,note3 ,images of the original pages are available through the the ,google ,books ,library ,project4 ,see http3_/_/www4google4com_/books8idex,n,p, a,a,a,a,m,a,a,j ,,the ,,social ,,contract ,,discourses by ,,jean ,,jacques ,,rousseau ,london ,toronto ,published by ,j4 ,m4 ,dent ,sons ,in ,new ,york by ,e4 ,p4 ,dutton ,co ,everyman's ,library ,edited by ,ernest ,rhys ,philosophy and ,theology ,,rousseau',s ,,social ,,contract1 ,,etc4 ,translated with ,introduction by ,g4,d4,h4 ,cole1 ,fellow of ,magdalen ,college1 ,oxford ,,introduction ,for the study of the great writers and thinkers of the past1 historical imagination is the first necessity4 ,without mentally referring to the environment in which they lived1 we cannot hope to penetrate below the inessential and temporary to the absolute and permanent value of their thought4 ,theory1 no less than action1 is subject to these necessities2 the form in which men cast their speculations1 no less than the ways in which they behave1 are the result of the habits of thought and action which they find around them4 ,great men make1 indeed1 individual contributions to the knowledge of their times2 but they can never transcend the age in which they live4 ,the questions they try to answer will always be those their contemporaries are asking2 their statement of fundamental problems will always be relative to the traditional statements that have been handed down to them4 ,when they are stating what is most startlingly new1 they will be most likely to put it in an old-fashioned form1 and to use the inadequate ideas and formulae of tradition to express the deeper truths towards which they are feeling their way4 ,they will be most the children of their age1 when they are rising most above it4 ,rousseau has suffered as much as any one from critics without a sense of history4 ,he has been cried up and cried down by democrats and oppressors with an equal lack of understanding and imagination4 ,his name1 a hundred and fifty years after the publication of the ,social ,contract1 is still a controversial watchword and a party cry4 ,he is accepted as one of the greatest writers ,france has produced2 but even now men are inclined1 as political bias prompts them1 to accept or reject his political doctrines as a whole1 without sifting them or attempting to understand and discriminate4 ,he is still revered or hated as the author who1 above all others1 inspired the ,french ,revolution4 ,at the present day1 his works possess a double significance4 ,they are important historically1 alike as giving us an insight into the mind of the eighteenth century1 and for the actual influence they have had on the course of events in ,europe4 ,certainly no other writer of the time has exercised such an influence as his4 ,he may fairly be called the parent of the romantic movement in art1 letters and life2 he affected profoundly the ,german romantics and ,goethe himself2 he set the fashion of a new introspection which has permeated nineteenth century literature2 he began modern educational theory2 and1 above all1 in political thought he represents the passage from a traditional theory rooted in the ,middle ,ages to the modern philosophy of the ,state4 ,his influence on ,kant's moral philosophy and on ,hegel's philosophy of ,right are two sides of the same fundamental contribution to modern thought4 ,he is1 in fact1 the great forerunner of ,german and ,english ,idealism4 ,it would not be possible1 in the course of a short introduction1 to deal both with the positive content of ,rousseau's thought and with the actual influence he has had on practical affairs4 ,the statesmen of the ,french ,revolution1 from ,robespierre downwards1 were throughout profoundly affected by the study of his works4 ,though they seem often to have misunderstood him1 they had on the whole studied him with the attention he demands4 ,in the nineteenth century1 men continued to appeal to ,rousseau1 without1 as a rule1 knowing him well or penetrating deeply into his meaning4 ,the ,social ,contract1 says ,m4 ,dreyfus-,brisac1 is the book of all books that is most talked of and least read4 ,but with the great revival of interest in political philosophy there has come a desire for the better understanding of ,rousseau's work4 ,he is again being studied more as a thinker and less as an ally or an opponent2 there is more eagerness to sift the true from the false1 and to seek in the ,social ,contract the principles of political right1 rather than the great revolutionary's ipse dixit in favour of some view about circumstances which he could never have contemplated4 ,the ,social ,contract1 then1 may be regarded either as a document of the ,french ,revolution1 or as one of the greatest books dealing with political philosophy4 ,it is in the second capacity1 as a work of permanent value containing truth1 that it finds a place among the world's great books4 ,it is in that capacity also that it will be treated in this introduction4 ,taking it in this aspect1 we have no less need of historical insight than if we came to it as historians pure and simple4 ,to understand its value we must grasp its limitations2 when the questions it answers seem unnaturally put1 we must not conclude that they are meaningless2 we must see if the answer still holds when the question is put in a more up-to-date form4 ,first1 then1 we must always remember that ,rousseau is writing in the eighteenth century1 and for the most part in ,france4 ,neither the ,french monarchy nor the ,genevese aristocracy loved outspoken criticism1 and ,rousseau had always to be very careful what he said4 ,this may seem a curious statement to make about a man who suffered continual persecution on account of his subversive doctrines2 but1 although ,rousseau was one of the most daring writers of his time1 he was forced continually to moderate his language and1 as a rule1 to confine himself to generalisation instead of attacking particular abuses4 ,rousseau's theory has often been decried as too abstract and metaphysical4 ,this is in many ways its great strength2 but where it is excessively so1 the accident of time is to blame4 ,in the eighteenth century it was1 broadly speaking1 safe to generalise and unsafe to particularise4 ,scepticism and discontent were the prevailing temper of the intellectual classes1 and a short-sighted despotism held that1 as long as they were confined to these1 they would do little harm4 ,subversive doctrines were only regarded as dangerous when they were so put as to appeal to the masses2 philosophy was regarded as impotent4 ,the intellectuals of the eighteenth century therefore generalised to their hearts' content1 and as a rule suffered little for their lse-majest3 ,voltaire is the typical example of such generalisation4 ,the spirit of the age favoured such methods1 and it was therefore natural for ,rousseau to pursue them4 ,but his general remarks had such a way of bearing very obvious particular applications1 and were so obviously inspired by a particular attitude towards the government of his day1 that even philosophy became in his hands unsafe1 and he was attacked for what men read between the lines of his works4 ,it is owing to this faculty of giving his generalisations content and actuality that ,rousseau has become the father of modern political philosophy4 ,he uses the method of his time only to transcend it2 out of the abstract and general he creates the concrete and universal4 ,secondly1 we must not forget that ,rousseau's theories are to be studied in a wider historical environment4 ,if he is the first of modern political theorists1 he is also the last of a long line of ,renaissance theorists1 who in turn inherit and transform the concepts of medival thought4 ,so many critics have spent so much wasted time in proving that ,rousseau was not original only because they began by identifying originality with isolation3 they studied first the ,social ,contract by itself1 out of relation to earlier works1 and then1 having discovered that these earlier works resembled it1 decided that everything it had to say was borrowed4 ,had they begun their study in a truly historical spirit1 they would have seen that ,rousseau's importance lies just in the new use he makes of old ideas1 in the transition he makes from old to new in the general conception of politics4 ,no mere innovator could have exercised such an influence or hit on so much truth4 ,theory makes no great leaps2 it proceeds to new concepts by the adjustment and renovation of old ones4 ,just as theological writers on politics1 from ,hooker to ,bossuet1 make use of ,biblical terminology and ideas2 just as more modern writers1 from ,hegel to ,herbert ,spencer1 make use of the concept of evolution1 ,rousseau uses the ideas and terms of the ,social ,contract theory4 ,we should feel1 throughout his work1 his struggle to free himself from what is lifeless and outworn in that theory1 while he develops out of it fruitful conceptions that go beyond its scope4 ,a too rigid literalism in the interpretation of ,rousseau's thought may easily reduce it to the possession of a merely historical interest3 if we approach it in a truly historical spirit1 we shall be able to appreciate at once its temporary and its lasting value1 to see how it served his contemporaries1 and at the same time to disentangle from it what may be serviceable to us and for all time4 ,rousseau's ,emile1 the greatest of all works on education1 has already been issued in this series4 ,in this volume are contained the most important of his political works4 ,of these the ,social ,contract1 by far the most significant1 is the latest in date4 ,it represents the maturity of his thought1 while the other works only illustrate his development4 ,born in #agab1 he issued no work of importance till #agej2 but he tells us1 in the ,confessions1 that in #agdc1 when he was attached to the ,embassy at ,venice1 he had already conceived the idea of a great work on ,political ,institutions1 which was to put the seal on his reputation4 ,he seems1 however1 to have made little progress with this work1 until in #agdi he happened to light on the announcement of a prize offered by the ,academy of ,dijon for an answer to the question1 ,has the progress of the arts and sciences tended to the purification or to the corruption of morality8 ,his old ideas came thronging back1 and sick at heart of the life he had been leading among the ,paris lumires1 he composed a violent and rhetorical diatribe against civilisation generally4 ,in the following year1 this work1 having been awarded the prize by the ,academy1 was published by its author4 ,his success was instantaneous2 he became at once a famous man1 the lion of ,parisian literary circles4 ,refutations of his work were issued by professors1 scribblers1 outraged theologians and even by the ,king of ,poland4 ,rousseau endeavoured to answer them all1 and in the course of argument his thought developed4 ,from #agej to the publication of the ,social ,contract and ,emile in #agfb he gradually evolved his views3 in those twelve years he made his unique contribution to political thought4 ,the ,discourse on the ,arts and ,sciences1 the earliest of the works reproduced in this volume1 is not in itself of very great importance4 ,rousseau has given his opinion of it in the ,confessions4 ,full of warmth and force1 it is wholly without logic or order2 of all my works it is the weakest in argument and the least harmonious4 ,but whatever gifts a man may be born with1 he cannot learn the art of writing in a moment4 ,this criticism is just4 ,the first ,discourse neither is1 nor attempts to be1 a reasoned or a balanced production4 ,it is the speech of an advocate1 wholly one-sided and arbitrary1 but so obviously and naively one-sided1 that it is difficult for us to believe in its entire seriousness4 ,at the most1 it is only a rather brilliant but flimsy rhetorical effort1 a sophistical improvisation1 but not a serious contribution to thought4 ,yet it is certain that this declamation made ,rousseau's name1 and established his position as a great writer in ,parisian circles4 ,d',alembert even devoted the preface of the ,encyclopdia to a refutation4 ,the plan of the first ,discourse is essentially simple3 it sets out from the badness1 immorality and misery of modern nations1 traces all these ills to the departure from a natural state1 and then credits the progress of the arts and sciences with being the cause of that departure4 ,in it1 ,rousseau is already in possession of his idea of nature as an ideal2 but he has at present made no attempt to discriminate1 in what is unnatural1 between good and bad4 ,he is merely using a single idea1 putting it as strongly as he can1 and neglecting all its limitations4 ,the first ,discourse is important not for any positive doctrine it contains1 but as a key to the development of ,rousseau's mind4 ,here we see him at the beginning of the long journey which was to lead on at last to the theory of the ,social ,contract4 ,in #agee appeared the ,discourse on the ,origin and ,foundation of ,inequality among ,men1 which is the second of the works given in this volume4 ,with this essay1 ,rousseau had unsuccessfully competed in #agec for a second prize offered by the ,academy of ,dijon1 and he now issued it prefaced by a long ,dedication to the ,republic of ,geneva4 ,in this work1 which ,voltaire1 in thanking him for a presentation copy1 termed his second book against the human race1 his style and his ideas have made a great advance2 he is no longer content merely to push a single idea to extremes3 while preserving the broad opposition between the state of nature and the state of society1 which runs through all his work1 he is concerned to present a rational justification of his views and to admit that a little at any rate may be said on the other side4 ,moreover1 the idea of nature has already undergone a great development2 it is no longer an empty opposition to the evils of society2 it possesses a positive content4 ,thus half the ,discourse on ,inequality is occupied by an imaginary description of the state of nature1 in which man is shown with ideas limited within the narrowest range1 with little need of his fellows1 and little care beyond provision for the necessities of the moment4 ,rousseau declares explicitly that he does not suppose the state of nature ever to have existed3 it is a pure idea of reason1 a working concept reached by abstraction from the state of society4 ,the natural man1 as opposed to man's man1 is man stripped of all that society confers upon him1 a creature formed by a process of abstraction1 and never intended for a historical portrait4 ,the conclusion of the ,discourse favours not this purely abstract being1 but a state of savagery intermediate between the natural and the social conditions1 in which men may preserve the simplicity and the advantages of nature and at the same time secure the rude comforts and assurances of early society4 ,in one of the long notes appended to the ,discourse1 ,rousseau further explains his position4 ,he does not wish1 he says1 that modern corrupt society should return to a state of nature3 corruption has gone too far for that2 he only desires now that men should palliate1 by wiser use of the fatal arts1 the mistake of their introduction4 ,he recognises society as inevitable and is already feeling his way towards a justification of it4 ,the second ,discourse represents a second stage in his political thought3 the opposition between the state of nature and the state of society is still presented in naked contrast2 but the picture of the former has already filled out1 and it only remains for ,rousseau to take a nearer view of the fundamental implications of the state of society for his thought to reach maturity4 ,rousseau is often blamed1 by modern critics1 for pursuing in the ,discourses a method apparently that of history1 but in reality wholly unhistorical4 ,but it must be remembered that he himself lays no stress on the historical aspect of his work2 he gives himself out as constructing a purely ideal picture1 and not as depicting any actual stages in human history4 ,the use of false historical concepts is characteristic of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries1 and ,rousseau is more to be congratulated on having escaped from giving them too much importance than criticised for employing them at all4 ,it is doubtful whether the ,discourse on ,political ,economy1 first printed in the great ,encyclopdia in #agee1 was composed before or after the ,discourse on ,inequality4 ,at first sight the former seems to be far more in the manner of the ,social ,contract and to contain views belonging essentially to ,rousseau's constructive period4 ,it would not1 however1 be safe to conclude from this that its date is really later4 ,the ,discourse on ,inequality still has about it much of the rhetorical looseness of the prize essay2 it aims not so much at close reasoning as at effective and popular presentation of a case4 ,but1 by reading between the lines1 an attentive student can detect in it a great deal of the positive doctrine afterwards incorporated in the ,social ,contract4 ,especially in the closing section1 which lays down the plan of a general treatment of the fundamental questions of politics1 we are already to some extent in the atmosphere of the later works4 ,it is indeed almost certain that ,rousseau never attempted to put into either of the first two ,discourses any of the positive content of his political theory4 ,they were intended1 not as final expositions of his point of view1 but as partial and preliminary studies1 in which his aim was far more destructive than constructive4 ,it is clear that in first conceiving the plan of a work on ,political ,institutions1 ,rousseau cannot have meant to regard all society as in essence bad4 ,it is indeed evident that he meant1 from the first1 to study human society and institutions in their rational aspect1 and that he was rather diverted from his main purpose by the ,academy of ,dijon's competition than first induced by it to think about political questions4 ,it need1 therefore1 cause no surprise that a work probably written before the ,discourse on ,inequality should contain the germs of the theory given in full in the ,social ,contract4 ,the ,discourse on ,political ,economy is important as giving the first sketch of the theory of the ,general ,will4 ,it will readily be seen that ,rousseau does not mean by political economy exactly what we mean nowadays4 ,he begins with a discussion of the fundamental nature of the ,state1 and the possibility of reconciling its existence with human liberty1 and goes on with an admirable short study of the principles of taxation4 ,he is thinking throughout of political in the sense of public economy1 of the ,state as the public financier1 and not of the conditions governing industry4 ,he conceives the ,state as a body aiming at the well-being of all its members and subordinates all his views of taxation to that end4 ,he who has only necessaries should not be taxed at all2 superfluities should be supertaxed2 there should be heavy imposts on every sort of luxury4 ,the first part of the article is still more interesting4 ,rousseau begins by demolishing the exaggerated parallel so often drawn between the ,state and the family2 he shows that the ,state is not1 and cannot be1 patriarchal in nature1 and goes on to lay down his view that its real being consists in the ,general ,will of its members4 ,the essential features of the ,social ,contract are present in this ,discourse almost as if they were commonplaces1 certainly not as if they were new discoveries on which the author had just hit by some happy inspiration4 ,there is every temptation1 after reading the ,political ,economy1 to suppose that ,rousseau's political ideas really reached maturity far earlier than has generally been allowed4 ,the ,social ,contract finally appeared1 along with ,emile1 in #agfb4 ,this year1 therefore1 represents in every respect the culmination of ,rousseau's career4 ,henceforth1 he was to write only controversial and confessional works2 his theories were now developed1 and1 simultaneously1 he gave to the world his views on the fundamental problems of politics and education4 ,it is now time to ask what ,rousseau's system1 in its maturity1 finally amounted to4 ,the ,social ,contract contains practically the whole of his constructive political theory2 it requires to be read1 for full understanding1 in connection with his other works1 especially ,emile and the ,letters on the ,mount 7#agfd71 but in the main it is self-contained and complete4 ,the title sufficiently defines its scope4 ,it is called ,the ,social ,contract or ,principles of ,political ,right1 and the second title explains the first4 ,rousseau's object is not to deal1 in a general way1 like ,montesquieu1 with the actual institutions of existing ,states1 but to lay down the essential principles which must form the basis of every legitimate society4 ,rousseau himself1 in the fifth book of the ,emile1 has stated the difference clearly4 ,montesquieu1 he says1 did not intend to treat of the principles of political right2 he was content to treat of the positive right 7or law7 of established governments2 and no two studies could be more different than these4 ,rousseau then conceives his object as being something very different from that of the ,spirit of the ,laws1 and it is a wilful error to misconstrue his purpose4 ,when he remarks that the facts1 the actual history of political societies1 do not concern him1 he is not contemptuous of facts2 he is merely asserting the sure principle that a fact can in no case give rise to a right4 ,his desire is to establish society on a basis of pure right1 so as at once to disprove his attack on society generally and to reinforce his criticism of existing societies4 ,round this point centres the whole dispute about the methods proper to political theory4 ,there are1 broadly speaking1 two schools of political theorists1 if we set aside the psychologists4 ,one school1 by collecting facts1 aims at reaching broad generalisations about what actually happens in human societies6 the other tries to penetrate to the universal principles at the root of all human combination4 ,for the latter purpose facts may be useful1 but in themselves they can prove nothing4 ,the question is not one of fact1 but one of right4 ,rousseau belongs essentially to this philosophical school4 ,he is not1 as his less philosophic critics seem to suppose1 a purely abstract thinker generalising from imaginary historical instances2 he is a concrete thinker trying to get beyond they inessential and changing to the permanent and invariable basis of human society4 ,like ,green1 he is in search of the principle of political obligation1 and beside this quest all others fall into their place as secondary and derivative4 ,it is required to find a form of association able to defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of every associate1 and of such a nature1 that each1 uniting himself with all1 may still obey only himself1 and remain as free as before4 ,this is the fundamental problem of which the ,social ,contract provides the solution4 ,the problem of political obligation is seen as including all other political problems1 which fall into place in a system based upon it4 ,how1 ,rousseau asks1 can the will of the ,state help being for me a merely external will1 imposing itself upon my own8 ,how can the existence of the ,state be reconciled with human freedom8 ,how can man1 who is born free1 rightly come to be everywhere in chains8 ,no-one could help understanding the central problem of the ,social ,contract immediately1 were it not that its doctrines often seem to be strangely formulated4 ,we have seen that this strangeness is due to ,rousseau's historical position1 to his use of the political concepts current in his own age1 and to his natural tendency to build on the foundations laid by his predecessors4 ,there are a great many people whose idea of ,rousseau consists solely of the first words of the opening chapter of the ,social ,contract1 ,man is born free1 and everywhere he is in chains4 ,but1 they tell you1 man is not born free1 even if he is everywhere in chains4 ,thus at the very outset we are faced with the great difficulty in appreciating ,rousseau4 ,when we should naturally say man ought to be free1 or perhaps man is born for freedom1 he prefers to say man is born free1 by which he means exactly the same thing4 ,there is doubtless1 in his way of putting it1 an appeal to a golden age2 but this golden age is admittedly as imaginary as the freedom to which men are born is bound1 for most of them1 to be4 ,elsewhere ,rousseau puts the point much as we might put it ourselves4 ,nothing is more certain than that every man born in slavery is born for slavery4444 ,but if there are slaves by nature1 it is because there have been slaves against nature 7,social ,contract1 ,book ,i1 chap4 ii74 ,we have seen that the contrast between the state of nature and the state of society runs through all ,rousseau's work4 ,the ,emile is a plea for natural education2 the ,discourses are a plea for a naturalisation of society2 the ,new ,hlose is the romantic's appeal for more nature in human relationships4 ,what then is the position of this contrast in ,rousseau's mature political thought8 ,it is clear that the position is not merely that of the ,discourses4 ,in them1 he envisaged only the faults of actual societies2 now1 he is concerned with the possibility of a rational society4 ,his aim is to justify the change from nature to society1 although it has left men in chains4 ,he is in search of the true society1 which leaves men as free as before4 ,altogether1 the space occupied by the idea of nature in the ,social ,contract is very small4 ,it is used of necessity in the controversial chapters1 in which ,rousseau is refuting false theories of social obligation2 but when once he has brushed aside the false prophets1 he lets the idea of nature go with them1 and concerns himself solely with giving society the rational sanction he has promised4 ,it becomes clear that1 in political matters at any rate1 the state of nature is for him only a term of controversy4 ,he has in effect abandoned1 in so far as he ever held it1 the theory of a human golden age2 and where1 as in the ,emile1 he makes use of the idea of nature1 it is broadened and deepened out of all recognition4 ,despite many passages in which the old terminology cleaves to him1 he means by nature in this period not the original state of a thing1 nor even its reduction to the simplest terms3 he is passing over to the conception of nature as identical with the full development of capacity1 with the higher6 idea of human freedom4 ,this view may be seen in germ even in the ,discourse on ,inequality1 where1 distinguishing self-respect 7amour de soi7 from egoism 7amour-propre71 ,rousseau makes the former1 the property of the natural man1 consist not in the desire for self-aggrandisement1 but in the seeking of satisfaction for reasonable desire accompanied by benevolence2 whereas egoism is the preference of our own interests to those of others1 self-respect merely puts us on an equal footing with our fellows4 ,it is true that in the ,discourse ,rousseau is pleading against the development of many human faculties2 but he is equally advocating the fullest development of those he regards as natural1 by which he means merely good4 ,the state of society1 as envisaged in the ,social ,contract1 is no longer in contradiction to the state of nature upheld in the ,emile1 where indeed the social environment is of the greatest importance1 and1 though the pupil is screened from it1 he is none the less being trained for it4 ,indeed the views given in the ,social ,contract are summarised in the fifth book of the ,emile1 and by this summary the essential unity of ,rousseau's system is emphasised4 ,rousseau's object1 then1 in the first words of the ,social ,contract1 is to inquire if1 in the civil order1 there can be any sure and certain1 rule of administration1 taking men as they are and laws as they might be4 ,montesquieu took laws as they were1 and saw what sort of men they made3 ,rousseau1 founding his whole system on human freedom1 takes man as the basis1 and regards him as giving himself what laws he pleases4 ,he takes his stand on the nature of human freedom3 on this he bases his whole system1 making the will of the members the sole basis of every society4 ,in working out his theory1 ,rousseau makes use throughout of three general and1 to some extent1 alternative conceptions4 ,these are the ,social ,contract1 ,sovereignty and the ,general ,will4 ,we shall now have to examine each of these in turn4 ,the ,social ,contract theory is as old as the sophists of ,greece 7see ,plato1 ,republic1 ,book ,,ii and the ,gorgias71 and as ,i elusive4 ,it has been adapted to the most opposite points of view1 and used1 in different forms1 on both sides of every question to which it could conceivably be applied4 ,it is frequent in medival writers1 a commonplace with the theorists of the ,renaissance1 and in the eighteenth century already nearing its fall before a wider conception4 ,it would be a long1 as well as a thankless1 task to trace its history over again3 it may be followed best in ,d4 ,g4 ,ritchie's admirable essay on it in ,darwin and ,hegel and ,other ,studies4 ,for us1 it is important only to regard it in its most general aspect1 before studying the special use made of it by ,rousseau4 ,obviously1 in one form or another1 it is a theory very easily arrived at4 ,wherever any form of government apart from the merest tyranny exists1 reflection on the basis of the ,state cannot but lead to the notion that1 in one sense or another1 it is based on the consent1 tacit or expressed1 past or present1 of its members4 ,in this alone1 the greater part of the ,social ,contract theory is already latent4 ,add the desire to find actual justification for a theory in facts1 and1 especially in an age possessed only of the haziest historical sense1 this doctrine of consent will inevitably be given a historical setting4 ,if in addition there is a tendency to regard society as something unnatural to humanity1 the tendency will become irresistible4 ,by writers of almost all schools1 the ,state will be represented as having arisen1 in some remote age1 out of a compact or1 in more legal phrase1 contract between two or more parties4 ,the only class that will be able to resist the doctrine is that which maintains the divine right of kings1 and holds that all existing governments were were imposed on the people by the direct interposition of ,god4 ,all who are not prepared to maintain that will be partisans of some form or other of the ,social ,contract theory4 ,it is1 therefore1 not surprising that we find among its advocates writers of the most opposite points of view4 ,barely stated1 it is a mere formula1 which may be filled in with any content from absolutism to pure republicanism4 ,and1 in the hands of some at least of its supporters1 it turns out to be a weapon that cuts both ways4 ,we shall be in a better position to judge of its usefulness when we have seen its chief varieties at work4 ,all ,social ,contract theories that are at all definite fall under one or other of two heads4 ,they represent society as based on an original contract either between the people and the government1 or between all the individuals composing the ,state4 ,historically1 modern theory passes from the first to the second of these forms4 ,the doctrine that society is founded on a contract between the people and the government is of medival origin4 ,it was often supported by references to the ,old ,testament1 which contains a similar view in an unreflective form4 ,it is found in most of the great political writers of the sixteenth century2 in ,buchanan1 and in the writings of ,james ,i3 it persists into the seventeenth in the works of ,grotius and ,puffendorf4 ,grotius is sometimes held to have stated the theory so as to admit both forms of contract2 but it is clear that he is only thinking of the first form as admitting democratic as well as monarchical government4 ,we find it put very clearly by the ,convention ,parliament of #afhh1 which accuses ,james ,,ii of having endeavoured to subvert the constitution of the kingdom by breaking the original contract between king and people4 ,while ,hobbes1 on the side of the royalists1 is maintaining the contract theory in its second form1 the ,parliamentarian ,algernon ,sidney adheres to the idea of a contract between the people and the government4 ,in this form1 the theory clearly admits of opposite interpretations4 ,it may be held that the people1 having given itself up once for all to its rulers1 has nothing more to ask of them1 and is bound to submit to any usage they may choose to inflict4 ,this1 however1 is not the implication most usually drawn from it4 ,the theory1 in this form1 originated with theologians who were also lawyers4 ,their view of a contract implied mutual obligations2 they regarded the ruler as bound1 by its terms1 to govern constitutionally4 ,the old idea that a king must not violate the sacred customs of the realm passes easily into the doctrine that he must not violate the terms of the original contract between himself and his people4 ,just as in the days of the ,norman kings1 every appeal on the part of the people for more liberties was couched in the form of a demand that the customs of the good old times of ,edward the ,confessor should be respected1 so in the seventeenth century every act of popular assertion or resistance was stated as an appeal to the king not to violate the contract4 ,the demand was a good popular cry1 and it seemed to have the theorists behind it4 ,rousseau gives his refutation of this view1 which he had1 in the ,discourse on ,inequality1 maintained in passing1 in the sixteenth chapter of the third book of the ,social ,contract4 7,see also ,book ,i1 chap1 iv1 init47 ,his attack is really concerned also with the theory of ,hobbes1 which in some respects resembles1 as we shall see1 this first view2 but1 in form at least1 it is directed against this form of contract4 ,it will be possible to examine it more closely1 when the second view has been considered4 ,the second view1 which may be called the ,social ,contract theory proper1 regards society as originating in1 or based on1 an agreement between the individuals composing it4 ,it seems to be found first1 rather vaguely1 in ,richard ,hooker's ,ecclesiastical ,polity1 from which ,locke largely borrowed3 and it reappears1 in varying forms1 in ,milton's ,tenure of ,kings and ,magistrates1 in ,hobbes's ,leviathan1 in ,locke's ,treatises on ,civil ,government1 and in ,rousseau4 ,the best-known instance of its actual use is by the ,pilgrim ,fathers on the ,mayflower in #afbj1 in whose declaration occurs the phrase1 ,we do solemnly and mutually1 in the presence of ,god and of one another1 covenant and combine ourselves together into a civil body politic4 ,the natural implication of this view would seem to be the corollary of complete popular ,sovereignty which ,rousseau draws4 ,but before ,rousseau's time it had been used to support views as diverse as those which rested on the first form4 ,we saw that1 in ,grotius's great work1 ,de ,jure ,belli et ,pacis1 it was already possible to doubt which of the two theories was being advocated4 ,the first theory was1 historically1 a means of popular protest against royal aggression4 ,as soon as popular government was taken into account1 the act of contract between people and government became in effect merely a contract between the individuals composing the society1 and readily passed over into the second form4 ,the second theory1 in its ordinary form1 expresses only the view that the people is everywhere ,sovereign1 and that1 in the phrase of ,milton's treatise1 the power of kings and magistrates is only derivative4 ,before1 however1 this view had been worked up into a philosophical theory1 it had already been used by ,hobbes to support precisely opposite principles4 ,hobbes agrees that the original contract is one between all the individuals composing the ,state1 and that the government is no party to it2 but he regards the people as agreeing1 not merely to form a ,state1 but to invest a certain person or certain persons with the government of it4 ,he agrees that the people is naturally supreme1 but regards it as alienating its ,sovereignty by the contract itself1 and delegating its power1 wholly and for ever1 to the government4 ,as soon1 therefore1 as the ,state is set up1 the government becomes for ,hobbes the ,sovereign2 there is no more question of popular ,sovereignty1 but only of passive obedience3 the people is bound1 by the contract1 to obey its ruler1 no matter whether he governs well or ill4 ,it has alienated all its rights to the ,sovereign1 who is1 therefore1 absolute master4 ,hobbes1 living in a time of civil wars1 regards the worst government as better than anarchy1 and is1 therefore1 at pains to find arguments in support of any form of absolutism4 ,it is easy to pick holes in this system1 and to see into what difficulties a conscientious ,hobbist might be led by a revolution4 ,for as soon as the revolutionaries get the upper hand1 he will have to sacrifice one of his principles3 he will have to side against either the actual or the legitimate ,sovereign4 ,it is easy also to see that alienation of liberty1 even if possible for an individual1 which ,rousseau denies1 cannot bind his posterity4 ,but1 with all its faults1 the view of ,hobbes is on the whole admirably1 if ruthlessly1 logical1 and to it ,rousseau owes a great deal4 ,the special shape given to the second ,social ,contract theory by ,hobbes looks1 at first sight1 much like a combination1 into a single act1 of both the contracts4 ,this1 however1 is not the view he adopts4 ,the theory of a contract between government and people had1 as we have seen1 been used mainly as a support for popular liberties1 a means of assertion against the government4 ,hobbes1 whose whole aim is to make his government ,sovereign1 can only do this by leaving the government outside the contract3 he thus avoids the necessity of submitting it to any obligation whatsoever1 and leaves it absolute and irresponsible4 ,he secures1 in fact1 not merely a ,state which has unbounded rights against the individual1 but a determinate authority with the right to enforce those rights4 ,his theory is not merely ,statism 7tatisme72 it is pure despotism4 ,it is clear that1 if such a theory is to be upheld1 it can stand only by the view1 which ,hobbes shares with ,grotius1 that a man can alienate not merely his own liberty1 but also that of his descendants1 and that1 consequently1 a people as a whole can do the same4 ,this is the point at which both ,locke and ,rousseau attack it4 ,locke1 whose aim is largely to justify the ,revolution of #afhh1 makes government depend1 not merely at its institution1 but always1 on the consent of the governed1 and regards all rulers as liable to be displaced if they govern tyrannically4 ,he omits1 however1 to provide any machinery short of revolution for the expression of popular opinion1 and1 on the whole1 seems to regard the popular consent as something essentially tacit and assumed4 ,he regards the ,state as existing mainly to protect life and property1 and is1 in all his assertions of popular rights1 so cautious as to reduce them almost to nothing4 ,it is not till we come to ,rousseau that the second form of the contract theory is stated in its purest and most logical form4 ,rousseau sees clearly the necessity1 if popular consent in government is to be more than a name1 of giving it some constitutional means of expression4 ,for ,locke's theory of tacit consent1 he substitutes an active agreement periodically renewed4 ,he looks back with admiration to the city-states of ancient ,greece and1 in his own day1 reserves his admiration for the ,swiss free cities1 ,berne and1 above all1 ,geneva1 his native place4 ,seeing in the ,europe of his day no case in which representative government was working at all democratically1 he was unable to conceive that means might be found of giving effect to this active agreement in a nation-state2 he therefore held that self-government was impossible except for a city4 ,he wished to break up the nation-states of ,europe1 and create instead federative leagues of independent city-states4 ,it matters1 however1 comparatively little1 for the appreciation of ,rousseau's political theory in general1 that he failed to become the theorist of the modern ,state4 ,by taking the ,state1 which must have1 in essentials1 everywhere the same basis1 at its simplest1 he was able1 far better than his predecessors1 to bring out the real nature of the social tie1 an alternative name which he often uses for the ,social ,contract4 ,his doctrine ,i of the underlying principle of political obligation is that of all great modern writers1 from ,kant to ,mr4 ,bosanquet4 ,this fundamental unity has been obscured only because critics have failed to put the ,social ,contract theory in its proper place in ,rousseau's system4 ,this theory was1 we have seen1 a commonplace4 ,the amount of historical authenticity assigned to the contract almost universally presupposed varied enormously4 ,generally1 the weaker a writer's rational basis1 the more he appealed to history--and invented it4 ,it was1 therefore1 almost inevitable that ,rousseau should cast his theory into the contractual form4 ,there were1 indeed1 writers of his time who laughed at the contract1 but they were not writers who constructed a general system of political philosophy4 ,from ,cromwell to ,montesquieu and ,bentham1 it was the practically minded man1 impatient of unactual hypotheses1 who refused to accept the idea of contract4 ,the theorists were as unanimous in its favour as the ,victorians were in favour of the organic theory4 ,but we1 criticising them in the light of later events1 are in a better position for estimating the position the ,social ,contract really took in their political system4 ,we see that ,locke's doctrine of tacit consent made popular control so unreal that he was forced1 if the ,state was to have any hold1 to make his contract historical and actual1 binding posterity for all time1 and that he was also led to admit a quasi-contract between people and government1 as a second vindication of popular liberties4 ,rousseau1 on the other hand1 bases no vital argument on the historical nature of the contract1 in which1 indeed1 he clearly does not believe4 ,how1 he asks1 did this change from nature to society come about8 ,and he answers that he does not know4 ,moreover1 his aim is to find a sure and legitimate rule of administration1 taking men as they are and laws as they might be2 that is to say1 his ,social ,contract is something which will be found at work in every legitimate society1 but which will be in abeyance in all forms of despotism4 ,he clearly means by it no more and no less than the fundamental principle of political association1 the basis of the unity which enables us1 in the ,state1 to realise political liberty by giving up lawlessness and license4 ,the presentation of this doctrine in the quasi-historical form of the ,social ,contract theory is due to the accident of the time and place in which ,rousseau wrote4 ,at the same time1 the importance of the conception is best to be seen in the hard death it dies4 ,though no-one1 for a hundred years or so1 has thought of regarding it as historical1 it has been found so hard to secure any other phrase explaining as well or better the basis of political union that1 to this day1 the phraseology of the contract theory largely persists4 ,a conception so vital cannot have been barren4 ,it is indeed1 in ,rousseau's own thought1 only one of the three different ways in which the basis of political union is stated1 according to the preoccupation of his mind4 ,when he is thinking quasi-historically1 he describes his doctrine as that of the ,social ,contract4 ,modern anthropology1 in its attempts to explain the complex by means of the simple1 often strays further from the straight paths of history and reason4 ,in a semi-legal aspect1 using the terminology1 if not the standpoint1 of jurisprudence1 he restates the same doctrine in the form of popular ,sovereignty4 ,this use tends continually to pass over into the more philosophical form which comes third4 ,sovereignty is the exercise of the general will4 ,philosophically1 ,rousseau's doctrine finds its expression in the view that the ,state is based not on any original convention1 not on1 any determinate power1 but on the living and sustaining rational will of its members4 ,we have now to examine first ,sovereignty and then the ,general ,will1 which is ultimately ,rousseau's guiding conception4 ,sovereignty is1 first and foremost1 a legal term1 and it has often been held that its use in political philosophy merely leads to confusion4 ,in jurisprudence1 we are told1 it has the perfectly plain meaning given to it in ,austin's famous definition4 ,the ,sovereign is a determinate human superior1 not in a habit of obedience to a like superior1 but receiving habitual obedience from the bulk of a given society4 ,where ,sovereignty is placed is1 on this view1 a question purely of fact1 and never of right4 ,we have only to seek out the determinate human superior in a given society1 and we shall have the ,sovereign4 ,in answer to this theory1 it is not enough1 though it is a valuable point1 to show that such a determinate superior is rarely to be found4 ,where1 for instance1 is the ,sovereign of ,england or of the ,british ,empire8 ,is it the ,king1 who is called the ,sovereign8 ,or is it the ,parliament1 which is the legislature 7for ,austin's ,sovereign is regarded as the source of law78 ,or is it the electorate1 or the whole mass of the population1 with or without the right of voting8 ,clearly all these exercise a certain influence in the making of laws4 ,or finally1 is it now the ,cabinet8 ,for ,austin1 one of these bodies would be ruled out as indeterminate 7the mass of the population7 and another as responsible 7the ,cabinet74 ,but are we to regard the ,house of ,commons or those who elect it as forming part of the ,sovereign8 ,the search for a determinate ,sovereign may be a valuable legal conception2 but it has evidently nothing to do with political theory4 ,it is1 therefore1 essential to distinguish between the legal ,sovereign of jurisprudence1 and the political ,sovereign of political science and philosophy4 ,even so1 it does not at once become clear what this political ,sovereign may be4 ,is it the body or bodies of persons in whom political power in a ,state actually resides8 ,is it merely the complex of actual institutions regarded as embodying the will of the society8 ,this would leave us still in the realm of mere fact1 outside both right and philosophy4 ,the ,sovereign1 in the philosophical sense1 is neither the nominal ,sovereign1 nor the legal ,sovereign1 nor the political ,sovereign of fact and common sense3 it is the consequence of the fundamental bond of union1 the restatement of the doctrine of ,social ,contract1 the foreshadowing of that of ,general ,will4 ,the ,sovereign is that body in the ,state in which political power ought always to reside1 and in which the right to such power does always reside4 ,the idea at the back of the philosophical conception of ,sovereignty is1 therefore1 essentially the same as that we found to underlie the ,social ,contract theory4 ,it is the view that the people1 whether it can alienate its right or not1 is the ultimate director of its own destinies1 the final power from which there is no appeal4 ,in a sense1 this is recognised even by ,hobbes1 who makes the power of his absolute ,sovereign1 the predecessor of ,austin's determinate human superior1 issue first of all from the ,social ,contract1 which is essentially a popular act4 ,the difference between ,hobbes and ,rousseau on this point is solely that ,rousseau regards as inalienable a supreme power which ,hobbes makes the people alienate in its first corporate action4 ,that is to say1 ,hobbes in fact accepts the theory of popular supremacy in name only to destroy it in fact2 ,rousseau asserts the theory in its only logical form1 and is under no temptation to evade it by means of false historical assumptions4 ,in ,locke1 a distinction is already drawn between the legal and the actual ,sovereign1 which ,locke calls supreme power2 ,rousseau unites the absolute ,sovereignty of ,hobbes and the popular consent of ,locke into the philosophic doctrine of popular ,sovereignty1 which has since been the established form of the theory4 ,his final view represents a return from the perversions of ,hobbes to a doctrine already familiar to medival and ,renaissance writers2 but it is not merely a return4 ,in its passage the view has fallen into its place in a complete system of political philosophy4 ,in a second important respect ,rousseau differentiates himself from ,hobbes4 ,for ,hobbes1 the ,sovereign is identical with the government4 ,he is so hot for absolutism largely because he regards revolution1 the overthrow of the existing government1 as at the same time the dissolution of the body politic1 and a return to complete anarchy or to the state of nature4 ,rousseau and1 to some extent1 ,locke meet this view by sharp division between the supreme power and the government4 ,for ,rousseau1 they are so clearly distinct that even a completely democratic government is not at the same time the ,sovereign2 its members are sovereign only in a different capacity and as a different corporate body1 just as two different societies may exist for different purposes with exactly the same members4 ,pure democracy1 however1 the government of the ,state by all the people in every detail1 is not1 as ,rousseau says1 a possible human institution4 ,all governments are really mixed in character2 and what we call a democracy is only a more or less democratic government4 ,government1 therefore1 will always be to some extent in the hands of selected persons4 ,sovereignty1 on the other hand1 is in his view absolute1 inalienable1 indivisible1 and indestructible4 ,it cannot be limited1 abandoned1 shared or destroyed4 ,it is an essential part of all social life that the right to control the destinies of the ,state belongs in the last resort to the whole people4 ,there clearly must in the end be somewhere in the society an ultimate court of appeal1 whether determinate or not2 but1 unless ,sovereignty is distinguished from government1 the government1 passing under the name of ,sovereign1 will inevitably be regarded as absolute4 ,the only way to avoid the conclusions of ,hobbes is1 therefore1 to establish a clear separation between them4 ,rousseau tries to do this by an adaptation of the doctrine of the three powers4 ,but instead of three independent powers sharing the supreme authority1 he gives only two1 and makes one of these wholly dependent on the other4 ,he substitutes for the co-ordination of the legislative1 the executive1 and the judicial authorities1 a system in which the legislative power1 or ,sovereign1 is always supreme1 the executive1 or government1 always secondary and derivative1 and the judicial power merely a function of government4 ,this division he makes1 naturally1 one of will and power4 ,the government is merely to carry out the decrees1 or acts of will1 of the ,sovereign people4 ,just as the human will transfers a command to its members for execution1 so the body politic may give its decisions force by setting up authority which1 like the brain1 may command its members4 ,in delegating the power necessary for the execution of its will1 it is abandoning none of its supreme authority4 ,it remains ,sovereign1 and can at any moment recall the grants it has made4 ,government1 therefore1 exists only at the ,sovereign's pleasure1 and is always revocable by the sovereign will4 ,it will be seen1 when we come to discuss the nature of the ,general ,will1 that this doctrine really contains the most valuable part of ,rousseau's theory4 ,here1 we are concerned rather with its limitations4 ,the distinction between legislative and executive functions is in practice very hard to draw4 ,in ,rousseau's case1 it is further complicated by the presence of a second distinction4 ,the legislative power1 the ,sovereign1 is concerned only with what is general1 the executive only with what is particular4 ,this distinction1 the full force of which can only be seen in connection with the ,general ,will1 means roughly that a matter is general when it concerns the whole community equally1 and makes no mention of any particular class2 as soon as it refers to any class or person1 it becomes particular1 and can no longer form the subject matter of an act of ,sovereignty4 ,however just this distinction may seem in the abstract1 it is clear that its effect is to place all the power in the hands of the executive3 modern legislation is almost always concerned with particular classes and interests4 ,it is not1 therefore1 a long step from the view of ,rousseau to the modern theory of democratic government1 in which the people has little power beyond that of removing its rulers if they displease it4 ,as long1 however1 as we confine our view to the city-state of which ,rousseau is thinking1 his distinction is capable of preserving for the people a greater actual exercise of will4 ,a city can often generalise where a nation must particularise4 ,it is in the third book of the ,social ,contract1 where ,rousseau is discussing the problem of government1 that it is most essential to remember that his discussion has in view mainly the city-state and not the nation4 ,broadly put1 his principle of government is that democracy is possible only in small ,states1 aristocracy in those of medium extent1 and monarchy in great ,states 7,book ,,iii1 chap4 iii74 ,in considering this view1 we have to take into account two things4 ,first1 he rejects representative government2 will being1 in his theory1 inalienable1 representative ,sovereignty is impossible4 ,but1 as he regards all general acts as functions of ,sovereignty1 this means that no general act can be within the competence of a representative assembly4 ,in judging this theory1 we must take into account all the circumstances of ,rousseau's time4 ,france1 ,geneva and ,england were the three ,states he took most into account4 ,in ,france1 representative government was practically non-existent2 in ,geneva1 it was only partially necessary2 in ,england1 it was a mockery1 used to support a corrupt oligarchy against a debased monarchy4 ,rousseau may well be pardoned for not taking the ordinary modern view of it4 ,nor indeed is it1 even in the modern world1 so satisfactory an instrument of the popular will that we can afford wholly to discard his criticism4 ,it is one of the problems of the day to find some means of securing effective popular control over a weakened ,parliament and a despotic ,cabinet4 ,the second factor is the immense development of local government4 ,it seemed to ,rousseau that1 in the nation-state1 all authority must necessarily pass1 as it had in ,france1 to the central power4 ,devolution was hardly dreamed of2 and ,rousseau saw the only means of securing effective popular government in a federal system1 starting from the small unit as ,sovereign4 ,the nineteenth century has proved the falsehood of much of his theory of government2 but there are still many wise comments and fruitful suggestions to be found in the third book of the ,social ,contract and in the treatise on the ,government of ,poland1 as well as in his adaptation and criticism of the ,polysynodie of the ,abb de ,saint-,pierre1 a scheme of local government for ,france1 born out of its due time4 ,the point in ,rousseau's theory of ,sovereignty that offers most difficulty is his view 7,book ,,ii1 chap1 vii7 that1 for every ,state1 a ,legislator is necessary4 ,we shall understand the section only by realising that the legislator is1 in fact1 in ,rousseau's system1 the spirit of institutions personified2 his place1 in a developed society1 is taken by the whole complex of social custom1 organisation and tradition that has grown up with the ,state4 ,this is made clearer by the fact that the legislator is not to exercise legislative power2 he is merely to submit his suggestions for popular approval4 ,thus ,rousseau recognises that1 in the case of institutions and traditions as elsewhere1 will1 and not force1 is the basis of the ,state4 ,this may be seen in his treatment of law as a whole 7,book ,,ii1 chap1 vi71 which deserves very careful attention4 ,he defines laws as acts of the general will1 and1 agreeing with ,montesquieu in making law the condition of civil association1 goes beyond him only in tracing it more definitely to its origin in an act of will4 ,the ,social ,contract renders law necessary1 and at the same time makes it quite clear that laws can proceed only from the body of citizens who have constituted the ,state4 ,doubtless1 says ,rousseau1 there is a universal justice emanating from reason alone2 but this justice1 to be admitted among us1 must be mutual4 ,humbly speaking1 in default of natural sanctions1 the laws of justice are ineffective among men4 ,of the law which set up among men this reign of mutual justice the ,general ,will is the source4 ,we thus come at last to the ,general ,will1 the most disputed1 and certainly the most fundamental1 of all ,rousseau's political concepts4 ,no critic of the ,social ,contract has found it easy to say either what precisely its author meant by it1 or what is its final value for political philosophy4 ,the difficulty is increased because ,rousseau himself sometimes halts in the sense which he assigns to it1 and even seems to suggest by it two different ideas4 ,of its broad meaning1 however1 there can be no doubt4 ,the effect of the ,social ,contract is the creation of a new individual4 ,when it has taken place1 at once1 in place of the individual personality of each contracting party1 the act of association creates a moral and collective body1 composed of as many members as the assembly contains voters1 and receiving from the act its unity1 its common identity 7moi commun71 its life and its will 7,book ,i1 chap4 vi74 ,the same doctrine had been stated earlier1 in the ,political ,economy1 without the historical setting4 ,the body politic is also a moral being1 possessed of a will1 and this general will1 which tends always to the preservation and welfare of the whole and of every part1 and is the source of the laws1 constitutes for all the members of the ,state1 in their relations to one another and to it1 the rule of what is just or unjust4 ,it will be seen at once that the second statement1 which could easily be fortified by others from the ,social ,contract1 says more than the first4 ,it is not apparent that the common will1 created by the institution of society1 need tend always to the welfare of the whole4 ,is not the common will at least as fallible as the will of a single individual8 ,may it not equally be led away from its true interests to the pursuit of pleasure or of something which is really harmful to it8 ,and1 if the whole society may vote what conduces to the momentary pleasure of all the members and at the same time to the lasting damage of the ,state as a whole1 is it not still more likely that some of the members will try to secure their private interests in opposition to those of the whole and of others8 ,all these questions1 and others like them1 have been asked by critics of the conception of the ,general ,will4 ,two main points are involved1 to one of which ,rousseau gives a clear and definite answer4 ,there is often1 he says1 a great deal of difference between the will of all and the general will2 the latter takes account only of the common interest1 while the former takes private interest into account1 and is no more than a sum of particular wills4 ,the agreement of all interests is formed by opposition to that of each 7,book ,,ii1 chap4 iii74 ,it is indeed possible for a citizen1 when an issue is presented to him1 to vote not for the good of the ,state1 but for his own good2 but1 in such a case1 his vote1 from the point of view of the ,general ,will1 is merely negligible4 ,but does it follow that the general will is exterminated or corrupted8 ,not at all3 it is always constant1 unalterable1 and pure2 but it is subordinated to other wills which encroach upon its sphere4444 ,the fault each man commits in detaching his interest from the common interest is that of changing the state of the question1 and answering something different from what he is asked4 ,instead of saying by his vote ',it is to the advantage of the ,state1' he says1 ',it is to the advantage of this or that man or party that this or that view should prevail4' ,thus the law of public order in assemblies is not so much to maintain in them the general will as to secure that the question be always put to it1 and the answer always given by it 7,book ,,iv1 chap4 i74 ,these passages1 with many others that may be found in the text1 make it quite clear that by the ,general ,will ,rousseau means something quite distinct from the ,will of ,all1 with which it should never have been confused4 ,the only excuse for such confusion lies in his view that when1 in a city-state1 all particular associations are avoided1 votes guided by individual self-interest will always cancel one another1 so that majority voting will always result in the ,general ,will4 ,this is clearly not the case1 and in this respect we may charge him with pushing the democratic argument too far4 ,the point1 however1 can be better dealt with at a later stage4 ,rousseau makes no pretence that the mere voice of a majority is infallible2 he only says1 at the most1 that1 given his ideal conditions1 it would be so4 ,the second main point raised by critics of the ,general ,will is whether in defining it as a will directed solely to the common interest1 ,rousseau means to exclude acts of public immorality and short-sightedness4 ,he answers the questions in different ways4 ,first1 an act of public immorality would be merely an unanimous instance of selfishness1 different in no particular1 from similar acts less unanimous1 and therefore forming no part of a ,general ,will4 ,secondly1 a mere ignorance of our own and the ,state's good1 entirely unprompted by selfish desires1 does not make our will anti-social or individual4 ,the general will is always right and tends to the public advantage2 but it does not follow that the deliberations of the people are always equally correct4 ,our will is always for our own good1 but we do not always see what that is3 the people is never corrupted1 but it is often deceived1 and on such occasions only does it seem to will what is bad 7,book ,,ii1 chap4 iii74 ,it is impossible to acquit ,rousseau in some of the passages in which he treats of the ,general ,will1 of something worse than obscurity--positive contradiction4 ,it is probable1 indeed1 that he never quite succeeded in getting his view clear in his own mind2 there is nearly always1 in his treatment of it1 a certain amount of muddle and fluctuation4 ,these difficulties the student must be left to worry out for himself2 it is only possible to present1 in outline1 what ,rousseau meant to convey4 ,the treatment of the ,general ,will in the ,political ,economy is brief and lucid1 and furnishes the best guide to his meaning4 ,the definition of it in this work1 which has already been quoted1 is followed by a short account of the nature of general wills as a whole4 ,every political society is composed of other smaller societies of various kinds1 each of which has its interest and rules of conduct2 but those societies which everybody perceives1 because they have an external or authorised form1 are not the only ones that actually exist in the ,state3 all individuals who are united by a common interest compose as many others1 either temporary or permanent1 whose influence is none the less real because it is less apparent4444 ,the influence of all these tacit or formal associations causes by the influence of their will as many modifications of the public will4 ,the will of these particular societies has always two relations2 for the members of the association1 it is a general will2 for the great society1 it is a particular will2 and it is often right with regard to the first object and wrong as to the second4 ,the most general will is always the most just1 and the voice of the people is1 in fact1 the voice of ,god4 ,the ,general ,will1 ,rousseau continues in substance1 is always for the common good2 but it is sometimes divided into smaller general wills1 which are wrong in relation to it4 ,the supremacy of the great ,general ,will is the first principle of public economy and the fundamental rule of government4 ,in this passage1 which differs only in clearness and simplicity from others in the ,social ,contract itself1 it is easy to see how far ,rousseau had in his mind a perfectly definite idea4 ,every association of several persons creates a new common will2 every association of a permanent character has already a personality of its own1 and in consequence a general will2 the ,state1 the highest known form of association1 is a fully developed moral and collective being with a common will which is1 in the highest sense yet known to us1 general4 ,all such wills are general only for the members of the associations ,which exercise them2 for outsiders1 or rather for other associations1 they are purely particular wills4 ,this applies even to the ,state2 for1 in relation to what is outside it1 the ,state becomes a simple being1 an individual 7,social ,contract1 ,book ,i4 chap4 vii74 ,in certain passages in the ,social ,contract1 in his criticism of the ,abb de ,saint-,pierre's ,project of ,perpetual ,peace1 and in the second chapter of the original draft of the ,social ,contract1 ,rousseau takes into account the possibility of a still higher individual1 the federation of the world4 ,in the ,political ,economy1 thinking of the nation-state1 he affirms what in the ,social ,contract 7,book ,,ii1 chap1 iii7 he denies of the city1 and recognises that the life of a nation is made up of the whole complex of its institutions1 and that the existence of lesser general wills is not necessarily a menace to the ,general ,will of the ,state4 ,in the ,social ,contract1 he only treats of these lesser wills in relation to the government1 which1 he shows1 has a will of its own1 general for its members1 but particular for the ,state as a whole 7,book ,,iii1 chap4 ii74 ,this governmental will he there prefers to call corporate will1 and by this name it will be convenient to distinguish the lesser general wills from the ,general ,will of the ,state that is over them all4 ,so far1 there is no great difficulty2 but in discussing the infallibility of the ,general ,will we are on more dangerous ground4 ,rousseau's treatment here clearly oscillates between regarding it as a purely ideal conception1 to which human institutions can only approximate1 and holding it to be realised actually in every republican ,state1 i4e4 wherever the people is the ,sovereign in fact as well as in right4 ,book ,,iv1 chap1 ii is the most startling passage expressing the latter view4 ,when in the popular assembly a law is proposed1 what the people is asked is not exactly whether it accepts or rejects the proposal1 but whether it is in conformity with the general will1 which is its will4444 ,when1 therefore1 the opinion that is contrary to my own prevails1 this proves neither more nor less than that ,i was mistaken1 and that what ,i thought to be the general will was not so4 ,on his own principles laid down elsewhere1 ,rousseau would have to admit that it proves nothing of the sort1 except in so far as the other voters have been guided by the general interest4 ,though he sometimes affirms the opposite1 there is no security on his principles that the will of the majority will be the ,general ,will4 ,at the most it can only be said that there is a greater chance of its being general than of the will of any selected class of persons not being led away by corporate interests4 ,the justification of democracy is not that it is always right1 even in intention1 but that it is more general than any other kind of supreme power4 ,fundamentally1 however1 the doctrine of the ,general ,will is independent of these contradictions4 ,apart from ,kant's narrow and rigid logic1 it is essentially one with his doctrine of the autonomy of the will4 ,kant takes ,rousseau's political theory1 and applies it to ethics as a whole4 ,the germ of mis application is already found in ,rousseau's own work2 for he protests more than once against attempts to treat moral and political philosophy apart1 as distinct studies1 and asserts their absolute unity4 ,this is brought out clearly in the ,social ,contract 7,book ,i1 chap1 viii71 where he is speaking of the change brought about by the establishment of society4 ,the passage from the state of nature to the civil state produces a very remarkable change in man1 by substituting justice for instinct in his conduct1 and giving his actions the morality they had hitherto lacked4444 ,what man loses by the social contract is his natural liberty and an unlimited right to everything he tries to get and succeeds in getting2 what he gains is civil liberty 444 which is limited by the general will4444 ,we might1 over and above all this1 add to what man acquires in the civil state moral liberty1 which alone makes him truly master of himself2 for the mere impulse of appetite is slavery1 while obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves is liberty4 ,this one chapter contains the gist of the ,kantian moral philosophy1 and makes it quite clear that ,rousseau perceived its application to ethics as well as to politics4 ,the morality of our acts consists in their being directed in accordance with universal law2 acts in which we are guided merely by our passions are not moral4 ,further1 man can only possess freedom when his whole being is unified in the pursuit of a single end2 and1 as his whole being can be unified only in pursuit of a rational end1 which alone excludes contradiction1 only moral acts1 only men directing their lives by universal law1 are free4 ,in ,kantian language1 the will is autonomous 7i4e4 prescribes to itself its own law7 only when it is directed to a universal end2 when it is guided by selfish passions1 or particular considerations1 it is heteronomous 7i4e4 receives its law from something external to itself71 and in bondage4 ,rousseau1 as he says 7,book ,i1 chap1 viii71 was not directly concerned with the ethical sense of the word liberty1 and ,kant was1 therefore1 left to develop the doctrine into a system2 but the phrases of this chapter prove false the view that the doctrine of a ,real ,will arises first in connection with politics1 and is only transferred thence to moral philosophy4 ,rousseau bases his political doctrine throughout on his view of human freedom2 it is because man is a free agent capable of being determined by a universal law prescribed by himself that the ,state is in like manner capable of realising the ,general ,will1 that is1 of prescribing to itself and its members a similar universal law4 ,the ,general ,will1 then1 is the application of human freedom to political institutions4 ,before the value of this conception can be determined1 there is a criticism to be met4 ,the freedom which is realised in the ,general ,will1 we are told1 is the freedom of the ,state as a whole2 but the ,state exists to secure individual freedom for its members4 ,a free ,state may be tyrannical2 a despot may allow his subjects every freedom4 ,what guarantee is there that the ,state1 in freeing itself1 will not enslave its members8 ,this criticism has been made with such regularity that it has to be answered in some detail4 ,the problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate1 and in which each1 while uniting himself with all1 may still obey himself alone1 and remain as free as before4 ,the clauses of the contract 444 are everywhere the same and everywhere tacitly admitted and recognised4444 ,these clauses1 properly understood1 may be reduced to one--the total alienation of each associate1 together with all his rights1 to the whole community4442 for1 if the individuals retained certain rights1 as there would be no common superior to decide between them and the public1 each1 being on one point his own judge1 would ask to be so on all1 and the state of nature would continue 7,book ,i1 chap4 vi74 ,rousseau sees clearly that it is impossible to place any limits upon the power of the ,state2 when the people combine into a ,state1 they must in the end submit to be guided in all things by the will of the effective majority4 ,limited ,sovereignty is a contradiction in terms2 the ,sovereign has a right to all that reason allows it1 and as soon as reason demands that the ,state shall interfere1 no appeal to individual rights can be made4 ,what is best for the ,state must be suffered by the individual4 ,this1 however1 is very far from meaning that the ruling power ought1 or has the moral right1 to interfere in every particular case4 ,rousseau has been subjected to much foolish criticism because1 after upholding the ,state's absolute supremacy1 he goes on 7,book ,,ii1 chap1 iv7 to speak of the limits of the sovereign power4 ,there is no contradiction whatsoever4 ,wherever ,state intervention is for the best1 the ,state has a right to intervene2 but it has no moral right1 though it must have a legal right1 to intervene where it is not for the best4 ,the ,general ,will1 being always in the right1 will intervene only when intervention is proper4 ,the ,sovereign1 therefore1 cannot impose upon its subjects any fetters that are useless to the community1 nor can it even wish to do so4 ,as1 however1 the infallibility of the ,general ,will is not enough to make the ,state infallible1 there still remains an objection4 ,since the ,general ,will cannot always be arrived at1 who is to judge whether an act of intervention is justified8 ,rousseau's answer fails to satisfy many of his critics4 ,each man alienates1 ,i admit1 by the social compact1 only such part of his powers1 goods and liberty as it is important for the community to control2 but it must also be granted that the ,sovereign is sole judge of what is important4 ,this1 we are told1 is mere ,state tyranny over again4 ,but how is it possible to avoid such a conclusion8 ,rousseau has already given his reasons for objecting to a limited ,sovereignty 7,book ,i1 chap1 vi73 it follows absolutely that we must take the best machinery we can find for the execution of the ,state's functions4 ,no doubt the machinery will be imperfect2 but we can only try to get as near the ,general ,will as possible1 without hoping to realise it fully4 ,the answer1 therefore1 to the critics who hold that1 in securing civil liberty ,rousseau has sacrificed the individual may be put after this fashion4 ,liberty is not a merely negative conception2 it does not consist solely in the absence of restraint4 ,the purest individualist1 ,herbert ,spencer for example1 would grant that a certain amount of ,state interference is necessary to secure liberty2 but as soon as this idea of securing liberty is admitted in the smallest degree1 the whole idea has undergone profound modification4 ,it can no longer be claimed that every interference on the part of the ,state lessens the liberty of the individual2 the liberty-fund theory is as untenable as that of the wages-fund3 the members of a ,state may be more free when all are restrained from doing one another mutual damage than when any one is left free to enslave another or be himself enslaved4 ,this principle once admitted1 the precise amount of ,state interference that is necessary to secure freedom will be always a matter for particular discussion2 every case must be decided on its own merits1 and1 in right1 the ,sovereign will be omnipotent1 or subject only to the law of reason4 ,it has often been held that ,rousseau cannot really have inspired the ,french ,revolution because this view is totally inconsistent with the rights of man1 which the revolutionaries so fervently proclaimed4 ,if every right is alienated in the ,social ,contract1 what sense can there be in talking of natural rights afterwards8 ,this1 however1 is to misrepresent ,rousseau's position4 ,the rights of man as they are preached by the modern individualist1 are not the rights of which ,rousseau and the revolutionaries were thinking4 ,we have seen that the theory of the ,social ,contract is founded on human freedom3 this freedom carries with it1 in ,rousseau's view1 the guarantee of its own permanence2 it is inalienable and indestructible4 ,when1 therefore1 government becomes despotic1 it has no more right over its subjects than the master has over his slave 7,book ,i1 chap1 iv72 the question is then purely one of might4 ,in such cases1 appeal may be made either to the terms of the ,social ,contract1 or1 putting the same idea another way1 to the natural right of human freedom4 ,this natural right is in no sense inconsistent with the complete alienation supposed in the ,contract2 for the ,contract itself reposes on it and guarantees its maintenance4 ,the ,sovereign must1 therefore1 treat all its members alike2 but1 so long as it does this1 it remains omnipotent4 ,if it leaves the general for the particular1 and treats one man better than another1 it ceases to be ,sovereign2 but equality is already presupposed in the terms of the ,contract4 ,it is more profitable to attack ,rousseau for his facile identification of the interests of each of the citizens with those of all2 but here1 too1 most of the critics have abused their opportunity4 ,he does not maintain that there can be no opposition between a man's particular interests and the ,general ,will as present in him2 on the contrary1 he explicitly and consistently affirms the presence of such opposition 7,book ,i1 chap4 vii74 ,what he asserts is1 first1 that the ,sovereign1 as such1 cannot have any interest contrary to the interest of the citizens as a whole--that is obvious2 and1 secondly1 that it cannot have an interest contrary to that of any individual4 ,the second point ,rousseau proves by showing that the omnipotence of the ,sovereign is essential to the preservation of society1 which in turn is necessary for the individual4 ,his argument1 however1 really rests on the fundamental character of the ,general ,will4 ,he would admit that1 in any actual ,state1 the apparent interest of the many might often conflict with that of the few2 but he would contend that the real interest of ,state and individual alike1 being subject to universal law could not be such as to conflict with any other real interest4 ,the interest of the ,state1 in so far as it is directed by the ,general ,will1 must be the interest of every individual1 in so far as he is guided by his real will1 that is1 in so far as he is acting universally1 rationally and autonomously4 ,thus the justification of ,rousseau's theory of liberty returns to the point from which it set out--the omnipotence of the real will in ,state and individual4 ,it is in this sense that he speaks of man in the ,state as forced to be free by the ,general ,will1 much as ,kant might speak of a man's lower nature as forced to be free by the universal mandate of his higher1 more real and more rational will4 ,it is in this recognition of the ,state as a moral being1 with powers of determination similar to the powers of the individual mind1 that the significance of the ,general ,will ultimately lies4 ,even1 however1 among those who have recognised its meaning1 there are some who deny its value as a conception of political philosophy4 ,if1 they say1 the ,general ,will is not the ,will of ,all1 if it cannot be arrived at by a majority vote or by any system of voting whatsoever1 then it is nothing2 it is a mere abstraction1 neither general1 nor a ,i will4 ,this is1 of course1 precisely the criticism to which ,kant's real will is often subjected4 ,clearly1 it must be granted at once that the ,general ,will does not form the whole actual content of the will of every citizen4 ,regarded as actual1 it must always be qualified by in so far as or its equivalent4 ,this1 however1 is so far from destroying the value of the conception that therein lies its whole value4 ,in seeking the universal basis of society1 we are not seeking anything that is wholly actualised in any ,state1 though we must be seeking something which exists1 more or less perfectly1 in every ,state4 ,the point of the ,social ,contract theory1 as ,rousseau states it1 is that legitimate society exists by the consent of the people1 and acts by popular will4 ,active will1 and not force or even mere consent1 is the basis of the republican ,state1 which can only possess this character because individual wills are not really self-sufficient and separate1 but complementary and inter-dependent4 ,the answer to the question ,why ought ,i to obey the ,general ,will8 is that the ,general ,will exists in me and not outside me4 ,i am obeying only myself1 as ,rousseau says4 ,the ,state is not a mere accident of human history1 a mere device for the protection of life and property2 it responds to a fundamental need of human nature1 and is rooted in the character of the individuals who compose it4 ,the whole complex of human institutions is not a mere artificial structure2 it is the expression of the mutual dependence and fellowship of men4 ,if it means anything1 the theory of the ,general ,will means that the ,state is natural1 and the state of nature an abstraction4 ,without this basis of will and natural need1 no society could for a moment subsist2 the ,state exists and claims our obedience because it is a natural extension of our personality4 ,the problem1 however1 still remains of making the ,general ,will1 in any particular ,state1 active and conscious4 ,it is clear that there are ,states in which visible and recognised institutions hardly answer in any respect to its requirements4 ,even in such ,states1 however1 there is a limit to tyranny2 deep down1 in immemorial customs with which the despot dare not interfere1 the ,general ,will is still active and important4 ,it does not reside merely in the outward and visible organisation of social institutions1 in that complex of formal associations which we may call the ,state2 its roots go deeper and its branches spread further4 ,it is realised1 in greater or less degree1 in the whole life of the community1 in the entire complex of private and public relations which1 in the widest sense1 may be called ,society4 ,we may recognise it not only in a ,parliament1 a ,church1 a ,university or a ,trade ,union1 but also in the most intimate human relationships1 and the most trivial1 as well as the most vital1 social customs4 ,but1 if all these things go to the making of the ,general ,will in every community1 the ,general ,will has1 for politics1 primarily a narrower sense4 ,the problem here is to secure its supremacy in the official institutions and public councils of the nation4 ,this is the question to which ,rousseau chiefly addressed himself4 ,here1 too1 we shall find the ,general ,will the best possible conception for the guidance of political endeavour ,for the ,general ,will is realised not when that is done which is best for the community1 but when1 in addition1 the community as a whole has willed the doing of it4 ,the ,general ,will demands not only good government1 but also self-government--not only rational conduct1 but good-will4 ,this is what some of ,rousseau's admirers are apt to forget when they use his argument1 as he himself was sometimes inclined to use it1 in support of pure aristocracy4 ,rousseau said that aristocracy was the best of all governments1 but he said also that it was the worst of all usurpers of ,sovereignty4 ,nor must it be forgotten that he expressly specified elective aristocracy4 ,there is no ,general ,will unless the people wills the good4 ,general ,will may be embodied in one man willing universally2 but it can only be embodied in the ,state when the mass of the citizens so wills4 ,the will must be general in two senses3 in the sense in which ,rousseau used the word1 it must be general in its object1 i4e4 universal2 but it must also be generally held1 i4e4 common to all or to the majority4#a ,the ,general ,will is1 then1 above all a universal and1 in the ,kantian sense1 a rational will4 ,it would be possible to find in ,rousseau many more anticipations of the views of ,kant2 but it is better here to confine comment to an important difference between them4 ,it is surprising to find in ,kant1 the originator of modern intellectualism1 and in ,rousseau1 the great apostle of sentiment1 an essentially similar view on the nature and function of the will4 ,their views1 however1 present a difference2 for1 whereas the moving force of ,kant's moral imperative is purely rational1 ,rousseau finds the sanction of his ,general ,will in human feeling itself4 ,as we can see from a passage in the original draft of the ,social ,contract1 the ,general ,will remains purely rational4 ,no-one will dispute that the ,general ,will is in each individual a pure act of the understanding1 which reasons while the passions are silent on what a man may demand of his neighbour and on what his neighbour has a right to demand of him4 ,the will remains purely rational1 but ,rousseau feels that it needs an external motive power4 ,if natural law1 he writes1 were written only on the tablets of human reason it would be incapable of guiding the greater part of our actions2 but it is also graven on the heart of man in characters that cannot be effaced1 and it is there it speaks to him more strongly than all the precepts of the philosophers 7from an unfinished essay on ,the ,state of ,war74 ,the nature of this guiding sentiment is explained in the ,discourse on ,inequality 7p4 #aig1 note #b71 where egoism 7amour-propre7 is contrasted with self-respect 7amour de soi74 ,naturally1 ,rousseau holds1 man does not want everything for himself1 and nothing for others4 ,egoism and altruism are both one-sided qualities arising out of the perversion of man's1 natural goodness4 ,man is born good1 that is1 man's nature really makes him desire only to be treated as one among others1 to share equally4 ,this natural love of equality 7amour de soi7 includes love of others as well as love of self1 and egoism1 loving one's self at the expense of others1 is an unnatural and perverted condition4 ,the rational precepts of the ,general ,will1 therefore1 find an echo in the heart of the natural man1 and1 if we can only secure the human being against perversion by existing societies1 the ,general ,will can be made actual4 ,this is the meeting-point of ,rousseau's educational with his political theory4 ,his view as a whole can be studied only by taking together the ,social ,contract and the ,emile as explained by the ,letters on the ,mount and other works4 ,the fundamental dogma of the natural goodness of man finds no place directly in the ,social ,contract2 but it lurks behind the whole of his political theory1 and is indeed1 throughout1 his master-conception4 ,his educational1 his religious1 his political and his ethical ideas are all inspired by a single consistent attitude4 ,here we have been attending only to his political theory2 in the volume which is to follow1 containing the ,letters on the ,mount and other works1 some attempt will be made to draw the various threads together and estimate his work as a whole4 ,the political works1 however1 can be read separately1 and the ,social ,contract itself is still by far the best of all text-books of political philosophy4 ,rousseau's political influence1 so far from being dead1 is every day increasing2 and as new generations and new classes of men come to the study of his work1 his conceptions1 often hazy and undeveloped1 but nearly always of lasting value1 will assuredly form the basis of a new political philosophy1 in which they will be taken up and transformed4 ,this new philosophy is the work of the future2 but1 rooted upon the conception of ,rousseau1 it will stretch far back into the past4 ,of our time1 it will be for all time2 its solutions will be at once relatively permanent and ceaselessly progressive4 ,g4 ,d4 ,h4 ,,cole4 #a ,the term general will means1 in ,rousseau1 not so much will held by several persons1 as will having a general 