direct duty of ,benevolence to human beings1 and regard our duties to brute animals as merely indirect and derived 8from the duty of ,self-culture10 they rather than their ,utilitarian opponents appear paradoxical4 ,and if1 in laying down that each agent is to consider all other happiness as equally important with his own1 ,utilitarianism seems to go beyond the standard of duty commonly prescribed under the head of ,benevolence1 it yet can scarcely be said to conflict with ,common ,sense on this point4 ,for the practical application of this theoretical impartiality of ,utilitarianism is limited by several important considerations4 ,in the first place1 generally speaking1 each man is better able to provide for his own happiness than for that of other persons1 from his more intimate knowledge of his own desires and needs1 and his greater opportunities of gratifying them4 ,and besides1 it is under the stimulus of self-interest that the active energies of most men are most easily and thoroughly drawn out3 and if this were removed1 general happiness would be diminished by a serious loss of those means of happiness which are obtained by labour2 and also1 to some extent1 by the diminution of the labour itself4 ,for these reasons it would not under actual circumstances promote the universal happiness if each man were to concern himself with the happiness of others as much as with his own4 ,while if ,i consider the duty abstractly and ideally1 even ,common ,sense morality seems to bid me 8love my neighbour as myself40 ,it might indeed be plausibly objected1 on the other hand1 that under the notions of ,generosity1 ,self-sacrifice1 etc41 ,common ,sense praises 7though it does not prescribe as obligatory7 a suppression of egoism beyond what ,utilitarianism approves3 for we perhaps admire as virtuous a man who gives up his own happiness for another's sake1 even when the happiness that he confers is clearly less than that which he resigns1 so that there is a diminution of happiness on the whole4 ,but 7#a7 it seems very doubtful whether we do altogether approve such conduct when the disproportion between the sacrifice and the benefit is obvious and striking3 and 7#b7 a spectator is often unable to judge whether happiness is lost on the whole1 as 7a7 he cannot tell how far he who makes the sacrifice is compensated by sympathetic and moral pleasure1 and 7b7 the remoter felicific consequences flowing from the moral effects of such a sacrifice on the agent and on others have to be taken into account3 while 7#c7 even if there be a loss in the particular case1 still our admiration of self-sacrifice will admit of a certain ,utilitarian justification1 because such conduct shows a disposition far above the average in its general tendency to promote happiness1 and it is perhaps this disposition that we admire rather than the particular act4 ,it has been said1#cbh however1 that the special claims and duties belonging to special relations1 by which each man is connected with a few out of the whole number of human beings1 are expressly ignored by the rigid impartiality of the ,utilitarian formula3 and hence that1 though ,utilitarianism and ,common ,sense may agree in the proposition that all right action is conducive to the happiness of some one or other1 and so far beneficent1 still they are irreconcileably divergent on the radical question of the distribution of beneficence4 ,here1 however1 it seems that even fair-minded opponents have scarcely understood the ,utilitarian position4 ,they have attacked ,bentham's well-known formula1 8every man to count for one1 nobody for more than one10 on the ground that the general happiness will be best attained by inequality in the distribution of each one's services4 ,but so far as it is clear that it will be best attained in this way1 ,utilitarianism will necessarily prescribe this way of aiming at it2 and ,bentham's dictum must be understood merely as making the conception of the ultimate end precise--laying down that one person's happiness is to be counted for as much as another's 7supposed equal in degree7 as an element of the general happiness--not as directly prescribing the rules of conduct by which this end will be best attained4 ,and the reasons why it is1 generally speaking1 conducive to the general happiness that each individual should distribute his beneficence in the channels marked out by commonly recognised ties and claims1 are tolerably obvious4 ,for first1 in the chief relations discussed in chap4 iv4 of ,book iii4--the domestic1 and those constituted by consanguinity1 friendship1 previous kindnesses1 and special needs1--the services which ,common ,sense prescribes as duties are commonly prompted by natural affection1 while at the same time they tend to develop and sustain such affection4 ,now the subsistence of benevolent affections among human beings is itself an important means to the ,utilitarian end1 because 7as ,shaftesbury and his followers forcibly urged7 the most intense and highly valued of our pleasures are derived from such affections2 for both the emotion itself is highly pleasurable1 and it imparts this quality to the activities which it prompts and sustains1 and the happiness thus produced is continually enhanced by the sympathetic echo of the pleasures conferred on others4 ,and again1 where genuine affection subsists1 the practical objections to spontaneous beneficence1 which were before noticed1 are much diminished in force4 ,for such affection tends to be reciprocated1 and the kindnesses which are its outcome and expression commonly win a requital of affection3 and in so far as this is the case1 they have less tendency to weaken the springs of activity in the person benefited2 and may even strengthen them by exciting other sources of energy than the egoistic--personal affection1 and gratitude1 and the desire to deserve love1 and the desire to imitate beneficence4 ,and hence it has been often observed that the injurious effects of almsgiving are at least much diminished if the alms are bestowed with unaffected sympathy and kindliness1 and in such a way as to elicit a genuine response of gratitude4 ,and further1 the beneficence that springs from affection is less likely to be frustrated from defect of knowledge3 for not only are we powerfully stimulated to study the real conditions of the happiness of those whom we love1 but also such study is rendered more effective from the sympathy which naturally accompanies affection4 ,on these grounds the ,utilitarian will evidently approve of the cultivation of affection and the performance of affectionate services4 ,it may be said1 however1 that what we ought to approve is not so much affection for special individuals1 but rather a feeling more universal in its scope--charity1 philanthropy1 or 7as it has been called7 the #8,enthusiasm of ,humanity4' ,and certainly all special affections tend occasionally to come into conflict with the principle of promoting the general happiness3 and ,utilitarianism must therefore prescribe such a culture of the feelings as will1 so far as possible1 counteract this tendency4 ,but it seems that most persons are only capable of strong affections towards a few human beings in certain close relations1 especially the domestic3 and that if these were suppressed1 what they would feel towards their fellow-creatures generally would be1 as ,aristotle says1 8but a watery kindness0 and a very feeble counterpoise to self-love3 so that such specialised affections as the present organisation of society normally produces afford the best means of developing in most persons a more extended benevolence1 to the degree to which they are capable of feeling it4 ,besides1 each person is for the most part1 from limitation either of power or knowledge1 not in a position to do much good to more than a very small number of persons2 it therefore seems1 on this ground alone1 desirable that his chief benevolent impulses should be correspondingly limited4 ,and this leads us to consider1 secondly1 the reasons why1 affection apart1 it is conducive to the general happiness that special claims to services should be commonly recognised as attaching to special relations2 so as to modify that impartiality in the distribution of beneficence which ,utilitarianism prima facie inculcates4 ,for clearness' sake it seems best to take this argument separately1 though it cannot easily be divided from the former one1 because the services in question are often such as cannot so well be rendered without affection4 ,in such cases1 as we saw1#cbi ,common ,sense regards the affection itself as a duty1 in so far as it is capable of being cultivated3 but still prescribes the performance of the services even if the affection be unhappily absent4 ,indeed we may properly consider the services to which we are commonly prompted by the domestic affections1 and also those to which we are moved by gratitude and pity1 as an integral part of the system of mutual aid by which the normal life and happiness of society is maintained1 under existing circumstances2 being an indispensable supplement to the still more essential services which are definitely prescribed by ,law1 or rendered on commercial terms as a part of an express bargain4 ,as political economists have explained1 the means of happiness are immensely increased by that complex system of co-operation which has been gradually organised among civilised men3 and while it is thought that under such a system it will be generally best on the whole to let each individual exchange such services as he is disposed to render for such return as he can obtain for them by free contract1 still there are many large exceptions to this general principle4 ,of these the most important is constituted by the case of children4 ,it is necessary for the well-being of mankind that in each generation children should be produced in adequate numbers1 neither too many nor too few2 and that1 as they cannot be left to provide for themselves1 they should be adequately nourished and protected during the period of infancy2 and further1 that they should be carefully trained in good habits1 intellectual1 moral1 and physical3 and it is commonly believed that the best or even the only known means of attaining these ends in even a tolerable degree is afforded by the existing institution of the ,family1 resting as it does on a basis of legal and moral rules combined4 ,for ,law fixes a minimum of mutual services and draws the broad outlines of behaviour for the different members of the family1 imposing#ccj on the parents lifelong union and complete mutual fidelity and the duty of providing for their children the necessaries of life up to a certain age2 in return for which it gives them the control of their children for the same period1 and sometimes lays on the latter the burden of supporting their parents when aged and destitute3 so that ,morality1 in inculcating a completer harmony of interests and an ampler interchange of kindnesses1 is merely filling in the outlines drawn by ,law4 ,we found1 however1 in attempting to formulate the different domestic duties as recognised by ,common ,sense1 that there seemed to be in most cases a large vague margin with respect to which general agreement could not be affirmed1 and which1 in fact1 forms an arena for continual disputes4 ,but we have now to observe that it is just this margin which reveals most clearly the latent ,utilitarianism of common moral opinion3 for when the question is once raised as to the precise mutual duties 7e4g47 of husbands and wives1 or of parents and children1 each disputant commonly supports his view by a forecast of the effects on human happiness to be expected from the general establishment of any proposed rule2 this seems to be the standard to which the matter is1 by common consent1 referred4 ,similarly the claim to services that arises out of special need 7which natural sympathy moves us to recognise7 may obviously be rested on an utilitarian basis3 indeed the proper fulfilment of this duty seems so important to the well-being of society1 that it has in modern civilised communities generally been brought to some extent within the sphere of ,governmental action4 ,we noticed that the main utilitarian reason why it is not right for every rich man to distribute his superfluous wealth among the poor1 is that the happiness of all is on the whole most promoted by maintaining in adults generally 7except married women71 the expectation that each will be thrown on his own resources for the supply of his own wants4 ,but if ,i am made aware that1 owing to a sudden calamity that could not have been foreseen1 another's resources are manifestly inadequate to protect him from pain or serious discomfort1 the case is altered2 my theoretical obligation to consider his happiness as much as my own becomes at once practical2 and ,i am bound to make as much effort to relieve him as will not entail a greater loss of happiness to myself or others4 ,if1 however1 the calamity is one which might have been foreseen and averted by proper care1 my duty becomes more doubtful3 for then by relieving him ,i seem to be in danger of encouraging improvidence in others4 ,in such a case a ,utilitarian has to weigh this indirect evil against the direct good of removing pain and distress3 and it is now more and more generally recognised that the question of providing for the destitute has to be treated as a utilitarian problem of which these are the elements1--whether we are considering the minimum that should be secured to them by law1 or the proper supplementary action of private charity4 ,poverty1 however1 is not the only case in which it is conducive to the general happiness that one man should render unbought services to another4 ,in any condition or calling a man may find himself unable to ward off some evil1 or to realise some legitimate or worthy end1 without assistance of such kind as he cannot purchase on the ordinary commercial terms2--assistance which1 on the one hand1 will have no bad effect on the receiver1 from the exceptional nature of the emergency1 while at the same time it may not be burdensome to the giver4 ,here1 again1 some jurists have thought that where the service to be rendered is great1 and the burden of rendering it very slight1 it might properly be made matter of legal obligation3 so that 7e4g47 if ,i could save a man from drowning by merely holding out a hand1 ,i should be legally punishable if ,i omitted the act4 ,but1 however this may be1 the moral rule condemning the refusal of aid in such emergencies is obviously conducive to the general happiness4 ,further1 besides these--so to say--accidentally unbought services1 there are some for which there is normally no market-price2 such as counsel and assistance in the intimate perplexities of life1 which one is only willing to receive from genuine friends4 ,it much promotes the general happiness that such services should be generally rendered4 ,on this ground1 as well as through the emotional pleasures which directly spring from it1 we perceive ,friendship to be an important means to the ,utilitarian end4 ,at the same time we feel that the charm of ,friendship is lost if the flow of emotion is not spontaneous and unforced4 ,the combination of these two views seems to be exactly represented by the sympathy that is not quite admiration with which ,common ,sense regards all close and strong affections2 and the regret that is not quite disapproval with which it contemplates their decay4 ,in all cases where it is conducive to the general happiness that unbought services should be rendered1 ,gratitude 7if we mean by this a settled disposition to repay the benefit in whatever way one can on a fitting opportunity7 is enjoined by ,utilitarianism no less than by ,common ,sense2 for experience would lead us to expect that no kind of onerous services will be adequately rendered unless there is a general disposition to requite them4 ,in fact we may say that a general understanding that all services which it is expedient that ,a should render to ,b will be in some way repaid by ,b1 is a natural supplement of the more definite contracts by which the main part of the great social interchange of services is arranged4 ,indeed the one kind of requital merges in the other1 and no sharp line can be drawn between the two3 we cannot always say distinctly whether the requital of a benefit is a pure act of gratitude or the fulfilment of a tacit understanding4#cca ,there is1 however1 a certain difficulty in this view of gratitude as analogous to the fulfilment of a bargain4 ,for it may be said that of the services peculiar to friendship disinterestedness is an indispensable characteristic2 and that in all cases benefits conferred without expectation of reward have a peculiar excellence1 and are indeed peculiarly adapted to arouse gratitude2 but if they are conferred in expectation of such gratitude1 they lose this excellence2 and yet1 again1 it would be very difficult to treat as a friend one from whom gratitude was not expected4 ,this seems1 at first sight1 an inextricable entanglement3 but here1 as in other cases1 an apparent ethical contradiction is found to reduce itself to a psychological complexity4 ,for most of our actions are done from several different motives1 either coexisting or succeeding one another in rapid alternation3 thus a man may have a perfectly disinterested desire to benefit another1 and one which might possibly prevail over all conflicting motives if all hope of requital were cut off1 and yet it may be well that this generous impulse should be sustained by a vague trust that requital will not be withheld4 ,and in fact the apparent puzzle really affords another illustration of the latent ,utilitarianism of ,common ,sense4 ,for1 on the one hand1 ,utilitarianism prescribes that we should render services whenever it is conducive to the general happiness to do so1 which may often be the case without taking into account the gain to oneself which would result from their requital3 and on the other hand1 since we may infer from the actual selfishness of average men that such services would not be adequately rendered without expectation of requital1 it is also conducive to the general happiness that men should recognise a moral obligation to repay them4 ,we have discussed only the most conspicuous of the duties of affection3 but it is probably obvious that similar reasonings would apply in the case of the others4 ,in all such cases there are three distinct lines of argument which tend to show that the commonly received view of special claims and duties arising out of special relations1 though prima facie opposed to the impartial universality of the ,utilitarian principle1 is really maintained by a well-considered application of that principle4 ,first1 morality is here in a manner protecting the normal channels and courses of natural benevolent affections2 and the development of such affections is of the highest importance to human happiness1 both as a direct source of pleasure1 and as an indispensable preparation for a more enlarged 8altruism40 ,and again1 the mere fact that such affections are normal1 causes an expectation of the services that are their natural expression2 and the disappointment of such expectations is inevitably painful4 ,while finally1 apart from these considerations1 we can show in each case strong utilitarian reasons why1 generally speaking1 services should be rendered to the persons commonly recognised as having such claims rather than to others4 ,we have to observe1 in conclusion1 that the difficulties which we found in the way of determining by the ,intuitional method the limits and the relative importance of these duties are reduced in the ,utilitarian system1 to difficulties of hedonistic comparison4#ccb ,for each of the preceding arguments has shown us different kinds of pleasures gained and pains averted by the fulfilment of the claims in question4 ,there are1 first1 those which the service claimed would directly promote or avert3 secondly1 there is the pain and secondary harm of disappointed expectation1 if the service be not rendered3 thirdly1 we have to reckon the various pleasures connected with the exercise of natural benevolent affections1 especially when reciprocated1 including the indirect effects on the agent's character of maintaining such affections4 ,all these different pleasures and pains combine differently1 and with almost infinite variation as circumstances vary1 into utilitarian reasons for each of the claims in question2 none of these reasons being absolute and conclusive1 but each having its own weight1 while liable to be outweighed by others4 #d4 ,i pass to consider another group of duties1 often contrasted with those of ,benevolence1 under the comprehensive notion of ,justice4 8,that ,justice is useful to society10 says ,hume1 8it would be a superfluous undertaking to prove03 what he endeavours to show at some length is 8that public utility is the sole origin of ,justice03 and the same question of origin has occupied the chief attention of ,j4 ,s4 ,mill4#ccc ,here1 however1 we are not so much concerned with the growth of the sentiment of ,justice from experiences of utility1 as with the ,utilitarian basis of the mature notion2 while at the same time if the analysis previously given be correct1 the ,justice that is commonly demanded and inculcated is something more complex than these writers have recognised4 ,what ,hume 7e4g47 means by ,justice is rather what ,i should call ,order1 understood in its widest sense3 the observance of the actual system of rules1 whether strictly legal or customary1 which bind together the different members of any society into an organic whole1 checking malevolent or otherwise injurious impulses1 distributing the different objects of men's clashing desires1 and exacting such positive services1 customary or contractual1 as are commonly recognised as matters of debt4 ,and though there have rarely been wanting plausible empirical arguments for the revolutionary paradox quoted by ,plato1 that 8laws are imposed in the interest of rulers10 it remains true that the general conduciveness to social happiness of the habit of ,order or ,law-observance1 is1 as ,hume says1 too obvious to need proof2 indeed it is of such paramount importance to a community1 that even where particular laws are clearly injurious it is usually expedient to observe them1 apart from any penalty which their breach might entail on the individual4 ,we saw1 however1 that ,common ,sense sometimes bids us refuse obedience to bad laws1 because 8we ought to obey ,god rather than men0 7though there seems to be no clear intuition as to the kind or degree of badness that justifies resistance72 and further allows us1 in special emergencies1 to violate rules generally good1 for 8necessity has no law10 and 8salus populi suprema lex40 ,these and similar common opinions seem at least to suggest that the limits of the duty of ,law-observance are to be determined by utilitarian considerations4 ,while1 again1 the ,utilitarian view gets rid of the difficulties in which the attempt to define intuitively the truly legitimate source of legislative authority involved us2#ccd at the same time that it justifies to some extent each of the different views current as to the intrinsic legitimacy of governments4 ,for1 on the one hand1 it finds the moral basis of any established political order primarily in its effects rather than its causes2 so that1 generally speaking1 obedience will seem due to any de facto government that is not governing very badly4 ,on the other hand1 in so far as laws originating in a particular way are likely to be 7#a7 better1 or 7#b7 more readily observed1 it is a ,utilitarian duty to aim at introducing this mode of origination3 and thus in a certain stage of social development it may be right that 7e4g47 a #8representative system' should be popularly demanded1 or possibly 7in extreme cases7 even introduced by force3 while1 again1 there is expediency in maintaining an ancient mode of legislation1 because men readily obey such3 and loyalty to a dispossessed government may be on the whole expedient1 even at the cost of some temporary suffering and disorder1 in order that ambitious men may not find usurpation too easy4 ,here1 as elsewhere1 ,utilitarianism at once supports the different reasons commonly put forward as absolute1 and also brings them theoretically to a common measure1 so that in any particular case we have a principle of decision between conflicting political arguments4 ,as was before said1 this ,law-observance1 in so far at least as it affects the interests of other individuals1 is what we frequently mean by ,justice4 ,it seems1 however1#cce that the notion of ,justice1 exhaustively analysed1 includes several distinct elements combined in a somewhat complex manner3 we have to inquire1 therefore1 what latent utilities are represented by each of these elements4 ,now1 first1 a constant part of the notion1 which appears in it even when the ,just is not distinguished from the ,legal1 is impartiality or the negation of arbitrary inequality4 ,this impartiality1 as we saw#ccf 7whether exhibited in the establishment or in the administration of laws71 is merely a special application of the wider maxim that it cannot be right to treat two persons differently if their cases are similar in all material circumstances4 ,and ,utilitarianism1 as we saw1 admits this maxim no less than other systems of ,ethics4 ,at the same time1 this negative criterion is clearly inadequate for the complete determination of what is just in laws1 or in conduct generally2 when we have admitted this1 it still remains to ask1 8,what are the inequalities in laws1 and in the distribution of pleasures and pains outside the sphere of law1 which are not arbitrary and unreasonable8 and to what general principles can they be reduced80 ,here in the first place we may explain1 on utilitarian principles1 why apparently arbitrary inequality in a certain part of the conduct of individuals#ccg is not regarded as injustice or even--in some cases--as in any way censurable4 ,for freedom of action is an important source of happiness to the agents1 and a socially useful stimulus to their energies3 hence it is obviously expedient that a man's free choice in the distribution of wealth or kind services should not be restrained by the fear of legal penalties1 or even of social disapprobation1 beyond what the interests of others clearly require2 and therefore1 when distinctly recognised claims are satisfied1 it is pro tanto expedient that the mere preferences of an individual should be treated by others as legitimate grounds for inequality in the distribution of his property or services4 ,nay1 as we have before seen1 it is within certain limits expedient that each individual should practically regard his own unreasoned impulses as reasonable grounds of action3 as in the rendering of services prompted by such affections as are normally and properly spontaneous and unforced4 ,passing to consider the general principles upon which #8just claims' as commonly recognised appear to be based1 we notice that the grounds of a number of such claims may be brought under the general head of #8normal expectations'2 but that the stringency of such obligations varies much in degree1 according as the expectations are based upon definite engagements1 or on some vague mutual understanding1 or are merely such as an average man would form from past experience of the conduct of other men4 ,in these latter cases ,common ,sense appeared to be somewhat perplexed as to the validity of the claims4 ,but for the ,utilitarian the difficulty has ceased to exist4 ,he will hold any disappointment of expectations to be pro tanto an evil1 but a greater evil in proportion to the previous security of the expectant individual1 from the greater shock thus given to his reliance on the conduct of his fellow-men generally3 and many times greater in proportion as the expectation is generally recognised as normal and reasonable1 as in this case the shock extends to all who are in any way cognisant of his disappointment4 ,the importance to mankind of being able to rely on each other's actions is so great1 that in ordinary cases of absolutely definite engagements there is scarcely any advantage that can counterbalance the harm done by violating them4 ,still1 we found#cch that several exceptions and qualifications to the rule of ,good ,faith were more or less distinctly recognised by ,common ,sense3 and most of these have a utilitarian basis1 which it does not need much penetration to discern4 ,to begin1 we may notice that the superficial view of the obligation of a promise which makes it depend on the assertion of the promiser1 and not1 as ,utilitarians hold1 on the expectations produced in the promisee1 cannot fairly be attributed to ,common ,sense3 which certainly condemns a breach of promise much more strongly when others have acted in reliance on it1 than when its observance did not directly concern others1 so that its breach involves for them only the indirect evil of a bad precedent1--as when a man breaks a pledge of total abstinence4 ,we see1 again1 how the utilitarian reasons for keeping a promise are diminished by a material change of circumstances1#cci for in that case the expectations disappointed by breaking it are at least not those which the promise originally created4 ,it is obvious1 too1 that it is a disadvantage to the community that men should be able to rely on the performance of promises procured by fraud or unlawful force1 so far as encouragement is thereby given to the use of fraud or force for this end4#cdj ,we saw1 again1#cda that when the performance would be injurious to the promisee1 ,common ,sense is disposed to admit that its obligation is superseded2 and is at least doubtful whether the promise should be kept1 even when it is only the promiser who would be injured1 if the harm be extreme2--both which qualifications are in harmony with ,utilitarianism4 ,and similarly for the other qualifications and exceptions3 they all turn out to be as clearly utilitarian1 as the general utility of keeping one's word is plain and manifest4 ,but further1 the expediency of satisfying normal expectations1 even when they are not based upon a definite contract1 is undeniable2 it will clearly conduce to the tranquillity of social existence1 and to the settled and well-adjusted activity on which social happiness greatly depends1 that such expectations should be as little as possible baulked4 ,and here ,utilitarianism relieves us of the difficulties which beset the common view of just conduct as something absolutely precise and definite4 ,for in this vaguer region we cannot draw a sharp line between valid and invalid claims2 #8injustice' shades gradually off into mere #8hardship4' ,hence the ,utilitarian view that the disappointment of natural expectations is an evil1 but an evil which must sometimes be incurred for the sake of a greater good1 is that to which ,common ,sense is practically forced1 though it is difficult to reconcile it with the theoretical