file which includes the original illustration4 ,see #dfabi-;h4htm or #dfabi-;h4zip3 7https3_/_/www4gutenberg4org_/cache_/epu b_/#dfabi_/pg#dfabi-;images4html7 or 7https3_/_/www4gutenberg4org_/files_/#df abi_/dfabi-;h4zip7 ,images of the original pages are available through ,internet ,archive4 ,see https3_/_/archive4org_/details_/dataofet hic#jjspenuoft ,illustration3 ,,herbert ,,spencer4 ,,the ,,data ,,of ,,ethics by ,,herbert ,,spencer ,author of ,first ,principles1 ,education1 etc4 ,illustration ,a4 ,l4 ,burt ,company1 ,publishers1 ,new ,york ,,author',s ,,preface4 ,a reference to the programme of the ,system of ,synthetic ,philosophy will show that the chapters herewith issued constitute the first division of the work on the ,principles of ,morality1 with which the ,system ends4 ,as the second and third volumes of the ,principles of ,sociology are as yet unpublished1 this installment of the succeeding work appears out of its place4 ,i have been led thus to deviate from the order originally set down by the fear that persistence in conforming to it might result in leaving the final work of the series unexecuted4 ,hints1 repeated of late years with increasing frequency and distinctness1 have shown me that health may permanently fail1 even if life does not end1 before ,i reach the last part of the task ,i have marked out for myself4 ,this last part of the task it is to which ,i regard all the preceding parts as subsidiary4 ,written as far back as #ahdb1 my first essay1 consisting of letters on ,the ,proper ,sphere of ,government1 vaguely indicated what ,i conceived to be certain general principles of right and wrong in political conduct1 and from that time onward my ultimate purpose1 lying behind all proximate purposes1 has been that of finding for the principles of right and wrong1 in conduct at large1 a scientific basis4 ,to leave this purpose unfulfilled1 after making so extensive a preparation for fulfilling it1 would be a failure the probability of which ,i do not like to contemplate1 and ,i am anxious to preclude it1 if not wholly1 still partially4 ,hence the step ,i now take4 ,though this first division of the work terminating the ,synthetic ,philosophy1 cannot1 of course1 contain the specific conclusions to be set forth in the entire work1 yet it implies them in such wise that1 definitely to formulate them requires nothing beyond logical deduction4 ,i am the more anxious to indicate in outline1 if ,i cannot complete1 this final work1 because the establishment of rules of right conduct on a scientific basis is a pressing need4 ,now1 that moral injunctions are losing the authority given by their supposed sacred origin1 the secularization of morals is becoming imperative4 ,few things can happen more disastrous than the decay and death of a regulative system no longer fit1 before another and fitter regulative system has grown up to replace it4 ,most of those who reject the current creed appear to assume that the controlling agency furnished by it may safely be thrown aside1 and the vacancy left unfilled by any other controlling agency4 ,meanwhile1 those who defend the current creed allege that in the absence of the guidance it yields1 no guidance can exist3 divine commandments they think the only possible guides4 ,thus1 between these extreme opponents1 there is a certain community4 ,the one holds that the gap left by disappearance of the code of supernatural ethics need not be filled by a code of natural ethics1 and the other holds that it cannot be so filled4 ,both contemplate a vacuum1 which the one wishes and the other fears4 ,as the change which promises or threatens to bring about this state1 desired or dreaded1 is rapidly progressing1 those who believe that the vacuum can be filled1 and that it must be filled1 are called on to do something in pursuance of their belief4 ,to this more special reason ,i may add a more general reason4 ,great mischief has been done by the repellent aspect habitually given to moral rule by its expositors1 and immense benefits are to be anticipated from presenting moral rule under that attractive aspect which it has when undistorted by superstition and asceticism4 ,if a father1 sternly enforcing numerous commands1 some needful and some needless1 adds to his severe control a behavior wholly unsympathetic2 if his children have to take their pleasures by stealth1 or1 when timidly looking up from their play1 ever meet a cold glance or more frequently a frown1 his government will inevitably be disliked1 if not hated1 and the aim will be to evade it as much as possible4 ,contrariwise1 a father who1 equally firm in maintaining restraints needful for the well-being of his children or the well-being of other persons1 not only avoids needless restraints1 but1 giving his sanction to all legitimate gratifications and providing the means for them1 looks on at their gambols with an approving smile1 can scarcely fail to gain an influence which1 no less efficient for the time being1 will also be permanently efficient4 ,the controls of such two fathers symbolize the controls of ,morality as it is and ,morality as it should be4 ,nor does mischief result only from this undue severity of the ethical doctrine bequeathed us by the harsh past4 ,further mischief results from the impracticability of its ideal4 ,in violent reaction against the utter selfishness of life as carried on in barbarous societies1 it has insisted on a life utterly unselfish4 ,but just as the rampant egoism of a brutal militancy was not to be remedied by attempts at the absolute subjection of the ego in convents and monasteries1 so neither is the misconduct of ordinary humanity1 as now existing1 to be remedied by upholding a standard of abnegation beyond human achievement4 ,rather the effect is to produce a despairing abandonment of all attempts at a higher life4 ,and not only does an effort to achieve the impossible end in this way1 but it simultaneously discredits the possible4 ,by association with rules that cannot be obeyed1 rules that can be obeyed lose their authority4 ,much adverse comment will1 ,i doubt not1 be passed on the theory of right conduct which the following pages shadow forth4 ,critics of a certain class1 far from rejoicing that ethical principles otherwise derived by them1 coincide with ethical principles scientifically derived1 are offended by the coincidence4 ,instead of recognizing essential likeness they enlarge on superficial difference4 ,since the days of persecution1 a curious change has taken place in the behavior of so-called orthodoxy toward so-called heterodoxy4 ,the time was when a heretic1 forced by torture to recant1 satisfied authority by external conformity3 apparent agreement sufficed1 however profound continued to be the real disagreement4 ,but now that the heretic can no longer be coerced into professing the ordinary belief1 his belief is made to appear as much opposed to the ordinary as possible4 ,does he diverge from established theological dogma8 ,then he shall be an atheist2 however inadmissible he considers the term4 ,does he think spiritualistic interpretations of phenomena not valid8 ,then he shall be classed as a materialist2 indignantly though he repudiates the name4 ,and in like manner1 what differences exist between natural morality and supernatural morality1 it has become the policy to exaggerate into fundamental antagonisms4 ,in pursuance of this policy1 there will probably be singled out for reprobation from this volume1 doctrines which1 taken by themselves1 may readily be made to seem utterly wrong4 ,with a view to clearness1 ,i have treated separately some correlative aspects of conduct1 drawing conclusions either of which becomes untrue if divorced from the other2 and have thus given abundant opportunity for misrepresentation4 ,the relations of this work to works preceding it in the series are such as to involve frequent reference4 ,containing1 as it does1 the outcome of principles set forth in each of them1 ,i have found it impracticable to dispense with re-statements of those principles4 ,further1 the presentation of them in their relations to different ethical theories1 has made it needful1 in every case1 briefly to remind the reader what they are1 and how they are derived4 ,hence an amount of repetition which to some will probably appear tedious4 ,i do not1 however1 much regret this almost unavoidable result2 for only by varied iteration can alien conceptions be forced on reluctant minds4 ,june1 #ahgi4 ,,contents4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,,page4 ,conduct in ,general #a ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,the ,evolution of ,conduct #g ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,good and ,bad ,conduct #bc ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,ways of ,judging ,conduct #ed ,,chapter ,v4 ,the ,physical ,view #ge ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,the ,biological ,view #hh ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,the ,psychological ,view #aba ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,the ,sociological ,view #aeg ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,criticisms and ,explanations #agh ,,chapter ,x4 ,the ,relativity of ,pains and ,pleasures #bjf ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,egoism versus ,altruism #bba ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,altruism versus ,egoism #bcg ,,chapter ,,xiii4 ,trial and ,compromise #beh ,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,conciliation #bhe ,,chapter ,,xv4 ,absolute and ,relative ,ethics #cjd ,,chapter ,,xvi4 ,the ,scope of ,ethics #ccb ,,the ,,data ,,of ,,ethics4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,,conduct ,,in ,,general4 #a4 ,the doctrine that correlatives imply one another--that a father cannot be thought of without thinking of a child1 and that there can be no consciousness of superior without a consciousness of inferior--has for one of its common examples the necessary connection between the conceptions of whole and part4 ,beyond the primary truth that no idea of a whole can be framed without a nascent idea of parts constituting it1 and that no idea of a part can be framed without a nascent idea of some whole to which it belongs1 there is the secondary truth that there can be no correct idea of a part without a correct idea of the correlative whole4 ,there are several ways in which inadequate knowledge of the one involves inadequate knowledge of the other4 ,if the part is conceived without any reference to the whole1 it becomes itself a whole--an independent entity2 and its relations to existence in general are misapprehended4 ,further1 the size of the part as compared with the size of the whole must be misapprehended unless the whole is not only recognized as including it1 but is figured in its total extent4 ,and again1 the position which the part occupies in relation to other parts1 cannot be rightly conceived unless there is some conception of the whole in its distribution as well as in its amount4 ,still more when part and whole1 instead of being statically related only1 are dynamically related1 must there be a general understanding of the whole before the part can be understood4 ,by a savage who has never seen a vehicle1 no idea can be formed of the use and action of a wheel4 ,to the unsymmetrically-pierced disk of an eccentric1 no place or purpose can be ascribed by a rustic unacquainted with machinery4 ,even a mechanician1 if he has never looked into a piano1 will1 if shown a damper1 be unable to conceive its function or relative value4 ,most of all1 however1 where the whole is organic1 does complete comprehension of a part imply extensive comprehension of the whole4 ,suppose a being ignorant of the human body to find a detached arm4 ,if not misconceived by him as a supposed whole1 instead of being conceived as a part1 still its relations to other parts1 and its structure1 would be wholly inexplicable4 ,admitting that the co-operation of its bones and muscles might be divined1 yet no thought could be framed of the share taken by the arm in the actions of the unknown whole it belonged to2 nor could any interpretation be put upon the nerves and vessels ramifying through it1 which severally refer to certain central organs4 ,a theory of the structure of the arm implies a theory of the structure of the body at large4 ,and this truth holds not of material aggregates only1 but of immaterial aggregates--aggregated motions1 deeds1 thoughts1 words4 ,the moon's movements cannot be fully interpreted without taking into account the movements of the ,solar ,system at large4 ,the process of loading a gun is meaningless until the subsequent actions performed with the gun are known4 ,a fragment of a sentence1 if not unintelligible1 is wrongly interpreted in the absence of the remainder4 ,cut off its beginning and end1 and the rest of a demonstration proves nothing4 ,evidence given by a plaintiff often misleads until the evidence which the defendant produces is joined with it4 #b4 ,conduct is a whole2 and1 in a sense1 it is an organic whole--an aggregate of inter-dependent actions performed by an organism4 ,that division or aspect of conduct with which ,ethics deals1 is a part of this organic whole--a part having its components inextricably bound up with the rest4 ,as currently conceived1 stirring the fire1 or reading a newspaper1 or eating a meal1 are acts with which ,morality has no concern4 ,opening the window to air the room1 putting on an overcoat when the weather is cold1 are thought of as having no ethical significance4 ,these1 however1 are all portions of conduct4 ,the behavior we call good and the behavior we call bad1 are included1 along with the behavior we call indifferent1 under the conception of behavior at large4 ,the whole of which ,ethics forms a part1 is the whole constituted by the theory of conduct in general2 and this whole must be understood before the part can be understood4 ,let us consider this proposition more closely4 ,and first1 how shall we define conduct8 ,it is not co-extensive with the aggregate of actions1 though it is nearly so4 ,such actions as those of an epileptic in a fit are not included in our conception of conduct3 the conception excludes purposeless actions4 ,and in recognizing this exclusion1 we simultaneously recognize all that is included4 ,the definition of conduct which emerges is either acts adjusted to ends1 or else the adjustment of acts to ends1 according as we contemplate the formed body of acts1 or think of the form alone4 ,and conduct in its full acceptation must be taken as comprehending all adjustments of acts to ends1 from the simplest to the most complex1 whatever their special natures and whether considered separately or in their totality4 ,conduct in general being thus distinguished from the somewhat larger whole constituted by actions in general1 let us next ask what distinction is habitually made between the conduct on which ethical judgments are passed and the remainder of conduct4 ,as already said1 a large part of ordinary conduct is indifferent4 ,shall ,i walk to the waterfall to-day8 or shall ,i ramble along the sea-shore8 ,here the ends are ethically indifferent4 ,if ,i go to the waterfall1 shall ,i go over the moor or take the path through the wood8 ,here the means are ethically indifferent4 ,and from hour to hour most of the things we do are not to be judged as either good or bad in respect of either ends or means4 ,no less clear is it that the transition from indifferent acts to acts which are good or bad is gradual4 ,if a friend who is with me has explored the sea-shore1 but has not seen the waterfall1 the choice of one or other end is no longer ethically indifferent4 ,and if1 the waterfall being fixed on as our goal1 the way over the moor is too long for his strength1 while the shorter way through the wood is not1 the choice of means is no longer ethically indifferent4 ,again1 if a probable result of making the one excursion rather than the other1 is that ,i shall not be back in time to keep an appointment1 or if taking the longer route entails this risk while taking the shorter does not1 the decision in favor of one or other end or means acquires in another way an ethical character2 and if the appointment is one of some importance1 or one of great importance1 or one of life-and-death importance1 to self or others1 the ethical character becomes pronounced4 ,these instances will sufficiently suggest the truth that conduct with which ,morality is not concerned1 passes into conduct which is moral or immoral1 by small degrees and in countless ways4 ,but the conduct that has to be conceived scientifically before we can scientifically conceive those modes of conduct which are the objects of ethical judgments1 is a conduct immensely wider in range than that just indicated4 ,complete comprehension of conduct is not to be obtained by contemplating the conduct of human beings only2 we have to regard this as a part of universal conduct--conduct as exhibited by all living creatures4 ,for evidently this comes within our definition--acts adjusted to ends4 ,the conduct of the higher animals as compared with that of man1 and the conduct of the lower animals as compared with that of the higher1 mainly differ in this1 that the adjustments of acts to ends are relatively simple and relatively incomplete4 ,and as in other cases1 so in this case1 we must interpret the more developed by the less developed4 ,just as1 fully to understand the part of conduct which ,ethics deals with1 we must study human conduct as a whole2 so1 fully to understand human conduct as a whole1 we must study it as a part of that larger whole constituted by the conduct of animate beings in general4 ,nor is even this whole conceived with the needful fullness1 so long as we think only of the conduct at present displayed around us4 ,we have to include in our conception the less-developed conduct out of which this has arisen in course of time4 ,we have to regard the conduct now shown us by creatures of all orders1 as an outcome of the conduct which has brought life of every kind to its present height4 ,and this is tantamount to saying that our preparatory step must be to study the evolution of conduct4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,the ,,evolution ,,of ,,conduct4 #c4 ,we have become quite familiar with the idea of an evolution of structures throughout the ascending types of animals4 ,to a considerable degree we have become familiar with the thought that an evolution of functions has gone on pari passu with the evolution of structures4 ,now1 advancing a step1 we have to frame a conception of the evolution of conduct1 as correlated with this evolution of structures and functions4 ,these three subjects are to be definitely distinguished4 ,obviously the facts comparative morphology sets forth1 form a whole which1 though it cannot be treated in general or in detail without taking into account facts belonging to comparative physiology1 is essentially independent4 ,no less clear is it that we may devote our attention exclusively to that progressive differentiation of functions1 and combination of functions1 which accompanies the development of structures--may say no more about the characters and connections of organs than is implied in describing their separate and joint actions4 ,and the subject of conduct lies outside the subject of functions1 if not as far as this lies outside the subject of structures1 still1 far enough to make it substantially separate4 ,for those functions which are already variously compounded to achieve what we regard as single bodily acts1 are endlessly recompounded to achieve that co-ordination of bodily acts which is known as conduct4 ,we are concerned with functions in the true sense1 while we think of them as processes carried on within the body2 and1 without exceeding the limits of physiology1 we may treat of their adjusted combinations1 so long as these are regarded as parts of the vital consensus4 ,if we observe how the lungs arate the blood which the heart sends to them2 how heart and lungs together supply arated blood to the stomach1 and so enable it to do its work2 how these co-operate with sundry secreting and excreting glands to further digestion and to remove waste matter2 and how all of them join to keep the brain in a fit condition for carrying on those actions which indirectly conduce to maintenance of the life at large2 we are dealing with functions4 ,even when considering how parts that act directly on the environment--legs1 arms1 wings--perform their duties1 we are still concerned with functions in that aspect of them constituting physiology1 so long as we restrict our attention to internal processes1 and to internal combinations of them4 ,but we enter on the subject of conduct when we begin to study such combinations among the actions of sensory and motor organs as are externally manifested4 ,suppose that instead of observing those contractions of muscles by which the optic axes are converged and the foci of the eyes adjusted 7which is a portion of physiology71 and that instead of observing the co-operation of other nerves1 muscles and bones1 by which a hand is moved to a particular place and the fingers closed 7which is also a portion of physiology71 we observe a weapon being seized by a hand under guidance of the eyes4 ,we now pass from the thought of combined internal functions to the thought of combined external motions4 ,doubtless1 if we could trace the cerebral processes which accompany these1 we should find an inner physiological co-ordination corresponding with the outer co-ordination of actions4 ,but this admission is consistent with the assertion1 that when we ignore the internal combination and attend only to the external combination1 we pass from a portion of physiology to a portion of conduct4 ,for though it may be objected that the external combination instanced is too simple to be rightly included under the name conduct1 yet a moment's thought shows that it is joined with what we call conduct by insensible gradations4 ,suppose the weapon seized is used to ward off a blow4 ,suppose a counter-blow is given4 ,suppose the aggressor runs and is chased4 ,suppose there comes a struggle and a handing him over to the police4 ,suppose there follow the many and varied acts constituting a prosecution4 ,obviously the initial adjustment of an act to an end1 inseparable from the rest1 must be included with them under the same general head2 and obviously from this initial simple adjustment1 having intrinsically no moral character1 we pass by degrees to the most complex adjustments and to those on which moral judgments are passed4 ,hence1 excluding all internal co-ordinations1 our subject here is the aggregate of all external co-ordinations2 and this aggregate includes not only the simplest as well as the most complex performed by human beings1 but also those performed by all inferior beings considered as less or more evolved4 #d4 ,already the question3 ,what constitutes advance in the evolution of conduct1 as we trace it up from the lowest types of living creatures to the highest8 has been answered by implication4 ,a few examples will now bring the answer into conspicuous relief4 ,we saw that conduct is distinguished from the totality of actions by excluding purposeless actions2 but during evolution this distinction arises by degrees4 ,in the very lowest creatures most of the movements from moment to moment made1 have not more recognizable aims than have the struggles of an epileptic4 ,an infusorium swims randomly about1 determined in its course not by a perceived object to be pursued or escaped1 but1 apparently1 by varying stimuli in its medium2 and its acts1 unadjusted in any appreciable way to ends1 lead it now into contact with some nutritive substance which it absorbs1 and now into the neighborhood of some creature by which it is swallowed and digested4 ,lacking those developed senses and motor powers which higher animals possess1 ninety-nine in the hundred of these minute animals1 severally living for but a few hours1 disappear either by innutrition or by destruction4 ,the conduct is constituted of actions so little adjusted to ends1 that life continues only as long as the accidents of the environment are favorable4 ,but when1 among aquatic creatures1 we observe one which1 though still low in type1 is much higher than the infusorium--say a rotifer--we see how1 along with larger size1 more developed structures1 and greater power of combining functions1 there goes an advance in conduct4 ,we see how by its whirling cilia it sucks in as food these small animals moving around2 how by its prehensile tail it fixes itself to some fit object2 how by withdrawing its outer organs and contracting its body1 it preserves itself from this or that injury from time to time threatened2 and how thus1 by better adjusting its own actions1 it becomes less dependent on the actions going on around1 and so preserves itself for a longer period4 ,a superior sub-kingdom1 as the ,mollusca1 still better exemplifies this contrast4 ,when we compare a low mollusc1 such as a floating ascidian1 with a high mollusc1 such as a cephalopod1 we are again shown that greater organic evolution is accompanied by more evolved conduct4 ,at the mercy of every marine creature large enough to swallow it1 and drifted about by currents which may chance to keep it at sea1 or may chance to leave it fatally stranded1 the ascidian displays but little adjustment of acts to ends in comparison with the cephalopod2 which1 now crawling over the beach1 now exploring the rocky crevices1 now swimming through the open water1 now darting after a fish1 now hiding itself from some larger animal in a cloud of ink1 and using its suckered arms at one time for anchoring itself and at another for holding fast its prey2 selects and combines and proportions its movements from minute to minute1 so as to evade dangers which threaten1 while utilizing chances of food which offer3 so showing us varied activities which1 in achieving special ends1 achieve the general end of securing continuance of the activities4 ,among vertebrate animals we similarly trace up1 along with advance in structures and functions1 this advance in conduct4 ,a fish roaming about at hazard in search of something to eat1 able to detect it by smell or sight only within short distances1 and now and again rushing away in alarm on the approach of a bigger fish1 makes adjustments of acts to ends that are relatively few and simple in their kinds2 and shows us1 as a consequence1 how small is the average duration of life4 ,so few survive to maturity that1 to make up for destruction of unhatched young and small fry and half-grown individuals1 a million ova have to be spawned by a cod-fish that two may reach the spawning age4 ,conversely1 by a highly-evolved mammal1 such as an elephant1 those general actions performed in common with the fish are far better adjusted to their ends4 ,by sight as well1 probably1 as by odor1 it detects food at relatively great distances2 and when1 at intervals1 there arises a need for escape1 relatively great speed is attained4 ,but the chief difference arises from the addition of new sets of adjustments4 ,we have combined actions which facilitate nutrition--the breaking off of succulent and fruit-bearing branches1 the selecting of edible growths throughout a comparatively wide reach2 and1 in case of danger1 safety can be achieved not by flight only1 but1 if necessary1 by defence or attack3 bringing into combined use tusks1 trunk and ponderous feet4 ,further1 we see various subsidiary acts adjusted to subsidiary ends--now the going into a river for coolness1 and using the trunk as a means of projecting water over the body2 now the employment of a bough for sweeping away flies from the back2 now the making of signal sounds to alarm the herd1 and adapting the actions to such sounds when made by others4 ,evidently1 the effect of this more highly-evolved conduct is to secure the balance of the organic actions throughout far longer periods4 ,and now1 on studying the doings of the highest of mammals1 mankind1 we not only find that the adjustments of acts to ends are both more numerous and better than among lower mammals1 but we find the same thing on comparing the doings of higher races of men with those of lower races4 ,if we take any one of the major ends achieved1 we see greater completeness of achievement by civilized than by savage2 and we also see an achievement of relatively numerous minor ends subserving major ends4 ,is it in nutrition8 ,the food is obtained more regularly in response to appetite2 it is far higher in quality2 it is free from dirt2 it is greater in variety2 it is better prepared4 ,is it in warmth8 ,the characters of the fabrics and forms of the articles used for clothing1 and the adaptations of them to requirements from day to day and hour to hour1 are much superior4 ,is it in dwellings8 ,between the shelter of boughs and grass which the lowest savage builds1 and the mansion of the civilized man1 the contrast in aspect is not more extreme than is the contrast in number and efficiency of the adjustments of acts to ends betrayed in their respective constructions4 ,and when with the ordinary activities of the savage we compare the ordinary civilized activities--as the business of the trader1 which involves multiplied and complex transactions extending over long periods1 or as professional avocations1 prepared for by elaborate studies1 and daily carried on in endlessly varied forms1 or as political discussions and agitations1 directed now to the carrying of this measure and now to the defeating of that--we see sets of adjustments of acts to ends1 not only immensely exceeding those seen among lower races of men in variety and intricacy1 but sets to which lower races of men present nothing analogous4 ,and along with this greater elaboration of life produced by the pursuit of more numerous ends1 there goes that increased duration of life which constitutes the supreme end4 ,and here is suggested the need for supplementing this conception of evolving conduct4 ,for besides being an improving adjustment of acts to ends1 such as furthers prolongation of life1 it is such as furthers increased amount of life4 ,reconsideration of the examples above given will show that length of life is not by itself a measure of evolution of conduct2 but that quantity of life must be taken into account4 ,an oyster1 adapted by its structure to the diffused food contained in the water it draws in1 and shielded by its shell from nearly all dangers1 may live longer than a cuttle-fish1 which has such superior powers of dealing with numerous contingencies2 but then1 the sum of vital activities during any given interval is far less in the oyster than in the cuttle-fish4 ,so a worm1 ordinarily sheltered from most enemies by the earth it burrows through1 which also supplies a sufficiency of its poor food1 may have greater longevity than many of its annulose relatives1 the insects2 but one of these during its existence as larva and imago1 may experience a greater quantity of the changes which constitute life4 ,nor is it otherwise when we compare the more evolved with the less evolved among mankind4 ,the difference between the average lengths of the lives of savage and civilized is no true measure of the difference between the totalities of their two lives1 considered as aggregates of thought1 feeling and action4 ,hence1 estimating life by multiplying its length into its breadth1 we must say that the augmentation of it which accompanies evolution of conduct1 results from increase of both factors4 ,the more multiplied and varied adjustments of acts to ends1 by which the more developed creature from hour to hour fulfills more numerous requirements1 severally add to the activities that are carried on abreast1 and severally help to make greater the period through which such simultaneous activities endure4 ,each further evolution of conduct widens the aggregate of actions while conducing to elongation of it4 #e4 ,turn we now to a further aspect of the phenomena1 separate from1 but necessarily associated with1 the last4 ,thus far we have considered only those adjustments of acts to ends which have for their final purpose complete individual life4 ,now we have to consider those adjustments which have to their final purpose the life of the species4 ,self-preservation in each generation has all along depended on the preservation of offspring by preceding generations4 ,and in proportion as evolution of the conduct subserving individual life is high1 implying high organization1 there must previously have been a highly-evolved conduct subserving nurture of the young4 ,throughout the ascending grades of the animal kingdom1 this second kind of conduct presents stages of advance like those which we have observed in the first4 ,low down1 where structures and functions are little developed1 and the power of adjusting acts to ends but slight1 there is no conduct1 properly so named1 furthering salvation of the species4 ,race-maintaining conduct1 like self-maintaining conduct1 arises gradually out of that which cannot be called conduct3 adjusted actions are preceded by unadjusted ones4 ,protozoa spontaneously divide and sub-divide1 in consequence of physical changes over which they have no control2 or1 at other times1 after a period of quiescence1 break up into minute portions which severally grow into new individuals4 ,in neither case can conduct be alleged4 ,higher up1 the process is that of ripening1 at intervals1 germ-cells and sperm-cells1 which1 on occasion1 are sent forth into the surrounding water and left to their fate3 perhaps one in ten thousand surviving to maturity4 ,here1 again1 we see only development and dispersion going on apart from parental care4 ,types above these1 as fish which choose fit places in which to deposit their ova1 or as the higher crustaceans which carry masses of ova about until they are hatched1 exhibit adjustments of acts to ends which we may properly call conduct1 though it is of the simplest kind4 ,where1 as among certain fish1 the male keeps guard over the eggs1 driving away intruders1 there is an additional adjustment of acts to ends2 and the applicability of the name conduct is more decided4 ,passing at once to creatures far superior1 such as birds1 which1 building nests and sitting on their eggs1 feed their broods for considerable periods1 and give them aid after they can fly2 or such as mammals which1 suckling their young for a time1 continue afterward to bring them food or protect them while they feed1 until they reach ages at which they can provide for themselves2 we are shown how this conduct which furthers race-maintenance evolves hand-in-hand with the conduct which furthers self-maintenance4 ,that better organization which makes possible the last1 makes possible the first also4 ,mankind exhibit a great progress of like nature4 ,compared with brutes1 the savage1 higher in his self-maintaining conduct1 is higher too in his race-maintaining conduct4 ,a larger number of the wants of offspring are provided for2 and parental care1 enduring longer1 extends to the disciplining of offspring in arts and habits which fit them for their conditions of existence4 ,conduct of this order1 equally with conduct of the first order1 we see becoming evolved in a still greater degree as we ascend from savage to civilized4 ,the adjustments of acts to ends in the rearing of children become far more elaborate1 alike in number of ends met1 variety of means used1 and efficiency of their adaptations2 and the aid and oversight are continued throughout a much greater part of early life4 ,in tracing up the evolution of conduct1 so that we may frame a true conception of conduct in general1 we have thus to recognize these two kinds as mutually dependent4 ,speaking generally1 neither can evolve without evolution of the other2 and the highest evolutions of the two must be reached simultaneously4 #f4 ,to conclude1 however1 that on reaching a perfect adjustment of acts to ends subserving individual life and the rearing of offspring1 the evolution of conduct becomes complete1 is to conclude erroneously4 ,or rather1 ,i should say1 it is an error to suppose that either of these kinds of conduct can assume its highest form1 without its highest form being assumed by a third kind of conduct yet to be named4 ,the multitudinous creatures of all kinds which fill the earth1 cannot live wholly apart from one another1 but are more or less in presence of one another--are interfered with by one another4 ,in large measure the adjustments of acts to ends which we have been considering1 are components of that struggle for existence carried on both between members of the same species and between members of different species2 and1 very generally1 a successful adjustment made by one creature involves an unsuccessful adjustment made by another creature1 either of the same kind or of a different kind4 ,that the carnivore may live herbivores must die2 and that its young may be reared the young of weaker creatures must be orphaned4 ,maintenance of the hawk and its brood involves the deaths of many small birds2 and that small birds may multiply1 their progeny must be fed with innumerable sacrificed worms and larv4 ,competition among members of the same species has allied1 though less conspicuous1 results4 ,the stronger often carries off by force the prey which the weaker has caught4 ,monopolizing certain hunting grounds1 the more ferocious drive others of their kind into less favorable places4 ,with plant-eating animals1 too1 the like holds3 the better food is secured by the more vigorous individuals1 while the less vigorous and worse fed1 succumb either directly from innutrition or indirectly from resulting inability to escape enemies4 ,that is to say1 among creatures whose lives are carried on antagonistically1 each of the two kinds of conduct delineated above1 must remain imperfectly evolved4 ,even in such few kinds of them as have little to fear from enemies or competitors1 as lions or tigers1 there is still inevitable failure in the adjustments of acts to ends toward the close of life4 ,death by starvation from inability to catch prey1 shows a falling short of conduct from its ideal4 ,this imperfectly-evolved conduct introduces us by antithesis to conduct that is perfectly evolved4 ,contemplating these adjustments of acts to ends which miss completeness because they cannot be made by one creature without other creatures being prevented from making them1 raises the thought of adjustments such that each creature may make them without preventing them from being made by other creatures4 ,that the highest form of conduct must be so distinguished1 is an inevitable implication2 for1 while the form of conduct is such that adjustments of acts to ends by some necessitate non-adjustments by others1 there remains room for modifications which bring conduct into a form avoiding this1 and so making the totality of life greater4 ,from the abstract let us pass to the concrete4 ,recognizing men as the beings whose conduct is most evolved1 let us ask under what conditions their conduct1 in all three aspects of its evolution1 reaches its limit4 ,clearly while the lives led are entirely predatory1 as those of savages1 the adjustments of acts to ends fall short of this highest form of conduct in every way4 ,individual life1 ill carried on from hour to hour1 is prematurely cut short2 the fostering of offspring often fails1 and is incomplete when it does not fail2 and in so far as the ends of self-maintenance and race-maintenance are met1 they are met by destruction of other beings of different kind or of like kind4 ,in social groups formed by compounding and re-compounding primitive hordes1 conduct remains imperfectly evolved in proportion as there continue antagonisms between the groups and antagonisms between members of the same group--two traits necessarily associated2 since the nature which prompts international aggression prompts aggression of individuals on one another4 ,hence the limit of evolution can be reached by conduct only in permanently peaceful societies4 ,that perfect adjustment of acts to ends in maintaining individual life and rearing new individuals1 which is effected by each without hindering others from effecting like perfect adjustments1 is1 in its very definition1 shown to constitute a kind of conduct that can be approached only as war decreases and dies out4 ,a gap in this outline must now be filled up4 ,there remains a further advance not yet even hinted4 ,for beyond so behaving that each achieves his ends without preventing others from achieving their ends1 the members of a society may give mutual help in the achievement of ends4 ,and if1 either indirectly by industrial co-operation1 or directly by volunteered aid1 fellow-citizens can make easier for one another the adjustments of acts to ends1 then their conduct assumes a still higher phase of evolution2 since whatever facilitates the making of adjustments by each1 increases the totality of the adjustments made1 and serves to render the lives of all more complete4 #g4 ,the reader who recalls certain passages in ,first ,principles1 in the ,principles of ,biology1 and in the ,principles of ,psychology1 will perceive above a restatement1 in another form1 of generalizations set forth in those works4 ,especially will he be reminded of the proposition that ,life is the definite combination of heterogeneous changes1 both simultaneous and successive1 in correspondence with external co-existences and sequences2 and still more of that abridged and less specific formula1 in which ,life is said to be the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations4 ,the presentation of the facts here made differs from the presentations before made1 mainly by ignoring the inner part of the correspondence and attending exclusively to that outer part constituted of visible actions4 ,but the two are in harmony2 and the reader who wishes further to prepare himself for dealing with our present topic from the evolution point of view1 may advantageously join to the foregoing more special aspect of the phenomena1 the more general aspects before delineated4 ,after this passing remark1 ,i recur to the main proposition set forth in these two chapters1 which has1 ,i think1 been fully justified4 ,guided by the truth that as the conduct with which ,ethics deals is part of conduct at large1 conduct at large must be generally understood before this part can be specially understood2 and guided by the further truth that to understand conduct at large we must understand the evolution of conduct1 we have been led to see that ,ethics has for its subject-matter that form which universal conduct assumes during the last stages of its evolution4 ,we have also concluded that these last stages in the evolution of conduct are those displayed by the highest type of being1 when he is forced1 by increase of numbers1 to live more and more in presence of his fellows4 ,and there has followed the corollary that conduct gains ethical sanction in proportion as the activities1 becoming less and less militant and more and more industrial1 are such as do not necessitate mutual injury or hinderance1 but consist with1 and are furthered by1 co-operation and mutual aid4 ,these implications of the ,evolution-,hypothesis1 we shall now see harmonize with the leading moral ideas men have otherwise reached4 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,good ,,and ,,bad ,,conduct4 #h4 ,by comparing its meanings in different connections and observing what they have in common1 we learn the essential meaning of a word2 and the essential meaning of a word that is variously applied1 may best be learned by comparing with one another those applications of it which diverge most widely4 ,let us thus ascertain what good and bad mean4 ,in which cases do we distinguish as good1 a knife1 a gun1 a house8 ,and what trait leads us to speak of a bad umbrella or a bad pair of boots8 ,the characters here predicted by the words good and bad1 are not intrinsic characters2 for apart from human wants1 such things have neither merits nor demerits4 ,we call these articles good or bad according as they are well or ill adapted to achieve prescribed ends4 ,the good knife is one which will cut2 the good gun is one which carries far and true2 the good house is one which duly yields the shelter1 comfort1 and accommodation sought for4 ,conversely1 the badness alleged of the umbrella or the pair of boots1 refers to their failures in fulfilling the ends of keeping off the rain and comfortably protecting the feet1 with due regard to appearances4 ,so is it when we pass from inanimate objects to inanimate actions4 ,we call a day bad in which storms prevent us from satisfying certain of our desires4 ,a good season is the expression used when the weather has favored the production of valuable crops4 ,if from lifeless things and actions we pass to living ones1 we similarly find that these words in their current applications refer to efficient subservience4 ,the goodness or badness of a pointer or a hunter1 of a sheep or an ox1 ignoring all other attributes of these creatures1 refer in the one case to the fitness of their actions for effecting the ends men use them for1 and in the other case to the qualities of their flesh as adapting it to support human life4 ,and those doings of men which1 morally considered1 are indifferent1 we class as good or bad according to their success or failure4 ,a good jump is a jump which1 remoter ends ignored1 well achieves the immediate purpose of a jump2 and a stroke at billiards is called good when the movements are skillfully adjusted to the requirements4 ,oppositely1 the badness of a walk that is shuffling and an utterance that is indistinct1 is alleged because of the relative non-adaptations of the acts to the ends4 ,thus recognizing the meanings of good and bad as otherwise used1 we shall understand better their meanings as used in characterizing conduct under its ethical aspects4 ,here1 too1 observation shows that we apply them according as the adjustments of acts to ends are1 or are not1 efficient4 ,this truth is somewhat disguised4 ,the entanglement of social relations is such that men's actions often simultaneously affect the welfares of self1 of offspring1 and of fellow-citizens4 ,hence results confusion in judging of actions as good or bad2 since actions well fitted to achieve ends of one order1 may prevent ends of the other orders from being achieved ,nevertheless1 when we disentangle the three orders of ends1 and consider each separately1 it becomes clear that the conduct which achieves each kind of end is regarded as relatively good2 and is regarded as relatively bad if it fails to achieve it4 ,take first the primary set of adjustments--those subserving individual life4 ,apart from approval or disapproval of his ulterior aims1 a man who fights is said to make a good defense1 if his defense is well adapted for self-preservation2 and1 the judgments on other aspects of his conduct remaining the same1 he brings down on himself an unfavorable verdict1 in so far as his immediate acts are concerned1 if these are futile4 ,the goodness ascribed to a man of business1 as such1 is measured by the activity and ability with which he buys and sells to advantage2 and may co-exist with a hard treatment of dependents which is reprobated4 ,though1 in repeatedly lending money to a friend who sinks one loan after another1 a man is doing that which1 considered in itself is held praiseworthy2 yet1 if he does it to the extent of bringing on his own ruin1 he is held blameworthy for a self-sacrifice carried too far4 ,and thus is it with the opinions we express from hour to hour on those acts of people around which bear on their health and personal welfare4 ,you should not have done that2 is the reproof given to one who crosses the street amid a dangerous rush of vehicles4 ,you ought to have changed your clothes2 is said to another who has taken cold after getting wet4 ,you were right to take a receipt2 you were wrong to invest without advice2 are common criticisms4 ,all such approving and disapproving utterances make the tacit assertion that1 other things equal1 conduct is right or wrong according as its special acts1 well or ill adjusted to special ends1 do or do not further the general end of self-preservation4 ,these ethical judgments we pass on self-regarding acts are ordinarily little emphasized2 partly because the promptings of the self-regarding desires1 generally strong enough1 do not need moral enforcement1 and partly because the promptings of the other-regarding desires1 less strong1 and often overridden1 do need moral enforcement4 ,hence results a contrast4 ,on turning to that second class of adjustments of acts to ends which subserve the rearing of offspring1 we no longer find any obscurity in the application of the words good and bad to them1 according as they are efficient or inefficient4 ,the expressions good nursing and bad nursing1 whether they refer to the supply of food1 the quantity and amount of clothing1 or the due ministration to infantine wants from hour to hour1 tacitly recognize as special ends which ought to be fulfilled1 the furthering of the vital functions1 with a view to the general end of continued life and growth4 ,a mother is called good who1 ministering to all the physical needs of her children1 also adjusts her behavior in ways conducive to their mental health2 and a bad father is one who either does not provide the necessaries of life for his family or otherwise acts in a manner injurious to their bodies or minds4 ,similarly of the education given to them1 or provided for them4 ,goodness or badness is affirmed of it 7often with little consistency1 however7 according as its methods are so adapted to physical and psychical requirements1 as to further the children's lives for the time being1 while preparing them for carrying on complete and prolonged adult life4 ,most emphatic1 however1 are the applications of the words good and bad to conduct throughout that third division of it comprising the deeds by which men affect one another4 ,in maintaining their own lives and fostering their offspring1 men's adjustments of acts to ends are so apt to hinder the kindred adjustments of other men1 that insistance on the needful limitations has to be perpetual2 and the mischiefs caused by men's interferences with one another's life-subserving actions are so great that the interdicts have to be peremptory4 ,hence1 the fact that the words good and bad have come to be specially associated with acts which further the complete living of others and acts which obstruct their complete living4 ,goodness1 standing by itself1 suggests1 above all other things1 the conduct of one who aids the sick in re-acquiring normal vitality1 assists the unfortunate to recover the means of maintaining themselves1 defends those who are threatened with harm in person1 property1 or reputation1 and aids whatever promises to improve the living of all his fellows4 ,contrariwise1 badness brings to mind1 as its leading correlative1 the conduct of one who1 in carrying on his own life1 damages the lives of others by injuring their bodies1 destroying their possessions1 defrauding them1 calumniating them4 ,always1 then1 acts are called good or bad according as they are well or ill adjusted to ends2 and whatever inconsistency there is in our uses of the words arises from inconsistency of the ends4 ,here1 however1 the study of conduct in general1 and of the evolution of conduct1 have prepared us to harmonize these interpretations4 ,the foregoing exposition shows that the conduct to which we apply the name good1 is the relatively more evolved conduct2 and that bad is the name we apply to conduct which is relatively less evolved4 ,we saw that evolution1 tending ever toward self-preservation1 reaches its limit when individual life is the greatest1 both in length and breadth2 and now we see that1 leaving other ends aside1 we regard as good the conduct furthering self-preservation1 and as bad the conduct tending to self-destruction4 ,it was shown that along with increasing power of maintaining individual life1 which evolution brings1 there goes increasing power of perpetuating the species by fostering progeny1 and that in this direction evolution reaches its limit when the needful number of young1 preserved to maturity1 are then fit for a life that is complete in fullness and duration2 and here it turns out that parental conduct is called good or bad as it approaches or falls short of this ideal result4 ,lastly1 we inferred that establishment of an associated state1 both makes possible and requires a form of conduct such that life may be completed in each and in his offspring1 not only without preventing completion of it in others1 but with furtherance of it in others2 and we have found above1 that this is the form of conduct most emphatically termed good4 ,moreover1 just as we there saw that evolution becomes the highest possible when the conduct simultaneously achieves the greatest totality of life in self1 in offspring1 and in fellow men2 so here we see that the conduct called good rises to the conduct conceived as best1 when it fulfills all three classes of ends at the same time4 #i4 ,is there any postulate involved in these judgments on conduct8 ,is there any assumption made in calling good the acts conducive to life1 in self or others1 and bad those which directly or indirectly tend toward death1 special or general8 ,yes2 an assumption of extreme significance has been made--an assumption underlying all moral estimates4 ,the question to be definitely raised and answered before entering on any ethical discussion1 is the question of late much agitated3 ,is life worth living8 ,shall we take the pessimist view8 or shall we take the optimist view8 or shall we1 after weighing pessimistic and optimistic arguments1 conclude that the balance is in favor of a qualified optimism8 ,on the answer to this question depends entirely every decision concerning the goodness or badness of conduct4 ,by those who think life is not a benefit but a misfortune1 conduct which prolongs it is to be blamed rather than praised2 the ending of an undesirable existence being the thing to be wished1 that which causes the ending of it must be applauded2 while actions furthering its continuance1 either in self or others1 must be reprobated4 ,those who1 on the other hand1 take an optimistic view1 or who1 if not pure optimists1 yet hold that in life the good exceeds the evil1 are committed to opposite estimates2 and must regard as conduct to be approved that which fosters life in self and others1 and as conduct to be disapproved that which injures or endangers life in self or others4 ,the ultimate question1 therefore1 is3 ,has evolution been a mistake2 and especially that evolution which improves the adjustment of acts to ends in ascending stages of organization8 ,if it is held that there had better not have been any animate existence at all1 and that the sooner it comes to an end the better2 then one set of conclusions with respect to conduct emerges4 ,if1 contrariwise1 it is held that there is a balance in favor of animate existence1 and if1 still further1 it is held that in the future this balance may be increased2 then the opposite set of conclusions emerges4 ,even should it be alleged that the worth of life is not to be judged by its intrinsic character1 but rather by its extrinsic sequences--by certain results to be anticipated when life has passed--the ultimate issue reappears in a new shape4 ,for though the accompanying creed may negative a deliberate shortening of life that is miserable1 it cannot justify a gratuitous lengthening of such life4 ,legislation conducive to increased longevity would1 on the pessimistic view1 remain blameable1 while it would be praiseworthy on the optimistic view4 ,but now1 have these irreconcilable opinions anything in common8 ,men being divisible into two schools differing on this ultimate question1 the inquiry arises--,is there anything which their radically opposed views alike take for granted8 ,in the optimistic proposition1 tacitly made when using the words good and bad after the ordinary manner2 and in the pessimistic proposition overtly made1 which implies that the words good and bad should be used in the reverse senses2 does examination disclose any joint proposition--any proposition which1 contained in both of them1 may be held more certain than either--any universally asserted proposition8 #aj4 ,yes1 there is one postulate in which pessimists and optimists agree4 ,both their arguments assume it to be self-evident that life is good or bad1 according as it does1 or does not1 bring a surplus of agreeable feeling4 ,the pessimist says he condemns life because it results in more pain than pleasure4 ,the optimist defends life in the belief that it brings more pleasure than pain4 ,each makes the kind of sentiency which accompanies life the test4 ,they agree that the justification for life as a state of being1 turns on this issue--whether the average consciousness rises above indifference-point into pleasurable feeling or falls below it into painful feeling4 ,the implication common to their antagonist views is1 that conduct should conduce to preservation of the individual1 of the family1 and of the society1 only supposing that life brings more happiness than misery4 ,changing the venue cannot alter the verdict4 ,if either the pessimist1 while saying that the pains of life predominate1 or the optimist1 while saying that the pleasures predominate1 urges that the pains borne here are to be compensated by pleasures received hereafter2 and that so life1 whether or not justified in its immediate results1 is justified in its ultimate results2 the implication remains the same4 ,the decision is still reached by balancing pleasures against pains4 ,animate existence would be judged by both a curse1 if to a surplus of misery borne here were added a surplus of misery to be borne hereafter4 ,and for either to regard animate existence as a blessing1 if here its pains were held to exceed its pleasures1 he must hold that hereafter its pleasures will exceed its pains4 ,thus there is no escape from the admission that in calling good the conduct which subserves life1 and bad the conduct which hinders or destroys it1 and in so implying that life is a blessing and not a curse1 we are inevitably asserting that conduct is good or bad according as its total effects are pleasurable or painful4 ,one theory only is imaginable in pursuance of which other interpretations of good and bad can be given4 ,this theory is that men were created with the intention that they should be sources of misery to themselves2 and that they are bound to continue living that their creator may have the satisfaction of contemplating their misery4 ,though this is not a theory avowedly entertained by many--though it is not formulated by any in this distinct way2 yet not a few do accept it under a disguised form4 ,inferior creeds are pervaded by the belief that the sight of suffering is pleasing to the gods4 ,derived from bloodthirsty ancestors1 such gods are naturally conceived as gratified by the infliction of pain3 when living they delighted in torturing other beings2 and witnessing torture is supposed still to give them delight4 ,the implied conceptions long survive4 ,it needs but to name ,indian fakirs who hang on hooks1 and ,eastern dervishes who gash themselves1 to show that in societies considerably advanced are still to be found many who think that submission to anguish brings divine favor4 ,and without enlarging on facts and penances1 it will be clear that there has existed1 and still exists1 among ,christian peoples1 the belief that the ,deity whom ,jephthah thought to propitiate by sacrificing his daughter1 may be propitiated by self-inflicted pains4 ,further1 the conception accompanying this1 that acts pleasing to self are offensive to ,god1 has survived along with it1 and still widely prevails2 if not in formulated dogmas1 yet in beliefs that are manifestly operative4 ,doubtless1 in modern days such beliefs have assumed qualified forms4 ,the satisfactions which ferocious gods were supposed to feel in contemplating tortures1 has been1 in large measure1 transformed into the satisfaction felt by a deity in contemplating that self-infliction of pain which is held to further eventual happiness4 ,but clearly those who entertain this modified view1 are excluded from the class whose position we are here considering4 ,restricting ourselves to this class--supposing that from the savage who immolates victims to a cannibal god1 there are descendants among the civilized1 who hold that mankind were made for suffering1 and that it is their duty to continue living in misery for the delight of their maker1 we can only recognize the fact that devil-worshipers are not yet extinct4 ,omitting people of this class1 if there are any1 as beyond or beneath argument1 we find that all others avowedly or tacitly hold that the final justification for maintaining life can only be the reception from it of a surplus of pleasurable feeling over painful feeling2 and that goodness or badness can be ascribed to acts which subserve life or hinder life only on this supposition4 ,and here we are brought round to those primary meanings of the words good and bad1 which we passed over when considering their secondary meanings4 ,for on remembering that we call good and bad the things which immediately produce agreeable and disagreeable sensations1 and also the sensations themselves--a good wine1 a good appetite1 a bad smell1 a bad headache--we see that by referring directly to pleasures and pains1 these meanings harmonize with those which indirectly refer to pleasures and pains4 ,if we call good the enjoyable state itself1 as a good laugh--if we call good the proximate cause of an enjoyable state1 as good music--if we call good any agent which conduces immediately or remotely to an enjoyable state1 as a good shop1 a good teacher--if we call good considered intrinsically1 each act so adjusted to its end as to further self-preservation and that surplus of enjoyment which makes self-preservation desirable--if we call good every kind of conduct which aids the lives of others1 and do this under the belief that life brings more happiness than misery2 then it becomes undeniable that1 taking into account immediate and remote effects on all persons1 the good is universally the pleasurable4 #aa4 ,sundry influences--moral1 theological1 and political--conspire to make people disguise from themselves this truth4 ,as in narrower cases so in this widest case1 they become so pre-occupied with the means by which an end is achieved1 as eventually to mistake it for the end4 ,just as money1 which is the means of satisfying wants1 comes to be regarded by a miser as the sole thing to be worked for1 leaving the wants unsatisfied2 so the conduct men have found preferable because most conducive to happiness has come to be thought of as intrinsically preferable1 not only to be made a proximate end 7which it should be71 but to be made an ultimate end1 to the exclusion of the true ultimate end4 ,and yet cross-examination quickly compels every one to confess the true ultimate end4 ,just as the miser1 asked to justify himself1 is obliged to allege the power of money to purchase desirable things1 as his reason for prizing it2 so the moralist who thinks this conduct intrinsically good and that intrinsically bad1 if pushed home1 has no choice but to fall back on their pleasure-giving and pain-giving effects4 ,to prove this it needs but to observe how impossible it would be to think of them as we do1 if their effects were reversed4 ,suppose that gashes and bruises caused agreeable sensations1 and brought in their train increased power of doing work and receiving enjoyment2 should we regard assault in the same manner as at present8 ,or suppose that self-mutilation1 say by cutting off a hand1 was both intrinsically pleasant and furthered performance of the processes by which personal welfare and the welfare of dependents is achieved2 should we hold as now1 that deliberate injury to one's own body is to be reprobated8 ,or again1 suppose that picking a man's pocket excited in him joyful emotions1 by brightening his prospects2 would theft be counted among crimes1 as in existing law-books and moral codes8 ,in these extreme cases1 no one can deny that what we call the badness of actions is ascribed to them solely for the reason that they entail pain1 immediate or remote1 and would not be so ascribed did they entail pleasure4 ,if we examine our conceptions on their obverse side1 this general fact forces itself on our attention with equal distinctness4 ,imagine that ministering to a sick person always increased the pains of illness4 ,imagine that an orphan's relatives who took charge of it1 thereby necessarily brought miseries upon it4 ,imagine that liquidating another man's pecuniary claims on you redounded to his disadvantage4 ,imagine that crediting a man with noble behavior hindered his social welfare and consequent gratification4 ,what should we say to these acts which now fall into the class we call praiseworthy8 ,should we not contrariwise class them as blameworthy8 ,using1 then1 as our tests1 these most pronounced forms of good and bad conduct1 we find it unquestionable that our ideas of their goodness and badness really originate from our consciousness of the certainty or probability that they will produce pleasures or pains somewhere4 ,and this truth is brought out with equal clearness by examining the standards of different moral schools2 for analysis shows that every one of them derives its authority from this ultimate standard4 ,ethical systems are roughly distinguishable according as they take for their cardinal ideas 7#a7 the character of the agent2 7#b7 the nature of his motive2 7#c7 the quality of his deeds2 and 7#d7 the results4 ,each of these may be characterized as good or bad2 and those who do not estimate a mode of life by its effects on happiness1 estimate it by the implied goodness or badness in the agent1 in his motive1 or in his deeds4 ,we have perfection in the agent set up as a test by which conduct is to be judged4 ,apart from the agent we have his feeling considered as moral4 ,and apart from the feeling we have his action considered as virtuous4 ,though the distinctions thus indicated have so little definiteness that the words marking them are used interchangeably1 yet there correspond to them doctrines partially unlike one another2 which we may here conveniently examine separately1 with the view of showing that all their tests of goodness are derivative4 #ab4 ,it is strange that a notion so abstract as that of perfection1 or a certain ideal completeness of nature1 should ever have been thought one from which a system of guidance can be evolved2 as it was in a general way by ,plato and more distinctly by ,jonathan ,edwardes4 ,perfection is synonymous with goodness in the highest degree2 and1 hence1 to define good conduct in terms of perfection1 is indirectly to define good conduct in terms of itself4 ,naturally1 therefore1 it happens that the notion of perfection like the notion of goodness can be framed only in relation to ends4 ,we allege imperfection of any inanimate thing1 as a tool1 if it lacks some part needful for effectual action1 or if some part is so shaped as not to fulfill its purpose in the best manner4 ,perfection is alleged of a watch if it keeps exact time1 however plain its case2 and imperfection is alleged of it because of inaccurate time-keeping1 however beautifully it is ornamented4 ,though we call things imperfect if we detect in them any injuries or flaws1 even when these do not detract from efficiency2 yet we do this because they imply that inferior workmanship1 or that wear and tear1 with which inefficiency is commonly joined in experience3 absence of minor imperfections being habitually associated with absence of major imperfections4 ,as applied to living things1 the word perfection has the same meaning4 ,the idea of perfect shape in a race-horse is derived by generalization from those observed traits of race-horses which have usually gone along with attainment of the highest speed2 and the idea of perfect constitution in a race-horse similarly refers to the endurance which enables him to continue that speed for the longest time4 ,with men1 physically considered1 it is the same3 we are able to furnish no other test of perfection than that of complete power in all the organs to fulfill their respective functions4 ,that our conception of perfect balance among the internal parts1 and of perfect proportion among the external parts1 originates thus1 is made clear by observing that imperfection of any viscus1 as lungs1 heart1 or liver1 is ascribed for no other reason than inability to meet in full the demands which the activities of the organism make on it2 and on observing that the conception of insufficient size1 or of too great size1 in a limb1 is derived from accumulated experiences respecting that ratio among the limbs which furthers in the highest degree the performance of all needful actions4 ,and of perfection in mental nature we have no other measure4 ,if imperfection of memory1 of judgment1 of temper1 is alleged1 it is alleged because of inadequacy to the requirements of life2 and to imagine a perfect balance of the intellectual powers and of the emotions1 is to imagine that proportion among them which ensures an entire discharge of each and every obligation as the occasion calls for it4 ,so that the perfection of man considered as an agent1 means the being constituted for effecting complete adjustment of acts to ends of every kind4 ,and since1 as shown above1 the complete adjustment of acts to ends is that which both secures and constitutes the life that is most evolved1 alike in breadth and length2 while1 as also shown1 the justification for whatever increases life is the reception from life of more happiness than misery2 it follows that conduciveness to happiness is the ultimate test of perfection in a man's nature4 ,to be fully convinced of this it needs but to observe how the proposition looks when inverted4 ,it needs but to suppose that every approach toward perfection involved greater misery to self1 or others1 or both1 to show by opposition that approach to perfection really means approach to that which secures greater happiness4 #ac4 ,pass we now from the view of those who make excellence of being the standard to the view of those who make virtuousness of action the standard4 ,i do not here refer to moralists who1 having decided empirically or rationally1 inductively or deductively1 that acts of certain kinds have the character we call virtuous1 argue that such acts are to be performed without regard to proximate consequences3 these have ample justification4 ,but ,i refer to moralists who suppose themselves to have conceptions of virtue as an end1 underived from any other end1 who think that the idea of virtue is not resolvable into simpler ideas4 ,this is the doctrine which appears to have been entertained by ,aristotle4 ,i say1 appears to have been1 because his statements are far from consistent with one another4 ,recognizing happiness as the supreme end of human endeavor1 it would at first sight seem that he cannot be taken as typical of those who make virtue the supreme end4 ,yet he puts himself in this category by seeking to define happiness in terms of virtue1 instead of defining virtue in terms of happiness4 ,the imperfect separation of words from things1 which characterizes ,greek speculation in general1 seems to have been the cause of this4 ,in primitive thought the name and the object named are associated in such wise that the one is regarded as a part of the other--so much so1 that knowing a savage's name is considered by him as having some of his being1 and a consequent power to work evil on him4 ,this belief in a real connection between word and thing1 continuing through lower stages of progress1 and long surviving in the tacit assumption that the meanings of words are intrinsic1 pervades the dialogues of ,plato1 and is traceable even in ,aristotle4 ,for otherwise it is not easy to see why he should have so incompletely disassociated the abstract idea of happiness from particular forms of happiness4 ,naturally where the divorcing of words as symbols1 from things as symbolized1 is imperfect1 there must be difficulty in giving to abstract words a sufficiently abstract meaning4 ,if in the first stages of language the concrete name cannot be separated in thought from the concrete object it belongs to1 it is inferable that in the course of forming successively higher grades of abstract names1 there will have to be resisted the tendency to interpret each more abstract name in terms of some one class of the less abstract names it covers4 ,hence1 ,i think1 the fact that ,aristotle supposes happiness to be associated with some one order of human activities1 rather than with all orders of human activities4 ,instead of including in it the pleasurable feelings accompanying actions that constitute mere living1 which actions he says man has in common with vegetables2 and instead of making it include the mental states which the life of external perception yields1 which he says man has in common with animals at large1 he excludes these from his idea of happiness1 and includes in it only the modes of consciousness accompanying rational life4 ,asserting that the proper work of man consists in the active exercise of the mental capacities conformably to reason1 he concludes that the supreme good of man will consist in performing this work with excellence or virtue3 herein he will obtain happiness4 ,and he finds confirmation for his view in its correspondence with views previously enunciated2 saying1 our notion nearly agrees with theirs who place happiness in virtue2 for we say that it consists in the action of virtue2 that is1 not merely in the possession1 but in the use4 ,now the implied belief that virtue can be defined otherwise than in terms of happiness 7for else the proposition is that happiness is to be obtained by actions conducive to happiness7 is allied to the ,platonic belief that there is an ideal or absolute good1 which gives to particular and relative goods their property of goodness2 and an argument analogous to that which ,aristotle uses against ,plato's conception of good1 may be used against his own conception of virtue4 ,as with good so with virtue--it is not singular but plural3 in ,aristotle's own classification1 virtue1 when treated of at large1 is transformed into virtues4 ,those which he calls virtues must be so called in consequence of some common character that is either intrinsic or extrinsic4 ,we may class things together either because they are made alike by all having in themselves some peculiarity1 as we do vertebrate animals because they all have vertebral columns2 or we may class them together because of some community in their outer relations1 as when we group saws1 knives1 mallets1 harrows1 under the head of tools4 ,are the virtues classed as such because of some intrinsic community of nature8 ,then there must be identifiable a common trait in all the cardinal virtues which ,aristotle specifies1 ,courage1 ,temperance1 ,liberality1 ,magnanimity1 ,magnificence1 ,meekness1 ,amiability or ,friendliness1 ,truthfulness1 ,justice4 ,what now is the trait possessed in common by ,magnificence and ,meekness8 and if any such common trait can be disentangled1 is it that which also constitutes the essential trait in ,truthfulness8 ,the answer must be1 ,no4 ,the virtues1 then1 not being classed as such because of an intrinsic community of character1 must be classed as such because of something extrinsic2 and this something can be nothing else than the happiness which ,aristotle says consists in the practice of them4 ,they are united by their common relation to this result2 while they are not united by their inner natures4 ,perhaps still more clearly may the inference be drawn thus3 ,if virtue is primordial and independent1 no reason can be given why there should be any correspondence between virtuous conduct and conduct that is pleasure-giving in its total effects on self1 or others1 or both2 and if there is not a necessary correspondence1 it is conceivable that the conduct classed as virtuous should be pain-giving in its total effects4 ,that we may see the consequence of so conceiving it1 let us take the two virtues considered as typically such in ancient times and in modern times--courage and chastity4 ,by the hypothesis1 then1 courage1 displayed alike in self-defence and in defence of country1 is to be conceived as not only entailing pains incidentally1 but as being necessarily a cause of misery to the individual and to the state2 while1 by implication1 the absence of it redounds to personal and general well-being4 ,similarly1 by the hypothesis1 we have to conceive that irregular sexual relations are directly and indirectly beneficial--that adultery is conducive to domestic harmony and the careful rearing of children2 while marital relations1 in proportion as they are persistent1 generate discord between husband and wife and entail on their offspring1 suffering1 disease and death4 ,unless it is asserted that courage and chastity could still be thought of as virtues though thus productive of misery1 it must be admitted that the conception of virtue cannot be separated from the conception of happiness-producing conduct2 and that as this holds of all the virtues1 however otherwise unlike1 it is from their conduciveness to happiness that they come to be classed as virtues4 #ad4 ,when from those ethical estimates which take perfection of nature1 or virtuousness of action1 as tests1 we pass to those which take for test rectitude of motive1 we approach the intuitional theory of morals2 and we may conveniently deal with such estimates by a criticism on this theory4 ,by the intuitional theory ,i here mean1 not that which recognizes as produced by the inherited effects of continued experiences1 the feelings of liking and aversion we have to acts of certain kinds2 but ,i mean the theory which regards such feelings as divinely given1 and as independent of results experienced by self or ancestors4 ,there is1 therefore1 says ,hutcheson1 as each one by close attention and reflection may convince himself1 a natural and immediate determination to approve certain affections and actions consequent upon them2 and since1 in common with others of his time1 he believes in the special creation of man1 and all other beings1 this natural sense of immediate excellence he considers as a supernaturally derived guide4 ,though he says that the feelings and acts thus intuitively recognized as good1 all agree in one general character1 of tending to the happiness of others2 yet he is obliged to conceive this as a pre-ordained correspondence4 ,nevertheless1 it may be shown that conduciveness to happiness1 here represented as an incidental trait of the acts which receive these innate moral approvals1 is really the test by which these approvals are recognized as moral4 ,the intuitionists place confidence in these verdicts of conscience simply because they vaguely1 if not distinctly1 perceive them to be consonant with the disclosures of that ultimate test4 ,observe the proof4 ,by the hypothesis1 the wrongness of murder is known by a moral intuition which the human mind was originally constituted to yield2 and the hypothesis1 therefore1 negatives the admission that this sense of its wrongness arises1 immediately or remotely1 from the consciousness that murder involves deduction from happiness1 directly and indirectly4 ,but if you ask an adherent of this doctrine to contrast his intuition with that of the ,fijian1 who1 considering murder an honorable action1 is restless until he has distinguished himself by killing some one2 and if you inquire of him in what way the civilized intuition is to be justified in opposition to the intuition of the savage1 no course is open save that of showing how conformity to the one conduces to well-being1 while conformity to the other entails suffering1 individual and general4 ,when asked why the moral sense which tells him that it is wrong to take another man's goods1 should be obeyed rather than the moral sense of a ,turcoman1 who proves how meritorious he considers theft to be by making pilgrimages to the tombs of noted robbers to make offerings1 the intuitionist can do nothing but urge that1 certainly under conditions like ours1 if not also under conditions like those of the ,turcomans1 disregard of men's claims to their property not only inflicts immediate misery1 but involves a social state inconsistent with happiness4 ,or if1 again1 there is required from him a justification for his feeling of repugnance to lying1 in contrast with the feeling of an ,egyptian1 who prides himself on skill in lying 7even thinking it praiseworthy to deceive without any further end than that of practicing deception71 he can do no more than point to the social prosperity furthered by entire trust between man and man1 and the social disorganization that follows universal untruthfulness1 consequences that are necessarily conducive to agreeable feelings and disagreeable feelings respectively4 ,the unavoidable conclusion is1 then1 that the intuitionist does not1 and cannot1 ignore the ultimate derivations of right and wrong from pleasure and pain4 ,however much he may be guided1 and rightly guided1 by the decisions of conscience respecting the characters of acts1 he has come to have confidence in these decisions because he perceives1 vaguely but positively1 that conformity to them furthers the welfare of himself and others1 and that disregard of them entails in the long run suffering on all4 ,require him to name any moral-sense judgment by which he knows as right some kind of act that will bring a surplus of pain1 taking into account the totals in this life and in any assumed other life1 and you find him unable to name one3 a fact proving that underneath all these intuitions respecting the goodness or badness of acts there lies the fundamental assumption that acts are good or bad according as their aggregate effects increase men's happiness or increase their misery4 #ad4 ,it is curious to see how the devil-worship of the savage1 surviving in various disguises among the civilized1 and leaving as one of its products that asceticism which in many forms and degrees still prevails widely1 is to be found influencing in marked ways men who have apparently emancipated themselves1 not only from primitive superstitions but from more developed superstitions4 ,views of life and conduct which originated with those who propitiated deified ancestors by self-tortures enter even still into the ethical theories of many persons who have years since cast away the theology of the past1 and suppose themselves to be no longer influenced by it4 ,in the writings of one who rejects dogmatic ,christianity1 together with the ,hebrew cult which preceded it1 a career of conquest costing tens of thousands of lives is narrated with a sympathy comparable to that rejoicing which the ,hebrew traditions show us over destruction of enemies in the name of ,god4 ,you may find1 too1 a delight in contemplating the exercise of despotic power1 joined with insistance on the salutariness of a state in which the wills of slaves and citizens are humbly subject to the wills of masters and rulers--a sentiment also reminding us of that ancient ,oriental life which biblical narratives portray4 ,along with this worship of the strong man--along with this justification of whatever force may be needed for carrying out his ambition--along with this yearning for a form of society in which supremacy of the few is unrestrained and the virtue of the many consists in obedience to them1 we not unnaturally find repudiation of the ethical theory which takes1 in some shape or other1 the greatest happiness as the end of conduct3 we not unnaturally find this utilitarian philosophy designated by the contemptuous title of pig-philosophy4 ,and then1 serving to show what comprehension there has been of the philosophy so nicknamed1 we are told that not happiness but blessedness must be the end4 ,obviously1 the implication is that blessedness is not a kind of happiness2 and this implication at once suggests the question--,what mode of feeling is it8 ,if it is a state of consciousness at all1 it is necessarily one of three states--painful1 indifferent1 or pleasurable4 ,does it leave the possessor at the zero point of sentiency8 ,then it leaves him just as he would be if he had not got it4 ,does it not leave him at the zero point8 ,then it must leave him below zero or above zero4 ,each of these possibilities may be conceived under two forms4 ,that to which the term blessedness is applied may be a particular state of consciousness--one among the many states that occur2 and on this supposition we have to recognize it as a pleasurable state1 an indifferent state1 or a painful state4 ,otherwise1 blessedness is a word not applicable to a particular state of consciousness1 but characterizes the aggregate of its states2 and in this case the average of the aggregate is to be conceived as one in which the pleasurable predominates1 or one in which the painful predominates1 or one in which pleasures and pains exactly cancel one another4 ,let us take in turn these two imaginable applications of the word4 ,blessed are the merciful2 ,blessed are the peacemakers2 ,blessed is he that considereth the poor2 are sayings which we may fairly take as conveying the accepted meaning of blessedness4 ,what now shall we say of one who is1 for the time being1 blessed in performing an act of mercy8 ,is his mental state pleasurable8 ,if so the hypothesis is abandoned3 blessedness is a particular form of happiness4 ,is the state indifferent or painful8 ,in that case the blessed man is so devoid of sympathy that relieving another from pain1 or the fear of pain1 leaves him either wholly unmoved1 or gives him an unpleasant emotion4 ,again1 if one who is blessed in making peace receives no gratification from the act1 then seeing men injure each other does not affect him at all1 or gives him a pleasure which is changed into a pain when he prevents the injury4 ,once more1 to say that the blessedness of one who considereth the poor implies no agreeable feeling1 is to say that his consideration for the poor leaves him without feeling or entails on him a disagreeable feeling4 ,so that if blessedness is a particular mode of consciousness temporarily existing as a concomitant of each kind of beneficent action1 those who deny that it is a pleasure1 or constituent of happiness1 confess themselves either not pleased by the welfare of others or displeased by it4 ,otherwise understood1 blessedness must1 as we have seen1 refer to the totality of feelings experienced during the life of one who occupies himself with the actions the word connotes4 ,this also presents the three possibilities--surplus of pleasures1 surplus of pains1 equality of the two4 ,if the pleasurable states are in excess1 then the blessed life can be distinguished from any other pleasurable life only by the relative amount1 or the quality1 of its pleasures3 it is a life which makes happiness of a certain kind and degree its end2 and the assumption that blessedness is not a form of happiness1 lapses4 ,if the blessed life is one in which the pleasures and the pains received balance one another1 so producing an average that is indifferent2 or if it is one in which the pleasures are outbalanced by the pains1 then the blessed life has the character which the pessimist alleges of life at large1 and therefore regards it as cursed4 ,annihilation is best1 he will argue1 since if an average that is indifferent is the outcome of the blessed life1 annihilation at once achieves it2 and if a surplus of suffering is the outcome of this highest kind of life called blessed1 still more should life in general be ended4 ,a possible rejoinder must be named and disposed of4 ,while it is admitted that the particular kind of consciousness accompanying conduct that is blessed1 is pleasurable1 it may be contended that pursuance of this conduct and receipt of the pleasure1 brings by the implied self-denial1 and persistent effort1 and perhaps bodily injury1 a suffering that exceeds it in amount4 ,and it may then be urged that blessedness1 characterized by this excess of aggregate pains over aggregate pleasures1 should nevertheless be pursued as an end1 rather than the happiness constituted by excess of pleasures over pains4 ,but now1 defensible though this conception of blessedness may be when limited to one individual1 or some individuals1 it becomes indefensible when extended to all individuals2 as it must be if blessedness is taken for the end of conduct4 ,to see this we need but ask for what purpose are these pains in excess of pleasures to be borne4 ,blessedness being the ideal state for all persons1 and the self-sacrifices made by each person in pursuance of this ideal state1 having for their end to help all other persons in achieving the like ideal state1 it results that the blessed though painful state of each1 is to be acquired by furthering the like blessed though painful states of others3 the blessed consciousness is to be constituted by the contemplation of their consciousnesses in a condition of average suffering4 ,does any one accept this inference8 ,if not1 his rejection of it involves the admission that the motive for bearing pains in performing acts called blessed1 is not the obtaining for others like pains of blessedness1 but the obtaining of pleasures for others1 and that thus pleasure somewhere is the tacitly implied ultimate end4 ,in brief1 then1 blessedness has for its necessary condition of existence1 increased happiness1 positive or negative1 in some consciousness or other1 and disappears utterly if we assume that the actions called blessed are known to cause decrease of happiness in others as well as in the actor4 #ae4 ,to make clear the meaning of the general argument set forth in this chapter1 its successive parts must be briefly summarized4 ,that which in the last chapter we found to be highly-evolved conduct1 is that which1 in this chapter1 we find to be what is called good conduct2 and the ideal goal to the natural evolution of conduct there recognized we here recognize as the ideal standard of conduct ethically considered4 ,the acts adjusted to ends which1 while constituting the outer visible life from moment to moment further the continuance of life1 we saw become1 as evolution progresses1 better adjusted1 until finally they make the life of each individual entire in length and breadth1 at the same time that they efficiently subserve the rearing of young1 and do both these1 not only without hindering other individuals from doing the like1 but while giving aid to them in doing the like4 ,and here we see that goodness is asserted of such conduct under each of these three aspects4 ,other things equal1 well-adjusted1 self-conserving acts we call good2 other things equal1 we call good the acts that are well adjusted for bringing up progeny capable of complete living2 and other things equal1 we ascribe goodness to acts which further the complete living of others4 ,this judging as good1 conduct which conduces to life in each and all1 we found to involve the assumption that animate existence is desirable4 ,by the pessimist1 conduct which subserves life cannot consistently be called good3 to call it good implies some form of optimism4 ,we saw1 however1 that pessimists and optimists both start with the postulate that life is a blessing or a curse1 according as the average consciousness accompanying it is pleasurable or painful4 ,and since avowed or implied pessimists1 and optimists of one or other shade1 taken together constitute all men1 it results that this postulate is universally accepted4 ,whence it follows that if we call good the conduct conducive to life1 we can do so only with the implication that it is conducive to a surplus of pleasures over pains4 ,the truth that conduct is considered by us as good or bad1 according as its aggregate results1 to self or others or both1 are pleasurable or painful1 we found on examination to be involved in all the current judgments on conduct3 the proof being that reversing the applications of the words creates absurdities4 ,and we found that every other proposed standard of conduct derives its authority from this standard4 ,whether perfection of nature is the assigned proper aim1 or virtuousness of action1 or rectitude of motive1 we saw that definition of the perfection1 the virtue1 the rectitude1 inevitably brings us down to happiness experienced in some form1 at some time1 by some person1 as the fundamental idea4 ,nor could we discover any intelligible conception of blessedness1 save one which implies a raising of consciousness1 individual or general1 to a happier state2 either by mitigating pains or increasing pleasures4 ,even with those who judge of conduct from the religious point of view1 rather than from the ethical point of view1 it is the same4 ,men who seek to propitiate ,god by inflicting pains on themselves1 or refrain from pleasures to avoid offending him1 do so to escape greater ultimate pains or to get greater ultimate pleasures4 ,if by positive or negative suffering here1 they expected to achieve more suffering hereafter1 they would not do as they do4 ,that which they now think duty they would not think duty if it promised eternal misery instead of eternal happiness4 ,nay1 if there be any who believe that human beings were created to be unhappy1 and that they ought to continue living to display their unhappiness for the satisfaction of their creator1 such believers are obliged to use this standard of judgment2 for the pleasure of their diabolical god is the end to be achieved4 ,so that no school can avoid taking for the ultimate moral aim a desirable state of feeling called by whatever name--gratification1 enjoyment1 happiness4 ,pleasure somewhere1 at some time1 to some being or beings1 is an inexpugnable element of the conception4 ,it is as much a necessary form of moral intuition as space is a necessary form of intellectual intuition4 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,ways ,,of ,,judging ,,conduct4 #ag4 ,intellectual progress is by no one trait so adequately characterized as by development of the idea of causation1 since development of this idea involves development of so many other ideas4 ,before any way can be made1 thought and language must have advanced far enough to render properties or attributes thinkable as such1 apart from objects2 which1 in low stages of human intelligence1 they are not4 ,again1 even the simplest notion of cause1 as we understand it1 can be reached only after many like instances have been grouped into a simple generalization2 and through all ascending steps1 higher notions of causation imply wider notions of generality4 ,further1 as there must be clustered in the mind concrete causes of many kinds before there can emerge the conception of cause1 apart from particular causes1 it follows that progress in abstractness of thought is implied4 ,concomitantly1 there is implied the recognition of constant relations among phenomena1 generating ideas of uniformity of sequence and of co-existence--the idea of natural law4 ,these advances can go on only as fast as perceptions and resulting thoughts are made definite by the use of measures1 serving to familiarize the mind with exact correspondence1 truth1 certainty4 ,and only when growing science accumulates examples of quantitative relations1 foreseen and verified1 throughout a widening range of phenomena1 does causation come to be conceived as necessary and universal4 ,so that though all these cardinal conceptions aid one another in developing1 we may properly say that the conception of causation especially depends for its development on the development of the rest2 and therefore is the best measure of intellectual development at large4 ,how slowly1 as a consequence of its dependence1 the conception of causation evolves1 a glance at the evidence shows4 ,we hear with surprise of the savage who1 falling down a precipice1 ascribes the failure of his foothold to a malicious demon2 and we smile at the kindred notion of the ancient ,greek1 that his death was prevented by a goddess who unfastened for him the thong of the helmet by which his enemy was dragging him4 ,but daily1 without surprise1 we hear men who describe themselves as saved from shipwreck by divine interposition1 who speak of having providentially missed a train which met with a fatal disaster1 and who called it a mercy to have escaped injury from a falling chimney-pot--men who1 in such cases1 recognize physical causation no more than do the uncivilized or semi-civilized4 ,the ,veddah who thinks that failure to hit an animal with his arrow resulted from inadequate invocation of an ancestral spirit1 and the ,christian priest who says prayers over a sick man in the expectation that the course of his disease will so be stayed1 differ only in respect of the agent from whom they expect supernatural aid and the phenomena to be altered by him3 the necessary relations among causes and effects are tacitly ignored by the last as much as by the first4 ,deficient belief in causation is1 indeed1 exemplified even in those whose discipline has been specially fitted to generate this belief--even in men of science4 ,for a generation after geologists had become uniformitarians in ,geology1 they remained catastrophists in ,biology3 while recognizing none but natural agencies in the genesis of the earth's crust1 they ascribed to supernatural agency the genesis of the organisms on its surface4 ,nay more--among those who are convinced that living things in general have been evolved by the continued interaction of forces everywhere operating1 there are some who make an exception of man2 or who1 if they admit that his body has been evolved in the same manner as the bodies of other creatures1 allege that his mind has been not evolved but specially created4 ,if1 then1 universal and necessary causation is only now approaching full recognition1 even by those whose investigations are daily re-illustrating it1 we may expect to find it very little recognized among men at large1 whose culture has not been calculated to impress them with it2 and we may expect to find it least recognized by them in respect of those classes of phenomena amid which1 in consequence of their complexity1 causation is most difficult to trace--the psychical1 the social1 the moral4 ,why do ,i here make these reflections on what seems an irrelevant subject8 ,i do it because on studying the various ethical theories ,i am struck with the fact that they are all characterized either by entire absence of the idea of causation1 or by inadequate presence of it4 ,whether theological1 political1 intuitional1 or utilitarian1 they all display1 if not in the same degree1 still1 each in a large degree1 the defects which result from this lack4 ,we will consider them in the order named4 #ah4 ,the school of morals properly to be considered as the still extant representative of the most ancient school1 is that which recognizes no other rule of conduct than the alleged will of ,god4 ,it originates with the savage whose only restraint beyond fear of his fellow man1 is fear of an ancestral spirit2 and whose notion of moral duty as distinguished from his notion of social prudence1 arises from this fear4 ,here the ethical doctrine and the religious doctrine are identical--have in no degree differentiated4 ,this primitive form of ethical doctrine1 changed only by the gradual dying out of multitudinous minor supernatural agents and accompanying development of one universal supernatural agent1 survives in great strength down to our own day4 ,religious creeds1 established and dissenting1 all embody the belief that right and wrong are right and wrong simply in virtue of divine enactment4 ,and this tacit assumption has passed from systems of theology into systems of morality2 or rather let us say that moral systems in early stages of development1 little differentiated from the accompanying theological systems1 have participated in this assumption4 ,we see this in the works of the ,stoics1 as well as in the works of certain ,christian moralists4 ,among recent ones ,i may instance the ,essays on the ,principles of ,morality1 by ,jonathan ,dymond1 a ,quaker1 which makes the authority of the ,deity the sole ground of duty1 and ,his communicated will the only ultimate standard of right and wrong4 ,nor is it by writers belonging to so relatively unphilosophical a sect only that this view is held2 it is held with a difference by writers belonging to sects contrariwise distinguished4 ,for these assert that in the absence of belief in a deity1 there would be no moral guidance2 and this amounts to asserting that moral truths have no other origin than the will of ,god1 which1 if not considered as revealed in sacred writings1 must be considered as revealed in conscience4 ,this assumption1 when examined1 proves to be suicidal4 ,if there are no other origins for right and wrong than this enunciated or intuited divine will1 then1 as alleged1 were there no knowledge of the divine will1 the acts now known as wrong would not be known as wrong4 ,but if men did not know such acts to be wrong because contrary to the divine will1 and so1 in committing them1 did not offend by disobedience2 and1 if they could not otherwise know them to be wrong1 then they might commit them indifferently with the acts now classed as right3 the results1 practically considered1 would be the same4 ,in so far as secular matters are concerned1 there would be no difference between the two2 for to say that in the affairs of life any evils would arise from continuing to do the acts called wrong1 and ceasing to do the acts called right1 is to say that these produce in themselves certain mischievous consequences and certain beneficial consequences2 which is to say there is another source for moral rules than the revealed or inferred divine will3 they may be established by induction from these observed consequences4 ,from this implication ,i see no escape4 ,it must be either admitted or denied that the acts called good and the acts called bad1 naturally conduce1 the one to human well-being and the other to human ill-being4 ,is it admitted8 ,then the admission amounts to an assertion that the conduciveness is shown by experience2 and this involves abandonment of the doctrine that there is no origin for morals apart from divine injunctions4 ,is it denied that acts classed as good and bad differ in their effect8 ,then it is tacitly affirmed that human affairs would go on just as well in ignorance of the distinction2 and the alleged need for commandments from ,god disappears4 ,and here we see how entirely wanting is the conception of cause4 ,this notion that such and such actions are made respectively good and bad simply by divine injunction1 is tantamount to the notion that such and such actions have not in the nature of things such and such kinds of effects4 ,if there is not an unconsciousness of causation there is an ignoring of it4 #ai4 ,following ,plato and ,aristotle1 who make ,state enactments the sources of right and wrong2 and following ,hobbes1 who holds that there can be neither justice nor injustice till a regularly constituted coercive power exists to issue and enforce commands2 not a few modern thinkers hold that there is no other origin for good and bad in conduct than law4 ,and this implies the belief that moral obligation originates with acts of parliament1 and can be changed this way or that way by majorities4 ,they ridicule the idea that men have any natural rights1 and allege that rights are wholly results of convention3 the necessary implication being that duties are so too4 ,before considering whether this theory coheres with outside truths1 let us observe how far it is coherent within itself4 ,in pursuance of his argument that rights and duties originate with established social arrangements1 ,hobbes says3 ,where no covenant hath proceeded1 there hath no right been transferred1 and every man has a right to everything2 and consequently1 no action can be unjust4 ,but when a covenant is made1 then to break it is unjust2 and the definitions of injustice is no other than the not performance of covenant4 ,and whatsoever is not unjust1 is just4 ,therefore1 before the names of just and unjust can have place1 there must be some coercive power to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants1 by the terror of some punishment greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant4,a ,in this paragraph the essential propositions are3 justice is fulfillment of covenant2 fulfillment of covenant implies a power of enforcing it3 just and unjust can have no place unless men are compelled to perform their covenants4 ,but this is to say that men cannot perform their covenants without compulsion4 ,grant that justice is performance of covenant4 ,now suppose it to be performed voluntarily3 there is justice4 ,in such case1 however1 there is justice in the absence of coercion2 which is contrary to the hypothesis4 ,the only conceivable rejoinder is an absurd one--voluntary performance of covenant is impossible4 ,assert this1 and the doctrine that right and wrong come into existence with the establishment of sovereignty is defensible4 ,decline to assert it1 and the doctrine vanishes4 ,from inner incongruities pass now to outer ones4 ,the justification for his doctrine of absolute civil authority as the source of rules of conduct1 ,hobbes seeks in the miseries entailed by the chronic war between man and man which must exist in the absence of society2 holding that under any kind of government a better life is possible than in the state of nature4 ,now whether we accept the gratuitous and baseless theory that men surrendered their liberties to a sovereign power of some kind1 with a view to the promised increase of satisfactions2 or whether we accept the rational theory1 inductively based1 that a state of political subordination gradually became established through experience of the increased satisfactions derived under it2 it equally remains obvious that the acts of the sovereign power have no other warrant than their subservience to the purpose for which it came into existence4 ,the necessities which initiate government1 themselves prescribe the actions of government4 ,if its actions do not respond to the necessities1 they are unwarranted4 ,the authority of law is1 then1 by the hypothesis1 derived2 and can never transcend the authority of that from which it is derived4 ,if general good1 or welfare1 or utility1 is the supreme end1 and if ,state enactments are justified as means to this supreme end1 then1 ,state enactments have such authority only as arises from conduciveness to this supreme end4 ,when they are right1 it is only because the original authority endorses them2 and they are wrong if they do not bear its endorsement4 ,that is to say1 conduct cannot be made good or bad by law2 but its goodness or badness is to the last determined by its effects as naturally furthering1 or not furthering1 the lives of citizens4 ,still more when considered in the concrete1 than when considered in the abstract1 do the views of ,hobbes and his disciples prove to be inconsistent4 ,joining in the general belief that without such security for life as enables men to go fearlessly about their business1 there can be neither happiness nor prosperity1 individual or general1 they agree that measures for preventing murder1 manslaughter1 assault1 etc41 are requisite2 and they advocate this or that penal system as furnishing the best deterrents3 so arguing1 both in respect of the evils and the remedies1 that such and such causes will1 by the nature of things1 produce such and such effects4 ,they recognize as inferable priori1 the truth that men will not lay by property unless they can count with great probability on reaping advantages from it2 that consequently where robbery is unchecked1 or where a rapacious ruler appropriates whatever earnings his subjects do not effectually hide1 production will scarcely exceed immediate consumption2 and that necessarily there will be none of that accumulation of capital required for social development1 with all its aids to welfare4 ,in neither case1 however1 do they perceive that they are tacitly asserting the need for certain restraints on conduct as deducible from the necessary conditions to complete life in the social state2 and are so making the authority of law derivative and not original4 ,if it be said by any belonging to this school that certain moral obligations1 to be distinguished as cardinal1 must be admitted to have a basis deeper than legislation1 and that it is for legislation not to create but merely to enforce them--if1 ,i say1 admitting this1 they go on to allege a legislative origin for minor claims and duties2 then we have the implication that whereas some kinds of conduct do1 in the nature of things1 tend to work out certain kinds of results1 other kinds of conduct do not1 in the nature of things1 tend to work out certain kinds of results4 ,while of these acts the naturally good or bad consequences must be allowed1 it may be denied of those acts that they have naturally good or bad consequences4 ,only after asserting this can it be consistently asserted that acts of the last class are made right or wrong by law4 ,for if such acts have any intrinsic tendencies to produce beneficial or mischievous effects1 then these intrinsic tendencies furnish the warrant for legislative requirements or interdicts2 and to say that the requirements or interdicts make them right or wrong is to say that they have no intrinsic tendencies to produce beneficial or mischievous effects4 ,here1 then1 we have another theory betraying deficient consciousness of causation4 ,an adequate consciousness of causation yields the irresistible belief that from the most serious to the most trivial actions of men in society1 there must flow consequences which1 quite apart from legal agency1 conduce to well-being or ill-being in greater or smaller degrees4 ,if murders are socially injurious whether forbidden by law or not--if one man's appropriation of another's gains by force brings special and general evils1 whether it is or is not contrary to a ruler's edicts--if non-fulfillment of contract1 if cheating1 if adulteration1 work mischiefs on a community in proportion as they are common1 quite irrespective of prohibitions2 then1 is it not manifest that the like holds throughout all the details of men's behavior8 ,is it not clear that when legislation insists on certain acts which have naturally beneficial effects1 and forbids others that have naturally injurious effects1 the acts are not made good or bad by legislation2 but the legislation derives its authority from the natural effects of the acts8 ,non-recognition of this implies non-recognition of natural causation4 #bj4 ,nor is it otherwise with the pure intuitionists1 who hold that moral perceptions are innate in the original sense--thinkers whose view is that men have been divinely endowed with moral faculties2 not that these have resulted from inherited modifications caused by accumulated experiences4 ,to affirm that we know some things to be right and other things to be wrong1 by virtue of a supernaturally given conscience2 and thus tacitly to affirm that we do not otherwise know right from wrong2 is tacitly to deny any natural relations between acts and results4 ,for if there exist any such relations1 then we may ascertain by induction1 or deduction1 or both1 what these are4 ,and if it be admitted that because of such natural relations1 happiness is produced by this kind of conduct1 which is therefore to be approved1 while misery is produced by that kind of conduct1 which is therefore to be condemned2 then it is admitted that the rightness or wrongness of actions are determinable1 and must finally be determined1 by the goodness or badness of the effects that flow from them2 which is contrary to the hypothesis4 ,it may1 indeed1 be rejoined that effects are deliberately ignored by this school2 which teaches that courses recognized by moral intuition as right1 must be pursued without regard to consequences4 ,but on inquiry it turns out that the consequences to be disregarded are particular consequences1 and not general consequences4 ,when1 for example1 it is said that property lost by another ought to be restored1 irrespective of evil to the finder1 who possibly may1 by restoring it1 lose that which would have preserved him from starvation1 it is meant that in pursuance of the principle1 the immediate and special consequences must be disregarded1 not the diffused and remote consequences4 ,by which we are shown that though the theory forbids overt recognition of causation1 there is an unavowed recognition of it4 ,and this implies the trait to which ,i am drawing attention4 ,the conception of natural causation is so imperfectly developed that there is only an indistinct consciousness that throughout the whole of human conduct necessary relations of causes and effects prevail1 and that from them are ultimately derived all moral rules1 however much these may be proximately derived from moral intuitions4 #ba4 ,strange to say1 even the utilitarian school1 which1 at first sight1 appears to be distinguished from the rest by recognizing natural causation1 is1 if not so far from complete recognition of it1 yet very far4 ,conduct1 according to its theory1 is to be estimated by observation of results4 ,when1 in sufficiently numerous cases1 it has been found that behavior of this kind works evil while behavior of that kind works good1 these kinds of behavior are to be judged as wrong and right respectively4 ,now though it seems that the origin of moral rules in natural causes1 is thus asserted by implication1 it is but partially asserted4 ,the implication is simply that we are to ascertain by induction that such and such mischiefs or benefits do go along with such and such acts2 and are then to infer that the like relations will hold in future4 ,but acceptance of these generalizations and the inferences from them does not amount to recognition of causation in the full sense of the word4 ,so long as only some relation between cause and effect in conduct is recognized1 and not the relation1 a completely scientific form of knowledge has not been reached4 ,at present1 utilitarians pay no attention to this distinction4 ,even when it is pointed out they disregard the fact that empirical utilitarianism is but a transitional form to be passed through on the way to rational utilitarianism4 ,in a letter to ,mr4 ,mill1 written some sixteen years ago1 repudiating the title anti-utilitarian1 which he had applied to me 7a letter subsequently published in ,mr4 ,bain's work on ,mental and ,moral ,science71 ,i endeavored to make clear the difference above indicated2 and ,i must here quote certain passages from that letter4 ,the view for which ,i contend is1 that ,morality1 properly so-called--the science of right conduct--has for its object to determine how and why certain modes of conduct are detrimental1 and certain other modes beneficial4 ,these good and bad results cannot be accidental1 but must be necessary consequences of the constitution of things2 and ,i conceive it to be the business of ,moral ,science to deduce1 from the laws of life and the conditions of existence1 what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness1 and what kinds to produce unhappiness4 ,having done this1 its deductions are to be recognized as laws of conduct2 and are to be conformed to irrespective of a direct estimation of happiness or misery4 ,perhaps an analogy will most clearly show my meaning4 ,during its early stages1 planetary ,astronomy consisted of nothing more than accumulated observations respecting the positions and motions of the sun and planets2 from which accumulated observations it came by-and-by to be empirically predicted1 with an approach to truth1 that certain of the heavenly bodies would have certain positions at certain times4 ,but the modern science of planetary ,astronomy consists of deductions from the law of gravitation--deductions showing why the celestial bodies necessarily occupy certain places at certain times4 ,now1 the kind of relation which thus exists between ancient and modern ,astronomy is analogous to the kind of relation which1 ,i conceive1 exists between the ,expediency-,morality and ,moral ,science1 properly so called4 ,and the objection which ,i have to the current ,utilitarianism is1 that it recognizes no more developed form of ,morality--does not see that it has reached but the initial stage of ,moral ,science4 ,doubtless if utilitarians are asked whether it can be by mere chance that this kind of action works evil and that works good1 they will answer--,no3 they will admit that such sequences are parts of a necessary order among phenomena4 ,but though this truth is beyond question2 and though if there are causal relations between acts and their results1 rules of conduct can become scientific only when they are deduced from these causal relations2 there continues to be entire satisfaction with that form of utilitarianism in which these causal relations are practically ignored4 ,it is supposed that in future1 as now1 utility is to be determined only by observation of results3 and that there is no possibility of knowing1 by deduction from fundamental principles1 what conduct must be detrimental and what conduct must be beneficial4 #bb4 ,to make more specific that conception of ethical science here indicated1 let me present it under a concrete aspect1 beginning with a simple illustration and complicating this illustration by successive steps4 ,if1 by tying its main artery1 we stop most of the blood going to a limb1 then1 for as long as the limb performs its function1 those parts which are called into play must be wasted faster than they are repaired3 whence eventual disablement4 ,the relation between due receipt of nutritive matters through its arteries1 and due discharge of its duties by the limb is a part of the physical order4 ,if1 instead of cutting off the supply to a particular limb1 we bleed the patient largely1 so drafting away the materials needed for repairing not one limb but all limbs1 and not limbs only but viscera1 there results both a muscular debility and an enfeeblement of the vital functions4 ,here1 again1 cause and effect are necessarily related4 ,the mischief that results from great depletion1 results apart from any divine command1 or political enactment1 or moral intuition4 ,now advance a step4 ,suppose the man to be prevented from taking in enough of the solid and liquid food containing those substances continually abstracted from his blood in repairing his tissues3 suppose he has cancer of the esophagus and cannot swallow--what happens8 ,by this indirect depletion1 as by direct depletion1 he is inevitably made incapable of performing the actions of one in health4 ,in this case1 as in the other cases1 the connection between cause and effect is one that cannot be established1 or altered1 by any authority external to the phenomena themselves4 ,again1 let us say that instead of being stopped after passing his mouth1 that which he would swallow is stopped before reaching his mouth2 so that day after day the man is required to waste his tissues in getting food1 and day after day the food he has got to meet this waste1 he is forcibly prevented from eating4 ,as before1 the progress toward death by starvation is inevitable--the connection between acts and effects is independent of any alleged theological or political authority4 ,and similarly if1 being forced by the whip to labor1 no adequate return in food is supplied to him1 there are equally certain evils1 equally independent of sacred or secular enactment4 ,pass now to those actions more commonly thought of as the occasions for rules of conduct4 ,let us assume the man to be continually robbed of that which was given him in exchange for his labor1 and by which he was to make up for nervo-muscular expenditure and renew his powers4 ,no less than before is the connection between conduct and consequence rooted in the constitution of things2 unchangeable by ,state-made law1 and not needing establishment by empirical generalization4 ,if the action by which the man is affected is a stage further away from the results1 or produces results of a less decisive kind1 still we see the same basis for morality in the physical order4 ,imagine that payment for his services is made partly in bad coin2 or that it is delayed beyond the date agreed upon2 or that what he buys to eat is adulterated with innutritive matter4 ,manifestly1 by any of these deeds which we condemn as unjust1 and which are punished by law1 there is1 as before1 an interference with the normal adjustment of physiological repair to physiological waste4 ,nor is it otherwise when we pass to kinds of conduct still more remotely operative4 ,if he is hindered from enforcing his claim1 if class-predominance prevents him from proceeding1 or if a bribed judge gives a verdict contrary to evidence1 or if a witness swears falsely1 have not these deeds1 though they affect him more indirectly1 the same original cause for their wrongness8 ,even with actions which work diffused and indefinite mischiefs it is the same4 ,suppose that the man1 instead of being dealt with fraudulently1 is calumniated4 ,there is1 as before1 a hinderance to the carrying on of life-sustaining activities2 for the loss of character detrimentally affects his business4 ,nor is this all4 ,the mental depression caused partially incapacitates him for energetic activity1 and perhaps brings on ill-health4 ,so that maliciously or carelessly propagating false statements tends both to diminish his life and to diminish his ability to maintain life4 ,hence its flagitiousness4 ,moreover1 if we trace to their ultimate ramifications the effects wrought by any of these acts which morality called intuitive reprobates--if we ask what results not to the individual himself only1 but also to his belongings--if we observe how impoverishment hinders the rearing of his children1 by entailing under-feeding or inadequate clothing1 resulting perhaps in the death of some and the constitutional injury of others2 we see that by the necessary connections of things these acts1 besides tending primarily to lower the life of the individual aggressed upon1 tend1 secondarily1 to lower the lives of all his family1 and thirdly1 to lower the life of society at large2 which is damaged by whatever damages its units4 ,a more distinct meaning will now be seen in the statement that the utilitarianism which recognizes only the principles of conduct reached by induction1 is but preparatory to the utilitarianism which deduces these principles from the processes of life as carried on under established conditions of existence4 #bb4 ,thus1 then1 is justified the allegation made at the outset1 that1 irrespective of their distinctive characters and their special tendencies1 all the current methods of ethics have one general defect--they neglect ultimate causal connections4 ,of course ,i do not mean that they wholly ignore the natural consequences of actions2 but ,i mean that they recognize them only incidentally4 ,they do not erect into a method the ascertaining of necessary relations between causes and effects1 and deducing rules of conduct from formulated statement of them4 ,every science begins by accumulating observations1 and presently generalizes these empirically2 but only when it reaches the stage at which its empirical generalizations are included in a rational generalization1 does it become developed science4 ,astronomy has already passed through its successive stages3 first collections of facts2 then inductions from them2 and lastly deductive interpretations of these1 as corollaries from a universal principle of action among masses in space4 ,accounts of structures and tabulations of strata1 grouped and compared1 have led gradually to the assigning of various classes of geological changes to igneous and aqueous actions2 and it is now tacitly admitted that ,geology becomes a science proper1 only as fast as such changes are explained in terms of those natural processes which have arisen in the cooling and solidifying earth1 exposed to the sun's heat and the action of the moon upon its ocean4 ,the science of life has been1 and is still1 exhibiting a like series of steps2 the evolution of organic forms at large is being affiliated on physical actions in operations from the beginning2 and the vital phenomena each organism presents are coming to be understood as connected sets of changes1 in parts formed of matters that are affected by certain forces and disengage other forces4 ,so is it with mind4 ,early ideas concerning thought and feeling ignored everything like cause1 save in recognizing those effects of habits which were forced on men's attention and expressed in proverbs2 but there are growing up interpretations of thought and feeling as correlates of the actions and reactions of a nervous structure1 that is influenced by outer changes and works in the body adapted changes3 the implication being that ,psychology becomes a science as fast as these relations of phenomena are explained as consequences of ultimate principles4 ,sociology1 too1 represented down to recent times only by stray ideas about social organization1 scattered through the masses of worthless gossip furnished us by historians1 is coming to be recognized by some as also a science2 and such adumbrations of it as have from time to time appeared in the shape of empirical generalizations1 are now beginning to assume the character of generalizations made coherent by derivation from causes lying in human nature placed under given conditions4 ,clearly then1 ,ethics1 which is a science dealing with the conduct of associated human beings1 regarded under one of its aspects1 has to undergo a like transformation2 and1 at present undeveloped1 can be considered a developed science only when it has undergone this transformation4 ,a preparation in the simpler sciences is pre-supposed4 ,ethics has a physical aspect2 since it treats of human activities which1 in common with all expenditures or energy1 conform to the law of the persistence of energy3 moral principles must conform to physical necessities4 ,it has a biological aspect2 since it concerns certain effects1 inner and outer1 individual and social1 of the vital changes going on in the highest type of animal4 ,it has a psychological aspect2 for its subject matter is an aggregate of actions that are prompted by feelings and guided by intelligence4 ,and it has a sociological aspect2 for these actions1 some of them directly and all of them indirectly1 affect associated beings4 ,what is the implication8 ,belonging under one aspect to each of these sciences--physical1 biological1 psychological1 sociological--it can find its ultimate interpretations only in those fundamental truths which are common to all of them4 ,already we have concluded in a general way that conduct at large1 including the conduct ,ethics deals with1 is to be fully understood only as an aspect of evolving life2 and now we are brought to this conclusion in a more special way4 #bc4 ,here1 then1 we have to enter on the consideration of moral phenomena as phenomena of evolution2 being forced to do this by finding that they form a part of the aggregate of phenomena which evolution has wrought out4 ,if the entire visible universe has been evolved--if the solar system as a whole1 the earth as a part of it1 the life in general which the earth bears1 as well as that of each individual organism--if the mental phenomena displayed by all creatures1 up to the highest1 in common with the phenomena presented by aggregates of these highest--if one and all conform to the laws of evolution2 then the necessary implication is that those phenomena of conduct in these highest creatures with which ,morality is concerned1 also conform4 ,the preceding volumes have prepared the way for dealing with morals as thus conceived4 ,utilizing the conclusions they contain1 let us now observe what data are furnished by these4 ,we will take in succession--the physical view1 the biological view1 the psychological view1 and the sociological view4 ,,chapter ,v4 ,,the ,,physical ,,view4 #bd4 ,every moment we pass instantly from men's perceived actions to the motives implied by them2 and so are led to formulate these actions in mental terms rather than in bodily terms4 ,thoughts and feelings are referred to when we speak of any one's deeds with praise or blame2 not those outer manifestations which reveal the thoughts and feelings4 ,hence we become oblivious of the truth that conduct as actually experienced consists of changes recognized by touch1 sight and hearing4 ,this habit of contemplating only the psychical face of conduct1 is so confirmed that an effort is required to contemplate only the physical face4 ,undeniable as it is that another's behavior to us is made up of movements of his body and limbs1 of his facial muscles1 and of his vocal apparatus1 it yet seems paradoxical to say that these are the only elements of conduct really known by us1 while the elements of conduct which we exclusively think of as constituting it1 are not known but inferred4 ,here1 however1 ignoring for the time being the inferred elements in conduct1 we have to deal with the perceived elements--we have to observe its traits considered as a set of combined motions4 ,taking the evolution point of view1 and remembering that while an aggregate evolves1 not only the matter composing it1 but also the motion of that matter1 passes from an indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity1 we have now to ask whether conduct as it rises to its higher forms1 displays in increasing degrees these characters2 and whether it does not display them in the greatest degree when it reaches that highest form which we call moral4 #be4 ,it will be convenient to deal first with the trait of increasing coherence4 ,the conduct of lowly-organized creatures is broadly contrasted with the conduct of highly-organized creatures in having its successive portions feebly connected4 ,the random movements which animalcule makes have severally no reference to movements made a moment before2 nor do they affect in specific ways the movements made immediately after4 ,to-day's wanderings of a fish in search of food1 though perhaps showing by their adjustments to catching different kinds of prey at different hours1 a slightly-determined order1 are unrelated to the wanderings of yesterday and to-morrow4 ,but such more developed creatures as birds1 show us in the building of nests1 the sitting on eggs1 the rearing of chicks1 and the aiding of them after they fly1 sets of motions which form a dependent series1 extending over a considerable period4 ,and on observing the complexity of the acts performed in fetching and fixing the fibres of the nest or in catching and bringing to the young each portion of food1 we discover in the combined motions1 lateral cohesion as well as longitudinal cohesion4 ,man1 even in his lowest state1 displays in his conduct far more coherent combinations of motions4 ,by the elaborate manipulations gone through in making weapons that are to serve for the chase next year1 or in building canoes and wigwams for permanent uses--by acts of aggression and defense which are connected with injuries long since received or committed1 the savage exhibits an aggregate of motions which1 in some of its parts1 holds together over great periods4 ,moreover1 if we consider the many movements implied by the transactions of each day1 in the wood1 on the water1 in the camp1 in the family1 we see that this coherent aggregate of movements is composed of many minor aggregates that are severally coherent within themselves and with one another4 ,in civilized man this trait of developed conduct becomes more conspicuous still4 ,be his business what it may1 its processes involve relatively numerous dependent motions2 and day by day it is so carried on as to show connections between present motions and motions long gone by1 as well as motions anticipated in the distant future4 ,besides the many doings1 related to one another1 which the farmer goes through in looking after his cattle1 directing his laborers1 keeping an eye on his dairy1 buying his implements1 selling his produce1 etc41 the business of getting his lease involves numerous combined movements on which the movements of subsequent years depend2 and in manuring his fields with a view to larger returns1 or putting down drains with the like motive1 he is performing acts which are parts of a coherent combination relatively extensive4 ,that the like holds of the shopkeeper1 manufacturer1 banker1 is manifest2 and this increased coherence of conduct among the civilized will strike us even more when we remember how its parts are often continued in a connected arrangement through life1 for the purpose of making a fortune1 founding a family1 gaining a seat in ,parliament4 ,now mark that a greater coherence among its component motions broadly distinguishes the conduct we call moral from the conduct we call immoral4 ,the application of the word dissolute to the last1 and of the word self-restrained to the first1 implies this--implies that conduct of the lower kind1 constituted of disorderly acts1 has its parts relatively loose in their relations with one another2 while conduct of the higher kind1 habitually following a fixed order1 so gains a characteristic unity and coherence4 ,in proportion as the conduct is what we call moral1 it exhibits comparatively settled connections between antecedents and consequents2 for the doing right implies that under given conditions the combined motions constituting conduct will follow in a way that can be specified4 ,contrariwise1 in the conduct of one whose principles are not high1 the sequences of motions are doubtful4 ,he may pay the money or he may not2 he may keep his appointment or he may fail2 he may tell the truth or he may lie4 ,the words trustworthiness and untrustworthiness1 as used to characterize the two respectively1 sufficiently imply that the actions of the one can be foreknown while those of the other cannot2 and this implies that the successive movements composing the one bear more constant relations to one another than do those composing the other--are more coherent4 #bf4 ,indefiniteness accompanies incoherence in conduct that is little evolved2 and throughout the ascending stages of evolving conduct there is an increasingly definite co-ordination of the motions constituting it4 ,such changes of form as the rudest protozoa show us1 are utterly vague--admit of no precise description2 and though in higher kinds the movements of the parts are more definable1 yet the movement of the whole in respect of direction is indeterminate3 there is no adjustment of it to this or the other point in space4 ,in such coelenterate animals as polypes we see the parts moving in ways which lack precision2 and in one of the locomotive forms1 as a medusa1 the course taken1 otherwise at random1 can be described only as one which carries it toward the light1 where degrees of light and darkness are present4 ,among annulose creatures the contrast between the track of a worm1 turning this way or that at hazard1 and the definite course taken by a bee in its flight from flower to flower or back to the hive1 shows us the same thing2 the bee's acts in building cells and feeding larv further exhibiting precision in the simultaneous movements as well as in the successive movements4 ,though the motions made by a fish in pursuing its prey have considerable definiteness1 yet they are of a simple kind1 and are in this respect contrasted with the many definite motions of body1 head1 and limbs gone through by a carnivorous mammal in the course of waylaying1 running down1 and seizing a herbivore2 and further1 the fish shows us none of those definitely adjusted sets of motions which in the mammal subserve the rearing of young4 ,much greater definiteness1 if not in the combined movements forming single acts1 still in the adjustments of many combined acts to various purposes1 characterizes human conduct1 even in its lowest stages4 ,in making and using weapons and in the maneuverings of savage warfare1 numerous movements1 all precise in their adaptations to proximate ends1 are arranged for the achievement of remote ends1 with a precision not paralleled among lower creatures4 ,the lives of civilized men exhibit this trait far more conspicuously4 ,each industrial art exemplifies the effects of movements which are severally definite2 and which are definitely arranged in simultaneous and successive order4 ,business transactions of every kind are characterized by exact relations between the sets of motions constituting acts1 and the purposes fulfilled1 in time1 place1 and quantity4 ,further1 the daily routine of each person shows us in its periods and amounts of activity1 of rest1 of relaxation1 a measured arrangement which is not shown us by the doings of the wandering savage1 who has no fixed times for hunting1 sleeping1 feeding1 or any one kind of action4 ,moral conduct differs from immoral conduct in the same manner and in a like degree4 ,the conscientious man is exact in all his transactions4 ,he supplies a precise weight for a specified sum2 he gives a definite quality in fulfillment of understanding2 he pays the full amount he bargained to do4 ,in times as well as in quantities1 his acts answer completely to anticipations4 ,if he has made a business contract he is to the day2 if an appointment he is to the minute4 ,similarly in respect of truth3 his statements correspond accurately with the facts4 ,it is thus too in his family life4 ,he maintains marital relations that are definite in contrast with the relations that result from breach of the marriage contract2 and as a father1 fitting his behavior with care to the nature of each child and to the occasion2 he avoids the too much and the too little of praise or blame1 reward or penalty4 ,nor is it otherwise in his miscellaneous acts4 ,to say that he deals equitably with those he employs1 whether they behave well or ill1 is to say that he adjusts his acts to their deserts2 and to say that he is judicious in his charities1 is to say that he portions out his aid with discrimination instead of distributing it indiscriminately to good and bad1 as do those who have no adequate sense of their social responsibilities4 ,that progress toward rectitude of conduct is progress toward duly-proportioned conduct1 and that duly-proportioned conduct is relatively definite1 we may see from another point of view4 ,one of the traits of conduct we call immoral1 is excess2 while moderation habitually characterizes moral conduct4 ,now excesses imply extreme divergences of actions from some medium1 while maintenance of the medium is implied by moderation2 whence it follows that actions of the last kind can be defined more nearly than those of the first4 ,clearly conduct which1 being unrestrained1 runs into great and incalculable oscillations1 therein differs from restrained conduct of which1 by implication1 the oscillations fall within narrower limits4 ,and falling within narrower limits necessitates relative definiteness of movements4 #bg4 ,that throughout the ascending forms of life1 along with increasing heterogeneity of structure and function1 there goes increasing heterogeneity of conduct--increasing diversity in the sets of external motions and combined sets of such motions--needs not be shown in detail4 ,nor need it be shown that becoming relatively great in the motions constituting the conduct of the uncivilized man1 this heterogeneity has become still greater in those which the civilized man goes through4 ,we may pass at once to that further degree of the like contrast which we see on ascending from the conduct of the immoral to that of the moral4 ,instead of recognizing this contrast1 most readers will be inclined to identify a moral life with a life little varied in its activities4 ,but here we come upon a defect in the current conception of morality4 ,this comparative uniformity in the aggregate of motions1 which goes along with morality as commonly conceived1 is not only not moral but is the reverse of moral4 ,the better a man fulfills every requirement of life1 alike as regards his own body and mind1 as regards the bodies and minds of those dependent on him1 and as regards the bodies and minds of his fellow-citizens1 the more varied do his activities become4 ,the more fully he does all these things1 the more heterogeneous must be his movements4 ,one who satisfies personal needs only1 goes through other things equal1 less multiform processes than one who also administers to the needs of wife and children4 ,supposing there are no other differences1 the addition of family relations necessarily renders the actions of the man who fulfills the duties of husband and parent1 more heterogeneous than those of the man who has no such duties to fulfill1 or1 having them1 does not fulfill them2 and to say that his actions are more heterogeneous is to say that there is a greater heterogeneity in the combined motions he goes through4 ,the like holds of social obligations4 ,these1 in proportion as a citizen duly performs them1 complicate his movements considerably4 ,if he is helpful to inferiors dependent on him1 if he takes a part in political agitation1 if he aids in diffusing knowledge1 he1 in each of these ways1 adds to his kinds of activity--makes his sets of movements more multiform2 so differing from the man who is the slave of one desire or group of desires4 ,though it is unusual to consider as having a moral aspect1 those activities which culture involves1 yet to the few who hold that due exercise of all the higher faculties1 intellectual and sthetic1 must be included in the conception of complete life1 here identified with the ideally moral life1 it will be manifest that a further