7universal7 object4 ,this is often misunderstood2 but the mistake matters the less1 because the ,general ,will must1 in fact1 be both4 ,a ,,note ,,on ,,books ,there are few good books in ,english on ,rousseau's politics4 ,by far the best treatment is to be found in ,mr4 ,bernard ,bosanquet's ,philosophical ,theory of the ,state4 ,viscount ,morley's ,rousseau is a good life1 but is not of much use as a criticism of views2 ,mr4 ,w4 ,boyd's ,the ,educational ,theory of ,rousseau contains some fairly good chapters on the political views4 ,d4 ,g4 ,ritchie's ,darwin and ,hegel includes an admirable essay on ,the ,social ,contract ,theory and another on ,sovereignty4 ,the ,english translation of ,professor ,gran's ,rousseau is an interesting biography4 ,in ,french1 there is a good cheap edition of ,rousseau's complete works published by ,hachette in thirteen volumes4 ,m4 ,dreyfus-,brisac's great edition of the ,contrat ,social is indispensable1 and there is a good small edition with notes by ,m4 ,georges ,beaulavon4 ,m4 ,faguet's study of ,rousseau in his ,dix-huitime sicle--tudes littraires and his ,politique compare de ,montesquieu1 ,voltaire et ,rousseau are useful1 though ,i am seldom in agreement with them4 ,m4 ,henri ,rodet's ,le ,contrat ,social et les ides politiques de ,j4 ,j4 ,rousseau is useful1 if not inspired1 and there are interesting works by ,,mm4 ,chuquet1 ,fabre and ,lematre4 ,the ,french translation of ,professor ,hffding's little volume on ,rousseau3 sa vie et sa philosophie is admirable4 ,miss ,foxley's translation of the ,emile1 especially of ,book ,v1 should be studied in connection with the ,social ,contract4 ,a companion volume1 containing the ,letters on the ,mount and other works1 will be issued shortly4 ,g4,d4,h4,c4 ,,bibliography ,,principal ,,works3 ,article in the ,mercure in answer to one entitled ,si le monde que nous habitons est une sphre ou une sphrode1 #agch2 ,le ,verger de ,mme4 de ,warens1 #agci2 ,sur la musique moderne1 #agdc2 ,si le rtablissement des ,sciences et des ,arts a contribu purer les ,murs1 prize essay1 #agej1 translated by ,r4 ,wynne1 #ageb1 by anonymous author1 #agfj1 by ,h4 ,smithers1 #ahah2 ,devin du ,village 7opera71 #agec1 translated by ,c4 ,burney1 #agff2 ,narcisse1 ou ,amant de lui-mme1 #agec2 ,lettre sur la musique ,francaise1 #agec2 ,sur l'origine de l'ingalit parmi les hommes1 #agee2 ,discours sur deux principes avancs par ,rameau1 #agee2 ,sur l'conomie politique1 #ageh2 ,letter to d',alembert on his article ,genve in the ,encyclopdie1 #ageh1 translated #ageie ,lettres ,voltaire1 #agei2 ,julie1 ou la nouvelle ,hlose1 first published under the title of ,lettres de deux amants1 habitants d'une petite ville au pied des ,alpes1 etc1 #agfa2 ,contrat ,social1 or ,principes du droit politique1 #agfb2 ,emile1 ou ,de l',education1 #agfb2 ,lettre ,christophe de ,beaumont1 ,archevque de ,paris1 #agfc2 ,alle de ,silvie 7poem71 #agfc2 ,lettres crites de la ,montagne1 #agfd2 ,de l'imitation thtrale1 #agfd2 ,dictionnaire de musique1 #agfg1 translated by ,w4 ,waring1 #aggi2 ,lettres sur son exil du ,canton de ,berne1 #aggj4 ,,posthumous ,,works3 ,emile et ,sophie1 #aghj2 ,les consolations des misres de ma vie1 #agha2 ,considrations sur le gouvernement de ,pologne1 #aghb2 ,les ,confessions1 and ,rveries du ,promeneur ,solitaire1 #d vols41 #aghb-i2 ,nouveau ,ddale1 #ahja2 ,la ,botanique de ,j4 ,j4 ,rousseau1 #ahje2 translated1 with additional letters1 by ,t4 ,martyn1 #aghe1 #gth edition1 #ahjg2 ,testament de ,j4 ,j4 ,rousseau1 #ahbj4 ,,translations3 ,hlose 7,eloisa71 #agfa1 with a sequel found after the author's death1 #aghd1 #agie1 #ahaj2 ,emile1 by ,nugent1 #agfc2 anonymous translator the same year2 abridged and annotated by ,w4 ,h4 ,payne1 #ahic2 ,emile et ,sophie1 by ,nugent1 #agfe 7871 by the translator of ,eloisa1 #agfg2 ,contrat ,social1 #agfd1 #agia1 in vol4 iii4 of ,political ,classics1 #agie2 #ahdj 7871 by ,r4 ,m4 ,harrington1 with ,introduction by ,e4 ,l4 ,walter1 #ahic2 by ,h4 ,j4 ,tozer #ahie1 #aijb1 #aije2 ,confessions1 #b vols41 #aghc2 #agif-ij1 #ahfa1 #ahia 7,masterpieces of ,foreign ,authors71 abridged from #ahif edition1 with preface by ,g4 ,j4 ,holyoake1 #aheg2 complete translation 7privately printed71 #b vols41 #ahif2 with ,introduction by ,hesketh ,milis 7,sisley ,books71 #aijg2 the second part1 with a new collection of letters1 #c vols41 #agia4 ,,works3 #agfd 7#f vols472 #agfi 7#aa vols472 #aggd 7,london1 #i vols472 #aghb1 etc4 7#ag vols472 #agij 7#cc vols472 #agij 7#cj vols41 or #ce72 #aghh-ic 7#ci vols472 #agic-ahjj 7,didot1 #ah vols471 and later editions from this same firm2 ,musset-,pathay1 #ahbc-f4 ,,miscellaneous ,,works3 #e vols41 #agfg4 ,,posthumous ,,works3 #aghb1 #aghc2 uvres indites 7,musset-,pathay71 #ahbe1 #ahcc2 ,fragments indits1 etc41 by ,a4 de ,bougy1 #ahec2 uvres et ,correspondence indites 7,streckeisen-,moultou71 #ahfa2 ,fragments indits2 ,recherches biographiques et littraires1 ,a4 ,jansen1 #ahhb4 ,works translated from the ,french1 #aj vols41 #aggc-gd4 ,,letters3 ,sur diffrents ,sujets1 #e vols41 #agdj-ec2 ,lettres nouvelles sur le motif de sa retraite la ,campagne1 adresses ,m4 de ,malesherbes1 #aghj2 ,nouvelles lettres1 #aghi2 ,lettres au citoyen ,lenieps1 etc1 #agic 7872 ,correspondance originate et incite avec ,mme4 ,latour de ,tranqueville et ,m4 du ,peyrou1 #b vols41 #ahjc2 ,lettres indites ,mme4 d',epinay 7see ,memoirs of ,mme4 d',epinay71 #ahah2 ,lettres de ,voltaire et de ,rousseau ,c4 ,j4 ,panckoucke1 #ahbh2 ,lettres indites ,m4 ,m4 ,rey1 #aheh2 ,lettres ,mme4 ,dupin 7in ,le ,portefeuille de ,mme4 ,dupin71 #ahhd2 ,lettres indites 7correspondence with ,mme4 ,roy de ,latour71 published by ,h4 de ,rothschild1 with preface by ,l4 ,claretie1 #ahib2 ,lettres 7between ,rousseau and ,henriette71 published by ,h4 ,buffenoir1 #aijb2 ,correspondance avec ,lonard ,usteri1 #aiaj4 ,,translations3 ,original letters to ,m4 de ,malesherbes1 d',alembert1 ,mme4 la ,m4 de ,luxembourg1 etc41 #agii1 #ahbj2 ,eighteen letters to ,mme4 d',houdetot1 ,october #ageg-,march #ageh1 #aije4 ,,life1 etc43 ,j4 ,h4 ,fuessli1 ,remarks on the ,writings and ,conduct of ,jean ,jacques ,rousseau1 #agfg2 ,stal-,holstein 7,baroness de ,rocco71 ,letters on the ,work and ,character of ,jean ,jacques ,rousseau 7translation71 #aghi1 #ahad2 ,j4 ,morley1 ,rousseau1 #ahgc1 #ahhf2 ,h4 ,g4 ,graham1 ,rousseau 7,foreign ,classics for ,english ,readers71 #ahhb2 ,t4 ,davidson1 ,rousseau and ,education according to ,nature 7,great ,educators71 vol4 ix41 #ahih2 ,j4 ,texte1 ,jean ,jacques ,rousseau and the ,cosmopolitan ,spirit in ,literature1 etc4 7translation71 #ahii2 ,h4 ,h4 ,hudson1 ,rousseau and ,naturalism in ,life and ,thought 7,world's ,epoch ,makers71 #aijc2 ,f4 ,macdonald1 ,jean ,jacques ,rousseau1 a new criticism1 #aijf2 ,j4 ,c4 ,collins1 ,voltaire1 ,montesquieu1 and ,rousseau in ,england1 #aijh4 ,,contents ,,introduction ,,the ,,social ,,contract ,,book ,i ,,foreword ,in which it is inquired why man passes from the state of nature to the state of society and what are the essential conditions of the compact4 ,i ,the ,subject of the first ,book ,,ii ,the first ,societies ,,iii ,the ,right of the ,strongest ,,iv ,slavery ,v ,that we must always go back to a first ,convention ,,vi ,the ,social ,compact ,,vii ,the ,sovereign ,,viii ,the ,civil ,state ,,ix ,real ,property ,,book ,,ii ,which treats of legislation4 ,i ,that ,sovereignty is inalienable ,,ii ,that ,sovereignty is indivisible ,,iii ,whether the general ,will is fallible ,,iv ,the ,limits of the ,sovereign ,power ,v ,the ,right of ,life and ,death ,,vi ,law ,,vii ,the ,legislator ,,viii ,the ,people ,,ix ,the ,people 7continued7 ,x ,the ,people 7continued7 ,,xi ,the various ,systems of ,legislation ,,xii ,the ,division of the ,laws ,,book ,,iii ,which treats of political laws1 that is to say1 of the form of government4 ,i ,government in ,general ,,ii ,the constituent ,principle in the various ,forms of ,government ,,iii ,the ,division of ,governments ,,iv ,democracy ,v ,aristocracy ,,vi ,monarchy ,,vii ,mixed ,governments ,,viii ,that all ,forms of ,government do not suit all ,countries ,,ix ,the ,marks of a good ,government ,x ,the ,abuse of ,government and its ,tendency to ,degenerate ,,xi ,the ,death of the ,body ,politic ,,xii ,how the ,sovereign ,authority maintains itself ,,xiii ,how the ,sovereign ,authority maintains itself 7continued7 ,,xiv ,how the ,sovereign ,authority maintains itself 7continued7 ,,xv ,deputies or ,representatives ,,xvi ,that the ,institution of ,government is not a ,contract ,,xvii ,the ,institution of ,government ,,xviii ,how to check the ,usurpations of ,government ,,book ,,iv ,which treats further of political laws and sets forth the means of strengthening the ,constitution of the ,state4 ,i ,that the general ,will is indestructible ,,ii ,voting ,,iii ,elections ,,iv ,the ,roman ,comitia ,v ,the ,tribunate ,,vi ,the ,dictatorship ,,vii ,the ,censorship ,,viii ,civil ,religion ,,ix ,conclusion ,a ,,discourse ,,on ,,the ,,arts ,,and ,,sciences ,a ,,discourse ,,on ,,the ,,origin ,,of ,,inequality -- ,appendix ,a ,,discourse ,,on ,,political ,,economy ,,the ,,social ,,contract ,,or ,,principles ,,of ,,political ,,right ,fderis quas ,dicamus leges4 7,vergil1 neid ,,xi47 ,,foreword ,this little treatise is part of a longer work which ,i began years ago without realising my limitations1 and long since abandoned4 ,of the various fragments that might have been extracted from what ,i wrote1 this is the most considerable1 and1 ,i think1 the least unworthy of being offered to the public4 ,the rest no longer exists4 ,,book ,i ,i mean to inquire if1 in the civil order1 there can be any sure and legitimate rule of administration1 men being taken as they are and laws as they might be4 ,in this inquiry ,i shall endeavour always to unite what right sanctions with what is prescribed by interest1 in order that justice and utility may in no case be divided4 ,i enter upon my task without proving the importance of the subject4 ,i shall be asked if ,i am a prince or a legislator1 to write on politics4 ,i answer that ,i am neither1 and that is why ,i do so4 ,if ,i were a prince or a legislator1 ,i should not waste time in saying what wants doing2 ,i should do it1 or hold my peace4 ,as ,i was born a citizen of a free ,state1 and a member of the ,sovereign1 ,i feel that1 however feeble the influence my voice can have on public affairs1 the right of voting on them makes it my duty to study them3 and ,i am happy1 when ,i reflect upon governments1 to find my inquiries always furnish me with new reasons for loving that of my own country4 ,,chapter ,i ,,subject ,,of ,,the ,,first ,,book ,man is born free2 and everywhere he is in chains4 ,one thinks himself the master of others1 and still remains a greater slave than they4 ,how did this change come about8 ,i do not know4 ,what can make it legitimate8 ,that question ,i think ,i can answer4 ,if ,i took into account only force1 and the effects derived from it1 ,i should say3 ,as long as a people is compelled to obey1 and obeys1 it does well2 as soon as it can shake off the yoke1 and shakes it off1 it does still better2 for1 regaining its liberty by the same right as took it away1 either it is justified in resuming it1 or there was no justification for those who took it away4 ,but the social order is a sacred right which is the basis of all other rights4 ,nevertheless1 this right does not come from nature1 and must therefore be founded on conventions4 ,before coming to that1 ,i have to prove what ,i have just asserted4 ,,chapter ,,ii ,,the ,,first ,,societies ,the most ancient of all societies1 and the only one that is natural is the family3 and even so the children remain attached to the father only so long as they need him for their preservation4 ,as soon as this need ceases1 the natural bond is dissolved4 ,the children1 released from the obedience they owed to the father1 and the father1 released from the care he owed his children1 return equally to independence4 ,if they remain united1 they continue so no longer naturally1 but voluntarily2 and the family itself is then maintained only by convention4 ,this common liberty results from the nature of man4 ,his first law is to provide for his own preservation1 his first cares are those which he owes to himself2 and1 as soon as he reaches years of discretion1 he is the sole judge of the proper means of preserving himself1 and consequently becomes his own master4 ,the family then may be called the first model of political societies3 the ruler corresponds to the father1 and the people to the children2 and all1 being born free and equal1 alienate their liberty only for their own advantage4 ,the whole difference is that1 in the family1 the love of the father for his children repays him for the care he takes of them1 while1 in the ,state1 the pleasure of commanding takes the place of the love which the chief cannot have for the peoples under him4 ,grotius denies that all human power is established in favour of the governed1 and quotes slavery as an example4 ,his usual method of reasoning is constantly to establish right by fact4#a ,it would be possible to employ a more logical method1 but none could be more favourable to tyrants4 ,it is then1 according to ,grotius1 doubtful whether the human race belongs to a hundred men1 or that hundred men to the human race3 and1 throughout his book1 he seems to incline to the former alternative1 which is also the view of ,hobbes4 ,on this showing1 the human species is divided into so many herds of cattle1 each with its ruler1 who keeps guard over them for the purpose of devouring them4 ,as a shepherd is of a nature superior to that of his flock1 the shepherds of men1 i4e4 their rulers1 are of a nature superior to that of the peoples under them4 ,thus1 ,philo tells us1 the ,emperor ,caligula reasoned1 concluding equally well either that kings were gods1 or that men were beasts4 ,the reasoning of ,caligula agrees with that of ,hobbes and ,grotius4 ,aristotle1 before any of them1 had said that men are by no means equal naturally1 but that some are born for slavery1 and others for dominion4 ,aristotle was right2 but he took the effect for the cause4 ,nothing can be more certain than that every man born in slavery is born for slavery4 ,slaves lose everything in their chains1 even the desire of escaping from them3 they love their servitude1 as the comrades of ,ulysses loved their brutish condition4#b ,if then there are slaves by nature1 it is because there have been slaves against nature4 ,force made the first slaves1 and their cowardice perpetuated the condition4 ,i have said nothing of ,king ,adam1 or ,emperor ,noah1 father of the three great monarchs who shared out the universe1 like the children of ,saturn1 whom some scholars have recognised in them4 ,i trust to getting due thanks for my moderation2 for1 being a direct descendant of one of these princes1 perhaps of the eldest branch1 how do ,i know that a verification of titles might not leave me the legitimate king of the human race8 ,in any case1 there can be no doubt that ,adam was sovereign of the world1 as ,robinson ,crusoe was of his island1 as long as he was its only inhabitant2 and this empire had the advantage that the monarch1 safe on his throne1 had no rebellions1 wars1 or conspirators to fear4 #a ,learned inquiries into public right are often only the history of past abuses2 and troubling to study them too deeply is a profitless infatuation 7,essay on the ,interests of ,france in ,relation to its ,neighbours1 by the ,marquis d',argenson74 ,this is exactly what ,grotius has done4 #b ,see a short treatise of ,plutarch's entitled ,that ,animals ,reason4 ,,chapter ,,iii ,,the ,,right ,,of ,,the ,,strongest ,the strongest is never strong enough to be always the master1 unless he transforms strength into right1 and obedience into duty4 ,hence the right of the strongest1 which1 though to all seeming meant ironically1 is really laid down as a fundamental principle4 ,but are we never to have an explanation of this phrase8 ,force is a physical power1 and ,i fail to see what moral effect it can have4 ,to yield to force is an act of necessity1 not of will--at the most1 an act of prudence4 ,in what sense can it be a duty8 ,suppose for a moment that this so-called right exists4 ,i maintain that the sole result is a mass of inexplicable nonsense4 ,for1 if force creates right1 the effect changes with the cause3 every force that is greater than the first succeeds to its right4 ,as soon as it is possible to disobey with impunity1 disobedience is legitimate2 and1 the strongest being always in the right1 the only thing that matters is to act so as to become the strongest4 ,but what kind of right is that which perishes when force fails8 ,if we must obey perforce1 there is no need to obey because we ought2 and if we are not forced to obey1 we are under no obligation to do so4 ,clearly1 the word right adds nothing to force3 in this connection1 it means absolutely nothing4 ,obey the powers that be4 ,if this means yield to force1 it is a good precept1 but superfluous3 ,i can answer for its never being violated4 ,all power comes from ,god1 ,i admit2 but so does all sickness3 does that mean that we are forbidden to call in the doctor8 ,a brigand surprises me at the edge of a wood3 must ,i not merely surrender my purse on compulsion2 but1 even if ,i could withhold it1 am ,i in conscience bound to give it up8 ,for certainly the pistol he holds is also a power4 ,let us then admit that force does not create right1 and that we are obliged to obey only legitimate powers4 ,in that case1 my original question recurs4 ,,chapter ,,iv ,,slavery ,since no man has a natural authority over his fellow1 and force creates no right1 we must conclude that conventions form the basis of all legitimate authority among men4 ,if an individual1 says ,grotius1 can alienate his liberty and make himself the slave of a master1 why could not a whole people do the same and make itself subject to a king8 ,there are in this passage plenty of ambiguous words which would need explaining2 but let us confine ourselves to the word alienate4 ,to alienate is to give or to sell4 ,now1 a man who becomes the slave of another does not give himself2 he sells himself1 at the least for his subsistence3 but for what does a people sell itself8 ,a king is so far from furnishing his subjects with their subsistence that he gets his own only from them2 and1 according to ,rabelais1 kings do not live on nothing4 ,do subjects then give their persons on condition that the king takes their goods also8 ,i fail to see what they have left to preserve4 ,it will be said that the despot assures his subjects civil tranquillity4 ,granted2 but what do they gain1 if the wars his ambition brings down upon them1 his insatiable avidity1 and the vexatious conduct of his ministers press harder on them than their own dissensions would have done8 ,what do they gain1 if the very tranquillity they enjoy is one of their miseries8 ,tranquillity is found also in dungeons2 but is that enough to make them desirable places to live in8 ,the ,greeks imprisoned in the cave of the ,cyclops lived there very tranquilly1 while they were awaiting their turn to be devoured4 ,to say that a man gives himself gratuitously1 is to say what is absurd and inconceivable2 such an act is null and illegitimate1 from the mere fact that he who does it is out of his mind4 ,to say the same of a whole people is to suppose a people of madmen2 and madness creates no right4 ,even if each man could alienate himself1 he could not alienate his children3 they are born men and free2 their liberty belongs to them1 and no one but they has the right to dispose of it4 ,before they come to years of discretion1 the father can1 in their name1 lay down conditions for their preservation and well-being1 but he cannot give them1 irrevocably and without conditions3 such a gift is contrary to the ends of nature1 and exceeds the rights of paternity4 ,it would therefore be necessary1 in order to legitimise an arbitrary government1 that in every generation the people should be in a position to accept or reject it2 but1 were this so1 the government would be no longer arbitrary4 ,to renounce liberty is to renounce being a man1 to surrender the rights of humanity and even its duties4 ,for him who renounces everything no indemnity is possible4 ,such a renunciation is incompatible with man's nature2 to remove all liberty from his will is to remove all morality from his acts4 ,finally1 it is an empty and contradictory convention that sets up1 on the one side1 absolute authority1 and1 on the other1 unlimited obedience4 ,is it not clear that we can be under no obligation to a person from whom we have the right to exact everything8 ,does not this condition alone1 in the absence of equivalence or exchange1 in itself involve the nullity of the act8 ,for what right can my slave have against me1 when all that he has belongs to me1 and1 his right being mine1 this right of mine against myself is a phrase devoid of meaning8 ,grotius and the rest find in war another origin for the so-called right of slavery4 ,the victor having1 as they hold1 the right of killing the vanquished1 the latter can buy back his life at the price of his liberty2 and this convention is the more legitimate because it is to the advantage of both parties4 ,but it is clear that this supposed right to kill the conquered is by no means deducible from the state of war4 ,men1 from the mere fact that1 while they are living in their primitive independence1 they have no mutual relations stable enough to constitute either the state of peace or the state of war1 cannot be naturally enemies4 ,war is constituted by a relation between things1 and not between persons2 and1 as the state of war cannot arise out of simple personal relations1 but only out of real relations1 private war1 or war of man with man1 can exist neither in the state of nature1 where there is no constant property1 nor in the social state1 where everything is under the authority of the laws4 ,individual combats1 duels and encounters1 are acts which cannot constitute a state2 while the private wars1 authorised by the ,establishments of ,louis ,,ix1 ,king of ,france1 and suspended by the ,peace of ,god1 are abuses of feudalism1 in itself an absurd system if ever there was one1 and contrary to the principles of natural right and to all good polity4 ,war then is a relation1 not between man and man1 but between ,state and ,state1 and individuals are enemies only accidentally1 not as men1 nor even as citizens1#a but as soldiers2 not as members of their country1 but as its defenders4 ,finally1 each ,state can have for enemies only other ,states1 and not men2 for between things disparate in nature there can be no real relation4 ,furthermore1 this principle is in conformity with the established rules of all times and the constant practice of all civilised peoples4 ,declarations of war are intimations less to powers than to their subjects4 ,the foreigner1 whether king1 individual1 or people1 who robs1 kills or detains the subjects1 without declaring war on the prince1 is not an enemy1 but a brigand4 ,even in real war1 a just prince1 while laying hands1 in the enemy's country1 on all that belongs to the public1 respects the lives and goods of individuals3 he respects rights on which his own are founded4 ,the object of the war being the destruction of the hostile ,state1 the other side has a right to kill its defenders1 while they are bearing arms2 but as soon as they lay them down and surrender1 they cease to be enemies or instruments of the enemy1 and become once more merely men1 whose life no one has any right to take4 ,sometimes it is possible to kill the ,state without killing a single one of its members2 and war gives no right which is not necessary to the gaining of its object4 ,these principles are not those of ,grotius3 they are not based on the authority of poets1 but derived from the nature of reality and based on reason4 ,the right of conquest has no foundation other than the right of the strongest4 ,if war does not give the conqueror the right to massacre the conquered peoples1 the right to enslave them cannot be based upon a right which does not exist ,no one has a right to kill an enemy except when he cannot make him a slave1 and the right to enslave him cannot therefore be derived from the right to kill him4 ,it is accordingly an unfair exchange to make him buy at the price of his liberty his life1 over which the victor holds no right4 ,is it not clear that there is a vicious circle in founding the right of life and death on the right of slavery1 and the right of slavery on the right of life and death8 ,even if we assume this terrible right to kill everybody1 ,i maintain that a slave made in war1 or a conquered people1 is under no obligation to a master1 except to obey him as far as he is compelled to do so4 ,by taking an equivalent for his life1 the victor has not done him a favour2 instead of killing him without profit1 he has killed him usefully4 ,so far then is he from acquiring over him any authority in addition to that of force1 that the state of war continues to subsist between them3 their mutual relation is the effect of it1 and the usage of the right of war does not imply a treaty of peace4 ,a convention has indeed been made2 but this convention1 so far from destroying the state of war1 presupposes its continuance4 ,so1 from whatever aspect we regard the question1 the right of slavery is null and void1 not only as being illegitimate1 but also because it is absurd and meaningless4 ,the words slave and right contradict each other1 and are mutually exclusive4 ,it will always be equally foolish for a man to say to a man or to a people3 ,i make with you a convention wholly at your expense and wholly to my advantage2 ,i shall keep it as long as ,i like1 and you will keep it as long as ,i like4 #a ,the ,romans1 who understood and respected the right of war more than any other nation on earth1 carried their scruples on this head so far that a citizen was not allowed to serve as a volunteer without engaging himself expressly against the enemy1 and against such and such an enemy by name4 ,a legion in which the younger ,cato was seeing his first service under ,popilius having been reconstructed1 the elder ,cato wrote to ,popilius that1 if he wished his son to continue serving under him1 he must administer to him a new military oath1 because1 the first having been annulled1 he was no longer able to bear arms against the enemy4 ,the same ,cato wrote to his son telling him to take great care not to go into battle before taking this new oath4 ,i know that the siege of ,clusium and other isolated events can be quoted against me2 but ,i am citing laws and customs4 ,the ,romans are the people that least often transgressed its laws2 and no other people has had such good ones4 ,,chapter ,v ,,that ,,we ,,must ,,always ,,go ,,back ,,to ,a ,,first ,,convention ,even if ,i granted all that ,i have been refuting1 the friends of despotism would be no better off4 ,there will always be a great difference between subduing a multitude and ruling a society4 ,even if scattered individuals were successively enslaved by one man1 however numerous they might be1 ,i still see no more than a master and his slaves1 and certainly not a people and its ruler2 ,i see what may be termed an aggregation1 but not an association2 there is as yet neither public good nor body politic4 ,the man in question1 even if he has enslaved half the world1 is still only an individual2 his interest1 apart from that of others1 is still a purely private interest4 ,if this same man comes to die1 his empire1 after him1 remains scattered and without unity1 as an oak falls and dissolves into a heap of ashes when the fire has consumed it4 ,a people1 says ,grotius1 can give itself to a king4 ,then1 according to ,grotius1 a people is a people before it gives itself4 ,the gift is itself a civil act1 and implies public deliberation4 ,it would be better1 before examining the act by which a people gives itself to a king1 to examine that by which it has become a people2 for this act1 being necessarily prior to the other1 is the true foundation of society4 ,indeed1 if there were no prior convention1 where1 unless the election were unanimous1 would be the obligation on the minority to submit to the choice of the majority8 ,how have a hundred men who wish for a master the right to vote on behalf of ten who do not8 ,the law of majority voting is itself something established by convention1 and presupposes unanimity1 on one occasion at least4 ,,chapter ,,vi ,,the ,,social ,,compact ,i suppose men to have reached the point at which the obstacles in the way of their preservation in the state of nature show their power of resistance to be greater than the resources at the disposal of each individual for his maintenance in that state4 ,that primitive condition can then subsist no longer2 and the human race would perish unless it changed its manner of existence4 ,but1 as men cannot engender new forces1 but only unite and direct existing ones1 they have no other means of preserving themselves than the formation1 by aggregation1 of a sum of forces great enough to overcome the resistance4 ,these they have to bring into play by means of a single motive power1 and cause to act in concert4 ,this sum of forces can arise only where several persons come together3 but1 as the force and liberty of each man are the chief instruments of his self-preservation1 how can he pledge them without harming his own interests1 and neglecting the care he owes to himself8 ,this difficulty1 in its bearing on my present subject1 may be stated in the following terms-- ,the problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate1 and in which each1 while uniting himself with all1 may still obey himself alone1 and remain as free as before4 ,this is the fundamental problem of which the ,social ,contract provides the solution4 ,the clauses of this contract are so determined by the nature of the act that the slightest modification would make them vain and ineffective2 so that1 although they have perhaps never been formally set forth1 they are everywhere the same and everywhere tacitly admitted and recognised1 until1 on the violation of the social compact1 each regains his original rights and resumes his natural liberty1 while losing the conventional liberty in favour of which he renounced it4 ,these clauses1 properly understood1 may be reduced to one--the total alienation of each associate1 together with all his rights1 to the whole community for1 in the first place1 as each gives himself absolutely1 the conditions are the same for all2 and1 this being so1 no one has any interest in making them burdensome to others4 ,moreover1 the alienation being without reserve1 the union is as perfect as it can be1 and no associate has anything more to demand3 for1 if the individuals retained certain rights1 as there would be no common superior to decide between them and the public1 each1 being on one point his own judge1 would ask to be so on all2 the state of nature would thus continue1 and the association would necessarily become inoperative or tyrannical4 ,finally1 each man1 in giving himself to all1 gives himself to nobody2 and as there is no associate over whom he does not acquire the same right as he yields others over himself1 he gains an equivalent for everything he loses1 and an increase of force for the preservation of what he has4 ,if then we discard from the social compact what is not of its essence1 we shall find that it reduces itself to the following terms-- ,each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will1 and1 in our corporate capacity1 we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole4 ,at once1 in place of the individual personality of each contracting party1 this act of association creates a moral and collective body1 composed of as many members as the assembly contains votes1 and receiving from this act its unity1 its common identity1 its life and its will4 ,this public person1 so formed by the union of all other persons1 formerly took the name of city1#a and now takes that of ,republic or body politic2 it is called by its members ,state when passive1 ,sovereign when active1 and ,power when compared with others like itself4 ,those who are associated in it take collectively the name of people1 and severally are called citizens1 as sharing in the sovereign power1 and subjects1 as being under the laws of the ,state4 ,but these terms are often confused and taken one for another3 it is enough to know how to distinguish them when they are being used with precision4 #a ,the real meaning of this word has been almost wholly lost in modern times2 most people mistake a town for a city1 and a townsman for a citizen4 ,they do not know that houses make a town1 but citizens a city4 ,the same mistake long ago cost the ,carthaginians dear4 ,i have never read of the title of citizens being given to the subjects of any prince1 not even the ancient ,macedonians or the ,english of to-day1 though they are nearer liberty than any one else4 ,the ,french alone everywhere familiarly adopt the name of citizens1 because1 as can be seen from their dictionaries1 they have no idea of its meaning2 otherwise they would be guilty in usurping it1 of the crime of lse-majest3 among them1 the name expresses a virtue1 and not a right4 ,when ,bodin spoke of our citizens and townsmen1 he fell into a bad blunder in taking the one class for the other4 ,m4 d',alembert has avoided the error1 and1 in his article on ,geneva1 has clearly distinguished the four orders of men 7or even five1 counting mere foreigners7 who dwell in our town1 of which two only compose the ,republic4 ,no other ,french writer1 to my knowledge1 has understood the real meaning of the word citizen4 ,,chapter ,,vii ,,the ,,sovereign ,this formula shows us that the act of association comprises a mutual undertaking between the public and the individuals1 and that each individual1 in making a contract1 as we may say1 with himself1 is bound in a double capacity2 as a member of the ,sovereign he is bound to the individuals1 and as a member of the ,state to the ,sovereign4 ,but the maxim of civil right1 that no one is bound by undertakings made to himself1 does not apply in this case2 for there is a great difference between incurring an obligation to yourself and incurring one to a whole of which you form a part4 ,attention must further be called to the fact that public deliberation1 while competent to bind all the subjects to the ,sovereign1 because of the two different capacities in which each of them may be regarded1 cannot1 for the opposite reason1 bind the ,sovereign to itself2 and that it is consequently against the nature of the body politic for the ,sovereign to impose on itself a law which it cannot infringe4 ,being able to regard itself in only one capacity1 it is in the position of an individual who makes a contract with himself2 and this makes it clear that there neither is nor can be any kind of fundamental law binding on the body of the people--not even the social contract itself4 ,this does not mean that the body politic cannot enter into undertakings with others1 provided the contract is not infringed by them2 for in relation to what is external to it1 it becomes a simple being1 an individual4 ,but the body politic or the ,sovereign1 drawing its being wholly from the sanctity of the contract1 can never bind itself1 even to an outsider1 to do anything derogatory to the original act1 for instance1 to alienate any part of itself1 or to submit to another ,sovereign4 ,violation of the act by which it exists would be self-annihilation2 and that which is itself nothing can create nothing4 ,as soon as this multitude is so united in one body1 it is impossible to offend against one of the members without attacking the body1 and still more to offend against the body without the members resenting it4 ,duty and interest therefore equally oblige the two contracting parties to give each other help2 and the same men should seek to combine1 in their double capacity1 all the advantages dependent upon that capacity4 ,again1 the ,sovereign1 being formed wholly of the individuals who compose it1 neither has nor can have any interest contrary to theirs2 and consequently the sovereign power need give no guarantee to its subjects1 because it is impossible for the body to wish to hurt all its members4 ,we shall also see later on that ,it cannot hurt any in particular4 ,the ,sovereign1 merely by virtue of what it is1 is is always what it should be4 ,this1 however1 is not the case with the relation of the subjects to the ,sovereign1 which1 despite the common interest1 would have no security that they would fulfil their undertakings1 unless it found means to assure itself of their fidelity4 ,in fact1 each individual1 as a man1 may have a particular will contrary or dissimilar to the general will which he has as a citizen4 ,his particular interest may speak to him quite differently from the common interest3 his absolute and naturally independent existence may make him look upon what he owes to the common cause as a gratuitous contribution1 the loss of which will do less harm to others than the payment of it is burdensome to himself2 and1 regarding the moral person which constitutes the ,state as a persona ficta1 because not a man1 he may wish to enjoy the rights of citizenship without being ready to fulfil the duties of a subject4 ,the continuance of such an injustice could not but prove the undoing of the body politic4 ,in order then that the social compact may not be an empty formula1 it tacitly includes the undertaking1 which alone can give force to the rest1 that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so by the whole body4 ,this means nothing less than that he will be forced to be free2 for this is the condition which1 by giving each citizen to his country1 secures him against all personal dependence4 ,in this lies the key to the working of the political machine2 this alone legitimizes civil undertakings1 which1 without it1 would be absurd1 tyrannical1 and liable to the most frightful abuses4 ,,chapter ,,viii ,,the ,,civil ,,state ,the passage from the state of nature to the civil state produces a very remarkable change in man1 by substituting justice1 for instinct in his conduct1 and giving his actions the morality they had formerly lacked4 ,then only1 when the voice of duty takes the place of physical impulses and right of appetite1 does man1 who so far had considered only himself1 find that he is forced to act on different principles1 and to consult his reason before listening to his inclinations4 ,although1 in this state1 he deprives himself of some advantages which he got from nature1 he gains in return others so great1 his faculties are so stimulated and developed1 his ideas so extended1 his feelings so ennobled1 and his whole soul so uplifted1 that1 did not the abuses of this new condition often degrade him below that which he left1 he would be bound to bless continually the happy moment which took him from it for ever1 and1 instead of a stupid and unimaginative animal1 made him an intelligent being and a man4 ,let us draw up the whole account in terms easily commensurable4 ,what man loses by the social contract in his natural liberty and an unlimited right to everything he tries to get and succeeds in getting2 what he gains is civil liberty and the proprietorship of all he possesses4 ,if we are to avoid mistake in weighing one against the other1 we must clearly distinguish natural liberty1 which is bounded only by the strength of the individual1 from civil liberty1 which is limited by the general will2 and possession1 which is merely the effect of force or the right of the first occupier1 from property1 which can be founded only on a positive title4 ,we might1 over and above all this1 add1 to what man acquires in the civil state1 moral liberty1 which alone makes him truly master of himself2 for the mere impulse of appetite is slavery1 while obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves is liberty4 ,but ,i have already said too much on this head1 and the philosophical meaning of the word liberty does not now concern us4 ,,chapter ,,ix ,,real ,,property ,each member of the community gives himself to it1 at the moment of its foundation1 just as he is1 with all the resources at his command1 including the goods he possesses4 ,this act does not make possession1 in changing hands1 change its nature1 and becomes property in the hands of the ,sovereign2 but1 as the forces of the city are incomparably greater than those of an individual1 public possession is also1 in fact1 stronger and more irrevocable1 without being any more legitimate1 at any rate from the point of view of foreigners4 ,for the ,state1 in relation to its members1 is master of all their goods by the social contract1 which1 within the ,state1 is the basis of all rights2 but1 in relation to other powers1 it is so only by the right of the first occupier1 which it holds from its members4 ,the right of the first occupier1 though more real than the right of the strongest1 becomes a real right only when the right of property has already been established4 ,every man has naturally a right to everything he needs2 but the positive act which makes him proprietor of one thing excludes him from everything else4 ,having his share1 he ought to keep to it1 and can have no further right against the community4 ,this is why the right of the first occupier1 which in the state of nature is so weak1 claims the respect of every man in civil society4 ,in this right we are respecting not so much what belongs to another as what does not belong to ourselves4 ,in general1 to establish the right of the first occupier over a plot of ground1 the following conditions are necessary3 first1 the land must not yet be inhabited2 secondly1 a man must occupy only the amount he needs for his subsistence2 and1 in the third place1 possession must be taken1 not by an empty ceremony1 but by labour and cultivation1 the only sign of proprietorship that should be respected by others1 in default of a legal title4 ,in granting the right of first occupancy to necessity and labour1 are we not really stretching it as far as it can go8 ,is it possible to leave such a right unlimited8 ,is it to be enough to set foot on a plot of common ground1 in order to be able to call yourself at once the master of it8 ,is it to be enough that a man has the strength to expel others for a moment1 in order to establish his right to prevent them from ever returning8 ,how can a man or a people seize an immense territory and keep it from the rest of the world except by a punishable usurpation1 since all others are being robbed1 by such an act1 of the place of habitation and the means of subsistence which nature gave them in common8 ,when ,nuez ,balbao1 standing on the sea-shore1 took possession of the ,south ,seas and the whole of ,south ,america in the name of the crown of ,castille1 was that enough to dispossess all their actual inhabitants1 and to shut out from them all the princes of the world8 ,on such a showing1 these ceremonies are idly multiplied1 and the ,catholic ,king need only take possession all at once1 from his apartment1 of the whole universe1 merely making a subsequent reservation about what was already in the possession of other princes4 ,we can imagine how the lands of individuals1 where they were contiguous and came to be united1 became the public territory1 and how the right of ,sovereignty1 extending from the subjects over the lands they held1 became at once real and personal4 ,the possessors were thus made more dependent1 and the forces at their command used to guarantee their fidelity4 ,the advantage of this does not seem to have been felt by ancient monarchs1 who called themselves ,king of the ,persians1 ,scythians1 or ,macedonians1 and seemed to regard themselves more as rulers of men than as masters of a country4 ,those of the present day more cleverly call themselves ,kings of ,france1 ,spain1 ,england1 etc43 thus holding the land1 they are quite confident of holding the inhabitants4 ,the peculiar fact about this alienation is that1 in taking over the goods of individuals1 the community1 so far from despoiling them1 only assures them legitimate possession1 and changes usurpation into a true right and enjoyment into proprietorship4 ,thus the possessors1 being regarded as depositaries of the public good1 and having their rights1 respected by all the members of the ,state and maintained against foreign aggression by all its forces1 have1 by a cession which benefits both the public and still more themselves1 acquired1 so to speak1 all that they gave up4 ,this paradox may easily be explained by the distinction between the rights which the ,sovereign and the proprietor have over the same estate1 as we shall see later on4 ,it may also happen that men begin to unite one with another before they possess anything1 and that1 subsequently occupying a tract of country which is enough for all1 they enjoy it in common1 or share it out among themselves1 either equally or according to a scale fixed by they ,sovereign4 ,however the acquisition be made1 the right which each individual has to his own estate is always subordinate to the right which the community has over all3 without this1 there would be neither stability in the social tie1 nor real force in the exercise of ,sovereignty4 ,i shall end this chapter and this book by remarking on a fact on which the whole social system should rest3 i4e4 that1 instead of destroying natural inequality1 the fundamental compact substitutes1 for such physical inequality as nature may have set up between men1 an equality that is moral and legitimate1 and that men1 who may be unequal in strength or intelligence1 become every one equal by convention and legal right4#a ,,book ,,ii ,,chapter ,i ,,that ,,sovereignty ,,is ,,inalienable ,the first and most important deduction from the principles we have so far laid down is that the general will alone can direct the ,state according to the object for which it was instituted1 i4e4 the common good3 for if the clashing of particular interests made the establishment of societies necessary1 the agreement of these very interests made it possible4 ,the common element in these different interests is what forms the social tie2 and1 were there no point of agreement between them all1 no society could exist4 ,it is solely on the basis of this common interest that every society should be governed4 ,i hold then that ,sovereignty1 being nothing less than the exercise of the general will1 can never be alienated1 and that the ,sovereign1 who is no less than a collective being1 cannot be represented except by himself3 the power indeed may be transmitted1 but not the will4 ,in reality1 if it is not impossible for a particular will to agree on some point with the general will1 it is at least impossible for the agreement to be lasting and constant2 for the particular will tends1 by its very nature1 to partiality1 while the general will tends to equality4 ,it is even more impossible to have any guarantee of this agreement2 for even if it should always exist1 it would be the effect not of art1 but of chance4 ,the ,sovereign may indeed say3 ,i now will actually what this man wills1 or at least what he says he wills2 but it cannot say3 ,what he wills tomorrow1 ,i too shall will because it is absurd for the will to bind itself for the future1 nor is it incumbent on any will to consent to anything that is not for the good of the being who wills4 ,if then the people promises simply to obey1 by that very act it dissolves itself and loses what makes it a people2 the moment a master exists1 there is no longer a ,sovereign1 and from that moment the body politic has ceased to exist4 ,this does not mean that the commands of the rulers cannot pass for general wills1 so long as the ,sovereign1 being free to oppose them1 offers no opposition4 ,in such a case1 universal silence is taken to imply the consent of the people4 ,this will be explained later on4 #a ,under bad governments1 this equality is only apparent and illusory3 it serves only to keep the pauper in his poverty and the rich man in the position he has usurped4 ,in fact1 laws are always of use to those who possess and harmful to those who have nothing3 from which it follows that the social state is advantageous to men only when all have something and none too much4 ,,chapter ,,ii ,,that ,,sovereignty ,,is ,,indivisible ,sovereignty1 for the same reason as makes it inalienable1 is indivisible2 for will either is1 or is not1 general2#a it is the will either of the body of the people1 or only of a part of it4 ,in the first case1 the will1 when declared1 is an act of ,sovereignty and constitutes law3 in the second1 it is merely a particular will1 or act of magistracy--at the most a decree4 ,but our political theorists1 unable to divide ,sovereignty in principle1 divide it according to its object3 into force and will2 into legislative power and executive power2 into rights of taxation1 justice and war2 into internal administration and power of foreign treaty4 ,sometimes they confuse all these sections1 and sometimes they distinguish them2 they turn the ,sovereign into a fantastic being composed of several connected pieces3 it is as if they were making man of several bodies1 one with eyes1 one with arms1 another with feet1 and each with nothing besides4 ,we are told that the jugglers of ,japan dismember a child before the eyes of the spectators2 then they throw all the members into the air one after another1 and the child falls down alive and whole4 ,the conjuring tricks of our political theorists are very like that2 they first dismember the body politic by an illusion worthy of a fair1 and then join it together again we know not how4 ,this error is due to a lack of exact notions concerning the ,sovereign authority1 and to taking for parts of it what are only emanations from it4 ,thus1 for example1 the acts of declaring war and making peace have been regarded as acts of ,sovereignty2 but this is not the case1 as these acts do not constitute law1 but merely the application of a law1 a particular act which decides how the law applies1 as we shall see clearly when the idea attached to the word law has been defined4 ,if we examined the other divisions in the same manner1 we should find that1 whenever ,sovereignty seems to be divided1 there is an illusion3 the rights which are taken as being part of ,sovereignty are really all subordinate1 and always imply supreme wills of which they only sanction the execution4 ,it would be impossible to estimate the obscurity this lack of exactness has thrown over the decisions of writers who have dealt with political right1 when they have used the principles laid down by them to pass judgment on the respective rights of kings and peoples4 ,every one can see1 in ,chapters ,,iii and ,,iv of the ,first ,book of ,grotius1 how the learned man and his translator1 ,barbeyrac1 entangle and tie themselves up in their own sophistries1 for fear of saying too little or too much of what they think1 and so offending the interests they have to conciliate4 ,grotius1 a refugee in ,france1 ill-content with his own country1 and desirous of paying his court to ,louis ,,xiii1 to whom his book is dedicated1 spares no pains to rob the peoples of all their rights and invest kings with them by every conceivable artifice4 ,this would also have been much to the taste of ,barbeyrac1 who dedicated his translation to ,george ,i of ,england4 ,but unfortunately the expulsion of ,james ,,ii1 which he called his abdication1 compelled him to use all reserve1 to shuffle and to tergiversate1 in order to avoid making ,william out a usurper4 ,if these two writers had adopted the true principles1 all difficulties would have been removed1 and they would have been always consistent2 but it would have been a sad truth for them to tell1 and would have paid court for them to no-one save the people4 ,moreover1 truth is no road to fortune1 and the people dispenses neither ambassadorships1 nor professorships1 nor pensions4 #a ,to be general1 a will need not always be unanimous2 but every vote--must be counted3 any exclusion is a breach of generality4 ,,chapter ,,iii ,,whether ,,the ,,general ,,will ,,is ,,fallible ,it follows from what has gone before that the general will is always right and tends to the public advantage2 but it does not follow that the deliberations of the people are always equally correct4 ,our will is always for our own good1 but we do not always see what that is2 the people is never corrupted1 but it is often deceived1 and on such occasions only does it seem to will what is bad4 ,there is often a great deal of difference between the will of all and the general will2 the latter considers only the common interest1 while the former takes private interest into account1 and is no more than a sum of particular wills3 but take away from these same wills the pluses and minuses that cancel one another1#a and the general will remains as the sum of the differences4 ,if1 when the people1 being furnished with adequate information1 held its deliberations1 the citizens had no communication one with another1 the grand total of the small differences would always give the general will1 and the decision would always be good4 ,but when factions arise1 and partial associations are formed at the expense of the great association1 the will of each of these associations becomes general in relation to its members1 while it remains particular in relation to the ,state3 it may then be said that there are no longer as many votes as there are men1 but only as many as there are associations4 ,the differences become less numerous and give a less general result4 ,lastly1 when one of these associations is so great as to prevail over all the rest1 the result is no longer a sum of small differences1 but a single difference2 in this case there is no longer a general will1 and the opinion which prevails is purely particular4 ,it is therefore essential1 if the general will is to be able to express itself1 that there should be no partial society within the ,state1 and that each citizen should think only his own thoughts3#b which was indeed the sublime and unique system established by the great ,lycurgus4 ,but if there are partial societies1 it is best to have as many as possible and to prevent them from being unequal1 as was done by ,solon1 ,numa and ,servius4 ,these precautions are the only ones that can guarantee that the general will shall be always enlightened1 and that the people shall in no way deceive itself4 #a ,every interest1 says the ,marquis d',argenson1 has different principles4 ,the agreement of two particular interests is formed by opposition to a third4 ,he might have added that the agreement of all interests is formed by opposition to that of each4 ,if there were no different interests1 the common interest would be barely felt1 as it would encounter no obstacle2 all would go on of its own accord1 and politics would cease to be an art4 #b ,in fact1 says ,macchiavelli1 there are some divisions that are harmful to a ,republic and some that are advantageous4 ,those which stir up sects and parties are harmful2 those attended by neither are advantageous4 ,since1 then1 the founder of a ,republic cannot help enmities arising1 he ought at least to prevent them from growing into sects 7,history of ,florence1 ,book vii74 ,rousseau quotes the ,italian4 ,,chapter ,,iv ,,the ,,limits ,,of ,,the ,,sovereign ,,power ,if the ,state is a moral person whose life is in the union of its members1 and if the most important of its cares is the care for its own preservation1 it must have a universal and compelling force1 in order to move and dispose each part as may be most advantageous to the whole4 ,as nature gives each man absolute power over all his members1 the social compact gives the body politic absolute power over all its members also2 and it is this power which1 under the direction of the general will1 bears1 as ,i have said1 the name of ,sovereignty4 ,but1 besides the public person1 we have to consider the private persons composing it1 whose life and liberty are naturally independent of it4 ,we are bound then to distinguish clearly between the respective rights of the citizens and the ,sovereign1#a and between the duties the former have to fulfil as subjects1 and the natural rights they should enjoy as men4 ,each man alienates1 ,i admit1 by the social compact1 only such part of his powers1 goods and liberty as it is important for the community to control2 but it must also be granted that the ,sovereign is sole judge of what is important4 ,every service a citizen can render the ,state he ought to render as soon as the ,sovereign demands it2 but the ,sovereign1 for its part1 cannot impose upon its subjects any fetters that are useless to the community1 nor can it even wish to do so2 for no more by the law of reason than by the law of nature can anything occur without a cause4 ,the undertakings which bind us to the social body are obligatory only because they are mutual2 and their nature is such that in fulfilling them we cannot work for others without working for ourselves4 ,why is it that the general will is always in the right1 and that all continually will the happiness of each one1 unless it is because there is not a man who does not think of each as meaning him1 and consider himself in voting for all8 ,this proves that equality of rights and the idea of justice which such equality creates originate in the preference each man gives to himself1 and accordingly in the very nature of man4 ,it proves that the general will1 to be really such1 must be general in its object as well as its essence2 that it must both come from all and apply to all2 and that it loses its natural rectitude when it is directed to some particular and determinate object1 because in such a case we are judging of something foreign to us1 and have no true principle of equity to guide us4 ,indeed1 as soon as a question of particular fact or right arises on a point not previously regulated by a general convention1 the matter becomes contentious4 ,it is a case in which the individuals concerned are one party1 and the public the other1 but in which ,i can see neither the law that ought to be followed nor the judge who ought to give the decision4 ,in such a case1 it would be absurd to propose to refer the question to an express decision of the general will1 which can be only the conclusion reached by one of the parties and in consequence will be1 for the other party1 merely an external and particular will1 inclined on this occasion to injustice and subject to error4 ,thus1 just as a particular will cannot stand for the general will1 the general will1 in turn1 changes its nature1 when its object is particular1 and1 as general1 cannot pronounce on a man or a fact4 ,when1 for instance1 the people of ,athens nominated or displaced its rulers1 decreed honours to one1 and imposed penalties on another1 and1 by a multitude of particular decrees1 exercised all the functions of government indiscriminately1 it had in such cases no longer a general will in the strict sense2 it was acting no longer as ,sovereign1 but as magistrate4 ,this will seem contrary to current views2 but ,i must be given time to expound my own4 ,it should be seen from the foregoing that what makes the will general is less the number of voters than the common interest uniting them2 for under this system1 each necessarily submits to the conditions he imposes on others2 and this admirable agreement between interest and justice gives to the common deliberations an equitable character which at once vanishes when any particular question is discussed1 in the absence of a common interest to unite and identify the ruling of the judge with that of the party4 ,from whatever side we approach our principle1 we reach the same conclusion1 that the social compact sets up among the citizens an equality of such a kind1 that they all bind themselves to observe the same conditions and should therefore all enjoy the same rights4 ,thus1 from the very nature of the compact1 every act of ,sovereignty1 i4e4 every authentic act of the general will1 binds or favours all the citizens equally2 so that the ,sovereign recognises only the body of the nation1 and draws no distinctions between those of whom it is made up4 ,what1 then1 strictly speaking is an act of ,sovereignty8 ,it is not a convention between a superior and an inferior1 but a convention between the body and each of its members4 ,it is legitimate1 because based on the social contract1 and1 equitable1 because common to all2 useful1 because it can have no other object than the general good1 and stable1 because guaranteed by the public force and the supreme power4 ,so long as the subjects have to submit only to conventions of this sort1 they obey no-one but their own will2 and to ask how far the respective rights of the ,sovereign and the citizens extend1 is to ask up to what point the latter can enter into undertakings with themselves1 each with all1 and all with each4 ,we can see from this that the sovereign power1 absolute1 sacred and inviolable as it is1 does not and cannot exceed the limits of general conventions1 and that every man may dispose at will of such goods and liberty as these conventions leave him2 so that the ,sovereign never has a right to lay more charges on one subject than on another1 because1 in that case1 the question becomes particular1 and ceases to be within its competency4 ,when these distinctions have once been admitted1 it is seen to be so untrue that there is1 in the social contract1 any real renunciation on the part of the individuals1 that the position in which they find themselves as a result of the contract is really preferable to that in which they were before4 ,instead of a renunciation1 they have made an advantageous exchange3 instead of an uncertain and precarious way of living they have got one that is better and more secure2 instead of natural independence they have got liberty1 instead of the power to harm others security for themselves1 and instead of their strength1 which others might overcome1 a right which social union makes invincible4 ,their very life1 which they have devoted to the ,state1 is by it constantly protected2 and when they risk it in the ,state's defence1 what more are they doing than giving back what they have received from it8 ,what are they doing that they would not do more often and with greater danger in the state of nature1 in which they would inevitably have to fight battles at the peril of their lives in defence of that which is the means of their preservation8 ,all have indeed to fight when their country needs them2 but then no one has ever to fight for himself4 ,do we not gain something by running1 on behalf of what gives us our security1 only some of the risks we should have to run for ourselves1 as soon as we lost it8 #a ,attentive readers1 do not1 ,i pray1 be in a hurry to charge me with contradicting myself4 ,the terminology made it unavoidable1 considering the poverty of the language2 but wait and see4 ,,chapter ,v ,,the ,,right ,,of ,,life ,,and ,,death ,the question is often asked how individuals1 having no right to dispose of their own lives1 can transfer to the ,sovereign a right which they do not possess4 ,the difficulty of answering this question seems to me to lie in its being wrongly stated4 ,every man has a right to risk his own life in order to preserve it4 ,has it ever1 been said that a man who throws himself out of the window to escape from a fire is guilty of suicide8 ,has such a crime ever been laid to the charge of him who perishes in a storm because1 when he went on board1 he knew of the danger8 ,the social treaty has for its end the preservation of the contracting parties4 ,he who wills the end wills the means also1 and the means must involve some risks1 and even some losses4 ,he who wishes to preserve his life at others expense should also1 when it is necessary1 be ready to give it up for their sake4 ,furthermore1 the citizen is no longer the judge of the dangers to which the law desires him to expose himself2 and when the prince says to him3 ,it is expedient for the ,state that you should die1 he ought to die1 because it is only on that condition that he has been living in security up to the present1 and because his life is no longer a mere bounty of nature1 but a gift made conditionally by the ,state4 ,the death-penalty inflicted upon criminals may be looked on in much the same light3 it is in order that we may not fall victims to an assassin that we consent to die if we ourselves turn assassins4 ,in this treaty1 so far from disposing of our own lives1 we think only of securing them1 and it is not to be assumed that any of the parties then expects to get hanged4 ,again1 every malefactor1 by attacking social rights1 becomes on forfeit a rebel and a traitor to his country2 by violating its laws he ceases to be a member of it2 he even makes war upon it4 ,in such a case the preservation of the ,state is inconsistent with his own1 and one or the other must perish2 in putting the guilty to death1 we slay not so much the citizen as an enemy4 ,the trial and the judgment are the proofs that he has broken the social treaty1 and is in consequence no longer a member of the ,state4 ,since1 then1 he has recognised himself to be such by living there1 he must be removed by exile as a violator of the compact1 or by death as a public enemy2 for such an enemy is not a moral person1 but merely a man2 and in such a case the right of war is to kill the vanquished4 ,but1 it will be said1 the condemnation of a criminal is a particular act4 ,i admit it3 but such condemnation is not a function of the ,sovereign2 it is a right the ,sovereign can confer without being able itself to exert it4 ,all my ideas are consistent1 but ,i cannot expound them all at once4 ,we may add that frequent punishments are always a sign of weakness or remissness on the part of the government4 ,there is not a single ill-doer who could not be turned to some good4 ,the ,state has no right to put to death1 even for the sake of making an example1 any one whom it can leave alive without danger4 ,the right of pardoning or exempting the guilty from a penalty imposed by the law and pronounced by the judge belongs only to the authority which is superior to both judge and law1 i4e4 the ,sovereign2 even its right in this matter is far from clear1 and the cases for exercising it are extremely rare4 ,in a well-governed ,state1 there are few punishments1 not because there are many pardons1 but because criminals are rare2 it is when a ,state is in decay that the multitude of crimes is a guarantee of impunity4 ,under the ,roman ,republic1 neither the ,senate nor the ,consuls ever attempted to pardon2 even the people never did so1 though it sometimes revoked its own decision4 ,frequent pardons mean that crime will soon need them no longer1 and no-one can help seeing whither that leads4 ,but ,i feel my heart protesting and restraining my pen2 let us leave these questions to the just man who has never offended1 and would himself stand in no need of pardon4 ,,chapter ,,vi ,,law ,by the social compact we have given the body politic existence and life3 we have now by legislation to give it movement and will4 ,for the original act by which the body is formed and united still in no respect determines what it ought to do for its preservation4 ,what is well and in conformity with order is so by the nature of things and independently of human conventions4 ,all justice comes from ,god1 who is its sole source2 but if we knew how to receive so high an inspiration1 we should need neither government nor laws4 ,doubtless1 there is a universal justice emanating from reason alone2 but this justice1 to be admitted among us1 must be mutual4 ,humanly speaking1 in default of natural sanctions1 the laws of justice are ineffective among men3 they merely make for the good of the wicked and the undoing of the just1 when the just man observes them towards everybody and nobody observes them towards him4 ,conventions and laws are therefore needed to join rights to duties and refer justice to its object4 ,in the state of nature1 where everything is common1 ,i owe nothing to him whom ,i nave promised nothing2 ,i recognise as belonging to others only what is of no use to me4 ,in the state of society all rights are fixed by law1 and the case becomes different4 ,but what1 after all1 is a law8 ,as long as we remain satisfied with attaching purely metaphysical ideas to the word1 we shall go on arguing without arriving at an understanding2 and when we have defined a law of nature1 we shall be no nearer the definition of a law of the ,state4 ,i have already said that there can be no general will directed to a particular object4 ,such an object must be either within or outside the ,state4 ,if outside1 a will which is alien to it cannot be1 in relation to it1 general2 if within1 it is part of the ,state1 and in that case there arises a relation between whole and part which makes them two separate beings1 of which the part is one1 and the whole minus the part the other4 ,but the whole minus a part cannot be the whole2 and while this relation persists1 there can be no whole1 but only two unequal parts2 and it follows that the will of one is no longer in any respect general in relation to the other4 ,but when the whole people decrees for the whole people1 it is considering only itself2 and if a relation is then formed1 it is between two aspects of the entire object1 without there being any division of the whole4 ,in that case the matter about which the decree is made is1 like the decreeing will general4 ,this act is what ,i call a law4 ,when ,i say that the object of laws is always general1 ,i mean that law considers subjects en masse and actions in the abstract1 and never a particular person or action4 ,thus the law may indeed decree that there shall be privileges1 but cannot confer them on anybody by name4 ,it may set up several classes of citizens1 and even lay down the qualifications for membership of these classes1 but it cannot nominate such and such persons as belonging to them2 it may establish a monarchical government and hereditary succession1 but it cannot choose a king1 or nominate a royal family4 ,in a word1 no function which has a particular object belongs to the legislative power4 ,on this view1 we at once see that it can no longer be asked whose business it is to make laws1 since they are acts of the general will3 nor whether the prince is above the law1 since he is a member of the ,state2 nor whether the law can be unjust1 since no one is unjust to himself2 nor how we can be both free and subject to the laws since they are but registers of our wills4 ,we see further that1 as the law unites universality of will with universality of object1 what a man1 whoever he be1 commands of his own motion cannot be a law2 and even what the ,sovereign commands with regard to a particular matter is no nearer being a law1 but is a decree1 an act1 not of sovereignty1 but of magistracy4 ,i therefore give the name ',republic' to every ,state that is governed by laws1 no matter what the form of its administration may be3 for only in such a case does the public interest govern1 and the res publica rank as a reality4 ,every legitimate government is republican2#a what government is ,i will explain later on4 ,laws are1 properly speaking1 only the conditions of civil association4 ,the people1 being subject to the laws1 ought to be their author3 the conditions of the society ought to be regulated solely by those who come together to form it4 ,but how are they to regulate them8 ,is it to be by common agreement1 by a sudden inspiration8 ,has the body politic an organ to declare its will8 ,who can give it the foresight to formulate and announce its acts in advance8 ,or how is it to announce them in the hour of need8 ,how can a blind multitude1 which often does not know what it wills1 because it rarely knows what is good for it1 carry out for itself so great and difficult an enterprise as a system of legislation8 ,of itself the people wills always the good1 but of itself it by no means always sees it4 ,the general will is always in the right1 but the judgment which guides it is not always enlightened4 ,it must be got to see objects as they are1 and sometimes as they ought to appear to it2 it must be shown the good road it is in search of1 secured from the seductive influences of individual wills1 taught to see times and spaces as a series1 and made to weigh the attractions of present and sensible advantages against the danger of distant and hidden evils4 ,the individuals see the good they reject2 the public wills the good it does not see4 ,all stand equally in need of guidance4 ,the former must be compelled to bring their wills into conformity with their reason2 the latter must be taught to know what it wills4 ,if that is done1 public enlightenment leads to the union of understanding and will in the social body3 the parts are made to work exactly together1 and the whole is raised to its highest power4 ,this makes a legislator necessary4 #a ,i understand by this word1 not merely an aristocracy or a democracy1 but generally any government directed by the general will1 which is the law4 ,to be legitimate1 the government must be1 not one with the ,sovereign1 but its minister4 ,in such a case even a monarchy is a ,republic4 ,this will be made clearer in the following book4 ,,chapter ,,vii ,,the ,,legislator ,in order to discover the rules of society best suited to nations1 a superior intelligence beholding all the passions of men without experiencing any of them would be needed4 ,this intelligence would have to be wholly unrelated to our nature1 while knowing it through and through2 its happiness would have to be independent of us1 and yet ready to occupy itself with ours2 and lastly1 it would have1 in the march of time1 to look forward to a distant glory1 and1 working in one century1 to be able to enjoy in the next4#a ,it would take gods to give men laws4 ,what ,caligula argued from the facts1 ,plato1 in the dialogue called the ,politicus1 argued in defining the civil or kingly man1 on the basis of right4 ,but if great princes are rare1 how much more so are great legislators8 ,the former have only to follow the pattern which the latter have to lay down4 ,the legislator is the engineer who invents the machine1 the prince merely the mechanic who sets it up and makes it go4 ,at the birth of societies1 says ,montesquieu1 the rulers of ,republics establish institutions1 and afterwards the institutions mould the rulers4#b ,he who dares to undertake the making of a people's institutions ought to feel himself capable1 so to speak1 of changing human nature1 of transforming each individual1 who is by himself a complete and solitary whole1 into part of a greater whole from which he in a manner receives his life and being2 of altering man's constitution for the purpose of strengthening it2 and of substituting a partial and moral existence for the physical and independent existence nature has conferred on us all4 ,he must1 in a word1 take away from man his own resources and give him instead new ones alien to him1 and incapable of being made use of without the help of other men4 ,the more completely these natural resources are annihilated1 the greater and the more lasting are those which he acquires1 and the more stable and perfect the new institutions2 so that if each citizen is nothing and can do nothing without the rest1 and the resources acquired by the whole are equal or superior to the aggregate of the resources of all the individuals1 it may be said that legislation is at the highest possible point of perfection4 ,the legislator occupies in every respect an extraordinary position in the ,state4 ,if he should do so by reason of his genius1 he does so no less by reason of his office1 which is neither magistracy1 nor ,sovereignty4 ,this office1 which sets up the ,republic1 nowhere enters into its constitution2 it is an individual and superior function1 which has nothing in common with human empire2 for if he who holds command over men ought not to have command over the laws1 he who has command over the laws ought not any more to have it over men2 or else his laws would be the ministers of his passions and would often merely serve to perpetuate his injustices3 his private aims would inevitably mar the sanctity of his work4 ,when ,lycurgus gave laws to his country1 he began by resigning the throne4 ,it was the custom of most ,greek towns to entrust the establishment of their laws to foreigners4 ,the ,republics of modern ,italy in many cases followed this example2 ,geneva did the same and profited by it4#c ,rome1 when it was most prosperous1 suffered a revival of all the crimes of tyranny1 and was brought to the verge of destruction1 because it put the legislative authority and the sovereign power into the same hands4 ,nevertheless1 the decemvirs themselves never claimed the right to pass any law merely on their own authority4 ,nothing we propose to you1 they said to the people1 can pass into law without your consent4 ,romans1 be yourselves the authors of the laws which are to make you happy4 ,he1 therefore1 who draws up the laws has1 or should have1 no right of legislation1 and the people cannot1 even if it wishes1 deprive itself of this incommunicable right1 because1 according to the fundamental compact1 only the general will can bind the individuals1 and there can be no assurance that a particular will is in conformity with the general will1 until it has been put to the free vote of the people4 ,this ,i have said already2 but it is worth while to repeat it4 ,thus in the task of legislation we find together two things which appear to be incompatible3 an enterprise too difficult for human powers1 and1 for its execution1 an authority that is no authority4 ,there is a further difficulty that deserves attention4 ,wise men1 if they try to speak their language to the common herd instead of its own1 cannot possibly make themselves understood4 ,there are a thousand kinds of ideas which it is impossible to translate into popular language4 ,conceptions that are too general and objects that are too remote are equally out of its range3 each individual1 having no taste for any other plan of government than that which suits his particular interest1 finds it difficult to realise the advantages he might hope to draw from the continual privations good laws impose4 ,for a young people to be able to relish sound principles of political theory and follow the fundamental rules of statecraft1 the effect would have to become the cause2 the social spirit1 which should be created by these institutions1 would have to preside over their very foundation2 and men would have to be before law what they should become by means of law4 ,the legislator therefore1 being unable to appeal to either force or reason1 must have recourse to an authority of a different order capable of constraining without violence and persuading without convincing4 ,this is what has1 in all ages1 compelled the fathers of nations to have recourse to divine intervention and credit the gods with their own wisdom1 in order that the peoples1 submitting to the laws of the ,state as to those of nature1 and recognising the same power in the formation of the city as in that of man1 might obey freely1 and bear with docility the yoke of the public happiness4 ,this sublime reason1 far above the range of the common herd1 is that whose decisions the legislator puts into the mouth of the immortals1 in order to constrain by divine authority those whom human prudence could not move4#d ,but it is not anybody who can make the gods speak1 or get himself believed when he proclaims himself their interpreter4 ,the great soul of the legislator is the only miracle that can prove his mission4 ,any man may grave tablets of stone1 or buy an oracle2 or feign secret intercourse with some divinity1 or train a bird to whisper in his ear1 or find other vulgar ways of imposing on the people4 ,he whose knowledge goes no further may perhaps gather round him a band of fools2 but he will never found an empire1 and his extravagances will quickly perish with him4 ,idle tricks form a passing tie2 only wisdom can make it lasting4 ,the ,judaic law1 which still subsists1 and that of the child of ,ishmael1 which1 for ten centuries1 has ruled half the world1 still proclaim the great men who laid them down2 and1 while the pride of philosophy or the blind spirit of faction sees in them no more than lucky impostures1 the true political theorist admires1 in the institutions they set up1 the great and powerful genius which presides over things made to endure4 ,we should not1 with ,warburton1 conclude from this that politics and religion have among us a common object1 but that1 in the first periods of nations1 the one is used as an instrument for the other4 #a ,a people becomes famous only when its legislation begins to decline4 ,we do not know for how many centuries the system of ,lycurgus made the ,spartans happy before the rest of ,greece took any notice of it4 #b ,montesquieu1 ,the ,greatness and ,decadence of the ,romans1 ch4 i4 #c ,those who know ,calvin only as a theologian much underestimate the extent of his genius4 ,the codification of our wise edicts1 in which he played a large part1 does him no less honour than his ,institute4 ,whatever revolution time may bring in our religion1 so long as the spirit of patriotism and liberty still lives among us1 the memory of this great man will be for ever blessed4 #d ,in truth1 says ,macchiavelli1 there has never been1 in any country1 an extraordinary legislator who has not had recourse to ,god2 for otherwise his laws would not have been accepted3 there are1 in fact1 many useful truths of which a wise man may have knowledge without their having in themselves such clear reasons for their being so as to be able to convince others 7,discourses on ,livy1 ,bk4 v1 ch4 xi74 7,rousseau quotes the ,italian47 ,,chapter ,,viii ,,the ,,people ,as1 before putting up a large building1 the architect surveys and sounds the site to see if it will bear the weight1 the wise legislator does not begin by laying down laws good in themselves1 but by investigating the fitness of the people1 for which they are destined1 to receive them4 ,plato refused to legislate for the ,arcadians and the ,cyrenans1 because he knew that both peoples were rich and could not put up with equality2 and good laws and bad men were found together in ,crete1 because ,minos had inflicted discipline on a people already burdened with vice4 ,a thousand nations have achieved earthly greatness1 that could never have endured good laws2 even such as could have endured them could have done so only for a very brief period of their long history4 ,most peoples1 like most men1 are docile only in youth2 as they grow old they become incorrigible4 ,when once customs have become established and prejudices inveterate1 it is dangerous and useless to attempt their reformation2 the people1 like the foolish and cowardly patients who rave at sight of the doctor1 can no longer bear that any one should lay hands on its faults to remedy them4 ,there are indeed times in the history of ,states when1 just as some kinds of illness turn men's heads and make them forget the past1 periods of violence and revolutions do to peoples what these crises do to individuals3 horror of the past takes the place of forgetfulness1 and the ,state1 set on fire by civil wars1 is born again1 so to speak1 from its ashes1 and takes on anew1 fresh from the jaws of death1 the vigour of youth4 ,such were ,sparta at the time of ,lycurgus1 ,rome after the ,tarquins1 and1 in modern times1 ,holland and ,switzerland after the expulsion of the tyrants4 ,but such events are rare2 they are exceptions1 the cause of which is always to be found in the particular constitution of the ,state concerned4 ,they cannot even happen twice to the same people1 for it can make itself free as long as it remains barbarous1 but not when the civic impulse has lost its vigour4 ,then disturbances may destroy it1 but revolutions cannot mend it3 it needs a master1 and not a liberator4 ,free peoples1 be mindful of maxim2 ,liberty may be gained1 but can never be recovered4 ,youth is not infancy4 ,there is for nations1 as for men1 a period of youth1 or1 shall we say1 maturity1 before which they should not be made subject to laws2 but the maturity of a people is not always easily recognisable1 and1 if it is anticipated1 the work is spoilt4 ,one people is amenable to discipline from the beginning2 another1 not after ten centuries4 ,russia will never be really civilised1 because it was civilised too soon4 ,peter had a genius for imitation2 but he lacked true genius1 which is creative and makes all from nothing4 ,he did some good things1 but most of what he did was out of place4 ,he saw that his people was barbarous1 but did not see that it was not ripe for civilisation3 he wanted to civilise it when it needed only hardening4 ,his first wish was to make ,germans or ,englishmen1 when he ought to have been making ,russians2 and he prevented his subjects from ever becoming what they might have been by persuading them that they were what they are not4 ,in this fashion too a ,french teacher turns out his pupil to be an infant prodigy1 and for the rest of his life to be nothing whatsoever4 ,the empire of ,russia will aspire to conquer ,europe1 and will itself be conquered4 ,the ,tartars1 its subjects or neighbours1 will become its masters and ours1 by a revolution which ,i regard as inevitable4 ,indeed1 all the kings of ,europe are working in concert to hasten its coming4 ,,chapter ,,ix ,,the ,,people 7continued7 ,as nature has set bounds to the stature of a well-made man1 and1 outside those limits1 makes nothing but giants or dwarfs1 similarly1 for the constitution of a ,state to be at its best1 it is possible to fix limits that will make it neither too large for good government1 nor too small for self-maintenance4 ,in every body politic there is a maximum strength which it cannot exceed and which it only loses by increasing in size4 ,every extension of the social tie means its relaxation2 and1 generally speaking1 a small ,state is stronger in proportion than a great one4 ,a thousand arguments could be advanced in favour of this principle4 ,first1 long distances make administration more difficult1 just as a weight becomes heavier at the end of a longer lever4 ,administration therefore becomes more and more burdensome as the distance grows greater2 for1 in the first place1 each city has its own1 which is paid for by the people3 each district its own1 still paid for by the people3 then comes each province1 and then the great governments1 satrapies1 and vice-royalties1 always costing more the higher you go1 and always at the expense of the unfortunate people4 ,last of all comes the supreme administration1 which eclipses all the rest4 ,all these overcharges are a continual drain upon the subjects2 so far from being better governed by all these different orders1 they are worse governed than if there were only a single authority over them4 ,in the meantime1 there scarce remain resources enough to meet emergencies2 and1 when recourse must be had to these1 the ,state is always on the eve of destruction4 ,this is not all2 not only has the government less vigour and promptitude for securing the observance of the laws1 preventing nuisances1 correcting abuses1 and guarding against seditious undertakings begun in distant places2 the people has less affection for its rulers1 whom it never sees1 for its country1 which1 to its eyes1 seems like the world1 and for its fellow-citizens1 most of whom are unknown to it4 ,the same laws cannot suit so many diverse provinces with different customs1 situated in the most various climates1 and incapable of enduring a uniform government4 ,different laws lead only to trouble and confusion among peoples which1 living under the same rulers and in constant communication one with another1 intermingle and intermarry1 and1 coming under the sway of new customs1 never know if they can call their very patrimony their own4 ,talent is buried1 virtue unknown and vice unpunished1 among such a multitude of men who do not know one another1 gathered together in one place at the seat of the central administration4 ,the leaders1 overwhelmed with business1 see nothing for themselves2 the ,state is governed by clerks4 ,finally1 the measures which have to