absoluteness of ,justice in the ,intuitional view of ,morality4 ,the gain of recognising the relativity of this obligation will be still more felt1 when we consider what ,i distinguished as ,ideal ,justice1 and examine the general conceptions of this which we find expressed or latent in current criticisms of the existing order of ,society4 ,we have seen that there are two competing views of an ideally just social order--or perhaps we may say two extreme types between which the looser notions of ordinary men seem to fluctuate--which ,i called respectively ,individualistic and ,socialistic4 ,according to the former view an ideal system of ,law ought to aim at ,freedom1 or perfect mutual non-interference of all the members of the community1 as an absolute end4 ,now the general utilitarian reasons for leaving each rational adult free to seek happiness in his own way are obvious and striking3 for1 generally speaking1 each is best qualified to provide for his own interests1 since even when he does not know best what they are and how to attain them1 he is at any rate most keenly concerned for them3 and again1 the consciousness of freedom and concomitant responsibility increases the average effective activity of men3 and besides1 the discomfort of constraint is directly an evil and pro tanto to be avoided4 ,still1 we saw#cdb that the attempt to construct a consistent code of laws1 taking ,maximum ,freedom 7instead of ,happiness7 as an absolute end1 must lead to startling paradoxes and insoluble puzzles3 and in fact the practical interpretation of the notion #8,freedom1' and the limits within which its realisation has been actually sought1 have always--even in the freest societies--been more or less consciously determined by considerations of expediency4 ,so that we may fairly say that in so far as ,common ,sense has adopted the ,individualistic ideal in politics1 it has always been as subordinate to and limited by the ,utilitarian first principle4#cdc ,it seems1 however1 that what we commonly demand or long for1 under the name of ,ideal ,justice1 is not so much the realisation of ,freedom1 as the distribution of good and evil according to ,desert3 indeed it is as a means to this latter end that ,freedom is often advocated2 for it is said that if we protect men completely from mutual interference1 each will reap the good and bad consequences of his own conduct1 and so be happy or unhappy in proportion to his deserts4 ,in particular1 it has been widely held that if a free exchange of wealth and services is allowed1 each individual will obtain from society1 in money or other advantages1 what his services are really worth4 ,we saw1 however1 that the price which an individual obtains under a system of perfect free trade1 for wealth or services exchanged by him1 may for several reasons be not proportioned to the social utility of what he exchanges3 and reflective ,common ,sense seems to admit this disproportion as to some extent legitimate1 under the influence of utilitarian considerations correcting the unreflective utterances of moral sentiments4 ,to take a particular case3 if a moral man were asked how far it is right to take advantage in bargaining of another's ignorance1 probably his first impulse would be to condemn such a procedure altogether4 ,but reflection1 ,i think1 would show him that such a censure would be too sweeping3 that it would be contrary to ,common ,sense to 8blame ,a for having1 in negotiating with a stranger ,b1 taken advantage of ,b's ignorance of facts known to himself1 provided that ,a's superior knowledge had been obtained by a legitimate use of diligence and foresight1 which ,b might have used with equal success4444 ,what prevents us from censuring in this and similar cases is1 ,i conceive1 a more or less conscious apprehension of the indefinite loss to the wealth of the community that is likely to result from any effective social restrictions on the free pursuit and exercise0 of economic knowledge4 ,and for somewhat similar reasons of general expediency1 if the question be raised whether it is fair for a class of persons to gain by the unfavourable economic situation of any class with which they deal1 ,common ,sense at least hesitates to censure such gains--at any rate when such unfavourable situation is due 8to the gradual action of general causes1 for the existence of which the persons who gain are not specially responsible40#cdd ,the general principle of #8requiting good desert1' so far as ,common ,sense really accepts it as practically applicable to the relations of men in society1 is broadly in harmony with ,utilitarianism2 since we obviously encourage the production of general happiness by rewarding men for felicific conduct2 only the ,utilitarian scale of rewards will not be determined entirely by the magnitude of the services performed1 but partly also by the difficulty of inducing men to perform them4 ,but this latter element seems to be always taken into account 7though perhaps unconsciously7 by ,common ,sense3 for1 as we have been led to notice1#cde we do not commonly recognise merit in right actions1 if they are such as men are naturally inclined to perform rather too much than too little4 ,again1 in cases where the ,intuitional principle that ill-desert lies in wrong intention conflicts with the ,utilitarian view of punishment as purely preventive1 we find that in the actual administration of criminal justice1 ,common ,sense is forced1 however reluctantly1 into practical agreement with ,utilitarianism4 ,thus after a civil war it demands the execution of the most purely patriotic rebels2 and after a railway accident it clamours for the severe punishment of unintentional neglects1 which1 except for their consequences1 would have been regarded as very venial4 ,if1 however1 in any distribution of pleasures and privileges1 or of pains and burdens1 considerations of desert do not properly come in 7i4e4 if the good or evil to be distributed have no relation to any conduct on the part of the persons who are to receive either7--or if it is practically impossible to take such considerations into account--then ,common ,sense seems to fall back on simple equality as the principle of just apportionment4#cdf ,and we have seen that the ,utilitarian1 in the case supposed1 will reasonably accept ,equality as the only mode of distribution that is not arbitrary2 and it may be observed that this mode of apportioning the means of happiness is likely to produce more happiness on the whole1 not only because men have a disinterested aversion to unreason1 but still more because they have an aversion to any kind of inferiority to others 7which is much intensified when the inferiority seems unreasonable74 ,this latter feeling is so strong that it often prevails in spite of obvious claims of desert2 and it may even be sometimes expedient that it should so prevail4 ,for1 finally1 it must be observed that ,utilitarianism furnishes us with a common standard to which the different elements included in the notion of ,justice may be reduced4 ,such a standard is imperatively required3 as these different elements are continually liable to conflict with each other4 ,the issue1 for example1 in practical politics between ,conservatives and ,reformers often represents such a conflict3 the question is1 whether we ought to do a certain violence to expectations arising naturally out of the existing social order1 with the view of bringing about a distribution of the means of happiness more in accordance with ideal justice4 ,here1 if my analysis of the common notion of ,justice be sound1 the attempt to extract from it a clear decision of such an issue must necessarily fail3 as the conflict is1 so to say1 permanently latent in the very core of ,common ,sense4 ,but the ,utilitarian will merely use this notion of ,justice as a guide to different kinds of utilities2 and in so far as these are incompatible1 he will balance one set of advantages against the other1 and decide according to the preponderance4 #e4 ,the duty of ,truth-speaking is sometimes taken as a striking instance of a moral rule not resting on a ,utilitarian basis4 ,but a careful study of the qualifications with which the common opinion of mankind actually inculcates this duty seems to lead us to an opposite result3 for not only is the general utility of truth-speaking so manifest as to need no proof1 but wherever this utility seems to be absent1 or outweighed by particular bad consequences1 we find that ,common ,sense at least hesitates to enforce the rule4 ,for example1 if a man be pursuing criminal ends1 it is prima facie injurious to the community that he should be aided in his pursuit by being able to rely on the assertions of others4 ,here1 then1 deception is prima facie legitimate as a protection against crime3 though when we consider the bad effects on habit1 and through example1 of even a single act of unveracity1 the case is seen to be1 on ,utilitarian principles1 doubtful3 and this is just the view of ,common ,sense4 ,again1 though it is generally a man's interest to know the truth1 there are exceptional cases in which it is injurious to him--as when an invalid hears bad news--and here1 too1 ,common ,sense is disposed to suspend the rule4 ,again1 we found it difficult to define exactly wherein ,veracity consists2 for we may either require truth in the spoken words1 or in the inferences which the speaker foresees will be drawn from them1 or in both4 ,perfect ,candour1 no doubt1 would require it in both3 but in the various circumstances where this seems inexpedient1 we often find ,common ,sense at least half-willing to dispense with one or other part of the double obligation4 ,thus we found a respectable school of thinkers maintaining that a religious truth may properly be communicated by means of a historical fiction3 and1 on the other hand1 the unsuitability of perfect frankness to our existing social relations is recognised in the common rules of politeness1 which impose on us not unfrequently the necessity of suppressing truths and suggesting falsehoods4 ,i would not say that in any of these cases ,common ,sense pronounces quite decidedly in favour of unveracity3 but then neither is ,utilitarianism decided1 as the utility of maintaining a general habit of truth-speaking is so great1 that it is not easy to prove it to be clearly outweighed by even strong special reasons for violating the rule4 ,yet it may be worth while to point out how the different views as to the legitimacy of ,malevolent impulses1 out of which we found it hard to frame a consistent doctrine for ,common ,sense1 exactly correspond to different forecasts of the consequences of gratifying such impulses4 ,prima facie1 the desire to injure any one in particular is inconsistent with a deliberate purpose of benefiting as much as possible people in general2 accordingly1 we find that what ,i may call ,superficial ,common ,sense passes a sweeping condemnation on such desires4 ,but a study of the actual facts of society shows that resentment plays an important part in that repression of injuries which is necessary to social wellbeing2 accordingly1 the reflective moralist shrinks from excluding it altogether4 ,it is evident1 however1 that personal ill-will is a very dangerous means to the general happiness3 for its direct end is the exact opposite of happiness2 and though the realisation of this end may in certain cases be the least of two evils1 still the impulse if encouraged is likely to prompt to the infliction of pain beyond the limits of just punishment1 and to have an injurious reaction on the character of the angry person4 ,accordingly1 the moralist is disposed to prescribe that indignation be directed always against acts1 and not against persons2 and if indignation so restricted would be efficient in repressing injuries1 this would seem to be the state of mind most conducive to the general happiness4 ,but it is doubtful whether average human nature is capable of maintaining this distinction1 and whether1 if it could be maintained1 the more refined aversion would by itself be sufficiently efficacious3 accordingly1 ,common ,sense hesitates to condemn personal ill-will against wrong-doers--even if it includes a desire of malevolent satisfaction4 ,finally1 it is easy to show that ,temperance1 ,self-control1 and what are called the ,self-regarding virtues generally1 are #8useful' to the individual who possesses them3 and if it is not quite clear1 in the view of ,common ,sense1 to what end that regulation and government of appetites and passions1 which moralists have so much inculcated and admired1 is to be directed2 at least there seems no obstacle in the way of our defining this end as ,happiness4 ,and even in the ascetic extreme of ,self-control1 which has sometimes led to the repudiation of sensual pleasures as radically bad1 we may trace an unconscious ,utilitarianism4 ,for the ascetic condemnation has always been chiefly directed against those pleasures1 in respect of which men are especially liable to commit excesses dangerous to health2 and free indulgence in which1 even when it keeps clear of injury to health1 is thought to interfere with the development of other faculties and susceptibilities which are important sources of happiness4 #f4 ,an apparent exception to this statement may seem to be constituted in the case of the sexual appetite1 by the regulation prescribed under the notion of ,purity or ,chastity4 ,and there is no doubt that under this head we find condemned1 with special vehemence and severity1 acts of which the immediate effect is pleasure not obviously outweighed by subsequent pain4 ,but a closer examination of this exception transforms it into an important contribution to the present argument3 as it shows a specially complex and delicate correspondence between moral sentiments and social utilities4 ,in the first place1 the peculiar intensity and delicacy of the moral sentiments that govern the relations of the sexes are thoroughly justified by the vast importance to society of the end to which they are obviously a means1--the maintenance1 namely1 of the permanent unions which are held to be necessary for the proper rearing and training of children4 ,hence the first and fundamental rule in this department is that which directly secures conjugal fidelity3 and the utilitarian grounds for protecting marriage indirectly1 by condemning all extra-nuptial intercourse of the sexes1 are obvious3 for to remove the moral censure that rests on such intercourse would seriously diminish men's motives for incurring the restraints and burdens which marriage entails2 and the youth of both sexes would form habits of feeling and conduct tending to unfit them for marriage2 and1 if such intercourse were fertile1 it would be attended with that imperfect care of the succeeding generation1 which it seems the object of permanent unions to prevent2 while if it were sterile1 the future of the human race would1 as far as we can see1 be still more profoundly imperilled4 ,but1 further1 it is only on ,utilitarian principles that we can account for the anomalous difference which the morality of ,common ,sense has always made between the two sexes as regards the simple offence of unchastity4 ,for the offence is commonly more deliberate in the man1 who has the additional guilt of soliciting and persuading the woman2 in the latter1 again1 it is far more often prompted by some motive that we rank higher than mere lust3 so that1 according to the ordinary canons of intuitional morality1 it ought to be more severely condemned in the man4 ,the actual inversion of this result can only be justified by taking into account the greater interest that society has in maintaining a high standard of female chastity4 ,for the degradation of this standard must strike at the root of family life1 by impairing men's security in the exercise of their parental affections3 but there is no corresponding consequence of male unchastity1 which may therefore prevail to a considerable extent without imperilling the very existence of the family1 though it impairs its wellbeing4 ,at the same time1 the condemnation of unchastity in men by the common moral sense of ,christian countries at the present day1 is sufficiently clear and explicit3 though we recognise the existence of a laxer code--the morality1 as it is called1 of #8the world'--which treats it as indifferent1 or very venial4 ,but the very difference between the two codes gives a kind of support to the present argument2 as it corresponds to easily explained differences of insight into the consequences of maintaining certain moral sanctions4 ,for partly1 it is thought by #8men of the world' that men cannot practically be restrained from sexual indulgence1 at least at the period of life when the passions are strongest3 and hence that it is expedient to tolerate such kind and degree of illicit sexual intercourse as is not directly dangerous to the wellbeing of families4 ,partly1 again1 it is maintained by some1 in bolder antagonism to ,common ,sense1 that the existence of a certain limited amount of such intercourse 7with a special class of women1 carefully separated1 as at present1 from the rest of society7 is scarcely a real evil1 and may even be a positive gain in respect of general happiness2 for continence is perhaps somewhat dangerous to health1 and in any case involves a loss of pleasure considerable in intensity2 while at the same time the maintenance of as numerous a population as is desirable in an old society does not require that more than a certain proportion of the women in each generation should become mothers of families2 and if some of the surplus make it their profession to enter into casual and temporary sexual relations with men1 there is no necessity that their lives should compare disadvantageously in respect of happiness with those of other women in the less favoured classes of society4 ,this view has perhaps a superficial plausibility3 but it ignores the essential fact that it is only by the present severe enforcement against unchaste women of the penalties of social contempt and exclusion1 resting on moral disapprobation1 that the class of courtesans is kept sufficiently separate from the rest of female society to prevent the contagion of unchastity from spreading2 and that the illicit intercourse of the sexes is restrained within such limits as not to interfere materially with the due development of the race4 ,this consideration is sufficient to decide a ,utilitarian to support generally the established rule against this kind of conduct1 and therefore to condemn violations of the rule as on the whole infelicific1 even though they may perhaps appear to have this quality only in consequence of the moral censure attached to them4#cdg ,further1 the #8man of the world' ignores the vast importance to the human race of maintaining that higher type of sexual relations which is not1 generally speaking1 possible1 except where a high value is set upon chastity in both sexes4 ,from this point of view the ,virtue of ,purity may be regarded as providing a necessary shelter under which that intense and elevated affection between the sexes1 which is most conducive both to the happiness of the individual and to the wellbeing of the family1 may grow and flourish4 ,and in this way we are able to explain what must have perplexed many reflective minds in contemplating the common-sense regulation of conduct under the head of ,purity3 viz4 that on the one hand the sentiment that supports these rules is very intense1 so that the subjective difference between right and wrong in this department is marked with peculiar strength3 while on the other hand it is found impossible to give a clear definition of the conduct condemned under this notion4 ,for the impulse to be restrained is so powerful and so sensitive to stimulants of all kinds1 that1 in order that the sentiment of purity may adequately perform its protective function1 it is required to be very keen and vivid2 and the aversion to impurity must extend far beyond the acts that primarily need to be prohibited1 and include in its scope everything 7in dress1 language1 social customs1 etc47 which may tend to excite lascivious ideas4 ,at the same time it is not necessary that the line between right and wrong in such matters should be drawn with theoretical precision3 it is sufficient for practical purposes if the main central portion of the region of duty be strongly illuminated1 while the margin is left somewhat obscure4 ,and1 in fact1 the detailed regulations which it is important to society to maintain depend so much upon habit and association of ideas1 that they must vary to a great extent from age to age and from country to country4 #g4 ,the preceding survey has supplied us with several illustrations of the manner in which ,utilitarianism is normally introduced as a method for deciding between different conflicting claims1 in cases where common sense leaves their relative importance obscure1--as 7e4g47 between the different duties of the affections1 and the different principles which analysis shows to be involved in our common conception of ,justice--3 and we have also noticed how1 when a dispute is raised as to the precise scope and definition of any current moral rule1 the effects of different acceptations of the rule on general happiness or social wellbeing are commonly regarded as the ultimate grounds on which the dispute is to be decided4 ,in fact these two arguments practically run into one2 for it is generally a conflict between maxims that impresses men with the need of giving each a precise definition4 ,it may be urged that the consequences to which reference is commonly made in such cases are rather effects on #8social wellbeing' than on #8general happiness' as understood by ,utilitarians2 and that the two notions ought not to be identified4 ,i grant this3 but in the last chapter of the preceding ,book ,i have tried to show that ,common ,sense is unconsciously utilitarian in its practical determination of those very elements in the notion of ,ultimate ,good or ,wellbeing which at first sight least admit of a hedonistic interpretation4 ,we may now observe that this hypothesis of #8,unconscious ,utilitarianism' explains the different relative importance attached to particular virtues by different classes of human beings1 and the different emphasis with which the same virtue is inculcated on these different classes by mankind generally4 ,for such differences ordinarily correspond to variations--real or apparent--in the ,utilitarian importance of the virtues under different circumstances4 ,thus we have noticed the greater stress laid on chastity in women than in men3 courage1 on the other hand1 is more valued in the latter1 as they are more called upon to cope energetically with sudden and severe dangers4 ,and for similar reasons a soldier is expected to show a higher degree of courage than 7e4g47 a priest4 ,again1 though we esteem candour and scrupulous sincerity in most persons1 we scarcely look for them in a diplomatist who has to conceal secrets1 nor do we expect that a tradesman in describing his goods should frankly point out their defects to his customers4 ,finally1 when we compare the different moral codes of different ages and countries1 we see that the discrepancies among them correspond1 at least to a great extent1 to differences either in the actual effects of actions on happiness1 or in the extent to which such effects are generally foreseen--or regarded as important--by the men among whom the codes are maintained4 ,several instances of this have already been noticed3 and the general fact1 which has been much dwelt upon by ,utilitarian writers1 is also admitted and even emphasised by their opponents4 ,thus ,dugald ,stewart#cdh lays stress on the extent to which the moral judgments of mankind have been modified by 8the diversity in their physical circumstances10 the 8unequal degrees of civilisation which they have attained10 and 8their unequal measures of knowledge or of capacity40 ,he points out1 for instance1 that theft is regarded as a very venial offence in the ,south ,sea ,islanders1 because little or no labour is there required to support life2 that the lending of money for interest is commonly reprehended in societies where commerce is imperfectly developed1 because the #8usurer' in such communities is commonly in the odious position of wringing a gain out of the hard necessities of his fellows2 and that where the legal arrangements for punishing crime are imperfect1 private murder is either justified or regarded very leniently4 ,many other examples might be added to these if it were needful4 ,but ,i conceive that few persons who have studied the subject will deny that there is a certain degree of correlation between the variations in the moral code from age to age1 and the variations in the real or perceived effects on general happiness of actions prescribed or forbidden by the code4 ,and in proportion as the apprehension of consequences becomes more comprehensive and exact1 we may trace not only change in the moral code handed down from age to age1 but progress in the direction of a closer approximation to a perfectly enlightened ,utilitarianism4 ,only we must distinctly notice another important factor in the progress1 which ,stewart has not mentioned3 the extension1 namely1 of the capacity for sympathy in an average member of the community4 ,the imperfection of earlier moral codes is at least as much due to defectiveness of sympathy as of intelligence2 often1 no doubt1 the ruder man did not perceive the effects of his conduct on others2 but often1 again1 he perceived them more or less1 but felt little or no concern about them4 ,thus it happens that changes in the conscience of a community often correspond to changes in the extent and degree of the sensitiveness of an average member of it to the feelings of others4 ,of this the moral development historically worked out under the influence of ,christianity affords familiar illustrations4#cdi ,i am not maintaining that this correlation between the development of current morality and the changes in the consequences of conduct as sympathetically forecast1 is perfect and exact4 ,on the contrary1--as ,i shall have occasion to point out in the next chapter--the history of morality shows us many evidences of what1 from the ,utilitarian point of view1 appear to be partial aberrations of the moral sense4 ,but even in these instances we can often discover a germ of unconscious ,utilitarianism2 the aberration is often only an exaggeration of an obviously useful sentiment1 or the extension of it by mistaken analogy to cases to which it does not properly apply1 or perhaps the survival of a sentiment which once was useful but has now ceased to be so4 ,further1 it must be observed that ,i have carefully abstained from asserting that the perception of the rightness of any kind of conduct has always--or even ordinarily--been derived by conscious inference from a perception of consequent advantages4 ,this hypothesis is naturally suggested by such a survey as the preceding2 but the evidence of history hardly seems to me to support it3 since1 as we retrace the development of ethical thought1 the ,utilitarian basis of current morality1 which ,i have endeavoured to exhibit in the present chapter1 seems to be rather less than more distinctly apprehended by the common moral consciousness4 ,thus 7e4g47 ,aristotle sees that the sphere of the ,virtue of ,courage 771 as recognised by the ,common ,sense of ,greece1 is restricted to dangers in war3 and we can now explain this limitation by a reference to the utilitarian importance of this kind of courage1 at a period of history when the individual's happiness was bound up more completely than it now is with the welfare of his state1 while the very existence of the latter was more frequently imperilled by hostile invasions3 but this explanation lies quite beyond the range of ,aristotle's own reflection4 ,the origin of our moral notions and sentiments lies hid in those obscure regions of hypothetical history where conjecture has free scope3 but we do not find that1 as our retrospect approaches the borders of this realm1 the conscious connexion in men's minds between accepted moral rules and foreseen effects on general happiness becomes more clearly traceable4 ,the admiration felt by early man for beauties or excellences of character seems to have been as direct and unreflective as his admiration of any other beauty3 and the stringency of law and custom in primitive times presents itself as sanctioned by the evils which divine displeasure will supernaturally inflict on their violators1 rather than by even a rude and vague forecast of the natural bad consequences of non-observance4 ,it is therefore not as the mode of regulating conduct with which mankind began1 but rather as that to which we can now see that human development has been always tending1 as the adult and not the germinal form of ,morality1 that ,utilitarianism may most reasonably claim the acceptance of ,common ,sense4 99 99 99 99 99 #cej;,if we consider the relation of ,ethics to ,politics from a ,utilitarian point of view1 the question1 what rules of conduct for the governed should be fixed by legislators and applied by judges1 will be determined by the same kind of forecast of consequences as will be used in settling all questions of private morality3 we shall endeavour to estimate and balance against each other the effects of such rules on the general happiness4 ,in so far1 however1 as we divide the ,utilitarian theory of private conduct from that of legislation1 and ask which is prior1 the answer would seem to be different in respect of different parts of the legal code4 #a4 ,to a great extent the rules laid down in a utilitarian code of law will be such as any man sincerely desirous of promoting the general happiness would generally endeavour to observe1 even if they were not legally binding4 ,of this kind is the rule of not inflicting any bodily harm or gratuitous annoyance on any one1 except in self-defence or as retribution for wrong2 the rule of not interfering with another's pursuit of the means of happiness1 or with his enjoyment of wealth acquired by his own labour or the free consent of others2 the rule of fulfilling all engagements freely entered into with any one1--at any rate unless the fulfilment were harmful to others1 or much more harmful to oneself than beneficial to him1 or unless there were good grounds for supposing that the other party would not perform his share of a bilateral contract--2 and the rule of supporting one's children while helpless1 and one's parents if decrepit1 and of educating one's children suitably to their future life4 ,as regards such rules as these1 ,utilitarian ,ethics seems independent of ,politics1 and naturally prior to it2 we first consider what conduct is right for private individuals1 and then to how much of this they can advantageously be compelled by legal penalties4 #b4 ,there are other rules again which it is clearly for the general happiness to observe1 if only their observance