heterogeneity is implied by them4 ,for each of such activities1 constituted by that play of these faculties which is eventually added to their life-subserving uses1 adds to the multiformity of the aggregated motions4 ,briefly1 then1 if the conduct is the best possible on every occasion1 it follows that as the occasions are endlessly varied the acts will be endlessly varied to suit--the heterogeneity in the combinations of motions will be extreme4 #bh4 ,evolution in conduct considered under its moral aspect1 is1 like all other evolution1 toward equilibrium4 ,i do not mean that it is toward the equilibrium reached at death1 though this is1 of course1 the final state which the evolution of the highest man has in common with all lower evolution2 but ,i mean that it is toward a moving equilibrium4 ,we have seen that maintaining life1 expressed in physical terms1 is maintaining a balanced combination of internal actions in face of external forces tending to overthrow it2 and we have seen that advance toward a higher life1 has been an acquirement of ability to maintain the balance for a longer period1 by the successive additions of organic appliances which by their actions counteract1 more and more fully1 the disturbing forces4 ,here1 then1 we are led to the conclusion that the life called moral is one in which this maintenance of the moving equilibrium reaches completeness1 or approaches most nearly to completeness4 ,this truth is clearly disclosed on observing how those physiological rhythms which vaguely show themselves when organization begins1 become more regular1 as well as more various in their kinds1 as organization advances4 ,periodicity is but feebly marked in the actions1 inner and outer1 of the rudest types4 ,where life is low there is passive dependence on the accidents of the environment2 and this entails great irregularities in the vital processes4 ,the taking in of food by a polype is at intervals now short1 now very long1 as circumstances determine2 and the utilization of it is by a slow dispersion of the absorbed part through the tissues1 aided only by the irregular movements of the creature's body2 while1 such ration as is effected is similarly without a trace of rhythm4 ,much higher up we still find very imperfect periodicities2 as in the inferior molluscs which1 though possessed of vascular systems1 have no proper circulation1 but merely a slow movement of the crude blood1 now in one direction through the vessels and then1 after a pause1 in the opposite direction4 ,only with well-developed structures do there come a rhythmical pulse and a rhythm of the respiratory actions4 ,and then in birds and mammals1 along with great rapidity and regularity in these essential rhythms1 and along with a consequently great vital activity and therefore great expenditure1 comparative regularity in the rhythm of the alimentary actions is established1 as well as in the rhythm of activity and rest2 since the rapid waste to which rapid pulsation and respiration are instrumental1 necessitates tolerably regular supplies of nutriment1 as well as recurring intervals of sleep during which repair may overtake waste4 ,and from these stages the moving equilibrium characterized by such interdependent rhythms1 is continually made better by the counteracting of more and more of those actions which tend to perturb it4 ,so is it as we ascend from savage to civilized and from the lowest among the civilized to the highest4 ,the rhythm of external actions required to maintain the rhythm of internal actions becomes at once more complicated and more complete1 making them into a better moving equilibrium4 ,the irregularities which their conditions of existence entail on primitive men1 continually cause wide deviations from the mean state of the moving equilibrium--wide oscillations2 which imply imperfection of it for the time being1 and bring about its premature overthrow4 ,in such civilized men as we call ill conducted1 frequent perturbations of the moving equilibrium are caused by those excesses characterizing a career in which the periodicities are much broken2 and a common result is that the rhythm of the internal actions being often deranged1 the moving equilibrium1 rendered by so much imperfect1 is generally shortened in duration4 ,while one in whom the internal rhythms are best maintained is one by whom the external actions required to fulfill all needs and duties1 severally performed on the recurring occasions1 conduce to a moving equilibrium that is at once involved and prolonged4 ,of course the implication is that the man who thus reaches the limit of evolution1 exists in a society congruous with his nature1 is a man among men similarly constituted1 who are severally in harmony with that social environment which they have formed4 ,this is1 indeed1 the only possibility4 ,for the production of the highest type of man can go on only pari passu with the production of the highest type of society4 ,the implied conditions are those before described as accompanying the most evolved conduct--conditions under which each can fulfill all his needs and rear the due number of progeny1 not only without hindering others from doing the like1 but while aiding them in doing the like4 ,and evidently1 considered under its physical aspect1 the conduct of the individual so constituted1 and associated with like individuals1 is one in which all the actions1 that is the combined motions of all kinds1 have become such as duly to meet every daily process1 every ordinary occurrence1 and every contingency in his environment4 ,complete life in a complete society is but another name for complete equilibrium between the co-ordinated activities of each social unit and those of the aggregate of units4 #bi4 ,even to readers of preceding volumes1 and still more to other readers1 there will seem a strangeness1 or even an absurdity1 in this presentation of moral conduct in physical terms4 ,it has been needful to make it1 however4 ,if that re-distribution of matter and motion constituting evolution goes on in all aggregates1 its laws must be fulfilled in the most developed being as in every other thing2 and his actions1 when decomposed into motions1 must exemplify its laws4 ,this we find that they do4 ,there is an entire correspondence between moral evolution and evolution as physically defined4 ,conduct1 as actually known to us in perception1 and not as interpreted into the accompanying feelings and ideas1 consists of combined motions4 ,on ascending through the various grades of animate creatures1 we find these combined motions characterized by increasing coherence1 increasing definiteness considered singly and in their co-ordinated groups1 and increasing heterogeneity2 and in advancing from lower to higher types of man1 as well as in advancing from the less moral to the more moral type of man1 these traits of evolving conduct become more marked still4 ,further1 we see that the increasing coherence1 definiteness1 and heterogeneity1 of the combined motions1 are instrumental to the better maintenance of a moving equilibrium4 ,where the evolution is small this is very imperfect and soon cut short2 with advancing evolution1 bringing greater power and intelligence1 it becomes more steady and longer continued in face of adverse actions2 in the human race at large it is comparatively regular and enduring2 and its regularity and enduringness are greatest in the highest4 ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,the ,,biological ,,view4 #cj4 ,the truth that the ideally moral man is one in whom the moving equilibrium is perfect1 or approaches nearest to perfection1 becomes1 when translated into physiological language1 the truth that he is one in whom the functions of all kinds are duly fulfilled4 ,each function has some relation1 direct or indirect1 to the needs of life3 the fact of its existence as a result of evolution1 being itself a proof that it has been entailed1 immediately or remotely1 by the adjustment of inner actions to outer actions4 ,consequently1 non-fulfillment of it in normal proportion is non-fulfillment of a requisite to complete life4 ,if there is defective discharge of the function1 the organism experiences some detrimental result caused by the inadequacy4 ,if the discharge is in excess1 there is entailed a reaction upon the other functions1 which in some way diminishes their efficiencies4 ,it is true that during full vigor1 while the momentum of the organic actions is great1 the disorder caused by moderate excess or defect of any one function1 soon disappears--the balance is re-established4 ,but it is none the less true that always some disorder results from excess or defect1 that it influences every function1 bodily and mental1 and that it constitutes a lowering of the life for the time being4 ,beyond the temporary falling short of complete life implied by undue or inadequate discharge of a function there is entailed1 as an ultimate result1 decreased length of life4 ,if some function is habitually performed in excess of the requirement1 or in defect of the requirement2 and if1 as a consequence1 there is an often repeated perturbation of the functions at large1 there results some chronic derangement in the balance of the functions4 ,necessarily reacting on the structures1 and registering in them its accumulated effects1 this derangement works a general deterioration2 and when the vital energies begin to decline1 the moving equilibrium1 further from perfection than it would else have been1 is sooner overthrown3 death is more or less premature4 ,hence the moral man is one whose functions--many and varied in their kinds1 as we have seen--are all discharged in degrees duly adjusted to the conditions of existence4 #ca4 ,strange as the conclusion looks1 it is nevertheless a conclusion to be here drawn1 that the performance of every function is1 in a sense1 a moral obligation4 ,it is usually thought that morality requires us only to restrain such vital activities as1 in our present state1 are often pushed to excess1 or such as conflict with average welfare1 special or general2 but it also requires us to carry on these vital activities up to their normal limits4 ,all the animal functions1 in common with all the higher functions1 have1 as thus understood1 their imperativeness4 ,while recognizing the fact that in our state of transition1 characterized by very imperfect adaptation of constitution of conditions1 moral obligations of supreme kinds often necessitate conduct which is physically injurious2 we must also recognize the fact that1 considered apart from other effects1 it is immoral so to treat the body as in any way to diminish the fullness or vigor of its vitality4 ,hence results one test of actions4 ,there may in every case be put the questions--,does the action tend to maintenance of complete life for the time being8 and does it tend to prolongation of life to its full extent8 ,to answer yes or no to either of these questions1 is implicitly to class the action as right or wrong in respect of its immediate bearings1 whatever it may be in respect of its remote bearings4 ,the seeming paradoxicalness of this statement results from the tendency1 so difficult of avoidance1 to judge a conclusion which presupposes an ideal humanity1 by its applicability to humanity as now existing4 ,the foregoing conclusion refers to that highest conduct in which1 as we have seen1 the evolution of conduct terminates--that conduct in which the making of all adjustments of acts to ends subserving complete individual life1 together with all those subserving maintenance of offspring and preparation of them for maturity1 not only consist with the making of like adjustments by others1 but furthers it4 ,and this conception of conduct in its ultimate form implies the conception of a nature having such conduct for its spontaneous outcome--the product of its normal activities4 ,so understanding the matter1 it becomes manifest that under such conditions any falling short of function1 as well as any excess of function1 implies deviation from the best conduct or from perfectly moral conduct4 #cb4 ,thus far in treating of conduct from the biological point of view1 we have considered its constituent actions under their physiological aspects only2 leaving out of sight their psychological aspects4 ,we have recognized the bodily changes and have ignored the accompanying mental changes4 ,and at first sight it seems needful for us here to do this2 since taking account of states of consciousness apparently implies an inclusion of the psychological view in the biological view4 ,this is not so however4 ,as was pointed out in the ,principles of ,psychology1 #eb1 #ec1 we enter upon psychology proper only when we begin to treat of mental states and their relations considered as referring to external agents and their relations4 ,while we concern ourselves exclusively with modes of mind as correlatives of nervous changes1 we are treating of what was there distinguished as stho-physiology4 ,we pass to psychology only when we consider the correspondence between the connections among subjective states and the connections among objective actions4 ,here1 then1 without transgressing the limits of our immediate topic1 we may deal with feelings and functions in their mutual dependencies4 ,we cannot omit doing this2 because the psychical changes which accompany many of the physical changes in the organism are biological factors in two ways4 ,those feelings1 classed as sensations1 which1 directly initiated in the bodily framework1 go along with certain states of the vital organs and more conspicuously with certain states of the external organs1 now serve mainly as guides to the performance of functions1 but partly as stimuli1 and now serve mainly as stimuli1 but in a smaller degree as guides4 ,visual sensations which1 as co-ordinated1 enable us to direct our movements1 also1 if vivid1 raise the rate of respiration2 while sensations of cold and heat1 greatly depressing or raising the vital actions1 serve also for purposes of discrimination4 ,so1 too1 the feelings classed as emotions1 which are not localizable in the bodily framework1 act in more general ways1 alike as guides and stimuli--having influences over the performance of functions more potent even than have most sensations4 ,fear1 at the same time that it urges flight and evolves the forces spent in it1 also affects the heart and the alimentary canal2 while joy1 prompting persistence in the actions bringing it1 simultaneously exalts the visceral processes4 ,hence1 in treating of conduct under its biological aspect1 we are compelled to consider that interaction of feelings and functions which is essential to animal life in all its more developed forms4 #cc4 ,in the ,principles of ,psychology1 #abd1 it was shown that necessarily1 throughout the animate world at large1 pains are the correlatives of actions injurious to the organism1 while pleasures are the correlatives of actions conducive to its welfare2 since it is an inevitable deduction from the hypothesis of ,evolution1 that races of sentient creatures could have come into existence under no other conditions4 ,the argument was as follows3 ,if we substitute for the word ,pleasure the equivalent phrase--a feeling which we seek to bring into consciousness and retain there1 and if we substitute for the word ,pain the equivalent phrase--a feeling which we seek to get out of consciousness and to keep out2 we see at once that if the states of consciousness which a creature endeavors to maintain are the correlatives of injurious actions1 and if the states of consciousness which it endeavors to expel are the correlatives of beneficial actions1 it must quickly disappear through persistence in the injurious1 and avoidance of the beneficial4 ,in other words1 those races of beings only can have survived in which1 on the average1 agreeable or desired feelings went along with activities conducive to the maintenance of life1 while disagreeable and habitually avoided feelings went along with activities directly or indirectly destructive of life2 and there must ever have been1 other things equal1 the most numerous and long-continued survivals among races in which these adjustments of feelings to actions were the best1 tending ever to bring about perfect adjustment4 ,fit connections between acts and results must establish themselves in living things1 even before consciousness arises2 and after the rise of consciousness these connections can change in no other way than to become better established4 ,at the very outset1 life is maintained by persistence in acts which conduce to it1 and desistance from acts which impede it2 and whenever sentiency make its appearance as an accompaniment1 its forms must be such that in the one case the produced feeling is of a kind that will be sought--pleasure1 and in the other case is of a kind that will be shunned--pain4 ,observe the necessity of these relations as exhibited in the concrete4 ,a plant which envelops a buried bone with a plexus of rootlets1 or a potato which directs its blanched shoots toward a grating through which light comes into the cellar1 shows us that the changes which outer agents themselves set up in its tissues are changes which aid the utilization of these agents4 ,if we ask what would happen if a plant's roots grew not toward the place where there was moisture1 but away from it1 or if its leaves1 enabled by light to assimilate1 nevertheless bent themselves toward the darkness1 we see that death would result in the absence of the existing adjustments4 ,this general relation is still better shown in an insectivorous plant1 such as the ,dionoea muscipula1 which keeps its trap closed round animal matter1 but not round other matter4 ,here it is manifest that the stimulus arising from the first part of the absorbed substance itself sets up those actions by which the mass of the substance is utilized for the plant's benefit4 ,when we pass from vegetal organisms to unconscious animal organisms1 we see a like connection between proclivity and advantage4 ,on observing how the tentacles of a polype attach themselves to1 and begin to close round1 a living creature1 or some animal substance1 while they are indifferent to the touch of other substance1 we are similarly shown that diffusion of some of the nutritive juices into the tentacles1 which is an incipient assimilation1 causes the motions effecting prehension4 ,and it is obvious that life would cease were these relations reversed4 ,nor is it otherwise with this fundamental connection between contact with food and taking in of food1 among conscious creatures1 up to the very highest4 ,tasting a substance implies the passage of its molecules through the mucous membrane of the tongue and palate2 and this absorption1 when it occurs with a substance serving for food1 is but a commencement of the absorption carried on throughout the alimentary canal4 ,moreover1 the sensation accompanying this absorption1 when it is of the kind produced by food1 initiates at the place where it is strongest1 in front of the pharynx1 an automatic act of swallowing1 in a manner rudely analogous to that in which the stimulus of absorption in a polype's tentacles initiates prehension4 ,if from these processes and relations that imply contact between a creature's surface and the substance it takes in1 we turn to those set up by diffused particles of the substance1 constituting to conscious creatures its odor1 we meet a kindred general truth4 ,just as1 after contact1 some molecules of a mass of food are absorbed by the part touched1 and excite the act of prehension1 so are absorbed such of its molecules as1 spreading through the water1 reach the organism2 and1 being absorbed by it1 excite those actions by which contact with the mass is effected4 ,if the physical stimulation caused by the dispersed particles is not accompanied by consciousness1 still the motor changes set up must conduce to survival of the organism1 if they are such as end in contact2 and there must be relative innutrition and mortality of organisms in which the produced contractions do not bring about this result4 ,nor can it be questioned that whenever and wherever the physical stimulation has a concomitant sentiency1 this must be such as consists with1 and conduces to1 movement toward the nutritive matter3 it must be not a repulsive but an attractive sentiency4 ,and this which holds with the lowest consciousness1 must hold throughout2 as we see it do in all such superior creatures as are drawn to their food by odor4 ,besides those movements which cause locomotion those which effect seizure must no less certainly become thus adjusted4 ,the molecular changes caused by absorption of nutritive matter from organic substance in contact1 or from adjacent organic substance1 initiate motions which are indefinite where the organization is low1 and which become more definite with the advance of organization4 ,at the outset1 while the undifferentiated protoplasm is everywhere absorbent and everywhere contractile1 the changes of form initiated by the physical stimulation of adjacent nutritive matter are vague1 and ineffectually adapted to utilization of it2 but gradually1 along with the specialization into parts that are contractile and parts that are absorbent1 these motions become better adapted2 for necessarily individuals in which they are least adapted disappear faster than those in which they are most adapted4 ,recognizing this necessity we have here especially to recognize a further necessity4 ,the relation between these stimulations and adjusted contractions must be such that increase of the one causes increase of the other2 since the directions of the discharges being once established1 greater stimulation causes greater contraction1 and the greater contraction causing closer contact with the stimulating agent1 causes increase of stimulus and is thereby itself further increased4 ,and now we reach the corollary which more particularly concerns us4 ,clearly as fast as an accompanying sentiency arises1 this cannot be one that is disagreeable1 prompting desistance1 but must be one that is agreeable1 prompting persistence4 ,the pleasurable sensation must be itself the stimulus to the contraction by which the pleasurable sensation is maintained and increased2 or must be so bound up with the stimulus that the two increase together4 ,and this relation which we see is directly established in the case of a fundamental function1 must be indirectly established with all other functions2 since non-establishment of it in any particular case implies1 in so far1 unfitness to the conditions of existence4 ,in two ways then1 it is demonstrable that there exists a primordial connection between pleasure-giving acts and continuance or increase of life1 and1 by implication1 between pain-giving acts and decrease or loss of life4 ,on the one hand1 setting out with the lowest living things1 we see that the beneficial act and the act which there is a tendency to perform1 are originally two sides of the same2 and cannot be disconnected without fatal results4 ,on the other hand1 if we contemplate developed creatures as now existing1 we see that each individual and species is from day to day kept alive by pursuit of the agreeable and avoidance of the disagreeable4 ,thus approaching the facts from a different side1 analysis brings us down to another face of that ultimate truth disclosed by analysis in a preceding chapter4 ,we found it was no more possible to frame ethical conceptions from which the consciousness of pleasure1 of some kind1 at some time1 to some being1 is absent1 than it is possible to frame the conception of an object from which the consciousness of space is absent4 ,and now we see that this necessity of thought originates in the very nature of sentient existence4 ,sentient existence can evolve only on condition that pleasure-giving acts are life-sustaining acts4 #cd4 ,notwithstanding explanations already made1 the naked enunciation of this as an ultimate truth1 underlying all estimations of right and wrong1 will in many1 if not in most1 cause astonishment4 ,having in view certain beneficial results that are preceded by disagreeable states of consciousness1 such as those commonly accompanying labor2 and having in view the injurious results that follow the receipt of certain gratifications1 such as those which excess in drinking produces2 the majority tacitly or avowedly believe that the bearing of pains is on the whole beneficial1 and that the receipt of pleasures is on the whole detrimental4 ,the exceptions so fill their minds as to exclude the rule4 ,when asked1 they are obliged to admit that the pains accompanying wounds1 bruises1 sprains1 are the concomitants of evils1 alike to the sufferer and to those around him2 and that the anticipations of such pains serve as deterrents from careless or dangerous acts4 ,they cannot deny that the tortures of burning or scalding1 and the miseries which intense cold1 starvation1 and thirst produce1 are indissolubly connected with permanent or temporary mischiefs1 tending to incapacitate one who bears them for doing things that should be done1 either for his own welfare or the welfare of others4 ,the agony of incipient suffocation they are compelled to recognize as a safeguard to life1 and must allow that avoidance of it is conducive to all that life can bring or achieve4 ,nor will they refuse to own that one who is chained in a cold1 damp dungeon1 in darkness and silence1 is injured in health and efficiency1 alike by the positive pains thus inflicted on him and by the accompanying negative pains due to absence of light1 of freedom1 of companionship4 ,conversely1 they do not doubt that notwithstanding occasional excesses the pleasure which accompanies the taking of food goes along with physical benefit2 and that the benefit is the greater the keener the satisfaction of appetite4 ,they have no choice but to acknowledge that the instincts and sentiments which so overpoweringly prompt marriage1 and those which find their gratification in the fostering of offspring1 work out an immense surplus of benefit after deducting all evils4 ,nor dare they question that the pleasure taken in accumulating property1 leaves a large balance of advantage1 private and public1 after making all drawbacks4 ,yet many and conspicuous as are the cases in which pleasures and pains1 sensational and emotional1 serve as incentives to proper acts and deterrents from improper acts1 these pass unnoticed2 and notice is taken only of those cases in which men are directly or indirectly misled by them4 ,the well-working in essential matters is ignored2 and the ill-working in unessential matters is alone recognized4 ,is it replied that the more intense pains and pleasures1 which have immediate reference to bodily needs1 guide us rightly2 while the weaker pains and pleasures1 not immediately connected with the maintenance of life1 guide us wrongly8 ,then the implication is that the system of guidance by pleasures and pains1 which has answered with all types of creatures below the human1 fails with the human4 ,or rather1 the admission being that with mankind it succeeds in so far as fulfillment of certain imperative wants goes1 it fails in respect of wants that are not imperative4 ,those who think this are required1 in the first place1 to show us how the line is to be drawn between the two2 and then to show us why the system which succeeds in the lower will not succeed in the higher4 #ce4 ,doubtless1 however1 after all that has been said1 there will be raised afresh the same difficulty--there will be instanced the mischievous pleasures and the beneficent pains4 ,the drunkard1 the gambler1 the thief1 who severally pursue gratifications1 will be named in proof that the pursuit of gratifications misleads2 while the self-sacrificing relative1 the worker who perseveres through weariness1 the honest man who stints himself to pay his way1 will be named in proof that disagreeable modes of consciousness accompany acts that are really beneficial4 ,but after recalling the fact pointed out in #bj1 that this objection does not tell against guidance by pleasures and pains at large1 since it merely implies that special and proximate pleasures and pains must be disregarded out of consideration for remote and diffused pleasures and pains2 and1 after admitting that in mankind1 as at present constituted1 guidance by proximate pleasures and pains fails throughout a wide range of cases2 ,i go on to set forth the interpretation ,biology gives of these anomalies1 as being not necessary and permanent1 but incidental and temporary4 ,already1 while showing that among inferior creatures1 pleasures and pains have all along guided the conduct by which life has been evolved and maintained1 ,i have pointed out that since the conditions of existence for each species have been occasionally changing1 there have been occasionally arising partial misadjustments of the feelings to the requirements1 necessitating readjustments4 ,this general cause of derangement1 operating on all sentient beings1 has been operating on human beings in a manner unusually decided1 persistent1 and involved4 ,it needs but to contrast the mode of life followed by primitive men1 wandering in the forests and living on wild food1 with the mode of life followed by rustics1 artisans1 traders1 and professional men in a civilized community1 to see that the constitution1 bodily and mental1 well-adjusted to the one1 is ill-adjusted to the other4 ,it needs but to observe the emotions kept awake in each savage tribe1 chronically hostile to neighboring tribes1 and then to observe the emotions which peaceful production and exchange bring into play1 to see that the two are not only unlike1 but opposed4 ,and it needs but to note how1 during social evolution1 the ideas and sentiments appropriate to the militant activities carried on by coercive co-operation have been at variance with the ideas and sentiments appropriate to the industrial activities1 carried on by voluntary co-operation1 to see that there has ever been within each society1 and still continues1 a conflict between the two moral natures adjusted to these two unlike modes of life4 ,manifestly1 then1 this readjustment of constitution to conditions1 involving readjustment of pleasures and pains for guidance1 which all creatures from time to time undergo1 has been in the human race during civilization especially difficult1 not only because of the greatness of the change from small nomadic groups to vast settled societies1 and from predatory habits to peaceful habits1 but also because the old life of enmity between societies has been maintained along with the new life of amity within each society4 ,while there co-exist two ways of life so radically opposed as the militant and the industrial1 human nature cannot become properly adapted to either4 ,that hence results such failure of guidance by pleasures and pains as is daily exhibited1 we discover on observing in what parts of conduct the failure is most conspicuous4 ,as above shown1 the pleasurable and painful sensations are fairly well adjusted to the peremptory physical requirements3 the benefits of conforming to the sensations which prompt us in respect of nutrition1 respiration1 maintenance of temperature1 etc41 immensely exceed the incidental evils1 and such misadjustments as occur may be ascribed to the change from the outdoor life of the primitive man to the indoor life which the civilized man is often compelled to lead4 ,it is the emotional pleasures and pains which are in so considerable a degree out of adjustment to the needs of life as carried on in society1 and it is of these that the readjustment is made in the way above shown1 so tardy because so difficult4 ,from the biological point of view1 then1 we see that the connections between pleasure and beneficial action and between pain and detrimental action1 which arose when sentient existence began1 and have continued among animate creatures up to man1 are generally displayed in him also throughout the lower and more completely organized part of his nature2 and must be more and more fully displayed throughout the higher part of his nature1 as fast as his adaptation to the conditions of social life increases4 #cf4 ,biology has a further judgment to pass on the relations of pleasures and pains to welfare4 ,beyond the connections between acts beneficial to the organism and the pleasures accompanying performance of them1 and between acts detrimental to the organism and the pains causing desistance from them1 there are connections between pleasure in general and physiological exaltation1 and between pain in general and physiological depression4 ,every pleasure increases vitality2 every pain decreases vitality4 ,every pleasure raises the tide of life2 every pain lowers the tide of life4 ,let us consider1 first1 the pains4 ,by the general mischiefs that result from submission to pains1 ,i do not mean those arising from the diffused effects of local organic lesions1 such as follow an aneurism caused by intense effort spite of protesting sensations1 or such as follow the varicose veins brought on by continued disregard of fatigue in the legs1 or such as follow the atrophy set up in muscles that are persistently exerted when extremely weary2 but ,i mean the general mischiefs caused by that constitutional disturbance which pain forthwith sets up4 ,these are conspicuous when the pains are acute1 whether they be sensational or emotional4 ,bodily agony long borne produces death by exhaustion4 ,more frequently1 arresting the action of the heart for a time1 it causes that temporary death we call fainting4 ,on other occasions vomiting is a consequence4 ,and where such manifest derangements do not result1 we still1 in the pallor and trembling1 trace the general prostration4 ,beyond the actual loss of life caused by subjection to intense cold there are depressions of vitality less marked caused by cold less extreme--temporary enfeeblement following too long an immersion in icy water2 enervation and pining away consequent on inadequate clothing4 ,similarly is it with submission to great heat3 we have lassitude reaching occasionally to exhaustion2 we have1 in weak persons1 fainting1 succeeded by temporary debilitation2 and in steaming tropical jungles ,europeans contract fevers which1 when not fatal1 often entail life-long incapacities4 ,consider1 again1 the evils that follow violent exertion continued in spite of painful feelings--now a fatigue which destroys appetite or arrests digestion if food is taken1 implying failure of the reparative processes when they are most needed2 and now a prostration of the heart1 here lasting for a time and there1 where the transgression has been repeated day after day1 made permanent3 reducing the rest of life to a lower level4 ,no less conspicuous are the depressing effects of emotional pains4 ,there are occasional cases of death from grief2 and in other cases the mental suffering which a calamity causes1 like bodily suffering1 shows its effects by syncope4 ,often a piece of bad news is succeeded by sickness2 and continued anxiety will produce loss of appetite1 perpetual indigestion and diminished strength4 ,excessive fear1 whether aroused by physical or moral danger1 will1 in like manner1 arrest for a time the processes of nutrition2 and1 not unfrequently1 in pregnant women brings on miscarriage2 while1 in less extreme cases1 the cold perspiration and unsteady hands indicate a general lowering of the vital activities1 entailing partial incapacity of body or mind or both4 ,how greatly emotional pain deranges the visceral actions is shown us by the fact that incessant worry is not unfrequently followed by jaundice4 ,and here1 indeed1 the relation between cause and effect happens to have been proved by direct experiment4 ,making such arrangements that the bile-duct of a dog delivered its product outside the body1 ,claude ,bernard observed that so long as he petted the dog and kept him in good spirits1 secretion went on at its normal rate2 but on speaking angrily1 and for a time so treating him as to produce depression1 the flow of bile was arrested4 ,should it be said that evil results of such kinds are proved to occur only when the pains1 bodily or mental1 are great1 the reply is that in healthy persons the injurious perturbations caused by small pains1 though not easily traced1 are still produced2 and that in those whose vital powers are much reduced by illness1 slight physical irritations and trifling moral annoyances1 often cause relapses4 ,quite opposite are the constitutional effects of pleasure4 ,it sometimes1 though rarely1 happens that in feeble persons intense pleasure--pleasure that is almost pain--gives a nervous shock that is mischievous2 but it does not do this in those who are undebilitated by voluntary or enforced submission to actions injurious to the organism4 ,in the normal order1 pleasures1 great and small1 are stimulants to the processes by which life is maintained4 ,among the sensations may be instanced those produced by bright light4 ,sunshine is enlivening in comparison with gloom--even a gleam excites a wave of pleasure2 and experiments have shown that sunshine raises the rate of respiration3 raised respiration being an index of raised vital activities in general4 ,a warmth that is agreeable in degree favors the heart's action1 and furthers the various functions to which this is instrumental4 ,though those who are in full vigor and fitly clothed can maintain their temperature in winter1 and can digest additional food to make up for the loss of heat1 it is otherwise with the feeble2 and1 as vigor declines1 the beneficence of warmth becomes conspicuous4 ,that benefits accompany the agreeable sensations produced by fresh air1 and the agreeable sensations that accompany muscular action after due rest1 and the agreeable sensations caused by rest after exertion cannot be questioned4 ,receipt of these pleasures conduces to the maintenance of the body in fit condition for all the purposes of life4 ,more manifest still are the physiological benefits of emotional pleasures4 ,every power1 bodily and mental1 is increased by good spirits1 which is our name for a general emotional satisfaction4 ,the truth that the fundamental vital actions--those of nutrition--are furthered by laughter-moving conversation1 or rather by the pleasurable feeling causing laughter1 is one of old standing2 and every dyspeptic knows that in exhilarating company1 a large and varied dinner1 including not very digestible things1 may be eaten with impunity1 and1 indeed1 with benefit1 while a small1 carefully chosen dinner of simple things1 eaten in solitude1 will be followed by indigestion4 ,this striking effect on the alimentary system is accompanied by effects1 equally certain though less manifest1 on the circulation and the respiration4 ,again1 one who1 released from daily labors and anxieties1 receives delights from fine scenery or is enlivened by the novelties he sees abroad1 comes back showing by toned-up face and vivacious manner1 the greater energy with which he is prepared to pursue his avocation4 ,invalids especially1 on whose narrowed margin of vitality the influence of conditions is most visible1 habitually show the benefits derived from agreeable states of feeling4 ,a lively social circle1 the call of an old friend1 or even removal to a brighter room1 will1 by the induced cheerfulness1 much improve the physical state4 ,in brief1 as every medical man knows1 there is no such tonic as happiness4 ,these diffused physiological effects of pleasures and pains1 which are joined with the local or special physiological effects1 are1 indeed1 obviously inevitable4 ,we have seen 7,principles of ,psychology1 #abc-abe7 that while craving1 or negative pain1 accompanies the under-activity of an organ1 and while positive pain accompanies its over-activity1 pleasure accompanies its normal activity4 ,we have seen that by evolution no other relations could be established2 since1 through all inferior types of creatures1 if defect or excess of function produced no disagreeable sentiency1 and medium function no agreeable sentiency1 there would be nothing to insure a proportioned performance of function4 ,and as it is one of the laws of nervous action that each stimulus1 beyond a direct discharge to the particular organ acted on1 indirectly causes a general discharge throughout the nervous system 7,prin4 of ,psy41 #ba1 #ci71 it results that the rest of the organs1 all influenced as they are by the nervous system1 participate in the stimulation4 ,so that beyond the aid1 more slowly shown1 which the organs yield to one another through the physiological division of labor1 there is the aid1 more quickly shown1 which mutual excitation gives4 ,while there is a benefit to be presently felt by the whole organism from the due performance of each function1 there is an immediate benefit from the exaltation of its functions at large caused by the accompanying pleasure2 and from pains1 whether of excess or defect1 there also come these double effects1 immediate and remote4 #cg4 ,non-recognition of these general truths vitiates moral speculation at large4 ,from the estimates of right and wrong habitually framed1 these physiological effects wrought on the actor by his feelings are entirely omitted4 ,it is tacitly assumed that pleasures and pains have no reactions on the body of the recipient1 affecting his fitness for the duties of life4 ,the only reactions recognized are those on character2 respecting which the current supposition is1 that acceptance of pleasures is detrimental and submission to pains beneficial4 ,the notion1 remotely descended from the ghost-theory of the savage1 that mind and body are independent1 has1 among its various implications1 this belief that states of consciousness are in no wise related to bodily states4 ,you have had your gratification--it is past2 and you are as you were before1 says the moralist to one4 ,and to another he says1 ,you have borne the suffering--it is over2 and there the matter ends4 ,both statements are false4 ,leaving out of view indirect results1 the direct results are that the one has moved a step away from death and the other has moved a step toward death4 ,leaving out of view1 ,i say1 the indirect results4 ,it is these indirect results1 here for the moment left out of view1 which the moralist has exclusively in view1 being so occupied by them that he ignores the direct results4 ,the gratification1 perhaps purchased at undue cost1 perhaps enjoyed when work should have been done1 perhaps snatched from the rightful claimant1 is considered only in relation to remote injurious effects1 and no set-off is made for immediate beneficial effects4 ,conversely1 from positive and negative pains1 borne now in the pursuit of some future advantage1 now in discharge of responsibilities1 now in performing a generous act1 the distant good is alone dwelt on and the proximate evil ignored4 ,consequences1 pleasurable and painful1 experienced by the actor forthwith1 are of no importance2 and they become of importance only when anticipated as occurring hereafter to the actor or to other persons4 ,and further1 future evils borne by the actor are considered of no account if they result from self-denial1 and are emphasized only when they result from self-gratification4 ,obviously1 estimates so framed are erroneous2 and obviously1 the pervading judgments of conduct based on such estimates must be distorted4 ,mark the anomalies of opinion produced4 ,if1 as the sequence of a malady contracted in pursuit of illegitimate gratification1 an attack of iritis injures vision1 the mischief is to be counted among those entailed by immoral conduct2 but if1 regardless of protesting sensations1 the eyes are used in study too soon after ophthalmia1 and there follows blindness for years or for life1 entailing not only personal unhappiness1 but a burden on others1 moralists are silent4 ,the broken leg which a drunkard's accident causes counts among those miseries brought on self and family by intemperance1 which form the ground for reprobating it2 but if anxiety to fulfill duties prompts the continued use of a sprained knee spite of the pain1 and brings on a chronic lameness involving lack of exercise1 consequent ill-health1 inefficiency1 anxiety1 and unhappiness1 it is supposed that ethics has no verdict to give in the matter4 ,a student who is plucked because he has spent in amusement the time and money that should have gone in study1 is blamed for thus making parents unhappy and preparing for himself a miserable future2 but another who1 thinking exclusively of claims on him1 reads night after night with hot or aching head1 and1 breaking down1 cannot take his degree1 but returns home shattered in health and unable to support himself1 is named with pity only1 as not subject to any moral judgment2 or rather1 the moral judgment passed is wholly favorable4 ,thus recognizing the evils caused by some kinds of conduct only1 men at large1 and moralists as exponents of their beliefs1 ignore the suffering and death daily caused around them by disregard of that guidance which has established itself in the course of evolution4 ,led by the tacit assumption common to ,pagan stoics and ,christian ascetics1 that we are so diabolically organized that pleasures are injurious and pains beneficial1 people on all sides yield examples of lives blasted by persisting in actions against which their sensations rebel4 ,here is one who1 drenched to the skin and sitting in a cold wind1 pooh-hoohs his shiverings and gets rheumatic fever1 with subsequent heart-disease1 which makes worthless the short life remaining to him4 ,here is another who1 disregarding painful feelings1 works too soon after a debilitating illness1 and establishes disordered health that lasts for the rest of his days1 and makes him useless to himself and others4 ,now the account is of a youth who1 persisting in gymnastic feats spite of scarcely bearable straining1 bursts a blood-vessel1 and1 long laid on the shelf1 is permanently damaged2 while now it is of a man in middle life who1 pushing muscular effort to painful excess1 suddenly brings on hernia4 ,in this family is a case of aphasia1 spreading paralysis and death1 caused by eating too little and doing too much2 in that1 softening of the brain has been brought on by ceaseless mental efforts against which the feelings hourly protested2 and in others1 less serious brain affections have been contracted by over-study continued regardless of discomfort and the cravings for fresh air and exercise4,b ,even without accumulating special examples1 the truth is forced on us by the visible traits of classes4 ,the careworn man of business too long at his office1 the cadaverous barrister pouring half the night over his briefs1 the feeble factory hands and unhealthy seamstresses passing long hours in bad air1 the anmic1 flat-chested school-girls1 bending over many lessons and forbidden boisterous play1 no less than ,sheffield grinders who die of suffocating dust1 and peasants crippled with rheumatism due to exposure1 show us the wide spread miseries caused by persevering in actions repugnant to the sensations and neglecting actions which the sensations prompt4 ,nay1 the evidence is still more extensive and conspicuous4 ,what are the puny malformed children1 seen in poverty-stricken districts1 but children whose appetites for food and desires for warmth have not been adequately satisfied8 ,what are populations stinted in growth and prematurely aged1 such as parts of ,france show us1 but populations injured by work in excess and food in defect3 the one implying positive pain1 the other negative pain8 ,what is the implication of that greater mortality which occurs among people who are weakened by privations1 unless it is that bodily miseries conduce to fatal illnesses8 ,or once more1 what must we infer from the frightful amount of disease and death suffered by armies in the field1 fed on scanty and bad provisions1 lying on damp ground1 exposed to extremes of heat and cold1 inadequately sheltered from rain1 and subject to exhausting efforts2 unless it be the terrible mischiefs caused by continuously subjecting the body to treatment which the feelings protest against8 ,it matters not to the argument whether the actions entailing such effects are voluntary or involuntary4 ,it matters not from the biological point of view whether the motives prompting them are high or low4 ,the vital functions accept no apologies on the ground that neglect of them was unavoidable1 or that the reason for neglect was noble4 ,the direct and indirect sufferings caused by non-conformity to the laws of life are the same whatever induces the non-conformity2 and cannot be omitted in any rational estimate of conduct4 ,if the purpose of ethical inquiry is to establish rules of right living2 and if the rules of right living are those of which the total results1 individual and general1 direct and indirect1 are most conducive to human happiness2 then it is absurd to ignore the immediate results and recognize only the remote results4 #ch4 ,here might be urged the necessity for preluding the study of moral science by the study of biological science4 ,here might be dwelt on the error men make in thinking they can understand those special phenomena of human life with which ,ethics deals1 while paying little or no attention to the general phenomena of human life1 and while utterly ignoring the phenomena of life at large4 ,and1 doubtless1 there would be truth in the inference that such acquaintance with the world of living things1 as discloses the part which pleasures and pains have played in organic evolution1 would help to rectify these one-sided conceptions of moralists4 ,it cannot be held1 however1 that lack of this knowledge is the sole cause1 or the main cause1 of their one-sidedness4 ,for facts of the kind above instanced1 which1 duly attended to1 would prevent such distortions of moral theory1 are facts which it needs no biological inquiries to learn1 but which are daily thrust before the eyes of all4 ,the truth is1 rather1 that the general consciousness is so possessed by sentiments and ideas at variance with the conclusions necessitated by familiar evidence that the evidence gets no attention4 ,these adverse sentiments and ideas have several roots4 ,there is the theological root4 ,as before shown1 from the worship of cannibal ancestors who delighted in witnessing tortures1 there resulted the primitive conception of deities who were propitiated by the bearing of pains1 and1 consequently1 angered by the receipt of pleasures4 ,through the religions of the semi-civilized1 in which this conception of the divine nature remains conspicuous1 it has persisted1 in progressively modified forms1 down to our own times2 and still colors the beliefs1 both of those who adhere to the current creed and of those who nominally reject it4 ,there is another root in the primitive and still-surviving militancy4 ,while social antagonisms continue to generate war1 which consists in endeavors to inflict pain and death while submitting to the risks of pain and death1 and which necessarily involves great privations1 it is needful that physical suffering1 whether considered in itself or in the evils it bequeaths1 should be thought little of1 and that among pleasures recognized as most worthy should be those which victory brings4 ,nor does partially developed industrialism fail to furnish a root4 ,with social evolution1 which implies transition from the life of wandering hunters to the life of settled peoples engaged in labor1 and which therefore entails activities widely unlike those to which the aboriginal constitution is adapted1 there comes an under-exercise of faculties for which the social state affords no scope1 and an overtaxing of faculties required for the social state2 the one implying denial of certain pleasures and the other submission to certain pains4 ,hence1 along with that growth of population which makes the struggle for existence intense1 bearing of pains and sacrifice of pleasures is daily necessitated4 ,now always and everywhere1 there arises among men a theory conforming to their practice4 ,the savage nature1 originating the conception of a savage deity1 evolves a theory of supernatural control sufficiently stringent and cruel to influence his conduct4 ,with submission to despotic government severe enough in its restraints to keep in order barbarous natures1 there grows up a theory of divine right to rule1 and the duty of absolute submission4 ,where war is made the business of life by the existence of warlike neighbors1 virtues which are required for war come to be regarded as supreme virtues2 while1 contrariwise1 when industrialism has grown predominant1 the violence and the deception which warriors glory in come to be held criminal4 ,in like manner1 then1 there arises a tolerable adjustment of the actually accepted 7not the nominally accepted7 theory of right living1 to living as it is daily carried on4 ,if the life is one that necessitates habitual denial of pleasures and bearing of pains1 there grows up an answering ethical system under which the receipt of pleasures is tacitly disapproved and the bearing of pains avowedly approved4 ,the mischiefs entailed by pleasures in excess are dwelt on1 while the benefits which normal pleasures bring are ignored2 and the good results achieved by submission to pains are fully set forth1 while the evils are overlooked4 ,but while recognizing the desirableness of1 and indeed the necessity for1 systems of ethics adapted1 like religious systems and political systems1 to their respective times and places1 we have here to regard the first as1 like the others1 transitional4 ,we must infer that like a purer creed and a better government1 a truer ethics belongs to a more advanced social state4 ,led1 priori1 to conclude that distortions must exist1 we are enabled to recognize as such the distortions we find3 answering in nature1 as these do1 to expectation4 ,and there is forced on us the truth that a scientific morality arises only as fast as the one-sided conceptions adapted to transitory conditions are developed into both-sided conceptions4 ,the science of right living has to take account of all consequences in so far as they affect happiness1 personally or socially1 directly or indirectly2 and by as much as it ignores any class of consequences1 by so much does it fail to be science4 #ci4 ,like the physical view1 then1 the biological view corresponds with the view gained by looking at conduct in general from the standpoint of ,evolution4 ,that which was physically defined as a moving equilibrium1 we define biologically as a balance of functions4 ,the implication of such a balance is that the several functions1 in their kinds1 amounts1 and combinations1 are adjusted to the several activities which maintain and constitute complete life2 and to be so adjusted is to have reached the goal toward which the evolution of conduct continually tends4 ,passing to the feelings which accompany the performance of functions1 we see that of necessity during the evolution of organic life1 pleasures have become the concomitants of normal amounts of functions1 while pains1 positive and negative1 have become the concomitants of excesses and defects of functions4 ,and though in every species derangements of these relations are often caused by changes of conditions1 they ever re-establish themselves3 disappearance of the species being the alternative4 ,mankind1 inheriting from creatures of lower kinds1 such adjustments between feelings and functions as concern fundamental bodily requirements2 and daily forced by peremptory feelings to do the things which maintain life and avoid those which bring immediate death2 has been subject to a change of conditions unusually great and involved4 ,this has considerably deranged the guidance by sensations1 and has deranged in a much greater degree the guidance by emotions4 ,the result is that in many cases pleasures are not connected with actions which must be performed1 nor pains with actions which must be avoided1 but contrariwise4 ,several influences have conspired to make men ignore the well-working of these relations between feelings and functions1 and to observe whatever of ill-working is seen in them4 ,hence1 while the evils which some pleasures entail are dilated upon1 the benefits habitually accompanying receipt of pleasures are unnoticed2 at the same time that the benefits achieved through certain pains are magnified while the immense mischiefs which pains bring are made little of4 ,the ethical theories characterized by these perversions are products of1 and are appropriate to the forms of social life which the imperfectly-adapted constitutions of men produce4 ,but with the progress of adaptation1 bringing faculties and requirements into harmony1 such incongruities of experience1 and consequent distortions of theory1 must diminish2 until1 along with complete adjustment of humanity to the social state1 will go recognition of the truths that actions are completely right only when1 besides being conducive to future happiness1 special and general1 they are immediately pleasurable1 and that painfulness1 not only ultimate but proximate1 is the concomitant of actions which are wrong4 ,so that from the biological point of view1 ethical science becomes a specification of the conduct of associated men who are severally so constituted that the various self-preserving activities1 the activities required for rearing offspring1 and those which social welfare demands1 are fulfilled in the spontaneous exercise of duly proportioned faculties1 each yielding when in action its quantum of pleasure1 and who are1 by consequence1 so constituted that excess or defect in any one of these actions brings its quantum of pain1 immediate and remote4 ,,note ,,to #cc4 ,in his ,physical ,ethics1 ,mr4 ,alfred ,barratt has expressed a view which here calls for notice4 ,postulating ,evolution and its general laws1 he refers to certain passages in the ,principles of ,psychology 7#ast ,ed4 ,pt4 ,,iii4 ch4 viii4 pp4 #cie1 sqq4 cf4 ,pt4 ,,iv4 ch4 iv47 in which ,i have treated of the relation between irritation and contraction which marks the dawn of sensitive life2 have pointed out that the primordial tissue must be differently affected by contact with nutritive and with innutritive matters--the two being for aquatic creatures respectively the soluble and the insoluble2 and have argued that the contraction by which a protruded part of a rhizopod draws in a fragment of assimilable matter is caused by a commencing absorption of the assimilable matter4 ,mr4 ,barratt1 holding that consciousness must be considered as an invariable property of animal life1 and ultimately1 in its elements1 of the material universe 7p4 #dc71 regards these responses of animal tissue to stimuli1 as implying feeling of one or other kind4 ,some kinds of impressed force1 he says1 are followed by movements of retraction and withdrawal1 others by such as secure a continuance of the impression4 ,these two kinds of contraction are the phenomena and external marks of pain and pleasure respectively4 ,hence the tissue acts so as to secure pleasure and avoid pain by a law as truly physical and natural as that whereby a needle turns to the pole1 or a tree to the light 7p4 #eb74 ,not without questioning that the raw material of consciousness is present even in undifferentiated protoplasm1 and everywhere exists potentially in that ,unknowable ,power which1 otherwise conditioned1 is manifested in physical action 7,prin4 of ,psy41 #bgb-c71 ,i demur to the conclusion that it at first exists under the forms of pleasure and pain4 ,these1 ,i conceive1 arise1 as the more special feelings do1 by a compounding of the ultimate elements of consciousness 7,prin4 of ,psy41 #fj1 #fa73 being1 indeed1 general aspects of these more special feelings when they reach certain intensities4 ,considering that even in creatures which have developed nervous systems1 a great part of the vital processes are carried on by unconscious reflex actions1 ,i see no propriety in assuming the existence of what we understand by consciousness in creatures not only devoid of nervous systems but devoid of structures in general4 ,,note ,,to #cf4 ,more than once in the ,emotions and the ,will1 ,dr4 ,bain insists on the connection between pleasure and exaltation of vitality1 and the connection between pain and depression of vitality4 ,as above shown1 ,i concur in the view taken by him2 which is1 indeed1 put beyond dispute by general experience as well as by the more special experience of medical men4 ,when1 however1 from the invigorating and relaxing effects of pleasure and pain respectively1 ,dr4 ,bain derives the original tendencies to persist in acts which give pleasure and to desist from those which give pain1 ,i find myself unable to go with him4 ,he says3 ,we suppose movements spontaneously begun1 and accidentally causing pleasure2 we then assume that with the pleasure there will be an increase of vital energy1 in which increase the fortunate movements will share1 and thereby increase the pleasure4 ,or1 on the other hand1 we suppose the spontaneous movements to give pain1 and assume that1 with the pain1 there will be a decrease of energy1 extending to the movements that cause the evil1 and thereby providing a remedy 7#c;d ,ed4 p4 #cae74 ,this interpretation1 implying that the fortunate movements merely share in the effects of augmented vital energy caused by the pleasure1 does not seem to me congruous with observation4 ,the truth appears rather to be that though there is a concomitant general increase of muscular tone1 the muscles specially excited are those which1 by their increased contraction1 conduce to increased pleasure4 ,conversely1 the implication that desistance from spontaneous movements which cause pain1 is due to a general muscular relaxation shared in by the muscles causing these particular movements1 seems to me at variance with the fact that the retractation commonly takes the form not of a passive lapse but of an active withdrawal4 ,further1 it may be remarked that depressing as pain eventually is to the system at large1 we cannot say that it at once depresses the muscular energies4 ,not simply1 as ,dr4 ,bain admits1 does an acute smart produce spasmodic movements1 but pains of all kinds1 both sensational and emotional1 stimulate the muscles 7,essays1 #ast series1 p4 #cfj1 #a1 or #b;d ed4 ,vol4 ,i4 p4 #baa1 #ab74 ,pain1 however 7and also pleasure when very intense71 simultaneously has an inhibitory effect on all the reflex actions2 and as the vital functions in general are carried on by reflex actions1 this inhibition1 increasing with the intensity of the pain1 proportionately depresses the vital functions4 ,arrest of the heart's action and fainting is an extreme result of this inhibition2 and the viscera at large feel its effects in degrees proportioned to the degrees of pain4 ,pain1 therefore1 while directly causing a discharge of muscular energy as pleasure does1 eventually lowers muscular power by lowering those vital processes on which the supply of energy depends4 ,hence we cannot1 ,i think1 ascribe the prompt desistance from muscular movements causing pain1 to decrease in the flow of energy2 for this decrease is felt only after an interval4 ,conversely1 we cannot ascribe the persistence in a muscular act which yields pleasure to the resulting exaltation of energy2 but must1 as indicated in #cc1 ascribe it to the establishment of lines of discharge between the place of pleasurable stimulation and those contractile structures which maintain and increase the act causing the stimulation--connections allied with the reflex1 into which they pass by insensible gradations4 ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,,the ,,psychological ,,view4 #dj4 ,the last chapter1 in so far as it dealt with feelings in their relations to conduct1 recognized only their physiological aspects3 their psychological aspects were passed over4 ,in this chapter1 conversely1 we are not concerned with the constitutional connections between feelings1 as incentives or deterrents1 and physical benefits to be gained1 or mischiefs to be avoided2 nor with the reactive effects of feelings on the state of the organism1 as fitting or unfitting it for future action4 ,here we have to consider represented pleasures and pains1 sensational and emotional1 as constituting deliberate motives--as forming factors in the conscious adjustments of acts to ends4 #da4 ,the rudimentary psychical act1 not yet differentiated from a physical act1 implies an excitation and a motion4 ,in a creature of low type the touch of food excites prehension4 ,in a somewhat higher creature the odor from nutritive matter sets up motion of the body toward the matter4 ,and where rudimentary vision exists1 sudden obscuration of light1 implying the passage of something large1 causes convulsive muscular movements which mostly carry the body away from the source of danger4 ,in each of these cases we may distinguish four factors4 ,there is 7a7 that property of the external object which primarily affects the organism--the taste1 smell1 or opacity2 and connected with such property there is in the external object that character 7b7 which renders seizure of it1 or escape from it1 beneficial4 ,within the organism there is 7c7 the impression or sensation which the property 7a7 produces1 serving as stimulus2 and there is connected with it1 the motor change 7d7 by which seizure or escape is effected4 ,now ,psychology is chiefly concerned with the connection between the relation a b1 and the relation c d1 under all those forms which they assume in the course of evolution4 ,each of the factors1 and each of the relations1 grows more involved as organization advances4 ,instead of being single1 the identifying attribute a1 often becomes1 in the environment of a superior animal1 a cluster of attributes2 such as the size1 form1 colors1 motions1 displayed by a distant creature that is dangerous4 ,the factor b1 with which this combination of attributes is associated1 becomes the congeries of characters1 powers1 habits1 which constitute it an enemy4 ,of the subjective factors1 c becomes a complicated set of visual sensations co-ordinated with one another and with the ideas and feelings established by experience of such enemies1 and constituting the motive to escape2 while d becomes the intricate and often prolonged series of runs1 leaps1 doubles1 dives1 etc41 made in eluding the enemy4 ,in human life we find the same four outer and inner factors1 still more multiform and entangled in their compositions and connections4 ,the entire assemblage of physical attributes a1 presented by an estate that is advertised for sale1 passes enumeration2 and the assemblage of various utilities1 b1 going along with these attributes1 is also beyond brief specification4 ,the perceptions and ideas1 likes and dislikes1 c1 set up by the aspect of the estate1 and which1 compounded and recompounded1 eventually form the motive for buying it1 make a whole too large and complex for description2 and the transactions1 legal1 pecuniary1 and other1 gone through in making the purchase and taking possession1 are scarcely less numerous and elaborate4 ,nor must we overlook the fact that as evolution progresses1 not only do the factors increase in complexity1 but also the relations among them4 ,originally1 a is directly and simply connected with b1 while c is directly and simply connected with d4 ,but eventually1 the connections between a and b1 and between c and d1 become very indirect and involved4 ,on the one hand1 as the first illustration shows us1 sapidity and nutritiveness are closely bound together2 as are also the stimulation caused by the one and the contraction which utilizes the other4 ,but1 as we see in the last illustration1 the connection between the visible traits of an estate and those characters which constitute its value1 is at once remote and complicated2 while the transition from the purchaser's highly composite motive to the numerous actions of sensory and motor organs1 severally intricate1 which effect the purchase1 is through an entangled plexus of thoughts and feelings constituting his decision4 ,after this explanation will be apprehended a truth otherwise set forth in the ,principles of ,psychology4 ,mind consists of feelings and the relations among feelings4 ,by composition of the relations1 and ideas of relations1 intelligence arises4 ,by composition of the feelings1 and ideas of feelings1 emotion arises4 ,and1 other things equal1 the evolution of either is great in proportion as the composition is great4 ,one of the necessary implications is that cognition becomes higher in proportion as it is remoter from reflex action2 while emotion becomes higher in proportion as it is remoter from sensation4 ,and now of the various corollaries from this broad view of psychological evolution1 let us observe those which concern the motives and actions that are classed as moral and immoral4 #db4 ,the mental process by which1 in any case1 the adjustment of acts to ends is effected1 and which1 under its higher forms1 becomes the subject-matter of ethical judgments1 is1 as above implied1 divisible into the rise of a feeling or feelings constituting the motive1 and the thought or thoughts through which the motive is shaped and finally issues in action4 ,the first of these elements1 originally an excitement1 becomes a simple sensation2 then a compound sensation2 then a cluster of partially presentative and partially representative sensations1 forming an incipient emotion2 then a cluster of exclusively ideal or representative sensations1 forming an emotion proper2 then a cluster of such clusters1 forming a compound emotion2 and eventually becomes a still more involved emotion composed of the ideal forms of such compound emotions4 ,the other element1 beginning with that immediate passage of a single stimulus into a single motion1 called reflex action1 presently comes to be a set of associated discharges of stimuli producing associated motions1 constituting instinct4 ,step by step arise more entangled combinations of stimuli1 somewhat variable in their modes of union1 leading to complex motions similarly variable in their adjustments2 whence occasional hesitations in the sensori-motor processes4 ,presently is reached a stage at which the combined clusters of impressions1 not all present together1 issue in actions not all simultaneous2 implying representation of results1 or thought4 ,afterward follow stages in which various thoughts have time to pass before the composite motives produce the appropriate actions4 ,until at last arise those long deliberations during which the probabilities of various consequences are estimated1 and the promptings of the correlative feelings balanced1 constituting calm judgment4 ,that under either of its aspects the later forms of this mental process are the higher1 ethically considered as well as otherwise considered1 will be readily seen4 ,for from the first1 complication of sentiency has accompanied better and more numerous adjustments of acts to ends2 as also has complication of movement1 and complication of the co-ordinating