be taken to1 maintain the general authority1 which all these distant officials wish to escape or to impose upon1 absorb all the energy of the public1 so that there is none left for the happiness of the people4 ,there is hardly enough to defend it when need arises1 and thus a body which is too big for its constitution gives way and falls crushed under its own weight4 ,again1 the ,state must assure itself a safe foundation1 if it is to have stability1 and to be able to resist the shocks it cannot help experiencing1 as well as the efforts it will be forced to make for its maintenance2 for all peoples have a kind of centrifugal force that makes them continually act one against another1 and tend to aggrandise themselves at their neighbours' expense1 like the vortices of ,descartes4 ,thus the weak run the risk of being soon swallowed up2 and it is almost impossible for any one to preserve itself except by putting itself in a state of equilibrium with all1 so that the pressure is on all sides practically equal4 ,it may therefore be seen that there are reasons for expansion and reasons for contraction2 and it is no small part of the statesman's skill to hit between them the mean that is most favourable to the preservation of the ,state4 ,it may be said that the reason for expansion1 being merely external and relative1 ought to be subordinate to the reasons for contraction1 which are internal and absolute4 ,a strong and healthy constitution is the first thing to look for2 and it is better to count on the vigour which comes of good government than on the resources a great territory furnishes4 ,it may be added that there have been known ,states so constituted that the necessity of making conquests entered into their very constitution1 and that1 in order to maintain themselves1 they were forced to expand ceaselessly4 ,it may be that they congratulated themselves greatly on this fortunate necessity1 which none the less indicated to them1 along with the limits of their greatness1 the inevitable moment of their fall4 ,,chapter ,x ,,the ,,people 7continued7 ,a body politic may be measured in two ways--either by the extent of its territory1 or by the number of its people2 and there is1 between these two measurements1 a right relation which makes the ,state really great4 ,the men make the ,state1 and the territory sustains the men2 the right relation therefore is that the land should suffice for the maintenance of the inhabitants1 and that there should be as many inhabitants as the land can maintain4 ,in this proportion lies the maximum strength of a given number of people2 for if there is too much land1 it is troublesome to guard and inadequately cultivated1 produces more than is needed1 and soon gives rise to wars of defence2 if there is not enough1 the ,state depends on its neighbours for what it needs over and above1 and this soon gives rise to wars of offence4 ,every people1 to which its situation gives no choice save that between commerce and war1 is weak in itself3 it depends on its neighbours1 and on circumstances2 its existence can never be more than short and uncertain4 ,it either conquers others1 and changes its situation1 or it is conquered and becomes nothing4 ,only insignificance or greatness can keep it free4 ,no fixed relation can be stated between the extent of the territory and the population that are adequate one to the other1 both because of the differences in the quality of land1 in its fertility1 in the nature of its products1 and in the influence of climate1 and because of the different tempers of those who inhabit it2 for some in a fertile country consume little1 and others on an ungrateful soil much4 ,the greater or less fecundity of women1 the conditions that are more or less favourable in each country to the growth of population1 and the influence the legislator can hope to exercise by his institutions1 must also be taken into account4 ,the legislator therefore should not go by what he sees1 but by what he foresees2 he should stop not so much at the state in which he actually finds the population1 as at that to which it ought naturally to attain4 ,lastly1 there are countless cases in which the particular local circumstances demand or allow the acquisition of a greater territory than seems necessary4 ,thus1 expansion will be great in a mountainous country1 where the natural products1 i4e4 woods and pastures1 need less labour1 where we know from experience that women are more fertile than in the plains1 and where a great expanse of slope affords only a small level tract that can be counted on for vegetation4 ,on the other hand1 contraction is possible on the coast1 even in lands of rocks and nearly barren sands1 because there fishing makes up to a great extent for the lack of land-produce1 because the inhabitants have to congregate together more in order to repel pirates1 and further because it is easier to unburden the country of its superfluous inhabitants by means of colonies4 ,to these conditions of law-giving must be added one other which1 though it cannot take the place of the rest1 renders them all useless when it is absent4 ,this is the enjoyment of peace and plenty2 for the moment at which a ,state sets its house in order is1 like the moment when a battalion is forming up1 that when its body is least capable of offering resistance and easiest to destroy4 ,a better resistance could be made at a time of absolute disorganisation than at a moment of fermentation1 when each is occupied with his own position and not with the danger4 ,if war1 famine1 or sedition arises at this time of crisis1 the ,state will inevitably be overthrown4 ,not that many governments have not been set up during such storms2 but in such cases these governments are themselves the ,state's destroyers4 ,usurpers always bring about or select troublous times to get passed1 under cover of the public terror1 destructive laws1 which the people would never adopt in cold blood4 ,the moment chosen is one of the surest means of distinguishing the work of the legislator from that of the tyrant4 ,what people1 then1 is a fit subject for legislation8 ,one which1 already bound by some unity of origin1 interest1 or convention1 has never yet felt the real yoke of law2 one that has neither customs nor superstitions deeply ingrained1 one which stands in no fear of being overwhelmed by sudden invasion2 one which1 without entering into its neighbours' quarrels1 can resist each of them single-handed1 or get the help of one to repel another2 one in which every member may be known by every other1 and there is no need to lay on any man burdens too heavy for a man to bear2 one which can do without other peoples1 and without which all others can do2#a one which is neither rich nor poor1 but self-sufficient2 and1 lastly1 one which unites the consistency of an ancient people with the docility of a new one4 ,legislation is made difficult less by what it is necessary to build up than by what has to be destroyed2 and what makes success so rare is the impossibility of finding natural simplicity together with social requirements4 ,all these conditions are indeed rarely found united1 and therefore few ,states have good constitutions4 ,there is still in ,europe one country capable of being given laws--,corsica4 ,the valour and persistency with which that brave people has regained and defended its liberty well deserves that some wise man should teach it how to preserve what it has won4 ,i have a feeling that some day that little island will astonish ,europe4 #a ,if there were two neighbouring peoples1 one of which could not do without the other1 it would be very hard on the former1 and very dangerous for the latter4 ,every wise nation1 in such a case1 would make haste to free the other from dependence4 ,the ,republic of ,thlascala1 enclosed by the ,mexican ,empire1 preferred doing without salt to buying from the ,mexicans1 or even getting it from them as a gift ,the ,thlascalans were wise enough to see the snare hidden under such liberality4 ,they kept their freedom1 and that little ,state1 shut up in that great ,empire1 was finally the instrument of its ruin4 ,,chapter ,,xi ,,the ,,various ,,systems ,,of ,,legislation ,if we ask in what precisely consists the greatest good of all1 which should be the end of every system of legislation1 we shall find it reduce itself to two main objects1 liberty and equality--liberty1 because all particular dependence means so much force taken from the body of the ,state1 and equality1 because liberty cannot exist without it4 ,i have already defined civil liberty2 by equality1 we should understand1 not that the degrees of power and riches are to be absolutely identical for everybody2 but that power shall never be great enough for violence1 and shall always be exercised by virtue of rank and law2 and that1 in respect of riches1 no citizen shall ever be wealthy enough to buy another1 and none poor enough to be forced to sell himself3#a which implies1 on the part of the great1 moderation in goods and position1 and1 on the side of the common sort1 moderation in avarice and covetousness4 ,such equality1 we are told1 is an unpractical ideal that cannot actually exist4 ,but if its abuse is inevitable1 does it follow that we should not at least make regulations concerning it8 ,it is precisely because the force of circumstances tends continually to destroy equality that the force of legislation should always tend to its maintenance4 ,but these general objects of every good legislative system need modifying in every country in accordance with the local situation and the temper of the inhabitants2 and these circumstances should determine1 in each case1 the particular system of institutions which is best1 not perhaps in itself1 but for the ,state for which it is destined4 ,if1 for instance1 the soil is barren and unproductive1 or the land too crowded for its inhabitants1 the people should turn to industry and the crafts1 and exchange what they produce for the commodities they lack4 ,if1 on the other hand1 a people dwells in rich plains and fertile slopes1 or1 in a good land1 lacks inhabitants1 it should give all its attention to agriculture1 which causes men to multiply1 and should drive out the crafts1 which would only result in depopulation1 by grouping in a few localities the few inhabitants there are4#b ,if a nation dwells on an extensive and convenient coast-line1 let it cover the sea with ships and foster commerce and navigation4 ,it will have a life that will be short and glorious4 ,if1 on its coasts1 the sea washes nothing but almost inaccessible rocks1 let it remain barbarous and ichthyophagous3 it will have a quieter1 perhaps a better1 and certainly a happier life4 ,in a word1 besides the principles that are common to all1 every nation has in itself something that gives them a particular application1 and makes its legislation peculiarly its own4 ,thus1 among the ,jews long ago and more recently among the ,arabs1 the chief object was religion1 among the ,athenians letters1 at ,carthage and ,tyre commerce1 at ,rhodes shipping1 at ,sparta war1 at ,rome virtue4 ,the author of ,the ,spirit of the ,laws has shown with many examples by what art the legislator directs the constitution towards each of these objects4 ,what makes the constitution of a ,state really solid and lasting is the due observance of what is proper1 so that the natural relations are always in agreement with the laws on every point1 and law only serves1 so to speak1 to assure1 accompany and rectify them4 ,but if the legislator mistakes his object and adopts a principle other than circumstances naturally direct2 if his principle makes for servitude while they make for liberty1 or if it makes for riches1 while they make for populousness1 or if it makes for peace1 while they make for conquest--the laws will insensibly lose their influence1 the constitution will alter1 and the ,state will have no rest from trouble till it is either destroyed or changed1 and nature has resumed her invincible sway4 #a ,if the object is to give the ,state consistency1 bring the two extremes as near to each other as possible2 allow neither rich men nor beggars4 ,these two estates1 which are naturally inseparable1 are equally fatal to the common good2 from the one come the friends of tyranny1 and from the other tyrants4 ,it is always between them that public liberty is put up to auction2 the one buys1 and the other sells4 #b ,any branch of foreign commerce1 says ,m4 d',argenson1 creates on the whole only apparent advantage for the kingdom in general2 it may enrich some individuals1 or even some towns2 but the nation as a whole gains nothing by it1 and the people is no better off4 ,,chapter ,,xii ,,the ,,division ,,of ,,the ,,laws ,if the whole is to be set in order1 and the commonwealth put into the best possible shape1 there are various relations to be considered4 ,first1 there is the action of the complete body upon itself1 the relation of the whole to the whole1 of the ,sovereign to the ,state2 and this relation1 as we shall see1 is made up of the relations of the intermediate terms4 ,the laws which regulate this relation bear the name of political laws1 and are also called fundamental laws1 not without reason if they are wise4 ,for1 if there is1 in each ,state1 only one good system1 the people that is in possession of it should hold fast to this2 but if the established order is bad1 why should laws that prevent men from being good be regarded as fundamental8 ,besides1 in any case1 a people is always in a position to change its laws1 however good2 for1 if it choose to do itself harm1 who can have a right to stop it8 ,the second relation is that of the members one to another1 or to the body as a whole2 and this relation should be in the first respect as unimportant1 and in the second as important1 as possible4 ,each citizen would then be perfectly independent of all the rest1 and at the same time very dependent on the city2 which is brought about always by the same means1 as the strength of the ,state can alone secure the liberty of its members4 ,from this second relation arise civil laws4 ,we may consider also a third kind of relation between the individual and the law1 a relation of disobedience to its penalty4 ,this gives rise to the setting up of criminal laws1 which1 at bottom1 are less a particular class of law than the sanction behind all the rest4 ,along with these three kinds of law goes a fourth1 most important of all1 which is not graven on tablets of marble or brass1 but on the hearts of the citizens4 ,this forms the real constitution of the ,state1 takes on every day new powers1 when other laws decay or die out1 restores them or takes their place1 keeps a people in the ways in which it was meant to go1 and insensibly replaces authority by the force of habit4 ,i am speaking of morality1 of custom1 above all of public opinion2 a power unknown to political thinkers1 on which none the less success in everything else depends4 ,with this the great legislator concerns himself in secret1 though he seems to confine himself to particular regulations2 for these are only the arc of the arch1 while manners and morals1 slower to arise1 form in the end its immovable keystone4 ,among the different classes of laws1 the political1 which determine the form of the government1 are alone relevant to my subject4 ,,book ,,iii ,before speaking of the different forms of government1 let us try to fix the exact sense of the word1 which has not yet been very clearly explained4 ,,chapter ,i ,,government ,,in ,,general ,i warn the reader that this chapter requires careful reading1 and that ,i am unable to make myself clear to those who refuse to be attentive4 ,every free action is produced by the concurrence of two causes2 one moral1 i4e4 the will which determines the act2 the other physical1 i4e4 the power which executes it4 ,when ,i walk towards an object1 it is necessary first that ,i should will to go there1 and1 in the second place1 that my feet should carry me4 ,if a paralytic wills to run and an active man wills not to1 they will both stay where they are4 ,the body politic has the same motive powers2 here too force and will are distinguished1 will under the name of legislative power and force under that of executive power4 ,without their concurrence1 nothing is1 or should be1 done4 ,we have seen that the legislative power belongs to the people1 and can belong to it alone4 ,it may1 on the other hand1 readily be seen1 from the principles laid down above1 that the executive power cannot belong to the generality as legislature or ,sovereign1 because it consists wholly of particular acts which fall outside the competency of the law1 and consequently of the ,sovereign1 whose acts must always be laws4 ,the public force therefore needs an agent of its own to bind it together and set it to work under the direction of the general will1 to serve as a means of communication between the ,state and the ,sovereign1 and to do for the collective person more or less what the union of soul and body does for man4 ,here we have what is1 in the ,state1 the basis of government1 often wrongly confused with the ,sovereign1 whose minister it is4 ,what then is government8 ,an intermediate body set up between the subjects and the ,sovereign1 to secure their mutual correspondence1 charged with the execution of the laws and the maintenance of liberty1 both civil and political4 ,the members of this body are called magistrates or kings1 that is to say governors1 and the whole body bears the name prince4#a ,thus those who hold that the act1 by which a people puts itself under a prince1 is not a contract1 are certainly right4 ,it is simply and solely a commission1 an employment1 in which the rulers1 mere officials of the ,sovereign1 exercise in their own name the power of which it makes them depositaries4 ,this power it can limit1 modify or recover at pleasure2 for the alienation of such a right is incompatible with the nature of the social body1 and contrary to the end of association4 ,i call then government1 or supreme administration1 the legitimate exercise of the executive power1 and prince or magistrate the man or the body entrusted with that administration4 ,in government reside the intermediate forces whose relations make up that of the whole to the whole1 or of the ,sovereign to the ,state4 ,this last relation may be represented as that between the extreme terms of a continuous proportion1 which has government as its mean proportional4 ,the government gets from the ,sovereign the orders it gives the people1 and1 for the ,state to be properly balanced1 there must1 when everything is reckoned in1 be equality between the product or power of the government taken in itself1 and the product or power of the citizens1 who are on the one hand sovereign and on the other subject4 ,furthermore1 none of these three terms can be altered without the equality being instantly destroyed4 ,if the ,sovereign desires to govern1 or the magistrate to give laws1 or if the subjects refuse to obey1 disorder takes the place of regularity1 force and will no longer act together1 and the ,state is dissolved and falls into despotism or anarchy4 ,lastly1 as there is only one mean proportional between each relation1 there is also only one good government possible for a ,state4 ,but1 as countless events may change the relations of a people1 not only may different governments be good for different peoples1 but also for the same people at different times4 ,in attempting to give some idea of the various relations that may hold between these two extreme terms1 ,i shall take as an example the number of a people1 which is the most easily expressible4 ,suppose the ,state is composed of ten thousand citizens4 ,the ,sovereign can only be considered collectively and as a body2 but each member1 as being a subject1 is regarded as an individual3 thus the ,sovereign is to the subject as ten thousand to one1 i4e4 each member of the ,state has as his share only a ten-thousandth part of the sovereign authority1 although he is wholly under its control4 ,if the people numbers a hundred thousand1 the condition of the subject undergoes no change1 and each equally is under the whole authority of the laws1 while his vote1 being reduced to one hundred thousandth part1 has ten times less influence in drawing them up4 ,the subject therefore remaining always a unit1 the relation between him and the ,sovereign increases with the number of the citizens4 ,from this it follows that1 the larger the ,state1 the less the liberty4 ,when ,i say the relation increases1 ,i mean that it grows more unequal4 ,thus the greater it is in the geometrical sense1 the less relation there is in the ordinary sense of the word4 ,in the former sense1 the relation1 considered according to quantity1 is expressed by the quotient2 in the latter1 considered according to identity1 it is reckoned by similarity4 ,now1 the less relation the particular wills have to the general will1 that is1 morals and manners to laws1 the more should the repressive force be increased4 ,the government1 then1 to be good1 should be proportionately stronger as the people is more numerous4 ,on the other hand1 as the growth of the ,state gives the depositaries of the public authority more temptations and chances of abusing their power1 the greater the force with which the government ought to be endowed for keeping the people in hand1 the greater too should be the force at the disposal of the ,sovereign for keeping the government in hand4 ,i am speaking1 not of absolute force1 but of the relative force of the different parts of the ,state4 ,it follows from this double relation that the continuous proportion between the ,sovereign1 the prince and the people1 is by no means an arbitrary idea1 but a necessary consequence of the nature of the body politic4 ,it follows further that1 one of the extreme terms1 viz4 the people1 as subject1 being fixed and represented by unity1 whenever the duplicate ratio increases or diminishes1 the simple ratio does the same1 and is changed accordingly4 ,from this we see that there is not a single unique and absolute form of government1 but as many governments differing in nature as there are ,states differing in size4 ,if1 ridiculing this system1 any one were to say that1 in order to find the mean proportional and give form to the body of the government1 it is only necessary1 according to me1 to find the square root of the number of the people1 ,i should answer that ,i am here taking this number only as an instance2 that the relations of which ,i am speaking are not measured by the number of men alone1 but generally by the amount of action1 which is a combination of a multitude of causes2 and that1 further1 if1 to save words1 ,i borrow for a moment the terms of geometry1 ,i am none the less well aware that moral quantities do not allow of geometrical accuracy4 ,the government is on a small scale what the body politic which includes it is on a great one4 ,it is a moral person endowed with certain faculties1 active like the ,sovereign and passive like the ,state1 and capable of being resolved into other similar relations4 ,this accordingly gives rise to a new proportion1 within which there is yet another1 according to the arrangement of the magistracies1 till an indivisible middle term is reached1 i4e4 a single ruler or supreme magistrate1 who may be represented1 in the midst of this progression1 as the unity between the fractional and the ordinal series4 ,without encumbering ourselves with this multiplication of terms1 let us rest content with regarding government as a new body within the ,state1 distinct from the people and the ,sovereign1 and intermediate between them4 ,there is between these two bodies this essential difference1 that the ,state exists by itself1 and the government only through the ,sovereign4 ,thus the dominant will of the prince is1 or should be1 nothing but the general will or the law2 his force is only the public force concentrated in his hands1 and1 as soon as he tries to base any absolute and independent act on his own authority1 the tie that binds the whole together begins to be loosened4 ,if finally the prince should come to have a particular will more active than the will of the ,sovereign1 and should employ the public force in his hands in obedience to this particular will1 there would be1 so to speak1 two ,sovereigns1 one rightful and the other actual1 the social union would evaporate instantly1 and the body politic would be dissolved4 ,however1 in order that the government may have a true existence and a real life distinguishing it from the body of the ,state1 and in order that all its members may be able to act in concert and fulfil the end for which it was set up1 it must have a particular personality1 a sensibility common to its members1 and a force and will of its own making for its preservation4 ,this particular existence implies assemblies1 councils1 power of deliberation and decision1 rights1 titles1 and privileges belonging exclusively to the prince and making the office of magistrate more honourable in proportion as it is more troublesome4 ,the difficulties lie in the manner of so ordering this subordinate whole within the whole1 that it in no way alters the general constitution by affirmation of its own1 and always distinguishes the particular force it possesses1 which is destined to aid in its preservation1 from the public force1 which is destined to the preservation of the ,state2 and1 in a word1 is always ready to sacrifice the government to the people1 and never to sacrifice the people to the government4 ,furthermore1 although the artificial body of the government is the work of another artificial body1 and has1 we may say1 only a borrowed and subordinate life1 this does not prevent it from being able to act with more or less vigour or promptitude1 or from being1 so to speak1 in more or less robust health4 ,finally1 without departing directly from the end for which it was instituted1 it may deviate more or less from it1 according to the manner of its constitution4 ,from all these differences arise the various relations which the government ought to bear to the body of the ,state1 according to the accidental and particular relations by which the ,state itself is modified1 for often the government that is best in itself will become the most pernicious1 if the relations in which it stands have altered according to the defects of the body politic to which it belongs4 #a ,thus at ,venice the ,college1 even in the absence of the ,doge1 is called ,most ,serene ,prince4 ,,chapter ,,ii ,,the ,,constituent ,,principle ,,in ,,the ,,various ,,forms ,,of ,,government ,to set forth the general cause of the above differences1 we must here distinguish between government and its principle1 as we did before between the ,state and the ,sovereign4 ,the body of the magistrate may be composed of a greater or a less number of members4 ,we said that the relation of the ,sovereign to the subjects was greater in proportion as the people was more numerous1 and1 by a clear analogy1 we may say the same of the relation of the government to the magistrates4 ,but the total force of the government1 being always that of the ,state1 is invariable2 so that1 the more of this force it expends on its own members1 the less it has left to employ on the whole people4 ,the more numerous the magistrates1 therefore1 the weaker the government4 ,this principle being fundamental1 we must do our best to make it clear4 ,in the person of the magistrate we can distinguish three essentially different wills3 first1 the private will of the individual1 tending only to his personal advantage2 secondly1 the common will of the magistrates1 which is relative solely to the advantage of the prince1 and may be called corporate will1 being general in relation to the government1 and particular in relation to the ,state1 of which the government forms part2 and1 in the third place1 the will of the people or the sovereign will1 which is general both in relation to the ,state regarded as the whole1 and to the government regarded as a part of the whole4 ,in a perfect act of legislation1 the individual or particular will should be at zero2 the corporate will belonging to the government should occupy a very subordinate position2 and1 consequently1 the general or sovereign will should always predominate and should be the sole guide of all the rest4 ,according to the natural order1 on the other hand1 these different wills become more active in proportion as they are concentrated4 ,thus1 the general will is always the weakest1 the corporate will second1 and the individual will strongest of all3 so that1 in the government1 each member is first of all himself1 then a magistrate1 and then a citizen --in an order exactly the reverse of what the social system requires4 ,this granted1 if the whole government is in the hands of one man1 the particular and the corporate will are wholly united1 and consequently the latter is at its highest possible degree of intensity4 ,but1 as the use to which the force is put depends on the degree reached by the will1 and as the absolute force of the government is invariable1 it follows that the most active government is that of one man4 ,suppose1 on the other hand1 we unite the government with the legislative authority1 and make the ,sovereign prince also1 and all the citizens so many magistrates3 then the corporate will1 being confounded with the general will1 can possess no greater activity than that will1 and must leave the particular will as strong as it can possibly be4 ,thus1 the government1 having always the same absolute force1 will be at the lowest point of its relative force or activity4 ,these relations are incontestable1 and there are other considerations which still further confirm them4 ,we can see1 for instance1 that each magistrate is more active in the body to which he belongs than each citizen in that to which he belongs1 and that consequently the particular will has much more influence on the acts of the government than on those of the ,sovereign2 for each magistrate is almost always charged with some governmental function1 while each citizen1 taken singly1 exercises no function of ,sovereignty4 ,furthermore1 the bigger the ,state grows1 the more its real force increases1 though not in direct proportion to its growth2 but1 the ,state remaining the same1 the number of magistrates may increase to any extent1 without the government gaining any greater real force2 for its force is that of the ,state1 the dimension of which remains equal4 ,thus the relative force or activity of the government decreases1 while its absolute or real force cannot increase4 ,moreover1 it is a certainty that promptitude in execution diminishes as more people are put in charge of it3 where prudence is made too much of1 not enough is made of fortune2 opportunity is let slip1 and deliberation results in the loss of its object4 ,i have just proved that the government grows remiss in proportion as the number of the magistrates increases2 and ,i previously proved that1 the more numerous the people1 the greater should be the repressive force4 ,from this it follows that the relation of the magistrates to the government should vary inversely to the relation of the subjects to the ,sovereign2 that is to say1 the larger the ,state1 the more should the government be tightened1 so that the number of the rulers diminish in proportion to the increase of that of the people4 ,it should be added that ,i am here speaking of the relative strength of the government1 and not of its rectitude3 for1 on the other hand1 the more numerous the magistracy1 the nearer the corporate will comes to the general will2 while1 under a single magistrate1 the corporate will is1 as ,i said1 merely a particular will4 ,thus1 what may be gained on one side is lost on the other1 and the art of the legislator is to know how to fix the point at which the force and the will of the government1 which are always in inverse proportion1 meet in the relation that is most to the advantage of the ,state4 ,,chapter ,,iii ,,the ,,division ,,of ,,governments ,we saw in the last chapter what causes the various kinds or forms of government to be distinguished according to the number of the members composing them3 it remains in this to discover how the division is made4 ,in the first place1 the ,sovereign may commit the charge of the government to the whole people or to the majority of the people1 so that more citizens are magistrates than are mere private individuals4 ,this form of government is called democracy4 ,or it may restrict the government to a small number2 so that there are more private citizens than magistrates2 and this is named aristocracy4 ,lastly1 it may concentrate the whole government in the hands of a single magistrate from whom all others hold their power4 ,this third form is the most usual1 and is called monarchy1 or royal government4 ,it should be remarked that all these forms1 or at least the first two1 admit of degree1 and even of very wide differences2 for democracy may include the whole people1 or may be restricted to half4 ,aristocracy1 in its turn1 may be restricted indefinitely from half the people down to the smallest possible number4 ,even royalty is susceptible of a measure of distribution4 ,sparta always had two kings1 as its constitution provided2 and the ,roman ,empire saw as many as eight emperors at once1 without it being possible to say that the ,empire was split up4 ,thus there is a point at which each form of government passes into the next1 and it becomes clear that1 under three comprehensive denominations1 government is really susceptible of as many diverse forms as the ,state has citizens4 ,there are even more3 for1 as the government may also1 in certain aspects1 be subdivided into other parts1 one administered in one fashion and one in another1 the combination of the three forms may result in a multitude of mixed forms1 each of which admits of multiplication by all the simple forms4 ,there has been at all times much dispute concerning the best form of government1 without consideration of the fact that each is in some cases the best1 and in others the worst4 ,if1 in the different ,states1 the number of supreme magistrates should be in inverse ratio to the number of citizens1 it follows that1 generally1 democratic government suits small ,states1 aristocratic government those of middle size1 and monarchy great ones4 ,this rule is immediately deducible from the principle laid down4 ,but it is impossible to count the innumerable circumstances which may furnish exceptions4 ,,chapter ,,iv ,,democracy ,he who makes the law knows better than any one else how it should be executed and interpreted4 ,it seems then impossible to have a better constitution than that in which the executive and legislative powers are united2 but this very fact renders the government in certain respects inadequate1 because things which should be distinguished are confounded1 and the prince and the ,sovereign1 being the same person1 form1 so to speak1 no more than a government without government4 ,it is not good for him who makes the laws to execute them1 or for the body of the people to turn its attention away from a general standpoint and devote it to particular objects4 ,nothing is more dangerous than the influence of private interests in public affairs1 and the abuse of the laws by the government is a less evil than the corruption of the legislator1 which is the inevitable sequel to a particular standpoint4 ,in such a case1 the ,state being altered in substance1 all reformation becomes impossible4 ,a people that would never misuse governmental powers would never misuse independence2 a people that would always govern well would not need to be governed4 ,if we take the term in the strict sense1 there never has been a real democracy1 and there never will be4 ,it is against the natural order for the many to govern and the few to be governed4 ,it is unimaginable that the people should remain continually assembled to devote their time to public affairs1 and it is clear that they cannot set up commissions for that purpose without the form of administration being changed4 ,in fact1 ,i can confidently lay down as a principle that1 when the functions of government are shared by several tribunals1 the less numerous sooner or later acquire the greatest authority1 if only because they are in a position to expedite affairs1 and power thus naturally comes into their hands4 ,besides1 how many conditions that are difficult to unite does such a government presuppose6 ,first1 a very small ,state1 where the people can readily be got together and where each citizen can with ease know all the rest2 secondly1 great simplicity of manners1 to prevent business from multiplying and raising thorny problems2 next1 a large measure of equality in rank and fortune1 without which equality of rights and authority cannot long subsist2 lastly1 little or no luxury--for luxury either comes of riches or makes them necessary2 it corrupts at once rich and poor1 the rich by possession and the poor by covetousness2 it sells the country to softness and vanity1 and takes away from the ,state all its citizens1 to make them slaves one to another1 and one and all to public opinion4 ,this is why a famous writer has made virtue the fundamental principle of ,republics2 for all these conditions could not exist without virtue4 ,but1 for want of the necessary distinctions1 that great thinker was often inexact1 and sometimes obscure1 and did not see that1 the sovereign authority being everywhere the same1 the same principle should be found in every well-constituted ,state1 in a greater or less degree1 it is true1 according to the form of the government4 ,it may be added that there is no government so subject to civil wars and intestine agitations as democratic or popular government1 because there is none which has so strong and continual a tendency to change to another form1 or which demands more vigilance and courage for its maintenance as it is4 ,under such a constitution above all1 the citizen should arm himself with strength and constancy1 and say1 every day of his life1 what a virtuous ,count ,palatine#a said in the ,diet of ,poland3 ,malo periculosam libertatem quam quietum servitium4 ,were there a people of gods1 their government would be democratic4 ,so perfect a government is not for men4 #a ,the ,palatine of ,posen1 father of the ,king of ,poland1 ,duke of ,lorraine4 ,i prefer liberty with danger to peace with slavery4 ,,chapter ,v ,,aristocracy ,we have here two quite distinct moral persons1 the government and the ,sovereign1 and in consequence two general wills1 one general in relation to all the citizens1 the other only for the members of the administration4 ,thus1 although the government may regulate its internal policy as it pleases1 it can never speak to the people save in the name of the ,sovereign1 that is1 of the people itself1 a fact which must not be forgotten4 ,the first societies governed themselves aristocratically4 ,the heads of families took counsel together on public affairs4 ,the young bowed without question to the authority of experience4 ,hence such names as priests1 elders1 senate1 and gerontes4 ,the savages of ,north ,america govern themselves in this way even now1 and their government is admirable4 ,but1 in proportion as artificial inequality produced by institutions became predominant over natural inequality1 riches or power#a were put before age1 and aristocracy became elective4 ,finally1 the transmission of the father's power along with his goods to his children1 by creating patrician families1 made government hereditary1 and there came to be senators of twenty4 ,there are then three sorts of aristocracy--natural1 elective and hereditary4 ,the first is only for simple peoples2 the third is the worst of all governments2 the second is the best1 and is aristocracy properly so called4 ,besides the advantage that lies in the distinction between the two powers1 it presents that of its members being chosen2 for1 in popular government1 all the citizens are born magistrates2 but here magistracy is confined to a few1 who become such only by election4#b ,by this means uprightness1 understanding1 experience and all other claims to pre-eminence and public esteem become so many further guarantees of wise government4 ,moreover1 assemblies are more easily held1 affairs better discussed and carried out with more order and diligence1 and the credit of the ,state is better sustained abroad by venerable senators than by a multitude that is unknown or despised4 ,in a word1 it is the best and most natural arrangement that the wisest should govern the many1 when it is assured that they will govern for its profit1 and not for their own4 ,there is no need to multiply instruments1 or get twenty thousand men to do what a hundred picked men can do even better1 but it must not be forgotten that corporate interest here begins to direct the public power less under the regulation of the general will1 and that a further inevitable propensity takes away from the laws part of the executive power4 ,if we are to speak of what is individually desirable1 neither should the ,state be so small1 nor a people so simple and upright1 that the execution of the laws follows immediately from the public will1 as it does in a good democracy4 ,nor should the nation be so great that the rulers have to scatter in order to govern it and are able to play the ,sovereign each in his own department1 and1 beginning by making themselves independent1 end by becoming masters4 ,but if aristocracy does not demand all the virtues needed by popular government1 it demands others which are peculiar to itself2 for instance1 moderation on the side of the rich and contentment on that of the poor2 for it seems that thorough-going equality would be out of place1 as it was not found even at ,sparta4 ,furthermore1 if this form of government carries with it a certain inequality of fortune1 this is justifiable in order that as a rule the administration of public affairs may be entrusted to those who are most able to give them their whole time1 but not1 as ,aristotle maintains1 in order that the rich may always be put first4 ,on the contrary1 it is of importance that an opposite choice should occasionally teach the people that the deserts of men offer claims to pre-eminence more important than those of riches4 #a ,it is clear that the word optimates meant1 among the ancients1 not the best1 but the most powerful4 #b ,it is of great importance that the form of the election of magistrates should be regulated by law2 for if it is left at the discretion of the prince1 it is impossible to avoid falling into hereditary aristocracy1 as the ,republics of ,venice and ,berne actually did4 ,the first of these has therefore long been a ,state dissolved2 the second1 however1 is maintained by the extreme wisdom of the senate1 and forms an honourable and highly dangerous exception4 ,,chapter ,,vi ,,monarchy ,so far1 we have considered the prince as a moral and collective person1 unified by the force of the laws1 and the depositary in the ,state of the executive power4 ,we have now to consider this power when it is gathered together into the hands of a natural person1 a real man1 who alone has the right to dispose of it in accordance with the laws4 ,such a person is called a monarch or king4 ,in contrast with other forms of administration1 in which a collective being stands for an individual1 in this form an individual stands for a collective being2 so that the moral unity that constituted the prince is at the same time a physical unity1 and all the qualities1 which in the other case are only with difficulty brought together by the law1 are found naturally united4 ,thus the will of the people1 the will of the prince1 the public force of the ,state1 and the particular force of the government1 all answer to a single motive power2 all the springs of the machine are in the same hands1 the whole moves towards the same end2 there are no conflicting movements to cancel one another1 and no kind of constitution can be imagined in which a less amount of effort produces a more considerable amount of action4 ,archimedes1 seated quietly on the bank and easily drawing a great vessel afloat1 stands to my mind for a skilful monarch1 governing vast states from his study1 and moving everything while he seems himself unmoved4 ,but if no government is more vigorous than this1 there is also none in which the particular will holds more sway and rules the rest more easily4 ,everything moves towards the same end indeed1 but this end is by no means that of the public happiness1 and even the force of the administration constantly shows itself prejudicial to the ,state4 ,kings desire to be absolute1 and men are always crying out to them from afar that the best means of being so is to get themselves loved by their people4 ,this precept is all very well1 and even in some respects very true4 ,unfortunately1 it will always be derided at court4 ,the power which comes of a people's love is no doubt the greatest2 but it is precarious and conditional1 and princes will never rest content with it4 ,the best kings desire to be in a position to be wicked1 if they please1 without forfeiting their mastery3 political sermonisers may tell them to their hearts' content that1 the people's strength being their own1 their first interest is that the people should be prosperous1 numerous and formidable2 they are well aware that this is ,untrue4 ,their first personal interest is that the people should be weak1 wretched1 and unable to resist them4 ,i admit that1 provided the subjects remained always in submission1 the prince's interest would indeed be that it should be powerful1 in order that its power1 being his own1 might make him formidable to his neighbours2 but1 this interest being merely secondary and subordinate1 and strength being incompatible with submission1 princes naturally give the preference always to the principle that is more to their immediate advantage4 ,this is what ,samuel put strongly before the ,hebrews1 and what ,macchiavelli has clearly shown4 ,he professed to teach kings2 but it was the people he really taught4 ,his ,prince is the book of ,republicans4#a ,we found1 on general grounds1 that monarchy is suitable only for great ,states1 and this is confirmed when we examine it in itself4 ,the more numerous the public administration1 the smaller becomes the relation between the prince and the subjects1 and the nearer it comes to equality1 so that in democracy the ratio is unity1 or absolute equality4 ,again1 as the government is restricted in numbers the ratio increases and reaches its maximum when the government is in the hands of a single person4 ,there is then too great a distance between prince and people and the ,state lacks a bond of union4 ,to form such a bond1 there must be intermediate orders1 and princes1 personages and nobility to compose them4 ,but no such things suit a small ,state1 to which all class differences mean ruin4 ,if1 however1 it is hard for a great ,state to be well governed1 it is much harder for it to be so by a single man2 and every one knows what happens when kings substitute others for themselves4 ,an essential and inevitable defect1 which will always rank monarchical below republican government1 is that in a republic the public voice hardly ever raises to the highest positions men who are not enlightened and capable1 and such as to fill them with honour2 while in monarchies these who rise to the top are most often merely petty blunderers petty swindlers1 and petty intriguers1 whose petty talents cause them to get into the highest positions at ,court1 but1 as soon as they have got there1 serve only to make their ineptitude clear to the public4 ,the people is far less often mistaken in its choice than the prince2 and a man of real worth among the king's ministers is almost as rare as a fool at the head of a republican government4 ,thus1 when1 by some fortunate chance1 one of these born governors takes the helm of ,state in some monarchy that has been nearly overwhelmed by swarms of 'gentlemanly' administrators1 there is nothing but amazement at the resources he discovers1 and his coming marks an era in his country's history4 ,for a monarchical ,state to have a chance of being well governed1 its population and extent must be proportionate to the abilities of its governor4 ,if is easier to conquer than to rule4 ,with a long enough lever1 the world could be moved with a single finger2 to sustain it needs the shoulders of ,hercules4 ,however small a ,state may be1 the prince is hardly ever big enough for it4 ,when1 on the other hand1 it happens that the ,state is too small for its ruler1 in these rare cases too it is ill governed1 because the ruler1 constantly pursuing his great designs1 forgets the interests of the people1 and makes it no less wretched by misusing the talents he has1 than a ruler of less capacity would make it for want of those he had not4 ,a kingdom should1 so to speak1 expand or contract with each reign1 according to the prince's capabilities2 but1 the abilities of a senate being more constant in quantity1 the ,state can then have permanent frontiers without the administration suffering4 ,the disadvantage that is most felt in monarchical government is the want of the continuous succession which1 in both the other forms1 provides an unbroken bond of union4 ,when one king dies1 another is needed2 elections leave dangerous intervals and are full of storms2 and unless the citizens are disinterested and upright to a degree which very seldom goes with this kind of government1 intrigue and corruption abound4 ,he to whom the ,state has sold itself can hardly help selling it in his turn and repaying himself1 at the expense of the weak1 the money the powerful have wrung from him4 ,under such an administration1 venality sooner or later spreads through every part1 and peace so enjoyed under a king is worse than the disorders of an interregnum4 ,what has been done to prevent these evils8 ,crowns have been made hereditary in certain families1 and an order of succession has been set up1 to prevent disputes from arising on the death of kings4 ,that is to say1 the disadvantages of regency have been put in place of those of election1 apparent tranquillity has been preferred to wise administration1 and men have chosen rather to risk having children1 monstrosities1 or imbeciles as rulers to having disputes over the choice of good kings4 ,it has not been taken into account that1 in so exposing ourselves to the risks this possibility entails1 we are setting almost all the chances against us4 ,there was sound sense in what the younger ,dionysius said to his father1 who reproached him for doing some shameful deed by asking1 ,did ,i set you the example8 ,no1 answered his son1 but your father was not king4 ,everything conspires to take away from a man who is set in authority over others the sense of justice and reason4 ,much trouble1 we are told1 is taken to teach young princes the art of reigning2 but their education seems to do them no good4 ,it would be better to begin by teaching them the art of obeying4 ,the greatest kings whose praises history tells were not brought up to reign3 reigning is a science we are never so far from possessing as when we have learnt too much of it1 and one we acquire better by obeying than by commanding4 ,nam utilissimus idem ac brevissimus bonarum malarumque rerum delectus cogitare quid aut nolueris sub alio principe1 aut volueris4#b ,one result of this lack of coherence is the inconstancy of royal government1 which1 regulated now on one scheme and now on another1 according to the character of the reigning prince or those who reign for him1 cannot for long have a fixed object or a consistent policy--and this variability1 not found in the other forms of government1 where the prince is always the same1 causes the ,state to be always shifting from principle to principle and from project to project4 ,thus we may say that generally1 if a court is more subtle in intrigue1 there is more wisdom in a senate1 and ,republics advance towards their ends by more consistent and better considered policies2 while every revolution in a royal ministry creates a revolution in the ,state2 for the principle common to all ministers and nearly all kings is to do in every respect the reverse of what was done by their predecessors4 ,this incoherence further clears up a sophism that is very familiar to royalist political writers2 not only is civil government likened to domestic government1 and the prince to the father of a family--this error has already been refuted--but the prince is also freely credited with all the virtues he ought to possess1 and is supposed to be always what he should be4 ,this supposition once made1 royal government is clearly preferable to all others1 because it is incontestably the strongest1 and1 to be the best also1 wants only a corporate will more in conformity with the general will4 ,but if1 according to ,plato1#c the king by nature is such a rarity1 how often will nature and fortune conspire to give him a crown8 ,and1 if royal education necessarily corrupts those who receive it1 what is to be hoped from a series of men brought up to reign8 ,it is1 then1 wanton self-deception to confuse royal government with government by a good king4 ,to see such government as it is in itself1 we must consider it as it is under princes who are incompetent or wicked3 for either they will come to the throne wicked or incompetent1 or the throne will make them so4 ,these difficulties have not escaped our writers1 who1 all the same1 are not troubled by them4 ,the remedy1 they say1 is to obey without a murmur3 ,god sends bad kings in ,his wrath1 and they must be borne as the scourges of ,heaven4 ,such talk is doubtless edifying2 but it would be more in place in a pulpit than in a political book4 ,what are we to think of a doctor who promises miracles1 and whose whole art is to exhort the sufferer to patience8 ,we know for ourselves that we must put up with a bad government when it is there2 the question is how to find a good one4 #a ,macchiavelli was a proper man and a good citizen2 but1 being attached to the court of the ,medici1 he could not help veiling his love of liberty in the midst of his country's oppression4 ,the choice of his detestable hero1 ,csar ,borgia1 clearly enough shows his hidden aim2 and the contradiction between the teaching of the ,prince and that of the ,discourses on ,livy and the ,history of ,florence shows that this profound political thinker has so far been studied only by superficial or corrupt readers4 ,the ,court of ,rome sternly prohibited his book4 ,i can well believe it2 for it is that ,court it most clearly portrays4 #b ,tacitus1 ,histories1 i4 #af4 ,for the best1 and also the shortest way of finding out what is good and what is bad is to consider what you would have wished to happen or not to happen1 had another than you been ,emperor4 #c ,in the ,politicus4 ,,chapter ,,vii ,,mixed ,,governments ,strictly speaking1 there is no such thing as a simple government4 ,an isolated ruler must have subordinate magistrates2 a popular government must have a head4 ,there is therefore1 in the distribution of the executive power1 always a gradation from the greater to the lesser number1 with the difference that sometimes the greater number is dependent on the smaller1 and sometimes the smaller on the greater4 ,sometimes the distribution is equal1 when either the constituent parts are in mutual dependence1 as in the government of ,england1 or the authority of each section is independent1 but imperfect1 as in ,poland4 ,this last form is bad2 for it secures no unity in the government1 and the ,state is left without a bond of union4 ,is a simple or a mixed government the better8 ,political writers are always debating the question1 which must be answered as we have already answered a question about all forms of government4 ,simple government is better in itself1 just because it is simple4 ,but when the executive power is not sufficiently dependent upon the legislative power1 i4e4 when the prince is more closely related to the ,sovereign than the people to the prince1 this lack of proportion must be cured by the division of the government2 for all the parts have then no less authority over the subjects1 while their division makes them all together less strong against the ,sovereign4 ,the same disadvantage is also prevented by the appointment of intermediate magistrates1 who leave the government entire1 and have the effect only of balancing the two powers and maintaining their respective rights4 ,government is then not mixed1 but moderated4 ,the opposite disadvantages may be similarly cured1 and1 when the government is too lax1 tribunals may be set up to concentrate it4 ,this is done in all democracies4 ,in the first case1 the government is divided to make it weak2 in the second1 to make it strong3 for the maxima of both strength and weakness are found in simple governments1 while the mixed forms result in a mean strength4 ,,chapter ,,viii ,,that ,,all ,,forms ,,of ,,government ,,do ,,not ,,suit ,,all ,,countries ,liberty not being a fruit of all climates1 is not within the reach of all peoples4 ,the more this principle1 laid down by ,montesquieu1 is considered1 the more its truth is felt2 the more it is combated1 the more chance is given to confirm it by new proofs4 ,in all the governments that there are1 the public person consumes without producing4 ,whence then does it get what it consumes8 ,from the labour of its members4 ,the necessities of the public are supplied out of the superfluities of individuals4 ,it follows that the civil ,state can subsist only so long as men's labour brings them a return greater than their needs4 ,the amount of this excess is not the same in all countries4 ,in some it is considerable1 in others middling1 in yet others nil1 in some even negative4 ,the relation of product to subsistence depends on the fertility of the climate1 on the sort of labour the land demands1 on the nature of its products1 on the strength of its inhabitants1 on the greater or less consumption they find necessary1 and on several further considerations of which the whole relation is made up4 ,on the other side1 all governments are not of the same nature3 some are less voracious than others1 and the differences between them are based on this second principle1 that the further from their source the public contributions are removed1 the more burdensome they become4 ,the charge should be measured not by the amount of the impositions1 but by the path they have to travel in order to get back to those from whom they came4 ,when the circulation is prompt and well-established1 it does not matter whether much or little is paid2 the people is always rich and1 financially speaking1 all is well4 ,on the contrary1 however little the people gives1 if that little does not return to it1 it is soon exhausted by giving continually3 the ,state is then never rich1 and the people is always a people of beggars4 ,it follows that1 the more the distance between people and government increases1 the more burdensome tribute becomes3 thus1 in a democracy1 the people bears the least charge2 in an aristocracy1 a greater charge2 and1 in monarchy1 the weight becomes heaviest4 ,monarchy therefore suits only wealthy nations2 aristocracy1 ,states of middling size and wealth2 and democracy1 ,states that are small and poor4 ,in fact1 the more we reflect1 the more we find the difference between free and monarchical ,states to be this3 in the former1 everything is used for the public advantage2 in the latter1 the public forces and those of individuals are affected by each other1 and either increases as the other grows weak2 finally1 instead of governing subjects to make them happy1 despotism makes them wretched in order to govern them4 ,we find then1 in every climate1 natural causes according to which the form of government which it requires can be assigned1 and we can even say what sort of inhabitants it should have4 ,unfriendly and barren lands1 where the product does2 not repay the labour1 should remain desert and uncultivated1 or peopled only by savages2 lands where men's labour brings in no more than the exact minimum necessary to subsistence should be inhabited by barbarous peoples3 in such places all polity is impossible4 ,lands where the surplus of product over labour is only middling are suitable for free peoples2 those in which the soil is abundant and fertile and gives a great product for a little labour call for monarchical government1 in order that the surplus of superfluities among the subjects may be consumed by the luxury of the prince3 for it is better for this excess to be absorbed by the government than dissipated among the individuals4 ,i am aware that there are exceptions2 but these exceptions themselves confirm the rule1 in that sooner or later they produce revolutions which restore things to the natural order4 ,general laws should always be distinguished from individual causes that may modify their effects4 ,if all the ,south were covered with ,republics and all the ,north with despotic ,states1 it would be none the less true that1 in point of climate1 despotism is suitable to hot countries1 barbarism to cold countries1 and good polity to temperate regions4 ,i see also that1 the principle being granted1 there may be disputes on its application2 it may be said that there are cold countries that are very fertile1 and tropical countries that are very unproductive4 ,but this difficulty exists only for those who do not consider the question in all its aspects4 ,we must1 as ,i have already said1 take labour1 strength1 consumption1 etc41 into account4 ,take two tracts of equal extent1 one of which brings in five and the other ten4 ,if the inhabitants of the first consume four and those of the second nine1 the surplus of the first product will be a fifth and that of the second a tenth4 ,the ratio of these two surpluses will then be inverse to that of the products1 and the tract which produces only five will give a surplus double that of the tract which produces ten4 ,but there is no question of a double product1 and ,i think no one would put the fertility of cold countries1 as a general rule1 on an equality with that of hot ones4 ,let us1 however1 suppose this equality to exist3 let us1 if you will1 regard ,england as on the same level as ,sicily1 and ,poland as ,egypt--further south1 we shall have ,africa and the ,indies2 further north1 nothing at all4 ,to get this equality of product1 what a difference there must be in tillage3 in ,sicily1 there is only need to scratch the ground2 in ,england1 how men must toil6 ,but1 where more hands are needed to get the same product1 the superfluity must necessarily be less4 ,consider1 besides1 that the same number of men consume much less in hot countries4 ,the climate requires sobriety for the sake of health2 and ,europeans who try to live there as they would at home all perish of dysentery and indigestion4 ,we are1 says ,chardin1 carnivorous animals1 wolves1 in comparison with the ,asiatics4 ,some attribute the sobriety of the ,persians to the fact that their country is less cultivated2 but it is my belief that their country abounds less in commodities because the inhabitants need less4 ,if their frugality1 he goes on1 were the effect of the nakedness of the land1 only the poor would eat little2 but everybody does so4 ,again1 less or more would be eaten in various provinces1 according to the land's fertility2 but the same sobriety is found throughout the kingdom4 ,they are very proud of their manner of life1 saying that you have only to look at their hue to recognise how far it excels that of the ,christians4 ,in fact1 the ,persians are of an even hue2 their skins are fair1 fine and smooth2 while the hue of their subjects1 the ,armenians1 who live after the ,european fashion1 is rough and blotchy1 and their bodies are gross and unwieldy4 ,the nearer you get to the equator1 the less people live on4 ,meat they hardly touch2 rice1 maize1 curcur1 millet and cassava are their ordinary food4 ,there are in the ,indies millions of men whose subsistence does not cost a halfpenny a day4 ,even in ,europe we find considerable differences of appetite between ,northern and ,southern peoples4 ,a ,spaniard will live for a week on a ,german's dinner4 ,in the countries in which men are more voracious1 luxury therefore turns in the direction of consumption4 ,in ,england1 luxury appears in a well-filled table2 in ,italy1 you feast on sugar and flowers4 ,luxury in clothes shows similar differences4 ,in climates in which the changes of season are prompt and violent1 men have better and simpler clothes2 where they clothe themselves only for adornment1 what is striking is more thought of than what is useful2 clothes themselves are then a luxury4 ,at ,naples1 you may see daily walking in the ,pausilippeum men in gold-embroidered upper garments and nothing else4 ,it is the same with buildings2 magnificence is the sole consideration where there is nothing to fear from the air4 ,in ,paris and ,london1 you desire to be lodged warmly and comfortably2 in ,madrid1 you have superb salons1 but not a window that closes1 and you go to bed in a mere hole4 ,in hot countries foods are much more substantial and succulent2 and the third difference cannot but have an influence on the second4 ,why are so many vegetables eaten in ,italy8 ,because there they are good1 nutritious and excellent in taste4 ,in ,france1 where they are nourished only on water1 they are far from nutritious and are thought nothing of at table4 ,they take up all the same no less ground1 and cost at least as much pains to cultivate4 ,it is a proved fact that the wheat of ,barbary1 in other respects inferior to that of ,france1 yields much more flour1 and that the wheat of ,france in turn yields more than that of northern countries2 from which it may be inferred that a like gradation in the same direction1 from equator to pole1 is found generally4 ,but is it not an obvious disadvantage for an equal product to contain less nourishment8 ,to all these points may be added another1 which at once depends on and strengthens them4 ,hot countries need inhabitants less than cold countries1 and can support more of them4 ,there is thus a double surplus1 which is all to the advantage of despotism4 ,the greater the territory occupied by a fixed number of inhabitants1 the more difficult revolt becomes1 because rapid or secret concerted action is impossible1 and the government can easily unmask projects and cut communications2 but the more a numerous people is gathered together1 the less can the government usurp the ,sovereign's place3 the people's leaders can deliberate as safely in their houses as the prince in council1 and the crowd gathers as rapidly in the squares as the prince's troops in their quarters4 ,the advantage of tyrannical government therefore lies in acting at great distances4 ,with the help of the rallying-points it establishes1 its strength1 like that of the lever1#a grows with distance4 ,the strength of the people1 on the other hand1 acts only when concentrated3 when spread abroad1 it evaporates and is lost1 like powder scattered on the ground1 which catches fire only grain by grain4 ,the least populous countries are thus the fittest for tyranny3 fierce animals reign only in deserts4 #a ,this does not contradict what ,i said before 7,book ii1 ch4 ix7 about the disadvantages of great ,states2 for we were then dealing with the authority of the government over the members1 while here we are dealing with its force against the subjects4 ,its scattered members serve it as rallying-points for action against the people at a distance1 but it has no rallying-point for direct action on its members themselves4 ,thus the length of the lever is its weakness in the one case1 and its strength in the other4 ,,chapter ,,ix ,,the ,,marks ,,of ,a ,,good ,,government ,the question ,what absolutely is the best government8 is unanswerable as well as indeterminate2 or rather1 there are as many good answers as there are possible combinations in the absolute and relative situations of all nations4 ,but if it is asked by what sign we may know that a given people is well or ill governed1 that is another matter1 and the question1 being one of fact1 admits of an answer4 ,it is not1 however1 answered1 because every-one wants to answer it in his own way4 ,subjects extol public tranquillity1 citizens individual liberty2 the one class prefers security of possessions1 the other that of person2 the one regards as the best government that which is most severe1 the other maintains that the mildest is the best2 the one wants crimes punished1 the other wants them prevented2 the one wants the ,state to be feared by its neighbours1 the other prefers that it should be ignored2 the one is content if money circulates1 the other demands that the people shall have bread4 ,even if an agreement were come to on these and similar points1 should we have got any further8 ,as moral qualities do not admit of exact measurement1 agreement about the mark does not mean agreement about the valuation4 ,for my part1 ,i am continually astonished that a mark so simple is not recognised1 or that men are of so bad faith as not to admit it4 ,what is the end of political association8 ,the preservation and prosperity of its members4 ,and what is the surest mark of their preservation and prosperity8 ,their numbers and population4 ,seek then nowhere else this mark that is in dispute4 ,the rest being equal1 the government under which1 without external aids1 without naturalisation or colonies1 the citizens increase and multiply most1 is beyond question the best4 ,the government under which a people wanes and diminishes is worst4 ,calculators1 it is left for you to count1 to measure1 to compare4#a #a ,on the same principle it should be judged what centuries deserve the preference for human prosperity4 ,those in which letters and arts have flourished have been too much admired1 because the hidden object of their culture has not been fathomed1 and their fatal effects not taken into account4 ,idque apud imperitos humanitas vocabatur1 cum pars servitutis esset4 ,fools called 'humanity' what was a part of slavery1 ,tacitus1 ,agricola1 #ca4 ,shall we never see in the maxims books lay down the vulgar interest that makes their writers speak8 ,no1 whatever they may say1 when1 despite its renown1 a country is depopulated1 it is not true that all is well1 and it is not enough that a poet should have an income of #ajj1jjj francs to make his age the best of all4 ,less attention should be paid to the apparent repose and tranquillity of the rulers than to the well-being of their nations as wholes1 and above all of the most numerous ,states4 ,a hail-storm lays several cantons waste1 but it rarely makes a famine4 ,outbreaks and civil wars give rulers rude shocks1 but they are not the real ills of peoples1 who may even get a respite1 while there is a dispute as to who shall tyrannise over them4 ,their true prosperity and calamities come from their permanent condition3 it is when the whole remains crushed beneath the yoke1 that decay sets in1 and that the rulers destroy them at will1 and ubi solitudinem faciunt1 pacem appellant ,where they create solitude1 they call it peace1 ,tacitus1 ,agricola1 #ca4 ,when the bickerings of the great disturbed the kingdom of ,france1 and the ,coadjutor of ,paris took a dagger in his pocket to the ,parliament1 these things did not prevent the people of ,france from prospering and multiplying in dignity1 ease and freedom4 ,long ago ,greece flourished in the midst of the most savage wars2 blood ran in torrents1 and yet the whole country was covered with inhabitants4 ,it appeared1 says ,macchiavelli1 that in the midst of murder1 proscription and civil war1 our republic only throve3 the virtue1 morality and independence of the citizens did more to strengthen it than all their dissensions had done to enfeeble it ,a little disturbance gives the soul elasticity2 what makes the race truly prosperous is not so much peace as liberty4 ,,chapter ,x ,,the ,,abuse ,,of ,,government ,,and ,,its ,,tendency ,,to ,,degenerate ,as the particular will acts constantly in opposition to the general will1 the government continually exerts itself against the ,sovereignty4 ,the greater this exertion becomes1 the more the constitution changes2 and1 as there is in this case no other corporate will to create an equilibrium by resisting the will of the prince1 sooner or later the prince must inevitably suppress the ,sovereign and break the social treaty4 ,this is the unavoidable and inherent defect which1 from the very birth of the body politic1 tends ceaselessly to destroy it1 as age and death end by destroying the human body4 ,there are two general courses by which government degenerates3 i4e4 when it undergoes contraction1 or when the ,state is dissolved4 ,government undergoes contraction when it passes from the many to the few1 that is1 from democracy to aristocracy1 and from aristocracy to royalty4 ,to do so is its natural propensity4#a ,if it took the backward course from the few to the many1 it could be said that it was relaxed2 by this inverse sequence is impossible4 ,indeed1 governments never change their form except when their energy is exhausted and leaves them too weak to keep what they have4 ,if a government at once extended its sphere and relaxed its stringency1 its force would become absolutely nil1 and it would persist still less4 ,it is therefore necessary to wind up the spring and tighten the hold as it gives way3 or else the ,state it sustains will come to grief4 ,the dissolution of the ,state may come about in either of two ways4 ,first1 when the prince ceases to administer the ,state in accordance with the laws1 and usurps the ,sovereign power4 ,a remarkable change then occurs3 not the government1 but the ,state1 undergoes contraction2 ,i mean that the great ,state is dissolved1 and another is formed within it1 composed solely of the members of the government1 which becomes for the rest of the people merely master and tyrant4 ,so that the moment the government usurps the ,sovereignty1 the social compact is broken and all private citizens recover by right their natural liberty1 and are forced1 but not bound1 to obey4 ,the same thing happens when the members of the government severally usurp the power they should exercise only as a body2 this is as great an infraction of the laws1 and results in even greater disorders4 ,there are then1 so to speak1 as many princes as there are magistrates1 and the ,state1 no less divided than the government1 either perishes or changes its form4 ,when the ,state is dissolved1 the abuse of government1 whatever it is1 bears the common name of anarchy4 ,to distinguish1 democracy degenerates into ochlocracy and aristocracy into oligarchy and ,i would add that royalty degenerates into tyranny2 but this last word is ambiguous and needs explanation4 ,in vulgar usage1 a tyrant is a king who governs violently and without regard for justice and law4 ,in the exact sense1 a tyrant is an individual who arrogates to himself the royal authority without having a right to it4 ,this is how the ,greeks understood the word tyrant3 they applied it indifferently to good and bad princes whose authority was not legitimate4#b ,tyrant and usurper are thus perfectly synonymous terms4 ,in order that ,i may give different things different names1 ,i call him who usurps the royal authority tyrant1 and him who usurps the sovereign power a despot4 ,the tyrant is he who thrusts himself in contrary to the laws to govern in accordance with the laws2 the despot is he who sets himself above the laws themselves4 ,thus the tyrant cannot be a despot1 but the despot is always a tyrant4 #a ,the slow formation and the progress of the ,republic of ,venice in its lagoons are a notable instance of this sequence2 and it is most astonishing that1 after more than twelve hundred years' existence1 the ,venetians seem to be still at the second stage1 which they reached with the ,serrar di ,consiglio in #aaih4 ,as for the ancient ,dukes who are brought up against them1 it is proved1 whatever the ,squittinio della libert veneta may say of them1 that they were in no sense ,sovereigns4 ,a case certain to be cited against my view is that of the ,roman ,republic1 which1 it will be said1 followed exactly the opposite course1 and passed from monarchy to aristocracy and from aristocracy to democracy4 ,i by no means take this view of it4 ,what ,romulus first set up was a mixed government1 which soon deteriorated into despotism4 ,from special causes1 the ,state died an untimely death1 as new-born children sometimes perish without reaching manhood4 ,the expulsion of the ,tarquins was the real period of the birth of the ,republic4 ,but at first it took on no constant form1 because1 by not abolishing the patriciate1 it left half its work undone4 ,for1 by this means1 hereditary aristocracy1 the worst of all legitimate forms of administration1 remained in conflict with democracy1 and the form of the government1 as ,macchiavelli has proved1 was only fixed on the establishment of the tribunate3 only then was there a true government and a veritable democracy4 ,in fact1 the people was then not only ,sovereign1 but also magistrate and judge2 the senate was only a subordinate tribunal1 to temper and concentrate the government1 and the consuls themselves1 though they were patricians1 first magistrates1 and absolute generals in war1 were in ,rome itself no more than presidents of the people4 ,from that point1 the government followed its natural tendency1 and inclined strongly to aristocracy4 ,the patriciate1 we may say1 abolished itself1 and the aristocracy was found no longer in the body of patricians as at ,venice and ,genoa1 but in the body of the senate1 which was composed of patricians and plebeians1 and even in the body of tribunes when they began to usurp an active function3 for names do not affect facts1 and1 when the people has rulers who govern for it1 whatever name they bear1 the government is an aristocracy4 ,the abuse of aristocracy led to the civil wars and the triumvirate4 ,sulla1 ,julius ,csar and ,augustus became in fact real monarchs2 and finally1 under the despotism of ,tiberius1 the ,state was dissolved4 ,roman history then confirms1 instead of invalidating1 the principle ,i have laid down4 #b ,omnes enim et habentur et dicuntur tyranni1 qui potestate utuntur perpetua in ea civitate qu libertate usa est 7,cornelius ,nepos1 ,life of ,miltiades74 ,for all those are called and considered tyrants1 who hold perpetual power in a ,state that has known liberty4 ,it is true that ,aristotle 7,nicomachean ,ethics1 ,book viii1 chapter x7 distinguishes the tyrant from the king by the fact that the former governs in his own interest1 and the latter only for the good of his subjects2 but not only did all ,greek authors in general use the word tyrant in a different sense1 as appears most clearly in ,xenophon's ,hiero1 but also it would follow from ,aristotle's distinction that1 from the very beginning of the world1 there has not yet been a single king4 ,,chapter ,,xi ,,the ,,death ,,of ,,the ,,body ,,politic ,such is the natural and inevitable tendency of the best constituted governments4 ,if ,sparta and ,rome perished1 what ,state can hope to endure for ever8 ,if we would set up a long-lived form of government1 let us not even dream of making it eternal4 ,if we are to succeed1 we must not attempt the impossible1 or flatter ourselves that we are endowing the work of man with a stability of which human conditions do not permit4 ,the body politic1 as well as the human body1 begins to die as soon as it is born1 and carries in itself the causes of its destruction4 ,but both may have a constitution that is more or less robust and suited to preserve them a longer or a shorter time4 ,the constitution of man is the work of nature2 that of the ,state the work of art4 ,it is not in men's power to prolong their own lives2 but it is for them to prolong as much as possible the life of the ,state1 by giving it the best possible constitution4 ,the best constituted ,state will have an end2 but it will end later than any other1 unless some unforeseen accident brings about its untimely destruction4 ,the life-principle of the body politic lies in the sovereign authority4 ,the legislative power is the heart of the ,state2 the executive power is its brain1 which causes the movement of all the parts4 ,the brain may become paralysed and the individual still live4 ,a man may remain an imbecile and live2 but as soon as the heart ceases to perform its functions1 the animal is dead4 ,the ,state subsists by means not of the laws1 but of the legislative power4 ,yesterday's law is not binding to-day2 but silence is taken for tacit consent1 and the ,sovereign is held to confirm incessantly the laws it does not abrogate as it might4 ,all that it has once declared itself to will it wills always1 unless it revokes its declaration4 ,why then is so much respect paid to old laws8 ,for this very reason4 ,we must believe that nothing but the excellence of old acts of will can have preserved them so long3 if the ,sovereign had not recognised them as throughout salutary1 it would have revoked them a thousand times4 ,this is why1 so far from growing weak1 the laws continually gain new strength in any well constituted ,state2 the precedent of antiquity makes them daily more venerable3 while wherever the laws grow weak as they become old1 this proves that there is no longer a legislative power1 and that the ,state is dead4 ,,chapter ,,xii ,,how ,,the ,,sovereign ,,authority ,,maintains ,,itself ,the ,sovereign1 having no force other than the legislative power1 acts only by means of the laws2 and the laws being solely the authentic acts of the general will1 the ,sovereign cannot act save when the people is assembled4 ,the people in assembly1 ,i shall be told1 is a mere chimera4 ,it is so to-day1 but two thousand years ago it was not so4 ,has man's nature changed8 ,the bounds of possibility1 in moral matters1 are less narrow than we imagine3 it is our weaknesses1 our vices and our prejudices that confine them4 ,base souls have no belief in great men2 vile slaves smile in mockery at the name of liberty4 ,let us judge of what can be done by what has been done4 ,i shall say nothing of the ,republics of ancient ,greece2 but the ,roman ,republic was1 to my mind1 a great ,state1 and the town of ,rome a great town4 ,the last census showed that there were in ,rome four hundred thousand citizens capable of bearing arms1 and the last computation of the population of the ,empire showed over four million citizens1 excluding subjects1 foreigners1 women1 children and slaves4 ,what difficulties might not be supposed to stand in the way of the frequent assemblage of the vast population of this capital and its neighbourhood4 ,yet few weeks passed without the ,roman people being in assembly1 and even being so several times4 ,it exercised not only the rights of ,sovereignty1 but also a part of those of government4 ,it dealt with certain matters1 and judged certain cases1 and this whole people was found in the public meeting-place hardly less often as magistrates than as citizens4 ,if we went back to the earliest history of nations1 we should find that most ancient governments1 even those of monarchical form1 such as the ,macedonian and the ,frankish1 had similar councils4 ,in any case1 the one incontestable fact ,i have given is an answer to all difficulties2 it is good logic to reason from the actual to the possible4 ,,chapter ,,xiii ,,the ,,same 7continued7 ,it is not enough for the assembled people to have once fixed the constitution of the ,state by giving its sanction to a body of law2 it is not enough for it to have set up a perpetual government1 or provided once for all for the election of magistrates4 ,besides the extraordinary assemblies unforeseen circumstances may demand1 there must be fixed periodical assemblies which cannot be abrogated or prorogued1 so that on the proper day the people is legitimately called together by law1 without need of any formal summoning4 ,but1 apart from these assemblies authorised by their date alone1 every assembly of the people not summoned by the magistrates appointed for that purpose1 and in accordance with the prescribed forms1 should be regarded as unlawful1 and all its acts as null and void1 because the command to assemble should itself proceed from the law4 ,the greater or less frequency with which lawful assemblies should occur depends on so many considerations that no exact rules about them can be given4 ,it can only be said generally that the stronger the government the more often should the ,sovereign show itself4 ,this1 ,i shall be told1 may do for a single town2 but what is to be done when the ,state includes several8 ,is the sovereign authority to be divided8 ,or is it to be concentrated in a single town to which all the rest are made subject8 ,neither the one nor the other1 ,i reply4 ,first1 the sovereign authority is one and simple1 and cannot be divided without being destroyed4 ,in th second place1 one town cannot1 any more than one nation1 legitimately be made subject to another1 because the essence of the body politic lies in the reconciliation of obedience and liberty1 and the words subject and ,sovereign are identical correlatives the idea of which meets in the single word citizen4 ,i answer further that the union of several towns in a single city is always bad1 and that1 if we wish to make such a union1 we should not expect to avoid its natural disadvantages4 ,it is useless to bring up abuses that belong to great ,states against one who desires to see only small ones2 but how can small ,states be given the strength to resist great ones1 as formerly the ,greek towns resisted the ,great ,king1 and more recently ,holland and ,switzerland have resisted the ,house of ,austria8 ,nevertheless1 if the ,state cannot be reduced to the right limits1 there remains still one resource2 this is1 to allow no capital1 to make the seat of government move from town to town1 and to assemble by turn in each the ,provincial ,estates of the country4 ,people the territory evenly1 extend everywhere the same rights1 bear to every place in it abundance and life3 by these means will the ,state become at once as strong and as well governed as possible4 ,remember that the walls of towns are built of the ruins of the houses of the countryside4 ,for every palace ,i see raised in the capital1 my mind's eye sees a whole country made desolate4 ,,chapter ,,xiv ,,the ,,same 7continued7 ,the moment the people is legitimately assembled as a sovereign body1 the jurisdiction of the government wholly lapses1 the executive power is suspended1 and the person of the meanest citizen is as sacred and inviolable as that of the first magistrate2 for in the presence of the person represented1 representatives no longer exist4 ,most of the tumults that arose in the comitia at ,rome were due to ignorance or neglect of this rule4 ,the consuls were in them merely the presidents of the people2 the tribunes were mere speakers2#a the senate was nothing at all4 ,these intervals of suspension1 during which the prince recognises or ought to recognise an actual superior1 have always been viewed by him with alarm2 and these assemblies of the people1 which are the aegis of the body politic and the curb on the government1 have at all times been the horror of rulers3 who therefore never spare pains1 objections1 difficulties1 and promises1 to stop the citizens from having them4 ,when the citizens are greedy1 cowardly1 and pusillanimous1 and love ease more than liberty1 they do not long hold out against the redoubled efforts of the government2 and thus1 as the resisting force incessantly grows1 the sovereign authority ends by disappearing1 and most cities fall and perish before their time4 ,but between the sovereign authority and arbitrary government there sometimes intervenes a mean power of which something must be said4 #a ,in nearly the same sense as this word has in the ,english ,parliament4 ,the similarity of these functions would have brought the consuls and the tribunes into conflict1 even had all jurisdiction been suspended4 ,,chapter ,,xv ,,deputies ,,or ,,representatives ,as soon as public service ceases to be the chief business of the citizens1 and they would rather serve with their money than with their persons1 the ,state is not far from its fall4 ,when it is necessary to march out to war1 they pay troops and