is enforced on others2 e4g4 abstinence from personal retaliation of injuries1 and a more general and unhesitating fulfilment of contracts than would perhaps be expedient if they were not legally enforced4 #c4 ,but again1 in the complete determination of the mutual claims of members of society to services and forbearances1 there are many points on which the utilitarian theory of right private conduct apart from law would lead to a considerable variety of conclusions1 from the great difference in the force of the relevant considerations under different circumstances2 while at the same time uniformity is either indispensable1 to prevent disputes and disappointments1 or at least highly desirable1 in order to maintain effectively such rules of conduct as are generally--though not universally--expedient4 ,under this head would come the exacter definition of the limits of appropriation1--e4g4 as regards property in literary compositions and technical inventions1--and a large part of the law of inheritance1 and of the law regulating the family relations4 ,in such cases1 in so far as they are capable of being theoretically determined1 ,utilitarian ,ethics seems to blend with ,utilitarian ,politics in a rather complicated way2 since we cannot determine the right conduct for a private individual in any particular case1 without first considering what rule 7if any7 it would be on the whole expedient to maintain1 in the society of which he is a member1 by legal penalties1 as well as by the weaker and less definite sanctions of moral opinion4 ,this problem1 moreover1 in any concrete case is necessarily further complicated by the consideration of the delicate mutual relations of ,positive ,law and ,positive ,morality--as we may call the actual moral opinions generally held in a given society at a given time4 ,for on the one hand it is dangerous in legislation to advance beyond ,positive ,morality1 by prohibiting actions 7or inactions7 that are generally approved or tolerated2 on the other hand1 up to the point at which this danger becomes serious1 legislation is a most effective instrument for modifying or intensifying public opinion1 in the direction in which it is desirable that it should progress4 ,leaving this difficult question of social dynamics1 we may say that normally in a well-organised society the most important and indispensable rules of social behaviour will be legally enforced and the less important left to be maintained by ,positive ,morality4 ,law will constitute1 as it were1 the skeleton of social order1 clothed upon by the flesh and blood of ,morality4 ,,footnotes3 #cbb ,it ought to be observed that ,cumberland does not adopt a hedonistic interpretation of ,good4 ,still1 ,i have followed ,hallam in regarding him as the founder of ,english ,utilitarianism3 since it seems to have been by a gradual and half-unconscious process that #8,good' came to have the definitely hedonistic meaning which it has implicitly in ,shaftesbury's system1 and explicitly in that of ,hume4 #cbc ,i should point out that ,hume uses 8utility0 in a narrower sense than that which ,bentham gave it1 and one more in accordance with the usage of ordinary language4 ,he distinguishes the 8useful0 from the 8immediately agreeable03 so that while recognising 8utility0 as the main ground of our moral approbation of the more important virtues1 he holds that there are other elements of personal merit which we approve because they are 8immediately agreeable10 either to the person possessed of them or to others4 ,it appears1 however1 more convenient to use the word in the wider sense in which it has been current since ,bentham4 #cbd ,lecky1 ,hist4 of ,eur4 ,mor4 chap4 i1 pp4 #cg1 #dj seqq4 7#acth impression74 #cbe ,book iii4 chap4 x4 #cbf ,book iii4 chap4 iv4 #a4 #cbg ,it will be seen that ,i do not here assume in their full breadth the conclusions of chap4 xiv4 of the preceding ,book4 #cbh ,cf4 ,j4 ,grote1 ,an ,examination of the ,utilitarian ,philosophy1 chap4 v4 #cbi ,book iii4 chap4 iv4 #a4 #ccj ,strictly speaking1 of course1 the ,law of modern states does not enforce this1 but only refuses to recognise connubial contracts of any other kind3 but the social effect is substantially the same4 #cca ,sometimes such unbargained requital is even legally obligatory3 as when children are bound to repay the care spent on them by supporting their parents in decrepitude4 #ccb ,further discussion of the method of dealing with these difficulties1 in their utilitarian form1 will be found in the two following chapters4 #ccc ,utilitarianism1 chap4 v4 #ccd ,cf4 ,book iii4 chap4 vi4 #b1 #c4 #cce ,cf4 ,book iii4 chap4 v4 #ccf ,book iii4 chap4 xiii4 #c4 #ccg ,cf4 ante1 p4 #bfh note4 #cch ,book iii4 chap4 vi4 #cci ,cf4 ante1 ,book iii4 chap4 vi4 #h4 #cdj ,in the case of force1 however1 there is the counterbalancing consideration that the unlawful aggressor may be led to inflict worse injury on his victim1 if he is unable to rely on the latter's promise4 #cda ,cf4 ,book iii4 chap4 vi4 #h4 #cdb ,book iii4 chap4 v4 #d4 #cdc ,in another work 7,principles of ,political ,economy1 ,book iii4 chap4 ii47 ,i have tried to show that complete laisser faire1 in the organisation of industry1 tends in various ways to fall short of the most economic production of wealth4 #cdd ,the quotations are from my ,principles of ,political ,economy1 ,book iii4 chap4 ix42 where these questions are discussed at somewhat greater length4 #cde ,cf4 ante1 #b1 and ,book iii4 chap4 ii4 #a4 #cdf ,i have before observed that it is quite in harmony with ,utilitarian principles to recognise a sphere of private conduct within which each individual may distribute his wealth and kind services as unequally as he chooses1 without incurring censure as unjust4 #cdg ,it is obvious that so long as the social sanction is enforced1 the lives of the women against whom society thus issues its ban must tend to be unhappy from disorder and shame1 and the source of unhappiness to others2 and also that the breach by men of a recognised and necessary moral rule must tend to have injurious effects on their moral habits generally4 #cdh ,active and ,moral ,powers1 ,book ii4 chap4 iii4 #cdi ,among definite changes in the current morality of the ,grco-,roman civilised world1 which are to be attributed mainly if not entirely to the extension and intensification of sympathy due to ,christianity1 the following may be especially noted3 7#a7 the severe condemnation and final suppression of the practice of exposing infants2 7#b7 effective abhorrence of the barbarism of gladiatorial combats2 7#c7 immediate moral mitigation of slavery1 and a strong encouragement of emancipation2 7#d7 great extension of the eleemosynary provision made for the sick and poor4 #cej ,this passage1 which in the second and subsequent editions occurred in chap4 ii4 of ,book i41 was omitted by ,professor ,sidgwick from that chapter in the sixth edition1 with the intention of incorporating it in ,book iv41 which he did not live to revise4 ,,chapter ,,iv ,,the ,,method ,,of ,,utilitarianism #a4 ,if the view maintained in the preceding chapter as to the general ,utilitarian basis of the ,morality of ,common ,sense may be regarded as sufficiently established1 we are now in a position to consider more closely to what method of determining right conduct the acceptance of ,utilitarianism will practically lead4 ,the most obvious method1 of course1 is that of ,empirical ,hedonism1 discussed in ,book ii4 chap4 iii42 according to which we have in each case to compare all the pleasures and pains that can be foreseen as probable results of the different alternatives of conduct presented to us1 and to adopt the alternative which seems likely to lead to the greatest happiness on the whole4 ,in ,book ii41 however1 it appeared that even the more restricted application of this method1 which we there had to consider1 was involved in much perplexity and uncertainty4 ,even when an individual is only occupied in forecasting his own pleasures1 it seems difficult or impossible for him to avoid errors of considerable magnitude2 whether in accurately comparing the pleasantness of his own past feelings1 as represented in memory1 or in appropriating the experience of others1 or in arguing from the past to the future4 ,and these difficulties are obviously much increased when we have to take into account all the effects of our actions on all the sentient beings who may be affected by them4 ,at the same time1 in ,book ii4 we could not find any satisfactory substitute for this method of empirical comparison4 ,it did not appear reasonable to take refuge in the uncriticised beliefs of men in general as to the sources of happiness3 indeed1 it seemed impossible to extract any adequately clear and definite consensus of opinion from the confused and varying utterances of ,common ,sense on this subject4 ,nor again could it be shown that the individual would be more likely to attain the greatest happiness open to him by practically confining his efforts to the realisation of any scientifically ascertainable physical or psychical conditions of happiness3 nor did it seem possible to infer on empirical grounds that the desired result would be secured by conformity to the accepted principles of morality4 ,but when we consider these latter in relation1 not to the happiness of the individual1 but to that of human 7or sentient7 beings generally1 it is clear from the preceding chapter that the question of harmony between ,hedonism and ,intuitionism presents prima facie an entirely different aspect4 ,indeed from the considerations that we have just surveyed it is but a short and easy step to the conclusion that in the ,morality of ,common ,sense we have ready to hand a body of ,utilitarian doctrine2 that the 8rules of morality for the multitude0 are to be regarded as 8positive beliefs of mankind as to the effects of actions on their happiness10#cea so that the apparent first principles of ,common ,sense may be accepted as the 8middle axioms0 of ,utilitarian method2 direct reference being only made to utilitarian considerations1 in order to settle points upon which the verdict of ,common ,sense is found to be obscure and conflicting4 ,on this view the traditional controversy between the advocates of ,virtue and the advocates of ,happiness would seem to be at length harmoniously settled4 ,and the arguments for this view which have been already put forward certainly receive support from the hypothesis1 now widely accepted1 that the moral sentiments are ultimately derived1 by a complex and gradual process1 from experiences of pleasure and pain4 ,the hypothesis1 in a summary form1 would seem to be this2 7#a7 in the experience of each member of the human community the pain or alarm caused to him by actions of himself and of others tends by association to excite in him a dislike of such actions1 and a similar though feebler effect is produced by his perception of pain or danger caused to others with whom he is connected by blood1 or by community of interest1 or any special tie of sympathy3 7#b7 experience also tends more indirectly to produce in him sentiments restraining him from actions painful or alarming to others1 through his dread of their resentment and its consequences1--especially dread of his chief's anger1 and1 where religious influence has become strong1 of the anger of supernatural beings3 7#c7 with these latter feelings blends a sympathetic aversion to the pain of other men generally1 which--at first comparatively feeble--tends to grow in force as morality develops4 ,in the same way experiences of pleasure and gratitude1 and desire of the goodwill of others and its consequences1 tend to produce liking for actions that are perceived to cause pleasure to self or to others4 ,the similar aversions and likings that are thus produced in the majority of the members of any society1 through the general similarity of their natures and conditions1 tend to become more similar through communication and imitation1--the desire of each to retain the goodwill of others operating to repress individual divergencies4 ,thus common likings for conduct that affects pleasurably the community generally or some part of it1 and common dislikes for conduct causing pain and alarm1 come to be gradually developed2 they are transmitted from generation to generation1 partly perhaps by physical inheritance1 but chiefly by tradition from parents to children1 and imitation of adults by the young2 in this way their origin becomes obscured1 and they finally appear as what are called the moral sentiments4 ,this theory does not1 in my view1 account adequately for the actual results of the faculty of moral judgment and reasoning1 so far as ,i can examine them by reflection on my own moral consciousness3 for this1 as ,i have before said1 does not yield any apparent intuitions that stand the test of rigorous examination except such as1 from their abstract and general character1 have no cognisable relation to particular experiences of any kind4#ceb ,but that the theory gives a partially true explanation of the historical origin of particular moral sentiments and habits and commonly accepted rules1 ,i see no reason to doubt2 and thus regarded it seems to supplement the arguments of the preceding chapter that tend to exhibit the morality of common sense as unconsciously or #8instinctively' utilitarian4 ,but it is one thing to hold that the current morality expresses1 partly consciously but to a larger extent unconsciously1 the results of human experience as to the effects of actions3 it is quite another thing to accept this morality en bloc1 so far as it is clear and definite1 as the best guidance we can get to the attainment of maximum general happiness4 ,however attractive this simple reconciliation of ,intuitional and ,utilitarian methods may be1 it is not1 ,i think1 really warranted by the evidence4 ,in the first place1 ,i hold that in a complete view of the development of the moral sense a more prominent place should be given to the effect of sympathy with the impulses that prompt to actions1 as well as with the feelings that result from them4 ,it may be observed that ,adam ,smith#cec assigns to this operation of sympathy1--the echo 7as it were7 of each agent's passion in the breast of unconcerned spectators1--the first place in determining our approval and disapproval of actions#ced2 sympathy with the effect of conduct on others he treats as a merely secondary factor1 correcting and qualifying the former4 ,without going so far as this1 ,i think that there are certainly many cases where the resulting moral consciousness would seem to indicate a balance or compromise between the two kinds of sympathy2 and the compromise may easily be many degrees removed from the rule which ,utilitarianism would prescribe4 ,for though the passions and other active impulses are doubtless themselves influenced1 no less than the moral sentiments1 by experiences of pleasure and pain2 still this influence is not sufficient to make them at all trustworthy guides to general1 any more than to individual1 happiness--as some of our moral sentiments themselves emphatically announce4 ,but even if we consider our common moral sentiments as entirely due--directly or indirectly--to the accumulated and transmitted experiences of primary and sympathetic pains and pleasures2 it is obvious that the degree of accuracy with which sentiments thus produced will guide us to the promotion of general happiness must largely depend upon the degree of accuracy with which the whole sum of pleasurable and painful consequences1 resulting from any course of action1 has been represented in the consciousness of an average member of the community4 ,and it is seen at a glance that this representation has always been liable to errors of great magnitude1 from causes that were partly noticed in the previous chapter1 when we were considering the progress of morality4 ,we have to allow1 first1 for limitation of sympathy2 since in every age and country the sympathy of an average man with other sentient beings1 and even his egoistic regard for their likings and aversions1 has been much more limited than the influence of his actions on the feelings of others4 ,we must allow further for limitation of intelligence3 for in all ages ordinary men have had a very inadequate knowledge of natural sequences2 so that such indirect consequences of conduct as have been felt have been frequently traced to wrong causes1 and been met by wrong moral remedies1 owing to imperfect apprehension of the relation of means to ends4 ,again1 where the habit of obedience to authority and respect for rank has become strong1 we must allow for the possibly perverting influence of a desire to win the favour or avert the anger of superiors4 ,and similarly we must allow again for the influences of false religions2 and also for the possibility that the sensibilities of religious teachers have influenced the code of duty accepted by their followers1 in points where these sensibilities were not normal and representative1 but exceptional and idiosyncratic4#cee ,on the other hand1 we must suppose that these deflecting influences have been more or less limited and counteracted by the struggle for existence in past ages among different human races and communities2 since1 so far as any moral habit or sentiment was unfavourable to the preservation of the social organism1 it would be a disadvantage in the struggle for existence1 and would therefore tend to perish with the community that adhered to it4 ,but we have no reason to suppose that this force would be adequate to keep positive morality always in conformity with a ,utilitarian ideal4 ,for 7#a7 imperfect morality would be only one disadvantage among many1 and not1 ,i conceive1 the most important1 unless the imperfection were extreme1--especially in the earlier stages of social and moral development1 in which the struggle for existence was most operative3 and 7#b7 a morality perfectly preservative of a human community might still be imperfectly felicific1 and so require considerable improvement from a ,utilitarian point of view4#cef ,further1 analogy would lead us to expect that however completely adapted the moral instincts of a community may be at some particular time to its conditions of existence1 any rapid change of circumstances would tend to derange the adaptation1 from survival of instincts formerly useful1 which through this change become useless or pernicious4 ,and indeed1 apart from any apparent changes in external circumstances1 it might result from the operation of some law of human development1 that the most completely organised experience of human happiness in the past would guide us but imperfectly to the right means of making it a maximum in the future4 ,for example1 a slight decrease in the average strength of some common impulse might render the traditional rules and sentiments1 that regulate this impulse1 infelicific on the whole4 ,and if1 when we turn from these abstract considerations to history1 and examine the actual morality of other ages and countries1 we undoubtedly find that1 considered as an instrument for producing general happiness1 it continually seems to exhibit palpable imperfections1--there is surely a strong presumption that there are similar imperfections to be discovered in our own moral code1 though habit and familiarity prevent them from being obvious4 ,finally1 we must not overlook the fact that the divergences which we find when we compare the moralities of different ages and countries1 exist to some extent side by side in the morality of any one society at any given time4 ,it has already been observed that whenever divergent opinions are entertained by a minority so large1 that we cannot fairly regard the dogma of the majority as the plain utterance of ,common ,sense1 an appeal is necessarily made to some higher principle1 and very commonly to ,utilitarianism4 ,but a smaller minority than this1 particularly if composed of persons of enlightenment and special acquaintance with the effects of the conduct judged1 may reasonably inspire us with distrust of ,common ,sense3 just as in the more technical parts of practice we prefer the judgment of a few trained experts to the instincts of the vulgar4 ,yet again1 a contemplation of these divergent codes and their relation to the different circumstances in which men live1 suggests that ,common-,sense morality is really only adapted for ordinary men in ordinary circumstances--although it may still be expedient that these ordinary persons should regard it as absolutely and universally prescribed1 since any other view of it may dangerously weaken its hold over their minds4 ,so far as this is the case we must use the ,utilitarian method to ascertain how far persons in special circumstances require a morality more specially adapted to them than ,common ,sense is willing to concede3 and also how far men of peculiar physical or mental constitution ought to be exempted from ordinary rules1 as has sometimes been claimed for men of genius1 or men of intensely emotional nature1 or men gifted with more than usual prudence and self-control4 ,further1 it is important to notice1 that besides the large amount of divergence that exists between the moral instincts of different classes and individuals1 there is often a palpable discrepancy between the moral instincts of any class or individual1 and such ,utilitarian reasonings as their untrained intellects are in the habit of conducting4 ,there are many things in conduct which many people think right but not expedient1 or at least which they would not think expedient if they had not first judged them to be right2 in so far as they reason from experience only1 their conclusions as to what conduces to the general happiness are opposed to their moral intuitions4 ,it may be said that this results generally from a hasty and superficial consideration of expediency2 and that the discrepancy would disappear after a deeper and completer examination of the consequences of actions4 ,and ,i do not deny that this would often turn out to be the case3 but as we cannot tell a priori how far it would be so1 this only constitutes a further argument for a comprehensive and systematic application of a purely ,utilitarian method4 ,we must conclude1 then1 that we cannot take the moral rules of ,common ,sense as expressing the consensus of competent judges1 up to the present time1 as to the kind of conduct which is likely to produce the greatest amount of happiness on the whole4 ,it would rather seem that it is the unavoidable duty of a systematic ,utilitarianism to make a thorough revision of these rules1 in order to ascertain how far the causes previously enumerated 7and perhaps others7 have actually operated to produce a divergence between ,common ,sense and a perfectly ,utilitarian code of morality4 #b4 ,but in thus stating the problem we are assuming that the latter term of this comparison can be satisfactorily defined and sufficiently developed2 that we can frame with adequate precision a system of rules1 constituting the true moral code for human beings as deduced from ,utilitarian principles4 ,and this seems to have been commonly assumed by the school whose method we are now examining4 ,but when we set ourselves in earnest to the construction of such a system1 we find it beset with serious difficulties4 ,for1 passing over the uncertainties involved in hedonistic comparison generally1 let us suppose that the quantum of happiness that will result from the establishment of any plan of behaviour among human beings can be ascertained with sufficient exactness for practical purposes--even when the plan is as yet constructed in imagination alone4 ,it still has to be asked1 ,what is the nature of the human being for whom we are to construct this hypothetical scheme of conduct8 ,for humanity is not something that exhibits the same properties always and everywhere3 whether we consider the intellect of man or his feelings1 or his physical condition and circumstances1 we find them so different in different ages and countries1 that it seems prima facie absurd to lay down a set of ideal ,utilitarian rules for mankind generally4 ,it may be said that these differences after all relate chiefly to details2 and that there is in any case sufficient uniformity in the nature and circumstances of human life always and everywhere to render possible an outline scheme of ideal behaviour for mankind at large4 ,but it must be answered1 that it is with details that we are now principally concerned2 for the previous discussion has sufficiently shown that the conduct approved by ,common ,sense has a general resemblance to that which ,utilitarianism would prescribe2 but we wish to ascertain more exactly how far the resemblance extends1 and with what delicacy and precision the current moral rules are adapted to the actual needs and conditions of human life4 ,suppose1 then1 that we contract the scope of investigation1 and only endeavour to ascertain the rules appropriate to men as we know them1 in our own age and country4 ,we are immediately met with a dilemma3 the men whom we know are beings who accept more or less definitely a certain moral code3 if we take them as they are in this respect1 we can hardly at the same time conceive them as beings for whom a code is yet to be constructed de novo3 if1 on the other hand1 we take an actual man--let us say1 an average ,englishman--and abstract his morality1 what remains is an entity so purely hypothetical1 that it is not clear what practical purpose can be served by constructing a system of moral rules for the community of such beings4 ,could we indeed assume that the scientific deduction of such a system would ensure its general acceptance2 could we reasonably expect to convert all mankind at once to ,utilitarian principles1 or even all educated and reflective mankind1 so that all preachers and teachers should take universal happiness as the goal of their efforts as unquestioningly as physicians take the health of the individual body2 and could we be sure that men's moral habits and sentiments would adjust themselves at once and without any waste of force to these changed rules3--then perhaps in framing the ,utilitarian code we might fairly leave existing morality out of account4 ,but ,i cannot think that we are warranted in making these suppositions2 ,i think we have to take the moral habits1 impulses1 and tastes of men as a material given us to work upon no less than the rest of their nature1 and as something which1 as it only partly results from reasoning in the past1 so can only be partially modified by any reasoning which we can now apply to it4 ,it seems therefore clear that the solution of the hypothetical ,utilitarian problem of constructing an ideal morality for men conceived to be in other respects as experience shows them to be1 but with their actual morality abstracted1 will not give us the result which we practically require4 ,it will perhaps be said1 8,no doubt such an ideal ,utilitarian morality can only be gradually1 and perhaps after all imperfectly1 introduced2 but still it will be useful to work it out as a pattern to which we may approximate40 ,but1 in the first place1 it may not be really possible to approximate to it3 since any particular existing moral rule1 though not the ideally best even for such beings as existing men under the existing circumstances1 may yet be the best that they can be got to obey3 so that it would be futile to propose any other1 or even harmful1 as it might tend to impair old moral habits without effectively replacing them by new ones4 ,and secondly1 the endeavour gradually to approximate to a morality constructed on the supposition that the non-moral part of existing human nature remains unchanged1 may lead us wrong3 because the state of men's knowledge and intellectual faculties1 and the range of their sympathies1 and the direction and strength of their prevailing impulses1 and their relations to the external world and to each other1 are continually being altered1 and such alteration is to some extent under our control and may be felicific in a high degree3 and any material modifications in important elements and conditions of human life may require corresponding changes in established moral rules and sentiments1 in order that the greatest possible happiness may be attained by the human being whose life is thus modified4 ,in short1 the construction of a ,utilitarian code1 regarded as an ideal towards which we are to progress1 is met by a second dilemma3--,the nature of man and the conditions of his life cannot usefully be assumed to be constant1 unless we are confining our attention to the present or proximate future2 while again1 if we are considering them in the present or proximate future1 we must take into account men's actual moral habits and sentiments1 as a part of their nature not materially more modifiable than the rest4 ,nor1 again1 can ,i agree with ,mr4 ,spencer#ceg in thinking that it is possible to solve the problems of practical ethics by constructing the final perfect form of society1 towards which the process of human history is tending2 and determining the rules of mutual behaviour which ought to be1 and will be1 observed by the members of this perfect society4 ,for1 firstly1 granting that we can conceive as possible a human community which is from a utilitarian point of view perfect2 and granting also ,mr4 ,spencer's definition of this perfection--viz4 that the voluntary actions of all the members cause 8pleasure unalloyed by pain anywhere0 to all who are affected by them#ceh--2 it still seems to me quite impossible to forecast the natures and relations of the persons composing such a community1 with sufficient clearness and certainty to enable us to define even in outline their moral code4 ,and secondly1 even if it were otherwise1 even if we could construct scientifically ,mr4 ,spencer's ideal morality1 ,i do not think such a construction would be of much avail in solving the practical problems of actual humanity4 ,for a society in which--to take one point only--there is no such thing as punishment1 is necessarily a society with its essential structure so unlike our own1 that it would be idle to attempt any close imitation of its rules of behaviour4 ,it might possibly be best for us to conform approximately to some of these rules2 but this we could only know by examining each particular rule in detail2 we could have no general grounds for concluding that it would be best for us to conform to them as far as possible4 ,for even supposing that this ideal society is ultimately to be realised1 it must at any rate be separated from us by a considerable interval of evolution2 hence it is not unlikely that the best way of progressing towards it will be some other than the apparently directest way1 and that we shall reach it more easily if we begin by moving away from it4 ,whether this is so or not1 and to what extent1 can only be known by carefully examining the effects of conduct on actual human beings1 and inferring its probable effects on the human beings whom we may expect to