or intellectual process uniting the two4 ,whence it follows that the acts characterized by the more complex motives and the more involved thoughts1 have all along been of higher authority for guidance4 ,some examples will make this clear4 ,here is an aquatic creature guided by the odor of organic matter toward things serving for food2 but a creature which1 lacking any other guidance1 is at the mercy of larger creatures coming near4 ,here is another which1 also guided to food by odor1 possesses rudimentary vision2 and so is made to start spasmodically away from a moving body which diffuses this odor1 in those cases where it is large enough to produce sudden obscuration of light--usually an enemy4 ,evidently life will frequently be saved by conforming to the later and higher stimulus1 instead of to the earlier and lower4 ,observe at a more advanced stage a parallel conflict4 ,this is a beast which pursues others for prey1 and1 either lacking experience or prompted by raging hunger1 attacks one more powerful than itself1 and gets destroyed4 ,conversely1 that is a beast which1 prompted by a hunger equally keen1 but either by individual experience or effects of inherited experience1 made conscious of evil by the aspect of one more powerful than itself1 is deterred from attacking1 and saves its life by subordinating the primary motive1 consisting of craving sensations1 to the secondary motive1 consisting of ideal feelings1 distinct or vague4 ,ascending at once from these examples of conduct in animals to examples of human conduct1 we shall see that the contrasts between inferior and superior have habitually the same traits4 ,the savage of lowest type devours all the food captured by to-day's chase1 and1 hungry on the morrow1 has perhaps for days to bear the pangs of starvation4 ,the superior savage1 conceiving more vividly the entailed sufferings if no game is to be found1 is deterred by his complex feeling from giving way entirely to his simple feeling4 ,similarly are the two contrasted in the inertness which goes along with lack of forethought1 and the activity which due forethought produces4 ,the primitive man1 idly inclined1 and ruled by the sensations of the moment1 will not exert himself until actual pains have to be escaped2 but the man somewhat advanced1 able more distinctly to imagine future gratifications and sufferings1 is prompted by the thought of these to overcome his love of ease3 decrease of misery and mortality resulting from this predominance of the representative feelings over the presentative feelings4 ,without dwelling on the fact that among the civilized1 those who lead the life of the senses are contrasted in the same way with those whose lives are largely occupied with pleasures not of a sensual kind1 let me point out that there are analogous contrasts between guidance by the less complex representative feelings1 or lower emotions1 and guidance by the more complex representative feelings1 or higher emotions4 ,when led by his acquisitiveness--a re-representative feeling which1 acting under due control1 conduces to welfare--the thief takes another man's property2 his act is determined by certain imagined proximate pleasures of relatively simple kinds1 rather than by less clearly imagined possible pains that are more remote and of relatively involved kinds4 ,but in the conscientious man1 there is an adequate restraining motive1 still more re-representative in its nature1 including not only ideas of punishment1 and not only ideas of lost reputation and ruin1 but including ideas of the claims of the person owning the property1 and of the pains which loss of it will entail on him3 all joined with a general aversion to acts injurious to others1 which arises from the inherited effects of experience4 ,and here at the end we see1 as we saw at the beginning1 that guidance by the more complex feeling1 on the average1 conduces to welfare more than does guidance by the simpler feeling4 ,the like holds with the intellectual co-ordinations through which stimuli issue in motions4 ,the lowest actions1 called reflex1 in which an impression made on an afferent nerve causes by discharge through an efferent nerve a contraction1 shows us a very limited adjustment of acts to ends3 the impression being simple1 and the resulting motion simple1 the internal co-ordination is also simple4 ,evidently when there are several senses which can be together affected by an outer object2 and when1 according as such object is discriminated as of one or other kind1 the movements made in response are combined in one or other way2 the intermediate co-ordinations are necessarily more involved4 ,and evidently each further step in the evolution of intelligence1 always instrumental to better self-preservation1 exhibits this same general trait4 ,the adjustments by which the more involved actions are made appropriate to the more involved circumstances1 imply more intricate1 and1 consequently1 more deliberate and conscious co-ordinations2 until1 when we come to civilized men1 who in their daily business1 taking into account many data and conditions1 adjust their proceedings to various consequences1 we see that the intellectual actions1 becoming of the kind we call judicial1 are at once very elaborate and very deliberate4 ,observe1 then1 what follows respecting the relative authorities of motives4 ,throughout the ascent from low creatures up to man1 and from the lowest types of man up to the highest1 self-preservation has been increased by the subordination of simple excitations to compound excitations--the subjection of immediate sensations to the ideas of sensations to come--the overruling of preservative feelings by representative feelings1 and of representative feelings by re-representative feelings4 ,as life has advanced1 the accompanying sentiency has become increasingly ideal2 and among feelings produced by the compounding of ideas1 the highest1 and those which have evolved latest1 are the re-compounded or doubly ideal4 ,hence it follows that as guides1 the feelings have authorities proportionate to the degrees in which they are removed by their complexity and their ideality from simple sensations and appetites4 ,a further implication is made clear by studying the intellectual sides of these mental processes by which acts are adjusted to ends4 ,where they are low and simple1 these comprehend the guiding only of immediate acts by immediate stimuli--the entire transaction in each case1 lasting but a moment1 refers only to a proximate result4 ,but with the development of intelligence1 and the growing ideality of the motives1 the ends to which the acts are adjusted cease to be exclusively immediate4 ,the more ideal motives concern ends that are more distant2 and with approach to the highest types1 present ends become increasingly subordinate to those future ends which the ideal motives have for their objects4 ,hence there arises a certain presumption in favor of a motive which refers to a remote good1 in comparison with one which refers to a proximate good4 #dc4 ,in the last chapter ,i hinted that besides the several influences there named as fostering the ascetic belief that doing things which are agreeable is detrimental while bearing disagreeable things is beneficial1 there remained to be named an influence of deeper origin4 ,this is shadowed forth in the foregoing paragraphs4 ,for the general truth that guidance by such simple pleasures and pains as result from fulfilling or denying bodily desires1 is1 under one aspect1 inferior to guidance by those pleasures and pains which the complex ideal feelings yield1 has led to the belief that the promptings of bodily desires should be disregarded4 ,further1 the general truth that pursuit of proximate satisfactions is1 under one aspect1 inferior to pursuit of ultimate satisfactions1 has led to the belief that proximate satisfactions must not be valued4 ,in the early stages of every science1 the generalizations reached are not qualified enough4 ,the discriminating statements of the truths formulated1 rise afterward1 by limitation of the undiscriminating statements4 ,as with bodily vision1 which at first appreciates only the broadest traits of objects1 and so leads to rude classings1 which developed vision1 impressible by minor differences1 has to correct1 so with mental vision in relation to general truths1 it happens that at first the inductions1 wrongly made all-embracing1 have to wait for scepticism and critical observation to restrict them1 by taking account of unnoticed differences4 ,hence1 we may expect to find the current ethical conclusions too sweeping4 ,let us note how1 in three ways1 these dominant beliefs1 alike of professed moralists and of people at large1 are made erroneous by lack of qualifications4 ,in the first place1 the authority of the lower feelings as guides is by no means always inferior to the authority of the higher feelings1 but is often superior4 ,daily occur occasions on which sensations must be obeyed rather than sentiments4 ,let any one think of sitting all night naked in a snow-storm1 or going a week without food1 or letting his head be held under water for ten minutes1 and he will see that the pleasures and pains directly related to maintenance of life may not be wholly subordinated to the pleasures and pains indirectly related to maintenance of life4 ,though in many cases guidance by the simple feelings rather than by the complex feelings is injurious1 in other cases guidance by the complex feelings rather than by the simple feelings is fatal2 and throughout a wide range of cases their relative authorities as guides are indeterminate4 ,grant that in a man pursued1 the protesting feelings accompanying intense and prolonged effort1 must1 to preserve life1 be overruled by the fear of his pursuers2 it may yet happen that1 persisting till he drops1 the resulting exhaustion causes death1 though1 the pursuit having been abandoned1 death would not otherwise have resulted4 ,grant that a widow left in poverty must deny her appetite that she may give enough food to her children to keep them alive2 yet the denial of her appetite pushed too far may leave them not only entirely without food but without guardianship4 ,grant that1 working his brain unceasingly from dawn till dark1 the man in pecuniary difficulties must disregard rebellious bodily sensations in obedience to the conscientious desire to liquidate the claims on him2 yet he may carry this subjection of simple feelings to complex feelings to the extent of shattering his health1 and failing in that end which1 with less of this subjection1 he might have achieved4 ,clearly1 then1 the subordination of lower feelings must be a conditional subordination4 ,the supremacy of higher feelings must be a qualified supremacy4 ,in another way does the generalization ordinarily made err by excess4 ,with the truth that life is high in proportion as the simple presentative feelings are under the control of the compound representative feelings1 it joins1 as though they were corollaries1 certain propositions which are not corollaries4 ,the current conception is1 not that the lower must yield to the higher when the two conflict1 but that the lower must be disregarded even when there is no conflict4 ,this tendency which the growth of moral ideas has generated1 to condemn obedience to inferior feelings when superior feelings protest1 has begotten a tendency to condemn inferior feelings considered intrinsically4 ,i really think she does things because she likes to do them1 once said to me one lady concerning another3 the form of expression and the manner both implying the belief not only that such behavior is wrong1 but also that every one must recognize it as wrong4 ,and there prevails widely a notion of this kind4 ,in practice1 indeed1 the notion is very generally inoperative4 ,though it prompts various incidental asceticisms1 as of those who think it alike manly and salutary to go without a great-coat in cold weather1 or to persevere through the winter in taking an out-of-door plunge1 yet1 generally1 the pleasurable feelings accompanying due fulfillment of bodily needs1 are accepted3 acceptance being1 indeed1 sufficiently peremptory4 ,but oblivious of these contradictions in their practice1 men commonly betray a vague idea that there is something degrading1 or injurious1 or both1 in doing that which is agreeable and avoiding that which is disagreeable4 ,pleasant but wrong1 is a phrase frequently used in a way implying that the two are naturally connected4 ,as above hinted1 however1 such beliefs result from a confused apprehension of the general truth that the more compound and representative feelings are1 on the average1 of higher authority than the simple and presentative feelings4 ,apprehended with discrimination1 this truth implies that the authority of the simple1 ordinarily less than that of the compound but occasionally greater1 is habitually to be accepted when the compound do not oppose4 ,in yet a third way is this principle of subordination misconceived4 ,one of the contrasts between the earlier evolved feelings and the later evolved feelings1 is that they refer respectively to the more immediate effects of actions and to the more remote effects2 and speaking generally1 guidance by that which is near is inferior to guidance by that which is distant4 ,hence has resulted the belief that1 irrespective of their kinds1 the pleasures of the present must be sacrificed to the pleasures of the future4 ,we see this in the maxim often impressed on children when eating their meals1 that they should reserve the nicest morsel till the last3 the check on improvident yielding to immediate impulse1 being here joined with the tacit teaching that the same gratification becomes more valuable as it becomes more distant4 ,such thinking is traceable throughout daily conduct2 by no means indeed in all1 but in those who are distinguished as prudent and well regulated in their conduct4 ,hurrying over his breakfast that he may catch the train1 snatching a sandwich in the middle of the day1 and eating a late dinner when he is so worn out that he is incapacitated for evening recreation1 the man of business pursues a life in which not only the satisfactions of bodily desires1 but also those of higher tastes and feelings1 are1 as far as may be1 disregarded1 that distant ends may be achieved2 and yet if you ask what are these distant ends1 you find 7in cases where there are no parental responsibilities7 that they are included under the conception of more comfortable living in time to come4 ,so ingrained is this belief that it is wrong to seek immediate enjoyments and right to seek remote ones only1 that you may hear from a busy man who has been on a pleasure excursion a kind of apology for his conduct4 ,he deprecates the unfavorable judgments of his friends by explaining that the state of his health had compelled him to take a holiday4 ,nevertheless1 if you sound him with respect to his future1 you find that his ambition is by-and-by to retire and devote himself wholly to the relaxations which he is now somewhat ashamed of taking4 ,the general truth disclosed by the study of evolving conduct1 sub-human and human1 that for the better preservation of life the primitive1 simple1 presentative feelings must be controlled by the later-evolved1 compound1 and representative feelings1 has thus come1 in the course of civilization1 to be recognized by men2 but necessarily at first in too indiscriminate a way4 ,the current conception1 while it errs by implying that the authority of the higher over the lower is unlimited1 errs also by implying that the rule of the lower must be resisted even when it does not conflict with the rule of the higher1 and further errs by implying that a gratification which forms a proper aim if it is remote1 forms an improper aim if it is proximate4 #dd4 ,without explicitly saying so1 we have been here tracing the genesis of the moral consciousness4 ,for unquestionably the essential trait in the moral consciousness is the control of some feeling or feelings by some other feeling or feelings4 ,among the higher animals we may see1 distinctly enough1 the conflict of feelings and the subjection of simpler to more compound2 as when a dog is restrained from snatching food by fear of the penalties which may come if he yields to his appetite2 or as when he desists from scratching at a hole lest he should lose his master1 who has walked on4 ,here1 however1 though there is subordination1 there is not conscious subordination--there is no introspection revealing the fact that one feeling has yielded to another4 ,so is it even with human beings when little developed mentally4 ,the pre-social man1 wandering about in families and ruled by such sensations and emotions as are caused by the circumstances of the moment1 though occasionally subject to conflicts of motives1 meets with comparatively few cases in which the advantage of postponing the immediate to the remote is forced on his attention2 nor has he the intelligence requisite for analyzing and generalizing such of these cases as occur4 ,only as social evolution renders the life more complex1 the restraints many and strong1 the evils of impulsive conduct marked1 and the comforts to be gained by providing for the future tolerably certain1 can there come experiences numerous enough to make familiar the benefit of subordinating the simpler feelings to the more complex ones4 ,only then1 too1 does there arise a sufficient intellectual power to make an induction from these experiences1 followed by a sufficient massing of individual inductions into a public and traditional induction impressed on each generation as it grows up4 ,and here we are introduced to certain facts of profound significance4 ,this conscious relinquishment of immediate and special good to gain distant and general good1 while it is a cardinal trait of the self-restraint called moral1 is also a cardinal trait of self-restraints other than those called moral--the restraints that originate from fear of the visible ruler1 of the invisible ruler1 and of society at large4 ,whenever the individual refrains from doing that which the passing desire prompts1 lest he should afterward suffer legal punishment1 or divine vengeance1 or public reprobation1 or all of them1 he surrenders the near and definite pleasure rather than risk the remote and greater1 though less definite1 pains1 which taking it may bring on him2 and1 conversely1 when he undergoes some present pain1 that he may reap some probable future pleasure1 political1 religious1 or social4 ,but though all these four kinds of internal control have the common character that the simpler and less ideal feelings are consciously overruled by the more complex and ideal feelings2 and though1 at first1 they are practically co-extensive and undistinguished1 yet1 in the course of social evolution1 they differentiate2 and1 eventually1 the moral control1 with its accompanying conceptions and sentiments1 emerges as independent4 ,let us glance at the leading aspects of the process4 ,while1 as in the rudest groups1 neither political nor religious rule exists1 the leading check to the immediate satisfaction of each desire as it arises1 is consciousness of the evils which the anger of fellow-savages may entail1 if satisfaction of the desire is obtained at their cost4 ,in this early stage the imagined pains which constitute the governing motive are those apt to be inflicted by beings of like nature1 undistinguished in power3 the political1 religious1 and social restraints are as yet represented only by this mutual dread of vengeance4 ,when special strength1 skill1 or courage1 makes one of them a leader in battle1 he necessarily inspires greater fear than any other1 and there comes to be a more decided check on such satisfactions of the desires as will injure or offend him4 ,gradually as1 by habitual warfare1 chieftainship is established1 the evils thought of as likely to arise from angering the chief1 not only by aggression upon him1 but by disobedience to him1 become distinguishable both from the smaller evils which other personal antagonisms cause1 and from the more diffused evils thought of as arising from social reprobation4 ,that is1 political control begins to differentiate from the more indefinite control of mutual dread4 ,meanwhile there has been developing the ghost theory4 ,in all but the rudest groups the double of a deceased man1 propitiated at death and afterward1 is conceived as able to injure the survivors4 ,consequently1 as fast as the ghost theory becomes established and definite1 there grows up another kind of check on immediate satisfaction of the desires--a check constituted by ideas of the evils which ghosts may inflict if offended2 and when political headship gets settled1 and the ghosts of dead chiefs1 thought of as more powerful and relentless than other ghosts1 are especially dreaded1 there begins to take shape the form of restraint distinguished as religious4 ,for a long time these three sets of restraints1 which their correlative sanctions1 though becoming separate in consciousness1 remain co-extensive1 and do so because they mostly refer to one end--success in war4 ,the duty of blood-revenge is insisted on even while yet nothing to be called social organization exists4 ,as the chief gains predominance1 the killing of enemies becomes a political duty2 and as the anger of the dead chief comes to be dreaded1 the killing of enemies becomes a religious duty4 ,loyalty to the ruler while he lives and after he dies is increasingly shown by holding life at his disposal for purposes of war4 ,the earliest enacted punishments are those for insubordination and for breaches of observances which express subordination--all of them militant in origin4 ,while the divine injunctions1 originally traditions of the dead king's will1 mainly refer to the destruction of peoples with whom he was at enmity1 and divine anger or approval are conceived as determined by the degrees in which subjection to him is shown1 directly by worship and indirectly by fulfilling these injunctions4 ,the ,fijian1 who is said on entering the other world to commend himself by narrating his successes in battle1 and who1 when alive1 is described as sometimes greatly distressed if he thinks he has not killed enemies enough to please his gods1 shows us the resulting ideas and feelings1 and reminds us of kindred ideas and feelings betrayed by ancient races4 ,to all which add that the control of social opinion1 besides being directly exercised1 as in the earliest stage1 by praise of the brave and blame of the cowardly1 comes to be indirectly exercised with a kindred general effect by applause of loyalty to the ruler and piety to the god4 ,so that the three differentiated forms of control which grow up along with militant organization and action1 while enforcing kindred restraints and incentives1 also enforce one another2 and their separate and joint disciplines have the common character that they involve the sacrifice of immediate special benefits to obtain more distant and general benefits4 ,at the same time there have been developing under the same three sanctions1 restraints and incentives of another order1 similarly characterized by subordination of the proximate to the remote4 ,joint aggressions upon men outside the society cannot prosper if there are many aggressions of man on man within the society4 ,war implies co-operation2 and co-operation is prevented by antagonisms among those who are to co-operate4 ,we saw that in the primitive ungoverned group1 the main check on immediate satisfaction of his desires by each man1 is the fear of other men's vengeance if they are injured by taking the satisfaction2 and through early stages of social development this dread of retaliation continues to be the chief motive to such forbearance as exists4 ,but though long after political authority has become established the taking of personal satisfaction for injuries persists1 the growth of political authority gradually checks it4 ,the fact that success in war is endangered if his followers fight among themselves1 forces itself on the attention of the ruler4 ,he has a strong motive for restraining quarrels1 and therefore for preventing the aggressions which cause quarrels2 and as his power becomes greater he forbids the aggressions and inflicts punishments for disobedience4 ,presently1 political restraints of this class1 like those of the preceding class1 are enforced by religious restraints4 ,the sagacious chief1 succeeding in war partly because he thus enforces order among his followers1 leaves behind him a tradition of the commands he habitually gave4 ,dread of his ghost tends to produce regard for these commands2 and they eventually acquire sacredness4 ,with further social evolution come1 in like manner1 further interdicts1 checking aggressions of less serious kinds2 until eventually there grows up a body of civil laws4 ,and then1 in the way shown1 arise beliefs concerning the divine disapproval of these minor1 as well as of the major1 civil offences3 ending1 occasionally1 in a set of religious injunctions harmonizing with1 and enforcing1 the political injunctions2 while simultaneously there develops1 as before1 a social sanction for these rules of internal conduct1 strengthening the political and religious sanctions4 ,but now observe that while these three controls1 political1 religious1 and social1 severally lead men to subordinate proximate satisfactions to remote satisfactions2 and while they are in this respect like the moral control1 which habitually requires the subjection of simple presentative feelings to complex representative feelings and postponement of present to future2 yet they do not constitute the moral control1 but are only preparatory to it--are controls within which the moral control evolves4 ,the command of the political ruler is at first obeyed1 not because of its perceived rectitude1 but simply because it is his command1 which there will be a penalty for disobeying4 ,the check is not a mental representation of the evil consequences which the forbidden act will1 in the nature of things1 cause3 but it is a mental representation of the factitious evil consequences4 ,down to our own time we trace in legal phrases1 the original doctrine that the aggression of one citizen on another is wrong1 and will be punished1 not so much because of the injury done him1 as because of the implied disregard of the king's will4 ,similarly1 the sinfulness of breaking a divine injunction was universally at one time1 and is still by many1 held to consist in the disobedience to ,god1 rather than in the deliberate entailing of injury2 and even now it is a common belief that acts are right only if performed in conscious fulfillment of the divine will3 nay1 are even wrong if otherwise performed4 ,the like holds1 too1 with that further control exercised by public opinion4 ,on listening to the remarks made respecting conformity to social rules1 it is noticeable that breach of them is condemned not so much because of any essential impropriety as because the world's authority is ignored4 ,how imperfectly the truly moral control is even now differentiated from these controls within which it has been evolving1 we see in the fact that the systems of morality criticized at the outset1 severally identify moral control with one or other of them4 ,for moralists of one class derive moral rules from the commands of a supreme political power4 ,those of another class recognize no other origin for them than the revealed divine will4 ,and though men who take social prescription for their guide do not formulate their doctrine1 yet the belief1 frequently betrayed1 that conduct which society permits is not blameworthy1 implies that there are those who think right and wrong can be made such by public opinion4 ,before taking a further step we must put together the results of this analysis4 ,the essential truths to be carried with us1 respecting these three forms of external control to which the social unit is subject1 are these3 ,first1 that they have evolved with the evolution of society1 as means to social self-preservation1 necessary under the conditions2 and that1 by implication1 they are in the main congruous with one another4 ,second1 that the correlative internal restraints generated in the social unit are representations of remote results which are incidental rather than necessary--a legal penalty1 a supernatural punishment1 a social reprobation4 ,third1 that these results1 simpler and more directly wrought by personal agencies1 can be more vividly conceived than can the results which1 in the course of things1 actions naturally entail2 and the conceptions of them are1 therefore1 more potent over undeveloped minds4 ,fourth1 that as with the restraints thus generated is always joined the thought of external coercion1 there arises the notion of obligation2 which so becomes habitually associated with the surrender of immediate special benefits for the sake of distant and general benefits4 ,fifth1 that the moral control corresponds in large measure with the three controls thus originating1 in respect of its injunctions2 and corresponds1 too1 in the general nature of the mental processes producing conformity to those injunctions2 but differs in their special nature4 #de4 ,for now we are prepared to see that the restraints1 properly distinguished as moral1 are unlike these restraints out of which they evolve1 and with which they are long confounded1 in this--they refer not to the extrinsic effects of actions but to their intrinsic effects4 ,the truly moral deterrent from murder is not constituted by a representation of hanging as a consequence1 or by a representation of tortures in hell as a consequence1 or by a representation of the horror and hatred excited in fellow men2 but by a representation of the necessary natural results1 the infliction of death-agony on the victim1 the destruction of all his possibilities of happiness1 the entailed sufferings to his belongings4 ,neither the thought of imprisonment1 nor of divine anger1 nor of social disgrace1 is that which constitutes the moral check on theft2 but the thought of injury to the person robbed1 joined with a vague consciousness of the general evils caused by disregard of proprietary rights4 ,those who reprobate the adulterer on moral grounds have their minds filled1 not with ideas of an action for damages1 or of future punishment following the breach of a commandment1 or of loss of reputation2 but they are occupied with ideas of unhappiness entailed on the aggrieved wife or husband1 the damaged lives of children1 and the diffused mischiefs which go along with disregard of the marriage tie4 ,conversely1 the man who is moved by a moral feeling to help another in difficulty1 does not picture to himself any reward here or hereafter2 but pictures only the better condition he is trying to bring about4 ,one who is morally prompted to fight against a social evil has neither material benefit nor popular applause before his mind1 but only the mischiefs he seeks to remove and the increased well-being which will follow their removal4 ,throughout1 then1 the moral motive differs from the motives it is associated with in this1 that instead of being constituted by representations of incidental1 collateral1 non-necessary consequences of acts1 it is constituted by representations of consequences which the acts naturally produce4 ,these representations are not all distinct1 though some of such are usually present2 but they form an assemblage of indistinct representations accumulated by experience of the results of like acts in the life of the individual1 superposed on a still more indistinct but voluminous consciousness due to the inherited effects of such experiences in progenitors1 forming a feeling that is at once massive and vague4 ,and now we see why the moral feelings and correlative restraints have arisen later than the feelings and restraints that originate from political1 religious1 and social authorities1 and have so slowly1 and even yet so incompletely1 disentangled themselves4 ,for only by these lower feelings and restraints could be maintained the conditions under which the higher feelings and restraints evolve4 ,it is thus alike with the self-regarding feelings and with the other-regarding feelings4 ,the pains which improvidence will bring1 and the pleasures to be gained by storing up things for future use1 and by laboring to get such things1 can be habitually contrasted in thought1 only as fast as settled social arrangements make accumulation possible2 and that there may arise such settled arrangements1 fear of the seen ruler1 of the unseen ruler1 and of public opinion1 must come into play4 ,only after political1 religious and social restraints have produced a stable community can there be sufficient experience of the pains1 positive and negative1 sensational and emotional1 which crimes of aggression cause1 as to generate that moral aversion to them constituted by consciousness of their intrinsically evil results4 ,and more manifest still is it that such a moral sentiment as that of abstract equity1 which is offended not only by material injuries done to men1 but also by political arrangements that place them at a disadvantage1 can evolve only after the social stage reached gives familiar experience1 both of the pains flowing directly from injustices1 and also of those flowing indirectly from the class privileges which make injustices easy4 ,that the feelings called moral have the nature and origin alleged is further shown by the fact that we associate the name with them in proportion to the degree in which they have these characters--firstly1 of being re-representative2 secondly1 of being concerned with indirect rather than with direct effects1 and generally with remote rather than immediate2 and thirdly1 of referring to effects that are mostly general rather than special4 ,thus1 though we condemn one man for extravagance and approve the economy shown by another man1 we do not class their acts as respectively vicious and virtuous4 ,these words are too strong2 the present and future results here differ too little in concreteness and ideality to make the words fully applicable4 ,suppose1 however1 that the extravagance necessarily brings distress on wife and children--brings pains diffused over the lives of others as well as of self1 and the viciousness of the extravagance becomes clear4 ,suppose1 further1 that prompted by the wish to relieve his family from the misery he has brought on them1 the spendthrift forges a bill or commits some other fraud4 ,though1 estimated apart1 we characterize his overruling emotion as moral1 and make allowance for him in consideration of it1 yet his action1 taken as a whole1 we condemn as immoral3 we regard as of superior authority the feelings which respond to men's proprietary claims--feelings which are re-representative in a higher degree and refer to more remote diffused consequences4 ,the difference1 habitually recognized1 between the relative elevations of justice and generosity1 well illustrates this truth4 ,the motive causing a generous act has reference to effects of a more concrete1 special1 and proximate kind than has the motive to do justice1 which1 beyond the proximate effects1 usually themselves less concrete than those that generosity contemplates1 includes a consciousness of the distant1 involved1 diffused effects of maintaining equitable relations4 ,and justice we hold to be higher generosity4 ,comprehension of this long argument will be aided by here quoting a further passage from the before-named letter to ,mr4 ,mill1 following the passage already quoted from it4 ,to make any position fully understood1 it seems needful to add that1 corresponding to the fundamental propositions of a developed ,moral ,science1 there have been1 and still are1 developing in the race1 certain fundamental moral intuitions2 and that1 though these moral intuitions are the results of accumulated experiences of ,utility1 gradually organized and inherited1 they have come to be quite independent of conscious experience4 ,just in the same way that ,i believe the intuition of space1 possessed by any living individual1 to have arisen from organized and consolidated experiences of all antecedent individuals who bequeathed to him their slowly developed nervous organizations--just as ,i believe that this intuition1 requiring only to be made definite and complete by personal experiences1 has practically become a form of thought1 apparently quite independent of experience2 so do ,i believe that the experiences of utility organized and consolidated through all past generations of the human race1 have been producing corresponding nervous modifications1 which1 by continued transmission and accumulation1 have become in us certain faculties of moral intuition--certain emotions responding to right and wrong conduct1 which have no apparent basis in the individual experiences of utility4 ,i also hold that just as the space intuition responds to the exact demonstrations of ,geometry1 and has its rough conclusions interpreted and verified by them2 so will moral intuitions respond to the demonstrations of ,moral ,science1 and will have their rough conclusions interpreted and verified by them4 ,to this1 in passing1 ,i will add only that the evolution-hypothesis thus enables us to reconcile opposed moral theories1 as it enables us to reconcile opposed theories of knowledge4 ,for as the doctrine of innate forms of intellectual intuition falls into harmony with the experiential doctrine1 when we recognize the production of intellectual faculties by inheritance of effects wrought by experience2 so the doctrine of innate powers of moral perception becomes congruous with the utilitarian doctrine1 when it is seen that preferences and aversions are rendered organic by inheritance of the effects of pleasurable and painful experiences in progenitors4 #df4 ,one further question has to be answered--,how does there arise the feeling of moral obligation in general8 ,whence comes the sentiment of duty1 considered as distinct from the several sentiments which prompt temperance1 providence1 kindness1 justice1 truthfulness1 etc48 ,the answer is that it is an abstract sentiment generated in a manner analogous to that in which abstract ideas are generated4 ,the idea of each color had originally entire concreteness given to it by an object possessing the color2 as some of the unmodified names1 such as orange and violet1 show us4 ,the dissociation of each color from the object specially associated with it in thought at the outset1 went on as fast as the color came to be associated in thought with objects unlike the first1 and unlike one another4 ,the idea of orange was conceived in the abstract more fully in proportion as the various orange-colored objects remembered1 cancelled one another's diverse attributes1 and left outstanding their common attribute4 ,so is it if we ascend a stage and note how there arises the abstract idea of color apart from particular colors4 ,were all things red the conception of color in the abstract could not exist4 ,imagine that every object was either red or green1 and it is manifest that the mental habit would be to think of one or other of these two colors in connection with anything named4 ,but multiply the colors so that thought rambles undecidedly among the ideas of them that occur along with any object named1 and there results the notion of indeterminate color--the common property which objects possess of affecting us by light from their surfaces1 as well as by their forms4 ,for evidently the notion of this common property is that which remains constant while imagination is picturing every possible variety of color4 ,it is the uniform trait in all colored things2 that is--color in the abstract4 ,words referring to quantity furnish cases of more marked dissociation of abstract from concrete4 ,grouping various things as small in comparison either with those of their kind or with those of other kinds1 and similarly grouping some objects as comparatively great1 we get the opposite abstract notions of smallness and greatness4 ,applied as these are to innumerable very diverse things--not objects only1 but forces1 times1 numbers1 values--they have become so little connected with concretes1 that their abstract meanings are very vague4 ,further1 we must note that an abstract idea thus formed often acquires an illusive independence2 as we may perceive in the case of motion1 which1 dissociated in thought from all particular bodies and velocities and directions1 is sometimes referred to as though it could be conceived apart from something moving4 ,now all this holds of the subjective as well as of the objective2 and among other states of consciousness1 holds of the emotions as known by introspection4 ,by the grouping of those re-representative feelings above described1 which1 differing among themselves in other respects1 have a component in common1 and by the consequent mutual cancelling of their diverse components1 this common component is made relatively appreciable1 and becomes an abstract feeling4 ,thus is produced the sentiment of moral obligation or duty4 ,let us observe its genesis4 ,we have seen that during the progress of animate existence1 the later evolved1 more compound and more representative feelings1 serving to adjust the conduct to more distant and general needs1 have all along had an authority as guides superior to that of the earlier and simpler feelings--excluding cases in which these last are intense4 ,this superior authority1 unrecognizable by lower types of creatures which cannot generalize1 and little recognizable by primitive men who have but feeble powers of generalization1 has become distinctly recognized as civilization and accompanying mental development have gone on4 ,accumulated experiences have produced the consciousness that guidance by feelings which refer to remote and general results is usually more conducive to welfare than guidance by feelings to be immediately gratified4 ,for what is the common character of the feelings that prompt honesty1 truthfulness1 diligence1 providence1 etc41 which men habitually find to be better prompters than the appetites and simple impulses8 ,they are all complex1 re-representative feelings1 occupied with the future rather than the present4 ,the idea of authoritativeness has1 therefore1 come to be connected with feelings having these traits3 the implication being that the lower and simpler feelings are without authority4 ,and this idea of authoritativeness is one element in the abstract consciousness of duty4 ,but there is another element--the element of coerciveness4 ,this originates from experience of those several forms of restraint that have1 as above described1 established themselves in the course of civilization--the political1 religious1 and social4 ,to the effects of punishments inflicted by law and public opinion on conduct of certain kinds1 ,dr4 ,bain ascribes the feeling of moral obligation4 ,and ,i agree with him to the extent of thinking that by them is generated the sense of compulsion which the consciousness of duty includes1 and which the word obligation indicates4 ,the existence of an earlier and deeper element1 generated as above described1 is1 however1 ,i think1 implied by the fact that certain of the higher self-regarding feelings1 instigating prudence and economy1 have a moral authority in opposition to the simpler self-regarding feelings3 showing that apart from any thought of factitious penalties on improvidence1 the feeling constituted by representation of the natural penalties has acquired an acknowledged superiority4 ,but accepting in the main the view that fears of the political and social penalties 7to which1 ,i think1 the religious must be added7 have generated that sense of coerciveness which goes along with the thought of postponing present to future and personal desires to the claims of others1 it here chiefly concerns us to note that this sense of coerciveness becomes indirectly connected with the feelings distinguished as moral4 ,for since the political1 religious and social restraining motives1 are mainly formed of represented future results2 and since the moral restraining motive is mainly formed of represented future results2 it happens that the representations1 having much in common1 and being often aroused at the same time1 the fear joined with three sets of them becomes1 by association1 joined with the fourth4 ,thinking of the extrinsic effects of a forbidden act1 excites a dread which continues present while the intrinsic effects of the act are thought of2 and being thus linked with these intrinsic effects causes a vague sense of moral compulsion4 ,emerging as the moral motive does but slowly from amidst the political1 religious and social motives it long participates in that consciousness of subordination to some external agency which is joined with them2 and only as it becomes distinct and predominant does it lose this associated consciousness--only then does the feeling of obligation fade4 ,this remark implies the tacit conclusion1 which will be to most very startling1 that the sense of duty or moral obligation is transitory1 and will diminish as fast as moralization increases4 ,startling though it is1 this conclusion may be satisfactorily defended4 ,even now progress toward the implied ultimate state is traceable4 ,the observation is not infrequent that persistence in performing a duty ends in making it a pleasure2 and this amounts to the admission that while at first the motive contains an element of coercion1 at last this element of coercion dies out1 and the act is performed without any consciousness of being obliged to perform it4 ,the contrast between the youth on whom diligence is enjoined1 and the man of business so absorbed in affairs that he cannot be induced to relax1 shows us how the doing of work1 originally under the consciousness that it ought to be done1 may eventually cease to have any such accompanying consciousness4 ,sometimes1 indeed1 the relation comes to be reversed2 and the man of business persists in work from pure love of it when told that he ought not4 ,nor is it thus with self-regarding feelings only4 ,that the maintaining and protecting of wife by husband often result solely from feelings directly gratified by these actions1 without any thought of must2 and that the fostering of children by parents is in many cases made an absorbing occupation without any coercive feeling of ought2 are obvious truths which show us that even now1 with some of the fundamental other-regarding duties1 the sense of obligation has retreated into the background of the mind4 ,and it is in some degree so with other-regarding duties of a higher kind4 ,conscientiousness has in many outgrown that stage in which the sense of a compelling power is joined with rectitude of action4 ,the truly honest man1 here and there to be found1 is not only without thought of legal1 religious1 or social compulsion1 when he discharges an equitable claim on him1 but he is without thought of self-compulsion4 ,he does the right thing with a simple feeling of satisfaction in doing it2 and is1 indeed1 impatient if anything prevents him from having the satisfaction of doing it4 ,evidently1 then1 with complete adaptation to the social state1 that element in the moral consciousness which is expressed by the word obligation1 will disappear4 ,the higher actions required for the harmonious carrying on of life will be as much matters of course as are those lower actions which the simple desires prompt4 ,in their proper times and places and proportions1 the moral sentiments will guide men just as spontaneously and adequately as now do the sensations4 ,and though1 joined with their regulating influence when this is called for1 will exist latent ideas of the evils which nonconformity would bring2 these will occupy the mind no more than do ideas of the evils of starvation at the time when a healthy appetite is being satisfied by a meal4 #dg4 ,this elaborate exposition1 which the extreme complexity of the subject has necessitated1 may have its leading ideas restated thus3 ,symbolizing by a and b1 related phenomena in the environment1 which in some way concern the welfare of the organism2 and symbolizing by c and d1 the impressions1 simple or compound1 which the organism receives from the one1 and the motions1 single or combined1 by which its acts are adapted to meet the other2 we saw that psychology in general is concerned with the connection between the relation a b and the relation c d4 ,further1 we saw that by implication the psychological aspect of ,ethics1 is that aspect under which the adjustment of c d to a b1 appears1 not as an intellectual co-ordination simply1 but as a co-ordination in which pleasures and pains are alike factors and results4 ,it was shown that throughout ,evolution1 motive and act become more complex1 as the adaptation of inner related actions to outer related actions extends in range and variety4 ,whence followed the corollary that the later evolved feelings1 more representative and re-representative in their constitution1 and referring to remoter and wider needs1 have1 on the average1 an authority as guides greater than have the earlier and simpler feelings4 ,after thus observing that even an inferior creature is ruled by a hierarchy of feelings so constituted that general welfare depends on a certain subordination of lower to higher1 we saw that in man1 as he passes into the social state1 there arises the need for sundry additional subordinations of lower to higher3 co-operation being made possible only by them4 ,to the restraints constituted by mental representations of the intrinsic effects of actions1 which1 in their simpler forms1 have been evolving from the beginning1 are added the restraints caused by mental representations of extrinsic effects1 in the shape of political1 religious1 and social penalties4 ,with the evolution of society1 made possible by institutions maintaining order1 and associating in men's minds the sense of obligation with prescribed acts and with desistances from forbidden acts1 there arose opportunities for seeing the bad consequences naturally flowing from the conduct interdicted and the good consequences from the conduct required4 ,hence eventually grew up moral aversions and approvals3 experience of the intrinsic effects necessarily here coming later than experience of the extrinsic effects1 and therefore producing its results later4 ,the thoughts and feelings constituting these moral aversions and approvals1 being all along closely connected with the thoughts and feelings constituting fears of political1 religious1 and social penalties1 necessarily came to participate in the accompanying sense of obligation4 ,the coercive element in the consciousness of duties at large1 evolved by converse with external agencies which enforce duties1 diffused itself by association through that consciousness of duty1 properly called moral1 which is occupied with intrinsic results instead of extrinsic results4 ,but this self-compulsion1 which at a relatively high stage becomes more and more a substitute for compulsion from without1 must itself1 at a still higher stage1 practically disappear4 ,if some action to which the special motive is insufficient1 is performed in obedience to the feeling of moral obligation1 the fact proves that the special faculty concerned is not yet equal to its function--has not acquired such strength that the required activity has become its normal activity1 yielding its due amount of pleasure4 ,with complete evolution then1 the sense of obligation1 not ordinarily present in consciousness1 will be awakened only on those extraordinary occasions that prompt breach of the laws otherwise spontaneously conformed to4 ,and this brings us to the psychological aspect of that conclusion which1 in the last chapter1 was reached under its biological aspect4 ,the pleasures and pains which the moral sentiments originate will1 like bodily pleasures and pains1 become incentives and deterrents so adjusted in their strengths to the needs that the moral conduct will be the natural conduct4 ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,,the ,,sociological ,,view4 #dh4 ,not for the human race only1 but for every race1 there are laws of right living4 ,given its environment and its structure1 and there is for each kind of creature a set of actions adapted in their kinds1 amounts1 and combinations1 to secure the highest conservation its nature permits4 ,the animal1 like the man1 has needs for food1 warmth1 activity1 rest1 and so forth1 which must be fulfilled in certain relative degrees to make its life whole4 ,maintenance of its race implies satisfaction of special desires1 sexual and philoprogenitive1 in due proportions4 ,hence there is a supposable formula for the activities of each species1 which1 could it be drawn out1 would constitute a system of morality for that species4 ,but such a system of morality would have little or no reference to the welfare of others than self and offspring4 ,indifferent to individuals of its own kind1 as an inferior creature is1 and habitually hostile to individuals of other kinds1 the formula for its life could take no cognizance of the lives of those with which it came in contact2 or rather1 such formula would imply that maintenance of its life was at variance with maintenance of their lives4 ,but on ascending from beings of lower kinds to the highest kind of being1 man2 or1 more strictly1 on ascending from man in his pre-social stage to man in his social stage1 the formula has to include an additional factor4 ,though not peculiar to human life under its developed form1 the presence of this factor is still1 in the highest degree1 characteristic of it4 ,though there are inferior species displaying considerable degrees of sociality1 and1 though1 the formulas for their complete lives would have to take account of the relations arising from union1 yet our own species is1 on the whole1 to be distinguished as having a formula for complete life which specially recognizes the relations of each individual to others1 in presence of whom1 and in co-operation with whom1 he has to live4 ,this additional factor in the problem of complete living is1 indeed1 so important that the necessitated modifications of conduct have come to form a chief part of the code of conduct4 ,because the inherited desires which directly refer to the maintenance of individual life are fairly adjusted to the requirements1 there has been no need to insist on that conformity to them which furthers self-conversation4 ,conversely1 because these desires prompt activities that often conflict with the activities of others2 and because the sentiments responding to other's claims are relatively weak1 moral codes emphasize those restraints on conduct which the presence of fellow men entails4 ,from the sociological point of view1 then1 ,ethics becomes nothing else than a definite account of the forms of conduct that are fitted to the associated state1 in such wise that the lives of each and all may be the greatest possible1 alike in length and breadth4 #di4 ,but here we are met by a fact which forbids us thus to put in the foreground the welfares of citizens1 individually considered1 and requires us to put in the foreground the welfare of the society as a whole4 ,the life of the social organism must1 as an end1 rank above the lives of its units4 ,these two ends are not harmonious at the outset2 and1 though the tendency is toward harmonization of them1 they are still partially conflicting4 ,as fast as the social state establishes itself1 the preservation of the society becomes a means of preserving its units4 ,living together arose because1 on the average1 it proved more advantageous to each than living apart2 and this implies that maintenance of combination is maintenance of the conditions to more satisfactory living than the combined persons would otherwise have4 ,hence1 social self-preservation becomes a proximate aim taking precedence of the ultimate aim1 individual self-preservation4 ,this subordination of personal to social welfare is1 however1 contingent3 it depends on the presence of antagonistic societies4 ,so long as the existence of a community is endangered by the actions of communities around1 it must remain true that the interests of individuals must be sacrificed to the interests of the community1 as far as is needful for the community's salvation4 ,but if this is manifest1 it is1 by implication1 manifest1 that when social antagonisms cease1 this need for sacrifice of private claims to public claims ceases also2 or rather1 there cease to be any public claims at variance with private claims4 ,all along1 furtherance of individual lives has been the ultimate end2 and1 if this ultimate end has been postponed to the proximate end of preserving the community's life1 it has been so only because this proximate end was instrumental to the ultimate end4 ,when the aggregate is no longer in danger1 the final object of pursuit1 the welfare of the units1 no longer needing to be postponed1 becomes the immediate object of pursuit4 ,consequently1 unlike sets of conclusions respecting human conduct emerge1 according as we are concerned with a state of habitual or occasional war1 or are concerned with a state of permanent and general peace4 ,let us glance at these alternative states and the alternative implications4 #ej4 ,at present the individual man has to carry on his life with due regard to the lives of others belonging to the same society2 while he is sometimes called on to be regardless of the lives of those belonging to other societies4 ,the same mental constitution1 having to fulfill both these requirements1 is necessarily incongruous2 and the correlative conduct1 adjusted first to the one need and then to the other1 cannot be brought within any consistent ethical system4 ,hate and destroy your fellow-man is now the command2 and then the command is1 love and aid your fellow-man4 ,use every means to deceive1 says the one code of conduct2 while the other code says1 be truthful in word and deed4 ,seize what property you can and burn all you cannot take away1 are injunctions which the religion of enmity countenances2 while by the religion of amity1 theft and arson are condemned as crimes4 ,and as conduct has to be made up of parts thus at variance with one another1 the theory of conduct remains confused4 ,there co-exists a kindred irreconcilability between the sentiments answering to the forms of co-operation required for militancy and industrialism respectively4 ,while social antagonisms are habitual1 and while1 for efficient action against other societies1 there needs great subordination to men who command1 the virtue of loyalty and the duty of implicit obedience have to be insisted on2 disregard of the ruler's will is punished with death4 ,but when war ceases to be chronic1 and growing industrialism habituates men to maintaining their own claims while respecting the claims of others1 loyalty becomes less profound1 the authority of the ruler is questioned or denied in respect of various private actions and beliefs4 ,state dictation is in many directions successfully defied1 and the political independence of the citizen comes to be regarded as a claim which it is virtuous to maintain and vicious to yield up4 ,necessarily during the transition1 these opposite sentiments are incongruously mingled4 ,so is it1 too1 with domestic institutions under the two rgimes4 ,while the first is dominant1 ownership of a slave is honorable1 and in the slave submission is praiseworthy2 but as the last grows dominant1 slave-owning becomes a crime and servile obedience excites contempt4 ,nor is it otherwise in the family4 ,the subjection of women to men1 complete while war is habitual but qualified as fast as peaceful occupations replace it1 comes eventually to be thought wrong1 and equality before the law is asserted4 ,at the same time the opinion concerning paternal power changes4 ,the once unquestioned right of the father to take his children's lives is denied1 and the duty of absolute submission to him1 long insisted on1 is changed into the duty of obedience within reasonable limits4 ,were the ratio between the life of antagonism with alien societies1 and the life of peaceful co-operation within each society1 a constant ratio1 some permanent compromise between the conflicting rules of conduct appropriate to the two lives might be reached4 ,but since this ratio is a variable one1 the compromise can never be more than temporary4 ,ever the tendency is toward congruity between beliefs and requirements4 ,either the social arrangements are gradually changed until they come into harmony with prevailing ideas and sentiments2 or1 if surrounding conditions prevent change in the social arrangements1 the necessitated habits of life modify the prevailing ideas and sentiments to the requisite extent4 ,hence1 for each kind and degree of social evolution determined by external conflict and internal friendship1 there is an appropriate compromise between the moral code of enmity and the moral code of amity3 not1 indeed1 a definable1 consistent compromise1 but a compromise fairly well understood4 ,this compromise1 vague1 ambiguous1 illogical1 though it may be1 is nevertheless for the time being authoritative4 ,for if1 as above shown1 the welfare of the society must take precedence of the welfares of its component individuals1 during those stages in which the individuals have to preserve themselves by preserving their society1 then such temporary compromise between the two codes of conduct as duly regards external defense1 while favoring internal co-operation to the greatest extent practicable1 subserves the maintenance of life in the highest degree2 and thus gains the ultimate sanction4 ,so that the perplexed and inconsistent moralities of which each society and each age shows us a more or less different one1 are severally justified as being approximately the best under the circumstances4 ,but such moralities are1 by their definitions1 shown to belong to incomplete conduct2 not to conduct that is fully evolved4 ,we saw that the adjustments of acts to ends which1 while constituting the external manifestations of life1 conduce to the continuance of life1 have been rising to a certain ideal form now approached by the civilized man4 ,but this form is not reached so long as there continue aggressions of one society upon another4 ,whether the hinderances to complete living result from the trespasses of fellow-citizens1 or from the trespasses of aliens1 matters not2 if they occur there does not yet exist the state defined4 ,the limit to the evolution of conduct is arrived at by members of each society only when1 being arrived at by members of other societies also1 the causes of international antagonism end simultaneously with the causes of antagonism between individuals4 ,and now having from the sociological point of view recognized the need for1 and authority of1 these changing systems of ethics1 proper to changing ratios between warlike activities and peaceful activities1 we have1 from the same point of view1 to consider the system of ethics proper to the state in which peaceful activities are undisturbed4 #ea4 ,if1 excluding all thought of danger or hinderances from causes external to a society1 we set ourselves to specify those conditions under which the life of each person1 and therefore of the aggregate1 may be the greatest possible1 we come upon certain simple ones which1 as here stated1 assume the form of truisms4 ,for1 as we have seen1 the definition of that highest life accompanying completely evolved conduct1 itself excludes all acts of aggression--not only murder1 assault1 robbery1 and the major offences generally1 but minor offences1 such as libel1 injury to property and so forth4 ,while directly deducting from individual life1 these indirectly cause perturbations of social life4 ,trespasses against others rouse antagonisms in them2 and if these are numerous the group loses coherence4 ,hence1 whether the integrity of the group itself is considered as the end1 or whether the end considered is the benefit ultimately secured to its units by maintaining its integrity1 or whether the immediate benefit of its units taken separately is considered the end1 the implication is the same3 such acts are at variance with achievement of the end4 ,that these inferences are self-evident and trite 7as indeed the first inferences drawn from the data of every science that reaches the deductive stage naturally are7 must not make us pass lightly over the all-important fact that1 from the sociological point of view1 the leading moral laws are seen to follow as corollaries from the definition of complete life carried on under social conditions4 ,respect for these primary moral laws is not enough1 however4 ,associated men pursuing their several lives without injuring one another but without helping one another1 reap no advantages from association beyond those of companionship4 ,if1 while there is no co-operation for defensive purposes 7which is here excluded by the hypothesis7 there is also no co-operation for satisfying wants1 the social state loses its raison d'tre--almost1 if not entirely4 ,there are1 indeed1 people who live in a condition little removed from this3 as the ,esquimaux4 ,but though these1 exhibiting none of the co-operation necessitated by war1 which is unknown to them1 lead lives such that each family is substantially independent of others1 occasional co-operation occurs4 ,and1 indeed1 that families should live in company without ever yielding mutual aid1 is scarcely conceivable4 ,nevertheless1 whether actually existing or only approached1 we must here recognize as hypothetically possible a state in which these primary moral laws are conformed to2 for the purpose of observing1 in their uncomplicated forms1 what are the negative conditions to harmonious social life4 ,whether the members of a social group do or do not co-operate1 certain limitations to their individual activities are necessitated by their association2 and1 after recognizing these as arising in the absence of co-operation1 we shall be the better prepared to understand how conformity to them is effected when co-operation begins4 #eb4 ,for whether men live together in quite independent ways1 careful only to avoid aggressing2 or whether1 advancing from passive association to active association1 they co-operate1 their conduct must be such that the achievement of ends by each shall at least not be hindered4 ,and it becomes obvious that when they co-operate there must not only be no resulting hinderance but there must be facilitation2 since1 in the absence of facilitation1 there can be no motive to co-operate4 ,what shape1 then1 must the mutual restraints take when co-operation begins8 or rather--,what1 in addition to the primary mutual restraints already specified1 are those secondary mutual restraints required to make co-operation possible8 ,one who1 living in an isolated way1 expends effort in pursuit of an end1 gets compensation for the effort by securing the end1 and so achieves satisfaction4 ,if he expends the effort without achieving the end there results dissatisfaction4 ,the satisfaction and the dissatisfaction are measures of success and failure in life-sustaining acts2 since that which is achieved by effort is something which directly or indirectly furthers life1 and so pays for the cost of the effort2 while if the effort fails there is nothing to pay for the cost of it1 and so much life is wasted4 ,what must result from this when men's efforts are joined8 ,the reply will be made clearer if we take the successive forms of co-operation in the order of ascending complexity4 ,we may distinguish as homogeneous co-operation 7#a7 that in which like efforts are joined for like ends that are simultaneously enjoyed4 ,as co-operation that is not completely homogeneous we may distinguish 7#b7 that in which like efforts are joined for like ends that are not simultaneously enjoyed4 ,a co-operation of which the heterogeneity is more distinct is 7#c7 that in which unlike efforts are joined for like ends4 ,and lastly comes the decidedly heterogeneous co-operation 7#d7 that in which unlike efforts are joined for unlike ends4 ,the simplest and earliest of these in which men's powers1 similar in kind and degree1 are united in pursuit of a benefit which1 when obtained1 they all participate in1 is most familiarly exemplified in the catching of game by primitive men3 this simplest and earliest form of industrial co-operation being also that which is least differentiated from militant co-operation2 for the co-operators are the same1 and the processes1 both destructive of life1 are carried on in analogous ways4 ,the condition under which such co-operation may be successfully carried on is that the co-operators shall share alike in the produce4 ,each thus being enabled to repay himself in food for the expended effort1 and being further enabled to achieve other such desired ends as maintenance of family1 obtains satisfaction3 there is no aggression of one on another1 and the co-operation is harmonious4 ,of course the divided produce can be but roughly proportioned to the several efforts joined in obtaining it1 but there is actually among savages1 as we see that for harmonious co-operation there must be1 a recognition of the principle that efforts when combined shall severally bring equivalent benefits1 as they would do if they were separate4 ,moreover1 beyond the taking equal shares in return for labors that are approximately equal1 there is generally an attempt at proportioning benefit to achievement1 by assigning something extra1 in the shape of the best part or the trophy1 to the actual slayer of the game4 ,and obviously1 if there is a wide departure from this system of sharing benefits when there has been a sharing of efforts1 the co-operation will cease4 ,individual hunters will prefer to do the best they can for themselves separately4 ,passing from this simplest case of co-operation to a case not quite so simple--a case in which the homogeneity is incomplete--let us ask how a member of the group may be led without dissatisfaction to expend effort in achieving a benefit which1 when achieved1 is enjoyed exclusively by another8 ,clearly he may do this on condition that the other shall afterward expend a like effort1 the beneficial result of which shall be similarly rendered up by him in return4 ,this exchange of equivalents of effort is the form which social co-operation takes while yet there is little or no division of labor1 save that between the sexes4 ,for example1 the ,bodo and ,dhimals mutually assist each other for the nonce1 as well in constructing their houses as in clearing their plots for cultivation4 ,and this principle--,i will help you if you will help me--common in simple communities where the occupations are alike in kind1 and occasionally acted upon in more advanced communities1 is one under which the relation between effort and benefit1 no longer directly maintained1 is maintained indirectly4 ,for whereas when men's activities are carried on separately1 or are joined in the way exemplified