stay at home3 when it is necessary to meet in council1 they name deputies and stay at home4 ,by reason of idleness and money1 they end by having soldiers to enslave their country and representatives to sell it4 ,it is through the hustle of commerce and the arts1 through the greedy self-interest of profit1 and through softness and love of amenities that personal services are replaced by money payments4 ,men surrender a part of their profits in order to have time to increase them at leisure4 ,make gifts of money1 and you will not be long without chains4 ,the word finance is a slavish word1 unknown in the city-state4 ,in a country that is truly free1 the citizens do everything with their own arms and nothing by means of money2 so far from paying to be exempted from their duties1 they would even pay for the privilege of fulfilling them themselves4 ,i am far from taking the common view3 ,i hold enforced labour to be less opposed to liberty than taxes4 ,the better the constitution of a ,state is1 the more do public affairs encroach on private in the minds of the citizens4 ,private affairs are even of much less importance1 because the aggregate of the common happiness furnishes a greater proportion of that of each individual1 so that there is less for him to seek in particular cares4 ,in a well-ordered city every man flies to the assemblies3 under a bad government no one cares to stir a step to get to them1 because no one is interested in what happens there1 because it is foreseen that the general will will not prevail1 and lastly because domestic cares are all-absorbing4 ,good laws lead to the making of better ones2 bad ones bring about worse4 ,as soon as any man says of the affairs of the ,state ,what does it matter to me8 the ,state may be given up for lost4 ,the lukewarmness of patriotism1 the activity of private interest1 the vastness of ,states1 conquest and the abuse of government suggested the method of having deputies or representatives of the people in the national assemblies4 ,these are what1 in some countries1 men have presumed to call the ,third ,estate4 ,thus the individual interest of two orders is put first and second2 the public interest occupies only the third place4 ,sovereignty1 for the same reason as makes it inalienable1 cannot be represented2 it lies essentially in the general will1 and will does not admit of representation3 it is either the same1 or other2 there is no intermediate possibility4 ,the deputies of the people1 therefore1 are not and cannot be its representatives3 they are merely its stewards1 and can carry through no definitive acts4 ,every law the people has not ratified in person is null and void--is1 in fact1 not a law4 ,the people of ,england regards itself as free2 but it is grossly mistaken2 it is free only during the election of members of parliament4 ,as soon as they are elected1 slavery overtakes it1 and it is nothing4 ,the use it makes of the short moments of liberty it enjoys shows indeed that it deserves to lose them4 ,the idea of representation is modern2 it comes to us from feudal government1 from that iniquitous and absurd system which degrades humanity and dishonours the name of man4 ,in ancient republics and even in monarchies1 the people never had representatives2 the word itself was unknown4 ,it is very singular that in ,rome1 where the tribunes were so sacrosanct1 it was never even imagined that they could usurp the functions of the people1 and that in the midst of so great a multitude they never attempted to pass on their own authority a single plebiscitum4 ,we can1 however1 form an idea of the difficulties caused sometimes by the people being so numerous1 from what happened in the time of the ,gracchi1 when some of the citizens had to cast their votes from the roofs of buildings4 ,where right and liberty are everything1 disadvantages count for nothing4 ,among this wise people everything was given its just value1 its lictors were allowed to do what its tribunes would never have dared to attempt2 for it had no fear that its lictors would try to represent it4 ,to explain1 however1 in what way the tribunes did sometimes represent it1 it is enough to conceive how the government represents the ,sovereign4 ,law being purely the declaration of the general will1 it is clear that1 in the exercise of the legislative power1 the people cannot be represented2 but in that of the executive power1 which is only the force that is applied to give the law effect1 it both can and should be represented4 ,we thus see that if we looked closely into the matter we should find that very few nations have any laws4 ,however that may be1 it is certain that the tribunes1 possessing no executive power1 could never represent the ,roman people by right of the powers entrusted to them1 but only by usurping those of the senate4 ,in ,greece1 all that the people had to do1 it did for itself2 it was constantly assembled in the public square4 ,the ,greeks lived in a mild climate2 they had no natural greed2 slaves did their work for them2 their great concern was with liberty4 ,lacking the same advantages1 how can you preserve the same rights8 ,your severer climates add to your needs2#a for half the year your public squares are uninhabitable2 the flatness of your languages unfits them for being heard in the open air2 you sacrifice more for profit than for liberty1 and fear slavery less than poverty4 ,what then8 ,is liberty maintained only by the help of slavery8 ,it may be so4 ,extremes meet4 ,everything that is not in the course of nature has its disadvantages1 civil society most of all4 ,there are some unhappy circumstances in which we can only keep our liberty at others' expense1 and where the citizen can be perfectly free only when the slave is most a slave4 ,such was the case with ,sparta4 ,as for you1 modern peoples1 you have no slaves1 but you are slaves yourselves2 you pay for their liberty with your own4 ,it is in vain that you boast of this preference2 ,i find in it more cowardice than humanity4 ,i do not mean by all this that it is necessary to have slaves1 or that the right of slavery is legitimate3 ,i am merely giving the reasons why modern peoples1 believing themselves to be free1 have representatives1 while ancient peoples had none4 ,in any case1 the moment a people allows itself to be represented1 it is no longer free3 it no longer exists4 ,all things considered1 ,i do not see that it is possible henceforth for the ,sovereign to preserve among us the exercise of its rights1 unless the city is very small4 ,but if it is very small1 it will be conquered8 ,no4 ,i will show later on how the external strength of a great people#b may be combined with the convenient polity and good order of a small ,state4 #a ,to adopt in cold countries the luxury and effeminacy of the ,east is to desire to submit to its chains2 it is indeed to bow to them far more inevitably in our case than in theirs4 #b ,i had intended to do this in the sequel to this work1 when in dealing with external relations ,i came to the subject of confederations4 ,the subject is quite new1 and its principles have still to be laid down4 ,,chapter ,,xvi ,,that ,,the ,,institution ,,of ,,government ,,is ,,not ,a ,,contract ,the legislative power once well established1 the next thing is to establish similarly the executive power2 for this latter1 which operates only by particular acts1 not being of the essence of the former1 is naturally separate from it4 ,were it possible for the ,sovereign1 as such1 to possess the executive power1 right and fact would be so confounded that no one could tell what was law and what was not2 and the body politic1 thus disfigured1 would soon fall a prey to the violence it was instituted to prevent4 ,as the citizens1 by the social contract1 are all equal1 all can prescribe what all should do1 but no one has a right to demand that another shall do what he does not do himself4 ,it is strictly this right1 which is indispensable for giving the body politic life and movement1 that the ,sovereign1 in instituting the government1 confers upon the prince4 ,it has been held that this act of establishment was a contract between the people and the rulers it sets over itself4--a contract in which conditions were laid down between the two parties binding the one to command and the other to obey4 ,it will be admitted1 ,i am sure1 that this is an odd kind of contract to enter into4 ,but let us see if this view can be upheld4 ,first1 the supreme authority can no more be modified than it can be alienated2 to limit it is to destroy it4 ,it is absurd and contradictory for the ,sovereign to set a superior over itself2 to bind itself to obey a master would be to return to absolute liberty4 ,moreover1 it is clear that this contract between the people and such and such persons would be a particular act2 and from this it follows that it can be neither a law nor an act of ,sovereignty1 and that consequently it would be illegitimate4 ,it is plain too that the contracting parties in relation to each other would be under the law of nature alone and wholly without guarantees of their mutual undertakings1 a position wholly at variance with the civil state4 ,he who has force at his command being always in a position to control execution1 it would come to the same thing if the name contract were given to the act of one man who said to another2 ,i give you all my goods1 on condition that you give me back as much of them as you please4 ,there is only one contract in the ,state1 and that is the act of association1 which in itself excludes the existence of a second4 ,it is impossible to conceive of any public contract that would not be a violation of the first4 ,,chapter ,,xvii ,,the ,,institution ,,of ,,government ,under what general idea then should the act by which government is instituted be conceived as falling8 ,i will begin by stating that the act is complex1 as being composed of two others--the establishment' of the law and its execution4 ,by the former1 the ,sovereign decrees that there shall be a governing body established in this or that form2 this act is clearly a law4 ,by the latter1 the people nominates the rulers who are to be entrusted with the government that has been established4 ,this nomination1 being a particular act1 is clearly not a second law1 but merely a consequence of the first and a function of government4 ,the difficulty is to understand how there can be a governmental act before government exists1 and how the people1 which is only ,sovereign or subject1 can1 under certain circumstances1 become a prince or magistrate4 ,it is at this point that there is revealed one of the astonishing properties of the body politic1 by means of which it reconciles apparently contradictory operations2 for this is accomplished by a sudden conversion of ,sovereignty into democracy1 so that1 without sensible change1 and merely by virtue of a new relation of all to all1 the citizens become magistrates and pass from general to particular acts1 from legislation to the execution of the law4 ,this changed relation is no speculative subtlety without instances in practice3 it happens every day in the ,english ,parliament1 where1 on certain occasions1 the ,lower ,house resolves itself into ,grand ,committee1 for the better discussion of affairs1 and thus1 from being at one moment a sovereign court1 becomes at the next a mere commission2 so that subsequently it reports to itself1 as ,house of ,commons1 the result of its proceedings in ,grand ,committee1 and debates over again under one name what it has already settled under another4 ,it is1 indeed1 the peculiar advantage of democratic government that it can be established in actuality by a simple act of the general will4 ,subsequently1 this provisional government remains in power1 if this form is adopted1 or else establishes in the name of the ,sovereign the government that is prescribed by law2 and thus the whole proceeding is regular4 ,it is impossible to set up government in any other manner legitimately and in accordance with the principles so far laid down4 ,,chapter ,,xviii ,,how ,,to ,,check ,,the ,,usurpations ,,of ,,government ,what we have just said confirms ,chapter ,,xvi1 and makes it clear that the institution of government is not a contract1 but a law2 that the depositaries of the executive power are not the people's masters1 but its officers2 that it can set them up and pull them down when it likes2 that for them there is no question of contract1 but of obedience2 and that in taking charge of the functions the ,state imposes on them they are doing no more than fulfilling their duty as citizens1 without having the remotest right to argue about the conditions4 ,when therefore the people sets up an hereditary government1 whether it be monarchical and confined to one family1 or aristocratic and confined to a class1 what it enters into is not an undertaking2 the administration is given a provisional form1 until the people chooses to order it otherwise4 ,it is true that such changes are always dangerous1 and that the established government should never be touched except when it comes to be incompatible with the public good2 but the circumspection this involves is a maxim of policy and not a rule of right1 and the ,state is no more bound to leave civil authority in the hands of its rulers than military authority in the hands of its generals4 ,it is also true that it is impossible to be too careful to observe1 in such cases1 all the formalities necessary to distinguish a regular and legitimate act from a seditious tumult1 and the will of a whole people from the clamour of a faction4 ,here above all no further concession should be made to the untoward possibility than cannot1 in the strictest logic1 be refused it4 ,from this obligation the prince derives a great advantage in preserving his power despite the people1 without it being possible to say he has usurped it2 for1 seeming to avail himself only of his rights1 he finds it very easy to extend them1 and to prevent1 under the pretext of keeping the peace1 assemblies that are destined to the re-establishment of order2 with the result that he takes advantage of a silence he does not allow to be broken1 or of irregularities he causes to be committed1 to assume that he has the support of those whom fear prevents from speaking1 and to punish those who dare to speak4 ,thus it was that the decemvirs1 first elected for one year and then kept on in office for a second1 tried to perpetuate their power by forbidding the comitia to assemble2 and by this easy method every government in the world1 once clothed with the public power1 sooner or later usurps the sovereign authority4 ,the periodical assemblies of which ,i have already spoken are designed to prevent or postpone this calamity1 above all when they need no formal summoning2 for in that case1 the prince cannot stop them without openly declaring himself a law-breaker and an enemy of the ,state4 ,the opening of these assemblies1 whose sole object is the maintenance of the social treaty1 should always take the form of putting two propositions that may not be suppressed1 which should be voted on separately4 ,the first is3 ,does it please the ,sovereign to preserve the present form of government8 ,the second is3 ,does it please the people to leave its administration in the hands of those who are actually in charge of it8 ,i am here assuming what ,i think ,i have shown2 that there is in the ,state no fundamental law that cannot be revoked1 not excluding the social compact itself2 for if all the citizens assembled of one accord to break the compact1 it is impossible to doubt that it would be very legitimately broken4 ,grotius even thinks that each man can renounce his membership of his own ,state1 and recover his natural liberty and his goods on leaving the country4#a ,it would be indeed absurd if all the citizens in assembly could not do what each can do by himself4 #a ,provided1 of course1 he does not leave to escape his obligations and avoid having to serve his country in the hour of need4 ,flight in such a case would be criminal and punishable1 and would be1 not withdrawal1 but desertion4 ,,book ,,iv ,,chapter ,i ,,that ,,the ,,general ,,will ,,is ,,indestructible ,as long as several men in assembly regard themselves as a single body1 they have only a single will which is concerned with their common preservation and general well-being4 ,in this case1 all the springs of the ,state are vigorous and simple and its rules clear and luminous2 there are no embroilments or conflicts of interests2 the common good is everywhere clearly apparent1 and only good sense is needed to perceive it4 ,peace1 unity and equality are the enemies of political subtleties4 ,men who are upright and simple are difficult to deceive because of their simplicity2 lures and ingenious pretexts fail to impose upon them1 and they are not even subtle enough to be dupes4 ,when1 among the happiest people in the world1 bands of peasants are seen regulating affairs of ,state under an oak1 and always acting wisely1 can we help scorning the ingenious methods of other nations1 which make themselves illustrious and wretched with so much art and mystery8 ,a ,state so governed needs very few laws2 and1 as it becomes necessary to issue new ones1 the necessity is universally seen4 ,the first man to propose them merely says what all have already felt1 and there is no question of factions or intrigues or eloquence in order to secure the passage into law of what every one has already decided to do1 as soon as he is sure that the rest will act with him4 ,theorists are led into error because1 seeing only ,states that have been from the beginning wrongly constituted1 they are struck by the impossibility of applying such a policy to them4 ,they make great game of all the absurdities a clever rascal or an insinuating speaker might get the people of ,paris or ,london to believe4 ,they do not know that ,cromwell would have been put to the bells by the people of ,berne1 and the ,due de ,beaufort on the treadmill by the ,genevese4 ,but when the social bond begins to be relaxed and the ,state to grow weak1 when particular interests begin to make themselves felt and the smaller societies to exercise an influence over the larger1 the common interest changes and finds opponents3 opinion is no longer unanimous2 the general will ceases to be the will of all2 contradictory views and debates arise2 and the best advice is not taken without question4 ,finally1 when the ,state1 on the eve of ruin1 maintains only a vain1 illusory and formal existence1 when in every heart the social bond is broken1 and the meanest interest brazenly lays hold of the sacred name of public good1 the general will becomes mute3 all men1 guided by secret motives1 no more give their views as citizens than if the ,state had never been2 and iniquitous decrees directed solely to private interest get passed under the name of laws4 ,does it follow from this that the general will is exterminated or corrupted8 ,not at all3 it is always constant1 unalterable and pure2 but it is subordinated to other wills which encroach upon its sphere4 ,each man1 in detaching1 his interest from the common interest1 sees clearly that he cannot entirely separate them2 but his share in the public mishaps seems to him negligible beside the exclusive good he aims at making his own4 ,apart from this particular good1 he wills the general good in his own interest1 as strongly as any one else4 ,even in selling his vote for money1 he does not extinguish in himself the general will1 but only eludes it4 ,the fault he commits is that of changing the state of the question1 and answering something different from what he is asked4 ,instead of saying1 by his vote1 ,it is to the advantage of the ,state1 he says1 ,it is of advantage to this or that man or party that this or that view should prevail4 ,thus the law of public order in assemblies is not so much to maintain in them the general will as to secure that the question be always put to it1 and the answer always given by it4 ,i could here set down many reflections on the simple right of voting in every act of ,sovereignty--a right which no-one can take from the citizens--and also on the right of stating views1 making proposals1 dividing and discussing1 which the government is always most careful to leave solely to its members2 but this important subject would need a treatise to itself1 and it is impossible to say everything in a single work4 ,,chapter ,,ii ,,voting ,it may be seen1 from the last chapter1 that the way in which general business is managed may give a clear enough indication of the actual state of morals and the health of the body politic4 ,the more concert reigns in the assemblies1 that is1 the nearer opinion approaches unanimity1 the greater is the dominance of the general will4 ,on the other hand1 long debates1 dissensions and tumult proclaim the ascendancy of particular interests and the decline of the ,state4 ,this seems less clear when two or more orders enter into the constitution1 as patricians and plebeians did at ,rome2 for quarrels between these two orders often disturbed the comitia1 even in the best days of the ,republic4 ,but the exception is rather apparent than real2 for then1 through the defect that is inherent in the body politic1 there were1 so to speak1 two ,states in one1 and what is not true of the two together is true of either separately4 ,indeed1 even in the most stormy times1 the plebiscita of the people1 when the ,senate did not interfere with them1 always went through quietly and by large majorities4 ,the citizens having but one interest1 the people had but a single will4 ,at the other extremity of the circle1 unanimity recurs2 this is the case when the citizens1 having fallen into servitude1 have lost both liberty and will4 ,fear and flattery then change votes into acclamation2 deliberation ceases1 and only worship or malediction is left4 ,such was the vile manner in which the senate expressed its views under the ,emperors4 ,it did so sometimes with absurd precautions4 ,tacitus observes that1 under ,otho1 the senators1 while they heaped curses on ,vitellius1 contrived at the same time to make a deafening noise1 in order that1 should he ever become their master1 he might not know what each of them had said4 ,on these various considerations depend the rules by which the methods of counting votes and comparing opinions should be regulated1 according as the general will is more or less easy to discover1 and the ,state more or less in its decline4 ,there is but one law which1 from its nature1 needs unanimous consent4 ,this is the social compact2 for civil association is the most voluntary of all acts4 ,every man being born free and his own master1 no-one1 under any pretext whatsoever1 can make any man subject without his consent4 ,to decide that the son of a slave is born a slave is to decide that he is not born a man4 ,if then there are opponents when the social compact is made1 their opposition does not invalidate the contract1 but merely prevents them from being included in it4 ,they are foreigners among citizens4 ,when the ,state is instituted1 residence constitutes consent2 to dwell within its territory is to submit to the ,sovereign4#a ,apart from this primitive contract1 the vote of the majority always binds all the rest4 ,this follows from the contract itself4 ,but it is asked how a man can be both free and forced to conform to wills that are not his own4 ,how are the opponents at once free and subject to laws they have not agreed to8 ,i retort that the question is wrongly put4 ,the citizen gives his consent to all the laws1 including those which are passed in spite of his opposition1 and even those which punish him when he dares to break any of them4 ,the constant will of all the members of the ,state is the general will2 by virtue of it they are citizens and free4#b ,when in the popular assembly a law is proposed1 what the people is asked is not exactly whether it approves or rejects the proposal1 but whether it is in conformity with the general will1 which is their will4 ,each man1 in giving his vote1 states his opinion on that point2 and the general will is found by counting votes4 ,when therefore the opinion that is contrary to my own prevails1 this proves neither more nor less than that ,i was mistaken1 and that what ,i thought to be the general will was not so4 ,if my particular opinion had carried the day ,i should have achieved the opposite of what was my will and it is in that case that ,i should not have been free4 ,this presupposes1 indeed1 that all the qualities of the general will still reside in the majority3 when they cease to do so1 whatever side a man may take1 liberty is no longer possible4 ,in my earlier demonstration of how particular wills are substituted for the general will in public deliberation1 ,i have adequately pointed out the practicable methods of avoiding this abuse2 and ,i shall have more to say of them later on4 ,i have also given the principles for determining the proportional number of votes for declaring that will4 ,a difference of one vote destroys equality2 a single opponent destroys unanimity2 but between equality and unanimity1 there are several grades of unequal division1 at each of which this proportion may be fixed in accordance with the condition and the needs of the body politic4 ,there are two general rules that may serve to regulate this relation4 ,first1 the more grave and important the questions discussed1 the nearer should the opinion that is to prevail approach unanimity4 ,secondly1 the more the matter in hand calls for speed1 the smaller the prescribed difference in the numbers of votes may be allowed to become3 where an instant decision has to be reached1 a majority of one vote should be enough4 ,the first of these two rules seems more in harmony with the laws1 and the second with practical affairs4 ,in any case1 it is the combination of them that gives the best proportions for determining the majority necessary4 #a ,this should of course be understood as applying to a free ,state2 for elsewhere family1 goods1 lack of a refuge1 necessity1 or violence may detain a man in a country against his will2 and then his dwelling there no longer by itself implies his consent to the contract or to its violation4 #b ,at ,genoa1 the word ,liberty may be read over the front of the prisons and on the chains of the galley-slaves4 ,this application of the device is good and just4 ,it is indeed only malefactors of all estates who prevent the citizen from being free4 ,in the country in which all such men were in the galleys1 the most perfect liberty would be enjoyed4 ,,chapter ,,iii ,,elections ,in the elections of the prince and the magistrates1 which are1 as ,i have said1 complex acts1 there are two possible methods of procedure1 choice and lot4 ,both have been employed in various republics1 and a highly complicated mixture of the two still survives in the election of the ,doge at ,venice4 ,election by lot1 says ,montesquieu1 is democratic in nature4 ,i agree that it is so2 but in what sense8 ,the lot1 he goes on1 is a way of making choice that is unfair to nobody2 it leaves each citizen a reasonable hope of serving his country4 ,these are not reasons4 ,if we bear in mind that the election of rulers is a function of government1 and not of ,sovereignty1 we shall see why the lot is the method more natural to democracy1 in which the administration is better in proportion as the number of its acts is small4 ,in every real democracy1 magistracy is not an advantage1 but a burdensome charge which cannot justly be imposed on one individual rather than another4 ,the law alone can lay the charge on him on whom the lot falls4 ,for1 the conditions being then the same for all1 and the choice not depending on any human will1 there is no particular application to alter the universality of the law4 ,in an aristocracy1 the prince chooses the prince1 the government is preserved by itself1 and voting is rightly ordered4 ,the instance of the election of the ,doge of ,venice confirms1 instead of destroying1 this distinction2 the mixed form suits a mixed government4 ,for it is an error to take the government of ,venice for a real aristocracy4 ,if the people has no share in the government1 the nobility is itself the people4 ,a host of poor ,barnabotes never gets near any magistracy1 and its nobility consists merely in the empty title of ,excellency1 and in the right to sit in the ,great ,council4 ,as this ,great ,council is as numerous as our ,general ,council at ,geneva1 its illustrious members have no more privileges than our plain citizens4 ,it is indisputable that1 apart from the extreme disparity between the two republics1 the bourgeoisie of ,geneva is exactly equivalent to the patriciate of ,venice2 our natives and inhabitants correspond to the townsmen and the people of ,venice2 our peasants correspond to the subjects on the mainland2 and1 however that republic be regarded1 if its size be left out of account1 its government is no more aristocratic than our own4 ,the whole difference is that1 having no life-ruler1 we do not1 like ,venice1 need to use the lot4 ,election by lot would have few disadvantages in a real democracy1 in which1 as equality would everywhere exist in morals and talents as well as in principles and fortunes1 it would become almost a matter of indifference who was chosen4 ,but ,i have already said that a real democracy is only an ideal4 ,when choice and lot are combined1 positions that require special talents1 such as military posts1 should be filled by the former2 the latter does for cases1 such as judicial offices1 in which good sense1 justice1 and integrity are enough1 because in a ,state that is well constituted1 these qualities are common to all the citizens4 ,neither lot nor vote has any place in monarchical government4 ,the monarch being by right sole prince and only magistrate1 the choice of his lieutenants belongs to none but him4 ,when the ,abb de ,saint-,pierre proposed that the ,councils of the ,king of ,france should be multiplied1 and their members elected by ballot1 he did not see that he was proposing to change the form of government4 ,i should now speak of the methods of giving and counting opinions in the assembly of the people2 but perhaps an account of this aspect of the ,roman constitution will more forcibly illustrate all the rules ,i could lay down4 ,it is worth the while of a judicious reader to follow in some detail the working of public and private affairs in a ,council consisting of two hundred thousand men4 ,,chapter ,,iv ,,the ,,roman ,,comitia ,we are without well-certified records of the first period of ,rome's existence2 it even appears very probable that most of the stories told about it are fables2 indeed1 generally speaking1 the most instructive part of the history of peoples1 that which deals with their foundation1 is what we have least of4 ,experience teaches us every day what causes lead to the revolutions of empires2 but1 as no new peoples are now formed1 we have almost nothing beyond conjecture to go upon in explaining how they were created4 ,the customs we find established show at least that these customs had an origin4 ,the traditions that go back to those origins1 that have the greatest authorities behind them1 and that are confirmed by the strongest proofs1 should pass for the most certain4 ,these are the rules ,i have tried to follow in inquiring how the freest and most powerful people on earth exercised its supreme power4 ,after the foundation of ,rome1 the new-born republic1 that is1 the army of its founder1 composed of ,albans1 ,sabines and foreigners1 was divided into three classes1 which1 from this division1 took the name of tribes4 ,each of these tribes was subdivided into ten curi1 and each curia into decuri1 headed by leaders called curiones and decuriones4 ,besides this1 out of each tribe was taken a body of one hundred ,equites or ,knights1 called a century1 which shows that these divisions1 being unnecessary in a town1 were at first merely military4 ,but an instinct for greatness seems to have led the little township of ,rome to provide itself in advance with a political system suitable for the capital of the world4 ,out of this original division an awkward situation soon arose4 ,the tribes of the ,albans 7,ramnenses7 and the ,sabines 7,tatienses7 remained always in the same condition1 while that of the foreigners 7,luceres7 continually grew as more and more foreigners came to live at ,rome1 so that it soon surpassed the others in strength4 ,servius remedied this dangerous fault by changing the principle of cleavage1 and substituting for the racial division1 which he abolished1 a new one based on the quarter of the town inhabited by each tribe4 ,instead of three tribes he created four1 each occupying and named after one of the hills of ,rome4 ,thus1 while redressing the inequality of the moment1 he also provided for the future2 and in order that the division might be one of persons as well as localities1 he forbade the inhabitants of one quarter to migrate to another1 and so prevented the mingling of the races4 ,he also doubled the three old centuries of ,knights and added twelve more1 still keeping the old names1 and by this simple and prudent method1 succeeded in making a distinction between the body of ,knights and the people1 without a murmur from the latter4 ,to the four urban tribes ,servius added fifteen others called rural tribes1 because they consisted of those who lived in the country1 divided into fifteen cantons4 ,subsequently1 fifteen more were created1 and the ,roman people finally found itself divided into thirty-five tribes1 as it remained down to the end of the ,republic4 ,the distinction between urban and rural tribes had one effect which is worth mention1 both because it is without parallel elsewhere1 and because to it ,rome owed the preservation of her morality and the enlargement of her empire4 ,we should have expected that the urban tribes would soon monopolise power and honours1 and lose no time in bringing the rural tribes into disrepute2 but what happened was exactly the reverse4 ,the taste of the early ,romans for country life is well known4 ,this taste they owed to their wise founder1 who made rural and military labours go along with liberty1 and1 so to speak1 relegated to the town arts1 crafts1 intrigue1 fortune and slavery4 ,since therefore all ,rome's most illustrious citizens lived in the fields and tilled the earth1 men grew used to seeking there alone the mainstays of the republic4 ,this condition1 being that of the best patricians1 was honoured by all men2 the simple and laborious life of the villager was preferred to the slothful and idle life of the bourgeoisie of ,rome2 and he who1 in the town1 would have been but a wretched proletarian1 became1 as a labourer in the fields1 a respected citizen4 ,not without reason1 says ,varro1 did our great-souled ancestors establish in the village the nursery of the sturdy and valiant men who defended them in time of war and provided for their ,sustenance in time of peace4 ,pliny states positively that the country tribes were honoured because of the men of whom they were composed2 while cowards men wished to dishonour were transferred1 as a public disgrace1 to the town tribes4 ,the ,sabine ,appius ,claudius1 when he had come to settle in ,rome1 was loaded with honours and enrolled in a rural tribe1 which subsequently took his family name4 ,lastly1 freedmen always entered the urban1 and never the rural1 tribes3 nor is there a single example1 throughout the ,republic1 of a freedman1 though he had become a citizen1 reaching any magistracy4 ,this was an excellent rule2 but it was carried so far that in the end it led to a change and certainly to an abuse in the political system4 ,first the censors1 after having for a long time claimed the right of transferring citizens arbitrarily from one tribe to another1 allowed most persons to enrol themselves in whatever tribe they pleased4 ,this permission certainly did no good1 and further robbed the censorship of one of its greatest resources4 ,moreover1 as the great and powerful all got themselves enrolled in the country tribes1 while the freedmen who had become citizens remained with the populace in the town tribes1 both soon ceased to have any local or territorial meaning1 and all were so confused that the members of one could not be told from those of another except by the registers2 so that the idea of the word tribe became personal instead of real1 or rather came to be little more than a chimera4 ,it happened in addition that the town tribes1 being more on the spot1 were often the stronger in the comitia and sold the ,state to those who stooped to buy the votes of the rabble composing them4 ,as the founder had set up ten curi in each tribe1 the whole ,roman people1 which was then contained within the walls1 consisted of thirty curia1 each with its temples1 its gods1 its officers1 its priests and its festivals1 which were called compitalia and corresponded to the paganalia1 held in later times by the rural tribes4 ,when ,servius made his new division1 as the thirty curi could not be shared equally between his four tribes1 and as he was unwilling to interfere with them1 they became a further division of the inhabitants of ,rome1 quite independent of the tribes3 but in the case of the rural tribes and their members there was no question of curi as the tribes had then become a purely civil institution1 and1 a new system of levying troops having been introduced1 the military divisions of ,romulus were superfluous4 ,thus1 although every citizen was enrolled in a tribe1 there were very many who were not members of a curia4 ,servius made yet a third division1 quite distinct from the two we have mentioned1 which became1 in its effects1 the most important of all4 ,he distributed the whole ,roman people into six classes1 distinguished neither by place nor by person1 but by wealth2 the first classes included the rich1 the last the poor1 and those between persons of moderate means4 ,these six classes were subdivided into one hundred and ninety-three other bodies1 called centuries1 which were so divided that the first class alone comprised more than half of them1 while the last comprised only one4 ,thus the class that had the smallest number of members had the largest number of centuries1 and the whole of the last class only counted as a single subdivision1 although it alone included more than half the inhabitants of ,rome4 ,in order that the people might have the less insight into the results of this arrangement1 ,servius tried to give it a military tone3 in the second class he inserted two centuries of armourers1 and in the fourth two of makers of instruments of war3 in each class1 except the last1 he distinguished young and old1 that is1 those who were under an obligation to bear arms and those whose age gave them legal exemption4 ,it was this distinction1 rather than that of wealth1 which required frequent repetition of the census or counting4 ,lastly1 he ordered that the assembly should be held in the ,campus ,martius1 and that all who were of age to serve should come there armed4 ,the reason for his not making in the last class also the division of young and old was that the populace1 of whom it was composed1 was not given the right to bear arms for its country3 a man had to possess a hearth to acquire the right to defend it1 and of all the troops of beggars who to-day lend lustre to the armies of kings1 there is perhaps not one who would not have been driven with scorn out of a ,roman cohort1 at a time when soldiers were the defenders of liberty4 ,in this last class1 however1 proletarians were distinguished from capite censi4 ,the former1 not quite reduced to nothing1 at least gave the ,state citizens1 and sometimes1 when the need was pressing1 even soldiers4 ,those who had nothing at all1 and could be numbered only by counting heads1 were regarded as of absolutely no account1 and ,marius was the first who stooped to enrol them4 ,without deciding now whether this third arrangement was good or bad in itself1 ,i think ,i may assert that it could have been made practicable only by the simple morals1 the disinterestedness1 the liking for agriculture and the scorn for commerce and for love of gain which characterised the early ,romans4 ,where is the modern people among whom consuming greed1 unrest1 intrigue1 continual removals1 and perpetual changes of fortune1 could let such a system last for twenty years without turning the ,state upside down8 ,we must indeed observe that morality and the censorship1 being stronger than this institution1 corrected its defects at ,rome1 and that the rich man found himself degraded to the class of the poor for making too much display of his riches4 ,from all this it is easy to understand why only five classes are almost always mentioned1 though there were really six4 ,the sixth1 as it furnished neither soldiers to the army nor votes in the ,campus ,martius1#a and was almost without function in the ,state1 was seldom regarded as of any account4 ,these were the various ways in which the ,roman people was divided4 ,let us now see the effect on the assemblies4 ,when lawfully summoned1 these were called comitia3 they were usually held in the public square at ,rome or in the ,campus ,martius1 and were distinguished as ,comitia ,curiata1 ,comitia ,centuriata1 and ,comitia ,tributa1 according to the form under which they were convoked4 ,the ,comitia ,curiata were founded by ,romulus2 the ,centuriata by ,servius2 and the ,tributa by the tribunes of the people4 ,no law received its sanction and no magistrate was elected1 save in the comitia2 and as every citizen was enrolled in a curia1 a century1 or a tribe1 it follows that no citizen was excluded from the right of voting1 and that the ,roman people was truly sovereign both de jure and de facto4 ,for the comitia to be lawfully assembled1 and for their acts to have the force of law1 three conditions were necessary4 ,first1 the body or magistrate convoking them had to possess the necessary authority2 secondly1 the assembly had to be held on a day allowed by law2 and thirdly1 the auguries had to be favourable4 ,the reason for the first regulation needs no explanation2 the second is a matter of policy4 ,thus1 the comitia might not be held on festivals or market-days1 when the country-folk1 coming to ,rome on business1 had not time to spend the day in the public square4 ,by means of the third1 the senate held in check the proud and restive people1 and meetly restrained the ardour of seditious tribunes1 who1 however1 found more than one way of escaping this hindrance4 ,laws and the election of rulers were not the only questions submitted to the judgment of the comitia3 as the ,roman people had taken on itself the most important functions of government1 it may be said that the lot of ,europe was regulated in its assemblies4 ,the variety of their objects gave rise to the various forms these took1 according to the matters on which they had to pronounce4 ,in order to judge of these various forms1 it is enough to compare them4 ,romulus1 when he set up curi1 had in view the checking of the senate by the people1 and of the people by the senate1 while maintaining his ascendancy over both alike4 ,he therefore gave the people1 by means of this assembly1 all the authority of numbers to balance that of power and riches1 which he left to the patricians4 ,but1 after the spirit of monarchy1 he left all the same a greater advantage to the patricians in the influence of their clients on the majority of votes4 ,this excellent institution of patron and client was a masterpiece of statesmanship and humanity without which the patriciate1 being flagrantly in contradiction to the republican spirit1 could not have survived4 ,rome alone has the honour of having given to the world this great example1 which never led to any abuse1 and yet has never been followed4 ,as the assemblies by curi persisted under the kings till the time of ,servius1 and the reign of the later ,tarquin was not regarded as legitimate1 royal laws were called generally leges curiat4 ,under the ,republic1 the curi still confined to the four urban tribes1 and including only the populace of ,rome1 suited neither the senate1 which led the patricians1 nor the tribunes1 who1 though plebeians1 were at the head of the well-to-do citizens4 ,they therefore fell into disrepute1 and their degradation was such1 that thirty lictors used to assemble and do what the ,comitia ,curiata should have done4 ,the division by centuries was so favourable to the aristocracy that it is hard to see at first how the senate ever failed to carry the day in the comitia bearing their name1 by which the consuls1 the censors and the other curule magistrates were elected4 ,indeed1 of the hundred and ninety-three centuries into which the six classes of the whole ,roman people were divided1 the first class contained ninety-eight2 and1 as voting went solely by centuries1 this class alone had a majority over all the rest4 ,when all these centuries were in agreement1 the rest of the votes were not even taken2 the decision of the smallest number passed for that of the multitude1 and it may be said that1 in the ,comitia ,centuriata1 decisions were regulated far more by depth of purses than by the number of votes4 ,but this extreme authority was modified in two ways4 ,first1 the tribunes as a rule1 and always a great number of plebeians1 belonged to the class of the rich1 and so counterbalanced the influence of the patricians in the first class4 ,the second way was this4 ,instead of causing the centuries to vote throughout in order1 which would have meant beginning always with the first1 the ,romans always chose one by lot which proceeded alone to the election2 after this all the centuries were summoned another day according to their rank1 and the same election was repeated1 and as a rule confirmed4 ,thus the authority of example was taken away from rank1 and given to the lot on a democratic principle4 ,from this custom resulted a further advantage4 ,the citizens from the country had time1 between the two elections1 to inform themselves of the merits of the candidate who had been provisionally nominated1 and did not have to vote without knowledge of the case4 ,but1 under the pretext of hastening matters1 the abolition of this custom was achieved1 and both elections were held on the same day4 ,the ,comitia ,tributa were properly the council of the ,roman people4 ,they were convoked by the tribunes alone2 at them the tribunes were elected and passed their plebiscita4 ,the senate not only had no standing in them1 but even no right to be present2 and the senators1 being forced to obey laws on which they could not vote1 were in this respect less free than the meanest citizens4 ,this injustice was altogether ill-conceived1 and was alone enough to invalidate the decrees of a body to which all its members were not admitted4 ,had all the patricians attended the comitia by virtue of the right they had as citizens1 they would not1 as mere private individuals1 have had any considerable influence on a vote reckoned by counting heads1 where the meanest proletarian was as good as the princeps senatus4 ,it may be seen1 therefore1 that besides the order which was achieved by these various ways of distributing so great a people and taking its votes1 the various methods were not reducible to forms indifferent in themselves1 but the results of each were relative to the objects which caused it to be preferred4 ,without going here into further details1 we may gather from what has been said above that the ,comitia ,tributa were the most favourable to popular government1 and the ,comitia ,centuriata to aristocracy4 ,the ,comitia ,curiata1 in which the populace of ,rome formed the majority1 being fitted only to further tyranny and evil designs1 naturally fell into disrepute1 and even seditious persons abstained from using a method which too clearly revealed their projects4 ,it is indisputable that the whole majesty of the ,roman people lay solely in the ,comitia ,centuriata1 which alone included all2 for the ,comitia ,curiata excluded the rural tribes1 and the ,comitia ,tributa the senate and the patricians4 ,as for the method of taking the vote1 it was among the ancient ,romans as simple as their morals1 although not so simple as at ,sparta4 ,each man declared his vote aloud1 and a clerk duly wrote it down2 the majority in each tribe determined the vote of the tribe1 the majority of the tribes that of the people1 and so with curi and centuries4 ,this custom was good as long as honesty was triumphant among the citizens1 and each man was ashamed to vote publicly in favour of an unjust proposal or an unworthy subject2 but1 when the people grew corrupt and votes were bought1 it was fitting that voting should be secret in order that purchasers might be restrained by mistrust1 and rogues be given the means of not being traitors4 ,i know that ,cicero attacks this change1 and attributes partly to it the ruin of the ,republic4 ,but though ,i feel the weight ,cicero's authority must carry on such a point1 ,i cannot agree with him2 ,i hold1 on the contrary1 that1 for want of enough such changes1 the destruction of the ,state must be hastened4 ,just as the regimen of health does not suit the sick1 we should not wish to govern a people that has been corrupted by the laws that a good people requires4 ,there is no better proof of this rule than the long life of the ,republic of ,venice1 of which the shadow still exists1 solely because its laws are suitable only for men who are wicked4 ,the citizens were provided1 therefore1 with tablets by means of which each man could vote without any one knowing how he voted3 new methods were also introduced for collecting the tablets1 for counting voices1 for comparing numbers1 etc42 but all these precautions did not prevent the good faith of the officers charged with these functions#b from being often suspect4 ,finally1 to prevent intrigues and trafficking in votes1 edicts were issued2 but their very number proves how useless they were4 ,towards the close of the ,republic1 it was often necessary to have recourse to extraordinary expedients in order to supplement the inadequacy of the laws4 ,sometimes miracles were supposed2 but this method1 while it might impose on the people1 could not impose on those who governed4 ,sometimes an assembly was hastily called together1 before the candidates had time to form their factions3 sometimes a whole sitting was occupied with talk1 when it was seen that the people had been won over and was on the point of taking up a wrong position4 ,but in the end ambition eluded all attempts to check it2 and the most incredible fact of all is that1 in the midst of all these abuses1 the vast people1 thanks to its ancient regulations1 never ceased to elect magistrates1 to pass laws1 to judge cases1 and to carry through business both public and private1 almost as easily as the senate itself could have done4 #a ,i say in the ,campus ,martius because it was there that the comitia assembled by centuries2 in its two other forms the people assembled in the forum or elsewhere2 and then the capite censi had as much influence and authority as the foremost citizens4 #b ,custodes1 diribitores1 rogatores suffragiorum4 ,,chapter ,v ,,the ,,tribunate ,when an exact proportion cannot be established between the constituent parts of the ,state1 or when causes that cannot be removed continually alter the relation of one part to another1 recourse is had to the institution of a peculiar magistracy that enters into no corporate unity with the rest4 ,this restores to each term its right relation to the others1 and provides a link or middle term between either prince and people1 or prince and ,sovereign1 or1 if necessary1 both at once4 ,this body1 which ,i shall call the tribunate1 is the preserver of the laws and of the legislative power4 ,it serves sometimes to protect the ,sovereign against the government1 as the tribunes of the people did at ,rome2 sometimes to uphold the government against the people1 as the ,council of ,ten now does at ,venice2 and sometimes to maintain the balance between the two1 as the ,ephors did at ,sparta4 ,the tribunate is not a constituent part of the city1 and should have no share in either legislative or executive power2 but this very fact makes its own power the greater3 for1 while it can do nothing1 it can prevent anything from being done4 ,it is more sacred and more revered1 as the defender of the laws1 than the prince who executes them1 or than the ,sovereign which ordains them4 ,this was seen very clearly at ,rome1 when the proud patricians1 for all their scorn of the people1 were forced to bow before one of its officers1 who had neither auspices nor jurisdiction4 ,the tribunate1 wisely tempered1 is the strongest support a good constitution can have2 but if its strength is ever so little excessive1 it upsets the whole ,state4 ,weakness1 on the other hand1 is not natural to it3 provided it is something1 it is never less than it should be4 ,it degenerates into tyranny when it usurps the executive power1 which it should confine itself to restraining1 and when it tries to dispense with the laws1 which it should confine itself to protecting4 ,the immense power of the ,ephors1 harmless as long as ,sparta preserved its morality1 hastened corruption when once it had begun4 ,the blood of ,agis1 slaughtered by these tyrants1 was avenged by his successor2 the crime and the punishment of the ,ephors alike hastened the destruction of the republic1 and after ,cleomenes ,sparta ceased to be of any account4 ,rome perished in the same way3 the excessive power of the tribunes1 which they had usurped by degrees1 finally served1 with the help of laws made to secure liberty1 as a safeguard for the emperors who destroyed it4 ,as for the ,venetian ,council of ,ten1 it is a tribunal of blood1 an object of horror to patricians and people alike2 and1 so far from giving a lofty protection to the laws1 it does nothing1 now they have become degraded1 but strike in the darkness blows of which no one dare take note4 ,the tribunate1 like the government1 grows weak as the number of its members increases4 ,when the tribunes of the ,roman people1 who first numbered only two1 and then five1 wished to double that number1 the senate let them do so1 in the confidence that it could use one to check another1 as indeed it afterwards freely did4 ,the best method of preventing usurpations by so formidable a body1 though no government has yet made use of it1 would be not to make it permanent1 but to regulate the periods during which it should remain in abeyance4 ,these intervals1 which should not be long enough to give abuses time to grow strong1 may be so fixed by law that they can easily be shortened at need by extraordinary commissions4 ,this method seems to me to have no disadvantages1 because1 as ,i have said1 the tribunate1 which forms no part of the constitution1 can be removed without the constitution being affected4 ,it seems to be also efficacious1 because a newly restored magistrate starts not with the power his predecessor exercised1 but with that which the law allows him4 ,,chapter ,,vi ,,the ,,dictatorship ,the inflexibility of the laws1 which prevents them from adapting themselves to circumstances1 may1 in certain cases1 render them disastrous1 and make them bring about1 at a time of crisis1 the ruin of the ,state4 ,the order and slowness of the forms they enjoin require a space of time which circumstances sometimes withhold4 ,a thousand cases against which the legislator has made no provision may present themselves1 and it is a highly necessary part of foresight to be conscious that everything cannot be foreseen4 ,it is wrong therefore to wish to make political institutions so strong as to render it impossible to suspend their operation4 ,even ,sparta allowed its laws to lapse4 ,however1 none but the greatest dangers can counter-balance that of changing the public order1 and the sacred power of the laws should never be arrested save when the existence of the country is at stake4 ,in these rare and obvious cases1 provision is made for the public security by a particular act entrusting it to him who is most worthy4 ,this commitment may be carried out in either of two ways1 according to the nature of the danger4 ,if increasing the activity of the government is a sufficient remedy1 power is concentrated in the hands of one or two of its members3 in this case the change is not in the authority of the laws1 but only in the form of administering them4 ,if1 on the other hand1 the peril is of such a kind that the paraphernalia of the laws are an obstacle to their preservation1 the method is to nominate a supreme ruler1 who shall silence all the laws and suspend for a moment the sovereign authority4 ,in such a case1 there is no doubt about the general will1 and it is clear that the people's first intention is that the ,state shall not perish4 ,thus the suspension of the legislative authority is in no sense its abolition2 the magistrate who silences it cannot make it speak2 he dominates it1 but cannot represent it4 ,he can do anything1 except make laws4 ,the first method was used by the ,roman senate when1 in a consecrated formula1 it charged the consuls to provide for the safety of the ,republic4 ,the second was employed when one of the two consuls nominated a dictator3#a a custom ,rome borrowed from ,alba4 ,during the first period of the ,republic1 recourse was very often had to the dictatorship1 because the ,state had not yet a firm enough basis to be able to maintain itself by the strength of its constitution alone4 ,as the state of morality then made superfluous many of the precautions which would have been necessary at other times1 there was no fear that a dictator would abuse his authority1 or try to keep it beyond his term of office4 ,on the contrary1 so much power appeared to be burdensome to him who was clothed with it1 and he made all speed to lay it down1 as if taking the place of the laws had been too troublesome and too perilous a position to retain4 ,it is therefore the danger not of its abuse1 but of its cheapening1 that makes me attack the indiscreet use of this supreme magistracy in the earliest times4 ,for as long as it was freely employed at elections1 dedications and purely formal functions1 there was danger of its becoming less formidable in time of need1 and of men growing accustomed to regarding as empty a title that was used only on occasions of empty ceremonial4 ,towards the end of the ,republic1 the ,romans1 having grown more circumspect1 were as unreasonably sparing in the use of the dictatorship as they had formerly been lavish4 ,it is easy to see that their fears were without foundation1 that the weakness of the capital secured it against the magistrates who were in its midst2 that a dictator might1 in certain cases1 defend the public liberty1 but could never endanger it2 and that the chains of ,rome would be forged1 not in ,rome itself1 but in her armies4 ,the weak resistance offered by ,marius to ,sulla1 and by ,pompey to ,csar1 clearly showed what was to be expected from authority at home against force from abroad4 ,this misconception led the ,romans to make great mistakes2 such1 for example1 as the failure to nominate a dictator in the ,catilinarian conspiracy4 ,for1 as only the city itself1 with at most some province in ,italy1 was concerned1 the unlimited authority the laws gave to the dictator would have enabled him to make short work of the conspiracy1 which was1 in fact1 stifled only by a combination of lucky chances human prudence had no right to expect4 ,instead1 the senate contented itself with entrusting its whole power to the consuls1 so that ,cicero1 in order to take effective action1 was compelled on a capital point to exceed his powers2 and if1 in the first transports of joy1 his conduct was approved1 he was justly called1 later on1 to account for the blood of citizens spilt in violation of the laws4 ,such a reproach could never have been levelled at a dictator4 ,but the consul's eloquence carried the day2 and he himself1 ,roman though he was1 loved his own glory better than his country1 and sought1 not so much the most lawful and secure means of saving the ,state1 as to get for himself the whole honour of having done so4#b ,he was therefore justly honoured as the liberator of ,rome1 and also justly punished as a law-breaker4 ,however brilliant his recall may have been1 it was undoubtedly an act of pardon4 ,however this important trust be conferred1 it is important that its duration should be fixed at a very brief period1 incapable of being ever prolonged4 ,in the crises which lead to its adoption1 the ,state is either soon lost1 or soon saved2 and1 the present need passed1 the dictatorship becomes either tyrannical or idle4 ,at ,rome1 where dictators held office for six months only1 most of them abdicated before their time was up4 ,if their term had been longer1 they might well have tried to prolong it still further1 as the decemvirs did when chosen for a year4 ,the dictator had only time to provide against the need that had caused him to be chosen2 he had none to think of further projects4 #a ,the nomination was made secretly by night1 as if there were something shameful in setting a man above the laws4 #b ,that is what he could not be sure of1 if he proposed a dictator2 for he dared not nominate himself1 and could not be certain that his colleague would nominate him4 ,,chapter ,,vii ,,the ,,censorship ,as the law is the declaration of the general will1 the censorship is the declaration of the public judgment3 public opinion is the form of law which the censor administers1 and1 like the prince1 only applies to particular cases4 ,the censorial tribunal1 so far from being the arbiter of the people's opinion1 only declares it1 and1 as soon as the two part company1 its decisions are null and void4 ,it is useless to distinguish the morality of a nation from the objects of its esteem2 both depend on the same principle and are necessarily indistinguishable4 ,there is no people on earth the choice of whose pleasures is not decided by opinion rather than nature4 ,right men's opinions1 and their morality will purge itself4 ,men always love what is good or what they find good2 it is in judging what is good that they go wrong4 ,this judgment1 therefore1 is what must be regulated4 ,he who judges of morality judges of honour2 and he who judges of honour finds his law in opinion4 ,the opinions of a people are derived from its constitution2 although the law does not regulate morality1 it is legislation that gives it birth4 ,when legislation grows weak1 morality degenerates2 but in such cases the judgment of the censors will not do what the force of the laws has failed to effect4 ,from this it follows that the censorship may be useful for the preservation of morality1 but can never be so for its restoration4 ,set up censors while the laws are vigorous2 as soon as they have lost their vigour1 all hope is gone2 no legitimate power can retain force when the laws have lost it4 ,the censorship upholds morality by preventing opinion from growing corrupt1 by preserving its rectitude by means of wise applications1 and sometimes even by fixing it when it is still uncertain4 ,the employment of seconds in duels1 which had been carried to wild extremes in the kingdom of ,france1 was done away with merely by these words in a royal edict3 ,as for those who are cowards enough to call upon seconds4 ,this judgment1 in anticipating that of the public1 suddenly decided it4 ,but when edicts from the same source tried to pronounce duelling itself an act of cowardice1 as indeed it is1 then1 since common opinion does not regard it as such1 the public took no notice of a decision on a point on which its mind was already made up4 ,i have stated elsewhere#a that as public opinion is not subject to any constraint1 there need be no trace of it in the tribunal set up to represent it4 ,it is impossible to admire too much the art with which this resource1 which we moderns have wholly lost1 was employed by the ,romans1 and still more by the ,lacedmonians4 ,a man of bad morals having made a good proposal in the ,spartan ,council1 the ,ephors neglected it1 and caused the same proposal to be made by a virtuous citizen4 ,what an honour for the one1 and what a disgrace for the other1 without praise or blame of either6 ,certain drunkards from ,samos#b polluted the tribunal of the ,ephors3 the next day1 a public edict gave ,samians permission to be filthy4 ,an actual punishment would not have been so severe as such an impunity4 ,when ,sparta has pronounced on what is or is not right1 ,greece makes no appeal from her judgments4 #a ,i merely call attention in this chapter to a subject with which ,i have dealt at greater length in my ,letter to ,m4 d',alembert4 #b ,they were from another island1 which the delicacy of our language forbids me to name on this occasion4 ,,chapter ,,viii ,,civil ,,religion ,at first men had no kings save the gods1 and no government save theocracy4 ,they reasoned like ,caligula1 and1 at that period1 reasoned aright4 ,it takes a long time for feeling so to change that men can make up their minds to take their equals as masters1 in the hope that they will profit by doing so4 ,from the mere fact that ,god was set over every political society1 it followed that there were as many gods as peoples4 ,two peoples that were strangers the one to the other1 and almost always enemies1 could not long recognise the same master3 two armies giving battle could not obey the same leader4 ,national divisions thus led to polytheism1 and this in turn gave rise to theological and civil intolerance1 which1 as we shall see hereafter1 are by nature the same4 ,the fancy the ,greeks had for rediscovering their gods among the barbarians arose from the way they had of regarding themselves as the natural ,sovereigns of such peoples4 ,but there is nothing so absurd as the erudition which in our days identifies and confuses gods of different nations4 ,as if ,moloch1 ,saturn and ,chronos could be the same god6 ,as if the ,phnician ,baal1 the ,greek ,zeus1 and the ,latin ,jupiter could be the same6 ,as if there could still be anything common to imaginary beings with different names6 ,if it is asked how in pagan times1 where each ,state had its cult and its gods1 there were no wars of religion1 ,i answer that it was precisely because each ,state1 having its own cult as well as its own government1 made no distinction between its gods and its laws4 ,political war was also theological2 the provinces of the gods were1 so to speak1 fixed by the boundaries of nations4 ,the god of one people had no right over another4 ,the gods of the pagans were not jealous gods2 they shared among themselves the empire of the world3 even ,moses and the ,hebrews sometimes lent themselves to this view by speaking of the ,god of ,israel4 ,it is true1 they regarded as powerless the gods of the ,canaanites1 a proscribed people condemned to destruction1 whose place they were to take2 but remember how they spoke of the divisions of the neighbouring peoples they were forbidden to attack6 ,is not the possession of what belongs to your god ,chamos lawfully your due8 said ,jephthah to the ,ammonites4 ,we have the same title to the lands our conquering ,god has made his own4#a ,here1 ,i think1 there is a recognition that the rights of ,chamos and those of the ,god of ,israel are of the same nature4 ,but when the ,jews1 being subject to the kings of ,babylon1 and1 subsequently1 to those of ,syria1 still obstinately refused to recognise any god save their own1 their refusal was regarded as rebellion against their conqueror1 and drew down on them the persecutions we read of in their history1 which are without parallel till the coming of ,christianity4#b ,every religion1 therefore1 being attached solely to the laws of the ,state which prescribed it1 there was no way of converting a people except by enslaving it1 and there could be no missionaries save conquerors4 ,the obligation to change cults being the law to which the vanquished yielded1 it was necessary to be victorious before suggesting such a change4 ,so far from men fighting for the gods1 the gods1 as in ,homer1 fought for men2 each asked his god for victory1 and repayed him with new altars4 ,the ,romans1 before taking a city1 summoned its gods to quit it2 and1 in leaving the ,tarentines their outraged gods1 they regarded them as subject to their own and compelled to do them homage4 ,they left the vanquished their gods as they left them their laws4 ,a wreath to the ,jupiter of the ,capitol was often the only tribute they imposed4 ,finally1 when1 along with their empire1 the ,romans had spread their cult and their gods1 and had themselves often adopted those of the vanquished1 by granting to both alike the rights of the city1 the peoples of that vast empire insensibly found themselves with multitudes of gods and cults1 everywhere almost the same2 and thus paganism throughout the known world finally came to be one and the same religion4 ,it was in these circumstances that ,jesus came to set up on earth a spiritual kingdom1 which1 by separating the theological from the political system1 made the ,state no longer one1 and brought about the internal divisions which have never ceased to trouble ,christian peoples4 ,as the new idea of a kingdom of the other world could never have occurred to pagans1 they always looked on the ,christians as really rebels1 who1 while feigning to submit1 were only waiting for the chance to make themselves independent and their masters1 and to usurp by guile the authority they pretended in their weakness to respect4 ,this was the cause of the persecutions4 ,what the pagans had feared took place4 ,then everything changed its aspect3 the humble ,christians changed their language1 and soon this so-called kingdom of the other world turned1 under a visible leader1 into the most violent of earthly despotisms4 ,however1 as there have always been a prince and civil laws1 this double power and conflict of jurisdiction have made all good polity impossible in ,christian ,states2 and men have never succeeded in finding out whether they were bound to obey the master or the priest4 ,several peoples1 however1 even in ,europe and its neighbourhood1 have desired without success to preserve or restore the old system3 but the spirit of ,christianity has everywhere prevailed4 ,the sacred cult has always remained or again become independent of the ,sovereign1 and there has been no necessary link between it and the body of the ,state4 ,mahomet held very sane views1 and linked his political system well together2 and1 as long as the form of his government continued under the caliphs who succeeded him1 that government was indeed one1 and so far good4 ,but the ,arabs1 having grown prosperous1 lettered1 civilised1 slack and cowardly1 were conquered by barbarians3 the division between the two powers began again2 and1 although it is less apparent among the ,mahometans than among the ,christians1 it none the less exists1 especially in the sect of ,ali1 and there are ,states1 such as ,persia1 where it is continually making itself felt4 ,among us1 the ,kings of ,england have made themselves heads of the ,church1 and the ,czars have done the same3 but this title has made them less its masters than its ministers2 they have gained not so much the right to change it1 as the power to maintain it3 they are not its legislators1 but only its princes4 ,wherever the clergy is a corporate body1#c it is master and legislator in its own country4 ,there are thus two powers1 two ,sovereigns1 in ,england and in ,russia1 as well as elsewhere4 ,of all ,christian writers1 the philosopher ,hobbes alone has seen the evil and how to remedy it1 and has dared to propose the reunion of the two heads of the eagle1 and the restoration throughout of political unity1 without which no ,state or government will ever be rightly constituted4 ,but he should have seen that the masterful spirit of ,christianity is incompatible with his system1 and that the priestly interest would always be stronger than that of the ,state4 ,it is not so much what is false and terrible in his political theory1 as what is just and true1 that has drawn down hatred on it4#d ,i believe that if the study of history were developed from this point of view1 it would be easy to refute the contrary opinions of ,bayle and ,warburton1 one of whom holds that religion can be of no use to the body politic1 while the other1 on the contrary1 maintains that ,christianity is its strongest support4 ,we should demonstrate to the former that no ,state has ever been founded without a religious basis1 and to the latter1 that the law of ,christianity at bottom does more harm by weakening than good by strengthening the constitution of the ,state4 ,to make myself understood1 ,i have only to make a little more exact the too vague ideas of religion as relating to this subject4 ,religion1 considered in relation to society1 which is either general or particular1 may also be divided into two kinds3 the religion of man1 and that of the citizen4 ,the first1 which has neither temples1 nor altars1 nor rites1 and is confined to the purely internal cult of the supreme ,god and the eternal obligations of morality1 is the religion of the ,gospel pure and simple1 the true theism1 what may be called natural divine right or law4 ,the other1 which is codified in a single country1 gives it its gods1 its own tutelary patrons2 it has its dogmas1 its rites1 and its external cult prescribed by law2 outside the single nation that follows it1 all the world is in its sight infidel1 foreign and barbarous2 the duties and rights of man extend for it only as far as its own altars4 ,of this kind were all the religions of early peoples1 which we may define as civil or positive divine right or law4 ,there is a third sort of religion of a more singular kind1 which gives men two codes of legislation1 two rulers1 and two countries1 renders them subject to contradictory duties1 and makes it impossible for them to be faithful both to religion and to citizenship4 ,such are the religions of the ,lamas and of the ,japanese1 and such is ,roman ,christianity1 which may be called the religion of the priest4 ,it leads to a sort of mixed and anti-social code which has no name4 ,in their political aspect1 all these three kinds of religion have their defects4 ,the third is so clearly bad1 that it is waste of time to stop to prove it such4 ,all that destroys social unity is worthless2 all institutions that set man in contradiction to himself are worthless4 ,the second is good in that it unites the divine cult with love of the laws1 and1 making country the object of the citizens' adoration1 teaches them that service done to the ,state is service done to its tutelary god4 ,it is a form of theocracy1 in which there can be no pontiff save the prince1 and no priests save the magistrates4 ,to die for one's country then becomes martyrdom2 violation of its laws1 impiety2 and to subject one who is guilty to public execration is to condemn him to the anger of the gods3 ,sacer estod4 ,on the other hand1 it is bad in that1 being founded on lies and error1 it deceives men1 makes them credulous and superstitious1 and drowns the true cult of the ,divinity in empty ceremonial4 ,it is bad1 again1 when it becomes tyrannous and exclusive1 and makes a people bloodthirsty and intolerant1 so that it breathes fire and slaughter1 and regards as a sacred act the killing of every one who does not believe in its gods4 ,the result is to place such a people in a natural state of war with all others1 so that its security is deeply endangered4 ,there remains therefore the religion of man or ,christianity--not the ,christianity of to-day1 but that of the ,gospel1 which is entirely different4 ,by means of this holy1 sublime1 and real religion all men1 being children of one ,god1 recognise one another as brothers1 and the society that unites them is not dissolved even at death4 ,but this religion1 having no particular relation to the body politic1 leaves the laws in possession of the force they have in themselves without making any addition to it2 and thus one of the great bonds that unite society considered in severalty fails to operate4 ,nay1 more1 so far from binding the hearts of the citizens to the ,state1 it has the effect of taking them away from all earthly things4 ,i know of nothing more contrary to the social spirit4 ,we are told that a people of true ,christians would form the most perfect society imaginable4 ,i see in this supposition only one great difficulty3 that a society of true ,christians would not be a society of men4 ,i say further that such a society1 with all its perfection1 would be neither the strongest nor the most lasting3 the very fact that it was perfect would rob it of its bond of union2 the flaw that would destroy it would lie in its very perfection4 ,every one would do his duty2 the people would be law-abiding1 the rulers just and temperate2 the magistrates upright and incorruptible2 the soldiers would scorn death2 there would be neither vanity nor luxury4 ,so far1 so good2 but let us hear more4 ,christianity as a religion is entirely spiritual1 occupied solely with heavenly things2 the country of the ,christian is not of this world4 ,he does his duty1 indeed1 but does it with profound indifference to the good or ill success of his cares4 ,provided he has nothing to reproach himself with1 it matters little to him whether things go well or ill here on earth4 ,if the ,state is prosperous1 he hardly dares to share in the public happiness1 for fear he may grow proud of his country's glory2 if the ,state is languishing1 he blesses the hand of ,god that is hard upon ,his people4 ,for the ,state to be peaceable and for harmony to be maintained1 all the citizens without exception would have to be good ,christians2 if by ill hap there should be a single self-seeker or hypocrite1 a ,catiline or a ,cromwell1 for instance1 he would certainly get the better of his pious compatriots4 ,christian charity does not readily allow a man to think hardly of his neighbours4 ,as soon as1 by some trick1 he has discovered the art of imposing on them and getting hold of a share in the public authority1 you have a man established in dignity2 it is the will of ,god that he be respected3 very soon you have a power2 it is ,god's will that it be obeyed3 and if the power is abused by him who wields it1 it is the scourge wherewith ,god punishes ,his children4 ,there would be scruples about driving out the usurper3 public tranquillity would have to be disturbed1 violence would have to be employed1 and blood spilt2 all this accords ill with ,christian meekness2 and after all1 in this vale of sorrows1 what does it matter whether we are free men or serfs8 ,the essential thing is to get to heaven1 and resignation is only an additional means of doing so4 ,if war breaks out with another ,state1 the citizens march readily out to battle2 not one of them thinks of flight2 they do their duty1 but they have no passion for victory2 they know better how to die than how to conquer4 ,what does it matter whether they win or lose8 ,does not ,providence know better than they what is meet for them8 ,only think to what account a proud1 impetuous and passionate enemy could turn their stoicism6 ,set over against them those generous peoples who were devoured by ardent love of glory and of their country1 imagine your ,christian republic face to face with ,sparta or ,rome3 the pious ,christians will be beaten1 crushed and destroyed1 before they know where they are1 or will owe their safety only to the contempt their enemy will conceive for them4 ,it was to my mind a fine oath that was taken by the soldiers of ,fabius1 who swore1 not to conquer or die1 but to come back victorious--and kept their oath4 ,christians1 would never have taken such an oath2 they would have looked on it as tempting ,god4 ,but ,i am mistaken in speaking of a ,christian republic2 the terms are mutually exclusive4 ,christianity preaches only servitude and dependence4 ,its spirit is so favourable to tyranny that it always profits by such a rgime4 ,true ,christians are made to be slaves1 and they know it and do not much mind3 this short life counts for too little in their eyes4 ,i shall be told that ,christian troops are excellent4 ,i deny it4 ,show me an instance4 ,for my part1 ,i know of no ,christian troops4 ,i shall be told of the ,crusades4 ,without disputing the valour of the ,crusaders1 ,i answer that1 so far from being ,christians1 they were the priests' soldiery1 citizens of the ,church4 ,they fought for their spiritual country1 which the ,church had1 somehow or other1 made temporal4 ,well understood1 this goes back to paganism3 as the ,gospel sets up no national religion1 a holy war is impossible among ,christians4 ,under the pagan emperors1 the ,christian soldiers were brave2 every ,christian writer affirms it1 and ,i believe it3 it was a case of honourable emulation of the pagan troops4 ,as soon as the emperors were ,christian1 this emulation no longer existed1 and1 when the ,cross had driven out the eagle1 ,roman valour wholly disappeared4 ,but1 setting aside political considerations1 let us come back to what is right1 and settle our principles on this important point4 ,the right which the social compact gives the ,sovereign over the subjects does not1 we have seen1 exceed the limits of public expediency4#e ,the subjects then owe the ,sovereign an account of their opinions only to such an extent as they matter to the community4 ,now1 it matters very much to the community that each citizen should have a religion4 ,that will make him love his duty2 but the dogmas of that religion concern the ,state and its members only so far as they have reference to morality and to the duties which he who professes them is bound to do to others4 ,each man may have1 over and above1 what opinions he pleases1 without it being the ,sovereign's business to take cognisance of them2 for1 as the ,sovereign has no authority in the other world1 whatever the lot of its subjects may be in the life to come1 that is not its business1 provided they are good citizens in this life4 ,there is therefore a purely civil profession of faith of which the ,sovereign should fix the articles1 not exactly as religious dogmas1 but as social sentiments without which a man cannot be a good citizen or a faithful subject4#f ,while it can compel no one to believe them1 it can banish from the ,state whoever does not believe them--it can banish him1 not for impiety1 but as an anti-social being1 incapable of truly loving the laws and justice1 and of sacrificing1 at need1 his life to his duty4 ,if any one1 after publicly recognising these dogmas1 behaves as if he does not believe them1 let him be punished by death3 he has committed the worst of all crimes1 that of lying before the law4 ,the dogmas of civil religion ought to be few1 simple1 and exactly worded1 without explanation or commentary4 ,the existence of a mighty1 intelligent and beneficent ,divinity1 possessed of foresight and providence1 the life to come1 the happiness of the just1 the punishment of the wicked1 the sanctity of the social contract and the laws3 these are its positive dogmas4 ,its negative dogmas ,i confine to one1 intolerance1 which is a part of the cults we have rejected4 ,those who distinguish civil from theological intolerance are1 to my mind1 mistaken4 ,the two forms are inseparable4 ,it is impossible to live at peace with those we regard as damned2 to love them would be to hate ,god who punishes them3 we positively must either reclaim or torment them4 ,wherever theological intolerance is admitted1 it must inevitably have some civil effect2#g and as soon as it has such an effect1 the ,sovereign is no longer ,sovereign even in the temporal sphere3 thenceforth priests are the real masters1 and kings only their ministers4 ,now that there is and can be no longer an exclusive national religion1 tolerance should be given to all religions that tolerate others1 so long as their dogmas contain nothing contrary to the duties of citizenship4 ,but whoever dares to say3 ,outside the ,church is no salvation1 ought to be driven from the ,state1 unless the ,state is the ,church1 and the prince the pontiff4 ,such a dogma is good only in a theocratic government2 in any other1 it is fatal4 ,the reason for which ,henry ,,iv is said to have embraced the ,roman religion ought to make every honest man leave it1 and still more any prince who knows how to reason4 #a ,nonne ea qu possidet ,chamos deus tuus1 tibi jure debentur8 7,judges xi4 #bd74 ,such is the text in the ,vulgate4 ,father de ,carrires translates3 ,do you not regard yourselves as having a right to what your god possesses8 ,i do not know the force of the ,hebrew text3 but ,i perceive that1 in the ,vulgate1 ,jephthah positively recognises the right of the god ,chamos1 and that the ,french translator weakened this admission by inserting an according to you1 which is not in the ,latin4 #b ,it is quite clear that the ,phocian war1 which was called the ,sacred ,war1 was not a war of religion4 ,its object was the punishment of acts of sacrilege1 and not the conquest of unbelievers4 #c ,it should be noted that the clergy find their bond of union not so much in formal assemblies1 as in the communion of ,churches4 ,communion and ex-communication are the social compact of the clergy1 a compact which will always make them masters of peoples and kings4 ,all priests who communicate together are fellow-citizens1 even if they come from opposite ends of the earth4 ,this invention is a masterpiece of statesmanship3 there is nothing like it among pagan priests2 who have therefore never formed a clerical corporate body4 #d ,see1 for instance1 in a letter from ,grotius to his brother 7,april #aa1 #afdc71 what that learned man found to praise and to blame in the ,de ,cive4 ,it is true that1 with a bent for indulgence1 he seems to pardon the writer the good for the sake of the bad2 but all men are not so forgiving4 #e ,in the republic1 says the ,marquis d',argenson1 each man is perfectly free in what does not harm others4 ,this is the invariable limitation1 which it is impossible to define more exactly4 ,i have not been able to deny myself the pleasure of occasionally quoting from this manuscript1 though it is unknown to the public1 in order to do honour to the memory of a good and illustrious man1 who had kept even in the ,ministry the heart of a good citizen1 and views on the government of his country that were sane and right4 #f ,csar1 pleading for ,catiline1 tried to establish the dogma that the soul is mortal3 ,cato and ,cicero1 in refutation1 did not waste time in philosophising4 ,they were content to show that ,csar spoke like a bad citizen1 and brought forward a doctrine that would have a bad effect on the ,state4 ,this1 in fact1 and not a problem of theology1 was what the ,roman senate had to judge4 #g ,marriage1 for instance1 being a civil contract1 has civil effects without which society cannot even subsist4 ,suppose a body of clergy should claim the sole right of permitting this act1 a right which every intolerant religion must of necessity claim1 is it not clear that in establishing the authority of the ,church in this respect1 it will be destroying that of the prince1 who will have thenceforth only as many subjects as the clergy choose to allow him8 ,being in a position to marry or not to marry people1 according to their acceptance of such and such a doctrine1 their admission or rejection of such and such a formula1 their greater or less piety1 the ,church alone1 by the exercise of prudence and firmness1 will dispose of all inheritances1 offices and citizens1 and even of the ,state itself1 which could not subsist if it were composed entirely of bastards8 ,but1 ,i shall be told1 there will be appeals on the ground of abuse1 summonses and decrees2 the temporalities will be seized4 ,how sad6 ,the clergy1 however little1 ,i will not say courage1 but sense it has1 will take no notice and go its way3 it will quietly allow appeals1 summonses1 decrees and seizures1 and1 in the end1 will remain the master4 ,it is not1 ,i think1 a great sacrifice to give up a part1 when one is sure of securing all4 ,,chapter ,,ix ,,conclusion ,now that ,i have laid down the true principles of political right1 and tried to give the ,state a basis of its own to rest on1 ,i ought next to strengthen it by its external relations1 which would include the law of nations1 commerce1 the right