exist in the proximate future4 #c4 ,other thinkers of the evolutionist school suggest that the difficulties of ,utilitarian method might be avoided1 in a way more simple than ,mr4 ,spencer's1 by adopting1 as the practically ultimate end and criterion of morality1 8health0 or 8efficiency0 of the social organism1 instead of happiness4 ,this view is maintained1 for instance1 in ,mr4 ,leslie ,stephen's ,science of ,ethics2#cei and deserves careful examination4 ,as ,i understand ,mr4 ,stephen1 he means by 8health0 that state of the social organism which tends to its preservation under the conditions of its existence1 as they are known or capable of being predicted2 and he means the same by 8efficiency02--since the work for which1 in his view1 the social organism has to be 8efficient0 is simply the work of living1 the function of 8going on40 ,i say this because 8efficiency0 might be understood to imply some #8task of humanity' which the social organism has to execute1 beyond the task of merely living2 and similarly 8health0 might be taken to mean a state tending to the preservation not of existence merely1 but of desirable existence--desirability being interpreted in some non-hedonistic manner3 and in this case an examination of either term would lead us again over the ground traversed in the discussion on ,ultimate ,good 7in chap4 xiv4 of the preceding ,book74#cfj ,but ,i do not understand that any such implications were in ,mr4 ,stephen's mind2 and they certainly would not be in harmony with the general drift of his argument4 ,the question1 therefore1 is whether1 if ,general ,happiness be admitted to be the really ultimate end in a system of morality1 it is nevertheless reasonable to take ,preservation of the social organism as the practically ultimate 8scientific criterion0 of moral rules4 ,my reasons for answering this question in the negative are two-fold4 ,in the first place ,i know no adequate grounds for supposing that if we aim exclusively at the preservation of the social organism we shall secure the maximum attainable happiness of its individual members3 indeed1 so far as ,i know1 of two social states which equally tend to be preserved one may be indefinitely happier than the other4 ,as has been before observed#cfa a large part of the pleasures which cultivated persons value most highly--sthetic pleasures--are derived from acts and processes that have no material tendency to preserve the individual's life3#cfb and the statement remains true if we substitute the social organism for the individual4 ,and ,i may add that much refined morality is concerned with the prevention of pains which have no demonstrable tendency to the destruction of the individual or of society4 ,hence1 while ,i quite admit that the maintenance of preservative habits and sentiments is the most indispensable function of utilitarian morality--and perhaps almost its sole function in the earlier stages of moral development1 when to live at all was a difficult task for human communities--,i do not therefore think it reasonable that we should be content with the mere securing of existence for humanity generally1 and should confine our efforts to promoting the increase of this security1 instead of seeking to make the secured existence more desirable4 ,but1 secondly1 ,i do not see on what grounds ,mr4 ,stephen holds that the criterion of #8tendency to the preservation of the social organism' is necessarily capable of being applied with greater precision than that of #8tendency to general happiness1' even so far as the two ends are coincident3 and that the former 8satisfies the conditions of a scientific criterion40 ,i should admit that this would probably be the case1 if the ,sociology that we know were a science actually constructed1 and not merely the sketch of a possible future science3 but ,mr4 ,stephen has himself told us that sociology at present 8consists of nothing more than a collection of unverified guesses and vague generalisations1 disguised under a more or less pretentious apparatus of quasi-scientific terminology40 ,this language is stronger than ,i should have ventured to use2 but ,i agree generally with the view that it expresses2 and it appears to me difficult for a writer who holds this view to maintain that the conception of 8social health10 regarded as a criterion and standard of right conduct1 is in any important degree more 8scientific0 than the conception of 8general happiness40 ,holding this estimate of the present condition of ,sociology1 ,i consider that1 from the utilitarian point of view1 there are equally decisive reasons against the adoption of any such notion as 8development0 of the social organism--instead of mere preservation--as the practically ultimate end and criterion of morality4 ,on the one hand1 if by 8development0 is meant an increase in 8efficiency0 or preservative qualities1 this notion is only an optimistic specialisation of that just discussed 7involving the--,i fear--unwarranted assumption that the social organism tends to become continually more efficient72 so that no fresh arguments need be urged against it4 ,if1 however1 something different is meant by development--as 7e4g47 a disciple of ,mr4 ,spencer might mean an increase in 8definite coherent heterogeneity10 whether or not such increase was preservative--then ,i know no scientific grounds for concluding that we shall best promote general happiness by concentrating our efforts on the attainment of this increase4 ,i do not affirm it to be impossible that every increase in the definite coherent heterogeneity of a society of human beings may be accompanied or followed by an increase in the aggregate happiness of the members of the society3 but ,i do not perceive that ,mr4 ,spencer1 or any one else1 has even attempted to furnish the kind of proof which this proposition requires4#cfc ,to sum up3 ,i hold that the utilitarian1 in the existing state of our knowledge1 cannot possibly construct a morality de novo either for man as he is 7abstracting his morality71 or for man as he ought to be and will be4 ,he must start1 speaking broadly1 with the existing social order1 and the existing morality as a part of that order3 and in deciding the question whether any divergence from this code is to be recommended1 must consider chiefly the immediate consequences of such divergence1 upon a society in which such a code is conceived generally to subsist4 ,no doubt a thoughtful and well-instructed ,utilitarian may see dimly a certain way ahead1 and his attitude towards existing morality may be to some extent modified by what he sees4 ,he may discern in the future certain evils impending1 which can only be effectually warded off by the adoption of new and more stringent views of duty in certain departments3 while1 on the other hand1 he may see a prospect of social changes which will render a relaxation of other parts of the moral code expedient or inevitable4 ,but if he keeps within the limits that separate scientific prevision from fanciful ,utopian conjecture1 the form of society to which his practical conclusions relate will be one varying but little from the actual1 with its actually established code of moral rules and customary judgments concerning virtue and vice4 ,,footnotes3 #cea ,cf4 ,j4 ,s4 ,mill1 ,utilitarianism1 chap4 ii4 ,mill1 however1 only affirms that the 8rules of morality for the multitude0 are to be accepted by the philosopher provisionally1 until he has got something better4 #ceb ,i refer to the abstract principles of ,prudence1 ,justice1 and ,rational ,benevolence as defined in chap4 xiii4 of the preceding ,book4 #cec ,theory of ,moral ,sentiments1 ,book i4 #ced ,this operation of sympathy is strikingly illustrated in the penal codes of primitive communities1 both by the mildness of the punishments inflicted for homicide1 and by the startling differences between the penalties allotted to the same crime according as the criminal was taken in the act or not4 8,it is curious to observe10 says ,sir ,h4 ,maine 7,ancient ,law1 chap4 x471 8how completely the men of primitive times were persuaded that the impulses of the injured person were the proper measure of the vengeance he was entitled to exact1 and how literally they imitated the probable rise and fall of his passions in fixing the scale of punishment40 ,and even in more civilised societies there is a very common feeling of uncertainty as to the propriety of inflicting punishment for crimes committed long ago1 which seems traceable to the same source4 #cee ,no doubt this influence is confined within strict limits3 no authority can permanently impose on men regulations flagrantly infelicific3 and the most practically originative of religious teachers have produced their effect chiefly by giving new force and vividness to sentiments already existing 7and recognised as properly authoritive7 in the society upon which they acted4 ,still1 it might have made a great difference to the human race if 7e4g47 ,mohammed had been fond of wine1 and indifferent to women4 #cef ,on this point ,i shall have occasion to speak further in the next section4 #ceg ,i refer especially to the views put forward by ,mr4 ,spencer in the concluding chapters of his ,data of ,ethics4 #ceh ,this definition1 however1 does not seem to me admissible1 from a utilitarian point of view3 since a society in this sense perfect might not realise the maximum of possible happiness2 it might still be capable of a material increase of happiness through pleasures involving a slight alloy of pain1 such as ,mr4 ,spencer's view of perfection would exclude4 #cei ,see especially chap4 ix4 ,pars4 #ab-ae4 #cfj ,it is obvious that if #8desirability1' in the above definition1 were interpreted hedonistically1 the term 8health0 would merely give us a new name for the general problem of utilitarian morality2 not a new suggestion for its solution4 ,i ought to say that the notions of 8social welfare0 or 8wellbeing0 are elsewhere used by ,mr4 ,stephen1 in the place of those here quoted1 but ,i do not think that he means by them any more than what ,i understand him to mean by 8health0 or 8efficiency0--i4e4 that state of the social organism which tends to its preservation under the conditions of its existence4 #cfa ,book ii4 chap4 vi4 #c4 #cfb ,i do not mean to assert that #8play' in some form is not necessary for physical health3 but there is a long step from the encouragement of play1 so far as salutary1 to the promotion of social culture4 #cfc ,it may be observed that the increased heterogeneity which the development of modern industry has brought with it1 in the form of a specialisation of industrial functions which tends to render the lives of individual workers narrow and monotonous1 has usually been regarded by philanthropists as seriously infelicific2 and as needing to be counteracted by a general diffusion of the intellectual culture now enjoyed by the few--which1 if realised1 would tend pro tanto to make the lives of different classes in the community less heterogeneous4 ,,chapter ,v ,,the ,,method ,,of ,,utilitarianism--,continued #a4 ,if1 then1 we are to regard the morality of ,common ,sense as a machinery of rules1 habits1 and sentiments1 roughly and generally but not precisely or completely adapted to the production of the greatest possible happiness for sentient beings generally2 and if1 on the other hand1 we have to accept it as the actually established machinery for attaining this end1 which we cannot replace at once by any other1 but can only gradually modify2 it remains to consider the practical effects of the complex and balanced relation in which a scientific ,utilitarian thus seems to stand to the ,positive ,morality of his age and country4 ,generally speaking1 he will clearly conform to it1 and endeavour to promote its development in others4 ,for1 though the imperfection that we find in all the actual conditions of human existence--we may even say in the universe at large as judged from a human point of view--is ultimately found even in ,morality itself1 in so far as this is contemplated as ,positive2 still1 practically1 we are much less concerned with correcting and improving than we are with realising and enforcing it4 ,the ,utilitarian must repudiate altogether that temper of rebellion against the established morality1 as something purely external and conventional1 into which the reflective mind is always apt to fall when it is first convinced that the established rules are not intrinsically reasonable4 ,he must1 of course1 also repudiate as superstitious that awe of it as an absolute or ,divine ,code which ,intuitional moralists inculcate4#cfd ,still1 he will naturally contemplate it with reverence and wonder1 as a marvellous product of nature1 the result of long centuries of growth1 showing in many parts the same fine adaptation of means to complex exigencies as the most elaborate structures of physical organisms exhibit3 he will handle it with respectful delicacy as a mechanism1 constructed of the fluid element of opinions and dispositions1 by the indispensable aid of which the actual quantum of human happiness is continually being produced2 a mechanism which no #8politicians or philosophers' could create1 yet without which the harder and coarser machinery of ,positive ,law could not be permanently maintained1 and the life of man would become--as ,hobbes forcibly expresses it--8solitary1 poor1 nasty1 brutish1 and short40 ,still1 as this actual moral order is admittedly imperfect1 it will be the ,utilitarian's duty to aid in improving it2 just as the most orderly1 law-abiding member of a modern civilised society includes the reform of laws in his conception of political duty4 ,we have therefore to consider by what method he will ascertain the particular modifications of positive morality which it would be practically expedient to attempt to introduce1 at any given time and place4 ,here our investigation seems1 after all1 to leave ,empirical ,hedonism as the only method ordinarily applicable for the ultimate decision of such problems--at least until the science of ,sociology shall have been really constructed4 ,i do not mean that the rudiments of ,sociological knowledge which we now possess are of no practical value3 for certainly changes in morality might be suggested--and have actually been proposed by persons seriously concerned to benefit their fellow-creatures--which even our present imperfect knowledge would lead us to regard as dangerous to the very existence of the social organism4 ,but such changes for the most part involve changes in positive law as well3 since most of the rules of which the observance is fundamentally important for the preservation of an organised community are either directly or indirectly maintained by legal sanctions3 and it would be going too far beyond the line which1 in my view1 separates ethics from politics1 to discuss changes of this kind in the present book4 ,the rules with which we have primarily to deal1 in considering the utilitarian method of determining private duty1 are rules supported by merely moral sanctions2 and the question of maintaining or modifying such rules concerns1 for the most part1 the well-being rather than the very existence of human society4 ,the consideration of this question1 therefore1 from a utilitarian point of view1 resolves itself into a comparison between the total amounts of pleasure and pain that may be expected to result respectively from maintaining any given rule as at present established1 and from endeavouring to introduce that which is proposed in its stead4 ,that this comparison must generally be of a rough and uncertain kind1 we have already seen2 and it is highly important to bear this in mind2 but yet we seem unable to find any substitute for it4 ,it is not meant1 of course1 that each individual is left to his own unassisted judgment in dealing with such questions3 there is a mass of traditional experience1 which each individual imbibes orally or from books1 as to the effects of conduct upon happiness2 but the great formul in which this experience is transmitted are1 for the most part1 so indefinite1 the proper range of their application so uncertain1 and the observation and induction on which they are founded so uncritical1 that they stand in continual need of further empirical verification2 especially as regards their applicability to any particular case4 ,it is perhaps not surprising that some thinkers#cfe of the ,utilitarian school should consider that the task of hedonistic calculation which is thus set before the utilitarian moralist is too extensive3 and should propose to simplify it by marking off a 8large sphere of individual option and self-guidance10 to which 8ethical dictation0 does not apply4 ,i should quite admit that it is clearly expedient to draw a dividing line of this kind3 but it appears to me that there is no simple general method of drawing it2 that it can only be drawn by careful utilitarian calculation applied with varying results to the various relations and circumstances of human life4 ,to attempt the required division by means of any such general formula as that #8the individual is not responsible to society for that part of his conduct which concerns himself alone and others only with their free and undeceived consent'#cff seems to me practically futile3 since1 owing to the complex enlacements of interest and sympathy that connect the members of a civilised community1 almost any material loss of happiness by any one individual is likely to affect some others without their consent to some not inconsiderable extent4 ,and ,i do not see how it is from a utilitarian point of view justifiable to say broadly with ,j4 ,s4 ,mill that such secondary injury to others1 if merely 8constructive or presumptive10 is to be disregarded in view of the advantages of allowing free development to individuality2 for if the injury feared is great1 and the presumption that it will occur is shown by experience to be strong1 the definite risk of evil from the withdrawal of the moral sanction must1 ,i conceive1 outweigh the indefinite possibility of loss through the repression of individuality in one particular direction4#cfg ,but further3 even supposing that we could mark off the 8sphere of individual option and self-guidance0 by some simple and sweeping formula1 still within this sphere the individual1 if he wishes to guide himself reasonably on utilitarian principles1 must take some account of all important effects of his actions on the happiness of others2 and if he does this methodically1 he must1 ,i conceive1 use the empirical method which we have examined in ,book ii4 ,and--to prevent any undue alarm at this prospect--we may observe that every sensible man is commonly supposed to determine at least a large part of his conduct by what is substantially this method2 it is assumed that1 within the limits which morality lays down1 he will try to get as much happiness as he can for himself and for other human beings1 according to the relations in which they stand to him1 by combining in some way his own experience with that of other men as to the felicific and infelicific effects of actions4 ,and it is actually in this way that each man usually deliberates 7e4g47 what profession to choose for himself1 or what mode of education for his children1 whether to aim at marriage or remain single1 whether to settle in town or country1 in ,england or abroad1 etc4 ,no doubt there are1 as we saw1#cfh other ends besides ,happiness1 such as ,knowledge1 ,beauty1 etc41 commonly recognised as unquestionably desirable1 and therefore largely pursued without consideration of ulterior consequences3 but when the pursuit of any of these ends involves an apparent sacrifice of happiness in other ways1 the practical question whether under these circumstances such pursuit ought to be maintained or abandoned seems always decided by an application1 however rough1 of the method of pure empirical ,hedonism4 ,and in saying that this must be the method of the ,utilitarian moralist1 ,i only mean that no other can normally be applied in reducing to a common measure the diverse elements of the problems with which he has to deal4 ,of course1 in determining the nature and importance of each of these diverse considerations1 the utilitarian art of morality will lay various sciences under contribution4 ,thus1 for example1 it will learn from ,political ,economy what effects a general censure of usurers1 or the ordinary commendation of liberality in almsgiving1 is likely to have on the wealth of the community2 it will learn from the physiologist the probable consequences to health of a general abstinence from alcoholic liquors or any other restraint on appetite proposed in the name of ,temperance2 it will learn from the experts in any science how far knowledge is likely to be promoted by investigations offensive to any prevalent moral or religious sentiment4 ,but how far the increase of wealth or of knowledge1 or even the improvement of health1 should under any circumstances be subordinated to other considerations1 ,i know no scientific method of determining other than that of empirical ,hedonism4 ,nor1 as ,i have said1 does it seem to me that any other method has ever been applied or sought by the common sense of mankind1 for regulating the pursuit of what our older moralists called #8,natural ,good1'--i4e4 of all that is intrinsically desirable except ,virtue or ,morality1 within the limits fixed by the latter2 the ,utilitarian here only performs somewhat more consistently and systematically than ordinary men the reasoning processes which are commonly admitted to be appropriate to the questions that this pursuit raises4 ,his distinctive characteristic1 as a ,utilitarian1 is that he has to apply the same method to the criticism and correction of the limiting morality itself4 ,the particulars of this criticism will obviously vary almost indefinitely with the variations in human nature and circumstances3 ,i here only propose to discuss the general points of view which a ,utilitarian critic must take1 in order that no important class of relevant considerations may be omitted4 #b4 ,let us first recall the distinction previously noticed#cfi between duty as commonly conceived1--that to which a man is bound or obliged--1 and praiseworthy or excellent conduct2 since1 in considering the relation of ,utilitarianism to the moral judgments of ,common ,sense1 it will be convenient to begin with the former element of current morality1 as the more important and indispensable2 i4e4 with the ensemble of rules imposed by common opinion in any society1 which form a kind of unwritten legislation1 supplementary to ,law proper1 and enforced by the penalties of social disfavour and contempt4 ,this legislation1 as it does not emanate from a definite body of persons acting in a corporate capacity1 cannot be altered by any formal deliberations and resolutions of the persons on whose consensus it rests2 any change in it must therefore result from the private action of individuals1 whether determined by ,utilitarian considerations or otherwise4 ,as we shall presently see1 the practical ,utilitarian problem is liable to be complicated by the conflict and divergence which is found to some extent in all societies between the moral opinions of different sections of the community3 but it will be convenient to confine our attention in the first instance to the case of rules of duty clearly supported by #8common consent4' ,let us suppose then that after considering the consequences of any such rule1 a ,utilitarian comes to the conclusion that a different rule would be more conducive to the general happiness1 if similarly established in a society remaining in other respects the same as at present--or in one slightly different 7in so far as our forecast of social changes can be made sufficiently clear to furnish any basis for practice74 ,and first we will suppose that this new rule differs from the old one not only positively but negatively2 that it does not merely go beyond and include it1 but actually conflicts with it4 ,before he can decide that it is right for him 7i4e4 conducive to the general happiness7 to support the new rule against the old1 by example and precept1 he ought to estimate the force of certain disadvantages necessarily attendant upon such innovations1 which may conveniently be arranged under the following heads4 ,in the first place1 as his own happiness and that of others connected with him form a part of the universal end at which he aims1 he must consider the importance to himself and them of the penalties of social disapprobation which he will incur3 taking into account1 besides the immediate pain of this disapprobation1 its indirect effect in diminishing his power of serving society and promoting the general happiness in other ways4 ,the prospect of such pain and loss is1 of course1 not decisive against the innovation2 since it must to some extent be regarded as the regular price that has to be paid for the advantage of this kind of reform in current morality4 ,but here1 as in many ,utilitarian calculations1 everything depends on the quantity of the effects produced2 which in the case supposed may vary very much1 from slight distrust and disfavour to severe condemnation and social exclusion4 ,it often seems that by attempting change prematurely an innovator may incur the severest form of the moral penalty1 whereas if he had waited a few years he would have been let off with the mildest4 ,for the hold which a moral rule has over the general mind commonly begins to decay from the time that it is seen to be opposed to the calculations of expediency3 and it may be better for the community as well as for the individual that it should not be openly attacked1 until this process of decay has reached a certain point4 ,it is1 however1 of more importance to point out certain general reasons for doubting whether an apparent improvement will really have a beneficial effect on others4 ,it is possible that the new rule1 though it would be more felicific than the old one1 if it could get itself equally established1 may be not so likely to be adopted1 or if adopted1 not so likely to be obeyed1 by the mass of the community in which it is proposed to innovate4 ,it may be too subtle and refined1 or too complex and elaborate3 it may require a greater intellectual development1 or a higher degree of self-control1 than is to be found in an average member of the community1 or an exceptional quality or balance of feelings4 ,nor can it be said in reply1 that by the hypothesis the innovator's example must be good to whatever extent it operates1 since pro tanto it tends to substitute a better rule for a worse4 ,for experience seems to show that an example of this kind is more likely to be potent negatively than positively2 that here1 as elsewhere in human affairs1 it is easier to pull down than to build up2 easier to weaken or destroy the restraining force that a moral rule1 habitually and generally obeyed1 has over men's minds1 than to substitute for it a new restraining habit1 not similarly sustained by tradition and custom4 ,hence the effect of an example intrinsically good may be on the whole bad1 because its destructive operation proves to be more vigorous than its constructive4 ,and again1 such destructive effect must be considered not only in respect of the particular rule violated1 but of all other rules4 ,for just as the breaking of any positive law has an inevitable tendency to encourage lawlessness generally1 so the violation of any generally recognised moral rule seems to give a certain aid to the forces that are always tending towards moral anarchy in any society4 ,nor must we neglect the reaction which any breach with customary morality will have on the agent's own mind4 ,for the regulative habits and sentiments which each man has received by inheritance or training constitute an important force impelling his will1 in the main1 to conduct such as his reason would dictate2 a natural auxiliary1 as it were1 to ,reason in its conflict with seductive passions and appetites2 and it may be practically dangerous to impair the strength of these auxiliaries4 ,on the other hand1 it would seem that the habit of acting rationally is the best of all habits1 and that it ought to be the aim of a reasonable being to bring all his impulses and sentiments into more and more perfect harmony with ,reason4 ,and indeed when a man has earnestly accepted any moral principle1 those of his pre-existing regulative habits and sentiments that are not in harmony with this principle tend naturally to decay and disappear2 and it would perhaps be scarcely worth while to take them into account1 except for the support that they derive from the sympathy of others4 ,but this last is a consideration of great importance4 ,for the moral impulses of each individual commonly draw a large part of their effective force from the sympathy of other human beings4 ,i do not merely mean that the pleasures and pains which each derives sympathetically from the moral likings and aversions of others are important as motives to felicific conduct no less than as elements of the individual's happiness3 ,i mean further that the direct sympathetic echo in each man of the judgments and sentiments of others concerning conduct sustains his own similar judgments and sentiments4 ,through this twofold operation of sympathy it becomes practically much easier for most men to conform to a moral rule established in the society to which they belong than to one made by themselves4 ,and any act by which a man weakens the effect on himself of this general moral sympathy tends pro tanto to make the performance of duty more difficult for him4 ,on the other hand1 we have to take into account--besides the intrinsic gain of the particular change--the general advantage of offering to mankind a striking example of consistent ,utilitarianism2 since1 in this case as in others1 a man gives a stronger proof of genuine conviction by conduct in opposition to public opinion than he can by conformity4 ,in order1 however1 that this effect may be produced1 it is almost necessary that the non-conformity should not promote the innovator's personal convenience2 for in that case it will almost certainly be attributed to egoistic motives1 however plausible the ,utilitarian deduction of its rightness may seem4 ,the exact force of these various considerations will differ indefinitely in different cases2 and it does not seem profitable to attempt any general estimate of them3 but on the whole1 it would seem that the general arguments which we have noticed constitute an important rational check upon such ,utilitarian innovations on ,common-,sense morality as are of the negative or destructive kind4 ,if now we consider such innovations as are merely positive and supplementary1 and consist in adding a new rule to those already established by ,common ,sense2 it will appear that there is really no collision of methods1 so far as the ,utilitarian's own observance of the new rule is concerned4 ,for1 as every such rule is1 ex hypothesi1 believed by him to be conducive to the common good1 he