above1 effort is immediately paid for by benefit1 in this form of co-operation the benefit achieved by effort is exchanged for a like benefit to be afterward received when asked for4 ,and in this case as in the preceding case1 co-operation can be maintained only by fulfillment of the tacit agreements4 ,for if they are habitually not fulfilled1 there will commonly be refusal to give aid when asked2 and each man will be left to do the best he can by himself4 ,all those advantages to be gained by union of efforts in doing things that are beyond the powers of the single individual1 will be unachievable4 ,at the outset1 then1 fulfillment of contracts that are implied if not expressed1 becomes a condition to social co-operation1 and therefore to social development4 ,from these simple forms of co-operation in which the labors men carry on are of like kinds1 let us turn to the more complex forms in which they carry on labors of unlike kinds4 ,where men mutually aid in building huts or felling trees1 the number of days' work now given by one to another is readily balanced by an equal number of days' work afterward given by the other to him4 ,and no estimation of the relative values of the labors being required1 a definite understanding is little needed4 ,but when division of labor arises--when there come transactions between one who makes weapons and another who dresses skins for clothing1 or between a grower of roots and a catcher of fish--neither the relative amounts nor the relative qualities of their labors admit of easy measure2 and with the multiplication of businesses1 implying numerous kinds of skill and power1 there ceases to be anything like manifest equivalence between either the bodily and mental efforts set against one another1 or between their products4 ,hence the arrangement cannot now be taken for granted1 as while the things exchanged are like in kind3 it has to be stated4 ,if ,a allows ,b to appropriate a product of his special skill1 on condition that he is allowed to appropriate a different product of ,b's special skill1 it results that as equivalence of the two products cannot be determined by direct comparison of their quantities and qualities1 there must be a distinct understanding as to how much of the one may be taken in consideration of so much of the other4 ,only under voluntary agreement1 then1 no longer tacit and vague1 but overt and definite1 can co-operation be harmoniously carried on when division of labor becomes established4 ,and as in the simplest co-operation1 where like efforts are joined to secure a common good1 the dissatisfaction caused in those who1 having expended their labors do not get their shares of the good1 prompts them to cease co-operating2 as in the more advanced co-operation1 achieved by exchanging equal labors of like kind expended at different times1 aversion to co-operate is generated if the expected equivalent of labor is not rendered2 so in this developed co-operation1 the failure of either to surrender to the other that which was avowedly recognized as of like value with the labor or product given1 tends to prevent co-operation by exciting discontent with its results4 ,and evidently1 while antagonisms thus caused impede the lives of the units1 the life of the aggregate is endangered by diminished cohesion4 #ec4 ,beyond these comparatively direct mischiefs1 special and general1 there have to be noted indirect mischiefs4 ,as already implied by the reasoning in the last paragraph1 not only social integration but also social differentiation1 is hindered by breach of contract4 ,in ,part ,,ii of the ,principles of ,sociology1 it was shown that the fundamental principles of organization are the same for an individual organism and for a social organism2 because both consist of mutually dependent parts4 ,in the one case as in the other1 the assumption of unlike activities by the component members1 is possible only on condition that they severally benefit in due degrees by one another's activities4 ,that we may the better see what are the implications in respect of social structures1 let us first note the implications in respect of individual structures4 ,the welfare of a living body implies an approximate equilibrium between waste and repair4 ,if the activities involve an expenditure not made good by nutrition1 dwindling follows4 ,if the tissues are enabled to take up from the blood enriched by food1 fit substances enough to replace those used up in efforts made1 the weight may be maintained4 ,and if the gain exceeds the loss1 growth results4 ,that which is true of the whole in its relations to the external world1 is no less true of the parts in their relations to one another4 ,each organ1 like the entire organism1 is wasted by performing its function1 and has to restore itself from the materials brought to it4 ,if the quantity of materials furnished by the joint agency of the other organs is deficient1 the particular organ dwindles4 ,if they are sufficient1 it can maintain its integrity4 ,if they are in excess1 it is enabled to increase4 ,to say that this arrangement constitutes the physiological contract1 is to use a metaphor which1 though not true in aspect is true in essence4 ,for the relations of structures are actually such that1 by the help of a central regulative system1 each organ is supplied with blood in proportion to the work it does4 ,as was pointed out 7,principles of ,sociology1 #bed7 well-developed animals are so constituted that each muscle or viscus1 when called into action1 sends to the vaso-motor centers through certain nerve-fibers1 an impulse caused by its action2 whereupon1 through other nerve-fibers1 there comes an impulse causing dilatation of its blood-vessels4 ,that is to say1 all other parts of the organism1 when they jointly require it to labor1 forthwith begin to pay it in blood4 ,during the ordinary state of physiological equilibrium1 the loss and the gain balance1 and the organ does not sensibly change4 ,if the amount of its function is increased within such moderate limits that the local blood-vessels can bring adequately-increased supplies1 the organ grows3 beyond replacing its losses by its gains1 it makes a profit on its extra transactions2 so being enabled by extra structures to meet extra demands4 ,but if the demands made on it become so great that the supply of materials cannot keep pace with the expenditure1 either because the local blood-vessels are not large enough1 or for any other reason1 then the organ begins to decrease from excess of waste over repair3 there sets in what is known as atrophy4 ,now1 since each of the organs has thus to be paid in nutriment for its services by the rest1 it follows that the due balancing of their respective claims and payments is requisite1 directly for the welfare of each organ1 and indirectly for the welfare of the organism4 ,for in a whole formed of mutually dependent parts1 anything which prevents due performance of its duty by one part reacts injuriously on all the parts4 ,with change of terms these statements and inferences hold of a society4 ,that social division of labor which parallels in so many other respects the physiological division of labor1 parallels it in this respect also4 ,as was shown at large in the ,principles of ,sociology1 ,part ,,ii1 each order of functionaries and each group of producers1 severally performing some action or making some article not for direct satisfaction of their own needs but for satisfaction of the needs of fellow-citizens in general1 otherwise occupied1 can continue to do this only so long as the expenditures of effort and returns of profit are approximately equivalent4 ,social organs1 like individual organs1 remain stationary if there come to them normal proportions of the commodities produced by the society as a whole4 ,if because the demands made on an industry or profession are unusually great1 those engaged in it make excessive profits1 more citizens flock to it and the social structure constituted by its members grows2 while decrease of the demands and therefore of the profits1 either leads its members to choose other careers or stops the accessions needful to replace those who die1 and the structure dwindles4 ,thus is maintained that proportion among the powers of the component parts which is most conducive to the welfare of the whole4 ,and now mark that the primary condition to achievement of this result is fulfillment of contract4 ,if from the members of any part payment is frequently withheld1 or falls short of the promised amount1 then1 through ruin of some and abandonment of the occupation by others1 the part diminishes2 and if it was before not more than competent to its duty1 it now becomes incompetent1 and the society suffers4 ,or if social needs throw on some part great increase of function1 and the members of it are enabled to get for their services unusually high prices2 fulfillment of the agreements to give them these high prices1 is the only way of drawing to the part such additional number of members as will make it equal to the augmented demands4 ,for citizens will not come to it if they find the high prices agreed upon are not paid4 ,briefly1 then1 the universal basis of co-operation is the proportioning of benefits received to services rendered4 ,without this there can be no physiological division of labor2 without this there can be no sociological division of labor4 ,and since division of labor1 physiological or sociological1 profits the whole and each part2 it results that on maintenance of the arrangements necessary to it1 depend both special and general welfare4 ,in a society such arrangements are maintained only if bargains1 overt or tacit1 are carried out4 ,so that beyond the primary requirement to harmonious co-existence in a society1 that its units shall not directly aggress on one another2 there comes this secondary requirement1 that they shall not indirectly aggress by breaking agreements4 #ed4 ,but now we have to recognize the fact that complete fulfillment of these conditions1 original and derived1 is not enough4 ,social co-operation may be such that no one is impeded in the obtainment of the normal return for effort1 but contrariwise is aided by equitable exchange of services2 and yet much may remain to be achieved4 ,there is a theoretically possible form of society1 purely industrial in its activities1 which1 though approaching nearer to the moral ideal in its code of conduct than any society not purely industrial1 does not fully reach it4 ,for while industrialism requires the life of each citizen to be such that it may be carried on without direct or indirect aggressions on other citizens1 it does not require his life to be such that it shall directly further the lives of other citizens4 ,it is not a necessary implication of industrialism1 as thus far defined1 that each1 beyond the benefits given and received by exchange of services1 shall give and receive other benefits4 ,a society is conceivable formed of men leading perfectly inoffensive lives1 scrupulously fulfilling their contracts1 and efficiently rearing their offspring1 who yet1 yielding to one another no advantages beyond those agreed upon1 fall short of that highest degree of life which the gratuitous rendering of services makes possible4 ,daily experiences prove that every one would suffer many evils and lose many goods did none give him unpaid assistance4 ,the life of each would be more or less damaged had he to meet all contingencies single-handed4 ,further1 if no one did for his fellows anything more than was required by strict performance of contract1 private interests would suffer from the absence of attention to public interests4 ,the limit of evolution of conduct is consequently not reached1 until1 beyond avoidance of direct and indirect injuries to others1 there are spontaneous efforts to further the welfare of others4 ,it may be shown that the form of nature which thus to justice adds beneficence1 is one which adaption to the social state produces4 ,the social man has not reached that harmonization of constitution with conditions forming the limit of evolution1 so long as there remains space for the growth of faculties which1 by their exercise1 bring positive benefit to others and satisfaction to self4 ,if the presence of fellow-men1 while putting certain limits to each man's sphere of activity1 opens certain other spheres of activity in which feelings1 while achieving their gratifications1 do not diminish1 but add to the gratifications of others1 then such spheres will inevitably be occupied4 ,recognition of this truth does not1 however1 call on us to qualify greatly that conception of the industrial state above set forth1 since sympathy is the root of both justice and beneficence4 #ee4 ,thus the sociological view of ,ethics supplements the physical1 the biological1 and the psychological views1 by disclosing those conditions under which only associated activities can be so carried on1 that the complete living of each consists with1 and conduces to1 the complete living of all4 ,at first the welfare of social groups1 habitually in antagonism with other such groups1 takes precedence of individual welfare2 and the rules of conduct which are authoritative for the time being1 involve incompleteness of individual life that the general life may be maintained4 ,at the same time the rules have to enforce the claims of individual life as far as may be1 since on the welfare of the units the welfare of the aggregate largely depends4 ,in proportion as societies endanger one another less1 the need for subordinating individual lives to the general life1 decreases2 and with approach to a peaceful state1 the general life1 having from the beginning had furtherance of individual lives as its ultimate purpose1 comes to have this as its proximate purpose4 ,during the transitional stages there are necessitated successive compromises between the moral code which asserts the claims of the society versus those of the individual1 and the moral code which asserts the claims of the individual versus those of the society4 ,and evidently each such compromise1 though for the time being authoritative1 admits of no consistent or definite expression4 ,but gradually as war declines--gradually as the compulsory co-operation needful in dealing with external enemies becomes unnecessary1 and leaves behind the voluntary co-operation which effectually achieves internal sustentation1 there grows increasingly clear the code of conduct which voluntary co-operation implies4 ,and this final permanent code alone admits of being definitely formulated1 and so constituting ethics as a science in contrast with empirical ethics4 ,the leading traits of a code1 under which complete living through voluntary co-operation is secured1 may be simply stated4 ,the fundamental requirement is that the life-sustaining actions of each shall severally bring him the amounts and kinds of advantage naturally achieved by them1 and this implies firstly that he shall suffer no direct aggressions on his person or property1 and1 secondly1 that he shall suffer no indirect aggressions by breach of contract4 ,observance of these negative conditions to voluntary co-operation having facilitated life to the greatest extent by exchange of services under agreement1 life is to be further facilitated by exchange of services beyond agreement3 the highest life being reached only when1 besides helping to complete one another's lives by specified reciprocities of aid1 men otherwise help to complete one another's lives4 ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,,criticisms ,,and ,,explanations4 #ef4 ,comparisons of the foregoing chapters1 with one another1 suggest sundry questions which must be answered partially1 if not completely1 before anything can be done toward reducing ethical principles from abstract forms to concrete forms4 ,we have seen that to admit the desirableness of conscious existence is to admit that conduct should be such as will produce a consciousness which is desirable--a consciousness which is as much pleasurable and as little painful as may be4 ,we have also seen that this necessary implication corresponds with the priori inference1 that the evolution of life has been made possible only by the establishment of connections between pleasures and beneficial actions1 and between pains and detrimental actions4 ,but the general conclusion reached in both of these ways1 though it covers the area within which our special conclusions must fall1 does not help us to reach those special conclusions4 ,were pleasures all of one kind1 differing only in degree2 were pains all of one kind1 differing only in degree2 and could pleasures be measured against pains with definite results1 the problems of conduct would be greatly simplified4 ,were the pleasures and pains serving as incentives and deterrents1 simultaneously present to consciousness with like vividness1 or were they all immediately impending1 or were they all equi-distant in time2 the problems would be further simplified4 ,and they would be still further simplified if the pleasures and pains were exclusively those of the actor4 ,but both the desirable and the undesirable feelings are of various kinds1 making quantitative comparisons difficult2 some are present and some are future1 increasing the difficulty of quantitative comparison2 some are entailed on self and some are entailed on others2 again increasing the difficulty4 ,so that the guidance yielded by the primary principle reached is of little service unless supplemented by the guidance of secondary principles4 ,already1 in recognizing the needful subordination of presentative feelings to representative feelings1 and the implied postponement of present to future throughout a wide range of cases1 some approach toward a secondary principle of guidance has been made4 ,already1 too1 in recognizing the limitations which men's associated state puts to their actions1 with the implied need for restraining feelings of some kinds by feelings of other kinds1 we have come in sight of another secondary principle of guidance4 ,still1 there remains much to be decided respecting the relative claims of these guiding principles1 general and special4 ,some elucidation of the questions involved will be obtained by here discussing certain views and arguments set forth by past and present moralists4 #eg4 ,using the name hedonism for that ethical theory which makes happiness the end of action1 and distinguishing hedonism into the two kinds1 egoistic and universalistic1 according as the happiness sought is that of the actor himself1 or is that of all1 ,mr4 ,sidgwick alleges its implied belief to be that pleasures and pains are commensurable4 ,in his criticism on 7empirical7 egoistic hedonism he says3 ,the fundamental assumption of ,hedonism1 clearly stated1 is that all feelings considered merely as feelings can be arranged in a certain scale of desirability1 so that the desirability or pleasantness of each bears a definite ratio to that of all the others4--,methods of ,ethics1 #b;d ed41 p4 #aae4 ,and asserting this to be its assumption he proceeds to point out difficulties in the way of the hedonistic calculation2 apparently for the purpose of implying that these difficulties tell against the hedonistic theory4 ,now1 though it may be shown that by naming the intensity1 the duration1 the certainty1 and the proximity1 of a pleasure or a pain1 as traits entering into the estimation of its relative value1 ,bentham has committed himself to the specified assumption2 and1 though1 it is1 perhaps1 reasonably taken for granted that hedonism1 as represented by him1 is identical with hedonism at large2 yet it seems to me that the hedonist1 empirical or other1 is not necessarily committed to this assumption4 ,that the greatest surplus of pleasures over pains ought to be the end of action is a belief which he may still consistently hold after admitting that the valuations of pleasures and pains are commonly vague and often erroneous4 ,he may say that though indefinite things do not admit of definite measurements1 yet approximately true estimates of their relative values may be made when they differ considerably1 and he may further say1 that even when their relative values are not determinable1 it remains true that the most valuable should be chosen4 ,let us listen to him4 ,a debtor who cannot pay me offers to compound for his debt by making over one of sundry things he possesses--a diamond ornament1 a silver vase1 a picture1 a carriage4 ,other questions being set aside ,i assert it to be my pecuniary interest to choose the most valuable of these1 but ,i cannot say which is the most valuable4 ,does the proposition that it is my pecuniary interest to choose the most valuable1 therefore1 become doubtful8 ,must ,i not choose as well as ,i can1 and if ,i choose wrongly must ,i give up my ground of choice8 ,must ,i infer that in matters of business ,i may not act on the principle that1 other things equal1 the more profitable transaction is to be preferred1 because1 in many cases1 ,i cannot say which is the more profitable1 and have often chosen the less profitable8 ,because ,i believe that of many dangerous courses ,i ought to take the least dangerous1 do ,i make 'the fundamental assumption' that courses can be arranged according to a scale of dangerousness1 and must ,i abandon my belief if ,i cannot so arrange them8 ,if ,i am not by consistency bound to do this1 then ,i am no more by consistency bound to give up the principle that the greatest surplus of pleasures over pains should be the end of action1 because the 'commensurability of pleasures and pains' cannot be asserted4 ,at the close of his chapters on empirical hedonism1 ,mr4 ,sidgwick himself says he does not think that the common experience of mankind1 impartially examined1 really sustains the view that ,egoistic ,hedonism is necessarily suicidal2 adding1 however1 that the uncertainty of hedonistic calculation cannot be denied to have great weight4 ,but here the fundamental assumption of hedonism1 that happiness is the end of action1 is still supposed to involve the assumption that feelings can be arranged in a certain scale of desirability4 ,this we have seen it does not3 its fundamental assumption is in no degree invalidated by proof that such arrangement of them is impracticable4 ,to ,mr4 ,sidgwick's argument there is the further objection1 no less serious1 that to whatever degree it tells against egoistic hedonism1 it tells in a greater degree against universalistic hedonism1 or utilitarianism4 ,he admits that it tells as much2 saying whatever weight is to be attached to the objections brought against this assumption the commensurability of pleasures and pains must of course tell against the present method4 ,not only does it tell1 but it tells in a double way4 ,i do not mean merely that1 as he points out1 the assumption becomes greatly complicated if we take all sentient beings into account1 and if we include posterity along with existing individuals4 ,i mean that1 taking as the end to be achieved the greatest happiness of the existing individuals forming a single community1 the set of difficulties standing in the way of egoistic hedonism1 is compounded with another set of difficulties no less great1 when we pass from it to universalistic hedonism4 ,for if the dictates of universalistic hedonism are to be fulfilled1 it must be under the guidance of individual judgments1 or of corporate judgments1 or of both4 ,now any one of such judgments issuing from a single mind1 or from any aggregate of minds1 necessarily embodies conclusions respecting the happiness of other persons2 few of them known1 and the great mass never seen4 ,all these persons have natures differing in countless ways and degrees from the natures of those who form the judgments2 and the happiness of which they are severally capable differ from one another1 and differ from the happinesses of those who form the judgments4 ,consequently1 if against the method of egoistic hedonism there is the objection that a man's own pleasures and pains1 unlike in their kinds1 intensities1 and times of occurrence1 are incommensurable2 then against the method of universalistic hedonism it may be urged that to the incommensurability of each judge's own pleasures and pains 7which he must use as standards7 has now to be added the much more decided incommensurability of the pleasures and pains which he conceives to be experienced by innumerable other persons1 all differently constituted from himself and from one another4 ,nay more--there is a triple set of difficulties in the way of universalistic hedonism4 ,to the double indeterminateness of the end has to be added the indeterminateness of the means4 ,if hedonism1 egoistic or universalistic1 is to pass from dead theory into living practice1 acts of one or other kind must be decided on to achieve proposed objects2 and in estimating the two methods we have to consider how far the fitness of the acts respectively required can be judged4 ,if1 in pursuing his own ends1 the individual is liable to be led by erroneous opinions to adjust his acts wrongly1 much more liable is he to be led by erroneous opinions to adjust wrongly more complex acts to the more complex ends constituted by other men's welfares4 ,it is so if he operates singly to benefit a few others2 and it is still more so if he co-operates with many to benefit all4 ,making general happiness the immediate object of pursuit1 implies numerous and complicated instrumentalities officered by thousands of unseen and unlike persons1 and working on millions of other persons unseen and unlike4 ,even the few factors in this immense aggregate of appliances and processes which are known1 are very imperfectly known1 and the great mass of them are unknown4 ,so that even supposing valuation of pleasures and pains for the community at large is more practicable than1 or even as practicable as1 valuation of his own pleasures and pains by the individual2 yet the ruling of conduct with a view to the one end is far more difficult than the ruling of it with a view to the other4 ,hence1 if the method of egoistic hedonism is unsatisfactory1 far more unsatisfactory for the same and kindred reasons1 is the method of universalistic hedonism1 or utilitarianism4 ,and here we come in sight of the conclusion which it has been the purpose of the foregoing criticism to bring into view4 ,the objection made to the hedonistic method contains a truth1 but includes with it an untruth4 ,for while the proposition that happiness1 whether individual or general1 is the end of action1 is not invalidated by proof that it cannot under either form be estimated by measurement of its components2 yet it may be admitted that guidance in the pursuit of happiness by a mere balancing of pleasures and pains1 is1 if partially practicable throughout a certain range of conduct1 futile throughout a much wider range4 ,it is quite consistent to assert that happiness is the ultimate aim of action1 and at the same time to deny that it can be reached by making it the immediate aim4 ,i go with ,mr4 ,sidgwick as far as the conclusion that we must at least admit the desirability of confirming or correcting the results of such comparisons of pleasures and pains by any other method upon which we may find reason to rely2 and then ,i go further1 and say that throughout a large part of conduct guidance by such comparisons is to be entirely set aside and replaced by other guidance4 #eh4 ,the antithesis here insisted upon between the hedonistic end considered in the abstract1 and the method which current hedonism1 whether egoistic or universalistic1 associates with that end2 and the joining acceptance of the one with rejection of the other2 commits us to an overt discussion of the two cardinal elements of ethical theory4 ,i may conveniently initiate this discussion by criticizing another of ,mr4 ,sidgwick's criticisms on the method of hedonism4 ,though we can give no account of those simple pleasures which the senses yield1 because they are undecomposable1 yet we distinctly know their characters as states of consciousness4 ,conversely1 the complex pleasures formed by compounding and re-compounding the ideas of simple pleasures1 though theoretically resolvable into their components1 are not easy to resolve2 and in proportion as they are heterogeneous in composition1 the difficulty of framing intelligible conceptions of them increases4 ,this is especially the case with the pleasures which accompany our sports4 ,treating of these1 along with the pleasures of pursuit in general1 for the purpose of showing that in order to get them one must forget them1 ,mr4 ,sidgwick remarks3 ,a man who maintains throughout an epicurean mood1 fixing his aim on his own pleasure1 does not catch the full spirit of the chase2 his eagerness never gets just the sharpness of edge which imparts to the pleasure its highest zest and flavor4 ,here comes into view what we may call the fundamental paradox of ,hedonism1 that the impulse toward pleasure1 if too predominant1 defeats its own aim4 ,this effect is not visible1 or at any rate is scarcely visible1 in the case of passive sensual pleasures4 ,but of our active enjoyments generally1 whether the activities on which they attend are classed as 'bodily' or as 'intellectual' 7as well as of many emotional pleasures71 it may certainly be said that we cannot attain them1 at least in their best form1 so long as we concentrate our aim on them4--,methods of ,ethics1 #b;d ed41 p4 #da4 ,now ,i think we shall not regard this truth as paradoxical after we have duly analyzed the pleasure of pursuit4 ,the chief components of this pleasure are3 ,first1 a renewed consciousness of personal efficiency 7made vivid by actual success and partially excited by impending success7 which consciousness of personal efficiency1 connected in experience with achieved ends of every kind1 arouses a vague but massive consciousness of resulting gratifications2 and second1 a representation of the applause which recognition of this efficiency by others has before brought1 and will again bring4 ,games of skill show us this clearly4 ,considered as an end in itself1 the good cannon which a billiard player makes yields no pleasure4 ,whence then does the pleasure of making it arise8 ,partly from the fresh proof of capability which the player gives to himself1 and partly from the imagined admiration of those who witness the proof of his capability3 the last being the chief1 since he soon tires of making cannons in the absence of witnesses4 ,when from games which1 yielding the pleasures of success1 yield no pleasure derived from the end considered intrinsically1 we pass to sports in which the end has intrinsic value as a source of pleasure1 we see substantially the same thing4 ,though the bird which the sportsman brings down is useful as food1 yet his satisfaction arises mainly from having made a good shot1 and from having added to the bag which will presently bring praise of his skill4 ,the gratification of self-esteem he immediately experiences2 and the gratification of receiving applause he experiences1 if not immediately and in full degree1 yet by representation2 for the ideal pleasure is nothing else than a faint revival of the real pleasure4 ,these two kinds of agreeable excitement present in the sportsman during the chase constitute the mass of the desires stimulating him to continue it2 for all desires are nascent forms of the feelings to be obtained by the efforts they prompt4 ,and though while seeking more birds these representative feelings are not so vividly excited as by success just achieved1 yet they are excited by imaginations of further successes2 and so make enjoyable the activities constituting the pursuit4 ,recognizing1 then1 the truth that the pleasures of pursuit are much more those derived from the efficient use of means than those derived from the end itself1 we see that the fundamental paradox of hedonism disappears4 ,these remarks concerning end and means1 and the pleasure accompanying use of the means as added to the pleasure derived from the end1 ,i have made for the purpose of drawing attention to a fact of profound significance4 ,during evolution there has been a superposing of new and more complex sets of means upon older and simpler sets of means1 and a superposing of the pleasures accompanying the uses of these successive sets of means1 with the result that each of these pleasures has itself eventually become an end4 ,we begin with a simple animal which1 without ancillary appliances1 swallows such food as accident brings in its way2 and so1 as we may assume1 stills some kind of craving4 ,here we have the primary end of nutrition with its accompanying satisfaction1 in their simple forms4 ,we pass to higher types having jaws for seizing and biting--jaws which thus1 by their actions1 facilitate achievement of the primary end4 ,on observing animals furnished with these organs1 we get evidence that the use of them becomes in itself pleasurable irrespective of the end3 instance a squirrel which1 apart from food to be so obtained1 delights in nibbling everything it gets hold of4 ,turning from jaws to limbs we see that these1 serving some creatures for pursuit and others for escape1 similarly yield gratification by their exercise2 as in lambs which skip and horses which prance4 ,how the combined use of limbs and jaws1 originally subserving the satisfaction of appetite1 grows to be in itself pleasurable1 is daily illustrated in the playing of dogs4 ,for that throwing down and worrying which1 when prey is caught1 precedes eating1 is1 in their mimic fights1 carried by each as far as he dares4 ,coming to means still more remote from the end1 namely1 those by which creatures chased are caught1 we are again shown by dogs that when no creature is caught there is still a gratification in the act of catching4 ,the eagerness with which a dog runs after stones1 or dances and barks in anticipation of jumping into the water after a stick1 proves that apart from the satisfaction of appetite1 and apart even from the satisfaction of killing prey1 there is a satisfaction in the successful pursuit of a moving object4 ,throughout1 then1 we see that the pleasure attendant on the use of means to achieve an end1 itself becomes an end4 ,now if we contemplate these as phenomena of conduct in general1 some facts worthy of note may be discerned--facts which1 if we appreciate their significance1 will aid us in developing our ethical conceptions4 ,one of them is that among the successive sets of means1 the later are the more remote from the primary end2 are1 as co-ordinating earlier and simpler means1 the more complex2 and are accompanied by feelings which are more representative4 ,another fact is that each set of means1 with its accompanying satisfactions1 eventually becomes in its turn dependent on one originating later than itself4 ,before the gullet swallows1 the jaws must lay hold2 before the jaws tear out and bring within the grasp of the gullet a piece fit for swallowing1 there must be that co-operation of limbs and senses required for killing the prey2 before this co-operation can take place1 there needs the much longer co-operation constituting the chase2 and even before this there must be persisted activities of limbs1 eyes1 and nose in seeking prey4 ,the pleasure attending each set of acts1 while making possible the pleasure attending the set of acts which follows1 is joined with a representation of this subsequent set of acts and its pleasure1 and of the others which succeed in order2 so that along with the feelings accompanying the search for prey1 are partially aroused the feelings accompanying the actual chase1 the actual destruction1 the actual devouring1 and the eventual satisfaction of appetite4 ,a third fact is that the use of each set of means in due order1 constitutes an obligation4 ,maintenance of its life being regarded as an end of its conduct1 the creature is obliged to use in succession the means of finding prey1 the means of catching prey1 the means of killing prey1 the means of devouring prey4 ,lastly1 it follows that though the assuaging of hunger1 directly associated with sustentation1 remains to the last the ultimate end2 yet the successful use of each set of means in its turn is the proximate end--the end which takes temporary precedence in authoritativeness4 #ei4 ,the relations between means and ends thus traced throughout the earlier stages of evolving conduct1 are traceable throughout later stages3 and hold true of human conduct1 up even to its highest forms4 ,as fast as1 for the better maintenance of life1 the simpler sets of means and the pleasures accompanying the uses of them1 come to be supplemented by the more complex sets of means and their pleasures1 these begin to take precedence in time and in imperativeness4 ,to use effectually each more complex set of means becomes the proximate end1 and the accompanying feeling becomes the immediate gratification sought2 though there may be1 and habitually is1 an associated consciousness of the remoter ends and remoter gratifications to be obtained4 ,an example will make clear the parallelism4 ,absorbed in his business the trader1 if asked what is his main end1 will say--making money4 ,he readily grants that achievement of this end is desired by him in furtherance of ends beyond it4 ,he knows that in directly seeking money he is indirectly seeking food1 clothes1 house-room1 and the comforts of life for self and family4 ,but while admitting that money is but a means to these ends1 he urges that the money-getting actions precede in order of time and obligation1 the various actions and concomitant pleasures subserved by them2 and he testifies to the fact that making money has become itself an end1 and success in it a source of satisfaction1 apart from these more distant ends4 ,again1 on observing more closely the trader's proceedings1 we find that though to the end of living comfortably he gets money1 and though to the end of getting money he buys and sells at a profit1 which so becomes a means more immediately pursued1 yet he is chiefly occupied with means still more remote from ultimate ends1 and in relation to which even the selling at a profit becomes an end4 ,for leaving to subordinates the actual measuring out of goods and receiving of proceeds1 he busies himself mainly with his general affairs--inquiries concerning markets1 judgments of future prices1 calculations1 negotiations1 correspondence3 the anxiety from hour to hour being to do well each one of these things indirectly conducive to the making of profits4 ,and these ends precede in time and obligation the effecting of profitable sales1 just as the effecting of profitable sales precedes the end of money-making1 and just as the end of money-making precedes the end of satisfactory living4 ,his bookkeeping best exemplifies the principle at large4 ,entries to the debtor or creditor sides are being made all through the day2 the items are classified and arranged in such way that at a moment's notice the state of each account may be ascertained2 and then1 from time to time1 the books are balanced1 and it is required that the result shall come right to a penny3 satisfaction following proved correctness and annoyance being caused by error4 ,if you ask why all this elaborate process1 so remote from the actual getting of money1 and still more remote from the enjoyments of life1 the answer is that keeping accounts correctly is fulfilling a condition to the end of money-making1 and becomes in itself a proximate end--a duty to be discharged1 that there may be discharged the duty of getting an income1 that there may be discharged the duty of maintaining self1 wife and children4 ,approaching as we here do to moral obligation1 are we not shown its relations to conduct at large8 ,is it not clear that observance of moral principles is fulfillment of certain general conditions to the successful carrying on of special activities8 ,that the trader may prosper1 he must not only keep his books correctly1 but must pay those he employs according to agreement1 and must meet his engagements with creditors4 ,may we not say1 then1 that conformity to the second and third of these requirements is1 like conformity to the first1 an indirect means to effectual use of the more direct means of achieving welfare8 ,may we not say1 too1 that as the use of each more indirect means in due order becomes itself an end1 and a source of gratification2 so1 eventually1 becomes the use of this most indirect means8 ,and may we not infer that though conformity to moral requirements precedes in imperativeness conformity to other requirements2 yet that this imperativeness arises from the fact that fulfillment of the other requirements1 by self or others1 or both1 is thus furthered8 #fj4 ,this question brings us round to another side of the issue before raised4 ,when alleging that empirical utilitarianism is but introductory to rational utilitarianism1 ,i pointed out that the last does not take welfare for its immediate object of pursuit1 but takes for its immediate object of pursuit conformity to certain principles which1 in the nature of things1 casually determine welfare4 ,and now we see that this amounts to recognition of that law1 traceable throughout the evolution of conduct in general1 that each later and higher order of means takes precedence in time and authoritativeness of each earlier and lower order of means4 ,the contrast between the ethical methods thus distinguished1 made tolerably clear by the above illustrations1 will be made still clearer by contemplating the two as put in opposition by the leading exponent of empirical utilitarianism4 ,treating of legislative aims1 ,bentham writes3 ,but justice1 what is it that we are to understand by justice3 and why not happiness but justice8 ,what happiness is1 every man knows1 because1 what pleasure is1 every man knows1 and what pain is1 every man knows4 ,but what justice is--this is what on every occasion is the subject-matter of dispute4 ,be the meaning of the word justice what it will1 what regard is it entitled to otherwise than as a means of happiness4,c ,let us first consider the assertion here made respecting the relative intelligibilities of these two ends1 and let us afterward consider what is implied by the choice of happiness instead of justice4 ,bentham's positive assertion that1 what happiness is every man knows1 because1 what pleasure is1 every man knows1 is met by counter-assertions equally positive4 ,who can tell1 asks ,plato1 what pleasure really is1 or know it in its essence1 except the philosopher1 who alone is conversant with realities4,d ,aristotle1 too1 after commenting on the different opinions held by the vulgar1 by the political1 by the contemplative1 says of happiness that1 to some it seems to be virtue1 to others prudence1 and to others a kind of wisdom3 to some again1 these1 or some one of these1 with pleasure1 or at least1 not without pleasure2 others again include external prosperity4,e ,and ,aristotle1 like ,plato1 comes to the remarkable conclusion that the pleasures of the intellect1 reached by the contemplative life1 constitute the highest happiness6,f ,how disagreements concerning the nature of happiness and the relative values of pleasures1 thus exhibited in ancient times1 continue down to modern times1 is shown in ,mr4 ,sidgwick's discussion of egoistic hedonism1 above commented upon4 ,further1 as was pointed out before1 the indefiniteness attending the estimations of pleasures and pains1 which stands in the way of egoistic hedonism as ordinarily conceived1 is immensely increased on passing to universalistic hedonism as ordinarily conceived2 since its theory implies that the imagined pleasures and pains of others are to be estimated by the help of these pleasures and pains of self already so difficult to estimate4 ,and that any one after observing the various pursuits into which some eagerly enter1 but which others shun1 and after listening to the different opinions concerning the likeableness of this or that occupation or amusement1 expressed at every table1 should assert that the nature of happiness can be fully agreed upon1 so as to render it a fit end for direct legislative action1 is surprising4 ,the accompanying proposition that justice is unintelligible as an end is no less surprising4 ,though primitive men have no words for either happiness or justice1 yet even among them an approach to the conception of justice is traceable4 ,the law of retaliation1 requiring that a death inflicted by one tribe on another1 shall be balanced by the death either of the murderer or some member of his tribe1 shows us in a vague shape that notion of equalness of treatment which forms an essential element in it4 ,when we come to early races who have given their thoughts and feelings literary form we find this conception of justice1 as involving equalness of action1 becoming distinct4 ,among the ,jews1 ,david expressed in words this association of ideas when1 praying to ,god to hear the right1 he said1 ,let my sentence come forth from thy presence2 let thine eyes behold the things that are equal2 as also1 among early ,christians1 did ,paul when to the ,colossians he wrote1 ,masters1 give unto your servants that which is just and equal4 ,commenting on the different meanings of justice1 ,aristotle concludes that the just will1 therefore1 be the lawful and the equal1 and the unjust the unlawful and the unequal4 ,but since the unjust man is also one who takes more than his share1 etc4 ,and that justice was similarly conceived by the ,romans they proved by including under it such meanings as exact1 proportionate1 impartial1 severally implying fairness of division1 and still better by identification of it with equity1 which is a derivative of quus3 the word quus itself having for one of its meanings just or impartial4 ,this coincidence of view among ancient peoples respecting the nature of justice1 has extended to modern peoples2 who by a general agreement in certain cardinal principles which their systems of law embody1 forbidding direct aggressions1 which are forms of unequal actions1 and forbidding indirect aggressions by breaches of contract1 which are other forms of unequal actions1 one and all show us the identification of justice with equalness4 ,bentham1 then1 is wrong when he says--,but what justice is--this is what on every occasion is the subject-matter of dispute4 ,he is more wrong1 indeed1 than has thus far appeared4 ,for1 in the first place1 he misrepresents utterly by ignoring the fact in ninety-nine out of every hundred daily transactions between men1 no dispute about justice arises2 but the business done is recognized on both sides as justly done4 ,and in the second place if1 with respect to the hundredth transaction there is a dispute1 the subject matter of it is not what justice is1 for it is admitted to be equity or equalness2 but the subject matter of dispute always is what1 under these particular circumstances1 constitutes equalness8--a widely different question4 ,it is not then self-evident1 as ,bentham alleges1 that happiness is an intelligible end while justice is not2 but contrariwise examination makes evident the greater intelligibility of justice as an end4 ,and analysis shows why it is more intelligible4 ,for justice1 or equity1 or equalness1 is concerned exclusively with quantity under stated conditions2 whereas happiness is concerned with both quantity and quality under conditions not stated4 ,when1 as in case of theft1 a benefit is taken while no equivalent benefit is yielded--when1 as in case of adulterated goods bought or base coin paid1 that which is agreed to be given in exchange as of equal value is not given1 but something of less value--when1 as in case of broken contract1 the obligation on one side has been discharged while there has been no discharge1 or incomplete discharge1 of the obligation on the other2 we see that1 the circumstances being specified1 the injustice complained of refers to the relative amounts of actions1 or products1 or benefits1 the natures of which are recognized only so far as is needful for saying whether as much has been given1 or done1 or allowed1 by each concerned1 as was implied by tacit or overt understanding to be an equivalent4 ,but when the end proposed is happiness1 the circumstances remaining unspecified1 the problem is that of estimating both quantities and qualities1 unhelped by any such definite measures as acts of exchange imply1 or as contracts imply1 or as are implied by the differences between the doings of one aggressing and one aggressed upon4 ,the mere fact that ,bentham himself includes as elements in the estimation of each pleasure or pain1 its intensity1 duration1 certainty1 and proximity1 suffices to show how difficult is this problem4 ,and when it is remembered that all pleasures and pains1 not felt in particular cases only but in the aggregate of cases1 and severally regarded under these four aspects1 have to be compared with one another and their relative values determined1 simply by introspection2 it will be manifest both that the problem is complicated by the addition of indefinite judgments of qualities to indefinite measures of quantities1 and that it is further complicated by the multitudinousness of these vague estimations to be gone through and summed up4 ,but now passing over this assertion of ,bentham that happiness is a more intelligible end than justice1 which we find to be the reverse of truth1 let us note the several implications of the doctrine that the supreme legislative body ought to make the greatest happiness of the greatest number its immediate aim4 ,it implies1 in the first place1 that happiness may be compassed by methods framed directly for the purpose1 without any previous inquiry respecting the conditions that must be fulfilled2 and this pre-supposes a belief that there are no such conditions4 ,for if there are any conditions without fulfillment of which happiness cannot be compassed1 then the first step must be to ascertain these conditions with a view to fulfilling them2 and to admit this is to admit that not happiness itself must be the immediate end1 but fulfillment of the conditions to its attainment must be the immediate end4 ,the alternatives are simple3 ,either the achievement of happiness is not conditional1 in which case one mode of action is as good as another1 or it is conditional1 in which case the required mode of action must be the direct aim and not the happiness to be achieved by it4 ,assuming it conceded1 as it will be1 that there exist conditions which must be fulfilled before happiness can be attained1 let us next ask what is implied by proposing modes of so controlling conduct as to further happiness1 without previously inquiring whether any such modes are already known8 ,the implication is that human intelligence throughout the past1 operating on experiences1 has failed to discover any such modes2 whereas present human intelligence may be expected forthwith to discover them4 ,unless this be asserted1 it must be admitted that certain conditions to the achievement of happiness have already been partially1 if not wholly1 ascertained2 and if so1 our first business should be to look for them4 ,having found them1 our rational course is to bring existing intelligence to bear on these products of past intelligence1 with the expectation that it will verify the substance of them while possibly correcting the form4 ,but to suppose that no regulative principles for the conduct of associated human beings have thus far been established1 and that they are now to be established de novo1 is to suppose that man as he is differs from man as he was in an incredible degree4 ,beyond ignoring the probability1 or rather the certainty1 that past experience generalized by past intelligence1 must by this time have disclosed partially1 if not wholly1 some of the essential conditions to the achievement of happiness1 ,bentham's proposition ignores the formulated knowledge of them actually existing4 ,for whence come the conception of justice and the answering sentiment4 ,he will scarcely say that they are meaningless1 although his proposition implies as much2 and if he admits that they have meanings1 he must choose between two alternatives either of which is fatal to his hypothesis4 ,are they supernaturally caused modes of thinking and feeling1 tending to make men fulfill the conditions to happiness8 ,if so their authority is peremptory4 ,are they modes of thinking and feeling naturally caused in men by experience of these conditions8 ,if so1 their authority is no less peremptory4 ,not only1 then1 does ,bentham fail to infer that certain principles of guidance must by this time have been ascertained1 but he refuses to recognize these principles as actually reached and present to him4 ,and then after all1 he tacitly admits that which he overtly denies1 by saying that--,be the meaning of the word justice what it will1 what regard is it entitled to otherwise than as a means of happiness8 ,for if justice is a means having happiness as its end1 then justice must take precedence of happiness1 as every other means takes precedence of every other end4 ,bentham's own elaborate polity is a means having happiness as its end1 as justice is1 by his own admission1 a means having happiness as an end4 ,if1 then1 we may properly skip justice1 and go directly to the end happiness1 we may properly skip ,bentham's polity1 and go directly to the end happiness4 ,in short1 we are led to the remarkable conclusion that in all cases we must contemplate exclusively the end and must disregard the means4 #fa4 ,this relation of ends to means1 underlying all ethical speculation will be further elucidated if we join with some of the above conclusions1 certain conclusions drawn in the last chapter4 ,we shall see that while greatest happiness may vary widely in societies which1 though ideally constituted1 are subject to unlike physical circumstances1 certain fundamental conditions to the achievement of this greatest happiness1 are common to all such societies4 ,given a people inhabiting a tract which makes nomadic habits necessary1 and the happiness of each individual will be greatest when his nature is so molded to the requirements of his life1 that all his faculties find their due activities in daily driving and tending cattle1 milking1 migrating and so forth4 ,the members of a community otherwise similar1 which is permanently settled1 will severally achieve their greatest happiness when their natures have become such that a fixed habitat1 and the occupations necessitated by it1 supply the spheres in which each instinct and emotion is exercised and brings the concomitant pleasure4 ,the citizens of a large nation1 industrially organized1 have reached their possible ideal of happiness1 when the producing1 distributing1 and other activities1 are such in their kinds and amounts1 that each citizen finds in them a place for all his energies and aptitudes1 while he obtains the means of satisfying all his desires4 ,once more we may recognize as not only possible but probable1 the eventual existence of a community1 also industrial1 the members of which1 having natures similarly responding to these requirements1 are also characterized by dominant sthetic faculties1 and achieve complete happiness only when a large part of life is filled with sthetic activities4 ,evidently these different types of men1 with their different standards of happiness1 each finding the possibility of that happiness in his own society1 would not find it if transferred to any of the other societies4 ,evidently1 though1 they might have in common such kinds of happiness as accompany the satisfaction of vital needs1 they would not have in common sundry other kinds of happiness4 ,but now mark that while1 to achieve greatest happiness in each of such societies1 the special conditions to be fulfilled must differ from those to be fulfilled in the other societies1 certain general conditions must be fulfilled in all the societies4 ,harmonious co-operation1 by which alone in any of them the greatest happiness can be attained1 is1 as we saw1 made possible only by respect for one another's claims3 there must be neither those direct aggressions which we class as crimes against person and property1 nor must there be those indirect aggressions constituted by breaches of contracts4 ,so that maintenance of equitable relations between men is the condition to attainment of greatest happiness in all societies1 however much the greatest happiness attainable in each may differ in nature1 or amount1 or both4 ,and here a physical analogy may fitly be used to give the greatest definiteness to this cardinal truth4 ,a mass of matter1 of whatever kind1 maintains its state of internal equilibrium1 so long as its component particles severally stand toward their neighbors in equi-distant positions4 ,accepting the conclusions of modern physicists1 which imply that each molecule moves rhythmically1 then a balanced state implies that each performs its movements within a space bounded by the like spaces required for the movements of those around4 ,if the molecules have been so aggregated that the oscillations of some are more restrained than the oscillations of others1 there is a proportionate instability4 ,if the number of them thus unduly restrained is considerable1 the instability is such that the cohesion in some part is liable to fail1 and a crack results4 ,if the excesses of restraint are great and multitudinous1 a trifling disturbance causes the mass to break up into small fragments4 ,to which add that the recognized remedy for this unstable state is an exposure to such physical condition 7ordinarily high temperature7 as enables the molecules so to change their relative positions that their mutual restraints become equal on all sides4 ,and now observe that this holds whatever be the natures of the molecules4 ,they may be simple2 they may be compound2 they may be composed of this or that matter in this or that way4 ,in other words1 the special activities of each molecule1 constituted by the relative movements of its units1 may be various in their kinds and degrees2 and yet1 be they what they may1 it remains true that to preserve internal equilibrium throughout the mass of molecules1 the mutual limitations of their activities must be everywhere alike4 ,and this is the above-described prerequisite to social equilibrium1 whatever the special natures of the associated persons4 ,assuming that within each society such persons are of the same type1 needing for the fulfillment of their several lives kindred activities1 and though these activities may be of one kind in one society and of another kind in another1 so admitting of indefinite variation1 this condition to social equilibrium does not admit of variation4 ,it must be fulfilled before complete life1 that is greatest happiness1 can be attained in any society2 be the particular quality of that life1 or that happiness1 what it may4,g #fb4 ,after thus observing how means and ends in conduct stand to one another1 and how there emerge certain conclusions respecting their relative claims1 we may see a way to reconcile sundry conflicting ethical theories4 ,these severally embody portions of the truth2 and simply require combining in proper order to embody the whole truth4 ,the theological theory contains a part4 ,if for the divine will1 supposed to be supernaturally revealed1 we substitute the naturally revealed end toward which the ,power manifested throughout ,evolution works2 then1 since ,evolution has been1 and is still1 working toward the highest life1 it follows that conforming to those principles by which the highest life is achieved1 is furthering that end4 ,the doctrine that perfection or excellence of nature should be the object of pursuit1 is in one sense true2 for it tacitly recognizes that ideal form of being which the highest life implies1 and to which ,evolution tends4 ,there is a truth1 also1 in the doctrine that virtue mast be the aim2 for this is another form of the doctrine that the aim must be to fulfill the conditions to achievement of the highest life4 ,that the intuitions of a moral faculty should guide or conduct1 is a proposition in which a truth is contained2 for these intuitions are the slowly organized results of experiences received by the race while living in presence of these conditions4 ,and that happiness is the supreme end is beyond question true2 for this is the concomitant of that highest life which every theory of moral guidance has distinctly or vaguely in view4 ,so understanding their relative positions1 those ethical systems which make virtue1 right1 obligation1 the cardinal aims1 are seen to be complementary to those ethical systems which make welfare1 pleasure1 happiness1 the cardinal aims4 ,though the moral sentiments generated in civilized men by daily contact with social conditions and gradual adaptation to them1 are indispensable as incentives and deterrents2 and though the intuitions corresponding to these sentiments have1 in virtue of their origin1 a general authority to be reverently recognized2 yet the sympathies and antipathies hence originating1 together with the intellectual expressions of them1 are1 in their primitive forms1 necessarily vague4 ,to make guidance by them adequate to all requirements1 their dictates have to be interpreted and made definite by science2 to which end there must be analysis of those conditions to complete living which they respond to1 and from converse with which they have arisen4 ,and such analysis necessitates the recognition of happiness for each and all1 as the end to be achieved by fulfillment of these conditions4 ,hence1 recognizing in due degrees all the various ethical theories1 conduct in its highest form will take as guides innate perceptions of right duly enlightened and made precise by an analytic intelligence1 while conscious that these guides are proximately supreme solely because they lead to the ultimate supreme end1 happiness special and general4 ,,chapter ,x4 ,,the ,,relativity ,,of ,,pains ,,and ,,pleasures4 #fc4 ,a truth of cardinal importance as a datum of ,ethics1 which was incidentally referred to in the last chapter1 must here be set forth at full length4 ,i mean the truth that not only men of different races1 but also different men of the same race1 and even the same men at different periods of life1 have different standards of happiness4 ,though there is some recognition of this by moralists1 the recognition is inadequate1 and the far-reaching conclusions to be drawn when the relativity of happiness is fully recognized1 are scarcely suspected4 ,it is a belief universal in early life--a belief which in most people is but partially corrected in later life1 and in very few wholly dissipated--that there is something intrinsic in the pleasantness of certain things1 while other things are intrinsically unpleasant4 ,the error is analogous to1 and closely allied with1 the error crude realism makes4 ,just as to the uncultured mind it appears self-evident that the sweetness of sugar is inherent in sugar1 that sound as we perceive it is sound as it exists in the external world1 and that the warmth from a fire is in itself what it seems2 so does it appear self-evident that the sweetness of sugar is necessarily grateful1 that there is in a beautiful sound something that must be beautiful to all creatures1 and that the agreeable feeling produced by warmth is a feeling which every other consciousness must find agreeable4 ,but as criticism proves the one set of conclusions to be wrong1 so does it prove to be wrong the other set4 ,not only are the qualities of external things as intellectually apprehended by us1 relative to our own organisms2 but the pleasurableness or painfulness of the feelings which we associate with such qualities1 are also relative to our own organisms4 ,they are so in a double sense--they are relative to its structures1 and they are relative to the states of its structures4 ,that we may not rest in a mere nominal acceptance of these general truths1 but may so appreciate them as to see their full bearings on ethical theory1 we must here glance at them as exemplified by animate creatures at large4 ,for after contemplating the wide divergences of sentiency accompanying the wide divergences of organization which evolution in general has brought about1 we shall be enabled the better to see the divergences of sentiency to be expected from the further evolution of humanity4 #fd4 ,because they can be most quickly disposed of1 let us first deal with pains3 a further reason for first dealing with pains being that we may thus forthwith recognize1 and then leave out of consideration1 those sentient states the qualities of which may be regarded as absolute rather than relative4 ,the painfulness of the feelings produced by forces which tend to destroy organic structures1 wholly or in part1 is of course common to all creatures capable of feeling4 ,we saw it to be inevitable that during evolution there must everywhere be established such connections between external actions and the modes of consciousness they cause1 that the injurious ones are accompanied by disagreeable feelings and the beneficial ones by agreeable feelings4 ,consequently1 pressures or strains which tear or bruise1 and heats which burn or scald1 being in all cases partially or wholly destructive1 are in all cases painful4 ,but even here the relativity of the feelings may in one sense be asserted4 ,for the effect of a force of given quantity or intensity varies partly with the size and partly with the structure of the creature exposed to it4 ,the weight which is scarcely felt by a large animal crushes a small one2 the blow which breaks the limb of a mouse produces little effect on a horse3 the weapon which lacerates a horse leaves a rhinoceros uninjured4 ,and with these differences of injuriousness doubtless go differences of feeling4 ,merely glancing at the illustrations of this truth furnished by sentient beings in general1 let us consider the illustrations mankind furnish4 ,comparisons of robust laboring men with women or children show us that degrees of mechanical stress which the first bear with impunity1 produce on the others injuries and accompanying pains4 ,the blistering of a tender skin by an amount of friction which does not even redden a coarse one1 or the bursting of superficial blood-vessels1 and consequent discoloration1 caused in a person of lax tissues by a blow which leaves in well-toned tissues no trace1 will sufficiently exemplify this contrast4 ,not only1 however1 are the pains due to violent incident forces1 relative to the characters or constitutional qualities of the parts directly affected1 but they are relative in equally marked ways1 or even in more marked ways1 to the characters of the nervous structures4 ,the common assumption is that equal bodily injuries excite equal pains4 ,but this is a mistake4 ,pulling out a tooth or cutting off a limb1 gives to different persons widely different amounts of suffering2 not the endurance only1 but the feeling to be endured1 varies greatly2 and the variation largely depends on the degree of nervous development4 ,this is well shown by the great insensibility of idiots--blows1 cuts1 and extremes of heat and cold1 being borne by them with indifference4,h ,the relation thus shown in the most marked manner where the development of the central nervous system is abnormally low1 is shown in a less marked manner where the development of the central nervous system is normally low2 namely1 among inferior races of men4 ,many travelers have commented on the strange callousness shown by savages who have been mangled in battle or by accident2 and surgeons in ,india say that wounds and operations are better borne by natives than by ,europeans4 ,further1 there comes the converse fact that among the higher types of men1 larger brained and more sensitive to pain than the lower1 the most sensitive are those whose nervous developments1 as shown by their mental powers1 are the highest2 part of the evidence being the relative intolerance of disagreeable sensations common among men of genius1,i and the general irritability characteristic of them4 ,that pain is relative not to structures only1 but to their states as well1 is also manifest--more manifest indeed4 ,the sensibility of an external part depends on its temperature4 ,cool it below a certain point and it becomes1 as we say1 numb2 and if by ether spray it is made very cold1 it may be cut without any feeling being produced4 ,conversely1 heat the part so that its blood-vessels dilate1 and the pain which any injury or irritation causes is greater than usual4 ,how largely the production of pain depends on the condition of the part affected1 we see in the extreme tenderness of an inflamed surface--a tenderness such that a slight touch causes shrinking1 and such that rays from the fire which ordinarily would be indifferent become intolerable4 ,similarly with the special senses4 ,a light which eyes that are in good order bear without disagreeable feeling1 cannot be borne by inflamed eyes4 ,and beyond the local state1 the state of the system as a whole1 and the state of the nervous centers1 are both factors4 ,those enfeebled by illness are distressed by noises which those in health bear with equanimity2 and men with overwrought brains are irritated in unusual degrees by annoyances1 both physical and moral4 ,further1 the temporary condition known as exhaustion enters into the relation4 ,limbs overworn by prolonged exertion1 cannot without aching perform acts which would at other times cause no appreciable feeling4 ,after reading continuously for very many hours1 even strong eyes begin to smart4 ,and noises that can be listened to for a short time with indifference1 become1 if there is no cessation1 causes of suffering4 ,so that though there is absoluteness in the relation between positive pains and actions that are positively injurious1 in so far that wherever there is sentiency it exists2 yet even here partial relativity may be asserted4 ,for there is no fixed relation between the acting force and the produced feeling4 ,the amount of feeling varies with the size of the organism1 with the character of its outer structures1 with the character of its nervous system2 and also with the temporary states of the part affected1 of the body at large1 and of the nervous centers4 #fe4 ,the relativity of pleasures is far more conspicuous2 and the illustrations of it furnished by the sentient world at large are innumerable4 ,it needs but to glance round at the various things which different creatures are prompted by their desires to eat and are gratified in eating--flesh for predaceous animals1 grass for the herbivora1 worms for the mole1 flies for the swallow1 seeds for the finch1 honey for the bee1 a decaying carcass for the maggot--to be reminded that the tastes for foods are relative to the structures of the creatures4 ,and this truth1 made conspicuous by a survey of animals in general1 is forced on our attention even by a survey of different races of men4 ,here human flesh is abhorred1 and there regarded as the greatest delicacy2 in this country roots are allowed to putrefy before they