of war and conquest1 public right1 leagues1 negotiations1 treaties1 etc4 ,but all this forms a new subject that is far too vast for my narrow scope4 ,i ought throughout to have kept to a more limited sphere4 ,a ,,discourse ,,which ,,won ,,the ,,prize ,,at ,,the ,,academy ,,of ,,dijon ,,in #agej1 ,,on ,,this ,,question ,,proposed ,,by ,,the ,,academy3 ,,has ,,the ,,restoration ,,of ,,the ,,arts ,,and ,,sciences ,,had ,a ,,purifying ,,effect ,,upon ,,morals8 ,barbaras his ego sum1 qui non intelligor illis4--,,ovid4#a #a ,here ,i am1 a barbarian1 because men understand me not4 ,,preface ,the following pages contain a discussion of one of the most sublime and interesting of all moral questions4 ,it is not concerned1 however1 with those metaphysical subtleties1 which of late have found their way into every department of literature1 and from which even our academic curricula are not always free4 ,we have now to do with one of those truths on which the happiness of mankind depends4 ,i foresee that ,i shall not readily be forgiven for having taken up the position ,i have adopted4 ,setting myself up against all that is nowadays most admired1 ,i can expect no less than a universal outcry against me3 nor is the approbation of a few sensible men enough to make me count on that of the public4 ,but ,i have taken my stand1 and ,i shall be at no pains to please either intellectuals or men of the world4 ,there are in all ages men born to be in bondage to the opinions of the society in which they live4 ,there are not a few1 who to-day play the free-thinker and the philosopher1 who would1 if they had lived in the time of the ,league1 have been no more than fanatics4 ,no author1 who has a mind to outlive his own age1 should write for such readers4 ,a word more and ,i have done4 ,as ,i did not expect the honour conferred on me1 ,i had1 since sending in my ,discourse1 so altered and enlarged it as almost to make it a new work2 but in the circumstances ,i have felt bound to publish it just as it was when it received the prize4 ,i have only added a few notes1 and left two alterations which are easily recognisable1 of which the ,academy possibly might not have approved4 ,the respect1 gratitude and even justice ,i owe to that body seemed to me to demand this acknowledgment4 ,,moral ,,effects ,,of ,,the ,,arts ,,and ,,sciences ,decipimur specie recti4--,,horace4 ,the question before me is1 ,whether the ,restoration of the arts and sciences has had the effect of purifying or corrupting morals4 ,which side am ,i to take8 ,that1 gentlemen1 which becomes an honest man1 who is sensible of his own ignorance1 and thinks himself none the worse for it4 ,i feel the difficulty of treating this subject fittingly1 before the tribunal which is to judge of what ,i advance4 ,how can ,i presume to belittle the sciences before one of the most learned assemblies in ,europe1 to commend ignorance in a famous ,academy1 and reconcile my contempt for study with the respect due to the truly learned8 ,i was aware of these inconsistencies1 but not discouraged by them4 ,it is not science1 ,i said to myself1 that ,i am attacking2 it is virtue that ,i am defending1 and that before virtuous men--and goodness is even dearer to the good than learning to the learned4 ,what then have ,i to fear8 ,the sagacity of the assembly before which ,i am pleading8 ,that1 ,i acknowledge1 is to be feared2 but rather on account of faults of construction than of the views ,i hold4 ,just sovereigns have never hesitated to decide against themselves in doubtful cases2 and indeed the most advantageous situation in which a just claim can be1 is that of being laid before a just and enlightened arbitrator1 who is judge in his own case4 ,to this motive1 which encouraged me1 ,i may add another which finally decided me4 ,and this is1 that as ,i have upheld the cause of truth to the best of my natural abilities1 whatever my apparent success1 there is one reward which cannot fail me4 ,that reward ,i shall find in the bottom of my heart4 ,,the ,,first ,,part ,it is a noble and beautiful spectacle to see man raising himself1 so to speak1 from nothing by his own exertions2 dissipating1 by the light of reason1 all the thick clouds in which he was by nature enveloped2 mounting above himself2 soaring in thought even to the celestial regions2 like the sun1 encompassing with giant strides the vast extent of the universe2 and1 what is still grander and more wonderful1 going back into himself1 there to study man and get to know his own nature1 his duties and his end4 ,all these miracles we have seen renewed within the last few generations4 ,europe had relapsed into the barbarism of the earliest ages2 the inhabitants of this part of the world1 which is at present so highly enlightened1 were plunged1 some centuries ago1 in a state still-worse than ignorance4 ,a scientific jargon1 more despicable than mere ignorance1 had usurped the name of knowledge1 and opposed an almost invincible obstacle to its restoration4 ,things had come to such a pass1 that it required a complete revolution to bring men back to common sense4 ,this came at last from the quarter from which it was least to be expected4 ,it was the stupid ,mussulman1 the eternal scourge of letters1 who was the immediate cause of their revival among us4 ,the fall of the throne of ,constantine brought to ,italy the relics of ancient ,greece2 and with these precious spoils ,france in turn was enriched4 ,the sciences soon followed literature1 and the art of thinking joined that of writing3 an order which may seem strange1 but is perhaps only too natural4 ,the world now began to perceive the principal advantage of an intercourse with the ,muses1 that of rendering mankind more sociable by inspiring them with the desire to please one another with performances worthy of their mutual approbation4 ,the mind1 as well as the body1 has its needs3 those of the body are the basis of society1 those of the mind its ornaments4 ,so long as government and law provide for the security and well-being of men in their common life1 the arts1 literature and the sciences1 less despotic though perhaps more powerful1 fling garlands of flowers over the chains which weigh them down4 ,they stifle in men's breasts that sense of original liberty1 for which they seem to have been born2 cause them to love their own slavery1 and so make of them what is called a civilised people4 ,necessity raised up thrones2 the arts and sciences have made them strong4 ,powers of the earth1 cherish all talents and protect those who cultivate them4#a ,civilised peoples1 cultivate such pursuits3 to them1 happy slaves1 you owe that delicacy and exquisiteness of taste1 which is so much your boast1 that sweetness of disposition and urbanity of manners which make intercourse so easy and agreeable among you--in a word1 the appearance of all the virtues1 without being in possession of one of them4 ,it was for this sort of accomplishment1 which is by so much the more captivating as it seems less affected1 that ,athens and ,rome were so much distinguished in the boasted times of their splendour and magnificence3 and it is doubtless in the same respect that our own age and nation will excel all periods and peoples4 ,an air of philosophy without pedantry2 an address at once natural and engaging1 distant equally from ,teutonic clumsiness and ,italian pantomime2 these are the effects of a taste acquired by liberal studies and improved by conversation with the world4 ,what happiness would it be for those who live among us1 if our external appearance were always a true mirror of our hearts2 if decorum were but virtue2 if the maxims we professed were the rules of our conduct2 and if real philosophy were inseparable from the title of a philosopher6 ,but so many good qualities too seldom go together2 virtue rarely appears in so much pomp and state4 ,richness of apparel may proclaim the man of fortune1 and elegance the man of taste2 but true health and manliness are known by different signs4 ,it is under the home-spun of the labourer1 and not beneath the gilt and tinsel of the courtier1 that we should look for strength and vigour of body4 ,external ornaments are no less foreign to virtue1 which is the strength and activity of the mind4 ,the honest man is an athlete1 who loves to wrestle stark naked2 he scorns all those vile trappings1 which prevent the exertion of his strength1 and were1 for the most part1 invented only to conceal some deformity4 ,before art had moulded our behaviour1 and taught our passions to speak an artificial language1 our morals were rude but natural2 and the different ways in which we behaved proclaimed at the first glance the difference of our dispositions4 ,human nature was not at bottom better then than now2 but men found their security in the ease with which they could see through one another1 and this advantage1 of which we no longer feel the value1 prevented their having many vices4 ,in our day1 now that more subtle study and a more refined taste have reduced the art of pleasing to a system1 there prevails in modern manners a servile and deceptive conformity2 so that one would think every mind had been cast in the same mould4 ,politeness requires this thing2 decorum that2 ceremony has its forms1 and fashion its laws1 and these we must always follow1 never the promptings of our own nature4 ,we no longer dare seem what we really are1 but lie under a perpetual restraint2 in the meantime the herd of men1 which we call society1 all act under the same circumstances exactly alike1 unless very particular and powerful motives prevent them4 ,thus we never know with whom we have to deal2 and even to know our friends we must wait for some critical and pressing occasion2 that is1 till it is too late2 for it is on those very occasions that such knowledge is of use to us4 ,what a train of vices must attend this uncertainty6 ,sincere friendship1 real esteem1 and perfect confidence are banished from among men4 ,jealousy1 suspicion1 fear1 coldness1 reserve1 hate and fraud lie constantly concealed under that uniform and deceitful veil of politeness2 that boasted candour and urbanity1 for which we are indebted to the light and leading of this age4 ,we shall no longer take in vain by our oaths the name of our ,creator2 but we shall insult ,him with our blasphemies1 and our scrupulous ears will take no offence4 ,we have grown too modest to brag of our own deserts2 but we do not scruple to decry those of others4 ,we do not grossly outrage even our enemies1 but artfully calumniate them4 ,our hatred of other nations diminishes1 but patriotism dies with it4 ,ignorance is held in contempt2 but a dangerous scepticism has succeeded it4 ,some vices indeed are condemned and others grown dishonourable2 but we have still many that are honoured with the names of virtues1 and it is become necessary that we should either have1 or at least pretend to have them4 ,let who will extol the moderation of our modern sages1 ,i see nothing in it but a refinement of intemperance as unworthy of my commendation as their artificial simplicity4#b ,such is the purity to which our morals have attained2 this is the virtue we have made our own4 ,let the arts and sciences claim the share they have had in this salutary work4 ,i shall add but one reflection more2 suppose an inhabitant of some distant country should endeavour to form an idea of ,european morals from the state of the sciences1 the perfection of the arts1 the propriety of our public entertainments1 the politeness of our behaviour1 the affability of our conversation1 our constant professions of benevolence1 and from those tumultuous assemblies of people of all ranks1 who seem1 from morning till night1 to have no other care than to oblige one another4 ,such a stranger1 ,i maintain1 would arrive at a totally false view of our morality4 ,where there is no effect1 it is idle to look for a cause3 but here the effect is certain and the depravity actual2 our minds have been corrupted in proportion as the arts and sciences have improved4 ,will it be said1 that this is a misfortune peculiar to the present age8 ,no1 gentlemen1 the evils resulting from our vain curiosity are as old as the world4 ,the daily ebb and flow of the tides are not more regularly influenced by the moon1 than the morals of a people by the progress of the arts and sciences4 ,as their light has risen above our horizon1 virtue has taken flight1 and the same phenomenon has been constantly observed in all times and places4 ,take ,egypt1 the first school of mankind1 that ancient country1 famous for its fertility under a brazen sky2 the spot from which ,sesostris once set out to conquer the world4 ,egypt became the mother of philosophy and the fine arts2 soon she was conquered by ,cambyses1 and then successively by the ,greeks1 the ,romans1 the ,arabs1 and finally the ,turks4 ,take ,greece1 once peopled by heroes1 who twice vanquished ,asia4 ,letters1 as yet in their infancy1 had not corrupted the disposition of its inhabitants2 but the progress of the sciences soon produced a dissoluteness of manners1 and the imposition of the ,macedonian yoke3 from which time ,greece1 always learned1 always voluptuous and always a slave1 has experienced amid all its revolutions no more than a change of masters4 ,not all the eloquence of ,demosthenes could breathe life into a body which luxury and the arts had once enervated4 ,it was not till the days of ,ennius and ,terence that ,rome1 founded by a shepherd1 and made illustrious by ,i peasants1 began to degenerate4 ,but after the appearance of an ,ovid1 a ,catullus1 a ,martial1 and the rest of those numerous obscene authors1 whose very names are enough to put modesty to the blush1 ,rome1 once the shrine of virtue1 became the theatre of vice1 a scorn among the nations1 and an object of derision even to barbarians4 ,thus the capital of the world at length submitted to the yoke of slavery it had imposed on others1 and the very day of its fall was the eve of that on which it conferred on one of its citizens the title of ,arbiter of ,good ,taste4 ,what shall ,i say of that metropolis of the ,eastern ,empire1 which1 by its situation1 seemed destined to be the capital of the world2 that refuge of the arts and sciences1 when they were banished from the rest of ,europe1 more perhaps by wisdom than barbarism8 ,the most profligate debaucheries1 the most abandoned villainies1 the most atrocious crimes1 plots1 murders and assassinations form the warp and woof of the history of ,constantinople4 ,such is the pure source from which have flowed to us the floods of knowledge on which the present age so prides itself4 ,but wherefore should we seek1 in past ages1 for proofs of a truth1 of which the present affords us ample evidence8 ,there is in ,asia a vast empire1 where learning is held in honour1 and leads to the highest dignities in the state4 ,if the sciences improved our morals1 if they inspired us with courage and taught us to lay down our lives for the good of our country1 the ,chinese should be wise1 free and invincible4 ,but1 if there be no vice they do not practise1 no crime with which they are not familiar2 if the sagacity of their ministers1 the supposed wisdom of their laws1 and the multitude of inhabitants who people that vast empire1 have alike failed to preserve them from the yoke of the rude and ignorant ,tartars1 of what use were their men of science and literature8 ,what advantage has that country reaped from the honours bestowed on its learned men8 ,can it be that of being peopled by a race of scoundrels and slaves8 ,contrast with these instances the morals of those few nations which1 being preserved from the contagion of useless knowledge1 have by their virtues become happy in themselves and afforded an example to the rest of the world4 ,such were the first inhabitants of ,persia1 a nation so singular that virtue was taught among them in the same manner as the sciences are with us4 ,they very easily subdued ,asia1 and possess the exclusive glory of having had the history of their political institutions regarded as a philosophical romance4 ,such were the ,scythians1 of whom such wonderful eulogies have come down to us4 ,such were the ,germans1 whose simplicity1 innocence and virtue1 afforded a most delightful contrast to the pen of an historian1 weary of describing the baseness and villainies of an enlightened1 opulent and voluptuous nation4 ,such had been even ,rome in the days of its poverty and ignorance4 ,and such has shown itself to be1 even in our own times1 that rustic nation1 whose justly renowned courage not even adversity could conquer1 and whose fidelity no example could corrupt4#c ,it is not through stupidity that the people have preferred other activities to those of the mind4 ,they were not ignorant that in other countries there were men who spent their time in disputing idly about the sovereign good1 and about vice and virtue4 ,they knew that these useless thinkers were lavish in their own praises1 and stigmatised other nations contemptuously as barbarians4 ,but they noted the morals of these people1 and so learnt what to think of their learning4#d ,can it be forgotten that1 in the very heart of ,greece1 there arose a city as famous for the happy ignorance of its inhabitants1 as for the wisdom of its laws2 a republic of demi-gods rather than of men1 so greatly superior their virtues seemed to those of mere humanity8 ,sparta1 eternal proof of the vanity of science1 while the vices1 under the conduct of the fine arts1 were being introduced into ,athens1 even while its tyrant was carefully collecting together the works of the prince of poets1 was driving from her walls artists and the arts1 the learned and their learning6 ,the difference was seen in the outcome4 ,athens became the seat of politeness and taste1 the country of orators and philosophers4 ,the elegance of its buildings equalled that of its language2 on every side might be seen marble and canvas1 animated by the hands of the most skilful artists4 ,from ,athens we derive those astonishing performances1 which will serve as models to every corrupt age4 ,the picture of ,lacedmon is not so highly coloured4 ,there1 the neighbouring nations used to say1 men were born virtuous1 their native air seeming to inspire them with virtue4 ,but its inhabitants have left us nothing but the memory of their heroic actions3 monuments that should not count for less in our eyes than the most curious relics of ,athenian marble4 ,it is true that1 among the ,athenians1 there were some few wise men who withstood the general torrent1 and preserved their integrity even in the company of the muses4 ,but hear the judgment which the principal1 and most unhappy of them1 passed on the artists and learned men of his day4 ,i have considered the poets1 says he1 and ,i look upon them as people whose talents impose both on themselves and on others2 they give themselves out for wise men1 and are taken for such2 but in reality they are anything sooner than that4 ,from the poets1 continues ,socrates1 ,i turned to the artists4 ,nobody was more ignorant of the arts than myself2 nobody was more fully persuaded that the artists were possessed of amazing knowledge4 ,i soon discovered1 however1 that they were in as bad a way as the poets1 and that both had fallen into the same misconception4 ,because the most skilful of them excel others in their particular jobs1 they think themselves wiser than all the rest of mankind4 ,this arrogance spoilt all their skill in my eyes1 so that1 putting myself in the place of the oracle1 and asking myself whether ,i would rather be what ,i am or what they are1 know what they know1 or know that ,i know nothing1 ,i very readily answered1 for myself and the god1 that ,i had rather remain as ,i am4 ,none of us1 neither the sophists1 nor the poets1 nor the orators1 nor the artists1 nor ,i1 know what is the nature of the true1 the good1 or the beautiful4 ,but there is this difference between us2 that1 though none of these people know anything1 they all think they know something2 whereas for my part1 if ,i know nothing1 ,i am at least in no doubt of my ignorance4 ,so the superiority of wisdom1 imputed to me by the oracle1 is reduced merely to my being fully convinced that ,i am ignorant of what ,i do not know4 ,thus we find ,socrates1 the wisest of men in the judgment of the god1 and the most learned of all the ,athenians in the opinion of all ,greece1 speaking in praise of ignorance4 ,were he alive now1 there is little reason to think that our modern scholars and artists would induce him to change his mind4 ,no1 gentlemen1 that honest man would still persist in despising our vain sciences4 ,he would lend no aid to swell the flood of books that flows from every quarter3 he would leave to us1 as he did to his disciples1 only the example and memory of his virtues2 that is the noblest method of instructing mankind4 ,socrates had begun at ,athens1 and the elder ,cato proceeded at ,rome1 to inveigh against those seductive and subtle ,greeks1 who corrupted the virtue and destroyed the courage of their fellow-citizens3 culture1 however1 prevailed4 ,rome was filled with philosophers and orators1 military discipline was neglected1 agriculture was held in contempt1 men formed sects1 and forgot their country4 ,to the sacred names of liberty1 disinterestedness and obedience to law1 succeeded those of ,epicurus1 ,zeno and ,arcesilaus4 ,it was even a saying among their own philosophers that since learned men appeared among them1 honest men had been in eclipse4 ,before that time the ,romans were satisfied with the practice of virtue2 they were undone when they began to study it4 ,what would the great soul of ,fabricius have felt1 if it had been his misfortune to be called back to life1 when he saw the pomp and magnificence of that ,rome1 which his arm had saved from ruin1 and his honourable name made more illustrious than all its conquests4 ,ye gods6 he would have said1 what has become of those thatched roofs and rustic hearths1 which were formerly the habitations of temperance and virtue8 ,what fatal splendour has succeeded the ancient ,roman simplicity8 ,what is this foreign language1 this effeminacy of manners8 ,what is the meaning of these statues1 paintings and buildings8 ,fools1 what have you done8 ,you1 the lords of the earth1 have made yourselves the slaves of the frivolous nations you have subdued4 ,you are governed by rhetoricians1 and it has been only to enrich architects1 painters1 sculptors and stage-players that you have watered ,greece and ,asia with your blood4 ,even the spoils of ,carthage are the prize of a flute-player4 ,romans6 ,romans6 make haste to demolish those amphitheatres1 break to pieces those statues1 burn those paintings2 drive from among you those slaves who keep you in subjection1 and whose fatal arts are corrupting your morals4 ,let other hands make themselves illustrious by such vain talents2 the only talent worthy of ,rome is that of conquering the world and making virtue its ruler4 ,when ,cyneas took the ,roman senate for an assembly of kings1 he was not struck by either useless pomp or studied elegance4 ,he heard there none of that futile eloquence1 which is now the study and the charm of frivolous orators4 ,what then was the majesty that ,cyneas beheld8 ,fellow citizens1 he saw the noblest sight that ever existed under heaven1 a sight which not all your riches or your arts can show2 an assembly of two hundred virtuous men1 worthy to command in ,rome1 and to govern the world4 ,but let pass the distance of time and place1 and let us see what has happened in our own time and country2 or rather let us banish odious descriptions that might offend our delicacy1 and spare ourselves the pains of repeating the same tilings under different names4 ,it was not for nothing that ,i invoked the ,manes of ,fabricius2 for what have ,i put into his mouth1 that might not have come with as much propriety from ,louis the ,twelfth or ,henry the ,fourth8 ,it is true that in ,france ,socrates would not have drunk the hemlock1 but he would have drunk of a potion infinitely more bitter1 of insult1 mockery and contempt a hundred times worse than death4 ,thus it is that luxury1 profligacy and slavery1 have been1 in all ages1 the scourge of the efforts of our pride to emerge from that happy state of ignorance1 in which the wisdom of providence had placed us4 ,that thick veil with which it has covered all its operations seems to be a sufficient proof that it never designed us for such fruitless researches4 ,but is there1 indeed1 one lesson it has taught us1 by which we have rightly profited1 or which we have neglected with impunity8 ,let men learn for once that nature would have preserved them from science1 as a mother snatches a dangerous weapon from the hands of her child4 ,let them know that all the secrets she hides are so many evils from which she protects them1 and that the very difficulty they find in acquiring knowledge is not the least of her bounty towards them4 ,men are perverse2 but they would have been far worse1 if they had had the misfortune to be born learned4 ,how humiliating are these reflections to humanity1 and how mortified by them our pride should be6 ,what6 it will be asked1 is uprightness the child of ignorance8 ,is virtue inconsistent with learning8 ,what consequences might not be drawn from such suppositions8 ,but to reconcile these apparent contradictions1 we need only examine closely the emptiness and vanity of those pompous titles1 which are so liberally bestowed on human knowledge1 and which so blind our judgment4 ,let us consider1 therefore1 the arts and sciences in themselves4 ,let us see what must result from their advancement1 and let us not hesitate to admit the truth of all those points on which our arguments coincide with the inductions we can make from history4 #a ,sovereigns always see with1 pleasure a taste for the arts of amusement and superfluity1 which do not result in the exportation of bullion1 increase among their subjects4 ,they very well know that1 besides nourishing that littleness of mind which is proper to slavery1 the increase of artificial wants only binds so many more chains upon the people4 ,alexander1 wishing to keep the ,ichthyophages in a state of dependence1 compelled them to give up fishing1 and subsist on the customary food of civilised nations4 ,the ,american savages1 who go naked1 and live entirely on the products of the chase1 have been always impossible to subdue4 ,what yoke1 indeed1 can be imposed on men who stand in need of nothing8 #b ,i love1 said ,montaigne1 to converse and hold an argument2 but only with very few people1 and that for my own gratification4 ,for to do so1 by way of affording amusement for the great1 or of making a parade of one's talents1 is1 in my opinion1 a trade very ill-becoming a man of honour4 ,it is the trade of all our intellectuals1 save one4 #c ,i dare not speak of those happy nations1 who did not even know the name of many vices1 which we find it difficult to suppress2 the savages of ,america1 whose simple and natural mode of government ,montaigne preferred1 without hesitation1 not only to the laws of ,plato1 but to the most perfect visions of government philosophy can ever suggest ,he cites many examples1 striking for those who are capable of appreciating them4 ,but1 what of all that1 says he1 they can't run to a pair of breeches6 #d ,what are we to think was the real opinion of the ,athenians themselves about eloquence1 when they were so very careful to banish declamation from that upright tribunal1 against whose decision even their gods made no appeal8 ,what did the ,romans think of physicians1 when they expelled medicine from the republic8 ,and when the relics of humanity left among the ,spaniards induced them to forbid their lawyers to set foot in ,america1 what must they have thought of jurisprudence8 ,may it not be said that they thought1 by this single expedient1 to make reparation for all the outrages they had committed against the unhappy ,indians8 ,,the ,,second ,,part ,an ancient tradition passed out of ,egypt into ,greece1 that some god1 who was an enemy to the repose of mankind1 was the inventor of the sciences4#a ,what must the ,egyptians1 among whom the sciences first arose1 have thought of them8 ,and they beheld1 near at hand1 the sources from which they sprang4 ,in fact1 whether we turn to the annals of the world1 or eke out with philosophical investigations the uncertain chronicles of history1 we shall not find for human knowledge an origin answering to the idea we are pleased to entertain of it at present4 ,astronomy was born of superstition1 eloquence of ambition1 hatred1 falsehood and flattery2 geometry of avarice2 physics of an idle curiosity2 and even moral philosophy of human pride4 ,thus the arts and sciences owe their birth to our vices2 we should be less doubtful of their advantages1 if they had sprung from our virtues4 ,their evil origin is1 indeed1 but too plainly reproduced in their objects4 ,what would become of the arts1 were they not cherished by luxury8 ,if men were not unjust1 of what use were jurisprudence8 ,what would become of history1 if there were no tyrants1 wars1 or conspiracies8 ,in a word1 who would pass his life in barren speculations1 if everybody1 attentive only to the obligations of humanity and the necessities of nature1 spent his whole life in serving his country1 obliging his friends1 and relieving the unhappy8 ,are we then made to live and die on the brink of that well at the bottom of which ,truth lies hid8 ,this reflection alone is1 in my opinion1 enough to discourage at first setting out every man who seriously endeavours to instruct himself by the study of philosophy4 ,what a variety of dangers surrounds us6 ,what a number of wrong paths present themselves in the investigation of the sciences6 ,through how many errors1 more perilous than truth itself is useful1 must we not pass to arrive at it8 ,the disadvantages we lie under are evident2 for falsehood is capable of an infinite variety of combinations2 but the truth has only one manner of being4 ,besides1 where is the man who sincerely desires to find it8 ,or even admitting his good will1 by what characteristic marks is he sure of knowing it8 ,amid the infinite diversity of opinions where is the criterion#b by which we may certainly judge of it8 ,again1 what is still more difficult1 should we even be fortunate enough to discover it1 who among us will know how to make right use of it8 ,if our sciences are futile in the objects they propose1 they are no less dangerous in the effects they produce4 ,being the effect of idleness1 they generate idleness in their turn2 and an irreparable loss of time is the first prejudice which they must necessarily cause to society4 ,to live without doing some good is a great evil as well in the political as in the moral world2 and hence every useless citizen should be regarded as a pernicious person4 ,tell me then1 illustrious philosophers1 of whom we learn the ratios in which attraction acts in vacuo2 and in the revolution of the planets1 the relations of spaces traversed in equal times2 by whom we are taught what curves have conjugate points1 points of inflexion1 and cusps2 how the soul and body correspond1 like two clocks1 without actual communication2 what planets may be inhabited2 and what insects reproduce in an extraordinary manner4 ,answer me1 ,i say1 you from whom we receive all this sublime information1 whether we should have been less numerous1 worse governed1 less formidable1 less flourishing1 or more perverse1 supposing you had taught us none of all these fine things4 ,reconsider therefore the importance of your productions2 and1 since the labours of the most enlightened of our learned men and the best of our citizens are of so little utility1 tell us what we ought to think of that numerous herd of obscure writers and useless litterateurs1 who devour without any return the substance of the ,state4 ,useless1 do ,i say8 ,would ,god they were6 ,society would be more peaceful1 and morals less corrupt4 ,but these vain and futile declaimers go forth on all sides1 armed with their fatal paradoxes1 to sap the foundations of our faith1 and nullify virtue4 ,they smile contemptuously at such old names as patriotism and religion1 and consecrate their talents and philosophy to the destruction2 and defamation of all that men hold sacred4 ,not that they bear any real hatred to virtue or dogma2 they are the enemies of public opinion alone2 to bring them to the foot of the altar1 it would be enough to banish them to a land of atheists4 ,what extravagancies will not the rage of singularity induce men to commit6 ,the waste of time is certainly a great evil2 but still greater evils attend upon literature and the arts4 ,one is luxury1 produced like them by indolence and vanity4 ,luxury is seldom unattended by the arts and sciences2 and they are always attended by luxury4 ,i know that our philosophy1 fertile in paradoxes1 pretends1 in contradiction to the experience of all ages1 that luxury contributes to the splendour of ,states4 ,but1 without insisting on the necessity of sumptuary laws1 can it be denied that rectitude of morals is essential to the duration of empires1 and that luxury is diametrically opposed to such rectitude8 ,let it be admitted that luxury is a certain indication of wealth2 that it even serves1 if you will1 to increase such wealth3 what conclusion is to be drawn from this paradox1 so worthy of the times8 ,and what will become of virtue if riches are to be acquired at any cost8 ,the politicians of the ancient world were always talking of morals and virtue2 ours speak of nothing but commerce and money4 ,one of them will tell you that in such a country a man is worth just as much as he will sell for at ,algiers3 another1 pursuing the same mode of calculation1 finds that in some countries a man is worth nothing1 and in others still less than nothing2 they value men as they do droves of oxen4 ,according to them1 a man is worth no more to the ,state1 than the amount he consumes2 and thus a ,sybarite would be worth at least thirty ,lacedmonians4 ,let these writers tell me1 however1 which of the two republics1 ,sybaris or ,sparta1 was subdued by a handful of peasants1 and which became the terror of ,asia4 ,the monarchy of ,cyrus was conquered by thirty thousand men1 led by a prince poorer than the meanest of ,persian ,satraps3 in like manner the ,scythians1 the poorest of all nations1 were able to resist the most powerful monarchs of the universe4 ,when two famous republics contended for the empire of the world1 the one rich and the other poor1 the former was subdued by the latter4 ,the ,roman empire in its turn1 after having engulfed all the riches of the universe1 fell a prey to peoples who knew not even what riches were4 ,the ,franks conquered the ,gauls1 and the ,saxons ,england1 without any other treasures than their bravery and their poverty4 ,a band of poor mountaineers1 whose whole cupidity was confined to the possession of a few sheep-skins1 having first given a check to the arrogance of ,austria1 went on to crush the opulent and formidable house of ,burgundy1 which at that time made the potentates of ,europe tremble4 ,in short1 all the power and wisdom of the heir of ,charles the ,fifth1 backed by all the treasures of the ,indies1 broke before a few herring-fishers4 ,let our politicians condescend to lay aside their calculations for a moment1 to reflect on these examples2 let them learn for once that money1 though it buys everything else1 cannot buy morals and citizens4 ,what then is the precise point in dispute about luxury8 ,it is to know which is most advantageous to empires1 that their existence should be brilliant and momentary1 or virtuous and lasting8 ,i say brilliant1 but with what lustre6 ,a taste for ostentation never prevails in the same minds as a taste for honesty4 ,no1 it is impossible that understandings1 degraded by a multitude of futile cares1 should ever rise to what is truly great and noble2 even if they had the strength1 they would want the courage4 ,every artist loves applause4 ,the praise of his contemporaries is the most valuable part of his recompense4 ,what then will he do to obtain it1 if he have the misfortune to be born among a people1 and at a time1 when learning is in vogue1 and the superficiality of youth is in a position to lead the fashion2 when men have sacrificed their taste to those who tyrannise over their liberty1 and one sex dare not approve anything but what is proportionate to the pusillanimity of the other2#c when the greatest masterpieces of dramatic poetry are condemned1 and the noblest of musical productions neglected8 ,this is what he will do4 ,he will lower his genius to the level of the age1 and will rather submit to compose mediocre works1 that will be admired during his life-time1 than labour at sublime achievements which will not be admired till long after he is dead4 ,let the famous ,voltaire tell us how many nervous and masculine beauties he has sacrificed to our false delicacy1 and how much that is great and noble1 that spirit of gallantry1 which delights in what is frivolous and petty1 has cost him4 ,it is thus that the dissolution of morals1 the necessary consequence of luxury1 brings with it in its turn the corruption of taste4 ,further1 if by chance there be found among men of average ability1 an individual with enough strength of mind to refuse to comply with the spirit of the age1 and to debase himself by puerile productions1 his lot will be hard4 ,he will die in indigence and oblivion4 ,this is not so much a prediction1 as a fact already confirmed by experience6 ,yes1 ,carle and ,pierre ,vanloo1 the time is already come when your pencils1 destined to increase the majesty of our temples by sublime and holy images1 must fall from your hands1 or else be prostituted to adorn the panels of a coach with lascivious paintings4 ,and you1 inimitable ,pigal1 rival of ,phidias and ,praxiteles1 whose chisel the ancients would have employed to carve them gods1 whose images almost excuse their idolatry in our eyes2 even your hand must condescend to fashion the belly of an ape1 or else remain idle4 ,we cannot reflect on the morality of mankind without contemplating with pleasure the picture of the simplicity which prevailed in the earliest times4 ,this image may be justly compared to a beautiful coast1 adorned only by the hands of nature2 towards which our eyes are constantly turned1 and which we see receding with regret4 ,while men were innocent and virtuous and loved to have the gods for witnesses of their actions1 they dwelt together in the same huts2 but when they became vicious1 they grew tired of such inconvenient onlookers1 and banished them to magnificent temples4 ,finally1 they expelled their deities even from these1 in order to dwell there themselves2 or at least the temples of the gods were no longer more magnificent than the palaces of the citizens4 ,this was the height of degeneracy2 nor could vice ever be carried to greater lengths than when it was seen1 supported1 as it were1 at the doors of the great1 on columns of marble1 and graven on ,corinthian capitals4 ,as the conveniences of life increase1 as the arts are brought to perfection1 and luxury spreads1 true courage flags1 the virtues disappear2 and all this is the effect of the sciences and of those arts which are exercised in the privacy of men's dwellings4 ,when the ,goths ravaged ,greece1 the libraries only escaped the flames owing to an opinion that was set on foot among them1 that it was best to leave the enemy with a possession so calculated to divert their attention from military exercises1 and keep them engaged in indolent and sedentary occupations4 ,charles the ,eighth found himself master of ,tuscany and the kingdom of ,naples1 almost without drawing sword2 and all his court attributed this unexpected success to the fact that the princes and nobles of ,italy applied themselves with greater earnestness to the cultivation of their understandings than to active and martial pursuits4 ,in fact1 says the sensible person who records these characteristics1 experience plainly tells us1 that in military matters and all that resemble them application to the sciences tends rather to make men effeminate and cowardly than resolute and vigorous4 ,the ,romans confessed that military virtue was extinguished among them1 in proportion as they became connoisseurs in the arts of the painter1 the engraver and the goldsmith1 and began to cultivate the fine arts4 ,indeed1 as if this famous country was to be for ever an example to other nations1 the rise of the ,medici and the revival of letters has once more destroyed1 this time perhaps for ever1 the martial reputation which ,italy seemed a few centuries ago to have recovered4 ,the ancient republics of ,greece1 with that wisdom which was so conspicuous in most of their institutions1 forbade their citizens to pursue all those inactive and sedentary occupations1 which by enervating and corrupting the body diminish also the vigour of the mind4 ,with what courage1 in fact1 can it be thought that hunger and thirst1 fatigues1 dangers and death1 can be faced by men whom the smallest want overwhelms and the slightest difficulty repels8 ,with what resolution can soldiers support the excessive toils of war1 when they are entirely unaccustomed to them8 ,with what spirits can they make forced marches under officers who have not even the strength to travel on horseback8 ,it is no answer to cite the reputed valour of all the modern warriors who are so scientifically trained4 ,i hear much of their bravery in a day's battle2 but ,i am told nothing of how they support excessive fatigue1 how they stand the severity of the seasons and the inclemency of the weather4 ,a little sunshine or snow1 or the want of a few superfluities1 is enough to cripple and destroy one of our finest armies in a few days4 ,intrepid warriors ,i permit me for once to tell you the truth1 which you seldom hear4 ,of your bravery ,i am fully satisfied4 ,i have no doubt that you would have triumphed with ,hannibal at ,cann1 and at ,trasimene3 that you would have passed the ,rubicon with ,csar1 and enabled him to enslave his country2 but you never would have been able to cross the ,alps with the former1 or with the latter to subdue your own ancestors1 the ,gauls4 ,a war does not always depend on the events of battle3 there is in generalship an art superior to that of gaining victories4 ,a man may behave with great intrepidity under fire1 and yet be a very had officer4 ,even in the common soldier1 a little more ,strength and vigour would perhaps be more useful than so much courage1 which after all is no protection from death4 ,and what does it matter to the ,state whether its troops perish by cold and fever1 or by the sword of the enemy8 ,if the cultivation of the sciences is prejudicial to military qualities1 it is still more so to moral qualities4 ,even from our infancy an absurd system of education serves to adorn our wit and corrupt our judgment4 ,we see1 on every side1 huge institutions1 where our youth are educated at great expense1 and instructed in everything but their duty4 ,your children will be ignorant of their own language1 when they can talk others which are not spoken anywhere4 ,they will be able to compose verses which they can hardly understand2 and1 without being capable of distinguishing truth from error1 they will possess the art of making them unrecognisable by specious arguments4 ,but magnanimity1 equity1 temperance1 humanity and courage will be words of which they know not the meaning4 ,the dear name of country will never strike on their ears2 and if they ever hear speak of ,god1#d it will be less to fear1 than to be frightened of ,him4 ,i would as soon1 said a wise man1 that my pupil had spent his time in the tennis court as in this manner2 for there his body at least would have got exercise4 ,i well know that children ought to be kept employed1 and that idleness is for them the danger most to be feared4 ,but what should they be taught8 ,this is undoubtedly an important question4 ,let them be taught what they are to practise when they come to be men2#e not what they ought to forget4 ,our gardens are adorned with statues and our galleries with pictures4 ,what would you imagine these masterpieces of art1 thus exhibited to public admiration1 represent8 ,the great men1 who have defended their country1 or the still greater men who have enriched it by their virtues8 ,far from it4 ,they are the images of every perversion of heart and mind1 carefully selected from ancient mythology1 and presented to the early curiosity of our children1 doubtless that they may have before their eyes the representations of vicious actions1 even before they are able to read4 ,whence arise all those abuses1 unless it be from that fatal inequality introduced among men by the difference of talents and the cheapening of virtue8 ,this is the most evident effect of all our studies1 and the most dangerous of all their consequences4 ,the question is no longer whether a man is honest1 but whether he is clever4 ,we do not ask whether a book is useful1 but whether it is well-written4 ,rewards are lavished on wit and ingenuity1 while virtue is left unhonoured4 ,there are a thousand prizes for fine discourses1 and none for good actions4 ,i should be glad1 however1 to know whether the honour attaching to the best discourse that ever wins the prize in this ,academy is comparable with the merit of having founded the prize4 ,a wise man does not go in chase of fortune2 but he is by no means insensible to glory1 and when he sees it so ill distributed1 his virtue1 which might have been animated by a little emulation1 and turned to the advantage of society1 droops and dies away in obscurity and indigence4 ,it is for this reason that the agreeable arts must in time everywhere be preferred to the useful2 and this truth has been but too much confirmed since the revival of the arts and sciences4 ,we have physicists1 geometricians1 chemists1 astronomers1 poets1 musicians1 and painters in plenty2 but we have no longer a citizen among us2 or if there be found a few scattered over our abandoned countryside1 they are left to perish there unnoticed and neglected4 ,such is the condition to which we are reduced1 and such are our feelings towards those who give us our daily bread1 and our children milk4 ,i confess1 however1 that the evil is not so great as it might have become4 ,the eternal providence1 in placing salutary simples beside noxious plants1 and making poisonous animals contain their own antidote1 has taught the sovereigns of the earth1 who are its ministers1 to imitate its wisdom4 ,it is by following this example that the truly great monarch1 to whose glory every age will add new lustre1 drew from the very bosom of the arts and sciences1 the very fountains of a thousand lapses from rectitude1 those famous societies1 which1 while they are depositaries of the dangerous trust of human knowledge1 are yet the sacred guardians of morals1 by the attention they pay to their maintenance among themselves in all their purity1 and by the demands which they make on every member whom they admit4 ,these wise institutions1 confirmed by his august successor and imitated by all the kings of ,europe1 will serve at least to restrain men of letters1 who1 all aspiring to the honour of being admitted into these ,academies1 will keep watch over themselves1 and endeavour to make themselves worthy of such honour by useful performances and irreproachable morals4 ,those ,academies also1 which1 in proposing prizes for literary merit1 make choice of such subjects as are calculated to arouse the love of virtue in the hearts of citizens1 prove that it prevails in themselves1 and must give men the rare and real pleasure of finding learned societies devoting themselves to the enlightenment of mankind1 not only by agreeable exercises of the intellect1 but also by useful instructions4 ,an objection which may be made is1 in fact1 only an additional proof of my argument4 ,so much precaution proves but too evidently the need for it4 ,we never seek remedies for evils that do not exist4 ,why1 indeed1 must these bear all the marks of ordinary remedies1 on account of their inefficacy8 ,the numerous establishments in favour of the learned are only adapted to make men mistake the objects of the sciences1 and turn men's attention to the cultivation of them4 ,one would be inclined to think1 from the precautions everywhere taken1 that we are overstocked with husbandmen1 and are afraid of a shortage of philosophers4 ,i will not venture here to enter into a comparison between agriculture and philosophy1 as they would not bear it4 ,i shall only ask ,what is philosophy8 ,what is contained in the writings of the most celebrated philosophers8 ,what are the lessons of these friends of wisdom4 ,to hear them1 should we not take them for so many mountebanks1 exhibiting themselves in public1 and crying out1 ,here1 ,here1 come to me1 ,i am the only true doctor8 ,one of them teaches that there is no such thing as matter1 but that everything exists only in representation4 ,another declares that there is no other substance than matter1 and no other ,god than the world itself4 ,a third tells you that there are no such things as virtue and vice1 and that moral good and evil are chimeras2 while a fourth informs you that men are only beasts of prey1 and may conscientiously devour one another4 ,why1 my great philosophers1 do you not reserve these wise and profitable lessons for your friends and children8 ,you would soon reap the benefit of them1 nor should we be under any apprehension of our own becoming your disciples4 ,such are the wonderful men1 whom their contemporaries held in the highest esteem during their lives1 and to whom immortality has been attributed since their decease4 ,such are the wise maxims we have received from them1 and which are transmitted1 from age to age1 to our descendants4 ,paganism1 though given over to all the extravagances of human reason1 has left nothing to compare with the shameful monuments which have been prepared by the art of printing1 during the reign of the gospel4 ,the impious writings of ,leucippus and ,diagoras perished with their authors4 ,the world1 in their days1 was ignorant of the art of immortalising the errors and extravagancies of the human mind4 ,but thanks to the art of printing#f and the use we make of it1 the pernicious reflections of ,hobbes and ,spinoza will last for ever4 ,go1 famous writings1 of which the ignorance and rusticity of our forefathers would have been incapable4 ,go to our descendants1 along with those still more pernicious works which reek of the corrupted manners of the present age6 ,let them together convey to posterity a faithful history of the progress and advantages of our arts and sciences4 ,if they are read1 they will leave not a doubt about the question we are now discussing1 and unless mankind should then be still more foolish than we1 they will lift up their hands to ,heaven and exclaim in bitterness of heart3 ,almighty ,god6 thou who holdest in ,thy hand the minds of men1 deliver us from the fatal arts and sciences of our forefathers2 give us back ignorance1 innocence and poverty1 which alone can make us happy and are precious in ,thy sight4 ,but if the progress of the arts and sciences has added nothing to our real happiness2 if it has corrupted our morals1 and if that corruption has vitiated our taste1 what are we to think of the herd of text-book authors1 who have removed those impediments which nature purposely laid in the way to the ,temple of the ,muses1 in order to guard its approach and try the powers of those who might be tempted to seek knowledge8 ,what are we to think of those compilers who have indiscreetly broken open the door of the sciences1 and introduced into their sanctuary a populace unworthy to approach it1 when it was greatly to be wished that all who should be found incapable of making a considerable progress in the career of learning should have been repulsed at the entrance1 and thereby cast upon those arts which are useful to society4 ,a man who will be all his life a bad versifier1 or a third-rate geometrician1 might have made nevertheless an excellent clothier4 ,those whom nature intended for her disciples have not needed masters4 ,bacon1 ,descartes and ,newton1 those teachers of mankind1 had themselves no teachers4 ,what guide indeed could have taken them so far as their sublime genius directed them8 ,ordinary masters would only have cramped their intelligence1 by confining it within the narrow limits of their own capacity4 ,it was from the obstacles they met with at first1 that they learned to exert themselves1 and bestirred themselves to traverse the vast field which they covered4 ,if it be proper to allow some men to apply themselves to the study of the arts and sciences1 it is only those who feel themselves able to walk alone in their footsteps and to outstrip them4 ,it belongs only to these few to raise monuments to the glory of the human understanding4 ,but if we are desirous that nothing should be above their genius1 nothing should be beyond their hopes4 ,this is the only encouragement they require4 ,the soul insensibly adapts itself to the objects on which it is employed1 and thus it is that great occasions produce great men4 ,the greatest orator in the world was ,consul of ,rome1 and perhaps the greatest of philosophers ,lord ,chancellor of ,england4 ,can it be conceived that1 if the former had only been a professor at some ,university1 and the latter a pensioner of some ,academy1 their works would not have suffered from their situation4 ,let not princes disdain to admit into their councils those who are most capable of giving them good advice4 ,let them renounce the old prejudice1 which was invented by the pride of the great1 that the art of governing mankind is more difficult than that of instructing them2 as if it was easier to induce men to do good voluntarily1 than to compel them to it by force4 ,let the learned of the first rank find an honourable refuge in their courts2 let them there enjoy the only recompense worthy of them1 that of promoting by their influence the happiness of the peoples they have enlightened by their wisdom4 ,it is by this means only that we are likely to see what virtue1 science and authority can do1 when animated by the noblest emulation1 and working unanimously for the happiness of mankind4 ,but so long as power alone is on one side1 and knowledge and ,understanding alone on the other1 the learned will seldom make great objects their study1 princes will still more rarely do great actions1 and the peoples will continue to be1 as they are1 mean1 corrupt and miserable4 ,as for us1 ordinary men1 on whom ,heaven has not been pleased to bestow such great talents2 as we are not destined to reap such glory1 let us remain in our obscurity4 ,let us not covet a reputation we should never attain1 and which1 in the present state of things1 would never make up to us for the trouble it would have cost us1 even if we were fully qualified to obtain it4 ,why should we build our happiness on the opinions of others1 when we can find it in our own hearts8 ,let us leave to others the task of instructing mankind in their duty1 and confine ourselves to the discharge of our own4 ,we have no occasion for greater knowledge than this4 ,virtue6 sublime science of simple minds1 are such industry and preparation needed if we are to know you8 ,are not your principles graven on every heart8 ,need we do more1 to learn your laws1 than examine ourselves1 and listen to the voice of conscience1 when the passions are silent8 ,this is the true philosophy1 with which we must learn to be content1 without envying the fame of those celebrated men1 whose names are immortal in the republic of letters4 ,let us1 instead of envying them1 endeavour to make1 between them and us1 that honourable distinction which was formerly seen to exist between two great peoples1 that the one knew how to speak1 and the other how to act1 aright4 #a ,it is easy to see the allegory in the fable of ,prometheus3 and it does not appear that the ,greeks1 who chained him to the ,caucasus1 had a better opinion of him than the ,egyptians had of their god ,theutus4 ,the ,satyr1 says an ancient fable1 the first time he saw a fire1 was going to kiss and embrace it2 but ,prometheus cried out to him to forbear1 or his beard would rue it4 ,it burns1 says he1 everything that touches it4 #b ,the less we know1 the more we think we know4 ,the peripatetics doubted of nothing4 ,did not ,descartes construct the universe with cubes and vortices8 ,and is there in all ,europe one single physicist who does not boldly explain the inexplicable mysteries of electricity1 which will1 perhaps1 be for ever the despair of real philosophers8 #c ,i am far from thinking that the ascendancy which women have obtained over men is an evil in itself4 ,it is a present which nature has made them for the good of mankind4 ,if better directed1 it might be productive of as much good1 as it is now of evil4 ,we are not sufficiently sensible of what advantage it would be to society to give a better education to that half of our species which governs the other4 ,men will always be what women choose to make them4 ,if you wish then that they should be noble and virtuous1 let women be taught what greatness of soul and virtue are4 ,the reflections which this subject arouses1 and which ,plato formerly made1 deserve to be more fully developed by a pen worthy of following so great a master1 and defending so great a cause4 #d ,penses philosophiques 7,diderot74 #e ,such was the education of the ,spartans with regard to one of the greatest of their-kings4 ,it is well worthy of notice1 says ,montaigne1 that the excellent institutions of ,lycurgus1 which were in truth miraculously perfect1 paid as much attention to the bringing up of youth as if this were their principal object1 and yet1 at the very seat of the ,muses1 they make so little mention of learning that it seems as if their generous-spirited youth disdained every other restraint1 and required1 instead of masters of the sciences1 instructors in valour1 prudence and justice alone4 ,let us hear next what the same writer says of the ancient ,persians4 ,plato1 says he1 relates that the heir to the throne was thus brought up4 ,at his birth he was committed1 not to the care of women1 but to eunuchs in the highest authority and near the person of the king1 on account of their virtue4 ,these undertook to render his body beautiful and healthy4 ,at seven years of age they taught him to ride and go hunting4 ,at fourteen he was placed in the hands of four1 the wisest1 the most just1 the most temperate and the bravest persons in the kingdom4 ,the first instructed him in religion1 the second taught him to adhere inviolably to truth1 the third to conquer his passions1 and the fourth to be afraid of nothing4 ,all1 ,i may add1 taught him to be a good man2 but not one taught him to be learned4 ,astyages1 in ,xenophon1 desires ,cyrus to give him an account of his last lesson4 ,it was this1 answered ,cyrus1 one of the big boys1 of the school having a small coat1 gave it to a little boy and took away from him his coat1 which was larger4 ,our master having appointed me arbiter in the dispute1 ,i ordered that matters should stand as they were1 as each boy seemed to be better suited than before4 ,the master1 however1 remonstrated with me1 saying that ,i considered only convenience1 whereas justice ought to have been the first concern1 and justice teaches that no one should suffer forcible interference with what belongs to him4 ,he added that he was punished for his wrong decision1 just as boys are punished in our country schools when they forget the first aorist of 4 ,my tutor must make me a fine harangue1 in genere demonstrative1 before he will persuade me that his school is as good as this4 #f ,if we consider the frightful disorders which printing has already caused in ,europe1 and judge of the future by the progress of its evils from day to day1 it is easy to foresee that sovereigns will hereafter take as much pains to banish this dreadful art from their dominions1 as they ever took to encourage it ,the ,sultan ,achmet1 yielding to the importunities of certain pretenders to taste1 consented to have a press erected at ,constantinople2 but it was hardly set to work before they were obliged to destroy it1 and throw the plant into a well4 ,it is related that the ,caliph ,omar1 being asked what should be done with the library at ,alexandria1 answered in these words4 ,if the books in the library contain anything contrary to the ,alcoran1 they are evil and ought to be burnt2 if they contain only what the ,alcoran teaches1 they are superfluous4 ,this reasoning has been cited by oar men of letters as the height of absurdity2 but if ,gregory the ,great had been in the place of ,omar1 and the ,gospel in the place of the ,alcoran1 the library would still have been burnt1 and it would have been perhaps the finest action of his life4 ,a ,,discourse ,,on ,a ,,subject ,,proposed ,,by ,,the ,,academy ,,of ,,dijon3 ,,what ,,is ,,the ,,origin ,,of ,,inequality ,,among ,,men1 ,,and ,,is ,,it ,,authorised ,,by ,,natural ,,law8 ,non in depravatis1 sed in his qua bene secundum naturam se habent1 considerandum est quid sit naturale4 ,aristotle1 ,politics1 ,bk4 i1 ch4 #b4 ,we should consider what is natural not in things which are depraved but in those which are rightly ordered according to nature4 ,,dedication ,,to ,,the ,,republic ,,of ,,geneva ,,most ,,honourable1 ,,magnificent ,,and ,,sovereign ,,lords1 convinced that only a virtuous citizen can confer on his country honours which it can accept1 ,i have been for thirty years past working to make myself worthy to offer you some public homage2 and1 this fortunate opportunity supplementing in some degree the insufficiency of my efforts1 ,i have thought myself entitled to follow in embracing it the dictates of the zeal which inspires me1 rather than the right which should have been my authorisation4 ,having had the happiness to be born among you1 how could ,i reflect on the equality which nature has ordained between men1 and the inequality which they have introduced1 without reflecting on the profound wisdom by which both are in this ,state happily combined and made to coincide1 in the manner that is most in conformity with natural law1 and most favourable to society1 to the maintenance of public order and to the happiness of individuals8 ,in my researches after the best rules common sense can lay down for the constitution of a government1 ,i have been so struck at finding them all in actuality in your own1 that even had ,i not been born within your walls ,i should have thought it indispensable for me to offer this picture of human society to that people1 which of all others seems to be possessed of its greatest advantages1 and to have best guarded against its abuses4 ,if ,i had had to make choice of the place of my birth1 ,i should have preferred a society which had an extent proportionate to the limits of the human faculties2 that is1 to the possibility of being well governed3 in which every person being equal to his occupation1 no one should be obliged to commit to others the functions with which he was entrusted3 a ,state1 in which all the individuals being well known to one another1 neither the secret machinations of vice1 nor the modesty of virtue should be able to escape the notice and judgment of the public2 and in which the pleasant custom of seeing and knowing one another should make the love of country rather a love of the citizens than of its soil4 ,i should have wished to be born in a country in which the interest of the ,sovereign and that of the people must be single and identical2 to the end that all the movements of the machine might tend always to the general happiness4 ,and as this could not be the case1 unless the ,sovereign and the people were one and the same person1 it follows that ,i should have wished to be born under a democratic government1 wisely tempered4 ,i should have wished to live and die free3 that is1 so far subject to the laws that neither ,i1 nor anybody else1 should be able to cast off their honourable yoke3 the easy and salutary yoke which the haughtiest necks bear with the greater docility1 as they are made to bear no other4 ,i should have wished then that no one within the ,state should be able to say he was above the law2 and that no one without should be able to dictate so that the ,state should be obliged to recognise his authority4 ,for1 be the constitution of a government what it may1 if there be within its jurisdiction a single man who is not subject to the law1 all the rest are necessarily at his discretion4 ,and if there be a national ruler within1 and a foreign ruler without1 however they may divide their authority1 it is impossible that both should be duly obeyed1 or that the ,state should be well governed4 ,i should not have chosen to live in a republic of recent institution1 however excellent its laws2 for fear the government1 being perhaps otherwise framed than the circumstances of the moment might require1 might disagree with the new citizens1 or they with it1 and the ,state run the risk of overthrow and destruction almost as soon as it came into being4 ,for it is with liberty as it is with those solid and succulent foods1 or with those generous wines which are well adapted to nourish and fortify robust constitutions that are used to them1 but ruin and intoxicate weak and delicate constitutions to which they are not suited4 ,peoples once accustomed to masters are not in a condition to do without them4 ,if they attempt to shake off the yoke1 they still more estrange themselves from freedom1 as1 by mistaking for it an unbridled license to which it is diametrically opposed1 they nearly always manage1 by their revolutions1 to hand themselves over to seducers1 who only make their chains heavier than before4 ,the ,roman people itself1 a model for all free peoples1 was wholly incapable of governing itself when it escaped from the oppression of the ,tarquins4 ,debased by slavery1 and the ignominious tasks which had been imposed upon it1 it was at first no better than a stupid mob1 which it was necessary to control and govern with the greatest wisdom2 in order that1 being accustomed by degrees to breathe the health-giving air of liberty1 minds which had been enervated or rather brutalised under tyranny1 might gradually acquire that severity of morals and spirit of fortitude which made it at length the people of all most worthy of respect4 ,i should1 then1 have sought out for my country some peaceful and happy ,republic1 of an antiquity that lost itself1 as it were1 in the night of time3 which had experienced only such shocks as served to manifest and strengthen the courage and patriotism of its subjects2 and whose citizens1 long accustomed to a wise independence1 were not only free1 but worthy to be so4 ,i should have wished to choose myself a country1 diverted1 by a fortunate impotence1 from the brutal love of conquest1 and secured1 by a still more fortunate situation1 from the fear of becoming itself the conquest of other ,states3 a free city situated between several nations1 none of which should have any interest in attacking it1 while each had an interest in preventing it from being attacked by the others2 in short1 a ,republic which should have nothing to tempt the ambition of its neighbours1 but might reasonably depend on their assistance in case of need4 ,it follows that a republican ,state so happily situated could have nothing to fear but from itself2 and that1 if its members trained themselves to the use of arms1 it would be rather to keep alive that military ardour and courageous spirit which are so proper among free-men1 and tend to keep up their taste for liberty1 than from the necessity of providing for their defence4 ,i should have sought a country1 in which the right of legislation was vested in all the citizens2 for who can judge better than they of the conditions under which they had best dwell together in the same society8 ,not that ,i should have approved of ,plebiscita1 like those among the ,romans2 in which the rulers in the ,state1 and those most interested in its preservation1 were excluded from the deliberations on which in many cases its security depended2 and in which1 by the most absurd inconsistency1 the magistrates were deprived of rights which the meanest citizens enjoyed4 ,on the contrary1 ,i should have desired that1 in order to prevent self-interested and ill-conceived projects1 and all such dangerous innovations as finally ruined the ,athenians1 each man should not be at liberty to propose new laws at pleasure2 but that this right should belong exclusively to the magistrates2 and that even they should use it with so much caution1 the people1 on its side1 be so reserved in giving its consent to such laws1 and the promulgation of them be attended with so much solemnity1 that before the constitution could be upset by them1 there might be time enough for all to be convinced1 that it is above all the great antiquity of the laws which makes them sacred and venerable1 that men soon learn to despise laws which they see daily altered1 and that ,states1 by accustoming themselves to neglect their ancient customs under the pretext of improvement1 often introduce greater evils than those they endeavour to remove4 ,i should have particularly avoided1 as necessarily ill-governed1 a ,republic in which the people1 imagining themselves in a position to do without magistrates1 or at least to leave them with only a precarious authority1 should imprudently have kept for themselves the administration of civil affairs and the execution of their own laws4 ,such must have been the rude constitution of primitive governments1 directly emerging from a state of nature2 and this was another of the vices that contributed to the downfall of the ,republic of ,athens4 ,but ,i should have chosen a community in which the individuals1 content with sanctioning their laws1 and deciding the most important public affairs in general assembly and on the motion of the rulers1 had established honoured tribunals1 carefully distinguished the several departments1 and elected year by year some of the most capable and upright of their fellow-citizens to administer justice and govern the ,state2 a community1 in short1 in which the virtue of the magistrates thus bearing witness to the wisdom of the people1 each class reciprocally did the other honour4 ,if in such a case any fatal misunderstandings arose to disturb the public peace1 even these intervals of blindness and error would bear the marks of moderation1 mutual esteem1 and a common respect for the laws2 which are sure signs and pledges of a reconciliation as lasting as sincere4 ,such are the advantages1 most honourable1 magnificent and sovereign lords1 which ,i should have sought in the country in which ,i should have chosen to be born4 ,and if providence had added to all these a delightful situation1 a temperate climate1 a fertile soil1 and the most beautiful countryside under ,heaven1 ,i should have desired only1 to complete my felicity1 the peaceful enjoyment of all these blessings1 in the bosom of this happy country2 to live at peace in the sweet society of my fellow-citizens1 and practising towards them1 from their own example1 the duties of friendship1 humanity1 and every other virtue1 to leave behind me the honourable memory of a good man1 and an upright and virtuous patriot4 ,but1 if less fortunate or too late grown wise1 ,i had seen myself reduced to end an infirm and languishing life in other climates1 vainly regretting that peaceful repose which ,i had forfeited in the imprudence of youth1 ,i should at least have entertained the same feelings in my heart1 though denied the opportunity of making use of them in my native country4 ,filled with a tender and disinterested love for my distant fellow-citizens1 ,i should have addressed them from my heart1 much in the following terms4 ,my dear fellow-citizens1 or rather my brothers1 since the ties of blood1 as well as the laws1 unite almost all of us1 it gives me pleasure that ,i cannot think of you1 without thinking1 at the same time1 of all the blessings you enjoy1 and of which none of you1 perhaps1 more deeply feels the value than ,i who have lost them4 ,the more ,i reflect on your civil and political condition1 the less can ,i conceive that the nature of human affairs could admit of a better4 ,in all other governments1 when there is a question of ensuring the greatest good of the ,state1 nothing gets beyond projects and ideas1 or at best bare possibilities4 ,but as for you1 your happiness is complete1 and you have nothing to do but enjoy it2 you require nothing more to be made perfectly happy1 than to know how to be satisfied with being so4 ,your sovereignty1 acquired or recovered by the sword1 and maintained for two centuries past by your valour and wisdom1 is at length fully and universally acknowledged4 ,your boundaries are fixed1 your rights confirmed and your repose secured by honourable treaties4 ,your constitution is excellent1 being not only dictated by the profoundest wisdom1 but guaranteed by great and friendly powers4 ,your ,state enjoys perfect tranquillity2 you have neither wars nor conquerors to fear2 you have no other master than the wise laws you have yourselves made2 and these are administered by upright magistrates of your own choosing4 ,you are neither so wealthy as to be enervated by effeminacy1 and thence to lose1 in the pursuit of frivolous pleasures1 the taste for real happiness and solid virtue2 nor poor enough to require more assistance from abroad than your own industry is sufficient to procure you4 ,in the meantime the precious privilege of liberty1 which in great nations is maintained only by submission to the most exorbitant impositions1 costs you hardly anything for its preservation4 ,may a ,republic1 so wisely and happily constituted1 last for ever1 for an example to other nations1 and for the felicity of its own citizens6 ,this is the only prayer you have left to make1 the only precaution that remains to be taken4 ,it depends1 for the future1 on yourselves alone 7not to make you happy1 for your ancestors have saved you that trouble71 but to render that happiness lasting1 by your wisdom in its enjoyment4 ,it is on your constant union1 your obedience to the laws1 and your respect for their ministers1 that your preservation depends4 ,if there remains among you the smallest trace of bitterness or distrust1 hasten to destroy it1 as an accursed leaven which sooner or later must bring misfortune and ruin on the ,state4 ,i conjure you all to look into your hearts1 and to hearken to the secret voice of conscience4 ,is there any among you who can find1 throughout the universe1 a more upright1 more enlightened and more honourable body than your magistracy8 ,do not all its members set you an example of moderation1 of simplicity of manners1 of respect for the laws1 and of the most sincere harmony8 ,place1 therefore1 without reserve1 in such wise superiors1 that salutary confidence which reason ever owes to virtue4 ,consider that they are your own choice1 that they justify that choice1 and that the honours due to those whom you have dignified are necessarily yours by reflexion4 ,not one of you is so ignorant as not to know that1 when the laws lose their force and those who defend them their authority1 security and liberty are universally impossible4 ,why1 therefore1 should you hesitate to do that cheerfully and with just confidence which you would all along have been bound to do by your true interest1 your duty and reason itself8 ,let not a culpable and pernicious indifference to the maintenance of the constitution ever induce you to neglect1 in case of need1 the prudent advice of the most enlightened and zealous of your fellow-citizens2 but let equity1 moderation and firmness of resolution continue to regulate all your proceedings1 and to exhibit you to the whole universe as the example of a valiant and modest people1 jealous equally of their honour and of their liberty4 ,beware particularly1 as the last piece of advice ,i shall give you1 of sinister constructions and venomous rumours1 the secret motives of which are often more dangerous than the actions at which they are levelled4 ,a whole house will be awake and take the first alarm given by a good and trusty watch-dog1 who barks only at the approach of thieves2 but we hate the importunity of those noisy curs1 which are perpetually disturbing the public repose1 and whose continual ill-timed warnings prevent our attending to them1 when they may perhaps be necessary4 ,and you1 most honourable and magnificent lords1 the worthy and revered magistrates of a free people1 permit me to offer you in particular my duty and homage4 ,if there is in the world a station capable of conferring honour on those who fill it1 it is undoubtedly that which virtue and talents combine to bestow1 that of which you have made yourselves worthy1 and to which you have been promoted by your fellow-citizens4 ,their worth adds a new lustre to your own2 while1 as you have been chosen1 by men capable of governing others1 to govern themselves1 ,i cannot but hold you as much superior to all other magistrates1 as a free people1 and particularly that over which you have the honour to preside1 is by its wisdom and its reason superior to the populace of other ,states4 ,be it permitted me to cite an example of which there ought to have existed better records1 and one which will be ever near to my heart4 ,i cannot recall to mind1 without the sweetest emotions1 the memory of that virtuous citizen1 to whom ,i owe my being1 and by whom ,i was often instructed1 in my infancy1 in the respect which is due to you4 ,i see him still1 living by the work of his hands1 and feeding his soul on the sublimest truths4 ,i see the works of ,tacitus1 ,plutarch and ,grotius1 lying before him in the midst of the tools of his trade4 ,at his side stands his dear son1 receiving1 alas with too little profit1 the tender instructions of the best of fathers4 ,but1 if the follies of youth made me for a while forget his wise lessons1 ,i have at length the happiness to be conscious that1 whatever propensity one may have to vice1 it is not easy for an education1 with which love has mingled1 to be entirely thrown away4 ,such1 my most honourable and magnificent lords1 are the citizens1 and even the common inhabitants of the ,state which you govern2 such are those intelligent and sensible men1 of whom1 under the name of workmen and the people1 it is usual1 in other nations1 to have a low and false opinion4 ,my father1 ,i own with pleasure1 was in no way distinguished among his fellow-citizens4 ,he was only such as they all are2 and yet1 such as he was1 there is no country1 in which his acquaintance would not have been coveted1 and cultivated even with advantage by men of the highest character4 ,it would not become me1 nor is it1 thank ,heaven1 at all necessary for me to remind you of the regard which such men have a right to expect of their magistrates1 to whom they are equal both by education and by the rights of nature and birth1 and inferior only1 by their own will1 by that preference which they owe to your merit1 and1 for giving you1 can claim some sort of acknowledgment on your side4 ,it is with a lively satisfaction ,i understand that the greatest candour and condescension attend1 in all your behaviour towards them1 on that gravity which becomes the ministers of the law2 and that you so well repay them1 by your esteem and attention1 the respect and obedience which they owe to you4 ,this conduct is not only just but prudent2 as it happily tends to obliterate the memory of many unhappy events1 which ought to be buried in eternal oblivion4 ,it is also so much the more judicious1 as it tends to make this generous and equitable people find a pleasure in their duty2 to make them naturally love to do you honour1 and to cause those who are the most zealous in the maintenance of their own rights to be at the same time the most disposed to respect yours4 ,it ought not to be thought surprising that the rulers of a civil society should have the welfare and glory of their communities at heart3 but it is uncommonly fortunate for the peace of men1 when those persons who look upon themselves as the magistrates1 or rather the masters of a more holy and sublime country1 show some love for the earthly country which maintains them4 ,i am happy in having it in my power to make so singular an exception in our favour1 and to be able to rank1 among its best citizens1 those zealous depositaries of the sacred articles of faith established by the laws1 those venerable shepherds of souls whose powerful and captivating eloquence are so much the better calculated to bear to men's hearts the maxims of the gospel1 as they are themselves the first to put them into practice4 ,all the world knows of the great success with which the art of the pulpit is cultivated at ,geneva2 but men are so used to hearing divines preach one thing and practise another1 that few have a chance of knowing how far the spirit of ,christianity1 holiness of manners1 severity towards themselves and indulgence towards their neighbours1 prevail throughout the whole body of our ministers4 ,it is1 perhaps1 given to the city of ,geneva alone1 to produce the edifying example of so perfect a union between its clergy and men of letters4 ,it is in great measure on their wisdom1 their known moderation1 and their zeal for the prosperity of the ,state that ,i build my hopes of its perpetual tranquillity4 ,at the same time1 ,i notice1 with a pleasure mingled with surprise and veneration1 how much they detest the frightful maxims of those accursed and barbarous men1 of whom history furnishes us with more than one example2 who1 in order to support the pretended rights of ,god1 that is to say their own interests1 have been so much the less greedy of human blood1 as they were more hopeful their own in particular would be always respected4 ,i must not forget that precious half of the ,republic1 which makes the happiness of the other2 and whose sweetness and prudence preserve its tranquillity and virtue4 ,amiable and virtuous daughters of ,geneva1 it will be always the lot of your sex to govern ours4 ,happy are we1 so long as your chaste influence1 solely exercised within the limits of conjugal union1 is exerted only for the glory of the ,state and the happiness of the public4 ,it was thus the female sex commanded at ,sparta2 and thus you deserve to command at ,geneva4 ,what man can be such a barbarian as to resist the voice of honour and reason1 coming from the lips of an affectionate wife8 ,who would not despise2 the vanities of luxury1 on beholding the simple and modest attire which1 from the lustre it derives from you1 seems the most favourable to beauty8 ,it is your task to perpetuate1 by your insinuating influence and your innocent and amiable rule1 a respect for the laws of the ,state1 and harmony among the citizens4 ,it is yours to reunite divided families by happy marriages2 and1 above all things1 to correct1 by the persuasive sweetness of your lessons and the modest graces of your conversation1 those extravagancies which our young people pick up in other countries1 whence1 instead of many useful things by which they might profit1 they bring home hardly anything1 besides a puerile air and a ridiculous manner1 acquired among loose women1 but an admiration for ,i know not what so-called grandeur1 and paltry recompenses for being slaves1 which can never come near the real greatness of liberty4 ,continue1 therefore1 always to be what you are1 the chaste guardians of our morals1 and the sweet security for our peace1 exerting on every occasion the privileges of the heart and of nature1 in the interests of duty and virtue4 ,i flatter myself that ,i shall never be proved to have been mistaken1 in building on such a foundation my hopes of the general happiness of the citizens and the glory of the ,republic4 ,it must be confessed1 however1 that with all these advantages1 it will not shine with that lustre1 by which the eyes of most men are dazzled2 a puerile and fatal taste for which is the most mortal enemy of happiness and liberty4 ,let our dissolute youth seek elsewhere light pleasures and long repentances4 ,let our pretenders to taste admire elsewhere the grandeur of palaces1 the beauty of equipages1 sumptuous furniture1 the pomp of public entertainments1 and all the refinements of luxury and effeminacy4 ,geneva boasts nothing but men2 such a sight has nevertheless a value of its own1 and those who have a taste for it are well worth the admirers of all the rest4 ,deign1 most honourable1 magnificent and sovereign lords1 to receive1 and with equal goodness1 this respectful testimony of the interest ,i take in your common prosperity4 ,and1 if ,i have been so unhappy as to be guilty of any indiscreet transport in this glowing effusion of my heart1 ,i beseech you to pardon me1 and to attribute it to the tender affection of a true patriot1 and to the ardent and legitimate zeal of a man1 who can imagine for himself no greater felicity than to see you happy4 ,most honourable1 magnificent and sovereign lords1 ,i am1 with the most profound respect1 ,your most humble and obedient servant and fellow-citizen4 ,j4 ,j4 ,,rousseau4 ,chambry1 ,june #ab1 #aged4 ,,preface ,of all human sciences the most useful and most imperfect appears to me to be that of mankind3 and ,i will venture to say1 the single inscription on the ,temple of ,delphi contained a precept more difficult and more important than is to be found in all the huge volumes that moralists have ever written4 ,i consider the subject of the following discourse as one of the most interesting questions philosophy can propose1 and unhappily for us1 one of1 the most thorny that philosophers can have to solve4 ,for how shall we know the source of inequality between men1 if we do not begin by knowing mankind8 ,and how shall man hope to see himself as nature made him1 across all the changes which the succession of place and time must have produced in his original constitution8 ,how can he distinguish what is fundamental in his nature from the changes and additions which his circumstances and the advances he has made have introduced to modify his primitive condition8 ,like the statue of ,glaucus1 which was so disfigured by time1 seas and tempests1 that it looked more like a wild beast than a god1 the human soul1 altered in society by a thousand causes perpetually recurring1 by the acquisition of a multitude of truths and errors1 by the changes happening to the constitution of the body1 and by the continual jarring of the passions1 has1 so to speak1 changed in appearance1 so as to be hardly recognisable4 ,instead of a being1 acting constantly from fixed and invariable principles1 instead of that celestial and majestic simplicity1 impressed on it by its divine ,author1 we find in it only the frightful contrast of passion mistaking itself for reason1 and of understanding grown delirious4 ,it is still more cruel that1 as every advance made by the human species removes it still farther from its primitive state1 the more discoveries we make1 the more we deprive ourselves of the means of making the most important of all4 ,thus it is1 in one sense1 by our very study of man1 that the knowledge of him is put out of our power4 ,it is easy to perceive that it is in these successive changes in the constitution of man that we must look for the origin of those differences which now distinguish men1 who1 it is allowed1 are as equal among themselves as were the animals of every kind1 before physical causes had introduced those varieties which are now observable among some of them4 ,it is1 in fact1 not to be conceived that these primary changes1 however they may have arisen1 could have altered1 all at once and in the same manner1 every individual of the species4 ,it is natural to think that1 while the condition of some of them grew better or worse1 and they were acquiring various good or bad qualities not inherent in their nature1 there were others who continued a longer time in their original condition4 ,such was doubtless the first source of the inequality of mankind1 which it is much easier to point out thus in general terms1 than to assign with precision to its actual causes4 ,let not my readers therefore imagine that ,i flatter myself with having seen what it appears to me so difficult to discover4 ,i have here entered upon certain arguments1 and risked some