is merely giving a special and stricter interpretation to the general duty of ,universal ,benevolence1 where ,common ,sense leaves it loose and indeterminate4 ,hence the restraining considerations above enumerated do not apply to this case4 ,and whatever it is right for him to do himself1 it is obviously right for him to approve and recommend to other persons in similar circumstances4 ,but it is a different question whether he ought to seek to impose his new rule on others1 by express condemnation of all who are not prepared to adopt it2 as this involves not only the immediate evil of the annoyance given to others1 but also the further danger of weakening the general good effect of his moral example1 through the reaction provoked by this aggressive attitude4 ,on this point his decision will largely depend on the prospect1 as far as he can estimate it1 that his innovation will meet with support and sympathy from others4 ,it should be observed1 however1 that a great part of the reform in popular morality1 which a consistent ,utilitarian will try to introduce1 will probably lie not so much in establishing new rules 7whether conflicting with the old or merely supplementary7 as in enforcing old ones4 ,for there is always a considerable part of morality in the condition of receiving formal respect and acceptance1 while yet it is not really sustained by any effective force of public opinion3 and the difference between the moralities of any two societies is often more strikingly exhibited in the different emphasis attached to various portions of the moral code in each1 than in disagreement as to the rules which the code should include4 ,in the case we are considering1 it is chiefly conduct which shows a want of comprehensive sympathy or of public spirit1 to which the ,utilitarian will desire to attach a severer condemnation than is at present directed against it4 ,there is much conduct of this sort1 of which the immediate effect is to give obvious pleasure to individuals1 while the far greater amount of harm that it more remotely and indirectly causes is but dimly recognised by ,common ,sense4 ,such conduct1 therefore1 even when it is allowed to be wrong1 is very mildly treated by common opinion2 especially when it is prompted by some impulse not self-regarding4 ,still1 in all such cases1 we do not require the promulgation of any new moral doctrine1 but merely a bracing and sharpening of the moral sentiments of society1 to bring them into harmony with the greater comprehensiveness of view and the more impartial concern for human happiness which characterise the ,utilitarian system4 #c4 ,we have hitherto supposed that the innovator is endeavouring to introduce a new rule of conduct1 not for himself only1 but for others also1 as more conducive to the general happiness than the rule recognised by ,common ,sense4 ,it may perhaps be thought that this is not the issue most commonly raised between ,utilitarianism and ,common ,sense3 but rather whether exceptions should be allowed to rules which both sides accept as generally valid4 ,for no one doubts that it is1 generally speaking1 conducive to the common happiness that men should be veracious1 faithful to promises1 obedient to law1 disposed to satisfy the normal expectations of others1 having their malevolent impulses and their sensual appetites under strict control3 but it is thought that an exclusive regard to pleasurable and painful consequences would frequently admit exceptions to rules which ,common ,sense imposes as absolute4 ,it should1 however1 be observed that the admission of an exception on general grounds is merely the establishment of a more complex and delicate rule1 instead of one that is broader and simpler2 for if it is conducive to the general good that such an exception be admitted in one case1 it will be equally so in all similar cases4 ,suppose 7e4g47 that a ,utilitarian thinks it on general grounds right to answer falsely a question as to the manner in which he has voted at a political election where the voting is by secret ballot4 ,his reasons will probably be that the ,utilitarian prohibition of falsehood is based on 7#a7 the harm done by misleading particular individuals1 and 7#b7 the tendency of false statements to diminish the mutual confidence that men ought to have in each other's assertions3 and that in this exceptional case it is 7#a7 expedient that the questioner should be misled2 while 7#b71 in so far as the falsehood tends to produce a general distrust of all assertions as to the manner in which a man has voted1 it only furthers the end for which voting has been made secret4 ,it is evident1 that if these reasons are valid for any person1 they are valid for all persons2 in fact1 that they establish the expediency of a new general rule in respect of truth and falsehood1 more complicated than the old one2 a rule which the ,utilitarian1 as such1 should desire to be universally obeyed4 ,there are1 of course1 some kinds of moral innovation which1 from the nature of the case1 are not likely to occur frequently2 as where ,utilitarian reasoning leads a man to take part in a political revolution1 or to support a public measure in opposition to what ,common ,sense regards as ,justice or ,good ,faith4 ,still1 in such cases a rational ,utilitarian will usually proceed on general principles1 which he would desire all persons in similar circumstances to carry into effect4 ,we have1 however1 to consider another kind of exceptions1 differing fundamentally from this1 which ,utilitarianism seems to admit2 where the agent does not think it expedient that the rule on which he himself acts should be universally adopted1 and yet maintains that his individual act is right1 as producing a greater balance of pleasure over pain than any other conduct open to him would produce4 ,now we cannot fairly argue that1 because a large aggregate of acts would cause more harm than good1 therefore any single act of the kind will produce this effect4 ,it may even be a straining of language to say that it has a tendency to produce it3 no one 7e4g47 would say that because an army walking over a bridge would break it down1 therefore the crossing of a single traveller has a tendency to destroy it4 ,and just as a prudent physician in giving rules of diet recommends an occasional deviation from them1 as more conducive to the health of the body than absolute regularity2 so there may be rules of social behaviour of which the general observance is necessary to the well-being of the community1 while yet a certain amount of non-observance is rather advantageous than otherwise4 ,here1 however1 we seem brought into conflict with ,kant's fundamental principle1 that a right action must be one of which the agent could 8will the maxim to be law universal40#cgj ,but1 as was before#cga noticed in the particular case of veracity1 we must admit an application of this principle1 which importantly modifies its practical force3 we must admit the case where the belief that the action in question will not be widely imitated is an essential qualification of the maxim which the ,kantian principle is applied to test4 ,for this principle1--at least so far as ,i have accepted it as self-evident--means no more than that an act1 if right for any individual1 must be right on general grounds1 and therefore for some class of persons2 it therefore cannot prevent us from defining this class by the above-mentioned characteristic of believing that the act will remain an exceptional one4 ,of course if this belief turns out to be erroneous1 serious harm may possibly result2 but this is no more than may be said of many other ,utilitarian deductions4 ,nor is it difficult to find instances of conduct which ,common ,sense holds to be legitimate solely on the ground that we have no fear of its being too widely imitated4 ,take1 for example1 the case of ,celibacy4 ,a universal refusal to propagate the human species would be the greatest of conceivable crimes from a ,utilitarian point of view2--that is1 according to the commonly accepted belief in the superiority of human happiness to that of other animals2--and hence the principle in question1 applied without the qualification above given1 would make it a crime in any one to choose celibacy as the state most conducive to his own happiness4 ,but ,common ,sense 7in the present age at least7 regards such preference as within the limits of right conduct2 because there is no fear that population will not be sufficiently kept up1 as in fact the tendency to propagate is thought to exist rather in excess than otherwise4 ,in this case it is a non-moral impulse on the average strength of which we think we may reckon3 but there does not appear to be any formal or universal reason why the same procedure should not be applied by ,utilitarians to an actually existing moral sentiment4 ,the result would be a discrepancy of a peculiar kind between ,utilitarianism and ,common-,sense morality2 as the very firmness with which the latter is established would be the ,utilitarian ground for relieving the individual of its obligations4 ,we are supposed to see that general happiness will be enhanced 7just as the excellence of a metrical composition is7 by a slight admixture of irregularity along with a general observance of received rules2 and hence to justify the irregular conduct of a few individuals1 on the ground that the supply of regular conduct from other members of the community may reasonably be expected to be adequate4 ,it does not seem to me that this reasoning can be shown to be necessarily unsound1 as applied to human society as at present constituted3 but the cases in which it could really be thought to be applicable1 by any one sincerely desirous of promoting the general happiness1 must certainly be rare4 ,for it should be observed that it makes a fundamental difference whether the sentiment in mankind generally1 on which we rely to sustain sufficiently a general rule while admitting exceptions thereto1 is moral or non-moral2 because a moral sentiment is inseparable from the conviction that the conduct to which it prompts is objectively right--i4e4 right whether or not it is thought or felt to be so--for oneself and all similar persons in similar circumstances2 it cannot therefore coexist with approval of the contrary conduct in any one case1 unless this case is distinguished by some material difference other than the mere non-existence in the agent of the ordinary moral sentiment against his conduct4 ,thus1 assuming that general unveracity and general celibacy would both be evils of the worst kind1 we may still all regard it as legitimate for men in general to remain celibate if they like1 on account of the strength of the natural sentiments prompting to marriage1 because the existence of these sentiments in ordinary human beings is not affected by the universal recognition of the legitimacy of celibacy3 but we cannot similarly all regard it as legitimate for men to tell lies if they like1 however strong the actually existing sentiment against lying may be1 because as soon as this legitimacy is generally recognised the sentiment must be expected to decay and vanish4 ,if therefore we were all enlightened ,utilitarians1 it would be impossible for any one to justify himself in making false statements while admitting it to be inexpedient for persons similarly conditioned to make them2 as he would have no ground for believing that persons similarly conditioned would act differently from himself4 ,the case1 no doubt1 is different in society as actually constituted2 it is conceivable that the practically effective morality in such a society1 resting on a basis independent of utilitarian or any other reasonings1 may not be materially affected by the particular act or expressed opinion of a particular individual3 but the circumstances are1 ,i conceive1 very rare1 in which a really conscientious person could feel so sure of this as to conclude that by approving a particular violation of a rule1 of which the general 7though not universal7 observance is plainly expedient1 he will not probably do harm on the whole4 ,especially as all the objections to innovation1 noticed in the previous section1 apply with increased force if the innovator does not even claim to be introducing a new and better general rule4 ,it appears to me1 therefore1 that the cases in which practical doubts are likely to arise1 as to whether exceptions should be permitted from ordinary rules on ,utilitarian principles1 will mostly be those which ,i discussed in the first paragraph of this section3 where the exceptions are not claimed for a few individuals1 on the mere ground of their probable fewness1 but either for persons generally under exceptional circumstances1 or for a class of persons defined by exceptional qualities of intellect1 temperament1 or character4 ,in such cases the ,utilitarian may have no doubt that in a community consisting generally of enlightened ,utilitarians1 these grounds for exceptional ethical treatment would be regarded as valid2 still he may1 as ,i have said1 doubt whether the more refined and complicated rule which recognises such exceptions is adapted for the community in which he is actually living2 and whether the attempt to introduce it is not likely to do more harm by weakening current morality than good by improving its quality4 ,supposing such a doubt to arise1 either in a case of this kind1 or in one of the rare cases discussed in the preceding paragraph1 it becomes necessary that the ,utilitarian should consider carefully the extent to which his advice or example are likely to influence persons to whom they would be dangerous3 and it is evident that the result of this consideration may depend largely on the degree of publicity which he gives to either advice or example4 ,thus1 on ,utilitarian principles1 it may be right to do and privately recommend1 under certain circumstances1 what it would not be right to advocate openly2 it may be right to teach openly to one set of persons what it would be wrong to teach to others2 it may be conceivably right to do1 if it can be done with comparative secrecy1 what it would be wrong to do in the face of the world2 and even1 if perfect secrecy can be reasonably expected1 what it would be wrong to recommend by private advice or example4 ,these conclusions are all of a paradoxical character3#cgb there is no doubt that the moral consciousness of a plain man broadly repudiates the general notion of an esoteric morality1 differing from that popularly taught2 and it would be commonly agreed that an action which would be bad if done openly is not rendered good by secrecy4 ,we may observe1 however1 that there are strong utilitarian reasons for maintaining generally this latter common opinion2 for it is obviously advantageous1 generally speaking1 that acts which it is expedient to repress by social disapprobation should become known1 as otherwise the disapprobation cannot operate2 so that it seems inexpedient to support by any moral encouragement the natural disposition of men in general to conceal their wrong doings2 besides that the concealment would in most cases have importantly injurious effects on the agent's habits of veracity4 ,thus the ,utilitarian conclusion1 carefully stated1 would seem to be this2 that the opinion that secrecy may render an action right which would not otherwise be so should itself be kept comparatively secret2 and similarly it seems expedient that the doctrine that esoteric morality is expedient should itself be kept esoteric4 ,or if this concealment be difficult to maintain1 it may be desirable that ,common ,sense should repudiate the doctrines which it is expedient to confine to an enlightened few4 ,and thus a ,utilitarian may reasonably desire1 on ,utilitarian principles1 that some of his conclusions should be rejected by mankind generally2 or even that the vulgar should keep aloof from his system as a whole1 in so far as the inevitable indefiniteness and complexity of its calculations render it likely to lead to bad results in their hands4 ,of course1 as ,i have said1 in an ideal community of enlightened ,utilitarians this swarm of perplexities and paradoxes would vanish2 as in such a society no one can have any ground for believing that other persons will act on moral principles different from those which he adopts4 ,and any enlightened ,utilitarian must of course desire this consummation2 as all conflict of moral opinion must pro tanto be regarded as an evil1 as tending to impair the force of morality generally in its resistance to seductive impulses4 ,still such conflict may be a necessary evil in the actual condition of civilised communities1 in which there are so many different degrees of intellectual and moral development4 ,we have thus been led to the discussion of the question which we reserved in the last section2 viz4 how ,utilitarianism should deal with the fact of divergent moral opinions held simultaneously by different members of the same society4 ,for it has become plain that though two different kinds of conduct cannot both be right under the same circumstances1 two contradictory opinions as to the rightness of conduct may possibly both be expedient2 it may conduce most to the general happiness that ,a should do a certain act1 and at the same time that ,b1 ,c1 ,d should blame it4 ,the ,utilitarian of course cannot really join in the disapproval1 but he may think it expedient to leave it unshaken2 and at the same time may think it right1 if placed in the supposed circumstances1 to do the act that is generally disapproved4 ,and so generally it may be best on the whole that there should be conflicting codes of morality in a given society at a certain stage of its development4 ,and1 as ,i have already hinted1 the same general reasoning1 from the probable origin of the moral sense and its flexible adjustment to the varying conditions of human life1 which furnished a presumption that ,common-,sense morality is roughly coincident with the ,utilitarian code proper for men as now constituted1 may be applied in favour of these divergent codes also3 it may be said that these1 too1 form part of the complex adjustment of man to his circumstances1 and that they are needed to supplement and qualify the morality of ,common ,sense4 ,however paradoxical this doctrine may appear1 we can find cases where it seems to be implicitly accepted by ,common ,sense2 or at least where it is required to make ,common ,sense consistent with itself4 ,let us consider1 for example1 the common moral judgments concerning rebellions4 ,it is commonly thought1 on the one hand1 that these abrupt breaches of order are sometimes morally necessary2 and1 on the other hand1 that they ought always to be vigorously resisted1 and in case of failure punished by extreme penalties inflicted at least on the ring-leaders2 for otherwise they would be attempted under circumstances where there was no sufficient justification for them3 but it seems evident that1 in the actual condition of men's moral sentiments1 this vigorous repression requires the support of a strong body of opinion condemning the rebels as wrong1 and not merely as mistaken in their calculations of the chances of success4 ,for similar reasons it may possibly be expedient on the whole that certain special relaxations of certain moral rules should continue to exist in certain professions and sections of society1 while at the same time they continue to be disapproved by the rest of the society4 ,the evils1 however1 which must spring from this permanent conflict of opinion are so grave1 that an enlightened ,utilitarian will probably in most cases attempt to remove it2 by either openly maintaining the need of a relaxation of the ordinary moral rule under the special circumstances in question2 or1 on the other hand1 endeavouring to get the ordinary rule recognised and enforced by all conscientious persons in that section of society where its breach has become habitual4 ,and of these two courses it seems likely that he will in most cases adopt the latter2 since such rules are most commonly found on examination to have been relaxed rather for the convenience of individuals1 than in the interest of the community at large4 #d4 ,finally1 let us consider the general relation of ,utilitarianism to that part of common morality which extends beyond the range of strict duty2 that is1 to the ,ideal of character and conduct which in any community at any given time is commonly admired and praised as the sum of ,excellences or ,perfections4 ,to begin1 it must be allowed that this distinction between ,excellence and ,strict ,duty does not seem properly admissible in ,utilitarianism--except so far as some excellences are only partially and indirectly within the control of the will1 and we require to distinguish the realisation of these in conduct from the performance of ,duty proper1 which is always something that can be done at any moment4 ,for a ,utilitarian must hold that it is always wrong for a man knowingly to do anything other than what he believes to be most conducive to ,universal ,happiness4 ,still1 it seems practically expedient1--and therefore indirectly reasonable on ,utilitarian principles1--to retain1 in judging even the strictly voluntary conduct of others1 the distinction between a part that is praiseworthy and admirable and a part that is merely right3 because it is natural to us to compare any individual's character or conduct1 not with our highest ideal--,utilitarian or otherwise--but with a certain average standard and to admire what rises above the standard2 and it seems ultimately conducive to the general happiness that such natural sentiments of admiration should be encouraged and developed4 ,for human nature seems to require the double stimulus of praise and blame from others1 in order to the best performance of duty that it can at present attain3 so that the #8social sanction' would be less effective if it became purely penal4 ,indeed1 since the pains of remorse and disapprobation are in themselves to be avoided1 it is plain that the ,utilitarian construction of a ,jural morality is essentially self-limiting2 that is1 it prescribes its own avoidance of any department of conduct in which the addition that can be made to happiness through the enforcement of rules sustained by social penalties appears doubtful or inconsiderable4 ,in such departments1 however1 the sthetic phase of morality may still reasonably find a place2 we may properly admire and praise where it would be inexpedient to judge and condemn4 ,we may conclude1 then1 that it is reasonable for a ,utilitarian to praise any conduct more felicific in its tendency than what an average man would do under the given circumstances3--being aware of course that the limit down to which praise worthiness extends must be relative to the particular state of moral progress reached by mankind generally in his age and country2 and that it is desirable to make continual efforts to elevate this standard4 ,similarly1 the ,utilitarian will praise the ,dispositions or permanent qualities of character of which felicific conduct is conceived to be the result1 and the ,motives that are conceived to prompt to it when it would be a clear gain to the general happiness that these should become more frequent3 and1 as we have seen1#cgc he may without inconsistency admire the ,disposition or ,motive if it is of a kind which it is generally desirable to encourage1 even while he disapproves of the conduct to which it has led in any particular case4 ,passing now to compare the contents of the ,utilitarian ,ideal of character with the virtues and other excellences recognised by ,common ,sense1 we may observe1 first1 that general coincidence between the two on which ,hume and others have insisted4 ,no quality has ever been praised as excellent by mankind generally which cannot be shown to have some marked felicific effect1 and to be within proper limits obviously conducive to the general happiness4 ,still1 it does not follow that such qualities are always fostered and encouraged by society in the proportion which a ,utilitarian would desire3 in fact1 it is a common observation to make1 in contemplating the morality of societies other than our own1 that some useful qualities are unduly neglected1 while others are over-prized and even admired when they exist in such excess as to become1 on the whole1 infelicific4 ,the consistent ,utilitarian may therefore find it necessary to rectify the prevalent moral ideal in important particulars4 ,and here it scarcely seems that he will find any such ,utilitarian restrictions on innovation1 as appeared to exist in the case of commonly received rules of duty4 ,for the ,common-,sense notions of the different excellences of conduct 7considered as extending beyond the range of strict duty7 are generally so vague as to offer at least no definite resistance to a ,utilitarian interpretation of their scope3 by teaching and acting upon such an interpretation a man is in no danger of being brought into infelicific discord with ,common ,sense3 especially since the ideal of moral excellence seems to vary within the limits of the same community to a much greater extent than the code of strict duty4 ,for example1 a man who in an age when excessive asceticism is praised1 sets an example of enjoying harmless bodily pleasures1 or who in circles where useless daring is admired1 prefers to exhibit and commend caution and discretion1 at the worst misses some praise that he might otherwise have earned1 and is thought a little dull or unaspiring3 he does not come into any patent conflict with common opinion4 ,perhaps we may say generally that an enlightened ,utilitarian is likely to lay less stress on the cultivation of those negative virtues1 tendencies to restrict and refrain1 which are prominent in the ,common-,sense ideal of character2 and to set more value in comparison on those qualities of mind which are the direct source of positive pleasure to the agent or to others--some of which ,common ,sense scarcely recognises as excellences3 still1 he will not carry this innovation to such a pitch as to incur general condemnation4 ,for no enlightened ,utilitarian can ignore the fundamental importance of the restrictive and repressive virtues1 or think that they are sufficiently developed in ordinary men at the present time1 so that they may properly be excluded from moral admiration2 though he may hold that they have been too prominent1 to the neglect of other valuable qualities1 in the common conception of moral ,perfection4 ,nay1 we may even venture to say that1 under most circumstances1 a man who earnestly and successfully endeavours to realise the ,utilitarian ,ideal1 however he may deviate from the commonly-received type of a perfect character1 is likely to win sufficient recognition and praise from ,common ,sense4 ,for1 whether it be true or not that the whole of morality has sprung from the root of sympathy1 it is certain that self-love and sympathy combined are sufficiently strong in average men to dispose them to grateful admiration of any exceptional efforts to promote the common good1 even though these efforts may take a somewhat novel form4 ,to any exhibition of more extended sympathy or more fervent public spirit than is ordinarily shown1 and any attempt to develop these equalities in others1 ,common ,sense is rarely unresponsive2 provided1 of course1 that these impulses are accompanied with adequate knowledge of actual circumstances and insight into the relation of means to ends1 and that they do not run counter to any recognised rules of duty4#cgd ,and it seems to be principally in this direction that the recent spread of ,utilitarianism has positively modified the ideal of our society1 and is likely to modify it further in the future4 ,hence the stress which ,utilitarians are apt to lay on social and political activity of all kinds1 and the tendency which ,utilitarian ethics have always shown to pass over into politics4 ,for one who values conduct in proportion to its felicific consequences1 will naturally set a higher estimate on effective beneficence in public affairs than on the purest manifestation of virtue in the details of private life3 while on the other hand an ,intuitionist 7though no doubt vaguely recognising that a man ought to do all the good he can in public affairs7 still commonly holds that virtue may be as fully and as admirably exhibited on a small as on a large scale4 ,a sincere ,utilitarian1 therefore1 is likely to be an eager politician3 but on what principles his political action ought to be determined1 it scarcely lies within the scope of this treatise to investigate4 ,,footnotes3 #cfd ,i do not mean that this sentiment is in my view incompatible with ,utilitarianism2 ,i mean that it must not attach itself to any subordinate rules of conduct1 but only to the supreme principle of acting with impartial concern for all elements of general happiness4 #cfe ,for example1 ,mr4 ,bain in ,mind 7,jan4 #ahhc1 pp4 #dh1 #di74 #cff ,this sentence is not an exact quotation1 but a summary of the doctrine set forth by ,j4 ,s4 ,mill in his treatise ,on ,liberty 7,introduction74 #cfg ,see ,mill ,on ,liberty1 chap4 iv4 ,it may be observed that ,mill's doctrine is certainly opposed to common sense3 since 7e4g47 it would exclude from censure almost all forms of sexual immorality committed by unmarried and independent adults4 #cfh ,cf4 ,book iii4 chap4 xiv4 #cfi ,cf4 especially ,book iii4 chap4 ii4 #cgj ,cf4 ,book iii4 chap4 i4 and chap4 xiii4 #cga ,book iii4 chap4 vii4 #c4 #cgb ,in particular cases1 however1 they seem to be admitted by ,common ,sense to a certain extent4 ,for example1 it would be commonly thought wrong to express in public speeches disturbing religious or political opinions which may be legitimately published in books4 #cgc ,cf4 chap4 iii4 #b of this ,book4 #cgd ,we have seen that a ,utilitarian may sometimes have to override these rules2 but then the case falls under the head discussed in the previous section4 ,,concluding ,,chapter ,,the ,,mutual ,,relations ,,of ,,the ,,three ,,methods #a4 ,in the greater part of the treatise of which the final chapter has now been reached1 we have been employed in examining three methods of determining right conduct1 which are for the most part found more or less vaguely combined in the practical reasonings of ordinary men1 but which it has been my aim to develop as separately as possible4 ,a complete synthesis of these different methods is not attempted in the present work3 at the same time it would hardly be satisfactory to conclude the analysis of them without some discussion of their mutual relations4 ,indeed we have already found it expedient to do this to a considerable extent1 in the course of our examination of the separate methods4 ,thus1 in the present and preceding ,books we have directly or indirectly gone through a pretty full examination of the mutual relations of the ,intuitional and ,utilitarian methods4 ,we have found that the common antithesis between ,intuitionists and ,utilitarians must be entirely discarded3 since such abstract moral