are eaten1 and in that the taint of decay produces disgust3 the whale's blubber which one race devours with avidity1 will in another by its very odor produce nausea4 ,nay1 without looking abroad we may1 in the common saying that one man's meat is another man's poison1 see the general admission that members of the same society so far differ1 that a taste which is to these pleasurable is to those displeasurable4 ,so is it with the other senses4 ,assafoetida1 which by us is singled out as typical of the disgusting in odor1 ranks among the ,esthonians as a favorite perfume1 and even those around us vary so far in their likings that the scents of flowers grateful to some are repugnant to others4 ,analogous differences1 in the preferences for colors1 we daily hear expressed4 ,and in a greater or less degree the like holds with all sensations down even to those of touch3 the feeling yielded by velvet1 which is to most agreeable1 setting the teeth on edge in some4 ,it needs but to name appetite and satiety to suggest multitudinous facts showing that pleasures are relative not only to the organic structures but also to their states4 ,the food which yields keen gratification when there is great hunger ceases to be grateful when hunger is satisfied1 and if then forced on the eater is rejected with aversion4 ,so1 too1 a particular kind of food1 seeming when first tasted so delicious that daily repetition would be a source of endless enjoyment1 becomes1 in a few days1 not only unenjoyable but repugnant4 ,brilliant colors which1 falling on unaccustomed eyes give delight1 pall on the sense if long looked at1 and there is relief in getting away from the impressions they yield4 ,sounds sweet in themselves and sweet in their combinations which yield to unfatigued ears intense pleasure1 become1 at the end of a long concert1 not only wearisome but1 if there is no escape from them1 causes of irritation4 ,the like holds down even to such simple sensations as those of heat and cold4 ,the fire so delightful on a winter's day is1 in hot weather1 oppressive2 and pleasure is then taken in the cold water from which1 in winter1 there would be shrinking4 ,indeed1 experiences lasting over but a few moments suffice to show how relative to the states of the structures are pleasurable sensations of these kinds2 for it is observable that on dipping the cold hand into hot water1 the agreeable feeling gradually diminishes as the hand warms4 ,these few instances will carry home the truth1 manifest enough to all who observe1 that the receipt of each agreeable sensation depends primarily on the existence of a structure which is called into play2 and1 secondarily1 on the condition of that structure1 as fitting it or unfitting it for activity4 #ff4 ,the truth that emotional pleasures are made possible1 partly by the existence of correlative structures and partly by the states of those structures1 is equally undeniable4 ,observe the animal which1 leading a life demanding solitary habits1 has an adapted organization1 and it gives no sign of need for the presence of its kind4 ,observe1 conversely1 a gregarious animal separated from the herd1 and you see marks of unhappiness while the separation continues1 and equally distinct marks of joy on joining its companions4 ,in the one case there is no nervous structure which finds its sphere of action in the gregarious state1 and in the other case such a structure exists4 ,as was implied by instances cited in the last chapter for another purpose1 animals leading lives involving particular kinds of activities1 have become so constituted that pursuance of those activities1 exercising the correlative structures1 yields the associated pleasures4 ,beasts of prey confined in dens1 show us by their pacings from side to side the endeavor to obtain1 as well as they can1 the satisfactions that accompany roaming about in their natural habitats1 and that gratification in the expenditure of their locomotive energies1 shown us by porpoises playing round a vessel1 is shown us by the similarly unceasing excursions from end to end of its cell which a captured porpoise makes4 ,the perpetual hoppings of the canary from bar to bar of its cage1 and the ceaseless use of claws and bill in climbing about its perch by the parrot1 are other activities which1 severally related to the needs of the species1 have severally themselves become sources of agreeable feelings4 ,still more clearly are we shown by the efforts which a caged beaver makes to build with such sticks and pieces of wood as are at hand1 how dominant in its nature has become the building instinct1 and how1 apart from any advantage gained1 it gets gratification by repeating1 as well as it can1 the processes of construction it is organized to carry on4 ,the cat which1 lacking something to tear with her claws1 pulls at the mat with them1 the confined giraffe which1 in default of branches to lay hold of wears out the upper angles of the doors to its house by continually grasping them with its prehensile tongue1 the rhinoceros which1 having no enemy to fight1 plows up the ground with his horn--all yield us analogous evidence4 ,clearly1 these various actions performed by these various creatures are not intrinsically pleasurable1 for they differ more or less in each species and are often utterly unlike4 ,the pleasurableness is simply in the exercise of nervo-muscular structures adapted to the performance of the actions4 ,though races of men are contrasted with one another so much less than genera and orders of animals are1 yet1 as we saw in the last chapter1 along with visible differences there go invisible differences1 with accompanying likings for different modes of life4 ,among some1 as the ,mantras1 the love of unrestrained action and the disregard of companionship1 are such that they separate if they quarrel1 and hence live scattered2 while among others1 as the ,damaras1 there is little tendency to resist1 but instead1 an admiration for any one who assumes power over them4 ,already when exemplifying the indefiniteness of happiness as an end of action1 ,i have referred to the unlike ideals of life pursued by the nomadic and the settled1 the warlike and the peaceful--unlike ideals which imply unlikenesses of nervous structures caused by the inherited effects of unlike habits accumulating through generations4 ,these contrasts1 various in their kinds and degrees among the various types of mankind1 every one can supplement by analogous contrasts observable among those around4 ,the occupations some delight in are to those otherwise constituted intolerable2 and men's hobbies1 severally appearing to themselves quite natural1 often appear to their friends ludicrous and almost insane3 facts which alone might make us see that the pleasurableness of actions of this or that kind1 is due not to anything in the natures of the actions but to the existence of faculties which find exercise in them4 ,it must be added that each pleasurable emotion1 like each pleasurable sensation1 is relative not only to a certain structure but also to the state of that structure4 ,the parts called into action must have had proper rest--must be in a condition fit for action2 not in the condition which prolonged action produces4 ,be the order of emotion what it may1 an unbroken continuity in the receipt of it eventually brings satiety4 ,the pleasurable consciousness becomes less and less vivid1 and there arises the need for a temporary cessation during which the parts that have been active may recover their fitness for activity1 and during which also the activities of other parts and receipt of the accompanying emotions may find due place4 #fg4 ,i have insisted on these general truths with perhaps needless iteration1 to prepare the reader for more fully recognizing a corollary that is practically ignored4 ,abundant and clear as is the evidence1 and forced though it is daily on every one's attention1 the conclusions respecting life and conduct which should be drawn1 are not drawn1 and so much at variance are these conclusions with current beliefs1 that enunciation of them causes a stare of incredulity4 ,pervaded as all past thinking has been1 and as most present thinking is1 by the assumption that the nature of every creature has been specially created for it1 and that human nature1 also specially created1 is1 like other natures1 fixed--pervaded too as this thinking has been1 and is1 by the allied assumption that the agreeableness of certain actions depends on their essential qualities1 while other actions are by their essential qualities made disagreeable2 it is difficult to obtain a hearing for the doctrine that the kinds of action which are now pleasurable will1 under conditions requiring the change1 cease to be pleasurable1 while other kinds of action will become pleasurable4 ,even those who accept the doctrine of ,evolution mostly hear with scepticism1 or at best with nominal faith1 the inferences to be drawn from it respecting the humanity of the future4 ,and yet as shown in myriads of instances indicated by the few above given1 those natural processes which have produced multitudinous forms of structure adapted to multitudinous forms of activity1 have simultaneously made these forms of activity pleasurable4 ,and the inevitable implication is that within the limits imposed by physical laws1 there will be evolved1 in adaptation to any new sets of conditions that may be established1 appropriate structures of which the functions will yield their respective gratifications4 ,when we have got rid of the tendency to think that certain modes of activity are necessarily pleasurable because they give us pleasure1 and that other modes which do not please us are necessarily unpleasing2 we shall see that the remolding of human nature into fitness for the requirements of social life1 must eventually make all needful activities pleasurable1 while it makes displeasurable all activities at variance with these requirements4 ,when we have come fully to recognize the truth that there is nothing intrinsically more gratifying in the efforts by which wild animals are caught1 than in the efforts expended in rearing plants1 and that the combined actions of muscles and senses in rowing a boat are not by their essential natures more productive of agreeable feeling than those gone through in reaping corn1 but that everything depends on the co-operating emotions1 which at present are more in accordance with the one than with the other2 we shall infer that along with decrease of those emotions for which the social state affords little or no scope1 and increase of those which it persistently exercises1 the things now done with dislike from a sense of obligation will be done with immediate liking1 and the things desisted from as a matter of duty will be desisted from because they are repugnant4 ,this conclusion1 alien to popular beliefs and in ethical speculation habitually ignored1 or at most recognized but partially and occasionally1 will be thought by the majority so improbable that ,i must give further justification of it3 enforcing the priori argument by an posteriori one4 ,small as is the attention given to the fact1 yet is the fact conspicuous that the corollary above drawn from the doctrine of ,evolution at large1 coincides with the corollary which past and present changes in human nature force upon us4 ,the leading contrasts of character between savage and civilized1 are just those contrasts to be expected from the process of adaptation4 ,the life of the primitive man is passed mainly in the pursuit of beasts1 birds and fish1 which yields him a gratifying excitement2 but though to the civilized man the chase gives gratification1 this is neither so persistent nor so general4 ,there are among us keen sportsmen1 but there are many to whom shooting and fishing soon become wearisome1 and there are not a few to whom they are altogether indifferent or even distasteful4 ,conversely1 the power of continued application1 which in the primitive man is very small1 has among ourselves become considerable4 ,it is true that most are coerced into industry by necessity2 but there are sprinkled throughout society men to whom active occupation is a need--men who are restless when away from business and miserable when they eventually give it up2 men to whom this or that line of investigation is so attractive that they devote themselves to it day after day1 year after year2 men who are so deeply interested in public affairs that they pass lives of labor in achieving political ends they think advantageous1 hardly giving themselves the rest necessary for health4 ,yet again1 and still more strikingly1 does the change become manifest when we compare undeveloped with developed humanity in respect of the conduct prompted by fellow-feeling4 ,cruelty rather than kindness is characteristic of the savage1 and is in many cases a source of marked gratification to him2 but though among the civilized are some in whom this trait of the savage survives1 yet a love of inflicting pain is not general1 and besides numbers who show benevolence1 there are those who devote their whole time and much of their money to philanthropic ends1 without thought of reward either here or hereafter4 ,clearly these major1 along with many minor1 changes of nature1 conform to the law set forth4 ,activities appropriate to their needs which give pleasures to savages have ceased to be pleasurable to many of the civilized2 while the civilized have acquired capacities for other appropriate activities and accompanying pleasures which savages had no capacities for4 ,now1 not only is it rational to infer that changes like those which have been going on during civilization1 will continue to go on1 but it is irrational to do otherwise4 ,not he who believes that adaptation will increase is absurd1 but he who doubts that it will increase is absurd4 ,lack of faith in such further evolution of humanity as shall harmonize its nature with its conditions1 adds but another to the countless illustrations of inadequate consciousness of causation4 ,one who1 leaving behind both primitive dogmas and primitive ways of looking at things1 has1 while accepting scientific conclusions1 acquired those habits of thought which science generates1 will regard the conclusion above drawn as inevitable4 ,he will find it impossible to believe that the processes which have heretofore so molded all beings to the requirements of their lives that they get satisfactions in fulfilling them1 will not hereafter continue so molding them4 ,he will infer that the type of nature to which the highest social life affords a sphere such that every faculty has its due amount1 and no more than the due amount1 of function and accompanying gratification1 is the type of nature toward which progress cannot cease till it is reached4 ,pleasure being producible by the exercise of any structure which is adjusted to its special end1 he will see the necessary implication to be that1 supposing it consistent with maintenance of life1 there is no kind of activity which will not become a source of pleasure if continued2 and that therefore pleasure will eventually accompany every mode of action demanded by social conditions4 ,this corollary ,i here emphasize because it will presently play an important part in the argument4 ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,,egoism ,,versus ,,altruism4 #fh4 ,if insistance on them tends to unsettle established systems of belief1 self-evident truths are by most people silently passed over2 or else there is a tacit refusal to draw from them the most obvious inferences4 ,of self-evident truths so dealt with1 the one which here concerns us is that a creature must live before it can act4 ,from this it is a corollary that the acts by which each maintains his own life must1 speaking generally1 precede in imperativeness all other acts of which he is capable4 ,for if it be asserted that these other acts must precede in imperativeness the acts which maintain life2 and if this1 accepted as a general law of conduct1 is conformed to by all1 then by postponing the acts which maintain life to the other acts which makes life possible1 all must lose their lives4 ,that is to say1 ,ethics has to recognize the truth1 recognized in unethical thought1 that egoism comes before altruism4 ,the acts required for continued self-preservation1 including the enjoyment of benefits achieved by such acts1 are the first requisites to universal welfare4 ,unless each duly cares for himself1 his care for all others is ended by death2 and if each thus dies1 there remain no others to be cared for4 ,this permanent supremacy of egoism over altruism1 made manifest by contemplating existing life1 is further made manifest by contemplating life in course of evolution4 #fi4 ,those who have followed with assent the recent course of thought1 do not need telling that throughout past eras1 the life1 vast in amount and varied in kind1 which has overspread the earth1 has progressed in subordination to the law that every individual shall gain by whatever aptitude it has for fulfilling the conditions to its existence4 ,the uniform principle has been that better adaptation shall bring greater benefit2 which greater benefit1 while increasing the prosperity of the better adapted1 shall increase also its ability to leave offspring inheriting more or less its better adaptation4 ,and1 by implication1 the uniform principle has been that the ill-adapted1 disadvantaged in the struggle for existence1 shall bear the consequent evils3 either disappearing when its imperfections are extreme1 or else rearing fewer offspring1 which1 inheriting its imperfections1 tend to dwindle away in posterity4 ,it has been thus with innate superiorities2 it has been thus also with acquired ones4 ,all along the law has been that increased function brings increased power2 and that therefore such extra activities as aid welfare in any member of a race1 produce in its structures greater ability to carry on such extra activities3 the derived advantages being enjoyed by it to the heightening and lengthening of its life4 ,conversely1 as lessened function ends in lessened structure1 the dwindling of unused faculties has ever entailed loss of power to achieve the correlative ends3 the result of inadequate fulfillment of the ends being diminished ability to maintain life4 ,and by inheritance1 such functionally produced modifications have respectively furthered or hindered survival in posterity4 ,as already said1 the law that each creature shall take the benefits and the evils of its nature1 be they those derived from ancestry or those due to self-produced modifications1 has been the law under which life has evolved thus far2 and it must continue to be the law however much further life may evolve4 ,whatever qualifications this natural course of action may now or hereafter undergo1 are qualifications that cannot1 without fatal results1 essentially change it4 ,any arrangements which in a considerable degree prevent superiority from profiting by the rewards of superiority1 or shield inferiority from the evils it entails--any arrangements which tend to make it as well to be inferior as to be superior1 are arrangements diametrically opposed to the progress of organization and the reaching of a higher life4 ,but to say that each individual shall reap the benefits brought to him by his own powers1 inherited and acquired1 is to enunciate egoism as an ultimate principle of conduct4 ,it is to say that egoistic claims must take precedence of altruistic claims4 #gj4 ,under its biological aspect this proposition cannot be contested by those who agree in the doctrine of ,evolution2 but probably they will not at once allow that admission of it under its ethical aspect is equally unavoidable4 ,while1 as respects development of life1 the well-working of the universal principle described is sufficiently manifest2 the well-working of it as respects increase of happiness may not be seen at once4 ,but the two cannot be disjoined4 ,incapacity of every kind and of whatever degree causes unhappiness directly and indirectly--directly by the pain consequent on the overtaxing of inadequate faculty1 and indirectly by the non-fulfillment1 or imperfect fulfillment1 of certain conditions to welfare4 ,conversely1 capacity of every kind sufficient for the requirement conduces to happiness immediately and remotely--immediately by the pleasure accompanying the normal exercise of each power that is up to its work1 and remotely by the pleasures which are furthered by the ends achieved4 ,a creature that is weak or slow of foot1 and so gets food only by exhausting efforts1 or escapes enemies with difficulty1 suffers the pains of over-strained powers1 of unsatisfied appetites1 of distressed emotions2 while the strong and swift creature of the same species delights in its efficient activities1 gains more fully the satisfactions yielded by food as well as the renewed vivacity this gives1 and has to bear fewer and smaller pains in defending itself against foes or escaping from them4 ,similarly with duller and keener senses1 or higher and lower degrees of sagacity4 ,the mentally-inferior individual of any race suffers negative and positive miseries2 while the mentally-superior individual receives negative and positive gratifications4 ,inevitably1 then1 this law in conformity with which each member of a species takes the consequences of its own nature2 and in virtue of which the progeny of each member1 participating in its nature1 also takes such consequences2 is one that tends ever to raise the aggregate happiness of the species1 by furthering the multiplication of the happier and hindering that of the less happy4 ,all this is true of human beings as of other beings4 ,the conclusion forced on us is that the pursuit of individual happiness within those limits prescribed by social conditions1 is the first requisite to the attainment of the greatest general happiness4 ,to see this it needs but to contrast one whose self-regard has maintained bodily well-being1 with one whose regardlessness of self has brought its natural results2 and then to ask what must be the contrast between two societies formed of two such kinds of individuals4 ,bounding out of bed after an unbroken sleep1 singing or whistling as he dresses1 coming down with beaming face ready to laugh on the smallest provocation1 the healthy man of high powers1 conscious of past successes and by his energy1 quickness1 resource1 made confident of the future1 enters on the day's business not with repugnance1 but with gladness2 and from hour to hour experiencing satisfactions from work effectually done1 comes home with an abundant surplus of energy remaining for hours of relaxation4 ,far otherwise is it with one who is enfeebled by great neglect of self4 ,already deficient1 his energies are made more deficient by constant endeavors to execute tasks that prove beyond his strength1 and by the resulting discouragement4 ,besides the depressing consciousness of the immediate future1 there is the depressing consciousness of the remoter future1 with its probability of accumulated difficulties and diminished ability to meet them4 ,hours of leisure which1 rightly passed1 bring pleasures that raise the tide of life and renew the powers of work1 cannot be utilized3 there is not vigor enough for enjoyments involving action1 and lack of spirits prevents passive enjoyments from being entered upon with zest4 ,in brief1 life becomes a burden4 ,now if1 as must be admitted1 in a community composed of individuals like the first1 the happiness will be relatively great1 while in one composed of individuals like the last1 there will be relatively little happiness1 or rather much misery2 it must be admitted that conduct causing the one result is good1 and conduct causing the other is bad4 ,but diminutions of general happiness are produced by inadequate egoism in several other ways4 ,these we will successively glance at4 #ga4 ,if there were no proofs of heredity--if it were the rule that the strong are usually begotten by the weak1 while the weak usually descend from the strong1 that vivacious children form the families of melancholy parents1 while fathers and mothers with overflowing spirits mostly have dull progeny1 that from stolid peasants there ordinarily come sons of high intelligence while the sons of the cultured are commonly fit for nothing but following the plow--if there were no transmission of gout1 scrofula1 insanity1 and did the diseased habitually give birth to the healthy and the healthy to the diseased1 writers on ,ethics might be justified in ignoring those effects of conduct which are felt by posterity through the natures they inherit4 ,as it is1 however1 the current ideas concerning the relative claims of egoism and altruism are vitiated by the omission of this all all-important factor4 ,for if health1 strength and capacity1 are usually transmitted2 and if disease1 feebleness1 stupidity1 generally reappear in descendants2 then a rational altruism requires insistance on that egoism which is shown by receipt of the satisfactions accompanying preservation of body and mind in the best state4 ,the necessary implication is that blessings are provided for offspring by due self-regard1 while disregard of self carried too far provides curses4 ,when1 indeed1 we remember how commonly it is remarked that high health and overflowing spirits render any lot in life tolerable1 while chronic ailments make gloomy a life most favorably circumstanced1 it becomes amazing that both the world at large and writers who make conduct their study1 should ignore the terrible evils which disregard of personal well-being inflicts on the unborn1 and the incalculable good laid up for the unborn by attention to personal well-being4 ,of all bequests of parents to children the most valuable is a sound constitution4 ,though a man's body is not a property that can be inherited1 yet his constitution may fitly be compared to an entailed estate2 and if he rightly understands his duty to posterity1 he will see that he is bound to pass on that estate uninjured if not improved4 ,to say this is to say that he must be egoistic to the extent of satisfying all those desires associated with the due performance of functions4 ,nay1 it is to say more4 ,it is to say that he must seek in due amounts the various pleasures which life offers4 ,for beyond the effect these have in raising the tide of life and maintaining constitutional vigor1 there is the effect they have in preserving and increasing a capacity for receiving enjoyment4 ,endowed with abundant energies and various tastes1 some can get gratifications of many kinds on opportunities hourly occurring2 while others are so inert1 and so uninterested in things around1 that they cannot even take the trouble to amuse themselves4 ,and unless heredity be denied1 the inference must be that due acceptance of the miscellaneous pleasures life offers1 conduces to the capacity for enjoyment in posterity2 and that persistence in dull monotonous lives by parents1 diminishes the ability of their descendants to make the best of what gratifications fall to them4 #gb4 ,beyond the decrease of general happiness which results in this indirect way1 if egoism is unduly subordinated1 there is a decrease of general happiness which results in a direct way4 ,he who carries self-regard far enough to keep himself in good health and high spirits1 in the first place1 thereby becomes an immediate source of happiness to those around1 and1 in the second place1 maintains the ability to increase their happiness by altruistic actions4 ,but one whose bodily vigor and mental health are undermined by self-sacrifice carried too far1 in the first place becomes to those around a cause of depression1 and1 in the second place1 renders himself incapable1 or less capable1 of actively furthering their welfare4 ,in estimating conduct we must remember that there are those who by their joyousness beget joy in others1 and that there are those who by their melancholy cast a gloom on every circle they enter4 ,and we must remember that by display of overflowing happiness a man of the one kind may add to the happiness of others more than by positive efforts to benefit them1 and that a man of the other kind may decrease their happiness more by his presence than he increases it by his actions4 ,full of vivacity the one is ever welcome4 ,for his wife he has smiles and jocose speeches2 for his children stores of fun and play2 for his friends pleasant talk interspersed with the sallies of wit that come from buoyancy4 ,contrariwise1 the other is shunned4 ,the irritability resulting now from ailments1 now from failures caused by feebleness1 his family has daily to bear4 ,lacking adequate energy for joining in them1 he has at best but a tepid interest in the amusements of his children1 and he is called a wet blanket by his friends4 ,little account as our ethical reasonings take note of it1 yet is the fact obvious that since happiness and misery are infectious1 such regard for self as conduces to health and high spirits is a benefaction to others1 and such disregard of self as brings on suffering1 bodily or mental1 is a malefaction to others4 ,the duty of making one's self agreeable by seeming to be pleased1 is1 indeed1 often urged1 and thus to gratify friends is applauded so long as self-sacrificing effort is implied4 ,but though display of real happiness gratifies friends far more than display of sham happiness1 and has no drawback in the shape either of hypocrisy or strain1 yet it is not thought a duty to fulfill the conditions which favor the display of real happiness4 ,nevertheless1 if quantity of happiness produced is to be the measure1 the last is more imperative than the first4 ,and then1 as above indicated1 beyond this primary series of effects produced on others there is a secondary series of effects4 ,the adequately egoistic individual retains those powers which make altruistic activities possible4 ,the individual who is inadequately egoistic loses more or less of his ability to be altruistic4 ,the truth of the one proposition is self-evident1 and the truth of the other is daily forced on us by examples4 ,note a few of them4 ,here is a mother who1 brought up in the insane fashion usual among the cultivated1 has a physique not strong enough for suckling her infant1 but who1 knowing that its natural food is the best1 and anxious for its welfare1 continues to give it milk for a longer time than her system will bear4 ,eventually the accumulating reaction tells4 ,there comes exhaustion running1 it may be1 into illness caused by depletion2 occasionally ending in death1 and often entailing chronic weakness4 ,she becomes1 perhaps for a time1 perhaps permanently1 incapable of carrying on household affairs2 her other children suffer from the loss of maternal attention2 and where the income is small1 payments for nurse and doctor tell injuriously on the whole family4 ,instance1 again1 what not unfrequently happens with the father4 ,similarly prompted by a high sense of obligation1 and misled by current moral theories into the notion that self-denial may rightly be carried to any extent1 he daily continues his office work for long hours regardless of hot head and cold feet2 and debars himself from social pleasures1 for which he thinks he can afford neither time nor money4 ,what comes of this entirely unegoistic course8 ,eventually a sudden collapse1 sleeplessness1 inability to work4 ,that rest which he would not give himself when his sensations prompted1 he has now to take in long measure4 ,the extra earnings laid by for the benefit of his family are quickly swept away by costly journeys in aid of recovery1 and by the many expenses which illness entails4 ,instead of increased ability to do his duty by his offspring1 there comes now inability4 ,life-long evils on them replace hoped-for goods4 ,and so is it1 too1 with the social effects of inadequate egoism4 ,all grades furnish examples of the mischiefs1 positive and negative1 inflicted on society by excessive neglect of self4 ,now the case is that of a laborer who1 conscientiously continuing his work under a broiling sun1 spite of violent protest from his feelings1 dies of sunstroke2 and leaves his family a burden to the parish4 ,now the case is that of a clerk whose eyes permanently fail from over-straining1 or who1 daily writing for hours after his fingers are painfully cramped1 is attacked with scrivener's palsy1 and1 unable to write at all1 sinks with aged parents into poverty which friends are called on to mitigate4 ,and now the case is that of a man devoted to public ends who1 shattering his health by ceaseless application1 fails to achieve all he might have achieved by a more reasonable apportionment of his time between labor on behalf of others and ministration to his own needs4 #gc4 ,in one further way is the undue subordination of egoism to altruism injurious4 ,both directly and indirectly unselfishness pushed to excess generates selfishness4 ,consider first the immediate effects4 ,that one man may yield up to another a gratification1 it is needful that the other shall accept it2 and where the gratification is of a kind to which their respective claims are equal1 or which is no more required by the one than by the other1 acceptance implies a readiness to get gratification at another's cost4 ,the circumstances and needs of the two being alike1 the transaction involves as much culture of egoism in the last as it involves culture of altruism in the first4 ,it is true that not unfrequently1 difference between their means or difference between their appetites for a pleasure which the one has had often and the other rarely1 divests the acceptance of this character2 and it is true that in other cases the benefactor manifestly takes so much pleasure in giving pleasure1 that the sacrifice is partial1 and the reception of it not wholly selfish4 ,but to see the effect above indicated we must exclude such inequalities1 and consider what happens where wants are approximately alike and where the sacrifices1 not reciprocated at intervals1 are perpetually on one side4 ,so restricting the inquiry all can name instances verifying the alleged result4 ,every one can remember circles in which the daily surrender of benefits by the generous to the greedy1 has caused increase of greediness1 until there has been produced an unscrupulous egoism intolerable to all around4 ,there are obvious social effects of kindred nature4 ,most thinking people now recognize the demoralization caused by indiscriminate charity4 ,they see how in the mendicant there is1 besides destruction of the normal relation between labor expended and benefit obtained1 a genesis of the expectation that others shall minister to his needs2 showing itself sometimes in the venting of curses on those who refuse4 ,next consider the remote results4 ,when the egoistic claims are so much subordinated to the altruistic as to produce physical mischief1 the tendency is toward a relative decrease in the number of the altruistic and therefore an increased predominance of the egoistic4 ,pushed to extremes1 sacrifice of self for the benefit of others leads occasionally to death before the ordinary period of marriage2 leads sometimes to abstention from marriage1 as in sisters of charity2 leads sometimes to an ill-health or a loss of attractiveness which prevents marriage2 leads sometimes to non-acquirement of the pecuniary means needed for marriage2 and in all these cases1 therefore1 the unusually altruistic leave no descendants4 ,where the postponement of personal welfare to the welfare of others has not been carried so far as to prevent marriage1 it yet not unfrequently occurs that the physical degradation resulting from years of self-neglect causes infertility2 so that again the most altruistically natured leave no like natured posterity4 ,and then in less marked and more numerous cases1 the resulting enfeeblement shows itself by the production of relatively weak offspring2 of whom some die early1 while the rest are less likely than usual to transmit the parental type to future generations4 ,inevitably1 then1 by this dying out of the especially unegoistic1 there is prevented that desirable mitigation of egoism in the average nature which would else have taken place4 ,such disregard of self as brings down bodily vigor below the normal level1 eventually produces in the society a counterbalancing excess of regard for self4 #gd4 ,that egoism precedes altruism in order of imperativeness1 is thus clearly shown4 ,the acts which make continued life possible1 must1 on the average1 be more peremptory than all those other acts which life makes possible1 including the acts which benefit others4 ,turning from life as existing to life as evolving1 we are equally shown this4 ,sentient beings have progressed from low to high types1 under the law that the superior shall profit by their superiority and the inferior shall suffer from their inferiority4 ,conformity to this law has been1 and is still1 needful1 not only for the continuance of life but for the increase of happiness3 since the superior are those having faculties better adjusted to the requirements--faculties1 therefore1 which bring in their exercise greater pleasure and less pain4 ,more special considerations join these more general ones in showing us this truth4 ,such egoism as preserves a vivacious mind in a vigorous body furthers the happiness of descendants1 whose inherited constitutions make the labors of life easy and its pleasures keen2 while1 conversely1 unhappiness is entailed on posterity by those who bequeath them constitutions injured by self-neglect4 ,again1 the individual whose well-conserved life shows itself in overflowing spirits1 becomes1 by his mere existence1 a source of pleasure to all around2 while the depression which commonly accompanies ill-health diffuses itself through family and among friends4 ,a further contrast is that whereas one who has been duly regardful of self retains the power of being helpful to others1 there results from self-abnegation in excess1 not only an inability to help others but the infliction of positive burdens on them4 ,lastly1 we come upon the truth that undue altruism increases egoism1 both directly in contemporaries and indirectly in posterity4 ,and now observe that though the general conclusion enforced by these special conclusions is at variance with nominally accepted beliefs1 it is not at variance with actually accepted beliefs4 ,while opposed to the doctrine which men are taught should be acted upon1 it is in harmony with the doctrine which they do act upon and dimly see must be acted upon4 ,for omitting such abnormalities of conduct as are instanced above1 every one1 alike by deed and word1 implies that in the business of life personal welfare is the primary consideration4 ,the laborer looking for wages in return for work done1 no less than the merchant who sells goods at a profit1 the doctor who expects fees for advice1 the priest who calls the scene of his ministrations a living1 assumes as beyond question the truth that selfishness1 carried to the extent of enforcing his claims and enjoying the returns his efforts bring1 is not only legitimate but essential4 ,even persons who avow a contrary conviction prove by their acts that it is inoperative4 ,those who repeat with emphasis the maxim1 ,love your neighbor as yourself1 do not render up what they possess so as to satisfy the desires of all as much as they satisfy their own desires4 ,nor do those whose extreme maxim is1 ,live for others1 differ appreciably from people around in their regards for personal welfare1 or fail to appropriate their shares of life's pleasures4 ,in short1 that which is above set forth as the belief to which scientific ethics leads us1 is that which men do really believe1 as distinguished from that which they believe they believe4 ,finally1 it may be remarked that a rational egoism1 so far from implying a more egoistic human nature1 is consistent with a human nature that is less egoistic4 ,for excesses in one direction do not prevent excesses in the opposite direction2 but rather1 extreme deviations from the mean on one side lead to extreme deviations on the other side4 ,a society in which the most exalted principles of self-sacrifice for the benefit of neighbors are enunciated1 may be a society in which unscrupulous sacrifice of alien fellow-creatures is not only tolerated but applauded4 ,along with professed anxiety to spread these exalted principles among heathens1 there may go the deliberate fastening of a quarrel upon them with a view to annexing their territory4 ,men who every ,sunday have listened approvingly to injunctions carrying the regard for other men to an impracticable extent1 may yet hire themselves out to slay1 at the word of command1 any people in any part of the world1 utterly indifferent to the right or wrong of the matter fought about4 ,and as in these cases transcendent altruism in theory co-exists with brutal egoism in practice1 so conversely1 a more qualified altruism may have for its concomitant a greatly moderated egoism4 ,for asserting the due claims of self1 is1 by implication1 drawing a limit beyond which the claims are undue2 and is1 by consequence1 bringing into greater clearness the claims of others4 ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,,altruism ,,versus ,,egoism4 #ge4 ,if we define altruism as being all action which1 in the normal course of things1 benefits others instead of benefiting self1 then1 from the dawn of life1 altruism has been no less essential than egoism4 ,though1 primarily1 it is dependent on egoism1 yet1 secondarily1 egoism is dependent on it4 ,under altruism1 in this comprehensive sense1 ,i take in the acts by which offspring are preserved and the species maintained4 ,moreover1 among these acts must be included not such only as are accompanied by consciousness but also such as conduce to the welfare of offspring without mental representation of the welfare--acts of automatic altruism as we may call them4 ,nor must there be left out those lowest altruistic acts which subserve race-maintenance without implying even automatic nervous processes--acts not in the remotest sense psychical1 but in a literal sense physical4 ,whatever action1 unconscious or conscious1 involves expenditure of individual life to the end of increasing life in other individuals1 is unquestionably altruistic in a sense1 if not in the usual sense1 and it is here needful to understand it in this sense that we may see how conscious altruism grows out of unconscious altruism4 ,the simplest beings habitually multiply by spontaneous fission4 ,physical altruism of the lowest kind1 differentiating from physical egoism1 may1 in this case1 be considered as not yet independent of it4 ,for since the two halves which1 before fission1 constituted the individual1 do not on dividing disappear1 we must say that though the individuality of the parent infusorium or other protozoon is lost in ceasing to be single1 yet the old individual continues to exist in each of the new individuals4 ,when1 however1 as happens generally with these smallest animals1 an interval of quiescence ends in the breaking up of the whole body into minute parts1 each of which is the germ of a young one1 we see the parent entirely sacrificed in forming progeny4 ,here might be described how among creatures of higher grades1 by fission or gemmation1 parents bequeath parts of their bodies1 more or less organized1 to form offspring at the cost of their own individualities4 ,numerous examples might also be given of the ways in which the development of ova is carried to the extent of making the parental body little more than a receptacle for them3 the implication being that the accumulations of nutriment which parental activities have laid up1 are disposed of for the benefit of posterity4 ,and then might be dwelt on the multitudinous cases where1 as generally throughout the insect-world1 maturity having been reached and a new generation provided for1 life ends3 death follows the sacrifices made for progeny4 ,but leaving these lower types in which the altruism is physical only1 or in which it is physical and automatically psychical only1 let us ascend to those in which it is also1 to a considerable degree1 conscious4 ,though1 in birds and mammals1 such parental activities1 as are guided by instinct1 are accompanied by either no representations or but vague representations of the benefits which the young receive1 yet there are also in them actions which we may class as altruistic in the higher sense4 ,the agitation which creatures of these classes show when their young are in danger1 joined often with efforts on their behalf1 as well as grief displayed after loss of their young1 make it manifest that in them parental altruism has a concomitant of emotion4 ,those who understand by altruism only the conscious sacrifice of self to others among human beings1 will think it strange1 or even absurd1 to extend its meaning so widely4 ,but the justification for doing this is greater than has thus far appeared4 ,i do not mean merely that in the course of evolution1 there has been a progress through infinitesimal gradations from purely physical and unconscious sacrifices of the individual for the welfare of the species1 up to sacrifices consciously made4 ,i mean that from first to last the sacrifices are1 when reduced to their lowest terms1 of the same essential nature3 to the last1 as at first1 there is involved a loss of bodily substance4 ,when a part of the parental body is detached in the shape of gemmule1 or egg1 or foetus1 the material sacrifice is conspicuous3 and when the mother yields milk by absorbing which the young one grows1 it cannot be questioned that there is also a material sacrifice4 ,but though a material sacrifice is not manifest when the young are benefitted by activities on their behalf2 yet1 as no effort can be made without an equivalent waste of tissue1 and as the bodily loss is proportionate to the expenditure that takes place without reimbursement in food consumed1 it follows that efforts made in fostering offspring do really represent a part of the parental substance2 which is now given indirectly instead of directly4 ,self-sacrifice1 then1 is no less primordial than self-preservation4 ,being in its simple physical form absolutely necessary for the continuance of life from the beginning2 and being extended under its automatic form1 as indispensable to maintenance of race in types considerably advanced2 and being developed to its semi-conscious and conscious forms1 along with the continued and complicated attendance by which the offspring of superior creatures are brought to maturity1 altruism has been evolving simultaneously with egoism4 ,as was pointed out in an early chapter1 the same superiorities which have enabled the individual to preserve itself better1 have enabled it better to preserve the individuals derived from it2 and each higher species1 using its improved faculties primarily for egoistic benefit1 has spread in proportion as it has used them secondarily for altruistic benefit4 ,the imperativeness of altruism as thus understood1 is1 indeed1 no less than the imperativeness of egoism was shown to be in the last chapter4 ,for while1 on the one hand1 a falling short of normal egoistic acts entails enfeeblement or loss of life1 and therefore loss of ability to perform altruistic acts1 on the other hand1 such defect of altruistic acts as causes death of offspring or inadequate development of them1 involves disappearance from future generations of the nature that is not altruistic enough--so decreasing the average egoism4 ,in short1 every species is continually purifying itself from the unduly egoistic individuals1 while there are being lost to it the unduly altruistic individuals4 #gf4 ,as there has been an advance by degrees from unconscious parental altruism to conscious parental altruism of the highest kind1 so has there been an advance by degrees from the altruism of the family to social altruism4 ,a fact to be first noted is that only where altruistic relations in the domestic group have reached highly-developed forms1 do there arise conditions making possible full development of altruistic relations in the political group4 ,tribes in which promiscuity prevails1 or in which the marital relations are transitory1 and tribes in which polyandry entails in another way indefinite relationships1 are incapable of much organization4 ,nor do peoples who are habitually polygamous show themselves able to take on those high forms of social co-operation which demand due subordination of self to others4 ,only where monogamic marriage has become general and eventually universal--only where there have consequently been established the closest ties of blood--only where family altruism has been most fostered1 has social altruism become conspicuous4 ,it needs but to recall the compound forms of the ,aryan family1 as described by ,sir ,henry ,maine and others1 to see that family feeling1 first extending itself to the gens and the tribe1 and afterward to the society formed of related tribes1 prepared the way for fellow feeling among citizens not of the same stock4 ,recognizing this natural transition1 we are here chiefly concerned to observe that throughout the latter stages of the progress1 as throughout the former1 increase of egoistic satisfactions has depended on growth of regard for the satisfactions of others4 ,on contemplating a line of successive parents and offspring1 we see that each1 enabled while young to live by the sacrifices predecessors make for it1 itself makes1 when adult1 equivalent sacrifices for successors1 and that1 in default of this general balancing of benefits received by benefits given2 the line dies out4 ,similarly1 it is manifest that in a society each generation of members1 indebted for such benefits as social organization yields them to preceding generations1 who have by their sacrifices elaborated this organization1 are called on to make for succeeding generations such kindred sacrifices as shall at least maintain this organization1 if they do not improve it3 the alternative being decay and eventual dissolution of the society1 implying gradual decrease in the egoistic satisfactions of its members4 ,and now we are prepared to consider the several ways in which1 under social conditions1 personal welfare depends on due regard for the welfare of others4 ,already the conclusions to be drawn have been foreshadowed4 ,as in the chapter on the biological view were implied the inferences definitely set forth in the last chapter1 so in the chapter on the sociological view were implied the inferences to be definitely set forth here4 ,sundry of these are trite enough1 but they must1 nevertheless1 be specified1 since the statement would be incomplete without them4 #gg4 ,first1 to be dealt with comes that negative altruism implied by such curbing of the egoistic impulses as prevents direct aggression4 ,as before shown1 if men instead of living separately are to unite for defense or for other purposes1 they must severally reap more good than evil from the union4 ,on the average1 each must lose less from the antagonisms of those with whom he is associated than he gains by the association4 ,at the outset1 therefore1 that increase of egoistic satisfactions which the social state brings1 can be purchased only by altruism sufficient to cause some recognition of others' claims3 if not a voluntary recognition1 still1 a compulsory recognition4 ,while the recognition is but of that lowest kind due to dread of retaliation1 or of prescribed punishment1 the egoistic gain from association is small1 and it becomes considerable only as the recognition becomes voluntary--that is1 more altruistic4 ,where1 as among some of the wild ,australians1 there exists no limit to the right of the strongest1 and the men fight to get possession of women while the wives of one man fight among themselves about him1 the pursuit of egoistic satisfactions is greatly impeded4 ,besides the bodily pain occasionally given to each by conflict1 and the more or less of subsequent inability to achieve personal ends1 there is the waste of energy entailed in maintaining readiness for self-defense1 and there is the accompanying occupation of consciousness by emotions that are on the average of cases disagreeable4 ,moreover1 the primary end of safety1 in presence of external foes1 is ill-attained in proportion as there are internal animosities1 such furtherance of satisfactions as industrial co-operation brings cannot be had1 and there is little motive to labor for extra benefits when the products of labor are insecure4 ,and from this early stage to comparatively late stages we may trace in the wearing of arms1 in the carrying on of family feuds1 and in the taking of daily precautions for safety1 the ways in which the egoistic satisfactions of each are diminished by deficiency of that altruism which checks overt injury of others4 ,the private interests of the individual are on the average better subserved1 not only in proportion as he himself refrains from direct aggression1 but also1 on the average1 in proportion as he succeeds in diminishing the aggressions of his fellows on one another4 ,the prevalence of antagonism among those around1 impedes the activities carried on by each in pursuit of satisfactions2 and by causing disorder makes the beneficial results of activities more doubtful4 ,hence1 each profits egoistically from the growth of an altruism which leads each to aid in preventing or diminishing others' violence4 ,the like holds when we pass to that altruism which restrains the undue egoism displayed in breaches of contract4 ,general acceptance of the maxim that honesty is the best policy1 implies general experience that gratification of the self-regarding feelings is eventually furthered by such checking of them as maintains equitable dealings4 ,and here1 as before1 each is personally interested in securing good treatment of his fellows by one another4 ,for in countless ways evils are entailed on each by the prevalence of fraudulent transactions4 ,as every one knows1 the larger the number of a shop-keeper's bills left unpaid by some customers1 the higher must be the prices which other customers pay4 ,the more manufacturers lose by defective raw materials or by carelessness of workmen1 the more must they charge for their fabrics to buyers4 ,the less trustworthy people are1 the higher rises the rate of interest1 the larger becomes the amount of capital hoarded1 the greater are the impediments to industry4 ,the further traders and people in general go beyond their means1 and hypothecate the property of others in speculation1 the more serious are those commercial panics which brings disasters on multitudes and injuriously affect all4 ,this introduces us to yet a third way in which such personal welfare as results from the proportioning of benefits gained to labors given1 depends on the making of certain sacrifices for social welfare4 ,the man who1 expending his energies wholly on private affairs refuses to take trouble about public affairs1 pluming himself on his wisdom in minding his own business1 is blind to the fact that his own business is made possible only by maintenance of a healthy social state1 and that he loses all round by defective governmental arrangements4 ,where there are many like-minded with himself--where1 as a consequence1 offices come to be filled by political adventurers and opinion is swayed by demagogues--where bribery vitiates the administration of the law and makes fraudulent ,state transactions habitual1 heavy penalties fall on the community at large1 and1 among others1 on those who have thus done everything for self and nothing for society4 ,their investments are insecure2 recovery of their debts is difficult1 and even their lives are less safe than they would otherwise have been4 ,so that on such altruistic actions as are implied1 firstly in being just1 secondly in seeing justice done between others1 and thirdly1 in upholding and improving the agencies by which justice is administered1 depend1 in large measure1 the egoistic satisfactions of each4 #gh4 ,but the identification of personal advantage with the advantage of fellow-citizens is much wider than this4 ,in various other ways the well-being of each rises and falls with the well-being of all4 ,a weak man left to provide for his own wants1 suffers by getting smaller amounts of food and other necessaries than he might get were he stronger4 ,in a community formed of weak men1 who divide their labors and exchange the products1 all suffer evils from the weakness of their fellows4 ,the quantity of each kind of product is made deficient by the deficiency of laboring power2 and the share each gets for such share of his own product as he can afford to give1 is relatively small4 ,just as the maintenance of paupers1 hospital patients1 inmates of asylums1 and others who consume but do not produce1 leaves to be divided among producers a smaller stock of commodities than would exist were there no incapables2 so must there be left a smaller stock of commodities to be divided1 the greater the number of inefficient producers1 or the greater the average deficiency of producing power4 ,hence1 whatever decreases the strength of men in general restricts the gratifications of each by making the means to them dearer4 ,more directly1 and more obviously1 does the bodily well-being of his fellows concern him2 for their bodily ill-being1 when it takes certain shapes1 is apt to bring similar bodily ill-being on him4 ,if he is not himself attacked by cholera1 or small-pox1 or typhus1 when it invades his neighborhood1 he often suffers a penalty through his belongings4 ,under conditions spreading it1 his wife catches diphtheria1 or his servant is laid up with scarlet fever1 or his children take now this and now that infectious disorder4 ,add together the immediate and remote evils brought on him year after year by epidemics1 and it becomes manifest that his egoistic satisfactions are greatly furthered by such altruistic activities as render disease less prevalent4 ,with the mental1 as well as with the bodily1 states of fellow-citizens1 his enjoyments are in multitudinous ways bound up4 ,stupidity like weakness raises the cost of commodities4 ,where farming is unimproved1 the prices of food are higher than they would else be2 where antiquated routine maintains itself in trade1 the needless expense of distribution weighs on all2 where there is no inventiveness1 every one loses the benefits which improved appliances diffuse4 ,other than economic evils come from the average unintelligence--periodically through the manias and panics that arise because traders rush in herds all to buy or all to sell2 and habitually through the mal-administration of justice1 which people and rulers alike disregard while pursuing this or that legislative will-o'-the-wisp4 ,closer and clearer is the dependence of his personal satisfactions on others' mental states1 which each experiences in his household4 ,unpunctuality and want of system are perpetual sources of annoyance4 ,the unskillfulness of the cook causes frequent vexation and occasional indigestion4 ,lack of forethought in the housemaid leads to a fall over a bucket in a dark passage4 ,and inattention to a message or forgetfulness in delivering it1 entails failure in an important engagement4 ,each1 therefore1 benefits egoistically by such altruism as aids in raising the average intelligence4 ,i do not mean such altruism as taxes ratepayers that children's minds may be filled with dates1 and names1 and gossip about kings1 and narratives of battles1 and other useless information1 no amount of which will make them capable workers or good citizens2 but ,i mean such altruism as helps to spread a knowledge of the nature of things and to cultivate the power of applying that knowledge4 ,yet again1 each has a private interest in public morals and profits by improving them4 ,not in large ways only1 by aggressions and breaches of contract1 by adulterations and short measures1 does each suffer from the general unconscientiousness2 but in more numerous small ways4 ,now it is through the untruthfulness of one who gives a good character to a bad servant2 now it is by the recklessness of a laundress who1 using bleaching agents to save trouble in washing1 destroys his linen2 now it is by the acted falsehood of railway passengers who1 by dispersed coats1 make him believe that all the seats in a compartment are taken when they are not4 ,yesterday the illness of his child due to foul gases1 led to the discovery of a drain that had become choked because it was ill-made by a dishonest builder under supervision of a careless or bribed surveyor4 ,to-day workmen employed to rectify it bring on him cost and inconvenience by dawdling2 and their low standard of work1 determined by the unionist principle that the better workers must not discredit the worse by exceeding them in efficiency1 he may trace to the immoral belief that the unworthy should fare as well as the worthy4 ,to-morrow it turns out that business for the plumber has been provided by damage which the bricklayers have done4 ,thus the improvement of others1 physically1 intellectually and morally1 personally concerns each2 since their imperfections tell in raising the cost of all the commodities he buys1 in increasing the taxes and rates he pays1 and in the losses of time1 trouble and money1 daily brought on by others' carelessness1 stupidity1 or unconscientiousness4 #gi4 ,very obvious are certain more immediate connections between personal welfare and ministration to the welfare of those around4 ,the evils suffered by those whose behavior is unsympathetic1 and the benefits to self which unselfish conduct brings1 show these4 ,that any one should have formulated his experience by saying that the conditions to success are a hard heart and a sound digestion1 is marvelous considering the many proofs that success1 even of a material kind1 greatly depending as it does on the good offices of others1 is furthered by whatever creates good will in others4 ,the contrast between the prosperity of those who1 to but moderate abilities join natures which beget friendships by their kindliness1 and the adversity of those who1 though possessed of superior faculties and greater acquirements1 arouse dislikes by their hardness or indifference1 should force upon all the truth that egoistic enjoyments are aided by altruistic actions4 ,this increase of personal benefit achieved by benefiting others is but partially achieved where a selfish motive prompts the seemingly unselfish act3 it is fully achieved only where the act is really unselfish4 ,though services rendered with the view of some time profiting by reciprocated services1 answer to a certain extent2 yet1 ordinarily1 they answer only to the extent of bringing equivalents of reciprocated services4 ,those which bring more than equivalents are those not prompted by any thoughts of equivalents4 ,for obviously it is the spontaneous outflow of good nature1 not in the larger acts of life only but in all its details1 which generates in those around the attachments prompting unstinted benevolence4 ,besides furthering prosperity1 other regarding actions conduce to self-regarding gratifications by generating a genial environment4 ,with the sympathetic being every one feels more sympathy than with others4 ,all conduct themselves with more than usual amiability to a person who hourly discloses a lovable nature4 ,such a one is practically surrounded by a world of better people than one who is less attractive4 ,if we contrast the state of a man possessing all the material means to happiness1 but isolated by his absolute egoism1 with the state of an altruistic man relatively poor in means but rich in friends1 we may see that various gratifications1 not to be purchased by money1 come in abundance to the last and are inaccessible to the first4 ,while1 then1 there is one kind of other regarding action1 furthering the prosperity of fellow-citizens at large1 which admits of being deliberately pursued from motives that are remotely self-regarding--the conviction being that personal well-being depends in large measure on the well-being of society--there is an additional kind of other regarding action having in it no element of conscious self-regard1 which nevertheless conduces greatly to egoistic satisfactions4 #hj4 ,yet other modes exist in which egoism unqualified by altruism habitually fails4 ,it diminishes the totality of egoistic pleasure by diminishing in several directions the capacity for pleasure4 ,self gratifications1 considered separately1 or in the aggregate1 lose their intensities by that too great persistence in them which results if they are made the exclusive objects of pursuit4 ,the law that function entails waste1 and that faculties yielding pleasure by their action cannot act incessantly without exhaustion and accompanying satiety1 has the implication that intervals during which altruistic activities absorb the energies1 are intervals during which the capacity for egoistic pleasure is recovering its full degree4 ,the sensitiveness to purely personal enjoyments is maintained at a higher pitch by those who minister to the enjoyments of others than it is by those who devote themselves wholly to personal enjoyments4 ,this which is manifest even while the tide of life is high1 becomes still more manifest as life ebbs4 ,it is in maturity and old age that we especially see how1 as egoistic pleasures grow faint1 altruistic actions come in to revive them in new forms4 ,the contrast between the child's delight in the novelties daily revealed1 and the indifference which comes as the world around grows familiar1 until1 in adult life1 there remain comparatively few things that are greatly enjoyed1 draws from all the reflection that as years go by pleasures pall4 ,and to those who think it becomes clear that only through sympathy can pleasures be indirectly gained from things that have ceased to yield pleasures directly4 ,in the gratifications derived by parents from the gratifications of their offspring1 this is conspicuously shown4 ,trite as is the remark that men live afresh in their children1 it is needful here to set it down as reminding us of the way in which1 as the egoistic satisfactions in life fade1 altruism renews them while it transfigures them4 ,we are thus introduced to a more general consideration--the egoistic aspect of altruistic pleasure4 ,not1 indeed1 that this is the place for discussing the question whether the egoistic element can be excluded from altruism1 nor is it the place for distinguishing between the altruism which is pursued with a foresight of the pleasurable feeling to be achieved through it1 and the altruism which1 though it achieves this pleasurable feeling1 does not make pursuit of it a motive4 ,here we are concerned with the fact that1 whether knowingly or unknowingly gained1 the state of mind accompanying altruistic action1 being a pleasurable state1 is to be counted in the sum of pleasures which the individual can receive1 and in this sense cannot be other than egoistic4 ,that we must so regard it is proved on observing that this pleasure1 like pleasures in general1 conduces to the physical prosperity of the ego4 ,as every other agreeable emotion raises the tide of life1 so does the agreeable emotion which accompanies a benevolent deed4 ,as it cannot be denied that the pain caused by the sight of suffering depresses the vital functions--sometimes even to the extent of arresting the heart's action1 as in one who faints on seeing a surgical operation1 so neither can it be denied that the joy felt in witnessing others' joy exalts the vital functions4 ,hence1 however much we may hesitate to class altruistic pleasure as a higher kind of egoistic pleasure1 we are obliged to recognize the fact that its immediate effects in augmenting life and so furthering personal well-being1 are like those of pleasures that are directly egoistic4 ,and the corollary drawn must be that pure egoism is1 even in its immediate results1 less successfully egoistic than is the egoism duly qualified by altruism1 which1 besides achieving additional pleasures1 achieves also1 through raised vitality1 a greater capacity for pleasures in general4 ,that the range of sthetic gratifications is wider for the altruistic nature than for the egoistic nature is also a truth not to be overlooked4 ,the joys and sorrows of human beings form a chief element in the subject-matter of art1 and1 evidently1 the pleasures which art gives increase as the fellow-feeling with these joys and sorrows strengthens4 ,if we contrast early poetry occupied mainly with war and gratifying the savage instincts by descriptions of bloody victories1 with the poetry of modern times1 in which the sanguinary forms but a small part while a large part1 dealing with the gentler affections1 enlists the feelings of readers on behalf of the weak2 we are shown that with the development of a more altruistic nature there has been opened a sphere of enjoyment inaccessible to the callous egoism of barbarous times4 ,so1 too1 between the fiction of the past and the fiction of the present1 there is the difference that while the one was almost exclusively occupied with the doings of the ruling classes1 and found its plots in their antagonisms and deeds of violence1 the other1 chiefly taking stories of peaceful life for its subjects1 and to a considerable extent the life of the humbler classes1 discloses a new world of interest in the every-day pleasures and pains of ordinary people4 ,a like contrast exists between early and late forms of plastic art4 ,when not representing acts of worship1 the wall sculptures and wall-paintings of the ,assyrians and ,egyptians1 or the decorations of temples among the ,greeks1 represented deeds of conquest2 whereas in modern times1 while the works which glorify destructive activities are less numerous1 there are an increasing number of works gratifying to the kindlier sentiments of spectators4 ,to see that those who care nothing about the feelings of other beings are1 by implication1 shut out from a wide range of sthetic pleasures1 it needs but to ask whether men who delight in dog-fights may be expected to appreciate ,beethoven's ,adelaida1 or whether ,tennyson's ,in ,memoriam would greatly move a gang of convicts4 #ha4 ,from the dawn of life1 then1 egoism has been dependent upon altruism as altruism has been dependent upon egoism1 and in the course of evolution the reciprocal services of the two have been increasing4 ,the physical and unconscious self-sacrifice of parents to form offspring1 which the lowest living things display from hour to hour1 shows us in its primitive form the altruism which makes possible the egoism of individual life and growth4 ,as we ascend to higher grades of creatures1 this parental altruism becomes a direct yielding up of only part of the body1 joined with an increasing contribution from the remainder in the shape of tissue wasted in efforts made on behalf of progeny4 ,this indirect sacrifice of substance1 replacing more and more the direct sacrifice as parental altruism becomes higher1 continues to the