conjectures1 less in the hope of solving the difficulty1 than with a view to throwing some light upon it1 and reducing the question to its proper form4 ,others may easily proceed farther on the same road1 and yet no one find it very easy to get to the end4 ,for it is by no means a light undertaking to distinguish properly between what is original and what is artificial in the actual nature of man1 or to form a true idea of a state which no longer exists1 perhaps never did exist1 and probably never will exist2 and of which1 it is1 nevertheless1 necessary to have true ideas1 in order to form a proper judgment of our present state4 ,it requires1 indeed1 more philosophy than can be imagined to enable any one to determine exactly what precautions he ought to take1 in order to make solid observations on this subject2 and it appears to me that a good solution of the following problem would be not unworthy of the ,aristotles and ,plinys of the present age4 ,what experiments would have to be made1 to discover the natural man8 ,and how are those experiments to be made in a state of society8 ,so far am ,i from undertaking to solve this problem1 that ,i think ,i have sufficiently1 considered the subject1 to venture to declare beforehand that our greatest philosophers would not be too good to direct such experiments1 and our most powerful sovereigns to make them4 ,such a combination we have very little reason to expect1 especially attended with the perseverance1 or rather succession of intelligence and good-will necessary on both sides to success4 ,these investigations1 which are so difficult to make1 and have been hitherto so little thought of1 are1 nevertheless1 the only means that remain of obviating a multitude of difficulties which deprive us of the knowledge of the real foundations of human society4 ,it is this ignorance of the nature of man1 which casts so much uncertainty and obscurity on the true definition of natural right3 for1 the idea of right1 says ,burlamaqui1 and more particularly that of natural right1 are ideas manifestly relative to the nature of man4 ,it is then from this very nature itself1 he goes on1 from the constitution and state of man1 that we must deduce the first principles of this science4 ,we cannot see without surprise and disgust how little agreement there is between the different authors who have treated this great subject4 ,among the more important writers there are scarcely two of the same mind about it4 ,not to speak of the ancient philosophers1 who seem to have done their best purposely to contradict one another on the most fundamental principles1 the ,roman jurists subjected man and the other animals indiscriminately to the same natural law1 because they considered1 under that name1 rather the law which nature imposes on herself than that which she prescribes to others2 or rather because of the particular acceptation of the term law among those jurists2 who seem on this occasion to have understood nothing more by it than the general relations established by nature between all animated beings1 for their common preservation4 ,the moderns1 understanding1 by the term law1 merely a rule prescribed to a moral being1 that is to say intelligent1 free and considered in his relations to other beings1 consequently confine the jurisdiction of natural law to man1 an the only animal endowed with reason4 ,but1 defining this law1 each after his own fashion1 they have established it on such metaphysical principles1 that there are very few persons among us capable of comprehending them1 much less of discovering them for themselves4 ,so that the definitions of these learned men1 all differing in everything else1 agree only in this1 that it is impossible to comprehend the law of nature1 and consequently to obey it1 without being a very subtle casuist and a profound metaphysician4 ,all which is as much as to say that mankind must have employed1 in the establishment of society1 a capacity which is acquired only with great difficulty1 and by very few persons1 even in a state of society4 ,knowing so little of nature1 and agreeing so ill about the meaning of the word law1 it would be difficult for us to fix on a good definition of natural law4 ,thus all the definitions we meet with in books1 setting3 aside their defect in point of uniformity1 have yet another fault1 in that they are derived from many kinds of knowledge1 which men do not possess naturally1 and from advantages of which they can have no idea until they have already departed from that state4 ,modern writers begin by inquiring what rules it would be expedient for men to agree on for their common interest1 and then give the name of natural law to a collection of these rules1 without any other proof than the good that would result from their being universally practised4 ,this is undoubtedly a simple way of making definitions1 and of explaining the nature of things by almost arbitrary conveniences4 ,but as long as we are ignorant of the natural man1 it is in vain for us to attempt to determine either the law originally prescribed to him1 or that which is best adapted to his constitution4 ,all we can know with any certainty respecting this law is that1 if it is to be a law1 not only the wills of those it obliges must be sensible of their submission to it2 but also1 to be natural1 it must come directly from the voice of nature4 ,throwing aside1 therefore1 all those scientific books1 which teach us only to see men such as they have made themselves1 and contemplating the first and most simple operations of the human soul1 ,i think ,i can perceive in it two principles prior to reason1 one of them deeply interesting us in our own welfare and preservation1 and the other exciting a natural repugnance at seeing any other sensible being1 and particularly any of our own species1 suffer pain or death4 ,it is from the agreement and combination which the understanding is in a position to establish between these two principles1 without its being necessary to introduce that of sociability1 that all the rules of natural right appear to me to be derived--rules which our reason is afterwards obliged to establish on other foundations1 when by its successive developments it has been led to suppress nature itself4 ,in proceeding thus1 we shall not be obliged to make man a philosopher before he is a man4 ,his duties toward others are not dictated to him only by the later lessons of wisdom and1 so long as he does not resist the internal impulse of compassion1 he will never hurt any other man1 nor even any sentient being2 except on those lawful occasions on which his own preservation is concerned and he is obliged to give himself the preference4 ,by this method also we put an end to the time-honoured disputes concerning the participation of animals in natural law3 for it is clear that1 being destitute of intelligence and liberty1 they cannot recognise that law2 as they partake1 however1 in some measure of our nature1 in consequence of the sensibility with which they are endowed1 they ought to partake of natural rights so that mankind is subjected to a kind of obligation even toward the brutes4 ,it appears1 in fact1 that if ,i am bound to do no injury to my fellow-creatures1 this is less because they are rational than because they are sentient beings3 and this quality1 being common both to men and beasts1 ought to entitle the latter at least to the privilege of not being wantonly ill-treated by the former4 ,the very study of the original man1 of his real wants1 and the fundamental principles of his duty1 is besides the only proper method we can adopt to obviate all the difficulties which the origin of moral inequality presents1 on the true foundations of the body politic1 on the reciprocal rights of its members1 and on many other similar topics equally important and obscure4 ,if we look at human society with a calm and disinterested eye1 it seems1 at first1 to show us only the violence of the powerful and the oppression of the weak4 ,the mind is shocked at the cruelty of the one1 or is induced to lament the blindness of the other2 and as nothing is less permanent in life than those external relations1 which are more frequently produced by accident than wisdom1 and which are called weakness or power1 riches or poverty1 all human institutions seem at first glance to be founded merely on banks of shifting sand4 ,it is only by taking a closer look1 and removing the dust and sand that surround the edifice1 that we perceive the immovable basis on which it is raised1 and learn to respect its foundations4 ,now1 without a serious study of man1 his natural faculties and their successive development1 we shall never be able to make these necessary distinctions1 or to separate1 in the actual constitution of things1 that which is the effect of the divine will1 from the innovations attempted by human art4 ,the political and moral investigations1 therefore1 to which the important question before us leads1 are in every respect useful2 while the hypothetical history of governments affords a lesson equally instructive to mankind4 ,in considering what we should have become1 had we been left to ourselves1 we should learn to bless ,him1 whose gracious hand1 correcting our institutions1 and giving them an immovable basis1 has prevented those disorders which would otherwise have arisen from them1 and caused our happiness to come from those very sources which seemed likely to involve us in misery4 ,quem te deus esse ,jussit1 et human qu parte locatus es in re1 ,disce4 ,persius1 ,satire iii1 #ga4 ,a ,,dissertation ,,on ,,the ,,origin ,,and ,,foundation ,,of ,,the ,,inequality ,,of ,,mankind ,it is of man that ,i have to speak2 and the question ,i am investigating shows me that it is to men that ,i must address myself3 for questions of this sort are not asked by those who are afraid to honour truth4 ,i shall then confidently uphold the cause of humanity before the wise men who invite me to do so1 and shall not be dissatisfied if ,i acquit myself in a manner worthy of my subject and of my judges4 ,i conceive that there are two kinds of inequality among the human species2 one1 which ,i call natural or physical1 because it is established by nature1 and consists in a difference of age1 health1 bodily strength1 and the qualities of the mind or of the soul3 and another1 which may be called moral or political inequality1 because it depends on a kind of convention1 and is established1 or at least authorised by the consent of men4 ,this latter consists of the different privileges1 which some men enjoy to the prejudice of others2 such as that of being more rich1 more honoured1 more powerful or even in a position to exact obedience4 ,it is useless to ask what is the source of natural inequality1 because that question is answered by the simple definition of the word4 ,again1 it is still more useless to inquire whether there is any essential connection between the two inequalities2 for this would be only asking1 in other words1 whether those who command are necessarily better than those who obey1 and if strength of body or of mind1 wisdom or virtue are always found in particular individuals1 in proportion to their power or wealth3 a question fit perhaps to be discussed by slaves in the hearing of their masters1 but highly unbecoming to reasonable and free men in search of the truth4 ,the subject of the present discourse1 therefore1 is more precisely this4 ,to mark1 in the progress of things1 the moment at which right took the place of violence and nature became subject to law1 and to explain by what sequence of miracles the strong came to submit to serve the weak1 and the people to purchase imaginary repose at the expense of real felicity4 ,the philosophers1 who have inquired into the foundations of society1 have all felt the necessity of going back to a state of nature2 but not one of them has got there4 ,some of them have not hesitated to ascribe to man1 in such a state1 the idea of just and unjust1 without troubling themselves to show that he must be possessed of such an idea1 or that it could be of any use to him4 ,others have spoken of the natural right of every man to keep what belongs to him1 without explaining what they meant by belongs4 ,others again1 beginning by giving the strong authority over the weak1 proceeded directly to the birth of government1 without regard to the time that must have elapsed before the meaning of the words authority and government could have existed among men4 ,every one of them1 in short1 constantly dwelling on wants1 avidity1 oppression1 desires and pride1 has transferred to the state of nature ideas which were acquired in society2 so that1 in speaking of the savage1 they described the social man4 ,it has not even entered into the heads of most of our writers to doubt whether the state of nature ever existed2 but it is clear from the ,holy ,scriptures that the first man1 having received his understanding and commandments immediately from ,god1 was not himself in such a state2 and that1 if we give such credit to the writings of ,moses as every ,christian philosopher ought to give1 we must deny that1 even before the deluge1 men were ever in the pure state of nature2 unless1 indeed1 they fell back into it from some very extraordinary circumstance2 a paradox which it would be very embarrassing to defend1 and quite impossible to prove4 ,let us begin then by laying facts aside1 as they do not affect the question4 ,the investigations we may enter into1 in treating this subject1 must not be considered as historical truths1 but only as mere conditional and hypothetical reasonings1 rather calculated to explain the nature of things1 than to ascertain their actual origin2 just like the hypotheses which our physicists daily form respecting the formation of the world4 ,religion commands us to believe that1 ,god ,himself having taken men out of a state of nature immediately after the creation1 they are unequal only because it is ,his will they should be so3 but it does not forbid us to form conjectures based solely on the nature of man1 and the beings around him1 concerning what might have become of the human race1 if it had been left to itself4 ,this then is the question asked me1 and that which ,i propose to discuss in the following discourse4 ,as my subject interests mankind in general1 ,i shall endeavour to make use of a style adapted to all nations1 or rather1 forgetting time and place1 to attend only to men to whom ,i am speaking4 ,i shall suppose myself in the ,lyceum of ,athens1 repeating the lessons of my masters1 with ,plato and ,xenocrates for judges1 and the whole human race for audience4 ,o man1 of whatever country you are1 and whatever your opinions may be1 behold your history1 such as ,i have thought to read it1 not in books written by your fellow-creatures1 who are liars1 but in nature1 which never lies4 ,all that comes from her will be true2 nor will you meet with anything false1 unless ,i have involuntarily put in something of my own4 ,the times of which ,i am going to speak are very remote3 how much are you changed from what you once were6 ,it is so to speak1 the life of your species which ,i am going to write1 after the qualities which you have received1 which your education and habits may have depraved1 but cannot have entirely destroyed4 ,there is1 ,i feel1 an age at which the individual man would wish to stop2 you are about to inquire about the age at which you would have liked your whole species to stand still4 ,discontented with your present state1 for reasons which threaten your unfortunate descendants with still greater discontent1 you will perhaps wish it were in your power to go back2 and this feeling should be a panegyric on your first ancestors1 a criticism of your contemporaries1 and a terror to the unfortunates who will come after you4 ,,the ,,first ,,part ,important as it may be1 in order to judge rightly of the natural state of man1 to consider him from his origin1 and to examine him1 as it were1 in the embryo of his species2 ,i shall not follow his organisation through its successive developments1 nor shall ,i stay to inquire what his animal system must have been at the beginning1 in order to become at length what it actually is4 ,i shall not ask whether his long nails were at first1 as ,aristotle supposes1 only crooked talons2 whether his whole body1 like that of a bear1 was not covered with hair2 or whether the fact that he walked upon all fours1 with his looks directed toward the earth1 confined to a horizon of a few paces1 did not at once point out the nature and limits of his ideas4 ,on this subject4 ,i could form none but vague and almost imaginary conjectures4 ,comparative anatomy has as yet made too little progress1 and the observations of naturalists are too uncertain1 to afford an adequate basis for any solid reasoning4 ,so that1 without having recourse to the supernatural information given us on this head1 or paying any regard to the changes which must have taken place in the internal1 as well as the external1 conformation of man1 as he applied his limbs to new uses1 and fed himself on new kinds of food1 ,i shall suppose his conformation to have been at all times what it appears to us at this day2 that he always walked on two legs1 made use of his hands as we do1 directed his looks over all nature1 and measured with his eyes the vast expanse of ,heaven4 ,if we strip this being1 thus constituted1 of all the supernatural gifts he may have received1 and all the artificial faculties he can have acquired only by a long process2 if we consider him1 in a word1 just as he must have come from the hands of nature1 we behold in him an animal weaker than some1 and less agile than others2 but1 taking him all round1 the most advantageously organised of any4 ,i see him satisfying his hunger at the first oak1 and slaking his thirst at the first brook2 finding his bed at the foot of the tree which afforded him a repast2 and1 with that1 all his wants supplied4 ,while the earth was left to its natural fertility and covered with immense forests1 whose trees were never mutilated by the axe1 it would present on every side both sustenance and shelter for every species of animal4 ,men dispersed up and down among the rest1 would observe and imitate their industry1 and thus attain even to the instinct of the beasts1 with the advantage that1 whereas every species of brutes was confined to one particular instinct1 man1 who perhaps has not any one peculiar to himself1 would appropriate them all1 and live upon most of those different foods1 which other animals shared among themselves2 and thus would find his subsistence much more easily than any of the rest4 ,accustomed from their infancy to the inclemencies of the weather and the rigour of the seasons1 inured to fatigue1 and forced1 naked and unarmed1 to defend themselves and their prey from other ferocious animals1 or to escape them by flight1 men would acquire a robust and almost unalterable constitution4 ,the children1 bringing with them into the world the excellent constitution of their parents1 and fortifying it by the very exercises which first produced it1 would thus acquire all the vigour of which the human frame is capable4 ,nature in this case treats them exactly as ,sparta treated the children of her citizens3 those who come well formed into the world she renders strong and robust1 and all the rest she destroys2 differing in this respect from our modern communities1 in which the ,state1 by making children a burden to their parents1 kills them indiscriminately before they are born4 ,the body of a savage man being the only instrument he understands1 he uses it for various purposes1 of which ours1 for want of practice1 are incapable3 for our industry deprives us of that force and agility1 which necessity obliges him to acquire4 ,if he had had an axe1 would he have been able with his naked arm to break so large a branch from a tree8 ,if he had had a sling1 would he have been able to throw a stone with so great velocity8 ,if he had had a ladder1 would he have been so nimble in climbing a tree8 ,if he had had a horse1 would he have been himself so swift of foot8 ,give civilised man time to gather all his machines about him1 and he will no doubt easily beat the savage2 but if you would see a still more unequal contest1 set them together naked and unarmed1 and you will soon see the advantage of having all our forces constantly at our disposal1 of being always prepared for every event1 and of carrying one's self1 as it were1 perpetually whole and entire about one4 ,hobbes contends that man is naturally intrepid1 and is intent only upon attacking and fighting4 ,another illustrious philosopher holds the opposite1 and ,cumberland and ,puffendorf also affirm that nothing is more timid and fearful than man in the state of nature2 that he is always in a tremble1 and ready to fly at the least noise or the slightest movement4 ,this may be true of things he does not know2 and ,i do not doubt his being terrified by every novelty that presents itself1 when he neither knows the physical good or evil he may expect from it1 nor can make a comparison between his own strength and the dangers he is about to encounter4 ,such circumstances1 however1 rarely occur in a state of nature1 in which all things proceed in a uniform manner1 and the face of the earth is not subject to those sudden and continual changes which arise from the passions and caprices of bodies of men living together4 ,but savage man1 living dispersed among other animals and finding himself betimes in a situation to measure his strength with theirs1 soon comes to compare himself with them2 and1 perceiving that he surpasses them more in adroitness than they surpass him in strength1 learns to be no longer afraid of them4 ,set a bear1 or a wolf1 against a robust1 agile1 and resolute savage1 as they all are1 armed with stones and a good cudgel1 and you will see that the danger will be at least on both sides1 and that1 after a few trials of this kind1 wild beasts1 which are not fond of attacking each other1 will not be at all ready to attack man1 whom they will have found to be as wild and ferocious as themselves4 ,with regard to such animals as have really more strength than man has adroitness1 he is in the same situation as all weaker animals1 which notwithstanding are still able to subsist2 except indeed that he has the advantage that1 being equally swift of foot1 and finding an almost certain place of refuge in every tree1 he is at liberty to take or leave it at every encounter1 and thus to fight or fly1 as he chooses4 ,add to this that it does not appear that any animal naturally makes war on man1 except in case of self-defence or excessive hunger1 or betrays any of those violent antipathies1 which seem to indicate that one species is intended by nature for the food of another4 ,this is doubtless why negroes and savages are so little afraid of the wild beasts they may meet in the woods4 ,the ,caraibs of ,venezuela among others live in this respect in absolute security and without the smallest inconvenience4 ,though they are almost naked1 ,francis ,correal tells us1 they expose themselves freely in the woods1 armed only with bows and arrows2 but no one has ever heard of one of them being devoured by wild beasts4 ,but man has other enemies more formidable1 against which he is not provided with such means of defence3 these are the natural infirmities of infancy1 old age1 and illness of every kind1 melancholy proofs of our weakness1 of which the two first are common to all animals1 and the last belongs chiefly to man in a state of society4 ,with regard to infancy1 it is observable that the mother1 carrying her child always with her1 can nurse it with much greater ease than the females of many other animals1 which are forced to be perpetually going and coming1 with great fatigue1 one way to find subsistence1 and another to suckle or feed their young4 ,it is true that if the woman happens to perish1 the infant is in great danger of perishing with her2 but this risk is common to many other species of animals1 whose young take a long time before they are able to provide for themselves4 ,and if our infancy is longer than theirs1 our lives are longer in proportion2 so that all things are in this respect fairly equal2 though there are other rules to be considered regarding the duration of the first period of life1 and the number of young1 which do not affect the present subject4 ,in old age1 when men are less active and perspire little1 the need for food diminishes with the ability to provide it4 ,as the savage state also protects them from gout and rheumatism1 and old age is1 of all ills1 that which human aid can least alleviate1 they cease to be1 without others perceiving that they are no more1 and almost without perceiving it themselves4 ,with respect to sickness1 ,i shall not repeat the vain and false declamations which most healthy people pronounce against medicine2 but ,i shall ask if any solid observations have been made from which it may be justly concluded that1 in the countries where the art of medicine is most neglected1 the mean duration of man's life is less than in those where it is most cultivated4 ,how indeed can this be the case1 if we bring on ourselves more diseases than medicine can furnish remedies8 ,the great inequality in manner of living1 the extreme idleness of some1 and the excessive labour of others1 the easiness of exciting and gratifying our sensual appetites1 the too exquisite foods of the wealthy which overheat and fill them with indigestion1 and1 on the other hand1 the unwholesome food of the poor1 often1 bad as it is1 insufficient for their needs1 which induces them1 when opportunity offers1 to eat voraciously and overcharge their stomachs2 all these1 together with sitting up late1 and excesses of every kind1 immoderate transports of every passion1 fatigue1 mental exhaustion1 the innumerable pains and anxieties inseparable from every condition of life1 by which the mind of man is incessantly tormented2 these are too fatal proofs that the greater part of our ills are of our own making1 and that we might have avoided them nearly all by adhering to that simple1 uniform and solitary manner of life which nature prescribed4 ,if she destined man to be healthy1 ,i venture to declare that a state of reflection is a state contrary to1 nature1 and that a thinking man is a depraved animal4 ,when we think of the good constitution of the savages1 at least of those whom we have not ruined with our spirituous liquors1 and reflect that they are troubled with hardly any disorders1 save wounds and old age1 we are tempted to believe that1 in following the history of civil society1 we shall be telling also that of human sickness4 ,such1 at least1 was the opinion of ,plato1 who inferred from certain remedies prescribed1 or approved1 by ,podalirius and ,machaon at the siege of ,troy1 that several sicknesses which these remedies gave rise to in his time1 were not then known to mankind3 and ,celsus tells us that diet1 which is now so necessary1 was first invented by ,hippocrates4 ,being subject therefore to so few causes of sickness1 man1 in the state of nature1 can have no need of remedies1 and still less of physicians3 nor is the human race in this respect worse off than other animals1 and it is easy to learn from hunters whether they meet with many infirm animals in the course of the chase4 ,it is certain they frequently meet with such as carry the marks of having been considerably wounded1 with many that have had bones or even limbs broken1 yet have been healed without any ,other surgical assistance than that of time1 or any other regimen than that of their ordinary life4 ,at the same time their cures seem not to have been less perfect1 for their not having been tortured by incisions1 poisoned with drugs1 or wasted by fasting4 ,in short1 however useful medicine1 properly administered1 may be among us1 it is certain that1 if the savage1 when he is sick and left to himself1 has nothing to hope but from nature1 he has1 on the other hand1 nothing to fear but from his disease2 which renders his situation often preferable to our own4 ,we should beware1 therefore1 of confounding the savage man with the men we have daily before our eyes4 ,nature treats all the animals left to her care with a predilection that seems to show how jealous she is of that right4 ,the horse1 the cat1 the bull1 and even the ass are generally of greater stature1 and always more robust1 and have more vigour1 strength and courage1 when they run wild in the forests than when bred in the stall4 ,by becoming domesticated1 they lose half these advantages2 and it seems as if all our care to feed and treat them well serves only to deprave them4 ,it is thus with man also3 as he becomes sociable and a slave1 he grows weak1 timid and servile2 his effeminate way of life totally enervates his strength and courage4 ,to this it may be added that there is still a greater difference between savage and civilised man1 than between wild and tame beasts3 for men and brutes having been treated alike by nature1 the several conveniences in which men indulge themselves still more than they do their beasts1 are so many additional causes of their deeper degeneracy4 ,it is not therefore so great a misfortune to these primitive men1 nor so great an obstacle to their preservation1 that they go naked1 have no dwellings and lack all the superfluities which we think so necessary4 ,if their skins are not covered with hair1 they have no need of such covering in warm climates2 and1 in cold countries1 they soon learn to appropriate the skins of the beasts they have overcome4 ,if they have but two legs to run with1 they have two arms to defend themselves with1 and provide for their wants4 ,their children are slowly and with difficulty taught to walk2 but their mothers are able to carry them with ease2 advantage which other animals lack1 as the mother1 if pursued1 is forced either to abandon her young1 or to regulate her pace by theirs4 ,unless1 in short1 we suppose a singular and fortuitous concurrence of circumstances of which ,i shall speak later1 and which would be unlikely to exist1 it is plain in every state of the case1 that the man who first made himself clothes or a dwelling was furnishing himself with things not at all necessary2 for he had till then done without them1 and there is no reason why he should not have been able to put up in manhood with the same kind of life as had been his in infancy4 ,solitary1 indolent1 and perpetually accompanied by danger1 the savage cannot but be fond of sleep2 his sleep too must be light1 like that of the animals1 which think but little and may be said to slumber all the time they do not think4 ,self-preservation being his chief and almost sole concern1 he must exercise most those faculties which are most concerned with attack or defence1 either for overcoming his prey1 or for preventing him from becoming the prey of other animals4 ,on the other hand1 those organs which are perfected only by softness and sensuality will remain in a gross and imperfect state1 incompatible with any sort of delicacy2 so that1 his senses being divided on this head1 his touch and taste will be extremely coarse1 his sight1 hearing and smell exceedingly fine and subtle4 ,such in general is the animal condition1 and such1 according to the narratives of travellers1 is that of most savage nations4 ,it is therefore no matter for surprise that the ,hottentots of the ,cape of ,good ,hope distinguish ships at sea1 with the naked eye1 at as great a distance as the ,dutch can do with their telescopes2 or that the savages of ,america should trace the ,spaniards1 by their smell1 as well as the best dogs could have done2 or that these barbarous peoples feel no pain in going naked1 or that they use large quantities of piemento with their food1 and drink the strongest ,european liquors like water4 ,hitherto ,i have considered merely the physical man2 let us now take a view of him on his metaphysical and moral side4 ,i see nothing in any animal but an ingenious machine1 to which nature hath given senses to wind itself up1 and to guard itself1 to a certain degree1 against anything that might tend to disorder or destroy it4 ,i perceive exactly the same things in the human machine1 with this difference1 that in the operations of the brute1 nature is the sole agent1 whereas man has some share in his own operations1 in his character as a free agent4 ,the one chooses and refuses by instinct1 the other from an act of free-will3 hence the brute cannot deviate from the rule prescribed to it1 even when it would be advantageous for it to do so2 and1 on the contrary1 man frequently deviates from such rules to his own prejudice4 ,thus a pigeon would be starved to death by the side of a dish of the choicest meats1 and a cat on a heap of fruit or grain2 though it is certain that either might find nourishment in the foods which it thus rejects with disdain1 did it think of trying them4 ,hence it is that dissolute men run into excesses which bring on fevers and death2 because the mind depraves the senses1 and the will continues to speak when nature is silent4 ,every animal has ideas1 since it has senses2 it even combines those ideas in a certain degree2 and it is only in degree that man differs1 in this respect1 from the brute4 ,some philosophers have even maintained that there is a greater difference between one man and another than between some men and some beasts4 ,it is not1 therefore1 so much the understanding that constitutes the specific difference between the man and the brute1 as the human quality of free-agency4 ,nature lays her commands on every animal1 and the brute obeys her voice4 ,man receives the same impulsion1 but at the same time knows himself at liberty to acquiesce or resist3 and it is particularly in his consciousness of this liberty that the spirituality of his soul is displayed4 ,for physics may explain1 in some measure1 the mechanism of the senses and the formation of ideas2 but in the power of willing or rather of choosing1 and in the feeling of this power1 nothing is to be found but acts which are purely spiritual and wholly inexplicable by the laws of mechanism4 ,however1 even if the difficulties attending all these questions should still leave room for difference in this respect between men and brutes1 there is another very specific quality which distinguishes them1 and which will admit of no dispute4 ,this is the faculty of self-improvement1 which1 by the help of circumstances1 gradually develops all the rest of our faculties1 and is inherent in the species as in the individual3 whereas a brute is1 at the end of a few months1 all he will ever be during his whole life1 and his species1 at the end of a thousand years1 exactly what it was the first year of that thousand4 ,why is man alone liable to grow into a dotard8 ,is it not because he returns1 in this1 to his primitive state2 and that1 while the brute1 which has acquired nothing and has therefore nothing to lose1 still retains the force of instinct1 man1 who loses1 by age or accident1 all that his perfectibility had enabled him to gain1 falls by this means lower than the brutes themselves8 ,it would be melancholy1 were we forced to admit that this distinctive and almost unlimited faculty is the source of all human misfortunes2 that it is this which1 in time1 draws man out of his original state1 in which he would have spent his days insensibly in peace and innocence2 that it is this faculty1 which1 successively producing in different ages his discoveries and his errors1 his vices and his virtues1 makes him at length a tyrant both over himself and over nature4#a ,it would be shocking to be obliged to regard as a benefactor the man who first suggested to the ,oroonoko ,indians the use of the boards they apply to the temples of their children1 which secure to them some part at least of their imbecility and original happiness4 ,savage man1 left by nature solely to the direction of instinct1 or rather indemnified for what he may lack by faculties capable at first of supplying its place1 and afterwards of raising him much above it1 must accordingly begin with purely animal functions3 thus seeing and feeling must be his first condition1 which would be common to him and all other animals4 ,to will1 and not to will1 to desire and to fear1 must be the first1 and almost the only operations of his soul1 till new circumstances occasion new developments of his faculties4 ,whatever moralists may hold1 the human understanding is greatly indebted to the passions1 which1 it is universally allowed1 are also much indebted to the understanding4 ,it is by the activity of the passions that pur reason is improved2 for we desire knowledge only because we wish to enjoy2 and it is impossible to conceive any reason why a person who has neither fears nor desires should give himself the trouble of reasoning4 ,the passions1 again1 originate in our wants1 and their progress depends on that of our knowledge2 for we cannot desire or fear anything1 except from the idea we have of it1 or from the simple impulse of nature4 ,now savage man1 being destitute of every species of intelligence1 can have no passions save those of the latter kind3 his desires never go beyond his physical wants4 ,the only goods he recognises in the universe are food1 a female1 and sleep3 the only evils he fears are pain and hunger4 ,i say pain1 and not death3 for no animal can know what it is to die2 the knowledge of death and its terrors being one of the first acquisitions made by man in departing from an animal state4 ,it would be easy1 were it necessary1 to support this opinion by facts1 and to show that1 in all the nations of the world1 the progress of the understanding has been exactly proportionate to the wants which the peoples had received from nature1 or been subjected to by circumstances1 and in consequence to the passions that induced them to provide for those necessities4 ,i might instance the arts1 rising up in ,egypt and expanding with the inundation of the ,nile4 ,i might follow their progress into ,greece1 where they took root afresh1 grew up and towered to the skies1 among the rocks and sands of ,attica1 without being able to germinate on the fertile banks of the ,eurotas3 ,i might observe that in general1 the people of the ,north are more industrious than those of the ,south1 because they cannot get on so well without being so3 as if nature wanted to equalise matters by giving their understandings the fertility she had refused to their soil4 ,but who does not see1 without recurring to the uncertain testimony of history1 that everything seems to remove from savage man both the temptation and the means of changing his condition8 ,his imagination paints no pictures2 his heart makes no demands on him4 ,his few wants are so readily supplied1 and he is so far from having the knowledge which is needful to make him want more1 that he can have neither foresight nor curiosity4 ,the face of nature becomes indifferent to him as it grows familiar4 ,he sees in it always the same order1 the same successions3 he has not understanding enough to wonder at the greatest miracles2 nor is it in his mind that we can expect to find that philosophy man needs1 if he is to know how to notice for once what he sees every day4 ,his soul1 which nothing disturbs1 is wholly wrapped up in the feeling of its present existence1 without any idea of the future1 however near at hand2 while his projects1 as limited as his views1 hardly extend to the close of day4 ,such1 even at present1 is the extent of the native ,caribean's foresight3 he will improvidently sell you his cotton-bed in the morning1 and come crying in the evening to buy it again1 not having foreseen he would want it again the next night4 ,the more we reflect on this subject1 the greater appears the distance between pure sensation and the most simple knowledge3 it is impossible indeed to conceive how a man1 by his own powers alone1 without the aid of communication and the spur of necessity1 could have bridged so great a gap4 ,how many ages may have elapsed before mankind were in a position to behold any other ,are than that of the heavens4 ,what a multiplicity of chances must have happened to teach them the commonest uses of that element6 ,how often must they have let it out before they acquired the art of reproducing it8 and how often may not such a secret have died with him who had discovered it8 ,what shall we say of agriculture1 an art which requires so much labour and foresight1 which is so dependent on others that it is plain it could only be practised in a society which had at least begun1 and which does not serve so much to draw the means of subsistence from the earth--for these it would produce of itself--but to compel it to produce what is most to our taste8 ,but let us suppose that men had so multiplied that the natural produce of the earth was no longer sufficient for their support2 a supposition1 by the way1 which would prove such a life to be very advantageous for the human race2 let us suppose that1 without forges or workshops1 the instruments of husbandry had dropped from the sky into the hands of savages2 that they had overcome their natural aversion to continual labour2 that they had learnt so much foresight for their needs2 that they had divined how to cultivate the earth1 to sow grain and plant trees2 that they had discovered the arts of grinding corn1 and of setting the grape to ferment--all being things that must have been taught them by the gods1 since it is not to be conceived how they could discover them for themselves--yet after all this1 what man among them would be so absurd as to take the trouble of cultivating a field1 which might be stripped of its crop by the first comer1 man or beast1 that might take a liking to it2 and how should each of them resolve to pass his life in wearisome labour1 when1 the more necessary to him the reward of his labour might be1 the surer he would be of not getting it8 ,in a word1 how could such a situation induce men to cultivate the earth1 till it was regularly parcelled out among them2 that is to say1 till the state of nature had been abolished8 ,were we to suppose savage man as trained in the art of thinking as philosophers make him2 were we1 like them1 to suppose him a very philosopher capable of investigating the sublimest truths1 and of forming1 by highly abstract chains of reasoning1 maxims of reason and justice1 deduced from the love of order in general1 or the known will of his ,creator2 in a word1 were we to suppose him as intelligent and enlightened1 as he must have been1 and is in fact found to have been1 dull and stupid1 what advantage ,would accrue to the species1 from all such metaphysics1 which could not be communicated by one to another1 but must end with him who made them8 ,what progress could be made by mankind1 while dispersed in the woods among other animals8 and how far could men improve or mutually enlighten one another1 when1 having no fixed habitation1 and no need of one another's assistance1 the same persons hardly met twice in their lives1 and perhaps then1 without knowing one another or speaking together8 ,let it be considered how many ideas we owe to the use of speech2 how far grammar exercises the understanding and facilitates its operations4 ,let us reflect on the inconceivable pains and the infinite space of time that the first invention of languages must have cost4 ,to these reflections add what preceded1 and then judge how many thousand ages must have elapsed in the successive development in the human mind of those operations of which it is capable4 ,i shall here take the liberty for a moment1 of considering the difficulties of the origin of languages1 on which subject ,i might content myself with a simple repetition of the ,abb ,condillac's investigations1 as they fully confirm my system1 and perhaps even first suggested it4 ,but it is plain1 from the manner in which this philosopher solves the difficulties he himself raises1 concerning the origin of arbitrary signs1 that he assumes what ,i question1 viz4 that a kind of society1 must already have existed among the first inventors of language4 ,while ,i refer1 therefore1 to his observations on this head1 ,i think it right to give my own1 in order to exhibit the same difficulties in a light adapted to my subject4 ,the first which presents itself is to conceive how language can have become necessary2 for as there was no communication among men and no need for any1 we can neither conceive the necessity of this invention1 nor the possibility of it1 if it was not somehow indispensable4 ,i might affirm1 with many others1 that languages arose in the domestic intercourse between parents and their children4 ,but this expedient would not obviate the difficulty1 and would besides involve the blunder made by those who1 in reasoning on the state of nature1 always import into it ideas gathered in a state of society4 ,thus they constantly consider families as living together under one roof1 and the individuals of each as observing among themselves a union as intimate and permanent as that which exists among us1 where so many common interests unite them3 whereas1 in this primitive state1 men had neither houses1 nor huts1 nor any kind of property whatever2 every one lived where he could1 seldom for more than a single night2 the sexes united without design1 as accident1 opportunity or inclination brought them together1 nor had they any great need of words to communicate their designs to each other2 and they parted with the same indifference4 ,the mother gave suck to her children at first for her own sake2 and afterwards1 when habit had made them dear1 for theirs3 but as soon as they were strong enough to go in search of their own food1 they forsook her of their own accord2 and1 as they had hardly any other method of not losing one another than that of remaining continually within sight1 they soon became quite incapable of recognising one another when they happened to meet again4 ,it is farther to be observed that the child1 having all his wants to explain1 and of course more to say to his mother than the mother could have to say to him1 must have borne the brunt of the task of invention1 and the language he used would be of his own device1 so that the number of languages would be equal to that of the individuals speaking them1 and the variety would be increased by the vagabond and roving life they led1 which would not give time for any idiom to become constant4 ,for to say that the mother dictated to her child the words he was to use in asking her for one thing or another1 is an explanation of how languages already formed are taught1 but by no means explains how languages were originally formed4 ,we will suppose1 however1 that this first difficulty is obviated4 ,let us for a moment then take ourselves as being on this side of the vast space which must lie between a pure state of nature and that in which languages had become necessary1 and1 admitting their necessity1 let us inquire how they could first be established4 ,here we have a new and worse difficulty to grapple with2 for if men need speech to learn to think1 they must have stood in much greater need of the art of thinking1 to be able to invent that of speaking4 ,and though we might conceive how the articulate sounds of the voice came to be taken as the conventional interpreters of our ideas1 it would still remain for us to inquire what could have been the interpreters of this convention for those ideas1 which1 answering to no sensible objects1 could not be indicated either by gesture or voice2 so that we can hardly form any tolerable conjectures about the origin of this art of communicating our thoughts and establishing a correspondence between minds3 an art so sublime1 that far distant as it is from its origin1 philosophers still behold it at such an immeasurable distance from perfection1 that there is none rash enough to affirm it will ever reach it1 even though the revolutions time necessarily produces were suspended in its favour1 though prejudice should be banished from our academies or condemned to silence1 and those learned societies should devote themselves uninterruptedly for whole ages to this thorny question4 ,the first language of mankind1 the most universal and vivid1 in a word the only language man needed1 before he had occasion to exert his eloquence to persuade assembled multitudes1 was the simple cry of nature4 ,but as this was excited only by a sort of instinct on urgent occasions1 to implore assistance in case of danger1 or relief in case of suffering1 it could be of little use in the ordinary course of life1 in which more moderate feelings prevail4 ,when the ideas of men began to expand and multiply1 and closer communication took place among them1 they strove to invent more numerous signs and a more copious language4 ,they multiplied the inflections of the voice1 and added gestures1 which are in their own nature more expressive1 and depend less for their meaning on a prior determination4 ,visible and movable objects were therefore expressed by gestures1 and audible ones by imitative sounds3 but1 as hardly anything can be indicated by gestures1 except objects actually present or easily described1 and visible actions2 as they are not universally useful--for darkness or the interposition of a material object destroys their efficacy--and as besides they rather request than secure our attention2 men at length bethought themselves of substituting for them the articulate sounds of the voice1 which1 without bearing the same relation to any particular ideas1 are better calculated to express them all1 as conventional signs4 ,such an institution could only be made by common consent1 and must have been effected in a manner not very easy for men whose gross organs had not been accustomed to any such exercise4 ,it is also in itself still more difficult to conceive1 since such a common agreement must have had motives1 and speech seems to have been highly necessary to establish the use of it4 ,it is reasonable to suppose that the words first made use of by mankind had a much more extensive signification than those used in languages already formed1 and that ignorant as they were of the division of discourse into its constituent parts1 they at first gave every single word the sense of a whole proposition4 ,when they began to distinguish subject and attribute1 and noun and verb1 which was itself no common effort of genius1 substantives were at first only so many proper names2 the present infinitive was the only tense of verbs2 and the very idea of adjectives must have been developed with great difficulty2 for every adjective is an abstract idea1 and abstractions are painful and unnatural operations4 ,every object at first received a particular name without regard to genus or species1 which these primitive originators were not in a position to distinguish2 every individual presented itself to their minds in isolation1 as they are in the picture of nature4 ,if one oak was called ,a1 another was called ,b2 for the primitive idea of two things is that they are not the same1 and it often takes a long time for what they have in common to be seen3 so that1 the narrower the limits of their knowledge of things1 the more copious their dictionary must have been4 ,the difficulty of using such a vocabulary could not be easily removed2 for1 to arrange beings under common and generic denominations1 it became necessary to know their distinguishing properties3 the need arose for observation and definition1 that is to say1 for natural history and metaphysics of a far more developed kind than men can at that time have possessed4 ,add to this1 that general ideas cannot be introduced into the mind without the assistance of words1 nor can the understanding seize them except by means of propositions4 ,this is one of the reasons why animals cannot form such ideas1 or ever acquire that capacity for self-improvement which depends on them4 ,when a monkey goes from one nut to another1 are we to conceive that he entertains any general idea of that kind of fruit1 and compares its archetype with the two individual nuts8 ,assuredly he does not2 but the sight of one of these nuts recalls to his memory the sensations which he received from the other1 and his eyes1 being modified after a certain manner1 give information to the palate of the modification it is about to receive4 ,every general idea is purely intellectual2 if the imagination meddles with it ever so little1 the idea immediately becomes particular4 ,if you endeavour to trace in your mind the image of a tree in general1 you never attain to your end4 ,in spite of all you can do1 you will have to see it as great or little1 bare or leafy1 light or dark1 and were you capable of seeing nothing in it but what is common to all trees1 it would no longer be like a tree at all4 ,purely abstract beings are perceivable in the same manner1 or are only conceivable by the help of language4 ,the definition of a triangle alone gives you a true idea of it3 the moment you imagine a triangle in your mind1 it is some particular triangle and not another1 and you cannot avoid giving it sensible lines and a coloured area4 ,we must then make use of propositions and of language in order to form general ideas4 ,for no sooner does the imagination cease to operate than the understanding proceeds only by the help of words4 ,if then the first inventors of speech could give names only to ideas they already had1 it follows that the first substantives could be nothing more than proper names4 ,but when our new grammarians1 by means of which ,i have no conception1 began to extend their ideas and generalise their terms1 the ignorance of the inventors must have confined this method within very narrow limits2 and1 as they had at first gone too far in multiplying the names of individuals1 from ignorance of their genus and species1 they made afterwards too few of these1 from not having considered beings in all their specific differences4 ,it would indeed have needed more knowledge and experience than they could have1 and more pains and inquiry than they would have bestowed1 to carry these distinctions to their proper length4 ,if1 even to-day1 we are continually discovering new species1 which have hitherto escaped observation1 let us reflect how many of them must have escaped men who judged things merely from their first appearance6 ,it is superfluous to add that the primitive classes and the most general notions must necessarily have escaped their notice also4 ,how1 for instance1 could they have understood or thought of the words matter1 spirit1 substance1 mode1 figure1 motion1 when even our philosophers1 who have so long been making use of them1 have themselves the greatest difficulty in understanding them2 and when1 the ideas attached to them being purely metaphysical1 there are no models of them to be found in nature8 ,but ,i stop at this point1 and ask my judges to suspend their reading a while1 to consider1 after the invention of physical substantives1 which is the easiest part of language to invent1 that there is still a great way to go1 before the thoughts of men will have found perfect expression and constant form1 such as would answer the purposes of public speaking1 and produce their effect on society4 ,i beg of them to consider how much time must have been spent1 and how much knowledge needed1 to find out numbers1 abstract terms1 aorists and all the tenses of verbs1 particles1 syntax1 the method of connecting propositions1 the forms of reasoning1 and all the logic of speech4 ,for myself1 ,i am so aghast at the increasing difficulties which present themselves1 and so well convinced of the almost demonstrable impossibility that languages should owe their original institution to merely human means1 that ,i leave1 to any one who will undertake it1 the discussion of the difficult problem1 which was most necessary1 the existence of society to the invention of language1 or the invention of language to the establishment of society4 ,but be the origin of language and society what they may1 it may be at least inferred1 from the little care which nature has taken to unite mankind by mutual wants1 and to facilitate the use of speech1 that she has contributed little to make them sociable1 and has put little of her own into all they have done to create such bonds of union4 ,it is in fact impossible to conceive why1 in a state of nature1 one man should stand more in need of the assistance of another1 than a monkey or a wolf of the assistance of another of its kind3 or1 granting that he did1 what motives could induce that other to assist him2 or1 even then1 by what means they could agree about the conditions4 ,i know it is incessantly repeated that man would in such a state have been the most miserable of creatures2 and indeed1 if it be true1 as ,i think ,i have proved1 that he must have lived many ages1 before he could have either desire or an opportunity of emerging from it1 this would only be an accusation against nature1 and not against the being which she had thus unhappily constituted4 ,but as ,i understand the word miserable1 it either has no meaning at all1 or else signifies only a painful privation of something1 or a state of suffering either in body or soul4 ,i should be glad to have explained to me1 what kind of misery a free being1 whose heart is at ease and whose body is in health1 can possibly suffer4 ,i would ask also1 whether a social or a natural life is most likely to become insupportable to those who enjoy it4 ,we see around us hardly a creature in civil society1 who does not lament his existence3 we even see many deprive themselves of as much of it as they can1 and laws human and divine together can hardly put a stop to the disorder4 ,i ask1 if it was ever known that a savage took it into his head1 when at liberty1 to complain of life or to make away with himself4 ,let us therefore judge1 with less vanity1 on which side the real misery is found4 ,on the other hand1 nothing could be more unhappy than savage man1 dazzled by science1 tormented by his passions1 and reasoning about a state different from his own4 ,it appears that ,providence most wisely determined that the faculties1 which he potentially possessed1 should develop themselves only as occasion offered to exercise them1 in order that they might not be superfluous or perplexing to him1 by appearing before their time1 nor slow and useless when the need for them arose4 ,in instinct alone1 he had all he required for living in the state of nature2 and with a developed understanding he has only just enough to support life in society4 ,it appears1 at first view1 that men in a state of nature1 having no moral relations or determinate obligations one with another1 could not be either good nor bad1 virtuous or vicious2 unless we take these terms in a physical sense1 and call1 in an individual1 those qualities vices which may be injurious to his preservation1 and those virtues which contribute to it2 in which case1 he would have to be accounted most virtuous1 who put least check on the pure impulses of nature4 ,but without deviating from the ordinary sense of the words1 it will be proper to suspend the judgment we might be led to form on such a state1 and be on our guard against our prejudices1 till we have weighed the matter in the scales of impartiality1 and seen whether virtues or vices preponderate among civilised men2 and whether their virtues do them more good than their vices do harm2 till we have discovered1 whether the progress of the sciences sufficiently indemnifies them for the mischiefs they do one another1 in proportion as they are better informed of the good they ought to do2 or whether they would not be1 on the whole1 in a much happier condition if they had nothing to fear or to hope from any one1 than as they are1 subjected to universal dependence1 and obliged to take everything from those who engage to give them nothing in return4 ,above all1 let us not conclude1 with ,hobbes1 that because man has no idea of goodness1 he must be naturally wicked2 that he is vicious because he does not know virtue2 that he always refuses to do his fellow-creatures services which he does not think they have a right to demand2 or that by virtue of the right he truly claims to everything he needs1 he foolishly imagines himself the sole proprietor of the whole universe4 ,hobbes had seen clearly the defects of all the modern definitions of natural right3 but the consequences which he deduces from his own show that he understands it in an equally false sense4 ,in reasoning on the principles he lays down1 he ought to have said that the state of nature1 being that in which the care for our own preservation is the least prejudicial to that of others1 was consequently the best calculated to promote peace1 and the most suitable for mankind4 ,he does say the exact opposite1 in consequence of having improperly admitted1 as a part of savage man's care for self-preservation1 the gratification of a multitude of passions which are the work of society1 and have made laws necessary4 ,a bad man1 he says1 is a robust child4 ,but it remains to be proved whether man in a state of nature is this robust child3 and1 should we grant that he is1 what would he infer8 ,why truly1 that if this man1 when robust and strong1 were dependent on others as he is when feeble1 there is no extravagance he would not be guilty of2 that he would beat his mother when she was too slow in giving him her breast2 that he would strangle one of his younger brothers1 if he should be troublesome to him1 or bite the arm of another1 if he put him to any inconvenience4 ,but that man in the state of nature is both strong and dependent involves two contrary suppositions4 ,man is weak when he is dependent1 and is his own master before he comes to be strong4 ,hobbes did not reflect that the same cause1 which prevents a savage from making use of his reason1 as our jurists hold1 prevents him also from abusing his faculties1 as ,hobbes himself allows3 so that it may be justly said that savages are not bad merely because they do not know what it is to be good3 for it is neither the development of the understanding nor the restraint of law that hinders them from doing ill2 but the peacefulness of their passions1 and their ignorance of vice3 tanto plus in illis proficit vitiorum ignoratio1 quam in his cognitio virtutis4#b ,there is another principle which has escaped ,hobbes2 which1 having been bestowed on mankind1 to moderate1 on certain occasions1 the impetuosity of egoism1 or1 before its birth1 the desire of self-preservation1 tempers the ardour with which he pursues his own welfare1 by an innate repugnance at seeing a fellow-creature suffer4#c ,i think ,i need not fear contradiction in holding man to be possessed of the only natural virtue1 which could not be denied him by the most violent detractor of human virtue4 ,i am speaking of compassion which is a disposition suitable to creatures so weak and subject to so many evils as we certainly are3 by so much the more universal and useful to mankind1 as it comes before any kind of reflection2 and at the same time so natural1 that the very brutes themselves sometimes give evident proofs of it4 ,not to mention the tenderness of mothers for their offspring and the perils they encounter to save them from danger1 it is well known that horses show a reluctance to trample on living bodies4 ,one animal never passes by the dead body of another of its species3 there are even some which give their fellows a sort of burial2 while the mournful lowings of the cattle when they enter the slaughter-house show the impressions made on them by the horrible spectacle which meets them4 ,we find1 with pleasure1 the author of the ,fable of the ,bees obliged to own that man is a compassionate and sensible being1 and laying aside his cold subtlety of style1 in the example he gives1 to present us with the pathetic description of a man who1 from a place of confinement1 is compelled to behold a wild beast tear a child from the arms of its mother1 grinding its tender limbs with its murderous teeth1 and tearing its palpitating entrails with its claws4 ,what horrid agitation must not the eye-witness of such a scene experience1 although he would not be personally concerned6 ,what anxiety would he not suffer at not being able to give any assistance to the fainting mother and the dying infant6 ,such is the pure emotion of nature1 prior to all kinds of reflection6 ,such is the force of natural compassion1 which the greatest depravity of morals has as yet hardly been able to destroy6 for we daily find at our theatres men affected1 nay shedding tears at the sufferings of a wretch who1 were he in the tyrant's place1 would probably even add to the torments of his enemies2 like the bloodthirsty ,sulla1 who was so sensitive to ills he had not caused1 or that ,alexander of ,pheros who did not dare to go and see any tragedy acted1 for fear of being seen weeping with ,andromache and ,priam1 though he could listen without emotion to the cries of all the citizens who were daily strangled at his command4 ,mollissima corda ,humano generi dare se natura fatetur1 ,qua lacrimas dedit4 ,juvenal1 ,satire xv1 #aea4d ,mandeville well knew that1 in spite of all their morality1 men would have never been better than monsters1 had not nature bestowed on them a sense of compassion1 to aid their reason3 but he did not see that from this quality alone flow all those social virtues1 of which he denied man the possession4 ,but what is generosity1 clemency or humanity but compassion applied to the weak1 to the guilty1 or to mankind in general8 ,even benevolence and friendship are1 if we judge rightly1 only the effects of compassion1 constantly set upon a particular object3 for how is it different to wish that another person may not suffer pain and uneasiness and to wish him happy8 ,were it even true that pity is no more than a feeling1 which puts us in the place of the sufferer1 a feeling1 obscure yet lively in a savage1 developed yet feeble in civilised man2 this truth would have no other consequence than to confirm my argument4 ,compassion must1 in fact1 be the stronger1 the more the animal beholding any kind of distress identifies himself with the animal that suffers4 ,now1 it is plain that such identification must have been much more perfect in a state of nature than it is in a state of reason4 ,it is reason that engenders self-respect1 and reflection that confirms it3 it is reason which turns man's mind back upon itself1 and divides him from everything that could disturb or afflict him4 ,it is philosophy that isolates him1 and bids him say1 at sight of the misfortunes of others3 ,perish if you will1 ,i am secure4 ,nothing but such general evils as threaten the whole community can disturb the tranquil sleep of the philosopher1 or tear him from his bed4 ,a murder may with impunity be committed under his window2 he has only to put his hands to his ears and argue a little with himself1 to prevent nature1 which is shocked within him1 from identifying itself with the unfortunate sufferer4 ,uncivilised man has not this admirable talent2 and for want of reason and wisdom1 is always foolishly ready to obey the first promptings of humanity4 ,it is the populace that flocks together at riots and street-brawls1 while the wise man prudently makes off4 ,it is the mob and the market-women1 who part the combatants1 and hinder gentle-folks from cutting one another's throats4 ,it is then certain that compassion is a natural feeling which1 by moderating the violence of love of self in each individual1 contributes to the preservation of the whole species4 ,it is this compassion that hurries us without reflection to the relief of those who are in distress3 it is this which in a state of nature supplies the place of laws1 morals and virtues1 with the advantage that none are tempted to disobey its gentle voice3 it is this which will always prevent a sturdy savage from robbing a weak child or a feeble old man of the sustenance they may have with pain and difficulty acquired1 if he sees a possibility of providing for himself by other means3 it is this which1 instead of inculcating that sublime maxim of rational justice1 ,do to others as you would have them do unto you1 inspires all men with that other maxim of natural goodness1 much less perfect indeed1 but perhaps more useful2 ,do good to yourself with as little evil as possible to others4 ,in a word1 it is rather in this natural feeling than in any subtle arguments that we must look for the cause of that repugnance1 which every man would experience in doing evil1 even independently of the maxims of education4 ,although it might belong to ,socrates and other minds of the like craft to acquire virtue by reason1 the human race would long since have ceased to be1 had its preservation depended only on the reasonings of the individuals composing it4 ,with passions so little active1 and so good a curb1 men1 being rather wild than wicked1 and more intent to guard themselves against the mischief that might be done them1 than to do mischief to others1 were by no means subject to very perilous dissensions4 ,they maintained no kind of intercourse with one another1 and were consequently strangers to vanity1 deference1 esteem and contempt2 they had not the least idea of meum and tuum1 and no true conception of justice2 they looked upon every violence to which they were subjected1 rather as an injury that might easily be repaired than as a crime that ought to be punished2 and they never thought of taking revenge1 unless perhaps mechanically and on the spot1 as a dog will sometimes bite the stone which is thrown at him4 ,their quarrels therefore would seldom have very bloody consequences2 for the subject of them would be merely the question of subsistence4 ,but ,i am aware of one greater danger1 which remains to be noticed4 ,of the passions that stir the heart of man1 there is one which makes the sexes necessary to each other1 and is extremely ardent and impetuous2 a terrible passion that braves danger1 surmounts all obstacles1 and in its transports seems calculated to bring destruction on the human race which it is really destined to preserve4 ,what must become of men who are left to this brutal and boundless rage1 without modesty1 without shame1 and daily upholding their amours at the price of their blood8 ,it must1 in the first place1 be allowed that1 the more violent the passions are1 the more are laws necessary to keep them under restraint4 ,but1 setting aside the inadequacy of laws to effect this purpose1 which is evident from the crimes and disorders to which these passions daily give rise among us1 we should do well to inquire if these evils did not spring up with the laws themselves2 for in this case1 even if the laws were capable of repressing such evils1 it is the least that could be expected from them1 that they should check a mischief which would not have arisen without them4 ,let us begin by distinguishing between the physical and moral ingredients in the feeling of love4 ,the physical part of love is that general desire which urges the sexes to union with each other4 ,the moral part is that which determines and fixes this desire exclusively upon one particular object2 or at least gives it a greater degree of energy toward the object thus preferred4 ,it is easy to see that the moral part of love is a factitious feeling1 born of social usage1 and enhanced by the women with much care and cleverness1 to establish their empire1 and put in power the sex which ought to obey4 ,this feeling1 being founded on certain ideas of beauty and merit which a savage is not in a position to acquire1 and on comparisons which he is incapable of making1 must be for him almost non-existent2 for1 as his mind cannot form abstract ideas of proportion and regularity1 so his heart is not susceptible of the feelings of love and admiration1 which are even insensibly produced by the application of these ideas4 ,he follows solely the character nature has implanted in him1 and not tastes which he could never have acquired2 so that every woman equally answers his purpose4 ,men in a state of nature being confined merely to what is physical in love1 and fortunate enough to be ignorant of those excellences1 which whet the appetite while they increase the difficulty of gratifying it1 must be subject to fewer and less violent fits of passion1 and consequently fall into fewer and less violent disputes4 ,the imagination1 which causes such ravages among us1 never speaks to the heart of savages1 who quietly await the impulses of nature1 yield to them involuntarily1 with more pleasure than ardour1 and1 their wants once satisfied1 lose the desire4 ,it is therefore incontestable that love1 as well as all other passions1 must have acquired in society that glowing impetuosity1 which makes it so often fatal to mankind4 ,and it is the more absurd to represent savages as continually cutting one another's throats to indulge their brutality1 because this opinion is directly contrary to experience2 the ,caribeans1 who have as yet least of all deviated from the state of nature1 being in fact the most peaceable of people in their amours1 and the least subject to jealousy1 though they live in a hot climate which seems always to inflame the passions4 ,with regard to the inferences that might be drawn1 in the case of several species of animals1 the males of which fill our poultry-yards with blood and slaughter1 or in spring make the forests resound with their quarrels over their females2 we must begin by excluding all those species1 in which nature has plainly established1 in the comparative power of the sexes1 relations different from those which exist among us3 thus we can base no conclusion about men on the habits of fighting cocks4 ,in those species where the proportion is better observed1 these battles must be entirely due to the scarcity of females in comparison with males2 or1 what amounts to the same thing1 to the intervals during which the female constantly refuses the advances of the male3 for if each female admits the male but during two months in the year1 it is the same as if the number of females were five-sixths less4 ,now1 neither of these two cases is applicable to the human species1 in which the number of females usually exceeds that of males1 and among whom it has never been observed1 even among savages1 that the females have1 like those of other animals1 their stated times of passion and indifference4 ,moreover1 in several of these species1 the individuals all take fire at once1 and there comes a fearful moment of universal passion1 tumult and disorder among them2 a scene which is never beheld in the human species1 whose love is not thus seasonal4 ,we must not then conclude from the combats of such animals for the enjoyment of the females1 that the case would be the same with mankind in a state of nature3 and1 even if we drew such a conclusion1 we see that such contests do not exterminate other kinds of animals1 and we have no reason to think they would be more fatal to ours4 ,it is indeed clear that they would do still less mischief than is the case in a state of society2 especially in those countries in which1 morals being still held in some repute1 the jealousy of lovers and the vengeance of husbands are the daily cause of duels1 murders1 and even worse crimes2 where the obligation of eternal fidelity only occasions adultery1 and the very laws of honour and continence necessarily increase debauchery and lead to the multiplication of abortions4 ,let us conclude then that man in a state of nature1 wandering up and down the forests1 without industry1 without speech1 and without home1 an equal stranger to war and to all ties1 neither standing in need of his fellow-creatures nor having any desire to hurt them1 and perhaps even not distinguishing them one from another2 let us conclude that1 being self-sufficient and subject to so few passions1 he could have no feelings or knowledge but such as befitted his situation2 that he felt only his actual necessities1 and disregarded everything he did not think himself immediately concerned to notice1 and that his understanding made no greater progress than his vanity4 ,if by accident he made any discovery1 he was the less able to communicate it to others1 as he did not know even his own children4 ,every art would necessarily perish with its inventor1 where there was no kind of education among men1 and generations succeeded generations without the least advance2 when1 all setting out from the same point1 centuries must have elapsed in the barbarism of the first ages2 when the race was already old1 and man remained a child4 ,if ,i have expatiated at such length on this supposed primitive state1 it is because ,i had so many ancient errors and inveterate prejudices to eradicate1 and therefore thought it incumbent on me to dig down to their very root1 and show1 by means of a true picture of the state of nature1 how far even the natural inequalities of mankind are from having that reality and influence which modern writers suppose4 ,it is in fact easy to see that many of the differences which distinguish men are merely the effect of habit and the different methods of life men adopt in society4 ,thus a robust or delicate constitution1 and the strength or weakness attaching to it1 are more frequently the effects of a hardy or effeminate method of education than of the original endowment of the body4 ,it is the same with the powers of the mind2 for education not only makes a difference between such as are cultured and such as are not1 but even increases the differences which exist among the former1 in proportion to their respective degrees of culture3 as the distance between a giant and a dwarf on the same road increases with every step they take4 ,if we compare the prodigious diversity1 which obtains in the education and manner of life of the various orders of men in the state of society1 with the uniformity and simplicity of animal and savage life1 in which every one lives on the same kind of food and in exactly the same manner1 and does exactly the same things1 it is easy to conceive how much less the difference between man and man must be in a state of nature than in a state of society1 and how greatly the natural inequality of mankind must be increased by the inequalities of social institutions4 ,but even if nature really affected1 in the distribution of her gifts1 that partiality which is imputed to her1 what advantage would the greatest of her favourites derive from it1 to the detriment of others1 in a state that admits of hardly any kind of relation between them8 ,where there is no love1 of what advantage is beauty8 ,of what use is wit to those who do not converse1 or cunning to those who have no business with others8 ,i hear it constantly repeated that1 in such a state1 the strong would oppress the weak2 but what is here meant by oppression8 ,some1 it is said1 would violently domineer over others1 who would groan under a servile submission to their caprices4 ,this indeed is exactly what ,i observe to be the case among us2 but ,i do not see how it can be inferred of men in a state of nature1 who could not easily be brought to conceive what we mean by dominion and servitude4 ,one man1 it is true1 might seize the fruits which another had gathered1 the game he had killed1 or the cave he had chosen for shelter2 but how would he ever be able to exact obedience1 and what ties of dependence could there be among men without possessions8 ,if1 for instance1 ,i am driven from one tree1 ,i can go to the next2 if ,i am disturbed in one place1 what hinders me from going to another8 ,again1 should ,i happen to meet with a man so much stronger than myself1 and at the same time so depraved1 so indolent1 and so barbarous1 as to compel me to provide for his sustenance while he himself remains idle2 he must take care not to have his eyes off me for a single moment2 he must bind me fast before he goes to sleep1 or ,i shall certainly either knock him on the head or make my escape4 ,that is to say1 he must in such a case voluntarily expose himself to much greater trouble than he seeks to avoid1 or can give me4 ,after all this1 let him be off his guard ever so little2 let him but turn his head aside at any sudden noise1 and ,i shall be instantly twenty paces off1 lost in the forest1 and1 my fetters burst asunder1 he would never see me again4 ,without my expatiating thus uselessly on these details1 every one must see that as the bonds of servitude are formed merely by the mutual dependence of men on one another and the reciprocal needs that unite them1 it is impossible to make any man a slave1 unless he be first reduced to a situation in which he cannot do without the help of others3 and1 since such a situation does not exist in a state of nature1 every one is there his own master1 and the law of the strongest is of no effect4 ,having proved that the inequality of mankind is hardly felt1 and that its influence is next to nothing in a state of nature1 ,i must next show its origin and trace its progress in the successive developments of the human mind4 ,having shown that human perfectibility1 the social virtues1 and the other faculties which natural man potentially possessed1 could never develop of themselves1 but must require the fortuitous concurrence of many foreign causes that might never arise1 and without which he would have remained for ever in his primitive condition1 ,i must now collect and consider the different accidents which may have improved the human understanding while depraving the species1 and made man wicked while making him sociable2 so as to bring him and the world from that distant period to the point at which we now behold them4 ,i confess that1 as the events ,i am going to describe might have happened in various ways1 ,i have nothing to determine my choice but conjectures3 but such conjectures become reasons1 when they are the most probable that can be drawn from the nature of things1 and the only means of discovering the truth4 ,the consequences1 however1 which ,i mean to deduce will not be barely conjectural2 as1 on the principles just laid down1 it would be impossible to form any other theory that would not furnish the same results1 and from which ,i could not draw the same conclusions4 ,this will be a sufficient apology for my not dwelling on the manner in which the lapse of time compensates for the little probability in the events2 on the surprising power of trivial causes1 when their action is constant2 on the impossibility1 on the one hand1 of destroying certain hypotheses1 though on the other we cannot give them the certainty of known matters of fact2 on its being within the province of history1 when two facts are given as real1 and have to be connected by a series of intermediate facts1 which are unknown or supposed to be so1 to supply such facts as may connect them2 and on its being in the province of philosophy when history is silent1 to determine similar facts to serve the same end2 and lastly1 on the influence of similarity1 which1 in the case of events1 reduces the facts to a much smaller number of different classes than is commonly imagined4 ,it is enough for me to offer these hints to the consideration of my judges1 and to have so arranged that the general reader has no need to consider them at all4 #a ,see ,appendix4 #b ,justin4 ,hist1 ii1 #b4 ,so much more does the ignorance of vice profit the one sort than the knowledge of virtue the other4 #c ,egoism must not be confused with self-respect3 for they differ both in themselves and in their effects4 ,self-respect is a natural feeling which leads every animal to look to its own preservation1 and which1 guided in man by reason and modified by compassion1 creates humanity and virtue4 ,egoism is a purely relative and factitious feeling1 which arises in the state of society1 leads each individual to make more of himself than of any other1 causes all the mutual damage men inflict one on another1 and is the real source of the sense of honour4 ,this being understood1 ,i maintain that1 in our primitive condition1 in the true state of nature1 egoism did not exist2 for as each man regarded himself as the only observer of his actions1 the only being in the universe who took any interest in him1 and the sole judge of his deserts1 no feeling arising from comparisons he could not be led to make could take root in his soul2 and for the same reason1 he could know neither hatred nor the desire for revenge1 since these passions can spring only from a sense of injury3 and as it is the contempt or the intention to hurt1 and not the harm done1 which constitutes the injury1 men who neither valued nor compared themselves could do one another much violence1 when it suited them1 without feeling any sense of injury4 ,in a word1 each man1 regarding his fellows almost as he regarded animals of different species1 might seize the prey of a weaker or yield up his own to a stronger1 and yet consider these acts of violence as mere natural occurrences1 without the slightest emotion of insolence or despite1 or any other feeling than the joy or grief of success or failure4 #d ,nature avows she gave the human race the softest hearts1 who gave them tears4 ,,the ,,second ,,part ,the first man who1 having enclosed a piece of ground1 bethought himself of saying ,this is mine1 and found people simple enough to believe him1 was the real founder of civil society4 ,from how many crimes1 wars and murders1 from how many horrors and misfortunes might not any one have saved mankind1 by pulling up the stakes1 or filling up the ditch1 and crying to his fellows1 ,beware of listening to this impostor2 you are undone if you once forget that the fruits of the earth1 belong to us all1 and the earth itself to nobody4 ,but there is great probability that things had then already come to such a pitch1 that they could no longer continue as they were2 for the idea of property depends on many prior ideas1 which could only be acquired successively1 and cannot have been formed all at once in the human mind4 ,mankind must have made very considerable progress1 and acquired considerable knowledge and industry which they must also have transmitted and increased from age to age1 before they arrived at this last point of the state of nature4 ,let us then go farther back and endeavour to unify under a single point of view that slow succession of events and discoveries in the most natural order4 ,man's first feeling was that of his own existence1 and his first care that of self-preservation4 ,the produce of the earth furnished him with all he needed1 and instinct told him how to use it4 ,hunger and other appetites made him at various times experience various modes of existence2 and among these was one which urged him to propagate his species--a blind propensity that1 having nothing to do with the heart1 produced a merely animal act4 ,the want once gratified1 the two sexes knew each other no more2 and even the offspring was nothing to its mother1 as soon as it could do without her4 ,such was the condition of infant man2 the life of an animal limited at first to mere sensations1 and hardly profiting by the gifts nature bestowed on him1 much less capable of entertaining a thought of forcing anything from her4 ,but difficulties soon presented themselves1 and it became necessary to learn how to surmount them3 the height of the trees1 which prevented him from gathering their fruits1 the competition of other animals desirous of the same fruits1 and the ferocity of those who needed them for their own preservation1 all obliged him to apply himself to bodily exercises4 ,he had to be active1 swift of foot1 and vigorous in light4 ,natural weapons1 stones and sticks1 were easily found3 he learnt to surmount the obstacles of nature1 to contend in case of necessity with other animals1 and to dispute for the means of subsistence even with other men1 or to indemnify himself for what he was forced to give up to a stronger4 ,in proportion as the human race grew more numerous1 men's cares increased4 ,the difference of soils1 climates and seasons1 must have introduced some differences into their manner of living4 ,barren years1 long and sharp winters1 scorching summers which parched the fruits of the earth1 must have demanded a new industry4 ,on the sea-shore and the banks of rivers1 they invented the hook and line1 and became fishermen and eaters of fish4 ,in the forests they made bows and arrows1 and became huntsmen and warriors4 ,in cold countries they clothed themselves with the skins of the beasts they had slain4 ,the lightning1 a volcano1 or some lucky chance