principles as we can admit to be really self-evident are not only not incompatible with a ,utilitarian system1 but even seem required to furnish a rational basis for such a system4 ,thus we have seen that the essence of ,justice or ,equity 7in so far as it is clear and certain71 is that different individuals are not to be treated differently1 except on grounds of universal application2 and that such grounds1 again1 are supplied by the principle of ,universal ,benevolence1 that sets before each man the happiness of all others as an object of pursuit no less worthy than his own2 while other time-honoured virtues seem to be fitly explained as special manifestations of impartial benevolence under various circumstances of human life1 or else as habits and dispositions indispensable to the maintenance of prudent or beneficent behaviour under the seductive force of various non-rational impulses4 ,and although there are other rules which our common moral sense when first interrogated seems to enunciate as absolutely binding2 it has appeared that careful and systematic reflection on this very ,common ,sense1 as expressed in the habitual moral judgments of ordinary men1 results in exhibiting the real subordination of these rules to the fundamental principles above given4 ,then1 further1 this method of systematising particular virtues and duties receives very strong support from a comparative study of the history of morality2 as the variations in the moral codes of different societies at different stages correspond1 in a great measure1 to differences in the actual or believed tendencies of certain kinds of conduct to promote the general happiness of different portions of the human race3 while1 again1 the most probable conjectures as to the pre-historic condition and original derivation of the moral faculty seem to be entirely in harmony with this view4 ,no doubt1 even if this synthesis of methods be completely accepted1 there will remain some discrepancy in details between our particular moral sentiments and unreasoned judgments on the one hand1 and the apparent results of special utilitarian calculations on the other2 and we may often have some practical difficulty in balancing the latter against the more general utilitarian reasons for obeying the former3 but there seems to be no longer any theoretical perplexity as to the principles for determining social duty4 ,it remains for us to consider the relation of the two species of ,hedonism which we have distinguished as ,universalistic and ,egoistic4 ,in chap4 ii4 of this ,book we have discussed the rational process 7called by a stretch of language #8proof'7 by which one who holds it reasonable to aim at his own greatest happiness may be determined to take ,universal ,happiness instead1 as his ultimate standard of right conduct4 ,we have seen1 however1 that the application of this process requires that the ,egoist should affirm1 implicitly or explicitly1 that his own greatest happiness is not merely the rational ultimate end for himself1 but a part of ,universal ,good3 and he may avoid the proof of ,utilitarianism by declining to affirm this4 ,it would be contrary to ,common ,sense to deny that the distinction between any one individual and any other is real and fundamental1 and that consequently 8,i0 am concerned with the quality of my existence as an individual in a sense1 fundamentally important1 in which ,i am not concerned with the quality of the existence of other individuals3 and this being so1 ,i do not see how it can be proved that this distinction is not to be taken as fundamental in determining the ultimate end of rational action for an individual4 ,and it may be observed that most ,utilitarians1 however anxious they have been to convince men of the reasonableness of aiming at happiness generally1 have not commonly sought to attain this result by any logical transition from the ,egoistic to the ,universalistic principle4 ,they have relied almost entirely on the ,sanctions of ,utilitarian rules2 that is1 on the pleasures gained or pains avoided by the individual conforming to them4 ,indeed1 if an ,egoist remains impervious to what we have called ,proof1 the only way of rationally inducing him to aim at the happiness of all1 is to show him that his own greatest happiness can be best attained by so doing4 ,and further1 even if a man admits the self-evidence of the principle of ,rational ,benevolence1 he may still hold that his own happiness is an end which it is irrational for him to sacrifice to any other2 and that therefore a harmony between the maxim of ,prudence and the maxim of ,rational ,benevolence must be somehow demonstrated1 if morality is to be made completely rational4 ,this latter view1 indeed 7as ,i have before said71 appears to me1 on the whole1 the view of ,common ,sense3 and it is that which ,i myself hold4 ,it thus becomes needful to examine how far and in what way the required demonstration can be effected4 #b4 ,now1 in so far as ,utilitarian morality coincides with that of ,common ,sense--as we have seen that it does in the main--this investigation has been partly performed in chap4 v4 of ,book ii4 ,it there appeared that while in any tolerable state of society the performance of duties towards others and the exercise of social virtues seem generally likely to coincide with the attainment of the greatest possible happiness in the long run for the virtuous agent1 still the universality and completeness of this coincidence are at least incapable of empirical proof3 and that1 indeed1 the more carefully we analyse and estimate the different sanctions--,legal1 ,social1 and ,conscientious--considered as operating under the actual conditions of human life1 the more difficult it seems to believe that they can be always adequate to produce this coincidence4 ,the natural effect of this argument upon a convinced ,utilitarian is merely to make him anxious to alter the actual conditions of human life3 and it would certainly be a most valuable contribution to the actual happiness of mankind1 if we could so improve the adjustment of the machine of ,law in any society1 and so stimulate and direct the common awards of praise and blame1 and so develop and train the moral sense of the members of the community1 as to render it clearly prudent for every individual to promote as much as possible the general good4 ,however1 we are not now considering what a consistent ,utilitarian will try to effect for the future1 but what a consistent ,egoist is to do in the present4 ,and it must be admitted that1 as things are1 whatever difference exists between ,utilitarian morality and that of ,common ,sense is of such a kind as to render the coincidence with ,egoism still more improbable in the case of the former4 ,for we have seen that ,utilitarianism is more rigid than ,common ,sense in exacting the sacrifice of the agent's private interests where they are incompatible with the greatest happiness of the greatest number3 and of course in so far as the ,utilitarian's principles bring him into conflict with any of the commonly accepted rules of morality1 the whole force of the ,social ,sanction operates to deter him from what he conceives to be his duty4 #c4 ,there are1 however1 writers of the ,utilitarian school#cge who seem to maintain or imply1 that by due contemplation of the paramount importance of ,sympathy as an element of human happiness we shall be led to see the coincidence of the good of each with the good of all4 ,in opposing this view1 ,i am as far as possible from any wish to depreciate the value of sympathy as a source of happiness even to human beings as at present constituted4 ,indeed ,i am of opinion that its pleasures and pains really constitute a great part of that internal reward of social virtue1 and punishment of social misconduct1 which in ,book ii4 chap4 v4 ,i roughly set down as due to the moral sentiments4 ,for1 in fact1 though ,i can to some extent distinguish sympathetic from strictly moral feelings in introspective analysis of my own consciousness1 ,i cannot say precisely in what proportion these two elements are combined4 ,for instance3 ,i seem able to distinguish the 8sense of the ignobility of ,egoism0 of which ,i have before spoken--which1 in my view1 is the normal emotional concomitant or expression of the moral intuition that the ,good of the whole is reasonably to be preferred to the ,good of a part--from the jar of sympathetic discomfort which attends the conscious choice of my own pleasure at the expense of pain or loss to others2 but ,i find it impossible to determine what force the former sentiment would have if actually separated from the latter1 and ,i am inclined to think that the two kinds of feeling are very variously combined in different individuals4 ,perhaps1 indeed1 we may trace a general law of variation in the relative proportion of these two elements as exhibited in the development of the moral consciousness both in the race and in individuals2 for it seems that at a certain stage of this development the mind is more susceptible to emotions connected with abstract moral ideas and rules presented as absolute2 while after emerging from this stage and before entering it the feelings that belong to personal relations are stronger4#cgf ,certainly in a ,utilitarian's mind sympathy tends to become a prominent element of all instinctive moral feelings that refer to social conduct2 as in his view the rational basis of the moral impulse must ultimately lie in some pleasure won or pain saved for himself or for others2 so that he never has to sacrifice himself to an ,impersonal ,law1 but always for some being or beings with whom he has at least some degree of fellow-feeling4 ,but besides admitting the actual importance of sympathetic pleasures to the majority of mankind1 ,i should go further and maintain that1 on empirical grounds alone1 enlightened self-interest would direct most men to foster and develop their sympathetic susceptibilities to a greater extent than is now commonly attained4 ,the effectiveness of ,butler's famous argument against the vulgar antithesis between ,self-love and ,benevolence is undeniable3 and it seems scarcely extravagant to say that1 amid all the profuse waste of the means of happiness which men commit1 there is no imprudence more flagrant than that of ,selfishness in the ordinary sense of the term1--that excessive concentration of attention on the individual's own happiness which renders it impossible for him to feel any strong interest in the pleasures and pains of others4 ,the perpetual prominence of self that hence results tends to deprive all enjoyments of their keenness and zest1 and produce rapid satiety and ennui3 the selfish man misses the sense of elevation and enlargement given by wide interests2 he misses the more secure and serene satisfaction that attends continually on activities directed towards ends more stable in prospect than an individual's happiness can be2 he misses the peculiar rich sweetness1 depending upon a sort of complex reverberation of sympathy1 which is always found in services rendered to those whom we love and who are grateful4 ,he is made to feel in a thousand various ways1 according to the degree of refinement which his nature has attained1 the discord between the rhythms of his own life and of that larger life of which his own is but an insignificant fraction4 ,but allowing#cgg all this1 it yet seems to me as certain as any conclusion arrived at by hedonistic comparison can be1 that the utmost development of sympathy1 intensive and extensive1 which is now possible to any but a very few exceptional persons1 would not cause a perfect coincidence between ,utilitarian duty and self-interest4 ,here it seems to me that what was said in ,book ii4 chap4 v4 #d1 to show the insufficiency of the ,conscientious ,sanction1 applies equally1 mutatis mutandis1 to ,sympathy4 ,suppose a man finds that a regard for the general good--,utilitarian ,duty--demands from him a sacrifice1 or extreme risk1 of life4 ,there are perhaps one or two human beings so dear to him that the remainder of a life saved by sacrificing their happiness to his own would be worthless to him from an egoistic point of view4 ,but it is doubtful whether many men1 8sitting down in a cool hour0 to make the estimate1 would affirm even this3 and of course that particular portion of the general happiness1 for which one is called upon to sacrifice one's own1 may easily be the happiness of persons not especially dear to one4 ,but again1 from this normal limitation of our keenest and strongest sympathy to a very small circle of human beings1 it results that the very development of sympathy may operate to increase the weight thrown into the scale against ,utilitarian duty4 ,there are very few persons1 however strongly and widely sympathetic1 who are so constituted as to feel for the pleasures and pains of mankind generally a degree of sympathy at all commensurate with their concern for wife or children1 or lover1 or intimate friend3 and if any training of the affections is at present possible which would materially alter this proportion in the general distribution of our sympathy1 it scarcely seems that such a training is to be recommended as on the whole felicific4#cgh ,and thus when ,utilitarian ,duty calls on us to sacrifice not only our own pleasures but the happiness of those we love to the general good1 the very sanction on which ,utilitarianism most relies must act powerfully in opposition to its precepts4 ,but even apart from these exceptional cases--which are yet sufficient to decide the abstract question--it seems that the course of conduct by which a man would most fully reap the rewards of sympathy 7so far as they are empirically ascertainable7 will often be very different from that to which a sincere desire to promote the general happiness would direct him4 ,for the relief of distress and calamity is an important part of ,utilitarian duty3 but as the state of the person relieved is on the whole painful1 it would appear that sympathy under these circumstances must be a source of pain rather than pleasure1 in proportion to its intensity4 ,it is probably true1 as a general rule1 that in the relief of distress other elements of the complex pleasure of benevolence decidedly outweigh this sympathetic pain3--for the effusion of pity is itself pleasurable1 and we commonly feel more keenly that amelioration of the sufferer's state which is due to our exertions than we do his pain otherwise caused1 and there is further the pleasure that we derive from his gratitude1 and the pleasure that is the normal reflex of activity directed under a strong impulse towards a permanently valued end4 ,still1 when the distress is bitter and continued1 and such as we can only partially mitigate by all our efforts1 the philanthropist's sympathetic discomfort must necessarily be considerable2 and the work of combating misery1 though not devoid of elevated happiness1 will be much less happy on the whole than many other forms of activity2 while yet it may be to just this work that ,duty seems to summon us4 ,or again1 a man may find that he can best promote the general happiness by working in comparative solitude for ends that he never hopes to see realised1 or by working chiefly among and for persons for whom he cannot feel much affection1 or by doing what must alienate or grieve those whom he loves best1 or must make it necessary for him to dispense with the most intimate of human ties4 ,in short1 there seem to be numberless ways in which the dictates of that ,rational ,benevolence1 which as a ,utilitarian he is bound absolutely to obey1 may conflict with that indulgence of kind affections which ,shaftesbury and his followers so persuasively exhibit as its own reward4 #d4 ,it seems1 then1 that we must conclude1 from the arguments given in ,book ii4 chap4 v41 supplemented by the discussion in the preceding section1 that the inseparable connexion between ,utilitarian ,duty and the greatest happiness of the individual who conforms to it cannot be satisfactorily demonstrated on empirical grounds4 ,hence another section of the ,utilitarian school has preferred to throw the weight of ,duty on the ,religious ,sanction3 and this procedure has been partly adopted by some of those who have chiefly dwelt on sympathy as a motive4 ,from this point of view the ,utilitarian ,code is conceived as the ,law of ,god1 who is to be regarded as having commanded men to promote the general happiness1 and as having announced an intention of rewarding those who obey ,his commands and punishing the disobedient4 ,it is clear that if we feel convinced that an ,omnipotent ,being has1 in whatever way1 signified such commands and announcements1 a rational egoist can want no further inducement to frame his life on ,utilitarian principles4 ,it only remains to consider how this conviction is attained4 ,this is commonly thought to be either by supernatural ,revelation1 or by the natural exercise of ,reason1 or in both ways4 ,as regards the former it is to be observed that--with a few exceptions--the moralists who hold that ,god has disclosed ,his law either to special individuals in past ages who have left a written record of what was revealed to them1 or to a permanent succession of persons appointed in a particular manner1 or to religious persons generally in some supernatural way1 do not consider that it is the ,utilitarian ,code that has thus been revealed1 but rather the rules of ,common-,sense morality with some special modifications and additions4 ,still1 as ,mill has urged1 in so far as ,utilitarianism is more rigorous than ,common ,sense in exacting the sacrifice of the individual's happiness to that of mankind generally1 it is strictly in accordance with the most characteristic teaching of ,christianity4 ,it seems1 however1 unnecessary to discuss the precise relation of different ,revelational ,codes to ,utilitarianism1 as it would be going beyond our province to investigate the grounds on which a ,divine origin has been attributed to them4 ,in so far1 however1 as a knowledge of ,god's law is believed to be attainable by the ,reason1 ,ethics and ,theology seem to be so closely connected that we cannot sharply separate their provinces4 ,for1 as we saw1#cgi it has been widely maintained1 that the relation of moral rules to a ,divine ,lawgiver is implicitly cognised in the act of thought by which we discern these rules to be binding4 ,and no doubt the terms 7such as #8moral obligation'71 which we commonly use in speaking of these rules1 are naturally suggestive of ,legal ,sanctions and so of a ,sovereign by whom these are announced and enforced4 ,indeed many thinkers since ,locke have refused to admit any other meaning in the terms ,right1 ,duty1 etc41 except that of a rule imposed by a lawgiver4 ,this view1 however1 seems opposed to ,common ,sense2 as may be1 perhaps1 most easily shown#chj by pointing out that the ,divine ,lawgiver is ,himself conceived as a ,moral ,agent2 i4e4 as prescribing what is right1 and designing what is good4 ,it is clear that in this conception at least the notions #8right' and #8good' are used absolutely1 without any reference to a superior lawgiver2 and that they are here used in a sense not essentially different from that which they ordinarily bear seems to be affirmed by the consensus of religious persons4 ,still1 though ,common ,sense does not regard moral rules as being merely the mandates of an ,omnipotent ,being who will reward and punish men according as they obey or violate them2 it certainly holds that this is a true though partial view of them1 and perhaps that it may be intuitively apprehended4 ,if then reflection leads us to conclude that the particular moral principles of ,common ,sense are to be systematised as subordinate to that pre-eminently certain and irrefragable intuition which stands as the first principle of ,utilitarianism2 then1 of course1 it will be the ,utilitarian ,code to which we shall believe the ,divine ,sanctions to be attached4 ,or1 again1 we may argue thus4 ,if--as all theologians agree--we are to conceive ,god as acting for some end1 we must conceive that end to be ,universal ,good1 and1 if ,utilitarians are right1 ,universal ,happiness3 and we cannot suppose that in a world morally governed it can be prudent for any man to act in conscious opposition to what we believe to be the ,divine ,design4 ,hence if in any case after calculating the consequences of two alternatives of conduct we choose that which seems likely to be less conducive to ,happiness generally1 we shall be acting in a manner for which we cannot but expect to suffer4 ,to this it has been objected1 that observation of the actual world shows us that the happiness of sentient beings is so imperfectly attained in it1 and with so large an intermixture of pain and misery1 that we cannot really conceive ,universal ,happiness to be ,god's end1 unless we admit that ,he is not ,omnipotent4 ,and no doubt the assertion that ,god is omnipotent will require to be understood with some limitation2 but perhaps with no greater limitation than has always been implicitly admitted by thoughtful theologians4 ,for these seem always to have allowed that some things are impossible to ,god3 as1 for example1 to change the past4 ,and perhaps if our knowledge of the ,universe were complete1 we might discern the quantum of happiness ultimately attained in it to be as great as could be attained without the accomplishment of what we should then see to be just as inconceivable and absurd as changing the past4 ,this1 however1 is a view which it belongs rather to the theologian to develop4 ,i should rather urge that there does not seem to be any other of the ordinary interpretations of ,good according to which it would appear to be more completely realised in the actual universe4 ,for the wonderful perfections of work that we admire in the physical world are yet everywhere mingled with imperfection1 and subject to destruction and decay3 and similarly in the world of human conduct ,virtue is at least as much balanced by ,vice as ,happiness is by misery4#cha ,so that1 if the ethical reasoning that led us to interpret ,ultimate ,good as ,happiness is sound1 there seems no argument from ,natural ,theology to set against it4 #e4 ,if1 then1 we may assume the existence of such a ,being1 as ,god1 by the consensus of theologians1 is conceived to be1 it seems that ,utilitarians may legitimately infer the existence of ,divine sanctions to the code of social duty as constructed on a ,utilitarian basis2 and such sanctions would1 of course1 suffice to make it always every one's interest to promote universal happiness to the best of his knowledge4 ,it is1 however1 desirable1 before we conclude1 to examine carefully the validity of this assumption1 in so far as it is supported on ethical grounds alone4 ,for by the result of such an examination will be determined1 as we now see1 the very important question whether ethical science can be constructed on an independent basis2 or whether it is forced to borrow a fundamental and indispensable premiss from ,theology or some similar source4#chb ,in order fairly to perform this examination1 let us reflect upon the clearest and most certain of our moral intuitions4 ,i find that ,i undoubtedly seem to perceive1 as clearly and certainly as ,i see any axiom in ,arithmetic or ,geometry1 that it is #8right' and #8reasonable' for me to treat others as ,i should think that ,i myself ought to be treated under similar conditions1 and to do what ,i believe to be ultimately conducive to universal ,good or ,happiness4 ,but ,i cannot find inseparably connected with this conviction1 and similarly attainable by mere reflective intuition1 any cognition that there actually is a ,supreme ,being who will adequately#chc reward me for obeying these rules of duty1 or punish me for violating them4#chd ,or1--omitting the strictly theological element of the proposition1--,i may say that ,i do not find in my moral consciousness any intuition1 claiming to be clear and certain1 that the performance of duty will be adequately rewarded and its violation punished4 ,i feel indeed a desire1 apparently inseparable from the moral sentiments1 that this result may be realised not only in my own case but universally2 but the mere existence of the desire would not go far to establish the probability of its fulfilment1 considering the large proportion of human desires that experience shows to be doomed to disappointment4 ,i also judge that in a certain sense this result ought to be realised3 in this judgment1 however1 #8ought' is not used in a strictly ethical meaning2 it only expresses the vital need that our ,practical ,reason feels of proving or postulating this connexion of ,virtue and self-interest1 if it is to be made consistent with itself4 ,for the negation of the connexion must force us to admit an ultimate and fundamental contradiction in our apparent intuitions of what is ,reasonable in conduct2 and from this admission it would seem to follow that the apparently intuitive operation of the ,practical ,reason1 manifested in these contradictory judgments1 is after all illusory4 ,i do not mean that if we gave up the hope of attaining a practical solution of this fundamental contradiction1 through any legitimately obtained conclusion or postulate as to the moral order of the world1 it would become reasonable for us to abandon morality altogether3 but it would seem necessary to abandon the idea of rationalising it completely4 ,we should doubtless still1 not only from self-interest1 but also through sympathy and sentiments protective of social wellbeing1 imparted by education and sustained by communication with other men1 feel a desire for the general observance of rules conducive to general happiness2 and practical reason would still impel us decisively to the performance of duty in the more ordinary cases in which what is recognised as duty is in harmony with self-interest properly understood4 ,but in the rarer cases of a recognised conflict between self-interest and duty1 practical reason1 being divided against itself1 would cease to be a motive on either side2 the conflict would have to be decided by the comparative preponderance of one or other of two groups of non-rational impulses4 ,if then the reconciliation of duty and self-interest is to be regarded as a hypothesis logically necessary to avoid a fundamental contradiction in one chief department of our thought1 it remains to ask how far this necessity constitutes a sufficient reason for accepting this hypothesis4 ,this1 however1 is a profoundly difficult and controverted question1 the discussion of which belongs rather to a treatise on ,general ,philosophy than to a work on the ,methods of ,ethics3 as it could not be satisfactorily answered1 without a general examination of the criteria of true and false beliefs4 ,those who hold that the edifice of physical science is really constructed of conclusions logically inferred from self-evident premises1 may reasonably demand that any practical judgments claiming philosophic certainty should be based on an equally firm foundation4 ,if on the other hand we find that in our supposed knowledge of the world of nature propositions are commonly taken to be universally true1 which yet seem to rest on no other grounds than that we have a strong disposition to accept them1 and that they are indispensable to the systematic coherence of our beliefs1--it will be more difficult to reject a similarly supported assumption in ethics1 without opening the door to universal scepticism4 ,,footnotes3 #cge ,see ,j4 ,s4 ,mill's treatise on ,utilitarianism 7chap4 iii4 passim73 where1 however1 the argument is not easy to follow1 from a confusion between three different objects of inquiry3 7#a7 the actual effect of sympathy in inducing conformity to the rules of ,utilitarian ethics1 7#b7 the effect in this direction which it is likely to have in the future1 7#c7 the value of sympathetic pleasures and pains as estimated by an enlightened ,egoist4 ,the first and third of these questions ,mill did not clearly separate1 owing to his psychological doctrine that each one's own pleasure is the sole object of his desires4 ,but if my refutation of this doctrine 7,book i4 chap4 iv4 #c7 is valid1 we have to distinguish two ways in which sympathy operates3 it generates sympathetic pleasures and pains1 which have to be taken into account in the calculations of ,egoistic ,hedonism2 but it also may cause impulses to altruistic action1 of which the force is quite out of proportion to the sympathetic pleasure 7or relief from pain7 which such action seems likely to secure to the agent4 ,so that even if the average man ever should reach such a pitch of sympathetic development1 as never to feel prompted to sacrifice the general good to his own1 still this will not prove that it is egoistically reasonable for him to behave in this way4 #cgf ,i do not mean to imply that the process of change is merely circular4 ,in the earlier period sympathy is narrower1 simpler1 and more presentative2 in the later it is more extensive1 complex1 and representative4 #cgg ,i do not1 however1 think that we are justified in stating as universally true what has been admitted in the preceding paragraph4 ,some few thoroughly selfish persons appear at least to be happier than most of the unselfish2 and there are other exceptional natures whose chief happiness seems to be derived from activity1 disinterested indeed1 but directed towards other ends than human happiness4 #cgh ,see chap4 iii4 #c of this ,book1 pp4 #dcb-cc4 #cgi ,see ,book iii4 chap4 i4 #b3 also ,book iii4 chap4 ii4 #a4 #chj ,cf4 ,book i4 chap4 iii4 #b4 #cha ,it may perhaps be said that this comparison has no force for ,libertarians1 who consider the essence of ,virtue to lie in free choice4 ,but to say that any free choice is virtuous would be a paradox from which most ,libertarians--admitting that ,evil may be freely chosen no less than ,good--would recoil4 ,it must therefore be ,free choice of good that is conceived to realise the divine end3 and if so1 the arguments for the utilitarian interpretation of ,good--thus freely chosen--would still be applicable mutatis mutandis3 and if so1 the arguments for regarding rules of utilitarian duty as divinely sanctioned would be similarly applicable4 #chb ,it is not necessary1 if we are simply considering ,ethics as a possible independent science1 to throw the fundamental premiss of which we are now examining the validity into a ,theistic form4 ,nor does it seem always to have taken that form in the support which ,positive ,religion has given to ,morality4 ,in the ,buddhist creed this notion of the rewards inseparably attaching to right conduct seems to have been developed in a far more elaborate and systematic manner than it has in any phase of ,christianity4 ,but1 as conceived by enlightened ,buddhists1 these rewards are not distributed by the volition of a ,supreme ,person1 but by the natural operation of an impersonal ,law4 #chc ,it may be well to remind the reader that by #8adequate' is here meant #8sufficient to