last to represent also altruism which is other than parental2 since this1 too1 implies loss of substance in making efforts that do not bring their return in personal aggrandizement4 ,after noting how among mankind parental altruism and family altruism pass into social altruism1 we observed that a society1 like a species1 survives only on condition that each generation of its members shall yield to the next1 benefits equivalent to those it has received from the last4 ,and this implies that care for the family must be supplemented by care for the society4 ,fullness of egoistic satisfactions in the associated state1 depending primarily on maintenance of the normal relation between efforts expended and benefits obtained1 which underlies all life1 implies an altruism which both prompts equitable conduct and prompts the enforcing of equity4 ,the well-being of each is involved with the well-being of all in sundry other ways4 ,whatever conduces to their vigor concerns him1 for it diminishes the cost of everything he buys4 ,whatever conduces to their freedom from disease concerns him1 for it diminishes his own liability to disease4 ,whatever raises their intelligence concerns him1 for inconveniences are daily entailed on him by others' ignorance or folly4 ,whatever raises their moral character concerns him1 for at every turn he suffers from the average unconscientiousness4 ,much more directly do his egoistic satisfactions depend on those altruistic activities which enlist the sympathies of others4 ,by alienating those around1 selfishness loses the unbought aid they can render2 shuts out a wide range of social enjoyments1 and fails to receive those exaltations of pleasure and mitigations of pain which come from men's fellow-feeling with those they like4 ,lastly1 undue egoism defeats itself by bringing on an incapacity for happiness4 ,purely egoistic gratifications are rendered less keen by satiety1 even in the earlier part of life1 and almost disappear in the later2 the less satiating gratifications of altruism are missed throughout life1 and especially in that latter part when they largely replace egoistic gratifications2 and there is a lack of susceptibility to sthetic pleasures of the higher orders4 ,an indication must be added of the truth1 scarcely at all recognized1 that this dependence of egoism upon altruism ranges beyond the limits of each society1 and tends ever toward universality4 ,that within each society it becomes greater as social evolution1 implying increase of mutual dependence1 progresses1 needs not be shown2 and it is a corollary that as fast as dependence of societies on one another is increased by commercial intercourse1 the internal welfare of each becomes a matter of concern to the others4 ,that the impoverishment of any country1 diminishing both its producing and consuming powers1 tells detrimentally on the people of countries trading with it1 is a commonplace of political economy4 ,moreover1 we have had of late years1 abundant experience of the industrial derangements through which distress is brought on nations not immediately concerned by wars between other nations4 ,and if each community has the egoistic satisfactions of its members diminished by aggressions of neighboring communities on one another1 still more does it have them diminished by its own aggressions4 ,one who marks how1 in various parts of the world1 the unscrupulous greed of conquest cloaked by pretences of spreading the blessings of ,british rule and ,british religion1 is now reacting to the immense detriment of the industrial classes at home1 alike by increasing expenditure and paralyzing trade1 may see that these industrial classes1 absorbed in questions about capital and labor1 and thinking themselves unconcerned in our doings abroad1 are suffering from lack of that wide-reaching altruism which should insist on just dealings with other peoples1 civilized or savage4 ,and he may also see that beyond these immediate evils1 they will for a generation to come suffer the evils that must flow from resuscitating the type of social organization which aggressive activities produce1 and from the lowered moral tone which is its accompaniment4 ,,chapter ,,xiii4 ,,trial ,,and ,,compromise4 #hb4 ,in the foregoing two chapters the case on behalf of ,egoism and the case on behalf of ,altruism have been stated4 ,the two conflict2 and we have now to consider what verdict ought to be given4 ,if the opposed statements are severally valid1 or even if each of them is valid in part1 the inference must be that pure egoism and pure altruism are both illegitimate4 ,if the maxim1 ,live for self1 is wrong1 so also is the maxim1 ,live for others4 ,hence1 a compromise is the only possibility4 ,this conclusion1 though already seeming unavoidable1 ,i do not here set down as proved4 ,the purpose of this chapter is to justify it in full1 and ,i enunciate it at the outset because the arguments used will be better understood1 if the conclusion to which they converge is in the reader's view4 ,how shall we so conduct the discussion as most clearly to bring out this necessity for a compromise8 ,perhaps the best way will be that of stating one of the two claims in its extreme form1 and observing the implied absurdities4 ,to deal thus with the principle of pure selfishness would be to waste space4 ,every one sees that an unchecked satisfaction of personal desires from moment to moment1 in absolute disregard of all other beings1 would cause universal conflict and social dissolution4 ,the principle of pure unselfishness1 less obviously mischievous1 may therefore better be chosen4 ,there are two aspects under which the doctrine that others' happiness is the true ethical aim presents itself4 ,the others may be conceived personally1 as individuals with whom we stand in direct relations1 or they may be conceived impersonally1 as constituting the community4 ,in so far as the self-abnegation implied by pure altruism is concerned1 it matters not in which sense others is used4 ,but criticism will be facilitated by distinguishing between these two forms of it4 ,we will take the last form first4 #hc4 ,this commits us to an examination of the greatest happiness principle1 as enunciated by ,bentham and his followers4 ,the doctrine that the general happiness ought to be the object of pursuit1 is not1 indeed1 overtly identified with pure altruism4 ,but as1 if general happiness is the proper end of action1 the individual actor must regard his own share of it simply as a unit in the aggregate1 no more to be valued by him than any other unit1 it results that since this unit is almost infinitesimal in comparison with the aggregate1 his action1 if directed exclusively to achievement of general happiness1 is1 if not absolutely altruistic1 as nearly so as may be4 ,hence1 the theory which makes general happiness the immediate object of pursuit may rightly be taken as one form of the pure altruism to be here criticised4 ,both as justifying this interpretation and as furnishing a definite proposition with which to deal1 let me set out by quoting a passage from ,mr4 ,mill's ,utilitarianism3 ,the ,greatest ,happiness ,principle1 he says1 is a mere form of words without rational signification1 unless one person's happiness1 supposed equal in degree 7with the proper allowance made for kind71 is counted for exactly as much as another's4 ,those conditions being supplied1 ,bentham's dictum1 'everybody to count for one1 nobody for more than one1' might be written under the principle of utility as an explanatory commentary 7p4 #ia74 ,now1 though the meaning of greatest happiness1 as an end1 is here to a certain degree defined1 the need for further definition is felt the moment we attempt to decide on ways of regulating conduct so as to attain the end4 ,the first question which arises is1 must we regard this greatest happiness principle as a principle of guidance for the community in its corporate capacity1 or as a principle of guidance for its members separately considered1 or both8 ,if the reply is that the principle must be taken as a guide for governmental action rather than for individual action1 we are at once met by the inquiry1 what is to be the guide for individual action8 ,if individual action is not to be regulated solely for the purpose of achieving the greatest happiness of the greatest number1 some other principle of regulation for individual action is required1 and the greatest happiness principle fails to furnish the needful ethical standard4 ,should it be rejoined that the individual in his capacity of political unit is to take furtherance of general happiness as his end1 giving his vote or otherwise acting on the legislature with a view to this end1 and that in so far guidance is supplied to him1 there comes the further inquiry1 whence is to come guidance for the remainder of individual conduct1 constituting by far the greater part of it8 ,if this private part of individual conduct is not to have general happiness as its direct aim1 then an ethical standard other than that offered has still to be found4 ,hence1 unless pure altruism as thus formulated confesses its inadequacy1 it must justify itself as a sufficient rule for all conduct1 individual and social4 ,we will first deal with it as the alleged right principle of public policy2 and then as the alleged right principle of private action4 #hd4 ,on trying to understand precisely the statement that when taking general happiness as an end1 the rule must be--everybody to count for one1 nobody for more than one1 there arises the idea of distribution4 ,we can form no idea of distribution without thinking of something distributed and recipients of this something4 ,that we may clearly conceive the proposition we must clearly conceive both these elements of it4 ,let us take first the recipients4 ,everybody to count for one1 nobody for more than one4 ,does this mean that1 in respect of whatever is proportioned out1 each is to have the same share whatever his character1 whatever his conduct8 ,shall he if passive have as much as if active8 ,shall he if useless have as much as if useful8 ,shall he if criminal have as much as if virtuous8 ,if the distribution is to be made without reference to the natures and deeds of the recipients1 then it must be shown that a system which equalizes1 as far as it can1 the treatment of good and bad1 will be beneficial4 ,if the distribution is not to be indiscriminate1 then the formula disappears4 ,the something distributed must be apportioned otherwise than by equal division4 ,there must be adjustment of amounts to deserts2 and we are left in the dark as to the mode of adjustment--we have to find other guidance4 ,let us next ask what is the something to be distributed8 ,the first idea which occurs is that happiness itself must be divided out among all4 ,taken literally1 the notions that the greatest happiness should be the end sought1 and that in apportioning it everybody should count for one and nobody for more than one1 imply that happiness is something that can be cut up into parts and handed round4 ,this1 however1 is an impossible interpretation4 ,but after recognizing the impossibility of it1 there returns the question--,what is it in respect of which everybody is to count for one and nobody for more than one8 ,shall the interpretation be that the concrete means to happiness are to be equally divided8 ,is it intended that there shall be distributed to all in equal portions the necessaries of life1 the appliances to comfort1 the facilities for amusement8 ,as a conception simply1 this is more defensible4 ,but passing over the question of policy--passing over the question whether greatest happiness would ultimately be secured by such a process 7which it obviously would not7 it turns out on examination that greatest happiness could not even proximately be so secured4 ,differences of age1 of growth1 of constitutional need1 differences of activity and consequent expenditure1 differences of desires and tastes1 would entail the inevitable result that the material aids to happiness which each received would be more or less unadapted to his requirements4 ,even if purchasing power were equally divided1 the greatest happiness would not be achieved if everybody counted for one and nobody for more than one2 since1 as the capacities for utilizing the purchased means to happiness would vary both with the constitution and the stage of life1 the means which would approximately suffice to satisfy the wants of one would be extremely insufficient to satisfy the wants of another1 and so the greatest total of happiness would not be obtained3 means might be unequally apportioned in a way that would produce a greater total4 ,but now if happiness itself cannot be cut up and distributed equally1 and if equal division of the material aids to happiness would not produce greatest happiness1 what is the thing to be thus apportioned8 ,what is it in respect of which everybody is to count for one and nobody for more than one8 ,there seems but a single possibility4 ,there remain to be equally distributed nothing but the conditions under which each may pursue happiness4 ,the limitations to action--the degrees of freedom and restraint1 shall be alike for all4 ,each shall have as much liberty to pursue his ends as consists with maintaining like liberties to pursue their ends by others2 and one as much as another shall have the enjoyment of that which his efforts1 carried on within these limits1 obtain4 ,but to say that in respect of these conditions everybody shall count for one and nobody for more than one1 is simply to say that equity shall be enforced4 ,thus1 considered as a principle of public policy1 ,bentham's principle1 when analyzed1 transforms itself into the principle he slights4 ,not general happiness becomes the ethical standard by which legislative action is to be guided1 but universal justice4 ,and so the altruistic theory under this form collapses4 #he4 ,from examining the doctrine that general happiness should be the end of public action1 we pass now to examine the doctrine that it should be the end of private action4 ,it is contended that from the standpoint of pure reason1 the happiness of others has no less a claim as an object of pursuit for each than personal happiness4 ,considered as parts of a total1 happiness felt by self and like happiness felt by another1 are of equal values2 and hence it is inferred that1 rationally estimated1 the obligation to expend effort for others' benefit1 is as great as the obligation to expend effort for one's own benefit4 ,holding that the utilitarian system of morals1 rightly understood1 harmonizes with the ,christian maxim1 ,love your neighbor as yourself1 ,mr4 ,mill says that as between his own happiness and that of others1 utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator 7p4 #bd74 ,let us consider the alternative interpretations which may be given to this statement4 ,suppose1 first1 that a certain quantum of happiness has in some way become available1 without the special instrumentality of ,a1 ,b1 ,c1 or ,d1 constituting the group concerned4 ,then the proposition is that each shall be ready to have this quantum of happiness as much enjoyed by one or more of the others as by himself4 ,the disinterested and benevolent spectator would clearly1 in such a case1 rule that no one ought to have more of the happiness than another4 ,but here1 assuming as we do that the quantum of happiness has become available without the agency of any among the group1 simple equity dictates as much4 ,no one having in any way established a claim different from the claims of others1 their claims are equal2 and due regard for justice by each will not permit him to monopolize the happiness4 ,now suppose a different case4 ,suppose that the quantum of happiness has been made available by the efforts of one member of the group4 ,suppose that ,a has acquired by labor some material aid to happiness4 ,he decides to act as the disinterested and benevolent spectator would direct4 ,what will he decide8--what would the spectator direct8 ,let us consider the possible suppositions1 taking first the least reasonable4 ,the spectator may be conceived as deciding that the labor expended by ,a in acquiring this material aid to happiness1 originates no claim to special use of it2 but that it ought to be given to ,b1 ,c1 or ,d1 or that it ought to be divided equally among ,b1 ,c1 and ,d1 or that it ought to be divided equally among all members of the group1 including ,a who has labored for it4 ,and if the spectator is conceived as deciding thus to-day1 he must be conceived as deciding thus day after day2 with the result that one of the group expends all the effort1 getting either none of the benefit or only his numerical share1 while the others get their shares of the benefit without expending any efforts4 ,that ,a might conceive the disinterested and benevolent spectator to decide in this way1 and might feel bound to act in conformity with the imagined decision1 is a strong supposition2 and probably it will be admitted that such kind of impartiality1 so far from being conducive to the general happiness1 would quickly be fatal to every one4 ,but this is not all4 ,action in pursuance of such a decision would in reality be negatived by the very principle enunciated4 ,for not only ,a1 but also ,b1 ,c1 and ,d1 have to act on this principle4 ,each of them must behave as he conceives an impartial spectator would decide4 ,does ,b conceive the impartial spectator as awarding to him1 ,b1 the product of ,a's labor8 ,then the assumption is that ,b conceives the impartial spectator as favoring himself1 ,b1 more than ,a conceives him as favoring himself1 ,a2 which is inconsistent with the hypothesis4 ,does ,b1 in conceiving the impartial spectator1 exclude his own interests as completely as ,a does8 ,then how can he decide so much to his own advantage1 so partially1 as to allow him to take from ,a an equal share of the benefit gained by ,a's labor1 toward which he and the rest have done nothing8 ,passing from this conceivable1 though not credible1 decision of the spectator1 here noted for the purpose of observing that habitual conformity to it would be impossible1 there remains to be considered the decision which a spectator really impartial would give4 ,he would say that the happiness1 or material aid to happiness1 which had been purchased by ,a's labor1 was to be taken by ,a4 ,he would say that ,b1 ,c1 and ,d had no claims to it1 but only to such happiness1 or aids to happiness1 as their respective labors had purchased4 ,consequently1 ,a1 acting as the imaginary impartial spectator would direct1 is1 by this test1 justified in appropriating such happiness or aid to happiness as his own efforts have achieved4 ,and so under its special form as under its general form1 the principle is true only in so far as it embodies a disguised justice4 ,analysis again brings out the result that making general happiness the end of action1 really means maintaining what we call equitable relations among individuals4 ,decline to accept in its vague form the greatest happiness principle1 and insist on knowing what is the implied conduct1 public1 or private1 and it turns out that the principle is meaningless save as indirectly asserting that the claims of each should be duly regarded by all4 ,the utilitarian altruism becomes a duly qualified egoism4 #hf4 ,another point of view from which to judge the altruistic theory may now be taken4 ,if1 assuming the proper object of pursuit to be general happiness1 we proceed rationally1 we must ask in what different ways the aggregate1 general happiness1 may be composed2 and must then ask what composition of it will yield the largest sum4 ,suppose that each citizen pursues his own happiness independently1 not to the detriment of others1 but without active concern for others2 then their united happinesses constitute a certain sum--a certain general happiness4 ,now suppose that each1 instead of making his own happiness the object of pursuit1 makes the happiness of others the object of pursuit2 then1 again1 there results a certain sum of happiness4 ,this sum must be less than1 or equal to1 or greater than1 the first4 ,if it is admitted that this sum is either less than the first1 or only equal to it1 the altruistic course of action is confessedly either worse than1 or no better than1 the egoistic4 ,the assumption must be that the sum of happiness obtained is greater4 ,let us observe what is involved in this assumption4 ,if each pursues exclusively the happiness of others2 and if each is also a recipient of happiness 7which he must be1 for otherwise no aggregate happiness can be formed out of their individual happinesses72 then the implication is that each gains the happiness due to altruistic action exclusively2 and that in each this is greater in amount than the egoistic happiness obtainable by him1 if he devoted himself to pursuit of it4 ,leaving out of consideration for a moment these relative amounts of the two1 let us note the conditions to the receipt of altruistic happiness by each4 ,the sympathetic nature gets pleasure by giving pleasure2 and the proposition is that if the general happiness is the object of pursuit1 each will be made happy by witnessing others' happiness4 ,but what in such case constitutes the happiness of others8 ,these others are also1 by the hypothesis1 pursuers and receivers of altruistic pleasure4 ,the genesis of altruistic pleasure in each is to depend on the display of pleasures by others2 which is again to depend on the display of pleasures by others2 and so on perpetually4 ,where1 then1 is the pleasure to begin8 ,obviously there must be egoistic pleasure somewhere before there can be the altruistic pleasure caused by sympathy with it4 ,obviously1 therefore1 each must be egoistic in due amount1 even if only with the view of giving others the possibility of being altruistic4 ,so far from the sum of happiness being made greater if all make greatest happiness the exclusive end1 the sum disappears entirely4 ,how absurd is the supposition that the happiness of all can be achieved without each pursuing his own happiness1 will be best shown by a physical simile4 ,suppose a cluster of bodies1 each of which generates heat1 and each of which is1 therefore1 while a radiator of heat to those around1 also a receiver of heat from them4 ,manifestly each will have a certain proper heat irrespective of that which it gains from the rest2 and1 each will have a certain heat gained from the rest irrespective of its proper heat4 ,what will happen8 ,so long as each of the bodies continues to be a generator of heat1 each continues to maintain a temperature partly derived from itself and partly derived from others4 ,but if each ceases to generate heat for itself and depends on the heat radiated to it by the rest1 the entire cluster becomes cold4 ,well1 the self-generated heat stands for egoistic pleasure2 the heat radiated and received stands for sympathetic pleasure2 and the disappearance of all heat if each ceases to be an originator of it1 corresponds to the disappearance of all pleasure if each ceases to originate it egoistically4 ,a further conclusion may be drawn4 ,besides the implication that before altruistic pleasure can exist1 egoistic pleasure must exist1 and that if the rule of conduct is to be the same for all1 each must be egoistic in due degree2 there is the implication that1 to achieve the greatest sum of happiness1 each must be more egoistic than altruistic4 ,for1 speaking generally1 sympathetic pleasures must ever continue less intense than the pleasures with which there is sympathy4 ,other things equal1 ideal feelings cannot be as vivid as real feelings4 ,it is true that those having strong imaginations may1 especially in cases where the affections are engaged1 feel the moral pain if not the physical pain of another1 as keenly as the actual sufferer of it1 and may participate with like intensity in another's pleasure2 sometimes even mentally representing the received pleasure as greater than it really is1 and so getting reflex pleasure greater than the recipients' direct pleasure4 ,such cases1 however1 and cases in which even apart from exultation of sympathy caused by attachment1 there is a body of feeling sympathetically aroused equal in amount to the original feeling1 if not greater1 are necessarily exceptional4 ,for in such cases the total consciousness includes many other elements besides the mentally-represented pleasure or pain--notably the luxury of pity and the luxury of goodness2 and genesis of these can occur but occasionally2 they could not be habitual concomitants of sympathetic pleasures if all pursued these from moment to moment4 ,in estimating the possible totality of sympathetic pleasures1 we must include nothing beyond the representations of the pleasures others experience4 ,and unless it be asserted that we can have other's states of consciousness perpetually reproduced in us more vividly than the kindred states of consciousness are aroused in ourselves by their proper personal causes1 it must be admitted that the totality of altruistic pleasures cannot become equal to the totality of egoistic pleasures4 ,hence1 beyond the truth that before there can be altruistic pleasures there must be the egoistic pleasures from sympathy with which they arise1 there is the truth that to obtain the greatest sum of altruistic pleasures1 there must be a greater sum of egoistic pleasures4 #hg4 ,that pure altruism is suicidal may be yet otherwise demonstrated4 ,a perfectly moral law must be one which becomes perfectly practicable as human nature becomes perfect4 ,if its practicableness decreases as human nature improves2 and if an ideal human nature necessitates its impracticability1 it cannot be the moral law sought4 ,now opportunities for practicing altruism are numerous and great in proportion as there is weakness1 or incapacity1 or imperfection4 ,if we passed beyond the limits of the family1 in which a sphere for self-sacrificing activities must be preserved as long as offspring have to be reared2 and if we ask how there can continue a social sphere for self-sacrificing activities1 it becomes obvious that the continued existence of serious evils1 caused by prevalent defects of nature1 is implied4 ,as fast as men adapt themselves to the requirements of social life1 so fast will the demands for efforts on their behalf diminish4 ,and with arrival at finished adaptation1 when all persons are at once completely self-conserved and completely able to fulfill the obligations which society imposes on them1 those occasions for postponement of self to others1 which pure altruism contemplates1 disappear4 ,such self-sacrifices become1 indeed1 doubly impracticable4 ,carrying on successfully their several lives1 men not only cannot yield to those around the opportunities for giving aid1 but aid cannot ordinarily be given them without interfering with their normal activities1 and so diminishing their pleasures4 ,like every inferior creature1 led by its innate desires spontaneously to do all that its life requires1 man1 when completely molded to the social state1 must have desires so adjusted to his needs that he fulfills the needs in gratifying the desires4 ,and if his desires are severally gratified by the performance of required acts1 none of these can be performed for him without balking his desires4 ,acceptance from others of the results of their activities can take place only on condition of relinquishing the pleasures derived from his own activities4 ,diminution rather than increase of happiness would result1 could altruistic action in such case be enforced4 ,and here1 indeed1 we are introduced to another baseless assumption which the theory makes4 #hh4 ,the postulate of utilitarianism as formulated in the statements above quoted1 and of pure altruism as otherwise expressed1 involves the belief that it is possible for happiness1 or the means to happiness1 or the conditions to happiness1 to be transferred4 ,without any specified limitation the proposition taken for granted is1 that happiness in general admits of detachment from one and attachment to another--that surrender to any extent is possible by one and appropriation to any extent is possible by another4 ,but a moment's thought shows this to be far from the truth4 ,on the one hand1 surrender carried to a certain point is extremely mischievous and to a further point fatal2 and on the other hand1 much of the happiness each enjoys is self-generated and can neither be given nor received4 ,to assume that egoistic pleasures may be relinquished to any extent1 is to fall into one of those many errors of ethical speculation which result from ignoring the truths of biology4 ,when taking the biological view of ethics we saw that pleasures accompany normal amounts of functions1 while pains accompany defects or excesses of functions2 further1 that complete life depends on complete discharge of functions1 and therefore on receipt of the correlative pleasures4 ,hence1 to yield up normal pleasures is to yield up so much life2 and there arises the question--,to what extent may this be done8 ,if he is to continue living1 the individual must take certain amounts of those pleasures which go along with fulfillment of the bodily functions1 and must avoid the pains which entire non-fulfillment of them entails4 ,complete abnegation means death2 excessive abnegation means illness2 abnegation less excessive means physical degradation and consequent loss of power to fulfill obligations1 personal and other4 ,when1 therefore1 we attempt to specialize the proposal to live not for self-satisfaction but for the satisfaction of others1 we meet with the difficulty that beyond a certain limit this cannot be done4 ,and when we have decided what decrease of bodily welfare1 caused by sacrifice of pleasures and acceptance of pains1 it is proper for the individual to make1 there is forced on us the fact that the portion of happiness1 or means to happiness1 which it is possible for him to yield up for redistribution1 is a limited portion4 ,even more rigorous on another side is the restriction put upon the transfer of happiness1 or the means to happiness4 ,the pleasures gained by efficient action--by successful pursuit of ends1 cannot by any process be parted with1 and cannot in any way be appropriated by another4 ,the habit of arguing about general happiness sometimes as though it were a concrete product to be portioned out1 and sometimes as though it were co-extensive with the use of those material aids to pleasure which may be given and received1 has caused inattention to the truth that the pleasures of achievement are not transferable4 ,alike in the boy who has won a game of marbles1 the athlete who has performed a feat1 the statesman who has gained a party triumph1 the inventor who has devised a new machine1 the man of science who has discovered a truth1 the novelist who has well delineated a character1 the poet who has finely rendered an emotion1 we see pleasures which must1 in the nature of things1 be enjoyed exclusively by those to whom they come4 ,and if we look at all such occupations as men are not impelled to by their necessities--if we contemplate the various ambitions which play so large a part in life2 we are reminded that so long as the consciousness of efficiency remains a dominant pleasure1 there will remain a dominant pleasure which cannot be pursued altruistically but must be pursued egoistically4 ,cutting off1 then1 at the one end1 those pleasures which are inseparable from maintenance of the physique in an uninjured state2 and cutting off at the other end the pleasures of successful action2 the amount that remains is so greatly diminished as to make untenable the assumption that happiness at large admits of distribution after the manner which utilitarianism assumes4 #hi4 ,in yet one more way may be shown the inconsistency of this transfigured utilitarianism which regards its doctrine as embodying the ,christian maxim--,love your neighbor as yourself1 and of that altruism which1 going still further1 enunciates the maxim--,live for others4 ,a right rule of conduct must be one which may with advantage be adopted by all4 ,act according to that maxim only1 which you can wish1 at the same time1 to become a universal law1 says ,kant4 ,and clearly1 passing over needful qualifications of this maxim1 we may accept it to the extent of admitting that a mode of action which becomes impracticable as it approaches universality1 must be wrong4 ,hence1 if the theory of pure altruism1 implying that effort should be expended for the benefit of others and not for personal benefit1 is defensible1 it must be shown that it will produce good results when acted upon by all4 ,mark the consequences if all are purely altruistic4 ,first1 an impossible combination of moral attributes is implied4 ,each is supposed by the hypothesis to regard self so little and others so much1 that he willingly sacrifices his own pleasures to give pleasures to them4 ,but if this is a universal trait1 and if action is universally congruous with it1 we have to conceive each as being not only a sacrificer but also one who accepts sacrifices4 ,while he is so unselfish as willingly to yield up the benefit for which he has labored1 he is so selfish as willingly to let others yield up to him the benefits they have labored for4 ,to make pure altruism possible for all1 each must be at once extremely unegoistic and extremely egoistic4 ,as a giver1 he must have no thought for self2 as a receiver1 no thought for others4 ,evidently1 this implies an inconceivable mental constitution4 ,the sympathy which is so solicitous for others as willingly to injure self in benefiting them1 cannot at the same time be so regardless of others as to accept benefits which they injure themselves in giving4 ,the incongruities that emerge if we assume pure altruism to be universally practiced1 may be otherwise exhibited thus4 ,suppose that each1 instead of enjoying such pleasures as come to him1 or such consumable appliances to pleasure as he has worked for1 or such occasions for pleasure as reward his efforts1 relinquishes these to a single other1 or adds them to a common stock from which others benefit1 what will result8 ,different answers may be given according as we assume that there are1 or are not1 additional influences brought into play4 ,suppose there are no additional influences4 ,then1 if each transfers to another his happiness1 or means to happiness1 or occasions for happiness1 while some one else does the like to him1 the distribution of happiness is1 on the average1 unchanged2 or if each adds to a common stock his happiness1 or means to happiness1 or occasions for happiness1 from which common stock each appropriates his portion1 the average state is still1 as before1 unchanged4 ,the only obvious effect is that transactions must be gone through in the redistribution2 and loss of time and labor must result4 ,now suppose some additional influence which makes the process beneficial2 what must it be8 ,the totality can be increased only if the acts of transfer increase the quantity of that which is transferred4 ,the happiness1 or that which brings it1 must be greater to one who derives it from another's efforts than it would have been had his own efforts procured it2 or otherwise1 supposing a fund of happiness1 or of that which brings it1 has been formed by contributions from each1 then each1 in appropriating his share1 must find it larger than it would have been had no such aggregation and dispersion taken place4 ,to justify belief in such increase two conceivable assumptions may be made4 ,one is that though the sum of pleasures1 or of pleasure-yielding things1 remains the same yet the kind of pleasure1 or of pleasure-yielding things1 which each receives in exchange from another1 or from the aggregate of others1 is one which he appreciates more than that for which he labored4 ,but to assume this is to assume that each labors directly for the thing which he enjoys less1 rather than for the thing which he enjoys more1 which is absurd4 ,the other assumption is that while the exchanged1 or redistributed pleasure of the egoistic kind1 remains the same in amount for each1 there is added to it the altruistic pleasure accompanying the exchange4 ,but this assumption is clearly inadmissible if1 as is implied1 the transaction is universal--is one through which each becomes giver and receiver to equal extents4 ,for if the transfer of pleasures1 or of pleasure-yielding things1 from one to another or others1 is always accompanied by the consciousness that there will be received from him or them an equivalent2 there results merely a tacit exchange1 either direct or roundabout4 ,each becomes altruistic in no greater degree than is implied by being equitable2 and each1 having nothing to exalt his happiness1 sympathetically or otherwise1 cannot be a source of sympathetic happiness to others4 #ij4 ,thus1 when the meanings of its words are inquired into1 or when the necessary implications of its theory are examined1 pure altruism1 in whatever form expressed1 commits its adherents to various absurdities4 ,if the greatest happiness of the greatest number1 or in other words1 the general happiness1 is the proper end of action1 then not only for all public action but for all private action1 it must be the end2 because1 otherwise1 the greater part of action remains unguided4 ,consider its fitness for each4 ,if corporate action is to be guided by the principle1 with its interpreting comment1 everybody to count for one1 nobody for more than one1 there must be an ignoring of all differences of character and conduct1 merits and demerits1 among citizens1 since no discrimination is provided for1 and1 moreover1 since that in respect of which all are to count alike cannot be happiness itself1 which is indistributable1 and since equal sharing of the concrete means to happiness1 besides failing ultimately would fail proximately to produce the greatest happiness2 it results that equal distribution of the conditions under which happiness may be pursued is the only tenable meaning3 we discover in the principle nothing but a round-about insistance on equity4 ,if1 taking happiness at large as the aim of private action1 the individual is required to judge between his own happiness and that of others as an impartial spectator would do1 we see that no supposition concerning the spectator save one which suicidally ascribes partiality to him1 can bring out any other result than that each shall enjoy such happiness1 or appropriate such means to happiness1 as his own efforts gain3 equity is again the sole content4 ,when1 adopting another method1 we consider how the greatest sum of happiness may be composed1 and1 recognizing the fact that equitable egoism will produce a certain sum1 ask how pure altruism is to produce a greater sum2 we are shown that if all1 exclusively pursuing altruistic pleasures1 are so to produce a greater sum of pleasures1 the implication is that altruistic pleasures1 which arise from sympathy1 can exist in the absence of egoistic pleasures with which there may be sympathy--an impossibility2 and another implication is that if1 the necessity for egoistic pleasures being admitted1 it is said that the greatest sum of happiness will be attained if all individuals are more altruistic than egoistic1 it is indirectly said that as a general truth1 representative feelings are stronger than presentative feelings--another impossibility4 ,again1 the doctrine of pure altruism assumes that happiness may be to any extent transferred or redistributed2 whereas the fact is that pleasures of one order cannot be transferred in large measure without results which are fatal or extremely injurious1 and that pleasures of another order cannot be transferred in any degree4 ,further1 pure altruism presents this fatal anomaly1 that while a right principle of action must be more and more practiced as men improve1 the altruistic principle becomes less and less practicable as men approach an ideal form1 because the sphere for practicing it continually decreases4 ,finally its self-destructiveness is made manifest on observing that for all to adopt it as a principle of action1 which they must do if it is a sound principle1 implies that all are at once extremely unegoistic and extremely egoistic--ready to injure self for others' benefit1 and ready to accept benefit at the cost of injury to others3 traits which cannot co-exist4 ,the need for a compromise between egoism and altruism is thus made conspicuous4 ,we are forced to recognize the claims which his own well-being has on the attention of each by noting how1 in some directions we come to a deadlock1 in others to contradictions1 and in others to disastrous results1 if they are ignored4 ,conversely1 it is undeniable that disregard of others by each1 carried to a great extent1 is fatal to society1 and carried to a still greater extent is fatal to the family1 and eventually to the race4 ,egoism and altruism are therefore co-essential4 #ia4 ,what form is the compromise between egoism and altruism to assume8 how are their respective claims to be satisfied in due degrees8 ,it is a truth insisted on by moralists and recognized in common life1 that the achievement of individual happiness is not proportionate to the degree in which individual happiness is made the object of direct pursuit2 but there has not yet become current the belief that1 in like manner1 the achievement of general happiness is not proportionate to the degree in which general happiness is made the object of direct pursuit4 ,yet failure of direct pursuit in the last case is more reasonably to be expected than in the first4 ,when discussing the relations of means and ends1 we saw that as individual conduct evolves1 its principle becomes more and more that of making fulfillment of means the proximate end1 and leaving the ultimate end1 welfare or happiness1 to come as a result4 ,and we saw that when general welfare or happiness is the ultimate end1 the same principle holds even more rigorously2 since the ultimate end under its impersonal form is less determinate than under its personal form1 and the difficulties in the way of achieving it by direct pursuit still greater4 ,recognizing1 then1 the fact that corporate happiness still more than individual happiness1 must be pursued not directly1 but indirectly1 the first question for us is--,what must be the general nature of the means through which it is to be achieved4 ,it is admitted that self-happiness is1 in a measure1 to be obtained by furthering the happiness of others4 ,may it not be true that1 conversely1 general happiness is to be obtained by furthering self-happiness8 ,if the well-being of each unit is to be reached partly through his care for the well-being of the aggregate1 is not the well-being of the aggregate to be reached partly through the care of each unit for himself8 ,clearly1 our conclusion must be that general happiness is to be achieved mainly through the adequate pursuit of their own happiness by individuals2 while1 reciprocally1 the happiness of individuals are to be achieved in part by their pursuit of the general happiness4 ,and this is the conclusion embodied in the progressing ideas and usages of mankind4 ,this compromise between egoism and altruism has been slowly establishing itself2 and toward recognition of its propriety1 men's actual beliefs1 as distinguished from their nominal beliefs1 have been gradually approaching4 ,social evolution has been bringing about a state in which the claims of the individual to the proceeds of his activities1 and to such satisfactions as they bring1 are more and more positively asserted2 at the same time that insistance on others' claims1 and habitual respect for them have been increasing4 ,among the rudest savages personal interests are very vaguely distinguished from the interests of others4 ,in early stages of civilization the proportioning of benefits to efforts is extremely rude3 slaves and serfs get for work arbitrary amounts of food and shelter3 exchange being infrequent1 there is little to develop the idea of equivalence4 ,but as civilization advances and status passes into contract there comes daily experience of the relation between advantages enjoyed and labor given3 the industrial system maintaining1 through supply and demand1 a due adjustment of the one to the other4 ,and this growth of voluntary co-operation1 this exchange of services under agreement1 has been necessarily accompanied by decrease of aggressions one upon another1 and increase of sympathy3 leading to exchange of services beyond agreement4 ,that is to say1 the more distinct assertions of individual claims1 and more rigorous apportioning of personal enjoyments to efforts expended1 has gone hand in hand with growth of that negative altruism shown in equitable conduct and that positive altruism shown in gratuitous aid4 ,a higher phase of this double change has in our own times become conspicuous4 ,if1 on the one hand1 we note the struggles for political freedom1 the contests between labor and capital1 the judicial reforms made to facilitate enforcement of rights1 we see that the tendency still is toward complete appropriation by each of whatever benefits are due to him1 and consequent exclusion of his fellows from such benefits4 ,on the other hand1 if we consider what is meant by the surrender of power to the masses1 the abolition of class-privileges1 the efforts to diffuse knowledge1 the agitations to spread temperance1 the multitudinous philanthropic societies2 it becomes clear that regard for the well-being of others is increasing pari passu with the taking of means to secure personal well-being4 ,what holds of the relations within each society holds to some extent1 if to a less extent1 of the relations between societies4 ,though1 to maintain national claims1 real or imaginary1 often of a trivial kind1 the civilized still make war on one another2 yet their several nationalities are more respected than in past ages4 ,though by victors portions of territory are taken and money compensations exacted2 yet conquest is not now1 as of old1 habitually followed by entire appropriation of territories and enslavement of peoples4 ,the individualities of societies are in a larger measure preserved4 ,meanwhile the altruistic intercourse is greater3 aid is rendered on occasions of disaster by flood1 by fire1 by famine1 or otherwise4 ,and in international arbitration as lately exemplified1 implying the recognition of claims by one nation upon another1 we see a further progress in this wider altruism4 ,doubtless there is much to be said by way of set-off2 for in the dealings of the civilized with the uncivilized little of this progress can be traced4 ,it may be urged that the primitive rule1 ,life for life1 has been developed by us into the rule1 ,for one life many lives1 as in the cases of ,bishop ,patteson and ,mr4 ,birch1 but then there is the qualifying fact that we do not torture our prisoners or mutilate them4 ,if it be said that as the ,hebrews thought themselves warranted in seizing the lands ,god promised to them1 and in some cases exterminating the inhabitants1 so we1 to fulfill the manifest intention of ,providence1 dispossess inferior races whenever we want their territories2 it may be replied that we do not kill many more than seems needful1 and tolerate the existence of those who submit4 ,and should any one point out that as ,attila1 while conquering or destroying peoples and nations1 regarded himself as the scourge of ,god1 punishing men for their sins1 so we1 as represented by a ,high ,commissioner and a priest he quotes1 think ourselves called on to chastise with rifles and cannon1 heathens who practice polygamy2 there is the rejoinder that not even the most ferocious disciple of the teacher of mercy would carry his vengeance so far as to depopulate whole territories and erase scores of cities4 ,and when1 on the other hand1 we remember that there is an ,aborigines ,protection ,society1 that there are ,commissioners in certain colonies appointed to protect native interests1 and that in some cases the lands of natives have been purchased in ways which1 however unfair1 have implied some recognition of their claims2 we may say that little as the compromise between egoism and altruism has progressed in international affairs1 it has still progressed somewhat in the direction indicated4 ,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,,conciliation4 #ib4 ,as exhibited in the last chapter1 the compromise between the claims of self and the claims of others seems to imply permanent antagonism between the two4 ,the pursuit by each of his own happiness while paying due regard to the happiness of his fellows1 apparently necessitates the ever-recurring question--,how far must the one end be sought and how far the other3 suggesting1 if not discord in the life of each1 still1 an absence of complete harmony4 ,this is not the inevitable inference however4 ,when1 in the ,principles of ,sociology1 ,part ,,iii1 the phenomena of race-maintenance among living things at large were discussed1 that the development of the domestic relations might be the better understood1 it was shown that during evolution there has been going on a conciliation between the interests of the species1 the interests of the parents1 and the interests of the offspring4 ,proof was given that as we ascend from the lowest forms of life to the highest1 race-maintenance is achieved with a decreasing sacrifice of life1 alike of young individuals and of adult individuals1 and also with a decreasing sacrifice of parental lives to the lives of offspring4 ,we saw that1 with the progress of civilization1 like changes go on among human beings2 and that the highest domestic relations are those in which the conciliation of welfares within the family becomes greatest1 while the welfare of the society is best subserved4 ,here it remains to be shown that a kindred conciliation has been1 and is1 taking place between the interests of each citizen and the interests of citizens at large2 tending ever toward a state in which the two become merged in one1 and in which the feelings answering to them respectively1 fall into complete concord4 ,in the family group1 even as we observe it among many inferior vertebrates1 we see that the parental sacrifice1 now become so moderate in amount as to consist with long-continued parental life1 is not accompanied by consciousness of sacrifice2 but contrariwise1 is made from a direct desire to make it3 the altruistic labors on behalf of young are carried on in satisfaction of parental instincts4 ,if we trace these relations up through the grades of mankind1 and observe how largely love rather than obligation prompts the care of children1 we see the conciliation of interests to be such that achievement of parental happiness coincides with securing the happiness of offspring3 the wish for children among the childless1 and the occasional adoption of children1 showing how needful for attainment of certain egoistic satisfactions are these altruistic activities4 ,and further evolution1 causing along with higher nature diminished fertility1 and therefore smaller burdens on parents1 may be expected to bring a state in which1 far more than now1 the pleasures of adult life will consist in raising offspring to perfection while simultaneously furthering the immediate happiness of offspring4 ,now though altruism of a social kind1 lacking certain elements of parental altruism1 can never attain the same level1 yet it may be expected to attain a level at which it will be like parental altruism in spontaneity--a level such that ministration to others' happiness will become a daily need--a level such that the lower egoistic satisfactions will be continually subordinated to this higher egoistic satisfaction1 not by any effort to subordinate them1 but by the preference for this higher egoistic satisfaction whenever it can be obtained4 ,let us consider how the development of sympathy1 which must advance as fast as conditions permit1 will bring about this state4 #ic4 ,we have seen that during the evolution of life1 pleasures and pains have necessarily been the incentives to1 and deterrents from1 actions which the conditions of existence demanded and negatived4 ,an implied truth to be here noted is1 that faculties which1 under given conditions1 yield partly pain and partly pleasure1 cannot develop beyond the limit at which they yield a surplus of pleasure3 if beyond that limit more pain than pleasure results from exercise of them1 their growth must be arrested4 ,through sympathy both these forms of feeling are excited4 ,now a pleasurable consciousness is aroused on witnessing pleasure2 now a painful consciousness is aroused on witnessing pain4 ,hence1 if beings around him habitually manifest pleasure and but rarely pain1 sympathy yields to its possessor a surplus of pleasure2 while1 contrariwise1 if little pleasure is ordinarily witnessed and much pain1 sympathy yields a surplus of pain to its possessor4 ,the average development of sympathy must1 therefore1 be regulated by the average manifestations of pleasure and pain in others4 ,if the life usually led under given social conditions is such that suffering is daily inflicted1 or is daily displayed by associates1 sympathy cannot grow3 to assume growth of it is to assume that the constitution will modify itself in such way as to increase its pains and therefore depress its energies2 and is to ignore the truth that bearing any kind of pain gradually produces insensibilty to that pain1 or callousness4 ,on the other hand1 if the social state is such that manifestations of pleasure predominate1 sympathy will increase2 since sympathetic pleasures1 adding to the totality of pleasures enhancing vitality1 conduce to the physical prosperity of the most sympathetic1 and since the pleasures of sympathy exceeding its pains in all1 lead to an exercise of it which strengthens it4 ,the first implication is one already more than once indicated4 ,we have seen that along with habitual militancy and under the adapted type of social organization1 sympathy cannot develop to any considerable height4 ,the destructive activities carried on against external enemies sear it2 the state of feeling maintained causes within the society itself frequent acts of aggression or cruelty2 and further1 the compulsory co-operation characterizing the militant rgime necessarily represses sympathy--exists only on condition of an unsympathetic treatment of some by others4 ,but even could the militant rgime forthwith end1 the hinderance to development of sympathy would still be great4 ,though cessation of war would imply increased adaptation of man to social life1 and decrease of sundry evils1 yet there would remain much non-adaptation and much consequent unhappiness4 ,in the first place1 that form of nature which has generated and still generates wars1 though by implication raised to a higher form1 would not at once be raised to so high a form that there would cease all injustices and the pains they cause4 ,for a considerable period after predatory activities had ended1 the defects of the predatory nature would continue3 entailing their slowly diminishing evils4 ,in the second place1 the ill-adjustment of the human constitution to the pursuits of industrial life1 must long persist1 and may be expected to survive in a measure the cessation of wars3 the required modes of activity must remain for innumerable generations in some degree displeasurable4 ,and in the third place1 deficiencies of self-control such as the improvident show us1 as well as those many failures of conduct due to inadequate foresight of consequences1 though less marked than now1 could not fail still to produce suffering4 ,nor would even complete adaptation1 if limited to disappearance of the non-adaptations just indicated1 remove all sources of those miseries which1 to the extent of their manifestation1 check the growth of sympathy4 ,for while the rate of multiplication continues so to exceed the rate of mortality as to cause pressure on the means of subsistence1 there must continue to result much unhappiness2 either from balked affections or from overwork and stinted means4 ,only as fast as fertility diminishes1 which we have seen it must do along with further mental development 7,principles of ,biology1 #cfg-cgg71 can there go on such diminution of the labors required for efficiently supporting self and family1 that they will not constitute a displeasurable tax on the energies4 ,gradually then1 and only gradually1 as these various causes of unhappiness become less can sympathy become greater4 ,life would be intolerable if1 while the causes of misery remained as they now are1 all men were not only in a high degree sensitive to the pains1 bodily and mental1 felt by those around and expressed in the faces of those they met1 but were unceasingly conscious of the miseries everywhere being suffered as consequences of war1 crime1 misconduct1 misfortune1 improvidence1 incapacity4 ,but1 as the molding and re-molding of man and society into mutual fitness progresses1 and as the pains caused by unfitness decrease1 sympathy can increase in presence of the pleasures that come from fitness4 ,the two changes are indeed so related that each furthers the other4 ,such growth of sympathy as conditions permit1 itself aids in lessening pain and augmenting pleasure3 and the greater surplus of pleasure that results makes possible further growth of sympathy4 #id4 ,the extent to which sympathy may develop when the hinderances are removed1 will be better conceived after observing the agencies through which it is excited1 and setting down the reasons for expecting those agencies to become more efficient4 ,two factors have to be considered--the natural language of feeling in the being sympathized with1 and the power of interpreting that language in the being who sympathizes4 ,we may anticipate development of both4 ,movements of the body and facial changes are visible effects of feeling which1 when the feeling is strong1 are uncontrollable4 ,when the feeling is less strong1 however1 be it sensational or emotional1 they may be wholly or partially repressed2 and there is a habit1 more or less constant1 of repressing them2 this habit being the concomitant of a nature such that it is often undesirable that others should see what is felt4 ,so necessary with our existing characters and conditions are concealments thus prompted1 that they have come to form a part of moral duty2 and concealment for its own sake is often insisted upon as an element in good manners4 ,all this is caused by the prevalence of feelings at variance with social good--feelings which cannot be shown without producing discords or estrangements4 ,but in proportion as the egoistic desires fall more under control of the altruistic1 and there come fewer and slighter impulses of a kind to be reprobated1 the need for keeping guard over facial expression and bodily movement will decrease1 and these will with increasing clearness convey to spectators the mental state4 ,nor is this all4 ,restrained as its use is1 this language of the emotions is at present prevented from growing4 ,but as fast as the emotions become such that they may be more candidly displayed1 there will go1 along with the habit of display1 development of the means of display2 so that besides the stronger emotions1 the more delicate shades and smaller degrees of emotion will visibly exhibit themselves2 the emotional language will become at once more copious1 more varied1 more definite4 ,and obviously sympathy will be proportionately facilitated4 ,an equally important1 if not a more important1 advance of kindred nature1 is to be anticipated4 ,the vocal signs of sentient states will simultaneously evolve further4 ,loudness of tone1 pitch of tone1 quality of tone1 and change of tone1 are severally marks of feeling2 and1 combined in different ways and proportions1 serve to express different amounts and kinds of feelings4 ,as elsewhere pointed out1 cadences are the comments of the emotions on the propositions of the intellect,j4 ,not in excited speech only1 but in ordinary speech1 we show by ascending and descending intervals1 by degrees of deviation from the medium tone1 as well as by place and strength of emphasis1 the kind of sentiency which accompanies the thought expressed4 ,now the manifestation of feeling by cadence1 like its manifestation by visible changes1 is at present under restraint2 the motives for repression act in the one case as they act in the other4 ,a double effect is produced4 ,this audible language of feeling is not used up to the limit of its existing capacity2 and it is to a considerable degree misused1 so as to convey other feelings than those which are felt4 ,the result of this disuse and misuse is to check that evolution which normal use would cause4 ,we must infer1 then1 that as moral adaptation progresses1 and there is decreasing need for concealment of the feelings1 their vocal signs will develop much further4 ,though it is not to be supposed that cadences will ever convey emotions as exactly as words convey thoughts1 yet it is quite possible that the emotional language of the future may rise as much above our present emotional language1 as our intellectual language has already risen above the intellectual language of the lowest races4 ,a simultaneous increase in the power of interpreting both visible and audible signs of feeling must be taken into account4 ,among those around we see differences both of ability to perceive such signs and of ability to conceive the implied mental states1 and their causes2 here1 a stolidity unimpressed by a slight facial change or altered tone of voice1 or else unable to imagine what is felt2 and there1 a quick observation and a penetrating intuition1 making instantly comprehensible the state of mind and its origin4 ,if we suppose both these faculties exalted--both a more delicate perception of the signs and a strengthened constructive imagination--we shall get some idea of the deeper and wider sympathy that will hereafter arise4 ,more vivid representations of the feelings of others1 implying ideal excitements of feelings approaching to real excitements1 must imply a greater likeness between the feelings of the sympathizer and those of the sympathized with2 coming near to identity4 ,by simultaneous increase of its subjective and objective factors1 sympathy may thus1 as the hinderances diminish1 rise above that now shown by the sympathetic as much as in them it has risen above that which the callous show4 #ie4 ,what must be the accompanying evolution of conduct8 ,what must the relations between egoism and altruism become as this form of nature is neared8 ,a conclusion drawn in the chapter on the relativity of pleasures and pains1 and there emphasized as one to be borne in mind1 must now be recalled4 ,it was pointed out that1 supposing them to be consistent with continuance of life1 there are no activities which may not become sources of pleasure1 if surrounding conditions require persistence in them4 ,and here it is to be added1 as a corollary1 that if the conditions require any class of activities to be relatively great1 there will arise a relatively great pleasure accompanying that class of activities4 ,what bearing have these general inferences on the special question before us8 ,that alike for public welfare and private welfare sympathy is essential we have seen4 ,we have seen that co-operation and the benefits which it brings to each and all1 become high in proportion as the altruistic1 that is the sympathetic1 interests extend4 ,the actions prompted by fellow-feeling are thus to be counted among those demanded by social conditions4 ,they are actions which maintenance and further development of social organization tend ever to increase1 and1 therefore1 actions with which there will be joined an increasing pleasure4 ,from the laws of life it must be concluded that unceasing social discipline will so mold human nature that eventually sympathetic pleasures will be spontaneously pursued to the fullest extent advantageous to each and all4 ,the scope for altruistic activities will not exceed the desire for altruistic satisfactions4 ,in natures thus constituted1 though the altruistic gratifications must remain in a transfigured sense egoistic1 yet they will not be egoistically pursued--will not be pursued from egoistic motives4 ,though pleasure will be gained by giving pleasure1 yet the thought of the sympathetic pleasure to be gained will not occupy consciousness1 but only the thought of the pleasure given4 ,to a great extent this is so now4 ,in the truly sympathetic1 attention is so absorbed with the proximate end1 others' happiness1 that there is none given to the prospective self-happiness which may ultimately result4 ,an analogy will make the relation clear4 ,a miser accumulates money1 not deliberately saying to himself1 ,i shall by doing this get the delight which possession gives4 ,he thinks only of the money and the means of getting it1 and he experiences incidentally the pleasure that comes from possession4 ,owning property is that which he revels in imagining1 and not the feeling which owning property will cause4 ,similarly1 one who is sympathetic in the highest sense1 is mentally engaged solely in representing pleasure as experienced by another1 and pursues it for the benefit of that other1 forgetting any participation he will have in it4 ,subjectively considered1 then1 the conciliation of egoism and altruism will eventually become such that though the altruistic pleasure1 as being a part of the consciousness of one who experiences it1 can never be other than egoistic1 it will not be consciously egoistic4 ,let us now ask what must happen in a society composed of persons constituted in this manner4 #if4 ,the opportunities for that postponement of self to others which constitutes altruism as ordinarily conceived1 must1 in several ways1 be more and more limited as the highest state is approached4 ,extensive demands on the benevolent presuppose much unhappiness4 ,before there can be many and large calls on some for efforts on behalf of others1 there must be many others in conditions needing help--in conditions of comparative misery4 ,but1 as we have seen above1 the development of fellow-feeling can go on only as fast as misery decreases4 ,sympathy can reach its full height only when there have ceased to be frequent occasions for anything like serious self-sacrifice4 ,change the point of view1 and this truth presents itself under another aspect4 ,we have already seen that with the progress of adaptation each becomes so constituted that he cannot be helped without in some way arresting a pleasurable activity4 ,there cannot be a beneficial interference between faculty and function when the two are adjusted4 ,consequently1 in proportion as mankind approach complete adjustment of their natures to social needs1 there must be fewer and smaller opportunities for giving aid4 ,yet again1 as was pointed out in the last chapter1 the sympathy which prompts efforts for others' welfare must be pained by self-injury on the part of others2 and must1 therefore1 cause aversion to accept benefits derived from their self-injuries4 ,what is to be inferred8 ,while each1 when occasion offers1 is ready1 anxious even1 to surrender egoistic satisfactions2 others1 similarly natured1 cannot but resist the surrender4 ,if any one1 proposing to treat himself more hardly than a disinterested spectator would direct1 refrains from appropriating that which is due2 others1 caring for him if he will not care for himself1 must necessarily insist that he shall appropriate it4 ,general altruism then1 in its developed form1 must inevitably resist individual excesses of altruism4 ,the relation at present familiar to us will be inverted1 and instead of each maintaining his own claims1 others will maintain his claims for him3 not1 indeed1 by active efforts1 which will be needless1 but by passively resisting any undue yielding up of them4 ,there is nothing in such behavior which is not even now to be traced in our daily experiences as beginning4 ,in business transactions among honorable men there is usually a desire on either side that the other shall treat himself fairly4 ,not unfrequently there is a refusal to take something regarded as the other's due1 but which the other offers to give up4 ,in social intercourse1 too1 the cases are common in which those who would surrender their shares of pleasure are not permitted by the rest to do so4 ,further development of sympathy cannot but make this mode of behaving increasingly general and increasingly genuine4 ,certain complex restraints on excesses of altruism exist1 which1 in another way1 force back the individual upon a normal egoism4 ,two may here be noted4 ,in the first place1 self-abnegations often repeated imply on the part of the actor a tacit ascription of relative selfishness to others who profit by the self-abnegations4 ,even with men as they are there occasionally arises a feeling among those for whom sacrifices are frequently made1 that they are being insulted by the assumption that they are ready to receive them1 and in the mind of the actor also1 there sometimes grows up a recognition of this feeling on their part1 and a consequent check on his too great or too frequent surrenders of pleasure4 ,obviously1 in more developed natures1 this kind of check must act still more promptly4 ,in the second place1 when1 as the hypothesis implies1 altruistic pleasures have reached a greater intensity than they now possess1 each person will be debarred from undue pursuit of them by the consciousness that other persons1 too1 desire them1 and that scope for others' enjoyment of them must be left4 ,even now may be observed among groups of friends1 where some competition in amiability is going on1 relinquishments of opportunities for self-abnegation that others may have them4 ,let her give up the gratification1 she will like to do so2 ,let him undertake the trouble1 it will please him2 are suggestions which1 from time to time1 illustrate this consciousness4 ,the most developed sympathy will care for the sympathetic satisfactions of others as well as for their selfish satisfactions4 ,what may be called a higher equity will refrain from trespassing on the spheres of others' altruistic activities1 as a lower equity refrains from trespassing on the spheres of their egoistic activities4 ,and by this checking of what may be called an egoistic altruism1 undue sacrifices on the part of each must be prevented4 ,what spheres1 then1 will eventually remain for altruism as it is commonly conceived8 ,there are three4 ,one of them must to the last continue large in extent2 and the others must progressively diminish1 though they do not disappear4 ,the first is that which family life affords4 ,always there must be a need for subordination of self-regarding feelings to other-regarding feelings in the rearing of children4 ,though this will diminish with diminution in the number to be reared1 yet it will increase with the greater elaboration1 and prolongation of the activities on their behalf4 ,but as shown above1 there is even now partially effected a