acquainted them with fire1 a new resource against the rigours of winter3 they next learned how to preserve this element1 then how to reproduce it1 and finally how to prepare with it the flesh of animals which before they had eaten raw4 ,this repeated relevance of various beings to himself1 and one to another1 would naturally give rise in the human mind to the perceptions of certain relations between them4 ,thus the relations which we denote by the terms1 great1 small1 strong1 weak1 swift1 slow1 fearful1 bold1 and the like1 almost insensibly compared at need1 must have at length produced in him a kind of reflection1 or rather a mechanical prudence1 which would indicate to him the precautions most necessary to his security4 ,the new intelligence which resulted from this development increased his superiority over other animals1 by making him sensible of it4 ,he would now endeavour1 therefore1 to ensnare them1 would play them a thousand tricks1 and though many of them might surpass him in swiftness or in strength1 would in time become the master of some and the scourge of others4 ,thus1 the first time he looked into himself1 he felt the first emotion of pride2 and1 at a time when he scarce knew how to distinguish the different orders of beings1 by looking upon his species as of the highest order1 he prepared the way for assuming pre-eminence as an individual4 ,other men1 it is true1 were not then to him what they now are to us1 and he had no greater intercourse with them than with other animals2 yet they were not neglected in his observations4 ,the conformities1 which he would in time discover between them1 and between himself and his female1 led him to judge of others which were not then perceptible2 and finding that they all behaved as he himself would have done in like circumstances1 he naturally inferred that their manner of thinking and acting was altogether in conformity with his own4 ,this important truth1 once deeply impressed on his mind1 must have induced him1 from an intuitive feeling more certain and much more rapid than any kind of reasoning1 to pursue the rules of conduct1 which he had best observe towards them1 for his own security and advantage4 ,taught by experience that the love of well-being is the sole motive of human actions1 he found himself in a position to distinguish the few cases1 in which mutual interest might justify him in relying upon the assistance of his fellows2 and also the still fewer cases in which a conflict of interests might give cause to suspect them4 ,in the former case1 he joined in the same herd with them1 or at most in some kind of loose association1 that laid no restraint on its members1 and lasted no longer than the transitory occasion that formed it4 ,in the latter case1 every one sought his own private advantage1 either by open force1 if he thought himself strong enough1 or by address and cunning1 if he felt himself the weaker4 ,in this manner1 men may have insensibly acquired some gross ideas of mutual undertakings1 and of the advantages of fulfilling them3 that is1 just so far as their present and apparent interest was concerned3 for they were perfect strangers to foresight1 and were so far from troubling themselves about the distant future1 that they hardly thought of the morrow4 ,if a deer was to be taken1 every one saw that1 in order to succeed1 he must abide faithfully by his post3 but if a hare happened to come within the reach of any one of them1 it is not to be doubted that he pursued it without scruple1 and1 having seized his prey1 cared very little1 if by so doing he caused his companions to miss theirs4 ,it is easy to understand that such intercourse would not require a language much more refined than that of rooks or monkeys1 who associate together for much the same1 purpose4 ,inarticulate cries1 plenty of gestures and some imitative sounds1 must have been for a long time the universal language2 and by the addition1 in every country1 of some conventional articulate sounds 7of which1 as ,i have already intimated1 the first institution is not too easy to explain7 particular languages were produced2 but these were rude and imperfect1 and nearly such as now to be found among some savage nations4 ,hurried on by the rapidity of time1 by the abundance of things ,i have to say1 and by the almost insensible progress of things in their beginnings1 ,i pass over in an instant a multitude of ages2 for the slower the events were in their succession1 the more rapidly may they be described4 ,these first advances enabled men to make others with greater rapidity4 ,in proportion as they grew enlightened1 they grew industrious4 ,they ceased to fall asleep under the first tree1 or in the first cave that afforded them shelter2 they invented several kinds of implements of hard and sharp stones1 which they used to dig up the earth1 and to cut wood2 they then made huts out of branches1 and afterwards learnt to plaster them over with mud and clay4 ,this was the epoch of a first revolution1 which established and distinguished families1 and introduced a kind of property1 in itself the source of a thousand quarrels and conflicts4 ,as1 however1 the strongest were probably the first to build themselves huts which they felt themselves able to defend1 it may be concluded that the weak found it much easier and safer to imitate1 than to attempt to dislodge them3 and of those who were once provided with huts1 none could have any inducement to appropriate that of his neighbour2 not indeed so much because it did not belong to him1 as because it could be of no use1 and he could not make himself master of it without exposing himself to a desperate battle with the family which occupied it4 ,the first expansions of the human heart were the effects of a novel situation1 which united husbands and wives1 fathers and children1 under one roof4 ,the habit of living together soon gave rise to the finest feelings known to humanity1 conjugal love and paternal affection4 ,every family became a little society1 the more united because liberty--and reciprocal attachment were the only bonds of its union4 ,the sexes1 whose manner of life had been hitherto the same1 began now to adopt different ways of living4 ,the women became more sedentary1 and accustomed themselves to mind the hut and their children1 while the men went abroad in search of their common subsistence4 ,from living a softer life1 both sexes also began to lose something of their strength and ferocity3 but1 if individuals became to some extent less able to encounter wild beasts separately1 they found it1 on the other hand1 easier to assemble and resist in common4 ,the simplicity and solitude of man's life in this new condition1 the paucity of his wants1 and the implements he had invented to satisfy them1 left him a great deal of leisure1 which he employed to furnish himself with many conveniences unknown to his fathers3 and this was the first yoke he inadvertently imposed on himself1 and the first source of the evils he prepared for his descendants4 ,for1 besides continuing thus to enervate both body and mind1 these conveniences lost with use almost all their power to please1 and even degenerated into real needs1 till the want of them became far more disagreeable than the possession of them had been pleasant4 ,men would have been unhappy at the loss of them1 though the possession did not make them happy4 ,we can here see a little better how the use of speech became established1 and insensibly improved in each family1 and we may form a conjecture also concerning the manner in which various causes may have extended and accelerated the progress of language1 by making it more and more necessary4 ,floods or earthquakes surrounded inhabited districts with precipices or waters3 revolutions of the globe tore off portions from the continent1 and made them islands4 ,it is readily seen that among men thus collected and compelled to live together1 a common idiom must have arisen much more easily than among those who still wandered through the forests of the continent4 ,thus it is very possible that after their first essays in navigation the islanders brought over the use of speech to the continent3 and it is at least very probable that communities and languages were first established in islands1 and even came to perfection there before they were known on the mainland4 ,everything now begins to change its aspect4 ,men1 who have up to now been roving in the woods1 by taking to a more settled manner of life1 come gradually together1 form separate bodies1 and at length in every country arises a distinct nation1 united in character and manners1 not by regulations or laws1 but by uniformity of life and food1 and the common influence of climate4 ,permanent neighbourhood could not fail to produce1 in time1 some connection between different families4 ,among young people of opposite sexes1 living in neighbouring huts1 the transient commerce required by nature soon led1 through mutual intercourse1 to another kind not less agreeable1 and more permanent4 ,men began now to take the difference between objects into account1 and to make comparisons2 they acquired imperceptibly the ideas of beauty and merit1 which soon gave rise to feelings of preference4 ,in consequence of seeing each other often1 they could not do without seeing each other constantly4 ,a tender and pleasant feeling insinuated itself into their souls1 and the least opposition turned it into an impetuous fury3 with love arose jealousy2 discord triumphed1 and human blood was sacrificed to the gentlest of all passions4 ,as ideas and feelings succeeded one another1 and heart and head were brought into play1 men continued to lay aside their original wildness2 their private connections became every day more intimate as their limits extended4 ,they accustomed themselves to assemble before their huts round a large tree2 singing and dancing1 the true offspring of love and leisure1 became the amusement1 or rather the occupation1 of men and women thus assembled together with nothing else to do4 ,each one began to consider the rest1 and to wish to be considered in turn2 and thus a--value came to be attached to public esteem4 ,whoever sang or danced best1 whoever was the handsomest1 the strongest1 the most dexterous1 or the most eloquent1 came to be of most consideration2 and this was the first step towards inequality1 and at the same time towards vice4 ,from these first distinctions arose on the one side vanity and contempt and on the other shame and envy3 and the fermentation caused by these new leavens ended by producing combinations fatal to innocence and happiness4 ,as soon as men began to value one another1 and the idea of consideration had got a footing in the mind1 every one put in his claim to it1 and it became impossible to refuse it to any with impunity4 ,hence arose the first obligations of civility even among savages2 and every intended injury became an affront2 because1 besides the hurt which might result from it1 the party injured was certain to find in it a contempt for his person1 which was often more insupportable than the hurt itself4 ,thus1 as every man punished the contempt shown him by others1 in proportion to his opinion of himself1 revenge became terrible1 and men bloody and cruel4 ,this is precisely the state reached by most of the savage nations known to us3 and it is for want of having made a proper distinction in our ideas1 and seen how very far they already are from the state of nature1 that so many writers have hastily concluded that man is naturally cruel1 and requires civil institutions to make him more mild2 whereas nothing is more gentle than man in his primitive state1 as he is placed by nature at an equal distance from the stupidity of brutes1 and the fatal ingenuity of civilised man4 ,equally confined by instinct and reason to the sole care of guarding himself against the mischiefs which threaten him1 he is restrained by natural compassion from doing any injury to others1 and is not led to do such a thing even in return for injuries received4 ,for1 according to the axiom of the wise ,locke1 ,there can be no injury1 where there is no property4 ,but it must be remarked that the society thus formed1 and the relations thus established among men1 required of them qualities different from those which they possessed from their primitive constitution4 ,morality began to appear in human actions1 and every one1 before the institution of law1 was the only judge and avenger of the injuries done him1 so that the goodness which was suitable in the pure state of nature was no longer proper in the new-born state of society4 ,punishments had to be made more severe1 as opportunities of offending became more frequent1 and the dread of vengeance had to take the place of the rigour of the law4 ,thus1 though men had become less patient1 and their natural compassion had already suffered some diminution1 this period of expansion of the human faculties1 keeping a just mean between the indolence of the primitive state and the petulant activity of our egoism1 must have been the happiest and most stable of epochs4 ,the more we reflect on it1 the more we shall find that this state was the least subject to revolutions1 and altogether the very best man could experience2 so that he can have departed from it only through some fatal accident1 which1 for the public good1 should never have happened4 ,the example of savages1 most of whom have been found in this state1 seems to prove that men were meant to remain in it1 that it is the real youth of the world1 and that all subsequent advances have been apparently so many steps towards the perfection of the individual1 but in reality towards the decrepitude of the species4 ,so long as men remained content with their rustic huts1 so long as they were satisfied with clothes made of the skins of animals and sewn together with thorns and fish-bones1 adorned themselves only with feathers and shells1 and continued to paint their bodies different colours1 to improve and beautify their bows and arrows and to make with sharp-edged stones fishing boats or clumsy musical instruments2 in a word1 so long as they undertook only what a single person could accomplish1 and confined themselves to such arts as did not require the joint labour of several hands1 they lived free1 healthy1 honest and happy lives1 so long as their nature allowed1 and as they continued to enjoy the pleasures of mutual and independent intercourse4 ,but from the moment one man began to stand in need of the help of another2 from the moment it appeared advantageous to any one man to have enough provisions for two1 equality disappeared1 property was introduced1 work became indispensable1 and vast forests became smiling fields1 which man had to water with the sweat of his brow1 and where slavery and misery were soon seen to germinate and grow up with the crops4 ,metallurgy and agriculture were the two arts which produced this great revolution4 ,the poets tell us it was gold and silver1 but1 for the philosophers1 it was iron and corn1 which first civilised men1 and ruined humanity4 ,thus both were unknown to the savages of ,america1 who for that reason are still savage2 the other nations also seem to have continued in a state of barbarism while they practised only one of these arts4 ,one of the best reasons1 perhaps1 why ,europe has been1 if not longer1 at least more constantly and highly civilised than the rest of the world1 is that it is at once the most abundant in iron and the most fertile in corn4 ,it is difficult to conjecture how men first came to know and use iron2 for it is impossible to suppose they would of themselves think of digging the ore out of the mine1 and preparing it for smelting1 before they knew what would be the result4 ,on the other hand1 we have the less reason to suppose this discovery the effect of any accidental fire1 as mines are only formed in barren places1 bare of trees and plants2 so that it looks as if nature had taken pains to keep the fatal secret from us4 ,there remains1 therefore1 only the extraordinary accident of some volcano which1 by ejecting metallic substances already in fusion1 suggested to the spectators the idea of imitating the natural operation4 ,and we must further conceive them as possessed of uncommon courage and foresight1 to undertake so laborious a work1 with so distant a prospect of drawing advantage from it2 yet these qualities are united only in minds more advanced than we can suppose those of these first discoverers to have been4 ,with regard to agriculture1 the principles of it were known long before they were put in practice2 and it is indeed hardly possible that men1 constantly employed in drawing their subsistence from plants and trees1 should not readily acquire a knowledge of the means made use of by nature for the propagation of vegetables4 ,it was in all probability very fang1 however1 before their industry took that turn1 either because trees1 which together with hunting and fishing afforded them food1 did not require their attention2 or because they were ignorant of the use of corn1 or without instruments to cultivate it2 or because they lacked foresight to future needs2 or lastly1 because they were without means of preventing others from robbing them of the fruit of their labour4 ,when they grew more industrious1 it is natural to believe that they began1 with the help of sharp stones and pointed sticks1 to cultivate a few vegetables or roots around their huts2 though it was long before they knew how to prepare corn1 or were provided with the implements necessary for raising it in any large quantity2 not to mention how essential it is1 for husbandry1 to consent to immediate loss1 in order to reap a future gain--a precaution very foreign to the turn of a savage's mind2 for1 as ,i have said1 he hardly foresees in the morning what he will need at night4 ,the invention of the other arts must therefore have been necessary to compel mankind to apply themselves to agriculture4 ,no sooner were artificers wanted to smelt and forge iron1 than others were required to maintain them2 the more hands that were employed in manufactures1 the fewer were left to provide for the common subsistence1 though the number of mouths to be furnished with food remained the same3 and as some required commodities in exchange for their iron1 the rest at length discovered the method of making iron serve for the multiplication of commodities4 ,by this means the arts of husbandry and agriculture were established on the one hand1 and the art of working metals and multiplying their uses on the other4 ,the cultivation of the earth necessarily brought about its distribution2 and property1 once recognised1 gave rise to the first rules of justice2 for1 to secure each man his own1 it had to be possible for each to have something4 ,besides1 as men began to look forward to the future1 and all had something to lose1 every one had reason to apprehend that reprisals would follow any injury he might do to another4 ,this origin is so much the more natural1 as it is impossible to conceive how property can come from anything but manual labour3 for what else can a man add to things which he does not originally create1 so as to make them his own property8 ,it is the husbandman's labour alone that1 giving him a title to the produce of the ground he has tilled1 gives him a claim also to the land itself1 at least till harvest2 and so1 from year to year1 a constant possession which is easily transformed into property4 ,when the ancients1 says ,grotius1 gave to ,ceres the title of ,legislatrix1 and to a festival celebrated in her honour the name of ,thesmophoria1 they meant by that that the distribution of lands had produced a new kind of right3 that is to say1 the right of property1 which is different from the right deducible from the law of nature4 ,in this state of affairs1 equality might have been sustained1 had the talents of individuals been equal1 and had1 for example1 the use of iron and the consumption of commodities always exactly balanced each other2 but1 as there was nothing to preserve this balance1 it was soon disturbed2 the strongest did most work2 the most skilful turned his labour to best account2 the most ingenious devised methods of diminishing his labour3 the husbandman wanted more iron1 or the smith more corn1 and1 while both laboured equally1 the one gained a great deal by his work1 while the other could hardly support himself4 ,thus natural inequality unfolds itself insensibly with that of combination1 and the difference between men1 developed by their different circumstances1 becomes more sensible and permanent in its effects1 and begins to have an influence1 in the same proportion1 over the lot of individuals4 ,matters once at this pitch1 it is easy to imagine the rest4 ,i shall not detain the reader with a description of the successive invention of other arts1 the development of language1 the trial and utilisation of talents1 the inequality of fortunes1 the use and abuse of riches1 and all the details connected with them which the reader can easily supply for himself4 ,i shall confine myself to a glance at mankind in this new situation4 ,behold then all human faculties developed1 memory and imagination in full play1 egoism interested1 reason active1 and the mind almost at the highest point of its perfection4 ,behold all the natural qualities in action1 the rank and condition of every man assigned him2 not merely his share of property and his power to serve or injure others1 but also his wit1 beauty1 strength or skill1 merit or talents3 and these being the only qualities capable of commanding respect1 it soon became necessary to possess or to affect them4 ,it now became the interest of men to appear what they really were not4 ,to be and to seem became two totally different things2 and from this distinction sprang insolent pomp and cheating trickery1 with all the numerous vices that go in their train4 ,on the other hand1 free and independent as men were before1 they were now1 in consequence of a multiplicity of new wants1 brought into subjection1 as it were1 to all nature1 and particularly to one another2 and each became in some degree a slave even in becoming the master of other men3 if rich1 they stood in need of the services of others2 if poor1 of their assistance2 and even a middle condition did not enable them to do without one another4 ,man must now1 therefore1 have been perpetually employed in getting others to interest themselves in his lot1 and in making them1 apparently at least1 if not really1 find their advantage in promoting his own4 ,thus he must have been sly and artful in his behaviour to some1 and imperious and cruel to others2 being under a kind of necessity to ill-use all the persons of whom he stood in need1 when he could not frighten them into compliance1 and did not judge it his interest to be useful to them4 ,insatiable ambition1 the thirst of raising their respective fortunes1 not so much from real want as from the desire to surpass others1 inspired all men with a vile propensity to injure one another1 and with a secret jealousy1 which is the more dangerous1 as it puts on the mask of benevolence1 to carry its point with greater security4 ,in a word1 there arose rivalry and competition on the one hand1 and conflicting interests on the other1 together with a secret desire on both of profiting at the expense of others4 ,all these evils were the first effects of property1 and the inseparable attendants of growing inequality4 ,before the invention of signs to represent riches1 wealth could hardly consist in anything but lands and cattle1 the only real possessions men can have4 ,but1 when inheritances so increased in number and extent as to occupy the whole of the land1 and to border on one another1 one man could aggrandise himself only at the expense of another2 at the same time the supernumeraries1 who had been too weak or too indolent to make such acquisitions1 and had grown poor without sustaining any loss1 because1 while they saw everything change around them1 they remained still the same1 were obliged to receive their subsistence1 or steal it1 from the rich2 and this soon bred1 according to their different characters1 dominion and slavery1 or violence and rapine4 ,the wealthy1 on their part1 had no sooner begun to taste the pleasure of command1 than they disdained all others1 and1 using their old slaves to acquire new1 thought of nothing but subduing and enslaving their neighbours2 like ravenous wolves1 which1 having once tasted human flesh1 despise every other food and thenceforth seek only men to devour4 ,thus1 as the most powerful or the most miserable considered their might or misery as a kind of right to the possessions of others1 equivalent1 in their opinion1 to that of property1 the destruction of equality was attended by the most terrible disorders4 ,usurpations by the rich1 robbery by the poor1 and the unbridled passions of both1 suppressed the cries of natural compassion and the still feeble voice of justice1 and filled men with avarice1 ambition and vice4 ,between the title of the strongest and that of the first occupier1 there arose perpetual conflicts1 which never ended but in battles and bloodshed4 ,the new-born state of society thus gave rise to a horrible state of war2 men thus harassed and depraved were no longer capable of retracing their steps or renouncing the fatal acquisitions they had made1 but1 labouring by the abuse of the faculties which do them honour1 merely to their own confusion1 brought themselves to the brink of ruin4 ,attonitus novitate mali1 divesque miserque1 ,effugere optat opes2 et qu mod voverat odit4#e ,it is impossible that men should not at length have reflected on so wretched a situation1 and on the calamities that overwhelmed them4 ,the rich1 in particular1 must have felt how much they suffered by a constant state of war1 of which they bore all the expense2 and in which1 though all risked their lives1 they alone risked their property4 ,besides1 however speciously they might disguise their usurpations1 they knew that they were founded on precarious and false titles2 so that1 if others took from them by force what they themselves had gained by force1 they would have no reason to complain4 ,even those who had been enriched by their own industry1 could hardly base their proprietorship on better claims4 ,it was in vain to repeat1 ,i built this well2 ,i gained this spot by my industry4 ,who gave you your standing1 it might be answered1 and what right have you to demand payment of us for doing what we never asked you to do8 ,do you not know that numbers of your fellow-creatures are starving1 for want of what you have too much of8 ,you ought to have had the express and universal consent of mankind1 before appropriating more of the common subsistence than you needed for your own maintenance4 ,destitute of valid reasons to justify and sufficient strength to defend himself1 able to crush individuals with ease1 but easily crushed himself by a troop of bandits1 one against all1 and incapable1 on account of mutual jealousy1 of joining with his equals against numerous enemies united by the common hope of plunder1 the rich man1 thus urged by necessity1 conceived at length the profoundest plan that ever entered the mind of man3 this was to employ in his favour the forces of those who attacked him1 to make allies of his adversaries1 to inspire them with different maxims1 and to give them other institutions as favourable to himself as the law of nature was unfavourable4 ,with this view1 after having represented to his neighbours the horror of a situation which armed every man against the rest1 and made their possessions as burdensome to them as their wants1 and in which no safety could be expected either in riches or in poverty1 he readily devised plausible arguments to make them close with his design4 ,let us join1 said he1 to guard the weak from oppression1 to restrain the ambitious1 and secure to every man the possession of what belongs to him3 let us institute rules of justice and peace1 to which all without exception may be obliged to conform2 rules that may in some measure make amends for the caprices of fortune1 by subjecting equally the powerful and the weak to the observance of reciprocal obligations4 ,let us1 in a word1 instead of turning our forces against ourselves1 collect them in a supreme power which may govern us by wise laws1 protect and defend all the members of the association1 repulse their common enemies1 and maintain eternal harmony among us4 ,far fewer words to this purpose would have been enough to impose on men so barbarous and easily seduced2 especially as they had too many disputes among themselves to do without arbitrators1 and too much ambition and avarice to go long without masters4 ,all ran headlong to their chains1 in hopes of securing their liberty2 for they had just wit enough to perceive the advantages of political institutions1 without experience enough to enable them to foresee the dangers4 ,the most capable of fore-seeing the dangers were the very persons who expected to benefit by them2 and even the most prudent judged it not inexpedient to sacrifice one part of their freedom to ensure the rest2 as a wounded man has his arm cut off to save the rest of his body4 ,such was1 or may well have been1 the origin of society and law1 which bound new fetters on the poor1 and gave new powers to the rich2 which irretrievably destroyed natural liberty1 eternally fixed the law of property and inequality1 converted clever usurpation into unalterable right1 and1 for the advantage of a few ambitious individuals1 subjected all mankind to perpetual labour1 slavery and wretchedness4 ,it is easy to see how the establishment of one community made that of all the rest necessary1 and how1 in order to make head against united forces1 the rest of mankind had to unite in turn4 ,societies soon multiplied and spread over the face of the earth1 till hardly a corner of the world was left in which a man could escape the yoke1 and withdraw his head from beneath the sword which he saw perpetually hanging over him by a thread4 ,civil right having thus become the common rule among the members of each community1 the law of nature maintained its place only between different communities1 where1 under the name of the right of nations1 it was qualified by certain tacit conventions1 in order to make commerce practicable1 and serve as a substitute for natural compassion1 which lost1 when applied to societies1 almost all the influence it had over individuals1 and survived no longer except in some great cosmopolitan spirits1 who1 breaking down the imaginary barriers that separate different peoples1 follow the example of our ,sovereign ,creator1 and include the whole human race in their benevolence4 ,but bodies politic1 remaining thus in a state of nature among themselves1 presently experienced the inconveniences which had obliged individuals to forsake it2 for this state became still more fatal to these great bodies than it had been to the individuals of whom they were composed4 ,hence arose national wars1 battles1 murders1 and reprisals1 which shock nature and outrage reason2 together with all those horrible prejudices which class among the virtues the honour of shedding human blood4 ,the most distinguished men hence learned to consider cutting each other's throats a duty2 at length men massacred their fellow-creatures by thousands without so much as knowing why1 and committed more murders in a single day's fighting1 and more violent outrages in the sack of a single town1 than were committed in the state of nature during whole ages over the whole earth4 ,such were the first effects which we can see to have followed the division of mankind into different communities4 ,but let us return to their institutions4 ,i know that some writers have given other explanations of the origin of political societies1 such as the conquest of the powerful1 or the association of the weak4 ,it is1 indeed1 indifferent to my argument which of these causes we choose4 ,that which ,i have just laid down1 however1 appears to me the most natural for the following reasons4 ,first3 because1 in the first case1 the right of conquest1 being no right1 in itself1 could not serve as a foundation on which to build any other2 the victor and the vanquished people still remained with respect to each other in the state of war1 unless the vanquished1 restored to the full possession of their liberty1 voluntarily made choice of the victor for their chief4 ,for till then1 whatever capitulation may have been made being founded on violence1 and therefore ipso facto void1 there could not have been on this hypothesis either a real society or body politic1 or any law other than that of the strongest4 ,secondly3 because the words strong and weak are1 in the second case1 ambiguous2 for during the interval between the establishment of a right of property1 or prior occupancy1 and that of political government1 the meaning of these words is better expressed by the terms rich and poor3 because1 in fact1 before the institution of laws1 men had no other way of reducing their equals to submission1 than by attacking their goods1 or making some of their own over to them4 ,thirdly3 because1 as the poor had nothing but their freedom to lose1 it would have been in the highest degree absurd for them to resign voluntarily the only good they still enjoyed1 without getting anything in exchange3 whereas the rich having feelings1 if ,i may so express myself1 in every part of their possessions1 it was much easier to harm them1 and therefore more necessary for them to take precautions against it2 and1 in short1 because it is more reasonable to suppose a thing to have been invented by those to whom it would be of service1 than by those whom it must have harmed4 ,government had1 in its infancy1 no regular and constant form4 ,the want of experience and philosophy prevented men from seeing any but present inconveniences1 and they thought of providing against others only as they presented themselves4 ,in spite of the endeavours of the wisest legislators1 the political state remained imperfect1 because it was little more than the work of chance2 and1 as it had begun ill1 though time revealed its defects and suggested remedies1 the original faults were never repaired4 ,it was continually being patched up1 when the first task should have been to get the site cleared and all the old materials removed1 as was done by ,lycurgus at ,sparta1 if a stable and lasting edifice was to be erected4 ,society consisted at first merely of a few general conventions1 which every member bound himself to observe2 and for the performance of covenants the whole body went security to each individual4 ,experience only could show the weakness of such a constitution1 and how easily it might be infringed with impunity1 from the difficulty of convicting men of faults1 where the public alone was to be witness and judge3 the laws could not but be eluded in many ways2 disorders and inconveniences could not but multiply continually1 till it became necessary to commit the dangerous trust of public authority to private persons1 and the care of enforcing obedience to the deliberations of the people to the magistrate4 ,for to say that chiefs were chosen before the confederacy was formed1 and that the administrators of the laws were there before the laws themselves1 is too absurd a supposition to consider seriously4 ,it would be as unreasonable to suppose that men at first threw themselves irretrievably and unconditionally into the arms of an absolute master1 and that the first expedient which proud and unsubdued men hit upon for their common security was to run headlong into slavery4 ,for what reason1 in fact1 did they take to themselves superiors1 if it was not in order that they might be defended from oppression1 and have protection for their lives1 liberties and properties1 which are1 so to speak1 the constituent elements of their being8 ,now1 in the relations between man and man1 the worst that can happen is for one to find himself at the mercy of another1 and it would have been inconsistent with common-sense to begin by bestowing on a chief the only things they wanted his help to preserve4 ,what equivalent could he offer them for so great a right8 ,and if he had presumed to exact it under pretext of defending them1 would he not have received the answer recorded in the fable3 ,what more can the enemy do to us8 ,it is therefore beyond dispute1 and indeed the fundamental maxim of all political right1 that people have set up chiefs to protect their liberty1 and not to enslave them4 ,if we have a prince1 said ,pliny to ,trajan1 it is to save ourselves from having a master4 ,politicians indulge in the same sophistry about the love of liberty as philosophers about the state of nature4 ,they judge1 by what they see1 of very different things1 which they have not seen2 and attribute to man a natural propensity to servitude1 because the slaves within their observation are seen to bear the yoke with patience2 they fail to reflect that it is with liberty as with innocence and virtue2 the value is known only to those who possess them1 and the taste for them is forfeited when they are forfeited themselves4 ,i know the charms of your country1 said ,brasidas to a ,satrap1 who was comparing the life at ,sparta with that at ,persepolis1 but you cannot know the pleasures of mine4 ,an unbroken horse erects his mane1 paws the ground and starts back impetuously at the sight of the bridle2 while one which is properly trained suffers patiently even whip and spur3 so savage man will not bend his neck to the yoke to which civilised man submits without a murmur1 but prefers the most turbulent state of liberty to the most peaceful slavery4 ,we cannot therefore1 from the servility of nations already enslaved1 judge of the natural disposition of mankind for or against slavery2 we should go by the prodigious efforts of every free people to save itself from oppression4 ,i know that the former are for ever holding forth in praise of the tranquillity they enjoy in their chains1 and that they call a state of wretched servitude a state of peace3 miserrimam servitutem pacem appellant4#f ,but when ,i observe the latter sacrificing pleasure1 peace1 wealth1 power and life itself to the preservation of that one treasure1 which is so disdained by those who have lost it2 when ,i see free-born animals dash their brains out against the bars of their cage1 from an innate impatience of captivity2 when ,i behold numbers of naked savages1 that despise ,european pleasures1 braving hunger1 fire1 the sword and death1 to preserve nothing but their independence1 ,i feel that it is not for slaves to argue about liberty4 ,with regard to paternal authority1 from which some writers have derived absolute government and all society1 it is enough1 without going back to the contrary arguments of ,locke and ,sidney1 to remark that nothing on earth can be further from the ferocious spirit of despotism than the mildness of that authority which looks more to the advantage of him who obeys than to that of him who commands2 that1 by the law of nature1 the father is the child's master no longer than his help is necessary2 that from that time they are both equal1 the son being perfectly independent of the father1 and owing him only respect and not obedience4 ,for gratitude is a duty which ought to be paid1 but not a right to be exacted3 instead of saying that civil society is derived from paternal authority1 we ought to say rather that the latter derives its principal force from the former4 ,no individual was ever acknowledged as the father of many1 till his sons and daughters remained settled around him4 ,the goods of the father1 of which he is really the master1 are the ties which keep his children in dependence1 and he may bestow on them1 if he pleases1 no share of his property1 unless they merit it by constant deference to his will4 ,but the subjects of an arbitrary despot are so far from having the like favour to expect from their chief1 that they themselves and everything they possess are his property1 or at least are considered by him as such2 so that they are forced to receive1 as a favour1 the little of their own he is pleased to leave them4 ,when he despoils them1 he does but justice1 and mercy in that he permits them to live4 ,by proceeding thus to test fact by right1 we should discover as little reason as truth in the voluntary establishment of tyranny4 ,it would also be no easy matter to prove the validity of a contract binding on only one of the parties1 where all the risk is on one side1 and none on the other2 so that no one could suffer but he who bound himself4 ,this hateful system is indeed1 even in modern times1 very far from being that of wise and good monarchs1 and especially of the kings of ,france2 as may be seen from several passages in their edicts2 particularly from the following passage in a celebrated edict published in #affg in the name and by order of ,louis ,,xiv4 ,let it not1 therefore1 be said that the ,sovereign is not subject to the laws of his ,state2 since the contrary is a true proposition of the right of nations1 which flattery has sometimes attacked but good princes have always defended as the tutelary divinity of their dominions4 ,how much more legitimate is it to say with the wise ,plato1 that the perfect felicity of a kingdom consists in the obedience of subjects to their prince1 and of the prince to the laws1 and in the laws being just and constantly directed to the public good6#g ,i shall not stay here to inquire whether1 as liberty is the noblest faculty of man1 it is not degrading our very nature1 reducing ourselves to the level of the brutes1 which are mere slaves of instinct1 and even an affront to the ,author of our being1 to renounce without reserve the most precious of all ,his gifts1 and to bow to the necessity of committing all the crimes ,he has forbidden1 merely to gratify a mad or a cruel master2 or if this sublime craftsman ought not to be less angered at seeing ,his workmanship entirely destroyed than thus dishonoured4 ,i will waive 7if my opponents please7 the authority of ,barbeyrac1 who1 following ,locke1 roundly declares that no man can so far sell his liberty as to submit to an arbitrary power which may use him as it likes4 ,for1 he adds1 this would be to sell his own life1 of which he is not master4 ,i shall ask only what right those who were not afraid thus to debase themselves could have to subject their posterity to the same ignominy1 and to renounce for them those blessings which they do not owe to the liberality of their progenitors1 and without which life itself must be a burden to all who are worthy of it4 ,puffendorf says that we may divest ourselves of our liberty in favour of other men1 just as we transfer our property from one to another by contracts and agreements4 ,but this seems a very weak argument4 ,for in the first place1 the property ,i alienate becomes quite foreign to me1 nor can ,i suffer from the abuse of it2 but it very nearly concerns me that my liberty should not be abused1 and ,i cannot without incurring the guilt of the crimes ,i may be compelled to commit1 expose myself to become an instrument of crime4 ,besides1 the right of property being only a convention of human institution1 men may dispose of what they possess as they please3 but this is not the case with the essential gifts of nature1 such as life and liberty1 which every man is permitted to enjoy1 and of which it is at least doubtful whether any have a right to divest themselves4 ,by giving up the one1 we degrade our being2 by giving up the other1 we do our best to annul it2 and1 as no temporal good can indemnify us for the loss of either1 it would be an offence against both reason and nature to renounce them at any price whatsoever4 ,but1 even if we could transfer our liberty1 as we do our property1 there would be a great difference with regard to the children1 who enjoy the father's substance only by the transmission of his right2 whereas1 liberty being a gift which they hold from nature as being men1 their parents have no right whatever to deprive them of it4 ,as then1 to establish slavery1 it was necessary to do violence to nature1 so1 in order to perpetuate such a right1 nature would have to be changed4 ,jurists1 who have gravely determined that the child of a slave comes into the world a slave1 have decided1 in other words1 that a man shall come into the world not a man4 ,i regard it then as certain1 that government did not begin with arbitrary power1 but that this is the depravation1 the extreme term1 of government1 and brings it back1 finally1 to just the law of the strongest1 which it was originally designed to remedy4 ,supposing1 however1 it had begun in this manner1 such power1 being in itself illegitimate1 could not have served as a basis for the laws of society1 nor1 consequently1 for the inequality they instituted4 ,without entering at present upon the investigations which still remain to be made into the nature of the fundamental compact underlying all government1 ,i content myself with adopting the common opinion concerning it1 and regard the establishment of the political body as a real contract between the people and the chiefs chosen by them3 a contract by which both parties bind themselves to observe the laws therein expressed1 which form the ties of their union4 ,the people having in respect of their social relations concentrated all their wills in one1 the several articles1 concerning which this will is explained1 become so many fundamental laws1 obligatory on all the members of the ,state without exception1 and one of these articles regulates the choice and power of the magistrates appointed to watch over the execution of the rest4 ,this power extends to everything which may maintain the constitution1 without going so far as to alter it4 ,it is accompanied by honours1 in order to bring the laws and their administrators into respect4 ,the ministers are also distinguished by personal prerogatives1 in order to recompense them for the cares and labour which good administration involves4 ,the magistrate1 on his side1 binds himself to use the power he is entrusted with only in conformity with the intention of his constituents1 to maintain them all in the peaceable possession of what belongs to them1 and to prefer on every occasion the public interest to his own4 ,before experience had shown1 or knowledge of the human heart enabled men to foresee1 the unavoidable abuses of such a constitution1 it must have appeared so much the more excellent1 as those who were charged with the care of its preservation had themselves most interest in it2 for magistracy and the rights attaching to it being based solely on the fundamental laws1 the magistrates would cease to be legitimate as soon as these ceased to exist2 the people would no longer owe them obedience2 and as not the magistrates1 but the laws1 are essential to the being of a ,state1 the members of it would regain the right to their natural liberty4 ,if we reflect with ever so little attention on this subject1 we shall find new arguments to confirm this truth1 and be convinced from the very nature of the contract that it cannot be irrevocable3 for1 if there were no superior power capable of ensuring the fidelity of the contracting parties1 or compelling them to perform their reciprocal engagements1 the parties would be sole judges in their own cause1 and each would always have a right to renounce the contract1 as soon as he found that the other had violated its terms1 or that they no longer suited his convenience4 ,it is upon this principle that the right of abdication may possibly be founded4 ,now1 if1 as here1 we consider only what is human in this institution1 it is certain that1 if the magistrate1 who has all the power in his own hands1 and appropriates to himself all the advantages of the contract1 has none the less a right to renounce his authority1 the people1 who suffer for all the faults of their chief1 must have a much better right to renounce their dependence4 ,but the terrible and innumerable quarrels and disorders that would necessarily arise from so dangerous a privilege1 show1 more than anything else1 how much human governments stood in need of a more solid basis than mere reason1 and how expedient it was for the public tranquillity that the divine will should interpose to invest the sovereign authority with a sacred and inviolable character1 which might deprive subjects of the fatal right of disposing of it4 ,if the world had received no other advantages from religion1 this would be enough to impose on men the duty of adopting and cultivating it1 abuses and all1 since it has been the means of saving more blood than fanaticism has ever spilt4 ,but let us follow the thread of our hypothesis4 ,the different forms of government owe their origin to the differing degrees of inequality which existed between individuals at the time of their institution4 ,if there happened to be any one man among them pre-eminent in power1 virtue1 riches or personal influence1 he became sole magistrate1 and the ,state assumed the form of monarchy4 ,if several1 nearly equal in point of eminence1 stood above the rest1 they were elected jointly1 and formed an aristocracy4 ,again1 among a people who had deviated less from a state of nature1 and between whose fortune or talents there was less disproportion1 the supreme administration was retained in common1 and a democracy was formed4 ,it was discovered in process of time which of these forms suited men the best4 ,some peoples remained altogether subject to the laws2 others soon came to obey their magistrates4 ,the citizens laboured to preserve their liberty2 the subjects1 irritated at seeing others enjoying a blessing they had lost1 thought only of making slaves of their neighbours4 ,in a word1 on the one side arose riches and conquests1 and on the other happiness and ,i virtue4 ,in these different governments1 all the offices were at first elective2 and when the influence of wealth was out of the question1 the preference was given to merit1 which gives a natural ascendancy1 and to age1 which is experienced in business and deliberate in council4 ,the ,elders of the ,hebrews1 the ,gerontes at ,sparta1 the ,senate at ,rome1 and the very etymology of our word ,seigneur1 show how old age was once held in veneration4 ,but the more often the choice fell upon old men1 the more often elections had to be repeated1 and the more they became a nuisance2 intrigues set in1 factions were formed1 party feeling grew--bitter1 civil wars broke out2 the lives of individuals were sacrificed to the pretended happiness of the ,state2 and at length men were on the point of relapsing into their primitive anarchy4 ,ambitious chiefs profited by these circumstances to perpetuate their offices in their own families3 at the same time the people1 already used to dependence1 ease1 and the conveniences of life1 and already incapable of breaking its fetters1 agreed to an increase of its slavery1 in order to secure its tranquillity4 ,thus magistrates1 having become hereditary1 contracted the habit of considering their offices as a family estate1 and themselves as proprietors of the communities of which they were at first only the officers1 of regarding their fellow-citizens as their slaves1 and numbering them1 like cattle1 among their belongings1 and of calling themselves the equals of the gods and longs of kings4 ,if we follow the progress of inequality in these various revolutions1 we shall find that the establishment of laws and of the right of property was its first term1 the institution of magistracy the second1 and the conversion of legitimate into arbitrary power the third and last2 so that the condition of rich and poor was authorised by the first period2 that of powerful and weak by the second2 and only by the third that of master and slave1 which is the last degree of inequality1 and the term at which all the rest remain1 when they have got so far1 till the government is either entirely dissolved by new revolutions1 or brought back again to legitimacy4 ,to understand this progress as necessary we must consider not so much the motives for the establishment of the body politic1 as the forms it assumes in actuality1 and the faults that necessarily attend it3 for the flaws which make social institutions necessary are the same as make the abuse of them unavoidable4 ,if we except ,sparta1 where the laws were mainly concerned with the education of children1 and where ,lycurgus established such morality as practically made laws needless--for laws as a rule1 being weaker than the passions1 restrain men without altering them--it would not be difficult to prove that every government1 which scrupulously complied with the ends for which it was instituted1 and guarded carefully against change and corruption1 was set up unnecessarily4 ,for a country1 in which no one either evaded the laws or made a bad use of magisterial power1 could require neither laws nor magistrates4 ,political distinctions necessarily produce civil distinctions4 ,the growing equality between the chiefs and the people is soon felt by individuals1 and modified in a thousand ways according to passions1 talents and circumstances4 ,the magistrate could not usurp any illegitimate power1 without giving distinction to the creatures with whom he must share it4 ,besides1 individuals only allow themselves to be oppressed so far as they are hurried on by blind ambition1 and1 looking rather below than above them1 come to love authority more than independence1 and submit to slavery1 that they may in turn enslave others4 ,it is no easy matter to reduce to obedience a man who has no ambition to command2 nor would the most adroit politician find it possible to enslave a people whose only desire was to be independent4 ,but inequality easily makes its way among cowardly and ambitious minds1 which are ever ready to run the risks of fortune1 and almost indifferent whether they command or obey1 as it is favourable or adverse4 ,thus1 there must have been2 a time1 when the eyes of the people were so fascinated1 that their rulers had only to say to the least of men1 ,be great1 you and all your posterity1 to make him immediately appear great in the eyes of every one as well as in his own4 ,his descendants took still more upon them1 in proportion to their distance from him2 the more obscure2 and uncertain the cause1 the greater the effect3 the greater--the number of idlers one could count in a family1 the more illustrious it was held to be4 ,if this were the place to go into details1 ,i could readily explain how1 even without the intervention of government1 inequality of credit and authority became unavoidable among private persons1 as soon as their union in a single society made them compare themselves one with another1 and take into account the differences which they found out from the continual intercourse every man had to have with his neighbours4#h ,these differences are of several kinds2 but riches1 nobility or rank1 power and personal merit being the principal distinctions by which men form an estimate of each other in society1 ,i could prove that the harmony or conflict of these different forces is the surest indication of the good or bad constitution of a ,state4 ,i could show that among these four kinds of inequality1 personal qualities being the origin of all the others1 wealth is the one to which they are all reduced in the end2 for1 as riches tend most immediately to the prosperity of individuals1 and are easiest to communicate1 they are used to purchase every other distinction4 ,by this observation we are enabled to judge pretty exactly how far a people has departed from its primitive constitution1 and of its progress towards the extreme term of corruption4 ,i could explain how much this universal desire for reputation1 honours and advancement1 which inflames us all1 exercises and holds up to comparison our faculties and powers2 how it excites and multiplies our passions1 and1 by creating universal competition and rivalry1 or rather enmity1 among men1 occasions numberless failures1 successes and disturbances of all kinds by making so many aspirants run the same course4 ,i could show that it is to this desire of being talked about1 and this unremitting rage of distinguishing ourselves1 that we owe the best and the worst things we possess1 both our virtues and our vices1 our science and our errors1 our conquerors and our philosophers2 that is to say1 a great many bad things1 and a very few good ones4 ,in a word1 ,i could prove that1 if we have a few rich and powerful men on the pinnacle of fortune and grandeur1 while the crowd grovels in want and obscurity1 it is because the former prize what they enjoy only in so far as others are destitute of it2 and because1 without changing their condition1 they would cease to be happy the moment the people ceased to be wretched4 ,these details alone1 however1 would furnish matter for a considerable work1 in which the advantages and disadvantages of every kind of government might be weighed1 as they are related to man in the state of nature1 and at the same time all the different aspects1 under which inequality has up to the present appeared1 or may appear in ages yet to come1 according to the nature of the several governments1 and the alterations which time must unavoidably occasion in them1 might be demonstrated4 ,we should then see the multitude oppressed from within1 in consequence of the very precautions it had taken to guard against foreign tyranny4 ,we should see oppression continually gain ground without it being possible for the oppressed to know where it would stop1 or what legitimate means was left them of checking its progress4 ,we should see the rights of citizens1 and the freedom of nations slowly extinguished1 and the complaints1 protests and appeals of the weak treated as seditious murmurings4 ,we should see the honour of defending the common cause confined by statecraft to a mercenary part of the people4 ,we should see taxes made necessary by such means1 and the disheartened husbandman deserting his fields even in the midst of peace1 and leaving the plough to gird on the sword4 ,we should see fatal and capricious codes of honour established2 and the champions of their country sooner or later becoming its enemies1 and for ever holding their daggers to the breasts of their fellow-citizens4 ,the time would come when they would be heard saying to the oppressor of their country-- ,pectore si fratris gladium juguloque parentis ,condere me jubeas1 gravidque in viscera partu ,conjugis1 invit peragam tamen omnia dextr4 ,lucan4 i1 #cgf4 ,from great inequality of fortunes and conditions1 from the vast variety of passions and of talents1 of useless and pernicious arts1 of vain sciences1 would arise a multitude of prejudices equally contrary to reason1 happiness and virtue4 ,we should see the magistrates fomenting everything that might weaken men united in society1 by promoting dissension among them2 everything that might sow in it the seeds of actual division1 while it gave society the air of harmony2 everything that might inspire the different ranks of people with mutual hatred and distrust1 by setting the rights and interests of one against those of another1 and so strengthen the power which comprehended them all4 ,it is from the midst of this disorder and these revolutions1 that despotism1 gradually raising up its hideous head and devouring everything that remained sound and untainted in any part of the ,state1 would at length trample on both the laws and the people1 and establish itself on the ruins of the republic4 ,the times which immediately preceded this last change would be times of trouble and calamity2 but at length the monster would swallow up everything1 and the people would no longer have either chiefs or laws1 but only tyrants4 ,from this moment there would be no question of virtue or morality2 for despotism cui ex honesto nulla est spes1 wherever it prevails1 admits no other master2 it no sooner speaks than probity and duty lose their weight and blind obedience is the only virtue which slaves can still practise4 ,this is the last term of inequality1 the extreme points that closes the circle1 and meets that from which we set out4 ,here all private persons return to their first equality1 because they are nothing2 and1 subjects having no law but the will of their master1 and their master no restraint but his passions1 all notions of good and all principles of equity again vanish4 ,there is here a complete return to the law of the strongest1 and so to a new state of nature1 differing from that we set out from2 for the one was a state of nature in its first purity1 while this is the consequence of excessive corruption4 ,there is so little difference between the two states in other respects1 and the contract of government is so completely dissolved by despotism1 that the despot is master only so long as he remains the strongest2 as soon as he can be expelled1 he has no right to complain of violence4 ,the popular insurrection that ends in the death or deposition of a ,sultan is as lawful an act as those by which he disposed1 the day before1 of the lives and fortunes of his subjects4 ,as he was maintained by force alone1 it is force alone that overthrows him4 ,thus everything takes place according to the natural order2 and1 whatever may be the result of such frequent and precipitate revolutions1 no one man has reason to complain of the injustice of another1 but only of his own ill-fortune or indiscretion4 ,if the reader thus discovers and retraces the lost and forgotten road1 by which man must have passed from the state of nature to the state of society2 if he carefully restores1 along with the intermediate situations which ,i have just described1 those which want of time has compelled me to suppress1 or my imagination has failed to suggest1 he cannot fail to be struck by the vast distance which separates the two states4 ,it is in tracing this slow succession that he will find the solution of a number of problems of politics and morals1 which philosophers cannot settle4 ,he will feel that1 men being different in different ages1 the reason why ,diogenes could not find a man was that he sought among his contemporaries a man of an earlier period4 ,he will see that ,cato died with ,rome and liberty1 because he did not fit the age in which he lived2 the greatest of men served only to astonish a world which he would certainly have ruled1 had he lived five hundred years sooner4 ,in a word1 he will explain how the soul and the passions of men insensibly change their very nature2 why our wants and pleasures in the end seek new objects2 and why1 the original man having vanished by degrees1 society offers to us only an assembly of artificial men and factitious passions1 which are the work of all these new relations1 and without any real foundation in nature4 ,we are taught nothing on this subject1 by reflection1 that is not entirely confirmed by observation4 ,the savage and the civilised man differ so much in the bottom of their hearts and in their inclinations1 that what constitutes the supreme happiness of one would reduce the other to despair4 ,the former breathes only peace and liberty2 he desires only to live and be free from labour2 even the ataraxia of the ,stoic falls far short of his profound indifference to every other object4 ,civilised man1 on the other hand1 is always moving1 sweating1 toiling and racking his brains to find still more laborious occupations3 he goes on in drudgery to his last moment1 and even seeks death to put himself in a position to live1 or renounces life to acquire immortality4 ,he pays his court to men in power1 whom he hates1 and to the wealthy1 whom he despises2 he stops at nothing to have the honour of serving them2 he is not ashamed to value himself on his own meanness and their protection2 and1 proud of his slavery1 he speaks with disdain of those1 who have not the honour of sharing it4 ,what a sight would the perplexing and envied labours of a ,european minister of ,state present to the eyes of a ,caribean6 ,how many cruel deaths would not this indolent savage prefer to the horrors of such a life1 which is seldom even sweetened by the pleasure of doing good6 ,but1 for him to see into the motives of all this solicitude1 the words power and reputation1 would have to bear some meaning in his mind2 he would have to know that there are men who set a value on the opinion of the rest of the world2 who can be made happy and satisfied with themselves rather on the testimony of other people than on their own4 ,in reality1 the source1 of all these differences is1 that the savage lives within himself1 while social man lives constantly outside himself1 and only knows how to live in the opinion of others1 so that he seems to receive the consciousness of his own existence merely from the judgment of others concerning him4 ,it is not to my present purpose to insist on the indifference to good and evil which arises from this disposition1 in spite of our many fine works on morality1 or to show how1 everything being reduced to appearances1 there is but art and mummery in even honour1 friendship1 virtue1 and often vice itself1 of which we at length learn the secret of boasting2 to show1 in short1 how1 always asking others what1 we are1 and never daring to ask ourselves1 in the midst of so much philosophy1 humanity and civilisation1 and of such sublime codes of morality1 we have nothing to show for ourselves but a frivolous and deceitful appearance1 honour without virtue1 reason without wisdom1 and pleasure without happiness4 ,it is sufficient that ,i have proved that this is not by any means the original state of man1 but that it is merely the spirit of society1 and the inequality which society produces1 that thus transform and alter all our natural inclinations4 ,i have endeavoured to trace the origin and progress of inequality1 and the institution and abuse of political societies1 as far as these are capable of being deduced from the nature of man merely by the light of reason1 and independently of those sacred dogmas which give the sanction of divine right to sovereign authority4 ,it follows from this survey that1 as there is hardly any inequality in the state of nature1 all the inequality which now prevails owes its strength and growth to the development of our faculties and the advance of the human mind1 and becomes at last permanent and legitimate by the establishment of property and laws4 ,secondly1 it follows that moral inequality authorised by positive right alone1 clashes with natural right1 whenever it is not proportionate to physical inequality2 a distinction which sufficiently determines what we ought to think of that species of inequality which prevails in all civilised countries2 since it is plainly contrary to the law of nature1 however defined1 that children should command old men1 fools wise men1 and that the privileged few should gorge themselves with superfluities1 while the starving multitude are in want of the bare necessities of life4 #e ,ovid1 ,metamorphoses xi1 #abg4 ,both rich and poor1 shocked at their new-found ills1 ,would fly from wealth1 and lose what they had sought4 #f ,tacitus1 ,hist4 iv1 #ag4 ,the most wretched slavery they call peace4 #g ,of the ,rights of the ,most ,christian ,queen over various ,states of the ,monarchy of ,spain1 #affg4 #h ,distributive justice would oppose this rigorous equality of the state of nature1 even were it practicable in civil society2 as all the members of the ,state owe it their services in proportion to their talents and abilities1 they ought1 on their side1 to be distinguished and favoured in proportion to the services they have actually rendered4 ,it is in this sense we must understand that passage of ,isocrates1 in which he extols the primitive ,athenians1 for having determined which of the two kinds of equality was the most useful1 viz4 that which consists in dividing the same advantages indiscriminately among all the citizens1 or that which consists in distributing them to each according to his deserts4 ,these able politicians1 adds the orator1 banishing that unjust inequality which makes no distinction between good and bad men1 adhered inviolably to that which rewards and punishes every man according to his deserts4 ,but in the first place1 there never existed a society1 however corrupt some may have become1 where no difference was made between the good and the bad2 and with regard to morality1 where no measures can be prescribed by law exact enough to serve as a practical rule for a magistrate1 it is with great prudence that1 in order not to leave the fortune or quality of the citizens to his discretion1 it prohibits him from passing judgment on persons and confines his judgment to actions4 ,only morals such as those of the ancient ,romans can bear censors1 and such a tribunal among us would throw everything into confusion4 ,the difference between good and bad men is determined by public esteem2 the magistrate being strictly a judge of right alone2 whereas the public is the truest judge of morals1 and is of such integrity and penetration on this head1 that although it may be sometimes deceived1 it can never be corrupted4 ,the rank of citizens ought1 therefore1 to be regulated1 not according to their personal merit--for this would put it in the power of the magistrate to apply the law almost arbitrarily--but according to the actual services done to the ,state1 which are capable of being more exactly estimated4 ,,appendix#a ,a famous author1 reckoning up the good and evil of human life1 and comparing the aggregates1 finds that our pains greatly exceed our pleasures3 so that1 all things considered1 human life is not at all a valuable gift4 ,this conclusion does not surprise me2 for the writer drew all his arguments from man in civilisation4 ,had he gone back to the state of nature1 his inquiries would clearly have had a different result1 and man would have been seen to be subject to very few evils not of his own creation4 ,it has indeed cost us not a little trouble to make ourselves as wretched as we are4 ,when we consider1 on the one hand1 the immense labours of mankind1 the many sciences brought to perfection1 the arts invented1 the powers employed1 the deeps filled up1 the mountains levelled1 the rocks shattered1 the rivers made navigable1 the tracts of land cleared1 the lakes emptied1 the marshes drained1 the enormous structures erected on land1 and the teeming vessels that cover the sea2 and1 on the other hand1 estimate with ever so little thought1 the real advantages that have accrued from all these works to mankind1 we cannot help being amazed at the vast disproportion there is between these things1 and deploring the infatuation of man1 which1 to gratify his silly pride and vain self-admiration1 induces him eagerly to pursue all the miseries he is capable of feeling1 though beneficent nature had kindly placed them out of his way4 ,that men are actually wicked1 a sad and continual experience of them proves beyond doubt3 but all the same1 ,i think ,i've shown that man is naturally good4 ,what then can have depraved him to such an extent1 except the changes that have happened in his constitution1 the advances he has made1 and the knowledge he has acquired8 ,we may admire human society as much as we please2 it will be none the less true that it necessarily leads men to hate each other in proportion as their interests clash1 and to do one another apparent services1 while they are really doing every imaginable mischief4 ,what can be thought of a relation1 in which the interest of every individual dictates rules directly opposite to those the public reason dictates to the community in general--in which every man finds his profit in the misfortunes of his neighbour8 ,there is not perhaps any man in a comfortable position who has not greedy heirs1 and perhaps even children1 secretly wishing for his death2 not a ship at sea1 of which the loss would not be good news to some merchant or other2 not a house1 which some debtor of bad faith would not be glad to see reduced to ashes with all the papers it contains2 not a nation which does not rejoice at the disasters that befall its neighbours4 ,thus it is that we find our advantage in the misfortunes of our fellow-creatures1 and that the loss of one man almost always constitutes the prosperity of another4 ,but it is still more pernicious that public calamities are the objects of the hopes and expectations of innumerable individuals4 ,some desire sickness1 some mortality1 some war1 and some famine4 ,i have seen men wicked enough to weep for sorrow at the prospect of a plentiful season2 and the great and fatal fire of ,london1 which cost so many unhappy persons their lives or their fortunes1 made the fortunes of perhaps ten thousand others4 ,i know that ,montaigne2 censures ,demades the ,athenian for having caused to be ,i punished a workman who1 by selling his coffins very dear1 was a great gainer by the deaths of his fellow-citizens2 but1 the reason alleged by ,montaigne being that everybody ought to be punished1 my point is clearly confirmed by it4 ,let us penetrate1 therefore1 the superficial appearances of benevolence1 and survey what passes in the inmost recesses of the heart4 ,let us reflect what must be the state of things1 when men are forced to caress and destroy one another at the same time2 when they are born enemies by duty1 and knaves by interest4 ,it will perhaps be said that society is so formed that every man gains by serving the rest4 ,that would be all very well1 if he did not gain still more by injuring them4 ,there is no legitimate profit so great1 that it cannot be greatly exceeded by what may be made illegitimately2 we always gain more by hurting our neighbours than by doing them good4 ,nothing is required but to know how to act with impunity2 and to this end the powerful employ all their strength1 and the weak all their cunning4 ,savage man1 when he has dined1 is at peace with all nature1 and the friend of all his fellow-creatures4 ,if a dispute arises about a meal1 he rarely comes to blows1 without having first compared the difficulty of conquering his antagonist with the trouble of finding subsistence elsewhere3 and1 as pride does not come in1 it all ends in a few blows2 the victor eats1 and the vanquished seeks provision somewhere else1 and all is at peace4 ,the case is quite different with man in the state of society1 for whom first necessaries have to be provided1 and then superfluities2 delicacies follow next1 then immense wealth1 then subjects1 and then slaves4 ,he enjoys not a moments relaxation2 and what is yet stranger1 the less natural and pressing his wants1 the more headstrong are his passions1 and1 still worse1 the more he has it in his power to gratify them2 so that after a long course of prosperity1 after having swallowed up treasures and ruined multitudes1 the hero ends up by cutting every throat till he finds himself1 at last1 sole master of the world4 ,such is in miniature the moral picture1 if not of human life1 at least of the secret pretensions of the heart of civilised man4 ,compare without partiality the state of the citizen with that of the savage1 and trace out1 if you can1 how many inlets the former has opened to pain and death1 besides those of his vices1 his wants and his misfortunes4 ,if you reflect on the mental afflictions that prey on us1 the violent passions that waste and exhaust us1 the excessive labour with which the poor are burdened1 the still more dangerous indolence to which the wealthy give themselves up1 so that the poor perish of want1 and the rich of surfeit2 if you reflect but a moment on the heterogeneous mixtures and pernicious seasonings of foods2 the corrupt state in which they are frequently eaten2 on the adulteration of medicines1 the wiles of those who sell them1 the mistakes of those who administer them1 and the poisonous vessels in which they are prepared2 on the epidemics bred by foul air in consequence of great numbers of men being crowded together1 or those which are caused by our delicate way of living1 by our passing from our houses into the open air and back again1 by the putting on or throwing off our clothes with too little care1 and by all the precautions which sensuality has converted into necessary habits1 and the neglect of which sometimes costs us our life or health2 if you take into account the conflagrations and earthquakes1 which1 devouring or overwhelming whole cities1 destroy the inhabitants by thousands2 in a word1 if you add together all the dangers with which these causes are always threatening us1 you will see how dearly nature makes us pay for the contempt with which we have treated her lessons4 ,i shall not here repeat1 what ,i have elsewhere said of the calamities of war2 but wish that those1 who have sufficient knowledge1 were willing or bold enough to make public the details of the villainies committed in armies by the contractors for commissariat1 and hospitals3 we should see plainly that their monstrous frauds1 already none too well concealed1 which cripple the finest armies in less than no time1 occasion greater destruction among the soldiers than the swords of the enemy4 ,the number of people who perish annually at sea1 by famine1 the scurvy1 pirates1 fire and shipwrecks1 affords matter for another shocking calculation4 ,we must also place to the credit of the establishment of property1 and consequently to the institution of society1 assassinations1 poisonings1 highway robberies1 and even the punishments inflicted on the wretches guilty of these crimes2 which1 though expedient to prevent greater evils1 yet by making the murder of one man cost the lives of two or more1 double the loss to the human race4 ,what shameful methods are sometimes practised to prevent the birth of men1 and cheat nature2 either by brutal and depraved appetites which insult her most beautiful work--appetites unknown to savages or mere animals1 which can spring only from the corrupt imagination of mankind in civilised countries2 or by secret abortions1 the fitting effects of debauchery and vitiated notions of honour2 or by the exposure or murder of multitudes of infants1 who fall victims to the poverty of their parents1 or the cruel shame of their mothers2 or1 finally1 by the mutilation of unhappy wretches1 part of whose life1 with their hope of posterity1 is given up to vain singing1 or1 still worse1 the brutal jealousy of other men3 a mutilation which1 in the last case1 becomes a double outrage against nature from the treatment of those who suffer it1 and from the use to which they are destined4 ,but is it not a thousand times more common and more dangerous for paternal rights openly to offend against humanity8 ,how many talents have not been thrown away1 and inclinations forced1 by the unwise constraint of fathers8 ,how many men1 who would have distinguished themselves in a fitting estate1 have died dishonoured and wretched in another for which they had no taste6 ,how many happy1 but unequal1 marriages have been broken or disturbed1 and how many chaste wives have been dishonoured1 by an order of things continually in contradiction with that of nature6 ,how many good and virtuous husbands and wives are reciprocally punished for having been ill-assorted6 ,how many young and unhappy victims of their parents' avarice plunge into vice1 or pass their melancholy days in tears1 groaning in the indissoluble bonds which their hearts repudiate and gold alone has formed6 ,fortunate sometimes are those whose courage and virtue remove them from life before inhuman violence makes them spend it in crime or in despair4 ,forgive me1 father and mother1 whom ,i shall ever regret3 my complaint embitters your griefs2 but would they might be an eternal and terrible example to every one who dares1 in the name of nature1 to violate her most sacred right4 ,if ,i have spoken only of those ill-starred unions which are the result of our system1 is it to be thought that those over which love and sympathy preside are free from disadvantages8 ,what if ,i should undertake to show humanity attacked in its very source1 and even in the most sacred of all ties1 in which fortune is consulted before nature1 and1 the disorders of society confounding all virtue and vice1 continence becomes a criminal precaution1 and a refusal to give life to a fellow-creature1 an act of humanity8 ,but1 without drawing aside the veil which hides all these horrors1 let us content ourselves with pointing out the evil which others will have to remedy4 ,to all this add the multiplicity of unhealthy trades1 which shorten men's lives or destroy their bodies1 such as working in the mines1 and the preparing of metals and minerals1 particularly lead1 copper1 mercury1 cobalt1 and arsenic3 add those other dangerous trades which are daily fatal to many tilers1 carpenters1 masons and miners3 put all these together and we can see1 in the establishment and perfection of societies1 the reasons for that diminution of our species1 which has been noticed by many philosophers4 ,luxury1 which cannot be prevented among men who are tenacious of their own convenience and of the respect paid them by others1 soon completes the evil society had begun1 and1 under the pretence of giving bread to the poor1 whom it should never have made such1 impoverishes all the rest1 and sooner or later depopulates the ,state4 ,luxury is a remedy much worse than the disease it sets up to cure2 or rather it is in itself the greatest of all evils1 for every ,state1 great or small3 for1 in order to maintain all the servants and vagabonds it creates1 it brings oppression and ruin on the citizen and the labourer2 it is like those scorching winds1 which1 covering the trees and plants with devouring insects1 deprive useful animals of their subsistence and spread famine and death wherever they blow4 ,from society and the luxury to which it gives birth arise the liberal and mechanical arts1 commerce1 letters1 and all those superfluities which make industry flourish1 and enrich and ruin nations4 ,the reason for such destruction is plain4 ,it is easy to see1 from the very nature of agriculture1 that it must be the least lucrative of all the arts2 for1 its produce being the most universally necessary1 the price must be proportionate to the abilities of the very poorest of mankind4 ,from the same principle may be deduced this rule1 that the arts in general are more lucrative in proportion as they are less useful2 and that1 in the end1 the most useful becomes the most neglected4 ,from this we may learn what to think of the real advantages of industry and the actual effects of its progress4 ,such are the sensible causes of all the miseries1 into which opulence at length plunges the most celebrated nations4 ,in proportion as arts and industry flourish1 the despised husbandman1 burdened with the taxes necessary for the support of luxury1 and condemned to pass his days between labour and hunger1 forsakes his native field1 to seek in towns the bread he ought to carry thither4 ,the more our capital cities strike the vulgar eye with admiration1 the greater reason is there to lament the sight of the abandoned countryside1 the large tracts of land that lie uncultivated1 the roads crowded with unfortunate citizens turned beggars or highwaymen1 and doomed to end their wretched lives either on a dunghill or on the gallows4 ,thus the ,state grows rich on the one hand1 and feeble and depopulated on the other2 the mightiest monarchies1 after having taken immense pains to enrich and depopulate themselves1 fall at last a prey to some poor nation1 which has yielded to the fatal temptation of invading them1 and then1 growing opulent and weak in its turn1 is itself invaded and ruined by some other4 ,let any one inform us what produced the swarms of barbarians1 who overran ,europe1 ,asia and ,africa for so many ages4 ,was their prodigious increase due to their industry and arts1 to the wisdom of their laws1 or to the excellence of their political system8 ,let the learned tell us why1 instead of multiplying to such a degree1 these fierce and brutal men1 without sense or science1 without education1 without restraint1 did not destroy each other hourly in quarrelling over the productions of their fields and woods4 ,let them tell us how these wretches could have the presumption to oppose such clever people as we were1 so well trained in military discipline1 and possessed of such excellent laws and institutions3 and why1 since society has been brought to perfection in northern countries1 and so much pains taken to instruct their inhabitants in their social duties and in the art of living happily and peaceably together1 we see them no longer produce such numberless hosts as they used once to send forth to be the plague and terror of other nations4 ,i fear some one may at last answer me by saying1 that all these fine things1 arts1 sciences and laws1 were wisely invented by men1 as a salutary plague1 to prevent the too great multiplication of mankind1 lest the world1 which was given us for a habitation1 should in time be too small for its inhabitants4 ,what1 then1 is to be done8 ,must societies be totally abolished8 ,must meum and tuum be annihilated1 and must we return again to the forests to live among beasts8 ,this is a deduction in the manner of my adversaries1 which ,i would as soon anticipate as let them have the shame of drawing4 ,o you1 who have never heard the voice of heaven1 who think man destined only to live this little life and die in peace2 you1 who can resign in the midst of populous cities your fatal acquisitions1 your restless spirits1 your corrupt hearts and endless desires2 resume1 since it depends entirely on yourselves1 your ancient and primitive innocence3 retire to the woods1 there to lose the sight and remembrance of the crimes of your contemporaries2 and be not apprehensive of degrading your species1 by renouncing its advances in order to renounce its vices4 ,as for men like me whose passions have destroyed their original simplicity1 who can no longer subsist on plants or acorns1 or live without laws and magistrates those who were honoured in their first father with supernatural instructions2 those who discover1 in the design of giving human actions at the start a morality which they must otherwise have been so long in acquiring1 the reason for a precept in itself indifferent and inexplicable on every other system2 those1 in short1 who are persuaded that the ,divine ,being has called all mankind to be partakers in the happiness and perfection of celestial intelligences1 all these will endeavour to merit the eternal prize they are to expect from the practice of those virtues1 which they make themselves follow in learning to know them4 ,they will respect the sacred bonds of their respective communities2 they will love theft fellow-citizens1 and serve them with all their might3 they will scrupulously obey the laws1 and all those who make or administer them2 they will particularly honour those wise and good princes1 who find means of preventing1 curing or even palliating all these evils and abuses1 by which we are constantly threatened2 they will animate the zeal of their deserving rulers1 by showing them1 without flattery or fear1 the importance of their office and the severity of their duty4 ,but they will not therefore have less contempt for a constitution that cannot support itself without the aid of so many splendid characters1 much oftener wished for than found2 and from which1 notwithstanding all their pains and solicitude1 there always arise more real calamities than even apparent advantages4 #a ,see the faculty of self-improvement4 ,a ,,discourse ,,on ,,political ,,economy ,the word ,economy1 or conomy1 is derived from 1 a house1 and 1 law1 and meant originally only the wise and legitimate government of the house for the common good of the whole family4 ,the meaning of the term was then extended to the government of that great family1 the ,state4 ,to distinguish these two senses of the word1 the latter is called general or political economy1 and the former domestic or particular economy4 ,the first only is discussed in the present discourse4 ,even if there were as close an analogy as many authors maintain between the ,state and the family1 it would not follow that the rules of conduct proper for one of these societies would be also proper for the other4 ,they differ too much in extent to be regulated in the same manner2 and there will always be a great difference between domestic government1 in which a father can see everything for himself1 and civil