make it the agent's interest to promote universal good'2 not necessarily #8proportional to ,desert4' #chd ,i cannot fall back on the resource of thinking myself under a moral necessity to regard all my duties as if they were commandments of ,god1 although not entitled to hold speculatively that any such ,supreme ,being really exists4 ,i am so far from feeling bound to believe for purposes of practice what ,i see no ground for holding as a speculative truth1 that ,i cannot even conceive the state of mind which these words seem to describe1 except as a momentary half-wilful irrationality1 committed in a violent access of philosophic despair4 ,,appendix ,,the ,,kantian ,,conception ,,of ,,free ,,will ,reprinted1 with some omissions1 from ,,mind1 #ahhh1 ,vol4 ,,xiii41 ,no4 #ea4 ,my aim is to show that1 in different parts of ,kant's exposition of his doctrine1 two essentially different conceptions are expressed by the same word freedom2 while yet ,kant does not appear to be conscious of any variation in the meaning of the term4 ,in the one sense1 ,freedom ,rationality1 so that a man is free in proportion as he acts in accordance with ,reason4 ,i do not in the least object to this use of the term ,freedom1 on account of its deviation from ordinary usage4 ,on the contrary1 ,i think it has much support in men's natural expression of ordinary moral experience in discourse4 ,in the conflict that is continually going on in all of us1 between non-rational impulses and what we recognise as dictates of practical reason1 we are in the habit of identifying ourselves with the latter rather than with the former3 as ,whewell says1 8we speak of ,desire1 ,love1 ,anger1 as mastering us1 and of ourselves as controlling them0--we continually call men 8slaves0 of appetite or passion1 whereas no one was ever called a slave of reason4 ,if1 therefore1 the term ,freedom had not already been appropriated by moralists to another meaning--if it were merely a question of taking it from ordinary discourse and stamping it with greater precision for purposes of ethical discussion--,i should make no objection to the statement that 8a man is a free agent in proportion as he acts rationally40 ,but1 what ,english defenders of man's free agency have generally been concerned to maintain1 is that 8man has a freedom of choice between good and evil10 which is realised or manifested when he deliberately chooses evil just as much as when he deliberately chooses good2 and it is clear that if we say that a man is a free agent in proportion as he acts rationally1 we cannot also say1 in the same sense of the term1 that it is by his free choice that he acts irrationally when he does so act4 ,the notions of ,freedom must be admitted to be fundamentally different in the two statements3 and though usage might fairly allow the word ,freedom to represent either notion1 if only one or other of the above-mentioned propositions were affirmed1 to use it to represent both1 in affirming both propositions1 is obviously inconvenient2 and it implies a confusion of thought so to use it1 without pointing out the difference of meaning4 ,if this be admitted1 the next thing is to show that ,kant does use the term in this double way4 ,in arguing this1 it will be convenient to have names for what we admit to be two distinct ideas4 ,accordingly1 the kind of freedom which ,i first mentioned--which a man is said to manifest more in proportion as he acts more under the guidance of reason--shall be referred to as #8,good' or #8,rational ,freedom1' and the freedom that is manifested in choosing between good and evil shall be called #8,neutral' or #8,moral ,freedom4'#che ,but before ,i proceed to the different passages of ,kant's exposition in which #8,good ,freedom' and #8,neutral ,freedom' respectively occur1 it seems desirable to distinguish this latter from a wider notion with which it may possibly be confounded1 and which it would be clearly wrong to attribute to ,kant4 ,i mean the 8power of acting without a motive10 which ,reid and other writers1 on what used to be called the ,libertarian side1 have thought it necessary to claim4 8,if a man could not act without a motive10 says ,reid1 8he could have no power0--that is1 in ,reid's meaning1 no free agency--8at all40 ,this conception of ,freedom--which ,i may conveniently distinguish as #8,capricious ,freedom'--is1 as ,i said1 certainly not ,kantian3 not only does he expressly repudiate it1 but nowhere--so far as ,i know--does he unconsciously introduce it4 ,indeed it is incompatible with any and every part of his explanation of human volition3 the originality and interest of his defence of ,neutral ,freedom--the power of choice between good and evil--lies in its complete avoidance of ,capricious ,freedom or the power of acting without a motive in any particular volition4 ,this distinction helps me to understand how it is that many intelligent readers have failed to see in ,kant's exposition the two ,freedoms--,good or ,rational ,freedom and ,neutral or ,moral ,freedom--which ,i find in ,kant4 ,they have their view fixed on the difference between ,rational or ,moral ,freedom1 which ,kant maintains1 and the ,freedom of ,caprice1 which he undoubtedly repudiates3 and are thus led to overlook with him the distinction between the ,freedom that we realise or manifest in proportion as we do right1 and the ,freedom that is realised or manifested equally in choosing either right or wrong4 ,when we have once put completely out of view the ,freedom of ,caprice1 the power of acting without a motive1 or against the strongest motive when the competition is among merely natural or non-rational desires or aversions1--when we have agreed to exclude this1 and to concentrate attention on the difference between ,good ,freedom and ,neutral ,freedom--,i venture to think that no one can avoid seeing each member of this latter antithesis in ,kant4 ,it will be easily understood that1 as he does not himself distinguish the two conceptions1 it is naturally impossible for the most careful reader always to tell which is to be understood2 but there are many passages where his argument unmistakably requires the one1 and many other passages where it unmistakably requires the other4 ,speaking broadly1 ,i may say that1 wherever ,kant has to connect the notion of ,freedom with that of ,moral ,responsibility or moral imputation1 he1 like all other moralists who have maintained ,free ,will in this connexion1 means 7chiefly1 but not solely7 ,neutral ,freedom--,freedom exhibited in choosing wrong as much as in choosing right4 ,indeed1 in such passages it is with the ,freedom of the wrong-chooser that he is primarily concerned3 since it is the wrong-chooser that he especially wishes to prevent from shifting his responsibility on to causes beyond his control4 ,on the other hand1 when what he has to prove is the possibility of disinterested obedience to ,law as such1 without the intervention of sensible impulses1 when he seeks to exhibit the independence of ,reason in influencing choice1 then in many though not all his statements he explicitly identifies ,freedom with this independence of ,reason1 and thus clearly implies the proposition that a man is free in proportion as he acts rationally4 ,as an example of the first kind1 ,i will take the passage towards the close of chap4 iii4 of the 8,analytic of ,practical ,reason10#chf where he treats1 in its bearing on ,moral ,responsibility1 his peculiar metaphysical doctrine of a double kind of causation in human actions4 ,according to ,kant1 every such action1 regarded as a phenomenon determined in time1 must be thought as a necessary result of determining causes in antecedent time--otherwise its existence would be inconceivable--but it may be also regarded in relation to the agent considered as a thing-in-himself1 as the 8nomenon0 of which the action is a phenomenon3 and the conception of ,freedom may be applied to the agent so considered in relation to his phenomena4 ,for since his existence as a nomenon is not subject to time-conditions1 nothing in this nomenal existence comes under the principle of determination by antecedent causes3 hence1 as ,kant says1 8in this his existence nothing is antecedent to the determination of his will1 but every action 444 even the whole series of his existence as a sensible being1 is in the consciousness of his supersensible existence nothing but the result of his causality as a nomenon40 ,this is the well-known metaphysical solution of the difficulty of reconciling ,free ,will with the ,universality of physical causation3 ,i am not now concerned to criticise it1--my point is that if we accept this view of ,freedom at all1 it must obviously be ,neutral ,freedom3 it must express the relation of a nomenon that manifests itself as a scoundrel to a series of bad volitions1 in which the moral law is violated1 no less than the relation of a nomenon that manifests itself as a saint to good or rational volitions1 in which the moral law or categorical imperative is obeyed4 ,and1 as ,i before said1 ,kant in this passage--being especially concerned to explain the possibility of moral imputation1 and justify the judicial sentences of conscience--especially takes as his illustrations nomena that exhibit bad phenomena4 ,the question he expressly raises is 8,how a man who commits a theft0 can 8be called quite free0 at the moment of committing it8 and answers that it is in virtue of his 8transcendental freedom0 that 8the rational being can justly say of every unlawful action that he performs that he could very well have left it undone10 although as phenomenon it is determined by antecedents1 and so necessary2 8for it1 with all the past which determines it1 belongs to the one single phenomenon of his character which he makes for himself1 in consequence of which he imputes to himself0 the bad actions that result necessarily from his bad character taken in conjunction with other causes4 ,hence1 however he may account for his error from bad habits which he has allowed to grow on him1 whatever art he may use to paint to himself an unlawful act he remembers as something in which he was carried away by the stream of physical necessity1 this cannot protect him from self-reproach3--not even if he have shown depravity so early that he may reasonably be thought to have been born in a morally hopeless condition--he will still be rightly judged1 and will judge himself 8just as responsible as any other man03 since in relation to his nomenal self his life as a whole1 from first to last1 is to be regarded as a single phenomenon resulting from an absolutely free choice4 ,i need not labour this point further2 it is evident that the necessities of ,kant's metaphysical explanation of moral responsibility make him express with peculiar emphasis and fulness the notion of what ,i have called ,neutral ,freedom1 a kind of causality manifested in bad and irrational volitions no less than in the good and rational4 ,on the other hand1 it is no less easy to find passages in which the term ,freedom seems to me most distinctly to stand for ,good or ,rational ,freedom4 ,indeed1 such passages are1 ,i think1 more frequent than those in which the other meaning is plainly required4 ,thus he tells us that 8a free will must find its principle of determination in the moral #8,law1'0#chg and that 8freedom1 whose causality can be determined only by the law1 consists just in this1 that it restricts all inclinations by the condition of obedience to pure law40#chh ,whereas1 in the argument previously examined1 his whole effort was to prove that the nomenon or supersensible being1 of which each volition is a phenomenon1 exercises 8free causality0 in unlawful acts1 he tells us elsewhere1 in the same treatise1 that the 8supersensible nature0 of rational beings1 who have also a 8sensible nature10 is their 8existence according to laws which are independent of every empirical condition1 and therefore belong to the autonomy of pure practical reason40#chi ,similarly1 in an earlier work1 he explains that 8since the conception of causality involves that of laws 444 though freedom is not a property of the will depending on physical laws1 yet it is not for that reason lawless2 on the contrary1 it must be a causality according to immutable laws1 but of a peculiar kind2 otherwise1 a free will would be a chimra 7,unding740#cij ,and this immutable law of the 8free0 or 8autonomous0 will is1 as he goes on to say1 the fundamental principle of morality1 8so that a free will and a will subject to moral laws are one and the same40 ,i have quoted this last phrase1 not because it clearly exhibits the notion of ,rational ,freedom1--on the contrary1 it rather shows how easily this notion may be confounded with the other4 ,a will subject to its own moral laws may mean a will that1 so far as free1 conforms to these laws2 but it also may be conceived as capable of freely disobeying these laws--exercising ,neutral ,freedom4 ,but when ,freedom is said to be a 8causality according to immutable laws0 the ambiguity is dispelled2 for this evidently cannot mean merely a faculty of laying down laws which may or may not be obeyed2 it must mean that the will1 qu free1 acts in accordance with these laws2--the human being1 doubtless1 often acts contrary to them2 but then1 according to this view1 its choice in such actions is determined not 8freely0 but 8mechanically10 by 8physical0 and 8empirical0 springs of action4 ,if any further argument is necessary to show that ,kantian 8,freedom0 must sometimes be understood as ,rational or ,good ,freedom1 ,i may quote one or two of the numerous passages in which ,kant1 either expressly or by implication1 identifies ,will and ,reason2 for this identification obviously excludes the possibility of ,will's choosing between ,reason and non-rational impulses4 ,thus in the ,grundlegung zur ,metaphysik der ,sitten1#cia he tells us that 8as ,reason is required to deduce actions from laws1 ,will is nothing but pure practical reason02 and1 similarly1 in the ,kritik der praktischen ,vernunft1 he speaks of the 8objective reality of a pure ,will or1 which is the same thing1 a pure practical reason40#cib ,accordingly1 whereas in some passages#cic the 8autonomy0 which he identifies with 8,freedom0 is spoken of as 8autonomy of will10 in others we are told that the 8moral law expresses nothing else than autonomy of the pure practical reason3 that is1 ,freedom40#cid ,i think that ,i have now established the verbal ambiguity that ,i undertook to bring home to ,kant's account of ,free ,will2 ,i have shown that in his exposition this fundamental term oscillates between incompatible meanings4 ,but it may1 perhaps1 be thought that the defect thus pointed out can be cured by a merely verbal correction3 that the substance of ,kant's ethical doctrine may still be maintained1 and may still be connected with his metaphysical doctrine4 ,it may still be held that ,reason dictates that we should at all times act from a maxim that we can will to be a universal law1 and that we should do this from pure regard for reason and reason's law1 admitting that it is a law which we are free to disobey2 and it may still be held that the reality of this moral freedom is to be reconciled with the universality of physical causation by conceiving it as a relation between the agent's nomenal self--independent of time-conditions--and his character as manifested in time2 the only correction required being to avoid identifying ,freedom and ,goodness or ,rationality as attributes of agents or actions4 ,i should quite admit that the most important parts both of ,kant's doctrine of morality1 and of his doctrine of ,freedom may be saved3--or ,i should perhaps rather say that the latter may be left to conduct an unequal struggle with the modern notions of heredity and evolution3 at any rate ,i admit that it is not fundamentally affected by my present argument4 ,but ,i think that a good deal more will have to go from a corrected edition of ,kantism than merely the 8word0 ,freedom in certain passages1 if the confusion introduced by the ambiguity of this word is to be eliminated in the manner that ,i have suggested4 ,i think that the whole topic of the 8heteronomy0 of the will1 when it yields to empirical or sensible impulses1 will have to be abandoned or profoundly modified4 ,and ,i am afraid that most readers of ,kant will feel the loss to be serious2 since nothing in ,kant's ethical writing is more fascinating than the idea--which he expresses repeatedly in various forms--that a man realises the aim of his true self when he obeys the moral law1 whereas1 when he wrongly allows his action to be determined by empirical or sensible stimuli1 he becomes subject to physical causation1 to laws of a brute outer world4 ,but if we dismiss the identification of ,freedom and ,rationality1 and accept definitely and singly ,kant's other notion of ,freedom as expressing the relation of the human thing-in-itself to its phenomenon1 ,i am afraid that this spirit-stirring appeal to the sentiment of ,liberty must be dismissed as idle rhetoric4 ,for the life of the saint must be as much subject--in any particular portion of it--to the necessary laws of physical causation as the life of the scoundrel3 and the scoundrel must exhibit and express his characteristic self-hood in his transcendental choice of a bad life1 as much as the saint does in his transcendental choice of a good one4 ,if1 on the other hand1 to avoid this result1 we take the other horn of the dilemma1 and identify inner freedom with rationality1 than a more serious excision will be required4 ,for1 along with #8,neutral' or #8,moral' ,freedom1 the whole ,kantian view of the relation of the nomenon to the empirical character will have to be dropped1 and with it must go the whole ,kantian method of maintaining moral responsibility and moral imputation3 in fact1 all that has made ,kant's doctrine interesting and impressive to ,english advocates of ,free ,will 7in the ordinary sense71 even when they have not been convinced of its soundness4 ,,footnotes3 #che ,the terms #8rational' and #8moral' seem to me most appropriate when ,i wish to suggest the affinity between the two notions3 the terms #8good' and #8neutral' seem preferable when ,i wish to lay stress on the difference4 #chf ,werke1 v4 pp4 #ajj-ajd 7,hartenstein74 #chg ,werke1 v4 p4 #cj4 #chh ,ibid4 p4 #hc4 #chi ,ibid4 p4 #df4 #cij ,werke1 iv4 p4 #bid4 #cia ,werke1 iv4 p4 #bfj 7,hartenstein74 #cib ,werke1 v4 p4 #eh4 ,see an acute discussion of ,kant's perplexing use of the term 8,will0 in ,prof4 ,schurman's ,kantian ,ethics1 which has anticipated me in the above quotations4 #cic ,e4g4 ,werke1 iv4 p4 #bif4 #cid ,e4g4 ,werke1 v4 p4 #ce4 ,,index #8,absolute' and #8,relative' ,ethics1 #ah note #b1 #agg note #a #8,act1' meaning of1 #bjj note #c1 #bja1 #bjb ,action1 ultimate end of1 #c1 #d1 etc42 motive to1 may be non-rational1 #e2 instinctive1 #bd1 #fa2 deliberate1 #bd1 #fa2 deliberate and impulsive1 #fa ,acuteness1 #bcf sthetic ,intuitionism1 #bbh1 #cib2 implicit reference to ,ultimate ,good in1 #cib1 #cic sthetic sensibility1 theories of1 #ahi ,affections1 ,duties of the1 #cde-cdi ,affections1 social and domestic1 #ach1 #aec1 #aef1 #aeg1 #dcc1 #dcd #8,altruism1' #dci 1 #def #8,apathy' as ideal of happiness1 #abe ,aristotle1 #ei note #a1 #ib1 #ib note #b1 #ih-ii1 #ii note #a1 #aba-abb1 #ahj1 #ahj note #a1 #aha note #a1 #bae1 #bbd1 #bca note #a1 #bfd note #b1 #bha1 #cge note #a1 #cgf1 #djc1 #def ,art1 ,definition of1 #d #8,art of conduct1' #d ,austin1 #cjj note #a ,aversion1 #db1 #dc1 #df1 #ade ,axioms1 #bae1 #cch-cdc1 #cgi-chi passim2 must 7a7 have the terms clear and precise1 #cch1 #cci2 7b7 be really self-evident1 #cci-cda2 7c7 not conflict with any other accepted proposition1 #cda2 7d7 be supported by consensus of experts1 #cda1 #cdb ,axiom--of ,justice or ,equity1 and ,rational ,benevolence1 #chg2 of ,prudence1 the logical basis of ,egoism1 #chf2 of ,rational ,benevolence1 the logical basis of ,utilitarianism1 #chg1 #chh2 -s of ,impartiality1 #cgi-chc1 #dif1 #dig ,bacon1 #cch ,bain1 #dc note #b1 ,note #ed-ef1 ,note #hg-hh1 #abe1 #abf1 #abg1 #dgg note #a2 7,the ,emotions and the ,will7 #ed1 #ee ,note1 #abf note #a2 7,mental and ,moral ,science7 #abg notes #a-c1 #agg note #a ,bastiat1 #bgh note #a ,beauty1 #aad ,benevolence1 #bch-bfc passim1 #cia1 #cic2 comprehensiveness and supremacy of1 #bch1 #bch note #b2 common maxim of1 #bch-bci2 axiom of1 #chb1 #che1 #chg1 #dif2 prescribes promotion of others' ,happiness rather than ,perfection1 #bdj1 #bda2 principles of its distribution1 #bda1 #bdb1 #bfa1 #bfb1 #bfc2 and ,justice1 spheres of1 #bdb1 #bdc1 #bfh2 virtue of1 #bdd1 #bec2 duty of1 #beb1 #bec1 #bec note #a1 #beh2 ,kant's view of the duty of1 #bci1 #bdj2 intellectual versus emotional excellence of1 #bdd note #a2 conflicting claims to1 #bdf2 duties of1 classified1 #bdh2 rational1 cf4 ,rational ,benevolence2 ,intuitional and ,utilitarian notions of1 reconciled1 #dcj-dca ,benevolent--emotion1 #bci2 disposition1 #bci ,bentham1 #aj1 #da1 #da note #a1 #hd1 #he1 #hf1 ,note #hg-hh1 #ib1 #id1 #aai1 #abd note #a1 #adc1 #afd1 #bjc1 #bib1 #cfd1 #dad1 #dag1 #dbc note #b1 #dbd2 7,memoirs7 #aj notes #b and #c1 7,deontology1 ,works1 ,bowring's edition7 #hg1 #hh ,note1 7,principles of ,morals and ,legislation7 #bf note #a1 7,constitutional ,code7 #da note #b ,bequest1 change of view respecting1 #bdf1 #bdg ,berkeley1 ,bishop1 #abj ,blackstone1 ,introduction1 #cjb note #a ,bouillier1 #ahj note #b ,butler1 #g1 #ci1 #dd1 #dd note #b1 #ha1 #hf1 #ic1 #id1 #aai1 #acc note #b1 #acf1 #agb1 #bjj1 #bbb1 #cff1 #cff note #c1 #cga1 #cgb1 #cgh1 #chf1 #dja1 #dje1 #eja2 7,analogy7 #cgh2 7,dissertation ,of the ,nature of ,virtue7 #hf note #b1 #agf note #a1 #cbg note #a2 7,sermons on ,human ,nature7 #g note #a1 #hf note #b1 #ic note #b1 #abj note #a1 #bjj note #b1 #cbc note #a ,candour1 #cee ,cardinal ,virtues1 #cge ,carelessness1 ,culpability of1 #fj1 #bib ,casuistry1 #ii ,categorical ,imperative1 #g1 #h1 #ae1 #ce1 #cf1 #cg1 #bji1 #bji note #a ,caution1 #bcf1 #bcf note #a1 #bcg ,celibacy1 #dhg1 #dhh ,charity 7,philanthropy71 #bbb1 #bci1 #dcj1 #dca1 #dcd ,chastity and ,purity1 #bbc1 #cbi-cca1 #cbi note #b #8,chief ,good' 7,summum ,bonum71 #acd1 #djg note #a ,chivalry1 #cbf ,chrysippus1 #cgf ,cicero1 #cgf2 ,de ,finibus1 #abe note #a ,clarke1 #hf1 #ajd1 #abj1 #abj note #b1 #chd1 #chd notes #c and #d1 #che2 ,boyle ,lectures1 #abj note #b1 #che notes #a and #b ,classification of ,duties1 #cab-cae #8,cognition1' use of1 #cd note #b 8,common good of all ,rationals10 ,cumberland's ultimate end1 #ajd1 #dbc ,common ,morality1 #bae-baf2 7cf4 ,morality of ,common ,sense7 ,common ,sense aversion to admit ,happiness as sole ultimate ,good1 explanation of1 #djb-djf ,compassion1 #bfb1 #cga ,conditional prescriptions 7,hypothetical ,imperatives71 #f1 #g ,conjugal relation1 the duties relating to it1 #bed1 #bee1 #bef1 #bee notes #a and #b1 #cdg1 #cdh1 #cdh note #a ,conscience1 popular view of1 #ii2 jural view of1 #ajj-aja ,conscience 7,moral ,faculty7 and ,benevolence1 ,butler's view of the relation between1 #hf1 #hf note #b2 and ,self-love1 ,butler's view of relation between1 #aai1 #abj1 #bjj1 #bjj note #b1 #cbg note #a1 #cff ,conscious ,utilitarianism rather the adult than the germinal form of morality1 #dee-deg ,consciousness not normally without pleasure or pain1 #abe ,consequences of actions1 ulterior1 #if1 #ig2 may be judged desirable without reference to pleasure or pain1 #ig ,contract1 claims arising from1 #bfi2 and ,freedom1 #bgf1 #bgf note #a ,courage1 #ccb-ccd2 defined1 #ccb2 ,greek view of1 #def2 and ,fortitude1 are subordinate duties1 #ccb1 #ccc2 ,moral1 #ccc note #c2 ,virtue of1 #cac1 #ccc1 #ccd2 and ,foolhardiness1 distinguished by ,utilitarian considerations1 #ccd1 #cee ,courtesy1 #bec ,cudworth1 #ajc ,note ,culture1 #aeg1 etc4 ,cumberland1 #hf1 #hf note #a1 #ajd2 and ,utilitarianism1 #dbc1 #dbc note #a ,custom1 alterations in1 #bdg ,decision1 #bcf1 #bcg ,deductive ,hedonism1 #agf-aie ,descartes1 #cch1 #cci ,desert--,good1 how determined1 #bhd-bij2 ,ill1 how determined1 #bia-bib2 requital of1 as principle of ,ideal ,justice1 #bhj1 #bha1 #bhc1 #bid1 #cdi2 and ,freedom1 #bhj1 #bhg2 and ,right of ,property1 #bhj1 #bhj note #a2 and ,determinism1 #bhd1 #bhe2 ,utilitarian interpretation of1 #bhd note #a2 and ,free ,will1 #ga1 #gb1 #bhd1 #bia #8,desirable1' confusion in ,mill's use of1 #chh note #b ,desirable consciousness is either happiness or certain objective relations of the conscious mind1 #cih-djj ,desire1 #dc1 #de-dg2 non-rational1 #bc-bd2 irrational1 #bc1 #bd2 and ,pleasure1 relation between1 #ci-ef passim ,determinism and ,free ,will1 #eg seq42 ,aristotelian1 #ei note #a2 and ,materialism1 #fb2 arguments for1 #fb-fe2 argument against1 #fe1 #ff ,determinist meaning of #8desert1' etc41 #ga1 #gb1 #bhd note #a ,development as ethical aim1 #ij seq41 #aib seq41 #dgc #8,dictates1' how used1 #if note #a 1 two meanings of1 #bfd note #b #8,disinterested action1' #eg ,distribution1 ,principle of ,equality a prima facie reasonable ,principle of1 #dag ,divine penalties1 #ca #8,doing good1' ambiguity of1 #bci1 #bdj ,dualism of the ,practical 7or ,moral7 ,reason1 #bjj1 #bje1 #bjf1 #cff1 #djd1 #djd note #a2 need of harmonising1 #ejg-eji ,dumont1 #ahj note #b #8,duties to ,god' and #8duty to man1' #bah ,duties1 division of1 into ,self-regarding and ,social1 #afc1 #cab1 #cac #8,duties to oneself1' #g #8,duty'--meaning and use of1 #gh1 #bag1 #bah1 #bbj note #c1 #bci1 #ejd-eje2 and #8right conduct' distinguished1 #bag ,duty relativity of1 #bah1 #bai2 and ,happiness of agent1 #cf1 #afb-age passim1 #die seq42 implies conflict of impulses1 #ha2 of self-preservation1 #cef2 of promoting others' happiness1 ,kant's arguments for1 #chi-cij2 most of the received maxims of1 involve reference to ,ultimate ,good1 #cia1 #cib #8,egoism1' #aa1 #hj note #a1 #hi seq42 ordinary use1 and ambiguity of1 #hi2 indefiniteness of1 #ie2 and ,greek ethical controversy1 #ia-ib ,egoism1 cf4 ,egoistic ,hedonism ,egoism--meaning of1 #abj-aba2 and ,self-love1 #cf1 #hi-ie passim2 ,principle and ,method of1 #aai-abb2 precepts of1 not clear and precise1 #aii-bjj2 rationality of1 #aai-abj1 #aii1 #bjj note #a2 sense of ignobility of1 #aii-bjj1 #bjj note #a 7cf4 #djb seq471 #eja2 ,pure 7or ,quantitative7 ,egoistic ,hedonism1 #ie2 and ,utilitarianism1 relation between1 #dig seq42 and ,utilitarian sanctions1 #dii-ejc #8,egoist1' meaning of1 #aba ,egoistic ,end--and ,positive ,religion1 #aba2 and ,natural ,religion1 #aba ,egoistic ,hedonism designated as ,egoism or as ,epicureanism1 #aa1 #hd1 #ie ,egoistic ,hedonism1 #db1 #aai-aba2 ,end of1 #ic2 ,pure or ,quantitative1 defined1 #ie2 ,fundamental ,principle of1 #ic1 #abj1 #aba2 ,empirical-reflective ,method of1 #aba1 #abb1 #aca seq42 and ,conscience1 #afa note #a2 ,fundamental ,paradox of1 #dh1 #acj1 #acf1 #acg1 #agc-agd1 #aid ,empirical ,hedonism1 #abc-aej2 fundamental assumption of1 #abc1 #aca1 #adf2 objections to1 #dfj2 ,method of1 takes advantage of traditional experience and of special knowledge1 #dgg1 #dgi ,empirical ,quantitative ,hedonism1 #adf ,empiricism1 #ajd #8,end1' ethical use of the term1 #acd ,end1 ,interdependence of ,method and1 #h1 #hc1 #hd2 adoption of any1 as paramount1 a phenomenon distinct from ,desire1 #ci ,ends accepted as rational by ,common ,sense1 #h1 #i ,energy1 #bcg ,epicureanism1 #aa1 #hd ,epicurus1 #aeh #8,equal return1' ambiguity of1 #bfa 7cf4 #bhh seq47 #8,equality of ,happiness1' as ,social ,end1 #bhd note #b ,ethical--judgment1 #bc-ch1 #gg2 ,principles and ,methods1 #gg-hh passim2 ,method1 three principal species of1 #hc seq42 controversy1 ancient and modern1 #aje1 #ajf1 #cib2 ,hedonism1 fundamental proposition of1 #abi2 and ,psychological ,hedonism1 #dj-db1 #dab1 #dab note #a2 and ,physical ,science1 structure of1 compared1 #eji ,ethics--boundaries of1 #a2 ,study or ,science8 #a1 #b2 forms of the problem of1 #b1 #c1 #cia2 and man's #8,true ,good1' #c2 definition of1 #d1 #ae2 ,absolute and ,relative1 #ah note #b1 #agg note #a2 and geometry1 analogy between1 #ah-ai2 and astronomy1 analogy between1 #ai2 concerned with ,duty under present conditions1 #ai2 aim of1 #dj1 #gg2 and ,rational or ,natural ,theology1 #ejd-ejf2 mutual relations of the three ,methods of1 #dif-eji ,ethics and ,politics 7cf4 ,law71 #ae-bb passim1 #bff1 #deg2 distinguished from ,positive sciences1 #a1 #b2 ,utilitarian1 #deg 7cf4 #bgd1 #bih72 in an ideal society1 #ah seq4 7 ,well-being the ,good attainable in human life71 #ia1 #ib2 misunderstanding of ,aristotle's use of1 #ib note #b ,excellence 7cf4 ,perfection7 #8,excellence' and #8,perfection1' #aj note #c ,excellence beyond strict duty1 ,utilitarian attitude towards1 #dib1 #dic ,explanation essentially different from ,justification1 #b ,fame1 #i1 #aee1 #aeg1 #aei1 #cfh1 7,posthumous7 #aef note #a ,feeling--preferableness of1 other than pleasantness1 dependent on objective relations of the feeling mind1 #abg1 #abh1 #cii2 qu feeling1 can only be judged by the person who feels1 #abh1 #abi1 #cih ,fidelity 7cf4 ,good ,faith71 #beh1 #bei ,firmness1 #bce1 #bcf ,fitness and ,desert1 #cej #8,formal' and #8,material' ,rightness1 #bjf-bjg1 #bjf note #a ,fortitude defined1 #ccb ,free choice as virtuous1 #ejd note #a ,freedom--sentiment of1 #ci2 as absolute end of ideal law1 #bgd seq41 #bic1 #big1 #cej-cea2 sphere of1 must be limited1 #bge2 ambiguity of1 #bge1 #bgf1 #bic2 and ,contract1 #bgf1 #bgf note #a2 and ,property1 #bgf1 #bgg2 ,civil and ,constitutional1 #bih1 #cea ,free ,will--controversy1 #eg-gf passim1 #ei1 #fa-fb1 #fe note #a1 #gd1 #ge2 conception of1 applied 7a7 in judging the conduct of others1 #fc note #a1 #ff1 #fg1 7b7 in forecasting our own future1 #fd2 partial illusoriness of the belief in1 #fd1 #fe2 and ,happiness1 #fh2 and ,perfection 7or ,excellence71 #fh1 #fh note #b2 and ,moral government of the world1 #fi1 #fi note #b1 #gj2 and ,determinism1 practical unimportance of issue between1 #fg1 #fh1 #gb-gf1 #bhe2 and ,justice1 #ga1 #gb1 #bhd1 #bia2 and ,desert 7or ,merit71 #fh note #b1 #bhe1 #bia2 and ,duty1 #gh2 7or ,freedom of ,will7--two senses of1 #eg-ei2 and ,moral responsibility1 #eh2 conception of1 involved in ordinary meaning of #8responsibility1' #8desert1' etc41 #ga2 metaphysical--ethical import of1 as regards 7a7 choice between rational and irrational alternatives1 #fg1 #fh1 #gj-ga1 7b7 view of what is rational1 #fh1 #fi1 7c7 forecasts of future action1 #fi1 #gj1 #gj note #a ,friendship and its duties1 #beg-bei1 #beg note #a1 #dcg #8,general ,good1' #cib ,generosity1 #bai1 #cbf ,gentleness1 #bec1 #cba ,god's ,will--conformity to1 #gi2 as ultimate reason for action1 #gi1 #hj #8,golden ,rule1' the1 unpreciseness of1 #cgi-chj #8,good1' #aje-aae passim2 indefiniteness of1 #ia-ib2 use and force of the term1 #hf note #a1 #aje1 #ajg seq41 #aab1 #aac2 and not #8,right' the fundamental notion in ,greek ethics1 #aje2 has not the same connotation as #8pleasant1' #ajg1 #ajh1 #aji1 #aaj2 implies reference to an universally valid standard1 #ajh-aji1 #aad2 adjective1 and #8,good' substantive1 #aji2 notion of1 distinct from #8,pleasure' and #8the ,pleasant1' and #8what ought to