conciliation such that those egoistic satisfactions which parenthood yields are achieved through altruistic activities--a conciliation tending ever toward completeness4 ,an important development of family altruism must be added3 the reciprocal care of parents by children during old age--a care becoming lighter and better fulfilled1 in which a kindred conciliation may be looked for4 ,pursuit of social welfare at large must afford hereafter1 as it does now1 scope for the postponement of selfish interests to unselfish interests1 but a continually lessening scope2 because as adaptation to the social state progresses the needs for those regulative actions by which social life is made harmonious become less4 ,and here the amount of altruistic action which each undertakes must inevitably be kept within moderate bounds by others2 for if they are similarly altruistic1 they will not allow some to pursue public ends to their own considerable detriment that the rest may profit4 ,in the private relations of men1 opportunities for self-sacrifice prompted by sympathy1 must ever in some degree1 though eventually in a small degree1 be afforded by accidents1 diseases1 and misfortunes in general2 since1 however near to completeness the adaptation of human nature to the conditions of existence at large1 physical and social1 may become1 it can never reach completeness4 ,flood1 fire1 and wreck must to the last yield at intervals opportunities for heroic acts2 and in the motives to such acts1 anxiety for others will be less alloyed with love of admiration than now4 ,extreme1 however1 as may be the eagerness for altruistic action on the rare occasions hence arising1 the amount falling to the share of each must1 for the reasons given1 be narrowly limited4 ,but though in the incidents of ordinary life1 postponements of self to others in large ways must become very infrequent1 daily intercourse will still furnish multitudinous small occasions for the activity of fellow feeling4 ,always each may continue to further the welfare of others by warding off from them evils they cannot see1 and by aiding their actions in ways unknown to them2 or1 conversely putting it1 each may have1 as it were1 supplementary eyes and ears in other persons1 which perceive for him things he cannot perceive himself3 so perfecting his life in numerous details1 by making its adjustment to environing actions complete4 #ig4 ,must it then follow that eventually1 with this diminution of the spheres for it1 altruism must diminish in total amount8 ,by no means4 ,such a conclusion implies a misconception4 ,naturally1 under existing conditions1 with suffering widely diffused and so much of effort demanded from the more fortunate in succoring the less fortunate1 altruism is understood to mean only self-sacrifice2 or1 at any rate1 a mode of action which1 while it brings some pleasure1 has an accompaniment of self-surrender that is not pleasurable4 ,but the sympathy which prompts denial of self to please others is a sympathy which also receives pleasure from their pleasures when they are otherwise originated4 ,the stronger the fellow-feeling which excites efforts to make others happy1 the stronger is the fellow-feeling with their happiness however caused4 ,in its ultimate form1 then1 altruism will be the achievement of gratification through sympathy with those gratifications of others which are mainly produced by their activities of all kinds successfully carried on--sympathetic gratification which costs the receiver nothing1 but is a gratis addition to his egoistic gratifications4 ,this power of representing in idea the mental states of others1 which1 during the process of adaptation has had the function of mitigating suffering1 must1 as the suffering falls to a minimum1 come to have almost wholly the function of mutually exalting men's enjoyments by giving every one a vivid intuition of his neighbor's enjoyments4 ,while pain prevails widely1 it is undesirable that each should participate much in the consciousnesses of others2 but with an increasing predominance of pleasure1 participation in others' consciousnesses becomes a gain of pleasure to all4 ,and so there will disappear that apparently permanent opposition between egoism and altruism1 implied by the compromise reached in the last chapter4 ,subjectively looked at1 the conciliation will be such that the individual will not have to balance between self-regarding impulses and other-regarding impulses2 but1 instead1 those satisfactions of other-regarding impulses which involve self-sacrifice1 becoming rare and much prized1 will be so unhesitatingly preferred that the competition of self-regarding impulses with them will scarcely be felt4 ,and the subjective conciliation will also be such that though altruistic pleasure will be attained1 yet the motive of action will not consciously be the attainment of altruistic pleasure2 but the idea present will be the securing of others' pleasures4 ,meanwhile1 the conciliation objectively considered will be equally complete4 ,though each1 no longer needing to maintain his egoistic claims1 will tend rather when occasion offers to surrender them1 yet others1 similarly natured1 will not permit him in any large measure to do this1 and that fulfillment of personal desires required for completion of his life will thus be secured to him2 though not now egoistic in the ordinary sense1 yet the effects of due egoism will be achieved4 ,nor is this all4 ,as1 at an early stage1 egoistic competition1 first reaching a compromise such that each claims no more than his equitable share1 afterward rises to a conciliation such that each insists on the taking of equitable shares by others2 so1 at the latest stage1 altruistic competition1 first reaching a compromise under which each restrains himself from taking an undue share of altruistic satisfactions1 eventually rises to a conciliation under which each takes care that others shall have their opportunities for altruistic satisfactions3 the highest altruism being that which ministers not to the egoistic satisfactions of others only1 but also to their altruistic satisfactions4 ,far off as seems such a state1 yet every one of the factors counted on to produce it may already be traced in operation among those of highest natures4 ,what now in them is occasional and feeble1 may be expected with further evolution to become habitual and strong2 and what now characterizes the exceptionally high may be expected eventually to characterize all4 ,for that which the best human nature is capable of1 is within the reach of human nature at large4 #ih4 ,that these conclusions will meet with any considerable acceptance is improbable4 ,neither with current ideas nor with current sentiments are they sufficiently congruous4 ,such a view will not be agreeable to those who lament the spreading disbelief in eternal damnation2 nor to those who follow the apostle of brute force in thinking that because the rule of the strong hand was once good it is good for all time2 nor to those whose reverence for one who told them to put up the sword1 is shown by using the sword to spread his doctrine among heathens4 ,from the ten thousand priests of the religion of love1 who are silent when the nation is moved by the religion of hate1 will come no sign of assent2 nor from their bishops who1 far from urging the extreme precept of the master they pretend to follow1 to turn the other cheek when one is smitten1 vote for acting on the principle--strike lest ye be struck4 ,nor will any approval be felt by legislators who1 after praying to be forgiven their trespasses as they forgive the trespasses of others1 forthwith decide to attack those who have not trespassed against them1 and who1 after a ,queen's ,speech has invoked the blessing of ,almighty ,god on their councils1 immediately provide means for committing political burglary4 ,but1 though men who profess ,christianity and practice ,paganism can feel no sympathy with such a view1 there are some1 classed as antagonists to the current creed1 who may not think it absurd to believe that a rationalized version of its ethical principles will eventually be acted upon4 ,,chapter ,,xv4 ,,absolute ,,and ,,relative ,,ethics4 #ii4 ,as applied to ,ethics1 the word absolute will by many be supposed to imply principles of right conduct that exist out of relation to life as conditioned on the ,earth1 out of relation to time and place1 and independent of the ,universe as now visible to us1 eternal principles as they are called4 ,those1 however1 who recall the doctrine set forth in ,first ,principles1 will hesitate to put this interpretation on the word4 ,right1 as we can think it1 necessitates the thought of not right1 or wrong1 for its correlative1 and hence1 to ascribe rightness to the acts of the ,power manifested through phenomena1 is to assume the possibility that wrong acts may be committed by this ,power4 ,but how come there to exist1 apart from this ,power1 conditions of such kind that subordination of its acts to them makes them right and insubordination wrong4 ,how can ,unconditioned ,being be subject to conditions beyond itself8 ,if1 for example1 any one should assert that the ,cause of ,things1 conceived in respect of fundamental moral attributes as like ourselves1 did right in producing a ,universe which1 in the course of immeasurable time1 has given origin to beings capable of pleasure1 and would have done wrong in abstaining from the production of such a ,universe2 then1 the comment to be made is that1 imposing the moral ideas generated in his finite consciousness1 upon the ,infinite ,existence which transcends consciousness1 he goes behind that ,infinite ,existence and prescribes for it principles of action4 ,as implied in foregoing chapters1 right and wrong as conceived by us can exist only in relation to the actions of creatures capable of pleasures and pains2 seeing that analysis carries us back to pleasures and pains as the elements out of which the conceptions are framed4 ,but if the word absolute1 as used above1 does not refer to the ,unconditioned ,being--if the principles of action distinguished as absolute and relative concern the conduct of conditioned beings1 in what way are the words to be understood8 ,an explanation of their meanings will be best conveyed by a criticism on the current conceptions of right and wrong4 #ajj4 ,conversations about the affairs of life habitually imply the belief that every deed named may be placed under the one head or the other4 ,in discussing a political question1 both sides take it for granted that some line of action may be chosen which is right1 while all other lines of action are wrong4 ,so1 too1 is it with judgments on the doings of individuals2 each of these is approved or disapproved on the assumption that it is definitely classable as good or bad4 ,even where qualifications are admitted1 they are admitted with an implied idea that some such positive characterization is to be made4 ,nor is it in popular thought and speech only that we see this4 ,if not wholly and definitely1 yet partially and by implication1 the belief is expressed by moralists4 ,in his ,methods of ,ethics 7#ast ,ed41 p4 #f7 ,mr4 ,sidgwick says3 ,that there is in any given circumstances some one thing which ought to be done and that this can be known1 is a fundamental assumption1 made not by philosophers only1 but by all who perform any processes of moral reasoning4,k ,in this sentence there is specifically asserted only the last of the above propositions2 namely1 that1 in every case1 what ought to be done can be known4 ,but though that which ought to be done is not distinctly identified with the right1 it may be inferred1 in the absence of any indication to the contrary1 that ,mr4 ,sidgwick regards the two as identical2 and doubtless1 in so conceiving the postulates of moral science1 he is at one with most1 if not all1 who have made it a subject of study4 ,at first sight1 indeed1 nothing seems more obvious than that if actions are to be judged at all1 these postulates must be accepted4 ,nevertheless they may both be called in question1 and ,i think it may be shown that neither of them is tenable4 ,instead of admitting that there is in every case a right and a wrong1 it may be contended that in multitudinous cases no right1 properly so-called1 can be alleged1 but only a least wrong2 and further1 it may be contended that in many of these cases where there can be alleged only a least wrong1 it is not possible to ascertain with any precision which is the least wrong4 ,a great part of the perplexities in ethical speculation arise from neglect of this distinction between right and least wrong--between the absolutely right and the relatively right4 ,and many further perplexities are due to the assumption that it can1 in some way1 be decided in every case which of two courses is morally obligatory4 #aja4 ,the law of absolute right can take no cognizance of pain1 save the cognizance implied by negation4 ,pain is the correlative of some species of wrong--some kind of divergence from that course of action which perfectly fulfills all requirements4 ,if1 as was shown in an early chapter1 the conception of good conduct always proves1 when analyzed1 to be the conception of a conduct which produces a surplus of pleasure somewhere2 while1 conversely1 the conduct conceived as bad proves always to be that which inflicts somewhere a surplus of either positive or negative pain2 then the absolutely good1 the absolutely right1 in conduct1 can be that only which produces pure pleasure--pleasure unalloyed with pain anywhere4 ,by implication1 conduct which has any concomitant of pain1 or any painful consequence1 is partially wrong2 and the highest claim to be made for such conduct is that it is the least wrong which1 under the conditions1 is possible--the relatively right4 ,the contents of preceding chapters imply throughout that1 considered from the evolution point of view1 the acts of men during the transition which has been1 is still1 and long will be1 in progress1 must1 in most cases1 be of the kind here classed as least wrong4 ,in proportion to the incongruity between the natures men inherit from the pre-social state1 and the requirements of social life1 must be the amount of pain entailed by their actions1 either on themselves or on others4 ,in so far as pain is suffered1 evil is inflicted2 and conduct which inflicts any evil cannot be absolutely good4 ,to make clear the distinction here insisted upon between that perfect conduct which is the subject-matter of ,absolute ,ethics1 and that imperfect conduct which is the subject-matter of ,relative ,ethics1 some illustrations must be given4 #ajb4 ,among the best examples of absolutely right actions to be named are those arising where the nature and the requirements have been molded to one another before social evolution began4 ,two will here suffice4 ,consider the relation of a healthy mother to a healthy infant4 ,between the two there exists a mutual dependence which is a source of pleasure to both4 ,in yielding its natural food to the child1 the mother receives gratification2 and to the child there comes the satisfaction of appetite--a satisfaction which accompanies furtherance of life1 growth and increasing enjoyment4 ,let the relation be suspended1 and on both sides there is suffering4 ,the mother experiences both bodily pain and mental pain1 and the painful sensation borne by the child brings as its result physical mischief and some damage to the emotional nature4 ,thus the act is one that is to both exclusively pleasurable1 while abstention entails pain on both2 and it is consequently of the kind we here call absolutely right4 ,in the parental relations of the father we are furnished with a kindred example4 ,if he is well constituted in body and mind1 his boy1 eager for play1 finds in him a sympathetic response1 and their frolics1 giving mutual pleasure1 not only further the child's physical welfare1 but strengthen that bond of good feeling between the two which makes subsequent guidance easier4 ,and then if1 repudiating the stupidities of early education as at present conceived and unhappily ,state-enacted1 he has rational ideas of mental development1 and sees that the second-hand knowledge gained through books should begin to supplement the first-hand knowledge gained by direct observation1 only when a good stock of this has been acquired1 he will1 with active sympathy1 aid in the exploration of the surrounding world which his boy pursues with delight2 giving and receiving gratification from moment to moment while furthering ultimate welfare4 ,here1 again1 are actions of a kind purely pleasurable alike in their immediate and remote effects--actions absolutely right4 ,the intercourse of adults yields1 for the reason assigned1 relatively few cases that fall completely within the same category4 ,in their transactions from hour to hour1 more or less of deduction from pure gratification is caused on one or other side by imperfect fitness to the requirements4 ,the pleasures men gain by laboring in their vocations and receiving in one form or other returns for their services usually have the drawback that the laborers are in a considerable degree displeasurable4 ,cases1 however1 do occur where the energies are so abundant that inaction is irksome2 and where the daily work1 not too great in duration1 is of a kind appropriate to the nature2 and where1 as a consequence1 pleasure rather than pain is a concomitant4 ,when services yielded by such a one are paid for by another similarly adapted to his occupation1 the entire transaction is of the kind we are here considering3 exchange under agreement between two so constituted becomes a means of pleasure to both1 with no set-off of pain4 ,bearing in mind the form of nature which social discipline is producing1 as shown in the contrast between savage and civilized1 the implication is that ultimately men's activities at large will assume this character4 ,remembering that in the course of organic evolution1 the means to enjoyment themselves eventually become sources of enjoyment2 and that there is no form of action which may not through the development of appropriate structures become pleasurable2 the inference must be that industrial activities1 carried on through voluntary co-operation1 will in time acquire the character of absolute rightness as here conceived4 ,already1 indeed1 something like such a state has been reached among certain of those who minister to our sthetic gratifications4 ,the artist of genius--poet1 painter1 or musician--is one who obtains the means of living by acts that are directly pleasurable to him1 while they yield1 immediately or remotely1 pleasures to others4 ,once more1 among absolutely right acts may be named certain of those which we class as benevolent4 ,i say certain of them1 because such benevolent acts as entail submission to pain1 positive or negative1 that others may receive pleasure1 are1 by the definition1 excluded4 ,but there are benevolent acts of a kind yielding pleasure solely4 ,some one who has slipped is saved from falling by a by-stander3 a hurt is prevented and satisfaction is felt by both4 ,a pedestrian is choosing a dangerous route1 or a fellow-passenger is about to alight at the wrong station1 and1 warned against doing so1 is saved from evil3 each being1 as a consequence1 gratified4 ,there is a misunderstanding between friends1 and one who sees how it has arisen explains1 the result being agreeable to all4 ,services to those around in the small affairs of life1 may be1 and often are1 of a kind which there is equal pleasure in giving and receiving4 ,indeed1 as was urged in the last chapter1 the actions of developed altruism must habitually have this character4 ,and so1 in countless ways suggested by these few1 men may add to one another's happiness without anywhere producing unhappiness--ways which are therefore absolutely right4 ,in contrast with these consider the many actions which from hour to hour are gone through1 now with an accompaniment of some pain to the actor and now bringing results that are partially painful to others1 but which nevertheless are imperative4 ,as implied by antithesis with cases above referred to1 the wearisomeness of productive labor as ordinarily pursued1 renders it in so far wrong2 but then far greater suffering would result1 both to the laborer and his family1 and therefore far greater wrong would be done1 were this wearisomeness not borne4 ,though the pains which the care of many children entail on a mother form a considerable set-off from the pleasures secured by them to her children and herself1 yet the miseries immediate and remote1 which neglect would entail1 so far exceed them that submission to such pains up to the limit of physical ability to bear them becomes morally imperative as being the least wrong4 ,a servant who fails to fulfill an agreement in respect of work1 or who is perpetually breaking crockery1 or who pilfers1 may have to suffer pain from being discharged2 but since the evils to be borne by all concerned if incapacity or misconduct is tolerated1 not in one case only but habitually1 must be much greater1 such infliction of pain is warranted as a means to preventing greater pain4 ,withdrawal of custom from a tradesman whose charges are too high1 or whose commodities are inferior1 or who gives short measure1 or who is unpunctual1 decreases his welfare1 and perhaps injures his belongings2 but as saving him from these evils would imply bearing the evils his conduct causes1 and as such regard for his well-being would imply disregard of the well-being of some more worthy or more efficient tradesman to whom the custom would else go1 and as1 chiefly1 general adoption of the implied course1 having the effect that the inferior would not suffer from their inferiority nor the superior gain by their superiority1 would produce universal misery1 withdrawal is justified--the act is relatively right4 #ajc4 ,i pass now to the second of the two propositions above enunciated4 ,after recognizing the truth that a large part of human conduct is not absolutely right1 but only relatively right1 we have to recognize the further truth that in many cases where there is no absolutely right course1 but only courses that are more or less wrong1 it is not possible to say which is the least wrong4 ,recurrence to the instances just given will show this4 ,there is a point up to which it is relatively right for a parent to carry self-sacrifice for the benefit of offspring1 and there is a point beyond which self-sacrifice cannot be pushed without bringing1 not only on himself or herself1 but also on the family1 evils greater than those to be prevented by the self-sacrifice4 ,who shall say where this point is8 ,depending on the constitutions and needs of those concerned it is in no two cases the same1 and cannot be by any one more than guessed4 ,the transgressions or short-comings of a servant vary from the trivial to the grave1 and the evils which discharge may bring range through countless degrees from slight to serious4 ,the penalty may be inflicted for a very small offense1 and then there is wrong done1 or1 after numerous grave offenses1 it may not be inflicted1 and again there is wrong done4 ,how shall be determined the degree of transgression beyond which to discharge is less wrong than not to discharge8 ,in like manner with the shopkeeper's misdemeanors4 ,no one can sum up either the amount of positive and negative pain which tolerating them involves1 nor the amount of positive and negative pain involved by not tolerating them1 and in medium cases no one can say where the one exceeds the other4 ,in men's wider relations frequently occur circumstances under which a decision one or other way is imperative1 and yet under which not even the most sensitive conscience1 helped by the clearest judgment1 can decide which of the alternatives is relatively right4 ,two examples will suffice4 ,here is a merchant who loses by the failure of a man indebted to him4 ,unless he gets help he himself will fail1 and if he fails he will bring disaster not only on his family but on all who have given him credit4 ,even if by borrowing he is enabled to meet immediate engagements1 he is not safe2 for the time is one of panic1 and others of his debtors by going to the wall may put him in further difficulties4 ,shall he ask a friend for a loan8 ,on the one hand1 is it not wrong forthwith to bring on himself1 his family1 and those who have business relations with him1 the evils of his failure8 ,on the other hand1 is it not wrong to hypothecate the property of his friend1 and lead him too1 with his belongings and dependents1 into similar risks8 ,the loan would probably tide him over his difficulty1 in which case would it not be unjust to his creditors did he refrain from asking it8 ,contrariwise1 the loan would very possibly fail to stave off his bankruptcy1 in which case is not his action in trying to obtain it1 practically fraudulent8 ,though1 in extreme cases1 it may be easy to say which course is the least wrong1 how is it possible in all those medium cases where even by the keenest man of business the contingencies cannot be calculated8 ,take1 again1 the difficulties that not unfrequently arise from antagonism between family duties and social duties4 ,here is a tenant farmer whose political principles prompt him to vote in opposition to his landlord4 ,if1 being a ,liberal1 he votes for a ,conservative1 not only does he by his act say that he thinks what he does not think1 but he may perhaps assist what he regards as bad legislation3 his vote may by chance turn the election1 and on a ,parliamentary division a single member may decide the fate of a measure4 ,even neglecting1 as too improbable1 such serious consequences1 there is the manifest truth that if all who hold like views with himself are similarly deterred from electoral expression of them1 there must result a different balance of power and a different national policy2 making it clear that only by adherence of all to their political principles can the policy he thinks right be maintained4 ,but now1 on the other hand1 how can he absolve himself from responsibility for the evils which those depending on him may suffer if he fulfills what appears to be a peremptory public duty8 ,is not his duty to his children even more peremptory8 ,does not the family precede the ,state2 and does not the welfare of the ,state depend on the welfare of the family8 ,may he1 then1 take a course which1 if the threats uttered are carried out1 will eject him from his farm2 and so cause inability1 perhaps temporary1 perhaps prolonged2 to feed his children4 ,the contingent evils are infinitely varied in their ratios4 ,in one case the imperativeness of the public duty is great and the evil that may come on dependents small2 in another case the political issue is of trivial moment and the possible injury which the family may suffer is great2 and between these extremes there are all gradations4 ,further1 the degrees of probability of each result1 public and private1 range from the nearly certain to the almost impossible4 ,admitting1 then1 that it is wrong to act in a way likely to injure the ,state2 and admitting that it is wrong to act in a way likely to injure the family1 we have to recognize the fact that in countless cases no one can decide by which of the alternative courses the least wrong is likely to be done4 ,these instances will sufficiently show that in conduct at large1 including men's dealings with themselves1 with their families1 with their friends1 with their debtors and creditors1 and with the public1 it usually happens that whatever course is taken entails some pain somewhere2 forming a deduction from the pleasure achieved1 and making the course in so far not absolutely right4 ,further1 they will show that throughout a considerable part of conduct1 no guiding principle1 no method of estimation1 enables us to say whether a proposed course is even relatively right2 as causing1 proximately and remotely1 specially and generally1 the greatest surplus of good over evil4 #ajd4 ,and now we are prepared for dealing in a systematic way with the distinction between ,absolute ,ethics and ,relative ,ethics4 ,scientific truths1 of whatever order1 are reached by eliminating perturbing or conflicting factors1 and recognizing only fundamental factors4 ,when1 by dealing with fundamental factors in the abstract1 not as presented in actual phenomena1 but as presented in ideal separation1 general laws have been ascertained1 it becomes possible to draw inferences in concrete cases by taking into account incidental factors4 ,but it is only by first ignoring these and recognizing the essential elements alone that we can discover the essential truths sought4 ,take1 in illustration1 the progress of mechanics from its empirical form to its rational form4 ,all have occasional experience of the fact that a person pushed on one side beyond a certain degree loses his balance and falls4 ,it is observed that a stone flung1 or an arrow shot1 does not proceed in a straight line1 but comes to the earth after pursuing a course which deviates more and more from its original course4 ,when trying to break a stick across the knee1 it is found that success is easier if the stick is seized at considerable distances from the knee on each side than if seized close to the knee4 ,daily use of a spear draws attention to the truth that by thrusting its point under a stone and depressing the shaft1 the stone may be raised the more readily the further away the hand is toward the end4 ,here1 then1 are sundry experiences1 eventually grouped into empirical generalizations1 which serve to guide conduct in certain simple cases4 ,how does mechanical science evolve from these experiences8 ,to reach a formula expressing the powers of the lever1 it supposes a lever which does not1 like the stick1 admit of being bent1 but is absolutely rigid1 and it supposes a fulcrum not having a broad surface1 like that of one ordinarily used1 but a fulcrum without breadth1 and it supposes that the weight to be raised bears on a definite point1 instead of bearing over a considerable portion of the lever4 ,similarly with the leaning body1 which1 passing a certain inclination1 overbalances4 ,before the truth respecting the relations of center of gravity and base can be formulated1 it must be assumed that the surface on which the body stands is unyielding1 that the edge of the body itself is unyielding1 and that its mass1 while made to lean more and more1 does not change its form--conditions not fulfilled in the cases commonly observed4 ,and so1 too1 is it with the projectile3 determination of its course by deduction from mechanical laws1 primarily ignores all deviations caused by its shape and by the resistance of the air4 ,the science of rational mechanics is a science which consists of such ideal truths1 and can come into existence only by thus dealing with ideal cases4 ,it remains impossible so long as attention is restricted to concrete cases presenting all the complications of friction1 plasticity and so forth4 ,but now1 after disentangling certain fundamental mechanical truths1 it becomes possible by their help to guide actions better1 and it becomes possible to guide them still better when1 as presently happens1 the complicating elements from which they have been disentangled are themselves taken into account4 ,at an advanced stage the modifying effects of friction are allowed for1 and the inferences are qualified to the requisite extent4 ,the theory of the pulley is corrected in its application to actual cases by recognizing the rigidity of cordage2 the effects of which are formulated4 ,the stabilities of masses1 determinable in the abstract by reference to the centers of gravity of the masses in relation to the bases1 come to be determined in the concrete by including also their characters in respect of cohesion4 ,the courses of projectiles1 having been theoretically settled as though they moved through a vacuum1 are afterward settled in more exact correspondence with fact by taking into account atmospheric resistance4 ,and thus we see illustrated the relation between certain absolute truths of mechanical science1 and certain relative truths which involve them4 ,we are shown that no scientific establishment of relative truths is possible until the absolute truths have been formulated independently4 ,we see that mechanical science1 fitted for dealing with the real1 can arise only after ideal mechanical science has arisen4 ,all this holds of moral science4 ,as by early and rude experiences there were inductively reached1 vague but partially true notions respecting the overbalancing of bodies1 the motions of missiles1 the actions of levers2 so by early and rude experiences there were inductively reached1 vague but partially true notions respecting the effects of men's behavior on themselves1 on one another1 and on society3 to a certain extent serving in the last case1 as in the first1 for the guidance of conduct4 ,moreover1 as this rudimentary mechanical knowledge1 though still remaining empirical1 becomes during early stages of civilization at once more definite and more extensive2 so during early stages of civilization these ethical ideas1 still retaining their empirical character1 increase in precision and multiplicity4 ,but just as we have seen that mechanical knowledge of the empirical sort can evolve into mechanical science only by first omitting all1 qualifying circumstances1 and generalizing in absolute ways the fundamental laws of forces2 so here we have to see that empirical ethics can evolve into rational ethics only by first neglecting all complicating incidents1 and formulating the laws of right action apart from the obscuring effects of special conditions4 ,and the final implication is that just as the system of mechanical truths1 conceived in ideal separation as absolute1 becomes applicable to real mechanical problems in such way that making allowance for all incidental circumstances there can be reached conclusions far nearer to the truth than could otherwise be reached2 so a system of ideal ethical truths1 expressing the absolutely right1 will be applicable to the questions of our transitional state in such ways that1 allowing for the friction of an incomplete life and the imperfection of existing natures1 we may ascertain with approximate correctness what is the relatively right4 #aje4 ,in a chapter entitled ,definition of ,morality in ,social ,statics1 ,i contended that the moral law1 properly so-called1 is the law of the perfect man--is the formula of ideal conduct--is the statement in all cases of that which should be1 and cannot recognize in its propositions any elements implying existence of that which should not be4 ,instancing questions concerning the right course to be taken in cases where wrong has already been done1 ,i alleged that the answers to such questions cannot be given on purely ethical principles4 ,i argued that3 ,no conclusions can lay claim to absolute truth1 but such as depend upon truths that are themselves absolute4 ,before there can be exactness in an inference1 there must be exactness in the antecedent propositions4 ,a geometrician requires that the straight lines with which he deals shall be veritably straight2 and that his circles1 and ellipses1 and parabolas shall agree with precise definitions--shall perfectly and invariably answer to specified equations4 ,if you put to him a question in which these conditions are not complied with1 he tells you that it cannot be answered4 ,so likewise is it with the philosophical moralist4 ,he treats solely of the straight man4 ,he determines the properties of the straight man2 describes how the straight man comports himself2 shows in what relationship he stands to other straight men2 shows how a community of straight men is constituted4 ,any deviation from strict rectitude he is obliged wholly to ignore4 ,it cannot be admitted into his premises without vitiating all his conclusions4 ,a problem in which a crooked man forms one of the elements is insoluble to him4 ,referring to this view1 specifically in the first edition of the ,methods of ,ethics1 but more generally in the second edition1 ,mr4 ,sidgwick says3 ,those who take this view adduce the analogy of ,geometry to show that ,ethics ought to deal with ideally perfect human relations1 just as ,geometry treats of ideally perfect lines and circles4 ,but the most irregular line has definite spatial relations with which ,geometry does not refuse to deal3 though of course they are more complex than those of a straight line4 ,so in ,astronomy1 it would be more convenient for purposes of study if the stars moved in circles1 as was once believed2 but the fact that they move not in circles but in ellipses1 and even in imperfect and perturbed ellipses1 does not take them out of the sphere of scientific investigation3 by patience and industry we have learned how to reduce to principles and calculate even these more complicated motions4 ,it is1 no doubt1 a convenient artifice for purposes of instruction to assume that the planets move in perfect ellipses 7or even--at an earlier stage of study--in circles73 we thus allow the individual's knowledge to pass through the same gradations in accuracy as that of the race has done4 ,but what we want1 as astronomers1 to know is the actual motion of the stars and its causes3 and similarly as moralists we naturally inquire what ought to be done in the actual world in which we live4 7,p4 #ai1 ,sec4 ,ed47 ,beginning with the first of these two statements1 which concerns ,geometry1 ,i must confess myself surprised to find my propositions called into question2 and after full consideration ,i remain at a loss to understand ,mr4 ,sidgwick's mode of viewing the matter4 ,when1 in a sentence preceding those quoted above1 ,i remarked on the impossibility of solving mathematically a series of problems respecting crooked lines and broken-backed curves1 it never occurred to me that ,i should be met by the direct assertion that ,geometry does not refuse to deal with the most irregular line4 ,mr4 ,sidgwick states that an irregular line1 say such as a child makes in scribbling1 has definite spatial relations4 ,what meaning does he here give to the word definite8 ,if he means that its relations to space at large are definite in the sense that by an infinite intelligence they would be definable1 the reply is that to an infinite intelligence all spatial relations would be definable3 there could be no indefinite spatial relations--the word definite thus ceasing to mark any distinction4 ,if1 on the other hand1 when saying that an irregular line has definite spatial relations1 he means relations knowable definitely by human intelligence1 there still comes the question1 how is the word definite to be understood8 ,surely anything distinguished as definite admits of being defined2 but how can we define an irregular line8 ,and if we cannot define the irregular line itself1 how can we know its spatial relations definite8 ,and how1 in the absence of definition1 can ,geometry deal with it8 ,if ,mr4 ,sidgwick means that it can be dealt with by the method of limits1 then the reply is that in such case1 not the line itself is dealt with geometrically1 but certain definite lines artificially put in quasi-definite relations to it1 the indefinite becomes cognizable only through the medium of the hypothetically definite4 ,turning to the second illustration1 the rejoinder to be made is that in so far as it concerns the relations between the ideal and the real1 the analogy drawn does not shake but strengthens my argument4 ,for whether considered under its geometrical or under its dynamical aspect1 and whether considered in the necessary order of its development or in the order historically displayed1 ,astronomy shows us throughout that truths respecting simple1 theoretically-exact relations1 must be ascertained before truths respecting the complex and practically inexact relations that actually exist can be ascertained4 ,as applied to the interpretation of planetary movements1 we see that the theory of cycles and epicycles was based on pre-existing knowledge of the circle3 the properties of an ideal curve having been learned1 a power was acquired of giving some expression to the celestial motions4 ,we see that the ,copernican interpretation expressed the facts in terms of circular movements otherwise distributed and combined4 ,we see that ,kepler's advance from the conception of circular movements to the conception of elliptic movements was made possible by comparing the facts as they are with the facts as they would be were the movements circular4 ,we see that the subsequently-learned deviations from elliptic movements were learned only through the presupposition that the movements are elliptical4 ,and we see1 lastly1 that even now predictions concerning the exact positions of planets1 after taking account of perturbations1 imply constant references to ellipses that are regarded as their normal or average orbits for the time being4 ,thus1 ascertainment of the actual truths has been made possible only by preascertainment of certain ideal truths4 ,to be convinced that by no other course could the actual truths have been ascertained1 it needs only to suppose any one saying that it did not concern him1 as an astronomer1 to know anything about the properties of circles and ellipses1 but that he had to deal with the ,solar ,system as it exists1 to which end it was his business to observe and tabulate positions and directions and to be guided by the facts as he found them4 ,so1 too1 is it if we look at the development of dynamical astronomy4 ,the first proposition in ,newton's ,principia deals with the movement of a single body round a single center of force2 and the phenomena of central motion are first formulated in a case which is not simply ideal1 but in which there is no specification of the force concerned3 detachment from the real is the greatest possible4 ,again1 postulating a principle of action conforming to an ideal law1 the theory of gravitation deals with the several problems of the ,solar ,system in fictitious detachment from the rest2 and it makes certain fictitious assumptions1 such as that the mass of each body concerned is concentrated in its center of gravity4 ,only later1 after establishing the leading truths by this artifice of disentangling the major factors from the minor factors1 is the theory applied to the actual problems in their ascending degrees of complexity2 taking in more and more of the minor factors4 ,and if we ask whether the dynamics of the ,solar ,system could have been established in any other way1 we see that here1 too1 simple truths holding under ideal conditions1 have to be ascertained before real truths existing under complex conditions can be ascertained4 ,the alleged necessary precedence of ,absolute ,ethics over ,relative ,ethics is thus1 ,i think1 further elucidated4 ,one who has followed the general argument thus far1 will not deny that an ideal social being may be conceived as so constituted that his spontaneous activities are congruous with the conditions imposed by the social environment formed by other such beings4 ,in many places1 and in various ways1 ,i have argued that conformably with the laws of evolution in general1 and conformably with the laws of organization in particular1 there has been1 and is1 in progress1 an adaptation of humanity to the social state1 changing it in the direction of such an ideal congruity4 ,and the corollary before drawn and here repeated1 is that the ultimate man is one in whom this process has gone so far as to produce a correspondence between all the promptings of his nature and all the requirements of his life as carried on in society4 ,if so it is a necessary implication that there exists an ideal code of conduct formulating the behavior of the completely adapted man in the completely evolved society4 ,such a code is that here called ,absolute ,ethics as distinguished from ,relative ,ethics--a code the injunctions of which are alone to be considered as absolutely right in contrast with those that are relatively right or least wrong2 and which1 as a system of ideal conduct1 is to serve as a standard for our guidance in solving1 as well as we can1 the problems of real conduct4 #aje4 ,a clear conception of this matter is so important that ,i must be excused for bringing in aid of it a further illustration1 more obviously appropriate as being furnished by organic science instead of by inorganic science4 ,the relation between morality proper and morality1 as commonly conceived1 is analogous to the relation between physiology and pathology2 and the course usually pursued by moralists is much like the course of one who studies pathology without previous study of physiology4 ,physiology describes the various functions which1 as combined1 constitute and maintain life2 and in treating of them it assumes that they are severally performed in right ways1 in due amounts1 and in proper order2 it recognizes only healthy functions4 ,if it explains digestion1 it supposes that the heart is supplying blood and that the visceral nervous system is stimulating the organs immediately concerned4 ,if it gives a theory of the circulation1 it assumes that blood has been produced by the combined actions of the structures devoted to its production1 and that it is properly rated4 ,if the relations between respiration and the vital processes at large are interpreted1 it is on the presupposition that the heart goes on sending blood1 not only to the lungs and to certain nervous centers1 but to the diaphragm and intercostal muscles4 ,physiology ignores failures in the actions of these several organs4 ,it takes no account of imperfections1 it neglects derangements1 it does not recognize pain1 it knows nothing of vital wrong4 ,it simply formulates that which goes on as a result of complete adaptation of all parts to all needs4 ,that is to say1 in relation to the inner actions constituting bodily life1 physiological theory has a position like that which ethical theory1 under its absolute form as above conceived1 has to the outer actions constituting conduct4 ,the moment cognizance is taken of excess of function1 or arrest of function1 or defect of function1 with the resulting evil1 physiology passes into pathology4 ,we begin now to take account of wrong actions in the inner life analogous to the wrong actions in the outer life taken account of by ordinary theories of morals4 ,the antithesis thus drawn1 however1 is but preliminary4 ,after observing the fact that there is a science of vital actions normally carried on1 which ignores abnormal actions1 we have more especially to observe that the science of abnormal actions can reach such definiteness as is possible to it only on condition that the science of normal actions has previously become definite2 or rather1 let us say that pathological science depends for its advances on previous advances made by physiological science4 ,the very conception of disordered action implies a preconception of well-ordered action4 ,before it can be decided that the heart is beating faster or slower than it should its healthy rate of beating must be learned2 before the pulse can be recognized as too weak or too strong1 its proper strength must be known1 and so throughout4 ,even the rudest and most empirical ideas of diseases1 pre-suppose ideas of the healthy states from which they are deviations1 and1 obviously1 the diagnosis of diseases can become scientific only as fast as there arises scientific knowledge of organic actions that are undiseased4 ,similarly1 then1 is it with the relation between absolute morality1 or the law of perfect right in human conduct1 and relative morality which1 recognizing wrong in human conduct1 has to decide in what way the wrong deviates from the right1 and how the right is to be most nearly approached4 ,when1 formulating normal conduct in an ideal society1 we have reached a science of absolute ethics1 we have simultaneously reached a science which1 when used to interpret the phenomena of real societies in their transitional states1 full of the miseries due to non-adaptation 7which we may call pathological states7 enables us to form approximately true conclusions respecting the natures of the abnormalities1 and the courses which tend most in the direction of the normal4 #ajf4 ,and now let it be observed that the conception of ethics thus set forth1 strange as many will think it1 is one which really lies latent in the beliefs of moralists at large4 ,though not definitely acknowledged it is vaguely implied in many of their propositions4 ,from early times downward we find in ethical speculations1 references to the ideal man1 his acts1 his feelings1 his judgments4 ,well-doing is conceived by ,socrates as the doing of the best man1 who1 as a husbandman1 performs well the duties of husbandry2 as a surgeon1 the duties of the medical art2 in political life1 his duty toward the commonwealth4 ,plato1 in ,minos1 as a standard to which ,state law should conform1 postulates the decision of some ideal wise man1 and in ,laches the wise man's knowledge of good and evil is supposed to furnish the standard3 disregarding the maxims of the existing society as unscientific1 ,plato regards as the proper guide1 that ,idea of the ,good which only a philosopher can ascend to4 ,aristotle 7,eth4 ,bk4 iii4 ch4 #d71 making the decisions of the good man the standard1 says3 ,for the good man judges everything rightly1 and in every case the truth appears so to him4444 ,and1 perhaps1 the principal difference between the good and the bad man is that the good man sees the truth in every case1 since he is1 as it were1 the rule and measure of it4 ,the ,stoics1 too1 conceived of complete rectitude of action as that which none could achieve except the wise man--the ideal man4 ,and ,epicurus had an ideal standard4 ,he held the virtuous state to be a tranquil1 undisturbed1 innocuous1 non-competitive fruition1 which approached most nearly to the perfect happiness of the gods1 who neither suffered vexation in themselves nor caused vexation to others4,l ,if1 in modern times1 influenced by theological dogmas concerning the fall and human sinfulness1 and by a theory of obligation derived from the current creed1 moralists have less frequently referred to an ideal1 yet references are traceable4 ,we see one in the dictum of ,kant--,act according to the maxim only1 which you can wish1 at the same time1 to become a universal law4 ,for this implies the thought of a society in which the maxim is acted upon by all and universal benefit recognized as the effect3 there is a conception of ideal conduct under ideal conditions4 ,and though ,mr4 ,sidgwick1 in the quotation above made from him1 implies that ,ethics is concerned with man as he is1 rather than with man as he should be2 yet1 in elsewhere speaking of ,ethics as dealing with conduct as it should be1 rather than with conduct as it is1 he postulates ideal conduct and indirectly the ideal man4 ,on his first page1 speaking of ,ethics along with ,jurisprudence and ,politics1 he says that they are distinguished by the characteristic that they attempt to determine not the actual but the ideal--what ought to exist1 not what does exist4 ,it requires only that these various conceptions of an ideal conduct1 and of an ideal humanity1 should be made consistent and definite1 to bring them into agreement with the conception above set forth4 ,at present such conceptions are habitually vague4 ,the ideal man having been conceived in terms of the current morality1 is thereupon erected into a moral standard by which the goodness of actions may be judged2 and the reasoning becomes circular4 ,to make the ideal man serve as a standard1 he has to be defined in terms of the conditions which his nature fulfills--in terms of those objective requirements which must be met before conduct can be right2 and the common defect of these conceptions of the ideal man is that they suppose him out of relation to such conditions4 ,all the above references to him1 direct or indirect1 imply that the ideal man is supposed to live and act under existing social conditions4 ,the tacit inquiry is1 not what his actions would be under circumstances altogether changed1 but what they would be under present circumstances4 ,and this inquiry is futile for two reasons4 ,the co-existence of a perfect man and an imperfect society is impossible2 and could the two co-exist1 the resulting conduct would not furnish the ethical standard sought4 ,in the first place1 given the laws of life as they are1 and a man of ideal nature cannot be produced in a society consisting of men having natures remote from the ideal4 ,as well might we expect a child of ,english type to be borne among ,negroes1 as expect that among the organically immoral1 one who is organically moral will arise4 ,unless it be denied that character results from inherited structure1 it must be admitted that since1 in any society1 each individual descends from a stock which1 traced back a few generations1 ramifies everywhere through the society1 and participates in its average nature1 there must1 notwithstanding marked individual diversities1 be preserved such community as prevents any one from reaching an ideal form while the rest remain far below it4 ,in the second place1 ideal conduct such as ethical theory is concerned with1 is not possible for the ideal man in the midst of men otherwise constituted4 ,an absolutely just or perfectly sympathetic person1 could not live and act according to his nature in a tribe of cannibals4 ,among people who are treacherous and utterly without scruple1 entire truthfulness and openness must bring ruin4 ,if all around recognize only the law of the strongest1 one whose nature will not allow him to inflict pain on others1 must go to the wall1 ,there requires a certain congruity between the conduct of each member of a society and other's conduct4 ,a mode of action entirely alien to the prevailing modes of action cannot be successfully persisted in--must eventuate in death of self1 or posterity1 or both4 ,hence it is manifest that we must consider the ideal man as existing in the ideal social state4 ,on the evolution hypothesis1 the two presuppose one another2 and only when they co-exist can there exist that ideal conduct which ,absolute ,ethics has to formulate1 and which ,relative ,ethics has to take as the standard by which to estimate divergencies from right1 or degrees of wrong4 ,,chapter ,,xvi4 ,,the ,,scope ,,of ,,ethics4 #ajg4 ,at the outset it was shown that as the conduct with which ,ethics deals is a part of conduct at large1 conduct at large must be understood before this part can be understood4 ,after taking a general view of conduct1 not human only but sub-human1 and not only as existing but as evolving1 we saw that ,ethics has for its subject-matter the most highly-evolved conduct as displayed by the most highly-evolved being1 ,man--is a specification of those traits which his conduct assumes on reaching its limit of evolution4 ,conceived thus as comprehending the laws of right living at large1 ,ethics has a wider field than is commonly assigned to it4 ,beyond the conduct commonly approved or reprobated as right or wrong1 it includes all conduct which furthers or hinders1 in either direct or indirect ways1 the welfare of self or others4 ,as foregoing chapters in various places imply1 the entire field of ,ethics includes the two great divisions1 personal and social4 ,there is a class of actions directed to personal ends1 which are to be judged in their relations to personal well-being1 considered apart from the well-being of others3 though they secondarily affect fellow-men these primarily affect the agent himself1 and must be classed as intrinsically right or wrong according to their beneficial or detrimental effects on him4 ,there are actions of another class which affect fellow-men immediately and remotely1 and which1 though their results to self are not to be ignored1 must be judged as good or bad mainly by their results to others4 ,actions of this last class fall into two groups4 ,those of the one group achieve ends in ways that do or do not unduly interfere with the pursuit of ends by others--actions which1 because of this difference1 we call respectively unjust or just4 ,those forming the other group are of a kind which influence the states of others without directly interfering with the relations between their labors and the results1 in one way or the other--actions which we speak of as beneficent or maleficent4 ,and the conduct which we regard as beneficent is itself subdivisible according as it shows us a self-repression to avoid giving pain1 or an expenditure of effort to give pleasure--negative beneficence and positive beneficence4 ,each of these divisions and sub-divisions has to be considered first as a part of ,absolute ,ethics and then as a part of ,relative ,ethics4 ,having seen what its injunctions must be for the ideal man under the implied ideal conditions1 we shall be prepared to see how such injunctions are to be most nearly fulfilled by actual men under existing conditions4 #ajh4 ,for reasons already pointed out1 a code of perfect personal conduct can never be made definite4 ,many forms of life1 diverging from one another in considerable degrees1 may be so carried on in society as entirely to fulfill the conditions to harmonious co-operation4 ,and if various types of men1 adapted to various types of activities1 may thus lead lives that are severally complete after their kinds1 no specific statement of the activities universally required for personal well-being is possible4 ,but1 though1 the particular requirements to be fulfilled for perfect individual well-being1 must vary along with variations in the material conditions of each society1 certain general requirements have to be fulfilled by the individuals of all societies4 ,an average balance between waste and nutrition has universally to be preserved4 ,normal vitality implies a relation between activity and rest falling within moderate limits of variation4 ,continuance of the society depends on satisfaction of those primarily personal needs which result in marriage and parenthood4 ,perfection of individual life hence implies certain modes of action which are approximately alike in all cases1 and which1 therefore1 become part of the subject matter of ,ethics4 ,that it is possible to reduce even this restricted part to scientific definiteness1 can scarcely be said4 ,but ethical requirements may here be to such extent affiliated upon physical necessities1 as to give them a partially scientific authority4 ,it is clear that between the expenditure of bodily substance in vital activities1 and the taking in of materials from which this substance may be renewed1 there is a direct relation4 ,it is clear1 too1 that there is a direct relation between the wasting of tissue by effort1 and the need for those cessations of effort during which repair may overtake waste4 ,nor is it less clear that between the rate of mortality and the rate of multiplication in any society1 there is a relation such that the last must reach a certain level before it can balance the first1 and prevent disappearance of the society4 ,and it may be inferred that pursuits of other leading ends are1 in like manner1 determined by certain natural necessities1 and from these derive their ethical sanctions4 ,that it will ever be practicable to lay down precise rules for private conduct in conformity with such requirements1 may be doubted4 ,but the function of ,absolute ,ethics in relation to private conduct will have been discharged when it has produced the warrant for its requirements as generally expressed2 when it has shown the imperativeness of obedience to them2 and when it has thus taught the need for deliberately considering whether the conduct fulfills them as well may be4 ,under the ethics of personal considered in relation to existing conditions1 have to come all questions concerning the degree in which immediate personal welfare has to be postponed1 either to ultimate personal welfare or to the welfare of others4 ,as now carried on1 life hourly sets the claims of present self against the claims of future self1 and hourly brings individual interests face to face with the interests of other individuals1 taken singly or as associated4 ,in many of such cases the decisions can be nothing more than compromises2 and ethical science1 here necessarily empirical1 can do no more than aid in making compromises that are the least objectionable4 ,to arrive at the best compromise in any case1 implies correct conceptions of the alternative results of this or that course4 ,and1 consequently in so far as the absolute ethics of individual conduct can be made definite1 it must help us to decide between conflicting personal requirements1 and also between the needs for asserting self and the needs for subordinating self4 #aji4 ,from that division of ,ethics which deals with the right regulation of private conduct1 considered apart from the effects directly produced on others1 we pass now to that division of ,ethics which1 considering exclusively the effects of conduct on others1 treats of the right regulation of it with a view to such effects4 ,the first set of regulations coming under this head are those concerning what we distinguish as justice4 ,individual life is possible only on condition that each organ is paid for its action by an equivalent of blood1 while the organism as a whole obtains from the environment assimilable matters that compensate for its efforts2 and the mutual dependence of parts in the social organism1 necessitates that1 alike for its total life and the lives of its units1 there similarly shall be maintained a due proportion between returns and labors3 the natural relation between work and welfare shall be preserved intact4 ,justice1 which formulates the range of conduct and limitations to conduct hence arising1 is at once the most important division of ,ethics and the division which admits of the greatest definiteness4 ,that principle of equivalence which meets us when we seek its roots in the laws of individual life1 involves the idea of measure2 and on passing to social life1 the same principle introduces us to the conception of equity or equalness1 in the relations of citizens to one another3 the elements of the questions arising are quantitative1 and hence the solutions assume a more scientific form4 ,though1 having to recognize differences among individuals due to age1 sex1 or other cause1 we cannot regard the members of a society as absolutely equal1 and therefore cannot deal with problems growing out of their relations with that precision which absolute equality might make possible2 yet1 considering them as approximately equal in virtue of their common human nature1 and dealing with questions of equity on this supposition1 we may reach conclusions of a sufficiently definite kind4 ,this division of ,ethics considered under its absolute form1 has to define the equitable relations among perfect individuals who limit one another's spheres of action by co-existing1 and who achieve their ends by co-operation4 ,it has to do much more than this4 ,beyond justice between man and man1 justice between each man and the aggregate of men has to be dealt with by it4 ,the relations between the individual and the ,state1 considered as representing all individuals1 have to be deduced--an important and a relatively difficult matter4 ,what is the ethical warrant for governmental authority8 ,to what ends may it be legitimately exercised8 ,how far may it rightly be carried8 ,up to what point is the citizen bound to recognize the collective decisions of other citizens1 and beyond what point may he properly refuse to obey them8 ,these relations1 private and public1 considered as maintained under ideal conditions1 having been formulated1 there come to be dealt with the analogous relations under real conditions--absolute justice being the standard1 relative justice has to be determined by considering how near an approach may1 under present circumstances1 be made to it4 ,as already implied in various places1 it is impossible during stages of transition which necessitate ever changing compromises1 to fulfill the dictates of absolute equity2 and nothing beyond empirical judgments can be formed of the extent to which they may be1 at any given time1 fulfilled4 ,while war continues and injustice is done between societies1 there cannot be anything like complete justice within each society4 ,militant organization no less than militant action1 is irreconcilable with pure equity2 and the inequity implied by it inevitably ramifies throughout all social relations4 ,but there is at every stage in social evolution1 a certain range of variation within which it is possible to approach nearer to1 or diverge further from1 the requirements of absolute equity4 ,hence these requirements have ever to be kept in view that relative equity may be ascertained4 #aaj4 ,of the two subdivisions into which beneficence falls1 the negative and the positive1 neither can be specialized4 ,under ideal conditions the first of them has but a nominal existence2 and the second of them passes largely into a transfigured form admitting of but general definition4 ,in the conduct of the ideal man among ideal men1 that self-regulation which has for its motive to avoid giving pain1 practically disappears4 ,no one having feelings which prompt acts that disagreeably affect others1 there can exist no code of restraints referring to this division of conduct4 ,but though negative beneficence is only a nominal part of ,absolute ,ethics1 it is an actual and considerable part of ,relative ,ethics4 ,for while men's natures remain imperfectly adapted to social life1 there must continue in them impulses which1 causing in some cases the actions we name unjust1 cause in other cases the actions we name unkind--unkind now in deed and now in word2 and in respect of these modes of behavior which1 though not aggressive1 give pain1 there arise numerous and complicated problems4 ,pain is sometimes given to others simply by maintaining an equitable claim2 pain is at other times given by refusing a request2 and again at other times by maintaining an opinion4 ,in these and numerous cases suggested by them1 there have to be answered the questions whether1 to avoid inflicting pain1 personal feelings should be sacrificed1 and how far sacrificed4 ,again1 in cases of another class1 pain is given not by a passive course1 but by an active course4 ,how far shall a person who has misbehaved be grieved by showing aversion to him8 ,shall one whose action is to be reprobated have the reprobation expressed to him or shall nothing be said8 ,is it right to annoy by condemning a prejudice which another displays8 ,these and kindred queries have to be answered after taking into account the immediate pain given1 the possible benefit caused by giving it1 and the possible evil caused by not giving it4 ,in solving problems of this class1 the only help ,absolute ,ethics gives1 is by enforcing the consideration that inflicting more pain than is necessitated by proper self-regard1 or by desire for another's benefit1 or by the maintenance of a general principle is unwarranted4 ,of positive beneficence under its absolute form nothing more specific can be said than that it must become co-extensive with whatever sphere remains for it2 aiding to complete the life of each as a recipient of services and to exalt the life of each as a renderer of services4 ,as with a developed humanity the desire for it by every one will so increase1 and the sphere for exercise of it so decrease1 as to involve an altruistic competition1 analogous to the existing egoistic competition1 it may be that ,absolute ,ethics will eventually include what we before called a higher equity1 prescribing the mutual limitations of altruistic activities4 ,under its relative form1 positive beneficence presents numerous problems1 alike important and difficult1 admitting only of empirical solutions4 ,how far is self-sacrifice for another's benefit to be carried in each case8--a question which must be answered differently according to the character of the other1 the needs of the other1 and the various claims of self and belongings which have to be met4 ,to what extent under given circumstances shall private welfare be subordinated to public welfare8--a question to be answered after considering the importance of the end and the seriousness of the sacrifice4 ,what benefit and what detriment will result from gratuitous aid yielded to another8--a question in each case implying an estimate of probabilities4 ,is there any unfair treatment of sundry others1 involved by more than fair treatment of this one other8 ,up to what limit may help be given to the existing generation of the inferior1 without entailing mischief on future generations of the superior8 ,evidently to these and many kindred questions included in this division of ,relative ,ethics1 approximately true answers only can be given4 ,but though here ,absolute ,ethics1 by the standard it supplies1 does not greatly aid ,relative ,ethics1 yet1 as in other cases1 it aids somewhat by keeping before consciousness an ideal conciliation of the various claims involved2 and by suggesting the search for such compromise among them1 as shall not disregard any1 but shall satisfy all to the greatest extent practicable4 ,,footnotes3 ,a ,leviathan1 ch4 xv4 ,b ,i can count up more than a dozen such cases among those personally well known to me4 ,c ,constitutional ,code1 chap4 xvi1 ,supreme ,legislative--,section vi4 ,omnicompetence4 ,d ,republic1 ,bk4 ix4 ,e ,nicomachean ,ethics1 ,bk4 i1 chap #h4 ,f ,bk4 x1 chap4 #g4 ,g ,this universal requirement it was which ,i had in view when choosing for my first work1 published in #ahej1 the title ,social ,statics4 ,h ,on ,idiocy and ,imbecility1 by ,william ,w4 ,ireland1 ,m4 ,d41 p4 #bee-f4 ,i ,for instances see ,fortnightly ,review1 ,vol4 ,,xxiv 7,new ,series71 p4 #gab4 ,j ,see ,essay on ,the ,origin and ,function of ,music4 ,k ,i do not find this passage in the second edition2 but the omission of it appears to have arisen not from any change of view1 but because it did not naturally come into the recast form of the argument which the section contains4 ,l ,most of these quotations ,i make from ,dr4 ,bain's ,mental and ,moral ,science4 99 99 99 99 99 99 ,transcriber's note3 ,punctuation1 hyphenation1 and spelling were made consistent when a predominant preference was found in this book2 otherwise they were not changed4 ,simple typographical errors were corrected2 occasional unpaired quotation marks were retained4 ,ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained4 ,there are two ,section #ad's1 #bb's and #aje's2 and no ,section #af4 ,page #id3 pharynx was misprinted as phayrnx42 changed here4 ,page #aaa3 pouring half the night may be a misprint for poring4 ,page #bjj3 ,missing closing quotation mark added after 'a means of happiness8'4 ,the text from this was quoted ends in a period1 not a question mark4 ,page #bbf3 this all all-important factor was printed with the word all duplicated and was not corrected4