government1 where the chief sees hardly anything save through the eyes of others4 ,to put both on an equality in this respect1 the talents1 strength1 and all the faculties of the father would have to increase in proportion to the size of his family1 and the soul of a powerful monarch would have to be1 to that of an ordinary man1 as the extent of his empire is to that of a private person's estate4 ,but how could the government of the ,state be like that of the family1 when the basis on which they rest is so different8 ,the father being physically stronger than his children1 his paternal authority1 as long as they need his protection1 may be reasonably said to be established by nature4 ,but in the great family1 all the members of which are naturally equal1 the political authority1 being purely arbitrary as far as its institution is concerned1 can be founded only on conventions1 and the ,magistrate can have no authority over the rest1 except by virtue of the laws4 ,the duties of a father are dictated to him by natural feelings1 and in a manner that seldom allows him to neglect them4 ,for rulers there is no such principle1 and they are really obliged to the people only by what they themselves have promised to do1 and the people have therefore a right to require of them4 ,another more important difference is that since the children have nothing but what they receive from their father1 it is plain that all the rights of property belong to him1 or emanate from him2 but quite the opposite is the case in the great family1 where the general administration is established only to secure individual property1 which is antecedent to it4 ,the principal object of the work of the whole house is to preserve and increase the patrimony of the father1 in order that he may be able some day to distribute it among his children without impoverishing them2 whereas the wealth of the exchequer is only a means1 often ill understood1 of keeping the individuals in peace and plenty4 ,in a word1 the little family is destined to be extinguished1 and to resolve itself some day into several families of a similar nature2 but the great family1 being constituted to endure for ever in the same condition1 need not1 like the small one1 increase for the purpose of multiplying1 but need only maintain itself2 and it can easily be proved that any increase does it more harm than good4 ,in the family1 it is clear1 for several reasons which lie in its very nature1 that the father ought to command4 ,in the first place1 the authority ought not to be equally divided between father and mother2 the government must be single1 and in every division of opinion there must be one preponderant voice to decide4 ,secondly1 however lightly we may regard the disadvantages peculiar to women1 yet1 as they necessarily occasion intervals of inaction1 this is a sufficient reason for excluding them from this supreme authority3 for when the balance is perfectly even1 a straw is enough to turn the scale4 ,besides1 the husband ought to be able to superintend his wife's conduct1 because it is of importance for him to be assured that the children1 whom he is obliged to acknowledge and maintain1 belong to no-one but himself4 ,thirdly1 children should be obedient to their father1 at first of necessity1 and afterwards from gratitude3 after having had their wants satisfied by him during one half of their lives1 they ought to consecrate the other half to providing for his4 ,fourthly1 servants owe him their services in exchange for the provision he makes for them1 though they may break off the bargain as soon as it ceases to suit them4 ,i say nothing here of slavery1 because it is contrary to nature1 and cannot be authorised by any right or law4 ,there is nothing of all this in political society1 in which the chief is so far from having any natural interest in the happiness of the individuals1 that it is not uncommon for him to seek his own in their misery4 ,if the magistracy is hereditary1 a community of men is often governed by a child4 ,if it be elective1 innumerable inconveniences arise from such election2 while in both cases all the advantages of paternity are lost4 ,if you have but a single ruler1 you lie at the discretion of a master who has no reason to love you3 and if you have several1 you must bear at once their tyranny and their divisions4 ,in a word1 abuses are inevitable and their consequences fatal in every society where the public interest and the laws have no natural force1 and are perpetually attacked by personal interest and the passions of the ruler and the members4 ,although the functions of the father of a family and those of the chief magistrate ought to make for the same object1 they must do so in such different ways1 and their duty and rights are so essentially distinct1 that we cannot confound them without forming very false ideas about the fundamental laws of society1 and falling into errors which are fatal to mankind4 ,in fact1 if the voice of nature is the best counsellor to which a father can listen in the discharge of his duty1 for the ,magistrate it is a false guide1 which continually prevents him from performing his1 and leads him on sooner or later to the ruin of himself and of the ,state1 if he is not restrained by the most sublime virtue4 ,the only precaution necessary for the father of a family is to guard himself against depravity1 and prevent his natural inclinations from being corrupted2 whereas it is these themselves which corrupt the ,magistrate4 ,in order to act aright1 the first has only to consult his heart2 the other becomes a traitor the moment he listens to his4 ,even his own reason should be suspect to him1 nor should he follow any rule other than the public reason1 which is the law4 ,thus nature has made a multitude of good fathers of families2 but it is doubtful whether1 from the very beginning of the world1 human wisdom has made ten men capable of governing their peers4 ,from all that has just been said1 it follows that public economy1 which is my subject1 has been rightly distinguished from private economy1 and that1 the ,state having nothing in common with the family except the obligations which their heads lie under of making both of them happy1 the same rules of conduct cannot apply to both4 ,i have considered these few lines enough to overthrow the detestable system which ,sir ,robert ,filmer has endeavoured to establish in his ,patriarcha2 a work to which two celebrated writers have done too much honour in writing books to refute it4 ,moreover1 this error is of very long standing2 for ,aristotle himself thought proper to combat it with arguments which may be found in the first book of his ,politics4 ,i must here ask my readers to distinguish also between public economy1 which is my subject and which ,i call government1 and the supreme authority1 which ,i call ,sovereignty2 a distinction which consists in the fact that the latter has the right of legislation1 and in certain cases binds the body of the nation itself1 while the former has only the right of execution1 and is binding only on individuals4 ,i shall take the liberty of making use of a very common1 and in some respects inaccurate1 comparison1 which will serve to illustrate my meaning4 ,the body politic1 taken individually1 may be considered as an organised1 living body1 resembling that of man4 ,the sovereign power represents the head2 the laws and customs are the brain1 the source of the nerves and seat of the understanding1 will and senses1 of which the ,judges and ,magistrates are the organs3 commerce1 industry1 and agriculture are the mouth and stomach which prepare the common subsistence2 the public income is the blood1 which a prudent economy1 in performing the functions of the heart1 causes to distribute through the whole body nutriment and life3 the citizens are the body and the members1 which make the machine live1 move and work2 and no part of this machine can be damaged without the painful impression being at once conveyed to the brain1 if the animal is in a state of health4 ,the life of both bodies is the self common to the whole1 the reciprocal sensibility and internal correspondence of all the parts4 ,where this communication ceases1 where the formal unity disappears1 and the contiguous parts belong to one another only by juxtaposition1 the man is dead1 or the ,state is dissolved4 ,the body politic1 therefore1 is also a moral being possessed of a will2 and this general will1 which tends always to the preservation and welfare of the whole and of every part1 and is the source of the laws1 constitutes for all the members of the ,state1 in their relations to one another and to it1 the rule of what is just or unjust3 a truth which shows1 by the way1 how idly some writers have treated as theft the subtlety prescribed to children at ,sparta for obtaining their frugal repasts1 as if everything ordained by the law were not lawful4 ,it is important to observe that this rule of justice1 though certain with regard to all citizens1 may be defective with regard to foreigners4 ,the reason is clear4 ,the will of the ,state1 though general in relation to its own members1 is no longer so in relation to other ,states and their members1 but becomes1 for them1 a particular and individual will1 which has its rule of justice in the law of nature4 ,this1 however1 enters equally into the principle here laid down2 for in such a case1 the great city of the world becomes the body politic1 whose general will is always the law of nature1 and of which the different ,states and peoples are individual members4 ,from these distinctions1 applied to each political society and its members1 are derived the most certain and universal rules1 by which we can judge whether a government is good or bad1 and in general of the morality of all human actions4 ,every political society is composed of other smaller societies of different kinds1 each of which has its interests and its rules of conduct3 but those societies which everybody perceives1 because they have an external and authorised form1 are not the only ones that actually exist in the ,state3 all individuals who are united by a common interest compose as many others1 either transitory or permanent1 whose influence is none the less real because it is less apparent1 and the proper observation of whose various relations is the true knowledge of public morals and manners4 ,the influence of all these tacit or formal associations causes1 by the influence of their will1 as many different modifications of the public will4 ,the will of these particular societies has always two relations2 for the members of the association1 it is a general will2 for the great society1 it is a particular will2 and it is often right with regard to the first object1 and wrong as to the second4 ,an individual may be a devout priest1 a brave soldier1 or a zealous senator1 and yet a bad citizen4 ,a particular resolution may be advantageous to the smaller community1 but pernicious to the greater4 ,it is true that particular societies being always subordinate to the general society in preference to others1 the duty of a citizen takes precedence of that of a senator1 and a man's duty of that of a citizen3 but unhappily personal interest is always found in inverse ratio to duty1 and increases in proportion as the association grows narrower1 and the engagement less sacred2 which irrefragably proves that the most general will is always the must just also1 and that the voice of the people is in fact the voice of ,god4 ,it does not follow that the public decisions are always equitable2 they may possibly1 for reasons which ,i have given1 not be so when they have to do with foreigners4 ,thus it is not impossible that a ,republic1 though in itself well governed1 should enter upon an unjust war4 ,nor is it less possible for the ,council of a ,democracy to pass unjust decrees1 and condemn the innocent2 but this never happens unless the people is seduced by private interests1 which the credit or eloquence of some clever persons substitutes for those of the ,state2 in which case the general will will be one thing1 and the result of the public deliberation another4 ,this is not contradicted by the case of the ,athenian ,democracy2 for ,athens was in fact not a ,democracy1 but a very tyrannical ,aristocracy1 governed by philosophers and orators4 ,carefully determine what happens in every public deliberation1 and it will be seen that the general will is always for the common good2 but very often there is a secret division1 a tacit confederacy1 which1 for particular ends1 causes the natural disposition of the assembly to be set at nought4 ,in such a case the body of society is really divided into other bodies1 the members of which acquire a general will1 which is good and just with respect to these new bodies1 but unjust and bad with regard to the whole1 from which each is thus dismembered4 ,we see then how easy it is1 by the help of these principles1 to explain those apparent contradictions1 which are noticed in the conduct of many persons who are scrupulously honest in some respects1 and cheats and scoundrels in others1 who trample under foot the most sacred duties1 and yet are faithful to the death to engagements that are often illegitimate4 ,thus the most depraved of men always pay some sort of homage to public faith2 and even robbers1 who are the enemies of virtue in the great society1 pay some respect to the shadow of it in their secret caves4 ,in establishing the general will as the first principle of public economy1 and the fundamental rule of government1 ,i have not thought it necessary to inquire seriously whether the ,magistrates belong to the people1 or the people to the ,magistrates2 or whether in public affairs the good of the ,state should be taken into account1 or only that of its rulers4 ,that question indeed has long been decided one way in theory1 and another in practice2 and in general it would be ridiculous to expect that those who are in fact masters will prefer any other interest to their own4 ,it would not be improper1 therefore1 further to distinguish public economy as popular or tyrannical4 ,the former is that of every ,state1 in which there reigns between the people and the rulers unity of interest and will3 the latter will necessarily exist wherever the government and the people have different interests1 and1 consequently1 opposing wills4 ,the rules of the latter are written at length in the archives of history1 and in the satires of ,macchiavelli4 ,the rules of the former are found only in the writings of those philosophers who venture to proclaim the rights of humanity4 ,i4 ,the first and most important rule of legitimate or popular government1 that is to say1 of government whose object is the good of the people1 is therefore1 as ,i have observed1 to follow in everything the general will4 ,but to follow this will it is necessary to know it1 and above all to distinguish it from the particular will1 beginning with one's self3 this distinction is always very difficult to make1 and only the most sublime virtue can afford sufficient illumination for it4 ,as1 in order to will1 it is necessary to be free1 a difficulty no less great than the former arises--that of preserving at once the public liberty and the authority of government4 ,look into the motives which have induced men1 once united by their common needs in a general society1 to unite themselves still more intimately by means of civil societies3 you will find no other motive than that of assuring the property1 life and liberty of each member by the protection of all4 ,but can men be forced to defend the liberty of any one among them1 without trespassing on that of others8 ,and how can they provide for the public needs1 without alienating the individual property of those who are forced to contribute to them8 ,with whatever sophistry all this may be covered over1 it is certain that if any constraint can be laid on my will1 ,i am no longer free1 and that ,i am no longer master of my own property1 if any one else can lay a hand on it4 ,this difficulty1 which would have seemed insurmountable1 has been removed1 like the first1 by the most sublime of all human institutions1 or rather by a divine inspiration1 which teaches mankind to imitate here below the unchangeable decrees of the ,deity4 ,by what inconceivable art has a means been found of making men free by making them subject2 of using in the service of the ,state the properties1 the persons and even the lives of all its members1 without constraining and without consulting them2 of confining their will by their own admission2 of overcoming their refusal by that consent1 and forcing them to punish themselves1 when they act against their own will8 ,how can it be that all should obey1 yet nobody take upon him to command1 and that all should serve1 and yet have no masters1 but be the more free1 as1 in apparent subjection1 each loses no part of his liberty but what might be hurtful2 to that of another8 ,these wonders are the work of law4 ,it is to law alone that men owe justice and liberty4 ,it is this salutary organ of the will of all which establishes1 in civil right1 the natural equality between men4 ,it is this celestial voice which dictates to each citizen the precepts of public reason1 and teaches him to act according to the rules of his own judgment1 and not to behave inconsistently with himself4 ,it is with this voice alone that political rulers should speak when they command2 for no sooner does one man1 setting aside the law1 claim to subject another to his private will1 than he departs from the state of civil society1 and confronts him face to face in the pure state of nature1 in which obedience is prescribed solely by necessity4 ,the most pressing interest of the ruler1 and even his most indispensable duty1 therefore1 is to watch over the observation of the laws of which he is the minister1 and on which his whole authority is founded4 ,at the same time1 if he exacts the observance of them from others1 he is the more strongly bound to observe them himself1 since he enjoys all their favour4 ,for his example is of such force1 that even if the people were willing to permit him to release himself from the yoke of the law1 he ought to be cautious in availing himself of so dangerous a prerogative1 which others might soon claim to usurp in their turn1 and often use to his prejudice4 ,at bottom1 as all social engagements are mutual in nature1 it is impossible for any one to set himself above the law1 without renouncing its advantages2 for nobody is bound by any obligation to one who claims that he is under no obligations to others4 ,for this reason no exemption from the law will ever be granted1 on any ground whatsoever1 in a well-regulated government4 ,those citizens who have deserved well of their country ought to be rewarded with honours1 but never with privileges3 for the ,republic is at the eve of its fall1 when any one can think it fine not to obey the laws4 ,if the nobility or the soldiery should ever adopt such a maxim1 all would be lost beyond redemption4 ,the power of the laws depends still more on their own wisdom than on the severity of their administrators1 and the public will derives its greatest weight from the reason which has dictated it4 ,hence ,plato looked upon it as a very necessary precaution to place at the head of all edicts a preamble1 setting forth their justice and utility4 ,in fact1 the first of all laws is to respect the laws3 the severity of penalties is only a vain resource1 invented by little minds in order to substitute terror for that respect which they have no means of obtaining4 ,it has constantly been observed that in those countries where legal punishments are most severe1 they are also most frequent2 so that the cruelty of such punishments is a proof only of the multitude of criminals1 and1 punishing everything with equal severity1 induces those who are guilty to commit crimes1 in order to escape being punished for their faults4 ,but though the government be not master of the law1 it is much to be its guarantor1 and to possess a thousand means of inspiring the love of it4 ,in this alone the talent of reigning consists4 ,with force in one's hands1 there is no art required to make the whole world tremble1 nor indeed much to gain men's hearts2 for experience has long since taught the people to give its rulers great credit for all the evil they abstain from doing it1 and to adore them if they do not absolutely hate it4 ,a fool1 if he be obeyed1 may punish crimes as well as another3 but the true statesman is he who knows how to prevent them3 it is over the wills1 even more than the actions1 of his subjects that his honourable rule is extended4 ,if he could secure that every one should act aright1 he would no longer have anything to do2 and the masterpiece of his labours would be to be able to remain unemployed4 ,it is certain1 at least1 that the greatest talent a ruler can possess is to disguise his power1 in order to render it less odious1 and to conduct the ,state so peaceably as to make it seem to have no need of conductors4 ,i conclude1 therefore1 that1 as the first duty of the legislator is to make the laws conformable to the general will1 the first rule of public economy is that the administration of justice should be conformable to the laws4 ,it will even be enough to prevent the ,state from being ill governed1 that the ,legislator shall have provided1 as he should1 for every need of place1 climate1 soil1 custom1 neighbourhood1 and all the rest of the relations peculiar to the people he had to institute4 ,not but what there still remains an infinity of details of administration and economy1 which are left to the wisdom of the government3 but there are two infallible rules for its good conduct on these occasions2 one is1 that the spirit of the law ought to decide in every particular case that could not be foreseen2 the other is that the general will1 the source and supplement of all laws1 should be consulted wherever they fail4 ,but how1 ,i shall be asked1 can the general will be known in cases in which it has not expressed itself8 ,must the whole nation be assembled together at every unforeseen event8 ,certainly not4 ,it ought the less to be assembled1 because it is by no means certain that its decision would be the expression of the general will2 besides1 the method would be impracticable in a great people1 and is hardly ever necessary where the government is well-intentioned3 for the rulers well know that the general will is always on the side which is most favourable to the public interest1 that is to say1 most equitable2 so that it is needful only to act justly1 to be certain of following the general will4 ,when this is flouted too openly1 it makes itself felt1 in spite of the formidable restraint of the public authority4 ,i shall cite the nearest possible examples that may be followed in such cases4 ,in ,china1 it is the constant maxim of the ,prince to decide against his officers1 in every dispute that arises between them and the people4 ,if bread be too dear in any province1 the ,intendant of that province is thrown into prison4 ,if there be an insurrection in another1 the ,governor is dismissed1 and every ,mandarin answers with his head for all the mischief that happens in his department4 ,not that these affairs do not subsequently undergo a regular examination2 but long experience has caused the judgment to be thus anticipated4 ,there is seldom any injustice to be repaired2 in the meantime1 the ,emperor1 being satisfied that public outcry does not arise without cause1 always discovers1 through the seditious clamours which he punishes1 just grievances to redress4 ,it is a great thing to preserve the rule of peace and order through all the parts of the ,republic2 it is a great thing that the ,state should be tranquil1 and the law respected3 but if nothing more is done1 there will be in all this more appearance than reality2 for that government which confines itself to mere obedience will find difficulty in getting itself obeyed4 ,if it is good to know how to deal with men as they are1 it is much better to make them what there is need that they should be4 ,the most absolute authority is that which penetrates into a man's inmost being1 and concerns itself no less with his will than with his actions4 ,it is certain that all peoples become in the long run what the government makes them2 warriors1 citizens1 men1 when it so pleases2 or merely populace and rabble1 when it chooses to make them so4 ,hence every prince who despises his subjects1 dishonours himself1 in confessing that he does not know how to make them worthy of respect4 ,make men1 therefore1 if you would command men3 if you would have them obedient to the laws1 make them love the laws1 and then they will need only to know what is their duty to do it4 ,this was the great art of ancient governments1 in those distant times when philosophers gave laws to men1 and made use of their authority only to render them wise and happy4 ,thence arose the numerous sumptuary laws1 the many regulations of morals1 and all the public rules of conduct which were admitted or rejected with the greatest care4 ,even tyrants did not forget this important part of administration1 but took as great pains to corrupt the morals of their slaves1 as ,magistrates took to correct those of their fellow-citizens4 ,but our modern governments1 which imagine they have done everything when they have raised money1 conceive that it is unnecessary and even impossible to go a step further4 ,,ii4 ,the second essential rule of public economy is no less important than the first4 ,if you would have the general will accomplished1 bring all the particular wills into conformity with it2 in other words1 as virtue is nothing more than this conformity of the particular wills with the general will1 establish the reign of virtue4 ,if our politicians were less blinded by their ambition1 they would see how impossible it is for any establishment whatever to act in the spirit of its institution1 unless it is guided in accordance with the law of duty2 they would feel that the greatest support of public authority lies in the hearts of the citizens1 and that nothing can take the place of morality in the maintenance of government4 ,it is not only upright men who know how to administer the laws2 but at bottom only good men know how to obey them4 ,the man who once gets the better of remorse1 will not shrink before punishments which are less severe1 and less lasting1 and from which there is at least the hope of escaping3 whatever precautions are taken1 those who only require impunity in order to do wrong will not fail to find means of eluding the law1 and avoiding its penalties4 ,in this case1 as all particular interests unite against the general interest1 which is no longer that of any individual1 public vices have a greater effect in enervating the laws than the laws in the repression of such vices3 so that the corruption of the people and of their rulers will at length extend to the government1 however wise it may be4 ,the worst of all abuses is to pay an apparent obedience to the laws1 only in order actually to break them with security4 ,for in this case the best laws soon become the most pernicious2 and it would be a hundred times better that they should not exist4 ,in such a situation1 it is vain to add edicts to edicts and regulations to regulations4 ,everything serves only to introduce new abuses1 without correcting the old4 ,the more laws are multiplied1 the more they are despised1 and all the new officials appointed to supervise them are only so many more people to break them1 and either to share the plunder with their predecessors1 or to plunder apart on their own4 ,the reward of virtue soon becomes that of robbery2 the vilest of men rise to the greatest credit2 the greater they are the more despicable they become2 their infamy appears even in their dignities1 and their very honours dishonour them4 ,if they buy the influence of the leaders or the protection of women1 it is only that they may sell justice1 duty1 and the ,state in their turn3 in the meantime1 the people1 feeling that its vices are not the first cause of its misfortunes1 murmurs and complains that all its misfortunes come solely from those whom it pays to protect it from such things4 ,it is under these circumstances that the voice of duty no longer speaks in men's hearts1 and their rulers are obliged to substitute the cry of terror1 or the lure of an apparent interest1 of which they subsequently trick their creatures4 ,in this situation they are compelled to have recourse to all the petty and despicable shifts which they call rules of ,state and mysteries of the cabinet4 ,all the vigour that is left in the government is used by its members in ruining and supplanting one another1 while the public business is neglected1 or is transacted only as personal interest requires and directs4 ,in short1 the whole art of those great politicians lies in so mesmerising those they stand in need of1 that each may think he is labouring for his own interest in working for theirs3 ,i say theirs on the false supposition that it is the real interest of rulers to annihilate a people in order to make it subject1 and to2 ruin their own property in order to secure their possession of it4 ,but when the citizens love their duty1 and the guardians of the public authority sincerely apply themselves to the fostering of that love by their own example and assiduity1 every difficulty vanishes2 and government becomes so easy that it needs none of that art of darkness1 whose blackness is its only mystery4 ,those enterprising spirits1 so dangerous and so much admired1 all those great ministers1 whose glory is inseparable from the miseries of the people1 are no longer regretted3 public morality supplies what is wanting in the genius of the rulers2 and the more virtue reigns1 the less need there is for talent4 ,even ambition is better served by duty than by usurpation3 when the people is convinced that its rulers are labouring only for its happiness1 its deference saves them the trouble of labouring to strengthen their power3 and history shows us1 in a thousand cases1 that the authority of one who is beloved over those whom he loves is a hundred times more absolute than all the tyranny of usurpers4 ,this does not mean that the government ought to be afraid to make use of its power1 but that it ought to make use of it only in a lawful manner4 ,we find in history a thousand examples of pusillanimous or ambitious rulers1 who were ruined by their slackness or their pride2 not one who suffered for having been strictly just4 ,but we ought not to confound negligence with moderation1 or clemency with weakness4 ,to be just1 it is necessary to be severe2 to permit vice1 when one has the right and the power to suppress it1 is to be oneself vicious4 ,it is not enough to say to the citizens1 be good2 they must be taught to be so2 and even example1 which is in this respect the first lesson1 is not the sole means to be employed2 patriotism is the most efficacious3 for1 as ,i have said already1 every man is virtuous when his particular will is in all things conformable to the general will1 and we voluntarily will what is willed by those whom we love4 ,it appears that the feeling of humanity evaporates and grows feeble in embracing all mankind1 and that we cannot be affected by the calamities of ,tartary or ,japan1 in the same manner as we are by those of ,european nations4 ,it is necessary in some degree to confine and limit our interest and compassion in order to make it active4 ,now1 as this sentiment can be useful only to those with whom we have to live1 it is proper that our humanity should confine itself to our fellow-citizens1 and should receive a new force because we are in the habit of seeing them1 and by reason of the common interest which unites them4 ,it is certain that the greatest miracles of virtue have been produced by patriotism3 this fine and lively feeling1 which gives to the force of self-love all the beauty of virtue1 lends it an energy which1 without disfiguring it1 makes it the most heroic of all passions4 ,this it is that produces so many immortal actions1 the glory of which dazzles our feeble eyes2 and so many great men1 whose old-world virtues pass for fables now that patriotism is made mock of4 ,this is not surprising2 the transports of susceptible hearts appear altogether fanciful to any one who has never felt them2 and the love of one's country1 which is a hundred times more lively and delightful than the love of a mistress1 cannot be conceived except by experiencing it4 ,but it is easy to perceive in every heart that is warmed by it1 in all the actions it inspires1 a glowing and sublime ardour which does not attend the purest virtue1 when separated from it4 ,contrast ,socrates even with ,cato2 the one was the greater philosopher1 the other more of the citizen4 ,athens was already ruined in the time of ,socrates1 and he had no other country than the world at large4 ,cato had the cause of his country always at heart2 he lived for it alone1 and could not bear to outlive it4 ,the virtue of ,socrates was that of the wisest of men2 but1 compared with ,csar and ,pompey1 ,cato seems a ,god among mortals4 ,socrates instructed a few individuals1 opposed the ,sophists1 and died for truth3 but ,cato defended his country1 its liberty and its laws1 against the conquerors of the world1 and at length departed from the earth1 when he had no longer a country to serve4 ,a worthy pupil of ,socrates would be the most virtuous of his contemporaries2 but a worthy follower of ,cato would be one of the greatest4 ,the virtue of the former would be his happiness2 the latter would seek his happiness in that of all4 ,we should be taught by the one1 and led by the other2 and this alone is enough to determine which to prefer3 for no people has ever been made into a nation of philosophers1 but it is not impossible to make a people happy4 ,do we wish men to be virtuous8 ,then let us begin by making them love their country3 but how can they love it1 if their country be nothing more to them than to strangers1 and afford them nothing but what it can refuse nobody8 ,it would be still worse1 if they did not enjoy even the privilege of social security1 and if their lives1 liberties and property lay at the mercy of persons in power1 without their being permitted1 or it being possible for them1 to get relief from the laws4 ,for in that case1 being subjected to the duties of the state of civil society1 without enjoying even the common privileges of the state of nature1 and without being able to use their strength in their own defence1 they would be in the worst1 condition in which freemen could possibly find themselves1 and the word country would mean for them something merely odious and ridiculous4 ,it must not be imagined that a man can break or lose an arm1 without the pain being conveyed to his head3 nor is it any more credible that the general will should consent that any one member of the ,state1 whoever he might be1 should wound or destroy another1 than it is that the fingers of a man in his senses should wilfully scratch his eyes out4 ,the security of individuals is so intimately connected with the public confederation that1 apart from the regard that must be paid to human weakness1 that convention would in point of right be dissolved1 if in the ,state a single citizen who might have been relieved were allowed to perish1 or if one were wrongfully confined in prison1 or if in one case an obviously unjust sentence were given4 ,for the fundamental conventions being broken1 it is impossible to conceive of any right or interest that could retain the people in the social union2 unless they were restrained by force1 which alone causes the dissolution of the state of civil society4 ,in fact1 does not the undertaking entered into by the whole body of the nation bind it to provide for the security of the least of its members with as much care as for that of all the rest8 ,is the welfare of a single citizen any less the common cause than that of the whole ,state8 ,it may be said that it is good that one should perish for all4 ,i am ready to admire such a saying when it comes from the lips of a virtuous and worthy patriot1 voluntarily and dutifully sacrificing himself for the good of his country3 but if we are to understand by it1 that it is lawful for the government to sacrifice an innocent man for the good of the multitude1 ,i look upon it as one of the most execrable rules tyranny ever invented1 the greatest falsehood that can be advanced1 the most dangerous admission that can be made1 and a direct contradiction of the fundamental laws of society4 ,so little is it the case that any one person ought to perish for all1 that all have pledged their lives and properties for the defence of each1 in order that the weakness of individuals may always be protected by the strength of the public1 and each member by the whole ,state4 ,suppose we take from the whole people one individual after another1 and then press the advocates of this rule to explain more exactly what they mean by the body of the ,state1 and we shall see that it will at length be reduced to a small number of persons1 who are not the people1 but the officers of the people1 and who1 having bound themselves by personal oath to perish for the welfare of the people1 would thence infer that the people is to perish for their own4 ,need we look for examples of the protection which the ,state owes to its members1 and the respect it owes to their persons8 ,it is only among the most illustrious and courageous nations that they are to be found2 it is only among free peoples that the dignity of man is realised4 ,it is well known into what perplexity the whole republic of ,sparta was thrown1 when the question of punishing a guilty citizen arose4 ,in ,macedon1 the life of a man was a matter of such importance1 that ,alexander the ,great1 at the height of his glory1 would not have dared to put a ,macedonian criminal to death in cold blood1 till the accused had appeared to make his defence before his fellow-citizens1 and had been condemned by them4 ,but the ,romans distinguished themselves above all other peoples by the regard which their government paid to the individual1 and by its scrupulous attention to the preservation of the inviolable rights of all the members of the ,state4 ,nothing was so sacred among them as the life of a citizen2 and no less than an assembly of the whole people was needed to condemn one4 ,not even the ,senate1 nor the ,consuls1 in all their majesty1 possessed the right2 but the crime and punishment of a citizen were regarded as a public calamity among the most powerful people in the world4 ,so hard indeed did it seem to shed blood for any crime whatsoever1 that by the ,lex ,porcia1 the penalty of death was commuted into that of banishment for all those who were willing to survive the loss of so great a country4 ,everything both at ,rome1 and in the ,roman armies1 breathed that love of fellow-citizens one for another1 and that respect for the ,roman name1 which raised the courage and inspired the virtue of every one who had the honour to bear it4 ,the cap of a citizen delivered from slavery1 the civic crown of him who had saved the life of another1 were looked upon with the greatest pleasure amid the pomp of their triumphs2 and it is remarkable that among the crowns which were bestowed in honour of splendid actions in war1 the civic crown and that of the triumphant general alone were of laurel1 all the others being merely of gold4 ,it was thus that ,rome was virtuous and became the mistress of the world4 ,ambitious rulers6 ,a herdsman governs his dogs and cattle1 and yet is only the meanest of mankind4 ,if it be a fine thing to command1 it is when those who obey us are capable of doing us honour4 ,show respect1 therefore1 to your fellow-citizens1 and you will render yourselves worthy of respect2 show respect to liberty1 and your power will increase daily4 ,never exceed your rights1 and they will soon become unlimited4 ,let our country then show itself the common mother of her citizens2 let the advantages they enjoy in their country endear it to them2 let the government leave them enough share in the public administration to make them feel that they are at home2 and let the laws be in their eyes only the guarantees of the common liberty4 ,these rights1 great as they are1 belong to all men3 but without seeming to attack them directly1 the ill-will of rulers may in fact easily reduce their effect to nothing4 ,the law1 which they thus abuse1 serves the powerful at once as a weapon of offence1 and as a shield against the weak2 and the pretext of the public good is always the most dangerous scourge of the people4 ,what is most necessary1 and perhaps most difficult1 in government1 is rigid integrity in doing strict justice to all1 and above all in protecting the poor against the tyranny of the rich4 ,the greatest evil has already come about1 when there are poor men to be defended1 and rich men to be restrained4 ,it is on the middle classes alone that the whole force of the law is exerted2 they are equally powerless against the treasures of the rich and the penury of the poor4 ,the first mocks them1 the second escapes them4 ,the one breaks the meshes1 the other passes through them4 ,it is therefore one of the most important functions of government to prevent extreme inequality of fortunes2 not by taking away wealth from its possessors1 but by depriving all men of means to accumulate it2 not by building hospitals for the poor1 but by securing the citizens from becoming poor4 ,the unequal distribution of inhabitants over the territory1 when men are crowded together in one place1 while other places are depopulated2 the encouragement of the arts that minister to luxury and of purely industrial arts at the expense of useful and laborious crafts2 the sacrifice of agriculture to commerce2 the necessitation of the tax-farmer by the mal-administration of the funds of the ,state2 and in short1 venality pushed to such an extreme that even public esteem is reckoned at a cash value1 and virtue rated at a market price3 these are the most obvious causes of opulence and of poverty1 of public interest1 of mutual hatred among citizens1 of indifference to the common cause1 of the corruption of the people1 and of the weakening of all the springs of government4 ,such are the evils1 which are with difficulty cured when they make themselves felt1 but which a wise administration ought to prevent1 if it is to maintain1 along with good morals1 respect for the laws1 patriotism1 and the influence of the general will4 ,but all these precautions will be inadequate1 unless rulers go still more to the root of the matter4 ,i conclude this part of public economy where ,i ought to have begun it4 ,there can be no patriotism without liberty1 no liberty without virtue1 no virtue without citizens2 create citizens1 and you have everything you need2 without them1 you will have nothing but debased slaves1 from the rulers of the ,state downwards4 ,to form citizens is not the work of a day2 and in order to have men it is necessary to educate them when they are children4 ,it will be said1 perhaps1 that whoever has men to govern1 ought not to seek1 beyond their nature1 a perfection of which they are incapable2 that he ought not to desire to destroy their passions2 and that the execution of such an attempt is no more desirable than it is possible4 ,i will agree1 further1 that a man without passions would certainly be a bad citizen2 but it must be agreed also that1 if men are not taught not to love some things1 it is impossible to teach them to love one object more than another--to prefer that which is truly beautiful to that which is deformed4 ,if1 for example1 they were early accustomed to regard their individuality only in its relation to the body of the ,state1 and to be aware1 so to speak1 of their own existence merely as a part of that of the ,state1 they might at length come to identify themselves in some degree with this greater whole1 to feel themselves members of their country1 and to love it with that exquisite feeling which no isolated person has save for himself2 to lift up their spirits perpetually to this great object1 and thus to transform into a sublime virtue that dangerous disposition which gives rise to all our vices4 ,not only does philosophy demonstrate the possibility of giving feeling these new directions2 history furnishes us with a thousand striking examples4 ,if they are so rare among us moderns1 it is because nobody troubles himself whether citizens exist or not1 and still less does anybody think of attending to the matter soon enough to make them4 ,it is too late to change our natural inclinations1 when they have taken their course1 and egoism is confirmed by habit3 it is too late to lead us out of ourselves when once the human ,ego1 concentrated in our hearts1 has acquired that contemptible activity which absorbs all virtue and constitutes the life and being of little minds4 ,how can1 patriotism germinate in the midst of so many other passions which smother it8 ,and what can remain1 for fellow-citizens1 of a heart already divided between avarice1 a mistress1 and vanity8 ,from the first moment of life1 men ought to begin learning to deserve to live2 and1 as at the instant of birth we partake of the rights of citizenship1 that instant ought to be the beginning of the exercise of our duty4 ,if there are laws for the age of maturity1 there ought to be laws for infancy1 teaching obedience to others3 and as the reason of each man is not left to be the sole arbiter of his duties1 government ought the less indiscriminately to abandon to the intelligence and prejudices of fathers the education of their children1 as that education is of still greater importance to the ,state than to the fathers3 for1 according to the course of nature1 the death of the father often deprives him of the final fruits of education2 but his country sooner or later perceives its effects4 ,families dissolve1 but the ,state remains4 ,should the public authority1 by taking the place of the father1 and charging itself with that important function1 acquire his rights by discharging his duties1 he would have the less cause to complain1 as he would only be changing his title1 and would have in common1 under the name of citizen1 the same authority over his children1 as he was exercising separately under the name of father1 and would not be less obeyed when speaking in the name of the law1 than when he spoke in that of nature4 ,public education1 therefore1 under regulations prescribed by the government1 and under magistrates established by the ,sovereign1 is one of the fundamental rules of popular or legitimate government4 ,if children are brought up in common in the bosom of equality2 if they are imbued with the laws of the ,state and the precepts of the general will2 if they are taught to respect these above all things2 if they are surrounded by examples and objects which constantly remind them of the tender mother who nourishes them1 of the love she bears them1 of the inestimable benefits they receive from her1 and of the return they owe her1 we cannot doubt that they will learn to cherish one another mutually as brothers1 to will nothing contrary to the will of society1 to substitute the actions of men and citizens for the futile and vain babbling of sophists1 and to become in time defenders and fathers of the country of which they will have been so long the children4 ,i shall say nothing of the ,magistrates destined to preside over such an education1 which is certainly the most important business of the ,state4 ,it is easy to see that if such marks of public confidence were conferred on slight grounds1 if this sublime function were not1 for those who have worthily discharged all other offices1 the reward of labour1 the pleasant and honourable repose of old age1 and the crown of all honours1 the whole enterprise would be useless and the education void of success4 ,for where-ever the lesson is not supported by authority1 and the precept by example1 all instruction is fruitless2 and virtue itself loses its credit in the mouth of one who does not practise it4 ,but let illustrious warriors1 bent under the weight of their laurels1 preach courage3 let upright ,magistrates1 grown white in the purple and on the bench teach justice4 ,such teachers as these would thus get themselves virtuous successors1 and transmit from age to age1 to generations to come1 the experience and talents of rulers1 the courage and virtue of citizens1 and common emulation in all to live and die for their country4 ,i know of but three peoples which once practised public education1 the ,cretans1 the ,lacedmonians1 and the ancient ,persians3 among all these it was attended with the greatest success1 and indeed it did wonders among the two last4 ,since the world has been divided into nations too great to admit of being well governed1 this method has been no longer practicable1 and the reader will readily perceive other reasons why such a thing has never been attempted by any modern people4 ,it is very remarkable that the ,romans were able to dispense with it2 but ,rome was for five hundred years one continued miracle which the world cannot hope to see again4 ,the virtue of the ,romans1 engendered by their horror of tyranny and the crimes of tyrants1 and by an innate patriotism1 made all their houses so many schools of citizenship2 while the unlimited power of fathers over their children made the individual authority so rigid that the father was more feared than the ,magistrate1 and was in his family tribunal both censor of morals and avenger of the laws4 ,thus a careful and well-intentioned government1 vigilant incessantly to maintain or restore patriotism and morality among the people1 provides beforehand against the evils which sooner or later result from the indifference of the citizens to the fate of the ,republic1 keeping within narrow bounds that personal interest which so isolates the individual that the ,state is enfeebled by his power1 and has nothing to hope from his good-will4 ,wherever men love their country1 respect the laws1 and live simply1 little remains to be done in order to make them happy2 and in public administration1 where chance has less influence than in the lot of individuals1 wisdom is so nearly allied to happiness1 that the two objects are confounded4 ,,iii4 ,it is not enough to have citizens and to protect them1 it is also necessary to consider their subsistence4 ,provision for the public wants is an obvious inference from the general will1 and the third essential duty of government4 ,this duty is not1 we should feel1 to fill the granaries of individuals and thereby to grant them a dispensation from labour1 but to keep plenty so within their reach that labour is always necessary and never useless for its acquisition4 ,it extends also to everything regarding the management of the exchequer1 and the expenses of public administration4 ,having thus treated of general economy with reference to the government of persons1 we must now consider it with reference to the administration of property4 ,this part presents no fewer difficulties to solve1 and contradictions to remove1 than the preceding4 ,it is certain that the right of property is the most sacred of all the rights of citizenship1 and even more important in some respects than liberty itself2 either because it more nearly affects the preservation of life1 or because1 property being more easily usurped and more difficult to defend than life1 the law ought to pay a greater attention to what is most easily taken away2 or finally1 because property is the true foundation of civil society1 and the real guarantee of the undertakings of citizens3 for if property were not answerable for personal actions1 nothing would be easier than to evade duties and laugh at the laws4 ,on the other hand1 it is no less certain that the maintenance of the ,state and the government involves costs and out-goings2 and as every one who agrees to the end must acquiesce in the means1 it follows that the members of a society ought to contribute from their property to its support4 ,besides1 it is difficult to secure the property of individuals on one side1 without attacking it on another2 and it is impossible that all the regulations which govern the order of succession1 will1 contracts1 c4 should not lay individuals under some constraint as to the disposition of their goods1 and should not consequently restrict the right of property4 ,but besides what ,i have said above of the agreement between the authority of law and the liberty of the citizen1 there remains to be made1 with respect to the disposition of goods1 an important observation which removes many difficulties4 ,as ,puffendorf has shown1 the right of property1 by its very nature1 does not extend beyond the life of the proprietor1 and the moment a man is dead his goods cease to belong to him4 ,thus1 to prescribe the conditions according to which he can dispose of them1 is in reality less to alter his right as it appears1 than to extend it in fact4 ,in general1 although the institution of the laws which regulate the power of individuals in the disposition of their own goods belongs only to the ,sovereign1 the spirit of these laws1 which the government ought to follow in their application1 is that1 from father to son1 and from relation to relation1 the goods of a family should go as little out of it and be as little alienated as possible4 ,there is a sensible reason for this in favour of children1 to whom the right of property would be quite useless1 if the father left them nothing1 and who besides1 having often contributed by their labour to the acquisition of their father's wealth1 are in their own right associates with him in his right of property4 ,but another reason1 more distant1 though not less important1 is that nothing is more fatal to morality and to the ,republic than the continual shifting of rank and fortune among the citizens3 such changes are both the proof and the source of a thousand disorders1 and overturn and confound everything2 for those who were brought up to one thing find themselves destined for another2 and neither those who rise nor those who fall are able to assume the rules of conduct1 or to possess themselves of the qualifications requisite for their new condition1 still less to discharge the duties it entails4 ,i proceed to the object of public finance4 ,if the people governed itself and there were no intermediary between the administration of the ,state and the citizens1 they would have no more to do than to assess themselves occasionally1 in proportion to the public needs and the abilities of individuals3 and as they would all keep in sight the recovery and employment of such assessments1 no fraud or abuse could slip into the management of them2 the ,state would never be involved in debt1 or the people over-burdened with taxes2 or at least the knowledge of how the money would be used would be a consolation ,for the severity of the tax4 ,but things cannot be carried an in this manner3 on the contrary1 however small any ,state may be1 civil societies are always too populous to be under the immediate government of all their members4 ,it is necessary that the public money should go through the hands of the rulers1 all of whom have1 besides the interests of the ,state1 their own individual interests1 which are not the last to be listened to4 ,the people1 on its side1 perceiving rather the cupidity and ridiculous expenditure of its rulers than the public needs1 murmurs at seeing itself stripped of necessaries to furnish others with superfluities2 and when once these complaints have reached a certain degree of bitterness1 the most upright administration will find it impossible to restore confidence4 ,in such a case1 voluntary contributions bring in nothing1 and forced contributions are illegitimate4 ,this cruel alternative of letting the ,state perish1 or of violating the sacred right of property1 which is its support1 constitutes the great difficulty of just and prudent economy4 ,the first step which the founder of a republic ought to take after the establishment of laws1 is to settle a sufficient fund for the maintenance of the ,magistrates and other ,officials1 and for other public expenses4 ,this fund1 if it consist of money1 is called rarium or fisc1 and public demesne if it consist of lands4 ,this1 for obvious reasons1 is much to be preferred4 ,whoever has reflected on this matter must be of the opinion of ,bodin1 who looks upon the public demesne as the most reputable and certain means of providing for the needs of the ,state4 ,it is remarkable also that ,romulus1 in his division of lands1 made it his first care to set apart a third for the use of the ,state4 ,i confess it is not impossible for the produce of the demesne1 if it be badly managed1 to be reduced to nothing2 but it is not of the essence of public demesnes to be badly administered4 ,before any use is made of this fund1 it should be assigned or accepted by an assembly of the people1 or of the estates of the country1 which should determine its future use4 ,after this solemnity1 which makes such funds inalienable1 their very nature is1 in a manner1 changed1 and the revenues become so sacred1 that it is not only the most infamous theft1 but actual treason1 to misapply them or pervert them from the purpose for which they were destined4 ,it reflects great dishonour on ,rome that the integrity of ,cato the censor was something so very remarkable1 and that an ,emperor1 on rewarding the talents of a singer with a few crowns1 thought it necessary to observe that the money came from his own private purse1 and not from that of the ,state4 ,but if we find few ,galbas1 where are we to look for a ,cato8 ,for when vice is no longer dishonourable1 what chiefs will be so scrupulous as to abstain from touching the public revenues that are left to their discretion1 and even not in time to impose on themselves1 by pretending to confound their own expensive and scandalous dissipations with the glory of the ,state1 and the means of extending their own authority with the means of augmenting its power8 ,it is particularly in this delicate part of the administration that virtue is the only effective instrument1 and that the integrity of the ,magistrate is the only real check upon his avarice4 ,books and auditing of accounts1 instead of exposing frauds1 only conceal them2 for prudence is never so ready to conceive new precautions as knavery is to elude them4 ,never mind1 then1 about account books and papers2 place the management of finance in honest hands3 that is the only way to get it faithfully conducted4 ,when public funds are once established1 the rulers of the ,state become of right the administrators of them3 for this administration constitutes a part of government which is always essential1 though not always equally so4 ,its influence increases in proportion as that of other resources is diminished2 and it may justly be said that a government has reached the last stage of corruption1 when it has ceased to have sinews other than money4 ,now as every government constantly tends to become lax1 this is enough to show why no ,state can subsist unless its revenues constantly increase4 ,the first sense of the necessity of this increase is also the first sign of the internal disorder of the ,state2 and the prudent administrator1 in his endeavours to find means to provide for the present necessity1 will neglect nothing to find out the distant cause of the new need2 just as a mariner when he finds the water gaining on his vessel1 does not neglect1 while he is working the pumps1 to discover and stop the leak4 ,from this rule is deduced the most important rule in the administration of finance1 which is1 to take more pains to guard against needs than to increase revenues4 ,for1 whatever diligence be employed1 the relief which only comes after1 and more slowly than1 the evil1 always leaves some injury behind4 ,while a remedy is being found for one evil1 another is beginning to make itself felt1 and even the remedies themselves produce new difficulties3 so that at length the nation is involved in debt and the people oppressed1 while the government loses its influence and can do very little with a great deal of money4 ,i imagine it was owing to the recognition of this rule that such wonders were done by ancient governments1 which did more with their parsimony than ours do with all their treasures2 and perhaps from this comes the common use of the word economy1 which means rather the prudent management of what one has than ways of getting what one has not4 ,but apart from the public demesne1 which is of service to the ,state in proportion to the uprightness of those who govern1 any one sufficiently acquainted with the whole force of the general administration1 especially when it confines itself to legitimate methods1 would be astonished at the resources the rulers can make use of for guarding against public needs1 without trespassing on the goods of individuals4 ,as they are masters of the whole commerce of the ,state1 nothing is easier for them than to direct it into such channels as to provide for every need1 without appearing to interfere4 ,the distribution of provisions1 money1 and merchandise in just proportions1 according to times and places1 is the true secret of finance and the source of wealth1 provided those who administer it have foresight enough to suffer a present apparent loss1 in order really to obtain immense profits in the future4 ,when we see a government paying bounties1 instead of receiving duties1 on the exportation of corn in time of plenty1 and on its importation in time of scarcity1 we must have such facts before our eyes if we are to be persuaded of their reality4 ,we should hold such facts to be idle tales1 if they had happened in ancient times4 ,let us suppose that1 in order to prevent a scarcity in bad years1 a proposal were made to establish public granaries2 would not the maintenance of so useful an institution serve in most countries as an excuse for new taxes8 ,at ,geneva1 such granaries1 established and kept up by a prudent administration1 are a public resource in bad years1 and the principal revenue of the ,state at all times4 ,alit et ditat is the inscription which stands1 rightly and properly1 on the front of the building4 ,to set forth in this place the economic system of a good government1 ,i have often turned my eyes to that of this ,republic1 rejoicing to find in my own country an example of that wisdom and happiness which ,i should be glad to see prevail in every other4 ,if we ask how the needs of a ,state grow1 we shall find they generally arise1 like the wants of individuals1 less from any real necessity than from the increase of useless desires1 and that expenses are often augmented only to give a pretext for raising receipts3 so that the ,state would sometimes gain by not being rich1 and apparent wealth is in reality more burdensome than poverty itself would be4 ,rulers may indeed hope to keep the peoples in stricter dependence1 by thus giving them with one hand what they take from them with the other2 and this was in fact the policy of ,joseph towards the ,egyptians3 but this political sophistry is the more fatal to the ,state1 as the money never returns into the hands it went out of4 ,such principles only enrich the idle at the expense of the industrious4 ,a desire for conquest is one of the most evident and dangerous causes of this increase4 ,this desire1 occasioned often by a different species of ambition from that which1 it seems to proclaim1 is not always what it appears to be1 and has not so much1 for its real motive1 the apparent desire to aggrandise the ,nation as a secret desire to increase the authority of the rulers at home1 by increasing the number of troops1 and by the diversion which the objects of war occasion in the minds of the citizens4 ,it is at least certain1 that no peoples are so oppressed and wretched as conquering nations1 and that their successes only increase their misery4 ,did not history inform us of the fact1 reason would suffice to tell us that1 the greater a ,state grows1 the heavier and more burdensome in proportion its expenses become3 for every province has to furnish its share to the general expense of government1 and besides has to be at the expense of its own administration1 which is as great as if it were really independent4 ,add to this that great fortunes are always acquired in one place and spent in another4 ,production therefore soon ceases to balance consumption1 and a whole country is impoverished merely to enrich a single town4 ,another source of the increase of public wants1 which depends on the foregoing1 is this4 ,there may come a time when the citizens1 no longer looking upon themselves as interested in the common cause1 will cease to be the defenders of their country1 and the ,magistrates will prefer the command of mercenaries to that of free-men2 if for no other reason than that1 when the time comes1 they may use them to reduce free-men to submission4 ,such was the state of ,rome towards the end of the ,republic and under the ,emperors3 for all the victories of the early ,romans1 like those of ,alexander1 had been won by brave citizens1 who were ready1 at need1 to give their blood in the service of their country1 but would never sell it4 ,only at the siege of ,veii did the practice of paying the ,roman infantry begin4 ,marius1 in the ,jugurthine war1 dishonoured the legions by introducing freedmen1 vagabonds and other mercenaries4 ,tyrants1 the enemies of the very people it was their duty to make happy1 maintained regular troops1 apparently to withstand the foreigner1 but really to enslave their countrymen4 ,to form such troops1 it was necessary to take men from the land2 the lack of their labour then diminished the amount of provisions1 and their maintenance introduced those taxes which increased prices4 ,this first disorder gave rise to murmurs among the people2 in order to suppress them1 the number of troops had to be increased1 and consequently the misery of the people also got worse2 and the growing despair led to still further increases in the cause in order to guard against its effects4 ,on the other hand1 the mercenaries1 whose merit we may judge of by the price at which they sold themselves1 proud of their own meanness1 and despising the laws that protected them1 as well as their fellows whose bread they ate1 imagined themselves more honoured in being ,csar's satellites than in being defenders of ,rome4 ,as they were given over to blind obedience1 their swords were always at the throats of their fellow-citizens1 and they were prepared for general butchery at the first sign4 ,it would not be difficult to show that this was one of the principal causes of the ruin of the ,roman ,empire4 ,the invention of artillery and fortifications has forced the princes of ,europe1 in modern times1 to return to the use of regular troops1 in order to garrison their towns2 but however lawful their motives1 it is to be feared the effect may be no less fatal4 ,there is no better reason now than formerly for depopulating the country to form armies and garrisons1 nor should the people be oppressed to support1 them2 in a word1 these dangerous establishments have increased of late years with such rapidity in this part of the world1 that they evidently threaten to depopulate ,europe1 and sooner or later to ruin its inhabitants4 ,be this as it may1 it ought to be seen that such institutions necessarily subvert the true economic system1 which draws the principal revenue of the ,state from the public demesne1 and leave only the troublesome resource of subsidies and imposts2 with which it remains to deal4 ,it should be remembered that the foundation of the social compact is property2 and its first condition1 that every one should be maintained in the peaceful possession of what belongs to him4 ,it is true that1 by the same treaty1 every one binds himself1 at least tacitly1 to be assessed toward the public wants3 but as this undertaking cannot prejudice the fundamental law1 and presupposes that the need is clearly recognised by all who contribute to it1 it is plain that such assessment1 in order to be lawful1 must be voluntary2 it must depend1 not indeed on a particular will1 as if it were necessary to have the consent of each individual1 and that he should give no more than just what he pleased1 but on a general will1 decided by vote of a majority1 and on the basis of a proportional rating which leaves nothing arbitrary in the imposition of the tax4 ,that taxes cannot be legitimately established except by the consent of the people or its representatives1 is a truth generally admitted by all philosophers and jurists of any repute on questions of public right1 not even excepting ,bodin4 ,if any of them have laid down rules which seem to contradict this1 their particular motives for doing so may easily be seen2 and they introduce so many conditions and restrictions that the argument comes at bottom to the same thing3 for whether the people has it in its power to refuse1 or the ,sovereign ought not to exact1 is a matter of indifference with regard to right2 and if the point in question concerns only power1 it is useless to inquire whether it is legitimate or not4 ,contributions levied on the people are two kinds2 real1 levied on commodities1 and personal1 paid by the head4 ,both are called taxes or subsidies3 when the people fixes the sum to be paid1 it is called subsidy2 but when it grants the product of an imposition1 it is called a tax4 ,we are told in the ,spirit of the ,laws that a capitation tax is most suited to slavery1 and a real tax most in accordance with liberty4 ,this would be incontestable1 if the circumstances of every person were equal2 for otherwise nothing can be more disproportionate than such a tax2 and it is in the observations of exact proportions that the spirit of liberty consists4 ,but if a tax by heads were exactly proportioned to the circumstances of individuals1 as what is called the capitation tax in ,france might be1 is would be the most equitable and consequently the most proper for free-men4 ,these proportions appear at first very easy to note1 because1 being relative to each man's position in the world1 their incidence is always public3 but proper regard is seldom paid to all the elements that should enter into such a calculation1 even apart from deception arising from avarice1 fraud and self-interest4 ,in the first place1 we have to consider the relation of quantities1 according to which1 ceteris paribus1 the person who has ten times the property of another man ought to pay ten times as much to the ,state4 ,secondly1 the relation of the use made1 that is to say1 the distinction between necessaries and superfluities4 ,he who possesses only the common necessaries of life should pay nothing at all1 while the tax on him who is in possession of superfluities may justly be extended to everything he has over and above mere necessaries4 ,to this he will possibly object that1 when his rank is taken into account1 what may be superfluous to a man of inferior station is necessary for him4 ,but this is false3 for a grandee has two legs just like a cow-herd1 and1 like him again1 but one belly4 ,besides1 these pretended necessaries are really so little necessary to his rank1 that if he should renounce them on any worthy occasion1 he would only be the more honoured4 ,the populace would be ready to adore a ,minister who went to ,council on foot1 because he had sold off his carriages to supply a pressing need of the ,state4 ,lastly1 to no man does the law prescribe magnificence2 and propriety is no argument against right4 ,a third relation1 which is never taken into account1 though it ought to be the chief consideration1 is the advantage that every person derives from the social confederacy2 for this provides a powerful protection for the immense possessions of the rich1 and hardly leaves the poor man in quiet possession of the cottage he builds with his own hands4 ,are not all the advantages of society for the rich and powerful8 ,are not all lucrative posts in their hands8 ,are not all privileges and exemptions reserved for them alone8 ,is not the public authority always on their side8 ,if a man of eminence robs his creditors1 or is guilty of other knaveries1 is he not always assured of impunity8 ,are not the assaults1 acts of violence1 assassinations1 and even murders committed by the great1 matters that are hushed up in a few months1 and of which nothing more is thought8 ,but if a great man himself is robbed or insulted1 the whole police force is immediately in motion1 and woe even to innocent persons who chance to be suspected4 ,if he has to pass through any dangerous road1 the country is up in arms to escort him4 ,if the axle-tree of his chaise breaks1 everybody flies to his assistance4 ,if there is a noise at his door1 he speaks but a word1 and all is silent4 ,if he is incommoded by the crowd1 he waves his hand and every one makes way4 ,if his coach is met on the road by a wagon1 his servants are ready to beat the driver's brains out1 and fifty honest pedestrians going quietly about their business had better be knocked on the head than an idle jackanapes be delayed in his coach4 ,yet all this respect costs him not a farthing3 it is the rich man's right1 and not what he buys with his wealth4 ,how different the case of the poor man6 the more humanity owes him1 the more society denies him4 ,every door is shut against him1 even when he has a right to its being opened3 and if ever he obtains justice1 it is with much greater difficulty than others obtain favours4 ,if the militia is to be raised or the highway to be mended1 he is always given the preference2 he always bears the burden which his richer neighbour has influence enough to get exempted from4 ,on the least accident that happens to him1 everybody avoids him3 if his cart be overturned in the road1 so far is he from receiving any assistance1 that he is lucky if he does not get horse-whipped by the impudent lackeys of some young ,duke2 in a word1 all gratuitous assistance is denied to the poor when they need it1 just because they cannot pay for it4 ,i look upon any poor man as totally undone1 if he has the misfortune to have an honest heart1 a fine daughter1 and a powerful neighbour4 ,another no less important fact is that the losses of the poor are much harder to repair than those of the rich1 and that the difficulty of acquisition is always greater in proportion as there is more need for it4 ,nothing comes out of nothing1 is as true of life as in physics3 money is the seed of money1 and the first guinea is sometimes more difficult to acquire than the second million4 ,add to this that what the poor pay is lost to them for ever1 and remains in1 or returns to1 the hands of the rich3 and as1 to those who share in the government or to their dependents1 the whole produce of the taxes must sooner or later pass1 although they pay their share1 these persons have always a sensible interest in increasing them4 ,the terms of the social compact between these two estates of men may be summed up in a few words4 ,you have need of me1 because ,i am rich and you are poor4 ,we will therefore come to an agreement4 ,i will permit you to have the honour of serving me1 on condition that you bestow on me the little you have left1 in return for the pains ,i shall take to command you4 ,putting all these considerations carefully together1 we shall find that1 in order to levy taxes in a truly equitable and proportionate manner1 the imposition ought not to be in simple ratio to the property of the contributors1 but in compound ratio to the difference of their conditions and the superfluity of their possessions4 ,this very important and difficult operation is daily made by numbers of honest clerks1 who know their arithmetic2 but a ,plato or a ,montesquieu would not venture to undertake it without the greatest diffidence1 or without praying to ,heaven for understanding and integrity4 ,another disadvantage of personal taxes is that they may be too much felt or raised with too great severity4 ,this1 however1 does not prevent them from being frequently evaded2 for it is much easier for persons to escape a tax than for their possessions4 ,of all impositions1 that on land1 or real taxation1 has always been regarded as most advantageous in countries where more attention is paid to what the tax will produce1 and to the certainty of recovering the product1 than to securing the least discomfort for the people4 ,it has been even maintained that it is necessary to burden the peasant in order to rouse him from indolence1 and that he would never work if he had no taxes to pay4 ,but in all countries experience confutes this ridiculous notion4 ,in ,england and ,holland the farmer pays very little1 and in ,china nothing3 yet these are the countries in which the land is best cultivated4 ,on the other hand1 in those countries where the husbandman is taxed in proportion to the produce of his lands1 he leaves them uncultivated1 or reaps just as much from them as suffices for bare subsistence4 ,for to him who loses the fruit of his labour1 it is some gain to do nothing4 ,to lay a tax on industry is a very singular expedient for banishing idleness4 ,taxes on land or corn1 especially when they are excessive1 lead to two results so fatal in their effect that they cannot but depopulate and ruin1 in the long run1 all countries in which they are established4 ,the first of these arises from the defective circulation of specie2 for industry and commerce draw all the money from the country into the capitals3 and as the tax destroys the proportion there might otherwise be between the needs of the husbandman and the price of his corn1 money is always leaving and never returning4 ,thus the richer the city the poorer the country4 ,the product of the taxes passes from the hands of the ,prince or his financial officers into those of artists and traders2 and the husbandman1 who receives1 only the smallest part of it1 is at length exhausted by paying always the same1 and receiving constantly less4 ,how could a human body subsist if it had veins and no arteries1 or if its arteries conveyed the blood only within four inches of the heart8 ,chardin tells us that in ,persia the royal dues on commodities are paid in kind3 this custom1 which1 ,herodotus informs us1 prevailed long ago in the same country down to the time of ,darius1 might prevent the evil of which ,i have been speaking4 ,but unless ,intendants1 ,directors1 ,commissioners and ,warehousemen in ,persia are a different kind of people from what they are elsewhere1 ,i can hardly believe that the smallest part of this produce ever reaches the king1 or that the corn is not spoilt in every granary1 and the greater part of the warehouses not consumed by fire4 ,the second evil effect arises from an apparent advantage1 which aggravates the evil before it can be perceived4 ,that is that corn is a commodity whose price is not enhanced by taxes in the country producing it1 and which1 in spite of its absolute necessity1 may be diminished in quantity without the price being increased4 ,hence1 many people die of hunger1 although corn remains cheap1 and the husbandman bears the whole charge of a tax1 for which he cannot indemnify himself by the price of his corn4 ,it must be observed that we ought not to reason about a land-tax in the same manner as about duties laid on various kinds of merchandise2 for the effect of such duties is to raise the price1 and they are paid by the buyers rather than the sellers4 ,for these duties1 however heavy1 are still voluntary1 and are paid by the merchant only in proportion to the quantity he buys2 and as he buys only in proportion to his sale1 he himself gives the law its particular application2 but the farmer who is obliged to pay his rent at stated times1 whether he sells or not1 cannot wait till he can get his own price for his commodity3 even if he is not forced to sell for mere subsistence1 he must sell to pay the taxes2 so that it is frequently the heaviness of the tax that keeps the price of corn low4 ,it is further to be noticed that the resources of commerce and industry are so far from rendering the tax more supportable through abundance of money1 that they only render it more burdensome4 ,i shall not insist on what is very evident2 i4e4 that1 although a greater or less quantity of money in a ,state may give it the greater or less credit in the eye of the foreigner1 it makes not the least difference to the real fortune of the citizens1 and does not make their condition any more or less comfortable4 ,but ,i must make these two important remarks3 first1 unless a ,state possesses superfluous commodities1 and abundance of money results from foreign trade1 only trading cities are sensible of the abundance2 while the peasant only becomes relatively poorer4 ,secondly1 as the price of everything is enhanced by the increase of money1 taxes also must be proportionately increased2 so that the farmer will find himself still more burdened without having more resources4 ,it ought to be observed that the tax on land is a real duty on the produce4 ,it is universally agreed1 however1 that nothing is so dangerous as a tax on corn paid by the purchaser3 but how comes it we do not see that it is a hundred times worse when the duty is paid by the cultivator himself8 ,is not this an attack on the substance of the ,state at its very source8 ,is it not the directest possible method of depopulating a country1 and therefore in the end ruining it8 ,for the worst kind of scarcity a nation can suffer from is lack of inhabitants4 ,only the real statesman can rise1 in imposing taxes1 above the mere financial object3 he alone can transform heavy burdens into useful regulations1 and make the people even doubtful whether such establishments were not calculated rather for the good of the nation in general1 than merely for the raising of money4 ,duties on the importation of foreign commodities1 of which the natives are fond1 without the country standing in need of them2 on the exportation of those of the growth of the country which are not too plentiful1 and which foreigners cannot do without2 on the productions of frivolous and all too lucrative arts2 on the importation of all pure luxuries2 and in general on all objects of luxury2 will answer the two-fold end in view4 ,it is by such taxes1 indeed1 by which the poor are eased1 and the burdens thrown on the rich1 that it is possible to prevent the continual increase of inequality of fortune2 the subjection of such a multitude of artisans and useless servants to the rich1 the multiplication of idle persons in our cities1 and the depopulation of the country-side4 ,it is important that the value of any commodity and the duties laid on it should be so proportioned that the avarice of individuals may not be too strongly tempted to fraud by the greatness of the possible profit4 ,to make smuggling difficult1 those commodities should be singled out which are hardest to conceal4 ,all duties should be rather paid by the consumer of the commodity taxed than by him who sells it3 as the quantity of duty he would be obliged to pay would lay him open to greater temptations1 and afford him more opportunities for fraud4 ,this is the constant custom in ,china1 a country where the taxes are greater and yet better paid than in any other part of the world4 ,the merchant himself there pays no duty2 the buyer alone1 without murmuring or sedition1 meets the whole charge2 for as the necessaries of life1 such as rice and corn1 are absolutely exempt from taxation1 the common people is not oppressed1 and the duty falls only on those who are well-to-do4 ,precautions against smuggling ought not to be dictated so much by the fear of it occurring1 as by the attention which the government should pay to securing individuals from being seduced by illegitimate profits1 which first make them bad citizens1 and afterwards soon turn them into dishonest men4 ,heavy taxes should be laid on servants in livery1 on equipages1 rich furniture1 fine clothes1 on spacious courts and gardens1 on public entertainments of all kinds1 on useless professions1 such as dancers1 singers1 players1 and in a word1 on all that multiplicity of objects of luxury1 amusement and idleness1 which strike the eyes of all1 and can the less be hidden1 as their whole purpose is to be seen1 without which they would be useless4 ,we need be under no apprehension of the produce of these taxes being arbitrary1 because they are laid on things not absolutely necessary4 ,they must know but little of mankind who imagine that1 after they have been once seduced by luxury1 they can ever renounce it3 they would a hundred times sooner renounce common necessaries1 and had much rather die of hunger than of shame4 ,the increase in their expense is only an additional reason for supporting them1 when the vanity of appearing wealthy reaps its profit from the price of the thing and the charge of the tax4 ,as long as there are rich people in the world1 they will be desirous of distinguishing themselves from the poor1 nor can the ,state devise a revenue less burdensome or more certain than what arises from this distinction4 ,for the same reason1 industry would have nothing to suffer from an economic system which increased the revenue1 encouraged agriculture by relieving the husbandman1 and insensibly tended to bring all fortunes nearer to that middle condition which constitutes the genuine strength of the ,state4 ,these taxes might1 ,i admit1 bring certain fashionable articles of dress and amusement to an untimely end2 but it would be only to substitute others1 by which the artificer would gain1 and the exchequer suffer no loss4 ,in a word1 suppose the spirit of government was constantly to tax only the superfluities of the rich1 one of two things must happen3 either the rich would convert their superfluous expenses into useful ones1 which would redound to the profit of the ,state1 and thus the imposition of taxes would have the effect of the best sumptuary laws1 the expenses of the ,state would necessarily diminish with those of individuals1 and the treasury would not receive so much less as it would gain by having less to pay2 or1 if the rich did not become less extravagant1 the exchequer would have such resources in the product of taxes on their expenditure as would provide for the needs of the ,state4 ,in the first case the treasury would be the richer by what it would save1 from having the less to do with its money2 and in the second1 it would be enriched by the useless expenses of individuals4 ,we may add to all this a very important distinction in matters of political right1 to which governments1 constantly tenacious of doing everything for themselves1 ought to pay great attention4 ,it has been observed that personal taxes and duties on the necessaries of life1 as they directly trespass on the right of property1 and consequently on the true foundation of political society1 are always liable to have dangerous results1 if they are not established with the express consent of the people or its representatives4 ,it is not the same with articles the use of which we can deny ourselves2 for as the individual is under no absolute necessity to pay1 his contribution may count as voluntary4 ,the particular consent of each contributor then takes the place of the general consent of the whole people3 for why should a people oppose the imposition of a tax which falls only on those who desire to pay it8 ,it appears to me certain that everything1 which is not proscribed by law1 or contrary to morality1 and yet may be prohibited by the government1 may also be permitted on payment of a certain duty4 ,thus1 for example1 if the government may prohibit the use of coaches1 it may certainly impose a tax on them2 and this is a prudent and useful method of censuring their use without absolutely forbidding it4 ,in this case1 the tax may be regarded as a sort of fine1 the product of which compensates for the abuse it punishes4 ,it may perhaps be objected that those1 whom ,bodin calls impostors1 i4e4 those who impose or contrive the taxes1 being in the class of the rich1 will be far from sparing themselves to relieve the poor4 ,but this is quite beside the point4 ,if1 in every nation1 those to whom the ,sovereign commits the government of the people1 were1 from their position1 its enemies1 it would not be worth while to inquire what they ought to do to make the people happy4