be desired1' #aji seq4 ,good1 ,the1 #c1 #ib1 #ajf2 7human7 or ,well-being1 its relation to ,happiness and to ,duty1 #c2 7human7 is either 7a7 ,happiness or 7b7 ,perfection or ,excellence of human existence1 #aad1 #aae2 the absolute and unconditional1 in ,kant's view1 #bbb2 in ,english ethical thought1 #dbc note #a ,good conduct1 #ajf1 #ajg1 #aab-aac2 standard of1 needed1 #aac2 ,greek conception of1 #ajg note #a1 #djd-dje1 #dje note #a ,good ,faith1 #bbd1 #cjc-caa passim1 #ceb-ced1 #cee2 stringency of the duty of1 #cjd-cje2 obligation of1 affected by 7a7 fraud or force1 #cje-cjf1 #cjf note #a1 7b7 material change of circumstances1 #cjf-cjh1 7c7 misapprehension1 #cji1 7d7 use of a prescribed formula1 #cji1 #caj ,good ,taste1 #ajh ,good humour1 #cba ,goodness1 implies relation to consciousness or feeling1 #aac-aad1 #aac note #b2 7,moral7 and ,beauty1 #ajg-ajh1 #ajg note #a1 #bbh ,government--by ,consent of ,subjects1 #big1 #cea2 ,aristocratic and ,democratic ,principles of1 #bii2 established1 difficulty of identifying1 #cjj1 #cja ,governmental ,authority1 conflicting claims to1 #bif1 #big1 #bii-cja2 ideal1 #big-bii ,grant ,allen1 #ahg2 ,physiological sthetics1 #ahg note #a ,gratitude1 #bei-bfa1 #dcg-dch2 universalised1 furnishes the principle #8that desert ought to be requited1' #bgi1 #bgi note #a1 #bhj2 ,kant on1 #bbc1 #bbc note #a #8,greatest ,happinesss1' meaning of1 #aba1 #dac2 ,utilitarian notion of1 its extent1 #dad2 total and average1 distinguished1 #dae1 #daf #8,greatest ,pleasure1' explanation of1 #dd note #c ,greek ethical thought1 the problem of1 #ajf2 tautological maxims of1 #cge-cgf ,green1 ,t4 ,h41 #acb seq41 #acd note #c1 #ace note #c2 7,introduction to ,hume's ,treatise on ,human ,nature7 #acb note #b1 #acc note #c2 7,prolegomena to ,ethics7 #ic note #a1 #acc note #a1 #acd notes #a and #b1 #ace notes #a and #b1 #cfc note #a ,grote1 ,j41 ,an ,examination of the ,utilitarian ,philosophy1 #dcb note #a ,gurney1 ,e41 #abc1 #ahd2 7,tertium ,quid7 #abc note #a2 7,power of ,sound7 #ahd note #a ,hallam1 #dbc note #a ,hamilton1 #aci1 #ahj-ahb2 7,lectures on ,metaphysics7 #ahj note #c ,happiness--as ,end1 #g1 #h1 #gh2 and ,duty1 connexion between1 #afb-age passim2 and ,duty1 are they coincident8 #afb1 #afc1 #afe1 #agf2 and ,duty1 ,plato's view of relation between1 #aga-agb2 and ,virtue1 #agd-age1 #dei2 and ,virtue1 connexion of1 in ,aristotle's view1 #aba-abb2 determination and measurement of1 an inevitable problem for ,ethics1 #agf2 production of1 #agf-agg2 relation of1 to mental concentration and dissipation1 #aic2 and ,self-development1 #aib-aic2 rejection of1 as end1 leaves us unable to frame a coherent account of ,ultimate ,good1 #djf2 an objection to1 as ,ultimate ,good1 considered1 #djg note #a2 principle of distribution of1 required1 #daf1 #dag2 universal1 as divine end1 #ejc-eje2 ,christian view of1 #abj1 #ach2 ,sources of1 #aea seq4 #8,happiness1' #da note #a1 #ib1 #ib note #b1 #ic note #a2 ambiguity of1 #ib2 precise meaning of1 #abj ,harm1 #bib1 #bic ,harmony as cause of ,pleasure1 #ahi ,health1 #aec1 #aed1 #aei #8,hedonism1' meaning of1 #ic ,hedonism 7,ethical71 the two ,methods of1 are ,universalistic and ,egoistic1 #aa2 connexion between the two ,methods of1 #hd1 #dig seq42 objections to1 stated and considered3--7a7 that the calculation required by the ,empirical-reflective method is too complex for practice1 #aca1 #acb2 7b7 that 8pleasure as feeling cannot be conceived10 #acb1 #acc2 7c7 that 8a sum of pleasures is intrinsically unmeaning10 #acc1 #acd2 7d7 that transient pleasures are unsatisfying1 #ace2 7e7 that the pursuit of pleasure tends to defeat its own end1 #acf seq42 7f7 that the habit of introspective comparison of pleasures is unfavourable to pleasure1 #ach-adj2 7g7 that any quantitative comparison of pleasures is vague and uncertain1 #adj-aej2 ,deductive1 #agf-aie passim2 deductive1 ,spencer's view of1 #agg note #a2 ,method of1 must be empirical1 #aie2 ,empirical1 method of1 #dfj2 and ,intuitionism1 #dfa2 and ,pessimism1 #aca ,note ,hedonistic ,zero 7or neutral feeling71 #abd1 #abe ,helvetius1 #hh ,highest ,good1 the 7cf4 ,the ,good and ,ultimate ,good71 #ajf ,hobbes1 #dd note #a1 #ef1 #hf1 #hi1 #ajc1 #aji1 #cjj note #a1 #dbc1 #dgf2 7,leviathan7 #hi note #a ,holmes1 ,o4 ,w41 jun41 ,the ,common ,law1 #bha note #a ,honour1 ,code of1 #cj1 #ca1 #afh1 #cdj ,hume1 #bc1 #hf1 #ajd1 #bbj1 #chd1 #dai1 #dbc1 #dbd1 #dbc notes #a and #b1 #dbf1 #ddj1 #dda1 #dic2 7,inquiry ,concerning the ,principles of ,morals7 #dd note #b1 #bbj note #b1 #dbd ,humility1 #ccd-ccf passim1 #cee1 #cef note #a1 #dbi ,hunger1 #de1 #df ,hutcheson1 #dd note #b1 #ej1 #hf1 #hf note #b1 #ajd1 #cff2 7,system of ,moral ,philosophy7 #cff note #a ,hypothetical ,imperatives imply an ulterior end1 #f1 #g1 #cg ,ideal and ,actual1 relation between1 #gi2 connected 7a7 in the conception of 8,god's ,will10 #gi1 7b7 in the notion of 8,nature10 #hj-hc ,ideal--,government1 no consensus as to what kind is legitimate1 #bii seq42 and ,traditional ,authority1 #bif2 ,society1 ethics of1 how far useful1 #bb-bd1 #dfe 8,idols of the ,cave0 and 8,idols of the ,tribe10 #aeb ,impulse to do acts qu recognised as right 7 ,moral ,motive71 #gg ,impulses1 extra-regarding and self-regarding may conflict1 #ea1 #eb1 #acf ,indifference 7,neutrality7 of feeling1 cf4 ,hedonistic ,zero ,individualistic--,ideal1 #bhf-bhg2 and ,socialistic ,ideals1 #bic1 #bid1 #ddd-dde ,inequality1 ,reasonable1 #bfh seq4 ,ingenuity1 #bcf ,intention1 #fj note #a1 #bjb1 #bjb note #a ,interest1 meaning of1 #g1 #abj2 ethical character of1 in ,butler's view1 #agf note #a #8,internal acts1' #bjd ,instinctive impulses regarded as inherited experience1 #aic1 #aid ,intrinsic value1 how determined1 #bhh1 #bhi ,intuition of rightness of acts1 excludes consideration of 7a7 ulterior consequences1 #if1 #ig1 7b7 8induction from experience0 of pleasures1 #ig1 #ih 7cf4 #ajb note #a7 ,intuitional--,method1 cf4 ,intuitionism2 moralists1 ,english1 may be broadly classified as ,dogmatic and ,philosophical1 #ajc1 #ajd #8,intuitional'--sense in which used1 #if1 #ig1 #ih2 wider and narrower senses of1 #ig1 #ajb note #a1 #bja ,intuitionism1 #c1 #h1 #ag1 #bj1 #if-ajd passim1 #aii-baf passim2 differences of its method due to two causes1 #ajc2 its method issues in ,universalistic ,hedonism 7,utilitarianism71 #djf-djg2 chronological development of the method of1 in ,england1 #ajc-ajd2 and ,utilitarianism1 #he-hf1 #chh-chi1 #dbc-deg passim1 #dif-dig2 ,philosophical1 #ajb-ajd1 #cgc-chi passim2 ,perceptional1 #ih-ajj1 #ajb2 ,dogmatic1 #ajj-aja 7cf4 ,intuitionism1 ,intuitive ,morality1 ,positive ,morality1 ,morality of ,common ,sense72 ,dogmatic1 fundamental assumption of1 #aja1 #bjj1 #bja2 three phases of1 #ajb1 #ajc2 a variety of1 constituted by substituting for #8right' the notion #8good1' #aje-ajg2 sthetic1 #bbh1 #cib2 ,jural or ,rational1 #bbh-bbi #8,intuitive' or #8a priori' ,morality generally used to mean ,dogmatic ,intuitionism or ,morality of ,common ,sense1 #aja-ajb ,irrational choice--sometimes conscious and deliberate1 #cf1 #cg-ch1 #da-db1 #eh1 #ei1 #aaj2 ,socratic and ,aristotelian view compared with modern view of1 #ei note #a ,jural method of ,ethics1 #ajj-aja ,just claims--arising from contract1 #bfi2 arising from natural and normal expectations1 #bfi1 #bgj1 #bgj note #a #8,justice1' #8justify1' etc41 uses of1 #bfd note #b1 #bgj1 #bhf1 #ddb ,justice1 #bj1 #ii1 #bfd-bid passim1 #cdi-ceb1 #cee1 #ddj-ddh passim2 or ,equity1 essence of1 #dif2 specially difficult to define1 #bfd2 intuitional view of the definition of1 #bfd2 involves notion of distribution1 #bfe1 #bff1 #bfh1 #bga2 and ,law1 connexion between1 #bfe1 #bff1 #bfg note #a2 distinct from ,order 7or ,law-observance71 #bfe2 and ,equality1 #bff1 #bfg1 #bfg note #a1 #bfh1 #bfh note #a1 #bgi1 #bhe note #a2 and taxation1 #bff1 #bff note #a2 ,conservative and ,ideal1 #bgb-bgc1 #bgc note #a1 #bgd1 #bic1 #bid2 ,ideal1 #bgc1 #bgd1 #bic1 #bid1 #ddd1 #dde2 ,ideal1 and ,natural ,eights1 #bgd1 #bge2 ,ideal1 and ,freedom1 #bgh1 #bgi2 ,corrective1 #bha2 ,reparative1 #bha1 #bhb1 #bha note #a1 #bhb note #a1 #bic2 ,reparative and ,retributive1 distinguished1 #bhb-bhc1 #bhb note #b2 and ,free ,will1 #ga1 #gb1 #bhd1 #bhe2 and #8,equity' or #8,fairness1' #bhe1 #bhf2 ,hume's treatment of1 #ddj ,kant1 #f1 #g1 #aa note #a1 #cf1 #eh1 #eh note #a1 #bji1 #baj1 #baj note #a1 #bbb1 #bbc1 #bci1 #bdj1 #cae1 #cbg note #a1 #cff1 #che1 #chf1 #chf note #a1 #chi-cij ,note1 #dhf1 ,appendix #eaj2 7,grundlegung zur ,metaphysik der ,sitten7 #bji note #a1 #chi-cij ,note2 7,metaphysische ,anfangsgrnde der ,tugendlehre7 #bbc note #a1 #cbg note #a1 #cff note #c1 #chf note #b1 #chi ,note2 7,kritik der reinen ,vernunft7 #cff note #c ,kant's ,fundamental ,moral ,rule or ,categorical ,imperative as criterion of rightness1 #bji-baj1 #bji note #a1 #baj note #a1 #cci note #a1 #chf1 #chi ,note1 #dhf ,knowledge--as an ,end1 #aad1 #cii1 #dja2 and ,feeling 7 ,cognition and ,pleasure or ,pain71 relation between1 #aci1 #adj2 and ,feeling1 ,hamilton's view of the relation between1 #aci ,laisser faire and economic production1 #dde note #b ,law1 #bie-cjc2 and ,morality1 relation between1 #bi1 #deg2 and ,positive ,morality1 #afd2 ,austin's definition of1 #cjj note #a ,laws--just1 characteristics of1 #bff1 #bfg1 #bga-bgb2 that ought to be obeyed1 are laid down by rightful authority1 #bif ,law-observance 7or ,order71 #bie-cjc passim1 #ceb1 #ddj1 #dda2 and ,good ,faith1 #bie1 #cjc2 in regard to mala prohibita1 #cjb note #a ,lecky1 ,history of ,european ,morals1 #ej note #a1 #cii note #a1 #dbg note #a ,legal obligation and punishment1 #bi ,liberality1 #cbd-cbf1 #cbe note #a1 #cee ,libertarian position1 #eh1 #fd-fe1 #ff ,liberty1 ,sentiment of1 #eh ,locke1 7,essay7 #bje1 #bhj note #a1 #ejc2 ethical view of1 #bje1 #bjf ,love1 #ej1 #bdd1 #bde1 #cfg1 #cfh2 common sense estimate of1 #bde1 #beh1 #beh note #a ,loyalty1 #bbc1 #bdd1 #bed ,mackenzie1 ,j4 ,s41 #dg1 #dh ,maine1 ,sir ,h41 7,ancient ,law7 #dfa note #b ,malevolence--character of1 as motive1 #cfd2 sometimes sweepingly condemned1 #cba1 #cbd2 sometimes partially approved on ,utilitarian grounds1 #cbb1 #cbc1 #cbd ,malevolent affections natural and normal1 #cbj1 #cba ,marcus ,aurelius1 #cgf note #a #8,market value1' #bhf seq4 ,marriage1 ,plato's 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not always to be preferred to #8lower1' #cfi1 #cgj1 #cga2 moral regulation of1 #cgj ,natural1 ,the--,interpretation of1 #hj seq42 gives no definite practical criterion of right conduct1 #hb ,natural--,selection1 effect of1 on impulses1 #aid2 and normal claims1 indefiniteness of1 #bgj1 #bga1 #bgb1 #bgb note #a2 expectations1 ambiguity of1 #bgb1 #bgc1 #ceb2 ,rights--difficulty of determining1 #bih2 ,good1 #dgg ,nature--,life according to1 #gi seq41 #cgg1 #cgh2 conformity to1 #hj2 ,stoic use of1 #cgg1 #cgh note #a2 ,butler's use of1 #cgh ,neighbourhood and ,nationality1 duties of1 #bej1 #bea1 #beb ,neutral excitements1 #ahf note #a 7cf4 ,hedonistic ,zero7 #8,objective' and #8subjective1' ethical application of1 #bjg1 #bjg note #a1 #bjh notes #a and #b1 #bjh1 #bji1 #baj1 #cdd note #b1 #cid1 #cie1 #dbi1 #dcj ,objective ,hedonism1 meaning of1 #aea2 and ,common ,sense1 #aea-afa2 advantages of1 #aea2 defects of1 #aea seq41 #deh1 #dei ,objective relations of conscious mind1 how far desirable1 #djj1 #dja ,objectivity of ,moral ,judgment1 #bg1 #cc ,order1 cf4 ,law-observance ,origin of ,moral ,intuitions1 ethical importance of1 #chc1 #chd1 #chd note #a #8,ought1' #bc-ch passim2 relative and unconditional uses of1 #f1 #g1 #ci2 implies reasonableness1 #be2 and #8right' imply the same notion1 #a note #a1 #bc1 #be2 does not refer to matters of fact1 #be2 implies objectivity1 #bg1 #cc2 does not merely signify 7a7 appropriateness of means to ends1 #bf1 7b7 an emotion of the person judging1 #bf-bh1 nor 7c7 bound under penalties1 #bi seq42 an elementary and irresolvable notion1 #cb-cc2 narrower and wider sense of1 #cc1 #cd1 #cd note #d2 carries with it an impulse to action1 #cd2 implies possible conflict with reason 7thus distinguishable from #8right'71 #cd1 #ce1 #bag2 determinist sense of1 #gh2 loose meaning of1 #ejh ,owen1 ,robert1 #bia ,pain--definition of1 #db-dc note #a1 #ahj1 #aia2 the negative quantity of pleasure1 #abd1 #abe2 physical concomitant of1 #ahc seq42 ,aristotle's 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seq41 #aca1 #aij2 ambiguities of1 #dc1 #dd1 #ic seq42 forecast of1 must take account of moral or quasi-moral pleasures1 #dj1 #agc2 the less sometimes chosen in preference to the greater1 #da1 #db1 #db note #a1 #acf2 of ,virtue1 its #8disinterestedness' not abnormal1 #ej1 #ea2 as aim of unconscious action1 #eb1 #ec2 as #8original' aim of action1 #ec1 #ed2 application of the term1 #ic2 has only quantitative differences1 #id1 #ie1 #aba2 maximum1 deductive methods of determining1 #aba1 #abb2 rational as opposed to impulsive pursuit of1 #abd note #a2 #8quality' of1 #id1 #ie1 #aba1 #abh-abi1 #abh note #a2 as ,feeling1 conceivableness of1 #acb1 #acc2 permanent sources of1 #ace1 #acf1 #aec2 how estimated1 #ada seq4 7cf4 #abg1 #abh1 #cih72 from others' pain1 various modes of1 #cba note #a2 and ,appetite1 identified by ,hobbes1 #dd note #a2 and ,desire1 controversy as to relation between1 #ci-ef2 ,aristotle's and ,hamilton's theory of1 #ahj seq41 #ahj note #a1 #aha note #a2 ,mr4 ,stout's theory of1 #ahb1 #ahh1 etc42 ,mr4 ,spencer's theory of1 #ahc seq42 ,grant ,allen's view of1 #ahg2 biological theory of1 #aij seq42 and ,desire1 7a7 ,mill's view of1 #dc-dd1 7b7 ,butler's view of1 #dd1 7c7 ,bain's view of1 #ed-ef2 effect of desire on estimate of1 #add1 #ade2 and ,preservation1 #aij1 etc42 7,hobbes' view of7 #hi2 and ,perfection or ,reality1 7,self-development71 ,spinoza's view of1 #ij2 and #8quantity of life1' #aib2 #8pure' #adc2 of pursuit1 #df seq41 #dg note #a1 #ee-ef2 of attainment1 #dg2 of business1 #di2 intellectual and sthetic1 #ajg-ajh1 #aec1 #aeg1 #dgb2 benevolent and sympathetic1 #di1 #ej2 of virtue1 #aec1 #agj1 #aga1 #agd1 #age2 -s1 of the animal life1 #aed1 #aeg1 #aei2 of wealth and greatness1 ,adam ,smith's view of1 #aee note #a--7;cf4 ,health1 ,wealth1 etc472 ,stoic view of1 #abi2 ,green's view of1 #acb seq42 ,plato's view of its illusoriness1 #adj2 ,spencer and ,grant ,allen's #8,intermittence' theory of1 #ahg ,pleasures and ,pains1 ,moral1 #agj seq41 #aga note #a2 of ,sympathy1 #di1 #ej1 #dii-ejb1 #dii note #a2 scale of1 involves assumption of a ,hedonistic zero1 #abd1 #abe2 commensurability of1 #abc-abe1 #abd note #a1 #abh note #a1 #aca1 #acb1 #adj-aej2 difficulties of a clear1 definite and consistent evaluation of1 #adj-aej2 incommensurable intensity of1 doubtful1 #abc1 #abd2 intensity of1 commensurable with duration1 #abd2 ,bentham's four dimensions of1 #abd note #a2 volitional efficacy of1 #abe-abg2 their relation to normal activities1 #ahe1 etc42 ,aristotle's and ,hamilton's theory of1 #ahj seq42 ,stout's theory of1 #ahb2 ,wundt's theory of1 #ahd2 ,spencer's biological theory of1 #aij seq4 ,plutarch1 #cgf ,politeness 7,good ,breeding1 ,fashion1 ,etiquette71 #bec2 ,code of1 #cj1 #cdj1 #cda ,political order1 ,rousseau's view of an ideally just1 #bih ,politics--and ,ethics1 #ae-bb2 definition of1 #a note #a1 #ae 7cf4 ,law7 ,positive ,morality--and ,morality of ,common ,sense1 #bae2 relation of1 to preservation and to happiness1 #dfd1 #dfe2 alteration of1 #afd1 #dhj ,power1 #aef1 #aeg1 #aei ,practical efficacy and speculative truth1 relation between1 #ejg note #a ,practical ,empirical ,hedonism1 an assumption of1 #aca ,practical 7or ,moral7 ,judgment1 #bc seq4 ,practical 7or ,moral7 ,reason1 #bc-ch passim2 its relation to ,interest and to non-rational and irrational desires1 #cf2 and ,nature1 #ha2 a postulate of1 #f1 #ab2 ,dualism of1 #djd note #a1 #cff1 #bjj1 #bje-bjf1 #dii1 #ejg-eji 7cf4 ,happiness and ,duty7 ,praise1 common sense award of1 explained by utility1 #dbh1 #dbi ,priestley1 #hh ,note ,promise1 #cjc-caa passim2 conditions and meaning of1 #cjd2 conditions of bindingness of a1 #caa ,proof of a first principle1 how possible1 #dai1 #dbj ,proof--of ,egoism may be demanded1 #dah1 #dai2 of ordinary moral rules is often required and given1 #dai ,proof of ,utilitarianism1 #dah-dbb passim2 clear demand of common sense for1 #dah1 #dai2 addressed to ,egoism1 #dbj1 #dba1 #dig-dih2 addressed to ,intuitionism1 twofold character of1 #dba1 #dbb 8,proof0 of ,utilitarian principle1 ,mill's1 #chg1 #chh ,property and ,right of ,bequest1 #bgg ,prudence 7or ,forethought71 #g1 #cf1 #if1 #cia2 common sense view of1 #cbg1 #cbh2 ,kant's and ,butler's views of1 #cbg note #a2 self-evident maxim of impartiality educible from the rule of1 #cha2 and ,benevolence1 subordination of other virtues to1 #dif-dig #8,prudential' and #8,moral1' #be-bf ,psychological ,hedonism1 #dj seq42 of ,bentham1 #he2 ethical import of1 #da1 #bje ,public ,opinion1 ,code of1 #cj ,public and private virtue1 ,utilitarian and ,intuitionist estimates of1 #die ,punishment1 #bha1 #bij seq41 #bij note #a1 #bia note #a2 preventive and retributory views of1 #ga-gb ,purity1 #bbc1 #cbi-cca1 #cbi note #b1 #ceg-cei ,quantitative ,hedonism1 #abi ,quasi-moral ,sentiment1 #bg-bh1 #agc-agd ,quasi-moral ,sentiments and ,rational ,self-love1 #agc-agd ,rank of ,motives1 difficulties of estimating1 #cfe-cfg1 #cfi2 conflicting estimates of1 by moralists1 #cff2 difficulty due to complexity of motive1 #cfh ,rational action1 not to be identified with 7a7 disinterested or 7b7 free action1 #eg2 ,spinoza's view of the principle of1 #hi-ij ,rational ,benevolence1 #if2 may be self-limiting1 #che2 ,kant's treatment of1 #che-chf ,note1 #chi-cij ,rational ,self-love 7,rational ,egoism1 ,prudence7--and ,conscience1 #agb1 #bjj1 #bjj note #b1 #cff2 and ,rational ,benevolence1 #chf note #d1 #dih seq4 ,reason--and ,ultimate ,ends1 #i1 #gg1 #gg note #a2 relation of1 to ,will and ,desire1 #bc seq42 reference of moral judgments to1 signifies merely their objectivity1 #cc2 conflict with1 implied in the terms dictate1 precept1 imperative1 ought1 duty1 moral obligation1 #cd1 #ce2 dictate or precept of1 is a rule which may be deviated from1 #da2 dictates or imperatives of1 #cd1 #cf1 #gg2 and the ,divine ,will1 #gi1 #hj2 dictate of1 implied by right1 rightness1 and their equivalents1 #aje2 and instinct1 #aic-aie2 may be self-limiting1 #cde2 dictates and dictation of1 #cde1 #cie1 #djd ,reason for doing what is seen to be right1 why men demand a1 #e-f ,reasonableness of ,self-love1 ,butler's view of1 #aai1 #abj2 ,clarke's view of1 #abj2 ,christian view of1 #abj2 common sense view of1 #abj ,rebellion1 when justifiable81 #bii1 #cjj1 #cja1 #ceb ,reciprocity1 principle of1 #afg1 #afh ,religious deception1 #caf1 #caf note #b ,renan quoted1 #ajh note #a ,reputation1 #aee ,resentment1 instinctive and deliberate1 #cbb1 #cbc2 deliberate1 ,butler's view of1 #cbc note #a1 #cga2 universalised the principle of retributive 7criminal7 justice1 #bha2 evaluation of1 #ddi ,resolutions1 #cg2 general1 may be contradicted by particular volitions1 #cg-ch ,respect1 tokens of1 #ccf1 #ccf note #a ,reverence for ,authority1 #ci #8,right'--notion involved in1 is unique1 #be2 and #8good1' #c1 #d2 and #8ought1' distinction between1 #cd1 #ce2 conduct and #8good' conduct1 #ajf1 #aac ,right ,conflict and ,ultimate ,good1 #c ,rights1 #bgd1 etc4 ,rightful authority1 how known81 #bif2 what are its limits81 #cja1 #cjb ,rousseau1 #bih2 his political ideal1 difficulty of realising1 #bih1 #bii #8,rule of ,equity1' ,clarke's1 #chd-che #8,rule of ,love or ,benevolence1' ,clarke's1 #che #8,rules of ,righteousness1' ,clarke's1 #chd1 #chd note #d1 #che ,rules prescribing actions as good or right open to ,utilitarian interpretation1 #dcj ,sagacity1 #bcf ,sanctions1 #afd-age passim1 #dih1 #dii1 #ejj seq41 #ejb1 #eje1 #ejg-ejh2 conflict of1 #afd1 #afe2 legal1 and happiness1 #afe1 #aff1 #afe note #a2 social1 and happiness1 #aff1 #afg2 social1 and extra-legal duty1 #afg1 #afh2 internal1 and happiness1 #agj1 #agj note #a1 #aga1 #aga note #a1 #agb1 #agc1 #eja-ejb ,scottish ,school of ,ethical ,thought1 #ajd ,self-control1 #bce-bcg1 #cca1 #cdd1 #cde1 #cef ,self-development 7,self-realisation71 indefiniteness of the notion1 #ij1 #ia2 as ethical aim1 #aib1 #aic2 understood as yielding to instinctive impulses1 #aic-aid ,self-evidence1 difficulty of discerning real1 #cci1 #cdj1 #cda ,self-interest1 #be1 #bf ,self-love1 ordinary use and ambiguity of1 #hi2 and certain elevated impulses1 #acg-ach2 ,butler's view of1 #ic2 and benevolence and affection1 #ach1 #djc1 #ejb ,self-preservation1 #hi ,self-realisation1 #hj1 #ij1 #ie ,self-regarding virtues1 #cbg-cca ,self-sacrifice1 #aji note #a1 #ach1 #dca1 #dcb ,self-satisfaction1 ,green's view of1 #acc1 #ace1 #ace note #c ,selfishness1 #dii ,services1 comparative worth of1 how determined1 #bhf1 #bhg2 reward of1 how determined1 #bij ,shaftesbury1 #hf1 #hf notes #a and #b1 #ach1 #dbc1 #dbc note #a1 #dcc1 #eja ,sidgwick1 ,principles of ,political ,economy1 #bfg note1 #dde note #b1 #ddf note #a ,sincerity1 #cee ,smith1 ,adam1 #dbd1 #dfa1 7,wealth of ,nations1 ,theory of ,moral ,sentiments7 #aee note #a ,social ,contract1 #ag1 #big-bih1 #cjc1 #cea ,social rank and status1 #aec1 #aee ,socialistic ideal1 #bhi1 #bic-bid ,sociology--scope and subject of1 #b2 present condition of1 #dgb1 #dgc ,socrates1 #ei note #a1 #ih-ii1 #bae1 #bca note #a1 #bii ,socratic ,induction1 #ih-ii ,socratic principle of 8,government by experts10 #bii 1 1 #bca1 #bca note #a ,sources of ,happiness1 #ace1 #acf1 #aec seq42 judgments of common sense respecting them1 only roughly trustworthy1 #aeh-afj2 common sense estimates of 7a7 at best are only true for ordinary persons1 7b7 are vitiated by mal-observation1 7c7 confuse between objects of natural desire and sources of experienced pleasure1 #aea1 #aeb1 7d7 mix moral and sthetic preferences with hedonistic1 #aec1 7e7 are found to be full of inconsistencies1 #aec-aeh ,sovereign power1 ,hobbist and ,austinian views of1 #cjj note #a ,special moral codes1 #cj1 #ca1 #afh1 #afi1 #cdj1 #cda ,special need1 duties arising out of1 #bfa1 #bfb ,spencer1 ,h41 #abe-abf1 #agg note #a1 #ahc seq41 #aid note #a1 #dgj1 #dga1 #dgj notes #a and #b1 #dgc2 7,social ,statics71 #ah note #b1 #aid note #a2 7,data of ,ethics71 #ah note #b1 #agg note #a1 #aid note #a1 #dgj note #a 8,sphere of individual option0 determined by ,utilitarian calculation1 #dgg-dgi ,spinoza1 #ij ,stephen1 ,leslie1 #cai ,note1 #dga1 #dga note #b1 #dgb1 #dgc2 7,science of ,ethics71 #db note #a1 #dga ,stewart1 ,dugald1 #ded1 #dee2 7,philosophy of the ,active and ,moral ,powers71 #ib note #b1 #ded note #a ,stoic system1 its place in the development of ethical thought1 #ajf2 ethics1 circular reasonings of1 #cgf1 #cgg ,stoicism1 later compared with earlier1 #cgf note #a ,stoics1 #ib1 #aje1 #abi ,stout1 ,g4 ,f41 #ahj note #b1 #ahb1 #ahf2 7,analytic ,psychology71 #ahb note #a ,subjective1 cf4 ,objective ,suggestio falsi1 #cag ,suicide prohibited by ,common ,sense1 #cbg1 #cca1 #cef ,sully1 ,pessimism1 #acf note #a1 #ahf note #a ,suppressio veri1 #cag ,sympathy--and ,moral ,sensibility1 relation between1 #agj note #a1 #ejj-eja2 with impulses prompting to action1 #dfc1 #dfc note #b2 limitations and perversions of1 #dfd2 twofold operation of1 on moral impulses1 #dhc2 confusion in ,mill's view of1 #dii note #a2 and happiness of agent1 #agj note #a1 #dii note #a1 #dii-ejc ,systematic ,morality1 explanation of indifference or hostility to1 #ii-ajj ,tautological propositions offered as ethical axioms1 #cgd seq4 ,temperance1 #bbd1 #cbh1 #cbi1 #cdd note #a1 #cef ,torquemada1 #bbf note #a #8,true ,good1' #c 7cf4 ,good1 ,ultimate ,good7 ,truth1 ,cartesian ,criterion of1 #cci ,ultimate ,end1 for the individual and for the whole1 #djd1 #dig-dih ,ultimate ,good1 ,my1 #aji seq41 #aji note #a1 #dig-dih ,ultimate ,good1 ,the 7the ,good71 #c1 #ajf seq41 #cia-djg passim ,ultimate reasonableness1 different views of1 implicit in ordinary thought1 #f ,ultimate reasons for conduct1 #gh1 #gi2 differences in1 correspond to different aspects of human existence1 #gh 7cf4 #gi7 #8,ultra-intuitional1' #ajj #8,unconscious ,utilitarianism' of ,common ,sense ,morality1 #dec seq41 #dhi1 etc4 ,universal ,happiness as standard and motive1 #dac ,universalistic and ,egoistic ,hedonism1 connexion between 7a7 in ,bentham's view1 #hg ,note2 7b7 in ,paley's view1 #aba ,unveracity1 common1 #caf seq41 #dhf ,utilitarian--formula of distribution not really at variance with ,common ,sense1 #dcb1 #dcc2 justification of special affections1 #dcc1 #dcd2 ideal code1 difficulties of constructing such1 for present human beings1 #dfg-dgj2 rectification of ,common ,sense ,morality must proceed by empirical method1 #dgf-dhj2 innovation1 negative and destructive1 probable effects of 7a7 on the agent1 #dha1 #dhb-dhc1 7b7 on others1 #dhb1 #dhc2 innovation1 positive and supplementary1 as affecting the agent and others1 #dhc1 #dhd2 innovation in relation to degree of publicity and generality of acceptance1 #dhi-dij1 #dhi note #a2 reform1 consists largely in enforcing old rules1 #dhd2 exceptions to current morality 7a7 may generally be stated as fresh rules1 #dhe1 #dhi1 7b7 special and rare cases of1 #dhf-dhg2 ,duty and ,religious ,sanction1 #ejc-ejf2 ,sanction1 #ejj seq4 ,utilitarianism1 #h1 #aa1 #aai2 7 ,universalistic or ,benthamite ,hedonism71 #hd1 #aai1 #daa2 ,proof of1 #dah-dbb2 ,principle of1 #hg1 7,mill's view of7 #chg1 #chh2 ,method of1 #dfj-die2 meaning of1 #daa-dag passim2 to be distinguished from 7a7 ,egoistic ,hedonism1 #daa1 #dab1 7b7 any psychogonical theory of the ,moral ,sentiments1 #dab-dac2 motive and standard of1 to be discriminated1 #dac2 contradictory objections to1 #hg2 and ,intuitionism1 relation between1 #he-hf1 #chf seq41 #dif-dig2 and ,intuitionism1 history of relation between1 in ,english ethical thought1 #hf1 #dbc1 #dbd2 and ,egoism1 relation between1 #dig1 #dih2 and ,egoism1 harmony of1 7a7 not empirically demonstrable1 #ejc1 7b7 required by ,reason1 #ejf2 and ,common ,sense ,morality1 #h1 #dbc-deg passim1 #dfh1 #dfi1 #dge1 #dgf1 #dhj seq41 #dih1 #dii2 justifies the unequal distribution which ,common ,sense approves1 #dcb seq42 more rigid than ,common ,sense1 #dii1 #ejd2 function of1 as arbiter to ,common ,sense1 #ded1 #dee2 reasonable attitude of1 to ,common ,sense ,morality1 #dgc-dgd1 #dge-dgf2 aims at remedying imperfections of ,common ,sense ,morality1 #dgf2 and ,axiom of ,benevolence1 #chg1 #chh1 #dif-dig1 #dih2 and ,conjugal and ,parental ,duties1 #dce1 #dcf2 and ,duties of ,special ,need1 #dcf1 #dcg2 and ,gratitude1 #dcg1 #dch2 and benevolent ,duties1 #dce seq42 and ,law-observance1 #ddj1 #dda2 and ,impartiality1 #dda1 #ddb1 #ddg1 #ddg note #a2 and ,normal ,expectations1 #ddb-ddc2 and ,good ,faith1 #ddc1 #ddd1 #ddc note #c2 and ,freedom1 #ddd1 #dde2 and distribution according to ,desert1 #dde-ddg2 and ,justice1 #ddj seq41 #ddg2 and ,veracity1 #ddh1 #ddi1 #dhc2 and ,malevolence1 #ddi2 and ,self-regarding virtues1 #dej2 and ,purity1 #ddi-dej2 and ,sympathy1 #ejj seq42 and ,christianity1 #ejd #8,utility1' ,hume's and ,bentham's uses of1 #dbc note #b ,veracity1 #ig1 #bbd1 #cac1 #cad-cai passim1 #cee1 #ddh1 #ddi2 and ,good ,faith1 #cjc1 #cjd1 #cac1 #cad ,virtue 7,moral ,perfection or ,excellence71 #aj1 #ad1 #gh1 #ajf1 #bai1 #bai note #a1 #bbj1 #bbj note #c1 #bba1 #bbb1 #bbf1 #bbg2 or ,right ,action1 its relation to the ,good1 #ajf2 and ,happiness1 #aai1 #abj1 #agd-age1 #dfa2 ,plato's and ,aristotle's accounts of1 #cgf2 involves reference to an ,ultimate ,good which is not ,virtue1 #cic1 #cid1 #cie2 and ,duty1 #bag-bcj passim2 and emotion1 #bbb-bbc1 #bbf2 voluntariness of1 #bbj1 #bbg2 and motive1 #bbc-bbd2 and habit1 #bbg2 and moral effort1 relation between1 #bbd1 #bbe1 #dbi2 intellectual conditions of1 #bbe2 is ,knowledge1 ,socratic doctrine that1 #bbg note #a2 felicific character of1 #dbd1 #dbe ,virtues1 intellectual1 #bca-bcg passim2 self-regarding1 #cbg-cca passim ,virtuous conduct1 commonly regarded as disinterested1 #gg1 #gh ,virtuous motives1 admitted by some moralists1 #cfe1 #cff2 ,dr4 ,martineau's rejection of1 #cfg ,vivisection controversy1 #djb1 #djf note #a ,volition1 analysis of1 #fa1 #fb2 ,determinist view of1 #fb note #a2 conception of1 how far inevitably ,libertarian1 #fg1 #ga2 causes muscular contractions1 #gc2 affects thought and feeling1 #gc1 #gd2 acting through resolutions alters men's tendencies to action1 #gd1 #ge1 #ge note #a2 its emotional antecedents of secondary ethical importance1 #gg ,voluntary action1 definition of1 #ei ,voluntary choice and irresistible impulse1 #fg note #c ,wayland1 ,elements of ,moral ,science1 #bef note #b ,wealth1 #aec1 #aed1 #aee ,well-being 7the ,good attainable in human life71 #ib1 #ib note #a2 ,stoic view of1 #ib2 ,aristotle's view of1 #ib1 #ib note #b2 not mere promise of future being1 #cif1 #cig ,whewell1 #eh1 #hf2 7,elements of ,morality71 #eh note #b1 #cag note #a1 #cbi note #a ,will--,subjective ,rightness of1 and ,ultimate ,good1 #cid1 #cie2 divorced from ,objective ,rightness is fanaticism1 #cie ,wisdom1 #bcj1 #bca-bcf passim1 #cdd1 #cde1 #cic1 #dcj2 meaning and use of term1 #bca2 ,greek view of1 #bca2 common sense definition of1 #bcc2 refers to ends as well as means1 #bca-bcc2 in selection of ends and means1 how far voluntary1 #bcc-bce2 in adoption of selected ends1 #bce2 comprehensiveness of1 #bch2 and ,temperance and ,justice1 tautological maxims of1 #cge2 and ,caution and ,decision1 do not furnish independent rules1 #bcg ,note ,wundt1 #ahd note #c ,zeal or ,moral ,ardour1 #bcg1 #cib ,zeno1 #cgf ,,the ,,end ,printed by ,r4 ,r4 ,,clark1 ,,limited1 ,edinburgh4 99 99 99 99 99 ,transcriber's ,note ,many references in the index are to the original numbers of the notes1 which do not correspond to the renumbering used in this e-text4 ,the following apparent errors have been corrected3 p4 ix more that changed to more than p4 xii chap iv4 changed to chap4 iv4 p4 xix chap iv4 changed to chap4 iv4 p4 xxviii #bja changed to #bja-bjg p4 xxxv legal code changed to legal code4 p4 #dd his own1 changed to his own4 p4 #ee adapted by changed to adopted by p4 #bgb 7note7 #b changed to #b4 p4 #cah 7note7 chap i4 changed to chap4 i4 p4 #dae 7note7 appear changed to appears p4 #dib let as changed to let us p4 #eah #bhe3 changed to #bhe2 p4 #eai cf4 ,law changed to cf4 ,law p4 #eai cf4 ,perfection changed to cf4 ,perfection p4 #ebj #ahj-ahb1 changed to #ahj-ahb2 p4 #eba ,hedonistic ,zero changed to ,hedonistic ,zero p4 #ebb ,note2 #dhf changed to ,note1 #dhf p4 #ebc #bjc note #a1 changed to #bjc note #a2 p4 #ebd #hd1 #ig3 changed to #hd1 #ig2 p4 #ebf ,good1 ,ultimate ,good changed to ,good1 ,ultimate ,good ,the following possible errors have been left as printed3 p4 #agg evaluing p4 #ebd #dje note #a2 #dda ,the following are used inconsistently in the text3 ,common-sense and ,common-,sense counterbalancing and counter-balancing fairminded and fair-minded goodwill and good-will highminded and high-minded lawgiver and law-giver note and ,note truthspeaking1 truth-speaking1 ,truthspeaking and ,truth-speaking twofold and two-fold vice vers and vice versa wellbeing1 well-being1 ,wellbeing and ,well-being widespread and wide-spread wrongdoing and wrong-doing